diff --git "a/ecthr_b/test.jsonl" "b/ecthr_b/test.jsonl"
deleted file mode 100644--- "a/ecthr_b/test.jsonl"
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1000 +0,0 @@
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a journalist for DN.no, a Norwegian Internet-based version of the newspaper Dagens N\u00e6ringsliv (\u201cDN\u201d), published by the company DN Nye Medier AS. 6.  On 23 June 2010 Mr X was indicted for market manipulation and insider trading under the 1997 Act on the Trade of Financial Assets (verdipapirhandelloven). He was accused of having requested Mr Y, an attorney, to draft a letter concerning the Norwegian Oil Company (\u201cDNO\u201d), a limited liability company quoted on the stock exchange. The letter, addressed to a trustee company representing the interests of bond holders in DNO (\u201cthe bond trustee company\u201d), gave the impression that it had been written on behalf of a number of bond holders who were seriously concerned about the company\u2019s liquidity, finances and future. In fact, it had been written only on Mr X\u2019s behalf. He had owned only one bond, which he had acquired the same day as he had asked attorney Y to draft the letter. 7.  Mr X had sent a copy of the above-mentioned letter by fax to the applicant on Friday 24 August 2007, and in this connection he had a telephone conversation with her. The following day, on Saturday 25 August 2007, the applicant wrote an article entitled \u201cFears of DNO collapse\u201d (\u201cFrykter at DNO rakner\u201d), in which she expressed strong concerns about the content of Attorney Y\u2019s letter, a central feature in the article. 8.  The price of DNO stock fell by 4.1% on Monday 27 August 2007, the first trading day after the content of the letter had become known in the press. On the same day, a new article on the topic was published in DN. Other media also reported on the first article, including an online newspaper (Hegnar online) which on 28 August 2007 reported that an analyst had stated that he would not be surprised if the letter had been sent by a person with a short-position or who wanted cheap stocks. The Oslo stock exchange (Oslo b\u00f8rs) suspected market manipulation and, having looked into the matter, forwarded the case to the Financial Supervisory Authority (Kredittilsynet) with suspicions that Mr X had infringed the Act on the Trade of Financial Assets. During subsequent questioning by the Financial Supervisory Authority, Mr X confirmed that he had initiated the letter and been the source of the article in DN. 9.  The applicant was questioned by the police on 19 June 2008. They informed her that Mr X had told the police that he had given her the letter. She was handed a signed statement from Mr X in which he confirmed this. The applicant was willing to say that she had received the letter on which the article was based by fax on Friday 24 August 2007, at 5.35 p.m. She also stated that the article had been published on DN.no at 3 a.m. on 25 August 2007. The applicant further explained that she had considered the information in the letter as price-sensitive. She had no particular thoughts as to how many persons were behind the letter, beyond the fact that it had been signed on behalf of several bond holders. The applicant refused to give additional information, referring to the journalistic principles on protection of sources. 10.  During the criminal case against Mr X in February 2011 before the Oslo City Court (tingrett), the applicant was summoned as a witness. She refused to answer questions about possible contacts between her and Mr X and other sources, if any, related to the publication by DN.no on 25 August 2007. Relying on Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 10 of the Convention, she argued that she was under no obligation to give evidence on those points. 11.  The prosecutor requested that the court impose on the applicant an order to testify. In the court records (\u201crettsboken\u201d), his arguments in favour of issuing such an order are restated as having included the following:\n\u201cThe prosecutor rose to speak and argued that the witness had an obligation to give testimony about her contact with the defendant in connection with the letter to [the bond trustee company] of 24 August 2007 and asked the court to make a decision on the matter. The prosecutor further justified the obligation of the witness to make a statement and argued that undoubtedly in this case it was desirable to hear her explanation, even if the prosecuting authority found the case adequately disclosed (fullgodt opplyst) without her statement. The press was sometimes abused by investors to take actions liable to affect the share price. The element of abuse should suggest that in a case like this the press would also have an interest in making a statement in order to avoid being abused in this way. Whether or not consent had been given by the source to the witness making her statement had no bearing on the obligation to give evidence. ...\u201d 12.  From the same records, it appears that Mr X, through his counsel and co\u2011counsel, had submitted that he had described his contact with the applicant and that she could contribute nothing further of interest. 13.  By a decision of 15 February 2011, the City Court held that the applicant had a duty to give evidence about her contacts with Mr X in relation to the letter of 24 August 2007 from Attorney Y to the bond trustee company. As to the scope of that duty, the City Court held:\n\u201cThe obligation to make a statement is, however, limited to the contact with the defendant as a source and not her communication with possible other unknown sources with whom she has been in contact and who may be protected by the protection of sources.\u201d 14.  The prosecutor then stated, according to the hearing protocol, \u201cthat he would not ask for postponement of the case as the prosecuting authority considers the case to be sufficiently disclosed (\u201ctilstrekkelig opplyst\u201d) even without the statement of the witness [the applicant]\u201d. It was then clarified that the applicant\u2019s appeal against the order would not be forwarded to the High Court until after the City Court\u2019s judgment in the case against Mr X had been delivered. 15.  On 3 March 2011 the City Court convicted Mr X in accordance with the indictment and sentenced him to one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment, of which nine months were suspended for a probationary period of two years. 16.  The judgment contains the following passage:\n\u201cOne of the witnesses pleaded, as a journalist, the protection of sources under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not willing to explain about her potential contact with the accused. The court held that the witness had an obligation to explain about her contact with the accused since he, as the source of the DN.no article, was known and the court ruled accordingly. An appeal was immediately made against the decision. No motion for extension was made (pending a final decision) as according to the prosecutor the case was sufficiently disclosed (tilstrekkelig opplyst) even without the statement by [the applicant] and this was used as a basis by the court.\u201d 17.  On 28 March 2011 Mr X appealed to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) against the City Court\u2019s assessment of the evidence and application of the law in relation to the issue of guilt, its procedure and the sentence (see paragraphs 34-36 below). 18.  The applicant appealed to the Borgarting High Court against the City Court\u2019s order of 15 February 2011. It rejected the appeal by a decision of 28 April 2011, finding it generally decisive whether the source was known. In this case, it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Mr X had been the applicant\u2019s source. 19.  An appeal by the applicant to the Supreme Court was rejected by three votes to two on 30 September 2011 (Norsk Retstidende \u2013 Rt. 2011 page 1266). The appeal had been directed at the High Court\u2019s assessment of evidence as well as its application of the law. The disagreement in the Supreme Court concerned primarily the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which, inter alia, journalists may refuse to answer questions as to who is the source of information confided to them for use in their work (see paragraph 37 below). The two factions of the Supreme Court disagreed, in particular, as to whether this provision was applicable if the source had stepped forward or the identity of the source had otherwise been established. 20.  The majority observed that it did not appear from the wording of Article 125 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that it was relevant whether the source had disclosed his or her role or that this role had in other ways become known. However, the wording could not be given decisive weight. It emerged from the preparatory work that the legislature had not, with the chosen formulation, taken a stance on the issue at stake in the present case. There was therefore greater reason to assess whether the rationale underpinning the main rule, namely the right not to answer questions concerning the identity of the source, could also be given significant weight when the person, who had been the source of the information, had given evidence concerning his or her role and had confirmed being the source. It was difficult to see that this should be the case. 21.  If the imposition of an obligation on the press to give evidence were limited to cases where the source had come forward, the person who was considering giving information to the press would know that it was up to him or her to determine whether the person who received the information would have an obligation to give evidence. There was thus no cogent reason why such a conditional obligation to give evidence should lead to increased scepticism towards providing information to the press. The same would, to a great extent, be true if the obligation to give evidence also applied when the identity of the source had become known in some other way. While the possibility that the identity of the source might be disclosed could well constitute a deterrent, it would hardly make much difference if information already known was also confirmed by the recipient of the information. 22.  An obligation on the press to give evidence in such cases was not thought likely to weaken the public\u2019s general trust that the press would protect its sources. The situation under review did not concern the disclosure of sources but rather whether the person\u2019s role had become known by other means. 23.  The majority further disagreed with the applicant\u2019s view that there was no reason to treat a situation, where the informant had identified himself or herself as the source, differently from those cases where the source had consented to being identified. A person who so consented could do so, trusting that the recipient of the information would respect the protection of sources as long as the identity of the source was unknown. Once an informant had confirmed that he was the source, this fact would become known. Should the recipient of the information then refuse to give evidence, this would normally appear futile. In such a situation, an exemption from the obligation to give evidence would in reality not constitute a protection against having to disclose the source, but rather a right to avoid contributing to the elucidation of a criminal case. 24.  Interpreting Article 125 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the light of certain statements made in the preparatory work (Ot.prp. nr. 55 (1997-1998), pp. 17 and 18) as followed up in the Supreme Court\u2019s case\u2011law (Rt. 1995 page 1166 and 2003 page 28), the majority held that this provision did not apply when the source had come forward and had confirmed his or her role. The same ought probably to apply when the identity of the source had been established beyond reasonable doubt by other means. If the state of the evidence was such that confirmation by the journalist of the identity of the source could not be said to assist in identifying the source, it seemed unquestionable to maintain the obligation to testify. 25.  As to whether a more wide-reaching protection of journalistic sources followed from Article 10 of the Convention, the majority had regard to the Strasbourg Court\u2019s case-law, including Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011II), Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 821/03, 15 December 2009) and the Chamber judgment in Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (no. 38224/03, 31 March 2009 \u2013 noting that the Grand Chamber had decided the latter case on a different ground). They observed that in the two British cases, a violation had been found under the necessity test even though strong countervailing arguments had been present. The majority further noted that there was no decision where the Court had examined the situation where the source had come forward and where in this sense there was no source to protect (\u201cingen kilde \u00e5 beskytte\u201d). The principal justification for source protection, as elaborated by the Court in its case-law, was based on the consequences that the disclosure of a source\u2019s identity might have for the free flow of information. However, these considerations did not apply where the source had confirmed his or her participation. 26.  Against this background, one could safely assume that no violation of the Convention would arise where a source had come forward and the obligation of the witness to give evidence had been expressly limited so as not to include questions that might lead to other sources being revealed. Also, the charge in this case had been based on the fact that the journalist had allowed herself to be used by the source in his efforts to manipulate the bonds market in a criminal manner. It was a serious criminal case, where it seemed likely that the applicant\u2019s evidence might significantly assist in elucidating the concrete circumstances of the defendant\u2019s contact with her. 27.  The minority observed that, should the applicant be ordered to testify concerning her possible contact with Mr X about Attorney Y\u2019s letter of 24 August 2007 to the trustee company, she would have to confirm or deny that Mr X was the source for her article on DN.no on 25 August 2007. By making a statement on this matter, she might also inadvertently reveal other potential sources. The legal question at hand was whether a journalist might rely on source protection if the source, without the journalist having revealed it, could be identified with more or less certainty by other evidence. 28.  The wording of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was absolute and granted members of the press, broadcasting and other media the right to \u201crefuse to answer questions concerning who is ... the source\u201d. The provision made no exception for cases where the identity could be established with more or less certainty in some other way. 29.  The protection of sources by journalists was, according to the European Court\u2019s case-law, \u201cone of the basic conditions for press freedom\u201d (Goodwin, cited above, \u00a7 39). The purpose was not to protect the source, but rather the public interest in free communication of news and opinions (Rt. 2010 page 1381). If journalists were allowed to protect their sources, they would obtain information enabling them to uncover matters in society that were worthy of criticism more easily than they would otherwise. The fact that it was for the journalist to decide to what extent he or she would rely on such protection reflected that it was not the source who was protected. If the journalist was willing to reveal the source, the source could not prevent it. 30.  If it were a precondition for the protection of journalistic sources that no other proof of the source had been presented, such protection would be undermined. This would enable a source to be tracked down, even if a requirement for waiver of source protection was that the source be identified with a criminal standard of proof. If the hearing of evidence on the identity of a source were to be allowed, the media\u2019s working conditions would become considerably more constricted and society\u2019s interest in free communication of information and opinions would suffer. 31.  If consent to source disclosure by a potential source should have the effect of removing source protection, the actual source might easily be identified and source protection would be undermined. In the present case Mr X had stated that he was the source. A situation where someone claimed to be the source ought to be considered in the same way as where the source consented to disclosure of his or her identity. A person might incorrectly claim to be the source so that the actual source might be identified by a process of elimination. And even if it were true that this person was the source, it would erode the journalist\u2019s right to source protection should the person who was the source be able to cancel the journalist\u2019s right. In addition, journalists often had several sources. If a journalist could be ordered to describe his or her contact with a person who claimed to be the source, his or her contact with other sources might also be revealed. 32.  Equally, a combination of someone claiming to be the source and other evidence confirming this, should not lead to source protection being removed. Effective source protection was necessary in order to ensure free communication of information and opinions. It should not be permissible for press journalists to confirm or deny that a person claiming to be the source was in fact the source, even where there was weighty evidence to this effect. As mentioned above, it was not the source, but society\u2019s interest in free communication of news and opinions, which was to be protected. 33.  The prosecutor had argued that Mr X had used the applicant as a tool to commit serious crimes, and this would have constituted a relevant argument, had the case been one concerning a possible individual exception to the right to non-disclosure of sources made under the third paragraph of Article 125. However, the prosecutor had not relied on that paragraph of the provision, and the source\u2019s motive could not render the principle of source protection as such inapplicable. Within the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of speech did not protect only information and views that were positively received, but also those which offended, shocked or disturbed the State or parts of the population. Therefore, the fundamental right of journalists to protect their sources could not be dependent on the sources\u2019 motives. 34.  Mr X\u2019s appeal against the City Court\u2019s judgment of 3 March 2011 (see paragraph 17 above) was examined by the High Court, which summoned and heard the applicant as a witness on 13 January 2012. She answered certain questions but affirmed that she still would not reply to questions about her contacts with Mr X. The court records contain the following passage:\n\u201cWhen heard as a witness [the applicant] stated that she had received Attorney [Y]\u2019s letter by fax on 24 August 2007 at 5.35 p.m. She does not wish to answer questions about who she had received the letter from or on her possible contact with Mr [X] during the period before or after this point in time. The presiding judge pointed out to the witness that after a legally enforceable decision by the Supreme Court she was obliged to give evidence about her contacts with Mr [X]. The presiding judge underlined that an omission to reply to such questions could constitute a ground for the imposition of a fine for an offence against the good order of court proceedings [\u201crettergangsbot\u201d]. It was emphasised that the duty to reply lay on the witness personally and that a possible fine would be imposed on her personally.\u201d 35.  On account of her refusal to comply, the High Court, by a decision of 25 January 2012, ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 30,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately 3,700 euro (EUR) for an offence against the good order of court proceedings, failing which she would be liable to ten days\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 36.  By a judgment of the same date, the High Court convicted Mr X on the charges and sentenced him to one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 37.  The relevant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 22 May 1981 (straffeprosessloven) read as follows:\n\u201cArticle 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court.\nArticle 125. The editor of a printed publication may refuse to answer questions as to who is the author of an article or report in the publication or the source of any information contained in it. The same applies to questions as to who is the source of other information that has been confided to the editor for use in his work.\nOther persons who have acquired knowledge of the author or the source through their work for the publishers, editors, press agency or printers in question have the same right as the editor.\nWhen important social interests indicate that the information should be given and it is of substantial significance for the clarification of the case, the court may, however, on an overall evaluation, order the witness to reveal the name. If the author or source has revealed matters that it was socially important to disclose, the witness may be ordered to reveal the name only when this is found to be particularly necessary.\nWhen an answer is given, the court may decide that it shall only be given to the court and the parties at a sitting in camera and under an order to observe a duty of secrecy.\nThe provisions of this section apply correspondingly to any director or employee of any broadcasting agency.\u201d\nThere is extensive Supreme Court case-law concerning the main rule in Article 125 \u00a7 1 about the protection of journalists\u2019 sources and the exception clause in Article 125 \u00a7 3 (see, for instance, paragraph 24 above). The Supreme Court interprets the provision in the light of Article 10 of the Convention. 38.  Section 205 \u00a7 1 of the Act Relating to the Courts of Justice of 13 August 1915 (domstolloven) reads:\n\u201cWhere a witness refuses to give evidence or give affirmation and provides no grounds or provides only those grounds that are dismissed by a legally enforceable ruling, said witness may be penalised by fines and ordered to compensate, in whole or in part, for the costs incurred. A party may also be penalised by fines in cases concerning attachment or garnishment of earnings, where he/she wilfully fails to provide the enforcement authority with the information said party is obligated to provide pursuant to the Enforcement Act, \u00a7\u00a7 7-12.\u201d 39.  In 2011 the UN Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment no. 34 concerning Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/GC/34), which reads, inter alia, (footnote omitted):\n\u201cStates parties should recognize and respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces the limited journalistic privilege not to disclose information sources.\u201d 40.  On 8 September 2015 the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression submitted a report to the UN General Assembly (A/70/361), which stated, inter alia (footnotes omitted):\n\u201cC. Nature and scope of protection 21.  Some authorities refer to a journalistic \u2018privilege\u2019 not to disclose a source\u2019s identity, but both reporter and source enjoy rights that may be limited only according to article 19 (3). Revealing or coercing the revelation of the identity of a source creates disincentives for disclosure, dries up further sources to report a story accurately and damages an important tool of accountability. In the light of the importance attached to source confidentiality, any restrictions must be genuinely exceptional and subject to the highest standards, implemented by judicial authorities only. Such situations should be limited to investigations of the most serious crimes or the protection of the life of other individuals. 22.  National laws should ensure that protections apply strictly, with extremely limited exceptions. Under Belgian law, journalists and editorial staff may be compelled by a judge to disclose information sources only if they are of a nature to prevent crimes that pose a serious threat to the physical integrity of one or more persons, and upon a finding of the following two cumulative conditions: (a) the information is of crucial importance for preventing such crimes; and (b) the information cannot be obtained by any other means. The same conditions apply to investigative measures, such as searches, seizures and telephone tapping, with respect to journalistic sources.\u201d 41.  Other international instruments concerning the protection of journalistic sources include the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994), and Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000. Relevant parts of the Recommendation, with the explanatory report, are quoted in Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, \u00a7\u00a7 43-44, 22 November 2007, inter alia:\n\u201cPrinciple 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure)\na.  The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature.\nb.  The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that:\ni.  reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and\nii.  the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that:\n- an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved,\n- the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature,\n- the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and\n- member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights.\nc.  The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked.\u201d\nIn the present case, the following paragraphs of the explanatory report are also of relevance:\n\u201cd.  Information identifying a source 18. In order to protect the identity of a source adequately, it is necessary to protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. The potential to identify a source therefore determines the type of protected information and the range of such protection. As far as its disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information shall be protected by this Recommendation:\ni.  the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer\u2019s name and other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source;\nii.  \u2019the factual circumstances of acquiring this information\u2019, for example the time and place of a meeting with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source and a journalist;\n...\u201d", "references": ["5", "1", "9", "8", "7", "0", "4", "3", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Odesa. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was the director general of a joint venture V. (\u201ccompany V.\u201d), which had its office in the premises belonging to a joint stock company Y. (\u201ccompany Y.\u201d). 7.  In March 2001 the owner of company Y. changed. The new management questioned the legality of the use of its premises by company V. More specifically, they challenged the lease contract of 12 January 1999 in respect of those premises, which had been signed by the applicant, on the one side, and N., the chairman of the board of directors of company Y. at the time, on the other side. Under that contract, company V. could use the office space in question from 12 January 1999 to 12 January 2020 without any payment, but in exchange for certain services for company Y. 8.  Starting from April 2001, company Y. no longer allowed access to its premises to company V. As a result, the applicant transformed his flat in a temporary office of company V. 9.  In June 2001 company V. brought commercial proceedings against company Y. seeking compliance with the lease contract. Company Y., in turn, lodged a counter-claim seeking invalidation of that contract. By a final decision of the Supreme Court of 25 September 2003, the national courts rejected the claim of company V. and discontinued the proceedings as regards company Y.\u2019s counter-claim. It was concluded that \u201cthere [was] no subject matter of the dispute\u201d, given that the impugned contract failed to stipulate basic terms inherent in a lease contract and could not therefore be regarded as a lease contract. 10.  On 3 October 2001 a criminal case was opened in respect of suspected forgery of the lease contract of 12 January 1999, without being targeted against any particular persons. 11.  On 8 October 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Prymorskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) issued a warrant for seizure of fifteen documents relevant for the investigation, such as the original of the lease contract itself, related correspondence and several statements of acceptance of the services indicated in the contract (see paragraph 7 above). The seizure was to be carried out in company V.\u2019s office. 12.  On 11 October 2001 the seizure took place in the applicant\u2019s flat, in the presence of his wife. It appears that the applicant was not present. Eleven of the fifteen documents listed in the warrant were seized. The seizure report did not contain any information as to whether it had been handed to any person occupying the premises. The applicant did not specify in the domestic proceedings, or in the present proceedings, how the seizure of the documents had taken place. 13.  On 15 October 2001 the seizure warrant of 8 October 2001 was served on the applicant. 14.  On 22 October 2001 the investigator decided that a forensic expert examination of the signatures on the contract of 12 January 1999 was required in order to establish their real date. 15.  On 7 November 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Court (\u201cthe Prymorskyy Court\u201d) ordered a search of the applicant\u2019s flat, which was also company V.\u2019s office, with a view to collecting samples of his handwriting and signatures. As stated in the court\u2019s ruling, \u201cnotebooks, correspondence and other personal records with [the applicant\u2019s] handwriting\u201d were required for the above-mentioned expert evaluation. That decision was not amenable to appeal. 16.  On the following day the search took place in the applicant\u2019s flat in his presence and resulted in a seizure of eleven documents. The applicant did not provide any description, be it in the domestic proceedings or in the present proceedings, as to how the search had been carried out. 17.  On 24 December 2001 the investigator ordered a seizure of company V.\u2019s constituent documents from the company\u2019s office. It appears that the seizure was carried out on the same day in the applicant\u2019s flat. 18.  On 9 January 2002 the above seizure warrant was served on the applicant. 19.  On 6 May 2002 company V. founders\u2019 meeting decided to suspend the applicant from the exercise of his duties as its director general pending the ongoing criminal proceedings. 20.  On 20 August 2002 the prosecutor discontinued the proceedings for the absence of unequivocal evidence of a criminal offence. Although a forensic expert examination had established that the signatures on the impugned contract had been antedated (namely, it was established that they had been made no earlier than in February 2001), the official approval of the technical methods used by the expert was previewed only for the autumn of 2002. 21.  On 1 September 2002 the applicant resumed his duties in company V. 22.  On 28 August 2002 the applicant brought proceedings against the Prymorskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office claiming compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by its unlawful actions. The applicant based his lawsuit on the fact that the criminal proceedings had been terminated, without raising any specific complaints about the search and seizures. He contended that the institution of the criminal proceedings had been arbitrary, which had led, inter alia, to the unlawful search of his flat and the seizure of documents. 23.  On 9 December 2002 the Prymorskyy Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unfounded. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision. It appears that the court\u2019s conclusion was that the applicant had not suffered any non-pecuniary damage. 24.  The applicant appealed. He argued, in particular, that the impugned measures had been devoid of any legitimate purpose given the impossibility at the time to carry out the forensic handwriting examination ordered by the investigator. He further submitted that, in ordering the seizure of documents, no differentiation had been made between the company\u2019s premises and his home. The applicant maintained that the first-instance court had left those matters without consideration. 25.  On 11 September 2003 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held, in particular, that the company\u2019s office had de facto been located in the applicant\u2019s flat. As regards his complaint about the court\u2019s failure to assess all the circumstances of the case, the appellate court dismissed it as ungrounded. 26.  On 3 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions.", "references": ["3", "1", "8", "9", "2", "7", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Sm\u011bd\u010dice. 6.  On 9 November 2006 the applicant requested a building permit for temporary stables for horses. On 6 January 2011 the Rokycany Planning Office (stavebn\u00ed \u00fa\u0159ad) dismissed his request and on 26 May 2011 the Plze\u0148 Regional Office (krajsk\u00fd \u00fa\u0159ad) upheld that decision. 7.  On 29 March 2013 the Plze\u0148 Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Plze\u0148 Regional Office. 8.  On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed spr\u00e1vn\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 August 2013. 9.  On 29 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost). 10.  On 31 March 2014 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal as being lodged out of time. It held that as the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s decision had been served on him on 28 August 2013, the last day of the two-month time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal was 28 October 2013. 11.  On 8 April 2014 the applicant wrote to the Constitutional Court urging it to set aside its decision. He argued that as 28 October 2013 had been a national holiday, domestic procedural rules provided that the last day for lodging his appeal had been the following day, namely 29 October 2013. 12.  By a letter of 11 April 2014 the Registrar (gener\u00e1ln\u00ed sekret\u00e1\u0159) of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the judge-rapporteur had undoubtedly overlooked the fact that the time-limit had been complied with. However, as the Constitutional Court did not have the power to set aside its own decision, he advised the applicant to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "0", "7", "4", "8", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  At the time of the events he was the director of a private company. 7.  In August 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in office. Subsequently, the tax-evasion charge was dropped. 8.  On 7 December 2004 the Kyiv Dniprovskyy District Court (\u201cthe Dniprovskyy Court\u201d) found the applicant guilty of forgery in office. It held that he had entered knowingly false data in the company\u2019s tax returns. More specifically, instead of applying a straight-line depreciation method in respect of the company\u2019s intangible assets, the applicant calculated their depreciation costs as the difference between the company\u2019s gross revenues and expenses. As a result, the documents showed the absence of any profit or loss in the company\u2019s activity, whereas in the reality it had had losses. The applicant was sentenced to one year\u2019s restriction of liberty (namely detention in a semi-open penal institution by the place of his residence) with a ban on holding administrative posts for one year. The sentence was suspended on probation for one year. The applicant was under an undertaking not to leave the town until the judgment became final. 9.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first\u2011instance court\u2019s judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10.  On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) stating as follows:\n\u201cThe [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005.\u201d 11.  In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12.  On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor\u2019s participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It delivered its ruling \u201chaving heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant\u2019s] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal\u201d. The issue of the applicant\u2019s and his lawyer\u2019s absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court\u2019s ruling. 13.  The applicant appealed on points of law, challenging, among other things, the examination of his case on appeal in his and his lawyer\u2019s absence as being in breach of his defence rights. 14.  On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court, in written proceedings, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. Referring to the case-file materials, it noted that the first-instance court had informed the applicant and his lawyer about the scheduled appellate hearing, without further details.", "references": ["2", "6", "1", "8", "0", "7", "9", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Staro Oryahovo. 6.  The applicant was driving his car along a road in the region of Varna on the evening of 10 March 2014. As established subsequently by the prosecution and the domestic courts in criminal proceedings opened into the incident that took place that evening, his car was weaving in an unsteady manner and he was spotted by patrolling police officers parked on the side of the road. They signalled for him to pull over, but instead of complying he sped away. According to the applicant\u2019s own statements given in the context of those proceedings, he was afraid that the police would charge him or take his licence away as he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. The prosecution and the courts established that the officers chased after him in their car, using flashing police lights and their siren. He only stopped when his car reached a field and could not go further. The police car stopped too. 7.  The parties have presented differing accounts of the circumstances in which the applicant was arrested. 8.  According to the applicant, one of the officers kicked him in the left leg and then pushed him violently to the ground as he was trying to get out of his vehicle. The applicant fell on his back and then three officers continued to kick him. The assault lasted a few minutes, after which they handcuffed him. One of the officers hit him on the head with a rubber truncheon before they drove him to the police station. 9.  According to the police officers, the applicant had jumped out of his car after it had come to a halt and had started running through the field in an attempt to escape. The officers had run after him, the applicant had slipped and fallen and the police had caught up with him. As he had resisted arrest, wriggling and struggling, they had used force which had consisted in twisting his arms in order to handcuff him. Once they had managed to handcuff him, the officers had driven him to the police station. 10.  According to written statements made during the criminal proceedings by several police officers present at the police station when the applicant was taken there, he told everyone present at the time that his clothes were muddy because he had tripped and fallen, which was also why he had a limp. As stated by the officers and by the applicant himself in the course of those proceedings, he made no complaints at that point in time. According to police records of the evening when the applicant was arrested, he refused to take an alcohol test or to sign the arrest report and was given a fine for refusing the alcohol test. As it emerges from the officers\u2019 statements, they discovered that he had no identity documents on him and called his brother, who brought them to the police station accompanied by a friend. The records indicate that the officers released the applicant immediately after checking his papers. 11.  According to a written statement made on 11 March 2014 by the applicant\u2019s brother to the police in the context of an official follow-up conducted into the events, on leaving the station, he asked him what had happened but the applicant stated that he did not wish to speak about it and preferred to be left alone in his home. Instead, his brother drove him to the local medical centre as he had noticed that the applicant was having difficulties breathing. On examination, a doctor noted a suspected broken left ankle and told the applicant to go to hospital. No ambulance was provided and the applicant\u2019s brother drove him there. It follows from medical documents that the doctors operated on him immediately as they had established that he had a broken rib which had pierced one of his lungs. 12.  The applicant\u2019s hospital record, signed by the doctor who had treated him and the head of the unit, stated that the applicant had been in hospital between 11 and 14 March 2014 and that he had a broken rib and a broken ankle. Upon his discharge on 14 March 2014, a different doctor examined the applicant and issued him with a medical certificate which recorded that he had a broken rib, a bruise of about 8 mm on his right eyebrow, and a fracture of the fibula close to the ankle that was in a cast. It also contained the phrase that it was not excluded that the injuries had been sustained in the manner suggested by the applicant, namely as a result of being hit or kicked. The certificate stated that no other traumatic injuries were present. 13.  On 11 March 2014 the police officer in charge of radio communications between patrolling officers and who was on duty on the night of the incident produced a written report to provide information for his superior and to receive whatever orders were deemed necessary. As well as repeating the account of the two arresting officers, he stated that he personally had seen the applicant at the station and that the applicant had told him that he had fallen while running and that his back was hurting. The officer had offered to call in medical staff from the local medical centre to check the applicant on the spot, but he had refused, saying that he did not need a doctor and wished to be released instead. 14.  A different police officer was sent to the local medical centre. In a written report he drew up on 11 March 2014 on his visit, he confirmed the existence of a record there that the applicant had visited it the previous evening and had been checked by a doctor who had directed him to the hospital for treatment of a suspected fractured ankle. Another officer visited the hospital the same day. In a written report he listed his findings, namely that the applicant had been admitted and treated for a broken rib and broken leg the previous night. The report indicated that in a conversation with the applicant conducted during that visit, the latter had told the officer that he could not remember the events in detail, but that he was certain that after the car chase two police officers had beaten and then handcuffed him before taking him to the police station. The applicant also gave a handwritten statement to an officer that day. In it he referred to the car chase, stated that he had wanted to escape as he had felt drunk, that when he had got out of his car the policemen had grabbed him, that one of them had pulled him to the ground and that the other one had handcuffed him. He concluded by saying that the injuries had most likely been caused during his arrest, given that immediately beforehand he had only been driving his car and did not remember breaking his leg and rib when he had brought the car to a stop. 15.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s brother also gave a written statement to the police (see paragraph 11 above). 16.  The two police officers involved in the car chase and the arrest also gave written statements on 11 March 2014. In addition to the description above (see paragraph 9), the officers stated that once the applicant had been handcuffed and put inside the police car, he had leaned on one of them and moaned. When asked if he had a problem and wished to be taken to a medical centre, he had refused and said, \u201cIt\u2019s nothing\u201d. At the police station the applicant had refused to be tested for alcohol or to sign the arrest report. 17.  On 13 March 2014 the Varna District Prosecutor, acting on his own initiative, opened criminal proceedings in relation to the conduct of the two officers who had arrested the applicant. The order for the opening of those proceedings indicated that it was \u201cagainst the guilty official from the Ministry of the Interior who, acting in the context of his professional functions, had caused bodily harm to the applicant on 10 March 2014 in Varna\u201d. A number of investigative steps were carried out. The investigating authorities questioned several police officers as witnesses, including the two involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest and those who had been at the police station on the night of the incident. The latter all stated that they had seen the applicant at the police station on the night in question. He had been calm, had smelt of alcohol and been visibly intoxicated, his clothes had been muddy and he had limped. The applicant, his brother and the friend of the brother who had accompanied him to collect the applicant from the police station, were also interviewed. The brother and his friend stated that the applicant had not told them anything about the circumstances of his arrest and that the brother had learned that the applicant had been beaten by the police from the doctors at the hospital. 18.  A forensic medical expert was appointed on 30 May 2014 to establish the nature of the injuries sustained by the applicant and the type of instrument used. The expert was given a list of specific questions that needed to be answered. The forensic medical report, containing a comprehensive and independent assessment, concluded that the three injuries recorded in the medical certificates drawn up in the immediate aftermath of the events (see paragraph 12 above) were incompatible with the applicant\u2019s allegations that the officers had hit him all over his body for a few minutes. In particular, being kicked by someone wearing boots or being hit for several minutes would have left the applicant with many more traces on different parts of his body, not just the three strictly localised injuries mentioned above. The report further indicated that the injuries could have been received as a result of falling over while moving in accelerated fashion, for example by running and falling. 19.  In a decree of 31 October 2014 for terminating the criminal proceedings, the prosecution established that the version of events given by the applicant at different stages of his questioning were not consistent. In particular, he had stated initially that he had sprained his ankle after tripping and falling, but had later changed his story and said that the injury had been the result of an intentional and prolonged beating by police officers. Furthermore, when questioned on 27 March 2014, the applicant had stated that the police officers had started hitting and kicking him after he had left his car voluntarily. When interviewed again on 28 May 2014, he had asserted that the officers had brutally pulled him out of the car and had thereafter only kicked him rather than hit him. He had tried to use his arms to protect his head from the kicks. He had stated that he could not remember or recognise the police officers who had beaten him, whether in a personal confrontation or from pictures. He had also complained that three officers had beaten him, while it had been unequivocally established that there had only been two patrolling officers. In addition, when on 6 October 2014 the investigator had handed the investigation file over to the applicant, he had signed the related acknowledgement, indicating that he did not wish to acquaint himself with the evidence, read the documents in the file, which was voluminous, and that he had no requests, comments or objections to the investigation. 20.  The prosecutor concluded in the decree for termination of the proceedings that the applicant\u2019s complaints were not supported by the evidence. The force used by the officers had been necessary for neutralising and detaining him in the circumstances, given that he had effectively been running away from the police and actively disobeying their orders to stop. The force had involved one officer holding the applicant on the ground, using one knee to press on his body, while the second officer had helped by handcuffing him. There was no evidence pointing to the officers having used violence or undue force when apprehending the applicant. The applicant challenged the prosecutor\u2019s decision in court. 21.  The prosecutor\u2019s decision to terminate the proceedings was confirmed at two levels of jurisdiction. In particular, the first-instance court, the Varna District Court, observed in its decision of 24 November 2014 that two officers had arrested the applicant after a long car chase, when he had tried to escape despite clear orders to the contrary. The officers had worn police uniforms that had been clearly visible and identifiable and had been driving a police car with flashing police lights and a siren while chasing the applicant. He had not only refused to stop but had actively avoided being caught. As to the differing versions of the events thereafter, the court found that the applicant\u2019s submissions were inconsistent and not supported by the evidence. As a consequence, the court gave no weight to his testimony, finding that it was incompatible with the rest of the evidence. 22.  The second-instance court, the Varna Regional Court, upheld those findings in a final decision on 9 January 2015.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "4", "9", "2", "6", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and is currently in detention in Rzesz\u00f3w. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 19 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention in Che\u0142m Prison. He was later held in several other detention facilities. 8.  On 4 August 2010 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder, rape, assault, robbery, fraud and handling stolen goods. On 8 February 2011 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 9.  Previously, on 21 November 2008 the governor of Che\u0142m Prison requested that the Lublin Regional Court order the applicant to take part in a rehabilitation programme for convicted drug addicts while he served his sentence. 10.  On 15 December 2008 the Lublin Regional Court granted the request. 11.  On 27 June 2010 the applicant complained to the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service that he had not in fact been taking part in the drug rehabilitation programme while serving his sentence. 12.  On 24 September 2010 the head of the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service replied that the applicant\u2019s programme had been planned to start on 6 January 2010. However, owing to his anti-social behaviour, which might have been dangerous for other inmates, he had been classified as a dangerous detainee and had therefore not been able to participate in the programme, which, as a rule, involved group sessions and treatment. 13.  On 14 September 2009 the Che\u0142m Prison Penitentiary Commission (\u201cthe commission\u201d) classified the applicant as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. The commission made its decision after a request from the governor of Che\u0142m Prison, which stated that the applicant had beaten another prisoner at the Lublin Detention Centre in 2002 (this event was not a subject matter of the above criminal proceedings). Additionally, the applicant had apparently behaved in an aggressive and unpredictable manner by, in particular, threatening prison guards, refusing to accept meals and trying to self-harm. He was frequently punished for disciplinary breaches. He did not appeal against the commission\u2019s decision. 14.  The decision to impose the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant was subsequently upheld, inter alia, by decisions of the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission of 10 December 2009; of 4 March, 2 June, 2 September and 2 December 2010; of 2 March, 2 June, 1 September and 1 December 2011; and of 1 March, 30 May, 29 August and 28 November 2012. The reasoning of all these decisions was similar and read as follows:\n\u201cThe Commission, having noted the proposals made by the Head of the Protection Division (Kierownik Dzia\u0142u Ochrony) and the Head of the Penitentiary Division (Kierownik Dzia\u0142u Penitencjarnego) and having heard the applicant held, in his presence, that the reasons justifying his classification as a dangerous detainee have not ceased to exist. It has been unanimously decided to extend the applicant\u2019s classification for further three months because he still poses a danger to the security of the society and the prison.\u201d 15.  The applicant appealed against most of the decisions issued in 2010 and 2011. The appeals were dismissed by the Lublin Regional Court on 9 April and 15 October 2010, and on 28 February and 27 April 2011. 16.  The court held that the commission\u2019s decisions had been lawful and justified as the dangerous detainee regime had been imposed on the applicant in accordance with Article 88a \u00a7 2, sub-paragraph 2(c) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. 17.  On 27 February 2013 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission extended the period of the imposition of the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant. The commission based its decision on the fact that the applicant had ill-treated another prisoner. It also made reference to the request for an extension of the regime made by the director of the remand centre, according to which the applicant had destroyed some objects in the penitentiary unit and had behaved in an aggressive and unpredictable manner. On 9 July 2013 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the commission\u2019s decision holding that the extension of the dangerous detainee regime was justified by the applicant\u2019s unpredictable behaviour, his interference with the peaceful functioning of the penitentiary unit, acts of self-mutilation and refusal to accept meals. 18.  The dangerous detainee regime was further extended on 22 May 2013. The Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission again based its decision on the fact that the applicant had ill-treated another prisoner. It also referred to the request for an extension of the regime made by the director of the remand centre, who relied on the fact that in February 2013 the applicant had been punished for destroying some objects in the penitentiary unit and that his behavior was still unpredictable. On 2 September 2013 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the commission\u2019s decision, holding that it had been given in accordance with the law. 19.  On 13 August and 13 November 2013 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission again extended the period of the dangerous detainee regime imposed on the applicant. In the decision of 13 August 2013 the commission relied on the request made by the director of the remand centre of 12 August 2013, according to which the applicant had been disciplinary punished on 4, 18 and 28 June 2013. In the decision of 13 November the commission made reference to the request of 12 November 2013 which was justified by the applicant\u2019s \u201cemotional instability\u201d and \u201cunpredictable behaviour\u201d. The applicant appealed, but the latter decision was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The court found, among other things, that the applicant could not control his aggressive behaviour and was a threat and danger to order in the prison. It referred to the applicant\u2019s aggressive behaviour on 5 June 2013 when he had tried to push out a guard from his cell and tear out shackles from him. He had also broken a support of his bed and used vulgar language. He had committed a further unspecified disciplinary offence on 21 June 2013. The decision of 13 November 2013 was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The court referred to the reasons relied on previously in its decision of 9 July 2013 (see paragraph 17 above). 20.  On 12 February 2014, owing to an improvement in the applicant\u2019s behaviour and his progress in understanding the need to undergo therapy for drug addicts, the dangerous detainee regime was lifted. The applicant appealed and the challenged decision was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 15 April 2014. 21.  The regime was applied to the applicant for four years and almost five months. 22.  The applicant was detained in several detention facilities - Che\u0142m Prison, Radom Remand Centre, Lublin Remand Centre and Potulice Prison. 23.  The cells, in which the applicant was kept, including the sanitary facilities, were constantly monitored via closed-circuit television. 24.  The applicant had to wear a red uniform, designated for dangerous detainees, which, as he alleged, was not warm enough in the winter. He was subjected to a strip search every time he left or entered his cell, which in practice meant that he had to strip naked in front of prison officers and bend over in order to enable the examination of his anus. The applicant had to wear handcuffs whenever he was outside his cell, including for appearances in court. 25.  The windows were covered by a plastic blind which limited access to daylight and fresh air in the cells. 26.  In Che\u0142m and Potulice prisons the cells were equipped with a sanitary facility which was partially separated from the rest of the cell. 27.  On 28 September 2009 the applicant was transferred from Che\u0142m to the Radom Remand Centre. According to the applicant, the cell there was equipped with a noisy ventilator and he could not sleep. 28.  On 27 November 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Lublin Remand Centre, where he was placed in solitary confinement. 29.  The applicant was detained in a single cell where the sanitary facility was not separated from the rest of the cell. He was also detained in cells in Lublin where the sanitary facility was separated. 30. In the cell he had no access to hot running water. According to the Government, there was a boiler in the cell so the applicant could heat water. The applicant submitted that he had had the boiler for six months and that it had then been taken away. He was allowed to have a shower once a week. 31.  The applicant was not allowed to go to mass in the Lublin Remand Centre. He lodged a complaint about this with the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service. In response, on 26 August 2010, the authorities decided that the applicant could listen to mass on the radio or have a private service with a priest. The applicant could go to the day room, which had sport facilities, a laptop, television, a computer game console and a DVD player, three times a week. He had access to press publications and could use the library. He could also participate in sports and art competitions. After the dangerous detainee regime was lifted, the applicant refused to participate in any sports and cultural activities because his cell was equipped with a television and a computer game console. 32.  On 20 March 2013 the applicant was transferred to Potulice Prison. 33.  The applicant had to wear joined shackles (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet whenever he was outside the prison, including for appearances at court hearings or while on medical visits. The shackles consisted of handcuffs and fetters joined by chains. The Government submitted that outside his cell and within the prison the applicant only had to wear handcuffs. According to the applicant, he had to wear the joined shackles in the rest of the prison, including when he was going to attend visits by members of his family. 34.  On an unspecified day in April or May 2013 the applicant was transferred back to the Lublin Remand Centre.", "references": ["3", "7", "5", "8", "4", "6", "0", "2", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in R\u012bga. 6.  She worked as an accountant in a building management company (namu p\u0101rvalde) from 1989. From the beginning of 1997 she also fulfilled the duties of a cashier and she was fully responsible for any shortfall in the material assets (materi\u0101l\u0101s v\u0113rt\u012bbas) entrusted to her. 7.  On 9 December 1997 the applicant\u2019s colleagues reported to the police that illicit cash withdrawals from the company\u2019s cash registers had been made. Allegedly, the withdrawals had been made by the applicant and her colleague, B.E., by means of annulling the records of cash transactions and then taking the money received in respect of those transactions from the cash register. 8.  Internal and external audits were carried out and it was discovered that certain data in the company\u2019s cash registers had been manipulated. Specific amounts of cash and dates were noted in the audits, as well as the customer numbers in respect of which this manipulation had been executed. It was later established that the data had been manipulated in order to conceal illicit cash withdrawals. Further internal and external audits were carried out in 1999 and 2001. 9.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant gave a written explanation (paskaidrojums) to a police inspector. The applicant testified that she had annulled three cash transactions and made three cash withdrawals in the amount of 1,228 Latvian lati (LVL \u2013 approximately 1,747 euros (EUR)). She had done so at the request of the deputy head of the company and had handed the cash over to him. As concerns the remainder of the missing cash, she stated that she had not taken it. Nor had she annulled any other cash transactions. 10.  On 16 January 1998 the police inspector issued a decision to institute criminal proceedings (l\u0113mums par krimin\u0101llietas ierosin\u0101\u0161anu) in respect of \u201cthe misappropriation of funds in the amount of LVL 7,559 [approximately EUR 10,756] carried out by the applicant and B.E. by annulling records of cash transactions\u201d. The applicant was not informed of this decision at that time. Instead, she was issued a summons to talks (p\u0101rrunas) and she was interviewed on 16 January 1998. A witness statement record (liecinieka nopratin\u0101\u0161anas protokols) was drawn up. The applicant was informed of the rights and obligations of witnesses, as stipulated by Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Krimin\u0101lprocesa kodekss, see paragraph 24 below); she was also informed that if she refused to testify or gave false testimony she would incur criminal liability. The applicant repeated that she had annulled only three cash transactions and had made only three cash withdrawals. She had handed the cash over to the deputy head. 11.  According to the applicant she appeared at the police station on 16 January 1998, accompanied by a lawyer whom she had authorised to represent her. Her request to be represented by the lawyer was refused \u2013 she was told that her status was that of a witness and that witnesses were not entitled to legal assistance. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s submission, as there was no mention of this in the witness statement record; the Government stated that the applicant had signed the record and had made no remarks. 12.  In the following years the applicant was interviewed as a witness five more times: on 21 January and 14 December 1999, 13 February 2002, and 6 January and 11 November 2004. Her rights and obligations as a witness \u2013 as well as the fact that she would render herself criminally liable if she refused to testify or gave false testimony \u2013 were explained to her (reference was made to Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code, see paragraph 24 below); no mention of any right to legal assistance was made. She reiterated that she had annulled only three cash transactions and had made only three cash withdrawals. She had handed the cash over to the deputy head of the company. She furthermore added that she had already repaid to the company approximately LVL 1,228 (approximately EUR 1,747). 13.  A confrontation (konfront\u0101cija) was also held between the applicant and B.E. on 27 January 1999 and with the deputy head of the company on 28 January 1999, who were also considered witnesses. Another confrontation between the applicant and the chief accountant was scheduled to take place on 24 May and 20 June 2002, but neither of them attended. 14.  In 2000, 2001 and 2002 the police considered the case material to be sufficient for bringing charges against the applicant and referred the case to the prosecutor\u2019s office. However, several prosecutors identified various shortcomings in the investigation and transferred the case back to the police for additional investigation. 15.  The identified shortcomings included the following aspects.\nFirst, the criminal case material was found to be insufficient to establish guilt and therefore no charges could be brought. Serious breaches of the Criminal Procedure Code and other regulations were found. The criminal case material had contained uncertified copies of documents, missing pages of explanations and incomplete procedural records. In addition, the audits had not been carried out in accordance with law. Another audit had to be commissioned and more witnesses had to be questioned.\nSecond, there had been discrepancies in the total amount of missing cash and it was impossible to establish that a crime had been committed or to bring charges against anyone. The audit had to be carried out by a certified auditor.\nA conclusion was made that the pre-trial investigation had been deficient, chaotic and had been carried out aimlessly. Moreover, the role of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company in the cash withdrawals had not been properly investigated. 16.  The police carried out further investigative measures \u2013 they commissioned another audit, collected further evidence, and questioned more witnesses (including the head, the deputy head, and the chief accountant of the company, as well as some of its customers). 17.  On 20 January 2005 the police referred the case to the prosecutor\u2019s office for the fourth time. This time the case material was deemed sufficient for charges to be brought and, on 27 January 2005, the applicant was officially charged with nineteen episodes of misappropriation of funds. She thus became an accused person (aps\u016bdz\u0113t\u0101 persona) in the criminal proceedings against her and was informed of her right to have a lawyer. A preventive measure \u2013 a prohibition on her changing her place of residence, which she had to acknowledge by giving her signature (paraksts par dz\u012bves vietas nemain\u012b\u0161anu) \u2013 was imposed on her. On 26 May 2005 the charges were slightly amended in respect of the total amount of misappropriated funds. 18.  On 27 January, 3 February, 26 May and 5 September 2005 the applicant was questioned as an accused person. On two occasions (on 27 January and on 26 May 2005) the applicant stated that a lawyer\u2019s presence was not necessary. On another occasion (on 3 February 2005) she stated that she would continue giving testimony without the presence of a lawyer. No remarks were made regarding the absence of a lawyer during the questioning of 5 September 2005. The applicant was given access to the criminal case file in order that she could acquaint herself with its contents. She subsequently requested that further investigative measures be taken. Some requests for further investigative measures were granted and some were refused. 19.  On 5 September 2005 the final bill of indictment was served on the applicant (uzr\u0101d\u012bta gal\u012bg\u0101 aps\u016bdz\u012bba) in the presence of a lawyer. The total amount of misappropriated funds was again slightly amended. On 21 October 2005 other preventive measures \u2013 a prohibition on leaving the country and the obligation to reside at a particular place of residence (uztur\u0113\u0161an\u0101s noteikt\u0101 dz\u012bvesviet\u0101) \u2013 were imposed on the applicant. On the same date the prosecutor\u2019s office forwarded the case file to the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa). 20.  On 23 October 2006 the first hearing was held. On 20 November 2006 the Riga Regional Court convicted the applicant of nineteen episodes of misappropriation of property that had been entrusted to her. The applicant did not admit her guilt. She agreed that she had annulled three cash transactions and made three cash withdrawals in the amount of LVL 1,228 (approximately EUR 1,747), but stated that she had done so at the request of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company with a view to paying out salaries. As concerns other cash transactions, she had not annulled those. The court, relying on witness testimony and other case material (the results of three audits, the electronic cash register records, the relevant bills and receipts, the respective employment agreements etc.), convicted the applicant. The court did not rely on the applicant\u2019s statements made during the pre-trial investigation. 21.  The applicant was given a three-year suspended prison sentence, with three years\u2019 probation (a more lenient sentence than the minimum provided by law). In setting the sentence the court took into account her state of health, the fact that she had partly compensated the company for the damage in question, and the fact that she had committed the crime nine years previously and that since then she had not committed any other crimes. The applicant lodged an appeal on 2 December 2006. 22.  The first appellate hearing was scheduled for 15 August 2007. On 17 August 2007 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Krimin\u0101llietu tiesu pal\u0101ta) quashed the applicant\u2019s conviction for lack of evidence in respect of five episodes of misappropriation of property. The applicant\u2019s sentence was reduced to a two-year suspended prison sentence, with one year\u2019s probation. In setting the sentence the court took into account the significantly lower number of episodes for which the applicant had been convicted, the fact that a particularly long period of time had elapsed since the commission of the crime, and the fact that there was no indication that she had committed any other crimes since then. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law on 18 October 2007. 23.  On 29 November 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ts) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. The Senate indicated that the former Criminal Procedure Code (which had been in force in January 2005, when the charges had been brought against the applicant) had not excluded that a person could have the procedural status of a witness while a pre-trial investigation was in progress and could only be officially charged once there was sufficient evidence concerning that person\u2019s guilt.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "7", "9", "5", "0", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in J\u0113kabpils Prison. He is a person with special needs. The applicant is deaf and mute since birth and his knowledge of sign language is poor. 6.  At least as of 2 March 2001, when his disability was certified as permanent, the applicant has been recognised as being category 3 disabled (the least severe level of disability). On an unspecified date his disability was re-categorised as category 2 (medium level of disability). 7.  On 7 May 2008 the applicant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to fifteen years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. That judgment became final on 24 February 2009. He started serving his sentence in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime in Liep\u0101ja Prison. 8.  On 23 December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Brasa Prison. He was placed in the medium regime as he had served one quarter of his sentence. He was held in cell no. 301 (from 1 January 2012 to 26 February 2013) and cell no. 303 (from 26 February to 30 October 2013). 9.  On 30 October 2013 the applicant was placed in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime. He was held in cell no. 203 (from 30 October 2013 until 16 February 2015). 10.  On 24 February 2016 the applicant was placed in the least restrictive \u201chigher\u201d regime. It appears that as of that date he was held in three different multi-occupancy cells. The number of his cellmates varied from two to fourteen. Each inmate had no less than 4 sq. m of living space in those cells. 11.  According to the applicant, he was held in dormitory\u2011type cells nos. 301, 303 and 203 together with other inmates, all of whom were in good health except for the applicant. The applicant\u2019s submissions as to the overall surface area in those cells as well as the size of the sanitary facilities were consistent with the Government\u2019s submissions (see paragraph 13 below). His account of the number of inmates was slightly different \u2013 he alleged that he had been held together with ten to twenty inmates in cells nos. 301 and 303. However, as concerns cell no. 203 he agreed with the Government \u2013 six inmates had been held in that cell. 12.  The applicant submitted that the heating had not been sufficient in those cells. He had been neither able to communicate with other inmates, nor with the prison management due to his disability. He had been in social isolation and had not received any special assistance. 13.  According to the Government, the applicant was held in three different cells, the conditions of which are detailed in the table below. The calculation of personal space (overall surface area with the in-cell sanitary facility deducted, divided by number of inmates held therein) is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility according to the floor plans of Brasa Prison.\nCell no.\nPeriod of detention\nTotal number of inmates\nOverall surface area in sq. m\nSanitary facility sq. m\nPersonal space in sq. m\n301 14.  As regards out-of-cell activities, the Government indicated that while being held in the medium regime \u2013 in cells nos. 301 and 303 \u2013 the applicant had been able to freely leave those cells in daytime and to use the common area. The Government further submitted that cell no. 301 had been equipped with one window. That window had been fitted with bars and had been placed in a wall (adjacent to a corridor) facing another window (in the corridor). This cell had had three fluorescent lamps, including one night lamp located above the door. Heating had been provided by one heating pipe of 5 cm in diameter and the heaters located in the adjacent corridor and in the hallway. A new automatic boiler had been installed in Brasa Prison, which had ensured a temperature of 18\u02daC. Heating arrangements in cell no. 303 had been the same as in cell no. 301. 15.  While being held in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime \u2013 in cell no. 203 \u2013 the applicant had been able to leave this cell only for a daily walk (one hour), to take a shower or for appointments with a doctor, a prison chaplain or a social worker when necessary. 16.  Overall, inmates in Brasa Prison had had access to a psychologist, but the applicant had never availed himself of this possibility. He had, however, met with a prison chaplain and a social worker on several occasions. The Government provided records of three conversations between the applicant and a social worker in 2016, including a meeting on 11 April 2016 where the latter had called a non-governmental organisation (Latvijas Nedzird\u012bgo Savien\u012bba) concerning the applicant\u2019s hearing aid. Lastly, the applicant had visited a psychiatrist at least on six occasions in the time period from 1 April 2015 to 7 September 2016. 17.  On 27 December 2011 the state of the applicant\u2019s health was examined for the first time in Brasa Prison. It was noted that the applicant was deaf and mute and that he suffered from spondylosis. 18.  The applicant submitted an extract of his medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 26 July 2016), he had been deaf since birth. On 13 August 2009 a psychiatrist had detected a psychiatric health condition (psihiskas vesel\u012bbas probl\u0113mas), namely, \u201creaction to situations with anxiety\u201d (situ\u0101cijas reakcija ar trauksmi). On 21 January 2010 the same psychiatrist had detected another sleep-related condition. On 10 December 2015 another psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as having \u201corganic personality disorder\u201d (organiski person\u012bbas trauc\u0113jumi). 19.  The Government submitted another extract of the applicant\u2019s medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 7 April 2015), upon admission to Brasa Prison the applicant had been diagnosed as being deaf and mute and having spondylosis. During the above-mentioned period the applicant had consulted prison medical staff on thirty\u2011nine occasions. He had been examined, treated and provided with medication when necessary. No serious health conditions, which would have required an in\u2011depth examination, had been diagnosed. There had been no indications that outpatient examination or treatment had been necessary. The applicant had most often complained of colds, headache, poor sleep, gastritis and back pain related to spondylosis. Those complaints had not concerned his disability. In 2013 and 2014 the prison medical staff had organised an outpatient medical examination (in relation to tuberculosis) and a consultation by an ophthalmologist to obtain glasses. On 1 April 2015, upon the request of the Prisons Administration (Ieslodz\u012bjuma vietu p\u0101rvalde), the applicant\u2019s state of health had been examined. It had been satisfactory, he had not had any complaints and he had gained weight while in prison. In sum, his health had not deteriorated. 20.  Over the course of two years (2012-14) the applicant lodged some twenty\u2011five handwritten complaints with various institutions (the management of Brasa Prison, the Prisons Administration, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior). 21.  He informed the authorities that he had been deaf and mute since birth and complained as follows:\n1)  he had communication problems and conflicts with other inmates (he referred to \u201cconflicts\u201d, having been \u201cinfluenced\u201d, \u201coffended\u201d and \u201claughed about\u201d by other inmates);\n2)  he wished to be transferred to a single or dual-occupancy cell;\n3)  he wished to be transferred to another prison;\n4)  he wished to have his prison regime changed;\n5)  his conditions of detention were inadequate and\n6)  his medical care was inadequate. 22.  His complaints were examined by the Prisons Administration, save for three of them that were examined by the management of Brasa Prison. 23.  The following conclusions were made:\n(1)  There had been no real threat to the applicant\u2019s life or health in Brasa Prison. He had not been subjected to psychological harassment. His complaints to the management of Brasa Prison had not concerned any threats from other inmates.\n(2)  The applicant did not have a subjective right to choose his cell or cellmates. It fell within the competence of the management of Brasa Prison. There was a limited number of cells with a capacity of four inmates and those inmates could not be moved for security reasons.\n(3)  The decision concerning the applicant\u2019s transfer to another prison had to be taken by the Prisons Administration. Taking into account that the applicant\u2019s state of health had permitted his placement in any prison, there had been no grounds to transfer him to another prison; he had had to continue serving his sentence in Brasa Prison.\n(4)  The possibility of his transfer to the most lenient prison regime could not be examined before 10 June 2015, when he would have served the relevant proportion of his prison sentence. As to the possibility of his transfer back to the more restrictive prison regime such actions could only be taken in cases of serious or systematic breaches of the prison regime.\n(5)  The conditions in cell no. 301 had been adequate. It had measured 36 sq. m. Natural and artificial lighting as well as heating had been sufficient. The temperature in cell had been 18\u02daC.\nThe conditions in cell no. 303 had been similar to cell no. 301 \u2013 lighting and heating had been adequate.\nThe conditions in cell no. 203 had been adequate. According to the Prisons Administration and the relevant floor plans that cell had measured 19.86 sq. m (including 1.87 sq. m for sanitation facilities). Besides the applicant, it had accommodated five other inmates. A reference was made to the Court\u2019s case-law and the applicable domestic standard of 2.5 sq. m per male inmate. The temperature in the cell had been 18\u02daC.\n(6)  The applicant\u2019s medical care had been carried out in accordance with domestic law. He had received the necessary medication in response to his complaints. He had never complained to prison doctors of \u201cneurological diseases\u201d, \u201cnoises\u201d or \u201cfears\u201d, but he had had at least one consultation with a psychiatrist. In any event, he had been able to complain of the quality of medical care in prison to the Health Inspectorate. 24.  On 1 October 2012 a judge of a first-instance court refused to allow the applicant\u2019s application to be transferred to another prison and to have his prison regime changed to a more restrictive one, a request made by the applicant in order to allow him to be held in a cell with a smaller number of inmates. Those issues fell within the realm of criminal law and could not be examined by the administrative courts. 25.  On 25 October 2012 another judge refused to allow the applicant\u2019s application to be transferred to another prison and to be relieved from the obligation to continue serving his sentence. As concerns his transfer, reference was made to the decision by the Prisons Administration whereby a conclusion had been drawn that the Administrative Procedure Law had not applied. As concerns judicial review of that decision, such a complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 24 above). As concerns the release application, it fell within the realm of criminal law; this issue could thus not be examined by the administrative courts. 26.  The applicant attempted to appeal against the above-mentioned refusals, but his appeal did not appear sufficiently clear. Accordingly, on 21 November 2012 another judge decided not to proceed with his appeal (atst\u0101t bez virz\u012bbas), asking the applicant to render it more precise. 27.  On 10 December 2013 another judge examined further complaints by the applicant. His application to be transferred to a more lenient prison regime and another prison were refused because such complaints had already been examined (see paragraphs 24-25 above). His complaint about insufficient heating in Brasa Prison did not appear sufficiently clear; the judge decided not to proceed with it, asking the applicant to render it more precise. As the applicant did not provide further information, the latter complaint was considered as not submitted (uzskat\u012bt par neiesniegtu). 28.  On 2 April 2014 the applicant complained to the administrative courts that the Prisons Administration had extended the time-limit for its last reply. On 29 May 2014 a judge terminated the administrative proceedings in this connection since the Prisons Administration had issued its decision in the meantime. 29.  On 31 August 2016 a panel in Brasa Prison examined the possibility of the applicant\u2019s transfer to a more lenient prison regime. The applicant and a sign-language interpreter were present. It was established that the applicant had been working in prison until 18 December 2015; he had stopped working owing to his state of health. He had a category 2 disability. He had completed secondary education but had not pursued his education further owing to being deaf and mute and needing a specialised learning programme. He had been working with an officer and a social worker for rehabilitation purposes. He had regularly visited a chaplain in prison; however, he had not met with a psychologist. He had participated in addiction recovery meetings. He had dedicated his free time to himself. He had received three positive citations (pamudin\u0101jums) from the prison management. 30.  A conclusion was drawn that the applicant had participated in nearly all the rehabilitation activities provided in the prison taking into account his capabilities. Therefore it was possible to transfer him to a more lenient prison regime in a partly closed prison. 31.  On 7 September 2016 the applicant was transferred to a partly closed prison in J\u0113kabpils, where he was held in a cell with two other inmates. One of them had a similar hearing impairment. 32.  The relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Latvia on 1 March 2010, have been outlined in Grimailovs v. Latvia (no. 6087/03, \u00a7 78, 25 June 2013). 33.  The relevant parts of the Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175) by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have been outlined in the above-cited Grimailovs case (ibid., \u00a7 79).", "references": ["6", "5", "8", "9", "2", "4", "0", "7", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1971, 1953 and 1976 respectively and live in Bergama, \u0130zmir. 6.  On 16 August 1989 the public limited company E.M. Eurogold Madencilik (\u201cthe company\u201d), subsequently renamed Normandy Madencilik A.\u015e., received an authorisation to begin prospecting for gold. Subsequently, the company was authorised to use cyanide leaching in the gold extraction process by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 7.  On 19 October 1994 the Ministry of the Environment decided to issue an operating permit to the company for the Ovac\u0131k gold mine. 8.  On 2 July 1996 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court dismissed a case brought before it for the annulment of the permit of 19 October 1994. On 13 May 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first-instance judgment and decided that the permit should be annulled. It referred to the State\u2019s obligation to protect the right to life and to a healthy environment and assessed the physical, ecological, aesthetic, social and cultural effects of the mining activity in question as described in the environmental impact report and the various expert reports which had been submitted to it. It held that those reports demonstrated the risk posed to the local ecosystem and to human health and safety by sodium cyanide use. It concluded that the operating permit in issue did not serve the public interest and that the safety measures which the company had undertaken to implement did not suffice to eliminate the risks involved in such an activity.  On 15 October 1997, in compliance with the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment, the Administrative Court annulled the Ministry of the Environment\u2019s decision to issue a permit for the mine. On 27 February 1998 the \u0130zmir provisional governor\u2019s office ordered that the mine be closed. On 1 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 15 October 1997. 9.  On 5 April 2000 the Prime Minister\u2019s office drew up a report on the mine. It concluded that operations at the mine could be authorised, having regard to the additional measures taken by the company, the conclusions of a report by the Turkish Institute of Scientific and Technical Research (\u201cT\u00dcB\u0130TAK\u201d), the Ministry of the Environment\u2019s favourable opinion and an opinion of the President\u2019s Administration, which had emphasised the economic importance of an investment of that type. 10.  On 1 June 2001 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court delivered a judgment on an application for judicial review of the report of the Prime Minister\u2019s office, brought by twenty-five residents of Bergama, including the second and third applicants, Mr Mustafa Demirgan (Demircan) and Mr Y\u0131lmaz Acar. The administrative court decided to set aside the report, which, in its opinion, constituted an enforceable administrative decision giving rise to the issuing of permits. Notwithstanding the measures taken by the company, the court held that judicial decisions which had become final had found that the \u201crisk and threat\u201d in question resulted from the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and that it was impossible to conclude that those risks could be avoided by implementing new measures. Equally, it had been established that the risk connected with the accumulation of heavy elements or cyanide could persist for twenty to fifty years and was likely to infringe the right of the area\u2019s inhabitants to a healthy environment. Accordingly, it was appropriate to conclude that the decision at issue could lead to the circumvention of a final judicial decision and was incompatible with the principle of the rule of law. 11.  On 29 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 1 June 2001 in so far as it had been brought by nineteen of the plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants and dismissed a rectification application by the Prime Minister\u2019s office on an unspecified date. 12.  In the meantime, on 22 December 2000 the Ministry of Health decided to authorise the continued use of the cyanidation process at the mine for an experimental period of one year. The company re-started mining operations on 13 April 2001. 13.  In a judgment of 27 May 2004, the \u0130zmir Administrative Court set aside the provisional permit issued by the Ministry of Health on 22 December 2000 in a case brought by fourteen people, including the first applicant, Ms Feride Gen\u00e7. In particular, it considered that the risks highlighted in the judgment of 13 May 1997 were, inter alia, linked to the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and to the climatic conditions and features of the region, which was situated in an earthquake zone. It held that those risks and threats could not be eliminated by supplementary measures which continued to be based on the same leaching process. It also concluded that the issuing of the permit in question had been incompatible with the principle of the rule of law as that administrative decision had in reality been intended to amend a judicial decision that had become final. 14.  On 2 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 27 May 2004 and dismissed a rectification application by the Ministry of Health on 3 April 2006. 15.  On 29 March 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers took a \u201cdecision of principle\u201d, stating that the gold mine situated in the area of Ovac\u0131k and \u00c7amk\u00f6y, in the district of Bergama (\u0130zmir) and belonging to the Normandy Madencilik A.\u015e. company, could continue operations. The decision was not made public. 16.  On 23 June 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the Cabinet decision in a case brought by twenty-four plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the Prime Minister\u2019s decision had been unlawful as the environmental impact assessment report which had allowed for the operating of the gold mine had been previously annulled. The Prime Minister\u2019s office objected. 17.  On 18 August 2004 referring to the decision of 23 June 2004, the \u0130zmir governor\u2019s office ordered the closure of mine. 18.  On 7 October 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the stay of execution of 23 June 2004. 19.  On 20 May 2005 the goldmine began operating again under a permit of the same date issued by the \u0130zmir governor\u2019s office. 20.  On 22 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers a decision which was upheld on 21 February 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 21.  According to the documents in the case file, various sets of other proceedings were brought between 2006 and 2012 by other residents of Bergama against various administrative authorities and Normandy Madencilik A.\u015e. before the administrative courts, some of which are still ongoing. The gold mine was in operation until at least 2014.", "references": ["1", "0", "8", "7", "9", "2", "5", "6", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, S.S. Yenik\u00f6y Konut Yap\u0131 Kooperatifi, is a housing construction cooperative under Turkish law operating in \u0130zmir. 5.  In 1993, a third party cooperative bought a plot of land measuring 12,000 square metres and the title deed of the land was registered in its name. In 1995, construction works started on the land in question. 6.  In 2000, the forest administration initiated proceedings before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the title deed to the land, alleging that it was part of the public forest area. In the meantime, the third party cooperative had merged with the applicant cooperative and the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the name of the latter. 7.  On 26 December 2002 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance ordered that 9,322 square metres of the land be registered in the name of the Treasury as it was part of the public forest area. It also ordered that the buildings constructed on this part of the land be demolished. 8.  Subsequently, the applicant brought a case before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and sought pecuniary damages from the Treasury under Article 1007 of the Civil Code which provided for the State\u2019s responsibility for any damage resulting from the keeping of the land registry records. 9.  On 4 February 2005 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance awarded 138,917,600,000 Turkish Liras (TRL \u2013 approximately 81,716 euros (EUR) at the time) to the applicant. 10.  On 7 February 2006 the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that there was no illegal act or action on the part of the land registry officials that might have had a causal link with the applicant\u2019s loss. 11.  On 6 July 2006 the applicant submitted a further petition to the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and indicated that there was a decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation which was in contradiction with the decision of the Fourth Civil Division. In this context, the applicant alleged that its case should be accepted according to that decision of the First Civil Division issued on 7 May 2002 and numbered E.2002/3549 K.2002/5807. 12.  On 20 October 2006 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance followed the decision of the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 13.  The applicant appealed. Reiterating its allegations and referring to the decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation of 7 May 2002, it repeated its compensation request. 14.  On 1 May 2007 the applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. This decision became final. 15.  In their decisions, neither the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance nor the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation expressed any reason about why they had reached a different conclusion from the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation.", "references": ["6", "4", "5", "0", "7", "9", "2", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, who was born in 1989, lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 6.  On 17 January 2009 the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court, after questioning the applicant, ordered his pre-trial detention. 7.  On 24 June 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 8.  The trial commenced before the Istanbul Assize Court and the first preparatory hearing was held on 4 November 2009. 9.  In the subsequent hearings held between 17 February 2010 and 3 November 2010, the applicant appeared before the court and the judges ordered his continued detention. 10.  The applicant filed an objection against the decision of 3 November 2010. On 29 November 2010 the 12th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing, and based on the public prosecutor\u2019s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 11.  On 13 February 2013 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 12.  According to the latest information in the case-file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance court.", "references": ["9", "5", "4", "6", "0", "7", "3", "8", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Turkey. 6.  On 22 August 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). The following day, on 23 August 2004, he was questioned by the gendarmerie, at which time he was reminded of his rights, including the right to benefit from legal assistance. He refused the assistance of a lawyer and gave a statement of forty-nine pages in length in which he admitted his membership of the PKK and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. According to transcripts of that statement, the applicant read its content and signed every page of it. 7.  On 26 August 2004 the applicant was brought before the Tunceli public prosecutor and he was again reminded of his right to benefit from legal assistance. He indicated that he did not wish to be assigned a lawyer and that he would make a statement without assistance. He confirmed his membership of the PKK and his support for that illegal organisation, however maintaining that he had never been involved in an armed operation. The applicant was placed in detention pending trial on the same day. 8.  On 3 December 2004 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the constitutional order and unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State\u2019s control. The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant:\n-  had exploded a remote-controlled land mine in Ovac\u0131k province in November 2003 that had caused the injury of one soldier,\n-  had exploded a time bomb in Ovac\u0131k province on 28 October 2003 that had caused the injury of two soldiers.\nIn its assessment report (tensip zapt\u0131) dated 10 December 2004 the Malatya Assize Court ordered a copy of the police statements of D.T., M.A., A.\u00c7., S.G., H.B. and V.D. The trial court further ordered that the whereabouts of D.T. be ascertained. 9.  M.A. was tried in another set of criminal proceedings concerning the same organisation. On 17 February 2004 M.A. lodged an application to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959), which had come into force on 6 August 2003. 10.  On 30 December 2004, at the first hearing, the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and accepted the contents of his police statement. In other words, the applicant once again admitted his membership of the PKK while insisting that he had not been involved in any armed activity. He further stated that his statement had not been read back to him by the police and asked the trial court not to take it into consideration in case it had any incriminatory remarks in respect of himself or third persons in so far as they concerned participation in armed activities. When asked about his statement before the public prosecutor, the applicant essentially confirmed it, whilst insisting that he had not given any statement concerning the attacks in Tunceli, a city in the east of Turkey, and adding that he had signed it without reading it. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had received training in bomb-making and that he had been planning to carry out bomb attacks in major cities in accordance with the instructions of the PKK. His lawyer submitted that he had nothing to add to the applicant\u2019s statements. 11.  During the same hearing the trial court questioned several witnesses, namely A.\u00c7., M.A. and K.A. A.\u00c7. testified that he knew the applicant but that they had not carried out any armed attack together. M.A. stated that he had not known the applicant\u2019s real name, but he had known him as \u201cHamza\u201d. M.A. further testified that he had no knowledge of the applicant\u2019s position and activities within the illegal organisation. K.A. testified that he did not know the applicant. 12.  At a hearing on 25 November 2005 the trial court noted that D.T. was in K\u0131rklareli Prison and it issued a letter of request to the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court, requesting that the latter obtain his statements. 13.  On 14 December 2005 D.T.\u2019s statement was taken by the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court, pursuant to the letter of request by the trial court. According to the transcript of the hearing at the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court, D.T. was detained in K\u0131rklareli E-type Prison at the time his statement was taken. D.T. stated that he had known the applicant as \u201cZafer\u201d and that he had knowledge of the attack in Ovac\u0131k province, adding that he had heard such information from the member with the code name \u201cSerhildan\u201d. 14.  On 15 March 2006 the applicant asked the trial court to hear evidence from D.T. in person. The trial court rejected this request on the basis that hearing D.T.\u2019s testimony in person would not contribute to its assessment since his statement given before another court had been considered sufficient for a conviction. 15.  On 10 May 2006 the Malatya Assize Court found the applicant guilty pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court took account of the variety of evidence and witness statements, including those of D.T., which had been taken by the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court at the trial court\u2019s request. The relevant parts of the trial court\u2019s reasoned judgment read as follows:\n\u201c...\nEVIDENCE, EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE AND REASONING\n...\na)  Evidence H.B., who is being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 18 of his police statement that N.I. [the co-accused] had been involved in the killings of two soldiers in May 2003 around the River Hiran in Tunceli.\n...\nWitness A.\u00c7. stated on page 52 of his police statement that the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names \u2018Zana\u2019 and \u2018F\u0131rat\u2019, who had been acting under the leadership of a member with the code name \u2018Dilhas\u2019, had infiltrated the security forces\u2019 cordon in May 2003 around the Ziyaret river at G\u00fcle\u00e7 village in Malazgirt.\n...\nWitness M.A. stated on page forty-four of his statement that the attack on the public-order commando unit at the location known as G\u00f6ktepe in Malazgirt province in May 2003, that resulted in two soldiers being killed, had been carried out by the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names \u2018Zana\u2019 and \u2018F\u0131rat\u2019, who were acting under the leadership of ... \u2018Dilhas\u2019. On page forty-four [of his statement], he stated that the bomb had been planted at the road checkpoint at the location known as Efkartepe in Ovac\u0131k province on 28 October 2003 by ... \u2018Hamza\u2019 and that he was an expert in explosives and was from a unit whose leader was the member with the code name \u2018Diyar\u2019.\n...\nWitness V.D. stated on page 20 of his police statement that ... \u2018Dilhas\u2019 had placed the explosives on the highway between Tunceli and P\u00fcl\u00fcm\u00fcr and that ... he had heard this from \u2018Dilhas\u2019. D.T., who was being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 15 of his police statement that the decision to attack the military unit had been taken in October or November 2003 and that the mines had been placed and set off ... by Suat Da\u015ftan [the applicant], who had the code name \u2018Zafer\u2019. D.T., who gave evidence as a witness before the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court, acting on letters of request, stated that his pre-trial statements had been correct and that he had knowledge concerning [the applicant]\u2019s actions [under the code name \u201cZafer\u201d] in Ovac\u0131k province and at the guard post and that he had received that information from ... \u2018Serhildan\u2019.\nWitness A.\u00c7., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that his pre-trial statements had not been correct and that the member with the code name \u2018Nurhak\u2019 mentioned by the applicant had been himself [A.\u00c7.] and that they had not committed any attacks together.\nWitness M.A., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that he had known the applicant\u2019s code name as \u2018Hamza\u2019 and that he had no knowledge concerning the applicant\u2019s illegal activities within the organisation [the PKK].\n...\nb)  Examination of evidence, admission of our court and reasons\n...\nAlthough it was stated in the indictment that the applicant had been responsible for the attacks of 28 October and November 2003 in Ovac\u0131k province, it was understood that the attack which was mentioned by the witness D.T. was the one of 28 October 2003 and that the two attacks mentioned in the indictment were one and the same. And although [the applicant\u2019s] code name was revealed as \u2018Zafer\u2019, it came to light as a result of the confrontation [between the applicant and the witness M.A.] conducted during the trial that ... \u2018Hamza\u2019, who had been mentioned by the witness M.A. on page forty-four of his [police] statement as the perpetrator of the attack on 28 October 2003 and who had received special training in explosives, had [in fact] been [the applicant].\n...\nAlthough the accused [the applicant] denied any involvement in any armed activity throughout the proceedings, the statements of S.G., A.\u00c7., H.B., V.D., M.A. and D.T. as well as the evidence given by M.A. and D.T. during the trial and the fact that M.A. had identified the applicant as ... \u2018Hamza\u2019 were consistent with each other and the admitted witness statements [showed] that ... the applicant, who was known as \u2018Hamza\u2019 by the witness M.A., had sprung the trap and had placed the mines on 28 October 2003.\n...\u201d 16.  On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["7", "1", "4", "9", "2", "0", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Manisa. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 7 July 2009 the applicant was dismissed from the Expert Gendarmerie School due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8.  On 28 July 2009 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the decision to dismiss him. 9.  On 6 January 2010 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s case, taking into account the \u201csecret documents\u201d submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10.  On 5 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s request for rectification was rejected by the same court.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "1", "2", "6", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1981 and 1966 respectively and live in Ecemi\u015f village near the town of Lice, located with the administrative jurisdiction of the province of Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  The facts of the case as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the time of the events the first applicant\u2019s brother and the second applicant\u2019s nephew Murat Tekdal was thirty years old and lived in Ecemi\u015f village. 8.  On 12 September 2008 Murat Tekdal returned to his village of Ecemi\u015f after having visited his uncle, the second applicant. Later the same day he left his home to walk to the nearby \u015eenlik village. 9.  Between 5 and 7 p.m. the same day, villagers in Ecemi\u015f village heard gunfire. The following day the headman of the village (\u201cmuhtar\u201d) was informed that a person had been killed. The headman, accompanied by 20\u201130 villagers, went to Lice, where he was handed the body of the applicants\u2019 relative, Murat Tekdal. 10.  According to a report drawn up on 13 September 2008 by seven members of the military, a military operation was being carried out in the area near the applicants\u2019 village on 12 September 2008 when at 11.15 p.m. soldiers encountered 3-4 persons in the area whom they considered to be members of the PKK. The soldiers asked the persons to stop and surrender, but the persons opened fire on the soldiers. The soldiers returned fire and a clash ensued which continued for a period of approximately five minutes. 11.  At 5 a.m. the following morning the soldiers conducted a search in the area and noticed the footsteps of four persons. The footsteps disappeared some two kilometres away, next to a little brook in a valley. At that location the soldiers also found supplies of food. The soldiers continued their search to the north of the brook, and found the body of Murat Tekdal in Kara\u00e7ay hill area. Next to the body was a hunting rifle still loaded with two unexploded cartridges. 12.  The soldiers concluded in their report that there had been five PKK members in the area the previous evening who had either been planning to attack the security forces or transporting food supplies to PKK bases. Having regard to the particular brand of the glue which some people used for sniffing, as well as to the hunting rifle, the seven soldiers concluded in their report that the applicant\u2019s relative had been a \u201cterrorist posing as an ordinary citizen\u201d. 13.  The Lice prosecutor and a crime scene officer arrived at the scene at 10.45 a.m. on 13 September 2008 and searched Murat Tekdal\u2019s pockets, where they found his identity card and a tube of glue. The body was then taken to the Lice State Hospital. They then took the body to the Diyarbak\u0131r State Hospital and subsequently drew up their own reports pertaining to the incident. 14.  According to the crime scene officer\u2019s report, a bullet had entered Murat Tekdal\u2019s abdomen. A cursory examination of the barrel of the hunting rifle found next to the body did not reveal any smell of gunpowder. There were also no fingerprints on the rifle. In a small bag found next to the body there were personal effects such as toothpaste, a toothbrush, a flick-knife, a packet of cigarettes, two sim cards, gloves, a tax\u2011payer\u2019s identity card and a bank card. Swabs were taken from Murat Tekdal\u2019s hands and face and from the barrel of the hunting rifle, in order to verify the existence or otherwise of gunpowder residue. He was fingerprinted and his jacket through which the bullet had gone was sent for forensic analysis. The body was photographed and taken to the hospital. It was subsequently established by a police laboratory that there was gunpowder residue on the outside of his left hand. It was also established that he had been shot at close range. 15.  It appears from the report prepared by the prosecutor that an autopsy was carried out at the hospital. The prosecutor stated in his report that he had gone to the scene after having been informed by the military that \u201ca terrorist had been killed\u201d. The headman of the applicant\u2019s village formally identified the body as that of Murat Tekdal, and told the prosecutor that Murat lived in Ecemi\u015f village. 16.  During the autopsy the doctor observed two bullet holes on Murat Tekdal\u2019s lower left abdomen. He also noted that bullets had skimmed both hands and the lower right side of the abdomen and caused superficial injuries. There was also a superficial injury on the front of the right axilla. The internal examination of the body revealed injuries to the stomach, liver, diaphragm, spleen, intestines and lungs, all caused by bullets. A bullet measuring approximately 0.7 centimetres was found inside the body. Samples taken from the body were sent for further forensic analyses. An x\u2011ray of the body showed a large number of metallic objects inside the abdomen. The doctor concluded that death had been caused by bullets which had either entered or exited from the lower left abdomen. He also recommended that the clothes with bullet holes in them be sent to the forensic authorities with a view to determining the distance and the direction from which he had been shot. 17.  On 16 September 2008 the second applicant applied to the Diyarbak\u0131r branch of the Human Rights Association of Turkey, and asked for assistance in bringing the perpetrators of the killing of his nephew to justice. He also stated that since the killing, soldiers had been setting fire to the area where his nephew had been killed, and deliberately destroying the evidence. 18.  On 6 October 2008 the Lice prosecutor sent the investigation file to the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor who had jurisdiction to investigate incidents perpetrated by illegal organisations. In his letter accompanying the file the Lice prosecutor named the first applicant Fatma G\u00fcler as the \u201cvictim of a crime\u201d, and her deceased brother Murat Tekdal as the \u201cdeceased/suspect\u201d. The offence in question was stated as the \u201cdestruction of the unity and integrity of the State and the country\u201d. The Lice prosecutor stated in his letter that on the evening of 12 September 2008 a number of soldiers from the Lice Infantry Brigade had had an armed clash with a group of five PKK members and that the body of Murat Tekdal had been found in the search conducted by the soldiers the following morning. 19.  On 22 October 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor decided not to bring any criminal proceedings against Murat Tekdal for the above-mentioned offence, because he was dead. 20.  On 24 November 2008 the applicants sent a letter to the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor and stated that the Lice prosecutor had started an investigation into the killing of their relative, but had subsequently decided that he had no jurisdiction to continue the investigation because the deceased had been a member of a terrorist organisation. In their letter the applicants denied that their relative had been a member of the PKK, and informed the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor that their relative had been living in the village of Ecemi\u015f for the previous seven years and that all his fellow villagers knew him. They argued that there was no evidence to show that an armed clash had taken place prior to his killing. Indeed, the fact that his hunting rifle had been found loaded with unfired cartridges showed that there had been no armed clash. They asked the prosecutor to identify and prosecute those responsible for the killing of their relative. 21.  On 5 October 2009 the applicants lodged an objection against the prosecutor\u2019s above-mentioned decision of 22 October 2008. In their objection petition they repeated their arguments of 24 November 2008 and referred to, inter alia, Article 2 of the Convention. They alleged that no effective investigation had been conducted into the killing, and urged the Assize Court to order the investigating authorities to carry out an investigation. 22.  The applicants\u2019 objection was rejected by the Malatya Assize Court on 9 April 2010. The Assize Court stated that the prosecutor\u2019s decision had concerned an offence which the applicants\u2019 deceased relative was suspected of having committed. The objection lodged by the applicants, on the other hand, concerned the killing of their relative. The Assize Court stated that there was no on-going investigation into the killing of Murat Tekdal and that there had not been a decision not to prosecute anyone in respect of his killing. As there was no on-going investigation into the killing, the applicants had no standing to bring an objection against the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor\u2019s decision. The Assize Court\u2019s decision was communicated to the applicants on 30 April 2010.", "references": ["6", "9", "8", "1", "2", "5", "7", "4", "3", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants alleged principally that their twenty-one relatives (spouses, children, brothers and an uncle) had been killed by State servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny (see Appendix for details). 6.  A criminal investigation into the murders was opened on 5 March 2000 by the Grozny town prosecutor\u2019s office. Over the years, the applicants or close members of their families were granted victim status in the proceedings. Those proceedings are still ongoing. 7.  The documents indicate that only one applicant, Olga Soltykhanova (application no. 22304/10), was in the Novye Aldy at the time of the events; the other applicants were out of the district or out of Chechnya, owing to heavy fighting in the preceding months. 8.  In support of their claims, the applicants submitted copies of the death certificates issued in respect of their relatives, copies of some documents from the criminal investigation file, decisions granting them or their close relatives victim status in the criminal proceedings, statements which they had made, statements from witnesses to the events, and press and NGO reports. Several applicants also submitted documents issued in 2000 and 2001 by the local administration or \u201cneighbourhood committees\u201d confirming that the houses in which they had lived had been destroyed or damaged in 2000. 9.  Some applicants complained that their state of health had deteriorated due to the stress and anguish which they had suffered in the aftermath of the Novye Aldy killings, and particularly in view of the inadequate and callous response of the authorities to their plight. 10.  The facts of the present case are connected to the case of Musayev and Others v. Russia (nos. 57941/00 and 2 others, 26 July 2007) in so far as the applicants claimed that their relatives had been killed by the same people and in the same circumstances as the relatives of the applicants in that case. 11.  The applicants in Musayev and Others complained that eleven of their relatives had been killed by unidentified servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy. The first applicant had witnessed the deaths of his seven distant relatives (cousins and nephews). Other applicants in Musayev and Others were more closely connected to the victims, and were their husband, sister or brothers. The first applicant had been granted victim status in the domestic criminal proceedings and had participated in those proceedings (see Musayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 68, 81, 94). It appeared that in the domestic criminal proceedings the proximity of the relationships between the victims and the deceased had not been fully ascertained, and, as noted in the Musayev and Others judgment, no single list existed of the victims and the people who had been granted victim status in the proceedings (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 74, 80, 162). The Government did not challenge the first applicant\u2019s victim status under Article 2 of the Convention. 12.  On the basis of the parties\u2019 submissions and inferences drawn by the Court, it was established that on 5 February 2000 eleven relatives of the applicants had been killed by State servicemen in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny, during a special operation (a \u201csweeping\u201d operation) carried out by, amongst others, servicemen from the Police Special Task Unit (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f (\u041e\u041c\u041e\u041d)) from St Petersburg (hereinafter the St Petersburg OMON). 13.  According to the documents examined by the Court, more than fifty people had been killed on that day in the Novye Aldy by unidentified servicemen wearing camouflaged uniforms and using automatic weapons, equipped with portable radio sets, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and military Ural trucks. The same servicemen had also looted and burnt down a number of houses. 14.  In April 2006, when the parties exchanged observations in Musayev and Others, the criminal investigation was still ongoing. Although the investigation file reflected some attempts to identify the servicemen involved, there was no information that anyone had been charged with the crimes. The Court concluded that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the deaths. 15.  In addition, the first applicant, who had witnessed the deaths of his relatives and had himself been held at gunpoint, was found to be a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Lastly, a breach of Article 13 of the Convention was found, since the criminal investigation into the deaths had been inefficient, rendering any other remedy equally futile. 16.  On 5 March 2000 the Grozny town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal investigation no. 12011 into the murder of several inhabitants of the Novye Aldy settlement in Grozny by \u201cunidentified men armed with guns\u201d under Article 105 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (the murder of two or more persons with aggravating circumstances); the decision also referred to the looting of residents\u2019 property. In response to the Court\u2019s request in the present case, the Government submitted copies of eight volumes of documents from criminal case no. 12011, produced after the judgment issued in Musayev and Others. Those documents can be summarised as follows. 17.  The applicants submitted that, prior to the Musayev and Others judgment in July 2007, they had not been aware that another group of victims had applied to the Court. They also submitted that, prior to that date, they had had no reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the domestic investigation, even if no regular updates from the prosecutor\u2019s office had been forthcoming. Some of the applicants also referred to their previous contact with lawyers whom they had instructed to apply to the Court in 2005, but one lawyer had died, and either their instructions to other lawyers had not been complied with or the applicants had not kept any written proof of those instructions. As the documents in the Court\u2019s possession indicate, in March 2005 thirty-one families of victims of the Aldy events sent a letter to the Court stating their intention to apply to the Court. That letter included at least ten applicants in the present case. The signatories failed to submit proper applications or otherwise pursue that complaint, which was eventually discontinued. 18.  The deaths of eleven people were found to be in breach of Article 2 of the Convention in the Musayev and Others judgment (cited above), and the family members of five of those people are applicants in the present complaint (see Appendix). While the first applicant in the Musayev and Others case was a cousin and a nephew of the deceased, the applicants in the present group are the deceased\u2019s spouses, children and brothers. 19.  The applicants in the present case (or their close relatives) were granted victim status in criminal investigation file no. 12011 on various dates between March 2000 and June 2012 (see Appendix). Eight applicants were questioned and received victim status in March and April 2000. Six were granted victim status in April and May 2004, and one in March 2005. The other five received such status between December 2007 and July 2012. On 19 April 2004 the investigator of the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office granted an application made by a lawyer, Mr A. Khamzayev. The application was for thirty-two people to have victim status. The list included fourteen applicants in the present case, twelve of whom later obtained and countersigned proper individual decisions as indicated above. There is no information that any other procedural acts involving the applicants\u2019 participation occurred between April 2000 and December 2007 (see the following paragraph). 20.  The investigation was adjourned and resumed a number of times (see subsection 5. Various procedural steps below); on 5 December 2007 the investigation was resumed. As of 2008 the applicants in the present case and in Musayev and Others and their close relatives were regularly questioned about the events of 5 February 2000. Thus, in December 2008 the following applicants were questioned: Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09), Malika Ganayeva (no. 30538/09), Ruslan Khadzhimuradov (no. 21194/09), Birland Tasuyeva (no. 27064/09), Ibragim Musayev (no. 21200/09), Aset Khakimova (no. 32851/09), Osman Kudozov (no. 30578/09), Manshura Sugaipova (no. 27259/09), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09), Baret Shamsatova (no. 27159/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), Alpatu Khirikhanova (no. 24700/09), Yakhita Bishayeva (no. 32855/09), and Yakhita Dzhabrailova (no. 32992/09). In November 2012 the investigators questioned Elina Umarkhadzhiyeva and Madina Dzhamoldayeva[1] (no. 30538/09); in December 2013 they questioned Rashid Gerikhanov (no. 27063/09), Aysest Musostova (no. 32862/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), and Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09). During questioning, the investigators informed the applicants about forensic expert reports on the bodies that had been carried out in 2000. The applicants were also asked questions about the loss of property and were asked to estimate the pecuniary damage which they had sustained. While they provided some estimates, no documents were provided, and all applicants stated that they intended to seek pecuniary damages as civil parties during the trial. 21.  Additional questioning of the applicants, their relatives and other local residents continued into 2009 and the years which followed. New victims of the events were identified as late as 2014, and their relatives were granted victim status in the proceedings. The questioning of other local residents continued until 2014, when they were granted victim status in the proceedings, notably in respect of the loss of property. 22.  On 9 February 2009 Mrs Birlant Beterakhmadova (application no. 24693/09) complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny regarding the decision of 24 November 2008 to adjourn the investigation and the prosecutor\u2019s failure to conduct an efficient investigation into the murders. 23.  On 3 April 2009 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court noted that the decision of 24 November 2008 had been quashed on 15 March 2009 by the Chechnya Investigative Committee, and dismissed Mrs Beterakhmadova\u2019s complaint. She did not appeal against that decision. 24.  The decision of 10 April 2006 to adjourn the investigation (and subsequent similar documents) indicates that in May 2005 the investigation identified S.B. as a suspect. He was charged with aggravated murder and robbery. In February 2000 S.B. had been a police technician with the sapper battalion of the St Petersburg OMON. The charges stated that on 5 February 2000 he, along with three other unidentified persons, had killed Mr Sultan Dzhabrailov (the husband of Mrs Yakhita Dzhabrailova, applicant in case no. 32992/09) by shooting him with a Kalashnikov machine gun. S.B. was also charged with robbing two other people of money and jewellery, A.M and B.M. In October 2005 S.B. escaped to Belarus and his name was put on the international wanted list. In February 2006 the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny ruled that S.B. should be arrested. The decision of 10 April 2006 states that the investigator informed the victims of that decision, but the case file contains no relevant correspondence. Copies of letters submitted by the parties indicate that a copy of that decision was sent to the victims on 14 November 2007. 25.  In April 2011 the investigators asked the prosecutor\u2019s office in St Petersburg to question S.B.\u2019s civil partner about his whereabouts. In November 2012 she stated that she had had no information about S.B.\u2019s whereabouts since 2006, although she had seen him in 2008 in St Petersburg. 26.  In November 2012 the investigators examined a social network page belonging to S.B. and noted that the latest photographs on it had been uploaded in 2007. In May 2013 the investigators sought to obtain additional information about S.B.\u2019s whereabouts by questioning his other relatives, locating his mobile phone, and so on. 27.  During the questioning of victims and witnesses the investigators collected additional information about the suspects. Thus, in February 2009 Mr Ibragim Musayev (application no. 21200/09) referred to servicemen from the 245th motorised rifle regiment, the commander of that regiment, and the commander of company no. 6 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 107) as possible suspects. 28.  In April 2010 the investigation produced a list of over 170 servicemen of the St Petersburg OMON who had been posted in Chechnya in February 2000, and asked for verification of whether one of them had a tattoo in the shape of a snake on his neck, mentioned by one of the witnesses. Dozens of servicemen were inspected, but no one with a snake-shaped tattoo was identified. When questioned in February 2011, the servicemen, in brief statements, confirmed that they had served in Chechnya in February 2000 but had no knowledge of the civilians killed in the Novye Aldy. 29.  In April 2010 the investigators sent a letter asking the prosecutor of the Northern Caucasus military circuit to identify and question the servicemen and commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment (see Musayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 105-07). The letter contained detailed information and questions about the events of 5 February 2000, and asked the prosecutor to identify and question the people who had used known radio call signs and to identify the commanders of the operation. In June 2010 an officer of the military unit concerned stated, as a witness, that all details about the use of radio equipment and the assignment of calls were stored as secret information for five years. Several reminders followed in 2011 asking, in particular, for the former commander of the 245th regiment, Major-General S.L., to be questioned. 30.  In June 2010 the investigator in charge sought similar information from another military unit (the 15th motorised rifle regiment), including the names of the unit commanders who had taken part in the operation on 5 February 2000. In particular, the letter referred to the commander of company no. 6 of the regiment, who, the investigators suggested, had written a note left by the servicemen for the local residents. 31.  In May 2011 the investigators asked the military investigators to submit information about the commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment and to ask them a number of specific questions about the events of 5 February 2000. 32.  In April 2011 the investigators asked the investigator of St Petersburg to carry out additional ballistic reports on 357 guns used by the St Petersburg OMON in February 2000. 33.  In May 2011 the investigator in charge informed the military prosecutor of the Southern military circuit that the special operation on 5 February 2000 in the south of Grozny had been under the command of Colonel Ye.K., the head of the operative headquarters of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior. He reminded the military prosecutors of his previous requests for the commanders of that operation to be identified and questioned. It does not appear that any progress was achieved in this respect. 34.  During additional questioning in the period 2009-2013, local residents were asked about the damage to their property caused in 2000. They explained that many houses had been burnt down by the servicemen, and that those who had stayed in the district had been forced to give up their jewellery and valuables as a result of threats. Others estimated the amount of pecuniary damage caused (see Appendix). No one was granted victim status in relation to any property offence and no additional documents were requested from the residents. The victims stated that they would seek damages in the course of a criminal trial, as civil parties. 35.  On 18 January 2014 the investigator ruled that no criminal proceedings should be opened in connection to the crimes relating to property, due to the expiration of the statutory limits for those crimes. It does not appear that that decision was challenged. In December 2014 decisions according civil party status in criminal proceedings with regard to property claims were issued in respect of the following applicants: Ayset Musostova (no. 32862/090), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693) and Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09). Osman Kudozov (application no. 30578/09) submitted documents which indicated that the house for which he claimed compensation had been owned by M.K., his sister. In his written statement to the Court he stated that at some point M.K. had received compensation from the State for the lost property, but he submitted no relevant documents. 36.  On 5 December 2007 the investigation of criminal case file no. 12011 into the events of 5 February 2000 was resumed, and the victims were informed accordingly. 37.  On 5 January 2008 the investigation was adjourned. 38.  The investigation was then resumed, but on 18 August 2008 was adjourned again, and the applicants were informed accordingly. 39.  The investigation was then resumed, but adjourned again on 24 November 2008. A letter informing the victims of the adjournment was dated 24 October 2008. 40.  It appears that the investigation was reopened and then adjourned again on 11 January 2009. 41.  It was then reopened in March 20009, and on 16 April 2009 adjourned again, for similar reasons as those stated in the decision of 10 April 2006 (see paragraph 24 above). 42.  On 22 March 2010 the Chechnya Investigative Committee gave an order for an investigating group to be set up which would include investigators from the military prosecutor\u2019s office, in view of information about the possible implication of military servicemen in the crimes. 43.  In June 2010 the investigators watched a video filmed in the Novye Aldy on 9 February 2000 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 25) and produced the video\u2019s transcript for the file. 44.  In November 2012 the investigators compiled a table of people who had been killed on 5 February 2000, indicating their places of burial, the next-of-kin granted victim status in the proceedings, and the dates of such decisions. The table contains information about forty-seven deaths, including the deaths of twenty people about which the applicants in the present case complain; the one exception is Isa Akhmadov, born in 1964 (the brother of Aysest Musostova, application no. 32862/09). At the same time, the table contains information about the death of a certain Isa Akhmatov, born in 1959, in respect of whose death another person (his brother) was questioned and granted victim status in June 2012. 45.  In December 2014 the investigation recognised civil party status of three applicants in connection with the destruction and theft of property during the events of 5 February 2000. 46.  It does not appear that the applicants were informed of any other developments, or that they sought further information from the investigating authorities.", "references": ["3", "7", "8", "4", "5", "1", "6", "2", "No Label", "0", "9"], "gold": ["0", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Budapest. 6.  On 20 July 2015 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and his common-law wife, H.M. The latter called an ambulance because the applicant was under the influence of alcohol and was behaving oddly, and had a violent outburst. 7.  At about 4.40 p.m., instead of an ambulance, police officers E.Sz. and T.Z. appeared at the applicant\u2019s flat, handcuffed the applicant and took him to the Orosh\u00e1za police department, arriving there at about 5.10 p.m. 8.  According to the applicant he had no injuries when he was put into the police car. He was allegedly assaulted at the police station. While he was handcuffed and in the room for short-term arrestees, one of the three police officers present either kicked or pushed him from behind onto the floor. He hit his face and nose, which started to bleed. He also suffered injuries to his teeth. He fainted and when he regained consciousness, about fifteen minutes later, he found himself handcuffed to a bench, his knees hurting. His request for help was allegedly disregarded by the police officers at first, but when it became apparent that he could not walk, he was taken to hospital. 9.  At 7.45 p.m. the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. at Orosh\u00e1za Hospital. He had bruises on the bridge of his nose and around his two wrists, abrasions on his right thigh, scratches below his left knee, and his left tibia was broken. He was hospitalised following the examination. 10.  On 22 July 2015 the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. of the Department of Traumatology, and further injuries were noted on his body: bruises on his upper left arm, an abrasion around the right side of his collar\u2011bone, scratches around the left side of his collar-bone, bruises on both sides of his hips, two loose teeth, one broken and one missing tooth in the upper jaw. 11.  The head of Orosh\u00e1za police station of his own motion filed a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators alleging \u201cill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings\u201d. The Central Investigation Office opened an investigation into ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings, assault causing actual bodily harm, and grievous bodily harm. 12.  In his testimony the applicant stated that he had been kicked from behind when taken into custody. At that time he had been handcuffed and had fallen onto his face on the floor, as a consequence of which his nose had started to bleed. He explained that he had remained unconscious for 15\u201120 minutes and when he had regained consciousness, his nose had been bleeding and he had felt pain in his knee. He had asked for help, but only when the police officers realised that he was unable to stand unaided had he been taken to hospital. 13.  H.M. was questioned as a witness. Describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived she stated that the applicant had not mentioned to her before the incident that he had hurt his leg. She also stated that on the day of the incident the applicant had been found by her daughter lying on the kitchen floor. She confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events in so far as she maintained that she had seen no injuries on the applicant when he was put into the police car. 14.  K.B., the daughter of H.M., also questioned as a witness, stated that on 20 July 2015 at around 12.30 p.m. she had found the applicant lying on the kitchen floor and not breathing. She proceeded to wake him up and could tell that he had been drinking alcohol. She had also seen the applicant earlier that day falling over in the yard, but he had sustained only minor injuries to his arm and leg. 15.  According to the police report, when the police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s flat, the applicant was sitting on the floor and was unable to communicate. He did not identify himself, despite the officers\u2019 order. When the police officers tried to handcuff him, he resisted, swinging his head from side to side. He fell to the ground and his nose started bleeding. He could only be put in the police car with the use of force, and when inside it he kept insulting the police officers. At the police station he continued to behave aggressively and tried to hit his head against the floor. He therefore had to be handcuffed and laid on the floor. He was not injured during these measures and his handcuffs were removed when he calmed down at around 7 p.m. He refused to be examined by a doctor. 16.  The Central Investigation Office also questioned E.Sz. and T.Z. and two other police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant\u2019s placement in the room for short-term arrestees, and a third officer who had come on duty at around 6 p.m. the same day. E.Sz. and T.Z. confirmed what was in the police report and the other three witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant. They all stated that the applicant had been drunk and had been handcuffed to prevent him causing harm to himself. 17.  The two members of the medical staff of Orosh\u00e1za Hospital who had been present during the applicant\u2019s treatment could not recall the event in detail but remembered that the applicant had not complained about ill\u2011treatment by the police officers and, although limping, was able to walk unaided to the x-ray examination room. 18.  On 1 November 2015 the medical expert appointed by the Central Investigation Office expressed the opinion that the applicant\u2019s leg had been broken one or two weeks prior to the incident and that it could not be determined whether the injuries to his teeth had been caused before or during his detention for questioning at the police station. According to the expert opinion, it was implausible that the applicant would have been capable of reconstructing the events of the day, owing to his drunkenness. 19.  On 17 December 2015 the Central Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of any conclusive evidence (as regards ill\u2011treatment committed in the course of official proceedings and assault causing actual bodily harm) and for the absence of a crime (as regards causing grievous bodily harm). According to the Investigation Office, it could not be established which injuries occurred during the police measures and whether they were caused by ill-treatment or the applicant\u2019s own behaviour. The decision also stated that the applicant\u2019s tibia could not have been broken during the incident and that the applicant\u2019s credibility was questionable due to his drunkenness. 20.  The applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order. He maintained that his colleagues and supervisors, as well as the members of his household could have confirmed that he had no leg injury before the incident if they were heard as witnesses or if specific questions were put to them in this regard. He also submitted that Dr CS.H. (see paragraph 9 above) had been biased and questioned the credibility of the statement in the expert opinion of 1 November 2015 concerning his drunkenness (see paragraph 18 in fine above). 21.  On 18 February 2016 the chief prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the complaint. It endorsed the first-instance decision concerning the assessment of evidence and the legal classification thereof, informing the applicant of the possibility of pursuing substitute private prosecution proceedings.", "references": ["7", "5", "9", "4", "6", "2", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Bas\u0131m ve Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k, which published a periodical, Vesta. 5.  In 2004 an article written by Mr M.\u015e. entitled \u201cOn the Kurdish Intellectual\u201d was published in Vesta. 6.  On 29 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, certain passages of the article depicted the PKK[1] as part of the Kurdish intellectual movement and hence constituted propaganda of the organisation, known for employing violence and terror. 7.  On 23 September 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as he had published the article in question in Vesta. 8.  In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court cited the following passages from the article:\n\u201cIn Kurdish history, there have been moments, in certain periods, during which Kurdish literature and culture developed and shone. In those moments, sparks of thought appeared. However, objectively and without renouncing the past, the conditions of the birth of Kurdish intellectualism are based on the 1970s. In earlier periods, there had only been individual and temporary developments not creating traditions. The political nature of the 20th century, the existence and rise of national liberation movements, the emergence of modern currents in Kurdish politics and, most importantly, the creation of a mass movement, served as the basis for the birth of the Kurdish intellectual. This process was manifested in the figure of the PKK. All political movements before the PKK were rebellious, devoid of political depth, tactical unity, stable path and permanence. The ideological and intellectual superficiality of these revolts and their fierce repression led to the loss of existing knowledge and to falling behind. From this point of view, through political and thoughtful analysis, while being free from the system and alienation, and bearing within it its own cultural identity based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics, [the PKK] allowed the beginning of a permanent and stable political enlightenment process.\n...\nAnother characteristic of the PKK movement at the beginning was that it realised that [the previous] abstract and theoretical movements had not led to a solution but deepened the problem.\n...\nThe fact that the PKK movement was based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics who were intact and preserved their national identity paved the way for a start favourable for a confident, militant and revolutionary tradition. Yet, the progress of the movement was accompanied by the downfall of the level of quality.\u201d 9.  The court considered that the aforementioned passages and the article in its entirety constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. It hence sentenced the applicant to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of 375 Turkish liras (TRY). Taking into account his good behaviour during the trial and his character, the court suspended the pronouncement of his conviction on condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (h\u00fckm\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n geri b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131). 10.  On 22 October 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision.", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "4", "9", "5", "1", "2", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  On 6 September 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Commission for Restitution (Komisija za restituciju nepokretnosti) in Berane requesting restitution of the property expropriated from his father in 1969. 7.  Following the adoption of a new Restitution Act (Zakon o povra\u0107aju oduzetih imovinskih prava i obe\u0161te\u0107enju), on 28 December 2005, the applicant submitted another application to the newly established Commission for Restitution and Compensation in Berane (Komisija za povra\u0107aj oduzetih imovinskih prava i obe\u0161te\u0107enja) requesting compensation. 8.  In 2008 all the Commissions for Restitution and Compensation were consolidated into three regional Commissions in Bar, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica. Due to the location of the expropriated property, the applicant\u2019s request was assigned to the Commission with its seat in Bijelo Polje (hereinafter \u201cthe Commission\u201d). 9.  On 19 February 2009 the applicant sought opinion from an independent expert regarding the expropriated property. 10.  On 21 July 2009 the Commission also requested an assessment report on the expropriated property. The report was submitted to the Commission on 24 July 2009. 11.  Due to Commission\u2019s inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (\u017ealba zbog \u0107utanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za \u017ealbe u postupku za povra\u0107aj imovinskog prava ili obe\u0161te\u0107enja). 12.  On 23 October 2009 and 5 December 2013 the applicant filed complaints with the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court, respectively, about the Appeals Commission\u2019s inactivity. 13.  On 24 December 2013 the Appeals Commission ordered the Commission to decide on the applicant\u2019s request within a period of 30 days. 14.  On 13 October 2014 the Commission ruled against the applicant. 15.  On 23 December 2014 the Appeals Commission upheld that decision on appeal. 16.  The applicant filed and action with the Administrative Court seeking redress. 17.  On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18.  On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).", "references": ["8", "0", "9", "2", "5", "1", "4", "7", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in the village of Bajorai in Vilnius Region. 6.  On 29 December 1999, 28 March 2000, 2 May 2000, 4 May 2000, 16 August 2000 and 18 September 2000 the national authorities allocated plots of land to S.J., I.T., E.G., A.G., J.T. and A.I. and E.\u0160. (thus compensating them for their or their parents\u2019 property nationalised by the Soviet regime (see paragraph 25 below)), who later transferred their property rights to \u017d.S. in accordance with requests they had lodged on 28 October 1991, 10 October 1991, 22 November 1991, 8 August 1991 and 9 December 1991 respectively. The land allocated to these third parties was located in the same area as where the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s land was situated before nationalisation following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940. 7.  On 29 July 2000 the applicant asked the Lithuanian authorities to restore his property rights to 9.5705 hectares of his father\u2019s land by giving him a new plot of land. 8.  On 22 January 2001 the national authorities established that part of the land was unoccupied and could have been returned to the heirs. 9.  On 15 March 2002 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the restoration of property rights of I.T. had been unlawful. As a result, a plot of land of 0.18 hectares was returned to the State. 10.  On 30 July 2002 the applicant changed his initial request (see paragraph 7 above) and asked for his property rights to be restored in natura. The authorities asked the applicant to provide them with some documents necessary to proceed with the restoration of his property rights. In January 2003 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) asked the Vilnius City Municipality (hereinafter \u201cthe VCM\u201d) to determine whether or not the land in question was State redeemable. In February 2003 the VCM found that the land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. Accordingly, the applicant was asked to express his intentions regarding the form in which he wanted his ownership rights to the property to be restored. 11.  As the plot of land previously owned by the applicant\u2019s father was State redeemable, in March 2003 the applicant asked to be provided with a new plot of land of equal value in Vilnius. 12.  In May 2006 the VCA asked the VCM to demarcate a plot of land, previously owned by the applicant\u2019s father, for the applicant. However, the VCM confirmed that the land was State redeemable because part of it was already being owned by third parties and was a State forest. 13.  In December 2007 the VCA informed the applicant that his father\u2019s land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. The applicant was also informed that he was included in the list of persons waiting to have their property rights restored, and was 4,055th in line. 14.  On 5 February 2009 the authorities adopted a decision restoring the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.18 hectares of his father\u2019s land and informed him that his property rights to the remaining 9.3905 hectares would be restored at a later date. 15.  The applicant lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and asked it to (i) annul the decisions of the authorities to restore property rights to his father\u2019s land to third parties on the grounds that they were unlawful, (ii) award him 1,422,791 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 412,069 euros (EUR)) in compensation in respect of pecuniary damage and (iii) oblige the authorities to restore his property rights to a specific plot of land. The latter request was later withdrawn. The applicant claimed that the decisions to restore property rights to his father\u2019s land to third parties were unlawful because he had submitted his request when the land had not yet been State redeemable. His property rights therefore had to be restored. 16.  The VCA explained that the applicant had submitted the request to have his property rights restored in 2000, while the third parties had done so in 1991 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The VCA also stated that the applicant had not provided any evidence that the requirements of the domestic law had been breached in restoring property rights to third parties. 17.  On 10 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the legislation in force at the time did not allow for the return of the land in natura to the applicant because he did not have any buildings on that land as property (see paragraph 24 below). In 2001 the provision in question was declared unconstitutional (see paragraph 23 below). The court also held that the applicant had not lost the opportunity to have his property rights restored. It was also possible that he would be given a more valuable plot of land, therefore it was decided that he had not suffered pecuniary damage. 18.  The applicant appealed. On 15 March 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It held that the applicant had not asked for the land to be returned in natura until after the property rights to it had already been restored to third parties (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The court also held that 29 October 2002 was the date when the specific location and borders of the land which the applicant asked to have returned in natura had been established. Furthermore, it did not consider that the domestic authorities had acted unlawfully, which was a precondition for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage. 19.  In February 2012 the National Land Service informed the applicant that in order to accelerate the process of restoring property rights to citizens, the domestic law had been amended and it had become possible for him to receive monetary compensation for the land. He was also informed that if he wished to use that opportunity, he had until 1 June 2012 to provide the authorities with a written request (see paragraph 25 below). The applicant replied in May 2012 that he had not changed his mind and still wanted to receive the land in natura or, if that was not possible, a plot of land of equal value in Vilnius. 20.  In August 2014 the National Land Service asked the VCM whether it was possible to demarcate any vacant land that was not State redeemable and could have been returned to the heirs of the applicant\u2019s father. 21.  In November 2014 the applicant was informed that he could change his mind about the form of restitution and receive a plot of forest of equal value. He was asked by letter to make a decision by 1 March 2015, but it appears that he did not respond.", "references": ["0", "2", "8", "3", "5", "6", "1", "7", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market. 6.  By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar D\u00fczenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Board\u201d) decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat\u0131 Sigorta Fonu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank\u2019s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7.  On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank\u2019s loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY). 8.  On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. 9.  On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131 Holding A.\u015e., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar D\u00fczenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Agency\u201d) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board\u2019s decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 10.  On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank\u2019s legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001. 11.  On 20 September 2001 Ms S. C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131o\u011flu, the main shareholder of C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131 Holding A.\u015e., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 12.  On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants\u2019 claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board\u2019s implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants\u2019 cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank\u2019s equities had been transferred to the Fund\u2019s account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts\u2019 decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final. 13.  Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board\u2019s decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants\u2019 requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts\u2019 decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board\u2019s decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank\u2019s shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank\u2019s shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC. 14.  Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank\u2019s equities had been transferred to the Fund\u2019s account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants\u2019 requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.", "references": ["8", "0", "4", "7", "6", "1", "5", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  Mr Adyan (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born in 1991, while Mr Avetisyan, Mr Khachatryan and Mr Margaryan (\u201cthe second, third and fourth applicants\u201d) were born in 1993. The first and second applicants live in Yerevan, while the third and fourth applicants live in Tsaghkavan and Kapan respectively. 7.  The applicants are four Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses who were found to be fit for military service. 8.  In May and June 2011 the applicants were called up for military service. They failed to appear, and instead addressed letters to the local military commissariat (\u0566\u056b\u0576\u057e\u0578\u0580\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u056f\u0578\u0574\u056b\u057d\u0561\u0580\u056b\u0561\u057f) and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, refusing to perform either military or alternative service. They stated that they were Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and that, having studied the Alternative Service Act, they had come to the conclusion that, by European standards, the service proposed was not of a genuinely civilian nature since it was supervised by the military authorities. Their conscience did not allow them to work directly or indirectly for the military system. The alternative labour service was known to be organised and supervised by the military authorities because the alternative labour serviceman\u2019s record booklet was marked \u201cArmed Forces of Armenia\u201d, and alternative servicemen were subject to military discipline and penalties and had to register with the military subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia. Furthermore, the law required that they remain at their place of service around the clock, seven days a week, which was akin to house arrest and was unacceptable to the applicants. The requirement to perform military service or the available alternative service violated their rights guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For the reasons stated above, their conscience did not allow them to perform the alternative service available in Armenia. The applicants added that they were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not in any way connected with the military authorities and did not violate their religious beliefs. 9.  On 15 June 2011 charges were brought against the second applicant under Article 327 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (evasion of regular conscription for military or alternative service). 10.  On 6 July 2011 the first and fourth applicants were arrested. 11.  On 7 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the first and fourth applicants. Finding the investigator\u2019s applications for their detention substantiated, the Syunik Regional Court decided to detain them. 12.  On 28 July 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the first and fourth applicants against the detention orders, finding, inter alia, that as the alleged offence carried a sentence of more than one year\u2019s imprisonment, that increased the probability that the first and fourth applicants would commit a new offence or evade punishment if they remained at large. 13.  On 27 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the third applicant and the Tavush Regional Court decided to detain him at the investigator\u2019s request, finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he was charged. 14.  On an unspecified date his criminal case was sent to court. 15.  On 19 August 2011 the Tavush Regional Court decided to set the case down for trial, finding that the \u201cdetention was to remain unchanged\u201d. 16.  On 24 August 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined an appeal lodged by the third applicant against the detention order of 27 July 2011 and decided to dismiss it, finding, inter alia, that the offence with which he was charged carried a sentence of more than one year\u2019s imprisonment, which increased the probability that he would commit a new offence or evade punishment if he remained at large. 17.  In the course of the proceedings before their respective trial courts, the applicants submitted that their opposition to military and alternative service was based on their religious beliefs. The alternative service provided for under domestic law was not of a genuinely civilian nature, as it was supervised by the military authorities. The right to conscientious objection was protected by, inter alia, Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not supervised by the military and was of a genuinely civilian nature. 18.  On 19 July 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years and six months in prison. He was taken into custody on the same day. 19.  On 27 July 2011 the Syunik Regional Court imposed similar sentences on the first and fourth applicants. 20.  On 25 November 2011 the Tavush Regional Court imposed a similar sentence on the third applicant. 21.  The applicants lodged appeals against their convictions, arguing that they violated the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention. Their opposition to the alternative service available in Armenia was based on their religious beliefs, as that service was not of a genuinely civilian nature and failed to comply with European standards. It was organised and supervised by the military authorities (section 14 of the Alternative Service Act (see paragraph 28 below)) and was equivalent to non-armed military service, whereas their conscience did not allow them to perform any service supervised by the military authorities. Furthermore, section 17(3) of the Act authorised a military authority to order the transfer of an alternative labour serviceman to another institution, while certain aspects of the service were organised in accordance with military rules (section 18(2) of the Act). Alternative labour servicemen were also required to wear a uniform that resembled a military uniform and to follow orders, and were not allowed to leave their place of service without authorisation. The cover of the alternative labour serviceman\u2019s record booklet (\u0561\u0575\u056c\u0568\u0576\u057f\u0580\u0561\u0576\u0584\u0561\u0575\u056b\u0576 \u0561\u0577\u056d\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0576\u0584\u0561\u0575\u056b\u0576 \u056e\u0561\u057c\u0561\u0575\u0578\u0572\u056b \u0563\u0580\u0584\u0578\u0582\u0575\u056f) bore the coat of arms and the words \u201cThe Armed Forces of Armenia\u201d, and the monthly allowance paid was the same as that of military servicemen. Moreover, alternative service was punitive in nature as it lasted forty-two months and alternative servicemen were required to stay at their place of service around the clock. They reiterated their readiness to perform a genuinely civilian alternative service and argued that, in the absence of alternative service that complied with European standards and was of a truly civilian nature, their sentences did not pursue a pressing social need and were not necessary in a democratic society. 22.  On 2 December 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Regional Courts in the cases of the first and second applicants.\nIn the first applicant\u2019s case, the Court of Appeal found as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the arguments of the defence that the alternative labour service in Armenia does not comply with European standards, is of a military nature and is supervised by the military, the Court of Appeal finds that [the State] ... is taking appropriate measures in respect of the obligations assumed before the Council of Europe as regards, in particular, the enactment and continuous improvement of the legislation concerning alternative service.\nThe Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the Alternative Service Act, the [relevant] Government decrees and [other executive orders] are based on the Armenian Constitution and must therefore be applied in the present case with the following considerations.\n[Citation of sections 2 and 3(1) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)]\nIt follows from the above-mentioned provisions that [the State] has made a clear distinction between alternative military service and alternative labour service, and has guaranteed by law the civilian nature of the latter.\n[Citation of sections 17 and 18(3) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)]\nBased on an analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, the Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the fact that the head of the institution [where alternative service is performed] notifies [the local military commissariat] regarding the alternative labour service to be performed by the serviceman, the fact that the serviceman can be transferred to another institution or place and the fact that alternative labour servicemen are discharged from service to the reserve and are registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, are not sufficient to conclude that the alternative labour service in Armenia is of a military nature, since ... the type, procedures and conditions of such labour are determined by the heads of the relevant institutions without any interference by the military authorities or their representatives.\nFurthermore, it is the head of [the relevant] institution who is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the alternative labour service and not the subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia.\nThe argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia similarly does not suggest that there is no alternative labour service in Armenia. It must be noted that in reality, servicemen perform the labour service outside the Armed Forces of Armenia and it does not contain elements of military service.\nThe Court of Appeal also finds it necessary to note that an analysis of the Alternative Service Act shows that the specifics of the legal status of alternative labour servicemen are set out in the said Act and the labour legislation of Armenia and they are subjects ... of labour rather than military relations.\nThe preceding conclusion is evidenced also by a number of other provisions of the Act, in particular, the fact that alternative labour servicemen are subordinate only to the heads of the relevant civilian institutions, are obliged to follow only their orders and instructions, and must abide by the internal disciplinary rules of such institutions, while questions relating to the social security of servicemen and their family members are regulated by the legislation on State pensions rather than military laws (sections 19 and 20).\nIt must be noted that Government Decree no. 940-N of 25 June 2004 established the list of institutions where alternative service is performed and the form and the manner of wearing the alternative serviceman\u2019s uniform.\nParagraph 2(b) of the Decree stipulates that \u2018alternative labour servicemen perform their service in the institutions under the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs\u2019.\nPursuant to [Annex 1] to the Decree, \u2018the tasks performed by alternative labour servicemen in the said bodies are those of an orderly\u2019.\nThe Government have entrusted the ministers of the bodies in question, as well as the Minister of Defence, with certain responsibilities, such as the provision of clothing, food and financial means to servicemen and other organisational work (paragraph 3 of the Decree).\nThe fact that the Minister of Defence is also involved in the organisation of the alternative service does not suggest that the labour service transforms into military service, since, firstly, the Minister of Defence and certain subdivisions of the Armed Forces are called upon to participate in the organisation of the alternative military service.\nAs regards the fact that the military authorities carry out supervision of labour servicemen together with the heads of the relevant institutions, the Court of Appeal considers that this still does not change the nature of the service performed. Moreover, as already noted above, the type, procedures and conditions of the civilian labour are determined and may be changed only by the head of the relevant institution.\n...\nIt must be noted that performing the tasks of an orderly at the relevant medical institutions of Armenia is not only not demeaning, but on the contrary is humanitarian, serves the interests of society and is aimed at preservation of human health and life.\nThe argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is punitive in nature is also unsubstantiated.\n...\nIn the light of the above, the Court of Appeal, based on the concrete facts of the case, namely that [the first applicant] has categorically refused to be conscripted to perform alternative labour service, concludes that he has been found criminally liable and sentenced in a justified and fair manner for such actions, and this fact does not contradict ... the case-law of the European Court regarding Article 9 of the Convention.\u201d\nIn the second applicant\u2019s case, the Court of Appeal found that his conviction had been lawful, well-founded and reasoned. 23.  On 9 December 2011 and 6 March 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal adopted judgments in the cases of the third and fourth applicants similar to its judgment in the case of the first applicant. 24.  The applicants lodged appeals on points of law, raising the same arguments as in their appeals. 25.  On 7, 8 and 17 February and 7 May 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 appeals inadmissible for lack of merit. 26.  On 8 and 9 October 2013 the applicants were released from prison following a general amnesty, after having served between twenty-six and twenty-seven months of their sentences. 27.  Article 327 \u00a7 1 provides that evasion of regular conscription for fixed-term military or alternative service, in the absence of legal grounds for exemption from such service, is punishable by detention (defined in this context as imprisonment under conditions of strict isolation) for a period not exceeding two months or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. 28.  The relevant provisions of the Alternative Service Act of 17 December 2003, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, read as follows:\nSection 2. Concept and types of alternative service\n\u201c1.  Within the meaning of this Act alternative service is the service that replaces compulsory fixed-term military service. It does not involve the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, and is performed in both military and civilian institutions. 2.  There are two types of alternative service:\n(a)  Alternative military service, namely military service performed in the armed forces of Armenia which does not involve being on combat duty or the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms; and\n(b)  Alternative labour service, namely labour service performed outside the armed forces of Armenia. 3.  The purpose of alternative service is to ensure the fulfilment of a civic obligation towards the motherland and society, and it does not have a punitive, demeaning or degrading nature.\u201d\nSection 3. Grounds for performing alternative service\n\u201c1.  An Armenian citizen whose creed or religious beliefs contradict the performance of military service in a military unit, including the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, may perform alternative service. ...\u201d\nSection 5. Duration of alternative service\n\u201cThe duration of alternative military service is 36 months.\nThe duration of alternative labour service is 42 months.\u201d\nSection 14. Ensuring the implementation of alternative service\n\u201cConscription for alternative service is organised and its implementation is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia. ...\u201d\nSection 17. Procedure for performing alternative labour service\n\u201c1.  A citizen conscripted to perform alternative labour service shall be sent, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, to the institution where he is to perform his alternative labour service. 2.  The head of the local institution where the alternative labour service is to be performed shall include the alternative labour serviceman in the institution\u2019s personnel list, decide on the type, procedures and conditions of work, ensuring that he is fully occupied, and notify the local military commissariat thereof in writing within three days. 3.  The alternative labour serviceman may be transferred to perform his service in another institution or place upon the order or initiative of the authorised public authority in the field of defence. 4.  The alternative labour serviceman shall remain at his place of service around the clock. The place of service is considered to be the area which the institution has the authority to be in charge of, to possess and to use. 5.  The alternative labour serviceman may not be appointed to managerial posts or be involved in other activities during his service. 6.  The alternative labour servicemen shall be discharged from service to the reserve and registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.\u201d\nSection 18. Responsibilities of the head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed\n\u201c1.  The head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed shall provide the alternative labour serviceman with food, a prescribed uniform, underwear, a sleeping facility, and bedding and personal hygiene items; shall familiarise [the alternative labour serviceman] with the internal rules of work discipline and the specifics of the work to be performed. 2.  The head of the institution shall guarantee the alternative labour serviceman\u2019s security at the place of service, oversee the implementation of the service and create the necessary conditions for the serviceman\u2019s rest and family visits, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act Establishing the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces. 3.  The head of the institution is responsible for the organisation and implementation of alternative labour service at the institution.\u201d\nSection 19. Rights and obligations of alternative servicemen\n\u201c1.  An alternative serviceman shall receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service. ...\n... 4.   During their service, alternative servicemen shall uphold the internal rules of service discipline, fulfil their responsibilities and follow the orders or instructions of the relevant head (or commander), wear the prescribed uniform and not leave the place of service without authorisation. ...\u201d\nSection 20. Social security cover for alternative servicemen and their family members\n\u201c1.  Questions related to social security cover for alternative military servicemen and their family members are regulated by the Social Security of Military Servicemen and their Family Members Act. 2.  Social security ... of alternative labour servicemen and their family members shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the State Pensions Act. ...\u201d 29.  On 28 April 2011 amendments were proposed to the Alternative Service Act. In the Explanatory Report on the proposed amendments, it was indicated that the Act \u2013 introduced for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations assumed by Armenia upon joining the Council of Europe \u2013 fell short of international standards. Its main shortcomings included the following:\n(a)  the fact that those performing alternative labour service were under military supervision, which contradicted their religious beliefs. Moreover, military supervision was prescribed in the case not only of alternative military service but also of alternative labour service. It deprived those whose religious beliefs contradicted not only the bearing and use of arms but also any kind of service under military supervision, of an alternative to compulsory military service; and\n(b)  the duration of the alternative service. 30.  The amendments in question were eventually passed on 2 May 2013 and entered into force on 8 June 2013. They included the following changes:\n-  section 5 was amended, reducing the duration of alternative military service to thirty months and that of alternative labour service to thirty-six months;\n-  in section 14 a distinction was made between alternative military service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority in the field of defence, and alternative labour service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority authorised by the Government. The new section 14 further specified that alternative labour service could not be supervised by the military;\n-  section 17 no longer required the head of the institution where alternative labour service was to be performed to ensure that the serviceman was fully occupied. The serviceman\u2019s transfer could be ordered or initiated by the National Commission (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below) as opposed to an \u201cauthorised public authority in the field of defence\u201d and he was no longer to be required to stay at his place of service around the clock;\n-  section 18(1) no longer required the head of the alternative service institution to provide the serviceman with food, uniform and other items. In the new section 18(2) the reference to the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces was removed, and the new text required the head of the institution to ensure that the serviceman\u2019s conditions of work were the same as those of other temporary or permanent employees.\nPursuant to the new section 19, an alternative labour serviceman was no longer to receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service, but an allowance of up to 30,000 Armenian drams. The obligation to wear a uniform was also removed. 31.  Section 4 provides that the term of compulsory military service for privates is twenty-four months. 32.  On 2 May 2013 a number of amendments to the Act were passed. They entered into force on 8 June 2013 and included the following amendment:\n\u201cA person who has committed an offence under [, inter alia, Article 327 of the Criminal Code] motivated by his religious beliefs or views and who is serving a sentence ..., may apply to a court for review of the sentence. The court shall discontinue any criminal proceedings and exempt the person concerned from serving the remainder of the sentence, provided that he applies for alternative service before 1 August 2013 and the authorised body decides to grant the application in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Alternative Service Act.\u201d 33.  Pursuant to paragraph 2(b), alternative labour servicemen were to perform their service in various institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, such as orphanages, retirement homes, mental health institutions, institutions for disabled persons and hospitals. They were to perform the functions of an orderly. Pursuant to paragraph 3, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and the Minister of Health were entrusted with providing alternative labour servicemen with clothing, food and financial means. The decree also set out the rules on the uniforms to be worn by both alternative military servicemen and alternative labour servicemen. 34.  On 1 August 2013 the decree was amended and made applicable only to alternative military servicemen. 35.  The decree established a National Commission to examine applications for alternative service. The commission was composed of the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia, as its president, the Military Commissar of Armenia (\u0540\u0540 \u0566\u056b\u0576\u057e\u0578\u0580\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u056f\u0578\u0574\u056b\u057d\u0561\u0580) as its vice-president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs, and the head of the Governmental Department for Administrative Bodies. 36.  On 25 July 2013 the decree was repealed and replaced with Decree No. 797-A, which modified the composition of the National Commission to include the First Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration as its president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Education and Science, the Deputy Minister of Defence, the Deputy Chief of Police and the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs. 37.  For the purpose of supervising the work discipline of persons conscripted to perform alternative labour service, the Military Commissar of Armenia and the head of the Military Police Division of the Ministry of Defence were ordered: (a) to carry out weekly joint spot checks to verify the presence of persons performing alternative labour service at the institutions located within the territory of the regional military commissariats and their sub-divisions; (b) to report the results of such checks to the head of the General Staff at the end of each month; and (c) to report immediately to the head of the General Staff in the event that any alternative labour servicemen were absent and to take necessary measures to find them. 38.  On 28 March 2014 and 27 March 2015 the Court of Cassation examined appeals by two conscientious objectors against their convictions by the lower courts under Article 327 of the Criminal Code (criminal cases nos. KD1/0053/01/12 and GD1/0006/01/13). It found that since their cases met the conditions specified in the Criminal Code Implementation Act, as amended on 8 June 2013, the provisions of that Act were applicable and hence their sentences were to be quashed and the criminal proceedings discontinued for lack of corpus delicti. 39.  In his 2008 Annual Report, the Human Rights Defender noted:\n\u201cThe draftees who belong to the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses explain their refusal to sign up for alternative labour service by the fact that the service is managed and supervised by divisions of the ... Ministry of Defence. For example, the conscription to alternative labour service is conducted by military commissariats, or the ... Defence Ministry\u2019s Military Police [Division] pays regular inspection visits to the institutions where the alternative labour service is being performed, requesting the alternative service personnel to line up and so on. In addition, some recruits expressed complaints that uniforms for alternative labour service personnel had been supplied by the ... Ministry of Defence.\nAccording to [section 18 of the Alternative Service Act], the party responsible for the implementation and supervision of alternative labour service shall be the head of the institution where the alternative labour service is ... performed. However, [section 14 of the same Act] states that conscription to alternative service shall be organised and supervised by [an authorised public authority in the field of defence]. Indeed, the ... Ministry of Defence justifies its regular inspection visits [by] the Military Police as [being in] implementation of [section 14] and claims that the purpose of such visits is to verify that alternative service personnel are actually at the places where alternative labour service is ... conducted.\nTaking this into account, the Human Rights Defender\u2019s Office recommends that changes be made to the legislation so that the responsibility for processing alternative service applications and the subsequent implementation and supervision of alternative service be given to an authorised ... labour and social security body. Thus, rather than registering alternative servicemen in the registries of the military reserve force, which is the current requirement of the ... [Military Liability Act], it is possible to envisage [a register] for citizens who have performed alternative service that is accompanied by a new type of [record booklet] to be established by law (in contrast to the regular military [record booklet]).\u201d 40.  The Committee of Ministers noted that \u201calternative service shall not be of a punitive nature. Its duration shall, in comparison to that of military service, remain within reasonable limits\u201d. 41.  The Committee of Ministers recommended that member States should ensure that any limitations on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of members of the armed forces complied with the requirements of Article 9 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, that conscripts should have the right to be granted conscientious objector status and that alternative service of a civilian nature should be proposed to them. The Explanatory Memorandum to this Recommendation noted, in particular, that the length of any alternative service to be performed by objectors should be reasonable in comparison with the length of ordinary military service. It further noted that the European Committee of Social Rights had deemed alternative service exceeding one\u2011and\u2011a\u2011half times the length of military service to be excessive. 1.  General documents\nRecommendation 1518 (2001): Exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military service in Council of Europe member States 42.  PACE recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite those member States that had not yet done so to introduce into their legislation a genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character. 43.  PACE noted that Armenia had undertaken to honour the following commitment:\n\u201cto adopt, within three years of accession, a law on alternative service in compliance with European standards and, in the meantime, to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms or service in disciplinary battalions, allowing them instead to choose, when the law on alternative service had come into force, to perform non-armed military service or alternative civilian service.\u201d\n(b)  Resolution 1532 (2007): Honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia 44.  As regards Armenia\u2019s commitment to enact legislation on alternative service \u201cin compliance with European standards\u201d and \u201cpardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms\u201d, PACE noted with disappointment that the current law, as amended in 2005 and subsequently in June 2006, still did not offer conscientious objectors any guarantee of \u201cgenuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character\u201d, as provided for by Council of Europe standards. It was deeply concerned that, for lack of a genuine form of civilian service, dozens of conscientious objectors, most of whom were Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, continued to be imprisoned, since they preferred prison to an alternative service which was not of a truly civilian nature. PACE urged the Armenian authorities to amend the law on alternative service in accordance with the recommendations made by the Council of Europe experts and, in the meantime, to pardon the young conscientious objectors serving prison sentences. 45.  In its Second Report on Armenia, adopted on 30 June 2006, ECRI noted:\n\u201cThe overwhelming majority of conscientious objectors in Armenia are Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. They are thus disproportionately affected by the issue of alternative service. On this point, the Armenian Parliament passed, on 1 December 2003, the [Alternative Service Act] which took effect on 1 July 2004. This law provides for alternative military service of 36 months and an alternative civilian service of 42 months. ECRI notes that alternative civilian service, which lasts longer than actual military service, is carried out under military supervision. ECRI has further been informed that directors of institutions (which include hospitals) where conscientious objectors carry out their duty receive their instructions about the conditions and modalities of their service from the military. Moreover, conscientious objectors are sent to military hospitals for medical treatment, they are largely confined to their place of service and required to wear military uniform. They also receive assignments and changes of assignments which are determined by the military. ... ECRI wishes to point out that the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] was to prevent conscientious objectors from being imprisoned for refusing to carry out military service. However, as a number of people are currently in prison for leaving or refusing to join the alternative civilian service due to the military influence on this service, the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] has unfortunately not been met.\u201d 46.  In his report of 9 May 2011 following his visit to Armenia from 18 to 21 January 2011, the Commissioner stated:\n\u201cThe issue of imprisoned conscientious objectors \u2013 currently, all of whom are members of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses community \u2013 has been on the table for many years. Conscientious objectors are not willing to perform an alternative service option which is under the supervision of the military. There is still no alternative to military service available in Armenia which can be qualified as genuinely civilian in nature. The Commissioner strongly believes that conscientious objectors should not be imprisoned and urges the authorities to put in place an alternative civilian service.\n...\nThe right to conscientious objection remains an open issue in Armenia. Those asking to perform civilian service on the basis of conscientious objection are mainly members of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses community. Over 70 persons are currently imprisoned for their refusal to serve in the army or to perform alternative military service. The conscientious objectors have all been sentenced under [Article] 327.1 of the Criminal Code to imprisonment ranging from 24 to 36 months.\nThe Law on Alternative service was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. The performance of alternative service remains under the supervision of the military, which constitutes a major obstacle for members of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses community on the basis of their religious beliefs. Another issue is the potentially punitive length of the civilian service, which currently amounts to 42 months, while regular military service is 24 months. In this respect, the European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe has found that a period of alternative service which is double the duration of military service is excessively lengthy and contrary to Article 1.2 of the European Social Charter. Under this article, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service.\nAt their meeting with the Commissioner, officials from the Ministry of Defence expressed readiness to amend the [Alternative Service Act]. In particular, the Minister indicated that on the basis of the amendments, supervision will be exercised by a ministry designated for the implementation of alternative service (labour, health, defence, etc.), thereby suggesting that a genuinely civilian service would be available. The draft Law on Amendments to the [Alternative Service Act] was adopted by the government in April 2011.\nConclusions and recommendations\n...\nThe Commissioner finds that there is an urgent need to review the [Alternative Service Act] and to develop appropriate mechanisms in order to create a genuinely civilian service option in Armenia. It is also important that the length of the alternative service be adjusted \u2013 taking into consideration the duration of military service - in a way that it is not perceived as punitive, deterrent or discriminatory.\u201d 47.  In their formal response to the Commissioner\u2019s report, the Government admitted that the exercise of the right to conscientious objection was still flawed in Armenia, and that they intended to introduce further legislative amendments to promote civilian control over alternative service and completely to withdraw military control over such service. That function was to be assigned to a new body composed of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and strictly civil service officers of the Ministry of Defence. 48.  In its Conclusions XIX-1 of 24 October 2008 regarding compliance by Greece with Article 1 \u00a7 2 of the European Social Charter (The right to work: effective protection of the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon), the European Committee of Social Rights noted:\n\u201cThe Committee notes that [the periods of alternative service to replace armed military service] are nearly double the length of armed military service. Admittedly, recognised conscientious objectors are in a better position than they are in countries that do no grant them special status or where refusal to serve is punishable by imprisonment. But even if the state acknowledges the principle of conscientious objection and institutes alternative service instead, it cannot make the latter longer than is necessary to ensure that refusal to serve on grounds of conscience is genuine and the choice of alternative service is not seen as advantageous rather than duty. Under Article 1 \u00a7 2 of the Charter, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service.\u201d", "references": ["3", "9", "8", "4", "1", "6", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "5"], "gold": ["5"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applications in the present case concern prolonged non\u2011enforcement of domestic final judicial decisions. They raise issues similar to those examined in the pilot judgment in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009; hereinafter \u201cIvanov\u201d or \u201cthe Ivanov judgment\u201d). They are part of a group of 12,143 Ivanov-type follow-up applications (hereinafter also referred to as \u201cIvanov\u2011type cases\u201d). 9.  Accordingly, before providing a description of the relevant facts and proceeding to the examination of the applicants\u2019 Convention grievances in the present case, the Court considers it necessary to present the procedure hitherto adopted in applications concerning non\u2011enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions in Ukraine. 10.  Prior to the adoption of the Ivanov pilot judgment the Court had dealt with a number of cases concerning the non-enforcement of domestic court decisions in Ukraine. The first decision on this issue was rendered in the case of Kaysin and Others v. Ukraine ((friendly settlement), no. 46144/99, 3 May 2001). Even though the case was settled by the parties and the applicants received the sums indicated in the friendly settlement agreement, the general issue of non\u2011enforcement remained unresolved largely owing to the lack of funds of the State entities, State-owned or State\u2011controlled debtors (hereinafter \u201cState debtors\u201d). Subsequent cases concerning non\u2011enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions related to payments of salaries and allowances to military servicemen, employees of the mining companies, judges, school teachers, debts of municipalities or State hospitals, State-owned banks, State-owned enterprises and the Cabinet of Ministers (see, among many other examples, the judgments in the cases of Voytenko v. Ukraine, no. 18966/02, 29 June 2004, Romashov v. Ukraine, no. 67534/01, 27 July 2004, Zubko and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 3955/04 and 3 others, ECHR 2006\u2011VI (extracts), Belanova v. Ukraine, no. 1093/02, 29 November 2005, Kucherenko v. Ukraine, no. 27347/02, 15 December 2005, Shmalko v. Ukraine, no. 60750/00, 20 July 2004, and Poltorachenko v. Ukraine, no. 77317/01, 18 January 2005). 11.  As a result of an increasing number of applications concerning prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions in Ukraine, the Court decided to have recourse to the pilot judgment procedure and selected the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (see paragraph 8 above) as representative of this problem. For the facts of this case reference is made to paragraphs 8-20 of the pilot judgment. 12.  In its Interim Resolution of 6 March 2008, the Committee of Ministers had already recognised the existence of a structural problem (see Ivanov, cited above, \u00a7 38, see also paragraph 124 below). 13.  In its pilot judgment of 15 October 2009 the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because of the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of final judicial decisions. The Court noted that the delays had been caused by a combination of factors, including the lack of budgetary funds, the bailiffs\u2019 omissions and shortcomings in the national legislation, as a result of which Mr Ivanov and other applicants in a similar situation were unable to have the judgments enforced (see Ivanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84). All those factors had been within the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and thus Ukraine was fully responsible for such non-enforcement (ibid. \u00a7 85). The Court further found that there had been no remedy at national level satisfying the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of Mr Ivanov\u2019s complaints about the non\u2011enforcement of the judgment in his favour (ibid. \u00a7\u00a7 66-70). 14.  Under Article 46, the Court held that the Ivanov case concerned two recurring problems: (a) the prolonged non-enforcement of final domestic decisions and (b) the lack of an effective domestic remedy to deal with it. These problems lay behind the violations of the Convention found by the Court since 2004 in over 300 cases concerning Ukraine. The Ivanov case demonstrated that these problems had remained without a solution despite the Court\u2019s clear rulings urging Ukraine to take appropriate measures to resolve those issues (see Ivanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 73, 74 and 83). 15.  In view of the fact that approximately 1,400 similar applications against Ukraine were pending before the Court at that time (ibid. \u00a7 86), the Court held in the relevant operative provisions of its judgment as follows:\n\u201c... 4.  ... that the [violations of Articles 6 \u00a7 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention found in the case] originated in a practice incompatible with the Convention which consists in the respondent State\u2019s recurrent failure to comply in due time with domestic decisions for the enforcement of which it is responsible and in respect of which aggrieved parties have no effective domestic remedy; 5.  ... that the respondent State must set up without delay, and at the latest within one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, an effective domestic remedy or combination of such remedies capable of securing adequate and sufficient redress for the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic decisions, in line with the Convention principles as established in the Court\u2019s case-law; 6.  ... that the respondent State must grant such redress, within one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final, to all applicants whose applications pending before the Court were communicated to the Government under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Rules of Court before the delivery of the present judgment or will be communicated further to this judgment and concern arguable complaints relating solely to the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions for which the State was responsible, including where complaints alleging a lack of effective remedies in respect of such non-enforcement are also raised; 7.  ... that pending the adoption of the above measures, the Court will adjourn, for one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final, the proceedings in all cases in which the applicants raise arguable complaints relating solely to the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions for which the State is responsible, including cases in which complaints alleging a lack of effective remedies in respect of such non-enforcement are also raised, without prejudice to the Court\u2019s power at any moment to declare any such case inadmissible or to strike it out of its list following a friendly settlement between the parties or the resolution of the matter by other means in accordance with Articles 37 or 39 of the Convention;\n...\u201d\nIn the event of the State\u2019s failure to adopt general remedial measures, the Court stated that it \u201cwill have no choice but to resume the examination of all similar applications pending before it and to take them to judgment so as to ensure effective observance of the Convention\u201d (ibid. \u00a7 100). The Court decided to adjourn proceedings in respect of all new applications lodged after delivery of the pilot judgment (ibid. \u00a7 97). As regards applications lodged prior to the delivery of the judgment, it decided that it would give notice of them to the Government and adjourn adversarial proceedings in them. Cases already communicated but undecided on the merits would likewise be adjourned for one year from the date on which the judgment had become final (ibid. \u00a7 98). Finally, as regards the application of Article 41 in the case, the Court held that the respondent State was to pay the applicant the outstanding debt under the domestic judgments and 174 euros (EUR) to cover inflation linked adjustments in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (ibid. \u00a7\u00a7 106\u2011107 and the eighth operative provision). 16.  In a letter of 27 January 2010 the Court informed the Ukrainian Government of its intention to communicate under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Rules of Court all Ivanov-type cases pending before the Court on the date of delivery of the Ivanov pilot judgment of 15 October 2009 which became final on 15 January 2010 (see point of the 6 operative provision and paragraph 15 above). 17. On 11 February 2010 the President of the Fifth Section accordingly decided, under the aforementioned Rule, to communicate the cases concerned to the respondent Government for information and possible action and, at the same time, to adjourn them formally for a period of one year from the date on which the judgment had become final (i.e. until 15 January 2011). 18.  By December 2010 the Government had submitted friendly settlement proposals and unilateral declarations in 372 cases. These cases were struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention, following the applicants\u2019 acceptance of friendly settlement proposals or the Court\u2019s acceptance of the Government\u2019s unilateral declarations. 19.  On 10 December 2010 the Government requested a one-year extension of the time-limit fixed in the pilot judgment in order to settle pending cases and to adopt the required general measures at domestic level. 20. On 18 January 2011 the Court decided to grant the Government\u2019s request in part and to extend the time limit until 15 July 2011. 21.  On 13 July 2011 the Government requested a further extension of six months. They also submitted friendly settlement proposals and unilateral declarations in nearly 1,000 cases. The Court eventually decided to strike 347 of these cases out of its list of cases. 22. On 6 September 2011 the Government\u2019s second request for an extension of the time-limit was refused. The Court considered that it fell to the Committee of Ministers to find the most appropriate and expedient means to bring about the necessary reforms in Ukraine as part of the process of supervising the execution of the pilot judgment. The question of further procedure in cases raising similar issues was adjourned and all such cases were put on hold. 23.  On 21 February 2012 the Court examined the situation in about 2,500 follow-up cases pending before it. While a number of cases had been struck out of its list following either a friendly settlement agreement or acceptance of a unilateral declaration, no settlement had been proposed in some 700 communicated cases. In the meantime, since 1 January 2011, approximately 1,000 further similar applications had been lodged with the Court. 24.  Referring to its warning in the pilot judgment (see Ivanov, \u00a7 100 and paragraph 15 above) that in the event of a failure to adopt the necessary general remedial measures at national level it would have no choice but to take pending applications to judgment, the Court decided to resume its examination of follow-up applications. It further expressed the hope that the Ukrainian authorities would continue cooperating with the Committee of Ministers in order to implement the pilot judgment without delay and with due regard to the relevant recommendations, resolutions and decisions of that body. 25.  On 5 June 2012, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted new legislation, namely \u201cthe Act on State Guarantees concerning execution of judicial decisions with amendments\u201d (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u201c\u041f\u0440\u043e \u0433\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0456\u0457 \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u0438 \u0449\u043e\u0434\u043e \u0432\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0441\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0445 \u0440\u0456\u0448\u0435\u043d\u044c\u201d; \u201cthe 2012 Act\u201d). The 2012 Act, which was amended on two occasions, namely on 15 May 2013 and 19 September 2013, introduced a procedure whereby the debts due under the domestic court judgments were to be paid by the State Treasury of Ukraine. It required applicants to apply to the State Treasury for such payments (see also paragraphs 103-104 below). 26.   Despite the introduction of a new remedy under the 2012 Act, as from the end of 2013 the influx of Ivanov type cases significantly increased. 27.  On 3 February 2015 the Court gave notice to the Ukrainian Government of Filipov and 3 other applications (no. 35660/13), where the applicants complained that the remedy introduced by the 2012 Act was ineffective. 28.  In the meantime, on 3 July 2012, the Court had adopted its judgment in Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine, ([Committee] no. 703/05, 26 July 2012), whereby it found a violation of Articles 6 \u00a7 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of prolonged non\u2011enforcement of final judicial decisions in Ukraine in respect of a group of applicants for the first time. That judgment concerned 116 applications. Ruling under Article 41 of the Convention on just satisfaction, the Court awarded the applicants, in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, EUR 1,500 for delays of up to three years and EUR 3,000 for delays exceeding three years. 29.  In accordance with the Court\u2019s decision to resume examination of pending cases (see paragraphs 23-24 above), follow-up applications were communicated to the Government in groups. The Government were invited to submit grouped unilateral declarations acknowledging the violations of the Convention and proposing just satisfaction for any pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage in line with the awards in Kharuk and Others. They were informed that if they failed to submit such unilateral declarations, the cases would be processed by way of similar grouped judgments. 30.  In 2013 the Court communicated 2,750 Ivanov-type applications to the Ukrainian Government and rendered judgments or decisions in 2,459 Ivanov\u2011type cases. 31.  In sum, the majority of the Ivanov-type cases which had been lodged with the Court before 2013 had been processed by way of judgments or decisions. 32.  As from 20 June 2013 the Court adopted a policy in Ivanov-type cases of awarding fixed-rate sums of EUR 2,000 for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage. As regards pecuniary damage, it also held that \u201cthe respondent State has an outstanding obligation to enforce the judgments which remain enforceable\u201d (see, among other authorities, Pysarskyy and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 20397/07 and 163 other applications, \u00a7\u00a7 24-25 and the sixth operative provision, 20 June 2013). 33.  On 3 June 2014 the Court declared inadmissible the application in Velikoda v. Ukraine (no. 43331/12). The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, on account of the fact that, following a final judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour ordering the national authorities to pay a social benefit, legislation had entered into force drastically reducing the amounts of the social payments in question (Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers\u2019 Resolution no. 745). 34.  The Court held, among other things, that the relevant legislative measures were not unreasonably disproportionate having been adopted as a result of economic policy considerations and the financial difficulties faced by the State. 35.  Following the Velikoda leading decision, approximately 5,600 cases that had previously been classified as Ivanov-type were declared inadmissible. 36.  On 2 September 2014 the Court adjourned its examination of Ivanov-type cases for one year as a result of the sharp increase in the number of new applications lodged (in January 2014 approximately 6,000 such applications were pending and by September the number had increased to 8,200). The Court decided to reconsider the situation within a period of six months. 37.  On 20 January 2015 the Court revisited its decision of 2 September 2014 to adjourn the Ivanov-type cases, and decided to resume its examination of these applications. In January 2015 the Court communicated a group of 5,000 such cases to the Ukrainian Government (see Samoylenko and 4,999 Others, nos. 11212/08 - 2803/15). 38.  In view of the large number of communicated cases, the Government asked the Court to allow them to submit observations in groups of 250 cases or a maximum of 500 cases per month starting from 23 May 2015. 39.  On 14 April 2015 the Court allowed the Government to submit observations in 250 cases per month, starting from 23 May 2015. 40.  Between 22 May 2015 and 26 February 2016 the Government submitted unilateral declarations proposing to pay applicants EUR 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage, together with an undertaking to enforce the domestic judgments, in 2,234 cases which had been communicated in January 2015 as part of the Samoylenko and 4,999 others group. 41.  On 16 June 2015 the Court examined the terms of the unilateral declarations submitted by the Government on 22 May 2015 in a group of 340 applications and decided that the above amount was sufficient taken together with the Government\u2019s undertaking. Subsequent to this decision, 2,041 applications were struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases.\nFollowing the Chamber\u2019s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in the present applications (see paragraph 5 above), the Government were informed that the Court would not deliver further judgments in the Ivanov-type cases pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. Consequently, the Government ceased submitting unilateral declarations. 42.  The Court has received letters from some applicants complaining that the Government had failed to honour their undertakings in the unilateral declarations on the basis of which the Court had struck the applications in question out of its list of cases. Moreover, in a significant number of cases which the Court had disposed of by means of a judgment, the applicants wrote back complaining that the Government had failed to enforce those judgments. Such complaints were transmitted to the Department for the Execution of Judgments (the Council of Europe\u2019s Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law) for action. 43.  According to the statistical information in the Court\u2019s possession on the date of delivery of the present judgment, there are 12,143 Ivanov-type cases pending before the Court, 7,641 of which have already been communicated to the Government. The available data shows that since 3 July 2012, when the Court introduced the fast-track procedure for grouped judgments and decisions, the Court has examined and disposed of 14,430 Ivanov-type cases, in particular:\n\u2013  Judgments were delivered in 3,491 cases;\n\u2013  Inadmissibility decisions were given in 289 cases;\n\u2013  Strike out decisions following friendly settlement were adopted in 1,103 cases;\n\u2013  Strike out decisions following unilateral declarations were adopted in 1,233 cases;\n\u2013  Strike out decisions for other grounds were adopted in 40 cases;\n\u2013  Inadmissibility decisions were rendered by Single Judge in 8,274 cases. 44.  A total of about 29,000 Ivanov-type applications have been submitted to the Court since the first application in 1999.\nSince the beginning of 2016 the Court has continued to receive a large number of such applications - over 200 per month. 45.  The applicant lives in the village of Olenychi, Ovruch District, Zhytomyr Region, Ukraine. She resides and works in an area of radioactive contamination and is entitled under the national law to various special social welfare benefits for persons who suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. 46.  In 2009 she instituted proceedings in the Ovruch Local Court of Zhytomyr Region (the Ovruch Court) against the Ovruch Labour and Social Welfare Department claiming arrears in social payments under the Chernobyl Victims\u2019 Status and Social Security Act. 47.  On 24 June 2009 the Ovruch Court ruled partly in her favour. This judgment was not appealed against and became final on 6 July 2009. On the same day the Ovruch Court issued a writ of execution. 48.  On 10 August 2009 the State Bailiffs Service of the Zhytomyr Regional Department of Justice instituted enforcement proceedings. Despite a number of actions undertaken by the bailiffs the judgment remains unenforced. 49.  Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in her case. She further complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective remedies to speed up the enforcement of the above judgment. 50.  The applicant, who lives in Zhytomyr, is a former Chernobyl relief worker. Since March 2010 he has a second degree disability related to this work. 51.  In October 2010 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Bogunskyy District Court of Zhytomyr (the Bogunskyy Court) against the Bogunskyy District Department of the Pension Fund, seeking a higher pension. 52.  On 20 June 2011 the Bogunskyy Court ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 1 July 2011. 55.  Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the State\u2019s failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case. 56.  The applicant, who lives in Kremenchuk, is a former Chernobyl relief worker. Since July 2009 he has a second degree disability related to this relief work. 57.  On 16 August 2010 the Kryukivskyy District Court of Kremenchuk (the Kryukivskyy Court) ordered the Kryukivskyy Labour and Social Welfare Department to recalculate the amount owed in respect of his participation in the Chernobyl relief work and to pay the applicant a lump sum. 58.  On 7 February 2011 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 16 August 2010. The judgment became final. 59.  On 16 September 2011 the Poltava Bailiffs\u2019 Service terminated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case. This decision was challenged by the applicant. 60.  By decision of 15 March 2012 the Kryukivskyy Court ruled in his favour and ordered the Bailiffs\u2019 Service to resume the enforcement proceedings. This decision was confirmed on appeal on 25 April 2012. 61.  On 19 July 2012 the Poltava Bailiffs\u2019 Service once again terminated the enforcement proceedings. On 5 October 2012 they rejected the applicant\u2019s request to renew them. 62.  On 28 February 2013, on the applicant\u2019s complaint, the Kryukivskyy Court quashed the bailiffs\u2019 decisions and ordered them to resume the enforcement proceedings 64.  Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case. 66.  On an unknown date the applicant\u2019s father instituted proceedings in the Zhytomyr Circuit Administrative Court (the Zhytomyr Court) against the Zhytomyr Labour and Social Welfare Department (the Labour Department), seeking recalculation of benefits and payment of a lump sum due to him. The applicant continued the proceedings after his father\u2019s death on 21 November 2007. 67.  On 24 January 2008 the Zhytomyr Circuit Administrative Court (the Zhytomyr Court) ordered the Zhytomyr Labour and Social Welfare Department (the Labour Department) to pay the applicant the outstanding debt owed to his late father. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 4 February 2008. 68.  The execution writ was issued by the Zhytomyr Court on 24 April 2008 and referred to the Zhytomyr Bailiffs\u2019 Service. 69.  On several occasions the Bailiffs\u2019 Service returned the execution writ without enforcement for lack of funds on the part of the debtor department. The judgment of 24 January 2008 remains unenforced. 70.  Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case. 72.  On 13 December 2007 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court (the Dnipropetrovsk Court) allowed the applicant company\u2019s claim for restitution of precious metals against the State Enterprise \u201cPrydniprovskyy Zavod Kolyorovykh Metaliv\u201d (the State Enterprise). It also awarded the applicant costs and expenses. This judgment was not appealed against and became final on 25 December 2007. The same day the court issued a writ of execution. 73.  On 30 January 2008 the Bagliyskyy Bailiffs\u2019 Service in Dniprodzerzhynsk started enforcement proceedings. 74.  On 11 March 2008 the enforcement proceedings were transferred to the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs\u2019 Service. 75.  On 4 April 2008, the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs\u2019 Service established that part of the metals had been returned by the debtor to the applicant company and the other part could not be found. 76.  On 6 June 2008 the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine ordered the liquidation of the State Enterprise. A liquidation commission was created. On 28 July 2008 the same Ministry issued another decree concerning liquidation of the State Enterprise. 77.  On 5 September 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs\u2019 Service closed the enforcement proceedings in respect of the award for costs and expenses under the judgment of 13 December 2007. 78.  Having been notified about the impossibility of finding the remainder of the metals to be restituted under the judgment of 13 December 2007, the applicant company requested the Dnipropetrovsk Court to vary the mode of execution of the judgment in that part and to award it the monetary equivalent of missing metals. 79.  On 22 September 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Court amended the procedure for enforcement of the judgment of 13 December 2007 and ordered the State Enterprise to pay the applicant company compensation. 80.  On 27 October 2008 and 25 February 2009, that decision was upheld by the Dnipropetrovsk Commercial Court of Appeal and the Higher Commercial Court respectively. 81.  On 9 April 2009 the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs\u2019 Service terminated the enforcement proceedings owing to the liquidation of the debtor. 82.  Following the applicant company\u2019s complaint, on 21 September 2009 the Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court quashed the decisions of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of 6 June and 28 July 2008 concerning the liquidation of the State Enterprise. This decision was overruled on appeal by the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal on 23 December 2009, but ultimately upheld by the Higher Administrative Court on 6 July 2010. 83.  On 10 April 2010 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court initiated insolvency proceedings in respect of the State Enterprise on the applicant\u2019s request. On 9 July 2013 the same court declared the State Enterprise insolvent and ordered its liquidation. 84.  The judgment of 13 December 2007 as varied by the ruling of 22 September 2008 remains unenforced. 85.  Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company complained of the national authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in its case. It further complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective remedies to speed up the enforcement of the above judgment.", "references": ["5", "1", "7", "6", "0", "4", "2", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Benevento. 6.  On 2 April 2013, between 1 and 1.15 p.m., the applicant was stopped by two officers of the Benevento municipal police while she was driving her car. 7.  According to the applicant, the police officers checked her driver\u2019s licence and her vehicle documents. An argument broke out between the applicant and the officers. In the applicant\u2019s view, her nervous and hostile attitude led the police officers to suspect that she was intoxicated, which she denied. As the officers did not have the necessary equipment to perform a breathalyser test, they requested the assistance of the road police (Polizia Stradale). The applicant returned to her car. Once she had got back into the vehicle, one of the police officers pulled the car door open and dragged her out by the arm. 8.  As recorded in the municipal police officers\u2019 report of 3 April 2013, the applicant had been stopped because she had been driving in an erratic manner, braking suddenly and changing lanes abruptly. The applicant did not seem to be able to exit the vehicle by herself and had had to be assisted by one of the officers. The officers reported that they had smelt alcohol on her breath and that she had been unsteady on her feet. The applicant had insulted and threatened them. 9.  At 1.30 p.m. traffic police officers arrived on the scene with the breathalyser equipment. 10.  According to the applicant, she was not able to take the test because she was in a state of anxiety that had been exacerbated by one of the officers shouting at her that she was drunk. That had caused her to tremble and had meant she could not keep the breathalyser tube in her mouth. The applicant requested that carabinieri be called to the scene, but the request was denied. 11.  According to the traffic police report (annotazione di servizio della Polizia Stradale), the applicant agreed to be breathalysed, but did not blow into the device in the manner she had been told to do by the officers and refused to cooperate. At one point she had thrown the device\u2019s mouthpiece into the face of one of the officers. The applicant was described as being in a \u201cclearly altered\u201d state, smelling strongly of alcohol and staggering. 12.  The applicant was taken to the municipal police station (Comando di Polizia Municipale), where she arrived at approximately 1.50 p.m. 13.  According to the applicant, once at the station the lieutenant on duty started drafting an offence report (verbale di contestazione) for driving under the influence of alcohol. The two officers who had stopped her in the street and escorted her to the station and another officer were also present. She repeatedly requested that she be allowed to use a telephone to let her family and her lawyer know of her whereabouts but her requests were denied. When she tried to pick up a telephone, one of the officers hit her in order to make her sit down. The same officer twisted her arms behind her back and handcuffed her, hurting her wrists. He then squeezed her buttocks and asked her if the handcuffs were tight enough. The applicant started screaming loudly and the officer removed the handcuffs in a violent manner. In doing so, he fractured the applicant\u2019s right thumb and caused other injuries to her wrists. He then warned her not to cause further trouble and threatened her. The applicant left the station between 2.15 and 2.30 p.m. and proceeded further on foot as her car had been seized. 14.  As recorded in the joint report issued on 3 April 2013 by the two municipal police officers who had stopped her in the street and the lieutenant on duty at the municipal police station, upon her arrival at the station the applicant had started threatening and insulting them. When the lieutenant started drafting the offence report, she grabbed a telephone from a desk and ran into the corridor. When the lieutenant tried to stop her, the applicant pushed him violently, causing him to fall. She then threw the telephone out of the window. The applicant, who was in an extremely agitated state, pushed and kicked the other two officers, and they eventually handcuffed her. When the applicant calmed down, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant ran out of the station, leaving her bag and personal belongings behind. Her vehicle and driver\u2019s licence had been seized under road traffic legislation. The same account of the events is recorded in the offence notification (informativa di reato) filed by the directing commander of the Benevento municipal police with the Benevento public prosecutor on 3 April 2013. 15.  According to the applicant, once she had left the station she got a lift to the emergency department of a local hospital, where she was examined. 16.  At approximately 8 p.m. the applicant went to the State Police and attempted, unsuccessfully, to lodge a criminal complaint against the municipal police officers. According to the report of the officer on duty, the applicant complained that she had been assaulted by Benevento municipal police officers and that her finger had been fractured. When the officer informed her that the she could not file a criminal complaint because the station was closed, the applicant started speaking incoherently in a loud voice. Given her nervous and agitated state, the officer called the local questura (police headquarters) for backup. The applicant requested that an ambulance be called. The ambulance arrived at 8.30 p.m. and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medics. She was taken home by ambulance at approximately 9 p.m. 17.  On 4 April 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers who had stopped her in the street on 2 April 2013 and the other two officers who had been present at the municipal police station, but whose names she did not know, alleging assault and battery, infliction of bodily harm, abuse of office, and threats. 18.  An investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations was initiated. Seven people identified by the applicant as witnesses (persone informate sui fatti) were interviewed. Two were people who stated they had seen one of the officers dragging the applicant out of her vehicle. One was the owner of a bar where the applicant had gone in order to call her former spouse once she had left the hospital on 2 April 2013. Another was the applicant\u2019s former spouse, who stated that her alcohol intake was limited to consumption during meals. He further stated that because of a traumatic event in her life the applicant became agitated, trembled and had trouble expressing herself when subjected to stress. The other three were colleagues, who stated that the applicant had not appeared to be intoxicated when she had left her office on 2 April 2013. The police officers who had allegedly been involved in the ill-treatment were not interviewed, and neither was the applicant. 19.  On 17 January 2014 the public prosecutor requested that the proceedings be discontinued. The basis of the request was that \u201cthe allegations in the criminal complaint are not confirmed by the statements made by the witnesses identified by the victim\u201d. 20.  On 27 February 2014 the applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor\u2019s request to discontinue the proceedings. She complained about the lack of reasoning in the prosecutor\u2019s request and alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. In that connection, she complained about the \u201ctotal absence\u201d of investigative measures with respect to the events that had occurred at the municipal police station and requested that the investigating judge order such measures without delay. Moreover, the applicant complained that she had not been questioned and requested that she be interviewed immediately. She also requested that officials interview the person who had taken her to the hospital when she had left the police station and other individuals. She also challenged the credibility of the official police reports, as they were in stark contrast with her account of the impugned events. 21.  At a hearing on 22 September 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer repeated the complaints and requests contained in the objection against the prosecutor\u2019s request to discontinue the proceedings and reiterated, in particular, the request to conduct an investigation into the events that had occurred at the municipal police station. 22.  By an order of 3 October 2014, served on the applicant on 27 October 2014, the Benevento District Court preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) decided to discontinue the proceedings. The order stated that the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation had not been sufficient to warrant indicting the officers. It stated that the victim\u2019s allegations had not been corroborated by evidence and that further investigative measures, as requested by the victim, would have \u201cno influence whatsoever\u201d. 23.  On 25 October 2013 the applicant was charged with a number of offences in connection with the events of 2 April 2013, including resisting a police officer, insulting a public official, and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was also charged with causing bodily harm to a police officer. 24.  On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor and the applicant reached a plea agreement with respect to the offence of bodily harm and requested that the judge proceed with the imposition of a sentence (applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti). 25.  On 21 November 2014 the Benevento preliminary hearings judge took note of the plea agreement and gave the applicant a suspended sentence of twenty-eight days\u2019 imprisonment. On the same day, the preliminary hearings judge suspended the proceedings against the applicant in connection with the charges of resisting a police officer, insulting a public official and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was placed on probation with a requirement that she perform community service. 26.  On 2 April 2013, the applicant went to the emergency department of a local hospital. At 6.42 p.m. she was examined by a radiologist, who established that her right thumb was fractured. 27.  On 3 April 2013 the applicant returned to the emergency department. According to the medical report, the applicant arrived at the hospital in an agitated state, complaining about pain in several parts of her body. She was examined by a doctor who noted the presence of a splint on her right hand to treat a fracture. The doctor further noted the presence of bruising resulting from traumatic injury (trauma contusivo con ecchimosi) to the right thigh, right shoulder and left wrist. 28.  On 4 April 2013 the applicant went to a different hospital. She was examined by an orthopaedist, who confirmed the fracture of the thumb and the presence of bruises on her left thigh and on her back. The doctor recommended surgery to treat the fracture. 29.  Owing to a traumatic event in her life, the applicant suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, which has evolved into a major depressive disorder. She also suffers from a disorder which is characterised by mood swings which are exacerbated in times of particular stress, by the consumption of alcohol or sleep deprivation. The disorder in question includes peaks of manic behaviour when the applicant loses contact with reality and experiences a sense of impending threat to her own safety and that of those around her. The applicant was prescribed drugs for insomnia in February 2013. Combining the drugs with even moderate amounts of alcohol can have the same consequences as excessive alcohol consumption.", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "0", "7", "6", "3", "4", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batumi. 6.  He was a judge at the Khulo District Court. On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds set out in section 2(2)-(a) Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, \u201cthe Disciplinary Proceedings Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 16 and 17 below). He was accused in particular of having kept a defendant in a criminal case under his consideration in unlawful detention for the period of fourteen days in September 2004, which fact was qualified as a \u201cmanifest breach of the law\u201d within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act. 7.  On 18 November 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, \u201cthe Panel\u201d), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr I.K., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. Describing the mistake at issue as unacceptable, the Panel decided, despite his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions and his good professional reputation, to remove the applicant from judicial office. 8.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, \u201cthe Disciplinary Council\u201d) on points of fact and law. He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 18 November 2004. 9.  By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel\u2019s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 10.  The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court quashed the Disciplinary Council\u2019s decision of 27 January 2005 for lack of reasoning and legal assessment of the facts, and remitted the case for re-examination. 11.  On 4 August 2005 the Disciplinary Council, composed of six members, including three members, Mr K.K. (President and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr I.K, who had sat at the first hearing, re-considered the applicant\u2019s case; another member of the Disciplinary Council who participated in the examination of the applicant\u2019s case was Ms N.K. During the oral hearing, the applicant challenged the above-mentioned three members of the bench \u2013 Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K \u2013 on the ground that they had considered his case when it had come before the Panel on 18 November 2004. The request was dismissed. 12.  After re-considering all the factual circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Council found, in its decision of 4 August 2005, that the applicant had committed \u201ca manifest breach of the law\u201d and upheld the Panel\u2019s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 13.  In his appeal on points of law, the applicant complained that Mr K.K. had presided over all of the benches of both the Disciplinary Council and the Panel, and three of the members sitting on the Disciplinary Council when it ruled on 4 August 2005 had already dealt with the case at first instance on 18 November 2004. He also complained about his request for their withdrawal being rejected. Finally, the applicant criticised the haste with which the case had been considered by the Disciplinary Council. 14.  On 14 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, finding that the case had been objectively and exhaustively examined by the disciplinary bodies and that the punishment imposed had been appropriate. As for the rest, noting that the Disciplinary Proceedings Act had instituted a system whereby members of the disciplinary panel could also sit on the Disciplinary Council, the Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the benches complained of by the applicant had been perfectly legal. Moreover, in the court\u2019s opinion, the fact that the persons concerned had previously participated in the examination of the case was not in itself sufficient to prove that the Disciplinary Council, in its ruling on 4 August 2005, had not been impartial. 15.  According to the materials available in the case file, the applicant did not voice, even in remote terms, either before the Panel, the Disciplinary Council or the Supreme Court any complaint about the lack of professional qualifications by any of the individual members of the Disciplinary Council who had participated in the examination of his case.", "references": ["2", "7", "4", "8", "9", "5", "6", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kraljevo. 6.  Between June 2003 and December 2004 the applicant, as an entrepreneur, was providing heating installation services to AD Fabrika za proizvodnju konfekcije i trikota\u017ee Ra\u0161ka, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d). 7.  On 2 December 2010 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 31/2010). 8.  The applicant duly submitted his claim. 9.  On 15 March 2011 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim. The applicant lodged a separate civil claim. 10.  On 1 December 2011 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the applicant by recognizing his claim and ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant the costs of the civil proceedings. 11.  On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings. 12.  On 22 July 2013 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of approximately 10 % of the total debt to the applicant. The applicant received this payment on an unspecified date. 13.  The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 9 July 2014. 14.  On 16 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining against the Commercial Court\u2019s decision of 22 July 2013 and that his right to work and right to compensation for work and providing services were infringed, because he received only 10 % of the total debt. He asked further the Constitutional Court to order the payment of the rest of the debt. 15.  On 2 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power to order such a payment. That decision was delivered to the applicant after 24 April 2015.", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "4", "8", "1", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1954. He lived in the Republic of Dagestan and was the mayor of Makhachkala between 1998 and 2013. He is currently detained in correctional colony no. 6 in Orenburg Region (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d). 7.  In June 2013 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody pending criminal proceedings against him. He suffered from several illnesses, including a urinary condition, a rectal prolapse, hepatitis C, and type 2 diabetes. He was confined to a wheelchair and had to use catheters and enemas to urinate and defecate. 8.  On 12 August 2013 he lodged an application with the Court complaining that he was not receiving adequate medical assistance in detention. Four days later the Court indicated to the Russian Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that he should be examined by medical experts. 9.  On 27 November 2014 the Court delivered a judgment in the case, finding, inter alia, that there had been violations of Articles 3 and 34 of the Convention on account of the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with adequate medical care or to comply with the interim measure indicated (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, \u00a7\u00a7 75, 93, and 94, 27 November 2014). 10.  Relying on Article 46 of the Convention the Court held that the authorities should admit the applicant, at that time detained in remand prison no. 4 in Rostov-on-Don, to a specialised medical facility where he should remain under constant medical supervision and should be provided with adequate medical services corresponding to his needs; alternatively, the authorities could place him in a specialised prison medical facility, if the facility could guarantee the requisite level of medical supervision and care. (see Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 118). 11.   After 27 November 2014, the date of the Court\u2019s judgment in the applicant\u2019s first case, he continued being detained in the remand prison pending the completion of his trial. 12.  According to the information from the Government, in 2014 the applicant\u2019s cell was re-equipped to take account of his needs as a wheelchair user. Handrails were installed near his bed and the toilet, and the furniture was put at a lower level in order to be accessible. Wheelchair ramps and a lift were installed in the detention facility. A room for personal-hygiene procedures needed by the applicant was located opposite his cell with all the necessary equipment. 13.  In 2015 he was examined by various doctors, such as a general practitioner, a neurologist, a surgeon, a urologist, and a proctologist. He underwent basic medical tests and received the treatment he had been prescribed. The prison doctors found his overall condition to be satisfactory. 14.  The applicant\u2019s lawyers noticed, however, that his state of health had worsened. They solicited medical opinions on the treatment required. 15.  On 14 July 2015 Dr W., a specialist in neurology, examined the applicant. He noted progressive muscular dystrophy, the development of leg convulsions, and urinary problems. An immediate admission to a specialised hospital for long-term treatment and urological surgery was recommended. The doctor said that further detention in prison would put the applicant\u2019s life at risk. 16.  On 30 October 2015 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert, Dr N., who confirmed the deterioration of his medical condition, and noted the development of bedsores. The doctor suggested that the applicant\u2019s state of health might warrant early release on medical grounds and stated that he needed constant medical care. 17.  On 22 January 2016 Dr N. assessed the quality of the medical care in the remand prison. He noted the absence of exercise therapy, physiotherapy, and massage, and was concerned that the prison premises were not sterile enough for hygienic procedures. 18.  In the meantime, on 27 August 2015 the Military Court of the North\u2011Caucasus Circuit found the applicant guilty of having organised an act of terrorism and an attempt to murder an investigator in his case. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction and sentence on 24 March 2016. 19.  On 1 April 2016 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in the correctional colony. 20.   He spent the first two weeks of his detention in an ordinary cell in the quarantine wing. According to a letter from the chairman of the Committee for Civil Rights sent to the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 20 April 2016, the cell was not adapted to the needs of a wheelchair prisoner. The applicant depended on his fellow inmates, who assisted him in his daily needs, including helping him to perform enemas on himself. 21.  Every day the applicant was taken, handcuffed and blindfolded, to the prison yard for exercise. 22.  On 2 April 2016 he was examined by several prison doctors: a tuberculosis specialist, an infectious-diseases specialist, a dentist and a general practitioner. The latter recorded his illnesses, ordered blood and urine tests, and prescribed treatment, comprising of a special diet and drugs. He noted that the applicant needed regular catheterisation and enemas. Examinations by specialists in endocrinology, ophthalmology, gastroenterology, neurology, cardiology, urology, and surgery, and exercise therapy were recommended. 23.  The applicant was regularly visited by the prison general practitioner in the quarantine wing and underwent blood and urine tests. The doctor was satisfied with his medical condition and the results of his treatment. 24.  On 14 April 2016 the applicant was moved to medical unit no. 56 and placed in cell no. 12. He shared its space of 14 sq. m with one cellmate. The applicant was provided with a wide bed, a sink installed at a low level, and a medical couch, which he used during self-catheterisation procedures. Enemas were carried out in a separate room twice a week with the assistance of the medical unit staff. The custodial authorities continued handcuffing and blindfolding him while he was escorted to the yard. 25.  On 11 May 2016 he was examined by several doctors: a general practitioner, an endocrinologist, a neurologist, and a urologist from the civilian hospital in Sol-Iletsk. According to the medical records kept by the doctors, his medical condition was acute. No recommendations for inpatient treatment or urgent medical measures were made. The endocrinologist ordered tests of his thyroid-gland hormones, which were carried out on the same day. The neurologist prescribed exercise. The latter prescription was endorsed by a prison doctor on 19 May 2016. 26.   On 23 May 2016 the applicant was again examined by the endocrinologist, who noted, inter alia, the risk due to a low level of thyroid hormones. Another hormone test was prescribed for August 2016. 27.  The applicant was examined by a medical board to establish whether he was entitled to early release on medical grounds. The board concluded that his medical condition did not warrant it. 28.  From 6 to 8 June 2016 a commission of officials from the Russian Ombudsman\u2019s Office, the Orenburg Ombudsman\u2019s Office, the Orenburg prosecutor\u2019s office, the Federal Service of the Execution for Sentences in Orenburg Region and medical unit no. 56 came to the applicant\u2019s detention facility and examined the quality of his medical care. The commission concluded that it was adequate. 29.  On 8 June 2016 the applicant was visited by an exercise-therapy specialist, who taught him exercises to support his health. It appears that this visit was a follow-up to previous visits by the specialist, in April and May 2016. However, the medical record does not disclose particular details of the recommendations made on those two previous occasions. 30.  On 4 July 2016 two members of the Orenburg Regional Public Commission for Monitoring the Protection of Human Rights in Detention (\u041e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0431\u043b\u044e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041e\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) inspected the colony. It appears that by the time of the inspection the applicant had been moved to another cell. The inspectors noted in particular, that the cell was divided into three sections by metal bars and housed six inmates. The applicant\u2019s section measured 10.8 sq. m; it had a bath, a medical couch, a sink, and a bedside table with television set. The toilet was not partitioned from the rest of the cell and the applicant could be observed by his cellmate while using it. The correctional colony lacked wheelchair ramps, so the applicant could not freely access the yard or meeting rooms. He complained that the necessary drugs had had to be supplied by his relatives, owing to a lack of funds, which were to be allocated in the near future. Medical supervision was carried out by the general practitioner as regular examinations by other specialists had not been considered necessary. Allegedly owing to the applicant not having received medical massages, the applicant\u2019s legs started convulsing. He was assisted by his cellmate, who helped him to get into bed. The applicant was not given a special diet. 31.  On 11 August 25 October and 16 December 2016, and 19 April 2017 a special medical board of highly qualified civilian and prison doctors, and specialists in cardiology, endocrinology, neurology, and urology examined the applicant. They concluded that there was no need to admit the applicant to a specialist medical facility and that he could continue receiving treatment in the medical unit. The doctors were satisfied with the quality of medical care given to the applicant. 32.  In the meantime the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation of the applicant\u2019s detention conditions and the poor quality of his medical treatment. The complaint was forwarded to the prosecutor\u2019s office for the supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg Region. Having carried out enquiries, on 5 July 2016 the Office replied as follows:\n\u201cIt has been established that on admission to [the correctional colony the applicant] was placed in [a cell of the quarantine wing]. It was designed for two persons and measured 12 sq. m, which satisfied the requirements of the Execution of Sentences Act ... [The applicant\u2019s] cellmate assisted him in his daily needs, which included hygienic procedures and moving around the cell. Accordingly, [the applicant] was not restricted in his rights ...\nThe allegation that [the applicant] was not provided with special conditions [needed in his situation] is not true. His cell in the medical unit is furnished with a specially designed table, a bed and a sink, so he can easily access them and move freely about the cell.\n[The applicant] is assisted by the medical unit staff members and inmates in his movements within the medical unit, in particular when entering/leaving buildings in a wheelchair, and in his daily needs.\nAs called for by [the applicant\u2019s] disability and illnesses, he is examined by the prison doctors on a daily basis, he receives medical treatment as prescribed to the relevant medical standards, and he is provided with dietary nutrition.\nIn May 2016 [the custodial authorities] provided him with a mattress [to prevent] bedsores.\n[The applicant] urinates with the help of a catheter which he inserts six to seven times per day (as recommended by [a urologist]). He defecates with the help of enemas performed every three days by medical staff from the medical unit. Detainees, who work in the medical unit, escort [the applicant] to a special room for that procedure and clean it afterwards.\nThe regional medical standard \u201cProcedures for simple medical procedures, desmurgy and immobilisation\u201d, approved by an Order of the Ministry of the Health Care and Social Development of Orenburg Region on 5 March 2010 does not require catheterisation or enemas to be carried out in a sterile room. Sterile catheters and enemas tips are used by [the applicant].\nIn breach of Article 30 of the Penal Institutions Act (Federal Law no. 5473-1 of 21 June 1993), [the applicant] was escorted for walks handcuffed and blindfolded until 24 May 2016.\nMoreover, the inquiry, which had been performed earlier, revealed breaches of Article 101 \u00a7 7 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and Articles 10, 11, and 11.1 of the Social Protection of the Disabled in the Russian Federation Act (Federal Law of 24 November 1995 No. 181-FZ). [In accordance with the aforementioned Regulation, the applicant] should have been given the necessary devices (a wheelchair for mobility, an indoor wheelchair, a gel pillow to prevent bedsores, nappies for adults, and urinals). However, the custodial authorities have not provided him with those items. [Moreover,] the detention facility did not take measures to provide the exercise and sport therapy [for the applicant] indicated in his rehabilitation programme.\nIn the light of the above, on 2 June 2016 the prosecutor\u2019s office for supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg issued a formal order to the head of the correctional colony to rectify the identified shortcomings. The order has been ... complied with ...\nThere are no grounds for a further intervention by the prosecutor ...\u201d", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "9", "5", "7", "2", "6", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 in Vladikavkaz, the Republic of North Ossetia\u2011Alania. He is currently detained in correctional colony no. 1 in Vladikavkaz (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d). 7.  On 21 January 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and taken to remand prison no. 20/1 in Grozny, the Chechen Republic (\u201cthe remand prison\u201d). 8.  On 17 July 2014 the Gudermes Town Court of the Chechen Republic convicted him as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  During a medical check-up upon his admission to the remand prison, a doctor noted an area of pigmentation on the applicant\u2019s face and ordered a biopsy. The test, performed on 27 February 2013 at the Regional Cancer Hospital in Grozny, revealed melanoma, a type of skin cancer. Radiotherapy and surgery were prescribed. 10.  Such treatment was considered advanced medical care, which could only be provided under a special programme in limited numbers. On 16 September 2013 a medical panel of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Chechen Republic offered that programme to the applicant. 11.  In October and November 2013 he was transferred to the Regional Cancer Hospital in Rostov (\u201cthe cancer hospital\u201d). He was examined and informed that the cancerous tumour could be removed, but he refused the treatment. 12.  On 3 June 2014 the applicant was examined at the Rostov Institute of Cancer Research (\u201cthe cancer institute\u201d). Surgical removal of the melanoma was recommended. It appears that several further consultations had been planned to take place at the facility, but the detention authorities failed to ensure his presence. 13.  On 20 June and 5 September 2014 a panel of doctors from the \u0441ancer hospital repeatedly recommended surgical removal of the melanoma. The applicant agreed to the treatment, but several days later withdrew his consent, saying that he had no confidence in the doctors practising in the Chechen Republic. 14.  On 22 September 2014 the applicant was admitted to the Town Hospital in Groznyy for cancer surgery, but refused it the next day as he had no confidence in the doctors. 15.  At the end of December 2014 he was moved from the remand prison to the correctional colony, where he had to serve his sentence. 16.  On 2 April 2015 a further biopsy showed that the applicant\u2019s tumour showed a moderate-stage basal cell carcinoma, another type of skin cancer. Given the extent to which the tumour had spread, reconstructive facial surgery was recommended. 17.  Several days later, after realising that the tumour had grown, the applicant gave his written consent to the prescribed surgery. 18.  The detention authorities contacted the cancer hospital with a view to arranging the treatment. 19.  On 6 April 2015 the head of the cancer hospital informed the detention authorities that the medical institution was unable to perform such complex surgery. 20.  On 27 October 2015 the applicant applied for early release from detention on medical grounds. On 23 November 2015 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Vladikavkaz refused to examine the application on the merits, because his illness was not included in Government Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004 setting out a list of illnesses warranting early release. Under the Decree, only patients with end-stage cancer could apply for early release on health grounds. 21.  On 11 January 2016 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, complaining of his inability to undergo the complex cancer surgery vitally needed in his situation. 22.  On 25 January 2016 the Court indicated to the Russian Government, under Rule 39, that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system with a view to determining: (i) whether he had been receiving adequate medical care; (ii) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the correctional colony; and (iii) whether his state of health called for urgent surgery and/or for a transfer to an appropriate civilian or prison hospital. Furthermore, the Government were also asked to ensure the applicant\u2019s transfer to such a relevant hospital for surgery, should the medical experts conclude that urgent surgery in a hospital was required. 23.  On 4 March 2016 the Government responded to a letter from the Court dated 25 January 2016, stating that the applicant\u2019s transfer to a hospital for surgery was scheduled for 10 March 2016. They also submitted the following: a document setting out the periods of the applicant\u2019s detention in custody, a document concerning the conditions of his detention, a report issued by the detention authorities on his current state of health, original and typed copies of his medical file, and copies of correspondence between the medical and detention authorities discussing surgery for the applicant. 24.  Ten days later the applicant was transferred to prison medical unit no. 61 in Rostov-on-Don (\u201cthe prison medical unit\u201d) for surgery. In that facility he was examined by a civilian oncologist, who confirmed that facial surgery was required. According to a letter from the head of the medical unit dated 14 April 2016, the facility was unable to carry any surgery out as its surgical unit was undergoing renovation. 25.  Having learned of the inability of the medical unit to provide the applicant with the required treatment, the detention authorities asked the cancer institute to perform the surgery. The request was refused due to a lack of appropriate security measures at the institution. However, the hospital was ready to sign an agreement with the detention authorities and send a surgeon to a prison medical unit to operate on the applicant. 26.  It appears that in response to the steps taken by the detention authorities to ensure surgery for the applicant by a civilian cancer surgeon, on 31 May 2016 he refused the treatment. The following day he was discharged from the medical unit and returned to the correctional colony. 27.  On 6 October 2016 the applicant agreed to the treatment in a cancer hospital. The detention authorities started organising his transfer to a hospital in the Krasnodar Region. The parties have not submitted information about any further developments in the case.", "references": ["2", "6", "9", "0", "5", "3", "7", "8", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant, Mr Stemplys, was born in 1963 and lives in Marijampol\u0117. The second applicant, Mr Debesys, was born in 1954 and lives in Vilnius. 5.  The first applicant was detained in the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility from 6 April 2005 to 28 August 2015. 6.  On 19 December 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed 250,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 72,400 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant\u2019s claim concerning the period before 19 December 2009 as time\u2011barred. The court then found that from 19 December 2009 to 19 December 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had between 1.98 and 2.74 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also dismissed as unproven the applicant\u2019s claim that his health had deteriorated. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8.  On 7 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 19 December 2012, claiming LTL 63,750 (approximately EUR 18,500) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10.  On 21 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It found that from 19 December 2012 to 21 October 2013 (the day the court issued its decision) the applicant had had 1.98 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m, and that during that period for fourteen days he had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, where he had had 3.47 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms, and dismissed as unproven the applicant\u2019s claims that his health had deteriorated. He was awarded LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11.  On 25 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. 12.  The second applicant was detained in the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility from 19 May 2001 to 20 December 2013. 13.  On 28 June 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed LTL 125,000 (approximately EUR 36,200) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 14.  On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant\u2019s claim concerning the period before 28 June 2009 as time\u2011barred. The court then found that from 28 June 2009 to 28 June 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had around 2.55 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also held that the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s state of health was not related to the conditions of his detention. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 15.  On 15 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. 16.  On 15 May 2013 the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 28 June 2012, claiming LTL 33,875 (approximately EUR 9,800) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 17.  On 16 September 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It found that from 28 June 2012 to 15 May 2013 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) the applicant had had between 1.59 and 2.77 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms and found no causal link between the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s state of health and the conditions of his detention. The applicant was awarded LTL 500 (approximately EUR 145) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 18.  On 18 September 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment in its entirety.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "3", "5", "8", "9", "7", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 24 January 2011 a bomb attack at the Domodedovo airport killed 37 people and injured more than 160. It was later established that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber and organised by a militant group operating in the North Caucasus. The applicant, who was present at the airport at the time of explosion, sustained multiple injuries to her body (wounds, contusions and fractures) which provoked further complications (cerebral oedema, coma, respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and a traumatic shock). The applicant\u2019s injuries were life-threatening and caused serious harm to her health. 7.  Within the framework of the criminal investigation into the bombing, the investigative authorities arrested four persons. On 11 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court found them guilty of multiple charges, including commission of an act of terror, organisation of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Three defendants received life sentence and the fourth one was sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  On 25 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 11 November 2013 in substance on appeal. 9.  According to the Government, the applicant was granted a victim status. She did not bring a civil action for damages against the convicted persons. 10.  On 25 January 2011 the Russian authorities opened criminal investigation on the charges of negligence against the airport managers and employees and the policemen deployed at the airport. On 22 March 2011 the applicant was granted a victim status in the proceedings. On 5 March 2012 the investigator decided to recall it. On 26 March 2012 the investigator discontinued the proceedings. 11.  On 22 May 2012 the Deputy President of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 26 March 2012 and re-opened the case. The proceedings are pending to date. 12.  On 3 June 2013 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of 5 March 2012. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim against the airport seeking damages resulting from the failure of the airport security to prevent the bombing. 14.  On 27 August 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims for damages. On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2013 on appeal. The City Court dismissed, inter alia, as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegation that the suicide bomber had been able to enter the airport owing to the lack of a metal detector at one of the airport entrances noting that such fact should have been established in the course of the relevant criminal investigation.", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "7", "5", "8", "3", "9", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in R\u00e2bni\u0163a. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 28 July 1999, the applicant was arrested in R\u00e2bni\u0163a by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d; for further details about the \u201cMRT\u201d, see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery. 8.  On 17 May 2000, the Camenca District Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the \u201cMRT\u201d, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. According to the applicant, he appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court on an unspecified date. 9.  The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chi\u015fin\u0103u-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10.  On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by \u201cMRT\u201d courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 11.  On 21 November 2001, members of LHR organised a press conference, during which they informed the media of the circumstances of the case and of the letter sent to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office on the previous day. 12.  Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to \u201cMRT\u201d prisons. 13.  On 23 November 2001, LHR informed the media of the detainees\u2019 transfer back to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities on 21 November 2001. 14.  On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15.  On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the \u201cMRT\u201d Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant\u2019s name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16.  On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17.  The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.", "references": ["4", "0", "7", "8", "5", "9", "3", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was employed by HK Komgrap and Komgrap-Maki\u0161 doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned (see Stokovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia, nos. 75879/14 and seq. \u00a7\u00a7 10-14, 8 March 2016) 6.  Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicant brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7.  On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and the various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005. 8.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (\u010cetvrti op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003. 9.  On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicant the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings. 10.  On 27 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question. 11.  On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the \u201cright to a trial within a reasonable time\u201d with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of these proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of 800 euros (EUR) converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 12.  The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned the pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeal in that regard.", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "8", "6", "1", "5", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1983 respectively. 6.  The first applicant, Aleksey Navalnyy, is a political activist, opposition leader, anti-corruption campaigner and popular blogger. He lives in Moscow. The second applicant, Oleg Navalnyy, is the first applicant\u2019s brother; he is an entrepreneur and a former employee of the Federal State unitary enterprise Russian Post. He is currently serving a three-and-a-half year sentence in a correctional colony in the Oryol Region. 7.  From 2005 the second applicant worked at the Main Centre for Long Distance Mail, a subsidiary of Russian Post. On 1 December 2007 he became head of its Internal Mail department and then worked in other managerial posts in various departments and divisions of Russian Post. 8.  On 17 October 2006 Russian Post concluded a contract with the limited liability company Multidisciplinary Processing (OOO \u041c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0444\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0438\u043d\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u2013 hereinafter \u201cMPK\u201d) and the telecommunications company Rostelekom, whereby MPK undertook to print Rostelekom\u2019s telephone bills and deliver them through Russian Post to Rostelekom\u2019s customers. 9.  On 1 February 2007, under a separate contract, Russian Post leased electronic equipment from MPK. On 10 April 2007 MPK subcontracted the sorting, packing and the transfer of the equipment leased to Russian Post to a private joint-stock company, the Interregional Mail Centre (OAO \u041c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0447\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cMSPT\u201d). 10.  On 3 December 2007 the applicants and their parents acquired the limited liability company Alortag Management Limited, incorporated in Cyprus. 11.  On 7 May 2008 MPK subcontracted the printing of the Rostelekom telephone bills to the limited liability company IPS M-City (OOO \u0418\u041f\u0421 \u041c\u2011\u0421\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cM\u2011City\u201d). 12.  On 19 May 2008 Alortag Management Limited set up a Russian limited liability company, Chief Subscription Agency (\u041e\u041e\u041e \u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 hereinafter \u201cGPA\u201d). Neither of the applicants held formal positions in GPA, but it appears that the second applicant was actively involved in its functioning. 13.  On 16 July 2008 the chief of Russian Post\u2019s Mail Service Directorate informed its client, the Russian subsidiary of French company Yves Rocher, the limited liability company Yves Rocher Vostok (OOO \u0418\u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0448\u0435 \u0412\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043a), that from 1 October 2008 it would terminate the practice of collecting the client\u2019s parcels from a specific distribution centre and that this service would henceforth be subject to a separate contract. Subsequently, Ms B., a manager at Yves Rocher Vostok, asked the second applicant for advice on handling the transfer of parcels from the distribution centre and he suggested that she use a private contractor, GPA. 14.  On 2 August 2008 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., signed a freight forwarding agreement with GPA for the collection and transfer of parcels from the distribution centre at 23,600 Russian roubles (RUB) per shipment. On 10 August 2008 GPA subcontracted the freight forwarding services under that agreement to two specialist courier companies. GPA paid the couriers RUB 14,000 per shipment. GPA and its contractors provided those services to Yves Rocher Vostok until the end of 2012. 15.  On 7 November 2008 the general director of MPK, Mr Sh., signed an agreement with GPA whereby the latter undertook to provide overall logistical services to MPK related to the printing, sorting, packing and distribution of telephone bills as well as the sorting, packing and transfer of electronic equipment to Russian Post. Subsequently, GPA subcontracted those services to seventeen specialist companies, including M-City. GPA and its contractors rendered the services to MPK until March 2013. 16.  In the same period, the first applicant ran an increasingly public anti-corruption campaign targeting high-ranking public officials (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, \u00a7 15, 23 February 2016). In 2011-2012 he organised and led a number of rallies, including an assembly at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (see, among other sources, Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). 17.  At the beginning of 2012 the first applicant investigated the off-duty activities of the chief of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe Investigative Committee\u201d), Mr Bastrykin. On 25 April 2012 the Investigative Committee, at the direct order of Mr Bastrykin, instituted criminal proceedings in embezzlement case against the first applicant (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, hereinafter \u201cthe Kirovles case\u201d). On 5 July 2012 Mr Bastrykin made a public statement expressing his determination to have the first applicant prosecuted. On 26 July 2012 the first applicant published an article about Mr Bastrykin, alleging in particular that his business activities and residence status were incompatible with the office he held (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 30-31 and 118). 18.  On 4 December 2012 the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., lodged a complaint with the Investigative Committee, alleging that in 2008 unidentified persons had misled his company\u2019s employees and had persuaded them to conclude a contract with GPA, thus depriving the company of a free choice of contractor. He stated that it was possible that the company had suffered significant damage as a result. 19.  On 10 December 2012 the first applicant made a public plea for people to participate in the Freedom March, an opposition rally at Lubyanskaya Square on 15 December 2012, in defiance of a ban by the Moscow authorities. 20.  On the same day the Investigative Committee decided to open a criminal file on the basis of material severed from the Kirovles case. The new file concerned suspicions of fraud by the applicants against Yves Rocher Vostok and the laundering of the proceeds of illegal transactions, offences set out in Articles 159.4 and 174.1 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. 21.  On 20 December 2012 charges of fraud and money laundering were brought against the applicants under Articles 159.4 and 174.1 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in connection with acts allegedly committed against MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok. 22.  On 13 February 2013 the second applicant requested that five Yves Rocher Vostok employees be questioned as witnesses, including the general director Mr B.L. and the manager Ms B., but the investigator rejected the request on 18 February 2013. It appears that the witnesses were questioned during the investigation, but the applicants were not informed of that fact or given the opportunity to have a formal face\u2011to-face confrontation with them. 23.  On 18 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov found the first applicant guilty of organising large-scale embezzlement in the Kirovles case and gave him a suspended prison sentence of five years. The Court subsequently found that those proceedings had been conducted in violation of Article 6 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 102-21). 24.  On 11 February 2013 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., submitted an internal audit report to the investigator stating that the company had not sustained any damage or loss of profits due to its agreement with GPA; it had been established by the auditors that GPA had charged the market price for its services. 25.  On 28 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the first applicant be placed under house arrest. This preventive measure was maintained until 5 January 2015. 26.  On 14 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began hearing the applicants\u2019 criminal case. 27.  On 14 November 2014 the applicants requested that the court call and examine the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., the manager, Ms B. and several employees of Russian Post as witnesses. They also asked the court to obtain certain internal documents relating to the structure and functioning of Russian Post. The court dismissed those requests. 28.  On 9 December 2014 the applicants asked the court to summon six witnesses, again including Mr B.L. and Ms B. 29.  On 15 December 2014 the court, at the request of the prosecutor, issued a warrant compelling Mr B.L. to appear, however, it was not executed. The court subsequently allowed statements that he and Ms B. had given during the investigation to be read out. 30.  On 19 December 2014 the court concluded the trial and said it would deliver a judgment on 15 January 2015. 31.  At about 4 p.m. on 29 December 2014 the applicants and their defence counsel were summoned by telephone to appear in court at 9 a.m. on 30 December 2014 for delivery of the judgment, which had been brought forward from 15 January 2015 for unknown reasons. 32.  On 30 December 2014 the court delivered the introductory and operative parts of the judgment. The applicants were found guilty of money laundering and of defrauding MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok and were convicted under Articles 159.4 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 and 174.1 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. The first applicant received a suspended sentence of three and a half years and the second applicant a prison sentence of the same duration, to be served in a correctional colony. They were also fined RUB 500,000 each and had to pay jointly RUB 4,498,546 in damages to MPK. The court ordered that the first applicant should remain under house arrest and that the second applicant be placed in \u201cpre-trial detention\u201d, with his term of imprisonment running from that day. Delivery of the judgment in full was adjourned until 12 January 2015. 33.  The second applicant appealed against his detention the same day. 34.  The first applicant appealed against the extension of his house arrest on 31 December 2014. 35.  On 12 January 2015 the applicants appealed against the judgment of 30 December 2014 on the merits. They received the full text of the judgment on the same day, which included the reasons for finding the applicants guilty of fraud. The court found that the applicants had set up a \u201cfake company\u201d, GPA, with the intention to use it as an intermediary to offer services to two clients of Russian Post, MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok. It held that the second applicant had taken advantage of insider information that Russian Post had ceased to provide the companies with certain services for lack of operational capacity and had convinced those clients to use GPA as a substitute; that he had misled the clients about GPA\u2019s pricing policy and its relationship with Russian Post, thus depriving them of the freedom of choice of service providers; that he had promoted his company\u2019s services while knowing that it would have to subcontract the work to other companies; and that GPA had retained the difference in price between what MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok paid for its services and what GPA paid to its subcontractors. The court concluded that the latter margin had been stolen from MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok by the applicants through GPA. The court further established that the amounts in question constituted the proceeds of crime, and that using that money to pay GPA\u2019s office rent, legal services, dividends to the applicants and for transfers to affiliated companies had constituted money laundering. 36.  On 19 January 2015 the Moscow City Prosecutor\u2019s Office appealed against the first-instance judgment on the grounds that the sentence given to both applicants had been too lenient. 37.  On 28 January 2015 the applicants challenged the accuracy of the verbatim records of the first-instance hearing. Only a few of their corrections were accepted. 38.  On 11 February 2015 the applicants lodged additional points of appeal and a request that six witnesses be called and examined, including Mr B.L. and Ms B. 39.  On 17 February 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment, except for the part imposing a fine and awarding damages to MPK, which was reversed. 40.  On 27 April 2015 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal. 41.  On 26 June 2015 the Moscow City Court refused leave to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["0", "7", "6", "5", "2", "8", "1", "4", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in \u0130zmir. 5.  On 18 June 1998 the applicant started working for a company owned by \u0130zmir City Council (\u201cthe City Council\u201d). On 19 March 2007 he resigned from his job to perform his military service. 6.  On 12 April 2007 the applicant was paid 16,985 Turkish liras (TRY \u2011 approximately 9,200 euros (EUR)) in respect of severance pay and he signed a release (ibraname) discharging the City Council from all liability. 7.  Following his discharge from the military on health grounds shortly after he was enlisted, on 20 April and 31 May 2007 the applicant requested his reinstatement in his previous job. However, his requests were rejected by the City Council. 8.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant initiated proceedings before the \u0130zmir Labour Court, seeking reinstatement. He relied on clause 19 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the company (\u201cthe collective agreement\u201d), which provided for the reinstatement of employees who had quit their jobs to perform their military service, provided that they applied within three months of their discharge from the armed forces. 9.  On 12 September 2007, in a decision rendered orally in the presence of the parties, the \u0130zmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicant. The Labour Court held that the applicant\u2019s discharge from the military shortly after he had been enlisted fell under the provision of the collective agreement, which called for the suspension of the employment contract when an employee was conscripted (silah alt\u0131na al\u0131nma) for reasons other than compulsory military service, such as being recalled to the armed forces in times of war. Therefore it held that the applicant was entitled to be reinstated in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. The court informed the parties that they could appeal against this decision within the time-limits set out in the applicable procedure. 10.  On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant. 11.  On 15 October 2007, the registry of the first-instance court forwarded the file to the Court of Cassation for appeal on points of law. 12.  On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court\u2019s interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant. 13.  On 21 July 2008, following an examination based on the case file and without holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s judgment and found in favour of the City Council. The Court of Cassation found it established that the applicant had resigned from his job to perform his military service and that he had been paid severance pay. It held that a rejection of the applicant\u2019s request for reinstatement could not be regarded as the termination of the applicant\u2019s employment contract; therefore, the applicant could not technically ask to be reinstated. The Court of Cassation further held that clause 19 of the collective agreement was not directly applicable in the case before it. No appeal was possible against this decision. 14.  This decision was served on the applicant on 22 September 2008.", "references": ["9", "7", "6", "1", "0", "2", "5", "8", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Forr\u00e1sk\u00fat. At the time of lodging the application, he was detained at M\u00e1rianosztra Prison. 5.  On 29 January 2014 the applicant was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, on 14 October 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 6.  The applicant began serving his sentence at Szeged Prison on 15 January 2015 and was transferred to M\u00e1rianosztra Prison on 26 January 2015. He was released on parole on 8 September 2015. 7.  While the applicant was held at Szeged Prison, the per capita space available to him was about 3.2 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 16 sq. m for five occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. He was allowed to spend one hour per day in the open air and could take part in various sports and other activities, thus reducing the time spent in the cell. He was provided with basic standard meals and was able to take a shower twice a week. 8.  At M\u00e1rianosztra Prison, the per capita cell space available to the applicant was about 2.67 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 8 sq. m for three occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. Only between 26 and 29 January and 11 and 15 May 2015 he was held in a cell where a wall separated the toilet from the rest of the space. He could take a shower twice a week and pursue certain free-time activities. At his request, he was provided with vegetarian meals but very often consisting only of soya beans. 9.  The applicant submitted that he suffered from epilepsy and a personality disorder. In his own submissions he stated that prior to his conviction he had cultivated and consumed cannabis partly because it alleviated his symptoms. 10.  As regards the medical care in prison, the Government submitted that, during the first examination at Szeged Prison, the applicant had stated that he suffered from epilepsy without presenting any relevant documentation. The doctor referred him for a psychiatric examination, which took place on 22 January 2015; but the applicant refused the treatment prescribed by the specialist. 11.  During his first medical examination at M\u00e1rianosztra Prison, the doctor noted that the applicant\u2019s aptitude for work could be assessed only after external medical records concerning his illness had been obtained. 12.  The applicant suffered an epileptic seizure on 24 April 2015, whilst in his cell. Following medication, his condition improved but he refused the neurological examination recommended by the doctor and any further treatment. He suffered further fits on 4 May and 8 July 2015, following which a neurologist prescribed him anti-epileptic drugs, but he agreed to take them only after suffering yet another seizure.", "references": ["6", "5", "0", "8", "3", "4", "7", "9", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Smederevo. 6.  On 26 March 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the \u017dabari Municipal Court against his employer, the Ministry of Interior, seeking payment of certain benefits. 7.  On 23 April 2012 the Po\u017earevac First Instance Court the \u017dabari Court Unit ruled in favour of the applicant. 8.  On 4 October 2012 the Belgrade Appellate Court revised the First Instance Court\u2019s judgment and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. The applicant received the said judgment on 5 November 2012. 9.  On 12 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal.", "references": ["0", "9", "1", "6", "8", "4", "2", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Sz\u00e1zhalombatta. 5.  On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend. 6.  The detention measure was extended on 8 May and again on 7 August 2009. The court reiterated its earlier reasons, adding that the risk of collusion was serious, since certain other suspects had not yet been apprehended. 7.  A further extension was ordered on 9 November 2009. The court stated that the applicant was being prosecuted for terrorist acts committed as an associate of an organised criminal group whose plans entailed a real risk of loss of life. It was of note that the group had existed for quite some time and had been committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Moreover, the volume of evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion, as weighed individually against the applicant, was increasing. 8.  On 9 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s detention was again extended, the court noting that, in view of the grounds for his detention, not even his clean criminal record, family ties and settled background could provide adequate justification for a less strict measure. 9.  On 7 April 2010 the measure was renewed, with special reference to the fact that the case was concerned with a series of crimes committed over a long period of time by a criminal organisation. 10.  On 9 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held under house arrest, holding that the danger of his re-offending was not of a degree that justified his continued detention, noting also that the investigation was about to be wrapped up and that, in any case, some accomplices in the case had already been released pending trial.\nThe applicant was released from detention the next day. During the ensuing period he complied with the rules of house arrest. 11.  On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest. 12.  The measure was extended on 4 August 2010. In addition to the previously cited reasons, the court considered that there was no reason to assume that the applicant\u2019s political motivation behind the incriminated acts had subsided, which meant that the risk of re-offending was real. 13.  On 24 November 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal ordered the applicant\u2019s house arrest, observing that the applicant had abided by the previous house arrest (see paragraph 10 above) and holding that the risk of re-offending was slight. 14.  On 20 September 2012 the applicant\u2019s house arrest was replaced by a restraining order, which was eventually lifted on 6 July 2014. 15.  On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015. 16.  On 18 December 2015 the applicant was released from detention and put under house arrest, which lasted until 27 July 2016. 17.  On 30 August 2016 the applicant and his accomplices were convicted. He was sentenced to 12 years in a strict-regime prison. 18.  Both the defendants and the prosecution appealed. The outcome of the ensuing proceedings is unknown.", "references": ["7", "1", "5", "6", "9", "4", "3", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit. 7.  On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison (\u201cthe military court\u201d) ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant\u2019s service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated. 8.  On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force. 9.  In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk. 10.  On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11.  On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs\u2019 service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12.  On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13.  In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant\u2019s requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14.  It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15.  On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "7", "8", "5", "6", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Lisichansk-18, the Lugansk region of Ukraine. 5.  In 1972 the applicant suffered 100 per cent disability as a result of a traffic accident. In 1994 the Lisichansk Town Court of the Lugansk Region of Ukraine found the State Health Care Institution of the Sanitary and Epidemiology Monitoring of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe institution\u201d) responsible for the accident and ordered it to pay to the applicant compensation and to reimburse his medical expenses. Since that time, the applicant has been involved in several sets of proceedings concerning various types of allowances and compensation due to him. 6.  On 17 July 1995 by the Lisichansk Town Court ordered the increase of the monthly payments due to the applicant in respect of compensation, allowances and medical expenses. It appears that the debtor institution complied with the judgment in part and in May 2000 discontinued payments due under the judgment. 7.  On 31 March 2006 the Perm Regional Court of Russia allowed the applicant\u2019s request for compulsory execution of the above judgment in Russia as from May 2000. It was enforced on 30 March 2007. 8.  The applicant sued the defendant institution for medical expenses, various types of allowances and compensation, as well as index-linking and arrears in the respective payments, and acquired several judgments by Russian courts in his favour listed in Appendixes I and II. 9.  In course of the proceedings the defendant institution was replaced by the Federal Health Care Institution \u201cHygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region and the Komi-Perm Autonomous Region\u201d and subsequently by Federal Health Care Institution \u201cHygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region\u201d, its legal successors. 10.  He complained about non-enforcement to the Ministry of Finance, the prosecutor\u2019s office and various other authorities, but to no avail. 11.  The judgments were enforced fully or in part on dates listed in Appendixes I and II. Some of them have not been enforced, as shown in the tables below.", "references": ["8", "7", "0", "5", "2", "1", "4", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Toronto, Canada. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The applicant was the director of a company (D.) registered in Ukraine. In 1996, in the name of D., he concluded a contract with a collective farm (N.), situated in the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d \u2013 for further details about the \u201cMRT\u201d, see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Under the contract, N. undertook to send D. 15 tonnes of paprika and 5 tonnes of butter, while D. undertook to send N. 275 tonnes of diesel fuel as payment. 9.  Subsequently, N. sent the paprika, but according to the applicant some of it was of poor quality and D. suffered financial losses as a result. Consequently, D. refused to send the diesel fuel. 10.  On 22 December 1996 the applicant was summoned to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime in Crivoi Rog, Ukraine, and asked to give an explanation for his refusal to send the diesel fuel. On 24 January 1997 he was summoned again. After the second interview he was taken, allegedly against his will and without his passport, to the \u201cMRT\u201d. 11.  The applicant was accused of fraud by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. On 30 December 1999 he was convicted and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment by the Ribnita People\u2019s Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the \u201cMRT\u201d. He did not appeal against that judgment, which then became final. 12.  On 2 March 2002 the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 13.  While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14.  According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day \u2013 some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15.  On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any \u201cMRT\u201d court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16.  On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client\u2019s abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17.  On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors. 18.  In reply to a complaint concerning his client lodged on an unknown date with the Russian President, on 25 September 2002 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice.", "references": ["3", "7", "9", "0", "8", "6", "4", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Vranje. 6.  On 19 January 2004 the Vladi\u010din Han Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company DP PK Deli\u0161es (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d), based in Vladi\u010din Han, to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of debt, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 15 March 2004. 7.  On 27 May 2004, upon the first applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Vladi\u010din Han Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs. 8.  On 30 January 2014 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 1/14). 9.  As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed by the Municipal Court\u2019s decision of 12 March 2014. 10.  The first applicant duly submitted his respective claim. 11.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 12.  On 23 January 2013 the first applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 13.  On 28 May 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It further awarded him 500 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. The Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint concerning his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as well as his request for pecuniary damages, since the insolvency proceedings were still pending. That decision was delivered to the first applicant on 13 July 2015. 14.  The second applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Ni\u0161. 15.  He was employed by DOO EI-7 Oktobar, a socially-owned company based in Ni\u0161 (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d). 16.  On 22 December 2005 the second applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date. 17.  On 17 December 2010, upon the second applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 18.  On 5 September 2008 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final by 23 December 2008. 19.  On 28 December 2010, upon the second applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 20.  On 30 June 2007 and 15 October 2007 respectively, the Republic Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions. These decisions became final on unspecified dates. 21.  On 27 December 2010 and 28 December 2010 respectively, upon the second applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said decisions and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 22.  On 23 May 2012 the Ni\u0161 Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 115/12). As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed. 23.  The second applicant duly submitted his respective claims. 24.  On 24 December 2015 the second applicant\u2019s claims were formally recognised. 25.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 26.  On 11 February 2013 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 27.  On 18 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the second applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decisions on the staying of the enforcement proceedings as a result of opening of the insolvency proceedings had been delivered to him. That decision was delivered to the second applicant after 16 July 2015. 28.  The third applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kragujevac. 29.  He was employed by DP Industrija Filip Kljaji\u0107, a socially-owned company based in Kragujevac (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d). 30.  On 13 May 2002 the third applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Kragujevac Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date. 31.  On 27 August 2002, upon the third applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Kragujevac Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the third applicant the enforcement costs. 32.  On 5 March 2010 the Kragujevac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 45/10). 33.  The third applicant duly submitted his respective claim. 34.  On 25 October 2010 the third applicant\u2019s claim was formally recognised. 35.  On 2 August 2012 the third applicant was paid 13.12 % of his recognized claim. 36.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 37.  On 10 May 2013 the third applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 38.  On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the third applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decision on opening of the insolvency proceedings had been rendered or as of the date when he had submitted his claim in the insolvency proceedings. That decision was delivered to the third applicant on 29 January 2016.", "references": ["8", "2", "6", "4", "1", "7", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Afidnes Attikis. 6.  On 2 November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against C.T. for breach of duty and extortion concerning acts he had allegedly committed as mayor of Kifissia Municipality. The applicant gave a statement under oath on the same day, repeating the allegations in his criminal complaint. He made a further statement under oath related to his criminal complaint on 21 December 2001. 7.  At the time the complaint was lodged C.T. was a member of the Greek Parliament. In accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution, the public prosecutor asked Parliament to lift C.T.\u2019s immunity from prosecution for breach of duty, extortion and bribery. That request was rejected on 20 March 2002. 8.  On 5 August 2003 the applicant, relying on the Court\u2019s judgments in Cordova v. Italy (no. 1) (no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003\u2011I) and Cordova v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003\u2011I (extracts)) resubmitted his criminal complaint, arguing that Parliament\u2019s rejection of the request to lift C.T.\u2019s immunity had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. On 21 October 2003 the criminal complaint was submitted to Parliament. On 2 February 2004 the President of Parliament rejected the request to lift C.T.\u2019s immunity, relying on Article 83 \u00a7 8 of Parliament\u2019s Regulation, according to which a request to lift a member\u2019s immunity for a criminal complaint based on the same facts as a previous request was inadmissible. 9.  On 18 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that Parliament\u2019s refusal to lift C.T.\u2019s immunity had violated his right of access to a court. On 16 November 2006 the Court delivered a judgment concluding that the refusal by the President of Parliament to lift C.T.\u2019s immunity for acts that had allegedly been committed prior to his election had violated the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (Tsalkitzis v. Greece, no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006). To date, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has not yet concluded the supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. 10.  In the meantime, on 4 April 2004 the applicant appeared on a television show on the nationwide ALTER Channel and reiterated the allegations made in his criminal complaint. 11.  On 2 July 2004 C.T. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for false accusation, perjury and slander. Following a preliminary examination, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant. On 15 November 2007 the applicant was convicted in absentia by a three\u2011member panel of the Athens Court of First Instance. He was sentenced to twenty months\u2019 imprisonment and deprivation of his political rights (decision no. 63131/07). C.T. joined the proceedings as a civil party. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. 12.  Before the three-member panel of the Athens Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), the applicant submitted that his trial for slander should have been suspended pursuant to Article 366 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code or, in any event, that it should have been adjourned in respect of all the charges, pursuant to Article 59 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At a hearing on 25 May 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to suspend or adjourn the trial and proceeded to examine C.T.\u2019s criminal complaint. In particular, it held the following:\n\u201c... Following this, the party who had filed the criminal complaint, Vasileios Tsalkitzis, lodged application no. 11801/04 with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, complaining that Greece had not lifted C.T.\u2019s parliamentary immunity and that criminal proceedings had not been initiated against him. That Court ... held that the refusal of the President of the Greek Parliament had violated Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention ... Therefore, the following issues have been identified concerning: a) the relation of international conventions to current constitutional provisions; b) the act in question of the President of the Greek Parliament and whether it breaches constitutional provisions and the above-mentioned international convention; and c) the question of whether or not it is possible to suspend the current criminal case being tried following the criminal complaint dated 2.11.2001 by the defendant Vasileios Tsalkitzis against ... C.T ... The matter of the supremacy of the Constitution does not appear to be contradicted by the above-mentioned European Court of Human Rights judgment, which identifies the issue as the act of the President of Parliament of not putting the request to the Plenary of the Greek Parliament, which resulted, according to the judgment, in impeding the applicant\u2019s and the case\u2019s access to the competent criminal court ... It is noted that the President of Parliament\u2019s act was based on Article 82 of Parliament\u2019s Regulations...\nAccording to the foregoing, it is clear that the Greek Parliament has irrevocably dismissed the request of the public prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance, thus refusing to lift the immunity of the member of Parliament against whom the criminal complaint was lodged ... on the basis of a legitimate procedure foreseen by the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Therefore, according to the legislation, there is absolutely no possibility of reconsidering the issue and, eventually, of instituting a criminal prosecution. During the ... Plenary meetings of the Greek Parliament, the issue of the well-foundedness of the accusation was examined as a whole, as were all aspects of the case, securing the work of the deputy and at the same time protecting him from malicious acts. In addition, and this is important, the whole case file which had been created following the preliminary examination was taken into account, as was the opinion of the competent public prosecutor who, following a review of the case, considered that there was no reason to initiate criminal proceedings against C.T. for the offences of which he had been accused ...\u201d 13.  Subsequently, the Court of Appeal proceeded to examine witnesses. The trial record shows that the applicant left the building following a short break after the examination of the first three witnesses for the prosecution. His lawyer then contacted him to find out his whereabouts and informed the court that he was not feeling well and had thus left the building. The hearing continued in the presence of his lawyer. In total, five prosecution witnesses were heard, including C.T., who joined the proceedings as a civil party, and one defence witness. It does not transpire from the information provided that the applicant or his representative requested the examination of any other defence witness and that such a request was refused. In view of the applicant\u2019s absence, the Court of Appeal asked his representative to express the applicant\u2019s views on the accusations. The applicant\u2019s representative stated that his client denied all the charges and insisted on the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T. 14.  The Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance verdict, including the sentence of twenty months\u2019 imprisonment and the deprivation of political rights (decision no. 4512/2009). 15.  On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law. He stated, inter alia, that the proceedings should have been suspended or adjourned pursuant to Article 366 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 59 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law (decision no. 912/2010). In particular, it held the following:\n\u201c... It is clear from this new provision (Article 59 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) ... that in order to adjourn a trial owing to an interlocutory criminal issue (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u03b6\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1) concerning Articles 224, 229, 362, 363 of the Criminal Code, a criminal prosecution must have been instituted for an act attested to on oath or for which a legal complaint has been submitted or one which a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about. As regards Article 366 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code ... the suspension of criminal proceedings is obligatory, but also requires a prior criminal prosecution for the act that a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about ... In the present case ... the court dismissed the above requests, providing full and correct reasoning, in particular because the immunity of the person against whom the criminal complaint had been lodged, who is now a civil party and member of Parliament, had not been lifted. Hence, a criminal prosecution had not been instituted, which is a prerequisite for the suspension and adjournment of criminal proceedings against a defendant who requests them. It can be concluded from the above-mentioned considerations that the court correctly interpreted and implemented the above-mentioned provisions, and did not violate them, when it proceeded to examine the allegations of false accusation, perjury and slander against the defendant-appellant on points of law and dismissed the defendant\u2019s request on the grounds that a criminal prosecution had not been instituted against the current civil party, former mayor and now member of Parliament, without suspending and adjourning the proceedings until the end of the previously instituted proceedings against him ...\u201d 16.  The decision was finalised on 4 June 2010 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae) and the applicant was able to receive a copy on 7 June 2010. The applicant was imprisoned from 13 May 2010 to 21 May 2010 as he was not able to pay the fine to which his sentence had been commuted. On 21 May 2010 his sentence was commuted to community service and he was released. Finally, on 31 May 2010 the applicant paid 5,799.94 euros in lieu of serving his sentence.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "4", "6", "9", "1", "2", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he apparently moved from France in November 2013. 6.  At 12.40 a.m. on 24 January 2014 he was arrested in Sofia while breaking into cars with a view to stealing items from them. He was taken to the First District Police Station and placed under police detention. According to the applicant, he was not put in a cell, but handcuffed to a bench in the station\u2019s corridor. 7.  According to the applicant, throughout the whole time that he spent in the police station he was not given any food or drink, allowed to go to the toilet, or allowed to use a telephone. He was visited by an ex officio lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. However, the lawyer spoke no French and very little English \u2013 a language that the applicant is apparently familiar with \u2013 and did not explain to him anything about the procedure in his case. 8.  In the late afternoon or the evening of 24 January 2014 the applicant was taken to a hospital for a medical examination, and then, at about 10 p.m. the same day, taken to a pre-trial detention facility in Sofia. 9.  It appears that the next day, or one of the following days, the applicant was brought before the Sofia District Court with a view to a decision on whether he should be remanded in detention, and that it was decided that he should remain in custody pending trial. A subsequent request for release apparently made by his counsel in the end of February 2014 was rejected as well. 10.  According to the applicant, upon his arrival in the pre-trial detention facility on the evening of 24 January 2014 (see paragraph 8 above), he was given a dirty mattress, pillow and blanket, but no bedlinen. Since he had arrived in the facility after suppertime, he could not eat or drink anything until lunchtime the following day, 25 January 2014. 11.  According to the applicant, the cell in which he had been placed had been dirty, cold, poorly ventilated, infested with cockroaches, overcrowded, and with a toilet which was not properly separated from the rest of the cell. 12.  According to the applicant, he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, as he was not provided with toilet paper or other toiletries, and had had no money to purchase them. As a result, it had been impossible for him to go to the shower for two weeks. On the third day of his stay in the facility, he had seen spots erupt on his skin and had asked to be examined by a medical doctor. The doctor had come to see him three days later, and had only examined him from a distance, without entering the cell. On an unspecified date in March 2014, the applicant was given a blood test which revealed that he had a staphylococcus infection. He was given antibiotics for it but was not taken to a hospital. 13.  According to the applicant, food had also been so poor and served so unhygienically that he had lost twenty-three kilogrammes during his stay in the detention facility. The space for out-of-cell exercise had also been so small that on many occasions he had chosen not to take his daily exercise. 14.  In the detention facility, there was a cardphone which inmates could use to call outside numbers. It was located in the space where they could take their daily one-hour out-of-cell exercise. Since it had to be shared among them, each inmate had about six minutes to use it. As the applicant had had no money on him when arrested, he could not however purchase a phonecard. With the help of a co-detainee who spoke some English, about two weeks after his arrival in the facility he managed to obtain one minute of call time free of charge, and on 5 February 2014 contacted the consulate of France in Sofia. The consulate immediately informed the applicant\u2019s Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend of his and his parents, who resided in France, that he had been arrested and detained, and the consul came to visit him. The same day the applicant\u2019s mother, who lived in France, wired money to the consul so that she could purchase food and clothes for the applicant. The consulate also arranged for a lawyer to represent the applicant in the criminal case against him. 15.  With the money that he received via the consulate, the applicant was able to purchase a phonecard. According to him, he had made many requests to that effect in the days after 5 February 2017, which the Government had not provided. The Government insisted that they had made available to the Court all documents in the applicant\u2019s detention file. They submitted a declaration by him dated 24 February 2014 whereby he had asked the detention facility\u2019s head to issue him a phonecard preloaded with 20 Bulgarian levs of credit and, as required under the relevant regulations (see paragraph 30 below), had submitted for approval a list of the persons \u2013 his Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend, his lawyer, and his mother and father in France \u2013 whom he wished to call. The same day the facility\u2019s head approved the list. The applicant was apparently able to call his mother in France for the first time two days later, on 26 February 2014. 16.  According to the applicant, the relevant order (see paragraph 31 below) had provided that detainees could purchase phonecards or recharge them twice a month. The Government did not comment on that point or submit a copy of the order. According to the official form used by the applicant to make his above-mentioned declaration, phonecards could be recharged once a month. The applicant alleged that the facility\u2019s staff had often not complied with the recharging schedule and that on one occasion he had been unable to recharge his phonecard for five weeks. He did not provide further details in that respect, but from the documents submitted by him it appears that between 24 March and 14 April 2014, a period of three weeks, he had not spoken on the telephone to his mother in France. 17.  Detainees in the facility could get two visits a month, each lasting up to twenty minutes. According to the Government, the applicant had received such visits on 5, 8 and 9 February and 23 March 2014. However, on one occasion on 22 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s Bulgarian girlfriend, who had come to visit him, was turned away with the explanation that the same day he had been moved to a different wing, detainees in which could be visited on another date according to the schedule of visits. She was apparently able to visit him the next day. It appears that a Bulgarian friend of the applicant who had also come to visit him on 22 March 2014 was likewise turned away. 18.  According to the Government, during his stay in the detention facility the applicant had been visited by his lawyer on twelve occasions in February and March 2014, and by consular staff on two occasions. He had also received parcels with food and other items on twenty-one occasions. 19.  Throughout his stay in the detention facility, the applicant was able to correspond with his parents in France with letters passed via his lawyer or the staff of the consulate of France in Sofia. 20.  On 17 April 2014 the applicant and the prosecution entered into an agreement whereby he pleaded guilty and accepted to serve a sentence of three months\u2019 imprisonment. The same day the Sofia District Court approved the agreement, and the next day, 18 April 2014, the applicant was moved to Sofia Prison. Since his pre-trial detention was taken into account in calculating the amount of time that he had to serve under his sentence of imprisonment, he spent there only six days, until 24 April 2014, when he was released. According to the applicant, conditions in Sofia Prison were nearly identical to, or even worse than, those in the detention facility. 21.  The applicant\u2019s parents came from France to Bulgaria to see him on 25 April 2014, the day after his release. It appears that they could not do so earlier because it was not possible for his mother to take leave from work.", "references": ["6", "2", "9", "8", "0", "5", "7", "3", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in Nysa Prison. 6.  On 28 May 2001 the Kielce Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was amended by the Cracow Court of Appeal on 5 December 2001. The applicant has been serving this sentence since 3 September 2000, with interruptions between 13 January 2003 and 13 January 2005; 31 May 2005 and 17 August 2005; and 13 May 2008 and 30 May 2014. 7.  In August 2005 the applicant was charged with murdering an Italian citizen, a certain P.A on 9 August 2005. Allegedly, he had repeatedly hit P.A. on the head, causing brain haemorrhages, swelling of the brain, and consequently P.A.\u2019s death. He was also charged with one count of robbery committed on 8 August 2005 and possession of 0.2327gr of MDMA (commonly known as extasy) on 17 August 2005. 8.  On 20 March 2006, after examining the applicant and analysing his medical file from 2000, psychiatrists concluded that he should undergo a psychiatric assessment, in order to determine whether he could be held criminally responsible for this offence. 9.  On 27 March 2006 the Katowice Regional Court ordered that the applicant should undergo a psychiatric assessment in a psychiatric facility. The applicant underwent this assessment in the psychiatric ward of Cracow Detention Centre between 12 April and 30 June 2006. In an opinion dated 18 July 2006 (\u201cthe 2006 opinion\u201d), two psychiatrists and a psychologist confirmed that he had been suffering from a chronic psychotic disorder of a delusional type related to organic lesions in his central nervous system, and also from a personality disorder (przewlek\u0142e psychotyczne zaburzenia psychiczne o obrazie zespo\u0142u urojeniowego u osoby ze zmianami organicznymi o.u.n.; zaburzenia rozwoju osobowo\u015bci), at the time the offences had been committed, and that he would not have been aware of and could not have controlled his actions. They further recommended that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital, as there was a risk that he could commit similar offences again. In an additional opinion of 12 January 2007 they confirmed their previous findings. 10.  On 2 April 2007 the Katowice Regional Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant, on the basis that he could not be held criminally responsible. It further ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital. 11.  On 25 May 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case. 12. The Katowice Regional Court examined the case at two hearings on 5 and 25 September 2007. On the former date the court heard evidence from the experts who had prepared the opinions. They confirmed their previous findings. T., an expert who spoke on behalf of the team, stated in particular that the experts had excluded the possibility that the applicant was simulating a mental illness. In support of this statement, he noted that the applicant had been medicated and subjected to a psychological personality test, the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory). The results of the test had confirmed that he could not be feigning the symptoms of a mental illness, as a healthy person would have had a very different reaction to those specific medications. The applicant\u2019s lawyer supported the prosecutor\u2019s application for the proceedings to be discontinued. 13.  On 25 September 2007 the Katowice Regional Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. On the basis of available evidence, the court established that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. However, as he had been suffering from a mental disorder at the time, he could not be held criminally responsible. The court referred to the experts\u2019 opinions and the evidence which they had given during the trial. It also noted that the applicant had undergone psychiatric treatment since 2000. 14.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision, and it became final on 10 October 2007. 15.  On 14 March 2012 the Katowice Court of Appeal refused an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings in the case. The court admitted that, in view of new evidence (see paragraphs 44 and 46 below), it appeared that the applicant had not murdered P.A., and that he had only participated in the robbery. However, even if the proceedings were reopened, they would have to be discontinued in any event, in view of the applicant\u2019s insanity. 16.  On 12 December 2007 the Psychiatric Commission on Security Measures (Komisja Psychiatryczna ds. \u015brodk\u00f3w zabezpieczaj\u0105ych \u2013 \u201cthe Commission\u201d) recommended that the applicant be placed in Branice Hospital. The applicant could not be transferred there immediately, as he was serving a sentence of 10 years\u2019 imprisonment imposed in the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above). The Katowice Regional Court asked the penitentiary division of the court to change the order in which the sentences would be served, and to apply the security measure first. On 25 April 2008 the court decided that the applicant should first be placed in a psychiatric facility. 17.  The applicant was admitted to Branice Hospital on 13 May 2008. 18.  A hospital psychologist, in opinions of 23 June and 15 December 2008, 20 May and 5 November 2009, confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in hospital. In her opinion of 20 April 2010 the expert noted that the applicant could be moved to a less secure hospital. 19.  Psychiatrists from Branice Hospital, in opinions of 14 June and 9 December 2008, 19 May and 9 November 2009 and 20 April 2010, also confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a psychiatric hospital. In particular, in the opinion of 9 November 2009 the doctors concluded that the applicant was suffering from a delusional disorder related to organic lesions in his central nervous system (zaburzenia omamowo-urojeniowe na pod\u0142o\u017cu organicznego uszkodzenia o.u.n.). There had been an improvement in his condition following the treatment, however there had been no complete recovery. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended by the Katowice Regional Court on 21 July 2008, 19 January, 22 June and 7 December 2009. Neither the applicant nor his representative appealed against those decisions. 20.  On 4 May 2010 the applicant was transferred to Lubliniec Hospital, a less secure institution. 21.  On 29 October 2010 experts from Lubliniec Hospital gave an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant\u2019s condition. They noted that the applicant should continue treatment in a more secure facility. Consequently, on 15 November 2010 the Katowice Regional Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 22.  In a joint opinion of 26 August 2011, Lubliniec Hospital psychiatrists confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a secure facility, as he still posed a serious threat to public order. 23.  Between 28 March and 22 May 2012 the applicant underwent a psychiatric assessment in Pruszk\u00f3w Hospital, pursuant to an order made in the course of the third set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 45 below). The relevant experts were asked to assess his mental state when he had allegedly committed other robberies between June and August 2005 (see paragraph 44 below). 24.  On 17 June 2012 two psychiatrists and a psychologist gave a joint opinion (\u201cthe Pruszk\u00f3w opinion\u201d), which disagreed with the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above). They concluded that the applicant had not been suffering from any mental illness at the time when the offences had been committed (tempore criminis). In their view, the applicant did not have any organic lesions in his central nervous system. Nor did he have a learning difficulty. They agreed that he had a dissocial personality disorder. They noted that, from an early age, the applicant had disregarded the rights and feelings of others, as well as social norms. He also failed to learn from his actions and repeated dysfunctional behaviour. However, they were of the opinion that his condition had significantly improved in recent years. While the risk that he would commit a similar offence was not very high, it could not be excluded that, in difficult situations, he might suffer from reactive disorders. It was therefore recommended that any prison sentence served by the applicant should be served in therapeutic conditions. The opinion was submitted to the Katowice Regional Court on 11 September 2012. 25.  Meanwhile, on 20 July 2012 psychiatrists from Lubliniec Hospital, in an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant\u2019s condition (\u201cthe Lubliniec opinion\u201d), had noted that the applicant had been diagnosed with delusional disorders related to organic lesions in his central nervous system. During his stay in Lubliniec Hospital, no acute psychotic symptoms had been observed. However, in view of the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle, it was felt that the applicant should continue treatment at a psychiatric hospital, as there was still a risk that he might commit criminal offences of significant harm to the community. 26.  At hearings held on 28 August and 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s application for release of 24 July 2012. The court heard evidence from Lubliniec experts who had given the opinion of 20 July 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). One of the experts clarified that, in assessing the possible risk of the applicant committing criminal offences, she had relied on the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle (his multiple convictions and the fact that he was young and single with no children). She further agreed with the Pruszk\u00f3w experts\u2019 opinion (see paragraph 24 above) that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder. His personality disorder was characterised by a tendency to manipulate and dominate others, and he was self-centred. These elements constituted a risk that the applicant might commit a criminal offence. The expert was not able to answer the court\u2019s question as to whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness. 27.  On 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to be released from hospital. With reference to the discrepancies between the two expert opinions, the court held that the Pruszk\u00f3w opinion concerned the applicant\u2019s capacity tempore criminis, while the Lubliniec opinion related to his general progress in treatment and his future prognosis. Moreover, the Pruszk\u00f3w opinion had been given with reference to different offences. The court also noted that both sets of experts agreed that the applicant had suffered from a dissocial personality disorder. In view of the above, the court decided to base its conclusion on the Lubliniec opinion and refused to release the applicant from detention. It also held that he should continue treatment in a less secure institution. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 28.  On 28 November 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed a further application by the applicant to be released from detention. It noted that his situation had not changed since the last decision had been given. It further decided to place him in a facility with enhanced security. It referred to a letter in which he had informed the authorities that he had been considering an escape from the psychiatric facility. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 22 January 2013. 29.  On 31 January 2013 the applicant attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on his medication. 30.  On 13 February 2013, the applicant was transferred to Cracow Psychiatric Hospital (a hospital with enhanced security). 31.  On 19 May 2013 the applicant sent a letter to the Katowice Regional Court, claiming that he had been simulating mental illness. He submitted that he owned a medical book on psychiatry and had also seen the film \u201cA Beautiful Mind\u201d, which had helped him to act out the symptoms of mental illness. He also informed the director of Lubliniec Hospital that he had been pretending to have a mental illness. However, she told him that many patients made the same claim. 32.  Meanwhile, on 19 March 2013, in the context of periodic review proceedings, the Katowice Regional Court had decided to continue the applicant\u2019s detention in a psychiatric facility. The court relied on an expert opinion of 15 March 2013, in which experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital had confirmed that the applicant suffered from a dissocial personality and had suffered from a psychotic disorder in the past. They had stressed that there was a risk that the applicant would commit a similar offence of significant harm to the community as a result of his psychiatric condition. In particular, the experts had referred to the fact that the applicant was not critical of the offences he had committed or his medical condition. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 16 April 2013. 33.  On 27 August 2013, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a severe dissocial personality disorder. They also noted that the applicant claimed to have suffered from a brief psychotic disorder in the past. They were convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. However, the experts considered that it was still likely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. This risk was not related to a mental illness, but to a severe personality disorder. The applicant was still in need of complex therapy for personality disorders. They experts left the decision as to whether security measures should be continued to the court\u2019s discretion. 34.  On 12 September 2013 the experts supplemented their opinion with regard to further questions put by the court. They confirmed that, at the time when the offences had been committed, the applicant had not been suffering from any delusional disorders which could have resulted in a conclusion that he had acted in a state of insanity. They also considered that it was highly likely that he would commit similar offences again. This risk was related to the applicant\u2019s lifestyle, his multiple convictions and his inability to learn social skills, but not to a mental illness. They stated that they could not recommend the applicant\u2019s release. Even if he had not been insane at the time when the offences had been committed, there was still a risk that he would commit further offences in view of his dissocial personality disorder. They further concluded that it was not a medical but a legal issue as to whether the applicant\u2019s detention should be lifted. 35.  Subsequently, on an unknown date the applicant lodged an application for release. It was examined by the Katowice Regional Court at two hearings: on 17 October and 8 November 2013. The applicant\u2019s representative and psychiatrists were present. The court heard evidence from experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital. They disagreed with the 2006 opinion and confirmed that the applicant was suffering from a dissocial personality disorder. The experts stated before the court that they had not recommended the applicant\u2019s release, as they were aware that they could have been wrong in their assessment. The experts were also not in a position to give a clear answer to the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness. They submitted a supplementary opinion in which they noted that on 18 October 2013 the applicant had attempted to commit suicide (see paragraph 39 below). In their opinion, in view of the applicant\u2019s fragile state, it was necessary to place him in a hospital with enhanced security. 36.  On 8 November 2013 the court refused to release the applicant from detention. The court thoroughly examined diverging psychiatric opinions, in particular the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above) and the opinions of 27 August and 12 September 2013 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). Relying on the testimonies obtained from experts, it concluded that there were no grounds to doubt the correctness of the 2006 opinion, especially after such a long lapse of time. The court also examined the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a psychotic disorder, and noted the experts\u2019 diverging views in this respect. It referred to T.\u2019s expert testimony on 5 September 2007 (see paragraph 12 above) and to the testimony given by the Cracow experts on 17 October 2013 (see paragraph 35 above). It also held that the applicant had been detained in several hospitals, and none of the experts who had examined him there had challenged the initial diagnosis. Lastly, it referred to the applicant\u2019s recent suicide attempt. In conclusion, the court held that there was still a risk that the applicant might commit an offence of significant social harm. 37.  On 22 November 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision. He referred to the divergent expert opinions. He also stressed that the applicant had recently been indicted for offences committed in 2005, and that his sanity was not being questioned in those proceedings (see paragraph 45 below). On 25 November 2013 the applicant lodged his own appeal, submitting in particular that he had been simulating a mental illness. 38.  The Katowice Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s appeal at two hearings: on 21 January and 11 March 2014. On the latter date, relying on the evidence gathered by the Regional Court, it upheld the decision of 8 November 2013 (see paragraph 36 above). The court referred to the reasons given by the Regional Court and considered that it was still likely that the applicant would commit similar offences again. 39.  Meanwhile, on 18 October 2013, the applicant had attempted to commit suicide by injecting himself with a significant dose of insulin. He was transferred to the toxicology ward of Cracow University Hospital, where he was treated for two days. 40.  On 20 January 2014 the applicant was transferred to Toszek Psychiatric Hospital. 41.  On 30 April 2014, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Toszek Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he only had a dissocial personality disorder and it was unlikely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. They further recommended his release from the psychiatric facility. 42.  On 15 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court appointed a new defence lawyer for the applicant, to replace the one who had resigned, and set a hearing date for 28 May 2014. On the latter date it heard evidence from the experts from the Toszek Hospital. The experts confirmed the findings they had made in the opinion of 30 April 2014. 43.  On 30 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court gave a decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s release from the psychiatric facility. The applicant was released on that date and transferred to Wojkowice Prison in order to serve the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which had been imposed following the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above). 44.  On 8 December 2010 the Katowice District Prosecutor charged the applicant with several counts of robbery (carjacking) committed between June and August 2005 (on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005). Allegedly, the applicant, together with a certain A.I. and one other person, had stolen five cars by using force and intimidating the cars\u2019 drivers (by hitting, kicking and using tear gas). During his questioning, the applicant informed the prosecutor that A.I. had been involved in P.A.\u2019s killing. 45.  On 30 January 2012 the Katowice Regional Court ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric medical examination at Pruszk\u00f3w Hospital in order to assess his mental state at the time when the alleged offences had been committed. As indicated in paragraph 24 above, the medical opinion given by experts from Pruszk\u00f3w Hospital on 17 June 2012 stated that the applicant had had full mental capacity in 2005. 46.  On 25 October 2013 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Katowice Regional Court. A.I. was charged with murdering P.A., and the applicant and a certain T.K. were only charged with theft and several counts of robbery committed in 2005. The trial before the Katowice Regional Court began in 2014. 47.  During a hearing on 14 January 2015 the court heard evidence from the Cracow Hospital experts who had prepared the opinion of 27 August 2013. As indicated in paragraph 33 above, they confirmed that the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a personality disorder. They were also convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. The experts disagreed with the opinion of 2006 (see paragraph 9 above). 48.  On 22 April 2015 the court heard evidence from psychiatrists from Pruszk\u00f3w Hospital who had prepared the opinion of 17 June 2012 (see paragraph 24 above). They confirmed that, in their opinion, the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness. They further agreed that it was very likely that the applicant had pretended to have symptoms of a mental illness. 49.  On 22 May 2015 the court heard evidence from the psychologist who, together with two psychiatrists, had prepared the opinion of 18 July 2006 (see paragraph 9 above). He stated that the applicant could have simulated a brief psychotic disorder (zaburzenia psychotyczne) during the psychological tests. 50.  On 20 July 2015 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The court established that the applicant, together with A.I. and a certain T.K. had participated in the assault on P.A.. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were subsequently discontinued due to his insanity. The court further thoroughly examined the applicant\u2019s mental capacity and found that the applicant had had full mental capacity in the relevant period. It convicted A.I. of P.A.\u2019s murder, T.K. of robbery and assault on P.A. and the applicant of several counts of robbery committed on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005. It also sentenced the applicant to three years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for seven years. 51.  The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that judgment.", "references": ["3", "6", "5", "8", "0", "1", "4", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Split. 6.  On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, \u0160o\u0161 v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, \u00a7 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 \u00a7 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). 7.  During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 \u00a7 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of \u0160o\u0161 (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 20 and 23). 8.  On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 \u00a7 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings. 9.  The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the \u0160o\u0161 case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28, 31, 36 and 41). 10.  On 16 May 2012 the applicant and nine other individuals were indicted on charges of drug trafficking in the Split County Court. 11.  Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 \u00a7 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the \u0160o\u0161 case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 44, 47 and 52). 12.  On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant\u2019s detention should be extended only under Article 123 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges). 13.  On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning. 14.  On 17 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the maximum two-year statutory time-limit for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention under Article 133 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further six months (until 19 November 2013) relying on section 35(2) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter \u201cthe OSCOCA\u201d). 15.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that section 35(2) of the OSCOCA was inapplicable to his case since he was not detained during the investigation. 16.  On 7 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the said provision of the OSCOCA made a mistaken reference to Article 130 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also considered that the cited provision was incomprehensible since, if understood as provided in that Act, it merely repeated paragraph 1 of section 35 of the OSCOCA, which would be obsolete. Instead it should be interpreted in line with the previous abrogated version of the OSCOCA, which in its section 28(3) had provided for a possibility of extension of the overall maximum period of detention for a further six months, which was in the applicant\u2019s case until 19 November 2013. 17.  On 18 June 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating his previous arguments. 18.  On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 19.  The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended, under Article 123 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), until the maximum period expired on 19 November 2013, when he was released.", "references": ["0", "3", "6", "4", "9", "1", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company was ordered to pay EUR 10,000 in damages to a person referred to as a presumed member of the mafia on one page of a book published by it. The domestic court considered that the applicant company, which had based the impugned passage of the book on, inter alia, an internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt), had not complied with its duty to carry out thorough research and had seriously interfered with the personality rights of the person referred to. 6.  The applicant company is a prominent German book-publishing house with its registered office in Munich. In 2015 it was ranked among the ten publishing firms generating the highest turnover in the German publishing sector. 7.  In September 2008 the applicant company published a book entitled \u201cMafia\u201d written by Petra Reski, an author internationally renowned for her anti-Mafia publications. The book was reprinted in several editions and also published in Italy. It deals, in its 352 pages, with the Mafia\u2019s ties to Germany, its inner structures and its various branches. The book also recounts an event which took place in 2007 in Duisburg where six people of Italian nationality were killed by fifty-six bullets in front of the Italian restaurant \u201cDa Bruno\u201d. The killings were supposed to be the culmination of a vendetta between two \u2018Ndrangheta families which had started in 1991 in Italy. The incident received national and international media attention. 8.  On pages 157 and 158 the book referred, by his full name, to a person called S.P., an Italian national residing in Germany. The relevant part reads as follows (translated, names abbreviated and emphasises added by the Court):\n\u201c... The public prosecutor\u2019s office of Stuttgart investigated the Calabrian [L] for drug dealing and money laundering \u2013 he is said to have contributed to financing the electoral campaign of [O] with his funds. This was not to remain the sole link existing between a presumed member of the \u02bdNdrangheta and a German politician: in the city of Erfurt, the Calabrian [S.P.], who had been mentioned already in 2000 in a report prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, gained notoriety. [S.P.] runs the restaurant \u2018[Pa]\u2019 in Erfurt: a restaurant seating 400 guests, not a bad rise for someone like [S.P.], who, according to statements of the investigators, had started out as a pizza baker in the pizza restaurant \u2018Da Bruno\u2019. After all, having contacts can be very helpful, even if, following the massacre of Duisburg, the pizza restaurant \u2018Da Bruno\u2019 no longer serves as that great a reference. In any case, [S.P.] continued to maintain his network of relationships in Erfurt by generously sponsoring the local golf club. When the police performed a search of the restaurant \u2018[Pa]\u2019 because of [S.P.]\u2019s alleged involvement in a murder, it ran into the then Prime Minister of Thuringia, [B.V.], and his Secretary of the Interior, [R.D.] \u2013 both of whom had been dining there purely as a matter of chance, as [S.P.] asserted. He, by the way, had excellent relations with the police: when a further search was performed, the police found an identity card in his premises, which had been issued to him in his purported capacity as interpreter for the Uzbek delegation at an Interpol conference in Rome. The identity card, it was stated, had been issued by the Secretary of the Interior of the Saarland. ...\u201d 9.  As regards S.P.\u2019s presumed membership of the \u2018Ndrangheta, the applicant company relied on, inter alia, reports by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation of 2000 and 2008. Neither report had been made public. 10.  The relevant passage in the report of 2000 reads:\n\u201cIf one takes account of the enormous reputation that [S.P.] has and the esteem in which he is held by the Italian community, one forms the opinion that [S.P.] is a de\u2011facto fully-fledged member of the \u2018Ndrangheta clan.\u201d 11.  The relevant parts of the report of 2008 read:\n\u201cAccording to Italian colleagues from Calabria and Bianco, this connection could have contributed to [S.P.] becoming a member of the Romeo alias \u2018Staccu\u2019 clan. Owing to the prestigious reputation [S.P.] enjoys in the \u2018Italian milieu\u2019, he has to be a full member of the \u2018Ndrangheta.\n...\nDirect relatives of the clan live in Germany and run pizza restaurants. Their main bases are in the cities of Duisburg, Erfurt, and Leipzig. These bases are led by [A.M.], [D.G.] and [S.P.], with [D.G.] taking the role of the so-called \u2018capo locale\u2019.\n...\n[D.G.] and [S.P.] could be in charge of investing the proceeds of drug trafficking. This theory is corroborated by the high number of good restaurants and statements from various sources that [S.P.] is said to have invested in several restaurants and acquired real estate in Dresden and the surrounding areas.\u201d 12.  In 1997 S.P. had already been mentioned by name in the context of organised crime. He had been interviewed in a television report regarding the \u2018Ndrangheta in Thuringia and had denied any membership of or connection to the \u2018Ndrangheta. 13.  After publication of the book, S.P. applied to a court for an injunction against the dissemination of the passages highlighted in the above excerpt of the book (see paragraph 8 above). On 13 November 2008, the Munich Regional Court issued the injunction and confirmed it on 15 December 2008 after hearing both parties. It held that even though there was a public interest in reporting about organised crime, the author had acted in breach of her journalistic duties. The internal reports of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation constituted an insufficient source for the allegations made in the book, since the reports were not intended for publication. The investigating authorities themselves had not come to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the Regional Court stated, a report on a suspicion also had to include the circumstances exonerating the party affected. Accordingly, the book should have stated that the investigating authorities had not obtained any indications which would have served as a basis for filing an indictment, much less a sentence, and that in fact the investigations pursued against the plaintiff had not resulted in any such bringing of charges or in any sentencing. In addition, the court held, the publication had not made it clear that the pizza restaurant \u201cDa Bruno\u201d, in which the murders had been perpetrated, was not identical to the pizza restaurant of the same name in which the plaintiff had worked as a pizza baker many years prior to those deeds. Lastly, the court continued, the book had been published unlawfully because the plaintiff had not been given any opportunity to make a statement regarding the suspicion prior to publication. 14.  On 7 April 2009 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 15 December 2008. It held that the book expressed a serious allegation that the plaintiff was a member of a criminal organisation and therefore seriously interfered with his personality rights. The section of the book dealing with the plaintiff did not allow an average reader to infer that the plaintiff\u2019s membership of the criminal organisation \u2018Ndrangheta could only be assumed vaguely. Rather, the court continued, the interplay of the many individual statements in the book created the impression that there was a very strong suspicion that the plaintiff was a member of the \u2018Ndrangheta. The evidentiary facts researched by the author and published by the applicant company did not constitute sufficient proof of the exceptionally grave suspicion raised in the book. The court established that even the internal report by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation only mentioned a number of vague suspicious circumstances, for the most part without providing any details or naming any specific sources. For example, it said that because of the high respect in which the plaintiff was held in the \u201cItalian milieu\u201d, he must be a fully fledged member of the \u2018Ndrangheta. The internal reports only showed that owing to certain information compiled in them, some of which had not been corroborated by evidence, assumptions had been made as to the existence of certain connections. This did not seem to be a sufficient basis for publicly branding the plaintiff as a presumed \u02bdNdranghetista. Moreover, the court continued, certain statements in the book were incorrect, such as the region in which the plaintiff had been born. Other statements were fragmentary, as the investigation during which the plaintiff\u2019s restaurant was searched by the police had been discontinued. In that regard, the court held that the book had failed to report exonerating circumstances. Even though authors did not have to await the outcome of an investigation before reporting on a corresponding suspicion, if the reporting on a suspicion was reliant on investigations that had been carried out six or seven years previously, the author could not ignore the fact that the investigation proceedings had come to an end without any charges having been brought. 15.  In the main proceedings, in addition to his request that the injunction be upheld, S.P. applied for damages in the amount of EUR 20,000. 16.  On 22 June 2011, the Munich Regional Court upheld the injunction, but dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s application for damages. The Regional Court reiterated the reasoning it had given in the judgment of 15 December 2008 and that given by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 7 April 2009 (see paragraphs 13-14 above). The court further reiterated that the author had not sufficiently researched the basis for the allegation that S.P. was a member of the \u02bdNdrangheta, since all the sources only indicated vague suspicious circumstances pointing at S.P. Secondly, the author had not complied with the \u201cabsolute requirement\u201d of presenting exonerating circumstances. Lastly, the court held that the publication was unlawful as the author had not given the plaintiff the possibility to comment on the allegation prior to publication. 17.  The Regional Court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s application for damages as being ill-founded. It held that even though the applicant company had breached the permissible boundaries of reporting on suspicions as well as its journalistic diligence, it had not done so in a serious manner. Accordingly, it sufficed to stop the dissemination of the impugned statements but did not require a payment of damages. 18.  During the proceedings before the Regional Court the applicant company offered to furnish certain evidence supporting the suspicion published in the book. In particular, it offered to provide the names of witnesses who could allegedly confirm the statements made in the internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation and the suspicion published in the book. The Regional Court refused to hear the witnesses as it found that they would be unable to give evidence regarding the alleged membership and that the applicant company had failed to identify the specific issues on which the witnesses could testify. 19.  The applicant company did not appeal against the judgment of the Regional Court. The plaintiff, however, appealed against the dismissal of his claim for damages. Consequently, in so far as the judgment ordered the injunction, it became final. 20.  On 29 November 2011, the Munich Court of Appeal, in addition to the injunction, sentenced the applicant company to pay damages in the amount of EUR 10,000 and dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s further claim for damages. The court stated that the prerequisite for any entitlement to pecuniary compensation was a serious violation of personality rights which could not be compensated in any other way. It found that that prerequisite had been met in the plaintiff\u2019s case. As far as the violation of the plaintiff\u2019s personality right was concerned, the Court of Appeal endorsed the reasoning of the Regional Court. It expressly conceded to the applicant company that there was great public interest in obtaining information about criminal organisations and \u201cthat the motivation of the author and of the defendant [in the instant case: applicant company] for informing the public on the activities pursued by the \u2018Ndrangheta in Germany was commendable and honest\u201d. However, the Court of Appeal continued, the applicant company had acted culpably to a significant extent. It had been grossly negligent on the part of the applicant company to disseminate an allegation based on a suspicion which seriously interfered with the plaintiff\u2019s personality right in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had obviously not been given an opportunity to be heard and that the allegation had been disseminated without including the necessary information that the murder investigation addressed by the book subsequently had been discontinued. This charge of gross negligence could not be put aside because the author had tackled a subject of strong public interest. The applicant company should have realised that the information compiled about the plaintiff was not corroborated by evidence and that there were insufficient evidentiary facts to support the allegation reported in the book. The applicant company could not argue that it had not acted culpably, as it had based its publication on information obtained from a governmental authority. That principle, the court held, had been developed by the courts in adjudicating for official press releases issued by German authorities. However, the author had relied solely on internal analyses prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation as well as evaluation reports and documents generated in the course of intra-agency communications between Italian government authorities. 21.  The Court of Appeal further reasoned that the injunction was not sufficient redress for the plaintiff, as it was not an adequate means of reaching the readers of a book that had already been published. Consequently, it found that the payment of damages was required. The court held that compensation in the amount of EUR 10,000, instead of the EUR 20,000 claimed by the plaintiff, was both sufficient and adequate. 22.  On 28 March 2012 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed as ill\u2011founded a complaint lodged by the applicant company that it had been denied the right to be heard. 23.  On 19 November 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint (1 BvR 82/12) lodged by the applicant company, without providing reasons.", "references": ["8", "5", "3", "2", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "6", "1", "4"], "gold": ["6", "1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7.  By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8.  The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9.  In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one\u2011year suspended prison sentence. 10.  In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11.  The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12.  On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant\u2019s sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13.  As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14.  In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities\u2019 Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15.  The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been \u201cpermanently altered\u201d, that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been \u201cirreparably damaged\u201d. 16.  In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter \u201cthe City Court\u201d) allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been \u201cunjustified\u201d and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to \u201cunlawful detention without any valid grounds\u201d. 17.  In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros \u2013 EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18.  The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19.  In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the \u201cnature of the offences\u201d the applicant had been convicted for, the \u201cregime under which the sentence had been served\u201d and the \u201csocially acceptable criteria for justice\u201d. It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20.  The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).", "references": ["6", "7", "5", "4", "9", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku. 5.  He was the chairman of the Azerbaijani National Statehood Party. 6.  In December 2010 the applicant sold his car to a certain E.R., who encountered a number of technical problems with it. 7.  On 7 January 2011 E.R. contacted the applicant and they agreed to meet on the same day. During the meeting E.R. expressed his dissatisfaction with the car and requested that the applicant return his money and take the car back. The applicant got angry, started to insult E.R. and then assaulted him together with a certain C. 8.  A passer-by intervened and stopped the altercation. E.R. reported the incident to the police on the same day. 9.  On 8 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant by the Nasimi District Police Office under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. The investigator\u2019s decision stated that at around 8.30 p.m. on 7 January 2011 the applicant and a certain C. had insulted and assaulted E.R. on the street in Baku. 10.  On 8 January 2011 the police compiled a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. 11.  On 10 January 2011 the applicant was charged under Articles 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health) and 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. 12.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released. 13.  On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail. 14.  On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision. 15.  On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 16.  On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released. 17.  On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention. 18.  On 9 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 3 March 2011. 19.  No further extension decisions are available in the case file. 20.  On 17 June 2011 the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. 21.  The applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon issued on 17 March 2016.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "1", "5", "0", "3", "4", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1954 and 1951 respectively and live in Kumanovo. 6.  On 23 August 1948 a plot of agricultural land (\u201cthe land\u201d) was confiscated from V.R., the applicants\u2019 late grandmother, on the basis of the Expropriation Act (\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u2013 \u201cthe first confiscation order\u201d), issued by the Kumanovo Peoples\u2019 City Council (\u0413\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u041d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043d \u041e\u0434\u0431\u043e\u0440 \u0432\u043e \u0433\u0440. \u041a\u0443\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e). According to the first confiscation order, the total surface area of the land was six shinik (\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043a \u2013 an old unit of land area (see paragraph 25 below)). 7.  On 20 October 1948 a second confiscation order was issued concerning a plot of land owned by V.R. The second confiscation order did not specify the surface of the land which was to be confiscated. 8.  On 17 December 1948 the Kumanovo Confiscation Commission adopted a confiscation decision (\u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430), which confirmed the above confiscations of V.R.\u2019s real property. According to the decision, the total area of the confiscated land was 3,349 square metres (sq. m). 9.  In a final court decision in inheritance proceedings of 19 January 2001, each applicant was declared heir of one half of the land confiscated from their late grandmother. According to this decision, the surface area of the land in question was six shinik. 10.  On 15 February 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings under the Restitution Act seeking restoration of the land confiscated from their grandmother. In support of their claim they submitted the first confiscation order (see paragraph 6 above). Copies of the restitution claim and the accompanying documents were communicated to the Solicitor General (\u0408\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b). It appears that the Solicitor General did not submit any observations in reply. 11.  On 25 June 2001 the Kumanovo Restitution Commission (part of the Ministry of Finance) (\u201cthe Restitution Commission\u201d) made an on-site inspection and found that the land in question had been free of any buildings. 12.  On 14 January 2002 the Restitution Commission accepted the applicants\u2019 restitution claim and decided to restore to their possession the plot of land, the total surface area of which was 8,309 sq. m, which, as stated in the order, corresponded to six shinik (\u201cthe restitution order\u201d). The order stated that the plot had been confiscated on the basis of the first confiscation order (see paragraph 6 above). Through a proprio motu investigation it also established that the land in question had been part of a larger undeveloped, State-owned plot. 13.  It appears that the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the order but did not lodge an appeal against it. As a consequence, it became final on 18 June 2002. 14.  On 27 June 2002 the total area of the land was transferred in the second applicant\u2019s possession (\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435). The applicants then had their property rights registered in the relevant Land Registry. 15.  In a decision of 15 April 2003, which became final on 16 May 2003, the Kumanovo Court of First Instance, in non-contentious proceedings, accepted the applicants\u2019 application to have the State, represented by the Solicitor General, delineate the area belonging to them (8,309 sq. m) from a larger plot of land belonging to the State. By this decision the applicants became the owners of a separate plot of land with the total area of 8,309 sq. m. 16.  In October 2003 the Solicitor General applied to have the applicants prohibited from further disposing of the land since the land restored to their possession had not corresponded to the land confiscated from their late predecessor in terms of its surface area. 17.  On 28 October 2003 the Kumanovo Court of First Instance dismissed that application finding that the land had been restored to the applicants\u2019 possession on the basis of the restitution order. Furthermore, no proceedings had been instituted under section 63 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 37 below) by a third party. 18.  On 1 July 2004 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld this decision noting that the Solicitor General had furthermore participated in the proceedings concerning the delineation of the land (see paragraph 15 above). 19.  On 7 October 2003 the Solicitor General sought, in administrative proceedings, that the restitution order be declared, under section 267(1)(5) of the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 37 below), partially null and void in respect of the part of the land which had been returned to the applicants but allegedly had not been confiscated from their predecessor. The Solicitor General argued that the restitution order had been based on the first confiscation order, which had been invalid since it had neither been signed nor stamped and it had specified the surface of the confiscated land in shinik. He had submitted the second confiscation order, which had specified that the surface area of the confiscated land had been 3,340m2. The Solicitor General therefore lodged an application to have the restitution order declared partially null and void regarding the difference in surface area of the land specified in the first confiscation order of 23 August 1948 and the confiscation decision of 17 December 1948. 20.  On 23 May 2005 the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u043d \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u2013 \u201cthe second-instance commission\u201d) dismissed that application finding that the final restitution order, which had meanwhile been enforced, could not be declared null and void on the basis of section 267(1)(5) of the Administrative Procedure Act because the sections of the Restitution Act on the basis of which the restitution order had been made had not contained any explicit provisions allowing for its nullification, as required under that subparagraph. As for the argument that the confiscation order had been neither signed nor stamped, is was stated that this could have been put forward before the finality of the restitution order, and could not have led to declaring the order null and void on the basis of section 267(1)(5). 21.  The Solicitor General challenged the latter decision by lodging an administrative action (\u0442\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440) with the Administrative Court in which he complained that the restitution order of 14 January 2002 had been based on a confiscation order which had not been signed and stamped and on erroneous facts regarding the surface area of the land. In this connection the Solicitor General referred to an extract from the State Archives dated 16 August 2005 which indicated that the land had been expropriated on the basis of a confiscation order of 20 October 1948. In this submission the Solicitor General noted that his claims regarding the differences in the surface areas had been substantiated by documents supplied to him by \u201cinterested parties\u201d according to which the accurate area of the land could be established. 22.  On 14 March 2008 the Administrative Court upheld the decision of the second-instance commission, finding that the remedy under section 267(1)(5) relied on by the Solicitor General had been inapplicable to the facts of the case. It further stated that the missing stamp and signature were not sufficient reasons to declare the restitution order null and void. Under the terms of the relevant domestic law applicable at the time, this was the final decision. With regard to the differences in surface areas the judgment stated:\n\u201cThe court, in deciding, assessed the arguments of the [Solicitor General] put forward in the claim, but it did not accept them as bases to decide differently, because none of the conditions under [section] 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act for declaring the order null and void had been fulfilled.\u201d 23.  On 14 January 2009 the Restitution Commission, acting on its own motion (\u043f\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442) and relying on section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act, found that the restitution order was unenforceable and declared it null and void in full (\u201cthe nullity decision\u201d). It further held that the merits of the case would be decided in a separate decision. It also issued a provisional measure (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043b\u0443\u0447\u043e\u043a), prohibiting the applicants from selling the land until the final resolution of the case. 24.  The Restitution Commission indicated that in the course of examining a separate restitution claim submitted by the heirs of a certain G.T, it had reviewed the documents concerning the applicants\u2019 restitution application. 25.  The Restitution Commission held that under the applicable law in 1948, a confiscation order (\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) had had to precede a confiscation decision (\u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430). It found that the restitution order had been based on the confiscation order of August 1948, according to which the total surface area of the land formerly owned by the applicants\u2019 predecessor had been six shinik. However, the confiscation decision dated 17 December 1948, on the basis of which the plot had been confiscated, had specified that the surface area of the confiscated land had been 3,349 sq. m. The Restitution Commission also referred to evidence submitted on 23 August 2001 by the Land Registry Office, according to which the area of the plot had been six shinik and had represented a part of a larger plot of land, the total surface area of which was 8,309 sq. m. A further extract from a \u201cGeodetic Review of the Association of Land Experts of Macedonia\u201d and \u201cReview of old units of land area and their conversion into hectares, areas and sq. m\u201d, issued on the basis of a letter dated 25 March 1952, specified that one shinik corresponded to 650 sq. m. Lastly, the Commission relied on a cadastral plan drawn up by a licenced surveyor (\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u043a\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0434 \u0433\u0435\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440) made for a separate set of restitution proceedings (instituted by the heirs of G.T.), according to which the surface area of the land, formerly owned by the applicants\u2019 predecessor, had been 3,763 sq. m. In such circumstances, the Commission found that the applicants had unlawfully obtained possession of 4,546 sq. m of land, on the basis of the restitution order. For those reasons, the Commission held that the restitution order had been contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Restitution Act and was legally unenforceable pursuant to section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act. In respect of the latter section, the Commission held that the unenforceability of a decision concerned not only the factual (\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430), but also the legal (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430) impossibility of enforcement. 26.  Both applicants appealed, arguing that the restitution order was a final decision which could not be altered. They also referred to the judgement of the Administrative Court of 14 March 2008, which had stated that none of the conditions for nullity under section 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act had been fulfilled (see paragraph 22 above). 27.  On 13 October 2009 the second-instance commission dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals, endorsing the reasoning given by the Restitution Commission. It held that the Restitution Commission had been obliged, pursuant to section 268 of the Administrative Procedure Act, to declare the restitution order null and void. 28.  The applicants lodged an administrative action against the latter decision before the Administrative Court. They again referred to the judgement of the Administrative Court of 14 March 2008 (see paragraph 22 above). They further stated that the issue of nullity had already been finally resolved following the application lodged by the Solicitor General (see paragraphs 19-22 above). 29.  On 17 May 2010 the Administrative Court upheld their action and annulled the decision of the second-instance commission. The court further rejected as inadmissible an application by R.T. and B.T., the legal successors of G.T. (\u201cthe third persons\u201d), to intervene in the proceedings. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201c... In the court\u2019s opinion, there has been no breach of section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act ... This section concerns the impossibility for factual enforcement and the legal impossibility for enforcement which would be in contravention of ... legislation. In the present case there is no such situation and therefore it cannot be considered that section 2 of the Restitution Act has been breached ... This is so because the evidence admitted in the course of the proceedings provides a certain basis for the court to conclude that in the present case the restitution order ... was adopted in accordance with the Restitution Act, which had been preceded by a correct and full establishment of the facts, thereby leading to the conclusion that in that case all statutory conditions had been fulfilled for [the return of] the property concerned.\nWith regard to the application lodged by R.T. and B.T. ... it is clear that [they] did not participate, nor could they have participated in the administrative proceedings initiated by other persons who claimed a right to restitution of a part of the property which had indisputably been in the possession of their legal predecessors. In view of that ... in the present case there is no possibility that third persons (interested persons) can have standing as parties to the restitution proceedings. However, that does not mean that those persons will be deprived of the right to protect their rights and interests ... a possibility remains for them to establish their rights by lodging a civil claim before a competent court within five years of the finalisation of the restitution order (section 63, paragraph 2 of the Act), against the persons to whom possession was restored or compensation was paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\u201d 30.  On 3 and 4 August 2010 the Solicitor General and the third persons respectively appealed against that judgment before the Supreme Court, which had in the meantime become competent to act upon appeals against judgments of the Administrative Court. In the appeal the third persons argued that the difference between 3,349 sq. m and the surface originally granted to the applicants belonged to them and adduced evidence to this end. The applicants submitted observations in reply. 31.  On 25 October 2010 the Supreme Court accepted the appeal submitted by the Solicitor General and overturned the decision of the Administrative Court. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion, which has been stated in several of this court\u2019s cases, a restitution order can be considered as legally impossible to enforce, if there are breaches of the law which cannot be remedied with the application of other legal means, as is the situation in the present case. In particular, with the [restitution] order more was restored to the [applicants] than what they had been entitled to, having in mind the surface of the property which was in their legal predecessor\u2019s possession. In support of this, the State organs submit \u2018Geodetic Review of the Association of Land Experts of Macedonia\u2019 and \u2018Review of old units of land area and their conversion into hectares, areas and sq. m\u2019 as evidence that one shinik in the city of Kumanovo amounted to 650 sq. m. This finds support in the expropriation decision of 17 December 1948 where it was noted that the expropriated land had had a surface of 3,349 sq. m, which had been preceded by an accurate determination of the object of expropriation. The finding is further supported by a cadastral plan done by a licenced surveyor (\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u043a\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0434 \u0433\u0435\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440) on the basis of the limits and boundaries of the plots of land as laid out in the expropriation decision.\n... [T]he conclusion is correct that in the present case, with the restitution order, the property registered as property of the State was restored contrary to the conditions specified in the Restitution Act, sections 1 and 2. Since the State organs established that part of the concerned property was not in possession of the legal predecessor [of the applicants], there is a legal obstacle for the exercise of a restitution right over that part of the property. Hence, such an order cannot be enforced, which is grounds for the application of paragraph 1 subparagraph 3 of section 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act, meaning that the decision is null and void (\u043d\u0438\u0448\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e) ...\n... In respect of the third persons, or the interested persons, the Restitution Act excludes the possibility for them to appear as parties to the restitution proceedings, but what remains for them is the possibility to claim their rights in a civil suit before a competent court within five years after the finalisation of the restitution order (section 63 paragraph 2 of the Act), against the persons to whom possession was restored or compensation was paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\u201d 32.  This decision was served on the applicants on 24 December 2010 and 25 January 2011 respectively. By decisions of 31 January and 28 March 2011 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible their applications for the reopening of the proceedings. 33.  On 19 December 2012, in civil proceedings initiated by the second applicant against the Land Registry, the Kumanovo Court of First Instance issued an injunction banning the respondent State from disposing of the plot of land. On 1 March 2013 the latter decision was annulled (\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043d \u0441\u0438\u043b\u0430) as the applicant had withdrawn the action against the Land Registry. 34.  Acting upon the initial restitution application, the Restitution Commission requested clarification from the Land Registry regarding the historical records of the plot of land in question on 27 March 2013. The Land Registry confirmed that the plot which had been taken from the applicants\u2019 predecessor was now a part of a plot owned by the State with an area of 8,309 sq. m. 35.  On 29 October 2013 the Restitution Commission accepted the applicants\u2019 restitution claim and decided to restore to their possession a plot of land with an area of 2,460 sq. m and to award them financial compensation for the remaining part of the plot with an area of 889 sq. m which could not be restored, in total amounting to a total surface area of 3,349 sq. m. 36.  On 5 December 2013 the second applicant challenged the latter decision with an administrative action. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "2", "7", "4", "1", "3", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The case concerned the publication of a newspaper article on the website of The New York Times. In the article the applicant had been mentioned by name and, based on reports by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter \u201cthe FBI\u201d) and European law-enforcement agencies, the applicant\u2019s alleged ties to Russian organised crime had been publicised. The applicant\u2019s attempt to obtain an injunction order before the domestic courts had been unsuccessful. 7.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in D\u00fcsseldorf. He is an internationally active entrepreneur in the media sector and chief executive officer of the media company Innova Film GmbH. 8.  He also holds the position of Vice-President of the World Jewish Congress and President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine. In 2010 the former mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, publicly honoured the applicant for his efforts to improve American\u2011Russian relations. 9.  On 12 June 2001, the daily newspaper The New York Times published an article about an investigation into corruption against R.L. A slightly changed version was also published on the newspaper\u2019s website. The online version, which was the subject of the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 12-20 below), reads, in so far as relevant, as follows (emphasis added and names abbreviated by the Court):\n\u201c[L] Media Company Faces a Federal Inquiry\nBy [R. B.]\nPublished: June 12 2001\nWASHINGTON, June 10\u2014 A company owned by [R.L.], the cosmetics heir and former New York City mayoral candidate, is under investigation by federal prosecutors over allegations that it paid at least $1 million in bribes to Ukrainian officials for a valuable television license, according to lawyers and Justice Department documents.\nThe United States attorney in Manhattan, [M.W.], has empaneled a grand jury and issued subpoenas, and prosecutors are studying some 6,000 pages of documents from Central European Media enterprise, which [R.L.] founded in 1991 as part of a plan to build a media empire in Europe. It now owns television stations in several Central and Eastern European countries.\nIn a Federal District Court filing in New York last year, [M.W.] sought the corporate documents, saying that they were needed for a criminal investigation into whether [R.L.]\u00b4s Central European Media had \u2018made corrupt and unlawful payments to Ukrainian officials\u2019 in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the federal law that prohibits American companies from paying bribes abroad. [R.L.] and the company did not challenge the request and turned over the documents, a lawyer said.\nThe payments being examined took place in 1996 after Ukraine\u00b4s licencing body granted a potentially lucrative licence to [R.L.]\u00b4s company despite the fact that the Ukraine Parliament had imposed a ban on new licences.\n...\nIn Ukraine, Central European Media controls the most popular station through its majority-owned subsidiary Studio 1 + 1.\nProsecutors are studying two transactions related to Central European Media\u2019s Ukraine investment, according to documents and persons close to the investigation. In one, prosecutors are trying to determine if L\u2019s company paid $1.2 million to two Lebanese businessmen living in Ukraine, who then distributed it to some members of Ukraine\u2019s television licensing board.\n... [R.L.]\u2019s bid to gain the television license in Ukraine began in 1995. That year, he met in New York with [O.V.], a top adviser to Ukraine President [L.K.], to discuss business opportunities.\nThe initial meetings between [R.L.] and his representatives and [O.V.] were not promising. ...\n[O.V.] suggested that [R.L.] team up with a new Ukrainian television broadcasting company, Studio 1 + 1, in Kiev, and he did. The principal owners were [V.R.] and Boris Fuchsmann, well known around Kiev for their influence and wealth. Less well known were their ties to Russian organized crime, according to reports by the F.B.I. and European law enforcement agencies.\n[V.R.], who no longer has an interest in 1 + 1, has denied any links to Russian organized crime. Mr. Fuchsmann did not respond to e-mail inquiries seeking comment on the licensing deal and the F.B.I.\u2019s claim of his ties to organized crime, although an assistant confirmed that he had received the inquiries.\nA 1994 F.B.I. report on Russian organized crime in the United States described Mr. Fuchsmann as a gold smuggler and embezzler, whose company in Germany was part of an international organized crime network. He is barred from entering the United States.\n...\nBesides Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.], there were other, silent owners of Studio 1 + 1. In one internal fax, in April 1996, [J] described the Studio 1 + 1 shareholders as \u2018\u2018extremely powerful\u2019 people whom, she added, \u2018I will not mention on this fax.\u2019\nCentral European Media now owns 60 percent of Studio 1 + 1, and Mr. Fuchsmann owns at least 30 percent, according to public statements.\nAt the time it went into business with Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.], Central European Media did not conduct investigations into their backgrounds, according to a report by [R.L.]\u2019s New York law firm, [D.&P.].\nIn their 20-page report, which the prosecutors now have, the firm\u2019s lawyers said that [R.L.] had been justified in dealing with Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.] because they had been highly recommended by [O.V.], whom the lawyers described as \u2018an ardent supporter of free-market business\u2019.\nThe lawyers also concluded that Central European Media had not engaged in any illegal or improper activities. They said they could not rule out the possibility that Studio 1 + 1 had made improper payments, though they did not believe it had.\nThe Ukraine\u2019s television licensing board issued a broadcast license to Studio 1 + 1 not only in spite of Parliament\u2019s moratorium, but with only four of the board\u2019s eight members present; the law required at least six members for a vote.\nA few days after the license was issued, Central European Media transferred $1.4 million to International Teleservices of Belize, according to a C.M.E. Wire Transfer Request. That is the second transaction being looked at by prosecutors.\nThe Belize company was indirectly owned by \u2018many high Ukrainian officials,\u2019 according to a second C.M.E. document, which did not name them.\nA third document shows that International Teleservices had paid this amount to a company in Germany owned by Mr. Fuchsmann, Innova, and that Innova had paid the license fees on behalf of Studio 1 + 1. Innova is part of a Russian organized crime network, according to U.S. and German law enforcement reports.\nIt is not clear why such a circuitous route was used, and a person involved in the transaction, with inside knowledge of the owners of International Teleservices, said the $1.4 million payment was not for a license fee. He would not say what it was for.\nCentral European Media officials were nervous about the license they won, and sought the opinion of two law firms in Kiev. Both acknowledged \u2018the potential weaknesses\u2019 of the broadcasting license, according to a C.M.E. document. One week later, O.V. had secured a letter from the Ukrainian justice ministry stating that the license was valid.\nFederal prosecutors, who opened their case in the wake of a number of private lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the license award, have been examining documents for nearly a year, and the exact status of the investigation is not clear.\u201d 10.  On 28 May 2001, before publication of the article, the journalist had notified the applicant, via an email to one of his employees, of the planned publication and had asked several questions. On 30 May 2001 the journalist had made a follow-up telephone call to the employee, who confirmed that the applicant had received the questions. However, the applicant refrained from answering the questions or commenting on the planned publication. 11.  Since 12 June 2001 the article, showing the date of first publication, is retrievable from the website of The New York Times. It can also be found through online search engines such as \u201cGoogle\u201d or \u201cBing\u201d. 12.  On 31 July 2002 the applicant sought injunctions against certain parts of the article (highlighted in the article, see paragraph 9 above), published in the print and online versions. 13.  On 9 January 2008 the D\u00fcsseldorf Regional Court declared the applicant\u2019s action inadmissible due to lack of international jurisdiction on the part of the German courts. It found that, at the material time, the print version of The New York Times was not distributed in Germany and that the Internet version of the newspaper was not directed at a readership in Germany. The D\u00fcsseldorf Court of Appeal confirmed that decision by its judgment dated 30 December 2008. On 2 March 2010 the Federal Court of Justice quashed the part of the decision regarding the applicant\u2019s claim for an injunction against the challenged statements in the online version of the article and referred that part of the action back to the Court of Appeal. The court held that the online version of the newspaper was accessible from Germany, and because it mentioned a German businessman in the article, the publication had a direct connection with Germany and German jurisdiction. It therefore affirmed the international jurisdiction of the German courts in that respect. 14.  On 22 June 2011 the Court of Appeal decided on the part of the dispute which had been referred back to it by the Federal Court of Justice. It granted the injunction in so far as the article stated that the applicant had been banned from entering the United States, and dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s action for lack of merit. The Court of Appeal held that German law was applicable with regard to the online publication, as the article was accessible in Germany via the Internet and therefore the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s reputation had at least occurred in Germany. 15.  The court accepted that the statements interfered with the applicant\u2019s reputation and personality right (allgemeines Pers\u00f6nlichkeitsrecht) as protected by Article 2 \u00a7 1 and Article 1 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). However, as the statements had been made in the press, which was constitutionally protected pursuant to Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law, it was necessary to balance both interests. Moreover, as the statements concerned a suspicion against the applicant, the presumption of innocence arising from Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and from German law also had to be taken into account. The court held that there was in principle a public interest in reporting on criminal offences, including the suspicion of their commission. On the other hand, continued the court, the interference with the rights of personality associated with such reporting required higher standards of care for newspaper reporting, because even if the investigation was later discontinued, \u201csomething of the accusation might stick to the person affected\u201d. Therefore, concrete, provable connecting facts which go beyond a vague, intangible suspicion were required, the reporting must concern an incident of great weight and the suspicion must be identified as such. In addition, the reporting must be balanced, the journalist must not fail to report on exculpatory circumstances and the person concerned must, as a rule, be invited to make his own comments before publication. 16.  As regards the statements at issue, the Court of Appeal held that there was a great informational interest on the part of the public in the reporting that the applicant, as a German businessman internationally active in the media sector, was suspected by the secret service of being involved in gold smuggling, embezzlement and organised crime. This assessment was not changed by the fact that the applicant had been mentioned by name in the article, or by the fact that when the article was published in 2001, the criminal offences mentioned therein had occurred more than sixteen years previously. Regarding the latter the court pointed out that the criminal offences had become relevant again, due to new suspicions regarding the involvement of a former mayoral candidate. For the understanding of these suspicions it had been necessary to elaborate on the companies and individuals, including the applicant, involved in the alleged corruption. Similarly, describing the suspected criminal backgrounds of some of the persons involved had been necessary for the readers\u2019 comprehension of the allegation. The court also took into account that the article remained accessible in an online archive of the daily newspaper. It held that there was a recognised public interest not only in information on current events but also in being able to research events from recent history. 17.  The court further considered that the reporting was free from polemic statements and insinuations, and made it sufficiently clear that only insights from FBI reports and the law-enforcement authorities were being reported. This was expressly pointed out in the challenged article with the words, \"according to reports by the F.B.I. and European law enforcement agencies\". The internal FBI report was confirmed by reports of several other law-enforcement agencies, and the applicant himself, while denying any criminal activities, confirmed certain facts mentioned in those reports during the proceedings. Furthermore, the author of the article had notified the applicant via email that the article would be published. In that context the court also considered that although the applicant had been aware of the defendant\u2019s reporting even before the article had been published, he had waited for more than one year before applying for an injunction against the defendant. Therefore, the applicant had not perceived the interference with his personality right as intolerable. 18.  In sum, the court concluded that the defendant had complied with the required journalistic duty of care and that the reporting had relied on sources and background information, which the journalist could reasonably consider reliable. Therefore, the informational interest of the public outweighed the concerns of protecting the applicant\u2019s personality right, even taking into account that such reporting might seriously damage his private and professional reputation. Regarding the alleged entry ban, the court concluded that there had been no reliable sources and that the applicant had shown that he had recently travelled to the United States. 19.  On 2 October 2012, the Federal Court of Justice rejected a complaint lodged by the applicant against the Court of Appeal\u2019s refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 20.  On 26 April 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint (no. 1 BvR 2387/12) lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons.", "references": ["6", "9", "3", "0", "1", "7", "8", "5", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Krasnodar. 6.  On 4 November 2003 the applicant, who was 16 years old at the time, and his brother were stopped by Krasnogvardeyskiy district police officers Ch. and Kh. at a petrol station in the village of Bolshesidorovskoye in the Adygeya Republic. The applicant submitted that the events had taken place in the context of tense relations between his family and those police officers. 7.  He described the events as follows. He and his brother were pushing their broken motorcycle to take it to a friend for repairs. They were verbally insulted by Ch. and Kh. Ch. then sat on the motorcycle and asked them to push it. Following their refusal, the brothers were subjected to physical violence. Kh. seized the applicant by his neck, knocked him down and started strangling him. He hit the applicant\u2019s head against the ground several times, dragged the applicant to a police car without releasing his grasp around his neck, hit his head against the car, punched him in the face and pushed him into the car. The applicant\u2019s and his brother\u2019s requests that their parents be informed or that they be taken home because the applicant felt unwell were disregarded by the police officers. The officers drove to the garage of a local collective farm and then to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration, where the applicant\u2019s father found the applicant and his brother and took them home. 8.  According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Kh., at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant\u2019s brother was apprehended for driving a motorcycle without a driving licence. The applicant\u2019s brother noted his disagreement, stating in the record that he had not been driving the motorcycle but had been pushing it. 9.  According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Ch., at 3 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant used obscene language in a public place, namely the petrol station in Bolshesidorovskoye. Therefore, the applicant\u2019s father committed an administrative offence by failing to properly bring up the applicant. Relying on the police officer\u2019s record, the Committee on Minors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration subsequently found the applicant\u2019s father guilty of that administrative offence. The Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court, however, granted the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s appeal against that decision, finding that the decision, the administrative-offence record and other material lacked any evidence of the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s failure to properly raise the applicant, and that, on the contrary, all his children had been well cared for, had studied hard at school, and the family was well thought of. The applicant was heard by the court and denied having used obscene language. The court quashed the decision and terminated the administrative proceedings against the applicant\u2019s father (judgment of 5 January 2004). 10.  At 5.45 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a surgeon at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Hospital, who recorded three abrasions on his neck which were 3 to 10 cm long, and a contusion to his right elbow. 11.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers. 12.  On 5 November 2003 a forensic medical expert from the Adygeya Republic Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator of the prosecutor\u2019s office. The expert recorded abrasions on the applicant\u2019s neck which were 7 and 12 cm long, a bruise on his right elbow measuring 5 by 4 cm, and a bruise on his lip. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the previous day, by fingernails as regards the abrasions on the neck, and by a hard blunt object as regards the bruises. 13.  On 6 November 2003 the applicant was examined by doctors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of a headache, dizziness, pain in his throat and pain when swallowing, pain in his neck area, lips, left eyebrow and right elbow. The doctors recorded oedema of both lips with bruises, oedema in the area of the left eyebrow and right elbow, and oedema, abrasions and bruises in the area of the neck. They diagnosed him with multiple contusions of the face, neck, larynx and laryngeal cartilages. Following an X-ray examination he was further diagnosed with a fracture of both branches of the hyoid bone. 14.  In an additional opinion of 2 December 2003 the forensic medical expert stated that the fracture of the branches of the hyoid bone, the oedema and the abrasions on the neck could have been caused on 4 November 2003 by pressure from fingers, and had resulted in harm to the applicant\u2019s health lasting up to twenty-one days, that is, minor harm to his health. 15.  Investigators of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions. The investigators\u2019 refusals (dated 13 November 2003, 21 November 2003, 28 December 2003, 7 February 2004, 27 April 2004, 6 June 2005, and 3 November 2005) were annulled by their superiors at the prosecutor\u2019s office, because the pre-investigation inquiry, on which the refusals were based, was considered incomplete. 16.  In the refusal of 7 February 2004 O., an investigator, found that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been the result of the use of physical force by Officers Ch. and Kh. in order to apprehend the applicant, who had \u201cdisobeyed their commands and attempted to escape\u201d. The investigator held that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions under Article 115 of the Criminal Code (minor harm to health), intent \u2013 which was lacking in their actions \u2013 being one of those elements. Nor did the investigator consider that there was sufficient information indicating the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions under Article 286 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority). 17.  In a decision of 27 February 2004, setting aside the refusal of 7 February 2004, a senior prosecutor from the Adygeya Republic prosecutor\u2019s office held that, in the course of an additional inquiry, the investigator should establish exactly what each of the police officers had done when restraining the applicant and placing him in their car, in particular if the injury had been inflicted by seizing the applicant by his neck. The prosecutor also held that it was necessary to give a legal assessment of the question whether there had been any need to apprehend the applicant, who was minor, on account of his swearing. The prosecutor noted that the relevant administrative proceedings had been brought against the applicant\u2019s father, and no statements concerning those events had been taken from the applicant. 18.  In the most recent refusal of 29 November 2005 the defects identified by the prosecutor were not rectified. O., the investigator, maintained his findings made in the decision of 7 February 2004, stating that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed by the results of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 19.  The investigator relied on the police officers\u2019 explanations that at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant\u2019s brother had disobeyed their command to stop a motorcycle without a registration plate which he had been driving. The applicant had been sitting on the passenger\u2019s seat. After the police officers had finally managed to stop the motorcycle at the petrol station, the applicant\u2019s brother had refused to produce his driving licence. The police officers had been drawing up an administrative-offence record when the applicant had started walking away, swearing at them. They had \u201crestrained him in order to prevent his escape\u201d. 20.  The investigator referred to explanations by Sh. that he had seen the police stopping the motorcycle at the petrol station, that he had been invited to act as an attesting witness and sign a record of the motorcycle\u2019s seizure which the police had drawn up on the spot, and that the applicant\u2019s brother had refused to sign the record and receive a copy of it. 21.  The investigator\u2019s decision also referred to statements by other third parties, in particular B., who worked at the petrol station and stated that he had seen the applicant falling onto the tarmac himself, resisting the police officers taking him to their car and trying to escape. B. stated that the police officers had not beaten up or strangled the applicant, but had \u201crestrained him\u201d. The applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint that B. had given false statements was dismissed by an investigator of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office on the grounds that false explanations given in the framework of a pre-investigation inquiry, as opposed to false statements given in the course of a criminal investigation, were not punishable as a criminal offence (decision of 10 January 2004). 22.  On 23 September 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged an application (\u0436\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0430) with the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). She complained that on 27 April 2004 the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office had refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officers Ch. and Kh. Its decision had been unfounded and on 3 May 2005 it had been set aside by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. Since then she had not been informed of any new decision. She argued that the police officers\u2019 actions, as a result of which the applicant had sustained serious bodily injuries, had been unlawful, and that criminal proceedings should be instituted against them. 23.  On 26 September 2005 the District Court decided that the application fell to be examined under the rules of civil procedure, and gave the applicant\u2019s mother a time-limit for complying with those rules, in particular in relation to paying a court fee. The applicant\u2019s mother requested that her application be examined under the rules of criminal procedure, notably Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d). On 7 December 2005 the District Court discontinued the civil proceedings and decided to examine the application under Article 125 of the CCrP. 24.  In its decision of 16 December 2005 the District Court examined the investigator\u2019s decision of 29 November 2005 and endorsed the investigator\u2019s conclusions that the police officers had acted lawfully. It also noted that the applicant, no longer a minor, should have applied to court himself. For those reasons, it rejected the application. 25.  The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against the decision, seeking, inter alia, to declare the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 unlawful and unfounded. On 31 January 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court quashed the decision, noting that the District Court should not have examined the application, as the applicant\u2019s mother had lacked authority to act on the applicant\u2019s behalf, and should not have examined the lawfulness of the police officers\u2019 actions in its review under Article 125 of the CCrP (which concerned the lawfulness of investigators\u2019 decisions). Since the District Court had not examined whether the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 was lawful and well-founded, the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court could not deal with that issue on appeal. 26.  On 8 February 2006 the District Court held that the application did not fall to be examined under Article 125 of the CCrP and discontinued the proceedings. On 21 March 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court upheld that decision upon an appeal by the applicant\u2019s mother, reiterating that she had lacked authority to act on the applicant\u2019s behalf and that the lawfulness of the police officers\u2019 actions could not be reviewed under Article 125 of the CCrP. It further stated that in her application she had not formulated a complaint that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings was unlawful or unfounded.", "references": ["6", "5", "8", "2", "3", "9", "7", "0", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 7 December 2009 the applicant was arrested. 8.  On 9 December 2009 the applicant was placed in detention on remand by the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of an illegal terrorist organisation, disseminating propaganda for the same organisation, storage of hazardous materials, and damage to public property. 9.  On 30 December 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed his indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  On 6 May 2010 the first hearing was held before the Istanbul Assize Court. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the continuation of his detention in the presence of the applicant. 11.  The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 20 May 2010 the 10th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12.  On 10 December 2010 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 13.  At the time when the application was lodged, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first-instance court.", "references": ["9", "1", "3", "6", "0", "5", "8", "7", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mersin. 5.  The applicant is a teacher in primary school and at the material time she was a member and secretary of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (E\u011fitim ve Bilim Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikas\u0131). 6.  On 28 November 2008 the applicant participated in a demonstration organised by the above mentioned trade union on the theme \u201cNo to violence against women\u201d. 7.  On 29 June 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on the applicant for her participation in the aforementioned demonstration under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8.  On 10 July 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9.  On 29 July 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Yeni\u015fehir district governor dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.", "references": ["3", "1", "8", "2", "9", "0", "5", "4", "6", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  Following the establishment of the communist regime in Romania in 1947, the State proceeded to nationalise buildings and agricultural land on a large scale. After the fall of the communist regime, the State enacted a series of laws aimed at affording redress for breaches of property rights by the former regime (see paragraphs 43-51 below). 6.  Laws nos. 112/1995 and 10/2001 established the principle of restitution of nationalised residential property and compensation in cases where restitution was no longer possible. Law no. 112/1995 introduced a cap on compensation, but this was subsequently abolished by Law no. 10/2001. 7.  Law no. 247/2005 attempted to harmonise the administrative procedures for restitution of properties covered by the above-mentioned laws and by the special legislation concerning restitution of agricultural land. 8.  On 12 October 2010, the Court adopted a pilot judgment in the case of Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania (nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010), in which it singled out the deficiencies of the restitution mechanism, indicating to the respondent State under Article 46 of the Convention that new steps needed to be taken in order to process the restitution claims with more efficiency. 9.  On 15 May 2013 Law no. 165/2013 came into force, setting out various procedures available to petitioners seeking settlement of their restitution claims. 10.  Based on the parties\u2019 observations and comments regarding the new remedies set out by Law no. 165/2013, on 29 April 2014 the Court found in its judgment in the case of Preda and Others v. Romania (nos. 9584/02 and 7 others, \u00a7\u00a7 134-40, 29 April 2014), that the mechanism established by the new law offered a range of effective remedies that needed to be exhausted by those claimants whose complaints referred to one of the following situations: the existence of concurrent titles to property with respect to the same plot of agricultural land; the annulment of such title to property without any compensation; the delivery of a final judgment confirming the right to compensation in respect of the unlawful seizure by the State of any type of immovable property, without fixing the amount; the failure to pay such compensation awarded in a final judgment; and the prolonged failure to give a decision on a restitution claim. 11.  However, the Court also held that Law no. 165/2013 did not contain any provisions of a procedural or substantive nature capable of affording redress on the matter of the existence of final judgments validating concurrent titles to property with respect to the same residential property. Furthermore, no procedure was available to former owners who, in the absence of restitution, would have been entitled to compensation but who did not to have access to it because the circumstances rendering restitution impossible had become known after the expiry of the time-limit for lodging compensation claims (ibid., \u00a7 124). 12.  The complaints set out in the present applications reflect the circumstances described above (see paragraph 11). In particular, the applicants have alleged that their title to the property (building and appurtenant land) had been acknowledged by the domestic courts; however, owing to the sale of the property by the State, the applicants were prevented from enjoying their respective right. They claimed that this deprivation, together with the total lack of compensation for it, had imposed on them an excessive and disproportionate burden. 1.  Facts concerning application no. 10346/03, lodged by Ms Dora Dickmann\n(a)  Restitution of the immovable property located on \u015eoseaua Giurgiului 13.  In 1950, under Decree no. 92, the State nationalised the building and its appurtenant land located at 22 \u015eoseaua Giurgiului in Bucharest, which belonged to the applicant\u2019s predecessors. 14.  In 1997 the applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts for restitution of the above-mentioned property, alleging that its nationalisation had been unlawful and that therefore the property right had left her predecessors\u2019 rightful ownership only when it had been transferred to her as heritage. The claim was formulated against Bucharest City Council and B., a State-owned company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State. 15.  In its judgment of 6 June 1997 the Bucharest Fourth District Court allowed the claims and ordered that the property be returned to the applicant, in her capacity as sole heiress of its rightful owners. The court held that the immovable property had been nationalised unlawfully, since the applicant\u2019s predecessors had not belonged to any of the social categories covered by the nationalisation decree and thus their right of property had been valid and continuous, being transferred as heritage to the applicant; the State could not therefore claim a valid title to the property. 16.  The judgment was not appealed against and thus became final. 17.  On 12 May 1998 the Mayor of Bucharest issued a restitution decision in respect of the immovable property located on \u015eoseaua Giurgiului, in compliance with the operative part of the judgment of 6 June 1997.\n(b)  Sale by the State of the flats located in the \u015eoseaua Giurgiului property 18.  Under the terms of contracts entered into in accordance with Law no. 112/1995, company B., managing the building (see paragraph 14 above), had sold the flats located therein to the tenants. 19.  The sale contract in respect of the first-floor flat was concluded on 5 November 1996 between B., representing the State, and the tenants, S.N. and S.P. 20.  The sale contract in respect of the ground-floor flat was concluded on 23 June 1997 between B. on behalf of the State, and the tenant, S. A.-L.\n(c)  Steps taken under ordinary law and under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain the rescission of the sale contracts 21.  On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant lodged before the domestic courts two civil actions seeking the rescission of the sale contracts of 5 November 1996 and 23 June 1997 respectively, in so far as the State had sold property which it had not owned. 22.  The final judgment of 7 February 2002 given by the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the claim in respect of the first-floor flat, holding that the applicant did not have legal standing to ask for the rescission of the sale contract, in so far as she had not been a party thereto. 23.  In its final judgment of 14 October 2003, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of the ground-floor flat, holding that the buyer had acted in good faith and had thus acquired a valid title to the property, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 10/2001, which had entered into force in the meantime. The court also held that the applicant was eligible for compensatory measures pursuant to the notice of claim (notificare) lodged with the administrative authorities under Law no. 10/2001 (see paragraph 25 below). 24.  On 12 August 2002 the applicant lodged another action before the domestic courts, seeking again the rescission of the sale contract concerning the first-floor flat. This time, however, she based her claim on the provisions of Law no. 10/2001. In its final judgment of 1 February 2006 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, holding that in so far as the sale contract had been concluded by the buyers in good faith, it was in compliance with the law.\n(d)  Steps taken under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain restitution of the flats 25.  On 12 October 2001 the applicant lodged a notice of claim with the Bucharest City Hall under Law no. 10/2001, seeking reparatory measures in respect of the two flats. Several documents were appended to the application, including a copy of the judgment of 6 June 1997 and a copy of the inheritance certificate attesting to the fact that the applicant was the sole heiress of her predecessors. 26.  On 23 and 24 April 2015 the Bucharest City Hall requested the applicant to complete her administrative file with documents related to her claim. However, the request did not reach the applicant, as the contact information mentioned in the 2001 application was no longer valid. 27.  As far as the Court is aware, no decision has been taken in respect of this claim. 2.  Facts concerning application no. 10893/04, lodged by Ms and Mr Gion\n(a)  Steps taken by the applicants to obtain the restitution of flat no. 30 located in Victoria Street, Pite\u015fti, and the sale of the flat by the State 28.  On 6 May 1977 flat no. 30, located in building A/4, Victoria Street, Pite\u015fti \u2013 the applicants\u2019 property \u2013 was seized by the State under Decree no. 223/1974, following the applicants\u2019 decision to leave the country. They were not notified of the administrative decision to confiscate the property. 29.  Between 1991 and 1995, the applicants wrote several letters to various domestic authorities, including the Pite\u015fti City Council, the Pite\u015fti Prefect\u2019s Office and the director of company R., which managed the building on behalf of the State, seeking to obtain possession of the flat. The replies stated that the applicants\u2019 claims could not be granted, as no relevant legislation had yet been enacted concerning reparatory measures in respect of previously nationalised property. In one of the replies sent by the Pite\u015fti City Council on 1 May 1995, the applicants were informed that flats which had been nationalised under Decree 223/1974 could not be purchased by their current tenants from the local authorities. 30.  On 9 July 1996 the applicants lodged a claim with the administrative authorities, seeking reparatory measures in respect of flat no. 30, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 112/1995. 31.  On 17 January 1997 company R. sold the flat to the tenants, S.C. and S.M. 32.  On 16 May 1997 the administrative authorities dismissed the applicants\u2019 claims lodged under Law no. 112/1995, in view of the fact that the flat had already been sold to its tenants.\n(b)  Restitution of the immovable property located in Pite\u015fti 33.  On 30 August 1999 the applicants lodged before the Arge\u015f County Court an action against Pite\u015fti City Council, aiming to recover possession of flat no. 30. They claimed that the confiscation of the property had been unlawful, as on the one hand it had been in breach of the Constitution in force at the time, and on the other hand, they had not been notified of the administrative decision to confiscate it. 34.  On 22 May 2000 the County Court allowed the applicants\u2019 claims. The defendant appealed. On 23 March 2001 the Pite\u015fti Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because no statement of appeal had been submitted. The decision thus became final. 35.  On 19 September 2002 the applicants, assisted by a bailiff, recovered possession of flat no. 30; the relevant minutes mentioned that the flat was empty and unfurnished.\n(c)  Challenge to the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000 36.  On 1 October 2002 S.C. and S.M. challenged the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000 (see paragraph 34 above). They claimed to be the rightful owners of flat no. 30, having bought it in good faith in 1997; furthermore, in so far as they had not been parties to the proceedings terminated by the outstanding judgment of 22 May 2000, they were not bound by it (inopozabil\u0103). 37.  By a final judgment of 25 June 2003, the Pite\u015fti Court of Appeal allowed the claims of S.C. and S.M. In its reasoning, the court essentially held that the sale contract had been validly and lawfully concluded by the tenants, who had acted in good faith at the time of the sale. Moreover, the judgment of 22 May 2000 awarding the applicants title to the property was unenforceable (inopozabil\u0103) against the buyers, because they had not been parties to the respective proceedings.\n(d)  Steps taken under ordinary law to obtain the rescission of the sale contract 38.  On 22 November 2006 the applicants lodged an action against S.C. and S.M. seeking to recover possession of flat no. 30 and urging the courts to find the sale contract unlawful. Their claims were allowed by the Pite\u015fti District Court on 23 January 2008. 39.  An appeal lodged by the defendants was allowed by the Arge\u015f County Court on 16 June 2008. The court considered that the sale of the flat had been lawful. At the same time, it held that the applicants were entitled to compensation for the flat, equivalent to its market value at the date of payment. 40.  The applicants have not lodged any claims under Law no. 10/2001.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "1", "7", "2", "3", "8", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, who belong to the Roma ethnic group, were born in 1970 and 1957 respectively and live in M\u0103n\u0103stirea (C\u0103l\u0103ra\u0219i). 6.  At the relevant time they were living together in a de facto partnership and were the parents of seven children:\n\u2013  E. and E.S., a boy and a girl, twins, born on 27 March 2004;\n\u2013  T., a boy, born on 7 March 2005;\n\u2013  A.-M., a girl, born on 31 March 2006;\n\u2013  S., a girl, born on 15 June 2007;\n\u2013  E.L., a girl, born on 29 June 2008;\n\u2013  I., a boy, born on 8 October 2009. 7.  The second applicant has been classified as suffering from second\u2011degree permanent disability on account of psychological disorders. 8.  On 3 October 2013 the applicants married. 9.  In August 2010 the first applicant sent a complaint to the Romanian president, claiming that her father had subjected her to abuse; she stated that he had raped her and threatened her children. She attached to her complaint a medical certificate attesting that in 2008 one of her children had sustained injuries necessity seven to eight days of medical treatment. 10.  Following an investigation, the authorities dealing with the matter established that the first applicant\u2019s allegations had no basis in fact and that the complaint had been drawn up in the context of a conflict between the first applicant and the representative of the religious organisation in her village, who had allegedly excluded her from that community. 11.  The first applicant\u2019s complaint was then transmitted to the authority responsible for monitoring the situation of maltreated or abandoned children, namely the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi Directorate-General of Social Assistance and Child Welfare (\u201cthe DGASPC\u201d, paragraph 12 below), in order to verify the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 children. On 16 September 2010 the DGASPC asked the Social Services Department of the M\u0103n\u0103stirea municipality (\u201cthe SPAS\u201d) to look into the education provided to the family\u2019s seven children, verify their welfare situation and their health, and to provide it with all relevant information (see paragraph 12 below). 12.  In September 2010 the SPAS visited the applicants\u2019 home. It noted that the family lived in an insalubrious house provided by the first applicant\u2019s father and that the applicants took no interest in their children\u2019s health or education. The family\u2019s monthly income amounted to 774 Romanian lei (RON) and this sum was composed of the second applicant\u2019s disability allowance, child allowances and an allowance paid to the first applicant as a single parent. The SPAS\u2019s report also mentioned that the applicants refused to enrol their children in school or with a doctor, and that they restricted their access to outdoor activities and any other activity which could potentially stimulate their integration or adaptation to life within the community. According to the SPAS, the applicants had refused assistance from social-service employees who wished to advise them about their responsibilities towards their children. 13.  Based on the SPAS\u2019s findings (see paragraph 12 above), on 20 September 2010 the DGASPC sent the applicants a letter informing them that, as parents, they had a duty to provide the minimum conditions necessary for their children\u2019s development and also to ensure that they did not neglect them. The DGASPC recommended that the applicants take the following measures:\n\u201c \u2013  provide [their children] with an appropriate level of physical cleanliness and clean clothes, [and guarantee the cleanliness] of the house and a proper diet;\n\u2013  sign up all the children with a family doctor, have them vaccinated and follow any recommended treatment;\n\u2013  enrol the children aged from three to seven years in a nursery school;\n\u2013  allow the children to create relationships with [the other children/] ([through] walks, games);\n\u2013  refrain from subjecting the children to physical and/or verbal violence and from giving them emotionally traumatising messages (do not create [feelings of] fear, isolation, [do not create in them a] lack of confidence).\u201d 14.  In the same letter, the DGASPC informed the applicants:\n\u201cThe manner in which you fulfil these obligations will be monitored by ... the DGASPC.\nShould the neglect of the children persist, and if this affects their safety within the family and [if] there is a breach of certain of their rights, urgent protection measures will be taken in respect of the children, even without [your] agreement, in accordance with sections 64, 65 and 66 of Law no. 272/2004 (the Protection of Children\u2019s Rights Act). ...\u201d 15.  A schedule was drawn up to ensure regular monitoring of the applicants\u2019 family by the social services. On 11 October 2010 the committee responsible for providing support to the M\u0103n\u0103stirea municipal guardianship and welfare office visited the applicants\u2019 home. It submitted a report stating that the applicants claimed not to have signed up their children with a doctor and had no intention of doing so; in addition, although they had enrolled one of the children in nursery school, they did not take him there for fear he would be kidnapped. The committee\u2019s report also noted that the house was made up of two rooms, an entrance corridor and a kitchen, where clothes and wood were piled up together. It added that the house was heated and clean, and that a meal had been prepared. 16.  It further indicated that the second applicant had become anxious and begun raising his voice to complain that he was not receiving allowances for all of his children. Informed that the monitoring of his family would last for several months, the second applicant apparently became agitated and informed the municipal employees that they were not to return to his home. The committee proposed in its report that the monitoring of the applicants\u2019 family should continue. 17.  On 22 December 2010 and 18 January 2011 the SPAS went to the applicants\u2019 home in order to assess the children\u2019s situation and advise the applicants about the measures to be taken in order to meet the DGASPC\u2019s recommendations (see paragraph 13 above). According to the SPAS, the second applicant was very recalcitrant, insulted the social-service employees, refused access to the children and declined to provide them with information about the children. In the reports drawn up after these two visits, the SPAS mentioned that the house was still poorly maintained, that the windows were covered with plastic tarpaulins, and that the door was damaged. It indicated that the children\u2019s situation did not seem to have improved since the monitory of the family had begun, and emphasised the applicants\u2019 refusal to cooperate with the social services and their failure to fulfil their parental obligations. In view of these findings, it suggested that a protective measure be imposed in respect of the children. 18.  On 28 January 2011 a set of measures was prepared in the context of protecting the applicants\u2019 children, \u201cas a result of the parents\u2019 lack of investment in their role, consisting in providing the minimal conditions necessary to raise [their children], care for them, oversee their satisfactory development, educate them and monitor their health\u201d. The SPAS continued to monitor the children\u2019s situation and ensure that welfare benefits were paid to the applicants. 19.  A new report, drawn up on 25 February 2011, indicated that the applicants\u2019 family had little contact with others and that the parents were not collaborating with the social services in respect of the monitoring of their children; their neighbours alleged that they behaved aggressively and that their children were still neglected. This report recommended that a protective measure be adopted in respect of the children. 20.  On 16 and 17 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up two reports about the applicants\u2019 children. These noted the unsanitary conditions in the house, the very poor hygiene conditions and the applicants\u2019 neglect of their children. With regard to this last aspect, the DGASPC noted that the applicants took little interest in their children\u2019s health and refused to send them to school, to participate in social activities and to have contact with others. In its view, the applicants were refusing to cooperate with the authorities in improving the children\u2019s situation. The reports concluded that, given the seriousness of the state of neglect faced by the children and the parents\u2019 lack of agreement to protective measures, emergency placement of the underage children was recommended. 21.  On 21 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up individual protection plans for the applicants\u2019 children, specifying their needs, the persons responsible for them and the support to be provided to the family. 22.  At the DGASPC\u2019s request, in two separate judgments of 6 April 2011 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court (the \u201ccounty court\u201d) ordered the children\u2019s emergency placement and transferred parental rights in their respect to the president of the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Council. 23.  In the absence of appeals, these judgments became final. 24.  On 4 August 2011, in spite of the applicants\u2019 objections, employees of the DGASPC, assisted by a bailiff, police officers and a psychologist gave effect to the judgments of 6 April 2011 (see paragraph 22 above). In consequence, the youngest child, I., was placed with a child-minder in C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi, a town situated about 38 km from the village in which the applicants lived; the oldest children were placed together in a residential centre situated about 88 km from the applicants\u2019 home. 25.   The children underwent psychological and medical tests after being taken into care by the authorities. The test report noted that serious deficiencies had been observed in the children, \u201cresulting from neglect by the parents\u201d. Thus, according to the report, I. was suffering from \u201crecent cerebral paroxysmal events, microcytic hypochromic anaemia and weight\u2011related hypotrophy\u201d, as a result of which she had been admitted to hospital urgently. As to the children\u2019s intellectual development, the report noted \u201cslight delayed development ... in all the children; speech issues, a limited vocabulary, a minimal level of socialisation, [and] a tendency to withdraw from others\u201d. 26.  On 5 August 2011 the DGASPC drew up a report on the six oldest children, noting as follows:\n\u201c... The conclusions of the social services\u2019 report indicate shortcomings in the place of residence (the dwelling belongs to C.G.; ..., the habitable area is insufficient and it is furnished and equipped to a minimal standard; the hygiene conditions are precarious, there are significant shortcomings [in housework and in maintaining] cleanliness in the house and also in terms of personal hygiene, clean clothing and food hygiene); financial [difficulties] \u2013 [the family\u2019s income] is made up of an allowance for a person with second-degree disability [on account of a] psychological disorder, amounting to 234 [RON], and of State child benefit, amounting to 540 [RON]. It should be noted that although both parents live in the village of M\u0103n\u0103stirea, [the second applicant] has never taken steps to be registered as resident in this municipality... [The first applicant] did not attend school and is not in any paid employment.\n... the parents\u2019 conduct was found to be negligent...: [they] did not look after or take elementary steps to provide for [their children\u2019s] health (none of the children was registered with a doctor); provided no educational stimulation to their children, had not registered them in nursery school and had limited their right [to take part in] socialisation [activities]. In this context, [the social inquiry report has indicated] language difficulties in six of the children and anxious behaviour (dread, remaining on the side-lines, retreating from strangers, lack of confidence) on account of [their fear] of being kidnapped for organ trafficking.\n... [The applicants] are known in the community as individuals who generate conflict and tensions, and who frequently accuse, criticise and insult the local authorities and their neighbours for financial reasons (they ask for additional benefits, etc.)...\nSimilar tensions exist in the relationship between the [applicants] and members of their extended family ... The latter have stated that they are unwilling and unable to take care of [the applicants\u2019] children, with whom they have no contact. Although [the applicants have] received psychological and educational assistance to help them fulfil their role, meet their parental obligations and to make conscious provision for the [essential] needs in raising [the children], overseeing their satisfactory development and educating them, their case has continued to be monitored by the SPAS representatives; [however,] they have been unable to enter the [applicants\u2019] home, as communication has always been difficult and accompanied by accusations and threats.\n[The applicants] have been informed of the effect of neglect on the children\u2019s development and about the option [that is available to the authorities] to limit their parental rights where cases of abuse through negligence are found. The protection measures available have been described to them, including maintaining normal relationships with the children throughout the period of separation from the family. The parents have vehemently rejected the appropriate protection measures and have refused to accept the intervention of specialised authorities.\u201d 27.  Also on 5 August 2011, I. was examined by a DGASPC psychologist. It was established on that occasion that the child suffered, among other problems, from delayed motor development and language acquisition, and emotional shortcomings. The psychologist recommended cognitive stimulation, particularly in terms of language. Having regard to the findings of this report, the family\u2019s precarious financial position and the parents\u2019 lack of cooperation in spite of the psychological and educational advice provided by the social services, the DGASPC considered that it was necessary to replace the emergency placement measure in respect of I. by a temporary placement order. 28.  The DGASPC submitted two requests to the county court, seeking to have the emergency placement measure replaced by a temporary placement order. It presented the children\u2019s situation as described in the reports of 5 August 2011 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) and indicated that no alternative form of care by a family member had been identified. 29.  The applicants, who were present at the hearing and represented by a lawyer acting pro bono, called for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed. They submitted that, in spite of their lack of resources, they were bringing up their children satisfactorily and that the children were not ill. 30.  In two judgments of 7 September 2011 the country court, basing its decision essentially on section 66 of Law no. 272/2004, ordered that the children be temporarily placed in care: by an initial judgment, I. was placed with a child-minder; by the second judgment, the six other children were placed in a special residential centre. Parental rights in respect of all the children were assigned to the president of the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Council. 31.  In reaching this conclusion, the county court noted in its two judgments that the evidence in the case-file indicated that the applicants\u2019 home was not a suitable place to bring up children, as the floor space was too small and poorly equipped, and there was no guarantee that it was clean. It also noted that serious shortcomings had been observed with regard to the personal hygiene and diet of family members. It noted the parents\u2019 negligence with regard to the children\u2019s health and their refusal to send them to school or allow them to take part in social activities. It also noted that, according to the documents in the files, the children\u2019s language development was delayed; they displayed anxiety-related behaviours which, in the county court\u2019s view, had been transmitted by their parents; and there were delays in the development of I.\u2019s motor skills. 32.  The county court added that although the applicants had received psychological and pedagogical advice to help them fulfil their parental duties, they had difficulties in grasping the children\u2019s needs and, through their conduct, still demonstrated negligence towards the underage children. It held that, for the time being, the applicants were not providing the necessary conditions for their children\u2019s satisfactory development and that it was in the children\u2019s best interests to be placed in care on a temporary basis. 33.  The applicants lodged appeals against those judgments. They asked for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed and submitted written evidence. 34.  On 22 and 23 September 2011 the applicants\u2019 six oldest children underwent individual psychological tests. These revealed that all of the children were slightly behind their age cohorts in terms of social and educational development and indicated that they required cognitive and educational stimulation. The children began attending school. 35.  By a final judgment of 7 November 2011, the Bucharest Court of Appeal (\u201cthe appeal court\u201d) dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 concerning their six oldest children. It held that the placement measure was justified by the precarious nature of the applicants\u2019 living conditions and by their attitude towards their children. It noted the temporary nature of the measure, which was due to be lifted once the applicants had submitted the necessary financial and non-financial guarantees with regard to raising their children. 36.  By a final judgment of 28 November 2011, the appeal court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 in respect of I.\u2019s placement. After endorsing the reasoning set out in the first-instance judgment, the appeal court considered that the lawfulness of its findings was confirmed by other evidence added to the case file, such as, for example, the medical report in respect of this child (see paragraph 22 above). 37.  Following the temporary placement of their children in care, the applicants had work done on the house to improve their living conditions. 38.  At their request, on 10 January 2012 the DGASPC carried out a social inquiry visit to their home. In its subsequent report, it was noted that the applicants had improved their living conditions by furnishing the house to a minimum level and that they now had electricity and access to drinking water. However, the DGASPC noted that the toilet area was not equipped in such a way as to permit privacy and that various sections of the roof had been visibly damaged by storms. After drawing attention to the family\u2019s income, it noted that the applicants had made efforts to maintain contact with their children, whom they had visited on two occasions since they were placed in care, and that the first applicant, at her initiative, had accompanied one of the children to hospital when he was ill. It added that the applicants had stated that they could not afford to travel more frequently to visit the children. 39.  The above-mentioned report further indicated that the municipal authorities, through their representative, had contacted the applicants to propose assistance, which the second applicant had refused. However, the applicants had apparently begun to cooperate with the authorities and to show an interest in maintaining contact with their children and in what they had to do so that the placement measures could be ended. In this connection, the local authorities had encouraged the second applicant to register his residence at the first applicant\u2019s address so that they could receive financial assistance from the municipality, and had informed him of the formalities to be completed. They had been offered psychological testing with a view to joining, as appropriate, a family-support programme to develop and consolidate their parenting skills. The applicants had apparently refused to undergo this testing. 40.  Having regard to those factors, the DGASPC concluded that, for the time being, the conditions for ensuring the children\u2019s safe return to the applicants had not been met: it emphasised the lack of fuel for heating the house and the second applicant\u2019s lack of cooperation with the authorities. It explained that it would be better to delay the children\u2019s return to their family and that the parents needed to achieve a certain level of progress, under the SPAS\u2019s supervision, to acquire the necessary skills to ensure their children\u2019s safety and to be informed of the potential risks to the children. It added that the children\u2019s return to their family in the near future was not to be ruled out; in its view, however, given the need to improve certain conditions so as to ensure their safety, the applicants\u2019 fluctuating attitude in their communication with the authorities and the applicants\u2019 difficulties in grasping and responding to the children\u2019s needs, the placement measure ought to be maintained for the time being. 41.  On 17 January 2012 the DGASPC asked the SPAS to continue to monitor and advise the applicants\u2019 family and to indicate to it those aspects that it still considered deficient in the visit that had been carried out on 10 January 2012 (see paragraphs 38 to 40 above). It also asked the SPAS to inform it of the measures taken to improve the applicants\u2019 living conditions. 42.  On 14 February 2012, following the DGASPC\u2019s request (see paragraph 41 above), the SPAS made another visit to the applicants\u2019 home. On this occasion, it was noted that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone, since it was difficult for them to travel to the residential centre on account of the wintery weather conditions. The visit report established that the applicants\u2019 physical living conditions had improved and that they had had work done to clean the house. The applicants had promised to enrol the children in school, register them with a doctor, and cooperate with the authorities. The SPAS concluded that the applicants\u2019 living conditions had improved in comparison with those existing when their children were placed in care and that the return of all the children to their family could be envisaged. 43.  In the meantime, on 11 January 2012 the applicants had brought an action against the DGASPC before the county court. They requested that the emergency placement order in respect of their seven children be lifted and that they be returned to the family home. They argued that their living conditions were of a satisfactory standard for raising their children, and submitted to the case file a copy of the agricultural register showing that they had free accommodation, and also an electricity bill, evidence of their income and documents stating that three of their seven children were enrolled in school. They added that the children were not being cared for properly in the residential centre. 44.  The DGASPC did not follow the SPAS\u2019s recommendation (see paragraph 42 above) and asked for the action to be dismissed on the grounds that, although the material living conditions in the applicants\u2019 home had improved, this aspect was not sufficient to ensure the children\u2019s safety. Nonetheless, the social inquiry report on the SPAS\u2019s visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above) was included in the case file. 45.  By a judgment of 15 February 2012, the county court dismissed the applicants\u2019 action on the ground that, in spite of the improvement in their living conditions, they had no other income apart from the allowances they received for their children and that there was no guarantee that these were used exclusively to care for the children. The court stated that those allowances had to cover the needs of the whole family. 46.  The applicants lodged an appeal. They argued that they provided appropriate living conditions to ensure their children\u2019s physical, intellectual and moral development. In addition, the county court had wrongly concluded that their only source of income was from the child allowances, whereas, in their submission, the second applicant was in receipt of two allowances and of income for day-work carried out for various inhabitants of the village. They added that they believed that the family\u2019s income ought to benefit the parents, but more especially the children. 47.  The DGASPC requested that the temporary placement measure be maintained. 48.  No new evidence was added to the case file. 49.  By a judgment of 20 March 2012, the appeal court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. Referring to sections 2, 66 and 68 \u00a7 2 of Law no. 272/2004, it considered that the circumstance which had led to the children\u2019s temporary placement in care had changed only in part, and held that the contested measure was to be maintained. 50.  In its judgment, the appeal court began by setting out the reasons justifying the temporary placement measure (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above) and stated that since the children had been placed in care the applicants had visited their six children in the residential centre twice and had visited I. once. 51.  It further noted that, since being placed in care, the children had been examined and treated by a doctor and had joined nursery or primary schools, depending on their age. It noted that the children were all receiving assistance in school from a specialised educator who was monitoring each child\u2019s situation and involving them in specially selected activities to enable them to catch up in those areas where academic delays had been observed when they were placed in care. It stated that, on the basis of the documents in the case file, the children had progressed in terms of independence, personal hygiene and diet since being placed in care and were developing positively. 52.  The appeal court then described the first meeting that had taken place in November between the applicants and the six children who were housed in the residential centre. After describing the children\u2019s reactions, it concluded that the meeting had proceeded normally; the applicants had eaten a meal and played with the children. It noted that the applicants had not expressed any dissatisfaction to the staff about their children\u2019s condition. It further noted that, since that meeting, the applicants had contacted the children by telephone and continued to express their fear that their children would be kidnapped for organ trafficking. However, it noted that the second applicant had refused to give his personal telephone number to the child-care staff so that he could be informed about any issue concerning the children, and that communication was possible only when he himself called the residential centre. 53.  The appeal court then compared the conditions considered necessary by the DGASPC for the children to be returned to their family (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above) with the SPAS\u2019s findings during the social inquiry visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above). It noted that although the applicants had satisfied certain of the conditions imposed by the DGASPC, there remained room for improvement. It held:\n\u201cThe conditions for the children\u2019s reintegration [into the family] have not been met, given that the other criteria laid down by the DGASPC to ensure the children\u2019s safety are not fulfilled: [namely,] the parents\u2019 involvement and cooperation...; the repair of the roof; registration of the [second] applicant\u2019s home in M\u0103n\u0103stirea in order to be able to receive welfare payments; maintenance of links with the children by increasing the regularity of visits; acceptance of their parental responsibilities (registering the children with a doctor, enrolling them in primary and nursery school); the fact of finding employment; improved relations with the other members of the community; undergoing the psychological tests proposed by the DGASPC\u2019s specialists to ascertain their level of parental skills, so as to be able to include them, if appropriate, in a parental support programme and thus develop and consolidate their parental skills; the prevention of major risks to the underage children by accepting monitoring by the M\u0103n\u0103stirea SPAS.\n....\nAt the same time, the appeal court notes that it has not been conclusively shown that the applicants have sufficient financial resources to support all of their children and to request [the latter\u2019s] return to their family. The two allowances ... received by the [second] applicant, amounting to a total of 646 RON per month, do not represent a source of income that is sufficient to raise and educate seven children, who currently live in better conditions that those that their parents could provide them with. In addition, no evidence has been submitted proving that the applicants have received additional income through day-work carried out in the municipality by the second applicant ....\u201d 54.  The appeal court concluded that, in any event, the improvements in the applicants\u2019 living conditions noted in the social inquiry report which had been added to the case file (see paragraph 42 above) was not the only condition that the applicants had to fulfil before being able to request their children\u2019s return. According to the appeal court, the applicants had still to fulfil the other conditions laid down by the DGASPC, which were intended to ensure that the children\u2019s best interests were protected. 55.  A social inquiry report drawn up on 2 April 2012 noted that the family\u2019s material conditions had improved, that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone and that they visited them once a month, the municipal authorities having provided them with fuel for these journeys. The report stated that the family\u2019s monthly income consisted in two allowances received by the second applicant, amounting to a total of RON 646. It was suggested that the municipal authorities make an emergency payment of RON 1,800 to the applicants for repair of the house\u2019s roof and the installation of toilets. 56.  By a decision of 4 April 2012, the municipal council granted the first applicant the above-mentioned RON 1,800 in emergency aid. 57.  On 10 April 2012 the applicants had a confidential interview with a psychologist from the DGASPC. Having been informed of the purpose of the interview, namely to assess their parental skills with a view to the children\u2019s return to the family, the applicants replied to questions. The report drawn up after this interview indicated that the applicants had low parenting skills: they met only their children\u2019s basic needs and were unaware of the effects that their conduct could have on the children\u2019s development. It suggested that the applicants be included in a psychological support programme so as to develop and consolidate their parental skills, inform them about how to exercise their rights, put their parental responsibilities into practice and improve their skills in developing relationships with the wider community. 58.  On 17 April 2012 the second applicant registered his home address at the first applicant\u2019s home. 59.  A visit to the applicants\u2019 home by social services on 26 April 2012 revealed that their living conditions had improved, that the applicants had cooperated with the authorities and that they had begun to take the steps recommended to them for the children\u2019s well-being. The DGASPC suggested that the six children who had been placed in the residential centre be reintegrated into their family. 60.  In May 2012 the children underwent psychological tests, which revealed an improvement in their general condition since they had been placed in care. 61.  By a report of 5 May 2012, the DGASPC noted that the family\u2019s situation had improved, that the applicants had visited their son regularly, shown an interest in his health and displayed affection towards him. It also indicated that meetings had been organised not only between I. and his parents but also with his brothers and sisters. Emphasising the clear interest shown by the applicants towards their child, the DGASPC proposed that the placement measure be ended. 62.  On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC brought an action before the county court requesting that I. be returned to the applicants\u2019 home. 63.  By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court decided that it was in I.\u2019s best interests to be returned to his family, especially as the conditions for his satisfactory development had been met and his relationship with his family was very strong. 64.  On 21 June 2012 I. was returned to the applicants\u2019 home. 65.  On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC and the applicants brought an action before the county court requesting that the temporary placement order in respect of the six other children be lifted. 66.  By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court dismissed the action. The applicants and the DGASPC lodged an appeal against that judgment. 67.  While that appeal was still pending, the six children spent the summer holiday at the applicants\u2019 home, at their parents\u2019 request. On 10 July 2012 the social services visited the applicants\u2019 home, in the presence of the children. This visit indicated that the children would be able to live and develop in satisfactory conditions in the home. The report on this visit was added to the case file before the appeal court. 68.  By a final judgment of 22 August 2012, the appeal court set aside the first-instance judgment and ordered that the children be returned to their family. It pointed out that Law no. 272/2004 sought to protect the best interests of the child and that the public authorities were required to help ensure that children developed and were raised within their families, and explained:\n\u201c... although the provision of a certain level of material comfort is an essential element for minors\u2019 development, [it is nevertheless the case that] an inadequate income does not in itself represent an insurmountable obstacle to the children\u2019s return to their family, provided that the parents show a genuine interest in raising the children themselves...\u201d. 69.  The appeal court held that, given the improvement in the applicants\u2019 living conditions through assistance from the public authorities, and the change in their conduct towards their children, it was in those children\u2019s best interests to re-join their family.\n...", "references": ["9", "2", "7", "0", "3", "1", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Antalya. 5.  The applicant is a teacher in a high school. At the material time he was a member of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (E\u011fitim ve Bilim Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikas\u0131). 6.  In May 2009, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for putting up a notice encouraging the participation in a press statement published by his Union on the notice board that was set aside for that particular purpose in their office, and for distributing it in one of the common areas at school. 7.  On 30 September 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on him, for putting up and distributing notices produced by the trade union, of which he was a member, under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8.  On 6 October 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9.  On 15 October 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Kepez district governor dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.", "references": ["2", "6", "5", "8", "1", "9", "3", "4", "0", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Ajdov\u0161\u010dina. She is the mother of Branko \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d, born in 1961. Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and depression and had been admitted to the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital on several occasions. In 2007 he lodged an extensive criminal complaint, alleging that he had suffered various injustices at the hands of his work colleagues, acquaintances, the police and other organisations. Upon examining the complaint, the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to pursue it. In June 2008 Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d started to telephone the Prosecutor\u2019s Office and go there in person on an almost daily basis. He made various delusional accusations regarding murders that had gone unpunished \u201csince the age of Christ\u201d. 6.  On 19 June 2008 Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d appeared at the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and was told by the receptionist that the office was closed that day. He replied that he would come back the next day, armed, and that nobody would be able to hide from him. Having been told about Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s threats, the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office, B.O., telephoned the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital and told the staff what had happened. She was told that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d was mentally ill and had already been treated in the hospital several times. She was further advised to contact the Ajdov\u0161\u010dina Community Health Centre and suggest that a referral be made for Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s involuntary confinement. In addition, B.O. was warned by Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s consulting psychiatrist that over the past few weeks his patient had threatened to kill several people, including his doctor, mother and sisters. In view of this, the psychiatrist had assessed that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d was dangerous and in need of treatment, and added that he should be taken seriously due to his physical strength. B.O. also called the Nova Gorica police and told them about Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s visits to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 7.  At 5.30 p.m. a doctor from the health centre telephoned the Ajdov\u0161\u010dina police station to request police assistance with Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s involuntary confinement on the grounds that he could become aggressive. She later took the request for his police-assisted transport and the order for his confinement to the police station in person. 8.  At 5.55 p.m. the duty officer submitted the request to the commander of the police station, who granted it immediately. 9.  At 6 p.m. officer J.T. from the Ajdov\u0161\u010dina police station set off to the applicant\u2019s house and found her son, who was living there, at home. He informed officers at the Nova Gorica police communications centre, and they informed the health centre staff that they could proceed with the involuntary confinement. Police officer J.T. remained at the scene until health centre medical staff consisting of B.A., the doctor on duty, and S.M. and I.P., medical technicians, arrived. Also sent to the scene were D.K., a second officer from the Ajdov\u0161\u010dina police station, police officer dog handler J.K., and two traffic officers of the Nova Gorica traffic police. 10.  According to the police report of 31 July 2008 based on the statements made by the police officers and medical staff, upon their arrival at around 8 p.m. the police officers and medical technicians first talked to the applicant, who was sitting on a bench at the back of her house. They asked her whether her son was in the house and whether he was armed. She replied that her son was indeed in the house and was on the telephone. She further explained that she was not aware of him possessing any firearms. The medical team informed the applicant why they were there and then entered the house, while the police officers remained at the front door. 11.  Dr B.A. informed Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d that they were going to take him to a psychiatric hospital, but he refused to go with them. The medical team attempted to persuade him, but he became agitated and verbally aggressive. The police officers warned him that he would be taken to the hospital by force if he refused to go of his own free will. 12.  The medical technicians attempted to take hold of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s arms, but he pushed them off and started to scream. Dr B.A. then instructed the police officers to handcuff him, but when J.T. and D.K. attempted to restrain him, he resisted forcefully and pushed them off. In response, the police officers used physical force in order to push him to the ground, and J.K. ordered a muzzled dog on a leash to jump at him. As Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d did not seem to react to the dog jumping at his chest, J.K. took it back to the police car. J.T. and D.K. meanwhile continued to use physical force and managed to wrestle Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d to the ground onto his back. 13.  The two police officers were then joined by dog handler J.K., who used the \u201crear chokehold\u201d technique on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d. Together they managed to put him into the recovery position and medical technician S.M. injected Haldol (an antipsychotic drug with tranquilising effects) into his buttocks. As Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d continued to resist, they could not administer the full dose of medication to him. The police officers then turned him onto his stomach, and J.T. handcuffed his hands behind his back. Medical technician I.P. injected him with Akineton, medication used on psychiatric patients to reduce the tremors caused by antipsychotic drugs. 14.  Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d calmed down as soon as he received the second dose of medication. A few moments later, the police officers and medical technicians noticed that there was a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. They alerted Dr B.A., who established that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had vomited and assessed that it could have been attributed to exertion. However, when one of the medical technicians checked Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d again, he detected an irregular heartbeat, and again called out to the doctor. The medical team began to resuscitate him at 8.10 p.m. The police officers attempted to unlock his handcuffs, but only managed to free one of his hands, before the key broke. 15.  The applicant, who was waiting outside during the intervention, was heading to the front of the house when she heard loud noises and a dog barking. When she approached the front door, she saw Dr B.A. massaging her son\u2019s chest. She asked the police officers what was going on, to which one of them replied that they were resuscitating her son. Another ambulance arrived at the scene at 8.42 p.m., and an electrocardiogram was performed on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d, but to no avail. At 8.45 p.m. Dr B.A. pronounced him dead. He attributed the death to a heart attack or stroke. 16.  Immediately after Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death, the officers from the Ajdov\u0161\u010dina police station notified the Nova Gorica police communications centre of the incident and secured the area. The duty State prosecutor and the duty investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court were also notified of the death. The investigating judge attended the scene and ordered a forensic examination of the body. The medical file and equipment used in his resuscitation were also seized. 17.  On 20 June 2008 police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. made records of the methods of restraint they had used on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d (physical force, handcuffs and the police dog), which were confirmed by their superior officers to have been lawful. 18.  In the days after the incident, an officer of the Nova Gorica police took statements from the police officers and medical staff involved in the incident, as well as from the applicant. 19.  The applicant stated that on the evening of 19 June 2008 several police cars and an ambulance drove to the house and an officer asked her whether her son was keeping firearms. She replied that he was not, as far as she was aware. The applicant remained outside during the intervention and could not remember exactly how the events unfolded. She heard screaming, but was afraid to go inside. Sometime later she looked into the hallway and saw her son lying on the floor, surrounded by Dr B.A. and the medical technicians. She asked them what was going on, and they replied that they were resuscitating her son. She noticed that he had vomited. 20.  D.K. and J.T., police officers, stated that upon entering the house, Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d, who appeared to be talking on the telephone, told the medical technicians that he would not go with them, and D.K. and J.T. then warned him that they would use force if necessary. Dr B.A. also tried to convince him to go with them without success and he then instructed the officers to handcuff him. D.K. and J.T. took him by the arms to lead him to the ambulance but he resisted strongly. Dog handler J.K. attempted to calm him down by ordering the police dog to jump at him but Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d did not react to the dog\u2019s attack. The officers struggled to wrestle him to the ground and eventually succeeded in pushing him to the ground on his back; they then turned him onto his stomach, but he continued to resist forcefully. Dog handler J.K. then used the so-called \u201crear chokehold\u201d technique on him, and together they managed to turn him onto his side. One of the medical technicians then administered the first dose of medication to him, whereupon he was again turned onto his stomach and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The second dose of medication was then administered to him and he calmed down. 21.  After Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d received the second dose of medication, D.K. noticed a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. Somebody mentioned that it was vomit and D.K. then asked if that was right. Dr B.A. was on the telephone arranging for Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s transport to the psychiatric hospital but upon hearing D.K.\u2019s question checked Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d and said that the vomiting was due to exertion. J.T. confirmed that Dr B.A. initially said that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d was okay and vomited from exertion but added that the doctor did not check Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s pupils or pulse. Then one of the medical technicians looked at Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d again and checked his pulse. He called out to the doctor, saying that something was not right as he was breathing irregularly. Officer J.T. then attempted to unlock the handcuffs, and managed to get the one on his right hand off before the key broke. The medical staff started to resuscitate him. The whole incident, from the beginning of the police intervention until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most. 22.  J.K., a police dog handler, confirmed that he had first joined the intervention by ordering the police dog, which was muzzled, to jump at Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d, who, however, made no attempt to shake the dog off or to withdraw from the attack. Therefore J.K. took the dog back to his car and then returned to the house, where officers D.K. and J.T. were not able to turn Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d onto his stomach. J.K. helped them by holding him in a rear chokehold and together they managed to turn him onto his stomach and handcuff him. As this was going on, one of the medical technicians injected medication into his buttocks. J.K. also confirmed his colleagues\u2019 accounts as to how the resuscitation of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d proceeded after it was discovered that he had vomited. 23.  I.P., a medical technician, stated that on his arrival, he first asked the applicant a few questions and then entered her house with his colleague S.M. According to both medical technicians, Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d pretended to be speaking on the telephone. I.P. explained to him that he was being taken to the psychiatric hospital to see a psychiatrist. Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d refused to go and Dr B.A. ordered him to be handcuffed. As regards the events that ensued concerning the use of force by the police officers, I.P.\u2019s statement matched the statements of police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. (see paragraphs 20\u201122 above), while S.M. did not pay much attention to the police operation, as he was preparing a syringe of Haldol. 24.  As soon as the police officers managed to wrestle Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d to the ground and turn him onto his side, S.M. injected him with Haldol. S.M. added that because Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d forcefully resisted, he could not administer the full dose of medication to him. He then left the house. While the police officers turned Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d onto his stomach, I.P. administered the second injection into his buttocks and he calmed down. I.P. then noticed that he was not breathing or was struggling to breathe. As far as he could remember, he called out that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d was not breathing. Dr B.A. approached him and saw him take a breath, concluding that he was breathing. S.M., standing outside, stated that he had not seen when and how Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had started to vomit, but heard the exchange between his colleague and Dr B.A. The doctor then left the house and started to arrange Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s transport to the hospital. I.P. checked Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d again and exclaimed that he was not breathing. Together with the police officers they turned Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d onto his back and I.P. noticed that he was cyanotic. He also noticed traces of vomit on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s face, so he first protected his airways. The police officers had by then removed the handcuffs from him. His colleague S.M., who confirmed that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d looked grey and had traces of vomit on his face, fetched the resuscitation kit from the ambulance. Together with Dr B.A. they had intubated him; however, even at the beginning of resuscitation, his pupils were dilated, which was also a bad sign. I.P. also stated that the whole incident, from the use of physical force on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most. I.P.\u2019s account was confirmed in substance by traffic officer M.D., who together with his colleague A.K. guarded the back entrance to the applicant\u2019s house and thus only heard part of the incident. 25.  Medical technician S.M. expressed the view that the police officers might have used excessive force in dealing with Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d. He added that though Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had refused to go to the psychiatric hospital, he had not been particularly aggressive, and above all, had not physically attacked anyone. 26.  Dr B.A., a general practitioner, stated that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s psychiatrist expected that he might behave aggressively so he received instructions to give him an injection of two ampoules of Haldol and one ampoule of Akineton. Although in the beginning of the intervention Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d appeared agitated, but not aggressive, he started to resist forcefully when the police officers attempted to handcuff him. 27.  According to Dr B.A., after Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d was handcuffed and calmed down, he came out of the applicant\u2019s house and started to arrange his transport. One of the police officers then called out to him that something was not right, that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had vomited and was having trouble breathing. He was immediately turned onto his back. Dr B.A. noticed that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had turned blue in the face and that he was wheezing. The medical team then started the resuscitation procedure, massaging his heart and intubating him, as well as administering 1 mg of adrenaline and 3 mg of atropine to him. However, as they did not have an electrocardiogram monitor or a defibrillator, another ambulance was called. By the time the second ambulance arrived at 8.42 p.m., they could only establish that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had died. 28.  On 21 July 2008 a criminal investigations officer of the Nova Gorica police obtained an oral preliminary report from the forensic pathologist who had performed the autopsy of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d. According to him, the deceased had most likely died of asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents (choking on his own vomit). With regard to the question of potential liability for Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death, he took the view that the asphyxiation occurred during the police intervention, and that the presence of a doctor could not have altered the course of events. He added that the doctor could only be accused of negligence if the death had occurred during the resuscitation, which in his opinion had not been the case. 29.  On 31 July 2008 the head of the Nova Gorica police criminal investigations unit submitted a report of the incident to the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. Based on a statement provided by the forensic pathologist who conducted the forensic examination, the report stated asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the cause of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death. As to the events leading to the death, the police report summarised the statements given by the intervention team and stated that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had resisted the police officers who had tried to take him to the psychiatric hospital, whereupon physical force had been used on him. After Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had been restrained and had calmed down, the police officers and medical technicians had noticed that he had vomited. After Dr B.A. had initially assessed that this could be attributed to exertion, he had been found to have an irregular heartbeat and the medical team had tried to resuscitate him, but to no avail. As regards the question of potential liability for Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death, the police report followed the forensic pathologist\u2019s opinion that he had died during the police intervention and that his death could not have been prevented by any medical assistance. The report concluded by saying that no facts had been established giving rise to a suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed in connection with the death of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d which warranted criminal prosecution. 30.  On 10 September 2008 the completed forensic report was submitted to the investigating judge of the District Court, confirming asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the immediate cause of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death. In addition to the trauma consistent with the cause of death, the examination revealed a number of blunt injuries to various parts of his body. 31.  These included contusions on the outer edge of the shoulder blade, the left of the back and the back of the right thigh, swelling on the right of the hairline and the squamous part of the temporal bone, contusions on the inside of the upper right arm and left forearm and on the front of the left thigh. Several haematomas were recorded around the left shoulder blade, on the outer edge of the right shoulder blade, on the right of the thorax and on the scalp, as well as a pulmonary oedema, an oblique fracture of the fifth rib, bruising around the lumbar spine, and brain swelling. 32.  According to the report, these injuries had either been caused by Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s body being struck by an object, by part of his body being pressed against something, by him falling, or by his body being pressed between two hard surfaces. As regards the injuries to the back of his body, hairline and front left thigh, the forensic pathologist concluded that they had most likely occurred by him falling or falling after being struck, and that the bruises were caused by the body being pulled to the ground. 33.  The toxicology report revealed a low concentration of haloperidol (an antipsychotic drug with strong calming effects) in Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s blood. The forensic report concluded that the substance had been consumed either as a prescription medicine or administered during the intervention in order to calm him down, but could not be linked to his death or identified as the cause of his vomiting. 34.  No particularities or disease-related changes had been found in Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s system which could have directly contributed to his death. 35.  With regard to enquiries made by the investigating judge as to whether Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death could have been prevented by prompt and adequate medical assistance, the forensic report stated:\n\u201cDisregarding the particular circumstances surrounding the incident, this question could be answered in the affirmative; however, one cannot neglect the exceptional circumstances in which the incident occurred.\nPrompt and adequate medical assistance could have saved the life of [Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d], even in the event that no ambulance with resuscitation equipment was immediately available.\nIt is likely that [Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d] was thrown or pushed to the ground where, prior to being handcuffed, his body was pushed down by applying body weight or some other pressure. [Being struck or pushed in] the stomach most likely induced the vomiting. In so far as the medical staff or the officers assisting them in the involuntary confinement had noticed in due course that [Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d] began to vomit, they could have prevented him from inhaling gastric contents either by lifting his body into a vertical position or by turning him onto his side and mechanically clearing his oral cavity by using their fingers or an aspirator (if an aspirator was at the disposal of the medical staff). However, it was not possible to apply any of these measures to an aggressive patient resisting hospitalisation; it is only possible to apply such measures after the patient has calmed down or lost consciousness as a result of disruption in the exchange of gases following the aspiration of gastric contents. Having regard to the agitation and aggressiveness of the patient, as well as the circumstances of the incident, such measures almost certainly could not have been applied.\nThe deceased only lost consciousness when his breathing was disrupted by inhaling massive amounts of gastric contents. Only then was it possible to apply more aggressive medical intervention (mechanical clearing of the oral cavity, suction of gastric contents from the oral cavity and respiratory tract, removal of potentially larger foreign objects and insertion of a tube with a balloon to prevent continuing aspiration of gastric contents, ventilation of the patient), which could not be performed on a conscious person, in particular on an aggressive person, due to the unpleasant feelings such an intervention induces. In the present case, the aspiration of gastric contents was particularly massive and aggressive, which is indicated by the pieces of food found by the histological analysis to be present even in the alveoli, the final branching of the respiratory system.\nIn the present case it was not possible, once the deceased lost consciousness, to apply those methods and to suck the gastric contents from the respiratory passages and alveoli; considering the quantity and force of the aspiration of gastric contents, medical assistance probably would not have saved the life of [Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d].\u201d 36.  On 18 September 2008 the investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court sent the statements of the persons involved in the incident, a record of the examination of the scene, the order for a forensic examination of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s body and the forensic report to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 37.  On 23 September 2008 the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office, B.O., informed the District Court that the conditions had not been met for the institution of criminal proceedings, and that the case file had been archived. 38.  On 20 January 2009 the applicant, through her representative, lodged a criminal complaint against police officers J.T., D.K. and J.K., whereby she stated that her son had been strangled and had died as a result of an unnecessary and unprofessional police intervention. The applicant also stated that the forensic report was misleading and there were doubts as to its accuracy. In addition, an anonymous criminal complaint was lodged against E.G., the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit. The complainant alleged that E.G. had abused his position by giving a statement at a press conference in which he had covered up the actual cause of Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death in order to prevent criminal prosecution of Dr B.A. 39.  After having reviewed the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u2019s case file, on 2 June 2009 a State prosecutor from the Group of State Prosecutors for Special Matters (Skupina dr\u017eavnih to\u017eilcev za posebne zadeve \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Special Matters Group\u201d), which had exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offences committed by police officers, rejected both criminal complaints on the basis of the police and forensic reports and the media reports from the press conference on Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death. 40.  The decision to reject the criminal complaints summarised the information included in the police and forensic reports, as well as the statements given to the police by Dr B.A. and medical technicians S.M. and I.P. 41.  The State prosecutor, relying on the forensic report, concluded that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d\u2019s death could have been prevented if someone had been noticed in time that he had started to vomit. However, in the case in question Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had been aggressive and resisted hospitalisation, and no assistance could be provided until he had calmed down. Therefore, in the State prosecutor\u2019s opinion there was no is reasonable suspicion that the actions of J.T., D.K. and J.K., the three police officers who had restrained Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d, constituted a criminal offence. Moreover, as regards the anonymous criminal complaint, the State prosecutor established that, according to the reports in the media, the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit had stated neither that Mr \u0160tefan\u010di\u010d had died as a result of being administered sedatives, nor that the medical team had immediately begun resuscitation after his condition had deteriorated. Therefore, no reasonable suspicion existed that E.G. had committed a criminal offence liable to prosecution ex officio. 42.  No appeal was available to the applicant against the decision to reject her criminal complaint. However, she could take over the conduct of criminal proceedings as a \u201csubsidiary prosecutor\u201d.", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "3", "6", "5", "7", "9", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1961 and 1967 respectively and live in Mersin and Diyarbak\u0131r. 5.  The applicants were civil servants for tax offices attached to the Ministry of Finance in Mersin and Diyarbak\u0131r. At the material time they were members of the local branch of the trade union B\u00fcro Emek\u00e7ileri, which is affiliated to Trades Union Confederation of Public Employees (Kamu Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikalar\u0131 Konfederasyonu-\u201cKESK\u201d). 6.  In March and April 2009, the applicants were informed of the disciplinary investigations that were initiated against them for having participated in a statement to the press organised by the trade union of which they were members and were invited to send their defence submissions. 7.   Subsequently, the disciplinary sanctions of warning and reprimand were imposed on the applicants for their participation in the aforementioned trade union activities under Section 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8.  The applicants objected to these decisions and requested their annulment. 9.  In May 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the tax offices dismissed the applicants\u2019 objections considering that the contested decisions were in accordance with law and there were no grounds for annulment.", "references": ["9", "6", "0", "8", "4", "2", "5", "3", "1", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1967, 1965, 1968, 1960 and 1958 respectively and live in \u0130zmir. 8.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9.  The applicants have been employed in the duty-free shops at \u0130zmir Adnan Menderes Airport since 1993. They are members of the Tekg\u0131da Work Union, which had signed a collective labour agreement with the General Directorate of Monopolies on Spirits and Tobacco, the applicants\u2019 employer and formerly a State-run enterprise. 10.  During their employment the applicants operated in \u201cwork and rest cycles\u201d. Accordingly, in the four months of the summer period they worked continuously for twenty-four hours and rested the next twenty-four hours. For the remaining eight months of the year, the winter period, they worked for twenty-four hours and rested for the next forty-eight hours. Their work schedule did not take account of weekends or public holidays as the duty\u2011free shops remained open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. As regards rest breaks and periods, section 22 of their collective labour agreement provided that such periods would be counted as working time and that they could not be subject to wage deductions. 11.  On 10 October 2003 the applicants, with the assistance of their lawyer, instituted individual and separate proceedings against their employer before the \u0130zmir Labour Court. They claimed compensation for the overtime hours they had worked beyond the legal working time for the previous five years of their employment. They referred to the Labour Code in force at the material time and to their collective agreement. Both documents defined overtime as work in excess of the regular forty-five-hour working week and provided for remuneration for such work at one and a half times the regular hourly rate. 12.  On 1 November 2003 the applicants instituted new proceedings against their employer before the \u0130zmir Labour Court and requested further remuneration for work done on weekends and public holidays and compensation for annual leave that they had not taken. 13.  Having regard to the common background of the applicants\u2019 complaints in both sets of proceedings, the \u0130zmir Labour Court decided to join each applicant\u2019s proceedings and to seek an expert report concerning the calculation of their claims for overtime, weekend and public holiday pay and remuneration for unused annual leave. 14.  On 14 July 2004 the expert submitted a report in which he noted, inter alia, that clause 25 (c) of the collective agreement concluded between the parties provided for an entitlement to overtime pay, calculated on the basis of one and half times the hourly rate. He further referred to an official audit report by the Ministry of Labour, dated 10 September 2003, which noted that during the preceding summer period, between the months of June and September, workers at the company in question had worked overtime of 139.5 hours in months which had thirty-one calendar days and 135 hours in the remaining months. In the previous winter period, between October and May, they had worked 22.5 hours and fifteen hours of overtime respectively. The hours worked in excess of the legal working time should have been remunerated accordingly. According to the expert report, the applicants\u2019 employer had previously been cautioned, on 25 November 1996, by the Ministry of Labour concerning its practices on working hours. 15.  On the basis of his examination of the company\u2019s timekeeping records, the expert calculated the number of hours worked as overtime in respect of each applicant, deducting three hours of rest per each day worked. 16.  The expert determined that the employer did not owe anything to the applicants for weekend and public holiday work as the remuneration for those days had been in accordance with the applicable regulations. The expert also noted that the applicants could not claim any compensation for unused annual leave as they were still working at the company and such leave was only payable at the end of a contract. 17.  The applicants raised a number of objections to the expert report. They stated that the timekeeping records used for the calculation did not reflect the actual hours worked as they were unofficial copies kept by the employer, which were not signed by employees. In that regard, the applicants submitted that they had worked for more hours than established by the expert. They requested that the court take other evidence into account, including the defendant employer\u2019s shift orders, which detailed who would work when and for how long, as well as reports from the Regional Labour Inspectorate. They also submitted that the deduction of three hours of rest per day was not based on fact but was an assumption by the expert. The applicants submitted that in any event the expert\u2019s hypothetical conclusion on rest periods could not be relied on because the collective agreement had expressly provided for the inclusion of such periods as a part of working time. The applicants raised no objections to the expert\u2019s conclusion on the dismissal of their claims for pay for work at the weekend and on public holidays and for unused annual leave. 18.  In submissions of 22 July 2004, the defendant employer raised objections to the expert report and also argued that the timekeeping documents could not be relied on as they were unofficial copies. It also maintained that it had been unable to pay overtime in full owing to a lack of funds from the State. It submitted that the applicants had in any event been aware of the working arrangements and had never requested a transfer to another unit of the General Directorate of Monopolies. 19.  The \u0130zmir Labour Court asked the expert to supplement his report with findings concerning the parties\u2019 objections. 20.  On 4 July 2005, the expert submitted a supplement to his report, in which he corrected his findings concerning the rest periods in the light of the applicants\u2019 objection and calculated the hours they had worked as twenty-four in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift. He maintained his findings regarding the timesheets, submitting that his in situ examination of the workplace and comparisons between the official record and the employer\u2019s copies had not revealed any inconsistencies. 21.  On 12 September 2005 the \u0130zmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicants in part and awarded them the amounts given in the expert\u2019s report in respect of the unpaid overtime. It rejected their claims for pay for weekend and public holiday work and for unused annual leave. 22.  Both parties appealed to the Court of Cassation. 23.  On 17 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision and remitted the case. It found that the Labour Court had not taken into account any time that could have been used for rest periods and that therefore the calculation of overtime could not be deemed accurate. It also stated that the overtime calculation should be based on weekly working hours rather than the monthly working time used in the expert report. 24.  In the resumed proceedings, the \u0130zmir Labour Court requested that the expert amend the report in light of the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision. 25.  On 11 September 2007 the expert revised the findings as ordered and concluded that the applicants were likely to have had a minimum of three hours for rest during a twenty-four-hour shift. The expert therefore recalculated their entitlement to overtime on the basis of twenty-one hours of actual work and compared it with the legal working week of forty\u2011five hours. 26.  On 26 May 2008 the \u0130zmir Labour Court awarded the applicants compensation for overtime as determined in the revised expert report. 27.  The defendant employer appealed, arguing that the presumption established in the case-law of the Court of Cassation that a person could not work more than fourteen hours in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift should be applied to the facts of the dispute. The Court of Cassation then quashed the first-instance judgment on 28 October 2008 and remitted the case on the following grounds:\n\u201cIt can be seen from the case file that during the summer months [the applicants] worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 24 hours; and in the winter months they worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 48 hours. However, as determined by the well-established case-law of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation\u2019s Civil Division, in workplaces where there are 24-hour shifts, after the deduction of time spent on certain activities such as resting, eating and fulfilling other needs, a person can only work for 14 hours a day ... This approach must also be followed in the present case.\u201d 28.  In the resumed proceedings, the \u0130zmir Labour Court decided to follow the decision of the Court of Cassation and another expert report was drawn up for that purpose. The report, dated 21 July 2009, calculated the applicants\u2019 daily working time as fourteen hours, in line with the Court of Cassation\u2019s presumption of fact. The calculation in the new report led to no overtime being found for the weeks in which the applicants had worked three days as the working time was less than the legal limit of forty-five hours. For the weeks in which the applicants had worked four days, the report calculated the total working time as fifty-six hours, leading to an assessment in the report of nine hours of overtime. On 28 December 2009 the \u0130zmir Labour Court rendered a final judgment in the applicants\u2019 case, based on the expert report of 21 July 2009. As a result of that interpretation, some of the applicants\u2019 claims were dismissed entirely, while the others were awarded almost ninety percent less than the previous expert report had calculated. 29.  On 25 January 2010 the applicants appealed against the decision and maintained that the fact that they had worked continuously for twenty-four hours had already been confirmed by the legal records of the Ministry of Labour, both parties\u2019 witness statements and other evidence in the file, including the expert reports overturned by the Court of Cassation. Although they had proven that fact, the judgment had been based on the presumption that working for more than fourteen hours a day was physically impossible. 30.  On 18 March 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the \u0130zmir Labour Court\u2019s decision without responding to the applicants\u2019 objections.", "references": ["4", "7", "8", "6", "5", "1", "2", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are serving either life sentences or whole-life sentences in different prisons in Bulgaria. 5.  The applicant is currently serving a whole-life imprisonment sentence in Belene Prison. The sentence was delivered by the Dobrich Regional Court in 2003. It was confirmed on appeal in February 2004 and, subsequently, by the Supreme Court of Cassation in a final judgment of 19 October 2004. 6.  As it is apparent from documents in the file, the applicant had unsuccessfully sought presidential clemency several times since 2007. He was initially placed in the high-security wing of Varna Prison where he started serving his sentence; since 2004 he has been under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d. 7.  He described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. His cell measured 5.5 by 3 metres and had a small grilled window which did not let much light in during the day. The lighting at night was also insufficient. The cell was humid, badly heated during the winter and deprived of ventilation during the summer. Given that in the cell there was neither running water, nor toilet facilities, the applicant had had to use a bucket to relieve himself. He was allowed to leave his cell three times a day, during meal times, for about forty-five minutes each time, in order to slop out, eat, wash himself and re-fill his water bottle from the tap. The prison was infested with cockroaches and rats, and he was only allowed to shower once a fortnight. The food was insufficient in quantity and of poor quality. During visits, he was separated from his family and lawyers by a grill and the meetings always took place in the presence of prison staff. His correspondence was routinely read by prison staff as he was obliged to transmit his letters to the outside world in open envelopes. The envelopes carrying correspondence with his lawyer bore a stamp showing that they had been checked. 8.  Both parties submitted that the applicant had been transferred to Belene Prison on 17 February 2009, where he continued to serve his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d. He was detained in the high-security wing of this prison, alone in a cell. 9.  According to the Government, since the beginning of his time in that prison, the applicant had gone on several hunger strikes. According to documents in the file, at the beginning of his stay in Belene Prison he demonstrated suicidal intentions and was identified as aggressive and hostile, as well as prone to attempting to escape. On the basis of an order of the prison governor of 19 February 2009, he did not take part in collective activities with other inmates, even those in his own category. In addition, the Government submitted that owing to lack of physical space in the prison, it was impossible to organise collective sport activities, or gather inmates for the purposes of reading, listening to music, playing board games or using the computer. Also, they emphasised that the impossibility was underpinned by the personal characteristics of the inmates which made them incompatible with each other and were an impediment to the authorities\u2019 organising joint activities for them. 10.  The parties submitted that the applicant\u2019s cell in Belene Prison was secured by a door and an external grill, both of which were locked. The light bulb remained on throughout the night, for security purposes, which the applicant claimed interfered with his sleep. His daily walks in the open air took place in a grilled space measuring, according to the applicant and not disputed by the Government, about 15 sq. m, where only persons serving life sentences were taken. According to the applicant, its floor was partially made of bare cement and there was no sports equipment there. According to the Government, there was a climbing wall, a bench and a fixed-height bar. Both parties submitted that each time the applicant left the high-security wing of the prison, he was handcuffed and the handcuffs were shackled to a belt. He claimed that his correspondence was routinely checked. According to the Government, prisoners\u2019 correspondence was checked out of security considerations. However, the authorities only checked the contents of the envelopes which the applicant received and not the text of the letters in them. 11.  In a final judgment of 15 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. The documents in the case file indicate that he had been initially imprisoned in Lovech Prison and was transferred to Belene Prison on 6 October 2009 where he was placed in the high-security wing. 12.  The Government submitted that he had been serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d since 5 May 2005. 13.  The applicant submitted that he had been kept in isolation in Belene Prison under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d and that the living conditions in his prison cell were inadequate. In particular he claimed that he spent about twenty-three hours a day locked up in a very small, poorly lit cell with a non-secluded toilet close to his bed. 14.  The Government did not dispute his claims. They specified that the size of his cell was 6 sq. m, that it was a \u201cnormal\u201d as opposed to a \u201cpunishment\u201d cell, that he had a bed, a drawer, a sink and a toilet in his cell, and that there was enough space for him to move about in it. 15.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of 10 December 2001 of the Supreme Court of Cassation. 16.  The applicant complained that, in accordance with the \u201cspecial regime\u201d under which he had been serving his sentence, he had been permanently locked up in a cell which he had only been allowed to leave for no more than one and a half hours a day. He also alleged very poor living conditions, the presence of rats, insufficient lighting, tainted water, limited space and time for outdoor activities, and consistent overuse of handcuffs. 17.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d in Bobov Dol Prison between 5 February 2002 and 19 April 2007 when his regime had been changed to \u201csevere\u201d. He had spent the following two years under the \u201csevere regime\u201d and on 1 June 2009 his regime had been changed to \u201cstrict\u201d. During his stay in Bobol Dol Prison between 2002 and 2012 the applicant had been in the high-security wing, alone in a cell measuring just under 13 sq. m. The cell had contained a sink and a toilet separated from the rest of the space. Hygiene in the cell had been satisfactory; the bed sheets had been washed weekly and the prisoners had been provided with sanitary products once a month. The cells had been disinfected and treated against mice with the same frequency. 18.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been kept in a permanently locked up cell in Bobov Dol Prison, in strict compliance with the relevant legal provisions and in particular section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act. As of February 2016, they specified that the applicant had formally satisfied the conditions for being detained together with other prisoners but that the applicant had considered himself not ready for it. 19.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant was transferred to Pazardzhik Prison upon his request and was placed in the high-security wing, in a cell measuring 7 sq. m. He expressed an interest in working but the authorities were not in a position to provide him with work. He had not committed disciplinary breaches to the time of application. As to the conditions of detention in Pazardzhik Prison, the Government submitted that he had not raised related grievances with the authorities. 20.  The applicant was sentenced for a number of offences and was given a total sentence of whole-life imprisonment in 2000. He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 21.  In a final judgment of 15 March 2010 the applicant was sentenced by an Austrian court to life imprisonment. He was transferred from Austria to Bulgaria on 15 July 2010 in order to serve his sentence. On 8 November 2010 the Vratsa Regional Court confirmed the sentence and accepted it for enforcement. This was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Appellate Court in a final decision of 9 February 2011. The applicant has been serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d since 18 February 2011. He is kept in a permanently locked cell in Vratsa Prison, in the high-security wing, in accordance with applicable rules for life prisoners under the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act. 22.  The applicant was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 28 February 2011 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation. 23.  The applicant complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 24.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 13 November 2008. He has been serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d in Varna Prison. He alleged that he spent his time almost permanently locked up in isolation from the other inmates, while the Government claimed that he was in \u201calmost permanent contact with other inmates\u201d without submitting more details. The applicant submitted that he had had to relieve himself in a bucket in his cell where there had been no running water. The Government clarified that this changed in 2012 when a toilet had been built in his cell. The food, according to the applicant and disputed by the authorities, was insufficient and of poor quality. 25.  The applicant was sentenced for different offences and given a total sentence of life imprisonment in a final judgment of 17 November 2011 by the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant has been serving his sentence in Stara Zagora Prison under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d in a permanently locked cell located in the high-security wing of the prison. The Government submitted that he was allowed to leave his cell twice a day for an hour at a time when he could see and communicate with other inmates detained in the same prison wing. He was also allowed to use sanitary facilities outside of his cell five times a day, and to shower twice a week. There was no toilet in the applicant\u2019s cell and no ventilation system had been installed. 26.  The applicant had been serving a sentence of whole-life imprisonment in Pleven Prison since 1999 under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d. In 2003 he was placed under the lighter \u201csevere regime\u201d and a year later under the even lighter \u201cstrict regime\u201d when he was also placed in a cell together with other inmates. 27.  He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 28.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment and has been serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d since 2009. Until 2009 he was detained in Varna Prison and since 18 February 2009 he has been detained in Plovdiv Prison. He complained in respect of his detention after February 2009, the conditions of his detention before 18 February 2009 having been examined by the Court in an earlier case with application no. 16391/05, which was decided in a judgment of 10 January 2012. 29.  Both the applicant and the Government submitted that he was detained in a permanently locked cell and isolated from the other prisoners. The Government pointed out that the applicant left his cell for an hour in the morning and for an hour in the afternoon every day for exercise and to spend time in the open air. 30.  The applicant also claimed that the material conditions in which he had been serving his sentence were inadequate and that he had been offered no collective activities or other forms of occupation. 31.  The Government stated that he was enrolled in the following weekly activities: a catechism course lasting an hour-and-a-half per week; and a course in basic computer skills with hour-long sessions; he also had an additional hour in the open air, as well as half an hour to take a bath on Wednesday evenings. Furthermore, when various competitions had taken place in the prison, or there had been concerts or recitals, inmates serving life sentences had been offered a chance to attend them as spectators. The Government further clarified that the applicant\u2019s regime had been changed to \u201cstrict\u201d in 2015 but he had continued to be in the high-security wing; according to the Government, he had repeatedly stated that he had not wished to be placed together with other prisoners.", "references": ["5", "9", "6", "2", "8", "7", "3", "0", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1964 respectively and live in Linz. They have been living in a stable relationship for many years. 6.  On 21 February 2010 the applicants lodged an application to enter into a registered partnership under the Registered Partnership Act (Eingetragene Partnerschaft-Gesetz). 7.  On 17 March 2010 the Mayor of Linz dismissed their application in accordance with sections 1, 2 and 5(1)(1) of the Registered Partnership Act, finding that the applicants did not meet the legal requirements, as the registered partnership was exclusively reserved for same-sex couples. 8.  The applicants appealed. Citing, inter alia, Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, they complained of discrimination based on their sex and their sexual orientation.  The Upper Austrian Regional Governor (Ober\u00f6sterreichischer Landeshauptmann) dismissed the appeal on 18 August 2010, arguing with reference to Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) that as the Contracting States were allowed to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples, it would appear unreasonable not to allow them to reserve access to registered partnerships exclusively for same-sex couples. 9.  The applicants subsequently lodged complaints with both the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, arguing that marriage was not a suitable option for them, as it was substantially different from a registered partnership. In their view, a registered partnership was in many ways more modern and \u201clighter\u201d than marriage. The applicants put forward several examples: the different statutory time-limit for divorce versus the time-limit for dissolution of a registered partnership in the event of an irretrievable breakdown (unheilbare Zerr\u00fcttung) of the relationship; the alimony payment obligations following a divorce/dissolution where blame could be placed on one spouse/partner; the obligations conferred by the respective legal institutions, in particular as regards trust, faithfulness and contributions to the household; and the consequences of a declaration of the death of a spouse/partner.  The applicants argued that the Court\u2019s considerations in Schalk and Kopf in respect of marriage were not applicable to the registered partnership, which was a new legal institution, introduced in the twenty-first century. It was therefore neither based on a long-standing discriminatory tradition and deep-rooted social connotations, nor aimed at possible procreation. 10.  On 22 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint. The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows:\n\u201cArticle 12 of the [Convention] only applies to the traditional civil marriage ..., which has \u2018deep-rooted social and cultural connotations\u2019 and was, in the historical context, clearly understood \u2018in its traditional sense\u2019 (ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, \u00a7\u00a7 55, 62). If the Court, in its judgment in the case of Schalk and Kopf, considers that the national provisions in the Council of Europe member States are diverse and range from allowing same-sex marriage to explicitly forbidding it, and concludes from this that, as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by domestic law (ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, \u00a7\u00a7 60f), this must, in view of the small number of States providing for a registered partnership for different\u2011sex couples in addition to marriage, be even more valid for this question.\nAs the [Convention] has to be read as a whole and its Articles have to be construed in harmony with one another, and as Article 12 of the [Convention] does not grant different-sex couples, in addition to the right to marry, a right to enter into a registered partnership, the prohibition of discrimination pursuant to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention], a provision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as imposing such an obligation beyond the scope of Article 12 of the [Convention] either (see, concerning the correlating question of the right of same-sex couples to marry, which cannot be derived from Article 14 of the [Convention] either, ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, \u00a7 101).\n...\n[A]s the Austrian legislator has provided for the possibility of legal recognition for same-sex couples by introducing the registered partnership, people may rely on the prohibition of discrimination provided for by Article 14 of the [Convention] ...\nThe Court has also stated, however, in the case of Schalk and Kopf, that the legislator may restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples because it has a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred by alternative means of recognition. Moreover, the Court assumes that the Registered Partnership Act allows couples to obtain, in many aspects, a legal status that is equal or comparable to marriage; apart from parental rights, there were only slight differences (see ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, \u00a7\u00a7 108 et seq.).\nGiven that persons of different sex have access to marriage (see the [explanatory report on the draft law]); the registered partnership was introduced only to counter discrimination against same-sex couples; [the registered partnership] should, in substance, have the same effects as marriage; different-sex couples are not a group (historically) discriminated against; and there is no European consensus on this matter, it does not amount to a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention] if the Austrian legislator does not grant different-sex couples access to the registered partnership.\n...\nThe Constitutional Court is not called upon to examine whether the particular differences between these legal institutions, as regards the legal consequences and dissolution options, comply with the principle of equality [Gleichheitssatz] and the prohibition of discrimination pursuant to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention], since the only question to be examined is whether different-sex couples have a constitutional right to access to the registered partnership.\u201d 11.  On 27 February 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint (see paragraph 9 above) as unfounded. That decision was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 25 March 2013.", "references": ["3", "6", "9", "0", "5", "7", "2", "No Label", "8", "1", "4"], "gold": ["8", "1", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Turin. The second applicant was born in 1975 and was detained in Turin up to the time of his death on 10 January 2017. 7.  In 2004 the applicants were detained in the Asti Correctional Facility. 8.  On 10 December 2004 the second applicant intervened in a fight that had broken out between the first applicant and a prison officer. 9.  The manner in which the impugned events occurred, as submitted by the applicants and as it emerges from their witness statements during the domestic proceedings, may be summarised as follows. 10.  On 10 December 2004, following an altercation with the prison officer, the first applicant was summoned to a meeting with the correctional unit commander (comandante di reparto della polizia penitenziaria). Before he reached the commander\u2019s office, he was stopped by a group of prison officers, who took turns beating him. Following the meeting, he was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing. 11.  The only item of furniture in the cell was a bed with no mattress, bed linen or covers. As to sanitary facilities, the cell had a squat toilet without running water and was not equipped with a sink. The cell window had no window panes and the only source of heating was a small, malfunctioning radiator, which provided little protection against the December weather. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. 12.  During the first week of his detention in solitary confinement no food was provided and he was given only scant amounts of water. He was subsequently given rationed quantities of food. 13.  He was beaten on a daily basis, several times per day. He was repeatedly punched, kicked and hit in the head by prison officers, who assaulted him in groups of varying sizes. 14.  He was also subjected to sleep deprivation, as the beatings often took place at night and the prison officers verbally abused him in order to keep him awake. 15.  During the detention in solitary confinement the applicant did not receive visits from his lawyer or his family. 16.  On 10 December 2004, following the same altercation with the prison officer, the second applicant was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing of the correctional facility. The bed in the cell had no mattress, sheets or covers, and the cell had no sink. Initially there were no panes in the windows, which were covered with some plastic sheeting after an unspecified number of days. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. He was subsequently given some light clothing. 17.  The applicant\u2019s food was rationed, and at certain times he was given only bread and water. On some days he received no food at all. 18.  The applicant was beaten by prison officers, often more than once per day. He was subjected to various forms of physical violence, including being repeatedly punched, kicked and slapped, at one point with his head being pinned to the ground by one of the prison officers\u2019 boots. The beatings occurred both during the day and at night. The applicant was beaten by four or five officers at a time. One prison officer ripped out a chunk of his hair. 19.  On 16 December 2004 he was admitted to the hospital. 20.  During the period he spent in solitary confinement he was only allowed outside the cell twice, once to shower and once for some outdoor time. 21.  A criminal investigation into the impugned treatment was launched in 2005. It was initiated when it emerged, in the context of covert surveillance in an operation to investigate drug smuggling in the Asti correctional facility, that a number of the prison officers had discussed the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants. 22.  On 7 July 2011 five prison officers, C.B., D.B., M.S., A.D., and G.S., were committed for trial. They were charged with ill-treatment of the applicants under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code (\u201cthe Criminal Code\u201d), in conjunction with Article 61 \u00a7 9 of the Criminal Code, a provision which considers the commission of an offence by a civil servant abusing his or her position to be an aggravating circumstance. 23.  On the same date the applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties. 24.  The Asti District Court\u2019s judgment was delivered on 30 January 2012. Its findings may be summarised as follows. 25.  As to the establishment of the facts concerning the ill-treatment, the court found that the evidence gathered during the investigation and produced at the trial showed that the events had occurred in the manner described by the victims in their submissions during the trial. The Court relied on statements to the effect that the applicants had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse, coupled with the deprivation of food, water, sleep, and clothing, and had been detained in cells without adequate access to sanitation, heating, and bedding. 26.  The court further found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had been subjected not merely to isolated acts of harassment and abuse, but to repeated ill-treatment which had been put into practice in a systematic manner. 27.  More specifically, the court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that the first and second applicants had been subjected to repeated physical violence from 10 to 29 December 2004 and from 10 to 16 December 2004 respectively. The court found that the beatings occurred regularly at all times of the day, and particularly at night. 28.  The court noted that the second applicant had been admitted to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital on 16 December 2004 with traumatic injuries. With regard to the first applicant, the court acknowledged his hospitalisation following the events without citing a date or specific medical documentation to this effect. 29.  Moreover, the court found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that in 2004 and 2005 in the Asti Correctional Facility there had existed what it defined as a \u201cgeneralised practice of ill-treatment\u201d that had been systematically inflicted on prisoners considered to be problematic. Measures which the court defines as exceeding the bounds of permitted disciplinary or security measures were routinely taken to punish and intimidate problematic detainees and to deter other disorderly behaviour. As part of this practice, a detainee would generally be taken to a cell in the solitary confinement unit where he would be subjected to repeated harassment and abuse by prison officers. The abuse would primarily take the form of physical violence, as detainees would be beaten by groups of prison officers, often during the night. In addition, detainees would be routinely subjected to sleep, food and water deprivation, and would also be denied access to sanitary facilities. 30.  The court further found ample evidence that the prison officers operated in a climate of impunity. This was due, in the court\u2019s view, to the acquiescence of high-level prison administrators and the complicity that existed among prison officers. 31.  It emerges that the court ordered an inspection of the correctional facility, including the solitary confinement wing, during the course of the trial. The court found that several cells in the solitary confinement wing of the Asti Correctional Facility were unfit for holding detainees. Some did not have bed linen, mattresses, sanitary facilities or heating. Although the windows in some cells had no panes and others had windows covered by metal plates with small perforations, the cells were nonetheless used during the winter months. Some cells were equipped with a bed and a squat toilet but no other furniture or sanitary facilities. 32.  Following the establishment of the facts, the court went on to assess responsibility for the established conduct. In this regard, G.S. was acquitted as to his involvement in the ill-treatment, and A.D. and D.B. were acquitted of the charge of ill-treatment under Article 572 of the Criminal Code. The court nonetheless held that the conduct of A.D. and D.B. amounted to infliction of bodily harm contrary to Article 582 of the Criminal Code. However, it ordered that the proceedings against them be discontinued due to the expiry of the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations. 33.  With respect to C.B. and M.S., the court held that there existed sufficient evidence to conclude that they had been responsible for most, if not all, of the acts of physical, psychological, and \u201cmaterial\u201d abuse at issue. The court then considered that the acts at issue could be classified as torture pursuant to the definition provided by the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It went on to observe that Italy had failed to incorporate the offence of torture into national legislation, in breach of its international obligations. It was therefore obliged to conclude that, under Italian law, there existed no legal provision that would allow it to classify the impugned conduct as acts of torture. 34.  Having taken note of the above-mentioned considerations, the court proceeded to assess which existing offence was more suitable in respect of the legal classification of C.B. and M.S.\u2019s conduct. When conducting its assessment, the court relied on the conclusion that the primary purpose of the impugned treatment was to punish the applicants, to \u201cmaintain order\u201d in the correctional facility, and to convey a clear message to the other detainees. 35.  The court considered that the conduct of the two prison officers thus fell most appropriately within the scope of Article 608 of the Criminal Code, which deals with abuse of authority against arrested or detained persons. However, the statutory limitation period for the offence in question had elapsed, as the court had found no procedural action which would have the effect of interrupting it.\nThe court stated that C.B. and M.S. were also responsible for the infliction of bodily harm, but that, as the statute of limitations was applicable to that offence as well, such a finding did not alter the substance of the decision. The court therefore ordered that the proceedings against C.B. and M.S be discontinued because the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations had expired. 36.  On 22 February 2012 the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Asti District Court had erred in the legal classification of the offence with respect to C.B. and M.S. The prosecutor contended that the most appropriate offence for the purposes of classification of the conduct in question would have been aggravated ill\u2011treatment under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code \u2012 as initially identified in the bill of indictment \u2012 in conjunction with Article 608 of the Criminal Code. 37.  By a judgment issued on 21 May 2012, and filed with the court Registry on 27 July 2012, the Court of Cassation declared the public prosecutor\u2019s application inadmissible. The court expressed its agreement with the prosecutor\u2019s contention as a matter of principle but, as the statute of limitations had been likewise applicable to the offence of aggravated ill\u2011treatment, a decision in favour of the prosecution would have been devoid of any practical effect. 38.  On 26 July 2012 C.B. lodged an objection to execution (incidente d\u2019esecuzione) with the Asti District Court, arguing that its decision of 30 January 2012 (see paragraph 24 above) could not be considered as final and binding insofar as he was concerned, as the decision had not been properly served on him. 39.  In a decision issued on 31 October the Asti District Court dismissed C.B.\u2019s objection on the grounds that C.B. must have had cognisance of the decision at the moment the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 36 above) or, at the latest, when his representative filed a defence brief at a hearing before the Court of Cassation in May 2012. 40.  On 26 July 2012 C.B. appealed against the decision before the Court of Cassation. 41.  In a judgment delivered on 11 July 2013, and filed with the Registry on 1 August 2013, the Court of Cassation granted the appeal. It found that the failure to serve the decision on C.B. could not be remedied by C.B.\u2019s potential knowledge of the decision at a later stage, as argued by the District Court. The Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 could not, accordingly, be considered final and binding insofar as C.B. was concerned. 42.  Based on the latter decision, on 10 October 2013 C.B. lodged an appeal against the Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 with the Turin Court of Appeal, seeking an acquittal. 43.  No further information has been provided by the parties as to the outcome of the proceedings. 44.  In their observations of 31 March 2016, the Government indicated that four prison officers had undergone disciplinary proceedings in connection with the impugned events and by different decisions issued on 29 January 2013 the following disciplinary sanctions had been imposed:\n\u2013  C.B. was dismissed from his functions (destituito dal servizio). He was, however, reinstated on 26 November 2013, following the Court of Cassation judgment of 11 July 2013 which suspended the binding nature of the Asti District Court\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 41 above);\n\u2013  M.S. was dismissed from his functions;\n\u2013  A.D. was suspended from duty for a period of 4 months;\n\u2013  D.B. was suspended from duty for a period of 6 months. 45.  According to a document issued by the Staff Director of the Prison Administration Department of the Ministry of Justice on 12 October 2015, and furnished by the Government, the four prison officers were not suspended from duty (sospensione precauzionale dal servizio) during the course of the investigation or the trial. 46.  At the Court\u2019s request, the Government submitted extracts from the prison medical record of the second applicant between 26 November 2004 and 5 March 2005 and typed copies of his hospitalisation record of 16 December 2004. 47.  The prison medical record indicates that on 13 December 2004 the second applicant was examined visually (whilst still \u201cbehind bars\u201d). He complained of pain in the thoracic area and right ear. The reporting physician noted the presence of ecchymoses and haematomas around the patient\u2019s ribcage. He recommended a more thorough medical examination and/or transfer to the infirmary. 48.  The record further indicates that another visual examination (also \u201cbehind bars\u201d) took place on 15 December 2004. The information in this entry is the same as in the previous entry. Transfer to the infirmary for a medical examination was recommended. 49.  On 15 December 2004 the record shows that the applicant underwent a medical examination in the afternoon. The physician reported ecchymoses on the patient\u2019s ribcage and in the retroauricular region. Palpation of the patient revealed diffuse pain. The reporting physician recommended that X\u2011rays be performed for a suspected fracture. Painkillers were administered. 50.  The entry of 16 December 2004 reports the applicant\u2019s transfer to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital as a consequence of traumatic injury. 51.  According to the medical record of the Asti Civil Hospital, an X-ray revealed a fractured rib and the medical examination disclosed diffuse bruising in the thoracic and abdominal area and pain on palpation. The record states that the applicant told the doctor his injuries occurred as a consequence of an accidental fall. 52.  The prison medical record entry on the applicant\u2019s discharge from the hospital on 16 December 2004 shows that he was prescribed painkillers. 53.  As to the first applicant, no copy of the prison medical register had been submitted by the Government, notwithstanding the Court\u2019s request for such information.", "references": ["7", "8", "3", "9", "4", "5", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1949, he is a lawyer and lives in Nicosia. 7.  The applicant was appointed as an IDC judge on 1 October 1997 and as its President on 6 December 2001. 8.  By a letter dated 18 July 2005 the two main trade unions and the two corresponding employers\u2019 federations submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court, alleging misconduct on the part of the applicant in the exercise of his judicial functions. The letter referred, in general, to complaints received by members of trade unions and employers\u2019 federations who had carried out duties as lay members of the IDC, concerning the applicant\u2019s conduct towards litigants, witnesses, lawyers and lay members of the court during proceedings. 9.  The applicant was served with a written notice from the Supreme Court dated 1 September 2005, informing him of the allegations against him and noting that the Supreme Court had decided that it was justified to activate Rule 3 of the Procedural Rules concerning the exercise of the SCJ\u2019s disciplinary authority (\u201cthe Procedural Rules\u201d; see paragraph 41 below). The applicant was provided with a copy of the letter of complaint and was requested to send his comments within seven days. 10.  By a letter dated 7 September 2005 the applicant submitted his comments to the Supreme Court with regard to the allegations against him. The applicant observed, inter alia, that the complaint was so general and vague that he was unable to identify the precise events on which it was based as he had presided over numerous proceedings. He also informed the Supreme Court that the authors of the letter had given a copy to the press and that it had been published in a newspaper on 21 July 2005. 11.  On 16 September 2005 the Supreme Court decided, in accordance with Rules 4 and 5 of the Procedural Rules (see paragraph 41 below), to appoint an investigating judge to look into the allegations against the applicant. 12.  On 19 September 2005 the Supreme Court appointed the then President of the District Court of Nicosia as investigating judge. 13.  In a letter dated 5 December 2005 the investigating judge informed the applicant of his appointment. He also provided the applicant with statements he had taken from twenty-eight people during his investigation and invited the applicant to submit a supplementary statement, if he so wished, within ten days. 14.  On 16 December 2005 the applicant made a lengthy supplementary statement to the investigating judge, providing his comments on the statements collected by the judge and referring to various proceedings in which the witnesses had been involved. He also noted that he did not view his comments as a supplementary statement as such, since it was only at that time that the complaint had become more precise, at least in part. Furthermore, he observed that the witness statements covered a period of six years, when he had sat in about three thousand cases. The statements could not therefore provide the full picture. He suggested that statements should be taken from a number of lay members of the court and provided the investigating judge with their names and telephone numbers. 15.  On 21 December 2005, upon completion of the investigation, the investigating judge submitted a report to the Supreme Court summarising his investigation and the evidence collected. The report was accompanied by all the material he had collected, including the statements given by the witnesses and the applicant. The report made no recommendation. 16.  By a letter dated 10 February 2006 the chief registrar of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that the court had decided that a disciplinary process was warranted. He provided the applicant with the charge sheet drawn up by the Supreme Court at a meeting it had held on 9 February 2006. This included two charges of misconduct, and details of the preparatory investigation by the investigating judge. The charges against the applicant were as follows:\n\u201cFirst Charge\nMisconduct (Articles 153 \u00a7 7 (4) and 157 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution)\nParticulars\nWhile you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting behaviour towards the lay members of the Court, both inside and outside the courtroom and, at the same time, in the course of proceedings you sometimes ignored them, sometimes did not allow them to put questions and sometimes did not allow them to ask for clarification on the matters at issue.\nSecond Charge\nMisconduct (Articles 153 \u00a7 7 (4) and 157 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution)\nParticulars\nWhile you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting and even humiliating behaviour towards lawyers and/or litigants and/or witnesses during the proceedings, including ironic comments at their expense and/or innuendos, with the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption caused to them, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course.\u201d 17.  A list of fifteen witnesses was attached to the charge sheet. 18.  In his letter the chief registrar summoned the applicant to appear on 9 March 2006 before the SCJ (see paragraph 36 below) to answer the charges. He informed the applicant that the proceedings would not be held in public unless he so wished and that, pending the proceedings, he would have to refrain from carrying out his duties. 19.  On 9 March 2006, before the applicant answered the charges against him, his lawyer raised several preliminary objections. In particular, he argued that the investigation had been incomplete as statements had not been taken from the people indicated by the applicant. Furthermore, he argued that the charge sheet was incomplete, defective and vague; it did not give sufficient information to the applicant about the offences in relation to the actual content of the two charges he was facing. 20.  The SCJ ruled the same day that the charge sheet, taken together with the fifteen statements, provided sufficient information to the applicant about the facts on which the charges had been based. In that regard, it noted that the applicant had commented on all the details referred to in the statements in a lengthy statement. The SCJ also held that the investigation had been adequate and had provided grounds for bringing charges. 21.  The applicant then pleaded not guilty to the charges. 22.  A hearing was set for 29 March 2006. The applicant\u2019s lawyer agreed that the proceedings would not be held in public. 23.  Hearings commenced on the scheduled date. The SCJ set out the procedure to be followed: every witness would read out the statement he or she had given to the investigating officer and would then be cross-examined by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. Following a request by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the SCJ also held on the same day that in view of the defence\u2019s line of argument all the files of the proceedings in which the witnesses had sat as members of the IDC, from the applicant\u2019s appointment as president of the IDC onwards, should be brought before it. The hearing was scheduled to continue on 31 March 2006. 24.  Following a request by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, leave was given by the SCJ on the latter date for the applicant to have full access to the IDC registry\u2019s archives in order to enable him to examine and collect any elements that could help his defence. 25.  The hearings continued, with around seven more sessions being held. Files of the proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved were admitted as exhibits. They were filed in separate bundles by reference to the particular witness and were recorded in the list of exhibits. 26.  During the proceedings it was clarified that the charge sheet was limited to the period subsequent to the applicant\u2019s appointment as President of the IDC. Further statements that related to pending proceedings and complaints that had previously been dealt with by the Supreme Court were removed from the charge sheet. Ten out of the fifteen witnesses listed on the charge sheet ultimately testified. They comprised six lay members, two lawyers and two people who had been witnesses in proceedings over which the applicant had presided. The witnesses read out and confirmed the contents of their statements. They were then cross-examined by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 27.  In addition, at the suggestion of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the court also summoned the IDC\u2019s registrar. 28.  After the conclusion of the witness statements and an address by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the SCJ found on 29 May 2006 that a prima facie case had been established against the applicant. It therefore called the applicant to put forward his defence. 29.  The applicant took until 23 June 2006 to set out his defence case, testifying himself and calling thirty-six witnesses. They consisted of twenty-six lay members of the IDC, nine lawyers and a representative from the redundancy fund. The proceedings concluded with the applicant\u2019s lawyer addressing the court. He raised the issue of the charge sheet again and also submitted that because the Supreme Court and the SCJ had the same composition, the same judges had examined the witness statements, had decided to refer the case to trial, formulated the charge sheet and overseen the proceedings. Those judges had also acted as prosecutors and had then tried the case. He argued that that was contrary to the rules of natural justice and the right to a fair trial. He stressed, however, that this had nothing to do with the judges as individuals. 30.  In a decision of 19 September 2006 the SCJ found, by a majority of twelve to one (the President and eleven justices concurring), that on the basis of the evidence and all the material facts before it, the applicant\u2019s alleged misconduct had been proved. The SCJ assessed the evidence given by the eleven witnesses and made specific reference to events transcribed in the records of court proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved. It referred to ten specific cases. After hearing the applicant, in accordance with Rule 26 (see paragraph 41 below), the SCJ removed him from office. 31.  The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c...\nRule 13 secures for the judge against whom proceedings are brought all the rights provided for in Article 12 \u00a7 5 of the Constitution for persons who are charged with a criminal offence. That constitutional provision secures the well-known rights that an accused has in a criminal trial and are identical to those secured under Articles 6 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by the House of Representatives by law in 1962 (Law 39/62). Furthermore, the provisions of Article 30 of our Constitution, which are the equivalent to those of Article 6 of the Convention, are also applicable.\n...\nAt no stage did the Supreme Council of Judicature function as a public prosecutor against Mr Kamenos. The President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature did not put a single question to the witnesses who were listed on the charge sheet, or to those summoned on behalf of Mr Kamenos, which might have been construed as cross-examination for the purpose of contesting the witnesses\u2019 allegations. On the contrary, the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked very few questions, and they were solely for the purpose of clarification; special reference will be made to some of those questions at the appropriate stage. Not a single question was put to Mr Kamenos. The Supreme Council of Judicature was not seeking to pursue a procedure of prosecution against Mr Kamenos in the form of a confrontation between prosecution and defence. For that reason, and despite having such powers under Rule 16, the relevant provision of the Constitution on the judicial process and the procedure to be followed in investigating disciplinary cases, it did not assign the duties of prosecutor to the judge-investigator or to any other judicial official. In that way, which was the declared intention of the Supreme Council of Judicature, more rights were secured for Mr Kamenos than those which he had under the aforementioned Articles of the Constitution and the Rule. That was precisely the aim of the procedure followed by the Supreme Council of Judicature, which essentially remained an audience for the witnesses\u2019 statements.\nIt follows that this is the appropriate moment to refer to the suggestion made by Mr Kamenos\u2019s lawyer in his final address. Its subject relates directly and absolutely to what we have just said. The lawyer alleged that the Supreme Council of Judicature had functioned in a dual capacity, given that it had judged the case and simultaneously exercised the duties of prosecutor. Clarifying his position, he said that that is inferred from the fact that the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature put questions to the witnesses. In our opinion, that suggestion is unfounded and unjustifiable. It is unfounded for the reasons which we explained above, and unjustifiable because it conflicts with what the lawyer said to us at the beginning of the proceedings, when he ... spoke in praise of the powers invested by the Constitution in the Supreme Council of Judicature, describing its work as difficult and important [in those instances] when it is called upon to decide whether a judge displayed misconduct and is obliged, again in accordance with the Constitution, to terminate the latter\u2019s services in the event of conviction. In brief, Mr Efstathiou not only accepted but also praised as correct the competence, arising from the Constitution, of the Supreme Council of Judicature, which is made up of the full bench of the Members of the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in the State.\n...\n[The applicant\u2019s lawyer] asked many witnesses to express an opinion on the extent to which they considered that Mr Kamenos\u2019s decisions were correct. Most of them, including the lawyers, gave the right reply, namely, that it was not for them to judge Mr Kamenos\u2019s decisions. In the same way, the Supreme Council of Judicature is not judging the correctness of Mr Kamenos\u2019s decisions. We do not have such competence. That belongs to the Supreme Court. The competence of the Supreme Council of Judicature is only to decide whether the charges of improper behaviour (misconduct) are proved, which [behaviour] in the case we are examining and according to the particulars of the charges, is continuous (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c3\u03c5\u03c1\u03c1\u03bf\u03ae, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03ae\u03c2) and directly refers to the function of Mr Kamenos as the President of the Industrial Disputes Court.\n...\nWe previously stated that certain witnesses called by Mr Kamenos, evidently in an endeavour to tone down or explain what the witnesses listed on the charge sheet had testified to and who touched on Mr Kamenos\u2019s behaviour in the course of the hearing, in essence confirmed what those witnesses had said. Several examples follow ...\n...\nFrom the evidence that we have analysed above, we find that the charges have been proved.\n...\nWe wish to clarify that the purpose of this procedure is not to punish Mr Kamenos but to protect the public by adopting of a strict standard of judicial behaviour in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity, prestige and independence of the judicial system. We borrow and adopt the above principle from the decision (Investigation concerning Judge Bruce Van Voorhis, No. 165) given in February 2003 by the Commission of Judicial Performance of the State of California, in the United States of America, which concerned a procedure against a specific judge whose services were also terminated for misconduct, with facts and particulars similar to the case before us. In essence, we translate the principle which that Commission adopted and recorded on page 31 of the decision. The principle is based, as stated in the decision, on what was said by the Supreme Court of the State, that the purpose of the procedure was not to punish judges who have erred but to protect the judicial system and those who are subject to the formidable power exercised by judges.\n...\nEvaluating the above with great care, caution and, we would say, anxiety, we are led to the conclusion that everything imputed to Mr Kamenos as stated in the two charges has been proved. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, which are referred to in our decision, the proof of a charge of misconduct against a judge leads to the termination of his services.\u201d 32.  The dissenting judge found in his decision that the evidence was not sufficient to prove such a serious charge as misconduct. As regards the procedure, the judge noted, inter alia, that the Supreme Council of Judicature had asked the witnesses very few questions and that they had been for the purposes of clarification. Furthermore, with regard to the investigation and the object of the hearing, he observed:\n\u201cA judicial official with the duties of prosecutor was not appointed, a possibility which is referred to in Rule 16, and we adopted the following approach: every witness read his statement to the investigating officer out loud and, immediately after, was cross-examined by Mr Kamenos\u2019s lawyer. During the cross-examination or subsequently members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked the witnesses a few questions for clarification purposes. This is also exactly what happened in the case of Mr Kamenos and the 36 witnesses called by him.\n...\nBefore referring to the evidence, it is useful if we outline the methodology which led to the taking of statements by the Investigating Officer. He did not himself take the initiative of collecting evidence in view of the accusation, as he explains in his report. The persons who signed the accusation did not have any personal knowledge of the circumstances and statements were taken from all those they ... named, and from others subsequently named by those who had been initially summoned. The investigation into the manner in which Mr Kamenos exercised his duties in general was therefore not systematic and that is also the reason for not taking statements from a number of other persons whom Mr Kamenos himself indicated. Besides, as we have seen, of the 28 statements which the Investigating Office took, only 15 were attached to the charge sheet, with a further reduction to 10 in the course of the hearing. They did not include statements which, as the Investigating Officer reported, not only expressed no complaints but stated that Mr Kamenos\u2019s conduct had been irreproachable in all respects. Consequently, as is in any case self-evident, the object of the hearing is [to determine] whether, on the basis of the evidence of those ten witnesses, the charge has been substantiated as formulated. That is to say, whether, from each individual\u2019s evidence and the correlation between them, to the extent possible, there arises conduct as cumulatively stated on the charge sheet, [and] in the case of the second charge \u201cwith the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption they were caused, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course\u201d. This (was the wording), without any specification on the charge sheet of a definite, specific incident at a specific time, ... in relation to a specific person in the context of a specific case. The witnesses who remained on the charge sheet (whose statements I shall of course return to), as lay members of the court, or as lawyers or witnesses, did not submit a complaint there and then about what they considered to be objectionable conduct. ... Nor did the litigants in any specific case which could be related to the charge sheet make a complaint at the time, or appeal or employ any other legal means so that any objectionable conduct would be examined also from the aspect of its effect on the final outcome. That was what occurred in the cases of Athanasiou v. Reana Manuf. & Trade Co.Ltd and others (2001) 1 C.L.R. 1635, and Fanos N. Epiphaniou Ltd v. Melarta and others (2002) 1 C.L.R.654, in which the Supreme Court annulled decisions issued by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal under the presidency of Mr Kamenos, using strong language about the degree of his intervention in the proceedings and the appearance of partiality to which it could give rise. Of course, the charge sheet does not extend to those cases and does not concern the issue of interventions as such ... The core of the charge is the conduct attributed to Mr Kamenos at the expense of lay members of the court, lawyers, litigants and witnesses, and it is in the light of such considerations that I shall go on to examine the evidence adduced.\u201d 33.  The applicant continued to receive all the benefits that came with his post during the proceedings. It appears from a letter sent to him by the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus that the applicant was considered as having retired from the date of his dismissal, 19 September 2006. He was paid a retirement lump sum and started receiving his pension.", "references": ["8", "6", "4", "5", "7", "1", "0", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zuj\u016bnai. 6.  In 1988 the applicant was provided with a plot of land of 0.15 hectares for residential purposes. 7.  In 1992 the authorities allocated him an additional plot of land of 0.05 hectares and similar additional plots were allocated to another twenty\u2011four people. 8.  On 15 April 1993 the applicant purchased a total of 0.2 hectares of land from the State. At that time there was no detailed plan of Vilnius County. Nevertheless, the plot of land assigned to the applicant was approved by the county\u2019s chief architect. 9.  The applicant obtained an official permit for the construction of a house on the land and has been living there since 2004. The house is the permanent residence of the applicant and his family. The plot of land of 0.05 hectares, which has been allocated to the applicant in 1992 (see paragraph 7 above), is where waste water treatment equipment, the gas and water supplies and an electricity meter were installed. 10.  In 2006 two neighbours started court proceedings against the applicant. They claimed that 0.05 hectares of the applicant\u2019s land occupied part of a street and that the applicant had built a concrete fence around it, making it impossible to use the street. They asked the court to establish an easement (servitutas) for access to it. 11.  On 26 September 2006 the Vilnius District Court held that the neighbours\u2019 rights had not been breached because they had access to their own land. However, the court ordered the applicant to give one of the neighbours access to an electricity meter. 12.  The applicant\u2019s neighbours appealed but on 4 January 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The court held that in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, an easement could be established only if it was impossible to use property in any other way (see paragraph 42 below). This meant that an easement could only be established if it was objectively necessary. The fact that the neighbours had to use another road and that entry to their own property was more difficult was not grounds to limit another person\u2019s property rights, namely those of the applicant. 13.  The applicant\u2019s neighbours lodged an appeal on points of law, and on 19 November 2007 the Supreme Court found that there were two civil cases regarding the same situation and suspended the proceedings until the other case had finished (see paragraph 15 below). 14.  On 29 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision of 4 January 2007. The court found that the applicant had purchased the plot of land of 0.2 hectares in 1993. The lawfulness of the purchase agreement had been proven by the domestic courts (see paragraph 17 below). The fact that the applicant was a bona fide owner of the land had not been denied and could only be so by reopening the proceedings involved. The court thus held that the mere fact that the applicant\u2019s neighbours wanted to use his land because it was more convenient was not enough to establish an easement. 15.  In October 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to annul the decisions of the national authorities and the purchase agreement that had entitled the applicant to 0.05 hectares of land, to apply restitution, to return the plot of land of 0.05 hectares to the State and to pay the applicant 15 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 4.34 euros (EUR)) in compensation. The prosecutor argued that the authorities had breached domestic law by allocating the applicant a plot of land of 0.05 hectares, thus it had to be returned to the State. The prosecutor also noted that the applicant had paid 1,500 roubles for the land, which amounted to approximately LTL 15. The prosecutor also stated that he had only found out about the violation on 30 August 2007, when he had received a report from an expert. 16.  On 11 April 2008 the Vilnius District Court held that the land had been sold to the applicant in breach of the provisions of domestic law (see paragraph 65 below). The contested decisions had been related to property rights over the land, which was a legitimate interest of the community as a whole, and thus the prosecutor\u2019s claim was related to the public interest. The applicant was ordered to return the plot to the State, with the State having to repay him the LTL 15. The parts of the order allocating the additional plot of 0.05 hectares to the applicant and the relevant part of the purchase agreement were annulled. 17.  The applicant appealed. On 10 December 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court noted that according to the prosecutor and the court of first instance any breach of legal norms regulating the division of land was a breach of the public interest. However, twenty-five people altogether, including the applicant, had been allocated additional plots at the time (see paragraph 7 above), but the prosecutor had only found a breach of the public interest in the applicant\u2019s case. The court also found that when the applicant had been allocated the first plot of land (see paragraph 6 above), there had been no other plots demarcated and the land in front of his had been vacant. He thus could not have anticipated that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares would occupy part of the road because the road had not existed at the time the detailed plan had been drawn up or when the applicant had purchased the land (see paragraph 8 above). The court stated that the mechanism of allocating the additional plot to the applicant had been breached, but that he was a bona fide owner. Mistakes had been made by the authorities and taking the land from the applicant would have disproportionate consequences for him. The court observed that the applicant\u2019s neighbours could easily access their land using other roads and their rights had not been breached. Consequently, the court overturned the first-instance decision and dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s complaints. The case file contains no information of whether there was an appeal on points of law. 18.  The prosecutor applied to reopen the proceedings that had ended on 10 December 2008 (see paragraph 17 above). He argued that the Vilnius Regional Court had made a mistake in its application of the law and submitted that the additional plot of land should only have been allocated to the applicant after land reform plans had been carried out. Moreover, the allocation of 0.05 hectares to the applicant had been against the public interest because he had constructed a concrete fence on the road. The prosecutor added that an appeal on points of law had in fact been submitted after the appeal decision, but had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 19.  On 4 December 2009 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings could only be lodged against a decision that had been appealed against (see paragraph 57 below). The prosecutor had alleged that the Vilnius Regional Court rather than the District Court had made a mistake. If the prosecutor\u2019s request were to be satisfied and proceedings reopened, the court of first instance would have to decide on the lawfulness of a decision by a higher court and domestic law did not provide for the possibility of a court of first instance annulling decisions made on appeal. As a result, the prosecutor\u2019s application to reopen the proceedings was dismissed. 20.  The Prosecutor General lodged a separate complaint. On 25 May 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court held that proceedings concerning a decision by an appellate court could not be reopened. Otherwise, appeals on points of law would be useless and the reopening of proceedings would be used as an opportunity to make proceedings more protracted. Moreover, there was a three-month time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings (see paragraph 58 below). The disputed decision had been adopted on 10 December 2008 and the prosecutor had sought to reopen proceedings on 8 July 2009, therefore the time-limit had been missed. As a result, the court upheld the Vilnius District Court\u2019s decision of 4 December 2009. 21.  The Prosecutor General lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 December 2010 the Supreme Court decided that the Prosecutor General could apply to reopen proceedings in all cases that had been terminated by a first-instance or appeal decision (see paragraphs 56 and 57 below). Moreover, the mere fact that a district prosecutor had brought civil proceedings did not mean that the Prosecutor General had to know about it. The court thus held that those processes (see paragraphs 18 above and 24 below) had been different and that the time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings had not been missed. Finally, the Supreme Court observed, without further specifications, that the lower courts had failed to properly assess the circumstances which had led to an alleged violation of the public interest and remitted the application to reopen proceedings for fresh examination by the appellate court. 22.  On 14 July 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the first\u2011instance decision (see paragraph 19 above) had lacked reasons for why a clear mistake in the application of the law had been made (see paragraph 57 below) and without them the appellate court could not decide whether the Prosecutor General\u2019s request to reopen proceedings had been examined properly. The court thus decided to return the case to the Vilnius District Court. 23.  On 25 October 2011 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings on the grounds of a mistake in the application of the law required not only that the mistake had to be clear, but also be one of substance (see paragraph 57 below). A clear mistake could be a failure to apply a required legal rule, a failure to properly interpret the substance of a legal rule, an obvious misinterpretation of the circumstances and so on. In the case in question, the Prosecutor General\u2019s application could not lead to a conclusion that the proceedings had to be reopened. The Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 17 above) had been wide\u2011ranging, it had given well-grounded responses to every violation of domestic law alleged by the Prosecutor General and had come to a reasoned conclusion. Reopening proceedings would thus lead to a repeated assessment of the facts and would be contrary to the domestic law and the main purpose of reopening proceedings. There was no information that the Prosecutor General had lodged an appeal on points of law against the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 17 above). Even if an appeal on points of law had been submitted and rejected, that meant that the court of cassation had not considered that there had been grounds to examine the case. As a result, the Prosecutor General\u2019s request to reopen the proceedings was dismissed. 24.  The Prosecutor General submitted a separate complaint. On 9 March 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the conclusions of the lower court that there was no public interest at stake had been unfounded. Violations of domestic regulations had already been found and those regulations were necessary in the process of the sale or rent of State property. Violations of such regulations were directly related to a breach of the public interest. The court thus decided to reopen the proceedings. 25.  On 15 June 2012 the Vilnius District Court ruled that the decision of 11 April 2008 to oblige the applicant to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State and to pay him LTL 15 had been justified. The court held that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares had been allocated to the applicant in breach of the requirements of domestic law and that by holding that the rights of the applicant\u2019s neighbours had not been breached and that the applicant had been a bona fide party to the purchase agreement, the Vilnius Regional Court had made a clear mistake in the application of the law. The court thus annulled the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision of 10 December 2008 and upheld that of the Vilnius District Court of 11 April 2008 (see paragraph 16 above). 26.  The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 25 January 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance (see paragraph 25 above). It also held that the applicant\u2019s argument that he could not have known that part of his land would block the road was not convincing enough as there had been a plan of the whole of the Zuj\u016bnai settlement and it had been obvious that there was a continuing road which was part of the 0.05 hectares of land in question. The court further held that the applicant had not been diligent enough and that ignorance of the law could not absolve someone of responsibility (see paragraph 37 below). The fact that the applicant had to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State did not prevent him from asking for an easement over the part of the State land where his waste water equipment and gas and water supplies were installed. The court thus rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the order to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State prevented him from using his house. 27.  The applicant lodged two appeals on points of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the first one as not raising important legal issues but merely disputing the facts established by the lower courts on 22 February 2013. The second appeal on points of law was dismissed on 26 April 2013. The Supreme Court accepted that if a person\u2019s appeal was dismissed as not raising important legal issues, he or she could, within the time-limit prescribed by law, submit another appeal on points of law having corrected the deficiencies. However, it found that in the applicant\u2019s case, the deficiencies of the first appeal on points of law had not been corrected, although the applicant had modified his arguments; therefore the complaint was repetitive and could not be accepted in accordance with the existing regulations (\u0161iuo atveju kasacinio skundo tr\u016bkumai nepa\u0161alinti, skundas pripa\u017eintinas pakartotiniu, pagal nustatyt\u0105 reglamentavim\u0105 jis negali b\u016bti priimtas). 28.  In April 2013 the applicant applied for a suspension of the execution of the decisions of the Vilnius District Court of 15 June 2012 and of Vilnius Regional Court of 25 January 2013 (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). He also sought to have the proceedings reopened. The applicant submitted that unless the execution of the decisions was suspended, he would have to initiate new proceedings for an easement. 29.  On 26 April 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to suspend execution, holding that his arguments did not constitute sufficient grounds. 30.  On 2 August 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to reopen the proceedings. It held that his argument that new circumstances had arisen was unfounded. The allegedly new circumstances were the fact that a general plan of the settlements of 1986 had not been registered in the State Register. The court observed that the applicant had been represented by a professional lawyer and must have been able to familiarise himself with the general plan and information about its registration. Furthermore, the fact that the plan had not been registered was not important to the examination of the case. The register had only been established in 1992 and had started functioning in 1996. 31.  The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 27 February 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and decided to terminate the applicant\u2019s appellate proceedings. 32.  The plot of land of 0.05 hectares was entered in the State Register as State property in May 2013. 33.  In January 2015 the authorities conducted an examination of the use of the 0.05 hectares of land and found that the applicant had not removed the fence, trees, a shed and paving stones from the plot. 34.  In September 2015 the authorities examined a March 2015 request from the applicant to purchase the plot of land of 0.05 hectares. The authorities stated that the plot could not be purchased as that would be contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 63 below). The same month the applicant was asked to remove the constructions described in the land examination document. It appears that the removal had to be conducted at the expense of the applicant. 35.  In March 2016 the authorities held that the constructions had not been removed. 36.  In February 2017 the applicant requested that the authorities rent the plot to him. In March 2017 the authorities replied that State land could be rented out if there were constructions on it that were owned by private individuals or legal entities. Such objects did not include temporary constructions, engineering systems, buildings that did not have a clear functional dependency or use, or other constructions designated as serving as dependencies of a main construction. The authorities held that the waste water treatment equipment was not an independent object and thus the applicant could not rent the plot of land.", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "6", "4", "7", "3", "0", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bac\u0103u. 6.  On 13 January 2005 the Bac\u0103u police division responsible for the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking (\u201cthe police\u201d) was informed by the Bac\u0103u Regional Division of the Romanian Post Office (\u201cthe Post Office\u201d) that it had identified three envelopes containing suspicious items. The envelopes, sent abroad by registered post sometime between 11 April and 13 May 2003, had been returned unopened as the intended recipients had failed to collect them. The people who had sent them could not be identified by postal workers and their addresses had proved to be fictitious. Consequently, the postal workers had opened the envelopes and contacted the police. 7.  The police seized and examined the envelopes and found that they contained Diazepam, a prescription medicine which also belonged to one of the categories of prohibited drugs under Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (\u201cLaw no. 143\u201d). 8.  Between January and February 2005 similar envelopes containing similar prescription medicines meant to be sent abroad were discovered by the Post Office and given to the police. 9.  On 9 and 14 February 2005 the division for the investigation of organised crime and terrorism from the Bac\u0103u Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) issued orders authorising the seizure of the suspicious envelopes under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 \u00a7 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe urgent procedure\u201d and \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 26 below). The prosecutor sent the orders to the County Court for the court\u2019s information on the next day.\nThe relevant parts of the orders read as follows:\n\u201cThe investigation showed that the recipients\u2019 addresses are false.\nAs it appears that the envelopes contain prohibited substances which are among those listed in Law no. 143,\nBearing in mind the urgency and the well-foundedness [of the measure] under Article 98 \u00a7 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the envelopes ... be taken by police officers ...\nItems which are of no relevance to the case shall be returned.\u201d 10.  On 18 February 2005 the prosecutor started criminal investigations in the matter against unidentified perpetrators. 11.  The prosecutor requested audio and video-surveillance of the post offices in Bac\u0103u. The measure was authorised by the Bac\u0103u County Court on 23 February 2005. 12.  With the help of the surveillance material the applicant (who at that point remained unidentified) was seen on 14 March 2005 in two different post offices as he deposited two other suspect envelopes to be sent abroad. The envelopes were seized under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 \u00a7 12 of the CCP (see paragraph 26 below) and on the next day the prosecutor sent the orders to the court for the court\u2019s information. An examination of the envelopes showed that they contained prescription medicine and that the sender\u2019s address was false. The prosecutor\u2019s orders read as follows:\n\u201c... a man brought a parcel with suspicious contents which were of interest to investigators ...\nAs the correspondence was of interest to investigators and as the situation is urgent and duly justified, under Article 98 \u00a7 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the police ... seize the parcel.\nCorrespondence and items which have been seized but which are of no relevance for the case shall be returned.\u201d 13.  On 25 March and 18 April 2005 an expert examined the writing on the envelopes seized by the police and concluded that it belonged to the applicant. 14.  During the investigation, the prosecutor identified two pharmacies where the drugs had been procured without prescription. The pharmacists identified the applicant as the person to whom they had sold the medicine. 15.  Based on the evidence that had been gathered, the prosecutor concluded that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had obtained medical products classified as drugs without prescription and had tried to sell them abroad. 16.  On 2 June 2005 the prosecutor committed the applicant for trial on a charge of dealing in drugs. Five of the envelopes seized on 9 February, 14 February and 14 March 2005 (see paragraphs 9 and 12 above) were attributed to the applicant and used as evidence. 17.  The applicant contested the lawfulness of the interception of his correspondence before the Bac\u0103u County Court and argued that the prosecutor had not obtained authorisation from the court to seize it, as required by the relevant provision of the CCP. As for the contents of the seized envelopes, he stated that he had sent scientific papers and samples abroad in relation to his research work and that he had used a fake identity to protect his private life and reputation in case the quality of the scientific work was considered as poor. He denied any involvement in drug trafficking. 18.  On 27 February 2007 the applicant was acquitted. The County Court excluded the prosecution\u2019s main evidence, considering that the seized envelopes had been obtained unlawfully as the prosecutor had failed to ask the court to approve the measure. As for the remaining evidence in the file, it noted that the audio and video-recordings were not relevant for the accusations brought against the applicant and that the witnesses were unreliable as they had changed their statements in court. 19.  On 18 September 2007 the Bac\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. 20.  However, on 28 January 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed an appeal on points of law by the prosecutor. It found that the lower courts had erred when they had set aside the evidence obtained from the seized correspondence. It considered that the provisions of the CCP meant that the prosecutor had been obliged to inform the courts about the seizure orders but not to seek their approval. It therefore sent the case back to the County Court and recommended that the court check whether the prosecutor\u2019s orders had been sent as information to the court and to examine the accusation in the light of all the evidence in the file. The decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice was final. 21.  On 12 February 2009 the Bac\u0103u County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. The County Court relied on the evidence in the file, namely the seized envelopes and the expert evaluation of their content and of the writing on them. It also relied on transcripts of the audio and video-surveillance in the post office and of the applicant\u2019s telephone; statements by seven pharmacists that they had sold the medicine in question to the applicant without prescription; and testimony by two doctors who had been asked by the applicant or pharmacists to write prescriptions to cover up for the medicine sold without prescription. There was also testimony from the family doctor, who denied prescribing any medicine to the applicant\u2019s parents, as the applicant had asserted. The County Court also had at its disposal statements from other witnesses, notably nine post office workers who remembered the applicant sending between one and five envelopes a week abroad, starting from 2003; four fellow researchers from the University, who worked or had worked in the same research team as the applicant; and a bus driver who said he had delivered an envelope for the applicant. The court heard evidence from twenty-three witnesses who had participated in various procedural acts as independent witnesses at the request of the police (martori asisten\u0163i). The court further relied on the results of checks on the addresses abroad used by the applicant; Interpol information about the recipients of the envelopes; and police reports about checks on the two pharmacies used by the applicant, notably concerning bills and permits for selling prescription medicine which constituted drugs (see paragraph 14 above). In addition, it referred to the police report concerning the applicant\u2019s activity on the Internet related to his alleged scientific work abroad (see paragraph 17 above). The court also had at its disposal reports from seven banks, attesting to the fact that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had received more than a hundred money transfers from abroad for small sums, amounting to more than 41,000 United States dollars (USD) and 10,000 euros (EUR). 22.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument of the unlawfulness of the interception of the correspondence. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, it found that the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his privacy had been provided for by law and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 23.  It also reiterated that as the situation had been urgent, the prosecutor had been allowed by law to intercept the correspondence without court authorisation, provided that he informed the court afterwards, which he had done. 24.  The applicant appealed. In the main, he argued that the interception of his correspondence had been unlawful and had breached his Article 8 rights. The court dismissed his arguments, making reference to the interpretation of the law given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in its decision of 28 January 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). He also contested the manner in which one of the postal workers had been interviewed by the prosecutor (see paragraph 21 above). He did not contest the lawfulness of the remaining evidence. In his defence, he explained that he had received money from abroad for experiments he had performed for foreign scientists\u2019 research work (see paragraph 21 above). 25.  The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged with the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He did not contest the remaining evidence in the file. The High Court dismissed the case in a final decision on 22 June 2010.", "references": ["5", "8", "6", "1", "2", "0", "7", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. The second applicant is a privately owned company, founded by the first applicant in 1990, with its registered seat in Ilija\u0161 - Podlugovi, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6.  On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7.  On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Directorate\u201d) rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 8.  On 28 February 2003 the Federal Ministry upheld that decision. 9.  On 28 March 2003 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). 10.  On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 11.  On 22 November 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003 (see paragraphs 7-8 above) on procedural grounds, and remitted the case to the Directorate. 12.  On 9 May 2007 the second applicant informed the Supreme Court that the decision of 22 November 2006 had not been enforced yet. 13.  On 16 August 2007 the Directorate rejected the second applicant\u2019s request. On 30 August 2007 the second applicant appealed. 14.  On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 15.  On 12 November 2007 the Federal Ministry upheld the decision of 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The decision was served on the second applicant on 18 April 2008. 16.  On 30 May 2008 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with the Supreme Court seeking it to quash the decisions of 16 August 2007 and 12 November 2007 (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). On 31 August 2009 the Supreme Court referred the claim to the Mostar Cantonal Court, as the competent court. 17.  On 27 November 2009 the Mostar Cantonal Court rejected the application for judicial review. 18.  On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010. 19.  On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d) complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20.  On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "5", "4", "6", "7", "9", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Dublin, Ireland. 6.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant was travelling on a passenger bus from Moldova to Romania, with Ireland as his final destination. 7.  At 12.30 a.m. his bus arrived at the Albi\u0163a border crossing between Moldova and Romania. Romanian custom officers stopped the bus, got on and started searching the passengers. Two silver ingots were found in the applicant\u2019s pockets. 8.  A customs officer decided that the applicant had failed to declare the ingots and confiscated them. An offence report drafted by the officer stated that the applicant had failed to declare two silver ingots of 1 kg each and had thereby breached the provisions of Article 653 (a) of the Customs Regulations (see paragraph 12 below). In addition to the confiscation the applicant was fined 3,000 Romanian lei (approximately 750 euros (EUR)). The report also stated that according to documents produced by the applicant he had bought the two ingots from a bank. 9.  The applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the Albi\u0163a Customs Office, asking for the annulment of the offence report of 28 October 2008 and the restitution of the confiscated goods. He explained that he had legally acquired the two ingots, which had a value of EUR 500. He had kept them on him in order to prevent them being stolen during the bus trip and not to elude customs. He also stated that it had not been possible to declare goods to customs in a discrete manner or in writing. The passengers had not been allowed to get off the bus before the customs officers had got on and he had wished to avoid saying what he was carrying in front of the other passengers. 10.  On 26 January 2009 the Hu\u015fi District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as ill-founded. Based on the elements in the case file, the court observed that the customs officer had asked the applicant whether he had anything to declare and the applicant had said no. Under those circumstances the court held that the applicant had been correctly sanctioned by the customs officer. 11.  An appeal on points of law by the applicant (recurs) was dismissed with final effect on 3 June 2009 by the Vaslui County Court. The court held that the applicant, who had signed the offence report, had failed to produce any evidence to challenge the customer officer\u2019s findings in that document. 12. The relevant provisions of the Romanian Customs Regulations, as approved by Government Decision No. 707/2006, are as follows:\nArticle 156\n\u201c(1) A written customs declaration shall be submitted for the following goods:\n....\nc) objects made of precious metals, with or without precious stones, which exceed the purposes of personal use as set forth in legal provisions;\n(2) For the goods listed in paragraph (1) travellers shall submit the written customs declaration on standard forms which are made available free of charge, upon request, by customs offices.\u201d\nArticle 653\n\u201cThe following is considered an offence and shall be sanctioned with a fine between 3,000 and 8,000 lei:\na) concealing from customs any goods or merchandise which should be placed under a customs regime. In such situations the goods shall be confiscated; ...\u201d\nArticle 657\n\u201cThe offences set forth in the present chapter are subject to the regulations provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences ...\u201d 13.  According to the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff in force at the relevant time silver imported from the Republic of Moldova was not subject to any duties. 14.  The relevant provisions of Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences in force at the relevant time are as follows:\nArticle 5\n\u201c(1) Offences may be punished with principal and complementary sanctions.\n(2) The principal sanctions are:\n...\nb) a fine\n...\n(3) The complementary sanctions are:\na) the confiscation of goods destined, used or derived from offences; ...\n(4) Special laws may provide for additional principal or complementary sanctions.\n(5) The sanction must be proportionate to the degree of social danger of the offence committed.\n(6) Complementary sanctions are applied in line with the nature and gravity of the offence.\n(7) Only one principal sanction can be applied for the same offence and one or more complementary sanctions.\u201d 15.  The Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1214/2007 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff entered into force on 1 January 2008 and from that date was directly applicable in all Member States. In Section XIV, Chapter 71 the regulation does not provide for any customs duties for silver in unwrought or semi-manufactured forms or in powder.", "references": ["8", "3", "6", "5", "2", "4", "7", "0", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  In 1989 the applicant and R.\u017d. started a company which imported and sold various goods. D.A., who was the stepson of the applicant\u2019s sister, sometimes worked as a security guard on the company\u2019s premises and as the applicant\u2019s bodyguard. 7.  In July 1993 R.\u017d. and another individual, A.\u010c., were found murdered in R.\u017d.\u2019s flat in Vilnius. 8.  In August 1993, while the applicant was in a car with D.A., the latter threatened him with a firearm. When the applicant tried to escape, D.A. hit him with the barrel of the gun, fired some shots into the ground, took the applicant\u2019s Rolex watch and fired at several passers-by, injuring them. 9.  On an unspecified date the authorities opened a pre-trial investigation into the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. (see paragraph 7 above) and the incident between the applicant and D.A. in the car (see paragraph 8 above). 10.  In September 1993 the Lithuanian authorities issued a search warrant in respect of D.A. It appears that he had left Lithuania and lived in several different countries. In July 2009 D.A. was apprehended in Ukraine and subsequently extradited to the Lithuanian authorities. 11.  In December 2007 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 129 \u00a7 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). It was suspected that the applicant had acted together with D.A. Further details were subsequently added to that notice in September 2012 and March 2013. 12.  In October 2009 D.A. was officially notified that he was suspected of having murdered R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state. D.A. was also notified that he was suspected of having attempted to murder the applicant and several other individuals, as set out in Article 129 \u00a7 2 (5), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 8 above and 34 below). 13.  In May 2010 the prosecutor decided to separate the pre\u2011trial investigation against the applicant and D.A. (see paragraph 37 below). He noted that the investigation concerned two criminal offences \u2013 the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. (see paragraph 7 above) and the attempted murder of the applicant and other individuals (see paragraph 8 above). The prosecutor observed that the applicant had been suspected of the former offence and that he had been granted victim status in respect of the latter offence, and the prosecutor considered that one person could not have dual status in the same investigation. He also noted that the investigation in respect of D.A. was almost complete and the case would soon be ready for trial, whereas the investigation in respect of the applicant was still ongoing. For those reasons, the prosecutor concluded that it was necessary to separate the investigation against the applicant from that against D.A. 14.  D.A. was charged with the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state (hereinafter \u201cthe first charge\u201d) and with the attempted murder of the applicant and several other individuals (hereinafter \u201cthe second charge\u201d). The criminal case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. With regard to the first charge, the applicant had the status of witness, and with regard to the second charge, he had the status of victim. 15.  The Vilnius Regional Court issued its judgment on 20 June 2011. It found D.A. guilty of the first charge as set out in Article 129 \u00a7 2 (2), (5) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). The court based its conclusion on multiple witness testimonies, the examination of various material objects, and conclusions delivered by forensic experts. 16.  One of the documents examined by the court was a handwritten letter which D.A. had addressed to the applicant at some point in 1993. The applicant had received that letter from D.A.\u2019s father and presented it to the police. A forensic examination revealed that the letter had indeed been written by D.A. In the letter, D.A. stated that he had killed R.\u017d. on the applicant\u2019s orders so that the applicant would get all the profit from their business. D.A. also alleged that the applicant had bought him weapons to carry out unspecified criminal activities for the applicant\u2019s benefit, and had bribed judges and prosecutors in order to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility for some unspecified offences. D.A. further alleged that the applicant had promised to pay him for the murder, but had still not done so, and that that had been the reason for their conflict in the car (see paragraph 8 above). He threatened to forward the letter to various newspapers if the applicant failed to pay him. 17.  When questioned by the court, D.A. submitted that the contents of the letter were false. He claimed that the applicant had owed him some money for another debt, so he had made up the story in the letter in order to scare the applicant into paying him back. The applicant, who was questioned as a witness in respect of that charge, also denied all the allegations in the letter and stated that he had no connection to the murder. 18.  However, the court held that the letter constituted D.A.\u2019s confession to the murder. The court considered it unlikely that D.A., who at the time of writing the letter had already been suspected of the murder, would falsely incriminate himself in the letter to the applicant, especially as their relationship at that time had not been friendly. It then stated that several of the allegations in the letter had been proved \u2013 for example, the applicant had admitted to having bought weapons for D.A., and there had indeed been several sets of criminal proceedings against D.A. which had eventually been discontinued. The court concluded:\n\u201cAs the facts laid out in the letter are consistent and objective, there are no grounds to doubt the truthfulness of the contents of the letter; the statement in the letter that [D.A.] \u2013 upon the orders of the individual in respect of whom a separate pre\u2011trial investigation was opened \u2013 killed [R.\u017d.] so that all the profit would go to that individual alone, and that all the money which they had jointly owned would belong to the individual in respect of whom a separate pre-trial investigation was opened, must be considered true.\u201d 19.  The descriptive part of the judgment also stated that D.A. had killed R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. while acting with unidentified accomplices. However, the court did not take that into account as an aggravating circumstance. 20.  As for the second charge against D.A., the court changed its legal classification. The court considered that it had not been proved that D.A. had intended to kill the applicant or any of the passers-by (see paragraph 8 above). However, it found D.A. guilty of stealing the applicant\u2019s property of high value (the Rolex watch) while threatening him with a firearm, and of negligently injuring several other individuals in his attempt to escape. D.A. was given a cumulative sentence of sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also allowed the applicant\u2019s civil claim submitted in respect of the second charge in its entirety, and ordered D.A. to pay him 40,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 11,600 euros (EUR)) in pecuniary damages for the stolen watch. 21.  The prosecutor, D.A., the applicant and another victim submitted appeals against the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 20 June 2011. In his appeal, the applicant argued that the court had de facto found him guilty of having instigated the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c., despite the fact that he had not been the accused in that case and had not been able to defend himself. The applicant asked the Court of Appeal to remove from the descriptive part of the judgment all the passages which alleged his involvement in the murder, in particular those which discussed D.A.\u2019s letter (see paragraphs 16-18 above). 22.  In its judgment of 12 June 2012 the Court of Appeal amended the first-instance judgment in part. It held that the Vilnius Regional Court had erred in changing the legal classification of the second charge, found D.A. guilty of the second charge as it had been originally presented (see paragraph 14 above), and increased the sentence to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In addition, the court removed from the descriptive part of the judgment the phrase that D.A. had killed R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. while acting with unidentified accomplices (see paragraph 19 above) \u2013 it held that, without identifying such individuals, inter alia, it could not be determined whether there had been an intention for them to act together. 23.  The court dismissed D.A.\u2019s appeal contesting his guilt in respect of both charges. With regard to the first charge, D.A. argued, inter alia, that his letter to the applicant (see paragraphs 16-18 above) should not have been considered evidence of his guilt. In response to D.A.\u2019s arguments, the court stated:\n\u201cD.A.\u2019s guilt in respect of the charge against him \u2013 the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state \u2013 has been proved by a series of pieces of indirect evidence collected in the case and adequately assessed in the [first\u2011instance] judgment, as well as one of the main pieces of direct evidence \u2011 D.A.\u2019s letter to [the applicant], allowing [the court] to make well-founded conclusions regarding the nature of the convicted individual\u2019s actions and the form of his guilt.\n...\nIt is underlined that the principal statements of the letter, assessed together with the other evidence collected in the case, correspond to the events which took place at that time ... The chamber concludes that the facts indicated in D.A.\u2019s letter are not made up, he refers to actual events which took place in his life, and there is no indication that he intended to threaten [the applicant] with that letter to make the latter pay him money.\u201d 24.  As to the applicant\u2019s appeal, the court stated:\n\u201cContrary to what is alleged in [the applicant\u2019s] appeal, the first-instance court, while examining the evidence related to [D.A.\u2019s] guilt in respect of the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c., did not assess [the applicant\u2019s] actions relating to the organisation of the murder of those individuals. As can be seen from the case file, on 22 December 2007 [the applicant] was notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. ... [The applicant] is entitled to exercise his defence rights and defend himself against the accusation in that criminal investigation. Only that investigation can determine [the applicant\u2019s] guilt in respect of the criminal offence of which he is suspected ... [The applicant] essentially contests his guilt in respect of the part of the judgment in which he does not have the status of either convicted individual or victim ... and his request goes beyond his procedural rights as a witness ... [The applicant\u2019s appeal] is thereby dismissed.\u201d 25.  D.A. and the applicant submitted appeals on points of law against the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 12 June 2012. The applicant raised essentially the same arguments as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 21 above). 26.  On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. In response to the applicant\u2019s submissions, the Supreme Court stated that the criminal proceedings in question concerned D.A.\u2019s and not the applicant\u2019s guilt in respect of the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c., and the applicant had not had victim status with regard to that charge, so he was not legally entitled to submit an appeal on points of law (see paragraph 40 below). 27.  On 11 April 2013 the applicant was served with an indictment and charged with having incited D.A. and another unidentified individual to murder R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 24 \u00a7 5 and Article 129 \u00a7 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 34-35 below). The case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 28.  When questioned by the court, the applicant denied his guilt in respect of the murder. He submitted that all the allegations against him in D.A.\u2019s letter had been false, and that D.A. had written the letter with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant, which was why the applicant had decided to give it to the police. D.A. was questioned as a witness and gave essentially the same statements as in the previous criminal proceedings, including those relating to his letter (see paragraph 17 above). 29.  On 9 October 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted the applicant. It considered that neither direct nor indirect evidence adequately proved that he was guilty of having instigated the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. The court underlined that it had not been proved that the death of R.\u017d., who had been the applicant\u2019s business partner, had been beneficial to the applicant; on the contrary, after his death, their company had suffered great losses and had eventually ceased operating. In addition, the court considered that the prosecution had not established any motive for the applicant to kill A.\u010c. 30.  With regard to D.A.\u2019s letter, the court stated that, although the letter included facts which were true, some of its other contents appeared to be \u201ccharacteristic of blackmail\u201d, in particular those which alleged that the applicant had bought D.A. weapons specifically to commit criminal offences, or that he had bribed some officials to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility (see paragraph 16 above). The court also considered that D.A.\u2019s threat to forward the letter to the media further indicated that it had been written with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant. Lastly, the court underlined that the applicant had not paid D.A. the money which he had demanded, nor had he destroyed the letter, but had submitted it to the police, which confirmed that the applicant had not been connected to the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c. 31.  The prosecutor appealed against that judgment. He submitted, inter alia, that the contents of D.A.\u2019s letter had been examined in the previous criminal proceedings which had been concluded by a final court judgment (see paragraphs 18, 23 and 26 above), and the courts in the proceedings against the applicant should have followed that assessment. 32.  On 5 March 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s acquittal. In response to the prosecutor\u2019s arguments concerning D.A.\u2019s letter, it stated that the courts in the criminal proceedings against D.A. had not examined the applicant\u2019s actions in relation to the murder of R.\u017d. and A.\u010c., so the prosecutor\u2019s arguments had to be dismissed.\nFrom the information which the parties submitted to the Court, it appears that no appeal against that judgment was lodged before the Supreme Court.", "references": ["6", "0", "9", "8", "4", "7", "1", "2", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Celje. 6.  He had been a professional truck driver until he became unable to work due to epilepsy. 7.  On 29 September 2003 the applicant was certified as having a \u201ccategory III work-related disability\u201d as a result of his condition. He was found to have a right to be reassigned to a suitable position of employment where he and others would not be at risk because of his condition, with (retroactive) effect from 14 August 2002. 8.  On 21 February 2005 the Celje regional unit of the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter \u201cthe regional ZPIZ\u201d) granted the applicant a so-called \u201callowance for the period of waiting to be reassigned to or employed in a different appropriate position of employment\u201d (hereinafter \u201cwaiting period allowance\u201d) from 8 October 2004. Though the sums appear to be lower during the first few months, he had been subsequently receiving around 390 euros (EUR) per month in waiting period allowance. The regional ZPIZ relied on section 123 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter \u201cthe 1992 Act\u201d) and section 446 of the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter \u201cthe 1999 Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 24 and 25 below). It noted that the applicant had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 and had been a beneficiary under section 22 of the 1999 Act from 1 March 2003 to 7 October 2004. Thus, once his unemployment allowance had come to an end he had become entitled to a waiting period allowance under section 123 of the 1992 Act (see paragraph 24 below). The regional ZPIZ also noted that, under section 193 of the 1992 Act, beneficiaries were entitled to a waiting period allowance until they fulfilled the conditions for retirement (ibid.). 9.  On 15 October 2010 the applicant\u2019s doctor informed the regional ZPIZ about a shoulder injury the applicant had sustained and requested a reassessment of his level of disability. 10.  On the basis of, inter alia, information provided by the applicant\u2019s doctor, the regional ZPIZ, on 2 February 2011, decided that the applicant had a right to be reassigned to another position of employment with several limitations, such as not to work at unprotected heights or drive category C and E vehicles, with effect from 1 February 2011. Subsequently, on 28 June 2011 it adopted a decision granting him a disability allowance (nadomestilo za invalidnost) from 24 February 2011 onwards. The regional ZPIZ relied on the 1999 Act, which had introduced certain new disability benefits (the term \u201cdisability benefit\u201d is used to cover any type of allowance that arises from a disability) and discontinued some of those provided for under the 1992 Act, including the waiting period allowance. Sections 397 and 446 of the 1999 Act stipulated that a right to a disability allowance applied as from 1 January 2003 (see paragraph 25 below). The regional ZPIZ noted in its decision that the applicant had not been insured under the compulsory insurance scheme at the onset of his disability, but had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 within thirty days of the final decision on his disability, as required by section 97 of the 1999 Act. It was established that his capacity to work had in fact further reduced, even though the category (III) of his disability remained unchanged. The regional ZPIZ found that, pursuant to section 94(1)(1) and (3)(1) of the 1999 Act, he should receive a benefit in the form of disability allowance, which in his case amounted to EUR 192.91. It drew the applicant\u2019s attention to section 185 of the 1999 Act, which required beneficiaries to inform the ZPIZ of any change in circumstances which could affect their rights under that Act (see paragraph 26 below). 11.  On 21 July 2011 the applicant appealed against the above decision, arguing that in determining the amount of his disability benefit, the regional ZPIZ should have respected the principle of acquired rights. He pointed out that his benefit had reduced considerably, even though his disability had in fact worsened, and claimed that such a decision was unlawful. 12.  On 21 October 2011 the central Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter \u201cthe central ZPIZ\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, confirming that the regional ZPIZ had properly applied the law and correctly calculated the amount of his disability allowance. 13.  On 5 December 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the Celje Labour and Social Court challenging the above decisions. He reiterated that the disability allowance granted to him under the 1999 Act violated his acquired rights and that instead of increasing his benefit it reduced it by half, which was unlawful and unconstitutional. 14.  On 26 March 2012 the Celje Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It explained that while recipients of disability-related rights under the 1992 Act retained their acquired rights after the date set out in section 446 of the 1999 Act, in the applicant\u2019s case a reassessment of his disability had been carried out on 2 February 2011 due to a worsening of his condition (see paragraph 10 above), which had resulted in further workplace limitations and his rights being consequently determined anew. In cases where a fresh assessment was made the 1999 Act was to be applied. The court concluded that the 1999 Act did not contain the right to a waiting period allowance. Instead, under section 94, it provided for the disability allowance (see paragraph 25 below) which had been correctly granted to the applicant. 15.  On 25 April 2012 the applicant appealed against the judgment, repeating the complaints he had made before the first-instance court and alleging that he ought to have been informed of the consequences of a request for a reassessment of his disability. If that had been the case, he would have \u201cforbidden\u201d his doctor from making such a request. Lastly, he reiterated that the decision of the regional ZPIZ of 28 June 2011 (see paragraph 10 above) was unlawful and unconstitutional, as it violated his right to social security; he pointed out that he was unable to survive on the newly determined disability allowance. 16.  On 21 June 2012 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, confirming the position of the lower court that the applicant\u2019s case concerned a change in the level of disability, which had required a fresh determination of his disability benefit. In such a situation, section 397(3) of the 1999 Act provided that the applicant acquired rights under the Act. Also, since the applicant\u2019s rights had been determined anew, the Higher Labour and Social Court concluded that there had been no violation of his acquired rights related to social security, and thus no violation of the Constitution. 17.  On 4 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, arguing that he could not have legitimately expected that the worsening of his disability would result in a severe reduction of his disability benefit. In that connection, he alleged that the Higher Labour and Social Court\u2019s view that the reduction did not interfere with his acquired rights or constitute a violation of his constitutional right to social security was arbitrary, as the court had provided no reasoning for that conclusion. The applicant further alleged that the newly determined amount of disability benefit interfered with his constitutional right to property. 18.  On 5 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, finding that the Higher Labour and Social Court had sufficiently explained that the change in his level of disability had required a fresh determination of his benefit in accordance with the 1999 Act. 19.  On 21 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights to property and social security. He argued that the reduction in the disability benefit had put his subsistence at risk and failed the test of proportionality. 20.  On 18 November 2013 the Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant\u2019s complaint for consideration on the merits, referring to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 27 below). 21.  In the meantime, on 22 May 2013, the applicant fulfilled the conditions for a retirement pension in the amount of EUR 374.73 and his disability allowance was discontinued from that date. He thus received the disability allowance for a period of twenty-seven months. 22.  Data concerning the applicant\u2019s income provided by the Slovenian tax authorities shows that he received EUR 4,908 in 2010 in pension and disability insurance and, after the impugned change in his allowance, EUR 2,902 in 2011 and EUR 2,480 in 2012.", "references": ["6", "4", "5", "1", "3", "8", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. He is of Roma origin. 7.  On 12 August 2010 at about 1.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department after he and his accomplices had been apprehended while driving a car containing goods apparently stolen from a nearby summer house. 8.  The applicant submitted that shortly afterwards, for about twenty minutes, he had been ill-treated by two police officers; at about 4.30 a.m. the two officers had returned and had continued hitting and kicking him for another thirty minutes or so. Some two hours later the two officers had escorted the applicant to another room for questioning, but had then continued beating him, together with several other officers. In the applicant\u2019s account of the events, altogether six officers and two security guards took part in the ill-treatment, with the apparent intention of extracting his confession to further offences. He stated that he had been hit in the face, forced to his knees and kicked repeatedly; a paper bag had been pulled over his head and the soles of his feet had been hit many times with a piece of wood. The officers had insisted that he admit to at least three counts of theft in order for them to stop hitting him, and they had repeatedly insulted him, making references to his Roma origin. One of them had said that they would not mind if he died \u2013 there would just be one Gypsy less. 9.  The applicant eventually signed the record of the questioning, which stated that the questioning had taken place between 5.51 a.m. and 6.33 a.m. 10.  Later that morning, at about 6 a.m., the applicant was allegedly escorted to the toilet, where he said the officers had again started hitting and kicking him. One of them had removed a towel-holder from the wall and hit the applicant\u2019s hand with it. Again, references were allegedly made to the applicant being a Roma. 11.  The applicant was released at about 2 p.m. 12.  Later that day, at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother, the general practitioner of the neighbouring village, Dr C.S., came to the applicant\u2019s house and examined him. Since she had apparently been told only about chest complaints, she did not examine the applicant\u2019s legs or feet. She did not identify any marks indicating external injury on the applicant but found that his ribs were sore and suggested that he go to hospital if he wished to obtain a medical certificate recording his injuries. Dr C.S. herself did not produce a medical report on the premises. 13.  On the same evening the applicant went to the emergency room of Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s. At 7.34 p.m. he was issued with a medical certificate, for which he paid the fee due, stating that he had bruises on the forehead, the nose and the left shoulder and an abrasion on the right hip; both his hands and arms were swollen and hyperaemic; and the rear surface of both thighs, as well as the soles of his feet, were swollen, red and sore. According to the certificate, the applicant had numerous contusions that had been inflicted by other persons. 14.  Still on the same evening, at 8.38 p.m., X-rays were taken of the applicant at Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Hatvan, a town at a distance of 32 kilometres, where the applicant was driven by his family members. He was diagnosed with a \u201cchest contusion\u201d, a \u201cskull contusion\u201d and \u201cbodily injury inflicted by human force\u201d. 15.  The applicant stated that he had been unhurt at the time that he had been taken to the police department. He added that between his release and the medical inspection, he had been continuously accompanied by his relatives, who testified in the ensuing proceedings that he had not suffered any injuries outside the police department. 16.  On 27 September 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been brutalised by police officers. The applicant alleged that during the ill-treatment the officers had made repeated references to his Roma origin. The case was being investigated by the Miskolc Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 17.  On 8 November 2010 the applicant was heard as a witness and shown, for the purposes of his identifying his alleged assailants, the photos of police officers serving at the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department. The applicant acknowledged from the outset that he would be able to identify with certainty only three of the several perpetrators. Nevertheless, he finally identified eight persons as the perpetrators \u2013 six police officers (T.B., M.Z., Gy.K., K.V., F.I. and H.A.) and two security guards employed by the police department (P.G. and Z.A.). Subsequently, the applicant became uncertain about the involvement of K.V. and H.A. 18.  The prosecutor\u2019s office appointed a forensic expert. This expert had at his disposal the medical reports issued by Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l and Albert Schweitzer Hospitals. In his opinion given in retrospect, he made the following statement as to the time when the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained:\n\u201cThe exact time of the infliction of the injuries cannot be established. Given that the doctor examining the applicant did not document any lesions characteristically pointing to an inveterate injury, it can only be said that the injuries had been sustained within a 24-48-hour-time-frame preceding the medical care. Since, according to the police report on the application of coercive measures, the local police constable handed the applicant over to the officer on duty without any complaints or injuries, the injuries were likely to have occurred after this point in time.\u201d\n\u201cA s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek pontos keletkez\u00e9si ideje nem hat\u00e1rozhat\u00f3 meg. Tekintettel arra, hogy a vizsg\u00e1l\u00f3 orvos id\u0151s\u00fcl\u0151ben l\u00e9v\u0151 s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sre jellegzetes elv\u00e1ltoz\u00e1sokat nem dokument\u00e1lt, az val\u00f3sz\u00edn\u0171s\u00edthet\u0151, hogy a s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek az orvosi ell\u00e1t\u00e1st megel\u0151z\u0151 24-48 \u00f3r\u00e1s id\u0151tartamon bel\u00fcl alakultak ki. Mivel a k\u00e9nyszer\u00edt\u0151 eszk\u00f6z alkalmaz\u00e1s\u00e1ra \u00edrt rend\u0151ri jelent\u00e9s adatai szerint a k\u00f6rzeti megb\u00edzott panasz \u00e9s s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9smentesen adta \u00e1t nevezettet az \u00fcgyeletes tisztnek, a s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek val\u00f3sz\u00edn\u0171s\u00edthet\u0151en ezen id\u0151pontot k\u00f6vet\u0151en keletkeztek.\u201d 19.  On 28 December 2010 the Miskolc Investigating Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the investigation, holding in essence that the applicant\u2019s version of events was not plausible. The prosecutor emphasised the fact that since the applicant had been apprehended just after he had committed the crime in question (and still in possession of the proceeds of that crime), coercive interrogation by police officers with the intention of extracting his confession to the offence in question seemed pointless and thus hardly plausible. Relying on the internal records of the police department recording the shifts of the officers, the prosecutor was satisfied that three of the alleged perpetrators, Gy.K., F.I. and H.A., had alibis for the time of the incident, in that early in the morning of that day, they had been assigned to patrol service. Therefore, they could not possibly have been present at the applicant\u2019s questioning. Furthermore, the two security guards (P.G. and Z.A.) were not allowed to leave their station and thus could not have been present at the incident. The prosecutor also observed that a general practitioner had examined the applicant between his release from the police department and the first hospital inspection, but had recorded no injuries. The prosecutor also found it material that the applicant had been uncertain of the identities of the alleged perpetrators when shown photos of the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s police officers; that he had contradicted himself on several occasions; and that he had complained about the alleged incident only on 27 September 2010, not before. 20.  On 16 January 2012 the Borsod-Aba\u00faj-Zempl\u00e9n County Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the discontinuation order. The prosecutor was satisfied that the investigation had been adequate and comprehensive, and that the obtaining of further evidence \u2013 in particular, by questioning the applicant\u2019s brother and friend, who were present at his release \u2013 was superfluous. The applicant\u2019s allegations about racist motives behind the ill-treatment were not addressed.\nThis decision was served on the applicant on 23 January 2012. 21.  On 21 March 2012 the applicant brought a substitute private prosecution against the eight presumed perpetrators \u2013 that is to say, six police officers and two security guards \u2013 on charges of coercive interrogation. The motion included assertions about racial insults being uttered during the incident. 22.  The Eger High Court held a hearing on 26 September 2012. At that hearing the applicant stated that he did not recognise the defendants P.G. and Z.A. and that he was not certain if K.V. had beaten him, so he dropped the charges against them. Accordingly, the court terminated the proceedings against these three defendants. 23.  The remaining defendants either denied the charges or refused to make any statements. The High Court heard Dr C.S., who confirmed that she had not seen any marks of external injury on the applicant\u2019s body when examining him on the day of the incident. A court-appointed medical expert stated that if the applicant had had the injuries in question when examined by Dr C.S. then the latter must have noticed them. The court also obtained testimony from the applicant\u2019s mother and brother and a friend (the two latter had not been heard during the investigation), who had been waiting for him in front of the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department on his release. They all stated that the applicant had already had those injuries at the moment of his release. 24.  The High Court was satisfied that Gy.K., F.I. and H.A. had alibis for the time of the incident. As to the charges against the two other officers, T.B. and M.Z., the court highlighted that even though the applicant said that he had been ill-treated in order to force him to admit to at least three counts of theft \u2013 which he finally did \u2013 there was actually no reference in the record of the questioning to any further counts of theft. The court also emphasised that, contrary to the statements of the applicant, the two officers could not have been continuously present in the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department because between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. they had been carrying out some onsite inspections in another town, Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. 25.  On 28 November 2012 the Eger High Court acquitted the officers for want of sufficient evidence. According to the reasoning of the judgment, the court relied on documentary evidence relating to the applicant\u2019s apprehension and questioning, documents relating to the service particulars of the officers involved, the testimony of the applicant, medical documentation, and the testimony of the officers. 26.  The applicant did not appeal. 27.  As a consequence of the applicant lodging, but subsequently withdrawing, a criminal complaint against K.V., criminal proceedings on charges of false accusation were conducted against the applicant. On 7 November 2013 the Eger District Court found him guilty as charged and placed him on three-year probation. The judgment was upheld in essence by the Eger High Court on 10 June 2014; however, the applicant\u2019s sentence was altered to 180 days of community work.", "references": ["6", "3", "9", "5", "2", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Co. Roscommon. 5.  In November 1999 the applicant purchased a newly-built house, which has been her dwelling place since then. The sale took the form of two agreements. The first was an agreement to purchase the land from the owners, Mr and Mrs F, for the sum of 5,000 Irish pounds (IEP) (approximately 6,350 euros). The second was a building agreement under which she paid IEP 80,000 (approximately 101,600 euros) to a building company called T and C Developments Ltd. The company was owned by Mr and Mrs F, who were the only shareholders. The house was covered by a guarantee provided by a company known as Homebond. 6.  From the time she moved into the house in March 2000, the applicant noted major structural defects in the property. She reported this to Homebond in September 2001. The company carried out an inspection of the house and, in September 2002, offered to make certain repairs to it in accordance with the terms of the guarantee. According to the applicant, Homebond refused to issue an Engineer\u2019s certificate/guarantee upon the completion of the works, which would have been required if the applicant were to sell the house afterwards. 7.  In February 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the High Court against the parties mentioned above, i.e. Mr and Mrs F (first and second defendants), T and C Developments (third defendant), and Homebond (fourth defendant). A fifth defendant was included in the action, a Mr Q, who, as an engineer, had certified that the house was in compliance with the relevant building regulations. In March 2003, Mr Q\u2019s company was named as the sixth defendant. The applicant filed her statement of claim in May 2003. 8.  Over the following months, she wrote several times to the solicitors for the first three defendants requesting that they deliver their defence, on each occasion offering some additional time for this purpose. By December 2003 these defendants had not yet delivered their defence, at which point the applicant applied to the High Court for a judgment in default of defence against them. 9.  The statement of claim was not served on the fourth defendant until December 2003, an oversight that the applicant attributed to her solicitors. The fourth defendant entered its defence to the plaintiff\u2019s claims in May 2004. 10.  In January 2004 the High Court ordered the first three defendants to deliver their defence within three weeks. In March 2004, the applicant agreed to allow an additional 21 days for them to file their defence. 11.  In July 2004 the applicant again applied to the High Court for a default judgment against the first three defendants, in light of their failure to enter their defence to the action. The defence was filed in September 2004. While it was presented as the defence of the first and second defendants, it was clarified at a later stage in the proceedings (in mid-2009), that it also concerned the third defendant. 12.  On 20 December 2004, at the request of the applicant, the High Court gave a default judgment against the fifth and sixth defendants (Mr Q and his company), holding them liable to the applicant in damages and for costs. According to the judgment, these sums were to be assessed at a future date. The judgment was never enforced. The applicant explained that she received legal advice to the effect that the practice was to hold over such judgments until the case had been heard and damages assessed. She added that at a later stage in the proceedings (2009/2010) she received legal advice that the default judgment had by then expired. 13.  According to the applicant, in the years 2005-2008 her solicitors considered it more effective to engage principally with the fourth defendant, Homebond, in light of the guarantee on the house. Homebond made a proposal to the applicant in June 2006 to carry out remedial work on the house. Her solicitor sought clarification of the proposal, writing several times between December 2006 and February 2008 when Homebond replied. The applicant indicated her readiness to accept the proposal. However, when subsequently requested to assign her rights to Homebond she sought clarification of the matter from the company, writing in April 2008 and again in April 2009. 14.  On 20 April 2009 the High court granted a motion brought by the applicant\u2019s solicitor to cease to represent her. From that point onwards, she acted as a lay litigant. 15.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant gave notice of intention to proceed with her case to all of the defendants, a necessary step under domestic law where proceedings have been dormant for more than one year (Order 122 r. 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts). 16.  On 20 July 2009 the High Court struck out the applicant\u2019s motion for a judgment in default of defence. The applicant sought to appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court, requesting additional time for this purpose in September 2009, which the Supreme Court refused to allow on 16 October 2009. 17.  On 13 October 2010 the applicant again gave notice of her intention to proceed. The following month, she was informed by solicitors for Homebond that the offer made in 2002 was still valid. 18.  On 12 September 2011 the applicant once more issued notice of her intention to proceed. In November 2011 she sought a trial date and was informed that a hearing would take place in March 2012, later moved to April 2012. At that point it was suggested by a High Court judge that the parties could attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation. The applicant explored this option but did not pursue it when it became clear, by June 2012, that some of the defendants were not interested. By this stage she had been informed that the sixth defendant had gone into voluntary liquidation. In July 2012 the applicant was informed that the case would be heard in early 2013. 19.  The case was not heard as a single action. Only the fourth and fifth defendants appeared (the latter only briefly) at the hearing that commenced on 29 January 2013. The first three defendants, although given notice of the hearing, were not represented at it. The High Court\u2019s ruling, given on 20 March 2013, therefore only considered the claims against Homebond and Mr Q. The judge ruled that Homebond was liable to the applicant under the terms of the guarantee. Although the guarantee set an upper limit of IEP 30,000 (approximately 38,100 euros), the judge considered that in the circumstances of the case it was justified to award the full amount of the estimate for repairs, approximately 51,000 euros. The judge dismissed the case against Mr Q, and observed that the real fault lay with the builder. 20.  On 10 April 2013 the High Court issued an order against the fourth defendant for the amount awarded to the applicant. 21.  On 15 May 2013 the same judge dealt with the case against the first three defendants. She held them jointly and severally liable to the applicant in damages for 94,082 euros. 22.  Homebond sought to appeal the judgment and order against it. For this it was required to serve the notice of appeal personally on the applicant within twenty-one days. According to the elements in the case-file, the company\u2019s solicitors tried unsuccessfully to arrange service on the applicant. They subsequently applied to the Supreme Court for additional time to appeal, which was granted on 14 June 2013. 23.  The applicant brought a cross appeal, claiming that the High Court had wrongly failed to award her legal costs. 24.  In October 2014 the applicant sought to have the appeal struck out for lack of prosecution by Homebond. This was not granted. Instead, ruling on 10 October 2014 the Supreme Court granted her two weeks to make her submissions on the question of costs. The applicant filed her submissions the following week. 25.  On 28 October 2014 many pending appeals were transferred from the Supreme Court to the new Court of Appeal, including the Homebond appeal. 26.  In November 2014, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to file their respective submissions within two weeks, granting a short extension of this deadline the following month. On 19 December 2014 it set a hearing date of 23 February 2015. On the latter date it allowed Homebond\u2019s appeal and dismissed the applicant\u2019s cross appeal. 27.  On 10 June 2013 the first and second defendants filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the High Court. 28.  On 8 July 2013 the High Court made a garnishee order attaching monies owed by a commercial bank to the first and second defendants in the amount of the damages awarded to the applicant. 29.  On 26 July 2013 the Supreme Court granted to the defendants a stay on the award of damages, on condition that they pay into court the sum of 45,000 euros within a period of three months, failing which the stay would lapse. The payment was not made. An application by the defendants to put forward property deeds in lieu of money was refused by the Supreme Court on 22 November 2013. 30.  The applicant obtained a judgment mortgage against the defendants on 29 October 2013. 31.  On 24 January 2014 the Supreme Court again refused an application from the defendants to stay the judgment of the High Court. It also refused to lift the garnishee order and to vacate the judgment mortgage obtained by the applicant. 32.  On 11 July 2014 the Supreme Court refused an application from the applicant to strike the appeal out for lack of prosecution. It directed the defendants to file their books of appeal within ten weeks, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. 33.  The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal, which indicated on 19 November 2014 that it would first consider the issue of the liability of the first and second defendants, and set a short deadline for the parties\u2019 submissions on this. 34.  The hearing took place on 9 March 2015. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court, holding that as a matter of law Mr and Mrs F were not liable to the applicant for the defects in the house since they had simply sold her the land and were not themselves party to the building agreement. There could only be a remedy against the third defendant, T and C Developments Ltd., with whom the applicant had concluded the agreement in 1999. 35.  The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. On 29 July 2015 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave.", "references": ["4", "7", "1", "9", "2", "5", "0", "6", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5.  On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (\u201cthe Administration\u201d), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.\u2019s eviction from the flat. 6.  On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute. 7.  On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties. 8.  On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration. 9.  On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.\u2019s property rights. 10.  On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value. 11.  On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed. 12.  In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non\u2011pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999. 13.  On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat\u2019s market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded. 14.  On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force. 15.  On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant\u2019s request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings. 16.  On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration\u2019s request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor. 17.  On 15 November 2004 the applicant\u2019s appeal against the above decision was dismissed. 18.  On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant. 19.  On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant\u2019s extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant. 20.  It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed. 21.  On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.\u2019s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims. 22.  On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims. 23.  On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant\u2019s request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.\u2019s poor state of health. 24.  On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court\u2019s impartiality. 25.  On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. 26.  On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law. 27.  On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.\u2019s return from vacation. 28.  On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007. 29.  On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant. 30.  It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information. 31.  On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him. 32.  By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court\u2019s findings on appeal. 33.  In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003. 34.  On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "8", "2", "6", "4", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicants were born in 1949 and 1923 respectively and lived in Bucharest, where the first applicant still lives. 9.  The applicants were co-owners of two adjacent plots of land in Montenegro. 10.  On 13 June 2009, during a visit to the plots, the first applicant noticed a metal fence built partly on their property. The fence divided the two plots of land and made it impossible for them to access one plot from the other. It appears that the fence had been erected some time in February 2009. 11.  On 15 July 2009 the applicants, who had legal representation, instituted civil proceedings for trespass (radi smetanja posjeda) against B.\u0106., their neighbour. 12.  On 27 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicants and ordered B.\u0106. to remove the fence and pay the applicants 1,435 euros (EUR) in respect of legal costs. The court was satisfied that the applicants had lodged their claim in time, given that the deadline for initiating proceedings was 30 days from the day on which they had noticed the trespass, taking into account that 13 and 14 July were national holidays. In doing so the court relied on section 77 of Property Act (see paragraph 14 below). 13.  On 20 December 2011 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica, ruling on an appeal lodged by B.\u0106., quashed the previous judgment and rejected the applicants\u2019 claim (tu\u017eba se odbacuje) as submitted out of time. The court held that 13 and 14 July were indeed national holidays when the courts did not sit. It considered, however, that the 30-day period within which the applicants could institute proceedings was mandatory \u201c[in which case] there could be no shifting of the time-limit when its last day fell on a day when the courts [did] not sit\u201d. The time-limit had therefore expired on 13 July 2009, and the applicants had not filed their claim until 15 July 2009.", "references": ["8", "9", "2", "6", "5", "4", "0", "7", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Omsk. 6.  The applicant was deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences. 7.  On 22 August 2002 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised for 180 days the interception and recording of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations, interception of postal communications and the collection of data from technical channels of communication. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n\u201cOperational-search measures carried out with the aim of combatting corruption within State authorities have revealed indications of a systematic bribery scheme operated by certain prison officials in the Omsk region.\nAccording to operative information, there are good reasons to suspect [the applicant], deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences, of arranging for, and systematically receiving, unlawful payments from confidants of the convicts serving their sentences in Omsk penal institutions in exchange for granting them various privileges (such as a prison leave, improved conditions of detention or transfer to another penal institution within the Omsk region, which was for some reason preferred by the convict in question).\nGiven that [the applicant\u2019s] actions contain elements of criminal offences under Article 290 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking], classified as a serious offence, and under Article 285 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code [abuse of power], it is necessary to perform a combination of operational-search measures (interception and recording of telephone conversations, monitoring of correspondence and collection of data from technical channels of communication) in order to collect evidence of his criminal activities, and to receive information about the bribe\u2011givers and the payment mechanisms used.\u201d 8.  On 18 February 2003 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised \u201caudio surveillance\u201d of the applicant\u2019s office for 180 days. The Government did not submit a copy of that decision. 9.  Charges of bribe-taking or abuse of power have never been brought against the applicant. 10.  In March 2003 the applicant was charged with disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, for informing a convict\u2019s relative that the convict was under covert surveillance. 11.  When studying the criminal case file, the applicant learnt for the first time that his telephone conversations had been recorded and his other communications monitored. He also learnt that a recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L., a sister of a convict detained in a penal institution under his supervision, formed the basis for the charge of disclosure of State secrets. During the conversation, which had taken place on 17 October 2002, the applicant had warned Ms L. that her relative was under covert surveillance and that there were listening devices hidden in his cell. 12.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence as it had been obtained unlawfully. 13.  On 16 February 2005 the Omsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. It relied on the recording of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversation with Ms L., among other evidence. It found that the recording was admissible as evidence as it had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In particular, the interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations had been authorised by a court on the grounds that he was suspected of the serious criminal offence of bribe\u2011taking. The applicant was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. 14.  In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, of a violation of his right to respect for his private life. He argued that the interception of his communications had been unlawful and unjustified, and that the recording of his conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence. 15.  On 21 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It noted that all the evidence had been collected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was admissible.", "references": ["2", "5", "8", "6", "7", "1", "9", "0", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6.  Between 21 and 27 December 1989 many people including the applicants and/or their close relatives involved in this case took part in the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timi\u0219oara, Bra\u0219ov, Re\u0219i\u021ba and Craiova which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations. 7.  In 1990 following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened investigations into the armed crackdown on the demonstrations. The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest and other cities has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 8.  In a number of cases concerning events in Bucharest and Craiova, the prosecutor decided not to initiate a criminal investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. Those decisions were taken between 1990 and 2007. It results from the documents submitted by the parties that, after the adoption of those decisions, the prosecutor continued to examine the circumstances of these cases in the main criminal investigation \u2013 object of file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9.  To date, the main criminal investigation appears to be still ongoing. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41) and Alecu and Others v. Romania, nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, \u00a7\u00a7 7-13, 27 January 2015. Subsequent developments are as follows. 10.  Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor\u2019s office. 11.  On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor\u2019s office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants\u2019 complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences and that some of them were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision (see Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania, nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, \u00a7 15, 12 April 2016). However, from the information available on the prosecutor\u2019s office website, the investigation is still ongoing and must have therefore been reopened.", "references": ["9", "1", "4", "2", "7", "3", "5", "6", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in K\u00f3pavogur. At the material time he was a well-known person in Iceland who for years had published articles, blogs and books and appeared in films, on television and other media, under pseudonyms. 6.  In November 2011, an 18-year-old woman reported to the police that the applicant and his girlfriend had raped her. In January 2012 another woman reported to the police that the applicant had committed a sexual offence against her a few years earlier. Upon the completion of the police investigation the Public Prosecutor, on 15 June and 15 November 2012, dismissed the cases in accordance with Article 145 of the Act on Criminal Procedures, because the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction. The applicant submitted a complaint to the police about allegedly false accusations made against him by the two women. This case was also dismissed. 7.  On 22 November 2012 Monitor, a magazine accompanying Morgunbla\u00f0i\u00f0 (a leading newspaper in Iceland), published an interview with the applicant. A picture of the applicant was published on the front page and in the interview the applicant discussed the rape accusation against him. The applicant claimed several times that the accusations were false. He stated, inter alia, that it was not a priority for him for the girl\u2019s name to be exposed and that he was not seeking revenge against her. He accepted that having placed himself in the spotlight of the media he had to tolerate publicity which was not always \u201csunshine and lollipops\u201d but criticised the way the media had covered his case. When asked about the girl\u2019s age, he responded that the girl had been in a club where the minimum age had been 20 years and that it had been a shock to find out later that she had been only 18 years old. When asked about his complaints against the girl for allegedly wrongful accusations, he stated again that he was not seeking revenge against those who had reported him to the police, but that it was clear that they had had ulterior motives. He hoped that the police would see that it was important to have a formal conclusion in the case and that the documents in the case were \u201cscreaming\u201d conspiracy. 8.  On the same day, X published an altered version of the applicant\u2019s front-page picture with the caption \u201cFuck you rapist bastard\u201d on his account on Instagram, an online picture-sharing application. X had altered the picture by drawing an upside down cross on the applicant\u2019s forehead and writing \u201closer\u201d across his face. 9.  Apparently X had believed that only his friends and acquaintances, who were his \u201cfollowers\u201d on Instagram, had access to the pictures he published. However, his pictures were also accessible to other Instagram users. 10.  On 23 November 2012 the newspaper V\u00edsir published an online article about X\u2019s post, along with the altered picture and an interview with the applicant. 11.  On 26 November 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to X requesting that he withdraw his statement, apologise in the media and pay the applicant punitive damages. By email the same day, X\u2019s lawyer submitted that X had not distributed the picture online; it had been posted for a closed group of friends on Instagram and others had distributed it. Furthermore, the email stated that X was sorry and that the picture had been shared without his consent or knowledge. 12.  On 17 December 2012, the applicant lodged defamation proceedings against X before the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk and asked for him to be sentenced to punishment, under the applicable provisions of the Penal Code, for altering the picture and for publishing it on Instagram with the caption \u201cFuck you rapist bastard\u201d. The applicant further requested that the statement \u201cFuck you rapist bastard\u201d be declared null and void and that X be ordered to pay him 1,000,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately 8,800 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, ISK 150,000 (approximately 1,300 EUR) for publishing the judgment in the media under Article 241 of the Penal Code, and the applicant\u2019s legal costs. 13.  By judgment of 1 November 2013, the District Court found against the applicant. The court stated, inter alia, that the applicant enjoyed the personal protection afforded by law, irrespective of which of his pseudonyms he was using. In the same way, the applicant had to take responsibility for material he issued, irrespective of the name he chose to use when doing so. The court further considered that the altered picture, along with the text, should be considered as a whole and that it contained X\u2019s opinion of the applicant\u2019s person, which indicated a strong dislike. As to the subject matter, the District Court found that the picture and the statement had been a part of general public debate because the applicant was a well-known person in Iceland and had to accept being the subject of public discussions. The court then described in detail his professional activities of writing online, publishing books and appearing on television, especially under pseudonyms, the subject matter of his work, the subsequent criticism of his work and his participation in public debates about it. The court noted that this had led to greater outcry and public debate about the accusations against him of sexual offences, a debate in which he had participated. The court concluded that the manner in which the words had been presented by X had been more invective than a factual statement, and should therefore be considered as a value judgment rather than a statement of fact. X\u2019s statement had been within the bounds of freedom of expression granted to him by law. 14.  On 26 March 2014 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court\u2019s judgment. Before the Supreme Court the applicant reiterated his argument that X\u2019s Instagram account had been an \u201copen\u201d account, meaning that the picture had been accessible not only to his followers but to all Instagram users, over 100,000,000 people at the material time. He submitted further documents to support his argument. 15.  By judgment of 20 November 2014 the majority of the Supreme Court (two out of three judges) upheld the District Court\u2019s conclusion. The Supreme Court accepted that the altered picture had been accessible, not only to X\u2019s followers on Instagram, but to other users as well. 16.  Furthermore, the judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201c[X] claims that his act of uploading the altered picture onto the picture-sharing application in question did not constitute the publication of the picture within the meaning of Article 236(2) of the Penal Code No 19/1940, as he had believed that only a limited number of people would have access to it. This cannot be accepted, as the act of making something accessible in electronic format to such a large number of people as stated above, irrespective of whether the persons in question are the friends and acquaintances of the person doing so, [...], is considered to be a publication according to the traditional definition of the term. It remains to be determined whether [X\u2019s] publication of the picture had, given the circumstances, constituted a defamatory allegation against the [applicant] under Article 235 of the Penal Code.\nThe appealed judgment describes in detail that, before the complaints of sexual offences against him as described above had been reported, [the applicant] had been a well-known person, not least for his performance in public under the names of Gillz or Gillzenegger, the names under which he wrote on Internet, published books and pictures and presented himself in the media. The views of the [applicant] published there garnered some attention, as well as controversy; views which included his attitudes towards women and their sexual freedom. The documents of the case reveal that there were instances when his criticism had been directed towards named individuals, often women, and in some cases his words could be construed to mean that he was in fact recommending that they should be subjected to sexual violence. The [applicant] has often justified such conduct by stating that the material had been meant in jest and that those who criticised it lacked a sense of humour. The Supreme Court agrees with the District Court that the [applicant] enjoys the personal protection provided for by law, under Article 71 of the Constitution and Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights, cf. Act No 62/1994, irrespective of whether he was appearing under his own name or a pseudonym. In the same manner, he must take responsibility for the material he produces, irrespective of what name he chooses to use.\nWhen the [applicant] gave the aforementioned newspaper interview and employed provocative, if not derogatory, comments about others, including the girl who had accused him of sexual offences, he launched a public debate and should, moreover, have known that his comments would result in strong reactions from those who strongly disliked his abovementioned views. [X] enjoys freedom of expression according to Article 73(2) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the District Court reached the correct conclusion that under these circumstances he had enjoyed greater freedom to express himself about the [applicant] and his opinions.\nIn assessing whether or not comments or other expressions can be considered a defamatory allegation according to Article 235 of the General Penal Code, taking into consideration the manner in which the provision of Article 10 of the [Convention] has been clarified by the European Court of Human Rights, it has to be decided whether the expression involved a value judgment or a factual statement. Although it can be agreed that by using the term \u2018rapist\u2019 about a named person, that person is being accused of committing rape, account must be taken of the context in which the term is set, cf. the ruling of the Supreme Court on 29 January 2009 in Case No 321/2008. If the altered picture and the comment \u2018Fuck you rapist bastard\u2019 are taken as a whole \u2013 as the parties agree should be the case \u2013 the Supreme Court agrees with the District Court that this was a case of invective on the part of [X] against the [applicant] in a ruthless public debate, which the latter, as stated previously, had instigated. It was therefore a value judgment about the [applicant] and not a factual statement that he was guilty of committing rape. In this context, it makes a difference, even though this alone is not decisive for the conclusion, that [X] did not maintain that the [applicant] had thus committed a criminal offence against someone else, named or unnamed. Accordingly, and with reference to the conclusion of the appealed judgment, the conclusion that [X] expressed himself within the limits of the freedom to which he is entitled under Article 73(2) of the Constitution, must be upheld. As a result he is acquitted of all the [applicant\u2019s] claims.\nAs is rightly stated in the appealed ruling, the modified picture and the comments of [X] attached thereto were indecent and tasteless with respect to the [applicant]. For this reason, and with reference to Article 130(3), cf. Article 166 of Act No 91/1991 on Civil Procedure, legal costs before both court instances will be cancelled.\u201d 17.  In the minority\u2019s opinion, the statement \u201cFuck you rapist bastard\u201d, considered in the light of the content of the article published by Monitor, could not be considered a value judgment but rather a grave insinuation that the applicant had committed a serious criminal offence. The minority concluded that, considering that the criminal investigation had ended with the case against the applicant being dismissed, and even if the applicant was a public person who had expressed himself in a controversial way in public, he should not have to tolerate this kind of comment.", "references": ["8", "5", "2", "9", "7", "0", "3", "1", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5.  Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6.  On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,800,000 for non\u2011pecuniary damage. 7.  No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final. Some judgments in respect of several applicants remained unenforced (see \u201cEnforcement status\u201d in the Appendix). 8.  On different dates in 2012 and 2013 the domestic courts granted the defendant authority\u2019s request to extend the time-limit for appeal essentially on the ground that the defendant authority had not been served with the impugned judgments. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants\u2019 favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law. The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments. 9.  The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application. 10.  Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants\u2019 obligation to reimburse the sums paid.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "1", "4", "8", "5", "2", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Belgrade. 6.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. He suffered severe serious injuries. An investigation into this incident was initiated in November 2004 and terminated in May 2005, with no criminal charges being brought. 7.  On 10 June 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim for non-pecuniary damages with the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade against the Belgrade City\u2019s Transportation Company (Gradsko saobra\u010bajno preduze\u010be Beograd). 8.  On 27 December 2007 the Second Municipal Court ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour. On 3 July 2008 the District Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 9.  On 23 October 2009 the Second Municipal Court adopted a partial decision (delimi\u010dnu presudu) against which the applicant and the defendant appealed on 7 December 2009 and 10 December 2009, respectively. 10.  On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeals in Belgrade quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for a re-trial. 11.  In the meantime, on 22 December 2009, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining under Article 32 of the Constitution (a provision which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention) about the overall fairness of domestic proceedings and their length. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was rendered on 4 November 2010. No violation in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints was found. 12.  Due to applicant\u2019s change to the value of the dispute (vrednost spora), on 31 October 2010 the Court of First Instance ruled that it had no further jurisdiction to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint. The case was then sent to the High Court in Belgrade. 13.  On 20 June 2013 the High Court adopted a partial judgment against which the applicant and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals in Belgrade. 14.  On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeals partly quashed the impugned judgment. 15.  It would appear that the case is still pending before the High Court. 16.  Additionally, on 28 October 2014 the applicant lodged a new submission with the Constitutionals Court concerning, inter alia, the length of the impugned proceedings. It would appear from the facts of the case that the Constitutional Court has not yet responded.", "references": ["2", "0", "8", "7", "1", "9", "5", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1957, 1961 and 1980 respectively and live in Svetlograd, Stavropol Region. The first and second applicants are husband and wife. The third applicant is their son. 5.  According to the first applicant, on 8 August 2003, at approximately 11.30 p.m., a police patrol car approached his car on a dark village road. A police officer, using a loudspeaker, ordered the first applicant to pull over. The first applicant replied that he would stop at the nearest road police post. The officer repeated his order, noting that he needed to borrow gasoline for the police car. The first applicant kept driving. Near Svetlograd the police officers blocked the road. When the first applicant stopped the car, one of the five policemen pulled him out of the car and hit him in the face. The police officers threw him against the hood of his car, kicked him in the shins and hit him with a butt of a machine gun. The first applicant fell down and fainted. After he regained consciousness and stood up, the police officers claimed that he was drunk and told him to take a breath test which showed that the first applicant was sober. The police officers checked his documents, searched his car and left. The first applicant got into his car and drove away in the same direction. Having driven approximately 500 metres, he saw that the police car had stopped and that the police officers had gathered around it. The first applicant approached the officers. The officer in charge identified himself as Ye. and apologised for the excessive force his subordinates had used towards the first applicant. 6.  The first applicant arrived home at approximately 2.30 a.m. on 9 August 2003. On the same day the first and third applicants filed a complaint about the incident with the local police station. 7.  At 9 a.m. on the same date the first applicant visited the second applicant who underwent a medical treatment in hospital. According to the second applicant, her husband told her about the altercation with the police. He also had visible bruising on his face. At 10.30 a.m. the first applicant underwent a medical examination at the same hospital. Having been diagnosed with multiple injuries, he was admitted for in-patient treatment. An extract from a medical record drawn up in the hospital indicated that the first applicant had injuries on the right cheek, the left shin and the lower back and the swelling of soft tissues. 8.  On 13 August 2003 the first applicant was admitted to the Stavropol Regional Hospital where he was diagnosed with \u201ca multisystem trauma; closed craniocerebral injury; a light brain contusion; an injury of the soft tissues of the right temporal region; a closed uncomplicated stable vertebra medullispinal injury, a compression fracture of the Th. VII vertebra; an intramuscular haematoma of the right side of the lumbar region; a neurologic form of the lumbar plexitis.\u201d Ten days later he was released from hospital on conditions of bed rest and subsequent supervision by a neurologist and orthopaedist. 9.  On 11 August 2003 investigator G. questioned the police officers who denied the first applicant\u2019s allegations. They claimed that they had ordered the first applicant to pull over because they had suspected that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The first applicant had refused to comply and had verbally insulted them demonstrating obscene hand gestures. After having searched the first applicant and his car, they had let him go. 10.  On the same date the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant. Having examined the first applicant, the forensic expert documented multiple injuries on the right cheek and the lumbar region, multiple bruises all over the body and swelling of the soft tissues. The expert considered that those injuries could have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects or from the fall. 11.  On 20 August 2003 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. It appears that his decision was quashed on a later date. 12.  On 9 September 2003 the first applicant underwent another forensic medical examination. The expert documented the first applicant\u2019s injuries considering that they might have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects. 13.  According to the first applicant, on 20 September 2003 an investigator of the district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. On 3 October 2003 the district prosecutor dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision. Ten days later, the Petrovskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision and authorised a new round of inquiry. 14.  On 28 October 2003 the police issued a report on the inquiry conducted in response to the first applicant\u2019s complaint. Having examined the forensic medical documents and the statements made by the police officers, the first applicant and the witnesses, the police investigator concluded that the first applicant might have sustained injuries as a result of the force used by the police officers in response to his unlawful actions. 15.  On 21 December 2003 investigator G. ordered a new forensic medical examination of the first applicant in order to reconcile inconsistencies in the experts\u2019 findings. 16.  It appears that the first applicant\u2019s complaint about the police brutality was dismissed by the authorities on another six occasions. Each time a superior prosecutor or a court quashed those decisions considering the investigator\u2019s findings incomplete and unsubstantiated and ordering further inquiry into the first applicant\u2019s allegations. 17.  On 22 July 2005 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the first applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by unidentified police officers. 18.  On 22 December 2005 the investigator V. stayed the criminal proceedings, holding that it was impossible to establish the alleged perpetrators who had assaulted the first applicant. 19.  On 2 February 2006 the first deputy of the regional prosecutor quashed decision of 22 December 2005 noting that the investigation had not been completed and reopened the proceedings. 20.  On 6 March 2006 the investigator concluded that there was no evidence showing that the first applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by the police officers and that he was unable to establish the real perpetrator. The first applicant appealed. 21.  On 3 April 2006 the district prosecutor partly accepted the first applicant\u2019s complaint and resumed the investigation. At the same time the prosecutor endorsed the investigator\u2019s reasoning that there was no evidence showing that the offence had been committed by the police officers. A week later the proceedings were again stayed because the perpetrator of the offence remained unknown. 22.  On 6 June 2006 investigator D. again discontinued the criminal investigation. The investigator established that, when searching the first applicant and his car, one of the police officers had punched him on the right cheek and hit him in the back twice with a blunt solid object. The investigator also accepted that, as of the morning of 9 August 2003, the first applicant had bruises on the right cheek, the back and the left shin. He further noted that the forensic medical experts had not ruled out a possibility that the first applicant might have sustained those injuries as a result of the altercation with the police, as alleged by him. The investigator dismissed the first applicant\u2019s allegations referring to his prior criminal record. He also noted that a number of the first applicant\u2019s neighbours had not confirmed that the latter had had any injuries on him on 9 August 2003. As regards the statements made to the contrary by the other neighbours, the investigator found them to be unsubstantiated. Lastly, the investigator took into account that all the police officers denied the first applicant\u2019s accusations. However, it was impossible for the investigator to establish the alleged perpetrator for lack of relevant evidence. 23.  It appears that the decision of 6 June 2006 was quashed and the case was re-opened. 24.  On 17 July 2006 investigator D. discontinued the criminal investigation reproducing verbatim his earlier decision of 6 June 2006. He also considered that the first applicant had willfully made false accusations against the police officers and should be held liable for his actions. The investigator forwarded the relevant material to the prosecutor\u2019s office. 25.  On 14 January 2011 the deputy head of the supervision unit of the Investigative committee considered the decision of 17 July 2006 unlawful and unsubstantiated, quashed it and remitted the matter for further investigation. He noted, inter alia, that the investigator had failed (1) to establish what each of the police officers had done once they had pulled over the first applicant\u2019s car; (2) to check whether any of the police officers had had a machine gun as claimed by the first applicant; and (3) to establish the reasons why the witnesses who had initially claimed that they had seen the police officers beating the first applicant had revoked their statements. 26.  On 1 March 2011 the senior investigator with the district investigative committee dismissed the first applicant\u2019s accusations against the police officers duplicating the findings summed up in the earlier decisions on the matter. Nevertheless, he allowed that the first applicant\u2019s injuries could have resulted from the beatings and that a criminal investigation should be opened on charges of battery. He transmitted the materials to the head of the district investigative committee. The parties did not inform about the outcome of the proceedings. 27.  On 30 September 2004, at approximately 11.00 p.m., the applicants, suspecting that their neighbour had committed a number of thefts and intended to steal their property, beat him up, broke into his car, took the documents for the car and refused to return them until the arrival of a police patrol car. 28.  On 15 June 2005 the Petrovskiy District Court found the applicants guilty of vigilantism and sentenced each of them to two and half years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on eighteen months\u2019 probation. On 4 August 2005 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction on appeal.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "5", "2", "9", "7", "4", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ivanovo. 6.  At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the Ivanovo Region electoral commission. 7.  On 23 October 2003 a deputy head of the Ivanovo Region Department of Internal Affairs ordered audio-visual \u201csurveillance\u201d (\u201c\u043d\u0430\u0431\u043b\u044e\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u201d) of the applicant\u2019s office. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision. 8.  The surveillance was carried out from 27 October to 5 November 2003 by means of a hidden camera. 9.  The applicant was subsequently charged with abuse of power, an offence under Article 285 of the Criminal Code. While studying the criminal case file he discovered that it contained video recordings of him talking on the telephone in his office. 10.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained unlawfully without prior judicial authorisation. He also challenged the authenticity of the recordings. 11.  On 27 September 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo convicted the applicant of abuse of power and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court relied on statements by several witnesses, physical evidence, expert reports and the video recordings of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations. It found that the video recordings were authentic and that they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 12.  The applicant appealed. He reiterated, in particular, his argument that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence. 13.  On 12 November 2004 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The court held that the District Court had correctly declared the video recordings admissible as evidence because they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.", "references": ["3", "5", "7", "9", "6", "2", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sarajevo. 5.  In 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer, the local police, seeking his reinstatement and damages. His claim was eventually rejected. 6.  The first-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Municipal Court on 17 April 2006. 7.  The second-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 27 March 2008. 8.  The third-instance judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 January 2010. 9.  On 19 April 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina complaining under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the outcome and length of his labour dispute. 10.  On 10 April 2013 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time and rejected the remainder of the case. It did not award any damages.", "references": ["0", "5", "1", "9", "2", "4", "8", "7", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Krasnoyarsk region. 6.  At the material time the applicant was a police officer with the Economic Crimes Department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region. 7.  On 31 July 2008 a certain Mr P. complained to the internal security department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region (\u201cthe internal security department\u201d) that the applicant had extorted money from him. In particular, the applicant had asked for money in exchange for assisting him, through his contacts in the regional government, in obtaining a licence for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Mr P. gave the internal security department a recording he had made of his telephone conversation with the applicant earlier the same day. During that conversation the applicant had asked Mr P. to bring him money before 2 August 2008. 8.  Police officers invited Mr P. to take part in an \u201coperative experiment\u201d (\u201c\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u201d), to which he consented. On the same day the head of the internal security department ordered an operative experiment in respect of the applicant with the use of audio and video recording devices. 9.  On the same day, 31 July 2008, the head of the internal security department also ordered the interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications without judicial authorisation by reference to section 8(3) of the of the Operational-Search Activities Act (hereafter \u201cthe OSAA\u201d). The decision read in its entirety as follows:\n\u201c[The internal security department] has received operative information that [the applicant], a senior police officer with the Economic Crimes Department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region, is extorting money in the amount of 200,000 roubles from [P.], the director of limited liability company [the company name], for assisting him in obtaining a licence for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. At the request of the police officer the money must be delivered in the period from 31 July to 2 August 2008; the exact time and place for delivering the money is to be agreed in advance by telephone [telephone number] given by [the applicant].\n[The applicant\u2019s] actions contain elements of a criminal offence under Article 290 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking] ...\nIt is necessary to perform the operational-search measure \u2018interception of telephone communications\u2019 with the aims of documenting [the applicant\u2019s] criminal activities in a thorough and objective way, collecting evidence and uncovering other participants in criminal offences.\u201d 10.  On 1 August 2008 the acting head of the internal security department sent a letter to the deputy President of the Tsentralnyy District Court of Krasnoyarsk, informing her that on 31 July and 1 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s telephone had been tapped in accordance with the urgent procedure provided for by section 8(3) of the OSAA. He then repeated verbatim the decision of 31 July 2008 ordering the interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications. 11.  On the same day, 1 August 2008, after the police had intercepted the applicant\u2019s telephone conversation with Mr P. in which the two men had arranged to meet later that day, Mr P. was provided with a video camera, a radio transmitter and the necessary amount of money in banknotes marked with a special substance. The applicant and Mr P. met in the applicant\u2019s car, where Mr P. left the marked money. Immediately after Mr P. had left, the applicant was arrested by the police, his car was searched and the money was seized. 12.  On 18 August 2008 the Investigations Committee of the Krasnoyarsk Region opened criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of attempted fraud, an offence under Article 159 of the Criminal Code, in connection with the aforementioned incident. The applicant was suspected of attempted fraudulent appropriation of the funds of a private company in the amount of 200,000 Russian roubles. 13.  On 28 October 2008, in reply to a request from the applicant for an expert examination of the recordings of his telephone conversations and the video recordings of his meeting with Mr P., the investigator in charge of the case held, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant\u2019s] guilt for the criminal offence under Article 159 \u00a7 3 ... is completely proven by the preponderance of evidence collected.\u201d 14.  Identical statements were made by the investigator in his decisions of 7 November and 12 December 2008 and 1 April 2009 rejecting various complaints lodged by the applicant. 15.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s complaints that his telephone had been tapped unlawfully without judicial authorisation, the investigator stated, in his decisions of 7 November and 12 December 2008, that section 8(3) of the OSAA permitted the interception of telephone communications without judicial authorisation in urgent cases, provided that a court was notified within twenty-four hours of its commencement and judicial authorisation was obtained within forty-eight hours, failing which it had to be discontinued. Interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications had been ordered by the head of the internal security department because at the time there had been sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant was involved in a serious criminal offence punishable under Article 290 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code. The District Court had been notified of the interception the next day, and on the same day, that is, before the expiry of the forty-eight-hour time-limit, the interception had been discontinued; hence, there had been no reason for seeking judicial authorisation. The interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications had therefore been lawful. 16.  During the trial the applicant challenged the admissibility of all the items of evidence obtained as a result of the \u201coperative experiment\u201d and the interception of his telephone communications. He argued, in particular, that the police had had insufficient grounds for carrying out the surveillance measures and that they had not obtained a judicial authorisation to intercept his telephone communications. 17.  On 7 December 2009 the Tsentralnyy District Court declared the audio and video recordings admissible as evidence. It held, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] argues that the operative experiment and other operational-search measures were unlawful because such measures are permissible only with the aim of suppressing, preventing and investigating criminal offences of medium severity or more serious criminal offences. I suppose that at the time when the police made the decision to carry out the operative experiment and other operational-search measures against [the applicant] they had information that he had committed criminal offences classified as serious or especially serious under the law (abuse of power, bribe\u2011taking).\nIn the court\u2019s opinion, for ordering operational-search measures it is sufficient that there be some elements of a criminal offence, rather than the entire corpus delicti, permitting [the police] to make a preliminary rather than definitive classification of the offence ...\nThe court is not convinced by [the applicant\u2019s] arguments that the interception of his telephone communications was unlawful because the case file does not contain a judicial decision authorising this operational-search measure. The operational-search measure against [the applicant] was carried out in conditions of urgency.\nSection 8(3) of the OSAA provides that a judge must be informed within twenty\u2011four hours of the commencement of operational-search activities in conditions of urgency and that judicial authorisation must be obtained within forty-eight hours, failing which the activities must be discontinued.\nThe court agrees with [the applicant] that the case file does not contain a judicial decision authorising operational-search measures. At the same time it notes that a judge was informed about the operational-search measures within twenty-four hours and the measures were discontinued within forty-eight hours of their commencement, as required by section 8(3) of the OSAA. No judicial refusal of authorisation was received. It therefore finds that no breaches of legal provisions governing operational\u2011search measures were committed in the present case ...\u201d 18.  On 22 December 2009 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged, sentenced him to two years and two months\u2019 imprisonment, and stripped him of his rank in the police. The court based its judgment on the statements of numerous witnesses, material evidence, expert opinions, and the audio and video recordings made on 31 July and 1 August 2008. It found that the recordings were authentic and had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, repeating the reasoning set out in the decision of 7 December 2009 on the admissibility of evidence. 19.  In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, among other things, that the District Court had relied on unlawfully obtained evidence, in particular on recordings of his telephone conversations made without judicial authorisation. He also contested the authenticity of the recordings. 20.  On 8 April 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal, adhering to the reasoning of the trial court. It found, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been correctly declared admissible as evidence and found authentic.", "references": ["3", "5", "8", "2", "1", "6", "9", "7", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  On 12 April 2002 the local police sent to the local investigations committee audio recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and several persons, and video recordings of their meetings in a flat in Novgorod. The accompanying letter, which the Government presented to the Court, stated that the audio and video recordings had been obtained in the course of covert \u201coperational-search\u201d measures (\u201c\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u044f\u201d) authorised by the President of the Novgorod Regional Court on 19 July and 31 August 2000 and 17 and 27 February 2001. 6.  On 16 April 2002 the applicant was arrested and charged with several counts of drug trafficking committed by an organised criminal group. Four more persons were arrested on the same charge. 7.  On 18 April 2002 the Novgorod Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in custody pending trial. He remained in custody throughout the criminal proceedings. 8.  The applicant learned about the audio and video recordings on an unspecified date while studying the criminal case file. 9.  On 26 June 2002 the investigation was completed and the case was sent for trial to the Novgorod Town Court. 10.  On 18 July 2002 counsel of one of the defendants asked that the trial be adjourned until September 2002 because he would be on annual leave until 6 September. 11.  On 20 August 2002 the Novgorod Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 16 September 2002. The hearing of 16 September 2002 was adjourned until 23 September 2002 because the applicant\u2019s counsel was in hospital and because the prosecution witnesses did not appear. The trial eventually started on 20 November 2002. 12.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation. 13.  His co-defendants pleaded guilty. They testified that the applicant was the leader of an organised group dealing in drugs. The applicant and another defendant, Mr K., had rented a flat where the members of the group had met to receive instructions from the applicant and to distribute the profits. They had also packaged and stored drugs in the flat. The owner of the flat testified that he had rented his flat to Mr K. and that on several occasions the rent had been paid by the applicant. 14.  On 24 November 2004 the Novgorod Town Court found the applicant and his co-defendants guilty of drug trafficking. It found it established that the applicant was the leader of an organised criminal group dealing in drugs. It relied on witness testimony, expert reports, audio recordings of telephone conversations between the defendants and video recordings of their meetings in the rented flat. It found that the recordings were admissible as evidence because they \u201chad been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him\u201d. The applicant was sentenced to nine years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation. 16.  On 8 February 2005 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It repeated verbatim the Town Court\u2019s finding that the audio and video recordings were admissible as evidence because they \u201chad been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him\u201d. 17.  The applicant worked as an investigator at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 18.  On 6 April 2004 he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting bribery. 19.  On 29 October 2004, while studying the criminal case file, the applicant discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations during the period from November 2003 to March 2004. 20.  The criminal case file also contained a letter of 21 October 2004 from the Federal Security Service to the local prosecutor stating that the audio recordings had been obtained in the course of covert operational\u2011search measures authorised by the Tver Regional Court in its decisions nos. 55-21, 55-30, 55-76, 55-93 and 55-103. Given that they were classified documents, the decisions could not be shown to the prosecutor and would be shown to the trial court only at its request. 21.  During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He argued, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence because the case file did not contain a copy of the judicial authorisation. The prosecutor stated in reply that the interception of his telephone communications had been authorised by the Tver Regional Court. A copy of the authorisation had not been included in the case file because it was confidential. 22.  On 14 May 2005 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting bribery and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The court relied, among other things, on the audio recordings of his telephone conversations. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence, finding that \u201cthe examination of the material in the case file [had] permitted [the court] to establish that the evidence [had been] obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act\u201d. 23.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the Regional Court had not given reasons for its finding that the audio recordings were admissible as evidence. In particular, it had not examined whether the interception of his telephone conversations had been duly authorised by a court and carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 24.  On 7 December 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The court did not specifically address the applicant\u2019s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence. It held that the finding of guilt had been based on evidence which had been properly analysed and assessed by the Regional Court. The applicant received the decision on 7 March 2006. 25.  On 5 July 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on charges of fraud. The applicant was absent from the hearing but his counsel attended. On 14 July 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The applicant was absent also from the appeal hearing, which was again attended by his counsel. 26.  On 3 November 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 January 2007. On 7 November 2006 the applicant appealed. On 5 December 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure and upheld the decision of 3 November 2006. 27.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended on several more occasions. 28.  In the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was detained in four remand prisons. According to the applicant, all four remand prisons were overcrowded. 29.  From 14 to 22 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. Cell 196 measuring 15 sq. m was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates. 30.  From 25 to 28 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 76/1 in Yaroslavl. Cell 133 measuring 9 sq. m was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to eight inmates. 31.  From 29 September to 1 October 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 43/1 in Kirov. His cell measuring 50 sq. m was equipped with forty sleeping places and accommodated up to twenty inmates. The cell was equipped with wooden boards instead of individual beds. 32.  From 2 October 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was held in remand prison 33/1 in Vladimir. Cell 63 measuring 14 sq. m was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated up to five inmates. 33.  On 28 and 29 September 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-76/1 and remand prison IZ-43/1 from Yaroslavl to Kirov. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates. 34.  On 1 and 2 October 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-43/1 and remand prison IZ-33/1 from Kirov to Vladimir. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to twelve inmates. 35.  On 25 December 2006 the applicant started to study the criminal case file and discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations between 22 and 25 July 2004. 36.  On 2 February 2007 the applicant asked the investigator for a copy of the judicial decision authorising the interception. On the same day the investigator refused his request. Relying on the Interior Ministry\u2019s Order no. 336 of 13 May 1998 (see paragraph 54 below), he replied that the police were not required to send the interception authorisation to the investigator; it was to be kept in the operational search file. The Vladimir Regional Court\u2019s decisions of 28 May and 2 June 2004 authorising interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications were stored by the local police. They were classified documents and neither the applicant nor his counsel, who had no security clearance, could be granted access to them. 37.  On 6 February 2007 the applicant complained to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir that the interception of his telephone communications had been unlawful, in particular because the case file did not contain a judicial authorisation. He submitted that the refusal to give him a copy of the interception authorisation had frustrated him in the exercise of his defence rights and deprived him of an effective remedy against an interference with his rights guaranteed by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, he had been unable to ascertain whether the interception authorisation had been issued by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, whether it had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons or whether the requirements for judicial authorisation, such as the authorised duration of interception, had been complied with at the implementation stage. 38.  On 19 February 2007 the Frunzenskiy District Court examined the complaint under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 63 below) and rejected it. Relying on section 12 of the Operational-Search Activities Act (see paragraph 49 below), the court held that the judicial decision authorising operational-search measures and the material that served as a basis for that decision were to be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such measures. It had therefore not been included in the criminal case file and the defendant was not entitled to have access to it. The court further referred to the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling of 14 July 1998, holding that the person whose communications were to be intercepted was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings or to be informed about the decision taken (see paragraph 50 below). The refusal to give the applicant a copy of the judicial authorisation had therefore been lawful. The court also rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint about the unlawfulness of the interception, without giving any reasons. 39.  On 3 April 2007 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 February 2007 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified.", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "0", "8", "3", "1", "6", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5.  Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6.  On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non\u2011pecuniary damage. 7.  No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed. 8.  On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority\u2019s request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants\u2019 favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "1", "0", "5", "6", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Murmansk. 6.  On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk regional prosecutor\u2019s office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was suspected of leadership of a criminal armed gang. According to the authorities, the applicant, as the leader of the gang, had planned and committed several offences, namely aggravated kidnapping, assault, aggravated robbery and extortion, in Murmansk and Moscow. 7.  On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications on his mobile telephone, number ...-15. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n\u201c[The police] are investigating [a case] against a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. [M.] and [Z.] are members of that gang. According to intelligence information, these people are planning to commit aggravated extortion from Murmansk businessmen. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-15, registered as belonging to [M.].\nIn view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant\u2019s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 \u00a7 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure]\ndecides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant\u2019s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-15.\u201d 8.  On 24 and 25 December 2003 the police intercepted the applicant\u2019s conversations with an accomplice, M. 9.  On 25 December 2003 two of the applicant\u2019s accomplices, M. and S., were arrested. The applicant went into hiding. 10.  On the same day, 25 December 2003, at the applicant\u2019s request his brother retained G. as the applicant\u2019s legal representative. The legal services agreement stated that G. was to consult and defend the applicant while his name was on the police\u2019s wanted persons list in connection with charges that were not yet known to him. If the applicant were to be arrested by the police, an additional agreement would be signed between G. and the applicant. There is no evidence that the police or the investigator were informed about that agreement. 11.  On 26 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n\u201c[The police] have intelligence information about a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-49.\nIn view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant\u2019s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 \u00a7 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure]\ndecides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant\u2019s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49.\u201d 12.  On 26 and 27 December 2003 the police intercepted conversations between the applicant and G. 13.  On 27 December 2003 the applicant was arrested. 14.  On 28 December 2003 G. informed the investigator that he was the applicant\u2019s defence counsel by virtue of instruction no. 1062 of the Murmansk Regional Bar Association (\u201cthe Bar Association\u201d). He was formally admitted (\u0434\u043e\u043f\u0443\u0449\u0435\u043d) as counsel for the applicant. 15.  On 5 January 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated robbery, assault, kidnapping and extortion, committed by an organised criminal group. S. and M. were also charged with the same criminal offences. 16.  At the beginning of August 2004 the investigator informed G. that his presence was required during investigative procedures involving the applicant. On 23 August 2004 the investigator was informed by the Bar Association that G. was on annual leave until 4 October 2004. 17.  On 24 August 2004 the investigator appointed legal aid counsel for the applicant, noting that he had refused to choose replacement counsel and had insisted on being represented by G. 18.  On 30 August 2004 the investigator decided to remove G. as counsel for the applicant, finding that it was necessary to question him about his telephone conversations with the applicant on 26 and 27 December 2003. He noted that at the time, G. had not yet been the applicant\u2019s counsel. However, well aware that the applicant had committed serious criminal offences, G. had advised him what to do. In particular, he had told the applicant that money was needed, which could possibly mean that G. had intended to bribe a police official. He had also informed him about the course of the criminal proceedings, which had become known to him as at the time he had been representing the applicant\u2019s accomplices, S. and M. When the police had tried to force the applicant\u2019s door, the applicant had summoned G., who had said that he could not come and offered to send another lawyer. He had then advised the applicant to try to avoid arrest and, if that was not possible, to destroy his telephone and the SIM card, and to remain silent when questioned. In the investigator\u2019s opinion, by giving such advice, G. had been trying to hide his connections with the applicant and his knowledge of the criminal offences committed by him. Given that at the material time G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant\u2019s counsel, he should be considered as having advised him in his capacity as a simple citizen. He should therefore be called as a witness in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 19.  On 11 October 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices was transferred to the Murmansk Regional Court for trial. The criminal case file comprised twelve volumes; five criminal cases were joined into one criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices. 20.  A preliminary hearing was held on 21 and 22 October 2004. 21.  The trial started on 3 November 2004. The applicant asked the court for permission for his brother, a civil lawyer working at a company which sold car spare parts, to act as his defence counsel. The court rejected his request, stating that the applicant\u2019s brother was not qualified to participate as defence counsel in criminal proceedings, that he did not have the relevant practical experience, and that the applicant was already represented by legal aid counsel. 22.  On 4 November 2004 the applicant requested that legal aid counsel assigned to his case be removed for failure to provide adequate legal assistance. The court rejected his request. The applicant then requested that AM. be admitted as his defence counsel instead of the legal aid lawyer. The judge granted that request and AM. represented the applicant throughout the remainder of the criminal proceedings. The trial was adjourned until 15 November 2004 to let AM. study the case file. 23.  On 15 November 2004 the hearing was again postponed, until 22 November 2004, owing to the failure of one of the co-accused to appear due to illness. 24.  Further hearings were held between 22 November and 9 December 2004. 25.  On 22 November 2004 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of transcripts of his telephone conversations with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He argued that G. had been his counsel as from 25 December 2003, as confirmed by the legal services agreement of that date and by relevant payment invoices. The conversations in question were therefore protected by legal professional privilege and their transcripts could not be used in evidence in criminal proceedings. 26.  On 30 November 2004 the Murmansk Regional Court found that the legal services agreement of 25 December 2003 stated that G. was to provide the applicant with legal assistance in the framework of criminal proceedings, without clearly identifying the criminal proceedings to which it related. The investigator had not been informed about that agreement. G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant\u2019s counsel in the present criminal proceedings until 28 December 2003 when he had shown the investigator the relevant instruction by the Bar Association. The Regional Court found it relevant that during the conversations intercepted by the police, G. had advised the applicant to remain in hiding and to destroy the evidence. Moreover, having been present, as their counsel, at S.\u2019s and M.\u2019s questioning after their arrest, G. had informed the applicant about their statements to the investigator. When summoned by the applicant to assist him at the time of his arrest, he had refused to come and had offered to send another lawyer. That gave reasons to doubt that G. had been representing the applicant at the time in the present criminal proceedings. The investigator had subsequently removed G.  as counsel for the applicant. G. had not, however, been called to testify against the applicant in breach of legal professional privilege. Given that the applicant\u2019s conversations with G. intercepted by the police contained information about the applicant\u2019s criminal activities, they were not subject to legal professional privilege and their transcripts were admissible as evidence. 27.  On 9 December 2004 the court ordered a graphological expert report and for that reason adjourned the trial until 5 April 2005. 28.  On 4 April 2005 the applicant lodged an action before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Murmansk, challenging the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 August 2004 to remove G. as his counsel. On 6 June 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed that complaint as inadmissible, finding that it could not be examined once the investigation had been completed. The applicant could raise the complaint before the trial court. 29.  Meanwhile, further hearings were held on 5, 25 and 27 April and 5 and 12 May 2005. 30.  On 19 May 2005 the court ordered a complex psychological expert examination of one of the co-accused and adjourned the trial pending the expert examination report. A further complex psychological examination was ordered on 4 July 2005 and the trial was again adjourned until 7 October 2005. 31.  On 7 October 2005 the trial was adjourned because the court ordered that two prosecution witnesses who had testified against S. and who were detained in Moscow be transported to Murmansk for a cross\u2011examination. 32.  The trial remained adjourned between 7 October 2005 and 6 March 2006 while awaiting the transfer of the prosecution witnesses, who at the time were on trial in a criminal case in Moscow. They were transferred to Murmansk on 3 March 2006, after their conviction of 7 October 2005 had been upheld on appeal on 26 December 2005. 33.  On 29 December 2005 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of the transcripts of his telephone conversations with M. on 24 and 25 December 2003 and with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He claimed, in particular, that the transcripts had been obtained unlawfully. 34.  The trial was resumed on 6 March 2006. Hearings were held on 16 March, 6, 7, 13 and 20 April 2006. 35.  During the trial the court examined numerous pieces of evidence, including three expert reports and the statements of six victims and twenty\u2011four witnesses from Murmansk and Moscow. 36.  On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. It relied on the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with G. and M., among other evidence, observing that the interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications had been authorised by a court. Having analysed the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with G., it held as follows:\n\u201cThe lawyer had not been formally admitted to provide legal assistance to [the applicant] at the time [when the interception had taken place]. His actions were considered by the investigator to be unlawful and served as a basis for the decision to remove [G.] as counsel for [the applicant] and for considering the question of opening criminal proceedings [against G.]. The court does not have any reason to believe that the information obtained as a result of [intercepting the applicant\u2019s] telephone communications with [G.] cannot be used as evidence, given that the information in question has not become known to [G.] as a result of providing legal assistance to [the applicant].\u201d 37.  The applicant appealed against the conviction, claiming that the Regional Court had erred in its assessment of the evidence, that the transcripts of his telephone conversations with his co-defendant M. and counsel G. had been unlawfully used as evidence in the criminal proceedings, that G. had been unlawfully removed as counsel from his case, and that the authorities had refused to allow his brother to act as his legal representative. 38.  On 18 December 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. It held, in particular, that the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with M. and G. had been correctly admitted as evidence. It further observed that the applicant\u2019s allegations of violations of his right to defence during the preliminary investigation had been examined by the first-instance court and had been rejected as unsubstantiated. 39.  The applicant was arrested on 27 December 2003. 40.  On 29 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court remanded the applicant in custody. It held that he was suspected of particularly serious offences, did not have a permanent job, and that his assertions that he owned a family business were unconvincing. There were therefore sufficient reasons to believe that he might abscond, obstruct the course of justice, and continue his criminal activities. 41.  On 24 February and 18 June 2004 the Regional Court ordered extensions of the applicant\u2019s detention, citing the need for further investigation, the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding, putting pressure on witnesses and obstructing the course of justice. There were no factors relating to the applicant\u2019s character, state of health, family or other circumstances which would warrant release. The applicant did not appeal against those extension orders. 42.  On 11 October 2004 the criminal case file was transferred to the Regional Court for trial.  On 22 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 detention during trial, referring to the gravity of the charges and the lack of permanent employment \u201cat the time of the commission of the crimes\u201d. It considered that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid. The applicant did not appeal. 43.  On 5 April, 4 July, 7 October and 29 December 2005 and 7 April 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s and his co\u2011defendants\u2019 detention, finding that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid and that there were therefore no reasons to change it. The trial could not proceed for objective reasons as it was necessary to wait for the results of a psychological expert examination of S. and for the transfer for questioning of two prosecution witnesses against S. 44.  The applicant appealed against the above extension orders to the Supreme Court. He submitted that he had been permanently residing in Murmansk, that he had been working in the family business, that he had no previous convictions and that he had no intention of absconding from the authorities. The authorities had failed to substantiate their allegations that he might abscond or continue with his criminal activity. As regards the risk that he might put pressure on witnesses, it was no longer relevant as all the witnesses had already been questioned by the trial court. According to the applicant, the extension of his detention had been based solely on the gravity of the charges against him. The trial had been adjourned for reasons which were not related to his personal situation, but in order to carry out expert psychological examinations of one of the co-accused and to ensure the transfer from Moscow of two prosecution witnesses who were to give evidence against that same co-accused. He asked to be released on bail or on his father\u2019s personal guarantee. 45.  On 11 August, 9 November and 15 December 2005 and 30 March 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding or putting pressure on witnesses. The fact that the witnesses had already been questioned was irrelevant because the applicant might still put pressure on them or otherwise obstruct the trial. 46.  The applicant was held as follows: in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk from 30 December 2003 to 21 May 2006; in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, Murmansk Region, in a special wing with the material conditions of detention of a remand prison (\u041f\u0424\u0420\u0421\u0418 \u2013 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0435 \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0436\u0438\u043c\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0438\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430) from 21 May to 9 October 2006; in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda from 12 to 17 October 2006; and in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow from 18 October 2006 to 24 January 2007. 47.  The Government submitted that it was impossible to provide original documentation concerning the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk because all the official records had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory period for their storage. In respect of that detention facility they submitted only statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010. They also submitted copies of the prison population register for the entire periods of the applicant\u2019s detention in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi and in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, and selected pages from the prison population register for the period of detention in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow. 48.  The Government submitted the following information about the applicant\u2019s detention, which was based on the above-mentioned documents:\n \nDetention facility\nCell No.\nPeriod of detention\nSurface area\n(in square metres)\nNumber of inmates\nNumber of beds\nremand prison IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk\n \n331\n30 December 2003 to 5 January 2004 49.  The Government asserted that in all the cells where the applicant had been detained between 2003 and 2007, the number of inmates had not exceeded the number of beds and that at all times while in detention the applicant had been provided with an individual sleeping place. At the same time, the Government submitted as follows:\n\u201c... during the applicant\u2019s detention the sanitary norm for space per inmate was not always complied with. However, it happened only occasionally ... and the prosecutor\u2019s office demanded that these infractions be eliminated ...\u201d 50.  Relying on the statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010, the Government further submitted that the applicant had been provided with bed sheets and cutlery. The cells were cleaned daily by the inmates and the administration of the penal institutions carried out a sanitary treatment of the premises every month. 51.  All cells were equipped with wash basins supplying cold water; hot water was available for personal and household needs. In addition, the inmates were allowed to use their own kettles and water heaters. 52.  At all times in all the remand prisons, the applicant and the other inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week; their linen was changed weekly. 53.  The applicant and other inmates were allowed to take one hour\u2019s daily exercise in specially equipped yards. 54.  According to the applicant, remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk had been severely overcrowded and the space available to him had been below the domestic standards. The applicant contested the accuracy of the data submitted by the Government about the designated number of bunk beds within the cells. For instance, in cell no. 423 the actual number of bunk beds had been eight and not three as submitted by the Government, as could be seen from the photographs he had submitted to the Court. Cell no. 406 had seven sleeping bunks and housed up to nine inmates. 55.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s complaints about poor conditions of detention, the Murmansk regional prosecutor\u2019s office stated, on 14 November 2005, as follows:\n\u201c... the applicant\u2019s complaints ... that the conditions of detention in SIZO-1 were not fully compatible with the sanitary regulations prescribed by the Federal Law on pre\u2011trial detention ... that the minimum individual space prescribed by the Law (4 sq. m per person) was not always complied with, that the premises needed repair, that the walls in some of the cells were stained with mould and crumbling, that the plumbing was often out of order, that not all the cells were equipped with a sufficient number of shelves and TV sets, that broken glass in the windows was not replaced promptly and that there were no refrigerators \u2013 [all these complaints] reflect the reality.\nThese deficiencies were noted by the prosecutor\u2019s office during their inspection of SIZO-1.\u201d 56.  On 25 April 2006 the Murmansk regional prosecutor\u2019s office stated:\n\u201c... in 2005-06 the number of detainees in SIZO-1 frequently exceeded the prescribed limits. For these reasons it was not always possible to comply with the sanitary regulations (4 sq. m per inmate). For the same reasons the requirements concerning the separate detention of different categories of detainees were sometimes not complied with ...\u201d 57.  As regards correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, the applicant stated that during his stay there he had been detained in inadequate conditions. The cells had been overcrowded. The space available to him throughout the detention period had been below the domestic standards. In particular, he had shared a cell measuring 20 sq. m with five other detainees. 58.  On 28 September 2006 the applicant complained to the Murmansk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of inadequate conditions of detention in IK-16. In particular, he complained of poor nutrition, overcrowding, a lack of newspapers and television sets, and of the authorities\u2019 refusal to make copies of documents at inmates\u2019 requests. He received no reply. 59.  Furthermore, as regards remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, the applicant stated that the quality of the food in the prison had been extremely poor. He had been detained with thirty-six other detainees in a cell measuring 50 sq. m. The cell had been infested with cockroaches, bedbugs and rats. The detainees had slept on bunk beds. 60.  Lastly, as regards remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, according to the applicant, he had been held in cell 434, which measured 13 sq. m, with seven other detainees. The inmates had slept on bunk beds. There had been a table measuring 1 m by 0.3 m but no benches or chairs to sit on. The cell had been swarming with insects. The inmates had been allowed to take exercise only in groups. 61.  From 9 to 12 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Murmansk to Vologda. He was given no food. He received his first meal on 13 October 2006. 62.  On 17 and 18 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Vologda to Moscow. 63.  From 24 January to 9 February 2007, on the way from Moscow to Murmansk, between St Petersburg and Murmansk, the applicant was transported in cramped conditions in a compartment with up to sixteen other inmates, some of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. 64.  As regards the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transportation between Murmansk and Vologda from 9 to 12 October 2006, the applicant was transported in a compartment with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. He was transferred from Vologda railway station to the local remand prison IZ\u201135/2 in a special vehicle separately from other inmates. 65.  When the applicant was transferred from Vologda railway station to Moscow on 17 and 18 October 2006, he was not transported with inmates who were suffering from tuberculosis. 66.  When the applicant was transferred from Moscow to Murmansk between 24 January and 9 February 2007, he was transported first alone in the railway compartment, then from St Petersburg onwards he was transported with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. 67.  During the transfers the applicant was duly provided with dry food rations; he was given permission to use hot water and the toilet. 68.  The applicant did not lodge any complaints about the conditions of his transportation between Murmansk and Moscow. He did not apply for medical assistance, nor did he complain about the state of his health. 69.  In their submission the Government neither specified the number of inmates transported with the applicant, nor the size of the compartments in which they had travelled. Nor did they submit any copies of documents regarding that part of the applicant\u2019s complaints, including the distribution of dry rations for the trip.", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "9", "8", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The first and second applicants\u2019 son was killed in a traffic accident on 17 July 2010 in which the fourth applicant sustained serious injuries. The third applicant is the fourth applicant\u2019s mother. 7.  The applicants joined the criminal proceedings concerning the accident as victims. 8.  On 9 and 10 December 2010 the applicants lodged a civil action within the criminal proceedings against the suspect, J., claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. 9.  On 28 January 2011 the applicants, represented by lawyers of their own choice, concluded an out-of-court settlement with J. (hereinafter \u201cout-of-court settlement agreement\u201d). They informed the prosecutor that they had agreed that the case would be settled (kokkuleppemenetlus). J. informed the prosecutor that he had paid the compensation to the applicants as laid down in the out-of-court settlement agreement. 10.  On 4 February 2011 the applicants\u2019 consent to the application of the settlement procedure was recorded in a report signed by the prosecutor and the applicants\u2019 representatives. The report stated that the applicants had been informed of their rights under the settlement procedure and set out the consequences of applying the settlement procedure. In a section entitled \u201cRemarks\u201d, it was noted that the applicants had given up their claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage against J. (as lodged on 9 and 10 December 2010), but had not given up their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. The report also stated that the victims had no right to withdraw their consent to the settlement procedure. At that time, the applicants had submitted neither an itemised list of legal costs nor any supporting documents. 11. On 11 February 2011 J. gave his consent to the application of the settlement procedure. The prosecutor, J. and the latter\u2019s counsel signed a settlement agreement in which they agreed, inter alia, on the type and extent of the damage caused. The agreement stated that the victims had withdrawn the civil claims they had lodged within the criminal proceedings. 12.  On 14 February 2011 the Harju County Court committed J. for trial and scheduled a hearing for 7 March 2011. J., his counsel and the prosecutor were summoned to appear at the court hearing. The applicants, however, were not summoned. 13.  On 4 March 2011 the applicants lodged a claim for legal costs in the amount of 6,483.66 euros (EUR) and submitted supporting documents. The Harju County Court received their submission on 7 March 2011. 14.  J., his counsel and the prosecutor attended the hearing held before the Harju County Court as scheduled. According to the court record, the trial judge disclosed the applicants\u2019 claim for reimbursement of their legal costs. J. asked the court not to examine the claim as it had been absorbed by the out-of-court settlement agreement. The applicants alleged that they had not been allowed to address the court notwithstanding their presence in the court building. 15.  In a judgment of the same date, the Harju County Court convicted J. of violating traffic and driving regulations and sentenced him to a suspended prison term. It also withdrew J.\u2019s driving licence and ordered him to pay the State Treasury expenses consisting of compensation levies (sundraha) and the cost of expert assessments. It held that the victims had given up the civil claims they had lodged within the framework of the criminal proceedings. The judgment made no reference to the applicants\u2019 claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. They complained that they had not been allowed to attend the court hearing of 7 March 2011 and that the court had left their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs undecided. 17.  On 23 March 2011 the Harju County Court refused to examine the appeal. Relying on Articles 246 and 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP; Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik), the court found that the applicants had not been parties to the court proceedings and did not, therefore, have the right to appeal (see paragraph 29 below). 18.  The applicants appealed against the County Court\u2019s decision, insisting that they had been parties to the proceedings and had the right to appeal. 19.  At a public hearing on 5 April 2011 the Tallinn Court of Appeal examined the appeal in the presence of J. and his counsel, the prosecutor and the applicants\u2019 counsel. At the hearing, the prosecutor firstly noted that the applicants had not submitted any documents concerning their claim for legal costs, despite the fact that they had had a week after the settlement to do so. According to the report of the hearing, the prosecutor later noted that those documents could have been submitted when the applicants had signed the report (see paragraph 10 above) or a few days later. The report stated that J. had wanted to submit the out-of-court settlement agreement to the judge in order to prove that it covered all the relevant damages. However, the Court of Appeal had refused, considering that it did not concern the subject matter of the dispute before the court in those proceedings. 20.  By a decision of 13 April 2011, the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the Harju County Court\u2019s decision of 23 March 2011. It referred to Article 243 of the CCrP, under which the victim was not entitled to revoke his or her consent to the application of the settlement procedure, and to Article 246 of the Code, which provided that the victim did not have to be summoned to a court hearing in settlement proceedings (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants, as victims, had not been parties to such court proceedings and that, accordingly, they had no right to appeal against the County Court\u2019s judgment. 21.  Although the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision stated that it was final and not amenable to appeal, the applicants\u2019 counsel nevertheless challenged it before the Supreme Court. 22.  By a decision of 3 October 2011 in case no. 3-1-1-60-11 the Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal on points of law because the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision had been final and not amenable to appeal. It nevertheless stated that according to the established case-law, in settlement proceedings the court should not limit itself to merely analysing the settlement reached. It must also verify whether there were still questions that should be addressed in the subsequent judgment, but which had not been included in the settlement agreement. The court noted that according to Article 245 of the CCrP, the settlement agreement did not necessarily have to address matters dealing with the costs of criminal procedure or cover the extent of granting the civil claim or of compensating for the damage caused by the criminal offence. However, referring to Article 306 \u00a7\u00a7 11, 13 and 14 of the CCrP and Article 248 \u00a7 1 (3) of the CCrP, the Supreme Court considered that those matters should not be overlooked by the court concerned (see paragraphs 30 and 31 below).", "references": ["8", "2", "6", "5", "4", "1", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time. 8.  On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention. 9.  On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered his detention pending extradition. 10.  On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant\u2019s extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms. 11.  On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 May 2014. 12.  An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) on 3 February 2014. 13.  On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 August 2014. 14.  An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014. 15.  On 9 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law. 16.  On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention. 17.  On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18.  On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that \u201c[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials\u201d 19.  The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court\u2019s assessment of the case, which took into consideration \u201c...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case\u201d. 20.  According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention. 21.  On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment. 22.  On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill\u2011treatment. 23.  On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court.", "references": ["6", "4", "9", "5", "0", "8", "7", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Illertissen. The second applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Harburg. 6.  On 9 December 2007 both applicants went to a football match in Munich. 7.  The police had predicted an increased risk of clashes between rival football supporters owing to confrontations at previous matches between the two teams. Therefore a total of 227 police officers were deployed, including two squads \u2013 comprising eight to ten police officers each \u2013 of the 3rd platoon of the Munich riot control unit (Unterst\u00fctzungskommando), one squad of the 2nd platoon of the Munich riot control unit and the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion (Bereitschaftspolizei). The deployed officers of the Munich riot control unit also included \u201cvideo officers\u201d, who carried handheld video cameras and recorded videos of incidents that might be relevant under criminal law. The officers of the Munich riot control unit were dressed in black/dark blue uniforms and wore black helmets with visors. The officers of the Dachau public-order support force battalion wore green uniforms and white helmets with visors. Both uniforms did not include any name tags or other signs identifying the individual officers. However, on the back of the helmets an identification number of the squad was displayed. 8.  After the match had ended the police cordoned off the stands of the supporters of one of the teams, including both applicants, to prevent them from leaving the stadium and encountering supporters of the other team. The cordon was lifted after around fifteen minutes. 9.  According to the first applicant, he left the stands after the blockade had been lifted. While walking between the exit of the stands and the exit of the football stadium a group of police officers dressed in black uniforms came running towards the exiting spectators with their truncheons raised above their heads. Some of these officers started hitting the spectators with their truncheons without any prior warning as soon as they reached them. The first applicant himself was hit with a truncheon on the head, which resulted in a bleeding laceration of 3 cm behind his ear. After having reached the exit of the stadium he was treated by a paramedic in an ambulance that was parked close to the ground. Subsequently, he returned to his home town, where he was treated in the emergency unit of the local hospital. 10.  The second applicant also exited the stands after the blockade had been lifted. Before exiting the stadium he was grabbed by the shoulder and, after turning round, had pepper spray doused in the face at close range. He lay down on the ground and was subsequently struck on his left upper arm with a truncheon. He suffered swelling and redness of his face and pain in his arm. 11.  Both applicants were able to identify their attackers as police officers, but were not able to distinguish them further, owing to their identical uniforms and the lack of identifying signs or name tags. 12.  According to the Government the blockade was lifted due to the aggressive behaviour of some of the spectators and the pressure applied to the police cordon. When the supporters streamed from the stands towards the exit, they came upon police units which had been called in to provide backup for the police cordon. Subsequently some of the supporters continued their aggressive behaviour towards these officers and provoked them. The supporters\u2019 conduct resulted in the arrest of one supporter and two police officers sustained minor injuries. After a few minutes the police pacified the situation and got the exiting supporters under control. 13.  The Government furthermore challenged the accounts of the applicants and submitted that there was no credible evidence that the applicants had deliberately been hit or harmed by police officers and that the injuries had been a result of the police operation. 14.  As of 15 December 2007 the press reported about the police operation in the aftermath of the football match, inter alia quoting football supporters describing arbitrary attacks by police officers of the riot control unit with truncheons and pepper-spray. In an article of 18 December 2007 a spokesperson of the police commented on the operation and stated that the alleged assaults by police officers would be investigated. On 2 January 2008, the Munich public prosecutor\u2019s office instigated a preliminary investigation. On 21 January 2008 the second applicant reported the alleged police violence and submitted a medical certificate concerning the effects of the pepper spray on his face from the same day. He filed a formal criminal complaint on 7 March 2008. The first applicant filed a criminal complaint against an unidentified police officer on 25 April 2008. He also submitted a medical certificate confirming a bleeding laceration on his head. The certificate was issued at 12.05 a.m. on 10 December 2007. Several other spectators at the match had also lodged criminal complaints against unidentified police officers. 15.  The investigation was conducted by the unit of the Munich police responsible for offences perpetrated by public officials under the responsibility of the Munich public prosecutor\u2019s office. The officer in charge interviewed a total of twenty witnesses, including the applicants, the officer in charge of the Munich riot control unit and the squad leaders of the deployed squads of the 2nd and 3rd Munich riot control units. 16.  The investigating division was also provided with a DVD showing excerpts of the video surveillance recorded by the riot control police at the football match. The DVDs were compiled by the \u201cvideo officers\u201d of the Munich riot control unit. In line with their usual procedure the entire recorded video material was reviewed by the respective video officer after his or her deployment and the parts which were deemed relevant under criminal law and of sufficient quality to serve as evidence were copied to a DVD. 17.  On 10 September 2008 the competent public prosecutor discontinued the investigation. He found that the investigation had produced evidence that some of the police officers had used truncheons against spectators, including women and children, in a disproportionate way and without an official order or approval. However, he concluded that the investigation had not led to a situation where concrete acts of violence could be related to specific police officers and it could not be ascertained either whether the use of force had been justified. In sum, the public prosecutor had been able neither to establish whether the applicants\u2019 injuries had been inflicted by police officers nor to identify the suspects who had allegedly struck and used pepper spray on the applicants. 18.  The applicants appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation and argued, in particular, that the public prosecutor had only questioned the squad leaders, but had not identified all the officers involved in the operation and deployed in the area of the stadium at issue. 19.  On 14 October 2008 the public prosecutor reopened the investigation and ordered further enquiries. On 20 October 2008 the head of the investigation unit met with the platoon leaders of the Munich riot control unit and other division heads of the Munich police to discuss the investigation. Neither the public prosecutor nor the applicants\u2019 representative attended the internal police meeting. Subsequently, a further twenty-two witnesses were interviewed including fourteen platoon leaders, squad leaders and video officers of the deployed police units. The individual squad members of the three squads of the Munich riot control unit were not interviewed. The applicants had requested that they be interviewed, as the evidence had suggested that the alleged perpetrators had belonged to one of these three squads. 20.  The investigating police unit was also provided with video surveillance recorded by the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion. Upon the request of the applicants to secure the entire video material of the police operation, and not only the already submitted video excerpts, it was established that the original video tapes and possible digital copies had already been deleted and that only the excerpts were still available. 21.  On 4 August 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the investigation again. In a detailed fifteen-page decision he first summarised the investigative measures taken, referring in particular to the interviews of several witnesses, including police officers and the alleged victims, the review of video material from the police and from the internet, the assessment of the applicants\u2019 written observations and of the submitted documents, inter alia, medical certificates, as well as gathered information and reports on past events and applicable guidelines. After assessing all the available evidence, the public prosecutor concluded that the enquiries had shown that several supporters had aggressively approached, insulted and provoked the deployed police officers and that therefore a situation had existed in which the officers could have been justified in using their truncheons. Besides this general conclusion he held that the applicants had neither been able to identify a particular suspect nor to determine whether the suspected police officers had been male or female and that the investigation had not produced other persons who had witnessed the alleged acts against the applicants. Furthermore, he outlined in detail certain \u201cconsiderable discrepancies\u201d in the witness statements of the first applicant and referred to \u201cunspecific\u201d statements of the second applicant. Consequently, according to the public prosecutor, there was insufficient evidence to establish criminal conduct by specific police officers to the detriment of both applicants. He concluded that the investigation had to be discontinued again, since the considerable additional investigative measures had not revealed disproportionate conduct on the part of individual police officers, in particular truncheon strikes against innocent bystanders, which would require criminal prosecution of the respective officers. 22.  On 20 August 2009 the applicants appealed and pointed out that the members of the deployed squads had still not been questioned and that the inspected videos were fragmentary, but nonetheless contradicted certain parts of the statements made by the squad leaders. 23.  On 3 February 2011 the Munich general public prosecutor confirmed the decision of the public prosecutor\u2019s office of 4 August 2009 to discontinue the investigation. The instructions on available legal remedies attached to the decision informed the applicants that they could request a judicial decision in the framework of proceedings to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsverfahren). 24.  On 19 September 2011 the Munich Court of Appeal declared the applicants\u2019 application to force further enquiries inadmissible. The court interpreted the applicants\u2019 request as an application to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsantrag) and held that these proceedings were only admissible if the prosecution of one or more identified accused had been requested. An application to force criminal proceedings against an unidentified accused had to be declared inadmissible, since the proceedings were not supposed to identify the accused or replace investigations. Only in a case where a public prosecutor\u2019s office had entirely refrained from investigating a crime had a court the possibility to order an investigation. Under Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d; see paragraph 37 below) a court was only allowed to conduct minor enquiries to fill in remaining gaps in an investigation. Moreover, the applicants had not submitted specific facts or evidence that would have allowed the court to identify an accused. 25.  On 25 October 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on Articles 2 \u00a7 2, 19 \u00a7 4 and 103 \u00a7 1 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (see paragraphs 29-31 below). Besides referring to articles of the Basic Law, the applicants also referred in their complaint to Articles 2, 3, and 13 of the Convention. In essence they complained that the investigation had not been effective and that the Court of Appeal had not evaluated the effectiveness of the investigation. 26.  On 23 March 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d) refused, in a reasoned decision (2 BvR 1304/12), to admit the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint. The court held that the investigations had been conducted diligently, but had not established sufficient suspicion of criminal conduct on the part of specific police officers. Moreover, the remaining gaps and factual uncertainties could not be attributed to omissions in the investigation. The court also found that it had not been necessary to question all the squad members who had possibly been involved. In its decision the Constitutional Court referred to the Court\u2019s case-law concerning the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention and, in particular, to the cases of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1995, Series A no. 324) and Grams v. Germany ((dec.), no. 33677/96, ECHR 1999\u2011VII). The court also emphasised that the public prosecutor\u2019s office had been the responsible authority for the investigation and thereby \u201cmaster of the proceedings\u201d (Herr des Verfahrens). 27.  During the investigation the applicants also filed criminal complaints in respect of assistance given in an official capacity in avoiding prosecution or punishment (Strafvereitelung im Amt) and suppression of evidence (Beweismittelunterdr\u00fcckung). The applicants alleged that several relevant parts of the video material, showing disproportionate police violence, had been deleted. The investigation against the five police officers was discontinued by the Munich public prosecutor\u2019s office. 28.  A subsequent appeal before the Munich general public prosecutor was to no avail.", "references": ["0", "9", "5", "7", "6", "4", "8", "3", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Riga. 5.  On 24 November 2005 a residential building maintenance services provider, Kurzemes Namu Apsaimniekot\u0101js, a limited liability company (\u201cthe plaintiff\u201d), brought a claim against the applicant for recovery of a debt for their services in the amount of 320 Latvian lati (LVL \u2013 approximately 455 euros (EUR)). The next day civil proceedings were instituted in that connection. The applicant disagreed; she argued that she did not owe any money to the plaintiff \u2013 they had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services and she was free to choose another service provider. In those proceedings the applicant was represented by Mr S. Se\u013cez\u0146ovs, who was not a lawyer. 6.  On 30 December 2005 a judge of the Riga City Kurzeme District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Kurzemes rajona tiesa \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe City Court\u201d) scheduled the first hearing to take place on 21 April 2006. During this hearing the applicant\u2019s representative requested additional time to examine the relevant legal norms and to obtain the relevant documents from the plaintiff. The City Court postponed the hearing to allow both parties to \u201cprepare documents\u201d. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 August 2006. 7.  On 9 August 2006 the plaintiff applied to have the hearing postponed because the applicant\u2019s debt for services had in the meantime increased and the plaintiff had not yet settled the courts fees for the increased claim. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2006. 8.  On 17 October 2006 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant\u2019s representative applied to have the hearing postponed so as to examine those documents. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 31 January 2007. 9.  On 31 January 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim to LVL 426 (approximately EUR 606) and submitted more documents. The applicant\u2019s representative submitted written observations and some documents showing some debts that had been paid. The City Court admitted them to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 23 March 2007. 10.  On 23 March 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted more documents. The applicant\u2019s representative requested that more detailed information be provided in this connection. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide observations by 13 August 2007 and scheduled the next hearing for 12 September 2007. 11.  On 11 September 2007 the City Court informed both parties that another judge was taking over the case; the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2007. 12.  On 17 October 2007 both parties pleaded their case. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide more detailed information and scheduled the next hearing for 13 November 2007. 13.  On 13 November 2007 the applicant\u2019s representative applied to have the hearing postponed as he had only received the relevant documents on the previous day. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 14 February 2008. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative pleaded the case. He argued that the service charges which the applicant had been asked to settle had been unclear. The plaintiff did not have all the relevant documents at hand and thus requested time to submit additional information. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to submit the specific documents and scheduled the next hearing for 17 April 2008. 15.  On 17 April 2008 the plaintiff submitted the relevant documents and the applicant\u2019s representative applied to have the hearing postponed to examine them. His application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 4 June 2008. 16.  The parties continued to plead their case in the hearing of 4 June 2008. The City Court imposed a monetary fine on the applicant\u2019s representative for disobeying a judge\u2019s order. Following an application by the plaintiff the hearing was postponed because the applicant\u2019s debt for services had in the meantime increased; they had not prepared the documents for the increased amount of the debt. The plaintiff was ordered to submit the relevant documents by an unknown date in September 2008 and the next hearing was scheduled for 28 October 2008. 17.  On 28 October 2008 the City Court held the last hearing in the case; it refused a fresh application by the plaintiff to postpone the hearing once again. On 6 November 2008 the City Court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s claim against the applicant as unsubstantiated \u2013 the plaintiff had not proved that the expenses had actually been incurred and that they had duly reflected the services provided. On 27 November 2008 the plaintiff appealed against the judgment. On 28 November 2008 a judge of the City Court gave the plaintiff additional time to comply with the procedural requirements for lodging an appeal. On 2 December 2008 the plaintiff rectified those deficiencies. On 3 December 2008 the appeal was admitted and sent to the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d). 18.  The first hearing before the Regional Court was held on 13 September 2010. The plaintiff increased the amount of the claim because the applicant\u2019s debt for services had in the meantime increased to LVL 3,173 (approximately EUR 4,515) and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant\u2019s representative disagreed with the increase of the claim. The Regional Court admitted those documents to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 8 December 2010. 19.  On 8 December 2010 the Regional Court held the last hearing in the case. The plaintiff did not attend, nor did it inform the court of any reasons for its absence. The Regional Court decided to proceed with the case. On 22 December 2010 the Riga Regional Court partly allowed the plaintiff\u2019s claim and ordered the applicant to settle the debt in the total amount of LVL 2,854 (approximately EUR 4,059). Although the parties had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services, the applicant was obliged to pay for those services in accordance with domestic law. She could contest bills provided by the plaintiff, however she had failed to do so. The applicant had selectively paid some bills, but not all of them. The Regional Court refused the plaintiff\u2019s claim to receive contractual penalty (l\u012bgumsods) for late payment but awarded default interest of 6%. On 18 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 3 February 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ts) remitted it to the Regional Court as the applicant had not paid the security deposit for lodging it. Those deficiencies were rectified. 20.  On 3 April 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court, following a preparatory meeting, refused to institute proceedings on points of law.", "references": ["0", "8", "6", "1", "5", "4", "2", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Manisa. 5.  On 17 August 1999 the applicant\u2019s daughter, Nesrin Deliba\u015f, lost her life following the collapse of the building where she resided in D\u00fczce as the result of an earthquake (see M. \u00d6zel and Others v. Turkey, nos. 14350/05 and 2 others, \u00a7 16, 17 November 2015 for further details regarding that earthquake). According to official records, fourteen other people lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the same building. 6.  Shortly after the incident, criminal proceedings were brought against the contractor (H.E.) and the architect (S.D.) of the building in question. On 27 August and 31 August 1999 H.E. and S.D. were questioned by the police and the D\u00fczce public prosecutor, respectively. They denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building. 7.  During an expert examination of the remains of the building on 26 August 1999, certain problems were noted with the building\u2019s reinforcing rods. It was also noted that the metal brackets had not been properly fastened to the girders. Apart from H.E. and S.D., against whom charges had already been brought in connection with the collapse of the building, the experts also identified the involvement of T.A., a civil engineer, and \u0130.\u00d6., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality of D\u00fczce (\u201cthe Municipality\u201d), in the preparation and authorisation of the respective construction project. 8.  On 31 August 1999 the police questioned \u0130.\u00d6., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality. He denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building. 9.  According to another report dated 7 September 1999, the expert examination of the collapsed building revealed that the granulometry of the concrete used in the building was very poor, that the concrete contained a very high proportion of pebbles, that the water-to-cement ratio in the concrete mix was not appropriate and had resulted in the formation of pores in the concrete, and that the ironwork had worked loose from the concrete because the metal brackets had corroded. 10.  On 14 September 1999 the applicant asked to join the proceedings as a civil party. He added that he wished to lodge a criminal complaint against all individuals who had been involved in the construction of the defective building in their different capacities, including the public officials who had authorised its construction and occupation. 11.  On 23 September 1999 the D\u00fczce public prosecutor disjoined the investigation against the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality (\u0130.\u00d6.) from those against H.E. and S.D. in view of the special judicial procedures that had to be followed in respect of the prosecution of civil servants under the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials (Law no. 4483). 12.  On 24 September 1999 the D\u00fczce public prosecutor\u2019s office filed a bill of indictment with the D\u00fczce Assize Court against H.E. and S.D. in respect of the deaths caused by the collapse of the building in question on 17 August 1999. The public prosecutor accused them of endangering the lives of others by carelessness, negligence or inexperience under Article 383 \u00a7 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code in force at the material time (Law no. 765), emphasising in particular the structural shortcomings in the building noted by the experts (see paragraph 7 and 9 above). 13.  At the hearing held on 21 October 1999 the applicant requested the investigation of all municipal officials who had authorised the construction and occupation of the building despite its failure to comply with the relevant technical regulations. Over the course of the criminal proceedings, the applicant repeated this request at least ten times. 14.  According to an expert report added to the criminal case file on 29 April 2001, the following people had responsibility for all private construction undertaken within the municipal boundaries: (i) the contractor, who was responsible for the realisation of the project in compliance with the technical and work safety standards; (ii) the project engineer, who was responsible for all technical aspects of the project, including compliance with all relevant rules and regulations; (iii) the municipal representative, who was responsible for examining the calculations and the plan prepared by the project manager, verifying the compatibility of the project with the regulations in force, and authorising the project; and (iv) the technical implementation officer, who was in charge of inspecting the construction work on behalf of the Municipality. On this basis, the experts concluded that H.E. and S.D. bore 25% and 37.5% responsibility for the collapse of the building. The experts stated that they could not, however, offer opinions on the responsibility of anyone other than the two defendants in the case (H.E. and S.D.). 15.  On 21 June 2001 the D\u00fczce Assize Court held that the statutory period during which H.E. and S.D. could be held criminally liable in connection with a collapse of the building had started running in 1985 \u2013 when the last official licence for the building was obtained \u2013 and had already expired by the date of the earthquake. The case was accordingly discontinued for having become time\u2011barred. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 21 October 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. It held that the statutory time-limit was to be calculated from the date on which the building collapsed, that is to say from 17 August 1999, the date on which the offence in question had been committed. 17.  On 14 August 2003 an additional indictment was filed against T.A., the civil engineer who had taken part in the construction of the building in question (see paragraph 7 above). It was noted in the indictment that T.A. had obtained licences to secure the illegal extension of the building subsequent to its construction. 18.  On 11 December 2003 the D\u00fczce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged and sentenced each of them to 10 months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine, but decided to suspend execution of the sentences under Section 6 of the Execution of Sentences Act (Law no. 647). The applicant appealed against this judgment and once again requested an investigation into the responsibility of the relevant municipal officials in relation to the collapse of the building. 19.  On 6 July 2004 the Court of Cassation once again quashed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s judgment, this time as the court had not taken any decision as regards the applicant\u2019s request to join the proceedings as a civil party in respect of the case subsequently brought against T.A. 20.  On 5 October 2004 the D\u00fczce Assize Court commissioned a new expert report from the Y\u0131ld\u0131z Technical University in Istanbul. The expert report subsequently released on 21 April 2005 found that the building in question had collapsed on account of the structural problems noted in the earlier expert reports, as well as its illegal extension subsequent to its construction. It was also stated in the report that the defendants jointly bore 75% of the responsibility for the collapse of the building. The remaining 25% responsibility lay with the Municipality officials on account of their failure to duly inspect the building before issuing it with the necessary permits for occupation. 21.  On 7 June 2005 the D\u00fczce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged, and sentenced each of them, once again, to 10 months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. Execution of the sentences was suspended pursuant to Article 51 \u00a7 1 of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237). Relying on the findings of the later expert report as regards the responsibility of the municipal officials for the collapse of the building, it also decided that a criminal complaint should be filed against the relevant officials with the D\u00fczce public prosecutor\u2019s office. The defendant H.E lodged an appeal against this judgment. 22.  On 5 December 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment for the third time. It found that the assize court had failed to evaluate the case in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) which had entered into force on 1 June 2005. 23.  On 21 February 2007 the D\u00fczce Assize Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings in respect of all three of the defendants as the prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 24.  On 23 October 2007 the Court of Cassation held firstly that the decision of the first-instance court, in so far as it concerned S.E. and T.A., was null and void, since the earlier judgment of 7 June 2005 had already become final in their regard as they had not lodged an appeal. It then went on to uphold the decision to discontinue the proceedings in respect of H.E. only. 25.  On 16 August 2000 the applicant, along with his wife and other daughter, instituted compensation proceedings before the Sakarya Administrative Court against the the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (Bay\u0131nd\u0131rl\u0131k ve \u0130skan Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131), the D\u00fczce governor\u2019s office and the Municipality of D\u00fczce, in respect of the death of their daughter Nesrin Deliba\u015f. The applicant and his wife each claimed 2,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Their daughter claimed TRY 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage only. 26.  On 29 December 2005 the Sakarya Administrative Court commissioned an expert report to determine responsibility on the part of the administration for the collapse of the building. 27.  As regards the findings in the reports adduced to the criminal case file, the experts noted that the quality of the concrete used in the construction and certain structural elements of the building had been below the required standard. The building had, moreover, been illegally extended after its construction. The municipal officials had failed to duly inspect the building during its construction phase or before issuing the necessary permit for its occupation. They had also failed to carry out a soil survey in the area and to identify the potential \u201cdisaster zones\u201d in the event of an earthquake, with a view to limiting the height of buildings in such areas. The experts concluded that, in view of such failures, the Municipality had been 50% responsible for the collapse of the building in question. On the other hand, it found that the other two defendants had not been at fault. 28.  Relying on that expert report, on 27 June 2007 the Sakarya Administrative Court partially accepted the applicant\u2019s claims against the Municipality, and awarded him TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage in accordance with his request, plus interest. It also awarded his wife and daughter TRY 1,000 and TRY 500, respectively, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. It rejected their claims in respect of pecuniary damage as being unfounded. 29.  On 14 September 2007 the applicant and his family received a total of TRY 11,371.80 (approximately 6,455 euros (EUR) at the material time) from the Municipality as compensation. In the meantime, the Municipality appealed against the judgment of the Sakarya Administrative Court. 30.  On 23 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the lower administrative court.", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "7", "4", "2", "5", "3", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  By five judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court (\u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) of 5 March 2009, 18 January 2012, 31 March 2010, 30 April 2012 and 13 June 2011, which became final on 17 June 2010, 13 February 2012, 1 September 2010, 12 March 2013 and 21 July 2011, respectively, the Central Bosnia Canton (Srednjobosanski kanton, \u201cthe CB Canton\u201d; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicants various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. 6.  The writs of execution issued by the Municipal Court on 23 September 2010, 14 June 2012, 4 October 2010, 13 February 2013 and 25 October 2011, respectively, were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges on the debtor\u2019s account. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the Municipal Court that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 7.  On 26 February 2013 and 7 January 2014 the Ministry of Finance of the CB Canton (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) informed the bank that no funds for the enforcement of final judgments had been provided in the cantonal budget for 2013 and 2014 and that, accordingly, the final judgments against the canton could not be enforced. 8.  However, on 9 January 2015, upon the applicants\u2019 enquiry, the Ministry informed them that in 2013 the canton had designated 620,000 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for the enforcement of judgments and BAM 605,900 in 2014 for the same purpose. 9.  The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d). On 17 September 2014 (decision no. AP 3438/12) and 26 February 2015 (decision no. AP 4242/14), the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants\u2019 and five other cases, on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the CB Canton to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of the cantonal debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although some of the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation.\nThe relevant part of the decision of 17 September 2014 reads as follows:\n\u201c36.  ... The court notes that the judgments [in favour of the appellants] have not been enforced due to the lack of funds on the debtor\u2019s bank account.\n... 39.  The Constitutional Court reiterates that under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the European Convention all levels of government must secure respect for individual human rights, including the right to enforcement of final judgments under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ... The scope of that obligation is not reduced in the present case, notwithstanding the large number of judgments ... [T]he Constitutional Court notes that in Jeli\u010di\u0107 v. BiH, and again in \u010coli\u0107 and Others v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that \u2018it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, but the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 \u00a7 1\u2019 ... 40.  The Constitutional Court agrees with the position taken by the European Court ... it is nevertheless aware of the effects the global economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina...The court notes that the federal and the cantonal governments had taken certain steps with the view to enforcement of final court decisions. Section 138 of the Federal Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 provides that the final judgments against the Federation and the cantons shall be enforced within the amount of budgetary funds designated for that purpose ... and that the creditors shall enforce their claims in the order in which they acquired the enforcement titles ...\n... 42.  The court finds that the crux of the problem in the present case is that the CB Canton did not identify the exact number of unenforced judgments and the aggregate debt ... without which it is impossible to know when all the creditors will realise their claims against this canton. Furthemore, there should exist a centralised and transparent database of all the claims listed in chronological order according to the time the judgments became final. It should include the enforcement time-frame and a list of partial payments, if any. This will also help to avoid abuses of the enforcement procedure. These measure and adequate funds in the annual budget would ensure that all the final judgments are enforced within a reasonable time ... and the CB Canton would ensure the respect of its obligations from Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 44.  The court considers that the adoption of section 138 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 had a legitimate aim, because the enforcement of a large number of judgments at the same time would jeopardise the normal functioning of the cantons. However, the limitation of the enforcement in the present case is contrary to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which requires that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights ... Section 138 places a disproportionate burden on the appellants ... they are placed in a situation of absolute uncertainty as regards the enforcement of their claims ...\n... 46.  In order to comply with its positive obligation, the government of the CB Canton must, as explained above, calculate the total amount of the aggregate debt arising from the final judgments and prepare a comprehensive and transparent database ... This court will not specify what a reasonable time-limit should be ... but, in any event, it must be in accordance with Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 47.  ... The current situation does not give any guarantees to the appellants that their claims against the CB Canton will be enforced within a reasonable time\u201d. 10.  The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 26 February 2015 follows the same legal reasoning. 11.  On 19 January 2016 Mr Jasmin Hod\u017ei\u0107 and Ms Jasmina Mezild\u017ei\u0107 concluded out-of-court settlements with the government of the CB Canton pursuant to which part of their principal claims were to be paid within 15 days following the settlement. They renounced the remaining principal claim and default interest. The legal costs were to be settled by a separate agreement. From the information available in the case it transpires that no such agreement has been concluded. 12.  As regards the rest of the applicants, the final judgments in their favour have not yet been enforced.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "1", "8", "2", "5", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Turkish nationals, whose dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the appendix. They all own plots of land located in different cities of Turkey. 5.  Following local land development plans, the applicants\u2019 plots of land were designated for public use. Subsequently, complaining about the decrease in the market value of the land and the long-term uncertainty about the fate of their plots of land, the applicants initiated compensation proceedings before the civil courts. 6.  During the proceedings relating to their land, the applicants submitted the decision given by the Plenary Chamber of the Court of Cassation (civil divisions, numbered E.2004/5-555 K.2005/17) to the domestic courts and asserted that according to this decision their compensation claims had to be accepted. 7.  On various dates between 2007 and 2010, the applicants\u2019 respective claims for compensation were dismissed by the domestic courts on the ground that their plots of land were not actually seized by the authorities. In their decisions, neither the courts of first instance nor Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation, which examined the applicants\u2019 claims on cassation, expressed any reason as to why they had reached a different conclusion from the plenary Court of Cassation. 8.  The details of the proceedings may be found in the appended table.", "references": ["7", "0", "9", "5", "2", "1", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lived, prior to his arrest and conviction, in Moscow. 5.  On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Ch. He was charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms and aggravated murder. 6.  On 11 July 2006 the investigator questioned Sh., who had witnessed Ch.\u2019s murder. Sh. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. On 27 July 2006 she confirmed her earlier statements in the applicant\u2019s presence. On an unspecified date Sh. was admitted to hospital and was unable to attend the trial. 7.  On 28 March 2007 the trial by a jury opened in the Moscow City Court. 8.  On 10 April 2007 the jury returned a guilty verdict. The twelve jurors held the applicant responsible for the murder by ten votes to two, and for unlawful possession of firearms by nine votes to three. 9.  By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  On 18 April 2007 the applicant lodged a statement of appeal in which he alleged, inter alia, that Sh.\u2019s statement had been read out during the trial in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure. On 28 April 2007 he lodged a supplementary statement of appeal \u201cin connection with newly discovered circumstances\u201d. He wrote that he had found out that on several occasions the presiding judge had entered the room where the jurors had been deliberating and advised them to declare him guilty. The applicant asked the appellate court to take evidence from the jurors and to quash the conviction. 11.  On 14 May 2007 Judge Sht., who had presided over the applicant\u2019s trial, refused to amend the minutes of the trial to take note of the applicant\u2019s statement that the judge had been present during the jury\u2019s deliberations, had advised them as to how to fill out the questionnaire and had made comments about the applicant\u2019s character and guilt. 12.  On 21 May 2007 the applicant\u2019s representative obtained a statement, certified by a notary public from N., a juror. The juror stated that during the trial the presiding Judge Sht. had often visited the deliberations room, that he had spoken of the applicant\u2019s guilt as if it had been already established and that he had given them instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire. 13.  On 5 June 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint about the presiding judge\u2019s interference with the jury deliberations in the following terms:\n\u201cThe [applicant\u2019s] allegations ... that the presiding judge breached the secrecy of jury deliberations and that he entered the deliberations room and told the jury how they were supposed to answer the questions [issued by the judge] are not substantiated.\nIt follows from the trial record that the defence did not object to the actions of the presiding judge and did not allege any breach of confidentiality of jury deliberations.\nThe [applicant\u2019s] argument that he learned about those breaches only after the end of the trial is not grounds for quashing the conviction.\nThe additional documents submitted by the defence \u2013 the statement by one of the jurors certified by a notary public \u2013 may only give rise to an application to law-enforcement authorities, which would have to decide on the institution of criminal proceedings.\nMoreover, the jurors rendered the verdict by a majority vote rather than unanimously ...\u201d 14.  As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that Sh., a witness, was not questioned in person during the trial and that the presiding judge allowed an earlier statement of hers to be read out, the Supreme Court noted as follows:\n\u201cThe defence did not object to the reading-out of the statement by Sh., who did not appear in court on account of her undergoing treatment in hospital. Neither [the applicant] nor his counsel questioned the authenticity of the medical certificate submitted by Sh.\u2019s counsel ...\u201d 15.  By a letter of 16 July 2007, the Moscow city prosecutor\u2019s office rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the actions by the presiding judge by reference to the Supreme Court\u2019s findings in the judgment of 5 June 2007.", "references": ["6", "7", "2", "5", "4", "1", "8", "9", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  By a judgment of the Zenica Cantonal Court of 5 February 2007, three judgments of the Te\u0161anj Municipal Court of 30 July 2008, 31 March 2008 and 15 May 2009 and a judgment of the Zenica Municipal Court of 26 April 2007, which became final on 5 February 2007, 18 August 2008, 23 March 2009, 25 June 2010 and 27 March 2008, respectively, the Zenica-Doboj Canton (Zeni\u010dko-dobojski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicants different sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. 6.  The writs of execution issued on 2 March 2007, 5 April 2010, 2 March 2010, 14 December 2010 and 24 June 2008, respectively, by the Zenica Municipal Court and the Te\u0161anj Municipal Court, were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges on the debtor\u2019s account. 7.  On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 8.  On 12 July 2008 the first applicant, Mr Suljo Kuni\u0107, complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d). 9.  On 12 October 2011 (decision no. AP 2110/08) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in Mr Suljo Kuni\u0107\u2019s and ten other cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in the appellants\u2019 favour. It ordered the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of the cantonal debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time.\nThe relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201c39.  ... The court notes that the judgments [in favour of the appellants] have not been enforced due to the lack of funds on the debtor\u2019s bank account.\n... 45.  The Constitutional Court reiterates that under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the European Convention all levels of government must secure respect for individual human rights, including the right to enforcement of final judgments under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ... The scope of that obligation is not reduced in the present case, notwithstanding the large number of judgments... [T]he Constitutional Court notes that in Jeli\u010di\u0107 v. BiH, and again in \u010coli\u0107 and Others v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that \u2018it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, but the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 \u00a7 1\u2019 ... 46.  The Constitutional Court agrees with the position taken by the European Court ... it is nevertheless aware of the effects the global economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina ... The court notes that the federal and the cantonal governments had taken certain steps with the view to enforcement of final court decisions. Section 138 of the Federal Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 provides that the final judgments against the Federation and the cantons shall be enforced within the amount of budgetary funds designated for that purpose ... and that the creditors shall enforce their claims in the order in which they acquired the enforcement titles ... In 2010 and 2011 the amount of funds for that purpose in the budget of the Zenica-Doboj Canton was 100,000 convertible marks.\n... 48.  The court finds that the crux of the problem in the present case is that the Zenica-Doboj Canton did not identify the exact number of unenforced judgments and the aggregate debt ... without which it is impossible to know when all the creditors will realise their claims against this canton. Furthemore, there should exist a centralised and transparent database of all the claims listed in chronological order according to the time the judgments became final. It should include the enforcement time-frame and a list of partial payments, if any. This will also help to avoid abuses of the enforcement procedure. These measure and adequate funds in the annual budget would ensure that all the final judgments are enforced within a reasonable time ... and the Zenica-Doboj Canton would ensure the respect of its obligations from Article 6 \u00a71 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 50.  The court considers that the adoption of section 138 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 had a legitimate aim, because the enforcement of a large number of judgments at the same time would jeopardise the normal functioning of the cantons. However, the limitation of the enforcement in the present case is contrary to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which requires that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights ... Section 138 places a disproportionate burden on the appellants ... they are placed in a situation of absolute uncertainty as regards the enforcement of their claims...\n... 52.  In order to comply with its positive obligation, the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton must, as explained above, calculate the total amount of the aggregate debt arising from the final judgments and prepare a comprehensive and transparent database ... This court will not specify what a reasonable time-limit should be ... but, in any event, it must be in accordance with Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 54.  ... The current situation does not give any guarantees to the appellants that their claims against the Zenica-Doboj Canton will be enforced within a reasonable time.\u201d 10.  On 16 January 2013 the Constitutional Court adopted a procedural decision to the effect that its decision of 12 October 2011 and eight other decisions on the same matter in cases concerning various individual appellants (see paragraph 15 below) had not been enforced. 11.  The final judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour have not yet been enforced.", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "0", "5", "1", "7", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Mardin. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a student at the Philosophy Department of the Faculty of Arts and Science at Dicle University. 6.  On 28 March 2006 a funeral of four militants of the PKK (Kurdish Workers\u2019 Party), an illegal armed organisation, took place in Diyarbak\u0131r. 7.  An incident report regarding events that took place between 28 March and 1 April 2006 was prepared on 3 April 2006 by the police and was signed by more than 220 officers. It stated that on 24 March 2006 fourteen PKK militants had been killed by the security forces and that the remains of four of the militants were released to their families in order to be buried in Diyarbak\u0131r. On 28 March 2006 at around 7 a.m., the remains were taken to a mosque where around 1,500\u20112,000 people had gathered. The crowd blocked the traffic as they carried the coffins, chanted separatist, hostile slogans in Turkish and Kurdish in support of the organisation and Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK, and waved PKK posters and banners. The crowd then walked to a cemetery for the burial of the deceased. The security forces did not intervene as there were relatives of the deceased, including children and old people, in the crowd. The police report stated that after the burial ceremony had been completed, a group of about 1,000 people continued to march. They were warned by the police that they were not allowed to chant illegal slogans, disseminate propaganda in support of the organisation or wave illegal flags. However, the crowd became agitated and started throwing stones at the police officers on duty, injuring a number of them and causing extensive damage to State buildings and vehicles, banks, shops and other vehicles belonging to private individuals. According to the police report, more people later joined the illegal demonstration, which continued on 29, 30 and 31 March and 1 April. The report further stated that prior to those events some media organs controlled by the PKK had called for mass protests. 8.  On 5 March 2007 a demonstration was held on the campus of Dicle University to protest about the conditions of Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s detention, and in particular about his alleged poisoning by the Turkish authorities. A group of forty people entered the university building and asked the students to leave. They held a press conference on the premises of the university and chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah \u00d6calan. 9.  On 9 March 2007 the applicant was arrested. 10.  On 10 March 2007 he was questioned at the anti-terror branch of the Diyarbak\u0131r police headquarters where he denied taking part in both the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and the funeral of 28 March 2006 and the subsequent events. 11.  On the same day, the applicant made a statement to the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor. He was shown photographs that had been taken of him on 28 March 2006 and 5 March 2007 during the funeral and the demonstration at the university. The applicant accepted that he had participated in the funeral of one of the PKK militants. He stated that the militant had been a relative of a friend of his, that he had attended the funeral as a religious duty, but that he had not attacked the police with stones. The applicant also stated that on 5 March 2007 he had stood in front of the university building with other students for a short while and that his photograph must have been taken then. He stated that he had not chanted slogans with the demonstrators. 12.  The applicant was brought before a judge of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court later that day. He maintained that his statements to the public prosecutor had reflected the truth. The judge remanded the applicant in custody on the basis of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in support of a terrorist organisation or its purposes. 13.  On 8 May 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. The applicant was charged with disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and with membership of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 6 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code. The public prosecutor noted that on 28 March 2006 the applicant had participated in an illegal demonstration held under the pretext of a funeral; had chanted a slogan; and had covered his face with the hood of his coat during the demonstration. The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant had supported the chanting of slogans in favour of the PKK by applauding during the demonstration of 5 March 2007. The public prosecutor further claimed that the applicant had regularly, willingly and knowingly participated in illegal demonstrations organised by political parties, associations and persons who supported the PKK and that therefore he should be punished for membership of an illegal organisation. 14.  In support of the indictment, the public prosecutor submitted police video recordings of the funeral held on 28 March 2006 and the demonstration at Dicle University of 5 March 2007 to the court. In the first recording, the applicant was seen in a crowd next to a coffin making a \u201cV\u201d sign. In the second recording the applicant was again seen in a crowd with the hood of his coat on his head. In the third recording, the applicant was seen applauding with other students. 15.  On 19 June 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held the first hearing during which the applicant made defence submissions. He stated that he had attended the funeral on 28 March 2006 and that he had briefly participated in the gathering at the university on 5 March 2007. He accepted that he was the person in the photographs. He denied the accuracy of the allegation that he had chanted slogans during the funeral and the demonstration. He noted that he did not remember that he had made a \u201cV\u201d sign, but that he might have done so, along with the rest of the crowd. A witness was also heard by the trial court, and confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events of 5 March 2007. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention on remand. 16.  On 30 November 2007, at the end of the fourth hearing, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK, pursuant to Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 6 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code, and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was also convicted of two counts of disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, for which he received a sentence of a total of one year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment. 17.  The court first gave a summary of the applicant\u2019s defence submissions, the public prosecutor\u2019s observations on the merits of the case and the evidence in the case file. That evidence was the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the judge, dated 10 March 2007; a photograph relating to the funeral of 28 March 2006; printed versions of news articles published by various media in support of the PKK which had been downloaded from the Internet; the arrest and incident reports; reports on the video recordings; a copy of the leaflet distributed at Dicle University on 5 March 2007; reports by experts on the examination of the video recordings; the applicant\u2019s identity documents; and a document showing that he had no previous criminal record. 18.  In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, on the basis of the police video recordings and the photographs extracted from those recordings, that the applicant had attended the funeral of four PKK militants on 28 March 2006; that he had walked in front of one of the coffins during the funeral; and that he had made a \u201cV\u201d sign. Noting that the funeral had subsequently turned into propaganda for the PKK-KONGRA/GEL, thus an illegal demonstration, and considering that the applicant had walked close to the coffins, the court considered that the applicant had played an active role in the illegal demonstration. The court noted that it was not established that the applicant had chanted slogans during the funeral. As to the demonstration held on 5 March 2007 at Dicle University, the trial court noted that the applicant had applauded while other demonstrators had chanted slogans in support of Abdullah \u00d6calan. 19.  The Assize Court noted that the funeral of the PKK militants and the demonstration of 5 March 2007 had both been held in line with calls and instructions issued by the PKK. They had subsequently turned into propaganda events in favour of the PKK and had become illegal demonstrations. Hence, the court found it established that the applicant had acted with the intention of supporting the deceased on 28 March 2006 and had acted together with illegal demonstrators on 5 March 2007, thereby committing the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader. 20.  The Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court further referred to a decision dated 22 March 2007 (case no. 2006/9165, decision no. 2007/2432) of the Ninth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, in which the latter had considered that the acts of the accused demonstrators (participation in the demonstration of 28 March 2006 after calls for a demonstration had been made by the PKK, in accordance with the latter\u2019s aims; the chanting of slogans in support of the PKK and Abdullah \u00d6calan; singing the PKK\u2019s youth march song; burning tyres and blocking traffic; carrying PKK flags and banners and \u00d6calan posters; attacking public buildings, as well as police and civilian vehicles with stones and Molotov cocktails; carrying the bodies of the PKK militants who had been killed by the security forces) should be considered as offences committed on behalf of that organisation. The Court of Cassation found therefore that the accused should be punished for those offences and also be convicted of membership of an illegal organisation. Noting that the applicant had acted together with the aforementioned demonstrators on 28 March 2006, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court considered that the applicant\u2019s participation in the funeral and demonstration and his conduct at that time had also occurred as a result of instructions and calls by the PKK. The court considered that the applicant had acted on behalf of the organisation, in line with the goals and activities of the PKK, and that therefore he should be punished for not only disseminating propaganda, but also for membership of an illegal organisation. 21.  One of the three judges sitting on the bench of the assize court dissented. In his dissenting opinion, the judge stated that neither Article 220 \u00a7 6 of the Criminal Code nor the explanatory memorandum on Article 220 \u00a7 6 explained the concept of committing an offence on behalf of an illegal organisation. The dissenting judge noted that such an offence should be capable of producing a result for a terrorist organisation and its aims, such as the offences of aggravated injury, kidnapping, deprivation of liberty, murder or bombing. He also noted that such an offence should have devastating repercussions for society when the way of committing the offence, the time of the offence and its effects were taken into consideration. He finally opined that in order to conclude that non-members of an illegal organisation had committed an offence on behalf of that illegal organisation, there should be a decision to commit an offence on behalf of that organisation and an intention to join the organisation in question. The judge therefore concluded that the applicant should only have been convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 22.  The applicant appealed. 23.  On 29 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 30 November 2007 in so far as it related to the applicant\u2019s conviction under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 6 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code, for membership of an illegal organisation. The higher court, however, quashed the applicant\u2019s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on procedural grounds. 24.  On 23 March 2009 the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 29 January 2009 was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court. 25.  On 28 April 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 26.  On 17 October 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant\u2019s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 27.  On 14 December 2012 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court decided to suspend the criminal proceedings against the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, pursuant to Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit an offence when expressing ideas and opinions through the medium of the press or other media, or by any other method. 28.  In the meantime, on 25 October 2010 the applicant was expelled from Dicle University by the administrative board of the Faculty of Arts and Science because he had failed to complete his degree within the maximum period of seven years for an undergraduate programme. The case lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court on 5 June 2012. The court considered that the fact that the applicant had been serving a prison sentence did not justify his non\u2011attendance at classes and examinations. 29.  After serving four years and eight months of his sentence, the applicant was released from prison on 15 November 2011.", "references": ["5", "6", "8", "3", "9", "0", "1", "4", "2", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  The applicant had a daughter, K.M., who was born on 19 November 1985. 7.  On 7 September 2007 at 10 p.m. K.M., who was in the early weeks of pregnancy at the time, was at home with her parents and husband when she fainted and began to have convulsions. An ambulance was called, which arrived 40-45 minutes later. 8.  Upon arrival, the ambulance doctor, A.G., found K.M. nearly unconscious, with impaired breathing and low blood pressure. According to the applicant, the doctor was told at that point that K.M. was pregnant. A.G. diagnosed a convulsion syndrome, gave K.M. two injections \u2013 one of relanium and one of magnesium \u2013 and took her to hospital. It appears that neither the doctor nor the nurse nor the driver of the ambulance helped her family carry K.M. downstairs from the eighth floor of the building and put her into the ambulance. Moreover, although K.M. had not regained consciousness after the injections, A.G. chose not to sit beside her during the journey to hospital, but instead sat beside the driver in the driver\u2019s cab. 9.  On the same day A.G. and the nurse drew up an ambulance visit record stating that they had arrived seven minutes after receiving the ambulance call and that they had administered only one medical injection, of relanium. 10.  On 14 September 2007 K.M. died in hospital without ever regaining consciousness. 11.  On the same day the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Yerevan launched an inquiry into her death and ordered an autopsy, which was also carried out that day. According to its report (forensic medical opinion no. 728), K.M. died from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn had been caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels. 12.  During the inquiry, the investigator took statements from the medical personnel who had provided assistance to K.M., including A.G., the nurse, and the driver. In particular, in her statement of 14 November 2007 the nurse stated that the doctor had ordered her to administer an injection of magnesium sulphate but that K.M.\u2019s convulsions had continued, after which the doctor had handed her a phial of relanium, which she had injected. In her statement made on the same day A.G. explained that upon arrival they had found K.M. having seizures and that, from talking to her family, she had learnt that K.M. was pregnant. She had then ordered the nurse to inject relanium and, knowing that K.M. was pregnant, she did not inject any other medication and did not take any further measures since she did not consider it necessary in the circumstances. 13.  On 26 November 2007 the ambulance nurse and A.G. were questioned again. The nurse stated, in particular, that the fact that only the injection of relanium and not the one of magnesium had been mentioned in the ambulance visit record could possibly be explained by her having forgotten to remind the doctor about the injection of magnesium. A.G. stated, inter alia, that she had ordered the nurse to give two injections. 14.  In the course of the inquiry the investigator ordered a forensic medical investigation to be carried out by a panel of experts. According to the results of the opinion (forensic medical opinion no. 89) produced on 14 January 2008, the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew had been correct at the given moment, taking into account the patient\u2019s condition \u2212 that is to say convulsion syndrome \u2212 and the injection of the given quantity of those substances was not contra-indicated. The opinion also stated that K.M.\u2019s medical treatment had been correct and had corresponded to the diagnosis. 15.  On 27 February 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. 16.  On 29 February 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Yerevan, seeking a new forensic medical investigation in which he would be allowed to participate. In particular, he claimed that his daughter had died as a result of negligence by A.G., who had given her two injections of chemical substances, the use of which was contra\u2011indicated given K.M.\u2019s pregnancy, impaired breathing and low blood pressure. In this respect, the applicant referred to medical instructions on the use of relanium and magnesium and extracts from a medical book, copies of which he attached to his application. The applicant also alleged that the ambulance had arrived belatedly, had lacked essential medical equipment such as an oxygen cylinder, and that the ambulance crew in general had not acted with due diligence. 17.  On 3 March 2008 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to quash the decision of 27 February 2008 and remit the case to the investigator for further inquiry. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s request for an additional forensic medical investigation involving his participation was well-founded. 18.  On 5 March 2008 the investigator ordered an additional forensic medical investigation by a panel of experts which was asked to determine the following:\n\u201c1.  The cause of K.M.\u2019s death, whether she suffered from any illnesses from birth ... whether an illness she had suffered from birth could have caused her death or somehow have a causal link to her death. 2.  Whether the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew was correct, whether the quantity was within that allowed and whether injecting magnesium might have entailed negative consequences. 3.  Whether there was any medication (in medical theory, in science) or medical approach the administration of which could have improved K.M.\u2019s condition and whether it should have been administered by the ambulance crew or in hospital. Whether the medical treatment had been appropriate and sufficient or whether omissions had occurred and, if so, who had been responsible for them. 4.  K.M.\u2019s transfer to the hospital took about 40 minutes; whether speedier transfer to the hospital would have made it possible to save K.M. 5.  Whether K.M.\u2019s five-week pregnancy contributed to the emergence and development of her illness, whether the pregnancy and the illness she was diagnosed with had a direct causal link with each other. 6.  K.M.\u2019s hospital record ... contained notes concerning the medical assistance, injections and medication and the doctors who had administered them over seven days. Whether the medical treatment provided had been correct, the injected medication correctly chosen with regard to type and quantity and whether these were permissible or not. If not, which doctor was responsible for errors and finally whether the medical treatment administered had brought about death. 7.  The scientific methods on which forensic medical opinion no. 728 and the forensic medical opinion no. 89 of the panel of experts were based, whether these were supported by medical literature and which methods had been applied during previous examinations... 19.  On 23 April 2008 the panel of experts delivered its report (forensic medical opinion no. 6), the conclusions of which read as follows:\n\u201c1  and 8: No information indicating that K.M. had congenital disorders was discovered, according to the medical documents. K.M.\u2019s death resulted from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn was caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels. As regards prior diseases resulting in functional disorders which could have brought about the convulsion syndrome, it was impossible to draw any conclusions in the absence of relevant medical documents. 2.  Injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the emergency care specialists was correct in view of the presence of the convulsion syndrome at the given moment. Not injecting magnesium at the given moment could have entailed negative consequences. 3.  In the case in question the medical assistance provided by the ambulance crew and in hospital was appropriate and sufficient, without omissions, which is substantiated by the data contained in the medical documents and by the evidentiary material in the case file. 5.  K.M.\u2019s five-week pregnancy was not linked to the cause of her death since the pregnancy and the illnesses did not have a direct causal link with each other either. 7.  Opinion no. 728 concerning the forensic medical examination of K.M.\u2019s corpse and opinion no. 89 produced by the forensic medical investigation panel are accurate and well\u2011founded; scientific methodologies were applied: histological examinations of the organs of the corpse were performed, and leading specialists of the Ministry of Health participated in the panel examination. 20.  On 25 April 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. The decision stated in particular that the relevant members of the medical personnel, including the emergency care specialists who had provided first aid assistance to K.M., had been questioned. It further reiterated the conclusions of the experts reflected in the forensic medical opinions nos. 89 and 6 and stated that the initial medical assistance administered as first-aid and the subsequent hospital treatment provided to K.M. had been performed properly, appropriately and in a timely manner without any errors or omissions. 21.  On the same day the investigator lodged a request with the director of the \u201cEmergency Medical Service\u201d State Close Joint Stock Company of the Yerevan Municipality (\u201cthe Emergency Medical Service\u201d) seeking to impose an appropriate penalty on the ambulance crew. In particular, the investigator stated that there had been a 40-minute delay before the ambulance arrived and that only one of two injections given to K.M. had been mentioned by the ambulance doctor in the visit record. Furthermore, the process of taking the patient to hospital had been slow and disorganised. The ambulance driver had not carried the patient downstairs and had not assisted in putting her in the ambulance. Instead of sitting beside K.M., whose condition was extremely critical, the doctor had chosen to sit in the driver\u2019s cab next to the driver. The investigator\u2019s conclusion was therefore that the ambulance crew had arrived after a serious delay and had not provided proper medical assistance. 22.  On 30 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan concerning the investigator\u2019s decision of 25 April 2008 seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against A.G. and the nurse. The applicant submitted, in particular, that the panel of experts performing the additional forensic medical investigation had not taken due account of his arguments, which had been based on relevant medical literature and Government decrees. He reiterated his arguments with regard to the contra-indication of relanium and magnesium in cases of pregnancy and low blood pressure and the other arguments previously submitted in his complaint lodged with the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 23.  On 16 May 2008 the medical council of the Emergency Medical Service held a meeting at which the circumstances described in the investigator\u2019s decision of 25 April 2008 were discussed. It appears that the members of the ambulance crew submitted written \u201cexplanations\u201d (\u0562\u0561\u0581\u0561\u057f\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576) in relation to the events of 7 September 2007. As a result, A.G. received a reprimand for serious breach of work regulations and medical ethics. Also, the head of the relevant emergency department was ordered to improve the supervision of employees as regards respecting work regulations, so as to prevent similar occurrences in future, and to examine every such case. 24.  On 26 May 2008 the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the inquiry into K.M.\u2019s death had been thorough and adequate. In doing so, the District Court referred to the results of the fresh forensic medical opinion. As regards the late arrival of the ambulance, incorrect completion of the visit record and the doctor\u2019s failure to sit beside the patient during the journey to the hospital, the District Court referred to the fact that A.G. had been reprimanded for poor performance of her duties. 25.  On 16 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Criminal Court of Appeal. He argued, in particular, that the District Court had failed to question A.G. and the nurse. Furthermore, the District Court had not adequately addressed their arguments concerning the injection of K.M. with substances that were contra-indicated, given her condition, or the over-dosage thereof which, he alleged, had caused her death. 26.  On 4 September 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court. In doing so, it stated that there was no necessity to summon A.G. and the nurse to testify in court since they had already made statements during the inquiry. As regards the applicant\u2019s arguments with regard to the contra\u2011indication of medical substances administered by injection to K.M., the Court of Appeal relied on the forensic medical opinions according to which their administration had been correct, taking into account the convulsion syndrome at that moment. 27.  On 30 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation against the decision of the Court of Appeal. 28.  On 30 October 2008 the Court of Cassation decided to refuse the examination of the appeal on points of law (\u057e\u0573\u057c\u0561\u0562\u0565\u056f \u0562\u0578\u0572\u0578\u0584\u0568 \u0569\u0578\u0572\u0576\u0565\u056c \u0561\u057c\u0561\u0576\u0581 \u0584\u0576\u0576\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576) since it had not been lodged by an advocate (\u0583\u0561\u057d\u057f\u0561\u0562\u0561\u0576) licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, as required by Article 404 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant claims that he could not afford the costly services of such an advocate.", "references": ["5", "3", "7", "8", "9", "1", "2", "6", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Hamburg. He is the brother of the late Y.C., also a Gambian national, who was born in 1987 and applied for asylum in Austria in 2004. 6.  On 4 April 2005, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht) convicted Y.C. of drug trafficking and sentenced him to seven months\u2019 imprisonment. Y.C. began serving his sentence at Vienna\u2011Josefstadt Prison (Strafvollzugsanstalt). On 2 May 2005 he was transferred to Linz Prison. 7.   On 18 April 2005 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion) dismissed Y.C.\u2019s asylum application and ordered his expulsion to the Gambia. An appeal lodged by Y.C. was dismissed by the Vienna Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) on 6 June 2005. He did not appeal against this decision and it became legally binding on 5 July 2005. 8.  On 8 September 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority issued an order for Y.C. to be placed in detention with a view to his expulsion. 9.  On 12 September 2005 Y.C. was conditionally released from prison and directly transferred to the Linz police detention centre (Polizeianhaltezentrum \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe detention centre\u201d). 10.  Upon his admission to the detention centre, Y.C. was examined by a police doctor (Polizeiarzt), who noted that Y.C. was in a good general state and was fit for detention. His weight was recorded at 76.5 kg and his height at 170 cm. Communication between the authorities and Y.C. took place in English. 11.  On 26 September 2005 the police doctor, while conducting a routine examination which all detainees have to undergo at two-week intervals, again noted that Y.C.\u2019s state of health was good and recorded his weight at 70 kg. 12.  On 27 September 2005 Y.C. went on hunger strike. On 28 September 2005 he informed the authorities thereof. Representatives of Human Rights Association Austria (Verein Menschenrechte \u00d6sterreich), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) who had already been counselling him since the day of his admission to the detention centre, came to talk to him. On the same day Y.C. was subject to an initial hunger-strike examination (Hungerstreik-Eingangsuntersuchung). Y.C. was handed an information pamphlet on hunger strikes (in English) and was also orally informed by the public medical officer of the possible consequences of a hunger strike. A medical hunger-strike protocol (Hungerstreikprotokoll) was filled out, in which his state of health was described as follows:\n\u201cMusculature in a good, well-trained state, pronounced muscles of the upper arm, six-pack like someone who practices athletic sports, appears vital, overall.\u201d 13.  On the hunger-strike protocol it was noted that at the outset of his hunger strike, Y.C. had weighed 67 kg. On the basis of this, Y.C.\u2019s \u201ccritical weight\u201d was calculated at 54 kg (see paragraph 64 below). Under the heading \u201creasons given for hunger strike\u201d, it was noted that Y.C. \u201cabsolutely wanted to be transferred back to cell no. 36\u201d. He had been placed in a different cell because he and his cellmates had allegedly tried to escape from cell no. 36. 14.  Daily health checks of Y.C. were subsequently carried out, during which his weight was checked, his blood pressure was taken and his oxygen saturation level was measured. Until 1 October 2005, no anomalies were detected. 15.  On 2 October 2005 the public medical officer noted that Y.C.\u2019s tongue was slightly dry, and on 3 October 2005 that his lips were \u201cbarky\u201d (borkig). Further, there were occasional comments on the hunger-strike form to the effect that Y.C. resisted examination and was \u201cmalingering\u201d (simuliert) \u2013 for example, he had \u201cpretended to fall\u201d, \u201crefused to be examined\u201d, \u201cneeded to be carried by other detainees\u201d, and \u201ctilted over from [his] chair in an ostentatious manner\u201d. 16.  After examining Y.C. during the morning of 4 October 2005, Dr F.G., the police doctor in charge, noted the following:\n\u201cPretends to be weak, has to be physically supported by two detainees \u2013 therefore weight check not possible. Dry tongue, barky lips. I request a medical assessment by a specialist. Possibly blood test, ionogram.\u201d 17.  On 4 October 2005 at 9.30 a.m., Y.C. was taken to Linz General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus) for examination and an assessment of whether he was fit enough for further detention. Because Y.C. resisted the examination and kicked out at a nurse, his hands and feet had to be shackled by the police officers who had accompanied him to the hospital. According to a report drawn up by the treating doctor on 4 October 2005, it was \u201cnot possible to assess the intake of liquids\u201d, \u201ccommunication [was] difficult\u201d because Y.C. did not speak German, he had \u201cdry lips\u201d and had his eyes \u201cconstantly closed\u201d, but \u201cwalking [was] possible if [he was] supported\u201d. The hospital further noted that if his general condition worsened, he would have to be force-fed and taken to a psychiatric ward, because he \u201clashed out from time to time\u201d. Taking his blood for a blood test had been difficult and risky; nevertheless, with the support of the two police officers, who secured Y.C. in a chair in the examination room, the doctor nonetheless managed to take a small amount of blood. After consulting the senior doctor, the treating doctor formally confirmed Y.C.\u2019s fitness for detention and noted the police doctor\u2019s telephone number in order to contact him after obtaining the results of the blood test. 18.   Y.C. was subsequently taken back to the detention centre and at around 11 a.m. was placed alone in a security cell (Sicherheitszelle) because of his behaviour at the hospital. His shackles were removed. The security cell did not contain a water outlet, but Y.C. could request a water bottle at any time. A police officer checked on Y.C. every fifteen to thirty minutes. At 12.30 p.m., Y.C., who was lying on the bed, reacted to the police officer\u2019s presence by lifting his head. When the officer next checked, at 12.50 p.m., he was not breathing anymore and had no pulse. At 1.20 p.m. he was declared dead by an emergency doctor who had been immediately called to the scene. The presumed time of death was 12.40 p.m. His weight was recorded at 59 kg. At 1.42 p.m. the blood test results from the hospital examination (see paragraph 17 above) were produced. They indicated that Y.C. had been dehydrated and that he should have been hydrated intravenously and placed in intensive care. 19.  In a report of 5 October 2005 the doctor from the hospital noted that Y.C. had been uncooperative during his examination. It had been virtually impossible to take a blood sample as the patient had resisted strongly. At that time nothing had indicated that Y.C.\u2019s physical condition could become life-threatening. In a statement given on 14 October 2005 the doctor described Y.C. as not having been weak at all, rather, he had been physically strong and had steadily resisted treatment with all his might (nach Leibeskr\u00e4ften), using the whole of his body and kicking out with his legs. After examination of his tongue, pulse, respiration, heartbeat and skin, he had observed Y.C.\u2019s dry lips, but had seen none of the other usual signs of dehydration or other abnormalities. He further stated that even as an experienced emergency unit doctor, a rapid and fatal development of Y.C.\u2019s situation had not at all been foreseeable by him. 20.  On 4 October 2005, the day of Y.C.\u2019s death, the Linz public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe public prosecutor\u201d) instituted a criminal investigation against \u201cunknown offenders\u201d and requested the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) to conduct a judicial investigation. The investigating judge ordered that an autopsy be conducted by a sworn and judicially certified expert (beeideter und gerichtlich zertifizierter Sachverst\u00e4ndiger); the autopsy was conducted on 5 October 2005. On the same day, the investigating judge, in response to a request made by the public prosecutor, delivered a decision ordering the seizure of the blood samples taken from Y.C., together with the pertinent examination report. 21.  On 5 October 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority submitted a detailed report on the circumstances of Y.C.\u2019s death. 22.  On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor requested the Office for Internal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior (B\u00fcro f\u00fcr interne Angelegenheiten des Bundesministeriums f\u00fcr Inneres \u2013 hereinafter the \u201cOIA\u201d) for it to carry out an investigation. The request included that interviews be conducted with: the two police officers who had accompanied Y.C. to the hospital on the day of his death; the police doctor who had examined Y.C. on that day; the doctor at Linz General Hospital who had examined Y.C.; the police officers who had been checking on Y.C. when he was placed in the security cell; and Y.C.\u2019s cellmate. 23.  On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor added to the case file a note regarding a telephone conversation between him and Dr H., the expert who had conducted the autopsy, regarding the preliminary findings of that autopsy. 24.  The OIA subsequently conducted an investigation at the detention centre\u2019s medical service, procured documents from the detention centre, and produced written records of the requested interviews (see paragraph 22 above). The OIA\u2019s report was submitted to the public prosecutor on 18 October 2005. 25.  On 24 October 2005 the investigating judge complied with a request lodged by the public prosecutor for the inclusion in the case file of the results of the investigation up until that date, as well as for Y.C.\u2019s medical history to be obtained from the detention centre, and for these documents to be transmitted to the expert Dr H. It was further decided that the scale used to weigh Y.C. at the detention centre be seized and sent for technical examination. 26.  On 5 November 2005 the OIA submitted a report containing the results of the supplementary investigation. 27.  On 1 December 2005, after being supplied with all pertinent documents by the OIA, the Austrian Human Rights Advisory Board (Menschenrechtsbeirat \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Advisory Board\u201d \u2013 an independent monitoring body established in 1999 at the Ministry of the Interior) issued a report on Y.C.\u2019s death. In that report, the Advisory Board considered several points to be problematic: that Y.C., after his visit to Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005, had been further monitored only by police officers, rather than by medical professionals; that no interpreter had been present during the said hospital visit; that a blood sample had been taken from Y.C. against his will; and that the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight had been questionable. The issues of Y.C.\u2019s possible dehydration and carrying sickle cell disease had not been addressed in the report, as it had been drawn up before the delivery of the final autopsy report by Dr H. (see paragraph 30 below). 28.  On 12 December 2005 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, joined the criminal proceedings as a private party. 29.  By an order of 14 December 2005 the investigating judge urged the expert to submit his report. 30.  On 4 January 2006 Dr H., the forensic expert who had conducted the autopsy, submitted his final autopsy report (dated 5 October 2005), as well as his expert report on Y.C.\u2019s death, to the Linz Regional Court. He stated in the autopsy report that Y.C.\u2019s body had not shown signs of \u201csignificantly acute malnutrition\u201d, nor had there been signs of \u201cclassic dehydration\u201d. 31.  In the more detailed expert report, Dr H. stated that Y.C.\u2019s body had not shown signs of any injuries; therefore, death caused by the use of force could be excluded. Y.C. had been slim, but had not appeared malnourished. His body had weighed 59.3 kg; his height had been 171 cm. No typical external signs of dehydration had been visible, except for the lips appearing to be slightly dry. The results of the internal investigation had recorded a thickening of the blood, which indicated a possible alternation to the blood while Y.C. had still been alive caused by a lack of hydration. Dr H. noted that a hunger strike alone could not lead to a thickening of the blood, as long as enough fluids were consumed. As concerns the hunger strike, Dr H. stated that it was likely that Y.C. had not eaten solid food for several days, but that it was unlikely that he had engaged in a long-term total hunger strike as the large intestine had still been filled with an abundance of stool along its entire length. 32.  Dr H. further stated that neither Y.C.\u2019s external appearance nor the medical reports produced until 4 October 2005 had indicated a life\u2011threatening situation, although there had been a significant reduction in his weight. Rather, it was more likely that a shift in the electrolyte system had commenced over a period of several days, as indicated by the results of the blood test conducted by Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005. A post-mortem examination of Y.C.\u2019s blood (conducted in the course of the autopsy) had shown that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait (Sichelzellanlage). Dr H. explained that sickle cell disease (Sichelzellenkrankheit) was an inherited red blood cell disorder; while red blood cells (containing normal haemoglobin) were disc-shaped, sickle haemoglobin could form stiff rods within the cell, changing it into a sickle shape. Dr H. added that the disease was rare among the white population, occurring mostly among black people. Unlike in the case of people suffering from sickle cell disease, in Y.C.\u2019s blood the trait had been present in the heterozygous form, which is why the disease had remained undetected during his lifetime. In cases like Y.C.\u2019s, symptoms of sickle cell disease only manifested themselves if there were further damaging external factors, such as dehydration or a lack of oxygen. 33.  Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death had been dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, which had caused a shift in the electrolyte system and had ultimately caused his heart to stop beating. Neither the authorities nor Y.C. himself had been aware that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait. Dr H. stated that Y.C.\u2019s death could only have been prevented if he had been tested earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. However, the hunger-strike protocol had not indicated any necessity for a blood test in that respect. The test results from the hospital on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death would have given reason for further tests. However, the results had only been produced after Y.C.\u2019s death. 34.  On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor made a note in the criminal file (Aktenvermerk) about a conversation with Dr H. The doctor had expressed the opinion that with hindsight Y.C.\u2019s extraordinarily aggressive behaviour at the hospital on the day of his death had resembled a delirious state caused by advanced dehydration and the consequent disintegration of his blood cells. 35.  On 13 January 2006 the public prosecutor decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into the death of Y.C., as no sufficient evidence could be found to warrant criminal proceedings. The applicant was informed that he had the right to ask the Council Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Linz Regional Court to conduct a preliminary investigation. However, he was also informed that he would have to bear the full costs of the criminal proceedings should the Council Chamber grant his request but the proceedings did not result in a criminal conviction. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 19 January 2006. The applicant did not request that a preliminary investigation be instituted. 36.  On 2 March 2006 the applicant submitted the decision of 13 February 2006 issued by the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabh\u00e4nigiger Verwaltungssenat Ober\u00f6sterreich \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe IAP\u201d) (see paragraph 46 below) to the public prosecutor and requested him to investigate further. On 13 March 2006 the public prosecutor replied that the documents submitted had already been made available to him, but that they could not change his assessment of the procedural results obtained so far, since every aspect of the legal question to be answered had already been clarified by Dr H.\u2019s autopsy report and his comprehensive expert report. 37.  On 15 November 2005 the applicant requested the IAP to review the lawfulness of Y.C.\u2019s detention (Schubhaftbeschwerde) and at the same time lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention (Ma\u00dfnahmenbeschwerde). He submitted in particular that Y.C. should not have continued to be kept in detention because he had no longer been fit to be detained on account of his hunger strike. As regards the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention, he submitted that the medical treatment of Y.C. had not been in conformity with section 10(1) of the Detention Ordinance (Anhalteordnung \u2013 see paragraph 59 below). He furthermore claimed that his brother had been placed in a security cell, without access to water, on the day of his death, in contravention of section 5(5) of the Detention Ordinance. 38.  On 13 February 2006 the competent member of the IAP held a hearing during which he examined as witnesses the applicant, a cellmate of Y.C., one of the police doctors who had examined Y.C. during his hunger strike, and the police officers who had been in charge of examining detainees on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death. 39.  Y.C.\u2019s former cellmate, H.C., stated that they had gone on hunger strike together to protest the duration of their detention, and that they had not been treated correctly by the police officers; however, he did not specify how that treatment had not been correct. He said that he did not remember the exact day on which they had begun their hunger strike, but that they had not eaten or drunk anything at all for twelve days. H.C. stated that he had had the impression that Y.C. had been \u201cterribly weak\u201d during the three days before his death. 40.  According to the witness statements by employees of the NGO Human Rights Association Austria who had visited Y.C. on several occasions, Y.C. had not raised any allegations of ill-treatment during their visits. In fact, with the exception of his former cellmate, all other witnesses who had been in contact with Y.C. until his death had also stated during the IAP hearing that he had not appeared to be ill or weak, but that on the contrary, even on the day of his death he had seemed athletic and strong; which had been corroborated by photographs taken of his dead body and its description by Dr H. in the autopsy report (see paragraph 30 above). 41.  One of the police doctors, Dr F.G., gave evidence regarding, inter alia, the reason why the calculation of the critical weight of a detainee on hunger strike was based on his or her weight at the outset of the hunger strike, and not the weight recorded upon admission to the detention centre. He stated that detainees usually lost weight slightly during their detention, but that it was also possible for them to gain weight. He acknowledged that he had not even checked Y.C.\u2019s initial weight, as the 65.5 kg recorded on the day after Y.C. had announced his hunger strike had in principle amounted to a normal weight, given his height. Dr F.G. furthermore stated that on 3 October 2005 Y.C. had walked into the examination room without support. One day later, Y.C. had showed signs of dehydration and had come to the examination room supported by two police officers. Dr F.G. stated that he had accordingly ordered him to be examined at the hospital. 42.   H., the police officer who had accompanied Y.C. to and from the hospital on the day of his death, stated that the reason for Y.C.\u2019s placement in solitary confinement had been that \u2013 following Y.C.\u2019s behaviour at the hospital \u2013 he and the other officer in charge had feared that Y.C. might harm himself or others. H. confirmed that there had been no water outlet in the security cell, but that Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time by ringing a bell. 43.  B., the police officer who had been in charge of checking on Y.C. while he was being held in the security cell, stated that he had received an order to do so every fifteen to thirty minutes. During the checks, he had had to make sure that the detainee reacted when spoken to. When B. had checked on Y.C. at 12.30 p.m., the latter had moved his head. At the next check at 12.50 p.m., he had showed no reaction and had subsequently been pronounced dead by the emergency doctor, who had immediately been called to the scene. 44.  During the IAP hearing on 13 February 2006 the applicant presented an undated and unsigned three-page statement by Dr W.G., whom he had engaged himself and who was a general practitioner in Linz with a focus on nutritional medicine. Dr W.G, who had not examined Y.C.\u2019s body, had based his report on the autopsy report and expert report issued by Dr H., the report of the OIA (see paragraph 24 above) and the report by Linz General Hospital, and had come to the following opinion. On 12 September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had been taken into detention with a view to his expulsion, he had weighed 76.5 kg. On 28 September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had announced that he was on hunger strike, he had had a body weight of only 67 kg. The police doctor had made a mistake in taking the latter as the normal weight of Y.C. for the purposes of calculating his critical body weight. The doctor had not taken into account the fact that Y.C. had already lost 9.5 kg between 12 and 28 September 2005, meaning that Y.C. must have already started his hunger strike before he had officially announced it. From 28 September until the day of his death on 4 October 2005, Y.C. had lost a further 8 kg in body weight. However, the doctor had used Y.C.\u2019s weight on 28 September (namely 67 kg) as a starting point, and had established his critical weight as 54 kg, which in Dr W.G.\u2019s view was incorrect. The police doctor should have based his calculations on how much Y.C. had weighed when he had arrived at the detention centre. If he had, the correct critical weight would have been determined at 67 kg, minus 10%. Instead, Y.C. at the time of his death had already lost approximately 18% of his weight in fluids. For an adult person a loss of even 10% in fluids constituted a life-threatening situation. Dr W.G. assumed that Y.C. had died of dehydration resulting from the erroneous calculation of his body weight. He did not deal with the question of how far the sickle cell trait present in Y.C.\u2019s blood had played a role in his death, nor did he provide any scientific source for his calculations. Dr W.G.\u2019s opinion was later not supported by any of the official experts. 45.  The applicant asked the IAP that the second police doctor in charge at the detention centre on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death be questioned, and that another expert report be obtained in order to refute the expert report issued by Dr H. (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP refused these requests. 46.  The IAP, at the end of the hearing of 13 February 2006, ruled that Y.C.\u2019s detention pending his expulsion had been unlawful and that the conditions of detention during his hunger strike had violated Y.C.\u2019s right under Article 3 of the Convention to protection against ill-treatment. Concerning the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death, the IAP reiterated the findings of the autopsy report and the expert report attached thereto (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP argued that the State authorities had not fulfilled their role of guarantor of the applicant\u2019s rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. It found that given the frequency of sickle cell disease among people from sub-Saharan Africa, the State was under an obligation to offer a test for sickle cell disease to all detainees from that specific geographic area, and in particular to those on hunger strike. 47.  The Ministry of the Interior appealed against that decision. 48.  On 30 August 2007, the Administrative Court quashed the IAP\u2019s decision. It held that the applicant had no locus standi regarding the request for a review of the lawfulness of the detention of his brother because rights under Article 5 of the Convention were not transferable to other persons. Therefore, the IAP had not had authority to issue a decision in that respect. Concerning the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, it held that the mere fact that a person was detained did not place any duty on the State to take measures (the need for which had not necessarily been foreseeable) because of the genetic disposition of that person without a manifest outbreak of disease in that person. Moreover, it found that the IAP had not respected certain procedural requirements, which is why the Administrative Court referred the case back to the IAP. 49.  On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning the above-mentioned judgment of the Administrative Court; it was registered as Ceesay v. Austria (no. 17208/08). Thereupon, the IAP decided to suspend the fresh proceedings until such time as the Court rendered its decision in respect of this complaint. 50.  On 21 May 2010 the Court declared application no. 17208/08 inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention, as the proceedings were still pending before the IAP and the complaints lodged by the applicant with the Court were therefore premature. 51.  The IAP resumed the proceedings and on 11 June 2010 again issued a decision finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention. It essentially reiterated the reasoning contained in its previous decision, explaining that the proceedings were not aimed at identifying an individual who could be held culpable for Y.C.\u2019s death but at identifying errors inherent in the detention system \u2013 specifically, the lack of a standardised test for sickle cell disease for certain high-risk groups and the lack of clear instructions for the staff of the detention centre concerning detainees on hunger strike. 52.  The Ministry of the Interior again lodged a complaint, arguing that there had been sufficient rules and instructions in place concerning the treatment of detainees. In the present case, there had not been any indications that Y.C. had suffered from sickle cell disease. Not even hospitals conducted standardised tests for this blood anomaly where there was no concrete suspicion in that respect. It added that the death of Y.C. had nonetheless prompted the Ministry of the Interior to issue a directive to detention centre authorities instructing them to (i) inform detainees who were on hunger strike and who belonged to a high-risk group of the possible consequences of sickle cell disease, and (ii) conduct the necessary tests. 53.  On 20 October 2011 the Administrative Court again quashed the IAP\u2019s decision. It reminded the IAP that it was bound by the legal interpretation that the Administrative Court had expressed in its previous judgment concerning the obligations of the State under Article 3 of the Convention towards detainees (see paragraph 48 above). Moreover, it suggested that the IAP order an expert report in order to determine whether the reduced mental and physical condition of Y.C. should have given rise to an investigation into the possibility that he had been suffering from sickle cell disease and whether appropriate medical treatment from that moment onwards could have prevented the death of Y.C. 54.  During the course of the new round of proceedings, the IAP ordered an expert report, as suggested by the Administrative Court. In a report dated 19 May 2012, as well as during the hearing of 21 June 2012, the expert in question, Dr L., confirmed that according to his findings, Y.C. had been a sickle cell trait carrier. He added that this was the case in respect of 30% of the population of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Gambia (where Y.C. had been from), and that this trait served as a protection from Malaria. The fact that a person was a carrier of sickle cell trait did not mean that he or she was ill or had a lower life expectancy. Nonetheless he or she would face a higher risk of death in the event of engaging in strenuous activities (anstrengungsassoziierte Todesf\u00e4lle), and the trait could also cause rapid dehydration in the event of reduced liquid intake. Dr L. explained that sickle cell disease could only be detected through an analysis of blood samples, but that the need for such an analysis had at no point been clearly indicated in Y.C.\u2019s case, even in the light of his reduced mental and physical condition. 55.  The applicant submitted the same unsigned statement that he had already submitted during the hearing of 13 February 2006 (see paragraph 44 above). He did not submit any further requests. When the expert Dr L. was questioned by the IAP regarding the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight, he stated that he was inclined to believe that Y.C.\u2019s weight had been correctly calculated, but that that calculation had been wrongly recorded. In his opinion, it was unlikely that Y.C. could have lost 9 kg over the course of a sixteen-day hunger strike. 56.  On 13 July 2012 the IAP dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint about the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention, basing its decision on the finding contained in the expert report of Dr L. (see paragraph 54 above) that the need for an analysis of Y.C.\u2019s blood in respect of sickle cell trait had not been indicated. It reiterated that according to the Administrative Court\u2019s legal interpretation, by which it was bound, the State had no duty to take measures the need for which had not been foreseeable in respect of a person because of a certain genetic disposition without a manifest outbreak of the disease in that person. Therefore, the authorities\u2019 conduct had not constituted a violation of Article 3. 57.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on 22 November 2013. 58.  On 25 April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court, which, referring to its decisions of 30 August 2007 and 20 October 2011, dismissed it. This decision was served on the applicant on 16 May 2014.", "references": ["6", "9", "2", "3", "7", "8", "5", "4", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  The applicant has been involved in various political organisations and local and international non-governmental organisations for a number of years. In 2009 he co-founded a political organisation named the Republican Alternative Movement (\u201cREAL\u201d) whose initial goal was to oppose the proposed changes to the Constitution, which included abolition of the limits on the re-election of the president, at the constitutional referendum of 18 March 2009. In 2012 the applicant was elected REAL\u2019s chairman. In this capacity, he expressed views opposing the current Government (for more detail, see an earlier judgment of this Court, Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, \u00a7\u00a7 6-7, 22 May 2014). According to the applicant, REAL was quickly becoming one of the main political forces opposed to the ruling Government. In 2014 it announced that it was beginning a process of transforming itself into a political party. 7.  The applicant had intended to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections of November 2013, but was unable to do so owing to the events giving rise to the present case and his nomination as a candidate was rejected by the electoral authorities (for more detail, see Ilgar Mammadov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 8 and 62-67). During the events giving rise to the present case, he also made an unsuccessful attempt to have himself registered as a candidate for repeat parliamentary elections in Agdash Constituency No. 90 in June 2016. 8.  Following the applicant\u2019s arrest described below, another member of the REAL board, Mr Rasul Jafarov, was arrested under charges of illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion and abuse of power (for more detail, see Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, 17 March 2016). According to the applicant, four other current or former members of the REAL board were forced to leave the country owing to the \u201cpressure by the Government\u201d. 9.  In the below-mentioned criminal proceedings, one of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants was Mr Tofiq Yaqublu, who was a deputy chairman of the Musavat Party and who also worked as a columnist for the Yeni Musavat newspaper (see Yagublu v. Azerbaijan, no. 31709/13, 5 November 2015). Pursuant to a presidential pardon decree of 17 March 2016, Mr Yaqublu was released from serving the remainder of his prison sentence. 10.  The circumstances relating to the Ismayilli events and the applicant\u2019s visit to Ismayilli are described as follows in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 9-12):\n\u201cB.  The Ismayilli events of January 2013 9.  On 23 January 2013 rioting broke out in the town of Ismayilli, located to the northwest of Baku. According to media reports quoting local residents, the rioting was sparked by an incident involving V.A., the son of the Minister of Labour and Social Protection and nephew of the Head of the Ismayilli District Executive Authority (\u2018IDEA\u2019). It was claimed that after being involved in a car accident, V.A. had insulted and physically assaulted passengers of the other car, who were local residents. On hearing of the incident, hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local residents took to the streets and destroyed a number of commercial establishments (including the Chirag Hotel) and other property in Ismayilli thought to be owned by V.A.\u2019s family. 10.  On 24 January 2013 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office issued a joint press statement, placing the blame for the rioting on E.S., a hotel manager, and his relative [El.M.], who had allegedly been drunk and who, it was claimed, had committed acts of hooliganism by damaging local residents\u2019 property and inciting people to riot. 11.  Meanwhile, [N.A.,] the Head of IDEA, V.A.\u2019s uncle, publicly denied that the Chirag Hotel belonged to his family. 12.  On 24 January 2013 the applicant travelled to Ismayilli to get a first\u2011hand account of the events. On 25 January 2013 he described his impressions from the trip on his blog. The entire post read as follows:\n\u2018Yesterday afternoon I spent a little longer than two hours in Ismayilli, together with [another member] of our Movement [REAL] and our media coordinator... First, here is [the summary of] what I wrote on Facebook during those hours using my phone:\n- We have entered the town.\n- There is a lot of police and their number is growing. The protesters gather each hour or two and make speeches. We are in front of the building of the [Ismayilli District] Executive Authority. There are around 500 police officers in this area.\n- The cause of the events is the general tension arising from corruption and insolence [of public officials]. In short, people have had enough. We are having conversations with local residents.\n- The [ethnic] Russians of the village of Ivanovka are also fed up; they tried to come to [Ismayilli] to support the protest, but the road was blocked and they were sent back.\n- Everybody is preparing for the night.\n- We are leaving Ismayilli, returning to Baku. The matter is clear to us. Quba was the first call. Ismayilli is the second. After the third call, the show will begin.\nWe came back after having fully investigated the situation in Ismayilli. I wrote that clashes would again take place in the evening, by posting \u2018everybody is preparing for the night\u2019 [on Facebook]. People there had been saying \u2018We\u2019ll give them hell in the evening; we have procured supplies\u2019 (meaning the fuel for Molotov cocktails had been bought). People are angry. There are also those who do not care and who are afraid, but those who are not afraid are very exasperated and will continue the protest at night. This is no longer a political situation where we could stay there and try to change something; this is already a situation of disorderly crisis which requires conciliatory steps by the State to be resolved.\nNo one should fool oneself or others. The events in Ismayilli were not and are not a calm peaceful protest, it is an extremely violent but just protest and the responsibility for it lies with Ilham Aliyev.\nAs it is with all revolutionary processes, in the beginning the political initiative is still in the hands of the President, but by not taking action he is gradually losing this initiative. When [such leaders] begin to react to the situation, it is usually too late and their actions have no effect. Mubarak, the Shah of Iran, and all others have gone this way\u2019.\u201d 11.  A day before posting the above in his blog, on his way back by car from Ismayilli to Baku on 24 January 2013, between 5.41 and 5.46 p.m. the applicant gave a live interview to Azadliq Radio by phone, stating in particular as follows (as quoted in the domestic courts\u2019 judgments):\n\u201cOur impressions are such that, after the Quba events, this is the most serious warning to the Azerbaijani leadership that the State can no longer be governed in this manner. So, we saw a lot of police. And so, we saw up to five hundred members of various forces, the police and internal troops in front of [the IDEA building]. And people held discussions in small groups and from time to time small groups united and, for example, shouted slogans. Their main demand was for [the Head of the IDEA] to apologise for these events. Because it is claimed that his relative had caused the initial incident [that sparked the riot]. However, the government representatives consider that the State is not responsible [for these events]. Thereafter we spoke to many people from the local population. All of them were discontent, and the main reason was, of course, last night\u2019s event, that is apparently the car accident [that sparked the riot]. But in reality there are deep social and economic problems at the root of this incident. A few families, a few small groups control the entire economy of the whole region, all of them are one another\u2019s relatives, there can be no talk of any competitive, just economy, social infrastructure is undeveloped, people live from pension to pension. Then, there are many complaints. Ordinary people say, for example, that when cash for pensions is brought [to the region] by a bank car, the cash is put into ATMs and is available for withdrawal a week later. The people suspect that that money is invested for interest during that week and those responsible for this make profit from the interest gained on the social funding of the entire region.\u201d 12.  Subsequent circumstances are described as follows in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 13-15):\n\u201c13.  On 28 January 2013 the applicant posted more information on his blog concerning the events, citing the official websites of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Taxes and publishing screenshots of those sites. In particular, he noted that, according to those sources and to information posted on V.A.\u2019s Facebook account, the Chirag Hotel was actually owned by V.A. This directly contradicted the earlier denial by the Head of IDEA. The information cited by the applicant was removed from the aforementioned Government websites and V.A.\u2019s Facebook page within one hour of the applicant publishing his blog entry. However, the blog entry itself was extensively quoted in the media. 14.  On 29 January 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a new joint press statement concerning the events in Ismayilli. It noted that ten people had been charged with criminal offences in connection with the events of 23 January 2013, and had been detained pending trial. In addition, fifty\u2011two people had been arrested in connection with their participation in \u2018actions causing a serious breach of public order\u2019; some of them had been convicted of \u2018administrative offences\u2019 and sentenced to a few days\u2019 \u2018administrative detention\u2019 or a fine, while others had been released. The statement further noted that \u2018lately, biased and partial information has been deliberately disseminated, distorting the true nature of the mentioned events resulting from hooliganism\u2019, including information about large numbers of injured people and the disappearance of one individual. The statement refuted that information, noting that only four people had been admitted to the regional hospital with injuries and that no one had disappeared. It further stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u2018Following the carrying out of inquiries, it has been established that on 24 January 2013 the Deputy Chairman of the Musavat Party, Tofiq Yaqublu, and the Co\u2011chairman of the REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov, went to Ismayilli and made appeals to local residents aimed at social and political destabilisation, such as calls to resist the police, not to obey officials and to block roads. Their illegal actions, which were calculated to inflame the situation in the country, will be fully and thoroughly investigated and receive legal assessment.\u2019 15.  On 30 January 2013 the applicant commented on that statement on his blog. He noted that the Government had taken a decision to \u2018punish and frighten\u2019 him, and that there were several reasons for that: firstly, the applicant\u2019s blog posting of 28 January 2013, which had revealed facts embarrassing the Government; secondly, the fact that REAL had raised a public debate on the June 2012 legislative amendments aimed at keeping secret information concerning shareholders in companies, creating \u2018a more clandestine environment for stealing the oil money\u2019; thirdly, the applicant\u2019s earlier criticism of the National Assembly, in which he compared it to \u2018a zoo\u2019, following enactment of the legislation placing \u2018severe limitations on the freedom of assembly\u2019 by \u2018introducing unjustifiably high monetary penalties for attending unauthorised demonstrations\u2019; and lastly, the REAL Movement\u2019s \u2018quickly accumulating strength\u2019 prior to the presidential election, becoming a \u2018serious barrier in the eyes of the traditional [political] players\u2019 and threatening \u2018to spoil the repeat of the election farce performed year after year\u2019.\u201d 13.  On 4 February 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office charged the applicant with criminal offences under Articles 233 (organising or actively participating in actions causing a breach of public order) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code, in connection with his alleged involvement in a riot in the town of Ismayilli on 24 January 2013. On 30 April 2013 the applicant was charged under Articles 220.1 (mass disorder) and 315.2 of the Criminal Code, thereby replacing the original charges. 14.  The applicant, Tofiq Yaqublu and two other defendants, E.I. and M.A., charged solely in connection with the events of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 20 (b) and (c) below) were joined as defendants to the existing criminal case concerning the events of 23 January 2013. 15.  The specific actions attributed to the applicant were described as follows:\n\u201cBeginning at around 3 p.m. on 24 January 2013, Ilgar Eldar oglu Mammadov,\nhaving taken advantage of the fact that from around 9.30 p.m. on 23 January 2013 a group of persons in the town of Ismayilli had engaged in acts of malicious hooliganism causing a serious breach of public order, had deliberately burned, in a publicly dangerous manner, property belonging to various persons [including] the Chirag Hotel, four cars, five mopeds and scooters, and an auxiliary building located in the yard of a private residential house, and had committed acts of violence against Government officials,\nhaving, in his false way of thinking, considered [the above events] as a \u2018rebellion\u2019,\naiming to make the above acts develop and acquire a continuous character in order to create artificial tension and to violate the social and political stability in the country,\nbeing a resident of Baku, arrived in Ismayilli and, together with Tofiq Rashid oglu Yaqublu and with the active participation of others, [committed the following:]\norganised, as an active participant, acts causing a serious breach of public order, by means of openly and repeatedly inciting town residents [E.I.], [M.A.] and others, who had gathered at the square near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department located on the Nariman Narimanov Street opposite to the administrative building of [the IDEA], [to do the following:]\n[i]  to enter in masses into the area in front of the building of [the IDEA], which is the competent body of the executive power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and by doing so to create difficulties for the movement of traffic and pedestrians, [ii]  to disobey the lawful demands to disperse, made by Government officials wanting to stop their illegal behaviour, [iii]  to resist uniformed police officers protecting the public order, by way of committing violent acts posing danger to [police officers\u2019] life and health, using various objects, [iv]  to disrupt the normal functioning of [the IDEA], State enterprises, bodies and organisations, as well as public-catering, commercial and public-service facilities, by way of refusing to leave, for a long period of time, the areas where the acts seriously breaching the public order were being committed, and [v]  to stop the movement of traffic, by way of blocking the central avenue and the Nariman Narimanov Street, and\nwas finally able to achieve that, at around 5 p.m. of the same day in the town of Ismayilli, a group of persons consisting of [E.I.], [M.A.] and others had marched in masses from the mentioned square in the direction of the administrative building of [the IDEA] and had thrown stones at officers of the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were preventing [this march] in accordance with the requirements of the law.\nBy these actions, Ilgar Eldar oglu Mammadov committed the criminal offences under Articles 233 [later replaced by Article 220.1] and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.\u201d 16.  The circumstances relating to the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and the pre-trial proceedings are described in detail in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 16-55). 17.  In that judgment, the Court found that, during the pre-trial period, the applicant had been deprived of his liberty without a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d of having committed a criminal offence, in breach of the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 87-101), that he had not been afforded a proper judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 111-19), that his right to presumption of innocence under Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention had been breached owing to the prosecuting authorities\u2019 prejudicial statements made before he had been proved guilty according to law (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 125-28), and that the restriction of the applicant\u2019s liberty had been applied for purposes other than bringing him before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, constituting a breach of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 137-44). 18.  After completion of the pre-trial investigation, the applicant\u2019s case was sent to trial at the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes. The applicant was to be tried, together with seventeen others, in connection with the Ismayilli events. 19.  The applicant\u2019s formal indictment sent by the prosecution to the trial court appears to have essentially repeated the initial accusations against him (see paragraph 15 above). It added, however, that as a result of the acts of mass disorder committed at around 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, six specifically named police officers had been subjected to violence threatening their lives and health (see paragraph 48 below). 20.  Out of the seventeen other defendants:\n(a)  fourteen were accused of participating in the riots on 23 January 2013 (which involved actions breaching public order, burning of private property, and acts of violence against public officials). They were charged under Articles 186.2.1, 186.2.2, 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code;\n(b)  one defendant, Mr Tofiq Yaqublu, also an opposition politician, was accused, like the applicant, of \u201corganising\u201d and actively participating in public disorder on 24 January 2013 by means of inciting local residents to commit acts breaching public order and acts of violence. Like the applicant, he was charged under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code; and\n(c)  two defendants, E.I. and M.A., were accused of participating, together with the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu, in the continuation of the riot on 24 January 2013 (which involved actions breaching public order and acts of violence against public officials). They were also charged under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code. 21.  On 4 November 2013 the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes held a preliminary hearing at which it examined a number of applications lodged by the applicant and other defendants. 22.  In particular, the applicant applied to the court requesting, firstly, that it hold its hearings in a larger courtroom which could accommodate media representatives and, secondly, that it allow for video and audio recording of the hearings. The court rejected the first request, noting that no media representatives had asked to attend the hearings. It also rejected the second request, finding that the victims of the criminal offences participating in the preliminary hearing had objected to being recorded during the trial. 23.  After a break in the preliminary hearing, the defence lodged an objection to the composition of the court, referring to the fact that it had rejected the two previous requests. The court refused to examine the objection, finding that it was ill-founded and intended to delay the trial. It noted in this connection that most of the text of the objection had been pre\u2011printed before the hearing, indicating an intention by the defence to object to the composition of the court no matter what happened at the hearing. 24.  The defence then applied to the court with the following requests:\n(a)  that the applicant be released from detention, with reference to Article 5 of the Convention and various provisions of the domestic law;\n(b)  that the proceedings against the applicant be discontinued owing to the absence of corpus delicti and on the grounds that the charges against him were false; and\n(c)  that the evidence against the applicant obtained at the pre-trial stage, including statements by a number of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 below), be declared inadmissible on the grounds that it had been unlawfully obtained, and that letters from the Ismayilli Region Police Department (\u201cthe Ismayilli RPD\u201d) and the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d) (see paragraph 73 below) also be declared inadmissible on the grounds that they contained information that had not been verified independently by the prosecution authorities. 25.  By an interim decision of 5 November 2013, delivered following the preliminary hearing, the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes decided to reject the applicant\u2019s requests as unsubstantiated, and to \u201ckeep unchanged\u201d the preventive measure of remand in custody. 26.  The trial spanned approximately thirty hearings. During the course of the hearings, the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes examined testimonial evidence, as well as video recordings and other material. 27.  At the time of communication of the application to the respondent Government, the Court requested the parties to submit, inter alia, \u201cthe transcripts of the first-instance and higher courts\u2019 hearings, in the parts relating to the applicant\u201d. The applicant was not in possession of copies of the trial transcripts, as he was allowed only to consult them. The Government failed to submit full copies of the transcripts of the first\u2011instance hearings in the parts relating to the applicant, and limited themselves to submitting a small selection of transcripts of the preliminary hearing and transcripts of hearings of 29 November and 29 December 2013 and 13 January 2014, where the first-instance court dealt with various procedural matters. Parts of the transcripts containing full statements of the witnesses and their cross-examination were not submitted. The Government also submitted a selection of transcripts of appellate and cassation hearings. 28.  Below is a brief summary of the evidence examined by the trial court, as described in the court\u2019s judgment itself as well as, where relevant, in the indictment and in the parties\u2019 submissions.\n(a)  Statements made by the accused 29.  The statements of the fourteen defendants charged with participation in the events of 23 January 2013 (see paragraph 20 (a) above) concerned only the events of 23 January 2013 and did not include any pertinent information about the events of 24 January 2013. The court examined both the statements they had made at the trial hearings and their pre-trial statements. 30.  When heard at the trial hearings, thirteen of the above-mentioned fourteen defendants pleaded not guilty and made statements differing from those made at the pre-trial stage. Ten of them alleged that they had given their pre-trial statements under duress, either psychological pressure or physical ill-treatment. At the conclusion of the trial, two of them retracted their allegations of ill-treatment in custody. 31.  One of the above-mentioned fourteen defendants admitted his guilt and confirmed his pre-trial statement admitting participation in public disorder on 23 January 2013. 32.  E.I. and M.A., the defendants charged with participation in clashes with the police in the morning (around 10:30 a.m.) and the afternoon (around 5 p.m.) of 24 January 2013 (allegedly after having been incited by the applicant) (see paragraph 20 (c) above), did not mention the applicant or Tofiq Yaqublu in their statements. 33.  At the trial hearings, E.I. pleaded not guilty and alleged that he had been beaten and tortured by investigators at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings with the purpose of obtaining a statement favourable to the prosecution. He stated that between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 24 January 2013, there was a crowd of a hundred or so people moving in the direction of the IDEA building. The police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd, and in response the protesters threw stones at the police. E.I. further stated that in the afternoon of 24 January 2013, and more specifically between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., he had not been in the town at all but had been attending a funeral in a nearby village. A number of other witnesses gave statements, some of which confirmed his version of the events (see paragraph 46 below). 34.  In his pre-trial statement, E.I. had stated that he had been in the town in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and had participated in the clashes with the police; he had not specified the exact time. 35.  At the trial hearings, M.A. pleaded not guilty and alleged that he had been beaten by investigators at the pre-trial stage with the purpose of obtaining a statement favorable to the prosecution. In addition, the investigators had demanded a bribe in the amount of 2,000 US Dollars from him. As to the events of 24 January 2013, M.A. stated that he had been in the town between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and that there had been many people in the town centre. In the afternoon, he had left Ismayilli for another town. According to the applicant, in order to prove this, M.A. had asked the court to examine records of the calls made from his mobile phone during the afternoon of 24 January 2013, but the court failed to do so. 36.  In his pre-trial statement, M.A. had stated that on 24 January 2013 he had joined the crowd of protesters and thrown stones at the police; he had not specified the exact time. 37.  Lastly, Tofiq Yaqublu and the applicant testified as follows. 38.  At the trial hearings, Tofiq Yaqublu stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at or shortly after 4 p.m. on 24 January 2013, together with journalists M.K. and Q.M. (see paragraphs 61 and 64 below) and another journalist. They parked close to a Unibank building located near the IDEA building. They saw a number of police officers in the area. There were also many journalists waiting to interview the head of IDEA. Tofiq Yaqublu spoke to those journalists for two minutes. He then received a call on his mobile phone and, while talking on the phone, saw the applicant together with a REAL member, N.C. (see paragraph 58 below). He stopped for five to ten seconds to quickly greet the applicant. The situation in the area was calm. He then went to see the burned hotel, where he was approached by two or three police officers who asked him to accompany them to a police station. In the police station, he was taken to S.K., a senior police officer of the Ismayilli RPD (see also paragraph 45 below), who enquired about the reasons for his visit to Ismayilli. A little later M.K. was also asked by phone to go to the police station. Both of them were told to leave Ismayilli and to report in Baku that the situation in the town had calmed down. They were then allowed to leave the police station. According to Tofiq Yaqublu, not counting the time he had spent at the police station, he spent about ten minutes in total in Ismayilli. During that time, he did not see any crowds or any clashes and did not hear anyone shouting slogans. He left Ismayilli at around 5 p.m. 39.  Tofiq Yaqublu\u2019s statement at the trial slightly differed from his pre-trial statement. In particular, in his pre-trial statement, Tofiq Yaqublu had stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at around 3 p.m. There he had seen a small group of eight to ten young locals. He had approached them and questioned them very briefly about the events of the previous night. 40.  In his statement at the trial hearings, the applicant submitted that his arrest had been politically motivated. As to the events in question, he stated that, after hearing about the events of 23 January 2013 in the news, the next day he and N.C. (see paragraph 58 below) had gone to Ismayilli by car. At around 3.30 p.m. on 24 January 2013 they had entered the Ismayilli Region and had arrived in the Ismayilli town centre at around 4 p.m. On the way to the town centre, they stopped from time to time and spoke to local residents, without getting out of the car, to receive information about the events that had taken place up to that time. In the town centre, they parked at the central square, where there was a group of journalists. He spoke to the journalists who told him that, despite the situation being calm at that moment, there was an atmosphere of tension in the town. While standing next to the journalists, he then posted some observations on his Facebook page. Just then he saw Tofiq Yaqublu passing by, speaking on his mobile phone. They greeted each other. After that, he, N.C. and one of the journalists went to a nearby teahouse. While they were in Ismayilli, there were no crowds of protesters and no violent clashes happening. After spending around thirty minutes in the teahouse, they left the town. On the way back to Baku, he gave a telephone interview to Azadliq Radio.\n(b)  Statements made by victims and witnesses 41.  The trial court heard around one hundred witnesses, the majority of whom were prosecution witnesses. Twenty-three of them had the status of victims of criminal offences and were mostly either police officers who had allegedly suffered minor injuries or owners of damaged or destroyed property.\n(i)  Witness statements concerning the events of 23 January 2013 42.  The majority of witnesses and victims of the criminal offences gave statements concerning solely the events of 23 January 2013. According to their statements, there was a spontaneous riot by local residents in the evening of 23 January 2013, sparked by violent behaviour of the director of the Chirag Hotel (E.S.) and his companion (El.M.), both of whom were heavily inebriated, after a car accident in which they had been involved. E.S. and El.M. repeatedly insulted and physically assaulted the other car\u2019s driver and some local residents who were in the vicinity of the accident. This resulted in a fight where E.S. and El.M. got beaten up and, with more people joining the fight, it eventually escalated into a riot. The riot continued late into the night and resulted in injuries to a number of people, including several police officers, and the destruction of various property. 43.  The victims included the owner, employees and guests of the hotel and a few bystanders who had lost their property, as well as a number of injured police officers. For example, one of the victims, V.Az., a maid employed by the hotel, stated that some of her personal belongings had been destroyed during the events of 23 January 2013.\n(ii)  Witness statements concerning the events of 24 January 2013\n(\u03b1)  Witnesses who did not mention personally seeing the applicant 44.  Two police officers stated that there was public disorder on the morning of 24 January 2013 (according to one, between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.; according to the other, between about 11 a.m. and noon). A crowd moved from the area near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department in the direction of the IDEA building, throwing stones at the police. One of the two police officers, E.A., stated that between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., he had been injured by a stone thrown at him and had been immediately taken to hospital. 45.  S.K., a senior police officer of the Ismayilli RPD, gave a lengthy statement about the events of 23 January 2013. As to those of 24 January 2013, he stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been detained and brought to him at the police station, and that at that time he had been informed that the applicant had also been in Ismayilli but had been \u201clost among the crowd and disappeared\u201d. S.K. had spoken to Tofiq Yaqublu for about half an hour, and thereafter the latter had been released. According to S.K., there had been outbreaks of unrest throughout the day on 24 January 2013. 46.  Thirteen residents of Ismayilli or various villages around Ismayilli made statements, mostly very scant, containing various types of information relating to the events of 24 January 2013. None of those witnesses\u2019 statements related directly to the charges against the applicant or Tofiq Yaqublu. Seven of them stated that on the afternoon of 24 January 2013, they had travelled in the same bus as E.I. (see paragraph 33 above) from one of the villages in Ismayilli Region to the town of Ismayilli, and had arrived in the evening, by which time there was unrest in the town. Three of them specified that they had arrived in the town between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m., while three others stated that they had arrived between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. or when \u201cit was already dark\u201d. One did not specify the time of arrival.\n(\u03b2)  Police officers 47.  Ten police officers mentioned in their pre-trial statements that they had seen the applicant on 24 January 2013. Some of them stated that there had been disorder between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 24 January 2013. They further stated that on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (according to three of them, at around 4 p.m.; according to two of them, at around 5 p.m.; according to four of them, between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m.; and one of them did not specify the exact time), they had seen a crowd gathered near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department (only two of them specified the size of the crowd, one of whom stated that there were twenty people, and the other \u2013 two hundred people). According to the documents in the case file, at least three of them stated that the people moved to the area close to the Regional Education Department along the \u201chospital road\u201d, which was the informal name for M.F. Akhundov Street used by locals. All ten of them further stated that they had also seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu among the crowd, inciting people to act unlawfully by telling them to \u201cblock the road, disobey orders, throw stones, go towards the IDEA building\u201d, and that, following this, the crowd had moved towards the IDEA building and thrown stones at the police. 48.  According to their own pre-trial statements (as summarised in the first-instance court\u2019s judgment), six of the above-mentioned police officers had allegedly been hit by stones thrown by the crowd on the afternoon of 24 January 2013. All six of them were recognised as \u201cvictims of crime\u201d. Two of them stated that they had not sustained any injuries because they had been wearing thick winter coats, while the others either stated that they had received only minor injuries or did not mention any injuries. One of them was the police officer who subsequently retracted his pre-trial statement (see paragraph 49 below), including the allegation that he had been hit by a stone. There were no medical records or other evidence in respect of any injuries to those police officers. According to the applicant, the very first time the above-mentioned six police officers were questioned about the events of 24 January 2013 was five months later, between 24 and 27 June 2013, and it was at that time that it was first alleged that they had had stones thrown at them on the afternoon of 24 January 2013. The Government remained silent in respect of these specific allegations by the applicant and did not submit any relevant documentary evidence refuting them. Neither did the Government submit full copies of these police officers\u2019 pre-trial statements or relevant excerpts of the trial transcripts reflecting their statements at the trial hearings. 49.  One of the above-mentioned six police officers gave a differing statement during the trial hearings, claiming that he had been at the police station the whole day on 24 January 2013. He stated that he had not seen any of the accused committing or inciting others to commit acts of disorder. He explained that he had signed his pre-trial statement without having read it. According to the applicant, three months after the first-instance court had delivered its judgment, that police officer was dismissed from the police service. 50.  According to the applicant, another police officer also initially retracted his pre-trial statement, giving a similar explanation to that of the above-mentioned officer, but after a break in the hearing, he asked to be heard again and informed the court that he confirmed the content of his pre\u2011trial statement. The Government did not submit the transcripts reflecting the statements of this witness at the trial and did not otherwise comment on the above allegation by the applicant. 51.  The other police officers\u2019 statements at the trial hearings appeared to confirm their pre-trial statements.\n(\u03b3)  Other witnesses 52.  According to the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, two residents of Ismayilli, R.N. and I.M., stated that between about 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 24 January 2013 they had seen a crowd of people near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department. They had also seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting them to riot, after which the crowd moved in the direction of the IDEA building committing acts of mass disorder. Both R.N. and I.M. specified that the crowd moved in the direction of the building of the Regional Education Department, and from there in the direction of the IDEA building, along the \u201chospital road\u201d (M.F. Akhundov Street). 53.  According to the applicant, during cross-examination by the defence, which was not reflected in the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, both of those witnesses, especially R.N., had given answers contradicting their earlier statements. In particular, the applicant claimed in his appeal (see paragraph 117 below) that, in his witness statement, R.N. had said that from around 3 p.m. on 24 January 2013 he had been at his relative\u2019s home for lunch. After lunch, sometime before 5 p.m., he had gone to the area next to the Regional Education Department, where he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting a large crowd of people to riot and that thereafter the crowd had attacked the police with stones. During cross-examination at the trial hearings, in response to a question by the defence, he had stated that, in connection with this criminal case, he had participated as a witness in the questioning by the prosecution authorities only two days after the Ismayilli events, and that he had not been a participant in any other investigative steps and had not signed any other procedural documents relating to this case. Following that response, the defence produced a copy of the record of the inspection of the damage to the Chiraq Hotel and N.A.\u2019s house, which had been conducted from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 65 below). According to the record, R.N. had been present during the inspection as an attesting witness and had signed the inspection record. Despite the fact that this had revealed a clear inconsistency between the record and R.N.\u2019s testimony and his responses to the defence\u2019s questions, raising a number of questions as to the witness\u2019s integrity and the truthfulness of his statements, the presiding judge had hastily dismissed the witness without giving the defence an opportunity to ask any more questions. 54.  Similarly, according to the applicant, witness I.M.\u2019s statement contained contradictory details and he had been unable to respond to the defence\u2019s questions seeking clarification. Moreover, the defence had found out that that witness\u2019s son was an employee of the burned hotel owned by V.A. 55.  The Government remained silent in respect of the above-mentioned allegations by the applicant in respect of R.N. and I.M.\u2019s self-contradictory statements and did not submit any relevant documentary evidence refuting them. Neither did the Government submit full copies of these witnesses\u2019 pre-trial statements or relevant excerpts of the trial transcripts reflecting their statements at the trial hearings. 56.  One resident of a nearby village, R.B., who had been in the town on 24 January 2013, stated, briefly, that there had been disorder in the centre of the town between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. and that he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu in the crowd. R.B. specified that the protesters moved towards the town centre along the \u201chospital road\u201d (M.F. Akhundov Street). According to the applicant, R.B. also stated that he had not heard exactly what the applicant and Tofiq Yagublu had been saying to people around them (see paragraph 116 below for more detail). 57.  N.M., a journalist, stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli between about 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. together with N.C. He had seen several other journalists in the town centre. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. The applicant did not make any inflammatory statements to local residents. After a while, the witness had gone to a teahouse together with the applicant. 58.  N.C., the applicant\u2019s colleague from REAL who had travelled together with the applicant and N.M. to Ismayilli, stated that they had arrived in the town at around 4 p.m. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. After staying in the square near the IDEA building for twenty-five to thirty minutes, they had gone to a teahouse. At around 5 p.m. they had left the town. 59.  I.A., a journalist, stated that there had been some disturbances in the town between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and that the police had used water cannons and rubber bullets against the protesters. At around 4 p.m. other journalists had arrived from Baku. The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had arrived with them. At that time, there had been no unrest and no clashes with the police. The applicant had invited him for a tea, but he had refused. At around 5 p.m. the applicant had left the town together with N.M. and N.C. After they had left, in the evening, there had been clashes between protesters and the police, which had continued until around 11 p.m. 60.  M.R., a journalist, stated that she had contacted the applicant by phone from Baku while he was in Ismayilli on 24 January 2013. 61.  M.K., a journalist, stated that he had travelled to Ismayilli together with Tofiq Yaqublu. They had arrived a little after 4 p.m. Very shortly after their arrival, Tofiq Yaqublu had been taken by plain-clothed individuals to the police station. A few minutes later, he himself had gone to the same police station, where both of them had been told that the situation in the town was now calm and had been asked to go back to Baku. No inflammatory statements were made by Tofiq Yaqublu while they were in Ismayilli. 62.  R.C., a journalist, stated that between about 3 p.m. and 4.p.m. he had seen Tofiq Yaqublu in Ismayilli. A little while later, sometime between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., he had seen the applicant and N.C. and had spoken to them for a few minutes. At around that time, plain-clothed individuals had taken Tofiq Yaqublu to the police station. After the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had left the town, between about 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. there had been a new round of clashes between the protesters and the police. 63.  E.M., a journalist, stated that he had seen Tofiq Yaqublu being taken to the police station; he did not specify the time. He had also seen the applicant. In the evening, after the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had left the town, there had been clashes between protesters and the police. 64.  Q.M., a journalist, stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at around 4 p.m., together with M.K. and Tofiq Yaqublu. The latter had been taken to the police station a few minutes later. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. He had not seen the applicant at all while he had been in Ismayilli.\n(c)  Other evidence 65.  The court also examined various material evidence, including video recordings and photographs of the events; inspection reports of damage to the Chirag Hotel, a house owned by the head of IDEA, several burned cars and scooters, public light fixtures, and other public and private property; and property documents showing, inter alia, that V.A. had property rights to the hotel. It appears that one of the formal inspections of the damaged property was conducted from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013, in the presence of R.N. (see paragraph 53 above) as an attesting witness. 66.  As for the injuries to police officers during the events of 23 and 24 January 2013, the court took note of six forensic reports dated between 24 and 26 January 2013 documenting various injuries sustained by six police officers on either 23 or 24 January 2013, and a record of 25 February 2013 showing that one more injured police officer had been admitted to hospital on 24 January 2013. None of these seven injured police officers were the same as the six who had allegedly been hit by stones on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 48 above). 67.  The court ordered forensic examinations in respect of allegations of ill-treatment by a number of the accused, including E.I. and M.A. (see paragraphs 30, 33 and 35 above). According to the forensic reports issued on 25 January 2014 (a year after the events in question), no injuries had been found on them. The court questioned four police officers named by the accused in connection with the alleged ill-treatment, all of whom denied that the accused had been ill-treated. The court noted that the majority of the accused, except one, had not complained of ill-treatment before being heard at the trial hearings. A criminal complaint by one of the accused had been examined by the Sabunchu District Prosecutor\u2019s Office and dismissed. In such circumstances, the court concluded that the defendants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment were ill-founded. 68.  In so far as directly relevant to the specific charges against the applicant, the court examined the following evidence. 69.  According to the description given in the court\u2019s judgment, a video recording of 24 January 2013 showed the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu \u201cstanding in the centre of the town of Ismayilli, opposite to the administrative building of the Education Department, at a place where acts of mass disorder had been committed\u201d. The description did not specify the time of day when that scene had been shot. 70.  Another set of video recordings of the events of 24 January 2013 showed a group of local residents in the centre of the town, in N. Narimanov Street and M.F. Akhundov Street, blocking the roads, shouting slogans and disobeying repeated orders by the police to disperse. The same video contained scenes showing E.I. and M.A. throwing stones at the police and encouraging others in the crowd to do the same and to disobey the police. There was also a scene showing a police officer (who was not one of the officers who claimed to have been injured on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraphs 44 and 48 above)) getting injured by a stone and leaving the area limping. Lastly, the video showed the police using a water cannon against the crowd and the protesters dispersing in various directions. The description of the above recordings did not specify the time of day when those scenes had been shot. 71.  The court also examined the applicant\u2019s mobile phone geo\u2011localisation records for 24 January 2013. They indicated that at 2.41 p.m. he had been within the zone of the antenna in the town of Gobustan; at 3.39 p.m. \u2013 the antenna in the village of Diyalli in the Ismayilli region; at 3.46 p.m., 3.59 p.m., 4.27 p.m., 4.40 p.m. and 4.58 p.m. \u2013 the antenna on Javanshir Street in the town of Ismayilli; at 6.09 p.m. \u2013 the antenna in the village of Bizlan in the Ismayilli region; at 7:25 p.m. \u2013 the antenna in Gobustan; and at 8.41 p.m. \u2013 an antenna in Baku. 72.  The court further examined the content of the applicant\u2019s blog post (see paragraph 10 above) and the content of the telephone interview he had given to Azadliq Radio between 5.41 p.m. and 5.46 p.m. on 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 11 above). 73.  The court also examined information given by the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS, described in the judgment as follows:\n\u201cAccording to letter no. 2/117 of the Ismayilli District Police Department dated 1 April 2013, on 24 January 2013, at places where people were densely gathered in front of the Education Department in Ismayilli, [Tofiq Yaqublu], together with [the applicant], incited people to make assertions against the State and government bodies and their activities.\nAccording to letter of 6/2274 of the Ministry of National Security dated 20 April 2013, on 24 January 2013 [Tofiq Yaqublu and the applicant] were in Ismayilli and called on residents to resist the police, to block roads ... and to commit other similar acts aimed at disturbing social and political stability.\u201d 74.  On 18 November 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyers applied to the trial court with a number of requests, in particular:\n(a)  that the applicant be released from pre-trial detention, with reference to Article 5 of the Convention and various provisions of domestic law (this request was similar to the one lodged at the preliminary hearing);\n(b)  that various pieces of evidence against the applicant obtained at the pre-trial stage be declared inadmissible, including statements by a number of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 above) on the grounds that they had been unlawfully obtained, and the letters from the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS (see paragraph 73 above) on the grounds that they contained information that had not been verified independently by the prosecution authorities (this request was also similar to the one lodged at the preliminary hearing);\n(c)  that additional witnesses for the defence be heard (including I.A., R.C., and E.M. (see paragraphs 59 and 62-63 above)) and other additional evidence (inter alia, contemporaneous media reports concerning the events of 24 January 2013) be examined; and\n(d)  that the hearings be held in a larger courtroom which could accommodate media representatives. 75.  The court examined those requests at the hearing held on 29 November 2013 and decided: (a)  to reject the request for release on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s circumstances had not changed; (b)  to reject the request concerning the inadmissibility of the evidence produced by the prosecution, on the grounds that it was ill-founded; (c)  to postpone the examination of the request for admission of additional evidence, because it was not sufficiently substantiated; and (d)  to reject the request to change the hearing venue, because media representatives were able to attend the hearings in the current venue. 76.  It appears from the transcript of the hearing of 29 November 2013 that there was a verbal altercation between the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu on one side, and some prosecution witnesses on the other, and that the presiding judge called the accused to order on several occasions. The judge also issued a warning to one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, for loudly objecting to the court\u2019s decisions to reject the defence\u2019s requests. 77.  On 2 December 2013, after having consulted the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyers applied to the court to amend some of the wording used in the transcript to describe the applicant\u2019s statement during the preliminary hearing to the effect that he considered the trial to be a sham and did not accept the trial court as a fair tribunal. On 13 December 2013 the court held that the transcript had been correct and that the amendments proposed had the purpose of justifying the applicant\u2019s and his lawyers\u2019 disrespectful attitude towards the court during the preliminary hearing. 78.  On 29 December 2013 the applicant applied for access to the transcripts of the trial hearings, arguing that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the transcript of each hearing had to be drafted within three days of the hearing and made available to the parties within the following three days. The court rejected the request, ruling that the transcripts should be made available to the parties not after each trial hearing, but after the completion of the trial. On 13 January 2014 the court reiterated its position on that matter. 79.  On 11 January 2013 one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers applied to the court to terminate the participation in the trial as \u201cvictims of crime\u201d of six police officers who had allegedly been hit by stones during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 48 above). He claimed that the decision granting them victim status had been unsubstantiated. In support of the request, the lawyer argued that all of those police officers had first been questioned five months after the events by the same investigator. He further argued that it had not been shown that the police officers had sustained any injuries, and that there were no forensic reports in this respect. Moreover, having been given victim status, unlike regular witnesses, those persons had been present in the courtroom throughout the entire trial, giving them an ability to coordinate their statements, not only with each other but with other prosecution witnesses. 80.  It appears that the above-mentioned application was dismissed by the court. 81.  At the hearing held on 13 January 2014 one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, lodged a second objection to the composition of the court, arguing, inter alia, that the court was biased: it had rejected all of the defence\u2019s requests and created obstacles to the proper questioning of \u201cfake witnesses\u201d by the defence. The court dismissed the objection, finding, inter alia, that it was ill-founded, that the reasons for the objection were artificial and unsubstantiated, and that it appeared to have been lodged with the purpose of delaying the trial. The court also imposed a fine on the lawyer in the amount of 220 Azerbaijani manats (AZN), under Article 107.4 of the CCrP, for disrupting the court proceedings. 82.  In February 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyers applied to the court to admit and examine as evidence contemporaneous reports by various news agencies, including the Azerbaijan Press Agency (\u201cthe APA\u201d) and Trend, showing that no clashes had been reported to be happening in Ismayilli at the time the applicant was there. It appears that this request was rejected. 83.  After the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes had delivered its judgment (see paragraphs 85 et seq. below), on 17 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyers and on 19 March 2014 the applicant himself applied for access to the transcripts of the court hearings. On 4, 10, 16 and 22 April 2014 the applicant was given access to the transcripts for a total of seventeen hours and thirty minutes. It appears that one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, was not given access to the transcripts because he had refused the demand by a court clerk to hand over all of the technical devices he had been carrying (his mobile phone, tablet, and so on) which could have been used to photograph pages of the transcripts. He had refused that demand on the grounds that there were more than ten volumes of transcripts (a total of about 2,000 to 3,000 pages) and that there was not enough time to properly consult them without the use of technical devices. It appears from the documents in the case file that the applicant\u2019s other lawyer, Mr K. Bagirov, was given access to the transcripts for an unspecified period of time. However, he was not allowed to make copies of the transcripts. 84.  On 28 April 2014 the applicant submitted to the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes his remarks concerning the transcripts of the trial hearings, of which he had time to read about 500 pages. He alleged that in a number of instances various statements by witnesses had been distorted or misrepresented in the transcripts in a manner unfavourable to him. By a decision of 12 May 2014 the court refused to accept the applicant\u2019s remarks, holding that the transcripts were accurate. 85.  On 17 March 2014 the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes delivered its judgment, deciding as follows. 86.  As to the accused whose allegations of ill-treatment were considered to be ill-founded (see paragraph 67 above), the court decided to take into account their pre-trial statements, in which they had admitted the factual accusations against them, as more truthful than their statements at the trial hearings, in which they had pleaded not guilty and claimed to have been ill\u2011treated at the pre-trial stage. 87.  In respect of the other accused and witnesses who had given differing statements at the pre-trial stage and during the trial hearings, including the police officer who had retracted his pre-trial statement (see paragraph 49 above) and the accused E.I. and M.A., the court decided to take into account the pre-trial statements as being more \u201ctruthful and objective\u201d, reasoning that the statements they had made later at the trial hearings, which had been more favourable to the accused, had been inconsistent with other evidence and had been designed to help the accused \u201cavoid criminal liability\u201d. 88.  With regard to the accusations against the applicant in particular, the court found as follows. 89.  The statements of prosecution witnesses, video recordings and other evidence proved that there had been mass disorder in Ismayilli between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, that the applicant had been in Ismayilli at that time, and that, together with Tofiq Yaqublu, he had incited local residents, including E.I. and M.A., to commit those violent acts of mass disorder, threatening the lives and health of six police officers. 90.  The court further held that the statements made by the applicant on his blog (see paragraph 10 above) and in his interview to Azadliq Radio (see paragraph 11 above) also proved that, even before traveling to Ismayilli, he had had an \u201cintention to organise mass disorder\u201d and that, when in Ismayilli, he was guilty of inciting people to commit acts of disorder and to disobey the police. 91.  As to the statements of witnesses Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C. and N.M., who had said that there had been no clashes between protesters and the police in the town at that time and that neither the applicant nor Tofiq Yaqublu had incited anyone to violence or disobedience, the court found that there were inconsistencies in their statements. In particular, the court found as follows:\n\u201cHowever, [Q.M.] stated that, after he had greeted [the applicant], he had gone to sleep in the car. In fact, he had not known the whereabouts of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] during that period of time. [M.K.] stated that, after getting out of the car, Tofiq Yaqublu had gone on foot towards the building of the IDEA, whereas during the pre-trial investigation [M.K.] had stated that [Q.M.] had left them, that he himself had frequently changed his location in order to record the people moving around in the square, that he had separated from Tofiq Yaqublu, that Tofiq Yaqublu had been at another place, that [another journalist] had been taking photos, that [N.A., the Head of the IDEA] had started to give an interview at that time, and that, when he had been going for the interview, Tofiq Yaqublu ... had been arrested and taken away by plain-clothed individuals. [E.M.] stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been arrested before the interview given by [the Head of the IDEA], while [R.C.] stated that the interview ... had lasted about twenty minutes at most and that, during that period of time, he had not been aware of the whereabouts of [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu. As it can be seen from the above, the witnesses who stated that they had been next to [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu at all times concealed the essence of the matter by giving contradictory statements.\u201d 92.  The court found that the statements by those witnesses were favourable to the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu because those witnesses knew the defendants personally and wanted to \u201chelp them avoid criminal liability\u201d. Their statements were not accepted as \u201cobjective, sincere and truthful\u201d because they were \u201cincompatible with the facts of the case and contradicted the irrefutable evidence\u201d of the applicant\u2019s guilt. 93.  The court further found that, likewise, the applicant\u2019s and Tofiq Yaqublu\u2019s statements at the trial hearings claiming that there had been no mass disorder while they had been in Ismayilli did not reflect the actual circumstances, and had been made in order to \u201cavoid criminal liability\u201d. 94.  The Sheki Court for Serious Crimes convicted the applicant under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 95.  The other defendants were also found guilty as charged and given sentences ranging from two years and six months\u2019 to eight years\u2019 imprisonment, with some sentences being conditional. 96.  On 14 April 2014 one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes of 17 March 2014. 97.  The lawyer pointed out at the outset that at the time of lodging the appeal, neither a full copy of the text of the judgment of 17 March 2014 nor the transcripts of the trial hearings had yet been made available to him. 98.  The lawyer argued that the applicant had been convicted following a sham trial by a court which had tried him from a position of \u201cpresumption of guilt\u201d throughout the entire proceedings. The applicant\u2019s visit to Ismayilli, as an opposition politician, to find out the reasons for the events of 23 January 2013 had been used by the Government as an excuse to punish him for his legitimate political criticism, a decision which had been taken long before the Ismayilli events. 99.  The rights of the defence had been seriously restricted in that the majority of their well-founded requests and objections had been routinely dismissed; the defence had not been given adequate access to trial transcripts and some of the evidence (including some video material); the defence lawyers had not been allowed to use various technical devices, such as laptop and tablet computers, during the trial hearings, and so on. 100.  The formal accusations against the applicant (see paragraphs 15 and 19 above) had been written in a manner which did not comply with the norms of the Azerbaijani language, making it difficult to understand exactly what the applicant was accused of. The factual allegations against him were unclear and did not fit the elements of the criminal offences proscribed under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code. Given that the applicant had been in Ismayilli for only about one hour and had no prior personal acquaintance with anyone implicated in the riots of the previous night, it was highly improbable \u2013 and even physically impossible \u2013 for him to have \u201corganised\u201d mass disorder within such a short time frame, as described in the formal accusations. 101.  The applicant had been accused and convicted of organising an outbreak of mass disorder which had never happened. All the reliable and meaningful evidence produced at the trial had clearly shown that there had been no acts of mass disorder during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 while the applicant was in the town. 102.  Firstly, all video recordings and other relevant material evidence showed that there had been no clashes with the police in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and that the applicant had not incited anyone to violence or disobedience. 103.  In particular, a video recording originally taken from the website of Obyektiv TV, operated by an NGO named the Institute for Reporters\u2019 Freedom and Safety (\u201cthe IRFS\u201d), had been edited before its examination by the court (see paragraphs 69-70 above). As to the parts of the video showing clashes between protesters and the police (it appears that, here, the lawyer referred to the scenes described in paragraph 70 above), it was clear from the size and direction of the shadows cast by buildings, people and other objects that the video had been shot during the morning. That fact had been additionally confirmed by the chairman of the IRFS in a letter dated 24 January 2014. The full, unedited version of the video attached to the letter contained scenes shot during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 showing numerous police vehicles on M.F. Akhundov Street advancing in the direction of the IDEA building with no protesters present. Then it showed the applicant, N.C. and N.M. standing near the Education Department and calmly talking to each other, with no one else in the vicinity. Afterwards, Tofiq Yaqublu could be seen talking to R.C. and two others (it appears that the above scenes correspond to the scenes described in paragraph 69 above). Then, it showed Tofiq Yaqublu being taken by the police to a car and driven away. Later, an interview with the head of the IDEA was shown. Throughout the entire video, the situation in the town during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 was calm and under the control of the police. 104.  A video made available by the Yeni Musavat newspaper showed the absence of any clashes between protesters and the police during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. According to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the first\u2011instance court added that video to the case file but, for unexplained reasons, decided not to use it as evidence. 105.  A third video that was examined during the trial had been recorded by a camera installed on the Unibank building, directed at the area of M.F. Akhundov Street near the building of the Regional Education Department. From that angle, if any crowd had passed in the vicinity of the Education Department and headed towards the IDEA building, it would certainly have been reflected in the recording. However, the parts of the video corresponding to the period between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2014 did not show any crowd or even a small group of protesters in that area. 106.  The applicant\u2019s mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that he had left the town of Ismayilli by 4.58 p.m. Similarly, Tofiq Yaqublu\u2019s mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that he had left the town by 5.17 p.m. 107.  On several occasions the defence had requested the trial court to examine a number of contemporaneous news reports by various information agencies, television and radio stations, and other mass-media sources which had closely followed the Ismayilli events. None of them had reported any unrest happening in Ismayilli in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and had only reported clashes happening in the evening, starting at around 8 p.m. However, the court had rejected the defence\u2019s requests to examine that material. 108.  Secondly, the applicant\u2019s version of the events was strongly corroborated by the statements of Tofiq Yaqublu, N.C., N.M., M.K., R.C., I.A., Q.M., E.M. and others. They had all stated that there had been no clashes during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and that the applicant had not incited anyone to commit any acts of disorder. Those statements were mutually consistent and were also corroborated by all the material evidence, as described above. 109.  Two of the accused, E.I. and M.A., had both stated that there had been unrest in Ismayilli during the morning of 24 January 2013, but that they had both been out of town during the afternoon. Neither the investigating authorities nor the court had bothered to check their alibis. Their statements also indirectly corroborated the applicant\u2019s version of the events, namely that there had been no unrest during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. Also, both of them had alleged before the court that they had been ill-treated by the investigating authorities with the aim of obtaining statements incriminating the applicant. 110.  Three police officers had mentioned in their statements that there had been no unrest during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. One police officer had testified that he had been injured by a stone during the morning. Their statements also corroborated the applicant\u2019s version of the events. 111.  As to the witnesses who had testified against the applicant, the majority of them were police officers. Their statements were contradictory, false, inconsistent in various details (such as, for example, the time and exact locations where they had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu) and conflicted with all the video recordings and other material evidence. 112.  In particular, the assertion that six police officers had been hit by stones on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 was false. None of those police officers had reported being injured or hit by stones immediately or soon after the alleged incident. All of them had been recognised as \u201cvictims of crime\u201d and questioned by the prosecution for the first time only between 24 and 27 June 2013, five months after the events. There had been no medical evidence of their injuries. By contrast, the injuries sustained by seven police officers on 23 January and during the early hours of 24 January 2013 had been promptly documented either on the same day or a couple of days later. In such circumstances, it was clear that the above-mentioned six police officers had given false testimony against the applicant. The applicant had formally applied to the court to exclude them from the trial as \u201cvictims of crime\u201d, but to no avail. 113.  When cross-examined by the defence at a trial hearing, one of the above-mentioned six police officers had been unable to name the personnel of the police unit to which he had been deployed and, until assisted by a prosecutor, could not pinpoint his own exact location in Ismayilli at the time when he had allegedly seen the applicant. When the defence lawyer had tried to get him to show, on an official map of Ismayilli, exactly where he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu standing and inciting the crowd, the presiding judge had forbidden the use of the map. When the defence lawyer had then asked the police officer to describe his location with reference to various landmarks next to the Regional Education Department, the presiding judge had dismissed the question. The defence lawyer had then lodged a second objection to the composition of the trial court. In response, the presiding judge had decided, firstly, to leave the objection unexamined and, secondly, to fine the lawyer in the amount of AZN 220 for having lodged an allegedly unsubstantiated objection designed to delay the hearing. Thereafter, the defence lawyers for all of the accused had been dissuaded from lodging any further objections, having been clearly shown that doing so would be meaningless. 114.  Similarly, other police officers had been unable to answer the defence\u2019s questions seeking clarification, or had given statements that differed significantly from their pre-trial statements, only to radically revert back to their pre-trial statements immediately after a break in the hearing announced by the court. On some occasions, the court had dismissed police officers from the witness stand before the defence could complete the cross\u2011examination. 115.  Furthermore, at the trial one of the police officers (see paragraph 50 above) had retracted the written statement he had signed at the pre-trial stage, stating that everything in it had been a product of an investigator\u2019s imagination. 116.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer argued that, at the trial hearings, witness R.B. (see paragraph 56 above) had stated that he had seen only about twenty people in the town centre between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and that, although he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu among them, he had not heard what they had been talking about with the people around them. 117.  The lawyer further argued that R.N. was a \u201dfake witness\u201d engaged by the police and claimed that both witnesses R.N. and I.M. had given knowingly false and contradictory statements as described in paragraphs 53\u201154 above. 118.  In conclusion, the applicant\u2019s lawyer argued that a proper assessment of the available evidence clearly showed that, contrary to the prosecution\u2019s version of the facts, there had been no acts of mass disorder at the time when the applicant had been in the town (between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m.) and that some clashes between protesters and the police had taken place several hours before he had arrived in the town (between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.) and several hours after he had left the town (after 8 p.m.). Statements given by the prosecution witnesses, to the contrary, had been shown to be contradictory, unreliable or false, and uncorroborated by the available material evidence. Accordingly, there was no corpus delicti in respect of the criminal offences for which the applicant had been convicted. 119.  Before the examination of the appeal, on 2 June 2014 the applicant applied to the Sheki Court of Appeal for access to the remaining part of the transcripts of the trial hearings for consultation. His request was granted and the date for his consultation of the transcripts was scheduled for 9 June 2014. However, on 6 and 9 June 2014 he lodged two applications withdrawing his previous request and, instead, asking for a speedy examination of his appeal. 120.  During the examination of the appeal by the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant\u2019s lawyers lodged a number of applications repeating those lodged with the first-instance court. It appears that all of them were rejected. 121.  By a judgment of 24 September 2014 the Sheki Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence, essentially reiterating the reasoning of the first-instance court in respect of the charges against him. The judgment did not address any of the arguments raised in the applicant\u2019s appeal. 122.  In November 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyers submitted a number of remarks concerning the transcript of the appellate hearings, and requesting amendments. The Sheki Court of Appeal refused to amend the transcripts. 123.  On 14 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyers lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating the points raised in the previous appeal. 124.  On 19 November 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court requested all the material of the case file from the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes. At the first hearing held on 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court decided, in the absence of any objections, to postpone further hearing of the case for an indefinite period because more time was needed for examination of the case file. The hearing was resumed on 13 October 2015. 125.  By a decision of 13 October 2015, the Supreme Court quashed the Sheki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 24 September 2014, having found that the lower courts\u2019 rejection of the defence\u2019s requests for the examination of additional defence witnesses (in particular, two members of REAL and one NGO director) and other evidence (in particular, contemporaneous news reports by various media agencies, additional mobile-phone records, additional video recordings, and so on) had been insufficiently reasoned and were in breach of the domestic procedural rules and the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The case was remitted for a new examination by the appellate court. 126.  Before the repeat examination of the case by the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant, who at that time was serving his sentence in Penal Facility No. 2 in Baku, wrote to the appellate court several times waiving his right to be personally present at the appeal hearings to be held in Sheki, expressing confidence that his lawyers would conduct his defence adequately in his absence. The Sheki Court of Appeal responded each time with an explanation that, under domestic law, the defendant\u2019s presence at appeal hearings was mandatory and invited him to attend the hearings. Finally, on 20 April 2016 the court ruled that the applicant should be brought to Sheki for the appeal hearings. 127.  During the hearings at the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant\u2019s lawyers lodged a number of applications, including requests for the applicant\u2019s release from detention; for the allegedly unlawfully obtained statements of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 above) and other evidence produced by the prosecution (including the letters of the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS) to be declared inadmissible; for additional defence witnesses to be heard; for the admission and examination of contemporaneous news reports by various information agencies; and for examination of the video recording taken by the camera installed on the Unibank building. It appears that, apart from the first two requests, all the others were granted. 128.  The appellate court re-examined the case material of the first\u2011instance trial and, in addition, examined new evidence. In particular, it heard two new defence witnesses (both members of REAL). Their statements do not appear to have contained any significant details in respect of the accusations against the applicant. The court also examined a number of contemporaneous news reports and the \u201cUnibank video recording\u201d. 129.  By a judgment of 29 April 2016, the Sheki Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence. Below is the summary of the appellate court\u2019s reasoning contained in its judgment. 130.  The court\u2019s assessment of the evidence examined at the first-instance and appeal hearings began as follows:\n\u201cHaving viewed the recording of the video surveillance camera installed at the ATM of Unibank in the town of Ismayilli, directed at M.F. Akhundov street leading towards the administrative buildings of the IDEA and the Education Department, the court determined that between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 [the situation] was relatively calm on that street.\nHaving examined [reports] of APA, Trend and other mass media ..., the court noted that the media had reported that, as a continuation of the events starting on 23 January 2013, between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 24 January 2013 there was a general situation of confrontation and tension in the centre of Ismayilli, [and had also reported] about growing numbers of people on the streets in the vicinity of buildings of government bodies.\n...\nIt is noted in the 25 January 2013 issue of the Yeni Musavat Online newspaper ... that [E.M.], the newspaper\u2019s correspondent sent to Ismayilli, reported at 4.05 p.m. on 24 January 2013 that \u2018currently numerous vehicles \u2013 buses, water cannons, and other vehicles, thought to be coming from Baku \u2013 are entering the town. The crowd around the area where the government bodies are located has been growing and tension remains.\u2019 At 5 p.m. he reported that \u2018... despite the engagement of additional forces, the crowd is growing on the streets where the government bodies are located and around them. According to local rumours, the protest, which started in the town centre yesterday, would continue tonight after dark\u2019.\u201d 131.  The court also referred to, as evidence, the letters from the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS, as described in the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 73 above). 132.  The judgment continued as follows:\n\u201cThe court does not accept as evidence the statements of witnesses [Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C. and N.M.] that there were no riots between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 and the statements of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] that they did not incite the public to riot or resist the police, that there were no riots between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and that they spent only five to ten minutes in Ismayilli.\nIn particular, [Q.M.] stated that, after he had greeted [the applicant], he had gone to sleep in the car and, in fact, had not known the whereabouts of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqbulu] during that period of time. [M.K.] stated that, after getting out of the car, Tofiq Yaqublu had gone on foot towards the building of the IDEA, while during the pre-trial investigation [M.K.] had stated that [Q.M.] had left them, that he himself had frequently changed his location in order to record the people moving around in the square, that he had separated from Tofiq Yaqublu, that Tofiq Yaqublu had been at another place, that [another journalist] had been taking photos, that [the head of the IDEA] had started to give an interview at that time, and that, when he had been going for the interview, Tofiq Yaqublu ... had been arrested and taken away by plain-clothed individuals. [E.M.] stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been arrested before the interview given by [the head of the IDEA], while [R.C.] stated that the interview ... had lasted about twenty minutes at most and that, during that period of time, he had not been aware of the whereabouts of [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu. As it can be seen from the above, the witnesses who stated that they had been next to [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu at all times, concealed the essence of the matter by giving conflicting statements. Moreover, in his interview to ... Azadliq Radio given from 5.41 to 5.46 p.m. on 24 January 2013, Tofiq Yaqublu stated that \u2018[he had been] detained at the police station for approximately forty minutes ... [He had been] taken to [S.K.\u2019s] office at the police station [who alleged that Tofiq Yaqublu] had come here to organise sabotage and to prepare people for more protests. [The police were then reassured that Tofiq Yaqublu was indeed a columnist for a newspaper]. For that reason, [he] was released.\u2019 This interview proves that Tofiq Yaqublu was not taken to the police station without a reason, but that he was detained ... because of his actions aimed at disruption and sabotage.\u201d 133.  The court then noted that the statements of ten police officers, including five of the six alleged victims of crime (see paragraphs 47-48 above) and witnesses R.N., I.M. and R.B. (see paragraphs 52-56 above) indicated that between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 there was mass disorder in front of the building of the Regional Education Department and that the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had incited people to riot and resist the police. 134.  The court referred to the applicant\u2019s interview with Azadliq Radio (see paragraph 11 above). According to the court\u2019s interpretation, contrary to what the applicant had stated in the court proceedings, the content of his interview showed that the situation had not been calm in Ismayilli during his visit. 135.  In respect of the witness statements favouring the applicant, the court concluded as follows:\n\u201cHaving come to the same conclusion as the first-instance court, the court considers that ... the witnesses [Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C., and N.M.] wanted to help [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu], whom they knew and had relations with, avoid criminal liability. The specific circumstances mentioned in their statements cannot be accepted as objective, sincere and genuine because they do not fit the factual circumstances of the case and conflict with other, irrefutable evidence.\u201d 136.  As to the video recording by the camera installed on the Unibank building, the court assessed it as follows:\n\u201cThe court holds that the statements of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] ... do not fit the actual circumstances of the case. [Their] statements ... are of a self-defence nature and designed to avoid criminal liability. As the main evidence proving their statements, they rely on the recording dated 24 January 2013 of the video surveillance camera installed at the ATM of Unibank, directed at M.F. Akhundov Street leading towards the administrative buildings of the IDEA and the Education Department. Although the recording shows that between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. the situation was relatively calm on that street, it is not the only street leading to the centre (the IDEA [building]); moreover, it cannot be ruled out that individuals could have gone along that street towards the building of the [IDEA] one-by-one and gathered there [afterwards], or could have arrived in the centre from other directions. ...\u201d 137.  As to the video evidence originally examined by the first-instance court, the Sheki Court of Appeal mentioned the video recording showing the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu \u201cstanding in the centre of the town of Ismayilli, opposite to the administrative building of the Education Department, at a place where acts of mass disorder had been committed\u201d, without specifying the time of day when that scene had been shot (see paragraphs 69 and 103 above). However, the Sheki Court of Appeal did not mention any of the other video recordings of 24 January 2013 relied on by the first-instance court, showing clashes between protesters and the police (see paragraphs 70 and 103 above). 138.  The court further noted that, according to the information obtained from the first-instance court, throughout the day on 24 January 2013 forty\u2011four people had been arrested under the Code of Administrative Offences, including nine people arrested between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. The court concluded that this was an indication that the situation in the town had not been calm while the applicant was there. 139.  The judgment continued as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] claimed that the evidence gathered by the prosecution against them had been false. As an example, they referred to the testimony of [R.N.] who had participated, as an attesting witness, in the inspection of the scene of the events [of the previous night] from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and had later testified that at around 5 p.m. on the same day he had seen [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting people to commit acts of disorder]. [They] argue that [R.N.] is a person who cooperates with the police and that the police had instructed him to testify against them. However, the court holds that [R.N.\u2019s] presence during the inspection of the scene of the events as an attesting witness does not make it impossible for him to have observed and witnessed an event occurring one hour later.\u201d 140.  The appellate court then digressed to discuss at significant length the Court\u2019s judgment in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above). 141.  The appellate court\u2019s judgment continued as follows:\n\u201cBeing far from an intention to give an assessment of the European Court\u2019s position in its above-mentioned judgment, the court holds that, first of all, [the applicant\u2019s and Tofiq Yaqublu\u2019s] unlawful actions should be evaluated through the prism of the events that took place in Ismayilli on 23 and 24 January 2013. That is so because those events constituted the reason and grounds for instituting criminal proceedings and the criminal prosecution of [the applicant, Tofiq Yaqublu] and others.\nAs described above, on 23 and 24 January 2013 in Ismayilli, under the organisation and with the active participation of the accused persons, a crowd formed by a large number of residents spontaneously joined together and destroyed, by burning, and partly looted the building of the Chirag Hotel, destroying equipment and items found inside the building, as well as personal belongings of the hotel guests and staff; [they also destroyed, by burning,] three cars in the grounds of the hotel, damaged houses and cars on the streets with stones, [and also destroyed, by burning,] private property of people who had no connection to the events, and inflicted bodily injuries on individuals, including many police officers who were performing their official duty to restore public order.\nIn connection with these events, on 23 January 2013 criminal proceedings were instituted under Articles 186.2.2, 221.2.1, 233 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan and eighteen individuals were charged [in the framework of those proceedings], over fifty individuals were found administratively liable, and twenty-four individuals were recognised as victims.\nThe criminal events that occurred in Ismayilli were the most widely covered news for several days by both local and reputable foreign mass media. In other words, they were not ordinary events that happened in Ismayilli.\nIn connection with the participation of [the applicant] in those events and the criminal offences committed by him, as well as the evidence concerning those offences, the court finds it necessary to reiterate once more the following.\nAlthough [the applicant] states that he arrived in Ismayilli at 3.46 p.m. and left before 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, examination of the detailed invoice of his incoming and outgoing mobile calls, and his blog post of 25 January 2013, where he shared his impressions from his trip by writing \u2018yesterday I was in Ismayilli for a little more than two hours together with another member of our movement (REAL) and a media coordinator\u2019, proves that on 24 January 2013 [the applicant] was in Ismayilli from 3.46 p.m. to 6 p.m.\n[The applicant] insists that, when he was in Ismayilli, there was no mass disorder there. However, this statement is completely refuted by the case material.\u201d 142.  In this connection, the court continued:\n\u201cVictims [in particular, five police officers (of the six mentioned in paragraph 48 above), E.A. (see paragraph 44 above) and V.Az. (see paragraph 43 above)] and witnesses [in particular, R.N., I.M. and R.B. (see paragraphs 52-56 above), as well as S.K. (see paragraph 45 above) and four other police officers (see paragraph 47 above)] stated during both the pre-trial investigation and the first-instance hearings that throughout the day on 24 January 2013, including between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m., mass riots had continued, crowds of people had attacked the [IDEA] building and had stoned police officers. They also testified that they had seen [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] standing separately from each other, raising their hands, talking to people surrounding them and saying \u2018do not be afraid of anything, enter the building of the IDEA, stone the police officers\u2019. At their instigation, a group of individuals started moving towards the building of the IDEA and [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] were also among them. The police attempted to isolate [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] from the crowd by requesting them to [step aside], but they disobeyed and moved to the back of the crowd.\nAnother circumstance worth noting is that [two police officers] gave those statements on 28 January 2013 and [R.N. and I.M.] gave their statements on 2 February 2013, that is before [the applicant\u2019s] arrest.\nAt the same time, [R.N. and I.M.] confirmed their statements during face-to-face confrontations with [the applicant].\u201d 143.  The court then once again referred to the information reported by the Yeni Musavat Online newspaper (see paragraph 130 above) and the information the applicant had published on his Facebook page (see paragraph 10 above). It then reiterated that nine people had been arrested between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. on 24 January 2013. 144.  The judgment continued:\n\u201cThe above-mentioned circumstances show that on 24 January 2013, when [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] were in Ismayilli, the events were unfolding there and that the crowd attacked the IDEA building and committed acts of violence against the police.\u201d 145.  The court then found that it was not \u201cbelievable\u201d that the applicant had visited Ismayilli simply to gather \u201cfirst-hand information\u201d, considering, inter alia, that his Facebook posts were aimed at \u201cpromoting disobedience\u201d. 146.  The court also found that the applicant\u2019s Facebook posts of the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and his blog post of 25 January 2013 (see paragraph 10 above) were proof of his intention to organise mass disorder. In particular, it stated:\n\u201cThe above-mentioned [posts by the applicant] demonstrate once again that, before traveling to Ismayilli, the applicant had an intention to organise mass disorder with the aim of defending the REAL movement\u2019s demands for the creation of conditions for a revolt, and that, after he had arrived in Ismayilli, he had carried out his intention.\u201d 147.  The court concluded its analysis as follows:\n\u201cThe above-mentioned circumstances of the case prove beyond doubt that on 24 January 2013 [the applicant] travelled to Ismayilli and organised mass disorder there together with [Tofiq Yaqublu]. Moreover, at around 5 p.m. on the same date, as active participants, [they] were able to achieve that a group of individuals formed of [E.I.], [M.A.] and others marched in masses in the direction of the administrative building of the [IDEA], and threw stones at police officers who were preventing [this march] in accordance with the requirements of the law, resulting in the use of violence posing a danger to the lives and health of [six named police officers].\nAs for [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] arriving from Baku and, within two hours, managing to convert unorganised riots into organised acts of subversion, the court considers that in normal circumstances it would not appear convincing that [this could have been done]; however, it must be taken into account that [the rioters] considered [N.A.], the Head of the [IDEA], responsible for the events, they were enraged and, as [the applicant] himself stated, \u2018the situation was flammable\u2019. [The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] took advantage of this factor and, using anti-government slogans, attracted [the rioters\u2019] attention, enraged them even more and then committed the criminal offences described above.\u201d 148.  On 21 June 2016 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr F. Agayev, lodged a cassation appeal against the Sheki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 29 April 2016, reiterating the points in his previous appeals and arguing further that the appellate court had assessed the evidence in a manifestly arbitrary manner. As an example, he pointed out that the court had failed to duly take into account that the video recording by the Unibank camera clearly refuted the prosecution\u2019s version of the events, according to which the crowd had allegedly moved specifically along M.F. Akhundov Street in the direction of the police positioned near the IDEA building. Moreover, the court had wrongly concluded that the applicant had left Ismayilli at 6 p.m., whereas the mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that his mobile had been last registered in the centre of the town at 4.58 p.m. 149.  By a decision of 18 November 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Sheki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 29 April 2016, finding that the lower court had correctly assessed the evidence and correctly applied the provisions of criminal law and criminal procedure. 150.  After the first-instance trial at the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes, on 17 March 2014 the presiding judge sent letters to the Bar Association requesting that disciplinary measures be taken against the applicant\u2019s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev and Mr K. Bagirov. The court stated that they had breached procedural rules and the rules on lawyers\u2019 conduct on numerous occasions throughout the trial, by making unauthorised objections and offensive and disrespectful remarks about various parties and the court, and refusing to wear lawyers\u2019 robes despite numerous demands by the presiding judge. 151.  After the proceedings at the Sheki Court of Appeal, on 25 September 2014 the presiding judge of that court also sent letters to the Bar Association requesting that it take disciplinary measures against both lawyers, stating that they had behaved similarly throughout the appellate proceedings. 152.  On 10 December 2014 the Bar Association held that Mr K. Bagirov had breached the rules for ethical conduct of advocates. It decided to refer his case to a court with a view to his disbarment and to suspend his activity as an advocate pending a decision by the court. On 10 July 2015 the Nizami District Court delivered a judgment ordering Mr K. Bagirov\u2019s disbarment. The judgment was upheld by the higher courts. Mr K. Bagirov has lodged an application with the Court concerning the matter (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, no. 28198/15, communicated to the respondent Government on 24 June 2016).", "references": ["4", "5", "6", "7", "9", "8", "1", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The Ohrid Archdiocese (\u041e\u0445\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0410\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0435\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0458\u0430), in its original form, existed until 1767, when it was abolished by the Turkish Sultan. As stated by the applicant association, after its abolition the territory over which the Ohrid Archdiocese had jurisdiction, which had included what is now the territory of the respondent State, fell under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which in 1918 issued a canonical release of those territories to the benefit of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). As stated by the Government, in 1943 it was decided that the Ohrid Archdiocese would be restored and continued by an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). In 1959 the MOC seceded from the SOC, and in 1967 it declared autocephaly. The Head of the Holy Synod of MOC is designated as \u201cArchbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia\u201d (\u0410\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0435\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043f \u041e\u0445\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0438 \u041c\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438). 6.  In negotiations which have been continuing since then, on 17 May 2002 the two churches signed a draft agreement (known as \u201cthe Ni\u0161 agreement\u201d) which provided for ecclesiastical union between them. It further specified that the MOC would renounce its autocephaly and obtain widest autonomy within the SOC under the name \u201cOhrid Archdiocese\u201d. 7.  According to the Government, during the negotiations and the signing of the Ni\u0161 agreement, there had been strong reaction by the public, which regarded the draft agreement as \u201ca scandalous and indecent act of treason\u201d and, owing to strong pressure by the public, on 25 May 2002 the Holy Synod of the MOC ultimately rejected this agreement. The applicant association disagreed that the rejection of the agreement had resulted solely from the reaction by the public and submitted that \u201cthe main pressure came directly from the Macedonian authorities who stood behind the protests\u201d. 8.  Mr J. Vrani\u0161kovski, a bishop and a member of the Holy Synod of the MOC at the time, was supportive of the Ni\u0161 agreement. After the Holy Synod of the MOC had rejected that agreement, Mr Vrani\u0161kovski accepted a call by the SOC for reunification dated 20 June 2002; on 21 June 2002 he publicly announced that he was prepared for canonical union with the SOC. The Government submitted that that had provoked a public reaction and that there had been street protests in several cities in the respondent State. 9.  On 5 July 2002 the Holy Synod of the MOC dismissed Mr Vrani\u0161kovski on the ground that, by his unilateral accession to the SOC, he had violated the oath by which he had bound himself to safeguard the Church\u2019s unity and Constitution (see Vrani\u0161koski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.) 39168/03, 22 June 2010). On 23 September 2002 the SOC declared the dismissal of Mr Vrani\u0161kovski null and void and appointed him \u201cexarch of the Pe\u0107 Archbishop and the Patriarch of Serbia for all eparchies of the Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d. 10.  On 25 December 2003 the applicant association constituted its own Holy Synod and appointed Mr Vrani\u0161kovski as its President. By a letter of 16 January 2004, received by the Commission for religious communities and groups (\u201cthe Commission\u201d, \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438 \u0441\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438 \u0438 \u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0438\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0438) on 27 January 2004, Mr Vrani\u0161kovski requested an opinion as to whether the applicant association should be registered, given that \u201cin all civilised States a church, which is older than the State is accepted without needing to be registered.\u201d The letter, which remained unanswered, further stated:\n\u201c... the true Macedonian Orthodox Church is the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese. It is a legitimate church, recognised by all churches in the world, so all who want to be Orthodox are welcome, the doors are open. Those who are schismatic should join the schismatic Synod (MOC). The Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese has nothing against the State registering schisms ... but it is against the State preventing its spiritual and leading operation in the Republic of Macedonia ...\u201d 11.  On 6 September 2004 Mr Vrani\u0161kovski submitted an application (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435) seeking that the applicant association be registered as a religious group (\u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0438\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0430). In support of the application, the applicant association submitted the following documents: (a) a founding decision of 1 September 2004 rendered by its Holy Synod. Under section 1 of that decision, the applicant association was defined \u201cas a voluntary, non-profit association of Christians that were not associated with any other religious community or group\u201d. Its aim was to acquire legal-entity status and to manage its property. The decision specified the temporary place of registration of the applicant association and authorised Mr Vrani\u0161kovski to submit an application for registration on behalf of the applicant association; (b) a list of its adherents; and (c) a Charter on the organisation and operation of the applicant (\u201cthe Charter\u201d). The latter provided that the applicant \u201cwould be autonomous within the canonical jurisdiction of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy (the SOC)\u201d; it specified that its temporary place of registration would be in Bitola, in the respondent State, \u201cuntil it was possible to designate a permanent seat\u201d; and that the applicant association and its structural units were legal entities and could obtain and manage property. It further provided that all legal persons that the applicant association might set up could have bank accounts. 12.  On 30 September 2004 the Commission found the application to be incomplete, and requested that the applicant association submit the following further documents: a) a copy of a decision appointing the authorised person to seek registration of the applicant association and b) a copy of the minutes of the constituent assembly. On 18 October 2004 the applicant association submitted the requested documents. 13.  On 3 November 2004 the Commission dismissed the application (\u0441\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) for the following reasons:\n(a)  the application was not submitted by an authorised person. The Commission held that it had been submitted by a certain J.N. (Bishop D.) and not by Mr Vrani\u0161kovski, who had been authorised to seek registration of the applicant association;\n(b)  the application for registration had been submitted outside the thirty\u2011day time-limit specified in section 11 (1) of the Act on Religious Communities and Religious Groups (\u201cthe 1997 Act\u201d, see paragraph 47 below), which had started to run on 25 December 2003, the date on which the applicant association\u2019s Holy Synod had been set up (see paragraph 10 above);\n(c)  relying on the applicant association\u2019s Charter, the Commission established that it would act as an autonomous religious group in canonical union with the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy (SOC). That the applicant association would operate as part of a foreign orthodox church was, in the Commission\u2019s view, in violation of section 12 of the 1997 Act. The Commission further stated that a religious community could be established only by nationals of the respondent State, and not by a foreign church or State;\n(d)  the applicant association had emerged from an already existing and registered religious community, notably the MOC, whose position and role had been specified in the Constitution. The fact that the applicant association had sought registration under the name \u201cOrthodox Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d had implied that its real intention was to create a parallel orthodox religious group to the MOC, which had been using that name (Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese) \u201cconstitutionally, historically, actually and continuously\u201d (\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e, \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0438, \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0435\u043b\u043d\u043e \u0438 \u0432\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442) for over eight centuries. That was not in compliance with section 8 (2) of the 1997 Act, under which only one religious community could be registered for one faith group. The Commission referred to a decision of the Constitutional Court which had found that provision compliant with the Constitution. It had ruled that the provision had protected people from being manipulated and same-faith believers from being divided into several religious groups (U.br.223/97 of 28 October 1998, see paragraph 54 below). The Commission also argued that the Preamble to the Constitution of the MOC specified that it was the canonical successor to the Ohrid Archdiocese. This was confirmed on 17 July 1967 when the Ohrid Archdiocese declared autocephaly, which was continued by the MOC. The Commission further held that on 6 August 2004 the MOC had asked the Industrial Property Bureau (\u201cthe Bureau\u201d, \u0417\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0434 \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0448\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u043f\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442) to register the name \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d in its trademark register (TM 2004/574).\nMoreover, on 13 August 2004 the MOC had asked the Commission to prevent registration of several names, including the name \u201cOhrid Archdiocese\u201d, to which it was entitled for historical, religious and moral reasons; and\n(e)  the Commission held that property-related provisions of the applicant\u2019s Charter were contrary to section 9 of the 1997 Act, according to which a religious group was a voluntary, non-profit association of believers. 14.  In its decision of 3 November 2004, the Commission further referred to several international documents and a Declaration that the Parliament of the respondent State adopted in 2004 regarding the MOC (see paragraph 51 below). 15.  The applicant association complained against this decision, arguing that:\n(a)  the application for registration had been submitted by Mr Vrani\u0161kovski. J.N. had only handed it over to the Commission\u2019s archives;\n(b)  the applicant association had been founded formally on 1 September 2004. On 25 December 2003, the date to which the Commission referred in its decision, the applicant association had only appointed the members of its Holy Synod;\n(c)  the applicant association was a new religious community that had no connection with, let alone stemmed from, the MOC, which, in any event, had not been recognised by any Orthodox Church;\n(d)  the fact that the MOC had sought to have the Bureau add \u201cOhrid Archdiocese\u201d to its name was irrelevant, since no such name existed in the Commission\u2019s records;\n(e)  the applicant association had denied that it had been set up by a foreign church or a foreign State. That it would operate in canonical union with another church of same religion did not imply that it had been founded contrary to section 9 (2) of the 1997 Act; 16.  On 11 January 2005 the Government Appeal Commission (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u043d \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0438, \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0442\u043e, \u0434\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430, \u043b\u043e\u043a\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043e\u0434 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0435\u0440) dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Commission. 17.  The applicant association challenged these decisions before the Supreme Court. In addition to the arguments already raised, it submitted that its name was neither identical with nor similar to the name of any other religious community or group registered by the Commission. 18.  On 9 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that the applicant association\u2019s name had implied creation of a parallel religious community, rather than a religious group as claimed, given that its name was substantially the same as the name of the MOC. The court referred to the applicant association\u2019s Charter and found that its determination to operate as an autonomous church in canonical union with the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy was contrary to the fact that the MOC had canonical jurisdiction in the territory of the respondent State. It also held that property-related rules were in violation of section 16 of the 1997 Act. The court accepted the remaining reasoning given by the administrative bodies. That decision was served on the applicant on 15 July 2006. 19.  On 15 July 2007 Bishop D. applied to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the refusal of the authorities to register the applicant association violated the freedom of belief and religion specified in Article 110 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution. While relying on the decisions of the authorities refusing the applicant association\u2019s registration as \u201cOrthodox Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d, he also notified the court that a fresh application for registration had been submitted under the name \u201cGreek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d (see paragraphs 23-34 below). He stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... it is obvious that followers of our religious organisation have been deprived of the rights specified in Articles 16 and 19 of the Constitution for seven years ... the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy is a religious organisation which should protect the religious needs of, among others, Serbs and Greeks in the Republic of Macedonia. It is an autonomous church under jurisdiction of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy, notably the Serbian Orthodox Church ...\u201d 20.  On 9 September 2009 (U.br.184/09) the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, which, as specified in the decision, concerned \u201cfreedom of belief and prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds\u201d. Relying on, inter alia, Articles 9, 16 and 19 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 42\u201144 below), the court found:\n\u201cThe complainant did not claim personal protection from discrimination ... but, he acts as a representative of a group of people with which he is associated ...\u201d 21.  It further stated:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the rights and interests of citizens in specific cases before administrative and judicial bodies. Neither has it jurisdiction to decide as a hierarchically superior court and examine the lawfulness and constitutionality of decisions adopted by competent administrative bodies ... the complainant refers to the non-registration as an action, but such an action ... stems from an individual decision which this court is not competent to examine ... the registration of ... a religious community or a group does not determine the religious beliefs and internal religious belief of a person, since expression of beliefs is an individual act, the registration procedure does not affect personal religious belief and rituals, and the court has not been presented with any evidence that they have been violated at any point.\u201d 22.  The court also held that the appeal had been submitted outside the two-month time-limit specified in the Rules of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 52 below), calculated since 9 November 2005, the date of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 18 above). 23.  On 20 September 2007 a new Act on the legal status of churches, religious communities and religious groups (\u201cthe 2007 Act\u201d) was adopted. It entered into force on 1 May 2008. 24.  On 3 and 6 April 2009 the applicant association inspected the register of churches, religious groups and communities (\u201cthe court register\u201d) of the Skopje Court of First Instance, which became, by virtue of the 2007 Act, the registration court. From 11 November 2008 onwards the MOC was recorded in the court register as \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d. The registration decision stated that in communication with third parties it would use the name \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church\u201d. 25.  According to \u201cthe minutes of the constituent assembly\u201d (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) \u201c... at the proposal of His Beatitude (\u041d\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0411\u043b\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e), the Archbishop of Ohrid and Metropolitan of Skopje Mr Jovan (Vrani\u0161kovski), the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese composed of (Bishops J., M., and D., all Macedonian nationals) convened a meeting on 27 April 2009 in order to adopt decisions for setting up and registration of \u201cthe Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d. The minutes of the constituent assembly were signed by all three bishops (their personal identity numbers and addresses were provided therein). 26.  On the same date a decision setting up the applicant association was adopted. As stated in its introductory part, \u201cat a meeting dated 27 April 2009 the Holy Synod decided to submit a request to the Skopje Court of First Instance for registration of \u2018the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u2019\u201d. It was set up \u201cas a voluntary, non-profit organisation of Christians who are not associated with any other registered religious community, and, in particular, has no connection with (the MOC)\u201d. It further stated:\n\u201cIt is an Orthodox church in full canonical and liturgical union with all recognised Orthodox churches in the world. For this reason, we consider that we should be registered as a church, but if the court considers otherwise, we would accept registration as a religious community or religious group.\u201d 27.  The decision further indicated that the applicant association\u2019s temporary place of registration would be in Bitola, in the respondent State. Bishop D. was authorised to submit the application for registration. He was also nominated to act on behalf of the applicant association (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0432\u0430) in relations with other legal entities until \u201c... Mr Jovan (Vrani\u0161kovski) returned from exile\u201d. 28.  The applicant association\u2019s Charter on the status, organisation and operation of the association (\u201cthe Charter\u201d) provided that it was \u201can autonomous church under the canonical jurisdiction of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d (section 2). The Holy Synod was \u201cthe highest managerial body\u201d of the applicant (section 6). It was composed of the Archbishop and two eparchy bishops (section 9). The assembly of archbishops (\u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0435\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0441\u043a\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) was \u201cthe supreme regulatory, administrative, supervisory and executive body concerning internal, financial and religious self-management\u201d (section 12). 29.  On 28 April 2009 Bishop D. submitted an application for registration of the \u201cGreek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d as \u201cone of the churches\u201d in the respondent State. The application expressly stated that the applicant association would agree to be registered as a religious community or group if the registration court found this more appropriate. The applicant association further expressed willingness to submit any documents, if need be, in order to avoid its application being refused. It was also stated that a refusal to register a religious group would be unjustified in a democratic society unless it was proven that the teaching of the group was destructive. That had not been the case with the \u2018\u201cGreek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u2019 which is two thousand years old\u201d. It further stated that:\n\u201c... any refusal to register \u2018the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u2019 is an obstacle to the Republic of Macedonia\u2019s future membership of the European Union ... It will not be pleasant, at the present time and place in history, if a judge appears as a persecutor of a church. Any person who does not respect human rights and freedoms regarding association of people on religious grounds, especially if he or she is a judge ... does not differ much from famous persecutors of the Holy Church ... we wrote the above in order to warn that it will be unpleasant if the court does not register \u2018the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u2019 ...\u201d 30.  On 10 July 2009, without reference to the applicant, the registration court sought an explanation from the MOC as to the meaning of the notion of \u201cPe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d. On 21 July 2009 the MOC replied (the reply was reproduced in the decision of the registration court of 28 July 2009, see paragraph 31 below) as follows:\n\u2018\u201cPe\u0107 Patriarchy\u2019 forms part of the name of the Serbian Orthodox Church and expresses the historical continuity of the Serbian Orthodox Church as canonical heir of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy: in the same way the name \u2018Ohrid Archdiocese\u2019 is part of the name of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The name \u2018Ohrid Archdiocese\u2019 is protected by the Macedonian Orthodox Church in the Industrial Property Bureau. The Serbian Orthodox Church, specifically the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy, has no canonical or any other jurisdiction over the Macedonian Orthodox Church or in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.\u201d 31.  On 28 July 2009 the registration court dismissed the applicant association\u2019s request for registration in the court register (\u0441\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u043f\u0438\u0441) for the following reasons:\n(a)  it was founded by the so-called Holy Synod, as a body, which was contrary to section 2 of the 2007 Act (see paragraph 49 below) according to which a decision to establish a religious entity was to be taken by the founding members at a constituent assembly. No such assembly had been held in the applicant\u2019s case;\n(b)  the application for registration concerned an organisation which had not been provided for under the 2007 Act. Its name did not specify whether it was a church, religious community or religious group. On the contrary, it implied that it was a divine organisation, which would operate as an autonomous Archdiocese under the canonical jurisdiction of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy. \u201cIt did not state that it was a voluntary organisation of physical persons\u201d as required under section 2 of the 2007 Act;\n(c)  the intended name of the applicant association included names or terms that were part of or indicated a relationship with the official names of States or religious communities or canonical territories already registered and under foreign jurisdiction. In this connection it held that the term \u201cGreek\u201d (\u0413\u0440\u043a\u043e) was an English translation of \u201cOrthodox Church\u201d. Its use was not in conformity with the 2007 Act (section 10 (3)). The \u201cOrthodox Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d partly covered the generic and historical name of the MOC; it did not differ from the latter\u2019s registered name. That name (Ohrid Archdiocese) has been used by the MOC \u201cconstitutionally, historically, actually and continuously\u201d for over 800 years, and only the MOC had the \u201chistorical, religious, moral and substantive right\u201d to use it. In this connection the court held that the legal status, name and official insignia of the MOC were safeguarded by the 2007 Act and the Constitution. That the applicant\u2019s intended name implied that it was under the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign church was in contravention of the 2007 Act and other laws. It was so because the MOC had canonical jurisdiction in the territory of the respondent State. It was only formally indicated that the applicant association would operate as an autonomous church. If registration was granted \u201cit would operate in the territory of the respondent State as part of a foreign orthodox church ... it would operate and be managed autonomously within the canonical jurisdiction of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy, notably (the SOC) ... which had no canonical or any other jurisdiction over (the MOC) or in the territory of (the respondent State).\u201d That was in violation of Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the Convention;\n(d)  the founding decision had specified only the temporary place of registration of the applicant association, without specifying \u201ca specific seat and address\u201d (\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043e \u0441\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0448\u0442\u0435 \u0438 \u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0430), as required under section 13 \u00a7 1 (2) of the 2007 Act; and\n(e)  Bishop D. was nominated to act on behalf (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0432\u0430) of the applicant association, but not to represent (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0443\u0432\u0430) it, as required under section 12 \u00a7 2 (5) of the 2007 Act. 32.  The registration court concluded that the applicant association\u2019s registration would run counter to the 2007 Act. It further stated that:\n\u201c(such a registration would violate) the freedom of religion ... of all physical persons, which they manifest through already registered religious communities. It would also violate the legitimate legal status of other voluntary associations of persons recorded in the court register ... their management bodies, hierarchy, competencies, titles, religious activities ...\u201d 33.  The applicant appealed, arguing (i) that the court had erred when seeking \u201can expert opinion\u201d about the meaning of \u201cPe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d from the MOC, which was not neutral; (ii) that the registration of the MOC in November 2008 under the name \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d had been unlawful. In this connection, the applicant submitted extracts from several media reports published at the time, according to which the competent body of the MOC, at its meeting held on 4 and 5 October 2008, had refused to change the name in its Constitution; (iii) that the MOC had applied to the Bureau for registration of the name \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d as a trademark was irrelevant, since the Industrial Property Act concerned goods and services and not religious organisations. In this connection, the applicant argued that, in any event, the Bureau had confirmed that on 6 August 2004 the MOC had requested registration of seventeen trademarks, including the trademark \u201cMacedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese\u201d. However, the MOC had never paid the registration fee for any of the trademarks for which registration had been sought. Consequently, those names were never registered as trademarks, nor were trademark certificates ever issued; (iv) the applicant association was set up by three founding members who had signed the minutes of the constituent assembly held on 27 April 2009. Consequently, the court had been wrong to hold that the founding decision had been rendered by the applicant association\u2019s Holy Synod, as that body had no legal capacity to act before the applicant association was registered; (v) no reasonable explanation had been given as to why the applicant association\u2019s intended name did not imply that it concerned a religious organisation; (vi) the court\u2019s interpretation that the expression \u201cGreek\u201d was an English translation of \u201cOrthodox Church\u201d was wrong; (vii) the intended name of the applicant association was different from the name of any registered religious organisation, including the name of the MOC to which \u201cOhrid Archdiocese\u201d had been unlawfully added. In this connection the applicant stated \u201c(it) differs from the MOC, with which we refuse to be associated.\u201d It further submitted that the court had allowed registration of two churches despite the fact that their names were substantially the same, namely \u201cChristian Adventist Church (church of the Adventists of the Seventh Day) in the Republic of Macedonia\u201d and \u201cChristian Adventist Church in Macedonia\u201d. It concluded the discussion under this head by saying that \u201chad the court had difficulty with the intended name, it could have raised that issue in written correspondence and we would have replied. This clearly suggests that the court would refuse to register [the applicant association] under any name\u201d; (viii) the registration court had given unsubstantiated explanations of a theological and historical nature favourable to the MOC; (ix) the applicable legislation did not preclude a religious community from being in canonical union with other churches in the world; (x) the refusal to register the applicant association violated the freedom of religion of the orthodox Greeks and Serbs in the respondent State, as the intended name suggested that it represented those communities; and (xii) lastly, the applicant association reiterated that it was ready to rectify any error the registration court might ask it to. 34.  On 4 February 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant association\u2019s appeal, reiterating the reasoning given by the registration court. 35.  On an unspecified date thereafter, D.N. (Bishop D.) submitted a constitutional appeal to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the authorities\u2019 refusal to register the applicant as \u201cthe Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d had affected his religious rights specified in Articles 16 and 19 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention. In this connection, he claimed that the religious organisation with which he was affiliated had not been allowed registration for many years, and thus had been denied the opportunity to obtain legal-entity status. He stated \u201cI\u2019m prevented from exercising my freedom of religious observance in association with other people on a voluntary basis.\u201d He further argued that without legal-entity status the applicant association was prevented from enjoying certain statutory rights: it could not construct religious temples; its members could not conduct religious ceremonies; it could not instruct religion or create religious schools; and it could not manage its property, nor could it hold bank accounts. Bishop D. invited the court to consider his appeal as submitted on behalf of all members of his religious organisation. Since the Constitutional Court had already rejected a similar appeal lodged on behalf of several people (U.br.182/09, see paragraph 55 below), he consented that his appeal be regarded as being submitted only in his name. He further stated:\n\u201cI agree, and after having consulted the other members of my religious community, I know that they also agree, that the Constitutional Court orders registration of the Greek Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy under conditions specified by law and we would adjust to any requirements set by the court. If a change in the name is needed, that should be indicated as a condition for our registration and once it is satisfied, (we) should be registered. If another condition should be fulfilled, that should be specified and we will try to accommodate it.\u201d 36.  On 15 December 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional appeal of D.N. concerning \u201cthe freedom of belief and prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds\u201d (U.br.118/10). Referring to the courts\u2019 decisions rejecting the applicant association\u2019s request for registration as \u201cGreek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy\u201d and relying on Articles 9, 16 and 19 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention, the court stated:\n\u201cThe court cannot examine the appeal on the merits since the complainant did not comply with the formal statutory requirements before a competent court (for registration of the applicant). The complainant is willing to comply with the statutory requirements for registration, but he has failed to do so in practice and (he) does not prove that the competent court was wrong in its judgment that those requirements had not been complied with ... in such circumstances, this court cannot rule on the request for the protection of human rights and freedoms in relation to specific final decisions of competent bodies. It is so since the person concerned (\u0441\u0443\u0431\u0458\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0442) did not take any action in the court proceedings to comply with the statutory requirements, which apply similarly to all citizens. This derives from his request that this court suggest to him what needs to be done for (the applicant association) to be registered, which implies knowledge that there were (certain) flaws which led to non-registration. The complainant was not a priori refused registration of his religious community by a final judicial decision. The refusal he received was for non-compliance with the statutory requirements.\u201d 37.  An article published in the daily newspaper Dnevnik on 26 September 2002 quoted the then Chairman of the Commission (see paragraph 10 above), who stated that:\n\u201cnot at any price will Bishop Jovan (Vraniskoski) be allowed to perform religious rituals or to have a seat in an exarchate.\u201d 38.  An article published in the daily newspaper Vest on 8 April 2004 quoted the following part of a joint statement by the then President of the respondent State and the Archbishop of the MOC:\n\u201cThe MOC and the Macedonian State are and will remain together. Schismatics and renegades should be marginalised, isolated and rejected. The media attention they receive, irrespective of motives and intentions, affects both the MOC and Macedonian national and State interests.\u201d 39.  An article published in the daily newspaper Ve\u010der on 23 November 2006 reported on discussions held between the Prime Minister of the respondent State and the Archbishop of the MOC regarding certain provisions of the 2007 Act. Following that discussion, the majority of bishops in the MOC, as stated in the article, had requested that the MOC should not accept any compromise which would prevent it from protecting itself against a parallel church, led by Mr Vrani\u0161kovski, being created. 40.  An article published in the daily newspaper Ve\u010der on 2 June 2009 reported on the alleged discontent of the applicant\u2019s followers about its name as submitted in the second registration proceedings. In this connection the article quoted a letter by Mr Vrani\u0161kovski in which he allegedly stated:\n\u201cThe (Holy) Synod was governed by the idea that the name of the religious community in respect of which we seek registration does not betray the essence of our Church. You know well that Greek-Orthodox does not mean Greek (by nationality) of Orthodox faith, but that name refers to all known Christian Orthodox Churches.\u201d 41.  The article continued, stating that Mr Vrani\u0161kovski had further asserted that the second part of the name was reasonable because the \u201cOhrid Orthodox Archdiocese\u201d was a part of the Pe\u0107 Patriarchy.", "references": ["1", "8", "2", "6", "0", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "7", "5"], "gold": ["7", "5"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are the brother and the parents of Mr Costas Tsalikidis, who was found dead on 9 March 2005. 6.  Mr Tsalikidis was Network Planning Manager for V., a mobile phone operator. On 9 March 2005 he was found dead in his apartment by his mother (the second applicant). He was found hanged by a rope tied to pipes above the bathroom door and a chair lay knocked over on the floor nearby. A little later his brother, the first applicant, arrived at the scene and used a knife to cut through the rope. He then placed his brother\u2019s body on the bed in his bedroom and took photographs of it. 7.  The applicants called Kolonos Police Station and the police sergeant in charge, acting as an interrogation officer, arrived at the scene to conduct an on-site inspection. In his report he stated that there were no signs of forced entry at any of the entrances to the residence, and no footprints or other marks on the balcony. He also noted that there was no mess in the residence nor were there any suspicious packets of drugs or other substances in the apartment or in the refuse containers. He did not conduct a search for fingerprints. No photos were taken of the place of death and no DNA test was performed on the rope by which Mr Tsalikidis was hanged. There was no suicide note. 8.  The body was transferred to the morgue, where an autopsy was performed on the body the next day by G.D.L., a coroner with the Forensic Medical Service of Athens. On 20 April 2005 he wrote an autopsy report in which he stated that there were no injuries to the body and that there were signs of pulmonary oedema. The rope mark encircled the cervical spine with a knot at the right of the occiput (\u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bc\u03b5 \u03ba\u03cc\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf \u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03ac \u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03ae \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1). The toxicology examination showed a small amount of alcohol at 0.12%. The hyoid bone and larynx appeared normal. It was concluded that the cause of death was hanging by a noose (\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b2\u03c1\u03cc\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5). No inspection of the place of death was performed by the coroner and in his report neither the temperature nor the weight of the body was recorded. 9.  On 9 February 2006, following the public announcement concerning the wiretapping case (see \u00a7\u00a7 14 \u2013 17 below) and while the investigation into his brother\u2019s death was still ongoing, the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor\u2019s office, asking for the scope of the investigation to be expanded. He requested in particular that the authorities examine the possible connection between his brother\u2019s death and the wiretapping case and investigate crimes that might possibly have been committed against him, such as homicide or extortion. He also requested the exhumation of his brother\u2019s body in order to search for specific poisons and other signs of homicide and declared his wish to join the proceedings as a civil party. 10.  Various witness testimonies were taken from colleagues, friends and family members of the deceased. In her testimonies dated 12 and 17 March 2005 and 7 February 2006, his fianc\u00e9e stated that she had spoken twice with him on the phone the night preceding his death without noticing anything particular. She expressed the view that he could not possibly have committed suicide, citing the fact that two days before he had asked her to book rooms for an excursion they were planning to make two weeks later and that he had expressed concerns about his mother\u2019s health. Lastly, she stated that about a month before his death he had confided to her that \u201cit was a matter of life and death for him to leave his job with V.\u201d and that \u201cV. was facing a serious problem that threatened its very existence\u201d. 11.  From the testimonies of his colleagues and his fianc\u00e9e it was evident that Mr Tsalikidis was sociable and had been well-respected in his work environment. Even though he had been under a lot of pressure at work, his colleagues expressed doubts as to whether stress could have driven him to suicide. He had expressed a wish to quit his job about a month before his death but had later changed his mind after a few days\u2019 leave. On the night of his death he had sent a work-related email to his colleagues at around 4.30 a.m. The content of the email was unremarkable. It was also alleged that on 7 March 2005 there had been a tense meeting at work in which he, amongst others, had been reprimanded by his superiors. His colleagues also testified that he had been responsible for holding monthly meetings with company E., one of V.\u2019s providers, at which they discussed new versions of software and other technical issues. 12.  Testimony was also taken from coroner F.K., the head of the Forensic Science Service of Athens University. In his statement dated 9 March 2006, he attempted to explain the lack of typical signs of hanging \u2013 such as injuries caused by body spasms or cyanosis of the face \u2013 by attributing the death to cardiac arrest caused by simultaneous pressure to the two carotid arteries. He also mentioned that the rope mark on the deceased man\u2019s neck had been typical in cases of hanging; it had been obliquely directed (\u03bb\u03bf\u03be\u03ac \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7) and the knot had been an \u201cordinary, everyday knot\u201d. In his view, a possible exhumation and/or toxicology test would be of no added value. 13.  In the light of the foregoing testimonies and having taken all evidence into account, on 20 June 2006 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance issued order no. 80/20-6-06 archiving the case, having concluded that there were no indications of any criminal acts committed against Mr Tsalikidis, even though his death was causally linked with the wiretapping case. On 25 September 2006 the decision was upheld by order no. 565/25-9-06 issued by the public prosecutor at the Court of Appeal following an appeal against it by the first applicant. 14.  On 2 February 2006 the Minister of Public Order made a statement informing the public that since June 2004 (two months before the Olympic Games) the telephones of many state officials had been tapped through spyware that had been implanted in the network of phone operator V. The wiretap, installed by persons unknown, had targeted more than 100 of Greece\u2019s State officials, including the Prime Minister and many senior members of the Cabinet. The spyware diverted phone conversations made by V.\u2019s subscribers to fourteen \u201cshadow\u201d pay-as-you-go mobile phones, allowing calls to be monitored. 15.  Following a parliamentary investigation, it was made known that the unauthorised spyware had been implanted in a software provided by company E. to phone operator V. Mr Tsalikidis had been responsible for accepting the software from E. on behalf of V. and met representatives from E. on a monthly basis in order to discuss new versions of the software and other technical issues. 16.  V. was informed by E. that their network had been used to wiretap State officials on 4 March 2005. On 8 March 2005 G.K., a senior manager with V., ordered that the newly discovered software be deactivated and removed from its systems. On 10 March 2005 he informed the Ministers of Justice and of Public Order and the director of the Prime Minister\u2019s office about the existence of the software. A criminal investigation was ordered but its conclusions are not apparent from the material in the Court\u2019s possession. 17.  The wiretapping affair assumed large dimensions both within and outside Greece, and the investigation was widely reported in the media. Mr Tsalikidis\u2019 death occurred the day after the spyware had been removed from V.\u2019s network and the day before the relevant ministers were informed and this fact was mentioned in all the newspaper articles, suggesting an association between his death and the wiretapping affair without his involvement in the case being established. 18.  On 8 February 2012, citing new evidence, the applicants requested that the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance reopen the case file for the purposes either of initiating criminal proceedings in rem for intentional homicide and/or exposure to peril and/or felonious extortion, or for launching a supplementary preliminary investigation into the aforementioned offences or any other offence that might have been committed. The applicants also declared that they wished to join the proceedings as civil parties. 19.  The first evidence submitted by the applicants was a forensic report dated 12 November 2010 prepared at their request by a British expert, Dr S.K. The expert wrote his report \u2212 in English \u2212 on the basis of his examination of a number of documents from the case file which had been translated into that language. The relevant parts of his report read as follows:\n\u201c... 2. In forming my opinion I have had to rely on a relatively limited group of materials including the original autopsy report translated by Mr Peter Tsalikidis, a set of colour scene photographs (it is not clear to me who took these photographs), scans of white and black photos showing an unclothed body with a ligature mark on mid\u2011-neck (the detail is poor) and a website videos that were produced for an expos\u00e9 produced by the Al-Jazeera network.\n... 5. On April 8 I received two emails from Mr Tsalikidis. The first was an extract of comments taken from a report issued by the Forensic Institute in Athens. The report states that the ligature was \u201cupwardly directed\u201d, a statement that appears to be contradicted by the photographs I have seen. Mr Tsalikidis also claims he was told that \u201cthe death was instant because of simultaneous pressure to the carotid bags (sic - this should be \u2018arteries\u2019)\u201d. This statement, too, is inconsistent with the normal colouration of the face as shown in the photographs. 6. On March 29 I was sent a link to a website dedicated to this case... The video also contains several images and statements that are confusing. These include (1) photograph of the suspensory knot \u2013 it is a complex knot, and definitely not the sort of knots seen in routine suicides. I do not know if the deceased possessed the requisite skills needed to tie such a complex knot. The video narrator stated that the body was hanging 3 inches from the floor. In spite of the short distance, it is possible for someone to hang themselves at this low height. In fact, it is not uncommon.\n... 8. ... The photographs do show that the deceased was unclothed; they also showed an obvious ligature mark that was located in mid-neck, parallel to the shoulders.\n...\nGross Autopsy Findings 10. Neither the height nor the weight of the deceased was supplied. Neither the core temperature of the cadaver nor the ambient room temperature was recorded. It appears that the autopsy was performed the next day, but whether the cadaver was refrigerated is not stated and, since core temperature was not obtained, it would have been irrelevant anyway. No attempt whatsoever was made to identify the time of death... No fibres were taken from the ligature for identification and no tissue taken from the ligature were taken for microscopic examination.\nDiscussion 1. The position of the rope mark is more consistent with strangulation than hanging \u2013 in cases of strangulation the ligature mark, as it was here, tends to encircle the entire neck without deviation upward or downward, and almost invariable there is a gap where the rope suspends the body. Hanging marks are almost always higher on the neck than strangulation marks. The marks present here are more consistent with strangulation. 2. From the photographs I saw there was no evidence of hypostasis (accumulation of blood in the legs that is to be expected after a normal hanging). This argues strongly against hanging.\n... 4. Perhaps more importantly, one expects to see some sort of soft tissue damage within the underlying neck. Injuries are present in at least 1/3 of hangings. No damage was seen within the neck, which is worrisome. The absence of soft tissue injury does not rule out hanging, but if it had been present, a much more convincing case for strangulation could have been made. 5. Damage to the lining of the great vessels in the neck is a frequent finding in strangulation, but that examination was never performed (in fact, no microscopic examination was performed). This means the autopsy was incomplete by U.S. and EU standards. 6. The colour of the face could only be described as normal; typically, victims of manual strangulation will have deeply congested haemorrhagic faces, but victims of hanging often have pale faces \u2013 in this particular instance the colour of the face is so normal that it almost appears that neither strangulation nor hanging occurred. 7. While adequate examination is not possible only from inspecting photographs, the knot used to anchor the rope appears quite complex. This might be expected if the deceased had nautical experience, but the family insists he did not. 8. Homicidal hanging is very rare, since it is very difficult for one person to hang another, unless of course they had been drugged first. The autopsy report says that blood and urine were tested for alcohol and that the results show the deceased had been drinking (post-mortem alcohol production of that magnitude does not occur that quickly). I think it would be very important to know if any other drugs were present. If testing was not done at the time of autopsy, exhumation and testing of the hair is still possible. The results, whether positive or negative, would be definitive. 9. The medical examiner commented on the presence of pulmonary oedema. Such may occur after hanging, but histological studies have shown that pulmonary oedema is much more common after strangulation. 10. There were no scratch marks on the neck, suggesting the deceased made no effort to claw the rope away from his neck. This is also consistent with his having been sedated.\nDiscussion\nObviously, there is no evidence of forceful strangulation and, in the absence of visible trauma, homicidal hanging would appear to be out of the question. The fact that there was minimal suspension does not rule out suicide. Having said that, the case has a number of disturbing features: (1) the autopsy was grossly inadequate, and even if signs of homicide had been present, they would have been missed; (2) the face was of normal colour \u2013 neither congested nor pale; this argues for death before hanging; (3) there was no accumulation of blood in the lower extremities \u2013 this absence argues against hanging altogether; (4) the furrow around the neck is in a position more often seen in strangulation than suicide; (5) none of the normal scratch marks normally seen outside of the neck when individuals hang themselves were evident. Nor, according to the autopsy pathologist, there none of the soft tissue injuries that are normally expected in hanging. Two other issues are of concern: (1) was the deceased able to tie the complex knot used to support him, and (2) it appears that complete toxicology testing (was not) performed and that is a very serious omission. There are many poisons that are not detected by routine tests \u2013 they are only identified if they are specifically sought. In the absence to these questions, the possibility of murder must be strongly considered. The most likely scenario, based on the evidence at hand, is that the deceased was sedated/poisoned and hung after death.\u201d 20.  The second evidence adduced by the applicants was an undated report produced at the applicants\u2019 request by Coroner Th.V. His report was prepared on the basis of the documents in the criminal case file. 21.  Coroner Th.V. emphasised that any assessment of a forensic report should be done with great caution; nevertheless, he stressed that in the initial autopsy there had been serious omissions. He identified in particular the lack of reference to the existence or not of haemorrhagic infiltration where the rope was positioned, as well as the precise position of the rope with reference to the neck (obliquely or vertically directed). He further criticised the failure to search for injuries to the inner part of carotid arteries which could have shown whether Mr Tsalikidis had been hanged or strangled. 22.  Coroner Th. V. included in his report a number of elements of evidence which precluded certain conclusions as to the cause of death. In particular, he stressed the absence of signs usually found in cases of hanging, that is to say cyanosis of the face, oedema of the face, and projection of the tongue, all of which were not present in this case. He furthermore described as strange, taking account of the place where the body was hanging, the complete absence of any injuries resulting from the usual body spasms, causing it to crash against nearby furniture and walls. 23.  In respect of the written statement given by F.K., who attempted to explain the lack of typical signs of hanging by attributing Mr Tsalikidis\u2019 death to cardiac arrest, coroner Th. V. stated that such manner of death was not very probable as it usually occurs in cases of pressure applied to the neck with the hands. In any event, this cause of death is still much debated in the medical community. 24.  Lastly, coroner Th.V. mentioned that a large number of poisons cannot be detected through routine examination. He opined that if exhumation of the body were to be ordered, then toxic substances could possibly be found as they can be detected even years later. A fresh examination of the place of death could also prove useful as long as the place was still intact. In any event, coroner Th. V. considered that the available evidence was not sufficient to allow it to be established whether Mr Tsalikidis\u2019 death had been the result of suicide or homicide. 25.  As third evidence the applicants submitted a letter dated 15 June 2010 written by the President of the Committee on Institutions and Transparency of the Greek Parliament and addressed to the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation in which the former expressed the view that there had not been sufficient investigation of the relationship between the death of Costas Tsalikidis and the wiretapping affair. They also cited a public statement made on 5 September 2011 by the former President of the Parliamentary Committee of Institutions and Transparency, who was then already Minister of Justice, that \u201cthe question of whether Costas Tsalikidis committed suicide or was murdered will always remain open\u201d. 26.  In view of the above evidence, the applicants requested the reopening of the case file. They requested in particular that the following investigative measures be implemented: phone operator V. to be ordered to provide the minutes of the meeting that took place the day before Mr Tsalikidis was found dead, representatives of V. to confirm officially that Mr Tsalikidis was the person responsible for accepting on behalf of their company the legal software provided by company E. which was used to activate the program of wiretapping, a forensic examination of the place of death and a reconstruction of the circumstances of the death to be conducted, exhumation and new toxicology tests to be run, a cross\u2011examination of the applicants\u2019 technical advisors together with coroners G.D.L. and F.K. to be organised, a new forensic report to be drawn up by another coroner, an expert report to be produced concerning the knot, technical advisors S.K. and Th. V. to be summoned to testify, and witness statements to be taken again in the light of the new evidence acquired. They stressed in particular that the scope of the investigation should include the deletion of the illegally installed software from the network of V. and why it was removed before the authorities had been informed. 27.  By document no. E 2006/1200/29-2-2012, issued by the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance on 29 February 2012 and addressed to the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal, approval was sought to reopen the case file pursuant to Article 43 \u00a7 3 (a) and Article 47 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 7 March 2012 the request was granted and a supplementary preliminary investigation was ordered. 28.  On 20 April 2012 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance ordered the exhumation of Mr Tsalikidis\u2019 body, the conduct of a new forensic autopsy and the execution of all laboratory tests to be carried out in a laboratory in the presence of the technical advisors appointed by the applicants. 29.  The exhumation took place on 3 May 2012 in the presence of coroners I.B., N.K. and Ch.S. and the applicants\u2019 technical advisor Th.V., and biological material was sent to the Universities of Athens and Crete for the purpose of conducting toxicology tests. According to toxicology report no. 1313/7-12-2012, drawn up on 7 December 2012 by the Forensic Science Laboratory of the Toxicology Unit of the University of Crete, and forensic report no. 865/25-11-2013 on the exhumed body, drawn up on 25 November 2013 by the Forensic and Toxicology Laboratory of the School of Medicine of Athens University, the results were negative as regards the presence of poison or medication. However, in both reports it was stressed that the absence of a positive finding did not preclude the possibility of the administration of poison or medication to the deceased, since a number of factors, such as the lapse of time, could have affected the results. 30.  According to histology report no. 889/12/26-2-2013 drawn up on 26 February 2013 by the First Pathological Anatomy Laboratory of the School of Medicine of Athens University, the deceased\u2019s hyoid bone was found to be broken. However, owing to the absence of surrounding soft tissue, it was not possible to say whether it had been broken ante-mortem or post-mortem. 31.  On the basis of the above-mentioned findings, the three coroners each prepared a new forensic report. Coroners I.B. and N.K., in their reports numbered 1408/2561/30-4-2012/10-7-2013 and 1287/18-6-2013 and drawn up on 10 July 2013 and on 18 June 2013 respectively, commented on the findings of the toxicology reports and histology report and concluded that the cause of Mr Tsalikidis\u2019 death remained unclarified due to the passage of time. Coroner Ch.S. prepared a similar report dated 25 November 2013 commenting on the above\u2011mentioned findings without any reference to the cause of death. 32.  The applicants also requested that a psychiatric report be included in the case file, and one was duly prepared at their request. Dr A.D. studied the case file documents and conducted interviews with the first applicant and the deceased\u2019s fianc\u00e9e. His report dated 12 April 2012 stated that the deceased did not betray any of the personality characteristics associated with a suicide risk. In addition, no other factors such as health issues or financial problems were detected as being of concern, and in general, no plausible grounds for suicide were identified. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, his support system of friends and family, his short-term (excursion) and long\u2011term (wedding) plans, together with the absence of any risk factors, were all indications that Mr Tsalikidis did not commit suicide. 33.  On 16 June 2014 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance, with the approval of the public prosecutor at the Court of Appeal, closed the supplementary investigation, concluding that the above\u2011mentioned reports, considered in conjunction with the evidence gathered during the main investigation, were sufficient to allow the case file to be archived, thereby upholding the conclusions of order 80/06 issued by the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance (order no. 14/3859/16-6-2014).", "references": ["6", "4", "1", "5", "8", "9", "7", "2", "3", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant is a French national who was born in 1970 and lives in Mouroux. He is the brother of the victim, M.B. born in 1968.\nThe second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, who were born in 1977, 1973, 1972, 1939 and 1951 respectively, are the victim\u2019s sister, widow, brother, father and mother. They live in Mouroux, Massy, Valentigney and Thulay respectively. 6.  On 12 November 2009, at about 4.30 p.m., M.B., who was 1 m 80 tall and weighed about 100 kilos, went into a pharmacy in Valentigney. He was known to the staff there, where he habitually went to collect the medicine prescribed for his psychiatric disorders. 7.  M.B. asked to exchange some medicine dispensed without a prescription, saying he was not satisfied with it. A pharmacist\u2019s assistant, Ms R., and the owner of the shop, Mr F., explained to him that the effects of the medicine had diminished because he had become addicted to it. M.B. started to become angry, throwing the medicine boxes on the floor, raised his voice and started speaking incoherently:\n\u201cI\u2019m fed up with your night visits, with your assistant and with you!\u201d 8.  M.B. told Mr F. that he intended to file a complaint against him. Mr F asked Ms R. to call the police. M.B. sat down on one of the chairs for customers at the pharmacy. 9.  At 4.53 p.m. four police officers arrived on the scene after receiving a call from the incident room instructing them to intervene in an incident involving an individual with psychiatric disorders. 10.  Deputy police sergeant L. and police constable M. asked M.B. several times to accompany them out of the pharmacy. When he vehemently refused, sergeant L. and constable D. seized him by the arm in order to remove him from the pharmacy. Constable M. seized M.B. by his right leg. M.B. struggled and called for help. 11.  At the doorstep up to the pharmacy M.B. found himself on the ground. Constable M. attempted to handcuff him behind his back while he continued to struggle and appeal to the police for help. Constable M. punched M.B. twice in the solar plexus but still did not succeed in handcuffing him. 12.  M.B. was then turned onto his right side and constable D. was able to handcuff him in the front with two pairs of interlinking handcuffs. 13.  Deputy police sergeant P. went to get the police vehicle to move it closer to the pharmacy. Two police officers seized M.B. by the arm in order to put him in the van. Despite putting up resistance, M.B. was forced inside the police van. 14.  M.B. continued struggling and shouting in the police van and pushed one police officer against the luggage holder above and another against a shelf before falling face downwards. Deputy police sergeant L. positioned himself above his shoulders in order to fasten another pair of handcuffs attaching M.B. to the fixed part of the back seat in the van. Constables D. and M. positioned themselves on top of him, on his legs and on his buttocks. 15.  At 4.58 p.m., that is, exactly five minutes after they had arrived, the three police officers present in the vehicle contacted their headquarters requesting assistance from the fire brigade and the mobile emergency medical service (SAMU). 16.  According to the incident room\u2019s telephone log, at 5.07 p.m. the fire brigade asked the police to transfer M.B. to their vehicle. Deputy police sergeant L. refused to do so on grounds of M.B.\u2019s extremely agitated state. 17.  The firemen then drew up a record of M.B.\u2019s condition. He had calmed down, but his heart rate could not be measured with the pulse oximeter because the sensors were not working. One of the firemen constantly monitored his breathing, which stopped at one point. A fireman noted the absence of blood circulation. 18.  The team of firemen brought M.B. inside the pharmacy. One of them alerted the ambulance service by radio. The firemen inserted a semi-automatic defibrillator and started carrying out cardiac massage. 19.  An emergency doctor from the mobile emergency and intensive care service (SMUR), called out by the firemen, administered specialist cardiopulmonary resuscitation. He recorded M.B.\u2019s death at 6.02 p.m. 20.  An investigation into the cause of M.B.\u2019s death was commenced immediately. 21.  Of the three pharmacists who gave a statement that day, on 12 November 2009, two were present when the police officers had asked M.B. to leave the premises. They confirmed that when M.B. had refused to comply, the police officers had approached him and seized him. They said that M.B. had begun shouting and struggling at that point and had continued shouting and struggling when he had got into the police van, handcuffed. None of the three witnesses had seen what had happened in the police van. 22.  One of them stressed the fact that M.B. had been a customer at the pharmacy for a year and a half and had always been very pleasant during his monthly visits to collect his neuroleptics prescription. 23.  On the same day Mr S., a volunteer firefighter, was also questioned. He stated that on his arrival M.B. had still been in a highly agitated state, lying face down in the van, with the police officers restraining him: one either sitting or kneeling on the victim\u2019s buttocks, and the other holding his legs; his hands were outstretched and fastened by several handcuffs to the back seat of the van; the victim\u2019s head was on the driver\u2019s side, and his right cheek face down on the floor. He explained that he had requested medical reinforcements and that then, when they observed that his heart had stopped beating, the firemen had decided to take him back into the pharmacy to continue carrying out cardiac massage. 24.  On 13 November 2009 one of the pharmacists was questioned a second time. He stated that M.B. had been a regular customer at the pharmacy. He said that the police officers had not hit M.B. 25.  Constable M. was questioned the same day. He stated that deputy sergeant L. had introduced himself to M.B. and had asked him to come outside \u201cto explain the problem, as in this type of intervention the aim is to separate the parties\u201d. He explained that M.B. had refused to leave the pharmacy several times despite repeated requests by the police, who had finally dragged hm towards the door. He said that he had then seized M.B.\u2019s right leg and that, just in front of the entrance to the pharmacy, M.B., who had lost his balance, had fallen down. He added that the police officers had then attempted to handcuff him and that when he had resisted attempts to put him in the police van constable D. had pulled his legs, which had unbalanced him and caused both of them and deputy police sergeant L. to fall over in the police van. He said that L. had managed \u201cI don\u2019t know how to pin him back down on the ground\u201d. He also said that in order to finish handcuffing him deputy sergeant L. had squatted down on M.B.\u2019s shoulders while constable D. remained at leg level; as M.B. had continued struggling, he himself had stood on his buttocks. He stated that they had remained \u201clike that for a while, but I cannot tell you how long, it felt like a long time, with me on his buttocks, my colleague on his shoulders and the third officer on his feet, assisted by P., who had crossed his legs to stop him moving. It was then that the fire brigade arrived\u201d. 26.  Deputy sergeant L. was also questioned on 13 November 2009. He stated that he had received instructions from his headquarters to go to a pharmacy and had been informed that M.B. \u201csuffered from psychiatric disorders\u201d. He confirmed that M.B. had put up a violent struggle before letting himself slide to the ground in front of the entrance to the pharmacy. He explained that constable M. had administered two punches to the abdomen, using a technique known as \u201cdiversionary blows\u201d. As regards the rest, he confirmed the above-mentioned conditions in which M.B. had been handcuffed in the police van. 27.  An autopsy was carried out on 13 November 2009. The forensic doctor described and explained the traumatic injuries observed: the injury to the left eyebrow and the associated swelling did not suggest injuries following a blow but were related to an impact by that part of his face on a ridged surface. The other facial injuries suggested close contact on a rough surface. The injuries to the wrists were characteristic of handcuffing. Those to the lower part of the chest and in the abdominal cavity could have been incurred as a result of two violent blows to that area. The forensic doctor specifed that the injuries had caused neither internal bleeding nor fractures. He mainly noted marks on the lungs and 70% stenosis on a heart artery. Dr H.\u2019s report, drawn up on 16 November 2009, contained the following conclusions:\n\u201cDeath in all likelihood occurred as a result of heart failure.\nAn atheromatous attack observed on an artery of the heart exposed him to a severe risk of cardiac rhythm disorders and sudden death.\nThe state of stress and agitation presented by the victim on his arrest may have contributed to heart failure.\nRestriction of chest expansion may have occurred when the victim was restrained, but it cannot be affirmed that mechanical asphyxiation was the cause of death. ...\nRecent traumatic injuries consistent with action by third parties were observed. In any event, the various injuries did not directly contribute to the death; nor is there any injury consistent with blows to the face.\u201d 28.  On 14 and 23 November 2009 Ms S., a shopkeeper, was questioned and stated that she had heard shouts from her shop opposite the pharmacy. She said that she had seen four police officers with a man lying face down with his arms behind his back being punched and kicked. Through a side window of the police van she stated that she had seen a female and a male police officer trampling on the spot while hanging on to the roof of the van, one administering three punches in a downwards movement and lifting his knee up very high before bringing it down in one sharp movement. 29.  On 23 November 2009 the shopkeeper\u2019s minor son was questioned and stated that he had seen two police officers trampling on M.B. in the road and that a female police officer had hit him several times with a truncheon in the stomach, back and face. 30.  On 3 December 2009 a judicial investigation for manslaughter was opened in respect of a person or persons unknown and assigned to two investigating judges. 31.  On an unknown date the applicants applied to join the proceedings as civil parties. 32.  On 7 January 2010 Ms C., a neighbour next to the pharmacy, stated that she had seen M.B. struggling, face downwards, outside the pharmacy. She said that the police officers had \u201cthrown him into the van\u201d and that she had left after the doors were closed. She stated that the police officers had not hit M.B. 33.  On 21 January 2010 chief brigadier M. D., an instructor in defence and arrest techniques and in the psychological and behavioural aspects of police intervention, was heard as a witness. He stated that in the event of a dispute between people, \u201cthe opposing parties should in so far as possible be separated\u201d: the police officers, in attempting to induce the M.B. to leave the pharmacy, had sought to avoid a fight in the shop. He said that the blows administered by constable M. and described as \u201ctwo punches to the suspect\u2019s abdominal area with the aim of distracting and and securely handcuffing him [were] among the priority areas for attempting to weaken the resistance of the person concerned. They [the police officers] had not been over zealous and had completed the handcuffing in the front. The officers had also acted in an emergency situation. The technique used by constable M. appear[ed] the most appropriate in the context of the intervention\u201d. He added that all the techniques taught were designed to weaken resistance to arrest. He specified that, with regard to the immobilisation of M.B. in the van, standing on a person\u2019s buttocks was not among the techniques taught and that positioning oneself across M.B.\u2019s shoulders, as sergeant L. had done, was one of the procedures taught. That technique enabled the officer to prevent the suspect from moving while avoiding postural asphyxiation. He concluded that the intervening officers, having regard to the context of the intervention, had acted with pragmatism and discernment. 34.  Reports were produced by several experts appointed by one of the investigating judges. On 23 June 2010 Dr L., professor of forensic medicine, and Dr R., lecturer in forensic medicine, provided a forensic medical report after examining M.B.\u2019s body on 18 December 2009. They stated that their examinations had revealed \u201ca series of cutaneous lesions that could not have contributed to the death\u201d. They did not indicate evidence of any \u201cfactor suggesting death by chest compression\u201d. There was thus no evidence of \u201cpetechial subconjunctival injuries or of facial petechial injuries\u201d. They stated as follows:\n\u201cour examination of the sealed evidence has not revealed any elements indicating the cause of death of [M.B.]. The sealed evidence shows that he was receiving psychiatric treatment for psychosis with several episodes of hallucination requiring the regular ingestion of antipsychotic medicines. ... At the levels measured, the ingestion of psychoactive drugs revealed by the toxicological investigations does not appear capable of explaining the victim\u2019s death by a process of direct toxicity. ... In conclusion, the death of [M.B.] ... is in all likelihood the result of myocardial failure. The death is due to natural causes.\u201d 35.  On 10 December 2010 Dr T. and Dr F. produced their anatomopathological expert report after examining a copy of the autopsy report of 16 November 2009, a copy of the interviews with the members of the police patrol team who had arrested M.B., a copy of the record of examination of two witnesses, various sealed samples collected both by Dr H. and by Professor L. and Dr R.:\n\u201c[M.B] died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress. ... In conclusion, the intense and prolonged emotional stress, and the prolonged and severe agitation, which started in the pharmacy and contined during the arrest explain the series of physiopathological phenomena which caused the death: (1) intense stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system (adrenergic neuro-hormonal system), (2) coronary-ischemic spasm, (3) fatal cardiac rhythm disorders.\u201d 36.  On 14 and 16 December 2010 and 19 January 2011 the four police officers appeared for the first time as assisted witnesses. 37.  On 8 April 2011 a reconstruction was organised, by the two investigating judges in charge of the case, in the presence of the civil parties\u2019 lawyers and the assisted witnesses. During the visit to the scene the forensic doctor stated that he had not noted any traumatic injury consistent with the violence described by the witness Ms S, the only injuries suggesting direct action by a third party being those corresponding to the punches administered to the stomach. 38.  On 5 July 2011 Dr C., university professor, neurologist and psychiatrist, and head of a forensic medical department, examined M.B.\u2019s medical file at his psychiatrist\u2019s surgery, his medical file at the casualty department of Montb\u00e9liard Hospital, and the medical file kept by M.B.\u2019s general practioner. He stated that M.B., who had been receiving psychiatric care for many years, had been admitted to a hospital psychiatric unit several times and presented a psychotic disorder characterised by delusional notions of a betwitching, persecutory and interpretative type During his most recent hospital consultation he had been diagnosed with paranoid psychosis, which is related to schizophrenia. Dr C. concluded his report as follows:\n\u201c[M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder, namely, delusional psychosis, which explains the initial altercation with the pharmacist and his subsequent state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy. It is also possible that the intervention by the police was interpreted in a delusional manner.\nWhen the SMUR [mobile emergency and intensive care service] intervened the criterion of seriousness was ... the fact that [M.B.] had been suffering from heart failure for approximately twenty minutes.\nThe superficial injuries observed, during the autopsy, to the right-hand side of the face and the front of the knees [appear to him] compatible with immobilisation on the floor of the van and the petechial injuries to the upper abdomen and the left abdominal region are compatible with punches administered as described in the autopsy report.\u201d 39.  On 25 November 2011 the Ombudsman, an institution independent of the State, having the task, inter alia, of ensuring compliance by the police with their code of professional ethics, to whom a member of parliament had submitted the case, produced a report. He found that whilst the police officers had been very quick to seek the assistance of the fire brigade and the emergency medical service, it was regrettable that the situation had been inaccurately described by the incident room to the firemen prior to their intervention (the latter had been informed of M.B.\u2019s \u201cwithdrawal symptoms\u201d). He considered that there had been no imminent danger to people or property in the pharmacy and thus no urgent need to remove M.B. as soon as possible. He stated that the immobilisation and compression procedures carried out in the van had been dangerous and disproportionate. He described as \u201camouting to a serious infringement of human dignity and to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3\u201d the techniques used by constables D. and M. to pin M.B. to the floor of the police van. The Ombudsman also noted conflicting statements by the police officers regarding whethere there had been physical violence other than the two diversionary blows and pointed out that no witnesses had been present throughout the entire incident. The Ombudsman concluded that the precipitation with which the police had acted had led them to make an erroneous assessment of M.B.\u2019s situation and to react in a stereotypical manner rather than adjust their conduct during the intervention, despite the fact that they knew that M.B. was receiving treatment for psychiatric disorders and that they had been able to observe abnormal behaviour on his part. He recommended reinforcing the initial and continuous training of police officers with regard to dealing with persons suffering from a mental disorder. Lastly, he recommended that disciplinary proceedings be brought against the four police officers who had arrested M.B. for \u201cdisproportionate use of force or failing to cease using such force\u201d. 40.  On 18 January 2012 Dr T. and Dr F. supplemented their expert report of 10 December 2010. They confirmed the conclusion of their earlier report and ruled out mechanical asphyxia: \u201cM.B. died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders, with no occurrence of mechanical asphyxia.\u201d They reiterated the part played by extreme stress in the death, stating that \u201cthe adrenergic stimulation was related to the extreme and prolonged emotional and physical stress. The stress lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes, starting in the pharmacy and continuing throughout the arrest\u201d. 41.  On 26 March 2012 the four police officers who had arrested M.B. were charged with manslaughter as a result of the manifestly wilful violation of a legal or statutory duty of caution and security. 42.  On 5 November 2012 the the public prosecutor at the Montb\u00e9liard tribunal de grande instance filed submissions recommending that the charges be dropped. 43.  On 21 December 2012 the investigating judges ruled that there was no case to answer. They found that whilst it was true that M.B. had been in a relatively calm state, the pharmacist had nonetheless considered his behaviour sufficiently disturbing to inform the police of the presence in his establishment of a person in an agitated state and suffering from psychiatric disorders. They observed that the police officers had not immediately used force and that, on being informed of M.B.\u2019s pyschiatric pathology, they had called the emergency medical service. The judges found that the evidence given by Ms S. had been invalidated by the observations made during the reconstruction, the statements made by the pharmacists and the conclusions of the forensic doctor. The investigating judges observed as follows:\n\u201c ... pinning [M.B.] to the ground was not identified by the medical experts as the direct cause of the death. Whilst the intervention by the police inevitably generated stress, the victim had already been stressed well before their intervention. As the police did not know about [M.B.\u2019s] heart disease, of which he himself was unaware, they could not foresee that the combination of these two factors [stress and heart disease] could create a risk for the victim.\u201d 44.  The judges considered that the force used by the police officers had been necessary and proportionate \u201ceven if being pinned down in the van, by L. and P. and M.\u2019s position \u2013 standing on [M.B.\u2019s] legs \u2013 may appear objectionable in absolute terms\u201d. 45.  The applicants appealed against that ruling. On 16 October 2013 the Investigation Division of the Besan\u00e7on Court of Appeal upheld the decision finding no case to answer on the following grounds:\n\u201c[M.B.\u2019s death was due] according to the forensic doctor who carried out the initial autopsy ... to heart failure in circumstances of stress and effort acting on a predisposed heart condition; the second forensic report supported the finding of cutaneous injuries that could not have been a contributory cause of death and ruled out death due to chest compression; the experts indicated that the death of [M.B.] was, in all likelihood, the result of myocardial failure and natural causes; the anatomopathological report ... [led] the experts to conclude that [M.B.] had died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress, and formally ruled out mechanical asphyxia; lastly, the forensic and psychiatric expert ... concluded that [M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder ... which explained the initial altercation with the pharmacist and the ensuing state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy, as their intervention could have been interpreted in a delusional manner\u201d. 46.  With regard to the conditions of arrest, the Investigation Division found that the agitated state and the \u201crecalcitrant, not to say violent, behaviour of [M.B.] had obliged the police officers to use force and intervention techniques, which they had been taught, to restrain him\u201d, including the two punches administered by constable M. \u201cwho explained that he had used a technique taught to police officers to assist in handcuffing suspects by creating a surprise effect, that explanation being confirmed by his colleagues and instructor\u201d. The Investigation Division found that M.B. had been pinned to the floor of the van in conditions that had been \u201cadmittedly unusual, or even objectionable\u201d, but that these had preserved the respiratory capacity and ventilation of a person who \u201cwas continuing to oppose strong resistance to the police officers\u201d. It concluded that \u201cno inadvertence, lack of care, inattention, negligence or breach of a statutory or legal duty of protection or care, or gross negligence [could] be attributed [to the police officers] in the death of [M.B.]\u201d. 47.  The applicants appealed on points of law. On 18 November 2014 the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal on the following grounds:\n\u201c ... the Court of Cassation is satisfied on the basis of the grounds of the judgment being appealed that in upholding the decision finding no case to answer the Investigation Division, after analysing all the facts referred to it and addressing the main grounds in the statement of appeal, gave sufficient and coherent reasons for their finding that the investigation had been thorough and that there was insufficient evidence on which to convict the persons charged with of manslaughter or any other offence ...\u201d\n...", "references": ["9", "5", "3", "4", "7", "6", "8", "2", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company registered in the town of Kstovo, in the Nizhegorodskiy Region. In 2008 it changed its name to Zemlyaki Publishing House. 6.  The applicant company is the founder, editor and publisher of a local newspaper, Zemlyaki, printed in Kstovo and distributed in the Kstovskiy District. 7.  In 2004 the applicant company published a series of articles commenting on the professional activity of Y.L., the then head of the Kstovo District Administration (\u201cthe District Administration\u201d). 8.  In an article published in issue 11 (400) dated 6 March 2004 and entitled \u201cSuccess has turned his head\u201d (\u201c\u0413\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0442 \u0443\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0445\u043e\u0432\u201d), N.G., a member of a local council, contested the validity of the District Administration\u2019s policy concerning spending and property management in respect of 2003 in the following terms:\n\u201c... I do not object for the sake of objecting, Y.L. I just do not understand, where exactly did you see the \u2018strict economy regime\u2019. Where exactly?\nIt has now been three years since the failure of MTS to repay its debt (of about seven million roubles). And the setting up of MTS was entirely your initiative and [it is your] creation. The Trade Committee is renting out the land for street commerce, but the profits somehow do not get back into the budget. You personally had given out the biggest shops for external management for free before the year in question, which resulted in budgetary losses of a few million roubles. I would not be surprised if [the shops] were sold by the Trade Committee to the \u2018right people\u2019, avoiding an open auction and following a well-established scheme (as was the case with your Mercedes car).\nYou have already created a precedent. You have entered into so many loan contracts with commercial banks [on behalf of the District Administration] that almost seven million roubles in interest is to be paid only this year. I read the fable \u2018Monkey and a loan\u2019 at the meeting of councillors. It is about a similar situation. The marmoset (\u043c\u0430\u0440\u0442\u044b\u0448\u043a\u0430) borrowed money from a bank to pay her debts. She did repay them, but afterwards the bank required her to pay back both the loan and interest. Do you remember? The moral of the fable is very obvious. That marmoset was a fool (\u0434\u0443\u0440\u0430).\n...\u201d 9.  In another article concerning the same subject matter, this time in issue 13 (402) dated 20 March 2004, authored by Z.O. and entitled \u201cThe golden grin awards\u201d (\u201c\u0412\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0438\u0438 \u041e\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043b\u201d), the newspaper published a photo collage depicting Y.L. as Osama bin Laden, along with the following comment:\n\u201cA golden grin statuette goes to the head of administration Y.L. for a rational proposal on the subject: how to dispose of industrial waste in village administration. The essence of the proposal is simple: \u2018We could blow anything up. Or burn it\u2019. It is a pity that the employees of waste disposal services have not thought about this yet. The solution is superficial. Or, more accurately, is going up in flames. Or, even more precisely, has been blown to bits.\u201d 10.  On 11 May 2004 Y.L. complained about the articles to the Kstovo City Court. He claimed that the articles published in the applicant company\u2019s newspaper had contained defamatory and damaging material. The applicant company disagreed. 11.  On 31 August 2004 the court issued a judgment in which it granted Y.L.\u2019s claims against the applicant company and N.G. in part. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201c... Examining the text of the publication, the court comes to a conclusion that the information contained in issue no. 11 (400) dated 6 March 2004 in the article \u2018Success has turned his head\u2019 and in issue no. 13 (402) dated 20 March 2004 in the article \u2018The golden grin awards\u2019 is defamatory to the claimant\u2019s honour, dignity and reputation; and in particular, in the article \u2018Success has turned his head\u2019, the defendant N.G. compares the claimant\u2019s activity as the head of the administration to the actions of a marmoset, eventually calling that marmoset a fool. In the Russian Language Dictionary edited by A.P. Evgenyev, the meaning of word \u2018marmoset\u2019 is defined as \u2018a little monkey with long limbs, a long tail and a short muzzle\u2019, and the meaning of the word \u2018fool\u2019 as ... \u2018a stupid, dumb person, in ancient times, a court or domestic jester\u2019.\nIn the article \u2018The golden grin awards\u2019 the defendant placed the claimant\u2019s photograph in a photo collage with a Muslim turban and a beard, having added to the portrait the following text in bold \u2018We could blow anything up. Or burn it\u2019. Considering the events of last year: terrorist acts in America, Russia, Spain, Iraq, the world\u2019s public opinion on bin Laden as terrorist no. 1, the court finds that the publication is defamatory to the honour, dignity and business reputation of the claimant and creates an image of an aggressive, cruel and fanatical actor.\n...\u201d 12.  The court declared the information in question erroneous and defamatory, and ordered the applicant company to pay an amount of a symbolic value to the claimant in damages and publish a retraction phrased in the following terms:\n\u201cThe editorial board of the [applicant company] offers its apologies to the head of the Kstovo District Administration, Y.L., for the unethical comparison of [his] actions with the actions of the marmoset, called a \u2018fool\u2019, ... as well as for the photo collage of Y.L ... The editorial board recognises that the photo collage is unfounded, incorrect and injurious, and once again offers its apologies to Y.L.\u201d 13.  The applicant company appealed against the judgment of 31 August 2004, relying on, among other things, the case-law of the Court and the failure of the Kstovo City Court to draw a distinction between statements of facts and value judgments, and the statements of politicians and those of the general public. 14.  On 22 October 2004 the Nizhegorodskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It held as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the case-file, the text of the publication [...] the [first instance] court rightly concluded that the information at issue defamed the honour, dignity and business reputation of Y.L. This being so, the court judgment was taken lawfully and justifiably, there being no grounds to quash it...\u201d.\nFurther attempts by the applicant company to have the case reviewed by way of supervisory review procedure were unsuccessful.", "references": ["5", "4", "2", "9", "3", "1", "8", "7", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1971 and 1997 respectively and live in St Petersburg. They are a single mother and her son. 6.  In 1995 the first applicant and her mother left Uzbekistan for Russia and settled in St Petersburg. They were granted the status of \u201cforced migrants\u201d for an initial period of five years. In 1997 the second applicant was born. 7.  In 1998 the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe FMS\u201d) provided the applicants and the first applicant\u2019s mother with a room in a three-room flat. A social tenancy agreement was concluded with the first applicant\u2019s mother. 8.  In October 2000 the FMS extended the forced migrant status of the first applicant and her mother until 2 June 2001. 9.  In July 2001 the second applicant was registered as living in the room. 10.  On 8 November 2001 the FMS deprived the first applicant of her status as a forced migrant on the grounds that she had not applied in due time for it to be extended. According to the first applicant, she was not informed of that decision until 2003. 11.  In 2002 the first applicant was excluded from the social tenancy agreement owing to the fact that she had lost her forced migrant status. 12.  On 17 February and 16 April 2003 the first applicant applied to the FMS with a request to re-establish her status as a forced migrant. 13.  On 20 February and 8 May 2003 respectively the FMS upheld its decision of 8 November 2001 and dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request. 14.  In February 2009 the first applicant\u2019s mother died. 15.  In July 2009 the FMS ordered the applicants to vacate the room. The applicants did not vacate the room and continued to live in it. 16.  In December 2009 the applicants were placed on the waiting list for social housing. 17.  On 19 January 2010 the applicant applied to the FMS with a new request to re-establish her forced migrant status. 18.  On 25 January 2010 the FMS upheld its decision of 8 November 2001. The first applicant decided to challenge that decision in court. 19.  On 3 November 2010 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg held that the decision of 25 January 2010 had been unlawful and had to be set aside. In particular, the court held that the first applicant had had valid reasons for missing the deadline for applying for an extension of her forced migrant status. The court ordered the FMS to extend the first applicant\u2019s migrant status. 20.  On 25 January 2011 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 3 November 2010 and dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of the FMS of 25 January 2010. The court held, in particular, that between 2003 and 2010 the first applicant had not tried to contest the refusals of the FMS of 8 November 2001, 20 February and 8 May 2003 to re-establish her forced migrant status, which showed that she had lost interest in having that status. In her complaint the first applicant had contested the decision of 25 January 2010 and therefore, it was irrelevant whether she had had valid reasons for missing the deadline for applying for an extension of her status. The court held, that the decision of 25 January 2010 had been based on Section 5 (4), of the Federal Law on Forced Migrants, which provided that the extension of the status of forced migrants could be granted only at their request (see Relevant domestic law below). Therefore, there were no grounds for declaring that decision unlawful. 21.  In 2011 the FMS brought court proceedings against the applicants, seeking their eviction from the room. 22.  The local authorities objected to the eviction, because the room was the only dwelling available to the second applicant. 23.  The applicants submitted that their eviction would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, since it was not necessary in a democratic society. The room in question was their only dwelling. They had been on the waiting list for social housing since 2009. The first applicant was a single mother whose income was insufficient for buying a flat. 24.  On 15 May 2012 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction from their room, without providing any alternative accommodation. In particular, the District Court held as follows:\n\u201c... Panyushkina M.S. [the first applicant] lost her forced migrant status in 2001, her minor son has never had such a status, and therefore the court comes to the conclusion that the respondents unlawfully occupy the disputed housing and should be evicted without the provision of any alternative accommodation ...\u201d 25.  The applicants lodged an appeal against the eviction order, submitting that their eviction was disproportionate since the court had not taken their arguments into account. 26.  On 4 October 2012 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the eviction order. In particular, the City Court held as follows:\n \u201c... It is impossible to take into account the arguments submitted by Panyushkina M.S. [the first applicant] in her grounds of appeal, whereby the eviction from the disputed housing without the provision of any alternative accommodation is a violation of their [the applicants\u2019] housing rights, since they do not have any other housing. The housing stock aimed at providing forced migrants with temporary housing is for a strictly designated use \u2013 the provision with housing of individuals who have been legally acknowledged to be forced migrants and their family members; the loss or deprivation of the status of forced migrant implies the loss of the right to live in the housing, termination of the social tenancy agreement and the obligation to vacate the occupied accommodation ...\u201d 27.  The applicants did not lodge a cassation appeal against the above decisions. 28.  On 22 November 2012 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings with regard to the eviction order. The applicants were given five days to comply voluntarily with the judgment of 15 May 2012. 29.  On 13 May 2013 the first applicant asked the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg to provide her with alternative accommodation. 30.  On 12 August 2013 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg concluded an agreement with the first applicant for use of social accommodation free of charge for a period of one year. The Government submitted that it had been open to the applicants to apply for an extension of that agreement. However, they had not asked for the agreement to be extended after the expiry of the initial period. The applicants submitted that it had not been possible to ask for any extension of the agreement. 31.  On 12 September 2013 the applicants vacated the disputed room in compliance with the eviction order of 15 May 2012. 32.  On 11 March 2015 the enforcement proceedings were terminated on the grounds that the applicants had voluntarily vacated the room. 33.  Since 15 March 2016 the second applicant has been registered as living in the flat belonging to his father and his paternal grandmother. 34.  The first applicant was currently renting for her and her son a room in a shared apartment at her own expense. Her landlord had not registered her as living at the address of the rented room. She submitted that she had asked her former husband to register the second applicant as living in his flat by necessity, because the absence of registration had subjected him to everyday difficulties. However, de facto the second applicant had continued to live with the first applicant. 35.  According to the information provided by the Government, in 2016 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg prepared a draft order for the removal of the second applicant from the waiting list of persons eligible for social housing.", "references": ["6", "3", "8", "2", "5", "9", "1", "7", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Dublin, Ireland. 7.  In 2004 he married a Slovak national and the couple settled in Ireland. Their two children, born in 2006 and 2008, are both Irish nationals. 8.  On 6 January 2011 the mother travelled to Slovakia with the two children and they have not returned to Ireland since. 9.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant commenced proceedings in the Slovakian courts for the return of his children to Ireland under the Brussels II bis Regulation and the Hague Convention. 10.  On 1 July and 26 October 2011 respectively, the Bratislava I District Court and, following an appeal by the mother, the Bratislava Regional Court, ordered the return of the children to Ireland as their country of habitual residence and issued several ancillary orders. 11.  The return order became enforceable on 8 July 2011. 12.  On 6 February 2012 the applicant applied for judicial enforcement of the return order since the mother had not complied with it. 13.  On 9 February 2012 the Michalovce District Court attempted to have the mother comply voluntarily with the order. In response, she informed the District Court that she had lodged a request with the Prosecutor General for him to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the return order by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie). 14.  On 26 March 2012 the District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings on the return order pending the outcome of the mother\u2019s request to the Prosecutor General. 15.  On 14 August 2012 the District Court resumed the enforcement proceedings after the Prosecutor General had found that there were no reasons to lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law. 16.  On 18 October 2012 and 26 June 2013 respectively, the District Court and, following an appeal by the applicant, the Ko\u0161ice Regional Court, found that the return order was not enforceable. They based their conclusions on the following two grounds.\nFirstly, they concluded that there already existed a previous decision on provisional measures, which had been delivered by the Michalovce District Court on 16 May 2011. That decision had temporarily entrusted the children to the care of the mother and required the applicant to pay child maintenance in the meantime. Those interim custody rights were to be determined later by the competent courts in Ireland.\nSecondly, the return order had failed to specify that it was directed at the mother or to give a precise time frame for its implementation.\nGiven the fact that the mother had not been identified as the recipient and that the applicant had not been provisionally entrusted with the care of the children, the order could not be enforced. 17.  Following the unsuccessful enforcement proceedings, the applicant applied to the same court which had delivered the return order, the Bratislava I District Court. He referred to the shortcomings in the order as identified by the enforcement courts and asked the court to specify to whom the order had been directed and to provide a time frame for the return of the children. The District Court concluded that the applicant\u2019s action was res iudicata and dismissed it on 6 November 2014. 18.  In the meantime, on 22 October 2013, the applicant challenged the enforcement courts\u2019 decisions of 18 October 2012 and 26 June 2013 by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). 19.  On 9 July 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible and on 27 May 2015 it found on the merits that the Ko\u0161ice Regional Court had violated the applicant\u2019s rights, as specified below (\u201cthe first constitutional judgment\u201d). 20.  In particular, it found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Articles 19 \u00a7 1 (family life), 41 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 (protection of parenthood and children, right to child care), and 46 \u00a7 1 (judicial protection) of the Constitution, and under Article 6 \u00a7 1 (fairness) and Article 8 (family life) of the Convention. 21.  The Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court\u2019s decision had been taken on purely formal grounds and had been arbitrary and in contravention of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Brussels II bis regulation, the Hague Convention and the Constitution. That arbitrary decision had meant that the positive obligations guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and the applicant\u2019s parental rights had been breached as well. 22.  Consequently, the Constitutional Court quashed the contested decision, remitted the applicant\u2019s appeal against the District Court\u2019s decision of 18 October 2012 to the Regional Court for re\u2011examination and awarded him 3,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. In addition, the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant everything he had claimed in legal costs (EUR 276.94). It noted that he had made no claim for costs in respect of his observations in reply to those of the enforcement courts concerned by his complaint and concluded that no award was therefore possible in that regard. 23.  The judgment was final and not amenable to appeal. 24.  Following the first constitutional judgment, the enforcement proceedings resumed before the Regional Court, which heard the case on 3 August 2015. It acknowledged that it was bound by the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment. However, having regard to the considerable length of time that had elapsed, it deemed it necessary to assess afresh all the circumstances decisive for the enforcement of the return order, such as the children\u2019s whereabouts, their health and the possibility of their returning to Ireland. It therefore quashed the District Court\u2019s decision under appeal and remitted the matter to it for re-examination. 25.  On 15 April 2016 the District Court again declared enforcement of the order impermissible on the basis of newly obtained evidence. It relied on medical reports concerning the children\u2019s health, a psychological report referring to negative consequences for them if they were separated from the mother and an opinion from the court-appointed guardian (the Michalovce office of employment, social affairs and family) about the stable family environment they had while living with their mother. It also took into account the children\u2019s wish to stay with their mother and her new husband, their social ties in Slovakia, where they had been residing since January 2011, and the applicant\u2019s lack of contact with them while in Slovakia. Relying on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (no. 41615/07, ECHR 2010), it concluded that their return to Ireland would go against their best interests. 26.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision on 3 August 2016 and it became final and binding on 22 August 2016. 27.  In the meantime, the applicant on 22 February 2016 lodged another constitutional complaint aimed at the enforcement proceedings held before the District Court (see paragraph 25 above). He alleged a violation of Articles 6 (length) and 8 (family life) of the Convention and their constitutional equivalents. 28.  On 14 December 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under both of those Convention provisions (\u201cthe second constitutional judgment\u201d). When dealing with the applicant\u2019s length of proceedings complaint, the Constitutional Court took into account that it was the first time the applicant had raised such a grievance. There had accordingly been no previous constitutional assessment of that matter to prevent it from assessing the impugned enforcement proceedings in their entirety, from when they had been initiated. Having regard to the sensitive nature of the matter and its importance for the applicant\u2019s enjoyment of his parental rights, the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had proceeded with the matter over a long time (for more than four years) and inefficiently (it had stayed the proceedings, delivered an arbitrary enforcement decision on the first occasion, and had taken lengthy procedural steps). Notably, the Constitutional Court emphasised that it was precisely the passage of time which had led the District Court to dismiss enforcement of the return order. It also reproached the District Court for the inadequate way it had dealt with the mother\u2019s procedural requests. It further stressed the particular nature of the enforcement of such return orders and pointed out that they required prompt and efficient decision\u2011making that was in accordance with international standards.\nMoreover, the Constitutional Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his family life as a consequence of the fact that throughout the enforcement proceedings, whose length had been in breach of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time, he had been unable to assert his parental rights before the competent courts. 29.  The Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to reimburse the applicant\u2019s legal costs and to pay him EUR 4,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 30.  After the enforcement proceedings had been completed by a final and binding decision and before the second constitutional judgment had been issued, the applicant applied to the Constitutional Court a third time on 14 October 2016. He relied on that occasion on Article 6 (fairness and length) in conjunction with Articles 13 and 8 (family life) of the Convention and challenged the decisions of 15 April and 3 August 2016 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) on their merits. That complaint is still ongoing.", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "5", "6", "7", "3", "0", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently being detained in a correctional colony in the village of Torbeyevo, Mordovia Republic, Russia. 6.  On 21 April 2005 the applicant was convicted during a public hearing of murder and was sentenced to imprisonment. He and his lawyer had had thirty-five minutes to study the case file, which consisted of five volumes. The conviction was upheld on appeal in a public hearing on 18 August 2005 (\u201cthe 2005 proceedings\u201d). 7.  On 30 July 2010 the appeal judgment was quashed by way of a supervisory review (on grounds not related to the applicant\u2019s Article 6 complaints in respect of the 2005 proceedings) as the applicant\u2019s right to defence had been breached during the appeal hearing. The case was sent for fresh examination on appeal. 8.  The applicant was allowed to re-read the case file within the new appeal proceedings. He and his lawyer had five days, from 4 to 8 October 2010, to study the now six-volume case file (about 1,500 pages) in remand prison no. IZ-24/1 in Krasnoyarsk, where the applicant was being detained. The applicant was allegedly held in a metal cage while studying the case, without a table or any other facilities to take notes. After studying the case file both the applicant and the lawyer filed appeals. In his appeal statements the applicant analysed the case materials in detail, referred extensively to all the main items of evidence, including expert opinions and witness testimony, and referred to exact pages in the case file. 9.  The applicant\u2019s case was examined by the Supreme Court of Russia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) over four hearings, three of which (21 October, 30 November and 16 December 2010), according to the trial record and the court\u2019s procedural decisions, were held in camera. The case file did not contain any formal decision by the Supreme Court to close the hearings to the public. The applicant was represented by two lawyers who confirmed to the court that they had had enough time to study the case file. 10.  On 16 December 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 21 April 2005. The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was delivered to the remand prison, where the applicant was still being detained, on 11 January 2011 (\u201cthe 2010 proceedings\u201d).", "references": ["5", "1", "8", "9", "4", "7", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  Ms Damani Kaimova, Ms Maryam Moldyyevna Kaimova, and Ms Zarina Tamiyevna Maskhurova were born on 16 February 1953, 13 January 2005, and 18 September 1981, respectively. They live in the Chechen Republic. The first applicant is the mother, the second applicant is a daughter, and the third applicant is the widow of the late Mr Kaimov. 7.  On 23 September 2006 Mr Kaimov was arrested for being a member of an illegal military organisation in the Chechen Republic. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. On 1 November 2006 the Achkhoiy-Martan District Court of the Chechen Republic found him guilty of charges related to the military organisation and illegal acquisition of weapons. He was sentenced to two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  In the meantime, he was charged with attempted murder of law\u2011enforcement officials, with making a homemade explosive, and other offences. He was convicted as charged by the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic on 28 October 2008 and sentenced to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  Prior to his detention Mr Kaimov had been diagnosed with tuberculosis for which he had been receiving outpatient treatment in a local hospital. 10.  On admission to a remand prison Mr Kaimov informed the custodial authorities of his history of tuberculosis. A chest X-ray in January 2007 examination revealed the signs of that disease. A standard treatment with first-line medication was prescribed. 11.  In early 2009 Mr Kaimov was sent to serve his sentence to the Republic of Tatarstan. In March 2009 he was admitted to prison medical institution no. 1 in Nizhnekamsk, where his tuberculosis was cured as confirmed by a medical board on 7 June 2009. 12.  On 2 October 2009 Mr Kaimov was discharged from the prison medical institution to remand prison no. IZ-16/2 in Kazan. Shortly thereafter his health worsened. 13.  On 28 October 2009 the prison authorities ordered his admission to prison medical institution no. 2 in Kazan (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) where Mr Kaimov was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the right lung at the stage of tissue destruction. Treatment with second-line drugs was prescribed. 14.  In February and March 2010 doctors noted progression of the disease. At that time Mr Kaimov started coughing up blood. An amended intense treatment brought his condition under control. 15.  On 14 April 2010, in response to Mr Kaimov\u2019s \u201cnegligent attitude towards his treatment\u201d, a doctor talked to him about the importance of taking his drugs regularly. On 22 April and 1 May 2010 the doctor had repeated talks with him on the issue. 16.  In late May 2010, the first applicant visited her son. Mr Kaimov was in a poor health. He claimed that no treatment had been given to him and that \u201cthe medical staff [had] paid absolutely no attention to his condition\u201d. 17.  On 22 April, 31 May and 8 June 2010 the doctor responsible for Mr Kaimov\u2019s treatment again noted in the medical file that the patient was not taking his drugs as prescribed and insisted that he should follow medical instructions properly. The medical records were not signed by Mr Kaimov. 18.  By mid-June 2010 Mr Kaimov\u2019s condition became serious. He was no longer able to leave his bed. 19.  On 24 June 2010 an inmate of the remand prison allegedly informed the first applicant that her son\u2019s condition had become very serious and that no medical care was being given to him. 20.  Four days later Mr K., a lawyer working with the Russian Justice Initiative, interviewed Mr Kaimov in the prison hospital. He said that he had not received the medicines, as the prison hospital did not have them. The prison hospital\u2019s management refused to accept parcels with drugs for detainees. 21.  Mr Kaimov died of heart failure caused by tuberculosis on 1 July 2010. The first applicant did not allow an autopsy to take place. 22.  According to the Government, the investigating authorities carried out a criminal inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Kaimov\u2019s death, which ended with a decision of 21 July 2010 not to open a criminal case. 23.  On 22 November 2010 Mr K. asked the head of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan to investigate the circumstances of Mr Kaimov\u2019s death. He pointed out that the detainee had complained of the lack of treatment in detention. A copy of the interview record of 28 June 2010 was attached to the request. 24.  The investigating authorities interviewed Mr K., who confirmed his statements, and Ms I., the head of the tuberculosis unit responsible for Mr Kaimov\u2019s treatment in 2009 and 2010. The doctor stated that the patient had received tuberculosis treatment until late May 2010, when he had refused to take any drugs. 25.  On 6 December 2010, citing statements by Ms I., the investigating authorities concluded that there had been no appearance of negligence on the part of the medical authorities. They decided not to open a criminal case. 26.  Three weeks later a higher-ranking investigator overruled that decision, noting that the investigation had not been thorough, in particular, because no medical documents had been collected. 27.  The investigator again refused to open a criminal case on 5 January 2011. That decision was annulled by the higher-ranking authority on 15 March 2011 for want of necessary investigative measures, in view of the investigator\u2019s failure to rectify the shortcomings already identified in the previous review decisions. 28.  Twelve days after the annulment of his previous decision, the investigator again refused to open a criminal case, having based his new decision on the same evidence and arguments as before. 29.  In the meantime, Mr K. submitted a new criminal complaint to the Central Inter-district Department of the Investigative Committee in the Republic of Tatarstan. The authorities were called on to verify whether the alleged inaction of the medical authorities had amounted to the deprivation of medical care, an offence under the Russian Criminal Code. On 10 May 2011 the case was forwarded to the Promyshlennyiy district police station in Kazan. 30.  A police investigator interviewed a tuberculosis specialist, who had treated Mr Kaimov, and a prison nurse. They unanimously stated that the patient had refused treatment. 31.  On 29 May 2011 the investigator refused to open a criminal case. Relying on the above statements and Mr Kaimov\u2019s medical history, he found that the latter\u2019s death had resulted from his own careless decision in not taking the prescribed drugs, and that the medical authorities had taken all reasonable steps to convince him to re-initiate the treatment. 32.  The first applicant appealed against the decision of 29 May 2011. Her appeal was rejected, in the final instance, by the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic on 11 October 2011. The courts concluded that the investigation into Mr Kaimov\u2019s death had been thorough and comprehensive. The decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings had been based on the examination of the medical file and statements by a number of witnesses, including the medical personnel of the prison hospital. The courts endorsed the investigator\u2019s conclusion that Mr Kaimov had refused treatment and had not followed the recommendations of the medical personnel. The courts also noted that the first applicant had been aware of Mr Kaimov\u2019s behaviour and had not made any complaints about the quality of the treatment at that time. 33.  Following the communication of the application to the Russian Government, they submitted that on 13 and 26 February 2015 the decisions of 27 March and 29 May 2011, respectively, had been overruled by higher\u2011ranking officials and additional investigative measures had been ordered. In particular, a medical expert examination was to be performed. 34.  According to the applicants\u2019 correspondence of 3 July 2015, the criminal investigation was pending. There is no further information about the outcome.", "references": ["9", "1", "7", "5", "3", "4", "8", "2", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 16 August 2004 he was charged with fraud in Armenia and the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court in Yerevan issued an arrest warrant. 6.  On 8 November 2006 the applicant was arrested in Ufa, Russia. On an unspecified date the Russian Prosecutor General received an extradition request from his Armenian counterpart. 7.  On an application a district prosecutor in Ufa, on 27 December 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa remanded the applicant in custody, without setting a time-limit for his detention. On 13 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan upheld the detention order on appeal. 8.  On 23 March 2007 a deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request; on 17 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that decision in final instance. 9.  On 24 August 2007 the applicant was extradited to Armenia where he was acquitted of all charges and released. 10.  On 16 February 2008, when attempting to return to Russia, the applicant was detained by the Russian border control and held in custody until 22 February 2008. The parties did not produce a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest or any judicial decision authorising his detention.", "references": ["4", "6", "5", "7", "9", "1", "3", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Ercsi. 6.  On 28 February 2007 the applicant filed an action with the Sz\u00e9kesfeh\u00e9rv\u00e1r Labour Court against his former employer, claiming unlawful dismissal. On 6 June 2008 the court found in his favour and obliged the respondent to the action to pay him a severance payment, outstanding wages, a lump sum in compensation, and default interest. 7.  On appeal, on 25 February 2009 the Fej\u00e9r County Regional Court changed the judgment in part. In June 2009 the respondent filed a petition for review. 8.  In an order of 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court forwarded the respondent\u2019s petition to the applicant and informed him that, within eight days of receiving the order, he could file comments on the respondent\u2019s petition and/or request an oral hearing. 9.  On 7 June 2010 the applicant received the order, and on 14 June 2010 he dispatched his comments on the petition for review. The document was received by the Supreme Court on 17 June 2010. 10.  Meanwhile, on 16 June 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting as a review court, had given a judgment in which it had reversed the previous decisions and dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The court stated that the applicant had not filed any comments on the petition for review. 11.  The applicant complained and addressed his complaint of 6 December 2010 to the President of the Supreme Court. The Head of the Civil Division informed him that his comments on the petition for review had been belated.", "references": ["1", "9", "0", "7", "6", "8", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Groznyy in the Chechen Republic. 5.  On 23 June 2012 the applicant was arrested in connection with a drug-related offence and placed in custody. 6.  On 14 August 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Groznyy found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 7.  On 14 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. 8.  On 30 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court again convicted the applicant and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment. The court stated that the \u201cpreventive measure [should] remain unchanged until the conviction [had become] final\u201d. 9.  On 24 June 2013 counsel for the applicant asked the director of the remand prison to release the applicant since he had already served the one-year sentence. On the same day a judge of the District Court faxed a letter to the director, informing him that the applicant should not be released until the Supreme Court had examined the matter on appeal since the District Court ordered the preventive measure to remain unchanged. 10.  On 3 July 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the applicant was released.", "references": ["1", "5", "8", "4", "9", "7", "3", "6", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 20 December 2012 at 4.55 p.m. V.B. and I.J., police officers of IV police station in Zagreb, caught the applicant in the act of attempting to rob an exchange office in Zagreb. The applicant started to run and fell. The police officers then arrested him. During his arrest some money fell out of the applicant\u2019s pockets. 7.  According to the Government, since the applicant was resisting arrest, the police officers had to apply force (the so-called armlock technique). 8.  According to the applicant, he was beaten by the police officers while lying on the ground. 9.  At 5 p.m. officers D.P. (the chief officer on duty in the IV Zagreb police station) and N.V. (the deputy head of IV Zagreb police station) were informed of the use of force against the applicant. The applicant was taken to the police station at 5.15 p.m. The applicant complained to Officer S.P. that his shoulder hurt. S.P. informed D.P. of this and the latter ordered that the emergency medical service be called. At 5.56 p.m. D.P. informed the Zagreb police operative centre about the use of force against the applicant. The applicant was seen by an emergency doctor between 7.40 p.m. and 7.57 p.m. He was transferred to the Sisters of Charity Hospital in Zagreb (Klini\u010dki bolni\u010dki centar Sestre milosrdnice) and was seen there by a surgeon at 8.11 p.m. An X-ray examination revealed that the applicant\u2019s right shoulder was broken. The applicant told the doctor that he had fallen during his arrest. He was provided with medical assistance for these injuries and then returned to the police station at 9.40 p.m. Officer D.P. questioned the applicant in connection with the criminal offence for which he had been arrested and the applicant stated that he wished to remain silent. 10.  The applicant was again seen by a surgeon in the same hospital on 24 December 2012 and surgery was recommended. 11.  The applicant was hospitalised in the Sisters of Mercy Hospital between 27 and 31 December 2012. He underwent surgery and it was established that his shoulder was broken in four places; his upper arm was also broken. He had an artificial shoulder implanted. 12.  An internal investigation into the use of force against the applicant was immediately initiated within the Zagreb police on 20 December 2012. Officer D.P. took a statement from the applicant who said that he had sustained an injury \u201cby the police officers\u201d and that he did \u201cnot want to say anything else\u201d. Officers V.B. and I.J. compiled a joint report on the use of force against the applicant. Later on, each of them provided a separate report. All these reports alleged that the applicant, in attempting to flee from the police officers, had fallen and that while on the ground had actively resisted the police officers, who had then applied the armlock technique and handcuffed him. 13.  On 21 December 2012 an internal police investigator of the Zagreb police, officer A.L., compiled a report on the basis of the documents, statements from Officers V.B., I.J. and D.P. and his interview with the applicant. In his report A.L. stated that the applicant had attempted to run from the said officers and had fallen. While on the ground he had actively resisted arrest and the officers had applied the armlock technique. A.L. concluded that the applicant had resisted the police officers since some money had fallen out of his clothes. A.L. was of the opinion that the force applied by officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant had had a \u201cbasis in law and [had been] justified\u201d. 14.  On 21 December 2012 the head of IV police station in Zagreb, S.T., compiled a report for the public-order division of the Zagreb police, on the basis of the report of A.L. S.T. stated that the applicant had said that he had fallen and that the police officers had caught him and applied force against him and denied that he had resisted arrest. In a short report of 28 December 2012 the head of the Zagreb police, G.B., concluded that the information gathered had shown that the use of force by Officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant had been lawful and justified. 15.  On 28 December 2012 the head of the Zagreb police informed the head of IV police station in Zagreb that, on the basis of the report of A.L., he considered the force used by officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant to have had a \u201cbasis in law and [to have been] justified\u201d 16.  On 3 January 2013 the head of the Zagreb police sent the case file concerning the internal police investigation to the Internal Control Service of the Ministry of the Interior. Upon inspecting the file the Internal Control Service instructed the police to forward the file to the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (hereinafter the \u201cZMSAO\u201d) for further assessment. 17.  On the instructions of the head of the Zagreb police, on 5 February 2013 the IV police station in Zagreb sent a report on the events at issue together with the applicant\u2019s medical report to the ZMSAO. The documents in the case file do not indicate that the ZMSAO carried out any further steps at that time. 18.  On 6 February 2013, upon a request by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the head of the IV police station in Zagreb shortly informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the force used against the applicant by the two police officers had had a basis in law and had been justified. The applicant\u2019s request to have access to the internal report on the use of force against him was denied on 11 February 2013 on the grounds that it was a classified document. 19.  On 15 May 2013 the head of IV police station in Zagreb compiled a report for the legal, financial and technical tasks division of the Zagreb police, where he described in detail the events at issue and the results of the internal police investigation with a final conclusion that the use of force against the applicant had had a basis in law and had been justified. 20.  On 28 July 2014 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the ZMSAO against Officers V.B. and I.J. 21.  The applicant alleged that during his arrest on 20 December 2012 police officers V.B. and I.J. had forced him to the ground and then hit, kicked and verbally insulted him and unnecessarily twisted his arm, owing to which he had sustained injuries, such as a broken arm and shoulder. The officers had then taken him to a police station where they continued to beat him. Only after three hours had he been taken to hospital. The doctors had recommended urgent surgery but the police officers had not allowed it. Instead, they had taken him back to the police station where they had continued to hit and insult him. In the evening he had been admitted to Zagreb Prison. 22.  The prosecuting authorities obtained the statements previously given by the applicant and the police officers involved. 23.  The ZMSAO attempted to contact the applicant on six occasions between 27 November 2014 and 15 September 2015. However, these attempts were unsuccessful since the applicant had changed his address and had not replied to the telephone calls on the mobile telephone number provided by his lawyer. 24.  In July and August 2015 the ZMSAO obtained the medical documentation concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries and medical treatment. 25.  On 13 October 2015 the ZMSAO interviewed the applicant, who said that during his arrest on 20 December 2012 one of the police officers, when applying the armlock technique, had broken his right arm. He had complained to the officers of intense pain but they had ignored his complaints. During his transport to the police station he had again complained about the pain in his arm but the officers had only told him to shut up. Upon his arrival at the police station he had continued to complain about the pain in his arm, but had been ignored. Only after a few hours had a doctor been called. The applicant admitted that he had told the doctor that he had sustained the injury to his right arm and shoulder when he had fallen during his arrest. He also said that during the arrest and later on in the police station, none of the police officers had hit or kicked him. He said that in the relevant period he had been abusing both alcohol and drugs. 26.  On 2 and 3 December 2015 Officers V.B., I.J. and D.B. also gave their statements denying any excessive use of force against the applicant. 27.  On 8 January 2016 the ZMSAO interviewed J.H., an employee of the exchange office where the applicant had attempted the robbery. She had also witnessed the applicant\u2019s arrest and said that she had not seen the police officers hitting or kicking the applicant. 28.  On 13 January 2016 the ZMSAO interviewed B.Z., a witness to the applicant\u2019s arrest, who said that the applicant had attempted to run from the police and had fallen and that he had not seen any police officers hitting or kicking the applicant. 29.  The investigation is still pending. 30.  On 28 August 2013 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu) against the State claiming damages in connection with his alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest and stay in the police station. 31.  Those proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["5", "3", "7", "0", "9", "2", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and at the material time was serving a sentence of imprisonment. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows. 6.  The case file indicates that in April 2001 and March 2005 the applicant was found guilty of various criminal offences, but his prison sentence was suspended for health reasons (cardiovascular and lung disorders, high blood pressure, a left bundle branch block, and tuberculosis of the left lung). 7.  In November 2005 and March 2007 two additional sets of criminal proceedings on multiple charges including armed robbery were initiated against the applicant. He was arrested on 28 December 2006 and placed in pre-trial detention. 8.  On 14 June 2007 the applicant was found guilty as charged in the first set of proceedings and sentenced to twenty-four years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant did not appeal against his conviction. 9.  On 25 September 2007, in the second set of criminal proceedings, the applicant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court further decided that the aggregate term of imprisonment to be served pursuant to that judgment and the judgment of 14 June 2007 should be fixed at thirty years. 10.  The judgment of 25 September 2007 was altered on appeal on 21 January 2008. The prison sentence for the offences committed in 2005 was reduced to ten years, but the total sentence to be served remained unchanged at thirty years. An appeal on points of law by the applicant was rejected as inadmissible by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 15 September 2008. 11.  On 1 November 2012 the applicant was granted early release from prison. 12.  The applicant entered the prison system with a history of tuberculosis of the left lung. On 10 April 2008 he was transferred to the Department of Prisons\u2019 medical facility (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d), where an X\u2011ray of his lungs was performed. As no pathologies were revealed, the applicant was returned to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 17 April 2008. 13.  On 1 May 2008 he was hospitalised again because of a cyst on his right testicle, and on 4 May 2008 he underwent a surgical operation to have the cyst removed. The results of a subsequent biopsy revealed that the cyst was a benign skin cyst. On 6 May 2008 additional blood tests revealed that the applicant did not have AIDS, but it was not possible at that stage to determine the presence of the hepatitis C antibody in his blood. Further tests three months later were recommended. After a trouble-free period of convalescence, the applicant was sent back to prison on 24 May 2008. 14.  On 23 June 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked for additional medical tests to be organised for the applicant. In particular, he asked for a blood test for hepatitis C. That request apparently went unanswered. On 10 July 2008 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital because of an abscess in his lower jaw. In addition to being treated by a dentist, according to the medical file, the applicant had a consultation with a neurologist and an endocrinologist because he was experiencing persistent headaches. The neurologist diagnosed him with post-traumatic encephalopathy and prescribed treatment. On 30 July 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital, although his headaches persisted. 15.  On 8, 9, 15 and 24 September 2008 the applicant applied to the prison authorities to be returned to the prison hospital \u201cfor serious health reasons\u201d. He did not specify what was wrong with his health. On 10 September 2008 the prison authorities forwarded the applicant\u2019s letters to the governor of Rustavi Prison no. 6 and the head of the prison administration\u2019s group of medical experts, so that they could be examined and appropriate action could be taken. 16.  On 30 October 2008 the applicant staged a hunger strike to obtain an examination by a neurologist. On 5 November 2008 the applicant was seen in prison by a neurologist, who prescribed treatment for his post-traumatic encephalopathy. 17.  On 10 November 2008 representatives of the Public Defender\u2019s Office visited the applicant, who complained of headaches. The applicant alleged that during his previous stay in the prison hospital he had taken medicine for his headaches for a week, but to no avail. He said that he had suffered from headaches before his arrest, however, the pain had become more severe, and at that point it had been constant for six months. He also alleged that the treatment prescribed on 5 November 2008 had not yielded any results. On 11 November 2008 the Public Defender sent a report on the meeting to the prison governor and requested news of the applicant\u2019s state of health. 18.  On 27 November 2008, after having examined the applicant, the neurologist diagnosed neurasthenia and post-traumatic encephalopathy. Noting that the previous treatment had not worked, he considered that a more thorough examination was necessary. 19.  On 8 December 2008 the applicant staged a second hunger strike, requesting that he be transferred to the prison hospital. He maintained that, having suffered a serious head injury in the past, he was in need of a comprehensive inpatient examination of his head. He further complained that, although he was only being prescribed simple sedatives, he was not receiving them. On 17 December 2008 a representative from the Public Defender\u2019s office met with the chief physician of Rustavi Prison no. 6, where the applicant was staying at the material time. The doctor confirmed that the applicant was suffering from headaches and was in need of a tomography scan. He explained, however, that the applicant was only receiving pain medication, as the relevant insurance company refused to finance the required examination and treatment. According to an entry in the applicant\u2019s medical file, on 19 December 2008 he was still on hunger strike, suffering from headaches. 20.  On 29 December 2008 the Public Defender wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice, the head of the Prisons Department, and the Governor of Rustavi Prison no. 6, challenging the effectiveness of the insurance company with which the Ministry of Prisons had concluded a contract, on the basis of, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s case. The Public Defender alleged that the applicant was being denied adequate examination and treatment for his post-traumatic brain condition. While discussing in detail the failures and shortcomings of the existing insurance scheme, the Public Defender recommended that the relevant authorities annul the relevant contract. 21.  In the meantime, an X-ray of the applicant\u2019s lungs taken on either 22 or 23 of December 2008 had revealed signs of recurrent tuberculosis. His doctor recommended bacteriological analysis and an examination by a specialist. On 23 January 2009 bacteriological tests revealed the presence of tuberculosis bacteria, and the applicant was immediately put on a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short\u2011course) programme, the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of tuberculosis, as recommended by the World Health Organisation. 22.  According to an entry in the applicant\u2019s medical file, on 18 February 2009 he was still suffering from constant headaches. The doctor treating the applicant recommended that he be transferred to the prison hospital for proper examination. On 19 February 2009 the applicant was placed in the prison hospital with a diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis and post\u2011traumatic encephalopathy. There, he underwent various medical tests, including a blood test for hepatitis C markers, which was negative, and a tomography scan. He also had a consultation with a neurologist. As a result, he was diagnosed with intracranial hypertension syndrome. The applicant was prescribed relevant treatment and sent back to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 26 February 2009. 23.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. On 10 and 13 July 2009 he violated the internal rules of the facility. As a result, on an unspecified date he was transferred back to Rustavi Prison no. 6, where, according to the latest medical examination of which the Court was informed, he continued his treatment for tuberculosis. 24.  On 14 July 2009 the applicant underwent a serological test, which detected no active hepatitis C virus in his system. 25.  On 29 December 2006 the applicant was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5, where he stayed for almost six months. According to him, the conditions of detention in that prison were inhuman and degrading. In view of the severe overcrowding in prison, he had to take turns sleeping, sleeping for a maximum of four hours a day. The sanitary and hygienic conditions were appalling, and for months there was no opportunity for him to have proper shower. The applicant was also deprived of the opportunity to have regular outdoor exercise. Whilst in Tbilisi Prison no. 5, he was not allowed to see his family even once. 26.  On 23 June 2007, following his conviction, the applicant was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 6. According to him, the conditions of his detention improved there, although he was still deprived of regular outdoor exercise. Moreover, the nutrition in the prison was poor and he was deprived of basic items relating to hygiene, such as soap, bed linen, toilet paper, and towels. 27.  According to a letter from the prison governor dated 24 June 2008, the applicant was only visited by his family once during his time in that prison, on 22 April 2008.", "references": ["9", "0", "5", "6", "2", "3", "8", "7", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. 7.  The applicant was a member of the Icelandic Parliament (Althingi) during the years 1987 to 2009. He served as Minister of Finance in the years 1998 to 2005, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2006 and Prime Minister from 2006 to 2009. After Parliamentary elections in May 2007 the applicant led the government which was formed by the Independence Party (Sj\u00e1lfst\u00e6\u00f0isflokkurinn), of which he was a member, and the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin). 8.  In the beginning of October 2008 the Icelandic banking system collapsed. On 6 October 2008 the applicant proposed a bill to Parliament which, on the same day, was adopted as the Act on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (L\u00f6g um heimild til fj\u00e1rveitingar \u00far r\u00edkissj\u00f3\u00f0i vegna s\u00e9rstakra a\u00f0st\u00e6\u00f0na \u00e1 fj\u00e1rm\u00e1lamarka\u00f0i ofl., no. 125/2008). Among other things, it authorised the Financial Supervisory Authority (Fj\u00e1rm\u00e1laeftirliti\u00f0) to intervene in the operations of financial undertakings. On 7 and 9 October 2008 the authority seized control of Iceland\u2019s three largest banks, Landsbanki \u00cdslands hf., Glitnir banki hf. and Kaup\u00feing banki hf. 9.  In December 2008 Parliament established a Special Investigation Commission (Ranns\u00f3knarnefnd Al\u00feingis, hereinafter \u201cthe SIC\u201d) to investigate and analyse the processes leading to, as well as the causes of, the collapse of the above-mentioned banks. According to section 1 of the Special Investigation Commission Act (L\u00f6g um ranns\u00f3kn \u00e1 a\u00f0draganda og ors\u00f6kum falls \u00edslensku bankanna 2008 og tengdra atbur\u00f0a, no. 142/2008; hereinafter \u201cthe SIC Act\u201d), one of the Commission\u2019s objectives was to assess whether mistakes or negligence had occurred in the course of implementing laws and rules in respect of financial activities in Iceland and regulatory inspection in that field and, if so, who might be responsible. While its role was not to investigate potential criminal conduct, the SIC should inform the State Prosecutor of any suspicions of criminal activities having taken place as well as any potential breaches of official duty. The SIC made an extensive investigation during which it collected information from individuals, financial institutions and public institutions, conducted formal hearings with 147 individuals and meetings with a further 183 individuals. 10.  The applicant testified before the SIC on 2 and 3 July 2009. On 8 February 2010 the SIC informed him that it considered that he had acted negligently and invited him to submit a written statement in reply, which he did on 24 February 2010. 11.  On 12 April 2010 the SIC issued its report which contained a detailed description of the causes of the collapse of the Icelandic banks as well as serious criticism of the acts and omissions of a number of public officials and institutions. This included the applicant and two other ministers from his cabinet, the Minister of Finance, Mr \u00c1rni M. Mathiesen from the Independence Party, and the Minister of Business Affairs, Mr Bj\u00f6rgvin G. Sigur\u00f0sson from the Social Democratic Alliance, who were found to have shown negligence by omitting to respond in an appropriate fashion to the impending danger for the Icelandic economy that was caused by the deteriorating situation of the banks. 12.  In the meantime, on 26 January 2009, the government led by the applicant resigned and on 1 February 2009 the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin \u2013 gr\u00e6nt frambo\u00f0) formed a government. Those two parties gained a majority of seats in Parliament in the subsequent elections on 25 April 2009. 13.  In 2009 Parliament passed an amendment to the SIC Act according to which it was to elect an ad hoc parliamentary review committee (\u00deingmannanefndin; hereafter \u201cthe PRC\u201d) \u201cto address the report of the SIC on the collapse of the banks, and form recommendations as to Parliament\u2019s response to the SIC\u2019s conclusions\u201d. It was also to adopt a position on ministerial accountability and assess whether there were grounds for impeachment proceedings before the Court of Impeachment (Landsd\u00f3mur) for violations of the Ministerial Accountability Act (L\u00f6g um r\u00e1\u00f0herra\u00e1byrg\u00f0, no. 4/1963). The PRC was established on 30 December 2009 and was composed of nine members of Parliament representing all the parliamentary party groups. It commenced work on 15 January 2010. 14.  The PRC examined the SIC report, held 54 meetings and multiple informal working meetings. It received several expert opinions on ministerial liability from professors as well as the former state prosecutor and Ms Sigr\u00ed\u00f0ur J. Fri\u00f0j\u00f3nsd\u00f3ttir, then deputy state prosecutor. Ms Fri\u00f0j\u00f3nsd\u00f3ttir attended five meetings of the PRC and expressed her opinions on the potential charges against ministers, the penal provisions that might apply, the evidence that could be relevant and the rules and content pertaining to an indictment. She also submitted a draft text for part of an indictment. The PRC further collected original documents relating to the ministers\u2019 duties which were mentioned in the SIC report, inter alia letters, notes, minutes, emails from the Government Offices and the Central Bank of Iceland and minutes from meetings of the consultative group on financial stability and contingency planning. On 18 May 2010 the PRC sent letters to 16 individuals, including the applicant, who had held office as ministers during the period covered by the SIC report, asking them to submit comments and information regarding the report\u2019s conclusions. The committee received replies from 14 individuals, including the applicant who submitted his reply by letter of 7 June 2010. 15.  On 11 September 2010 the PRC submitted a proposal for a parliamentary resolution to commence impeachment proceedings against four cabinet members: the three mentioned above (including the applicant) and Ms Ingibj\u00f6rg S\u00f3lr\u00fan G\u00edslad\u00f3ttir, who was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Social Democratic Alliance. The proposal listed six points of alleged negligent behaviour, corresponding to the counts in the eventual indictment issued against the applicant (see paragraph 23 below). The applicant was considered to have been negligent in all six respects, whereas the other three ministers were deemed responsible only in respect of five of the points (excluding what was to become count 1.3 in the applicant\u2019s indictment). The proposal was presented as a whole but Parliament decided to vote on each former minister separately. In a resolution of 28 September 2010, by 33 votes to 30, it approved the PRC\u2019s proposal to commence impeachment proceedings against the applicant. With similar small majorities, the votes concerning the other former ministers led to the conclusion that they should not be indicted.\nAll 15 members of the Left-Green Movement and all three members of The Movement (Hreyfingin) voted in favour of impeachment of each of the four former ministers and all 16 members of the Independence Party voted against the proposal. Six of the nine members of the Progressive Party (Frams\u00f3knarflokkurinn) voted in favour of impeachment of all the ministers and three members voted against. As regards the members of the Social Democratic Alliance, one of its 20 members voted in favour of impeachment of each of the ministers and 11 members voted against in respect of all of them. The remaining eight Social Democratic members were the only ones that cast differing votes in regard to the four ministers: the applicant \u2013 eight in favour of impeachment; Mr Mathiesen \u2013 six; Ms G\u00edslad\u00f3ttir \u2013 four; and Mr Sigur\u00f0sson \u2013 two. 16.  On the same day, 28 September 2010, the applicant designated a lawyer for his defence. On 30 September he was formally notified of the result of the voting in Parliament. The Parliament resolution, containing the exact points of indictment, the PRC\u2019s proposal and an explanatory memorandum with the reasons for the proposal, was made available on the website of the Parliament. 17.  On 12 October 2010 Parliament appointed Ms Fri\u00f0j\u00f3nsd\u00f3ttir to prosecute the case on its behalf. It also appointed a parliamentary committee to assist her and to monitor the case. 18.  The Court of Impeachment constituted to adjudicate the case was composed, in accordance with section 2 of the Court of Impeachment Act (see paragraph 44 below). Thus, five members of the court were judges of the Supreme Court, one was a judge of the District Court (H\u00e9ra\u00f0sd\u00f3mur) of Reykjav\u00edk, and one was a professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Iceland. The latter member was, on 1 September 2011, appointed as justice of the Supreme Court, but continued to sit on the Court of Impeachment in his original capacity. The remaining eight members of the Court of Impeachment were lay judges appointed by Parliament. 19.  Following the applicant\u2019s request by letter of 15 November 2010 the Court of Impeachment, on 30 November 2010, appointed the applicant\u2019s lawyer as his defence counsel. The applicant claims that he and his lawyer had made such a request on several earlier occasions. However, no evidence thereof has been submitted in the present case. 20.  According to Parliament\u2019s prosecutor (see paragraph 28 below) she invited, by a letter of 9 December 2010, the applicant\u2019s counsel to make comments or request that further information be collected. It appears that counsel did not make any comments or requests in reply. 21.  Following decisions of the Court of Impeachment of 22 March 2011 and the District Court of 24 March 2011, the prosecutor was given access to documents and information, including documents from the SIC database, statements given before the SIC as well as correspondence from the applicant\u2019s former work email. She conducted a research into these documents but did not hear the applicant or any witnesses during her investigation. 22.  On 11 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s counsel was provided with a USB memory stick containing the documents which the prosecutor had obtained from the SIC database. 23.  On 10 May 2011 the applicant was indicted, in accordance with the Parliamentary resolution of 28 September 2010:\n\u201c1. 1.1  For having shown serious neglect of his duties as Prime Minister in the face of major danger looming over Icelandic financial institutions and the State Treasury, a danger of which he was or ought to have been aware and would have been able to respond to by initiating measures, legislation, general governmental instructions or governmental decisions on the basis of current law, for the purpose of avoiding foreseeable danger to the fortunes of the State. 1.2  For having failed to take initiative, either by taking measures of his own or by proposing measures to other ministers, to the effect that there would be a comprehensive and professional analysis within the administrative system of the financial risk faced by the State because of the risk of financial crisis. 1.3  For having neglected to ensure that the work and emphasis of a consultative group of the Government of financial stability and preparedness, which was established in 2006, were purposeful and produced the desired results. 1.4  For having neglected to take initiative on active measures on behalf of the State to reduce the size of the Icelandic banking system by, for example, advocating that the banks reduce their balance sheets or that some of them move their headquarters out of Iceland. 1.5  For not having followed up and assured himself that active measures were being taken in order to transfer Landsbanki \u00cdslands hf.\u2019s Icesave accounts in Britain to a subsidiary, and then to look for ways to enable this to happen with the active involvement of the State.\nThe above-specified conduct is deemed subject to section 10(b), cf. section 11, of Act no. 4/1963 [on Ministerial Responsibility], and, alternatively, section 141 of the General Penal Code, no. 19/1940. 2.\nFor having, during the above-mentioned period [February 2008 \u2013 October 2008] failed to implement what is directed in Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic on the duty to hold ministerial meetings on important government matters. During this period there was little discussion at ministerial meetings of the imminent danger; there was no formal discussion of it at ministerial meetings, and nothing was recorded about these matters at the meetings. There was nevertheless specific reason to do so, especially after the meeting on 7 February 2008 between him, Ingibj\u00f6rg S\u00f3lr\u00fan G\u00edslad\u00f3ttur, \u00c1rni M. Mathiesen and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland; after his and Ingibj\u00f6rg S\u00f3lr\u00fan G\u00edslad\u00f3ttir\u2019s meeting on 1 April 2008 with the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland; and following a declaration to the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Central Banks, which was signed on 15 May 2008. The Prime Minister did not initiate a formal ministerial meeting on the situation nor did he provide the Government with a separate report on the problem of the banks or its possible effect on the Icelandic State.\nThis is deemed to fall under section 8(c), cf. section 11, of Act no. 4/1963, and, alternatively, section 141 of the General Penal Code, no. 19/1940.\u201d 24.  Also on 10 May 2011 an amendment to the Court of Impeachment Act (L\u00f6g um landsd\u00f3m, no. 3/1963) entered into force, according to which the judges \u201cwho hold seat on [the court] when Parliament has decided to impeach a minister, and their substitutes, shall complete the case although their term has expired\u201d. According to the bill introducing the amendment, this was to avoid disruption of a judge\u2019s examination of an ongoing case. As a consequence, the six-year term of office of the court\u2019s eight lay judges, who had been appointed by Parliament on 11 May 2005, was extended until the conclusion of the proceedings against the applicant. 25.  The case was filed by the prosecution with the Court of Impeachment on 7 June 2011. The prosecution argued, inter alia, in respect of count 2 of the indictment, that the matter of the banking system and the risk of financial crisis had been important government matters and could hardly have been more important. Storm clouds had been gathering since before the beginning of the period to which the indictment related and the applicant had known or ought to have known where things were headed. Thus, this matter should have been discussed at ministerial meetings as prescribed by Article 17 of the Constitution which should be interpreted according to its words (see paragraph 42 below). The prosecution objected to the applicant\u2019s argument that a constitutional custom had developed to the effect that only matters under Article 16 of the Constitution should be discussed in ministerial meetings under Article 17, and even if such custom existed, it could not override a clear provision of the Constitution. Furthermore, a breach against Article 17 had substantive consequences since, if cabinet meetings were not convened on urgent problems, the opportunity to respond clearly would be lessened. It had been apparent that important government matters had not been discussed by the cabinet and the knowledge that the defendant had demonstrably possessed had not been reported to the ministers. The applicant\u2019s violation according to count 2 of the indictment was a conduct offence and punishable irrespective of the consequences or risks attributable to the conduct. 26.  The applicant challenged the impartiality and independence of the eight judges appointed by Parliament, mainly on the ground that Parliament had extended their term by having enacted the above-mentioned legislation. By its ruling on 10 June 2011, the Court of Impeachment rejected the petition, finding that the legislator had pursued a legitimate aim and that the measure had been proportionate vis-\u00e0-vis the applicant. 27.  On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged a request to have the case dismissed, relying, among other things, on Article 6 of the Convention. He claimed that the investigation in the case had been manifestly defective, inter alia as the investigation conducted by the SIC had not been criminal in nature, the SIC having no such mandate, and as no real investigative measures had been undertaken by the PRC or the prosecutor. He had not been questioned or invited to respond to the accusations, neither before Parliament\u2019s resolution nor before the prosecutor issued her indictment. He also challenged the impartiality of the prosecutor due to her involvement in Parliament\u2019s preparation of the decision to indict him, during which she had been repeatedly consulted by the PRC and had allegedly expressed her opinion on his potential responsibility under the Ministerial Accountability Act. The applicant further maintained that his chance of preparing a proper defence was compromised as the counts of the indictment were undefined and only described in general terms his alleged criminal conduct and the criminal provisions under which that conduct was subsumed were unclear and discretionary. Also the rules governing the impeachment proceedings and the penal provisions of the Ministerial Accountability Act and other invoked legislation were, in his view, so unclear that due process could not be ensured. Finally, he asserted that the decision by Parliament to bring proceedings against him alone had been taken on purely arbitrary and political grounds and thus did not treat him equally with other ministers originally subject to the investigation in the case. 28.  The prosecutor contested the applicant\u2019s request, maintaining, inter alia\u00b8 that, in view of the thorough gathering of material by the SIC, there had been no need for an independent collection of evidence by the PRC, which was supposed to base its work on the report of the SIC. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s defence counsel had not asked that the applicant be heard during the investigative stage, although such an opportunity was provided by section 16(2) of the Court of Impeachment Act and the prosecutor had invited him, by a letter of 9 December 2010, to make comments or request further information to be collected. With respect to the applicant\u2019s challenge against her impartiality, the prosecutor objected to the assertion that she had expressed an opinion on the applicant\u2019s potential criminal liability. She further claimed that the counts of the indictment were not unclear or worded in general terms, pointing out that further specifications in regard to several counts were found in the explanatory memorandum accompanying Parliament\u2019s resolution and that, additionally, count 2 of the indictment provided explanatory examples of events that had given reason to discuss the imminent financial crisis at ministerial meetings. The prosecutor also disagreed with the applicant\u2019s contention that the applicable procedural or criminal provisions were unclear. As for the alleged unequal treatment by Parliament when deciding to charge the applicant but not the other ministers, she stated that the majority of its members, bound only by their own conviction, had found that the facts of the case up until that point were likely to lead to a conviction of the applicant but not the others. 29.  By a decision of 3 October 2011 the Court of Impeachment upheld the applicant\u2019s motion for dismissal in so far as it concerned counts 1.1 and 1.2 of the indictment, but rejected the remainder of the request. It noted that Parliament held the authority to bring cases against a minister and that its review committee, the PRC, had obtained, inter alia, various evidence referred to in the SIC report and written statements from several ministers, including the applicant, before finding that there was enough evidence for a parliamentary resolution to commence proceedings against the applicant. Parliament\u2019s handling of the matter had been in compliance with relevant legislation and its resolution to commence impeachment proceedings had not prevented the appointed prosecutor from investigating the case further and gathering new evidence. Indeed, the prosecutor had continued the investigation of the case before issuing the indictment against the applicant. Moreover, judgment in a criminal case should be based on evidence presented in court, including the testimonies of witnesses. If there were insufficient support for the charges against the defendant, he would be acquitted of the charges, a more favourable outcome for him than a dismissal, which could lead to possible shortcomings being remedied and a new indictment being issued.\nAs regards the involvement of the prosecutor, the court referred to the general rules of pre-trial investigation under the Criminal Procedure Act (L\u00f6g um me\u00f0fer\u00f0 sakam\u00e1la, no. 88/2008), according to which he or she is authorised to take various measures, including the collection of information and the making of decisions affecting the position of a suspect. Such intervention by the prosecutor did not affect his or her eligibility to handle the case later, such as by deciding whether to indict and bring the case to court. In line with this, the advice given to the PRC by the person subsequently appointed prosecutor could not lead to her disqualification in the case, even less so since Parliament held the authority to decide whether to indict and to determine the content of the indictment.\nWith respect to the content of the indictment, the court found that it generally complied with the form and structure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act and that it did not show such shortcomings that the entire case should be dismissed. As for counts 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 2, the court considered that there was no doubt as to what conduct was the subject of the indictment and how it was deemed punishable by law. However, the conduct imputed to the applicant in counts 1.1 and 1.2 had not been specified with sufficient clarity and these charges were accordingly dismissed.\nThe court went on to find that the procedure in impeachment proceedings was unambiguous and foreseeable, the Court of Impeachment Act containing a few special provisions and the proceedings being, in all other respects, governed by the rules of general application laid down in the Criminal Procedure Act. Furthermore, the penal provisions invoked by the prosecution were worded in such a way that they could be interpreted on the basis of objective criteria and were clear enough to enable a proper defence.\nFinally, in regard to the fact that Parliament had voted to bring proceedings exclusively against the applicant, the court noted that, under the Constitution, members of Parliament were bound only by their own conviction. Moreover, the resolution adopted by Parliament, as the holder of authority to decide on prosecution in impeachment cases, was not subject to review by the court in such a manner as might lead to the dismissal of the case. 30.  Subsequently, the applicant submitted written pleadings to the Court of Impeachment. 31.  The public hearing in the case commenced on 5 March 2012. It started with the formal testimony of the applicant, the first statement he gave since the charges had been brought against him. During the hearing, which lasted until 16 March, written evidence was produced and 40 witnesses gave evidence before the court. The applicant attended all sessions. On 13 March the applicant testified for a second time. Oral pleadings by the lawyers for the applicant and the prosecution were made on 15 and 16 March. 32.  By a judgment of 23 April 2012 the Court of Impeachment unanimously acquitted the applicant of counts 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 of the indictment, finding that the prosecution had not established that the actions which he was accused of having neglected could or would have averted the danger facing the Icelandic financial institutions and the State treasury or reduced it considerably. As for certain negligence imputed to him by the prosecution, the court considered that it related to actions that were not among his duties. However, by nine votes to six, the majority consisting of five professional judges and four lay judges, the Court of Impeachment found the applicant guilty in respect of count 2. The court considered it established that major danger had been threatening the Icelandic commercial banks and the State Treasury as early as February 2008 and that the applicant had to have been aware of that danger. However, basing itself on the minutes of 52 ministerial meetings held between 1 February and 6 October 2008 and the testimony of the applicant and the witnesses, in particular five ministers who had held a seat in the government in 2008, the court found that this matter had not been discussed during the meetings, apart from the last four meetings, on 30 September and on 3, 5 and 6 October. It therefore concluded that the applicant had failed to comply with the duty set out in Article 17 of the Constitution to hold ministerial meetings on \u201cimportant government matters\u201d. 33.  As to the criminal liability under the Ministerial Accountability Act, the court generally stated:\n\u201cThe accountability provided for in Article 14 of the Constitution and Article 1 of [the Ministerial Accountability Act] represents an addition to the parliamentary and political responsibility borne by a minister towards Parliament in respect of the discharge of his duties of office on the basis of parliamentary rule. Even though parliamentary responsibility places great restraint on a minister, the Constitution assumes that a breach in office on his part may entail criminal liability, as further laid down by law. When comparing these two kinds of responsibility it must be concluded that only serious wrongs on the part of the minister committed in office would lead to his punishment. Accordingly, the sole matter of his conduct being worthy of criticism or blame cannot suffice for invoking the legal accountability in question, so that more grave matters must be in issue. It is then determined by an assessment of all facts whether certain conduct is considered serious enough to be subject to punishment, either pursuant to [the Ministerial Accountability Act] or the general penal code, cf. section 1(2) of the aforementioned Act.\u201d 34.  The court went on to make the following remarks about section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act:\n\u201cAccording to section 8(c) of [the Act] it is punishable if a minister, apart from the incidents described in points (a) and (b) of the section, \u2018by other means personally implements, orders the implementation or allows the implementation of any measure that contravenes the Constitution of the Republic, or fails to implement any measure prescribed therein, or causes neglect of such implementation\u2019. The latter part of this provision describes an offence of direct omission, which means that the very fact of a minister neglecting to implement any matter ordered by the Constitution or causing the neglect of its implementation will be a punishable offence irrespective of the consequences or risks attributable to such an omission. As noted in the explanatory notes to the bill that became [the Act], section 8(c) of the Act contains a provision of general import which applies to all breaches of the Constitution other than those specifically made punishable in other points of the section. Accordingly, it falls within the conduct description of this provision to fail to comply with the duty, provided for in Article 17 of the Constitution, to hold ministerial meetings \u2018to discuss new legislative proposals and important government matters\u2019.\u201d 35.  In regard to the applicant\u2019s motion to have the whole case dismissed due to the alleged lack of clarity of section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act, the Court of Impeachment considered that the words \u201cimportant government matters\u201d in Article 17 of the Constitution, to which section 8(c) referred, could easily be understood by a reasonable man in the office held by the applicant and that the provisions contained predictable and reasonable criteria regarding the minister\u2019s discharge of official duties. 36.  The applicant had also maintained that it was clear from the origin and history of Article 17 of the Constitution that important government matters that should be discussed in ministerial meetings according to that provision were only matters that should have been submitted to the President in the State Council according to Article 16 of the Constitution. The court examined the history of the two constitutional articles, in particular the difference in language between \u201cimportant government measures\u201d (mikilv\u00e6gar stj\u00f3rnarr\u00e1\u00f0stafanir) in Article 16 and \u201cimportant government matters\u201d (mikilv\u00e6g stj\u00f3rnarm\u00e1lefni) in Article 17, finding that the latter term was literally more extensive. It concluded as follows:\n\u201c... These two features, that the constitutional provisions on ministerial meetings has remained substantially unchanged despite the change in Iceland\u2019s constitutional position in 1944 and that a distinction was made between matters to be discussed at ministerial meetings, on the one hand, and those to be submitted to the State Council, on the other, in the first Act on the Government Offices of Iceland, unequivocally support a literal interpretation of the instruction under Article 17 of the Constitution. In accordance with a principle of statutory interpretation it will here be found proper to follow the clear language of the provision, which prior preparatory works cannot refute.\nAccordingly, the Prime Minister, who heads the cabinet and leads ministerial meetings, has a duty to ensure that important government matters of which he is aware are discussed and, where applicable, addressed in those meetings, as provided for in Article 17 of the Constitution. ...\u201d 37.  The court then noted that it was not at the Prime Minister\u2019s sole discretion to determine when a matter was of such nature that it should be raised at a ministerial meeting. Rather, of primary importance was to what extent it concerned the interests of the state and the general population. The court concluded that the danger facing the Icelandic bank system and thus the welfare of the state had been of gigantic and unprecedented proportions and was, due to the great public interest at stake, without a doubt an important government matter within the meaning of Article 17 of the Constitution. 38.  The applicant had asserted that cabinet meetings were not a common platform for ministers to discuss matters with other ministers and that Article 17 of the Constitution did not prevent individual ministers from discussing certain matters among themselves without presenting them at the meetings. Furthermore, the minutes of the cabinet meetings did not exhaustively record the discussions, as they contained only a listing of the items placed on the agenda. Frequently, other subjects than those listed had been discussed, inter alia under the item \u201cother issues\u201d. Statements by former ministers before the court had clearly showed that the banking system had been repeatedly discussed at the meetings held during the period to which the indictment referred.\nIn this respect, the court noted that, under the Constitution, cabinet meetings was the forum for political consultation between ministers on important government matters. Whether or not it had been customary to raise comparable issues at ministerial meetings or in informal consultations between the chairmen of governing coalition parties, such practices could not absolve the Prime Minister from the duty laid down in Article 17. 39.  As regards the specific conduct imputed to the applicant, the court stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cAccording to that which has been related above, it is considered proved beyond doubt in the case that the great danger facing the Icelandic banks and thus the welfare of the State was not discussed at cabinet meetings in the period from February 2008 until the end of September the same year. As stated above, it must also be considered a fact in the resolution of the case that various issues that were up for discussion in the consultative group on financial stability and contingency planning, and which there was due reason to discuss in the cabinet, were not dealt with at those meetings. That was all the more urgent as the defendant did not convey important information which he possessed about the affairs of the banks to the Minister for Business Affairs, to whom they pertained. Last but not least it is proven that those two aforesaid documents that were forwarded to foreign authorities [a declaration of 16 May 2008 signed by the defendant, the ministers of foreign affairs and finance and the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iceland to the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and Norway on the completion of currency swap agreements and a letter of 20 August 2008 by the Ministry of Business Affairs to the UK Treasury providing answers to certain questions posed by the latter] and contained, on the one hand, obligations, and, on the other, promises, in the name of the government, were not discussed at its meetings.\nThe defendant and various other persons who have testified before the Court have emphasised that the situation in financial markets was so sensitive during the period related to the case that the slightest rumour that the Icelandic banks might encounter a liquidity crisis could have accelerated and even caused their collapse. For this reason it had been very important to discuss the danger facing the banking system within a small group, in full confidentiality. Although those views may have been fully justified, especially while the difficulties of the banks were still known by few, it is to no avail for the defendant to allege that for this reason he was unable to give an account of the issues in question at cabinet meetings. The framework of those meetings is not least designed so that ministers and supreme holders of executive power can consult one another and discuss important issues confidentially and behind closed doors, with the ministers having a compelling duty ... not to disclose points raised there concerning such confidential matters.\nThe defendant\u2019s conduct of failing to comply with Article 17 of the Constitution where it prescribes that ministerial meetings should be held on important government matters ... not only led to a breach against a procedural rule but also contributed to the fact that a political policy to address the huge problem of which the defendant must have been aware in February 2008 was not formulated at the level of the cabinet of ministers. If such a policy had been formulated and then implemented in an organised manner, including action by the Central Bank of Iceland and the Financial Supervisory Authority, it may be argued that it would have been possible to lessen the harm caused by the collapse of the banks in the beginning of October 2008. It is also likely that the authorities would then have been better prepared for taking a position towards the request of Glitnir Bank hf. for financial assistance at the end of September 2008, so that the problems of that bank might have been resolved in a more deliberate manner than was the case.\nIt may be inferred from the defendant\u2019s testimony before the court that he closely followed the progress of the matters in question. ... [I]t must be regarded as gross carelessness on the part of the defendant to have failed to take up the issues related above for discussion at cabinet meetings, as he was aware or at least should have been aware that they were of such importance, and of such nature, as an integral part of the government\u2019s economic policy, that he had a duty to do so.\u201d 40.  The applicant was consequently convicted of a violation of section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act, for having by gross negligence failed to hold ministerial meetings on important government matters as prescribed in Article 17 of the Constitution. He was not sentenced to any punishment and the Icelandic State was ordered to bear all legal costs, including fees to the applicant\u2019s counsel. Not subject to an appeal, the judgment was final. 41.  The minority\u2019s opinion was to acquit the applicant of all charges. In regard to count 2 of the indictment, the minority referred to the requirement of foreseeability and clarity and to the rule of interpretation that a criminal provision should be narrowly construed when there is doubt as to its application. It expressed the following view on the history of Articles 16 and 17 of the Constitution:\n\u201cAccording to the interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution related above, the duty to hold ministerial meetings only extended to meetings on matters to be submitted to the State Council and matters which individual ministers wished to raise, and the actual practice in respect of the functions of ministerial meetings has been in keeping with this ever since. In addition, the witness statements by ministers in the [applicant\u2019s] cabinet have indicated that economic issues and the issues of financial undertakings were frequently discussed in cabinet meetings at the outset of the meeting or under the agenda item of other issues, even though this was not recorded in the minutes.\nIn this case, the interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution is in issue when assessing whether [the applicant] became guilty of punishable conduct, and viewpoints on good administrative practices which have gained more prominence of late cannot be a determining factor in this context. It should also be noted that a minister will not be held criminally liable under [the Ministerial Accountability Act] unless serious errors have been committed while in office, which cannot apply to the charges according to this count of the indictment, as related above in the course of interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution. Taking this into consideration, we are of the opinion that the [applicant] should be acquitted of a violation of the [Act].\u201d", "references": ["6", "8", "9", "5", "4", "1", "0", "2", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant company, a limited liability company based in Vienna, owns and publishes the daily newspaper Der Standard and the online news portal derstandard.at. 7.  The Carinthian Regional Hospital Operating Company (Landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe KABEG\u201d) is a public-law institution (Anstalt \u00f6ffentlichen Rechts) which operates five hospitals in Carinthia previously owned by the Region of Carinthia (Land K\u00e4rnten). 8.  The KABEG is governed and represented by the board of management (Vorstand) which consists of at least one person and is appointed and supervised by the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The supervisory board consists of three members of the Regional Government, one person who is appointed by the Regional Government and two representatives of the employees of the KABEG. The chairperson of the supervisory board is appointed by the Regional Government. 9.  In 2011 I.M. was the member of the board of management in charge of human resources. K.S. was the chairperson of the supervisory board and leader of the parliamentary group (Fraktionsf\u00fchrer) of the Freedom Party of Carinthia (Freiheitliche Partei in K\u00e4rnten) in the Carinthian Regional Parliament (Landtag). His brother, U.S., was Deputy Governor of the Region of Carinthia. 10.  Because of financial problems, rehiring (Wiedereinstellung) of high\u2011level managers and accusations of tortious interference on the part of politicians in the recruitment process, management errors and corruption within the KABEG, a public debate arose in 2010. On 28 October 2010 the medical director of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital (Landeskrankenhaus), who was in charge at that time, criticised I.M. in a confidential employees\u2019 meeting of the medical doctors of the hospital. Only a few hours later the medical director was dismissed without notice. 11.  On 25 November 2011 on the internet news portal derstandard.at and on 26 November 2011 in the daily newspaper Der Standard the following article was published:\n\u201cSpying accusation against KABEG board of management\n...\nThe [KABEG] board of management ..., [I.M.], is under heavy pressure. According to the minutes of a meeting disclosed on Friday, she is supposed to have ordered the spying on a confidential employees\u2019 meeting [Betriebsversammlung] for doctors of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital herself. These minutes were drafted after the employees\u2019 meeting on 28 October 2010 in the course of a subsequent meeting in the office of the board of management and they state: \u2018[I.M.] explains that she has, as a precaution, sent an informant, who wrote up a transcript [Wortprotokoll].\u2019\n\u2018Stasi methods\u2019\nProminent victim of this informant was the medical director, [M.A.], who had accused the KABEG management of using \u2018Stasi methods\u2019 against insubordinate doctors. M.A. was dismissed without notice immediately after the employees\u2019 meeting. The informant was a trainee lawyer under [I.M.]\u2019s lawyer. [I.M] always claimed that she had not been aware of this operation, that the KABEG lawyer had acted on his own volition. [He] took the blame and therefore had to explain himself before the bar association. K.S. ([Freedom Party of Carinthia]), chairperson of the supervisory board, who also put pressure on journalists in respect of critical reports on the KABEG, is supposed to be the spiritus rector of the spying operation.\nThe now disclosed minutes (which are at the disposal of Der Standard) cast doubts on [I.M.]\u2019s version ...\u201d 12.  On 10 January 2012 K.S., referring to the statement, that he was supposed to be the spiritus rector of the spying operation, initiated private prosecution proceedings for defamation under the Media Act (Mediengesetz) against the applicant company. He claimed compensation and demanded publication of the judgment, arguing that the statement had been a statement of fact, lacked any factual basis and was untrue. 13.  The applicant company argued that the statement was a critical but permissible value judgment and had had a factual basis: K.S. had cultivated a friendship with I.M. and had supported her in the ongoing public debate; moreover, he had been associated with other spying accusations and had even announced in public that he would investigate and spy on politically unpopular individuals in order to get information to discredit them in public. The article did not allege that K.S. had personally initiated or ordered that a spy be sent to the employees\u2019 meeting; however, by regularly applying and publicly announcing such practices he had created a climate and environment where such unfair methods were anticipated as \u201cnormal\u201d and commonplace. 14.  On 21 March 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Strafsachen) rejected K.S.\u2019s claims under the Media Act as inadmissible, reasoning that the term spiritus rector was neither defamatory nor mocking, nor did it allege specific conduct. Being called a spiritus rector meant being seen as a spiritual or ideological guide (geistiger oder weltanschaulicher F\u00fchrer), which, especially for politicians, could not be seen as a negative quality and only suggested that others felt inspired by this person. 15.  On 18 April 2012, following a prior complaint lodged by K.S., the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) quashed the Regional Criminal Court\u2019s decision of 21 March 2012 and ordered it to initiate proceedings under the Media Act against the applicant company. It held that, taking into account the contents of the whole article, the statement suggested that K.S. had been the \u201cspin doctor\u201d (Ideengeber) of the spying operation. Based on this interpretation, the article would qualify as defamatory and originate a claim under the Media Act. It was thus required to examine the factual basis of the article. 16.  In the subsequent proceedings before the Regional Criminal Court the applicant company explicitly declared that it would not provide evidence as to the truth (Wahrheitsbeweis) of K.S. having acted as a spin doctor or the like. It maintained its position that the statement was a value judgment. 17.  On 15 May 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court ordered the applicant company, under Section 6 of the Media Act, to pay 3,000 euros (EUR) (EUR 1,500 for each publication of the article) in compensation to K.S. on account of defamation, and to publish the judgment. Assuming that the statement was to be understood in the way set out in the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 18 April 2012, and noting that the applicant company had not provided evidence as to the truth of the allegation, it found that the article and statement qualified as defamation within the meaning of Article 111 \u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). 18.  On 26 September 2012 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal against this decision. It held that describing someone as the spiritus rector of a negatively connoted spying operation had left no doubt for the readers addressed that the suggestion had been that this person had been the initiator and spin doctor of this operation. The statement implied a \u201cspecific and sufficiently concrete\u201d (spezifisch und hinreichend konkretisiert) accusation of conduct and thus qualified as a statement of fact, as to the truth of which the applicant company had failed to provide evidence. As regards the applicant company\u2019s complaint about the amount of compensation granted, the Court of Appeal held that it did not even amount to 10% of the maximum compensation permitted by law, and was not excessive in relation to the circulation of the newspaper and the online news portal. 19.  That decision was served on the applicant company\u2019s counsel on 24 October 2012. 20.  The applicant company subsequently lodged an application for renewal of the criminal proceedings (Erneuerung des Strafverfahrens) under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafproze\u00dfordnung) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), complaining under Article 10 of the Convention of a violation of its right to freedom of expression. 21.  On 26 June 2013 the Supreme Court rejected the application. It stated that the Court of Appeal\u2019s considerations as to the qualification of the statement as a statement of fact did not raise concerns, and held that such statements of fact, which had not been proven to be true and were thus defamatory, were not protected by Article 10. It concluded that the interference with the applicant company\u2019s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others and had been necessary in the circumstances of the case, in particular taking into account the low amount of compensation granted. 22.  On 10 January 2012 K.S. also lodged an injunction suit under Article 1330 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines B\u00fcrgerliches Gesetzbuch) against the applicant company, requesting that the latter be ordered to refrain from alleging or disseminating that K.S. had been or was supposed to have been the spiritus rector of a spying operation on a confidential employees\u2019 meeting for doctors of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital. 23.  On 5 March 2012 the applicant company requested that the proceedings be suspended until the termination of the proceedings under the Media Act (see paragraphs 12 et seq. above), arguing that the assessment of the factual elements in those proceedings, which would presumably lead to a rejection of K.S.\u2019s application, would have a binding effect on the civil proceedings. 24.  On 19 March 2012, during a hearing, the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht) suspended the proceedings until the termination of the proceedings under the Media Act, holding that they should only be continued at one party\u2019s request. 25.  At K.S.\u2019s request of 1 October 2012, the Commercial Court resumed the proceedings on an unspecified date. 26.  On 19 November 2012 the Commercial Court granted the injunction, finding that the criminal conviction in the proceedings under the Media Act had binding effect on the injunction proceedings. 27.  On 29 June 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal against that decision. It confirmed that, in line with the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law, the conviction in the proceedings under the Media Act was binding, both in relation to the established elements of facts and the legal assessment. In particular, a final conviction under section 6 of the Media Act establishing that a particular media content fulfilled the objective elements of defamation would determine \u2013 in a way that was binding and not revisable in the civil proceedings \u2013 that the audience understood the media content as defamatory. Referring to the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law on the issue, the Court of Appeal did not grant leave to lodge an ordinary appeal on points of law (ordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court. 28.  The applicant company did not lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law (au\u00dferordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court.", "references": ["2", "4", "7", "5", "1", "3", "9", "8", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time of the introduction of his application, the applicant served a prison sentence in Croatia. 7.  During June and July 2008 the Istria Police Department (Policijska uprava istarska; hereafter: \u201cthe police\u201d) received several complaints concerning the use of counterfeit euro banknotes in Istria. 8.  The video surveillance recordings made in one of the shops where the counterfeit currency was used revealed that a certain C.M. had paid using several counterfeit 100 euro notes. 9.  According to a police report dated 21 July 2008, further unspecified investigative police work identified the applicant as the person who had supplied a total of 3,000 counterfeit euros to C.M. The report also claimed that the applicant was expected to return from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia for the purpose of uttering a further 20,000 counterfeit euros and, if that proved to be successful, he would bring a further 200,000 counterfeit euros with a view to uttering them in Istria. 10.  Acting on the evidence presented in the police report (see paragraph 9 above), on 21 July 2008 the Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Puli) asked an investigating judge from the Pula County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Puli) to authorise the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant, namely tapping his telephone, covertly monitoring him using undercover agents, and conducting a simulated purchase operation. 11.  The investigating judge granted the request and on the same day issued an order for the use of special investigative measures. The relevant part of the statement of grounds reads:\n\u201cThe request of the [Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office] is well-founded.\nAs the materials and information available to the police suggest that there is probably cause to believe that Zoran Grba, a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, engages in the offence of currency counterfeiting under Article 274 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, and given that, in the view of the investigating judge, the investigation cannot be efficiently carried out by other means, or would be extremely difficult, the well-founded request of the [Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office] should be granted and the requested measures are hereby ordered with regard to Zoran Grba as indicated in the operative part of this order. These measures will be implemented by the police between 21 July and 21 November 2008.\u201d 12.  On 6 August 2008 the Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office informed the investigating judge that the applicant also used another telephone number, and requested an authorisation for the tapping thereof. 13.  On the same day the investigating judge granted the request, finding that there were no new facts or circumstances suggesting that the use of the special investigative measures in respect of the applicant should be discontinued. 14.  Meanwhile, on the same day, the applicant met an undercover police agent who purchased one counterfeit 100 euro note from him. 15.  In the ensuing period several further meetings and contacts between the applicant and the undercover agent took place. On 12 August 2008 the undercover agent purchased 149 counterfeit 100 euro notes from the applicant, and on 17 October 2008 the applicant sold him a further sixty\u2011four counterfeit 100 euro notes. 16.  On 17 November 2008 the police informed the Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office of the actions taken through applying special investigative measures. The police stated that the applicant\u2019s arrest had initially been planned for 17 November 2008, when he was supposed to come to Croatia for the purpose of selling further counterfeit euro banknotes to an undercover agent but he had postponed that meeting. The police therefore requested an extension of the use of special investigative measures in order to identify and arrest all those involved in the uttering of the counterfeit banknotes and to collect evidence concerning the offence at issue. 17.  On 18 November 2008 the Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office made a fresh request for the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant. 18.  The investigating judge granted the request and on the same day issued an order extending the use of special investigative measures for a further month. The judge found that the grounds set out in his order of 21 July 2008 remained valid (see paragraph 11 above) and that the information provided by the police suggested that it was necessary to extend the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant for a further month. 19.  On 19 November 2008 the Pula County State Attorney\u2019s Office asked for corrections to be made to the order in relation to an incorrect phone number in its request of 18 November 2008 and also in respect of the omission of another phone number used by the applicant. The investigating judge granted this request on 21 November 2008. 20.  On 22 November 2008 the applicant, accompanied by his brother D.S., met the undercover agent in Solin. On that occasion he sold him 600 counterfeit 100 euro notes for 21,000 euros (EUR). Following the illicit transaction, the applicant and D.S. were arrested by the police. 21.  After the arrest the applicant and his car were searched. The police found and seized EUR 21,000 in cash. 22.  On 23 November 2008 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the Pazin Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Pazinu) against the applicant on charges of currency counterfeiting. No criminal complaint was lodged against D.S. 23.  On the same day the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of the Pula County Court for questioning, during which he remained silent. The investigating judge ordered his remand in custody. 24.  The investigating judge also heard D.S. as a witness but he invoked his testimonial privilege as the applicant\u2019s brother and gave no evidence. 25.  Following a request for the opening of a judicial investigation in respect of the applicant, on 26 November 2008 the investigating judge questioned the applicant, but the applicant again remained silent. On the same day, the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant in connection with suspected currency counterfeiting relating to the four occasions on which he had sold the counterfeit banknotes to the undercover agents. 26.  In the course of the investigation, the investigating judge obtained an expert report stating that the 600 banknotes of 100 euro which the applicant had sold to the undercover agents were counterfeit. The judge also decided that the undercover police agents would be questioned under the pseudonyms E.K. and A.B. via video link and with distorted images and sound. 27.  On 23 January 2009 the investigating judge questioned the undercover agent E.K. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present during the questioning. 28.  In his statement E.K. said that his first contact with the applicant had occurred sometime in late July 2008, when they had spoken on the phone. According to E.K., he had not told the applicant the reason for calling him, but at the time the applicant had been in Sarajevo so they had been unable to meet. E.K. also explained that following this initial contact, he had met the applicant in a restaurant in Duga Resa at the beginning of August 2008. On that occasion they had started talking about business. The applicant had asked him what he was interested in and E.K. had replied that he had heard that the applicant was offering some good \u201cpapers\u201d. The applicant had replied that it was true and asked E.K. what he was really interested in and E.K. had repeated that he had heard that the applicant was offering good \u201cpapers\u201d. However, E.K. was no longer able to recall the further details of this conversation with the applicant. E.K. explained that during this first meeting the applicant had sold him a 100 euro note for 300 Croatian kunas (HRK) (approximately EUR 40), which E.K. had accepted. According to E.K., the applicant had also said that if E.K. wished, they could arrange a further purchase of a larger quantity of such banknotes. 29.  E.K. stated that eight to ten days following his first meeting with the applicant, they had met again in a car park near Zagreb. On that occasion the applicant had offered E.K. the opportunity to buy a further 15,000 counterfeit euros. E.K. had accepted the offer and had paid EUR 6,000 for the counterfeit euros. E.K. testified that a further meeting with the applicant had taken place in Odra after a phone call from the applicant. On that occasion the applicant had asked E.K. whether he knew anybody who would be interested in the purchase of larger quantities of counterfeit currency and E.K. had replied that he had a friend \u2012 in actual fact another undercover agent, A.B. \u2012 who would be interested. According to E.K., the next meeting with the applicant had taken place some time in mid\u2011October 2008 in a restaurant in Lupoglav. E.K. explained that on that occasion he had been accompanied by the second undercover agent, A.B. On that occasion E.K. had bought 6,500 counterfeit euros (it later turned out that the amount was in fact 6,400 euros) from the applicant for EUR 2,500. Following this exchange they had been in contact by phone but they had not met. 30.  The investigating judge also questioned the undercover agent A.B. in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 31.  During his questioning A.B. described the circumstances in which he had first met the applicant in the restaurant in Lupoglav in October 2008 (see paragraph 29 above). According to A.B., the applicant had asked him whether or not he wanted to buy counterfeit currency. A.B. had then expressed interest in doing so and the applicant had stated that he could supply 50,000 counterfeit euros, which he would be prepared to bring to Split. They had then agreed to stay in touch and exchanged phone numbers. A.B. also stated that the applicant had called him in early November 2008 and asked him whether he wanted to buy the counterfeit euros. Afterwards they had had several telephone conversations until the applicant had finally called A.B. and offered him 60,000 counterfeit euros for the price of EUR 21,000. A.B. had accepted that and they had met in a shopping centre in Solin. The illicit exchange had then taken place and the applicant had afterwards been arrested. 32.  After completion of the investigation, the investigating judge forwarded the case file to the Pazin Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office for further examination and a decision. 33. On 17 February 2009 the Pazin Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant in the Pazin Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Pazinu) on charges of currency counterfeiting in connection with the four occasions on which he had sold counterfeit euros to the undercover police agents (see paragraphs 14-15 and 20 above). 34.  A three-judge panel of the Pazin Municipal Court confirmed the indictment on 10 March 2009 and sent the case for trial. 35.  At a hearing on 27 March 2009 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, pleaded not guilty with regard to the first three instances of the alleged uttering of counterfeit notes (see paragraphs 14-15 above), whereas he considered himself \u201cresponsible\u201d for the transaction on 22 November 2008 because he had \u201cgiven in to the inducement\u201d by the police. 36.  At the same hearing the Pazin Municipal Court questioned the undercover police agents E.K. and A.B. The undercover agent E.K. stated that he could no longer say who had initiated a meeting specifically for the purchase of the counterfeit currency and he was unable to answer the question whether the applicant should have been arrested as soon as he had sold the first counterfeit 100 euro note to him. E.K. was also unable to say whether he would have been authorised to arrest the applicant. The undercover agent A.B. reiterated the statement he had given to the investigating judge. 37.  Following the questioning of the witnesses, the trial bench examined the secret surveillance recordings and asked the police to inform them whether the euros paid for the counterfeit notes at the first three meetings (see paragraphs 14-15 above) had been traced and confiscated. 38.  On 6 April 2009 the police replied that they had neither traced the money which had been paid for the purchase of the counterfeits nor confiscated it from the applicant on the first three occasions. 39.  A further hearing was held on 16 April 2009, at which the trial bench commissioned a psychiatric expert report concerning the applicant\u2019s mental condition at the moment of the commission of the offences. 40.  In the course of his examination by a psychiatrist the applicant explained that he had had serious financial difficulties and that he had needed money urgently. He also stated that he had never before broken the law and had never committed an offence. In summer 2008 an undercover police agent had started contacting him, asking him whether he could supply counterfeit euros. The applicant believed that one of the people in Croatia who owed him money must have given his phone number to the police. As the agent had been very persistent in his calls (he had called him at least fifty times), the applicant had agreed to his request. The applicant had not believed that he was doing anything bad by simply delivering counterfeit money. He explained that he would have never agreed to do it had he not been pressurised by the undercover agent. 41.  In his report dated 21 April 2009 the expert witness found that the applicant had had full mental capacity at the time of commission of the offences. 42.  On 13 May 2009 a further hearing was held before the Pazin Municipal Court at which the expert witness responded to questions concerning his report. 43.  At the same hearing the applicant was questioned but decided to remain silent and not to give any evidence. Following the applicant\u2019s questioning, the trial bench concluded the trial proceedings and heard the parties\u2019 closing arguments. The applicant contended that he had been incited by the police to commit the offences at issue. He argued that it had been the undercover agents who had contacted him first and that their evidence concerning the circumstances of their various contacts had been both incomplete and contradictory. He pointed out that there no audio recordings of his meetings with the undercover agents and it was unclear why had they not arrested him before 22 November 2008 if he had committed an offence on the first three occasions, as suggested in the indictment. 44.  On 13 May 2009 the Pazin Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. It also confiscated HRK 300 (approximately EUR 40) and EUR 8,500 from the applicant and ordered his expulsion from Croatia. The Pazin Municipal Court held that the four occasions on which the applicant had sold counterfeit currency to the undercover agents should be classified as a repeated offence of uttering counterfeit currency under Article 274 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. When sentencing the applicant, the Pazin Municipal Court explained that the applicant\u2019s persistence in uttering counterfeit currency on four occasions, as well the quantity of counterfeit banknotes uttered (81,400 counterfeit euros in total), constituted particularly aggravating factors. With regard to the applicant\u2019s plea of entrapment, the Pazin Municipal Court merely noted that it had no reason to doubt the statements provided by the undercover agents. 45.  The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment before the Pula County Court arguing, in particular, that the circumstances of his entrapment had not been properly examined. 46.  On 20 October 2009 the Pula County Court quashed the first\u2011instance judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. It found that the first-instance judgment had been based solely on the undercover agents\u2019 statements about their conversations with the applicant, which was contrary to Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 47.  In the resumed proceedings the Pazin Municipal Court excluded from the case file as unlawful evidence all the undercover agents\u2019 statements about their conversations with the applicant. 48.  At a hearing on 18 January 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court again questioned the undercover agents E.K. and A.B. 49.  In his statement E.K. explained that he could not judge whether he had contacted the applicant more frequently than the applicant had contacted him. He was also unable to recall the details of his conversation with the applicant when they had first talked over the phone. E.K. also explained that a simulated purchase operation was sometimes carried out just once and sometimes on several occasions. In the case at issue, he had been instructed by his superiors to conduct several such simulated purchases. Moreover, it was for his superior and not him to determine the ultimate aim of the simulated purchase operation. In any case, the aim of such a police operation was to eradicate currency counterfeiting. E.K. was unable to recall who had initiated the meeting in Lupoglav in mid-October 2008 when he had introduced the applicant to the second undercover agent A.B. Nor could he say who had initiated the other meetings. With regard to his first meeting with the applicant, he could not say whether the applicant had had only one 100 euro counterfeit note in his possession or more than one. E.K. answered that it was \u201c[the applicant\u2019s] own business\u201d. 50.  In his statement A.B. explained that his meeting in Solin had taken place at the applicant\u2019s initiative and that it was the applicant who had contacted him more frequently than vice versa. A.B. further stated that it was his superior who had the authority to decide whether the simulated purchase would be organised just once or on several occasions. 51.  Following the questioning of the undercover agents, the defence asked that C.M. \u2012 who was initially identified as the person to whom the applicant had allegedly first supplied the counterfeit euros (see paragraphs 7\u20119 above) \u2012 be questioned at the trial. The trial bench of the Pazin Municipal Court dismissed the request by the defence as irrelevant and adjourned the hearing in order to examine the recordings of the applicant\u2019s secret surveillance. 52.  On 30 March and 27 April 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court examined the recordings of the applicant\u2019s communications and meetings with the undercover agents. It found that there had been eight unsuccessful attempts on the part of the undercover agents to contact the applicant. 53.  At a hearing on 27 April 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court heard the parties\u2019 closing arguments. The applicant argued in particular that the police had abused their powers in not arresting him after the first illicit transfer of counterfeit euros and had instead incited him to commit further offences by arranging purchases of larger quantities of counterfeit euros. He also contended that there had never been a reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence which could have justified the investigating judge\u2019s decision to authorise the use of undercover investigative measures. 54.  On the same day the Pazin Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. It also confiscated HRK 300 (approximately EUR 40) and EUR 8,500 from the applicant and ordered his expulsion from Croatia. When sentencing the applicant, the Pazin Municipal Court reiterated its previous findings (see paragraph 44 above). 55.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s plea of entrapment, the Pazin Municipal Court observed:\n\u201cIn the case at issue, examination of the audio recordings of the phone taps confirmed the circumstances surrounding the communication between the undercover agents and the accused, in particular the intensity of the telephone communications. Taking note of the recorded statements of the undercover agents during their communications [with the applicant], it was established that the purpose of the communications was [organising] a meeting with the accused in order to effectuate a simulated purchase.\nThis court considers that it cannot be said that the undercover agents acted improperly in the sense that by their actions they allowed the accused to develop his criminal activity [or] in any manner incited him to commit an offence.\nNeither the questioning of the undercover agents nor any other [evidence adduced] suggests that the undercover agents incited the accused to commit an offence in the sense that they offered him some reward or brought him presents or such like.\nIt is true [as was established during the proceedings] that, for instance, between 12 and 16 October 2008 the undercover agent tried to contact the accused eight times on his mobile phone, but this court considers that this was not prohibited nor did it incite the accused to commit criminal acts. Those were attempts to contact the accused in the period which was \u2018covered\u2019 by the [investigating judge\u2019s order]. It should be also taken into account that in the period at issue there had already been communication between the accused and the undercover agent.\u201d 56.  The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment by lodging an appeal before the Pula County Court. He argued, in particular, that the orders for the use of special investigative measures had not been adequately reasoned, as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also contended that there had been no reason to continue with the use of simulated purchases and the undercover agents\u2019 activities after the first illicit transfer of counterfeit euros in August 2008. All further events had constituted entrapment intended to extend the scope of his criminal activity, which eventually resulted in a more severe sentence. The applicant claimed that such measures could have been justified by the necessity to arrest further individuals involved in the offence, but no activity in that respect had been undertaken in his case. 57.  On 24 September 2010 the Pula County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It held that the investigating judge\u2019s orders for the use of special investigative measures had been properly reasoned as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. With regard to the plea of entrapment, the Pula County Court observed:\n\u201c... [The investigating judge] ordered that the [special investigative] measures be implemented between 21 July and 21 November 2008, namely over a period of four months. The investigating judge\u2019s order ... of 18 November 2008 shows that the use of [special investigative] measures was extended for a month from 21 November to 21 December 2008. It is apparent from the order that, in response to an application by the State Attorney\u2019s Office, the investigating judge extended the use of [special investigative] measures for appropriate reasons. It [also] follows from the circumstances of the case that there was probably cause to believe that the accused had uttered counterfeit euros, which suggested the commission of a serious criminal offence (currency counterfeiting). Taking into account the nature of such an offence and the fact that the use of special investigative measures was producing certain results, there were relevant reasons for extending the use of [special investigative] measures under Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot therefore be said that the conduct of the undercover agents broadened the extent of the criminal activity of the accused.\nIt should be noted that it cannot be claimed that the use of special investigative measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1(4) and (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be considered as an incitement to commit a criminal offence. The undercover agent E.K. contacted the accused only after the use of special investigative measures had been ordered and there is therefore no unlawfulness in his conduct. Furthermore, the fact that E.K. first contacted the accused without telling him the reason for the contact, as was established by the first-instance court from the statement of E.K., and the fact that the first meeting took place almost a month later (on 6 August 2008) \u2012 when the undercover agent in Duga Resa bought one 100 euro counterfeit note from the accused for the amount of HRK 300 \u2012 cannot be considered as an incitement but was a tactical action aimed at gaining the confidence of the accused and further uttering of counterfeit euros. The fact that the undercover agent succeeded in his task is self\u2011evident, since the accused continued to sell him larger quantities of counterfeit euros for real euros until he was arrested.\u201d 58.  On 6 November 2010 the applicant filed a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the findings of the Pula County Court. He contended that the Pula County Court had failed to provide adequate reasoning for its findings concerning the incitement. Specifically, it had not thoroughly examined the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s first contact with the undercover agent when the first instance of incitement had occurred. Furthermore, the Pula County Court had not taken into account the fact that the majority of the contacts with the applicant had been initiated by the undercover agents, and it had not analysed the substance of their discussions, even though they had been duly recorded, as a result of the applicant\u2019s phone having been tapped. In this connection the applicant pointed out relevant parts of the transcript of the phone taps, in particular the part where the undercover agent stated: \u201cCome on, you must definitely come. Don\u2019t you know, ok, we are serious people ...\u201d; or where the applicant stated \u201cI will not bring [it] and that\u2019s it\u201d, after which the undercover agent started inciting him to a criminal act. The applicant also contended that the investigating judge\u2019s orders for the use of special investigative measures had not been properly reasoned, as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 59.  On 5 April 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for extraordinary review of a final judgment, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts concerning the applicant\u2019s plea of incitement. It found that there was nothing in the conduct of the undercover agents suggesting incitement. It also considered that there had been sufficient basis for the use of secret surveillance and that the orders of the investigating judge had been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 60.  On 24 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating the arguments he had presented before the lower courts. He pointed out in particular that the use of special investigative measures had been authorised contrary to the relevant domestic law as the investigating judge\u2019s orders had not been properly reasoned. In his view, this had infringed his right to respect for his private life and the confidentiality of his correspondence guaranteed under Articles 35 and 36 of the Constitution. The applicant also contended that he had been incited to commit an offence by the undercover agents and that the lower courts had not properly examined his plea of entrapment. 61.  On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the decision of the Supreme Court concerned neither a determination of his rights and obligations nor a criminal charge against him. 62.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 5 January 2012.", "references": ["2", "5", "7", "1", "0", "6", "9", "8", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Katyr-Yurt, the Chechen Republic. He is the father of Mr R., who died of tuberculosis in a prison hospital. 7.  In 2004 Mr R. arrived at correctional colony no. 4 in the Arkhangelsk Region where he was to serve his twelve-year sentence. On admission to that facility, he underwent a general medical check-up permed by a prison doctor who concluded that he was healthy. Two routine chest X-ray examinations in March and October 2004 confirmed that conclusion. 8.  On 10 March 2005 Mr R. complained to the prison medical authorities of fatigue and a cough. Acute rhinopharyngitis was diagnosed and a standard treatment for that condition was prescribed, but the symptoms persisted. Eleven days later, the prison doctor diagnosed acute pneumonia of the left lung. Mr R. was admitted to the prison medical unit and prescribed medication and a special dietary regime. 9.  On 6 April 2005, in view of the absence of any positive changes in Mr R.\u2019s health, he was moved to a prison tuberculosis hospital. A chest X\u2011ray examination performed on the day of his admission showed a massive infiltration in the lungs. 10.  The next day Mr R. underwent a sputum test, which revealed his affliction with tuberculosis combined with pneumonia. Treatment with five first-line drugs was prescribed. It was started about two weeks later, but had no effect on Mr R.\u2019s health. 11.  On 12 April 2005 a drug susceptibility test was performed. The test result was only received on 18 July 2005 (see paragraph 15 below). An additional chest X-ray examination on 18 April 2005 indicated further progress of the diseases. 12.  In the light of the above, on 23 April 2005 Mr R. was transferred to the Arkhangelsk regional prison tuberculosis hospital (\u201cregional prison hospital\u201d), where his treatment continued as previously prescribed. 13.  According to the applicant, Mr R. was unsatisfied with the quality of his treatment. In early May 2005 both the applicant and Mr R. unsuccessfully sought the latter\u2019s transfer to a medical facility located in a southern region, where Mr R. could have been provided with adequate treatment in a more suitable climate. 14.  In the meantime, regular chest X-ray examinations showed that Mr R.\u2019s health was continuing to deteriorate. By mid-July 2005 pulmonary cavities had appeared, and his condition had become serious. 15.  On 18 July 2005 the regional prison hospital received the result of the drug susceptibility test of 12 April 2005. It revealed that Mr R.\u2019s tuberculosis was resistant to four antibiotics being used in his treatment. 16.  According to a medical entry made at the top of a page outside the related fields in Mr R.\u2019s medical file, on 28 July 2005 he was prescribed treatment with advanced antibiotics. There are no regular entries showing the actual intake of the new drugs. 17.  In August 2005 Mr R.\u2019s condition was assessed as \u201cof medium gravity\u201d, but on 10 September 2005 he died. According to an autopsy report drawn up two days later, the cause of death was cardio-respiratory insufficiency provoked by tuberculosis. 18.  In September 2006 the applicant asked for criminal proceedings to be instituted into the circumstances leading to his son\u2019s death. He alleged that the authorities responsible for protecting the life and well\u2011being of his son had failed to comply with their obligations. 19.  On 21 October 2006 the Primorskiy Inter-District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open a criminal case. Its page-long decision was based on the autopsy report and general information on Mr R.\u2019s treatment submitted by the prison medical authorities. The investigator concluded that Mr R. had died of tuberculosis for which he had received medical treatment, and that the patient\u2019s detention in a northern region had not breached Russian law. 20.  In November 2006 the applicant repeated his request, having argued that the custodial authorities bore responsibility for his son\u2019s death because they had failed to protect him from tuberculosis and to ensure prompt diagnosis of the disease. 21.  By a letter of 9 January 2007 a prosecutor informed the applicant that a criminal inquiry had established that his son had contracted tuberculosis in early March 2005. The correctional colony had promptly identified the disease and had ensured treatment keeping the disease under control. The investigating authorities did not assess the quality of the medical services provided between late April and September 2005. 22.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 21 October 2006, insisting that the investigator\u2019s finding had not been supported by expert evidence. He further argued that the detention authorities had failed not only to diagnose his son\u2019s tuberculosis promptly, but also to provide him with adequate care in the regional prison hospital. 23.  On 3 July 2007 the Isakogorskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk examined the claim. Ms B., the head of the regional prison hospital\u2019s unit responsible for Mr R.\u2019s treatment, was heard. She stated that Mr R. had been admitted to the hospital on 23 April 2005. Shortly thereafter he had undergone medical testing. Ms B. stressed that the testing had been complex and that the hospital had only received the test result in August 2005. On 26 August 2005 the doctors had learned that Mr R.\u2019s tuberculosis had been drug resistant. They had prescribed treatment with advanced antibiotics. However, by that time pathological changes in the patient\u2019s body had already become irreversible. 24.  Having regard to the investigation file, the court noted that the investigating authorities had solicited neither the autopsy report nor medical documents concerning Mr R.\u2019s treatment and that they had not interviewed any doctor involved in the treatment. The court thus concluded that the criminal inquiry had not been thorough. It overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 21 October 2006 not to open a criminal case. 25.  On 14 August 2007 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court quashed the District Court\u2019s decision on appeal. It noted that it was not for the investigative authorities to assess all possible versions of the events and that there was no obligation on them to resolve each inconsistency in the case. The court found that the documents obtained by the first\u2011instance court and the statement by Ms B. had remedied the alleged shortcomings in the investigation. The case was remitted to the District Court for a fresh examination. 26.  Ten days later the District Court re-examined the case. It concluded that the criminal inquiry had been carried out in compliance with the requirements of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the impugned decision of 21 October 2006 had been based on sufficient evidence duly assessed by the investigating authorities. The applicant\u2019s claim was accordingly rejected. 27.  On 23 November 2007 the Regional Court upheld the above\u2011mentioned decision on appeal.", "references": ["6", "3", "2", "9", "5", "4", "1", "7", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lived until his arrest in the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Sakhalin Region. 5.  On 3 April 2003 the applicant was apprehended in a flat with unregistered firearms in his possession. Four tied persons with traces of beatings, including Mr P., were discovered in a cloakroom of the flat. An investigator of the Sakhalin Regional police department drew up an arrest record. 6.  On the following day the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was authorised. A week later the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including organisation and leadership of an armed gang, several counts of aggravated kidnapping, extortion, robbery and fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms. 7.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended by the Yuzhno\u2011Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant\u2019s detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant\u2019s liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant\u2019s accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons\u2019 list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant\u2019s requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 8.  On 21 April 2004 the applicant and his lawyers started studying the case file materials comprising nineteen volumes, 200-300 pages long each. On 7 September 2004 the Town Court set a time-limit for studying, affording the applicant additional twenty working days to complete it. On 29 December 2004 the case was referred to the Regional Court for trial. 9.  On 6 April 2006 the Regional Court, by a jury verdict, found the applicant and six of his accomplices guilty as charged. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on the jury verdict, sentenced the applicant to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant\u2019s accomplices, and taken to the applicant\u2019s country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11.  Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution\u2019s request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.\u2019s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter\u2019s objections. 12.  The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant\u2019s objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.\u2019s pre-trial statements against the applicant. 13.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court, complaining, among other matters, about the decision to read out pre-trial statements by Mr L., Mr P. and Mr K. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, noting that it had correctly considered that reasons for the witnesses\u2019 absence had been extraordinary and that it had lawfully read out their pre-trial statements.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "6", "4", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and is detained in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  On 8 March 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. The applicant\u2019s right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody according to the now defunct Law no. 3842. On the same day he was examined by a doctor at his own request. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant\u2019s body. 7.  On 16 March 1995 the applicant was taken part in \u201can identification parade with statements (ifadeli y\u00fczle\u015ftirme tutana\u011f\u0131)\u201d with other accused persons and identified, in the absence of a lawyer, certain persons as members of the said organisation and confessed to committing a murder. 8.  On 26 March 1995 the applicant further participated in the reconstruction of the events (olay ve yer g\u00f6sterme) in the course of which he had confessed, in the absence a lawyer, having carried out an arson attack. 9.  On 29 March 1995 the applicant was questioned by the police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in Hizbullah. 10.  On 5 April 1995 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements claiming that he had been subjected to torture. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. On the same day and before his statements were taken, he had been examined by a doctor at the request of the police. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant\u2019s body. 11.  On 12 April 1995 he was examined by a doctor at his own request claiming that he had been subjected to torture while in police custody. The doctor noted that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant\u2019s body. 12.  On 2 May 1995 the applicant gave evidence as complainant before the public prosecutor and stated that the had been subjected to various forms of torture, which included beatings, electric shock treatment, blindfolding, hosing with cold water, and being stripped naked. 13.  On 23 May 1995 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was accused of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, proscribed by Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 19 October 1995 the State Security Court held the first hearing in the case. 15.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 16.  On 31 March 2005 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17.  On 11 December 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 31 March 2005 in respect of some of the accused, including the applicant, and remitted the case to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 18.  On 9 November 2007, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment again. 19.  On 19 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["6", "0", "4", "7", "2", "9", "8", "5", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1969 and 1961 respectively and live in Podgorica. 6.  On 1 February 2011 the Dean of the School of Mathematics of the University of Montenegro (Prirodno-matemati\u010dki fakultet), at a session of the School\u2019s council, informed the professors teaching there, including the applicants, that \u201cvideo surveillance has been introduced\u201d (da je uveden video nadzor) and that it was in the auditoriums where classes were held. 7.  On 24 February 2011 the Dean issued a decision introducing video surveillance in seven amphitheatres and in front of the Dean\u2019s Office (ispred dekanata). The decision specified that the aim of the measure was to ensure the safety of property and people, including students, and the surveillance of teaching (pra\u0107enje izvr\u0161avanja nastavnih aktivnosti). The decision stated that access to the data that was collected was protected by codes which were known only to the Dean. The data were to be stored for a year. 8.  On 14 March 2011 the applicants complained to the Personal Data Protection Agency (Agencija za za\u0161titu li\u010dnih podataka, \u201cthe Agency\u201d) about the video surveillance and the collection of data on them without their consent. They relied on the Personal Data Protection Act (see paragraphs 24\u201127 below).The applicants submitted, in particular, that the amphitheatre where they taught was locked both before and after the classes, that the only property there was fixed desks and chairs and a blackboard, that they knew of no reason to fear for anybody\u2019s safety and that, in any event, there were other methods for protecting people and property and monitoring classes. They requested that the cameras be removed and the data erased. 9.  On 21 March 2011 two Agency inspectors issued a report (zapisnik) after visiting the School of Mathematics, stating that the video surveillance was in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act. According to them, there had been cases of destruction of university property, the bringing in of animals, drink and tobacco, and the presence of people who were not students. They also noted that the cameras provided \u201ca picture from a distance without clear resolution, that is people\u2019s features [could not] be easily recognised\u201d, that they could not zoom in and out and did not record any audio (ne reprodukuju audio zapis). While the decision on introducing video surveillance had provided that data would be stored for a year, the servers\u2019 capacity was such that the data was stored for thirty days and then automatically erased by new recordings. The inspectors also noted that information on a \u201cplan to introduce video surveillance\u201d (planiranje uvo\u0111enja video nadzora) had been given at a session of the School Council on 1 February 2011. 10.  On 22 March 2011 the applicants filed an objection to the report, submitting, inter alia, that they were not aware of any of the alleged incidents and that, in any event, it was unclear how such cameras could ensure the safety of people and property. They agreed that cameras over the entrances and exits from the university building might perhaps be an adequate form of ensuring such security. They also submitted that employees had not been \u201cnotified in writing on the introduction of video surveillance before it started\u201d (nijesu bili obavje\u0161teni o uvo\u0111enju video nadzora u pisanom obliku prije po\u010detka vr\u0161enja istog). Notably, the decision had been issued on 24 February 2011 whereas surveillance had commenced a few weeks before. They did not specify when exactly but referred to the minutes of the session of 1 February 2011 (see paragraph 6 above). 11.  On 28 April 2011, after the applicants\u2019 objection to the report, the Agency\u2019s Council (Savjet Agencije za za\u0161titu li\u010dnih podataka) issued a decision (rje\u0161enje) ordering the School of Mathematics to remove the cameras from the auditoriums within fifteen days as the video surveillance was not in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act, notably sections 10, 35 and 36 (see paragraphs 24, and 26-27 below). In particular, the Council held that the reasons for the introduction of video surveillance provided for by section 36 had not been met, given that there was no evidence that there was any danger to the safety of people and property in the auditoriums, still less to confidential data, and that the surveillance of teaching was not among the legitimate grounds for video surveillance. None of the parties initiated an administrative dispute in court against that decision. 12.  On 25 January 2012 the School of Mathematics was served with the Agency Council\u2019s decision of 28 April 2011. The cameras were removed by 27 January 2012 at the latest. It appears that the data that had been collected was also erased on an unspecified date. 13.  On 19 January 2012 the applicants brought a compensation claim against the University of Montenegro, the Personal Data Protection Agency and the State of Montenegro, for a violation of their right to a private life, notably by the unauthorised collection and processing of data on them. They submitted in particular that such an interference with their private lives, without any possibility to control that process, was not provided for by any piece of legislation and that therefore it had not been in accordance with the law, within the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. They also maintained that it had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. They relied on the relevant provisions of the Personal Data Protection Act, Article 8 of the Convention and the relevant case-law of the Court. 14.  On 27 December 2012 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica ruled against the applicants. The court found that the notion of private life certainly included activities in the business and professional spheres. It also held, however, that the university was a public institution performing activities of public interest, teaching being one of them (poziv redovnog profesora [je] tako\u0111e javan), and that it was thus not possible for video surveillance of the auditoriums as public places to violate the applicants\u2019 right to respect for their private life. It was a working area, just like a courtroom or parliament, where professors were never alone, and therefore they could not invoke any right to privacy that could be violated. The data that had been collected could thereby also not be considered as personal data. The university\u2019s failure to remove the cameras immediately had been unauthorised, but it could not be classed as an interference with the applicants\u2019 private life and was therefore irrelevant. The court further held that such a conclusion was in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law given that the monitoring of actions taking place in public was not an interference with a person\u2019s private life when those means just recorded (bilje\u017ei) what others could see if they happened to be in the same place at the same time. The court also held that the monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the use of photographic equipment which just instantaneously recorded visual data did not give rise to an interference with that individual\u2019s private life, which could arise once any footage of such material became publicly available. It concluded that the installation and use of video surveillance and the collection of data thereby had not violated the applicants\u2019 right to privacy (pravo na privatnost) and had therefore not caused them any mental anguish. During the proceedings one of the witnesses stated that there had been cases of theft and of damage to the interior of the building and that on one occasion five laptops had disappeared from a laboratory. Those events had led to the hiring of a private security agency two or three years earlier. According to the witness, the police had suggested installing video surveillance equipment on the School\u2019s premises. The court, for its part, did not deal with those issues. 15.  On 31 December 2012 the applicants appealed. They relied, inter alia, on Article 8 of the Convention. They maintained, in particular, that the interference with their right to respect for their private lives had not been in accordance with any law and had therefore been contrary to Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It had also not been necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, the Court of First Instance had not relied on any legal provision in ruling against them and had failed to assess their arguments. 16.  On 17 July 2013 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica upheld the first-instance judgment, endorsing its reasons in substance. The High Court held in particular that the applicants had not proved that their right to privacy had been violated and found that the first-instance court had \u201csufficiently related the Court\u2019s case-law to the case at issue (dao jasan osvrt na odnos prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava i konkretnog slu\u010daja) ... The court considered the [applicants\u2019] other arguments and found that they did not justify ruling otherwise in the present case...\u201d. 17.  The applicants did not file a constitutional appeal.", "references": ["6", "3", "9", "8", "0", "5", "2", "1", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Nalchik, the Ingushetiya Republic. He is a practising lawyer. 5.  On 10 October 2006 the applicant was travelling by a collective taxi from Nalchik to Grozny in Chechnya. At about 1 p.m. a police officer stopped the vehicle at the Ingush-Chechen administrative border and proceeded to check the passengers\u2019 identity documents. He discovered that the applicant\u2019s signature in his passport had been made in red ink and told him that he would be charged with an administrative offence under Article 19.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences for using an invalid identity document. The applicant raised his objections, claiming that the wrong kind of ink did not render his passport invalid. 6.  The police first took the applicant by car to the Goragorsk police station (\u0422\u041e\u041c \u043f\u043e\u0441. \u0413\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a) where an inspector told him that he was \u201ctemporarily detained for the purpose of drawing up a report\u201d. Once the report had been completed at 3.15 p.m., another police officer took the applicant, again by police car, from Goragorsk the Nadterechnyi district police station (\u041e\u0414\u0427 \u041d\u0430\u0434\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430). An operative established his identity, verified his documents and let him go at 5.10 p.m. The station chief later stated that the applicant had \u201cthanked him for a prompt release\u201d. 7.  The applicant asked the supervising prosecutor to investigate whether the police had abused their powers by detaining him. The Nadterechnyi district prosecutor\u2019s office issued several decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings. One of them was set aside by the Nadterechnyi District Court on 13 July 2007 for the following reasons:\n\u201cThe issue whether the administrative detention of Mr Timishev was necessary has not been clarified. Pursuant to Article 27.3(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative detention may be applied in exceptional circumstances if this is necessary for the prompt and proper examination of the alleged administrative offence. The decision ... refusing institution of criminal proceedings indicates that a report on the administrative offence ... was compiled and forwarded to [Mr Timishev\u2019s] place of residence. In these circumstances, the court sees no grounds for the administrative detention of Mr Timishev.\u201d 8.  Subsequent decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings stated alternatively that it was impossible to establish the time of the applicant\u2019s detention because it had not been recorded in any documents, that the applicant had been detained for disobeying police orders, that he had been actually free to go after 3.15 p.m. but had asked to be taken to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint there and the police had ensured his safe passage. Each time the prosecutor concluded that the police had not committed any prosecutable offence. 9.  On 27 January 2009 the Nadterechnyi District Court identified a number of serious shortcomings in the investigation. The court pointed out that it had not been established why the report on the administrative office could not have been drafted at the checkpoint and why it was considered necessary to escort the applicant to Goragorsk. It remained unclear what had happened to the report: the investigator had not obtained the forwarding letter or any information about the outcome of the proceedings. The investigator had not inquired why an escorting report required under Article 27.2(3) of the Code or the detention report required under Article 27.4 of the Code had not been prepared. Nor had he determined what \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d within the meaning of Article 27.3(1) had called for the applicant\u2019s detention and at what time the applicant had actually left the Nadterechnyi police station. 10.  The court was not convinced that the applicant had asked the police to take him to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint. It considered implausible that the police had provided a car and an escort to help him complain about their conduct. Even assuming that he had indeed wished to make a complaint, the investigator did not establish what had happened to it or, alternatively, why he had not written it, or why he had gone there in person instead of sending it by post from Goragorsk. Statements by the police officers who stated that the applicant had been \u201creleased\u201d were also indicative of the fact that he had been taken to the Nadterechnyi office against his will. 11.  Finally, the court criticised the investigator\u2019s assumption that the applicant had committed an administrative offence. It noted that, according to the Guidance on Issuing Passports (order no. 605 of 15 September 1997), the head of the passports department should have asked the passport holder to sign the passport with special ink. Responsibility for the wrong kind of ink should lie with the official who departed from the Guidance rather than with the applicant. 12.  On 9 April 2009 the investigator issued a further decision refusing institution of criminal proceedings. It was similar in its wording to the previous ones and did not touch upon the areas of concern identified in the District Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["0", "8", "7", "5", "1", "6", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and is detained in Dob pri Mirni. 7.  On 18 March 2006 a person called A.\u010c. called the police and informed them that three people had been stabbed in the town of Izola. Only the injured people, namely \u0160.A., S.M, and F.M, were found at the place of the incident. A few hours later the applicant and his two sons, A.R. and E.R., were arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. 8.  On 20 March 2006 the applicant, A.R. and E.R. were brought before the investigating judge. The applicant, who was assisted by counsel, gave the following statement in his defence. He alleged that he had intended to meet \u0160.A. in order to demand that he pay rent for workers who had previously been accommodated in his flat and to cancel their residence registration at that address. Before he set off to a bar where \u0160.A.\u2019s workers met after work (hereinafter \u201cthe bar\u201d), he telephoned his sons and asked them to come and assist him in case he met any trouble from \u0160.A. After \u0160.A. refused to resolve the matter, the applicant left the bar and was followed by between ten and twelve of \u0160.A.\u2019s workers. \u0160.A. and F.M., one of the workers, started hitting the applicant all over his body. His sons, standing nearby, came to his aid. After \u0160.A. hit A.R., the applicant, an electrical fitter by profession, took out the knife he used for work, which had a seven- to eight-centimetre blade, and began brandishing it. Among others, he stabbed \u0160.A. several times in the back. \u0160.A. then backed off and the applicant and his sons fled the scene. Once at home the applicant gave the knife to his wife, who disposed of it. The applicant also stated that the only injuries he had sustained had been some bruises on his head. 9.  The applicant\u2019s sons stated that their father had met with \u0160.A. and another person and that a fight had started. When they had gone to help him, a number of other men had approached and had started beating them. The applicant\u2019s sons also stated that they had not been carrying any knives themselves. According to them, E.R. had defended himself with a wooden clothes hanger. 10.  The injured parties, S.M., F.M., and \u0160.A., were also questioned in the investigation and they stated, inter alia, as follows. 11.  F.M. stated that after leaving the bar he had been attacked by the applicant, who had hit him on the nose with the handle of the knife. S.M. and \u0160.A. had arrived after that and the applicant had again attacked F.M. E.R. had attacked S.M. while A.R. had attacked \u0160.A. In the course of the fight the applicant had stabbed F.M. and had also attacked S.M. and \u0160.A., before fleeing the scene. The applicant and his sons had had knives. The applicant\u2019s knife had had a ten-centimetre blade. 12.  S.M. stated that he had heard people saying there was a crowd outside the bar, he had gone out and found F.M. being hit in the face and running. He had then seen the applicant attacking F.M. He had attempted to separate them, but E.R. had stabbed him. E.R. had then fled and the applicant had stabbed him several times, which had caused him to faint. 13.  \u0160.A. testified that after being told that something was going on outside the bar he had gone out and found S.M. and F.M. being attacked. He had attempted to help S.M., who had been stabbed in the neck by the applicant, and F.M. He had been stabbed in the back several times by the applicant. 14.  In addition to the accused and the injured parties the investigating judge questioned five witnesses \u2013 A.\u010c., M.H., \u0110.\u0160., \u0160e.A. and I.B. 15.  A.\u010c. testified that he had noticed the applicant and his sons, together with F.M. and another person, standing a few metres from the bar. \u0160.A. had approached them and a few seconds later they had started to fight. According to A.\u010c., only those six people had been involved in the fight. He had not seen any weapons, but had seen blood on \u0160.A.\u2019s shirt. In addition, the third victim (S.M.) had been holding his neck. A.\u010c. also stated that he had called to his acquaintance M.H. to telephone the police. 16.  M.H. gave a fairly detailed account. He explained that he had seen the applicant in the bar arguing with \u0160.A. and then leaving around thirty minutes before the fight. Twenty minutes later F.M. and S.M. had left the bar as well. \u0160.A. had received a call and had gone out. After being alerted by A.\u010c. and seeing the fight through the window, he had gone out of the bar and had seen the applicant and his sons, as well as S.M., F.M., and \u0160.A., fighting. He testified that the applicant and his sons had been the weaker parties in the fight until the applicant had pulled out a knife, saying, \u201cNow let us see\u201d, and using it to attack \u0160.A., F.M. and S.M. He added that he had not seen the applicant\u2019s sons handling any knives and also described the applicant\u2019s knife as having a blade of about eight to ten centimetres. 17.  \u0110.\u0160., the third witness, stated that between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. on the day in question he had first seen the applicant and later his sons park their cars in front of the bar where the events at issue took place. \u0110.\u0160. and his friend had then approached the bar and had seen S.M. lying unconscious on the ground. 18.  On 10 April 2006 the investigating judge questioned I.B. and \u0160e.A. in the presence of the district public prosecutor and counsel for A.R., who were also allowed to put questions. I.B. told the investigating judge that he had been walking home with \u0160e.A. when he had seen the applicant, his sons, and F.M. coming out of the bar. The applicant had had his hand in his pocket and appeared to be holding something. He had seen him pointing at F.M. and heard him telling his sons, \u201cThis is [F.M.]\u201d. He had later seen his brother-in-law (S.M.) lying on the ground with blood on his head. The police and an ambulance had arrived. 19.  \u0160e.A. stated that he and I.B. had been on their way home when F.M. had come out of the bar and told them to wait. \u0160e.A. had then noticed the applicant and his sons. He had seen the applicant pointing at F.M. and saying something, whereupon the applicant had gone towards F.M. and hit him in the face with the handle of his knife. As F.M. had moved away, towards the bar, one of the applicant\u2019s sons had approached. Both S.M. and \u0160.A. had come out of the bar at that moment and a fight had broken out between E.R., S.M., and the applicant and F.M., A.R. and \u0160.A. \u0160e.A. had approached the fighting men and tried to separate E.R. and S.M. E.R. had then struck S.M. with a knife, but when \u0160e.A. had approached, he had turned to him. \u0160e.A. had got scared and had run away. \u0160e.A. described the knife as being old, with a blade of between ten to fifteen centimetres, but could not remember further details. \u0160e.A. stated during the questioning that his work visa was valid until January 2007. 20.  In May 2008 the court summoned the witnesses, including I.B. and \u0160e.A., to a hearing that had been scheduled for 11 September 2008. The summons for I.B. was served on his neighbour while \u0160e.A.\u2019s was served on his wife. The court subsequently cancelled the hearing and ordered that the witnesses, including I.B. and \u0160e.A., be summoned to a hearing on 25 September 2008. However, since I.B. and \u0160e.A. no longer had a place of residence that was registered in Slovenia, the court on 21 November 2008 asked the Police Department for International Cooperation to investigate where the two witnesses were living. Further to another request from the court, the Izola Administrative Unit informed it that \u0160e.A. had cancelled his residence status in Izola on 17 January 2008 and that I.B. had cancelled his on 20 December 2006. It appears that the police registered their enquiries about the whereabouts of I.B. and \u0160e.A. in the Schengen system. 21.  After receiving information from the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Slovenian police informed the court on 23 January 2009 of I.B.\u2019s address, whence the court subsequently sent the summons. On 20 March 2009 the Court received a statement from I.B., given to a notary, in which he excused himself from attending the hearing, saying that he needed a visa to enter Slovenia. However, in order to comply with the summons, he included his testimony, which he had given to the notary. He stated that he did not remember exactly when the incident in question had happened but thought it was around two years earlier, when he had had a temporary job as a construction worker in Slovenia. He had at that time been in the process of moving from the applicant\u2019s apartment to \u0160.A.\u2019s apartment. As to the incident, he said that he remembered seeing S.M. lying on the ground and the police and ambulance arriving at the scene. 22.  In April 2009, further to indications from the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the injured parties\u2019 counsel that \u0160e.A. was in Italy, the Italian authorities checked their data, but stated that \u0160e.A. had never had any registered address in that country. On 18 May 2009 the Office of the General Police Administration informed the court that the border police had talked to \u0160e.A. when he had crossed the Slovenian border. He had given an address in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Italy and his mobile telephone number. 23.  After his wife received the summons at his address in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, \u0160e.A. wrote to the court to say that his father was very ill and that therefore he could not travel for the following two to three weeks. In addition, he said that he had been working in Italy since September 2008 and could not travel to Slovenia as he would risk losing his job. He added that he had already given a statement regarding the charges against the applicant and the other defendants and had nothing to add. The court received the letter on 25 May 2009. 24.  On 16 May 2006 the district state prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicant, E.R. and A.R. for the attempted murder of \u0160.A., S.M. and F.M. 25.  Seven hearings were held, taking place on 25 September 2008, 27 November 2008, 29 January 2009, 19 February 2009, 10 April 2009, 29 May 2009 and 17 June 2009. 26.  At the hearing of 29 May 2009, at which the applicant and his counsel were present, the court noted that \u0160e.A. had sent a letter in reply to the summons (see paragraph 23 above). After the letter had been read out, the panel of judges took a decision that his and I.B.\u2019s statements to the investigating judge should be read out at the hearing, finding that the conditions set out in point 1 of the first paragraph of section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act had been met (see paragraph 39 below). The record of the hearing shows that no comments on the reading out of the statements were made by those present. 27.  The accused, the injured parties and the witnesses A.\u010c., M.H. and \u0110.\u0160. were examined at the hearings.\n-  The applicant kept to the statement he had given to the investigating judge and repeated that he had acted in self-defence. He now alleged that the blade of the knife had been only three centimetres long.\n-  A.R. maintained that he had gone to help his father but the workers had started to beat him as well. \u0160.A. had been on top of him, hitting him until he had managed to escape. A.R. also stated that he had had no plans to meet his brother in Izola that day.\n-  E.R. stated that he had only wanted to have a coffee with a friend but had ended up in a fight, and having to defend himself until he had passed out. He denied that he had had a knife that day and said that he had not seen his brother or father carrying one either.\n-  S.M. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 12 above), adding some details about which of the three accused had stabbed him and where, attributing most of the injuries to the applicant. He explained that he had assumed that F.M. had been hit in the face as he had seen him holding his hand there and added that the applicant\u2019s knife blade had been ten to fifteen centimetres long.\n-  F.M. added further details to his statement from the investigation (see paragraph 11 above), testifying how he had been stabbed by the applicant and that he had seen the applicant stabbing S.M. and \u0160.A. before fleeing the scene.\n-  \u0160.A. described how he had been stabbed by the applicant and his sons. He also testified that before arriving on the scene he had received a brief telephone call from \u0160e.A., who had told him that the men had been attacked outside. When he had gone outside he had seen S.M. on his knees and the applicant stabbing him. \u0160.A. denied that the applicant or his sons had called him that day. He was asked to explain the difference between his testimony during the investigation, when he said he had fought with one of the applicant\u2019s sons, and at the hearing, when he had said that he had not fought back. He stated that he had remembered the events better during the investigation.\n-  A.\u010c. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 15 above).\n-  At his first examination M.H. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 16 above). Six months later, he changed his statement and alleged, among other things, that the fight had started after \u0160.A. had first hit A.R.\n-  \u0110.\u0160. stated that he had seen E.R. parking his car and going directly into the bar. He had arrived at the scene with his friends and had found S.M. lying unconscious on the floor. 28.  The panel also questioned Dr G.R., the surgeon who had treated all three victims at the local hospital and who explained the severity of the individual wounds sustained by the victims. The court also obtained the testimony of two medical experts. Dr A.\u0160. made an assessment of the victims\u2019 individual injuries, the most likely manner in which they had been sustained, the angles of the stab wounds, and so forth. The doctor stated that \u0160.A. had sustained four wounds to his back and a number of wounds to his chest. S.M. had been stabbed seven times from behind, five times in the neck and on the back of the head, once to the left shoulder and once in the left side of his chest. F.M. had been stabbed in the stomach. Dr D.M.S. performed a clinical examination of \u0160.A. in order to assess his wounds in more detail. 29.  The panel also examined several documents that had been called in evidence. Medical reports relating to the applicant and his sons showed that they had sustained minor injuries, the applicant notably sustaining only a few contusions (on the right forearm, above the left scapula and on his left eye, which remained undamaged). Other evidence showed that the applicant had been in a dispute over workers hired by \u0160.A. who had vacated the applicant\u2019s flat. \u0160.A. had not made a declaration of a change of residence to the competent administrative authority, although as an employer and new landlord he should have done so. Furthermore, telephone records showed that the applicant and \u0160.A. had had three conversations on the day of the incident. Moreover, A.R., the applicant\u2019s son, had called his father a number of times that day just before the fight broke out. 30.  On 19 June 2009 the Koper District Court panel found the applicant guilty of attempting to murder S.M., F.M. and \u0160.A. by stabbing the first in the neck, on the back of the head and the left side of his chest, the second in the left side of the stomach and the third in the back. Two of the offences had been aided and abetted by the applicant\u2019s sons, who were each convicted of one count of attempted murder. The court sentenced the applicant to five years and ten months in prison, while his sons were both sentenced to one year and two months in prison. 31.  In a judgment of fifty-four pages, the court established on the basis of the testimony, telephone and GPS data that the applicant had called \u0160.A. on the day of the attack in order to discuss the workers\u2019 change of residence, but they had been unable to resolve the matter. Consequently, the applicant had gone to the bar with a view to get the workers to sign written statements concerning their change of residence. He had asked F.M., who had been in the bar with S.M., to sign the statement, but he had refused. After that the applicant had again called \u0160.A., but to no avail. Being informed of the situation by the applicant, A.R. and E.R. had joined him and they had together gone in search of F.M. and \u0160.A. They had stopped F.M. near the bar and the applicant had hit him in the face with the handle of the knife. F.M. had withdrawn in the direction of the bar, and had been joined by S.M. and \u0160.A., who had been informed about the attack by the telephone call from \u0160e.A. A fight involving the six men had then started, with the accused being prepared for it as they had been equipped with knives. It had finished when the applicant and his sons had left the scene and \u0160.A. had called the police. 32.  The court found that only five minutes had passed between F.M. being stopped by the applicant and his sons and the call to the police, while the fight and stabbing could not have lasted more than two minutes. In particular, the court established that \u0160.A. had received the call from \u0160e.A. at two minutes and forty eight second past eight in the evening and that less than three minutes later \u0160.A. had called 113. In the meantime, he had been stabbed several times. As regards the other circumstances of the fight, such as who had hit whom, the court relied on the testimony of S.M., F.M., and the witnesses A.\u010c. and M.H. The court, taking into account the fact that the injured parties could not have been expected to pay particular attention to what was happening to others while they themselves were engaged in the fight, found their testimony mostly consistent, except for the question of when \u0160.A. had joined the fight. The court took the view on that point that the fight had only broken out after \u0160.A.\u2019s arrival, contrary to what he himself had alleged. The court further found M.H.\u2019s initial testimony (see paragraph 16 above) to be the more persuasive of the two, and that it was in line with the findings of the medical experts. It found that E.R. had initially fought with S.M., the applicant with F.M., and A.R. with \u0160.A. \u2013 a fact which the court found confirmed by the testimony of \u201cS.M., F.M., and also the witnesses A.\u010c. and M.H., and \u0160e.A.\u201d Referring to M.H.\u2019s initial testimony and the applicant\u2019s statement during the investigation, which it found was also supported by \u0160e.A.\u2019s testimony, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s statement at the hearing that his knife had only had a three-centimetre blade. 33.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s argument that he had acted in self-defence, the court found that \u201cthe statements given by the accused were contradictory and refuted self-defence ... [and] the evidence produced at the hearing completely excluded that possibility [of self-defence]\u201d. The Court found that only the defendants and the three injured parties had engaged in the fight and that if \u0160.A. had wanted to attack the applicant he could easily have outnumbered the defendants. The applicant and his sons had been motivated by anger towards \u0160.A. and F.M., while S.M. had become involved because he had tried to protect F.M. As the applicant had failed to convince F.M. to cancel his residence status, he had resorted to violence. If the applicant had felt that he was in danger, he could simply have walked away. Instead, he had provoked a fight, together with his sons. The court also found that while the applicant had admitted to stabbing \u0160.A. several times in the back, he and the other two defendants had not addressed the fact that the injured parties had sustained other stab wounds too. Moreover, the court noted that none of the witnesses had testified that the applicant had lain on the floor and been kicked by the other men. The court found that since the defendants had been prepared for a fight in advance the injured parties should be believed when they stated that they had in fact been attacked and that they had responded by fighting back. It considered the injured parties\u2019 description of how they had obtained the wounds to be persuasive. Having regard to the fact that the fight was of short duration, the court found that the defendants had pulled their knives out quickly and had quickly \u201cfinished with\u201d the injured parties. The court further found that as the victims had sustained fourteen stab wounds altogether, it was plausible that the applicant had not been the only assailant, but that all three defendants had inflicted them. Finally, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had pulled the knife out after being attacked by ten people as \u201cunrealistic\u201d. 34.  In the judgment the court also explained the reasons for reading out I.B. and \u0160e.A.\u2019s statements. It noted that the two witnesses had not attended the hearing, despite being properly summoned, and that counsel for the defendants had been offered the possibility to attend their questioning during the investigation. 35.  The applicant appealed to the Koper Higher Court, complaining, inter alia, that the first-instance court had violated his defence rights by relying on the record of the testimony that I.B. and \u0160e.A. had given during the investigation. 36.  On 7 July 2011 the higher court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. As regards the applicant\u2019s alleged inability to cross-examine I.B. and \u0160e.A. at the trial, the higher court considered that the applicant had had an opportunity to question the witnesses during the investigation. It noted that counsel for the applicant had been informed about the hearing with the investigating judge, as confirmed by an acknowledgment of receipt, but had failed to attend it. According to the higher court, the defence had been aware of the notice of the possibility to participate in the questioning of witnesses during the investigation but had consciously disregarded it. Hence, it had accepted the risk that the witnesses would not be available for questioning at the trial. Moreover, the higher court considered that the applicant had failed to comply with paragraph 2 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 39 below) as he had not substantiated in what way his inability to question the two witnesses at the trial had undermined the legality of the judgment. 37.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 24 August 2012. The court confirmed that the first-instance court had correctly applied section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act by reading out the testimony given by I.B. and \u0160e.A. during the investigation as the witnesses, who were foreigners, had been duly summoned to appear before the court but had refused to attend. The Supreme Court further found that section 178(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provided that the investigating judge should have sent the request to attend the questioning directly to the defendants as well as to counsel. However, according to the Supreme Court, the applicant had failed to explain how that error on the part of the investigating judge had affected the legality of the impugned judgment. In the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion, the error could only have affected the legality of the judgment if the first-instance court had relied on the testimony of I.B. and \u0160e.A. to a decisive extent, which, however, had not been alleged in the case. 38.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 24 December 2012, pursuant to section 55b of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 40 below). 39.  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 63/94 with the relevant amendments) read as follows:\nSection 75\n\u201c(1) Counsel is entitled to do everything in a defendant\u2019s interests that the defendant himself can do.\n...\u201d\nSection 178\n\u201c...\n(4) The public prosecutor, defendant and counsel can be present during the questioning of a witness. ...\n(5) The investigating judge should inform the public prosecutor and counsel in an appropriate manner of when and where a defendant will be questioned. Likewise, he must in an appropriate manner inform the public prosecutor, the defendant, counsel and the injured party of when and where other investigative measures at which they can be present will take place, unless it would be dangerous to wait. If the defendant has counsel, the investigating judge in principle informs only him. If the defendant has been detained and the investigative measures are to be carried out outside the area of the court\u2019s jurisdiction, the investigating judge must decide whether the presence of the defendant is necessary.\n...\u201d\nSection 244a\n\u201c(1) Under the provisions of this section, questioning the defendant or a witness can be carried out by means of modern technical equipment for voice and image transmission (video-conferencing).\n(2) Questioning the defendant or a witness can be carried out by means of video-conferencing if:\n...\n(iii) the competent authority has made a proper request to another country in accordance with the law or international treaties or\n(iv) for any other justified reason which makes it undesirable or impossible for the person to appear before the authority conducting the hearing.\n...\u201d\nSection 340\n\u201c(1) In addition to the instances specified in the present Act, the record of witnesses\u2019 statements ... can be read out, on the basis of a decision by a panel and only in the following circumstances:\n(i) if the persons questioned have died, or have been affected by a mental illness, or cannot be found, or are unable to appear in court because of old age, illness or some other weighty reason, or their appearance would involve great difficulty, or if they live abroad and fail to appear at the main hearing despite being duly summoned;\n(ii) if witnesses or experts refuse to testify at the main hearing without a legal justification.\n...\n(4) The reasons for reading out the record shall be indicated in the transcript of the main hearing ...\u201d\nSection 342\n\u201cAfter examining each witness or expert, and after reading each record or other written document, the presiding judge shall ask the parties and the injured person to make comments if they so wish.\u201d\nSection 371\n\u201c(1) A substantial violation of the provisions of criminal procedure shall be deemed to exist:\n...\n(viii) if the judgment relies on evidence which was obtained by a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, or evidence it should not have relied on, in accordance with the provisions of the present Act, or evidence which was obtained on the basis of such impermissible evidence;\n...\n(2) A substantial violation of the provisions of criminal procedure shall also be deemed to exist if in preparation for a hearing or in the course of a hearing or in giving judgment the court omitted to apply a provision of this Act or applied it incorrectly, or if in the course of the hearing the court violated the rights of the defence, which influenced or might have influenced the legality and regularity of the judgment.\u201d 40.  Section 55b, paragraph 2, of the Constitutional Court Act (Official Gazette no. 15/94 with relevant amendments) provides as follows:\n\u201c(2) A constitutional complaint shall be accepted for consideration:\n- if there has been a violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms which has had serious consequences for the complainant;\nor\n- if it concerns an important constitutional question which exceeds the importance of the particular case in question.\u201d 41.  On 26 June 1997 the Slovenian Parliament ratified the \u201cTreaty between Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia concerning Legal Aid in Civil and Criminal Matters\u201d, which entered into force on 5 September 1997. Article 3 of the Treaty states that legal assistance comprises, among other things, the service of legal documents and the questioning of witnesses. Article 32 provides that participants in criminal proceedings and counsel can be present when an act of legal assistance is carried out in the requested state. 42.  The 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 26 October 1999 and with respect to Slovenia on 17 October 2001. It provides in Articles 8 and 10, respectively, as follows:\nArticle 8\n\u201cA witness or expert who has failed to answer a summons to appear, service of which has been requested, shall not, even if the summons contains a notice of penalty, be subjected to any punishment or measure of restraint, unless subsequently he voluntarily enters the territory of the requesting Party and is there again duly summoned.\u201d\nArticle 10\n\u201c1 If the requesting Party considers the personal appearance of a witness or expert before its judicial authorities especially necessary, it shall so mention in its request for service of the summons and the requested Party shall invite the witness or expert to appear.\nThe requested Party shall inform the requesting Party of the reply of the witness or expert.\n...\u201d 43.  The Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was adopted on 8 November 2001. It entered into force with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 1 April 2009. However with respect to Slovenia it entered into force only on 1 July 2013, which is after the proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case had been concluded. Article 9 regulates hearings by video\u2011conference. 44.  On 29 May 2000 the Council of the European Union adopted the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2000/C 197/01), which aims at facilitating mutual judicial assistance between the authorities of the Member States. It supplements the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Article 10 regulates hearings by video-conference. It sets out that such hearing can be requested if a person is in one Member State\u2019s territory and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another Member State and it is not desirable or possible for the person to be heard to appear on its territory in person.", "references": ["9", "1", "4", "7", "5", "0", "2", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a construction company, which was established in 2003 and has its seat of business in Mersin. 6.  In 2005, after having obtained a permit to operate a mine, the applicant opened a mine in a plot of land of 8,700 m\u00b2 which it owned. 7.  During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m\u00b2, outside of its licensed area. 8.  On 8 March 2006 the Tarsus Provincial Administration informed the applicant that it had decided to impose the proposed administrative fine pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulation Concerning Group A Mines (A Grubu Madenlerle \u0130lgili Uygulama Y\u00f6netmeli\u011fi). 9.  On 8 February 2006 the applicant company\u2019s president, \u00dc.T., filed a complaint with the Mersin Public Prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that one of the auditors in the commission, M.A.L., had told him that the fine had initially been calculated as TRY 500,000 and that he had reduced that amount. \u00dc.T. claimed that M.A.L. had asked him to pay TRY 10,000 in return and had threatened to have his mine closed if he refused to do so. He indicated that M.A.L. had acted together with a certain F.G., an official at the Provincial Administration. 10.  In his police statements on 9 February 2006, \u00dc.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two. 11.  Subsequently, on 16 February 2006 the Mersin Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against M.A.L. and F.G., accusing them of extortion. 12.  On 13 May 2011 the Mersin Assize Court found the two officials guilty as charged. The appeal proceedings with regard to that judgment are still pending before the Court of Cassation as of September 2017. 13.  In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 the applicant had filed an objection with the Tarsus Magistrates\u2019 Court and requested a stay of execution of the fine. It informed the court of the criminal proceedings pending against certain officials involved, in which they were being tried for extortion. By a subsequent petition dated 5 June 2006, the applicant also requested the court to hold an oral hearing, to carry out an on-site examination, and to hear its witnesses in order to better evaluate the credibility of the inspection report the fine was based on. 14.  On 13 June 2006, the Tarsus Magistrates\u2019 Court rejected the applicant\u2019s requests for an oral hearing and on-site examination without indicating any reasons for its decision. Relying on the inspection report drawn up on 31 January 2006, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s objection. 15.  The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that the fine had been unlawfully imposed on it and that the Magistrates\u2019 Court had failed to adequately assess the case as it had not held a hearing. It drew the court\u2019s attention once again to the criminal proceedings against the officials involved. 16.  On 10 July 2006 the Tarsus Assize Court rejected the applicant\u2019s objection without holding a hearing. 17.  On 7 March 2008 the administration seized the plot of land where the applicant conducted mining activities due to the latter\u2019s failure to pay the administrative fine.", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "8", "7", "6", "5", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  The applicant was born in 1986 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. In 1996, when he was ten years old, his parents divorced and he moved with his mother to Kaluga in Russia. In 2003, the applicant graduated from high school in Kaluga and began studies at the Finance and Economics Institute. 6.  On 4 May and 17 October 2005 the applicant was convicted of various offences and given a custodial sentence. Upon his release on 29 February 2008, he returned to Kaluga. 7.  On 12 January 2012 the police stopped the applicant in the courtyard of his house and charged him with illegal residence in Russia. 8.  On the following day the Kaluzhskiy District Court in the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence under Article 18.8 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (failure to leave Russia upon the expiry of the authorised period of stay and illegal residence) and sentenced him to a fine of 2,500 Russian roubles (62 euros) and administrative removal from the Russian Federation. Pending removal, the District Court held that the applicant should be held in the detention centre. On 24 January 2012 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on appeal. 9.  The applicant asked the District Court to postpone the enforcement of the removal order, emphasising that it was currently unenforceable because he had no identity documents and because he was not a Georgian national and could not be sent to Georgia. On 12 April 2012 the District Court refused the applicant\u2019s request in a summary fashion. 10.  The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated. 11.  The toilet bowl sunk into the floor was located 40 centimetres from the nearest bed. It was cleaned with cold water without detergent. Prisoners were given three litres of water per day, it was not allowed to boil it. Once a week prisoners were taken to the shower room. There was not enough hot water for all of them and they took turns skipping the shower. 12.  There was no calendar or clock in the cell. Nor was there a radio, television, books or newspapers. Board games were forbidden. The applicant did not speak the Uzbek language and could not communicate with his cellmates. 13.  Prisoners were taken outdoors in groups of thirty. The yard was small, six by four metres, so they huddled together. It had no sports equipment or awning for bad weather. 14.  The applicant\u2019s complaints to a prosecutor were rejected as unfounded. In January and March 2012 two members of the Kaluga public monitoring commission visited the facility. Their report corroborated the applicant\u2019s description of his conditions of detention. 15.  In May 2012 the applicant developed pulmonary tuberculosis. He was transferred for treatment to a civilian hospital in Kaluga. Upon his discharge, he took advantage of the absence of police escort and absconded. A search operation was launched; the applicant was located on 30 January 2013 and returned to the detention centre. 16.  On 31 January 2013 the applicant was placed on board of a Tbilisi-bound flight and left Russia.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "4", "8", "5", "3", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Yalova. 6.  The applicant lived in Turkey between 2001 and 2003, when he met his wife and got married. The applicant and his wife have four children. In 2003 the applicant was deported to Algeria by the Turkish authorities. Between 2003 and 2006 he was imprisoned in Algeria, where he alleges he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. 7.  The applicant and several other individuals founded the Rachad Movement in Algeria, a political organisation which opposes that country\u2019s government through non-violent means. After the protest movement known as the Arab Spring began in 2010, he was taken into police custody in Algeria and he alleges he was subjected to ill-treatment there. 8.  On an unspecified date he fled from Algeria to Syria, where he worked as a teacher. Subsequently, in August 2013, he arrived in Yalova, Turkey, where his wife and children lived. 9.  On 3 November 2013 he was taken into police custody as he did not have a passport. On the same day, the applicant was placed in a detention room at the Yalova police headquarters, where he was detained between 3 November 2013 and 7 January 2014. 10.  The applicant submitted that the detention room in which he had been kept was in an ordinary police detention facility where arrestees were held for short periods (generally one day). During his detention, many people were detained in the room, at times as many as 10-12 people. The room was around 10 sq. m and there was no heating or ventilation, and no bed. Nor did it receive any natural light. He was confined in that room and was exceptionally allowed to use the other parts of the detention facility. He could use the hall in the centre of the facility only when his family members visited him. The applicant was provided with a mattress and a blanket and he slept on the floor. He was never taken out of the detention facility and did not have access to exercise in the open air. The facility had no shower and he therefore had to wash himself in the toilets. As he suffered from asthma, anaemia and back problems, he needed medical assistance. However, he was taken to hospital on only one occasion. 11.  The applicant submitted a number of photographs in support of his submissions. In one of those photographs he is seen sitting on the bench in a small detention room behind bars. 12.  In their submissions dated 18 January 2017, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the \u201ccustody cell\u201d of the public security branch of the Yalova police headquarters. The custody cell in question was used as a foreigners\u2019 detention centre because there was no separate foreigners\u2019 detention centre in Yalova at that time. The Government stated that the custody facility measured approximately 92 sq. m and consisted of two detention rooms of 12.8 sq. m and 17.6 sq. m, two toilets (3.5 and 5.7 sq. m respectively), a room for the taking of police statements of 13.5 sq. m, a room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers of 6 sq. m, and an identification parade room of 6 sq. m. There was also a hall in the centre of the facility, which measured 21 sq. m, onto which the detention rooms opened. The hall had an air conditioner and two windows measuring 70 x 93 cm and 150 x 205 cm which provided natural light for the detention rooms. 13.  In their additional observations dated 23 May 2017, the Government submitted that foreign nationals and Turkish nationals detained in the context of criminal investigations were kept separately in two detention rooms in the facility in question. They stated that at the material time the Turkish nationals had been kept locked in one of the detention rooms and that the applicant and other foreign nationals had had access at all times to the hall in the centre of the facility \u2212 where there were chairs and a table \u2013 and to the toilets. When there were no Turkish national detainees, the foreign nationals also had access to both detention rooms. 14.  In support of their submissions the Government submitted a sketch map of the detention facility and a total of thirty-nine photographs. Nine of these photographs were taken outside and show the police station building. Eleven photographs were taken in the toilets, which appeared clean. There is a shower head installed in each of the toilets. Nine other photographs show the room for the taking of police statements, the room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers, and the identification parade room. Lastly, nine further photographs show the detention rooms and the hall. It is apparent that the detention rooms are separated from the hall by bars. There are no beds in the detention rooms but along their three walls there are concrete benches topped with a cushion. On the benches there are blankets, apparently used both for covering and as pillows. The detention rooms do not have windows but appear to receive light from the hall. The photographs of the hall show that there are two windows, a table and chairs on which towels were put in that area. 15.  The Government also submitted custody registers showing the occupation rates at the detention facility for the period between 4 November 2013 and 7 January 2014. According to those documents, the applicant was detained alone for thirty-one days and for thirty days he was detained together with between one and six foreign nationals. On 26 November 2013 there were seven foreign nationals, including the applicant, detained at the facility. On 27 and 28 November 2013 the applicant was detained together with eleven other foreign nationals. 16.  For thirty days between 4 November 2013 and 7 January 2014, there had been no Turkish nationals detained at the facility. In particular, on 26, 27 and 28 November 2013 no Turkish national had been held in custody. During the remaining thirty-five days, a minimum of one and a maximum of five Turkish nationals had been in detention, except for 1 January 2014, when eleven Turkish nationals had been held in police custody. In particular, on 29 November 2013 one Turkish national had been detained at the facility in question. 17.  On 27 December 2013 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. The applicant alleged, inter alia, that the conditions of his detention at the Yalova police headquarters described above had amounted to ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 10 above). 18.  On 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the admissibility and merits of the applicant\u2019s case. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint that the conditions of his detention at the Yalova police headquarters had amounted to ill-treatment, the Constitutional Court noted that he had complained that his health had worsened as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. Since the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when he had fallen ill in detention, the Constitutional Court found that the administrative authorities had taken the necessary measures to protect the applicant\u2019s physical and psychological health. As a result, the court concluded that the treatment of the applicant had not attained the minimum level of severity required to be described as inhuman or degrading treatment. 19.  On 24 June 2015 the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative. 20.  The Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) concerning the conditions of detention of foreign nationals (see the CPT standards, document no. CPT/Inf(97)10-part) provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c27.  In certain countries, CPT delegations have found immigration detainees held in police stations for prolonged periods (for weeks and, in certain cases, months), subject to mediocre material conditions of detention, deprived of any form of activity and on occasion obliged to share cells with criminal suspects. Such a situation is indefensible. 28.  The CPT recognises that, in the very nature of things, immigration detainees may have to spend some time in an ordinary police detention facility. However, conditions in police stations will frequently - if not invariably - be inadequate for prolonged periods of detention. Consequently, the period of time spent by immigration detainees in such establishments should be kept to the absolute minimum. 29.  In the view of the CPT, in those cases where it is deemed necessary to deprive persons of their liberty for an extended period under aliens legislation, they should be accommodated in centres specifically designed for that purpose, offering material conditions and a regime appropriate to their legal situation and staffed by suitably-qualified personnel. 30.  Obviously, such centres should provide accommodation which is adequately-furnished, clean and in a good state of repair, and which offers sufficient living space for the numbers involved. Further, care should be taken in the design and layout of the premises to avoid as far as possible any impression of a carceral environment. As regards regime activities, they should include outdoor exercise, access to a day room and to radio/television and newspapers/magazines, as well as other appropriate means of recreation (e.g. board games, table tennis). The longer the period for which persons are detained, the more developed should be the activities which are offered to them.\n... 79.  Conditions of detention for irregular migrants should reflect the nature of their deprivation of liberty, with limited restrictions in place and a varied regime of activities. For example, detained irregular migrants ... should be restricted in their freedom of movement within the detention facility as little as possible.\u201d", "references": ["6", "3", "9", "0", "8", "5", "4", "2", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965. When he lodged his application he was in prison serving a sentence for economic offences. 7.  In 2002 the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service commenced proceedings against the applicant on charges of involvement in a vast criminal network operating in the economic field, involving several dozen individuals and some one hundred business companies. With the complicity of bank employees, fraudulent appropriations were granted to those companies, which money was then misused for the benefit of the accused. 8.  By final judgment of 28 February 2013 the High Court of Cassation and Justice convicted the applicant on conspiracy charges, sentencing him to three years, four months\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  Meanwhile, in November 2012, the applicant had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. At that time the illness had already reached an advanced stage and the applicant displayed bone metastases, brain haematoma and intraocular haemorrhages. On 27 November 2012 the applicant had been admitted to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology, from which he had been discharged on 11 January 2013. From 14 to 18 January 2013 he had once again been admitted to hospital. He had undergone prostate surgery and begun chemotherapy. He had subsequently had several short stays in hospital. In January 2013 the diagnosis reached by the oncologist had emphasised the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s condition. The prognosis was that he had a short time to live given that the disease had spread to the bone, for which condition the existing treatment was insufficient. On 26 February 2013 the applicant was examined by a medical board, which issued him with a certificate of severe disability. 10.  On 28 February 2013 the applicant was taken into Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. His state had worsened and he was suffering from bone pain. The applicant continued his chemotherapy and remained in hospital until 4 March 2013, when he was handed over to police officers who had come to escort him to Bac\u0103u Prison where he was to begin serving his sentence. 11.  On the same day the applicant, through the intermediary of his lawyer, applied to the Bac\u0103u County Court for an interruption of his prison sentence on health grounds. He pointed out that since he could not receive his treatment in prison, his life would be in danger. 12.  On 27 March 2013 he was transferred to the Rahova Prison Hospital. On 5 April 2013 he returned to Bac\u0103u Prison. On 15 April 2013 he was readmitted to the Rahova Prison Hospital, and then transferred back to Bac\u0103u prison on 28 May 2013. 13.  The court commissioned a report on the applicant\u2019s condition from a board of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine. At the board\u2019s request, the applicant underwent several medical examinations, which showed that his condition required radiotherapy sessions and further chemotherapy. Furthermore, it transpired from the medical documents made available to the committee that the applicant had had chemotherapy sessions at Bac\u0103u Hospital on 12 April 2013 and at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology on 10 and 17 May 2013. 14.  In its report of 19 June 2013 the board concluded that the applicant\u2019s survival depended on the medical care with which he was being provided and a complex form of treatment which he could only receive in specialised clinics operating under the Ministry of Health. Consequently, it considered that the court had to order either an interruption of the applicant\u2019s sentence or his hospitalisation under supervision in one of the aforementioned establishments. 15.  On 25 June 2013 the court allowed the applicant\u2019s request and ordered a three-month interruption of his sentence. Having regard to the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s illness, it ruled that hospitalisation under supervision would considerably reduce his chances of survival and recovery owing to the stress and mental suffering caused by the continued execution of his sentence. Moreover, the court emphasised that the applicant posed no threat to public order, that the sentence, one third of which had already been served, was reasonably short and that the applicant\u2019s conduct had been good throughout the criminal proceedings. The prosecution appealed. 16.  The applicant was released on the same day. On 4 and 19 July 2013 he underwent chemotherapy at Bac\u0103u Hospital and continued the treatment on 1 and 16 August 2013 at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology. 17.  On 29 August 2013 the Bac\u0103u Court of Appeal considered the prosecution appeal. By final judgment delivered the same day, it allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. Relying on Articles 455 and 453 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter \u201cthe CPP\u201d - see paragraph 34 below), the Court of Appeal ruled that the interruption of the applicant\u2019s sentence was unjustified provided that his treatment could continue, under guard, in a civil hospital. In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges on the trial bench considered that the sentence should be interrupted on humanitarian grounds; consequently, having regard to the applicant\u2019s condition, he considered that his continued detention was in breach of the proportionality principle and reduced his chances of survival. 18.  On 31 August 2013 the applicant was imprisoned in Bac\u0103u to serve his sentence. On 24 September 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 27 September 2013 he was admitted to the Rahova Prison hospital. On 3 October 2013 he returned to Vaslui Prison. 19.  On 4 October 2013 the applicant was admitted to T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital, diagnosed with \u201cprostatic neoplasia with bone and brain metastases\u201d. On the same day, noting the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s general condition, a multidisciplinary team from the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital placed a prisoner on constant standby to assist the applicant in his everyday activities. That prisoner reportedly assisted the applicant up until the day of his last transfer to Bac\u0103u Hospital (see paragraph 28 below). 20.  On 9 October 2013 the applicant was once again transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison, from whence he was taken, on the same day, to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. He was unable to move, was suffering from severe bone pain and had almost completely lost his sight and hearing. Furthermore, he was also showing signs of severe depression. His condition was so severe that he could no longer undergo chemotherapy, which was replaced by palliative care. 21.  The applicant remained in the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department until 24 October 2013, when he was transferred to Ia\u015fi Prison. On 28 October 2013 he was taken into the Ia\u015fi Regional Institute of Oncology for five palliative radiotherapy sessions geared to alleviating his bone pain. He remained in the institute until 1 November 2013. He lost his sight completely and his depression continued. 22.  On 5 November 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 6 November 2013 he was admitted to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital where he stayed until 12 November 2013, when he was transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison. 23.  On 22 November 2013 the judge delegated to Bac\u0103u Prison granted the applicant the most favourable possible detention regime, allowing him to move around inside prison and to take part in outdoor activities unsupervised. 24.  Still on 22 November 2013, the applicant was admitted to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. The senior medical officer said that the applicant\u2019s condition could deteriorate suddenly and that he therefore needed round-the-clock medical care. From 25 to 27 November 2013 the applicant received palliative care in the same hospital before being transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison and then to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital. 25.  In reply to a request from the applicant to be released on licence, the Prison Director told him that his request would be examined in 2015. 26.  The applicant wrote to the President of the Romanian Republic and the Director of T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison to request their assistance regarding his release. He explained that he was dying and that he wanted to have his family present. He pointed out that he was now bedridden, blind and deaf, and that there was no one in prison to assist him in his everyday activities. He added that the doctors had been reluctant to treat him because had was keep under guard and in handcuffs. 27.  The National Administration of Prison Authorities replied that only a court could order his release. 28.  On 4 December 2013 the applicant was transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison and then to Bac\u0103u Hospital, where he remained until 7 December 2013. On that date he was transferred to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison Hospital. On 19 December 2013 he returned to Bac\u0103u Prison and the same day was admitted to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. He died there on 24 December 2013. 29.  It transpires from the medical files included in the case file that between 24 January 2013 and 24 December 2013, the date of his death, the applicant was admitted to Bac\u0103u hospital eighteen times, including several hospital stays lasting several days. During those stays he had some fifteen chemotherapy sessions, usually at fortnightly intervals: prior to 24 October 2013 in the framework of the cancer treatment, and after that date, in the framework of palliative treatment. He also received various types of treatment for the illnesses caused by the metastatic progression of his prostate cancer. 30.  In a report drawn up at the Government agent\u2019s request, the senior medical officer at the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department highlighted certain dysfunctions in the administration of the treatment. Drawing on the medical files relating to the applicant\u2019s stays in that hospital, he pointed out that on 14 March 2013 the applicant had begun the chemotherapy without having received the radiotherapy recommended by the doctors in his department. He added that the chemotherapy session scheduled for between 28 and 30 March 2013 had not taken place because the applicant had been absent, having been transferred to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology for examinations. Lastly, he noted that on 18 September 2013 the applicant had arrived late at the hospital to continue his chemotherapy. Furthermore, when the applicant had been hospitalised, he had been guarded by two police officers and had remained handcuffed to the bed, even after he had become blind and deaf and was suffering extreme bone pain. 31.  In a report of 21 September 2015, the Ia\u015fi Regional Institute of Oncology pointed out that between 28 October and 1 November 2013, the applicant had had five radiotherapy sessions, had kept the medical appointments made and had been neither handcuffed nor immobilised during those sessions. 32.  In a report of 22 September 2015, the Bucharest Institute of Oncology pointed out that the applicant had been hospitalised several times in the institute between 27 November 2012 and 24 May 2013, primarily for chemotherapy. The institute\u2019s senior medical officer stated in the report that the applicant had duly respected all his medical appointments and that during his stays at the institute he had not been constrained but had been guarded by prison officers. 33.  According to the information provided by the prison authorities, the applicant had been held in Bac\u0103u Prison in a cell measuring 33 m2, which he had shared with six other prisoners. At Rahova Prison hospital he had shared a 38-m2 cell with four other prisoners. At Vaslui Prison, where he was held from 24 to 27 September, from 3 to 4 October and from 5 to 6 November 2013, he had occupied a 14.75-m2 cell with six other prisoners. At T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital he had been held in a 48-m2 cell with eight other prisoners. At Ia\u015fi Prison he had remained from 24 October to 5 November 2013 in a 15.92-m2 cell with three other prisoners.", "references": ["7", "8", "2", "6", "4", "3", "9", "5", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in St Petersburg. She is the mother of the late Mr Denis Aleksandrovich Vyrzhikovskiy. 6.  On 1 October 2010 police officers apprehended the applicant\u2019s son and his friend, Ms Z. and took them to the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of St Petersburg (\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0430). No record of their arrest was drawn up. 7.  For approximately six hours the applicant\u2019s son was ill-treated by police officers He was repeatedly punched in the stomach and hit to the head, right palm and both calves. He was also subjected to the so-called \u201cswallow\u201d method of torture (\u201c\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0430\u201d), with his head, hands and legs being pulled together towards the spine. 8.  Two police officers then took the applicant\u2019s son and Ms Z. to another police station. Ms Z. later testified to having seen a bruise on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy\u2019s forehead and to his having been in pain and having had difficulties getting into a police car. 9.  Early in the morning on 2 October 2010 Mr Vyrzhikovskiy was taken from the station to a hospital. He died there eight days later. An autopsy report stated that the cause of death was \u201ca severe fat pulmonary embolism aggravated by bronchopneumonia with cerebral edema resulted from a comminuted humeral head fracture with a tear of joint capsules and massive bruises, suffusion and strain of soft tissue and the subcutaneous fat layer.\u201d A pathologist also found the following ante mortem injuries on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy\u2019s body, all directly linked to his death: massive bruises covering hands, chest, upper back, neck, armpits and most of his face and ears; bruises on the left hip, right palm, right part of the stomach, right thigh, left knee, both calves; abrasions and bruises on the buttocks. All injuries had been inflicted by hard blunt objects. 10.  On 12 October 2010 criminal investigation was initiated. The applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Several police officers were charged with manslaughter and abuse of powers entailing a substantial violation of individual rights, committed using violence. 11.  On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant\u2019s son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death. 12.  On 2 March 2015 the investigation was suspended because the time\u2011limit for the investigation had expired and it was impossible to identify the perpetrators and to carry out any investigative measures in the absence of an accused. On 12 November 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg upheld that decision as lawful. The decision became final on 27 January 2016.", "references": ["2", "5", "4", "9", "8", "3", "7", "6", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and is detained in Nizhniy Tagil. 5.  On 20 January 2009 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of fraud. The authorised detention period was subsequently extended on several occasions. 6.  On 16 February 2010 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial. It directed the prosecution to remedy certain defects and extended the authorised period of the applicant\u2019s detention until 22 April 2010. 7.  On 21 April 2010 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court heard an appeal against that detention order and decided that the applicant could be released on bail. By a supplementary decision taken on the following day in the absence of the applicant and his representatives, the Regional Court fixed the time-limit for posting bail until 11 May 2010. On 29 April 2010 that decision was sent by fax to the remand prison where the applicant was held. He was however unable to post the bail because the District Court did not have a deposit account. The applicant remained in custody. 8.  On 12 May 2010 the District Court held that the applicant must be re-detained for his failure to comply with the bail conditions. It did not set any time-limit for the application of the custodial measure. 9.  On 2 June 2010 the Regional Court quashed the detention order, finding that the detention order had lacked a basis in fact. It annulled the custodial measure and ordered the applicant\u2019s release. 10.  The applicant was released on 4 June 2010. 11.  The conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in remand prison IZ-66/1 can be summarised as follows:\n(a)  Cell 622, from January to June 2009, measured 30 square metres and accommodated 20 to 25 persons who took turns to sleep; windows were not glazed; the toilet was not separated from the living area;\n(b)  Cell 129, June and July 2009, 9 square metres and 6 inmates;\n(c)  Cell 407, July 2009, 12 square metres and 12 to 14 inmates;\n(d)  Cell 408, August 2009 to April 2010, same as above;\n(e)  Cell 155, April 2010, 15 square metres;\n(f)  Cell 134, May 2010, 14 square metres for 8 inmates.", "references": ["4", "6", "1", "0", "8", "7", "3", "9", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant company was established in 1991 and has its registered office in Bratislava. It is the operator of two private television channels and the broadcaster of a television programme, JOJ PLUS. The present case concerns a commentary (glosa) delivered during a television programme broadcast on 12 April 2010 after the crash of the plane in which the late President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, had been travelling. 7.  The commentary\u2019s title was \u201cCompassion in Accordance with Protocol\u201d; the commentary contained the following:\n\u201cThe crash of a Polish plane carrying the presidential couple on board is a true human tragedy. The whole of Poland is in mourning and politicians are more or less expressing their condolences. That is required by diplomatic protocol. Thus, Slovak russophile politicians too shed a tear, albeit a forced one, over the death of the russophobe, Lech Kaczynski. Even ordinary citizens, not bound by any protocol, are expressing their sorrow. Jews, homosexuals, liberals, feminists and left\u2011oriented intellectuals are bitterly sorry for the death of a man who represented an extreme Polish conservativism, and who was a symbol of a country where people who are not white heterosexual Catholic Poles were born as a punishment. I am sorry, but I do not pity Poles. I envy them.\u201d 8.  Following the broadcast of the above-mentioned commentary, the Broadcasting Council (Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu) commenced administrative proceedings against the applicant company, pursuant to section 19(1)(a) of the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act (Law no. 308/2000 Coll., as amended - \u201cthe Broadcasting Act\u201d), on 25 May 2010. 9.  On 14 September 2010 the Broadcasting Council found that the applicant company had breached its obligations under the Broadcasting Act in that the manner of processing and presenting the content of the commentary had interfered with the dignity of the late Polish President, Lech Kaczynski. It fined the applicant company 5,000 euros (EUR). 10.  The Broadcasting Council assessed the conflict between the applicant company\u2019s freedom of expression and the protection of the human dignity of the late President. On the one hand, it acknowledged the aim of the commentator to express his opinion and his subjective stance on the social and political event through criticism, sarcasm and irony, which were inherent to journalistic expression. On the other hand, where the Broadcasting Council found difficulties was in particular the content of the last two sentences of the commentary (\u201cI am sorry, but I do not pity the Poles. I envy them\u201d). The Broadcasting Council concluded that the manner in which the commentator had presented his opinion \u2013 that is to say his lack of regret for the Polish President\u2019s death \u2013 had contravened the duty to respect his human dignity. According to the Broadcasting Council, the degree of sarcasm and irony in the broadcast commentary had been so high that its content and the manner in which the author\u2019s opinion had been presented had been sub\u2011standard and had dishonoured the late President. 11.  The Broadcasting Council noted that Mr Kaczynski, as President, was sufficiently recognisable as an \u201cindividual\u201d, which was a prerequisite for the applicability of the protection of the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of \u201cothers\u201d under section 19(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act. It concluded that by broadcasting the aforesaid commentary the applicant company had committed an administrative offence (spr\u00e1vny delikt) \u2013 in particular a breach of its duties under the said provision \u2013 and that imposing a fine on it in that respect was in order. It considered such a measure to be necessary in a democratic society, as it served a legitimate aim \u2013 that is to say the protection of the right to human dignity. 12.  On 10 March 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the Broadcasting Council\u2019s decision. It rejected the applicant company\u2019s argument that the Broadcasting Council had sanctioned it for voicing its political opinion. Rather, the Supreme Court confirmed the Broadcasting Council\u2019s conclusion about the defamatory character of the commentary in question and the interference with the late President\u2019s human dignity. 13.  The applicant company lodged a complaint before the Constitutional Court challenging the decisions of the Broadcasting Council and the Supreme Court under Articles 6 \u00a7 1 and 10 of the Convention and Articles 26 (freedom of expression) and 46 (right to judicial protection) of the Constitution.\nIt alleged that the decisions in question had been arbitrary, unfair and insufficiently reasoned and that their respective authors had breached its freedom of expression by sanctioning it for voicing its opinion regarding the late President as a politician. 14.  On 27 July 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s complaint. It considered, inter alia, that the above-mentioned authorities had duly explained their conclusions, without having overly strayed from a reasonable interpretation of the applicable rules and established practice. The Constitutional Court noted that the impugned commentary had expressed not only sarcasm and criticism of the late President\u2019s policy but also a positive attitude towards his death. This very fact had interfered with his right to respect for his human dignity, which led the Constitutional Court to conclude that the domestic authorities\u2019 decisions had not been arbitrary.\nAs to the applicant company\u2019s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention (and Article 26 of the Constitution), the Constitutional Court held that a general court could not bear \u201csecondary liability\u201d for a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of a substantive nature unless there had been a constitutionally relevant violation of procedural rules. Given that it had rejected the complaint concerning the alleged violation of procedural rules, it also had to reject the complaint relating to an alleged violation of a substantive provision.", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "3", "1", "2", "0", "7", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5.  On 13 May 2009 he was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On the following day the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded him in custody and set the time-limit until 12 July 2009. 6.  On 13 July 2009 the District Court granted a two-month extension of the detention period. However, on 31 July 2009 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court quashed the extension order as it had been issued outside the authorised detention period, and ordered the applicant\u2019s release. 7.  The applicant was not released. He was not allowed to leave the police ward and was re-arrested on the charge of theft. The arrest record mentioned the charge, without specifying when or where the theft had been committed or why the applicant was suspected of it. 8.  On 2 August 2009 the District Court adjourned the detention hearing for seventy-two hours, at the request from the applicant\u2019s counsel. On 4 August 2009 the District Court issued a detention order which did not set a time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention or give any assessment to the existence of a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d against the applicant.  On 2 September 2009 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9.  Further extensions of the applicant\u2019s detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a future period. 10.  On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant\u2019s appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11.  On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant\u2019s criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 12.  Throughout the trial the applicant was held in a metal cage. 13.  On 13 May 2010 the applicant was found guilty of theft and armed robbery and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. On 18 August 2010 the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 24 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother died. His request to be allowed to attend the funeral was rejected by the governor of the IZ-66/1 remand prison and upheld by the courts on the ground that remand prisoners did not have the benefit of a leave of absence under Russian law. When his father died on 5 November 2010, the director of the correctional colony in Sosnovoborsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region also refused his request for a short-term absence, on account of the funeral being held outside of the region where the colony was located. 15.  The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant\u2019s family lived.", "references": ["8", "6", "3", "9", "0", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6.  On 21 November 1994 the applicants were taken into police custody. Their statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. All the applicants confessed to having committed the crimes with which they had been charged. On 28 December 1994 they were remanded in custody. 7.  On 24 January 1995 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicants (except for Eyyup Ya\u015far), charging them under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 8.  On 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judges sitting on the bench of the State Security Courts were replaced by civilian judges. 9.  On 4 December 2001 the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged. 10.  On 20 November 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the convictions. 11.  State Security Courts were abolished on 16 June 2004 pursuant to Law no. 5190. The case was accordingly transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 12.  On 22 February 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court again convicted the applicants under Section 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 13.  On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the convictions.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "2", "9", "4", "6", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public event entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  The applicant is a human rights activist and a lawyer of an NGO, the Committee for Civil Rights (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430). On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to participate in the demonstration and during its dispersal kicked an unidentified police officer in the arm. After these events the applicant continued to live at his usual address and to pursue his normal activities, including taking part in authorised public events. 10.  On 25 July 2012 the applicant\u2019s flat was searched; the police seized the applicant\u2019s clothes, domestic and international passports, other documents and his computer. On the same day the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder on 6 May 2012. 11.  On 26 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 25 September 2012 on the following grounds:\n\u201cThe prosecution bodies suspect [the applicant] of having committed a serious offence punishable with imprisonment of over two years.\n... the court concludes that there are grounds to consider that [the applicant], if at liberty, is likely to abscond from the investigation and trial, to act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, to continue [his] criminal activity, to destroy evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation, which is at its initial phase.\nOperational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant\u2019s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and its environs, therefore, if at liberty, [he] might co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices.\n... No factual information excluding the detention of [the applicant] on health grounds has been submitted to the court. The court takes into account that [the applicant] may request medical assistance in the detention facility, if necessary ...\u201d 12.  The District Court dismissed an application by the applicant for an alternative preventive measure, such as house arrest, and stated that his state of health did not preclude him from detention. On 5 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 13.  On 2 August 2012 the applicant was charged with the offence laid down in Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence) and accused, in particular, of having kicked a police officer. 14.  On 24 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012, having found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. The District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of lack of medical assistance in the remand prison as unsubstantiated. It stated that the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. On 15 October 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 15.  On 31 October 2012 the Basmannyy District extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2013 on essentially the same grounds as earlier. On 26 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 16.  On 4 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new application for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant complained of exacerbation of chronic diseases in detention. He asked to be released on bail and presented personal guarantees from two prominent public figures, including a human-rights activist, who vouched for him. On the same day the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 July 2013. It considered that a milder preventive measure, including release on bail, would not prevent the applicant from obstructing the proper administration of justice. The applicant\u2019s allegations in respect of the deterioration of his health were dismissed; the court relied on the medical statement from the remand prison, according to which his health was satisfactory. On 17 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 17.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 18.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the seriousness of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that \u201cthe reasons which had initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The Moscow City Court upheld this extension order on 2 July 2013. 19.  On 2 August 2013 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court examined the supervisory appeal lodged by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation. It rectified the extension orders of 24 September and 31 October 2012, and 4 March and 6 June 2013 as well as the Moscow City Court\u2019s decision of 15 October 2012. The Presidium found that the applicant\u2019s detention had been unjustified and that the detention orders had not been supported by relevant facts; it also took account of his worsening health. The Presidium lifted the detention order and placed the applicant under the house arrest until 2 October 2013 under the following conditions: prohibition from leaving his house or changing his place of residence; prohibition from communicating with co-defendants and witnesses; prohibition from sending and receiving correspondence; prohibition from using any means of communication. On the same day the applicant was released from pre-trial detention. 20.  On 26 September 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s house arrest until 2 January 2014. It referred to the seriousness of the charges and considered that as a human-rights activist the applicant could communicate with different authorities and persons and thus obstruct the course of criminal proceedings. On 28 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld this decision on appeal. 21.  On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act, which exempted people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code from criminal liability. 22.  On 19 December 2013 the applicant applied for the termination of the criminal proceedings against him under the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretsky District Court granted his application and lifted the house arrest. 23.  Prior to his detention, the applicant was diagnosed with an organic lesion of the central nervous system, hypertensive syndrome, tonsillitis, chronic gastritis, atopic dermatitis, osteochondrosis and dorsopathy (back pain). According to the applicant, these diseases required regular medical supervision, diet and lifestyle adjustments. 24.  From 27 July 2012 to 2 August 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/2 in Moscow. Upon his admission to the prison he underwent a health check which revealed no health issues except atopic dermatitis and scoliosis. The applicant provided the detention facility with his medical records which stated his chronic ailments. 25.  On 31 August 2012 the applicant underwent a medical examination by a general practitioner (\u201cGP\u201d). He was diagnosed with vegetative-vascular dystonia, dorsopathy, osteochondrosis, kyphoscoliosis, and first- or second\u2011degree obesity. He received a prescription for a special diet limiting intake of fats and quickly-absorbed carbohydrates. 26.  The applicant was subsequently examined by a GP on 25 September, 19 October and 26 November 2012, and 24 January, 15 and 25 February, and 15 March 2013. The examinations revealed no negative dynamics in the state of the applicant\u2019s health; the prescriptions for the special diet were renewed each time. 27.  By letter of 2 November 2012 the head of the IZ-77/2 informed the applicant\u2019s father that chronic gastritis was not on the list of diseases which allow patients to receive additional nutrition. 28.  On 30 November 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the prison chief of the deterioration of his client\u2019s health, in particular, of his regular headaches, back pain and weight-gain. He alleged that the applicant had put on 20 kg over the five months in detention and requested an inpatient medical examination. 29.  On 31 January 2013 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and received a prescription for treatment in relation to vegetative-vascular dystonia. At the regular check-up by a GP on 15 February 2013 the applicant stated that his condition had improved; he was recommended to continue the prescribed treatment. 30.  On 14 February 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer reiterated his application for a medical examination and asked to give the applicant access to a gym. 31.  On 4 April 2013 a medical commission composed of a GP, an infection specialist, a surgeon and two administrators examined the applicant and his medical history. In addition to the previous diagnoses, they established chronic liver disorder and recommended that he continue the special diet. 32.  On 14 April 2013 the applicant was temporarily transferred to the medical wing of IZ-77/1. Upon his admission he was found to be suffering from second- or third-degree obesity (at this stage he weighed 109 kg and was 178 cm in height) and was prescribed the same diet as before. 33.  In IZ-77/1 the applicant underwent series of medical examinations and tests, including an abdominal ultrasound, a thyroid echography, an electrocardiogram, roentgenofluorography, X-ray examinations of his skull and spine, and blood tests. He was regularly examined by a GP who adjusted the treatment according to the results of the tests. The applicant also had a consultation with a dermatologist. 34.  The public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited the applicant on 17 and 24 April and 2 May 2013. According to the journal of their visits, the applicant did not complain of inadequate medical assistance in IZ-77/1. 35.  The discharge summary (\u0432\u044b\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0440\u0438\u0437) from the medical wing of IZ-77/1, issued on 17 May 2013, contained the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations. He was diagnosed with osteochondrosis, dorsopathy, fatty liver, hypercholesterolemia, vegetative-vascular dystonia, acne and first-degree obesity. The applicant received a prescription for physiotherapy and a special diet; he was also recommended to undergo a magnetic resonance imaging procedure in relation to a suspected cerebral condition, which had to be carried out in a different hospital equipped with the appropriate scanning device. On the same day the applicant was transferred back to IZ\u201177/2. 36.  On 6 July 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint about the authorities\u2019 failure to carry out his medical examination to the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 4 September 2013 the Tverskoy District Court refused to examine this complaint. 37.  The magnetic resonance imaging procedure had not been carried out before the applicant\u2019s release from the detention facility on 2 August 2013. 38.  After release the applicant had a medical examination at the town hospital and a consultation with a prominent gastroenterologist. The doctor confirmed the applicant\u2019s previous diagnoses related to the digestive system and prescribed him medical treatment, a special diet and physical exercise. 39.  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back was identical to that in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-73). 40.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 and at the end of July moved to hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms, as described in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74\u201176). From 2 August 2013 the applicant was no longer placed in the glass cabin owing to a change in the measure of restraint for him.", "references": ["4", "5", "3", "0", "6", "8", "7", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1961 and 1996 respectively and live in Mu\u011fla. 5. The first applicant was the husband and the second applicant was the son of Mrs \u00d6zlem G\u00fcrak\u0131n, who died on 3 September 2001. 6.  On an unspecified date, the applicants brought compensation proceedings against the Dokuz Eyl\u00fcl University Hospital, alleging that Mrs \u00d6zlem G\u00fcrak\u0131n had been a victim of medical negligence. The applicants further requested legal aid for the court fees. In respect of their legal aid claim, they submitted documents attesting to their poor financial situation. 7.  On 13 December 2006 the Izmir Administrative Court rejected the applicants\u2019 legal aid claim, without indicating any specific reasons. They were notified that they had to pay 1,683 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 870 Euros (EUR)) in court fees within one month to continue the proceedings and that failure to do so would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings. 8.  As the applicants failed to pay the court fees within the time-limit, the \u0130zmir Administrative Court sent a further warning letter to the applicants and ordered them to pay the court fees. 9.  On 6 April 2007 the applicants made a second request for legal aid and asked the court to reconsider its former decision. 10.  On 20 April 2007 the Izmir Administrative Court once again rejected the applicants\u2019 request and granted them one month to pay the court fees. 11.  On 12 July 2007 the court decided to discontinue the proceedings, because the applicants had not paid the necessary court fees.", "references": ["6", "5", "7", "0", "4", "2", "8", "1", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in Valuyki, the Belgorod region. 6.  On 14 June 2006 Ms I., a university student, disappeared. 7.  On 15 June 2006 her mother reported her missing to the Severnyy police department of the Kominternovskiy district of Voronezh, which initiated a search for her. According to the applicant, on the morning of 17 June 2006 the police searched his flat without drawing up a record. They then searched his car. According to police records, the applicant\u2019s car was searched between 10.10 and 11.20 a.m. that day in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance by an investigator of the Severnyy police department. 8.  After the search the applicant was taken to the Severnyy police department, where he was interviewed about I.\u2019s whereabouts. He stated that he knew I. and had last seen her on 14 June 2006 but was unaware of her whereabouts. A record of his \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) was drawn up by operative officer M. 9.  According to the applicant, police officers beat him up in order to extract information from him about I.\u2019s whereabouts. 10.  According to the Government, after being interviewed the applicant was released and later taken again to the police station. A record drawn up by operative officer M. states that at 9 p.m. on 17 June 2006 the applicant was taken in for committing petty hooliganism in the vicinity of the police station by swearing at passers-by. It is stated in the record that he had no injuries. According to a decision delivered by the acting head of the Severnyy police department in administrative proceedings conducted the same day, the applicant was found guilty of petty hooliganism and fined. At 11.50 p.m. that evening his administrative detention was ordered by the police. 11.  The applicant was detained at the Severnyy police department until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2006. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department, where further operative measures in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance were carried out. 12.  According to the applicant, he was subjected to beatings and given electric shocks by police officers of the Sovetskiy police department in order to make him give information about I.\u2019s whereabouts. He allegedly had a cap put on his head so that he could not see anything and was taken by car out of town, where he was beaten up and given electric shocks with wires attached to his little fingers. His mouth was taped so that he would not scream. When he was ready to give a statement in order to stop the torture, he was taken to a river bank and shown a dead body. He was thrown on the ground and kicked. When taken back to the Sovetskiy police department, he made a confession statement to an investigator in the presence of the same police officers who had ill\u2011treated him. 13.  According to the applicant\u2019s \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) given to investigator S. of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh on 19 June 2006, he confessed to the murder of I. by strangulation. He also stated that he had been beaten up and had received all his injuries at the Severnyy police department, but had not been subjected to any ill\u2011treatment at the Sovetskiy police department, and had no complaints against its officers. The applicant was then taken to the place where he had allegedly hidden I.\u2019s body. According to a record drawn up by investigator S., an examination of the place was carried out between 11 p.m. and midnight, and a woman\u2019s body was recovered. 14.  At 12.50 a.m. on 20 June 2006 investigator S. arrested the applicant as a suspect and questioned him between 1 and 1.50 a.m., and then between 11 and 11.15 a.m., in the presence of P., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator S. The applicant reiterated his earlier self\u2011incriminating statements, as well as the statements concerning his ill\u2011treatment at the Severnyy police department. He also stated that he had burnt I.\u2019s body after he had strangled her. Between 11.30 a.m. and 1.32 p.m. his statements were verified at the scene of the crime by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. and operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department. The applicant also showed where he had hidden the victim\u2019s mobile telephone. 15.  On 20 June 2006 investigator S. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. That day an operative officer of the Sovetskiy police department took him to the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Bureau. An expert recorded multiple bruises and abrasions on his face, head, trunk and upper and lower extremities. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted after his arrest on 17 June 2006 by police officers who had punched him in the head and different parts of his body and beaten him with a rubber baton on the back and legs. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object between one and three days before the examination. 16.  On 21 June 2006 the applicant was questioned as an accused by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. He confirmed his earlier self\u2011incriminating statements and statements concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment at the Severnyy police department. 17.  On the same day the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention at a hearing in the presence of lawyer P. He was placed in detention facility SIZO-36/1. In the criminal proceedings that followed the applicant was represented by a lawyer hired for him by his family. 18.  On 28 June 2006 investigator S. communicated the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the unlawful actions of the police officers from the Severnyy police department to the Kominternovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh. An investigator of that prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. His two decisions of 1 July and 2 August 2006 were annulled by his superiors on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry. 19.  In the most recent refusal of 29 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that the officers of the Severnyy police department had committed a crime, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements. On 17 June 2006 certain operative officers of the criminal search unit of the Severnyy police department carried out operational-search activities in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance. In order to check the applicant\u2019s involvement in I.\u2019s disappearance they took him to the Severnyy police department with his consent and interviewed him. After receiving his \u201cexplanation\u201d M. released him. That evening M. took him to the police station again for swearing on the street near the police station. From 9.50 p.m. on 17 June until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2006 the applicant was detained in a cell for administrative offenders. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department. No physical force was used against him, and no complaints were made by him. 20.  The investigator noted that on the two occasions the applicant had been taken to the Severnyy police department \u2013 first, for giving statements in relation to I.\u2019s disappearance, and second, for having committed the administrative offence \u2013 he had had no injuries. In the same decision the investigator suggested that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted by a third party outside the Severnyy police department, between 17 and 19 June 2006, between one and three days before his medical examination by the forensic expert on 20 June 2006. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant also complained about the unlawful actions of officers of the Sovetskiy police department, explaining that he had blamed the officers of the Severnyy police department for all his injuries for fear of reprisals from the officers of the Sovetskiy department, in whose hands he had been at the time. An investigator of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. His decision of 10 August 2006 was annulled by his superior as unlawful and unfounded. 22.  In the most recent refusal of 21 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed, the investigator found, relying on statements by the operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department, that the applicant had been taken to the station with his consent and had confessed to the murder of I. He had also shown where he had hidden her body voluntarily, without any coercion. 23.  An appeal by the applicant of 17 May 2007 against the investigators\u2019 decisions was not examined by the District Court because by that time he had been convicted by a final judgment, as was stated by the court in a letter of 4 June 2007. 24.  At his trial the applicant pleaded innocent and submitted that he had given the self-incriminating statements at the preliminary investigation stage as a result of physical coercion by officers of the Severnyy and Sovetskiy police departments. His counsel requested that the records of the investigative measures carried out on 19, 20 and 21 June 2006 be declared inadmissible, arguing, inter alia, that they had been obtained in the presence of lawyer P., who had been invited by investigator S. in breach of the relevant procedure and without the applicant\u2019s consent. 25.  The District Court dismissed the request, noting that all investigative measures since the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect on 20 June 2006 had been carried out in the presence of lawyer P. Moreover, there was no evidence that the applicant had rejected her services. Following his confession, recorded in his \u201cexplanation\u201d to the investigator of 19 June 2006, the applicant had shown where he had hidden I.\u2019s body, which had not required the presence of a lawyer. The court based its findings on the self\u2011incriminating statements given by the applicant in the preliminary investigation, noting that his allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody had been examined and dismissed by the Sovetskiy and Kominternovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s offices in decisions of 21 and 29 September 2006 respectively. 26.  On 25 October 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. 27.  On 30 November 2006 the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association examined a disciplinary case against lawyer P. which originated in a complaint by the applicant. It found that P. had defended the applicant at investigator S.\u2019s direct invitation, surpassing the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association in breach of the relevant procedure. P. was subjected to disciplinary liability in the form of a warning. On 5 December 2006 the Council informed the applicant of its decision, explaining that there was nothing to suggest that P. had failed to properly defend the applicant. However, it had established a breach of the procedure for providing legal assistance at the invitation of the investigating authorities. 28.  On 6 February 2007 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the judgment on an appeal by the applicant, fully endorsing the trial court\u2019s findings. 29.  Applications by the applicant for supervisory review of his case were dismissed by the Regional Court.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "9", "7", "8", "4", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959. He is currently detained at S\u0103poca Psychiatric Hospital, in a section of the hospital located in the municipality of Ojasca (Buz\u0103u County). 6.  The applicant has been in receipt of a second-degree disability allowance since 1993. 7.  On 29 January 2001, following the publication of an article in the national press and a programme broadcast on a national television channel, the police operating at Bucharest police station no. 20 initiated a criminal prosecution against the applicant. He was charged with incest and sexual corruption of his two under-age daughters, aged 15 and 16. He was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with his elder daughter and forced both his daughters to be present while he was having sexual intercourse with his wife. 8.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by the police in the presence of an officially appointed lawyer regarding the charges against him, before being placed in police custody for twenty-four hours. 9.  On 30 April 2001 the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer, was questioned by a prosecutor concerning the same charges. 10.  On the same day the prosecution, with reference to Article 114 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Penal Code (CP), ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional detention in a psychiatric hospital with a view to conducting a medical examination to assess his capacity for discernment. The prosecution noted in that regard that a paranoid affective psychosis diagnostic had been posited on several occasions between 1994 and 1999. It stated the following:\n\u201c... in the present case there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of the precarious state of health of the accused, who represents an extremely serious danger to society given that he is liable to commit further such antisocial acts.\u201d 11.  On the same day the applicant was admitted to the Alexandru Obregia Psychiatric Hospital in Bucharest. He underwent psychiatric examinations which found, inter alia, paranoid impulsive tendencies with high conflict potential. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s state was described as comprising irritability, suspicion, interpretative tendencies and potential aggression. 12.  A forensic medical report was drawn up on 2 November 2001 establishing that the applicant suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and lack of discernment. It recommended putting in place the compulsory medical treatment provided for by Article 113 CP. 13.  A preliminary investigation was also instigated against the applicant for the rape of his wife. 14.  The prosecution heard the applicant\u2019s wife and two daughters. 15.  By decision of 27 February 2002 the prosecution, in the absence of a medical certificate and since the applicant\u2019s daughter had not confirmed the sexual relations with her father, ordered the closure of the criminal proceedings against the applicant for incest. Drawing on the statements of his two daughters, it also concluded that the applicant had forced them to be present while he was having sexual intercourse with his wife, thus committing offences of sexual corruption of minors, but decided to close the proceedings on that count owing to the applicant\u2019s lack of discernment, as found in the forensic medical report of 2 November 2001 (see paragraph 12 above). The prosecution further dropped the rape charge on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s wife had not lodged a criminal complaint against him. Lastly, it referred the case file to the competent court for confirmation of the preventive measure of medical detention. 16.  By decision of 22 April 2002 Bucharest District Court 6 upheld the medical detention order. Listing the criminal charges against the applicant, the court stated the following:\n\u201cIn the light of the findings of the psychiatric forensic medical report that N. suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and lacks discernment as regards the offences he committed, and having regard to the recommendations of the [reporting] committee that the preventive detention measure should be imposed on the accused, the court accedes to the [prosecution\u2019s] request and, pursuant to Article 114 CP, confirms the provisional medical detention order and informs the Bucharest Health Department of the implementation of that order.\u201d 17. The applicant did not attend the hearing, nor was he represented by a lawyer in court. 18.  The decision was posted on the door to the applicant\u2019s home and in the town hall of Bucharest District 6, where the applicant\u2019s home was located. 19.  From 30 January 2001 to 20 January 2003 the applicant was detained in the Alexandru Obregia Psychiatric Hospital. On 21 January 2003 he was transferred to the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital, where he remained until 29 January 2006. The applicant was provided with a neuroleptic- and tranquilliser-based treatment.\n... 32.  In March 2007, after the entry into force of the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) requiring periodic and automatic judicial review of the detention (see paragraph 90 below), the judge of Buz\u0103u District Court (\u201cthe delegated judge\u201d) ordered a psychiatric forensic medical report. 33.  In July 2007 the competent medical board drew up a report based on the results of an examination of the applicant, the medical documentation transmitted by the psychiatric hospital, the report by his GP, a social welfare inquiry concerning the applicant conducted on 3 May 2006, the 22 April 2002 decision of Bucharest District Court 6 and the forensic medical report of 2 November 2001.\nThe board found that during his detention the applicant had expressed delusions of grandeur with transient psychotic relapses, had endeavoured to conceal his symptoms, had behaved in a calm, composed manner, had accepted his treatment, had refrained from stirring up trouble with the other patients and had shown little hostility during the treatment. It pointed out, however, that he had been hostile during the examination and had expressed delusional ideas of injustice and his intention to remedy the latter. It concluded that the applicant was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that, having regard to the medical documentation, to the evolution in the patient\u2019s condition during his detention and to the psychiatric examination in issue, the detention measure should remain in place. 34.  On 15 August 2007 the delegated judge invited Buz\u0103u District Court to replace the detention measure provided for in Article 114 CP with the compulsory medical treatment measure provided for in Article 113 CP. 35.  On 11 September 2007 the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer, was heard by the court. He requested his release, seconded by his lawyer. 36.  By decision of the same day, Buz\u0103u District Court decided to order the applicant\u2019s continued psychiatric detention. It reasoned as follows:\n\u201cBy Criminal Decision No. 588 of 22 April 2002, Bucharest District Court 6 ordered N.\u2019s medical detention on the grounds that he had been charged with having committed the offence of incest, consisting of sexual relations with his 16-year-old daughter, in 2000, and the offence of sexual corruption on the grounds that on 21 January 2001 he had sexual intercourse with his wife in the presence of his two daughters.\nThe psychiatric forensic medical report [of July 2007] shows that the patient suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and points to the advisability of maintaining the preventive detention measure laid down in Article 114 CP.\nHaving regard to the foregoing, the court ... decides to maintain the medical detention measure (Article 114 CP) imposed on patient N.\u201d 37.  The applicant took cognisance of that decision in summer 2008, when he underwent a further forensic medical examination. He appealed. 38.  By final decision of 19 December 2008 Buz\u0103u County Court, referring to the reasoning of the Court of First Instance, dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill-founded after having heard the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer. 39.  The applicant\u2019s detention measure was made subject to several judicial reviews by Buz\u0103u District Court and Buz\u0103u County Court. It transpires from the decisions adopted, of which the Court has copies, that the applicant was heard by both courts during the different sets of proceedings. 40.  He was assisted by various officially appointed lawyers, who, in the proceedings completed before 2016, had confined themselves to referring to the findings of the forensic medical assessments carried out, and had either left it to the discretion of the courts whether or not to maintain the measure or objected to the lifting thereof. 41.  Apart from the decisions adopted after 2015, the case file does not indicate whether the prior decisions had been served on the applicant. 42.  According to the forensic medical reports drawn up after each review, the applicant, who had not fully acknowledged the fact of his mental illness, had been calm, had not refused his treatment and had refrained from causing trouble with the other patients. On the other hand, the reports stated that he had vehemently denied having committed the criminal offences with which he had been charged, claiming that his former wife had been plotting against him. 43.  By decision of 13 October 2008 Buz\u0103u District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. The court referred to the 22 April 2002 decision and to a forensic medical report drawn up following an examination of the applicant in May 2008, which had recommended maintaining the measure. On 9 January 2009, on appeal from the applicant, Buz\u0103u County Court upheld that decision. 44.  By decision of 18 February 2010 Buz\u0103u District Court dismissed a request submitted by the applicant for the lifting of the detention measure. The court referred to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant the same month, which had recommended maintaining the measure and described the applicant\u2019s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a new State, his lack of feasible future plans and the fact that he had not fully accepted his drug therapy. 45.  By decision of 1 April 2010 Buz\u0103u District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. It referred to the decision of 22 April 2002 to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant in December 2009, insofar as it recommended maintaining the measure and described the applicant\u2019s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a new State and his lack of realistic future plans. 46.  Furthermore, although this aspect was not mentioned by the court, it transpires from that report that the applicant\u2019s GP had noted an erotomaniac obsession with his former wife, which had indicated a total incapacity for social reintegration and would most likely have triggered conflicts or unforeseeable, potentially dangerous situations had he returned to the apartment where he had lived with his family. The report further noted that the applicant\u2019s friend, who had attended most of the medical boards\u2019 meetings, had come down emphatically in favour of the applicant\u2019s release, claiming that he would accommodate him indefinitely in the apartment which he shared with his mother. However, the assessment board doubted the reality of such support proffered by someone who was himself suffering from psychiatric problems. On the other hand, the report mentioned that the applicant had been plainly rejected by his daughters and his former wife, and that despite the rejection by his former wife and the fact that he himself considered that his detention was the result of scheming on her part, he intended to get back together with her if he was released. 47.  By decision of 22 April 2010 the Buz\u0103u Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant\u2019s second application for release on the grounds that its decision of 18 February 2010 had meanwhile become final and was therefore res judicata. During the proceedings a forensic medical report had been drawn up on 9 March 2010, reaching conclusions similar to the findings of the report submitted in December 2009 (see paragraph 45 above). 48.  In November 2010, May and November 2011 and April 2012 the delegated judge requested the Buz\u0103u Institute of Forensic Medicine to carry out psychiatric assessments with a view to periodic reviews of the need to maintain the applicant\u2019s psychiatric detention. 49.  The Institute of Forensic Medicine examined the applicant on the aforementioned dates but did not draw up or forward its reports until November 2013. The reports confirmed the diagnosis of the applicant\u2019s condition and proposed maintaining the detention measure. 50.  By four separate decisions adopted on 17 and 19 December 2013, the Court of First Instance, citing the case-law of the Court in matters of detention of persons suffering from mental disorders, maintained the detention measure. It referred to the findings of the above-mentioned forensic medical reports. In its decision of 17 December 2013 the court further had regard to a forensic medical report drawn up following an examination of the applicant carried out a few days previously, in December 2013. Furthermore, it referred, broadly, to the \u201caim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law\u201d, and concluded that the criteria set out in Article 434 \u00a7 1 CPP had been satisfied. 51.  By three separate decisions adopted on 4 February 2014, Buz\u0103u District Court maintained the applicant\u2019s detention measure on the basis of three psychiatric forensic medical reports drawn up following examinations of the applicant in November 2012, May 2013 and November 2013. The Court has not received copies of those reports and decisions. 52.  On 1 July 2014 S\u0103poca Psychiatric Hospital applied to the courts to declare the applicant incapable and place him under guardianship (see paragraph 77 et seq. below for the conduct of the related proceedings). 53.  By decision of 19 February 2015, citing the Court\u2019s case-law in matters of detention of persons suffering from mental disorders, Buz\u0103u District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. It referred to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant in September 2014, which recommended maintaining the measure and referred to the \u201caim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law\u201d. 55.  In April 2015 the applicant appealed to the Judicial Inspection Board of the Higher Council of the Judiciary against the alleged practice of Buz\u0103u District Court of conducting retrospective reviews of the need to maintain the detention measure. By decision of 15 June 2015 the Judicial Inspection Board dropped the applicant\u2019s complaint. It confirmed the existence of the practice criticised by the applicant, but pointed out that it had been caused by the medical authorities\u2019 delay in forwarding their expert reports and not in any breach by the judges of their attributions. 56.  On 3 September 2015 the delegated judge requested the Buz\u0103u Institute of Forensic Medicine to conduct a further psychiatric expert assessment with a view to periodically reviewing the need to maintain the applicant\u2019s psychiatric detention. The applicant filed a separate action seeking the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment measure. 57.  On 23 September 2015 the Forensic Medical Board also examined the applicant. The applicant\u2019s lawyer representing him in the present application before the Court sent a reasoned letter to the Board strongly advocating the replacement of the measure implemented in respect of his client. 58.  On 1 October 2015 the Board drew up its forensic medical report recommending the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment measure. It emphasised that the persistence of the applicant\u2019s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a \u201cnew State\u201d and his lack of social and family support, a factor conducive to social reintegration, supervision of his medical treatment and the management of the applicant\u2019s daily needs relating to the purported \u201cnew State\u201d, had justified maintaining the detention up until then. It noted that the applicant had not been aggressive to others or to himself during his detention. In that context, it welcomed the steps taken by S\u0103poca Hospital to place the applicant under guardianship, which it considered appropriate in the perspective of his release, given that the applicant had been rejected by his family (his brother, sister, former wife and daughters). Finally, the Board recommended that the social welfare services of the applicant\u2019s district of residence should be informed that they had to take the necessary action with a view to releasing him. 59.  On 22 October 2015 Buz\u0103u District Court, which was responsible for the review, ordered a fresh forensic medical report from the National Institute of Forensic Medicine (IFM) in Bucharest. 61.  On 12 April 2016 the IFM submitted its expert report, which stated, in particular, that:\n\u2013  the applicant was suffering from chronic delusional disorder with no prospect of improvement, but rather with future aggravation of the illness due to aging;\n\u2013  the illness as manifested in the applicant did not point to any risk of a danger to society, but the lack of feasible plans for the future foreshadowed future conflicts, a risk of advanced social deterioration and the impossibility of monitoring the evolution of his illness;\n\u2013  the applicant lacked any social support from his family or other persons of trust.\nUnder those conditions, the forensic medical board pointed out that the case presented a genuine psychiatric and deontological dilemma. Indeed, it considered that although, from the psychiatric point of view, the applicant could be released subject to compulsory medical treatment on the basis of Article 109 CP, that measure was inconceivable in the absence of social support. Consequently, it proposed provisionally maintaining the detention until the social welfare services could transfer the applicant to a specialised institution capable of providing him with appropriate living conditions and treatment. 62.  By decision of 27 May 2016 the Buz\u0103u Court of First Instance, referring to the findings of the 12 April 2016 forensic medical rapport (see paragraph 61 above), ordered the maintenance of the detention measure. 63.  The applicant appealed to Buz\u0103u District Court against that decision. He was represented by an officially appointed lawyer, who argued that the applicant\u2019s wishes should be complied with. Questioned by the court, the applicant stated that he would live with his former wife and one of his daughters in their apartment. He added that he had a retirement pension. 64.  By judgment of 29 August 2016 Buz\u0103u County Court upheld the 27 May 2016 decision. It held as follows:\n\u201cGiven the absence of improvement in the patient\u2019s state of health and the fact that the members of his family cannot monitor his continued medical treatment, and having regard to the nature of the charges against him which had resulted in his medical detention, family members against whom [the applicant] has committed antisocial acts cannot be expected to cohabit with him.\nNevertheless, the director of the establishment [where the applicant is detained] must inform the social welfare services responsible for transferring [the applicant] to a specialised institution capable of providing proper living conditions and treatment.\u201d\n(b) Measures taken by the national administrative and hospital authorities 65.  On 6 September 2016 the Director of S\u0103poca Hospital invited the Directorate General of Social Assistance and Child Welfare (\u201cDGASPC\u201d) in Bucharest District 6 to adopt welfare measures in respect of the applicant pursuant to the instructions set out in the forensic medical report of 12 April 2016. 66.  By letter of 29 September 2016 the DGASPC replied that the applicant\u2019s former wife had informed it that she did not intend to be involved in any way in the process leading up to the applicant\u2019s release. Furthermore, the DGASPC pointed out that it had contacted the social welfare services in the county of residence of the applicant\u2019s sister with an eye to his possible placement with her. It also stated that the only centre in Bucharest District 6 which took in persons suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders could not admit the applicant owing to a lack of available places. Finally, it explained that it had also unsuccessfully attempted to contact other specialised and residential centres. 67.  On 15 November 2016 the Director of S\u0103poca Hospital contacted the municipality of Unguriu, which had meanwhile been assigned the guardianship of the applicant .... The Director informed the municipal authorities the implementation of the preventive detention measure was temporary, and that they were required to act in the interests of the applicant, particularly with a view to his possible placement in a specialised institution after his release. 68.  On 21 November 2016 Unguriu municipality replied that the guardianship order was not yet final and that it therefore could not act in respect of the applicant. 70.  The forensic medical report drawn up on 25 January 2017 recommended replacing the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment order in view of the applicant\u2019s \u201clow level of dangerousness (while on treatment), compliance with the rules, absence of incidents, [and] the lengthy period of supervision\u201d. The report mentioned in particular:\n\u2013  the existence of a single, strange and systematic delusionary theme concerning the creation of a \u201cunited Somali State\u201d, which delusion did not however alter his compliance with hospital rules;\n\u2013  lack of conflict situations and of incidents pointing to potentially aggressive behaviour;\n\u2013  proper therapeutic cooperation during detention, despite his purely formal acquiescence in the reality of his illness and need for treatment;\n\u2013  absence of antisocial precedents \u2013 apart from the acts noted during his placement in detention \u2013 or consumption of psychoactive substances (drugs, alcohol);\n\u2013  negative effect of the extension of detention for social reasons on the development of the applicant\u2019s illness and physiological state, and\n\u2013  the guardianship order.\nThe report nevertheless emphasised the risk of decompensation of the illness, involving possible negative social consequences should the aftercare provided to the applicant by the body assigned guardianship prove inadequate. 71.  On 21 February 2017 the applicant was heard by Buz\u0103u District Court. He was represented by an officially appointed lawyer, who advocated replacing the detention measure. 72.  By final decision given on the same day, Buz\u0103u District Court ordered the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory treatment order until the applicant had made a full recovery. It referred to the forensic medical report of 25 January 2017 (see paragraph 70 above) and to the \u201caim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law\u201d.\nb)  Measures taken by the national administrative and hospital authorities 74.  On 8 March 2017 the lawyer representing the applicant before the Court sent a letter to S\u0103poca Hospital recommending, in the framework of enforcement of the decision of 21 February 2017, the applicant\u2019s ultimate reintegration into society rather than his placement in a residential centre. He emphasised that releasing the applicant without adequate support would condemn him to vagrancy, destitution and the deterioration of his physical and mental health. Lastly, he requested the setting up of an interdisciplinary commission responsible for identifying the action to be taken on the applicant, on the model of the efforts expended in other countries to deinstitutionalise persons in medical detention. 75.  On 9 March 2017 the applicant was transferred to another section of the same hospital for persons suffering from chronic illnesses. 76.  On 14 March 2017 the Director of S\u0103poca Hospital invited la DGASPC to implement assistance measures in respect of the applicant pursuant to the final decision ordering the replacement of the detention measure. It also attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact two foundations in Bucharest for the same purpose.\n...", "references": ["5", "6", "1", "7", "4", "3", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  In May 2008 the first applicant turned to the child welfare authorities because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation: she did not have a permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents, the fourth and fifth applicants. 6.  When the first applicant was twenty-eight weeks\u2019 pregnant she visited the local hospital and requested a late abortion. On 1 July 2008 the hospital sent a notice to the child welfare authorities indicating that the applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and follow-up with regard to motherhood. It also indicated that she needed to stay at a parent-child institution (\u201cfamily centre\u201d). The child welfare authorities opened a case with the first applicant\u2019s consent. She agreed to stay at a family centre for three months after the child was born, so that her ability to give the child adequate care could be evaluated. 7.  On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to a son, X, the second applicant. The identity of X\u2019s father was unknown to the authorities and the first applicant refused to reveal his name. Four days later, on 29 September 2008, the first applicant and X moved to the family centre. For the first five days the fourth applicant (X\u2019s grandmother) also stayed with them. The staff soon became concerned about the first applicant\u2019s parenting abilities and X\u2019s development. On 14 October 2008 they asked for an emergency meeting with the child welfare authorities because X had lost a lot of weight and the first applicant did not show any understanding of his needs. 8.  On 17 October 2008 the first applicant withdrew her consent to stay at the family centre. She wanted to leave and take X with her. On the same day the child welfare authorities decided to take X into immediate compulsory care and place him in a foster home on an emergency basis. In the decision they stated that the family centre\u2019s staff had had to check on the family every third hour to make sure that X was receiving enough food. Without those checks, they doubted whether X would have survived. After the placement, the first applicant had weekly half-hour visits with X. The fourth applicant (the grandmother) was present at most of the visits, the fifth (the grandfather) at some of them. 9.  The first applicant appealed against the decision of the child welfare authorities to the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker), claiming that she and X could live together with her parents. Her mother, the fourth applicant, was staying at home and was willing to help take care of X. They were also willing to accept help from the child welfare authorities. 10.  On 23 October 2008 the family centre drew up a report of the first and second applicants\u2019 stay. The report stated, inter alia:\n\u201cThe mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner. During the time the mother and child have stayed [at the family centre] ..., the staff here ... have been very concerned that the child\u2019s needs are not being met. In order to ensure that the child\u2019s primary needs for care and food are met, the staff has intervened and followed-up the child closely day and night.\nThe mother is not able to meet the boy\u2019s practical care needs. She has not taken responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner. The mother has needed guidance at a very basic level, and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several times.\nThroughout the stay, the mother has made statements that we find very worrying. She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son, and has several times expressed disgust with the child. The mother has demonstrated very little understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control.\nThe mother\u2019s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care. Her ability to provide practical care must be seen in light of this. The mother\u2019s mental health is marked by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other people. The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need.\nOur assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child. We are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow-up. As we have verbally communicated to the child welfare service, we believe it to be important that the mother is taken especially closely care of in the time following the emergency placement.\nThe mother is vulnerable. She should be offered a psychological assessment and treatment, and probably needs help to find motivation for this. The mother should have an individual plan to ensure follow-up in several areas. The mother has resources (cf. the abilities tests) that she needs help to make good use of.\u201d 11.  On 26 October 2008 the County Social Welfare Board rejected the appeal (see paragraph 9 above). It concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the daily care of X, not the fourth applicant, and that the first applicant was unable to provide the care that X needed. Furthermore, the fourth applicant had stayed with the first applicant and X during the first days at the family centre, but had not noticed the first applicant\u2019s lack of parenting skills, even though it had been obvious to the staff. 12.  On 27 October 2008 X was sent to a child psychiatry clinic for an evaluation. The team at the clinic carried out six different observations between 3 and 24 November 2008. Their conclusions were set out in a report dated 5 December 2008, which read, inter alia:\n\u201c[X] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for evaluation and observations. Today he is functioning as a normal two-month-old baby, and has the possibility of a good normal development. He has, from what can be observed, been a child at high risk. For vulnerable children the lack of response and confirmation, or other interferences in interaction, can lead to more or less serious psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not get other corrective relationship experiences. The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive development. [X] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development now.\u201d 13.  The first applicant appealed against the Board\u2019s decision of 26 October 2008 to the City Court (tingrett) which, on 26 January 2009, upheld it in full. In the judgment the court found that X had shown signs of both psychological and physical neglect when he was taken into local authority care. Moreover, it did not find that the first applicant\u2019s abilities to take care of X had improved or that the support of the fourth and fifth applicants would be sufficient to ensure that X was given adequate care. The first applicant did not appeal to the High Court. 14.  Following the judgment by the City Court on 26 January 2009, the local authorities applied to the County Social Welfare Board for a care order, submitting that the first applicant lacked parenting skills. 15.  On 2 March 2009 the Board accepted the child welfare authorities\u2019 application. X remained in the foster home where he had already been placed on an emergency basis in October 2008, when first taken into care (see paragraph 8 above). The Board also decided that contact rights for the first applicant should be fixed at six two-hour visits per year, under supervision. It concluded, on the basis of the report from the family centre, that if X were returned to the first applicant, there would be serious deficiencies in both the physical and psychological caregiving, which could not be remedied with assistance measures. For those reasons the Board found that it would be in the best interests of X to be placed in care. 16.  The first applicant appealed against the Board\u2019s decision and again submitted that the authorities had not tried to intervene in other ways before immediately taking X into care, and that the decision was based on insufficient evidence. 17.  On 19 August 2009 the City Court overturned the Board\u2019s decision and decided that X should be reunited with the first applicant, but that there was a need for a readjustment period. It found, inter alia, that X\u2019s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye infection. 18.  As a consequence of the judgment, the first applicant\u2019s visits with X were increased with the goal of reunification. According to the child welfare authorities, the visits were characterised by hostility from the first applicant and her parents towards the foster mother. The authorities claimed that after the visits, X had reacted strongly, he had become tired, anxious and insecure, and his sleeping patterns had changed. 19.  The child welfare authorities appealed against the City Court\u2019s judgment and concurrently applied for its implementation to be suspended. They claimed that it was unlikely that the eye infection could have been the reason for X\u2019s slow weight gain. Moreover, the first applicant had had visits with X, but they had not worked well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them. X had had strong reactions after the visits. 20.  On 8 September 2009, the City Court decided to suspend enforcement of its judgment until the High Court had adjudicated the case. 21.  On 9 October 2009, the child welfare authorities decided to appoint two experts, a psychologist, B.S., and a family therapist, E.W.A., who submitted their report on 20 February 2010 (see paragraph 29 below). 22.  Meanwhile, on 12 October 2009, the High Court (lagmannsrett) granted leave to appeal on the ground that the ruling of, or the procedure in, the City Court had been seriously flawed (see paragraph 66 below). It also upheld the City Court\u2019s decision to suspend the implementation of the judgment. 23.  On 3 March 2010, the High Court appointed an expert to assess the case, psychologist M.S., who also submitted a report. 24. In its judgment of 22 April 2010, the High Court confirmed the Board\u2019s decision that X should be taken into compulsory care. It also reduced the first applicant\u2019s contact rights to four two-hour visits per year. 25.  The High Court had regard to the information in the report produced by the family centre on 23 October 2008 (see paragraph 10 above). It also took account of the family consultant\u2019s testimony before the court, in which it had been stated that the first applicant\u2019s mother had lived with her at the family centre for the first four nights. It went on to state:\n\u201cIt was particularly after this time that concerns grew about the practical care of the child. The agreement was that [the first applicant] was to report all nappy changes etc. and meals, but she did not. The child slept more than they were used to. [The family consultant] reacted to the child\u2019s breathing and that he was sleeping through meals. Due to weight loss, he was to be fed every three hours around the clock. Sometimes, the staff had to pressure the mother into feeding her son.\u201d 26.  The High Court found that the family centre had made a correct evaluation and \u2013 contrary to the City Court \u2013 considered it very unlikely that the evaluation would have been different if X had not had an eye infection. 27.  Furthermore, the High Court referred to the report of 5 December 2008 from the child psychiatry clinic (see paragraph 12 above). It also took into account the report of the court-appointed expert, M.S. (see paragraph 23 above). 28.  As the stay at the family centre had been short, the High Court found it appropriate to consider the first applicant\u2019s behaviour (\u201cfungering\u201d) during the contact sessions that had been organised subsequent to X\u2019s placement in foster care. Two persons had been entrusted with the task of supervising the sessions, and both had written reports, none of which had been positive. The High Court stated that one of the supervisors had given an \u201coverall negative description of the contact sessions\u201d. 29.  The High Court also referred to the report of the psychologist and the family therapist appointed by the child welfare authorities (see paragraph 21 above). They had assessed X in relation to the reactions that he had shown after visits from the first applicant. In their report, they noted, inter alia:\n\u201cthere does not seem to be much contact between the mother and [X], including in the periods with frequent contact sessions. He turns away from his mother and prefers to seek contact with others. He tries to distance and protect himself by protesting against his mother, by refusing to eat, by not looking at her and then seeking out the person to whom he has a secure attachment, namely his foster mother. [X] becomes uncertain and insecure when he is not \u2018read\u2019 and understood.\n...\n... the biggest source of stress for [X] is probably not meeting his mother and her extended family during the contact sessions in itself, but the amount of contact and the pressure arising from [utterances to the effect that] \u2018now you\u2019re coming back home\u2019, and an atmosphere dominated by the mother\u2019s hostility towards the foster mother. It is also a problem that the mother makes negative and offensive statements about the foster mother, so that the atmosphere becomes unpleasant and insecure. It is concluded that [X] has reached his tolerance threshold for contact on the occasions when he has fallen asleep immediately once the contact session is over, when he has cried afterwards, been difficult to regulate and calm down, and had difficulties sleeping.\u201d 30.  Furthermore, the High Court noted that the court-appointed psychologist, M.S. (see paragraph 23 above), stated in court that the contact sessions had appeared to be so negative that she was of the opinion that the mother should not have right of access to her son. The contact sessions were, in her view, \u201cnot constructive for the child\u201d. In conclusion to the question of the first applicant\u2019s competence as a carer, she stated in her report that the stay at the family centre had illustrated that the first applicant \u201chad problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her behaviour\u201d. She went on to state:\n\u201cIt is not a question of a lack of willingness, but of an inadequate ability to plan, organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect.\u201d 31.  The High Court agreed with the conclusion of expert M.S., before proceeding to the question whether assistance measures could sufficiently remedy the shortcomings in the first applicant\u2019s lack of parenting skills. In that respect, it noted that the reasons for the deficiencies in competence as a carer were crucial. The High Court referred at this point to the expert\u2019s elaboration on the first applicant\u2019s medical history, namely how she had suffered from serious epilepsy since childhood and until brain surgery had been carried out in 2009, when the first applicant had been 19 years old. 32.  The High Court noted that expert M.S. had also pointed out that the first applicant\u2019s medical history must necessarily have affected her childhood in several ways. Her summary as regards the illness and its consequences read as follows:\n\u201cAnamnestic information from the school, the specialist health service and the family provides an overall picture of weak learning capacity and social functioning from early childhood into adulthood. [The first applicant] performed poorly at school despite good framework conditions, considerable extra resources and good efforts and motivation on her own part. It is therefore difficult to see any other explanation for her performance than general learning difficulties caused by a fundamental cognitive impairment. This is underlined by her consistently low IQ score \u2013 regardless of the epilepsy surgery. She also had problems with socio-emotional functioning, which has also been a recurring topic in all documents that deal with [the first applicant\u2019s] childhood and adolescence. A lack of social skills and social adaptation is reported, primarily related to social behaviour that is not adequate for her age (\u2018childish\u2019) and poor impulse control. It is also stated that [the first applicant] has been very reserved and had low self-confidence, which must be seen in conjunction with her problems.\u201d 33.  The High Court based its assessment on the description of expert M.S. concerning the first applicant\u2019s health problems and the impact they had had on her social skills and development. It further noted that placement at a family centre (see paragraphs 7-8 above) had been attempted as an assistance measure. The stay had been supposed to last for three months, but had been interrupted after just under three weeks. As a condition for staying longer, the first applicant had demanded a guarantee that she be allowed to take her son home with her after the stay. The child welfare authorities could not give such a guarantee, and the first applicant had therefore returned home on 17 October 2008. 34.  The High Court noted that relevant assistance measures were assumed to consist of a supervisor and further help and training in how to care for children. However, the High Court found that it would take so long to provide the first applicant with sufficient training that it was not a real alternative to continued foster-home placement. Furthermore, the result of such training was uncertain. In this connection, the High Court attached weight to the fact that both the first applicant and her immediate family had said that they did not want follow-up or assistance if X was returned to them. It agreed with the conclusions of the court-appointed expert, M.S., who had stated in her report:\n\u201cIn my assessment, there are grounds for claiming that there were serious deficiencies in the care the child received from the mother, and also serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security he needed according to his age and development. [The first applicant\u2019s] cognitive impairment, personality functioning and inadequate ability to mentalise make it impossible to have a normal conversation with her about the physical and psychological needs of small children. Her assessments of the consequences of having the child returned to her care and what it will demand of her as a parent are very limited and infantile, with her own immediate needs, there and then, as the most predominant feature. It is therefore found that there is a risk of such deficiencies (as mentioned above) continuing if the child were to live with his mother. It is also found that satisfactory conditions for the child cannot be created with the mother by means of assistance measures under the Act relating to Child Welfare Services, section 4-4 (e.g. relief measures in the home or other parental support measures), due to a lack of trust and a reluctance to accept interference from the authorities \u2013 taking the case history into consideration.\u201d 35.  The High Court\u2019s conclusions in its judgment of 22 April 2010 was that a care order was necessary and that assistance measures for the mother would not be sufficient to allow the son to stay with her. The conditions for issuing a care order under the second paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act were thus met (see paragraph 65 below). In this connection, the High Court also gave weight to the attachment that X had formed to his foster parents, particularly the foster mother. 36.  The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against the judgment. 37.  On 18 July 2011 the child welfare authorities requested the County Social Welfare Board to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibility for X, which would then be transferred to the authorities, and to grant X\u2019s foster parents, with whom he had stayed since he was taken into care (see paragraph 8 above), permission to adopt him. The identity of X\u2019s biological father was still unknown to the authorities. In the alternative, the authorities\u2019 proposed that the first applicant\u2019s contact rights be removed. 38.  On 29 July 2011 the first applicant applied for termination of the care order or, in the alternative, extended contact rights with X. 39.  On 18 October 2011 the first applicant gave birth to Y, the third applicant. She had married the father of Y in the summer of that same year. The new family had moved to a different municipality. When the child welfare authorities in the first applicant\u2019s former municipality became aware that she had given birth to another child, it sent a letter expressing concern to the new municipality, which started an investigation into her parenting abilities. 40.  On 28, 29 and 30 November 2011 the County Social Welfare Board, composed of a lawyer, a psychologist and a lay person, held an oral hearing at which the first applicant was present together with her legal representative. Twenty-one witnesses were heard. 41.  On 8 December 2011 the Board decided that the first applicant should be deprived of her parental responsibility for X and that X\u2019s foster parents should be allowed to adopt him. The Board found that there was nothing in the case to indicate that the first applicant\u2019s parenting abilities had improved since the High Court\u2019s judgment of 22 April 2010. Therefore she was still considered incapable of giving X adequate care. Moreover, the Board stated:\n\u201cIn her statement before the County Social Welfare Board, the mother maintained her view that the care order was a conspiracy between the child welfare service, [the parent-child institution] and the foster parents for the purpose of \u2018helping a woman who is unable to have children\u2019. In the mother\u2019s words, it was a question of \u2018an advance order for a child\u2019. The mother had not realised that she had neglected [X], and stated that she spent most of her time and energy on \u2018the case\u2019.\nThe reports from the contact sessions between the mother and [X] consistently show that she is still unable to focus on [X] and what is best for him, but is influenced by her very negative view of the foster mother and of the child welfare service.\n[The first applicant] has married and had another child this autumn. Psychologist [K.M.] has stated before the Board that he observed good interaction between the mother and child and that the mother takes good care of the child. The Board takes note of this information. In the County Social Welfare Board\u2019s opinion, this observation can in any case not be used as a basis for concluding that the mother has competence as a caregiver for [X].\nThe County Social Welfare Board finds it reasonable to assume that [X] is a particularly vulnerable child. He experienced serious and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. Reference is also made to the fact that there have been many contact sessions with the mother, some of which have been very stressful for [X]. All in all, he has been through a lot. He has lived in the foster home for three years and does not know his biological mother. If [X] were to be returned to the care of his mother, this would require, among other things, a great capacity to empathise with and understand [X] and the problems he would experience, not least in the form of mourning and missing his foster parents. The mother and her family appeared to be completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding. Both the mother and grandmother stated that it would not be a problem, \u2018he just had to be distracted\u2019, and thus gave the impression of not having sympathy with the boy and therefore also being incapable of providing the psychological care he would need in the event of a return.\u201d 42.  In addition, the Board had especially noted the conclusions of expert M.S. They were quoted by the High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraph 34 above). The Board found that this description of the first applicant was still accurate. In any event, it was decisive that X had established such a connection to his foster family that removing him would result in serious and permanent problems for him. 43.  The Board assumed that the alternative to adoption would have been continued foster care on a long-term basis, and noted that the foster parents were X\u2019s main caregivers and the ones he thought of as his parents. The foster parents were moreover considered suitable and wanted to take care of X as their own child. The Board made general reference to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2007 page 561 (see paragraph 69 below) and found that the considerations underlying the following passage from that judgment \u2013 reiterated in Aune v. Norway, no. 52502/07, \u00a7 37, 28 October 2010 \u2013 were also pertinent to the present case:\n\u201c\u2018A decision that he should remain a foster child would tell him that the people with whom he has always lived and who are his parents and with whom he established his earliest ties and sense of belonging should remain under the control of the Child Welfare Service \u2014 the public authorities \u2014 and that they are not viewed by society as his true parents but rather as foster parents under an agreement that can be terminated. ...\u2019\u201d 44.  In conclusion, the adoption would be in X\u2019s best interests. The Board took Article 8 of the Convention into consideration when making its decision. 45.  The first applicant appealed against the decision, claiming that the Board had made a wrongful evaluation of the evidence when deciding that she was unable to give X adequate care. She considered that it would be in X\u2019s best interest to be returned to her and stressed that her situation had changed drastically. The first applicant was now married and had another child that she was taking care of. She had a good support system in her husband and her extended family, and was also prepared to accept help from the child welfare authorities. Moreover, in her view, removing X from the foster home would only cause him problems in the short term; no long-term problems could be expected. She also claimed that the visits between her and X had worked well. 46.  The child welfare authorities opposed the appeal and submitted that the first applicant\u2019s ability to care for X had not changed since the High Court\u2019s judgment of 22 April 2010. The visits between X and the first applicant had not worked well. She had had outbursts during the visits and had left before the time was up. Afterwards X had reacted negatively. The first applicant and her mother had manifested a very negative attitude towards the authorities. Moreover, X had a good attachment to his foster family and had lived with them for over three years. He was a vulnerable child and he needed a caregiver who was sensitive to his needs. They also noted that the first applicant had exposed X and their story on the Internet, together with pictures of them, which could be harmful for X. It was in the best interests of X to be adopted by the foster family. 47.  On 22 February 2012 the City Court, comprised of one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person, in accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 66 below), upheld the decision after having held an oral hearing which lasted for three days and during which twenty-one witnesses were heard. The first applicant was present together with her legal counsel. 48.  The City Court initially noted that the first applicant\u2019s general situation had improved. She had married in August of 2011, her husband had a permanent job and they had a daughter, Y. It also noted that the child welfare authorities in the couple\u2019s current municipality were conducting an ongoing inquiry concerning the mother\u2019s ability to care for Y. A staff member of the authorities in that new municipality had testified at the oral hearing, stating that they had not received any reports of concern other than that from the authorities in the first applicant\u2019s former municipality. As part of their inquiry they had made observations at the first applicant\u2019s home. They had observed many good things but also that the parents might need some help with routines and structure. The City Court found that this indicated that the authorities in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved thought that the parents could give Y adequate care if assisted by the authorities. She was not a child with any special care needs. 49.  However, on the basis of the evidence, the situation was different with regard to X, whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child. The City Court referred in particular to a statement from a professional at the Children\u2019s and Young People\u2019s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic (Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk \u2013 BUP) explaining that, as late as December 2011, X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support. If he was to have a sound emotional development in the future, the carer would have to be aware of that and take it into account. When the first applicant gave evidence in court, she had clearly shown that she did not realise what challenges she would face if X were to be moved from the foster home. She could not see his vulnerability, her primary concern being that he should grow up \u201cwhere he belonged\u201d. The first applicant believed that returning him would be unproblematic and still did not understand why the child welfare authorities had had to intervene when he was placed in the emergency foster home. She had not wished to say anything about how she thought X was doing in the foster home. In the City Court\u2019s view, the first applicant would not be sufficiently able to see or understand X\u2019s special care needs, and if those needs were not met, there would be a considerable risk of abnormal development. 50.  Furthermore, the City Court took account of how the foster parents and supervisor had described X\u2019s emotional reactions after contact sessions with his mother in the form of inconsolable crying and his needing a lot of sleep. During the contact sessions, X had repeatedly resisted contact with the first applicant and, as the sessions had progressed, reacted with what had been described as resignation. The City Court considered that a possible reason for that could be that the boy was vulnerable to inexpedient interaction and information that was not adapted to his age and functioning. The first applicant\u2019s emotional outbursts in situations during the contact sessions, for example when X had sought out his foster mother and called her \u201cmummy\u201d, were seen as potentially frightening and not conducive to X\u2019s development. 51.  The City Court held that the presentation of evidence had \u201cclearly shown\u201d that the \u201cfundamental limitations\u201d that had existed at the time of the High Court\u2019s judgment still applied. Nothing had emerged during the City Court\u2019s consideration of the case to indicate that the first applicant had developed a more positive attitude to the child welfare authorities or to the foster mother, beyond a statement made by her to the extent that she was willing to cooperate. She had snubbed the foster mother when she had said hello during the contact sessions and had never asked for information about X. The first applicant had left in frustration forty minutes before the last visit had been scheduled to end. Everyone who had been present during the contact sessions had described the atmosphere as unpleasant. The City Court considered that one possible reason why the first applicant\u2019s competence at contact sessions had not improved was that she struggled so much with her own feelings and with missing X, that it made her incapable of considering the child\u2019s perspective and protecting him from her own emotional outbursts. An improvement was contingent upon her understanding X and his needs and on her being willing to work on herself and her own weaknesses. The first applicant had not shown any positive developments in her competence in contact situations throughout the three years she had had rights of access. The fact that her parents, the fourth and fifth applicants, had a remarkably negative attitude to the municipal child welfare authorities did not make it any easier for her. 52.  The first applicant had claimed in court that she was a victim of injustice and that she would fight until X was returned to her. To shed light on her own situation, she had chosen to post her story on the Internet in June 2011 with a photograph of herself and X. In that article and several comments posted during the autumn of 2011, she had made serious accusations against the child welfare authorities and the foster parents \u2013 accusations which she had admitted in court were untrue. The first applicant did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term. 53.  The City Court noted that psychologist K.M., who had examined and treated the first applicant, had testified that she did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric diagnosis. He had counselled her in connection with the trauma inflicted on her by having her child taken away. The goal of the treatment had been to make the first applicant feel like a good mother. He believed that the previous assessments of the first applicant\u2019s ability to provide care had at that time been incorrect, and argued before the City Court that the best outcome for X would be to be returned to his biological mother. However, the City Court stated that psychologist K.M.\u2019s arguments had been based on research conducted in the 1960s, and found them to be incompatible with recent infant research. It noted that the other experts who had testified in court, including psychologists B.S. and M.S., had advised against returning X to his mother, as this would be very harmful for him. 54.  In conclusion thus far, the City Court agreed with the County Social Welfare Board that the first applicant had not changed in such a way as to indicate that it was highly probable that she would be able to provide X with proper care. It endorsed the Board\u2019s grounds, holding that the first applicant\u2019s clear limitations as a carer could not be mitigated by an adapted transitional scheme, assistance measures or support from her network. It did not find reason to discuss other arguments regarding her ability to provide care in more detail, as returning X to her was in any case not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home. The City Court agreed at this point with the County Social Welfare Board in its finding that X had developed such attachment to his foster parents, his foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would lead to serious problems if he would have to move. X had his primary security and belonging in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his psychological parents. On those grounds, the care order could not be revoked. 55.  Turning to the issues of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption, the City Court stated at the outset that when a care order has been issued, it is in principle sufficient for removal of parental rights that this is in the child\u2019s best interests. At the same time, it had been emphasised in several Supreme Court judgments that removal of parental responsibility is a very invasive decision and that therefore strong reasons are required for making such a decision (see, inter alia, paragraph 67 below). The requirements in respect of adoption were even more stringent. However, the questions of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption had to be seen in conjunction, since the primary reason for depriving someone of parental responsibility would be to facilitate adoption. The court also took into consideration that if the mother retained her parental responsibility, she might engage in conflicts in the future about the rights that such responsibility entailed, such as exposing the child on the Internet. 56.  The City Court went on to declare that adoption could only be granted if the four conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act were met (see paragraph 65 below). In the present case, the decisive factor would be whether adoption was in X\u2019s best interests and whether consent for adoption should be given on the basis of an overall assessment. Regarding that assessment, several Supreme Court judgments had stated that strong reasons must exist for consenting to adoption against the will of a biological parent. There must be a high degree of certainty that adoption would be in the child\u2019s best interests. It was also clear that the decision must be based not only on a concrete assessment, but also on general experience from child-psychology research. Reference was made to the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in Rt. 2007 page 561 (see paragraph 69 below). 57.  Applying the general principles to the instant case, the City Court first noted that X was at the time three and a half years old and had lived in his foster home since he was three weeks old. His fundamental attachment in the social and psychological sense was to his foster parents, and it would in any event be a long-term placement. X was moreover a vulnerable child, and adoption would help to strengthen his sense of belonging with his foster parents, whom he regarded as his parents. It was particularly important to a child\u2019s development to experience a secure and sound attachment to its psychological parents. Adoption would give X a sense of belonging and security in the years ahead for longer than the period a foster-home relationship would last. Practical considerations also indicated that persons who had care and control of a child and who in reality functioned as its parents should attend to the functions that followed from parental responsibility. 58.  The City Court noted that adoption meant that the legal ties to the biological family were broken. In its opinion, X, despite spending the first three weeks of his life with his mother and having many contact sessions, had not bonded psychologically with her. That had remained the case even though he had been told at a later stage that the first applicant had given birth to him. 59.  Furthermore, the court took account of the fact that even if no more contact sessions were organised, the foster parents had taken a positive view of letting X contact his biological parent if he so wished. 60.  Based on an overall assessment, the City Court found that it would be in X\u2019s best interests for the first applicant to be deprived of her parental responsibility and for the foster parents to be allowed to adopt him. The court believed that particularly weighty reasons existed for consenting to adoption in the case. 61.  The City Court lastly stated that since it had decided that X should be adopted, it was unable to decide on contact rights for the first applicant, since that question would be up to the foster parents to decide on. It mentioned that section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act provided a legal basis for fixing rights to access subsequent to adoption (see paragraph 65 below, where that provision is reiterated, and paragraph 72 below, on the \u201copen adoption\u201d-system). The City Court was, however, not competent to examine or decide on such rights since its competence was dependent on a party to the case having made a request to that effect. In the instant case, none of the parties had done so. 62.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment, claiming that the City Court had evaluated the evidence incorrectly when considering her ability to give X the necessary care. She also argued that the City Court should have obtained an evaluation by an expert witness concerning her and her husband\u2019s ability to provide adequate care. She submitted an evaluation made by the municipality in which she currently lived, dated 21 March 2012. 63.  On 22 August 2012, the High Court decided not to grant leave to appeal. It stated that the case did not raise any new legal issues of importance for the uniform application of the law. As concerned the new evidence, the court noted that the evaluation dated 21 March 2012 had been made by, inter alia, an expert who had testified before the City Court and that the document would not change the outcome of the case. Moreover, it observed that the first applicant had not asked for an expert witness to be heard in the City Court and had not given any reasons as to why it was necessary to appoint an expert before the High Court. Thus there were no reasons for leave to appeal to be granted. 64.  The first applicant appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett) which, on 15 October 2012, refused leave to appeal.", "references": ["1", "8", "9", "0", "3", "5", "6", "7", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1960. He currently lives in Belgium, but at the material time lived in Podgorica, Montenegro. 7.  The applicant is a Roma and a Muslim. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant and his family moved into an apartment in a building constructed for socially disadvantaged families. According to the applicant, because of constant attacks in which his car and the apartment were damaged, the perpetrators of which were never found, he installed a camera outside his apartment. 8.  On 26 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s next-door neighbour, Y, was watching a kickboxing match between a Montenegrin and a Bosnian contestant on television. The applicant overheard the next-door conversation as the doors of both his and Y\u2019s (adjacent) terraces were open. When the Bosnian kickboxer appeared with his coaches, all of whom were Muslim, Y allegedly said that he would slaughter one of them, and X, another neighbour, made a disparaging reference to the Bosnian kickboxer\u2019s Turkish descent. According to the applicant, X left Y\u2019s apartment at a certain point and went to his car, from which he took a gun. Y said \u201cturn it to the left\u201d, which was the direction of the applicant\u2019s terrace. This was followed by nine to ten gunshots, and Y\u2019s calling out insulting references to the applicant\u2019s \u201cTurkish mother\u201d. X, Y and Y\u2019s family picked up the spent cartridges from the ground afterwards. 9.  On 9 September 2009 three neighbours, V (Y\u2019s wife), S and B, were talking on the next-door terrace. As he was on his terrace, the applicant overheard the conversation. V said that she was fighting \u201ccockroaches, frogs, nits and lice, and all sorts of other things\u201d, which had been brought by \u201cthose dirty gipsies\u201d (\u201cod ovija gabelj\u010dina\u201d). V continued by saying that B and S \u201c[could] use a hammer and a pruning knife (kosijer), and [she] would use an axe\u201d. S replied that \u201cher [people] carried swords\u201d. V said that the axe could serve just as well. S answered \u201cno, no, he is a Muslim, I have a sword\u201d. B said \u201call is fine, whatever is more readily available\u201d (\u201cvalja \u0161to god prije stigne\u201d). V said loudly \u201cAn axe, an axe, a sledgehammer, like the one used on pigs\u201d. 10.  On 15 September 2009 Y was having an argument with M, another neighbour, when X joined and said, among other things, that if he \u201csaw red\u201d, he would \u201ckill both you and your brother here like a dog\u201d (\u201ce \u0107u te ubit ka psa i tebe i brata o\u0111e\u201d), apparently pointing at the applicant\u2019s apartment, adding \u201cdirty gypsy\u201d (\u201ccigane glibavi\u201d) and \u201ctrash\u201d (\u201covo sme\u0107e\u201d). This was witnessed by M\u2019s brother, D. It is unclear from the case\u2011file if the applicant was present during the argument or if he learned about it in some other manner. 11.  On 22 September 2009, the day of Ramadan Bayram, a religious holiday celebrated by the applicant and his family, a large cross was drawn on the applicant\u2019s apartment door, and a large message was written on the wall next to it saying \u201cmove out or you\u2019ll bitterly regret it\u201d (\u201cseli se, usko \u0107e ti bit\u201d). The applicant called the police, who came and took photographs of the cross and the message. The same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the police against the families of X, Y, S and B, and one more family living in the building. 12.  Between 19 and 22 October 2009 the police interviewed X, Y, V, B, M, D, and three other neighbours. 13.  X, Y, V, and B denied the applicant\u2019s allegations. X and Y also denied that they had watched the match together, and Y submitted that everything he had said had been addressed to the Bosnian kickboxer. Both X and Y confirmed that they had heard the shots but said they did not know who had fired them. Y and his children had indeed picked up the spent cartridges from the ground, not in order to hide anything, but because the children found the spent cartridges interesting to play with. Neither X nor Y knew who was responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009, but they suspected the applicant himself. 14.  V submitted that the discussion of 9 September 2009 had referred to another person sought by the police at the time in relation to various attacks, and they had been discussing how they would defend themselves in the event of an attack. B denied that she had been in V\u2019s apartment on that occasion. 15.  M confirmed that during the argument with Y, X had come and said that if he \u201csaw red\u201d he would \u201ckill them, as well as this gypsy\u201d (\u201cnapravi\u0107u d\u017eenaze i vama, a i ovom ciganinu\u201d), pointing in the direction of the applicant\u2019s flat. M had assumed that he had meant the applicant. D confirmed M\u2019s statement. 16.  The other two neighbours were not aware of any conflicts amongst the neighbours, or that anybody ill-treated or insulted the applicant on the basis of his national origin. They had no idea who could be responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009. The third neighbour, N.L., confirmed the applicant\u2019s submissions in relation to another incident (see paragraph 30 (b) below). 17.  On 26 October 2009 the case file was transmitted to the State prosecutor\u2019s office (Osnovno dr\u017eavno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo) in order to assess whether there were any elements of the criminal offence of jeopardising someone\u2019s security (ugro\u017eavanje sigurnosti). 18.  On 18 November 2009 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the higher State prosecutor\u2019s office (Vi\u0161e dr\u017eavno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo) in Podgorica in relation to the above events. He filed the complaint against X, Y, V, S and B for incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred, discontent and intolerance (izazivanje nacionalne, rasne i vjerske mr\u017enje, razdora i netrpeljivosti, hereinafter \u201chate crime\u201d) in connection with discrimination, racial and otherwise (see paragraphs 38-39 below). He also enclosed relevant video material. 19.  On 24 November 2009 the higher State prosecutor\u2019s office rejected the complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of any hate crime or other criminal offence within its competence. The applicant was notified that he could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor and that the case file had already been forwarded to the State prosecution service on 26 October 2009 (see paragraph 17 above). 20.  On 25 November 2009 the State prosecution service issued an official report (slu\u017ebena zabilje\u0161ka) finding that the impugned words of 26 May, as well as those of 9 September 2009, which referred to the use of swords and axes, had not been addressed to either the applicant or anybody close to him, and that the incident of 15 September 2009 could not be considered a threat. It was concluded that none of those three events had involved an element of jeopardising someone\u2019s security, or any other criminal offence subject to public prosecution. The incident of 22 September 2009, however, could be considered as jeopardising security. On 27 November 2009 the State prosecution service asked the police to undertake measures in order to find the perpetrator. At the same time the police were informed that the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint in this regard would be kept until the perpetrator was found, or until 22 September 2012, when the prosecution of that criminal offence would become time-barred.  On 31 December 2009 the State prosecutor informed the applicant of this, as well as of the fact that he could file a criminal complaint against a specific person with appropriate evidence (uz valjane dokaze). 21.  On 14 December 2009 the applicant filed an application for an investigation (zahtjev za sprovo\u0111enje istrage) with the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica. He enclosed the relevant videos, and proposed that the court hear a number of neighbours, including those he suspected. 22.  On 17 March 2010 the High Court dismissed that application for lack of evidence. In particular, the submitted video material was considered to be inadmissible, having been obtained without a prior court order, and the court observed that the suspected neighbours had denied that what they had said related to the applicant. It was further held that the applicant had not submitted any evidence in relation to the incident of 22 September 2009, nor had he called the police at the time to come to the scene and \u201ccollect the necessary material for further analysis\u201d in order to verify his suspicions. 23.  On 26 March 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision. He submitted, in particular, that on 22 September 2009 he had actually called the police, who had only taken photographs of the scene. The fact that they had failed to do what they should have done was in no way his fault, as it was not up to him to tell the police what to do, but only to lodge a criminal complaint, which he had done. 24.  On 31 May 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal for lack of evidence, in substance endorsing the reasoning of the High Court. In doing so, the court held that the applicant\u2019s objections as to the gathering of evidence by the police \u201ccould not be the subject of [that] court\u2019s assessment\u201d. 25.  On 19 July 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He maintained, inter alia, that because of the failure of the domestic authorities to protect him and his family, they had had to move out of the apartment (see paragraph 35 below). He relied on the right to private life, the right to an effective domestic remedy, and the prohibition of discrimination. 26.  On 25 March 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. It considered that it should be examined under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and corresponding Articles of the Montenegrin Constitution, and found there had been no violation of any of them. 27.  On 7 April 2016, as regards the incident of 22 September 2009, the police informed the State prosecutor\u2019s office that \u201c[they] had acted on [the applicant\u2019s] criminal complaint and undertaken measures in accordance with their authority, having dedicated a significant amount of time [to the complaint]. While carrying out those official actions [they] had not found material evidence which would undoubtedly indicate the perpetrator of this criminal offence\u201d. 28.  The Government submitted information from the applicant\u2019s criminal record reflecting convictions for minor offences in 1981, 1990 and 2002. For each of these offences he had received a suspended sentence. 29.  On 20 December 2007 the applicant was celebrating Bayram. X and Y claimed before the domestic bodies that the applicant had celebrated inappropriately by playing loud music from very early in the morning, shooting in the air and calling Turks and Wahhabi (vehabije) to jihad. He had apparently also tried to hit X with a flagpole (koplje od zastave). The applicant submitted that X and W (the husband of X\u2019s niece) had been insulting him and his family, while X had also spat on him, shouted obscenities and thrown stones at him, causing him minor physical injuries. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was found guilty in misdemeanour proceedings of disturbing public order and peace (naru\u0161avanje javnog reda i mira) by shooting several shots in the air from his starting pistol on 20 December 2007. He was sentenced to a ten-day period of imprisonment and the pistol was confiscated. The decision was upheld by a second\u2011instance body on 23 December 2008. In relation to the same incident, on 29 July 2008 X and W were charged with violent behaviour against the applicant. In the course of the proceedings, a medical expert witness submitted that the applicant had a contusion (nagnje\u010denje) on the left part of the back of his head, which would have been classified as a minor physical injury at the time it had been inflicted. The medical expert submitted that the injury had been caused by a blunt object, possibly a \u201clarger stone\u201d, and that it could not have been caused by sand or \u201cstones the size of beans\u201d. On 24 May 2011, after the case had been remitted, the Court of First Instance acquitted X and W, considering that it had not been proved that they had committed the offence. 30.  The applicant reported the following events to the police, but to no avail: (a) on 6 October 2008 an unknown person had thrown a brick and broken one of the windows of his apartment; (b) on 11 September 2009 S and her husband, Z, had tried to hit the applicant\u2019s parked car with their own car; this was confirmed by another neighbour, N.L., who witnessed this event and was interviewed by the police in October 2009 (see paragraph 16 above); (c) on 16 October 2009 S had asked Y aloud if he was going to \u201cslaughter\u201d somebody, and he had answered that he was, both of them looking at the applicant; S had said that he would \u201cmake [his] car dirty with that man\u201d; (d) on 19 December 2009 an unknown person had fired several shots in front of the applicant\u2019s apartment, below the children\u2019s bedroom; the applicant gave the police eight bullet shells that he had found on the ground; (e) on 1 January 2010, shortly after midnight, X had thrown firecrackers at the applicant\u2019s car and broken its windscreen; he had also thrown a glass bottle at the applicant and a metal bar at his son, swearing profusely and threatening to slaughter them all; this had been followed by gunshots. 31.  On 21 October, 23 October and 30 October 2009 X, V and M.\u0106. respectively lodged criminal complaints against the applicant for insulting and provoking them, and for playing loud music and calling Turks and Wahhabi to jihad. On 25 December 2009 those complaints were rejected by the State prosecutor. 32.  On 24 April 2010 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica found the applicant guilty of recording Y without authorisation and eavesdropping (prislu\u0161kivanje) on him, and sentenced him to 40 days\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year. That judgment was upheld by the High Court on 15 October 2010. On 26 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant in this regard. 33.  On 7 May 2010 the applicant was fined 800 euros (EUR) in minor offence proceedings (prekr\u0161ajni postupak) for threatening (izazivanje osje\u0107aja ugro\u017eenosti) V, a decision which was upheld on 7 July 2010. 34.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against X with the State prosecution service, alleging that in August and September 2009 he had threatened to \u201ccut [the applicant\u2019s] gypsy head off and impale it on a pike\u201d (nabiti na kolac). On 27 July 2010 the deputy State prosecutor rejected the criminal complaint. On 12 August 2010 the applicant filed a private criminal action (optu\u017eni predlog) against X, who was acquitted by the Court of First Instance on 7 June 2011. The court found that X had indeed said the impugned words in front of a witness, and that the words could have made the applicant feel frightened and insecure, but the court could not accept \u201cthat [the applicant] had taken those words seriously, especially since the witness, who was the only one who had heard the words, had not taken them seriously, which was why he had informed the applicant about them only two months later\u201d. That decision was upheld by the High Court on 7 March 2012. 35.  On 6 July 2010 X threatened the applicant\u2019s daughter by saying that he would kill and slaughter them all, with his hands stretched towards her neck. The girl apparently fainted and was admitted to hospital unconscious. The same day the applicant and his family moved out of their apartment. They were allegedly on a hunger strike for the next twenty-four days, seeking help from various State institutions.", "references": ["6", "1", "9", "3", "5", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant lives in Sarajevo. He is the grandfather of the second applicant. The second applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sarajevo. 5.  On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 6.  On 26 January 2006 the competent Ministry upheld the first-instance decision. 7.  On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant\u2019s request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012. 8.  In the meantime, on 10 October 2012, the Constitutional Court found a breach of the second applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time. It did not award any damages.", "references": ["5", "1", "8", "0", "4", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Maribor. 6.  The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (\u201cthe SFRY\u201d) was a federal State composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Nationals of the SFRY had \u201cdual citizenship\u201d for internal purposes, that is to say they were citizens of both the SFRY and one of the six republics. They had freedom of movement within the federal State and could register as permanent residents wherever they settled on its territory. 7.  The SFRY had two pension systems \u2013 military and civil. The pension rights of military personnel were regulated by and secured through the federal authorities. In particular, members of the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army (hereinafter \u201cthe YPA\u201d), the armed forces of the SFRY, paid their contributions to and received their pensions from a special military pension fund based in Belgrade (Zavod za socialno osiguranje vojnih osiguranika, hereinafter \u201cthe YPA Fund\u201d). The YPA Fund paid pensions to military pensioners irrespective of where they undertook military service or lived once retired. This was the only pension fund existing at federal level. In parallel, each republic had in place its own pension legislation and public pension fund set up for the payment of civil pensions. 8.   Between 1991 and 1992 the SFRY broke up. On 25 June 1991 Slovenia declared its independence. 9.  In 1992 the Slovenian Government issued the Ordinance on the payment of advances on military pensions (see paragraph 28 below, hereinafter \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d) which regulated, on a temporary basis, the payment of military pensions to former YPA military personnel residing in the Republic of Slovenia who had applied for or fulfilled the conditions for retirement under the rules governing the pension and disability insurance of military personnel (hereinafter \u201cthe SFRY military rules\u201d) by 18 October 1991, the date of withdrawal of the YPA from Slovenia (see P.P. v. Slovenia, no. 39923/98, Commission decision of 1 July 1998, Decisions and Reports (DR) 3, p. 25). This was followed in 1998 by a new Act on the Rights Stemming from the Pension and Disability Insurance of Former Military Personnel (see paragraph 29 below, hereinafter \u201cthe 1998 Act\u201d) which put in place a comprehensive regulatory framework for the pension rights of former YPA military personnel, in most cases allowing for pensions to be paid only to Slovenian nationals. 10. In 1994 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (succeeded in 2006 by Serbia) transformed the YPA Fund (see paragraph 7 above) into the Social Insurance Fund of Military Personnel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of the Yugoslav Army Act. The (transformed) YPA Fund continued paying YPA pensions to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it remains uncertain to what extent, if at all, the YPA Fund continued paying YPA pensions to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia residing in the other former SFRY republics (see also, mutatis mutandis, Kudumija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and Remenovi\u0107 and Ma\u0161ovi\u0107 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, (dec.), nos. 28233/08 and 2 others, \u00a7 11, 4 June 2013). 11.  At the inter-State level, however, the question of responsibility for the payment of pensions to military personnel who had acquired or applied for pensions with the YPA Fund under the rules governing the pension and disability insurance of military personnel (hereinafter \u201cthe SFRY military rules\u201d) remained unresolved until the Agreement on Succession Issues entered into force in 2004 (see paragraph 30 below). 12.  The applicant was a citizen of the Republic of Serbia in the SFRY. Following its dissolution, he retained citizenship of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He has been residing in Slovenia since 1964 and has had permanent resident status since 1981. In 1969 he married a Slovenian woman, with whom he had two children. He was a non-commissioned officer in active military service in the YPA until 30 September 1991, when he retired. 13.  On 16 July 1991 he applied for retirement to the Maribor military district headquarters, and was then \u201cavailable\u201d (na razpolago) until his retirement. On 13 November 1991 the YPA Fund found him to be entitled to an old-age pension under the SFRY military rules as from 1 October 1991 with more than forty-one pensionable years with bonus (benificirana doba) in the YPA. The applicant maintained that he had only received his pension from the YPA Fund twice (in November 1991 and January 1992), when he had personally gone to Belgrade to collect it. 14.  On 23 October 1991 the applicant applied for Slovenian citizenship under section 40 of the Citizenship Act (see paragraph 26 below). By a decision of 11 July 1992 the Ministry of Interior dismissed his application. It based its decision on section 40(3) and section 10(1)(8) of the Citizenship Act, which stipulated that the Ministry was allowed to refuse an application where there was reason to believe that the person posed a threat to public order, security or national defence. After the Constitutional Court quashed the decision and the case was remitted to the Ministry of Interior for fresh consideration, the latter on 2 September 1997 again dismissed his application on the same grounds. The applicant instituted court proceedings, which were unsuccessful. On 13 October 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional complaint by him on the grounds that it was no longer relevant because he had acquired Slovenian citizenship in 2003 (see paragraph 19 below). 15.  On 27 February 1992 the applicant applied for an advance on his military pension under the Ordinance (see paragraph 28 below). On 29 April 1993 he requested the YPA Fund to discontinue the payment of his pension. By a decision of 17 May 1993 his payments were stopped with effect from 31 January 1992. The applicant lodged this request after realising that the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter \u201cthe Institute\u201d) only granted advances under the Ordinance provided that the YPA Fund stopped paying the pension. By a decision of 5 May 1993 the Institute found that the applicant had been entitled to such an advance starting from 1 November 1991. It held that he had been a permanent resident of Slovenia since 1 April 1981 and had fulfilled the conditions for pension entitlement under the SFRY military rules by 18 October 1991. 16.  On 13 October 1998 the Institute, on the basis of section 25 of the 1998 Act (see paragraph 29 below), issued of its own motion a decision not to convert the applicant\u2019s advance on his military pension into an old-age pension under the 1998 Act. His advance was suspended as of 31 October 1998. The Institute decided that since the applicant had been in active military service in the YPA from 25 June to 18 July 1991 and from 18 July 1991 had been on leave, he did not fulfil the statutory conditions for converting the advance on his military old-age pension into an old-age pension under section 2(1)(4) of the 1998 Act. 17.  The applicant appealed, complaining that at the relevant time he had not been on leave, but had been available until his retirement. On 30 September 2002 the Institute dismissed his appeal, holding that he could not be considered a beneficiary under section 2(1) of the 1998 Act as he did not have Slovenian citizenship and did not comply with the requirements applicable to foreign beneficiaries. It added that he could re-apply for an old-age pension under the 1998 Act once he acquired Slovenian citizenship. 18.  The applicant subsequently applied for judicial review of the Institute\u2019s decision before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, maintaining that, as a resident of Slovenia, he should have been treated in the same way as Slovenian citizens. 19.  On 1 April 2003 the applicant acquired citizenship by naturalisation under section 19 of the amended Citizenship Act read in conjunction with section 10(1) of the Citizenship Act (see paragraph 27 below). 20.  On 4 June 2003, after lodging a new request with the Institute, the applicant was granted an old-age pension as from 1 April 2003. 21.  On 13 January 2006 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court dismissed the application for judicial review (see paragraph 18 above). It pointed out that the applicant\u2019s situation had to be assessed with regard to the different categories of beneficiaries listed in section 2(1) of the 1998 Act. It concluded that the applicant had not fulfilled the conditions for an old-age pension set out in section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act. Likewise, as a foreigner he had not met the conditions set out in section 2(1)(4) of the 1998 Act. He had therefore been eligible for an old-age pension under section 2 of the 1998 Act only from 1 April 2003 onwards, the date on which he had acquired Slovenian citizenship. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Labour and Social Court. On 21 March 2007 the appeal was dismissed, essentially on the grounds that in the legally relevant period the applicant had been a foreigner who had not had rights to a pension or other benefits under the SFRY military rules by 25 June 1991 as required by section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act. The court held that the other provisions of section 2 of the 1998 Act were applicable only to Slovenian citizens and, thus, the applicant, who had not fulfilled the condition of nationality, should not have relied upon them. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, claiming he should have been treated the same as Slovenian citizens. On 23 March 2009 it was dismissed by the Supreme Court, which followed the lower courts\u2019 reasoning. It held that in the period at issue the applicant had not met the requirements of any of the categories of beneficiaries under section 2 of the 1998 Act, having applied for the pension under the SFRY military rules on 16 July 1991 and having only acquired Slovenian citizenship on 1 April 2003. 24.  On 24 March 2010 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional issue or entail a violation of human rights which had serious consequences for him.", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "7", "0", "5", "6", "9", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Gornja Mao\u010da. 6.  On 28 October 2011 Mr Mevlid Ja\u0161arevi\u0107, a member of the local group advocating the Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam (see, concerning this group, Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 3727/08, \u00a7 20, 7 February 2012), attacked the United States Embassy in Sarajevo. One police officer was severely wounded in the attack. In April 2012 Mr Ja\u0161arevi\u0107 and two other members of the group were indicted in relation to that event. Mr Ja\u0161arevi\u0107 was eventually convicted of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The other two defendants were acquitted. The relevant part of the first-instance judgment rendered in that case, depicting the religious community to which the applicant also belonged, reads as follows:\n\u201cIn his Report/Findings and Opinion and at the main trial, the expert witness Prof. Azinovi\u0107 clarified the notions of \u2018Wahhabism\u2019 and \u2018Salafism\u2019 from a scientific perspective:\n\u2018...\nSalafi communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the one in Gornja Mao\u010da (in which the accused lived at the time of the attack), are often isolated and inaccessible. The choice of remote and isolated locations to establish settlements is often informed by the belief that true believers who live in a non-believer (or secular) country need to resort to hijrah \u2013 emigration or withdrawal from the surrounding (non-believers\u2019) world, following the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and his followers, who moved from Mecca to Medina in 622 to establish the first Muslim community.\nDespite mutual differences, most of the Bosnian Salafi groups share some common traits that are not inherent in Islamic organisations (or religious sects) only. In practice, they confirm the tendencies of certain traditional religious communities to isolate from other believers and define their holy community through their disciplined opposition to both non-believers and half-hearted believers. This pattern is inherent in fundamentalist movements and sects within almost all religious traditions. Such movements as a rule have similar characteristics despite the differences in theological doctrines, size and social composition, the scope of their influence or their tendency towards violence. Yet these fundamentalist and puritan groups mostly do not encourage or approve violence, whether it is aimed against members of the same group or against the outer world.\nAccording to the available sources and their own declarations, members of the community in Gornja Mao\u010da oppose the concept of a secular State, democracy, free elections and any laws that are not based on Sharia. The positions taken by this group are, inter alia, available at a number of web sites, including www.putvjernika.com, while part of its followers live in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Australia and other countries.\u2019\n... 6.1.5.1  Punishment of the accused (Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)\nHaving been called by the court officer to stand up when the Trial Chamber entered the courtroom at the first hearing, the accused refused to do so. Also, the accused Ja\u0161arevi\u0107 and Fojnica were wearing skullcaps, which the Court could correlate with clothing details indicating their religious affiliation. Pursuant to Article 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all those present in the courtroom must stand up upon the call from a court officer. The President of the Trial Chamber asked the accused to explain both their refusal to stand up and the reasons why they had entered the courtroom wearing skullcaps. The accused stated that they only respected Allah\u2019s judgment and that they did not want to take part in rituals acknowledging man-made judgment. The Court thereupon warned the accused that standing up was a statutory obligation of the accused and that under Article 242 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, disruptive conduct constituted contempt of court, which the Court would punish by removing them from the courtroom.\nAfter the warning, the President adjourned the hearing and provided the accused with a reasonable period of time to consult their attorneys in order to change their minds.\nWhen the Trial Chamber returned to the courtroom, the accused did not stand up, and therefore the President removed them from the courtroom. The transcript from the hearing was subsequently delivered to the accused.\nAt a new hearing, the accused Fojnica and Ahmetspahi\u0107 again did not want to stand up on being called by the court officer, while the accused Ja\u0161arevi\u0107 refused to enter the courtroom. The President therefore asked the accused to respond whether it was their definite decision to act in the same way until the completion of the trial. The accused confirmed that, until the completion of the trial, they had no intention of showing any respect, by standing up, for the Court, which they did not recognise. The Court found that to continue to bring the accused to scheduled hearings would unnecessarily expose the Court to significant expense. Therefore, the Court decided to remove the accused from the trial until its completion, with a warning that they would be notified of any scheduled hearing, and that, prior to it, they could notify the Court if they changed their mind, in which case the Court would allow them to come to the hearing. The accused Fojnica and Ahmetspahi\u0107 then changed their mind and regularly appeared before the Court, while the accused Ja\u0161arevi\u0107 did so only at the following hearing. The Court delivered to the accused the audio-recordings and the transcripts from the hearings they had not attended in order to allow them to agree with their defence attorneys on their defence strategy.\u201d 7.  In the context of that trial, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe State Court\u201d) summoned the applicant, who belonged to the same religious community, to appear as a witness on 10 September 2012. He appeared, as summoned, but refused to remove his skullcap, notwithstanding an order from the president of the trial chamber to do so. He was then expelled from the courtroom, convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to a fine of 10,000 convertible marks (BAM)[1] under Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe Court has examined the situation encountered in the courtroom with the utmost care. The Court is aware that the witness belongs to a religious community, organised under special rules in the village of Mao\u010da, of which the accused are also members. In view of that, the Court has acquainted the witness with the provisions of Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the obligations of the parties in the judicial institutions, which ban visitors from entering these buildings in clothing that is not in accordance with the generally accepted dress codes within the professional environment of the judicial institutions. In addition, the Court has pointed out to the witness that, in public institutions, it is not acceptable to display religious affiliation through clothing or religious symbols, and that the Court is obliged to support and promote values that bring people closer, not those that separate them. The Court has particularly emphasised that the rights of the individual are not absolute and must not jeopardise common values.\nThe witness\u2019s attention has especially been drawn to the fact that people of various religious beliefs, belonging to different religious groups, appear before the court and that it is necessary to have confidence in the court. Thus, the court is not a place where religious beliefs can be expressed in a way that discredits certain common rules and principles in a multicultural society. That is why the law obliges everyone who appears before the Court to respect the Court and its rules.\nThe Court finds the witness\u2019s refusal to accept the rules of court and to show respect to the Court by accepting its warnings, to be a flagrant breach of order in the courtroom. The Court has found that this behaviour is connected to a number of other identical cases before it, in which the members of the same religious group behaved in the same manner, publicly indicating that they did not recognise this Court. The frequency of such disrespectful behaviour and contempt of court is producing dangerous criminogenic effects and undoubtedly presents a specific threat to society. It is not necessary to particularly substantiate how this behaviour impairs the Court\u2019s reputation and confidence in the Court. A legitimate conclusion may be that it is essentially directed against the State and basic social values. Therefore, a severe and uncompromising reaction on the part of the State, taking all existing repressive measures, is crucial for dealing with such behaviour. Restraint on the part of the State in cases of this or other types of extremism can have serious consequences for the reputation of the judiciary and the stability of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nBearing in mind the frequency, seriousness and gravity of this type of breach of order in the courtroom and its damaging consequences, the Court has decided to punish the witness by imposing the maximum fine of BAM 10,000. Such a severe penalty should be a message to all the parties in the courtroom that contempt of court is unacceptable. The Court must be respected and the level of respect for the Court is the same as for the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\u201d 8.  On 11 October 2012 an appeals chamber of the same court reduced the fine to BAM 3,000 and upheld the rest of the first-instance decision. It held that the requirement to remove any and all headgear on the premises of public institutions was one of the basic requirements of life in society. It further held that in a secular State such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, any manifestation of religion in a courtroom was forbidden. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201cThe Chamber observes that it is obvious and well known that skullcaps, hats and other headgear should be removed when entering any premises, and notably the premises of State and other public institutions, as there is no longer a need to wear them and removing a skullcap or a hat is an expression of respect for this institution and its function. The duty to remove headgear exists not only in this court but also in other courts and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in other States. Such rules and duties apply to all persons without exception, regardless of religious, sexual, national or other affiliation.\nIndeed, this is a duty of all those who visit the State Court in whatever capacity, as explained in more detail in Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina: \u2018Visitors must respect the dress code applicable to judicial institutions. Visitors shall not wear miniskirts, shorts, t-shirts with thin straps, open heel shoes and other garments that do not correspond to the dress code applicable to judicial institutions\u2019.\nIt would appear from the case file that the judge in charge of this specific case first directed the witness to remove his skullcap in the courtroom, and then gave him an additional ten minutes to think about it as well as about the consequences of rejecting that order. As the witness had nevertheless failed to remove his skullcap, showing thereby wilful disrespect for the authority of the court, the President of the Trial Chamber fined him in accordance with Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nIt follows from the aforementioned that the judge in charge did not invent the duty of removing the skullcap when addressing the court, as claimed in the appeal. This is indeed a matter of a generally accepted standard of behaviour in the courtroom which applies not only to this Court but also to other courts; furthermore, it has always been applied. This duty stems from Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions cited above. Therefore, the allegations made by the lawyer Mulahalilovi\u0107 in the appeal are not only unjustified but totally inappropriate.\nThe allegation in the appeal that the witness was punished simply because he was a believer who was practising his religion, and that he had thereby been discriminated against, is also unsubstantiated. The duty of removing headgear and behaving decently applies without exception to anyone visiting the court premises. All persons visiting the Court, regardless of their religion, nationality, sex or other status, have the same rights and obligations and are obliged, among other things, to remove their skullcaps, hats and other headgear. This was explained to the witness. Any behaviour to the contrary has always been interpreted and is still interpreted as disrespectful towards the court, and the appellant is aware of that. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mentioned in the impugned decision, is a secular State in which religion is separate from public life. The Chamber therefore holds that the premises of the Court cannot be a place for the manifestation of any religion.\nIt clearly follows from the aforementioned that the witness Husmet Hamidovi\u0107 was not deprived of his right to freedom of religion and freedom to manifest religion at his home or any other place dedicated for that purpose, but not in the courtroom. Therefore, the allegations by the lawyer Mulahalilovi\u0107 of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, and of discrimination on religious grounds, are unsubstantiated.\nHaving found that the witness\u2019s punishment was justified and that his appeal was ill-founded in that part, the Appeals Chamber then examined the amount of the fine and decided that it was excessive.\nAs noted in the appeal, BAM 10,000 is the maximum fine for contempt of court. The maximum fine should be imposed in the most serious cases.\nTurning to the relevant criteria, the nature and the seriousness of the conduct must certainly be taken into consideration. However, the appellant is wrong in claiming that his means should have also been taken into account, as the fine for contempt of court is not a criminal sanction, but is of a disciplinary nature.\nWhile the witness showed a high level of determination in disrespecting the court (he again failed to remove his skullcap after a pause of ten minutes given to him to reflect) and this fact definitely affected the amount of the fine, the act itself (failure to remove headgear) is not the most serious case of contempt of court which would justify the maximum fine. Since the witness did not use offensive language, there was no need to impose the maximum fine. This is notwithstanding the fact that members of the same religious group have lately shown a pattern of disrespectful behaviour. While it is true that the general prevention is one of the aims of sanctions, including disciplinary ones, disciplinary sanctions are primarily directed at individuals. Everyone should therefore be held responsible and adequately punished for his/her conduct only, and not for that of other members of any group. This follows from Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nIn the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the nature and the intensity of contempt of court committed by this witness, the appeals chamber finds that a fine in the amount of BAM 3,000 is appropriate. The appeal by the lawyer Mulahalilovi\u0107 is therefore partially accepted and the impugned decision amended.\u201d 9.  As the applicant had failed to pay the fine, on 27 November 2012 the fine was converted into thirty days\u2019 imprisonment pursuant to Article 47 of the Criminal Code. That decision was upheld on 13 December 2012 and the applicant served his prison sentence immediately. 10.  On 9 July 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found no breach of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, fully accepting the reasoning of the State Court. At the same time, it found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention because of the automatic way in which fines were converted into imprisonment and ordered that Article 47 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina be amended. However, it decided not to quash the decision converting the fine into imprisonment in this case, relying on the principle of legal certainty.\nThe relevant part of the majority decision reads as follows:\n\u201c40.  The Constitutional Court notes that the present case concerns a specific situation where the universally accepted standard of conduct in a judicial institution intertwines with the right of the appellant to manifest in a courtroom, contrary to that standard, affiliation with his religious community. The appellant claims that the State Court did not have a basis in law for imposing a fine for his failure to comply with a court order, as the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain a provision prescribing any such measure, for which reason his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was violated. 41.  Starting from the main objection raised by the appellant, that the limitation in the case at hand was not prescribed by law, the Constitutional Court notes that the European Court (The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, \u00a7 49, Series A no. 30) has held that two requirements flow from the expression \u2018prescribed by law\u2019 in Article 9 of the European Convention. \u2018Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a \u2018law\u2019 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.\u2019 In addition, the wording of many statutes is not absolutely precise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances means that many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague. The interpretation and application of such enactments depend on practice (see Kokkinakis, cited above). 42.  Accordingly, as concerns the issue of whether the State Court, in adopting the challenged ruling, acted in accordance with the law, the Constitutional Court observes that the provision of Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge or the presiding judge may order that a party to the proceedings who disrupts order in a courtroom or disobeys court orders be removed from the courtroom and be fined in an amount of up to BAM 10,000. The Constitutional Court also observes that the cited provision, on which the State Court relied, does not prescribe a list of all types of conduct which may be regarded as disruption of order in a courtroom, but rather each court, in the circumstances of a given case, decides whether some type of conduct may be considered disruptive or not, which falls within the scope of that court\u2019s margin of discretion (see the Constitutional Court decision no. AP 2486/11 of 17 July 2014, \u00a7 33). This is a universally accepted standard of conduct of the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is in accordance with the position of the European Court, referred to in the Kokkinakis judgment, that the interpretation and application of such enactments that are couched in vague terms depend on practice. 43.  The Constitutional Court notes that the State Court relied also on Rule 20 of the House Rules, providing that \u2018visitors must respect the dress code applicable to judicial institutions\u2019, as an internal act of the State Court and other judicial institutions. The Constitutional Court observes likewise that the mentioned provision does not specify what that dress code is. However, the State Court in the case at hand kept in mind that the universally accepted standard of conduct in a civilised society required that upon entering the premises of a public institution one should remove one\u2019s headgear out of respect for that institution and its function. Likewise, the Constitutional Court is aware that the said House Rules were not published, but that is not a problem since the present case concerns a universally accepted and usual standard of conduct in a judicial institution in a civilised and democratic society that Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to become. The Constitutional Court also holds that the standard in issue could and should have been known to the appellant. In addition, the Constitutional Court observes that the State Court clearly and unequivocally warned the appellant of that universally accepted standard of conduct, which is indeed mandatory for all visitors of judicial institutions, irrespective of their religion, sex, national origin or other status. 44.  Moreover, the State Court clearly warned the appellant of the consequences of such conduct and, although it was not required to do so, accorded him an additional time to reconsider his position. This is clearly in accordance with the stance taken by the European Court in relation to the notion \u2018prescribed by law\u2019 (The Sunday Times, cited above). Indeed, the State Court clearly and unequivocally informed the appellant of the applicable rules in the judicial institutions and of the consequences of disobeying the rules. Moreover, at his own request, the appellant was granted additional time to think about all this. The Constitutional Court especially emphasises the fact that the limitation in question applied only while the appellant was in the courtroom, that is, during his testimony before the State Court. The Constitutional Court holds that the State Court did not thereby place an excessive burden on the appellant, given that it simply requested that the appellant adjust his conduct to the House Rules, which applied to all visitors, and only in the courtroom. Bearing in mind all the aforementioned, the Constitutional Court holds, in the circumstances of this particular case, that the State Court, using the margin of discretion referred to in Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acted in accordance with the law, and that, contrary to the appellant\u2019s opinion, the interference, which was of a limited nature, was lawful. 45.  As to the question whether the interference in the present case had a legitimate aim, the Constitutional Court notes that the State Court simply relied on a universally accepted standard of conduct in a judicial institution, which requires all the visitors of judicial institutions to respect \u2018the dress code applicable to judicial institutions\u2019. That court further relied on the inadmissibility of the manifestation in public institutions of religious affiliation and religious symbols which were contrary to the usual standards of conduct, and in so doing it took into account its obligation to support the values that bring people closer and not those that separate them. The Constitutional Court notes that the State Court underlined in that regard that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a secular State where religion was separated from public life and that therefore no one could manifest his/her religion or religious affiliation in a courtroom. Considering the position of the European Court that in democratic societies in which several religions coexist (as is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina) it may be necessary to place restrictions on the freedom of religion (Kokkinakis, cited above), in the context of the obligation of an independent judicial institution to support the values that bring people closer, and not those that separate them, the Constitutional Court holds that the restriction in the present case, which was of a temporary nature, aspired to achieve legitimate aims. Finally, the Constitutional Court reiterates that Article 242 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is primarily designed to allow the State Court unhindered and effective conduct of proceedings. A judge or the president of a chamber is thereby given the possibility of imposing a fine for any inappropriate behaviour which is directed at disrupting order in a courtroom or at damaging the reputation of the State Court. In the present case, the State Court considered the repeated refusal of the appellant to comply with an order of the court to be damaging to the reputation and the dignity of a judicial institution. Therefore, the Constitutional Court finds that the restriction in issue, which was of a limited nature, was in accordance with the legitimate aim of maintaining the dignity of a judicial institution for the purposes of Article 9 of the European Convention. 46.  Finally, as to the question whether the decision was necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve one of the legitimate aims under Article 9 of the European Convention, the Constitutional Court reiterates that, according to the settled case-law of the European Court, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent of the need for interference, but this margin is subject to European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts (Dahlab, cited above). Furthermore, under the well-established case-law of the European Court, the Court is called upon to establish whether the measures undertaken at the national level were justified in principle \u2013 that is, whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify them were \u2018relevant and sufficient\u2019 and whether the measures were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (The Sunday Times, cited above, \u00a7 50[2]). 47.  The Constitutional Court notes that the appellant was fined for contempt of court; that is, for his failure to respect an order of the State Court to remove his skullcap in the courtroom. The Constitutional Court further notes that the first-instance decision imposed a fine in the amount of BAM 10,000, but that the second-instance decision reduced the fine to BAM 3,000. The Appeals Chamber held that the fine set in the first-instance decision was excessive, and taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, it concluded that a fine in the amount of BAM 3,000 was appropriate. The Constitutional Court observes that the State Court acted in this case in accordance with its margin of discretion, accorded by Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enabling the courts to fine participants in proceedings who refuse to obey court orders, with a view to conducting proceedings efficiently and maintaining the authority and dignity of courts. The Constitutional Court took into account the fact that owing to his failure to pay the fine, the appellant\u2019s fine was converted to a prison sentence pursuant to Article 47 of the Criminal Code. However, the Constitutional Court will examine that factor in the following paragraphs of this decision concerning the right to a fair trial. Therefore, in view of the above and the circumstances of this particular case, the Constitutional Court holds that the impugned restriction did not constitute an excessive burden for the appellant, that the measure undertaken by the State Court pursued legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 9 of the European Convention, and that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the restriction and the legitimate aim pursued. 48.  Accordingly, the Constitutional Court concludes that the impugned decision did not breach the appellant\u2019s right to manifest his religion under Article II \u00a7 3 (g) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 9 of the European Convention.\u201d 11.  Two out of the eight judges of the Constitutional Court appended dissenting opinions. They disagreed with the majority as concerns Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention. In particular, given that the applicant had appeared as summoned and had stood up while addressing the court, they considered that his conduct had not been disrespectful. They further maintained that, unlike public officials, private citizens, such as the applicant, did not owe a duty of neutrality. Therefore, the applicant\u2019s punishment for refusing to remove a religious symbol in a courtroom constituted, in their opinion, disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of religion.", "references": ["0", "7", "4", "9", "6", "3", "8", "2", "1", "No Label", "5"], "gold": ["5"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants complained of a breach of their property rights through the actions of Russian military forces in Chechnya in 2000 and the failure of the competent domestic authorities to provide them with effective remedies in respect of those breaches. 5.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The application was lodged on 14 March 2008 by Mr Isa Magometkhozhiyev, who was born in 1950 and currently lives in Urus-Martan, Chechnya. He is represented before the Court by Mr D. Itslayev, a lawyer practising in Grozny.\n(a)  Seizure of the applicant\u2019s vehicle 7.  The applicant lived at 109 Sovetskaya Street, Urus-Martan. At about 10 a.m. on 10 March 2000 a group of military servicemen arrived at the house. The servicemen drove two armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and an Ural lorry with the registration number M 105 61. The group\u2019s commander introduced himself to the applicant as Major Iv. They seized the applicant\u2019s GAZ-330700 petrol lorry, which was stationed in the courtyard. They did not show any documents or give any explanation in respect of the seizure to the applicant, except to tell him that they had been instructed by their commanders to do so. 8.  The applicant followed the servicemen who drove his lorry away. They entered the compound of a military unit known as DON-100, in the south-western outskirts of Urus-Martan. 9.  On 11 March 2000 the applicant was allowed by a soldier to enter the compound and he saw his vehicle there. The applicant states that he saw many other vehicles stationed there; some had parts missing. 10.  Two weeks later a serviceman told the applicant that his vehicle had been transported to a military unit in Mozdok, North Ossetia. 11.  The applicant stated that he had reported the seizure of the vehicle to the authorities immediately, but submitted no documents in this respect.\n(b)  Criminal investigation 12.  On 15 March 2001 the applicant informed the military prosecutor of Chechnya of the unlawful seizure of his lorry and asked him to intervene. 13.  On 19 June 2001 an investigator of the Urus-Martan district prosecutor\u2019s office (hereinafter \u201cthe district prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) asked the Ministry of Justice to inform him of the current location of Major Iv., who was no longer stationed in Chechnya. 14.  In July and August 2001 the Ministry of Justice replied to the investigator that no Ministry serviceman by the name of Iv. had been serving in Urus-Martan at the time in question. 15.  On 20 January 2002 the district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal investigation file no. 61001 into the alleged robbery. The decision by which the criminal investigation file was opened stated that in March 2000 a group of unidentified armed persons had, having threatened the applicant with firearms, taken his lorry from his house. 16.  After a subsequent exchange of letters between the district prosecutor\u2019s office and the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence, it proved impossible to identify the military unit in question. On this basis, in April 2003 the military prosecutor\u2019s office refused to take possession of the file. 17.  Officials of the North Caucasus Military Circuit denied that the GAZ lorry with the registration and identification numbers indicated by the applicant had been registered with any of their units. This was affirmed by the Chechnya Agency of State property. 18.  Certain documents indicated that the servicemen identified by the applicant as belonging to \u201cDON-100\u201d had served in military unit no. 3660 of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, which was permanently based in the Rostov Region. 19.  At some point the applicant was granted victim status and information about the vehicle was entered in the national register of missing and stolen vehicles. 20.  The applicant on numerous occasions complained to various bodies, including the civilian and military prosecutor\u2019s offices, and the military and civilian authorities both in Chechnya and at the federal level. 21.  The investigation was adjourned and reopened on several occasions but failed to identify the perpetrators, to find or question anyone from the military unit in question, or to locate the vehicle.\n(c)  Civil proceedings 22.  The applicant lodged a claim for compensation against the State Treasury. On 8 August 2005 the Urus-Martan Town Court refused to consider the claim on the merits. The applicant appealed, and on 30 August 2005 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed that decision and remitted it to the District Court for fresh examination. 23.  In the meantime, the applicant applied to the Urus-Martan Town Court, requesting that it confirm his ownership of the vehicle in question. The applicant submitted that the vehicle and relevant documents had been taken from him by unidentified servicemen of the Ministry of Justice. The Chechnya traffic police were unable to issue any documents since their archives had burned down in 2000, but a police inspector from Urus-Martan confirmed that the applicant had had the vehicle in his possession. Two witnesses confirmed that the applicant had owned the vehicle. On the strength of the above, on 27 February 2006 the Town Court confirmed the applicant\u2019s ownership of the vehicle in question. 24.  By a decision dated 21 September 2006 the Urus-Martan Town Court transferred the applicant\u2019s claim for damages to the Basmanny District Court of Moscow, the city in which the Federal Treasury was situated. The applicant appealed, and on 4 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the decision of 21 September 2006 and remitted the case to the Urus-Martan Town Court for fresh consideration. 25.  On 21 December 2006 the Urus-Martan Town Court considered the substance of the case and concluded that the evidence submitted by the applicant and adduced during the pending criminal investigation had failed to establish conclusively the implication of State agents in the crime. 26.  The applicant appealed, and on 30 January 2007 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the judgment of 21 December 2006 and again remitted the case to the Urus-Martan Town Court for fresh consideration. 27.  The applicant lodged a claim seeking compensation for the cost of the lorry (which he estimated at 170,000 Russian roubles (RUB)) and lost income, together with compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 1 August 2007 the Urus-Martan Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, referring to the absence of conclusive proof that State servicemen had seized the vehicle. On 18 September 2007 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that ruling, referring to the fact that the criminal investigation remained pending. 28.  The application was lodged on 6 October 2008 by Mr Ismail Amalayev, who was born in 1960 and currently lives in Kiel, Germany.\n(a)  Destruction of the applicant\u2019s lorry 29.  In the evening of 14 October 2000 the applicant, his wife and aunt travelled in the applicant\u2019s KAMAZ 53-20 lorry from the village of Starye Atagi to the Chiri-Yurt district of Grozny, Chechnya. At about 5 p.m. the applicant\u2019s lorry got stuck on the road, not far from a security roadblock. The applicant tried to seek help from the passing drivers, but they were either unable to tow the lorry or didn\u2019t want to stop, in view of the approaching curfew. 30.  An armoured personnel carrier (APC), with the hull number 233, belonging to military unit no. 205 was passing by, and the applicant signalled to it by flashing his headlights. The APC stopped within 200-300 metres of the applicant\u2019s lorry. Several servicemen got out but did not approach the lorry. Soon afterwards the applicant\u2019s lorry was shot at from the direction of the APC; the applicant, his wife and his aunt escaped unhurt and ran to Starye Atagi. 31.  In the morning on 15 October 2000 the applicant went to the lorry and found it burnt out and looking as though it had suffered from an explosion. The applicant immediately informed the local police, the head of the local administration of Starye Atagi and the local military commander\u2019s office.\n(b)  Criminal investigation 32.  On 19 October 2000 the applicant drew up a description of the destroyed lorry, which was co-signed by two traffic police officers from Starye Atagi. The description concluded that the lorry had been \u201cblown up and burned during curfew hours not far from the roadblock manned by the [servicemen of the] 205th motorised rifle regiment\u201d. The applicant submitted a copy of this document to the Court, with some handwritten corrections. 33.  On the same day a senior inspector of the state traffic police of the Grozny district department of the interior (\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0413\u0440\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438) concluded that the applicant\u2019s KAMAZ lorry had been destroyed by fire as a result of being fired at and could not be repaired. 34.  In a decision dated 24 October 2000, the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office stated that it would not open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations. It concluded that the applicant had left his lorry on the road and that the car had been destroyed by fire as a result of an electrical short circuit. In 2001-2002 the applicant lodged a number of complaints against that decision. 35.  On 25 March 2001 the Grozny District Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations that his KAMAZ lorry had been shot at and been destroyed by fire by unidentified servicemen driving APC no. 233. The investigation was adjourned on several occasions. 36.  In March 2006 the applicant, his wife and aunt were granted victim status. The value of the lorry was put by the applicant at RUB 280,000. It does not appear that the investigation progressed beyond the facts communicated by the applicant. 37.  On 8 May 2008 the Grozny District Court refused to consider the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation, since on 1 May 2008 the latest decision to adjourn the investigation had been quashed. On 11 June 2008 the Supreme Court of Chechnya confirmed this decision. 38.  On 1 June 2008 the applicant was, once again, informed that the investigation had been adjourned.\n(c)  Civil proceedings 39.  The applicant lodged a claim, seeking to recover the cost of the lorry directly from the military unit. On 15 November 2006 the Grozny District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The applicant appealed, and on 19 December 2006 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the District Court\u2019s decision and remitted the case to the District Court. The Supreme Court pointed out that the case-file material in respect of the pending criminal case, the applicant\u2019s submissions and the evidence produced all pointed to the Ministry of Defence as the possible tortfeasor. It considered that the District Court had failed to elucidate the circumstances of the events in question and to inform the Ministry of Defence of the hearing of 15 November 2006. 40.  The case was then transferred to Moscow, where the Ministry of Defence headquarters is located. On 2 March 2007 the Presnensky District Court dismissed the claim. It pointed out that the circumstances of the events in question were the subject of pending criminal proceedings and that \u201cmilitary unit no. 205\u201d did not exist, according to the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence. It is not clear if the applicant appealed. 41.  It appears that in March 2013 the applicant left Chechnya and, via Poland, moved to Germany.", "references": ["6", "8", "4", "3", "0", "2", "7", "1", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants are journalists. At the relevant time they were employed by one of the two national television stations in Denmark, Danmarks Radio, hereafter \u201cDR\u201d. The first applicant produced a television programme, described as a documentary, called \u201cWhen the doctor knows best\u201d, which was broadcast at 8 p.m. on 24 September 2008, and seen by 534,000 viewers. The second applicant was the first applicant\u2019s superior and responsible for the content of the programme. 7.  The television programme concerned the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, notably at Copenhagen University Hospital (Rigshospitalet), where Consultant S was in charge of treatment. It focused on two types of chemotherapy medication, Alimta, produced by L, and Vinorelbine, produced by F. Copenhagen University Hospital and S used Vinorelbine as first-line treatment in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin, depending on whether the treatment was related to an operation (operable patients) or to prolonging life and relieving pain and symptoms (inoperable patients). 8.  Three experts participated in the programme: a medical doctor from Karolinska Hospital in Sweden, a professor from Switzerland and a medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany. They all used Alimta as first-line treatment, most often in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin. The programme followed four patients and their relatives, who told their stories, and a narrator spoke as a voice-over throughout the programme. 9.  In preparation for the programme, the first applicant had carried out research on the subject which included, inter alia, the following. 10.  On 20 September 2004 the European Union had approved the marketing of Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for treatment of patients with inoperable pleural mesothelioma cancer. The background for the approval was, among others, research which had been carried out examining the effect of treatment with Alimta in combination with Cisplatin as compared to treatment with Cisplatin alone (a phase III trial, see paragraph 14 below) as first-line therapy. 11.  In July 2007 the Minister for Internal Affairs and Health replied to various questions posed by Members of Parliament as to the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer in Denmark. The Minister replied, inter alia, that there was no proof that an Alimta-based treatment was more efficient than other chemotherapy-based treatments, including that offered in Denmark; that the combination of Vinorelbine and Cisplatin, which was used at Copenhagen University Hospital, resulted in a one-year survival rate of 50% and a median lifetime of 12 months, which was exactly the survival rate from using the combination of Alimta and Cisplatin, but that there had been no direct comparison of the two treatments; and that there was no internationally accepted standard chemotherapy for the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, but that several single and combined treatments were used. 12.  On 11 June 2008 Copenhagen University Hospital produced a memorandum about pleural mesothelioma cancer and its treatment, which was sent to DR. It stressed that international studies, including of Vinorelbine and Alimta, had not shown that any two-combination regime was superior to other two\u2011combination regimes. That information was confirmed by the professor from Switzerland in an email of 25 June 2008 and by the medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany in an email of 27 June 2008. The memorandum also referred to a fund aimed at developing research on pleural mesothelioma cancer, in the amount of 90,000 Danish kroner (DKK), equal to approximately 12,000 Euros (EUR), received by S from company F, which produces Vinorelbine. The money had been used to pay nurses and students and for data collection. It emerged that there had been no financial profit for the doctors involved. 13.  Having received the above-mentioned memorandum, the first applicant again contacted the professor from Switzerland and the medical doctor at Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany. In essence, they confirmed in subsequent emails of 2 and 21 July 2008 that since there had been no direct comparative clinical studies, there was no scientific evidence that one two\u2011combination regime was superior to another two-combination regime. 14.  Medical research studies involving human subjects are called clinical trials. They are divided into different stages, called phases. Generally, it can be said that the earliest phase trials may look at whether a drug is safe or at its side-effects. A later phase II trial aims to find out whether the treatment works well enough, for which types of cancer the treatment works, more about side effects and how to manage them and more about the best dose to use. A later phase III trial aims to test whether a new treatment is better than existing treatments (standard treatment). These trials may compare a completely new treatment with the standard treatment or with different doses or ways of giving a standard treatment. 15.  Subsequent to the broadcast on 24 September 2008 of the television programme, on 27 October 2008 Copenhagen University Hospital and S instituted defamation proceedings before the Copenhagen City Court (K\u00f8benhavns Byret) against the Director of DR and the two applicants, maintaining that the latter, in the programme in question, had made direct and indirect accusations, covered by Article 267 of the Penal Code (Straffeloven), against Copenhagen University Hospital and S, of malpractice regarding certain patients suffering from pleural mesothelioma cancer, allegedly resulting in the patients\u2019 unnecessary death and shortening of life, in the interest of S\u2019s professional prestige and private finances. 16.  Before the City Court, the applicants, S, and Medical Director H for Copenhagen University Hospital gave evidence. 17.  The first applicant stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... that she had not criticised Copenhagen University Hospital for improper treatment causing death. Her message was only to point out that the substance of Alimta had been better documented than the substance of Vinorelbine. She had collected statements from patients and experts, but could not state herself whether Alimta was a better product than Vinorelbine ... The experts had not stated whether Alimta in combination with another product was better than Vinorelbine in combination with another product. However, all experts had emphasised that Alimta had been evaluated in a phase III trial, for which reason it was a more thoroughly tested product. ... her questions had been answered during her conversations with professor M on 19 October 2007 and S on 22 October 2007. Subsequently no one had been willing to answer her questions. That was the only real conversation she had had with S. The next time she had called him, he had put down the receiver. When it had not been possible for her to get any response to her many points of criticism, she had contacted H ... she had wanted statements from both H and S as the programme would be unbalanced if they were not heard ... Some found that Alimta had been better documented than Vinorelbine. She was not aware of any trial demonstrating that a combination with Alimta was better than a combination with another medicinal product ...\u201d.\nS stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cAlimta has been used for second-line therapy in Denmark since 2004, and since 2007 as first-line therapy. Patients had been given the impression in the media that Alimta was a miracle cure. Therefore Copenhagen University Hospital had introduced it as an option. Today, Alimta is used in combination with Carboplatin as the standard therapy for inoperable patients ... Sometimes in autumn 2008, the standard therapy for operable patients had been changed to Cisplatin in combination with Alimta. If some patients were offered Alimta everybody had to be offered Alimta ... After the programme had been broadcast ... patients started mistrusting the Vinorelbine therapy. Afterwards it was not possible to perform the trial [phase II] on this drug. Nor would it be possible to obtain funding for the trial. Therefore no trial had been performed of Vinorelbine ... he had provided the information included in professor M\u2019s memorandum of 23 September 2008 ...he had talked to [the first applicant] several times and had spent a lot of time and energy on explaining cancer therapy... he had also lost confidence in [the first applicant]...\u201d\nH stated, among other things:\n\u201c ...The approval of Alimta by the Danish Medicines Agency for the treatment of mesothelioma only means that a marketing authorisation has been granted for the drug, which means that advertisement of the product is permitted. Vinorelbine has also been approved by the Danish Medicines Agency, but for a wide range of oncological therapies ... in 2003 when Alimta was tested [phase III] the bar had been set quite low. The study compared Alimta with a clearly inferior treatment that would not actually be offered to anybody. It would have been more relevant to study Alimta in combination with Cisplatin versus Vinorelbine with Cisplatin .... S has made a phase II trial of the standard therapy [Vinorelbine] ... Subsequently the standard therapy regimen has been expanded to include Alimta, which is not a better product than Vinorelbine, but eight times more expensive ... if two drugs are equally effective, but one of them is eight times more expensive than the other, patients will be offered therapy using the cheaper drug. ... The standard therapies now offered by Copenhagen University Hospital are Vinorelbine in combination with Cisplatin for inoperable patients and Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for operable patients ... the shift to Alimta as the standard therapy at Copenhagen University Hospital did not reflect that Alimta was medically better. The [applicants\u2019] programme had had a large impact as patients were asking not to be treated with Vinorelbine. Copenhagen University Hospital had therefore had to change medical products because patients had the clear impression that Vinorelbine was not as good as Alimta ... It is quite usual for Copenhagen University Hospital to surrender material to the press and to answer questions, but the questions of [the first applicant] were never-ending. Copenhagen University Hospital has spent about a man-year, or about DKK 400,000, responding to inquiries from [the first applicant], and huge efforts had been made to accommodate her requests ... the programme had created distrust towards both Copenhagen University Hospital and S and had created uncertainty in both patients and relatives. He had received 50 to 100 \u201chate mails\u201d himself ...\u201d 18.  By a judgment of 9 April 2010, the Copenhagen City Court found against the applicants (and the Director of DR) and sentenced them each to 10 day-fines of 1,000 Danish Kroner (DKK). The allegations were declared null and void. The reasoning was as follows:\n\u201c...\nBased on the evidence, the City Court accepts as a fact that in 2004, following a phase III trial, EMEA approved Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for treating patients suffering from inoperable malignant pleural mesothelioma and that subsequently the same was approved by the Danish Medicines Agency. The court also accept as a fact that Vinorelbine is a drug dating back more than 20 years whose effect had been documented by clinical experience and approved by the Danish Medicines Agency for a wide range of oncological therapies. Finally, the court also accepts as a fact that it has not been documented that Alimta therapy in combination with a platin medicinal product is more effective than Vinorelbine therapy in combination with a platin medicinal product.\nAs regards the term \u201cexperimental drug\u201d the court accepts as a fact that a drug administered to patients in a trial is referred to as an experimental drug, no matter whether the same drug is the standard therapy offered outside the trial setting.\nNo matter that [the applicants] are deemed to have been aware of the above circumstances following their comprehensive research of the matter, it was said in the programme that, for dying patients, [S and Copenhagen University Hospital] had prescribed a \u201cnon-approved chemotherapy regimen\u201d not approved for the diagnosis or which was not \u201cthe correct chemotherapy\u201d, and that [S and Copenhagen University Hospital] used an \u201cexperimental drug\u201d, the \u201cworst-case scenario being that patients would die earlier than if they had been treated with an approved substance\u201d, or that it would have \u201cfatal consequences\u201d. Moreover, the phrase \u201cthe only drug with a known effect\u201d was used.\nSince no account was given in the programme of the above-mentioned trials and approval process and the terminology applied for that process, the court finds that it would seem to a non-professional viewer that Alimta was the only effective drug for mesothelioma, particularly because the programme linked the treatment of two patients with Vinorelbine to their death, whereas the prospect of several more years to live was held out to the one patient who had been given Alimta therapy in Germany.\nMoreover, the programme also linked S\u2019s use of Vinorelbine to his personal esteem and his \u201cpersonal research account\u201d, although [the applicants] had been made aware of the research grant management procedure though Professor M\u2019s memorandum of 23 September 2008 before the broadcast.\nSince no account was given either of the procedure for managing research grants, the court also finds in this respect that it would seem to a non-professional viewer that S had a personal financial interest in starting Vinorelbine treatment rather than Alimta.\nThe [applicants] are therefore considered to have violated Article 267 of the Penal Code.\nAccording to the information on [the applicants\u2019] knowledge after their comprehensive research of the matter, the court finds no basis for exempting them from punishment or remitting the penalty under Article 269 of the Penal Code, compare also Article 10 of the Convention.\n...\n[The applicants] are furthermore jointly and severally liable for paying legal costs of DKK 62,250.\u201d 19.  On appeal, on 10 June 2011 the judgment was upheld by the High Court of Eastern Denmark (\u00d8stre Landsret) with the following reasoning:\n\u201cIn the introduction to the programme \u2018When the doctor knows best\u2019 a narrator states, among other things: \u2018A Danish doctor is entering a medical congress to show his research results. For years he has gone his own way, he has treated dying patients with chemotherapy that is not approved.\u2019\nLater during the programme, it is stated at which hospitals one can receive treatment for pleural mesothelioma cancer, that these hospitals co-operate with Copenhagen University Hospital, and a reference is made to a named Consultant, S, head of the Scandinavian Centre for treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer.\nDuring the various interviews, a narrator states, inter alia:\n- \u2018The doctor does not give his patients the only approved medication. Instead, he uses a test medication. In the worst scenario, that may result in the patients dying earlier than if they had been given the approved substance.\u2019\n- \u2018There is only one approved chemotherapy against pleural mesothelioma cancer, but that is not offered to SP [one of the patients followed in the programme]. The doctors chose to treat her with a substance that is not approved for the diagnosis, and whose effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer is not substantiated.\u2019\n- \u2018However, that chemotherapy turned out to have huge consequences for her [SP].\u2019\n- \u2018S can freely choose the medication that he thinks is best. There is only one treatment which, in comparative studies, has proved to have an effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer. Accordingly, that is the only medication which is approved as treatment. That medication is called Alimta. However, S chose not to use that medication on his patients.\u2019\n- \u2018Thus, it has not been proved whether Vinorelbine works. According to the calculations made by DR, close to 300 patients in Denmark have been given test medication. In the worst scenario, that may result in patients dying earlier than if they had been given the approved medication.\u2019\n-\u2019For her [SP] the lack of effect of treatment by Vinorelbine turns out to have had fatal consequences.\u2019\n- \u2018The family K ask themselves why S goes his own way. They suspect that he has other interests than those of the patients. That suspicion grows, when they talk to SK\u2019s personal doctor.\u2019\n- \u2018It turns out, however, that S may also have had other reasons for choosing Vinorelbine. Because he has used this medication in medical tests on the patients. In a phase when they are fighting for their lives.\u2019\n-\u2019The question remains: why does S carry out tests with Vinorelbine? Could it have something to do with the prestige which is implicit in having research articles published?\u2019\n- \u2018We do not know whether it is prestige that impels S.\u2019\n- \u2018Thus, S will not acknowledge what leading experts agree on; [namely] that Alimta is the only medication whose effect is substantiated.\u2019\n- \u2018Here it turns out that S has received more than DKK 800,000 over the last five and a half years from the company F. That is the company behind the test medication Vinorelbine. The money has been paid into S\u2019s personal research account. DKK 90,000 is earmarked for the tests. S withheld that information.\u2019\nThe programme ends by informing us, among other things, that two of the patients who were interviewed have passed away. The narrator says, inter alia:\n\u2018TJ, who was part of S\u2019s tests with Vinorelbine, died on 4 January 2008.\u2019\nWith these statements, [the applicants] not only passed on assertions by patients, relatives and experts, but also took a stand, so that the programme undisputedly gave the viewers the impression that malpractice has occurred at Copenhagen University Hospital, in that S has deliberately used medication (Vinorelbine), which is not approved for treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, and whose effect has not been substantiated, that the medication in question was part of a test, and that the test medication has resulted in patients dying or having their lives shortened. The way that the programme is built up with its beginning and ending, the viewers get the clear impression that the reasons behind this choice of medication [Vinorelbine] were S\u2019s professional prestige and personal finances.\nAgainst this background, in the programme, the applicants, as producer of the programme and as chief sub-editor, have made an allegation against Copenhagen University Hospital and S of malpractice and of nourishing irrelevant considerations to the detriment of the lives and health of patients. Such an accusation is likely to disparage [Copenhagen University Hospital and S] in the eyes of their fellow citizens as set out in Article 267 of the Penal Code. It must have been clear to them [the applicants] that they were making such an allegation by way of their presentation of the programme.\nThe applicants have not attempted to establish the truth of the allegation, but have submitted that the allegation shall be unpunishable by virtue of Article 269 (1) of the Penal Code as they acted in lawful protection of an obvious public interest or the interest of others or, in the alternative, that punishment should be remitted under Article 269 (2) of the Penal Code because they were justified in regarding the allegations as true.\nThese provisions must, in connection with Article 267 of the Penal Code, be understood in the light of Article 10 of the Convention on the protection of freedom of expression. A very considerable public interest is related to journalistic discussion about risk to life and health, or suspicion thereof, as regards public hospital treatment. When balancing considerations of freedom of expression with considerations of the protection of the name and reputation of persons and companies, the former is accorded tremendous weight on the scale. That entails acknowledgement of a very far-reaching freedom of expression for the press, and accordingly the press must be permitted, as the public control- and information organ (\u2018public watchdog\u2019), a certain amount of exaggeration and provocation in connection with their discussion of these questions, when factually there are reasons for expressing criticism.\nOn the basis of the information in the case, including the research material that the applicants possessed before the broadcast of the programme, in particular the emails from [the medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany and the professor from Switzerland], the replies by the Minister for Internal Affairs and Health to various questions [posed by Members of Parliament], and the memorandum of 11 June 2008 produced by Copenhagen University Hospital [about pleural mesothelioma cancer], it can be established that Vinorelbine in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin was standard treatment at Copenhagen University Hospital, that the European Union on 20 September 2004 approved the marketing of Alimta in connection with Cisplatin for treatment of inoperable patients with pleural mesothelioma cancer, that there was no substantiation or basis for believing that an Alimta-based treatment was more efficient than the treatment offered by Copenhagen University Hospital, that some patients at Copenhagen University Hospital, who were already about to receive Vinorelbine as standard treatment, were chosen and offered the same medicine as part of a test [it is not known for what], and that S did not make any private financial profit from these tests.\nAgainst this background, including the fact that the word \u2018approved\u2019 was not explained during the programme, namely the difference between medication approved for treatment and [medication] approved for marketing, and by consistently using the word \u201ctest medication\u201d, even though only one patient in the programme participated in tests, [the applicants] made allegations which were based on an incorrect factual basis, of which they must have been aware via the research material.\nThe aim of the programme \u2013 to make a critical assessment of the treatment of patients with pleural mesothelioma cancer offered by Copenhagen University Hospital and the responsible consultant \u2013 is a legitimate part of the press\u2019s role as \u2018public watchdog\u2019, but it cannot justify an allegation, which is built on a factually incorrect basis, and thus a wrong premise. [The applicants], who did not limit themselves to referring to or disseminating statements by experts, patients and relatives, did not have any basis for making such serious allegations against Copenhagen University Hospital and S. The allegations cannot be justified on the grounds that Copenhagen University Hospital and S refused to participate in the programme.\nAgainst this background, and since in relation to Article 10 there is no interest to protect when there is no factual basis for the accusations, the allegations are not unpunishable under Article 269 (1), nor is there any basis for remitting the punishment under Article 269 (2) [of the Penal Code].\nIt is an aggravating factor that the wrongful accusations were disseminated on national television during primetime and on DR\u2019s homepage, by means of which the accusations had a significant spread.\nAccordingly, [the High Court] agrees [with the Copenhagen City Court\u2019s judgment] that [the applicants] be fined under Article 267, and that the allegations be declared null and void by virtue of Article 273 (1).\nThe High Court thus dismisses the appeal and upholds the judgment of the Copenhagen City Court.\nThe applicants shall be jointly and severally liable for paying legal costs of the High Court appeal to Copenhagen University Hospital and S, in the amount of DKK 90,000, which constitutes the legal fee inclusive of VAT. In fixing the amount, the High Court took into account the scope and duration of the case.\u201d 20.  On 27 October 2011 the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsn\u00e6vnet) refused the applicants\u2019 request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret). 21.  Subsequent to the broadcast on 24 September 2008 of the television programme, four complaints were lodged with the Patient Insurance Association (Patientforsikringen) relating to the issues raised by the programme. A press release published on the Associations\u2019 website on 9 March read as follows:\n\u201cAs of today, the Patient Insurance Association has received four complaints relating to the treatment of mesothelioma patients with combinatorial drugs other than Carboplatin and Alimta. That treatment was questioned by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) in a documentary programme in September 2008.\nThe Patient Insurance Association has received four complaints relating to the criticism raised. This means that the persons claiming compensation are either patients or their dependants, one of the reasons being their belief that the combinatorial drugs administered to treat the disease were incorrect ones.\nAll four complaints have been refused, one of the reasons being that the independent medical oncologists who assessed the cases found that it was in compliance with optimum medical standards to treat patients with the selected combination therapy.\nTwo of the cases have been appealed against to the National Agency for Patients\u2019 Rights and Complaints (Patientskadeanken\u00e6vnet). The National Agency for Patients\u2019 Rights and Complaints upheld the decision of the Patient Insurance Association, finding, inter alia:\u2019... [patients] were offered Carboplatin and Vinorelbine, which must be considered to be as active as other combinations with a favourable profile of adverse reactions\u2019. The other appeal does not concern the issue of combination therapy.\u201d", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "4", "1", "9", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The five applicants are Iraqi nationals. They now live in Switzerland, where they were granted asylum in July 2017 (see paragraph 31 below). The first and second applicants, Mr S.F. and Mrs W.O., born respectively in 1975 and 1978, are spouses. The other three applicants, Mr Y.F., Mr S.F. and Mr A.F., born respectively in 1999, 2004 and 2014, are their sons. 6.  On 14 August 2015 the applicants, who had fled from Iraq, covertly crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border. They were travelling with four other families. From there, they took taxis which drove them to the outskirts of Sofia, where they slept under the open sky for two nights. On 17 August 2015, they hired other taxis to drive them to the Bulgarian-Serbian border, somewhere around the town of Bregovo. Shortly before the border, the applicants switched cars, getting into a Toyota sports utility vehicle, which was supposed to take them through a wooded area to the border itself. They intended to cross that border covertly as well, and from there continue towards Western Europe. 7.  At that time, the second applicant was three months pregnant. 8.  According to media reports, over the last few years the above\u2011mentioned route has been a popular one for migrants trying to cross Bulgaria covertly on their way to Western Europe. According to a report submitted by the Government, in August 2015 the Bulgarian border police intercepted 350 adult migrants and 132 minor migrants near Bregovo and took them into custody. 9.  In the late afternoon of 17 August 2015 the applicants were driven in the Toyota towards the Bulgarian-Serbian border near the village of Rabrovo, which is about fifteen kilometres south of Bregovo, twenty-five kilometres west of the town of Vidin, and about two kilometres from the border. It was also transporting the four other families; together with the applicants, it carried a total of eighteen passengers, eight of whom were minors. 10.  At about 5 p.m., when the Toyota was just a few metres away from the border, two officers of the Bulgarian border police intercepted it. The driver fled. One of the officers gave chase, while the other ordered all the passengers to step out of the vehicle. The first officer could not catch up with the driver and came back. According to the applicants, he was apparently annoyed about his inability to detain the driver and hit one of the passengers. The applicants submitted that they had been afraid that he might hit them as well. 11.  Half an hour later, two more officers came to the scene; subsequently, a bus, with a driver and a photographer, also arrived. According to the applicants, the officers insulted the arrestees, called them \u201cmice\u201d (the applicants did not specify in what language), and made insulting gestures. They ordered the applicants and the other passengers to get into the bus and drove them to the Bregovo Border Police Department\u2019s detention facility in Vidin. According to the applicants, the drive took about an hour. According to the Government, the drive could not have taken less than three hours. The preparation of the documents relating to the applicants\u2019 arrest then took another hour, and the written declarations that they had been acquainted with their rights were stamped as having been signed at 9 p.m. The applicants could not have therefore been placed in their cell earlier than 10 p.m. 12.  Upon their arrival at the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin, the applicants were searched. According to them, all their effects \u2013 including travelling bags, mobile telephones, money, food, and even the fifth applicant\u2019s nappies, baby bottle and milk \u2013 were taken away from them, except for a mobile telephone belonging to the third or the fourth applicant, which they managed to conceal. According to a search report submitted by the Government, when searching the second applicant the authorities seized from her four mobile telephones, SIM cards, a USB flash drive, two digital video disks and cash. The Government also pointed out that in a video submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 15 below), travel bags and personal effects were visible inside their cell. 13.  After the search, the arrestees were split into two groups. The applicants and another family were put in one cell, and the others in an adjoining one. In the application form, the applicants stated that both cells were on the detention facility\u2019s second floor. 14.  According to the applicants, the cell was hot and its window could not be opened. 15.  The applicants also submitted a video, which according to them had been shot with the mobile telephone that they had managed to conceal during the search (see paragraph 12 above). It shows that the cell was at ground level, about 4 by 4 metres, with a large double window (secured on the inside by a mesh grille), an open door, and a padlocked metal grille on the door. In the video the cell looks run-down, with dilapidated walls, paint coming off the ceiling in flakes, and a dirty floor partly covered with dirty (and in places damp) cardboard sheets. The furniture consists of two old and dilapidated bunk beds and a single bed, with four or five bare soiled mattresses. Two of the mattresses are on the floor, one is on the single bed, and one is on the bottom bunk of one of the bunk beds. A single crumpled\u2011up bed sheet lies on one of the mattresses on the floor. Personal effects, such as a small shoulder bag, training shoes and some litter, are strewn about. Other random objects \u2013 food remains, empty plastic bottles, rubbish and a torn blanket \u2013 are piled up in a corner. The third and fourth applicants can be seen sitting on one of the bunk beds, whereas the fifth applicant (the toddler) can at first be seen sitting on the floor beside the door and then being picked up and carried around by the first applicant. Apart from the five applicants, three other people can be seen in the cell: a middle\u2011aged woman lying on the single bed, a boy (perhaps two or three years old), and the man shooting the video. 16.  The video was submitted by the applicants on a digital video disk containing two video files. One is in .mpg format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 5.36 p.m. on 17 September \u200e2015; and the other is in .mp4 format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 3.27 p.m. on 15 December 2015. The footage in both files is identical, except that: (a) the faces of the applicants in the first one have been pixelated (whereas in the second they have not); (b) the running time of the first video is one minute and twenty-one seconds (whereas that of the second is one minute and thirty-two seconds, as it continues for another ten seconds); and (c) in the first file the footage is horizontal whereas in the second it is rotated to the right at a ninety-degree angle. The footage in the first file has a definition of 1,280 by 720 pixels and is at twenty-four frames per second, whereas that in the second file has a definition of 1,920 by 1,080 pixels and is at twenty-nine frames per second. 17.  The applicants explained that the above-mentioned dates and times corresponded with when they had copied the video files in Switzerland, and that they had in fact recorded the original video on 18 August 2015, at about noon. Since they had taken the SIM cards out of the mobile telephone several times in the course of their journey and then re-inserted them, the telephone had not indicated the correct time and date, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact date and time when the video had been recorded. 18.  In a letter to the Government Agent, an official from the Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sofia, having compared the video footage with the photographs in the applicants\u2019 migration files, stated that he could confirm that the applicants were indeed the people featured in the video. 19.  According to the Government, the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin was equipped in accordance with the relevant regulations. They did not provide further details in that respect. 20.  According to the applicants, after being put in the cell, they were not given anything to eat or drink, or allowed to go to the toilet. Since there was no toilet or a bucket in the cell, they had to urinate onto the floor. The Government did not comment on that point. 21.  About four hours later, at about 10 p.m., officers came and took the first applicant to another building in order to take his picture and to digitally fingerprint him. After that, the officers took out the second applicant for fingerprinting. After the fingerprinting procedure, the officers left the applicants in the cell for the night. 22.  Between 10.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. and between 11 a.m. and 11.30 a.m. the next day, 18 August 2015, a border police investigator interviewed respectively the first and the second applicants. The interviews were conducted in English and translated into Bulgarian with the help of an interpreter. 23.  According to the applicants, after the interview the second applicant asked the guards to give her back her bag, so that she could prepare a baby bottle for her toddler (the fifth applicant), and the guards did so. The Government did not comment on that point. 24.  After that, the guards took the applicants one by one out of the cell to go to the toilet. 25.  According to the applicants, later that day, a ten-month-old child in the adjoining cell touched an electrical wire and suffered an electric shock. That caused panic among the detainees, and the guards allowed all of them out of their cells. An ambulance was called. When hearing that the applicants had not had anything to eat or drink since their arrest, the nurse who came with the ambulance argued with the guards and took the second applicant and her youngest child, the fifth applicant, to a hospital in Vidin, where the second applicant was examined by a gynaecologist between 8.05 p.m. and 8.35 p.m., and the fifth applicant was examined by a paediatrician between 8.20 p.m. and 8.40 p.m. Two or three hours later they were taken back to the detention facility. 26.  According to the applicants, at that point the guards told them that they would give them food if they paid for it; the guards then took money from their bags and gave them two loaves of bread, a yoghurt, four bottles of Coca-Cola, one kilogram of tomatoes, one kilogram of cucumbers, one kilogram of bananas, and a small piece of pat\u00e9. According to the Government, the applicants were provided with food and water, in accordance with the relevant regulations. In support of their assertion, the Government submitted a table setting out the prescribed daily rations for adult and minor detained migrants and a report, drawn up by the head of the Bregovo Border Police Department on 1 September 2015, which listed the names of all migrants \u2013 including the applicants \u2013 which had been detained in the Department\u2019s detention facility in Vidin during the month of August 2015 and provided with food there. 27.  Then, at about 10 p.m. or 11 p.m., the applicants were put back in the cell. According to them, they were allowed to go to the toilet before that, but had not been able to do so during the night. The Government did not comment on that point. 28.  The next day, 19 August 2015, the applicants were served with orders for the first and second applicants\u2019 removal from Bulgaria and for their detention pending removal, all issued the previous day. It does not appear that separate orders were issued with respect to the third, fourth and fifth applicants, who were mentioned as accompanied minors in the orders for the first and second applicants\u2019 detention (see paragraph 33 below). 29.  According to the applicants, at about midday on 19 August 2015 they were given back their belongings and driven to an immigration detention facility in Sofia. According to the Government, that happened much earlier that day, at about 6 a.m. or 7 a.m., since the relevant records showed that the applicants had been placed in the detention facility in Sofia at 2.45 p.m., and the normal travel time between the two facilities was about six or seven hours. 30.  On 24 August 2015 the applicants sought international protection in Bulgaria. Their applications were registered by the State Agency for Refugees on 31 August 2015, and they were released from the immigration detention facility in Sofia and settled in an open facility for the accommodation of asylum-seekers. On 23 September 2015 those proceedings were, however, discontinued because the applicants had vanished from the facility. 31.  In the meantime, the applicants made their way to Switzerland, where they likewise sought international protection on 8 September 2015. On 8 January 2016 the Swiss authorities decided not to examine their applications but rather to transfer them back to Bulgaria under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third\u2011country national or a stateless person (\u201cthe Dublin III Regulation\u201d), which also applies to Switzerland (see A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350/13, \u00a7\u00a7 12-13, 30 June 2015). Following legal challenges by the applicants, on 7 July 2016 the Swiss authorities varied their own decision and proceeded with the examination of the applications. Just over a year later, on 27 July 2017, the applicants were granted asylum in Switzerland.", "references": ["2", "6", "0", "3", "7", "9", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 5.  On 23 April 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted. 6.  On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7.  On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 8.  On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9.  On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.\u2019s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer was on vacation. 10.  On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11.  On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12.  On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.\u2019s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13.  On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14.  On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.\u2019s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15.  On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.\u2019s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16.  On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 17.  On 11 January 2008 the Riga Regional Court started to hear the parties\u2019 arguments regarding the merits of the case. On 15 January 2008 it convicted the applicant of attempted bribery and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. 19.  On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 20.  By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s \u201creference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic.\u201d", "references": ["4", "8", "6", "0", "9", "2", "5", "1", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  In 1957 several plots of land (agricultural land at the time) were expropriated from the applicants\u2019 legal predecessors. The present cases concern restitution proceedings in which the applicants sought that the plots of land, which, at present, form part of a campsite on the shore of Lake Ohrid, be restored to their possession. 6.  On 14 August 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings. On 15 September 2003 the Ministry of Finance\u2019s Restitution Commission (\u201cthe Restitution Commission\u201d) granted the applicants\u2019 claims and awarded them compensation, the form of which was to be determined by a separate decision. It established that according to an urban plan of 20 March 2002 the land was designated as a public green zone in a tourist area. Relying on an on-site inspection (\u0443\u0432\u0438\u0434) of 1 September 2002, it further held that the land was developed (\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440) with access paths and supporting infrastructure. 7.  On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 8.  On 31 May 2005 the the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u043d \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u2013 \u201cthe second-instance commission\u201d) dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Restitution Commission. Relying on section 10 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 15 below), the second-instance commission held that the land in question was of public interest (\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441) and could not be restored to the applicants\u2019 possession, but that compensation should be awarded instead. 9.  On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants\u2019 case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10.  On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 11.  On 28 November 2003 the Restitution Commission upheld the applicants\u2019 restitution claim and awarded them compensation in State bonds. Relying on an on-site inspection of 13 May 2002 and a certificate of 15 September 2002 issued by the competent Ministry, it established that the plot in question was located within the boundaries of the campsite; that it had been designated as a public green zone and that pedestrian paths and other similar infrastructure were planned for construction. It concluded accordingly that the plot could not be restored to the applicants\u2019 possession. 12.  An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13.  The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission\u2019s decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14.  On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.", "references": ["8", "6", "4", "0", "9", "2", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1973, lives in Austria since 2001 and is currently in detention pending extradition at Vienna-Josefstadt Prison. 8.  The application concerns proceedings for extradition from Austria to Kosovo, which have the following background: 9.  S.Lu. is the former husband of the applicant\u2019s sister, T.L. In the course of an argument on 9 October 2001, S.Lu. stabbed the applicant in the chest. On 27 May 2002 S.Lu. was convicted in Austria of attempted intentional homicide (versuchter Totschlag) committed in a comprehensible state of emotion (in einer allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gem\u00fctsbewegung) under Articles 15 and 76 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant testified as a witness during that trial. 10.  After S.Lu. was released from prison in 2005, the applicant\u2019s sister reported him to the police for having repeatedly raped her during their marriage, and for threatening to kill her and her family. Out of fear of her husband, she changed her and her children\u2019s names. An order to determine S.Lu.\u2019s whereabouts (Ausschreibung zur Aufenthaltsbestimmung) was issued by the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office in 2008 and is in effect until 2 February 2018. 11.  On the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by the Mitrovica District Court (Kosovo) on 26 November 2010 and 6 May 2011, the applicant was apprehended and taken into detention pending extradition by a decision of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Criminal Court\u201d) of 15 January 2016. On 20 January 2016 the Ministry of Justice of Kosovo requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. According to the arrest warrant, the applicant was suspected of aggravated murder under Article 147 \u00a7 7 in conjunction with Article 24 of the Kosovo Criminal Code. He had allegedly ordered L.Q. in July 2010 to murder S.Lu. (his former brother-in-law) for a payment of 30,000 euros (EUR). On 3 August 2010 L.Q. fired gunshots at a car in the vicinity of the intended victim S.Lu., but instead killed N.Lu., S.Lu.\u2019s cousin. 12.  During the extradition proceedings, the applicant alleged that he had nothing to do with the murder in Kosovo. He claimed that the accusations had been invented by S.Lu. as revenge for the applicant\u2019s having testified against him during the criminal proceedings in Austria. Furthermore, the \u201cLu. clan\u201d (the family of S.Lu.) was very influential in Kosovo and had connections to the highest Government officials and the justice authorities there, which is why the applicant could not expect a fair trial in that jurisdiction. In addition, the conditions of detention in Kosovo prisons were deplorable and would amount to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Because of the threat emanating from S.Lu. and his family, the applicant would have to fear for his life there. They could easily get to him in prison by using their connections. 13.  On 24 February 2016, after having held an oral hearing, the Criminal Court declared the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kosovo permissible. It held that during the extradition proceedings, the court was not called on to examine whether the applicant was guilty or innocent, but merely to assess whether there was enough evidence to raise suspicions against him, which according to the documents submitted by the Kosovo authorities was the case. None of the evidence offered by the applicant had been capable of dispelling these suspicions immediately and without doubt, as would have been required by section 33(2) of the Extradition and Legal Aid Act (Auslieferungs- und Rechtshilfegesetz \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Extradition Act\u201d). The fact that S.Lu. had been convicted of attempted intentional homicide in 2002 and the allegation that he wanted to take revenge on the applicant did not dispell the suspicion either. Furthermore, the court remarked that S.Lu.\u2019s cousin had actually been killed, which called into question the applicant\u2019s theory of that being a contrived story. It could equally be argued that the applicant had wanted to take revenge on S.Lu. for stabbing him. Concerning the applicant\u2019s fear for his life in Kosovo, the court stated that the mere possibility of inhuman or degrading treatment did not suffice. The applicant had failed to adduce specific evidence of an actual, individual threat of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, in case of extradition to a member state of the Convention, the responsibility of the extraditing state was limited, as the person concerned could seek protection against a violation of the Convention in the receiving state. 14.  On 24 March 2016 the applicant appealed. He submitted that if extradited to Kosovo, he risked treatment contrary to Article 3, because Lu. Clan wished to take revenge on him. In fact, Sm. Lu., a very influential member of that clan, was detained at Mitrovica prison and following extradition to Kosovo, he would be detained at that prison as well. Security in prison in Kosovo was a problem, as prisoners became frequently victims of aggression, and he would therefore also risk to become the victim of an assault. 15.  On 31 May 2016 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien \u2011 hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It confirmed the Criminal Court\u2019s finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate a real and individual risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that the Kosovo authorities would not be able to protect him from third, private parties. Furthermore, members of the allegedly influential Lu. clan were themselves imprisoned in Kosovo. In particular, on 21 January 2008 S.Lu. was convicted in Kosovo for issuing a dangerous threat against the applicant, which demonstrated that the Kosovo authorities were indeed capable of taking adequate measures to protect the applicant. Moreover, the Lu. clan could not be that influential if it was not capable of keeping its own members out of prison. Concerning the conditions of detention, the court held that the report on Kosovo by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (hereinafter \u201cthe CPT\u201d) of 2011 (see paragraph 30 below) did not state that ill-treatment was the rule in Kosovo prisons, but that there were merely sporadic incidents of violence. The mere possibility of ill-treatment by prison officers did not suffice to stop the applicant\u2019s extradition. In relation to the material conditions of detention in Mitrovica Detention Centre, where the applicant alleged he would most likely be held if extradited, the Court of Appeal again quoted the above-mentioned CPT report of 2011, where it was found that inmates were able to move freely within that facility during the day and could exercise outside on a daily basis for three and a half hours, and that fitness and computer rooms have recently been installed. 16.  On 13 June 2016 the Austrian Federal Minister of Justice (Justizminister) approved the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kosovo. 17.  On 20 June 2016 the applicant requested that the Court indicate to the Austrian Government to stay his extradition to Kosovo under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would run the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or even death, as the Lu. clan wanted to take revenge on him and the Kosovo authorities were not willing or able to afford him protection. 18.  On 22 June 2016 the Court granted the applicant\u2019s request. 19.  On 17 June 2016 the applicant lodged applications for the reopening (Wiederaufnahme) of the extradition proceedings and a stay of the extradition with the Criminal Court. He produced a certified declaration by L.Q., who had retracted his previous confession to the police that the applicant had ordered the murder of S.Lu. He asserted that he had been tortured by the Kosovo police during his questioning and had been pressured into blaming the applicant for ordering the murder. L.Q. alleged that he had fallen unconscious several times because of the \u201cmental and physical torture\u201d. L.Q. averred that he did not even know the applicant in person. The applicant further submitted into evidence several sworn statements from family members and friends, who attested that his life was in danger in Kosovo because of threats from S.Lu. and his clan. 20.  On 23 June 2016 the Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s applications. It held that in accordance with section 33(2) of the Extradition Act, the applicant had failed to adduce evidence which would have been capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against him raised in the extradition request. L.Q.\u2019s declaration did not constitute objective evidence and did not indicate any violations in Kosovo of the applicant\u2019s rights under the Convention either. The applicant appealed. 21.  On 18 July 2016 the applicant lodged an application for a renewal (Erneuerung) of the extradition proceedings with the Supreme Court under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d), requesting suspensive effect at the same time. 22.  On 6 September 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. It found that the new evidence the applicant had produced in the proceedings before it were a matter for the pending reopening proceedings, not for requesting a renewal of the extradition proceedings. In relation to the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the event of his extradition, the Supreme Court found that mere allegations referencing general reports on the human rights situation were not capable of substantiating a real and immediate risk to the applicant under these provisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the applicant did not have a right under the law to request suspensive effect, which is why that request had to be rejected. 23.  On 24 January 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the Criminal Court\u2019s decision of 23 June 2016 (see paragraph 20 above). The court found that the applicant had failed to produce objective evidence which would have indicated a real and immediate risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if extradited to Kosovo and therefore would have warranted a reopening of the extradition proceedings. While the sworn statement by L.Q. in principle raised doubts in relation to the suspicions against the applicant, it had not constituted the only evidence against him. More pertinent had been the fact that, during the criminal proceedings against L.Q. in Kosovo, a microcassette had been put into evidence by S.Lu. which had allegedly contained a conversation confirming his statements that the applicant had been to blame for the murder. In addition, L.Q.\u2019s initial incriminating statements against the applicant had been made in the presence of his lawyer. Moreover, L.Q. had not specified what exactly the police had allegedly done to him, which had made it impossible to evaluate whether the alleged treatment had actually amounted to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal reiterated that it was in any event for the Kosovo courts to evaluate the evidence against the applicant. In sum, it confirmed that the statement by L.Q. was not capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against the applicant on which the extradition request was based. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that despite not being a State Party to the Convention or the Council of Europe, Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo granted the Convention direct effect under and superiority to national law, therefore domestic law equally offered protection from violations of the Convention. The Court of Appeal\u2019s decision to dismiss the applicant\u2019s appeal was served on his counsel on 30 January 2017.", "references": ["5", "8", "7", "2", "4", "6", "9", "No Label", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["0", "1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant was employed as a police officer in 1977. After having participated in several international missions, in 2001 he applied for a position as police observer in a new mission. This necessitated an assessment of his psychological suitability, which he underwent at the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s Psychology Institute (hereinafter \u201cthe Institute\u201d) on 1 September 2001. 7.  The result of the assessment was negative and the applicant was not included in the contingent to be sent to the international mission. 8.  The applicant complained of the negative result of his psychological assessment to the head of the Institute, but was informed, in a letter dated 1 February 2002, that a check-up had shown that the assessment had been objective and correct. In an explanatory note sent to the head of the Institute in relation to that check-up the psychologist who had carried out the assessment explained that during his interview with the applicant he had informed the latter of the results of the assessment in a \u201cclement manner\u201d, and that the applicant had been able to pose questions and to comment. 9.  After the negative outcome of the assessment, on 1 March 2002 the applicant retired from service. The parties have not specified whether he would have been able to continue working for the Ministry of the Interior at a different position. 10.  Despite having formally retired, after the expiry of the statutory time-limit of one year the applicant was allowed to undergo a fresh psychological assessment at the Institute, in relation to the preparation of a new international police mission. The new psychological assessment was conducted on 11 October 2002, and the Institute psychologists concluded once again that the applicant was psychologically unfit for the job. Thus, the applicant\u2019s application to join the new mission was rejected. 11.  The applicant complained of this outcome to the Minister of the Interior and other bodies, such as the parliamentary commission on internal security and public order and the President of the Republic. The human resources department of the Ministry of the Interior informed him, in a letter dated 29 January 2003, that the refusals to include him in the international contingents had been lawful. 12.  On 12 February 2003 the applicant applied under the Protection of Personal Data Act (see paragraph 22 below) to receive access to the documents contained in his personnel file at the Ministry of the Interior. He argued that the file contained data which could be considered personal for the purposes of this Act, including \u201cappraisals, the results of different tests, data from psychological assessments\u201d. 13.  In the subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings, as described below, the competent national authorities did not refer to any individual documents or a category of documents, but instead referred generally to the information sought by the applicant as \u201cpersonal data\u201d contained in his personnel file. 14.  An initial refusal to allow him access to the file, signed by the head of the Ministry\u2019s human-resources department and dated 2 April 2003, was quashed on 17 November 2003 by the Sofia City Court, as it had not been ordered by the competent body, namely the Minister of the Interior. This conclusion was upheld on 30 July 2004 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 15.  On 31 January 2005 the Minister of the Interior issued a decision refusing the applicant access to his personnel file. He relied in general terms on the provisions of section 34(3) of the Protection of Personal Data Act and section 182(7) of the Ministry of the Interior Act, as in force at the time (see paragraphs 22 and 25 below). 16.  This refusal was quashed by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court on 29 July 2005, on the grounds that it had not been reasoned, as it had merely referred to the provisions restricting access to personal data without explaining how they had been relevant to the circumstances of the case and without accounting for the applicant\u2019s own right to access to data concerning him. On 15 August 2006 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court upheld these findings. 17.  In a new decision dated 17 October 2006, the Minister of the Interior refused the applicant access to his personnel file at the Ministry. The Minister relied once again on section 34(3) of the Protection of Personal Data Act, as well as on section 161 of the Ministry of the Interior Act of 2006 (see paragraphs 22 and 26 below). He explained that personnel files of officers contained information on \u201cthe enquiries in respect of a person applying to be employed\u201d at the Ministry and information revealing the Ministry\u2019s \u201cstructures, positions and functions\u201d. He noted that the first category of information was classed as an official secret, but at the same time mentioned that, in accordance with an internal instruction of the Ministry, officers\u2019 personnel files had to be considered to contain information which was a State secret. It was explained further that even though personnel files also comprised documents which contained no sensitive information, owing to the presence of some classified documents the files had to be classified in their entirety. 18.  The applicant applied for judicial review. He explained the circumstances in which he had left the Ministry of the Interior and that he had a \u201cparticularly strong interest\u201d to get acquainted with his psychological assessments. He stated furthermore that his application for access to his personnel file concerned his \u201cprofessional identity\u201d. He argued that the Minister of the Interior had not duly taken into account his right to access to information, that there were no legal grounds to consider the information referred to in the decision as classified, and that in any event, seeing that the applicant had left the Ministry in 2002 and that the relevant time-limits for keeping classified documents representing official secrets had expired, any such documents in his file had had in the meantime to be declassified. 19.  In a judgment of 25 March 2008 a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review. It held that the Minister\u2019s decision was well reasoned, and that the Minister had correctly considered that the information concerned was classified. It pointed out that even though personnel files of police officers also comprised documents which contained no sensitive information, they had to be classified in their entirety due to the presence of some classified documents. 20.  Upon appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 8 July 2008 the judgment above was upheld by a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. It endorsed the three-member panel\u2019s reasoning, adding that the declassification of documents could only occur after an express decision of the competent official, despite the expiry of the relevant time-limits. 21.  In the proceedings before the Court the Government submitted copies of the applicant\u2019s psychological assessments of September 2001 and October 2002. They bear no security markings.", "references": ["3", "9", "2", "6", "7", "8", "0", "1", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Enfield (United Kingdom). 7.  The complaints raised in this application arise out of the Turkish military intervention in northern Cyprus in July and August 1974. The general context of the property issues arising in this connection is set out in the cases of Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, \u00a7\u00a7 13-16 and 28-33, ECHR 2001\u2011IV), and Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) ([GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, \u00a7\u00a7 4-16, ECHR 2010). 8.  In 1997 the applicant was gifted five plots of land, or shares in them, by her aunt, who died in 1998. In 2008 she was also gifted an additional share of one of the plots of land by her mother. According to the certificates of ownership provided by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, the applicant is the sole owner of four plots of land and owns a 9/16 share of the fifth plot. 9.  The land lies in the village Koma Tou Yialou (Kumyali) in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. The total area of the land is some 18 d\u00f6n\u00fcm.[1] 10.  In 2007 the applicant instructed a law firm in Nicosia, which duly obtained a valuation report on the land from a Turkish Cypriot chartered surveyor. The valuation report of 3 December 2007 assessed each of the five plots of land and provided valuations for them, which ranged from 500 pounds sterling (GBP) per d\u00f6n\u00fcm to GBP 10,000 per d\u00f6n\u00fcm. 11.  In October 2011 the applicant obtained a further valuation report by a chartered surveyor from the Republic of Cyprus. This report valued the five plots of land, including the economic loss and interest (all calculated for the period between 1974 and 2011), at 2,690,962 euros (EUR) in total. 12.  In February 2017 the applicant obtained a new valuation report from the Land Registration Office of the Republic of Cyprus which assessed the value of the property in question, including economic loss and interest accrued since 1997 (when the applicant became owner of the property) to December 2016, at EUR 2,088,366 in total. 13.  In May 2008 the applicant, through her Turkish Cypriot representatives, filed a claim with the IPC under Law no. 67/2005 (see paragraphs 41-43 below) \u2012 supported by an affidavit \u2012 claiming restitution of her property and/or compensation at the property\u2019s current market value and damages for loss of use of the land in question. The total compensation sought was GBP 100,000 per d\u00f6n\u00fcm (GBP 1,800,000 or approximately EUR 2,285,000). 14.  In her affidavit the applicant attested that the property in question had been transferred to her after 1974 by her aunt, who had owned it since before 1974. The affidavit also attested that there were no mortgages, liabilities or restrictions on the property in question, that the applicant lived in South Cyprus in a house owned by a Turkish Cypriot, and that she was paying rent to the Republic of Cyprus. The file also contained the applicant\u2019s identity documents (British passport and Cypriot identity card), certificates from the Republic of Cyprus Land Registry and Surveys Department concerning the ownership and legal status of the applicant\u2019s plots of land (indicating no mortgages, liabilities or other restrictions), and a document issued by the relevant Cypriot authority showing that the applicant lived in a house owned by a Turkish Cypriot and had been billed 270 Cypriot pounds (CYP) by way of rent for the period 1 April 2003 to 30 June 2004. 15.  The applicant\u2019s claim was communicated to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney General as provided under Law no. 67/2005 and the relevant IPC Rules (see paragraph 43 below). 16.  On 5 May 2010, the Attorney General\u2019s Office submitted an opinion to the IPC in reply to the applicant\u2019s claim. It relied on an affidavit by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Director of the Land Registry and Surveys Department, who explained that their records showed that one of the registered owners of the property in question was Chrystollou Nicola Stavrinou (the applicant\u2019s aunt), that Maria Nicola Stavrinou (the applicant\u2019s mother) was the owner of part of one of the plots of land, and that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that she was the legal heir of the two registered owners. He also considered that the applicant\u2019s compensation claim was excessive and unfounded. 17.  A directions hearing before the IPC took place on 25 May 2010. The applicant\u2019s representative stated that they had received the Attorney General\u2019s opinion only on the day of the hearing and thus asked for an adjournment in order to prepare their case. The Attorney General\u2019s representative did not object and the hearing was adjourned until 1 June 2010. 18.  At a directions hearing on 1 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative undertook to obtain a valuation report and a document showing that the plots of land had been transferred to the applicant by way of donation. The Attorney General\u2019s representative requested that documents showing that the applicant was the legal heir of Chriystolleuo Nicola Stavrou [sic.] should be provided, as well as proof of the amount of rent she was paying for the Turkish Cypriot house where she lived in the South, or alternatively the lease agreement by which the house had been allocated to her. The Attorney General\u2019s representative also undertook to submit a search document from the \u201cTRNC\u201d Land Registry and Surveys Department, and indicated that he reserved his right to submit and request further documents. The hearing was adjourned so that the parties could obtain the relevant documents. 19.  On 3 June 2010 the Attorney General submitted the search document of the \u201cTRNC\u201d Land Registry and Surveys Department relating to the plots included in the applicant\u2019s claim. 20.  On 6 June 2012, through her representative, the applicant asked permission to amend her initial claim. She submitted that she had in the meantime become the sole owner of the plot of which she had previously owned a 5/6 share and that in October 2011 she had obtained a valuation report indicating that the value of her properties was EUR 2,690,962 (see paragraph 8 above). 21.  At a preliminary hearing on 18 June 2012, after the Attorney General\u2019s representative stated that he had no objections with regard to the amendment of the applicant\u2019s claim; the President of the IPC accepted the amendment and instructed the applicant to submit her amended claim and the Attorney General\u2019s Office to submit an opinion in that regard. 22.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant complied with the order and amended her claim, seeking compensation in accordance with the new findings and developments concerning her property title. 23.  On 20 November 2012 the applicant submitted the documents requested by the Attorney General\u2019s representative on 1 June 2010 (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, the applicant submitted certificates issued by the head of the local community (mukhtar) explaining that there were inconsistencies in the spelling of the applicant\u2019s aunt\u2019s name in different documents. The mukhtar explained that the latter had held Cypriot identity document no. 327090 and had been variously known as: Christallou Nikola Stavrinou, Chriystallou Nicola Stavrinon, Christallou Nicola Stavrinou, Christalla Nikola and Chrystallou Nicola, but these were one and the same person. The mukhtar further certified that she had never married and that before her death she had gifted her immovable property to her sister\u2019s daughter, the applicant (Andriani Ioannou, holder of a Cypriot identity card). In support of the mukhtar\u2019s certificates, the applicant submitted her aunt\u2019s identity documents (including a Cypriot identity document). The applicant also submitted documents showing the transfer of title from her aunt to her in respect of the plots of land in question. She also submitted documents showing that she had been allocated a Turkish Cypriot house in the South and had paid CYP 342 by way of rent for the period 1 June 2000 to 31 December 2001 and CYP 270 for the period 1 April 2003 to 30 June 2004. 24.  A preliminary hearing before the IPC scheduled for 10 January 2013 was adjourned due to the absence of the Attorney General\u2019s representative, who could not attend the hearing for family reasons. 25.  At a preliminary hearing on 25 January 2013 the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities were represented by the Attorney General\u2019s representative and the under\u2011secretary of the Housing Affairs Department. They asked the applicant to submit the birth certificates of her aunt and her mother and a title deed for the property which she now owned in its entirety. The hearing was adjourned to enable the applicant to obtain the documents in question. 26.  On 19 February 2013 the applicant submitted the requested documents, which also included documents confirming that her aunt had never been married. 27.  At a preliminary hearing on 25 April 2013 the \u201cTRNC\u201d representatives asked the applicant to submit certificates from the mukhtar showing that the names Andriani Joannou, Andriani Ioannou and Andriani Georgiou Antoniou all referred to the applicant, and further certificates showing that her aunt had been variously known as Chrystollou Nicola Stavrinou, Chrystolleuo Nicola Stavriou, Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou, Nikola Hristallu (Nicola Hrystallou), Hristalla Nicola and Hrystallou Nicola (Nikola), and that her mother had been variously known as Maria Nicola Stavrinou, Maria Stavrinou, Maria Georgiou and Maria Georgios, and that their antecedent Nikolas Stavrinou (Nicolas Stavrinou), had also been known as Nicola Stavrinou and Nicola Stavrinu. The hearing was adjourned to permit the applicant to obtain the requested documents. 28.  On 9 May 2013 the applicant submitted certificates from the mukhtar showing that the aforementioned different names referred to the same individuals, namely the applicant, her mother, her aunt and their antecedent, respectively. The mukhtar\u2019s certificates also identified these individuals on the basis of their identity card numbers. A certificate dated 8 May 2013 indicated that the applicant\u2019s mother was variously known as Maria Nicola (Nicolas, Nikola, Nikolas) Stavrinou and her aunt as Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou. 29.  At a preliminary hearing on 24 October 2013, at which the applicant was also present, the \u201cTRNC\u201d representatives argued that the mukhtar\u2019s certificates were incomplete and that the names Maria Nicola (Nicolas, Nikola, Nikolas) Stavrinou, for the applicant\u2019s mother, and Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou, for the applicant\u2019s aunt, should be added. The representative further argued that an official document should be submitted showing that the applicant\u2019s aunt had not married and did not have any other heirs. He also requested a document showing that there were no liabilities attaching to the property in question. Upon production of these documents, the Attorney General\u2019s representative would be prepared to settle the case by paying GBP 60,000 to the applicant. 30.  In reply, the applicant\u2019s representative stated that they would obtain the requested documents. However, he pointed out that they had already produced documents showing that the applicant\u2019s aunt had never married and this was anyway apparent from the fact that she had never changed her last name. The applicant\u2019s representative also pointed out that the applicant\u2019s aunt had transferred the property in question to the applicant while she was still alive. He asked for an adjournment in order to consider the Attorney General\u2019s settlement offer. 31.  On 16 January 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative asked that a hearing be held before the IPC. 32.  A further examination of the case before the IPC took place on 1 March 2016. The President and members of the IPC questioned the applicant\u2019s representative with regard to the instructions he had received from the applicant concerning the case. As the applicant was not present and could not be reached at that time to give clear instructions concerning the case, the hearing was adjourned. 33.  On 9 March 2016 the applicant\u2019s Turkish Cypriot representatives informed her representative in the Republic of Cyprus that the fact that an application had been lodged with the Court had caused them upset. They also stated that they would not represent the applicant in further proceedings. 34.  A hearing before the IPC was held on 28 June 2016. The applicant\u2019s Turkish Cypriot representative explained that she had informed the applicant of her wish to withdraw from the case. However, she was unable to provide an official document to that effect and the hearing was therefore adjourned in order for the representative to complete the formalities for withdrawal. 35.  On 19 August 2016 the applicant took over the files from her Turkish Cypriot representatives. 36.  At a hearing on 28 September 2016 the IPC accepted the applicant\u2019s Turkish Cypriot representatives\u2019 withdrawal from the case and decided that the applicant should be contacted directly during the future course of the proceedings. Another hearing was scheduled for 12 October 2016. 37.  On 15 October 2016 the applicant informed the IPC that she had not received the summons to the hearing of 12 October 2016 until 13 October 2016. 38.  A further meeting for the examination of the case, at which the applicant was personally present, was held on 2 March 2017. The \u201cTRNC\u201d representatives argued that the applicant should provide further documents showing the exact dates of birth of her mother and her aunt as well as the respective death certificates. Furthermore, they argued that the applicant could not be considered to be a legal heir of her aunt for the purpose of Law no. 67/2005 as she had obtained the property at issue from her aunt while the latter was still alive. The applicant contended that these arguments were being raised for the first time now and she therefore asked for a formal hearing to be opened in her case. The President of the IPC instructed the applicant that the opinions expressed by the \u201cTRNC\u201d representatives did not represent the official position of the IPC and that the matter would be decided after the examination of all the circumstances of the case. The proceedings before the IPC are still pending.", "references": ["8", "6", "2", "3", "1", "7", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Pskov. 7.  At about 2 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant was travelling in a car with B. \u2013 who was driving \u2013 M. and T. Their car was stopped by the police. Police Officers F. and K. asked for their ID cards. The applicant, who did not have his ID card on him, was taken to Zavelichenskiy police station in Pskov. 8.  The applicant described events at the police station as follows. F. and K. had demanded that he stand facing a wall, hands raised, and had searched him. They had allegedly insulted him verbally and physically. In particular, they had punched him repeatedly in the face and the lumbar region and had tried to knock him down. 9.  They then took him to the Pskov regional addiction-treatment clinic. When coming out of the police station they were approached by B., M., T. and I., the applicant\u2019s brother. According to statements by B. and I., the applicant was depressed, his sweater was dirty and the bridge of his nose was red. I. also saw injuries on the applicant\u2019s torso when he asked the applicant to lift his sweater. 10.  At 2.56 a.m. a doctor at the addiction-treatment clinic carried out a breath test and tested his coordination. She stated in a record of \u201cmedical examination for establishment of alcohol consumption and state of inebriation\u201d that the applicant\u2019s examination had been initiated by Officer K. in connection with an administrative offence, and that the applicant had consumed alcohol but had revealed no signs of inebriation. She noted in the part of the record concerning the tested person\u2019s \u201cappearance\u201d that the applicant had no injuries, and in the part concerning \u201cvegetative-vascular reactions\u201d that his face was \u201chyperemic\u201d. 11.  According to the applicant, the doctor did not ask him to undress and did not examine his body. Nor was he asked to sign the record of his examination or given its copy. 12.  After the test the applicant was taken back to the police station. At the request of a police officer he signed a statement that at about 1 a.m. on 17 August 2005, when passing by a bus stop in B.\u2019s car, he had called out through an open window to girls at the bus stop inviting them for a drive in the car. After that a police car had followed them and B. had stopped the car. The police officers had ordered him to proceed with them to the police station \u201cfor the reason that he had used foul language\u201d. 13.  At about 5 a.m. he was released. 14.  At 10 a.m. the applicant was examined at his request by a forensic-medical expert at the Pskov Regional Forensic-Medical Bureau. The applicant explained that he had been punched and kicked by two police officers at about 2 a.m. that day. According to the medical report, the applicant had the following injuries: (i) an abrasion measuring 1.2 by 0.2 cm on the bridge of the nose, (ii) a bruise measuring 2 cm by 2 cm in the area of the right cheekbone, (iii) a bruise measuring 2.5 by 1 cm on a finger of the left hand, and (iv) a bruise measuring 2.5 by 2 cm on the left side of the lumbar region. The expert concluded that the injuries, which were not considered harmful to the applicant\u2019s health, could have been caused on that day by hard blunt objects, for example by fists or feet. 15.  On the same day Officer K. lodged a criminal complaint that at 2.10 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had sworn at him through an open car window when passing by. In the course of enquiries into the police officer\u2019s allegations the applicant denied swearing or any other misbehaviour on his part. The Pskov police found no elements of criminal offences such as hooliganism (Article 213 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code) or insult of a public official (Article 319 of the Criminal Code) in the applicant\u2019s actions and refused to institute criminal proceedings against him (decision of 24 August 2005). 16.  On 22 August 2005 the applicant complained to the Pskov town prosecutor\u2019s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers, indicating their service identification numbers. 17.  Investigators of the Pskov town prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. Their two decisions of 7 October and 2 December 2005 were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the decisions had been based on an incomplete inquiry. 18.  In the most recent refusal of 23 December 2005 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements. At 2 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had addressed F. and K. with foul language from the window of his car, which had stopped near their police car. After that, the car with the applicant had started driving away. F. and K. had pursued the car and stopped it. They had taken the applicant to the police station. K. had explained to the applicant that he had been arrested for having committed a criminal offence under Article 319 of the Criminal Code (insult of a public official). On their way to the police station the applicant had behaved provocatively and threatened the police officers that they would have problems at work and would be dismissed. During the applicant\u2019s escorting to the police station the police officers had not used physical force or any means of restraint. F. and K. had taken the applicant from the police station to an addiction-treatment clinic for a medical examination because he had been drunk. Before leaving for the clinic they had been approached by the applicant\u2019s brother, who had enquired about the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention and a further procedure. The applicant\u2019s brother had suggested that the applicant should have simulated concussion and complained that he had been beaten up by the police officers. 19.  The investigator further noted that the drug-clinic doctor had not recorded any injuries on the applicant; and that in his statement signed at the police station the applicant had not denied using foul language and had not complained of any use of force or means of restraint against him. The investigator dismissed statements by I., M. and T. in support of the applicant\u2019s allegations as unreliable and held that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed. 20.  On 31 January 2006 the Pskov Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the investigator\u2019s decision of 23 December 2005. It noted that F. and K. had \u201ccategorically\u201d denied that they had beaten up the applicant. It held that there was no evidence of the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment at the police station and that his injuries could have been received in \u201cother circumstances\u201d. On 22 March 2006 the Pskov Regional Court upheld the Town Court\u2019s decision on the applicant\u2019s appeal. It stressed that there had been no eyewitnesses to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment, and that the applicant had not complained of any ill-treatment to the drug-clinic doctor. Referring to the \u201ccategorical\u201d denial of any ill-treatment by F. and K., the Regional Court held that the applicant had failed to prove his ill-treatment and that he could have received his injuries in \u201cother circumstances\u201d on 17 August 2005, in a time span between his examination at the addiction\u2011treatment clinic and his examination by the forensic-medical expert. 21.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Novyy Toryal in the Mariy-El Republic. 22.  At about 1 a.m. on 31 March 2007 a car without a licence plate, in which the applicant and other young men were going home after a party, was stopped by the traffic police officer. Soon another police car arrived with four or five police officers who, according to the applicant, pushed him and the other young men to the ground, and punched and kicked them. The applicant identified the police officers as M., O., S., V. and Zh. 23.  The applicant and the other three men were taken to the police station in Novyy Toryal, where they arrived at 1.45 a.m. 24.  According to the applicant, the events at the police station were as follows. Police Officers M., O. and S. interviewed him, asking who had been driving the car and whether the car had been stolen. The applicant denied that he had been driving the car and stated that the driver had run away and that he did not know him. The police officers repeatedly punched and kicked him in the head and on other parts of his body. 25.  At 3.20 a.m. the applicant and the others were released. The applicant\u2019s mother met them at the police station and called the ambulance. All four men were taken to the emergency unit of Novyy Toryal Central District Hospital, where they were recorded as having injuries. 26.  The applicant was examined at 3.26 a.m. and admitted to the hospital surgical unit in a condition of \u201cmedium seriousness\u201d at 4.20 a.m. His right ear was swollen and bleeding. He had a swelling on the back of the head measuring 7 by 4 cm, numerous bruises on the face and temples, and numerous abrasions on the back, neck, shoulders, the right side of the torso and one of his fingers. He had no alcohol on his breath. He was diagnosed with closed craniocerebral injury, brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum and numerous contusions to the head and the lumbar region. He was exempted from attending school until 22 April 2007 due to his temporary disability on account of the closed craniocerebral injury and concussion. The hospital communicated information about the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation with injuries allegedly received as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by police officers to the Novyy Toryal police. 27.  On 31 March 2007 the Novyy Toryal police officers reported to their superior that they had pursued a car which had had no licence plates and had not stopped at their initial order. When the car had eventually stopped, several young men, seemingly drunk, had sworn at them, refused to get into the police car and tried to run away. The police officers had used force to overcome their resistance, managing to restrain them on the ground and search them, and had then taken them to the police station. 28.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers. An investigator of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into her complaint. 29.  On 4 April 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic-medical expert from the Novyy Toryal division of the Mariy-El Republic Forensic\u2011Medical Bureau. The applicant had bruises around both eyes and an abrasion measuring 4 by 2 cm on the back of the head. Having examined the applicant\u2019s hospital records, the expert concluded in a report of 13 April 2007 that the applicant\u2019s injuries, notably brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum, bruises on the face, abrasions on the head, torso and limbs and swelling in the lumbar region, could have been sustained on 31 March 2007 by impacts from hard, blunt objects. The injuries had resulted in short-term health issues for the applicant including a temporary incapacity for work lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to his health. 30.  On 8 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police brought administrative proceedings against the applicant, issuing administrative-offence records and a decision which stated that at 1 a.m. on 31 March 2007 the applicant had driven a car without a licence plate and without a driving licence and had not stopped the car on a police officer\u2019s repeated order. A fine was imposed on the applicant. 31.  On 9 May 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office decided that material concerning the applicant\u2019s unlawful driving on 31 March 2007 should be examined separately from the material concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. 32.  On 20 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police decided that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the applicant, whose actions disclosed no elements of a crime under Article 166 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (carjacking). It found that it had been the applicant who had been driving the car with no licence plates before being stopped by the police on 31 March 2007. The applicant had bought it from a third person. However, he had not paid the full price and the previous owner had not given him the documents necessary for re\u2011registering the car in his name and obtaining licence plates. 33.  Investigators of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office thrice refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions. The refusals were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the inquiry was incomplete. 34.  In the most recent decision of 22 June 2007 the investigator, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, established the facts as follows. During the night of 30-31 March 2007 the applicant, who had been driving a car without a licence plate, had disobeyed a traffic policeman\u2019s order to stop and had tried to escape, thereby violating the traffic rules and committing administrative offences. However, administrative proceedings had not been brought against him in accordance with the law as a result of negligence on the part of the police officers responsible for drawing up administrative-offence records. The police had acted lawfully in apprehending the applicant and taking him to the police station. Officers O., M., S., V., S.K. and N.K. had lawfully used physical force in the course of the applicant\u2019s apprehension, as a result of which he had sustained the injuries described in the forensic-medical expert\u2019s report. 35.  That decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novyy Toryal district deputy prosecutor (report of 24 June 2007) and by the Novyy Toryal District Court (decision of 14 August 2007, upheld by the Mariy\u2011El Supreme Court on 26 September 2007). 36.  On 25 February 2013 the Mariy-El Republic deputy prosecutor annulled the decision of 22 June 2007 as unlawful and unfounded and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry. 37.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Diveyevo in Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 38.  At about 11 p.m. on 24 March 2007 the applicant was attending a discotheque at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre when he was approached by Police Officer K., who led him to the police car and took him to the Diveyevo district police station. According to the applicant, Police Officer K. twisted his arms behind his back when leading him to the car. 39.  According to the applicant the events at the police station were as follows. He was requested to stand facing the wall. K., who wore army-type boots, kicked him at least ten times on the legs. Then he was placed in an administrative-detention cell, where he stayed until his release at about noon on 26 March 2007. 40.  In reports to their superiors dated 24 March 2007 Officer K. and two police trainees stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who had been drunk, had used foul language in their presence, ignoring their orders to stop. 41.  N., a police officer on duty at the Diveyevo police station, drew up an administrative-detention record, in which he stated that the applicant, who had committed petty hooliganism, had been subjected to administrative detention for the purpose of the averting the offence. No injuries on the applicant were mentioned in the part of the record concerning the routine procedure of inspection of detainees for injuries. The time of the record was drawn up was indicated as 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007. 42.  Officer T. drew up an administrative-offence record, in which he stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who was drunk, had used foul language and ignored police officers\u2019 orders to stop. He had thereby committed an administrative offence of petty hooliganism. The time of the drawing-up the record was indicated as 11.40 p.m. on 24 March 2007. The acting head of the Diveyevo district police issued the applicant a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 43.  After his release from the police station, at 3.20 p.m. on 26 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a doctor at Diveyevo Hospital, who recorded bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts), an abrasion on the front of the left shin, a bruise on the left ankle, a bruise on the right knee, a bruise on the left elbow, and an abrasion on the left hand. The applicant was diagnosed with contusions of the left shin, left ankle, right knee and left elbow, and abrasions of the left shin and left hand. 44.  The hospital passed on information about the applicant\u2019s injuries, allegedly inflicted by the police, to the Diveyevo district prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint seeking K.\u2019s prosecution. An investigator of the prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 45.  On 27 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic\u2011medical expert from the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Forensic\u2011Medical Bureau. The applicant had two bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts) measuring 7 by 3 cm and 10 by 5 cm, a 1.5 by 0.5 cm bruise on the front of the left shin, a 2 by 1 cm bruise on the left ankle, and a 3 by 1.5 cm bruise on the left elbow. He also had an abrasion on the front of the left shin measuring 1.5 by 0.8 cm, an abrasion on the right ankle measuring 1 by 0.4 cm and an abrasion on the left hand measuring 3 by 2 cm. The areas of the back of the left shoulder in the middle part, the left knee, the left shin and the left ankle were painful at palpation. The expert concluded that the injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant\u2019s health, had been caused by hard blunt objects two or three days before the examination, as a result of at least five traumatic impacts (report of 27 March 2007). In reply to the investigator\u2019s additional question as to whether the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car, the expert stated that such a possibility could not be excluded. 46.  The Diveyevo district police carried out an internal inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, in the course of which K., other police officers and witnesses gave statements about the events in question. On 28 April 2007 the head of the Diveyevo district police approved a report on the inquiry in which the facts were established as follows. After 10 p.m. on 24 March 2007 K. and two police trainees had approached the applicant and rebuked him for using foul language; he had ignored their commands and continued swearing; K. had ordered that he go with them to the police station but he had refused; K. took him by the sleeve and led him to the police car; they took the applicant to the police station. It was established that no physical force had been used against the applicant. A number of other internal inquiries into the same events were carried out later, with the most recent one (report of 4 March 2013 approved by an acting head of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police force) finding no disciplinary misconduct in K.\u2019s actions. There was no mention in the report of the applicant receiving injuries when getting into the police car. Nor did K. mention it in his statements given in the course of the internal inquiry on 30 November 2007. K. stated that no physical force or means of restraint had been used against the applicant for lack of resistance on his part. 47.  Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings against Police Officer K. Their refusal was annulled five times by their superiors, who considered that their inquiry was incomplete. 48.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in K.\u2019s actions was taken on 2 September 2008 by an investigator from the Sarov investigative committee of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office. Relying on statements by K. and other police officers, who had denied any violence against the applicant, the investigator held that the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car before being taken to the police station on 24 March 2007. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well\u2011founded in the Sarov Town Court\u2019s decision of 16 January 2009, upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 13 March 2009. 49.  In May 2013 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He complained of a sleep disorder on account of his ill-treatment in police custody on 24 March 2007. He was diagnosed with sleep disorder related to the legs injuries sustained on that day and recommended a consultation and treatment by a neurologist and a trauma specialist. 50.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lived in Cheboksary. 51.  At about 12.30 a.m. on 29 June 2006 the applicant\u2019s car was stopped by Officers V. and Z. of the traffic police. According to the applicant, they knocked him to the ground and kicked him repeatedly. The police officers then drew up records, stating that he was drunk. He disagreed, requesting that he be taken for a medical examination which would confirm that he was not. The police officers took him to the Kaliniskiy district police station instead. 52.  According to records drawn up by V. between 12.30 a.m. and 1.50 a.m.: (i) the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and slurred speech); (ii) he had been ordered to undergo a medical examination to determine whether he had been in a state of alcohol intoxication, but he had refused to do so; (iii) his car had been impounded; and (iv) the applicant had been found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police. 53.  At the police station V. and Z. reported to their superior that the applicant had disobeyed their order to stop his car; that they had pursued him until he had eventually stopped; that he had resisted arrest; and that in order to apprehend him they had twisted his arm behind his back, as a result of which he had fallen. 54.  At about 5 a.m. the applicant was released from the Kaliniskiy district police station. 55.  On the same day both the applicant and Officer Z. lodged criminal complaints with the Kalininskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, Cheboksary. The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by V. and Z. The latter complained that in the course of the applicant\u2019s apprehension he had hurt his hand when they both had fallen. 56.  On 30 June 2006 an investigator ordered the applicant\u2019s forensic\u2011medical examination, which was carried out on 3 July 2006. A forensic-medical expert from the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau recorded ten abrasions measuring from 0.2 by 0.1 cm to 10 by 5 cm on the upper and middle parts of the lower right arm, on the right wrist and on both knees. The applicant also had four bruises on the middle part of the right upper arm and on the upper and middle parts of the left upper arm, measuring 1.6 by 1.2 cm, 1.7 by 1.3 cm, 0.9 by 0.3 cm and 0.2 by 0.2 cm. The expert concluded that all injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant\u2019s health, could have been caused by hard blunt objects. 57.  On 3 August 2006 the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 7 of the Kalininskiy District of Cheboksary held a hearing in the administrative proceedings against the applicant. The applicant contested the police officers\u2019 versions of events on 29 June 2006 and stated that he had not been drunk and had demanded to undergo a medical examination that would have confirmed that fact; however, the police officers had not let him be examined. His statements were supported by a witness. The court found the applicant guilty of disobedience of a police officer\u2019s lawful order to undergo a medical examination to detect alcohol intoxication, and sentenced him to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half. On 31 August 2006 the Kalininskiy District Court, following a prior appeal by the applicant, upheld the judgment. 58.  Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers. Their refusals were annulled by their superiors more than twenty times on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry. On several occasions the Kalininskiy District Court of Cheboksary rejected the applicant\u2019s appeals on the grounds that the investigators\u2019 decisions had already been annulled. On two occasions the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeals and found the decisions unlawful and unfounded. 59.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions was issued on 28 September 2009 by an investigator from the Cheboksary inter-district investigative committee. Relying on the reports by Officers V. and Z. and similar statements given by them later, the investigator held that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police officers during his arrest. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well\u2011founded in the Kalininskiy District Court\u2019s decision of 12 November 2009, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 17 December 2009. 60.  In the same decision of 28 September 2009 the investigator dismissed the criminal complaint lodged by Z., finding no fault on the part of the applicant as Z. had fallen and hurt his hand when arresting him. 61.  The applicant brought civil proceedings, seeking to have the investigating authority\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation declared unlawful and claiming compensation. On 26 May 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed his application, finding that he had failed to prove that the investigating authority had acted unlawfully, that he had been harmed as a result of its actions or inaction, that there had been a causal connection between specific unlawful behaviour and any harm, and that there had been evidence of an alleged tortfeasor\u2019s liability. It held that domestic law did not provide for compensation of non\u2011pecuniary damage in a case of a delayed decision in reply to a criminal complaint or in a case of the annulment of such a decision. On 30 June 2008, following an appeal by the applicant, the Chuvashia Supreme Court upheld the judgment. 62.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 63.  At about 6 a.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant and other young men, who were sitting in his parked car, were approached by traffic-police officers and taken to Novocheboksarsk police station following a complaint from a certain P. that they had broken a window in her car and tried to steal a child seat. The applicant was handcuffed. 64.  The applicant described events at the police station as follows. One of the police officers had grabbed him by the neck with one hand and by his head with the other and hit his face against a wall. The applicant\u2019s two front teeth had fallen out and he had felt unwell. Later, he had asked to have the handcuffs removed as they had been causing him pain. Instead, a police officer lifted his hands shackled behind him, inflicting more pain. 65.  According to the records drawn up by Officer B. between 6.50 a.m. and 9.20 a.m. on 8 February 2008: (i) the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and trembling fingers); (ii) he was ordered to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, but refused to do so; (iii) his car was impounded; and (iv) the applicant was found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police. The applicant was subsequently found guilty of disobeying a police officer\u2019s lawful order to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, and sentenced to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half (judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 5 of Novocheboksarsk of 14 March 2008, and was upheld by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court on 19 May 2008). 66.  In a report to his superior, Officer M. stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively at the police station and that he himself had hit his head against a wall and had broken his tooth. 67.  No criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant in relation to P.\u2019s complaint in respect of the attempted theft of a child seat (Novocheboksarsk town police decision of 18 February 2008). 68.  After his release at about 6 p.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant was examined by a doctor at the traumatology unit of the Novocheboksarsk town hospital. The applicant had abrasions on the right side of his face, his lip, the left side of his neck and the wrists, and the crowns of two upper teeth on the right side were broken. On the same day he was examined by a dentist who recorded that the upper front tooth on the right was missing, the crown of the next tooth to the right was broken, and that the two lower front teeth were loose as a result of a traumatic subluxation. 69.  On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint that he had been ill-treated at the police station. The Novocheboksarsk investigative committee at the Chuvashiya Republic prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry. 70.  An investigator obtained an opinion of a forensic-medical expert from the Novocheboksarsk division of the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau, who considered that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been received within twenty-four hours of the applicant\u2019s medical examination on 8 February 2008, as a result of an impact from a hard blunt object, for example as a result of hitting a wall as regards the injuries to the front teeth, lip and face. The injuries had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant\u2019s health. 71.  Investigators of the Novocheboksarsk investigative committee refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police. Their refusal was annulled fourteen times by their superiors, who considered that it had been based on an incomplete inquiry, and a fresh pre\u2011investigation inquiry was ordered. 72.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions was taken by an investigator on 5 November 2009. He cited the police officers\u2019 statements that the applicant had tried to run away, they had therefore handcuffed him in order to take him to the police station, where the applicant himself had struck his face against a wall. Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, the investigator concluded that the applicant had inflicted the injuries on himself by striking his face against a wall at the police station, and that the abrasions on his neck and wrists had been a result of the lawful use of force by the police officers in the course of his arrest. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court\u2019s decision of 23 April 2010, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 25 May 2010. 73.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Moscow. 74.  At about 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant was arrested by Police Officers P. and V. in a twenty-four-hour shop and taken to the Mitino district police station of the Moscow North-Western administrative circuit. According to the applicant, in the police car he was slapped in the face several times, and at the police station the police officers repeatedly punched him in the head and other parts of the body and kicked him in the chest. 75.  In their reports concerning the incident the police officers did not mention that the applicant had had any injuries. 76.  In a record of the applicant\u2019s administrative detention at 5.30 a.m. on 28 May 2008, drawn up at 5.32 a.m. that day, an officer on duty at the police station noted the applicant\u2019s complaint that the police officers had inflicted injuries on him. The record further stated that the applicant\u2019s examination had revealed no injuries on him. 77.  At 6 a.m. the applicant was examined by a doctor at an addiction\u2011treatment hospital and was found to be in a state of alcohol intoxication. The doctor noted that the applicant was handcuffed and had abrasions on his face. 78.  According to an administrative-offence record drawn up on 28 May 2008 by the officer on duty, at 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant had breached public order by using foul language in a public place and ignoring police officers\u2019 requests to stop. On the same day the Justice of the Peace of the Mitino District Court Circuit no. 175 found that the applicant had committed petty hooliganism and imposed a RUB 500 fine on him. The applicant, who pleaded guilty, did not appeal against the judgment. He was released after the hearing. 79.  On the same day he was examined by a doctor at polyclinic no. 229 who recorded bruising to the area of both eyes and the nose, bleeding of the sclera of both eyes, a fractured nose and a possible concussion. On 3 June 2008 the applicant was examined at town hospital no. 71 and diagnosed with acute right\u2011side perforated post-traumatic otitis and bruising of the soft tissue of the head, in particular in the area of the left eye and the cheek bones. On 9 June 2008 he was examined at polyclinic no. 2 and diagnosed with hearing difficulties on both sides and acute right\u2011side perforated post\u2011traumatic otitis. 80.  Following the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of 2 July 2008, the Tushinskiy district investigative committee at the Moscow prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 81.  The applicant\u2019s medical records were examined by a forensic\u2011medical expert from the Moscow City Forensic-Medical Bureau. The expert concluded that the bruising and fracture of the nose (which had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant\u2019s health), the bruising in the area of both eyes and the cheek bones and the bleeding to the sclera of both eyes could have been sustained on 28 May 2008 as a result of impacts from hard blunt objects. As no injuries had been recorded in the area of the external right ear, the expert doubted that the perforated otitis had been a result of trauma or its connection to the alleged police ill-treatment (the expert\u2019s report of 9 October 2009). 82.  Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions. Their three refusals issued between July 2008 and October 2009 were annulled because they were based on an incomplete inquiry. 83.  In the most recent refusal to open a criminal case of 28 January 2010 an investigator held that the applicant, who had been drunk, could have fallen and injured himself. It relied, inter alia, on Officer P.\u2019s report dated 7 July 2008 that the applicant had been brought to the police station with \u201cvisible injuries\u201d. That decision was declared lawful and well-founded in the Tushinskiy District Court\u2019s decision of 19 March 2010, and later upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 May 2010.", "references": ["4", "6", "5", "0", "3", "9", "7", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Moscow. 7.  In June 1998 he deposited 5,187.40 United States dollars in a three\u2011month account with Russian Credit, a private bank. 8.  In August 1998 the country suffered a financial crisis, the rouble fell, and the bank defaulted. In December 1998 the applicant accepted the bank\u2019s offer to settle and close his account in return for the balance in depreciated roubles. By the time the money reached the applicant in March 1999, the rouble had depreciated further. 9.  In October 1999 the bank went into external administration and its debt repayments were frozen pending a restructuring. 10.  In May 2000 the bank and its creditors negotiated a group settlement of the pre-October 1999 debt and had it approved by the courts. The settlement discharged the bank from fines, penalties, default interest, and damages arising under legislation, contracts with clients, and court decisions. 11.  In December 2001 the applicant sued the bank for the loss caused by the exchange-rate fluctuations between the day he had accepted the bank\u2019s offer and the day the money had arrived. The bank objected to that claim on the ground that it had extinguished its obligations by repaying the deposit to the applicant. On 17 April 2002 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow awarded the applicant 77,603.50 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 12.  In May 2003 the applicant filed a writ of execution with a bailiff. 13.  On 17 June 2003, on the application of the bank, the District Court terminated the enforcement of its judgment in view of the group settlement. The District Court said:\nConsidering the nature of the legal relationship at issue, the court takes into account the fact that the enforcement proceedings have been instituted with the purpose of collecting from [Russian Credit] the liabilities that had come into existence before 18 October 1999 inclusive and, under the ... terms of the friendly settlement, are related to [the bank\u2019s] restructured liabilities subject to novation on the terms of the friendly settlement approved by a [court decision] that had defined the procedure and terms of the extinction of the liabilities.\nPursuant to section 23 \u00a7 2 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings, the conclusion of a friendly settlement between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a ground for the termination of the enforcement proceedings, and therefore the [bank\u2019s] application shall be granted and the [enforcement proceedings] shall be terminated. 14.  In July 2003, in reply to the applicant\u2019s query, the bank\u2019s external administrator informed the applicant that his deposit had not been on the books and that under the terms of the group settlement his judgment debt could not be paid. 15.  On 14 August 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision, finding that the applicant\u2019s individual claim was to be settled with the group claim. The City Court said:\nWhen terminating the [enforcement] proceedings the [District Court] has referred to the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reached the conclusion that the terms of the said friendly settlement regarding the restructuring of the credit obligations of [Russian Credit] extended also to [the applicant].\nThe [City Court] agrees with the said conclusion of the [District Court] as based on the provisions of the law and confirmed by the circumstances of the present case.", "references": ["1", "8", "2", "6", "7", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter \u201cthe FMS\u201d) in different towns in Russia. 8.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9.   On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants\u2019 dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10.  All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others\u2019 requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS\u2019s refusals. Only Y.A.\u2019s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11.  According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12.  Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13.  According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants\u2019 detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14.  Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15.  The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home\u2011cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16.  Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17.  The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees\u2019 cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen \u201cchosen\u201d inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre\u2019s administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18.  Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19.  The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20.  During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21.  According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "0", "4", "5", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 7.  On 11 July 2000 the Adana Magistrate\u2019s Court ordered the detention of the applicant in absentia. 8.  On 20 July 2000 the applicant was questioned by the gendarmerie in the absence of his lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in an illegal organisation and the activities in which he had taken part. Subsequently, he was brought before the public prosecutor at the Adana State Security Court. During the interview, the applicant stated, again in the absence of a lawyer, that his statements made to the gendarmerie had been correct. 9.  On 15 September 2000 the investigating judge at the Mardin Magistrate\u2019s Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, again in the absence of a lawyer. 10.  On 24 October 2000 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment before the Adana State Security Court, charging the applicant under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 11.  On 25 October 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. 12.  On 26 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction. 13.  On 6 November 2007 the Adana Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, the applicant had committed the offence under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 14.  On 12 November 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction.", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "5", "8", "7", "1", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1982 and 1981 respectively. 5.  On 22 April 2006 upon receipt of intelligence reports that the youth branch of the PKK would be holding a meeting in the premises of a cooperative, the police officers, under the orders of the magistrates\u2019 court, conducted a search in the premises of the co-operative of which the applicants were members. The police seized several documents and CDs that contained propaganda materials related to the youth branch of the PKK. 6.  On the same day the applicants were taken into custody on suspicion of being members of a terrorist organisation. 7.  On 24 April 2006 the Urfa Magistrates\u2019 Court ordered the applicants\u2019 detention on remand. 8.  On 27 April 2006 and 28 April 2006, respectively, the applicants filed objections against their pre-trial detention. The courts rejected their request on the basis of the case-file, without holding a hearing. 9.  During the pre-trial stage, the magistrates\u2019 court continued to examine, by virtue of Article 108 of Law no. 5271, the necessity of applicants\u2019 continued detention every thirty days on the basis of the case file, without holding an oral hearing. The applicants also filed objections against their continued pre-trial detention, namely on 15 June, 12 July, 17 July, 1 August and 17 October 2006. All these objections were examined on the basis of the case file and were rejected by the domestic courts. 10.  On 10 October 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court charging the applicants, along with twenty three other persons, with aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237). 11.  On 30 November 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held its first hearing and the applicants appeared before the court. On the same day, the applicants were released pending trial. 12.  On 4 November 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court acquitted the applicants of the charges against them. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment became final on 12 November 2008.", "references": ["4", "8", "6", "9", "0", "1", "7", "3", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ankara. 5.  The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Ankara. On an unspecified date, the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court against the \u00c7ankaya Municipality and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for the annulment of the construction permit pertaining to a neighboring building which was being built opposite his apartment. 6.  On 14 December 1999 the Ankara Administrative Court accepted the applicant\u2019s request and revoked the construction permit based on a breach of height restrictions. According to this judgment, the building in question was constructed 1.48 meters higher than the norm that was laid down in the zoning plan in force. 7.  On 17 February 2000 the \u00c7ankaya municipal executive committee (belediye enc\u00fcmeni) ordered the demolition of the illegally constructed part of the building in order to comply with the administrative court\u2019s judgment. However, it did not implement the said decision. 8.  On 19 November 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court\u2019s judgment. 9.  In the meantime, on 3 August 2001 the \u00c7ankaya municipal council (belediye meclisi) amended the zoning plan and sent its decision to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for approval. 10.  On 26 October 2001 the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality withheld its approval, holding that the zoning plan had been amended with the aim of legalizing the previously revoked building permit and thereby avoiding the demolition of the illegal construction. 11.  On 5 December 2001 the \u00c7ankaya municipal council insisted in its previous decision and the amended zoning plan thus came into force. 12.  Subsequently on 31 December 2001 the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court for the annulment of the \u00c7ankaya municipal council\u2019s decision of 5 December 2001. 13.  On 31 March 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the said decision for, inter alia, encouraging unlicensed construction practices. 14.  On 21 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court\u2019s decision and on 18 October 2005 it rejected the \u00c7ankaya Municipality\u2019s rectification request. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 December 2005.", "references": ["1", "5", "4", "2", "0", "7", "6", "9", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Babushkin, Republic of Buryatiya, Russia. 6.  On 6 January 2005 M.D. was arrested and taken to a police station. Allegedly, police officers threatened him with murder and ill-treatment if he refused to make a confession. In the presence of counsel, he made a written statement confessing to a murder. On 7 January 2005 an investigator compiled an arrest record. 7.  On 30 September 2005 another investigator issued a formal decision confirming that M.D.\u2019s real name was M.M., the applicant in the present case before the Court. 8.  On 12 March 2007 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. On 6 June 2007 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the judgment. 9.  In the meantime, on 4 April 2005 the applicant had tested positive for HIV. 10.  According to the applicant, on 30 August 2006 (see below) he learnt that in October or November 2005 Z., a deputy district prosecutor, had given G., the sister of the murder victim, access to the file concerning the criminal charges against the applicant. 11.  At a hearing on 30 August 2006 the trial court granted G. victim status in the criminal case (see paragraph 36 below). At the same time, the trial court allowed a decision granting G. victim status to be added to the file (a decision apparently taken in late 2005 by an unspecified authority during the criminal investigation \u2013 however, see paragraphs 14-15 below). G. was cross-examined at that hearing. She stated that she had had access to the file and had then told D., the applicant\u2019s relative, about his HIV status to prove that the applicant was not a good person. According to the applicant, G. also disclosed his HIV status to some other neighbours. 12.  Between September 2006 and 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully sought the institution of criminal proceedings against G. for the disclosure of private information, which was an offence under Article 137 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below). It appears that the applicant also sought the institution of criminal proceedings against Z. in relation to the disclosure of private information involving the use of an official position and abuse of power (Article 137 \u00a7 2 and Article 286 of the Criminal Code; see also paragraph 15 below). 13.  A pre-investigation inquiry was carried out for the offence allegedly committed by G. 14.  In December 2006 Z., the deputy district prosecutor, wrote to the applicant indicating that G. had not been granted victim status, and that the investigator in charge of the case had not provided her with access to the file during the preliminary investigation. 15.  In December 2006 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that G. had been granted victim status and had studied the case file in August 2006, she had not applied for victim status before that time, and there were no grounds for any pre-investigation inquiry in respect of Z. It is unclear whether the applicant took any further action as regards his criminal complaint against Z. 16.  As a result of the inquiry in respect of G., a refusal to institute criminal proceedings was issued. It was then overruled. Further refusals to prosecute were issued on 1 October and 26 November 2007 and on 9 February 2008. 17.  On 25 November 2008 the District Court refused to carry out judicial review of the refusal dated 9 February 2008. The Regional Court then considered that the applicant was entitled to judicial review and ordered the District Court to re-examine the issue. In the resumed proceedings, on 13 February 2009 the District Court noted that the applicant no longer wished to pursue the judicial complaint, and discontinued it. 18.  In the meantime, on 23 January 2009 an investigator had issued a new refusal to prosecute with reference to the expiry of the two-year time\u2011limit for prosecution of an offence under Article 137 of the Criminal Code. The investigator heard D., who confirmed that G. had briefly mentioned the applicant\u2019s HIV status. The investigator\u2019s decision indicates that he considered the disclosure of the applicant\u2019s medical data an established fact. 19.  On 28 September 2009 the District Court confirmed the refusal to prosecute dated 23 January 2009. The judge noted (apparently with reference to 2007) that for some time the institution of criminal proceedings had been refused because \u201cat the time no written statement could be obtained from [the applicant] in relation to his complaint\u201d. This had prompted the supervising prosecutor to set aside, among other things, the refusals to prosecute dated 1 October and 26 November 2007 and 9 February 2008. The prosecutor had acted promptly by taking decisions on 5 October and 29 December 2007 and on 30 December 2008. Following each decision, law-enforcement officers had taken measures to interview the applicant (apparently by asking staff at his remand centre to interview him), but \u201cno statement had been received from him\u201d. 20.  On 17 March 2010 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 28 September 2009. The appeal court stated that, while the fact of the dissemination of the applicant\u2019s medical data by G. had been established, she could not be prosecuted, owing to the expiry of the time-limit for prosecution. However, those grounds for discontinuing the case were, in a way, in the applicant\u2019s interest, and it remained open to him to bring civil proceedings against her. 21.  In May 2010 the applicant brought civil court proceedings against G., seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of the disclosure of his HIV status to other people. On 13 September 2010 the District Court discontinued the case because the respondent was a foreign national not residing in Russia. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal. 22.  The applicant also lodged a claim under the 2010 Compensation Act. A judge rejected it, noting that the Act did not give standing to a criminal complainant with no \u201cvictim\u201d status seeking compensation on account of the length of a pre-investigation inquiry. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal. 23.  The applicant provided the following account of his conditions of detention. 24.  Between 17 January 2005 and July 2007 the applicant was kept in Yekaterinburg Remand Centre no. 66/1. After his arrival he was placed in cell no. 301, which measured 20 square metres and accommodated five people. This cell had no window, and the temperature in the cell was around 2\u02daC. There was no bed or bedding. The toilet did not work and was not separated from the main area. 25.  On 18 January 2005 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 625, which measured 20 square metres and had six beds, but which actually accommodated seventeen people. The toilet was not separated from the main area. 26.  From 19 January to 4 April 2005 the applicant was in cell no. 125, which measured 4 or 7 square metres and accommodated four detainees (or up to six people, according to the applicant\u2019s amended description). 27.  From 4 April to 18 May 2005 the applicant was kept in cell no. 204, which measured 20 square metres and had six beds, but accommodated twenty-three to twenty-eight people. 28.  From 18 May to 2 June 2005 the applicant was in hospital. It appears that the material conditions of his stay there were acceptable. However, between 24 May and 1 June 2005 he was allegedly ill-treated by medical assistants (also people who had been convicted) who, at the instigation of police officers, tried to extract a confession from him. 29.  After being returned to the remand centre, the applicant was placed in cell no. 205, which measured 20 square metres and accommodated up to twenty-five people, despite having only sixteen beds. 30.  From 11 July 2005 the applicant was in cell no. 117, which measured 4 square metres and accommodated four detainees. 31.  Furthermore, the applicant provided a detailed account of the conditions of his detention between July 2005 and July 2007, conditions which were also cramped or unacceptable and where, at times, he was not able to have an individual bed. 32.  Between 2005 and 2009 the applicant lodged numerous complaints in relation to his conditions of detention. For instance, on 15 February 2006 the Prisons Department of the Sverdlovsk Region dismissed one of his complaints, whilst indicating that the actual number of detainees in the remand centre exceeded the design capacity of this detention facility. By a letter of 13 March 2006 the administration of the remand centre informed the applicant that the actual capacity of cells was such as to afford each detainee 2.5 square metres of space, which was a temporary measure related to the overpopulation problem. 33.  By a letter of 2 October 2008 the Sverdlovsk prosecutor\u2019s office supervising prisons confirmed that the applicant had been afforded between 0.9 and 3.8 square metres of cell space. 34.  By a letter of 2 December 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sverdlovsk Region informed the applicant that, following an inspection, it could be not confirmed that the cell toilets were not separated from the main area.", "references": ["3", "5", "6", "0", "9", "7", "8", "2", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and is detained in Bezhetsk, Tver Region. 6.  According to the indictment, on 15 October 2010 Ms K., who had not been previously known to the applicant, invited him and Mr A. to the apartment of Mr X. In the apartment they found Mr X. lying on the floor in a state of heavy alcoholic intoxication. For reasons which the investigation failed to ascertain, the applicant demanded X.\u2019s passport, but the latter did not react to the demand in any way. Enraged by X.\u2019s inaction, the applicant and Mr A. started violently kicking him in the shoulder, chest, stomach and legs until he stopped breathing. The applicant told Ms K., who witnessed the attack, to \u201cforget everything\u201d and gave her 100 Russian roubles (RUB) (2.5 euros (EUR)). 7.  On 18 October 2010 Ms K., aged twenty-four at the time, was voluntarily hospitalised for treatment of alcohol-induced psychosis and seizures after she had an epileptic seizure on the street. 8.  On 21 October 2010, while undergoing treatment, Ms K. was taken to an investigator for questioning. Prior to the interview, the investigator had received permission to interview Ms K. from the head doctor of the medical facility and satisfied herself as to the witness\u2019s ability to testify, relying on the opinion of the doctor treating her. According to a medical certificate, Ms K. was \u201cconscious, accessible for contact, answer[ed] questions following their direction\u201d and had \u201cno acute psychiatric disorders\u201d. 9.  According to the interview records, Ms K. alleged that on 11 October 2014 her encounter with Mr X. had resulted in a drinking spree, which had lasted several days until 14 or 15 October 2010, when Mr X. had refused to consume any more alcohol because he could no longer stand up. On the day of the attack, she had witnessed the applicant entering the apartment with Mr A. and immediately starting to violently kick Mr X., who had been lying on the floor. After an unsuccessful search for X.\u2019s passport, they had resumed the attack and had kicked the victim about forty times until he died. 10.  On 22 October 2010 the applicant and Mr A. were arrested and detained on suspicion of manslaughter. On the same day Mr A. confessed to manslaughter committed together with the applicant. On 29 October 2010 during questioning, he stated that the applicant\u2019s insistence on obtaining X.\u2019s passport had been induced by the desire to coerce the latter to sell his apartment and to share the proceeds. 11.  In the course of questioning on 13 and 17 December 2010 the applicant admitted his presence in X.\u2019s apartment during the attack, but denied any involvement in it. In his opinion Mr A. had committed perjury for an unknown reason. 12.  The criminal case against the applicant and Mr A. was examined by the Tsentralniy District Court of Tver (\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0433. \u0422\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d). 13.  On 17 January 2011 during a pre-trial hearing the District Court granted applications lodged by the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer to have the medical records of Ms K. produced in court at trial. 14.  On 24 January 2011 the District Court received extracts of Ms K.\u2019s medical history provided by a regional psychiatric hospital. According to the medical records, she suffered from long-term alcohol abuse and had a tendency of having compulsive heavy drinking episodes. In October 2010, during the sixth hospitalisation since 2008, she had been hallucinating, anxious, aggressive, rude and unaware of the current date. When discharged from hospital in November 2010, the symptoms of withdrawal syndrome had receded and there were no signs of acute psychiatric disorders. 15.  On 27 January 2011 the District Court received a certificate from a regional psychoneurology clinic. According to the certificate, in 2008 Ms K. had been diagnosed with an organic mental disorder of complex origin (perinatal and alcohol induced), hallucino-paranoid syndrome with mild personality changes, and alcohol-withdrawal symptoms. 16.  On 2 and 8 February 2011 the District Court heard several prosecution witnesses, mostly relatives, neighbours and acquaintances of the persons involved. The witnesses either attested to the reputation or character of the victim and the accused, or provided hearsay and circumstantial evidence on the events prior and subsequent to the alleged crime. Ms K. was duly summoned to both hearings, but did not appear and provided no reasons for her absence. 17.  On 10 February 2011 at the request of the defence the District Court issued a subpoena ordering the bailiffs to ensure Ms K.\u2019s presence at the next hearing. 18.  On 17 February 2011 the bailiffs submitted to the trial court a report that the witness could not be found at her place of residence and according to her mother \u201cmight be undergoing treatment\u201d in a psychoneurology clinic. 19.  On the same day the District Court examined a prosecution witness, Ms D., an investigator during the pre-trial stages of the proceedings. She testified to the circumstances of Ms K.\u2019s interview on 21 October 2010 and her identification of the applicant, as well as to her psychological state and ability to give answers at the time. Ms D. stated that the witness had been \u201crational\u201d, had given coherent testimony, had correctly recounted the events and, according to the doctor treating her at the time, had been capable of answering questions. 20.  During the hearing the trial court was notified over the phone that the applicant had been undergoing in-patient treatment for alcohol dependency since 22 January 2011. The prosecutor\u2019s request that Ms K.\u2019s pre-trial statements be read out in court was denied and the hearing was adjourned until further information on the witness\u2019s health had been received from the doctors. 21.  On 18 February 2011 the psychoneurology clinic sent a letter to the District Court confirming the information previously submitted and stating that Ms K. was due to be discharged in early March 2011. 22.  On the same day during the hearing, the prosecutor, referring to the above-mentioned letter, repeatedly requested that Ms K.\u2019s pre-trial statements be read out in court on account of her in-patient treatment, the fact that her presence at trial could not be ensured, and because the date of her discharge from the clinic was unclear. The applicant\u2019s defence lawyers objected, referring to Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which proscribed the reading out of witness statements except in cases of \u201cgrave illness\u201d. The District Court, without providing further reasons, allowed the reading out of the testimony with reference to Article 281 of the Code. 23.  Between 24 February and 6 April 2011 the District Court held at least six further hearings. During those hearings the applicant and his co\u2011accused were examined and essentially confirmed their conflicting pre-trial statements. The District Court also heard two character witnesses called by the defence, who attested to Mr A.\u2019s bad reputation and speculated about his involvement in illegal activities. The trial court also considered the following documentary evidence presented by the prosecution: (a) crime scene inspection records; (b) the confession of Mr A. and verification records; (c) records of identification procedures; and (d) reports of the medical examiner and forensic experts on the victim\u2019s injuries and the cause of death. 24.  On 8 April 2011 during the closing argument the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer, Mr V., argued that the statements of Ms K., which were \u201cthe only evidence\u201d, could not qualify as eyewitness statements due to her state of mental health. He submitted that in the absence of a forensic psychiatric examination, it was impossible to rely on the testimony of a person suffering from an organic mental disorder and alcohol dependency. Her hospitalisation in a psychiatric facility in a delusional state and her interrogation less than one week after the alleged crime had made any testimony unreliable. He further stated that in any event, the reading out of her testimony had been unlawful under Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in violation of the applicant\u2019s right to examine witnesses under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention. Accordingly, her testimony could not be used as evidence in the case against the applicant. 25.  On 12 April 2011 the District Court convicted the applicant and Mr A. of manslaughter and sentenced them to ten and eight years\u2019 imprisonment respectively in a high-security correctional facility. The District Court, confronted with the conflicting positions of the two co\u2011accused, referred several times to Ms K.\u2019s testimony as a significant, if not decisive, factor. In respect of the reliability of the testimony and its reading out, it stated:\n\u201c... The statements of Ms K. made during the pre-trial investigation were read out under Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\nThe court does not accept Mr Zadumov\u2019s argument that [according to the medical records] the mental state of Ms K. casts doubt on her ability to correctly perceive and recount the events and that [her questioning during treatment in a psychoneurology facility] also casts doubt on the veracity and reliability of her testimony ...\nThe medical records referred to by the defence do not suggest that Ms K. has any psychiatric disorder. [Moreover, the available certificates state that she was accessible for contact, answered questions following their direction and had no acute psychiatric disorders. This fact is further confirmed by the testimony of Ms D., the investigator, given at trial.]\nThe court also considers that Ms K.\u2019s statements are consistent with the confession of Mr A.\u201d 26.  The applicant\u2019s defence lawyers lodged an appeal, restating among others their arguments concerning the reading out of Ms K.\u2019s pre-trial statements. 27.  On 3 June 2011 the Tver Regional Court (\u0422\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) upheld the judgment on appeal. In respect of Ms K.\u2019s statements the Regional Court stated:\n\u201c... The involvement of Mr Zadumov [the applicant] in the committed crime is steadfastly confirmed by the testimony of Ms K.\n[The appeal court] like the trial court finds no grounds to doubt the testimony of this witness, because it is coherent, detailed, logical and authentic.\n[From] the information provided by Ms K. on the victim\u2019s state before and after the infliction of bodily injuries by Mr A. and Mr Zadumov, the sequence of events is consistent with [expert evidence and the testimony of other witnesses and the co-accused].\nAccordingly there are no reasons to consider that the witness could not correctly perceive or recount the events.\nMoreover [her] mental state received consideration during the hearing. [According to the investigator\u2019s statements she was rational, gave coherent testimony, correctly recounted the events, and according to her doctor was capable of answering questions.] ... [Therefore] the trial court reached a correct conclusion that this evidence was admissible.\n[The appeal court] cannot consider justified the arguments of the defence that criminal procedure legislation had been breached by the reading out of Ms K.\u2019s pre\u2011trial statements, [since her presence at hearings was impossible as she was undergoing treatment in a clinic].\u201d", "references": ["8", "0", "7", "1", "9", "2", "5", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1982 in Venezuela and is currently detained in Valdemoro Prison. 9.  The applicant has been living in Spain with his family since 2003. 10.  In an indictment filed on 15 November 2005 in the United States (hereinafter, \u201cthe US\u201d) District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the applicant was charged with one count of conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(A), and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Four); and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(I), and 846, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Five). Each of those offences carried a possible maximum term of life imprisonment. 11.  By diplomatic note of 6 December 2013, the US authorities transmitted a request to the Spanish authorities for the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest with a view to his extradition. 12.  On 13 December 2013 the applicant was arrested in Lugo by the Spanish police. The Central Court of Investigation No. 4 (Juzgado Central de Instrucci\u00f3n) initiated extradition proceedings on the same day and ordered his provisional release. The extradition request was then allocated to the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional. 13.  On 31 March 2014 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office agreed to the applicant\u2019s extradition. 14.  On 1 October 2014 the Audiencia Nacional granted the extradition request on condition that the US authorities provided a guarantee that any life sentence that was handed down would not be irreducible. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. 15.  On 3 November 2014 the ruling was upheld by the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional. The applicant subsequently lodged a plea of nullity (incidente de nulidad de actuaciones) against that decision. On 19 December 2014 the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional ruled against the applicant, arguing that the object and purpose of annulment proceedings was not to serve as a second appeal instance against an extradition decision, but to correct possible violations of a fundamental right committed in a decision which was not subject to appeal. 16.  On 3 December 2014 the U.S. Embassy issued a note verbale, which provided the following answer:\n\u201cThe United States notes that the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Spain does not provide a basis for conditioning extraditions on assurances relating to life sentences. While the United States is not, therefore, obligated to provide the assurance requested, in consideration of the request of the Spanish Court and given the intentions of the U.S. prosecutor, the United States is prepared in this particular case to inform the Government of Spain as follows: Should LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005 for which extradition is sought, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment because, if a life sentence is imposed, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence ...\u201d 17.  On 19 January 2015 the note verbale was communicated to the interested parties. On 23 January 2015 the Public Prosecutor submitted a report stating that the guarantees provided by the United States were adequate and that consequently extradition should be granted. 18.  On 24 February 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (providencia) assessing the US guarantees, deeming them to be \u201csufficient\u201d. 19.  The applicant brought two s\u00faplica appeals against that decision, the first of which was lodged on 28 February 2015. The applicant argued that the decision of 24 February 2015 should be declared null and void since the matter should have been addressed through an auto, instead of a providencia[1]. Secondly, the applicant contested the argument that the US Government had provided sufficient guarantees, stating that they were identical to the ones that had already been analysed by the Court in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (no. 140/10, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) and found to be in violation of Article 3 (inter alia). The second s\u00faplica appeal was lodged on 2 March 2015 and included three different requests. First, he requested that the decision on whether the US guarantees were sufficient be addressed and dealt with by the Plenary of the Audiencia Nacional. He also sought the recusal of three judges who were members of the bench which had initially issued the decision of 24 February 2015. Lastly, he lodged an application for the general recusal of all the judges of the Audiencia Nacional who \u201chad been invited by the United States of America on holiday trips\u201d which had been paid for by that country. 20.  On 25 March 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision stating the following:\n\u201cFIRST - We will examine in the first place the plea for a referral to the Plenary formation of this Court of the decision about the sufficiency of the assurances given by the U.S. Government concerning the possibility for two life sentences to be imposed on the extradited person. This Chamber, given that the President of this Court has duly empowered it to decide about this matter, considers that the referral is not necessary as the assurances given are correct and sufficient, and furthermore show compliance with the ECtHR case-law in the Trabelsi vs Belgium case referred to by the appellant ....\nTherefore, if the assurances given by the U.S. Government are the following:\n\u201cShould LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence;\u201d\nwe can conclude that the warranty expresses the actual existing legal means for the revision of a sentence of life imprisonment in a way that shows that this punishment is not irreducible during the whole life-span of the person, complying with what the ECtHR has requested in order to consider that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.\nThat is why there is no need to refer a decision on this matter to the Plenary formation of this Court.\u201d 21.  Additionally, the Audiencia Nacional agreed on opening a procedure aimed at addressing the issue of the recusals requested by the applicant through a full report, at the same time ordering the suspension of the extradition proceedings until the recusal proceedings had been terminated. 22.  On 12 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (acuerdo gubernativo) dismissing the applicant\u2019s request. 23.  On 25 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional detention (auto). The applicant lodged another s\u00faplica appeal against that decision and requested that the extradition proceedings be suspended on the grounds that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first s\u00faplica appeal of 28 February 2015. 24.  In a decision of 28 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional rejected the applicant\u2019s request to stay the extradition proceedings, finding that the complaints contained in the first s\u00faplica appeal had already been dealt with in the decision of 25 March 2015. 25.  On 1 June 2015 the applicant lodged another s\u00faplica appeal against the decisions of 25 May 2015 and 28 May 2015, contesting the reasoning as regards his request to stay the extradition proceedings and emphasising that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first s\u00faplica appeal of 28 February 2015. 26.  On 3 June 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a new decision dismissing the s\u00faplica appeals lodged by the applicant and confirming the decision on the applicant\u2019s imprisonment pending extradition to the United States. In particular, the decision stated the following:\n\u201cThe applicant considers that his s\u00faplica appeal lodged against the decision of 24 February 2015 has not been answered ... .\nThis Court refers at this point to what was already established in its decision of 25 March 2015 ... .\nNevertheless, in order to clarify any doubts that the applicant might have concerning whether or not he has received an answer to his s\u00faplica appeal, we [the Court] will resolve here the issued raised in that appeal.\n...\nThe guarantees provided have been considered sufficient for the Court. Consequently, regardless of the judgment mentioned by the applicant, we consider that they comply with the requirements established in the ECtHR\u2019s judgment Hutchinson v. United Kingdom [(no. 57592/08, 3 February 2015)], as well as the judgment of 13 November 2014 [Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, 13 November 2014)], lodged by a French citizen...\nTaking into consideration the above-mentioned reasoning, the Court\nDecides\nto dismiss the s\u00faplica appeals referred to in the present ruling, maintaining the order of imprisonment for Andr\u00e9s L\u00f3pez Elorza, in view of his extradition to the United States of America\u201d. 27.  On 19 June 2015 the applicant was detained for the purposes of being extradited to the United States. 28.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court against the extradition decision. He asked for interim measures, requesting the Constitutional Court to order a stay of the extradition while the case was still pending. He contended, inter alia, that the assurances provided by the US authorities did not fulfil the criteria for assessing the reducibility of a life sentence and that the extradition would amount to a violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 29.  On 1 July 2015 the Constitutional Court issued a decision declaring the amparo appeal and the request for interim measures inadmissible. In particular, it found that the part of the amparo appeal concerning the validity of the assurances given by the US authorities and about a possible violation of the applicant\u2019s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment had been lodged too late as the alleged violations stemmed from the decision of 25 March 2015, thus the 30-day time\u2011limit established in section 44(2) of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court No. 2/1919 had already passed when he had lodged his amparo appeal. 30.  On 2 July 2015 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures with the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He requested the Court to indicate to the Spanish Government that his extradition should be stayed pending the outcome of proceedings before the Court. The request was granted on the same day on a temporary basis until 1 August 2015, and the Government were asked the following questions:\n\u201ca.- Does the applicant risk under US criminal law, in respect of the charges, a maximum penalty that precludes early release and/or release on parole?\nb.- What are the concrete mechanisms and under what US legal basis is the applicant entitled to review his possible final life sentence? In this sense, are the appeal, pardon and other review mechanisms referred to in the note verbale of 3 December 2014 the ones described in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (application no. 140/10, 4 September 2014, \u00a7 27)?\u201d 31.  On 23 July 2015 the Government submitted their response and attached a document issued by the Office of International Affairs of the US Department of Justice called \u201csupplemental information to Spain on Sentencing Issues in Relation to Andres Lopez Elorza, a/k/a \u2018Andres Lopez Flores\u2019 (hereinafter, \u201cthe US report\u201d). The report stated the following:\n\u201cBy way of introduction, Lopez Elorza\u2019s extradition is sought in order for him to stand trial on federal narcotics offenses in the Eastern District of New York. In essence, Lopez Elorza, a veterinarian, is charged with having been a member of a conspiracy between September 2004 and January 2005, the goal of which was to import heroin into the United States for subsequent distribution, in which Lopez Elorza\u2019s role was to surgically implant packages of liquid heroin into the bodies of dogs that later were transported to the United States. The charges followed the search, in January 2005, of a farm Lopez Elorza operated in Medellin, Colombia, in which law enforcement authorities seized six puppies into which three kilograms of liquid heroin had been surgically implanted. The six puppies were bound for the United States, and the heroin they carried was surgically removed. After the search of his farm, Lopez Elorza fled Colombia.\u201d 32.  As regards the first question put to the Government, the US report argued that there were pretrial factors that could affect the applicant\u2019s sentencing. In particular, the report noted the following:\n\u201cBefore any trial, Lopez Elorza could, with the advice of his lawyer, decide to give up the right to a trial and plead guilty to the charges in the indictment, with or without the agreement of the prosecution. See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a). A timely admission of guilt is a factor which could reduce the sentence the judge decides to impose following a conviction. In the United States, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Lopez Elorza may seek to reach an agreement with the prosecution wherein he would plead guilty in exchange for certain favorable actions, such as an agreement to allow him to plead guilty to fewer than all the charges in the indictment (with the remainder of the charges to be dismissed at sentencing), or even to lesser charges, or in exchange for the government\u2019s promise to affirmatively recommend to the court that a particular lesser sentence be imposed. The agreement may also include the parties\u2019 recommendation as to the appropriate sentence that - depending upon the type of plea agreement that is negotiated - may or may not bind the judge regarding the sentence that will be imposed. Such agreements are within the discretion of the government to enter into, and the judge may also decline to approve an agreement she or he does not believe to be in the interests of justice. The agreement may include, inter alia, an agreement to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Thus, if Lopez Elorza were willing and able to provide substantial assistance to the United States in the investigation or prosecution of another person who had committed a crime, a plea agreement might include a promise by the government attorneys, in exchange for his guilty plea, to file a motion with the court asking that Lopez Elorza\u2019s cooperation be taken into account and permitting the Court to impose a lower sentence that it might otherwise impose. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(e); United States Sentencing Guidelines, Section 5K1.1. In such cases, it is not atypical for a judge to impose a sentence that is significantly less than the Guidelines recommendation.\u201d 33.  It also observed that \u201c[i]f, however, Lopez Elorza decides not to plead guilty and instead exercise his right to a trial, and if he is found guilty of one or more charges, his sentencing exposure will vary, depending on the nature of the charges on which he is found guilty. Moreover, the judge will have broad discretion to determine the appropriate sentence [...]\u201d. 34.  As regards the estimated sentence that the applicant could face, the US report stated firstly that, \u201cIn imposing a sentence in a federal criminal case, the judge must consult the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines\u201d. It added that the Guidelines were advisory since the judge had \u201cthe discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range so long as the court states \u2018with specificity,\u2019 both at sentencing and in the written judgment and commitment order, its reason for doing so\u201d. It additionally stated that, \u201c[b]oth the defendant and the government have the statutory right to appeal any sentence imposed on the grounds that it is substantively or procedurally unreasonable under the circumstances of the case\u201d. Moreover, the decision whether to sentence a person convicted of multiple counts concurrently or consecutively was at the discretion of the court. Section 3584 of Title 18 of the US Code, states, in part, that \u201c[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively\u201d. The report further stressed the following:\n\u201cPrior to sentencing, a probation officer will prepare a presentence report that contains information about the defendant\u2019s offense, his criminal history, other background information, and a calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant has the right to object to the information and conclusion in the present report. Later, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, defense counsel will be able to present to the judge various mitigating factors to consider that may result in the reduction of his sentence. Specifically, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), in determining the particular sentence imposed on a defendant, the court shall consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, punishment for the offense, deter the defendant or others from committing similar criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the applicable guideline range; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to the victims of the offense(s). In assisting the court in considering the above seven factors, defense counsel will be able to present to the court in detail any mitigating factors relating to these criteria. This would enable the defense to provide to the sentencing court information regarding Lopez Elorza\u2019s background and circumstances, including: his family environment and relationships, the environment in which he was raised, his work history,... socioeconomic factors including educational opportunities or lack thereof, his physical and psychological well-being and any past or current treatment, prior criminal conduct, if any, and any resultant rehabilitative programs and periods of probation, incarceration, and parole, as well as Lopez Elorza\u2019s longterm educational, vocational, and sociological goals\u201d. 35.  The report noted that there were many factors that contributed to the imposition of a sentence and that it was \u201cimpossible to address every conceivable permutation that could occur or every possible scenario that might arise\u201d. However, the report indicated that according to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the advisory sentencing range was \u201c188 to 235 months incarceration, far less than the possible life sentence provided for under the statutes with which he was charged\u201d. 36.  Furthermore, the report stated that under section 3553(a) of Title 18 of the US Code, there was a \u201cneed to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities\u201d. In that regard, the report stated that several of the applicant\u2019s co-conspirators had already been sentenced in a related case before the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant\u2019s case. One of the co-conspirators \u201cfaced a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months and received a sentence of 72 months incarceration\u201d, another \u201cfaced a Guidelines range of 78 to 87 months and received a sentence of 14 months incarceration\u201d and a third had \u201cfaced a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months and received a sentence of Time Served (approximately 12 months incarceration)\u201d. The US report also noted that none of those defendants had entered into cooperation agreements with the government. Consequently, the sentences imposed on the applicant\u2019s co-conspirators by the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant\u2019s case \u201c[could] be of value in assessing the sentence that will be imposed on him\u201d. 37.  The report concluded that while it was possible that any available maximum sentence could be imposed for an offence, under the circumstances present in this case, \u201cthe risk of L\u00f3pez Elorza receiving such a sentence is low\u201d. 38.  As regards the second question, the US report stated that if the applicant was sentenced to a life term, he could benefit from a variety of mechanisms to seek to have the sentence invalidated or reduced or to obtain early release. 39.  Concerning the applicant\u2019s right to invalidate or reduce his sentence, the Government stated that the applicant would have the right under US law to lodge an appeal with the Court of Appeals, asking for a reversal of his conviction \u201cbased on an error in the proceedings\u201d. The applicant would also be able to \u201cask the Court of Appeals to review the appropriateness of his sentence\u201d. He could argue that a life sentence was \u201cunreasonable\u201d in the circumstances of his case. The report also stated that even after the applicant had exhausted his rights at trial and on appeal, he could under US law file \u201ca motion in the trial court claiming that his life sentence was imposed \u2018in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States\u2019, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack\u201d. 40.  Concerning the applicant\u2019s right to obtain early release, the report specifically stated that \u201csince 1987, there has been no federal parole system in the United States\u201d. The applicant, however, could ask for early release if he provided substantial assistance after his conviction and the imposition of his sentence. In addition, US law also allowed for compassionate release under section 3582 of Title 18 of the US Code. The report specifically stressed that the Bureau of Prisons could reduce the applicant\u2019s sentence if it found that there was \u201can extraordinary and compelling reason to do so; for example, if a medical condition arose with L\u00f3pez Elorza that would warrant such a modification\u201d. Finally, the applicant could also seek executive clemency in the form of commutation (reduction) of his sentence. The report noted that in cases similar to the applicant\u2019s, commutation of life sentences was not \u201ca rare occurrence\u201d. It gave as an example that of 13 July 2015, when President Obama had commuted the life sentences of \u201cfourteen persons who had been convicted of drug related offenses\u201d. 41.  On 31 July 2015 the interim measures under Rule 39 were extended and the Court requested that the Government stay the applicant\u2019s extradition to the United States while the proceedings were pending before the Court.", "references": ["4", "8", "7", "2", "0", "6", "3", "5", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 6.  On 25 January 2006 the applicant\u2019s wife, I., gave birth to a son, N. On 25 August 2008 I. gave birth to another son, V. The family lived in Vladimir. 7.  In July 2011 the applicant and I. divorced. 8.  On 8 October 2011 the applicant took the children away from their home in Vladimir and brought them to the town of Shakhunya in Nizhniy Novgorod Region where his mother lived. He did not obtain I.\u2019s consent. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to the Shakhunskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod Region for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with him in Shakhunya. On 24 October 2011 I. lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which the children would live with her in Vladimir. 10.  On an unspecified date in November 2011 the applicant returned the children to their mother in Vladimir. 11.  On 19 January 2012 experts appointed by the court issued their report. They found that the applicant was self-confident, domineering and inclined to lie. He was emotionally stable but, at the same time, easily carried away and fickle in his interests, which could mean that he would not always wish to take care of his children. The applicant strived to spend a lot of time with the children and was against punishing them. I. was seen to be impulsive, anxious, diffident and emotionally unstable. Her intellectual capacities were low. Her manner of upbringing was erratic: she vacillated between excessive demands and punishments and insufficient demands and punishments. Her manner of upbringing could be detrimental to the children\u2019s psychological development. The children were anxious and stressed. N. had a closer emotional connection with his father than with his mother. As regards V., any situations involving his mother were stressful to him because they were associated with excessive demands and punishments. 12.  The childcare authority issued an opinion that the children should reside with their mother. The mother had better living conditions. The children attended school (N.), a nursery school (V.) and various extracurricular activities at her place of residence in Vladimir. I. took good care of the children and did not prevent them from seeing their father. 13.  The applicant submitted audio recordings of his conversations with his children. A psychologist, who had analysed those recordings, stated in court that the parents were both uncooperative and were both equally responsible for the stress from which N. and V. suffered. The audio recordings submitted by the applicant showed that he had tried to manipulate the children into saying that they wanted to live with him. In her opinion, the children had a stronger attachment to the mother. It was preferable that they lived with her in Vladimir where the living conditions were more comfortable and where they had constantly lived since their birth. 14.  On 20 February 2012 the Shakhunskiy District Court granted I.\u2019s application for a residence order in her favour and dismissed a similar application by the applicant. The court doubted the authenticity of an employment certificate from a private company submitted by the applicant. Given that he had not produced any official documents confirming his employment, the court found that he had not proved that he had a permanent income. There was no evidence that the applicant had supported his children financially during the period since his separation from I. in February 2011 until October 2011, when the children had been living with their mother. He had started to pay child maintenance only after he had lodged his application for a residence order in October 2011. The applicant had moreover asked that the children\u2019s residence be fixed at his mother\u2019s address, which showed that he did not have any intention of taking care of them personally. It was clear from the audio recordings submitted by the applicant, as analysed by a psychologist, that the applicant had attempted to manipulate the children and to force them to make a choice between the parents. He was therefore willing to reach his aims by any means, even at the price of making his children suffer. He had moreover taken the children away from their home in Vladimir and brought them to his mother\u2019s residence in Shakhunya without I.\u2019s consent. According to witness statements, I. had always taken good care of the children. It was I. who had always accompanied them to school and extracurricular activities. The fact that she had a partial disability had never so far prevented her from raising them and caring for them. The fact that the applicant\u2019s living conditions were better was insufficient in itself for making a residence order in his favour. Nor was the court convinced by the applicant\u2019s assertion that the children had a stronger attachment to him than to their mother. The children had always lived with their mother, except for several weeks during the summer holidays when they had stayed with him at his mother\u2019s residence in Shakhunya. There was no evidence that I. had shouted or excessively punished the children. Although the experts had indeed found her manner of upbringing to be erratic, their report did not mention that she could cause detriment to their psychological development. Moreover, it was evident from the audio recordings that it was the applicant who had tried to turn the children against their mother. The childcare authorities had also considered that it was in the children\u2019s interest to live with the mother. Given that I. had never prevented the applicant from seeing the children, the applicant would be able to visit them as often as he liked, while the children would continue living in the environment familiar to them. 15.  On 29 May 2012 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. The applicant\u2019s cassation appeal was rejected by a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 30 November 2012.\n(b)  Second residence order 16.  In January 2013 the applicant applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Vladimir for a reconsideration of the children\u2019s residence arrangements. He asked for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with him in Vladimir. He submitted, in particular, that the children wished to live with him. He had been picking them up from school almost every day lately and bringing them back to I. only to sleep. I. shouted at the children, slapped them and humiliated them. She did not work and lived on social benefits and child maintenance. In the alternative, he asked for a contact order, claiming that I. occasionally prevented him from seeing the children. 17.  On 4 March 2013 N. and V. were assessed by a psychologist who found that their psychological state was good. They were resigned to their parents\u2019 divorce and no longer experienced any negative emotions in that connection. Their relationship with their mother was friendly and supportive. They considered her as family, while their father was considered to be a friend who came regularly to play with them. 18.  On 22 March 2013 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that both parents had satisfactory living conditions. N. had expressed a wish to live with the applicant. The childcare authority considered that it was desirable to perform a psychological expert examination of the children to assess their attachment to each parent. However, I. objected to any assessment of her children by a psychologist. The childcare authorities had however learned that she had secretly seen a psychologist. The children had told the psychologist that they wished to live with their father. However, given that the children had not yet reached an age at which they were able to form their own opinions on the matter, as they were still highly impressionable and changeable, the childcare authority considered that it was possible for the children to continue living with their mother. The applicant should be able to have regular contact with the children for two weekends per month. 19.  On 6 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for a residence order and maintained the residence order in favour of I. It found it established that I. was unemployed and that the applicant had a permanent job. The living conditions of both parents were satisfactory. The court took note of the expert report of 19 January 2012 (see paragraph 11 above), observing that the experts had found that the parent-child relationships were complicated in the applicant\u2019s family. The expert report did not however contain an explicit finding that the children were attached to their father more than to their mother. The applicant had not proved that I. had shouted at the children, humiliated them or neglected her parental responsibilities. Evidence showed that she was taking good care of the children. There was therefore no reason to change the children\u2019s residence arrangements established by the judgment of 20 February 2012. 20.  The court further held that N. and V. were entitled to maintain contact with their father and his paternal family and determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicant was to be able to have contact with the children each weekend from 5 p.m. on Saturday until 7 p.m. on Sunday at the applicant\u2019s place of residence, with the mother\u2019s prior agreement. 21.  On 25 September 2013 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. A cassation appeal by the applicant was rejected by a judge of the Vladimir Regional Court on 14 May 2014.\n(c)  Third residence order 22.  On 4 October 2013 the applicant lodged a new application for a residence order in his favour with the Oktyabrskiy District Court. He submitted that V. currently lived with him and did not want to return to his mother who shouted at him and physically punished him. Both V. and N. had stated many times that they wanted to live with him. He devoted a lot of time to the children by picking them up after school, bringing them for walks and educating them. He had a comfortable and stable income and good living conditions. By contrast, I. did not work and did not have any income except social payments and the child maintenance payments that she received from the applicant. It was therefore the applicant who maintained the children financially. The applicant further relied on the expert report of 19 January 2012 (see paragraph 11 above) from which it was apparent that the children had a stronger attachment to their father than to their mother, that any situations involving their mother were stressful for them and that the mother\u2019s methods of upbringing were detrimental to the children\u2019s psychological development. The applicant submitted audio recordings of many conversations he had had with the children between March 2012 and September 2013. The children invariably stated that they wanted to live with the applicant, complained that their mother shouted at them and whipped them with a belt, and protested, crying, that they did not want to return living with her. 23.  On 19 February 2014 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that V. had indeed lived with the applicant during his (V.\u2019s) illness from 25 September to 31 October 2013. He had however then returned to his mother. The children also stayed with the applicant on weekends. The applicant always accompanied V. to nursery school and N. to extracurricular activities. He paid child maintenance without delay and regularly gave additional financial support to the children. The applicant and I. were attending mediation sessions. The applicant was in permanent employment and had a high stable income. I. was partly disabled and did not work. Her mother and grandmother helped her in raising the children. According to I., the children were very attached to their father, spoke to him over the telephone every day and spent their holidays with him. The childcare authority concluded that the children were attached to both parents, that I. was taking good care of their health and development and that their living conditions were comfortable. It was therefore possible for the children to continue living with their mother. 24.  A representative of the childcare authority stated at the hearing that she had followed the family for some time. She had the impression that the children were equally attached to both parents and both parents took equally good care of them. Recently she noted positive changes in the highly conflictive relationship between the parents. In particular, the mother allowed the father to spend more time with the children than before. The father picked up the children from school and they spent weekends and part of their holidays with him. She considered that there was no reason to change the children\u2019s residence arrangements and recommended that the children should continue living with their mother. 25.  I. stated that she loved her children and took good care of them. She also alleged that the applicant\u2019s motives for asking for a residence order in his favour were mercenary as he wanted to use the flat that belonged to the children. She therefore asked that the residence order previously granted to her be maintained. 26.  The applicant\u2019s neighbour stated that she often saw the applicant walking and playing with the children. She thought that he was a very good father and that the children loved him. In October 2013 I. had come to the applicant\u2019s flat in the middle of the night on at least three occasions. She had shouted, had threatened to break the windows and to take the children away from the applicant by force. The neighbours had had to call the police, who took I. away. 27.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s request to play the audio recordings submitted by him on 4 October 2013 (see paragraph 22 above), the judge stated that it was not necessary because the other party had not contested them. The applicant\u2019s written description of those audio recordings had been examined at the hearing. 28.  The applicant also asked that a copy of the expert report of 19 January 2012 be admitted as evidence. Both I. and the childcare authority objected, arguing that the expert examination had been made two years before and was therefore out of date. The court rejected the application, finding that the expert report had been analysed by the courts which had issued previous residence orders. 29.  On 19 February 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court ordered an expert psychological examination of the children to assess their relationship with both parents. 30.  On 8 April 2014 the expert found that it was not possible to make an expert report because I. had refused to come to the examination or to bring the children. The court considered that it was not necessary to reiterate the order for an expert examination as there was sufficient material for making a decision on the case. 31.  On 8 April 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for a residence order in his favour. The court found no circumstances warranting the change of the residence arrangements established in the residence orders of 20 February 2012 and 6 May 2013. It had no reason to doubt that I. loved her children and took good care of them. The applicant\u2019s allegations that I.\u2019s manner of upbringing were detrimental to the children\u2019s development had not been confirmed by the evidence in the case. The criminal proceedings on charges of fraud against her had been discontinued. Her living conditions were satisfactory. The fact that she had no employment or income did not justify granting a residence order to the applicant. She did not prevent the applicant from seeing the children as much as he liked. As indicated in the judgment of 6 May 2013, the expert report of 19 January 2012 did not contain an explicit finding that the children were more attached to their father than to their mother. The childcare authorities had found that the children had been equally attached to both parents. There were therefore no reasons to issue a residence order in favour of the applicant. 32.  On 1 July 2014 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. In particular, it held that the applicant had not proved that there had been sufficient reasons to change the residence arrangements established by the earlier residence orders. No exceptional circumstances warranting the children\u2019s separation from their mother had been established. It had not been proved that the children had had an exceptionally strong attachment to the father or wished to live with him and him only. In such circumstances, and taking into account the children\u2019s age, their established way of life, the satisfactory living conditions of both parents and the opinion of the childcare authorities\u2019 on the case, the decision to maintain the residence order in favour of the mother was in the best interests of the children. The Regional Court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint that the District Court had not assessed the family situation with sufficient thoroughness because it had not questioned the children and had refused to admit the expert report of 19 January 2012 as evidence. The Regional Court held that, given that the children were under ten years old, their opinion on the residence issue could not be taken into account. As regards the expert report of 19 January 2012, it had been made in the framework of separate proceedings and had been already assessed by the courts in those proceedings. The District Court considered that the expert opinion was not necessary because the evidence included in the case file was already sufficient to adjudicate the dispute. 33.  A cassation appeal by the applicant was rejected by a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 8 December 2014. 34.  On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Vladimir authorised, against the applicant\u2019s will, a trip abroad for the children for the winter holidays. On 15 December 2014 the children left for Germany with their mother. They returned to Russia on 9 January 2015. The decision of 4 December 2014 was later annulled by the Oktyabrskiy District Court because it found that it had no territorial jurisdiction over the case. 35.  On an unspecified date I. applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladimir for a judicial authorisation for the children to travel to Germany during the approaching school summer holidays, complaining that the applicant had refused to give such an authorisation. The applicant submitted in reply that if the children left for the entire summer holidays he would not be able to see them for three months. He also submitted that there was a risk that the children might not return from Germany. He asked for an interim measure prohibiting the children from leaving Russia pending the proceedings. 36.  On 12 March 2015 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for interim measures, finding that the application of interim measures requested would amount to a prejudgement of the case. 37.  On 6 May 2015 the Leninskiy District Court authorised the children\u2019s trip abroad for the period from 1 June to 31 August 2015. The court found it established that I. intended to travel to Germany together with V. and N. during the summer school holidays. She had received an accommodation guarantee from her new partner\u2019s sister, who lived permanently in Germany. The applicant had however refused to give V. and N. an authorisation to travel without giving reasons. The court found that the parents could not exercise parental rights to the detriment of their children\u2019s rights. In particular, the children\u2019s right to travel could not be made dependant on the parents\u2019 willingness to authorise their going abroad, especially in the case of a disagreement between the parents. The court considered that the children\u2019s trip abroad would not breach the applicant\u2019s rights and would encourage the children\u2019s development, education and broad-mindedness. 38.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that under domestic law if a child left Russia accompanied by one of the parents an authorisation from the other parent was not required; such authorisation was required only if the child went abroad unaccompanied by the parents. A judicial travel authorisation could be given only if one of the parents had formally objected to the child\u2019s going abroad (see paragraph 51 below). Given that the applicant had never lodged such an objection in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the judicial travel authorisation had been unlawful and unnecessary. 39.  On 9 July 2015 I. married her partner, a national of Germany. She then left for Germany with N. and V. In September 2015 she gave birth to a child. N. and V. are now living in Germany with their mother, her new husband and their half-brother. 40.  The applicant lodged an additional appeal, submitting that although the decision of 6 May 2015 had not yet become enforceable, I. had been able to leave with the children for Germany. That fact had clearly demonstrated that a judicial authorisation was not required for leaving Russia. It had however been used by I. to obtain a German visa for the children, which she could not have otherwise obtained without his agreement. The applicant also complained that the children had not returned to Russia by 31 August 2015, although the judicial authorisation had been valid only until that date. 41.  On 2 December 2015 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal. The Regional Court held that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. In particular, it found that the applicant had not submitted to the District Court any evidence showing that the trip abroad would have been contrary to the children\u2019s best interests. 42.  On 8 September 2015 the bailiffs service opened, at the applicant\u2019s request, enforcement proceedings in respect of the contact order of 6 May 2013 (see paragraph 20 above). 43.  In October 2015 the applicant complained about the bailiffs\u2019 inaction to the Oktyabrskiy District Court. On 16 December 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected his complaint, finding that the bailiffs had taken measures to enforce the contact order but enforcement had been impossible through no fault of the bailiffs service, specifically because I. and the children had been living in Germany. On 3 March 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. Cassation appeals by the applicant were rejected by a judge of the Vladimir Regional Court on 21 October and then by a judge of the Supreme Court on 30 December 2016. 44.  Meanwhile, the bailiffs asked the Oktyabrskiy District Court for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings on the grounds that I. and the children were abroad and it was therefore impossible to take any coercive measures against her. On 8 February 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the bailiffs\u2019 request, finding that the children\u2019s residence abroad was not a sufficient reason to suspend the enforcement proceedings. 45.  The applicant also submitted numerous requests to various Russian authorities, including in January 2016 to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, for assistance in recovering his children and in enforcing the contact order of 6 May 2013. In December 2015 he complained of the authorities\u2019 inaction to the Leninskiy District Court. On 4 February 2016 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that those authorities had no competence in the matter. The only authority competent to assist him in re-establishing contact with his children was the bailiffs service. On 12 May 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 46.  According to the Government, in April 2016 the bailiffs service advised the applicant to apply for recognition and enforcement of the contact order to the competent German authorities, via the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. There is no evidence that the applicant used that procedure. 47.  On an unspecified date I. applied to the Leninskiy District Court for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with her in Germany. The applicant lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which the children would live with him in Vladimir. He also asked for an interim order to return the children to Russia and to ensure that until their return the children communicated with him via VOIP calls every Wednesday, Friday and Sunday at 9 p.m. (Moscow time). On 24 May 2016 the Leninskiy District Court refused the applicant\u2019s application for an interim order, finding that he had not proved that the failure to take interim measures might complicate or make impossible the execution of the forthcoming judgment. On 22 June 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. The residence order proceedings are pending.", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "7", "5", "6", "8", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in \u010ca\u010dak. 5.  On 7 September 2005 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor seeking redress regarding various contractual issues. 6.  On 4 December 2008 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicant. 7.  On 17 November 2009 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica upheld this judgment on appeal. 8.  On 20 May 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the previous judgments and ordered a re-trial. 9.  On 12 August 2011 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled against the applicant. This judgment was upheld by the High Court in Podgorica and the Supreme Court on 6 April 2012 and 12 September 2012 respectively. 10.  The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicant on 20 October 2012. 11.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 28 November 2012. 12.  On 30 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 25 September 2015.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "7", "9", "5", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5.  On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (\u201cthe Oktyabrskiy District Court\u201d) ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise \u201c16th Military Plant\u201d (\u201cthe company\u201d) to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6.  On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7.  On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs\u2019 Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8.  On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9.  On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs\u2019 Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10.  On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11.  On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs\u2019 application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12.  On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13.  Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14.  The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company\u2019s aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16.  Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod \u2013 \u0424\u0413\u0423\u041f 9 \u0426\u0410\u0420\u0417 or \u0424\u0413\u0423\u041f 9 \u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043d\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0417\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0434). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17.  In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "4", "1", "2", "8", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1977, 1978, 1977, 1981, 1981, 1980, 1982 and 1980 respectively. They lived in Hakkari (the first applicant), Bing\u00f6l (the second applicant), Istanbul (the third, fourth, fifth and eighth applicants), Diyarbak\u0131r (the sixth applicant) and Mu\u015f (the seventh applicant) at the time their applications were lodged with the Court. 5.  The applicants, who are of Kurdish ethnic origin, were students at various faculties attached to Istanbul University (\u201cthe University\u201d) at the time of the events. In November 2001 they petitioned the University Rector\u2019s office requesting that Kurdish language classes be introduced as an optional module. 6.  Around the same time similar petitions were submitted by students studying at various universities in Turkey. 7.  Upon receipt of these petitions a disciplinary investigation was initiated by the University into the applicants\u2019 actions. 8.  On 14 February 2002, relying either on regulation 9(d) or on regulation 10(e) of the Disciplinary Regulations of Higher Education Institutions, the Administrative Board of Istanbul University, after having heard defence submissions from some of the applicants, either suspended them from the University for a period of two semesters (Mr \u00c7\u00f6lge\u00e7en and Mr Salim) or expelled them from the University (Mr Bek, Mr \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan, Ms I\u015f\u0131k, Mr Ay, Mr U\u00e7ak and Mr Tur\u011fay). 9.  The applicants claim that following this disciplinary sanction they were denied access to the University facilities, they were branded as terrorists by the University authorities, their names were put on notice boards and they were shunned by their friends and other students. Some of the applicants also alleged that they were subject to criminal investigations. 10.  The applicants, upon notification of the disciplinary sanctions in question, lodged separate actions with the Istanbul Administrative Court, requesting a stay of execution of the disciplinary decisions, with a view to their subsequent annulment. 11.  On 9 May 2002 and on 27 June 2002 (in respect of the fifth applicant) the Istanbul Administrative Court suspended the execution of the applicants\u2019 disciplinary sanctions on the grounds that, inter alia, the sanctions in question were unlawful and that, therefore, their application would cause irreparable damage to the applicants. It appears that the objections of the University to some of these decisions were also dismissed by the court on 4 July 2002. 12.  On 25 June 2002, following the notification of the aforementioned decisions to the University, the applicants, save for Mr \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan, were all re-enrolled in their respective faculties. As a result they were allowed to take part in the repeat exams held on 1-12 July 2002. Mr \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan was re\u2011enrolled on 23 July 2002 and he was allowed to sit his exams, upon his request, in the 2002-2003 spring midterm period. 13.  On 12 and 19 December 2002 the Istanbul Administrative Court examined the merits of the cases and annulled the disciplinary sanctions against the applicants on the ground that they were unlawful. In its decisions, the court noted, inter alia, that there was nothing in the content of the petitions or in the manner in which they were submitted to warrant disciplinary sanctions. 14.  The University unsuccessfully challenged these decisions before the Supreme Administrative Court. 15.  In 2004 the applicants each lodged an action for compensation with the Istanbul Administrative Court pursuant to Article 13 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). In their petitions they maintained that they had sustained psychological damage as a result of the disciplinary punishment imposed on them for having used their democratic right of petition, and requested non\u2011pecuniary damages. 16.  Between September 2004 and January 2005 the Istanbul Administrative Court awarded compensation to the applicants on the grounds that they had been denied their right to education and that their honour and dignity had been adversely affected by the accusations against them. 17.  Between March 2007 and March 2008 the Istanbul District Administrative Court quashed the judgments of the first-instance court and dismissed the actions. In its decisions the court held, inter alia, that following the stay of execution of the disciplinary sanctions the University administration had permitted the students to take repeat exams in July, compensating for the exams which they had been unable to sit in the spring semester and that therefore the conditions for awarding non-pecuniary damage had not been met. 18.  By a letter dated 25 March 2011 the office of the Dean of the Faculty of Literature of Istanbul University submitted the following information to the Government for the purposes of the present proceedings:\n\u2013  Mr Mehmet Halit \u00c7\u00f6lge\u00e7en, who was studying to become a librarian, graduated on 14 July 2006;\n\u2013  Mr \u00dcbeyt Salim, who was studying Russian language and literature, graduated on 11 October 2004;\n\u2013  Mr M\u00fcrsel Bek, who was studying to become a teacher of Turkish language, graduated on 13 June 2003;\n\u2013  Mr Yavuz U\u00e7ak, who was studying to become a primary school teacher, graduated on 4 June 2003;\n\u2013  Mr Mustafa \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan, who was studying to become a primary school mathematics teacher, graduated on 11 July 2006;\n\u2013  Mr M\u00fcn\u00fcr Ay, who was studying geography, failed to finish his studies within the required time-limit and he was removed from the University register on 18 February 2008;\n\u2013  Ms Ruken Buket I\u015f\u0131k, who was studying English language and literature, graduated on 9 February 2007;\n\u2013  Mr Ali Tur\u011fay, who was studying Turkish language and literature, graduated on 27 July 2006.\nAccording to the Dean of the Faculty of Literature of Istanbul University, Mr Bek and Mr U\u00e7ak graduated from the University within the minimum time allowed (4 years). 19.  Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution provides that no one shall be denied the right to education or to instruction. Its last paragraph reads: \u201cNo language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved\u201d. 20.  Article 74 of the Turkish Constitution reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n \u201cCitizens and foreigners resident in Turkey, with the condition of observing the principle of reciprocity, have the right to apply in writing to the competent authorities and to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with regard to requests and complaints concerning themselves or the public ...\u201d 21.  At the material time, regulation 9(d) of the Disciplinary Regulations of Higher Education Institutions provided that a person who engaged in activities which gave rise to polarisation on the basis of language, race, religion or denomination was to be suspended from the institution in question for either half or a whole semester. 22.  At the material time, regulation 10(e) provided that a person who was a member of an illegal organisation, who engaged in actions on behalf of or who helped such an organisation, would be expelled from the higher education institution. 23.  Persons who have sustained damage as a result of an administrative act may also lodge an application with the superior authority of the relevant administrative body and request the annulment, withdrawal or alteration of the impugned act (section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act). The administrative authorities\u2019 failure to reply within sixty days is considered to be a tacit refusal of that request (section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act). The persons concerned may then bring an action before the administrative courts requesting the annulment of the administrative act and compensation for the damage they have sustained (section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act). 24.  Under Section 13 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577 of 6 January 1982), those who have suffered damage on account of a wrongful act by the administration may bring compensation proceedings against the latter within a year from the date on which they learned of the impugned act and, in any event, within five years from the commission of that act. The proceedings before the administrative courts are in writing. 25.  Article 27 \u00a7 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the Supreme Administrative Court or a lower administrative court may decide to stay the execution of an administrative act if its implementation would result in damage which would be difficult or impossible to compensate, and if this act is clearly unlawful. 26.  At the time of the events in question domestic law did not provide for the teaching of the Kurdish language at any levels of education in public or private institutions. On 2 August 2002 the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching (Law no. 2923 of 14 October 1983) was amended by Law no. 4771 with a view to regulating the principles of education and training of citizens of Turkey in the different languages and dialects traditionally used in daily life. The title of the law in question was changed to \u201cThe Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching and the Learning of Turkish Citizens\u2019 Different Languages and Dialects\u201d. 27.  On 30 July 2003 an amendment was made to the second sentence of section 2 (a) of Law no. 2923 with a view to enabling the opening of private courses for the teaching of the different languages and dialects used by citizens of Turkey. This provision was further amended on 2 March 2014 by Law no. 6529 with a view to facilitating the opening of private schools to provide for education and training in a language or dialect traditionally used in daily life by citizens of Turkey. 28.  By decisions dated 25 June 2012, 7 September 2012 and 23 January 2014, the Board of Education and Training of the Ministry of Education added \u201cliving languages and dialects (Kurdish language)\u201d to the weekly timetable of primary and secondary schools as an elective course. 29.  On 5 July 2014 the Regulation on Foreign Language Education and Training issued by the Ministry of Education was amended so as to provide for the possibility of education and training in a language or dialect that is traditionally used by citizens of Turkey in their daily lives in private schools. 30.  According to the information provided by the Government, graduate and postgraduate education in the field of Kurdish language and literature is available at tertiary level in six Universities, namely Batman University, Bingol University, Mardin Artuklu University, Mu\u015f Alpaslan University, Siirt University and 100. Y\u0131l University.", "references": ["8", "1", "5", "3", "4", "7", "9", "2", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kalush. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  In 1996 V.D., the applicant\u2019s future husband and his parents living in corporate housing (\u201cflat A\u201d) owned by \u201cK.T.\u201d, a State company (hereinafter \u201cthe K.T. company\u201d), were offered the chance by the latter to exchange this accommodation for larger corporate housing accommodation (\u201cflat B\u201d), which was also owned by the same Company. Having accepted this offer, the three of them signed a written undertaking to vacate flat A when they moved to flat B. 7.  In July 1997 the applicant married V.D. and joined him, his parents and brother to live in flat A. 8.  In 1998 the applicant\u2019s and V.D.\u2019s son was born. Along with the applicant, he was registered by the local authority as a co-tenant of flat A on the grounds that both of them had become members of the original tenants\u2019 family. 9.  In 1999 the K.T. company transferred ownership of flat A to the municipality. 10.  At various subsequent dates the applicant\u2019s husband and parents-in-law moved out into flat B and registered their residence at the new address. 11.  According to the Government, the applicant and her son also moved into flat B at the material time. 12.  According to the applicant, she and her son remained residents in flat A, as her marriage with V.D. was falling apart and living together had become intolerable. 13.  In August 2004 V.D. and the applicant divorced. 14.  On 20 July 2005 the K.T. company decided to reallocate flat A to the family of R., its employee, who lived in an accommodation hall (\u0433\u0443\u0440\u0442\u043e\u0436\u0438\u0442\u043e\u043a). 15.  In October 2005 the K.T. company lodged a claim in the Kalush Town Court, seeking, in particular, to evict the applicant and her son from flat A. It argued that there was no legal basis for them to remain in the property, which had been reallocated to a new tenant (R.). 16.  On 25 July 2006 the court dismissed the claim for the eviction of the applicant and her son. It found, in particular, that the applicant had lawfully moved into flat A as a member of the original tenants\u2019 family and so had acquired all the rights of a social tenant, within the meaning of Article 64 of the Housing Code (1983). She and her son had never promised to relocate and had remained residents of flat A at the material time. They had not been included in the occupancy voucher (\u00ab\u043e\u0440\u0434\u0435\u0440\u00bb) of flat B and had not been provided with any other housing. They could therefore not be evicted without being provided with alternative accommodation. Moreover, in 1999 the K.T. company had transferred flat A to municipal ownership. It had therefore had no standing in 2005 to reallocate the same flat to R.\u2019s family or to bring the present proceedings. 17.  The K.T. company appealed, referring to Article 55 of the Housing Code. 18.  On 14 September 2006 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 25 July 2006 and ordered the applicant\u2019s and her son\u2019s eviction \u201cwithout provision of any other accommodation\u201d. It held that the Kalush Court, having properly established the relevant facts, had interpreted the law incorrectly. Notably, according to Articles 55 and 99 of the Housing Code, the applicant (together with her son) \u2013 having settled in flat A as a member of the original tenants\u2019 family \u2013 was bound by the duty of the original tenants to vacate the flat. There was therefore no legal basis for the applicant\u2019s and her son\u2019s continued residency in flat A, and this fact constituted a sufficient basis for their eviction without the provision of any other housing. Furthermore, the Kalush Court had erred in respect of the K.T. company\u2019s legal standing. Under Article 55 of the Housing Code, notwithstanding the transfer of the property to the municipality, the K.T. company had retained the right to allocate the flat to one of its employees. It had therefore had legitimate standing to seek the vacation of the flat by its previous tenants. 19.  The applicant lodged a request for leave to appeal in cassation. She noted that she and her minor son had been lawful and registered residents of the disputed flat for eight years. During this period, she had dutifully engaged in the payment of all expenses relating to her occupancy of the flat. Unlike her former husband and in-laws, she and her son had not given any promises to vacate flat A and had not acquired any rights to live in flat B with them. Accordingly, her and her son\u2019s eviction would effectively render them homeless. 20.  On 16 November 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal in cassation, ruling that her submissions did not contain any argument creating an appearance that there could be a problem under applicable law. 21.  On 15 December 2006 the applicant requested the Kalush Court to postpone her eviction, in particular, because she had no other accommodation and her salary was too small for her to rent private-sector housing. 22.  On 21 December 2006, while the applicant\u2019s request was pending consideration, the State bailiffs arrived at flat A and had the applicant vacate it and surrender the keys. 23.  On 25 December 2006 the local registration authority annulled the applicant\u2019s and her son\u2019s registration as residents of flat A. 24.  On 29 December 2006 the Kalush Court allowed the applicant\u2019s request for her and her son\u2019s eviction to be postponed; it postponed their eviction for three months, referring to her indigent status and the interests of a minor child. 25.  According to the applicant, after her eviction she had to seek emergency refuge in the home of a colleague and subsequently rented odd accommodations at various places. She submitted testimony given by various acquaintances and copies of some fixed-term lease agreements. 26.  The Government contested this account, insisting that the lease agreements were fictitious and the applicant had de facto lived in flat B permanently since 2004 without proper registration.", "references": ["6", "8", "0", "2", "7", "5", "1", "3", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicants\u2019 details can be found in the Annex. 11.  These two applicants met in February 2007, and in 2009 they entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 12.  On 11 October 2009 Ms Mortagna moved to Toronto, Ontario, Canada for work purposes. A month later the two applicants decided to get married and on 27 August 2010 they married in Toronto. 13.  In the meantime, on 2 April 2010, Ms Mortagna\u2019s employment came to an end and as a result she was no longer entitled to a residence permit. She therefore returned to Italy and since then has been cohabiting with Ms Orlandi. 14.  On 18 April 2011 their physical cohabitation was registered and since then they have been considered as a family unit for statistical purposes. 15.  On 9 September 2011 the two applicants asked the Italian Consulate in Toronto to transmit to the Civil Status Office in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 16.  On 8 November 2011 the relevant documents were transferred. 17.  On 13 December 2011 the Commune of Ferrara informed the two applicants that it was not possible to register their marriage. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples, and that although the law did not specify that couples had to be of the opposite sex, doctrine and jurisprudence had established that Article 29 of the Constitution referred to the traditional concept of marriage, understood as being a marriage between persons of the opposite sex. Thus, the spouses being of different sex was an essential element to qualify for marriage. Moreover, according to Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a marriage contracted abroad between persons of the same sex, one of whom was Italian, could not be registered in so far as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 18.  These two applicants, who live in Italy, met in 2007 and entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 19.  On 9 January 2008 they started cohabiting in G.P.\u2019s apartment, although D.P. maintained formal residence in his own apartment. In 2009 G.P. purchased a second property which, in the absence of any legal recognition, for practical and fiscal reasons remained in his name only. In 2010 G.P. purchased, through a mandate in the name of D.P (for the purposes of purchasing such property), a garage. In June 2011 the couple moved into D.P.\u2019s apartment and established their home there. They have since been considered as a family unit for statistical purposes. 20.  On 16 August 2011 the two applicants got married in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. On 10 October 2011 they opened a joint bank account. On 12 January 2012, before a notary, the two applicants appointed each other reciprocally as guardians in the event of incapacitation (amministratore di sostegno). 21.  Following the applicants\u2019 request, on 7 January 2012, the Italian Consulate in Toronto transmitted to the Civil Status Office in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 22.  On 20 January 2012, the Commune of Peschiera Borromeo informed the two applicants that it was not possible to register their marriage. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples. Moreover, according to Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a marriage contracted abroad between persons of the same sex, one of whom was Italian, could not be registered in so far as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 23.  Following the entry into force of the new law (see paragraph 97 below), on 12 September 2016 the two applicants requested that their marriage be transcribed as a civil union. According to the applicants\u2019 submissions of 30 January 2017 their request was still pending and no reply had yet been received. 24.  According to documents dated 31 March 2017 submitted to this Court in June 2017, by the Government, the applicants\u2019 marriage was transcribed as a civil union on 21 November 2016. A certification of this registration, submitted by the Government, is dated 16 May 2017. 25.  The two applicants met in Italy in 2002 and entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. Mr Bray, who is Canadian, did not have a residence permit in Italy at the time, Mr Isita therefore travelled repeatedly to Canada. 26.  On 18 July 2005 the couple married in Vancouver, Canada. In the same year Mr Isita designated Mr Bray as his heir. In 2007 Mr Isita retired and moved to Canada permanently, although he maintained formal residence in Italy. 27.  In 2004 the two applicants had purchased some land together; in 2007 the couple purchased a further piece of land, and in 2008 they purchased a house and in 2009 a commercial property with an annexed cottage. In 2009 they also opened a joint bank account. 28.  On 10 October 2011 they asked the Civil Status Office to register their marriage contracted in Canada. 29.  On 25 November 2011 the Commune of Naples informed the two applicants that no such registration was possible. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples as reiterated in Circular no. 55 of 2007 issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 30.  Following guidance from the Mayor of Naples, directing the Civil Status Office of the commune to register such marriages (see below), Mr Mario Isita and Mr Grant Bray re-submitted an application to have their marriage registered. According to information sent to the applicants by email, their request was granted on 6 August 2014. However, further to the circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see paragraph 89 below) the registration was cancelled on an unspecified date. 31.  On an unspecified date, following the entry into force of the new law, the two applicants requested that their marriage be transcribed as a civil union. According to the applicants\u2019 submissions of 30 January 2017 their request was still pending and no reply had yet been received. 32.  According to undated documents submitted to this Court in June 2017, by the Government, the applicants\u2019 marriage was transcribed as a civil union on 27 October 2016. A certification of this registration, submitted by the Government, is dated 29 March 2017. 33.  These two applicants met in October 1995, and a month later entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 34.  In 1996 Mr Giartosio purchased a house in Rome, Italy and in spring 1998 the two applicants started to cohabit there. There they established their common residence. 35.  In 1998 the two applicants symbolically celebrated their union before their friends and family. In 2001 Mr Giartioso allowed limited access to his bank account in favour of Mr Goretti. In 2005 the two applicants drafted wills nominating each other as each other\u2019s heirs. 36.  On 9 September 2008 the two applicants got married in Berkeley, California. 37.  In 2009 the applicants purchased property together and opened a joint bank account. 38.  Following their request of the same day, on 29 September 2011 the Commune of Rome informed the applicants that the registration of their marriage was not possible, as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 39.  On 1 October 2011 the couple filed a declaration with the Rome \u201cRegistry of civil unions\u201d to the effect that they were entering into a civil union and constituting a de facto couple. The declaration is acknowledged by the relevant authorities, but has only symbolic value (see relevant domestic law and practice below). 40.  Following guidance from the Mayor of Rome directing the Civil Status Office of the commune to register such marriages (see below), on 15 October 2014 Mr Gianfranco Goretti and Mr Tommaso Giartosio re\u2011submitted an application to have their marriage registered. Their request was also granted and the marriage was registered. However, further to the circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see paragraph 89 below) by a decision of the Prefect of Rome of 31 October 2014 the above-mentioned registration was cancelled. 41.  On 23 November 2016, following the entry into force of the new law and their request to that effect, the applicants\u2019 marriage was transcribed as a civil union. 42.  These two applicants met in July 1993 and immediately entered into a committed and stable relationship with each other. A few weeks later Mr Dal Molin moved in with Mr Rampinelli in La Spezia, Italy. 43.  In 1997 the couple moved to Milan, Italy. 44.  In 1998 Mr Rampinelli moved to Germany for employment purposes, maintaining a long-distance relationship with Mr Dal Molin; however they met every week. 45.  In 1998 Mr Dal Molin purchased a property in Milan with financial assistance from Mr Rampinelli. 46.  In 2000 Mr Rampinelli returned to Italy; the couple moved to Mediglia and continued cohabiting. 47.  In 2007 Mr Rampinelli moved to the Netherlands, again for work purposes, maintaining however, a long-distance relationship with regular weekly visits to Italy. 48.  After being in a relationship for fifteen years, on 12 July 2008 the couple got married in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In November 2008 the couple opened a joint bank account. 49.  In 2009 Mr Dal Molin left his job in Italy and moved to the Netherlands. As he was unemployed, he was totally dependent on his spouse. Mr Rampinelli also supported financially Mr Dal Molin\u2019s mother, a victim of Alzheimer\u2019s disease. They are under a system of separation of estates; however, their accounts are in joint names and their wills indicate each other as heirs. 50.  On 28 October 2011 the applicants requested the General Consulate in Amsterdam to transmit to the respective Civil Status Offices in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 51.  On 29 November 2011 the Commune of Mediglia informed the applicants that the registration of their marriage was not possible, as it was contrary to the norms of public order. No reply was received from the Commune of Milan. 52.  Following the guiding decision by the Mayor of Milan, mentioned above, the applicants also re-submitted an application to have their marriage registered. According to the information provided by the applicants on 30 January 2017, their marriage was never registered. 53.  However, on 4 October 2016, following the entry into force of the new law and their request to that effect, the applicants\u2019 marriage was transcribed as a civil union. 54.  The two applicants married in The Hague on 1 June 2002. 55.  On 12 March 2004, the applicants being resident in Latina, Italy, they requested the Civil Status Office to register their marriage contracted abroad. 56.  On 11 August 2004 their request was rejected in accordance with the advice of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 28 February 2004. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not provide for the possibility of two Italian nationals of the same sex contracting marriage; this was a matter contrary to internal public order. 57.  On 19 April 2005 the applicants lodged proceedings before the competent Tribunal of Latina, requesting the registration of their marriage in the light of DPR 396/2000 (see relevant domestic law below). 58.  By a decision of 10 June 2005 the Latina Tribunal rejected the applicants\u2019 claim. It noted that the registration of the marriage was not possible, because if such a marriage had been contracted in Italy it would not have been considered valid according to the current state of the law, as it failed to fulfil the most basic requirement, that of having a female and a male. In any event, the marriage contracted by the applicants had no consequence in the Italian legal order in so far as a marriage between two persons of the same sex, although validly contracted abroad, ran counter to international public order. Indeed same-sex marriage was in contrast with Italy\u2019s history, tradition and culture, and the fact that so few European Union (EU) countries had provided such legislation went to show that it was not in line with the common principles of international law. 59.  An appeal by the applicants was rejected by a decision of the Rome Court of Appeal, filed in the relevant registry on 13 July 2006. The Court of Appeal noted that such registration could not take place, given that their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites to amount to the institution of marriage in the domestic order, namely the spouses being of different sexes. 60.  On 17 July 2007 the two applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation. In particular they highlighted, inter alia, that public order referred to in Article 18 of Law no. 218/95, had to be interpreted as international public order not national public order, and thus it had to be established whether same-sex marriage was against that order, in the light of international instruments. 61.  By a judgment of 15 March 2012 (no. 4184/12) the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and confirmed the previous judgment. Noting the Court\u2019s case-law in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) it acknowledged that a marriage contracted abroad by two persons of the same sex was indeed existent and valid, however, it could not be registered in Italy in so far as it could not give rise to any legal consequence. 62.  The Court of Cassation referred to its case-law, to the effect that civil marriages contracted abroad by Italian nationals had immediate validity in the Italian legal order as a result of the Civil Code and international private law. This would be so in so far as the marriage had been contracted in accordance with the laws of the foreign state in which it had been contracted, and that the relevant substantive requirements concerning civil status and the capacity to marry (according to Italian law) subsisted, irrespective of any non-observance of Italian regulations regarding the issuing of the banns or the subsequent registration. The former were subject solely to administrative sanctions and the latter were not conducive of any legal effects \u2013 since registration had the mere significance of giving publicity to a deed or act which was already valid on the basis of the locus regit actum principle. Thus, had the marriage been contracted by persons of the opposite sex, in the absence of any other fundamental requirements it would have been valid and conducive of legal effects in the Italian legal order. In that case the Civil Status Officer would have no option but to register the marriage. However, the case-law had shown that the opposite sex of the spouses was the most indispensable requirement for the \u201cexistence\u201d of a marriage as a legally relevant act, irrespective of the fact that this was not stated anywhere explicitly in the relevant laws. Thus, the absence of such a requirement placed in question not only the validity of the marriage, but its actual existence, meaning that it would not be conducive to any legal effects (as opposed to a nullity). It followed that according to the ordinary law of the land, two same-sex spouses had no right to have their marriage contracted abroad registered. 63.  The Court of Cassation considered that the said refusal could not be based on the ground that such a marriage ran counter to public order (as dictated by the relevant circulars), but that the refusal was simply a consequence of the fact that it could not be recognised as a marriage in the Italian legal order. 64.  The Court of Cassation went on to note that the social reality had changed, yet the Italian order had not granted same-sex couples the right to marry as concluded in the Court of Cassation judgment no. 358/10 (which it cited extensively). Indeed the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage, or the registration thereof, was not a matter of EU law, it being left to regulation by Parliament. However, the Italian legal order was also made up of Article 12 of the Convention as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in Schalk and Kopf (cited above); in that case the Court considered that the difference of sex of spouses was irrelevant, legally, for the purposes of marriage. It followed that, irrespective of the fact that it was a matter to be dealt with by the national authorities, it could no longer be a prerequisite for the \u201cexistence\u201d of marriage. Moreover, the Court of Cassation noted that persons of the same sex living together in a stable relationship had the right to respect for their private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention; therefore, even if they did not have the right to marry or to register a validly contracted marriage abroad, in the exercise of the right to freely live with the inviolable status of a couple, they could bring actions before the relevant courts to claim, in specific situations related to their fundamental rights, treatment which was uniform with that afforded by law to married couples. 65.  In conclusion, the Court of Cassation found that the claimants had no right to register their marriage. However, this was so not because the marriage did not \u201cexist\u201d or was \u201cinvalid\u201d but because of its inability to produce (as a marriage deed) any legal effect in the Italian order. 66.  Law no. 218 of 31 May 1995 regarding the reform of the Italian system of private international law, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\nArticle 16\n\u201ci) Foreign law shall not be applied if its effects are contrary to public order.\n ii) In such cases, another law shall apply, in accordance with other connecting criteria provided in relation to the same subject matter. In the absence of any such connecting criteria, Italian law shall apply.\u201d\nArticle 17\n\u201cThe following provisions are without prejudice to the prevalence of Italian laws which in view of their object and scope shall be applied notwithstanding reference to the foreign law.\u201d\nArticle 18\n\u201cLegal certificates released abroad shall not be registered in Italy if they are against public order.\u201d\nArticle 27\n\u201cCapacity to enter into marriage and other conditions required to enter into marriage are regulated by the national law of each spouse at the time of the marriage, this without prejudice to the unmarried status (stato libero) of any of the spouses, obtained as a result of an Italian judgment or one which has been recognised in Italy.\u201d\nArticle 28\n\u201cA marriage is valid, in relation to form, if it is considered as such by the law of the country where it is celebrated or by the national law of at least one of the spouses at the time of the marriage or by the law of the common state of residence at the time of the marriage.\u201d\nArticle 29\n\u201ci) Personal relations between spouses are regulated by the national law common to both parties.\nii) Personal relations between spouses who have different nationalities or several nationalities common to both are regulated by the law of the state where their matrimonial life is mostly spent.\u201d\nArticle 65\n\u201cForeign documents concerning the status of individuals and the existence of family relations are recognised under Italian law if released by public authority of the State whose law is recognised by the present law ... unless those documents violate the public order...\u201d 67.  Title VI of the First Book of the Civil Code deals with marriage, and is divided into six chapters (which are again divided into sections). Chapter III deals with the celebration of a civil marriage. Its Articles 115 and 130, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\nArticle 115\n\u201cA citizen is subject to the provisions of section one [conditions to contract marriage] of this Chapter even when contracting marriage in a foreign state according to the form applicable in such foreign state ...\u201d\nArticle 130\n\u201cNobody is entitled to claim the title of spouse and the legal consequences of marriage unless a certified copy of the celebration as recorded in the family registers is presented.\u201d\nArticle 131\n\u201cA factual reality reflecting the recognition by society of a civil status, which is in conformity with the marriage deed, sanctions any defect of form present in the marriage deed.\u201d 68.  Other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\nArticle 167\n\u201cEach or both spouses may by public deed, or a natural third person may by means of a will, create a patrimonial fund for the needs of the family, assigning selected property, real estates or other goods which are recorded in the official Italian registers, or bonds.\u201d\nArticle 230 bis\n\u201c1. In the absence of contractual relationships, family members who work permanently for the family business are entitled to maintenance, to the financial increments of the business, and to a share in the business, according to the type and standard of work done. 3. The notion of family member includes: the spouse, relatives within the third degree, and in-laws within the second degree. A family business is a business in which the spouse, relatives within the third degree, and in-laws within the second degree, work.\u201d\nArticle 408\n\u201c... A guardian in the event of incapacity may be chosen by the interested person, by means of a public deed or an authenticated private deed.\u201d\nArticle 540\n\u201cThe surviving spouse is entitled to half of the entire estate of the deceased, subject to the provisions of Article 542 if there are surviving children.\nIrrespective of whether there are any siblings or parents of the deceased, the surviving spouse is entitled to live in the family house and to use its furniture, whether it is their common possession or solely belongs to the deceased.\u201d\nArticle 1321\n\u201cA contract is an agreement between two or more parties with the intent to establish, regulate or extinguish a patrimonial relationship between them.\u201d\nArticle 1372\n\u201cObligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties ... They have no effects on third parties unless so provided by law.\u201d 69.  Registration of civil status acquired abroad is provided for by the Decree of the President of the Republic no. 396 of 3 November 2000 entitled \u201cRegulation of the revision and simplification of the legal order of civil status pursuant to Article 2 (12) of Law no. 127 of 15 May 1997\u201d (DPR 396/2000). Its Article 16, regarding marriages contracted abroad, reads as follows:\n\u201cWhen both spouses are Italian nationals or one is an Italian national and the other a foreigner, a marriage abroad may be contracted before the competent diplomatic or consular authorities or before the local authorities according to the law of the place. In the latter case a copy of the marriage deed shall be deposited with the diplomatic and consular authority.\u201d 70.  Article 17 relates to the transmission of the deed, and according to Article 18 deeds contracted abroad may not be registered if they are contrary to public order. 71.  For the purposes of guidance on the application of DPR 396/2000 the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued various circulars. Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs expressly provided that a marriage between two persons of the same sex, contracted abroad, cannot be registered in the Civil Status Registry in so far as it is contrary to the norms of public order. Similarly, Circular no. 55 of 18 October 2007 provided that the Italian legal order does not allow homosexual marriage, and a request for registration of such a marriage contracted abroad must be refused, it being considered contrary to the internal public order. These circulars are binding on the Officer for Civil Status, who is competent to ascertain that the requisites of law are fulfilled for the purposes of registration. 72.  In the Italian legal order marriage registration does not produce any ulterior legal effects (non ha natura costitutiva); it serves the purpose of acknowledgment in the public domain (significato certificativo, efficacia dichiarativa) in so far as it gives publicity to a deed or act which is already valid on the basis of the locus regit actum principle (the rule providing that, when a legal transaction which complies with the formalities required by the law of the country where it is carried out is also valid in the country where it is to be given effect). 73.  Extracts from relevant judgments read as follows:\nDecision of 3 April 2009 of the Venice Tribunal\n\u201cThe difference of sex constitutes an indispensable prerequisite, fundamental to marriage, to such an extent that the opposite hypothesis, namely that of persons of the same sex, is legally inexistent and certainly extraneous to the definition of marriage, at least in the light of the current legal framework.\u201d\nRome Court of Appeal decision of 13 July 2006 and Treviso Tribunal decision of 19 May 2010\n\u201c[Marriage between two persons of the same sex] may not be registered in the Italian Civil Status Registry because it does not fulfil one of the essential requisites necessary for marriage in the internal order, namely the difference of sex of the spouses.\u201d\nConstitutional Court judgment no. 138/2010 74.  The Italian Constitutional Court in its judgment no. 138 of 15 April 2010 declared inadmissible the constitutional challenge (submitted by persons in a similar situation to those of the applicants) to Articles 93, 96, 98, 107, 108, 143, 143 bis and 231 of the Italian Civil Code, as it was directed to the obtainment of additional norms not provided for by the Constitution (diretta ad ottenere una pronnunzia additiva non costituzionalmente obbligata). The case had been referred to it by the ordinary courts in the ambit of a procedure challenging the refusal of the authorities to issue marriage banns for the claimants\u2019 same-sex marriage. 75.  The Constitutional Court considered Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, which provided that the Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, as an individual and in social groups where personality is expressed, as well as the duties of political, economic and social solidarity against which there was no derogation. It noted that by social group one had to understand any form of community, simple or complex, intended to enable and encourage the free development of any individual by means of relationships. Such a notion included homosexual unions, understood as a stable cohabitation of two people of the same sex, who have a fundamental right to freely express their personality in a couple, obtaining \u2013 in time and by the means and limits to be set by law \u2013 a juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties. However, this recognition, which necessarily requires general legal regulation, aimed at setting out the rights and duties of the partners in a couple, could be achieved in other ways apart from the institution of marriage between homosexuals. As shown by the different systems in Europe, the question of the type of recognition was left to regulation by Parliament, in the exercise of its full discretion. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court clarified that without prejudice to Parliament\u2019s discretion, it could however intervene according to the principle of equality in specific situations related to a homosexual couple\u2019s fundamental rights, where the same treatment between married couples and homosexual couples was called for. The court would in such cases assess the reasonableness of the measures. 76.  It went on to consider that it was true that the concepts of family and marriage could not be considered \u201ccrystallised\u201d in reference to the moment when the Constitution came into effect, given that constitutional principles must be interpreted bearing in mind the changes in the legal order and the evolution of society and its customs. Nevertheless, such an interpretation could not be extended to the point where it affects the very essence of legal norms, modifying them in such a way as to include phenomena and problems which had not been considered in any way when it was enacted. In fact it appeared from the preparatory work to the Constitution that the question of homosexual unions had not at all been debated by the assembly, despite the fact that homosexuality was not unknown. In drafting Article 29 of the Constitution, the assembly had discussed an institution with a precise form and an articulate discipline provided for by the Civil Code. Thus, in the absence of any such reference, it was inevitable to conclude that what had been considered was the notion of marriage as defined in the Civil Code, which came into effect in 1942 and which at the time, and still today, established that spouses had to be of the opposite sex. Therefore, the meaning of this constitutional precept could not be altered by a creative interpretation. In consequence, the constitutional norm did not extend to homosexual unions, and was intended to refer to marriage in its traditional sense. 77.  Lastly, the court considered that, in respect of Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the principle of equality, the relevant legislation did not create an unreasonable discrimination, given that homosexual unions could not be considered equivalent to marriage. Even Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not require full equality between homosexual unions and marriages between a man and a woman, as this was a matter of Parliamentary discretion to be regulated by national law, as evidenced by the different approaches existing in Europe. 78.  Similarly, the Italian Constitutional Court, in its judgments nos. 276/2010 of 7 July 2010 filed in the registry on 22 July 2010, and 4/2011 of 16 December 2010 filed in the registry on 5 January 2011, declared manifestly ill-founded claims that the above-mentioned articles of the Civil Code (in so far as they did not allow marriage between persons of the same sex) were not in conformity with Article 2 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court reiterated that juridical recognition of homosexual unions did not require a union equal to marriage, as shown by the different approaches undertaken in different countries, and that under Article 2 of the Constitution it was for the Parliament, in the exercise of its discretion, to regulate and supply guarantees and recognition to such unions. 79.  Generally, domestic jurisprudence until 2012 seemed to indicate that the impossibility of registering a homosexual marriage contracted abroad was a result of the fact that it could not be considered a marriage. However, this line of jurisprudence was put aside in the Court of Cassation judgment no. 4184/12 (in the case of the applicants) concerning the refusal of registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad, and a further development occurred in 2014, as follows:\nCourt of Cassation judgment no. 4184/2012 80.  See paragraphs 61-65 above\nJudgment of the Tribunal of Grosseto of 3 April 2014 81.  In the mentioned judgment, delivered by a court of first instance, it was held that the refusal to register a foreign marriage was unlawful. The court thus ordered the competent public authority to proceed with its registration. While the order was being executed, the case was appealed against by the State. By a judgment of 19 September 2014 the Court of Appeal of Florence, having detected a procedural error, quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the Tribunal of Grosseto. By a first-instance decision of 2 February 2015 the Tribunal of Grosseto again ordered the competent public authority to proceed with its registration.\nProceedings leading to the Court of Cassation judgment no. 2487/2017 82.  On an unspecified date a certain GLD and RLH (a same-sex couple, one of whom was an Italian national) had requested their marriage contracted in France to be registered in the Civil Status Office of the relevant commune. However, the relevant mayor had refused their request. The couple instituted proceedings against such a decision, but were unsuccessful before the first-instance Tribunal of Avellino. 83.  By decree no. 1156, filed in the relevant registry on 8 July 2015, the Milan Court of Appeal found in favour of the claimants. Referring to the judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 4148 of 2012 and 8097 of 2015, the Court of Appeal considered that since the marriage had been validly contracted in France, it could not be weakened because of a move to Italy, which would be discriminatory and would entail a breach of Article 12 of the Convention, as well as a breach of the right to free movement under European Union law. The Court of Appeal noted that the matter was regulated by Article 19 of legislative decree no. 396/2000 concerning registration of marriages contracted abroad, given that Article 28 of Law no. 218/1995 provided that a marriage was valid in respect of form if it is so considered in accordance with the laws of the country where it was contracted. It reiterated the principle that the same sex of the couple does not go against (non costitusice un limite) public order, be it national or international. 84.  The judgment became final on 15 July 2016 given that the Court of Cassation in its judgment no. 2487/2017 of 31 January 2017 found that the appeals had not been lodged according to the relevant procedures. 85.  In a case before the Tribunal of Reggio Emilia [at first\u2013instance], the claimants (a same-sex couple) had not requested the tribunal to recognise their marriage entered into in Spain, but to recognise their right to family life in Italy, on the basis that they were related. The Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, by means of an ordinance of 13 February 2012, in the light of the EU directives and their transposition into Italian law, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, considered that such a marriage was valid for the purposes of obtaining a residence permit in Italy.\nConstitutional Court judgment no. 170/14 of 11 June 2014 86.  Judgment no. 170/14 of the Constitutional Court found a breach of the Constitution, as a result of the legally obligatory termination of a marriage, and the impossibility of the partners in that case (who had become same-sex partners following gender reassignment of one of the partners) to obtain an alternative recognition of their union. In that case the Constitutional Court also left to the legislature the task of urgently enacting another form of registered cohabitation, one which would protect the couple\u2019s rights and obligations.\nCourt of Cassation judgment no. 8097/2015 87.  In the light of the findings of the Constitutional Court judgment no. 170/14 of 11 June 2014, the Court of Cassation held that it was necessary to maintain in force the rights and obligations pertaining to the marriage (after one of the spouses had changed sex) until the legislator provided for an alternative means of recognition.\nJudgment of the Court of Cassation no. 2400/15 88.  In a case concerning the refusal to issue marriage bans to a same\u2011sex couple who had so requested, the Court of Cassation, in its judgment of 9 February 2015, rejected the claimants\u2019 request. Having considered recent domestic and international case-law, it concluded that - while same\u2011sex couples had to be protected under Article 2 of the Italian Constitution and that it was for the legislator to take action to ensure recognition of the union between such couples - the absence of same sex-marriage was not incompatible with the applicable domestic and international system of human rights. Accordingly, the lack of same sex-marriage could not amount to discriminatory treatment, as the problem in the current legal system revolved around the fact that there was no other available union apart from marriage, be it for heterosexual or homosexual couples. However, it noted that the court could not establish through jurisprudence matters which went beyond its competence. 89.  Following decisions of some mayors (including the mayors of Bologna, Naples, Rome and Milan) to register same\u2011sex marriages validly contracted abroad, by a circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, addressed to the Prefects of the Republic, the Government Commissioners of the Provinces of Bolzano and Trento, and the President of the Regional Government of Val D\u2019Aosta, the following instruction was issued:\n\u201cWhere mayors have issued directives concerning the registration of same-sex marriages issued abroad, and in the event that these directives have been enforced, you are requested to formally invite such mayors to withdraw such directives and cancel any such registrations which have already taken effect. At the same time you should warn them that in the absence of any action on their part the acts illegitimately affected will be annulled ex officio in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 nonies of Law no. 241 of 1990 and Article 54 (3) and (11) of legislative decree 267/2001.\u201d 90.  By a first-instance judgment no. 3907 of 12 February 2015 filed in the relevant registry on 9 March 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of Rome, Lazio, reiterating that there existed no right to have registered same\u2011sex marriages contracted abroad (and therefore confirming the legitimacy of the content of the circular of 7 October 2014), nevertheless declared the above order of 7 October 2004 null and void. Having examined the relevant legal framework, it considered that the Central Administrative Authority and Prefects were not competent to order the annulment of any such registrations, such competence being reserved solely to the judicial authorities. 91.  This decision was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 8 October 2015, filed in the relevant registry on 26 October 2015. 92.  The court noted that Article 27 and 28 of Law no. 218 of 31 May 1995 provided that the subjective conditions for the validity of a marriage are to be regulated by the national law of each spouse to be, and that a marriage is valid, in respect of its form, if it is considered to be valid according to the law of the place where it has been celebrated or the national law of at least one of the spouses. Furthermore, Article 115 of the Civil Code explicitly subjected Italian nationals to the relevant civil laws in relation to the conditions necessary to contract marriage, even if the marriage is contracted abroad. A combined reading of those provisions demands the identification of the mandatory substantive requirements (particularly, the status and capacity of the spouses-to-be) which would allow such a marriage to produce its ordinary legal effects in the national legal order. The difference in sex of the spouses to be was the first condition for the validity of a marriage according to the relevant articles of the civil code, and in line with the long cultural and legal tradition of the institution of marriage. It followed that same-sex marriage was devoid of one of the essential elements enabling it to produce any legal effect in the Italian legal order.\nIn consequence, a State official whose duty it is to ensure (before registering a marriage) that all the formal and substantive requirements have been fulfilled, would be unable to register a same-sex marriage contracted abroad in so far as it does not fulfil the requirement of having a \u201chusband and wife\u201d as required by law (section 64 of Law no. 396/2000). For this reason such a marriage could not be registered, even assuming it were not against public order.\nQuite apart from this inability arising from the ordinary Italian legal order, relying on the relevant constitutional court judgments (nos. 138 of 2010 and no. 170 of 2014) the court found that neither could any obligation be derived from the constitution or international instruments to which Italy was a party. Nor could the recent ECtHR judgment in Oliari and Others v. Italy (nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015) supersede the obstacles created by Article 29 of the Constitution as interpreted by the domestic courts. Indeed that judgment had solely found for the need to introduce a relevant legal framework for the protection of same-sex unions, and reiterated that the introduction of same-sex marriage was a matter to be left to the State. The same conclusions had to be reached even in connection with the rights to freedom of movement and residence as understood in the relevant EU legislation, in so far as the recognition of same sex-marriages celebrated abroad fell outside the scope of EU legislation. It followed that in the absence of a right to same-sex marriage, the latter could not be compared to heterosexual marriage. Indeed, admitting the registration of same-sex marriages obtained abroad, irrespective of the absence of legislation to that effect, would mean superseding the choice of the national parliament.\nIn relation to the nullity of the order of 7 October 2014, it noted that the mayor was subordinate to the Minister and, in line with the relevant norms, in circumstances such as the present one the Prefect had the power ex officio to quash any illegitimate measures taken by the mayor. Indeed the power of the ordinary judge to delete such registrations risked creating uncertainty on such a delicate matter, because of the independence of such a body and the possibility of conflicting decisions. It followed that the appeal was upheld and the first-instance decision quashed. 93.  In more or less the same time, similar proceedings were on-going in connection with the Mayor of Milan\u2019s decision of 9 October 2014 to register a same-sex marriage obtained abroad and the circular of 7 October 2014 (inviting the mayors to cancel such registrations), and the subsequent cancellation, ex officio, of such registrations by means of a decree of 4 November 2014 as well as further annotations made on 11 February 2015 resulting from the latter decree. 94.  By a first-instance judgment no. 20137 of 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of Lombardia, found in favour of the mayor and annulled the subsequent impugned acts (but not the circular of 7 October 2014). It considered that in his supervisory powers a Prefect can issue orders or directives in the ambit of the functioning of the Civil Status Office. However, the Prefect cannot issue an act of annulment in the context of registrations of same-sex marriages obtained abroad, given that the applicable laws give the power to rectify or annul erroneously-registered marriages only to the ordinary judicial authorities. 95.  By means of a judgment no. 05048/16 of the Supreme Administrative Court, published on 1 December 2016, the first-instance decision to annul the impugned acts was confirmed on the basis of a different reasoning. Having analysed all the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Supreme Administrative Court found that no law had attributed to the Minister for Internal affairs (or the Prefect) the power of annulling acts performed by mayors in order to register marriages. Indeed such power was attributed to the Government in its collegial composition. Further, it was not for the court to determine during such proceedings whether the decisions of the mayors to register such marriages were legitimate or not. 96.  A set of similar proceedings concerning the registrations made by the Mayor of Udine was also on-going at the same time, and was decided in favour of the mayor in a first-instance judgment no. 228 of 2015 of the Administrative Tribunal of Friuli Venezia Giulia, which annulled the impugned acts. The judgment was confirmed on appeal by means of a judgment no. 05047/16 of the Supreme Administrative Court published on 1 December 2016 on the basis of the reasoning referred to in the previous paragraph. 97.  By Law no. 76 of 20 May 2016, hereinafter \u201cLaw no. 76/2016\u201d, entitled \u201cRegulation of civil unions between people of the same sex and the rules relating to cohabitation\u201d, the Italian legislator provided for civil unions in Italy. The latter legislation came into force on 5 June 2016. 98.  The same legislation, in particular its Article 28 (a) and (b), provided that within six months from its entry into force, the Italian Government was delegated to adopt legislative decrees providing for the modification of relevant laws concerning private international law, in order to provide for the applicability of same-sex civil unions as provided in Italian law, to persons who have contracted marriage, civil union or any other corresponding union abroad. 99.  By decree no. 144 of the President of the Council of Ministers of 23 July 2016, which came into force on 29 July 2016, transitory provisions were adopted pending the relevant legislative decrees mentioned above (under Article 28). In particular, it was provided that marriages or civil unions contracted abroad are to be registered through the consular offices. 100.  On 19 January 2017 three legislative decrees (nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 19 January 2017) were adopted in line with the above requirements and on 27 February 2017 the relative decrees allowing for the entry into force of such measures as well as legislative changes to other relevant laws were adopted by the Ministry for the Interior. 101.  Until then Italian domestic law did not provide for any alternative union to marriage, either for homosexual couples or for heterosexual ones. The former had thus no means of recognition (see also Oliari and Others, cited above, \u00a7 43, concerning a report of 2013 prepared by Professor F. Gallo (then President of the Constitutional Court)). 102.  Nevertheless, some cities had established registers of \u201ccivil unions\u201d between unmarried persons of the same sex or of different sexes: among others are the cities of Empoli, Pisa, Milan, Florence and Naples. However, the registration of \u201ccivil unions\u201d of unmarried couples in such registers has a merely symbolic value. 103.  Before the adoption of Law no. 76/2016, cohabitation agreements were not specifically provided for in Italian law. 104.  Protection of cohabiting couples more uxorio had been derived from Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, as interpreted in various court judgments over the years (post 1988). In more recent years (2012 onwards) domestic judgments had also considered cohabiting same-sex couples as deserving such protection. 105.  In order to fill the lacuna in the written law, with effect from 2 December 2013 it had been possible to enter into \u201ccohabitation agreements\u201d, namely a private deed, which did not have a specified form provided by law, and which may be entered into by cohabiting persons, be they in a parental relationship, partners, friends, simple flatmates or carers, but not by married couples. Such contracts mainly regulated the financial aspects of living together, cessation of the cohabitation, and assistance in the event of illness or incapacity[1]. 106.  The relevant Council of Europe materials can be found in Oliari and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 56-61). 107.  The relevant European Union law can be found in Oliari and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 62-64). 108.  Of particular interest is Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Its Article 2 contains the following definition:\n\u201c \u2018Family member\u2019 means:\n(a) the spouse\n(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State.\n(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b)\n(d) the dependent direct relative in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b);\u201d 109.  According to the European Commission \u00abCommunication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States\u00bb COM(2009) 313 final (pg. 4):\n\u201cMarriages validly contracted anywhere in the world must be in principle recognized for the purpose of the application of the Directive.\nForced marriages, in which one or both parties is married without his or her consent or against his or her will, are not protected by international or Community law. ...\nMember States are not obliged to recognise polygamous marriages, contracted lawfully in a third country, which may be in conflict with their own legal order. ...\nThe Directive must be applied in accordance with the non-discrimination principle enshrined in particular in Article 21 of the EU Charter.\u201d 110.  The comparative law material available to the Court on the introduction of official forms of non-marital partnership within the legal systems of Council of Europe (CoE) member States shows that fifteen countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) recognise same-sex marriage. 111.  Nineteen member States (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy (as from 2016), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) authorise some form of civil partnership for same-sex couples (by itself or besides marriage). In certain cases such a union may confer the full set of rights and duties applicable to the institute of marriage, and thus be equal to marriage in everything but name, as for example in Malta. Portugal does not have an official form of civil union. Nevertheless, the law recognises de facto civil unions[2], which have automatic effect and do not require the couple to take any formal steps for recognition. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Iceland used to provide for registered partnership in the case of same-sex unions, this was however abolished in favour of same-sex marriage. 112.  It follows that to date (2017) twenty-seven countries out of the forty\u2011seven CoE member states have already enacted legislation permitting same\u2011sex couples to have their relationship recognised as a legal marriage or as a form of civil union or registered partnership. 113.  According to information available to the Court (dated July 2015), concerning the practice of twenty-seven member States which did not at the time provide for same sex-marriage (Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine), concerning the registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad, the following situation emerges: all of these member States, with the exception of Andorra, Malta, as well as Estonia (following a court ruling of 2016), refuse to allow same-sex couples to register domestically a same\u2011sex marriage validly contracted abroad. The reasons for refusal vary; some member States base their position on the legal definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman only, and some States go further and rely on grounds of public order, tradition and procreation. 114.  The twenty-five member States which did not at the time allow same\u2011sex marriage registration can be divided into two groups: those that allowed for married same-sex couples to register their relationship as a same\u2011sex partnership (nine member States - Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia (until 2016), Finland, Germany, Ireland, Slovenia and Switzerland) and those that did not (the remaining sixteen member States). Of the EU member States surveyed none reported a distinction in their legislation between marriages obtained within the EU or elsewhere. 115.  On 26 June 2015, in the case of Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health et al, the Supreme Court of the United States held that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, and that there was no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognise a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character (see for details, Oliari and Others, cited above, \u00a7 65).", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "0", "5", "9", "3", "1", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Korostyshiv. 6.  The applicant, at the relevant time a judge of the Radomyshl District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), was convicted of abuse of office for having exploited a certain Mr I. as a worker on the renovation of his father\u2019s house under the following circumstances. In April 2007 the applicant, having sentenced I. to fifteen days\u2019 imprisonment for disorderly conduct, had the site manager for the house renovation, Mr Sh., check I. out of the police detention facility (\u201cthe facility\u201d) where the latter was serving his sentence and take him to the construction site where he was to work under Sh.\u2019s direction. Then, in November 2007, a police officer, G., conspired with the applicant in drawing up a report falsely accusing I. of another episode of disorderly conduct. G. fabricated written statements by false witnesses, P.S. and I.A., incriminating I., and submitted the file to the applicant. Knowing that I. was innocent and the report was false, the applicant convicted I. and sentenced him to another fifteen days\u2019 detention. The same scheme was used to exploit I. on the construction site. 7.  On 21 November 2007 officers of the Security Service discovered I. on the construction site in Sh.\u2019s company. 8.  According to the transcript of his statement dated 23 January 2008, which was also video-recorded, Sh. stated that the applicant had employed him to work on his father\u2019s house, that in April 2007 I. had worked on the site on terms he had negotiated with the applicant and that in November I. had worked while serving his fifteen-day sentence. The applicant had instructed Sh. to collect I. from the detention facility, so he had done so. The statement was signed by Sh. on the first and second pages, where his rights as a witness were explained. The statement consists of three more type-written pages containing the transcript of the interview but is not signed by Sh. at the end. It contains a note by the investigator to the effect that Sh. did not sign because he failed to appear when summoned by the investigator. The file contains a report of the same date, signed by Sh., to the effect that he had watched the video recording of his interview and had no comment to make. 9.  On 23 January 2008 I. was interviewed by the investigator. He stated that around May (sic) 2007 he had been sentenced to fifteen days\u2019 imprisonment for disobeying the orders of a police officer. While serving his sentence he had worked on the construction of a house belonging to the applicant, under the direction of Sh. After his release, he had agreed to work for the applicant in return for payment and had carried out construction work for him in June and October 2007. He had then stopped working for the applicant. On 8 November 2007 he had been taken from his home by police officers, who had told him that the applicant had accused him of stealing some cables from the building site. He had been taken to the office of the applicant, who had told him that since he refused to work for money, he would have to work for free. As he had refused to work for free, the applicant had responded that then he would rot in a cell, and had given him a fifteen-day sentence. While he had been serving his sentence, Sh. had taken him out of the detention facility several times and he had worked on the applicant\u2019s construction site: he had refused to build a fence and had done some other work on the site. He had not been remunerated. The applicant had visited the site once and had seen him working but they had not spoken. 10.  On 12 September 2008 I. made a notarised statement to the effect that his statement incriminating the applicant had been given \u201cunder the influence of psychological violence and trickery\u201d (\u0437 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f\u043c \u0449\u043e\u0434\u043e \u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0438\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0442\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0443) and that in fact he had worked willingly and for remuneration. 11.  On 30 September 2008 I. was again interviewed by the investigator. The interview was video-recorded. He largely confirmed the tenor of his statement of 23 January 2008 and denied knowingly signing the notarised statement repudiating it. In addition to repeating various elements of his statement of 23 January 2008, he said that although the house where he had worked formally belonged to the applicant\u2019s father, it was the applicant himself who had organised the work. He stressed that he had not been remunerated for his work in April and November 2007 and had not worked voluntarily. In September 2008 the applicant had made him visit a notarial office to formalise some papers, the nature of which he was not clear about. 12.  The applicant and his co-defendant, former police officer G., stood trial before the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal, which was acting as the trial court. 13.  The applicant testified that he had had no connection to his father\u2019s house or work on it. He had not requested that I. be sent there. When convicting I., he had not been aware that the charges against him had been false. I. had worked voluntarily and for remuneration. The applicant did not deny that Sh. had been the construction site manager on the renovation of his father\u2019s house but argued that it had been his father who had been concerned by those works and that the applicant himself had had minimal contact with Sh. The phone number which the prosecution argued he had used to contact Sh. in fact belonged not to him but to his father. 14.  G. admitted that he had forged the administrative arrest report in respect of I. but stated that he had done it at the request of officers B. and S. (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). He said that the applicant had not been involved and had been unaware of the forgery when convicting I. 15.  B., the head of the detention facility, testified that in late October or early November 2007 the applicant had told him that I. had stolen some things from his construction site and had asked B. to bring I. to him. On 8 November 2007 he had taken I. from his home to the police station. He denied having instructed G. to forge documents in I.\u2019s case. On 12 November 2007 B. was informed by another officer that a stranger claiming to be a court officer showed up at the station and was asking for prisoners to perform works at the court. This was refused. Sometime afterwards the applicant called the station to discuss the release of prisoners and spoke to the commanding officer of the station who gave permission for release of prisoners. 16.  S., an officer on duty at the police station, testified that I. had on several occasions been handed over to a person introduced as an employee of the District Court, supposedly for work at the court. On 21 November 2007 the applicant had called personally and asked that I. be handed over for such work. The applicant contested the way S.\u2019s testimony was recorded in the domestic court\u2019s judgment and asserted that S. had not identified him by name. It appears that S. also denied having given any unlawful instructions to G. concerning I.\u2019s case. 17.  Other police officers testified that Sh. had checked I. out of the facility on several occasions. 18.  P., a District Court officer, stated that he was in charge of taking prisoners from the police detention facility to the District Court to carry out work, and that he knew I. well. However, in November 2007 the latter had not worked at the court. 19.  The applicant\u2019s father confirmed that he had bought the house and had had Sh. perform renovation works on it. He denied knowing I. 20.  On 3 July 2009 the trial court, noting that I. had failed to appear despite the fact that summonses had been duly sent to him, ordered the police to escort I. to the next court hearing on 10 July 2009. 21.  On 8 July 2009 the police reported that I. could not be found at his last known address in Radomyshl and that his whereabouts were unknown. His mother, niece and another neighbour had informed the police that I. had not been living at his usual address in Radomyshl for some time, having left to work in Kyiv. Although he visited briefly from time to time, they had no way of contacting him. 22.  On 24 July 2009 the trial court asked the Zhytomyr regional prosecutor to establish the whereabouts of I. and Sh., and to escort them to the hearing scheduled for 17 September 2009. The prosecutor in turn asked the Security Service for assistance in establishing the whereabouts of those two individuals. On 4 September 2009 the Security Service reported essentially the same information as gathered by the police on 8 July 2009. They also stated that Sh. was not living at his address and his whereabouts were unknown. 23.  On 17 September 2009 the trial court again ordered that the police bring I. to the next court hearing on 29 September 2009. The police could not locate I. at his last known address. His mother gave the same explanation for his absence. 24.  On 29 September 2009 the trial court decided that as the presence of I. and Sh. could not be ensured, their statements should be read out and video recordings of their interviews shown. 25.  According to the applicant, he met with I. several times and attempted to persuade him to testify, but I. refused, stating that officers of the Security Service had threatened him with imprisonment if he did. 26.  On 5 November 2009 the trial court convicted the applicant and G. of abuse of office under the circumstances described in paragraph 6 above and sentenced each of them to five years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for three years. In convicting the applicant, the court relied on:\n(a)  I.\u2019s statements, including the one video-recorded, and Sh.\u2019s statement;\n(b)  evidence presented by the co-defendant G. and witnesses B., S. and P. (see paragraphs 14 to 18 above);\n(c)  evidence that the applicant had had regular telephone contacts with Sh. at the relevant time;\n(d)  expert evidence to the effect that it had been Sh. who had signed for I. in the register of prisoners taken out of the detention facility in April and November 2007 and evidence of police officers that Sh. had taken I. from the detention facility;\n(e)  the statements of witnesses P.S. and I.A., who had been identified in the forged police report as witnesses to I.\u2019s alleged disorderly conduct (see paragraph 6 above), to the effect that their statements had been forged. They stated that they did not know I., had not observed him committing the offence, and had not made any statements about it to the police. P.S. testified at the trial. I.A. gave video-recorded evidence in the course of the pre-trial investigation but did not testify at the trial;\n(f)  expert evidence showing that the signatures attributed to P.S. and I.A. on the statements incriminating I. had in fact been made by certain police officers; and\n(g)  the statements of other witnesses, primarily police officers, concerning the circumstances of I.\u2019s arrest. 27.  The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court. He argued that Sh.\u2019s statement should not have been relied upon because Sh. had not signed it and had not been examined at the trial. The applicant also stated that the trial court had misstated I.\u2019s evidence, in particular by ascribing to I. statements which were not in his video-recorded interview shown in the course of the trial. In that interview I. had also made other statements indicating that he had worked voluntarily. The applicant questioned the trial court\u2019s decision to trust the statements given by I., a drunk who had a prior conviction for murder and who had failed to remember the content of the notarised statement he had signed just weeks before, which showed that he was susceptible to signing anything presented to him by the investigator. 28.  On 22 April 2010 the Supreme Court held a hearing to examine the appeal. No representative for the defence was present. A prosecutor was present and made oral submissions in opposition to the appeal. At the close of the hearing the court ordered that references to Sh.\u2019s statement be struck from the judgment, since he had not signed his pre-trial statement and thus his statement was inadmissible. The court listed the remaining evidence supporting the applicant\u2019s conviction and considered that, other than Sh.\u2019s statement, the evidence was admissible and sufficiently supported the verdict. The court upheld the remainder of the judgment.", "references": ["7", "5", "2", "8", "6", "1", "4", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently detained in Lannemezan Prison. 6.  The applicant was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut \u2013 \u201cthe FIS\u201d) and left Algeria prior to the dissolution of that political group by a judgment of the Algiers Administrative Court dated 19 March 1992. After spending some time in Pakistan he entered the United Kingdom in January 1993 using the false name of Elias Serbis. On 26 February 1993 he applied for political asylum in that country, claiming to have been forced to leave Algeria because of his membership of the FIS. His application was refused on 10 August 1994. 7.  On 25 July, 17 and 26 August, 3, 4 and 7 September and 6 and 17 October 1995 eight terrorist attacks were carried out in France. 8.  Although no organisation explicitly claimed responsibility, certain factors, such as the existence of virulent press statements against France and the mode of operation of the attacks, pointed to the involvement of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement Islamique Arm\u00e9 \u2013 \u201cthe GIA\u201d). 9.  In the course of the judicial investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators, telephone tapping operations carried out on public payphones used by a certain B.B. led to a number of persons being arrested and to the search being focused on the United Kingdom and an individual named Elyes (also known as Elyesse or Eliass). The sources of these names or pseudonyms were a telephone conversation of 1 November concerning Elyes and the Western Union bank, a search of B.B.\u2019s home during which a document was found showing that a sum of money had been transferred to B.B. from that bank on 16 October 1995, and the decoding of a list of telephone numbers found on B.B.\u2019s person and at his home and featuring three numbers in England preceded by the name \u201cElyesse\u201d or \u201cEliass\u201d. B.B., who was arrested on 1 November 1995, also directly implicated \u201cYlies\u201d, claiming that he had funded the campaign of attacks from London and had been kept informed of their progress. 10.  On 3 November 1995 the French National Surveillance Directorate informed the investigators that the individual known as \u201cElyes, Ilyes, Lyes, Iliesse, Eliass or Elyasse\u201d, whom B.B. had identified as having funded the attacks, might be the applicant. The latter, who was living in London, was suspected of being one of the leaders of the GIA in the United Kingdom, in particular because of his involvement with the publication Al Ansar (or Al Ansaar) which the GIA used as a mouthpiece abroad. 11.  The investigations carried out in London established that the applicant had a home there and had a set of keys to a second London address, which served as the offices of the magazine Al Ansar and as a meeting place for all the persons involved in publishing and distributing it. On the premises the investigators found, among other items, the following: contracts for three mobile phones in the names of three of the applicants\u2019 acquaintances and corresponding to the numbers identified at the home of B.B., who had rung the numbers before and after each attack; a receipt for the rental of a post-office box in the name of Fares ELIASS with the applicant\u2019s fingerprints on it; letters and statements from the FIS; a statement saying that only the GIA was entitled to conduct the jihad; a letter from the GIA to the French President calling on him to convert to Islam; a letter commenting on the attacks carried out in France; copies of press articles on anti-terrorism mentioning the names of judges and members of the intelligence service; a piece of paper on which \u201cNotre Dame 33\u20111\u201143\u201154-46-12\u201d was written, corresponding to the telephone number of the Western Union branch at 4 rue du Clo\u00eetre Notre Dame in Paris; and a receipt dated 21 July 1995 issued by a branch of Thomas Cook in London for a sum of 5,000 pounds sterling (GBP). 12.  The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody from 4 to 7 November 1995 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 13.  On 7 November 1995 the applicant was detained pending extradition under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued on the same day in connection with the investigation into the attack carried out on 6 October 1995 close to the Maison Blanche metro station. 14.  Three further international arrest warrants were issued concerning the applicant: on 24 November 1995 in relation to the attack of 17 October at the Gare d\u2019Orsay station; on 29 January 1996 in the case concerning a conspiracy to prepare terrorist attacks; and on 16 January 2001 in relation to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station. 15.  The applicant lodged habeas corpus applications which were dismissed in June 1997 and in 2001. On 8 October 2001 the British Home Secretary ordered his removal to France, but that order was quashed by the High Court, Queen\u2019s Bench Division, on 27 June 2002. 16.  On 6 April 2005 the Home Secretary signed a fresh order for the applicant\u2019s extradition in the light of the assurances provided by the French authorities concerning the safeguards of a fair and impartial trial in France. On 14 October 2005 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. 17.  On 1 December 2005 the applicant was handed over to the French authorities and was remanded in custody the following day. 18.  By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement \u2013 in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 \u2013 in an association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question. The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows:\n \u201c- [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar, a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group;\n- ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France;\n- ... was the main contact person in Europe for [D.Z.], alias Abou Abderhamane Amine, in organising and carrying out the GIA\u2019s activities in Europe;\n- ... was tasked with sending money to GIA members still in France to enable them to fund and carry out attacks;\n- ... was in contact with numerous persons involved in and convicted of criminal conspiracy with a view to a terrorist enterprise.\u201d 19.  In a judgment of 29 March 2006 accompanied by over thirty pages of reasoning, the Criminal Court first of all set out the facts with regard to the \u201cpolitical/religious background\u201d, the emergence of the FIS and then the GIA, the \u201cbackground to the attacks\u201d in 1995 \u2013 which it listed and described as attributable in all likelihood to the GIA \u2013 and the \u201ccontext surrounding Rachid Ramda\u201d. 20.  Ruling on the criminal charges, the court began by examining the case against the applicant. It found that it could be established with certainty, on the basis of precise and concurring physical evidence, that the applicant had indeed used various false names and aliases which had come up in the course of the investigations, a fact the court described as \u201cbeyond doubt and indisputable\u201d. With regard to the GIA\u2019s funding the court, having noted the prosecution\u2019s claims that the applicant had funded the GIA groups which carried out the attacks in France during the second half of 1995, examined the factual evidence in the case file at length and in detail. It observed in particular that, according to one witness who was a GIA member, the organisation\u2019s groups had different specialisations depending on their location, with the London group being responsible for sending funds. The court further noted that the applicant had transferred GBP 5,000 on 16 October 1995, two days before the attack of 17 October 1995. This was established by the statements of the British police officers tasked with keeping the applicant under surveillance and of the staff of the Western Union branch where the transfer had been made, and also by the discovery of the applicant\u2019s fingerprints on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union branch. The court also observed that one of the perpetrators of the attacks, B.B., had stated that the money used in preparing the various attacks had always been supplied by the applicant from London. The court inferred that the facts as a whole \u201cdemonstrate[d] that Rachid Ramda was indeed responsible for funding terrorist groups on French soil\u201d. Furthermore, in response to the public prosecutor\u2019s submissions concerning the applicant\u2019s role in disseminating GIA propaganda, the first-instance court also considered the various items of factual evidence before it, and in particular the wealth of correspondence and propaganda documents relating to the GIA\u2019s views and actions that had been found during the searches of the various premises used by the applicant, as well as the statements by a GIA member confirming the applicant\u2019s role as a member of the team publishing the magazine Al Ansar, which was the GIA outlet used in particular to claim responsibility for attacks. It also noted the presence at the applicant\u2019s home of pamphlets promoting terrorism and killing with specific reference to France. The court concluded that the applicant had played a part in disseminating GIA propaganda and ideas. 21.  Turning next to the applicant\u2019s involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, the court found this offence to have been made out, as the investigation had shown that several groups located in the Lyons area, in Paris and in Lille had been behind the 1995 attacks. All the members had either been directly involved or had played an indirect role by aiding and abetting and providing resources, and all of them were either known activists or claimed to be activists within the GIA. The court found that the applicant\u2019s contacts with the various members of these networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the court set out, among other findings, the facts showing the existence of links to eight members of three groups forming a support network for the GIA. 22.  Accordingly, the Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, on the basis of Articles 450-1 and 421-1 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. The court cited as reasons for imposing the prison sentence the fact that \u201cby providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, Rachid RAMDA not only enabled the attacks to be carried out but acted as a propagandist, potentially attracting new members to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries\u201d. It further cited the fact that \u201chis double talk reveal[ed] both his bad faith and his complete lack of regret or remorse\u201d. The court awarded one euro (EUR) in damages to the association SOS Attentats, which had joined the proceedings as a civil party. 23.  In a final judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. While referring expressly to the statement of facts as established in the judgment, it devoted some thirty pages to analysing the charges against the applicant, giving reasons. First of all, the Court of Appeal gave further details concerning the evolution and operation of the GIA. It also specified that the case before it concerned \u201cthe series of attacks carried out in France in the summer and autumn of 1995\u201d, and that \u201cthe facts of the case at hand concern[ed] the preparation of the attacks and the actions enabling the attacks, which started in France in July 1995, to be carried out\u201d. The Court of Appeal went on to list the eight attacks carried out between 25 July and 17 October 1995. With particular reference to the evidence of the existence of an information hub based in London which the applicant had allegedly managed, it found this to be established on the basis of the telephone calls made on the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris\u2011Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean-Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the \u201cfinal preparations\u201d for the Lille attack. 24.  The Court of Appeal also emphasised the existence of several items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant\u2019s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA\u2019s activities. These included the fact that the applicant had sent funds from England on 16 October 1995 under the false name of Philippe Hervier, which had been received by B.B. at the Rivoli branch of the Rivaud bank under the false name of A. Benabbas, and which matched an entry in A.T.\u2019s accounts book marked \u201c36,800 francs, Lyseo\u201d and B.B.\u2019s statements; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and 50,000 French francs (FRF), as shown by an entry in A.T.\u2019s accounts book which mentioned funds sent by \u201cWalid\u201d, a false name used by the applicant or the first name of one of his acquaintances who could be contacted in order to reach him; statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising, the sending of substantial sums of money, a transfer of EUR 4,000 to M. and the existence of a receipt for GBP 100. 25.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been \u201cthe main contact person ... in organising and carrying out the GIA\u2019s activities in Europe\u201d, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been \u201cthe GIA\u2019s main propaganda agent outside Algeria\u201d, with \u201chis role on the magazine Al Ansaar\u201d (particularly in the light of documents seized at the applicant\u2019s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic, a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA\u2019s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies, and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine\u2019s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of \u201cthe London cell which revolved around [him and which] also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through\u201d, as demonstrated by the personal histories of four of them; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with \u201ca strategic role in the GIA\u2019s external organisation\u201d, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide. 26.  The Court of Appeal echoed the reasons given by the Criminal Court and added that there was sufficient evidence in the case to demonstrate that the applicant had been contacted regularly in order to be kept informed of events, that he had been responsible for funding GIA operations in Europe, that he had acted as a conduit for the GIA\u2019s military command and as a propaganda agent for that organisation, especially through the magazine Al Ansar, that he had given shelter to fugitives passing through London and had sometimes been called upon to coordinate the GIA\u2019s external activities. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded as follows:\n \u201cThe Court of Appeal, like the first-instance court, therefore finds it established that the GIA created \u2018an external structure\u2019 in Europe designed to enable it to pursue its goal of overthrowing the Algerian regime, including by attacking institutions and people in countries that supported or were deemed to support that regime, by setting up networks in Belgium and France in particular which provided support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens (accommodation and false identity papers) to fighters who were fleeing the maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks, organised and coordinated by a cell in London in charge of fundraising and using funds acquired lawfully or unlawfully.\n... [the applicant] knowingly played a decisive role, by means of the material acts referred to by the Criminal Court and by this court above, in the achievement of the GIA\u2019s goal, participating from London in the implementation of the group\u2019s external structure, and played a vital role within the organisation whose aim was to prepare, assist in and carry out the attacks which took place.\u201d 27.  In a judgment of 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. 28.  In a judgment of 13 February 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal indicted B.B., S.A.B. and the applicant for the attack of 17 October 1995 and committed them for trial before the Paris special Assize Court. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection principally or incidentally with a terrorist enterprise, and with the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 29.  On 3 August and 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the orders issued by the Paris investigating judge on 27 April (concerning the attack of 25 July 1995) and 13 July 2001 (concerning the attack of 6 October 1995) for the indictment of the applicant and B.B. and their committal for trial before the special Assize Court. The applicant faced trial for aiding and abetting the crimes of murder, attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing death, mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection with a terrorist enterprise, and for the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 30.  These three judgments of the Investigation Division specified that the applicant had aided and abetted by: transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering attacks with explosives and providing B.B. with instructions on manufacturing; relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks; providing the perpetrators with the funds needed not just to manufacture the explosive devices but also to make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out the attacks. The judgments of 13 February and 3 August 2001 added the fact that the funds had also been intended, if necessary, to enable the perpetrators based in France to flee. 31.  In these judgments the judges noted in particular the following facts in relation to the applicant. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B. on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1885 at 3.50 p.m. (Paris time) for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B.\u2019s home, together with a notice of transfer of FRF 38,000 from an English branch of Western Union, and the checks carried out established that the applicant had gone into a Londis shop in Wembley containing a Western Union office at 2.34 p.m. on 16 October 1995 and had re-emerged at 3.26 p.m. (London time); the applicant\u2019s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words \u201cLYESO \u2013 FF 36,600\u201d had been found in the credit column of B.B.\u2019s accounts and the words \u201cWest Union\u201d and \u201cWest-Union Bank\u201d had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Clo\u00eetre in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant\u2019s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by A.T. written on the back, and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B.\u2019s accounts for the sum of \u201c5,000 pounds sterling from [W.], converted at a rate of 7.5%\u201d; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a \u201cGB ticket\u201d, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint\u2011Michel suburban rail station; and a letter from British Telecom had been found, addressed to \u201cWalid\u201d at 122 Hamlet Gardens, the applicant\u2019s address. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had keys, containing two financial reports, one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B.\u2019s arrest. 32.  In its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 the Investigation Division observed in particular that the applicant\u2019s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995. It compared these calls with the statements made by B.B. and a further accomplice, who had been planning an attack on Lille city market, according to which they had reported to the applicant on preparations for the operations, and in particular for the attack of 17 October 1995. The Investigation Division also noted that the applicant had made a transfer of FRF 36,800 from London the day before that attack \u2013 as shown by the fact that his fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip in the Western Union office in London \u2013 which had been received by B.B. in Paris on the same day. The link between that transfer and the attack of 17 October 1995 had also been established by B.B.\u2019s statements and by a call made to the applicant\u2019s mobile phone the same day, after the money had been received. 33.  In its judgment of 3 August 2001 relating more specifically to the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that the applicant\u2019s English mobile phone had been called two days before that attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B.\u2019s home from which other calls had been made, including a call to a mobile phone belonging to a member of the French GIA network, made one minute before the applicant was called. Furthermore, the day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Above all, the Investigation Division noted that the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995. 34.  Lastly, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division also noted that it was clear from these different elements that the applicant had sent funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, not just in relation to the campaign of attacks as a whole but also for use directly in carrying out the attack of 6 October 1995. With regard to the latter, it noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaigns, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had also funded all the operational arrangements put in place in France in order to ensure the success of the attacks, and that the recipients had been required to report to him on how the money had been used. A number of telephone calls had established that the applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995, which had been followed by a telephone call on 8 October 1995 telling the applicant that everything had gone well on 6 October. 35.  On 26 October 2007 the Paris special Assize Court, composed of seven professional judges, found the applicant guilty as charged in connection with the three attacks. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years. The applicant appealed on 29 October 2007. 36.  The appeal proceedings before the Paris special Assize Court, this time composed of nine professional judges, took place from 16 September to 13 October 2009. One hundred and ninety-six individuals joined the proceedings as civil parties, as did the RATP (the Paris public-transport operator), the SNCF (the French national rail company), the Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorist acts and other crimes, the Government Law Officer and the association SOS Attentats. 37.  At the hearing of 16 September 2009 counsel for the applicant made submissions requesting the termination of the proceedings and a finding that the prosecution was null and void, on the basis of the ne bis in idem principle. Citing Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and the judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 10 February 2009, they argued that the material acts which the Assize Court was called on to examine were the same as those of which the applicant had previously been convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal in its final judgment of 18 December 2006. In counsel\u2019s view, the material acts alleged in the Assize Court proceedings, namely the transfer of funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, the transmission of instructions to the same perpetrators, and the monitoring of the preparation and carrying-out of the attacks, had also been alleged in the Criminal Court proceedings. 38.  In an interlocutory judgment of 17 September 2009 the special Assize Court dismissed the objection regarding a breach of the ne bis in idem principle, finding as follows:\n \u201cAlthough Rachid RAMDA\u2019s defence counsel correctly points out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second \u2018offence\u2019 in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same, the following factors need to be taken into consideration in the present case:\n- The facts on which the criminal courts based their finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty, while they related to criminal acts dealt with in the current set of proceedings, were by no means confined to them. In finding the offence of criminal conspiracy to be made out \u2013 a separate offence that is provided for and punishable under Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code \u2013 the courts considered all the elements apt to substantiate the accused\u2019s involvement in the conspiracy, which was aimed at organising, developing and ensuring the continuation of a movement that was bent on imposing its cause, in particular by using clandestine methods and material and intellectual resources (recruitment of and regular contact with activists, dissemination of information on the GIA\u2019s activities and views, fundraising, seeking donations of weapons and various items of equipment, etc.), without necessarily pursuing the sole objective of carrying out the attacks that are the subject of the proceedings.\n - The facts to be considered by this court differ substantially from the earlier ones in that they relate to criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of one-off objectives which were determined with precision and were not inextricably linked, and which were driven by a specific motivation consisting in particular in providing others, in full knowledge of the situation, with the means of deliberately harming human life or individuals\u2019 physical or mental integrity by the use of explosives.\n - In these circumstances the finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty and his conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal cannot lead the Assize Court to find that his prosecution has lapsed and to declare the criminal proceedings against him null and void.\n - It is thus the task of the Assize Court, on conclusion of the proceedings and in the light thereof, to rule, by answering the questions raised before it, as to whether or not Rachid RAMDA is guilty of aiding and abetting as charged ...\u201d 39.  In an interlocutory judgment of 24 September 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal deferred its decision on a request for further information and eventually rejected the request in a further interlocutory judgment of 8 October 2009. 40.  Sixty-three questions concerning the applicant alone were put to the special Assize Court of Appeal. Twenty-six related to the circumstances surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The questions gave precise details of the various alleged acts and where and when they had been committed, and listed the names of dozens of victims of killings and attempted killings, mutilation or permanent disability, injuries resulting in unfitness for work of up to eight days or more, and victims of damage to their property. The answer to sixty-one of the questions was \u201cyes\u201d, by a majority (some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly \u201cdevoid of purpose\u201d), and two questions were found to be \u201cdevoid of purpose\u201d. Besides details regarding the places and dates concerned in each instance, as well as the indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant\u2019s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The parties did not comment on these questions. 41.  An affirmative answer was given to the questions whether the applicant had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and in issuing instructions to that effect, in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and whether he had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995. 42.  In a judgment of 13 October 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years, and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. It adjourned the civil hearing for a later date. The applicant appealed on points of law. 43.  On 15 June 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. Regarding his ground of appeal to the effect that no reasons had been given for the finding of guilt, based in particular on Article 6 of the Convention, it found as follows:\n \u201cFirstly, the impugned questions, which were put in accordance with the law, established in all aspects the acts of aiding and abetting of which Mr Ramda was found guilty.\nSecondly, the judgment convicting Mr Ramda included the answers which the judges comprising the special Assize Court of Appeal gave immediately after the oral proceedings, on the basis of their personal conviction and by a majority following a secret vote, to the questions concerning his guilt which were put to them in accordance with the operative provisions of the committal orders and were the subject of adversarial argument.\nAccordingly, and given that steps were taken to ensure the prior investigation of the charges contained in the indictment, the free exercise of the rights of the defence, and the public and adversarial nature of the proceedings, the requirements laid down by the statutory and Convention provisions relied on were satisfied.\u201d 44.  As to the ground of appeal concerning a breach of the ne bis in idem principle on account of the applicant\u2019s final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 on the basis of identical facts, the Court of Cassation held that criminal conspiracy was a separate offence from the crimes prepared or committed by its members and also from the offences characterised by certain material acts that embodied it.\n...", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "8", "1", "7", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Vila Nova de Gaia. The applicant\u2019s husband, Mr Ant\u00f3nio Rui Calisto Fernandes, was born in 1957. He died on 8 March 1998 following a series of medical problems that occurred after he had undergone minor surgery for the removal of nasal polyps. 11.  On 26 November 1997 Mr Fernandes was admitted to the ear, nose and throat (ENT) department of Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital (\u201cthe CHVNG\u201d) for a nasal polypectomy. He underwent the operation on 27 November 1997 and was discharged from hospital on 28 November 1997 at 10 a.m. 12.  On 29 November 1997, at 1 a.m., the applicant took her husband to the emergency department of the CHVNG because he was suffering from violent headaches and was in an agitated state. There he was examined by the doctors on duty, in particular by a neurologist. The doctors considered that Mr Fernandes was suffering from psychological problems and prescribed tranquilisers. The applicant claims that they recommended her husband\u2019s discharge but that she objected. 13.  In the morning Mr Fernandes was examined by the new medical team on duty. At 10 a.m. he underwent a lumbar puncture which revealed that he had bacterial meningitis. He was transferred to the hospital\u2019s intensive care unit. 14.  On 30 November 1997 a scan revealed a cerebral oedema. On 2 December 1997 another scan revealed that the cerebral oedema had diminished. 15.  On 5 December 1997, following an improvement in his clinical condition, Mr Fernandes was transferred to the hospital\u2019s general D. ward, where he was under the care of Dr J.V. He was diagnosed with two duodenal ulcers on 10 December 1997. 16.  Mr Fernandes was discharged from hospital on 13 December 1997 as his condition was considered to be stable. A follow-up scan as an outpatient was recommended. 17.  On 18 December 1997 Mr Fernandes, who was suffering from vertigo and headaches, was admitted to the emergency department of the CHVNG. He was examined by Dr J.V., who kept him under observation because he had acute diarrhoea, abdominal pain and severe anaemia. Mr Fernandes received blood transfusions. 18.  On 19 December 1997 an endoscopy was performed on Mr Fernandes, confirming that he had a gastroduodenal ulcer. 19.  On 23 December 1997 Mr Fernandes was discharged from hospital. He was prescribed a special diet and medication. A medical appointment was fixed for 9 February 1998. 20.  The applicant\u2019s husband continued to suffer from severe abdominal pain and diarrhoea. On 9 January 1998 he returned to the emergency department of the CHVNG. He was examined by Dr J.V., who did not consider it necessary to admit him. Mr Fernandes therefore returned home the same day. 21.  On 25 January 1998 Mr Fernandes was readmitted to the CHVNG. A colonoscopy revealed infectious ulcerative colitis. Bacteriological tests showed the presence of the Clostridium difficile bacterium. Mr Fernandes was placed on a drip and treated with antibiotics. 22.  At the request of the applicant and her husband, Dr J.V. discharged the latter on 3 February 1998. Dr J.V. prescribed oral treatment and referred Mr Fernandes for further treatment in the hospital\u2019s outpatient department. 23.  On 17 February 1998 Mr Fernandes was admitted to Santo Ant\u00f3nio General Hospital in Oporto after he was found to be suffering from chronic diarrhoea and microcytic anaemia. He underwent various examinations including a colonoscopy, an endoscopy and blood tests. The medical team considered several possible causes, including an infection with the Clostridium difficile bacterium, but all these possibilities were subsequently ruled out. However, a cytomegalovirus was detected and treatment was given. 24.  On 5 March 1998 Mr Fernandes was examined by a doctor who judged the situation to be under control. 25.  On 6 March 1998 Mr Fernandes\u2019s condition deteriorated. He was examined by a doctor who suspected a possible perforated viscus. An X\u2011ray and an abdominal ultrasound were carried out. The latter showed ascites in the abdomen but did not confirm the initial diagnosis. At 5.30 p.m. the applicant\u2019s husband was examined by another doctor who detected some resistance to abdominal palpation. A gas analysis showed metabolic alkalosis, but there were no signs of hypocalcaemia. A sigmoidoscopy was performed which showed that the applicant\u2019s husband had rectocolitis. 26.  On 7 March 1998 at 1 p.m. the applicant\u2019s husband was placed on oxygen because he had difficulty breathing. At 3 p.m. Mr Fernandes was examined by a general physician and subsequently by a surgeon. The latter decided that urgent surgery was needed as there was widespread peritonitis. Mr Fernandes was taken to the operating theatre at 4 p.m. and was brought out again a few minutes later in order to be prepared for surgery, in particular by being given a blood transfusion. He re-entered the operating theatre at 8 p.m. He died the following day at 2.55 a.m. 27.  According to the death certificate issued by Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital, the applicant\u2019s husband died from septicaemia caused by peritonitis and a perforated viscus. 28.  On 13 August 1998 the applicant wrote a joint letter to the Ministry of Health, the regional health authority for the North region and the Medical Association, stating that she had received no response from the hospitals to explain the sudden deterioration in her husband\u2019s health and his death. 29.  On 30 October and 23 December 1998 the regional health authority for the North region sent the applicant copies of the reports drawn up by the CHVNG and Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital on the basis of her husband\u2019s medical records. 30.  On 30 May 2000 the applicant requested an update on progress in the proceedings from the regional health authority, stating that she had still received no clear explanations concerning the events preceding her husband\u2019s death. In a letter of 5 July 2000 the authority informed her that the file had been sent to the Inspectorate General for Health (Inspe\u00e7\u00e3o\u2011Geral da Sa\u00fade \u2013 \u201cthe IGS\u201d) with a view to the opening of an investigation. 31.  By an order of 20 September 2000 the Inspector General for Health ordered an investigation (processo de averigua\u00e7\u00f5es). 32.  On 6 November 2001 an inspector was appointed to head the investigation. 33.  On 7 February 2002 the IGS informed the applicant that evidence would be taken from the members of the medical team which had treated her husband and that an expert medical report would be prepared. 34.  The applicant gave evidence on 3 April 2002. 35.  On 23 September 2002 expert medical reports were requested. Reports prepared by experts in the fields of internal medicine, gastroenterology and general surgery were submitted in November 2002. According to the reports, in view of the deterioration in his state of health after the nasal polypectomy, it would not have been possible to save the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s life. 36.  The report of the investigation was submitted on 28 November 2002. It found, on the basis of the expert medical reports received, that the treatment administered to the applicant\u2019s husband had been appropriate. 37.  In an order of 12 December 2002 the Inspector General for Health declared the investigation closed, finding that there had been no medical negligence and that there were no grounds for instituting disciplinary proceedings against the doctors who had treated the applicant\u2019s husband. 38.  In a letter of 17 February 2003 the applicant appealed against the order. She argued that the final report had not answered her questions, complaining about areas of uncertainty and about the duration of the investigation and its findings. 39.  On 28 March 2003 the Inspector General for Health informed the applicant that he had set aside the order of 12 December 2002 and ordered the reopening of the investigation. 40.  On 26 September 2005, in view of the questions raised by the applicant, the medical experts were requested to provide additional information. 41.  A new investigation report was submitted on 23 November 2005, clarifying the facts and taking account of the answers provided by the three medical experts. The report stated that there were no grounds for criticising the health-care personnel who had been involved in the care of the applicant\u2019s husband in the CHVNG and Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital, as the patient had received proper and appropriate medical assistance in terms of his diagnosis, supervision and treatment. The report further noted that his discharge had been justified on each occasion in view of the improvement in his state of health. The report concluded as follows:\n\u201cThe results of the investigation ... following the reopening of the proceedings and the fresh inquiries and medical reports do not indicate that there was any negligent or careless conduct in breach of good medical practice. There is therefore no need to take legal or disciplinary action against any persons involved in the [patient\u2019s] care ...\u201d 42.  Taking this report into account, the Inspector General for Health made a fresh order discontinuing the proceedings on 27 December 2005. 43.  In a letter of 1 February 2006 the applicant appealed against that order, complaining of unclear points and omissions. She also raised the possibility that the sudden deterioration in her husband\u2019s health and his eventual death might have been caused by bacteria present in the operating theatre on the day of the nasal polypectomy, that the diagnoses may have been made in haste and that there may have been negligence and carelessness in the medical treatment administered to her husband. She further complained that the internal medicine and gastroenterology reports had been prepared each time by the same experts. The applicant therefore requested the reopening of the investigation and the preparation of a fresh expert medical report. 44.  The Inspector General for Health wrote to the applicant on 2 March 2006 informing her that he had set aside his previous order and ordered fresh expert assessments to be carried out by different experts in the fields of internal medicine and gastroenterology. 45.  The applicant gave evidence again on 27 April 2006. 46.  The medical experts submitted their reports on 20 May and 10 July 2006. The expert in gastroenterology stated that it was possible, albeit rare, for a nasal polypectomy to cause meningitis. He further considered that the applicant\u2019s husband had received appropriate treatment but that his discharge on 3 February 1998 may not have been wise in view of his clinical condition. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s husband had suffered a series of complications which were uncommon but could occur, and that he had received proper medical care at the CHVNG. As to the care in Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital, the expert considered that the condition of the applicant\u2019s husband had been extremely complicated and had given rise to doubts as to the best way to proceed. In his report, the expert in internal medicine rejected the idea of a hospital-acquired infection on the grounds that, had that been the case, the antibiotics administered to the patient would have had no effect. In his view, the meningitis had developed unexpectedly. He further took the view that the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s discharge on 3 February 1998 had been appropriate but that he should have continued to be monitored as an outpatient. 47.  On 25 July 2006 a report was drawn up on completion of the investigation, which concluded as follows:\n\u201c...\nThe content of the most recent expert medical reports shows ... that there are no grounds for a finding of disciplinary liability for negligence against any of the health\u2011care professionals involved in A.\u2019s medical treatment...\n... the decision by the assistant doctor [J.V.] to refer the patient for outpatient treatment was not appropriate and sufficient from a clinical viewpoint in so far as, in order to prevent a recurrence of the colitis caused by Clostridium difficile ..., the patient should have remained in hospital under close medical supervision ...\n...\nHence, the doctor in question did not act with the necessary care and diligence, thereby incurring disciplinary liability on account of his negligent conduct in the medical assistance provided ... in D. ward of the CHVNG\u2019s medical department between 25 January and 3 February 1998.\nThe medical opinions make no criticisms of the assistance provided in the gastroenterology department of Santo Ant\u00f3nio General Hospital in Oporto ...\u201d 48.  In the light of this report the Inspector General made an order on 26 July 2006 for the opening of disciplinary proceedings against Dr J.V. 49.  By a letter dated 31 July 2006 the applicant was informed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Dr J.V. would be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 59-68 below). 50.  In the meantime, on 31 August 1998, the Medical Association acknowledged receipt of the applicant\u2019s letter of 13 August 1998, informing her that steps would be taken in response to it. 51.  The case was referred to the Medical Association\u2019s regional disciplinary council for the North region. The latter obtained the patient\u2019s medical records and sought the opinions of four specialist panels: gastroenterology, infectious diseases, general surgery and ear, nose and throat (ENT). 52.  In its report of 14 July 1999, the gastroenterology panel issued the following conclusions:\n\u201c...\nA simple X-ray of the abdomen performed the day before the patient\u2019s death did not detect any dilatation or perforation of the colon.\nThe patient\u2019s death was caused by peritonitis as a result of the perforation of the duodenal ulcer. The difficulties in diagnosing the condition were understandable in view of the patient\u2019s serious clinical condition and the fact that his abdominal pains were explained by the inflammatory disease in the colon.\nThe role of the corticosteroids in aggravating or reactivating the peptic ulcer ... is not currently considered a risk factor ... However, given that the patient had already experienced one episode of intestinal bleeding, there would have been grounds for weighing up the use of these drugs.\n...\nThe decisions to discharge the patient [from hospital] may have delayed the diagnosis or the commencement of treatment. Nevertheless, after examining the documents submitted to me, I am unable to confirm whether these discharge decisions adversely affected his diagnosis or programme of treatment.\n...\u201d 53.  The conclusions of the report of 17 April 2000 by the infectious-diseases panel read as follows:\n\u201c1.  In our opinion the diagnosis of meningitis, most likely resulting from the nasal polypectomy, was inexplicably delayed. The fact that there was no one on the medical team trained in this type of diagnosis (for example, a specialist in infectious diseases) may be regarded as the only explanation for such an incident. However, this was not the immediate cause of the patient\u2019s death. 3.  The procedure has been undermined to an incalculable extent by the fact that no autopsy was performed, although an autopsy is mandatory (mandat\u00f3ria) in cases of this type in order to shed light on the chain of events.\u201d\nIn its report the panel further held as follows:\n\u201cThe inhuman conditions described in this process, as regards how the patient was treated, are another example of the situation encountered on a daily basis in our hospitals; a reflection of the appalling structural and operational conditions which require urgent analysis and change.\nThis board of the Infectious-Diseases Panel of the Medical Association must have a fundamental role in advocating the rights of patients and doctors in order to create better conditions of care for the former and better working conditions for the latter.\nWe reiterate, once more, the need to consider the creation of infectious-diseases departments/units in hospitals of the same type as Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital, in order to improve the quality of care in this regard.\u201d 54.  In a report of 24 April 2001 the general-surgery panel found that there had been no negligence or medical malpractice in the hospitals concerned. The report read as follows:\n\u201c1. A perforated duodenal ulcer requires immediate surgery. In the present situation the perforated ulcer ... was difficult, if not impossible, to diagnose given the clinical context in which it occurred. Furthermore, in view of the seriousness of the patient\u2019s clinical condition, the approach to surgery had to be given careful consideration and the patient had to be prepared by means of various measures.\n...\u201d 55.  In a report dated 1 August 2001 the ENT panel concluded as follows:\n\u201c1.  Meningitis following micro-endoscopic surgery for nasal polyps is described as one of the (major) complications of this type of surgery, estimated in the literature to occur in between 0.6% and 1% of cases. These figures will be higher in the event of a repeat operation, as in the present case (surgery was performed in 1993 as stated on page 314 of the file concerning the operation). 2.  The post-operative CT scan of the brain carried out on 29 November 1997 does not show any discontinuity in the bones at the base of the skull ... which suggests that no invasive endocranial surgery was carried out. 3.  The description of the surgery performed on the patient on 26 November 1997 (page 310 of the file) does not give any indication of clinical malpractice or negligence. 4.  No ENT procedures were performed during any of the patient\u2019s subsequent stays in Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital or in Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital.\u201d 56.  In an order of 28 December 2001 the regional disciplinary council for the North region decided, after having examined the conclusions of the different specialist panels, to take no further action on the applicant\u2019s complaint, on the ground that there was no evidence of misconduct or medical negligence. 57.  The disciplinary council observed the following:\n(i)  meningitis was a complication that could arise in between 0.6% and 1% of cases following a nasal polypectomy; the figures were liable to be higher for a repeat operation, as in the case in question;\n(ii)  the applicant\u2019s husband had received appropriate treatment during his various hospital stays;\n(iii)  the patient\u2019s bacterial meningitis (Pseudomonas) had been treated properly;\n(iv)  although the infectious-diseases panel had suggested that the presence of a specialist in that discipline might have enabled a diagnosis to be made sooner, this had not been a decisive factor in the development of the clinical situation;\n(v)  the perforation of the duodenal ulcer had been the cause of the peritonitis. This had been difficult to diagnose in view of the patient\u2019s serious clinical condition, a fact acknowledged by the gastroenterology and general-surgery panels;\n(vi)  although the infectious-diseases panel had considered that too long a period had elapsed between the diagnosis of the perforated duodenal ulcer and surgery, the time taken to prepare for the operation had been justified since the patient had been suffering from intestinal disease and had severe anaemia, sepsis and a fluid and electrolyte imbalance, as noted by the general-surgery panel. 58.  On 29 April 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against that order with the Medical Association\u2019s National Disciplinary Council. On 18 March 2003 the appeal was declared inadmissible as being out of time. 59.  On 29 April 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint for negligent homicide with the Oporto criminal investigation and prosecution department. 60.  She gave evidence on 7 June 2002. 61.  By order of the Criminal Investigation Court of 27 September 2002 the applicant was given leave to intervene in the proceedings as an assistant to the public prosecutor (assistente). 62.  On 7 December 2007 the public prosecutor\u2019s office made its submissions, charging Dr J.V. with homicide by gross (grosseira) negligence. In support of their decision the prosecuting authorities referred to the report appended to the IGS order of 25 July 2006. They considered that Dr J.V. should not have discharged the applicant\u2019s husband on 3 February 1998 in so far as the patient\u2019s clinical condition had been problematic and he had been infected with the Clostridium difficile bacterium. 63.  The case was referred to the Vila Nova de Gaia District Court. During the trial the court heard evidence from the applicant, the accused, eight doctors who had been involved in treating the applicant\u2019s husband in the CHVNG and in Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital, and the five medical experts appointed in the context of the proceedings before the IGS. The court also sought the opinion of the Medical Association\u2019s Disciplinary Council. 64.  On 15 January 2009 the District Court acquitted Dr J.V. of the charges against him. In particular, it took the view that the findings made by the IGS in its order of 26 July 2006 could not be taken into consideration as they had not been confirmed by the five medical experts who had given evidence during the trial. 65.  As to the facts, the District Court considered, inter alia, the following to be established:\n\u201cThe patient\u2019s hospitalisation on 18 December 1997 ... was not the result of a lack of medical supervision of his clinical condition ... since it was unconnected to the complications arising out of the meningitis. In fact, it resulted from acute anaemia caused by intestinal bleeding from a duodenal ulcer; ...\nThe decisions to discharge the patient on 13 and 23 December 1997 were appropriate, given that, in the former case, the problem of bacterial meningitis had been resolved, [the patient] had completed the course of antibiotics, he no longer had any symptoms or fever, had a slightly increased white-blood cell count, a falling neutrophil count and normal sedimentation rate, and was not complaining ... and, in the latter case, that is to say, the patient\u2019s hospitalisation from 18 to 23 December 1997, the patient was not complaining of abdominal pain, diarrhoea or bleeding ... with the result that it was possible to continue treating his ulcer with a dietary regime while monitoring him on an outpatient basis ...\nWhen the patient was admitted to Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital, laboratory tests were carried out for Clostridium difficile. The results were negative on two occasions.\u201d 66.  On the subject of the surgery preceding the death of the applicant\u2019s husband, the District Court observed as follows:\n\u201c... the patient was in a very serious clinical state, with septic shock and multiple organ dysfunction. For that reason, he was placed on artificial ventilation and vasoactive drugs and fluids were administered ..., together with hydrocortisone to deal with possible acute adrenal insufficiency (fal\u00eancia supra-renal aguda), and broad-spectrum antibiotics;\n... in this medical context the patient\u2019s prospects of survival were very uncertain, in view of the septic shock and multiple organ dysfunction;\n... a simple abdominal X-ray and an abdominal and pelvic ultrasound scan were therefore requested, which did not reveal a perforation of the intestine.\u201d 67.  In the District Court\u2019s view, it had not been demonstrated that the care provided to the applicant\u2019s husband during his stay in hospital from 25 January to 3 February 1998 had not been in accordance with good medical practice, or that he should have been kept in hospital for longer. The court therefore concluded that there was no causal link between the treatment administered by Dr J.V. to the applicant\u2019s husband in the CHVNG and his death, which had been caused by a perforated viscus that was unconnected to the colonic disease treated by the accused. It held:\n \u201c...there was no evidence to show that the treatment administered by the accused for the Clostridium difficile infection was incomplete, that the patient was discharged prematurely on 3 February 1998 or, in sum, that the accused was responsible for the death of the patient on 8 March 1998.\u201d 68.  The applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 69.  On 6 March 2003 the applicant brought an action in the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court against the CHVNG, Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital and the eight doctors who had been involved in treating her husband while he was in hospital, claiming compensation for the damage she had suffered on account of her husband\u2019s death. She alleged, inter alia,\n(i)  that her husband\u2019s meningitis had been caused by Pseudomonas cepacia bacteria which, she alleged, had been present in the operating theatre during the nasal polypectomy;\n(ii)  that the meningitis had been diagnosed too late, allowing the illness to become serious;\n(iii)  that the administering of excessive doses of medication and the lack of a suitable prophylactic had caused the duodenal ulcer which had led to her husband\u2019s death. 70.  In the context of these proceedings the applicant was granted legal aid in the form of exemption from payment of the court fees and the fees of a lawyer of her own choosing. 71.  Between 4 and 24 April 2003 the eight doctors contested their standing to be sued (ilegitimidade passiva), relying on Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967. 72.  On 16 April 2007 the court gave a preparatory decision (despacho saneador) specifying which facts were considered to be established and which remained to be established. In accordance with Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967 it further held that the doctors among the defendants did not have standing in so far as they had been sued only for negligent conduct. Accordingly, it declared the claim admissible only in respect of the hospitals. 73.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant gave evidence. 74.  During the three hearings the court heard evidence from the following witnesses:\n(i)  eleven doctors who had been involved in treating the applicant\u2019s husband during his various stays in the CHVNG and Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital;\n(ii)  the general practitioner of the applicant\u2019s husband;\n(iii)  two doctors who were friends of the family;\n(iv)  the inspector who had written the final report on completion of the investigation within the IGS; and\n(v)  the medical experts in gastroenterology and internal medicine whose reports had formed the basis for the last IGS decision. 75.  On 24 May 2011 the court made an order concerning the facts. Taking into account the medical records of the applicant\u2019s husband and the various statements made by the witnesses who had given evidence, the court considered it established, inter alia,\n(i)  that a polypectomy was a straightforward surgical operation which posed minimal risk and that the patient had been informed accordingly;\n(ii)  that the operating theatre had been aseptic and sterilised at the time of the polypectomy;\n(iii)  that the origin of the bacterium linked to the patient\u2019s meningitis had not been proven. The court dismissed the possibility of a hospital-acquired infection, pointing out that in that case the prescribed treatment would have had no effect;\n(iv)  that the medication prescribed in the CHVNG and Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital could cause intestinal problems and hence could give rise to colitis;\n(v)  that the applicant\u2019s husband had been treated with drugs to protect his stomach in the CHVNG;\n(vi)  that the gastroduodenal perforation had not been detected until the operation was being performed; and\n(vii)  that the applicant\u2019s husband had died from septicaemia caused by peritonitis resulting from a perforated viscus. 76.  On 23 January 2012 the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court delivered a judgment in which it dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. On the facts, the judgment stated, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cThe Pseudomonas bacterium was resistant to the various antibiotics that were tried ...\nWhen the patient attended Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital on 18 December 1997 he had completely recovered from his bacterial meningitis.\n...\nOn 25 January 1998 the patient again attended Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital, where he was diagnosed with pseudomembranous colitis caused by Clostridium difficile ... The colitis was successfully treated in that hospital ...;\nThroughout his stay in Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital he was given treatment to protect his stomach.\n...\nWhen he was admitted (to Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital on 17 February 1998) he had chronic diarrhoea ... and was diagnosed with suspected inflammatory bowel disease. Medication was prescribed in keeping with that diagnosis.\n...\nWhile in Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital he was kept under observation, received daily medication and underwent various tests.\n...\nOn 6 March 1998 ... nothing had made it possible to predict the gastroduodenal perforation ... the tests carried out that day ... did not confirm the existence of any duodenal perforation such that the situation had to be kept under review;\n...\nIt was not until 7 March 1998 that the patient\u2019s acute abdominal syndrome was diagnosed, calling for urgent surgery ... it was only during the operation that the patient was found to be suffering from a duodenal perforation;\n...\nThe perforation had occurred 24 hours before surgery.\u201d 77.  The judgment concluded as follows:\n\u201c ... in view of the facts that have been established, it is not possible to determine at what point the defendants, by their actions or omissions, breached the rules of good medical practice ...\nIt is considered established that [Mr Fernandes\u2019s] death was caused by sepsis due to peritonitis resulting from the perforation of his duodenal ulcer...\nNo doubts persisted regarding the diagnosis of meningitis, the procedure adopted, the sequence of treatment and the resolution of the problem, as all the various after\u2011effects were duly explained.\nHence there were no differences of opinion regarding the need to prescribe and use antibiotics in the context of [Mr Fernandes\u2019s] meningitis and other conditions, although it was explained that colitis is a bacterial imbalance caused by antibiotics (the very ones which have undesirable effects on intestinal flora).\nNevertheless, it was not possible to determine the agent or identify the cause of the bacterium linked to the meningitis and it could therefore not be established with certainty whether the sinus surgery was the source of the problem or was simply one factor causing the infection. The other factors and circumstances preceding the operation ... thus cease to be relevant.\nIt is nonetheless surprising that the death of the claimant\u2019s husband should have occurred ... given that he had been strong and in good health and that the microsurgery on his sinuses was a straightforward operation. However, it has not been demonstrated that the therapy or medication administered to [Mr Fernandes] at any point was unsuited to his clinical condition. There was therefore no breach of the rules of good medical practice (either by action or omission). Accordingly, one of the cumulative conditions for establishing civil liability, namely an unlawful act, is absent.\u201d 78.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court. She contested the facts deemed to be established, arguing that only by studying the circumstances before, during and after the operation would it be possible to understand what type of bacterium her husband had contracted. She further reiterated that her husband had contracted a hospital-acquired infection and had not received adequate treatment either in the CHVNG or in Santo Ant\u00f3nio Hospital. 79.  On 26 February 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims, upholding the judgment of the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court. It first of all declined to review the facts considered by the lower court to have been established, on the grounds that the hearings had not been recorded and that no new documents had been submitted which could cast doubt on the evidence forming the basis for the court\u2019s decision. The Supreme Administrative Court summed up its judgment as follows:\n\u201cThe lower court considered, in sum, that it had not been possible to identify the nature and origin of the bacterium that caused the meningitis and that it had not been demonstrated that the illnesses subsequent to [the patient\u2019s] treatment and recovery from that illness ... had been the consequence of incorrect diagnosis or treatment.\nFor that reason it found that no breach of the rules of good medical practice had been demonstrated that might have caused the patient\u2019s death.\nThe claimant takes a different view of the matter. However, she bases her arguments mainly on allegations that have not been proven, and in particular the allegation that the meningitis was caused by the Pseudomonas bacterium, allegedly acquired in hospital ... and that the patient did not receive appropriate prophylactic treatment to protect his stomach during his treatment with antibiotics.\nAccordingly, these claims can be summed up as allegations of medical negligence which are unsupported by the established facts.\u201d", "references": ["5", "4", "2", "8", "1", "6", "3", "9", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6.  On 25 October 2002 the Military Court of the Vladikavkaz Garrison (\u201cthe Military Court\u201d) ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military institute to re-calculate the period of the applicant\u2019s service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for a specified period of service. The applicant was also awarded some additional allowances and payments for certain periods. 7.  The judgment came into force on 5 November 2002. 8.  On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs\u2019 service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9.  On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10.  On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11.  On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12.  On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs\u2019 service. 13.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs\u2019 service. 14.  On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs\u2019 service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15.  In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 \u201311,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 \u2013 RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance \u2013 RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.", "references": ["8", "7", "4", "5", "0", "2", "1", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicants were born in 1963, 1976 and 1961 respectively and at the time the applications were lodged were detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 9.  The first applicant is serving a sentence of thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment in the Corradino Correctional Facility. The sentence was imposed on him by the Criminal Court on 24 May 2010 for drug\u2011related offences. The Criminal Court also ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 30,000 euros (EUR) as well as EUR 1,898.21 in fees payable to the court experts, which were to be converted into a further eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment if not paid. Pending proceedings before this Court, the first applicant \u2212 having served his sentence \u2212 was released from detention in September 2016. 10.  The applicant alleged that he had been detained in Division 6, a high\u2011security division, from 12 September 2006 until 23 August 2008. He claimed that during this period he had been unable to use any electronic equipment, to work, study or go to church, and that he had been subjected to psychological torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. He argued that he was neither aggressive nor an addict and there was no reason why he should have been placed in Division 6, which was intended to house very dangerous, problematic, aggressive and addicted prisoners. The Government submitted that the first applicant had been placed in Division 6 following an order from the head of security at the prison, and that, according to documents submitted to the Court, on 1 August 2007 the applicant had been given the option to move to a less secure Division, but had refused. In Division 6 he had had access to the main library of the prison. English lessons and mass were also provided in the Division. He could make phone calls and had had access to the communal TV and DVD player, and TV sets were also allowed in the cells. During that time he had also carried out paid work assembling plastic toys. 11.  Since 23 August 2008 the first applicant has been detained in Division 3, specifically in cell 139 since 19 August 2013. 12.  He complained that the cell windows were very small and that there was inadequate ventilation and no natural light. The water supply was inadequate and he had to use a bucket to flush the toilet. 13.  He claimed to be suffering from symptoms that were the after\u2011effects of physical and psychological stress. In this regard, the first applicant stated that he had been examined by the prison psychologist, who had prescribed medicine to help him sleep in addition to painkillers. According to the applicant the psychologist had also suggested that he be referred to the psychiatric hospital, but no such transfer had taken place. 14.  The Government submitted that the cells in which the first applicant had been housed in both Division 6 and 3 had measured 365cm x 265cm. They noted that the first applicant had been asked (on an unspecified date) whether he wanted to be transferred from Division 3 but he had replied in the negative. He had also been asked, following communication of the complaint to the respondent Government, whether he had a problem with the window in his cell and the reply had been in the negative. They submitted that the applicant had chosen to paint over the glass shade covering the ceiling light in his cell, and when asked about this, he had stated that he had no need for a ceiling light and for that reason had painted over it. According to the Government, the first applicant had a secondary light that he used and he had stated that it provided plenty of light for him. Moreover, the cell had two vents on opposite sides and the cell door had an aperture which was always left open for ventilation purposes. Relying on an indistinct photo submitted to the Court, the Government submitted that the applicant had covered the ventilation grilles on the wall with masking tape, thereby restricting the ventilation. 15.  The Government submitted that the cell was equipped with a wash\u2011basin with running water and an additional wall-mounted tap. According to the Government, when the applicant was asked whether he had an issue with the provision of water, he stated that he no longer had any issues. As far as the use of the toilet was concerned, the Government admitted that Division 3 did not have a combined flushing and WC system and that the inmates had to flush the toilets manually using buckets that were provided in all cells and could be filled from the wall-mounted taps. 16.  The Government submitted that the prison psychologist was not in a position to prescribe medicine or to refer inmates to the psychiatric hospital. They stated that when the first applicant was interviewed by the prison psychologist on 18 October 2006, he had stated that he was sleeping three to four hours per night but that he did not want to take medication. According to the medical records kept by the prison medical unit, none of the doctors who had examined the applicant had found it necessary to refer him to a psychiatrist. The in-house doctor at the prison confirmed that the first applicant was never referred for psychiatric treatment as he was not mentally unstable and had not expressed a desire to be referred. The doctor also confirmed that he could not see that there had ever been such a referral by any doctor in the past. The applicant had met the doctor on four occasions and the latter had treated him for his medical needs but no psychiatric concerns had been observed or reported or expressed. On 1 May 2016 the applicant had refused all treatment, which is the right of any patient and must be respected. The Government submitted that the doctor had also confirmed that the medical notes showed that, whilst in Division 6, the first applicant had also been examined by medical doctors and treatment had been provided as needed. 17.  The second applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment of eleven years for drug-related offences in the Corradino Correctional Facility. The Criminal Court, which sentenced him on 26 September 2012, had also imposed a fine of EUR 30,000, which the applicant was to pay within two months and which would be converted to a further term of one year\u2019s imprisonment if not paid. The Criminal Court also ordered the second applicant to pay EUR 1,032.71 in respect of costs arising from the appointment of experts. Likewise, if not paid within fifteen days, this sum would be converted into a term of imprisonment. The judgment was confirmed on appeal on 12 December 2013. The applicant has been held in cell 102 in Division 3 since 9 February 2012. 18.  The applicant claimed that he was forced to buy bottled drinking water, as the available water was undrinkable. Since there is no laundry service in prison, he was dependent on donated clothes \u2212 which did not always fit him \u2013 in order to have access to clean clothing. 19.  The applicant alleged that his cell was old and that he was living in squalor. The cell walls contained asbestos and the old paint was peeling off the walls and the ceiling. Moreover, according to the applicant, the building was infested by rats and cockroaches. 20.  During summer, the cell was too hot and since the cell window was too small, the ventilation was inadequate. On the other hand, during winter the cell was freezing cold. No heating was provided in the cells and the blankets were not adequate. The applicant stated that he had to wear his jacket in order to be able to sleep in winter. 21.  The applicant, a non-smoker, complained that he was not separated from inmates who smoke. He was thus a victim of passive smoking every hour of the day. 22.  According to the applicant he was frequently not given any breakfast and more than 95% of the food served in prison consisted of bread and pasta. He also stated that, although tobacco was easily accessible, fresh fruit was mostly restricted. Occasionally, apples that were past their sell-by date and could not be sold in local supermarkets were brought to the inmates. 23.  The Government submitted that, when specifically asked by the prison authorities whether he had ever lodged a request to be transferred to a newer part of the prison, the second applicant replied that he had never made such a request and that he did not want to be transferred. 24.  They further submitted that the tap water in the cell was fit for human consumption. The water in all parts of the prison facility had been certified by the Public Health Laboratory as being potable (certification submitted to the Court is dated 2015). The water is tested and certified approximately every six months. Division 3 had access to water directly from the mains, that is to say, drinking water. In addition to the availability of the running tap water supply, the inmates had the right to obtain bottled water from the residents\u2019 tuck-shop. 25.  In 2015 the second applicant received EUR 40.79 every four weeks in so-called \u201cWork & Pay\u201d remuneration and gratuity money, as well as EUR 169.49 every four weeks for work he carried out assembling plastic dolls. They stated that at the tuck-shop a six-pack of water cost EUR 2.24 and an individual bottle EUR 0.38. 26.  The Government submitted that inmates were provided with washing powder \u2212 at no cost \u2013 so that they could wash their clothes. All cells were equipped with a wall-mounted tap and a sink with running water in which to wash their clothes. It was the duty of the inmates to wash their clothing and to be clean at all times. 27.  The Government submitted that the walls did not contain asbestos but were built from Maltese limestone. They stated that the applicant had never painted his cell, nor had he ever requested any materials to do so, even though such material was free of charge. The Government claimed that the applicant had stated that he would never paint his cell himself because he felt that this was the responsibility of the prison officials. 28.  The Government denied that the building was infested by rats and cockroaches, pointing out that pest control treatment had been carried out sixteen times at the prison since 2013 (certificates confirming the application of pest control in specific areas of the prison, including Division 3, were submitted to the Court). 29.  The Government also submitted that, apart from the window, there were also three vents in the cell, along with an aperture in the cell door which was always left open. However, the applicant had fixed a sheet over the window and had covered one of the ventilation grilles on the wall with a piece of paper, thereby restricting the amount of ventilation. 30.  The Government submitted that the second applicant had asked for an extra blanket in January 2012 (while in Division 12) but had then rejected the extra blanket he was given, saying that it was too old. Since the applicant had been in Division 3, he had not asked for any additional blankets. 31.  As to the second applicant\u2019s claim concerning passive smoking, the Government submitted that the second applicant resided in a single cell and had access to fresh air in the adjoining yard for most of the day. The learning zones were all smoke-free. 32.  The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegation concerning breakfast and the quality of food, stating that breakfast was served as follows: on weekdays all inmates were served with a ham or cheese sandwich and at weekends and on public holidays sandwiches were served with boiled eggs. The inmates had access to unlimited tea and coffee. The Government submitted to the Court the 15 daily menus constituting the lunch and dinner choices over a six month period \u2013 the menus showed a variety of meat and fish dishes, as well as pasta dishes and pies. Apart from the menu of the day, inmates could opt for tuna salad, eggs and chips with corned beef, eggs and chips with ham or cheese, omelette with ham or cheese and soup, or both. According to the Government, in cases where an inmate had been ordered to go on a diet by the doctor, pasta with ricotta or steamed fish would be provided at lunchtime and steamed chicken for dinner. Should a special diet be prescribed by the medical doctor, the food thereby indicated would be provided by the prison authorities. According to the Government, fresh fruit was delivered to the prison every Monday and Thursday \u2212 approximately eleven boxes of bananas and fourteen boxes of oranges were delivered to the prison and distributed to the inmates weekly. 33.  On 28 April 2015 the second applicant instituted proceedings complaining about his conditions of detention. In particular he noted that, cumulatively, he had been held in the correctional facility since 13 July 2009 and, since that date, had been forced to live in a cell subject to the following hardships: without adequate drinking water; without clothing to keep him warm throughout winter; being dependent on charitable institutions to obtain clothing; the cell contained a significant quantity of asbestos that was causing him physical harm; the cell was infested with rats and cockroaches; the Corradino Correctional Facility lacked adequate sanitary facilities; the cell only had one small window which could not be opened as it was too high up; during winter he was only given one thin blanket although the facility was cold and it was therefore difficult to sleep; all detainees were allowed to smoke wherever and whenever they wanted and, as a consequence, inmates who, like the applicant, are non-smokers, were being subjected to passive smoking; these conditions amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 36 of the Constitution of Malta. 34.  On 10 November 2015 the second applicant gave oral testimony and submitted that in prison he generally felt hot and had been advised by a prison guard to buy a fan; after asking for water he had been advised to either buy it or drink the water supplied by the correctional facility. Nothing further was submitted in his oral testimony. 35.  The respondent denied the above allegations. According to the medical doctor there were no mental or physical issues, nor had the applicant ever sought medical assistance. As regards the structural complaints submitted by the second applicant, the maintenance official submitted the following evidence in summarised form: 36.  The Division in which the complainant was held consists of sixty cells, one of which is not currently in use; complainant is housed in a cell on his own; his particular cell is a normal one with a standard window and adequate light \u2013 being built the way it is for security reasons \u2013 and the lighting in the cell is appropriate; when the cells are open, inmates may freely walk in and out of them whenever they want, except when \u201cunder report\u201d (that is to say confined to quarters); the complainant had access to open spaces from 2.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. just like all other inmates and when so authorised; the Correctional Facility conducts a yearly analysis of the water supply to check that it is fit for human consumption, and the most recent report (that of 2015), conducted by a private laboratory, concluded that the water supply is good for drinking and meets the standard for human consumption; the Facility provides potable water from the mains for the inmates and that water is supplied free of charge; inmates are allowed to buy bottled water; when inmates enter the Facility they are given blankets, sheets, pillows and a mattress; upon request, they are also given extra blankets, however, the complainant had never registered any such request; as regards any infestation of rats and cockroaches, the maintenance official presented a report submitted by a private company on these issues (such inspection is carried out yearly) stating that three rodent control visits were carried out in 2014 and the last visit showed that \u201ceverything was under control\u201d. As regards smoking: inmates are allowed to smoke in cells; if some inmates within a particular cell are non\u2011smokers, then the other inmates are not allowed to smoke in that particular cell; the complainant does not smoke, although the prison doctor affirms that he stated upon admission into the Correctional Facility that he was a smoker. 37.  By a judgment of 28 June 2016 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint. It considered that he had failed to submit the evidence that was deemed legally necessary to prove his case \u2212 the complainant had merely alleged the existence of the various shortcomings referred to above, but had failed to submit the relevant evidence to substantiate his allegations. By contrast, the evidence submitted in the proceedings by the doctor and the maintenance official satisfactorily showed that the allegations were unfounded. 38.  On the specific issues raised, the court found as follows:\nWater supply: the Water Services Corporation submitted adequate proof that the water supply used in the Correctional Facility was potable, fit for human consumption and conformed to the Legal Notice on Water intended for Human Consumption Regulation, 2009, after being microbiologically analysed to this end. However, reference is made to the Chemistry (PHL) \u2011 Water Analysis Test Report, which stated that the \u201cchloride content exceeds the indicator parameter value in LN 17 of 2009\u201d. Even given the above breach of the statutory limit, the complainant\u2019s allegation is not substantiated as he could make use of viable alternatives to overcome the issue, either consuming warm potable water or buying bottled water from the gratuity money given to him by the facility\u2019s authorities; 39.  Blankets and clothing: it sufficiently results that, upon entering the Correctional Facility, inmates are issued with a residential kit consisting of blankets, sheets, pillows and a mattress; if required, inmates may ask their Division officer for more blankets. As regards clothing, the Facility is supported by charities which are allowed to distribute suitable clothing as required. It is apparent that the complainant never submitted a complaint on these issues. 40.  Asbestos: The complaint submitted by the complainant alleging that there is asbestos in his cell is not borne out by fact; There is therefore no such danger to the complainant\u2019s health and in fact, no such complaint has been submitted by the complainant at any time during his stay in the facility since 2009. 41.  Rodents and cockroaches: pest control by a private company that specialises in this particular activity is constantly and periodically (yearly) undertaken by the Facility\u2019s authorities. According to the treatment report released by the private company involved (dated 4 July 2014) the situation was certified as being under control. 42.  Smoking: the complainant is housed in a cell on his own. However, inmates are allowed to smoke in particular areas and at particular times. In the particular division where the complainant is housed, there is no area where smoking is prohibited, and the complainant is therefore being subjected to passive smoking. Ideally, non-smokers should be segregated from smokers in order to avoid unnecessary hardship but, despite this resulting in an unsavoury situation, it is understood that because of the particular circumstances such obvious segregation might not be practically possible. As a result it cannot be held that this situation reaches the level of severity and intensity required by Article 3 of the Convention or Article 36 of the local Constitution. Furthermore, upon examining the medical records presented in the case file of the proceedings, no medical or physical deterioration was recorded in the health of the complainant as a result of the passive smoking analysed herein 43.  Cell window and consequent availability of adequate light: the cell at issue is a normal Division cell furnished with a standard window and occupied only by the complainant. The window provides enough light in the cell to serve its purpose. The complainant is allowed to leave his cell at the appointed times, and on the basis of the medical reports that were accumulated throughout the years of confinement, no medical conditions have been reported as arising as a result thereof. 44.  No appeal appears to have been lodged against this judgment. 45.  The third applicant is currently detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility. By a judgment of the Criminal Court of 22 June 2010 he was found guilty and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of EUR 30,000, which was to be converted into a term of eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment if not paid, along with EUR 1,289.50 in respect of expert fees. The applicant has been detained in Division 3 since 2010; for the first two and a half years he was held in cell 120, which was a little worse than cell 147 in which he has been housed ever since. 46.  He stated that his cell window was positioned at a height of more than two metres; he therefore had to climb onto something to open it. It had three metal bars which hampered the entry of natural light. 47.  According to the third applicant, the temperature in his cell may be as low as 10 oC during winter, and yet he is not allowed to have a heater in his cell. In winter, the applicant allegedly suffers from arthritis, which causes him unbearable pain. However, he is not able to use Voltaren (which is the only medicine provided by the prison authorities) because he suffers from Hepatitis C. 48.  The applicant alleged that during the summer the cells were infested with cockroaches. Furthermore, his cell became very hot and there was inadequate ventilation. However, prison regulations restricted the number of fans per cell to one. Although the applicant had two fans in his cell, he stated that in summer they merely circulated the hot air and the steel door of the cell prevented any fresh air circulation. By contrast, he noted that the offices of the prison personnel (who were exposed to the same temperatures) were equipped with air conditioning and heating facilities. 49.  The applicant claimed that in winter the hot water supply was not sufficient to cater for the approximately sixty inmates in his Division. Furthermore, the water was not drinkable and he therefore had to purchase bottled water, which was only possible when he had money. He claimed that when he did not have any money, he was obliged to drink the undrinkable water, which caused him skin blemishes. He stated that drinking water was only distributed to the prison personnel, but did not reach the detainees. 50.  The applicant also claimed that inmates did not have access to a laundry and foreign inmates were not given detergents with which to wash their clothes and clean their cells and toilets. 51.  According to the applicant, the building was a hundred years old and its condition was inadequate. Dust fell from the applicant\u2019s cell\u2019s ceiling and walls, which he then breathed in. 52.  The applicant also stated that since the prison did not provide him with tablets for his migraine, he had been obliged to buy such tablets for six years. 53.  According to the Government, the applicant has resided in cell 147 in Division 3 since 8 January 2015, and when asked by the prison authorities if he would like to be transferred to another part of the prison, he declined. 54.  In reply to the second and third applicants\u2019 claims, the Government submitted that the window in the cell could be opened using a tool provided by the authorities or by standing on the bed or on a chair or stool. Moreover, the metal bars at the window were a security feature and did not prevent natural light from entering the cell. 55.  As to the claim concerning heaters, the Government referred to their submissions below (see paragraph 100). They further noted that \u2013 due to the climate in the Maltese islands \u2013 such requests were not frequent; however, they submitted that due consideration would be given to the matter if a medical reason was found to be at the root of such request. 56.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been diagnosed with right dupuytrens contracture, which is a hand deformity affecting the fingers, so that they cannot be straightened completely. The applicant underwent surgery on the 27 August 2014 which did not result in any complications. The applicant was discharged and prescribed paracetamol and diclofenac. Although the applicant alleged that he suffered from arthritis, he did not visit the medical unit complaining of pain in the joints. 57.  The Government also referred to the submissions made in paragraphs 26 and 29 above). They noted that the window in cell  147 could be opened and closed by the occupant. There were also two vents as well as the aperture in the cell door which was always left open. According to the Government the third applicant had covered one of the wall vents with a sheet of paper, thereby restricting the amount of ventilation, and the aperture in the cell door had been covered with a piece of cardboard from inside the cell. Furthermore, the Government submitted that it was permissible for inmates to have more than one fan in their cell. In fact, most of the inmates had two fans, as did the third applicant. 58.  As to the quality and provision of water, the Government referred to their submissions in paragraph 86 below. They noted that in 2015, the [third] applicant received EUR 36.45 every four weeks in \u201cWork & Pay\u201d remuneration and gratuity money, as well as EUR 207.50 every four weeks for work he carried out assembling plastic dolls, thereby enabling him to buy bottled water at tuck-shop prices. 59.  According to the Government there are no medical records referring to skin blemishes at the Medical Unit. They acknowledged that Division 3 was located within the older part of the facility however they stated that all cells were equipped with the necessary facilities and paint was provided on request so that the inmates could keep their cells in good condition. Relying on photos submitted, the Government considered that the ceiling and walls appeared to be in good condition and there was no flaking. 60.  Lastly, the Government acknowledged that the applicant had had to buy migraine tablets, namely Zolmiles 2.5mg. Purchasing these tablets was standard policy for all inmates who suffer from migraine since inmates are eligible for medicine which is supplied by the Government to all citizens for free, but Zolmiles is not on the free medication list. Nevertheless, as can be seen from documentation submitted to the Court, the Secretary of the Malta Community Chest Fund (MCCF) informed the applicant that the MCCF Board had decided to grant him the full cost of treatment upon presentation of the original receipts. They noted that the third applicant had been referred to the State hospital in December 2011 for a common migraine and medication was prescribed as stated above. On 27 August 2014 he was admitted to the Day care unit at the State hospital, where he underwent surgery, and he was discharged the same day, with a follow-up appointment being scheduled for 11 September 2014.", "references": ["6", "3", "5", "9", "7", "0", "4", "2", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and at the time that he lodged the application with the Court was serving a sentence of eight years\u2019 imprisonment in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Malta. He had been detained since 19 February 2010. 7.  The sentence was imposed on him by the Criminal Court on 14 March 2012 for drug related offences. The Criminal Court also ordered him to pay a fine of 23,500 euros (EUR) as well as EUR 1,462.94 in fees payable to the experts, which were to be converted into a further term of imprisonment if not paid. On 13 April 2012 the aforementioned sums were converted into 490 days\u2019 imprisonment. Following an amnesty and payment of the fee for the experts, the applicant was released on 14 April 2016 and flown back to Costa Rica after being given the requisite vaccinations. 8.  On 12 July 2013, between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m., the applicant was assaulted by another inmate, causing the former to allegedly lose consciousness and sustaining fractures to his facial and leg bones. The Government admitted that the applicant had sustained injuries to his leg and face but argued that there was no evidence that he had lost consciousness at any time. 9.  According to the applicant, disciplinary measures were taken by the prison Chief Security officer, who ordered that he be placed in solitary confinement. Thus, despite his condition, the applicant had had to pack his belongings and walk to the solitary confinement unit. At an unspecified time the prison officer brought the applicant a pair of crutches to assist him walking. According to the Government, disciplinary measures were taken against another inmate involved in the incident but not against the applicant, who had been transferred (from Division 2) to Division 6, a more secure division, immediately after the incident. They also submitted that the applicant had not been placed in solitary confinement. 10.  The applicant alleged that he did not receive any medical treatment for one or two hours after the incident had taken place. Thereafter he had been kept in solitary confinement without assistance from the prison medical staff. The applicant explained that he had subsequently been seen by a doctor, who had referred him to the hospital, where he underwent surgery. He stated that a plaster cast had been put around his leg and that he had been informed that he might need to undergo surgery if his eyesight was damaged as a result of the injury of his facial bone. Regarding the period of solitary confinement, the applicant claimed that he had been held on the second floor of the building and had not been allowed to see anyone or to use the communal areas. 11.  According to the applicant, the cell did not have adequate ventilation, the heat was unbearable and there was no cold water to drink since he did not have access to the ground floor. Consequently he had to drink warm water and an occasional bottle of cold water (when his friend managed to obtain one). The applicant claimed that he had specifically needed to drink water since he was taking antibiotics. 12.  The heat and lack of ventilation caused the applicant, who is an asthma sufferer, to struggle with his breathing. He also complained that he had had to go to the clinic for treatment of his injuries himself since the nurses refused to visit his cell because of the unbearable heat. He had therefore had to use the staircase whilst still walking with crutches. 13.  The applicant stated that he had been kept in the isolation unit for twenty-two days, and after five days had become suicidal. Subsequently he had been transferred to a unit that had fewer restrictions. The applicant complained that he had been placed in the same unit as his aggressor, putting his physical integrity at risk since he could have been attacked again. 14.  The applicant submitted that upon his release from solitary confinement, he had spent most of his time in his cell. On an unspecified date he had asked to see a psychologist urgently, but was not able to speak to one for twenty-seven days. The psychologist referred the applicant to a psychiatrist, who eventually prescribed medication. However, the applicant had refused to take the medication and claimed that the psychiatrist had refused to help him. Later, he had refused to consult the prison psychiatrist because he no longer trusted the prison staff and did not want to be sent to a psychiatric hospital since the facilities there were allegedly worse than those in the prison. 15.  According to the Government the applicant was admitted to the medical infirmary of the prison at 4.15 p.m. on 12 July 2013 and a referral to the emergency department of the state hospital was made at 5 p.m. The referral note issued by the doctor indicated that the applicant had swelling in the face, a bruise on one loin, and severe swelling with limited movement in his right ankle. At an unspecified time on the same day he was provided with a pair of crutches by the prison medical infirmary. On the same day he was also admitted to hospital and returned to cell 8 in Division 6 on 14 July 2013. The case summary drawn up on 14 July \u2013 before his discharge \u2011 and submitted to the Court showed that all the medical investigations had been concluded and the results received prior to his discharge from hospital. According to the case summary the ankle x\u2011ray revealed a fracture and there was subluxation of the right foot; there was a head injury, specifically a fracture of the orbit and of the maxillary sinus; there were no signs of injury or fluid collection in the internal organs; an ophthalmic review had been carried out and the patient had been discharged from that department as well as from the orthopaedic ward where he had undergone tests and treatment for his bone injuries. The summary also showed that the applicant had to use crutches and to avoid bearing weight for the two weeks leading up to his outpatient appointment, after which he still would not be able to bear weight fully. It ordered a change of dressing to be undertaken within three days and prescribed appropriate medicines. Records also showed that a nurse had visited Division 6 to attend to the applicant on 15 July \u2013 the note in the register reads as follows: \u201cNurse C. and S. came to Division 6 at about 11.35 am to visit Fernando Soto in his cell\u201d. Other notes show that a nurse went to Division 6 on subsequent days to give inmates medication, without indicating their names. Another note also showed that a certain Ms M. (whose role is unidentified) visited the applicant on 16 July. 16.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been held in Division 6 for his own safety. The Chief Security officer had ordered that the applicant should not meet the other inmate involved in the argument and that the applicant\u2019s cell be opened for seven hours a day until further instructions. The applicant was initially placed in cell 8 (on the upper floor of Division 6), which was about six metres away from the guard room, thus making it possible to observe the applicant\u2019s cell, which was to be left open. The Government submitted that, by order of a manager, on 21 July 2013 the applicant had been allowed to mingle with all other inmates without restriction. The applicant had then been transferred to cell 13 on a lower floor as soon as it was deemed safe for him, specifically on 26 July 2013. On 7 August 2013 he had been transferred to Division 5, which was also a secure division although it had fewer restrictions. The applicant was finally transferred to Division 3 on 22 October 2013. According to the Government, the applicant had never been kept in solitary confinement, nor had the inmate involved in the argument with the applicant been accommodated in any of the above-mentioned Divisions while the applicant was there, except for a short stay in Division 6. 17.  According to the Government the first request for psychological services made by the applicant had been in April 2014. According to the documents submitted, thereafter he was seen monthly by the psychologist until April 2015 and later three or four times per month until his release in 2016 (from November 2015 onwards he had been seen by a counselling trainee). Moreover, in April 2015 the applicant had been referred for psychiatric services by the psychologist. The Government submitted that although the applicant had a past history of being suicidal, there was no record that he had attempted suicide during the period he was detained in Division 6. The report prepared by the senior psychologist in prison (dated 27 April 2015) noted that the applicant attended his sessions regularly and was making progress. It noted that he felt guilty for not having made amends with his mother before her death (a few months earlier) and that he had deliberately provoked a fight. The report described the applicant as being \u201cedgy and hyper-vigilant but not psychotic\u201d, his sleep was not problematic, his appetite was normal and he was cooperative. He had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, but no other affective disorder was evident. He was put on medication for depression and further follow\u2011ups with the psychologist. He was seen again in a follow-up session with the psychiatrist on 4 May 2015, but on 1 June 2015 he refused a psychiatric review. 18.  In a letter dated 10 July 2014, the applicant alleged that he had not received rehabilitative treatment for his fractures since the prison officials had unilaterally decided to cancel the treatment. According to the Government, on 14 July 2013, prior to being discharged from hospital, the applicant had been seen by a physiotherapist and found fit for discharge. The applicant had also been given three appointments (between July and August 2013) with the ENT department of the hospital in connection with his facial injuries. On 20 July 2013, the applicant had been referred by the prison medical officer to the emergency department of the hospital because of a recurrent swelling of his right ankle. The applicant had at the time already been taking antibiotics and his stitches were intact. On 21 July, 31 July, 28 August, and 30 October 2013, x-rays were taken of the applicant\u2019s right ankle by the orthopaedic department of the hospital. The applicant was also referred to the ophthalmology department on 5 August 2013. Further referrals to hospital were made by the prison medical doctor, but the Government claimed they were unrelated to the injuries suffered as a result of the incident on 12 July 2013. One such referral was made on 13 June 2014. An outpatient service appointment record given to the applicant listed appointments scheduled for 18 November 2014 and 6 February 2014 at the medical outpatients\u2019 clinic, which the applicant also attended. It is recorded that the applicant refused to attend an appointment scheduled for 12 June 2015. 19.  In a subsequent letter dated 11 May 2015 (at a time when he was held in Division 3) the applicant explained that his cell window was positioned at a height of two metres and was therefore very difficult to open. It was also small and had three different bands of metal shutters, which hampered the entry of natural light. He claimed that his cell had lacked good ventilation \u2013 although there were two vents, one of them had been blocked. He alleged that the parts of the ceiling were falling apart and that white and yellow dust caused him to experience breathing problems, since he was an asthma sufferer. The applicant also alleged that the water was not drinkable and that he had therefore had to buy water with the little money that he earned. He claimed that foreign inmates were treated differently from the Maltese inmates since the former had to wait longer to have their petitions decided. 20.  The Government submitted that at the time when this letter was written, the applicant was accommodated in cell 154 in Division 3. 21.  The Government submitted that inmates were responsible for the upkeep of their cells. For this purpose, the materials needed to carry out basic repair work in the cells were provided free of charge. If an inmate required assistance for more specialised work, the Trade Section personnel would carry out the work necessary to keep the cell in good condition. The Government submitted pictures dated 2016 showing that the ceiling in cell 154 was in good condition and that the current resident was carrying out some works and removing paint from the ceiling, exposing the stone underneath. 22.  The Government submitted that all the cells were equipped with running water which was fit for human consumption. According to certification dated 2015 that has been submitted to the Court, water in the prison (no specific location was indicated in the reports) had been certified by the Public Health Laboratory as being fit for consumption, although the mains supply and the other Divisions (including no. 3) had been recorded as having a chloride content which exceeded the recommended parameter value indicated in the relevant law. The Government submitted that the water was tested and certified approximately every six months. In addition to the availability of running potable tap water, the inmates were allowed to purchase bottled water from the residents\u2019 tuck-shop. 23.  In 2013, the applicant received EUR 27.95 every four weeks in so\u2011called \u201cGratuity\u201d money and EUR 46.90 every four weeks for work carried out assembling dolls. Between January 2013 and April 2016 the applicant received EUR 3,526.95 in total. A six-pack of water at the tuck\u2011shop cost EUR 2.24 or an individual bottle EUR 0.38. Government submitted that all inmates received equal treatment irrespective of the State of their origin. 24.  In a letter dated 5 August 2015, the applicant alleged that the prison authorities had refused to forward his letters to the Court in order to dissuade him from pursuing his case before it. He was therefore corresponding with the Court through another address. 25.  From the records of the correspondence sent by the applicant held at the prison authorities and submitted by the Government, it is apparent that the applicant sent registered letters to the Court on 12 February, 1 April and 3 June 2014 and an unregistered letter on 6 May 2015. No further requests were made by the applicant to send any communication to the Court, although letters were sent by the applicant to other addresses on 3 September, 22 September and 7 October 2015, and on 4 February and 6 March 2016.", "references": ["8", "0", "2", "3", "7", "5", "9", "4", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Switzerland. He grew up in Iran and entered Switzerland in 2009. 7.  The applicant applied for asylum under the name of L.B. on 13 August 2009, stating that he had entered Switzerland illegally the same day. He was questioned twice, on 18 August and 24 August 2009, by the Swiss authorities responsible for asylum and migration (until 31 December 2014 the authority was called the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Migration, but it was renamed with effect from 1 January 2015 as the Staatssekretariat f\u00fcr Migration, SEM \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe asylum authorities\u201d). An interpreter was present at both hearings and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present at the second hearing as a neutral witness, in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing about any irregularities, but he made no such observations. 8.  During the hearings the applicant stated that he had attended a number of demonstrations in connection with the presidential election in 2009. He had been arrested during one such demonstration on 15 June 2009 in I. He was subsequently placed in prison, where he was severely tortured every day. After twenty-two days in prison, he was scheduled to appear in court on 6 July 2009. He was placed in a bus with about thirty-five other people but managed to escape during a disturbance caused by one of the other detainees when disembarking from the bus. He then managed to hide with his relatives. After his escape, the authorities had sent a court summons to his home and, when he had failed to appear, the court had sentenced him in absentia to thirty-six months\u2019 imprisonment. He managed to leave the country on 25-26 July 2009 with the help of a smuggler. In support of his account, the applicant submitted copies of his identity card, a court summons of 9 July 2009 and a judgment of 21 July 2009. He explained that the judgment had been sent to his home and that a neighbour had given it to him prior to his departure. 9.  On 4 February 2013 the asylum authorities rejected his asylum application and ordered him to leave Switzerland, finding that his account was not credible as it was contradictory and, in relation to key aspects, not sufficiently substantiated. Despite repeated questions, the applicant had been unable to describe what he had experienced during his imprisonment in a detailed and differentiated manner. He had also contradicted himself regarding his transportation from the prison to court and his escape. Neither his alleged arrest in connection with his participation in a demonstration nor his subsequent detention and escape therefrom had been credible. The documents submitted by the applicant could not lead to a different result as they could easily be bought in Iran and falsified. Moreover, the alleged conduct of the Iranian authorities in sending a court summons to the applicant\u2019s home after his escape, rather than going there to arrest him on the spot, was not credible, nor was his submission that the judgment of 21 July 2009 had been sent to his home and given to a neighbour prior to his departure. 10.  As the applicant did not appeal, the decision became final. 11.  On 13 November 2013 the applicant, through a lawyer, lodged an application for his asylum application to be reconsidered. He was by that time using the identity of A. and stated that he had entered Switzerland legally under that name in May 2009 based on a visa to visit his sister, who lived there. In substance, he stated that his relationship with his father had broken down entirely and that as a result he risked being arrested upon his return because his father had ties to the secret service. Moreover, he had been baptised as a Christian on 25 August 2013. Emphasising that Iran applied the death penalty for apostasy, he alleged that he was at risk of ill\u2011treatment on account of his conversion. He submitted a copy of his baptism certificate, issued by a Pentecostal church, a Protestant house church, to support his account. 12.  On 17 January 2014 the asylum authorities, who treated the applicant\u2019s request as a second asylum application, questioned the applicant in person. An interpreter was present and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing if he witnessed any irregularities, but did not make any such observations. 13.  During the hearing, the applicant stated that he had first had contact with a Catholic church in Switzerland in 2011 and then with the Pentecostal church from early 2013. The members of the latter had gradually become his family. One of them had invited him home once or twice a week to familiarise him with the Bible. He had regularly attended church services and after about six or seven months had been baptised in that church. For him, being a Christian meant believing in Jesus Christ and spreading his message. He stated that he continued to study the Bible and recited parts of it. The principle of honesty enshrined in Christianity was particularly important to him. Even if he were unable to manifest his belief in the future, he would always retain the truthfulness of his faith, which nobody could take away from him. He submitted statements that he had attended different churches to support his account. The applicant did not make any submissions regarding the risk allegedly caused by the broken relationship with his father and the latter\u2019s ties to the secret service. 14.  On 26 February 2014 the asylum authorities rejected the applicant\u2019s application. They considered that his conversion to Christianity did not in and of itself expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment. Such a risk could exist if he proselytised or attracted public attention in another way. Based on his statement, they considered that he did not intend to practise his faith in such a manner. There were no indications that the Iranian authorities were even aware of his conversion. They also doubted that the applicant\u2019s conversion was genuine and lasting, noting, in particular, that it had occurred after the applicant\u2019s first asylum application had been rejected, that the baptism had taken place in a house church rather than a church recognised by the State, and that the applicant did not base his conversion on the key aspects of Christianity, but on the personal relationships he had formed with members of his church community. 15.  On 31 March 2014 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, appealed against that decision. He pointed out that there had been an increased number of arrests of members of Christian house churches since 2010 and argued that his conversion to Christianity in and of itself exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. A Christian convert faced a much greater risk of ill-treatment than those born into the Christian religion. His conversion to Christianity was genuine and lasting. He had first had contact with a Catholic church in Switzerland in 2011 and was serious in practising his faith, as evidenced by the documents he had submitted. 16.  On 14 May 2014 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It expressed doubts as to whether his conversion had been genuine or was lasting, but found that this did not have to be determined. It considered that a person could only face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran if that person\u2019s Christian faith had been manifested in Switzerland in such a way as to make it visible to the outside and if it could be assumed that his or her family and acquaintances in Iran would learn about that active manifestation of faith, even if it was short of proselytising. If close family members were \u201cfanatic\u201d Muslims, they might denounce the conversion to the secret service. In addition, conversion to Christianity might be seen as treason. Where a conversion had taken place abroad, there had to be both an assessment of whether it was genuine and the extent to which it had become publicly known. Even assuming that the applicant\u2019s conversion had been genuine and was lasting, the court considered that he did not manifest his Christian faith in the manner described. There were no indications that the Iranian authorities had even become aware of his conversion. 17.  On 2 May 2016 the applicant, through a lawyer, lodged an application for temporary admission under section 83 of the Aliens Act. He relied on the risks presented by the Iranian authorities and non-state actors on account of his conversion and active membership of a Christian community in Switzerland, as well as his participation in a demonstration in Berne in August 2015 against human rights violations and the persecution of Christians by the Iranian authorities. In that connection, he had signed a letter of protest addressed by the organisers to the Iranian Government, which were thus aware of his conversion. To support his account he submitted photographs, letters of support from various persons and several reports. 18.  On 14 June 2016 the asylum authorities rejected his application, which they had treated as a further asylum application. They noted that the applicant had previously been through two sets of asylum proceedings and that the alleged risk of ill-treatment on account of his conversion to Christianity had already been examined. It was not necessary to examine the matter again as the applicant had not put forward any arguments that could give rise to an assessment that was different from that of the Federal Administrative Court in its judgment of 14 May 2014. 19.  It was true that the Iranian authorities took an interest in the activities of their citizens abroad, but such monitoring was focused on people who stood out from the large number of Iranians critical of the Government and who were perceived as a serious threat by the authorities because of their political or religious activities. Whether a person \u201cstood out\u201d was not so much a question of visibility and the possibility of identifying the person concerned, but was rather one of public exposure. The personality of the individuals concerned, the form of their appearances in public and the content of their public statements were relevant parameters in that regard. The asylum authorities considered that mere participation in a demonstration against the Iranian Government, without the applicant acting in a particular manner or holding a special function, was not sufficient for him to be perceived as a concrete threat by the Iranian authorities. They also noted that there were no indications that the authorities had taken any measures against him. 20.  The Iranian authorities were aware that Iranian citizens at times attempted to rely on conversion to Christianity abroad in order to obtain refugee status in Western countries. Such circumstances would be taken into account by the Iranian authorities but would not, upon someone\u2019s return, lead to ill-treatment within the meaning of the refugee definition. Moreover, it was possible to practise religions other than Islam in Iran in a discreet and private manner. Citing the criteria contained in the Federal Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 14 May 2014, the State Secretariat for Migration did not contest, per se, the fact that the applicant was part of a Christian circle in Switzerland. There were, however, no indications that he was involved in a leading function or was particularly exposed in other ways in connection with his Christian faith. His participation in a demonstration and the signing of a letter of protest to the Iranian Government did not lead to a different conclusion. He was only an ordinary member of a Christian organisation and there was, therefore, no concrete risk that the Iranian authorities had become aware of his conversion. The asylum authorities concluded that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the refugee definition or those for temporary admission. 21.  On 13 July 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, in substance repeating his earlier submissions. On 30 August 2016 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill\u2011founded, fully endorsing the asylum authorities\u2019 reasoning. 22.  On 4 October 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration set a deadline for the applicant\u2019s voluntary departure, which passed on 31 October 2016.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "9", "6", "2", "8", "No Label", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["0", "1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Novyy, Tatarstan Republic, Russia. 6.  The domestic authorities opened a criminal investigation in relation to the murder of G. committed on 7 September 2002. The applicant\u2019s husband, Zhavdet Khayrullin, was identified in the course of the investigation as a possible eyewitness. A certain Mr V. was a suspect. 7.  On 13 September 2002 the applicant\u2019s husband was taken to Tukayevskiy police station. The exact timing of this, various other circumstances, and the legal grounds and reasons for his detention were the subject of conflicting accounts at domestic level (see, for instance, paragraphs 8 and 23 below). 8.  It is apparent from a copy of the police logbook submitted by the applicant that her late husband was taken to the police station by officers Ag. and Na. at around 1 p.m., according to the record, for the purpose of verifying his identity; this verification was completed and he was released at 1.30 p.m. It is also apparent from the evidential material that between 4.15 and 4.45 p.m. the applicant\u2019s husband was in an office, apparently on the fifth floor, where he was interviewed by investigator R. According to the material in the case file record, the applicant\u2019s husband stated during the interview that he and V. had left the house of victim G. after drinking vodka together. Subsequent to this interview, for unspecified reasons the applicant\u2019s husband was interviewed again, this time by field officer (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439) Kh., and made a written statement affirming that V. had punched G. during a quarrel. It appears that the applicant\u2019s husband was thereupon required to come for another interview on 14 September 2002. 9.  On the same date, 13 September 2002, V. was taken to the police station and made a spontaneous confession regarding the murder. According to the applicant, V. heard the applicant\u2019s husband screaming (allegedly in pain) in the neighbouring room during the evening of 13 September 2002 (however, for V.\u2019s amended statement in 2010, see paragraph 38 below). 10.  According to the applicant, V. had been beaten up and ill-treated whilst at the police station, in particular by suffocation inflicted through the application of a gas mask. 11.  According to the authorities, the applicant\u2019s husband left Kh.\u2019s office at 8 p.m. and attempted to commit suicide on a balcony located on the fifth floor of the police station. The same evening he was found unconscious and was admitted to hospital. 12.  On an unspecified date a pre-investigation inquiry was opened in relation to the above events (see also paragraph 16 below), apparently within the framework of the investigation into G.\u2019s murder (see paragraph 6 above). According to the applicant, during this inquiry investigative measures were carried out by unspecified officers from Tukayevskiy police station. 13.  Officer Kh. stated during the inquiry that he had collected a statement from the applicant\u2019s husband and had seen him leave his office at 8 p.m. Soon thereafter Kh. had left for home. 14.  Ga., the deputy chief officer of the police station, stated that after hearing some noise and seeing officers on the fifth floor balcony, he had gone there and had seen Officers F., Va. and Kha. providing medical assistance to an unconscious man. 15.  It also appears that Gar., another deputy chief officer, carried out an internal inquiry and concluded that no official had committed any offence. 16.  On 21 September 2002, referring to the ongoing murder investigation into G.\u2019s death (see paragraph 6 above), an assistant to the district prosecutor issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against any officers on account of Mr Khayrullin\u2019s attempted suicide or incitement to suicide. Having summarised the above testimonies and referring to the conclusions of the internal inquiry, the assistant to the prosecutor concluded that no criminal offence had been committed. 17.  This decision was annulled by the higher prosecutor and the inquiry was reassigned to another investigator. 18.  On 13 December 2002 the applicant\u2019s husband died, apparently without ever regaining consciousness. On the same day the investigator commissioned a forensic medical examination of the victim\u2019s body. The expert was asked to clarify the cause of death, to identify any injuries and to specify their origin, in particular whether they had been sustained before death and whether they were linked to his subsequent death, and whether the victim could have continued to be active after the injuries. 19.  According to the autopsy report issued on 17 January 2003, the victim died of asphyxia resulting from strangulation. 20.  On 3 February 2003 the district prosecutor issued an order for the opening of a criminal investigation into an offence under Article 286 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (actions committed by a public official manifestly outside the scope of his powers, causing significant damage to a person\u2019s rights and freedoms, and entailing serious consequences). In his order the prosecutor stated, inter alia, that \u201cacting manifestly beyond the scope of their powers, unspecified officers unlawfully placed [the victim] in an interrogation room\u201d. The criminal investigation was opened against unspecified officers, and was then assigned to investigator R. 21.  The investigator interviewed paramedic A., who stated that upon arrival at the police station he and his colleagues had been taken to a detention cell; one of the officers explained to him that during a routine check of cells they had had difficulty opening the door of one of the cells and had discovered that it was blocked by the body of an unconscious detainee with a jacket tied around his neck; he had not seen any injuries on the visible part of the body, only on the neck. A similar statement was made by paramedics Zh. and Gi. A reanimation medical professional B. stated that the victim had had no other visible injuries. 22.  The investigator also questioned the victim\u2019s son. The latter had received a telephone call from the victim on the evening of 13 September 2002 in which his father had told him that he was to be interviewed and would be let go next morning. On arriving at the police station the next day, he had been told that his father would be released in the afternoon. 23.  Field officers Na. and Ag. told the investigator that, while on patrol checking permits for firearms, they had spotted the applicant\u2019s husband, who had looked suspicious. They had therefore taken him to the police station to check his identity; having checked it, this person had been allowed to leave the police station. 24.  According to Officer F., the victim was found sitting on the floor with his back against the balcony bars, with one part of his jacket tied around his neck and the other attached to the balcony bars. 25.  On 3 May 2003 investigator R. issued a decision discontinuing the criminal investigation for absence of any criminal event, while noting that \u201cunidentified officers from the police station had manifestly exceeded their powers when placing [the victim] in an investigation room\u201d. Having listed the summaries of various testimonies mentioned above, the investigator concluded that the victim had attempted suicide. 26.  On 20 June 2003 the district prosecutor ordered that the investigation was to be continued in order to examine the instructions relating to the placement of detainees in designated rooms or cells, to determine who exactly had placed the victim in the cell or investigation room, and who had opened the doors. It was also to deal with contradictory statements made by the officers Na. and Ag., on one hand, and by other officers and the victim\u2019s relatives on the other. It was also to properly examine the testimonies given by the paramedics, in particular as regards the place where the victim had been discovered. 27.  It appears that the criminal investigation was reassigned to another investigator, I., who suspended it on 20 July 2003. On 22 July 2003 the regional deputy prosecutor issued an order requesting further investigation and on 23 July 2003 the acting district prosecutor quashed the suspension and ordered the investigation to be continued. 28.  On 23 August 2003 investigator R. issued a decision discontinuing the criminal investigation in terms that were similar to the decision of 3 May 2003. On 12 September 2003 the district prosecutor stated that the requirements made on 22 July 2003 had not been complied with, and that the investigation must be continued. 29.  On 12 October 2003 investigator I. issued a decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. 30.  On 10 November 2003 the deputy regional prosecutor quashed this decision, finding that (i) it remained necessary to interview officer F. again and to give a more detailed assessment of the circumstances in which the victim\u2019s body had been discovered by this officer. In particular, it was important to clarify whether the officer had seen the victim in the state of strangulation, what was the body\u2019s position, where the \u201cnoose\u201d had been and who had removed it, and (ii) it was necessary to interview V. who allegedly heard the victim screaming, to interview the victim\u2019s next of kin in relation to the circumstances in which the victim had been apprehended and taken to the police station, and in particular to interview the victim\u2019s wife, who had allegedly seen signs of bleeding around the victim\u2019s wrists resulting from the use of handcuffs. 31.  A fresh discontinuation decision was issued by the investigator on 10 December 2003. 32.  This decision was subsequently quashed and other similar decisions were issued and quashed on several occasions. For instance, on 10 December 2008 an investigator issued a decision to discontinue the criminal case, concluding that the applicant\u2019s husband had attempted to commit suicide. 33.  On an unspecified date, the investigating officer asked expert Va., who had issued the report of 17 January 2003 (see paragraph 19 above) to express his opinion. Expert Va. stated that the constriction mark on the victim\u2019s neck could have been caused by soft pressure such a fabric jacket. Various types of mechanical asphyxia such as hanging or asphyxia in an enclosed space (by way of placing a gas mask a person\u2019s head) entail the same pathological process arising from a sudden insufficiency of oxygen inflow into blood and tissues. 34.  On 28 January 2010 the investigator issued a decision to discontinue the criminal case because of the absence of a criminal event. 35.  The applicant sought judicial review of the discontinuation decision. On 10 June 2010 the Tukayevskiy District Court of the Tatarstan Republic allowed her complaint. On 10 June 2010 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 36.  On 25 August 2010 the decision of 28 January 2010 was revoked and the investigation was resumed. 37.  A new refusal was issued on 25 September 2010. It was quashed on 1 November 2010 because the circumstances in which the victim had been taken to the police station and possible reasons leading to the attempted suicide had not been clarified. 38.  On 23 November 2010 the most recent discontinuation decision was issued, which read as follows:\n\u201cOn 13 September 2002 Khayrullin was taken to the police station for questioning as a witness. During an interview he stated that he and V. had gone to G.\u2019s home, where they had consumed vodka and had then left.\nKhayrullin was then interviewed by field officer Kh. and stated that V. had struck several blows to G.\u2019s face and had then run away. Khayrullin was required to attend a further interview and then left room no. 514 ...\nIt is apparent from the report of the medical expert that Khayrullin\u2019s death was caused by a post-strangulation condition which had been caused by the squeezing of the neck by some kind of noose; this condition had been aggravated by an impact adversely affecting brain function. The medical documents show no indication of any bodily injuries when he was admitted to the hospital.\nParamedics A., Zh. and Gi. stated during their interviews that no bodily injuries (except for a faint, non-continuous strangulation mark on his neck) had been identified on the victim\u2019s body when they attended to him in the police station.\nOfficer F. stated during his interview that around 11 p.m. on 13 September 2002 he had gone out to the balcony on the fifth floor for a smoke and had seen the victim sitting on the floor with his back to the railing; his neck had been encircled by a jacket, with a part of it being fixed to the railing. He had detached the jacket and had started to provide first aid to the victim. He had also alerted the duty-officers of the police station and had then helped to take the victim to the first floor. The victim had then been examined by a medical professional before being taken to hospital.\nAn investigative re-enactment was carried out on the basis of the above information. Medical expert Va. was interviewed in this connection and confirmed that it would have been possible for the hanging and the strangulation marks to have been created in the circumstances described by F.\nInterviews were carried out with those police officers at the police station who had talked to the victim on 13 September 2002. They stated that ... the victim had been interviewed by the investigator; no questioning had been carried out prior to that ...\nAccording to the expert reports and Va.\u2019s statement during an interview, the strangulation mark could have been caused by the pressure of a soft \u201cnoose\u201d such as might be left, for instance, by a jacket. Moreover, for other types of mechanical asphyxia, including hanging or asphyxia in a limited space (as by means of applying a gas mask) the same life-threatening pathological process occurs, which is caused by a sudden insufficiency of oxygen in the blood and tissues ...\nMrs Khayrullina stated that at 8 p.m. on 13 September 2002 she had received a telephone call from her husband who told her he would come home. His voice had been calm and cheerful.\nMr V. stated that around 8 p.m. he had been kept in one of the rooms on the fifth floor; he had heard the victim in a neighbouring room speaking indistinctly; there had been no screaming or any suspicious noise ...\nIn view of the above, all possible investigative measures have been completed ...\nIt is not possible to carry out expert examination of samples collected from the balcony or the jacket because [they] were lost ...\nAccording to an additional medical report by an expert, a strangulation mark is produced by the pressure of some kind of \u201cnoose\u201d on the neck; one can speak about the pressure by a soft \u201cnoose\u201d, for instance made by a jacket such as the one given to the expert; in normal circumstances a gas mask the size of a person\u2019s head would not exert excessive pressure on the neck and would not leave a strangulation mark ...\nAccording to a further expert report dated 13 September 2010, the absence of macroscopic indications of mechanical asphyxiation in the available material means the cause of death cannot be determined, in particular whether it could have resulted from asphyxia following a hanging or the blocking of the airflow by an object ...\nFurthermore, there were four forensic reports dated 14 December 2002, 17 January 2003, 4 December 2003 and 5 December 2004. None of them indicated any other bodily injuries.\nThere is thus insufficient evidence to consider that any official of the police station abused his or her power or acted in a manner pushing the victim to attempt suicide.\nThe available medical documents do not specify whether the victim had any bodily injuries when admitted for treatment to the hospital.\u201d 39.  The applicant brought civil proceedings claiming 1,500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) by way of compensation in connection with the unlawful arrest and detention of her late husband in the police station and his subsequent death following his ill-treatment at the police station. 40.  By a judgment of 5 December 2008 the Novo-Savinovskiy District Court of Kazan awarded her RUB 250,000 (equivalent to 7,066 euros (EUR) at the material time) against the Federal Ministry of Finance. Retracing the procedural history of the pre-investigation inquiry and the criminal investigation, the court held as follows:\n\u201cThe court has established that Mr Khayrullin\u2019s body was discovered at the police station after he had been taken there for questioning as a witness and that he had been unlawfully placed in an investigation room of the police station. The above has been confirmed by the investigating authority. As noted in the decision of 13 September 2002, unspecified officials of the police station had acted manifestly outside their powers when placing Mr Khayrullin in an investigation room.\nOn the same day Mr Khayrillin attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself in the investigation room.\nIn contrast to this finding, according to the decision of 10 December 2002 setting aside the refusal to prosecute, it was noted that the victim had been discovered on the balcony on the fifth floor. Neither of the above decisions contains any explanation about the change in the circumstances in which the victim had been discovered ... At the same time, the refusal to prosecute dated 10 December 2003 clearly indicates as an established fact that Mr Khayrullin had attempted suicide at the balcony of the fifth floor ...\nIt is apparent from the available material that a criminal investigation was opened under Article 286 of the Criminal Code in respect of unidentified officials; this legal classification has not been changed since 2002; the investigation is ongoing.\nSince the investigation is ongoing, this court \u2212 dealing with a civil case as it is \u2212 has no competence to question whether the legal classification is appropriate or whether there is a corpus delicti. However, this court finds it established that the damage to Mr Khayrullin\u2019s health was caused on the premises of the police station.\nThis conclusion is based on the facts established in the present case, irrespective of the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s findings regarding the place where the body was discovered; the circumstances relating to his presence in the police station (that is his being taken there for questioning as a witness) remain unchanged ...\nThe court therefore finds it established that on 13 September 2002 Mr Khayrullin sustained injuries in the police station, entailing his death ...\nThe court considers that the grave consequences (Mr Khayrullin\u2019s death) ensued as a result of unlawful actions on the part of public officials at the police station ...\nAs stated by the European Court in the case of Sheydayev v. Russia (application no. 65859/01, 7 December 2006), the national authorities are responsible for ensuring the physical inviolability of detained persons. Where a person was placed in custody in good health and had injuries when released, the national authorities must provide a plausible explanation for the injuries ...\nThe court accepts the claimant\u2019s argument that the harm was caused by unlawful actions on the part of public officials at the police station ... Thus, the court finds it appropriate to grant the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage ...\nThe matters relating to the unlawful arrest and the ineffective investigation cannot form a basis for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage ... The court has not established that the mere arrest of Mr Khayrullin on 13 September 2002 entailed a violation of the claimant\u2019s non-material rights or interests; any eventual violation might relate to Mr Khayrullin ...\nThe court considers that the suspension and resumption of the criminal investigation are legitimate procedural actions and thus, even if multiple, do not entail a conclusion of unlawfulness on the part of public officials ... The prosecution period for the offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code has not yet expired. The court dismisses the claimant\u2019s argument that non-pecuniary damage was caused by the ineffective investigation ...\u201d 41.  The Ministry of Finance and the applicant appealed. The applicant argued that the first-instance judgment\u2019s conclusion regarding her standing to seek compensation in relation to Mr Khayrullin\u2019s arrest contradicted the Court\u2019s case-law (Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, ECHR 2006\u2011XIII (extracts), and Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, no. 40464/02, 10 May 2007). It was acceptable for the next of kin of a deceased person to lodge a complaint under Article 5 of the Convention about that person\u2019s deprivation of liberty; the Court has awarded next of kin just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained in relation to such deprivation of liberty. Moreover, it was open to next of kin to lodge a complaint under Article 3 of the Convention on the basis of their own suffering in relation to events relating to a relative who had died or disappeared in suspicious circumstances engaging the responsibility of the State. The applicant also argued that the award of RUB 250,000 was manifestly insufficient in view of the first-instance court\u2019s findings relating to the responsibility of public officials in relation to Mr Khayrullin\u2019s death. At the same time, the trial court did not adduce sufficient reasons for dismissing her monetary claim in relation to her argument about the ineffective investigation into her late husband\u2019s death. 42.  On 22 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the judgment. The appellate court held as follows:\n\u201cWhen granting the claims in relation to the injuries sustained by the victim, the trial court rightly proceeded from the understanding that the injuries had been sustained in the police station on 13 September 2002 because the case file materials confirmed that public officials had committed actions exceeding their powers ...\nThus, as a result of actions on the part of public officials, the claimant had sustained psychological suffering on account of the death of a person close to her ...\nWhen dismissing the remainder of the claim, the trial court rightly proceeded from the understanding that there was no evidence that the claimant had sustained psychological suffering on account of the ineffective investigation ... The investigation is ongoing; at present there is no criminal court judgment in respect of the officials at the police station. Moreover, their actions in relation to the arrest of the victim did not in any event impinge upon the claimant\u2019s non-material rights or interests.\u201d 43.  The applicant received the judicial award on 20 April 2009.", "references": ["5", "6", "8", "1", "9", "7", "4", "3", "No Label", "0", "2"], "gold": ["0", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Zemun. 6.  On 12 March 2003 the Serbian Prime Minister, Mr Zoran \u0110in\u0111i\u0107, was assassinated by members of a criminal group known as the Zemun Clan (Zemunski klan). 7.  The Prime Minister\u2019s assassination prompted the Serbian Government to declare a state of emergency and introduce measures in accordance with the State of Emergency Act 1991 (Zakon o merama za slu\u010daj vanrednog stanja, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 19/1991). 8.  During that time a large-scale police operation known as Operation Sabre (Sablja) took place. Approximately 10,000 people were arrested during the operation and placed in pre-trial detention. 9.  The state of emergency lasted until 23 April 2003. 10.  The applicant was a member of a criminal group linked to the Zemun Clan. During Operation Sabre all members of the Zemun Clan and groups linked to it were arrested and questioned about the Prime Minister\u2019s assassination. Those arrested were also questioned about other crimes such as murders, abductions and drug trafficking. 11.  The applicant\u2019s arrest took place at around 4 p.m. on 1 April 2003, when five members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit broke into the apartment in which he was hiding with five friends. 12.  The applicant claims that on the arrival of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit he was subjected to physical and verbal abuse. Its members immediately started to kick and beat him indiscriminately all over his body and face. They put a pillowcase over his head, verbally abused him and made threats aimed at his family. The maltreatment continued for an hour. On the recording of his arrest, which was broadcast on national television at the beginning of April 2003, he was shown with visible bruises on his face. 13.  At around 6 p.m. the applicant and his friends were taken to the police station and left in the corridor. According to the applicant, police officers passing by sporadically hit and kicked him and his friends. He could not identify them as his face was still covered with a pillowcase. 14.  At some point two police officers came and took the applicant for questioning. He was taken to an office in which seven to nine people were present. Two or three of them were women. 15.  According to the applicant, the maltreatment continued there. He was beaten with baseball bats and police truncheons. He was beaten on the soles of his feet and the palms of his hands. A truncheon was inserted several times into his anus. At one point, a nylon bag was put over the pillowcase which made him lose consciousness. During all that time the applicant remembered hearing his friends screaming. 16.  At around 3.30 a.m. on 2 April 2003 two police officers took him to a solitary confinement cell. He was unable to walk so the officers carried him. In the cell his handcuffs were taken off and a detention order was put before him for signature. 17.  As alleged by the applicant, approximately half an hour later two police officers entered the cell. They handcuffed him, put a bag over his head and took him for questioning. During that time he was again beaten, kicked and maltreated. Throughout this time, he was not allowed to drink any water. 18.  In the applicant\u2019s version of events, after approximately two hours of maltreatment he was returned to the solitary confinement cell. He was kept there for eleven days. During the first five days no food was given to him. Afterwards, he was given one sandwich per day. Throughout that period police officers routinely questioned and ill-treated him in the same way as before. 19.  At approximately 10 p.m. on 12 April 2003 the applicant was transferred to Belgrade District Prison (Okru\u017eni zatvor), where he remained for a year and two months pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings instituted against him. 20.  On 15 April 2003 a prison doctor examined him and issued a medical certificate, which contained an extensive list of his injuries. These included large haematomas on the soles of his feet, palms of his hands, face, shoulders and buttocks, as well as conjunctival hyperaemia (redness) on the external parts of his eyes. The certificate also contained a statement that the applicant had been \u201cbeaten in the police station\u201d. 21.  During the first sixty days of his detention in Belgrade District Prison he was placed in a solitary confinement cell and only had contact with the doctors who examined him. After two months he had fully recovered from the ill-treatment he had suffered. 22.  On 13 October 2003 the applicant was charged with illegal production and trafficking of drugs (neovla\u0161\u0107ena proizvodnja i stavljanje u promet opojnih droga), abduction (otmica) and unlawful deprivation of liberty (protivpravno li\u0161enje slobode). On 22 June 2004 he was sentenced to four years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. He was released from pre-trial detention on 25 June 2004 pending the outcome of appeal proceedings. 23.  On 18 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Inspector General\u2019s Service of the Ministry of the Interior (Generalni inspektorat Ministarstva unutra\u0161njih poslova), alleging that her son had been tortured by members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and police officers working for the Narcotics Department of the Criminal Police Directorate (Odeljenje za suzbijanje narkomanije Uprave kriminalisti\u010dke policije, also known as the Fourth Department) in Belgrade. 24.  On 11 May 2005, 26 May 2005, 8 June 2005 and 12 January 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother submitted additional information complaining that her son had been ill-treated, and that moveable property had been confiscated from his home. 25.  On 24 February 2006 the applicant was invited to the Inspector General\u2019s Service to give a statement about his mother\u2019s allegations. He confirmed that he had been ill-treated. 26.  On 16 March 2006 the Inspector General\u2019s Service interviewed D.S., the Deputy District Public Prosecutor (zamenik Okru\u017enog javnog tu\u017eioca) in Belgrade, who stated that in April 2003 he had been at the police station during the applicant\u2019s questioning. D.S. gave the names of several of the police officers involved and stated that he had not seen any injuries on the applicant. On the contrary, the applicant had seemed pleased because he had been informed that he would be charged with lesser offences than expected. D.S. also claimed that the applicant had had no complaints about his treatment. 27.  On 13 June 2006 statements were taken from two police officers, R.P. and A.K. Both claimed that they had not participated in the immediate arrest, but had entered the apartment after the members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit had already arrested the applicant and his friends. In the apartment they had seen several people dressed in only their underwear, being handcuffed and lying face down. They denied having seen any bruises or injuries on those arrested. 28.  On 10 July 2006 the Inspector General\u2019s Service interviewed the applicant\u2019s wife, who made no complaints about the applicant\u2019s treatment during his arrest or while in detention. She only complained about the confiscation of certain movables from their home. 29.  On 28 September 2006 the chief of the Fourth Department of the Criminal Police Directorate in Belgrade (Na\u010delnik \u010detvrtog odeljenja UKP SUP), Z.K., gave a statement to the Sector for the Internal Control of the Police. He said that he had had no knowledge of the applicant or his friends having been subjected to any ill-treatment. 30.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment of her son was rejected by the Inspector General\u2019s Service for lack of evidence of a crime. 31.  On 1 July 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the First Municipal Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Prvo op\u0161tinsko javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo \u2013 \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) against a number of the unknown perpetrators as well as against three police officers identified only by surname. 32.  On 20 July 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened an official inquiry with requests for the police to provide evidence and the names of those involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning, and an investigative judge to question the applicant. He was interviewed on 9 October 2007. 33.  On 30 November 2007 the Sector for the Internal Control of the Police identified three police officers, V.M., S.P., and Z.K., in connection with the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning. The officers stated that no violence had ever been used against the applicant. On 27 December 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office dropped the charges against them for lack of evidence. 34.  At the same time the case against the unidentified police officers remained open because, according to the prosecutor\u2019s office, \u201cit transpired from the evidence gathered that Krsmanovi\u0107 \u0110or\u0111e had sustained injuries while in detention\u201d (iz prikupljenih dokaza utvr\u0111eno je da je Krsmanovi\u0107 \u0110or\u0111e zadobio povrede u periodu dok mu je bio odre\u0111en pritvor). It would appear that the case is still open. 35.  After learning of that decision, on 23 January 2008 the applicant took over the criminal proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor (o\u0161te\u0107eni kao tu\u017eilac) by requesting to have an investigation opened against V.M., S.P., and Z.K. 36.  On 21 April and 18 November 2008 the investigating judge to whom the case was assigned interviewed three doctors who worked at the prison hospital. On 15 January 2009 he also interviewed the police officers accused of ill-treatment. On 24 March 2009 he refused to open an investigation because there was not enough evidence to prove that the accused had committed the crime they were suspected of. On 23 September 2009 the pre-trial chamber of the First Belgrade Municipal Court upheld the decision of the investigating judge. The applicant appealed. On 13 April 2010 the Belgrade Appellate Court upheld that decision. 37.  On 10 July 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the prosecutor\u2019s office, which was rejected on 11 October 2010. 38.  On 11 July 2010 the applicant also lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained principally about the lack of an effective investigation into the events under Articles 21, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33 and 36 of the Constitution and Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention. On 23 July 2013 his constitutional appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court, whose decision was served on the applicant on 11 September 2013. The court primarily considered the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and found them to be manifestly ill-founded. As to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court found it to be outside its temporal jurisdiction in view of the date of entry into force of the Constitution itself. In respect of the other complaints, the Constitutional Court held, inter alia, that:\n\u201cit is not enough to allege a violation of one\u2019s rights in a constitutional appeal or list the constitutional rights that are considered to be violated and reasons for their violations based on the appellant\u2019s subjective estimation or evaluation, but to put each mentioned reason into a direct relationship with the allegedly violated constitutional right, and a violation or denial of a certain constitutional right has to be caused by an act or action that occurred before the entry into force of the Constitution. This also implies that specific and detailed reasons of the alleged violation of the constitutional right have to be specified in the constitutional appeal, because only a causal link presented in such manner may compel the Court to find a violation or denial of a certain right.\u201d", "references": ["2", "6", "8", "5", "9", "7", "0", "4", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, Mr Grigoriy Nikolayevich Pleshchinskiy, is a Russian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was kept in Solnechnogorsk Police\u2019s temporary detention centre in overcrowded cells from 2 to 10 October 2003; 20 to 24 October 2003; 17 to 21 November 2003; 21 to 28 November 2003; 22 to 29 December 2003; 26 to 30 January 2004; 2 and 3 February 2004; 31 March to 2 April 2004 and then on several occasions between April and 22 July 2004. He had to relieve himself in a bucket in the presence of other detainees and it was very difficult to breathe in the cells. There was no tap or other access to water, no proper light, no table on which to eat food and no area for outdoor activities. In the winter the walls and ceiling were covered with ice or damp. He had no access to a shower. 7.  The applicant made numerous journeys in 2003-2004 between Volokolamsk remand centre and the temporary detention centre in Solnechnogorsk, which took three to four hours in an overcrowded van, which was cold in the winter and stuffy in the summer. 8.  On 11 July 2005 the applicant sued the State for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly appalling conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre. 9.  On 14 November 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. It established that the material conditions of his detention could be explained by insufficient funding. 10.  On 22 November and 6 December 2005 the applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 14 November 2005. 11.  On 19 December 2005 the applicant was informed that the text of the judgment had been available since 5 December 2005. 12.  On an unspecified date the court sent a summons to an appeal hearing which had been scheduled for 30 January 2006. However, the applicant did not receive the summons as it contained an error in the address, which was written as \u201c2, Vishnevskaya Street\u201d instead of \u201c2, Vishnevaya Street\u201d. 13.  On 30 January 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 14 November 2005 in the applicant\u2019s absence. 14.  In reply to an enquiry from the applicant about the date of the appeal hearing, he was informed on 1 February 2006 that it had been held on 30 January 2006. 15.  In December 1992 the municipality allowed the applicant and his son, a minor at the time, to obtain ownership of the flat in Solnechnogorsk in which they were living by way of privatisation. The applicant obtained a title certificate, which, however, named him as the sole owner. 16.  After reaching the age of majority, the son sued the father, asserting his right to the flat and seeking an annulment of the above-mentioned certificate. 17.  In support of his claim the plaintiff submitted a copy of the housing register, and certificates from his school and kindergarten. All the documents showed that the plaintiff had been permanently residing in Solnechnogorsk. 18.  The applicant sought to prove that at the material time the plaintiff had lived in a flat in another town, Taganrog, and tried to obtain certificates of his moving in and out of the privatised flat. However, the competent authority would not issue them unless they were requested by a judge. However, the judge considered that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff sufficed. 19.  On 4 May 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court of the Moscow Region granted the plaintiff\u2019s claim. It held that the housing law provided that minors living with a tenant in a flat leased under a social lease agreement enjoyed the same rights as the tenant as of the privatisation date. Accordingly, where flats were privatised without payment, they could become owners of the flat together with the adults. Furthermore, under the privatisation law then in force, a privatisation agreement had to contain a reference to the minors who enjoyed the right to use the premises in question. 20.  On 14 June 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 4 May 2005 on appeal.", "references": ["9", "0", "1", "7", "6", "8", "4", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in \u010curug. 5.  On 2 August 2002 the applicant and one of his colleagues (hereinafter \u201cthe plaintiffs\u201d) instituted civil proceedings against their employer seeking payment of salary arrears and other employment-related benefits. 6.  On 8 February 2013, after two remittals the First Instance Court in Novi Sad, specifically its Detached Section in Be\u010dej, ruled partly in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering their employer to pay each of them specified sums in respect of salary arrears. The remainder of their claims was rejected. 7.  On 15 April 2013 the Court of Appeal in Novi Sad reversed a part of the above judgment, while upholding the remainder. This judgment was served on the plaintiffs on 6 June 2013. 8.  On 29 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 appeal on points of law as the value of their respective claims was below the statutory threshold allowing for this remedy. 9.  On 9 April 2013 the plaintiffs lodged the constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the impugned proceedings. By its decision of 9 December 2015, the Constitutional Court found a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded each of them EUR 800 in respect of the non\u2011pecuniary damage suffered.", "references": ["4", "5", "1", "2", "6", "0", "8", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Edirne. 6.  On 8 February 2001 a certain \u0130.Y. and his son M.Y., filed a complaint with the Bursa Public Prosecutor\u2019s office, claiming that they had been threatened by members of a criminal organisation, including the applicant, who had acted under his boss, O.K., and that they had had to give them a substantial amount of money and property as a result. 7.  On 20 March 2001 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court requested the Bursa Security Directorate to investigate the matter within the context of an investigation concerning a bigger criminal organisation. 8.  On 21 March 2001 police officers from the Bursa Security Directorate conducted a search at the applicant\u2019s house, during which they found an unlicensed semi-automatic weapon. The applicant was immediately arrested after the search. 9.  Subsequently, he was taken to the Bursa Directorate of Forensic Medicine, where he was examined by a doctor who noted that there were no signs of ill-treatment on his body. He was placed in police custody on the same day. 10.  On 23 March 2001, following the extension of his police custody by two days, the applicant underwent another medical examination. The report drawn up after that examination noted the names of several persons who had also been arrested as part of the same investigation and indicated that no injury could be found on any of them. 11.  On 24 March 2001 the applicant gave his police statements. He described the course of the events in detail and stated that he and certain people that he worked with had visited \u0130.Y. and M.Y. at their homes several times in order to obtain money by threatening them. 12.  On 25 March 2001 the applicant\u2019s police custody was extended and he was medically examined once again together with twenty-five others. The doctor who conducted the examination simply noted that there were no traces of ill-treatment on any of the persons he had examined. The day after, 26 March 2001, another doctor issued a report in respect of the same people, stating that none of them had any complaints and that he could find no signs of injury on their bodies. 13.  On 28 March 2001 the applicant went through a final medical examination before he was detained on remand. This time, a report specific to him was drawn up, stating that he had not put forward any physical or psychological complaints during the examination and that there was no indication of ill-treatment on his body. In his application form, the applicant maintained that the doctor had taken account of his submissions and examined his genitals, but had not been able to find any traces of the electric shocks administered to him. 14.  On the same day the applicant gave his statements before the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. He reiterated his account of the events, but denied certain parts of his police statements, whereby he had admitted to being a member of a criminal organisation and having threatened \u0130.Y. He did not indicate anything with regard to his alleged ill\u2011treatment. 15.  On 21 June 2001 the Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing the applicant of armed robbery, membership of a criminal organisation and illegally carrying weapons. After having explained in detail the composition and acts of a criminal organisation, the Public Prosecutor indicated that the applicant was a member of another organisation, which had threatened and extracted money from \u0130.Y., a member of the first one. In his recapitulation of the events, the Public Prosecutor mentioned a certain A.V.O., who he claimed to have been involved in the money transactions at issue and to have been threatened by that second criminal organisation. He requested the opening of criminal proceedings against a total of thirty-one people, accusing them of being members of two separate criminal organisations. 16.  On 13 September 2001, at the first hearing before the Istanbul State Security Court, \u0130.Y. stated in the absence of the applicant (who was unrepresented) that he had asked for help from the applicant\u2019s boss, O.K., to sell some of his property in order to pay his debts and that he had paid him a certain amount in return. He claimed that after the transaction, the applicant had threatened him to obtain more money. 17.  At the second hearing, held on 6 December 2001, the applicant stated before the court that the indictment had not been served on him and that he had not fully understood the charges against him. After having described the events, he maintained that he and his boss had helped \u0130.Y. pay his debts and that he had just asked him to pay their share, without making any threats. He further retracted the previous statements he had made before the police and the Public Prosecutor. Finally, he argued that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody, without giving any details about his allegation. 18.  During the same hearing, M.Y. submitted that his father, \u0130.Y., had been threatened by the applicant. The applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on these submissions. 19.  On 9 April 2002 the Public Prosecutor submitted his written opinion to the Istanbul State Security Court. He stated that the telephones of two of the accused had been intercepted and that the conversations between them and with the applicant had revealed that the latter had threatened \u0130.Y. upon an order from O.K. In describing the events at issue, the Public Prosecutor once again maintained that A.V.O. had been involved in the transactions and had been threatened by fellow members of the applicant\u2019s criminal organisation. He further indicated that the unfolding of the events had been corroborated by the statements of all of the accused, but that they had all denied having threatened \u0130.Y. and M.Y. Finally, relying on the telephone recordings and the statements of the other accused, the Public Prosecutor proposed that the applicant should be found guilty as charged. 20.  Subsequently, the applicant submitted his statements to the court, requesting the examination of two witnesses, A.V.O., who had been mentioned in the Public Prosecutor\u2019s written opinion, and a certain \u0130.D. 21.  At the hearing on 3 September 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court rejected the request, finding that the examination of the witnesses called by the applicant would have no effect on the outcome of the proceedings. After making a summary of all of the defendants\u2019 statements, the court found the applicant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to twenty years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a judicial fine. In its reasoning, it stated that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been established on the basis of an overall assessment of the evidence at its disposal, without specifying which particular evidence it relied on. 22.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the court had failed to hear any witnesses on his behalf and that it had restricted his right to defend himself during the course of the proceedings, in that it had not taken account of any of his submissions. 23.  On 12 April 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment after holding a hearing, during which the applicant was not present. 24.  The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings, including the appeal proceedings before the Court of Cassation. 25.  On 11 October 2004 a committal order concerning the execution of the applicant\u2019s sentence was prepared. It was notified to the applicant by the prison administration on 13 October 2004.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "8", "5", "9", "7", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and was serving a prison sentence at the time in question. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was arrested on 20 July 2003 and sentenced by the first-instance court on 19 May 2004 to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment for murder. His conviction was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara on 19 July 2004. 7.  According to the available medical file (covering the periods between 30 July-10 September 2005, 25 January - 27 March 2008, and 5 June \u2013 8 September 2008), the first time the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital after his arrest was on 30 July 2005. At that time he was diagnosed with viral hepatitis C, chronic cholecystitis, and radiculitis. The applicant complained of suffering from sleeping disorders and anxiety and was placed in the psychiatric ward of the prison hospital. On 16 August 2005 he was transferred to the infectious ward, where he was treated for his viral hepatitis C. The applicant was discharged from the prison hospital on 10 September 2005. 8.  According to the applicant, in October 2007 he had an operation for an ingrowing toenail on his right foot. After the operation the scar became infected and the applicant was sent to the prison hospital on 25 January 2008 on account of his deteriorating health. At that time the applicant\u2019s diagnosis was as follows: chronic arterial insufficiency of the lower limbs, arterial occlusion and obliterating arteritis, and subungual panaritium. 9.  On 29 January 2008 the applicant had his toenail removed. He spent the post-surgery period under permanent medical supervision in the prison hospital. Although he was provided with painkillers and treated with antibiotics, the applicant, according to the case file, complained every day about severe pain in his right foot. On 25 February 2008 he was seen by an angiosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo a dopplerography of the legs and that his transcutaneous oxygen pressure (\u201cTc PO2\u201d) be measured. The surgeon would decide on the need to amputate the big toe on the applicant\u2019s right foot on the basis of these tests. 10.  According to a note made by a prison hospital doctor in the applicant\u2019s medical file on 25 March 2008, the dopplerography and Tc PO2 test could not be organised in the prison hospital for technical reasons. The doctor noted an improvement in the applicant\u2019s general condition and concluded that in any event, and notwithstanding the specialist\u2019s recommendation, there was no need for those examinations, given that there were no \u201cabsolute indications\u201d that surgery was called for. On 27 March 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital and sent back to Tbilisi Prison no. 1 with a recommendation that he continue palliative treatment on an outpatient basis. 11.  At the request of the applicant, on 5 May 2008 the board of forensic experts of the Ministry of Justice \u2013 having examined him \u2013 drew up a medical report (\u201cthe 5 May 2008 medical report\u201d), which diagnosed the applicant as suffering from the following: arteritis, occlusion of the arteries in the right shin, stenosis of the arteries in the left shin, artery deficiency in the right lower limb (at stage IV of the disease), necrosis of tissue in the right big toe, cardiac ischaemia, second-degree angina pectoris, second\u2011degree arterial hypertension, second-degree cardiac insufficiency, and low\u2011activity chronic hepatitis C. The experts concluded that from a cardiological point of view the applicant\u2019s condition was potentially serious. As for his vascular condition, the main blood vessels in both of his legs were damaged and his condition was serious. They recommended that he be placed in a specialist cardiology clinic and have his toe amputated. 12.  On 20 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyers complained to the Director of the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Prisons Department\u201d) that their client, who had been in the prison hospital since 25 January 2008, had been sent to Tbilisi Prison No. 1, despite the seriousness of his state of health, and that the treatment in that hospital had not produced any results. They complained that the applicant\u2019s condition had deteriorated there. The lawyers requested that the applicant be taken to hospital on the grounds that his life was in danger. On the same day they sent the same request to the director and the head doctor at the medical unit of Tbilisi Prison No. 1. 13.  On 27 May 2008 the head of the welfare unit of the Prisons Department referred the lawyers\u2019 request to the prison governor and a group of qualified medical experts \u201cfor an opinion\u201d. He observed that, in accordance with ministerial order no. 717, patients were hospitalised on the orders of the prison governor, following a report by the head doctor of the prison\u2019s medical unit. 14.  Following that letter, on 3 June 2008 one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers contacted the prison governor reminding him of the terms of ministerial order no. 717 and asking him what the response of the head doctor had been and enquiring as to when the applicant would be hospitalised. 15.  On 9 June 2008 the Prisons Department informed the lawyers that the applicant had been placed in the prison hospital on 5 June 2008. 16.  According to the daily notes made in his medical file, the applicant continued to suffer from pain in the right foot. It can be seen from the contents of the medical file that his right foot was treated with antiseptic products and bandaged daily. During that period the applicant was examined by a vascular specialist twice: on 11 June and on 31 July 2008. On 11 June 2008 the vascular specialist recommended that the bandage be changed regularly and the toe treated with antiseptic products. He also prescribed Alprostapint infusions. On 31 July 2008 the vascular specialist recommended a Tc PO2 test in order to assess the possibility of amputating the toe, and prescribed continuing palliative treatment. It appears from the case file that the relevant drugs were administered to the applicant by his wife and other family members. 17.  On 7 August 2008 the applicant underwent a Tc PO2 test at a specialist hospital. On the basis of the results of the test the examining doctor concluded that the microcirculation in the lower limbs of the applicant (particularly in the right foot) was very low. In his view, surgical intervention was not appropriate because the particularly low level of oxygen in the right foot would have hampered the healing of the resulting wound. 18.  On 8 September 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital because of the appeal court\u2019s decision to suspend his prison sentence (see paragraph 28 below). 19.  On the basis of the 5 May 2008 medical report (see paragraph 11 above), and in view of the fact that his treatment at the prison hospital was producing no results, on 14 May 2008 the applicant applied to the Tbilisi City Court for his sentence to be suspended on health grounds (under Article 607 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2013 \u201cthe CCP\u201d). A representative of the Prisons Department opposed the application on the grounds that the prison hospital had \u201ca medical service capable of treating the applicant\u201d and that \u201cif necessary he [would] be transferred to a specialist clinic\u201d. One of the experts who had produced the above-mentioned report confirmed to the court judge that the applicant was seriously ill. However, as he had no knowledge of the medical facilities at the prison hospital, he said he could not judge whether it was appropriate to keep the applicant there. He also confirmed that the applicant\u2019s right big toe had to be amputated. 20.  On 11 June 2008 the Tbilisi City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, on the grounds that the prison hospital had a medical service capable of providing the necessary treatment and that the applicant, who was being looked after by specialist doctors, would be transferred to a specialist clinic if necessary. 21.  On 18 June 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted to the court his comments on the record of the hearing of 11 June 2008. The record of the hearing, according to those comments, did not refer to the expert\u2019s opinion in respect of the risk to the applicant\u2019s life. The expert had said that the applicant\u2019s gangrene, which was now at the fourth (and last) stage, could cause septicemia and death if not properly treated. Regarding the applicant\u2019s heart condition, the expert had said that the applicant needed treatment in a specialist clinic to prevent sudden death. On 19 June 2008 the court granted that request and ordered that the record of hearing be amended by adding the expert\u2019s comments. 22.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 11 June 2008, pointing out that, according to the medical experts who had examined him, the treatment at the prison hospital had produced no results and that, if he was not properly treated, the question of the amputation of various parts of his right lower limb could arise. The applicant\u2019s lawyers pointed out that prisoners frequently died as a result of a lack of treatment at the prison hospital. They also complained about the Prisons Department having joined the trial as a party to the proceedings, which was in breach of Article 617 \u00a7 4 of the CCP. In their view, a representative of the Prisons Department was not in a position to assess the danger that detention might pose to the life of the applicant. Subsequently, the lawyers requested that the applicant\u2019s doctor and the doctor from the specialist hospital who had treated the applicant on 7 August 2008 be heard as witnesses (see paragraph 17 above). At the examination in the specialist hospital in question, apart from the findings of the above-mentioned expert report, Buerger\u2019s disease of the lower limbs had also been diagnosed. 23.  At a hearing before the Court of Appeal on 4 September 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyers requested that the representative of the Prisons Department be debarred from joining the proceedings as a party, in accordance with Article 617 \u00a7 4 of the CCP. The Court of Appeal allowed that request but authorised the representative in question to attend the hearing in order to reply to any questions. It also decided to call the prison hospital surgeon, the vascular specialist (see paragraph 17 above), and the forensic expert (see paragraph 11 above) as witnesses. 24.  At the next hearing on 8 September 2008 the forensic expert repeated that the applicant\u2019s state of health was serious, and that Article 7 \u00a7 2 of order no. 72/N (issued by the Health Minister) concerning the early termination of prison sentences on health grounds was indisputably applicable. He added that necrosis of the tissue of the lower limb had set in and was progressively affecting the limb from the bottom up. If that were to continue, the applicant might develop septicemia and die. In his view, it was impossible to cure the applicant completely. 25.  The applicant\u2019s doctor \u2013 a surgeon who was a member of the prison hospital\u2019s permanent staff \u2013 also gave evidence before the Court of Appeal, explaining the diagnosis and confirming that his patient was seriously ill, with the arterial disease having reached the fourth and final stage. He said that he had seen the applicant in December 2007 and also in May 2008 and that no serious necrosis had been observed at that time. He further explained that at that stage of the disease the treatment usually prescribed was either palliative or surgical. The applicant was being given palliative treatment with medicines (antioxidants, protective drugs, sedatives). An operation was not recommended because it might make his condition worse. The likelihood of the scar healing was nil. The doctor was gradually removing the necrosed tissue in the right foot. The doctor also confirmed that the applicant\u2019s illness was chronic, progressive and that he needed constant medical treatment. He added that he could not be cured at the prison hospital but that there was a clinic outside the prison that could treat this kind of patient. In answer to a question from the judge, the doctor said that the applicant had been hospitalised twice after his operation and that at the relevant time the necrosis had not reached such an advanced stage. At that time the prison hospital doctors had done all they could to halt the development of the necrosis but without much success. If the situation continued, the applicant might have to have his entire right leg amputated. 26.  The vascular specialist \u2013 a doctor at the prison hospital \u2013 said that he had examined the applicant in December 2007 and found that the gangrene had already affected the big toe of the right foot. This had then quickly spread, despite the treatment administered. Shortly before the hearing the applicant had been prevented from lying down and had been made to stay in a sitting position. His state of health was worsening daily. The results of the Tc PO2 test had shown that the oxygen tension in the right foot stood at level 2 in the lying-down position and at level 21 in the sitting position (the normal level being 60-70; an indicator of 30 was necessary if the wound could be expected to heal properly). Accordingly, amputation was impossible. The vascular specialist said that the prison hospital was complying with his orders but that there was no specialist unit. In his view, the applicant\u2019s lower left limb was also damaged, but not yet affected by gangrene. At the time it was a question of saving the applicant\u2019s life and subsequently considering whether to amputate the right leg. 27.  In his final address the applicant\u2019s lawyer drew the Court of Appeal\u2019s attention to the fact that, despite the presence of gangrene as early as December 2007, the applicant had been sent to Prison No. 1 and left there untreated. Given that, according to the doctors, the applicant could not be cured, the lawyer requested that her client be dispensed from having to serve the remainder of his prison sentence (under Article 608 \u00a7 1 of the CCP). 28.  In a judgment of 8 September 2008 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant\u2019s prison sentence be suspended pending a substantial improvement in his state of health, provided that he undergo a medical examination every six months and provide the court with the results thereof. The applicant was immediately released. 29.  According to a medical report of 6 March 2009, the applicant suffered from cardiac ischaemia, second-degree angina pectoris, third\u2011degree hypertension and second-degree heart failure. From a cardiological point of view, his heart condition remained serious. With regard to his arteries, the applicant suffered from Buerger\u2019s disease, occlusion of the arteries in the right tibia, stenosis of the arteries in the left tibia, chronic arterial deficiency in the right lower limb at the fourth stage of the disease and gangrene of the tissue in the right big toe. The gangrene was still described as progressive. The experts concluded that the applicant required cardiological and angiological treatment in a specialist institution. 30.  Over May and June 2011 the applicant underwent another forensic examination. It appeared from the report of 21 June 2011 that on 6 February 2011 the applicant had had the lower part of his right leg amputated. At the same time he was diagnosed with gangrene on the big toe of the left foot. While confirming his diagnosis from a cardiological point of view as potentially serious the four experts involved in the examination also concluded that the applicant\u2019s angiological condition had deteriorated as a result of ischemia. Thus, from the angiological point of view he was categorised as a seriously ill patient.", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "7", "9", "6", "5", "8", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Dnipro, Ukraine. The applicant bank was a commercial joint-stock bank based in Ukraine with its registered office in Zaporizhzhya. Its banking licence was revoked on 11 January 2001 (see paragraph 12 below). Subsequently, the applicant bank was liquidated (see paragraph 19 below). 6.  The first applicant was the vice-president, founder and majority shareholder of the applicant bank. 7.  In February and March 2000 the domestic authorities instituted two sets of criminal proceedings for tax evasion and abuse of office by the management of the applicant bank. 8.  In March 2000 the first applicant was arrested as part of the criminal proceedings (for more details see Feldman v. Ukraine, nos. 76556/01 and 38779/04, 8 April 2010). In April 2000 the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported on a session of the Coordination Committee on Combating Corruption and Organised Crime. The relevant extract reads:\n\u201c\u2018It is a matter of honour for the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the State Tax Administration to bring the story of Slovyanskyy Bank to its logical conclusion,\u2019 said the President of Ukraine during his speech at the session ... He stated that the chairs of the bank had turned it into a source of uncontrolled personal income. \u2018Such money\u2011makers have powerful patrons, and there is great pressure on the investigation,\u2019 stated the President.\u201d 9.  On 29 June 2000 the National Bank of Ukraine (\u201cthe NBU\u201d) suspended the applicant bank\u2019s licence for some of its operations, considering that its financial position had deteriorated sharply and that it had been performing risky operations which threatened its solvency. 10.  In July 2000 an investigator from the tax police of the State Tax Administration, acting in the course of the criminal proceedings, ordered an attachment of the applicant bank\u2019s securities. 11.  On 18 September 2000 the NBU put the applicant bank under temporary administration, which involved suspending the functions of some of the bank\u2019s managers. 12.  On 11 January 2001 the NBU issued a resolution \u201cOn the Liquidation of Slovyanskyy Commercial Joint-Stock Bank\u201d by which, among other things, (1) the applicant bank\u2019s operating licence was revoked in full; (2) the powers of the board, the council and the general shareholders\u2019 meetings were terminated; and (3) the applicant bank was ordered to be liquidated. By the same resolution the NBU approved the composition of a liquidation commission for the bank, consisting of eleven officials from the regional departments of the NBU and two members of staff from the local tax office. 13.  On 5 March 2001 the first applicant, who was in detention at the time, brought a claim under the rules of Chapter 31-A of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1963 with the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, challenging the NBU\u2019s decision. He maintained that the impugned resolution was unlawful and that the NBU had decided to liquidate the applicant bank owing to its failure to fulfil its financial obligations, whereas that failure had been caused by the NBU itself and the tax authorities. The first applicant emphasised that after the resolution had been adopted, the applicant bank had not been able to protect its rights and interests on its own. He added that the resolution had been detrimental to the interests of the applicant bank\u2019s shareholders, including himself. 14.  On 26 June 2001 the court found that the first applicant could bring a claim, however, it had to be dismissed. The court held that the NBU had been competent to adopt the impugned resolution, that the measures taken had been lawful and that they had been made necessary by gross violations of banking legislation by the applicant bank and its difficult financial position. 15.  The first applicant appealed against that decision. 16.  On 5 July 2002 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 26 June 2001 in part, but changed its reasoning. It held that the NBU\u2019s resolution of 11 January 2001 had not concerned the first applicant and it had not been established during the determination of the claim that his rights and freedoms had been violated. For those reasons the court of appeal dismissed the claim. 17.  The first applicant appealed on points of law. 18.  On 21 April 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the decisions of 26 June 2001 and 5 July 2002 and terminated the proceedings, considering that the claim was inadmissible. It found as follows:\n\u201c... The first and second-instance courts have established that Mr B.M. Feldman brought a claim as a shareholder of Slovyanskyy Bank, however he did not request the protection of his own rights and freedoms but, in fact, acted in the interests of Slovyanskyy Bank, without being duly authorised [bold text in the original].\nAccording to Articles 1 and 12 of the Code of Commercial Proceedings, disputes between a subject of entrepreneurial activities and enterprises, institutions and organisations concerning the protection of their rights and freedoms, and their disputes concerning the declaration of legal acts as invalid, should be examined by the commercial courts.\nGiven that a shareholder is not entitled to apply to a court for the examination of such a dispute and that this case is not to be examined in accordance with civil procedure, the decisions adopted in this case should be quashed and the proceedings should be terminated, in accordance with Article 136 \u00a7 2 (1) and Article 227 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ...\u201d 19.  The liquidation process of the applicant bank was completed on 30 November 2012. The bank was removed from the legal entities official database on 4 August 2014.", "references": ["4", "7", "1", "6", "2", "5", "0", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Melitopol. 6.  Between 2004 and 2006 the applicant was head of Melitopol City Council\u2019s Disadvantaged Persons\u2019 Welfare Centre (\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u043f\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044e \u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0445, \u043d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0435\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0442\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0431\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0433\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0434\u044f\u043d \u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0456, \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0445\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0443 \u0442\u0430 \u0436\u0438\u0442\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0443\u0431\u0441\u0438\u0434\u0456\u0439 \u041c\u0435\u043b\u0456\u0442\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe Centre\u201d). On 21 April 2006 she was dismissed as part of a reorganisation of the Centre. Another person was subsequently appointed to a position similar to the one previously occupied by the applicant. 7.  In May 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Melitopolskyy Local Court (\u201cthe Melitopolskyy Court\u201d) seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 24 October 2006 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. It found that the Centre had offered the applicant another position but that she had rejected this proposal, and that a more experienced person had been appointed as the head of the Centre. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 7 December 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant lodged a further appeal, and on 22 August 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed these decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that the case was to be considered under the administrative justice procedure since it concerned a public-service dispute. 8.  Accordingly, the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Melitopolskyy Court, which, on 21 February 2008, again found against her for reasons similar to those listed in its decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant appealed, and on 16 July 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal quashed this decision and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that it fell to be examined under the civil justice procedure as the applicant was not a public servant. On 2 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld this decision. On 14 April 2011 the same court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ukraine against the decision of 2 March 2011. 9.  On 28 March 2011 the applicant again lodged a civil claim seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 4 August 2011 the Melitopolskyy Court refused to examine the merits of the applicant\u2019s civil claim as the applicant had sought to have adjourned previous court hearings in respect of her case on numerous occasions without good reason. On 5 October 2011 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "9", "2", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Voluntari. 6.  In March 2014 a large-scale criminal investigation was initiated against several persons for money laundering and fiscal fraud. On 3 December 2014 the investigation was extended in respect of thirty-two other persons, including the applicant. 7.  Within the framework of the criminal investigation, on 4 December 2014 several police officers carried out a search at the applicant\u2019s home. According to the search report, signed by the applicant and by her appointed lawyer without any objections, the search started at 6.15 a.m. and lasted until 2 p.m. 8.  Immediately after the search and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 265-266 of the Romanian Criminal Code of Procedure (hereinafter RCCP, see paragraph 33 below), namely on the basis of an order to appear before the investigation body, the applicant was taken by police officers to the Bucharest police headquarters. 9.  According to the record drawn up at the time, the enforcement of the order to appear was executed between 2.10 p.m. and 2.40 p.m., when the applicant arrived at the police station. 10.  The order to appear had been issued by the prosecutor on 3 December 2014. It mentioned that\n\u201cIn the interests of the investigation ongoing in the above-mentioned criminal file [number] concerning money laundering and fiscal fraud, the questioning of [the applicant\u2019s name and identification data] in her capacity of suspect is necessary.\nThe criminal investigation bodies (...) will bring the suspect to the police headquarters on 4 December 2014 for the purpose of making a statement [before the investigating authorities].\u201d 11.  The documents on file show that between 8.40 a.m. on 4 December 2014 and 3 a.m. the next day, the investigating authorities, namely five prosecutors and six judicial police officers, conducted interviews in respect of fourteen witnesses and twenty-five suspects and/or defendants in connection with the criminal investigation involving the applicant. 12.  According to the register kept by the police to record third parties entering the police station on a daily basis, the applicant\u2019s appointed lawyer, Mr R.-M.S., entered the premises of the police headquarters at 4.10 p.m. The applicant contended that up until that time, her lawyer had been prevented from joining her because he had not submitted a written mandate proving that he lawfully represented her (see also paragraph 22 in fine, below). 13.  It appears from the file that during her stay in the police station, the applicant\u2019s phone conversations were tapped. 14.  At an unspecified time before 7.32 p.m., a prosecutor informed the applicant that she was a suspect in an ongoing criminal investigation, and was to be charged with complicity in fiscal fraud; the applicant was also informed of the rights and obligations she had in that capacity. When invited to give a statement, she refused, claiming that she was unwell and needed medical assistance.\nThe minutes recording this interview do not mention the exact time of their drafting; they are signed by the applicant, who confirmed having received a copy. Her lawyer does not appear to have been present. 15.  The Government contended that the applicant\u2019s request for medical assistance had been part of her defence strategy, as proved, in their view, by the transcripts of a phone conversation she had had with a third party at 7.14 p.m., in which she was advised accordingly (see also paragraph 13 above). The same argument was backed, according to the Government, by the conclusions of the medical investigations, which attested to the fact that no urgent need for medical care had been identified in her case (see paragraph 16 below). 16.  At 7.32 p.m. an ambulance was called to the police station. It arrived at 7.50 p.m. and provided medical care (mainly intravenous infusion with minerals) to the applicant until 8.31 p.m., when she was taken to the Emergency University Hospital. Accompanied by police officers, she arrived at the hospital at 8.40 p.m., and was diagnosed with lipothymia. She remained in the hospital until 00.10 a.m. the next day and several medical examinations were performed during this time, following which vitamins, calcium and analgesics were administered. The diagnosis when the applicant left the hospital, accompanied by police officers, was neurovegetative dystonia and light hypokalemia. 17.  The applicant claimed that during the whole time she was in hospital she had been guarded by police officers, who had then escorted her back to the police headquarters. 18.  At about 00.22 a.m. the applicant\u2019s questioning started. In the presence of her chosen lawyer, the applicant refused to give a statement on the grounds that she was very tired, having spent the last four hours in hospital. She also referred to the fact that neither she nor her lawyer had been given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the contents of the criminal case file in which she was a suspect. 19.  Subsequently, at 01.10 a.m., the applicant was informed in the presence of her chosen lawyer that the prosecutor had decided to remand her in custody (re\u0163inere) for twenty-four hours. 20.  Her lawyer lodged a complaint with the prosecutor against the decision to remand her in custody, as well as another complaint concerning her being unlawfully deprived of her liberty as of 12.00 p.m. on 4 December 2014. 21.  In the first complaint, it is claimed that the order to appear became effective on 4 December 2014 at 6.20 a.m., and that the applicant was de facto remanded in custody as of 2.20 p.m. It is argued that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty throughout that interval was unlawful and unjustified, aimed solely at obtaining statements from her under duress. 22.  In the second complaint it is claimed that on 4 December 2014, as of 12.00 p.m. when the search of her home ended, the applicant\u2019s liberty to move around was restricted, as proved by the fact that she had been accompanied by police officers not only to the police station but also to the hospital, where she had been taken under escort to obtain medical assistance. The applicant mentioned that her lawyer had not been allowed to accompany her or to assist her because he did not have a written mandate, even though the lack of such a document was objectively justified by the circumstances in which she had been taken to the police station. 23.  The prosecutor dismissed both complaints on the same day, holding that the measure to remand the applicant in custody was lawful, necessary and proportional to the gravity of the charge. He stated that the order to appear became effective after the house search had been performed, the presence of the applicant during the search being necessary in relation to its conduct and thus outside the limits of such an order. The prosecutor further considered that the time interval during which the applicant was under medical surveillance could not be included within the eight-hour time-limit set out by Article 265 \u00a7 12, as that was an incident excluding the responsibility of the investigating authorities. The limitation of her lawyer\u2019s access to the criminal file had been justified by the necessity to get to the truth and to obtain from the applicant a genuine statement, uninfluenced by those already given by the other suspects or witnesses. 24.  On 5 December 2014, relying on testimonial, documentary and audio surveillance evidence, the prosecutor asked the Bucharest County Court to place the applicant in pre-trial detention (arest preventiv) for thirty days as her release posed a threat to public order. 25.  By an interlocutory judgment delivered on 6 December 2014, the Bucharest County Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s request and ordered the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 January 2015. An appeal lodged against this was dismissed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 15 December 2014. Her pre-trial detention was extended for another thirty days by a decision of the Bucharest County Court issued on 29 January 2015, upheld on appeal. 26.  The applicant was released on 11 February 2015 after two months of pre-trial detention. 27.  It appears that the proceedings on the merits are still pending. 28.  The applicant claimed that for two months, she had been placed in a cell measuring 9 square metres, which she had shared with three other detainees. She also complained about the poor conditions of hygiene, lack of ventilation and natural light. According to the applicant, the toilet was not separated from the living area by any partition, thus offering no privacy. 29.  The Government provided information about the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention. They submitted that the applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 9.32 sq m, which she had occupied with two or three other detainees from 5 to 8 December 2014. From 9 December to the date of her release, the applicant had been placed in a room measuring 9.42 sq m, along with two or three others. 30.  They stated that each cell had sanitary facilities such as a toilet and a shower, which were separated from the rest of the cell by a curtain. Both cells had access to natural and artificial light, as well as ventilation provided by a double-glazed window measuring 115cm x 77cm.", "references": ["4", "6", "0", "7", "3", "8", "5", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1968 and 1972 respectively and live in Vilnius. 6.  On 28 May 2003 L.G. sold a plot of forest land measuring 0.4807 hectares to the applicants. The purchase agreement categorised the land as forest. 7.  In February 2005 a registration certificate was issued for the plot of land. It categorised the land as forest and determined special conditions on use of the plot, namely, that restrictions applied to the use of the whole plot and that there were surface water protection zones. 8.  On an unspecified date, the first applicant asked the Mol\u0117tai District Court to establish as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings on the 0.4807-hectare plot. On 22 September 2005 the Mol\u0117tai District Court established as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings (a cattle shed and a storehouse (galvid\u0117 ir klojimas) there. The court noted that the first applicant was the owner of a plot of forest land on which construction of new buildings was prohibited, unless it was a reconstruction of a former residential property. The court found that a former residential property had been situated outside the boundaries of the first applicant\u2019s plot but held that if the requested legal fact was established, he would be able to reconstruct the buildings previously sited there (nusta\u010dius pra\u0161om\u0105 fakt\u0105, parei\u0161k\u0117jas \u012fgis teis\u0119 atstatyti jo valdomame \u017eem\u0117s sklype buvusius statinius). A representative from the Utena District environmental protection department of the Ministry of the Environment (hereinafter \u201cthe Utena environmental protection department\u201d) had no objections to the establishment of the legal fact. 9.  In November 2005 the first applicant asked the authorities to issue him with the relevant documents necessary for construction. The Utena environmental protection department stated that the construction of a building had to comply with the Law on Construction; the existing flora had to be preserved and the method of waste collection had to be decided on. The permanent committee on construction of the Mol\u0117tai Municipality verified the documents submitted by the first applicant and recommended that he be issued with a building permit. 10.  On 22 November 2005 the Mol\u0117tai Municipality issued the first applicant with the documents necessary for construction, in accordance with the domestic regulations, in particular with Government Resolution no. 1608 (see paragraph 49 below). It was indicated that anyone intending to carry out construction work was required to preserve existing flora, and was not allowed to block the shore of the lake or interfere with the existing landscape. 11.  On 5 December 2005 the Mol\u0117tai Municipality issued the first applicant with a permit to build a summer house (non-residential building). The permit was valid for ten years. 12.  In 2007 the plan of the building was specified (the facades were modified) and the amendments were verified by the Utena environmental protection department. 13.  In March 2007 the Utena County Administration issued a certificate about the summer house as 97% finished and following that, on 2 April 2007 the house was registered in the Centre of Registers (Registr\u0173 centras) as 97% finished. 14.  On 2 May 2011 the Ministry of the Environment received a report via a hotline for allegedly illegal construction work. On 10 May 2011 the authorities estimated the distance between the house and the lake at 27 metres, and between the terrace of the house and the lake at 24.5 metres. 15.  On 5 August 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to revoke the recommendation to grant the first applicant building permission; to annul the building permit and oblige the applicants to demolish the building at the expense of the established guilty parties, that is the applicants, the Mol\u0117tai Municipality, and the Utena environmental protection department. The prosecutor claimed that the building permit could not have been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law (see paragraphs 39, 42, 43 and 49 below). 16.  On 4 June 2012 the Mol\u0117tai District Court dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s complaint, holding that the legal facts had been established in September 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). It had not been until 2006 that the Supreme Court had held that the sole fact that the storehouses had been sited on a specific plot of land, without any proof that a residential building had been sited there, did not mean that there had previously been a residential property there (see paragraph 56 below). The District Court further held that in accordance with relevant legislation in force at the time, it was possible to construct new residential buildings in the place of former buildings, as well as to reconstruct existing residential buildings and construct necessary storehouses (see paragraph 49 below). Moreover, it had been established that any construction work in the forest could only be started after having received building permission and in accordance with the relevant plans. That legislation had been repealed after the Constitutional Court had declared that the domestic regulations were in breach of the laws and, by extension, of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 below). The court thus held that the case-law on construction in the forest had been established after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant. The court further held that the applicants had built the building lawfully, there was no evidence as to any negative consequences of the construction for the environment or the public interest. The court also observed that in the applicants\u2019 case it would be unreasonable and unjust to apply the measure established in the Civil Code \u2013 to oblige the applicants to demolish the buildings (see paragraph 29 below). Moreover, the court was not convinced that the environment would be restored to its previous state if the buildings were demolished because the demolition would also cause some environmental damage. 17.  The prosecutor appealed. On 4 December 2012 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal. The court held that the Mol\u0117tai District Court had established as a legal fact that there used to be a cattle shed and a storehouse on the applicants\u2019 plot of land (see paragraph 8 above). A summer house could not be constructed as it did not fall within the category of buildings that could be constructed in the forest. Even the Mol\u0117tai District Court had emphasised that the construction of new buildings was prohibited on that plot. The building permit had obviously been issued to the first applicant unlawfully and, in the appellate court\u2019s view, the latter had asked the court to establish a legal fact for the sole purpose of constructing a house. The court also held that neither the Law on Forests nor the Law on Land provided for any exceptions, so the right to construct buildings on the plot of forest land had never existed. The court thus ordered the first applicant to demolish the buildings at the expense of the applicants, the Mol\u0117tai Municipality and the Utena environmental protection department. The Court did not explain how the costs of demolition had to be divided between the three parties. 18.  The applicants, the Mol\u0117tai Municipality and the Utena environmental protection department lodged an appeal on points of law. The applicants claimed that the appellate court had breached the principle of lex retro non agit by assessing the documents, issued in 2005, in view of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2006. They also claimed that the appellate court had breached their legitimate expectations to execute their proprietary interests in accordance with the domestic regulation in force at the time. 19.  On 27 September 2013 the Supreme Court held that relevant laws provided that the only buildings that could be constructed in the forest were timber storehouses and other buildings for forestry equipment. There were no provisions allowing construction of residential or commercial buildings in the forest. It was in certain cases possible to change the purpose of the land, but as the land in question was situated in a surface water protection zone, any such change was prohibited. The court held that although the applicants referred to the Regulation of Construction on Private Land (see paragraph 49 below, hereinafter the \u201cRegulation\u201d), none of the provisions of that Regulation could be interpreted as allowing construction of the buildings in question. There was no argument that the buildings in question had been constructed where farm buildings had previously been sited, thus the provision of the Regulation allowing construction where residential buildings had previously been sited did not allow the applicants to construct a summer house. The court thus held that the construction had been illegal. As regards the removal of the consequences of illegal construction, the court held that it was crucial to assess the consequences of the illegal construction for the environment and the public interest, the consequences of the demolition of the buildings, the possibility of restoring the environment to its state before the illegal construction, and whether the persons who had acquired property rights had acted in good faith. In cases where the construction was in breach of the territorial planning documents and/or the imperative requirements of environmental protection, heritage protection and protection of protected areas, a decision to legalise the illegal construction could not be taken. The court thus had to assess whether the construction in question should have been carried out at the relevant time. It held that legalisation of the buildings in question was impossible and that demolition had to take place (see paragraphs 46 and 47 below). As to the applicants\u2019 argument that the appellate court had breached the principle of legitimate expectations, the court held that the construction in question had been prohibited by the relevant domestic legislation in force at the time. Even if the applicants had misinterpreted the provisions of the Regulation, the Constitutional Court had found the Regulation to be inconsistent with the law, and, by extension, with the Constitution on 14 March 2006, only three months after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant. The applicants should therefore have been able to understand the consequences of constructing illegally and to avoid them. Although the authorities were partly responsible for the illegal construction, that fact per se did not mean that all illegal construction had to be legalised in order to protect the legitimate expectations and proprietary interests of the owners. The legal regulation established the responsibility of the authorities for the unlawful issue of the construction permit. As a result, the court upheld the decision of the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court (see paragraph 17 above). 20.  On an unspecified date the bailiff asked the Mol\u0117tai District Court to explain the order to enforce the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court\u2019s decision. On 12 February 2014 the Mol\u0117tai District Court dismissed the bailiff\u2019s request because she had failed to provide specific details as to what required clarification. 21.  It appears that the applicants asked the bailiff to suspend the execution of the judgment and that their request was refused. 22.  On an unspecified date the applicants applied to the Utena District Court to overrule the bailiff\u2019s refusal to suspend the execution of the judgment and to suspend it until the case had been examined at the European Court of Human Rights. On 23 December 2015 the Utena District Court held that domestic law did not oblige the bailiff to suspend the execution of judgments if the applicants had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Code of Civil Procedure provided that there would be grounds for reopening the proceedings if the European Court of Human Rights found that a domestic court decision had breached an applicant\u2019s rights under the Convention or one of its Protocols (see paragraph 32 below). The court held that if the national court\u2019s order to demolish the building was executed, the possibility of reopening the proceedings after a positive outcome for the applicants in the European Court of Human Rights would become complicated. On the other hand, if the European Court of Human Rights adopted a different decision, the demolition of the buildings would still be possible. The court observed that the applicants\u2019 building did not infringe the rights of third persons as it was sited on a plot of forest land that belonged to the applicants. As a result, the Utena District Court suspended the execution of the judgment pending a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. 23.  The State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate lodged a separate complaint, but on 15 March 2016 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision.", "references": ["8", "1", "7", "3", "0", "4", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are sisters, who were born in 1949 and 1950 respectively and live in Vilnius and Var\u0117na. 6.  On 23 May 1996 the national authorities issued a decision to restore the applicants\u2019 father\u2019s property rights in respect of a plot of land measuring 9.87 hectares. His property rights were registered on 6 June 1996. 7.  Following their father\u2019s death on 23 December 1995, the applicants were issued with a certificate of inheritance on 27 June 1996 and inherited his property in equal parts. Two plots of land measuring 8.93 hectares and 0.94 hectares respectively were returned to them in natura. These plots were marked out in October 1995, but an engineer did not indicate in the plan that there was a house situated on the plot of land of 8.93 hectares that did not belong to the applicants. 8.  On 5 July 2001 J.P. bought a house and a storehouse. The cadastral measurements of the house were taken in September 1992, and the building was classified as residential. The plot of land under the house and for residential purposes measured 0.5204 hectares, and although J.P. did not buy the land on which the house stood, he used it. On 4 August 2005 A.P., who was J.P.\u2019s mother, had her property rights restored, and transferred her plot of land of 0.51 hectares to the place where J.P.\u2019s house was located. J.P., as A.P.\u2019s heir, asked for the plot of land of 0.51 hectares to be entered into the land registry in his name. However, his request was refused by the national authorities, because that plot overlapped the applicants\u2019 land. 9.  In June 2007 the Alytus County Administration (\u201cthe ACA\u201d) stated that the applicants\u2019 father\u2019s rights had been restored in respect of the land under the buildings that did not belong to him. The ACA also explained that, if there was no dispute, the decision of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 6 above) could be amended and the borders of one of the applicants\u2019 plots of land could be changed as well (see paragraph 39 below). If there was a dispute, the ACA would initiate court proceedings in order to annul part of the decision of 23 May 1996. The applicants were given until 1 August 2007 to reply in writing to the ACA\u2019s proposal. The applicants did not agree with the ACA\u2019s proposal. 10.  In December 2007 the National Land Service held that domestic law did not allow the restoration of property rights to land under buildings owned by third parties. As a result, the documents restoring the property rights of the applicants\u2019 father had to be amended. 11.  As there was a dispute, the ACA asked a prosecutor to start court proceedings. In April 2008 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Var\u0117na District Court and asked it to annul part of the decision of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 6 above) restoring the property rights of the applicants\u2019 father in respect of 0.4863 hectares of land, and the relevant part of the succession document issued to the applicants. 12.  On 21 April 2009 the Var\u0117na District Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s application, indicated that the part of the decision of 23 May 1996 regarding the 0.4863 hectares had to be annulled, and held that a plot of land of 0.51 hectares had to be demarcated for J.P. The applicants\u2019 property rights would be protected by giving them an equivalent plot of land in another area. It appears that the court suggested several times that the parties conclude a friendly settlement agreement, but the applicants refused. 13.  The applicants appealed. They claimed, among other things, that the prosecutor had missed the thirty-day time-limit for lodging a claim. 14.  On 4 November 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The court held that the prosecutor had only found out about the situation at issue on 31 March 2008, and had lodged the complaint on 30 April 2008, thus the time-limit for lodging a claim had not been missed. The court further held that the plot of land that J.P. had been using had been formed back in 2001 when the buildings had belonged to V.G., and that the applicants had signed the documents and agreed with the borders of the plot under the buildings. The court also held that the restitution of property was a matter of public interest, because it not only related to specific individuals, but to public opinion in general (formuoja visos visuomen\u0117s nuomon\u0119). The property rights of land owners were not absolute, and in the case at issue the lawful interests of a third party had to be protected. 15.  The applicants submitted an appeal on points of law, and on 19 April 2010 the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination, stating that the lower courts had not examined the factual circumstances regarding how big the plot of land had to be in order for the buildings to be used. The Supreme Court also held that the Vilnius Regional Court should assess the fact that no plot of land under the buildings had been demarcated at the time the applicants\u2019 father\u2019s property rights had been restored. 16.  On 2 February 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court sent the case back to the court of first instance for fresh examination, stating that the substance of the case had not been examined thoroughly. The court held that one of the buildings belonging to J.P. had previously been a school building, but since 1992 it had been registered in the register of immovable property as a residential building. The court observed that some mistakes had been made in the process of restoring both J.P.\u2019s mother\u2019s and the applicants\u2019 father\u2019s property rights. The court further held that the conclusion of the Var\u0117na District Court that J.P. was entitled to a plot of land measuring 0.51 hectares was unfounded. Although there were some buildings on the land that had been returned to the applicants\u2019 father, the exact size of the plot necessary in order for the buildings to be used had not been determined. Moreover, although the applicants and J.P. had provided some evidence, this was insufficient to prove that the size of the plot of land under the buildings had to be 0.51 hectares. Lastly, the Vilnius Regional Court obliged the parties to the proceedings to provide documents proving how big the plot of land had to be in order for J.P.\u2019s buildings to be used. 17.  On 20 February 2012 the Var\u0117na District Court established that J.P.\u2019s buildings were on the plot of land measuring 0.51 hectares. The court also held that J.P. was using the exact plot which had been marked out for V.G., and the plan of the land had been signed by the applicants (see paragraph 14 above). The court considered that the person who had measured the land for the applicants had not marked the house in that area, and had not taken any actions to find out who the owner of the house was; therefore, he was the person who had made a mistake. The court noted that in fact 0.5019 hectares overlapped the applicants\u2019 land, but as J.P. was not asking for this, only 0.4863 hectares of land had to be taken from the applicants. Lastly, although the 0.4863 hectares of land had to be taken away from the applicants, their property rights had to be protected by providing them with a new plot of land of equivalent value in another place. 18.  The applicants appealed, and on 24 July 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the Var\u0117na District Court of 20 February 2012. The court held that, although the applicants claimed that J.P.\u2019s house was not a residential building and thus no land for residential purposes could exist, the data from the register of immovable property and the purchase agreements showed that the building was a residential building. The court also held that the applicants\u2019 father\u2019s property rights to the land under the buildings at issue could not have been restored, as those were not his buildings. In fact, since 1992 the relevant documents had referred to there being a plot of land of 0.5204 hectares near the buildings. 19.  The applicants submitted numerous appeals on points of law, but they were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 5 September 2013, 7 and 25 October 2013 and 10 December 2013 as either not raising important legal issues or being repetitive. 20.  On 27 January 2014 the National Land Service sent a letter to the applicants explaining that the legal registration in respect of their plot of land of 0.4863 hectares had been annulled following the decisions of the domestic courts, and asked them to choose the means by which they wanted their property rights in respect of the plot of land of 0.4863 hectares to be restored. The National Land Service noted that the restoration of property rights in natura was not possible. 21.  In February 2014 one of the applicants wrote to the National Land Service and asked for the return of the plot of 0.4863 hectares in natura. She also claimed that J.P. was using the plot of land for residential purposes unlawfully and that she had sustained damage. 22.  In March 2014 the National Land Service informed the applicant that she could start court proceedings for damages. The National Land Service also explained that the purchase agreement in respect of J.P.\u2019s buildings was valid, and that, in accordance with the decisions of the domestic courts, J.P. was entitled to use the plot of land under the buildings. 23.  In September 2014 the National Land Service replied to a request by one of the applicants in July 2014 for an explanation of the actions of the Var\u0117na Division of the National Land Service and compensation in respect of pecuniary damage. The National Land Service stated that the applicants were aware of the court proceedings regarding the decision of 23 May 1996 to restore their father\u2019s property rights. It also held that J.P. was entitled to buy the plot of land for residential purposes located under the buildings from the State. 24.  In June 2014 J.P. was included into the list of candidates to buy a plot of land of 0.51 hectares and on 18 November 2015, after some measurements had been carried out, the plot of land of 0.5082 hectares was sold to J.P. 25.  In March 2015 the National Land Service replied to a complaint by one of the applicants about the restoration of her father\u2019s property rights. Among many other things, the applicant asked for: the process of amending the borders of their plot of land to be terminated; J.P. to be prohibited from constructing buildings and growing plants; his property to be kept on the plot of land at issue; an opportunity to buy the plot of land that had been taken from them; and an easement under J.P.\u2019s buildings to be established. The National Land Service indicated that such a request had already been dismissed by the domestic courts (see paragraph 29 below). It was impossible to allow the applicants to buy the same plot of land that had been taken from them, because that plot of 0.4863 hectares had not belonged to their father in the first place. In addition, J.P. was not stating that he wanted an easement to be established, thus the applicant\u2019s request in this respect was unfounded. 26.  The applicants complained to a member of the Seimas, who sent their complaint to the Var\u0117na Division of the National Land Service. The member of the Seimas asked for explanations about the procedure for restoring the applicants\u2019 property rights and why their property rights to the 0.4863 hectares of land had not been restored. In May 2015 the Var\u0117na Division of the National Land Service explained that the applicants\u2019 property rights to the plot of land of 0.4863 hectares had been annulled in accordance with the decisions of the domestic courts (see paragraphs 17-19 above). In January 2014 the applicants had been asked to choose the means by which they wished their property rights in respect of the 0.4863 hectares of land to be restored (see paragraph 20 above), but they still insisted on having the land returned in natura (see paragraph 21 above), which was not possible. The Var\u0117na Division of the National Land Service also provided detailed information about monetary compensation as a means of restoring the applicants\u2019 property rights. The monetary compensation procedure could be started after the applicants submitted a request for their property rights to be restored by means of monetary compensation. As a preliminary estimate, the value of the plot at issue was estimated at 217 euros (EUR). 27.  In June 2015 the Var\u0117na Division of the National Land Service once again informed the applicants that returning the 0.4863 hectares of land in natura was not possible and that they could have monetary compensation. The applicants were also informed that the procedure could be started after a request to restore their property rights by means of monetary compensation was received by the authorities (see paragraph 42 below). The preliminary estimate as to the value of the plot was also indicated as being EUR 217. It appears that the applicants did not reply to this letter, nor did they submit a request for monetary compensation, but the National Land Service calculated the compensation at EUR 433 after having adjusted it in line with the inflation index, and on 12 July 2017 invited the applicants to come and discuss the restoration of their property rights. The meeting was adjourned once until 25 July 2017 because the applicants\u2019 lawyer had holidays planned. On 24 July 2017 the applicants\u2019 lawyer asked to adjourn the meeting again because one of the applicants was ill, but she did not provide any documents confirming this. The National Land Service decided to hold a meeting as planned on 25 July 2017, and issued a decision to restore the applicants\u2019 property rights to the 0.4863 hectares of land by paying them monetary compensation of EUR 433.60. One of the applicants collected the decision on 8 September 2017. The decision was not appealed against. 28.  In 2010 one of the applicants asked a prosecutor to start a pre-trial investigation into J.P.\u2019s actions. According to her, J.P. was using land to which he had no rights. In November 2010 the prosecutor decided to terminate the pre-trial investigation, as there was no evidence of a criminal act. That decision was upheld by a higher prosecutor in December 2010 and by the Var\u0117na District Court and the Vilnius Regional Court in January 2011. 29.  In 2011 the applicants asked for interim measures to be applied and for J.P. to be prohibited from constructing buildings, temporary constructions and roads, and from growing plants and farming on the plot of land at issue. Their application was dismissed by the Var\u0117na District Court and Vilnius Regional Court in May 2011 and November 2011 respectively. 30.  On an unspecified date one of the applicants started court proceedings regarding the cadastral measurements of the land. The applicant also claimed that J.P. had acquired his building unlawfully and that he had been using her land without any legal grounds. On 6 May 2014 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant\u2019s allegations had already been rejected by the decision of the Var\u0117na District Court of 20 February 2012 (see paragraph 17 above). The court also stated that the cadastral plan proposed by the applicant was not approved, because she had included J.P.\u2019s land on it and marked it as hers. As a result, the applicant\u2019s complaint was dismissed. 31.  In 2015 the applicants initiated civil proceedings regarding the change of purpose of one of the buildings belonging to J.P. They claimed that J.P.\u2019s house had previously been a school, and thus its purpose was communal and not residential. In November 2015 the Var\u0117na District Court dismissed their claim. In April 2016 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision, and in July and August 2016 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicants on points of law.", "references": ["6", "8", "4", "5", "2", "0", "7", "1", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1976 and lives in \u017dagar\u0117 and the second applicant was born in 1957 and lives in \u0160iauliai. 5.  In December 2010 the first applicant bought a house at an auction organised by the State and registered his property rights in the State Property Register. At the time, the former owners of the house, Z.B. and his wife G.B., were living there. The auction was organised as a result of a debt of Z.B. 6.  In January 2011 the first applicant lodged a claim with the court, asking to evict Z.B. and G.B. and for an award in respect of pecuniary damage. 7.  On 21 December 2011 the \u0160iauliai District Court held that the first applicant was the lawful owner of the house and that Z.B. and G.B. were unlawfully occupying the premises. The court held that Z.B. and G.B. had to be evicted and decided to award the applicant 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 289 euros (EUR)) for every month from 28 December 2010 until the eviction of Z.B. and G.B. from the house. It appears that by May 2017 EUR 5,013 had been recovered from Z.B. and G.B. and paid to the first and the second applicants, the remaining amount to be paid being EUR 5,070. 8.  On 4 April 2012 the \u0160iauliai District Court issued a writ of execution and on 5 April 2012 it was received by the bailiff\u2019s office. 9.  On 6 April 2012 the bailiff sent a letter to Z.B. and G.B. and asked them to vacate the house, the letter was received by Z.B. on 13 April 2012. 10.  In May 2012 G.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff but on 6 June 2012 the \u0160iauliai District Court dismissed it. G.B. then lodged a separate complaint which was also dismissed by the \u0160iauliai Regional Court on 24 September 2012. 11.  In October 2012 the first applicant asked the bailiff to ensure that the police were present during the forced eviction; to ensure that the access to the house was not impeded by the dog; the first applicant also asked the bailiff to get the information from the Children\u2019s Rights Protection Service because Z.B. claimed that his minor granddaughter had been living in the house. The first applicant also asked the police to oblige the residents of the house to terminate their unlawful actions; to oblige them to remove their dog from the area; to warn the unlawful residents of the house of their responsibility for material damage and to fine them. 12.  In October 2012 the bailiff asked the authorities about the permanent place of residence of Z.B.\u2019s granddaughter. The authorities stated that Z.B.\u2019s daughter and granddaughter were living together in Vilnius. This was later confirmed by Z.B.\u2019s daughter herself. 13.  On 13 November 2012 the bailiff informed Z.B. and G.B. that the eviction would take place on 23 November 2012. On 15 November 2012 Z.B. asked the bailiff to suspend the eviction because G.B. was ill. At first the bailiff refused to suspend the enforcement action but on 22 November 2012, after having received medical documents about G.B.\u2019s state of health, he postponed the eviction until 14 December 2012. 14.  On 20 November 2012 Z.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff, also asking the court to apply interim measures \u2013 to suspend the eviction proceedings owing to G.B.\u2019s illness and the presence of his minor granddaughter in the house. On 22 November 2012 the \u0160iauliai District Court decided to apply interim measures and to suspend the eviction proceedings until the complaint against the bailiff was examined. 15.  The complaint against the bailiff was examined on 19 December 2012 by the \u0160iauliai District Court, which decided to dismiss Z.B.\u2019s complaint. The court held that the writ of execution had been issued on 4 April 2012 (see paragraph 8 above) and that the bailiff had urged Z.B. and G.B. to vacate the house before 15 May 2012; thus he had given them thirty-nine days. The court further held that Z.B. had complained about the bailiff\u2019s eviction notice about the forced eviction but had also asked that the execution proceedings be suspended and the eviction postponed. The court held that Z.B. had already asked the bailiff to suspend the eviction but the bailiff had refused to satisfy this request. The court also stated that Z.B. had complained about the bailiff\u2019s eviction notice of 13 November 2012 (see paragraph 13 above). The bailiff had informed the animal shelter, the police and the Children\u2019s Rights Protection Service; he had thus acted in accordance with domestic law. The court decided to annul the interim measures applied by the decision of the \u0160iauliai District Court (see paragraph 14 above). 16.  Z.B. submitted a separate complaint against the decision of the \u0160iauliai District Court (see paragraph 15 above), complaining that the court had made a purely formalistic assessment of his minor granddaughter\u2019s living arrangements in the house and that it had not commented on the fact that the bailiff had ignored his wife\u2019s illness. On 28 March 2013 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court held that the illness of G.B. had not come on suddenly, that there were no minors living in the house and that there were no grounds to suspend the execution of the eviction order. 17.  The bailiff submitted a separate complaint against the decision of the \u0160iauliai District Court (see paragraph 14 above). On 25 January 2013 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court dismissed the bailiff\u2019s complaint holding that G.B.\u2019s illness had been grounds to suspend the eviction proceedings. 18.  On 3 April 2013 the bailiff informed Z.B. and G.B. that the eviction would take place on 16 April 2013. On that day Z.B. stated that his mother was living in the house and, because she was not on the list of persons who could be evicted, the eviction could not take place. The bailiff decided to suspend the eviction. 19.  On 16 April 2013 Z.B. lodged a complaint with the court, stating that the bailiff\u2019s actions had been arbitrary and asking to remove him from the case. This complaint was dismissed by the \u0160iauliai District Court on 23 April 2013. 20.  On 22 April 2013 the first applicant complained to the bailiff about the latter\u2019s inactivity on 16 April 2013 (see paragraph 18 above). The first applicant claimed that the bailiff had to enter the house and evict Z.B. and G.B. by force and that Z.B.\u2019s mother had to be taken care of by the police or other relevant authorities. 21.  On 2 May 2013 the bailiff decided not to satisfy the first applicant\u2019s complaint. The bailiff held that he could only evict those persons that were listed on the writ of execution, and Z.B.\u2019s mother was not one of them. The bailiff agreed with the first applicant that Z.B. had been avoiding the eviction but stated that he had tried to defend the first applicant\u2019s interests by suggesting to the latter to apply to the \u0160iauliai District Court so that it broadened the list of persons to be evicted. 22.  The first applicant then lodged a complaint before the \u0160iauliai District Court, complaining about the bailiff\u2019s inactivity. 23.  On 14 June 2013 the first applicant sold the house to the second applicant. 24.  Consequently, on 19 June 2013 the \u0160iauliai District Court replaced the first applicant with the second applicant in the proceedings (see paragraph 22 above). 25.  On 16 August 2013 the \u0160iauliai District Court satisfied the second applicant\u2019s complaint. The court held that when the execution actions had been protracted, the interests of a creditor had been breached, and thus the main role in the execution proceedings had been played by the bailiff. Only the persons listed on the writ of execution could be evicted, and any other persons were considered to be only temporarily present and had to immediately leave the premises. Only the court and not the bailiff could postpone the eviction. The court held that the bailiff had failed to perform the execution of the eviction properly and that he had had no grounds to suspend or postpone the execution. The court thus annulled the bailiff\u2019s order of 16 April 2013 to suspend the eviction and the order of 2 May 2013 by which the bailiff dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above). 26.  Z.B. submitted a separate complaint. On 31 October 2013 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court dismissed it. 27.  On 7 November 2013 the bailiff issued an order for forced eviction. 28.  On 18 November 2013 the forced eviction took place, with the participation of the bailiff, the locksmith and two police officers. However, Z.B. and G.B. did not participate in it and when the second applicant entered the house, all their furniture and other belongings were still there. The next day, the bailiff drew up a document by which the second applicant was assigned as the property manager of the goods that had been left in the house and that had been seized. 29.  In December 2013 Z.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff regarding the forced eviction. On 3 January 2014 the \u0160iauliai District Court held that the eviction had been lawful and that the bailiff had acted in accordance with domestic law. 30.  Z.B. submitted a separate complaint, which was dismissed by the \u0160iauliai Regional Court on 27 March 2014. 31.  The Government submitted that on 11 February 2014 the bailiff ordered Z.B. and G.B. to collect their goods that had not been seized (see paragraph 28 above) from the house on 17 February 2014 at the latest. As this order had not been executed, on 26 March 2014 the bailiff issued a property-seizure order with the aim of selling the goods off. 32.  Z.B. and G.B. lodged a complaint in respect of the bailiff\u2019s decision to issue the property-seizure order (see paragraph 31 above). On 26 May 2014 the \u0160iauliai District Court dismissed their complaint, holding that in accordance with domestic law the evicted person had to take his or her property. If he or she failed to collect the property within three months from the date when it had been transferred to the property manager, it could be sold and the income given to the debtor. In the present case, the second applicant had become the property manager on 18 November 2013 (see paragraph 28 above), the property seizure act had been drawn up on 19 November 2013, and the property had to be taken by Z.B. and G.B. before 17 February 2014. After this date the sale of the property would become lawful. 33.  On 30 and 31 October 2014 the bailiff announced a public auction concerning the movable property of Z.B. and G.B. It was also suggested to the debtors\u2019 representative that they could approach the second applicant and take back their property that had not been seized. 34.  Z.B. applied to the \u0160iauliai District Court to have interim measures applied to prevent the bailiff from selling their movable property. Z.B. explained that he wanted either to lodge a complaint against the bailiff in accordance with the out-of-court settlement procedure or to lodge a claim with the court. Z.B.\u2019s application was accepted by the \u0160iauliai District Court on 3 December 2014. Z.B. was also instructed to lodge any such complaint against the bailiff under the out-of-court settlement procedure or a claim with the court before the deadline of 17 December 2014 and to pay the applicable court fees. According to the Government, Z.B. failed to pay the court fees, and the interim measures were therefore annulled on 9 June 2015. 35.  On 17 June 2015 the \u0160iauliai District Court rejected another complaint lodged by Z.B. against the bailiff, the second applicant and third parties regarding the annulment of the negative consequences caused by the unlawful actions of the bailiff and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that Z.B. had asked it to rule that some personal belongings could not be sold at auction. The court held that Z.B. and G.B. had not taken advantage of the opportunity to name buyers who might have had an interest in taking part in the auction that had been subsequently carried out. Z.B. had failed to explain why he had not taken his belongings within the three\u2011month time-limit; moreover, he had not even provided a description of his alleged personal belongings. The court therefore dismissed Z.B.\u2019s complaint. 36.  On 8 April 2013 G.B. lodged an application for interim measures, asking to prohibit the use of the house and other buildings in the garden and complaining of the result of the auction \u2013 the first applicant purchasing the house (see paragraph 5 above) \u2013 and asking for the result of the auction and the purchase agreement to be annulled. 37.  On 16 May 2013 this application was dismissed by the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court and on 5 September 2013 by the Court of Appeal. 38.  G.B. lodged another application for interim measures, complaining of the results of the auction. Her application for interim measures was dismissed by the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court on 10 September 2013 and her complaint about the result of the auction was dismissed by the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court on 9 December 2013.", "references": ["8", "3", "2", "6", "5", "4", "7", "1", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  At the time of the events the applicants were all working as cashiers for M.S.A., a Spanish family-owned supermarket chain. 7.  At the beginning of February 2009 the applicants\u2019 employer noticed some irregularities between the supermarket stock levels and what was actually sold on a daily basis. In particular, the shop supervisor identified losses in excess of EUR 7,780 in February, EUR 17,971 in March, EUR 13,936 in April, EUR 18,009 in May and EUR 24,614 in June 2009. 8.  In order to investigate and put an end to the economic losses, on 15 June 2009 the employer installed surveillance cameras consisting of both visible and hidden cameras. The purpose of the visible cameras was to record possible customer thefts and they were pointed toward the entrances and exits of the supermarket. The purpose of the hidden cameras was to record and control possible employee thefts and they were zoomed in on the checkout counters, which covered the area behind the cash desk. The company gave its workers prior notice of the installation of the visible cameras. Neither they nor the company\u2019s staff committee were informed of the hidden cameras. 9.  On 25 and 29 June 2009 all the workers suspected of theft were called to individual meetings. During those meetings the applicants admitted their involvement in the thefts in the presence of the union representative and the company\u2019s legal representative. 10.  Hereafter and for the sake of clarity, the applicants will be referred to as the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants (see the attached Annex). 11.  On 25 and 29 June 2009 the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds: they had been caught on video helping co-workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves. According to their letters of dismissal, the security cameras had caught them scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co-workers and afterwards cancelling the purchases. Security cameras had also caught them allowing customers and co-workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for. 12.  On 22 July 2009 the first applicant brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before the Granollers Employment Tribunal no.1 (hereinafter \u201cthe Employment Tribunal\u201d). The same day the second applicant brought similar proceedings before the Employment Tribunal in a joint application with the third, fourth and fifth applicants (see paragraph 20 below). 13.  In the framework of the proceedings both applicants objected to the use of the covert video surveillance, arguing that it had breached their right to protection of their privacy. 14.  On 20 January 2010 the Employment Tribunal issued two judgments ruling against the applicants, declaring both dismissals fair. The main evidence supporting the fairness of their dismissals was the recordings resulting from the covert surveillance, as well as the witness statements of co-workers dismissed for their involvement in the thefts, the shop manager, the union representative and the company\u2019s legal representative. 15.  The Employment Tribunal found in both judgments \u2013 as regards these two applicants in particular \u2013 that the use of covert video surveillance in the workplace without prior notice had been in accordance with Article 20 of the Labour Regulations (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), which allowed an employer to use monitoring and surveillance measures which he or she deemed appropriate to verify that an employee was fulfilling his or her employment duties, as long as the employer respected \u201chuman dignity\u201d. This had been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in several judgments (see, among other authorities, judgment no. 186/2000 of 10 July 2000). According to the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law, an employer\u2019s right to adopt organisational arrangements and act as a disciplinary authority had to be weighed against an employee\u2019s fundamental right to privacy recognised under Article 18 of the Constitution. In cases where there were substantiated suspicions of theft, special circumstances justified interference with an employee\u2019s right to privacy, which was considered to be appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued, necessary and proportionate. Following this case-law, the Employment Tribunal, having regard to the evidence before it, found that the employer had had sufficient grounds to conclude that the applicants\u2019 conduct amounted to a \u201cbreach of contractual good faith and abuse of trust\u201d and thus declared both dismissals fair in conformity with Article 54.2.d of the Labour Regulations. 16.  The applicants appealed before the High Court of Justice of Catalonia on 16 and 22 March 2010 respectively. On 28 January and 24 February 2011 the court upheld both first-instance judgments, referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law and endorsing the Employment Tribunal\u2019s finding that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance of the cash desks. While acknowledging that it was possible that the employer could face an administrative sanction for not informing its employees and the staff committee in advance of the installation of the cameras, that fact alone had no relevance from a constitutional point of view, since from that perspective the covert video surveillance had been justified (in that there had been reasonable suspicions of theft), appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued, necessary and proportionate. Consequently, their dismissals had been justified on the same grounds as already stated by the Employment Tribunal. 17.  The applicants brought cassation appeals, which were declared inadmissible on 5 October 2011 and 7 February 2012 respectively. Ultimately the applicants lodged amparo appeals with the Constitutional Court, which were declared inadmissible on 27 June and 18 July 2012 respectively, due to the \u201cnon-existence of a violation of a fundamental right\u201d. 18.  On 25 and 29 June 2006 the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds: they had been caught on video helping co-workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves. According to the employer, the security cameras had caught the third applicant scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co-workers and afterwards voiding the receipts. Security cameras had also caught her allowing customers or co-workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for. As regards the fourth and fifth applicants, security cameras had caught them stealing goods with the help of their co-workers, such as the second applicant. 19.  On the days that they were dismissed all three applicants signed a document called a \u201csettlement agreement\u201d (acuerdo transaccional), by which they committed themselves not to bring proceedings against their employer for unfair dismissal, while the employer committed itself not to bring criminal charges against them for theft. In the meetings at least one union representative and the company\u2019s legal representative were also present. 20.  Despite the settlement agreements, on 22 July 2009 the applicants, together with the second applicant (see paragraph 12 above), brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before the Employment Tribunal. According to the applicants, the settlement agreements had to be declared void. They claimed that the consent they had given was not valid, since they had been under duress at the time they had signed the settlement agreements (a company representative had allegedly threatened to bring criminal proceedings against them if they did not sign the agreements). They also argued that the evidence derived from the covert video surveillance had been obtained illegally. 21.  On 20 January 2010 the Employment Tribunal ruled against the applicants and declared the dismissals fair. It carefully analysed the settlement agreements signed by the applicants. In particular, it addressed their allegation of invalid consent, finding that there was no evidence proving the existence of any kind of duress or intention to commit a crime (dolo) at the time the applicants had signed the settlement agreements. The court concluded that the applicants had signed the settlement agreements freely and voluntarily with the clear purpose of avoiding criminal proceedings for the alleged thefts they had been accused of (and to which they had already confessed). Further evidence as to the lack of any threat or coercion was the fact that other employees in the same situation as the applicants (such as the first and second applicants) had refused to sign the settlement agreements. Accordingly, the settlement agreements were declared valid under Article 1.809 of the Civil Code and, consequently, the Employment Tribunal ruled against the third, fourth and fifth applicants. As the signing of the settlement agreements rendered their dismissals fair, the use and analysis of the impugned videos as evidence in the proceedings was deemed unnecessary. 22.  The applicants appealed before the High Court of Justice of Catalonia on 16 March 2010. On 24 February 2011 it upheld the first-instance judgment and endorsed the Employment Tribunal\u2019s finding that the settlement agreement signed by the applicants was valid. The court also analysed, for the sake of clarity, the legality of the covert video surveillance. Referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law, it confirmed that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance on the applicants. 23.  The applicants brought a joint cassation appeal, which was declared inadmissible on 7 February 2012. Ultimately, they lodged a joint amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of Articles 18 and 24 of the Constitution. It was declared inadmissible on 18 July 2012 due to the \u201cnon-existence of a violation of a fundamental right\u201d.", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "6", "9", "1", "0", "8", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Bostadel Prison, in Menzingen. 6.  In a judgment of 27 May 2005 the Criminal Court of the Canton of Basle Urban (\u201cthe Criminal Court\u201d) found the applicant guilty, on account of acts committed between 2000 and 2004, of robbery, endangering life, assault with a dangerous object causing multiple bodily injuries, multiple acts of coercion, multiple offences of receiving stolen goods, and offences under federal legislation on drugs, road traffic and weapons. The Criminal Court sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment, after deducting periods spent in pre-trial detention from 22 May to 25 June 2003 and from 3 May 2004 until the delivery of the judgment. In addition, the Criminal Court declared enforceable a twelve-month custodial sentence that had been suspended when handed down on 2 May 2001, for theft and attempted coercion. On 19 July 2005 the applicant was transferred to Bostadel Prison. 7.  In a judgment of 12 January 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Basle Urban (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed an appeal by the applicant, essentially upholding the first-instance judgment. In a judgment of 12 May 2007 the Federal Court dismissed a subsequent appeal by the applicant. 8.  In a letter dated 4 July 2007, addressed to the intercantonal commission for the assessment of the dangerousness of offenders in the Cantons of Solothurn, Basle Urban and Basle Rural (\u201cthe intercantonal commission\u201d), the applicant asked for the conditions of his sentence to be relaxed. The intercantonal commission submitted its report on 29 October 2007. It found that it was premature to grant any adjustments other than the opportunity to work in an outside environment, on the grounds that the applicant, who did not have a mental illness or a personality disorder, had not shown willingness to \u201ccome to terms with his criminal past\u201d. The intercantonal commission thus concluded that the applicant was to be regarded as a danger to the public. It recommended an expert psychiatric assessment and vocational guidance measures, and acknowledged that the applicant could work in an outside environment but could not be granted any other adjustments of the conditions of his sentence, such as being able to spend the holidays with his father. 9.  Acting on instructions from the Department of Justice of the Canton of Basle Urban, Dr R.A., a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, issued a psychiatric opinion on 24 September 2008 after examining the applicant in person, and diagnosed him as having moderate paranoid and narcissistic personality disorders (World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases \u2013 ICD-10), with full criminal responsibility. Dr R.A. found that these disorders had already been present at the time when the offences had been committed. He also noted that the applicant was not prepared to engage in self-reflection and to change his attitude, meaning that there would generally be a high risk of reoffending, and concluded that the prognosis was highly unfavourable. 10.  On 15 October 2008 the governor of Bostadel Prison drew up a progress report on the applicant\u2019s detention, in which he noted that there was a high risk that the applicant might escape and accordingly proposed that he be employed within the prison premises. 11.  In a report dated 10 November 2008 the intercantonal commission found that the applicant represented a danger to the public, and recommended that no adjustments to the conditions of his sentence be ordered and that the appropriate court be asked to review whether the conditions for an (outpatient) therapeutic measure in conjunction with the sentence (vollzugsbegleitende therapeutische Massnahme) were satisfied (Article 63 of the Criminal Code). The intercantonal commission also recommended that should such a measure prove unsuccessful, consideration be given to converting the sentence into indefinite detention. 12.  On 30 December 2008 the Department of Justice of the Canton of Basle Urban asked the Court of Appeal to ascertain whether, following its judgment of 12 January 2007, the conditions for ordering a therapeutic measure were satisfied. On 9 June 2009 the governor of Bostadel Prison issued a progress report on the applicant\u2019s detention, in which he noted in particular that the applicant had refused any psychotherapy. In a judgment of 4 December 2009 the Court of Appeal held that there was no legal basis justifying a subsequent order for an outpatient therapeutic measure, but wondered whether it might be advisable to order institutional measures. To clarify this possibility, it proposed that an additional expert report be drawn up. 13.  In a report dated 5 January 2010 the governor of Bostadel Prison noted in particular that the applicant had displayed good behaviour while working in an outside environment and that release on parole could therefore be envisaged, even if only for a limited period. 14.  On 30 June 2010, in an additional report to the expert report of 24 September 2008, after examining the applicant in person, Professor A.E., a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, concluded that it was unlikely that an institutional therapeutic measure would serve any useful purpose, given that the applicant was not showing any motivation to change his attitude towards the offences he had committed and was incapable of developing empathy. She added that the applicant was not especially overawed, in emotional terms, by the sentence he was serving. However, she did not rule out all possibility of treatment, referring to some more promising therapeutic approaches. 15.  On 7 July 2010, referring to the above-mentioned additional psychiatric report, the post-sentencing authority of the Canton of Basle Urban (\u201cthe post-sentencing authority\u201d) asked the Court of Appeal to review whether, following its judgment of 12 January 2007, the conditions for ordering subsequent indefinite detention, or possibly an institutional therapeutic measure, were satisfied (Articles 64 and 59 of the Criminal Code respectively, taken together with Article 65; see paragraph 24 below). In submissions of 20 September 2010 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to find that this was not the case. 16.  On 17 December 2010 the governor and the sentence supervision officer of Bostadel Prison produced a report on the progress of the applicant\u2019s detention, in which they noted that there was no obstacle to a gradual relaxation of the conditions of his sentence until his release on parole. In a letter dated 21 April 2011 to the Court of Appeal, they confirmed their findings of 17 December 2010. 17.  In a judgment of 6 May 2011, after hearing evidence from Professor A.E. and the applicant\u2019s representative that day, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant\u2019s subsequent indefinite detention under Article 65 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, in its version in force since 1 January 2007. At the hearing that day, the applicant and his lawyer had had the opportunity to put questions to A.E. 18.  In a judgment of 30 January 2012 the Federal Court partly upheld an appeal by the applicant against the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 6 May 2011, finding that the conditions for ordering subsequent indefinite detention were not satisfied. It noted that indefinite detention was an exceptional measure and could only be ordered with caution. It pointed out that in view of the significant restrictions this measure entailed for the person concerned, indefinite detention should be regarded as a last resort, and this applied a fortiori where it was ordered subsequently. It added that the indefinite detention of a young person who had received no previous treatment could only be justified if it was unlikely that within a period of approximately five years, therapy would lead to a significant reduction of the risk of reoffending.\nIn addition, the Federal Court noted that it was appropriate to consider whether an institutional therapeutic measure should be ordered. It found that it could not be ruled out that the applicant might respond favourably to psychological counselling. Accordingly, it quashed the judgment appealed against and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for a fresh decision. 19.  In a judgment of 22 August 2012 the Court of Appeal ordered an institutional therapeutic measure, in accordance with Article 65 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, at the same time suspending the execution of the part of the sentence remaining to be served (\u201cDer Restvollzug ... wird aufgeschoben ...\u201d). Before giving judgment, the Court of Appeal had requested information from Professor A.E. In her reply dated 25 June 2012 she had affirmed, with reference to Article 59 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code, that in view of the type, severity and complexity of the applicant\u2019s mental disorder, only an institutional measure was likely to meet his therapeutic needs to an adequate extent. She had also pointed out that the prisons in Thorberg (Canton of Berne) and P\u00f6schwies (Canton of Zurich) had therapy departments (\u201cTherapieabteilungen\u201d) for the purposes of Article 59 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code and that this should be borne in mind. 20.  According to the applicant, he should have completed his sentence on 19 March 2013, taking into account his pre-trial detention from 22 May to 25 June 2003 and from 3 May 2004 onwards (see paragraph 6 above). 21.  In a judgment of 28 May 2013 the Federal Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the judgment of 22 August 2012, observing that the subsequent ordering of an institutional therapeutic measure was compatible with the Convention, from the standpoint of Articles 5 and 7 and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, and with federal law. More specifically, the Federal Court acknowledged that the law governing measures for offenders other than sentences (Articles 56-65 of the Criminal Code) applied retrospectively to criminal acts committed before the entry into force of the relevant law on 1 January 2007 (paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1, of the transitional provisions of the 13 December 2002 amendment to the Criminal Code). The Federal Court left open the question of the application of the principle of non-retrospective application to institutional therapeutic measures ordered subsequently, pointing out that although such measures were to be regarded as a penalty within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention, the fact that such a measure had been ordered subsequently in the applicant\u2019s case had not resulted in a heavier penalty being imposed on him than the one applicable under the law in force when the criminal acts had been committed, seeing that the measures provided for under the former law (Article 43 of the Criminal Code, in force until 31 December 2006) had been at least as strict as those applicable under the new law; that being so, there had been no breach of the principle of non-retrospective application in the present case. Regarding Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention, the Federal Court noted that although a subsequent order for an institutional therapeutic measure was inherently at variance with the binding nature of the principal judgment, there had to be a sufficient causal link between the judgment and the measure for the subsequent detention ordered in the context of review proceedings to comply with that Convention provision. Such a link had been present in his case. With regard to the ne bis in idem principle, after noting that Article 4 \u00a7 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention provided for a number of exceptions to that principle, the Federal Court observed that the review conducted in the present case for the purposes of ordering a subsequent institutional therapeutic measure on the basis of the applicant\u2019s serious mental illness, which had already been present but had not been detected at the time of the initial judgment, did not constitute a second penalty in respect of him.\nIn response to the applicant\u2019s argument that the expert medical opinions no longer reflected his current psychiatric condition, the Federal Court pointed out that the extremely detailed expert opinion of 24 September 2008 had been supplemented by the report of 30 June 2010 and corroborated by the expert\u2019s oral statements at the hearing on 6 May 2011 concerning the diagnosis and the risk of reoffending. The Federal Court thus concluded that the expert opinions reflected the applicant\u2019s current state of health. 22.  Having been invited by the Court to provide information about the applicant\u2019s current situation, the parties submitted observations on the matter. In a letter dated 26 May 2016 the applicant informed the Court that he was still in Bostadel Prison, and had been there since 19 July 2005 (see paragraph 6 above). He maintained that he was not receiving any treatment or therapy.\nIn a letter dated 31 May 2016 the Government confirmed that the applicant was still in Bostadel Prison. They added that the prison offered programmes, in the form of therapeutic services provided by the Forensic Institute of Central Switzerland (Forensisches Institut Zentralschweiz (forio)), aimed at treating disorders such as those affecting the applicant. The Government stated that he had categorically refused to undergo any (psychiatric) treatment whatsoever and had justified his refusal by referring to the proceedings pending before the Court.\nBoth parties appended reports by Bostadel Prison on the applicant\u2019s behaviour. The reports indicated that his behaviour was decent and discreet, including in the context of his work assignments.", "references": ["1", "9", "3", "5", "8", "7", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Vilnius. 5.  On 29 December 2001 the applicant\u2019s husband asked the national authorities to restore his property rights to a house and a plot of land in Vilnius which had belonged to his grandfather before nationalisation. On 28 February 2002 the applicant\u2019s husband specified his initial request and asked to have the plot of land restored in natura to him if possible, or to provide him with another plot of land in Vilnius. 6.  The property rights of the applicant\u2019s husband were restored to some premises (a storehouse) in Vilnius in 2003 and it was decided to pay him monetary compensation for the other premises that had not been returned to him in natura. 7.  On 10 April 2003 the Vilnius County Administration informed the Vilnius Municipality that the property rights of the applicant\u2019s husband would be restored to 0.1638 hectares of land for residential purposes. 8.  On 11 June 2003 the Vilnius Municipality informed the Vilnius County Administration that a plot of land of 0.1007 hectares had been formed near the buildings owned by the applicant\u2019s husband. 9.  In November 2003 the Vilnius City First District Court established as a legal fact that the grandmother of the applicant\u2019s husband had owned a plot of land in Vilnius measuring 362 square \u201cfathoms\u201d (sieksnis \u2013 1 fathom equals 1.82 m). 10.  On 12 March 2004 the Vilnius County Administration informed the Vilnius Municipality that the property rights of the applicant\u2019s husband would be restored and that he was a candidate to receive a plot of land measuring 0.1638 hectares in natura. In July 2004 the Vilnius County Administration issued a document stating that the applicant\u2019s husband had a right to a plot of land of 0.1638 hectares. 11.  In August 2006 the authorities replied to the applicant husband\u2019s letter asking why only a plot of land of 0.1007 hectares instead of 0.1638 hectares had been formed near the house, and stated that the plot of land 0.1007 hectares where the premises had been situated, would be divided for several co-owners of the premises and the rest of the land would be returned to the applicant\u2019s husband by the means he chose. 12.  On 16 May 2007 the applicant\u2019s husband died and the applicant became his heir. 13.  On 27 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s son, as the representative of the applicant, asked the authorities to restore the property rights of his father to the plot of land of 0.1171 hectares by paying compensation in securities. 14.  On 9 April 2009 the property rights of the applicant\u2019s husband were restored in natura to 0.0467 hectares of land and it was provided that compensation of approximately 1,642 euros (EUR) would be paid in securities for the remaining 0.1181 hectares of land. On 24 July 2009 this decision was changed and it was decided to restore the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s property rights to a plot of land of 0.0362 hectares in natura and to pay compensation in securities for the plot of land of 0.1286 hectares, amounting to approximately EUR 1,788. 15.  In October 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, claiming that the compensation in securities, established by the national authorities, was unjust, and asking to have the value of the plot of land measuring 0.1286 hectares recalculated. In February 2010 the applicant applied to have the administrative proceedings suspended and to have the matter of calculation of compensation referred to the Constitutional Court. 16.  On 10 February 2010 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the Vilnius County Administration had calculated the compensation in accordance with the methodology approved by the Government (see paragraph 33 below). However, the calculation of the municipality provided that the market value of the plot was approximately EUR 786,029 and the market value of the plot as calculated by the Centre of Registers was approximately EUR 750,313. The court stated that in comparison with these numbers, the value of the plot of land provided by the Vilnius County Administration (see paragraph 14 above) was 327.5 times lower, and it could not conform to the principle of equal value. Moreover, in accordance with the methodology approved by the Government, the calculation was the same for plots of land in the city centre and outside the city. The court thus decided to suspend the administrative proceedings and to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. 17.  In April 2013 the National Land Service informed the applicant that the relevant laws had been changed and that she could change the form of restoration of the property rights to 0.1286 hectares of land. Instead of securities she could choose one of the following: to be assigned a new plot of land of equivalent value to the one held previously; to have the liabilities to the State legally voided; to be assigned a new plot of land for individual construction; to receive monetary compensation. It appears that the applicant did not reply to this letter. 18.  On 30 September 2013 the applicant was included on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house. 19.  After the matter had been resolved by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 35 below), the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim on 4 November 2013. The court analysed the domestic regulation regarding the calculation of the value of the land and observed that this matter had been referred to the Constitutional Court, which held that the methodology approved by the Government setting down the principles of calculation of the value of the land was in accordance with the law. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court also held that the Law on the Restoration of Citizens\u2019 Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and persons could, before 1 July 2013, choose other means to restore their property rights than by payment of securities. If no other means were chosen, the property rights had to be restored by paying monetary compensation. The court further observed that the authorities had suggested the applicant choose other means to have her property rights restored (see paragraph 17 above), and that in September 2013 it had been decided to include the applicant on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house. The decision the applicant complained of, that is to say the calculation of the compensation to be paid in securities, had not been of legal importance to the applicant because the Law on the Restoration of Citizens\u2019 Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and it had become impossible to restore the property rights in securities. The decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights by paying her compensation in securities had to be changed to monetary compensation. Because the applicant had been included on the list of persons to receive a new plot of land for individual construction, she could use another way to restore her property rights. 20.  The applicant appealed. On 29 May 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court also emphasised the argument of the Constitutional Court that, in calculating the compensation, it was justified to pay heed not only to the market value of the property but also to its value at the time of nationalisation and to the changes in the quality and the value of property. The Supreme Administrative Court also held that the applicant had complained about the length of the court proceedings. The court held that the applicant had lodged the complaint on 4 November 2009; it had been accepted by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court on 17 November 2009. On 10 February 2010 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had decided to apply to the Constitutional Court, which had adopted its decision on 11 September 2013. The proceedings in the administrative case had recommenced on 16 September 2013 and the decision had been adopted on 4 November 2013. Given the complexity of the case and referral of the matter to the Constitutional Court, the length of proceedings had not breached the reasonable time requirement. 21.  On 11 November 2014 the National Land Service informed the applicant\u2019s son, as the applicant\u2019s representative, that on 1 November 2014 it had become possible to restore the property rights by receiving a plot of forest of equal value. The applicant was asked to express her wish before 1 March 2015. It appears that she never replied to this letter.", "references": ["7", "3", "4", "1", "6", "8", "5", "0", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant is currently in Sweden. 7.  In 2005 he was granted a temporary residence permit in Sweden which was made permanent in 2007. Both permits were based on the applicant\u2019s family ties, but he was not granted Swedish citizenship. In 2009 he married a non-Swedish national who held a permanent residence permit in Sweden. 8.  In March 2016 the Swedish Security Service (S\u00e4kerhetspolisen) applied to the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) requesting the applicant\u2019s expulsion. During the Migration Agency\u2019s examination of the request, the applicant applied for asylum, claiming that he was in need of international protection. He further contested the Security Service\u2019s request alleging that, since the Security Service had branded him a terrorist, he would risk torture and at least ten years\u2019 imprisonment in Morocco. He submitted that he would be forced to confess to an act of terrorism that he had not committed. The applicant stated that his parents lived in Morocco and he had visited them a few years earlier. During the visit, police officers had approached him and informed him that they were monitoring him and advised him to \u201clisten to our friends in Sweden or stay away from Morocco forever\u201d. He acknowledged that he had left Morocco legally with his own passport, that he had not been wanted in Morocco, that there were no legal proceedings pending against him and that he had never published anything on, for example, religion or politics. Moreover, to his knowledge, his parents had never been approached by the authorities because of him and the Moroccan authorities had never contacted him in Sweden. However, he claimed that the Swedish Security Service would inform the Moroccan authorities of the reasons for his arrest and expulsion and other Moroccans in Sweden might also submit such information. He was not aware if his situation had been noted in Morocco. The applicant referred to country information about Morocco according to which physical ill-treatment and arbitrary detention occurred, in particular of suspected terrorists. Such persons had been tortured into confession and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. He also referred to the Court\u2019s case law. 9.  On 22 April 2016 the Migration Agency granted the Security Services\u2019 request to expel the applicant and, at the same time, rejected the applicant\u2019s demand for asylum and international protection. It noted that the human rights situation in Morocco had improved significantly. Violence at police stations and prisons had decreased. Imprisonment was common in terror-related cases and persons affiliated with Islamic movements ran a higher risk of being subjected to violence. Older reports contained accounts of torture and ill\u2011treatment in cases concerning national security and terrorism. However, the Moroccan authorities had publicly stated that the fight against terrorism should not be used as a pretext for depriving people of their rights. Torture was illegal and efforts to curb the use of torture had been successful. In terror-related cases, arrested suspects were examined by doctors before and after interrogation to prevent the use of violence by the interrogators. 10.  As concerned the applicant\u2019s situation, the Migration Agency found no reasons to question the Security Service\u2019s assessment of the applicant. In this regard, it found that the applicant lacked credibility since his submissions relating to his background and previous activities were contradicted by the information submitted by the Security Service. Moreover, the Agency considered that he had not made out that the Moroccan authorities had previously showed an interest in him. It took into account that he had lived outside Morocco for about a decade and that, as he said himself, he had lived an inconspicuous life in Sweden without political or religious activities. Furthermore, after his last visit to Morocco, he had left the country legally using his passport. His parents in Morocco had not reported any visits from the authorities enquiring about him and the Moroccan authorities had never contacted him in Sweden. They had never requested his extradition either, or informed him that he was suspected of terrorism or any other kind of criminality. He had never been convicted of any terror\u2011related crimes in Sweden. The Agency observed that the applicant had submitted that he was not sought in Morocco, that he had not been involved in any legal proceedings there and that the Moroccan authorities had never subjected him to any acts of persecution in the past. As late as towards the end of 2015, the applicant had travelled internationally using his passport, without being stopped. Even though older \u201ccountry of origin\u201d reports included accounts of ill-treatment, the most recent reports instead spoke of measures taken by the Moroccan authorities aimed at reinforcing the rule of law. 11.  As concerned the risk upon return because it was the Security Service which had requested the expulsion, the Migration Agency found that the applicant had not made out that he risked persecution upon return on this ground. It took into account that no objective evidence suggested that the Moroccan authorities were aware of his case and that the legislation had regard to the possible risks of being labelled a terrorist and had been designed to avoid such risks. 12.  The Migration Agency concluded that, even taking into account the applicant\u2019s submissions, it shared the Security Service\u2019s assessment and considered that there were grounds to expel the applicant with reference to Section 1, paragraph 2, of the Special Controls of Aliens Act (lagen [1991:572] om s\u00e4rskild utl\u00e4nningskontroll). It thus rejected his request for asylum and international protection, revoked his permanent residence permit and ordered his expulsion to either Morocco or another specified country. It also decided on a lifelong ban on returning to Sweden. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Government, submitting that the Security Service\u2019s assessment had been accepted by the Migration Agency without a careful examination, rendering the proceedings unfair and partial. He maintained his claims and stressed that the use of torture was frequent in Morocco, in particular in relation to suspected terrorists. 14.  The Migration Agency forwarded the appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen) in accordance with Section 3 of the Special Controls of Aliens Act. The Agency maintained its stance and stated, inter alia, that the applicant had not made it probable that he was of interest to the Moroccan authorities and there was no concrete information indicating that they should be aware of what had happened to him in Sweden. The Security Service stated that it was as transparent as possible but, for reasons of confidentiality, could not reveal its working methods and sources. It added that it was continually assessing whether it was possible to enforce the expulsion. If information were to emerge which raised the issue of impediments to the expulsion, the Government would be informed. 15.  On 22 June 2016, after having held an oral hearing, the appellate court shared the reasoning of the Migration Agency and decided to recommend that the Government uphold the Agency\u2019s decision. It found, inter alia, that there was nothing to support that the applicant at that point in time was known by the Moroccan authorities and of interest to them. 16.  On 8 September 2016 the Government upheld the Migration Agency\u2019s decision in full. The Government noted the Security Service\u2019s submissions concerning the applicant\u2019s background and connections and found that there were no grounds for questioning these submissions. In view of what was known about the applicant\u2019s former activities and other circumstances, the Government concluded that it was reasonable to fear that the applicant would commit or participate in committing a terrorist offence which warranted his expulsion in accordance with the Special Controls of Aliens Act. 17.  On 22 September 2016, following the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Government decided to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order until further notice.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "9", "3", "5", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Larnaca. 7.  Following his dismissal from Cyprus Airways Ltd as a trainee pilot, the applicant on 26 June 1998 brought a civil action before the District Court of Nicosia for wrongful dismissal and defamation (civil action no. 7562/98). The defendant company was represented by a law firm. 8.  On 29 December 2006 the court dismissed the action. 9.  On 9 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 43/07). The appeal was tried by a bench of three judges. 10.  The hearing of the appeal was held on 11 March 2007. On that date the managing partner of the above-mentioned law firm, Mr P.G.P., appeared for the defendant company and addressed the Supreme Court. Up until that date, other lawyers from the firm had appeared before the appeal bench on behalf of the defendant company. 11.  On 21 April 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal unanimously. 12.  The applicant submitted that after the judgment of the Supreme Court was given, he discovered that the son of one of the judges sitting on the bench, Judge A.K., and the daughter of Mr P.G.P., were married and that both worked at the latter\u2019s law firm. The lawyer representing him in the domestic proceedings had not requested the exemption of the judge in question because he had not had sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts at the time. The applicant had also not instructed his lawyer to do so as he had found out about this fact only after the appeal proceedings had ended.", "references": ["2", "6", "1", "4", "8", "0", "9", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5.  On 25 January 2008 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah \u00d6calan by using the honorific \u201csay\u0131n\u201d, meaning esteemed. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching a prison order by the Bolu F-type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as \u201cthe board\u201d). 7.  On 1 February 2008 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days\u2019 solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above-mentioned letter. 8.  On 26 February 2008 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant\u2019s objection. 9.  On 11 March 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 26 February 2008.", "references": ["2", "7", "4", "5", "9", "1", "8", "0", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1989. 5.  On 27 December 2010 the applicant was arrested on drug-related charges and placed in custody. 6.  On 14 December 2012 the case was submitted for trial to the Voronezh Regional Court. 7.  On 11 July 2013 the court returned the case to the deputy Prosecutor General for remedying certain procedural defects. 8.  On 20 September 2013 the Investigations Department of the Federal Drug Control Service received the case file and forwarded it to its regional branch in St Petersburg. 9.  On 1 November 2013 an investigator asked the St Petersburg City Court to extend the applicant\u2019s detention for a further four months, until 31 March 2014. On 8 November 2013 the City Court granted the application. The applicant filed an appeal. He pointed out that the maximum statutory time period for keeping him in pre-trial detention had expired a long time ago and that any further extensions had been unlawful. 10.  On 27 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court rejected his appeal in a summary fashion, without examining his arguments in detail.", "references": ["3", "7", "1", "9", "5", "0", "4", "6", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a non-governmental organisation which promotes tolerance and condemns all types of racially motivated discrimination. It was established under Swiss law and registered in Z\u00fcrich. 6.  On 5 November 2009 the youth wing of the Swiss People\u2019s Party (Junge Schweizerische Volkspartei) held a demonstration in the train station square in the town of Frauenfeld concerning a public initiative to support the prohibition of the building of minarets in Switzerland. After the event the party published a report on its website, including the following excerpts:\n\u201cIn his speech in front of the Thurgau government building [Thurgauer Regierungsgeb\u00e4ude], B.K., the president of the local branch of the Young Swiss People\u2019s Party [\u201cthe JSVP\u201d], emphasised that it was time to stop the expansion of Islam. With this demonstration, the Young Swiss People\u2019s Party wanted to take an extraordinary measure in an extraordinary time. The Swiss guiding culture (\u201cschweizerische Leitkultur\u201d), based on Christianity, cannot allow itself to be replaced by other cultures, B.K. added. A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, would therefore be an expression of the preservation of one\u2019s own identity.\u201d 7.  In response, the applicant posted an entry on its website in the section called \u201cChronology \u2013 Verbal racism\u201d, entitled \u201cFrauenfeld TG, 5 November 2009\u201d, including the following extract:\n\u201cAccording to the report of the event, B.K., the president of the local branch of the Young Swiss People\u2019s Party, emphasised that it was time to stop the expansion of Islam. He added further: \u2018The Swiss guiding culture, based on Christianity, cannot allow itself to be replaced by other cultures. A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, would therefore be an expression of the preservation of one\u2019s own identity.\u2019 Swiss People\u2019s Party of Switzerland canton representative H.L. also spoke to the few people who attended; nevertheless, the Young Swiss People\u2019s Party speaks of a great success. (Verbal racism)\u201d 8.  On 29 November 2009 the popular initiative against the construction of minarets was accepted in a referendum and a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets was introduced. 9.  On 21 August 2010 B.K. filed a claim for the protection of his personality rights with the Kreuzlingen District Court (Bezirksgericht Kreuzlingen). He applied, firstly, to have the applicant organisation withdraw the entry in question from its homepage and, secondly, for it to be replaced with the court\u2019s judgment. The applicant organisation replied that the title of the Internet entry had to be considered as a value judgment, which could only lead to an infringement of personality rights if it entailed an unnecessarily hurtful and insulting attack on the person concerned. 10.  On 15 March 2011 the Kreuzlingen District Court dismissed B.K.\u2019s action. It held that the publication of the impugned article on the applicant\u2019s website had been justified since it had related to a political discussion on a matter of public interest. 11.  On appeal, on 17 November 2011 the Thurgau Cantonal High Court (Obergericht des Kantons Thurgau) reversed the first-instance judgment. It held that classifying B.K.\u2019s speech as \u201cverbally racist\u201d had been a mixed value judgment, which could lead to an infringement of personality rights if it was based on untruths. The High Court concluded that B.K.\u2019s speech itself had not been racist. It therefore ordered that the impugned article be removed from the applicant\u2019s website and replaced with the court\u2019s judgment. 12.  On 25 January 2012 the applicant organisation filed an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht), reiterating its argument that any interference with B.K.\u2019s personality rights had been justified. One of the applicant\u2019s main aims was to fight racism and to inform the public about hidden and open racist behaviour. Its website stated that public comments would be documented, even if they did not fall within the scope of the prohibition of racial discrimination enshrined in Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. To fulfil its role of watchdog in that sense, it published articles and interviews concerning current events relating to racism and anti\u2011Semitism. 13.  On 29 August 2012 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s appeal, finding as follows (unofficial translation):\n\u201c3. The classification of and commenting on a person\u2019s statements as \u2018verbal racism\u2019 violate that person\u2019s honour. Not only in the context of the criminal offence of racial discrimination (Article 261bis of the Criminal Code) but more generally, the term in question is, in the eyes of the average reader, capable of deliberately debasing the person whose comments have been classified as \u2018verbally racist\u2019, accusing him or her of behaviour which is frowned upon by society in the form of an act which is, at the very least, questionable in constitutional terms (cf. BGE 127 III 481 E. 2b / aa p. 487, 129 III 49 E. 2.2 p. 51 and 715 E. 4.1 p. 722). The appellant referred to the respondent\u2019s speech at the public demonstration of 5 November 2009 on its website ... freely accessible on the Internet, commenting on the term \u2018verbal racism\u2019. It thereby violated the respondent\u2019s honour as part of his personality within the meaning of Article 28 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. The infringement is unlawful if it is not justified by the consent of the injured party, by an overriding private or public interest or by law (Article 28 \u00a7 2 ZGB). 4. The main point in dispute is whether the appellant can rely on an overriding interest in classifying the respondent\u2019s comments as \u2018verbal racism\u2019. 4.1. The case-law on press statements, on which the appellant relies, distinguishes between statements of facts on the one hand and value judgments on the other, and can be summarised as follows: ... 4.2. The appellant assigned the respondent\u2019s statements to the section entitled \u2018verbal racism\u2019 ... That was a mixed value judgment. It contains a substantive core and, at the same time, a value judgment. In order to justify the substantive core, it is necessary to examine whether the respondent\u2019s comments were indeed racist. 4.3. The term \u2018racism\u2019 is understood as \u2018a doctrine\u2019 which states that \u2018certain races or nations are superior to others in terms of their cultural capacity\u2019, and, on the other hand, a \u2018certain attitude, manner of thinking and acting towards people of (certain) other races or nations\u2019 (cf. Duden, The Great Dictionary of the German Language in Six Volumes, Vol. 5, 1980, p. 2099). The adjective \u2018verbal\u2019 describes racism as \u2018[occurring] with words, with the help of language\u2019 (cf. Duden, The Great Dictionary of the German Language in Six Volumes, Vol. 6, 1981, p. 2730). Verbal racism is, therefore, no longer merely a certain attitude, but an attitude in the instant case which was expressed publicly through language (as opposed to, for example, through deeds). \u2018Verbal racism\u2019 could therefore mean racial discrimination in the criminal sense, as the respondent claims. What is decisive, however, as the second-instance court correctly stated, is that the mere demonstration of a difference between two individuals or groups does not constitute racism. Racism begins where the difference amounts simultaneously to denigration of the victims and where the highlighting of differences is ultimately only a means to represent the victims negatively and to show disregard for their dignity. 4.4. The statements that led the appellant to conclude that there had been \u2018verbal racism\u2019 are the core phrases \u2018it is time to stop the spread of Islam ... The Swiss guiding culture (\u201cschweizerische Leitkultur\u201d), based on Christianity, cannot let itself be repressed by other cultures ... A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, is therefore an expression of the preservation of one\u2019s own identity\u2019. 4.4.1. In his public speech, the respondent expressed his opinion on the prohibition of minarets, which, in the opinion of the High Court, would not be compatible with freedom of religion and non-discrimination. He has, in that connection, compared his own beliefs (\u2018Christianity\u2019) with foreign beliefs (\u2018Islam\u2019), delimited them (\u2018to halt\u2019, \u2018preserving one\u2019s own identity\u2019) and described his own as worthy of protection and defence (\u2018Swiss leading culture\u2019, \u2018not to be repressed\u2019). For the average listener, that does not result in the blanket denigration of the followers of Islam or show fundamental contempt for Muslims. 4.4.2. On the whole, it cannot be said that the comments made by the respondent, as understood by the average listener, could be described as \u2018verbally racist\u2019. Therefore, the substantive core does not apply and the assessment is not acceptable. It shows the respondent in the wrong light. Therefore, the mixed value judgment, which infringed personality rights, cannot be justified by any overriding interest within the meaning of Article 28 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code. 4.4.3. That assessment cannot be altered by the fact that in the general interest of informing the public, there is an increased degree of publicity and a reduced level of protection for personality rights for people who engage in a political debate, such as the respondent in the campaign for the minaret initiative (see BGE 105 II 161 E. 3b p. 165, 107 II 1 E. 3b p. 5). That special framework allows for the assessment of breaches of honour on a somewhat different scale, but it can neither justify the dissemination of untruths nor the publication of value judgments that do not appear to be justified with regard to the underlying facts.\u201d", "references": ["2", "5", "9", "1", "8", "3", "7", "0", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Sochi. 5.  On 27 November 2010 the applicant, a police captain, was arrested for soliciting a bribe. He was taken into custody and his detention was extended on several occasions. On 4 July 2011 the case was submitted for trial in the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi. 6.  On 8 July 2011 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial and returned the file to the prosecutor. By the same decision, it extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 10 August 2011. 7.  On 9 August 2011 the director of the IZ-23/2 remand prison where the applicant was held reported to the Sochi prosecutor and to the president of the Tsentralnyy District Court that, in the absence of an order extending the applicant\u2019s detention beyond 10 August, he would need to be released on that date. On the same date the Sochi prosecutor replied to him that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant because the date for hearing the prosecutor\u2019s appeal against the District Court\u2019s order of 8 July had been fixed for 17 August. The applicant was not released on 10 August. He complained about his unlawful detention to the head of the Investigations Committee and the regional head of the Ministry of the Interior but did not receive any reply. 8.  On 17 August 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the District Court\u2019s order on appeal. As regards the custodial measure, it held that no extension had been necessary because by virtue of Article 255 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the applicant could be held in custody for an initial six-month period starting from the date on which the case had been submitted for trial.", "references": ["6", "7", "1", "5", "8", "0", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Toksovo. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 2 October 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of raping K., who was employed at the Vasileostrovskiy District Court in St Petersburg as an assistant to Judge N., and who also was the daughter of that court\u2019s former president, Judge K., who carried on working as a judge at that time. 8.  On 4 October 2009 Judge R. of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He rejected a challenge for bias which the applicant\u2019s lawyer raised in respect of the entire composition of the District Court because of a link between the alleged victim and the judges of that court. On 26 October 2009 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal, rejecting a challenge by the applicant as unsubstantiated. 9.  On 30 November 2009 a deputy president of the City Court referred an application by an investigator for an extension order to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for consideration. The District Court granted the application on the following day. On 11 December 2009 the City Court upheld that decision on appeal. However, on 31 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia determined that the decision to refer the application to another district court had been invalid, because the City Court\u2019s deputy president had decided on the change of venue of his own initiative without hearing what the defendant\u2019s opinion on that issue was. 10.  On 30 December 2009 a further extension was granted by the President of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court, Judge Sh., who again rejected a challenge for bias by the applicant. On 26 January 2010 the City Court upheld the extension order on appeal. By a separate decision of the same date, it upheld the rejection of the challenge in respect of Judge Sh.:\n\u201cThe available material indicates that the court considered the challenge for bias in accordance with the established procedure, and upon review of the parties\u2019 arguments found no grounds for the challenge; the stated grounds fall outside of the scope of Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as they do not indicate the presiding judge\u2019s interest in any predetermined outcome of the case ...\nIn addition, when considering the challenge in respect of the presiding judge, the court had regard to the opinion of the prosecutor, who declared at the hearing on 30 December 2009 that there were no legal grounds for allowing the challenge ... in particular because the hearing did not touch upon the defendant\u2019s guilt; it was not an examination of the merits of the case, but a hearing [on the remand matter].\u201d 11.  On 27 January and 27 February 2010 extension orders were issued by judges of the Kalininskiy District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction over the area where the applicant was detained. Those orders were upheld on appeal on 25 March and 8 April 2010. 12.  On 11 March 2010 the case against the applicant was referred to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court for trial and allocated to its President, Judge Sh. On 23 March 2010 Judge Sh. allowed the applicant\u2019s challenge for bias in respect of the entire composition of that court, holding as follows:\n\u201cIt has been established that the injured party in the criminal proceedings [K.] works as an assistant to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court\u2019s Judge [N.], and that her father [Judge K.] is a judge of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court. It follows that circumstances exist leading the defendant and his counsel to believe that [Judge Sh.] and all the judges of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court are, either directly or indirectly, interested in the outcome of the criminal case.\nIn order to ensure an impartial examination of the criminal case, the challenge ... must be allowed and the case referred to the President of the St Petersburg City Court for determination of the territorial jurisdiction.\u201d 13.  Continuing the same decision, Judge Sh. extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 12 May 2010. On the last day of the extended period the Presidium of the City Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the decision of 23 March in part in relation to the detention matter, on the grounds that an extension could not have been granted by a judge who had recused himself. The Presidium extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 12 August 2010. 14.  On 15 April 2010 a deputy president of the City Court determined that the trial would be held in the Petrogradskiy District Court. On 31 March 2011 the Petrogradskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["5", "8", "7", "0", "1", "3", "4", "9", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicants are owners of residential buildings or apartments which were subject to the rent-control scheme. Under the relevant legislation they were obliged to let their flats to tenants while charging no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State. The legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases or selling the flats in question to anyone other than the respective tenants. The particulars of the flats affected by the rent control are set out in Appendices 10 \u2011 17 (columns A \u2011 F). 9.  The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as that of the applicants in Bitt\u00f3 and Others v. Slovakia (no. 30255/09, 28 January 2014 (merits) and 7 July 2015 (just satisfaction)), and subsequently decided cases concerning the rent-control scheme in Slovakia (see Krahulec v. Slovakia, no. 19294/07; Bukov\u010danov\u00e1 and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23785/07; Rudolfer v. Slovakia, no. 38082/07, 5 July 2016; Riedel and Others v. Slovakia, nos. 44218/07, 54831/07, 33176/08, 47150/08; and Me\u010diar and Others v. Slovakia, no. 62864/09, 10 January 2017; Matuschka and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 33076/10, 14383/11, Balan and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 51414/11, 46098/12, and Bajz\u00edk and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 46609/13, 9892/14, 27 June 2017). 10.  Two residential building at 27 Panensk\u00e1 St. and 14 Konventn\u00e1 St. in Bratislava were acquired in 2002 by a religious organisation with legal personality, Cirkevn\u00fd zbor Evanjelickej cirkvi Augsbursk\u00e9ho vyznania na Slovensku Bratislava (hereinafter \u201cthe Bratislava Evangelical Church\u201d). This body established three other entities with legal personalities, including the applicant organisation the Old Town Evangelical Church. 11.  The property in question was conveyed by the Bratislava Evangelical Church to the Old Town Evangelical Church by way of donation on 6 February 2013. On 15 February 2013 the previous owner ceased legally to exist and was legally succeeded by the Old Town Evangelical Church and the other two entities. 12.  On 22 February 2012 the Old Town Evangelical Church gave formal notices of termination of their lease to the two tenants residing in flat no. 11 situated in the residential building at 27 Panensk\u00e1 St. in Bratislava. By law, these tenants had under certain circumstances the right to claim that the municipality provide them with a substitute flat on the termination of their lease. They did not avail themselves of that right. 13.  On 6 August 2013 the Old Town Evangelical Church applied to the Bratislava I District Court for an eviction order against the occupants of this flat who had failed to vacate it by the expiry of the twelve\u2011month notice period. As the occupants eventually vacated the flat on 25 February 2015, the Old Town Evangelical Church withdrew its action and the proceedings in respect of it were discontinued on 9 March 2015. Until the vacation of the flat, the occupants had paid the Old Town Evangelical Church compensation in an amount equal to the regulated rent. 14.  The tenants residing in flats nos. 1 and 9 on 22 Moyzesova St. in \u017dilina moved in 2002 into flats nos. 5 and 12 within the same building owing to rebuilding of the original flats. The tenants continued to pay the regulated rent.\nIn 2003 flat no. 5 was rebuilt and its area was changed from 110.27 sq. m to 59.18 sq. m. 15.  A similar situation arose in the residential building on 33 Pra\u017esk\u00e1 St. in Bratislava where in 2014 the tenant residing in flat no. 16 moved to flat no. 9, and in the residential building located on 15 Vrbovsk\u00e1 cesta St. in Pie\u0161\u0165any, where the tenant living in the flat no. 14 moved to flat no. 25.", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "5", "4", "3", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  On 11 December 2011 one of the applicant\u2019s neighbours called the police to complain about the fact that the applicant had stored personal items in the common space of their apartment building. 7.  At 6 p.m. on 11 December 2011 two police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s door and asked for his identification papers without giving their names or informing him of the purpose of their visit. The applicant asked them what the purpose of their request was but they did not answer. For that reason, the applicant refused to present his papers, telling the police officers to come \u201csome other time\u201d (alt\u0103dat\u0103). 8.  The police officers immobilised the applicant, threw him to the ground and then handcuffed him. Noting the escalation of events, the applicant\u2019s partner, G.C., searched for his identification papers and handed them all to the police officers: identity card, pension benefits slip and a certificate that he had been a fighter in the 1989 Revolution. 9.  The police officers took the papers without looking at them and took the applicant to police station no. 19 to be identified. 10.  At the police station the applicant was struck with fists, feet and truncheons. The pain was so intense that the applicant soiled himself. During the beating, the applicant\u2019s mobile phone and still camera were destroyed and his clothes were torn. 11.  When the beating ended, the police officers checked the applicant\u2019s papers and then left him alone for fifteen minutes in a room. When they returned they informed him that they were leaving on a mission. After being again left alone, the applicant managed to find the officer on duty at the police headquarters (ofi\u0163erul de serviciu) to ask permission to use the toilet. The police officer sent him home to clean himself up. 12.  The applicant went home and then returned to the police section to recover his identity papers. 13.  On 16 December 2011 the applicant was examined by a forensic doctor at Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute (\u201cthe Forensic Institute\u201d). The doctor drafted a medical report dated 16 December 2011; a copy of the report was given to the applicant on 4 January 2012. It noted that the applicant had borne traces of violence on his wrists, arms and legs as a consequence of having been hit with a hard object; that he had complained of chest pains; and that the injuries could have dated from 12 December 2011 and had needed four to five days of medical care. 14.  Two weeks after the incident, the applicant received by mail an offence report (proces verbal de contraven\u0163ie) drafted by the police officers on 23 December 2011 in his absence, whereby he was fined 100 Romanian lei (RON) for \u201crefusal to present data necessary for his identification\u201d. 15.  On 11 December 2011 two police officers were directed by the officer on duty at police station no. 19 to settle a conflict between the applicant and a neighbour. Upon arrival, the police officers asked the applicant to present his identity papers, but he became violent and refused to comply. When the applicant tried to return to his apartment the police officers handcuffed him and transported him to the police station. After his identity had been established, the applicant left the police station. 16.  The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers, accusing them of unlawful deprivation of liberty, unlawful investigation and torture, and seeking compensation. The complaint was registered with police station no. 19 on 13 January 2012. On 7 August 2012 the file was sent for investigation to the internal investigations department of the Bucharest General Police Headquarters, and police officers from that department were delegated to conduct all relevant investigations. 17.  These investigators heard evidence from the two police officers, from the officer on duty on the day of the events and from the neighbour\u2019s husband (see below). 18.  On 11 September 2012 the investigating police officers heard evidence from the neighbour\u2019s husband, who declared that when the applicant, \u201cknown as a mentally ill person\u201d, had refused, in inappropriate and disrespectful language, to present his identification papers and had attempted to return to his apartment, the police officers had immobilised him on the ground and handcuffed him, without ill-treating him in the process. 19.  The officer on duty declared on 3 October 2012 that he had not spoken at all to the applicant on the night in question and had only seen him when the police officers had brought him in to establish his identity; those same officers had subsequently advised him to leave the police station \u2013 the officer on duty stated that he had seen the applicant again when he was leaving the building. He added that as he had been very busy in his office he had seen the applicant only for a couple of seconds, and had thus not been in a position to see whether the applicant had been injured. 20.  Lastly, the two police officers gave their statements on respectively 4 and 5 October 2012.\nOne of the officers declared that at the time of the events in question, the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol, because he had smelled of alcohol and had displayed a defiant attitude towards the police officers.\nBoth officers mentioned in very similar terms that when asked to present his identification papers, the applicant had tried to evade the measure (\u201cse sustrage m\u0103surii legitim\u0103rii\u201d) and had attempted to re-enter his apartment by using physical force; for this reason, they had proceeded to handcuff him and had taken him to the police station. Both officers denied having inflicted any harm on the applicant, claiming that they had acted proportionately in view of the applicant\u2019s opposition to their request. 21.  G.C., the applicant\u2019s partner, was never heard by the investigators. 22.  On 12 November 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest County Court decided not to prosecute. On the basis of the evidence in the file, attesting, inter alia, to the fact that the applicant was known as a person who engaged in violent behaviour and who was frequently under the influence of alcohol, the prosecutor decided that the injuries suffered by the applicant had been superficial and that the use of force had been proportionate and necessary in order to immobilise him and take him to the police station, as provided for by Articles 26 \u00a7 1 (2) and Article 31 \u00a7 1 a) and b) of Law no. 218/2002 on the Organisation and Functioning of the Romanian Police (see paragraph 26 below). 23.  The applicant lodged an objection. The prosecutor\u2019s decision was upheld on 22 March 2013 by the head of the above-mentioned prosecutor\u2019s office, who considered that the police intervention had been rendered necessary by the applicant\u2019s violent behaviour and had not been excessive, as demonstrated by the fact that the injuries suffered had been insignificant. 24.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Bucharest County Court against the two decisions. He mainly argued that the investigation had been superficial, and that the conclusions of the investigation had been based exclusively on the statements given by the two police officers who had behaved aggressively towards him, while his partner, for instance, had never been heard. He contested the prosecutor\u2019s opinion that the injuries incurred had been superficial. He referred to the Court\u2019s relevant case-law, which required a plausible explanation for any traces of violence sustained while a person had been under police supervision. He also contested the proportionality of the police reaction, pointing out that he had merely refused orally to show his identification and that the police officers could not claim or prove that they had sustained any traces of violence during that intervention. 25.  On 11 June 2013 the County Court dismissed the complaint and consequently upheld the prosecutors\u2019 decisions. The court considered that the police intervention had been lawful. It further held that the applicant\u2019s minor lesions had been caused when he had fallen at the moment of his being immobilised by the police, which had been necessary because of the applicant\u2019s verbal and physical resistance. The court considered that the applicant had not been kept unlawfully in the police station but had been released as soon as his identity had been established, and that the consequences of the police intervention had not been serious enough to constitute the crime of torture, as alleged by the applicant. The decision was final, no further appeal being possible.", "references": ["5", "2", "7", "9", "3", "0", "4", "6", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Habibe \u0130ncin, is the wife of Kerim \u0130ncin; the second to seventh applicants are his children; the eighth applicant is his mother and the remaining seven applicants are the siblings of Kerim \u0130ncin. 6.  On 22 March 2005 the applicants Halima \u0130ncin and Haz\u0131m \u0130ncin, with the assistance of their lawyer, submitted a petition to the Hakkari prosecutor. In their petition the two applicants alleged that after severe military clashes had taken place in the vicinity of their village, in 1994 they and their family members had left Turkey and moved to live with their relatives in Iraq. In June 1995 Kerim \u0130ncin had gone back to their village in Turkey to collect a sum of money he was owed. While he was having dinner in the village headman\u2019s house, village guards had arrived and taken him to the nearby Ge\u00e7imli military station. While at the military station Kerim \u0130ncin had been questioned and subjected to ill-treatment. After having detained him at the station for a week, the soldiers had taken him back to the village, where they had shot him and buried him. 7.  In the petition the lawyer representing the applicants stated that the applicant Haz\u0131m \u0130ncin had recently returned to Turkey from Iraq and wanted to lodge an official complaint concerning the killing of his father. In their petition the two applicants also gave the prosecutor the names of a number of people who they alleged had witnessed the incident in question. They asked the prosecutor to carry out an investigation, to identify and question all the eyewitnesses, to exhume the body of Kerim \u0130ncin and to find and punish those responsible for the killing. 8.  The prosecutor started an investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations immediately. In the course of the investigation, between 2005 and 2006 the prosecutor questioned the applicants and other members of their family. During the same period the prosecutor also identified, summoned and questioned a large number of witnesses and members of the military who had lived or worked in the region at the time of the events but who, in the years that had elapsed since the killing, had moved to different parts of the country. A number of witnesses told the prosecutor that they had seen Kerim \u0130ncin being taken away from the village by the soldiers and added that shortly afterwards a large-scale military operation had been conducted in the area and they had heard that Kerim \u0130ncin had been killed in the course of that operation. 9.  Some members of the military forces told the prosecutor during their questioning that they had no recollection of the events while others stated that no such incident had taken place. 10.  As a result of the questioning the prosecutor found it established that Kerim \u0130ncin had indeed been killed and that his body had been buried in Ta\u015fba\u015f\u0131 village cemetery. 11.  On 26 May 2006 the prosecutor asked the Hakkari Gendarmerie Command whether there would be any security concerns if he were to visit that cemetery with a view to exhuming a body. The prosecutor was informed in reply that it was not a good idea to do so because the security forces conducted spontaneous operations in the area during the summer months. 12.  The prosecutor continued to request security updates from the military until 2009 and sent approximately twenty letters requesting that the military inform him as soon as it was possible to visit the village. In respect of the requests made during winter months the military informed the prosecutor that it would not be safe to go to the area because of adverse weather conditions. In their replies during spring, summer and autumn months, the soldiers informed the prosecutor that it was not a good idea to go to the area in question because a military operation could be conducted there at any time. 13.  Finally, on 11 June 2009 the prosecutor informed the military of his intention to go to the cemetery on 18 June 2009 and instructed the military to take the necessary security measures for his planned visit. 14.  On 18 June 2009 the prosecutor went to the cemetery in question and a body was exhumed from a grave in his presence. It was subsequently established by DNA analysis that it was the body of Kerim \u0130ncin. Forensic examinations showed that there were ten holes in the clothes in which Kerim \u0130ncin had been buried and that the cause of death had been numerous firearms injuries inflicted on his body and skull. 15.  On 25 March 2010 the prosecutor took a decision not to prosecute ten of the suspects who had been working as members of the military at the time of the events, for lack of evidence. The following day the prosecutor prepared an indictment and charged Y.K. \u2212 who had been the commander of the Ge\u00e7imli military station where Kerim \u0130ncin had allegedly been taken at the time of the events \u2212 with the offence of murder. 16.  The trial before the Hakkari Assize Court started on 12 April 2010. The two applicants who had introduced the complaint with the prosecutor on 22 March 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), namely Halima \u0130ncin and Haz\u0131m \u0130ncin, joined the criminal proceedings as interveners. In the course of the trial a total of twenty hearings were held. On 27 November 2014 the Hakkari Assize Court acquitted Y.K. for lack of evidence. The same day the applicants appealed against the judgment acquitting Y.K. and the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are still pending. 17.  At the request of the Court, the Government stated that, in accordance with the applicable statute of limitations, the criminal proceedings against Y.K. would not become time-barred until 2025.", "references": ["7", "2", "9", "8", "4", "1", "5", "3", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants, Mr Makhlyagin and Mr Belyayev, were born in 1983 and 1979 respectively and were held in different detention facilities. The facilities\u2019 officials opened and/or inspected letters that the applicants exchanged with the Court. 5.  From September 2008 until October 2009 the applicant, detained in a correctional colony, lodged several letters with the Court. All of them were accompanied by cover letters from a chief officer of the colony summarising the content of the applicant\u2019s letters. Some letters also bore the colony\u2019s registration stamps. 6.  The applicant lodged a claim, alleging that the colony\u2019s staff had impeded his correspondence with the Court. On 22 January 2009 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil dismissed his claim 7.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court. On 4 March 2009 the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court rejected his appeal, stating that it should be lodged through the first-instance court. The regional court also noted that the applicant could request that the time-limit in respect of the appeal be re-set. 8.  On 30 March 2009 the applicant lodged his appeal with the first\u2011instance court. Instead of requesting that the time-limit in respect of his appeal be re-set the applicant asked the court to restore his case to the list of pending cases. On 9 April 2009 the District Court refused to examine the appeal as belated. 9.  The applicant appealed against this decision. However, he once again lodged his appeal with the Regional Court instead of the first-instance court. His appeal statement did not contain a request for the missed time\u2011limit to be re-set. The Sverdlovskiy Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 10.  On 2 November 2010 the applicant received a letter from the Court; the letter was opened by a member of the remand prison staff. 11.  The applicant lodged a claim for compensation. By a final decision of 7 June 2011 the Tver Regional Court dismissed his claim. The court stated that Russian law did not prohibit the opening of incoming correspondence from the Court.", "references": ["6", "1", "5", "7", "0", "2", "3", "8", "4", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Voluntari. 6.  In 2002 he was the legal secretary of Voluntari City Hall in charge of registering applications for restitution of land based on Law no. 18/1991. On an unspecified date in 2003 the prosecutor attached to the Buftea District Court initiated a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant and two other individuals, M.C.I. and N.G. 7.  The injured party, M.M. \u2012 who filed the criminal complaint \u2012maintained that in December 2002, N.G. \u2013 who was employed at Voluntari City Hall \u2013 had, at the request of the applicant, antedated the registration of six applications for title submitted by M.C.I. 8.  On 19 February and 23 July 2004 respectively the prosecutor questioned N.G. On both occasions she stated that she had antedated the registration of the applications submitted by M.C.I. at the applicant\u2019s express request. 9.  The applicant gave statements on 27 February and 11 August 2004. He admitted that he knew M.C.I. (\u201cas an acquaintance but not as a friend\u201d) but denied that he had asked N.G. to falsify the date of registration of the applications. 10.  An expert report ordered by the prosecutor confirmed the fact that N.G. had antedated the registration of the six applications. 11.  The prosecutor charged N.G. with committing intellectual forgery and charged the applicant with acting as N.G.\u2019s accomplice. He decided not to institute a criminal investigation against M.C.I. 12.  The injured party stated before the first-instance court that the only fact that she knew was that M.C.I. had asked some civil servants at Voluntari City Hall to antedate the registration of the applications. 13.  At a hearing on 11 March 2005 the Buftea District Court questioned the applicant and N.G. in respect of the charges brought against them. N.G. changed the statements she had made initially before the prosecutor and stated that the applicant had only called her and asked her to help M.C.I. to register the applications for title. She also stated that she had antedated the registration at M.C.I.\u2019s request. The applicant did not change his statements and continued to deny any involvement in committing the intellectual forgery. He stated that he had only called N.G. and asked her to help M.C.I. with the registration of the applications as the latter had arrived after closing time.\nTwo other witnesses made statements at the same hearing. However, their statements did not provide any further clarification concerning the applicant\u2019s role in committing any offence. 14.  The district court changed the legal classification of the offence with which the applicant had been charged to inciting intellectual forgery. 15.  By a judgment of 9 May 2005 the Buftea District Court convicted N.G. of intellectual forgery, imposed a suspended sentence of six months\u2019 imprisonment and placed her on probation. The court noted that N.G. had given contradictory statements to the prosecutor and to the court with respect to the applicant\u2019s role in the commission of the offence. It held that the statement given to the prosecutor, but not maintained before the court \u2013 according to which the applicant had asked her to antedate the registration of the applications \u2013 was not corroborated by the other pieces of evidence adduced before it. The applicant was therefore acquitted on the grounds of not having committed the offence with which he had been charged. 16.  An appeal against this decision was lodged by the prosecutor\u2019s office but was dismissed as unfounded by the Bucharest County Court on 16 December 2005. The applicant, co-defendant N.G. and the witnesses were not heard directly by the County Court. It upheld the decision of the first\u00adinstance court, emphasising that there was no evidence that the applicant had asked N.G. to antedate the registration of the applications. 17.  The prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, pointing to fundamental factual errors in the decisions of the two lower courts regarding the applicant\u2019s acquittal and claiming that the court had made a superficial assessment of the evidence in the file. 18.  No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 19.  On 24 February 2006 the Bucharest Court of Appeal heard submissions from the prosecutor and counsel for the defence and allowed the applicant to address it at the end of the hearing (ultimul cuv\u00e2nt al inculpatului). 20.  By a final decision of 3 March 2006, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor\u2019s office, quashing the two previous decisions. It convicted the applicant of inciting intellectual forgery and imposed a suspended sentence of six months\u2019 imprisonment, placing him on probation. 21.  The appellate court based its reasoning on the evidence existent in the file. It held that both the lower courts had made a wrong assessment of evidence. However, it did not question the applicant, the co-defendant N.G., or the witnesses, instead merely citing some of the statements they had made before the prosecutor and the first-instance court. It referred in particular to the statements submitted by N.G. to the prosecutor on 19 February and 23 July 2004 and before the district court on 11 March 2005, and to the statements given by the applicant on 27 February and 11 August 2004. Having reassessed the facts without rehearing any evidence, it arrived at the conclusion that the applicant had incited N.G. to commit intellectual forgery. 22.  The final written decision containing the court\u2019s reasoning became available on 20 March 2006. The applicant alleged that he had been served with a copy of the decision later but he was not able to state any date.", "references": ["1", "0", "6", "2", "5", "4", "8", "7", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first and second applicants are Ilinden\u2019s chairman and deputy chairman. The remaining seven applicants are members of Ilinden\u2019s board of management. 7.  The background to the refusal to register Ilinden at issue in this case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 8.  On 19 September 2010 ninety-eight members of Ilinden held a founding meeting at which they resolved to form the organisation and apply to register it, adopted articles of association, and elected individuals to the organisation\u2019s constituent bodies. 9.  On 27 September 2010 Ilinden\u2019s managing council applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. 10.  In the course of the proceedings, the court several times asked the applicants to rectify deficiencies in the registration papers. 11.  In a decision of 3 February 2012 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 15 \u043e\u0442 03.02.2012 \u0433., \u043f\u043e \u0444. \u0434. \u2116 85/2010 \u0433., \u0411\u041e\u0421), the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused to register Ilinden. It noted that it had on several occasions instructed the applicants to rectify deficiencies in the registration papers, the latest such instruction having been given on 29 November 2011. The applicants\u2019 subsequent filing of papers on 5 January 2012 had, however, failed to deal satisfactorily with the court\u2019s concerns. The applicants had not clearly set out the competences of the association\u2019s constituent bodies and had not made it clear which of the several copies of the articles of association filed with the court, in which differences appeared, had been the ones adopted at the founding meeting. Also, Ilinden\u2019s aims, as defined in its articles of association, contravened Article 44 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below). It was true that Ilinden intended to use peaceful means to attain those aims. But the aims were themselves contrary to the State\u2019s security and sought to stir up national hatred. Ilinden asked that Bulgaria \u201cstop carrying out its policy of assimilating Macedonians\u201d, \u201cstop supporting nationalist propaganda that [has] sow[n] discrimination, hostility and threats against Macedonians\u201d, \u201cstop preventing Macedonians from holding peaceful rallies\u201d, and \u201cnot [to] discriminate against Macedonians\u201d. Those aims were directed against the security of the rest of the citizens and would lead to hostile relations between allegedly \u201cdiscriminated Macedonians\u201d and other Bulgarian citizens. They were therefore unlawful and precluded Ilinden\u2019s registration. 12.  The applicants appealed. They submitted that the court had misconstrued Ilinden\u2019s articles of association and that it was not seeking to stir up hatred or hostility. The real reason for the refusal to register it had been that it had advocated opinions which were at odds with official opinion. The registration papers met all the required formalities. 13.  In a decision of 23 April 2012 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 634 \u043e\u0442 23.04.2012 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0444. \u0434. \u2116 1002/2012 \u0433., \u0421\u0410\u0421, \u0413\u041a), the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to register Ilinden. It held that its aims, as set out in its articles of association, were political, which was not permissible for an association seeking registration under the Non-Profit Legal Persons Act 2000 (see paragraphs 19-21 and 23 below). For instance, in clause 2 of its articles of association, Ilinden proclaimed itself as successor to \u201cthe national liberation struggle of the Macedonian nation\u201d, and in clause 3 stated that it would \u201cexpress and protect the civic, political, national, social and economic rights of Macedonians living in Bulgaria\u201d. Clause 4 spoke of the protection of Macedonians subjected to racial and ethnic assimilation by the Bulgarian State\u2019s nationalistic policies and demanded that Pirin Macedonia be given cultural autonomy, that the assimilation of Macedonians be stopped, and that Macedonian identity, religion, language, traditions and heritage, allegedly being subjected to ethnocide by the Bulgarian authorities, be protected. Clause 5 said that Ilinden would strive to free Macedonians from the sense of fear engendered by the Bulgarian State\u2019s policy of discrimination and assimilation and to outlaw Bulgarian racism against Macedonians. According to the Sofia Court of Appeal, the lower court had been correct to find these aims contrary to the unity of the nation. They overtly pitted one group of citizens against another and engendered national and ethnic hatred, contrary to Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below) 14.  At the end of its decision, the Sofia Court of Appeal said that it was amenable to appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Cassation. 15.  On 4 June 2012 the applicants lodged such an appeal, reiterating their earlier arguments and submitting that the refusal to register Ilinden had been in breach of their right to freedom of conscience and association and that it had penalised them for advocating views contrary to those held by the majority of the population. 16.  In a decision of 30 April 2013 (\u043e\u043f\u0440 \u2116 133 \u043e\u0442 30.04.2013 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0442. \u0434. \u2116 510/2012 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, I \u0442. \u043e.) a three-member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal on points of law. It held that under the applicable provisions of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure, as construed in a binding interpretative decision in 2001 (see paragraph 24 below), appellate decisions upholding refusals to register a non-governmental organisation had been amenable to appeal on points of law. However, that was not the case under the 2007 Code of Civil Procedure, which had come into effect on 1 March 2008. The court analysed in detail the relevant provisions of the new Code and found that, when properly construed in the light of its overall scheme and the provisions governing similar registration proceedings, the rules governing the manner of appealing against a refusal to register a non-governmental organisation were to be construed as permitting an appeal to a court of appeal against a first-instance decision refusing registration but precluding an appeal on points of law against the court of appeal\u2019s decision. 17.  On 14 May 2013 the applicants lodged a procedural appeal against that decision under Article 274 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (1) and 2 of the 2007 Code. They contested the way in which the three-member panel had construed the relevant provisions of the new Code. 18.  In a final decision of 15 July 2013 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 508 \u043e\u0442 15.07.2013 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0447. \u0442. \u0434. \u2116 2571/2013 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, II \u0442. \u043e.), another three-member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the first panel\u2019s decision. It noted that the appeal had been lodged within the applicable one-week time-limit under Article 275 \u00a7 1 of the 2007 Code, which ran from the date of serving of the decision. However, it went on to hold that the appeal was unfounded, and that no appeal on points of law lay against the Sofia Court of Appeal\u2019s decision. Analysing in detail the applicable provisions of the new Code, it confirmed the manner in which the first three-member panel had interpreted them.", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "5", "6", "9", "2", "8", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan. He is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the material time he headed a political movement called \u201cCivil Disobedience\u201d. 6.  On 5 May 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 190 \u00a7 3 (1) of the Criminal Code (money laundering) in respect of the applicant. 7.  On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any well\u2011founded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days. 8.  On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments. 9.  On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances of the case and the possible investigative measures to be carried out gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation. 10.  On 2 July 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months, upon an application by the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 11.  On 3 July and 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised. 12.  On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant\u2019s behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond. 13.  On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 14.  On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised 15.  On 6 September 2007 the investigator decided to replace the applicant\u2019s detention with a written undertaking not to leave his residence and to release him in view of the fact that the investigative measures would take some time and it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention. 16.  On 17 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to leave the applicant\u2019s appeal of 3 September 2007 unexamined in view of the fact that he had been released.", "references": ["8", "4", "9", "7", "6", "1", "0", "5", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 7.  The background to the banning of the two rallies at issue in the present case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 8.  The applicant was one of the applicants in Ivanov and Others (cited above). He is the brother of Mr Yordan Kostadinov Ivanov, who was one of the applicants in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2), and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others (no. 2) (all cited above). 9.  On 15 September 2006 the applicant, acting on behalf of the unregistered organisation the Macedonian Initiative Committee, notified Blagoevgrad\u2019s mayor that the Committee intended to stage a rally at 4 p.m. on 30 September 2006 in Macedonia Square to commemorate the eighty-second anniversary of \u201cthe day of the genocide of Macedonians in Bulgaria \u2013 12 September 1924\u201d. The rally would consist of the laying of wreaths and flowers and the reading of a short address. 10.  The same day the mayor replied to the applicant that the rally could not proceed as the municipality had planned an event in Macedonia Square for the same date \u2013 a concert marking the Day of Music. That parallel event made the staging of the rally impossible. 11.  On 18 September 2006, again acting on behalf of the Macedonian Initiative Committee, the applicant sought judicial review of the mayor\u2019s decision. He argued that under the applicable international-law agreements, that organisation was entitled to stage peaceful rallies without being registered. 12.  In a final decision of 19 September 2006, the Blagoevgrad District Court held that the application was admissible and that the mayor\u2019s decision was amenable to judicial review. However, it went on to find that the mayor\u2019s decision was lawful, because there was a risk that the rights and freedoms of others might be infringed. It was not appropriate to hold the rally, which, in view of its intended theme, was political in character, alongside the municipality\u2019s event. The performance of musical works could not at all be reconciled with political addresses. It was not proper to force music lovers to listen to political speeches and declarations, especially ones not accepted unequivocally by Bulgarian society, which was particularly sensitive to assertions that a Macedonian minority existed in Bulgaria and that its rights were being infringed. 13.  As a result, the Macedonian Initiative Committee called off the rally. The applicant submitted that he was not aware of whether the municipality\u2019s event had in fact taken place. He had made a request for information in that connection under freedom-of-information laws, but had not received a reply. The municipality\u2019s cultural calendar for 2006 showed that the concert marking the Day of Music had been scheduled for 1 October rather than 30 September 2006. 14.  An earlier attempt by the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (\u201cIlinden\u201d), an unregistered association based in south-western Bulgaria, in an area known as the Pirin region or the geographic region of Pirin Macedonia, to organise a similar rally on 11 or 12 September 2006 had also been fruitless. Blagoevgrad\u2019s mayor had banned that rally, and a legal challenge to his decision had been dismissed by the Blagoevgrad District Court on 8 September 2006 (see United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-63). 15.  The circumstances relating to the rally organised by Ilinden on 12 September 2007 are set out in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 90-95) in the following way:\n\u201c90.  On 28 August 2007 Ilinden notified the Mayor of Blagoevgrad of its intention to stage a rally on Macedonia Square, in front of Gotse Delchev\u2019s monument, at 4.30 p.m. on 12 September 2007. The event, which was to mark the anniversary of \u2018the genocide against the Macedonians\u2019, would consist of the laying of a wreath and flowers on the monument and a short speech. It would last one hour. 91.  On 29 August 2007 the Mayor replied that the notification could not be examined as Ilinden had not produced documents proving its official registration. It was thus impossible to identify the \u2018managing bodies of [the] event\u2019. Moreover, the municipality had planned an event on Macedonia Square for the same date, a children\u2019s holiday under the name \u2018Hello, school\u2019, to mark the beginning of the school year, which made the holding of the rally impossible. 92.  On 30 August 2007 Ilinden sought judicial review by the newly created Blagoevgrad Administrative Court ..., reiterating the arguments raised in its previous applications. In a decision of 30 August 2007 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court found that under the 1990 Meetings and Marches Act, which was lex specialis in relation to the general rules of administrative procedure, the court competent to examine an application for judicial review of a Mayor\u2019s decision to ban a rally was the district court. It therefore sent the file to the Blagoevgrad District Court. 93.  In a final decision of 5 September 2007 the Blagoevgrad District Court dismissed the application. It held that, while the lack of registration did not amount to sufficient grounds to prohibit the rally, the fact that another event, likely to draw a number of people, many of whom were children, was due to take place on the same date in Macedonia Square was enough to justify the ban. In the court\u2019s view, it was inopportune to allow two wholly different events to be staged at the same time and place. 94.  According to the applicants, no school event took place at 4 p.m. on 12 September 2007 on Macedonia Square. When a number of members and supporters of Ilinden gathered in front of the American University in Blagoevgrad at about 5 p.m., they were stopped by the police and a number of them were arrested. They were taken to a police station, held for about three hours and charged with committing administrative offences for having tried to take part in a banned rally. 95.  On 22 October 2007 the deputy Mayor of Blagoevgrad imposed administrative punishments (fines of 200 Bulgarian levs (102.26 euros) each) on [Mr Yordan Kostadinov Ivanov] and on a number of members of Ilinden for having taken part in a banned rally, in breach of a public-order regulation issued by the Blagoevgrad Municipal Council. All of them sought judicial review. In a series of judgments delivered on 18 and 19 February, 11 March, and 22 and 29 May 2008 the Blagoevgrad District Court annulled the fines. In some of the judgments it found that they were invalid, as under the applicable rules the deputy Mayor had no power to impose administrative punishments. In other judgments the court found that the deputy Mayor\u2019s decisions were defective because they did not specify which administrative offences had been committed. In others it held that although the Mayor\u2019s ban on the rally planned for 12 September 2007 was legally binding, the actions of the members of Ilinden on that date had not amounted to the staging of a rally, as they had been too few and had not tried to wave banners and make speeches, but merely to lay flowers on Gotse Delchev\u2019s monument. The court went on to say that every person, regardless of their political convictions, had the right to honour the memory of national heroes in peace.\u201d 16.  It was the applicant who acted on behalf of Ilinden in its dealings with Blagoevgrad\u2019s mayor and the courts in relation to that rally.", "references": ["0", "3", "6", "1", "8", "4", "5", "9", "2", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation of tracts of real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron district of Yerevan, to be taken for State needs, with a total area of 345,000 sq. m. 6.  It appears that the applicant ran a small kiosk on a plot of land situated within the area to be expropriated. It also appears that the authorities demolished this kiosk for the development of that area within the framework of Decree no. 1151-N. 7.  On 10 October 2002, as compensation for the applicant\u2019s kiosk, the Mayor of Yerevan adopted decision no. 1785-A, granting her the right to lease a plot of public land of 5 sq. m. at a specified address in the Kentron district of Yerevan for seven years and to construct and run her kiosk on this land. By the same decision, the Mayor authorised the local authority of Kentron district to conclude the lease agreement with the applicant. 8.  On 17 December 2002 the applicant received planning permission for the plot of land specified in decision no. 1785-A. 9.  On 26 December 2006 and 24 August 2007, following the applicant\u2019s enquiries concerning the implementation of decision no. 1785-A, the Kentron district authorities suggested that the applicant address her enquiries to the Mayor of Yerevan, while on 1 May and 6 September 2007 the latter suggested that the applicant address her enquiries to the Kentron district authorities. 10.  On 26 February 2008 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Mayor and Kentron district, seeking to implement decision no. 1785-A. 11.  On 30 July 2008 the Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim and obliged the Mayor of Yerevan to conclude the agreement specified in decision no. 1785-A with the applicant. No appeals were lodged and this judgment became final on 30 August 2008. 12.  On 9 September 2008 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution for the judgment of 30 July 2008. 13.  On 24 September 2008 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (\u201cthe DEJA\u201d) instituted enforcement proceedings against the city of Yerevan, obliging it to conclude the land-lease agreement with the applicant within ten days. 14.  On 17 June 2009 the Mayor\u2019s office offered the applicant a possibility to start negotiations. However, by her letter of 30 June 2009 the applicant refused to negotiate with the Mayor\u2019s office. 15.  On 2 March, 23 April, 3 and 31 July, 23 November, 23 December 2009, 17 and 18 March and 7 April 2010, upon the applicant\u2019s enquiries concerning the enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008, bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008 was in progress and that she would be informed of the results. 16.  On 16 June 2010 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, requesting that the court oblige it to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 17.  On 22 June 2010 the Administrative Court declared the applicant\u2019s claim inadmissible on the grounds that she lacked standing. The Administrative Court reasoned that the applicant had failed to show that her rights had been breached as a result of an administrative action by the DEJA. The Administrative Court noted that the DEJA had taken certain actions in order to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008 and that the enforcement procedure was still pending. The decision of the Administrative Court of 22 June 2010 was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation on 25 August 2010. 18.  On 21 October and 4 November 2010, following an enquiry by the applicant, the bailiff responded that the enforcement was in progress and that the applicant would be informed of the results. 19.  On 24 January 2011, pursuant to the applicant\u2019s enquiries concerning the implementation of decision no. 1785-A, the Mayor of Yerevan informed her of the changes in legislation concerning land and reminded the applicant that she had to conclude the land-lease agreement with Kentron district. 20.  On 3 May 2011 the Mayor\u2019s office offered the applicant three different plots of land acceptable in terms of urban planning. However, by a letter sent to the Mayor\u2019s office, she refused to accept any of the plots. 21.  On 4 August 2011, relying on section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act, the DEJA decided to discontinue the proceedings on the grounds that enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008 had become impossible. It reasoned that, by a letter of 17 June 2009 addressed to the applicant, the Mayor of Yerevan had suggested that the applicant approach the department of management of immovable property of the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s office for the implementation of the judgment of 30 July 2008, but the applicant had failed to do so. 22.  On 27 February 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking to declare the decision of 4 August 2011 null and void, as well as to oblige the DEJA to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 23.  On 15 February 2013 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s first claim, reasoning that there were not sufficient grounds for declaring the DEJA\u2019s decision of 4 August 2011 null and void. It refused to examine the applicant\u2019s second claim. 24.  On 14 May 2012 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking to oblige it to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 25.  On 12 June 2013 the Administrative Court terminated the proceedings on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. This decision was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation on 18 December 2013. 26.  On 18 July 2013 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court seeking, inter alia, that the DEJA reopen the proceedings discontinued on 4 August 2011. On 4 December 2013 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, reasoning that, for the proceedings which had been discontinued on the grounds of impossibility, there were no legal grounds for reopening. 27.  On 3 March 2014 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking that the decision of the DEJA of 10 February 2014 refusing to initiate new proceedings be declared invalid, and that the DEJA be obliged to initiate new proceedings. 28.  On 28 September 2016 the Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s first claim, declaring the decision of the DEJA of 10 February 2014 invalid. As to the applicant\u2019s second claim, the Administrative Court terminated the proceedings in that regard on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction. 29.  The proceedings concerning the judgment of 28 September 2016 are pending before the Administrative Court of Appeal.", "references": ["8", "7", "4", "5", "0", "2", "6", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The background to the refusal to register Ilinden at issue in this case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 7.  On 27 September 2010 Ilinden\u2019s board of management applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. On 3 February 2012 the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused the application, and on 23 April 2012 its decision was upheld by the Sofia Court of Appeal. A detailed account of those proceedings may be found in Yordan Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 70502/13, \u00a7\u00a7 8-18, 11 January 2018). 8.  On 23 March 2014 the second and third applicants and seven other people held a meeting at which they resolved to set up Ilinden as an association. They defined Ilinden\u2019s aims and the means that it would use to attain them, adopted its articles of association, and elected its board of management, which consisted of all nine of them. 9.  Shortly after that, Ilinden\u2019s board of management applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. 10.  In a decision of 30 June 2014 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 2768 \u043e\u0442 30.06.2014 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0444. \u0434. \u2116 36/2014 \u0433., \u0411\u041e\u0421) the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused the application. It first observed that even though Ilinden had declared that it intended to be an association which only served the interests of its members, its aims, as set out in its articles of association, showed that in reality it meant to serve broader public interests (see paragraph 23 below). The court went on to note that Ilinden\u2019s articles of association stated that it would strive for, inter alia, the introduction of the Macedonian language in schools, the protection of the right of Macedonians to refute propaganda about their history and culture, and the protection of Macedonian cultural heritage, which was being \u201csubjected to ethnocide by Bulgarian cultural institutions\u201d. The articles of association also stated that Ilinden would organise seminars and press conferences to expose the reasons which underlay the \u201cpolicy of forced assimilation and discrimination of, and xenophobia towards, Macedonians in Bulgaria\u201d. According to the articles of association, Ilinden was a \u201cMacedonian organisation based on a Macedonian ethnic foundation and origin within the boundaries of Bulgaria\u201d, and it \u201cwould remind [people] of the terror perpetrated by Bulgaria, of the thousands of Macedonians killed, of the violence, the prisons and the deprivation of basic human rights and freedoms of Macedonians after 1913, which amounted to crimes under international law\u201d. For the court, all those statements gave the impression that Ilinden intended to stir up national and ethnic hatred, contrary to Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 21 below). Moreover, the statements, combined with the existence, albeit brief, of a political party called the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN, whose re-registration had recently been refused, and with the existence of organisations bearing the same or similar names, led to the conclusion that the intention was to mislead society and to obtain the registration of an organisation pursuing political aims (see paragraphs 18-20 below), or an organisation directed against the unity of the nation. This was also contrary to section 7(2) of the Non-Profit Legal Persons Act 2000 (see paragraph 24 below), which barred associations from having misleading names. Lastly, the association\u2019s intended name was not unique, as required by law. 11.  Ilinden\u2019s founders appealed. They submitted that the court had misconstrued Ilinden\u2019s articles of association and had erred in finding that its activities would be political or directed against the unity of the nation. The real reason for the refusal to register Ilinden had been that it advocated views which were at odds with the official ones. 12.  In a decision of 18 November 2015 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 2272 \u043e\u0442 18.11.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0444. \u0434. \u2116 2968/2014 \u0433., \u0421\u0410\u0421, \u0422\u041e) a three-member panel of the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to register Ilinden by two votes to one. 13.  The court began by saying that when assessing the aims of an association seeking registration, it had to base itself chiefly on the articles of association. But since by law in registration proceedings the court had to examine the reality of the matter rather than carry out a mere formal check, it had to have regard not just to the aims set out in the articles of association, but to the entirety of the articles, and on that basis ascertain the founders\u2019 real aims and intentions. The court also had to bear in mind the traditions which the association purported to represent and the historical figures with which it identified, the past activities, if known, of its founders, leaders and supporters, as well as the positions they had advocated. All those elements had to be juxtaposed with the aims set out in the articles of association, with a view to verifying whether those aims were not in effect a cover for other aims. In doing so, and thus balancing the rights of the founders of the association against the rights of others and the public interest, the court could rely not only on the material in the case file but also on facts which were publicly known and of which it could therefore take judicial notice. 14.  In Ilinden\u2019s case, it had been common knowledge, sufficiently publicised in both Bulgarian and foreign media, that since 1990 some of its founders, leaders and supporters had in a persistent manner openly challenged both those who had opposed their views and the State authorities, which had led to a string of breaches of public order \u2013 clashes between Ilinden\u2019s supporters and their opponents on account of the views expressed by the former about Macedonian history \u2013 reported in the media. Seen against that background, the declaration in Ilinden\u2019s articles of association that people of any ethnicity could become members did not reflect the reality of the situation, which was that the organisation had been conceived as one based purely on Macedonian ethnicity. The same went for the declaration in the articles of association that Ilinden would only resort to peaceful means to achieve its aims. This had been belied by the organisation\u2019s record of provoking its opponents and the State authorities by making strongly worded statements about violence against Macedonians \u2011 such statements had featured in its articles of association as well \u2011 which had led to real public clashes. The court had to also take into account the complex ethnic and religious situation in some neighbouring countries, as well as the severe migrant crisis affecting all of Europe and Bulgaria in particular, as a front-line State of the European Union. That crisis, coupled with the \u201crecent, likewise commonly known, tragic events in Central European countries\u201d, showed a categorical need to mobilise all available State and social resources. 15.  In those circumstances, the application to register Ilinden had to be turned down for two reasons. Firstly, the pursuit of its real aims, seen against the backdrop of the heightened sensitivities of the population in Pirin Macedonia, where it was based, could have led to serious tensions and breaches of public order caused by, or involving, supporters of the organisation, as had happened in the past. In the tense situation facing Bulgaria and its neighbouring States, that had to be seen as a genuine possibility. Secondly, the realisation of Ilinden\u2019s right to freedom of association would infringe the rights of all Bulgarians who did not support its aims or the means which it intended to use to attain those aims. All were entitled to believe that they were not citizens of a State which had committed international crimes, that they did not engage, in their capacity as Bulgarian citizens, in propaganda and manipulation of the history and culture of a neighbouring country and that they were not citizens of a State whose institutions had subjected the cultural heritage of part of its population to ethnocide. The Sofia Court of Appeal concluded that it was necessary to refuse the registration application, even though it recognised that it was also possible to dissolve an already registered association if it engaged in anti-constitutional or unlawful conduct. The refusal was a justified preventive measure. 16.  The dissenting judge noted that Ilinden\u2019s founders had complied with all formal requirements of the law. She went on to say that the registration regime was not to be used to hinder the exercise of the fundamental right to associate with others, and that the case called for the direct application of Article 11 of the Convention, which was part of Bulgarian law. She then noted how that Article had been construed by the European Court of Human Rights in several cases, including United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others (both cited above), and stated that, in her view, the fact that an association advocated a form of minority consciousness could not justify a restriction of its rights under that Article. The Court\u2019s ruling on that point in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (cited above) had to be taken into account when examining the registration request at issue. There was, moreover, no evidence of actions by Ilinden\u2019s founders which ran counter to the prohibition in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 21 below). The refusal to register it was thus disproportionate and unjustified. 17.  Ilinden\u2019s founders sought to appeal on points of law. On 22 February 2016 the judge-rapporteur of the Sofia Court of Appeal, who under the relevant rules of procedure had to check the appeal\u2019s admissibility before forwarding it to the Supreme Court of Cassation, sent it back to the appellants. He noted that under the applicable rules of procedure, as consistently construed by the Supreme Court of Cassation, no appeal lay against appellate decisions confirming refusals to register an association. In a final decision of 15 July 2016 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 317 \u043e\u0442 15.07.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0447. \u0442. \u0434. \u2116 1062/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, I \u0442. \u043e.) the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the founders\u2019 appeal against the judge-rapporteur\u2019s order. It likewise found that under the applicable rules of procedure, which it had already construed in several cases, the Sofia Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal.", "references": ["5", "8", "9", "6", "1", "2", "0", "4", "3", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (\u201cthe Service\u201d), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant\u2019s employment. 6.  On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position. 7.  On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8.  This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9.  On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10.  On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11.  On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (\u201cthe DEJA\u201d) initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 12.  It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011. 13.  On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14.  On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15.  On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant\u2019s request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16.  On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "2", "6", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant is a professor of law at a private university in Skopje. She holds a doctoral degree in the field of criminal law. 5.  On 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) in order to be recognised as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination (\u0438\u0437\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0441\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0438\u0446\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u043d \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0438\u0442). As she did not obtain a decision, she lodged two further requests, on 24 November 2011 and 6 February 2012. 6.  On 11 April 2012 the Ministry rejected her request, holding that she did not meet the relevant criteria to obtain such recognition. In particular, the Ministry found that although she was a professor of law at a university, she did not hold a bachelor\u2019s degree in law (\u0434\u0438\u043f\u043b\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043d \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0443\u043b\u0442\u0435\u0442). The Ministry further found that the bachelor\u2019s degree which she had obtained had been awarded by the Faculty of Security and Social Defence (\u0424\u0430\u043a\u0443\u043b\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442 \u0438 \u043e\u043f\u0448\u0442\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0448\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0430), and not by a faculty of law, as required. 7.  On 10 May 2012 the applicant brought an action with the Administrative Court (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434), challenging the refusal. She argued that as a university professor at a faculty of law she met the relevant criteria. 8.  On 30 May 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It held that regardless of her current status, she did not meet the criteria to obtain the desired recognition under domestic law. In particular, it established that the applicant did not hold a bachelor\u2019s degree in law, which was a condition for the recognition she sought. 9.  On 23 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Administrative Court (\u0412\u0438\u0448 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434). She argued that she met the relevant criteria and that the lower court had failed to properly interpret the procedural and substantive law in the case. 10.  On an unspecified date, the Ministry submitted observations to the Higher Administrative Court concerning the applicant\u2019s case. The Ministry stated in the observations that the right to obtain recognition as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination was dependent on having a bachelor\u2019s degree issued by a faculty of law. The applicant did not possess such a degree and had therefore failed to meet the criteria under domestic law. Those observations were not communicated to the applicant. 11.  On 30 January 2014 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, reiterating in full the reasons provided by the Administrative Court. It restated that the recognition sought by the applicant was dependent on her having a bachelor\u2019s degree issued by a faculty of law, a condition which she had failed to meet. 12.  The decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2014.", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "6", "5", "9", "1", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kocaeli. 6.  Following a dispute with a private third party, the applicant initiated compensation proceedings. 7.  On 12 March 2009 the Tuzla Civil Court of General Jurisdiction granted the applicant compensation, amounting to 386,464.75 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 174,000 euros (EUR)). In the operative part of the judgment, the court indicated that the defendant party had to pay TRY 16,000 (approximately EUR 7,400) for court fees pursuant to the Law on Charges. The court registry accordingly sent a payment order to the defendant party. However, no payment was made. 8.  On 18 May 2009 the applicant submitted a petition to the registry of the first instance court, requesting that the judgment be served on her in order to commence enforcement proceedings. On the same day, the court rejected the request on the ground that it was impossible under Section 28(1) (a) of the Law on Charges (Law no. 492) to serve a copy of the judgment unless the court costs that should have been born by the defendant party had been discharged. 9.  At the time when the application was introduced, the applicant had therefore been unable to bring enforcement proceedings in order to have the above-mentioned judgment executed unless she herself was willing to pay the court fees that the defendant party had failed to pay. 10.  Following the introduction of the present application with the Court, the domestic legislation was amended (see paragraphs 11-13 below), and subsequently the judgment in question was served on the applicant. In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 17 October 2012. On 5 March 2013 the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings against her debtor. On 10 April 2013 the applicant further requested the enforcement office to place a lien on the debtor\u2019s property. According to the documents in the file, as of 14 April 2017 the debt, which is still not enforced, amounts to TRY 812,648.94 (approximately EUR 193,500) including the initial amount of compensation awarded by the domestic court plus interest running at statutory rate.", "references": ["1", "2", "8", "7", "4", "6", "5", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Timi\u015foara. 6.  In 2004 the applicant lodged a civil action against her employer, a private company, C.G.H.T. (\u201cthe company\u201d), seeking the revocation of its decision of 17 October 2003 to dismiss her, and claiming various salary entitlements. 7.  On 29 April 2004 the Timi\u0219 County Court dismissed her action as ill\u2011founded. The applicant appealed. 8.  In a final judgment of 29 September 2004 (\u201cthe judgment\u201d), the Timi\u0219oara Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It ordered the company to revoke its dismissal decision and to pay the applicant pecuniary damages in the form of all her salary entitlements from 17 October 2003 until the pronouncement of the final judgment, updated and index-linked. The domestic court also awarded the applicant the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings. 9.  On 15 November 2004 the Timi\u0219 County Court validated the judgment (\u00eenvestire cu formul\u0103 executorie), pursuant to Article 374 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe RCCP\u201d), as in force at the time (see paragraph 37 below). 10.  The applicant instituted enforcement proceedings on 21 January 2005, requesting the bailiffs\u2019 office M.S.R. & S.A.I. (\u201cthe bailiff\u201d) to enforce the judgment. 11.  On 26 January 2005 the bailiff issued a notice of payment (soma\u021bie) and served it on the company. 12.  According to a report of 11 February 2005 issued by the bailiff, the bailiff and the applicant\u2019s lawyer visited the company\u2019s premises. As the company\u2019s legal representative was not present, the bailiff granted the company a further five days in which to execute the final judgment of their own accord. 13.  However, the company refused to fulfil its obligations. Moreover, it lodged a complaint seeking to have the enforcement proceedings annulled, pursuant to Article 399 of the RCCP, as in force at the time (see paragraph 39 below). During those proceedings and at the company\u2019s request, on 24 February 2005 the Timi\u0219oara District Court ordered the suspension of the enforcement proceedings until a final judgment was given; the suspension was made subject to payment of a deposit of 4,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL), namely approximately 90 euros (EUR). 14.  In response, on 16 May 2005 the applicant brought urgent proceedings seeking to have the impugned suspension lifted. She argued that the matter was urgent because she needed to obtain the salary entitlements that would allow her to provide for herself and her infant. 15.  In a judgment of 18 May 2005 the Timi\u0219oara District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, holding that she had not proved the existence of any imminent damage, so as to justify the urgency of the request. 16.  On 2 June 2005 the Timi\u0219oara District Court allowed the company\u2019s complaint against the enforcement proceedings. The court held that the procedural requirements had not been thoroughly complied with in so far as the bailiff had failed to serve the company with a copy of the enforceable judgment. 17.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the court\u2019s judgment. On 6 October 2005 the Timi\u0219 County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as ungrounded. The first-instance judgment thus became final. 18.  The company lodged another request seeking to obtain the annulment of the restriction order (anularea m\u0103surii de poprire) issued by the bailiff in respect of its bank accounts. On 21 April 2005 the Timi\u0219oara District Court allowed the request, in so far as the restriction order had been issued subsequent to the suspension of the enforcement proceedings ordered by the court (see paragraph 13 above). 19.  In the meantime, on 29 June 2005, the bailiff issued another notice of payment. On 4 July 2005 it was posted, together with the enforceable judgment, at the company\u2019s main entrance. 20.  On 2 November 2005 the bailiff received a letter from the applicant, in which she enquired whether the company had complied with the outstanding judgment. The bailiff replied in the negative on 4 November 2005. 21.  In so far as this was the last exchange of information between the applicant and the bailiff concerning the impugned enforcement procedure, and in view of the obligations imposed by law on the creditor, who was required to play a constantly active role throughout the enforcement procedure, on 28 May 2007 the bailiff issued an official report, noting that, under Article 389 of the RCCP as in force at the time, the procedure had become time-barred (\u201cperimarea execut\u0103rii\u201d; see paragraph 38 below). It is not clear whether that report was communicated to the applicant or not. 22.  On 5 May 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Timi\u0219oara District Court seeking to obtain a court order for immediate enforcement of the judgment, pursuant to Article 5803 of the RCCP as in force at the time (see paragraph 40 below). 23.  In a decision of 18 August 2005 the Timi\u0219oara District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and ordered the company to pay a coercive fine of ROL 500,000 per day until it fulfilled its obligations. 24.  An appeal by the company against that decision was allowed on 16 December 2005 by the Timi\u015f County Court. The court held that the coercive fine had the nature of a civil penalty aimed at securing the enforcement of a personal obligation which could not be otherwise executed, as provided for by Article 5803. However, the payment of the company\u2019s debt could be enforced with the assistance of a bailiff; therefore the applicant\u2019s complaint was ill-founded. 25.  On 12 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice about the outcome of the judgment of 2 June 2005 (see paragraph 16 above). The complaint was lodged under the provisions of Law no. 303/2004, defining the framework for judges\u2019 disciplinary and criminal responsibility and the specific authorities empowered to initiate such proceedings. 26.  On 24 August 2005 the applicant\u2019s complaint was forwarded to the Timi\u0219oara Court of Appeal. On 5 September 2005 the Timi\u0219oara Court of Appeal noted that the impugned proceedings had been terminated by a judgment that was final and therefore not subject to appeal. 27.  In 2005 the applicant complained to different State authorities that the company\u2019s representatives had failed to execute the judgment. She relied on Articles 277, 278 and 280 of the Labour Code and Article 83 of Law no. 168/1999 regarding the resolution of labour disputes (see paragraphs 43-44 below). 28.  On 5 December 2006 a criminal investigation was initiated against M.D., the company\u2019s administrator, for refusal to execute the judgment.\nOn 4 February 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office at the Timi\u0219oara District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against M.D. and fined him RON 1,000, namely approximately EUR 250. The prosecutor investigating the case found that M.D.\u2019s actions could not be classified as an offence. 29.  A complaint lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed on 8 April 2008 by the senior prosecutor at the Timi\u015foara District Court. 30.  On 2 June 2008 both the applicant and M.D. appealed against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions before the Timi\u015foara District Court. The court dismissed both appeals on 17 October 2008. It held that the applicant\u2019s appeal had been lodged outside the time-limit. With regard to M.D.\u2019s appeal, it reiterated that even though he had not executed the judgment, his actions could not be classified as an offence and, therefore, the administrative fine had been fair. 31.  In a final judgment of 28 January 2009 the Timi\u015f County Court dismissed appeals on points of law lodged by the applicant and M.D. 32.  On 5 August 2014 the company\u2019s two shareholders decided that the company should be liquidated (dizolvare), in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 31/1990 on trading companies. At their request, the Companies Registration Office (Oficiul Registrului Comer\u0163ului) decided on 7 August 2014 to publish the shareholders\u2019 decision in the Romanian Official Journal. The decision was published on 26 August 2014, in accordance with the provisions of Emergency Government Ordinance no. 116/2009 regulating the registration of specific acts in the companies register (see paragraph 48 below). 33.  It was noted in an accounting report drawn up on 30 August 2014 that the company\u2019s only creditors were the two shareholders. 34.  On 10 October 2014 one of the shareholders asked the Companies Registration Office to strike the company off the register. The request was granted on the same day, and the Companies Registration Office decided that the decision would be published in the Romanian Official Journal. 35.  No appeal was lodged against the decisions taken by the Companies Registration Office in respect of the company.", "references": ["1", "7", "2", "4", "6", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, whose names are listed in the appendix, are Turkish nationals. 6.  On 17 and 18 July 2008, each of the applicants sent a letter to the Halfeti (\u015eanl\u0131urfa) public prosecutor`s office which contained the following passage:\n \"If using the word of \u201csay\u0131n\u201d (esteemed) is an offense, then I also say \u201cSay\u0131n Abdullah \u00d6calan\u201d, I commit this offense and denounce myself.\" 7.  On 19 September 2008, the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Halfeti Magistrates\u2019 Court in Criminal Matters against the applicants. They were charged with praising an offence and offender, prescribed by Article 215 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on account of their statements in the above mentioned letters. 8.  On 9 March 2009 the Halfeti Magistrates\u2019 Court in Criminal Matters found the applicants guilty of praising the imprisoned leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, on account of their statements in the aforementioned letters and accordingly, sentenced them each to two months and fifteen days\u2019 imprisonment. In accordance with Article 50 of the Criminal Code, this prison sentence was commuted to a fine of 1,500 Turkish Liras (TRY). 9.  The applicants appealed against this judgment. On 20 June 2012 the Court of Cassation, holding that the amount of the fine that had been imposed on the applicants did not attain the minimum requisite level, dismissed the appeal request.", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "8", "9", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Chisinau. 5.  At the material time, the applicant was a student and was undertaking an unpaid internship at a law firm. 6.  On 23 October 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated against T., a lawyer with whom the applicant worked, on charges of trading in influence. In particular, T. was accused of receiving 10,500 euros (EUR) from D. to pass on to the judges examining a criminal case against a relative of D.\u2019s in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. The applicant had no procedural standing in those proceedings. 7.  On 30 October 2008 the police lodged with an investigating judge a request for a warrant to search the applicant\u2019s apartment. The request was granted; the decision to issue the warrant read as follows:\n\u201cThe criminal investigation against T. was initiated on 23 October 2008 ... In the course of the investigation it has been established that from March until September 2008, T. extorted and received from D. in several instalments the amount of EUR 10,500, [to be given to] the judges who examined D.\u2019s relative\u2019s case, in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence.\nOn 24 October 2008 T. was caught in flagrante receiving 3,800 US dollars (USD) from D., allegedly for influencing the prosecutor not to appeal against the [subsequent] judgment [acquitting the accused].\nThe evidence in the file and the material obtained through the operational investigation allow the well-founded assumption that at [the applicant\u2019s] home, situated at [address], can be found EUR 10,500 received from D. and relevant documents,\nDecides\nTo order a search of [the applicant\u2019s] residence, situated at [address], with the aim of finding and seizing EUR 10,500 received from D. and documents concerning the criminal case.\u201d 8.  On the same day, a prosecutor lodged a request with the Buiucani District Court for a warrant to be issued for the search of the applicant\u2019s apartment. His request took the form of a verbatim copy of the police decision. Also on the same day the Buiucani district investigating judge issued a decision authorising the search. The decision read as follows:\n\u201cThe present criminal proceedings were initiated on 23 October 2008 ... against T.\nAfter hearing the prosecutor and examining the material, and taking in consideration the fact that that material had been obtained in [a manner] in compliance with the law, the court finds that the request for the authorisation of the search is well founded and should be upheld.\nOn the basis of Articles 41, 125, 301, 305 and 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court:\n... 9.  On 10 December 2008 the police searched the applicant\u2019s apartment in the presence of her elderly mother [but not the applicant]. They did not find anything. 10.  On 21 August 2009 the applicant lodged a request for access to the evidence which had been presented to the judge to justify the search. On 3 September 2009 the Buiucani district investigating judge replied that the case file was held at the [premises of] the investigating authority and that access could only be granted pursuant to the law. 11.  It appears from the material in the case file that the criminal proceedings against T. ended with the latter\u2019s acquittal.", "references": ["1", "0", "7", "5", "3", "6", "9", "8", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5.  On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah \u00d6calan by using the honorific \u201csay\u0131n\u201d, meaning esteemed. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as \u201cthe Board\u201d). 7.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days\u2019 solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8.  On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant`s objection. 9.  On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.", "references": ["4", "2", "5", "7", "3", "9", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant, a practising defence lawyer, represented \u2012 initially before the Ljubljana District Court and subsequently before the appellate courts \u2012 a defendant, I.P., who had been charged with three murders committed on 15 August 2002. The offence carried a thirty-year prison sentence. During the first-instance criminal proceedings, three certified sworn-in experts were appointed. A psychologist, J.R., and a psychiatrist, V.R., were asked to assess the accountability of the defendant and the probability that he had committed the criminal offences of which he had been accused. An expert in forensic medicine, J.B., was asked to prepare a report and testify, among other things, about the time of death of the victims, which was an important element in the accusation against the applicant\u2019s client. In his written and oral submissions the applicant continuously protested his client\u2019s innocence, pointing to what in his view was unreliable expert evidence, and requesting the exclusion of all evidence obtained by alleged violations of his client\u2019s human rights. It would also appear that at some point in the proceedings the applicant asked to be given the results of a lie-detector test performed during the police investigation, but his request was refused. 7.  At the final hearing held on 12 March 2004 V.R. replied to questions put by the applicant and the public prosecutor. Subsequently, the applicant requested that a new expert psychiatrist be appointed and that he should be assisted by a psychologist specialising in psychodiagnosis. Under the rules of the Criminal Procedure Act, a new expert witness should not be appointed unless there are contradictions or deficiencies in the available expert opinion or if reasonable doubt arises with regard to its correctness \u2013 the applicant therefore pointed out what he considered to be such deficiencies with respect to V.R. and J.R. In his oral submissions, the applicant argued that J.R. was known to be inclined towards psychodynamics which, in the applicant\u2019s opinion, meant that \u201che was not familiar with top-level means of diagnosis, which were to be used in the process of psychosocial diagnosis\u201d. He also stated that the psychodynamic psychotherapy used by the expert was not a scientific method and did not produce reliable data. The applicant further maintained in his speech that the results of the test used on his client were wholly contradictory and as such invalid. He gave examples from the expert opinion, such as its finding that the accused had little sense of reality but, at the same time, good general knowledge, and that while he was mentally rigid he was of above-average intelligence. The applicant continued by saying:\n\u201cThat this was just senseless extensive talking without any meaning, full of contradictions, is supported by the fact that the expert did not link his mental constructs with any concrete mental disorder, not least with the personality disorder in which he had proclaimed himself to be the expert.\u201d 8.  The applicant then went on to say that none of the tests could lead to a finding of the narcissist characteristics mentioned by expert J.R. and that, in any case, narcissism was not part of the valid method of diagnosis. He then stated:\n\u201cThe opinions of both the psychiatrist and psychologist indicate the sad truth that in their professional weakness, both experts resorted to methods that did not form part of their professional practice. The psychiatrist used psychological methods which he absolutely did not understand and applied them only mechanically; the psychologist applied outdated psychological methods from the stone age of psychology and unscientific psychodynamic concepts and thereby failed to obtain any useful results, therefore he resorted to the field of medicine ...\u201d 9.  The applicant concluded by saying that the proposed new expert opinions would have proven that his client could not have committed the crimes with which he had been charged. 10.  The court rejected the applicant\u2019s proposal to appoint new experts and concluded the evidence-taking procedure. 11.  On 16 March 2004 the applicant\u2019s client, I.P., was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment. On 22 June 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Ljubljana Higher Court. He supplemented it with further written submissions and on 16 December 2004 attended a session and a hearing before the court. The applicant argued, inter alia, that the date of the murder could not have been 15 August 2002 as established by expert, J.B. (see paragraph 6 above), which meant that his client could have not committed it; that the public prosecutor had not submitted the results of the lie-detector test which would have allegedly exculpated his client and the court had refused to obtain them from the Croatian authorities; and that his client had not been psychologically capable of committing the alleged crime. In his written and oral submissions before the Ljubljana Higher Court, the applicant strongly criticised the work of the experts, public prosecutor and the court and used a number of expressions which the Higher Court found amounted to contempt of court (see paragraph 19 below). 12.  On 19 March 2004 the Ljubljana District Court issued a decision, fining the applicant 150,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT \u2013 approximately 625 euros (EUR)) for contempt of court for his statements given at the hearing of 12 March 2004 regarding the expert witnesses, namely for making the following remarks, the translation of which has not been disputed by the parties: \u201csenseless talking\u201d (neosmi\u0161ljeno nakladanje), \u201cmental constructs\u201d (umotvori), \u201cprofessional weakness\u201d (strokovna \u0161ibkost) of the experts and saying that \u201cthe psychiatrist used psychological methods which he absolutely did not understand\u201d (psihiater si je pomagal s psiholo\u0161kimi metodami, ki jih absolutno ne razume) and that \u201cthe psychologist [applied] outdated psychological methods from the stone age of psychology and unscientific psychodynamic concepts\u201d (psiholog z zastarelimi psiholo\u0161kimi metodami iz kamene psiholo\u0161ke dobe ter neznanstvenim psihodinamskim konceptom) (see paragraphs 7 to 9 above). The court took the view that the applicant had expressed insulting value judgments with regard to the expert witnesses\u2019 professional qualifications. Moreover, it considered that the professional competence of certified experts approved by the Ministry of Justice was not open to doubt. As regards the level of the fine imposed on the applicant, the court noted that it reflected the nature and seriousness of the offensive statements and the fact that he was a lawyer with many years\u2019 experience of representation in court proceedings. 13.  The applicant appealed on 8 July 2004. He argued that he had not intended to insult anyone, and had only wanted to draw attention to the unacceptable way by which the opinions that could result in a potential thirty-year prison sentence had been prepared. He maintained that the impugned allegations were substantiated by the criticism expressed in the appeal. He pointed out that he did not have the required knowledge to substantiate the criticism but had been warned about the serious errors committed by the two experts by those from the \u201cpsychiatric and psychological profession\u201d. According to the applicant, the courts had to reflect on their practice of punishing lawyers, which was used by some judges to \u201ccover up\u201d their own unprofessional and incompetent work. He alleged that the punishment of defence counsels often had a chilling effect and thereby interfered with freedom of expression. 14.  On 3 February 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded, finding that his remarks \u201cconstituted insulting value judgments which were damaging to the honour and reputation of both experts, since they expressed contempt and disrespect for the human dignity of other people and were as such unworthy of the profession practised by a lawyer\u201d. The court considered that it was obliged to protect its authority and the personal dignity of other participants in the criminal proceedings and pointed out that the applicant could have expressed his criticism in a number of legally acceptable ways. It also held that punishing a defence counsel did not constitute a serious interference with the constitutional right of freedom of expression, nor did it limit the constitutional right of defence. The court concluded that the lower court\u2019s decision was correct and did not restrict the rights of the defence \u201cas alleged by the appellant who obviously, lacking any self-criticism, still maintains that the allegations laid against the experts were justified\u201d. 15.  On 31 March 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, in which he complained of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention and Article 39 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression. He argued that he had expressed the impugned opinions with the aim of providing the best possible defence to his client and that his punishment had not been necessary in a democratic society. Relying on the case of Nikula v. Finland (no. 31611/96, ECHR 2002-II), he argued that the critical comments had been directed solely at the unprofessional and inadequate work of the experts and had not insulted the court in any way. His criticism of the two experts \u201cwas fully justified and based on scientific fact\u201d. Furthermore, alternative less severe measures were available, such as a private prosecution for slander. 16.  On 15 May 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. The most relevant parts of its decision are as follows (as translated in the English version provided on the Constitutional Court\u2019s website):\n\u201c9. ... Certainly it has to be taken into account that the freedom of expression of a lawyer in his capacity as defence counsel in criminal proceedings serves the purpose of the defendant\u2019s right to a defence ... The circumstance that a defence counsel in judicial proceedings exercises his right to freedom of expression because and only because he represents a client is of primary importance for the review of the admissibility of the interference with the right of a defence counsel determined in the first paragraph of Article 39 of the Constitution [freedom of expression], but this cannot entail that because of this circumstance the Constitutional Court would not review whether the courts\u2019 decisions on punishing the defence counsel violated his right to freedom of expression. 10. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 39 of the Constitution, freedom of ... expression [is] guaranteed. The ECHR protects the freedom of expression in the first paragraph of Article 10...\n... 12. The duty of the courts in general and the court deciding on the merits of the case is to direct proceedings in such a manner so as to ensure the proper conduct of the parties and above all the fairness of the trial \u2013 rather than to examine in a subsequent trial the appropriateness of the party\u2019s statements in the courtroom However, this does not entail that the defence counsel\u2019s freedom of expression in criminal proceedings should be unlimited. Due to the fact that a defence counsel takes part in judicial proceedings and that his right to freedom of expression is intended for the protection of the rights of others, it is limited to a greater extent than the right to freedom of expression of any other individual in a public space may be limited. A defence counsel is namely limited by the fact that he participates in proceedings that are [formalised] and as such conducted in a rational manner, as well as by his professional ethics. A defence counsel may express strong and sharp criticism, however his argumentation in protecting the interests of his clients must remain within the range of reasonable argumentation, and there is no room for insults charged with emotion. It is understandable that in cases of defending a defendant charged with a grave criminal offence for which a severe penalty is prescribed, the tolerance threshold which may be allowed by the courts may be higher than in other cases, however, the defence counsel may not cross the outer boundaries of this tolerance. If he does cross them, it is proper that the court protects other values, i.e. confidence in the judiciary and the good reputation and authority of the judiciary, which ensures that the public respects the courts and has confidence that the courts are able to perform the role they have in a state governed by the rule of law. Protecting the authority of the judiciary includes the notion that the courts are the proper forum for the settlement of legal disputes and for the determination of a person\u2019s guilt or innocence regarding a criminal charge, whereby it is important that the public at large have respect for and confidence in the courts\u2019 capacity to fulfil that function. The above-mentioned is a constitutionally admissible reason to limit the defence counsel\u2019s right to freedom of expression. The Constitutional Court has already [emphasised] in Decision No. U-I-145/03 that the institution of a punishment for insulting submissions is not the primary way to ensure the good reputation and authority of the judiciary, it is, however, an additional (and subordinate) tool which ensures the protection of the good reputation of the courts in situations in which confidence in the work of the judiciary is undermined by degrading criticism and [generalised], and from the viewpoint of the protection of rights in an individual case, unnecessary attacks on the work of the courts. 13. The complainant used the expressions mentioned in the first paragraph of the reasoning of this decision while defending a defendant who was charged with murder, for which the prescribed sentence is thirty years of imprisonment. The expressions entailed criticism of the expert witnesses who provided expert opinions in the criminal proceedings as permanently sworn-in experts. On the basis of [section] 248 of the Criminal Procedure Act, expert witnesses are engaged when the determination or assessment of a material fact call for the findings and opinion of a specialist possessing the necessary expertise for the task. The Constitutional Court in Decision No. U-I-132/95, dated 8 January 1998 (Official Gazette RS, No. 11/98 and OdlUS VII,1), [emphasised] that expert testimony is not only evidence, that is, a source for learning of relevant facts, but that an expert witness is an assistant to the court in exercising its function. The requirement that expert witnesses must be impartial follows from this, as otherwise parties to criminal proceedings would not be in an equal position. In view of the position that expert witnesses have as assistants to the courts in exercising their function, their authority must be protected in the same manner as the authority of the judiciary. This is a constitutionally admissible aim for which it was admissible to limit the complainant\u2019s right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the Constitutional Court cannot accept the complainant\u2019s view that a situation in which he directs insulting expressions towards the court is different than a situation in which such expressions are directed towards expert witness. 14. The courts\u2019 assessment that the complainant expressed contemptuous criticism towards the expert witnesses is supported by reasons and is not unsound. The complainant did not merely express sharp criticism of the expert opinions, but his insulting remarks entailed personal disparagement of the expert witnesses as experts. The expressed contemptuous criticism is beyond the reasonable argumentation by which the defence counsel could justify his motion that new expert witnesses be called. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that such criticism could be justified for the purpose of exercising the defendant\u2019s right to a defence as determined in Article 29 of the Constitution. Contemptuous criticism of an expert witness as a person who has been called to provide an expert opinion could even threaten a fair trial in criminal proceedings. The Constitutional Court has already [emphasised] in Decision No. U-I-145/03 that it is of exceptional importance that parties to proceedings [realise] that insulting sharp speech before the court does not prove that the defence counsel has provided quality representation. The quality defence provided by a defence counsel can also not be based on expressing contemptuous criticism which shows contempt for expert witnesses, instead, the defence must be directed towards a criticism of their opinions provided in the individual proceedings, and supported by arguments and reason. Therefore, it cannot be expected from the courts that they should, within the boundaries of tolerance, also allow insults for which the courts reasonably assessed that they showed contempt for the expert witnesses in their capacity as expert assistants to the court. Therefore, the interference with the complainant\u2019s right to freedom of expression which the court made by punishing the defence counsel for the expressed insults with a fine, is not disproportional. 15. ...The Constitutional Court did not have to address the question whether by using the above-mentioned expressions the complainant had fulfilled all the statutorily determined elements of the criminal offence determined in Article 169 of the Penal Code, as this was not the subject of the challenged judicial decisions. ... In Decision No. 145/03, the Constitutional Court already [emphasised] that the possibility of independent criminal protection is not an appropriate substitute and cannot serve the purpose for which the legislature enacted the possibility that insulting submissions be punished. The Constitutional Court reiterates that the protection which the legislature defined in the first paragraph of [section] 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not intended to protect individual expert witnesses but to protect the good reputation and authority of the judiciary as a whole. The reasons why also the good reputation and authority of expert witnesses as impartial assistants to courts is a part of the protected value has been outlined in paragraph 13 of the reasoning of this decision. 17.  The Constitutional Court reached the above decision by six votes to one. Judge J.Z. wrote a separate concurring opinion. Judge C.R., who voted against, wrote an extensive dissenting opinion. He argued that the applicant\u2019s conduct had been judged too harshly by the majority, who had not approached the case correctly. In particular, the Constitutional Court had supported the finding of no violation by the fact that the impugned statements had been given during court proceedings, although \u2012 in his view \u2012 this should have weighed in favour of the applicant. Furthermore, proper attention had not been given in the reasoning to the nature of the proceedings, which had been criminal not civil, the target, which had been the experts and not the court, and the seriousness of the criminal offence the client had been risking \u2013 an offence carrying a potential thirty-year prison sentence. In this connection, the dissenting judge argued that the Constitutional Court should have taken account of the principles arising in Kyprianou v. Cyprus ([GC], no. 73797/01, ECHR 2005-XIII), especially those relating to the role of defence lawyers in criminal trials. He pointed out that a public prosecutor could not be fined for contempt of court and that less invasive measures were available to the court which were applicable to both defence lawyers and public prosecutors. In his opinion, such measures might constitute interruption of the speech in question, a formal warning, and the informing of the appropriate professional association or body. Lastly, he pointed to the danger that the decision in the present case might have a discouraging effect on other defence lawyers, particularly given that the penalising of expressions such as \u201cprofessional weakness\u201d had been considered justified by the Constitutional Court. 18.  According to a letter by the Ljubljana District Court of 30 March 2017, prepared for the purposes of the present proceedings, the applicant paid the first fine (see paragraph 12 above) on 1 April 2005. 19.  On 3 February 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court issued a decision fining the applicant SIT 400,000 (approximately EUR 1,670) for contempt of court for his statements in the appeal proceedings regarding the expert witnesses, the State Prosecutor and the first-instance court (see paragraph 11 above). The court found that the following remarks of the applicant, the translation of which has not been disputed by the parties, amounted to contempt of court (taken from the decision):\n\u201cAs regards the State Prosecutor:\n\u2018... it can be concluded that someone \u2013 a person who was aware of the exculpatory nature of this documentation for the defendant \u2013 hid this documentation ...\u2019\n\u2018... it is permissible for a prosecutor to hide crucial evidence which could release the defendant from his liability ...\nAs regards the expert psychologist ... [J.R.] ... :\n\u2018... he had intentionally overlooked any information pointing to another possibility...\u2019\n\u2018... on the other hand, I, as a layman, consider this to be a reflection of possible narcissism on the part of the expert himself ...\u2019\nAs regards the forensic expert psychiatrist ... [V.R] ... :\n\u2018... from the perspective of forensic ethics, by which the forensic expert is bound, such a way of working represents an intentional violation of those ethics, giving statements without any scientifically based value ...\u2019\n\u2018... could be seen from the qualified (ab)use ((zlo)rabe) of the experiments, which the expert ...\u2019\n\u2018... as he cannot have the slightest idea (ne more imeti najmanj\u0161ega pojma) as to how far normality extends and when pathology starts ...\u2019\n\u2018... commenting on or describing handwriting analysis amounts to quackery (je na nivoju \u0161arlatanstva) ...\u2019\n\u2018... the psychiatrist either does not know all this or he is narcissistically ignoring it ...\u2019\n\u2018... in this case we can talk of a typical abuse of a test, most likely a pirate version. In view of the fact that this abuse of the test took place in proceedings before a court \u2013 a judicial institution \u2013 this is almost grotesque ...\u2019\n\u2018... the conclusion is almost dilettantish ...\u2019\n\u2018... The expert did not show the slightest scientific doubt (niti trohe prisotnosti znanstvenega dvoma), but instead focused all his energy on defending his own infallibility, which is extremely inappropriate for any expert, and for one who is \u201caccepting\u201d the expert skills (\u201csprejemnika\u201dizvedenske ve\u0161\u010dine) it is dangerous ...\u2019\n As regards the forensic expert ... [J.B.], the head of the forensic medicine institute:\n\u2018... and when such negligence (malomarnost) by experts in preparing their opinions, resulting in a [thirty]-year prison sentence, justifiably upsets me ...\u2019\n\u2018... that the negligence (\u0161lamparija) of this expert is immense ...\u2019\nAs regards the court:\n\u2018... the judicial farce referred to is of course not over ...\u2019\u201d\nOf the above, the second of the statements referring to the public prosecutor and the statements referring to expert J.B. were expressed orally at the Ljubljana Higher Court\u2019s session; the remainder were given in writing. 20.  In providing its reasoning for the decision, the Ljubljana Higher Court found that the applicant had expressed insulting value judgments which had shown contempt for the participants in the proceedings and the court and had had nothing to do with freedom of expression. The court also noted that the applicant had previously been offensive within the same set of proceedings and that therefore, even from a subjective perspective, the offensive statements had to have been made intentionally. As regards the level of the fine imposed on the applicant, the court noted that it reflected the nature and seriousness of the offensive statements, the fact that he was a lawyer with many years\u2019 experience of representation in court proceedings and the fact that he had previously made similar offensive statements during the first-instance proceedings. Lastly, the court decided to inform the Bar Association of the outcome of the proceedings. 21.  The applicant appealed against this decision on 17 March 2005. He argued that his statements had not been offensive, given their context. As regards the criticism expressed against the public prosecutor and the court, he referred to the arguments of the defence concerning the undisclosed results of the lie-detector test. Among other things, he stated that \u201csuch a way of evidence taking [was] mystic and [had] no connection with the modern trial\u201d. As regards expert J.R., the applicant stated that he had \u201cdirected all his intellectual abilities at defending his unprofessional opinion\u201d. The applicant further referred to the objections made by the defence, which had allegedly been ignored by J.R., and stated that he, \u201cas a layman, [could not] consider such conduct to be anything else than a reflection of possible narcissism on the part of the expert himself\u201d. Regarding the criticism of expert V.R., the applicant referred to the examination of this expert during the trial, to the statements he had given and which, in the applicant\u2019s view, showed that V.R. had been using methods which had not been within his competence, and had claimed to have been using a particular test \u201cwithout ever seeing the original ... in his life\u201d. The applicant also argued that V.R. had not shown \u201cthe slightest scientific doubt but had focused all his energy on defending his own infallibility\u201d. As to expert J.B., the applicant stressed that his comments had related to J.B.\u2019s assessment of the time of death \u2013 the air temperature at the time of the victims\u2019 death had been an important, but disregarded, factor. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, the assessment of the time of death had been done carelessly by J.B., who had kept changing his mind on the issue. The applicant pointed out that the time of death had been a crucial element in the trial and could have led to an acquittal if assessed properly. He concluded that \u201csuch expert opinions [were] a catastrophe for the Slovenian judiciary and very dangerous for its citizens\u201d. 22.  On 19 January 2006 the Supreme Court \u2012 sitting as a panel of five judges, one of whom was B.Z. \u2012 dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the courts were under obligation to protect their authority and the dignity of the participants in the proceedings. While section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act provided for disciplinary sanctions, it could not be interpreted as allowing sanctioning of every inappropriate expression. Instead, the courts were called to take into account all the circumstances and decide whether, on balance, the insult had been such as to require a disciplinary sanction. The Supreme Court stressed that the courts had to show particular restraint and caution in deciding on a disciplinary sanction against a defence counsel, because in such cases not only was his or her right to freedom of expression at stake but also his or her role in defending the accused person in criminal proceedings. It noted that a defence counsel might, therefore, be critical of the State prosecutor and other participants in the proceedings, including the court, but even this rule did not apply in absolute terms. If a defence counsel conducted his defence in criminal proceedings by insulting or humiliating other participants, by accusing them of personal dishonesty or bias or of lacking the essential professional capacities, personal qualities or similar, or if he or she was also insulting to the court, his or her conduct was deemed unacceptable and therefore had to be subject to a sanction by a fine pursuant to section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Supreme Court concurred with the Higher Court that the case at hand involved insulting value judgments and expressions of contempt and disrespect for other participants in the proceedings and the court. The Supreme Court referred to the applicant\u2019s statements and examined their semantic meanings and upheld the view that he \u201chad expressed contempt for the court experts, not only regarding their professional abilities but also by attributing to them negative personal characteristics, thereby expressing insulting value judgments\u201d. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the applicant had had the right to challenge the correctness of the court\u2019s procedural decisions, but should have done so in a legally acceptable manner. The Supreme Court also found that the Higher Court had provided reasonable grounds for the amount of the fine imposed. 23.  On 16 March 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal in which he complained of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention and Article 39 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression. He argued that his criticism had been essentially directed against the experts and the public prosecutor and not against the court. Although the participants in question might have preferred not to hear his opinion, he had had to express it for the benefit of the defendant. In the applicant\u2019s view, the court had to take into account the importance of freedom of expression in the process of a criminal trial, which was one of the most important mechanisms of State repression. He also argued that he had expressed acceptable criticism which, though presented in a slightly illustrative manner, had not been insulting to the experts but instead had challenged the credibility of their opinions. He argued that he had expressed the impugned opinions with the aim of providing the best possible defence to his client and that his punishment had not been necessary in a democratic society. Relying on Nikula (cited above), he argued that the critical comments had been directed solely at the unprofessional and inappropriate work of the experts and had not insulted the court in any way. 24.  On 31 March 2008, at an administrative session, the Constitutional Court decided that Judge J.Z. (who was not present) would not sit it the cases concerning the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in which he had taken part, or those in which his wife, Judge B.Z., had taken part. 25.  On 2 April 2008 an order was issued by the secretary general of the Constitutional Court for Judge J.Z.\u2019s removal from the \u201cconsideration and decision-making\u201d in the applicant\u2019s case. 26.  On 3 December 2008 a panel of three judges of the Constitutional Court issued a decision refusing to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for consideration on the merits as, in its view, it did not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 2 of section 55b of the Constitutional Court Act. Two judges, Judge E.P. and Judge J.P., voted in favour of the dismissal while Judge C.R. voted against it. It was also noted that as the panel had not been unanimous, the decision had been submitted to the remaining Constitutional Court judges pursuant to section 55c of the Constitutional Court Act. However, as the three votes in favour of examination had nevertheless not been obtained, the constitutional complaint was rejected. 27.  On 5 December 2016 the Constitutional Court sent to the applicant a corrigendum of its decision of 3 December 2008, noting that Judge J.Z. had not been submitted a decision as he had withdrawn from the case. The explanation to the corrigendum noted that after being requested by the State Attorney to send information for the purposes of the proceedings before this Court, the Constitutional Court upon looking into the file had discovered a clerical error, namely the omission to indicate in the decision sent to the applicant that Judge J.Z. had not taken part in the proceedings in question. 28.  According to a letter by the Ljubljana District Court of 30 March 2017, prepared for the purposes of the present proceedings, there was no record of the applicant having paid the second fine of SIT 400,000 (equal to approximately EUR 1,670 \u2013 see paragraph 19 above).", "references": ["8", "1", "2", "4", "7", "0", "5", "9", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1967, 1965 and 1972 respectively and at the time of lodging their applications they were serving their prison sentences in the Mu\u015f E-type prison. 5.  On 6 and 7 March 2006 each applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice, referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah \u00d6calan, by using the honorific \u201csay\u0131n\u201d, meaning esteemed. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicants were found guilty of breaching prison order by the Erzurum H- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as \u201cthe Board\u201d). 7.  On 5 April 2006 the applicants were each sentenced to 12 days\u2019 solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of the statements in the above mentioned letters. 8.  On 17 April 2006 the Erzurum Enforcement Judge rejected the applicants\u2019 objections. 9.  On 30 June 2006 the Erzurum Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 April 2006. 10.  Furthermore, on 4 July 2005 a disciplinary sanction was imposed on the first applicant, as he avoided visits and telephone calls to protest against the detention conditions of \u00d6calan. He was accordingly banned from receiving visitors for 2 months. On 21 October 2005 and 14 November 2005, respectively, the Erzurum Enforcement Court and the Erzurum Assize Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s appeal requests.", "references": ["0", "2", "5", "9", "3", "8", "1", "4", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Valencia. He has lived in San Jos\u00e9, a residential district of Valencia since 1962. Since 1974 Valencia City Council (\u201cthe City Council\u201d) has allowed licensed premises, such as bars, pubs and discotheques, to open in the vicinity of his home. In view of the problems caused by the noise, the City Council resolved on 22 December 1983 not to permit any more licensed premises to open in the area. However, the resolution was never implemented and new licences were granted. In 1993, the Polytechnic University of Valencia carried out a study of the levels of night-time noise during the weekend on behalf of the City Council. It was reported that in the San Jos\u00e9 district the noise levels were notably higher to the legally accepted norm. 6.  In 1994, the applicant became president of the neighbourhood association of his district. In that position, and in an attempt to improve the noise-pollution situation for both himself and his neighbours, he lodged various claims against the City Council. He also asked for the withdrawal of the business licences of several establishments. The City Council replied that in fact no business activities were being carried out in some of the premises, and that the business activities carried out in the others could not be considered as producing a high level of noise (for example bakeries). Lastly, the licences had in any case expired in many of the establishments. 7.  On 28 June 1996 the City Council adopted the municipal Ordinance on noise and vibrations (Ordenanza Municipal de Ruidos y Vibraciones \u2011 hereinafter \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d). Furthermore, in July 2000, at the applicant\u2019s request, the municipality required the pub located in the basement of the applicant\u2019s building to install a noise limiter. 8.  Following a resolution of the City Council, sitting in plenary session on 27 December 1996, which was published in the Valencia Official Gazette on 27 January 1997, the area in which the applicant lives was designated an \u201cacoustically saturated zone\u201d (zona ac\u00fasticamente saturada). 9.  In view of the fact that the levels of noise pollution did not decrease, the applicant decided to replace his windows with double glazing and to install air conditioning in order to alleviate the high temperatures caused by having the windows permanently closed in summer. 10.  On 14 June 1999 the applicant brought a preliminary State liability claim before the City Council, relying on Article 15 (right to life and to physical integrity) and Article 18 \u00a7 2 (right to privacy and inviolability of the home) of the Constitution. The applicant asked for compensation for the expenses incurred, as well as for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 11.  Having received no reply from the authorities (silencio administrativo negativo), the applicant lodged a complaint with the Valencia High Court of Justice (\u201cthe High Court\u201d) on 5 December 2001. On 5 January 2001 the City Council issued a resolution denying his preliminary State liability claim. The City Council joined the proceedings before the High Court. 12.  The applicant provided the court with two reports: the first one of 1 April 1998 prepared by the municipal service for the environment stated that:\n\u201cPrior to the entry into force of the declaration of an acoustically saturated zone, the levels of disturbance by noise during the night exceeded 65 decibels, mainly during the nights from Thursdays to Sundays from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in the morning.\n... after the declaration [of the area] as an acoustically saturated zone and the adoption of some corrective measures the levels of disturbance still exceed [those permitted for night-time]. 13.  The second report was issued on 28 March 2000 by the same municipal service, which admitted that:\n\u201c... it must be concluded that ... the limits established in Article 30 \u00a7 2 of [the Ordinance] are still being exceeded.\u201d 14.  In order to sustain his arguments, the applicant also produced an expert report, produced by an applied physics professor, which was joined to his complaint. The report noted as follows:\n\u201cThe measured noise on the street and the noise perceived by neighbours in their homes, in the Xuquer area of Valencia \u2013 which is where the applicant lives \u2013 rise high total levels of ... 70 decibels ... Those levels are clearly related to the presence of a concentration of the entertainment industry in that area (pubs and discotheques). 15.  As a result of this situation, the expert stated that it could be estimated that the sound levels for instance in a front facing bedroom were approximately 50 decibels (hereinafter dBA) and sometimes they could even reach 60 dBA. The expert highlighted that the City Council had recommended a maximum permitted level at night of 30 dBA. Consequently, there was a difference of 20-30 dBA. However, the expert report pointed out that this was a general estimation and that it was made without measuring the inside of the dwellings concerned. 16.  Lastly, the applicant produced a medical report stating that he was suffering from anxiety due to the excessive noise inside his flat. The report concluded by considering that there was a relationship of cause-effect between the noise pollution and his psychiatric illness. 17.  During the proceedings, the High Court ordered a legal medical expert report by a specialist in preventive medicine. The appointed expert reported that:\n\u201c... the nocturnal noise altered necessarily the physiological sleep of Mr Cuenca and his family, [although it is not] possible to ascertain the intensity of the disturbance owing to the lack of corresponding sleep studies\u201d.\n\u201c... the sleep disturbance as a consequence of that noise produced in Mr Cuenca an \u2018anxious depressive syndrome reacting to the noise, change in his psychiatric state manifested by irritability with his, anxiety, diminution of intellectual ability and somatization\u2019\u201d. 18.  The City Council maintained that it was not proven that the applicant was suffering the noise level which he claimed in his home, as the environmental noise is perceived differently in each home, according to its height, aspect and other particularities. Furthermore, the City Council had been carrying out extensive activities in order to enforce compliance with the legislation on noise. It could not be said that the City Council tolerated infractions of that legislation. 19.  In a judgment of 20 June 2003 the High Court dismissed the complaint. It found that there was no causal connection between the noise pollution and the alleged damage caused to the applicant, since there was no evidence proving that in his particular flat the level of noise pollution exceeded the established limits. Indeed, the applicant had decided to replace his windows without previously asking for a measurement of the noise inside his flat, as provided by Article 54 of the Ordinance. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the applicant\u2019s flat was on the fourth floor, where the noise would certainly be less intense than on a lower floor. 20.  The applicant lodged an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court, claiming that the State had violated his fundamental rights protected by Articles 14 (equality before the law), 15 (right to life and to physical and moral integrity), 18 (inviolability of the home) and 24 (right to a fair trial) of the Spanish Constitution. This appeal was initially dismissed on 18 October 2004. 21.  On 16 November 2004 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter \u201cthe Court\u201d) delivered a judgment in the case of Moreno G\u00f3mez v. Spain (no. 4143/02, ECHR 2004\u2011X). In the light of this judgment, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal against the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, asking for the admission of the applicant\u2019s amparo appeal. On 31 January 2005 the Constitutional Court upheld the public prosecutor\u2019s appeal and declared the amparo appeal admissible. The Constitutional Court stated that the judgment issued by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Moreno Gomez:\n\u201c... justifie[d] entirely the reconsideration of the present amparo appeal, in order to ascertain the measure in which it might deal with an analogous case, and to examine whether the objects of analysis of the [Strasbourg] Court [had been] the same fundamental rights as in this amparo appeal\u201d. 22.  In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the public prosecutor claimed that there had been a violation of Articles 15 and 18 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution. He argued that the Court had already addressed this issue in the case of Moreno G\u00f3mez, which had dealt with the exact same situation suffered by the applicant\u2019s neighbour, and declared that Spain had violated Article 8 of the Convention. The prosecutor considered that Moreno G\u00f3mez and the applicant\u2019s case were similar in terms of the facts as well as in the object and the merits, which was in principle sufficient to deliver a judgment on the merits on the alleged violations of the right to private and family life and to inviolability of the home. 23.  In a judgment of 29 September 2011, served on the applicant on 19 October 2011, the plenary of the Constitutional Court dismissed the amparo appeal, arguing that (1) both cases were not identical, (2) the applicant had not proved that in his particular case the noise at his flat was above the permitted level, (3) that the City Council had indeed adopted specific measures to reduce noise pollution at the applicant\u2019s neighbourhood and (4) that he had not proved that his health problems had been directly caused by noise pollution. The judgment was not adopted by unanimity. 24.  Three judges out of twelve issued a dissenting opinion holding that there had been a violation of Articles 10 \u00a7 2, 18 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Constitution. In particular, the dissenting judges argued that the standard employed by the Constitutional Court to decide when the right to privacy and family life had been infringed should have been based on the case-law of the Court and that prolonged exposure to a high levels of sound that could be qualified as avoidable and unbearable deserved the protection of the courts, given that it impeded him from living a normal life. They reiterated that according to the judgment delivered in the Moreno G\u00f3mez case (cited above), the assessment of a violation no longer depended on the evidence provided by the applicant about the seriousness of the noise pollution inside his home. Instead, the decisive element was to be hereafter the location of the house in an excessively noisy area and it would be enough for the applicant to prove the excessive level of noise in the street. Furthermore, the effects of noise on the applicant\u2019s health had been confirmed by the expert report issued in the proceedings before the High Court.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "3", "2", "6", "1", "7", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1976 respectively. 6.  At the material time, the first applicant, Mr Fevzi Sayg\u0131l\u0131, was the owner of a daily newspaper, Yeni Evrensel. The second applicant, Mr Ali Karata\u015f, was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. 7.  On 8 January 2000 an article entitled \u201cFriends, I surely have to watch [it]\u201d (\u201cBen mutlaka izlemeliyim arkada\u015flar\u201d) written by Fatih Polat was published on page two of Yeni Evrensel\u2019s 472nd issue. It concerned a case that had caused a public outcry in Turkey, namely that of Metin G\u00f6ktepe, a journalist who was beaten to death by the police whilst under arrest in 1996[1]. Following the killing, the Turkish Grand National Assembly set up a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission in order to shed light on the murder of Metin G\u00f6ktepe. On 19 July 1996 the Commission published its report which contained, among other things, the names, the functions and the statements of numerous police officers, including O.T. and K.B.\nThe above-mentioned article read as follows:\n\u201cThis is what Metin said [I surely have to watch [it]] to colleagues who were making their final preparations to observe the funerals of R\u0131za Boyba\u015f and Orhan \u00d6zen \u2013 two revolutionary detainees who had been killed in \u00dcmraniye Prison four days earlier \u2013 when he arrived at the newspaper office on 8 January 1996. This was an expression of his commitment and involvement in life with a great enthusiasm, which went beyond the mere love of his job.\nThe difference between doing this job [journalism] reluctantly and doing it wholeheartedly and flawlessly was apparent in his effort to report events fully, notwithstanding the hindrances created by the police at Alibeyk\u00f6y, where he went on the day of the events.\nUnlike his colleagues, he perceived pushing against the police barricade as the means to reach the news behind that barricade. What else was journalism for?\nThe barricade that stands in front of the reality that the people of Turkey need stands in front of the journalist sometimes officially, sometimes unofficially and sometimes in the form of a gang. However, when that barricade is broken down, a dark bottomless well filled with the danger of \u201cbeing eliminated\u201d \u2212 to use the expression of the official Susurluk Report \u2212 is waiting in front of you to swallow you up. In the last ten years alone, fifty-one journalists have been swallowed up by this well. The important message behind this is that we need determination to go beyond the darkness and reach the light. Or, to put it a different way, it is not possible to reach the light from the darkness without eliminating the eliminators (Ya da, ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle, \u201cbertaraf ediciler\u201d, \u201cbertaraf\u201d edilmeden karanl\u0131ktan s\u00fcrekli ayd\u0131nl\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kmak da m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fil). Following Metin\u2019s death, the honest journalists of Turkey, especially the young ones, thought that waiting to confront that reality was a hopeless prospect. Indeed, they thought that it was already too late. It was also like this for the country\u2019s working class who constantly encountered the police in their struggle to seek legal solutions. Moreover, Metin was one of them. This consciousness became the driving force behind the transformation of every hearing of his trial \u2212 which was \u201cexiled\u201d, first to Ayd\u0131n then to Afyon Province, with the aim of keeping it hidden from public view \u2212 into a demonstration.\nWe have learnt that the murderers will be tried, and we are duty-bound to ensure the effective continuation of such proceedings. This has been the only trial involving a journalist in which the murderers were punished notwithstanding the public authorities\u2019 reluctance \u2212 which has taught us all that democracy is won not by waiting for it to appear from some place but by standing up for it. And above all, assuming that the protective ring around the former Director of \u0130stanbul Security Directorate, O.T., who issued the collective detention order which ended with the death of Metin, and around Vice-Director K.B., who executed this order, would remain in place forever would represent nothing but a lack of faith in all these struggles (Metin\u2019in \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcyle sonu\u00e7lanan toplu g\u00f6zalt\u0131 emrini veren d\u00f6nemin \u0130stanbul Emniyet M\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc O.T. ile bu emri uygulayan yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 K.B.\u2019\u0131n \u00fczerindeki koruma halesinin sonsuza kadar \u00f6yle kalaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmek ise, her\u015feyden \u00f6nce verilen onca m\u00fccadeleye kar\u015f\u0131 bir inan\u00e7s\u0131zl\u0131k olur). All those following the case of Metin G\u00f6ktepe will not stop coming after T. and B., who were already guilty in people\u2019s minds (Metin G\u00f6ktepe davas\u0131n\u0131n takip\u00e7isi olanlar, halk\u0131n vicdan\u0131nda \u00e7oktan mahkum olan T. ve B.\u2019\u0131n pe\u015fini elbette b\u0131rakmayacaklar).\nThe fact that the eliminators dragged one more name into their dark well after Metin\u2019s, namely that of Ahmet Taner K\u0131\u015flal\u0131, has shown another reality. Absolute protection from this fate requires constant and persistent monitoring. Is not one of the reasons why we are entering the third millennium with unsolved journalist murders the fact that those who occupy the seat and write the column of \u00c7etin Eme\u00e7 at H\u00fcrriyet, and those who occupy the seat and write the column of Abdi \u0130pek\u00e7i at Milliyet, and also the newspaper of the journalist \u0130zzet Kezer, did not make it their business to reveal the murderers and all those responsible in the first place?\nIs there any solution other than coming after the \u201celiminators\u201d, whilst \u201csurely watching\u201d, and removing them and their collaborators completely from our soil, in order to save ourselves from becoming a country in which gangs can behave as they please?\u201d 8.  On 18 January 2000 the prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with that court and charged the applicants with offences defined in Section 6 \u00a7 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), namely disclosing the identities of public officials who are involved in the fight against terrorism, thereby rendering such persons targets for terrorist organisations. In addition, he called for the application of Additional section 2 of the Press Act (Law no. 5680) and Article 36 of the former Criminal Code. 9.  In a petition dated 17 May 2000 the applicants\u2019 lawyer argued in their defence submissions that the crime of disclosing the identities of public officials who are involved in the fight against terrorism is not committed merely by using the officials\u2019 names in connection with a case in which they have been tried as accused. The applicants\u2019 lawyer maintained that the persons were already known to the public due to their positions and that their names were already in the public domain. He further contended that the applicants\u2019 trial before the State Security Court was in contravention of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention. 10.  On 21 June 2000 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to heavy fines, of 474,481,000 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 804 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) and TRL 237,240,000 (approximately EUR 402) respectively. In accordance with Additional section 2 \u00a7 1 of Law no. 5680, the first-instance court also ordered the temporary closure of the newspaper for a period of seven days. According to the brief reasons given by the Istanbul State Security Court, the following sentences from the article were sufficient to conclude that O.T. and K.B. had been rendered targets for terrorist organisations:\n\u201c... it is not possible to reach the light from the darkness without eliminating the eliminators ... And above all, supposing that the protective ring around the former Director of \u0130stanbul Security Directorate, O.T., who issued the collective detention order which ended with the death of Metin, and around Vice-Director K.B., who executed this order, would remain in place forever would represent nothing but a lack of faith in all these struggles. All those following the case of Metin G\u00f6ktepe will not stop coming after T. and B., who were already guilty in people\u2019s minds.\u201d 11.  On the same day, the applicants lodged an appeal. They stated first of all that the article in question had been written on the fourth anniversary of the killing of journalist Metin G\u00f6ktepe, who had been beaten to death by the police in 1996 whilst in custody. The applicants argued that the purpose of the article had been to raise concern over the fact that some high-ranking officials had not been tried and that those accused in Metin G\u00f6ktepe\u2019s trial had still not been convicted, four years after the death of Metin G\u00f6ktepe. The applicants maintained in this respect that the two officials concerned, namely O.T. and K.B., were the ones who had given and executed the detention order which had resulted in Metin G\u00f6ktepe\u2019s death. The applicants also pointed out that these two officials had been the only ones in respect of whom the requests for authorisation to prosecute under Law no. 4483 (Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials) had been rejected by the Interior Minister at the material time. The names of the two officials had therefore been mentioned in the article because of their involvement in the above\u2011mentioned events and not because of their role in the fight against terrorism. The applicants further submitted that the names of the officials had already appeared in the public domain and that the officials, being the Director and the Vice-Director of Istanbul Security Directorate, were already known to the public and thus not in a position to complain about the disclosure of their identities. 12.  As regards the content of the article, the applicants observed that the writer of the article had defended the rule of law and the notion of justice and had not incited people to violence or advocated terrorism. According to the applicants, the article constituted a critical assessment of Metin G\u00f6ktepe\u2019s trial and of the impunity of some high-ranking officials, as well as the challenges journalists were facing. 13.  The applicants emphasised that the sentence \u201cAnd above all, assuming that the protective ring around the former Director of \u0130stanbul Security Directorate, O.T., who issued the collective detention order which ended with the death of Metin, and around Vice-Director K.B., who executed this order, would remain in place forever, would represent nothing but a lack of faith in all these struggles\u201d had been a reference to the fact that no permission had been given under Law no. 4483 to authorise the prosecution of the two officials in question for their alleged criminal conduct in connection with the events surrounding Metin G\u00f6ktepe\u2019s death. 14.  They observed that, with the sentence \u201c...it is not possible to reach the light from the darkness without eliminating the eliminators\u201d the writer of the article had highlighted the challenges faced by journalists in their struggle to seek justice. This being so, they argued that it was untenable to conclude that the writer had in any way suggested the physical elimination of the two officials. 15.  Lastly, they asserted that with the expression \u201ccoming after\u201d the writer had obviously referred to the aftermath of Metin G\u00f6ktepe\u2019s trial which contributed significantly to the punishment of the accused police officers. According to the applicants, the writer had wished the cases against the two officials to be followed up by the people of Turkey with a view to bringing these officials to justice. 16.  In their appeal application, the applicants requested that the Court of Cassation hold a hearing. 17.  They also complained about the application of Additional section 2 \u00a7 1 of Law no. 5680. 18.  On 1 February 2001 the Court of Cassation rejected the request for a hearing and upheld the judgment. 19.  The closure order for the newspaper was executed from 20 to 27 March 2001.", "references": ["5", "0", "3", "4", "2", "8", "7", "9", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Erzincan. 5.  The applicant was a civil servant in the Erzincan Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, and at the time of the events he was a member of the local branch of a trade union affiliated to KESK (Kamu Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikalar\u0131 Konfederasyonu \u2013 Confederation of Public Employees\u2019 Trade Unions). 6.  On 27 November 2004 and 12 December 2004 respectively, the applicant participated in a press statement and a demonstration organised by his trade union. 7.  Subsequently, a disciplinary investigation was initiated against the applicant for his participation in the above mentioned trade union activities. 8.  On 31 August 2005 a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reduction in salary was imposed on the applicant for having participated in trade union activities. 9.  On 27 October 2005 the applicant filed a petition with the Sivas Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the disciplinary sanction that had been imposed on him. 10.  On 18 May 2006 the Sivas Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, considering that the administrative decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment. 11.  On 20 October 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Sivas Administrative Court.", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "8", "9", "2", "3", "6", "5", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Mrs Daniela Nedescu, is married to the second applicant, Mr C\u0103lin Nedescu. They were born in 1976 and live in Bucharest. 6.  In 2008 the applicants, who were childless but wanted to have children, decided to try assisted reproduction at a private clinic, the S. Clinic.\nIt appears that the S. Clinic had previously applied to the National Transplant Agency (\u201cthe Transplant Agency\u201d) for authorisation to function as a cell and tissue bank and user in accordance with the legal requirements, an application which was still pending completion in 2008. 7.  Following an ovarian stimulation and in vitro fertilisation, seven embryos were obtained, of which three were transferred immediately to Mrs Nedescu, who became pregnant and gave birth. 8.  The four remaining embryos were frozen and put in storage at the S. Clinic in November 2008 with a view to their future use by Mrs Nedescu. 9.  On 15 July 2009 the procedure for obtaining the required authorisation from the Transplant Agency was completed and the S. Clinic was authorised to act as a medical centre that could function as a storage bank for genetic material. 10.  On 24 July 2009, following a criminal investigation into the delivery of the above authorisation, the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism attached to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Romania (DIICOT) closed the S. Clinic, seized all the genetic material found there, including the applicants\u2019 embryos, and transferred it to the Mina Minovici Institute of Forensic Medicine (\u201cthe IFM\u201d).\nThe applicants\u2019 embryos and those of other couples were kept in containers. Each container had different vials for each set of embryos. 11.  It appears from a DIICOT report dated 9 November 2009 that the embryos of more than 240 families were seized at the S. Clinic.\nAs with other patients of the Clinic, the applicants were neither informed of the seizure, which they learned about from the media, nor consulted about the transfer of the seized embryos from the S. Clinic to the IFM. 12.  On 13 March 2010 the applicants requested that DIICOT allow them to retrieve their embryos as they wished to undergo a new assisted reproduction procedure in another clinic. They pointed out that it was of the utmost importance that they be allowed to retrieve the embryos rapidly since the storage period was to expire in August 2010 and there was a strict procedure for the transfer. 13.  On 30 March 2010 DIICOT allowed the applicants to recover the embryos directly from the IFM. They had to be accompanied by an embryologist and provide a special container with liquid nitrogen. 14.  On 21 July 2010 the applicants went to the IFM accompanied by an embryologist, however, they were not allowed to retrieve the embryos. They were asked instead to show that the Transplant Agency had approved the transfer. 15.  The first applicant, under the supervision of a specialist doctor, therefore attempted to have a new ovarian stimulation in the hope of creating new embryos. 16.  However, on 18 August 2010, while being treated for premature menopause, she underwent a medical examination which revealed that her state of health did not allow her to undergo another ovarian stimulation. 17.  The applicants joined the criminal proceedings instituted against the administrative board of the S. Clinic and the doctors practising within or in cooperation with it, and sought damages under domestic tort provisions for not being able to use the embryos. In an interlocutory judgment of 29 November 2010 the applicants\u2019 action was dismissed for lack of victim status on the grounds that the IFM\u2019s refusal to allow them to recover the embryos had no link with the crimes allegedly committed by the accused. The applicants were directed to bring a claim for damages before a civil court. 18.  The applicants therefore resumed their efforts to retrieve the embryos deposited with the IFM, but were not successful. 19.  In November 2010 they brought an action before the Bucharest Court of Appeal against the Transplant Agency and the Ministry of Health, seeking to obtain the agency\u2019s authorisation to transfer their embryos to an authorised clinic, in Romania or abroad, where Mrs Nedescu could try again to become pregnant. 20.  On 12 December 2010 Mrs Nedescu had another examination, which led to the same conclusions as on 18 August 2010. 21.  On 13 December 2010 the Transplant Agency informed the applicants that it refused to approve a transfer of the embryos. It stated that DIICOT had moved the embryos to the IFM unlawfully as the institute had never obtained the required permit to act as a tissue and cell bank. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relied on by DIICOT had also not provided any guarantees for the safety of the embryos deposited with the IFM. 22.  At a hearing on 22 March 2011 the applicants asked the Court of Appeal to order the transfer of the embryos from the IFM to a private clinic of their choice located in Sibiu, the P. Clinic, which was authorised to carry out assisted reproduction and act as a genetic material storage bank. 23.  The court dismissed the applicants\u2019 application on the same day. It relied on the provisions of section 148(4) and (5) of the Health Care Reform Act. It found that the Transplant Agency\u2019s refusal to allow the transfer of the embryos had been lawful since neither the S. Clinic nor the IFM had been accredited or authorised to function as genetic material banks and the transfer of genetic material could only be performed between institutions authorised to function as such storage banks. 24.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 25.  On 12 October 2011 DIICOT appointed a public hospital, the P.S. Hospital, as the new legal custodian for all the embryos, including the ones belonging to the applicants.\nThe transfer of the embryos to the new custodian took place on 19 October 2011. According to a report drafted by the judicial authorities on that occasion, Ms A.M., the doctor from P.S. Hospital who took delivery of the embryos, drew up a disclaimer to the effect that the genetic material listed in the inventory accompanying the embryos had been received without any prior checks of the vials, that it had not been possible for her to check each individual item owing to the absence of the embryologist who had participated in the initial freezing and that the procedures in use at that time were different from those used by the first custodian. 26.  On 20 December 2011 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed the appeal against the judgment of 22 March 2011 and ordered the Transplant Agency to implement the prosecutor\u2019s decision to return the embryos by allowing their transfer from the IFM to an authorised clinic or hospital of the applicants\u2019 choice in Romania or abroad.\nIt found, firstly, that the Transplant Agency, which was organised as a structure within the Ministry of Health, had been duly informed about the investigating authorities\u2019 decision to deposit the material seized at the S. Clinic with the IFM, and that, secondly, the Ministry of Health had signed the record drawn up at the end of the procedure for moving the embryos to the IFM, together with the investigating authorities.\nIt held that in so far as the Transplant Agency\u2019s task was to coordinate the activities of procuring, processing, preserving, storing, approving and distributing human tissue and cells in Romania, there had been no legal grounds for it to interfere with the implementation of the prosecutor\u2019s decision to return the embryos to the applicants.\nThe High Court further relied on the Government\u2019s observations submitted to the Court in the case of Knecht v. Romania (no. 10048/10, 2 October 2012), from which it could be seen that the investigating authorities had authorised Ms Knecht to retrieve her embryos from the IFM, and that the Government\u2019s understanding was that Ms Knecht had been lawfully entitled to arrange for their transfer to an authorised clinic. The High Court stressed that Mr and Mrs Nedescu\u2019s embryos had been stored in the same container as those belonging to Ms Knecht. There was therefore nothing to prevent them from arranging the transfer of their embryos to an authorised clinic or hospital of their choice, in Romania or abroad.\nLastly, the court granted costs and fees of 4,000 Romanian lei (RON) to the applicants. 27.  On 26 March 2012 DIICOT informed the applicants that the prosecutor had appointed P.S. Hospital as the new legal custodian of their embryos. They therefore had to agree on a transfer date with that institution in order to retrieve the embryos. 28.  The applicants contacted P.S. Hospital, which informed them on 27 September 2012 that they could only retrieve the embryos if they were accompanied by a representative from the Transplant Agency, an embryologist from the S. Clinic, where the embryos had been stored initially, and a DIICOT representative. 29.  On 1 November 2012 P.S. Hospital informed the applicants that in order to retrieve their embryos they had to agree on a date, obtain an authorisation document from the Transplant Agency, make sure a certified specialist embryologist was present and provide a special container with liquid nitrogen from an accredited transportation company. 30.  On 12 November 2012, in reply to a request from the applicants, P.S. Hospital informed them that it could not transfer the remaining embryos to Mrs Nedescu as they had only been appointed as a custodian by DIICOT. Nevertheless, the applicants could attempt to obtain new embryos at the hospital which could then be transferred to her. 31.  In a letter dated 7 January 2013 to the Government Agent, a representative of P.S. Hospital reiterated that the embryos could only be retrieved after prior approval from the Transplant Agency and that an embryologist from the S. Clinic and a DIICOT representative had to be present.\nIt also stated that they declined any responsibility for the identification, quality and viability of the frozen embryos deposited with the IFM because DIICOT had not organised any individual identification when the embryos had been transferred. The hospital could therefore only assume that the embryos belonging to the Nedescus were among those that had been transferred to it. The hospital reiterated that the IFM had no authorisation to function as a genetic material bank (for tissues and cells).\nFurthermore, the hospital did not only have the task of implementing DIICOT\u2019s decision to allow the applicants to remove the embryos and ensure respect for the conditions that the removal be made in the presence of an embryologist and include the provision of a container with liquid nitrogen. It also had to comply with the relevant legislation on the removal and transfer of genetic material and with the conditions set down by the Transplant Agency in a decision of 3 June 2011, Decision no. 5.\nThe representative also stated that the existing embryos could be transferred to the mother at the hospital but that the hospital\u2019s own doctors would not carry out the procedure as they could not assume any responsibility owing to the quality of the embryos. However, the hospital preferred that such a transfer be performed elsewhere. 32.  On 16 January 2013 the applicants applied to DIICOT to be appointed custodians of their own embryos. They indicated that they were able to bear the costs of becoming custodians.\nA DIICOT prosecutor informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer by telephone that the application had been rejected.\nIn a letter dated 18 April 2013 to the Government\u2019s Agent, a DIICOT chief prosecutor stated that the cost of appointing the applicants as custodians was very high and that the judicial bodies involved had no competence to make such a decision. In any event, \u201cno formula allowing for consensus among all the parties involved has so far been identified\u201d. 33.  Following the criminal investigation of the S. Clinic (see paragraph 10 above), the High Court of Cassation on 21 October 2014 found its managers, owner and the then director of the Transplant Agency guilty of association for the purposes of creating a criminal group. It handed down various prison sentences.", "references": ["9", "6", "2", "0", "5", "7", "8", "1", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Galway, Ireland. 6.  On 27 March 2000 the applicant gave birth to a child, a girl named A. She was married at the time to the child\u2019s father, M.K., and lived in Poland. She already had a son from a previous relationship, B, born in 1993. 7.  In 2006 the family moved to Ireland. They lived there together until January 2009, when the couple split up and M.K. moved back to Poland. 8.  In June 2009 M.K. went to Ireland on holiday and said he intended to take A to Poland for the summer holidays. The applicant was concerned whether M.K. would return the child to Ireland after their holidays in Poland. On 29 June 2009 she instituted proceedings before Ennis District Court under the Guardianship of Infants Act of 1964, seeking declaration that the habitual residence of the child was in Ireland and that the child was to return to Ireland on 15 August 2009. 9.  On 2 July 2009 the Ennis District Court issued a consent order as an interim measure. It stated that the child could visit Poland between 7 July and 15 August 2009 with M.K. and established that her habitual residence was in Ireland. Other custody matters were adjourned to the next hearing, scheduled for 15 September 2009. On the latter day the court issued a certificate of enforceability of the order of 2 July 2009, pursuant to Article 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (\u201cthe Brussels II bis Regulation\u201d). 10.  M.K. failed to return A to her mother on 15 August 2009. 11.  On 15 September 2009 the Ennis District Court decided that A\u2019s residence would be in Ireland with her mother, who was granted sole custody. The court also ordered the return of the child to the applicant. On 17 September 2009 it also issued a certificate of enforceability of the order pursuant to Article 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. 12.  M.K. appealed against the order of 15 September 2009 but the appeal was dismissed by the Limerick Circuit Family Court on 10 December 2009. 13.  In September 2009 the applicant applied to the Polish Ministry of Justice \u2013 designated as the Central Authority under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d) \u2013 for assistance in securing the return of the child. 14.  On 6 October 2009 the Malbork District Court heard the applicant\u2019s application and M.K.\u2019s counterclaim to dismiss the case. It decided to commission an expert opinion from the Regional Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny O\u015brodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny \u2013 \u201cRODK\u201d). 15.  On 18 December 2009 the Malbork District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application under the Hague Convention to return A to her. The court based its decision on Article 13, stating that the Polish authorities were not bound to return the child since there was a risk she would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. The court supported its reasoning by referring to the findings of the RODK and other social and psychological studies. In particular, the court highlighted that the RODK report had stated that A wished to remain in Poland. The RODK had also stated that M.K. was closer to A and more attentive to her particular needs than the applicant. It was found that although the applicant was also an important person in A\u2019s life, the child saw her actions as going against her own wishes and placing her in uncomfortable situations. 16.  On 18 May 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. The court took into account the preference of A to stay with her father. The child, at that time nine-years-old, was considered by the experts as mature and aware of her family situation. 17.  On 15 October 2009 the applicant applied to the Polish authorities to recognise and enforce the Ennis District Court\u2019s order of 15 September 2009. 18.  On 18 November 2009 the applicant requested that the proceedings be dealt with more speedily and that an earlier date for hearing the case be scheduled. The applicant underlined her lack of contact with her daughter. 19.  On 4 December 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court decided to enforce the Irish order of 15 September 2009. M.K. appealed to the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal. 20.  On 22 June 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court of 4 December 2009. The court decided that the Irish court had ruled on parental responsibility and that judgment could not be reconciled with the subsequent judgment of the Polish court of 18 December 2009 dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim for the child\u2019s return under the Hague Convention. The Irish decision was therefore no longer enforceable in Poland. 21.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 22.  On 24 August 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s ruling and remitted the case for re-examination. The Supreme Court firstly reiterated that the provisions of the Brussels II bis Regulation were binding and directly applicable. Secondly, the court explained that the purpose of a ruling under the Hague Convention was the prompt return of a child to the country of his or her habitual residence. A decision to return a child or a decision to refuse such a return under Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention could not be understood as containing a ruling on matters of custody or parental responsibility. The reasons for a decision not to return a child under Article 13 (b) were factual in nature and could not create a new custodial right. That had also been set out in Article 10 of the Hague Convention. Thirdly, the exception allowing for a refusal to enforce a judgment provided for in Article 23 (e) of the Brussels II bis Regulation required the existence of a later and contradictory ruling relating to parental responsibility. The decision of 18 December 2009 issued under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention could not be considered as such a ruling. 23.  On 28 February 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal refused to declare that the order of 15 September 2009 was enforceable on the grounds that the High Court of Ireland had made a new custody order on 9 September 2011 (see paragraph 27 below). 24.  On 4 October 2010 the applicant lodged an application in Ireland for enforcement of the Ennis District Court\u2019s decision of 15 September 2009 and the return of A to her. 25.  On 28 January 2011 the High Court of Ireland gave an interim order. It considered that the Irish courts had jurisdiction to decide on the custody of A and had retained that jurisdiction after her wrongful removal in August 2009. 26.  On 28 August 2011 a court-commissioned clinical psychological report was published. The expert involved interviewed the applicant, A and M.K. She found that both parents had the ability to provide a stable and loving home environment for A and that their care and affection was important to her emotional, social and psychological wellbeing. The report recommended that the court should take account of the wish A had expressed to attend school in Poland and to consider an arrangement whereby the child lived with her father during school terms and spend her holidays in Ireland. The report also stated that firm arrangements should be put in place by the court for the time that A was to spend in her mother\u2019s care and for the father\u2019s access during those times since, if there was room for parental discretion, the time allocated was likely to be reduced. That was especially important because there was a risk that M.K. would interfere with the development of the child\u2019s confidence and security in her mother\u2019s care owing to the father\u2019s belief in the importance of his constant input in A\u2019s life. 27.  On 9 September 2011 the High Court of Ireland gave a judgment superseding the order of 15 September 2009. The court decided to grant joint custody to both parents, but still ordered the child\u2019s return to Ireland by 2 November 2011. The court decided that A should finish the school year in Ireland and start the next one, from September 2012, in Poland. The judgment also set out which parts of the school holidays A should spend with the applicant and which with M.K. 28.  M.K. unsuccessfully appealed against the judgment and was refused a stay in the order on 21 October 2011. 29.  In October 2011 the applicant lodged an application with the Polish Ministry of Justice to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Ireland of 9 September 2011 and for the return of the child to her. The Polish Ministry of Justice advised the Irish Central Authority to lodge an application with the relevant court in Poland for the compulsory removal of the child. 30.  On 28 November 2011 the applicant lodged a request through the Irish Central Authority to have A returned to her. 31.  From October 2011 to January 2012 the Irish and the Polish Central Authorities corresponded with each other for the purposes of enforcing the Irish judgment of 9 September 2011. 32.  On 23 January 2012 the Irish Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform received a letter from the Polish Ministry of Justice stating that the applicant\u2019s application for the compulsory removal of her daughter and her return to Ireland had been sent to the Gda\u0144sk District Court that day. 33.  On 25 January 2012 the Irish Family Liaison Judge for the European Judicial Network (EJN) sent a letter to the Polish Family Liaison Judge for the European Judicial Network, urging Poland to execute the High Court of Ireland\u2019s custody decision of 9 September 2011. Noting that M.K. had commenced divorce proceedings in which there was also a reference to custody, the letter also requested that the relevant judge in the divorce proceedings be made aware of the High Court of Ireland order of 9 September 2011. 34.  On 4 May 2012 the court appointed guardian interviewed A and submitted an opinion to the court. It stated that A had wished to stay in Poland where she had had home, school, and friends. A expressed her wish to have regular contacts with her mother via Skype. She felt her mother had been putting pressure on her to return to Ireland. The parental conflict made her follow a psychological treatment and take antidepressant medication. 35.  On 9 May 2012 the Malbork District Court held a hearing and encouraged the parties to reach agreement on a date for the child\u2019s return to Ireland. At the hearing M.K. explained that he had refused to comply with the Irish courts\u2019 orders because his daughter had been in a bad psychological state. 36.  On 28 June 2012 the Malbork District Court ordered A\u2019s removal from M.K. by a guardian on the basis of Article 598 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court also ordered that its decision was immediately enforceable. 37.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant and the guardian arrived at M.K.\u2019s place of residence to take the child away, but found no one there. 38.  On 9 July 2012 the guardian made a further attempt to remove the child but their home was again empty. On 13 July 2012 the guardian made a third unsuccessful attempt to remove the child. On 24 July 2012 the guardian requested that the police intervene. 39.  On 7 September 2012 the Malbork District Court discontinued proceedings for the compulsory execution of the decision by the Irish court of 9 September 2011. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s right to demand A\u2019s return to Ireland had effectively expired on 31 August 2012 and that, as of that day, there was no executory title which could provide grounds for proceedings to be carried out effectively. It found that the original 2011 Irish order had stated that A was to start the 2012 school year in Poland and so her compulsory removal, as a minor, was not allowed. 40.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant met A outside her school and travelled to Ireland with her. 41.  On 12 November 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court quashed the Malbork District Court findings of 7 September 2012, stating that the return order remained valid. 42.  On 21 October 2012 the applicant applied to the High Court of Ireland for an order prohibiting A\u2019s removal from that country by any person save the applicant, unless she had given her consent or a court had given leave. During the subsequent proceedings M.K. made requests to have unsupervised contact with A by telephone or Skype. The court commissioned an expert opinion and held hearings. 43.  On 24 June 2013 the parties reached an agreement. The terms of the agreement stated that the applicant would have sole custody of A for the following year, pending review by the court in July 2014. It also set out M.K.\u2019s access rights, which provided that during his visits to Ireland he would have to give two weeks\u2019 notice to the applicant and could see the child on Saturdays from 1.30 p.m. to 7 p.m. and on Sundays from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. Access during the school holidays would take place in Ireland, but could be for longer periods and on weekdays. 44.  On 8 October 2012 M.K. brought proceedings in the Polish courts for an order that A be returned to him. 45.  On 11 January 2013 the Malbork District Court excluded the presiding judge from taking part in the proceedings owing to close personal ties with M.K.\u2019s mother. 46.  On 11 February 2013 the Malbork District Court rejected M.K.\u2019s action, stating that the Irish courts had jurisdiction given A\u2019s habitual place of residence. M.K. lodged an appeal. 47.  On 22 March 2013 the Malbork District Court appointed a legal guardian to represent A\u2019s interests in proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s taking of A to Ireland without M.K.\u2019s consent. 48.  On 6 May 2013 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court quashed the decision of the Malbork District Court of 11 February 2013. The court decided that in accordance with the decision of the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court in its decision of 4 July 2011 (see paragraph 52 below) A\u2019s place of residence was with her father in Malbork. 49.  Following the quashing, M.K.\u2019s motion had to be returned to the lower court. There is no information about the course of the proceedings afterwards. 50.  In July 2009 M.K. initiated divorce proceedings before the Gda\u0144sk District Court, which were subsequently stayed pending the determination of the application concerning the child\u2019s return. 51.  On 16 March 2011 M.K. applied for an interim order to establish that A\u2019s place of residence was with him during the proceedings. 52.  On 4 July 2011 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court granted M.K. an interim order establishing that he should have custody over A for the duration of the proceedings. The court considered that the child\u2019s place of residence was in Poland. The court reasoned that, although both parents had custody of A, M.K. was better placed to exercise parental rights as he had lived in Poland and had developed a strong bond with his daughter. M.K. provided a guarantee that A would be properly cared for. A was found by the court to have settled well in Malbork since she was doing well at school and had good relations with her fellow students. The court stated that in spite of the divorce proceedings in Poland the applicant had also gone to court in Ireland concerning A, thus giving rise to feelings of uncertainty in the child and the fear that she would be taken to Ireland against her will. The court found that such factors made it necessary to grant the injunction. 53.  On 17 October 2013 the Irish liaison judge for the EJN wrote to the Polish liaison judge informing him of the custody proceedings in Ireland, the agreement of 24 June 2013 made by the parties in relation to custody and access rights and the order of 25 June 2013 of the High Court of Ireland giving effect to that agreement. The letter requested that the information be passed on to the judge in the Polish divorce proceedings. 54.  On 30 October 2013 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court granted a divorce between M.K. and the applicant, stating that they shared fault. The court refused to decide on issues of custody and access, referring to the agreement the parties had come to on 24 June 2013 in Ireland. 55.  On 13 May 2014 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment. 56.  After M.K. failed to return the child on 15 August 2009, the applicant had no contact with her daughter for three months. 57.  On 8 October 2009 the applicant saw A for the first time during an interview conducted by court experts. 58.  On 18 December 2009 the applicant saw A in Poland at the court hearing but spent no time alone with her at any point. 59.  In May 2010 the applicant saw A in Poland over several consecutive days. She also saw her in February 2011 and attended her birthday party in March 2011. 60.  It appears that afterwards A went to Ireland upon a court order in July 2011. At that time A, the applicant, B and M.K were all interviewed by the High Court\u2019s expert. 61.  A has been in the care of the applicant since 26 September 2012 and they live in Ireland.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "9", "5", "3", "8", "1", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Smolyan. 5.  In two final judgments of 28 February 2005 and 8 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in respect of breach of contract for construction works which she had carried out. The awarded damages comprised BGN 52,784 for the principal amount, plus BGN 17,685 in default interest and BGN 5,433 in costs and expenses, or a total amount of BGN 75,902.93, the equivalent to 38,000 euros (EUR). The damages were awarded to the applicant against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport \u2013 Ministry of Education and Science (\u201cthe Centre\u201d, a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education and Science and exercising certain functions delegated by the Ministry). 6.  By an order of 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education closed down the Centre and ordered that its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint\u2011stock company with part of the Centre\u2019s property, including the real estate in which the applicant had carried out the construction works. 7.  On 13 May 2005 and 15 March 2007 the applicant was issued with two writs of enforcement for the amounts awarded in the final judgments of 2005 and 2006 (see paragraph 5 above) and on 6 February 2008 she presented the writs to the Ministry of Education asking it to pay. 8.  The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 9.  The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Minister\u2019s refusal. In a final decision of 8 April 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. 10.  As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant\u2019s last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.", "references": ["4", "7", "1", "8", "0", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Saatli. 5.  The applicant was a journalist and worked for the Bizim Yol newspaper at the time of the events described below. 6.  Following the publication of a series of articles criticising the activities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) written by the applicant, the head of the Ministry\u2019s administration, R.A., contacted the applicant and asked for a meeting. They met on 11 June 2007, and then on 19 and 20 July 2007 as well. According to the applicant, during these meetings R.A. firstly demanded that he stop writing articles about the Ministry. R.A. also threatened him saying that he should not forget the case of B.H., a journalist who had been heavily beaten in May 2006. However, when R.A. realised that the applicant would continue to write articles about the Ministry\u2019s activities, he proposed him money in exchange for stopping writing the articles. According to the applicant, at the beginning he rejected that proposal, but he later accepted it because of his difficult financial situation. 7.  On 24 July 2007 they met again at a restaurant in Baku. During the meeting when the applicant received 3,500 United States dollars from R.A., agents of the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d) intervened and arrested him. 8.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 311.1 (bribe-taking) of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 26 July 2007 the applicant was charged under Article 311.1. 10.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of three months. The judge substantiated the necessity for this measure as follows:\n\u201cTaking into account the possibility of the accused\u2019s absconding from the investigation, and the character and gravity of the crime attributed to him, I consider it necessary to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him.\u201d 11.  On 27 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the detention order, claiming that there was no risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigation and that the court had failed to take his personal situation into consideration. 12.  On 3 August 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court did not make mention of the applicant\u2019s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance court, when deciding to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of Mushfig Huseynov, has correctly taken into account the character and degree of public dangerousness of the committed crime, the possibility of his absconding from the investigation, and the fact that the sanction provided for the commission of this act is over two years\u2019 imprisonment.\nTherefore, there is no ground for granting the appeal and quashing the impugned decision.\u201d 13.  On 17 October 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged an application with the court asking for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of three months. In that connection, he submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 14.  On 19 October 2007 the Nasimi District Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s request by extending the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by three months, until 24 January 2008. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the necessity of additional time to carry out further investigative actions, as well as by the seriousness of the charge and the likelihood that if released he might abscond. It appears from the court decision and the transcript of the court hearing of 19 October 2007 that the hearing was held in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. 15.  On 22 October 2007 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first-instance court had failed to justify his continued detention and to take his personal situation into account. The applicant did not make any mention of his and his lawyer\u2019s absence from the hearing of 19 October 2007 in his appeal. 16.  On 31 October 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 19 October 2007 was justified. It appears from the appellate court\u2019s decision and the transcript of the court hearing of 31 October 2007 that the hearing was held in the absence of the applicant, but in the presence of his lawyer. 17.  On 21 January 2008 the Assize Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 4 April 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, but reduced his sentence to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  On 29 July 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 4 April 2008. 20.  On 25 December 2009 the applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence after being pardoned by a presidential decree. 21.  On 1 August 2007 a television programme concerning the applicant\u2019s arrest on 24 July 2007 was broadcast on a private television channel. It appears from the transcript of the broadcast that the programme began with a narrated section, the transcript of which reads as follows in its relevant part:\n\u201cAlthough in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which has chosen to take a democratic development path, all the legislative guarantees and comprehensive conditions have been established for freedom of speech and of the press, it is still possible to encounter members of the press who violate the requirements, established by the Mass Media Act, prohibiting abuse of the freedom of the press and performance of unlawful actions incompatible with journalistic ethics. One of these undesirable members of the mass media is the editor of the Bizim Yol newspaper, Huseynov Mushfiq Tofig oglu \u2013 who was accused of having committed serious and especially serious crimes and was convicted of libel and defamation under Articles 147.2 and 148 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Nasimi District Court\u2019s judgment of 25 April 2006 \u2013 [he] did not draw conclusions from that and committed an even more serious crime, bribe-taking ...\u201d 22.  The programme then showed the video recordings, filmed by the law-enforcement authorities, of the meeting and dialogue between the applicant and R.A., and of the applicant\u2019s arrest by the agents of the MNS when he was taking money from R.A. At the end of the programme the narrator stated that the criminal investigation was ongoing and that the public would be informed of further developments.", "references": ["9", "1", "0", "4", "8", "7", "5", "6", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The Sofia Municipal Council approved the exchange of a municipal flat for a smaller flat owned and occupied by the applicant in December 2005. However, the mayor of Sofia did not issue the necessary order and did not sign a contract for the exchange, as provided in the applicable rules. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal to act. The Sofia Administrative Court quashed the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal in a judgment of 1 April 2010 and instructed the mayor to issue an order for the exchange of the flats. That part of the judgment became final and enforceable on 19 May 2010. 7.  By a decision of 25 March 2010 the Sofia Municipal Council revoked its December 2005 decision approving the exchange of the two properties. The applicant lodged a challenge against that 25 March 2010 decision. In a final judgment of 7 March 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the Council\u2019s decision of 25 March 2010 null and void. 8.  On 18 April 2011 the mayor issued a decision explicitly refusing to issue an order for the exchange of the two flats. Following an application by the applicant for judicial review, on 30 March 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court declared that decision null and void as having been issued in breach of the judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 1 April 2010. The court also instructed the mayor to issue an order for the conclusion of the exchange agreement. 9.  The mayor ordered the flat exchange on 6 March 2013 and the applicant signed a contract for the exchange on 25 June 2013.", "references": ["4", "1", "9", "6", "0", "8", "7", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants are the National Federation of Sportspersons\u2019 Associations and Unions (F\u00e9d\u00e9ration nationale des associations et syndicats de sportifs \u2013 hereafter \u201cFNASS\u201d), the National Rugby Players\u2019 Union (Syndicat national des joueurs de rugby \u2013 hereafter \u201cProvale\u201d), the National Professional Footballers\u2019 Union (Union nationale des footballeurs professionnels \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe UNFP\u201d), the Professional Handball Players\u2019 Association (Association des joueurs professionnels de handball \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe AJPH\u201d), and the National Basketball Players\u2019 Union (Syndicat national des basketteurs \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe SNB\u201d). FNASS, which was established in 1992, is a federation of trade unions representing professional athletes, which today comprises the unions representing track and field athletes (SAF), basketball players (SNB), cyclists (UNCP), footballers (UNFP), handball players (AJPH) and rugby players (Provale). It represents around 3,500 professional athletes in France. Its aim is to defend the individual and collective rights and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests of professional athletes in all disciplines. The remaining 99 applicants are professional handball, football, rugby and basketball players. 7.  On 14 April 2010 the Government issued Order no. 2010-379 on athletes\u2019 health, bringing the Sports Code into line with the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code (hereafter \u201cthe Order of 14 April 2010\u201d). The Order was aimed, firstly, at bringing the provisions of the Sports Code into line with the most recent version of the World Anti-Doping Code (hereafter \u201cthe WADC\u201d), which entered into force on 1 January 2009 (see paragraph 45 below) following the Third World Conference on Doping in Sport held in Madrid in November 2007 (Title I) and, secondly, to clarify certain provisions of the Sports Code concerning athletes\u2019 health and efforts to combat doping (Title II). The provisions of the Order were ratified by Law no. 2012-158 of 1 February 2012 on strengthening sports ethics and athletes\u2019 rights. They were codified in Articles L. 232-2 et seq. of the Sports Code, which has undergone several amendments since. 8.  Article 3 of the Order (Article L. 232-5 of the Sports Code) set forth the tasks and powers of the French Anti-Doping Agency (Agence fran\u00e7aise de lutte contre le dopage \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe AFLD\u201d) and provided as follows:\n\u201cI. \u2013 In paragraph I of Article L. 232-5 of the Code, sub-paragraphs 1 to 13 shall be replaced by the following provisions:\n(1) It shall define an annual programme of tests;\n...\n(3)  In the case of athletes subject to the whereabouts requirement referred to in Article L. 232-15, it shall carry out tests subject to the conditions laid down in Articles L. 232-12 to L. 232-16:\n(a)  during sporting events organised by federations approved or licensed by the federations to which powers have been delegated;\n(b)  during the international sporting events defined in Article L. 230-2 with the agreement of the competent international body or, failing that, the World Anti-Doping Agency;\n(c)  during periods of training in preparation for the sporting events referred to in Article L. 230-3;\n(d)  independently of the sporting events referred to in Article L. 230-3 and the periods of training in preparation for them;\n...\u201d 9.  Article 6 of the Order (Article L. 232-13-1 of the Sports Code, see paragraph 63 below) provided, in particular, that individualised anti-doping testing of athletes included in the testing pool could be carried out at training and sporting venues, but also \u201cat any location chosen with the athlete\u2019s agreement at which the test can be carried out in compliance with the athlete\u2019s right to respect for his or her privacy, including, at his or her request, at home.\u201d 10.  Article 7 of the Order added the following:\n\u201cArticle L. 232-15 of the Code shall read as follows:\nThe athletes in the testing pool, designated for a period of one year by the French Anti-Doping Agency, shall be required to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts for the purposes of conducting the tests referred to in Article L. 232-5. The athletes concerned shall be:\n(1)   those whose names are on the list of elite athletes or the list of promising young athletes (Espoir) within the meaning of the present Code, or athletes whose names have featured on one of those lists for at least one of the past three years;\n(2)  professional athletes who are licensed by the approved federations or who have been engaged in professional sport for at least one of the past three years;\n(3) athletes who have been the subject of a disciplinary sanction on the basis of Articles L. 232-9, L. 232-10 or L. 232-17 during the past three years.\nThe information concerned may be computerised by the Agency with a view to organising tests. Computerised processing of information concerning athletes\u2019 whereabouts is authorised by a decision of the Agency\u2019s Board, taken after consultation with the National Commission on Data Processing and Civil Liberties.\u201d 11.  In an application registered on 1 June 2010 some of the applicants (unions and twenty-four individual applicants), together with other athletes, requested the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat to set aside the Order, and in particular Articles 3 and 7 thereof (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). With regard to the whereabouts requirement provided for in those Articles, they complained of a \u201cparticularly intrusive\u201d testing system which compelled athletes in the testing pool to provide the AFLD with information concerning their places of residence, training and competition so that they could be located at any time, and to undergo immediate tests ordered on a discretionary basis and without advance notice. They complained in particular of the fact that the tests could be carried out independently of sporting events and outside training periods, that is, during periods when athletes were no longer at the disposal of their employer but were on holiday, resting or on sick leave or leave following an occupational injury. They argued that Article 3 infringed their freedom of movement by requiring them to give notice of their whereabouts on an ongoing basis, including during non-professional activities, and also infringed their right to a normal family life and their individual freedom as athletes. In their view, the unconditional implementation of Article 3(I)(3)(d) of the Order, allowing tests to be carried out independently of sporting events and outside training periods, meant that between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. (the testing period laid down by Article L. 232-14 of the Sports Code, see paragraph 64 below) the athletes in the testing pool faced the permanent prospect of physically intrusive tests. This entailed systematically giving advance notice of their schedule, in breach of the right to establish relationships with their peers and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their private lives. Lastly, the applicants complained of a breach of the principle of equality, as the whereabouts requirement for the purposes of anti-doping tests was confined to athletes included in the testing pool. 12.  In a judgment of 24 February 2011 the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat rejected the application in the following terms:\n\u201c... As regards Articles 3 and 7 of the impugned Order:\nThese provisions provide a strict framework governing the locations where AFLD testing of athletes in the \u2018testing pool\u2019 may take place, and the period during which such tests may be carried out. They require the athletes in question, in view of the demands of efforts to combat doping, to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts for the purposes of organising tests, including unannounced tests, with a view to the effective detection of the use of doping substances, which can be detected only for a short time after being taken despite having lasting effects. Hence, Articles 3 and 7 of the impugned order, which do not hamper athletes\u2019 freedom of movement, interfere with their right to respect for their private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8, and with individual freedoms, only to the extent that is necessary and proportionate to the general-interest aims pursued by efforts to combat doping, namely to protect athletes\u2019 health and to ensure fair and ethical sporting competitions. In any event, the order under challenge also complies with the provisions of the International Convention against Doping in Sport, which do not have direct effect.\nThe principle of equality does not prevent the regulatory authority from laying down different rules for different situations or from derogating from equality on general\u2011interest grounds, provided that, in both cases, the resulting difference in treatment is proportionate to the purpose of the rule establishing it. Athletes whose names feature on the list of elite sportsmen and women or the list of promising young athletes, which include amateur athletes and licensed professionals who may be required to notify their whereabouts with a view to anti-doping tests, are not in the same situation as other athletes, in view of the level at which they compete and the greater risk of doping such competition may entail. Likewise, athletes who have been the subject of disciplinary sanctions for doping during the past three years are not in the same situation as other athletes. Furthermore, athletes belonging to the \u2018testing pool\u2019 are not in the same situation as persons in other professions and may therefore be made subject to special doping control measures without the principle of equality being breached.\u201d 13.  In their initial and additional observations of 22 October 2013 and 17 February 2014 the Government provided the Court with the following information concerning the situation of the individual applicants with regard to the impugned legislation.\n(a)  Eight of the ninety-nine applicants had never been included in the AFLD testing pool (Mr Millo-Chluski, Mr Nallet, Mr Traille, Mr Mas, Mr Domingo, Mr Dusautoir, Mr Heymans and Mr Para).\n(b)  Of the twenty-four applicants who had participated in the domestic proceedings, none had belonged to the testing pool on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court.\n(c)  Eleven applicants who had not participated in the domestic proceedings had belonged to the testing pool on the date on which the application was lodged (Mr Da Silva, Mr Gomis, Mr Ho You Fat, Mr Perquis, Mr Congre, Mr Coulibaly, Mr Cavalli, Mr Cabarry, Mr Huget, Mr Honrubia and Mr Gharbi). According to the Government, these athletes had been included in the testing pool in September and October 2010. They had all undergone testing, some of them between two and eight times. Nine of them had been issued with one or two warnings. One (Mr Huget) had received three warnings, leading to the institution of disciplinary proceedings and to an administrative penalty which he had not contested before the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat. Of the eleven aforementioned applicants, six had had their inclusion in the testing pool renewed following two decisions of the AFLD Board of 12 and 25 September 2013. Mr Coulibaly, Mr Cavalli, Mr Gomis, Mr Cabarry and Mr Huget had been removed from the list.\n(d)  With regard to Mr Kerckhof, the Government stated that he had been included in the testing pool on 7 November 2009 and had been kept on the list for a further year from 17 September 2010. During that time he had been found to be in breach of the whereabouts requirement on one occasion. 14.  In a letter of 22 August 2016 the Government informed the Court that, by decisions of the AFLD of 4 September and 22 October 2014, five of the six athletes still belonging to the AFLD\u2019s testing pool in 2013 (Mr Honrubia, Mr Perquis, Mr Congre, Mr Da Silva and Mr Gharbi, see paragraph 13 (c) above) had been removed from the list at their request, on the grounds that their names had been on it for four years.\n(b)  Information provided by the applicants 15.  In their observations in reply of 3 December 2013 the eight applicants who were not in the AFLD testing pool (see paragraph 13 (a) above) stated that they were in the testing pool of the International Rugby Board (IRB). They stated that they were required to declare their whereabouts in France on the same basis as the applicants included in the AFLD testing pool and that the AFLD, which had subsidiary powers in that regard, was empowered to impose sanctions on them. 16.  The twenty-four applicants who had applied to the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat also reported as follows on their situation at the time of lodging of the application on 23 July 2011.\n(a)  Four of them (Mr Pierre, Mr Sissokho, Mr Psaume and Mr Talmont) had been included in the testing pool in 2010, and had remained in it for a further twelve months from 11 June 2010. They produced a letter from the AFLD dated 17 June 2011 asking the President of the Professional Football League to send a list of players by 2 September 2011 who should be included or retained in the testing pool. However, they did not produce the updated list of athletes who had been retained in the pool.\n(b)  A further four (Mr Busselier, Mr Ternel, Mr Kiour and Mr Haon) had been included in the testing pool in 2009 or 2010 and had been retained for another twelve months from 23 September 2010. In a letter dated 23 September 2010 to the President of the National Handball League and the President of the French Handball Federation, forwarding the updated list of athletes in the testing pool, the President of the AFLD pointed out that the athletes in question were required to declare their whereabouts every day in accordance with decision no. 54 of 18 October 2007 (see paragraphs 69 and 70 below).\n(c)  A further thirteen applicants who had been included in the testing pool in 2009 submitted that they had been included or retained in the pool on 11 June 2010 for a minimum twelve-month period (Mr Strunc, Mr Soliman, Mr Dondon, Mr Jeanneau, Mr Melody, Mr Kerckhof, Mr Linehan, Mr Maynier, Mr Ouattara, Mr Tsagarakis, Mr Moncade, Mr Pons and Mr Toffin). They produced a letter from the AFLD to the President of the National Basketball League dated 11 June 2010, asking the latter to send a list of players by 30 August 2010 who should be included or retained in the testing pool. The applicants did not furnish the updated list of the athletes retained in the testing pool (however, as regards Mr Kerckhof, see the Government\u2019s observations at paragraph 13 (d) above).\n(d)  Three applicants had been included in the pool in 2009 for a twelve\u2011month period (Mr Ayed, Mr Guilbert and Mr Dearlove). 17.  The remaining applicants stated that they had been included in the testing pool following the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat ruling and had joined the application to the Court in their capacity as union members. They did not provide any documents demonstrating that they belonged to the testing pool. 18.  In additional observations of 5 December 2013 Mr Da Silva\u2019s lawyer informed the Court that his client had appealed in the following terms to the President of the AFLD against the decision to retain him in the testing pool for an eighteen-month period from 26 September 2013:\n \u201c... I was first included in the testing pool on 20 September 2010, in other words a full three years ago, and you have just retained my name on the list until 2015 at least, making a total of five years! This is completely unacceptable and disproportionate.\nI have complied with all the obligations entailed in belonging to the testing pool. This has affected my family life and had a considerable impact on my children, who often see inspectors turn up on my doorstep at 6 a.m. I have always provided details of my whereabouts in good time, have never missed a test and, in three years, have never received the slightest warning, still less tested positive for any banned substance ...\nCan you kindly explain [the] scientific reasons for keeping me in the testing pool? Does the fact that I\u2019m nearing the end of my career make me a potential cheat? ... Keeping me in the testing pool for another 18 months stigmatises me in the eyes of my teammates as a potential cheat and is not acceptable.\nI agree that it\u2019s necessary to tackle doping in sport, but not to the detriment of MY life. ... I am therefore asking you to review your position on my inclusion in the testing pool: keeping the same person in the pool for five consecutive years is not an effective way of tackling doping.\u201d 19.  The applicant, who was born in 1958, is a French national. She is an international racing cyclist who is on the list of elite athletes and has set numerous world records. She stated that she had undergone more than 1,200 anti-doping tests in the course of her career. She maintained that she had undergone unannounced tests abroad (in the United States, China, Switzerland and Australia) as well as regular tests at World Championship and Olympic events. 20.  By a decision of the AFLD\u2019s director of testing of 14 March 2008 the applicant was designated as one of the athletes in the testing pool and subject to individualised testing. At that time athletes could be included in the testing pool for an indeterminate period. 21.  The Order of 14 April 2010, cited above (see paragraph 10), laid down a one-year time-limit for inclusion in the pool of athletes to be tested. 22.  By a decision of 10 June 2010 taken under the transitional rules, the applicant was re-registered as belonging to the testing pool. 23.  In 2011, following three failures to comply with the rules on whereabouts, the applicant gave evidence before a disciplinary board of the French Cycling Federation. She was cleared of misconduct on the grounds that, at the time of the most recent failure to comply, in the United States in June 2011, she had no longer been in the testing pool and had thus no longer been liable for testing. 24.  In a letter of 20 December 2011 the AFLD invited the applicant to submit observations on her possible re-inclusion in the testing pool. In a letter, and subsequently during an interview with the President of the AFLD at which her lawyer was present, the applicant expressed her objections. She argued, among other things, that she was included in the testing pool of the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). In an email of 16 March 2012 the UCI informed the AFLD that the applicant was no longer in the UCI testing pool. 25.  In the meantime, on 10 February 2012, the applicant\u2019s husband and coach was placed under investigation for importing prohibited goods, infringements of the regulations on the trading and use of poisonous substances, and importing doping substances without duly substantiated medical reasons. 26.  On 19 March 2012 the AFLD\u2019s director of testing included the applicant in the testing pool. She lodged an application for reconsideration of that decision which was rejected on 22 May 2012. 27.  A few days previously the President of the French Cycling Federation (F\u00e9d\u00e9ration fran\u00e7aise de cyclisme) had contacted the President of the AFLD in connection with the applicant\u2019s planned selection for the London Olympics, expressing regret at the time taken to include the applicant in the testing pool. 28.  In a decision taken on 27 September 2012, anticipating a Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat decision of 10 October 2012 (CE, no. 357097) to the effect that the director of testing did not have power to decide on the inclusion of an athlete in the testing pool (see paragraph 60 below), the AFLD Board, in order to prevent a legal vacuum that might adversely affect the implementation of checks on athletes\u2019 whereabouts, approved the applicant\u2019s inclusion in the testing pool. 29.  On 11 February 2013 the applicant and her husband brought proceedings in the Paris Criminal Court against the AFLD and three of its senior officials, accusing them of forwarding confidential information to the newspaper L\u2019\u00c9quipe concerning the disciplinary proceedings instituted in 2011 and the ongoing criminal proceedings. 30.  In a letter dated 20 March 2013 the applicant contested the possibility of her renewed inclusion in the testing pool. 31.  By a decision of the AFLD Board of 28 March 2013 the applicant was again designated for inclusion in the \u201ctesting pool\u201d. The decision contained the following reasoning:\n\u201cShe maintains ... that, since the entry into force of the Order of 14 April 2010, inclusion in the testing pool is possible only for a non-renewable one-year period. This argument has to be dismissed on the grounds that the provisions of the Sports Code concerning the whereabouts requirement must be read in the light of the \u2018principles\u2019 established by the World Anti-Doping Code ... Article 2.4 of the World Anti-Doping Code lays down the principle of checks on whereabouts and possible sanctions for violations of the resulting requirements in the event of three failures to comply \u2018within a twelve-month period\u2019. Moreover, limiting inclusion in the pool to a non-renewable one-year period could render the whereabouts checks ineffective; this is clearly not what the legislature intended.\u201d 32.  On 28 December 2012 and 28 May 2013 the applicant lodged an application with the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat for judicial review of the AFLD\u2019s decisions of 27 September 2012 and 28 March 2013. She argued, in particular, that the rules on whereabouts and the unannounced testing of athletes in the testing pool were contrary to Article 8 of the Convention, and complained of being made subject to these rules for several years. 33.  In the meantime, in a memorial of 11 March 2013, the applicant requested the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat to refer the following question to the Constitutional Council for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality with regard to the whereabouts requirement:\n \u201cDo the provisions of Articles L. 232-5-3 and L. 232-15 of the Sports Code establishing rules on the whereabouts and unannounced testing of athletes in the testing pool infringe the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, in the light of Article 34 of the Constitution, Articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (freedom of movement, respect for private life and inviolability of the home), Article 66 of the Constitution (\u2018No one may be detained arbitrarily. The judicial authority, as the guardian of individual freedoms, shall ensure compliance with this principle ...\u2019) and, finally, the principle of equality before the law?\u201d 34.  In a decision of 29 May 2013 the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat decided not to refer the question. It observed that the provisions complained of did not call into question the individual freedom which Article 66 of the Constitution placed under the protection of the ordinary courts (arbitrary detention), but fell within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts (see the position of the Court of Cassation on this issue at paragraph 73 below). 35.  In a judgment of 18 December 2013 the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat joined the two applications of 28 December 2012 and 28 May 2013 and rejected them, after deciding not to refer a second question for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality. With regard to the alleged violation of the right to respect for private and family life, the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat found as follows:\n \u201c... Firstly, the aforementioned provisions of the Sports Code relating to the obligations of athletes in the \u2018testing pool\u2019 do not infringe the right to freedom of movement or the equivalent right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the [Convention]. They lay down strict rules for determining the locations where testing of athletes in the \u2018testing pool\u2019 may be carried out and the periods and hours during which these tests may be conducted, and preclude the testing of athletes at home without their consent. The computer processing provided for in Article L. 232-15 for the purposes of organising tests is subject to the Law of 6 January 1978 on data processing, files and freedoms. While the arrangements thus defined place restrictions on athletes, notably by requiring them to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts, the legislative provisions at issue are justified by the demands of efforts to combat doping. These entail, in particular, the ability to carry out unannounced tests in order effectively to detect the use of certain performance-enhancing drugs which can be detected only for a short time after being taken despite having more lasting effects. Hence, these provisions interfere with the right of the athletes concerned to respect for their private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, only to the extent that is necessary and proportionate to the general-interest aims pursued by efforts to combat doping, namely to protect athletes\u2019 health and to ensure fair and ethical sporting competitions. ...\nSeventhly, although the provisions of L. 232-15 of the Sports Code, which provide that inclusion in the \u2018testing pool\u2019 is \u2018for a period of one year\u2019, require the [AFLD] to review periodically the composition of the testing pool, in order to ensure that the athletes are not subjected for unduly long periods and without specific reasons to the constraints linked to the requirement to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts, those provisions do not have the purpose or effect of prohibiting the Agency from designating athletes who have already been included in the \u2018testing pool\u2019. Thus, the argument that Article L. 232-15 of itself prevents the Agency from designating an athlete previously included in the testing pool must be dismissed.\u201d 36.  In a judgment delivered in 2014 the Paris Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action against the AFLD. 37.  By a decision of 9 April 2015 the AFLD removed the applicant from the list of athletes in the testing pool. 38.  In a judgment of 9 March 2017, following proceedings whose fairness he challenged before the Court (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant\u2019s husband was sentenced to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended, for importing erythropoietin (EPO). 39.  In 1967 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (\u201cthe Committee of Ministers\u201d) adopted Resolution (67) 12 on the Doping of Athletes. This was followed in 1979, 1984 and 1988 by three recommendations, the most recent of which provided for the introduction of out-of-competition doping controls without prior notice (Recommendation No. R (88) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the Institution of Doping Controls without Warning outside Competitions). 40.  Subsequently, the Anti-Doping Convention (ETS No. 135, hereafter \u201cthe Council of Europe Convention\u201d) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 November 1989. This convention, which is the European reference instrument, has been ratified by all the Council of Europe member States and by five non-member States (Australia, Belarus, Canada, Morocco and Tunisia). It lays down a number of common rules and standards on the basis of which the States Parties undertake to adopt the necessary harmonisation measures at national and international level in order to effectively combat doping in sport. A Monitoring Group was set up to monitor implementation of the Convention; its activities involve working with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA, established in 1999, see paragraph 45 below) and the international sports federations. There is also an Ad Hoc European Committee for the World Anti-Doping Agency (CAHAMA), which is a committee of experts responsible for coordinating the positions of the European countries acting on behalf of WADA. 41.  The preamble to the Council of Europe Convention highlights the ethical, moral and health-related aspects of efforts to combat doping:\n \u201c... Concerned by the growing use of doping agents and methods by sportsmen and sportswomen throughout sport and the consequences thereof for the health of participants and the future of sport. ...\nAware that public authorities and the voluntary sports organisations have complementary responsibilities to combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them.\u201d 42.  Point 3 of Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention, entitled \u201cCo-operation with sports organisations on measures to be taken by them\u201d, reads as follows:\n \u201cMoreover, the Parties shall encourage their sports organisations:\n(a) to introduce, on an effective scale, doping controls not only at, but also without advance warning at any appropriate time outside, competitions, such controls to be conducted in a way which is equitable for all sportsmen and sportswomen and which include testing and retesting of persons selected, where appropriate, on a random basis ...\u201d 43.  An Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention was opened for signature on 12 September 2002 and entered into force on 1 April 2004. Its aim is to ensure the mutual recognition of doping controls and to reinforce the application of the Convention by means of a binding monitoring mechanism. 44.  At the fourteenth Council of Europe conference of Ministers responsible for sport, held on 29 November 2016, the Ministers adopted Resolution No. 1.1 on the role of the governments in addressing emerging challenges in the fight against doping in sport at national and international level. The resolution recognised the considerable challenges that had recently threatened the integrity of the international anti-doping system and observed the need to protect athletes against forced or encouraged doping schemes and to provide them with proper anti-doping education. It reaffirmed the Ministers\u2019 support for WADA as the \u201cglobal anti-doping regulator responsible for standard-setting and monitoring\u201d, and called for a strengthening of WADA\u2019s capacity. It welcomed the enhanced cooperation between the Council of Europe and WADA, and encouraged the Monitoring Group set up to monitor the implementation of the 1989 Convention to continue its standard-setting work in order to offer practical guidance to the States Parties on addressing emerging anti-doping issues in compliance with the Convention. The Ministers recognised that all anti-doping organisations must comply with the rules of good governance and the principle of proportionality, while respecting the fundamental rights of the individuals subjected to the anti-doping regulations, particularly when it came to data protection. 45.  Anti-doping activities took on a new dimension in the early twenty\u2011first century. The World Anti-Doping Agency (hereafter \u201cWADA\u201d) was established in the wake of the scandal that followed the discovery at the 1998 Tour de France of large-scale trafficking in doping substances involving one team and several well-known cyclists. WADA is an independent international organisation and a foundation under Swiss private law. It is composed of and financed by the Olympic Movement and governments. It draws up the WADC, which was adopted in 2003 and came into force on 1 January 2004 and which was subsequently revised in 2009 and 2015. WADA coordinates and supervises worldwide anti-doping activities in all sporting disciplines, with a view to harmonised implementation of a common set of general principles at international level, encompassing the definition of doping offences, the list of prohibited substances, tests, sanctions and the system of exemptions for therapeutic use. 46.  The WADC is the instrument for bringing consistency to the anti\u2011doping practices of the different international federations and States. The introductory part spells out the \u201cfundamental rationale for the World Anti-Doping Code\u201d as follows:\n\u201cAnti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as \u2018the spirit of sport\u2019. It is the essence of Olympism, the pursuit of human excellence through the dedicated perfection of each person\u2019s natural talents. It is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and is reflected in values we find in and through sport, including: ethics, fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other participants, courage, community and solidarity. Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.\u201d 47.  Article 2 of the WADC lists violations of the anti-doping rules, including the rule on athletes\u2019 whereabouts, which at the relevant time read as follows:\n \u201c2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out\u2011of\u2011Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation.\u201d 48.  As worded at the relevant time, Article 5 of the WADC concerning testing specified that the national anti-doping organisations and international federations had jurisdiction in the matter. The relevant parts read as follows:\n \u201c5.1.1 [The above-mentioned organisations shall p]lan and conduct an effective number of In-Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on Athletes over whom they have jurisdiction, including but not limited to Athletes in their respective Registered Testing Pools. Each International Federation shall establish a Registered Testing Pool for International-Level Athletes in its sport, and each National Anti-Doping Organization shall establish a national Registered Testing Pool for Athletes who are present in that National Anti-Doping Organization\u2019s country or who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations of that country. In accordance with Article 14.3, any Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to the whereabouts requirements set out in the International Standard for Testing. 49.  In its wording at the time of the events, Article 10.3.3 of the WADC, entitled \u201cSanctions on Individuals\u201d, provided as follows:\n\u201cFor violations of Article 2.4 (Whereabouts Filing Failures and/or Missed Tests), the period of Ineligibility shall be at a minimum one (1) year and at a maximum two (2) years based on the Athlete\u2019s degree of fault.\u201d 50.  Article 14.3, entitled \u201cAthletes whereabouts information\u201d provided at the relevant time that the International Federation and the national anti\u2011doping organisation were to coordinate the identification of athletes and the collecting of current location information and submit them to WADA. 51.  The revised version of the WADC, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, contained numerous amendments. Those of interest in the context of the present applications are as follows. Under the revised Article 2.4, a violation is established where three \u201cwhereabouts failures\u201d occur within a twelve-month period (rather than eighteen months as previously, see paragraph 47 above). The revised Article 5.2 now provides that \u201c[a]ny Athlete may be required to provide a Sample at any time and at any place\u201d if, according to the comment on the Article by WADA itself, the anti\u2011doping organisation has a serious and specific suspicion that the athlete may be engaged in doping. 52.  The provisions of the WADC operate in conjunction with five international standards. Section 11 of the standard on testing (\u201cAthlete whereabouts Requirements\u201d), as in force at the material time, read, inter alia, as follows:\n \u201c11.1 Objective/general principles 11.1.1 It is recognised and accepted that (a) No Advance Notice Out-of-Competition Testing is at the core of effective Doping Control; and (b) without accurate information as to an Athlete\u2019s whereabouts, such Testing can be inefficient and often impossible.\n[11.1.1 Comment: Such recognition is the fundamental rationale underlying Code Article 2.4 and this Section 11 of the International Standard for Testing.] 11.1.2 Therefore, in addition to developing a Test Distribution Plan in accordance with Section 4 of this International Standard, each IF [International Federation] and NADO [National Anti-Doping Organisation] shall create a Registered Testing Pool of Athletes ... Athletes in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to and required to comply with the Athlete whereabouts requirements set out in this Section 11: see Code Article 14.3. 11.1.3 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool is required to make a quarterly Whereabouts Filing that provides accurate and complete information about the Athlete\u2019s whereabouts during the forthcoming quarter, including identifying where he/she will be living, training and competing during that quarter, so that he/she can be located for Testing at any time during that quarter: see Clause 11.3. A failure to do so amounts to a Filing Failure and therefore a Whereabouts Failure for purposes of Code Article 2.4. 11.1.4 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool is also required to specify in his/her Whereabouts Filing, for each day in the forthcoming quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot where he/she will be available at a specified location for Testing: see Clause 11.4. This does not limit in any way the Athlete\u2019s obligation to be available for Testing at any time and place. Nor does it limit his/her obligation to provide the information specified in Clause 11.3 as to his/her whereabouts outside of that 60\u2011minute time slot. However, if the Athlete is not available for Testing at such location during the 60-minute time slot specified for that day in his/her Whereabouts Filing, and has not updated his/her Whereabouts Filing prior to that 60-minute time slot to provide an alternative time slot/location for that day, that failure shall amount to a Missed Test and shall therefore constitute a Whereabouts Failure for purposes of Code Article 2.4.\n[11.1.4 Comment: The purpose of the 60-minute time slot is to strike a balance between the need to locate the Athlete for Testing and the impracticality and unfairness of making Athletes potentially accountable for a Missed Test every time they depart from their previously-declared routine. ... After extensive consultation with stakeholders with substantial whereabouts experience, the view was taken that the best way to maximize the chances of finding the Athlete at any time, while providing a reasonable and appropriate mitigation of \u201824/7\u2019 Missed Test liability, was to combine the best elements of each system, i.e. requiring disclosure of whereabouts information on a \u201824/7\u2019 basis, while limiting exposure to a Missed Test to a 60-minute time slot ...]\u201d\nUnder heading 11.3 (\u201cWhereabouts Filing Requirements\u201d), Clause 11.3.1 stated that the athletes concerned had to provide the International Federation or the national anti-doping organisation with the following information: a complete mailing address; details of any disability; specific confirmation of their consent to the sharing of their whereabouts information with other organisations having authority to test them; for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place where they would be residing (for example, home, temporary lodgings, hotel, and so on); and for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where they would train, work or conduct any other regular activity (for instance, school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities. Clause 11.3.2 provided that the whereabouts information also had to include, for each day during the following quarter, one specific sixty-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day during which the athlete concerned would be available and accessible for testing at a specific location. The comment on this clause stated that the athletes concerned could choose which location to nominate for this sixty-minute time slot: it could be their place of residence, training or competition, or it could be another location (for instance, work or school). A failure to be available for testing at the specified location during the specified time slot would be regarded as a missed test. Clause 11.3.6 specified that athletes could delegate the filing of the information to a third party.\nUnder heading 11.4 (\u201cAvailability for Testing\u201d), Clause 11.4.1 provided as follows:\n\u201c11.4.1 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool must specifically be present and available for Testing on any given day in the relevant quarter for the 60-minute time slot specified for that day in his/her Whereabouts Filing, at the location that the Athlete has specified for that time slot in such filing.\u201d 53.  The International Convention against Doping in Sport, adopted under the auspices of UNESCO (hereafter \u201cthe UNESCO Convention\u201d) came into force on 1 February 2007. The preamble to this Convention reads as follows:\n \u201c... Conscious that sport should play an important role in the protection of health, ...\nConcerned by the use of doping by athletes in sport and the consequences thereof for their health, the principle of fair play, the elimination of cheating and the future of sport, ...\nMindful also of the influence that elite athletes have on youth, ...\nAware that public authorities and the organizations responsible for sport have complementary responsibilities to prevent and combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them, ...\nRecognizing that the elimination of doping in sport is dependent in part upon progressive harmonization of anti-doping standards and practices in sport and cooperation at the national and global levels, ...\u201d 54.  As the WADC is not binding on States because the instruments adopted by WADA are governed by private law, it was decided to draw up an international Convention in order to provide an internationally recognised legal framework allowing States to incorporate the Code into their domestic legislation. The UNESCO Convention has hitherto been ratified by France and by 186 other States. Article 4 stipulates that the provisions of the WADC are not an integral part of the Convention and do not have direct effect in national law. It states that \u201c[i]n order to coordinate the implementation, at the national and international levels, of the fight against doping in sport, States Parties commit themselves to the principles of the Code as the basis for the measures provided for in Article 5 of this Convention.\u201d Articles 3 and 5 provide that States undertake to \u201cadopt appropriate measures at the national and international levels which are consistent with the principles of the Code\u201d and that \u201csuch measures may include legislation, regulation, policies or administrative practices\u201d. According to Article 12, States are to encourage the implementation of doping controls in a manner consistent with the Code, including no\u2011advance-notice and out-of-competition testing. Article 19 encourages States to implement education and training programmes on anti-doping, both for athletes and for the sporting community in general, who should be provided with information on \u201cthe harm of doping to the ethical values of sport\u201d and \u201cthe health consequences of doping\u201d. 55.  Articles 6 and 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide as follows:\nArticle 6\n \u201cThe Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level, be: ...\n(e) education, vocational training, youth and sport; \u201d\n \nArticle 165\n \u201c1. ... The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function. 2. Union action shall be aimed at: ...\n- developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. 3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe. ...\u201d 56.  The EU contributes to the revision of the WADC. Hence, in a contribution sent to WADA in March 2012 (6846/12), the Council of the European Union expressed its point of view on the whereabouts requirement, referring to an opinion of the \u201cArticle 29\u201d Data Protection Working Party (opinion 4/2009). That opinion stressed that the information to be provided concerning the whereabouts and the time slots for controls should be clearly determined by taking into account the requirements of the principles of necessity and proportionality with respect to the purposes of out-of-competition testing. In another contribution concerning the revision of the WADC (no. 6427/13), the Council observed that athletes\u2019 rights could be enhanced by the preparation of guidance aimed at ensuring the proportionality of measures concerning registered testing pools and athletes\u2019 whereabouts.", "references": ["6", "9", "2", "0", "5", "3", "7", "1", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Cork. 5.  She has been receiving treatment for a pituitary brain tumour since 1982. In that year, she underwent surgery to remove as much of the tumour as possible. In the following years she received a variety of treatments for her condition. In 1995 she became the patient of Dr B, a consultant endocrinologist. He referred her for an MRI scan of the tumour, performed that same year, and monitored her condition in the following years. In August 2000, at the request of Dr B, the applicant underwent another MRI scan. This indicated that there had in fact been no significant change since 1995, but the tumour remained large. The applicant also underwent two types of test to determine her level of growth hormone. 6.  Dr B received the result of the first test on 5 September 2000. He spoke by phone with the applicant, telling her that the tumour was very unsatisfactory. Prior to that conversation, the applicant was under the belief that the operation in 1982 had removed almost the entire tumour. She therefore understood the information given to her by Dr B about the tumour to mean that it was growing rapidly, gravely endangering her health. 7.  The applicant was prescribed a newly-available drug to treat her condition, to be injected by her general practitioner on a monthly basis from September 2000. As the drug led to severe gastrointestinal side effects within a short time, Dr B reduced the dosage by half. It appears there were no side effects following the injections of October and November 2000. At the end of the year the applicant was unwell, and was hospitalised in early January 2001 suffering from vomiting, diarrhoea, severe exhaustion, headaches, cramps and muscular spasms in her arms and legs. A blood test indicated that she was also severely hypothyroid. It was later established that this was a side-effect of the drug, not known at the time. 8.  The applicant had further discussions with Dr B about her condition and treatment. Dr B proposed to defer the next injection until the following month. The applicant received two more injections, in February and March 2001. From February 2001 she became the patient of another endocrinologist. 9.  In May 2004 the applicant commenced civil proceedings in the High Court against Dr B and the hospital. Her case in negligence was that Dr B had failed in his duty of care towards her in the prescribing of the drug and the monitoring of its administration to her. She further argued that her consent to the treatment was vitiated for lack of sufficient information, or for misinformation, about her condition and the appropriateness of the medication proposed to her. 10.  The applicant\u2019s statement of claim was served on the defendants in October 2004. Dr B entered his defence in February 2005, seeking further and better particulars from the applicant, which the applicant\u2019s solicitor provided in June 2005. The hospital entered its defence in June 2005, and also sought further and better particulars. 11.  According to the Government, between February 2005 and September 2008 eleven motions seeking various forms of interim relief were brought before the High Court and decided in relation to the case. 12.  In October 2009, the case was included in a procedure before a judge of the High Court known as a \u201cpositive callover\u201d. The purpose of this was to assign hearing dates to cases that had already been waiting for a considerable period of time. A hearing date in April 2010 was set for the case. 13.  In January 2010 the applicant\u2019s solicitor replied to the request for further and better particulars made by the second defendant in June 2005. The hearing commenced on 13 April 2010 and took place over twelve days. Two expert witnesses appeared for the applicant and two for the defence. The hearing concluded on 7 May 2010. Judgment was given on 20 May 2010. 14.  The High Court ruled against the applicant on all grounds. The judge preferred the evidence given by the witnesses appearing on behalf of the defence, deeming their qualifications to be more relevant to this specialised area than those of the experts retained by the applicant. He found that Dr B had complied with the therapeutic indications on the data sheet of the drug. The doctor\u2019s decision to place the applicant directly on the long-acting form of the drug was supported by the expert opinion given on his behalf. The judge did not accept that Dr B had failed to monitor adequately the effects of the drug on the applicant during the months that she received it. Likewise, he rejected the claim that the doctor had failed in his duty of care in the manner in which he had explained the proposed course of treatment to the applicant and the possible side effects. 15.  On the question of consent, the judge considered that while the applicant had misunderstood the exact state of her tumour, this was not to be blamed upon Dr B, who had fulfilled his legal duty by giving her accurate and appropriate information about her condition. The applicant\u2019s mistaken impression was neither caused nor contributed to by the doctor\u2019s explanations. He found that Dr B had not been aware of the applicant\u2019s misunderstanding and could not be blamed for the deficiencies in her knowledge of her condition. Moreover, he had given sufficient warning to the applicant regarding the gastro-intestinal side effects of the drug. Other potential side-effects (gallstones, hepatic dysfunction) had not been raised, but as they had not in fact materialised there were no grounds for complaint. The judge concluded that the applicant had given her valid, informed consent to the treatment. 16.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, advancing numerous grounds. The appeal was filed on 1 July 2010. It remained pending before the Supreme Court until it was transferred to the newly-established Court of Appeal on 29 October 2014. The hearing of the appeal took place on 30 July 2015. 17.  In a judgment of 17 November 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal addressed two issues. First, regarding the treatment of the applicant with the particular drug, it saw no basis to criticise the findings of the trial judge. His preference for the evidence of the defendants\u2019 experts was rationally grounded, and his rejection of the applicant\u2019s criticisms of Dr B was based on careful consideration of the evidence. 18.  Second, on the issue of consent, the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence about what Dr B knew of the applicant\u2019s understanding of her condition. It rejected her claim that the High Court had made a clear error on this point. It considered that Dr B\u2019s actions had been in keeping with the relevant domestic legal principles. It noted that Dr B\u2019s opinion at the time was that the applicant had a serious condition that required treatment. As surgery was not possible, the only alternative was medication. It was, the Court of Appeal held, reasonably open to him to hold that view. He had explained to the applicant the expected benefits of the drug prescribed, as well as the unpleasant side effects. As for the argument that the doctor should have also presented a \u201cdo nothing\u201d option, the Court of Appeal described this as \u201csomewhat unreal\u201d. Where a person seeks referral from a general practitioner to a specialist, it could be reasonably assumed that they wished to receive treatment, and that they had excluded the non-treatment option. 19.  The applicant sought leave to appeal. On 8 March 2016 the Supreme Court refused.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "4", "8", "6", "2", "1", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyustendil. 5.  In a judgment of 15 August 2004 the Sofia District Court awarded the applicant BGN 2,120.28 (about 1,100 euros (EUR)) in damages, plus the legal interest for the period starting on 11 February 2003 until full payment, and BGN 200 in costs and expenses, against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport (\u201cthe Centre\u201d). The Centre was a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education. It exercised certain functions entrusted by the Ministry. The damages were awarded for loss of salary following the applicant\u2019s unlawful dismissal from work. The judgment became final on 11 February 2008. 6.  In the meantime, on 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education ordered that the Centre be closed down and its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint-stock company with part of the Centre\u2019s property. 7.  On 26 November 2008 the applicant was issued with a writ of enforcement for the amount awarded against the Centre in the final judgment of 11 February 2008 (see paragraph 5 above). On 18 March 2009 he filed a request with the Minister for Education for payment of that amount. 8.  The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them. 9.  As of 23 March 2015, the date of the applicant\u2019s last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been recorded.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "4", "8", "6", "2", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Giresun. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 8 February 2006 the applicant, a caretaker employed at the Public Education Centre (Halk E\u011fitim Merkezi) in Giresun, was taken into police custody on suspicion of child molestation, after being caught in an allegedly indecent position with X., a 9-year-old pupil at the primary school located in the same building as the Public Education Centre. 8.  On 8 March 2006 the Espiye Public Prosecutor lodged an indictment with the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance, charging the applicant with the sexual abuse, sexual assault and unlawful detention of a minor, pursuant to Articles 103 \u00a7 1 (a), 109 \u00a7 3 (f) (5) and 102 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (a) of the Turkish Criminal Code. 9.  During the ensuing criminal proceedings, the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance heard statements from the applicant, the parents of X., the psychiatrist who had interviewed the girl after the incident, and the teachers and personnel at the Public Education Centre and the neighbouring primary school, including the teacher E.U., who was the sole eyewitness to the incident. Denying the allegations against him, the applicant stated that on the morning in question, he had entered one of the classrooms in the building for cleaning purposes, where the alleged victim was already present with another pupil. While he was busy cleaning, X. had asked for a simit (a type of bread roll) and had attempted to hug him, as a result of which gesture he had lost his balance and fallen onto a desk with X. It was at that point that the teacher E.U. had entered the classroom. 10.  E.U., on the other hand, testified before the trial court that as she opened the door of the classroom in question, she saw the applicant sitting on a desk in the dark with his legs apart, hugging X. who was sitting on his lap, facing the blackboard. Within a matter of seconds, upon seeing her, the applicant threw X. away in panic. E.U. stated that while she had never witnessed similar behaviour by the applicant before, the scene she had seen on the day in question looked suspicious. She also confirmed that there was another pupil in the classroom at the time. 11.  S.P., who worked in the same primary school and was also the uncle of X.\u2019s mother, asserted before the court that although he had never witnessed any suspicious behaviour on the part of the applicant, he had heard a colleague, \u0130.K., say that the applicant had engaged in indecent behaviour towards some pupils at the school where he had worked previously. However, \u0130.K., who was the deputy principal at the applicant\u2019s previous school, denied giving S.P. any such information concerning the applicant or hearing any adverse rumours or complaints about him for that matter. 12.  X.\u2019s father alleged that according to the information he had received from M.\u00d6. and M.K. \u2012 respectively an employee and the manager at the Public Education Centre \u2012 the applicant had been dismissed from his previous job for similar behaviour. M.\u00d6. denied this allegation, but M.K. confirmed that the above-mentioned S.P. had given him this information, although he himself had never witnessed any indecent behaviour by the applicant. 13.  Another witness, B.A., confirmed that the applicant had apologised to him following the incident. There is no information in the case-file as to the exact content of this apology. 14.  The psychiatrist who interviewed X. after the incident reported that the latter lacked the mental capacity to comprehend and recount what might have taken place on the relevant day and, for that reason, it would be futile, and possibly harmful for her well-being, for the trial court to question her. 15.  On the basis of all the evidence before it, on 18 December 2008 the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance ordered the applicant\u2019s acquittal, holding that it was not possible to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that he had committed the sexual acts forming the basis of the charge. The court observed that the statements of the sole eyewitness were contradictory in parts and that they included her personal interpretation of what had actually taken place on the relevant morning. It added that, despite E.U.\u2019s allegation that the applicant had thrown X. to one side upon her entry in the room, no wounds or bruises had been detected on the girl\u2019s body. 16.  On 13 January 2009 the acquittal judgment became final in the absence of any appeal. 17.  Parallel to the criminal proceedings pending before the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance, a disciplinary investigation was conducted against the applicant in relation to allegations of harassment. 18.  The disciplinary investigation was carried out by two inspectors who took statements from X.\u2019s father, from M.K., the manager of the Public Education Centre, from B.A., a teacher at the primary school, from A.T., the principal of the primary school, and from the applicant, who was being held in detention in relation to the criminal proceedings at the time. The inspectors also took two separate statements from the sole eyewitness, the teacher E.U., under oath and took into account a report from the guidance counsellors of the primary school regarding the psychological and physical development of the minor X. That report, dated 7 January 2003, described the physical and social developmental attributes of the girl as weak and very timid, respectively. The medical diagnosis was stated as autism. 19.  The investigation report which was issued at the end of the disciplinary investigation on 3 April 2006 found the allegations of harassment against the applicant to be well-founded and recommended the dismissal of the applicant from the civil service on the grounds that his conduct constituted \u201cshameful and disgraceful conduct incompatible with the civil service\u201d as provided under section 125 \u00a7 E (g) of Law no. 657. In coming to this conclusion, the inspectors noted the following:\n\u201c...The eyewitness, E.U., reported having seen the applicant in a position which made her suspect that he had been in the course of sexually harassing the student, [X.] She explained that the following facts \u2012 in particular, the room being dark as a result of the lights having been turned off, the applicant sitting at the desk right next to the door with his legs open with the minor on his lap and the desk in front having been pushed further away, coupled with the fact that he had been caressing the body of the minor and holding her tight around her waist \u2012 had led her to conclude that [the applicant] had been attempting to harass her. [She stated that] what she witnessed did not look like a regular display of affection and when she had entered the room, he had thrown the child off him in panic. In his statement, [the applicant] stated that the minor had attempted to hug him while he was cleaning the floor and that, as a result of that gesture he had lost his balance and the minor had sat on his lap. He added that when E.U. entered the room, he was trying to get the minor off him. [The applicant\u2019s] statement that he had fallen onto a desk with the minor as a result of the latter trying to hug him corroborates E.U.\u2019s version of the events. However, the part about him having lost his balance as a result of the minor\u2019s attempt to hug him would be quite unusual given the physical attributes of the minor in question. Moreover, the consistent statements of E.U., taken under oath, who as a mother and an educator seems to have suffered a great deal of emotional distress from these events, give the impression that the allegations against the applicant are well-founded.\n[...]\nThe event has shocked and distressed the town community as well as the school... The severity of this event is further exacerbated by the fact that the student in question is a mentally disabled child, ... unable to express or defend herself...This is a disgraceful thing for a civil servant. [The event] has also given rise to a criminal investigation instigated by the Espiye Public Prosecutor\u2019s office where [the applicant], is accused of sexually abusing a minor who was born on [...] February 1993 and who was unable to defend herself due to her mental incapacity, and to the remanding in custody of [the applicant].\n...we are of the opinion that [the applicant] has harassed [X.] and that this conduct, which is proven, falls under situations provided for in section 125 \u00a7 E (g) of law no. 657, that is to say, \u201cshameful and disgraceful conduct that is incompatible with the civil service\u201d. 20.  On 25 May 2006 the applicant submitted his written defence to the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Education (\u201cthe Supreme Disciplinary Council\u201d). He requested at the outset that the investigation be postponed until the criminal proceedings against him on the same allegations had been finalised. Furthermore, denying all accusations, he challenged E.U.\u2019s statements as being wholly subjective and distorting the facts, bearing particularly in mind that the whole incident had taken place within a matter of seconds, as she too had acknowledged, which did not realistically allow her to make the detailed observations that she had recounted to the authorities. He added that it was not logical that he would have committed the alleged act in the presence of another pupil in the classroom right before the start of the classes. 21.  On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Disciplinary Council issued the following decision in relation to the applicant, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cUpon examination of the file ... and of the defence statement duly taken [from the applicant], the following has been decided:\nOn the basis of the information and documents in the file, the veracity of the act [harassment of X.] attributed to the applicant has been conclusively established... For this reason, it has been decided unanimously to accept the proposal to dismiss the applicant from the civil service in accordance with section 125 \u00a7 E (g) of the Law no. 657 [on Civil Servants], ...\u201d 22.  On 30 October 2006 the applicant objected to the Supreme Disciplinary Council\u2019s decision before the Ordu Administrative Court. The applicant argued that his dismissal on the basis of a finding that he had committed the act of sexual harassment of a minor, which is a criminal act, while criminal proceedings were still pending in respect of that self-same allegation violated his right to the presumption of innocence. 23.  On 3 July 2007 the Ordu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection on the following grounds:\n\u201cThe case concerns the dismissal of the [applicant,], who worked as a caretaker, on the basis of the allegations that he harassed [X.] on the premises of the primary school.\nSection 125 E-g of Law no. 657 provides that shameful and disgraceful conduct that is incompatible with the civil service requires dismissal from the civil service.\nSection 131 of the same Law also provides that the commencement of criminal proceedings against a civil servant shall not suspend disciplinary proceedings arising out of the same facts and that acquittal or conviction in the criminal proceedings shall not prevent the execution of disciplinary sanctions.\u201d\n[...]\nAlthough it has been argued that the sole eyewitness\u2019s version of the events cannot be taken as a conclusive basis on which to deem that the applicant committed the act imputed to him, on the basis of the evidence in the case-file and in consideration of the position in which the applicant was found in the classroom, as well as the fact that the classroom\u2019s door had been shut and the lights had been turned off and the room was therefore dark as it was also very early in the morning and it was raining [...], having further regard to the statement by the principal of the neighbouring primary school, A.T., during the criminal proceedings acknowledging that the applicant had apologised to him after the incident and that he had also heard rumours about the applicant\u2019s similar indecent behaviour in other schools where he had previously worked, the applicant\u2019s argument has not been found to be credible. 24.  This statement by A.T., referred to in the Ordu Administrative Court judgment, is not mentioned in the judgment of the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance. 25.  On 28 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Ordu Administrative Court, which he considered to be based on groundless accusations. He argued firstly that, in circumstances where the act forming the basis of criminal and disciplinary investigations was one and the same, the criminal proceedings would be better placed to shed light on the circumstances and to arrive at an accurate conclusion regarding the facts than would be those of the disciplinary bodies, whose findings would be at best hypothetical. He pointed out that the administrative court had ignored the presence of another pupil in the classroom at the time of the incident, as well as his explanation that the door had been shut as a result of the draught from the open window. The administrative court had similarly overlooked his service record (sicil dosyas\u0131) and the fact that it made no mention of any allegations of misconduct in his previous post, which would be unimaginable if he had really been dismissed from that post for indecent behaviour. He also referred in this connection to the statements of \u0130.K., the deputy principal at the previous school, denying any such allegations of indecent behaviour. 26.  On 17 November 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the first-instance court\u2019s reasoning and not mentioning the acquittal judgment which had been delivered by the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance in the meantime. 27.  On 7 July 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s rectification request. 28.  On 27 May 2013, that is to say after lodging his complaint with the Court, the applicant brought proceedings against the Ministry of Education and requested the reopening of the proceedings concerning his dismissal from the civil service. The applicant relied on the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance\u2019s final judgment of 18 December 2008, which acquitted him of the charges of sexual abuse, sexual assault and the unlawful detention of a minor, and argued before the Ordu Administrative Court that his right to the presumption of innocence had been violated in the course of the dismissal proceedings because he had been dismissed on the basis of allegations that he had committed offences in respect of which the criminal proceedings had not yet become final. On 24 October 2013, the Ordu Administrative Court dismissed the case, holding that the arguments put forward by the applicant for reopening proceedings did not fall within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for this extraordinary remedy. 29.  In their observations on 14 March 2014, the Government informed the Court that appeal proceedings were pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.", "references": ["6", "2", "5", "1", "0", "9", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in K\u0131r\u0131kkale. 6.  On 25 September 1998 the applicant was arrested by police officers and taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation. 7.  On 30 September 1998 police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters took a statement from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, as a result of the restriction stemming from Law no. 3842. He confessed that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about certain activities in which he had participated. 8.  On 2 October 1998 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor. He confirmed the statement he had made to the police. 9.  On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The applicant alleged that he had given the statements under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 10.  On 7 October 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with being involved in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 11.  On 12 October 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 16 December 1998. 12.  On 16 December 1998 the other co-accused, namely G.T., Z.A. and D.P.N.J., gave evidence in person. They did not give any statement in relation to the applicant. 13.  On 8 March 1999 the trial court, noting the absence of the accused, decided to adjourn the hearing. 14.  At the hearing held on 2 June 1999, the applicant gave evidence in person and stated that he had been forced to sign his previous statements. The applicant retracted those statements while maintaining that he had not been involved in any of the offences attributed to him. At the same hearing, the other co-accused, namely A.B. and B.G. also gave evidence in person. They did not make any statements in respect of the applicant. 15.  While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. Between 18 June 1999 and 2 September 2002, the trial court consisting of three civilian judges held fourteen hearings on the merits. 16.  On 4 August 1999, the State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, heard evidence from A.S., \u015e.K., H.K., S.K., N.\u00c7., T.G., \u00d6.\u00d6. as witnesses, from M.N. as accused and from K.\u00d6. as a complainant. Two of them made incriminatory statements in relation to the applicant. When asked his comments concerning those statements, the applicant rejected them, maintaining that he had had no connection with the accusations. 17.  On 25 April 2001 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits (esas hakk\u0131nda m\u00fctalaa) and requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested time to submit the applicant\u2019s defence submissions. 18.   On 29 August 2001 the applicant\u2019s lawyer made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case. 19.  On 27 March 2002 the applicant\u2019s lawyer reiterated his previous defence submissions. 20.  On 19 June 2002 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, again reiterated his previous defence submissions. At the same hearing, the applicant stated that he had agreed to his lawyer\u2019s submissions. 21.  On 2 September 2002 the applicant and his lawyer presented their closing arguments. On the same day the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The first-instance court based its decision on several items of evidence, such as the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, documents relating to the organisation which had been found and seized in the course of police operations, and the statements of some co-defendants. 22.  On 7 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 29 May 2003 that decision was deposited with the registry of the Istanbul State Security Court.", "references": ["6", "2", "8", "9", "1", "4", "7", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant political party has its registered seat in Budapest. 6.  On 2 October 2016 a referendum related to the European Union\u2019s migrant relocation plan was held in Hungary. The referendum was initiated by the Government and posed the following question: \u201cDo you want the European Union to be entitled to order the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without Parliament\u2019s consent?\u201d 7. In the course of the campaign several opposition parties called on voters to boycott the referendum or to cast invalid ballots that would not count in the final tally but could still be interpreted as rejecting the idea of the referendum. On 29 September 2016 the applicant political party made available a mobile telephone application to voters (\u201cthe cast-an-invalid-vote app\u201d) where they could upload, and share with the public, photographs taken of their ballots. It also enabled voters to comment on the reasons for how they cast their ballot. The posting and sharing of photographs were anonymous. The application was reported in major online journals. 8.  On 29 September 2016 a private individual lodged a complaint with the National Election Commission (Nemzeti V\u00e1laszt\u00e1si Bizotts\u00e1g) about the application. 9.  In a decision of 30 September 2016 the National Election Commission found that the application infringed the principles of fairness of elections, voting secrecy, and the proper exercise of rights (rendeltet\u00e9sszer\u0171 joggyakorl\u00e1s), and ordered the applicant organisation to refrain from further breaches of section 2(1)(a) and (e) of Act no. XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure and Article 2(1) of the Fundamental Law. Relying on a previous resolution issued in 2014, it held that voters could not treat ballot papers as their own [property], and therefore could neither take them out of the voting booths nor take a photograph of them. It held that taking photographs of ballot papers could lead to electoral fraud. Furthermore, although the principle of secrecy did not create any obligation on the voters\u2019 side, it nevertheless did not entitle them to abuse their situation, bearing in mind that voting secrecy could only be maintained with their cooperation. The Commission concluded that the phone application was capable of discrediting the work of election bodies and tallying systems in the eyes of the public. 10.  The applicant sought judicial review of this decision before the K\u00faria. 11.  By a judgment of 10 October 2016 the K\u00faria upheld the Commission\u2019s decision as to its finding regarding the infringement of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. The K\u00faria held that the purpose of the ballots had been to enable voters to express their opinion on the referendum question, and that taking photographs of ballots and subsequently publishing them had not been in line with this purpose. A ban on photographs and on publication had not infringed voters\u2019 freedom of expression, since they had been free to express their opinions by casting their ballots and to share with others how they had voted. The K\u00faria overturned the remainder of the Commission\u2019s decision on the infringement of the secrecy of the electoral process and on the discrediting of the work of the electoral bodies. It found that there was no regulation prohibiting voters from taking photographs of their ballot papers in the voters\u2019 booths and that their identity could not have been revealed through the mobile telephone application. 12.  Meanwhile, on 3 October 2016 the same private individual lodged a new complaint with the National Election Commission, in the light of the fact that the applicant political party had activated the \u201ccast-an-invalid-vote app\u201d on 2 October, the day of the referendum. The complainant maintained that by operating the mobile telephone application and by encouraging voters to make use of it, the applicant political party had infringed the principles governing the bona fide and proper exercise of rights, and also the principles of fairness and secrecy of elections. 13.  In a decision of 7 October 2016 the National Election Commission reiterated its previous finding that taking photographs of ballot papers had infringed the principle of the secrecy of voters\u2019 ballots, the fairness of elections, and the proper exercise of rights, and fined the political party 832,500 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately 2,700 euros (EUR)). The Commission supplemented its previous reasoning by noting that the mobile telephone application calling on voters to cast an invalid ballot could have influenced voters and had thus constituted unlawful campaigning. 14.  The applicant political party sought judicial review of this decision as well. 15.  By a decision of 18 October 2016 the K\u00faria upheld the Commission\u2019s decision as to the finding of an infringement of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. It explained that the purpose of the ballot papers had been for voters to express their opinion on the referendum question, and any other use of them had constituted a violation of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. The K\u00faria overturned the remainder of the Commission\u2019s decision as to a violation of the fairness and voting secrecy and the principle of the bona fide exercise of rights. It reiterated its previous finding that the identity of the individual voters had not been revealed, and emphasised that the conduct of the applicant political party had had no impact on the fairness of the referendum. It reduced the fine to HUF 100,000 (approximately EUR 330). 16.  The applicant organisation lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions of both 10 and 18 October 2016. In both complaints the applicant requested the Constitutional Court to \u201cestablish that the K\u00faria\u2019s decision infringed its right recognised in Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law\u201d. It argued that \u201cunder Article 27 of the Act on the Constitutional Court an organisation personally concerned by an unconstitutional judicial decision, after having exhausted all other remedies, may lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court if the decision on the merits infringed its right ensured by the Constitution. The decision of the K\u00faria declared the applicant\u2019s conduct unlawful and obliged it to pay a fine, it was the applicant who lodged the petition for review with the K\u00faria, thus it was individually concerned in the present case...By making the mobile phone application available the applicant reacted to the spreading of social media communication. Citizens regularly share events, thoughts and opinions on internet websites through photos taken with their mobile phones. In the context of elections, this led to the fact that all over the world, voters take photos of their ballot papers and share it through social media. By developing the mobile phone application the applicant wanted to enable voters to share photos of ballot papers (or in case of those who absented from the referendum photos of the activities undertaken instead of voting) and other messages in an anonymous way and exercise their right to freedom of expression in a way that the content of the vote could not be linked to the voter. ...In the applicant\u2019s view the impugned decision, its legal interpretation and the consequences applied by the K\u00faria infringe its right under Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law. The conduct of voters taking photos of ballot papers and sharing it with others is an expression of an opinion in public matters and constitutes a conduct falling under the freedom of expression of opinions, and in particular, the most protected aspect of it, a discussion on matters of public interest. Thus, the applicant\u2019s activity, providing a forum for voters to express an opinion is also protected by the Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law...In the applicant\u2019s opinion, the decision of the the K\u00faria, by invoking voters\u2019 right to freedom of expression, restrained in fact, the applicant\u2019s own conduct of exercising its right to freedom of expression without any constitutional reason.\u201d The applicant further submitted that, as established by the K\u00faria, the mobile phone application had not infringed the secrecy and fairness of the voting procedure and it had also not been capable of doing so, since the content of the ballot papers could not be linked to the voters. Thus, it argued that these aims could not serve as a legitimate basis for restricting the right to freedom of expression. In any event, even if the application could have infringed the secrecy of voting, the ban on the application had been disproportionate. 17.  The Constitutional Court declared the complaints inadmissible on 24 October 2016, with identical reasoning, on the grounds that the cases did not concern the applicant organisation\u2019s right to freedom of expression. It reiterated the K\u00faria\u2019s finding that although the case related to the freedom of expression of voters, this had not been infringed by the decision of the Election Commission, which had only found that the method used \u2013 that is to say uploading photographs to a mobile application \u2013 had not been in compliance with the obligation to exercise voting rights in accordance with their purpose. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the applicant political party had merely provided a forum for voters to share photographs of their ballot papers or their intention to abstain from voting, it had did not itself expressed an opinion. Since the applicant political party had only complained about the restriction of voters\u2019 right to freedom of expression, it had not been personally concerned by the decision of the K\u00faria.", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "3", "0", "4", "5", "2", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Ankara. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application the applicant was serving as a chief police officer in Ankara. 8.  On 12 April 2002 a woman named S.K. filed a criminal complaint with officers at Demirf\u0131rka police station, alleging that she had been taken into a police car by two officers on the pretext of her being a suspect. Afterwards, they had driven her around in the car and finally had taken her to an empty plot of land where she had been raped in the car by one of the police officers. He had been wearing glasses and had held a police radio in his hand. She identified the vehicle\u2019s licence plate. 9.  The applicant and the other police officer were immediately called into the police station for questioning as they had been assigned to the vehicle which had the licence plate identified by S.K. 10.  In his statement to the police, made in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant said that he had picked up S.K. around 2 a.m. while he was patrolling with his colleague, S.A., on Talatpa\u015fa Boulevard. He submitted that S.K., who had looked intoxicated, had hailed them, stopped their car, and told them that she worked as a \u201ckonsomatris\u201d, a bar hostess who entertains male guests by keeping them company. She had asked for their help to go to a safe place and the applicant had offered to take her to her home, which she had declined. According to the applicant they had also offered to take her to the police station, which she had also declined. Finally, they had taken her to S.A.\u2019s home with the intention of sobering her up. The applicant stated that when S.A. was in the kitchen preparing something to eat, S.K. had started behaving strangely, taking off her clothes and acting in a sexually inviting manner. The applicant said that as a result of being aroused he had simply ejaculated in his own hand but had not touched her. He had then called S.A. and told him that they had to leave immediately. The applicant stated that they had left S.K. in front of a hotel at 3 a.m. and had continued with their patrol until they had been called into the police station for questioning. 11.  S.A. confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events in his statement to the police on the same day. 12.  In an additional statement to the police, also made on the same day, S.K. told the police that she could not remember whether the police officers had taken her to an apartment or some other place as she had been very intoxicated. 13.  A forensic medical examination of S.K. was carried out on the same day, showing that she had no bruises on her body. 14.  A forensic expert report drafted on 15 April 2002 stated that the underwear that the applicant had been wearing on the night in question had S.K.\u2019s and his own DNA on it. Furthermore, napkins found in the rubbish bin on the balcony of S.A.\u2019s apartment had traces of the applicant\u2019s semen. 15.  On 6 June 2002 the Ankara governor decided to authorise the prosecution of the applicant and S.A. for alleged rape and abuse of authority. The applicant lodged an objection with the Ankara District Administrative Court seeking annulment of the governor\u2019s decision, but it was dismissed. 16.  On 15 November 2002 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance, charging the applicant and S.A. with abuse of public authority and the unlawful use of a public vehicle under Article 240 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and section 16 of the Law on Vehicles (Law no. 237). 17.  In her statement in the first-instance proceedings, S.K. said that she had flagged down a police car that day to ask for help. As she had been intoxicated, she could not remember exactly what had happened later or which officer had raped her. 18.  The chief public prosecutor submitted an opinion on the merits and stated that the applicant\u2019s conduct should be reclassified as rape and unlawful detention and that of S.A. as having aided and abetted those acts. He therefore argued that the case should be referred to the Ankara Assize Court, which has jurisdiction to hear such charges. 19.  On 13 July 2004 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. It found that the offences committed by the applicant while performing his official duties were rape and the unlawful detention of an adult, which were governed, inter alia, by Articles 251, 416 \u00a7 1 and 429 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code, and the unlawful use of a public vehicle, which came under section 16 of Law no. 237. It stated that those offences had to be tried by assize courts and it therefore referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court. 20.  At a hearing held on 24 March 2005, the Ankara Assize Court heard S.K. who, contrary to her previous statements, submitted that the officers had not raped her and had not taken her anywhere without her consent. She then submitted that she wished to withdraw her complaint. 21.  On 13 September 2005 the Ankara Assize Court acquitted the applicant and S.A. of all charges, holding that there was no evidence of force on S.K.\u2019s body, one of the constituent elements of the offences of rape and unlawful detention. The court further held that despite S.K.\u2019s statement of 24 March 2005, the forensic report of 15 April 2002 had established that the applicant had had intercourse with her. In the absence of evidence that corroborated the fact of the applicant having forced himself on S.K., it could not be established beyond doubt that the act of sexual intercourse itself had not been consensual. The court stated in that connection that even if S.K. had been drunk that night, her allegations of rape and of being held against her will needed to be supported by some sign of resistance. In the light of the conclusion that there had been no indication of a criminal offence committed by the police officers, the court then held that the applicant and S.A. could not be deemed to have committed the separate offence of the unlawful use of a public vehicle. It therefore acquitted them of all the charges. 22.  On 21 September 2005 the acquittal became final as no appeals had been made. 23.  In the aftermath of the events of 12 April 2002 a preliminary disciplinary investigation was launched against the applicant and S.A. on 24 April 2002. 24.  On 2 and 29 May 2002 the applicant was questioned in relation to the allegations of rape against him. He submitted that he had not had sexual intercourse with S.K. He repeated his earlier statements that S.K. had seduced him to the point where he had had to ejaculate in his own hand. The applicant was also requested to submit a written defence statement. He wrote that he had taken S.K. into the police car with the intention of helping her and had not forced himself on her, as alleged by S.K. He pointed out that the forensic expert evidence had established that there had been no traces of violence, whether on S.K.\u2019s body or in the form of any other type of evidence, such as damage to property or blood stains at S.A.\u2019s apartment or inside the police car. 25.  An investigation report dated 6 June 2002, prepared by the police investigator, concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of rape, while S.A. was guilty of the offence of conduct unbecoming and incompatible with the civil service and therefore recommended that the applicant be sanctioned with a deferral of advancement to a higher rank for a period of twenty-four months. The report further stated that a recommendation for a separate criminal investigation against the applicant and S.A. had already been submitted to the governor\u2019s office for authorisation. 26.  On 28 November 2002, the Supreme Disciplinary Council found the applicant guilty of abuse of his authority as a police officer and of sexually assaulting S.K. Noting that the applicant\u2019s appraisal scores had only been average for the years 1999 and 2000, and taking account of the shameful nature of the act he had committed, it found that the applicant could not be given a penalty that was less severe than the one decided on. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c... the victim complained to the police and confirmed the event by giving the licence plate number of the vehicle and accurately describing the officer as wearing glasses and holding a police radio in his hand. The applicant, on the other hand, hid the facts by denying that he had had intercourse with S.K. [D]espite the fact that the vaginal examination of the victim did not reveal the presence of any active or passive semen, the victim\u2019s statement that she was menstruating on the night in question and the forensic evidence finding traces of both the applicant\u2019s and S.K.\u2019s DNA on the applicant\u2019s underwear and the two napkins found in S.A.\u2019s apartment containing the applicant\u2019s DNA, point to the conclusion that the applicant must have ejaculated prematurely before sexual intercourse. He has therefore committed the offence of \u2018sexual assault\u2019 and he furthermore used his position as a police officer by calling the victim a \u2018suspect\u2019 in order to lure her into the police car ... Criminal proceedings are pending against the applicant on charges of abuse of authority under Article 240 of the Turkish Criminal Code.\n... It has been decided unanimously to dismiss the accused from the police force, in accordance with section 8(6) and (7) of the Disciplinary Regulation of the Security Forces on the grounds that it has been proven that he has committed the offence of sexual assault and of using his position as a police officer for personal ... advantage.\u201d 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant objected to the Supreme Disciplinary Council\u2019s decision before the Ankara Administrative Court. The applicant argued that his dismissal on the basis of a finding that he had committed sexual assault, although he had not been found guilty of that offence by a criminal court, had violated his right to the presumption of innocence. 28.  On 4 July 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case, holding that the decision to dismiss the applicant from the police force had been in accordance with the law. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cActs, conduct and behaviour of the kind listed in section 8(6), \u2018... rape, sexual assault, ... or attempting to commit any of those offences\u2019 and in section 8 (7), \u2018using his position as a police officer for his own or another person\u2019s advantage\u2019, are sanctioned with dismissal from the police force.\nAfter examination of the file, it appears that the case concerns the applicant\u2019s dismissal from the police force on the basis of a disciplinary investigation which established that he had intercourse with a woman without her consent on the pretext of calling her a suspect .., by asking her to get into a police car so that he could verify her identity at the police station, although in the end he took her to a piece of empty land and had intercourse with her without her consent.\nOn the basis of the case file, statements, the forensic report and other information, the veracity of the accusation is reinforced and therefore the decision to dismiss the applicant is in accordance with the law.\u201d 29.  On 13 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal by a majority by endorsing the reasons provided by the Ankara Administrative Court. One judge out of the five expressed a dissenting opinion, reasoning that the applicant had been acquitted of the charges in the parallel criminal proceedings, including of rape, and that therefore the disciplinary decision to dismiss him from the police force on those grounds could no longer be upheld. The dissenting judge further argued that the courts should have reclassified the applicant\u2019s conduct as conduct that was incompatible with the reputation and trust inherent in the functions of an official and sanctioned him with the corresponding penalty of the deferral of moving to a higher rank for a period of sixteen months. 30.  On 23 June 2006 the applicant submitted a request to rectify the decision of 13 March 2006, arguing in the main that the fact that he had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings and had been found innocent of the allegations of rape had not been taken into account in the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s decision. He further argued that the contradictory conclusions of the criminal and administrative courts in relation to what had happened on the night in question had cast doubt on his innocence. 31.  The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request on 17 June 2008, holding that none of the reasons for rectification he had put forth fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for such a decision in section 54 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). 32.  In their observations the Government submitted that on 26 November 2008 the applicant had brought proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior and had requested that the reopening of the proceedings for his dismissal from the police force. The applicant relied on the Ankara Assize Court\u2019s final judgment of 13 September 2005, acquitting him of the charges of, inter alia, attempted rape and abuse of authority. He argued before the Ankara Administrative Court that the establishment of his innocence should be regarded as new grounds for reopening the dismissal proceedings. On 27 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s request was dismissed. The Court was not provided with a copy of that decision; however, the Government provided a summary of parts of it, which was not contested by the applicant. According to the Government, the administrative court held that \u201cthe decision of the Assize Court was available on the dates the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant\u2019s appellate review and request for rectification of the decision, and that accordingly the court in question made an assessment of the decision rendered by the Assize Court\u201d. 33.  According to the information submitted by the Government, the applicant did not appeal against that decision.", "references": ["6", "2", "5", "7", "4", "0", "8", "9", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Budapest. 6.  She is the widow of a well-known Hungarian poet, Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy. They married in 2002, and their relationship, partly due to a significant difference in age, as well as their life and work, were constantly the subject of widespread media coverage. They often appeared in the tabloids. 7.  The applicant\u2019s husband died in 2006. 8.  On an unspecified date in 2008 an article was published in a daily newspaper, Blikk, based on an interview with the applicant, revealing that she wanted to have a child who would be a blood relative of both her and her late husband and have the same intellect and attitude as him. The applicant explained that she envisaged her own sister and her late husband\u2019s grandson being the parents of that child. 9.  Following some talks with the applicant, on 26 March 2008 Helyi T\u00e9ma, at the material time the biggest weekly journal, republished the same story, adding that the late poet\u2019s grandson had dismissed the idea of having a child with the applicant\u2019s sister. The front page of the newspaper contained a photograph of the applicant with her late husband and the headline \u201cTrampling on the memory of Faludy. The widow does everything for the limelight\u201d. Despite a previous request by the applicant, the article made no mention of a book to be published on the applicant\u2019s late husband. 10.  Subsequently, in reaction to a complaint by the applicant, the newspaper published an additional article on the book under publication; however, it did not appear on the front page as the applicant\u2019s had presumably wished. The applicant asked for a further article to be published but the newspaper declined. 11.  Dissatisfied, the applicant lodged a civil action against the publisher of the weekly newspaper under article 78 of the (old) Civil Code, alleging a violation of her personality rights, in particular her right to reputation. She maintained that the headline published on 26 March 2008 had negatively affected her public image. She sought an injunction against any further infringement of her right to reputation, an apology from the publisher and compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 4,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)). 12.  According to the witnesses who gave evidence before the first-instance court, the applicant had been truly saddened by the way the article had presented her family plans, especially that her statements had been hurtful to the memory of her late husband. She had also received a lot of criticism from her acquaintances. In a judgment of 5 April 2009 the Budapest Regional Court granted an injunction against any further infringement, ordered a public apology and obliged the publisher to pay the applicant HUF 600,000 (EUR 2,000) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation was dismissed. The court established the following:\n \n\u201c..the private life of the plaintiff and her late spouse was previously at the centre of media attention ... Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy and the plaintiff have already shocked public opinion with the declaration of their love. It turned out that she seduced the poet from a man ... The poet-prince (k\u00f6lt\u0151fejedelem) happily introduced to the world his then yet unknown lover, who became his muse and who was 65 years younger than him. The Kossuth Prize winner and internationally recognised poet had a tendency to push the boundaries, openly admitted his homosexual adventures and love affairs, and held that taboos were to be dismantled. Therefore, when the country just began to digest and accept his relationship with Fanny, the poet accepted an offer from Penthouse magazine, which has since closed down, agreeing to be presented in the magazine in high-quality erotic pictures with his lover ... [The plaintiff] had even been subject of numerous hurtful and degrading remarks and attacks during Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy\u2019s life. The media echoed that opinion, doubting her true feelings towards her husband, and some of the publications stressed that theirs was a marriage of convenience ... They planned to adopt a child during the poet\u2019s lifetime, but since that plan failed, Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy came up with the idea of having a child through his son, but since his son was terminally ill, that plan could not go ahead either.\n...\n...the plaintiff\u2019s idea can be said to be bizarre and eccentric, nonetheless, how she has spoken about childbearing does not, following the rules of formal logic, mean that she has trampled on her husband\u2019s memory.\nBased on the witness statements and the role the plaintiff\u2019s late husband played in public life, the court concluded that the applicant\u2019s idea about childbearing was not contrary to the thinking of Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy...\u201d 13.  The Regional Court added that both the applicant and her late husband had unusual, provocative personalities and ways of thinking, and the statement according to which she had infringed her late husband\u2019s memory did not correspond to reality and was unjustifiably hurtful. According to the court, statements in a front page headline constituted journalistic opinion, and were protected by the right to freedom of expression, as long as they were not devoid of any factual basis and did not amount to a blatantly humiliating or offensive value judgment. The court concluded that the statement that the applicant did everything for the limelight had not infringed her personality rights, whereas the statement that she had trampled on her husband\u2019s memory had infringed her right to reputation and dignity (33.P.22.472/2009/16.). 14.  On 8 December 2011 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the previous judgment finding an infringement of the applicant\u2019s reputation and dismissed her action in its entirety. The court reiterated the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law on the different fundamental rights at stake, pointing out that even shocking, disturbing or inaccurate opinions were protected by the right to freedom of expression and were not susceptible of proof. It also stressed that statements should be assessed in context and with regard to their background. The court explained in detail that the applicant and her husband had triggered controversial reactions and \u201ceveryday people with an average mindset\u201d would have had an opinion on their relationship and marriage. It held that the headline was not a statement of fact but a value judgment expressed in connection with the applicant\u2019s own \u201cpeculiar\u201d statements. According to the court, the main issue at stake was whether, in the light of the applicant\u2019s own conduct \u201cdiverging from the widely\u2011accepted social and ethical norms\u201d, the statement could be regarded as unreasonably hurtful and humiliating.\nThe court also found that the headline could not have infringed the applicant\u2019s reputation since her own statements were irrational and undignified, putting Gy\u00f6rgy Faludy\u2019s grandson in an embarrassing situation. 15.  The applicant lodged a petition for review with the K\u00faria. In a judgment of 12 September 2012, the K\u00faria endorsed the finding of the second-instance court that the headline did not constitute a statement of fact but a value judgment concerning the unusual manner in which the applicant intended to start a family. Since it was not devoid of factual basis, it could not be considered humiliating, hurtful or offensive and as such had not infringed the applicant\u2019s dignity. The court nonetheless stated that it was irrelevant whether the applicant\u2019s previous unconventional conduct justified the value judgment (Pfv.IV.20.710/2012/5.).", "references": ["2", "9", "0", "7", "5", "6", "8", "1", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants\u2019 particulars appear in the appendix to this judgment. 6.  During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about a third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the \u201cSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina\u201d (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter \u201cKrajina\u201d). At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced their intention to take military action with the aim of regaining control over Krajina. The operation was codenamed \u201cStorm\u201d (Oluja) and took place from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before the military action, the vast majority of the population of Krajina fled Croatia. Most of them went to Bosnia and Herzegovina but some also went to Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 7.  On 5 November 1997 Croatia ratified the Convention. 8.  The applicants and P.M. (born in 1942), who was the husband of one of the applicants and the father of the others, lived in Razboji\u0161te, near the larger village of Krupa, on the territory of Krajina. During the night of 4 to 5 August 1995 all the family, save for P.M., fled Croatia. P.M. was killed during Operation Storm on 5 August 1995.\nAccording to the applicants, P.M. was killed in the courtyard of his house in Razboji\u0161te, although he was an unarmed civilian.\nAccording to the Government, he was armed and was killed in an exchange of fire with the Croatian Army in the broader area of Krupa. The villages of Razboji\u0161te, Krupa and \u017degar and the settlement of Mili\u0107i are located near each other. 9.  On 11 October 1995 the police found the remains of an unidentified person in Razboji\u0161te and they were buried in Gra\u010dac Cemetery under the number 434. 10.  On June 2002 exhumations were carried out at Gra\u010dac Cemetery. The process was conducted under the auspices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Me\u0111unarodni kazneni sud za biv\u0161u Jugoslaviju) and the County State Attorney\u2019s Office in Zadar. Body no. 434 was also dug up and an identity card was found in the name of P.M. The remains were examined at the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Zagreb (Zavod za sudsku medicinu i kriminalistiku) and on 15 October 2002 an autopsy report was issued which concluded that the cause of death had been three wounds from shelling. On 24 November 2003 the third applicant identified the remains as those of her father, P.M. 11.  The police opened an investigation into the circumstances of P.M.\u2019s death after the applicants on 5 September 2005 brought a claim for damages with the State Attorney\u2019s Office in connection with his killing (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  On 21 October 2005 the police interviewed \u017d.M., who said that P.M. had joined a village guard unit during the war. \u017d.M. did not know who might have killed P.M. 13.  On 11 August 2015 the Zadar police received an anonymous letter stating that on 10 August 1995 two men, V.G. and M.B., had killed twelve elderly people in the village of \u017degar in the \u201cMili\u0107a\u201d cave, near Krupa. 14.  On 25 August 2015 the police interviewed O.M. and S.M., residents of \u017degar. O.M. said that he had never heard of someone being killed in the \u201cMili\u0107a\u201d cave even though he had lived all his life in the area. He also said that during Operation Storm five people from the settlement called Mili\u0107i, part of the village of \u017degar, had been killed, including P.M. They had all been members of the paramilitary forces and had been armed. He had heard that they all had perished in rocky areas of the village but did not know the cause and manner of their deaths. 15.  On 26 August 2015 the Zadar police informed the Zadar County State Attorney\u2019s Office that five persons had been killed in the settlement of Mili\u0107i during Operation Storm, one of whom was P.M., who had died on 5 August 1995. 16.  On 14 September 2015 the police interviewed V.G., a captain in the Croatian Army during Operation Storm, who had been in command of the Zadar Military Police Third Company of the 72nd Battalion, who said that he had never been to \u017degar and had never heard of anyone being killed there. He had been in Benkovac (a town situated some forty kilometres from \u017degar) throughout Operation Storm. He had also said that he could state with certainty that none of the members of his unit had committed any crimes, otherwise he would have known about it. 17.  On 16 September 2015 the police interviewed M.B., a Croatian soldier and member of the 72nd Battalion during Operation Storm. He also said that he had never been to \u017degar and had never heard of anyone being killed there. He had been near Obrovac (a town situated some twenty kilometres from \u017degar) during the military operation. 18.  On 1 October 2015 the Zadar County State Attorney\u2019s Office closed the investigation. 19.  On 22 January 2016 the Zadar County State Attorney\u2019s Office informed its counterpart in Split County that it had not been able to confirm the allegations made in the anonymous letter of 11 August 2015 as there was no indication that twelve elderly people had been killed in the \u201cMili\u0107a\u201d cave. However, five members of the Serbian paramilitary forces had been killed during Operation Storm, including P.M. Enquiries had therefore been stopped since the information given in the anonymous letter had proved to be unreliable. 20.  On 5 September 2005 the applicants submitted a claim for damages with the State Attorney\u2019s Office in connection with the killing of P.M. The request was refused.\nOn 12 April 2006 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with P.M.\u2019s death.\nThe claim was dismissed on 30 March 2010 on the grounds that it had not been established how P.M. had been killed and that the applicants had not proved that his killing had amounted to a terrorist act for which the State was liable. It had also not been established that he had been killed by members of the Croatian army or police in areas where there had been no operations related to the war. In addition, the claim had become statute\u2011barred. During the proceedings information was obtained from the archives of the Ministry of Defence showing that the Croatian army had entered the area in question on 6 August 1995, whereas P.M. had been killed on 5 August 1995. The first-instance court also accepted the statement of the witness O.M., who said that the village of \u017degar had been shelled on 5 August 1995.\nThe first-instance judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court on 21 September 2010.\nOn 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgments in respect of the ruling that the applicants\u2019 claim had become statute-barred. 21.  A constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant was dismissed on 25 February 2015.", "references": ["6", "3", "9", "2", "4", "1", "5", "8", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. He is a lawyer practising in Sofia. 6.  The applicant signed a contract with the then Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (hereafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) on 15 July 2004. According to the terms of the contract the applicant undertook to act as a legal representative for the Ministry in a case before the International Court of Arbitration in Paris, for which the Ministry was to pay him 58,100 Bulgarian Levs (BGN, about EUR 29,600). This sum comprised a legal fee and all related costs and expenses incurred by him in connection with the representation. 7.  The Ministry paid the applicant half of the amount due on the day the contract was signed. The contract stipulated that the second half was to be paid to him at the end of the proceedings. 8.  The proceedings before the International Court of Arbitration in Paris ended on 28 November 2005. On 19 December 2005 the applicant asked the Ministry to pay him the balance due, but the Ministry failed to reply. The applicant then asked the Sofia District Court to issue him with a writ of enforcement against the Ministry. On 23 February 2006 the court issued the writ on the basis of the contract of 15 July 2004 for the amount of BGN 29,631, comprising BGN 29,050 due on the basis of the contract and BGN 581 for costs related to the enforcement proceedings, plus the legal interest rate for the period from 1 February 2006 until full payment. 9.  On 24 February 2006, in compliance with Article 399 of the 1952 Code, a notary acting for the applicant served the original writ of enforcement on the Ministry and requested that the institution pay. As the Ministry still did not reply, the applicant sought the assistance of the Ombudsman. Subsequently, the Ministry confirmed to the Ombudsman in a letter of 27 March 2006 that it had received a notarial request for payment and the writ of enforcement in the applicant\u2019s case. It also stated that, if money for the honouring of debts of the Ministry had not been included in the current year\u2019s budget, this would be done in the following year\u2019s budget. 10.  In July 2006 the Ministry asked the Sofia Bar Association to open disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for acting against the interests of his client, the Ministry. The Sofia Bar Association terminated those proceedings the same year after establishing that the applicant had not acted contrary to the interests of the Ministry. 11.  The Ministry did not pay the balance due to the applicant. Instead, on 26 July 2006 the Ministry brought a civil claim against him in court, seeking damages for his failure to carry out the duties ensuing from the contract of 15 July 2004. The amounts sought in damages were 568,897.90 United States dollars (USD) and BGN 29,500 (approximately EUR 15,000), the latter explicitly referred to as corresponding to the first half of the fee due to the applicant which had been paid to him by the Ministry upon signing the contract. In addition, the Ministry sought BGN 4,648 (about EUR 2,300) by way of penalty, representing 8% of the total amount of BGN 58,100 (about EUR 29,600) due to the applicant in fees; that penalty had been provided for in the contract in case the applicant were to default on his contractual obligations. In its claim before the court the Ministry made no mention of the balance of the fee it owed the applicant on conclusion of the contract of 2004; a sum subject to a writ of enforcement and served on the Ministry earlier in 2006. 12.  In a judgment of 3 August 2009 the Sofia City Court, acting as a first-instance court, rejected the Ministry\u2019s claim in respect of all amounts. The court found that although the Ministry had indeed incurred losses in the amount of USD 568,897.90 in the context of the arbitration proceedings in Paris, those losses had not been the result of the applicant\u2019s conduct. The court found further that, because the applicant had complied with his contractual obligations, the payment he had received, corresponding to the first half of the agreed fee, had been owed and duly paid to him by the Ministry. Similarly, given that the applicant had complied with his contractual obligations, imposition of the penalty which had been agreed in the contract in the event of failure to deliver was not justified. 13.  Following an appeal by the Ministry, in a judgment of 30 April 2010, the Sofia Court of Appeal rejected the Ministry\u2019s claim in respect of the two amounts sought in damages (see paragraph 11 above). As regards the first half of the fee paid to the applicant, in particular, the court observed that the Ministry had not claimed that the contract it had concluded with the applicant had been cancelled and found that the first half of the fee paid could not be considered as damages. The court held, however, that the applicant owed the Ministry the amount of BGN 4,648 (about EUR 2,300) by way of penalty because during the arbitration proceedings he had omitted to transmit to the Ministry a request by the arbitrator that the original of a document be submitted to the latter. The penalty agreed in the contract between the Ministry and the applicant was payable in the event of the failure of the applicant to comply with his obligations and the Ministry did not need to prove that it had incurred any loss as a result of the applicant\u2019s conduct. The court therefore allowed the Ministry\u2019s claim for the amount of BGN 5,102.88, which corresponded to BGN 4,648 by way of penalty and BGN 418.88 for case-related costs. Since the Ministry\u2019s claim did not mention the balance of the fee due to the applicant, at no point did the court examine in that judgment whether the second half of the payment of the legal fee agreed in the contract was due to him following its conclusion. 14.  In a final decision of 28 June 2011, the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) did not allow a cassation review, finding that the statutory conditions for this were not met. The judgment of the Sofia Court of Appeal thus became final on that date. 15.  On 12 July 2011 the applicant again asked the Ministry, through a duly served notarial request, to pay to him the amount of BGN 57,964.81, which represented BGN 29,050 (the principal amount, corresponding to the balance of the fee due to him), BGN 12,874.58 (default penalty agreed in the contract in case of the Ministry\u2019s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations), BGN 20,143.23 (legal interest rate) and BGN 581 (costs and expenses), minus the 8% default penalty in the amount of BGN 4,648 which the Sofia Court of Appeal had ordered the applicant to pay to the Ministry in its judgment. 16.  On 15 July 2011 the Ministry replied that its debts were to be paid from its annual budget and, in the event of the non-availability of funds, money for outstanding debts was to be included at the latest in the following year\u2019s budget. The Ministry also asked the applicant to submit the original writ of execution. The applicant wrote to the Ministry on 28 July 2011 stating that he had already served it on them and specified the date and reference number of the notarial document with which that had been done (see paragraphs 8-9 above). 17.  On 2 August 2013 the applicant again asked the Ministry in writing to pay him the outstanding amount. They replied in writing the same month stating that they had received the original writ of enforcement on 24 February 2006 but could not trace what had happened to it thereafter.", "references": ["8", "4", "5", "3", "0", "2", "6", "1", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Leipzig. 7.  On 30 October 2009 the Munich II Public Prosecution Office charged the applicant with coercion to engage in sexual activity in at least 300 cases and with sexual coercion in another eighteen cases. 8.  On 20 July 2012 the Munich II Regional Court, after taking evidence at seventeen days of hearing, issued a decision limiting the prosecution to charges concerning four incidents which had taken place between 19 and 25 August 2007. The court provisionally discontinued the proceedings in respect of all the other offences the applicant had been charged with (see paragraph 7 above), in accordance with Article 154 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 17 below), in view of the penalty the applicant could expect for the four remaining incidents. The applicant was further informed that if he was convicted the court could take into account findings made in respect of the other incidents when setting his sentence. 9.  In a judgment delivered on the same day, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of four counts of coercion to engage in sexual activity, committed between 19 and 25 August 2007, and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  In its findings of fact, the Regional Court stated that between January 2001 and October 2007 the applicant had forced P., aged between 29 and 35 at the relevant time and suffering from a moderate mental disorder and an autistic and speech disorder, to satisfy him manually or orally on at least fifty further occasions (out of the at least 300 offences the applicant had initially been charged with, see paragraph 7 above). The court had regard to P.\u2019s extensive description of different incidents, which happened either in the house the applicant and P. were both living in or in the applicant\u2019s car. P. had notably explained how the applicant had regularly, when his wife and son were absent, brought her into his apartment or in the basement boiler room, had undressed himself and had instructed her how to satisfy him, partly while playing pornographic films. The applicant had systematically threatened P. that she would have to return to a home for the disabled if she did not comply with his requests. From 19 to 25 August 2007, when the applicant\u2019s wife and son were on holiday, the applicant had forced P. to satisfy him orally at least twice and to satisfy him manually on two further occasions in their house or in the basement boiler room. The veracity of P.\u00b4s consistent statements was confirmed by further witnesses and three psychological expert opinions on P.\u00b4s credibility and ability to testify. 11.  The Regional Court explained that it had restricted the conviction to the four events that had taken place between 19 and 25 August 2007. It had discontinued the proceedings in respect of the at least 300 further charges under Article 154 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but was convinced that in at least fifty cases there had been incidents comparable to the four of which the applicant was formally convicted. It had simply been impossible to determine their exact time and place due to the victim\u2019s speech disorder. 12.  In the impugned passages of the judgment, the Regional Court found as follows:\n\u201cThe chamber is convinced on the basis of the credible statement by the injured party that in addition to the four cases between January 2001 and October 2007 on which judgment was passed, at least 50 other comparable cases occurred. The injured party herself said that the applicant had coerced her to perform sexual acts from as early as 2001. From 2003, the frequency of these incidents had increased and the applicant had demanded sexual gratification from her approximately every 1\u00bd weeks. Even if one were to disregard the years 2001 and 2002 and August and October 2007 in favour of the applicant and also to presume that from 2003 onwards, such incidents occurred only once a month there are 56 cases. Following the deduction of a further safety margin the chamber assumes that there were at least 50 more, comparable cases during the total period from January 2001 to October 2007.\n...\nOn the other hand, the chamber considers as an aggravating element that it is convinced that, in addition to the four incidents in August 2007 which the accused has been convicted of, there have been at least 50 comparable incidents since January 2001. A conviction for those events was only made impossible by the victim\u2019s incapacity to substantiate them in terms of the time and the place where they happened in a manner making it possible to define them as procedural offences (offences in the procedural sense). As it could no longer be determined with certainty in which cases the accused, by his threats, made the victim satisfy him orally or manually, the chamber will proceed on the basis that there were 50 further cases of manual satisfaction.\u201d\n(\u201cDie Kammer ist aufgrund der glaubhaften Aussage der Gesch\u00e4digten davon \u00fcberzeugt, dass es neben den vier abgeurteilten Taten im Zeitraum Januar 2001 bis Oktober 2007 zu mindestens 50 weiteren, vergleichbaren F\u00e4llen kam. Die Gesch\u00e4digte selbst gab an, der Angeklagte habe sie bereits ab dem Jahr 2001 zu sexuellen Handlungen gen\u00f6tigt. Ab dem Jahr 2003 sei die Frequenz dieser Vorf\u00e4lle gestiegen und der Angeklagte habe ungef\u00e4hr alle 1 \u00bd Wochen sexuelle Befriedigung von ihr verlangt. Selbst wenn man zugunsten des Angeklagten die Jahr 2001 und 2002 sowie den August und Oktober 2007 unber\u00fccksichtigt l\u00e4sst und zudem davon ausgeht, dass es ab dem Jahr 2003 lediglich einmal im Monat zu derartigen Vorf\u00e4llen kam, so ergeben sich 56 F\u00e4lle. Nach Abzug eines weiteren Sicherheitsabschlags geht die Kammer von mindestens 50 weiteren, vergleichbaren F\u00e4llen im gesamten Zeitraum von Januar 2001 bis Oktober 2007 aus.\n...\nAndererseits wertet die Kammer zu Lasten des Angeklagten den Umstand, dass es nach \u00dcberzeugung der Kammer neben den verurteilten vier Vorf\u00e4llen im August 2007 bereits ab Januar 2001 zu mindestens 50 vergleichbaren Vorf\u00e4llen gekommen war. Eine Verurteilung dieser Vorf\u00e4lle scheiterte lediglich an der mangelnden F\u00e4higkeit der Gesch\u00e4digten, die Vorf\u00e4lle zeitlich und \u00f6rtlich so zu konkretisieren, dass diese als prozessuale Taten abgrenzbar waren. Da sich nicht mehr mit Sicherheit aufkl\u00e4ren lie\u00df, in welchen F\u00e4llen der Angeklagte die Gesch\u00e4digte durch seine Drohung zu einer oralen und in welchen zu einer manuellen Befriedigung brachte, geht die Kammer insoweit von 50 weiteren F\u00e4llen der manuellen Befriedigung aus.\u201d) 13.  In an appeal on points of law to the Federal Court of Justice, the applicant complained that the Regional Court had breached the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention by taking fifty unproven incidents into account as an aggravating factor meriting a more severe sentence, despite the fact that the proceedings in relation to them had been discontinued under Article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14.  The Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the Regional Court had been entitled to take account of the sexual offences committed previously by the applicant as an aggravating element as part of his previous history (Vorleben) and thus as one of the elements in setting his sentence under Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 18 below). In accordance with the Federal Court of Justice\u2019s case-law, the Regional Court had made sufficient findings of fact establishing a minimum level of guilt in respect to those offences. 15.  On 6 February 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded, without giving specific reasons. 16.  In a decision of 16 May 2013, which was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 28 May 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider a constitutional complaint by the applicant, in which he had again complained of a breach of the presumption of innocence (file no. 2 BvR 575/13).", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "9", "6", "7", "No Label", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["0", "1", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  Prior to the events in question, he had been actively involved in Ukrainian politics. From 25 May 2006 to 15 June 2007 and from 23 November 2007 to 23 May 2008 he was a Member of Parliament and from 26 December 2007 to 24 March 2010 he was First Deputy Minister of Justice. His father-in-law was President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine from 2006 to 2011. 7.  Between November 2005 and June 2006 and then between June and March 2008 the applicant was one of the equity partners of the law firm Magisters & Partners Ltd (subsequently renamed Magisters Ltd). 8.  In December 2008 the State-owned joint-stock company Naftogaz Ukrayiny (hereinafter referred to as \u201cNaftogaz\u201d), which was involved in several serious disputes before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, decided to extend the legal services agreement which it had concluded with Magisters Ltd in 2002 and which was about to expire. 9.  On 23 February 2009 the applicant, acting in his capacity as First Deputy Minister of Justice, sent a letter to Naftogaz, at the latter\u2019s request, informing it of the existence of exceptional conditions, as provided under domestic law, for purchasing legal services from Magisters Ltd without inviting bids from other law firms. It was noted that Magisters Ltd had been providing Naftogaz with legal services for a long time, including in the proceedings before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Accordingly, changing the legal services\u2019 provider would be costly and unjustified. 10.  The applicant\u2019s letter, which was subsequently submitted to the Economy Ministry, provided the basis for Naftogaz to contract further legal services from Magisters Ltd without pursuing a bidding procedure. 11.  On 24 June 2009 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office (\u201cthe PGO\u201d) opened a criminal case under Article 366 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d; see paragraph 40 below) in respect of alleged forgery of the letter of 23 February 2009 by unspecified officials at the Ministry of Justice. On 14 September 2009 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d) quashed the above ruling after a complaint by the applicant. On 21 October 2009 and 15 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 12.  On 1 July 2009 the PGO opened another criminal case in respect of the same facts, this time under Article 364 \u00a7 2 of the CC (see paragraph 38 below) on suspicion of abuse of office with grave consequences by unspecified Ministry of Justice officials. On 28 December 2009 the Pecherskyy Court quashed that ruling. Its decision was upheld by the appellate court on 10 February 2010. It appears that it was not challenged on points of law. 13.  On 5 August 2010 the PGO faxed the applicant \u201can invitation\u201d to go to its offices at 10 a.m. the following day for questioning about \u201cpossible abuse of office and forgery by officials of the Ministry of Justice\u201d. 14.  On 6 August 2010 the PGO re-sent the \u201cinvitation\u201d to the applicant. This time his questioning was expected at 9.30 a.m. on 9 August 2010. However, he did not appear before the prosecutor. 15.  On 20 December 2010 the PGO instructed the Kyiv city police to establish the applicant\u2019s whereabouts and to hand him a summons for questioning at 10 a.m. on 22 December 2010. The letter noted that the applicant had not been present at his address as established by the investigation. 16.  Also on 20 December 2010 the PGO enquired with the State Border Service regarding the applicant\u2019s trips abroad in 2009 and 2010. According to the information it received on 21 December 2010, the applicant had left Ukraine more than thirty times during the period in question. 17.  On 21 December 2010 an official of the Kyiv city police wrote to the PGO that its information about the applicant\u2019s address was outdated (he had sold the flat in 2003 and had not lived there since). 18.  On 22 December 2010 the PGO enquired with the Kyiv city and regional address bureau about the applicant\u2019s registered address and received a reply on 23 December 2010 that he lived in Yagotyn in the Kyiv region. 19.  On 22 December 2010 the PGO instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 365 \u00a7 3 of the CC (exceeding of powers by an official leading to grave consequences \u2013 see paragraph 39 below). In describing the applicant\u2019s actus reus, the prosecutor found that he had bypassed the registry of the Ministry of Justice when accepting the request from Naftogaz and issuing his letter in reply; that his conclusion about the existence of exceptional conditions for Naftogaz not to pursue a bidding procedure had been in contradiction with the applicable legal provisions; and that he had had no right to put that conclusion on official Ministry of Justice paper. The subsequent extension by Naftogaz of its contract with Magisters Ltd had caused considerable losses to the State budget. 20.  Later that day the investigator called the applicant by telephone to summon him for questioning. At the time, he was in hospital with his wife, who was giving birth to their third child. 21.  In the afternoon of 22 December 2010, the applicant appeared before the investigator and after being questioned was arrested at 4.50 p.m. under Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d; see paragraph 41 below). According to the official report, the applicant had been arrested on the grounds that \u201ceyewitnesses, including victims, directly identified [him] as the one who had committed the offence\u201d. His arrest was justified by the necessity to prevent him evading justice or from obstructing the establishment of the truth, and to ensure the execution of an eventual court judgment. The arrest report had the following description of the facts giving rise to the prosecution:\n\u201c... during the period from 5 to 27 February 2009 [the applicant], exceeding his official powers, issued an expert conclusion with knowingly false information, as a result of which considerable damage, amounting to 1,697,600 [Ukrainian] hryvnias [equal to about 152,000 euros at the time] was caused to [Naftogaz]. In other words, he is suspected of committing a criminal offence under Article 365 \u00a7 3 of the [CC].\u201d 22.  The procedural rights of arrestees were also listed. The applicant signed it with a remark that he considered his arrest as unlawful given that he had complied with the investigator\u2019s summons in accordance with the CCP and that there was no risk of him hindering the establishment of the truth as he was no longer a civil servant. 23.  On 23 December 2010 the applicant was officially charged under Article 365 \u00a7 3 of the CC. 24.  On 24 December 2010 the applicant challenged his arrest before a court. He claimed that the investigator had failed to refer to any factual circumstances to justify his arrest under Articles 106 and 115 of the CCP. The applicant contended that he had appeared before the investigator upon the latter\u2019s first summons, despite the fact that on that day his wife had been in hospital giving birth. That indicated, in his opinion, that he had had no intention of absconding or hindering the investigation. 25.  Also on 24 December 2010 the investigator applied to the court for the applicant to be held in pre-trial detention. The necessity of that preventive measure was explained as follows:\n\u201cHaving regard to [the applicant\u2019s] role in the commission of the offence and his causing serious damage to State interests, his age, state of health, family and financial situation, and other circumstances characterising him, the investigation has grounds to believe that [the applicant] will try to influence the witnesses in this case given his extensive networks in law-enforcement bodies and among judicial authorities.\nFurthermore, the case file contains sufficient evidence showing that [the applicant] avoided appearing before the investigation authorities, that he travels abroad regularly and that he is absent from his registered address. That being so, if at liberty, he will abscond or hinder the investigation and the implementation of procedural decisions.\nTherefore, the application of any other preventive measure in respect of the accused ... will not be able to ensure his proper procedural conduct and the fulfilment of procedural decisions...\u201d 26.  On the same day the Pecherskyy Court found that the case file did not contain sufficient information about the applicant in order to take a decision on the investigator\u2019s application. In particular, the file did not contain sufficient information about the applicant\u2019s health, family and financial situation or his occupation. The court therefore extended the applicant\u2019s preliminary detention to ten days as a temporary preventive measure. The decision was not subject to appeal. 27.  On 30 December 2010 the Pecherskyy Court allowed the investigator\u2019s application (see paragraph 25 above) as well-founded and ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court further held that that finding rendered it unnecessary to examine alternative preventive measures. It rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint about his arrest as unsubstantiated. 28.  On 2 January 2011 the applicant appealed. He reiterated his earlier arguments on the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest by the investigator (see paragraph 24 above). Furthermore, he complained that the Pecherskyy Court had failed to justify the application of what was the most intrusive preventive measure available in his case. He argued that the court had not taken into account the fact that he was the sole breadwinner for his three children and his wife and that their newborn child was still in hospital. Positive character references and his requests for a non-custodial preventive measure had also been disregarded. 29.  On 4 January 2011 the President of the Ukrainian Bar Association applied to the Court of Appeal, offering his personal surety for the applicant\u2019s release. In the alternative, he indicated that he was ready to pay bail for the applicant. 30.  On 13 January 2011 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the findings and reasoning of the Pecherskyy Court\u2019s decision of 30 December 2010. There was no reference in the ruling to the application by the Bar Association President. 31.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant was additionally charged with forging an official document under Article 366 \u00a7 2 of the CC (see paragraph 40 below). 32.  On the same day the pre-trial investigation was declared completed and the applicant was given access to the case file. 33.  On 10 February 2011 the Pecherskyy Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to three months, finding that there were no grounds to change the preliminary measure to a more lenient one. 34.  On 15 February 2011 the investigator released the applicant under an undertaking not to abscond. The change of preventive measure was explained by the fact that the applicant could no longer influence witnesses or impede the investigation. The investigator also made a general reference to the applicant\u2019s age, state of health, family and financial situation, as well as the fact that he had children to care for, permanent employment and positive character references. 35.  As known from public available material, some media outlets linked the applicant\u2019s release to a private meeting between his father-in-law as the President of the Supreme Court and the President of Ukraine a day earlier, on 14 February 2011. The applicant publicly denied those rumours. 36.  The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. Publicly available material shows that he was amnestied in December 2011.", "references": ["5", "3", "6", "9", "7", "0", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Csob\u00e1nka, Hungary. 6.  In 2000 the applicant and H.B., also a Hungarian citizen, married in the United States of America, where they had lived since 1996. 7.  On 9 February 2003 their son was born in the US and acquired dual citizenship. 8.  The couple, who were becoming gradually estranged, returned to Hungary in 2004. On 26 December 2004, after a quarrel, H.B. took their son and left for an unknown destination. Over the next two weeks, he informed the applicant by telephone about the condition of their son on a few occasions. After January 2005 the calls stopped. Since then, the applicant has had no contact with her son. 9.  Subsequently, the applicant filed for divorce. Since the whereabouts of H.B. were unknown, he did not personally participate in the proceedings and his interests were represented by a guardian ad litem. 10.  On 16 November 2005, as an interim measure immediately enforceable irrespective of any appeal, the Szentendre District Court placed the child with the applicant, pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings. The interim decision became final on 14 January 2006. 11.  On 28 February 2007 the District Court pronounced the divorce of the applicant and H.B. As regards the child, the court noted that H.B. had taken him unlawfully and had deprived the applicant of any possibility of seeing her son for over two years. The court granted the applicant sole custody of the child, terminated H.B.\u2019s parental rights and ordered him to pay child maintenance. The court did not grant H.B. any visiting rights. The judgment became final on 24 April 2007. It appears that this decision was served on the guardian ad litem but not on H.B. 12.  Meanwhile, on 29 November 2005 the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department alleging child abduction. 13.  On 7 December 2005 the authorities carried out an identity check on H.B. who declared his address to be in Sopron, Hungary. 14.  On 3 February 2006 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint, again requesting the authorities to issue a warrant against H.B. 15.  On 20 March 2006 the police again carried out an identity check on H.B. in Sopron. He declared the same address as on 7 December 2005. 16.  On 3 April 2006 the applicant filed a complaint with the authorities pointing out that they had already had two opportunities to interrogate H.B. and obtain information regarding the whereabouts of the child, but they had failed to do so. 17.  On 18 May 2006 the Szentendre Police Department issued a warrant against H.B. 18.  On 25 May 2006 the investigation was suspended because \u2011 according to the information the Szentendre Police Department had at that point \u2012 H.B.\u2019s place of residence had become unknown and the proceedings could not be continued in absentia. 19.  On 29 May 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint was dismissed (see paragraph 16 above). 20.  On 23 May 2007 the Sopron Police Department carried out a third identity check on H.B. at the police station. He informed the authorities of an address, although an incomplete one, in London (United Kingdom) where the child was allegedly living with his grandmother. After questioning, he was released. 21.  Since H.B.\u2019s address had become known, on 29 May 2007 the Szentendre Police Department decided to continue the investigation. The following day, 30 May 2007, that is to say after the judgment on the parties\u2019 divorce had been delivered, the District Court was informed about the location of H.B. 22.  On 9 August 2007 the resumed investigation was terminated for lack of any offence. According to the reasoning underlying the decision, the crime of unlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence may be committed only with intent, whereas the investigation concluded that H.B. was not aware of the District Court\u2019s judgment obliging him to hand over the child to the applicant. 23.  On 2 April 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Sopron Police Department alleging H.B.\u2019s failure to provide child maintenance. On 16 June 2008 the authorities terminated the investigation, stating that the offence of failure to provide child maintenance may be committed only with intent, whereas the investigation concluded that H.B. was not aware of the District Court\u2019s judgment containing the obligation to pay child maintenance. 24.  The complaint submitted by the applicant on 27 June 2008 was rejected by the Sopron Police Department on 16 July 2008. 25.  On 4 April 2008 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department. The applicant and her father were interviewed in the course of the investigation. However, on 11 November 2009 the investigation was terminated for lack of evidence. 26.  A complaint submitted by the applicant challenging this decision was dismissed on 17 December 2009. 27.  In June 2013 the applicant\u2019s parents received an official letter notifying them of the amount to be paid for the child\u2019s school books. As a consequence, they became aware that the child was registered as attending school in Sopron. On the basis of this information, on 28 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s father lodged a criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department alleging unlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence. 28.  On the same day the criminal complaint was transferred to the Sopron Police Department, within whose territorial competence it fell. However, on 22 October 2013 the investigation was suspended because after the authorities had attempted to establish the whereabouts of the suspect, his address again became unknown. A warrant was issued against H.B. 29.  Previously, on 6 February 2006 the applicant had requested the enforcement of the District Court\u2019s interim measure of 16 November 2005 that placed the child with the applicant (see paragraph 10 above). 30.  On 17 March 2006 the bailiff requested that the Sopron Police Department issue a warrant against H.B. On 30 March 2006 the bailiff visited the registered address of H.B. and established that neither he nor the child lived there. He found out that H.B. and the child might be residing in the United States. Apparently, no further measures were taken in these proceedings. 31.  In reply to a related complaint, on 4 May 2012 the applicant was informed that, in the view of the Hungarian Court Bailiffs Chamber, the officer concerned was not responsible for the shortcomings of the enforcement proceedings since H.B. and the child were resident abroad, and diplomatic steps were therefore required to enforce the court\u2019s order. 32.  Meanwhile, on 13 April 2007 the applicant contacted the Ministry of Justice, submitting that her child might be in the US. She later informed the Ministry that H.B. had in the meantime brought him back to Hungary. 33.  On 12 June 2009, in criminal proceedings conducted for fraud and other offences, international and European warrants were issued against H.B. On 27 July 2009 the Ministry of Justice requested the Hungarian Centre for International Cooperation in Criminal Matters to issue a warrant against H.B. 34.  On 15 December 2009 the Centre forwarded to the Ministry of Justice the information received from its US and Canadian partner offices, according to which H.B. had been placed in immigration detention in Canada. 35.  On 15 December 2009 H.B. was expelled from Canada and was ordered to leave the country before 7 January 2010. However, he escaped from custody and the Canadian authorities notified their Hungarian counterparts that he had booked a plane ticket to Vienna under a false name. 36.  The Hungarian authorities requested Austrian cooperation, but on 12 January 2010 they were notified that H.B. had not been on the flight indicated by the Canadian police. 37.  On 6 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother informed the Ministry of Justice that she thought the child had been taken to California. 38.  The Ministry of Justice sent a request to the US for facilitation of child contact under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. However, the measures taken by the US authorities in order to find the child were unsuccessful. On 22 October 2012 they indicated that the child and H.B. were probably in Canada and transferred the request to the Canadian authorities. The proceedings of the latter were also fruitless. 39.  On 24 April 2013 the applicant informed the Hungarian Ministry of Justice that the H.B. was on the list of wanted persons in Canada and that he had previously fled from custody. On the basis of this information, on 26 April 2013 the Ministry of Justice asked the Canadian authorities to establish the child\u2019s place of residence. However, they were unable to do so. 40.  On 8 May 2014 H.B. was apprehended in Budapest and the child could at last be located. 41.  Since the applicant was living abroad at that time, the child\u2019s place of residence was established temporarily with her father in Csob\u00e1nka, Hungary. 42.  The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction which entered into force on 1 July 1986 with regard to Hungary state as follows:\n\u201cThe States signatory to the present Convention,\nFirmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,\nDesiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access,\nHave resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions \u2013\n...\nArticle 1\nThe objects of the present Convention are \u2013\na) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and\nb) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.\n...\nArticle 3\nThe removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where \u2013\na) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and\nb) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.\nThe rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.\nArticle 4\nThe Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.\nArticle 5\nFor the purposes of this Convention \u2013\na) \u2018rights of custody\u2019 shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child\u2019s place of residence;\nb) \u2018rights of access\u2019 shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child\u2019s habitual residence.\n...\nArticle 11\nThe judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.\nIf the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. ...\nArticle 12\nWhere a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.\nThe judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.\nWhere the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.\nArticle 13\nNotwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that \u2013\na) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or\nb) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.\nThe judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.\nIn considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child\u2019s habitual residence.\nArticle 14\nIn ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.\n...\nArticle 16\nAfter receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice.\nArticle 17\nThe sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take account of the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention.\n...\nArticle 19\nA decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.\nArticle 20\nThe return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms....\u201d", "references": ["8", "9", "2", "7", "3", "5", "0", "6", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in town Uzlovaya, Tula region. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers; there were numerous clashes between the two sides. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered the meeting to finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was a fourth-year student at the Russian State Humanities University. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. After the events the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his studies. 10.  On 8 June 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder and of using violence against the police during the demonstration of 6 May 2012. 11.  On 9 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention until 8 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that if at liberty the applicant could co-ordinate his position with accomplices, who had yet to be discovered and whose identities were still being established by the investigation. The court concluded that those circumstances gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant was likely to flee to avoid the investigation and trial, continue his criminal activity, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, which was still at an initial stage. 12.  On 15 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence) and 318 \u00a7 1 (use of violence against a public official) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of attempting to break through the police cordon and of throwing pieces of tarmac and stones at Police Officer K., which had caused him a broken finger. 13.  On 16 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 9 June 2012. 14.  On 6 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined an application from the investigator for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant asked for the preventive measure to be changed to house arrest, a written undertaking not to leave a specified place, or personal guarantees. On the same day the District Court granted the investigator\u2019s application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012. It considered that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 15.  On 12 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 August 2012. 16.  On 30 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds as earlier, noting that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 17.  On 20 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were reformulated. It was stated that he had gone to the venue of the public event with a mask, which he had later put on to conceal his face. He had shouted anti-government slogans and thrown at least three pieces of tarmac at the police officers. One chunk had hit Officer K. on the right hand, causing him pain but no lasting harm. The classification of the offences remained unchanged. 18.  On 1 March 2013 and 22 April 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted applications from the investigator for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, until 8 June and 6 July 2013 respectively. It considered that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. The Moscow City Court upheld those extension orders on 10 April and 30 May 2013 respectively. 19.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 20.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on its findings that \u201cthe reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The applicant\u2019s request for an alternative preventive measure was dismissed on the grounds that no other measure could secure the proper course of justice in the case. The Moscow City Court upheld that extension order on 2 July 2013. 21.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 22.  The applicant was held in IZ-77/5 in four different cells for the whole period of his pre-trial detention from 20 June 2012. He did not provide any description of the conditions of his detention. 23.  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back and the Government\u2019s submissions in that regard were identical to those in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-73). 24.  As regards the conditions of detention in the convoy room of the Moscow City Court, the applicant submitted that it was poorly lit and that access to the toilet was limited to once an hour. In addition, he had been required to strip naked and to perform sit-ups during the body search conducted in the convoy room. 25.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, while in January and February 2014 they took place at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in hearing room no. 410. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (eight from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 26.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77). 27.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the trial on the merits. 28.  On an unidentified date Police Officer K., the alleged victim of the applicant\u2019s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that he had noticed the applicant in the crowd wearing a black mask with eye holes. The applicant had acted aggressively and had thrown pieces of tarmac, bottles and stones at police officers along with other participants. One piece of tarmac had him on the right hand, which had caused a broken finger. K. had then arrested the applicant, who had tried to escape and had resisted the police officers. Another police officer, K.K., also questioned as a witness, testified that the applicant had thrown stones at the police officers. 29.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretsky District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cBetween 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ...\nThus, in furtherance of this criminal intent, at an unidentified time and place ... [the applicant] ... put on a mask to conceal his face so that he could not be recognised and brought to responsibility for committing unlawful acts ...\n... between 5 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. [the applicant] ... repeatedly shouted anti\u2011government slogans.\nMoreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ...\n[The applicant] used violence against Police Officer [K.] which did not endanger his life or health...\n[The applicant] ... from 5 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. ... put on a mask to conceal his face ... and threw at least three pieces of tarmac ... at police officers in a targeted manner ... One of the pieces ... which measured 15 cm by 15 cm ... hit the police officer [K.] on the right hand ... which caused him pain. ...\n[The applicant] pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he had decided to attend the public gathering on 6 May 2012 ... after the security check he put on a mask with eye holes because he wanted to avoid being recognised by members of the opposition ... When a stampede occurred, he tried to leave the venue but could not get out of the crowd ... At some point ... [the applicant] saw three police officers with truncheons heading in his direction. He got scared and tried to hide from them in the crowd but they ran him down and twisted his arms behind his back, and one of the police officers asked him why he was wearing a mask and then said that it was prohibited. ... [the applicant] took the mask off and the police officers conveyed him to a police vehicle. Then they returned the mask to him. ... [the applicant] did not pick up any objects or did throw them at the police, he did not engage in any acts against Police Officer K. and did not resist arrest.\n... the court finds that [the applicant\u2019s] guilt is established by the following evidence: ... a medical expert opinion stating that ... K. had a broken finger which could have been caused ... on 6 May 2012 ... the recovery process would take more than 21 days ...\n... the court considers the [defendants\u2019] arguments that they were protecting somebody from police officers or happened to be the victims of the police\u2019s use of force as farfetched and aimed at the mitigation of their responsibility ... 30.  The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year and four months under Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 31.  The applicant appealed. He contested his involvement in the acts of mass disorder and insisted that he had caused no injuries to Police Officer K. The applicant also complained that the court had refused to question Officer Sh., who could have confirmed his account of events. 32.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "9", "5", "3", "No Label", "6", "7", "1", "2"], "gold": ["6", "7", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Tekirda\u011f. 7.  On 9 September 1995 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8.  On the same day the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody for a period of up to 15 days. 9.  On 13 September 1995 the applicant\u2019s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed to being a member of an illegal organisation and having been involved in a murder. 10.  On 14 September 1995 the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer g\u00f6sterme) with another suspect K.A., organised by the police in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report, drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant and K.A., both of the accused gave the details of the murder which they had committed. 11.  On 22 September 1995 the applicant was examined by a doctor from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. A collective medical report was drawn up in respect of the applicant and five other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant\u2019s body. 12.  On 22 September 1995 the applicant was heard by a public prosecutor and an investigating judge respectively. In his statements to the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements alleging that they had been taken under duress. Following his questioning, the investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. 13.  On 9 October 1995 a public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence prescribed by Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 7 December 1995 the applicant was heard by the trial court during the first hearing in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant denied all the charges against him and stated that his statements at the police had been taken under duress. 15.  In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  On 13 September 2007, relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s and his co-accused K. A.\u2019s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life-imprisonment. 17.  On an unknown date the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against the judgment of 13 September 2007. 18.  On 1 December 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the above judgment.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "1", "5", "2", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  The end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 were marked by a dispute between Ukraine and Russia on the conditions for gas supplies, including the price paid by Ukraine and the transit price charged by Ukraine to Russia. It culminated in Russia cutting off supplies in early January 2009, affecting not only Ukraine but also European States dependent on Russian gas. 7.  On 18 January 2009 the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Russia, Ms Yulia Tymoshenko and Mr Vladimir Putin, reached an agreement with a view to resolving the dispute. 8.  On 19 January 2009 the chairmen of the boards of the respective countries\u2019 gas companies, Naftogaz Ukrainy and Gazprom of Russia, formalised the terms of the agreement by signing a 2009-2019 gas supply contract. In particular, it provided for a new approach to gas pricing and for passing to direct contractual relations (Gazprom had previously supplied gas to Ukraine through an intermediary, RosUkrEnergo AG, a Swiss-registered joint venture company, 50% of which was owned by Gazprom itself and 50% by two Ukrainian businessmen through a private company, also registered in Switzerland). 9.  On 20 January 2009 the first deputy chairman of the board of Naftogaz Ukrainy, D., and the deputy chairman of the board of Gazprom signed a further contract regarding the terms of natural gas transit through the territory of Ukraine. Under Addendum no. 1, a claim of 11 billion cubic metres of natural gas imported by way of transit to Ukraine by RosUkrEnergo AG was ceded to Naftogaz Ukrayiny. 10.  On 28 January 2009 the President of Ukraine Mr Viktor Yushchenko appointed the applicant as chief of the State Customs Service of Ukraine, upon the Prime Minister\u2019s nomination. 11.  On 26 February 2009 D. sent a letter to the applicant, requesting customs clearance for the 11 billion cubic metres of natural gas referred to in the contract of 20 January 2009 and the annulment of nineteen customs declarations stating that the gas had been imported for transit purposes. 12.  Also on 26 February 2009 Mr Oleksandr Turchynov, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, instructed the applicant in writing to ensure prompt customs clearance of the gas in question. 13.  On 27 February 2009 the applicant countersigned D.\u2019s letter with the statement \u201cTo [K.] for execution taking into account the requirements of Article 88 of the Customs Code of Ukraine\u201d (K. was chief of the Regional Customs Office for Power, and the legal provision in question set out the duties and responsibilities of customs applicants). On the same day the applicant also countersigned Mr Turchynov\u2019s letter with the statement \u201cTo [K.] for execution\u201d. 14.  On 7 February 2010 Mr Viktor Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine after defeating Ms Tymoshenko in a run\u2011off. 15.  On 22 March 2010 the applicant resigned. 16.  On an unspecified date RosUkrEnergo AG instituted proceedings in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, alleging that the 11 billion cubic metres of gas was its property and had been unlawfully expropriated by Naftogaz Ukrayiny. 17.  On 8 June 2010 the Institute found for RosUkrEnergo AG. 18.  On 10 June 2010 the State Security Service of Ukraine (hereinafter \u201cthe Security Service\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings against D. on suspicion of large-scale embezzlement on account of his involvement in the gas transactions of January 2009. 19.  On 22 June 2010 the police questioned Mr Sh., who had been the deputy chief of the Customs Clearance Unit of the Regional Customs Office for Power in January 2009, as a witness in the proceedings. He replied in the positive to a question about whether he was familiar with D.\u2019s letter to the applicant of 26 February 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). 20.  On 23 June 2010 the applicant appeared for questioning as a witness in the proceedings against D. He was accompanied by his lawyer. 21.  The questioning concerned the two letters sent to the applicant on 26 February 2009 and his actions thereupon. 22.  After the end of the applicant\u2019s questioning at 3.43 p.m., the investigator informed him about the imminent institution of criminal proceedings against him. The applicant remained at the Security Service, without any immediate procedural steps being taken against him. According to him, he was not allowed to leave. The Government stated that it was the applicant\u2019s own decision to wait until the decision on criminal proceedings was ready. 23.  The proceedings were instituted later that day on suspicion of neglect of his official duties entailing grave consequences under Article 367 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d, see paragraph 52 below). The charge was related to his countersigning the letters for customs clearance for the gas imported by way of transit without verifying the lawfulness of those demands and so causing substantial damage to the prestige of the State and to RosUkrEnergo AG\u2019s interests. The criminal case was joined to that against D. (see paragraph 18 above). 24.  At 6.42 p.m. on 23 June 2010 the applicant signed the decision on the institution of criminal proceedings against him with a statement that he had de facto been under arrest from 3.43 p.m. that day. 25.  According to the Government, the applicant and his lawyer studied the decision from 4.15 p.m. to 6.45 p.m. 26.  At 7.02 p.m. the investigator drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s arrest with a general reference to Articles 106 \u00a7 2 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 50 below). As noted in the report, the investigation had established that the applicant had had no legitimate grounds to endorse the First Deputy Prime Minister\u2019s request of 26 February 2009 (see paragraph 12 above). The investigator further stated that the applicant\u2019s rights as a suspect had been explained to him at 6.30 p.m. The applicant wrote on the report that the arrest period had actually started at 3.43 p.m. 27.  At 8.05 p.m. on 23 June 2010 the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He emphasised that he was willing to cooperate with the investigation and that his behaviour in the proceedings had been flawless. He also stated that there were no grounds for his arrest and that he was prepared to pay bail as a preventive measure in accordance with the CCP. 28.  On 24 June 2010 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody for two months. By way of reasoning, the court noted that the applicant was suspected of a serious offence potentially entailing imprisonment; that he could interfere with investigative activities, either by absconding or tampering with evidence; and that he was capable of influencing witnesses, regard being had, in particular, to his connections with former colleagues, his prominent social status and his wealth. Moreover, the applicant had no employment or young children under his charge. The court therefore rejected an application by fifty Members of Parliament to release him on their personal surety. 29.  The applicant appealed, contending in particular that his arrest had been arbitrary and not based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. Moreover, the court\u2019s findings as to the probability of his interfering with the investigative activities were arbitrary. He had been a civil servant with an impeccable reputation, no prior criminal record, strong family ties and a permanent residence in Kyiv. Moreover, his conduct in relation to the criminal proceedings concerning the gas dealings had been beyond reproach. Between the date of the initiation of the related proceedings against D. on 10 June and the applicant\u2019s arrest on 23 June 2010, he had twice been abroad and had returned to Ukraine of his own free will; he had duly reported for questioning as a witness as soon as he had been summoned; and he was willing to continue his cooperation with the authorities in good faith. Lastly, he referred to the surety offered by the Members of Parliament to ensure his proper conduct in the proceedings. 30.  On 2 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the custodial measure. The court noted, in particular:\n\u201c... the particularly large amount of damage caused to RosUkrEnergo AG and the existence of serious consequences, manifested in the prestige of the State being undermined, indicate a high degree of danger to society from the crime, a primary ground for imposing on A. V. Makarenko a preventive measure entailing his being remanded in custody.\u201d 31.  The appellate court also concurred with the first-instance court\u2019s finding that the applicant might take advantage of his social connections and wealth to influence the investigation if he remained at liberty. 32.  On 28 July 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an application by the applicant for leave to appeal in cassation against the decisions as not envisaged by law. 33.  On 30 July 2010 the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest of 23 June 2010 before the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Court\u201d). He alleged, firstly, that his arrest had not fallen within the ambit of Article 106 \u00a7 2 of the CCP and so had been arbitrary and unforeseeable. Furthermore, before his official arrest at 7.02 p.m., he had already been held at the Security Service for more than three hours without any legal grounds. On 27 September and 12 October 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Court and the Court of Appeal, respectively, rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the investigator had acted in accordance with the law. 34.  On 20 August 2010 the Pecherskyy Court extended the term of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 10 October 2010. The court noted that a number of investigative measures were still necessary and there were no reasons justifying lifting the custodial measure. 35.  On 27 August 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the appeal against that decision. 36.  On 25 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected a request for leave to appeal in cassation as not envisaged by law. 37.  On 30 September 2010 the Security Service re-classified the applicant\u2019s actions as intentional abuse of office under Article 364 \u00a7 3 of the CC rather than neglect of his official duties under Article 367 \u00a7 2 (see paragraphs 51-52 below). 38.  On 6 October 2010 the Pecherskyy Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 October 2010, referring to essentially the same arguments as before. 39.  On 12 October 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 40.  On 13 October 2010 the applicant was notified of the completion of the pre-trial investigation and given access to the case file. 41.  On 22 October and 9 December 2010 and on 5 January, 7 February and 9 March 2011 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention by one month (the last extension was until 10 April 2011), given that further time was required for the applicant and his lawyers to study the case file, which consisted of forty-eight volumes. In all those rulings the appellate court noted that it had had regard to \u201cthe circumstances of the case, information as a whole about the character of the accused, the gravity of the offence ... and the absence of any grounds for changing the preventive measure [in his respect] to a more lenient one\u201d. 42.  On 1 April 2011 the applicant applied to be released under an undertaking not to abscond. He noted that his health had seriously deteriorated in detention and that he required a specialist medical examination and assistance on account of several heart conditions but that there was no cardiologist in the detention facility. 43.  On 13 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the term of his client\u2019s detention ordered by the court had expired on 10 April 2011. He therefore requested the applicant\u2019s immediate release. There was no follow up to that complaint. 44.  On 14 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court held a preparatory hearing for the applicant\u2019s trial. It decided to keep him in pre-trial detention as it found no grounds to change the measure. The applicant re-submitted his request for release as formulated on 1 April 2011 (see paragraph 42 above), however, the court ruling did not contain any reference to it. 45.  On 26 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court remitted the case to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for further investigation given that meanwhile, on 11 April 2011, the latter had instituted criminal proceedings against former Prime Minister Tymoshenko on suspicion of abuse of authority for signing the gas contracts in January 2009 (see paragraph 7 above). The court held that the factual circumstances in those proceedings were the same as in the applicant\u2019s case. 46.  On 5 July 2011 the Court of Appeal released the applicant under an undertaking not to abscond. 47.  On 20 July 2012 the Pecherskyy Court found him guilty as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of four years\u2019 imprisonment. 48.  The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. Publicly available material shows that on 3 March 2014 the Pecherskyy Court absolved him from criminal liability and found him not to have had any criminal record.", "references": ["6", "9", "1", "0", "8", "5", "4", "7", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kharkiv. 6.  At the time of the events she worked as a passport registration officer (\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0441\u0442) in one of the municipal housing and public utilities\u2019 offices (\u041a\u041f\u0416\u0420\u0415\u041f) in Kharkiv. 7.  On 6 February 2004 a certain M. went to the passport registration office where the applicant worked to apply for a passport for her son, who had reached the age of sixteen. As M. subsequently mentioned to the police (see paragraphs 13 and 17 below), she had already applied to the applicant in the past. According to M., when she was waiting in the queue, she heard people saying that the applicant was known for taking bribes and that her \u201cusual rate\u201d was 100 United States dollars (USD). Given the considerable number of visitors, M. could not get an appointment that day. She waited for the applicant in the corridor after work and explained the situation to her. The applicant allegedly told M. that it might be time-consuming to settle the matter, in particular because of the fact that M.\u2019s son had been born in Russia and his original birth certificate was not available. However, according to M., the applicant agreed to help her to speed up the procedure with the higher authority, where she would need to pay USD 100 to the official in charge. 8.  According to the applicant\u2019s version of events, she did indeed have a late visitor in the corridor that day, whom she advised to come back during working hours, with no further exchange taking place. 9.  On 7 February 2004 M. made a written statement to the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Police that the applicant had asked for a bribe of USD 100 to speed up the passport issuance procedure. M. confirmed that she was aware of the criminal liability for knowingly making a false report about a crime. According to the police records, the above statement was made at 5 p.m. However, as subsequently established (see paragraph 59 below), that was an error and the actual time of the statement was about 10 a.m. 10.  M. provided the police with a banknote of USD 100, two banknotes of USD 20 and one of USD 10. A detective officer put a special luminescent fluid on the banknotes and returned them to M. That act took place in the presence of two attesting witnesses and was documented in a report. It is not known why it was decided to mark the additional banknotes, not only the USD 100 note. 11.  At about 1 p.m. on the same day M. entered the applicant\u2019s office and emerged a few minutes later, indicating to the investigator and the attesting witnesses that she had given the USD 100 banknote to the applicant. As it was the end of the working day, the applicant locked her office and began to leave. However, the investigator stopped her and suggested she return to her office, which they did together in the presence of the two attesting witnesses. The investigator asked the applicant whether she had received any money from M. She stated that she had and took the banknote from her purse. The police officer then checked the applicant\u2019s hands with a special device and found traces of the luminescent liquid. They were wiped off with cotton pads, which were then packed and sealed as material evidence. Such traces were also found on the banknote of USD 100 in the applicant\u2019s purse and on the purse itself. Lastly, several passports and other papers with various banknotes inserted, varying from two Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (equivalent to about 0.28 euros (EUR) at the time) to UAH 50 (equal to about EUR 7), were found in the applicant\u2019s bag and were seized. The investigator drew up an inspection and seizure report. The serial number of the USD 100 banknote seized from the applicant, as indicated in the report, differed by one letter (out of eleven characters) from the one noted in the report on marking the bill with the luminescent fluid drawn up earlier that day (see paragraph 10 above). 12.  The applicant wrote an explanation, stating that she had indeed taken USD 100 from M., which she had intended to pay to an unspecified official at the local passport registration authority with a view to speeding up the issuance of the passport for M.\u2019s son. The applicant also stated that she had voluntarily complied with the police\u2019s request to give them the banknote in question. She noted that she had studied the inspection and seizure report and that she agreed with its contents. Lastly, she stated that she had no complaints against the police and that she regretted her actions. 13.  Also on 7 February 2004, following the police operation, the investigator collected \u201cexplanations\u201d from M. and the attesting witnesses. M. supplemented her initial statement to the police with further factual details (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). Both attesting witnesses described the police operation which they had observed, as summarised in paragraphs 10 and 11 above. 14.  On 10 February 2004, during her questioning by the investigator, the applicant changed her account of the events as follows. On 7 February 2004, when she had been about to leave work at 1 p.m., M. had entered the office. She had brought some documents in order to get a passport for her son. The applicant had informed her that certain documents were missing. The applicant had also clarified that she would be working in a different office from Monday, 9 February 2004. While collecting her papers and belongings before leaving, the applicant had noticed that M. had thrown something on the table and had run out of the office. The applicant had seen that it was a USD 100 banknote. She had taken it and had tried to get an explanation from M. However, she had already left. When the applicant had looked out into the corridor, she had only seen a man waiting there. It was T., one of the attesting witnesses. Given that different people would be working in the office on the following working day and because she knew her manager was away, the applicant had decided to keep the banknote in order to return it to M. later. 15.  Furthermore, the applicant explained that her initial statement (see paragraph 12 above) had been made in a state of shock and had not been truthful. Allegedly, the investigator had dictated the statement to her. 16.  On 11 February 2004 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of incitement to bribery. 17.  On the same date M. gave written explanations to the Kyiv District Prosecutor\u2019s Office with her account of the events, which was the same as before (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 18.  On 16 February 2004 the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by the lawyer Zh. and the latter was admitted to the proceedings. When questioned in her lawyer\u2019s presence on the same day, the applicant admitted that on 7 February 2004 she had hinted to M. that the examination of her application was likely to take time and that the applicant would be prepared to speed up the procedure before the higher authority, which she had not intended to do in reality. However, she had seen M. putting a USD 100 banknote on the table and had decided to take advantage of the situation given her own financial difficulties. She explained the difference between her latest account and her earlier submissions by shock and stress, and expressed remorse for what had happened. 19.  On the same date, 16 February 2004, M. was also questioned. As indicated in the report of the questioning, she was registered as living in Kharkiv. 20.  On 26 February 2004 an expert report established that the traces of luminescent liquid on the USD 100 banknote and on the applicant\u2019s hands were the same. 21.  On 28 February 2004 fraud was added to the charges against the applicant, given that she had promised to M. to act as an intermediary in bribing a higher-level official, whereas in reality she had meant to keep the money for herself. 22.  On 28 February 2004 formal charges were brought against the applicant and her status changed from being a suspect to an accused. 23.  On the same day the applicant changed her lawyer. When questioned that day in the presence of her new lawyer (K.), she returned to the account of events she had given on 10 February 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). She submitted that she had stated differently in the presence of her previous lawyer (see paragraph 18 above) because she had \u201cconsidered it useless to prove [her] case and feared that nobody would believe [her]\u201d. 24.  On the same day the investigator returned the USD 100 banknote to M., who wrote a receipt in confirmation. She also undertook to keep the banknote until the end of the proceedings. 25.  On 29 February 2004 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office approved the bill of indictment against the applicant. It contained the following list of persons to be summoned to court: the applicant, the victim (M.) and the two attesting witnesses (G. and T.). 26.  On 10 November 2004 the Kyivskyy Court dropped the charge of incitement to bribery. It also ruled to relieve the applicant of criminal liability in respect of the fraud charge and terminated proceedings on that point on the grounds that she was not a danger to society (see paragraph 60 below). 27.  The applicant appealed, seeking the termination of the criminal proceedings against her owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. She denied asking for or receiving any money from M. and maintained that the latter had simply thrown the banknote on her table. Overall, the applicant considered \u201ceverything that had happened to [her] as a provocation on the part of the law-enforcement authorities\u201d. She also complained that she had not been able to cross-examine M. 28.  On 14 April 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the above decision. It held that the first-instance court had not been entitled to terminate the proceedings in the way it had done without the applicant\u2019s consent. The appellate court also noted that the applicant\u2019s argument about her inability to cross-examine M. had not been examined. The case was remitted to the same first-instance court for fresh examination by a different panel. 29.  The Kyivskyy Court adjourned hearings in the case several times owing to the absence of M. and the two attesting witnesses. On 18 July 2005 it decided that it was impossible to complete its judicial investigation in their absence and ordered the police to ensure their attendance. 30.  The police found out that M. had sold her house in Kharkiv on an unspecified date in 2004 and had moved to Russia, with her new address being unknown. G. had moved to a different city in Ukraine, but eventually attended one of the hearings. The other attesting witness, T., was always away from home when visited by the police and his neighbours had not seen him for some time. Eventually, the police located him and on 14 October 2005 he made a written statement that he would appear at a hearing scheduled for 17 October 2005 (with no further details available). 31.  As stated in a note issued by a clerk of the Kyivskyy Court on 17 October 2005, the hearing scheduled for that day was postponed to 6 December 2005 given the judges\u2019 involvement in a different case. It is not known whether there was a hearing on 6 December 2005. It is an established fact, however, that T. did not attend any of the hearings. 32.  In January 2006 the applicant enquired with the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Military Enlistment Office as to whether M.\u2019s son was registered there. On 24 January 2006 she received a reply that he had appeared before that office in April and May 2005, and that the army conscription commission had found him unfit for military service in peacetime by a decision of 6 May 2005. The son had not changed the place of his military registration. The applicant brought the above information to the knowledge of the trial court dealing with her case. 33.  On 26 January 2006 the Kyivskyy Court once again ordered the police to ensure the presence of M. and the two attesting witnesses at the trial. 34.  On 8 February 2006 it decided to continue the examination of the case in the absence of M. as it appeared impossible to establish her whereabouts. In reaching that conclusion, the court referred to the fact that she was no longer registered as being resident in the Kharkiv region and that the police had information that she had emigrated to Russia. By the same ruling, the Kyivskyy Court ordered the prosecution authorities to ensure the mandatory presence of T. 35.  On 16 February 2006 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and incitement to bribery and sentenced her to a fine of UAH 5,000 (then equivalent to EUR 830). Although the applicant pleaded innocent, the court considered her guilt to be proved by the totality of the evidence. It relied on the statements of M., the aggrieved party, made during the pre\u2011trial investigation, and those of the attesting witnesses, made by G. before the court and by T. during the pre-trial investigation. The court stated that it had \u201cno grounds for questioning the credibility of the aggrieved party and the witnesses whose statements [were] corroborated by other objective [...] evidence\u201d. The trial court also relied on the inspection and seizure report of 7 February 2004 (see paragraph 11 above) and the forensic expert examination report of 26 February 2004 (see paragraph 20 above). The verdict noted that the applicant had initially confessed to the offences, but had later retracted her confession for no apparent reason other than an attempt to escape liability. Her initial statement was considered, however, more plausible. 36.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant appealed and on 25 April 2006 she submitted further \u201cwritten explanations to [her] appeal\u201d. She complained, in particular, that her conviction had been based mainly on the statements of M., who had never appeared before the court and whom the applicant had never been able to cross-examine. She argued that the first-instance court had not shown due diligence in finding and summoning M. The applicant also complained that the Kyivskyy Court had wrongly relied on her initial confession, which had been dictated to her by the police before the institution of criminal proceedings against her. 37.  The applicant did not refer in her appeal or in its supplement to her inability to examine T. or to have him examined. At the same time, on 7 April 2006, she lodged a written application to the appellate court to summon T. given that he \u201cwas an attesting witness\u201d and that he \u201chad made statements against [the applicant]\u201d. 38.  On 25 April 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 16 February 2006. It considered that the applicant had initially made a confession of her own free will and that she had failed to give any convincing explanation about her subsequent change in position. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the whereabouts of M. and T. could not be established. There were no reasons to question the veracity of the statements they had made during the pre-trial investigation. Nor were there any reasons to suspect any intention by them to falsely accuse the applicant. In sum, the appellate court did not discern any procedural flaws which warranted quashing the verdict. 39.  The applicant appealed on points of law. She argued that the covert operation of 7 February 2004 had been unlawful because it had not been duly authorised and had taken place in the absence of any criminal proceedings against her, even prior to the formal registration of M.\u2019s statement. The applicant also complained that her rights under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached on account of her inability to cross-examine M. and T. 40.  On 18 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. Its general conclusion was that no violations of the law of criminal procedure had been established. 41.  On 27 March 2009 the Kyivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal case against the applicant for a failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 (see paragraph 35 above and paragraph 61 below). 42.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant was placed under an undertaking not to leave her town of residence as a preventive measure pending trial. 43.  In the absence of any formal charges against her, the preventive measure ceased to apply ten days later, on 20 November 2009 (see paragraph 62 below), a fact of which the applicant was not aware. It is not known if there was any formal decision lifting the measure in question. 44.  On 7 December 2009 the criminal proceedings were terminated for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in the applicant\u2019s actions. On 11 December 2009 that decision was quashed and the case was returned for additional investigation. The case file does not contain any documents regarding the preventive measure then applicable to the applicant, if any. 45.  On 12, 15 and 18 June 2012 the applicant, who considered herself still bound by the undertaking not to leave her town of residence of 10 November 2009, requested leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region from the investigator. On 22 June 2012 the investigator sent her a letter stating that her request could not be granted because she had not provided any address or other details about the planned trip. 46.  On 5 July 2012 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued again. However, two days later the investigation was resumed. 47.  On 12 October 2012 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. It was concluded that she had not evaded paying the fine, but that it had been impossible for her to do so given her low income. By the same ruling, the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was lifted, without further details. 48.  On 20 November 2012 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) entered into force. Instead of opening a criminal case, it provided for the initiation of an investigation by way of making an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. 49.  On 22 March 2013 a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 was launched again and was registered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. On an unspecified date the proceedings were discontinued. On 8 April 2013 they were, however, resumed. 50.  On 5 June 2013 those proceedings were discontinued once again on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of a crime in the applicant\u2019s actions. The case file contains no information about any further developments. 51.  On 26 February 2013 the applicant lodged a claim against the State Treasury, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of her allegedly unlawful criminal prosecution from 27 March 2009 to 12 October 2012. She enclosed copies of the two rulings of those dates, by which the investigator had opened and had discontinued the criminal proceedings against her. The applicant also mentioned, in general terms, that she had been unlawfully placed under an undertaking not to leave her town, without further details. 52.  The prosecutor submitted objections. He stated that on 20 November 2009 the investigator dealing with the applicant\u2019s case had revoked the impugned preventive measure, given that no charges had been brought against her within ten days of 10 November 2009 (see paragraphs 43 above and 62 below). The prosecutor also noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been reopened on 8 April 2013 (see paragraph 49 above) and remained pending. 53.  On 17 May 2013 the Kyivskyy Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. As regards her undertaking not to leave the town, the court concluded that it had only been applicable from 10 to 20 November 2009. 54.  The applicant appealed. She submitted, in particular, that \u201cthe [first\u2011instance] court had not given any legal assessment to the fact that the criminal proceedings against [her] had been instituted on 27 March 2009 and discontinued on 12 October 2012, and that all that time [she] had been under an undertaking not to abscond, which had been lifted by the ruling on the termination of the criminal proceedings of 12 October 2012, that being confirmed by [the investigator\u2019s] letter of 22 June 2012\u201d (see paragraph 45 above). The applicant indicated in brackets the page number of the letter concerned in the case file. She further argued, in general terms, that the court had incorrectly interpreted Article 1176 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 63 below) and that it had not calculated, as prescribed under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 64 below), an amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage to which she was entitled. The applicant did not enclose any documents with her appeal. 55.  On 18 June 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Kyivskyy Court. It noted that the sole fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued did not imply that she had suffered non-pecuniary damage and she had failed to prove otherwise. The appellate court further observed that the applicant \u201c[had] not proved when exactly she had been placed under the undertaking not to leave the town as a preventive measure. Therefore, her submission that she had been restrained in her liberty of movement for more than three years [could] not be taken into consideration\u201d. 56.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which she indicated, in particular, that the applicability of the undertaking not to leave the town from 10 November 2009 to 12 October 2012 had been established by documents. She reiterated her earlier argument that no assessment had been given to the investigator\u2019s refusals of her requests for leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region in June 2012. This time the applicant enclosed a copy of the letter referred to. 57.  On 22 July 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 58.  On 17 April 2006 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in the undercover operation of 7 February 2004. Her main argument was that M.\u2019s complaint had been registered only at about 5 p.m. that day, which had been after the completion of the police operation and thus had undermined its lawfulness. 59.  The prosecution authorities refused to open a criminal case against the police on several occasions. It was established that M.\u2019s complaint had indeed been registered, by mistake, at 5 p.m. instead of 10 a.m. on 7 February 2004, for which the respective officer had been reprimanded. However, there was no indication of a criminal offence.", "references": ["1", "8", "4", "9", "7", "5", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 20 January 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody. 6.  On 22 January 2009 the Edirne Magistrates\u2019 Court placed the applicant in detention on remand on suspicion of forming an organised criminal organisation to commit offences and illegal possession of firearms contrary to Article 13 \u00a7 1 of Law no. 6136. 7. On 3 July 2009 the Edirne public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Edirne Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of an organised criminal organisation as well as fraud and robbery. 8.  On 8 July 2009 the Edirne Assize Court held that it had no jurisdiction and referred the case file to the Istanbul Assize Court. The court also ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 9.  On 12 August 2009 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 10.  On 29 December 2009 the first hearing was held before the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 11.  On 4 May 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court held another hearing and decided to prolong the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. The applicant was present at this hearing. 12.  The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 25 May 2010 his objection was dismissed by the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court without holding an oral hearing. 13.  By decisions dated 30 June 2010 and 8 July 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant\u2019s requests for release without holding an oral hearing. 14.  On 30 September 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held the third hearing in the proceedings and again prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant was present at this hearing. 15.  On 11 October 2011 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize held the seventh hearing in the proceedings and released the applicant from detention on remand. 16.  At the time when he present application was lodged with the Court, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first\u2011instance court. The parties did not submit any further information concerning the outcome of the proceedings.", "references": ["3", "9", "0", "5", "4", "6", "8", "1", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1931, 1972, 1948, 1965, 1970, and 1964 respectively, and live in Golubovci. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicants intervened, as injured party, in criminal proceedings against X, in the course of which they sought 2.705,70 euros (EUR) as compensation for legal costs. 8.  On 14 October 2008 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica found X guilty and, inter alia, ordered him to pay the applicants 505.70 euros (EUR) for the costs of legal representation, without specifying what exactly was covered by this amount. 9.  On an unspecified date X and the High State Prosecutor appealed. 10.  On 30 March 2009 the applicants appealed in respect of costs and expenses. On 6 May 2009 the High Court transmitted the applicants\u2019 appeal to the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica. 11.  On 22 September 2009 the Court of Appeal ruled on the appeals lodged by the High State Prosecutor and X. The applicants learned of this judgment on 27 May 2010 when checking the case-file at the High Court. It was served on them on 3 October 2013. 12.  On 28 May 2010 the applicants complained to the President of the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal had failed to rule on their appeal. 13.  On 7 June 2010 the President of the Supreme Court notified them that she had been informed by the High Court President that the case file had been \u201cat the Court of Appeal in order for it to rule on [their] appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings given that it had not been ruled upon by [its] judgment of 22 September 2009\u201d. 14.  On 24 October 2011 the applicants requested the President of the High Court to transmit the case file to the Court of Appeal given that they had learnt that the file had been archived in the High Court, contrary to what that court had said to the President of the Supreme Court. 15.  On 11 January 2012 the applicants again complained to the President of the Supreme Court. 16.  It would appear that the Court of Appeal has not ruled on the applicants\u2019 appeal. 17.  On 14 March 2011, in the absence of any ruling by the Court of Appeal, the applicants filed a compensation claim against the State. 18.  On 17 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica rejected the claim (odbacuje se) finding that the High Court had awarded them the costs, which judgment had become final in the meantime, and that the issue was thus res iudicata. 19.  On 7 July 2011 the High Court upheld this judgment. 20.  On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants\u2019 dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne gra\u0111anske tu\u017ebe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 21.  On 8 December 2011 the High Court issued a decision ordering its finance department (ra\u010dunovodstvo) to pay the applicants\u2019 representative the amount awarded by the High Court on 14 October 2008. This decision became final on 5 January 2012, given that no appeal was lodged against it. 22.  On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent\u2019s office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants\u2019 appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants\u2019 representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.", "references": ["6", "9", "8", "4", "5", "7", "2", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was serving in the Turkish Army as a lieutenant-colonel. 7.  On 8 May, 10 May and 11 May 2000, the applicant was interrogated by the military prosecutor within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against him for embezzlement. 8.  On 16 June 2000 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement. 9.  19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 10.  On the same day, the applicant gave a power of attorney to a lawyer. 11.  On 22 June 2000 the applicant\u2019s brother \u015e\u00fckr\u00fc Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s brother was released. 12.  On 26 June 2000 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the General Staff Military Court charging the applicant with embezzlement under Section 131 of Military Criminal Code, involving in trade activities as a soldier under Additional Section 1 of Military Criminal Code and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628 (Law on Disclosure of Assets and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption). The siblings of the applicant, \u015e\u00fckr\u00fc Aymelek and Ulviye Toprakk\u0131ran were also charged with the same bill of indictment with embezzlement and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628. 13.  On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment. 14.  On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother \u015e\u00fckr\u00fc Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 15.  On 19 September 2002 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier by the General Staff Military Court, composed of a military officer with no legal background and two military judges. 16.  On 6 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of the General Staff Military Court. 17.  On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 18.  On 17 December 2003 the General Staff Military Court found the applicant guilty for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier, but reduced his prison sentence. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 2 June 2004 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 17 December 2003. 20.  On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness\u2019 written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21.  On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant\u2019s request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness\u2019 statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "0", "5", "4", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5.  On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah \u00d6calan by using the honorific \u201csay\u0131n\u201d, meaning esteemed. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as \u201cthe Board\u201d). 7.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days\u2019 solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8.  On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant\u2019s objection. 9.  On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "0", "4", "9", "1", "3", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Adana. 6.  On 16 February 2006 a gathering was held in Adana on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Adana branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP), where a press statement was read out. Being a member of the DTP, the applicant participated in the gathering. 7.  Subsequently, clashes occurred between police officers and some demonstrators who were attempting to block the traffic. According to police reports, two police officers were injured as a result of objects thrown from the DTP building. The police then entered the DTP building and arrested 223 people, including the applicant. The next day, the applicant was detained on remand. 8.  On 10 March 2006 the Adana public prosecutor charged the applicant and sixteen other people with membership of the PKK under Articles 220 \u00a7 6 and 314 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor alleged that the accused had participated in the public gathering in question in response to calls made by the PKK and had resisted the police officers, and that they had therefore acted on behalf of the PKK. 9.  On 5 May 2006 the applicant was released pending trial. 10.  On 10 September 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The assize court did not find it established that the applicant had attended the reading out of the press statement in response to calls made by the PKK or that she had injured any police officers. It therefore concluded that the applicant could not be convicted of membership of the PKK or resistance to the police. The court nonetheless considered that on 16 February 2006 the applicant had gone to the DTP building with a view to disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and that she should therefore be convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicant was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  Taking into account the applicant\u2019s good behaviour during the trial and the absence of any previous criminal record, the court suspended the pronouncement of her conviction on condition that she did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (h\u00fckm\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n geri b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131). 12.  On 20 November 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision. The final decision was served on the applicant on 9 January 2009.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "1", "2", "9", "4", "6", "3", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lived in Moscow until his arrest. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers; there were numerous clashes between the two sides. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered the meeting to finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was a second-year student at the Moscow University of Social Studies and worked part-time as a courier for an insurance company. According to him, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Kaluzhskaya Square to take part in the march and walked with other participants to Bolotnaya Square. Upon arrival there he discovered that the police cordon had blocked access to the square. When passage to the stage of the rally taking place along the embankment was opened, the applicant went in that direction. The police started to disperse the protesters, using excessive force and beating them with truncheons. In response, the protesters dragged metal barriers in place to protect themselves from the police. At one point the applicant observed a protester in a green T-shirt, who five or six police officers were holding and beating with truncheons. He grabbed the protester and pulled him back, trying to protect him from the blows. The applicant was later arrested by the police and taken to a police station before being released shortly after. After the events in question he continued to live at his usual address and pursue his studies. 10.  On 26 July 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder on 6 May 2012. 11.  On 27 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention until 26 September 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and information about the applicant\u2019s character, including a report by Moscow Police\u2019s chief of department at the Centre for Counter-Extremism. According to that report, the applicant was an active member of organisations of a destructive character. If he were to stay at liberty, he planned to threaten witnesses, abscond and obstruct the investigation. The court concluded that those circumstances gave sufficient grounds to believe that the applicant was likely to flee to avoid the investigation and trial, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, which was still at an initial stage. 12.  On 1 August 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Article 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence). He was accused, in particular, of resisting police officers by pushing them away when they were arresting other protestors and by trying to liberate the latter. 13.  On 27 August 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 27 July 2012. 14.  On 24 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined an application from the investigator for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant asked for the preventive measure to be changed to house arrest, a written undertaking not to leave a specified place, bail or personal guarantees. On the same day the District Court granted the investigator\u2019s application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012. It considered that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 15.  On 1 October 2012 Police Officer T. identified the applicant during an identification parade as a participant in mass disorder who had used violence against him. In particular, when T. and other officers had been arresting a protester, the applicant had grabbed his hand and pulled it off the protestor, thereby causing the police officer pain. Another police officer, L., also identified the applicant as a participant in acts of mass disorder who had tried to prevent the police arresting another protestor. 16.  On 22 October 2012 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the extension order of 24 September 2012. 17.  On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds as earlier, noting that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. In particular, it dismissed an objection from the applicant to the use of the operational-search reports concerning his character and rejected his contesting of the alleged membership of any organisations of a destructive nature. 18.  On 15 November and 21 December 2012 the charges against the applicant were reformulated. It was stated that the applicant, who had been wearing a surgical mask to conceal his face, had used violence against the police while trying to liberate protestors who had been arrested and that he had pushed police officers away. In particular, he had grabbed Officer T.\u2019s hand and pulled it off a protester, thereby preventing his arrest. He had also built a line of metal barriers to block the police and had tried to repel the police with them. The applicant\u2019s alleged offences were classified additionally under Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a public official). 19.  On 5 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 6 July 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before. On 17 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 20.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 21.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that \u201cthe reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The applicant\u2019s request for an alternative preventive measure was dismissed on the grounds that no other measure could secure the proper course of justice in the case. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 2 July 2013. 22.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 23.  The applicant was held in IZ-77/2 for the whole period of his pre-trial detention from 4 September 2012. According to him, the conditions of his detention had been poor. The applicant referred to cases against Russia in which the Court had previously found a breach of Article 3 because of overcrowding in IZ-77/2 in 2004-2005 (see Lind v. Russia, no. 25664/05, \u00a7\u00a7 42 and 58-63, 6 December 2007; Zentsov and Others v. Russia, no. 35297/05, \u00a7\u00a7 25-29 and 40-44, 23 October 2012; and Vyatkin v. Russia, no. 18813/06, \u00a7\u00a7 26\u201127 and 38-43, 11 April 2013). The applicant submitted that his conditions of detention had been similar. 24.  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back and the Government\u2019s submissions in that regard were identical to those in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-73). 25.  As regards the conditions of detention in the convoy room of the Moscow City Court, the applicant submitted that it was poorly lit and that access to the toilet was limited to once an hour. In addition, he had been required to strip naked and to perform sit-ups during the body search conducted in the convoy room. 26.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, while in January and February 2014 they took place at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in hearing room no. 410. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (seven from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 27.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77). 28.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the trial on the merits. 29.  On 5 September 2013 Police Officer T., the alleged victim of the applicant\u2019s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that the applicant had impeded him and two other police officers from arresting a protester by grabbing T.\u2019s hand and pushing the officers away. The applicant had caused him pain but had not inflicted any injuries. During the hearing the applicant and his lawyers applied to deprive T. of victim status because no harm had been caused to him, but the court refused that request as unsubstantiated. 30.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cBetween 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ...\nMoreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ...\n[The applicant] ... who was wearing a surgical mask to hide his face, together with unidentified persons ... tried to liberate those arrested by the police for a breach of public order and pushed the police officers away ...\n... [the applicant] used violence against Police Officer [T.] which did not endanger his life or health ...\n[The applicant] ... from 5 p.m. to 9.40 p.m. ... when unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder tried to break the police cordon, acting intentionally and using force, grabbed [T.\u2019s] hand and then pulled it off the person whom [T.] was arresting, thus impeding his apprehension, which caused [T.] pain.\nIn addition, [the applicant] together with unidentified persons ... built a line of metal barriers blocking the police\u2019s movements, and ... tried to repel the line of police officers ... with the help of those barriers.\n[The applicant] pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he had decided to attend the public gathering on 6 May 2012 ... for the purposes of personal security he wore a surgical mask ... [The applicant] was at the bridge when a blockage occurred. He did not see what was happening, but at one point ... he had been able to proceed with the flow of people towards the stage. There [the applicant] saw the mass beating of people by police officers and participants of the rally starting to bring forward metal barriers ... and to put them close to the police officers, trying to protect themselves from the latter. [The applicant] was standing close to the barriers, taking his hands off when the police officers used their truncheons to hit over the barriers. Then ... [the applicant] saw a group of five or six police officers who were trying to seize a young man in a green T-shirt. They hit the man with their truncheons, and [the applicant], considering that the man was in danger because the police actions were unlawful, tried to snatch him from the officers\u2019 hands. He grasped the young man\u2019s waistband, pulled it and turned his back to protect him from the truncheon blows. [The applicant] finds it conceivable that in this turmoil he might unintentionally have pushed someone and asks for attention to be paid to [T.\u2019s] statements that the latter did not feel any pain. Then [the applicant] was arrested and taken to a police vehicle.\n... the court considers the [defendants\u2019] arguments that they were protecting somebody from police officers or happened to be victims of the police\u2019s use of force as farfetched and aimed at the mitigation of their responsibility ...\u201d 31.  The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article  212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year and three months under Article 318 \u00a7 1. The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 32.  The applicant appealed. He complained that the same acts imputed to him had been classified under both Article 212 and Article 318 of the Criminal Code. He insisted that he had not used violence against T. because the latter had not suffered any pain or injuries. 33.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.", "references": ["8", "5", "4", "3", "9", "0", "No Label", "6", "7", "1", "2"], "gold": ["6", "7", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers; there were numerous clashes between the two sides. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered the meeting to finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was working as an artist. According to him, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Kaluzhskaya Square to take part in the march and walked down Yakimanka Street to Bolotnaya Square. He passed the metal detectors and joined other protestors in front of the stage, where a rock group was performing. Sometime after 6 p.m. he walked towards Malyy Kamenyy Bridge but discovered that movement in that direction had been blocked by a police cordon. The applicant walked back, staying in the general area; at around 7.30 p.m. groups of police officers started pushing into the crowd, forcing it apart by using their truncheons. Protestors were surrounded and squeezed together. At some point the applicant realised that he was facing the police line and that the police were using excessive force to arrest protestors. The applicant was both angered and scared by the actions of the police and actively resisted. He was eventually seized by four police officers and escorted to a police car, which took him to a police station. 10.  On 14 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of the 100th Court Circuit of the Yakimanka District of Moscow found the applicant guilty of non\u2011compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The Justice of the Peace established that after the meeting at Bolotnaya Square the applicant had shouted anti-government slogans, ignoring the lawful demands of the police to cease those acts. He had thrown objects at the police officers, including stones, flagpoles, empty plastic bottles, and pieces of asphalt, and had refused to proceed to the police van. The applicant was sentenced to detention of twenty-four hours. It appears that after his release the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his customary activities. 11.  On 28 May 2012 the applicant\u2019s flat was searched. On the same day he was detained on suspicion of participation in acts of mass disorder and of committing violent acts against the police on 6 May 2012. 12.  On 30 May 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention until 6 July 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that if he was at liberty the applicant could co-ordinate his position with accomplices whose identities were still being established by the investigation. The court also pointed out that the applicant had forcefully resisted the police officers during his arrest, which had led to them using force and handcuffs against him. In addition, the court relied on information obtained from undercover sources that the applicant had connections with football fans and groups of anarchists. The applicant denied that allegation and challenged the use of information from undisclosed sources. However, the court concluded that there were sufficient reasons to believe that he was likely to abscond, continue his criminal activity, threaten witnesses, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the course of the criminal proceedings. It dismissed a request from the applicant for an alternative preventive measure and found that his release was not required on health grounds. 13.  On 4 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the detention order, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 27 June 2012. 14.  On 5 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under two Articles of the Criminal Code, Articles 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence) and 318 \u00a7 1 (use of violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of active resistance to police officers and of participation in a group assault on a police officer whereby the applicant had allegedly pulled a protective helmet off the officer\u2019s head and had punched and kicked him on the head and body. 15.  On 4 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined an application from the investigator for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that he had no criminal record, was in work, and had a permanent residence in Moscow where he lived with his family. He denied any involvement with football fans or anarchists and asked for the preventive measure to be changed to house arrest. On the same day the District Court granted the investigator\u2019s application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012. It relied on the gravity of the charges and information on the applicant\u2019s character, which gave it sufficient grounds to presume that he might reoffend, threaten witnesses and other participants of the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. 16.  On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 6 August 2012. 17.  On 31 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new application for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. Referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the criminal investigation, the court extended his detention until 6 March 2013. 18.  On 13 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order, which was dismissed on 3 December 2012 by the Moscow City Court. 19.  On 16 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated. The classification of the offences remained unchanged but it was specified that the applicant had struck the police officer once on the head and had kicked him once on the body while he was lying on the ground. 20.  On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court authorised a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 28 May 2013. The court relied on the gravity of the charges and the need to allow the defendants sufficient time to read the investigation case file. That decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 10 April 2013. 21.  On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court granted an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 July 2013. The court noted that even though the applicant and his lawyer had already finished reading the case file, other defendants had not. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. The Moscow City Court upheld that decision on 30 May 2013. 22.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 23.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that \u201cthe reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The Moscow City Court upheld that extension order on 2 July 2013. 24.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 25.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, while in January and February 2014 they took place at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in hearing room no. 410. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (seven from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 26.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77). 27.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the court began the trial on the merits. 28.  On an unidentified date Police Officer K., the alleged victim of the applicant\u2019s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that he had been carrying out an order to split the crowd up when someone had pulled at his bullet-proof vest. He had fallen to the ground; someone had hit him several times and had taken off his anti-riot helmet. Other police officers had picked him up to take away him from the crowd. As a result of his fall and the blows, he had sustained injuries. Another police officer, V.K., testified that the applicant had kicked an unidentified police officer. 29.  Three other officers, also examined as witnesses, stated that the applicant had resisted arrest by planting his feet firmly on the ground and attempting to escape. He had also uttered obscenities to the police officers and shouted at them. 30.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretsky District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cBetween 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ...\nMoreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ...\nThus, [the applicant] used violence against Police Officer [K.] which did not endanger his life or health ...\n... between 5.10 p.m. and 8.20 p.m. ... unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder ... intentionally seized [K.] by his uniform and knocked him down, while [the applicant] together with other unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder, acting intentionally ... tore off [K.\u2019s] anti-riot helmet ... and punched and kicked him several times on his head and body, meanwhile [the applicant] punched [K.\u2019s] head at least once and at least once kicked [K.] on the body when the latter was lying on the ground. ...\n[The applicant] ... pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he wanted to see why the meeting was not starting and went to Malyy Kamennyy Bridge where he saw the cordon ... Around 7.30 p.m. [the applicant] saw how police officers ... started beating people with truncheons. ... Then a jam occurred ... At some point [the applicant] found himself in the first line and saw the police officers harshly arresting and beating people, who tried to evade the blows. He was hit several times on the shoulder and the head, which led to dizziness. He was scared, he felt that his life was in danger, and while in a state of fury he moved towards a police officer, who happened to be [K.] and then moved his leg towards the police officer, who was getting up. [The applicant] did not see who knocked the latter down... [He] did not know whether his hand reached the target but supposed that he was able to touch the bullet-proof vest. He definitely did not touch [K.] with his leg and he caused him no harm. A few minutes later he was taken out of the crowd and beaten, his T-shirt was torn, then ... four police officers seized him and dragged him along the tarmac to the police vehicle. [The applicant] insists that he caused no injuries to the police officer and that his actions, provoked by panic, were taken in response to the events occurring around him. ...\n... the court considers the [defendants\u2019] arguments that they were protecting somebody from the police officers or happened to be victims of the police\u2019s use of force as farfetched and aimed at the mitigation of their responsibility ...\n... no medical document which could prove the presence of injuries on the [applicant\u2019s] body ... was provided to the court.\u201d 31.  The applicant was sentenced to three years and seven months\u2019 imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year and eight months under Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 32.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He contested the classification of the crimes under both Article 212 and Article 318 of the Criminal Code. He insisted that he had been a victim of unlawful police action and that his involvement in using violence against the police officer has not been proven. 33.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.", "references": ["3", "5", "4", "8", "9", "0", "No Label", "6", "7", "1", "2"], "gold": ["6", "7", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company established under Lithuanian law with its registered office in Vilnius. 6.  In September and October 2012, for about two weeks, the applicant company ran an advertising campaign introducing a clothing line by designer R.K. The campaign featured three visual advertisements which were displayed on twenty advertising hoardings in public areas in Vilnius and on R.K.\u2019s website (hereinafter \u201cthe advertisements\u201d). 7.  The first of the three advertisements showed a young man with long hair, a headband, a halo around his head and several tattoos wearing a pair of jeans. A caption at the bottom of the image read \u201cJesus, what trousers!\u201d (J\u0117zau, kokios tavo keln\u0117s!). 8.  The second advertisement showed a young woman wearing a white dress and a headdress with white and red flowers in it. She had a halo around her head and was holding a string of beads. The caption at the bottom of the image read \u201cDear Mary, what a dress!\u201d (Marija brangi, kokia suknel\u0117!). 9.  The third advertisement showed the man and the woman together, wearing the same clothes and accessories as in the previous advertisements. The man was reclining and the woman was standing next to him with one hand placed on his head and the other on his shoulder. The caption at the bottom of the image read \u201cJesus [and] Mary, what are you wearing!\u201d (J\u0117zau Marija, kuo \u010dia apsireng\u0119!). 10.  On 28 September and 1 October 2012 the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority (Valstybin\u0117 vartotoj\u0173 teisi\u0173 apsaugos tarnyba \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe SCRPA\u201d) received four individual complaints by telephone concerning the advertisements. The individuals complained that the advertisements were unethical and offensive to religious people. 11.  After receiving those complaints, the SCRPA asked the Lithuanian Advertising Agency (Lietuvos reklamos biuras \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe LAA\u201d), a self-regulation body composed of advertising specialists, to give an opinion on the advertisements. On 2 October 2012 a seven-member commission of the LAA decided by five votes to two that the advertisements breached the General Principles and Articles 1 (Decency) and 13 (Religion) of the Code of Advertising Ethics (see paragraph 37 below). The LAA commission held:\n\u201cIn the commission\u2019s view, the advertisements may lead to dissatisfaction of religious people. [The advertisements might be seen as] humiliating and degrading people because of their faith, convictions or opinions. Religious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising, so we suggest avoiding the possibility of offending their dignity.\nIn this case the game has gone too far. (\u0160iuo atveju u\u017esi\u017eaista per daug.)\nHumour is understandable but it can really offend religious people. We suggest finding other characters for communicating the uniqueness of the product.\n...\nIt is recommended ... to have regard for the feelings of religious people, to take a more responsible attitude towards religion-related topics in advertising, and to stop the dissemination of the advertisements or change the characters depicted therein.\u201d 12.  On 8 October 2012 the SCRPA received a complaint from a law firm in Kaunas concerning the advertisements. The complaint stated that the advertisements degraded religious symbols, offended the feelings of religious people and created \u201ca danger that society might lose the necessary sense of sacredness and basic respect for spirituality\u201d (kyla pavojus visuomenei nustoti b\u016btinos sakralumo pajautos ir elementarios pagarbos dvasingumui). It asked the SCRPA to fine the applicant company and to order it to remove the advertisements as being contrary to public order and public morals. 13.  The SCRPA forwarded the aforementioned complaints and the LAA opinion (see paragraphs 10-12 above) to the State Inspectorate of Non-Food Products (Valstybin\u0117 ne maisto produkt\u0173 inspekcija \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Inspectorate\u201d). On 9 October 2012 the Inspectorate informed the applicant company that the advertisements were possibly in violation of Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising as being contrary to public morals (see paragraph 34 below). It stated:\n\u201cThe Inspectorate, having examined the material presented to it, is of the view that the advertisements use religious symbols in a disrespectful and inappropriate manner. Religious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising. The use of religious symbols for superficial purposes may offend religious people. Advertisements must not include statements or visuals which are offensive to religious feelings or show disrespect for religious people.\u201d 14.  The applicant company submitted written explanations to the Inspectorate. It firstly submitted that in the advertisements the word \u201cJesus\u201d was used not as an address to a religious personality but as an emotional interjection which was common in spoken Lithuanian, similar to \u201coh my God!\u201d, \u201coh Lord!\u201d, \u201cGod forbid!\u201d (Dievuliau, Vie\u0161patie, gink Dieve) and many others. The applicant company argued that, because of its common use to express one\u2019s emotions, that word had lost its exclusively religious significance. It further submitted that the people depicted in the advertisements could not be unambiguously considered as resembling religious figures, but even if they were, that depiction was aesthetically pleasant and not disrespectful, unlike various kitschy and low-quality religious items typically sold in markets. It further contended that, in the absence of a State religion in Lithuania, the interests of one group \u2013 practising Catholics \u2013 could not be equated to those of the entire society. It lastly submitted that the LAA opinion had been based on emotional assessment but not on any proven facts, as demonstrated in particular by such phrases as \u201creligious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising\u201d or \u201cthe game has gone too far\u201d (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant company therefore argued that the advertisements had not breached any law and that holding to the contrary would be detrimental to the right to freedom of thought and expression, protected by the Constitution. 15.  On 27 November 2012 the Inspectorate drew up a report of a violation of the Law on Advertising against the applicant company. The report essentially repeated the contents of the Inspectorate\u2019s previous letter to the applicant company (see paragraph 13 above), adding that \u201cadvertisements of such nature offend[ed] religious feelings\u201d and \u201cthe basic respect for spirituality [was] disappearing\u201d (nelieka elementarios pagarbos dvasingumui). It was forwarded to the SCRPA. 16.  On 29 January 2013 the SCRPA asked the Lithuanian Bishops Conference (Lietuvos vyskup\u0173 konferencija), which is the territorial authority of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania, for an opinion on the advertisements. On 5 March 2013 the latter submitted the following opinion:\n\u201cReligious symbols are not just simple signs, pictures or logos. In the Christian tradition, a religious symbol is a visible sign representing the invisible sacred reality.\nThe advertisements ... make both visual and written references to religious sacred objects, such as a rosary, the names of Jesus and Mary, and the symbol of the Piet\u00e0.\nChrist and Mary, as symbols of faith, represent certain moral values and embody ethical perfection, and for that they are examples of appropriate behaviour and desirable life for the faithful. The inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements encourages a frivolous attitude towards the ethical values of the Christian faith, and promotes a lifestyle which is incompatible with the principles of a religious person. The persons of Christ and Mary are thereby degraded as symbols of the sacredness of the Christian faith. For that reason, such depiction offends the feelings of religious people. The degrading and distortion of religious symbols by purposely changing their meaning is contrary to public morals, especially when it is done in pursuit of commercial gain, and must therefore not be allowed, in line with Article 4 of the Law on Advertising.\u201d 17.  On 21 March 2013 the SCRPA held a meeting in which representatives of the applicant company, the State Inspectorate of Non\u2011Food Products and the Lithuanian Bishops Conference participated. A representative of the Bishops Conference repeated its previous position (see paragraph 16 above) and stated that it had received complaints from about a hundred religious individuals concerning the advertisements. Representatives of the applicant company also expressed essentially the same position as in their previous submissions to the Inspectorate (see paragraph 14 above). They in particular argued that the people depicted in the advertisements differed in several aspects from the depiction of Jesus and Mary in religious art, and that an educated and cosmopolitan society would not equate every picture with such art. They further submitted that the advertisements had relied on wordplay and they had been meant to be funny but not to offend anyone. 18.  On the same day the SCRPA adopted a decision against the applicant company concerning a violation of Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). It noted that the concept of \u201cpublic morals\u201d was not defined in any legal instruments, but it necessarily implied respect for the rights and interests of others. It also stated that \u201cadvertising must be tasteful and correspond to the highest moral standards\u201d and that \u201cadvertising which might humiliate or degrade people because of their faith, convictions or opinions must be considered immoral and unacceptable\u201d. The SCRPA considered that \u201cthe elements of the advertisements taken together \u2013 the persons, symbols and their positioning \u2013 would create an impression for the average consumer that the depicted persons and objects were related to religious symbols\u201d. It further stated:\n\u201cWhen determining whether the use of religious symbols in the present case was contrary to public morals, [the SCRPA] notes that religious people react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious persons in advertising, especially when the chosen form of artistic expression is not acceptable to society \u2013 for example, the bodies of Jesus and Mary are adorned with tattoos. [The SCRPA] also agrees with the Lithuanian Bishops Conference that the use of religious symbols for commercial gain in the present case exceeds the limits of tolerance. [The SCRPA] considers that using the name of God for commercial purpose is not in line with public morals. With that in mind, [the SCRPA] notes that the inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements in question encourages a frivolous attitude towards the ethical values of the Christian faith, promotes a lifestyle which is incompatible with the principles of a religious person, and that way the persons of Christ and Mary are degraded as the sacred symbols of Christianity ...\nIn addition, the inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements was not only likely to offend the feelings of religious people but actually offended them because [the SCRPA] has received complaints about them ... and the Lithuanian Bishops Conference has received a letter expressing dissatisfaction of the [nearly a hundred] religious individuals, which demonstrates that the feelings of religious people have been offended.\nIt must be emphasised that respect for religion is undoubtedly a moral value. Accordingly, disrespecting religion breaches public morals.\u201d 19.  Accordingly, the SCRPA concluded that the advertisements had breached Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). When determining the penalty, it took into account several circumstances: the advertisements had been displayed in public places and must have reached a wide audience, and there had been complaints about them; at the same time, the advertisements had only been displayed for a few weeks and only in the city of Vilnius; the applicant company had stopped displaying them after it had been warned by the authorities, and it had cooperated with the SCRPA; it had been the first such violation committed by the applicant company. As a result, the applicant company was given a fine of 2,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 580 euros (EUR); see paragraph 36 below). 20.  The applicant company brought a complaint concerning the SCRPA\u2019s decision (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above) before an administrative court. It argued that the persons and objects shown in the advertisements were not related to religious symbols: neither the characters themselves nor their clothes, positions or facial expressions were similar to the depiction of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary in religious art; the only physical similarity was the long hair of the man but every man with long hair could not be presumed to be a depiction of Jesus. The applicant company also submitted that the expressions \u201cJesus!\u201d, \u201cDear Mary!\u201d and \u201cJesus [and] Mary!\u201d were widely used in spoken language as emotional interjections, and the advertisements had used them for the purpose of wordplay, not as a reference to religion. 21.  The applicant company further argued that the Law on Advertising did not explicitly prohibit all use of religious symbols in advertising but only when such use may offend the sentiments of others or incite hatred (see paragraph 34 below). It submitted that the advertisements were not offensive or disrespectful in any way, and that the SCRPA had not justified why they \u201cexceeded the limits of tolerance\u201d or why \u201cusing the name of God for commercial purposes [was] not in line with public morals\u201d (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant company also submitted that complaints by a hundred individuals (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 17 above) were not sufficient to find that the majority of religious people in Lithuania had been offended by the advertisements. 22.  Lastly, the applicant company submitted that the advertisements were a product of artistic activity and were therefore protected freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution. 23.  On 12 November 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s complaint. The court considered that the SCRPA had correctly assessed all the relevant circumstances (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), and concluded that \u201cthe form of advertising used by [the applicant company was] prohibited because it distort[ed] the main purpose of a religious symbol (an object of religion) respected by a religious community \u2013 that purpose being to refer to a deity or to holiness\u201d. 24.  The applicant company appealed against that decision. In its appeal it repeated the arguments raised in its initial complaint (see paragraphs 20\u201122 above). It also provided four examples of other advertisements for various products which had depicted religious figures, religious symbols and Catholic priests \u2013 one of those was an advertisement for beer depicting a wooden figure of Jesus, common in the Lithuanian folk art (R\u016bpintoj\u0117lis). The applicant company argued that such examples strengthened its argument that the use of religious symbols in advertising was not prohibited as such, unless it was offensive or hateful \u2013 and it submitted that its advertisements did not fall into either of those categories, as they did not include any slogans or visuals directly degrading religious people or inciting religious hatred. 25.  On 25 April 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal. The court held:\n\u201cThe entirety of the evidence in the present case gives grounds to conclude that the advertisements displayed by [the applicant company] are clearly contrary to public morals, because religion, as a certain type of world view, unavoidably contributes to the moral development of the society; symbols of a religious nature occupy a significant place in the system of spiritual values of individuals and the society, and their inappropriate use demeans them [and] is contrary to universally accepted moral and ethical norms. The form of advertising [chosen by the applicant company] does not conform to good morals and to the principles of respecting the values of the Christian faith and its sacred symbols, and [the advertisements] therefore breach Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising.\n...\nIn its appeal [the applicant company] alleges that there are no objective grounds to find that the advertisements offended the feelings of religious people ... It must be noted that the case file includes a letter by almost one hundred religious individuals, sent to the Lithuanian Bishops Conference, expressing dissatisfaction with the advertisements in question. This refutes [the applicant company\u2019s] arguments and they are thereby dismissed as unfounded.\u201d 26.  On 21 August 2014 the President of the Supreme Administrative Court asked that court to examine whether there were grounds for reopening the proceedings in the applicant company\u2019s case (see paragraphs 40 and 41 below). He considered that it was necessary to assess whether the decision of 25 April 2014 (see paragraph 25 above) had adequately addressed the applicant company\u2019s arguments related to the permissible restrictions of freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution and various international legal instruments, and whether it had properly examined the necessity and proportionality of restricting that freedom, in line with the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The President submitted that if any such shortcomings were identified, that would give grounds to believe that the Supreme Administrative Court had incorrectly applied the substantive law and that its case-law was developing in an erroneous direction. 27.  On 20 November 2014 a different panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused to reopen the proceedings in the applicant company\u2019s case. It emphasised that proceedings which had been concluded by a final court decision could be reopened only when there had been a manifest error in the interpretation or application of the law, and not when it was merely possible to interpret that law differently. 28.  The court observed that the freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution, was not absolute and could be restricted (see paragraphs 31 and 42-44 below), and one of the permissible restrictions was provided in Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). It stated that the decision of 25 April 2014 (see paragraph 25 above) had not denied the applicant company\u2019s right to freedom of expression, but it had sought to balance that right against public morals, and the latter had been given priority. The court considered that the decision of 25 April 2014 had not denied the essence of the applicant company\u2019s right and had not been manifestly disproportionate because the fine had been close to the minimum provided in law (see paragraph 36 below), so there were no grounds to find that the law had been interpreted or applied incorrectly. 29.  The court further observed that the advertisements had had a purely commercial purpose and had not been intended to contribute to any public debate concerning religion or religious symbols. Referring to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in M\u00fcller and Others v. Switzerland (24 May 1988, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 133) and Otto\u2011Preminger\u2011Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, \u00a7 50, Series A no. 295\u2011A), it stated that it was not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society and that even within a single country such conceptions might vary; for that reason it was not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constituted a permissible interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such expression was directed against the religious feelings of others, and a certain margin of appreciation was therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such interference. The Supreme Administrative Court considered that the panel which had adopted the decision of 25 April 2014 had taken into account the fact that Catholicism was the religion of a very big part of the Lithuanian population and that the use of its most important symbols in the advertisements, which distorted their meaning, offended the feelings of religious people. 30.  The Supreme Administrative Court thus concluded that the decision of 25 April 2014 had adequately justified the restriction of the applicant company\u2019s freedom of expression and had correctly applied Article 4 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising.", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "5", "8", "7", "3", "2", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  In 2005, while he was a first-year mechanics student in the technical faculty of F\u0131rat University (\u201cthe faculty\u201d), the applicant was seriously injured in an accident which left his lower limbs paralysed. He had to suspend his studies until he had recovered sufficiently to return to university. 1.  On 17 March 2007 the applicant requested the faculty to adapt the university premises in order to enable him to resume his studies for the 2007\u20112008 academic year. 2.  The faculty replied to that request by letter of 25 May 2007. It pointed out that the faculty building had been designed and built with several floors in order to accommodate 3,000 students and that its architecture could not be adapted. It stated that the administration had been asked for leave to conduct redevelopment work on the doors to the building, but that that work could not be carried out in the short term. It added that the mechanics course required the applicant to participate in practical workshops, considering that as things stood such participation would cause problems. The faculty concluded that if the applicant wished to continue his studies it would help him as far as possible. 3.  On 16 August 2007 the applicant sent, through a notary, formal notice to the administration of F\u0131rat University and the faculty dean inviting them to carry out the redevelopment work requested. Relying on Article 42 of the Constitution, section 15 of Law no. 5378 on persons with disabilities and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he affirmed that it was the State\u2019s duty to guarantee the citizens\u2019 right to education, in line with the principle of equal opportunities. He further alleged that the faculty\u2019s reply to his request (see paragraph 8 above) had been intended solely to induce him to abandon his studies. 4.  The administration replied to that formal notice by letter of 10 September 2007. The latter stated that the redevelopment works mentioned should be considered in the light of compliance with the regulations on public property, which could take some time. Furthermore, any problems encountered by the applicant in attending the theoretical classes administered in a three-storey building could be resolved with the help of a companion.\nThe Administration pointed out that the practical workshops were held on the ground floor of the building and posed no problems with regard to access, and that the applicant would consequently have no difficulty in attending the courses administered in the framework of those workshops. It explained that the only reason why the applicant\u2019s participation in the practical workshops had previously been described as problematic (see paragraph 8 above) was that such workshops necessitated a considerable physical effort and that his particular situation required some thought regarding the type of assistance with which he could be provided. Furthermore, all the parties involved were anxious to help students in difficulty, and there was no question of deterring the applicant from continuing his studies. Finally, the Administration pointed out that since, in its view, the budget allocated by the State was limited, the redevelopment work necessitated by the applicant\u2019s situation was subject to unavoidable budgetary and time constraints. 5.  On 15 November 2007 the applicant filed with the Elaz\u0131\u011f Administrative Court an action for annulment of the university\u2019s replies of 25 May and 10 September 2007 and to provide compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which he claimed he had sustained. He complained that the authorities had not removed the physical obstacles preventing him from exercising his right to education. He claimed 25,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and TRY 30,000 in respect of pecuniary damage. 6.  The Administration of F\u0131rat University replied in a defence memorial of 24 March 2008. That document stated that the university had not been responsible for the applicant\u2019s accident. It criticised the applicant for having opted for judicial channels, and alleged that he was acting in bad faith, adding, in that connection, that he had been informed that he would be provided with support should he decide to return to university. Furthermore, the relevant agencies had been contacted with a view to redeveloping the faculty building and a proposal had been made to include the works in an investment programme complying with the relevant regulations governing public property. The Administration further argued that it had offered the applicant the services of an assistant, but that he had not submitted any request for such help. The office added that access to the workshops posed no problems for persons with disabilities, but that the courses administered at the workshops demanded a physical effort from participants. Lastly, it pointed out that the applicant had never been barred from any course. 7.  The applicant replied, refuting the arguments put forward by the Administration. He submitted that his right to education was guaranteed by domestic law and by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and that it was incumbent on the domestic authorities to take steps to enable him to exercise that right, with respect for the principle of equal opportunities. Moreover, he argued that the redevelopment work requested was such as should already have been conducted in any case, in line with the requirements of section 1bis of Law no. 3194 on urban planning (see paragraph 23 above). Furthermore, he considered that the authorities\u2019 offer of an assistant illustrated their ignorance of his personal situation and the implications of that situation. He added that it would be degrading for him to be placed in a situation of dependence on a third person because of his disability, citing the example of how the constant presence and assistance of a third person would invade his privacy. He also pointed out that the fact of being carried upstairs by another individual comprised a definite risk of his falling. 8.  On 13 October 2008 the faculty terminated its contracts with a number of students, including the applicant, on the grounds that they had not re-registered at the start of two successive academic years. 9.  2 November 2009 saw the enactment of Legislative Decree no. 2009/15546, published in the Official Gazette (\u201cthe OG\u201d) on 13 November 2009, closing down certain categories of institutions of higher education, including technical faculties, one of which was the technical faculty of F\u0131rat University, which was replaced by a new faculty of technology. Under the legislative decree students who were already registered could continue their studies in the new faculties. 10.  On 9 April 2010 the Elaz\u0131\u011f Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. In the reasoning of its judgment it stated, in particular, that the buildings in question had been erected in accordance with the regulations in force in 1988. The court took the view that although it was incumbent on the authorities to apply the technical guidelines set out in the legislation subsequently enacted for persons with disabilities, it could not be contended that the respondent authority had not followed those guidelines during the construction of a building erected in 1988, before the guidelines had come into force. Lastly, the judgment mentioned that the authorities had informed the complainant that architectural measures would be adopted, depending on the available budget, and that a person would be appointed to assist him in attending the courses. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Administrative Court against that judgment. 12.  On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court delivered a judgment dismissing that appeal on points of law and upholding the first-instance judgment as being in conformity with the procedure and laws. 13.  The applicant lodged an application for rectification of that judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court, complaining of an infringement of his right to education and the equality principle. 14.  On 28 September 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, holding that there were no grounds for rectification.", "references": ["0", "2", "9", "1", "6", "7", "5", "3", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1951 respectively and live in Sliema. 6.  Pursuant to the terms of a contract of 11 April 1962 a house (of fourteen rooms, including four double bedrooms) in Sliema (hereinafter \u201cthe property\u201d) owned by a third party was rented out under a contract of temporary sub-emphyteusis to J.G. for twenty-five years as from 15 June 1962 at 100 Maltese liras (MTL \u2013 approximately 233 euros (EUR)) per year. According to the contract the tenant was responsible for all maintenance work, both ordinary and extraordinary, internally and externally. 7.  On 15 June 1987, by operation of law (Act XXII of 1979), that contract was converted into one of lease, and the owner continued to receive rent. 8.  On 11 January 1988 the applicants acquired the property from the above mentioned third party at the price of MTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 25,600) in the full knowledge that the property was occupied under title of lease and that J.G. had three children, one of whom was unmarried. However since all the descendants had settled lives of their own, the applicants expected that the property would be returned to them after the tenant\u2019s and his wife\u2019s death. At the time the applicants lived in the United Kingdom. Initially they asked J.G. whether he was willing to vacate the property, but he did not consent to do so. Eventually the applicants agreed that J.G. and his wife, at the time 76 and 77 years old respectively, would continue to reside in the property against the rent as adjusted by law. They thus recognised them as tenants and regularly received the rent in question ((EUR 466 per year) which had been adjusted once and could not be readjusted further since it had reached the maximum amount allowed by law, namely double the original rent). 9.  In 1993 the applicants returned to Malta. In out-of-court discussions they asked J.G. and his wife to vacate the premises. Eventually, given their advanced age (80 and 81 respectively) and the fact that their children owned properties of their own \u2013 thus making it unlikely that they would return to live in the premises \u2013 the applicants decided not to take formal steps to have them evicted. 10.  However, the applicants were unable to find an apartment to rent in Malta given that, at the time, owners were reluctant to lease property to Maltese residents because of the rent laws in force. In consequence the applicants had to reside in their smaller apartment on the island of Gozo and the first applicant was obliged to commute by boat on a daily basis to get to work. 11.  In 1995 the Maltese rent laws were amended and a free and open market was re-established for new leases. Subsequent to the change, the applicants found an apartment in Malta which they rented at EUR 2,795 annually. Allegedly the applicants spent EUR 12,000 in maintenance and furnishings. 12.  In 2003, P.G., the daughter of J.G. and his wife, who had been living in the United Kingdom for thirty years in a house she owned, returned to live with her parents in the property in Malta. In 2004 and 2008 respectively her parents passed away. 13.  On 6 June 2008 the applicants asked P.G. to vacate the property. She refused and requested that she be recognised as a tenant in accordance with Article 2 of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, as she had been residing in the property at the date of her father\u2019s death. 14.  The applicants refused to recognise P.G. as a tenant and refused to accept rent from her. They also insisted she had to undertake repair work in the property pursuant to the original contract. 15.  P.G., a seventy-year old pensioner, had a constant and considerable income (a monthly pension of 900 pounds sterling (GBP), and during her stay in Malta she was letting her property in the UK at GBP 1,000 a month); she eventually sold her property in the UK for GBP 305,000. She went on to inherit various assets and sold them for a considerable sum. In the constitutional redress proceedings (mentioned below), she declared that she needed the property which was spacious in order to store her parent\u2019s furniture. 16.  In 2009, the enactment of Act X of 2009 was meant to ameliorate the position of land owners whose properties were subject to controlled rents. The amendments operated to bring rates of rent up to EUR 185 per year where these were below that figure; however this increase did not apply to the applicants\u2019 property, the rent of which was already more than EUR 185. Pursuant to the current law the rent applicable in the applicants\u2019 case is increased every three years in accordance with the increase in the inflation index (capped at a 100%). 17.  On 17 February 2010 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They claimed that they were suffering a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of the laws in force which allowed the tenant to enjoy a title of lease over their property and made it impossible for them to regain possession of it despite their own need for housing. They noted that they were renting a property at EUR 2,795 per year, while they were only earning around EUR 39 per month (EUR 466 per year) from their own house, which had a lease market value of EUR 3,500 per month. The applicants further relied on Article 14 of the Convention. The applicants asked the court to order the eviction of the tenant and the latter to pay for ordinary and extraordinary repairs, and to award damages for the loss sustained as a result of the low amount of rent received, and in connection with the disbursements they had to make for their own housing. 18.  By a judgment of 31 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of the application of Articles 2 and 12 of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta and ordered that the tenant be evicted within four months of the date of judgment. It considered that the rent payable, namely EUR 466 per year in accordance with the law was derisory, bearing in mind that such property had a rental market value of EUR 3,000 per month \u2013 the court noted that while an architect\u2019s valuation would have been preferable the latter sum appeared to be an appropriate rent. Furthermore, the burden on the applicants was greater as this arrangement had gone on beyond the death of the original lessor, and was now benefitting his daughter. 19.  The court rejected the remainder of the claims. 20.  The Government and the tenant appealed and the applicants cross\u2011appealed. 21.  By a judgment of 22 February 2013 the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment and found no violation of the said provision, and rejected the remainder of the applicants\u2019 appeal. It considered that Act XXII of 1979, which provided for the conversion of a temporary emphyteusis into a lease, had constituted interference with the applicants\u2019 right of property as it had created a forced landlord-tenant relationship for an indeterminate time, during which they had not been able to use their own property and during which they had suffered financial losses as a result of the low amount of rent received, which had been established by law. The interference pursued a legitimate social\u2011policy aim, specifically the social protection of tenants. However, the applicants, fully aware of the factual and legal situation, opted of their own free will to purchase the property and to enter into the existing agreement with J.G., whose emphyteusis had just been converted into a lease on 15 June 1987, and from whom they continued to receive rent. The court concluded that the applicants had not suffered any imposition in so far as they had willingly entered into that contract at a point where the law had been crystal clear as to the consequences which would ensue. 22.  The applicants are now of pensionable age. In or around 2013 the applicants were given notice to vacate the property which they had been leasing as their ordinary residence since 1996 (see paragraph 11 above), as there were plans to demolish the property in 2014. At the time when they were renting this property, the second applicant\u2019s mother had been one of five co-owners of the dwelling, and it appears that the second applicant has since become a co-owner. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to prove that they had been paying rent and, if so, what rent they had been paying for these premises. According to the applicants, they have since moved to a different property.", "references": ["4", "5", "0", "2", "3", "6", "1", "7", "No Label", "8", "9"], "gold": ["8", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 1984. They are currently serving life sentences imposed in the impugned proceedings described below. 6.  On 18 May 2006 at 11.45 p.m. several persons arrived by car in front of an Internet caf\u00e9 in Skopje and opened fire with machine guns. According to an expert report admitted in the ensuing proceedings, around 70 bullets were fired towards the caf\u00e9. In the incident three children were killed and six people were seriously injured (\u201cthe victims\u201d). 7.  Following a criminal complaint for murder lodged against unknown perpetrators, on 3 August 2006 the public prosecutor requested that an investigating judge question the victims and a certain B.H. who had allegedly been present at the scene at the time of the shooting. 8.  Between 6 and 19 December 2006 the investigating judge heard oral evidence from the victims and other witnesses. None of them identified the applicants as the perpetrators. Some victims, as well as other witnesses who had arrived at the scene immediately after the shooting, stated that there had been no street lighting and that visibility had been considerably impaired. The investigating judge also heard oral evidence from M.M., who had sold the car used in the incident to two people whom he didn\u2019t know and \u201cwould not recognise if I (he) were to see them now\u201d. He stated that a certain F. had introduced him to the buyers. 9.  During the investigation, there were several unsuccessful attempts by the investigating judge to summons B.H. Assistance from the police was also sought. Having been alerted to the summons and the police inquiry, B.H. appeared in court to testify before the investigating judge. On 27 February and 23 March 2007 he confirmed that he had been present at the scene at the time of the incident and that he had been shot in the upper leg. He had fainted and had spent time recovering in a private hospital outside the respondent State. He stated that there had been four people in the car and that all had fired on the caf\u00e9. He identified a certain Dz. as the driver of the car. He also alleged that he himself had been the most likely target of the attack owing to his alleged involvement in the killing of the applicants\u2019 brother, which had happened at the beginning of 2006. In that context, he had received threats that he would be killed. 10.  On 4 May 2007 two people who had been eye-witnesses to the incident gave oral evidence in the presence of the investigating judge and the public prosecutor. They testified as anonymous witnesses (\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043a \u0441\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043d \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442) under the pseudonyms \u201cKorab\u201d and \u201cVodno\u201d. The latter asked not to have his identity revealed for the following reasons:\n\u201cthe people who committed the crime are violent and have a criminal record and that\u2019s why I\u2019m afraid of their threats; they are armed, convicted, I fear for my life and the life of my family, I fear reprisals.\u201d 11.  On photographs shown in evidence, both witnesses identified one of the applicants as having fired on the caf\u00e9 and Dz. as the driver of the car. \u201cVodno\u201d also identified the other applicant as having fired on the caf\u00e9. He stated that three people (including the applicants) had fired weapons in the incident of 18 May 2006. 12.  On 11 May 2007 another individual was examined before the investigating judge and the public prosecutor under the pseudonym \u201cVardar\u201d for the same reasons as the witness \u201cVodno\u201d. He confirmed that Mr Ramiz Asani (the applicant) had bought the car used in the accident from M.M. He also stated that after the incident Mr Ramiz Asani had told him the following:\n\u201cwhat you\u2019ve seen and heard on television about the incident with M.M.\u2019s car \u2013 I did it in revenge for the killing of my brother ...\u201d 13.  On the same date, the investigating judge opened an investigation against the applicants and Dz. on reasonable suspicion of murder. The applicants, who had in the meantime been arrested, were remanded in prison custody. On a later date the investigating judge suspended the investigation in respect of Dz. as he had proved to be untraceable. 14.  In an indictment of 13 August 2007, the public prosecutor accused the applicants \u2212 who had no previous record, but had criminal proceedings in relation to other charges pending against them \u2212 of having fired machine guns at the Internet caf\u00e9 with the intention of killing B.H. The prosecutor requested that the trial judge examine the victims and several witnesses \u2212 including B.H. and M.M., and the anonymous witnesses \u2212 and to admit other material evidence in evidence, including post-mortem reports and other expert reports. 15.  At the trial, the applicants, represented by two lawyers, unsuccessfully requested that evidence produced by the anonymous witnesses be rejected and that the written transcripts of their depositions be excluded from the case file. The trial judge, however, granted their request for witnesses \u201cKorab\u201d and \u201cVodno\u201d to be questioned at the trial. The examination was carried out at a hearing of 21 January 2008 in the presence of only the trial judge and the public prosecutor, as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act in force at the time (see paragraph 24 below). Both witnesses repeated the statements they had given before the investigating judge and reiterated their fear of negative repercussions. Their statements were read out at the trial in the presence of the applicants. A written transcript of their depositions was communicated to the applicants who, at their request, obtained a ten-day grace period in which to prepare written questions to be put to these witnesses by the court. The applicants formulated seven questions to be put to each witness. Both witnesses replied, again in the presence of only the trial judge and the public prosecutor. \u201cKorab\u201d stated that only one person had fired, while according to \u201cVodno\u201d three people had fired at the caf\u00e9. Both witnesses submitted that, despite the impaired visibility, there had been sufficient light to see the applicants. A transcript of their replies was communicated to the applicants. 16.  The trial judge further examined M.M., who did not recognise Mr Ramiz Asani as the buyer of the car used in the incident. He also heard oral evidence from three of 25 witnesses proposed by the applicants regarding their whereabouts at the time when the crime was committed. All three witnesses corroborated the applicants\u2019 version of events, namely that they had been in another local caf\u00e9 at that time. 17.  Since the identity of witness \u201cVardar\u201d had been disclosed in the proceedings (F.S.), the trial judge granted the applicants\u2019 request for him to be questioned again. At a hearing held on 1 April 2008 in the presence of the applicants, F.S. denied that he had testified as an anonymous witness. He denied that the applicants had bought the car from M.M. He alleged that he had been beaten by the police in order to tell the investigating judge that the applicants had bought the car (see paragraph 12 above). 18.  At the same hearing, the trial judge read out B.H.\u2019s pre-trial statement (see paragraph 9 above). The judge did so after having tried on several occasions to secure his attendance at the trial and having inquired with the police about his whereabouts. It was noted that, according to official notes in the case file, B.H. was untraceable. The record of the hearing did not specify that the applicants objected to the reading of the statement. 19.  During the proceedings, the trial judge granted the applicants\u2019 request for a face-to-confrontation with the experts who had carried out the ballistic examination. He did not, however, allow an additional ballistic examination and refused to admit further evidence regarding the intensity of the street lighting at the scene at the relevant time (the applicants alleged that the street light had been too low to allow the anonymous witnesses to see the assailants). In their concluding remarks, the applicants claimed that B.H. was in the respondent State and had been involved in incidents relating to the parliamentary elections of 1 June 2008. 20.  On 23 June 2008 the trial court delivered a judgment in which it found the applicants guilty of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The applicants\u2019 presence at the scene when the incident happened, as well as the development and dynamics of events, was established on the basis of the testimony of the anonymous witnesses \u201cKorab\u201d and \u201cVodno\u201d, which the court regarded as credible and consistent despite \u201csmall differences which were due to the intensity of the shooting and fear for their lives\u201d. The court also gave weight to the statement given by F.S. in the pre-trial proceedings under the pseudonym \u201cVardar\u201d. It disregarded his statement of 1 April 2008 (see paragraph 17 above), finding that it had been given under duress and the threat that he or his family would be killed. In this connection it referred to a police report of 24 January 2008 according to which F.S. had been visited several times by unknown people who had threatened him and his family about the testimony given in the pre-trial proceedings. The motive for the crime was established on the basis of the statement given by B.H. in the pre-trial proceedings. That witness had not been examined at the trial since he had been untraceable. In that context, the trial court referred to an official note by the police of 9 January 2008 informing the court that B.H. had fled the respondent State and that an arrest warrant (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430) had been issued against him. The court did not say anything regarding the applicants\u2019 allegations that B.H. had in fact been in the respondent State and could have been located (see paragraph 19 above). In the court\u2019s view, the evidence produced by the defence witnesses was unreliable and aimed at enabling the accused to avoid criminal responsibility. For this reason it considered it irrelevant to examine the remaining witnesses proposed by the defence. The applicants\u2019 defence that they had been at another location at the relevant time was found to be self\u2011serving. 21.  In public hearings held on 10 October 2008 and 25 September 2009 (latter judgment served on the applicant on 5 January 2010) respectively, the Skopje Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction and the sentence imposed on them. They dismissed appeals lodged by the applicants in which they complained inter alia that the trial court had failed to admit evidence proposed by the defence, that their conviction could not be based solely on the statements of the anonymous witnesses, which had been unlawfully obtained, and that the trial court had not examined B.H. notwithstanding their claims that he would have been available for examination. In this connection they argued that it had been an issue of public record that in the election incidents of 1 June 2008 B.H. had been wounded and hospitalised and later detained by the police. 22.  The courts held that the evidence produced by the anonymous witnesses had been lawfully obtained and that the applicants\u2019 opportunity to put written questions to them had secured their defence rights. The fact that the witnesses had only produced evidence a year after the incident had been due to their fear. Furthermore, they stated that the applicants\u2019 conviction had not been based solely on the evidence produced by those witnesses. In this connection they found that the trial court had admitted other evidence, both documentary and verbal. As regards the evidence produced by B.H., the courts held that the trial court had tried to secure his attendance at the trial, but he had been unavailable for examination, as described in the police note. The higher courts also endorsed the trial court\u2019s finding regarding the applicants\u2019 motive for committing the crime, as established on the basis of the evidence produced by B.H. That had been confirmed by the pre-trial statement of witness F.S. given under pseudonym \u201cVardar\u201d (see paragraph 12 above). 23.  On 2 December 2010 Dz. was found and detained. In subsequent criminal proceedings, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "5", "0", "1", "4", "8", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 5.  In December 2005 violent robberies were committed at two scrap metal collection points in Odesa. One employee was shot dead. In the course of the investigation, the police organised an ambush, which led to the applicant and his acquaintance, Mr D., being arrested. As established by the domestic courts, before his arrest the applicant had pointed a gun at a police officer, who had knocked it out of his hands using a martial arts technique. The gun had been loaded and had had its safety catch released. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant had free legal counsel appointed for him for the pre-trial investigation and the proceedings before the first\u2011instance court. 7.  On 4 September 2006 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of the illegal handling of arms, robbery with violence, intentional murder for profit and an attempt on the life of a law-enforcement officer. It relied, inter alia, on the statements of several eyewitnesses who had recognised the applicant. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had previously been convicted of the intentional infliction of fatal injuries and that he had committed the crimes at issue while on probation following release in October 2005, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. 8.  The applicant, who was no longer legally represented, appealed in cassation. He complained, in particular, about the absence of free legal assistance at that stage of the proceedings. The applicant contended that the first-instance court had erred in its assessment of the facts of the case and their legal classification. 9.  On 30 January 2007, following a hearing with the participation of Mr D. (the other defendant) and his lawyer, as well as the prosecutor, but without the applicant or any representative from his side, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 4 September 2006. 10.  On 11 June 2007 the applicant, who was not aware of the above ruling, requested that the Supreme Court ensure his presence at its hearing. 11.  On 17 August 2007 a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling of 30 January 2007 was sent to the applicant.", "references": ["5", "7", "0", "2", "9", "1", "8", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1997. 5.  Following the death of her grandmother in 2010 the applicant, who was a minor at the time, began to show signs of distress. Her parents sought the opinion of a psychiatrist, who emphasised that their daughter was suffering from emotional instability, alternating between periods of anger and periods of agitation. 6.  On 19 April 2013 the applicant went to a party where there were drugs and alcohol. The police arrived, seized the drugs and alcohol and checked the identity of the minors who were present. 7.  On 23 April 2013 the prefect of Rome informed the public prosecutor at the Rome Youth Court (\u201cthe Youth Court\u201d) of the police operation carried out on 19 April 2013 and of the presence of V.C., a minor, at the scene. A criminal investigation was opened and the public prosecutor at the Youth Court was informed. 8.  On 31 May 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from V.C.\u2019s parents. They stated that their daughter had been having difficulties and that they were worried about her, saying that she was taking drugs and stealing money at home. They also told the prosecutor that, according to the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant, she suffered from a bipolar disorder and an attention deficit disorder caused by drug use and also showed signs of a borderline and anti-social personality. 9.  Subsequently, in June 2013, V.C.\u2019s parents informed the prosecutor that they had discovered through their daughter\u2019s Facebook page that she had been approached by a photographer to pose for pornographic photographs. The Government maintained that the parents had told the prosecutor on that occasion that their daughter did not want to be placed in a specialist institution. 10.  On 5 June 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from the applicant, who stated that she had started to take drugs when she was twelve but had since stopped. The applicant stated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution or in a foster family. 11.  On 25 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s mother informed the public prosecutor by telephone that the situation had not improved and that the applicant had been approached to pose for pornographic photographs. 12.  On 2 July 2013 the public prosecutor informed the Youth Court that it was clear from the statements made by the parents and the applicant, who had admitted stopping school and using drugs, and from the psychiatrist\u2019s diagnosis, that V.C. was in danger as she was no longer attending school and there was a risk that she might be caught up in a child prostitution ring, given that she had been approached to pose for photographs. The public prosecutor therefore requested the Youth Court to institute urgent proceedings under Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934 and to have the minor placed in a specialist institution and in the care of the social services. 13.  On 24 July 2013 the Youth Court appointed a judge (giudice onorario) to hear evidence from the applicant, her parents and the social services, in order to learn more about her environment and take the appropriate measures to protect her. 14.  On 14 October 2013, that is, almost three months later, the Youth Court gave the social services notice to appear before it. However, they did not appear. 15.  The Youth Court gave notice to the applicant\u2019s parents to appear before it on 21 October 2013. The parents gave evidence without the social services being present and stated that their daughter did not want to give evidence. 16.  On 24 October 2013 the public prosecutor requested the judge to place the child in the care of the social services and in a specialist institution. 17.  On 9 December 2013 the Youth Court, after hearing evidence from the parents and adding to the file the conversations which the applicant, who had refused to give evidence, had had on Facebook, and taking into account the fact that the social services had not attended the hearing, decided that it was necessary to place the child in the care of the social services. The court ordered her placement in a specialist institution for an initial twelve-month period so that she could follow a specific programme designed to help her to amend her behaviour, which the court described as erratic, and thus to resume a normal life. 18.  On 11 December 2013 the social services received a copy of the Youth Court\u2019s decision. 19.  On 17 December 2013 a first meeting was held between the social services and the applicant\u2019s parents. During the meeting the parents told the social services that there was a risk that their daughter might be caught up in a prostitution ring. They informed the social services that a criminal investigation was in progress. 20.  On 18 December 2013 the social services contacted the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant and later met the applicant. 21.  On 19 December 2013 the public prosecutor at the District Court informed the public prosecutor at the Youth Court that a criminal investigation was in progress concerning two individuals for exploitation of the applicant for prostitution. The applicant had given evidence on 4 and 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 48 below).\nThe public prosecutor stressed that the arrest of the two suspects was imminent, and requested the prosecutor at the Youth Court to inform him of the measures taken to implement the Youth Court\u2019s decision of 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 17 above), given that the applicant was due to give evidence at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio) (see paragraph 51 below). 22.  On 20 December 2013 the applicant reiterated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution. 23.  However, in January 2014 she consented to such placement. 24.  On 30 January 2014 the social services contacted the regional drug addiction agency for advice on how to help the applicant withdraw from drugs. 25.  During the night of 30 January 2014 V.C. was the victim of a rape (violenza sessuale) committed by two individuals (see paragraph 54 below). On 31 January the applicant went to hospital with a police officer and her mother in order to be examined. 26.  On 6 February 2014 the social services told the Youth Court that they had had several meetings with V.C.\u2019s parents and with the psychologist and psychiatrist whom she was seeing. They also informed the court that the girl had agreed to be placed in a specialist facility with a view to drug rehabilitation treatment. 27.  On 7 February 2014 the social services were informed of the assault on the applicant. 28.  On 19 February 2014 the President of the Youth Court made an urgent request to the social services to inform her of the measures taken to assist the applicant. She stressed that, in view of the applicant\u2019s age, it was still possible for her to change her behaviour and that a programme should be put in place to protect her from the risks she was facing. 29.  On 25 February 2014, having received no information on the applicant\u2019s situation, the Youth Court requested the competent social services departments to draw up a report on the measures taken to assist her. 30.  On 13 March 2014 the youth mental health department informed the Youth Court that the applicant had been diagnosed as being anti-social and drug-dependent and that she had agreed to being placed in a treatment centre (comunit\u00e0 terapeutica). The department had therefore requested the V.L. centre to admit her. 31.  On 17 March 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the Youth Court that the applicant had not consented to her placement and that, in any event, a psychiatric expert opinion was required prior to placement. 32.  On 27 March 2014 the social services requested that the applicant be placed in a care facility as a temporary measure. On 31 March 2014 the care facility that been chosen stated that it did not have any places available. 33.  In a report of 3 April 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the court that it had chosen a treatment centre where the applicant could undergo rehabilitation. 34.  On 3 April 2014 V.C.\u2019s parents requested the Youth Court to enforce the decision of 9 December 2013 ordering their daughter\u2019s placement in a specialist institution in order to help her. They also requested that a curator be appointed and that the court take urgent steps to protect their daughter. 35.  On 4 April 2014 the Youth Court ordered the child\u2019s immediate placement in the Karisma treatment centre. The measure took effect on 14 April 2014. 36.  On 2 July 2014 the staff of the Karisma centre observed that the applicant\u2019s behaviour was challenging owing to her drug and alcohol dependency. 37.  On 19 December 2014 the Karisma treatment centre informed the social services that the applicant\u2019s problems persisted and that it did not have the necessary infrastructure to deal with them in view of the applicant\u2019s drug addiction. They requested her transfer to a facility specialising in the treatment of minors with drug dependency problems. 38.  The social services did not respond to this request. 39.  On 7 September 2015 V.C. left the Karisma centre and returned to live with her parents. 40.  On 22 October 2015 the social services sent a report to the Youth Court stressing that two meetings had been held with the applicant\u2019s parents and that a psychiatric expert assessment had been carried out. According to the expert, the applicant had problems with numeracy and was advised to follow a course of pharmacological treatment. 41.  On 19 May 2016 the Youth Court held a hearing that was not attended by the social services. The applicant gave evidence. She stated that she had gone back to school and was continuing to be monitored by the social services. She said that she had made new friends and had had a positive experience in the treatment centre. 42.  On 1 June 2016 the public prosecutor\u2019s office approved the continuation of the programme that had been put in place. The applicant stated that no such programme had actually been in place. 43.  On 22 December 2016 the Youth Court gave notice to two representatives of the social services to appear before it in order to provide an update on the applicant\u2019s situation. According to the social services, the applicant\u2019s situation had improved and their involvement was thus no longer necessary. 44.  On 10 January 2017 the public prosecutor issued an opinion in favour of discontinuing the proceedings instituted on the basis of Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934. 45.  In a decision of 17 January 2017 the Youth Court discontinued the proceedings. 46.  An investigation into the prostitution ring was opened in April 2013 and was concluded in December of that year. 47.  On 25 September 2013 the public prosecutor at the Youth Court reported on the applicant\u2019s situation to his counterpart at the Rome District Court. 48.  The applicant gave evidence in the criminal investigation on 4 and 9 December 2013. She said that she had worked as a prostitute for two individuals. 49.  On 16 January and 6 February 2014 two suspects were arrested. 50.  On 21 January 2014 the prosecuting authorities again heard evidence from the applicant. 51.  On 26 March 2014, at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio), the applicant reiterated that she had worked as a prostitute for the two suspects between August and December 2013. 52.  On 17 November 2014 the Rome District Court sentenced the two defendants to prison terms of five years and four years respectively for living on the earnings of prostitution. It also ordered them to pay damages to the applicant, who had applied to join the proceedings as a civil party. The court found that the two defendants had put pressure on the applicant to engage in prostitution, had benefited from the applicant\u2019s prostitution and had shared the proceeds. In its decision the court stated that the applicant had been the victim of sexual exploitation from August to December 2013 and that the defendants had been aware of her age.\nOn 4 February 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 53.  The applicant stated that she had not received the amount awarded by the courts in respect of damages. 54. An investigation into the gang rape (violenza sessuale di gruppo) of the applicant on the night of 30 January 2014 was opened concerning two suspects. The case was set down for preliminary hearing on 6 November 2015 before the Rome District Court. It appears from the file that a further hearing was held on 16 February 2016 and that the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["7", "6", "3", "2", "8", "9", "5", "0", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Varna. 8.  As is apparent from the documents in the file, the applicant moved from Turkmenistan to Bulgaria in late 2001 together with her parents. In the summer of 2002 she obtained temporary residency status. Before the move, the applicant\u2019s father had been the deputy chair of the Central Bank of Turkmenistan and later a member of a political movement which was critical of the domestic political regime. It appears that, because of her father\u2019s political activity, members of her family were subjected to persecution in Turkmenistan and that in 2006 the applicant\u2019s aunt was tortured and murdered in prison. 9.  The applicant started studying at a secondary school with an intensive foreign languages curriculum in the autumn of 2002. Her father opened his own construction business in Bulgaria. 10.  On 22 October 2002 the Turkmen authorities charged both of the applicant\u2019s parents with aggravated embezzlement of public funds amounting to 40,000,000 United States dollars, allegedly committed between 25 July 2002 and 3 September 2002. The Turkmen prosecutor ordered their detention in relation to those charges and filed a request for their extradition with the Bulgarian authorities. 11.  The following circumstances are undisputed between the parties. 12.  On 4 December 2002 the applicant, aged fourteen at the time, was alone at home. At around 11 a.m. about ten police officers arrived at the family apartment. On entering the apartment the officers informed the applicant that they had come to arrest her parents. She called her parents on the telephone. It appears from the documents before the domestic courts that at that time, the parents were out shopping accompanied by their legal representative, who returned home with them. This took some time because of heavy traffic. In the meantime the officers prohibited the applicant from moving around the apartment and interrogated her in the absence of a social worker and a psychologist, despite having seen her identity document, which indicated her age. 13.  The applicant\u2019s parents were arrested as soon as they arrived home. The record of a court hearing in the domestic proceedings for damages (see paragraphs 27-41 below) indicates that the parents\u2019 legal representative was present during the arrest. The lawyer stated that the police officers had not allowed the parents to collect personal belongings from the flat but that, as far as he could recall, they had allowed the applicant to hand them some personal items from the flat. He did not know where the police officers had taken the applicant\u2019s parents but said that he thought that they had been taken to the Regional Investigation Office. In any event, he had visited them the following day but could not remember exactly where. The legal representative also stated that during the next few days his task had been to circulate between the two different prisons where the applicant\u2019s parents were detained in order to organise their defence. He stated that he could not describe the state of the applicant at the time of the arrest, his task having been to defend her parents. He did not know what had happened to the applicant and had not seen her after her parents\u2019 arrest. 14.  An order for the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 detention for twenty-four hours was issued by the police on 4 December 2002 and they were placed in police custody for that period. Upon their application for judicial review of that detention order, the Varna Regional Court set it aside the following day, finding it flawed as it did not indicate any legal grounds for the detention. Immediately upon their release from police custody the applicant\u2019s parents were served with a prosecutor\u2019s order for their detention for seventy-two hours in connection with the extradition request (see paragraph 10 above). They were detained on the spot. 15.  On 6 December 2002, at two separate hearings, the Varna Regional Court extended their detention for a period of thirty days. The applicant\u2019s father was taken to Varna Prison and her mother to Sliven Prison. 16.  During and after the court hearings on 6 December 2002 the applicant\u2019s parents were represented by the same lawyer who had been present during their arrest and was a friend and neighbour of the family. 17.  The parties dispute what took place at the hearing when the judge enquired about the care measures in place in relation to the applicant. According to the latter, when her mother was asked by the judge through an interpreter whether there was anyone who could take care of her child, her mother replied by shaking her head. In Bulgaria nodding one\u2019s head signifies \u201cno\u201d and shaking it means \u201cyes\u201d. According to the applicant, the judge, having interpreted the mother\u2019s response as \u201cyes\u201d, noted in the record of the hearing: \u201cThe child has someone to take care of her\u201d. 18.  The Government, in contrast, pointed to the record of the hearing, which indicated that the applicant\u2019s mother had replied that there was someone who could take care of her child. In their view, this was evidence of the mother\u2019s reply. In addition, they cited an excerpt of the court\u2019s record where the applicant\u2019s mother had addressed the court in the following terms: \u201cI am very surprised as I have worked as an associate professor, with a doctorate in science, for ten years, and for some reason, they want to accuse me of something that happened out there, and I\u2019ve been living here for a whole year. We came here so that my children could study in Varna, in a democratic country, because Turkmenistan is a dictatorship; a fascist regime has begun. There is someone to take care of my child.\u201d According to the court record of the hearing, the mother\u2019s statement had been preceded by an intervention by the prosecutor, who had indicated that it was necessary to comply with the requirements of Article 152 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so that if the family had no relatives or friends to care for the child, the municipality had to be informed with a view to placing her in a child-care centre, kindergarten or boarding facility (\u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442). 19.  On an appeal by the applicant\u2019s parents, the Varna Court of Appeal lifted the detention orders in two separate decisions on 17 December 2002. The applicant\u2019s parents were released on bail and returned home to the applicant the same day. 20.  The request for their extradition to Turkmenistan was ultimately refused on 22 May 2003 by the Varna Regional Court. During those proceedings they were represented by the same lawyer. The refusal became final on 30 May 2003 as it had not been appealed against. The court found that the criminal proceedings against the applicants\u2019 parents were connected to the father\u2019s political activities and that the extradition request had been made with the aim of persecuting and punishing him for his political beliefs. 21.  It is alleged that the applicant\u2019s parents were arrested so rapidly that they did not manage to leave any money for her, or to give her any instructions as to whom to turn to or how to go about caring for herself. The officers did not tell the applicant for how long they were taking her parents away, where they would be taken or for what reason. According to the applicant, they indicated that they would either lock her parents in prison or deport them to Turkmenistan. Both prospects caused the applicant anguish as she had heard that prisons were horrible both in Turkmenistan and in Bulgaria. She also feared that her parents might be subject to the same treatment in Bulgaria that members of her family had endured in Turkmenistan. 22.  According to the applicant, no one took care of her after her parents\u2019 arrest. She only found 15 levs (about 7 euros (EUR)) in the apartment, which she used for bus tickets to go to school and for food. The money ran out fast and during the last days of her parents\u2019 absence she did not have anything to eat. She suffered insomnia and, when she could sleep, had nightmares. Before her parents\u2019 arrest, her mother had been the one to wake her up in the morning. 23.  She permanently dreaded being herself sent back to Turkmenistan, where her relatives were in prison and her grandparents had been made homeless for having opposed the regime. 24.  She alleged that she had gone several times to the police\u2019s office for foreigners, looking for her parents. She had also tried to telephone people in Turkmenistan to ask for help. Both steps proved unsuccessful. 25.  The applicant had to ask people in the street how to reach her school as, before the arrest, her father had always taken her there. At some stage during her parents\u2019 detention a stray dog bit the applicant on the leg. She did not know what to do or how to seek help. Her mother took her to hospital on 18 December 2002, the day after she was released from detention, fearing that the wound might have become infected. 26.  The Government alleged that it had not been proven that the applicant had been left alone, without an adult carer, during the period in question. The Government stressed that the applicant\u2019s parents had been represented throughout by the same legal representative, who was, moreover, a neighbour and friend. When questioned in the context of the domestic proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case about the exchanges in court on 6 December 2002, the lawyer indicated that he had no recollection of them (see paragraph 35 below). 27.  On 7 March 2006 the applicant, with her parents\u2019 agreement, brought proceedings for damages under section 45 of the Contracts and Obligations Act before the Varna Regional Court. She directed her claim against the Varna regional office of the Ministry of the Interior, the Prosecution Service, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council, and sought to establish the responsibility of the authorities that had left her unattended during her parents\u2019 detention in December 2002, in breach of the Child Protection Act. 28.  In a decision of 27 March 2006 the court invited her to specify the grounds of her claim and to indicate the specific actions, the particular respondent and the type of damage caused to her. She specified that she was seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage stemming from the authorities\u2019 failure to organise support and care for her during her parents\u2019 detention. 29.  On 10 April 2006 the court reclassified her claim under section 49 of the Contracts and Obligations Act. It further invited her to specify the names of the officials against whom she had directed her claim, and to show that she had paid the court fees of about EUR 10,000, corresponding to 4% of the total amount of damages sought. The applicant lowered the value of her claim on 9 May 2006, paid the corresponding court fees in the amount of about EUR 6,135 and submitted additional proof to the court. 30.  On 15 May 2006 the Varna Regional Court terminated the proceedings as it found that the applicant had failed to correct the irregularities in her claim as directed by the court on 10 April 2006. 31.  The applicant appealed on 12 May 2006 to the Varna Court of Appeal, submitting that the respondents were the legal entities specified in her legal claim of 7 March 2006 as amended, given that they had been represented by different individuals at different points in time. The appellate court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision on 4 October 2006. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting that her claim was directed against the different institutions as legal persons, as she could not know the names of the individual officials who had failed to provide her with care. She also described her condition after her parents\u2019 detention. On 14 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court\u2019s decision, finding that it had wrongly instructed the applicant to specify individual respondents. It remitted the case to the first-instance court, the Varna Regional Court, for a fresh examination. 33.  On 25 October 2007 the applicant further specified her claim before the Varna Regional Court, in particular describing her circumstances in the immediate aftermath of her parents\u2019 arrest and the continuing psychological trauma which she had suffered as a result. She submitted that during the hearing on 6 December 2002 on the extension of her parents\u2019 detention, the judge had wrongly interpreted her mother\u2019s response to the question posed regarding her care. 34.  A psychiatric and psychological report was prepared in the context of the court proceedings in 2008. The report established that the applicant was depressed and at times aggressive. This was attributed to the shock she had experienced in relation to her parents\u2019 detention and the ensuing uncertainty. She showed signs of accumulated tension, fear, worries, disappointment and anger towards the officials who had abandoned her to her own devices following her parents\u2019 arrest. She had no interest in her daily life or in the future and had become withdrawn as a result of her loss of confidence in the justice system. Two additional medical expert reports were prepared in 2008. They found that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, which was probably the result of what she had gone through after her parents\u2019 arrest. The doctors stated in court that no improvement was likely in her case and that her condition was expected to become chronic. Another medical report ordered by the court in 2009 confirmed that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and that, while she had been a healthy and energetic child prior to her parents\u2019 arrest, she had experienced frequent bouts of depression thereafter and had succumbed to overwhelming feelings of self-pity, insecurity and futility of effort and engagement. 35.  The applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 lawyer, who had attended the hearings relating to their detention in 2002, testified on 22 February 2008 that he did not know what had happened to the applicant during her parents\u2019 arrest; nor could he remember anything about the circumstances relating to the question and answer in court on 6 December 2002 concerning her care. On 24 October 2008, during the same proceedings, the applicant\u2019s teacher testified that she could not remember the applicant being absent from or having gone hungry at school. The girl had not complained to her about anything at the time. 36.  The Varna Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim on 27 July 2009, finding that it had not been proven that she had been left alone while her parents had been detained in December 2002. The court also held that, in the three days following the court hearing on 6 December 2002, the applicant\u2019s mother had not sought to have the record of the hearing rectified, even though it was legally possible to do so. 37.  Furthermore, the court held that on 6 December 2002 the Varna Regional Court had accepted that the mother had replied in the affirmative to the judge\u2019s question regarding whether there had been anyone to care for the applicant. That question had been transmitted to the applicant\u2019s mother with the assistance of an interpreter. Consequently, the court concluded that it had not been incumbent on the criminal justice system to act in any other way in order to protect the applicant. 38.  The court further accepted fully the conclusions of the psychological reports on the applicant\u2019s state of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder after the December 2002 events. However, it found that the only evidence supporting the applicant\u2019s claim that she had been left alone in December 2002 was her parents\u2019 testimony and that there were no other pieces of evidence in support of this assertion. Given that the mother had stated during the hearing on her detention that someone had been taking care of the child, the conditions set out in Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been met and, therefore, the institutions involved in the criminal proceedings had not been obliged to pursue steps towards taking the applicant into care. 39.  The applicant appealed to the Varna Court of Appeal. She again challenged the findings of the lower court about her mother\u2019s reply during the court hearing on 6 December 2002. She also submitted that her mother had not been in a position to see the record of the hearing, given that she had been taken back immediately to the remand prison. She further asserted that the authorities had been under an obligation to verify at the time of the arrest on 4 December 2002 and immediately afterwards whether care had been available to her, and that in any event they should not have waited two days to enquire about her situation for the first time during the court hearing. She submitted that her current state of health was the direct result of the shock and stress she had endured in connection with the arrest and the lack of provision of care. She paid about EUR 3,000 in court fees. 40.  The appellate court confirmed the lower court\u2019s decision on 10 December 2010. It found that, even if the applicant had been left alone after the arrest, responsibility for that could not be attributed to the police, the prosecuting authorities or the court, given that her mother had stated that there had been someone to take care of her. In addition, the post-traumatic stress disorder from which it had been established that she suffered could have been the result of additional factors not directly related to her parents\u2019 arrest. 41.  The Supreme Court of Cassation rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant in a final decision of 18 January 2012, finding no grounds for allowing the appeal to be pursued. 42.  The applicant was granted humanitarian status on 10 March 2004 and refugee status on 15 September 2007.\nII.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL TEXTS\nUnited Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 43.  This treaty (hereinafter \u201cthe UN Convention\u201d), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989, has binding force under international law on the Contracting States, including all of the member States of the Council of Europe. Article 3(i) of the UN Convention states:\n\u201cIn all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.\u201d", "references": ["0", "1", "6", "8", "5", "3", "2", "9", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in San Jose, the United States of America. 6.  On 6 September 2005 the applicant brought proceedings against the private company X and a third party, seeking the recovery of property rights pertaining to land, both on his own behalf and on behalf of six other plaintiffs who were allegedly co-owners of the property. 7.  Between 11 October 2005 and 24 March 2008 the Ploie\u015fti District Court (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe District Court\u201d) held more than fifteen hearings in the case in order to allow the parties to add evidence to the file. 8.  On 21 December 2005 the District Court ordered the applicant to inform it by 31 January 2006 of the home addresses of the other six plaintiffs on whose behalf he had brought the proceedings. The applicant complied with the court\u2019s order. 9.  On 29 November 2006 the applicant informed the District Court on behalf of himself and the other six plaintiffs of the cancellation of the legal representation contract they had signed with their initial legal representative. 10.  On 24 March and 21 April 2008 the District Court adjourned the proceedings on procedural grounds and in order to allow the applicant to add to the file the relevant documents proving that he and the other six plaintiffs were entitled to claim the land in question and that the applicant was authorised by the other plaintiffs to represent them. The court also noted that the proceedings would be suspended in accordance with the relevant civil procedure rules if the applicant failed to comply with the court\u2019s request to add the requisite documents. 11.  On 16 June 2008 the District Court suspended the proceedings in accordance with Article 242 \u00a7 1(2) of the former Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the \u201cCCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 25 below) on the grounds that none of the parties had attended the hearing scheduled for that date. 12.  On 26 January 2009 the District Court amended of its own motion the decision of 16 June 2008. It held that some of the parties had in fact attended the hearing of 16 June 2008. However, the proceedings had had to be suspended on the grounds that, according to the available evidence, four of the other six plaintiffs had died prior to 2005 and the applicant had taken no steps to identify the heirs of the deceased parties in order to enable the court to summon them as parties to the proceedings. 13.  The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against both the decision of 16 June 2008 and that of 26 January 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). 14.  On 8 October and 3 December 2009 the Prahova County Court (hereinafter referred to as the \u201cthe County Court\u201d) adjourned the aforementioned appeal proceedings brought by the applicant in order to allow the private company X to prepare its defence and the applicant to submit proof of the steps he had taken to identify the home addresses of the other six plaintiffs, and to serve a summons on the six plaintiffs by publishing it in a national newspaper. 15.  On 11 February 2010 the County Court allowed the applicant\u2019s aforementioned appeal against the District Court\u2019s decisions and ordered the reopening of the proceedings. It held that there was no evidence in the file that four of the other plaintiffs had died or that the first-instance court had adjourned the proceedings in order to allow the applicant to submit proof of those deaths. Also, the decision of 26 January 2009 to amend the decision of 16 June 2008 (see paragraph 12 above) had been unlawful. 16.  On 2 July 2010 the applicant asked the President of the District Court to order that court to start the re-examination of the case. He complained that even though the County Court had ordered the reopening of the proceedings in the case in February 2010, the District Court had still not resumed the examination thereof. 17.  On 14 October and 9 December 2010 and 3 March 2011 the District Court adjourned the proceedings on procedural grounds to allow the plaintiffs\u2019 legal representative to add documents to the file and to prepare his defence, and for the court to deliberate. In addition, it ordered the applicant to clarify whether the other six plaintiffs were still alive and, if not, to establish who were their heirs. The court further noted that the proceedings would be suspended according to the civil procedure rules if the applicant failed to comply with the court\u2019s request. 18.  On 8 March 2011 the District Court suspended the proceedings on the grounds that the applicant had failed to clarify whether the other six plaintiffs were still alive and if not who were their heirs. It noted that the applicant had made some attempts to obtain the requested information from the relevant domestic authorities, but he had failed to provide relevant information about the plaintiffs which would have enabled the authorities to identify them. Moreover, the summonses sent by the court to the known foreign addresses of the other six plaintiffs provided by the applicant had either not been received by the recipients or had been returned because the intended recipients had been unknown at those addresses. The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against the decision. 19.  On 18 January and on 14 and 21 March 2012 the County Court adjourned the appeal proceedings in order to allow the six other plaintiffs to be publicly summonsed, and for the parties to make written submissions. 20.  On 28 March 2012 the County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact and points of law against the District Court\u2019s decision of 8 March 2011 (see paragraph 18 above). It held, amongst other things, that the applicant had acted as the other six plaintiffs\u2019 representative without being able to prove that they were still alive or to identify their heirs, if such heirs existed. Since he was the one who had brought the proceedings, he had a duty to produce evidence in respect of the persons he was representing and was solely responsible for the way he had chosen to formulate his action before the court. The court was bound by the procedural framework set by the applicant. Since he had chosen to sign the application to the court both on his own behalf and on that of other persons, he should have been aware that he would be responsible for proving his status and his right to act as a representative. 21.  On 29 November 2012 the County Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal for a review of proceedings instituted by the applicant against the final judgment of 28 March 2012 as having been lodged out of time. 22.  On 11 March 2013 the County Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal for the annulment of the proceedings instituted by the applicant against the final judgment of 28 March 2012 as ill-founded. 23.  On 23 May 2013 the District Court of its own motion declared the proceedings brought by the applicant on 6 September 2005 (see paragraph 6 above) to be barred by limitation on account of his inaction. It held that for more than a year the applicant had failed to make any request for the proceedings to be reopened. The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against the decision. 24.  By a final judgment of 27 March 2014 the County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact and points of law against the District Court\u2019s decision of 23 May 2013 (see paragraph 23 above). It reiterated the reasons provided by the first-instance court. It also held that the extraordinary appeals lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 28 March 2012 (see paragraph 20 above) had not put a stop to the bar by limitation, because they could not be considered as procedural acts aimed at reopening the proceedings.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "1", "9", "2", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a legal entity registered in Vilnius. 6.  In 1994 the Government adopted a resolution establishing the Development Plan for the Curonian Spit National Park (hereafter \u201cthe development plan\u201d). The main objectives of the development plan were published in the Official Gazette (Valstyb\u0117s \u017einios) (see paragraph 53 below). The development plan explicitly indicated that the buildings with a former military objective, situated in the adjacent dunes, had to be removed (nukeliami) and the natural environment fully restored. 7.  In 1998 the Government decided to privatise the former Soviet (later the \u2013 Russian Federation) military buildings, without the land, in Juodkrant\u0117, the Neringa Municipality, within the Curonian Spit National Park. There were two military barracks, a canteen, a store house and two sheds. 8.  In 1999 the State Property Fund carried out a public auction, at which the applicant company was the only participant and purchased the buildings for 226,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 65,454 euros (EUR)). The purchase agreement, which was concluded in February 2000, indicated that the applicant company had to lease the land assigned to the buildings (\u012fsipareigoja i\u0161sinuomoti \u0161iam objektui priskirt\u0105 \u017eem\u0117s sklyp\u0105). 9.  In September 2001 the Neringa Municipality decided to prepare a detailed plan of the area where the buildings were sited. The purpose of the plan was to designate a plot of land near the existing buildings, providing an opportunity to renovate the buildings or to build new recreational buildings. 10.  In August 2002 the authorities in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park decided that renovation of the buildings had to meet the requirements applicable to the whole area. The buildings had to be integrated in the landscape; as they were sited in the forest, the purpose of the use of the land had to be changed. 11.  In September 2002 the Klaip\u0117da Region department of environmental protection decided that the purpose of the use of the land, on account of its specific location, could only be changed if the projects were approved by those managing protected areas or with the approval of the Ministry of Environment. In August 2003 the same department rejected a detailed plan submitted by the applicant company, seeking to amend the purpose of the land so that it became a recreational area. 12.  The applicant company instituted court proceedings, urging the court to declare unlawful the authorities\u2019 rejection of the detailed plan proposed by the applicant company (see paragraph 11 above) and to oblige them to accept it. 13.  The applicant company\u2019s claim was dismissed on 23 October 2003 by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Administrative Court and on 27 January 2004 by the Supreme Administrative Court. The courts held that in accordance with domestic law there was no possibility to build new recreational buildings in the Curonian Spit National Park (see paragraph 53 below). The courts thus held that the applicant company\u2019s detailed plan was contrary to the development plan. 14.  In January 2004 the applicant company asked the authorities to conclude a lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings. The authorities replied that the applicant company had to provide a plan of the land. However, as there was no detailed plan of the area, the land could not be leased. The applicant company was also obliged to pay the land tax. 15.  The applicant company instituted court proceedings and complained that it had to pay the land tax but the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court on 30 April 2004 and the Supreme Administrative Court on 17 September 2004 held that it had to pay the land tax because it had been using the land in question. 16.  In February 2006 the applicant company asked the authorities to include the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone. In March, the Protected Areas Service replied that the development plan of 1994 indicated that the buildings had to be demolished. It said that it would formulate provisions in the explanatory report regarding the possibility to compensate the applicant company for the buildings. In this case, the applicant company would be able to acquire other buildings owned by the authorities. 17.  In November 2011 the applicant company proposed that the land under its buildings be included in the recreational zone and that a compensation mechanism be determined for the buildings if the area had to be redeveloped. In December 2011 the authorities replied that the redevelopment of the area had been determined in 1994 and that they could not agree with the applicant company\u2019s proposals. The authorities indicated that any decision regarding the applicant company\u2019s buildings had to be taken by the Government. 18.  In January 2012 the applicant company complained about the refusal of its proposal (see paragraph 17 above) to the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate. It claimed that it had legitimate expectations that it would be able to use its possessions in an appropriate manner, namely that it would be allowed to reconstruct the buildings without increasing their height. In February 2012 the Inspectorate replied that when approving the Curonian Spit National Park Management Plan (hereafter \u201cthe Management Plan\u201d), a decision on a compensation mechanism and time-limits would also have to be taken. 19.  In April 2012 the applicant company examined a draft of the Management Plan and found that its buildings were indicated as objects to be redeveloped (rekultivuojami objektai) but that that decision had not been explained. The applicant company asked the authorities to amend the draft so that it included the issue of compensation for the buildings or included the buildings in the landscape management recreational zone. 20.  In May 2012 the Ministry of Environment and the Protected Areas Service replied that they had set up a working group to determine a compensation mechanism for the property that had to be expropriated. 21.  In May 2012 the applicant company asked the authorities to inform it about the conclusions of the working group. In June 2012 the authorities replied that the working group had to be set up before 29 June 2012. 22.  The working group was set on 20 July 2012 and had to provide its proposals before 19 November 2012. 23.  In February 2010 the applicant company asked the authorities for planning permission to carry out major renovation work on one of the buildings, namely the canteen. The authorities replied that they could not issue planning permission and that the applicant company had to provide them with the lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings. Only after such agreement was provided, the authorities would examine the applicant company\u2019s request. 24.  The applicant company lodged a complaint with the domestic courts against the authorities\u2019 refusal to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen. On 30 August 2010 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Administrative Court allowed the claim, holding that the applicant company had been paying the land tax, which was evidence that it had been using the plot of land. 25.  On 9 May 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed an appeal lodged by the authorities. It held that the applicant company had not provided any information proving that it was the owner of the plot of land, so the authorities had not been obliged to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen. The applicant company applied for the reopening of the proceedings. Its request was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court in January 2012. 26.  On 6 June 2012 the Government approved the Management Plan by Resolution No. 702 (see paragraph 54 below) and asked the Ministry of Environment to set up a working group to assess the legal grounds for expropriating property for public needs (d\u0117l darbo grup\u0117s teisin\u0117ms prielaidoms paimti turt\u0105 visuomen\u0117s poreikiams sudarymo). The working group was set up on 20 July 2012 and its proposals were to be submitted by 19 November 2012. The Management Plan included the reserve land in Juodkrant\u0117, indicating that its purpose was to compensate for the possible losses incurred by lawful owners of buildings that had been earmarked for demolition. 27.  On 4 July 2012 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, urging it to revoke the part of the Government Resolution where it had been decided that the buildings at 21 Mi\u0161ko street (the location of the applicant company\u2019s buildings) would be demolished and to order the authorities to amend the Management Plan. The applicant company argued that the issue of compensation and the time-limits for the demolition of property had not even been mentioned in the Management Plan. It also argued that clear indications on compensation for the buildings and for the land tax were needed. 28.  On 23 July 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court refused to examine the claim. The reasons were provided in two short paragraphs, which mainly reiterated the provisions of domestic law (see paragraph 62 below). The applicant company had complained about the lawfulness of the Government Resolution. The court considered that issues as to whether acts adopted by the Government were in accordance with the Constitution or laws fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. It stated that it was not within the area of competence of the administrative courts to examine the lawfulness of the activities of, inter alia, the Government (as a collegial institution). As regards an amendment to the Management Plan, the court stated that that was linked to the first part of the claim and thus would not have any legal consequences on the applicant company. 29.  In August 2012 the applicant company lodged a separate complaint and asked the Supreme Administrative Court to examine the case on the merits. It claimed that the first-instance court had misinterpreted the provisions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, and thus limited the applicant company\u2019s right of access to a court. The applicant company thought that when the Government had approved the Management Plan, it had been implementing the function of public administration, and that that document had had a direct influence on the applicant company\u2019s rights and obligations, and was thus an individual legal act that had to be examined before the administrative courts. On 28 November 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court of 23 July 2012. It held that the applicant company had questioned the lawfulness of both the Management Plan and the development plan. The Supreme Administrative Court held that when the Government had approved the Management Plan, it had been carrying out the function of State power. Moreover, the court had already ruled on the issue of the attribution of the Management Plan to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts and had decided that it had not been attributable to those courts (see paragraph 79 below). The court indicated that a legal act could consist of textual and graphic information (tables, drawings, schemes, plans, symbols, emblems). The Constitutional Court had already held that all parts of a legal act were interrelated and were of equal legal effect (see paragraph 77 below). The court further held that the present case was in substance identical to cases already examined by it, and that there were no grounds to reach a different conclusion on the nature of the Management Plan. The court explained that the applicant company could only raise the issue of the lawfulness of the Government Resolution in the context of an individual case regarding violation of its specific rights (by complaining against an individual legal act, by which the Government Resolution and the decisions of the Management Plan would be implemented). It could then ask the court examining that case to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court. The applicant company\u2019s request to organise the procedure to amend the Management Plan so that it included the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone was dismissed because the applicant company had failed to address the authorities or the courts after the approval of the Management Plan. 30.  The applicant company then applied for the reopening of the proceedings. On 3 April 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected its application on the grounds that the applicant company\u2019s claims had been dismissed for being outside the administrative court\u2019s jurisdiction and the proceedings could only be reopened if an administrative case had been examined on the merits. 31.  In October 2011 the applicant company asked the authorities which documents were necessary for the proposed renovation work. In November 2011 the authorities replied that it was not clear from the applicant company\u2019s request which building (\u201cspecific, not complex or non\u2011specific\u201d (ypatingas, nesud\u0117tingas ar neypatingas), as defined in the domestic law) it was aiming to renovate. The applicant company had indicated major repair work. The authorities stated that a detailed plan was not necessary, the location of the building to be renovated was not important and a document proving ownership of the land (see paragraph 25 above) was not necessary either. 32.  In May 2013 the Neringa Municipality inspected the applicant company\u2019s buildings and held that they were in a state of disrepair. It requested that the applicant company appoint a person responsible for the maintenance of the buildings before 3 June 2013, remove the damaged parts of the buildings before 1 July 2013 and renovate the buildings before 31 May 2014. 33.  On 30 December 2013 the applicant company asked the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park to issue planning permission to carry out major repair work in order to renovate the buildings. The same month the applicant company received a response that permission could not be issued because it would be contrary to the Management Plan of 6 June 2012 (see paragraph 26 above). 34.  The applicant company instituted court proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court against the decision of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park of 30 December 2013 (see paragraph 33 above). It urged the court to order the authority to issue the planning permission required for it to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR 48,489 in respect of pecuniary damage for the land tax and property tax it had paid between 2000 and 2014. 35.  In the course of proceedings the applicant company submitted a draft friendly settlement agreement to be concluded by the State, proposing that the State compensate it for the removal of the buildings by providing the applicant company with lease rights to State-owned land measuring 0.7685 hectares in Neringa with construction rights. The State representative refused to agree to the proposal because it was in breach of domestic law (see paragraph 63 below). 36.  On 14 November 2016 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the refusal of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park to issue the planning permission required to carry out major repair work was in accordance with the relevant domestic law. The applicant company also asked the court to refer the question of whether the Management Plan was in accordance with the Constitution to the Constitutional Court. The court acknowledged that the authority\u2019s decision had lacked a seal of approval but held that that shortcoming could not be regarded as grounds to overrule the decision. The court also held that the authority had not acted unlawfully, so there were no grounds for awarding the applicant company pecuniary damages. Moreover, domestic law did not require that the Management Plan contain a compensation mechanism for the buildings to be \u201cremoved\u201d. However, the Management Plan in question indicated that an area in Juodkrant\u0117 had been designated to compensate for the losses incurred by the lawful owners of the buildings to be removed. Thus the Management Plan provided for the opportunity to compensate for possible losses. As regards the referral to the Constitutional Court, the court held that the applicant company had mistakenly stated that the decision to remove the buildings had only been indicated in the Management Plan. The court stated that it was a commonly known fact that the applicant company\u2019s buildings had been earmarked for removal at the time the purchase agreement had been concluded, and the applicant company, as a diligent legal entity, should have assessed the legal status of the buildings and the restrictions on their use. The legitimate expectations of the applicant company had not been breached as it had not proved the need to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court. The court also pointed out that the buildings had not been taken from the applicant company for the needs of society (see paragraph 45 below). However, when using them the applicant company had to follow the legal regulations, which established that construction in the area in question was not allowed and that it was attempting to protect its rights in the wrong way. The decision that had had legal consequences for the applicant company had been the decision to privatise the buildings and to sell them to the applicant company. 37.  In December 2016 the applicant company appealed and asked the Supreme Administrative Court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court; to overrule the decision of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park of 30 December 2013; to order the authority to issue the applicant company with the planning permission required to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR 48,489 in respect of pecuniary damage. The proceedings are still ongoing. 38.  On 15 April 2015 the Government adopted Resolution No. 389 approving the start of the amendment of the Management Plan. One of the purposes set out in the resolution was to combine the interests of the State and municipalities with those of the relevant natural and legal persons. 39.  In June 2016 the applicant company submitted its proposals, namely that the area in which its buildings were located be included in the landscape management zone and that the buildings there should not exceed one storey with an attic. If the proposal to redevelop the land were maintained, the applicant company wanted a clear decision on time-limits for redevelopment and a compensation mechanism. 40.  On 20 June 2016 the Protected Areas Service indicated that the land on which the applicant company\u2019s buildings were sited was not affected by the amendment of the Management Plan. It also indicated that the reply could be appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Disputes Commission (\u201cthe commission\u201d) or to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court in one month from its reception. 41.  In July 2016 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the commission about the reply of the Protected Areas Service (see paragraph 40 above). The applicant company stated that it had paid EUR 41,887 in land tax and EUR 22,795 in property tax between 2000 and 2014. It also stated that although the Management Plan had entered into force in 2012, it had not been proven that removing the buildings was necessary in the interests of society. There had also been no indications about the exact time-limits and procedure for the removal of the buildings. The applicant company thus asked the commission to overrule the decision of the Protected Areas Service of 20 June 2016 and to order it to amend the Management Plan in accordance with the applicant company\u2019s proposals. 42.  In August 2016 the commission closed the case, stating that the issue was not within its competence. The applicant company appealed against that decision, claiming that it had been formal and lacked reasoning, and that the commission had ignored the fact that the Protected Areas Service\u2019s reply of 20 June 2016 had indicated that it was amenable to appeal before the administrative courts or the commission (see paragraph 40 above). 43.  On 15 December 2016 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal. It held that the applicant company had been represented by professional lawyers and the mere fact that the Protected Areas Service had erroneously indicated that its decisions were amenable to appeal did not discharge the applicant company of the obligation to follow the appeal procedure as laid down in domestic law (see paragraph 50 below). The court held that the applicant company had to address the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate with its complaint. 44.  In January 2017 the applicant company appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court. The proceedings are still ongoing.", "references": ["5", "6", "2", "1", "0", "8", "4", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act. 10.  The applicant is a political activist and a member of an opposition movement called Levyy Front. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to participate in the demonstration and, according to him, did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his customary activities, including taking part in authorised public events. 11.  On 10 June 2012 the applicant was detained on suspicion of participation in acts of mass disorder and committing violent acts against the police on 6 May 2012. On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow held a hearing on the investigating authorities\u2019 request to detain the applicant pending the completion of the criminal investigation. In view of the need to provide additional evidence in support of the request, the court adjourned the hearing and authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for seventy\u2011two hours. 12.  On 14 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 10 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not preclude his being detained. The District Court concluded that the applicant, faced with the risk of a prison term, might obstruct the proper administration of justice or abscond. 13.  On 19 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Article 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of having thrown an unidentified solid object towards the police. 14.  On 11 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 14 June 2012. 15.  On 8 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a request for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant requested to be released, arguing that all the necessary investigative acts had already been carried out. He presented personal guarantees from two State Duma deputies in support of an undertaking by him to appear before the investigating authorities and the courts for examination of his case. The applicant also requested his release on health grounds and submitted a medical document from 2004 which showed that he had a number of eye conditions. 16.  On the same day the District Court granted an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 6 November 2012. It relied on the reasons for and the nature of the crime which had been committed, which gave sufficient grounds to presume that the applicant might reoffend, influence and threaten witnesses and other participants of the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. In addition, the applicant had negative reports related to his place of residence. In particular, he had no permanent employment or family and had been repeatedly brought to administrative responsibility. His state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. Lastly, the court held that in view of the above circumstances the custodial measure could not be replaced by a more lenient preventive measure. 17.  On 12 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 8 August 2012. 18.  On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new request for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that his detention was detrimental to his health, in particular his eyesight. He referred again to the personal guarantees of two State Duma deputies in support of his request for a milder preventive measure. On the same day the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2013. The court referred to the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offence imputed to the applicant, along with information about his personality, namely that he had no permanent employment or regular source of income and had negative reports from his place of residence. 19.  On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated. The classification of the offence remained unchanged. According to the new indictment, between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square unidentified persons had called those present to move outside the agreed meeting area and to disobey lawful police orders, leading to mass disorder accompanied by violence against public officials. Between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m. that day the applicant had taken part in acts of mass disorder, in particular, he had repeatedly shouted anti-government slogans. During that period of time the participants of the mass disorder threw pieces of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police, which hit them on various parts of their body. The applicant, no later than at 8 p.m., found a flagpole and threw it at an unidentified police officer, hitting him in the chest. 20.  On 26 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 29 October 2012. 21.  On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 10 June 2013. It stressed the complexity of the case, reiterated the grounds given in the previous orders and noted that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. The applicant asked to be released on bail and presented personal guarantees from a well\u2011known writer and two directors of prominent NGOs, but the court considered that a milder preventive measure could not be applied. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 3 April 2013. 22.  On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request to extend the applicant\u2019s detention and set a new term of 6 July 2013 on the same grounds as previously. 23.  On 16 May 2013 the Moscow City Court examined an appeal by the applicant against its decision of 23 April 2013 and reversed it on the grounds that the prosecutor\u2019s office would have enough time to bring an indictment by 10 June 2013, adding that after that date the trial court could consider a new extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 24.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 25.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that \u201cthe reasons which had initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The court also pointed out that the applicant\u2019s state of health was not incompatible with his being kept in custody. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 2 July 2013. 26.  On 18 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began the trial in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. 27.  The applicant made an application for release during a court hearing on 6 August 2013 but it was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day. 28.  On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation submitted a complaint to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court about the extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and requested an alternative preventive measure for him. 29.  On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman\u2019s request. 30.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of ten defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 31.  On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act which applied, inter alia, to pending criminal proceedings against people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 32.  On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention. 33.  The applicant has moderate myopia, complex myopic astigmatism and a congenital coloboma of the choroid. 34.  From 23 June 2012 to 17 September 2012 and from 4 November 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/5 in Moscow. Upon his arrival there he was given a medical check which did not reveal any health issues. 35.  In IZ-77/5 the applicant was detained in cells 320 (until 29 June 2012), 406 (until 17 September 2012, then from 4 to 30 November 2012), 509 (until 10 December 2012), 506 (until 19 June 2013), and 507 (until 29 June 2013). 36.  The cells had the following characteristics: 37.  The parties agreed that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceeded the design capacity. They also agreed that the size of the cells and the number of detainees had allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 38.  The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in the cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, were excessively hot in the summer and cold in the winter, they all had a lavatory pan which was separated from the living space by a plastic partition to chin level, which did not provide enough privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke and that although the window in the cell could be opened, it overlooked a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish and had let in fumes. There was therefore a constant lack of fresh air in the cell, which the ventilation system could not compensate for. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also stated that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. Finally, he alleged that the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for access to drinking water. 39.  According to the Government, the cells were equipped with ventilation; the state of the sanitary facilities had been satisfactory; the cells had been cleaned and bedding changed once a week; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise per day; and the cells had been disinfected and subjected to pest control monthly. They provided measurement tables for the remand prison, which had been created in August 2013. They showed that the level of light in the cells in which the applicant had been detained had ranged between 152 and 264 lux, the standard being 150 lux. The temperature in the cells had measured between 26oC and 28oC and humidity between 41% and 47%, while the permissible level was up to 28oC and 65% respectively. The Government also noted that detainees had access to a gym upon a written request. 40.  On 11 July 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested that the head of the remand prison order a medical examination for the applicant. He alleged that there had been a rapid deterioration of his eyesight. 41.  On 16 July 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about excessive heat in his cell and a deterioration of his eyesight. 42.  On 30 July 2012 the applicant requested that the head of the remand prison organise a medical examination owing to his worsening eyesight. 43.  On 27 August 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist. He was diagnosed with severe myopia, amblyopia, esotropia, and a congenital coloboma of the iris. The doctor noted that the applicant had last been examined in October 2004 and recommended that he have a special examination to determine his disability status (\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043a\u043e-\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430). 44.  On 8 November 2012 the chief of IZ-77/5 requested another ophthalmologic consultation, repeating the applicant\u2019s complaints about the deterioration of his eyesight. 45.  On 23 November 2012 the applicant was taken for another outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who concluded that there were no negative developments in his state of health. The doctor also recommended that he have eye tests once a year. 46.  On 13 December 2012 the applicant underwent the special examination for recognition of the status of being disabled, which he was refused. 47.  On 29 March and 19 April 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about the poor quality of his mattress and the deterioration of his eyesight. 48.  On 17 September 2012 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ-77/1 in Moscow (\u041c\u0430\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0442\u0438\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0430), which had a medical wing. The applicant remained there until 4 November 2012 and underwent a series of medical examinations, including blood tests, an echography, a chest photofluorography and an electrocardiogram. 49.  According to the applicant, the prison cell measured 4 by 3.5 square metres and housed four inmates, including himself. The window measured 1.75 by 0.5 metres and was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. The artificial light was dim and flickering and was turned on even at night. There was no mechanical ventilation and the cell was damp, with broken window panes letting in the cold. A shower was allowed once a week and the toilet was only separated from the rest of the cell by a low wall. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day and the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for getting access to drinking water. 50.  According to the certificate issued by the prison governor on 13 November 2013, the applicant was held in cell 707 in IZ-77/1. That cell had measured 16 square metres and had housed four inmates, including the applicant. The cell had one window measuring 115 by 170 cm and the state of the glazing was inspected every day and fixed whenever necessary. The temperature in the cell had been maintained at 18oC. Artificial light was provided by a fluorescent lamp with two 40-watt tubes from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. and by a 40-watt lamp during the night, in line with requirements. The windows had no shutters, only a metal grill with 20-mm metal bars; the size of the mesh was 100 by 200 mm. Inmates had to clean the cell each day with chlorine bleach and detergent provided by the facility. The applicant had been able to shower once a week for fifteen minutes. The cell had been disinfected and subjected to pest control measures regularly. 51.  On 16 October 2012 the applicant was examined by a commission of four doctors, including an ophthalmologist. They issued a report which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n\u201c... According to the [the applicant\u2019s] medical documents, dated from 1997 to 2004, [he had been diagnosed with] medium myopia, complex myopic astigmatism, a congenital coloboma of the choroid, and a vascular congenital coloboma of the iris. Partial optic atrophy.\nAccording to the results of the medical examination in [IZ-77/1] carried out on 5 October 2012 [he has] high myopia of the right eye. High-degree amblyopia of the left eye, esotropia. A congenital coloboma of the iris [and] of the choroid.\n...\nThere have been no negative developments compared with the previous evaluation reports (medical examinations).\u201d 52.  On 31 October 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/1 to check the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention. Its report read as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] is being held in a cell in the remand prison\u2019s medical wing. There are two other detainees in the cell. The cell is one of the worst in the medical wing of [IZ-77/1]. It is cold, the radiator is lukewarm and the glass in the hinged window is broken. The cell has not been renovated for a long time. Dirty, scuffed walls. There is no refrigerator or television, the radio socket is broken. [The applicant] complains that he has not received any treatment in the hospital for three weeks. The medical wing of the remand prison has no ophthalmologist and he was taken for a consultation to the [city hospital] ... According to the chief physician of the medical wing ... [the applicant] had 10% sight in one eye and 20% sight in the other. But the prison doctors could not recommend his release ... because only totally blind detainees are eligible.\n... [The applicant\u2019s] detention is detrimental to his health, his eyesight is deteriorating as each day goes by: the light is always on in the cell, day and night. The light is dim; that is bad for his eyesight.\n...\nThe members of the [commission] consider that [the applicant\u2019s] detention ... is a way to pressure him into giving the evidence the investigation wants. [He] risks losing his remaining eyesight. It is evident that he has been placed in the worst cell, cold and damp, instead of being treated in the hospital. He has been deprived of the possibility to receive visits from his family and has found himself in an information vacuum, without any television, radio or press. No adequate treatment or medical care.\u201d 53.  On 2 November 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the previous diagnoses and identified no change in the applicant\u2019s condition. 54.  The discharge summary (\u0432\u044b\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0440\u0438\u0437) issued on 4 November 2012 contained the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations carried out in IZ-77/1. The head of the prison\u2019s medical wing concluded that they did not reveal the presence of any of the serious conditions which were listed as being incompatible with custody and there were thus no obstacles to the applicant\u2019s detention. 55.  On 30 June 2013 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ-77/2 in Moscow (\u0411\u0443\u0442\u044b\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0442\u044e\u0440\u044c\u043c\u0430) where he was held until his release on 19 December 2013. 56.  In IZ-77/2 the applicant was detained in cells 52 (until 7 July 2013), 01-a (until 12 July 2013), 703 (until 2 September 2013), 332 (until 19 September 2013), and 327 (apparently until his release). 57.  The cells had the following characteristics: 58.  According to the applicant, the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, especially because of a lack of regular outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. In particular, the lavatory pan was only separated from the living space by a chest-high partition which did not provide sufficient privacy. In addition, the applicant did not take a shower after his transfer to IZ-77/2 until at least 30 July 2013, as he indicated in his letter. 59.  According to the Government, the conditions in the cells at IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell, which provided the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were disinfected and subjected to a pest control procedure once every three months or whenever necessary; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise daily; the cell had been cleaned and the bedding changed weekly; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window. Artificial light was provided from a 100-watt bulb by day and a 75-watt bulb by night. The glazing of the windows let in sufficient daylight. 60.  On 12 July 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical wing of IZ\u201177/2 for an additional examination and adjustment of his treatment. He had been discharged on 18 July 2013 after refusing further treatment. 61.  According to a statement of 7 November 2013 issued by IZ-77/2, the applicant\u2019s state of health had been satisfactory and doctors had recommended that he have regular consultations with an ophthalmologist. 62.  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back was identical to that in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-73). 63.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 and in the end of July moved to hearing room no. 635 at the Moscow City Court. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, which was equipped with metal cages. 64.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 74-77).", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "0", "7", "9", "6", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Sarajevo. 5.  By its decision of 3 August 2004, and at the recommendation of the Sarajevo Psychiatric Clinic (the \u201cPsychiatric Clinic\u201d), the Sarajevo Municipal Court instituted proceedings for the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric facility. 6.  On 18 August 2004, the Sarajevo Municipal Court decided to keep the applicant in the Psychiatric Clinic for a maximum of 45 days (counting from the date of his placement, that is 1 August 2004). 7.  On 22 September 2004 the Sarajevo Canton Social Care Centre (the \u201cSocial Care Centre\u201d) placed the applicant in the Drin Social Care Home (the \u201cDrin Home\u201d). 8.  On 7 January 2005, the Sarajevo Municipal Court deprived the applicant of his legal capacity. 9.  On 10 March 2005 the Social Care Centre placed the applicant under the guardianship of D.M., one of its employees. Several other employees were subsequently appointed as the applicant\u2019s successive guardians. 10.  By its decisions of 25 February 2010 and 25 December 2014, the Social Care Centre decided that the applicant should remain in the Drin Home. 11.  On 16 September 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d) held that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty had not been \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as he had been held in psychiatric detention without a decision of a competent civil court. It also found that Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention had been breached because of the lack of judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention. The Constitutional Court ordered the Social Care Centre to take measures to ensure respect for the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention. 12.  On 7 December 2015, the Sarajevo Municipal Court restored the applicant\u2019s legal capacity. 13.  The applicant was released from the Drin Home on 14 December 2015. 14.  At the applicant\u2019s request, the Social Care Centre again admitted him to the Drin Home, between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016. 15.  The applicant requested an extension of his stay in social care, which request was granted on 1 April 2016. The applicant was thus placed in the Social and Health Care Home for Persons with Disabilities and Other Persons (the \u201cSocial and Health Care Home\u201d). 16.  The applicant died on 26 September 2016, while in the Social and Health Care Home.", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "6", "8", "9", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in St Petersburg. 5.  According to the applicant, in 1994 she moved in with her partner, N., who lived in a flat in St Petersburg of which he was the sole owner. 6.  The applicant alleged that on 7 April 1998 her partner had borrowed 18,000 United States dollars from her for a period of two years. He had undertaken to give her his flat if he failed to repay her. 7.  In 1998 the applicant was registered as living in that flat and lived there with N. for the following fifteen years. They never married. 8.  On 9 May 2013 N. died intestate. 9.  In October 2013 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking to have her property rights over her partner\u2019s flat acknowledged on account of usucaption. 10.  On 17 June 2014 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims, having found that although she had lived in the flat since 1994, there were no grounds to acknowledge her property rights to that flat on account of usucaption. 11.  On 30 September 2014 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld that judgment. 12.  On 4 March 2015 a judge of the City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant to the court of cassation. 13.  In 2015 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg (\u201cthe district administration\u201d) brought court proceedings against the applicant, seeking her eviction from the flat. The administration claimed that the flat was an heirless estate and therefore the property rights to it had to be transferred to the administration. The district administration, as the new owner of the flat, had the right to seek the applicant\u2019s eviction in accordance with Article 304 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. 14.  The applicant contested those claims on the following grounds:\n -  she and N. had been living in the flat since 1994 as husband and wife;\n -  she had shared a common household with N.;\n -  N. had let her live in the flat as his family member;\n -  she had been paying the charges for the flat;\n -  she had no other housing. 15.  On 23 November 2015 the District Court refused to evict the applicant from the flat. The court found, with reference to Article 31 of the Housing Code, that N. had let the applicant live in the flat as a family member, and until his death had shared a common household with her. Therefore, after N.\u2019s death the applicant had not lost the right to live in the flat. 16.  In its appeal against that judgment the district administration submitted that it had become the owner of the flat on 10 May 2013 following the death of the applicant\u2019s partner. Therefore the applicant\u2019s right to use that flat had come to an end on the same date. The district administration asked the appeal court to quash the judgment of 23 November 2015 and to issue a new decision granting its eviction claim against the applicant. 17.  On 25 April 2016 the City Court quashed the judgment of 23 November 2015 and ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction from the flat. The City Court held as follows:\n\u201c...\nThe owner of the flat in question, Mr Nikolayev A.A., who had let the defendant live in [the flat], died on 9 May 2013.\n...\nTaking into account that none of the heirs of Mr Nikolayev A.A. had come into an inheritance, ..., the property right to flat no. 20 at 11, Marshal Novikov street in St Petersburg, which was a heirless estate, had been transferred to the city of St Petersburg from the moment the inheritance had been opened, and in accordance with the law it belongs to social housing which is managed by the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg.\n...\nMrs Valdgardt Ye.V. [the applicant] had been allowed to live in the flat by the former owner. However, following the death of the owner and the transfer of the property rights in respect of the flat to the City of St Petersburg pursuant to Article 292 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the right of Mrs Valdgardt to use the contested flat had come to an end.\nTaking into account that there are no legal grounds which would allow Mrs Valdgardt to continue living in the flat and also because the defendant had not vacated the flat voluntarily, the claims of the administration of the Primorskiy District to evict the defendant from the residential premises should be granted ...\u201d 18.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the presidium of the City Court. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had not taken into account that she was in need of housing and had been put on a municipal housing list. 19.  On 15 July 2016 a judge of the City Court refused to refer the applicant\u2019s appeal to the cassation court. The judge noted, in particular, that the fact that the applicant was on a housing list had no legal relevance for the case. 20.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had failed to examine the proportionality of her eviction in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 21.  On 22 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the cassation court. 22.  On 5 April 2017 the District Court issued a writ of execution. 23.  On 15 May 2017 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. 24.  On an unspecified date the bailiffs service informed the applicant that if the writ of execution was not enforced by 8.30 a.m. on 26 July 2017, a forced eviction would be carried out at 9 a.m. on 26 July 2017 with the assistance of the police and bailiffs.", "references": ["7", "2", "1", "6", "8", "5", "3", "0", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Belebey, Republic of Bashkortostan. 5.  In October 2007 the applicant and his family moved from Uzbekistan to Russia, apparently for the purpose of obtaining Russian nationality as well as seeking medical treatment for the applicant\u2019s drug addiction. 6.  In December 2007 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant with large-scale drug-trafficking committed in October 2007 and issued a detention order and an international search warrant. 7.  On 12 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and on 14 July 2008 the Dragomilovskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition, without setting any time-limit. 8.  On 9 December 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition. 9.  On 28 January 2009 the Moscow City Court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention, and upheld the extradition. 10.  In the meantime, on 4 March 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 28 January 2009. 11.  On 10 August 2009 the applicant issued an authority form to lawyers to lodge an application with the Court on his behalf. 12.  On 21 August 2009 the extradition order was enforced and the applicant was transferred to Uzbekistan. 13.  On 28 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyers \u2013 who were apparently unaware of the extradition \u2212 requested an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to stay the removal. On 1 September 2009 the Court indicated the relevant measure to the Russian Government. 14.  However, after the Russian Government had informed the Court about the extradition on 21 August 2009, the interim measure was lifted on 7 October 2009. 15.  The parties submitted no information on related events in Uzbekistan. 16.  On an unspecified date the applicant joined his family in Russia.", "references": ["5", "8", "3", "7", "4", "9", "1", "0", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Khorly. 6.  At the material time the applicant was the head of Khorly Village Council. 7.  On 8 May 2007 he signed a permit allowing a businessman, Ya., to set up a tent with game machines in the village. This permit had no official stamp on it. According to the applicant, it was not stamped because the council\u2019s accountant was away on a work matter and had the stamp with her. However, according to the court findings in the criminal case against the applicant (see below), the applicant told Ya. that the permit would be stamped upon receipt of 20,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH \u2013 approximately 3,800 euros (EUR)). 8.  On 14 May 2007 Ya. complained to the police. On the same day he was given audio and video-recording equipment and marked banknotes. When he entered the applicant\u2019s office the applicant showed him a piece of paper with something written on it, pointed to the bus stop outside his window and said \u201cThere is a man out there\u201d. Ya. went to the bus stop and gave money to V., who was standing there. Later, police officers seized the marked banknotes from V. in the presence of I. and L. 9.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for requesting a bribe. 10.  At 7 p.m. on 14 May 2007 the applicant was arrested. 11.  On 16 May 2007 the applicant was charged with taking a bribe. 12.  On 17 May 2007 the Komsomolskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s custody until 24 May 2007. The court held that there was no information about the applicant\u2019s previous convictions, if any, or his family situation, state of health and so on; therefore the court \u201ccould not authorise a preventive measure, such as pre-trial detention\u201d. That decision was not open to appeal. 13.  On 22 May 2007 the District Court remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention, since he had been accused of a serious crime and might abscond, hinder the investigation or continue his criminal activity. 14.  The applicant appealed. His lawyer indicated that, when requesting that the applicant be remanded in custody, the prosecutor\u2019s office had failed to comply with the court decision of 17 May 2007 (see paragraph 12 above), and had submitted only documents referring to the absence of previous convictions and the applicant\u2019s satisfactory state of health. The lawyer further argued that the applicant had not committed any crime, there were no indications that he would abscond or hinder the investigation, his state of health was not satisfactory, and that council members and village inhabitants had signed a petition for his release. 15.  On 1 June 2007 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 22 May 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The court noted that the case file contained material confirming the applicant\u2019s wish \u201cto go to Russia to his brother\u201d. It also noted that he might hinder the investigation by using his official position. 16.  On 27 July 2007 the District Court released the applicant on bail. 17.  On 16 January 2008 the District Court again remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention at the prosecutor\u2019s request. The relevant decision reads as follows:\n\u201cOn 16 January 2008 the Komsomolskiy District Court of Kerson ... established:\nThe criminal case concerning the accusation of [the applicant] under Article 368 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is pending before the Komsomolskiy District Court of Kherson.\nThe prosecutor requested that the preventive measure against [the applicant] be changed in view of the fact that [the applicant], using publications in ... newspaper, is putting pressure on witnesses in the case (K. and A.) who have not yet been questioned by the trial court. [This] could affect the truthfulness of their testimony and their appearance before the court. In the hearing, the prosecutor further provided additional evidence to confirm the fact of [the applicant\u2019s] putting pressure on I., a witness, and the victim, Ya.\nHaving heard the prosecutor\u2019s explanations, as well as [the applicant] and his lawyers, the court finds that the application has to be allowed on the following grounds.\n[The applicant] is accused of having committed a crime under Article 386 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The sanction established for the crime is imprisonment for the period from five to nine years. On 27 July 2007 bail ... was chosen as a preventive measure in respect of [the applicant].\nPursuant to Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preventive measures shall be applied to a defendant with the aim of preventing attempts ... to obstruct the truth from being established in a criminal case. ... Preventive measures shall be applied if there are sufficient grounds to consider that the defendant will try to abscond from the trial or obstruct the truth from being established in a case.\n[The applicant] has no criminal record, has committed a serious crime linked to his professional activity as the head of Khorol Village Council, is currently removed from his position and accordingly is not able to continue his criminal activity, [and] is well thought of at his place of work and place of residence. However, the court believes that [the applicant], acting through unidentified individuals, has taken steps aimed at obstructing the truth from being established in the case in the course of the court\u2019s consideration of his case.\nThus, according to statements of 28 December 2007 made by the victim, Ya., and I., a witness, unknown individuals acting on [the applicant\u2019s] behalf, have put psychological pressure on them, trying to prevent their appearing at the hearing of 29 December 2007.\nThe above-mentioned fact is evidence of a breach by [the applicant] of his undertakings.\nBearing in mind that the court proceedings in the criminal case are still ongoing, that K. and A., witnesses, have not yet been questioned, and that there may be a need for additional questioning of I., a witness, and Ya., the victim, the court believes that the prosecutor\u2019s application is well-founded and should be granted in order to prevent further possible pressure [being put] on the witnesses and the victim, and thus to eliminate obstacles to establishing the truth in the case ...\nGiven what has been stated above, ... the court rules to change the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] ... \u201d 18.  On the same date the President of the District Court rejected an application by the applicant\u2019s lawyer for the judge who was dealing with the case to be withdrawn on the basis of bias. He held that the expression \u201chas committed a serious crime\u201d used by the court concerned \u201cthe classification of the offence of which the applicant was accused\u201d, and did not mean that the court was biased. 19.  On 23 January 2008 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal refused the applicant leave to appeal against the decision of 16 January 2008 remanding him in pre-trial detention (see paragraph 17 above), since that decision was not open to appeal. 20.  On 15 and 22 February 2008 the applicant unsuccessfully asked the court to change the preventive measure to a non-custodial one. 21.  On 29 February 2008 the District Court released the applicant on bail. It found that Ya. and I. had complained on 28 December 2007 to the police that that they had been threatened by individuals unknown to them. However, by 29 February 2008 no further investigation of this allegation had been carried out by the police, so it was decided that the applicant should be released. 22.  On 16 April 2008 the District Court sentenced the applicant to five years\u2019 imprisonment for taking a bribe. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the principle of the presumption of innocence had been breached in his case. 23.  On 24 June 2008 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment. 24.  On 26 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. 25.  The applicant served his sentence at Dariyivska Correctional Colony no. 10 (\u201cthe prison\u201d) from 16 July 2008 to 14 March 2011. According to the applicant, there were up to ninety inmates in the living quarters. There was no ventilation. The washing facilities were situated in the basement, which was constantly flooded by underground water. There were five basins and three taps for 300 detainees. There was no electricity or light at night. The food was of a very low quality and the water was undrinkable. 26.  According to the Government, the applicant was held in a block which measured 271.7 square metres and was designed to accommodate up to ninety prisoners, thus each prisoner had no less than 3 square metres of personal space. They did not provide any facts or comments with respect to the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaint.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "9", "8", "4", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant company, S.C. Textinc S.A., is a Romanian company whose registered office is in Timi\u015foara. 5.  On 12 December 2008 the Timi\u015foara Finance Inspectorate (hereinafter, \u201cthe T.F.I.\u201d) instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant company on the grounds that it had an outstanding tax liability for the year 2008 amounting to 237,128 Romanian lei (RON). 6.  The applicant company, represented by its appointed lawyer, Mr. P. S\u0103l\u0103jan, challenged before the Timi\u015foara District Court the T.F.I.\u2019s decision to open enforcement proceedings. It claimed that it had no outstanding fiscal debts and submitted documentary evidence in this respect. 7.  At the first hearing in the proceedings the T.F.I. acknowledged that the applicant company had no outstanding tax liability and that the enforcement proceedings had been instituted in error. Invoking Article 275 of the Romanian Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter, \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 15 below), it also contended that as it had acknowledged its error at the first hearing in the proceedings it should not be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company. 8.  By a judgment of 16 February 2009 the Timi\u015foara District Court allowed the applicant company\u2019s challenge concerning the T.F.I.\u2019s decision to open enforcement proceedings and ordered the T.F.I. to pay the applicant RON 9,893; this sum represented respectively the fees of the applicant company\u2019s lawyer (9,700 RON), stamp duty and trial tax (193 RON). The court held that although the T.F.I. had acknowledged its error at the first hearing it could not be exonerated from the payment of the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company, as the challenge proceedings were the result of a mistake on its part. The court further noted that the T.F.I. had started enforcement proceedings against the applicant company for a non-existent debt and that the latter had accordingly had to hire a lawyer and pay the trial fees in order to defend itself. The court also noted that the applicant company had submitted evidence to support its request for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred. 9.  The T.F.I. lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 16 February 2009. It claimed that the first-instance court had not observed the principle of adversarial proceedings and of equality of arms, as it had not had the opportunity to challenge the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer\u2019s fees, which in its opinion were too high. 10.  By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timi\u015f County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer\u2019s fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer\u2019s fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timi\u015foara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 11.  The T.F.I. lodged with the Timi\u015f County Court an application for the judgment of 12 August 2009 to be set aside (contesta\u0163ie \u00een anulare \u2013 see paragraph 14 below) on the grounds that the County Court had not examined all the arguments that it had raised in its appeal on points of law; the T.F.I. referred in particular to the fact that before the Timi\u015foara District Court they were not given the possibility to bring their arguments concerning the amount requested by the applicant company and then awarded in legal costs and expenses by the first-instance court. 12.  In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timi\u015f County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 \u00a7 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court\u2019s view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments. 13.  The County Court then re-examined the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer\u2019s fees and considered that in relation to the lawyer\u2019s input in the case, it was justified to reduce that amount from RON 9700 to RON 700. It also considered that the stamp duty and trial tax in the amount of 193 RON were not to be granted to the applicant company, in so far as this amount could be requested separately from the fiscal authorities, based on the Law no. 146/1997 on stamp duty, as a consequence of the fact that the challenge to the enforcement had been allowed.", "references": ["8", "2", "0", "4", "9", "7", "1", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is serving a prison sentence in M\u00edrov Prison. 5.  On 8 April 2004 the applicant initiated civil proceedings for protection of his personality rights (\u201cthe main proceedings\u201d) against the Czech Republic in the person of the Ministry of Justice (no. 37 C 51/2004). On 28 March 2008 the Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The Prague High Court (vrchn\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal by the applicant on 20 October 2008 and the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law on 15 April 2010. 6.  On 12 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act (Act no. 82/1998) from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings. As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the six-month statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action on 18 December 2007 (proceedings no. 17 C 204/2007). 7.  On 18 December 2009 the Prague 2 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud) acknowledged that there had been delays in the main proceedings and awarded the applicant 30,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (1,140 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and dismissed the rest of the claim. 8.  On 15 September 2010 the Prague Municipal Court amended the lower court\u2019s judgment by dismissing the whole financial claim, leaving the rest of the judgment intact. It found that the applicant had not suffered any non-pecuniary damage on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings. 9.  On 30 November 2011 the Supreme Court, upon an appeal on points of law by the applicant, quashed the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case to it. On 11 April 2012 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for financial compensation but acknowledged that his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time had been violated in the main proceedings. Given the high number of lawsuits brought by the applicant, the court concluded that the finding of a violation was sufficient redress for the non-pecuniary damage caused to him. The court also saw no need to award him damages on account of the length of the compensation proceedings, as the applicant had requested, considering that they had not been unreasonably long. 10.  On 12 August 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant, stating, inter alia:\n\u201cThe Supreme Court pointed out in its previous cassation judgment in this case that, without providing any further reasons, it cannot be concluded that the fact that a plaintiff has initiated a large number of disputes ... means that the presumption of non-pecuniary damage caused by excessively long proceedings has been rebutted.\n...\nThe fact that an injured person has instigated a large number of judicial disputes can have an impact on his approach to a particular set of proceedings; for example, he may fail to respond to the court\u2019s requests on time, pay court fees on time, remedy shortcomings in his submissions on time and such like, thus he may not pay proper attention to the proceedings. Such conduct may show that the subject matter of the proceedings is of lesser importance for the injured person and it may be taken into consideration under the criterion of the injured person\u2019s conduct.... Nonetheless, even if there are no such circumstances on the part of the injured person, it is not possible to wholly ignore the fact that the plaintiff has initiated a large number of judicial disputes. It puts him in a different position as regards the perception of the degree of damage caused by the excessive length of one of the disputes compared to the position of a person participating in only one or only a few judicial proceedings (compare, in similar terms, the European Court of Human Rights inadmissibility decision in the case of Havelka v. the Czech Republic, of 20 September 2011, applications nos. 7332/10, 42666/10 and 61523/10, and the decision of the Supreme Court of 4 June 2013, no. 30 Cdo 1042/2013).\nAs to the appellant\u2019s complaint that the court of appeal should have taken the length of the compensation proceedings themselves into account when determining redress, it must be admitted that the base amount of compensation can indeed be increased if compensation proceedings are themselves excessively long and a plaintiff requests an increase in compensation on those grounds (part VI. of the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion of 13 April 2011, no. Cpjn 206/2010 ...). However, in its judgment of 14 November 2011, no. 30 Cdo 3340/2011, the Supreme Court added that if in the proceedings concerned the procedure under Article 118 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) has been followed, the application of the possibility to increase compensation is limited by the rules for submitting new facts and modifying the initial action in the proceedings before the court of first instance; the same applies in similar fashion to appeal proceedings (see Article 205a \u00a7 1 and Article 2016 \u00a7 2 of the CCP). Thus, an injured person has to raise an objection about the length of compensation proceedings pending the effects of concentration in the particular proceedings. In the present case, the appellant raised a claim for compensation for the length of the compensation proceedings only in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court, in a submission of 11 April 2012 (file page 128) ... so it was an inadmissible new claim.\u201d 11.  On 24 April 2014 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) dismissed a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) by the applicant. 12.  In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation (no. 23 C 149/2012) for non-pecuniary damage for the excessive length of the first set of compensation proceedings (no. 17 C 204/2007). He later began proceedings for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the second set of compensation proceedings too (no. 22 C 204/2015). 13.  On 19 September 2003 the applicant brought a civil action against the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court under the State Liability Act. He claimed compensation for an allegedly illegal search of his house on 6 March 2001. 14.  On 4 November 2004 he was asked to remedy shortcomings in his action, which he did on 16 November 2004. 15.  On 21 March 2005 the District Court decided the case was not in its jurisdiction and referred it to the Prague 2 District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Prague Municipal Court upheld the jurisdiction decision on 20 December 2005. 16.  On 24 January 2007 the District Court appointed a legal representative for the applicant. On 6 June and 20 September 2007 and 4 January 2008 the applicant supplemented his action. 17.  On 26 March 2008 the District Court asked the Prague 3 District Court to send it the criminal case file concerning the house search at issue. 18.  The District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action on 21 December 2009 after a hearing on 16 December 2009. 19.  On 26 October 2011 the Prague Municipal Court upheld that decision. 20.  On 27 January 2012 the applicant appealed on points of law. On 7 February 2012 he filed a constitutional complaint, which was rejected as premature by the Constitutional Court on 29 May 2012. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on points of law on 11 November 2015, referring, inter alia, to a decision by the Court on the same matter, which had found the complaint manifestly ill-founded (see \u017dirovnick\u00fd v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 7022/06, 5 October 2010). 21.  The applicant subsequently renewed his complaint to the Constitutional Court but it was dismissed on 15 March 2016. 22.  On 8 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no. 18 C 84/2006). As the Ministry did not deal with his request within the six-month statutory time-limit, on 9 December 2007 he brought a civil action before the Prague 7 District Court seeking CZK 8,315.84 (EUR 318) in compensation. 23.  On 20 January 2012 the District Court dismissed the action, considering that the main proceedings had not been unreasonably long. 24.  On 12 December 2012 the Prague Municipal Court upheld the judgment, finding that although the main proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time the applicant could not be awarded compensation because of the lack of significance of the proceedings for him. According to the court, the applicant had abused his right of access to a court by initiating a very large number of legal disputes against the State. 25.  On 18 February 2015 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It noted that even if the applicant had abused his right of access to a court, unreasonably long proceedings might still cause him damage which had to be compensated for by at least a finding of a violation. 26.  On 14 September 2015 the Municipal Court modified the District Court\u2019s judgment by finding a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment. The court refused to deal with a new complaint by the applicant about the length of the compensation proceedings. 27.  On 27 November 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is apparently still under consideration. 28.  In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation (no. 12 C 301/2011) for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initial compensation proceedings and then proceedings for compensation for delays in that second case (no. 22 C 141/2015). 29.  On 15 September 2003 the applicant brought an action for damages against the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court, alleging that he had suffered damage in connection with a \u201cterrorist attack\u201d on his family by police officers on 6 March 2001. 30.  On 28 July 2004 the case was referred to the Prague Municipal Court as the court competent to deal with it at the first instance. 31.  After several decisions on exemption from court fees, the appointment of a legal representative for the applicant and several attempts by the court to procure the related criminal case files, a hearing was held on 28 March 2008, following which the Municipal Court dismissed the action. 32.  On 25 November 2008 the Prague High Court upheld the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant on 31 August 2010. 33.  On 6 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings, no. 34 C 126/2004. As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 13 December 2007, seeking EUR 4,229.64 in compensation. 34.  On 18 March 2010 the District Court dismissed his action, acknowledging that the main proceedings had been unreasonably long, but seeing no necessity to award him financial compensation. 35.  On 16 December 2010 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment, finding it non-reviewable for lack of reasoning, and remitted the case to the District Court. In a judgment of 21 March 2012, the District Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment and dismissed the action regarding financial compensation. According to the court, the finding of a violation constituted adequate redress. It found that awarding him financial compensation would be against good morals, given the circumstances of the case, namely the applicant\u2019s conduct in the main proceedings, the conduct of the courts, the importance of the subject matter of the proceedings for the applicant as well as his character, his relation towards the State and society and his lack of respect for the rights of others. 36.  On 6 December 2012 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment. 37.  On 29 September 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. A subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on 19 February 2015. 38.  Following a plea of nullity by the applicant, the Municipal Court on 10 April 2015 quashed its judgment of 6 December 2012 on the grounds that the applicant had not been able to attend a hearing at the court. 39.  On 19 November 2015 the Municipal Court issued a new judgment, modifying the District Court\u2019s judgment by awarding the applicant CZK 32,400 (EUR 1,200). It found that the length of the compensation proceedings meant that a mere finding of a violation of his rights no longer constituted adequate redress. Having regard to the overall length of the main proceedings, the Municipal Court determined the sum to be awarded to the applicant (CZK 108,000 \u2013 EUR 4,000) and then adjusted it with regard to the length of the compensation proceedings (+20%), procedural difficulties in the main proceedings (-30%) and the importance of what had been at stake for him (-40%). 40.  It appears that the compensation proceedings are still ongoing. 41.  The applicant instituted a further two sets of proceedings related to the compensation claim: one to seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage for delays in the initial compensation proceedings (no. 23 C 163/2012) and one for compensation for the excessive length of that second set of compensation proceedings (no. 29 C 215/2015). 42.  On 15 October 2004 the applicant brought an administrative action against the Ministry of Justice before the Prague Municipal Court, seeking the annulment of Ministry of Justice Decree no. 345/1999 on the rules for imprisonment (vyhl\u00e1\u0161ka Ministerstva spravedlnosti, kterou se vyd\u00e1v\u00e1 \u0159\u00e1d v\u00fdkonu trestu odn\u011bt\u00ed svobody) and the internal rules of Plze\u0148 Prison. 43.  On 11 March 2005 the Municipal Court rejected his action for lack of competence. 44.  Following a cassation complaint (kasa\u010dn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) by the applicant, the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed spr\u00e1vn\u00ed soud) quashed the judgment on 20 September 2006 and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It found that the applicant\u2019s action should have been dismissed (zam\u00edtnuta) rather than rejected (odm\u00edtnuta). 45.  After several decisions on the appointment of a legal representative for the applicant in 2007, the Municipal Court dismissed the action on 30 September 2008. 46.  On 5 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a cassation complaint by the applicant. 47.  On 10 October 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no. 5 Ca 176/2004, later no. 5 Ca 329/2006). As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 10 April 2008, seeking EUR 3,487.77 in compensation. 48.  On 11 May 2009 the District Court dismissed the action, considering that the overall length of the proceedings at issue had not been unreasonable despite one particular delay, particularly because the applicant had in fact known the result of the proceedings after the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s first judgment of September 2006. 49.  On 17 February 2010 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment, holding that a finding of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights would be sufficient compensation for the one delay in the main proceedings. 50.  On 22 November 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court, stating that the finding of a violation should have been set out in the operative part of the judgment. 51.  In a judgment of 18 April 2012 the Municipal Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard without unnecessary delays in the operative part of the judgment. It found that the length of the main proceedings had been unreasonable, given that the case had not been complex. However, it found that the finding of a violation would provide adequate redress, given the lack of importance of what was at stake for the applicant and the fact that he must have known the result of the proceedings as soon as the Supreme Administrative Court had issued its first judgment. The court considered the finding of a violation to be adequate redress, even taking into account the length of the compensation proceedings themselves. 52.  On 29 November 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. On 29 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. 53.  In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings (no. 15 C 244/2012) for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initial compensation proceedings. He later made a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage from the excessive length of the latter compensation proceedings too (no. 17 C 146/2015). 54.  On 12 October 2004 the applicant brought an administrative action against the Prison Service (v\u011bze\u0148sk\u00e1 slu\u017eba) and the Ministry of Justice, challenging decisions on a disciplinary penalty (a reprimand) that had been imposed on him and the failure of the Ministry of Justice to decide on a complaint by him about a violation of regulations by Prison Service staff. 55.  After exempting the applicant from court fees, appointing a lawyer to represent him and seeking necessary clarification of the action, on 19 October 2006 the Prague Municipal Court found the action in respect of the disciplinary decisions inadmissible, severing the part of the action concerning the Ministry of Justice\u2019s alleged failure to act. 56.  On 10 May 2007 the Municipal Court dismissed the latter part of the action, finding that the Ministry had not been obliged to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint in administrative proceedings. 57.  On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a cassation complaint by the applicant. On 21 May 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. 58.  On 30 October 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no. 10 Ca 10/2005). As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 6 May 2008, seeking EUR 3,412.69 in compensation. 59.  On 11 May 2009 the District Court dismissed the action, finding that the main proceedings had not been unreasonably long. 60.  On 6 January 2010 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Court since it had failed to also consider proceedings no. 10 Ca 400/2006. 61.  On 14 June 2010 the District Court again dismissed the action, finding that the main proceedings, nos. 10 Ca 10/2005 and 10 Ca 400/2006, had not been unreasonably long. 62.  On 19 January 2011 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment. Although, contrary to the District Court, it considered that the main proceeding had been unreasonably long, it held that finding a violation was sufficient redress. 63.  On 30 January 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. The latter court on 17 June 2013 modified the District Court\u2019s judgment by setting out a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment. It did not find that the length of the compensation proceedings had been unreasonable. 64.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is apparently still ongoing. 65.  In the meantime, the applicant initiated two other cases for compensation for non-pecuniary damage from delayed proceedings: one related to delays in the initial compensation proceedings (no. 15 C 139/2012) and one related to delays in that further compensation proceedings (no. 14 C 154/2015). 66.  On 13 December 2007 the applicant sent a request for compensation of CZK 300,000 (EUR 11,430) under the State Liability Act to the Ministry of the Interior. He stated that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of irregular official conduct by police officers who, on 27 June 2007, had taken a DNA sample by way of a cheek swab, without authority to do so and under the threat of force. 67.  On 7 January 2008 the Ministry rejected the request. On 31 January 2008 the applicant brought an action for damages against the Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court. 68.  On 4 December 2008 the District Court rejected the action as time-barred. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 5 August 2009 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Court, finding an erroneous assessment of the statutory limitation period. 69.  On 23 March 2010 the District Court delivered a new judgment, dismissing the action for compensation. It admitted that there had been irregularities in the actions of the police officers when taking the applicant\u2019s DNA samples, but found that he had not suffered any damage. 70.  On 27 October 2010 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment, although with different reasoning. It considered that the finding of a violation was adequate redress for the damage caused to the applicant. 71.  On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It stated that the Municipal Court \u201cshould not overlook\u201d the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law regarding the statutory limitation of a claim. Consequently, on 20 November 2013 the Municipal Court delivered a new judgment, dismissing the applicant\u2019s action as time-barred. 72.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 13 November 2014 the Supreme Court discontinued proceedings on that appeal as the applicant\u2019s lawyer had failed to submit it properly within the statutory time-limit. 73.  On 19 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional complaint by the applicant on the grounds that he was not represented by a lawyer. It also observed that the applicant did not want to pursue the complaint. 74.  On 23 December 2011 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings no. 10 C 49/2008. 75.  On 10 May 2012 the Ministry rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding no delays in the main proceedings and considering their overall length as reasonable. On 30 May 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the Ministry, seeking EUR 4,549.14 in compensation. 76.  After several attempts by the court to procure the relevant case file (no. 10 C 49/2008), a hearing was held on 22 September 2015. The District Court dismissed the action on the same day, finding that the length of the main proceedings had been reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 77.  According to the Government, the applicant filed an appeal on 6 November 2015, which is apparently still ongoing. 78.  In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initial compensation proceedings (no. 19 C 149/2015). 79.  On 7 November 2006 the applicant brought an action for protection of his personality rights against a newspaper publisher and the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of Justice. 80.  After an amendment of the action and several decisions on exempting the applicant from court fees, on 8 December 2008 the Prague Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings against the Czech Republic. 81.  On 24 March 2009 the Municipal Court dismissed the action. 82.  On 10 November 2009 the Prague High Court modified the judgment, awarding the applicant CZK 100,000 (EUR 3,920). 83.  On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the High Court, which upheld the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment on 15 May 2012. 84.  On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is apparently still under consideration. 85.  On 30 August 2012 the applicant lodged a plea of nullity against the High Court\u2019s judgment, asserting that he had not been able to attend a hearing. Apparently, those proceedings are still ongoing. 86.  On 14 February 2012 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings. 87.  On 20 August 2012 the Ministry rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding no delays in the main proceedings. On 23 August 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the Ministry, seeking EUR 5,774.37 in compensation. 88.  On 18 January 2013 the Prague 2 District Court awarded the applicant CZK 54,250 (EUR 2,120) and dismissed the rest of the action. It considered that the main proceedings had been unreasonably long, taking into consideration that they had concerned the applicant\u2019s personality rights. 89.  On 1 October 2013 the Prague Municipal Court modified the judgment by finding a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time but dismissing his claim for financial compensation. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had brought a number of actions, overloading the court system in the Czech Republic by such actions, the court concluded that the finding of a violation constituted adequate redress for non-pecuniary damage. 90.  On 20 August 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on points of law. It emphasised that if a plaintiff initiated a large number of legal cases then the strength of his feelings towards the damage caused by the unreasonable length of one of those sets of proceedings was different to someone who had participated in only one or a few sets of proceedings. 91.  The Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded on 18 December 2014.", "references": ["7", "9", "0", "2", "1", "6", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Slavonski Brod. 6.  The applicant is a local political figure in Slavonski Brod. She was the head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, and during several local elections ran for mayor of that town. While the applicant held the position of head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, Z.B. sought and obtained employment in one of the kindergartens in Slavonski Brod as a teacher. One of the conditions for obtaining such employment was holding Croatian citizenship, and Z.B. presented a certificate confirming such citizenship. At a certain point in time Z.B., as an employee of a kindergarten in Slavonski Brod, was a subordinate of the applicant. In February 2008 Z.B. was appointed head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod. 7.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant held a press conference entitled \u201cAll victims of the human resources policy of the mayor of Slavonski Brod, M.D.\u201d, where she alleged that the mayor of Slavonski Brod was involved in various irregularities in the employment of civil servants in local public institutions. The applicant thereby also alleged that the mayor had appointed Z.B. as the manager of a kindergarten run by the municipality even though she had used invalid documents and held only citizenship of the former Yugoslavia, and that together the mayor and Z.B. had denied a Croatian war veteran\u2019s daughter employment (see paragraph 11 below). 8.  On 24 November 2008 Z.B. instituted a private prosecution against the applicant in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Slavonskom Bordu) on charges of defamation related to the above-mentioned statement. 9.  During the proceedings the applicant contended that she had wanted to show all irregularities concerning the mayor\u2019s employment of local civil servants, and that she had learnt that Z.B. had requested Croatian citizenship only after she had been employed as manager of the kindergarten. The applicant also submitted that a councillor in the local assembly had provided her with certain documents concerning Z.B., including an annulled citizenship certificate. 10.  On 21 May 2010 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court acquitted the applicant on the grounds that the material obtained during the proceedings showed that Z.B. had been registered in 1985 in the register of births of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the time had been one of the former Yugoslav republics. She had been registered as a Croatian citizen on 13 October 2008, whereas she had lodged her application for employment at the kindergarten on 12 February 2008. In the circumstances, the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court considered that the applicant demonstrated the veracity of her statements. 11.  On 23 May 2011, upon an appeal by Z.B., the Slavonski Brod County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial, on the grounds that not all of the relevant facts had been properly established. 12.  After a retrial, on 26 January 2012 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court found the applicant guilty of defamation for having said \u201c[the mayor] appointed people who are using invalid documents to crucial positions, for example Z.B., who unfortunately still has citizenship of the former Yugoslavia\u201d and \u201c[the mayor], together with his manager [Z.B.], fired a girl on the pretence that, as the child of a [Croatian] war veteran, she had no right to preferential treatment with regard to employment\u201d. The applicant was given a suspended sentence of sixty days\u2019 imprisonment with a probation period of one year. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court held that it was a well-known fact that Yugoslavia no longer existed, and that therefore Z.B. could not have Yugoslav citizenship. Moreover, Z.B. had acquired Croatian citizenship in 1992, but her citizenship certificate had later been annulled in 2008 due to some administrative irregularities, and later she had been issued with a new certificate. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court therefore held that the applicant had uttered untrue information concerning Z.B. in public, amounting to defamation. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in the amount of 8,250 Croatian kunas (HRK). 13.  The applicant appealed, and on 30 May 2012 the Slavonski Brod County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the first-instance judgment. 14.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining, inter alia, that her freedom of expression had been violated by the judgments of the lower courts. 15.  On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 16.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 11 October 2012. 17.  On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), \u201cTowards decriminalisation of defamation\u201d, in which it urged those member States which still allowed prison sentences for defamation, even if those sentences were not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay.", "references": ["0", "1", "7", "5", "4", "2", "8", "3", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1947 and 1971 and live in Skopje. The first applicant is the father of the second applicant. 7.  The first applicant was arrested on 23 December 2010. The second applicant was arrested on the next day. 8.  On 24 December 2010 the applicants were brought before an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435, \u201cthe trial court\u201d). On the same day the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of twenty people, including the applicants, on suspicion of criminal conspiracy (\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043a\u043e \u0437\u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) and tax evasion (\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0458\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435). It was alleged that the first applicant had conspired to create an organised group for the commission of various criminal offences through a network of companies founded and owned by the suspects. 9.  At the same time the investigating judge ordered that nineteen of the suspects, including the applicants, be held in pre-trial detention for thirty days. The order also applied to five suspects who were still at large, including H.R., the son of the first applicant and brother of the second applicant. The order was based on all three grounds specified in section 199(1) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430, Official Gazette no. 15/2005 \u2013 \u201cthe Act\u201d), namely a risk of the suspects absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. As to the risk of absconding, the judge took into account the statements of the suspects, including the fact that some of them had decided to remain silent, the gravity of the charges and the severity of the anticipated penalty, and concluded that there was a risk of the suspects absconding if they were released. Detaining the suspects on the grounds of the risk of their reoffending was justified by the fact that most of them held managerial posts in companies implicated in the criminal proceedings and had authority to sign business accounts and other financial documents. The judge further held that special circumstances (\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438) suggested that if released, the suspects might interfere with the investigation by influencing prosecution witnesses who were to be examined by the investigating judge. The preparation of a financial expert report was also ordered. 10.  On 21 January 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court set up under section 22(6) of the Act (see paragraph 33 below) ordered a thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and twelve other suspects on all three grounds specified under the Act. As to the risk of their absconding, the panel reasoned as follows:\n\u201cThe material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the reasonable suspicion that the defendants have committed the crimes of which they are suspected. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences that are being investigated, as well as the gravity of the charges, the level of criminal responsibility, the anticipated penalty ... the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the defendants are released ... The risk of flight is further reinforced by the financial circumstances of the defendants, given the fact that most of them do not have immovable property in their name ... The panel has taken into consideration the fact that most of the defendants have families and that they are parents, as well as that [some of the defendants, including Ms E. Ramkovska] have immovable property in their name, but these circumstances do not eliminate the risk of the defendants absconding and are insufficient to secure their attendance at the pre-trial proceedings.\u201d 11.  The panel also considered that, if released, the suspects might interfere with the investigation. In this connection, it took note of the fact that the examination of prosecution witnesses had been scheduled for 21, 25 and 31 January 2011. The fact that some of the suspects (but not the applicants) had decided to remain silent was considered by the panel as a factor that heightened the risk of interference with the investigation. 12.  As regards the risk of reoffending, the panel took into account that the applicants were suspected of being part of an organised group that had been operating over a prolonged period of time, with assigned roles in business structures of already existing companies or companies which the suspects aimed to establish with a view to making unlawful gains. The fact that the suspects still held the same posts in the companies implicated in the criminal proceedings implied a risk of reoffending, if they were released. 13.  On 26 January 2011 the applicants lodged appeals complaining that the three-judge panel had not given concrete reasons to justify their pre-trial detention. They argued that the panel had not provided sufficient reasons to justify detaining them on grounds of the risk of their reoffending, and that the risk of interference with the investigation had not been substantiated since nearly all the evidence had already been gathered. The fact that some of the other suspects had decided to remain silent could not serve as basis for extending their pre-trial detention. The applicants also submitted that they did not have a previous criminal record; they had not resisted arrest and had behaved in an exemplary manner during their detention. Both of them had families and possessions in the respondent State. The second applicant was a mother of three minor children. They sought release and replacement of the detention order with a more lenient measure, such as house arrest. 14.  On 4 February 2011 the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435, \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other suspects and upheld the court order. As regards the risk of interference with the investigation, the Court of Appeal held that the investigation had not yet been completed and the examination of the witnesses was ongoing. The court relied on the gravity of the charges and the severity of the penalty to justify detaining them on the grounds of the risk of their absconding. As to the risk of reoffending, the Court of Appeal reiterated the panel\u2019s finding that the suspects were being investigated for acting as an organised group over a prolonged period of time, through a network of companies founded at home and abroad, with a view to making unlawful gains. 15.  On 21 February 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and nine other suspects. The panel used identical wording to justify detaining them on the grounds of the risk of the suspects absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. Additionally, the panel took into consideration the fact that the investigation had been extended to include additional criminal offences. Thus additional evidence, including the examination of two witnesses \u2013 M.N. and R.D. as representatives of certain companies \u2013 was yet to be secured. 16.  On 4 March 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the applicants and the other suspects. It upheld the panel\u2019s decision and its reasoning justifying further extension of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention. 17.  On 22 March 2011 the applicants and the other suspects were indicted before the trial court. Both applicants were charged with money laundering, criminal conspiracy and tax evasion. The first applicant was further charged with abuse of office. 18.  On the same day a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and other accused. The extension was ordered on grounds of the risk of the accused absconding and reoffending. The panel provided the following reasoning:\n\u201cThe material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the high degree of reasonable suspicion that the accused have committed the crimes with which they are charged. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences with which the accused are charged under the indictment; given that the accused committed the criminal offences as a well-organised and compact group consisting of organisers and members with assigned roles in taking the incriminated actions they are suspected of; having regard to the degree of danger for society and criminal responsibility; having regard to the type and severity of the anticipated penalty for the type of offences of which the accused are suspected, including the possibility of an effective prison sentence, the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the accused are released ... The risk of flight is increased if the behaviour of H.R., N.R., R.I. and R.C [other accused] is taken into consideration given that they remain unavailable to the law-enforcement authorities ...\nIn the assessment of the risk of reoffending as a ground warranting further extension of the pre-trial detention, the panel took into account the nature and type of the offences with which the accused were charged ... and the fact that the defendants are accused of acting as a well-organised group, consisting of organisers and members, with assigned roles in the business structures of several companies, that acted over a prolonged period of time. The risk of reoffending is reinforced due to the circumstance that some of the criminal offences were committed as continuous crimes, which underlines the nature and character [of the accused], as well as their susceptibility to carry out criminal activities of this type over a prolonged period of time. The fact that the majority of the accused still occupy the same posts in the companies involved in the criminal proceedings, from which they took the incriminated actions of which they are accused in the criminal proceedings at hand, generates a risk of reoffending if the accused are released ...\u201d 19.  On 28 March 2011 the applicants lodged appeals complaining that the court order violated their rights under Article 5 of the Convention, in that it did not provide concrete reasons for their detention. They argued that the panel had essentially issued a collective detention order, using identical wording and standardised phrases without specifying any particular reason concerning the applicants\u2019 personal character that would justify their pre-trial detention. They also argued that the wording used by the panel was in violation of the principle of presumption of innocence guaranteed under Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. 20.  On 11 April 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other accused. It relied on the gravity of the charges and the severity of the anticipated penalty as circumstances warranting further extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and the other accused. With regard to the risk of reoffending, the Court of Appeal took note of the fact that the defendants were accused of acting as an organised group over a prolonged period of time, with pre-defined roles, using the established business structure of companies in the respondent State and abroad. 21.  On 21 April 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and other accused on the grounds that they might abscond and reoffend. It provided the same reasons as before. 22.  On 29 April 2011 the applicants appealed against the panel\u2019s decision before the Court of Appeal. 23.  On 10 May 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other accused, providing the same reasoning as before. 24.  On 13 May 2011 that decision was served on the first applicant in prison. On the same day the applicants\u2019 lawyer inspected the case file in the trial court. 25.  In the meantime, the applicants unsuccessfully applied for release on several occasions. On 10 May 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court dismissed an application for release submitted by the second applicant. It also removed the risk of reoffending from the list of grounds justifying the second applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 26.  In the course of the proceedings the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention was continuously extended until their conviction by the trial court. The first applicant\u2019s detention was extended on the grounds that he might abscond and reoffend. After 10 May 2011 the second applicant\u2019s detention was extended solely on grounds that she might abscond. 27.  On 14 March 2012 the trial court convicted the applicants as charged. The court further decided that they would remain in custody until the judgment became final. 28.  On 25 February 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction. The applicants have started to serve their prison sentences. 29.  In their observations the Government informed the Court about an article published on 19 November 2014 on an internet portal called Prizma-Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) entitled \u201cThe Government offered settlement \u2013 Ramkovski declined, he will wait for Strasbourg\u201d (\u201c\u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043d\u0443\u0434\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0431\u0430 \u2013 \u0420\u0430\u043c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0458\u0430 \u043e\u0434\u0431\u0438\u043b, \u045c\u0435 \u0433\u043e \u0447\u0435\u043a\u0430 \u0421\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0431\u0443\u0440\u201d). In the article the journalist wrote about the factual background of the case, the complaints communicated to the Government and the questions asked by the Court. It included a link to the statement of facts and the Court\u2019s questions sent to the parties. 30.  The caption under the title of the article read as follows:\n\u201cThe State offered a settlement to Velija Ramkovski \u2013 compensation for the long pre-trial detention and violation of the presumption of innocence in the \u2018spider web\u2019 affair, in relation to which he has complained before the European Court [of Human Rights] \u2013 but he refused. Faced with the fact that the State will lose the case, the Government will change the legal provisions concerning pre-trial detention.\u201d 31.  The last part of the article was entitled \u201cRamkovski refuses settlement, the Government changes the law\u201d (\u201c\u0420\u0430\u043c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043e\u0434\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0431\u0430, \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0433\u043e \u043c\u0435\u043d\u0443\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0442\u201d). The article went on to say:\n\u201cAfter the Court asked the questions, the State offered a settlement, Velija Ramkovski\u2019s defence team confirmed for BIRN. A settlement between the parties for payment of compensation is allowed by the statute of the Court. However it was not acceptable to Ramkovski.\n- I met with Velija Ramkovski in prison, I gave him the message from the State about a settlement, but he refused. He has decided to wait for the Court in Strasbourg to find violations in his case with a judgment \u2013 confirmed for BIRN a member of Ramkovski\u2019s legal defence team who is representing him before the domestic courts.\nThe State confirmed that they have been contacted by the Court in Strasbourg and also confirmed the credibility of the documents in BIRN\u2019s possession.\n- The Government agent and the Bureau for representation of the State before the Court in Strasbourg are preparing the observations to be sent to the Court by the end of November \u2013 said the Government agent, Kostadin Bogdanov.\nHe says that in the meantime they have contacted the parties by telephone and have offered them a settlement. However, they have received no response yet and they are required to submit their observations to the Court within several days.\n...\u201d 32.  After it had been published on the Prizma-BIRN internet portal, information about the settlement offer had appeared on several other internet portals.", "references": ["5", "4", "6", "1", "0", "7", "8", "9", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972. 6.  The applicant arrived in Russia in 1988. He was subsequently convicted of criminal offences on several occasions. He was released on 3 December 2014 after serving his most recent prison sentence. 7.  On 2 December 2014 the Russian Ministry of Justice issued an exclusion order, declaring the applicant\u2019s presence in Russia undesirable and prohibiting his return to Russia until 2020. Further to the exclusion order, on 4 March 2015 the migration authorities issued a deportation order in respect of the applicant and he was later arrested. On 6 March 2015 a judge authorised his further detention until 10 March 2015, with a view to enforcing the deportation order. His detention was then extended until 30 August 2015. 8.  On 7 May 2015 the Georgian authorities informed the Russian migration authority that the applicant was not a Georgian national and that they would not assist in his return to Georgia. The applicant was released on 30 August 2015 following the expiry of the latest detention order. 9.  On 14 December 2015 the applicant was accused of an offence under Article 18.8 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) on account of his presence in Russia without the necessary documents. On 15 December 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg convicted the applicant and ordered his administrative removal from Russia (without specifying the destination country). The judge noted that the applicant was a stateless person but held that he had to comply with a statutory obligation to leave Russia, having no valid legal basis for being there. Lastly, the judge ordered that the applicant be placed in a detention centre for foreigners, with a view to enforcing his administrative removal. 10.  The judgment was amenable to appeal within ten days of receipt by the defendant. 11.  On 25 December 2015 the applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the penalty of administrative removal could not be enforced in the absence of Georgian or any other nationality and that it was therefore unjustified to place him in detention and keep him there. 12.  On 26 January 2016 the Saint Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment of 15 December 2015. The appeal court considered that the applicant could still be removed to the country from which he had arrived in Russia if there was a readmission agreement with that country; that he could be held in detention for a maximum of two years, which was the statutory period for the enforceability of a penalty; and that the CAO had not required the trial judge to set any time-limit when ordering his placement in a detention centre for foreigners. 13.  On 24 March 2016 the Georgian authorities again informed the Russian migration authority that they would not assist in providing documents for the applicant\u2019s return to Georgia as he was not a Georgian national and there were no other legal grounds for such assistance. 14.  The applicant sought a review of the decisions of 15 December 2015 and 26 January 2016. On 24 June 2016 the deputy President of the City Court upheld them on review under Article 30.12 of the CAO. 15.  On 22 July 2016 the District Court dismissed an application from the applicant to terminate the proceedings to enforce the judgment of 15 December 2015. The court held that there was no statutory basis in the CAO or other legislation for granting such an application. On 8 November 2016 the City Court upheld that decision. 16.  In the meantime, on 1 August 2016, referring to Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, the applicant lodged an application for release and again sought termination of the enforcement proceedings. By a letter of 2 August 2016 a judge of the District Court returned his application without examination. 17.  The applicant lodged an individual complaint with the Russian Constitutional Court (see paragraph 29 below). 18.  On 5 June 2017 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an application with the Kirovskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg in order to obtain the applicant\u2019s release, referring to the above-mentioned constitutional ruling. On 22 June 2017 the District Court ordered his release. 19.  From 15 December 2015 to 5 August 2016 (when the application was lodged with the Court) and then further until 22 June 2017 the applicant was kept in the \u0421entre for the Temporary Confinement of Foreign Nationals (\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d) in Krasnoye Selo. From the start date to mid-February 2016 he was kept in cell no. 404 and from mid-February to 3 August 2016 he was in cell no. 403. According to the applicant, each cell measured eighteen square metres and accommodated four people. The cells were equipped with bedside boards and beds but there were no chairs, tables or other furniture. On 3 August 2016 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 304, measuring eight square metres, where he was kept alone. From late September 2016 to 17 January 2017 he shared cell no. 706, measuring ten square metres, with another detainee. From 17 to 22 January he was in cell no. 405 and from 22 January to 22 June 2017 he was kept in cell no. 406 with three other detainees. 20.  During the period of his confinement up to 3 August 2016 the applicant was locked in his cell most of the time, being taken to a courtyard (measuring some fifteen square metres) every second day for ten to fifteen minutes. He was taken there every third day from early 2017. The yard had no equipment for sport or leisure activities, no benches and no shelter from the rain or snow. 21.  The toilets in the cells were separated from the main area by a fixed partition. There was no proper, ceramic toilet bowl, just a \u201chole\u201d with a flusher set on a small base so the toilet had to be used in a squatting position. According to the applicant, the partition was not high enough and the toilet area remained visible. There were also unpleasant odours. 22.  Shower facilities were accessible for ten minutes every fourth day in 2016 and once every seven to ten days from early 2017. There were no facilities for washing or drying clothes and no toilet paper, toothpaste, soap or the like was provided. Bedding was changed once a month. Subsequently, the applicant also stated that the cells became infested with bugs, cockroaches and mice, although it was not clear to what period of time he referred to. He submitted a photograph showing two captured mice in containers. 23.  Food was brought to the cells but was cold, particularly in winter, and of mediocre quality. In the absence of tables, detainees had to eat on their beds. There was no supply of drinking water and no facilities for boiling water or cooking food. It was not possible to purchase food. 24.  He had been allowed to leave cells 304 and 706 and move within the corridor and shower area but had been prohibited from entering other cells. 25.  No radio, television, newspapers or the like were provided in the detention centre. The applicant and his co-detainees were apparently allowed to have a television set during his most recent period of detention. 26.  The applicant has submitted several photographs of the cells, a statement written by his cellmate after March 2017, a statement from a detainee written in 2015 and a recent news report about the detention centre. 27.  In November 2016 the detention facility was visited by members of a public oversight committee. They noted that the toilets (consisting of a \u201chole\u201d) in the cells on the fourth floor were separated from the main area by a low partition or curtain and that it was not possible to switch the lights on or off from inside the cells. They also noted that the detention centre had no courtyard for detainees. 28.  According to the Government, as of February 2017 the applicant was being held in cell no. 403, which measured 27.4 square metres (not eighteen as submitted by the applicant). The cell was equipped with a toilet, a sink with hot and cold water, beds and a table. The main lights were switched off at night. The detention centre had a library and detainees could borrow books. Food was prepared and delivered by an external catering company. Hot food was brought in special containers.", "references": ["6", "5", "3", "4", "8", "0", "7", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 5.  On the dates indicated in the appended tables the applicants obtained monetary court awards against the Municipal Unitary Enterprise Passenger Transport Company of Kotlas (MUP Kotlas Passazhirskoye avtotransportnoye predpriyatiye \u2013 \u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435 \u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041a\u043e\u0442\u043b\u0430\u0441 \u00ab\u041f\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0430\u0436\u0438\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435\u00bb). 6.  Some of the judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour have been partly enforced during the insolvency proceedings in respect of the company (see paragraphs 7-10 below), while others remained unenforced to date. 7.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by the municipality of Kotlas. The company provided transport services in the town. It had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it. 8.  As submitted by the applicants, the prices for the transport services in the town of Kotlas were regulated by the Administration of Arkhangelsk region. 9.  On 28 September 2007 insolvency proceedings started in respect of the company. 10.  On 18 September 2012 the company was declared insolvent and subsequently liquidated.", "references": ["2", "7", "1", "5", "4", "8", "6", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Pogradec. 6.  According to the applicant, on 6 August 2012 he witnessed a violent verbal altercation between N.P., a relative of his, and A.S. in one of the main streets of Pogradec. The applicant\u2019s intervention to calm down N.P. and A.S. was unsuccessful. The verbal exchange became increasingly heated and ended in the use of physical violence. 7.  After the eruption of the physical violence, a special police unit of the Rapid Reaction Force (Forcat e Nd\u00ebrhyrjes s\u00eb Shpejt\u00eb, hereinafter \u201cthe RRF\u201d) intervened to put an end to the violence. As a result, the applicant and the other two individuals were taken to the local police station. In his application form, the applicant submitted that he had sustained injuries as a result of the police intervention, and that on the way to the police station he had been insulted, threatened and ill-treated by RRF police officers. His requests to be taken to a hospital to receive medical treatment had gone unanswered. 8.  The relevant criminal file, which was submitted by the Government as part of their observations, indicated that two investigations had been opened into the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions by a person vested with public powers in the exercise of his duties, as provided for in Article 250 of the Criminal Code (Kodi Penal, hereinafter \u201cthe CC\u201d). 9.  A patrol report (raport sh\u00ebrbimi) drawn up by the RRF officers\u2019 team leader, V.B., and dated 6 August 2012 stated that RRF forces had been informed of a violent physical dispute in one of the main streets of Pogradec at around 7.40 p.m. As a result, they had intervened and taken three people to the local police station. According to the report, N.P. and the applicant had physically and verbally resisted the RRF officers. The report further stated that the applicant had sustained an injury to the back of his head. 10.  The escort record (formulari i raportit t\u00eb shoq\u00ebrimit) in respect of the applicant, which bore the date 6 August 2012 and the time 8.10 p.m., stated that \u201che was bleeding from the back of his head and physically and verbally resisted the police officers.\u201d 11.  It would appear that on 6 August 2012 at 8.30 p.m. the applicant telephoned a certain N.L., who was a judicial police officer working for the Minister of the Interior\u2019s Internal Control Service in Pogradec (Sh\u00ebrbimi i Kontrollit t\u00eb Brendsh\u00ebm, hereinafter \u201cthe ICS\u201d), and informed him of his intention to lodge a criminal complaint against the RRF officers who had allegedly beaten him on the shoulder, leg and head with a rubber truncheon. 12.  On 7 August 2012 N.L. took a statement from the applicant, who stated that he had intervened to break up a brawl between A.S. and N.P. At that moment RRF officers had arrived at the scene. The RRF officers had subsequently intervened without assessing the situation, and had beaten him with a rubber truncheon on the head, shoulder and legs. Consequently, he had sustained an open wound to his head. He had been forcibly put into a police vehicle, where he had been subjected to psychological pressure and insulted by the RRF officers, and subsequently taken to Pogradec\u2019s police station together with N.P. and A.S. He had stayed at the police station for four hours, and the authorities had not offered him any medical aid, despite the wound on his head and other injuries to his shoulder and leg which he had sustained (see also paragraph 38 below). The applicant further stated that a certain M.S. had been present at the scene. 13.  On the same day N.L. took a statement from A.S., who stated that he had met N.P. and had asked to be paid for work he had carried out in N.P.\u2019s caf\u00e9 bar. N.P. had made a telephone call to the applicant for help. After some moments the applicant had appeared at the scene. As they had not agreed on the sum to be paid, the applicant and N.P. had engaged in a brawl with A.S. After the RRF officers had intervened, the applicant and N.P. had objected to the orders given by the officers to get into the police vehicle, and had not complied with those orders. In A.S.\u2019s view, the actions of the police officers had been lawful (see also paragraph 31 below). 14.  On the same day at 12.20 p.m. N.L. contacted V.B. by telephone. As recorded in the patrol report (raport sh\u00ebrbimi) drawn up on 7 August 2012, V.B. stated the following:\n\u201cPetri Pihoni, A.S. and N.P. had been involved in an argument. They [the RRF officers] were called upon to put an end to the argument, which had become more intense. In such circumstances, we [stopped them from arguing] and took them to Pogradec police station in the police vehicle. ... I would point out that N.P. and Petri Pihoni verbally and physically resisted us as they were taken to the police station. From the outset, it was noted that Petri Pihoni had sustained an injury to the back of his head (Shtetasi Petri Pihoni q\u00eb n\u00eb momentin e pare t\u00eb konstatimit nga ana jone ishte i d\u00ebmtuar n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn e pasme t\u00eb kok\u00ebs). A patrol report was drawn up in relation to this event, which we will make available.\u201d 15.  On 7 August 2012 N.L. drew up a record for the inspection of documents relating to the registration log (libri i marrjes s\u00eb informacionit` dhe dh\u00ebnies s\u00eb urdhrave) of the local police station. The record contained entry no. 270, according to which V.B. had reported the dispute on 6 August 2012 at 8.10 p.m., and three people, namely the applicant, A.S. and N. P., had been taken to the police station. 16.  On 10 August 2012 N.L. referred a criminal offence to the Pogradec prosecutor\u2019s office. His report described the events as mentioned in the statement made by the applicant on 7 August 2012 (see paragraph 12 above) and the statement made by A.S. on the same day (see paragraph 13 above). The report also referred to the registration log of the police station and the telephone conversation N.L. had had with V.B. (see paragraph 14 above). N.L. had been unable to question the RRF officers, as they had left for Tirana on the morning of 7 August 2012. 17.  On 10 August 2012 the Pogradec district prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d) opened criminal file no. 303 in response to the information transmitted by the ICS for a preliminary investigation into the offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for in Article 250 of the CC. 18.  On 13 August 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: the examination of a forensic medical report in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 20 below), the questioning of the applicant, the examination of the four people who had knowledge of the events, the collection of information about the identity of the RRF police officers, and any other action as appropriate. 19.  On 3 September 2012 the Pogradec prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal file no. 347 in response to a criminal complaint lodged by the applicant on 8 August 2012 against the RRF police officers in relation to the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for in Article 250 of the CC. The applicant\u2019s criminal complaint stated the following:\n\u201c... at the time I intervened to break up the fight [between N.P. and A.S.], Rapid Reaction Force officers, without enquiring about the situation, came from behind and physically attacked me without any warning, beating me with hard objects on my back, legs and head, also causing a wound which was later treated at the hospital. At the time I was physically attacked, I told police officers not to use any violence, as I was not part of the dispute and had simply intervened to prevent it.\n... despite my statements, and without enquiring about the situation, they took me by force and used psychological pressure [by threatening me with] the rubber truncheon as I was taken to the local police station. After [I asked them] not to insult me and exert pressure on me, the team leader said, \u2018we\u2019ll see to you, shut up and give me your name\u2019 (ta tregojm\u00eb neve ty po qepe dhe m\u00eb jep emrin k\u00ebtu). No medical aid was offered to me, despite the serious injuries which I had sustained. It would appear that the RRF officers had come from Tirana.\u201d 20.  The applicant had submitted a forensic medical report (no. 204) dated 7 August 2012, which had been ordered by N.L., the judicial police officer, in support of the criminal complaint. The medical examination had found that the applicant had been injured by a hard, blunt object (mjet i fort\u00eb mbret\u00ebs), which had caused a wound requiring stitches, three scratches (d\u00ebrrmishje), an oedema and an ecchymosis. The above injuries had resulted in the applicant being unable to work for nine days. 21.  The district prosecutor decided that further investigation was required in order to identify the perpetrators and determine criminal responsibility in respect of the offence of the commission of arbitrary actions under Article 250 of the CC. On 3 September 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: the inspection of the registration log of the police station, the collection of information about the identity of the RRF police officers, the holding of an identification parade to identify the police officers, the taking of statements from the applicant and other people who had knowledge of the events, and any other action as appropriate. 22.  On 6 September 2012 the applicant made another statement in which he said that he had seen a group of police officers wearing uniforms of the State police getting out of a police car, but had not noticed when they had arrived at the scene. Afterwards he had been beaten with a rubber truncheon on the head and on the back of his body. He was unable to name any of the police officers, given the events, but stated that he would be able to recognise them at an identification parade. He had noticed that they were part of an RRF unit. In spite of his explanations that he was a bailiff, he had been pulled by the arm and put inside a police vehicle and taken to the local police station. On the way to the police station one of the police officers had remained standing with his arm raised, ready to hit the applicant with the rubber truncheon he had in his hand. No reasons had been given to the applicant for his detention at the police station. Despite the fact that he had been bleeding from the back of his head as a result of blows received from rubber truncheons, no medical assistance had been offered. He had been released from the police station at around 11.15 p.m., after which time he had gone to hospital to receive treatment. He stated that the events might have been recorded by the security cameras of a nearby bank. 23.  On 10 September 2012 the district prosecutor requested that video footage be provided by a nearby bank whose security cameras were believed to have registered images of the events of 6 August 2012. On 14 September 2012 the bank submitted video footage on a CD-ROM. A record dated 30 January 2013 on the examination and collection of evidence recorded an expert\u2019s findings to the effect that the video footage was not relevant to the investigation (nuk paraqesin asnj\u00eb interes p\u00ebr hetimin). 24.  On 10 September 2012 the district prosecutor asked the local police station to provide information relating to the identity of the RRF officers who had been on duty in Pogradec on 6 August 2012. On 17 September 2012 the Pogradec police station responded that the RRF team had been led by V.B., who was responsible for disclosing the information relating to the identity of the members. 25.  On 18 September 2012 the district prosecutor decided to join both criminal files under file no. 303. 26.  On 18 September 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: questioning of the applicant, inspection of the registration log of the police station, inspection of the registration log of the local hospital\u2019s emergency ward, examination of the forensic medical report in respect of the applicant (presumably the report set out in paragraph 20 above), collection of information about the identity of the RRF officers, questioning of four people who had knowledge of the events, examination of video footage from the nearby bank, and any other action as appropriate. 27.  Most likely on 17 October 2012, although the date on the record reads 17 January 2012 (17/01/2012), A.E., who owned a bar close to the site where the brawl had taken place, made a statement. He stated that two people had been having a fight with a third person. RRF officers had intervened to break up the fight. They had not used any rubber truncheons, in spite of the resistance shown by some of the people put into the police vehicle. 28.  On 7 November 2012 a judicial police officer inspected an order for the deployment of RRF forces (urdh\u00ebr p\u00ebr daljen me sh\u00ebrbim). According to that order, a team of six RRF police officers from Tirana, led by V.B., had been made available to the local police station to assist with random patrols during the busy summer season. 29.  On 13 December 2012 N.P., one of the parties involved in the fight, stated that he had sustained blows from a rubber truncheon used by the RRF officers. They had forcibly put him, the applicant and A.S. into a police vehicle. The police officers had not introduced themselves when they had arrived at the scene, and had not warned any of them by saying \u201cStop, police\u201d. On the same day Ni.P., a relative of the applicant and N.P., stated that the RRF officers had used rubber truncheons on the applicant, N.P. and A.S. 30.  On 4 January 2013 P.B., who had been on duty at the local police station on 6 August 2012, stated that the applicant and two other people (N.P. and A.S.) had been brought to the police station at 8.00 p.m., following the RRF intervention to break up a fight amongst them. None of those people had made any complaints. P.B. had provided them with a decision directing them to have a medical examination. 31.  On 15 January 2013 A.S. gave another statement and stated that he had been hit on his back by the applicant. As a result, he had reacted and hit back. The fight had continued for a few minutes and A.S. had targeted the applicant. N.P. had been been drunk and had collapsed on the ground (see also paragraph 13 above). On the same day J.K., an eyewitness and a relative of A.S., stated that the RRF officers had intervened to break up the fight, but had not used any force or hit the three people. A.S. had been hit on his back by N.P. Afterwards, he had been attacked by the applicant. A.S. had reacted and hit both of them back. He also stated that it had been N.P. who had made a telephone call to the applicant for help. 32.  On 21 January 2013 V.B., who had been the RRF officers\u2019 team leader at the time of the events, gave a statement. According to that statement, on 6 August 2012 at 7.40 p.m. he and his team had been informed by a plain-clothed police officer that a brawl was taking place in one of Pogradec\u2019s main streets. When the team had arrived at the scene, they had seen that seven to eight people were involved in a violent fight, hitting each other with blunt objects such as beer bottles and wooden sticks. Three of them (the applicant, N.P. and A.S.) had been the most aggressive. Two of them (the applicant and N.P.) had subdued the third person (A.S.) and were kicking him. The RRF officers had intervened, broken up the fight and escorted the three people to the local police station. The three people had claimed that they had sustained injuries, some of which were visible. As a result, N.P. had been taken to hospital for treatment. The applicant had subsequently been released.\nOn 7 August 2012, following instructions they had received, V.B. and his team had left Pogradec. On the same day V.B. had received a telephone call from a certain N.L., to whom he had given an explanation about the intervention (see paragraph 14 above). V.B. further stated that on 25 December 2012 he had complied with a summons to appear at the Pogradec police station to give a further explanation. Upon his arrival, he had run into the applicant, who had continued to watch him and his colleague closely at the police station for more than an hour. He had refused to take part in an identification parade, owing to the fact that he had not been informed of such a procedural action, he and his colleague had been the only police officers wearing distinct RRF uniforms, and the applicant had been observing them for more than an hour. In his view, an identification parade would have been contrary to the provisions of Articles 171 and 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodi i Procedur\u00ebs Penale, hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d) and decision (no. 7/2005) of the Constitutional Court. 33.  S.H., who was one of the RRF officers, had also complied with the summons to appear on 25 December 2012 at the Pogradec police station to give a further explanation. He had also declined to take part in an identification parade, for the same reasons as those mentioned above by V.B..\nOn 21 January 2013 S.H. gave a statement. In addition to confirming the facts set out in V.B.\u2019s statement, he added that the applicant had actively resisted their order for him to get into the police vehicle. The applicant had also exerted psychological pressure on the officers, stating \u201cYou\u2019ll see what I\u2019ll do to you\u201d. Given the circumstances, the police officers had been unable to use any equipment (rubber truncheons, automatic weapons or tear gas canisters) or handcuff the people inside the vehicle. 34.  On 21 January 2013 G.B., I.M. and A.D., who were the three other RRF officers, gave statements which contained the same information that had been provided by V.B and S.H. No mention was made of their being summoned to give explanations on 25 December 2012. 35.  On 22 January 2013 a judicial police officer inspected Pogradec police station\u2019s registration log, according to which the applicant had entered the police station at 8.20 p.m. and had made no complaints (nuk kam pretendime). It would appear that the applicant had left the police station at 10.30 p.m. The registration log of the local hospital showed that the applicant had reported to the emergency ward at 11.00 p.m. with a wound caused by tearing and a contusion on the back of his head (vulnus laceratum, contusio capitis regionis occipitalis). 36.  On 13 February 2013 the district prosecutor decided that another expert report should be produced by a group of specialist doctors from the Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituti i Mjek\u00ebsis\u00eb Ligjore, hereinafter \u201cthe  FMI\u201d). That decision referred to the first forensic medical report (no. 204) which had been issued in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 20 above). It further mentioned that the RRF police officers had stated that they had not used any objects or equipment to break up the fight. It also referred to the statements given by A.S. and J.K., according to which A.S. had exchanged blows with both the applicant and N.P. In such circumstances, it was important to identify the blunt object that had been used to cause the applicant\u2019s injuries as stated in the first forensic medical report. 37.  On 5 March 2013 the FMI informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that they had been unable to identify the object that had caused the applicant\u2019s injuries. 38.  On 12 April 2013, during questioning by a judicial police officer, the applicant stated, among other things, that he had not been involved in a dispute, nor had he been struck by A.S. or struck back at A.S himself. The applicant denied having received a telephone call from his relative N.P. for help. He confirmed that he had not been able to identify the police officers, since he had been hit from behind (see also paragraph 12 above). 39.  On 13 May 2013 the district prosecutor, by a reasoned decision, decided to stay the investigation in accordance with Article 326 of the CCP, and referred the case file to the ICS for further actions to identify the perpetrators. The decision described all the evidence that had been obtained, as well as the statements that had been given by the applicant and the other people who had either been involved in or had witnessed the brawl on 6 August 2012. In so far as relevant, the decision stated the following:\n\u201cJ.K. gave information about the event, stating that Petri Pihoni had been involved in the dispute, having been informed [about it] by telephone by N.P. ... Petri had struck A., who had hit back in response ... the police officers had escorted A.S., N.P. and Petri [to the police station]. [J.K.] saw that both N.P. and Petri resisted the police officers by declining to get into the police vehicle ... [J.K.] confirmed that the officers\u2019 actions were correct ... none of them touched or used force against them [A.S., N.P. and the applicant].\n... A.E. was questioned in relation to the events. He runs a private business close to the site. His statement indicates that a physical dispute was taking place between three people. All the people were having a fight [by the time] an RRF police car arrived. The police officers called on those people to stop fighting, but they continued to have a fist fight until the officers intervened, pulled them by their arms and got them into the [police] vehicle. [A.E.] stated that he had not seen any officers using rubber truncheons.\n...\nDrawing on the facts and evidence collected during the course of [the investigation in respect of] criminal file no.  303, the result is that we are not confronted with the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for by Article 250 of the Criminal Code.\n... In the instant case, it was proved that Petri Pihoni was involved in a physical argument with some people. Despite his own statements, the statements given by A.S., J.K. and A.E. indicate that N.P. called Petri, who appeared at the scene and became involved in a debate about the sum that N.P. owed A.S. The debate escalated into a physical dispute in which Petri struck A.S., who hit back in response.\nIn such circumstances, the RRF officers witnessed a violent dispute and took the three people to the police station with a view to [their] giving explanations about its causes.\nI consider that the officers\u2019 actions ... are in compliance with (sections 4, 92, 95 and 96 of) the State Police Act and cannot be classified as arbitrary actions which affect the freedom of citizens.\nAs regards the criminal complaint that physical violence was used by the RRF officers when Petri was taken to the police station, I consider that doubts arise as to whether the offence of abuse of power as provided for by Article 248 of the CC has been committed. This is the case, given the injuries sustained by Petri, which may have been caused while he was escorted [to the police station] by RRF officers ...\nDuring the investigation, Petri Pihoni was questioned on several occasions as to whether he could identify the RRF officers who might have struck him. He responded that he was unable to proceed with the identification [procedure] because the blows had come from behind and he was unable to identify the officer who had struck the blows.\nThe remaining evidence obtained during the investigation does not shed any light on this [incident]. Having regard to the fact that criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, I consider that the investigation should be stayed.\u201d 40.  Having not received any response from the Pogradec prosecutor\u2019s office about the progress of the investigation, on 27 December 2012 the applicant sought the assistance of the Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture (\u201cthe Centre\u201d). On the same date the Centre unsuccessfully asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to provide it information about the applicant\u2019s case. 41.  On 11 May 2013 the Centre repeated its request to the Pogradec prosecutor\u2019s office. It also complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s office that no information had been provided to the applicant about the progress of the investigation eight months after the incident. It does not appear that a reply was given. 42.  On 7 June 2013 the Pogradec prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that on 13 May 2013 it had stayed the investigation. A copy of the decision of 13 May 2013 was enclosed. 43.  On 27 November 2013 the Centre asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to provide it with a copy of the investigation file. No reply was given. 44.  On 7 July 2017, under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, the Court asked the parties to submit any new factual information that might have come to light after the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 13 May 2013. 45.  On 27 July 2017 the district prosecutor replied to the applicant that the investigation in respect of criminal file no. 303 into the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions was still stayed, and the file was still with the Korca Police Directorate. The district prosecutor further informed the applicant that it had not been possible to identify the perpetrators of the criminal offence. 46.  On 6 September 2017 the district prosecutor, having regard to his decision of 13 May 2013, replied to the Government that no criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions had been committed. Furthermore, he informed the Government that doubts had arisen as to whether the offence of abuse of power had been committed. In any event, the evidence obtained had not shed any light in this regard. The criminal file had been sent to the ICS for further actions. The latter had not identified any need to reinitiate the investigation. It had not identified any new facts which had come to light after the proceedings had been stayed. The applicant had been duly informed about the outcome of the investigation.", "references": ["9", "0", "8", "2", "3", "5", "4", "7", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6.  From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d and \u201cLuhansk People\u2019s Republic\u201d (the \u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d). 7.  In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an \u201canti-terrorist operation\u201d. 8.  In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9.  On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10.  On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11.  Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government\u2019s control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government\u2019s control is the city of Donetsk. 12.  On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13.  On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14.  In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15.  The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16.  On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17.  The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18.  The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19.  According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and \u201cDPR\u201d armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.", "references": ["7", "1", "0", "2", "4", "5", "6", "No Label", "8", "3", "9"], "gold": ["8", "3", "9"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Kiev, Ukraine. 9.  In his application to the Court the applicant stated that at the relevant time he had been employed as a journalist by a Ukrainian television channel. In July 2006 he had volunteered to cover the G8 Summit, which was being held in the St Petersburg region, for Libertarian Information and News Collective (LINC), disseminating press-releases and information on the Internet about protests, connecting journalists and protesters, and providing coverage about the issues raised by activists. In his comments on the third-party submissions before the Court, the applicant added that at the time he had been \u201cinvolved with\u201d the Independent Media Centre (Indymedia); prior to the G8 summit, he had taken leave from his television assignments and had \u201cfocused on media work\u201d in the framework of LINC. 10.  According to the applicant, at 8.30 a.m. on 16 July 2006 he happened to \u201cbe around\u201d when a so-called \u201canti-globalism\u201d march was taking place in Nevskiy Avenue in St Petersburg (see also paragraphs 19 and 20 below). He was not wearing any distinctive clothing or insignia to designate him as a journalist. He did not take part in the protest; rather, his actions were limited to observing people and taking photographs, including when the police started to disperse the gathering and to arrest some of the participants. One of the police officers spotted him taking pictures and ordered him to switch off the camera. According to the applicant, he complied and no further order was given to him; he did not show any resistance to the police. In his observations before the Court the applicant said that he had presented his press-card issued by the International Federation of Journalists, and explained his presence at the venue. 11.  It follows from the identical reports of two police officers that they approached the applicant and ordered him to cease his \u201cunlawful actions\u201d; despite several warnings, the applicant refused; he was then ordered to follow them to the police vehicle in order to be taken to the police station. Despite several warnings, he refused, grabbed their uniforms, behaved defiantly and shouted. He was then taken to the police vehicle by force. 12.  A record of administrative escorting was drawn up under Article 27.2 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d). The record contained no reasoning. 13.  The applicant was then subjected to the procedure of administrative arrest under Article 27.3 of the CAO. The following pre-typed text was underlined in the record: \u201carrested in order to put an end to the offence, to compile the record of administrative offence, to examine the case and so on, as required by the CAO\u201d. According to the record, the applicant was not subjected to the procedure involving a personal search or an examination of his belongings. 14.  According to the Government, when the applicant was arrested and held in the police station, he was in possession of an immigration card indicating \u201ca private visit\u201d to Mr T. residing in Moscow as the aim of his presence in Russia, as well as photocopies of his Ukrainian passport and Shengen visa. The applicant was then interviewed and said that he was a journalist and worked as an editor for the Studio1+1 television channel. The Government pointed out, in this connection, that the administrative case file contained no photocopies of any document confirming the applicant\u2019s status as a professional journalist. 15.  Apparently, the applicant managed to contact a lawyer. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the lawyer arrived at the police station at 9.15 a.m. but was not allowed to see him until 2 p.m. 16.  At around that time, the applicant was allowed access to the administrative-offence record. The record compiled by Officer F. indicated that the applicant had been arrested because of his \u201cparticipation in a non\u2011authorised demonstration in Nevskiy Avenue, thus creating a risk of accident threatening his own and others\u2019 lives and limb\u201d. The record also stated:\n\u201cA police officer approached [the applicant], introduced himself and asked [the applicant] to cease his unlawful actions. Despite repeated and lawful orders to cease unlawful actions, [the applicant] refused. Despite repeated and lawful orders to get into the police vehicle, he also refused while grabbing the police officers\u2019 clothes and shouting. Physical force had to be used against him to make him get into the vehicle.\u201d\nThe record also had the following pre-typed line with added handwritten text:\n\u201cWitnesses, attesting witnesses, victims: Go., [address]; So., [address] ...\u201d 17.  Several hours later, a new administrative-offence record was compiled by Officer D. The applicant read and signed it at around 7 p.m. According to the record, the applicant was arrested because he had \u201cdisobeyed a lawful order from a police officer\u201d. The record also had the following pre-typed line with added handwritten text:\n\u201cWitnesses, attesting witnesses, victims: Bo., [address]; Ka., [address] ...\u201d 18.  At around 8.30 p.m. the applicant was brought before a justice of the peace. He was accused of disobeying two orders from the police: (i) to cease his participation in the non-authorised demonstration; and (ii) to get, \u201cvoluntarily\u201d, into the police vehicle, as stated in the judgment of the justice of the peace. 19.  The applicant stated before the court that while having a walk with his friend, Ms K., he had seen people running along Nevskiy Avenue with banners and posters; he had followed them to take some photographs. 20.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer pointed out that the second record drawn up by the police was substantially different from the initial one. His efforts to have it admitted to the file, however, were unsuccessful. The judge heard Ms K., who stated that she had been taking a walk together with the applicant at 8.30 a.m. on 16 July 2006 when they had seen people running along Nevskiy Avenue; the applicant had started to follow them; she had lost sight of him and had eventually caught up with him when he had been placed in a police vehicle; at that point, he had not been showing any resistance to the police. 21.  According to the applicant, the court refused to hear the officers who had arrested him (\u201cthe arresting officers\u201d), the officers who had compiled the initial and the amended administrative-offence records or anyone mentioned in the record (see paragraphs 16-17 above). According to the Government, the applicant made no request to have the arresting officers examined at the trial. 22.  On the same evening, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 19.3 of the CAO and sentenced him to three days of detention, to be counted from 10 a.m. on the same day. 23.  The court relied on (i) the (second) administrative-offence record, compiled by the authority initiating prosecution against the applicant, and (ii) the written statements made by the arresting officers prior to the trial. 24.  The applicant was held in a police cell for a night and then transferred to a special detention facility to serve the sentence. 25.  Although the trial judgment was amenable to appeal within ten days, the applicant chose to lodge an appeal without delay. He also made a written statement, which read:\n\u201cActing as a journalist, on 16 July 2006 I took photographs during a public event. I did not think I was breaching any law. If I did so unknowingly, I am sorry about that. On the same day I was sentenced to three days\u2019 detention. I ask the appeal court, when examining my appeal, to grant it as regards my release. I would ask you to examine the appeal in my absence but with the participation of my counsel and a representative from the Ukrainian Consulate.\u201d 26.  On 18 July 2006 the applicant was visited by an official from the Ukrainian Consulate and signed a document authorising the Consul to represent him on appeal. 27.  The Consul asked the appeal court to examine the appeal without delay. 28.  On 18 July 2006 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg heard the representative, upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to two days\u2019 detention. The appeal court held as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] argued in his statement of appeal that the trial court had not taken into account that as a journalist he had not taken part in the so-called \u201canti-globalist\u201d protest; the trial court had not examined prosecution witnesses while the judgment was solely based on the written reports made by the police officers who had arrested him ...\nThe trial judge gave a proper assessment of the officers\u2019 reports and testimonies, including the testimony by K. who had been examined at the defendant\u2019s request. It followed from K.\u2019s statement that she had not observed the moment of the defendant\u2019s arrest. This court has no reasons to doubt the officers\u2019 reports because they had not been previously acquainted with the defendant and had no reason to commit perjury.\u201d\nThe appeal court indicated that its decision was \u201csubject to immediate enforcement\u201d. 29.  According to the applicant, he was released at 4 p.m. on the same day. Referring to a logbook of detainees (a copy of the relevant extract from which has not been submitted to this Court), the Government submitted that the applicant had been released at 10 a.m. on 18 July 2006. 30.  The applicant sought a supervisory review of the judgments before the City Court. He argued, inter alia, that he had been refused an opportunity to examine the arresting officers whose pre-trial reports had constituted the main adverse evidence. On 13 November 2006 the deputy President of the City Court upheld the conviction in a summary manner.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "0", "4", "9", "No Label", "6", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  On 28 February 1996 the applicants and the debtor (JSP \u201cTara\u201d Cetinje) reached a court approved settlement before the Cetinje Municipal Court, whereby the debtor undertook to pay the applicants specified amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 5.  The settlement became final on the same date. 6.  The debtor ultimately paid part of the amounts determined in the settlement. 7.  On 26 May 1997 the Podgorica Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 8.  On 19 August 1997 the applicants submitted their respective claims based on the settlement. 9.  In the course of the insolvency proceedings the Podgorica Commercial Court acknowledged the applicants\u2019 claims. 10.  On 23 December 2009 the Podgorica Commercial Court terminated (zaklju\u010dio) the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, but continued the proceedings against the debtor\u2019s estate. This decision was upheld by the Appellate Court on 9 April 2010. 11.  The proceedings are still pending. 12.  On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal on procedural grounds. 13.  The court settlement in question remains partly unenforced to the present day. 14.  It transpires from the case file that at the time the court settlement was concluded and became final (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above) the debtor was a company predominantly comprised of State\u2011controlled capital. The Government neither contested this nor provided any evidence to the contrary.", "references": ["1", "0", "5", "7", "6", "2", "4", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tver. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 7 May 2009 the applicant and his classmate A. were arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily injuries to a boy from their school. They confessed to their deeds. The applicant was initially released under parental supervision, whilst A. was remanded in custody. The following day they retracted their confessions. 8.  On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows:\n\u201c[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator\u2019s application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges.\u201d 9.  On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant \u201chad changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial\u201d. In the court\u2019s opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary \u201cto secure the enforcement of the conviction\u201d. On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10.  On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case refused the parents\u2019 request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows:\n\u201cThe investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case.\u201d 11.  On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant\u2019s father about the investigator\u2019s decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator\u2019s discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were \u201cpersuasive and well-justified\u201d. 12.  On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13.  The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations. 14.  By a judgment of 25 March 2010, the Regional Court found the applicant and his co-defendant guilty of attempted murder and sentenced each of them to five years\u2019 imprisonment. On 9 June 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. 15.  Between November 2009 and July 2010 the applicant\u2019s parents visited him in prison a total of sixteen times. All visits were carried out under the supervision of a warden while the applicant was separated from his parents by a glass partition.", "references": ["5", "1", "7", "8", "6", "9", "0", "3", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1987 and 1986 and live in G\u00fcm\u00fc\u015fhane and Erzincan respectively. 5.  On 18 May 2007 the applicants participated in reading out a press statement in commemoration of \u0130brahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of the TKP/ML[1] (Turkish Communist Party \u2013 Marxist/Leninist), who had died in 1973, allegedly under torture in police custody. 6.  On 7 January 2008 the Erzurum public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against fifteen people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering, the second applicant had read out a press declaration containing statements praising the TKP/ML and \u0130brahim Kaypakkaya, and the following slogans had been chanted by the demonstrators: \u201c\u0130brahim is our leader\u201d, \u201cOur struggle continues and shall continue\u201d, \u201c\u0130brahim Kaypakkaya is immortal\u201d, \u201cDown with the USA\u201d and \u201cWe will drown fascism in the blood it has shed\u201d. The group had also carried a banner which read \u201c\u0130brahim Kaypakkaya is immortal \u2013 Partizan\u201d[2]. 7.  On 31 March 2009 the Erzurum Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the assize court held that the applicants had disseminated propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, given that the second applicant had read out the press statement and the first applicant had chanted slogans. The court based its judgment on a report prepared by an expert regarding a police video-recording of the public gathering in question. 8.  Taking into account the applicants\u2019 good behaviour during the trial and the fact that they had no previous criminal convictions, the court suspended pronouncement of the applicants\u2019 conviction on the condition that they did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (h\u00fckm\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n geri b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131). 9.  The applicants filed an objection against the decision of 31 March 2009. In their petition, they stated that the first-instance court had erred in interpreting the facts and the law, and they asked to be acquitted of the charges against them. They further stated that their prosecution had constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 10.  On 20 July 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held that the application of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case was in line with the domestic law, and rejected the applicants\u2019 objection without examining the merits of the case. That decision was served on the applicants on 5 August 2009.", "references": ["3", "1", "9", "5", "0", "8", "7", "2", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Krasnodar. 6.  The applicant had a press card issued to him as a photographer, stating that he was a \u201ccorrespondent at Agency.Photographer.ru\u201d. According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, he also prepared various texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets on an occasional basis. 7.  In August 2009 the applicant and Ms D. travelled to Abkhazia to prepare a report with photographs on, as he described it, \u201cthe life of this unrecognised republic\u201d. 8.  On 27 August 2009 they returned to Russia, arriving on foot at the Adler customs checkpoint. The applicant presented his Russian passport, press card and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The laptop was his own property, however, he also used it for professional purposes. 9.  The applicant and D. were examined by Officer K. In his report to his superior, drawn up at 10.40 a.m. on 27 August 2009, he stated that in view of the applicant\u2019s answers to questions and because of his behaviour, neither of which have been specified to the Court, there was a need to verify the information contained in the applicant\u2019s customs declaration by way of an \u201cinspection procedure\u201d (see paragraph 31 below) in respect of the items in his bag and backpack and to \u201capply the measure for minimising risk as per profile no. 55/1000000/11062008/00228 ...\u201d. 10.  The Government have submitted to the Court a written statement from K., which reads as follows:\n\u201cFollowing the customs control measure of an interview and given [D.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s] behaviour and the nature of their professional activities, a supposition/assumption (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) arose that they might have banned printed and/or audio- and video-material with extremist content in their bags ... Since [the applicant] noted in his declaration that he had electronic storage devices, I made a written report to the acting chief officer of the customs checkpoint concerning the need for carrying out an inspection of [the applicant\u2019s] bags in the framework of the risk management system and for involving Officer B., an IT specialist. The inspection was approved by the chief officer by way of his handwritten approval on my report ... The chief officer issued an order for an inspection and authorised B. and myself to use the sampling procedure ... The above-mentioned supposition/assumption was based on the presence of a folder labelled \u201cExtremist\u201d in the laptop ... Data from it was copied on the same day [on the spot] ... to DVD RW disks, which were then sealed in a plastic bag ... [The applicant], B. and two attesting witnesses were present ... The sampling report contained a detailed description of the data that was copied, including the names of the folders that had been copied, their number and the number of files in each folder ... The copying was carried out by Officer B. I did not open or copy any electronic folders or files ... I did not read any \u2018correspondence\u2019 (personal correspondence or other text material) ... An order to carry out a forensic examination was issued on 8 September 2009 ... because on 27 August 2009 we had no information about the relevant expert organisations for that type of forensic examination ...\u201d 11.  The Government have also submitted a written statement from Officer B., which reads as follows:\n\u201cIn accordance with the order for an inspection [no. ...], which required sampling and which also indicated \u2018other\u2019, I copied data from [the applicant\u2019s] laptop to six DVD RW disks ... because we had no other type of disks or electronic storage devices ... Since the laptop\u2019s hard drive was some 160 Gb and at the time we had no means for fast copying, I decided only to copy folders with strange names. I did not read any \u2018correspondence\u2019 (personal correspondence or other text material) from the laptop.\u201d 12.  According to the Government, after finding in the directory of the laptop an electronic folder entitled \u201cExtremism (for RR[1])\u201d, which contained a number of photographs, the customs officer decided to copy it and some other folders from the laptop for further examination by an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature. 13.  The folder contained seven subfolders and 180 files. The applicant made a note in the record, stating that the material had been copied onto rewritable DVD disks (thus technically allowing the data to be modified, including by way of adding data). According to the applicant, the folder had some photographs and a PDF copy of an article entitled \u201cHow to incite hatred?\u201d on anti-extremism legislation. The article, written by Ms V., was published in the Russian Reporter magazine in June 2009 and was accompanied by photographs taken by the applicant. The author of the article discussed the controversies and difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Russian anti-extremism legislation, with reference to four criminal cases under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, the material that was copied included documents and text concerning two ethnic groups (the Yazidis and the Meskhetian Turks), who were allegedly under pressure from the Krasnodar regional administration. For instance, a folder named \u201cIsolation\u201d contained texts describing the social problems facing thirty-seven Yazidi families (with references to their personal details), who had been discriminated against by the regional administration. 14.  It can be seen from the record of the sampling that thirty-four folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The folders had the following names (mostly in Russian): In motion, Miscellaneous, Desktop, Foto_projects, On the road, Isolation, Drawings, 1 May, 9 May, 14 February, Law, Extremism (for RR). 15.  It appears that the data from the laptop was first copied to a mobile or external hard drive and then recopied to six DVDs. According to the Government, the information was then deleted from the external hard drive. The original data in the laptop was not deleted and remained intact. 16.  According to the applicant, his laptop remained with Officer B. for several hours. Allegedly, the officer read through the applicant\u2019s correspondence in the ICQ messaging program and copied some 26 gigabytes of data, including the applicant\u2019s personal correspondence, personal photographs and FTP[2]-type passwords. 17.  The applicant submitted the following written statement by Ms D. to the Court:\n\u201cAt 10 a.m. we presented ourselves at the border control and presented our passports ... We were then taken to the customs control area ... There the customs officers asked [the applicant] to hand over his press card; so they were aware that he had one ... Officer K. interviewed us about the purpose of our visit to Abkhazia and our professional and civic activities ... I heard an FSB border officer tell the customs officers about the need for a \u2018special check\u2019 of our electronic storage devices ... Seeing a laptop in [the applicant\u2019s] bag, the customs officers expressed their intention to copy all the available information ... I was interviewed (again) about my civic activities, my political views and about [the applicant\u2019s] professional activities ... the type of work done and the publications ...\u201d 18.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine whether the data copied from his laptop had any prohibited \u201cextremist\u201d content. 19.  In November 2009 the expert organisation returned the DVDs to the customs office, stating that it was not possible to carry out the examination, although it gave no reasons. In December 2009 a report was sought from another expert organisation. Apparently, it concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed over to him in November 2011. 20.  In the meantime, the applicant brought judicial review proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d), challenging the adverse acts and actions of the customs officials. 21.  By a judgment of 25 January 2010 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his claims. The court held as follows:\n\u201cLaptops, storage devices, photo- and video-cameras should be considered as \u2018goods\u2019 within the meaning of Article 11 of the Customs Code. All goods should be presented for checking by customs, as required under Article 14 of the Code ... The customs authorities are authorised to take samples of goods for examination ... and to use technical devices to speed up the checks ... The data from the applicant\u2019s laptop was copied for the purposes of examination in compliance with Presidential Decree no. 310 on combating fascism and political extremism ... In the circumstances, the fact that the samples taken for examination constituted all the relevant data was justified ...\u201d 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the first-instance court\u2019s assessment had not taken into account the requirements relating to Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, in particular, the requirement that any interference by a public authority had to be shown to be \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. He mentioned the Court\u2019s case-law relating to the seizure of printed material and electronic devices, an action which adversely affects the maintenance of professional secrecy. The applicant also argued as follows:\n(a)  Compliance with Decree no. 310 was not possible without actually reading someone\u2019s correspondence and other personal information, thereby interfering with the constitutional right to the protection of the secrecy of correspondence and other communications. Article 55 of the Constitution only permitted restrictions on people\u2019s rights on the basis of a federal statute; the decree in question was secondary legislation (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0430\u043a\u0442) and could not lawfully introduce additional limitations on constitutional rights;\n(b)  The trial court had mentioned that laptops, flash memory cards and the like were \u201cgoods\u201d for the purposes of customs legislation. However, the sampling had been carried out in respect of the information they contained rather than the carriers or containers of the information (\u201cthe goods\u201d). Access to that information, however, was only allowed on the basis of a court order, as stated in Article 23 of the Constitution;\n(c)  In his \u201cwritten explanations\u201d to the appeal court, the applicant insisted that in Chapter 25 proceedings a public authority had the burden of proving that its acts were lawful and justified. However, the first-instance court had not required the customs authority to cite a specific legal provision authorising its officials to examine electronic data. According to the applicant, the customs authority representative had refused at the hearing to explain the specific content of the risk profile concerning the applicant, referring to the fact that the information in question was classified and was for internal use only. However, a 2004 Instruction by the Federal Customs Authority only authorised a customs inspection where the risk profile in question provided for that type of measure (see also paragraph 37 below). 23.  On 22 April 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentially reproducing the lower court\u2019s reasoning as follows:\n\u201cUnder Articles 403 and 408 of the Customs Code, customs authorities fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to them by federal and other legislation ... and have the authority to apply measures prescribed by the Customs Code for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ...\nArticle 11 of the Customs Code defines goods (for the purposes of customs legislation) as movable property which is being transferred across the customs border. This includes laptops, memory flash cards, photo-cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like. Article 14 of the Code provides that all such goods should be subject to customs clearance and customs control. Article 123 of the Code provides that goods should be declared when being transferred across the customs border. Article 124 of the Code provides that the declaration is made by way of presenting a written declaration or otherwise ... The transfer of goods by individuals for personal use is prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Customs Code, and Government decree no. 715 of 27 November 2003 and no. 718 of 29 November 2003. Article 13 of the Code provides that goods which are prohibited from being transferred to Russia must be removed from Russia.\nBy a letter of 16 July 2008 the Federal Customs Authority listed the goods which are banned from Russian territory ... By a letter of 3 May 2006 the Authority listed the goods that must be declared to customs.\nThe procedure for and the types of customs checks are described in Chapters 34-37 of the Code. Article 358 of the Code provides that customs checks are based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, should be limited to such forms of control as are sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ... When selecting the form of control, the risk management approach is applied, which is based on the effective use of resources for preventing violations of the legislation ... Risk is defined as a probability of non-compliance with customs legislation.\nWhen carrying out a customs check, the customs authority is allowed to take samples of goods which are needed for further assessment. The relevant procedure is defined in Article 383 of the Code and Customs Authority order no. 1519 of 23 December 2003. When carrying out a customs check, the authority is allowed to use technical means to limit the time of such checks; the list and procedures for their use are defined in Article 388 of the Code and in Customs Authority order no. 1220 of 29 October 2003 ...\nOrder no. 677 of 10 November 1995 by the Customs Authority (\u2018On preventing the transfer of prohibited printed, audio- and video-material across the customs border\u2019) does not contradict the current customs legislation and has not been revoked because the current Customs Code contains Article 13 concerning bans and limitations on the transfer of goods across the customs border ...\nIn view of the above, the court agrees with the first-instance court that the customs inspection was authorised and carried out within customs control procedures and that the data was copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995 ... Article 2 of the decree clearly requires the customs authority to \u2018arrest and bring to liability persons who disseminate printed, cinematographic, audio-, photo- or video-materials which are aimed at being propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; and to take measures for seizing printed material of that kind\u2019 ...\nArticle 383 of the Code concerning the minimal amount of samples was complied with because the information taken for sampling was not homogenous. Thus when the samples were taken, it was necessary to take the full amount of information from the device ...\nIn addition, it is noted that under Article 10 of the Customs Code, information received by customs officials may be used exclusively for the purposes of customs legislation ...\nCustoms officials are not authorised to disclose that information or transfer it to third persons, except as set down in the Code or other legislation ...\u201d 24.  The applicant does not appear to have been prosecuted subsequently in criminal, administrative or other proceedings in connection with the data obtained from his laptop by the customs authorities.", "references": ["3", "1", "7", "8", "0", "2", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  Since 2002, following their ancestors\u2019 demise, the applicants have been the holders of the utile dominium (by way of sub-emphyteusis which expires in 2047) of a portion of land in Zabbar, Malta. The directum dominus (direct owner) is the State. 6.  The applicants\u2019 ancestors acquired the utile dominium of the property also through inheritance from a certain X. who had held the property under title of temporary sub-emphyteusis of 150 years. On the said property there was a shop which was rented out to third parties as a snack bar. 7.  By a Governor\u2019s declaration of 7 May 1965 published in the Government Gazette on 14 May 1965 (no. 290), a part, amounting to 80 sq. m. (including the shop of an area of approximately 50 sq. m.), of the applicants\u2019 property (as well as other land not held by the applicants) was declared to be needed for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter, \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d). 8.  The Government took possession of the entirety of the property mentioned in the declaration and demolished the shop in order to build a local civic centre and service roads (in connection with a development project for the locality). However, in 1972 changes were made to the plan (pjan regolatur). Specifically it was decided to reposition the road which had to be built on the part of the land on which the shop had stood. Thus, it was decided that on that plot of land which adjoined another larger plot of land (not owned by the applicants), a new shop would be built at the Government\u2019s expense in order to serve the square and the civic centre, as well as government offices and for use as a bus terminus. The civic centre at that time hosted the Zabbar Local Council, a social-security office, a police station, a post office, a snack bar, a butcher\u2019s shop, a draper\u2019s shop, a beauty parlour and a grocer\u2019s shop. 9.  The new shop (of larger dimensions than the previous one) was built mostly on the applicants\u2019 land and leased to the same third party mentioned above for use as a snack bar. The remaining small area of land, belonging to the applicants\u2019 ancestors, which had been taken but not used, was returned to them in 1988. 10.  Extra-judicial requests to obtain the return of the property used for the purposes of the snack bar were to no avail. 11.  Pending the constitutional-redress proceedings (below), on 13 April 2010 the Commissioner of Land (hereinafter \u201cthe Commissioner\u201d) extended the lease in favour of the third party until 31 January 2020, at a rent of approximately 2,100 euros (EUR) per year. 12.  In the light of Article 9 of the Ordinance and Act I of 2006, on 6 October 2010, by a President\u2019s declaration of 3 September 2010, the sum offered for the taking of 7 May 1965 was EUR 13,000 in accordance with an architect\u2019s valuation dated 1 January 2005. 13.  In 2010 the bus terminus was moved as a result of changes in the transport system. Currently, within a radius of 300 m of the civic centre there are eleven establishments offering take-away food services (bars, snack bars, confectioners\u2019, pizzerias, pastizzerias, and so forth). 14.  On 2 March 2010 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They complained that they had suffered a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, in so far as their land had not been taken in the public interest, and of Article 6 of the Convention, as well as the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of Malta. They requested that the court annul the Governor\u2019s declaration in respect of their property, order that it be returned to their possession and award adequate redress. 15.  By a judgment of 26 June 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, upheld the applicants\u2019 claims. 16.  The court noted that pursuant to the Ordinance, as it was at the time, it had been the Commissioner who had had to make an offer, and in the event that the offer had been refused, the same Commissioner had had to institute proceedings before the Land Arbitration Board (hereinafter \u201cthe LAB\u201d). Pursuant to the Ordinance as amended, it was still for the Commissioner to make an offer. It was open, however, for the receivers of the offer, if they disagreed, to institute proceedings to challenge the offer before the LAB. Nevertheless, in the present case, it had taken forty\u2011five years for the Commissioner to make an offer, during which time the applicants had had no possibility of initiating proceedings, and thus had no ordinary remedies to exhaust in connection with their request for compensation. The same applied concerning their complaint of a lack of public interest despite amendments to the law in 2009 (Act XXV of 2009) \u2011 which had introduced the possibility of challenging the public interest of an expropriation before the LAB, within twenty-one days of the declaration \u2013 in the court\u2019s view it was unlikely that an individual would be able to challenge a public interest which had not been mentioned in the declaration. 17.  As to the complaint concerning the applicants\u2019 property rights, having extensively referred to domestic as well as Strasbourg case-law, the court held that the taking had not been in the public interest in so far as the property had been leased to third parties as a snack bar and thus for commercial purposes. It had solely and intrinsically served private interests, specifically those of the third parties who had been leasing the property merely for commercial purposes, irrespective of the fact that the snack bar had been regularly used by bus drivers. Furthermore, the applicants had received no compensation in forty-five years, and the offer made to them in 2010 (solely after constitutional redress proceedings had been commenced) had been based on a valuation from 2005. In the court\u2019s view, based on the rent as submitted by the Commissioner, \u201ccapitalised\u201d at the rate of 3.5% applicable in such cases, the value of the property was approximately EUR 60,000, that is to say five times the sum offered by the Commissioner. The situation was made even worse by the lack of procedural safeguards (as mentioned above) through which they could challenge their situation, which also meant that they had not had any access to court in order to claim compensation, as required by Article 6 of the Convention. 18.  The court annulled the Governor\u2019s declaration of 7 May 1965 and the President\u2019s declaration of 6 October 2010 as well as any other action, affecting the property, taken by the defendant pending the proceedings. It ordered the return of the property (vacant possession) in favour of the applicants and awarded EUR 40,000 in compensation including non\u2011pecuniary (moral damage as known in the domestic system) and pecuniary damage (material damage) covering occupation of the premises until the date of return, in connection with the breach suffered. 19.  The defendants appealed, arguing that there was a public interest and challenging the award of compensation and the return order. 20.  By a judgment of 26 April 2013 the Constitutional Court allowed the appeal in part and quashed the first-instance judgment in part.\nIt considered that at the time of the declaration the taking (of the land on which the shop had stood) had been certainly in the public interest, specifically the building of roads giving access to the public. It was true that use of that plot of land had changed in 1972, as it had been decided to build a snack bar (and later to lease it) to see to the needs of the users of the square, as well as the civic centre, government offices, and a bus terminus. Thus, in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the fact that it had been rented out to third parties had not diminished the public interest in the taking. Nevertheless, there had been a violation of the applicants\u2019 property rights in so far as they had been deprived of their property for a number of years without any compensation. In particular they had received no compensation whatsoever for the part of the property taken and not used, which had been returned to them only after twenty-three years, and in respect of the remaining part which was used, the applicants were still awaiting compensation. The Constitutional Court however disagreed with the redress given by the first-instance court, in so far as that court had also awarded pecuniary damage. It considered that that court should have awarded compensation without prejudice to the pecuniary damage due in accordance with the relevant law (Article 12 \u00a7 3 of the Ordinance, specifically interest of 5% on the value of the property). Thus, without prejudice to any such claim for pecuniary compensation in respect of the property taken and the relative interest, the Constitutional Court awarded EUR 10,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damages for the violation suffered, bearing in mind that the value of the property was EUR 13,000, and it annulled the return order for the property. 21.  As the applicants refused to collect the award made by the Constitutional Court, in January 2014 the Commissioner deposited the award in court by means of a schedule of deposit. 22.  On 3 September 2015 the Government sent the applicants a letter reminding them to send evidence concerning their title in connection with the President\u2019s declaration of 6 October 2010.", "references": ["7", "2", "3", "4", "6", "1", "5", "8", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Gebze. 6.  On 17 August 2002 a certain H.A. was found dead in a junkyard. The police initiated an investigation into the matter to find the perpetrators. 7.  On 20 August 2002 the applicant, a minor at the time, was brought to the police headquarters, where he was searched. Following the search, he went through a medical examination. The report drawn up after that examination noted that he did not have any complaints and that there were no signs of injury on his body. 8.  On 21 August 2002 at 1.30 p.m. another report was issued in respect of the applicant, indicating that there were no traces of ill-treatment on him. He was released afterwards. 9.  The same day the applicant\u2019s house was searched by the police, who seized certain objects. The search records prepared by the police noted that the applicant was suspected of having committed the crime. 10.  At around 11 p.m. the applicant was brought to the police headquarters once again, together with some others. 11.  On 22 August 2002 he gave his statements before the police in the absence of a lawyer and indicated that he had spent the day with his friends on 16 August 2002, the day H.A. had been killed. The medical report prepared following his examination reiterated the findings of the previous reports, noting no signs of injury on his body. Several members of the applicant\u2019s family were also questioned the same day. The applicant and the others were all released after their questioning. 12.  On 26 August 2002 the applicant turned eighteen years of age. 13.  On 20 September 2002 the applicant was questioned by the police once again. In the absence of a lawyer, he submitted that he had known H.A. as the grandmother of one of his friends and that when he had heard of the murder, he had speculated with his friends that she could have been killed for the jewellery she wore. 14.  A police report prepared on 11 October 2002 established that according to the results of a DNA test, the blood stains on a tile-cutting machine found at the applicant\u2019s house matched the sample tissues taken from the deceased. Subsequently, the applicant, other members of his family and his friend A.S. were arrested. The search and arrest records held by the police noted that all of those arrested had been placed in police custody following their medical examinations. The medical report concerning the applicant noted no signs of injury. 15.  On 12 October 2002 the police conducted a reconstruction of the events at the applicant\u2019s house, during which he confessed to having killed H.A. He maintained that he had hit her on the head with a wooden club in the basement of their house, with the intention of stealing her jewellery, and that he had put her in a nylon bag afterwards as he had panicked. He went on to describe in detail how he had disposed of the body and showed the police the pushcart he had used to that effect. According to the police records bearing the applicant\u2019s signature, the applicant did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during the reconstruction of events and was not informed of his rights to request legal assistance and to remain silent. 16.  Subsequently, the applicant was taken back to police station, where he reiterated his confession in the absence of a lawyer. He also added certain details such as the locations of the jewellery stores in Istanbul and \u0130zmir where he had changed the deceased\u2019s jewellery, and how he had spent the money in \u0130zmir with his friend A.S., who had not known how he had obtained it. His statements were transcribed on a form, on the first page of which there was a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had been informed of his right to remain silent and to choose a lawyer, and that he refused legal assistance. 17.  On 13 October 2002, at the end of the applicant\u2019s police custody, another medical report was drawn up, again indicating no signs of ill\u2011treatment on his body. 18.  On 13 October 2002 the applicant was questioned by the Gebze Public Prosecutor. Pursuant to his request, he was assisted by a lawyer appointed by the Bar Association during the questioning. He reiterated his previous statements and maintained that he accepted those he had made before the police. He argued, however, that electric shocks had been administered to him through his penis and small toe during his time in police custody. 19.  A medical examination conducted pursuant to the Public Prosecutor\u2019s request revealed no traces of injury on the applicant\u2019s penis, small toe or any other part of his body. 20.  On the same day the applicant repeated his previous statements before the investigating judge and claimed once again that he had been subjected to electric shocks while in police custody. He was subsequently placed in detention on remand. 21.  On 22 October 2002 the Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Gebze Assize Court, accusing the applicant of murder and robbery. 22.  At the first hearing held on 19 November 2002, the applicant denied his previous statements and argued that he had had to confess to having committed the murder as a result of the ill-treatment inflicted on him. He requested that the appointed lawyer who had been present during his questioning by the Public Prosecutor and the investigating judge be heard as a witness. The court rejected that request. 23.  In a petition dated 11 September 2003, the applicant argued that he had been coerced into making self-incriminating statements, in that he had been subjected to ill-treatment and psychological duress by the police, who had threatened him with bringing charges against his family members if he did not confess to having murdered H.A. He submitted that his waiver of his right to legal assistance had not been unequivocal, which had been proven by the fact that he had requested a lawyer before the Public Prosecutor, as soon as his police custody ended. He further contested the relevance of the DNA examination with regard to the tile-cutting machine, arguing that the court should conduct an examination of the wooden club indicated in his police statements, in order to prove that his confessions had not been genuine. 24.  On 16 October 2003 the Gebze Assize Court held that it lacked jurisdiction and forwarded the case to the Kocaeli Juvenile Court as the applicant had been a minor at the time of the murder. During the course of the thirteen hearings before it, the Assize Court obtained a report from the Istanbul Forensics Institute and heard all the police officers involved in the applicant\u2019s questioning. It further examined two witnesses, namely, the owners of the jewellery stores described by the applicant, who stated that they had not seen him before. 25.  During the course of the hearings before the Juvenile Court, the applicant requested the court to obtain a new forensics report, claiming that there were discrepancies between the police report and that prepared by the Istanbul Forensics Institute, as the latter noted that no blood sample could be found on either the tile-cutting machine or the wooden club. The court rejected that request. Nevertheless, it re-examined and accepted the applicant\u2019s request to have the appointed lawyer heard. In his statements before the court, that lawyer submitted that he had first seen the applicant during the interview at the Public Prosecutor\u2019s office and had suspected that he might have been ill-treated as he had been nervous. The court also heard a number of other witnesses, including his friend A.S., who indicated that the applicant had spent a considerable amount of money in \u0130zmir. 26.  In his submissions before the Juvenile Court, the applicant maintained that he had not been assigned a lawyer while in police custody and claimed that he had been coerced into making a false confession although he had not committed the murder. He added that he had withdrawn the money he had spent after the events with his father\u2019s debit card. Following that latter submission, the court obtained the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s bank account, which showed no such transaction. 27.  On 31 May 2004 the Juvenile Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-six years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment. The court noted that it did not take account of the statements made by the applicant during his questioning by the police, as in any event it found him guilty on the basis of his subsequent statements confessing his acts, the records of the reconstruction of events, the forensics reports, the statements of A.S., and the bank transcripts which rebutted his defence with regard to the money he had spent after the murder. 28.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that he might have made contradictory remarks as he had been confused with the questions of the judges. Reiterating his submissions with regard to his alleged ill-treatment, he maintained that he had not been assigned a lawyer while in police custody although he had requested one. 29.  On 16 June 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, finding that the applicant\u2019s sentence needed to be re-evaluated in the light of the new Penal Code, which had entered into force following the judgment. 30.  On 27 July 2005 the Juvenile Court sentenced the applicant to a total of twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment. On 12 October 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment once again, this time as a result of the Juvenile Court\u2019s failure to hold a hearing while re-evaluating the sentence. 31.  On 15 February 2007, after holding a hearing and assessing the applicant\u2019s final submissions, the Juvenile Court sentenced him to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and robbery. That judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 19 July 2007.", "references": ["2", "0", "6", "4", "1", "9", "5", "8", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and is currently detained in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel near Sofia. 5.  In a final judgment of 23 February 2009, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. On 6 April 2009 he entered Sofia Prison to serve his sentence. He did not say anything about the conditions of his detention there. 6.  On 21 August 2009 he was transferred to Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel, a closed-type prison hostel. 7.  On 26 August 2009 the serving of his sentence of imprisonment was interrupted in order for him to take care of his elderly mother, who had undergone hip-replacement surgery in July 2009. The interruption came to an end on 26 October 2009, and the applicant was again placed in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel. 8.  From 26 October 2009 until 28 October 2010 the applicant was placed in group no. 72. According to him, the group was housed in several cabins with cement floors. The cells were heated with wooden and coal stoves. They were damp and had many of their windows broken and doors shattered. Each cell had between thirty and thirty-five square metres of floor space and housed between sixteen and twenty-two inmates \u2013 that is, provided less than two square metres per inmate \u2013, and had one sink and one toilet with a shower. According to the Government, the cell measured between thirty-five and forty square metres and housed around twelve inmates. 9.  The applicant further said that cold water was only available between 6 and 8 a.m. and 6 and 8 p.m., and hot water was only available between 8 and 9 a.m. and 7 and 8 p.m. Hygienic and sanitary materials were not regularly provided. There was no canteen or dedicated eating space, and no cutlery. As a result of those conditions \u2013 mainly the cold and the humidity \u2013he had developed arthritis of both knees. 10.  On 28 October 2010 the applicant was transferred to group no. 6. He was placed in a cell which he shared with three to four other inmates. He also started working in the hostel\u2019s canteen and had his meals there. According to the Government, the applicant had to share a cell with two to three inmates. The cell was heated with electricity and there were no water supply restrictions. The door and the windows were in good condition. 11.  After the applicant\u2019s prison regime was changed to a more lenient one, on 19 November 2014 he was placed in a cell outside the guarded area of the hostel. The Government submitted that his cell had its own sanitary facilities and that no water supply restrictions existed. 12.  According to the applicant, material conditions in the cells in which he was placed after 28 October 2010 were significantly better in terms of heating, lighting and hygiene, and were satisfactory. Food was also of good quality. Taking a shower, however, was only possible after 10 p.m. due to low water pressure. 13.  Lastly, the applicant alleged that health care in custody was inadequate, with no qualified doctors but only a dentist working on site, and no provision of medicines at reduced prices, as available to people out of prison. 14.  Kremikovtsi Prison is a closed-type prison hostel attached to Sofia Prison. 15.  According to the 2010 report of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) on the visit to Bulgaria from 15 to 19 December 2008, in 2008 the number of the inmates detained in that facility was 622. 16.  In its 2008 report The Prisons in Bulgaria the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee noted poor material conditions, overcrowding and problems with health care in closed-types prison hostels. According to the same report in 2007 the health-care staff in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel consisted only of a dentist and a feldsher. 17.  According to information provided by the Government to the Council of Europe\u2019s Committee of Ministers, in December 2013 the official capacity of the prison hostel was 426, whereas the actual number of inmates housed there was 493 (see Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925/10 and 5 others, \u00a7 143, 27 January 2015). 18.  In the 2012 report and 2016 report adopted under the national preventive mechanism, the Ombudsman of Bulgaria recommended that Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel be closed due to severe overcrowding, poor hygiene and unsanitary living conditions.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "8", "0", "3", "7", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Cetinje. The second applicant was founded in Cetinje in 1990. The first applicant is the founder, the sole owner, and the executive director of the second applicant. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 1 July 2013 an insolvency creditor X (ste\u010dajni povjerilac) requested the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Podgorica to open insolvency proceedings (ste\u010dajni postupak) in respect of the second applicant. In the proceedings before the Commercial Court the second applicant was represented by the first applicant and a lawyer duly authorised by the latter. On 27 December 2013 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the second applicant and, inter alia, appointed an insolvency administrator (ste\u010dajni upravnik). 7.  On 23 January 2014 the second applicant, through the lawyer, lodged an appeal against the Commercial Court decision. 8.  On 18 March 2014 the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica rejected the appeal (\u017ealba se odbacuje) as having been submitted by an unauthorised person, given that the lawyer had not been appointed by the insolvency administrator. The court relied on sections 75 and 76 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraphs 17-18 below). This decision was served on the applicants on 17 April 2014. 9.  On 12 May 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 10.  On 13 May 2014 the applicants\u2019 representative filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) seeking the assessment of the constitutionality of section 76 of the Insolvency Act in force at the time. There is nothing in the case-file as to the outcome of that initiative. 11.  On 23 July 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal for \u201cnot having been lodged by a party to the domestic proceedings or by a person authorised to appeal on behalf of the person whose rights and freedoms were violated\u201d. This decision was served on the applicants on 15 October 2014.", "references": ["8", "1", "6", "2", "4", "7", "9", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 24 November 2006 the applicant, the owner and CEO of a large dairy producer, was charged with large-scale fraud and money laundering and summoned for questioning. He did not show up for a few initial interviews and the investigator put his name on the list of fugitives from justice. 8.  On 26 January 2007 the investigator, acting on the information that the applicant had fled abroad, asked the Ostankinskiy District Court in Moscow for a detention order. 9.  The detention hearing was fixed for 1 February 2007. The applicant\u2019s lawyers had been notified of the date and time of the hearing on the previous day but did not show up and asked the investigator to postpone the examination of his application because they were busy in other proceedings. The District Court appointed legal-aid counsel to represent the absent applicant, proceeded with the hearing and issued the detention order, referring to the fact of the applicant\u2019s absconding to Ukraine and from there to Hungary, the gravity of the charges against him and the risk of interference with the investigation. On 9 February 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyers appealed. 10.  On 15 February 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 11.  On 19 March 2007 the Moscow City Court heard an appeal against the detention order. The applicant and his lawyers were present at the hearing. Considering that the risks of flight and obstruction of the investigation were sufficiently established, the City Court upheld the detention order. 12.  The applicant\u2019s detention was later extended on nine occasions. The applicant appealed against each of the detention orders, lodging statements of appeal within two to ten days of the hearing date. It took the appeal courts between twenty-six and sixty days to examine the complaints. 13.  The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant\u2019s release on bail. 14.  While in custody, the applicant asked the investigator to be allowed to receive visits from his mother, wife and children and also pastoral visits from two Orthodox priests, A. and S. 15.  With the investigator\u2019s consent, the applicant\u2019s mother and daughters visited him on two occasions in April and May 2007. In August and September 2007 the investigator interviewed his wife and mother as potential witnesses but they refused to testify, invoking the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. The investigator refused the applicant\u2019s subsequent applications to see his family, stating that such visits could \u201chave a negative influence on the conduct of the investigation\u201d. As to the Orthodox priests, on 29 March 2007 the investigator invoked the same ground to refuse a visit from S. On 30 August 2007 the investigator once again refused a pastoral visit, stating that the applicant should see the prison chaplain instead. 16.  Counsel for the applicant applied for a judicial review of visiting restrictions. 17.  On 24 October 2007 and 6 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court pronounced the refusal of pastoral visits to be lawful and justified, holding that the investigator had full discretion to determine whether or not such visits ran counter to the interests of the investigation. On 18 June 2008 the City Court upheld the latter decision on appeal, holding that a restriction on religious rights was an inherent consequence of the pre-trial detention. 18.  As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant\u2019s complaint in part, finding as follows:\n(a)  restrictions on visits from the applicant\u2019s wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator;\n(b)  restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time;\n(c)  restrictions on visits from the applicant\u2019s children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant\u2019s rights. 19.  On 10 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s representative before the Court, Ms Kostromina, asked the director of the remand prison to allow her to see the applicant and provided credentials confirming her status. Her application was referred to the investigator. 20.  On 24 January 2008 Ms Kostromina lodged a complaint with the Preobrazhenskiy District Court claiming that the prison director should have authorised her visit without any restrictions, on the basis of Article 34 of the Convention guaranteeing unhindered access of an applicant to his representative. 21.  On 15 February 2008 the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that Ms Kostromina was not the applicant\u2019s counsel in the domestic criminal proceedings and could not therefore visit him. On 6 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.", "references": ["7", "9", "8", "1", "6", "3", "0", "No Label", "2", "4", "5"], "gold": ["2", "4", "5"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant was diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder and was undergoing voluntary treatment for his condition. 8.  On 24 April 2014 he was apprehended by the police on the street in the Bibirevo district of Moscow. The police report stated that the applicant had been \u201charassing an underage teenager\u201d without providing a detailed account of the events. It is not clear from the material available to the Court whether the intervention by the police had been triggered by any complaint from that teenager or any other person. 9.  He was then taken to the local police station and later transferred by the psychiatric ambulance service to the Central Clinical Psychiatric Hospital of the Moscow Region (\u0413\u041a\u0423\u0417 \u041c\u041e \u00ab\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043a\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430\u00bb) (\u201cthe Hospital\u201d). The report of the ambulance service stated the following:\n\u201c[T]aken to [a police station] for [on several occasions] sexually harassing ... [and] stalking an underage teenager and not allowing him to walk away [from such encounters] ...\nMentally alert. Aware of his surroundings. Unwilling to engage in contact. Reserved, secretive, tense, but during the conversation acknowledges the existence of the teenager and the repeated instances of sexual harassment ...\u201d 10.  The psychiatrist who admitted the applicant to the Hospital made the following record:\n\u201cTense, exhibits [exaggerated and pretentious facial] mannerisms. No eye contact. Selective in answering questions, answers [only] after some pause. Asks for some time to \u201cspend with boys\u201d. Distracted. Not reflective [about his mental state]. Diagnosis: schizotypal disorder.\u201d 11.  On 25 April 2014 the applicant was examined jointly by the attending psychiatrist and the head of one of the Hospital\u2019s departments. They made the following record:\n\u201cFollow-up patient history: According to the patient, about three years ago [in 2011] he started feeling the desire to be in contact with boys, to look like a girl. He dyed his hair to attract attention. He started watching television shows to observe how a woman moves; he uses make-up, dresses up. Since the beginning of last year he has become fixated on these thoughts, and started contemplating the possibility of gender reassignment. During this period he has had mood swings, has been anxious, irritable, [and had] difficulties in focusing his attention. Given these circumstances he was hospitalised in [a psychiatric facility]. After his discharge his condition improved. He continued his studies. In the past year he has started paying more attention to his appearance, using lipstick, wearing women\u2019s jewellery, [and has] sometimes tried on women\u2019s clothing at home. He became acquainted with a boy, a ninth grade student, during one of his walks in the city. He started meeting him, talking to him, tried to \u2018have physical contact\u2019, touched his hand, fondled it. Had a desire to be \u2018caressed\u2019.\nAccording to the supporting documents \u2013 [a report to the head of the police station, the order for a psychiatric ambulance] \u2013 he was apprehended by police officers on the street, where he had been sexually harassing an underage teenager, having stalked him for four months, repeatedly not allowing him to walk away from such encounters. Transferred to [the police station] where he was examined by a psychiatrist on duty, subsequently involuntarily admitted [to the psychiatric hospital] ... During his examination in the reception ward he signed [a document consenting] to treatment ...\nPsychiatric state: Self-aware. Subdued mood. Somewhat distracted. Looks untidy, unkempt hair, dyed ginger. Soft, high-pitched voice. Indisposed to conversation, replies [only] after some pause, does not answer certain questions, asks for some questions to be repeated. While replying he gulps with an expression of pain. Excessive facial expressions during conversation. States that he feels uncontrollable attraction to boys, to be liked by them, to have contact with them. Requests a \u201cspace to meet with a boy\u201d. Blushes while saying this. Considers himself a \u201cfemale person\u201d. Considers in-patient treatment necessary for himself in order to improve his mood, reduce irritability and \u201cperplexity of thoughts\u201d. Denies hallucinations. Denies suicidal thoughts.\nDiagnosis: Schizotypal disorder.\u201d 12.  On the same day the applicant, after conferring with his father, demanded to be discharged from the Hospital; however, his request was denied. 13.  On the same day a medical counselling panel composed of the resident psychiatrists of the Hospital examined the applicant and diagnosed him with organic delusional disorder. The panel also found that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and that there was a risk of significant damage to his health due to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The full text of the panel\u2019s report and conclusion read as follows:\n\u201c25.04.2014 12.00 Panel examination due to refusal of treatment.\nLethargic, sluggish. Subdued mood. Attributes [the cause of] his subdued mood to [his] inability to meet up with a boy he is attracted to. Unsure whether that boy also is attracted to him. Goes across the city to see that \u2018boy\u2019. He wants to be \u2018treated gently, to be caressed, fondled\u2019. Admitted that he goes to women\u2019s clothing stores [because he likes the clothing], which is \u2018soft and bright\u2019. For a long time has been visiting the neighbourhood where he met the boy; previously he had been going to other neighbourhoods to watch boys.\nDiagnosis: Organic delusional disorder.\nConclusion: needs involuntary placement and treatment, in accordance with section 29(a) and (c) of the 1992 Psychiatric Assistance Act.\u201d 14.  On the same day the Hospital applied for judicial authorisation of the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation under section 29(a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992, since the applicant was a danger to himself or others and there was a risk of significant damage to his health owing to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The application restated the findings of the earlier joint examination (see paragraph 11 above) and set out the following conclusions:\n\u201cOn 25 April 2014 was examined by the panel of resident psychiatrists of [the Hospital] and diagnosed with organic delusional disorder.\nThe patient needs to be involuntarily hospitalised and treated under section 29 (a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act of 1992.\nThe examination and treatment of the patient can take place only under an in-patient regime ...\n[It is requested] 2.  That the request for authorisation be assessed on the premises of the Hospital, since because of his mental state [the applicant] cannot be produced in court ...\u201d 15.  On 5 May 2014 the Savyolovskiy District Court of Moscow (\u0421\u0430\u0432\u0451\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0433. \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u044b) held a hearing on the premises of the psychiatric facility. The hearing was attended by the applicant, his father and mother, the attending psychiatrist Mr P., the head of one of the Hospital\u2019s departments (Mr L.), the representative of the Hospital (Mrs K.) and the local prosecutor. 16.  During the hearing Mr P., Mr L., and Mrs K. generally advanced the same arguments as those presented in the application for judicial authorisation (see paragraph 14 above), maintaining that the applicant needed to be hospitalised and treated, that he posed a danger to himself and others, and that there was a risk of significant damage to his health in the event of a deterioration in or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. Mr P. also reported that the applicant considered himself to be healthy and refused treatment, while at the same time \u201cbeing confused, replying to questions with other questions, and being exceptionally insincere\u201d. They also emphasised the fact that the applicant had been apprehended by the police for sexually harassing an underage person. 17.  The applicant\u2019s parents had conflicting opinions about the need for hospitalisation. The mother stated that the applicant did \u201cnot feel well\u201d and had been \u201cirritable lately\u201d, that her communication with him was restricted by the father and that she had not seen him since 10 February 2014. In her opinion, in-patient treatment was necessary. The applicant\u2019s father, acting as his representative, objected to involuntary hospitalisation and did not agree that his son posed any danger to himself or to others. He stated that Mr X was voluntarily following the treatment prescribed by a neurologist and a psychiatrist, that his condition showed signs of improvement and that hospitalisation would interfere with his studies and future career. In his opinion his son had only tried to become friends with \u201cthe boy\u201d, not sexually harass him. He furthermore stated that the police report referred to by the Hospital contained no information on the alleged sexual harassment or other unlawful acts. 18.  The applicant stated the following during the hearing:\n\u201cI refuse treatment and feel myself to be well ... There is nothing special about me. I dyed my hair ginger because that colour suits me, I do not like black. I only wanted to become friends with that boy, nothing special; I tried no clothes on; that is all nonsense. [I want to finish my studies]; I have only two months left and I do not want to be in hospital. I made no statements concerning trying on womens\u2019 clothing or changing gender.\u201d 19.  The District Court, having considered the above-mentioned statements, medical evidence, a police report, and the applicant\u2019s educational records, the same day authorised the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation. The authorisation issued by the court in a succinct manner stated that, while the applicant and his father objected to hospitalisation, the evidence presented by the medical panel of the Hospital demonstrated that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and that his mental state might deteriorate in the absence of treatment. 20.  The applicant\u2019s father appealed. The statement of appeal indicated that the District Court had relied exclusively on the evaluation of the resident psychiatrists, had not addressed inconsistencies in evidence, had failed to substantiate the assertion that the applicant\u2019s condition was severe and that he posed a danger to himself or others, and, lastly, had failed to demonstrate the absence of any alternative treatment options. 21.  On 20 May 2014 the applicant was discharged from the Hospital after an improvement in his mental state. 22.  Certificates issued by the local police station in May 2014 stated that the applicant had not committed any administrative or criminal offence and that he had been referred to psychiatrists because of mental disorders. 23.  On 18 July 2014 the appeal was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434). The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c... The case file shows that on 24 April 2014 [a policeman apprehended the applicant]. The police report indicates that [he] had been harassing underage persons ...\nSince the behaviour of [the applicant] exhibited symptoms of mental disorder, [he was taken to the Hospital], where he initially agreed to hospitalisation, stated that since 2013 [he had been subject to] mood changes, and that he [suffered from] anxiety, irritability and difficulties in focusing his attention. Previously he had been hospitalised in [a psychiatric facility]; following his discharge from [that facility] his mental state improved, [and] he had continued his studies. However during the last year the condition re-appeared.\n[According to the medical evidence] on 25 April 2014 [the applicant] was lethargic, sluggish, and had a subdued mood, which he attributed to his inability to meet up with a boy he is attracted to.\nDuring the hearing the representative of [the Hospital] stated that [the applicant] had been brought in in a delusional state, and had talked about \u2018a boy\u2019 who did not [in fact] exist. In this state he had been travelling long distances, presenting a danger to himself and others ...\nThe evidence [submitted to the first-instance court] substantiating the need for involuntary hospitalisation \u2013 including information on previous treatment for his delusional disorder and somatic condition (a second-degree disability) \u2013 constituted legal grounds for involuntary hospitalisation.\nSince the reaching of conclusions regarding the mental health of a person is within the exclusive competence of psychiatrists, the [district] court reasonably gave due regard to the report on the need to provide in-patient treatment to [the applicant] ...\nThe appeal does not refer to any factual information demonstrating that the relatives of [the applicant] or other persons are capable of ensuring his and other persons\u2019 safety without an in-patient treatment regime ...\u201d 24.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent attempts to initiate a review of the above-mentioned judicial decisions proved unsuccessful.", "references": ["0", "3", "9", "5", "8", "6", "7", "4", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Galashki, Ingushetia Republic. 5.  On 11 December 2009 the applicant was abducted by S. with intent to marry her. The applicant\u2019s mother opposed the marriage and on the same day S.\u2019s relatives took the applicant back to her mother\u2019s house. 6.  On 12 December 2009 the relatives of the applicant\u2019s deceased father made the applicant go back to S.\u2019s, because of the presumed consummation of the marriage. They also threatened to kill S., should the applicant decide to leave him. 7.  The applicant had to live with S.\u2019s family as his wife. The marriage was not officially registered. She was kept locked in a room without being able to communicate with people outside S.\u2019s family. S. moved to a different town. On rare occasions S.\u2019s sister let the applicant use her mobile phone so that she could call her mother. She complained that S.\u2019s family, especially her mother-in-law, treated her poorly. She did not feel well and complained about dizziness, numbing of the lower jaw and difficulty to breathe. According to the applicant\u2019s mother, the applicant told her once that her mother-in-law did not let her see S. and claimed that the applicant would not last living with them longer than two months. On several occasions the applicant lost consciousness and foamed at the mouth. 8.  On 28 December 2009 the applicant was taken to a municipal hospital. The doctor diagnosed her with renal colic. 9.  On 29 December 2009 during another visit to hospital the applicant was diagnosed with poisoning by unknown substance. 10.  On 1 February 2010 the applicant foamed at the mouth again and was taken to hospital. She was released on the same day. 11.  On 2 February 2010 the applicant lost consciousness and was taken to hospital. A general practitioner and a neuropathologist examined her. She was diagnosed with stress and overdose of sedatives and placed in an intensive care unit. Subsequently she was diagnosed with post-hypoxic encephalopathy and vegetative state. She has not regained consciousness since then. 12.  In April 2010 the applicant was released to her mother\u2019s care. 13.  On 23 September 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the local police department and prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been forcefully held by S.\u2019s family in inhuman conditions which led to deterioration of her health and coma. 14.  On 10 October 2010 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.\u2019s family on the charges of incitement of suicide and causing damage to health. 15.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged another complaint with the local police department alleging that the applicant had been poisoned while staying at S.\u2019s house. She also stated that the applicant had been repeatedly beaten up and deprived of her liberty. 16.  According to the forensic medical report completed on 8 November 2011, a vegetative state, similar to the applicant\u2019s, could be caused primarily by intoxication. The expert, however, was unable to determine the cause of the applicant\u2019s condition. 17.  On 24 November 2011 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.\u2019s family. The applicant appealed. 18.  On 29 July 2012 the supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 24 November 2011 and ordered further inquiry into the matter. 19.  On 3 August 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of attempted murder. 20.  On 1 October 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of causing serious damage to health. The applicant appealed. 21.  On 26 July 2013 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of the Ingushetiya Republic quashed the decision of 1 October 2012. The court noted that the inquiry had been incomplete. The investigator had failed (1) to question a number of important witnesses and (2) to determine the cause of the applicant\u2019s condition. 22.  On 26 September 2013 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings reiterating verbatim his reasoning set out in the decision of 1 October 2013. 23.  On 15 January, 14 March and 21 May 2014 the deputy head of the district police department ordered a new inquiry noting that the previous inquiry had been incomplete. 24.  On 18 January and 18 March 2014 the investigator refused to open a criminal investigation reproducing verbatim the earlier decisions of 1 October 2012 and 26 September 2013. 25.  On 21 May 2014 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation. In addition to his earlier findings, he studied the applicant\u2019s medical case-file and concluded that it did not contain information accounting for the cause of her medical condition. 26.  On 28 February 2015 the district deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2014 and ordered a further inquiry. 27.  The case-file materials submitted by the Government contain two decisions dated 6 March 2015. The first decision was taken by the investigator who refused to institute a criminal investigation in the applicant\u2019s case. The second decision was taken by the district deputy prosecutor who ordered a new inquiry. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings.", "references": ["1", "3", "6", "4", "9", "7", "8", "2", "5", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kai\u0161iadorys. 5.  The applicant worked as a lawyer in his own private practice. 6.  On 28 January 2011 V.\u0160., a convicted prisoner, provided a statement to the Special Investigation Service (Speciali\u0173j\u0173 tyrim\u0173 tarnyba, hereinafter \u201cthe STT\u201d) and stated the following. He had heard from other inmates that the deputy head of Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility, L.D., took bribes to transfer inmates to units with lighter security and that L.D. had mentioned to V.\u0160. that it was possible to be released on probation for money. V.\u0160. was questioned by the STT and stated that in December 2010 L.D. had asked him to his office and enquired whether he wanted to be released early. L.D. had indicated that he had a friend who could help V.\u0160. obtain release on probation and promised to organise a meeting with him. V.\u0160. was asked again that month by L.D. to go to the latter\u2019s office, where he met the applicant (see paragraph 7 below). V.\u0160. asked the applicant what he should do in order to obtain release on probation. The applicant stated that V.\u0160. would first have to be transferred to a unit with lighter security. V.\u0160. asked the applicant how much it would cost him and the applicant replied that Kai\u0161iadorys [District Court] would cost him 7,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,027 euros (EUR)). After that the applicant indicated several judges that would agree to release V.\u0160. on probation. The applicant also stated that the cost for the same thing in the Kaunas Regional Court would be approximately LTL 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,896) but that that was not the final amount. The applicant also mentioned that V.\u0160. would have to pay LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) for the transfer to a unit with lower security. After that conversation V.\u0160. started recording his discussions with L.D. and the applicant using a voice recorder watch which he said he had obtained from other inmates in exchange for cigarettes. Figures mentioned during the other meetings were LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 579) for the transfer to another unit and LTL 12,000 (approximately EUR 3,475) for the judges at the Kaunas Regional Court as that amount could be more easily divided in three than LTL 10,000. V.\u0160. stated that no agreement on legal services had been concluded with the applicant. V.\u0160. then contacted an acquaintance, G.T., a former police officer who promised to contact the authorities. 7.  The transcript of the conversation recorded between V.\u0160. and the applicant on 26 January 2011 showed that V.\u0160. had around LTL 35,000 (approximately EUR 10,137). The conversation went as follows:\n\u201cThe applicant: \u2018 ...You understand that the intermediary who will go will also need some, and..\u2019\n...\nThe applicant: \u2018You know, salaries there are [LTL] 7,000, so you know...\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018As with [D], when he brought, looked, he went there with those pennies, [they] said no, and he did not have any more...\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018Listen, I will be honest, for example I said, the deputy head asked me, asked. I told him that I will have ten, ten euros, so to say thirty five litai.\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018... With that, we can easily talk about Kaunas.\u2019\n...\nThe applicant: \u2018I believe you. I think that it will go through with such an amount of money.\u2019\u201d\nThe applicant told V.\u0160. that that amount might not actually be necessary. V.\u0160. then told the applicant that G.T. would contact him and give him LTL 2,000 (EUR 579). The applicant also told V.\u0160. that he had won a case against Lithuania at the Court and that he had not accepted a bribe in that case. The conversation went as follows:\n\u201cThe applicant: \u2018I have already been burnt and only got things straight in Strasbourg. I have won [in] the Strasbourg Court against Lithuania. I previously worked as a prosecutor.\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018The deputy did not tell me anything.\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018I could go back to being a prosecutor. I have won a case against Lithuania in Strasbourg.\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018I will ... shake your hand. I can say ... that this seems unreal to me.\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018... The prosecutor with a bribe... Strasbourg proved that it was a provocation. I proved it in Strasbourg. The proceedings [there] took eight years.\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018It was nothing to do with a bribe .... I ... bought an apartment, I asked someone to give me a loan... He ... was in prison later. He was released... and became a snitch.\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018A friend\u2019.\nThe applicant: \u2018... He used to sleep at my mother\u2019s place... I don\u2019t know where he disappeared to. He will not die a natural death. I was not the only one he set up. Two judges in Kaunas as well.\u2019\n...\nThe applicant: \u2018And I won a case in Strasbourg later. The Supreme Court rehabilitated me.\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018Yes.\u2019\nThe applicant: \u2018The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges, the plenary session for criminal cases.\u2019\n...\nThe applicant: \u2018So look. When will that person come? So that I know what ...\u2019 V.\u0160.: \u2018So I can call you and simply say one word. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow.\u2019\u201d\nThe applicant asked V.\u0160. to make sure that G.T. did not tell anyone about the agreement and V.\u0160. assured him that G.T. would not ask any questions. 8.  On 31 January the STT asked a prosecutor to apply to a pre-trial judge for authorisation for G.T. and V.\u0160. to offer and give a bribe to L.D. and the applicant, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law. The prosecutor also sought permission to make video and/or voice-recordings, to take pictures and to allow three officers to monitor L.D.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations. The prosecutor also asked the Vilnius City Second District Court on the STT\u2019s behalf to authorise covert surveillance of the applicant and L.D. for two months. The STT additionally informed the prosecutor that a pre-trial investigation had been opened against L.D. and the applicant. 9.  On the same day the Vilnius City Second District Court authorised taps on the telephones of L.D., V.\u0160., G.T. and the applicant and allowed G.T. and V.\u0160. to perform actions which imitated criminal conduct for two months, until 31 March 2011. V.\u0160. was allowed to use various types of telecommunications and electronic network measures. 10.  On 31 January 2011 V.\u0160. was transferred to a unit with lighter security, based on good behaviour and active participation in the commemoration of the Day of the Defenders of Freedom. 11.  On 31 January 2011 G.T. was questioned by the STT. He stated that he had visited V.\u0160. earlier in January 2011 and that the latter had asked him whether he could give LTL 2,000 to someone. G.T. had agreed. 12.  On 1 February 2011 V.\u0160. and G.T. signed documents stating that they were not allowed to incite someone to commit an offence. 13.  On the same day the applicant visited V.\u0160. and they talked about the situation of V.\u0160. 14.  Later that day G.T. called the applicant and agreed to meet him the following day. After the meeting G.T. left LTL 2,000, given to him by the STT officers, in the side pocket of the applicant\u2019s car. 15.  On 3 February 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and asked how matters were proceeding. The applicant said that he would call back, but later asked to call the following Tuesday. On 10 February 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and said that they would be in touch; he also asked if the applicant would pay him a visit and the applicant said that he would come at some point in the future. On 14 February 2014 V.\u0160. called the applicant and said that he had received a character reference from the psychologist and the applicant stated that he would be in touch. V.\u0160. then asked the applicant whether he should call him and the applicant said that he could call when the documents for his transfer to a unit with lighter security were ready. On 19 February 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and informed him that the documents for the court had already been prepared. The applicant stated that he would be in touch and would come to visit V.\u0160. because they could not talk on the telephone. The applicant said that V.\u0160. could call him the following Wednesday or Thursday but then decided that Wednesday would be the best day. On 1-3 March 2011 V.\u0160. called L.D. and complained that he could not reach the applicant and asked for help in finding him. On 3 March 2011 L.D. called a certain A. and asked him where the applicant was. A. told him that it was not the first time that the applicant had disappeared. 16.  On 7 March 2011 L.D. called the applicant and said that people were looking for him. The applicant said that V.\u0160.\u2019s case was still in progress. L.D. asked the applicant to come and meet V.\u0160. and the applicant said that he had understood. V.\u0160. then called the applicant, who said he was going to visit him in a few hours and that they would talk in person. V.\u0160. again called the applicant later that day and asked whether he should bring the medical certificate to the meeting and the applicant said that he was already in the correctional facility. During the visit they discussed the fact that V.\u0160.\u2019s case had not yet been transferred to court. V.\u0160. asked whether the applicant still had the necessary access [in the Kaunas Regional Court]. The applicant confirmed that he did, that the person concerned was coming back from Austria the following Monday and that without that person the matter could not be settled there. The applicant asked whether V.\u0160. wanted him to participate in a hearing before the court of first instance and V.\u0160. said yes. Then they talked about someone else\u2019s situation and the applicant said that he knew the prosecutor and had bought him. The applicant further said that not every prosecutor could be bought but there were two he could buy. V.\u0160. said that he had LTL 30,000 (approximately EUR 8,689) and it did not matter for what [court] he had to pay. The applicant then asked V.\u0160. to speak quieter. He also asked V.\u0160. to call him from time to time. V.\u0160. asked whether he would have to pay something before the hearing in the Kai\u0161iadorys District Court and the applicant said he would not have to give much because the chances were fifty-fifty. The applicant also stated that the rest of the money would be held in reserve for Kaunas [Regional Court] and he would take LTL 1,000 for Kai\u0161iadorys [District Court]. Later in the same conversation he mentioned LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434). The applicant asked V.\u0160. to get in touch with his contact person, who was to call and meet the applicant in the evening. After the applicant had left the correctional facility V.\u0160. called him and told him that the papers had been sent to the court on the twenty-third. The applicant asked V.\u0160. to call him in an hour. When V.\u0160. called, the applicant told him that the hearing would take place on 23 March and that the applicant would participate in it; he also asked to call him in the evening. 17.  On 9 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant, who said that he would write him a message. On 14 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and they again discussed V.\u0160.\u2019s situation. On 17 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and the applicant said that they would keep in touch after the following Sunday, and V.\u0160. was asked to call on Monday after lunch. On 18 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant, who said that he would not participate in the hearing at the court of first instance regarding V.\u0160.\u2019s release on probation and that if something happened he would inform V.\u0160. On 21 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant, who confirmed his intention as regards the court of first instance because he did not expect anything good to come out of it. However, he said he would try to talk to someone and V.\u0160. said he would not forget his debt to the applicant. On 23 March 2011 V.\u0160. called the applicant and informed him that the Kai\u0161iadorys District Court had decided not to release him on probation. The applicant then said that he would visit V.\u0160. so he could sign an appeal. On 23 March 2011 V.\u0160. called L.D. and asked him to ask the applicant about his chances to be released on probation. L.D. called the applicant the same day and asked how matters were proceeding with their client. The applicant said that he would come on Friday and that they would talk then. On 25 March 2011 the applicant visited V.\u0160., who signed some blank pieces of paper, on which the applicant said he would later write an appeal. V.\u0160. asked whether they would be covered by the amount they had discussed before. The applicant said that he would see, that he had talked with the men in question and asked them to do everything and that they would receive some money. V.\u0160. then told the applicant that his contact person would come the following Monday. After that, they discussed amounts and the applicant told V.\u0160. that the entire sum discussed would be necessary. V.\u0160. asked whether they were talking about thirty [thousand] and whether that amount included the applicant\u2019s share and the applicant said it did. The applicant also said that before that amount would have guaranteed his release on probation one hundred percent but that now there was some trouble. The applicant then told V.\u0160. to call his contact person and ask him to meet the applicant on Monday. V.\u0160. asked whether his person (G.T.) should bring thirty (thousand) and the applicant confirmed that he should. 18.  On 29 March 2011 the applicant and G.T. met in the applicant\u2019s car, where LTL 30,000 was given to the applicant so that he could secure V.\u0160.\u2019s release on probation. The applicant was arrested by STT officers immediately afterwards and the money was found in the side door pocket of the applicant\u2019s car. 19.  V.\u0160. was questioned additionally on 30 March 2011. He stated that L.D. had talked of the applicant as a reliable person who had access to prosecutors and judges. V.\u0160. also showed that L.D. had been the first one to start a conversation about the possibility of V.\u0160. being released on probation and that L.D. had told him several times before that \u201cserious men pay money and are released and do not sit in prison\u201d (rimti vyrai moka pinigus ir eina \u012f laisv\u0119, o ne s\u0117di kal\u0117jime). 20.  On 8 April 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed V.\u0160.\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision not to release him on probation. 21.  On 9 August 2011 a bill of indictment was drawn up against L.D. and the applicant. The applicant was accused of promising to influence L.D. and the judges at the Kai\u0161iadorys District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court with a bribe so that V.\u0160. would be released on probation. He was also accused of taking a bribe of LTL 2,000 and LTL 30,000 respectively on two occasions. 22.  On 31 August 2011 the Court of Appeal examined an application by the prosecutor to transfer the criminal case from the Kai\u0161iadorys District Court. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had stated that he could influence two judges in Kai\u0161iadorys and thus decided to transfer the case to the K\u0117dainiai District Court so that the proceedings would be fair. 23.  On 19 October 2011 the Vilnius City Third District Court approved an application by V.\u0160. to be released on probation. The court held that at that time V.\u0160. was serving his sentence in Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had taken part in the social rehabilitation, legal and social education programmes and had provided information that he would be employed on release. 24.  By a judgment of 18 July 2012 the K\u0117dainiai District Court found the applicant guilty of bribing an intermediary and sentenced him to sixty days in prison. The court found it established that G.T. had given the applicant LTL 2,000 and LTL 30,000 respectively during their meetings on 2 February and 29 March 2011 in return for a promise that the applicant would help in the proceedings for V.\u0160.\u2019s release on probation. The applicant pleaded not guilty and stated that an act of provocation had been organised against him. He also stated that the money he had received was remuneration for his services as V.\u0160.\u2019s lawyer. The applicant said that although no agreement on the provision of legal assistance had been concluded, he had intended to conclude one after the proceedings for V.\u0160.\u2019s release on probation. The applicant refused to provide comments on the recordings and stated that his conversations with V.\u0160. were irrelevant because he had only wanted to show that he was working on his case. Those conversations had not been of any consequence as he had not been able to influence L.D. or the judges at Kai\u0161iadorys District Court and Kaunas Regional Court (Pokalbi\u0173 telefonu ir \u012fra\u0161u su V.[\u0160.] nekomentuoja, paai\u0161kindamas, kad visi jo pokalbiai su V.[\u0160.] buvo d\u0117l aki\u0173, kadangi ka\u017ek\u0105 kalb\u0117ti su V.[\u0160.] reik\u0117jo, tad nieko nerei\u0161kian\u010diais pokalbiais jis tik siek\u0117 parodyti, kad dirba, ta\u010diau tuo jis nesiek\u0117 sukelti joki\u0173 pasekmi\u0173, kadangi negal\u0117jo paveikti nei L.[D.], nei Kai\u0161iadori\u0173 apylink\u0117s ar Kauno apygardos teismo teis\u0117j\u0173). G.T. stated that he had known V.\u0160. since 2000 and that V.\u0160. had called him and asked for help. When G.T. had gone to Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility, V.\u0160. had told him that the applicant required money and that V.\u0160. doubted that the money would be used in the proper way.\nThe court\u2019s conclusions were based on the evidence given by V.\u0160., G.T., L.D. and other employees of Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility. It also addressed the secret recordings of the applicant\u2019s conversations, including those recorded prior to the authorisation for actions imitating criminal conduct. The court held that the transcripts of the conversations between the applicant and V.\u0160. showed that the applicant had been the first to indicate the amounts of money to be paid. The applicant\u2019s statement that he had been going to conclude an agreement on legal services after he had taken LTL 30,000 were refuted by his conversation with G.T., where the applicant had stated that in case of failure he would keep 20% of the money and return the rest. The video-recordings showed that the applicant had not counted the money and that he had indicated to G.T. to put it in the side pocket of the car door. That allowed the court to draw the conclusion that the applicant realised that the money was remuneration for his criminal activity. The court further held that V.\u0160.\u2019s testimony, voice and video\u2011recordings showed that the applicant had not been incited to take a bribe and that the criminal conduct simulation model had been applied within the limits prescribed by the court (see paragraph 12 above). By the same judgment the K\u0117dainiai District Court found L.D. guilty of abuse of office and forgery, which had allowed V.\u0160. to be transferred to a unit with lighter security (see paragraph 10 above). It ordered L.D. to pay a fine of LTL 12,480 (approximately EUR 3,614). L.D. pleaded guilty, but stated that V.\u0160. had named the applicant as a lawyer that could help him obtain release on probation. The court decided to return the recorder watch to V.\u0160. 25.  The applicant and L.D. lodged an appeal. The applicant argued that the provisions of domestic law had been applied incorrectly, that V.\u0160. and G.T. used undue pressure, and that V.\u0160. had used unauthorised equipment, the recorder watch, which he had not been allowed to have in prison. The applicant asked the appellate court to question V.\u0160. and ask him how he had acquired such a watch in a correctional facility. The applicant also stated that L.D. had overseen matters relating to V.\u0160.\u2019s transfer to a unit with lighter security and that there was no evidence that he had tried to bribe L.D. The applicant also stated that he had never named any specific person in the courts whom he would have bribed because he had not intended to perform such an act. He had only talked to V.\u0160. about the outcome of the proceedings for release on probation because V.\u0160. had called him constantly. 26.  On 23 October 2012 the Court of Appeal approved an application by the prosecutor to transfer the case to Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court from Kaunas Regional Court for examination on appeal in order to have a fair trial. 27.  The Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court held an oral hearing where several witnesses, including V.\u0160., had been questioned. On 13 June 2013 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court held that V.\u0160. had purchased the watch for his personal use and that the provisions of domestic law did not directly prohibit the use of such equipment in prison. The court also held that the initial contact between V.\u0160. and the applicant had been arranged by L.D., that V.\u0160. had not known the applicant beforehand and had not had any motive to incite him to commit a crime. The court also found that no agreement on the provision of legal services had been concluded between the applicant and V.\u0160. and that the applicant\u2019s argument that he had intended to conclude one later had been dismissed as an attempt to improve his situation. On the basis of the audio-recordings, the court also observed that the applicant had been the first to say that he could settle the matter for money. The court also found that there had been no incitement and that the authorities had not put any active pressure on the applicant to commit an offence. On the contrary, the applicant had incited V.\u0160. to give him an amount that would be sufficient for himself, an intermediary and three court judges. The court also held that at the time the offence had been committed, Article 226 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code provided for two alternative sentences for bribery of an intermediary: arrest or imprisonment for up to three years. On 5 July 2011 the Criminal Code had been amended and the applicant\u2019s offence had then satisfied the requirements of Article 226 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, which provided for various sentences: a fine, arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. As the provision in force provided for a more lenient sentence, the court decided to impose a fine of LTL 65,000 (approximately EUR 18,825). The court dismissed L.D.\u2019s appeal by the same judgment. 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He again argued that he had been incited to commit an offence, that V.\u0160., as a convicted prisoner, was not allowed to have recording equipment, that he had been provided with that equipment by the STT, and that the transcripts of the recordings should not have been used as evidence against him in the case. The applicant also alleged that the LTL 2,000 had been remuneration for his legal services and that he had not actually taken the LTL 30,000 from G.T., who had simply left the money in his car. The applicant further complained that the court of first instance had not even assessed whether the evidence had been lawfully collected. The appellate court, in turn, had approved evidence that had been gathered unlawfully and had misinterpreted domestic law. The applicant also argued that V.\u0160.\u2019s testimony had contradicted itself: it was not clear who had informed the STT about the alleged crime. 29.  On 28 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. The court held that the pre-trial investigation had been opened on 28 January 2011 upon the request of V.\u0160. Together with his testimony, V.\u0160. had given the authorities his voice-recording watch, where he had recorded his conversations with L.D. and the applicant. The court held that convicted prisoners who used voice recorders breached internal prison regulations, but that did not mean that officers who carried out a pre\u2011trial investigation and obtained information from such a voice recorder acted unlawfully. The court also held that the finding of the applicant\u2019s guilt had not been based solely on the evidence obtained from V.\u0160.\u2019s watch. The court observed that L.D. had suggested the applicant as a lawyer because he knew the prosecutors and judges dealing with V.\u0160.\u2019s case, while L.D. had not incited the applicant to take bribes. By the same judgment the Supreme Court left an appeal on points of law by L.D. unexamined because therein he had raised arguments that had not been raised before the appellate court. 30.  On 19 December 2014 the Supreme Court examined an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings. It decided not to do so, but reduced the fine to LTL 13,000 (approximately EUR 3,765).", "references": ["8", "1", "6", "9", "4", "7", "2", "5", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company and is the owner of the Greek television channel ALPHA. 6.  On 24 January 2002, ALPHA broadcast a television show named \u201cJungle\u201d (\u0396\u03bf\u03cd\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b1) in which three videos that had been filmed with a hidden camera were broadcast. In the first video, A.C., then a member of the Hellenic Parliament and chairman of the inter-party committee on electronic gambling, was shown entering a gambling arcade and playing on two machines. The second video showed a meeting between A.C. and associates of the television host of \u201cJungle\u201d, M.T., during which the first video was shown to A.C. The third video showed a meeting between A.C. and M.T. in the latter\u2019s office. On 27 January 2002 the videos were shown again during a television show named \u201cYellow Press\u201d (\u039a\u03af\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a4\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2) presented by the same television host. 7.  On 23 May 2002 the National Radio and Television Council (\u0395\u03b8\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf \u03a1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03bb\u03b5\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2), following an invitation to the applicant company, held a hearing in which the applicant company was represented by its attorneys. As can be seen from the minutes of the meeting, the applicant company\u2019s attorneys acknowledged the use of hidden camera in the above-mentioned incidents. They argued that such use had been justified owing to A.C. being a public figure and that it had served the public interest, as proven by the fact that the report had resulted in A.C.\u2019s being dismissed from the parliamentary group of the political party for which he had been elected as parliamentary deputy. In their view, that had been the result not only of A.C.\u2019s gambling activities, but also of the fact that he had tried to negotiate with the applicant company\u2019s reporters to present the incident differently. The applicant company\u2019s attorneys further argued that the use of a hidden camera had been exceptional and had been resorted to following the receipt of information that could not have been verified otherwise, as nobody would have believed the journalists\u2019 allegations if they had reported on the issue without broadcasting the images. It can also be seen from the minutes that the members of the National Radio and Television Council expressed their disagreement regarding the use of a hidden camera, arguing that if anyone were able to use a hidden camera by claiming that there was an overriding public interest in doing so, then all citizens \u2013 especially if they were public figures \u2013 would be exposed to the possibility of being subject to pressure and extortion. They furthermore stressed that nobody would ever forbid journalists to report on a certain issue; however the means used raised an issue, as the use of hidden camera could be accepted only in respect of a national security issue or for the prevention of a serious crime or other similar situations. They also noted that there were two separate issues in the instant case; on the one hand the use of a hidden camera and on the other hand the entrapment of A.C. 8.  By its decision 214/162/23.05.2002, the National Radio and Television Council ordered the applicant company to pay one hundred thousand (100,000) euros (EUR) for each of the two television shows during which the above-mentioned videos were shown, as well as to broadcast on three days in a row on its main news show the content of that decision. The decision included a short description of the three videos, a citation of the relevant legislation, and the conclusion that the use of hidden camera in that case had not been in accordance with the relevant law. It further stated that the sanctions had been imposed following an assessment of the gravity of the offence, of the number of viewers of the two television shows, of the size of the investment that had been made by the applicant company and the fact that the television channel had been repeatedly fined in the past for the same offence. 9.  On 10 June 2002 the decision of the National Radio and Television Council was communicated to the Minister of Press and Media, who, after examining its legality, issued decision no 3156/E/11.02.2003 confirming its content. 10.  On 4 April 2003 the applicant company lodged an application for annulment (\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b1\u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2) against the decisions of the National Radio and Television Council and the Minister of Press and Media with the Supreme Administrative Court (\u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u0395\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2) on the grounds that the above-mentioned decision had violated Articles 9, 15 \u00a7 1 and 25 of the Greek Constitution, as well as Article 10 of the Convention. A.C. lodged a third-party intervention requesting from the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the application for annulment. On 23 January 2006 the President of the Supreme Administrative Court referred the case to the Plenary Supreme Administrative Court owing to its high importance. 11.  The hearing before the Plenary Supreme Administrative Court took place on 2 June 2006. By its judgment no. 1213/2010, published on 16 April 2010 and finalised on 21 May 2010 (\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae), the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for annulment. 12.  In its legal assessment, the majority of the Supreme Administrative Court firstly referred to the constitutional provisions providing the right to impart and receive information, and then emphasised that this right is subject to limitations whose legitimate aim is the protection of the rights of others and the observance of the rule of law on condition that those limitations are proportionate. It additionally referred to the Court\u2019s case-law in respect of Article 10 and on Article 8, with specific reference to case-law concerning the protection of a person\u2019s image (see Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004\u2011VI; Sch\u00fcssel v. Austria (dec.), no. 42409/98, 21 February 2002; and Sciacca v. Italy, no. 50774/99, ECHR 2005\u2011I). It continued by noting that under Article 15 of the Constitution the State has the legal duty to exercise control over the radio and television in order to ensure respect for human values and that sanctions imposed by the National Radio and Television Council served that purpose. 13.  The Supreme Administrative Court laid down the conditions under which it is legitimate to broadcast an image that has been filmed with the method of hidden camera, by making a distinction between reporting on specific news, whose exclusive or main source is an image of a specific person recorded by secret means, and the broadcasting of the relevant, secretly recorded image. According to that reasoning, recording by secret means an image which has as its main or only subject a specific person constitutes in principle a violation of that person\u2019s right to his own image, which is protected by Articles 9 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution and 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as a specific aspect of the right to respect for one\u2019s private life. Consequently, the broadcasting on television of news whose exclusive or main source is an image of a specific person recorded by secret means cannot, in principle, be considered as constituting the legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, given that the disseminated news has been received under circumstances which constitute a violation of an individual\u2019s right to his own image. Nevertheless, in certain cases it may be considered justified to broadcast such news, on account of its contribution to a debate of general interest and taking into account the secretly recorded person\u2019s position or standing. However, even when broadcasting of the news is considered a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, this does not automatically render legitimate the broadcasting of the relevant, secretly recorded images, as that constitutes a much more intense [\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2] limitation of the constitutionally protected right of that person to his own image than the simple transmission of news. In the domestic court\u2019s view, broadcasting of a secretly recorded image can only be justified if the legitimate (for the reasons mentioned above) broadcasting of such news is completely impossible or particularly difficult without broadcasting the image that was recorded by hidden means and which constitutes the source of the news. 14.  By applying the above-mentioned principles to the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s argument that it had legitimately transmitted the news concerning A.C. in view of A.C.\u2019s capacity as a public figure. The domestic court stressed that from the text of the decision and from the minutes of the meeting of the National Radio and Television Council it derived that the sanction was imposed to the applicant company solely and exclusively on account of the broadcast of the images that had been recorded by hidden means and not on account of the transmission of the news, whose source had been the secretly recorded images. As far as the broadcasting of the images was concerned, the applicant company had not disputed that the images had been recorded by secret means and had not claimed that broadcasting of the news was absolutely impossible or extremely difficult without broadcasting the relevant images. Therefore, the applicant company\u2019s allegation that it had broadcast the impugned images for reasons of journalistic interest and of public interest was dismissed. 15.  On the basis of the above-mentioned reasoning, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the decision of the National Radio and Television Council had been fully reasoned and dismissed the applicant company\u2019s application for annulment. 16.  A concurring, more specific (\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7) opinion was joined to the majority opinion; the seven judges considered that the recording of a person without his knowledge and the use of it for the broadcasting of news constituted a direct violation of that person\u2019s right to dignity as it reduces him to an instrument for others to achieving goals that are irrelevant to him. Given that, pursuant to Articles 2 \u00a7 1, 15 \u00a7 2 and 25 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, the protection of human dignity is absolute, the broadcasting of such news is always forbidden, irrespective of whether such a broadcast includes the image in question. For those reasons, the judges who supported this opinion considered that the application for annulment should be dismissed. 17.  In addition, there were two dissenting opinions. According to the first one, in view of the fact that the National Radio and Television Council had considered that the broadcasting of news that had been recorded by secret means had constituted a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, the same considerations should be extended to the broadcasting of the relevant image. The reason for this was the special nature of television, in comparison with the other media, owing to which the broadcasting of the image went hand-in-hand with broadcasting the news itself. Therefore, the application for annulment should have been allowed, given that the National Radio and Television Council\u2019s decision had been based solely on the fact that the image of A.C. had been recorded by hidden means, without considering whether broadcasting news whose source was the above images constituted a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information. 18.  Lastly, according to the other dissenting opinion, no constitutional provision justified the absolute protection of an image (as was held by the majority). A person\u2019s right to his own image was susceptible to limitations that varied according to that person\u2019s position and the space in which the recording in question had taken place. For individuals, protection against the recording of their image without their consent was absolute, irrespective of whether it took place in a public or private space, unless the recording was not directed to them or the recording of the image took place with a view to the prevention of crimes in public space. For public figures, however, protection was less absolute. In particular, public figures, such as politicians, were exposed to publicity and sometimes they even pursued it. As a result, there was a legitimate expectation on the part of the media and of the public to impart and receive information regarding their public activities. For these persons, there was an absolute protection of their image in their private space and in public spaces in which they shared private or family moments. When, however, public figures were in public spaces but not under the conditions described above, or acted in a way that was of interest to the public (such as in cases in which they engaged in behaviour contrary to what their public role entailed or contrary to the image they projected towards the public), then the right to receive and impart information could justify the recording of that person without his consent and the broadcasting of the relevant images by the media. In this regard, the dissenting judges argued that it would be inconceivable to equate radio with television, as they did not operate on the same way; therefore, it would not be possible for a television show to simply announce the news without broadcasting the relevant images, as would be the case on the radio. In respect of legitimately recorded images, when there is a balance between transparency and the right to receive information on the one hand and the protection of a person\u2019s image on the other hand, the presumption should be that the recorded image could be broadcast without consent. In view of the above, the four judges considered that the application for annulment should be allowed, taking into account especially the fact that A.C. was a public figure, that the recording of his image had taken place in a public space (that is to say in a gambling arcade), and that the broadcasting of the relevant images had served the purpose of informing the public of behaviour on the part of a member of Parliament that did not meet the requirements of his position. Therefore, the television channel\u2019s decision to broadcast the image as a part of the television shows, which otherwise could be considered unfounded or even defamatory, had not breached the proportionality principle.", "references": ["5", "9", "8", "1", "0", "2", "7", "No Label", "6", "3", "4"], "gold": ["6", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Louvencourt. 7.  He was hired in 1976 by the French national railway company (Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nationale des chemins de fer \u2013 \u201cthe SNCF\u201d), where he last worked as Deputy Head of the Amiens Regional Surveillance Unit. He stated that in 2007 he had complained to senior management about the conduct of one of his subordinates, who, he alleged, had used extreme language when addressing a colleague. The employee in question had then filed a complaint against him, following which the applicant had been charged with making false accusations. The applicant had subsequently been suspended from duty by the SNCF on grounds of that charge. 8.  The proceedings were discontinued a few months later, whereupon the applicant notified his employers of his wish to be reinstated in his former post. He received a reply inviting him to consider appointment to another post, but maintained his original request. 9.  On the day of his reinstatement, on 17 March 2008, the applicant found that his work computer had been seized. After being summoned by his superiors, he was informed on 5 April 2008 that the hard disk on the computer had been analysed and that \u201caddress change certificates drawn up for third persons and bearing the Lille General Security Service logo\u201d had been found, as well as a large number of files containing pornographic images and films. It can be seen from the judgment of the Amiens Court of Appeal of 15 December 2010 (see paragraphs 14-15 below) that the person who had replaced the applicant during his suspension from post had found \u201cdocuments which had caught his attention\u201d on the computer, and that he had alerted his superiors in March 2007 and January 2008. 10.  A request for a written explanation was sent to the applicant on 7 May 2008. He replied that in 2006, following problems with his personal computer, he had transferred the contents of one of his USB keys to his work computer. He added that the files containing pornographic material had been sent to him by people he did not know, via the SNCF\u2019s Intranet. 11.  The applicant was summoned to a disciplinary hearing, which took place on 21 May 2008. On 9 June 2008 he was informed by the \u201cresources management director\u201d of Amiens head office that a proposal had been made to dismiss him from the service and that he would be summoned to appear before the disciplinary board. The board convened on 15 July 2008. 12.  On 17 July 2008 the SNCF regional director decided to dismiss the applicant from the service. His decision was worded as follows:\n\u201c ... the analysis of the files stored on the hard disk of [the applicant\u2019s] work computer, used for his professional duties, contained the following:\ni) change of address certificate, signed in his name, certifying the transfer on 01/11/2003 of Ms Catherine [T.] to the Lille General Security Service; the original certificate, sent to ICF North-East enabled the notice period for vacating her flat to be shortened;\nii) change of address certificate, bearing the Ministry of Justice logo, in the name of M. [S.-J.], governor of Fresnes Prison, certifying the transfer of M. [P.] Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric to Strasbourg Prison, from 1 November 2006;\niii) draft documents drawn up in the name of Michel [V.], director of the SOCRIF, certifying his financial situation with regard to that company;\niv) a very large number of files containing pornographic images and films (zoophilia and scatophilia).\nThese facts are in breach of the special obligation of exemplary conduct inherent in the duties formerly performed by him within the General Security Service, and of the following provisions:\ni) Article 5.2 of the RH 0006 on the principles governing the conduct of SNCF officials;\nii) the general security database RG 0029 (information systems security policy \u2013 user\u2019s charter);\niii) the RA 0024 \u201ccode of professional conduct\u201d - conduct to be observed with regard to the company\u2019s information system;\niv) Article 441-1 of the Criminal Code.\u201d 13.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant brought proceedings before the Amiens Industrial Tribunal (conseil des prud\u2019hommes) seeking a ruling that he had been dismissed without genuine or serious cause. On 10 May 2010 the Industrial Tribunal held that the decision dismissing the applicant from the service had been justified and, accordingly, rejected his claims. 14. On 15 December 2010 the Amiens Court of Appeal upheld the substance of that judgment. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c ... [The applicant] submitted that the SNCF had infringed his private life by opening, in his absence, files identified as personal in his computer.\nAs a matter of policy, documents kept by employees in the company\u2019s office, save those identified by them as personal, are presumed to be for professional use, meaning that the employer can have access to them in the employee\u2019s absence.\nIt can be seen from the report drawn up by the SEF that the pornographic photos and videos were found in a file called \u201cfun\u201d stored on a hard disk labelled \u201cD:/personal data\u201d.\nThe SNCF explained, without being challenged, that the \u201cD\u201d drive was called \u201cD:/data\u201d by default and was traditionally used by staff to store their work documents.\nAn employee cannot use an entire hard disk, which is supposed to record professional data, for his or her private use. The SNCF were therefore entitled to consider that the description \u201cpersonal data\u201d appearing on the hard disk could not validly prohibit their access to it. In any event, the generic term \u201cpersonal data\u201d could have referred to work files being personally processed by the employee and did not therefore explicitly designate elements relating to his private life. That had been the case here, moreover, since the analysis of the hard disk yielded numerous work documents (\u201cLGV photos\u201d file, \u201cwarehouse photos\u201d ... .\nThe term \u201cfun\u201d, moreover, does not clearly convey that the file in question is necessarily private. The term can denote exchanges between colleagues at work or work documents kept as \u201cbloopers\u201d by the employee. The employer also rightly pointed out that the user\u2019s charter provided that \u201cprivate information [had to] be clearly identified as such (\u201cprivate\u201d option in the Outlook criteria)\u201d and that the same was true of the media receiving that information (\u201cprivate\u201d folder). The lower court was therefore correct in considering that the file had not been identified as personal.\nThe same applies to the files containing the impugned certificates registered under the names \u201cFred [P.]\u201d, \u201cSOCRIF\u201d and \u201cCatherine\u201d.\u201d 15.  The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant\u2019s dismissal from the service had not been disproportionate. It observed that both the SNCF\u2019s Code of Professional Conduct and the internal rules provided that staff were required to use the computers provided to them for exclusively professional ends, with the occasional private use being merely tolerated. It found that the applicant had committed a \u201cmassive breach of those rules, going as far as using his work tools to produce a forged document\u201d. In the court\u2019s view, those acts had been particularly serious because, as an official responsible for general surveillance, he would have been expected to be of exemplary conduct. 16.  The applicant appealed on points of law. He submitted, in particular, that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Social Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 4 July 2012. It held as follows:\n\u201c ... whilst files created by an employee with the assistance of the computer facilities supplied to him by his employer for work purposes are presumed to be professional in nature, meaning that the employer is entitled to open them in the employee\u2019s absence, unless they are identified as personal, the description given to the hard disk itself cannot confer privacy on all the data contained in it. The Court of Appeal, which found that labelling the hard disk in the employee\u2019s computer \u201cD:/ personal data\u201d could not enable him to use it for purely private purposes and prohibit access by the employer, drew the legitimate conclusion that the files in question, which had not been identified as \u201cprivate\u201d according to the recommendations of the IT charter, could be lawfully opened by the employer.\nThe Court of Appeal, which found that the employee had stored 1,562 pornographic files representing a volume of 787 megabytes over a period of four years, and that he had also used his work computer to produce forged certificates, rightly held that such misuse of his office equipment in breach of the rules in force at the SNCF amounted to a breach of his contractual obligations. ...\u201d.\n...", "references": ["1", "2", "7", "5", "8", "9", "0", "6", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bijela, Montenegro. 5.  On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant\u2019s employer \u201cVektra Boka\u201d AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) to carry out a re\u2011allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 6.  On 15 January 2013 the applicant requested enforcement of the above judgment and the Herceg Novi First Instance Court issued an enforcement order on 31 January 2013. 7.  On 12 June 2015 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8.  On 28 January 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action. 9.  On 22 March 2016 the Commercial Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement due to the opening of the insolvency proceedings, which decision became final on 11 May 2016. 10.  The judgement in question remains unenforced to the present day. 11.  On 8 February 2013 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings seeking, on the basis of the above judgment, the removal of competing titles from the Land Register. 12.  On 29 July 2015 the Real Estate Directorate terminated (prekinuo) the administrative proceedings because the Commercial Court had commenced insolvency proceeding in respect of the debtor. 13.  On 7 September 2015 the applicant submitted an objection against the above decision. This objection was rejected as being out of time by the Real Estate Directorate on 5 October 2015. 14.  The administrative proceedings are still pending. 15.  On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour. 16.  On 22 September 2015 the High Court upheld this judgment on the merits, but quashed it as regards the costs. 17.  On 31 October 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action due to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 18.  On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19.  The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court\u2019s decision became final and was served on the applicant.", "references": ["7", "1", "5", "2", "0", "4", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Si\u0121\u0121iewi. 6.  The applicant is the owner of 14 Kirkop Square, Kirkop, a two\u2011storey tenement with a surface area of around 175 sq.m. (hereinafter \u201cthe property\u201d). In 1975, 1979, and 1987, following the death of their father, mother and uncle respectively, the applicant and her three brothers inherited an estate which included the property. By a deed of partition of 11 November 1998 the property was assigned to the applicant and she became its sole owner. 7.  The property was requisitioned in 1955 by means of a requisition order. The premises were then allocated to the San Leonard Band Club in Kirkop (hereinafter \u201cthe band club\u201d). The owners of the property never recognised the tenant or accepted any rent from the club. According to a judgment of 1 February 1958 of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction, the owners were entitled to do so because the tenement had not been leased as a dwelling, and thus greater risks were involved. 8.  In the years that followed rent was paid to the owners by the competent authority (then the Director of Social Housing, today the Housing Authority). The annual rent payable amounted to 30 Maltese Lira (MTL \u2013 approximately 70 euros (EUR)), less than EUR 6 per month. According to an architect\u2019s valuation from 2007 submitted by the applicant, the rental value of the tenement at the time was MTL 750 (approximately EUR 1,747) per month. The Government challenged this estimate, as the valuation had contained no explanation as to the basis for the calculations, or whether the property was considered residential or commercial, or vacant or occupied. They relied on a valuation in an architect\u2019s report concerning a property (3 Kirkop Square) requisitioned in 1955 for the purposes of the band club \u2013 which stated that the rental value in 2015 was EUR 12,250 per year, which meant EUR 1,021 per month. The Government did not refer to the different address, arguing as though the valuation referred to the property at issue in the present case. 9.  Over the years the band club carried out extensive structural alterations, without obtaining the consent of the owners or the relevant permits from the competent authorities. According to an architect\u2019s report, there had been a total change and the alteration effected had effaced what had once been the traditional layout of important buildings in old Maltese towns. According to the applicant, this deprived her of the valuable quality and historical and architectural importance of the property, thus devaluing it. The Government argued that the applicant had not availed herself of any ordinary remedy in this regard and had thus failed to substantiate the loss in value. Moreover, in their view the property was in a good state of repair and the alterations had increased its value. 10.  According to the applicant, the band club also repeatedly breached the tenancy agreement which it had signed, by manufacturing fireworks on the premises and conducting commercial activities (such as running a bar and letting the premises out as a wedding venue despite not having the requisite authorisation). The Government submitted that these were unsubstantiated allegations, which had not been proved before the domestic courts. 11.  As from 2008, in the light of constitutional proceedings (see below), the band club started depositing the annual rent in court. 12.  The applicant and her brothers also owned a property (18 St. John\u2019s Alley, Kirkop) adjacent to the tenement above, which was requisitioned in 1986 and also assigned to the band club. 13.  In 1987 the owners of the tenement instituted civil proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction against the Housing Secretary and the band club. They requested that the requisition order of 30 December 1986 be declared null and void as being contrary to the 1949 Housing Act, and sought to regain possession of the tenement. They also requested compensation for the damage allegedly sustained. 14.  In a judgment of 9 October 1991 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 claim. The owners appealed against that decision. 15.  In a judgment of 30 December 1993 the Court of Appeal declared the requisition order null and void and ordered that the appellants be given possession of the premises within six months. It held that the requisition for the purposes of assigning the property to the band club could not be considered to be in the public interest. It sent the case back to the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction for it to award the appellants compensation. 16.  In a judgment of 31 May 2005 the Court of Appeal rejected a request for a new trial submitted by the band club. 17.  In a judgment of 16 October 2006 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction found the Housing Secretary and the band club liable for the damage suffered by the owners in connection with the structural alterations to the property. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 27 February 2009. 18.  By a judgment of 6 May 2009 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction awarded the owners EUR 72,000 in damages, covering EUR 16,000 for missing objects, EUR 40,000 to rectify the structural changes made and EUR 16,000 for the loss of use of the property for twenty years. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 2 October 2012. 19.  In 2007 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings in relation to the property requisitioned in 1955, asking the court to declare that, as a result of the requisition order and the continued occupation of the premises, she had suffered a breach of her rights under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She asked the court to award her compensation for the taking of possession of the property and for the violations suffered, and to order any other measure capable of preventing the continuation of the violation, including the release of the property. 20.  The defendants, the Director of Social Accommodation, the Attorney General and the band club, argued that no such violations had occurred. 21.  By a judgment of 11 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction upheld the applicant\u2019s claims. It considered that the requisition order had been issued for the property to be enjoyed by a private entity and therefore the measure had not been in the public interest. In this connection, it referred to a judgment of 30 December 1993 by the Court of Appeal concerning what it considered to be the same property (see above). Moreover, the measure had not been proportionate. The rent had been derisory, causing the applicant to suffer a disproportionate and excessive burden. She had therefore suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. According to the court, the applicant had also suffered a violation of Article 14, as only her property had been requisitioned for the use of the band club. In determining the amount of compensation, the court did not take into account the fact that the applicant or her ancestors had received rent, given that the amount was derisory. Bearing in mind the values established by the applicant\u2019s expert as to the rental value and sale value of the property, which was MTL 180,000 (approximately EUR 420,000) (pg.12 of the judgment), as well as the length of time the requisition was and remained in place, the court awarded the applicant EUR 60,000 in compensation (kumpens) for the requisition of the premises and the violations found, noting it was not awarding civil damages (danni \u010bivili) in this context. Three quarters of the amount was to be paid by the Director of Social Housing and one quarter by the band club. It further ordered the band club to vacate the premises within three months of the date of judgment and to return the premises to the applicant. 22.  The band club appealed, arguing that it could not be held responsible for breaches of human rights and that, in any event, the measure had been in the public interest. It further contested the order to vacate the property. The Attorney General and the Director of Social Accommodation also appealed, in particular in relation to the findings of a lack of public interest, a violation of Article 14 and the redress awarded. The applicant cross\u2011appealed, arguing that the compensation awarded was too low and did not reflect the losses she had incurred over the years. 23.  By a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in part. It reiterated the finding of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the requisition had been disproportionate. It found, however, that it had been in the public interest \u2013 the court considered that jurisprudence had shifted since the time of the judgment of 30 December 1993 of the Court of Appeal on which the first-instance court had based its assessment. In the present case the requisition had served a social and cultural purpose for the generality of citizens and could not be said to have served solely private interests. 24.  It further found that there had been no violation of Article 14. 25.  As to the redress, the Constitutional Court revoked the order for the club to vacate the premises. Considering that the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was a consequence of the lack of a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and those of the tenant, and given that the validity of the lease was not at issue in the present case, it did not seem appropriate for it to evict the tenant; it sufficed that that unfair balance be redressed. 26.  The Constitutional Court confirmed the amount of compensation awarded by the first-instance court, including the way in which it had to be shared. It considered that the band club had benefited from the situation and had never attempted to fix it, despite the fact that it had not been recognised as a tenant. In relation to the amount of compensation, it considered that the disproportionality of the measure had not persisted since the start of the requisition in 1955, but had started to be so only after the 1980s. Furthermore, the applicant had received the rent paid by the department and had only instituted constitutional proceedings in 2007 (while never contesting the validity of the requisition), thus it was legitimate and in line with local case-law to reduce her compensation. It also held that the property had been taken in the public interest and therefore the compensation needed not reflect market values. It followed that the compensation had to be reduced, however, given that the property was not to be vacated, it was appropriate to retain the amount awarded by the first\u2011instance court. Lastly, the court held that the claim for damages for the depreciation of the property as a result of structural works did not fall within the ambit of a constitutional complaint, and it was thus not its place to award such damages. 27.  The Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal and half the judicial costs of the proceedings before the two levels of jurisdiction.", "references": ["7", "5", "2", "1", "6", "4", "8", "3", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 1.  At the material time the applicant was the Executive Chair of the Partidul Verde ecological party, a political movement affiliated with the European Green Party. 2.  Partidul Verde had put up candidates for the 2008 general elections but failed to win any seats. In 2009 the applicant was the party\u2019s candidate in the presidential elections. He won about 60,000 votes, or some 0.6 % of the total validly cast votes. 3.  The 2008 general elections had been governed by Law no. 35/2008 on elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, amending Law no. 67/2004 on local authority elections, Law no. 215/2001 on local public authorities and Law no. 393/2004 on the status of local elected representatives (\u201cLaw no. 35/2008\u201d; see paragraph 17 below). In 2009 Parliament amended Law no. 35/2008 under Law no. 323/2009 approving Emergency Order no. 97/2008 (\u201cLaw no. 323/2009\u201d; see paragraph 18 below). That amendment made it impossible for parties not represented in Parliament, as well as independent candidates, to put up candidates for or stand in parliamentary by-elections. 4.  Parliamentary by-elections were scheduled for 17 January 2010 in order to fill a vacant seat in a Bucharest constituency. According to information available to the Court, that seat had fallen vacant in October 2009. 6.  On 29 December 2009 the Electoral Board rejected the candidacy on the grounds that Partidul Verde was not represented in Parliament. 7.  Partidul Verde, represented by the applicant, challenged that rejection before Bucharest County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) and requested the acceptance of the applicant\u2019s candidacy. It entered an objection of unconstitutionality under section 48 (17) of Law no. 35/2008 (see paragraph 18 below). It alleged in particular that the ban on candidates from parties not represented in Parliament and independent candidates infringed the right to free elections and amounted to unjustified discrimination as compared with parties represented in Parliament. The party added that, contrary to the recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (\u201cthe Venice Commission\u201d; see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), Law no. 35/2008 had been amended less than one year before the by-elections. 8.  By interlocutory decision of 30 December 2009 the County Court deferred its ruling so that the Constitutional Court could consider the objection of unconstitutionality. 9.  By Decision no. 61/2010 of 14 January 2010, the Constitutional Court dismissed the objection of unconstitutionality. Having reiterated that Parliament\u2019s political structure was defined by general elections, the Constitutional Court rejected Partidul Verde\u2019s arguments as follows:\n\u201cThe [Constitutional] Court observes that the reason for the holding of the parliamentary by-elections was the fact that a parliamentary seat had fallen vacant. Such by-elections are held in order to assign seats in Parliament while simultaneously respecting the structure of Parliament as it emerged from the latest general elections. In order to respect the sovereignty and the will of the electorate as expressed in the framework of general elections, it is necessary that the by-election stage, which is subsidiary and complementary to the general elections, should observe the electoral threshold criterion which allows political parties to be represented in Parliament. To allow candidates to stand in by-elections for political parties which are not represented in Parliament would alter the latter\u2019s political structure, [which is] incompatible with the votes cast by the electorate during the general elections which led to the constitution of the Romanian people\u2019s supreme representative body, with a specific political make-up, which can only be modified in the cases and conditions determined by law.\n...\nMoreover, allowing a person who does not belong to a party represented in Parliament to obtain a parliamentary mandate further to by-elections would be tantamount to allowing something which had not been obtained in the framework of general elections to be obtained by the \u2018devious means\u2019 of a by-election.\u201d 10.  As regards the plea based on the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the Constitutional Court assessed it \u201cwith reservations\u201d. It noted that the said recommendations advised against amending the electoral law less than one year before any elections, but that they also comprised the hypothesis that such amendments \u201cshould be adopted at the level of the Constitution or at a level higher than that of ordinary law\u201d (see paragraph 20 below). In the present case the Constitutional Court ruled that the recommendation had been complied with because the amendment to Law no. 35/2008 had been effected under an organic law, which met the criterion of a \u201clevel higher than that of ordinary law\u201d (see paragraph 16 below). 11.  By judgment of 30 March 2010 the County Court dismissed the party\u2019s challenge, referring to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in its aforementioned decision of 14 January 2010, to the effect that since Partidul Verde had failed to pass the electoral threshold in the general elections it could not put up candidates for the by-elections. The County Court further noted that the elections had already been held and that the challenge had therefore become devoid of purpose. 12.  Fresh parliamentary by-elections were scheduled for 25 April 2010 in Bucharest to fill another vacant seat. 13.  The applicant stood as an independent candidate. His candidacy was rejected by the Electoral Board pursuant to section 48 (17) of Law no. 35/2008. The applicant appealed to the County Court against the rejection of his candidacy, and lodged a fresh objection of unconstitutionality. 14.  By Decision no. 503/2010 of 20 April 2010, the Constitutional Court allowed the objection of unconstitutionality lodged by the applicant and declared the part of the impugned section prohibiting independent candidacies unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed the right to stand for election. The relevant parts of that decision read as follows:\n\u201cAlthough, as regards political parties which are not represented in Parliament, the Constitutional Court\u2019s Decision no. 61 of 14 January 2010 set out the reasons justifying, in the light of constitutional standards, the elimination of such parties from by-elections, as regards independent candidates no reason was given for subjecting them to the same legal treatment. Thus the electoral threshold means that political parties must be representative, to some extent, of the electorate, as required by the sovereignty principle. in the case of independent candidates, however, such a criterion would be absurd; ... they are asked to submit support lists comprising the signatures of a minimum 4% of all the voters registered in the permanent electoral lists of the boards to which they submit their candidacies, [and the total number should not be lower that] 2,000 electors in the case of the Chamber of Deputies and 4,000 electors in the case of the Senate. Consequently, for general elections, the legislature had laid down this precondition, which is necessary in order to stand as an independent candidate, and simultaneously in order to exercise the right to be elected. Nevertheless, in relation to by-elections, the legislature failed to lay down the requisite conditions for this category of persons standing for election, providing that the category of candidates for by-elections comprised only political parties and organisations of citizens belonging to national minorities having passed the legal electoral threshold at the general elections, whether individually or in the framework of a political or electoral alliance. That being the case, it is a case not of setting limits on or circumscribing the manner of exercising the right to be elected, but of annulling that right by failing to recognise it, [by an] unlawful absence of regulation.\n...\nIn conclusion, the Electoral Law may specify the conditions in which an individual may stand for election as an independent (financial deposit, a specific number of supporters, etc.), but it can in no way exclude from the electoral process, in the case of by-elections, the candidacy of a person [standing as an] independent candidate without thereby infringing the fundamental right enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution \u2013 the right to be elected.\u201d 15.  The applicant stood in the 2012 general elections and obtained a seat in the Chamber of Deputies for a four-year mandate.", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "9", "4", "7", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977. 7.  On 25 April 1999 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen persons. On the same day, she underwent a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted no sign of injury on her body. 8.  On 26 April 1999 police officers at the Istanbul Security Directorate took statements from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed that she was a member of the illegal organisation and admitted having planned an attack on a shopping centre and having acted as a lookout while other co-accused started a fire by throwing Molotov cocktails at the shopping centre, killing thirteen persons in March 1999. 9.  On 27 April 1999 the applicant was required to confront with two other co-accused before the police, in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record of the confrontation she admitted having carried out the attack on the shopping centre with those two and another co-accused. 10.  On the same day an identification parade took place at the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the absence of a lawyer, where one of the eyewitnesses of the incident identified the applicant in front of police officers and the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. 11.  On the same day the applicant was also required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer g\u00f6sterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the applicant described in detail what steps she had taken before the attack on the shopping centre and indicated how she had acted as a lookout while the other co-accused threw Molotov cocktails in the shopping centre. 12.  On 30 April 1999 the applicant was seen by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institution who noted in his report that the applicant bore no traces of ill-treatment. 13.  On the same day, the applicant was heard by the Istanbul Public Prosecutor and by the investigating judge, still in the absence of a lawyer. In her statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that her statements to the police had been given under duress. Subsequently, the investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. 14.  On 6 May 1999 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, and charged the applicant with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 15.  The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  On 7 May 2007 relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment for membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen people. In delivering its judgment, the Assize Court further took into consideration several items of evidence, such as the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, public prosecutor and investigating judge, video recordings and written records of the crime scene visits, autopsy reports, eyewitness identifications, and the statements given by some of the accused persons. 17.  On 7 May 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "1", "0", "8", "6", "2", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Mu\u015f. 7.  On 19 April 2003 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8.  On 20 April 2003 the applicant\u2019s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). 9.  On 22 April 2003 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10.  On 6 May 2003 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, Law no. 765. 11.  The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12.  On 19 September 2006, relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  On 19 November 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds. 14.  On 30 December 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant again under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  On 20 March 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.", "references": ["9", "5", "1", "8", "4", "0", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973. She grew up in \u0160iauliai, which in 2003, the time relevant in this case, had about 130,000 inhabitants. She currently lives in Vilnius. 6.  The applicant\u2019s medical records show that in May 1992 she was treated for three weeks at Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital (Kauno psichiatrijos ligonin\u0117), where doctors diagnosed her with an acute paranoid reaction disorder (\u016bmi paranoidin\u0117 reakcija). The applicant had been taken to hospital by her parents, who had stated that she had previously joined the Believers in God religious sect (Dievo tik\u0117jimo sekta) and that she had become agitated and disorientated. At her parents\u2019 request and once her health had improved, in summer 1992 she continued treatment at a psychiatric institution in \u0160iauliai (\u0160iauli\u0173 psichoneurologijos dispanseris), where her diagnosis was acute paranoid psychosis (\u016bmi paranoidin\u0117 psichoz\u0117). The doctors noted that the applicant had joined another religious sect, the Hungarian sect (Vengr\u0173), and that her condition had worsened after joining in certain of the sect\u2019s activities in a forest. In particular, she had not been able to communicate well and had spoken only about religion-related topics while at the hospital. Subsequently, the applicant received treatment in the same psychiatric institution in \u0160iauliai in 1994, when she was diagnosed with paranoia (paranoidin\u0117 b\u016bsena). She was disorientated and depressed. The doctors noted that the applicant had an inner conflict \u2013 she was dissatisfied with the hyper care (hipergloba) given to her by her mother, but was nevertheless not independent or mentally mature. In the summer of 1996 the applicant was again admitted to hospital and treated in the psychiatric institution in \u0160iauliai, where she was diagnosed with moderately severe endogenous depression (endogenin\u0117 depresija, vidutinio gilumo). Once her mental state had improved, the applicant refused to stay in psychiatric institution and was released. 7.  On an unknown date, the applicant obtained a degree in law. In 1997 she won a competition to pursue postgraduate studies (podiplominei sta\u017euotei) in the United States, where she studied for two years. 8.  In May 2002, the applicant\u2019s father became ill with cancer. The applicant was distressed, did not sleep well and had a car accident. Her mother took her the same month to the Volte private hospital in Vilnius, where she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (potrauminio streso sutrikimas). She spent a week in the hospital and was released at her own wish so she could be treated as an outpatient. 9.  In December 2002 the private company which employed the applicant as an in-house lawyer was put into liquidation. The applicant later found a job as a lawyer at the Ministry of Economy (\u016akio ministerija). 10.  In February 2003 the applicant made her first visit to the Ojas Meditation Centre, the Lithuanian branch of the Osho religious movement (see Leela F\u00f6rderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany (no. 58911/00, \u00a7 6, 6 November 2008), where she started meditating (prad\u0117jo medituoti). She states that she found \u201cinner spiritual and emotional healing for [her] stressed and disharmonious inner state, [caused by her] father\u2019s illness, car accident and the loss of [her previous private sector] job\u201d. 11. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records and court decisions (also see paragraphs 29, 33 and 45 below), on the morning of 7 May 2003 she arrived for work as usual at the Ministry of Economy in Vilnius. She suddenly felt exhausted and asked her superior (vir\u0161inink\u0117) for some time off. When her superior refused, the applicant slammed doors and ran out of the office. She was stressed and agitated. She then left her vehicle unlocked in the middle of the street, returned to her apartment, undressed completely, and began screaming on her balcony. She did not open the door to her work colleagues. The applicant\u2019s mother called her the same day, but could not communicate with her because of the applicant\u2019s state of mind. The mother then asked for help from the applicant\u2019s cousin, E.\u0160.\nAt about 8 p.m. the applicant\u2019s sister, G.M., and her cousin, E.\u0160., arrived in Vilnius, and called an ambulance. The applicant was then taken by force to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital (Respublikin\u0117 Vilniaus psichiatrijos ligonin\u0117), a public hospital under the Ministry of Health Care. 12.  At the psychiatric hospital, the applicant refused to sign a form consenting to her admission and treatment. Her cousin did so instead, at 9.15 p.m. The applicant was agitated, aggressive and could not understand the situation. She was physically restrained three times for forty minutes, and forcibly administered neuroleptics, including haloperidol. She fell asleep at 4.20 a.m. on 8 May. 13.  Later the same morning, the applicant was seen by a psychiatrist, doctor D.\u0160., who was also a head of division at that hospital, and doctor A.G. The doctors indicated in her medical records that the applicant \u201cdid not object to being treated\u201d at that hospital (also see paragraph 29 below). 14.  In her application to the Court, and without being contradicted on this point by the Government, the applicant stated that from 8 May to 13 May 2007 she had been placed under the strictest patient regime at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. She had been supervised by a nurse twenty\u2011four hours a day in a ward with eight other patients. She had not been able to leave the ward without a nurse.\nFrom 13 May to 5 June, the applicant was under a strict care regime. She could have a walk around the hospital grounds, but only if accompanied by a nurse.\nOn 5 June, and until her release on 26 June 2003, the applicant\u2019s care regime was changed and at certain times of the day she could take walks on her own within the territory of the hospital. 15.  The applicant\u2019s medical record of 26 May 2003 reads that the applicant at that time did not yet fully understand how sick she was (pilno liguistos b\u016bkl\u0117s suvokimo dar n\u0117ra). The record also states that \u201cit has emerged that the patient attends the Osho non-traditional meditation and improvement centre. During conversation [the applicant] states that attending the centre \u2018brings her peace\u2019 while not disturbing her social functions; it is also her \u2018essential interest\u2019. [The applicant] has an uncritical attitude to attending the centre. Psycho-correction therapy to be continued\u201d. 16.  The record of 2 June 2003 reads that the applicant was clear-headed (m\u0105stymas nuoseklus) and was not agitated (afektas adekvatus). The applicant \u201cwas gradually adopting a critical attitude towards psychotic behaviour and also about ways to spend her free time. The treatment was to be continued.\u201d 17.  The record of 20 June 2003 reads that \u201cduring psycho correction, the applicant was categorical about attending the Ojas Centre, and asserted that \u2018it was a personal matter (tai jos asmeninis reikalas)\u2019. The applicant showed no psychotic symptoms.\u201d 18.  The applicant was released from Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital on 26 June 2003, after fifty-two days. Her medical records, issued by that hospital and later confirmed by the court appointed experts, stated that from 8 May until 26 June 2003 the applicant had a transitory psychotic disorder (tranzitorinis psichozinis susirgimas), which was a serious mental disorder.\nThe applicant\u2019s medical record of 26 June 2003 stated that her affect (mental state) was flat (calm) and stable (afektas lygus, stabilus) and that she was clear\u2011headed. She had realistic and concrete plans for the future, had a critical attitude towards psychotic behaviour (atsiradusi kritika psichoziniam elgesiui), and had promised to continue treatment as an outpatient. 19.  On 17 June 2003, while the applicant was still being held in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, an episode of the Srov\u0117s television programme was aired on the LNK national television channel. The channel made an announcement (anonsas) about the forthcoming broadcast in the following way:\n\u201cR.S. [journalist]: a secret has been revealed (demaskuota paslaptis). There is a centre which has not been registered anywhere and where the meditation practised is so powerful that to become a member you have to submit medical proof that you are not ill with HIV. ... After such meditation Violeta is today in a psychiatric hospital. Her mother is in tears ...\u201d 20.  The programme itself contained the following statements, including two by doctor D.\u0160., head of division and a psychiatrist at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, who was interviewed by the journalist on what appeared to be the premises of Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital:\n\u201cA.K. [journalist]: B. is a woman who has had a management job all her life. ...Today B. has agreed to talk because what has happened is completely unexpected. The woman did not foresee disaster, she did not foresee how her older daughter, who is now an adult, the thirty-year-old Violeta, had been charmed and what she got herself involved with.\u201d\n\u201cR.S.: The organisation we are talking about today has many secrets ...\u201d\n\u201cDoctor D.\u0160.: It does not appear that this young woman (mergina) would participate in orgies. She is not hypersexual, and, well, you know, as far as I have learned, she is of high morals and studied for a couple of years in America for a master\u2019s degree.\u201d\n...\n\u201cR.S.: We are meeting Violeta\u2019s mother and her seventeen-year-old sister at Vilnius train station. The mother and her daughter came here by train from \u0160iauliai, wishing to tell Violeta\u2019s story. They did not wish to meet in Violeta\u2019s home town (gimtuosiuose namuose), \u0160iauliai. They are afraid to hurt Violeta\u2019s father. He is seriously ill and it would be hard for him to accept (i\u0161gyventi \u017eini\u0105) what has happened to his elder daughter. More than a month ago, in the apartment in the capital where Violeta lives, the most horrible event in the young woman\u2019s life took place. Violeta suddenly had a complete nervous breakdown, acute psychosis. For Violeta\u2019s family, the reason for that psychosis is the influence of the Ojas Meditation Centre.\u201d\nThe programme then discussed the activities of the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius. The journalist implied that the followers of Osho in Vilnius held sex orgies. As to the applicant\u2019s identity, the journalist also mentioned that \u201cVioleta obtained a master\u2019s degree abroad, had an important job in State service (dirbo atsaking\u0105 valstybin\u012f darb\u0105)\u201d and that the person was \u201ccurrently being treated at a psychiatric hospital\u201d. The programme included the following statements:\n\u201cR.S.: Violeta\u2019s family state that a couple of weeks before the tragedy Violeta would meditate all day and practically not speak to anyone else. She is currently being treated in a psychiatric hospital. ...After two months of meditation Violeta was placed in a psychiatric hospital, in a state of acute psychosis (\u016bmios psichoz\u0117s b\u016bsenoje).\u201d\n\u201cDoctor D.\u0160.: They [people belonging to sects] do not talk about it at all. As far as I have heard, the teachings there [at the Ojas Meditation Centre] take a couple of years, and enlightment happens or something of that kind. This takes place over four years, something is being cleansed. She [Violeta] does not talk about that. She even says that she performs some kind of practice (atlieka praktikas) there; she hides [things]. This is a common trait of members of sects, that they very much hide that fact. Or, if [things] come to light, they portray it as completely innocent. That is very common.\u201d M.V., who according to the register of religious organisations in Lithuania is the \u201cleader\u201d and master (lyderis (meistras)) of the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius, stated during the broadcast that the applicant had been terrorised by her mother. The broadcast concluded with statements by the journalist and M.V.:\n\u201cR.S.: Maybe it is a coincidence, but a clear danger to Violeta\u2019s mental state appeared just after she had started meditating in accordance with Osho teachings. The young woman will need a long and difficult course of medical treatment (mergina dar ilgai ir sunkiai gydysis). The fact that she has only been in this [Ojas Meditation] centre for a couple of months leads one to reflect on how the practices of the Ojas Meditation Centre can affect someone who is constantly seeking to liberate their soul.\u201d\n\u201cM.V.: Actually, there is a Catholic atmosphere and a Catholic resistance, maybe even a Christian resistance, against meditation, because there is no God in meditation ...\u201d\nThe applicant\u2019s mother and sister were shown during the programme and identified by their real first names as \u201cB., Violeta\u2019s mother\u201d and \u201cG., Violeta\u2019s sister\u201d. They made statements about the destructive influence that, in their view, the Ojas Meditation Centre had had on the applicant. 21.  On 14 August 2003 on the internet site of the Ojas Meditation Center the applicant published a five-page open letter to the journalists at Srov\u0117s, signing it with her real name and surname. She expressed regret that the broadcast had not been an objective portrayal of her story. She stated that \u201cby using me, you have maybe created an interesting story, but it is very one-sided. Maybe by unraveling (narpliodamos) the story through my mother you also wanted to protect me and sought to help me, but in reality your broadcast has caused me to feel much distrust and a lot of pain\u201d. The applicant then mentioned that she had previously been admitted to psychiatric institutions in 1992 and 2002, emphasising that those two periods had been unrelated to meditation. She also wrote that she had only started attending the Ojas Meditation Centre in February 2003 and that her emotional breakdown in May 2003 had had no connection to those visits. For the applicant, the Srov\u0117s journalists had therefore given an unfair account of her story, and had shown bias by implying that her mental health issues had been caused by meditating at the Ojas Centre. The applicant also stated that in 2002 she had consulted several psychotherapists (psichoterapeutai), who had helped her realise that her psychological problems had roots in her childhood, when she had been controlled by and had lived in fear of emotional and physical violence from her mother. Even at the time of writing there had been resistance and mockery from her family when the applicant had shared her new interests, such as yoga or meditation. The applicant also stated that she \u201chad not been put under a spell (neap\u017eav\u0117jo)\u201d by meditation. Instead, meditation had entered her life naturally as the result of a long and intense spiritual search. She continued:\n\u201cMeditation for me is a way to learn about myself and the world, and on the basis of that understanding and by deepening it, to open myself to peace, joy, truth and love. Today meditation for me is a means to reduce emotional, spiritual and psychological tension and stress, to understand the reasons behind unhappiness, including by learning how to avoid it. Meditation allows me to live a more conscious life (s\u0105moningesnis) and one which is full of joy.\u201d 22.  The applicant also referred in the letter to her involuntary admission to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital in 2003, where she had been taken by force and deceit, and where she had never agreed to be treated. She wrote that the psychiatrists had blindly believed her mother\u2019s stories and had diagnosed her as being under the influence of a sect (sektanti\u0161kumas). That had led to the psychiatric treatment she had received being mainly directed at how to cure her from practising meditation (pagydyti nuo meditacijos) in a hostile environment that had damaged her psychologically and emotionally. In particular, the psychiatrists at the hospital had interrogated her (buvau kamantin\u0117jama) about the Ojas Meditation Centre and its practices, forced her to promise not to meditate, alleged that sex orgies had taken place there, that meditation was harmful for her mental health, that she should follow the Catholic religion which is traditional in Lithuania and that meditation was not compatible with her \u201csocial status\u201d. During one visit (vizitacija), a doctor had called her \u201cthe one from the Ojas Centre\u201d, rather than using her name. The applicant also wrote that when she had spoken about meditation at the Ojas Meditation Centre doctor D.\u0160. had simply made fun of it, had said that that was not meditation, and that the applicant knew nothing about what meditation actually was. The applicant had not been able to resist the psychiatrists at the hospital because refusing to talk to them or disagreeing with their statements about the Ojas Meditation Centre or their instructions to stop meditating had been treated as signs of mental illness. For that reason, the amount of medication at the hospital had not been reduced for a long time, strong drugs had been injected into her, and her release from hospital had been postponed. The applicant also noted that she had intended to submit a written statement to the hospital that she refused treatment, but she had been persuaded not to do so because the doctors had threatened that otherwise they would diagnose her problems in such a way that could later prevent her from getting a job. 23.  The applicant concluded by noting that in July 2003 she had attended a session at the Ojas Meditation Centre, and had finally been able to meditate and recover after nearly two months in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital in a hostile environment that had harmed her mind and body. She saw meditation as means to live a more conscious and meaningful life. 24.  In May 2006 the applicant sued Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. She alleged: (1) unlawful deprivation of liberty; (2) a violation of her right to a private life; (3) a violation of her right to freedom of religion; (4) a violation of her right to the inviolability of her body; (5) failure to provide proper medical care; and (6) a breach of her right to be properly informed about her diagnosis, methods of treatment and prognosis. 25.  Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital responded by saying that on 7 May 2003 the applicant had been involuntarily hospitalised since she had been in a state of acute psychosis and had posed a danger to herself and others. The hospital also submitted that the applicant had never complained in writing about being held unlawfully. The hospital argued that it had not disclosed any confidential information about the applicant, and that it could not be responsible for the actions of the applicant\u2019s mother and the way the Srov\u0117s broadcast had been presented. It added that the Osho religious movement had been acting outside the law in 2003 because it had only been registered in Lithuania as a religious movement on 12 April 2005 (see paragraph 56 below). Furthermore, the applicant had not proved that the hospital had had no reason to think that her non-traditional religious beliefs had been the reason behind her emotional outburst (emocin\u0117s i\u0161krovos prie\u017eastis). 26.  The Vilnius Regional Court ordered the State Forensic Psychiatry Service at the Ministry of Health Care to produce a report to answer certain questions regarding the applicant\u2019s medical condition and her admission to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital between 7 May and 26 June 2003 on the basis of her medical records. The forensic report was produced in November 2007. 27.  On 25 June 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s action.\n(a)  As to the lawfulness of the restriction of liberty when the applicant was held at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital 28.  The Vilnius Regional Court noted at the outset that according to Articles 27 and 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care a person could be placed in hospital without his or her consent if there was a clear and present danger of him or her harming themselves or others. Even then, a court order was needed within two days to keep the person in hospital. Should a court refuse such an order, the forced hospitalisation and treatment had to be discontinued (see paragraph 69 below). 29.  On the basis of the forensic expert report and other material, the Vilnius Regional Court firstly observed that the applicant had not actually denied that she might have required medical assistance on 7 May 2003 because of her state of mind. However, the court found that as of 8 May 2003 she had no longer been in need of medical support. That was confirmed by the applicant\u2019s medical file, where doctor D.\u0160. had noted on 8 May at 8.15 a.m. that \u201cthe patient is responding to meaningful contact, is correctly orientated (pacient\u0117 prieinama prasmingam kontaktui, orientuota teisingai)\u201d. Also, at 8.30 a.m. on the same day, doctor A.G., the other psychiatrist treating her at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, had written that \u201ccurrently the patient is sleepy because of medication ... her mind is clear, she is well orientated when it comes to place and time ... currently the affect is flat (pacient\u0117 \u0161.m. mieguista d\u0117l vaist\u0173 poveikio, s\u0105mon\u0117 ai\u0161ki, orientacija vietoje ir laike tiksli... \u0161iuo metu afektas lygus)\u201d. The court also based itself on the applicant\u2019s other medical records. All that meant that the applicant\u2019s state of health had no longer corresponded to that set down in Article 27 of the Law on Mental Health Care to permit her further forced hospitalisation. Despite that, the applicant had been held against her will and treated at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital until 26 June 2003, without the hospital ever asking for a court order. That had been in breach of the two\u2011day time-limit set in Article 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care. 30.  The Vilnius Regional Court also agreed with the applicant\u2019s argument that she had not been able to leave the hospital because she was under the influence of drugs, had faced a threat of being physically restrained if she disobeyed the doctors, and had been under a strict regime. The court noted that the requirement that a psychiatric patient should normally be able to express his or her consent to be hospitalised and treated had also been underlined by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 31.  The Vilnius Regional Court also observed that there was no written evidence that the applicant had ever agreed to be placed in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital between 7 May and 26 June 2003. According to the forensic expert report, the applicant had not been able to understand her actions on 7 May 2003; however, the experts had not reached the same conclusion about the period between 8 May and 26 June 2003. That notwithstanding, the applicant had been forced to stay in hospital for fifty\u2011two days for treatment. The court also emphasised that the patient was always the weaker party in relation to the hospital and its personnel. The hospital\u2019s argument that the applicant had agreed to stay by acquiescence was therefore null and void. The court also relied on doctor D.\u0160.\u2019s admission during court hearings that the applicant\u2019s life had \u201cnot necessarily been in danger\u201d for all of the fifty-two days of treatment and to the same conclusion by the applicant\u2019s treating doctor A.G. In fact, the records signed by doctor A.G. on 8 and 12 May 2007 stating that the applicant was being treated at the hospital had given only one side (viena\u0161ali\u0161ki) of the situation as they had not been countersigned by the applicant. In that context, the court also had regard to the applicant\u2019s explanation that because of the side effects of the medication (sleepiness, inability to concentrate) and the possibility of physical restraint (being tied down) in case of disobedience, she had not been able to express her disagreement about being treated at the hospital in writing. The court also considered that the consent given on 7 May 2013 by the applicant\u2019s cousin, E.\u0160., for the applicant to be put in hospital and treated could also not be considered as an act of agreement expressed by the applicant. 32.  In the light of those factors, the Vilnius Regional Court concluded that the procedure set down in domestic law for forced admission to hospital and treatment had not only been breached in the applicant\u2019s case, but outright disregarded.\n(b)  As to the applicant\u2019s right to privacy 33.  The applicant\u2019s mother also testified before the Vilnius Regional Court. She said that she had learned on 7 May 2003 that the applicant was delirious and had asked E.\u0160. for help. That had led to the applicant being taken to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. The mother also said she had contacted the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius about her daughter, but had not received a constructive response. She had then contacted the journalists from Srov\u0117s, because she had wished to find out what was happening to her daughter. She had not known what diagnosis the psychiatric hospital had given the applicant and had only told the Srov\u0117s journalists which hospital her daughter was in. 34.  Doctor D.\u0160. testified that she was head of division (skyriaus ved\u0117ja) at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital when the applicant had been treated there. She said that the journalists had not called her directly but that the hospital administration had informed her that they would come and had \u201ckind of stated that the talk would be about Mockut\u0117\u201d. The doctor testified that she had \u201cnot discussed [the applicant\u2019s] health\u201d with the journalists, only the Ojas Meditation Centre and meditation as such. 35.  The Vilnius Regional Court then turned to the applicant\u2019s complaint of a breach of her right to privacy. Relying on Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care and Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data (see paragraphs 59 and 61 below), the court noted that \u201cthere was evidence in the case-file (byloje yra pateiktas \u012frodymas) that doctor D.\u0160. had, without obtaining the applicant\u2019s consent to disclose confidential information, revealed to the Srov\u0117s journalists that the applicant had been diagnosed with acute psychosis (\u016bmin\u0117 psichoz\u0117), that she was being treated at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, and that she had studied in the United States\u201d. The interview with the doctor had been shown during the Srov\u0117s programme on 17 June 2003. The court noted that even in 2008 (\u0161iuo metu) there were not many people in Lithuania who had studied in the United States and so that characteristic had not been very common. The court also considered that \u201cother information revealed to the journalists about the applicant could also allow the applicant\u2019s identity to be established\u201d, although the court did not specify what other information it meant.\n(c)  As to the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of religion 36.  The court then had regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint about freedom of religion by referring to Article 9 of the Convention. It also relied on Article 7 of the Law on Mental Health Care (see paragraph 67 below). 37.  The court found valid the applicant\u2019s complaints that the doctors had tried to dissuade (atkalb\u0117ti) her from meditating, attempted to alter her views on non-traditional meditation religion and had treated her against meditating and attending the Ojas Meditation Centre. That conclusion was based on the applicant\u2019s medical file, which contained the following records for 26 May and 20 and 23 June 2003: \u201c ... absence of a critical attitude towards attending [the Ojas Meditation] Centre\u201d; \u201cduring psycho-correction expressed opinion in categorical terms about attending the Ojas Centre, argues, that \u2018it is a personal matter\u2019\u201d; \u201cwhen efforts were made during psycho-correction to get the applicant to form a critical attitude (suformuoti kritik\u0105) towards non-traditional religious beliefs, [the applicant] for a long time remained uncritical and also categorical\u201d. The first-instance court underlined the fact that the psychiatric hospital had not provided any proof of the suggestion that practising a non-traditional religion would place the applicant or others in danger. The court thus concluded that \u201cby attempting to alter the applicant\u2019s attitude to non-traditional religion, meditation, and their practice at the Ojas Meditation Centre\u201d the hospital had breached her right to freedom of religion. Lastly, the court rejected as legally irrelevant the hospital\u2019s assertion that at the time of the applicant\u2019s admission to hospital the meditation centre had been operating \u201cunlawfully\u201d. The Vilnius Regional Court observed that the religious movement had been a party to court proceedings for its registration at the time and had been registered on 12 April 2005.\n(d)  As to the applicant\u2019s remaining complaints 38.  After finding that between 9 May 2003 and 26 June 2003 the applicant had been placed in hospital and given treatment against her will in breach of domestic law (see paragraph 31 above), the Vilnius Regional Court considered that there had therefore been a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to the inviolability of her body. Furthermore, Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital had failed to prove that it had properly informed the applicant about her state of health, her diagnosis, the methods of treatment and the prognosis for her condition (see paragraph 70 below). 39.  However, the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s claims that she had been provided with inappropriate medical care at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital and that the doctors there had forged her medical records.\n(e)  The first-instance court\u2019s conclusion 40.  The Vilnius Regional Court thus granted the applicant\u2019s civil claim in full and awarded her 110,000 Lithuanian litas (LTL, approximately 31,850 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. She was also awarded legal costs of LTL 1,000 (EUR 290). 41.  Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital appealed. According to the hospital, there was no proof that doctor D.\u0160. had disclosed confidential information about the applicant\u2019s acute psychosis and that she was being treated at the hospital. The doctor had merely given an opinion about an unidentified person. Moreover, the doctor had pointed out during the first\u2011instance hearings that she had only given her views when answering the questions the journalists had put to her. Three witnesses \u2013 the applicant\u2019s mother, sister and the journalist R.S. \u2013 had explained during the first\u2011instance court\u2019s hearings that the television programme had been initiated by the applicant\u2019s relatives, who had provided information about the applicant. The first-instance court\u2019s reference to studies in the United States as a way of identifying someone was not sufficiently weighty either, and such information was not protected under Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care. 42.  As to the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of religion, the hospital argued that the lower court had erred in equating meditation with religion. The fact that since February 2003 the applicant had attended meditation sessions of \u201cunknown origin and manner (neai\u0161kios kilm\u0117s ir pob\u016bd\u017eio meditacijas)\u201d and that they could have been one of the reasons behind her illness, had not been denied. The hospital insisted that in February 2003 the Ojas Meditation Centre had been operating outside the law. The hospital also relied on a 29 August 2003 statement by the Ministry of Justice that Osho movement centres did not have the status of a religion (see paragraph 55 below), which supported the hospital\u2019s view that meditation was not a religious practice. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s \u201cfictitious\u201d (tariama) religious freedom had not been breached. 43.  The applicant responded by submitting that the right to privacy included the right not to have her health or other confidential information revealed to the journalists or her mother. The applicant added that when she had been in the psychiatric hospital, doctor D.\u0160. had persistently asked about the meditation she practised and had spoken of it with contempt. Doctor A.G. would tenaciously try to persuade her to denounce her religion and give up meditation. 44.  On 20 March 2009 the Court of Appeal upheld the hospital\u2019s appeal in part.\n(a)  As to the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s placement in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital 45.  The appellate court upheld the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s finding that on the basis of her health on 7 May 2003 the applicant had been lawfully placed in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. Her condition that day had corresponded to the domestic legal requirements for involuntary hospitalisation (see paragraph 68 below). However, the hospital had not provided any evidence that her treatment from 8 May had been indispensable. It was therefore clear that as of that date her treatment at the hospital and her presence there had been involuntary and also amounted to an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The Court of Appeal relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s practice in case no. 3K-3110/2004 of 11 February 2004 to the effect that it was obligatory to follow the procedure set out in Articles 16 and 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care, both when providing a patient with the necessary help (b\u016btinoji pagalba) and when placing that person in hospital without his or her consent. Under that procedure, it had been possible to place the applicant in hospital and treat her without her consent for no longer than forty-eight hours. Without a court order, the forced hospitalisation and forced treatment had to be discontinued. However, there was no information in the case file that such an order had been granted. To make matters worse, the hospital had never even asked the court for such an authorisation. The Court of Appeal thus fully shared the lower court\u2019s view that legal procedures had been outright disregarded, making the applicant\u2019s stay in the hospital unlawful.\n(b)  As to the applicant\u2019s right to privacy 46.  The Court of Appeal noted that under Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care, patients had a right to have information about their health kept confidential (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above). It could not be disclosed by doctor in charge of treatment or by hospital administration. 47.  That being so, the Court of Appeal did not agree with the first\u2011instance court\u2019s conclusion that doctor D.\u0160.\u2019s interview with the journalists, which had been shown during the television programme of 17 June 2003, had disclosed information that had revealed the applicant\u2019s identity. The appellate court relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in case no. 3K-3-630/2004 of 24 November 2004, where it had found that in cases where there was no direct mention of a person in a publication, the process of identification was based on the aggregate evidence of the presence of features which could sufficiently describe the person in mind (see paragraph 63 below). In the particular case of the applicant, the Court of Appeal also referred to her open letter of 14 August 2003 to the Srov\u0117s journalists (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above), where she had acknowledged that the television broadcast had been instigated by members of her family, that she had not been shown in the programme in person, and that she had been given a different name. The Court of Appeal considered that the fact that the main character of the programme (laidos heroj\u0117) had studied in the United States was not sufficient to establish that the programme was about the applicant. As the applicant had not established that the information disclosed during the broadcast had allowed her to be identified, her claim for breach of privacy had to be dismissed. 48.  Lastly, the appellate court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that her privacy had been breached because confidential information had been given to her mother. The applicant had been treated earlier in psychiatric institutions in Kaunas and \u0160iauliai because of mental health problems and her mother had been aware of those previous periods in hospital. Moreover, providing information to close relatives about the applicant\u2019s health could not be regarded as a breach of her right to privacy.\n(c)  As to the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of religion 49.  The Court of Appeal noted that the right to freedom of religion had been enshrined in Article 26 of the Constitution (see paragraph 64 below) and Article 9 of the Convention. It also noted that under Article 7 of the Law on Mental Health Care, people in hospital had the right to perform religious rites. That right could be restricted by a psychiatrist\u2019s decision only if there was a clear danger to the patient or others, and such restrictions had to be recorded in the patient\u2019s medical file (see paragraph 67 below). 50.  On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court\u2019s conclusion that there had been a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of religion while she was in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. For the Court of Appeal, there was no evidence in the file that the applicant had been forbidden from performing religious rites. Even though the medical records showed (yra matyti) that her doctors had tried to get the applicant to form a critical attitude towards her religious convictions (religinius \u012fsitikinimus), there was no information that any restrictions had been applied to her. The Court of Appeal found that \u201cthe doctors\u2019 attempts to get the applicant to form a critical attitude towards her religious convictions did not mean that [the applicant\u2019s] religious freedom had been breached\u201d.\n(d)  As to the applicant\u2019s remaining complaints 51.  The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s findings that there was no proof that the applicant had received inappropriate medical treatment. It also shared the lower court\u2019s conclusion that Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital had not properly informed the applicant about the treatment she received therein.\n(e)  The appellate court\u2019s conclusion 52.  Having dismissed part of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Court of Appeal lowered the award for non-pecuniary damage to LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800). The applicant was also ordered to pay Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital\u2019s legal costs of LTL 3,202 (approximately EUR 927). Lastly, the appellate court quashed the part of the first-instance decision on the applicant\u2019s costs being paid by the hospital so she had to bear the legal costs herself. 53.  On 17 June 2009 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law. She argued that the lower courts had failed to properly apply Convention norms on the right to privacy and freedom of religion. 54.  By a ruling of 19 June 2009 the Supreme Court refused to admit the appeal for examination, holding that the applicant\u2019s arguments were not sufficient to merit examination. 55.  On 12 March 2003 the Ojas Meditation Centre applied to the Ministry of Justice to be registered as a religious community.\nOn 29 August 2003 the Ministry of Justice rejected the application because it considered that although the Centre was on the \u201cborder between self-help psychology and religion (egzistuojantis savipagalbos psichologijos ir religijos paribyje)\u201d, it should not be treated as a religious community. Even though the Osho teachings mentioned in the Ojas Meditation Centre\u2019s by-laws were called religious, meditation there was more based on esoteric doctrines of self-improvement than on a religious practice whose main feature was connecting with God, gods or other sacred forms. The Ministry of Justice also noted that Osho movements did not have the status of a religion in western Europe countries. 56.  The Ojas Meditation Centre then started court proceedings. Its action was eventually granted by the Supreme Administrative Court on 4 February 2005. The court found no evidence that the Ojas Meditation Centre propagated any controversial practices amongst its members. It was registered as a religious community (religin\u0117 bendruomen\u0117) on 12 April 2005 (see Gineitien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 20739/05, \u00a7 24, 27 July 2010). 57.  In her observations sent to the Court on 13 January 2015, the applicant stated that she had continued to that day to practise meditation at the Ojas Meditation Centre.", "references": ["7", "3", "2", "1", "9", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "4", "5"], "gold": ["4", "5"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, a Syrian national, was born in 1993 and currently resides in Khartoum, Sudan. 5.  On 24 April 2015 the applicant arrived in Russia, being in possession of a study visa. He enrolled in the Izhevsk State Technical University and had his registered residence in the town of Izhevsk. His visa expired on 26 April 2016. 6.  On 4 May 2016 the applicant applied for refugee status alleging the risks to his life and safety in the light of the on-going conflict in Syria. The request and the subsequent appeals were dismissed by the Russian migration authorities and the courts. 7.  On 8 June 2016 the applicant was arrested and put in detention by the migration authorities. 8.  By a judgment of 9 June 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk found the applicant in breach of migration rules, an offence under Article 18.8 \u00a7 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and ordered his expulsion. In order to facilitate enforcement, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in detention. 9.  On 10 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Udmurtiya Republic upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. 10.  On 22 June 2016 the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Syria for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. Since that date the enforcement of the applicant\u2019s expulsion was monthly postponed by the domestic courts. 11.  On 13 January 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on appeal amended the lower courts\u2019 judgments and excluded administrative removal from the sanction, since it would have exposed the applicant\u2019s life to risk in Syria. 12.  On 20 January 2017 the applicant left Russia for Lebanon.", "references": ["4", "3", "9", "8", "6", "7", "0", "1", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Tekirda\u011f. 7.  On 13 February 1999, the applicant was arrested during an operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), at which time he was found to be in possession of a fake identity card. 8.  On 15 February 1999 the applicant was interrogated by police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters in the absence of a lawyer pursuant to Law No. 3842, which at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest provided for a systemic restriction in respect of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 9.  The applicant admitted in his statement that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about a number of activities in which he had participated, including armed activities. 10.  On 18 February 1999 statements were taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation in question, that he had joined them in a rural area, and that he had afterwards tried to collect money for the organisation in Istanbul. However, he withdrew the statements he had made to the police, maintaining that he had not participated in any other activity for the illegal organisation. He alleged that he had given those statements to the police under duress. 11.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge, once again in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 12.  On 19 March 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation and involvement in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. 13.  On 5 June 1999 Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Istanbul State Security Court. 14.  At a hearing held on 18 February 2000, the applicant stated that he had not been able to see his lawyer to prepare his defence and requested time to do so. The applicant was granted time to prepare his defence. 15.  At a hearing held on 1 September 2000, the applicant gave evidence in person and denied all the charges. He stated that he had given his previous statements under duress. 16.  At a hearing held on 14 November 2001 the applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation, but had carried out only political activities for the organisation and not armed activities. 17.  On 1 July 2003 another set of criminal proceedings brought against the applicant, which had been pending since 1994 and concerning charges related to membership of the PKK and taking part in activities for that illegal organisation, was merged with the one that had been initiated in 1999. 18.  The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004 and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19.  On 16 September 2004 Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court based its decision, inter alia, on the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and other witness statements taken by the police and the public prosecutor. 20.  On 3 May 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of 16 September 2004 on the grounds that the details of a number of PKK activities for which the applicant had been held responsible had not been discussed in the decision in depth and that the case file lacked the necessary official reports. 21.  The applicant was tried afresh before the Istanbul Assize Court. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The applicant claimed during the trial that his statements during the preliminary investigation had been made under duress and he asked to be allowed to confront and examine a certain witness, namely S.K., whose statements had been relied on by the prosecutor in the indictment. His request to examine that witness was rejected. 22.  On 1 February 2007 Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty of committing an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and again sentenced him to life imprisonment. 23.  On 9 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 1 February 2007.", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "2", "8", "4", "1", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Altay region. 5.  At the material time the applicant was serving a sentence for robbery in correctional colony no. LIU-8 in the Altay region. 6.  On 22 June, 12 July and 20 December 2004 he attempted suicide by opening his veins. 7.  On 12 July 2004 a prison psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a slight mental retardation, psychopathy and claustrophobia with elements of self-aggression. An entry was made in his medical records that solitary confinement was contraindicated for mental health reasons. The correctional colony authorities were informed accordingly. The applicant was prescribed treatment. Since that time he had been examined by the prison psychiatrist at regular intervals. The prison psychiatrist\u2019s diagnosis and recommendations were confirmed by the psychiatric unit of prison hospital no. 12 where the applicant was treated from 2 to 26 April 2005. 8.  On 3 May 2005 the governor of the correctional colony ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a punishment cell for thirteen days as a punishment for the disorderly state of his bed and bedside table. 9.  On 5 May 2005 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor on duty who found that his state of health permitted his placement in a punishment cell, provided that he was not held in solitary confinement. 10.  The applicant was then placed in punishment cell no. 32 designed to accommodate two inmates. He was left alone in the cell, but the door was kept open. 11.  On the same day the applicant went on a hunger strike in protest against his placement in solitary confinement. 12.  At 8 p.m. on 8 May 2005 the applicant was visited by the prison doctor on duty who examined him and found that his health was satisfactory. He reiterated the recommendation that given the applicant\u2019s mental condition solitary confinement was contraindicated. 13.  After the doctor left, the door of the applicant\u2019s cell was shut. About an hour later the applicant had a panic attack and attempted to open his veins with his teeth. The doctor was called back. He noted numerous lacerated wounds on the applicant\u2019s forearms and made bandages. 14.  By letters of 15 June, 8 August and 1 November 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Altay Region to initiate criminal proceedings against the warders on duty. 15.  On 15 December 2005 a deputy prosecutor of Barnaul refused to open criminal proceedings. He referred to statements by a warder, Mr Sh., that the applicant had himself asked him to shut the door. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s health had not been seriously damaged as a result of the incident. 16.  It follows from the letter of 16 December 2005 from the prosecutor of Barnaul that the prosecutor\u2019s office had found that the applicant had been lawfully placed in a punishment cell. At the same time, the warders had disrespected the doctor\u2019s recommendation by leaving the applicant alone in a closed cell. The governor of correctional colony no. LIU-8 had been warned against \u201cpermitting similar incidents to occur in future\u201d. 17.  Following to further complaints by the applicant, in which he stated in particular that he had never asked the warders to close the door, the prosecutor of Barnaul conducted an additional inquiry. He questioned the applicant and Mr Sh. He also questioned warders Mr K. and Mr S. who testified that the door to the applicant\u2019s cell had been temporarily closed to prevent his communication with other inmates who were at that time receiving clean bedding in the storage room opposite to the applicant\u2019s cell. 18.  On 27 January 2006 the prosecutor of Baranaul refused to open criminal proceedings against the warders. He found that the warders had acted in compliance with the internal regulations and had had no intention of provoking the applicant to self-injury. 19.  The applicant challenged the prosecutor\u2019s decisions of 15 December 2005 and 27 January 2006 before the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul. 20.  On 27 September 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decisions, finding that the inquiry had been thorough and the refusals to open criminal proceedings had been lawful and justified. 21.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the warders had known that he suffered from claustrophobia and had closed the door to take vengeance on him for going on a hunger strike. 22.  On 2 November 2006 the Altay Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 September 2006 on appeal.\nII.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "9", "0", "4", "6", "8", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Belovo, Kemerovo Region. 5.  Following the applicant\u2019s arrest on suspicion of drug trafficking, on 14 November 2008 he was placed in temporary detention facility no. 70/1 in Tomsk. He remained in that facility until 20 April 2010. He was detained in cells nos. 91, 1, 7, 55, 4, 56, 51. Each cell measured approximately twenty metres and housed, for the major part of his stay, between 10 and 14 inmates. In the majority of the cells the toilet was merely a hole in the floor. A lavatory pan was installed in three cells, in the corner, and was separated from the living area by a 1.5-metre fence. The applicant was afforded an hour-long walk daily in the recreation yard. 6.  According to the Government the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place, except for the detention period between 18 November and 2 December 2008. There was artificial lighting, natural and artificial ventilation in the cells; the cells were heated. 7.  On 30 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Tomsk found the applicant guilty of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to nine years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal and asked to ensure the applicant\u2019s presence at the appeal hearing. 9.  On 17 May 2010 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the conviction, having heard a prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s lawyer. The applicant was not transported to the hearing. 10.  On 13 February 2013 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 17 May 2010 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 25 March 2013 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing.", "references": ["0", "3", "7", "4", "8", "9", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Istanbul. 7.  On 16 June 1999 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. 8.  On 21 June 1999 the applicant\u2019s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the Hizbullah and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9.  On 22 June 1999 the applicant was heard by the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same date, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10.  On 30 June 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 \u00a7 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code, namely for membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11.  On 9 November 1999 the applicant was released pending trial. 12.  The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 13.  On 12 June 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the Assize Court further took into consideration information on computer hard disks and print-outs, which had been seized in a house belonging to the illegal organisation, as well as the statements of several witnesses who had testified against the applicant. 14.  On 4 June 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "2", "8", "5", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Vilnius. 5.  The applicant\u2019s father, V.P., was a well-known writer in Lithuania. In September 2003 he published a book entitled \u201cThe Ship of Idiots\u201d (Durni\u0173 laivas \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe book\u201d) in which he presented his memoirs of various events in the history of Lithuania, often using a satirical and mocking tone. Several passages in the book discussed the personality and activities of V.L.-\u017d. (deceased at the time of publication). V.L.-\u017d. had been a minister in the Provisional Government of Lithuania, which operated from June to August 1941, and his son V.L. had been a prominent Lithuanian politician since the 1980s. The book contained the following statements (hereinafter \u201cthe disputed statements\u201d), in which V.L.-\u017d. was referred to as \u201c[L.] senior\u201d or \u201cthe patriarch\u201d:\n\u201c[V.L.] had to somehow cover for his father, who had for many years collaborated with the KGB ... Having worked as a spy, he was returned home by Moscow ...\u201d ([L.] reik\u0117jo kaip nors pridengti t\u0117v\u0105, ilgus metus bendradarbiavus\u012f su KGB ... J\u012f kaip atidirbus\u012f \u017evalg\u0105 namo sugr\u0105\u017eino Maskva ...)\n\u201cSome were already [trying to get familiar with] the new \u2018patriarch\u2019, Hitler\u2019s ... friend, ... spy, ... copier of strategic maps, [L.] senior ...\u201d (Kai kas jau ved\u017eiojo u\u017e paranki\u0173 naujai i\u0161kept\u0105 \u201epatriarch\u0105\u201c, Hitlerio ... draug\u0105, ... \u017evalg\u0105, ... strategini\u0173 \u017eem\u0117lapi\u0173 kopijuotoj\u0105 sen\u0105j\u012f [L.] ...)\n\u201c[L.] senior ... told how in 1918 ... [they] had raised the flag in the castle tower ... [H]ow afterwards they had had to flee to Kaunas in order to escape from the Bolsheviks, how on the way they had been arrested [and] interrogated... (and, as far as I know, recruited).\u201d (Senasis [L.] ... pasakojo, kaip 1918 metais ... pilies bok\u0161te k\u0117l\u0117 v\u0117liav\u0105, ... kaip jiems po to teko nuo bol\u0161evik\u0173 b\u0117gti \u012f Kaun\u0105, kaip pakeliui juos are\u0161tavo, tard\u0117... (o kiek man \u017einoma, ir u\u017everbavo).)\n\u201cThe pharmacy was ejected onto the streets. Moreover, the pharmacists were sued because \u2018the patriarch\u2019 did not find on the veranda the six-metre oak bench which he had left there before the war.\u201d (Vaistin\u0119 i\u0161met\u0117 \u012f gatv\u0119. Dar daugiau, vaistininkai buvo paduoti \u012f teism\u0105 tod\u0117l, kad patriarchas verandoje nerado \u0161e\u0161i\u0173 metr\u0173 \u0105\u017euolinio suolo, kur\u012f buvo palik\u0119s prie\u0161 kar\u0105.) 6.  On the fourth page of the book it was stated that the author assumed full responsibility for the truthfulness of the facts presented in the book (autorius prisiima vis\u0105 atsakomyb\u0119 u\u017e knygoje i\u0161d\u0117styt\u0173 fakt\u0173 tikrum\u0105). 7.  After the book\u2019s publication, V.L. lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d), seeking the opening of a pre-trial investigation against V.P. for defamation of his late father. On 21 October 2003 the prosecutor opened the investigation. 8.  During the investigation, the prosecutor asked various bodies about the activities of V.L.-\u017d. described in the disputed statements. He received replies from the Central State Archives, the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, the National Library of Lithuania, the Archives of Literature and Art, and the State Security Department. They all stated that they did not have any information indicating that V.L.-\u017d. had collaborated with the Nazi or Soviet regimes or any information confirming any of the other parts of the disputed statements. The prosecutor also interviewed several individuals who had been quoted as sources in V.P.\u2019s book but they all stated that they were unable to confirm the truthfulness of the events described in the disputed statements. 9.  On 10 October 2005 the Vilnius City First District Court acquitted V.P. of defamation on the grounds that the offence could be committed only against a living person, whereas V.L.-\u017d. was already dead when V.P.\u2019s book had been published. The court noted that V.P.\u2019s actions could have constituted the crime of contempt for the memory of a deceased person, but that charge had not been included in the indictment. 10.  V.L., V.P. and the prosecutor all submitted appeals against that decision, and on 17 January 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed it. The court found that the indictment had not complied with the relevant procedural requirements, and returned the case to the prosecutor. 11.  On 9 August 2006 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He considered that there was sufficient evidence to charge V.P. with contempt for the memory of a deceased person, but criminal prosecution for that offence had become time-barred. 12.  In June 2007 V.L. lodged a civil claim against V.P. He asked the court to order V.P. to publicly retract the disputed statements and to award him 100,100 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 29,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. V.L. submitted that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of his late father, as well as to his own honour and dignity. 13.  V.P. disputed the claim, submitting that he had not intended to defame or insult anyone and that the disputed statements had been taken out of context. He contended that the book had been a product of literary creativity made up on the basis of his subjective memories, and that it had been written in figurative and exaggerated language which could be interpreted in many different ways. V.P. thus argued that the disputed statements should be regarded as value judgments and not as factual statements. He further submitted that, in any event, when writing the book he had relied on various historical sources and witness testimonies, as well as on his own personal experience \u2013 he provided a list of books and other publications which he had consulted, and described the circumstances in which he had found out about the events discussed in the disputed statements. Therefore, he argued that the disputed statements had been sufficiently accurate. Lastly, V.P. contended that both V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. had been prominent politicians and public figures and therefore had to tolerate higher levels of criticism. 14.  On 10 December 2008 V.P. died. The court adjourned the examination of the case until V.P.\u2019s legal successors were identified. On 7 May 2009 the applicant and her two brothers, who had accepted their father\u2019s inheritance, were issued with certificates of inheritance, stating that they had inherited their father\u2019s estate in equal parts. On 23 July 2009 the court decided to continue with the examination of the case, replacing the defendant V.P. with the applicant and her brothers. 15.  V.L. subsequently amended his claim and asked the court to declare that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of himself and his late father (see paragraph 36 below), and to award him a symbolic sum of LTL 1 (approximately EUR 0.29) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 16.  At the court hearing on 9 December 2009, V.L. argued that the disputed statements amounted to statements of fact and not value judgments. He submitted that, in line with the domestic courts\u2019 case-law, the burden was on the author to prove that those statements were factually accurate, but the evidence collected in both the civil and the criminal proceedings demonstrated that they did not have any factual basis. 17.  The applicant and her brothers were represented by the same lawyer who had represented V.P. in the civil proceedings up until his death. They submitted essentially the same arguments that V.P. had submitted before (see paragraph 13 above). They also argued that an obligation to pay compensation for damage allegedly caused by a literary work was a personal obligation of the author and could not be transferred to his heirs. They furthermore submitted that the disputed statements had been based on their late father\u2019s memories and subjective opinions, and so they should not be required to prove the truthfulness of those statements. 18.  On 23 December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court found in V.L.\u2019s favour. It stated that, in line with the domestic law, in order to uphold the claim, four circumstances had to be established: firstly, that certain statements had been disseminated; secondly, that those statements had concerned the claimant (V.L.) and his late father (V.L.-\u017d.); thirdly, that the statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-\u017d. and V.L.; and fourthly, that the statements had been erroneous. The claimant (V.L.) had to prove that the first three circumstances had existed, whereas the defendants (the applicant and her brothers) had to prove that the fourth circumstance had not (see paragraph 34 below). 19.  The Vilnius Regional Court observed that there was no dispute that statements had been disseminated and that they had referred to V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. (see paragraph 5 above). However, the parties disagreed as to whether they had amounted to statements of fact or to value judgments. The court found that the disputed statements had been presented as factual statements about V.L.-\u017d.: they had implied that certain events had actually occurred, for example, that V.L.-\u017d. had been recruited by the Soviet forces and had collaborated with them, or that he had expressed support for Hitler\u2019s ideology (see paragraph 5 above). Accordingly, the court held that those statements should have had a sufficient factual basis. 20.  Seeking to determine whether the disputed statements had been factually accurate, the Vilnius Regional Court examined the evidence which had been collected in the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), as well as the sources indicated by V.P. himself in his written submissions to the court during the civil proceedings (see paragraph 13 above). The court found that none of those sources had been able to confirm any parts of the disputed statements to the standard of proof required in civil cases. 21.  The Vilnius Regional Court next examined whether the disputed statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. As for the first three statements (see paragraph 5 above), it considered that, in the historical context of Lithuania, the allegations of collaboration with the Soviet security services or of support for Nazi ideology had clearly been insulting not only to V.L.-\u017d. but also to his family, including V.L., who had been a prominent politician himself. As for the fourth statement (see paragraph 5 above), it considered that allegations of ejecting the pharmacy owners onto the streets and suing them for a wooden bench \u2013 an item of movable property of low value \u2013 had created the impression of V.L.-\u017d. as someone with low moral standards and a lack of respect for others, and that that statement had therefore been insulting as well, not only to V.L.-\u017d. himself, but also to his family. 22.  The court dismissed the defendants\u2019 objection that the case concerned the personal obligations of their father. It held that the domestic law provided several different remedies for victims of defamation in publications (see paragraph 36 below). On the one hand, the victim could ask the court to order the author of the work to retract the disputed statements, which would be a personal obligation on the part of the author which could not be transferred to his or her heirs. On the other hand, the victim could ask the court to declare that the disputed statements were erroneous and defamatory (insulting to the victim\u2019s honour and dignity), in other words to request an objective assessment of those statements. Such an assessment could be made without the involvement of the author and would thus not constitute a personal obligation on the part of the author. Accordingly, the court held that, since V.L. had made the latter request (see paragraph 15 above), domestic law permitted the transfer of civil liability to the author\u2019s heirs. 23.  As a result, the Vilnius Regional Court upheld one part of V.L.\u2019s claim and declared that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to his and his late father\u2019s honour and dignity. It dismissed V.L.\u2019s claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage as time\u2011barred. 24.  The applicant and her brothers lodged an appeal against the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). 25.  On 13 August 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision in its entirety. It firstly stated that the key difference between statements of fact and value judgments was that the truthfulness of the former could be verified and proved, whereas the latter expressed a subjective view to which the criteria of truthfulness or accuracy did not apply. The court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the book had been based on the author\u2019s memories, the disputed statements had not been limited to expressing a subjective view on any persons or events, but alleged that certain actions had been taken and certain events had occurred. In the court\u2019s view, the average reader, even when reading the disputed statements as part of the entire book and not \u201cout of context\u201d (see paragraph 13 above), would perceive them as statements of fact and not as value judgments. 26.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the defendants that V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. had been public figures and therefore had to tolerate greater levels of criticism. It observed that, in line with the case-law of the domestic courts, dissemination of factually inaccurate statements about a public figure did not attract civil liability when such statements concerned that person\u2019s public activities and when their author had acted in good faith, seeking to inform society about such activities (see paragraph 35 below). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal stated that this could not justify dissemination of falsehoods which were insulting to a person\u2019s honour and dignity, even when they concerned a public figure. It held that, in the case at hand, the first-instance court had thoroughly examined the evidence collected during the criminal proceedings and the sources indicated by the author himself (see paragraph 20 above), and had reached the conclusion that, on the balance of probabilities, the events described in the disputed statements \u201cwere more likely not to have happened than to have happened\u201d. The Court of Appeal also examined additional sources referred to in the defendants\u2019 appeal, but found that they did not contain any information which would enable it to reach a different conclusion than that reached by the first\u2011instance court. It therefore held that the factual accuracy of the disputed statements had not been proved. The Court of Appeal also upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s conclusion that those statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. (see paragraph 21 above). 27.  Lastly the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants\u2019 argument that they had been obliged to prove the truthfulness of their father\u2019s memories and subjective opinions. It observed that the disputed statements had been found to constitute statements of fact and not value judgments and it had therefore been necessary to prove their factual accuracy and not the reasons why the author might have held certain opinions. The court stated that the factual accuracy of the disputed statements could be proved by anyone and not only by their author, and that the applicant and her brothers had been able to rely on the material collected during the criminal proceedings and on the submissions made by their father in the civil proceedings, as well as to submit new evidence themselves. The Court of Appeal also observed that the applicant and her brothers had accepted their father\u2019s inheritance (see paragraph 14 above), which included the rights to reprint the book and to receive royalties from it. The court considered that if the author\u2019s heirs had been exempted from the liabilities arising from the book, then the claimant, V.L., would have been denied any possibility to defend his rights against the erroneous and insulting statements published therein. 28.  Consequently, the Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance decision declaring the disputed statements erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. 29.  The applicant and her brothers submitted an appeal on points of law, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). 30.  On 14 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed that appeal. It underlined the importance of striking a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for honour and dignity, but stated that the right to freedom of expression did not extend to the deliberate dissemination of falsehoods with the aim of humiliating, insulting or otherwise causing harm to others, even if directed at public figures. The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had established that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-\u017d. and V.L. (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above); it therefore ruled that the dissemination of those statements could not be justified by the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 31.  The Supreme Court also reiterated that the claim submitted by V.L. did not constitute a personal obligation of the author of the book and could therefore be transferred to his heirs. It stated that the applicant and her brothers had accepted their father\u2019s inheritance, which included certain rights to the book (see paragraph 14 above). Accordingly, once the court had declared that the disputed statements in the book had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of others, the author\u2019s legal successors had the obligation to ensure that those statements would no longer be disseminated.", "references": ["8", "1", "5", "7", "9", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  At the time of the events she belonged to an artistic group called the St Luke Brotherhood, which was known for its provocative public performances. 7.  On 16 December 2010 the applicant, together with three other members of the above-mentioned union, made what she described as an \u201cact of performance\u201d, which, according to both parties\u2019 accounts, consisted of the following. They went to the Eternal Glory Memorial to those who perished in the Second World War, which contained the tombs of thirty-two soldiers, including that of an Unknown Soldier. The applicant took a frying pan prepared in advance, broke some eggs into it and fried them over the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Two of her friends joined her and fried sausages on skewers over the flame. Another member of the group filmed the event. Two police officers approached them and made a remark that their behaviour was inappropriate, without further interference. On the same day the applicant posted the video on the Internet on behalf of the St Luke Brotherhood. It was accompanied by the following statement:\n\u201cPrecious natural gas has been being burned, pointlessly, at the Glory Memorial in Kyiv for fifty-three years now. This pleasure costs taxpayers about 300,000 hryvnias [UAH] per month. And this is only one \u2018eternal flame\u2019 pagan temple, whereas there are hundreds or even thousands of them throughout Ukraine. On 16 December the St Luke Brotherhood reacted to this by an act of protest in the Glory Park in the capital. It showed that people should use the \u2018eternal flame\u2019.\nWe suggest to the outraged representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine to follow the example of ancient Roman vestal virgins and to carry out around-the-clock duty at the \u2018eternal flames\u2019, keeping the fire lit manually by wood. There is no doubt that communists will have no problems with fulfilling this task, because they already have experience of taking care of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and their financing is much better than that which the vestal virgins had.\u201d 8.  While the parties did not provide a copy of the video in question to the Court, it was possible to view it on several publicly available websites. In addition to the factual account from the parties summarised above, the Court notes that the soundtrack to the video was a famous 1974 Soviet song \u201cThe battle is going on again\u201d (devoted to the victory of the 1917 revolution and optimism about the future of the communist regime). The video started with the following opening titles: \u201cThe St Luke Brotherhood presents\u201d, \u201cRecipe of the day\u201d, \u201cEternal fried eggs on the eternal flame\u201d. The participants in the performance did not make any public address and their conversation was not audible. They had no posters or other visual aids, apart from the food and cooking utensils. It could be seen on the video that once the applicant had broken the eggs in the frying pan and was about to approach the fire, while her friends held skewers with sausages, the two police officers appeared and the applicant explained something to them and they left. In order to reach the flame the applicant had to step over a sculpture of a wreath of oak leaves and step on the words \u201cGlory to the Unknown Soldier\u201d. 9.  There were several complaints to the police that the action on the video had amounted to desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and called for criminal prosecution. 10.  On 21 December 2010 the police questioned D., one of the women who had participated in the performance. She submitted that she had not known the other members of the group and that she had met them by chance. As they had allegedly explained to her, they had been hungry and had intended to cook food in order to eat it. 11.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against D. and three unidentified persons on suspicion of hooliganism. 12.  On 23 December 2010 D. wrote a confession that she had participated in a protest against inappropriate use of natural gas and that she regretted it. She knew only the first names of the other participants. 13.  On 24 December 2010 another criminal case was opened against her and three unidentified persons in respect of the same event, this time on suspicion of desecration of a tomb. It was joined to that opened earlier. Subsequently the charge of hooliganism was dropped. 14.  The police retrieved photos of several persons who might have been involved in the incident from the passport office\u2019s database and showed them to D. She recognised the applicant. 15.  On 5 February 2011 the investigator questioned the applicant\u2019s grandmother and mother, who lived at the address of the applicant\u2019s registered residence. They submitted that they knew nothing about her involvement in the event in question. They also stated that the applicant did not in fact live there and denied knowing her whereabouts or having her contact details. They only knew that she had left for western Ukraine, without further details. The grandmother stated that the applicant had visited her about two weeks earlier. The applicant\u2019s mother had seen her about a week earlier and had received a telephone call from her two days earlier. 16.  On 18 February 2011 the investigator severed the criminal case in respect of the applicant and two unidentified persons on suspicion of desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by a group following a prior conspiracy. 17.  On the same day the applicant was declared wanted by the police. 18.  On 17 March 2011 the investigator applied to the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d) for the applicant\u2019s detention as a preventive measure pending trial. His arguments were as follows: the offence of which the applicant was suspected was punishable by a prison term of more than three years; the applicant had absconded, as a result of which she had been declared wanted by the police; and she could reoffend or hinder the establishment of the truth if at liberty. 19.  On 25 March 2011 a judge of the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application in part: he ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest with a view to bringing her before the court for examination. 20.  On 29 March 2011 at 9 p.m. the applicant was arrested at the flat of a certain Z. in Kyiv. As the latter subsequently stated during her questioning, the applicant had been living there from 25 March 2011 at the request of an acquaintance. 21.  On 31 March 2011 the applicant was questioned as an accused in the presence of her lawyer. While insisting that her only intention had been to protest against the inappropriate use of natural gas, she confessed to the offence and expressed remorse. 22.  On the same day the investigator once again applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant\u2019s detention as a preventive measure. His reasoning was the same as before. 23.  On 31 March and 1 April 2011 two deputies of the Kyiv Regional Council applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant\u2019s release in exchange of their personal guarantee of her adequate procedural behaviour. 24.  On 1 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. It noted that she was accused of a serious offence punishable by imprisonment of from three to five years. Furthermore, the judge referred to the fact that the applicant had absconded and had therefore been put on the wanted list. It was also considered that she might hinder establishing the truth if at liberty. In so far as the applicant\u2019s lawyer relied on her positive character references from various sources, the court noted that those could not guarantee her compliance with all the procedural requirements. While having noted that the applicant also relied on the letters of personal guarantee from the people\u2019s deputies, the judge did not further comment on them. It was specified in the ruling that the term of the applicant\u2019s detention was to be calculated from 29 March 2011. Under the applicable legislation, the duration of pre-trial detention was limited to two months, with the possibility of further extensions. 25.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed. He submitted that his client was willing to cooperate with the investigation and that there were no reasons for her detention. It was further pointed out in the appeal that the applicant had been declared wanted by the police on the very same day the criminal case against her had been opened. The lawyer noted that there had not been a single summons sent by the investigation to the applicant\u2019s address prior to her arrest. According to her, she had found out about the charge against her only on the day of her arrest on 29 March 2011. Lastly, the lawyer submitted that the first-instance court had not considered any less intrusive preventive measures as an alternative to detention and that it had left without consideration the people deputies\u2019 letters of guarantee. 26.  On 11 April 2011 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal rejected the above appeal. It noted that the Pecherskyy Court had already duly examined all the arguments raised in it. 27.  On 25 May 2011 the applicant was indicted. On the same day the case was sent to the Pecherskyy Court for trial. 28.  On 10 June 2011 the applicant applied to the court for release under an undertaking not to abscond. She submitted that she enjoyed positive character references, had no criminal record and had cooperated with the investigation. Furthermore, the applicant observed that by that time the investigation had already been completed and could not therefore be hampered. She emphasised that her actions had been nothing else than a protest driven by good motives. Several members of parliament and other prominent figures joined her in that application and expressed their wish to act as her personal guarantors. 29.  On 17 June 2011 the Pecherskyy Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it rejected the applicant\u2019s application for release with reference to the seriousness of the charge against her, \u201cthe nature and the circumstances of the offence of which she [was] accused\u201d, as well as the fact that she had been declared wanted by the police. The judge also stated, in general terms, that there were no grounds for the applicant\u2019s release under a personal guarantee. 30.  On 30 June 2011 the applicant applied once again to be released. On the same day the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application and released her under an undertaking not to leave the town. 31.  On 4 October 2012 the Pecherskyy Court found the applicant guilty of the desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, acting as part of a group of persons following a prior conspiracy. The court noted that the applicant had convinced D. and two other people, whose identities remained unestablished, to carry out a performance at the \u201cEternal Glory\u201d memorial aimed at protesting against the waste of natural gas caused by the burning of the Eternal Flame. D., who was questioned in court, confirmed that account of events. The court also questioned the memorial keeper, who had witnessed the performance from a distance, and the two police officers who had spoken to the applicant and her friends (see paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, the court examined the video-recording of the performance as material evidence. 32.  The judgment mentioned the statement made by the applicant during the hearing that in her opinion people bringing flowers to the memorial did not really understand what exactly it was dedicated to. She insisted that she had not committed any crime as her performance had not been meant to desecrate the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Furthermore, she maintained that there could not be a tomb beneath the Eternal Flame because of the gas pipe. 33.  The Pecherskyy Court held that the applicant\u2019s arguments had no impact on the legal classification of her actions and that they were refuted by the evidence as a whole. The judgment further stated in that regard:\n\u201c... the court considers that by committing deliberate acts in a group which showed disrespect for the burial place of the Unknown Soldier and for the public tradition of honouring the memory of soldiers who perished defending or liberating Kyiv and the lands of Ukraine from the fascist hordes, and by subsequently presenting those actions as a protest, [the applicant] has tried to escape social condemnation of her conduct and criminal liability for the offence.\u201d 34.  Relying on local authority documents, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s submission that there was no established location for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. 35.  The court did not discern any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the case. At the same time, in deciding on the penalty, it took into account, on the one hand, the fact that the applicant did not have a criminal record, that she was working as a political analyst and got positive character references by her place of residence and work. On the other hand, the court noted that the criminal offence in question was of medium gravity and that the applicant did not show any remorse for what she had done. As a result, she was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. 36.  On the same date the Pecherskyy Court exempted D. from criminal liability under the surety of her employer. 37.  The applicant appealed. Relying on the definition of the desecration of a burial place under the Burial and Funeral Business Act (see paragraph 47 below), she maintained that in the absence of any intention by her to \u201cdefile the family or social memory of a deceased or to show contempt for a burial place, or social and religious principles and traditions\u201d, there were no constituent elements of a crime in her actions. The applicant reiterated her argument that her performance had been nothing more than a protest. Lastly, she submitted that the criminal proceedings against her had violated her right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 38.  The prosecutor also appealed, considering the sentence to be too lenient. 39.  On 18 December 2012 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It stated that desecration of a tomb could have different expressions, indicating an insulting attitude, mockery or disrespect towards a tomb or the person buried therein, regardless of the stated motives. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument on her right to freedom of expression, the court noted that that right was not unlimited and that the restriction in the applicant\u2019s case was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim. The appellate court also rejected the prosecutor\u2019s appeal. 40.  The applicant further reiterated her arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged by her, which was, however, rejected by the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters on 11 April 2013.", "references": ["1", "9", "0", "3", "4", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Mu\u015f. 7.  On 30 October 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). 8.  On 1 November 2001 the applicant\u2019s statement was taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the PKK and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9.  On 3 November 2001 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10.  On 6 November 2001 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, with membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11.  The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12.  On 6 October 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, convicted him of membership of an illegal organisation under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the new Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  On 15 December 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first\u2011instance court.", "references": ["1", "9", "4", "6", "0", "5", "7", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Tiszal\u00f6k. 5.  On 19 July 2012 at approximately 9 a.m. the applicant, who had been placed in pre-trial detention in Budapest Prison, was transported to the premises of the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning. He was accompanied by two guards and was handed over for questioning at around 9.20 a.m., when he showed no sign of injuries. 6.  The questioning started at approximately 9.55 a.m. and lasted until approximately 11.30 a.m. It was conducted by police officers A and B The applicant chose not to give a statement. 7.  On being released after the interrogation, the applicant was handed over to the guards of Budapest Prison who, in the presence of the police officer, asked him whether he had been ill-treated. The applicant declared that he had not been. 8.  After being transported back to Budapest Prison, the applicant underwent a medical examination before his readmission during which he claimed that he had been ill-treated by police officer A. Certain injuries were noted on the applicant. A report was drawn up on the incident and photos were taken of the injuries. 9.  Right after the medical examination the applicant was again transported to the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning, from where he was taken to the military hospital by the police officer conducting his interrogation and allegedly assaulting him. At the hospital he was examined in the presence of the police officer. The medical report noted bleeding on the lower lip, jaw sensitive to pressure, and bruises on the ribs, all likely to heal within eight days. 10.  According to the applicant\u2019s submission, following his return to Budapest Prison, he was again subjected to a medical examination. 11.  The police report filed by A on 19 July 2012 stated that the applicant had not been ill-treated during questioning. None of the police officers had seen the applicant harming himself but A. had observed him biting his nails and lips. Also, according to the report, the applicant had been left alone for a few minutes at the police station without constant surveillance. 12.  On 20 July 2012 the applicant complained of a headache and dizziness and was again examined by medical staff at Budapest Prison. He asserted that he had been ill-treated during his interrogation. The medical report recorded the following injuries: swelling on the right cheek, head sensitive to pressure, bruising on the lower lip, and abrasions on the lower right ribs and on the left shoulder blade. 13.  Budapest Prison initiated criminal proceedings on charges of forced interrogation. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s statements given during the medical examination (see paragraph 8 above) were qualified as a criminal complaint by the investigation authorities. 14.  In the ensuing criminal investigation conducted by the Central Investigation Office the applicant gave a testimony on 14 November 2012, stating that during his questioning he had refused to make a statement and as a consequence had been punched by one of the police officers several times on his head, neck and back. He had fallen against a chair and when he had tried to get up, he had been slapped four or five times in the face. He had been shown the results of a DNA test, and when he refused to comment on it, had again been beaten by the police officer. The same police officer had also punched him in the mouth when he had failed to recognise a person shown to him in a photograph. He had been pushed against the door and when he again fell over, the police officer had kicked him on his left side. 15.  On 24 July 2013 one of the prisoner escort officers, C was questioned, and recalled that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment upon his return to the prison facility, which had surprised him since he had previously asked the applicant whether he had any complaints and had seen no injuries on the applicant\u2019s body. He also stated that he had noted the injuries on the applicant\u2019s face following the medical examination at Budapest Prison. He had asked the applicant why he had not complained of his ill-treatment earlier, to which the applicant had replied that he had been afraid of the police officers. According to C, as a general practice, detainees had been transferred in a special prisoner transport vehicle where they had not been constantly monitored and would have had the opportunity to inflict injuries on themselves. 16.  On 25 July 2013 D, the other prisoner escort officer who accompanied the applicant to his interrogation, was also heard as a witness. He did not remember either the applicant or the circumstances of his transfer. He had a vague recollection that since there had been some complaints from the applicant\u2019s side once they had arrived back at the prison facility, they had had to transfer him back to the police department. He maintained that if they had seen any injury on the applicant\u2019s face following interrogation, they would surely have inquired of him whether he had been ill-treated by the police officers. Therefore, in his estimation the applicant could not have shown any visible signs of injury when he was handed back from the interrogation. 17.  On 6 October 2013 E, the prison security officer who had taken photos of the applicant\u2019s injuries during his readmission was questioned as a witness. He could not give any details of the incident. He could not remember whether he had escorted the applicant to the medical examination, but suggested that the applicant\u2019s injuries must have occurred before he had been examined by the medical staff, which was why he had been called on to take photos. 18.  On 18 November 2013 F, the nurse on duty at Budapest Prison was questioned, but she did not remember the incident. She could only confirm that if she had seen the applicant\u2019s injuries prior to his transfer, she would surely have inquired about their origin. Examining the photos of the applicant, she asserted that the bruises on the applicant\u2019s face would have occurred immediately after an impact and that the applicant could have caused them himself. 19.  On 5 December 2013 G, the guard on duty at Budapest Prison, was questioned as a witness; he could not remember either the applicant or anything else concerning his complaint. He nonetheless maintained that if he had seen injuries on the applicant as presented to him on a photo, he would surely have inquired about their origin. 20.  On 2 January 2014 the Central Investigation Office also heard evidence from H and I, two prison escort officers from Budapest Prison who had been on duty on the day of the incident, and who were responsible for transferring detainees to the healthcare facilities. They did not remember the applicant and could not recall the circumstances of his medical examination or admission to the prison, since, as one of them explained, they were responsible for escorting thirty to forty prisoners a day. H stated that as a general practice detainees were under constant supervision while waiting for medical examinations, whereas I asserted that there were instances where detainees were left alone when placed in so\u2011called \u201chealthcare waiting rooms\u201d. Neither of the witnesses knew with certainty whether this had been the case for the applicant. 21.  On the same day, three members of the medical staff of Budapest Prison were also heard as witnesses. Two of them could not recall anything about the incident and did not remember the applicant, mostly because they were responsible for a large number of cases. Another member of the healthcare staff stated that she had a recollection of an incident, but was not sure whether it involved the applicant or another person. As a general rule, the witnesses explained that they would not admit a detainee into the prison if he showed signs of injuries. Examining the photos of the applicant, two of the medical staff stated that because of the bad quality of the photos, they weren\u2019t even sure if they showed actual injuries or simply the shape of the applicant\u2019s face, while the third asserted that the injury must have been fresh when the photo was taken. 22.  The prison doctor was also questioned the same day. She could not identify the applicant, did not remember whether she had met him, had no recollection of the incident and could only recount what she had previously stated in the medical report. However, she stated that if the applicant had been left alone, he could have inflicted the injuries on himself. 23.  The Central Investigation Office commissioned a forensic expert opinion. According to the expert assessment, the applicant\u2019s account of the origins of his injuries was implausible, since if he had been ill-treated in the way described by him, his injuries would have been of a more serious nature. Furthermore, the location of the injuries had not corresponded to the applicant\u2019s description of the incident either. The report stated that it was impossible to establish when the applicant\u2019s injuries had occurred. Referring to the witness testimonies and the location of the injuries, it suggested that the applicant could have inflicted them on himself. 24.  The investigation was discontinued on 8 May 2014 on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s allegations could not be substantiated beyond doubt in the absence of any witness testimony and taking into account the conclusions of the forensic expert opinion. According to the reasoning, the available evidence neither refuted nor proved the applicant\u2019s allegations. The applicant complained, seeking the continuation of the investigations. The first-instance decision was upheld by the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 15 July 2014. The decision called the applicant\u2019s attention to the possibility of lodging of initiating substitute private prosecution proceedings.", "references": ["6", "8", "0", "9", "5", "7", "3", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Sestaci. 6.  The applicant is a journalist who, at the time of the events, was employed as Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. In January 2003 he sent to a newspaper two letters containing information about pressure put on the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office by a high-ranking politician. In one of the letters, the Vice-President of Parliament expressed discontent that several police officers were being criminally prosecuted for allegedly ill-treating and unlawfully detaining suspects. In another letter it was stated that one of those police officers had previously been convicted of similar offences, but had been exempted from serving a sentence and had soon been re-employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequently, the newspaper published an article on the basis of the letters. The applicant was then dismissed by the Prosecutor General for having violated the internal regulations of the Press Department. In proceedings for his reinstatement brought against the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, he argued before the domestic courts that the disclosure of the letters had been in good faith and had pursued the aim of \u201cfighting corruption and trading in influence\u201d. He argued that, in any event, the letters could not be classified as secret under domestic law. The domestic courts found in favour of the applicant\u2019s employer, on the grounds that the applicant had breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing the letters, and that he had failed to consult other heads of departments before disclosing the letters to the newspaper. 7.  On 30 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Court. 8.  In a judgment of 12 February 2008 the Grand Chamber of the Court held that the applicant\u2019s dismissal from his employment had infringed his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, ECHR 2008). 9.  The Court found that, for the purposes of Article 10 \u00a7 2, the measure taken against the applicant had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression, had been \u201cprescribed by law\u201d, and had pursued a legitimate aim. 10.  As to whether the measure had been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d within the meaning of that provision, the Court noted firstly that the applicant had not had alternative channels for disclosing the letters, and that, in the circumstances of the case, external reporting, even to a newspaper, could be justified. Against that background, it also found that the information disclosed by the applicant was of major public interest, because it concerned such issues as the separation of powers, improper conduct by a high-ranking politician, and the government\u2019s attitude towards police brutality. Balancing the different issues involved, the Court also took into consideration the detriment caused to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office by the disclosure. In doing so, the Court came to the conclusion that the public interest in having information about undue pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office revealed was so important in a democratic society that it outweighed the interest in maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. Lastly, the Court noted that the applicant had acted in good faith and that the most severe sanction possible had been imposed on him. In view of all the considerations, the Court came to the conclusion that the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart information, had not been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, and that there had been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 11.  As to the application of Article 41, the Court ordered Moldova to pay the sum of 10,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 8,413 for costs and expenses. 12.  After the Court had delivered the above judgment, the applicant applied to the domestic courts to have the domestic judgments confirming his dismissal set aside. He was successful, and on 28 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice ordered his reinstatement. On the same day the applicant lodged an application for reinstatement with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 13.  According to the applicant, on 29 May 2008 he had a meeting with the Prosecutor General, who asked him to resign from his position. As the applicant refused, the Prosecutor General told him that \u201che had enough wits to force him to do that\u201d. He was told to go home and wait for his employment order. The Government disputed the above submissions. 14.  On 5 June 2008 the Prosecutor General issued an order reinstating the applicant as Head of the Press Department and ordering that his salary arrears be paid. On the same date the Prosecutor General wrote to the head of the trade unions of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, seeking the trade unions\u2019 approval of the applicant\u2019s dismissal from his employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act (see paragraph 23 below). In accordance with the labour legislation in force, the trade unions\u2019 approval was a necessary step in dismissing the applicant, and it was obtained the next day. 15.  On 6 June 2008 the applicant was invited to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and presented with the employment order. According to the applicant, he was, however, not allocated an office and not given a badge to access the building. Each morning he had to wait outside the building until one of his superiors allowed him to enter. Since he had no office, he stayed in the library or in the press office. However, when other employees from the press office had to leave the office, he was locked outside it with the explanation that his superiors had not allowed him access to sensitive information. The applicant was not given any tasks. The Government also disputed the above submissions. 16.  On 16 June 2008 the applicant was presented with a dismissal order, effective as of 10 June 2008. The dismissal was based on section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The reason for the applicant\u2019s dismissal was the appointment of a new Prosecutor General in 2007. According to the order, the trade unions had consented to his dismissal on 6 June 2008. 17.  On 10 July 2008 the applicant contested the order of 16 June 2008 before the Chisinau Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and sought reinstatement. He presented details about his meeting with the Prosecutor General of 29 May 2008 and about his discussion with him (see paragraph 13 above). He also stated that since his re-employment on 6 June 2008 he had not received a badge to access the building, had not been given an office, and had not been given any tasks. Moreover, on the very day of his reinstatement, the Prosecutor General had obtained the trade unions\u2019 approval of his dismissal. He argued, inter alia, that since 2003 the Prosecutor General had changed twice, and that he was the first person to be dismissed on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The applicant also argued that that section was not applicable in the circumstances of the case, since the position of Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office was not part of the cabinet of the Prosecutor General. He expressed the view that his dismissal constituted a failure on the part of the State to abide by the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008. 18.  The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office did not contest the applicant\u2019s allegations about the Prosecutor General\u2019s discussion with him and about the treatment to which he had been subjected during his employment. It only submitted that labour-law provisions had been respected at the time the applicant had been dismissed. 19.  On 17 December 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s action and ruled that his dismissal had been in accordance with the law. In particular, the court found that since the new Prosecutor General had been appointed in 2007, he had the power to terminate the applicant\u2019s employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The Court of Appeal considered that the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008 had been implemented once the domestic courts had revised the judgments confirming his dismissal in 2003. The Court of Appeal did not give any consideration to the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning his discussion with the Prosecutor General and/or his experience during the time of his employment. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he submitted, inter alia, that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had failed to prove wrong his contentions about its failure to issue him with a badge or an office and to give him tasks. After making reference to the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008, the applicant claimed that his reinstatement had been simulated, referring to it as \u201cthe so\u2011called reinstatement\u201d. He also contended that his dismissal had not been the result of an ordinary labour dispute, and that in fact the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had acted in bad faith with a view to getting rid of an inconvenient employee (salariat incomod). However, the appeal on points of law was dismissed on 29 April 2009. Like the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court did not make any assessment of the applicant\u2019s allegations about his discussion with the Prosecutor General and the treatment to which he had been subjected during his ten days of employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument about the State\u2019s failure to execute the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008 by finding that that judgment had been enforced once the domestic judgments had been reviewed and the applicant had been reinstated in his previous position. 21.  The applicant informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights about the developments described above, and alleged that his being dismissed once again and the outcome of the new reinstatement proceedings amounted to a failure by the State to comply with the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008. In an action report of 2 December 2016 (see DH-DD(2016)1446) the Government informed the Committee of Ministers about the general and individual measures taken in the course of implementing the Court\u2019s judgment of 12 February 2008, and expressed the view that that judgment had been enforced once the Supreme Court had reviewed and quashed its own judgment of 26 November 2003. They asked the Committee of Ministers to terminate the execution procedure in respect of that case. 22.  At the time of issuing the present judgment, the procedure for supervising the execution of the judgment of 12 February 2008 is still ongoing before the Committee of Ministers.", "references": ["8", "3", "9", "5", "2", "4", "1", "0", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Zagreb. He was formerly a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 6.  In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanovi\u0107 v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, \u00a7\u00a7 11\u201113, 4 April 2017). 7.  On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of corruption involving a number of officials of the Fund and other individuals. 8.  Following his arrest, an investigation was opened in the Zagreb County Court (see, for further details, Matanovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 15-28). 9.  On 12 February 2008, upon completion of the investigation, the State Attorney\u2019s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta \u2013 hereinafter: \u201cthe State Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d) indicted the applicant and nine other individuals in the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes, and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted \u2012 in his capacity as the lawyer acting for the Vice-President of the Fund \u2012 for facilitating the receipt of a bribe of 150,000 euros (EUR) for his client and aiding and abetting the abuse of power and authority by him. 10.  During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 29-63). 11.  On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant\u2019s conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12.  On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13.  On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14.  On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts\u2019 factual conclusions. 15.  On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts. 16.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 23 February 2012.", "references": ["6", "0", "7", "8", "5", "1", "2", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Simferopol. She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was eight years old. 5.  On 24 July 1995 the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus. She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain. As a result, the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability (\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u0456\u043d\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456). 6.  In January 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Tsentralnyy District Court against the Simferopol Trolley Bus Company, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident. In particular, as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines, additional nutrition, treatment in a sanatorium, transport expenses, and compensation for loss of earnings. 7.  On 25 February 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03) complaining, inter alia, under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts. 8.  On 1 February 2007, while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts, the Court delivered a judgment on the applicant\u2019s first application (no. 9724/03), finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive. The Court took into consideration the period after 11 September 1997, when the Convention had come into force in respect of Ukraine. The length of the proceedings within the Court\u2019s competence was nine years and twenty two days. 9.  The Court, in particular, noted the following:\n\u201c47. As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree. Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise, the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims.\u201d 10.  On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 11.  On 13 May 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court partly found for the applicant. On 29 July 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 15 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 12.  On 10 November 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court left the applicant\u2019s case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on 28 October 2009 and 10 November 2009. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above-mentioned hearings. On 27 January 2010 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings. On 5 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decisions of the lower courts. A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail.", "references": ["7", "9", "8", "2", "5", "1", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in Nigeria in 1975 and lives in Z\u00f6lling. 6.  In Nigeria, the applicant completed eleven years of schooling and subsequently held various jobs in Lagos. After leaving the country, he lived in Spain from 1994 to 1997, living at first on social security and later working as a day-labourer on several farms. In 1997 he arrived in Germany, where he applied for asylum under a different identity. His application was finally rejected in July 1998. He left Germany for Italy with a German national with whom he had started a relationship. In January 1999 he moved on to Spain, where he worked as a cook and waiter in various restaurants. 7.  In October 2000 the applicant re-entered Germany. On 21 October 2000 his daughter, from his above-mentioned relationship, was born. The applicant\u2019s daughter is a German national. 8.  In 2000 and 2001 the applicant and the child\u2019s mother lived together. From the outset they had, and continue to have, joint custody. On 11 December 2000, the Authority of the City of Munich issued the applicant a residence permit based on family ties, valid until 1 December 2001. 9.  On 18 July 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed an offence under the Narcotics Act (Bet\u00e4ubungsmittelgesetz). 10.  On 28 May 2002 the Munich Regional Court sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment for drug trafficking on a large scale. It observed that the applicant had recruited and instructed the child\u2019s mother as a drugs runner for two separate consignments of cocaine from South America to Europe in summer 1998 and in late 1999/early 2000. It considered, in favour of the applicant, that this was his first criminal conviction, that the first delivery had failed (the drugs did not actually enter the distribution system), and that the applicant had been detained on remand since July 2001. The Regional Court held against the applicant that he had used as drugs runners two young women who were adolescents at the time the offences were committed, and who ran the risk of a lengthy prison sentence in South America; that he had exploited the naivety of his daughter\u2019s mother; that a large amount of cocaine was meant to be smuggled in the first case and that four kilograms of cocaine were smuggled into Europe in the second case; and that the entire undertaking had been handled very professionally. In addition, the Regional Court considered that a conviction for a third case of drug smuggling could not be envisaged for the sole reason that the precise amount of cocaine transported in a suitcase from Peru to Spain could not be determined. 11.  The applicant submitted that his daughter and her mother had visited him in prison from 2001 to 2003 and that he had sought a court ruling on contact with his daughter, when the child\u2019s mother discontinued the visits. On 4 July 2006, the applicant and the child\u2019s mother agreed before the Munich Family Court that supervised meetings between him and his daughter would take place as soon as he was released from prison. As of 31 January 2008, the daughter visited the applicant regularly in prison \u2013 every four weeks for two hours at a time \u2013 in the company of a priest. 12.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant was released, after having served his entire sentence. He was placed under supervision of conduct (F\u00fchrungsaufsicht) until 3 July 2013. 13.  After his release, the applicant was granted exceptional leave to remain (Duldung) under Section 60a of the Residence Act \u2013 according to the information available to the Court this was granted most recently in January 2017 and would last until July 2017. It meant that enforcement of the expulsion order was temporarily suspended, being impossible to execute as the applicant did not have a valid passport (see paragraphs 28, 29 and 36\u201142 below). He began occupational re-training as a management assistant in marketing communication in April 2010, which he successfully completed in June 2012, but was not allowed to engage in gainful employment since his release. 14.  The applicant has not lived with his daughter and her mother since his release. Since 2012 they have been living in different cities, with distances between their homes varying between thirty and seventy kilometres and the travelling time varying between forty minutes and one hour. The applicant sees his daughter on a regular basis and maintains close contact with her. It is not disputed between the parties that she spends every other weekend with him. According to a social worker\u2019s statement, he has become an important contact person for her. Both the applicant\u2019s daughter and her mother explicitly wish the applicant\u2019s contact with his child to continue. 15.  Since his release, the applicant was convicted of three offences by the Munich District Court, of fraud in 2011 and of theft in 2015 and 2016. He was sentenced to twenty, thirty and ninety day-fines, respectively. By being present on German territory without having a passport, he committed an ongoing offence under the Residence Act. Criminal proceedings in this connection were discontinued by the public prosecutor in November 2013 because the applicant\u2019s guilt was considered to be of a minor nature and because prosecution was not in the public interest. The matter was referred to the administrative authority for treatment as an administrative offence. 16.  On 21 March 2003 the Authority of the City of Munich refused to renew the applicant\u2019s residence permit and ordered his expulsion. It held that the applicant\u2019s expulsion was mandatory pursuant to Section 47 \u00a7 1 of the Aliens Act (Ausl\u00e4ndergesetz; since 2004: Section 53 of the Residence Act) which foresaw the mandatory expulsion of an alien if he or she were sentenced to either at least three years\u2019 imprisonment for a criminal offence, or to any period of imprisonment (not on probation) for an offence under the Narcotics Act. The authority examined whether the applicant enjoyed special protection against expulsion because he was the father of a German child. It found that the applicant had lived with his daughter only for a short time prior to his imprisonment, she had thus experienced separation from the applicant and that, in the light of the applicant\u2019s very serious criminal offences, the State\u2019s interest in removing the applicant prevailed over his interest in enjoying family life with his daughter. He could remain in contact with her by letter or telephone and could apply for permission to enter Germany for specific periods of time (Betretenserlaubnis). It considered that the applicant\u2019s expulsion was in conformity with Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. This decision, which also contained an unlimited re-entry ban and notice that he would be deported to Nigeria if he did not leave Germany voluntarily within four weeks after being released from prison, became final on 26 August 2003. 17.  On 15 November 2006, after the applicant had served more than two thirds of his prison sentence, the authorities envisaged his expulsion as of 1 November 2007. 18.  On 3 December 2007 the applicant introduced another asylum application (see paragraph 6 above). On 8 February 2008, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees dismissed his application as manifestly ill\u2011founded under Section 30 \u00a7 3 of the Asylum Procedure Act (see paragraph 33 below) and, finding that there were no impediments to his return to his country of origin, ordered his expulsion. The decision again contained notice that he would be deported to Nigeria if he did not leave Germany voluntarily within one week after the decision became final. On 6 March 2008, the Munich Administrative Court granted suspensive effect to the applicant\u2019s appeal in the asylum procedure. On 8 September 2009 it dismissed his appeal in the main procedure, also finding, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s ties to his daughter could not be taken into account in the asylum procedure. This decision became final on 1 December 2009. 19.  On 10 September 2009 the applicant applied for a residence permit based on family ties. 20.  On 9 February 2010 the Authority of the City of Munich rejected his application, holding that there was a final expulsion decision (of 21 March 2003) against the applicant, which precluded granting him a residence permit. No impediments arose from the fact that his daughter was a German national. The applicant could maintain contact with her through letters, telephone calls and occasional visits. His daughter was accustomed to a long-distance relationship with him. He was responsible for the renewed separation and the purpose of the expulsion order had not yet been achieved. At the same time, it reduced the re-entry ban to five years and ruled that the applicant could, starting one year after his actual expulsion, apply for permission to enter Germany twice a year for a total of four weeks. 21.  On 14 April 2010 the Munich Administrative Court quashed that decision and ordered the administrative authority to issue a residence permit. It noted that the applicant met the requirements for a residence permit based on family ties, but that granting such a permit was precluded by the final expulsion decision. However, the applicant was entitled to a residence permit on humanitarian grounds in accordance with Section 25 \u00a7 5 of the Residence Act, with the margin of appreciation inherent in this provision being reduced to zero. Section 11 \u00a7 1 of the Residence Act was not applicable to this provision and the applicant\u2019s departure was impossible in law due to his family life with his daughter, which was protected, inter alia, by Article 8 of the Convention. 22.  The Administrative Court found that, despite the serious nature of the criminal offences the applicant had committed, there was no public interest that outweighed the child\u2019s best interests and the applicant\u2019s interest in having contact with his daughter. The relationship between the applicant and his daughter had the quality of a \u201cfamily\u201d and their ties were of benefit to the child. It considered that they could only live together in Germany, as the child could not be expected to relocate to Nigeria; that the applicant had committed the criminal offences prior to the birth of his daughter; that he had made considerable efforts as a father, as was also evidenced by his choice to remain imprisoned in Germany and to have supervised meetings with his daughter as of January 2008 rather than having his sentence suspended and being expelled as of 1 November 2007; that the latter event marked a turning point, which occurred after the expulsion order had become final in 2003 and which had not been taken into account by the administrative authorities; that the child had already been deprived of a relationship with her father for many years during his imprisonment; that the material assessment with a view to the applicant\u2019s expulsion had been conducted on 21 March 2003, years before the developments in the father\u2011daughter relationship and the moment the expulsion order would be enforced; and that the enforcement of the expulsion order in connection with a re-entry ban would deprive the child of the possibility of a normal father-daughter relationship for the remainder of her childhood. 23.  On 27 June 2011 the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal overturned that judgment and denied the applicant\u2019s right to a residence permit. It considered that his asylum application had been rejected as manifestly ill-founded under Section 30 \u00a7 3 of the Asylum Procedure Act and that, therefore, in accordance with Section 10 \u00a7 3, second sentence, of the Residence Act, he could not be granted a residence permit prior to leaving Germany (see paragraph 33 below). The exception to this rule, foreseen in the third sentence of this paragraph, was not applicable because the applicant did not have a claim to a residence permit within the meaning of that provision (see paragraph 34 below). 24.  First, a claim to a residence permit based on family ties under Sections 27 et seq. of the Residence Act was precluded by Section 11 of the Residence Act due to the final expulsion order of 21 March 2003 (see paragraph 35 below). Second, a claim to a residence permit on humanitarian grounds under Section 25 \u00a7 5 of the Residence Act was proscribed because the applicant did not have a valid passport, which was a general requirement for the granting of a residence permit (see paragraph 32 below). As the decision to waive this requirement in cases concerning residence permits on humanitarian grounds was a discretionary one, the applicant did not have a claim to a residence permit within the meaning of Section 10 \u00a7 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act, not even if the margin of appreciation were reduced to zero (see paragraph 34 below). Third, the court found that the applicant could not base a claim to a residence permit on impediments to his return to his country of origin either, referring to the outcome of the asylum proceedings in 2008 and 2009 (see paragraph 18 above). The Court of Appeal concluded that, under these circumstances, it was not decisive whether the ties between the applicant and his daughter were such that the requirements for a residence permit on humanitarian grounds under Section 25 \u00a7 5 of the Residence Act were met, if the applicant\u2019s asylum application had not been dismissed, and refrained from elaborating on this aspect. 25.  On 12 September 2011 the applicant lodged an action to be granted leave to appeal on points of law, arguing that his case raised a matter of fundamental importance. He submitted that he should be granted a residence permit under Section 25 \u00a7 5 of the Residence Act because, as the father of a minor child of German nationality for whom he had joint custody, he did, in principle, have a claim to a residence permit based on family ties. The purpose of Section 10 \u00a7 3 of the Residence Act was to sanction abuse of the asylum procedure, but an abusive asylum application should not bear negative consequences where the foreigner had a claim, within the meaning of that provision, to a residence permit. In that regard, it should be decisive whether or not the substantive requirements of the respective provision for a residence permit were met, as in his case with regard to the permit based on family ties, and that the reason for the claim not being realised, in his case the final expulsion order against him, should not be relevant. 26.  On 16 February 2012 the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s action. It noted that, according to the case-law of the domestic courts, the exception foreseen in Section 10 \u00a7 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act only applied to claims that followed directly from legislative provisions and in respect of which all requirements, general and specific, were met. A residence permit based on family ties was precluded because of the final expulsion order against the applicant. Under these circumstances, granting a residence permit on humanitarian grounds was to be considered. However, as the applicant did not have a valid passport, which was a general requirement for the granting of a residence permit from which derogations were, in cases concerning Section 25 \u00a7 5 of the Residence Act, possible only by way of a discretionary decision, the exception foreseen in Section 10 \u00a7 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act was not applicable. The decision was served on the applicant on 22 February 2012. 27.  On 22 March 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging that the decisions of the Administrative Court of Appeal and of the Federal Administrative Court violated his right to respect for his family life with his daughter. On 18 July 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 657/12). 28.  After the Authority of the City of Munich, on 12 June 2012, had ordered the applicant to present himself to the Embassy of Nigeria in Germany so that a passport for the upcoming expulsion could be issued, the applicant refused to do so and filed an action against this order with the Munich Administrative Court. During the court hearing on 1 August 2012, the applicant and the immigration authorities agreed to the following:\n\u201c- The effect of the re-entry ban will be limited to two and a half years after leaving Germany.\n- The immigration authorities will give their consent for a visa to enter Germany based on family reunion. If the applicant by then still has joint custody with the child\u2019s mother, a residence permit on the grounds of family ties will be issued. If the applicant no longer has joint custody for his daughter, the immigration authority will use its discretion regarding the issue of a residence permit in favour of the applicant.\n- All of this applies only if the applicant can show that he has not committed further criminal offences and if no other reasons for his expulsion emerge.\n- A time\u2011limit for leaving the country is set at 1 November 2012.\u201d\nIn the light of this agreement, the applicant withdrew his action, and the proceedings before the Munich Administrative Court were discontinued. 29.  On 25 September 2012 the Embassy of Nigeria in Germany declared that it would not issue a passport to the applicant as long as the proceedings before this Court were pending. On 6 November 2012 the applicant informed the immigration authorities that he would not leave Germany, contrary to his initial plans and to his declaration before the Munich Administrative Court. As a result, the agreement concluded before that court became void.", "references": ["9", "3", "1", "7", "8", "5", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants alleged, before the domestic courts and before the Court, that on 26 August 2002 police detained Mr S. Selami and took him from Gostivar to Skopje where he was severely beaten. Mr S. Selami sustained serious injuries to his head including a brain haemorrhage and fell into a coma. The police brought him to Skopje Hospital, where he underwent brain surgery. He was in a coma for two weeks and was connected to a ventilator for assisted breathing. 6.  By a letter of 28 August 2002 the applicants contacted the Ministry of the Interior seeking information about Mr S. Selami\u2019s whereabouts. By a letter of 29 August 2002, the Ministry had informed them that Mr S. Selami had been admitted to Skopje Hospital. 7.  According to a medical certificate from Tetovo Medical Centre issued on 29 January 2003 on the basis of the available medical evidence, Mr S. Selami was in a post-operative state (following medical trepanation of his skull and evacuation of the internal brain haemorrhage); parts of his skull and the tough brain membrane had been seriously damaged; he had suffered reduced mobility of all limbs, muscle hypotonia and neck and rib fractures. According to the report, those injuries had qualified as serious and had had permanent effects on the life and body of Mr S. Selami. 8.  As to the subsequent establishment of facts by the domestic civil courts, see paragraphs 15-18 below. 9.  On 31 August 2002, five days after first having been detained and beaten by the police (see paragraphs 15 to 22 below), an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) opened an investigation against Mr S. Selami and three other persons in connection with their alleged involvement in enemy activities against the State and ordered their pre-trial detention. The investigating judge specified that Mr S. Selami had been hospitalised and that the detention order would be enforced as soon as he was discharged from hospital. Mr S. Selami\u2019s detention was extended on three occasions. The extension orders specified that he had been deprived of his liberty on 18 September 2002 and that he had been held under the detention order in Skopje Hospital until 18 October 2002. 10.  On 14 November 2002 Mr S. Selami was indicted for membership of a terrorist group whose aim had been to organise terrorist attacks on the police in order to endanger the security and constitutional order of the State. On 10 December 2002 Mr S. Selami was released on bail on account of, inter alia, the \u201cserious deterioration of [his] health\u201d. 11.  By a judgment of 9 September 2003 the trial court discontinued (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0440\u0430) the criminal proceedings against Mr S. Selami since the prosecution had withdrawn the charges. The remaining accused were acquitted (\u043e\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0431\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435). 12.  On 18 November 2003 Mr S. Selami contacted the Ministry of Justice with a view to securing an out-of-court settlement and payment of 16,170,000 Macedonian denars (MKD \u2013 equivalent to 263,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused, so it was asserted, by the unlawful deprivation of his liberty and the serious injuries that he had sustained at the hands of the police on 26 August 2002. In support he submitted the medical certificate from Tetovo Medical Centre (see paragraph 7 above). 13.  In the absence of any response from the Ministry, on 30 January 2004 Mr S. Selami and the applicants submitted two separate lawsuits, one in relation to his unlawful detention and one in relation to his physical ill-treatment by the police, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in both. They reiterated that on 26 August 2002 Mr S. Selami had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty; that he had been taken to police stations where he had been beaten and physically ill-treated; and that the police had taken him to Skopje Hospital where he had undergone head surgery. On 19 September 2002 he had been transferred from the hospital to Skopje detention facility in view of his detention on remand. The applicants\u2019 claim was based on section 190(3) of the Obligations Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438), which entitles a spouse and children to obtain non-pecuniary damages in a case of severe disability of the victim (see paragraph 27 below). 14.  Both claims were joined and decided in a single set of proceedings. During the proceedings, the domestic courts commissioned two expert opinions and admitted into evidence extensive medical material issued by relevant medical institutions in Switzerland concerning Mr S. Selami\u2019s earlier injury while at work in that State. 15.  In a judgment of 22 April 2010, the Gostivar Court of First Instance ruled partly for Mr S. Selami and, relying on section 189 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 26 below), it awarded him the equivalent of EUR 18,000 in non-pecuniary damages for the unjustified detention between 19 September and 10 December 2002. It dismissed the remaining part of Mr S. Selami\u2019s claim. As to the applicants\u2019 claims, the court held that the consequences suffered by Mr S. Selami as a consequence of \u201cthe unjustified detention\u201d could not be regarded \u201cextremely severe disability\u201d, as required by section 190(3) of the Obligations Act. 16.  On the basis of the available medical evidence, the court established that in 1985, while at work in Switzerland, Mr S. Selami had fallen and injured his spine and right leg, which had become dysfunctional. As a result of that injury, he had been certified as disabled for the purposes of work in Switzerland and he had had to use crutches and a disability-adapted car. 17.  Relying on the expert evidence admitted at the trial, the court established, as a matter of fact, that during the \u201cincriminating event of 26 August 2002 ... Mr S. Selami had sustained serious bodily injury. As a result of the head trauma, there was haemorrhage ... in the right (part of the brain) ... After the surgery, Mr S. Selami had remained in coma and ... had been connected to a ventilator for assisted breathing. He had recovered after three weeks ...\u201d. The court further referred to the expert opinion according to which Mr S. Selami had sustained strong and intensive physical pain, as well as strong emotional pain and humiliation while being beaten. He had sustained serious head injuries, which had affected, though not permanently, the left side of his body and had provoked other negative psychological effects. 18.  Relying on the statements of Mr S. Selami and the first and fourth applicants, the court established that in August 2002 the police had searched their house. They had asked Mr S. Selami to come with them to Gostivar police station. There, he had been questioned in relation to an incident in which two policemen had been killed. He had denied having any connection to that incident. He had been taken by police car to Skopje, where he had been placed in \u201ca cellar or a garage\u201d and beaten. The applicants had not been aware of Mr S. Selami\u2019s whereabouts for several days after which they had discovered that he had been hospitalised in Skopje Hospital. Despite these findings of fact, the Court of First Instance expressed no conclusion about the lawfulness of any detention prior to 19 September 2002 or the treatment suffered by Mr S. Selami during that detention. 19.  Both Mr S. Selami and the applicants appealed to the Skopje Court of Appeal. They argued that the first-instance court had not determined their claim in relation to the serious injuries inflicted on him by the police, as a result of which he had had his skull broken; had suffered a brain haemorrhage; had required head surgery; had been immobilised and had lost the full use of his hands. The Solicitor General also challenged the judgment. 20.  On 6 April 2011 Mr S. Selami died. 21.  On 24 August 2012 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals by Mr S. Selami and the applicants and allowed the appeal by the Solicitor General. It overturned the lower court\u2019s judgment and awarded Mr S. Selami the equivalent of EUR 9,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage due to his \u201cunjustified detention between 19 September and 10 December 2002\u201d. The court, inter alia, stated:\n\u201cIn the impugned judgment, the first-instance court established ... on the basis of the expert opinion [that Mr S. Selami] had experienced intense pain on his head and body when he had been physically attacked ... every blow had caused physical pain of different intensity, accompanied by swelling and bruises on his body ... Regarding the intensity and duration of the fear, the experts are of the opinion that when arrested and physically assaulted and hit, particularly on his head, [Mr S. Selami] had had intense, unpleasant, emotional experiences of primary fear ... which persisted until he had fallen into a coma ... Regarding the emotional suffering due to his unjustified deprivation of liberty and detention, the experts are of the opinion that the basis for an award of non-pecuniary damages ... is the time calculated as of 26 August 2002 ... when [Mr S. Selami] was arrested by the police ..., transferred to other police stations, where he was subjected to serious physical ill-treatment and beaten, which caused serious bodily injury ...\nThis court considers that the [above] facts were correctly established.\n...\n... This court established on the basis of medical evidence that in 1989 [Mr S. Selami] had been certified disabled in Switzerland and that he had been receiving disability benefits ever since. The serious injury inflicted on him (during the 2002 detention) had caused his left limbs to become dysfunctional to a minor extent, which cannot be regarded as an extremely severe disability.\u201d 22.  The court rejected the applicants\u2019 arguments that the first-instance court had not decided the claim for compensation for damage sustained as a result of Mr S. Selami\u2019s physical ill-treatment. In this connection it stated that:\n\u201cthe operative provisions and the reasons given in the [impugned] judgment clearly and unequivocally confirm that the court had decided the entire claim ... This court considers that the emotional suffering due to unjustified detention is a single type of damage which includes all the detrimental effects on the victim, including his physical ill-treatment ... In assessing the amount of the award, this court took into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the unjustified deprivation of liberty, the respect with which the plaintiff was held in his family and in the community, that during the unjustified deprivation of liberty he was physically ill-treated and sustained serious bodily injury, as a result of which his left limbs became dysfunctional to a minor extent, that he was hospitalised and operated on and that he had been disabled before ...\u201d 23.  By a final decision of 31 October 2012, delivered by a notary public, the fourth applicant was declared the sole heir of Mr S. Selami\u2019s inheritance, including the compensation awarded to him. The remaining applicants refused to accept being declared heirs of the late Mr S. Selami. 24.  On 1 November 2012 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Skopje Court of Appeal reiterating their earlier arguments. The fourth applicant, as the statutory successor of the late Mr S. Selami, lodged the appeal in his name and on behalf of Mr S. Selami. 25.  On 11 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the lower courts.", "references": ["0", "7", "5", "4", "9", "6", "3", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Nova Kakhovka. 6.  Prior to the events of 1 June 2007 that are in issue in the present case the applicant, who is not a lawyer, had appeared before the Nova Kakhovka Court (hereinafter \u201cthe court\u201d) in a number of cases, either as a party or as a representative. In particular she had been involved in litigation with the local municipal utilities company. 7.  In December 2006 B. \u2013 one of the judges of the court \u2013 ordered the applicant to pay damages to the municipal utilities company\u2019s in-house lawyer Ms S. for defamation. 8.  In 2007 the municipal utilities company instituted proceedings against the applicant, seeking recovery of utilities arrears. 9.  On 1 June 2007 a preliminary hearing in that case was held before Judge M., sitting in a single-judge formation; it was audio-recorded at the applicant\u2019s request. 10.  The applicant appeared before the court and, at the opening of the hearing, challenged the presiding judge, M., in the following terms:\n\u201cApplicant: Your Honour, I would like to challenge the composition of the court.\nJudge: Please proceed.\nApplicant: Your Honour, the grounds on which I challenge you are that, [when] sitting on the [bench of] the Nova Kakhovka Court, you have not given a single lawful decision in any case where I was a representative or a party. You have not even once protected my rights or the rights of the individuals I have been representing and helping ... Previously I used not to challenge you but lately I have started to do so. You do not allow my challenges, arguing that my arguments against you are supposedly made up and subjective. However, recently I have read an article [entitled] \u201cFather for son, brother for brother\u201d in the Delovye Novosti newspaper, which clearly and specifically states that you, on the basis of corporate solidarity among judges, have given a similarly unlawful judgment, as a result of which a person was falsely convicted and sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. The newspaper article says that this issue has attracted the attention of the presidential administration and the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office. I know that the case in question was examined by the Council of Judges and by a parliamentary commission, before which you appeared, before your appointment. This was the source of the problems you had in securing your appointment to the position of judge for life .... This article tells me unequivocally that you will only decide [this] case according to the instructions which you ... receive, and the law \u2013 including my rights as a consumer \u2013 will mean absolutely nothing to you. All the more so because I know from a court clerk that an instruction [has been given to] the Nova Kakhovka Court to decide cases [in which I am involved] against me.\nIn support of what I have said I can refer to the case where you considered my claim against [a prosecutor] and where you delivered a totally illegal judgment, even though there have been decisions of the Nova Kakhovka Court and of the Court of Appeal concerning the same situation, in which the actions of the prosecutor had been declared unlawful in that the prosecutor should have delivered not only letters in response to my complaints but formal decisions so that I could challenge those decisions. You, by your decision, deprived me of that right.\nFor me this is another signal: if the fate of that young man did not mean anything to you, then mine would mean even less. So it is not just that I have serious doubts about your impartiality; I know of no case where you have given a lawful decision. When you came to the Nova Kakhovka Court, I told you that I had much hope in you \u2013 that you were a competent and good judge. I was mistaken. Especially since the time when I and [another person], waiting in the corridor, overheard you [discussing about me and laughing].\nJudge [voice rising]: Olena Oleksandrivna, I am forced to interrupt you because you are making clearly false statements; this is grounds for drawing up a report of contempt of court! So please be balanced; you have just made so many false statements that are insulting the court.\nApplicant: What I said ... [inaudible]\nJudge [voice rising]: Please substantiate it, substantiate it with evidence \u2013 substantiate it!\nApplicant: There is my complaint ... [inaudible]\nJudge [voice rising]: That complaint is just your subjective opinion! Please be balanced!\nApplicant [voice rising]: I am balanced. No, it is your subjective opinion. You prove that you haven\u2019t done all of this! We stood there and heard ...\nJudge: The judgments were upheld by the Court of Appeal: your case concerning K. \u2013 your case concerning elections. So please be balanced [inaudible] in [stating] your grounds for your challenge.\nApplicant: Your references to the Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions ... [the applicant lists names, apparently of other judges]\nJudge: The hearing is adjourned!\u201d 11.  According to the applicant, the hearing was adjourned at 9.30 a.m. Upon the adjournment Judge M. instructed her secretary, Ms P., to draw up an administrative-offence report in respect of the applicant for contempt of court. 12.  The report charged the applicant with contempt of court. The report stated that the applicant \u201con 1 June 2017 in the course of a court hearing ..., while challenging the presiding judge, accused [her] of delivering unlawful judgments [and undertaking] unlawful actions, uttered knowingly (\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043e\u043c\u043e) false statements detrimental to the judge\u2019s honour and dignity, failed to react to the court\u2019s admonishment to be balanced, [and] continued making statements which demonstrated her clear contempt for the court\u201d, and in doing so committed an offence under Article 185-3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe Code\u201d) \u2013 see paragraph 22 below). The report stated that the applicant\u2019s rights as a person accused of an administrative offence, as set out in Article 268 of the Code (see paragraph 25 below), had been explained to her and that her case would be examined on the same day. According to the applicant, the report was drawn up at 10.04 a.m. Having read it, she refused to sign it. 13.  The report was accompanied by written statements by Ms S. (see paragraph 7 above) and Ms Me. (according to the applicant, Ms Me. was Judge M.\u2019s trainee), who had been present at the hearing and who affirmed the information in the report. 14.  According to the applicant, the witness statements had not been in the file when it was transferred to Judge B., who examined her contempt case; rather, they were obtained subsequently under Judge B.\u2019s direction. 15.  The applicant alleged that the case file had been transmitted from Judge M.\u2019s secretary to Judge B. directly, without being registered at the court registry and without being assigned by the court president in accordance with the usual procedure. She also alleged that she had not been given access to the case file before the contempt hearing. 16.  On the same day Judge B. held a hearing in the presence of the applicant. According to the applicant, the hearing commenced at 10.27 a.m. In the course of the hearing the applicant pleaded not guilty of the administrative offence of contempt of court and made oral submissions in respect of the charge against her. It appears that in the course of the hearing the applicant secretly audio-recorded the proceedings, producing a recording of a rather poor quality which she provided to the Court on a CD disc (see paragraph 48 below). 17.  At 11.46 Judge B. gave her judgment, by which the applicant was found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to administrative detention for five days. Judge B. found that the applicant \u201cin the course of a court hearing, in making a challenge, had accused Judge M. of adopting unlawful decisions [and undertaking] unlawful actions, had made false statements detrimental to the judge\u2019s honour and dignity, had failed to react to the court\u2019s admonishment to be balanced, and had continued making insulting statements which had demonstrated clear contempt for the court.\u201d In convicting the applicant the court relied on the report (see paragraph 12 above), the statements of the witnesses Me. and S. (see paragraph 13 above), and the audio recording of the hearing (see paragraph 10 above). 18.  The applicant then spent five days in detention. 19.  On 2 July 2007 the First Vice-President of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal, acting on his own motion within the meaning of Article 294 of the Code (see paragraph 28 above), reviewed the case. He examined the case-file materials without holding a hearing and upheld Judge B.\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 17 above). In his reasoning the First Vice-President noted in particular that the applicant had failed to lodge any application in her case, be it to be permitted to examine the case file, for evidence to be collected, or to be allowed to have the assistance of a lawyer. 20.  The article entitled \u201cFather for son, brother for brother\u201d, to which the applicant referred in her challenge of Judge M. (see paragraph 10 above), was published in the Delovye Novosti newspaper on an unspecified date. It described a criminal case concerning a bar brawl in which a person had been killed and a certain G. charged with murder. The article was apparently mainly based on the statements of G.\u2019s father. It put forward a point of view according to which G. was innocent since he had not provoked the brawl but had simply been defending a friend whom the victim had supposedly humiliated. The article described, in caustic terms, the decisions of the courts in the case. It also described G.\u2019s father\u2019s and brother\u2019s efforts to defend him. According to the article, G. had been convicted by Judge V. of the Nova Kakhovka Court and sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. After the conviction had been quashed on appeal, a retrial had been conducted by Judge M. who, according to the article, had been driven to convict G. by \u201c[judges\u2019] esprit de corps and corporate solidarity\u201d. The article reported that G\u2019s conviction by Judge M. had again been quashed on appeal and the case remitted for retrial before a different district court and that G.\u2019s relatives had apparently made sure that the case would be under the supervision of the presidential administration and other high State bodies.", "references": ["8", "7", "5", "2", "0", "4", "9", "1", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant, is a French citizen, who was born in 1969 and lives in Gaillard, France. 7.  In 2003 the applicant met K.B.V., a Hungarian national. In 2009 K.B.V. moved to France and the couple lived together in the applicant\u2019s flat in Gaillard. On 18 October 2013 their son, L., was born. In December 2013 the couple spent the Christmas holidays with the applicant\u2019s family in Nancy. The applicant returned to their home on 27 December 2013. 8.  On 28 December 2013 K.B.V. lodged a complaint against the applicant in Toul. She alleged that the applicant had become hostile and sometimes aggressive towards her and constituted a danger to her and their son. 9.  On 4 January 2014 K.B.V. left for Hungary with L, without the prior knowledge or authorisation of the applicant. Since then K.B.V. has lived with L. at her parents\u2019 home in Szombathely. 10.  On 9 January 2014 K.B.V. initiated custody proceedings in respect of L. before the Szombathely District Court. 11.  On 7 February 2014 the applicant instigated proceedings before the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance. On 24 March 2014 the court found that L. had been illegally taken from France, placed the son with his father (that is to say the applicant), and granted the applicant sole custody. The court ordered the provisional execution of the judgment. Following an appeal by K.B.V., in a judgment of 22 July 2014, the Chambery Court of Appeal granted K.B.V. the right to have supervised contact every other Saturday between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m., awarded the parents joint custody, and upheld the remainder of the first-instance decision. 12.  On 28 January 2015 the Chambery Court of Appeal issued a certificate of enforceability under Article 39 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (known \u201cthe Brussels II bis Regulation\u201d). 13.  On 23 September 2015 the Court of Cassation quashed the second\u2011instance judgment of the Chambery Court of Appeal and remitted the case to the Lyon Court of Appeal. 14.  On 10 December 2014 the Pest Central District Court received from the applicant a request under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Articles 11-12) and the Brussels II bis Regulation for the child to be returned to France. The applicant maintained that L.\u2019s place of residence was in France and that under French law parents exercised their custody rights jointly. K.B.V. had decided on the child\u2019s place of residence without his approval. On 17 November and 4 and 12 December 2014, and 8, 22 and 28 January and 9 February 2015 the court examined the request in the presence of both parents. 15.  By a decision of 12 February 2015 the Pest Central District Court dismissed the request under Article 11 of the Hague Convention and Article 11 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. Relying on the definition of child abduction, as provided in Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the court found that K.B.V. had abducted L. from his habitual residence in France, where the parents had exercised their custody rights jointly. However, on the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded that if L. (who was still being breastfed) were returned to France, he would be placed in uncertain circumstances, only seeing his mother every second week for a couple of hours. It emphasised that according to the applicant\u2019s own submissions, he was away from home from 7 a.m. until 10 p.m. and that it would be difficult for him to look after the child during weekends. Thus, as he suggested, his sister would look after L. The court also noted that the applicant had lodged his request almost a year after L.\u2019s abduction and that although he had visited Hungary on a number of occasions, he had not been in contact with L. Thus, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. 16.  The Budapest High Court upheld the first-instance decision on 28 April 2015. It reiterated the conclusion of the first-instance court that there was a grave risk that L.\u2019s return to France would expose him to harm. In this aspect the court found relevant that L. was only one and a half years old and if returned to France he would be deprived of all maternal care. Thus, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, the Hungarian courts were not bound to order the child\u2019s return. The court also held that Article 11 \u00a7 4 of the Brussels II bis Regulation was not applicable, since no measures or arrangements were available to secure the protection of L. after his return. 17.  The applicant lodged a petition for judicial review of this decision with the K\u00faria. He argued that Article 13 of the Hague Convention was applicable to exceptional circumstances only and that neither the child\u2019s age nor his closer connection to his mother had any bearing on the matter and could not constitute a decisive element in the decision to refuse to order the child\u2019s return to his habitual residence. He also argued that he had contributed to the child\u2019s care and that his employment, which allowed him to provide for his family, could not be held against him. Furthermore, the decisions had failed to take into account L.\u2019s best interests, which lay in his being raised by both of his parents. He also maintained that his lack of contact with L. was due to K.B.V.\u2019s own conduct and the fact that he had not been aware of the child\u2019s place of residence until August 2014. Finally, the lower-instance courts had not respected the six-week deadline stipulated by the Brussels II bis Regulation. 18.  The K\u00faria dismissed the applicant\u2019s petition for judicial review on 6 October 2015. According to its reasoning both the Brussels II bis Regulation and the Hague Convention had established the presumption that a child\u2019s interests could best be served by his immediate return to his habitual residence. However, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention this presumption could be rebutted in exceptional circumstances. It agreed with the applicant that the child\u2019s young age, his close connection to the parent living in Hungary and his Hungarian roots could not serve as a basis for the refusal to order his return to France. It nonetheless held that at the time of his abduction L. had only been two and a half months old and that a considerable time had passed without him having contact with the applicant. The reason for this was that the applicant had refused to see L. at the premises of a child protection service, as suggested by K.B.V. The K\u00faria also found it important that according to the applicant\u2019s own statements his sister would take care of L. if the child were returned to France and that, according to the decision of the French courts, K.B.V. would only have very limited contact with L. Furthermore, there was no information about any measure of protection envisaged in the event of L.\u2019s return. Thus, the K\u00faria concluded that the return of the child, who was less than two years old, to an unknown environment would cause serious psychological harm. 19.  On 9 January 2014 K.B.V. initiated custody proceedings in respect of L. before the Szombathely District Court; she also requested the court to adopt an interim measure placing L. under her custody. 20.  On 27 August 2014 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, regard being had to the judgments delivered by the French courts. On 31 October 2014 the Szombathely High Court overturned this decision and ordered the District Court to examine whether the judgments of the French courts could be recognised and if not whether it had jurisdiction in the matter. 21.  On 5 January 2015 the District Court discontinued the proceedings again, finding that K.B.V. could have exercised her procedural rights before the French courts, submitting her written observations through her representative in the course of the appellate proceedings. This decision was overturned again by the High Court on 5 March 2015 owing to procedural errors. 22.  On 22 April 2015 the applicant tried to abduct L., who was walking with his grandfather on the street. Following the incident K.B.V. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and requested that a restriction order be imposed on him. On 8 May 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued a restriction order in respect of the applicant, which was subsequently overturned on appeal on the grounds that the mother herself had not been a victim of violent behaviour on the part of the applicant. 23.  On 30 April 2015, in an interim decision, the District Court decided not to recognise the judgments adopted by the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance and the Chambery Court of Appeal, established that it did have jurisdiction in the matter, and temporarily placed L. in his mother\u2019s sole custody. According to the District Court the French courts had found that the interests of the child could best be served by his return to France. However, the proceedings before the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance had failed to respect K.B.V.\u2019s right to a fair trial, since \u2013 owing to the fact that the applicant had given false information to the French authorities \u2013 she had not been informed of the proceedings and had not been able to be heard in person. Thus, the court concluded that the decision could not be recognised, pursuant to Articles 21 \u00a7 4 and 23(d) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. It also held that it had jurisdiction under Article 8 (1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, since the child\u2019s habitual residence was in Hungary. As to the interim resolution of custody rights, the Court held that the interests of the child could be best served if he remained in his habitual environment \u2013 that is to say in the company of his mother and maternal grandparents \u2013 and that removing him from Hungary would pose a risk of causing him psychological harm. 24.  Following a further appeal, on 11 August 2015 the Szombathely High Court overturned the decision concerning custody rights and remitted the case to the first-instance court. As to the decision on the non-recognition of the judgments delivered by the French courts, it found that recognition could not be refused on the basis that K.B.V. had not been heard in person before the French courts, since the Brussels II bis Regulation did not stipulate such an obligation and the mother could have submitted written observations. Nonetheless, the court found that the recognition of the foreign judgments could not be recognised, pursuant to Article 23(b) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, since recognition would have been contrary to the public policy of Hungary, given that the best interests of the child had only been respected in a formalistic way. According to the High Court, restricting the mother\u2019s contact with L. to two hours every second week would have caused harm to L., especially since the applicant himself had stated that L. would be looked after by his sister. The court also had regard to the forensic psychiatric opinion prepared by Dr Gy.L.K. on 28 August 2014 and supplemented by L.K. on 6 March 2015, according to which \u2011 from a psychological point of view \u2013 the enforcement of the French courts\u2019 judgment would constitute \u201cinstitutional abuse\u201d. Furthermore, the court found that no measures were being contemplated by the applicant to ensure the protection of the child after his return to France.\nA petition for judicial review lodged by the applicant with the K\u00faria was dismissed as time-barred on 15 January 2016. 25.  On 13 July 2015, in the course of the custody proceedings, the applicant also lodged a request for an interim measure regulating his access rights. 26.  On 8 December 2015 the applicant abducted L. from K.B.V., in the course of which he caused grievous bodily harm to her. L was taken to France. 27.  On 10 December 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued an interim decision on the exercise of parental custody and access rights. It noted that since January 2014 the applicant had seen his son only three times and had been in contact with him seven or eight times via Skype. It held that L. needed to have contact with his father and therefore ruled that the applicant could visit him for three hours every second weekend and could contact him via Skype every other weekend. Given the applicant\u2019s violent behaviour towards the mother (and previously towards the child\u2019s grandfather \u2013 see paragraph 22 above), the court held that the applicant\u2019s visits should take place under supervision. The applicant appealed. 28.  On 11 December 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued a European arrest warrant against the applicant, who was detained in France on 14 December 2015. L. was placed in a childcare institution. 29.  By a decision of 24 December 2015 the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance found that the applicant had endangered the child\u2019s development and temporarily placed L. in his mother\u2019s custody. The applicant was granted access rights, in accordance with the Szombathely District Court\u2019s decision of 10 December 2015. The applicant appealed against this decision. 30.  L. was returned to Hungary on 28 December 2015. 31.  On 3 February 2016 the Szombathely High Court upheld the decision of the District Court of 10 December 2015 on the temporary placement of L. in his mother\u2019s custody, emphasising that the Thonon\u2011Les\u2011Bains tribunal de grande instance had arrived at the same conclusion. 32.  In the meantime, on 24 February 2015 the applicant applied for the execution of the judgments delivered by the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance and the Chambery Court of Appeal. 33.  On 7 September 2015 the Szombathely District Court dismissed the application, relying on the decision of the Szombathely High Court of 11 August 2015 on the non-recognition of the French courts\u2019 judgments. It relied on Article 23(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. 34.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court had erred in finding that the decision on the non-recognition of the French courts\u2019 judgments was relevant in the case. Since in the meantime the Court of Cassation had overturned the judgment of the Chambery Court of Appeal, the applicant requested the enforcement of the judgment of the Thonon\u2011Les\u2011Bains tribunal de grande instance and maintained that this judgment had been declared automatically enforceable. The Szombathely High Court held that the judgment of the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance, under which no rights at all were granted to the mother at all, was contrary to the public policy of Hungary since it did not respect fundamental rights, and in particular the best interest of the child, and refused by a decision of 10 December 2015 to execute it.", "references": ["6", "5", "9", "8", "2", "3", "1", "0", "No Label", "7", "4"], "gold": ["7", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Stryzhavka. 6.  On 12 September 2006 the applicant submitted a written notice to the mayor of Vinnytsia informing him that the Chumatskyy Shlyakh civic youth association (\u201cthe Association\u201d) registered in Vinnytsia, of which he was chairman, intended to hold a picket (\u043f\u0456\u043a\u0435\u0442) outside the Vinnytsia Regional Authority (\u201cthe regional authority\u201d) building. The notice read as follows:\n\u201cWe inform you that, starting from 14 September 2006 our organisation will hold a picket [in front] of the [regional authority] for an indefinite term in view of the unhealthy, in our view, social and economic state of affairs in the region.\nBeginning of the picket: 14 September 2005 at 14:00.\nPlace: square in front of the [regional authority] building;\nResponsible person according to the decision of the Association\u2019s management: Chumak S.V. [the applicant].\nChairman of the [Association] Chumak, Sergiy Viktorovych.\u201d 7.  According to the Government, the Association\u2019s officially registered chairman at the material time was a certain Igor Viktorovyh Chumak. The applicant was neither the chairman, nor could he even be a member of the Association because according to the Association\u2019s charter, membership was open to persons under the age of twenty-eight. At the time of the relevant events the applicant was older. 8.  On 13 September 2006 the mayor\u2019s office forwarded the applicant\u2019s notice to the police, requesting that they maintain public order during the demonstration. 9.  On 14 September 2006 the Association started the picket as intended. According to the applicant, several other local groups joined the action and two small camping tents (measuring 2 by 2 metres) were erected by the walls of the regional authority building on a 15-metre wide street for storing handout materials and displaying the protesters\u2019 slogans. 10.  On 15 September 2006 the executive committee of Vinnytsia City Council instituted administrative proceedings seeking \u201cto enjoin the [Association] not to organise and carry out pickets on the streets and squares of Vinnytsia and to oblige it to uninstall the unlawfully erected \u2018small architectural structures\u2019 (\u043c\u0430\u043b\u0456 \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0456\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0456 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438).\u201d The plaintiff alleged that the protesters had been breaching the peace and public order by offending passers-by, acting arrogantly towards them, obstructing the traffic and pedestrians and endangering the lives and health of local residents. Referring to Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Justice (\u201cthe CAJ\u201d, see paragraph 20 below), which provided for the lodging of an action before the start of a picket, the plaintiff asked the court to admit its action for consideration out-of-time on the grounds that only after the picket had started had it become apparent that the protesters intended to engage in inappropriate conduct. The statement of claim was supplemented with applications by V.Ch. and Y.S., two passers-by, addressed to the police, in which they complained that the protesters had \u201cacted arrogantly\u201d, had offended their feelings and had erected tents obstructing pedestrians and spoiling the street aesthetics. 11.  On the same date the Leninskiy District Court in Vinnytsia (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) held a hearing at which the applicant, representing the Association, denied the allegations that the picketers had engaged in any inappropriate conduct. According to him, during the hearing he had unsuccessfully made several requests for the production of evidence. Notably, he had requested that V.Ch., Y.S. and the police officers present at the site of the picket be summoned for questioning; that the police authorities be asked whether any incidents of unlawful conduct by the picketers had been documented; and that the site be inspected in order to determine whether, in fact, the camping tents mounted by the picketers had obstructed the traffic or the passage of pedestrians. 12.  Later on the same date, the District Court allowed the claim, having decided that the case file contained sufficient evidence that the protesters had behaved inappropriately. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... [the] executive committee ... did not and could not have known about a possible breach of public order by the participants of the event, which fact resulted in missing the time-limit for lodging a court action as required by paragraph 1 of Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine; the court therefore resets the procedural time-limit ...\nThe court, when deciding the case, takes into account that the participants in the event installed small architectural edifices on the pavement. In addition, during the event, they acted arrogantly, thus offending other citizens, obstructed the passage of pedestrians along Soborna street, and endangered road users, a fact confirmed by the complaints from Y.S. and V.Ch.\nIn addition, the court has regard to the fact that in the notice of the event it is stated that it will be held indefinitely. Also the number of protesters is not defined ... and it may gradually increase. Accordingly, at any time during the picket of indeterminate length, it cannot be excluded that those taking part might repeatedly breach public order.\u201d 13.  The court also noted that the picket \u201cmay potentially encroach upon the rights and freedoms of other local residents\u201d and held as follows:\n\u201c[the court holds] to prohibit [the Association] and other persons taking part in the action from organising and carrying out peaceful assemblies in the streets and squares of Vinnytsia, [and] from installing small architectural edifices in Vinnytsia; ... oblige them to dismantle the small architectural edifices installed in the square in front of the [Administration\u2019s] building ...\nTo allow immediate enforcement of the court ruling ...\u201d 14.  At 9 p.m. on 15 September 2006 the protesters were dispersed by the police. 15.  On 29 September 2006 the local registry office informed the applicant that V.Ch. and Y.S. were not registered as residents at the addresses indicated by them in their complaints lodged with the police. 16.  On 8 October 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against the court judgment of 15 September 2006, which he signed as the Association\u2019s chairman. He submitted that under Article 182 of the CAJ, a plaintiff\u2019s action could not be examined when it had been lodged out of time. He further submitted that the court\u2019s factual conclusions had been devoid of an evidentiary basis. In particular, there was no evidence whatsoever that the protesters had breached the law, apart from the complaints by V.Ch. and Y.S., who had given false home addresses and thus could not be identified. The applicant further complained that the court had rejected his request that those individuals be located and summoned, and that the police officers present at the site of the picket also be summoned for questioning concerning the alleged breaches of the law by the protesters. He also regretted that the court had refused his requests that the relevant police reports documenting the purported breaches of the law (if any) be produced and an inspection of the picket site be carried out with a view to determining whether the tents erected by the activists could count as \u201carchitectural structures\u201d and whether there had been any obstruction of traffic or pedestrians. Lastly, the applicant complained that the sanction imposed by the District Court (a total and permanent ban on the Association organising peaceful assemblies in Vinnytsia) had been arbitrary and disproportionate. 17.  On 22 November 2006 the Vinnytsia Regional Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and decided that, in view of the circumstances of the case (namely, the short notice of the intention to hold a picket and the indefinite period during which the participants planned to continue their demonstration) the administrative action lodged by the executive committee could be accepted for examination. It agreed with the District Court\u2019s findings of fact and noted, in particular, that by installing the tents, the protesters had breached section 16 of the Populated Localities Development Act and section 18 of the Automobile Roads Act. At the same time, the Court of Appeal found that the sanction imposed on the protesters had been disproportionate. In particular, the Constitution of Ukraine generally allowed peaceful assemblies, which could therefore not be prohibited in a blanket manner. Nevertheless, it did not envisage a form of assembly such as the \u201cpicketing\u201d of administrative buildings \u201cwith the installation on the streets of small architectural structures\u201d. Accordingly, the court found that the term \u201cpeaceful assemblies\u201d in the operative part of the District Court\u2019s judgment had to be substituted with the term \u201cpickets\u201d. The court then rejected the applicant\u2019s remaining arguments as unsubstantiated. 18.  On 1 April 2009 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant.", "references": ["2", "1", "5", "9", "3", "8", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Frankfurt am Main. 7.  On 30 October 2013 the Frankfurt am Main District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant as there was a strong suspicion that he had aided the commission of crimes, worth several million euros, of aggravated fraudulent conversion, corruption, corruption in commercial practice and aggravated tax evasion through an elaborate system of bribes and fictitious invoices in connection with international business undertakings by a company. The arrest warrant was based on the risk of his absconding owing to the possible heavy sentence for the offences in question. He was also married to the co-accused, who, like him, was a national of the Russian Federation, and he did not have a legal residence or other significant ties to Germany. There was also a risk of collusion. On the same day, he was arrested and the District Court ordered his detention on remand. On 11 September 2014 the District Court included additional charges in the arrest warrant. 8.  On 19 December 2014 the Frankfurt am Main prosecution authorities brought criminal proceedings against the applicant, charging him with eight counts of aiding aggravated fraudulent conversion, one count of aiding aggravated corruption and fourteen counts of aiding aggravated tax evasion. On 26 January 2015 the Darmstadt Regional Court sent the translation of the 280-page indictment to the applicant. On 6 March 2015 he responded to the indictment and asked the court not to open the main proceedings. On 18 March 2015 the prosecution authorities asked the Regional Court to amend the proceedings against the applicant, based on the results of the investigation obtained after the criminal proceedings had been brought. 9.  On 6 May 2015 the Regional Court decided to open the main proceedings, which commenced on 8 June 2015. On 14 July 2016 the Regional Court convicted the applicant on five counts each of aiding fraudulent conversion and tax evasion and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The conviction has not yet become final, with appeals lodged by both the applicant and the prosecution authorities still pending at the time the Court examined the application. 10.  On 26 October 2016 the Frankfurt am Main District Court decided to set aside the arrest warrant of 30 October 2013, which since the outset had been the basis for the applicant\u2019s continuous detention on remand. 11.  From 15 January 2014 onwards the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his remand detention before the Frankfurt am Main District Court and the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court without success. Following a request by the prosecution authorities, the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal on 28 July 2014 ordered the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s remand detention. It also ordered that the case file be re-submitted to it by 28 October 2014 at the latest for the next periodic review. Until that time, it transferred the competency for further reviews to the court having jurisdiction according to the general provisions (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below). It considered that there was a risk that the applicant might abscond and that continued detention on remand was not disproportionate in light of the sentence which he risked incurring if found guilty. On 5 September 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against that decision. The court refused to accept it for adjudication, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 2050/14), a decision which was served on the applicant on 6 October 2014. 12.  Subsequently, the applicant initiated another set of review proceedings before the District Court and lodged a complaint of bias against the competent judge. The complaint was eventually rejected in accordance with the proceedings prescribed by law, as were the remedies pursued by the applicant. On 8 December 2014 the Frankfurt am Main District Court dismissed an application from the applicant to set aside the detention order as it had become devoid of purpose (prozessual \u00fcberholt) because the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal had been seized with a review of the applicant\u2019s detention under Articles 121 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13.  On 24 October 2014 the prosecution authorities submitted a statement and the case file to the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, requesting the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in accordance with Articles 121 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14.  On 7 November 2014 the applicant requested that the detention order be set aside. He also requested that the Court of Appeal decide on his objection and an appeal to be heard, lodged on 25 August 2014 against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 28 July 2014, prior to the expiry of the time\u2011limit given to him to respond to the prosecution authorities\u2019 submission. On 10 November 2014 the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection and the appeal to be heard. 15.  On 19 November 2014 the names of the judges called to decide on the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention were disclosed to the applicant, following his request of the same day. On 25 November 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint of bias against two of the three judges concerned, arguing that they had repeatedly contacted the wrong authorities \u2013 either the Frankfurt am Main District Court or Regional Court, rather than the prosecution authorities \u2013 to request the case file and had taken two and half months to decide on his objection and appeal to be heard. That had amounted to an arbitrary handling of his case and the judges involved could not decide on the continuation of his detention with the necessary impartiality. The judges gave their statements on 27 November 2014 and 1 December 2014. The applicant then requested additional statements from them, which was not deemed to be necessary by the Court of Appeal on 11 December 2014. Four days later the applicant lodged another complaint about bias, arguing that their statements in response to his first such complaint could not restore his confidence in their impartiality. The judges concerned again gave statements and the applicant\u2019s counsel was given the opportunity to respond. On 30 December 2014 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s first complaint of bias as ill-founded, finding that there were no indications that the judges concerned were partial, even assuming that they had made a procedural mistake in connection with requesting the case file, leading to a delay in deciding on his objection and appeal to be heard. On 8 January 2015 the applicant lodged an objection against that decision. On 22 January 2015 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s second complaint of bias as ill-founded, also addressing his objection in its decision. 16.  On 26 January 2015 the Court of Appeal asked the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court about the current state of the criminal proceedings and what developments there had been. The Court of Appeal was informed by the prosecution authorities that the criminal proceedings had been brought before the Darmstadt Regional Court, rather than the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, so the Court of Appeal made a similar enquiry to the court in question on 3 February 2015. 17.  On 10 March 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent to the Court of Appeal two comprehensive submissions which he had made in the main proceedings before the Regional Court and asked the appeal court to take them into account when deciding on the continuation of the applicant\u2019s remand detention. 18.  On 27 March 2015 and on 10 April 2015 the applicant lodged two applications with the Court of Appeal, asking it to take a decision in the pending review proceedings without delay. 19.  On 21 April 2015 the applicant lodged another constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging that the absence of a decision by the Court of Appeal in the pending detention review proceedings had violated his right to liberty and security. On 27 April 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 726/15). 20.  On 15 May 2015 the applicant was served with a decision by the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, taken on 15 April 2015 and issued on 13 May 2015, ordering the continuation of his detention on remand. It found that the risk of his absconding continued to exist. It further considered that in the light of, inter alia, the amount of evidence to be examined, the requests for legal assistance sent to several countries, and the scope and complexity of the case, there was no indication of undue delay in the conduct of the criminal proceedings, with the trial being scheduled to commence in June 2015. The applicant\u2019s continued detention on remand was, therefore, proportionate. The court did not address the duration of the review proceedings nor provide any reasons for it.", "references": ["9", "7", "1", "5", "3", "0", "4", "6", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in M\u0101rupe. At the material time the applicant held a pilot licence and was undergoing aviation training. 6.  In 2008 the applicant used the services of a company, KD.C. (the name of this company was subsequently changed, but it will be referred to hereinafter as \u201cKD.C.\u201d or \u201cthe company\u201d). D.K. held 100% of the shares in the company (he was its sole owner) and he was also its sole board member. The company provided private flights and organised private pilot training courses. The Civil Aviation Agency had issued the company with a registration certificate for the provision of private pilot training courses. 7.  The company did not provide commercial flights, therefore it fell outside the scope of the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers on Procedures Regarding the Issuing of an Air Operator\u2019s Certificate for Aerial Work (8 May 2007), and was not certified by the Civil Aviation Agency. 8.  On 16 August 2008 KD.C. organised a private flight from Riga to Tukums using a multi-engine aircraft, a Piper PA-31 with a maximum allowed mass of 2,900 kg. The applicant and six other people boarded the aircraft as passengers. The applicant occupied the front seat of the aircraft, next to the pilot, G.V., and maintained radio communication with the air traffic control service. 9.  At around 10 a.m. the pilot, G.V., lost control of the aircraft and it crashed (see paragraph 12 below). As a result, the pilot died and all passengers sustained serious injuries. 10.  According to a forensic medical examination, the applicant suffered serious, life-threatening injuries. He permanently lost the vision in his right eye and sustained other permanent damage to his health. He underwent treatment in Latvia and abroad.\nAfter rehabilitation, the applicant was able to continue working as an aviation specialist, but under certain limitations. He was not permitted to operate an aircraft independently and was required to undergo medical checks more often than other aviation specialists. 11.  Following the accident on 16 August 2008 officials from the Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (Transporta nelaimes gad\u012bjumu un incidentu izmekl\u0113\u0161anas birojs, hereinafter \u201cthe TAIIB\u201d), whose main task was to establish the circumstances of an accident, went to the scene of the accident and carried out an investigation. 12.  According to the TAIIB\u2019s final report of 27 June 2009, on the day of the accident, when operating in cloudy weather, G.V., the pilot, made a series of chaotic manoeuvres, as a result of which the aircraft, which was about 30-50 m from the ground, lost altitude. The attempts to stabilise it were unsuccessful. As a consequence of hitting the ground and damaging its tank, the aircraft caught fire. 13.  The investigation concluded that the primary cause of the accident was \u201chuman error\u201d (cilv\u0113ka faktors), namely G.V. having insufficient skills and experience to independently operate a multi-engine aircraft in accordance with instrumental flight rules and, in particular, to operate a Piper PA-31 aircraft. The pilot had not obtained authorisation from the Civil Aviation Agency to fly that particular type of aircraft. In particular, G.V. had started the \u201cdifferences training programme\u201d for the Piper PA\u201131 aircraft on 1 August 2008, but had not finished it. Nevertheless, on 16 August 2008 he had flown without sufficient qualifications. 14.  The final report indicated several aspects which had contributed to the accident, such as unfavourable weather conditions with poor visibility, and the \u201cunsafe supervision\u201d (nedro\u0161a uzraudz\u012bba) carried out by the Civil Aviation Agency \u201c[to ensure] that the aviation legislation and visual flight rules were complied with\u201d. 15.  With regard to KD.C., the company which owned the aircraft, the investigation concluded that it had not followed up on the pilot\u2019s differences training programme and its outcome. On the day of the accident the company had not checked whether the pilot\u2019s documents complied with the requirements of the legislation, and it had unjustifiably (nepamatoti) handed over the aircraft to him and verbally authorised him to fly. 16.  The above report, inter alia, addressed to the Civil Aviation Agency eight recommendations concerning flight safety. The second recommendation advised the Civil Aviation Agency to impose a duty on aircraft owners to set up a procedure for aircraft handovers which would prevent pilots from operating a flight without a licence and would contain confirmation of an appropriate qualification certificate issued by the Civil Aviation Agency. 17.  On 16 August 2008 a criminal investigation was opened into the aircraft accident. In the course of the investigation the police gathered evidence, ordered that forensic examinations be carried out, and interviewed numerous witnesses, including various aviation specialists. 18.  Questioned as a witness, D.K. stated that he himself had no experience of operating aircrafts, and that G.V. had been the company\u2019s de facto associate, although legally he had had no contractual relationship with the company; D.K. also stated that he had had no doubts that G.V. had had sufficient qualifications, because he had undergone the necessary training and obtaining a certificate had only been a formality. It had been supposed that G.V. would at all times be accompanied by a more experienced instructor during the training flights. On the day of the accident D.K. had a telephone conversation with G.V. and the latter informed him that he had finished his \u201cinstruction\u201d and would soon be starting a flight. Only afterwards did D.K. find out that another aeroplane had returned to the same airport owing to bad weather conditions. 19.  The investigation revealed that G.V. had undertaken to fly the aircraft even though he lacked the requisite skills, which had caused the accident in question. On 14 January 2010 the proceedings with regard to G.V. were terminated due to his death. 20.  The material in the criminal case contained a letter from the TAIIB dated 20 October 2009 which stated, inter alia, that at the material time the legislative acts regulating aviation safety in Latvia had not provided for a procedure setting out how to hand over an aircraft for a general aviation flight. 21.  This was further confirmed in a statement given by a TAIIB official during the investigation, that in general aviation, unlike in commercial aviation, there were no established (nebija sak\u0101rtots) regulations regarding an aircraft owner\u2019s responsibility in relation to a specific flight and a pilot\u2019s skills. Therefore the recommendations of the TAIIB were adopted to address that issue within the existing system (see paragraph 16 above). During the investigation, an official of the Civil Aviation Agency testified that in commercial aviation, the question of an operator\u2019s responsibility with regard to the qualifications and rights of a pilot was sufficiently regulated, however this regulation did not apply to general aviation flights. 22.  On 24 May 2011 the prosecution indicted D.K. for negligence in the performance of his professional duties (section 197 of the Criminal Law) and violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations (section 257(2) of the Criminal Law). The prosecution alleged that D.K. had handed over the aircraft to G.V. knowing that the latter lacked the requisite permit and skills to operate it. On 8 June 2011 the prosecution referred the case for trial. 23.  On 22 October 2012 the Tukums District Court found D.K. guilty on both counts. It established that D.K. had not applied any measures to verify G.V.\u2019s qualifications. He had given the aircraft to the pilot knowing that the latter lacked the appropriate authorisation and had permitted him to fly. D.K. was given a suspended prison sentence of five years. He was also ordered to pay the applicant 20,000 Latvian lati (around 29,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 24.  On 15 May 2013 the Zemgale Regional Court, acting as an appellate court, quashed the above judgment and acquitted D.K. In the appeal proceedings, D.K. testified that in his telephone conversation with G.V. on 16 August 2008 they had agreed that G.V. would not fly, owing to the bad weather conditions. He explained the inconsistency in relation to his pre\u2011trial testimony (see paragraph 18 above) as follows. Firstly, he had been a witness at that stage. Secondly, he had been interviewed in Latvian, which was not his mother tongue, and he had not been as fluent as was necessary. He had no doubt that G.V. was responsible for the accident, and he could not envisage also being charged in criminal proceedings. 25.  With regard to negligence in the performance of his professional duties (see paragraph 44 below), the court deemed that neither the indictment nor the first-instance judgment had shown what professional duties in particular D.K. had neglected. Also, not being an aviation specialist, he could not have been regarded as a \u201cspecial subject\u201d for the purposes of this section of the Criminal Law (an organisation\u2019s responsible employee). 26.  Concerning the alleged violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations (see paragraph 45 below), the appellate court concluded that it had not been established precisely what regulations D.K. had violated and by what conduct in particular. Besides, section 257 of the Criminal Law required that the prohibited conduct be committed by a transport employee, which D.K. was not. 27.  The appellate court indicated that, even though D.K. could not be held criminally liable, KD.C. had an obligation to provide compensation for the damage sustained by the victim, and therefore the applicant had rights to seek damages in civil proceedings. 28.  Both the applicant and the prosecutor submitted appeals against the appellate court\u2019s judgment. 29.  On 9 December 2013 the Senate of the Supreme Court endorsed the appeal court\u2019s findings that it had not been shown that D.K. had committed the requisite actus reus. The Senate confirmed that D.K.\u2019s actions did not contain the necessary elements of a crime under sections 197 and 257(2) of the Criminal Law. 30.  The Senate stated that the prosecution should not have relied on certain provisions of the Commercial Law, the Civil Law, the Law on Aviation and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter \u201cthe Chicago Convention\u201d). Those provisions were applicable when determining the civil and not criminal liability of an aircraft owner. In accordance with section 34 of the Law on Aviation, a pilot was prohibited from performing his functions in the event that he had not acquired the appropriate qualifications. The above provision had been binding upon the pilot and not D.K. The Senate also stated that only on 18 November 2010 had Part II of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention, Seventh Edition, come into force, making provision for the liability of an aircraft owner and a pilot; before that date the Chicago Convention provided the responsibility only of the pilot (see also paragraph 58 et seq. below). 31.  Furthermore, at the material time, no legislation had provided for a procedure for handing over an aircraft to a pilot, designating a person responsible for verifying pilots\u2019 training, or checking flight planning and implementation. Only subsequent to the accident in question had recommendations been issued to the Civil Aviation Agency on the preparation of statutes relevant to flight safety. As of 24 April 2013, section 91 of the Law on Aviation had provided that an aircraft owner or operator was not allowed to hand over an aircraft to a person lacking the appropriate qualifications and insurance cover (see paragraph 55 below). 32.  On 13 August 2010 the applicant lodged a claim for damages against KD.C. (the company which owned the aircraft), D.K. (the sole owner and board member of the company), and the insurance company. In the claim, inter alia, the applicant relied on sections 1782, 2347 and 2349 of the Civil Law (see paragraphs 42-43 below). In the meantime, by a final decision of the Riga Regional Court of 8 November 2010, KD.C. was declared bankrupt (maks\u0101tnesp\u0113j\u012bgs) upon application by one of its creditors and respective proceedings were started with retrospective effect from 31 December 2008. 33.  On 14 May 2013 the Riga Regional Court, acting as a court of first instance, dismissed the claim in full on the grounds that the defendants had not committed unlawful actions (prettiesiska darb\u012bba). There was no dispute that D.K. had agreed to the pilot starting a \u201cdifferences training programme\u201d for the Piper PA-31 aircraft with a flight instructor, O.G. However, there was no evidence that on 16 August 2008 D.K. had allowed the pilot to operate this aircraft carrying seven passengers. On the contrary, the instructor and another witness (J.Z.) had testified that it had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor, who had not arrived at the airport to take the flight on that date because of the bad weather conditions. The pilot had been informed of the bad weather conditions and the fact that the flight instructor would not arrive for the flight.\nBy referring to the investigation carried out by the TAIIB, the Riga Regional Court noted that the primary reason for the accident was \u201chuman error\u201d on the part of the pilot, and that the lack of sufficient procedure in relation to handing over an aircraft had contributed to the accident, but was not the sole cause of it. Moreover, the applicant had occupied the front seat of the aircraft, next to the pilot, and had maintained radio communication. Taking into account that he was a pilot himself and that he had received information about the unfavourable weather conditions, he could have avoided any damage by choosing not to fly in such circumstances.\nBy referring to the second recommendation (see paragraph 16 above), the court concluded that, at the material time, there had been no obligation for aircraft owners to verify the qualifications and health of pilots. 34.  On 24 September 2015 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in full on the following grounds. 35.  With regard to KD.C., the civil proceedings were terminated because the company had ceased to exist (on 26 May 2015 it had been excluded from the Companies Register) and there was no legal successor. 36.  Next, the appellate court found that D.K. could not be held liable under sections 1779 and 1635 of the Civil Law for the damage sustained by the applicant. By referring to the investigation carried out by the TAIIB, the appellate court also noted that the primary cause of the accident had been \u201chuman error\u201d on the part of the pilot. While the lack of a sufficient procedure in relation to handing over the aircraft had contributed to the accident, there was no causal link between the accident and the actions of D.K., who managed the company.\nThe appellate court also referred to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings to the effect that D.K. was not liable for the flight operated by the pilot, and the fact that he had been acquitted. Moreover, the appellate court referred to evidence given to the first-instance court and concluded that on 16 August 2008 D.K. had not allowed the pilot to operate the aircraft independently and that the pilot\u2019s course of action (to operate the aircraft independently) had been arbitrary and unlawful. It had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor (see paragraph 33 above).\nIn the light of sections 97 and 98 of the Law on Aviation, the owner of the aircraft was the company and not D.K. Thus, the latter could not be held responsible under the Law on Aviation. In so far as the applicant referred to the Chicago Convention, this was inapplicable, because it only provided for the responsibility of a pilot-in-command and, from 18 November 2010 onwards, the responsibility of an owner; D.K. was neither a pilot nor an owner.\nNeither could D.K. be held liable under section 1782 of the Civil Law (see paragraph 43 below) because the pilot had not been an employee of the company. Nor could he be held liable under sections 2347 and 2349 of the Civil Law (see paragraph 42 below). Referring to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings, the appellate court held that D.K. had not engaged in any unlawful (prettiesiska) or liable (vainojama) activity. Therefore, he could not be required to pay damages to the applicant. There was no doubt that the aircraft was a source of dangerous activity, but D.K. was not its owner. Instead, KD.C. was the owner of the aircraft, therefore it was liable for loss caused by the source of dangerous activity. 37.  The appellate court also refused to hold D.K. liable as a board member of the company. It concluded that, under the relevant provisions of the Commercial Law, board members were liable for damage caused to a company. In the present case, the company had not incurred any losses because it had not provided compensation for any damage sustained by the applicant. 38.  Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the claim against the insurance company. In the judgment, it stated that the aircraft accident fell outside the terms of the aircraft\u2019s insurance, which provided that compensation was not awarded if an accident was caused by a pilot who had no right to operate an aircraft. In the present case, the pilot had not had a permit to operate the aircraft in question. 39.  In a preparatory meeting on 5 May 2016 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant in the case against KD.C., D.K. and the insurance company. 40.  In a letter dated 12 May 2015 addressed to the Government regarding the accident in question, the Civil Aviation Agency stated:\n\u201cAs regards the responsibility of the aircraft owner, we note that the legislative acts [at the material time] provided that the owner of an aircraft was responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the aircraft\u2019s airworthiness, but not its safe operation during a flight, which was the pilot\u2019s responsibility. In particular, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks, under Annex I (Part M) M.A. 201 (a), the owner is responsible for the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft and shall ensure that no flight takes place unless: the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition; and any operational and emergency equipment fitted is correctly installed and serviceable or clearly identified as unserviceable; and the airworthiness certificate remains valid; and the maintenance of the aircraft is performed in accordance with the approved maintenance programme.\u201d 41.  Article 92 of the Constitution (Satversme) provides, inter alia, that \u201cany person whose rights are violated without justification has a right to commensurate compensation\u201d. Domestic legal provisions pertaining to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage under the Civil Law (Civillikums) are quoted in full in Zavoloka v. Latvia (no. 58447/00, \u00a7\u00a7 17\u201119, 7 July 2009). Sections 1635 and 1779 are also explained in the case of Holodenko v. Latvia (no. 17215/07, \u00a7 45, 2 July 2013). 42.  Under section 2347 of the Civil Law, if a person is responsible for causing another person bodily injury through an illegal action, the person responsible shall compensate the victim for medical expenses and the loss of future income (paragraph one). A person engaging in activities, which are dangerous for others (transport, enterprise, construction, dangerous substances, etc.), shall compensate for loss caused by the source of dangerous activity, unless he or she proves that it was incurred owing to force majeure, or through the victim\u2019s own intentional act or gross negligence (paragraph two). Under section 2349 of the Civil Law, the domestic courts shall award compensation for bodily injuries causing mutilation and disfigurement. 43.  Section 1782 provides that a person who fails to exercise due care in choosing agents or other employees, and who fails to satisfy himself or herself as to their abilities and suitability to perform duties as may be imposed on them, shall be liable for losses the agents or employees cause a third party. 44.  Section 197 criminalises negligence by an organisation\u2019s employee in the performance of his or her professional duties where substantial harm is caused to the organisation or to the lawful rights and interests of another person. 45.  Section 257(2) criminalises, inter alia, violation by a transport employee of air traffic safety or operation regulations if there are serious consequences (smagas sekas). 46.  Section 5 provided that the Ministry of Transport and the Civil Aviation Agency implemented the State policy and administration in the area of the use of the Republic of Latvia\u2019s airspace and civil aviation operations. 47.  Section 6 defined the powers of the Civil Aviation Agency. These powers comprised, inter alia: carrying out State supervision of the use of the Republic of Latvia\u2019s airspace and civil aviation operations; prohibiting activities related to the use of airspace or the operation of aircrafts in breach of legislative acts; coming up with measures to guarantee aircraft flight safety; and drawing up legislative acts regulating the safety of civil aviation operations. Together with other authorities, the Civil Aviation Agency was also tasked with supervising the training, retraining and raising of the level of qualifications of civil aviation personnel (section 31). 48.  Section 33 provided that aviation specialists should carry out their functions pursuant to the domestic and European Union law and the international agreements which were binding upon the Republic of Latvia. 49.  The relevant parts of section 34 read as follows:\n\u201cAn aviation specialist is prohibited from performing his or her functions if he or she:\n1) is unable to present a licence with an appropriate qualification stamp allowing the performance of such functions, or if the specialist\u2019s [possession of] the appropriate qualification has not been verified within the time-limit prescribed;\n...\u201d 50.  Section 36 provided that the work of a civil aircraft flight crew should be managed by a pilot-in-command. If a civil aircraft flight crew included only one pilot, he or she was also the pilot-in-command. 51.  Section 37 set out the duties of the pilot of an aircraft, such as: managing the work of a flight crew so that aircraft flight safety was ensured and the provisions of this Law and other laws of the Republic of Latvia were respected, as well as the requirements of by-laws, instructions and other laws and regulations; implementing measures to prevent danger threatening the aircraft which he or she controlled; rescuing passengers, injured crew members, the aircraft, and its documentation and property on board; and providing medical assistance to those who were injured if the aircraft had an aviation accident. 52.  Section 38 set out the rights of the pilot of an aircraft, such as: taking the final decision on an aircraft taking off, continuing with a flight or landing at an intended flight destination or an alternate aerodrome; or temporarily suspending the departure of an aircraft. 53.  Section 96 provided as follows:\n\u201cAn aircraft owner or operator, if the aircraft has been operated by another person, shall be liable for any harm caused by the death or damage to health of a member of the flight crew which occurs during the performance of his or her official duties. The performance of duties shall commence with a flight crew member\u2019s preparation for a flight and shall conclude after the flight at the moment when he or she has fulfilled all of the functions set out in the rules regarding the operation of the aircraft and other regulations.\u201d 54.  Section 97 provided as follows:\n\u201cAn aircraft owner or operator, if the aircraft is operated by another person, shall be liable for any harm caused to a third party in the territory of the Republic of Latvia by an aircraft in flight or an object that has become separated from that aircraft [where this harm] manifests [itself] in either the death of the third party or damage caused to his or her health, or harm caused to his or her property, if the aircraft owner or operator, in accordance with the procedures laid down in legal acts of the Republic of Latvia, does not prove that the harm occurred according to the fault of the victim himself or herself. The Cabinet [of Ministers] shall determine the procedures by which compensation for harm to a third party or [that third party\u2019s] property shall be provided, if [such harm] is caused by a military or civil aircraft (or an object that has become separated from that aircraft) of the Republic of Latvia which the National Armed Forces of Latvia use for military purposes.\nFor the purposes of this section, an aircraft shall be deemed to be an aircraft in flight from the moment the engines of the aircraft are started before take-off until the moment when the aircraft has finished taxiing after its landing.\u201d 55.  On 21 March 2013 the Law on Aviation was supplemented by section 91. This was to have effect from 24 April 2013 onwards and was worded in the following manner:\n\u201cAn aircraft owner and operator is prohibited from handing over an aircraft which is to be flown to a person who does not have a civil aircraft flight crew member licence with an appropriate qualification stamp and who is not insured in accordance with section 111 of this law.\u201d 56.  In a judgment of 24 November 2010 in case no. SKC-233/2010, the Civil Cases Chamber of the Senate of the Supreme Court held that there was no specific legal regulation for compensation with regard to actions taken by a domestic court, save for regulation concerning unjustified conviction and administrative arrest. However, such an absence could not be an obstacle to lodging a respective claim, because the third sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution, which provided for the right to receive compensation, was directly applicable.\nThe Administrative Cases Chamber of the Senate of the Supreme Court, in a decision of 24 July 2012 in case SKA-726/2012, held that, in order for a person to seek compensation for an infringement of his or her rights caused by a legal provision adopted by Parliament, he or she could file a civil claim with a court of general jurisdiction, directly referring to the third sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution. Such a claim would be brought against the Republic of Latvia, which would be represented by its Parliament (pret Latvijas Republiku Saeimas person\u0101). 57.  The claimant in civil case no. 04255508, relying on Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 1635 of the Civil Law, alleged liability on the part of the State and requested an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of a failure to ensure the safety of soldiers\u2019 skydiving classes and their compliance with legal provisions, which had resulted in the death of the claimant\u2019s son. These skydiving classes had been organised by the National Armed Forces, and the domestic courts established negligence on the part of State officials (they had failed to comply with various provisions of domestic law and internal instructions), as well as a causal connection between that negligence and the death of the soldier. In its judgment of 6 March 2013, the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, referring to, inter alia, the State\u2019s positive obligations enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, ruled that an acquittal in criminal proceedings did not exclude the State\u2019s liability for an accident. Consequently, the victim\u2019s relatives had a right to seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage.\nIn its judgment of 31 October 2014 in civil case no. C33137808, the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, noted that the State police\u2019s conclusion reached in the course of criminal proceedings as to the absence of pecuniary damage was not binding on a court adjudicating a civil claim, and did not absolve parties to civil proceedings from the obligation to prove the non-existence of pecuniary damage in the course of those proceedings.\nIn another decision of 3 February 2015 in case no. C322451I I, the Civil Cases Division of the Supreme Court upheld a lower court\u2019s ruling awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage to a victim\u2019s relatives, notwithstanding the fact that criminal proceedings were ongoing in respect of the same events. 58.  The Chicago Convention provides that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Article 1). No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State without that State\u2019s special permission (Article 6). Latvia acceded to the Convention on 13 July 1992, and it entered into force in respect of Latvia on 12 August 1992. The Sixth Edition of Annex 6 (\u201cOperation of Aircraft\u201d) to the Chicago Convention contains International Standards and Recommended Practices that were applicable on 1 July 2008. It contains three parts: international commercial air transport \u2013 aeroplanes (Part I), international general aviation \u2013 aeroplanes (Part II) and international operations \u2013 helicopters (Part III). 59.  Part II reads as follows:\nFOREWORD\nHistorical background\n\u201c...\nLevel of safety. The Annex should ensure an acceptable level of safety to passengers and third parties (third parties meaning persons on the ground and persons in the air and in other aircraft). Also, as some international general aviation operations (typically under 5,700 kg) would be performed by crews less experienced and less skilled, with less reliable equipment, to less rigorous standards and with greater freedom of action than in commercial air transport operations, it was therefore, accepted that the passenger in international general aviation aircraft would not necessarily enjoy the same level of safety as the fare-paying passenger in commercial air transport. However, it was recognised that in ensuring an acceptable degree of safety for third parties, an acceptable level of safety for flight crews and passengers would be achieved.\nFreedom of action. The maximum freedom of action consistent with maintaining an acceptable level of safety should be granted to international general aviation.\nResponsibility. The responsibility that devolves under the operator in Annex 6, Part I, should, in Part II of the Annex, fall under the owner and pilot-in-command.\n...\u201d\nApplicability\n\u201cThe Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 6, Part II, are applicable to international general aviation operations with aeroplanes.\nThe Standards and Recommended Practices represent minimum provisions and, together with those of Annex 6 \u2013 Operation of Aircraft, Part I \u2013 International Commercial Air Transport \u2013 Aeroplanes, now cover the operation of all aeroplanes in international civil aviation, except in aerial work operations.\nIt will be noted that the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 6, Part II, when applied to the operation of large aeroplanes, are less stringent than those in Annex 6, Part I, applicable to the same or similar aeroplanes when used in commercial air transport operations. Nevertheless, it is considered that, in conjunction with existing provisions in Annexes 1 and 8, Annex 6, Part II, ensures an adequate level of safety for the operations envisaged for the large aeroplanes in question. In this connection attention is drawn to the point that the entire performance Standards of Annex 8 are applicable to all aeroplanes of over 5,700 kg mass intended for the carriage of passengers or cargo or mail international air navigation, of which the prototype was submitted for certification on or after 13 December 1964. Moreover, by virtue of Annex 1 the pilot of an aircraft certificated for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots must hold a type rating for that aircraft type.\u201d\nSECTION 2 \u2013 GENERAL AVIATION OPERATIONS\nCHAPTER 2.1 GENERAL 2.1.1 Compliance with laws, regulations and procedures\n\u201c2.1.1.1 The pilot-in-command shall comply with the laws, regulations and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted.\n... 2.1.1.2 The pilot-in-command shall be familiar with the laws, regulations and procedures, pertinent to the performance of his or her duties, prescribed for the areas to be traversed, the aerodromes to be used and the air navigation facilities relating thereto. The pilot-in-command shall ensure that other members of the flight crew are familiar with such of these laws, regulations and procedures as are pertinent to the performance of their respective duties in the operation of the aeroplane. 2.1.1.3 The pilot-in-command shall have responsibility of the operational control.\n...\u201d\nCHAPTER 2.2 FLIGHT OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Operating facilities\n\u201cThe pilot-in-command shall ensure that a flight will not be commended unless it has been ascertained by every reasonable means available that the ground and/or water facilities including communication facilities and navigation aids available and directly required on such flights, for the safe operation of the aeroplane, are adequate for the type of operation under which the flight is to be conducted ...\u201d 2.2.2.1 Operating instructions \u2013 general\n\u201cAn aeroplane shall not be taxied on the movement area of an aerodrome unless the person at the controls is an appropriately qualified pilot or:\na) has been authorised by the owner ...;\nb) is fully competent to taxi the aeroplane;\nc) is qualified to use the radio if radio communications are required; and\nd) has received instruction from a competent person in respect of aerodrome layout, and where appropriate, information on routes, signs, marking, lights, ATC signals and instructions, phraseology and procedures, and is able to conform to the operational standards required for safe aeroplane movement at the aerodrome.\u201d 2.2.5 Duties of pilot-in-command\n\u201c2.2.5.1 The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation, safety and security of the aeroplane and the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board.\n...\u201d\nCHAPTER 2.6 AEROPLANE MAINTENANCE 2.6.1 Owner\u2019s maintenance responsibilities\n\u201c2.6.1.1 The owner of an aeroplane, or in case where it is leased, the lessee, shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures acceptable to the State of Registry [the State on whose register the aircraft is entered]:\na) the aeroplane is maintained in an airworthy condition;\nb) the operational and emergency equipment necessary for an intended flight is serviceable; and\nc) the certificate of airworthiness of the aeroplane remains valid. 2.6.1.2 The owner or the lessee shall not operate the aeroplane unless it is maintained and released to service under a system acceptable to the State of Registry.\n...\u201d\nCHAPTER 2.7 AEROPLANE FLIGHT CREW 2.7.2 Qualifications\n\u201c2.7.2.1 The pilot-in-command shall:\na) ensure that each flight crew member holds a valid licence issued by the State of Registry...;\nb) ensure that flight crew members are properly rated; and\nc) be satisfied that flight crew members have maintained competency.\n ...\u201d\nCHAPTER 2.9 SECURITY 2.9.1 Security of aircraft\n\u201cThe pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the security of the aircraft during its operation.\u201d 60.  Section 3 of Part II, providing for the responsibility of an operator of a flight, is not relevant to the present case, because it applies to international general aviation operations with aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5,700 kg, or aeroplanes equipped with one or more turbojet engines.", "references": ["1", "5", "8", "9", "6", "2", "7", "4", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained at Varna Prison. 7.  Before the events at issue, he had several previous convictions for theft. 8.  A seventy-five-year-old lady, a neighbour of the applicant\u2019s parents, was murdered in her house in Varna on the morning of 18 June 2006, and a number of her personal possessions were stolen from the house. The applicant was suspected of having committed the offence and a search order was issued in respect of him. 9.  On the morning of 21 June 2006 the applicant was arrested. He had been hiding in an abandoned house in a neighbouring village. The police report on his arrest stated that he had \u201cslightly\u201d resisted the arrest, and that force had been used in order to take him out of his hiding place (under a bed) and handcuff him. 10.  The applicant was taken to the police station in the nearby town of Valchi Dol, where, at 11.30 a.m., an order for his arrest was issued under section 63(1) of the Ministry of the Interior Act 2006 (see paragraph 26 below). The applicant signed a declaration stating that he wanted to be assisted by a lawyer and that he had liver and stomach pains, due to \u201cpast ailments\u201d, and wished to be examined by a doctor. 11.  Later in the day, two police officers from Varna, Z.K. and V.V., arrived in Valchi Dol. They had a conversation with the applicant, during which he confessed, according to him under physical duress, to having committed the murder and described his actions in the days preceding his arrest. In addition, he confessed to having stolen a gun and other personal possessions from another house on an earlier occasion. The confession was written down and was signed by the applicant and Officer V.V. 12.  Later on that same day the applicant was transferred to the police station in Varna, where he asked to be examined by a doctor. The examination started at about 8 p.m. The doctor identified bruises and haematomas on the applicant\u2019s right elbow, right flank, buttocks and wrists, which had been caused by hard, blunt objects less than twenty-four hours earlier. 13.  On 22 June 2006 an investigator brought charges against the applicant in relation to another offence, an unrelated theft, and a prosecutor ordered his detention for up to seventy-two hours. On 23 June 2006 the Varna District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in connection with that charge. The criminal proceedings concerning that charge proceeded alongside the proceedings which are the subject of this application, and were completed in March 2007. 14.  The murder investigation, to which the investigation into the alleged theft of a gun and other personal possessions mentioned in the applicant\u2019s confession to Officers Z.K. and V.V. was joined, continued over the months which followed. The police gathered further evidence and witness testimony, some of which was identified on the basis of that confession. They never found the objects stolen from the victim\u2019s house. On 18 December 2006 an investigator brought charges against the applicant in connection with the two offences mentioned above. On that occasion the applicant had a lawyer, retained by him on the same day. The applicant made a brief statement that he was not guilty. 15.  On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant was indicted and taken to court. 16.  The Varna Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), which examined the case at first instance, held its first hearing on 25 June 2007. It heard the doctor who had examined the applicant on the evening of 21 June 2006 (see paragraph 12 above). She stated that she maintained the opinions expressed in her previous report, and the prosecution and the defence posed no further questions. Officers Z.K. and V.V. were examined as witnesses and recounted their conversation with the applicant on 21 June 2006 and the confession he had made to them. They replied to questions posed by the prosecution and the defence. The applicant\u2019s father was examined as well, and he stated that he had visited his son about ten days after his arrest. The applicant had told him that he had been beaten in order to confess, and some traces of this beating had still been visible on him. The Regional Court heard other experts and witnesses. 17.  During the next hearing, held on 3 October 2007, the applicant made a statement on the charges. He said that he had not committed the offences, as at the time of the murder he had been at his grandmother\u2019s house in another village, and that he had confessed to the offences under duress. 18.  On 11 February 2008 the Regional Court examined more witnesses and then the parties made oral submissions. Counsel for the applicant contested the testimony of Z.K. and V.V. in particular, arguing that their examination had been contrary to Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below). He pointed out moreover that, while the applicant had made a confession to those two officers, he had not repeated that confession when taken before an investigator. At the same time, the confession was one of \u201cthe pillars\u201d of the indictment, as there was no other evidence showing the course of the events inside the victim\u2019s house. 19.  In a judgment given on 11 February 2008 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the basis of the evidence collected, it concluded that the applicant had stolen a gun and other personal possessions several days before the murder, and on the day of the murder had entered the victim\u2019s house in order to steal food. When she had surprised him in the house, he had attacked her, hitting her with the gun stolen earlier \u2013 in such a way that a part of the gun\u2019s cock had broken off and fallen to the floor \u2013 and with an axe which he had found in the house. After the murder the applicant had run away. A stranger had given him a lift to another village, but the applicant had forgotten a bag containing his clothes and the gun in the stranger\u2019s car. 20.  In establishing the facts, the Regional Court relied on the following most important pieces of evidence: a metal fragment which had been found under the victim\u2019s body and which the experts confirmed to be the missing part of the cock of the gun; traces of the victim\u2019s blood found on the handle of the gun found in the applicant\u2019s bag; the testimony of the person who had given the applicant a lift in his car and had found that bag; the fact that that person had also recognised the applicant\u2019s photo when it had been shown to him by the police; and the testimony of Officers Z.K. and V.V., who had recounted what the applicant had confessed to them with regard to the course of the events in the victim\u2019s house. As to the officers\u2019 testimony, the Regional Court pointed out that it considered it credible, since the confession as recounted by them had enabled the police to continue the investigation and identify further evidence. 21.  The applicant lodged an appeal. 22.  In his written and oral submissions to the Varna Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), counsel for the applicant contested once again the testimony given by Z.K. and V.V. He argued that the Regional Court had not commented on the evidence showing that the applicant had been beaten in order to make the confession the officers had recounted, pointed out that the confession had not been repeated once the applicant had been taken before an investigator, and relied again on Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 23.  In a judgment of 30 May 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence, finding that his guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In addition to the evidence described above, it relied on the testimony of a neighbour of the victim, who had seen a person considered to be the applicant on the roof of the victim\u2019s house shortly before the murder. As to Z.K. and V.V., the Court of Appeal pointed out that they had not been investigating bodies within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that their testimony had been assessed in the light of all other evidence. Furthermore, it commented on the exonerating evidence, in particular expert reports finding no fingerprints of the applicant and no traces of his scent in the victim\u2019s house, saying that this was not sufficient to refute the accusations. 24.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His counsel contested once again the testimony of Officers Z.K. and V.V., pointing out that the lower courts had not commented on the evidence showing that the applicant had been beaten in order to confess. Moreover, the officers\u2019 testimony had been given in breach of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25.  In a final judgment of 13 November 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment. As to the arguments of the defence concerning the testimony of Z.K. and V.V., it observed that the confession as recounted by the officers contained details which could only have been known to the perpetrator of the crimes at issue, and thus could not have been \u201cinstigated\u201d. Moreover, allowing Z.K. and V.V. to testify had not been in breach of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "9", "6", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1974, 1973 and 1972 respectively. 6.  On 4 May 1995 a group of about fifteen individuals carrying banners from the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK), an illegal armed organisation, and chanting slogans in favour of the organisation marched in a street in the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece district of Istanbul. The members of the group threw Molotov cocktails at various shops. Several of the shops caught fire and three teenage girls were killed in one of these establishments, namely a shop called Nazl\u0131m. 7.  On the same day, Mr Can\u015fad (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was arrested and taken into custody at the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Istanbul Security Directorate. 8.  The police obtained evidence from several witnesses. One of those witnesses, a certain A.A., who had been working on the street where the events had taken place, indicated that he had seen a group of about twenty people marching in the streets, chanting slogans and throwing Molotov cocktails at shops, and that the group had dispersed after several shops had caught fire. He further stated that he had seen two individuals: a woman with curly hair wearing a jacket and white jeans, and a short-haired man who was approximately 1.80 meters tall wearing a green jacket and jeans. He added that, having seen the man from afar, he could not describe his face. However, he indicated that he would be likely to recognize the individuals concerned, and that in any event the man had already been apprehended by uniformed police officers. 9.  A second witness, a certain \u00d6.L.A., stated that he had seen an individual dressed in jeans and a green jacket, and that he would not be likely to recognise his face, but the man had been arrested by police officers. 10.  A third witness, a certain Y.K., an employee at Nazl\u0131m, identified the first applicant as the man who had thrown Molotov cocktails at the shop where she worked, where three people had been killed. In addition, an identification parade was carried out, at the end of which \u00d6.L.A. and A.A. identified the first applicant as one of the individuals who had thrown Molotov cocktails at that shop. 11.  On 11 May 1995 the first applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. He admitted having had sympathy towards the illegal organisation and having been involved in the march. However, he stated that he had only acted as a lookout at the entrance to the street, and denied having thrown Molotov cocktails. 12.  On 15 May 1995 the first applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer g\u00f6sterme) in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, he admitted his involvement in the march but denied having thrown Molotov cocktails. 13.  On 16 May 1995 the first applicant took part in a photo identification procedure, again in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, he identified Mr Bing\u00f6l (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) as one of the accomplices. 14.  The first applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 17 May 1995, with the authorisation of the public prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same day he gave statements to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. He denied the content of the statements he had given to the police, claiming that his confession had been extorted under pressure and torture. He further stated that he had been arrested near the scene of the incident while on his way to his friend\u2019s home, that he had seen a group of about thirty or forty people, and that he had had nothing to do with the events in connection with which he had been arrested. 15.  On the same day, the first applicant was brought before a judge of the Istanbul State Security Court, before whom he reiterated that he had not participated in the rally and had nothing to say about it. The judge ordered the first applicant\u2019s detention and, in the absence of the second applicant, issued a warrant for the latter\u2019s arrest. 16.  The second applicant was arrested during an identity check on 27 April 1996 in the town of Gen\u00e7 in the south-eastern part of the country, and was held in custody. He was then handed over to the Istanbul Security Directorate. 17.  On 9 May 1996 the second applicant took part in a photo identification procedure in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, he identified the first applicant. On the same day, he participated in a reconstruction of the events in the absence of a lawyer and admitted having thrown a Molotov cocktail at a shop on 4 May 1995. 18.  On 10 May 1996 the second applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. He gave a detailed account of his activities within the illegal organisation, including his participation in the events of 4 May 1995, and provided the names of various individuals who had also participated in that incident, including that of the first applicant. 19.  On 10 May 1996 he was brought before the public prosecutor, where he accepted the statements which he had given to the police and admitted his participation in various activities of the organisation, including those of 4 May 1995. He stated that he had left the organisation and that he wished to have the benefit of Law no. 4959, which provided for amnesty and mitigation of sentence for members of terrorist organisations in exchange for information. That statement was also taken in the absence of a lawyer. Subsequently, he was brought before a judge, where he accepted the previous statements he had given. The judge ordered his detention. 20.  The first hearing was held on 27 July 1995. 21.  The applicants denied the charges against them during the criminal proceedings before the Istanbul State Security Court. 22.  On 29 August 1995 the trial court held a hearing in which, in the absence of the applicants and their lawyers, it heard several witnesses who had been interviewed by the police. \u00d6.L.A. indicated that, contrary to what was in the statement which he had given to the police, he had not seen anyone sufficiently clearly to be able to identify them. Y.K., an employee at Nazl\u0131m, also gave evidence in person, stating that she had seen a man and a woman set fire to the shop and had provided the police with a detailed description of the woman. As for the man, she indicated that she had not seen his face, but she had recognised him at the police station because of his clothes. At the end of the hearing the trial court issued a letter of request asking for evidence to be obtained from A.A. by his giving evidence at a court near his place of residence. 23.  At a hearing on 7 October 1997 the trial court read out a statement by A.A. given before the Bursa Assize Court. The content of that statement is not included in the file. At that hearing, counsel for the first applicant requested that A.A. should be heard by the court in the presence of the applicant. In that connection, he stated that his testimony contained significant contradictions. According to the transcript of that hearing, the first applicant did not want to participate in the hearing. 24.  At the end of each hearing the trial court decided to continue the applicants\u2019 detention. 25.  On 22 October 1998 the applicants were sentenced to death. 26.  On 13 May 1999 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, without examining the merits of the case. 27.  Following the judgment of the Court of Cassation, the proceedings before the trial court started again on 19 September 1999 and the composition of the trial court was changed several times. In addition, the first applicant repeatedly requested that the trial court summon A.A. in order for him to be cross-examined him directly. The trial court rejected his applications. 28.  On an unspecified date A.A. sent a letter to the Istanbul State Security Court in which he retracted his previous testimony and stated that he had not identified anyone. That letter was read out at a hearing on 7 February 2002. 29.  On 27 February 2002 the trial court sentenced the applicants to death, but commuted this to life imprisonment (m\u00fcebbet a\u011f\u0131r hapis). 30.  On 9 October 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment again on procedural grounds, without examining the merits of the case. 31.  On 9 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court found the applicants guilty of the offence provided for in Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 32.  The applicants appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that A.A. had not been heard by the trial court in their presence. 33.  On 6 December 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["4", "1", "9", "0", "7", "2", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "3.  According to a medical report issued on 29 June 2004 by the Gaziantep university hospital, the applicant\u2019s state of health required him to follow one diet for his diabetes and another one for his coronary disease, and to live in a well-ventilated environment free of tobacco smoke. 4.  On 30 April 2008 the applicant was placed in the Erzurum H-type prison, where he remained until 6 March 2009, serving a term for terrorist offences. 5.  On 17 July 2008 the applicant was taken to the cardiology department of the Atat\u00fcrk university hospital in Erzurum (\u201cErzurum hospital\u201d) for blood tests and an echocardiogram. 6.  A report drawn up on 24 July 2008 by the Erzurum hospital\u2019s health board pointed out that owing to his cardiac issues the applicant had to adhere to a special anti-cholesterol diet with high poultry meat and vegetable content and low levels of beef and saturated fats. The report mentioned that if the prison in which the applicant had been placed offered a wide choice of daily menus it would be unnecessary to transfer the applicant to another prison providing such facilities. It added that on the other hand, if the prison only offered one standard menu, the Erzurum hospital\u2019s health board would hold a further meeting in order to decide whether the applicant should be transferred to another prison, after ascertaining the view of a dietician on the cholesterol content of the standard menu. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant, arguing that the meal served in prison was incompatible with his medically prescribed diet, asked the prison authorities to send samples to the Ministry of Justice and the Human Rights Commission of the Grande National Assembly of Turkey. 8.  On 24 October 2008 the prison disciplinary board rejected his request on the grounds that the foodstuffs would spoil very quickly, before reaching their destination. That board pointed out that the applicant could lodge a complaint by mail with the aforementioned institutions in order to inform them of his grievances concerning the meals served in prison. 9.  The applicant appealed against that decision. On 7 November 2008 the Erzurum judge responsible for the execution of sentences (\u201cthe judge responsible for the execution of sentences\u201d) dismissed the appeal. On 5 December 2008 the Erzurum Assize Court (\u201cthe Assize Court\u201d) upheld the dismissal decision given by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences.\n  10.  Meanwhile, on 24 November 2008, the applicant had been taken to the emergency department of Erzurum hospital complaining of chest pains. On 5 December 2008 he underwent an exercise electrocardiogram. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the judge responsible for the execution of sentences about the refusal by the prison authorities, despite his many requests, to provide him with meals compatible with his medically prescribed diet, which he said formed an integral part of his medical treatment. He also complained about his difficulties in obtaining medication. The applicant stated the following, inter alia:\n\u201c... my state of health [is poor]; the prison authorities informed me that I would be provided with meals compatible with my diet, but that has not happened; this can be noted from surveillance camera footage; I was not provided with the menu list when I wanted to submit it to the Ministry for examination.\u201d 12.  On 2 January 2009 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences allowed the applicant\u2019s request. That judge referred in his decision to a document which the prison authorities had drawn up for the attention of the Erzurum public prosecutor\u2019s office, stating the following:\n\u201c... medically prescribed diets cannot be prepared in [our] prison\u2019s kitchen; we can only cook unsalted and unspiced versions of the meals prepared for the other [prisoners]. Extra potatoes, boiled eggs and tomatoes are sometimes provided.\u201d 13.  The judge responsible for the execution of sentences pointed out that the prison had not indicated in that document whether or not the meals contained fats, which made it impossible to assess their cholesterol content. In view of the impossibility of ascertaining whether meals prepared in that manner were compatible with the medical prescriptions in question, he ordered that the standard menu should be examined by a dietician and, if that menu proved incompatible with the applicant\u2019s diet, that the applicant should be provided with an appropriate menu. 14.  On 5 January 2009 the Erzurum public prosecutor (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) appealed against the decision of 2 January 2009. On 8 January 2009 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed that appeal. 15.  On the same day the prosecutor lodged a fresh appeal against the decision of 8 January 2009, this time with the Assize Court. He argued as follows: the meals were prepared in the prison kitchen; the daily allowance per prisoner, which totalled three Turkish liras (TRY \u2013 about 1.40 euro at the material time), was only sufficient to prepare one type of meal per day, which meant that the prisoners could not be offered several types of menus; menus could not be prepared for the medically prescribed diets for a total of thirty-eight individuals detained in the same prison, and only an unsalted, fat-free and unspiced version of the standard menu was on offer. According to the prosecutor, the prison would only be able to improve its service in that respect if the amount of the daily allowance were increased. 16.  On 9 January 2009 the Assize Court followed the prosecutor\u2019s reasoning and quashed the decisions given by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences on 2 and 8 January 2009. 17.  Furthermore, according to the weekly lists of standard menus for the weeks of 24 February 2009 and 3 March 2009, the meals served to prisoners in the Erzurum Prison had mainly consisted of beef, fried food and starches: poultry meat had only been served once a week and the menus had comprised minimal fresh vegetables.", "references": ["4", "6", "9", "8", "7", "3", "5", "0", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant institute is a private institute that carries out research in the field of social sciences. Its registered office is in Ljubljana. 6.  In June 2003, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport (hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) made two calls for tenders for the purpose of making awards for scientific research projects; one call was directed at private entities and the other at public research organisations. The Ministry announced that in 2004 it would finance 100,000 research hours, which were estimated to amount to 750,000,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT \u2013 approximately 3,130,000 euros (EUR)). The research projects were to be evaluated under the Rules on Quality Assessment and Funding of the Public Research Organisation Programme. The applicant institute submitted a tender for research in the field of social sciences. 7.  Subsequently, the Ministry seems to have joined the proceedings for the two tenders, but no formal decision regarding the joinder appears to have been made. On 17 February 2004 the Ministry decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding. 8.  The applicant institute applied to the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia (\u201cthe Administrative Court\u201d), seeking the setting aside of the Ministry\u2019s decision. The action was granted by a decision of 4 April 2007 and the case was remitted to the Ministry for reconsideration. 9.  On 19 October 2009 the applicant institute lodged another action before the Administrative Court on account of the Ministry\u2019s failure to adopt a decision within the prescribed time-limit. 10.  On 30 March 2010 the Ministry again decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding. It explained that the institute\u2019s research programme had been ranked fifth among the research programmes in the field of political sciences and that only four programmes in that group would receive funding. The Ministry pointed out that it was presumed that no conflict of interests existed, even when evaluators worked in the same institution whose tenders they were evaluating and that this was a common European practice. It was further noted that evaluators had signed a declaration of confidentiality and an undertaking to withdraw in the event that a conflict of interests was found. 11.  In order to reflect the fact that the Ministry had adopted the decision of 30 March 2010, the applicant institute supplemented its action of 19 October 2009, which it had originally lodged on account of the Ministry\u2019s failure to adopt a decision (see paragraph 9 above), with a request that the Ministry\u2019s decision be set aside. It further urged the Administrative Court to decide that it would be awarded funding. It complained that the Ministry had joined the proceedings that had initially been intended for consideration of tenders from private research organisations to the proceedings for consideration of tenders from public research organisations, without issuing a formal decision to that effect. It also complained of errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes, because not all of the criteria specified in the Rules on Quality Assessment and Funding of the Public Research Organisation Programme had been taken into account. It argued, inter alia, that the evaluation procedure had been unfair because some of the evaluators had been biased, as they had been evaluating research programmes which were competing with the very programmes in which they themselves participated. This provoked a distortion of the results of the procedure, as shown by the fact that only those research programmes in which the evaluators were leaders or members of research teams obtained financing. The applicant institute expressly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard with regard to the alleged procedural errors in the evaluation of the programmes. Additionally, it submitted a letter of 2 December 2003 which one of the witnesses, K., had sent to the Minister of Education, Science and Sport and several other addressees. In the letter K. notified them of problems he had detected in the tender proceedings in which he had participated as an evaluator. 12.  After the parties had exchanged a number of written submissions, the Administrative Court, without holding a hearing, dismissed the action. In its decision of 2 February 2011 the court gave an extensive account of the proceedings before the Ministry and the submissions of both parties. The reasons for the decision were given on a single page. Invoking section 71(2) of the Administrative Dispute Act (Zakon o upravnem sporu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe ADA\u201d, see paragraph 23 below), the Administrative Court chiefly referred to the submissions of the Ministry. It considered, among other things, that the Ministry had not acted unlawfully in joining the proceedings. It accepted the Ministry\u2019s submission that its decision had been dictated by the nature of the research and infrastructural programmes, taking into account the guidelines of the National Research and Development Programme. The court also pointed out that the procedural rules for the evaluation of research programmes adopted by the National Scientific and Research Council clearly defined the stages of the evaluation procedure, the participants in it and their tasks. Regarding the alleged conflict of interests, the court stated that it agreed with the Ministry as to why no such conflict existed and cited section 71(2) of the ADA (see paragraph 23 below). As to the alleged errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes, the court merely disagreed with the applicant institute that not all criteria had been taken into account and again cited section 71(2) of the ADA. 13.  No reasons were given for not holding a hearing. None of the evidence relied on by the applicant institute in their appeal (see paragraph 11 above) was acknowledged or referred to in the court\u2019s reasoning. 14.  On 31 March 2011 the applicant institute lodged an appeal on points of law. It complained that the Administrative Court had not held a hearing even though the facts of the case had been contested and the applicant institute had explicitly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard. It also argued that the Administrative Court had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure, and complained that insufficient reasoning had been given for the decision. 15.  On 1 September 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. No reasons were given in its decision on the merits of the applicant institute\u2019s complaints. 16.  The applicant institute then lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing, among other things, that the decisions of the Ministry and the domestic court had been arbitrary and that the courts had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure. It reiterated that the witnesses it had proposed had not been heard and that no hearing had been held. 17.  On 19 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant institute\u2019s complaint, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights with serious consequences for the applicant institute.", "references": ["2", "6", "9", "5", "8", "1", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles. 7.  On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. 8.  On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police. 9.  On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Ba\u011flar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention. 10.  On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 11.  On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police. 12.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor\u2019s office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from F\u0131rat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele. 13.  State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 14.  On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence. 15.  During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant\u2019s continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant\u2019s request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file. 16.  On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence. 17.  On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. 18.  On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence. 19.  On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (g\u00f6revsizlik karar\u0131), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Juvenile Court. 20.  On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial. 21.  On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbak\u0131r Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment. 22.  On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbak\u0131r Juvenile Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "4", "8", "9", "0", "1", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  In 1983 and 1988 the applicant was found guilty of indecent acts with minors and sentenced to prison sentences. 7.  On 25 January 2001 the Court of Cassation decided to allow an extraordinary appeal lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor General of Armenia, quashed the two judgments and terminated both sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant on the grounds of absence of corpus delicti. In particular, the Court of Cassation found that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant had committed the imputed offences, and that the court judgments had been based on assumptions and erroneous interpretation of the law. 8.  From 2001 the applicant lodged two civil claims against the State, seeking compensation for pecuniary damage sustained as a result of his two convictions. These claims were allowed on 10 September 2001 and 26 August 2005 by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, which decided to award the applicant \u2013 as an acquitted person \u2013 sums of money in compensation for lost income, medical costs incurred to restore his damaged health, his future treatment abroad and travel costs to be incurred in that connection. 9.  On 13 April 2005 Investigator N. of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted a criminal case under Article 316 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) in respect of the applicant who was suspected of having assaulted two traffic-police officers, V.S. and G.G., who had stopped the applicant\u2019s car for a violation of traffic laws. 10.  On the same date, the applicant was arrested and two days later charged, under the same Article, with assaulting the two traffic-police officers. 11.  On 16 April 2005 it was decided not to detain the applicant and to release him on a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence, on the grounds that he was a disabled person suffering from a number of diseases, had no previous convictions, had two children who were minors, as well as his wife and mother as dependants, and had a permanent place of residence. 12.  On an unspecified date the two police officers were recognised as victims for the purposes of the criminal case. 13.  On 5 May 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, on the basis of an application by the investigator, changed the preventive measure in respect of the applicant from a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence to detention on remand for a period of two months. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, which was dismissed by the Criminal Court of Appeal on 2 June 2005. 14.  In the course of the investigation the applicant testified that V.S. and G.G. had demanded a bribe from him in order not to record a violation of the traffic laws and then subjected him to beatings when he refused. A forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out, which found that he had suffered injuries, including concussion and a fractured cheek bone. 15.  On 10 June 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer addressed a letter to the investigator, alleging that it had been the applicant who had been assaulted by V.S. and G.G rather than the other way around. Thus, the applicant\u2019s actions had been wrongly assessed as falling within the scope of Article 316 \u00a7 1 of the CC, while no charges had been brought against the police officers. The lawyer requested the investigator that such charges be brought. 16.  On 20 June 2005 the District Prosecutor decided to replace the applicant\u2019s detention on remand with a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence, on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph \n11 above). 17.  On 21 June 2005 Investigator N., having reviewed the materials of the criminal case against the applicant, took a decision to discontinue a part of that case and not to carry out criminal prosecution (\u0548\u0580\u0578\u0577\u0578\u0582\u0574 \u0584\u0580\u0565\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0563\u0578\u0580\u056e\u056b \u0574\u0561\u057d\u0568 \u056f\u0561\u0580\u0573\u0565\u056c\u0578\u0582 \u0587 \u0584\u0580\u0565\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0570\u0565\u057f\u0561\u057a\u0576\u0564\u0578\u0582\u0574 \u0579\u056b\u0580\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0581\u0576\u0565\u056c\u0578\u0582) with regard to the infliction of injuries on the applicant by V.S. and G.G.. The investigator found that the traffic-police officers had inflicted injuries on the applicant as they had tried to overcome his resistance at the time of arrest, and therefore their actions had amounted to a legitimate use of force. 18.  On 16 February 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan acquitted the applicant, finding that he was not guilty of the imputed offence. The District Court also held that the police officers V.S. and G.G. had exceeded their authority by acting violently against the applicant, which had caused serious damage and grave consequences to the applicant and his family. In particular, the applicant had been taken to the police station unlawfully and had been arrested on the basis of false information provided by traffic-police officers V.S. and G.G. The police officers had subjected the applicant to beatings, as a result of which the latter had sustained injuries, including a concussion and a fractured cheek bone. Furthermore, they had forced the applicant into the police car and driven him to the police station leaving the applicant\u2019s car, with his eight\u2011year-old son inside, in the outside lane of the road. As a result, the applicant\u2019s son had suffered psychological trauma and damage to his health. In spite of the fact that the applicant had not violated the conditions of his written undertaking not to leave his place of residence and that he had been a disabled person and had had two minors as dependants, the investigator had applied to a court with an unfounded application seeking to have him detained. As a result, the applicant had been detained from 5 May to 20 June 2005. Moreover, the grounds for his release on 20 June 2005 under a written undertaking were the same as those which had already been used on 16 April 2005 to justify his release under a written undertaking as opposed to placing him in pre-trial detention. The District Court lastly found that the investigator had taken an unfounded decision not to prosecute the police officers by assessing their actions as lawful and asked the Prosecutor General, with reference to Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), to institute criminal proceedings against them under Article 309 \u00a7 3 of the CC for exceeding their authority, resulting in grave consequences. 19.  On unspecified dates the prosecutor\u2019s office and Officers V.S. and G.G. lodged appeals against that judgment. 20.  On 14 November 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the District Court, finding that the applicant had acted in necessary self-defence. However, it decided to annul the request made to the Prosecutor General on the grounds that Article 21 of the CCP prohibited the reopening of proceedings if there had been a decision of the prosecuting authority to discontinue the proceedings or not to carry out prosecution. On 21 June 2005 the investigator had taken such a decision in respect of V.S. and G.G., which had never been annulled, hence Article 21 excluded the possibility of prosecuting them. 21.  On 15 May 2007 the Court of Cassation declared inadmissible for lack of merit an appeal lodged by police officers V.S. and G.G. against that judgment. 22.  On 27 November 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the courts, seeking to annul the investigator\u2019s decision of 21 June 2005 as it contradicted the findings reached by the courts in his trial when assessing the actions of the police officers. 23.  The district prosecutor argued that the applicant\u2019s complaint must be dismissed, since he had missed the six months\u2019 time-limit prescribed by Article 21 \u00a7 4 of the CCP. The applicant argued in reply that, pursuant to Article 21 \u00a7 5 of the CCP, the time-limits prescribed by that Article did not apply in the event of newly emerged circumstances, which in his case were the judgments adopted in his criminal case. Furthermore, the prosecuting authority was obliged by law to take measures to restore his rights of its own motion. 24.  On 25 March 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to dismiss the complaint, finding the district prosecutor\u2019s arguments under Article 21 of the CCP to be valid. It further stated that the district prosecutor\u2019s office could not bear responsibility for the applicant\u2019s failure to contest the investigator\u2019s decision in due time. 25.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. 26.  On 19 May 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that Article 21 \u00a7 5 of the CCP was not applicable to his case and holding that the applicant had failed to contest the investigator\u2019s decision of 21 June 2005 within the time-limits prescribed by Articles 21 and 290 of the CCP, as well as the time-limit for requesting a reopening of a case prescribed by Article 426.3 of the CCP. The Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was subject to appeal within one month of the date of its delivery. 27.  On 16 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision, together with a request that the missed one-month time-limit for appeal be renewed. 28.  On 8 April 2009 the Court of Cassation found that the applicant had failed to show that he had valid reasons for missing the prescribed one-month time\u2011limit and decided to refuse the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 29.  On 11 September 2007 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, seeking further compensation for pecuniary damage, specifically for loss of income, and compensation for non-pecuniary damage in relation to his two unfair convictions, in the amount of 15,078,664 United States dollars, and in relation to his unlawful arrest and detention and infliction of bodily harm, in the amount of 1,000,000 euros (EUR). 30.  On 26 November 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court decided to dismiss his claims. It stated at the outset that the applicant was an \u201cacquitted person\u201d within the meaning of Article 66 of the CCP and was entitled under the same Article to claim pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his unlawful arrest, detention, indictment and conviction. However, the types of compensation that the applicant sought were not envisaged by Article 66 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, apart from that sought for loss of income, which the applicant had failed to substantiate. 31.  On 28 November 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal. 32.  On 7 March 2008 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the District Court, finding that the applicant had already been compensated for pecuniary damage in relation to his convictions, while his new claims for pecuniary damages were unsubstantiated. As regards the claim for non-pecuniary damage, this had to be rejected on the grounds that Armenian law did not provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 33.  On 29 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation on 28 October 2008. 34.  On 26 February 2009 the applicant lodged another civil claim against the State, seeking compensation for pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his ill-treatment, such as various medical costs. 35.  On 26 December 2011 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan examined the applicant\u2019s claim. It held at the outset, with reference to the judgments adopted in the applicant\u2019s criminal case and Article 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the applicant had a case for damages under Article 1063 of the Civil Code, taking into account the fact that the police officers\u2019 actions had been unlawful within the meaning of that Article. The District Court went on to conclude, however, that there was no causal link between the police officers\u2019 unlawful actions and the specific medical costs claimed by the applicant, and decided to dismiss the claim. 36.  On 25 January 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal. 37.  On 4 October 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the District Court. 38.  On 2 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation on 28 November 2012.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "6", "3", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4. The applicant lives in Kutina. 5.  From 1 January 2001 the applicant concluded several consecutive fixed-duration contracts of employment with the company C.N.S. Ltd. concerning the same post. The contracts were for a continuous period which in total amounted to over seven years and seven months. 6.  On 5 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s employer returned the applicant\u2019s employment registration book to him, without any written or oral notification, showing that his employment had been terminated. 7.  On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivani\u0107 Grad Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Ivani\u0107 Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8.  On 22 January 2010 the Ivani\u0107 Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as time-barred. 9.  Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first\u2011instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant\u2019s claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10.  In the fresh proceedings, the Ivani\u0107 Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant\u2019s action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant\u2019s argument, the first\u2011instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11.  On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12.  On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first\u2011instance decision. 13.  On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time. 14.  On 14 March 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that the courts had wrongly declared his claim inadmissible because it had been of a declaratory nature and as such had not been subject to deadlines. He relied on a decision by the Velika Gorica County Court of 16 January 2013 in the case of a colleague of his, who for the same reasons as the applicant had also sought to have the court recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment. In that decision the Velika Gorica County Court, in accordance with instructions given in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision no. Revr-1697/11 of 6 June 2012, had dismissed the defendant\u2019s (the employer\u2019s) objection that the claim was time-barred. Namely, the Supreme Court had held that the claim had been of a declaratory nature and as such was not subject to deadlines. 15.  On 6 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "9", "6", "8", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Stari Mikanovci. 6.  The applicant was an employee of the State\u2019s railway company, Hrvatske \u017eeljeznice. He suffered a work-related accident and became unable to work. 7.  On 26 April 1977 the Osijek County Court (Okru\u017eni sud u Osijeku) awarded the applicant a lump sum in compensation and ordered the defendant \u2013 Hrvatske \u017eeljeznice \u2013 to pay him monthly payments in respect of the difference between his disability pension and the salary he would have been earning were it not for his inability to work. 8.  On 5 May 1988 the Vukovar Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vukovaru) increased the above-mentioned monthly payments. At the same time, it established that the applicant\u2019s inability to work was only 50% due to the above-mentioned accident, and 50% due to a pre-existing illness. 9.  On 24 December 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Hrvatske \u017eeljeznice, seeking that the above-mentioned monthly payments be increased on the grounds of changed circumstances. 10.  The defendant did not oppose an increase in the monthly payments, but disputed the amount requested. 11.   The Vukovar Municipal Court commissioned a report from an accounting expert, and on 13 February 1991 the expert witness submitted his report. 12.  At a hearing held on 20 February 1991 the expert witness gave oral evidence. 13.  On 24 April 1991 the first-instance court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part, but on 16 August 1991 the Vukovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vukovaru) quashed the first-instance judgment in part, because it found that the first-instance court had failed to correctly establish the facts. It remitted the case for fresh consideration and ordered the first-instance court to establish, in terms of a percentage, how much the applicant\u2019s inability to work was due to his pre-existing illness. 14.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance court commissioned a report from an accounting expert and ordered the applicant to pay costs in advance in the sum of 696.55 Croatian kunas (HRK). 15.  On 5 June 2003 the expert witness submitted his report and the defendant objected to the expert\u2019s findings. 16.  On 15 October 2003 the expert witness submitted his observations in reply to the defendant\u2019s objection. 17.  At a hearing on 28 November 2003 the court heard oral evidence from the expert witness. He stated that he could not precisely determine individual amounts until the Croatian Pension Fund adjusted the applicant\u2019s pension. 18.  On 22 December 2003, after the Croatian Pension Fund had adjusted the applicant\u2019s pension, the expert witness submitted an additional report. 19.  At a hearing on 23 January 2004 the expert witness again gave oral evidence. 20.  On the same date, on the basis of the expert witness\u2019s report, the first-instance court issued a judgment allowing the applicant\u2019s claim in part. 21.  On 3 May 2005 the Vukovar County Court quashed the judgment of 23 January 2004 for substantial violation of the civil procedure rules and ordered a fresh consideration of the case. It held that the first-instance court had failed to take into account the fact: that the first-instance judgment of 24 April 1991 had become final as regards an amount of 63.80 former Yugoslav dinars (YUD) per month payable for the period from 1 January 1991 onwards; the applicant had turned 60 on 15 August 1994; and he should have lodged an application for his disability pension to be recalculated as an old-age pension. 22.  At a hearing held on 15 September 2005 the first-instance court commissioned a further report from an accounting expert, in accordance with the instruction given by the second-instance court. Specifically, it ordered the expert witness, in calculating the monthly amount, to take into account the amount of 63.80 dinars which had already been awarded, as well as the fact that the defendant was 50% responsible for the damage at issue, and to establish whether the applicant had used his right to have his disability pension recalculated as an old-age pension when he had turned 60. 23.  Meanwhile, the defendant split into four companies, and the first\u2011instance court ordered the applicant to correct his claim by accurately identifying the defendant. 24.  On 2 November 2007 the first-instance court declared the claim inadmissible, because it held that the applicant had failed to properly correct the claim. 25.  Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 9 September 2008 the Vukovar County Court quashed the first-instance decision, because it held that the applicant had already identified the defendant. 26.  In the resumed proceedings, at a hearing held on 22 December 2008 the first-instance court commissioned a report from an accounting expert in accordance with the second-instance court\u2019s instruction given in its judgment of 3 May 2005, and ordered the applicant to pay the related costs in the amount of HRK 2,578 in advance. 27.  On 15 January 2009 and 3 February 2009 the applicant asked for an exemption from paying the costs of the expert witness, claiming that, given his financial situation, and the fact that his pension was HRK 2,313 per month and his wife was unemployed and without any income, he was unable to pay those costs without putting his own and his wife\u2019s subsistence at risk. He asked for those costs to be covered by the first-instance court\u2019s funds, a possibility provided for by the Civil Procedure Act. He submitted a certificate from the Croatian Pension Fund concerning his pension and certificates demonstrating his and his wife\u2019s income. 28.  At a hearing on 3 February 2009 the applicant reiterated all the arguments and repeated that he had not been able to pay for the costs of the expert report. He asked the court to allow his claim as specified in his submissions of 16 February 2007. Neither party put forward any new evidence. The court set aside its decision of 22 December 2008 regarding a further report from an accounting expert, because the applicant had failed to pay for the costs, and concluded the hearing. 29.  On 16 February 2009, relying on the rules regulating the burden of proof, the first-instance court issued a judgment dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that, owing to his failure to pay for the costs of the expert report, the court had not been able to establish the exact amount of the monthly payments. In its reasoning, the first-instance court stated that the Vukovar County Court, in its decision of 11 November 2008, had awarded the applicant HRK 20,000 for the violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time, and that he could have paid for the costs of the expert witness with that money. 30.  The applicant lodged an appeal, claiming that the amount awarded to him for the violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been paid to him on 13 March 2009, namely after the first-instance judgment had already been delivered. 31.  On 4 February 2010 the second-instance court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment. In addition, it held that the applicant failed to demonstrate when the State had deposited the amount of HRK 20,000 on a bank account of his representative. 32.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija), which the Supreme Court declared inadmissible on 10 January 2011. 33.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, and on 11 July 2012 the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["1", "4", "8", "5", "6", "9", "2", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "12.  The applicant was born in 1962 in Jendouba, in the Tunisian Republic (\u201cTunisia\u201d), and lives in Versoix in the Canton of Geneva. 13.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 14.  According to the applicant, on 22 April 1992 he was arrested by the Italian police at his place of residence in Italy and taken to the Tunisian Consulate in Genoa, where he was presented with a bill of indictment stating that he represented a threat to Italian State Security. He alleges that he was then taken to Tunis by Tunisian officials. By his own account, he has never instituted proceedings against the Italian authorities in respect of those events. 15.  The applicant further submits that he was arbitrarily detained and tortured in Tunis in the premises of the Ministry of the Interior, from 24 April to 1 June 1992, on the orders of A.K., the then Minister of the Interior. He submits that he was subjected to the so-called \u201croast chicken\u201d position throughout the entire period of detention and deprived of his basic physiological needs, particularly sleep; he was also beaten on the soles of his feet with a baseball bat and struck all over his body with telephone cords. 16.  The applicant submits that he suffers from a series of physical and psychological injuries and disorders. 17.  After having been subjected to the alleged torture in Tunisia in 1992, the applicant fled that country in 1993 and took refuge in Switzerland, where he applied for asylum in the same year. The applicant has since been living in the Canton of Geneva. 18.  On 8 November 1995 the Swiss authorities granted the applicant asylum. 19.  On 14 February 2001, having learnt that A.K. was being treated in a Swiss hospital, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against him with the Principal Public Prosecutor for the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (\u201cthe Principal Public Prosecutor\u201d), for severe bodily injury, illegal confinement, insults, causing danger to health, coercion and abuse of authority. The applicant applied to join these proceedings as a civil party seeking damages. 20.  On the same date the Principal Public Prosecutor transmitted to the head of the security police, by internal mail, a request to \u201cattempt to locate and identify the accused individual, who [was] supposedly hospitalised in the Geneva University Hospital, for heart surgery\u201d and \u201cif possible, to arrest him and bring him before an investigating judge\u201d. On receipt of this request, the police immediately contacted the hospital, which informed them that A.K. had indeed been a patient there, but that he had already left the hospital on 11 February 2001. 21.  On 19 February 2001 the Principal Public Prosecutor made an order discontinuing the proceedings on the grounds that A.K. had left Switzerland and that the police had been unable to arrest him. This decision to discontinue the proceedings was not challenged by the applicant. 22.  By his own account, on 22 July 2003 the applicant asked a Tunisian lawyer to represent him with a view to bringing a civil action for compensation against A.K. and the Tunisian Republic. On 28 July 2003 the lawyer informed the applicant that this type of action had never been successful and advised him not to lodge such a claim. It was allegedly impossible to lodge a civil action of this sort in Tunisia. 23.  By a writ dated 8 July 2004, the applicant lodged a claim for damages with the Court of First Instance of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (\u201cthe Court of First Instance\u201d) against Tunisia and against A.K. He claimed 200,000 Swiss francs (CHF), with 5% interest from 1 June 1992, as compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage arising from the acts of torture to which he had allegedly been subjected. The applicant submitted that the conditions for reparation of non-pecuniary damage provided for by Articles 82 et seq. of the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts, applicable under section 133 (2) of the Federal Law on Private International Law (Loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale sur le droit international priv\u00e9, the LDIP, see paragraph 37 below), had been met. 24.  On 9 June 2005 a hearing was held before the Court of First Instance; neither of the defendants was in attendance or represented. 25.  By a judgment of 15 September 2005, the Court of First Instance declared the claim inadmissible on the grounds that it lacked territorial jurisdiction. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cWith regard to an action in tort based on the unlawful acts that were allegedly committed in Tunisia by the defendants, to the claimant\u2019s detriment, the Swiss courts do not have territorial jurisdiction under international law to examine the complaint, given that the defendants are not domiciled or habitually resident in Switzerland, and given also that no illegal act or detrimental outcome occurred in Switzerland, pursuant to sections 2 and 129 of the LDIP.\u201d 26.  Under section 3 of the LDIP (see paragraph 37 below), the Swiss courts also lacked jurisdiction under the forum of necessity, given the lack of a sufficient connection between, on the one hand, the case and the facts, and, on the other, Switzerland. In this connection, the Court of First Instance ruled as follows:\n\u201cAll of the acts with regard to whose after-effects the claimant, a Tunisian national, seeks compensation for non-pecuniary damage, were allegedly inflicted on him, as he submits, in Tunisia in 1992, within the premises of the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, by the Tunisian State and its officials. The mere fact that on account of those acts the claimant applied for and received political asylum in 1995 in Switzerland, where he has since been domiciled, does not, in itself and in the light of current case-law, amount to a sufficient connection enabling a forum of necessity to be established against the defendants in Switzerland and Geneva.\u201d 27.  By a writ dated 16 November 2005, the applicant appealed against that decision before the Court of Justice of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (\u201cthe Court of Justice\u201d). His appeal was rejected in a judgment of 15 September 2006. After noting that the appellant had shown that he was unable to bring a civil action in Tunisia, the Court of Justice found as follows:\n\u201cAs the outcome of the present appeal depends on the immunity from jurisdiction of the respondent parties, the question whether there exists a forum of necessity in the appellant\u2019s place of residence can, however, remain undecided.\u201d 28.  The Court of Justice thus held that the respondents enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction, since the acts of torture had been perpetrated in the exercise of sovereign authority (iure imperii) and not under private law (iure gestionis). Referring to the judgment delivered by the Court in the case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI), it further considered that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court, dated 20 October 2006, in which he asked it to rule that the courts of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva had territorial jurisdiction and to find that the defendants did not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction. With regard to the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts, he argued that the purpose of the introduction of a forum of necessity in section 3 of the LDIP (see paragraph 37 below) had been to avoid denials of justice, especially in cases of political persecution, and that he had provided sufficient evidence that he could not reasonably bring proceedings before a foreign court. As to the immunity from jurisdiction purportedly enjoyed by Tunisia and A.K., the applicant submitted that the exercise of public power did not include an entitlement to commit international crimes such as torture. He specified in this regard that the very definition of torture in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (hereafter: \u201cthe Convention against Torture\u201d; see paragraphs 45 et seq. below) ruled out any immunity. Lastly, he referred, in very general terms, to Article 16 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (see paragraph 60 below). 30.  By a judgment of 22 May 2007, the reasoning of which was notified to the applicant on 7 September 2007, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Reiterating the reasoning in the first-instance judgment, the Federal Supreme Court considered that the Swiss courts did not in any event have territorial jurisdiction. The relevant passages of the Federal Supreme Court\u2019s judgment read as follows:\n\u201cIt must first be considered whether the Swiss courts have jurisdiction to examine the action. 3.1 As Tunisia is not a party to the Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention, RS 0.275.11), there exists no convention rule between the two States governing the question of forum, which must therefore be examined in the light of the LDIP (sections 1(1)(a) and 1(2) LDIP). 3.2 In this instance, the jurisdiction of the Swiss authorities cannot be derived from the general rule concerning the international jurisdiction of the State of domicile of the defendant contained in section 2 of the LDIP, since the respondents are not domiciled in Switzerland. The cantonal court was, moreover, right in finding that the criteria, set out in section 129 of the LDIP, for establishing jurisdiction over actions in respect of wrongful acts were not met in so far as the defendants had neither their domicile nor their place of habitual residence or business in Switzerland (section 129(1) LDIP), and neither the wrongful act nor the resultant injury occurred in Switzerland (section 129(2) LDIP). 3.3 In the absence of an ordinary forum, the problem must be addressed under section 3 of the LDIP, which concerns the forum of necessity ... Under the latter provision, where no forum is provided for in Switzerland by the LDIP and where proceedings in another country prove impossible or one cannot reasonable require that they be brought in that country, the Swiss judicial or administrative authorities of the locality with which the case has a sufficient connection have jurisdiction.\nThe application of this rule for assigning jurisdiction thus calls for three cumulative conditions to be met: firstly, the Swiss authorities do not have jurisdiction under another provision; secondly, legal proceedings in another country are impossible or cannot reasonably be required; and, thirdly, the case in question has a sufficient connection with Switzerland. In the present case, the first condition is indisputably fulfilled. Fulfilment of the second condition appears more problematic, but in the light of the third condition, which merits more extensive discussion, it is not necessary to elaborate further on this question. 3.4 Section 3 of the LDIP, which must be interpreted restrictively ... represents a safety valve, intended to avoid denials of justice ... in the event of a negative conflict of jurisdiction.\nIn this connection, the Federal Council, in its authoritative interpretation of this provision, noted that \u201cthere are cases that have such a tenuous connection with Switzerland that it is not appropriate to set in motion the entire judicial system in order to resolve them. However, section 3 lays down an exception to this principle. The Swiss authorities must assume jurisdiction even in cases where the connection with our country is very tenuous, where it is impossible to bring proceedings or to lodge an appeal abroad. It is for the claimant or the appellant to demonstrate this impossibility. Where this evidence has been adduced, jurisdiction reverts to the authority of the locality with which the case has a sufficient connection. Where there are several competing fora in Switzerland, it is the first authority before which an action is brought that has jurisdiction. Clearly, the impossibility of bringing and pursuing proceedings abroad can only be examined in the light of the tangible circumstances and of the possible consequences for the individual concerned in the particular case; it will ultimately be for the court to recognise, or not, its jurisdiction\u201d .... .\nAlthough section 3 LDIP may thus seem innately paradoxical in so far as proceedings for which there is no basis for connection with an ordinary forum in Switzerland are, ipso facto, lacking in any particular connection with this country, in such a way that determining a \u201csufficient connection\u201d may prove challenging, and the aim pursued by the law \u2013 to prevent a formal denial of justice \u2013 difficult to achieve, this legal provision has not in practice been without effect; the cantonal courts in particular have recognised its applicability in the areas of family law, inheritance and proceedings on debt-enforcement and bankruptcy... .\nMoreover, legal writers have noted that a subsidiary forum must necessarily be recognised in situations of political persecution... However, neither the case-law nor legal opinion provide much in the way of guidance concerning civil actions for compensation in respect of damage resulting from crimes against humanity, life and physical integrity, committed abroad, by foreign perpetrators. 3.5 That being stated, it is necessary to consider what is meant by \u201ccase\u201d [\u201ccause\u201d in the French version] in section 3 LDIP.\nIt is settled case-law that the law must, in the first instance, be interpreted literally. An interpretation which deviates from the literal meaning of a text expressed in clear terms is allowable only where there are objective reasons for considering that the text fails to convey the true meaning of the provision concerned. Such reasons may derive from the drafting history, from the aim and sense of the provision concerned and from the structure and layout of the law. If the text is not absolutely clear, if it can be interpreted variously, the approach must be to seek out the true import of the provision having regard to all relevant factors, including in particular the drafting history, the intention pursued by the rule, the spirit and values on which it is based or again its relationship with other legal provisions. The Federal Supreme Court does not favour any one method of interpretation but adopts a pragmatic plurality in its search for the true meaning of the rule; in particular, it takes as a basis a literal understanding of the text only where this offers, with no ambiguity, a solution that is substantively just (ATF 133 III 175 \u00a7 3.3.1, V 57 \u00a7 6.1; 132 III 226 \u00a7 3.3.5 and the judgments cited therein).\nIn itself, the meaning to be attributed to the term \u201ccause\u201d is uncertain in the sense that it does not have a general definition in the laws of civil procedure of the French-speaking cantons (see, however, Bertossa/Gaillard/Guyet/ Schmidt, Commentaire de la loi de procedure civile genevoise, vol. I, Geneva 2002, n.10 ad Article 99/LPC/GE, concerning the force of res judicata, in which the authors consider that identical claims, in terms of their content, based on the same arguments and the same combination of alleged facts, constitute the objective limit of res judicata; that identity is determined by the complete set of legal considerations which formed part of the first application and were adjudicated upon; this was how \u201ccause\u201d was to be understood in former Article 99(2); the alleged facts of the case determine an overall situation [\u201cSachverhalt\u201d, \u201cProzessstoff\u201d] which it is for the court to assess) but would appear to equate to \u201cproc\u00e9dure\u201d or \u201cdemande en justice\u201d or in German to \u201cRechtsstreit\u201d, \u201cRechtssache\u201d, \u201cProzess\u201d, \u201cAngelegenheit\u201d, \u201ccausa litigandi\u201d or \u201cStreitgrund\u201d. At all events, \u201ccause\u201d is not the literal and unambiguous translation of the terms \u201cSachverhalt\u201d or \u201cfattispecie\u201d used in the German and Italian versions of section 3 of the LDIP. It should be borne in mind, at this point, that the latter terms are usually translated in French as \u201c\u00e9nonc\u00e9\u201d or \u201cexpos\u00e9 des faits\u201d or \u201c\u00e9tat des faits\u201d.\n As the versions of the law drafted in the three official languages have the same standing, the question arises whether the difference between the French wording and that of the other two versions results from an error in the legislative process, from a difference in meaning which becomes apparent only in the context of specific cases according to a varying understanding of the legal provision in each of the languages, or, lastly, from a linguistic difference attributable either to the non-translatability knowingly taken into account in the drafting or to uncertainty on the part of the legislator as to the meaning to be conveyed (see Schubarth, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Gesetzestexte, in Rapports suisses pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s au XVIIe Congr\u00e8s international de droit compar\u00e9, Zurich 2006, p. 11 et seq., especially p. 12 s.).\n It seems clear that the first of these possibilities can be ruled out. To distinguish between the second and third possibilities the understanding of the term \u201ccause\u201d in legal French terminology must be considered. In this regard, the \u201ccause\u201d of the action is the basis of the claim [\u201cbase de la pr\u00e9tention\u201d] (\u2018Streitgrund\u201d rather than \u201cSachverhalt\u201d), though it should be noted that the legal writers are in some disagreement as to the content and scope of that basis. Some argue that the \u201ccause\u201d must be seen as a legal concept allowing the claim to be defined, while for others the \u201ccause\u201d comes down to a set of facts giving rise to the legal issues in debate or the legal interest invoked (see Vincent/Guinchard, Proc\u00e9dure civile, 24th edition, Paris 1996, n. 519 p. 386 et seq., who conclude that the \u201ccause\u201d of the action is constituted by a legally characterised set of facts).\n In the case in point, it must be acknowledged that a comparison with the German and Italian versions assists in the interpretation of the French text, supporting the view that the term \u201ccause\u201d should be assigned the restricted meaning of \u201cset of facts\u201d or, to take a literal translation of \u201cSachverhalt\u201d and \u201cfattispeccie\u201d, \u201cexpos\u00e9\u201d or \u201c\u00e9tat de faits\u201d and not \u201cproc\u00e9dure\u201d. In other words, it is the \u201ccause\u201d \u2013 which concerns the set of facts and the legal argumentation \u2013 rather than the person of the applicant which must have a sufficient connection with Switzerland.\nIn the present case, however, the claimant complains of acts of torture that were allegedly committed in Tunisia, by Tunisians resident in Tunisia, against a Tunisian residing in Italy. All of the specific features of the case come back to Tunisia, except for the fact of residence in Italy at the relevant time. The facts of the case thus have no connection with Switzerland, so that the question of whether or not the link with this country is sufficient does not arise. In those circumstances, it is not possible to recognise the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts, short of disregarding the clear text of s[ection] 3 of the LDIP [see paragraph 37 below]. The fact that the claimant then chose to come to Switzerland cannot change anything, since it is a fact subsequent to the events of the case and, moreover, does not form part of it. 4. Since the absence of a sufficient connection between the facts of the case and Switzerland suffices to establish the Swiss courts\u2019 lack of jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed, without it being necessary to examine the issue of immunity from jurisdiction.\n...\u201d 31.  The Swiss Government made submissions before the Grand Chamber describing the action taken by the Tunisian Republic after the fall of the regime in January 2011 in order to establish a new democracy and a political system based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. They considered that the possibility of submitting complaints to the newly established courts was the most direct and \u201cnatural\u201d means of promoting reconciliation, re-establishing social peace and improving prevention, whilst also respecting the steps taken to repair the harm done to the victims. In this context, the Government referred to Article 148 \u00a7 9 of the Tunisian Constitution of 14 January 2014, worded as follows:\n\u201cThe State commits to implementing the transitional justice system in all areas within the timeline set by the related legislation. In this regard, no claim in respect of the non-retrospective nature of laws, or the existence of a previous amnesty or pardon, or the binding force of double jeopardy, or the statute of limitations or prescription of the crime or punishment, shall be admitted.\u201d 32.  The Government observed that the constituent elements of transitional justice had already been set out in \u201cOrganic Law no. 2013-53 of 24 December 2013, on the introduction of transitional justice and related organisational arrangements\u201d, enacted by the Tunisian Parliament on 23 December 2013 and published in the Official Gazette on 31 December 2013. The respondent Government specified that Part III of Title I covered \u201cAccountability and criminal liability\u201d, in order to \u201cprevent impunity and ensure that offenders do not escape punishment\u201d (section 6). Section 8 provided for the establishment of specialised divisions in the courts of first instance, composed of judges who would receive special training in transitional justice. They \u201c[would] rule on cases relating to serious violations of human rights\u201d, including torture (section 8 (2)(3)), which \u2013 in accordance with section 9 \u2013 were not subject to statutory limitation. 33.  The Government explained that Part IV of Title I focused more specifically on \u201cReparation and Rehabilitation\u201d (sections 10 to 13). Pursuant to section 11 \u00a7 1:\n\u201c[t]he compensation of victims of violations is a right guaranteed by law and the State shall offer every form of sufficient, effective redress commensurate with the extent of the violations committed and the individual situation of each victim.\u201d 34.  The Government further added that Title II of the law established a \u201cTruth and Dignity Commission\u201d (TDC), which was an independent body whose members were chosen by the Legislative Assembly from among public officials known for their neutrality, impartiality and competence (sections 16, 19 and 38 of the Organic Law). Under section 17, the TDC\u2019s work was to cover the entire period from 1 July 1955 to 31 December 2013, the date of the law\u2019s promulgation. The duration of the TDC\u2019s work was limited to four years, starting from the date of appointment of its members (section 18). 35.  Lastly, the Government informed the Court that, according to information obtained by it from the Swiss Embassy in Tunis, persons who considered themselves victims of the former regime had until 15 June 2016 to apply to the TDC. The Commission was currently dealing with over 60,000 cases. In this capacity, it was holding hearings which, since November 2016, had also been held in public. According to the information received, it was foreseen that selected cases would be transmitted to the courts at a later stage in the investigation process. 36.  The applicant has not contested these submissions by the Swiss Government (see paragraphs 31-35 above). He specified at the hearing of 14 June 2017 that he had in fact contacted the TDC and had received a simple acknowledgment of receipt in February 2016, but had had no further communication from the TDC since then.", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "8", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant company is a privately owned company registered in Danilovgrad, Montenegro. 5.  In July 2004 a call for tender for hotel \u201cOtrant\u201d in Montenegro was issued. The deadline for submitting bids was October 2004. Together with three other companies, the applicant company took part in the tendering process. On 30 November 2004, however, it was informed that the tender was awarded to another bidder. 6.  On an unspecified date in December 2004, the applicant company objected to this decision. On 29 December 2004 the Commercial Court in Podgorica (Privredni sud u Podgorici) rejected the applicant company\u2019s objection. 7.  On 28 January 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 8.  On 15 June 2006 the Commercial Court ruled against the applicant company. This decision was served on the applicant company on 8 September 2009. 9.  On 26 March 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Commercial Court. The decision of the Court of Appeal was served on the applicant company\u2019s lawyer on 27 April 2010. 10.  On 15 July 2010 the applicant company lodged an initiative urging the Supreme Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Vrhovno dr\u017eavno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo) to file a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za za\u0161titu zakonitosti), but this motion was rejected on 21 July 2010. 11.  On 30 July 2010 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected this appeal as having been lodged out of time.", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "6", "9", "8", "7", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicants live in Stobre\u010d (application no. 37685/10) and Split (application no. 22768/12). Their names and dates of birth are set out in the Appendix. 11.  The legislation of the former Yugoslavia, in particular section 29 of the 1980 Basic Property Act (see paragraph 53 below), prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property[1] by adverse possession (dosjelost). 12.  When incorporating the 1980 Basic Property Act into the Croatian legal system on 8 October 1991, Parliament repealed the above-mentioned provision (see paragraph 54 below). 13.  Subsequently, the new Property Act of 1996, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, provided in section 388(4) that the period prior to 8 October 1991 was to be included in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of socially owned immovable property (see paragraph 56 below). 14.  Following several petitions for an abstract constitutional review (prijedlog za ocjenu ustavnosti) submitted by former owners of properties that had been appropriated under the socialist regime, on 8 July 1999 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) accepted the initiative and decided to institute proceedings to review the constitutionality of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. 15.  In a decision of 17 November 1999 the Constitutional Court invalidated with ex nunc effect section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. It held that the impugned provision had retroactive effect resulting in adverse consequences for the rights of third parties (primarily those who, under the restitution legislation, were entitled to the restitution of property appropriated during the Communist regime) and was therefore unconstitutional (for the relevant part of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, \u00a7 17, 11 June 2009). The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision came into effect on 14 December 1999 when it was published in the Official Gazette. 16.  On 19 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Splitu) against Split Township (Grad Split \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe respondent authority\u201d) seeking a declaration of their ownership of five plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobre\u010d Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in their possession and the possession of their predecessors for more than seventy years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed, the applicants claimed to have acquired ownership of the land. Their statement of claim (tu\u017eba) read as follows:\n\u201cPlots of land nos. 866/91 (...), 866/117 (...), 866/136 (...) and 866/175 ... are registered in the name of the Stobre\u010d Municipality.\nEVIDENCE: Extract from the land register.\nHowever, the plaintiffs and their legal predecessors have been holding the above-mentioned immovable property in their possession for more than 70 years, and thereby acquired the ownership of that immovable property.\nEVIDENCE: Extract from the cadastre, testimony of the witness N.P., parties\u2019 testimonies and other evidence, if needed.\n(a)  [...]\n(b)  Plot no. 866/136 belongs to the plaintiffs Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts;\n(c)  Plot no. 866/175 belongs to the plaintiff Ivan Br\u010di\u0107 in its entirety.\nEVIDENCE: See above\nFor these reasons it is proposed that the court, after having conducted the proceedings, adopt the following\nJudgment 1.  It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs are the owners and co-owners, respectively, of the [following] immovable property ... and therefore:\n(a)  [...]\n(b)  Plot no. 866/136 Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts;\n(c)  Plot no. 866/175 Ivan Br\u010di\u0107 in its entirety 2.  The plaintiffs are, on the basis of this judgment, entitled to seek and obtain registration in their name of the right of ownership and co-ownership, respectively, of the immovable property listed in point 1 of this judgment in the land register, as well as concurrent deletion of that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority\u2019s legal predecessor, the Stobre\u010d Municipality. 17.  By a judgment of 20 September 2004 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. It held that they had proved that they and their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question since at least 1912 and in good faith. Furthermore, it held that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession at the relevant time had been twenty years. Consequently, in the applicants\u2019 case that period had elapsed in 1932. The relevant part of that judgment reads:\n\u201cIn the statement of claim it is submitted ... that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had been in possession of the immovable property [in question] for more than 70 years and that they had thereby acquired ownership of that property by adverse possession.\n...\nThe plaintiffs base their claim on ... adverse possession. [E]ven if they do not expressly state it, the facts alleged in their statement of claim suggest that they maintain that the requirements for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been met before 6 April 1941. This means that it was necessary to establish whether the requirements prescribed by the ... laws and other regulations in force at the time were met.\n...\nIn the opinion of this court, because of changed economic and social circumstances, the time-limits for acquiring title to property by adverse possession prescribed by ... laws and other regulations in force on 6 April 1941 do not correspond to the principle of protection of legitimate interests of individuals, long-term possessors in good faith, or to the principle of legal certainty. [The court] therefore considers that the period of 20 years is required and sufficient to acquire ownership of immovable property by adverse possession.\u201d 18.  In its appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession, and that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants responded that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive possession of the property since the beginning of the twentieth century and thus for more than thirty years even before 6 April 1941. 19.   In a judgment of 17 May 2007 the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants\u2019 action. It held that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly (continuous and exclusive possession of the land in good faith since 1912) but had erred in its application of the substantive law. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 53-54, 57 and 59-60 below). However, those requirements had not been met in the applicants\u2019 case. That was so because under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (which was applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below) immovable property owned by municipal authorities could be acquired by adverse possession only after forty years. However, having regard to the factual findings of the first-instance court, according to which the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land at issue since 1912 (see paragraph 17 above), that time-limit had not expired before 6 April 1941. The relevant part of that judgment reads:\n\u201cIn calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Act on Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Act on the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.\u201d 20.  The applicants then, on 23 July 2007, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment alleging infringements of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... according to the findings in the contested judgment the plaintiffs ... have been in continuous exclusive possession from 1912 until the present day in good faith. ... The case therefore concerns [such] possession in the period of 90 years before the bringing of the civil action.\n... In the instant case the court did not apply the cited provisions even though the plaintiffs\u2019 predecessors had possessed [the property in question] since at least the beginning of the twentieth century and their possession had been continuous until the bringing of the civil action and lasts until the present day.\n...\nIf the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.\u201d 21.  In a decision of 30 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint and on 19 November 2009 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201cOnly those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court.\nIn the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith.\n...\nIn the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that, in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property, the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account.\nIn the examination of the constitutional complaint ... one has to take note of the fact that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991, did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in the decision U\u2011III\u20111595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.\u201d 22.  On 25 May 1993, 21 February 1996 and 20 July 1999 respectively, the applicants bought three plots of land from various individuals. However, the plots were recorded in the land register in the name of Stobre\u010d Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township. 23.  On 4 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court against Split Township, seeking a declaration of their ownership of the three plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobre\u010d Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in the possession of their legal predecessors for more than 100 years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed in respect of their legal predecessors, the applicants claimed that by buying the land from them they had validly acquired ownership. Their statement of claim read as follows:\n\u201cThe plaintiffs together, each in one half, bought from R.K. and M.K. ... the plots of land no. 866/34 (...) ... from T.F. ... the plot of land no. 866/59 (...), ... and from M.S. ... the plot of land no. 866/35 (...) ...\nEVIDENCE: [The three sale and purchase agreements between the plaintiffs and the above mentioned individuals]\nThe plaintiffs immediately, upon the conclusion of the above sale and purchase agreements entered into possession of all the immovable property listed above. They remained in possession of it until the present day. After the [relevant tax authority ordered them to pay tax] they paid it.\nEVIDENCE: Tax payment receipt\n Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S. ...\nAll the above-mentioned immovable property is registered in the land register in the name of the Stobre\u010d Municipality even though the vendors in the enclosed [sale purchase] agreements and their legal predecessors have been in possession of that immovable property for more than 100 years, which means that they acquired ownership of that immovable property by adverse possession.\nEVIDENCE: Extract from the land register;\n Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S., ... ; and\n other evidence, if needed.\nGiven that the vendors were non-registered owners of the above-mentioned immovable property, they have by the sale purchase agreements transferred their right of ownership to the plaintiffs as buyers. [In this way] the plaintiffs, through their legal predecessors, acquired ownership of the plots nos. 866/34 (...), 866/59 (...) and 866/35 (...)  ...\nEVIDENCE: See above.\nFor these reasons it is proposed that the court adopt the following\nJudgment 1.  It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs Jakov Jakelji\u0107 and Ivica Jakelji\u0107 are the co-owners, each in one half, of the plots nos. 866/34, 866/59 and 866/35 ... 2.  The respondent authority shall within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, provide the plaintiffs with the document containing clausula intabulandi necessary to record the right of ownership in the land register and delete that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority\u2019s legal predecessor, the Stobre\u010d Municipality. Otherwise, this judgment shall replace [such document]. 3.  The respondent authority shall, within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, reimburse the plaintiffs for the costs of these proceedings.\u201d 24.  In the response to the applicants\u2019 action the respondent authority submitted that the property in question had been in social ownership and that, having regard to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraph 15 above), the fact of possessing socially owned property before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for adverse possession. The applicants replied that the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision to which the respondent authority had referred was of no relevance for the resolution of the dispute. 25.  In a judgment of 19 December 2002 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. However, following an appeal lodged by the respondent authority, that judgment was quashed on 2 March 2006 by the Osijek County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Osijeku) on procedural grounds. 26.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 1 June 2007, the Split Municipal Court again ruled in favour of the applicants. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 52 and 59-60 below). It found, however, that the applicants had proved that their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the three plots of land in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941, and had continued to do so until they had sold them to the applicants (see paragraph 22 above). The applicants\u2019 predecessors had therefore, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession even before that date. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the response to the action the respondent denied the claim because the property in question had been [in] social ownership and because, pursuant to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act], possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring title to property by adverse possession.\n...\nGiven that the action was brought in 2002, that in the land register the right of ownership is registered in the name of the Stobre\u010d Municipality, that section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act] was invalidated by the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 17 November 1999 \u2013 which means that the fact of possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time necessary for adverse possession \u2013 ... the plaintiffs and their predecessors could not have acquired ownership before 1991 unless they manage to prove that they had acquired [it] by adverse possession before 6 April 1941. The plaintiffs\u2019 action evidently relies precisely on that. Therefore, since [for the court] it is beyond dispute that the plot in question had been socially owned on 8 October 1991 ... in order to determine whether it had been acquired by adverse possession it had to be established whether the plaintiffs\u2019 legal predecessors had been in possession of certain quality of the disputed property before 6 April 1941 and thus for the period prescribed for adverse possession by the rules applicable at the time.\u201d 27.  In their appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession unless the ownership had been acquired in that manner before 6 April 1941. The respondent authority claimed that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants retorted that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive and continuous possession of the property in good faith for more than a hundred years and that they had in any event acquired ownership thereof by adverse possession, having possessed it for more than forty years before 6 April 1941. 28.  In a judgment of 29 May 2008 the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants\u2019 action. It found that the applicants\u2019 predecessors had only been in possession of the land in question (continuously and in good faith) since 1912. The forty-year time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession set out in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code had not therefore expired by 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 51 below). In the subsequent period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 the relevant legislation had prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession (see paragraph 11 above and paragraphs 52-53 below). This had discontinued the running of the statutory time-limits. The time which had elapsed before 6 April 1941 had therefore not continued to run after 8 October 1991 \u2013 it had actually started to run again. The relevant part of that judgment reads:\n \u201cIn calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.\u201d 29.  The applicants then, on 1 August 2008, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they, inter alia, stated:\n\u201cTherefore, from the legal and factual situation where, as in the instant case, the plaintiffs have, themselves and through their predecessors, indisputably been in possession in good faith of the property in question for more than 100 years, and viewing such situation in the light of Croatian law in force, ... it follows that it is necessary to ... quash the contested judgment and remit the case ...\nIf the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.\n... by not taking into account the entire period of possession of the property at issue before the bringing of the civil action the court misapplied the substantive law and thereby violated constitutional rights relied on by the plaintiffs.\u201d 30.  In a decision of 15 September 2011, the Constitutional Court dismissed their constitutional complaint and on 4 October 2011 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201cOnly those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court.\nIn the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith.\n...\nIn the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account.\nIn the examination of the constitutional complaint ... the Constitutional Court notes that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991 did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in decision U\u2011III\u20111595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.\u201d 31.  In the proceedings before the Chamber the applicants complained that the Split County Court judgments in their cases were in breach of their rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention. 32.  The relevant part of the application forms in both cases reads as follows:\n\u201cIII.  STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION(S) OF THE CONVENTION AND/OR PROTOCOLS AND OF RELEVANT ARGUMENTS\nThe applicants consider that ... the Split County Court by dismissing the applicants\u2019 action, and the Constitutional Court by dismissing the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint violated, i.e. breached their rights provided by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter \u2018the Convention\u2019), in particular those included in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which guarantees the protection of the right of property, and the rights provided by Article 14 of the Convention because the applicants\u2019 are being discriminated and thereby placed in a disadvantageous position compared to other Croatian nationals because in almost the same, i.e. in terms of substantive law and factual background compatible, cases the same court, the Split County Court, has been adopting judgments allowing registration of the right of ownership [in respect of the land] in the immediate vicinity of that of the applicants, to those who make such requests on the basis of undisturbed possession of hundred years.\n... 33.  In the application form in the Jakelji\u0107 case (no. 22768/12) the applicants also added:\n\u201cBefore that court the applicants\u2019 representative had lodged the application in the ... [case of Radomilja and Others], which the Court has registered under no. 37685/10. It is therefore suggested to consult that case-file and its enclosures.\nBefore the Croatian courts in substantially similar cases final judgments were adopted from which it follows that the courts have been granting the claims of those in possession of the land adjacent to that of the applicants, and have been declaring those possessors the owners of that immovable property on the basis of adverse possession that is, undisturbed possession of 20 years , which [period] elapsed by 6 April 1941, and so in accordance with the opinion [expressed at] extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960.\nTherefore, [such] different treatment by the courts placed the applicants in an unequal position, which caused them enormous damage.\u201d 34.  On 23 May 2014 and 25 June 2015 respectively, notice of the complaints concerning the alleged violation of their property rights was given to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above). The question communicated to the parties in both cases referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in the Trgo case (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009) and read as follows:\n \u201cWas the refusal of the domestic courts to acknowledge the applicants\u2019 ownership of five/three plots of land they claim to have acquired by adverse possession, in violation of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009)?\u201d 35.  In their observations of 6 October 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 20 October 2015 (in the Jakelji\u0107 case) the Government argued, inter alia, that the cases had to be distinguished from the Trgo case. In particular, they submitted that, unlike the situation in Trgo, in the instant cases the applicants had instituted civil proceedings after the Constitutional Court had invalidated the 1996 version of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 15-16 and 23 above and paragraph 56 below). Accordingly, the applicants could not have had legitimate expectations that the said provision would be applied in their case and that their claim to be declared the owners of the property in question would be granted (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 43, and Jakelji\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 37). The relevant part of their observations in both cases reads:\n\u201c... at the time of bringing the civil action, and pursuant to domestic law, the applicants could not have had a legitimate expectation that they would see their claim upheld on the basis of the repealed section 388(4) of the Property Act. That is to say, at the time when the applicants brought their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, neither the provisions of the then valid Property Act, nor the case law of the highest courts of justice in the Republic of Croatia, had provided for the possibility of including the period in question in the time-limit for adverse possession.\n...\n... in the Trgo case, the applicant brought a civil action in 1997 to determine the right of ownership due to the expiry of the time-limit for adverse possession. Then (at the time the civil action was brought), the provision of the Property Act that dictated the inclusion of the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 in the time-limit for adverse possession was still in force. During these civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court adopted the decision repealing the stated provision of the Property Act, and the applicant lost his case in the end for this reason. Furthermore, the Court noted in that case that repealing a particular legal provision had an ex nunc effect, but that this rule was not applied in the ongoing proceedings. Therefore, the Court concluded that the applicant should not have to suffer the negative consequences of correcting the legislator\u2019s mistake, since the applicant had reasonably relied on legislation that was valid at the time when he initiated the proceedings. Therefore, the Court acknowledged that the applicant in that case had legitimate expectations, and consequently the right of ownership, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n However, the situation in the present case is completely different. This is because of the described legislative activity after the decision of the Constitutional Court, but also because of the previously described consistent case-law. Therefore, the applicants in this case, at the time of bringing their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, could not have had any legitimate expectations that the court would acknowledge the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 as being included in the time-limit for adverse possession, and that they would gain recognition of the right of ownership on that basis.\nFurthermore, the Government deem that the attitude of the applicants themselves before the domestic bodies, as well as the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint, clearly show that they did not even have such expectations.\nThe Government primarily point out that it was disputed before the ordinary courts (i) whether the applicants and their predecessors had been possessors in good faith and fair possessors, (ii) how long the applicants and their legal predecessors had been in possession of the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and (iii) whether the legal time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941.\nAt no time was it disputed between the parties in the proceedings whether the possession of the real property in the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession. Furthermore, the applicants expressly claimed before the domestic court that their civil action was based on the fact that the time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941 ...\nThe fact that the applicants themselves did not dispute this is also shown by their constitutional complaint.\n... this constitutional complaint shows that the applicants did not believe that this time period should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession in their case, but that it was necessary to include in that time-limit the period during which their legal predecessors had owned the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and to add the length of possession after 8 October 1991 to that time period.\nFinally, the Government observe that, even in their application to the Court, the applicants did not refer to the fact that the domestic courts had miscalculated the time-limit for adverse possession, with regard to the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991.\nThe Government additionally observe that the time required for adverse possession of socially-owned real property according to the provisions of the General Civil Code was indisputably 40 years. The applicants did not claim at any time before the domestic courts or the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia that the time required for adverse possession had been shorter. Precisely to the contrary, the applicants argued their constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court by claiming that the requirement of expiry of the time-limit of 40 years was met, because the time before 6 April 1941 should be added to the time after 8 October 1991, which according to their claims amounted to 41 years (see ... the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint).\nIn conclusion, it is entirely obvious in this case that the applicants did not \u2018rely reasonably on a legislative provision that was later repealed\u2019, but they tried to argue and prove that they met the requirements for adverse possession, in accordance with the legal provisions that were in force at the time the civil action was brought and in accordance with the case-law related to that legislation.\nTherefore, this case was about hope in the acknowledgement of the right of ownership, which cannot be considered \u2018possessions\u2019 within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kopecky v. Slovakia, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 September 2004, \u00a7 35).\nFollowing the above, the Government deem that the applicants\u2019 application is manifestly ill-founded and should be dismissed under Article 35, paragraph 3 of the Convention.\u201d\n(b)  The applicants\u2019 observations in reply 36.  The applicants, in their observations in reply of 3 November 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 30 November 2015 (in the Jakelji\u0107 case), submitted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was applicable because their claims to be declared the owners of the land in question had a sufficient basis in national law, specifically (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 45, and Jakelji\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 39):\n- in both cases, in the interpretation adopted at the extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960, which was still being applied by the Croatian Supreme Court in cases similar to theirs (see paragraphs 58-60 below), and\n- in the Jakelji\u0107 case, also in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below).\nAccording to that interpretation by the Supreme Court a person would have acquired ownership of immovable property by adverse possession after being in possession thereof in good faith for twenty years (see paragraphs 58-60 below). 37.  For the applicants in the case of Radomilja and Others, the issue was whether the period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had in their case expired before 6 April 1941 or not. The above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see the preceding paragraph and paragraphs 58-60 below), coupled with the factual findings of the domestic courts that they and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 and 26-28 above), suggested that it had. They could have therefore legitimately expected that their claim to be declared the owners of that land would be granted. Yet, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim by holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 46). 38.  The applicants in Radomilja and Others also contested the factual findings of the domestic courts by arguing that those courts had misinterpreted the witness statement from which they had arrived at the conclusion that the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). In fact, the evidence suggested that they had been in possession of that land since 1900 (ibid., \u00a7 47). 39.  In Jakelji\u0107 the applicants submitted that the Split Municipal Court had established that their predecessors had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 26 above). Yet, the Split County Court, while stating that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly, had somehow distorted those factual findings by holding that the applicants\u2019 predecessors had actually only been in possession since 1912 (see paragraph 28 above). Had it correctly understood those factual findings, the County Court would have reached the same conclusion as to the law as the Municipal Court, namely that the applicants\u2019 predecessors had, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 (see Jakelji\u0107, \u00a7 40). 40.  In the alternative, the applicants in Jakelji\u0107 argued that even if their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912, they should have acquired it by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 based on the above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see paragraph 36 above and paragraph 58 below). The applicants, who had bought the land in question from their predecessors, could therefore have legitimately expected that their claim to be declared owners of that land would be granted. However, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim, holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (ibid., \u00a7 41). Those courts had also wrongly applied the relevant domestic law by refusing to add up the period before 6 April 1941 and that after 8 October 1991 when holding that in between these two periods the running of the statutory time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been discontinued (see paragraph 28 above). 41.  In view of those arguments (see paragraphs 36-40 above), the applicants in both cases submitted that the Court\u2019s findings in the Trgo case were not relevant in their cases (see Radomilja and Others, \u00a7 48). In particular, in their reply to the Government\u2019s observations they stated as follows (ibid.):\n\u201c... the Court has specified that the case of Trgo v. Croatia is relevant case-law [; this] case does not have the same factual and legal background as the present [one]. In particular, the Trgo case was about acknowledging ownership acquired by adverse possession in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991, whereas the applicants herein do not claim that said period should, nor do they have any expectations that the said period would, be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession given that they acquired the ownership [of the land in question by adverse possession] regardless [of that period]\nThe Trgo case therefore cannot be regarded as relevant case-law in the present case.\u201d 42.  The applicants in their observations in both cases cited section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act, as amended by the 2001 Amendment (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe 2001 version of section 388(4)\u201d). They also made the following statements in relation to the issue whether they had legitimate expectations:\n\u201cDuring the domestic proceedings it was established beyond dispute that the applicants had been in possession of [the land in question] since the early 20th century until the present day, and that all this time they had been in peaceful and uninterrupted possession. Furthermore, the applicants believe that on the basis of more than a hundred years of peaceful possession they have a property interest, for which there is a sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as a \u2018possession\u2019 protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, the legitimate expectation of the applicants is based on a reasonable [and] justified reliance on the relevant statutory provisions, on the basis of which they have ex lege acquired ownership by the lapse of time necessary for [acquiring ownership by] adverse possession.\n...\n... the Government argued that the applicants at the time they brought their civil action could not have had legitimate expectation that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act \u2013 which provision allowed the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession \u2013 because that provision had been invalidated at the time of bringing of the civil action.\nIt is submitted, first of all, that the applicants\u2019 complaints primarily concern the fact that the second-instance court, in contrast to the first-instance court, did not acknowledge the legal consequences [produced], that is [the right of] ownership which the applicants had acquired, before 6 April 1941.\n...\nBesides, from the Government submissions on the merits it follows that they do not comment on the fact ..., ... which is one of the grounds of this application, that in accordance with the [case-law of the] domestic courts the time-period necessary for acquiring ownership of immovable property in social ownership by adverse possession is 20 years, which has to elapse by 6 April 1941.\n...\nHowever, if the view that the [land in question] was socially-owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.\n...\n... even if one accepts the factual findings of the domestic courts ... that is, that the applicants and their predecessors have been in possession of the [land] in question since 1912 ... they possessed [it] for 29 years before 6 April 1941 and for 11 years [in the period] from 8 October 1991 until the bringing of their civil action. This period of [altogether] 40 years is under the relevant provisions of the [1811 Civil Code, 1980 Basic Property Act and the 1996 Property Act] sufficient for acquiring ownership of the [land] in question.\n...\n... in the present case the applicant\u2019s predecessors ... have possessed [the land in question] as [if they have been the] owners since before 1900 ... [T]hey have possessed [the land] in that way before 6 April 1941, between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 and after 8 October 1991 until the present day. They have therefore maintained uninterrupted possession on which grounds they should have, on the basis of the relevant legislation, acquired ownership by adverse possession.\nWhat is important to emphasise is ... that no one has ever acquired any rights in respect of the [land in question] nor has anyone except the applicants themselves claimed any rights in respect of [that land]. ...\nThe Government\u2019s argument that the applicants\u2019 could not have had legitimate expectations that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act is entirely misplaced because the applicants do not ask the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. It is submitted, first of all, that the applicants have never relied on section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act nor do they in their application rely on it. [That is so] because that they have, regardless of that time-period, acquired the right of ownership on several grounds and so before 6 April 1941 as well as after 8 October 1991, or until the time they brought the[ir] civil action.\n...\nThe applicants have therefore at the time they brought the[ir] civil action, in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions which were in force at the time of brining the civil action and in accordance with the relevant case-law, acquired the ownership by adverse possession and so without taking into account the time period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991. If that view is not to be accepted, they have definitely acquired ownership by taking into account the period after 8 October 1991 in which period they have retained uninterrupted peaceful possession of [the land in question] until the present day.\n...\n... in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, case-law and above stated facts it is beyond any doubt that the applicants acquired ownership by adverse possession ...\nIn line with the above it is suggested that the Court refuse the Government\u2019s objections regarding applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ... and deliver a judgment finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and enable the applicants to enjoy their right of ownership.\u201d\n(c)  The Government\u2019s comments on the applicants\u2019 observations 43.  The Government in their comments of 15 January 2015 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and of 4 January 2016 (in the Jakelji\u0107 case) first reiterated their arguments as to why the applicants had not had legitimate expectations to become the owners of the land in question. In support of their arguments the Government emphasised that in their reply the applicants admitted that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 56-57 below) as well as the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 17 November 1999 (see paragraph 15 above) had no significance in their cases and expressly argued that the cases had a factual and legal background different from the Trgo case (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 44, and Jakelji\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 38). 44.  In their comments in the Jakelji\u0107 case the Government also replied to the applicants\u2019 arguments that the time necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession had been twenty rather than forty years (see paragraphs 36 and 40 above). In particular, the Government submitted that the applicants had:\n\u201c... introduced the complaint on the allegedly inconsistent domestic practice [concerning the time required for adverse possession] only in these proceedings before the Court, in contravention of the principle of subsidiarity. If the applicants considered that their rights were violated by different legal views of domestic courts that were applied in their case, as opposed to other similar cases, they should have brought these complaints to the attention of the Constitutional Court. However, the applicants failed to do so.\u201d 45.  As regards the applicants\u2019 arguments as to why Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was nevertheless applicable (see paragraphs 36-40 and 42 above), the Government submitted that they concerned questions of fact and the application of domestic law, which under the Convention were not the Court\u2019s task to examine (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, \u00a7 44, and Jakelji\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 38).", "references": ["4", "8", "3", "5", "6", "2", "1", "0", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "11.  The applicant was born in 1953. He is currently detained in Istanbul. 12.  The applicant is an economics professor and a journalist in Turkey. Prior to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016, he presented a political discussion programme on Can Erzincan TV, a television channel that was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). 13.  In the years leading up to the attempted coup, the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government\u2019s policies. 14.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the \u201cPeace at Home Council\u201d attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. 15.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators\u2019 control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 16.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah G\u00fclen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FET\u00d6/PDY (\u201cG\u00fclenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure\u201d). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. 17.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. 18.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 19.  On an unspecified date, the Istanbul public prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation in respect of suspected members of FET\u00d6/PDY. In addition, on the basis of Article 3 \u00a7 1 (l) of Legislative Decree no. 668, he ordered restrictions on the right of the suspects\u2019 lawyers to inspect the contents of the investigation file or to obtain copies of documents in the file. In the course of the criminal investigation, the applicant was arrested at his home on 10 September 2016 and taken into police custody on suspicion of having links to the media wing of the organisation in question. 20.  On the same day, the applicant\u2019s home was searched by police officers without his lawyers being present, as they had been prevented from attending the search on account of the state of emergency. 21.  Later that day, the applicant lodged an objection challenging his detention in police custody and seeking his release. On 12 September 2016 the Istanbul magistrate\u2019s court dismissed the objection. 22.  The applicant remained in police custody for twelve days at the Istanbul police anti-terrorist branch. During his first five days in custody, he was not permitted to speak to his lawyers. 23.  On 20 September 2016, while at the police station, the applicant stated that he was asserting his right to remain silent. 24.  On 21 September 2016 he was questioned by the Istanbul public prosecutor on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the government or to prevent it from discharging its duties (Article 312 of the Criminal Code \u2013 (\u201cthe CC\u201d) and of being a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY terrorist organisation (Article 314 of the CC). 25.  The records of the questioning indicate that the applicant was accused of: (i) attempting to discredit an investigation into an alleged coup (the \u201cBalyoz\u201d case); (ii) making certain statements serving the interests of FET\u00d6/PDY, in particular during a television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016, in the course of which, according to the public prosecutor, the terrorist organisation had sought to prepare the public for a military coup; (iii) holding an account with Bank Asya, a bank with alleged links to FET\u00d6/PDY; (iv) avoiding a criminal investigation through the assistance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FET\u00d6/PDY; (v) visiting Fetullah G\u00fclen at his home in Pennsylvania and kissing his hand; and (vi) having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an \u201cF\u201d serial number (denoting the initial of the forename Fetullah). In reply, the applicant stated that he did not know any Turkish army officers and had no links to the attempted coup. The comments he had made during the television programme in question had been intended as warnings to prevent future military coups. Regarding the bank account, some years previously he had taught for three months at a private university, which had asked him to open an account at the bank in question for payment of his wages. He added that he had not been aware of having avoided a criminal investigation through the assistance of certain suspected members of an illegal organisation, and that this was a matter to be taken up with the police officers allegedly responsible. Furthermore, he had visited Fetullah G\u00fclen as a member of a group of journalists, for purely professional reasons linked to his role as a journalist, and had never kissed anyone\u2019s hand. Lastly, the one-dollar bill was of no special significance. 26.  On 22 September 2016 the applicant appeared before the Istanbul 10th Magistrate\u2019s Court and was questioned about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, having taken the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offences and the fact that they were among the offences listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) \u2013 the so-called \u201ccatalogue offences\u201d, for which a suspect\u2019s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant\u2019s participation in the criminal proceedings. In the reasons for his decision, the magistrate noted the following: during the attempted military coup, members of FET\u00d6/PDY had used heavy weapons; since February 2012 the organisation in question had been explicitly waging a campaign against the political authorities; the members of FET\u00d6/PDY had attempted to force the government\u2019s resignation by discrediting it in public opinion, especially through judicial operations carried out between 17 and 25 December 2013; and the organisation had taken control of several media outlets with a view to achieving its aim. The magistrate further noted that during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016, the applicant had said: \u201cWithin the State of the Republic of Turkey, there is probably another structure, whose components outside Turkey are closely observing and documenting all these events. It is not clear exactly when [it] will pull its hand out of the bag or how [it] will do so\u201d (\u201cT\u00fcrkiye Devleti i\u00e7inde de muhtemelen b\u00fct\u00fcn bu geli\u015fmeleri d\u0131\u015f d\u00fcnyada daha fazla belgeleyen, izleyen bir ba\u015fka da yap\u0131 var. Onun ne zaman torbadan elini \u00e7\u0131karaca\u011f\u0131, nas\u0131l elini \u00e7\u0131karaca\u011f\u0131 belli de\u011fil\u201d). The magistrate concluded that there were suspicions that the contents of the applicant\u2019s statements about the political authorities had been intended to prepare the ground for a military coup and were not covered by freedom of the press. 27.  On 28 September 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In a decision of 10 October 2016 the Istanbul 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court dismissed the objection. 28.  On 14 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Istanbul 3rd Magistrate\u2019s Court rejected the application. 29.  On various dates the applicant lodged further applications seeking his release pending trial. According to the documents produced by the parties, the applications were all rejected by the competent magistrates\u2019 courts, for example on 10 and 24 November 2016 and 8 December 2016. 30.  On 14 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 \u00a7 6 of the CC, of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor presented the following items of evidence against the applicant: two articles written by him; his comments during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016; the fact that he had an account with Bank Asya; and the seizure at his home of a United States one-dollar bill with an \u201cF\u201d serial number. He sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment on the applicant. 31.  On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor filed his submissions on the merits (esas hakk\u0131nda m\u00fctalaa). He sought the applicant\u2019s conviction for the offences with which he was charged. Besides the evidence he had already submitted when the bill of indictment had been filed, the public prosecutor also produced messages sent by other suspected members of FET\u00d6/PDY via ByLock, an encrypted messaging service allegedly used by members of that organisation. 32.  During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence. 33.  In a summary judgment of 16 February 2018 the Istanbul 26th Assize Court sentenced the applicant to aggravated life imprisonment, in accordance with Article 309 of the CC, for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order. The criminal proceedings are still ongoing in the national courts. 34.  On 8 November 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also submitted that he had been arrested and detained for reasons other than those provided for by the Constitution. In addition, he complained that his detention in police custody had been unlawful and excessively lengthy, that he had had no access to the investigation file in order to challenge his pre-trial detention, that the magistrates ordering his detention had not been independent or impartial, that no hearings had been held following his applications challenging his continued pre-trial detention, and that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. 35.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/23672) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. 36.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint that his pre-trial detention was unlawful, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled \u201cThe meaning of Sledgehammer\u201d (\u201cBalyoz\u2019un Anlam\u0131\u201d), published in the Star newspaper in 2010; (ii) his statements during the television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016; and (iii) an article entitled \u201cTurbulence\u201d (\u201cT\u00fcrb\u00fclans\u201d), published on his own website on 20 July 2016. After examining the substance of these items of evidence, the Constitutional Court held that the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FET\u00d6/PDY or with the purpose of preparing the ground for a possible military coup. The Constitutional Court observed that, as well as having published the above-mentioned articles and made the statements in question, the applicant was accused of holding an account with Bank Asya, having avoided a criminal investigation through the connivance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FET\u00d6/PDY, and having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an \u201cF\u201d serial number. Addressing those allegations, the Constitutional Court held, having regard to the applicant\u2019s testimony and line of defence, that no specific facts had been established that could refute his explanations, which were \u201cconsistent with the normal course of life\u201d. Similarly, regarding the contents of the messages exchanged by other individuals via ByLock, the Constitutional Court held that the messages could not in themselves be regarded as significant indications that the applicant had committed an offence. Accordingly, it concluded that \u201cstrong evidence that an offence had been committed\u201d had not been sufficiently established in the applicant\u2019s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution, had been breached. 37.  However, having regard to the length of the applicant\u2019s detention and the documents available to it, the Constitutional Court held that his complaint that he had been detained for political purposes, on grounds other than those provided for by the Constitution, lacked a sufficient basis. 38.  With regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles and statements (see paragraph 235 of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 155-57 of its judgment \u2013 see paragraph 36 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 39.  With regard to the complaints concerning the lawfulness and duration of the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody, the Constitutional Court held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 \u00a7 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information in the application or the appended material as to whether the applicant had lodged an objection under Article 91 \u00a7 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared these complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 40.  As to the complaint of a lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the magistrates who had ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court dismissed it as being manifestly ill-founded, on the grounds that the magistrates were appointed by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and were entitled to the same constitutional safeguards as other judges. 41.  Concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had had no access to the investigation file, the Constitutional Court held that he had had sufficient means available to prepare his defence to the charges against him and challenge his pre-trial detention, in view of the contents of the detailed questions put to him during questioning by the public prosecutor and the magistrate, and the overall duration of the restriction on access to the case file. Accordingly, it declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 42.  With regard to the complaint that no hearing had been held during the examination of the applicant\u2019s applications challenging his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court found that there was no obligation to hold a hearing on each and every objection to pre-trial detention orders and their extension, and that where a person had been able to appear before the first-instance court considering the issue of detention, the fact that there was no hearing on a subsequent appeal did not in itself contravene the Constitution since it did not breach the principle of equality of arms. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant and his lawyer had been present at the hearing on 22 September 2016, following which the applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention. It observed that he had lodged an objection against his detention on 28 September 2016, that the objection had been dismissed on 10 October 2016 and that eighteen days had thus elapsed between his previous appearance in court and the dismissal of his objection. Taking this period into account, the Constitutional Court considered that there had been no obligation to hold a hearing during the examination of his objection, and accordingly declared this complaint likewise inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 43.  Lastly, with regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the Constitutional Court observed that he had not raised this issue with the enforcement judge. Accordingly, it declared the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 44.  Having regard to its findings of violations, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant was to be awarded 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY \u2013 approximately 4,500 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and TRY 2,219.50 (approximately EUR 500) in respect of costs and expenses. 45.  As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court so that it could take \u201cthe necessary action\u201d. 46.  On 11 January 2018 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court for his client\u2019s release. 47.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court rejected the application by two votes to one, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment. It held in addition that the summary judgment submitted by the applicant\u2019s lawyer did not contain any indication by the Constitutional Court of a measure relating to the applicant\u2019s release. 48.  In his opinion the dissenting judge stated that, in accordance with Article 153 \u00a7 6 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments were binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the administrative authorities and natural and legal persons. Accordingly, where a violation had been found on account of a judicial decision, the relevant court was required to take the necessary action to redress the effects of the violation, pursuant to section 50(2) of Law no. 6216 on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court (\u201cLaw no. 6216\u201d). In his view, the only way of satisfying this requirement in the applicant\u2019s case was to order his release. 49.  On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release, submitting a copy of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 11 January 2018 as published on the court\u2019s website. 50.  In a decision delivered on 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 27th Assize Court, by two votes to one, dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection and ordered the continuation of his pre-trial detention. In reaching that finding, it observed that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment had not been published in the Official Gazette as required by Article 153 \u00a7 6 of the Constitution. 51.  In his dissenting opinion, the judge in the minority expressed the view that, since the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments were binding and not subject to appeal, the applicant should be released pending trial without waiting for the judgment in question to be published in the Official Gazette. 52.  On 19 January 2018 the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment on the individual application lodged by the applicant was published in Official Gazette no. 20306. 53.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court examined of its own motion the question of the applicant\u2019s continued detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment no. 2016/23672 was not in compliance with the law. The Assize Court added that ordering the applicant\u2019s release as an automatic consequence of the judgment in question would run counter to the general principles of law, the independence of the courts, the principle that no authority could give orders or instructions to the courts, and the \u201cnatural judge\u201d principle. Lastly, by two votes to one, it ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. In so holding, it took the following into account: the evidence before it; the large scale of the attempted military coup; the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding; the current state of the case file; and the severity of the potential sentence in the event of a conviction. 54.  The judge who had voted in favour of the applicant\u2019s release stated in a dissenting opinion that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments were binding and that the Assize Court was thus required to comply with judgment no. 2016/23672. He pointed out that the only possible way for it to do so was to order the applicant\u2019s release. 55.  On 30 January 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 11 January 2018.", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "5", "7", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5.  In 1999 he obtained a Russian passport. 6.  On 29 December 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, ordered to arrest and bring the applicant to the court in order to determine the preventive measure during the investigation of his alleged robbery. The applicant\u2019s name was put on the international list of wanted persons. 7.  On 26 September 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. As the applicant was a Russian national, he was released. 8.  On 14 October 2007 the Ukrainian authorities sought the applicant\u2019s extradition from Russia in relation to the criminal proceedings against him. 9.  On 21 December 2007 the Russian Federal Migration Authority concluded that the applicant had fraudulently obtained his Russian passport by falsifying a number of documents. They ordered to seize his passport and put his name on the federal wanted list. The applicant\u2019s subsequent attempts to challenge the Federal Migration Authority\u2019s decision on his Russian passport were unsuccessful. 10.  On 13 May 2008 the applicant was arrested. On 15 May 2008 a prosecutor authorised his detention considering that the decision of 29 December 2006 of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk had authorised the applicant\u2019s \u201cplacement into custody\u201d, as mentioned in Article 61 \u00a7 1 of the Minsk Convention. 11.  On 24 June 2008 a district prosecutor decided that the applicant should be \u201cplaced in custody\u201d considering that the decision of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk of 29 December 2006 authorised \u201cplacement into custody\u201d, as required under Article 466 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d). 12.  On several occasions the applicant unsuccessfully complained about his detention to the prosecuting authorities. On 4 September 2008 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint considering that his arrest and detention in relation to the Ukrainian extradition request had been and remained lawful. On 24 November 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld this decision of 4 September 2008 concluding that \u201cmatters relating to lawfulness and reasons for detention should be raised under another procedure prescribed by law\u201d. 13.  On 3 October 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office granted the extradition request. On 18 November 2008 the Moscow City Court confirmed the decision of 3 October 2008. On 29 January 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 18 November 2008 on appeal. 14.  On 20 May 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Ukrainian authorities in the town of Kharkov. On 26 May 2009 he was transferred to the town of Dnepropetrovsk. On 6 June 2009 a Ukrainian court refused to order the applicant\u2019s detention pending the investigation. The applicant was released.", "references": ["9", "4", "7", "6", "1", "5", "3", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in St Petersburg. 5.  On 17 February 2000 the applicant lodged a claim with the Yakutskiy Town Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) against the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) for providing him with a housing subsidy and for a compensation of non-pecuniary damage. 6.  On 2 February 2001 the Town Court dismissed the claims. 7.  On 23 April 2001 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). 8.  On 7 April 2005, following the applicant\u2019s supervisory review appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 23 April 2001. The Supreme Court remitted the case for a new examination by the court of cassation instance for the applicant had not been duly summoned to the hearing of 23 April 2001. 9.  On 11 May 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal and upheld the judgment of 2 February 2001. 10.  On 26 January 2006, upon the applicant\u2019s supervisory review appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 2 February 2001 and the decision of 11 May 2005 as it found that the lower courts misjudged the facts of the case and erred in application of the national law. 11.  On 17 May 2006 the Town Court again dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. 12.  On 21 August 2006 the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of 17 May 2006 on appeal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the lower court had misapplied the national law. 13.  On 18 December 2006 the Town Court ordered the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) to pay the applicant 683,619 Russian roubles (RUB) from the federal budget funds allocated for providing the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 14.  On 12 February 2007 the Supreme Court found the decision of 18 December 2006 to award the applicant money unlawful and unreasoned, quashed the decision and yet again remitted the case for a new examination. 15.  Twice, on 26 April 2007 and 7 September 2007, the Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. 16.  Each time, on 18 July 2007 and 19 May 2008, respectively, the judgment of the Town Court was set aside on appeal, and the case was remitted for a new examination. In the first set of the proceedings, the appellate court found the judgment unlawful, and requested to bring into the proceedings the municipality \u201cNizhnekolymskiy rayon\u201d. In the second set of the proceedings, the appellate court found that the applicant had not been duly summoned to the hearing, and that the municipality should have been joined to the proceedings as a defendant rather than a third party. 17.  On 23 September 2008 the Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s claims in part. It ordered the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) to pay the applicant RUB 1,812,838.10 from the federal budget funds allocated for the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 18.  On 17 November 2008 the judgment of 23 September 2008 was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court. 19.  On 25 November 2010 the applicant requested the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of the Town Court of 23 September 2008. 20.  On 10 February 2010 a writ of execution was issued. 21.  On unspecified dates, the applicant submitted the writ of execution, first, to the Department of the Federal Treasury and, second, to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 22.  On 13 April and 8 June 2011 respectively the writ of execution was returned to the applicant as the debtor had no accounts at these bodies. 23.  On 29 July 2011 the Department of the Federal Bailiffs\u2019 Service for the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (\u201cthe Bailiffs\u2019 Service) received the writ of execution and opened the enforcement proceedings. 24.  On 24 August 2011 the Head of the Bailiffs\u2019 Service ordered to set aside the above decision to open the enforcement proceedings. 25.  On 30 August 2011 the decision of 29 July 2011 was set aside and the Bailiffs\u2019 Service refused institution of enforcement proceedings with the reasoning that as the enforcement document required recovery of public budgetary funds, it could not be enforced by the Bailiffs\u2019 Service. 26.  On 8 February 2012 the District Court clarified the judgment of 23 September 2008. It explained that the debt had to be recovered from the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) represented by the Federal Treasury of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) from the federal budget sources allocated for the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant on one more occasion sent the writ of execution to the Department of the Federal Treasury. On 26 April 2012 the writ was returned to him for the debtor had no account at the Treasury. 28.  On 10 July 2012 the Bailiffs\u2019 Service received the writ of execution and opened the enforcement proceedings. 29.  On 10 September 2012 the enforcement proceedings were terminated for the debtor had no property that the debt could be recovered from. 30.  On the same date the bailiff responsible for the execution of the judgment issued an act establishing that there were grounds for returning the writ of execution to the creditor. According to this document, the debtor, the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), was a collective executive body, without the status of a legal entity or any property on their balance sheet. 31.  The judgment of 23 September 2008 remained unenforced. 32.  On 29 November 2010 the applicant lodged a claim under the Compensation Act (see the Domestic Law part below). He complained that the civil proceedings in his case against the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) had been unreasonably long, and asked for a compensation in that respect. 33.  On 20 December 2010 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia ordered that the application should be returned to the applicant with the reasoning that the proceedings complained of ended on 17 November 2008, i.e. before the entry into force of the Compensation Act. 34.  On 15 March 2011 the applicant\u2019s special appeal against the above decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Russia. The court agreed with the judge that had passed the decision of 20 December 2010 that the end date of the proceedings was the date of the decision of 17 November 2008 to uphold the judgment of 23 September 2008 on appeal, while the subsequent period when the applicant applied for supervisory review of that decisions should not be included in the overall length of the proceedings.", "references": ["9", "0", "1", "7", "2", "8", "6", "4", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "11.  The applicant was born in 1944. He is currently detained in Istanbul. 12.  The applicant is a journalist who had been working since 2002 for the daily newspaper Zaman, which was viewed as the principal publication medium of the \u201cG\u00fclenist\u201d network and was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). From 2001 onwards, he also lectured on comparative politics and Turkish political history at a private university in Istanbul. 13.  In the years leading up to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016 the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government\u2019s policies. 14.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the \u201cPeace at Home Council\u201d attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. 15.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators\u2019 control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 16.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah G\u00fclen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FET\u00d6/PDY (\u201cG\u00fclenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure\u201d). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. 17.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. 18.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 19.  On 27 July 2016, in the course of one of the criminal investigations initiated in respect of suspected members of FET\u00d6/PDY, the applicant was arrested at his home in Istanbul and taken into police custody. 20.  On 30 July 2016 the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, was questioned at the Istanbul Security Directorate. During the questioning the applicant denied that he belonged to an illegal organisation. Later that day, the Istanbul public prosecutor sought a judicial order for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation. 21.  On the same day, several editors and columnists of the daily newspaper Zaman, including the applicant, were brought before the Istanbul 4th Magistrate\u2019s Court. The magistrate questioned the applicant about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. The applicant stated that he had joined Zaman in order to be able to express his opinions; that he was in favour of a democratic system corresponding to European standards; that he was a secular person; that he had not been aware of the threat posed by Fetullah G\u00fclen\u2019s movement until after the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016; and that he was opposed to any attack on democracy. 22.  At the end of the hearing, the magistrate, taking into account the contents of the articles written by the applicant \u2013 and finding that they had promoted the terrorist organisation in question, even after 17 December 2013 \u2013 ordered his pre-trial detention. He noted in that connection that although criminal proceedings had been instituted against E.D. (the editor-in-chief of Zaman) before the attempted military coup, the applicant had continued to work for the newspaper and within the organisation\u2019s media structure. In the reasons given for ordering the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, the magistrate took the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offence and the fact that it was among the offences listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) \u2013 the so-called \u201ccatalogue offences\u201d, for which a suspect\u2019s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; the state of the evidence and the risk of its deterioration; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant\u2019s participation in the criminal proceedings. 23.  On 5 August 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. He argued that there was no justification for detaining him. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions in the prison where he was being held. In a decision of 8 August 2016 the Istanbul 5th Magistrate\u2019s Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection. 24.  On 17 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 19 October 2016 the Istanbul 10th Magistrate\u2019s Court rejected the application. In his decision, the magistrate stated in particular that it was an established fact that in order to prepare the ground for a military coup, the instigators needed to create the perception that the leaders of the country concerned were dictators. In his view, the applicant\u2019s articles accusing the President of Turkey of being a dictator and calling for him to leave office had contributed to propaganda of that kind. 25.  On 10 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, who were suspected of being part of the FET\u00d6/PDY media network, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 \u00a7 6 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d), of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment on the suspects, including the applicant. As evidence, he produced six articles written by the applicant in 2013 and 2014. 26.  The public prosecutor submitted that the articles by the applicants and other individuals being charged in the same criminal proceedings against leading members of FET\u00d6/PDY\u2019s media wing could not be regarded as an expression of the authors\u2019 opposition to or criticism of the government. In the applicant\u2019s case, the public prosecutor contended that the expressions he had used had gone beyond the limits of freedom of the press in that they had undermined the rights of the official authorities and endangered social peace and public order. The public prosecutor found that the applicant had not hesitated to call for a possible military coup in his articles and, in short, had discharged functions serving the interests of the terrorist organisation in question. 27.  During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence. 28.  The criminal proceedings are currently pending before the Istanbul 13th Assize Court. 29.  On 8 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions of his continued detention since he was suffering from benign prostate hyperplasia, hyperlipidaemia, hyperuricemia, a multinodular goitre and sleep apnoea. On that account he asked the Constitutional Court to indicate an interim alternative measure to detention, thus allowing him to be released pending trial. 30.  In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Constitutional Court refused to apply an interim measure of that kind. In reaching that decision, it noted firstly that the applicant\u2019s health had been regularly monitored from the start of his pre-trial detention, and that there was a State hospital inside the prison where he was being held. In that connection, it noted that on 4 October 2016, following a request he had made to that effect the previous day, the applicant had been examined in prison by a general practitioner and had then been transferred to the urology department of the State hospital, where he had undergone a medical examination on 20 October 2016, and that his next appointment had been scheduled for 22 March 2017. In those circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention did not currently constitute a danger to his life or health. It added that should there be a change in his health or the conditions of his detention, he would be entitled to make a further application for an interim measure to secure his release. 31.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/16092) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. 32.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled \u201cAs if it were a religious war\u201d (\u201cDin Sava\u015f\u0131ym\u0131\u015f\u201d), published on 21 December 2013; (ii) an article entitled \u201cThe President must not remain a spectator\u201d (\u201cCumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Seyirci Kalamaz\u201d), published on 24 December 2013; (iii) an article entitled \u201cBetween Erdogan and the West\u201d (\u201cErdo\u011fan ile Bat\u0131 Aras\u0131nda\u201d), published on 28 December 2013; (iv) an article entitled \u201cYes, both the crime and the punishment are individual\u201d (\u201cEvet Su\u00e7 da Ceza da \u015eahsidir\u201d), published on 8 February 2014; (v) an article entitled \u201cThis nation is not empty-headed\u201d (\u201cBu Millet Bidon Kafal\u0131 De\u011fildir\u201d), published on 1 March 2014; and (vi) an article entitled \u201cThe solution is a government without Erdo\u011fan\u201d (\u201c\u00c7\u0131kar Yol Erdo\u011fan\u2019s\u0131z H\u00fck\u00fbmet\u201d), published on 29 March 2014. After examining the substance of these articles, the Constitutional Court found that they mainly dealt with matters relating to the \u201c17-25 December [2013]\u201d criminal investigations. In them the applicant had set out his opinion that the government members implicated in the criminal investigation in question should be brought to justice and that it was the responsibility of the President and the ruling party\u2019s leaders to take action to that end. He had contended that the government\u2019s reaction to the investigation had been unjust. The Constitutional Court also observed that the applicant had written that if the investigation in question had been carried out on the orders of suspected members of FET\u00d6/PDY, they too should be the subject of a criminal investigation. However, he had maintained that it was unfair to accuse all members of the G\u00fclenist movement. The Constitutional Court further noted that in the articles in question, the applicant had not argued that the government should be overthrown by force. On the contrary, he had asserted that the ruling party would lose in the next elections. The Constitutional Court also found that the article published one day before the attempted military coup suggested that the applicant was opposed to coups d\u2019\u00e9tat. It held that he had been expressing opinions on a topical issue that were similar to those of the opposition leaders. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FET\u00d6/PDY. It added that the fact that he had expressed his views in Zaman could not in itself be deemed sufficient to infer that the applicant was aware of that organisation\u2019s goals. Accordingly, it concluded that \u201cstrong evidence that an offence had been committed\u201d had not been sufficiently established in the applicant\u2019s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution, had been breached. 33.  Next, with regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles (see paragraph 140 of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 108-10 of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment \u2013 see paragraph 32 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 34.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with respect for human dignity, the Constitutional Court noted that he had access to the treatment required for his condition within the prison where he was being held, and declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 35.  The applicant did not submit a claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court made no award under that head. The applicant claimed an unspecified sum in respect of the pecuniary damage he had allegedly sustained. The Constitutional Court found no causal link between the violation established and the damage alleged on that account and dismissed the claim. However, it held that the applicant was to be awarded 2,219.50 Turkish liras (TRY \u2013 approximately 500 euros (EUR)) in respect of costs and expenses. 36.  As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court so that it could take \u201cthe necessary action\u201d. 37.  On 11 January 2018 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court for his client\u2019s release. 38.  On the same day, the Istanbul 13th Assize Court rejected the application, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment. 39.  On 12 January 2018 the Istanbul 13th Assize Court, having observed that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment had been published on its website, examined of its own motion the question of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment no. 2016/16092 was not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power (g\u00f6rev gasb\u0131). Regarding the effects of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments, the Assize Court added that only judgments that were in accordance with the Constitution and the law should be deemed to be final and binding. It noted, moreover, that more extensive reasoning could be given to justify keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention and that the file contained sufficient evidence against him in that regard. However, this would create the risk of prejudging the case (ihsas-\u0131 rey), seeing that a detailed explanation of the reasons justifying continued detention could be seen as an expression of the judges\u2019 opinions before they had determined the merits of the case. Accordingly, the Assize Court held that it was impossible to accept the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment. Lastly, reiterating that the judgment in question amounted to usurpation of power, it held, by two votes to one, that there was no need for it to give a decision on the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 40.  The judge in the minority observed in his dissenting opinion that he agreed with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment was not in compliance with the law. However, noting that the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments were final and binding on the Assize Court, he expressed the view that the applicant\u2019s release should be ordered. 41.  On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release. 42.  In a decision of 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 14th Assize Court unanimously dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection, essentially on the same grounds as the 13th Assize Court had done. 43.  On 1 February 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 11 January 2018.", "references": ["9", "7", "0", "3", "5", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Naxxar. 6.  The applicant served as a member of parliament between 1976 and 1996, and he served as a government minister between 1987 and 1996. Even before he was elected to Parliament he had already established himself as a political commentator in the media and regularly authored opinions related to national politics which were published in national newspapers. Upon his retirement from Parliament the applicant began writing weekly opinion columns in the newspaper Maltatoday and another weekly paper. 7.  On 6 May 2007 Dr Michael Falzon (referred to hereinafter as M.F., for ease of reference \u2013 as he has the exact same name as the applicant), the deputy leader of the Malta Labour Party (MLP), delivered a speech in public, which was reported on the national media. During the speech he informed the public that he had received an anonymous email and threatening letters, in respect of which he had complained directly to the Commissioner of Police (CoP). He furthermore referred to the discussion he had had with the latter during which he had asked him to investigate the issue. 8.  The most relevant parts of the speech read as follows (translation done by the Registry):\n\u201c...But the fact that today, one opens the newspaper Illum, front page, and reads the editorial by S.B., who chose to speak about a pending police investigation, about an anonymous email that I received and about a threatening letter that I received... this is a level which should not be acceptable in our country. And whoever is behind these stories \u2013 wherever he might be \u2013 and let me be clear \u2013 wherever he might be \u2013 he should be ashamed...ashamed!\n...\nYes I received an anonymous email...and I received threatening letters last November. I did not disclose this to my family. Today they were told by Maltatoday...I can tell them myself...But when something illegal occurs, I go to the police. And that\u2019s what I did. And I went to the CoP, since people who put forward such stories can disclose them I can also do so now for everyone to know. So I went to the CoP. I will tell you what I told him...and he will confirm it. He told me: \u2018What will we do, Mike, if it were to [turn out to] be X or Y?\u2019 I told him: \u2018I am telling you as of now, Mr R. Be it whosoever in this country, I am authorising you as from now, in advance, even before you start the investigation, to proceed. Because what is illegal, I condemn it, and we as a party always condemned illegality.\nAnd we come to [the subject of] the anonymous email [U wasalna fuq email anonima].\nAnd today ... K.S.N. [a journalist], this person phoned me yesterday as well, told me \u2018But you know, this is an innocuous email, it contains nothing.\u2019 And I tell K.S.N. and [other purveyors of] this type of journalism, that when they saw [that] there is a police investigation, is it you, you decide what is illegal and what is not [?]\nBecause [he was] an admirer. And [the sender] of this email, true. I will speak to him, of course. But note, that he sent it anonymously! Generally admirers tell you, \u2018Hi, Mike, is everything alright?\u2019 They do not write anonymously. And K.S.N said other things as well, and so did S.B. [the editor of Maltatoday]. Among other things he said \u2011 because he knows a lot \u2011 he also phoned me yesterday, and I told him. I told him: \u2018You are breaking the law. It is now up to the police\u2019. He also said that apparently \u2011 apparently \u2011 from the investigation into the email conducted by the police, nothing had emerged, and that it will stop there. And I will tell him now in public: \u2018Mr K.S.N. and Mr S.B., you have not discovered America!\u2019 Words to that effect have been said by an employee of our party for weeks...at the Centre...for weeks. And he told me that I will make a fool of myself. I will not interfere. I will not interfere with the police investigation. That is for them to see.\nBut yesterday I told the CoP, and Inspector C., that such discourse had long been doing the rounds at the Centre [party club]. I gave [them] the names, and it is now up to the police to decide whether to find out where this information originated from, and who is deciding matters in this country.\u201d 9.  On the same day K.S.N., a journalist, published an article in the newspaper Illum, entitled \u201cEmail sent to M.F. brings admirer before the Police\u201d. The article started off by stating that an innocent email sent to the deputy leader of the MLP had been passed on to the police, who in turn had identified the sender and subsequently questioned him. It concluded with the statement that when M.F. was asked about him reporting the matter to the police, the deputy leader of the MLP (that is to say M.F.) replied that \u201che would not confirm nor deny\u201d that he was aware of the case. 10.  On 13 May 2007 Maltatoday published an opinion by the applicant entitled \u201cPolicing one\u2019s enemies\u201d, prompted by the above-mentioned speech, in which the applicant queried the manner in which the two main political parties perceived the police force. The article\u2019s opening paragraphs read as follows:\n\u201cDuring a recent short visit to London, I had the opportunity to watch the film \u2018The Lives of Others\u2019 (original title: Das Leben Anderen [sic]) an Academy Award\u2011winning German movie, set in the 1984 cultural scene of East Berlin, monitored by secret agents of the Stasi: the secret police of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The film puts the methods of the Stasi at the centre of the plot and as a result clearly exposes their repulsive behaviour.\nThe police force, I believe, is simply responsible for making sure that people obey the law, for protecting people and property and for arresting criminals. Using the police in a different context and for the purpose of controlling people\u2019s freedoms is the basic notion of the typical police state, even if you insert the word \u2018democratic\u2019 in your country\u2019s official title.\nFor me, the biggest unease was caused by the realisation that the film was set in a period that is only some twenty-two years ago, which in Malta corresponds to the Mintoff [former Labour Party leader and Prime Minister] years when I was already active in politics. Little did I think that events that were to unfold when I was back in my country would make me wonder whether the PN [Nationalist Party] and the MLP look at the duties of the police in somewhat different manner.\u201d 11.  Other relevant parts of the article, read as follows:\n\u201cI say this with deep regret, but I can only be seriously perturbed by the ease with which MLP Deputy Leader Michael Falzon [M.F.] persuaded the Commissioner of Police to investigate the source of a trivial and unimportant anonymous e-mail that he had received. More so, when this e-mail could only have been misguidedly considered \u2018suspicious\u2019, and even then in an absolutely far-fetched way, in the context of the infighting and internal feuds within the MLP.\nAccording to what Dr. Michael Falzon [M.F.] said, the Police Commissioner \u2011 who apparently is on familiar first name speaking terms with Dr. Falzon [M.F.] \u2011 asked whether he would proceed in the same fashion whether the culprit eventually proved to be X or Y; implying that the Commissioner was offering to act in a discriminatory way according who the \u2018guilty\u2019 person was.\nMatters are even more worrying because when the police successfully traced the original writer and dispatcher of the e-mail, they impounded his computer and obliged him to go and sign daily at the Police Headquarters even though he was not accused of any crime.\nHas not MLP Deputy Leader Michael Falzon [M.F.] successfully used the Police Force to control the freedom of an innocent, law-abiding private citizen whom he suspected could be a political enemy? And has not somebody in the police force abused of his powers by condescending to do this for the advantage of the faction led by Michael Falzon [M.F.] in the MLP\u2019s internal squabbles? Why should the police force interfere in Labour\u2019s internal politics where, it is obvious, there are too many cooks spoiling the broth?\u201d\n ...\n\u201cYet the ease with which the MLP Deputy Leader phones him up to complain, and \u2011 even worse \u2011 the ease with which this leading politician is provided with a service that cannot be linked in any way with the pursuit of \u2018criminality\u2019 \u2011 as we know it \u2011 makes one wonder.\u201d\n...\n\u201cThese events seem to indicate that within Labour there are people who can influence and interfere in decisions taken by the Police Force. This is happening when they are still in Opposition. Asking what would happen in this area, once they are in government is, therefore, a legitimate question.\u201d\n...\n\u201cSo what is the Government doing about this? Does the MLP Deputy Leader who happens to be my namesake, carry more weight and influence with the Commissioner of Police than the Deputy Prime Minister who is politically responsible for the Police Force?\u201d\n...\n\u201cI firmly believe that Tonio Borg [then Minister of Interior] should set up a high powered inquiry with the specific task of getting to the bottom of this sordid soap opera. He owes it to those who dedicated the best years of their life to ensure the personal freedom of each and every citizen of Malta. He owes it to all present and future Maltese citizens who did not live the past \u2011 so that they will live in a future where no one controls their freedom and hence their lives.\u201d 12.  On 17 July 2007 M.F., the deputy leader of the MLP, instituted libel proceedings against the applicant (and against the editor of the newspaper) under Article 28 of Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta (see the \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d section below), and sought damages, claiming that the above\u2011mentioned extracts of the article had been defamatory. 13.  By way of defence the applicant claimed that (a) the published article had contained his opinion and had consequently constituted a fair comment and the expression of a value judgment, (b) any facts had been substantially correct and based on what had been declared publicly by M.F. himself a few days prior to the impugned publication, and (c) the claimant was a person occupying a public office and was consequently bound to accept a wider level of criticism. 14.  During the proceedings the Court of Magistrates heard the testimony of the plaintiff (M.F.), the CoP, the applicant, the editor (S.B.), and two other journalists (A.B.D. and K.S.N.). It saw documentation submitted consisting of an email exchange between the MLP deputy leader and a third person (J.B.), as well as the transcript of the deputy leader\u2019s speech and copies of two articles, both entitled \u201cEmail sent to deputy leader brings an admirer before the Police\u201d (one having been published online and one in print). 15.  The CoP testified as follows (as summarised by the first\u2011instance court):\n- He denied that M.F. had persuaded him or influenced him in respect of his doing his job in connection with the case at issue;\n- M.F. had requested and obtained a normal appointment with the CoP; when they met M.F. had showed him a letter which the CoP considered to be \u201cinjurious and full of threats\u201d towards M.F.; the latter requested the CoP to investigate the contents of the letter;\n- M.F. also informed the CoP that he had received an email, which was later passed on to the CoP, following an invitation to do so by the same CoP;\n- The CoP asked M.F. whether he intended to initiate proceedings against the person who should result to be responsible, given that the prosecution of such a crime would require the injured party to lodge a complaint;\n- The documents which had been passed on to the CoP had in turn been passed on to the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) for further investigation, and the CoP had had no further contact with M.F. concerning the case, which had not been given any particular priority on his part. 16.  The applicant failed to make written submissions within the stipulated timeframe, and his late submissions were not accepted by the court that proceeded to judgment. 17.  By a judgment of 4 May 2010 the Court of Magistrates found the applicant guilty of having defamed the deputy leader of the MLP and was ordered to pay him 2,500 euros (EUR) in damages. Costs were also to be paid jointly by the applicant and the editor (who was also ordered to pay EUR 1,000 in damages). 18.  The court referred to the CoP\u2019s witness testimony to explain the factual situation. In its view, while noting that public figures such as politicians were subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism, they were nevertheless protected under Article 10 \u00a7 2 \u2013 their protection having to be weighed in relation to the interests of the open discussion of political issues. The court considered the article defamatory as it had tarnished and impinged on the claimant\u2019s reputation. It rejected the applicant\u2019s defence, noting that it had not been proved that: i) M.F. had manipulated the CoP due to the political office that he held in the party in which he militates; ii) that with his actions M.F. had offended the Police Force since he used the Police Force for his personal aims; iii) that M.F. was some deus ex machina who pulls the strings of the Police Force, from behind the scene, to reach his goals. 19.  The applicant appealed. 20.  By a judgment of 6 October 2010 the Court of Appeal (in its inferior jurisdiction) rejected the appeal and confirmed the first\u2011instance judgment. It considered it appropriate to analyse and mention all the relevant evidence that had not been referred to by the first\u2011instance court:\n- M.F., as plaintiff and now respondent, submitted that the reader had been induced to believe that he had persuaded the police to harm someone, when all he had done was to file a report requesting that the anonymous letters and emails he had received be investigated.\n- The court also referred to the statements made by the CoP (see above).\n- The applicant (appellant before the Court of Appeal) explained that in his view the email received by M.F. had been innocuous and that M.F. had thus reacted disproportionality. According to the applicant, from the speech delivered by M.F. publicly (at the Labour Centre in Rabat), it transpired that there was a certain familiarity between him and the CoP; indeed if that had not been so M.F. would have reported the incident at a police station like an ordinary citizen, and not with the CoP. In his view it was natural to question whether M.F. had used the CoP in connection with the internal affairs of the party. Even when cross-examined, he reiterated that influence had been exerted by M.F. on the CoP.\n- The editor testified that in his opinion the speech delivered by the deputy leader of the MLP indicated that the latter had put pressure on the CoP to investigate the matter when he had met up with him to discuss the emails and the anonymous letters.\n- In reply to a question, while being cross-examined, as to whether M.F. had put pressure on the CoP, K.S.N. replied that he was aware that a report had been filed concerning the email and that on the same day of publication, M.F. had declared that he was authorising the CoP to institute proceedings against whomever turned out to be the culprit. 21.  The Court of Appeal was of the view that, having examined all the relevant evidence and thus gaining an understanding of the circumstances preceding and surrounding the article, the applicant\u2019s assumption could not be considered as constituting fair comment. In the eyes of the ordinary reader, the comments and criticism made by the applicant could not be considered as objectively reasonable, made in good faith and balanced, given that they were based on a certain assumption \u2013 that M.F. had exercised influence over the CoP with the aim of controlling people\u2019s freedom; the attack on M.F. had thus exceeded the limits of just criticism. M.F. had had every right to file a report, and the fact that he was politically active had not justified such an attack, which had not been corroborated by factual evidence. It considered that even though the manifestation of free expression was an established principle, that freedom was to be exercised within those just limits of the canon of objective veracity of facts and restraint (entro l-limiti \u0121usti ta\u2019 dak il\u2011kanoni tal-verita\u2019 o\u0121\u0121ettiva tal-fatti u tal-kontinenza), as elaborated by the most progressive doctrine and jurisprudence on topical issues and the exercise of criticism. 22.  On 9 March 2011 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that he had suffered, inter alia, a breach of Article 10 of the Convention as a result of the judgments in the libel proceedings. He argued, in substance, that his opinion piece had consisted of criticism, which was a legitimate manner of expressing an opinion about the work of a public figure and was allowed in a democratic society \u2011 noting that the extensive protection given to such a public figure served to silence free expression. He further claimed that the ordinary courts had referred to insinuations and allegations which had not been made or implied by the applicant in his article, such as the statement by the Court of Magistrates to the effect that M.F. had \u201cmanipulated\u201d the CoP or that the latter had been subjected to pressure which had \u201cimpeded the exercise of his function\u201d as well that M.F. \u201cwas a deus ex macchina pulling the strings of the Police Force\u201d. The applicant emphasised that these were gratuitous inventions by the ordinary court which had not been mentioned in the article. 23.  By a judgment of 30 March 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. 24.  It considered that the applicant was attempting to obtain a revision of the ordinary proceedings and noted that it was not quite true that the applicant had never implied that M.F. had \u201cmanipulated\u201d the CoP \u2011 indeed his article had precisely questioned \u201chas not the MLP deputy leader MF successfully used the Police Force to control the freedom of an innocent law\u2011abiding private citizen whom he suspected could be a political enemy?\u201d. In any event, even if the applicant considered the statements made by the Court of Magistrates in its reasoning to be invented, this had not constituted a breach of his Article 10 rights. 25.  The court noted the reference to the Stasi with which the applicant had started his article and his narrative of M.F.\u2019s actions, which had resulted in an individual being investigated and subsequently having his computer seized. In that context he had asked whether M.F. had \u201cused\u201d the police against a political opponent. The applicant criticised the CoP for following up on the indications given by M.F., to the extent that the applicant had called on the Minister of the Interior to look into the matter. Indeed, the CoP was also an object of the applicant\u2019s criticism. 26.  According to the court, the word \u201cuses\u201d did not mean \u201cmanipulate\u201d, as implied by the Court of Magistrates, but within the context of the article at issue, it nevertheless implied an element of abuse. The criticism against M.F. was that he had taken advantage of his political position to put pressure on the police in order that the latter would take action in persecuting an innocent citizen. The court considered that it was legitimate for a victim of a crime to complain to the police, and then it was for the police to act on the matter. Further, the initial reference to the \u201cStasi\u201d in the opening of the article had been regrettable; even if it was not intended to do so, it had given the impression of a comparison being made. 27.  In its view, even accepting that a public person was subject to greater limits of acceptable criticism, given the article at issue, the ordinary courts had not failed to strike a fair balance between the competing rights. 28.  The applicant appealed. 29.  By a judgment of 11 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal. 30.  It noted that the ordinary court judgments and the penalty inflicted constituted an interference with the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 10, which had been prescribed by law (Article 28 of the Press Act). It emphasised the importance of free expression for the press; nevertheless, it noted that the press could not exceed certain limits and had to exercise its function in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others. Acknowledging that politicians were subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism, it nevertheless noted that they remained holders of their right to the protection of their reputation. The quest for reasonableness and proportionality in such circumstances had to be seen against the background of the importance of public debate. 31.  Noting the difference between facts and value judgments (the latter not being subject to the need for proof), it considered that a person could not hide behind an opinion or value judgment to impute untrue facts in respect of other persons. It considered that the Court of Appeal had reached a legitimate conclusion in finding that the applicant\u2019s opinion piece had contained declarations which assumed as a fact that the MLP deputy leader had illegitimately and abusively influenced the police and also that the exercise of illegitimate and abusive pressure on the CoP had not been proved as a fact. 32.  The Constitutional Court noted that while the article had contained a series of questions (in respect of which the applicant argued that it was for the reader to answer), it had also contained assertions, some of which had not reflected the real facts, according to the Court of Appeal. Further, the Constitutional Court considered that just because an alleged fact was given the form of a question, this did not entail that it was no longer a factual assertion but rather became a value judgment. Even the way in which the question was posed, namely \u201cHas not M.F. ...\u201d clearly included a factual affirmation and clearly invited a positive reply. Similarly, the quest \u201cDoes the MLP Deputy Leader, who happens to be my namesake, carry more weight and influence with the Commissioner of Police than the Deputy Prime Minister, who is politically responsible for the Police Force?\u201d was nothing but an allegation of fact in the form of a question. 33.  Lastly, the Constitutional Court noted that the amount of the fine had not been particularly severe, so much so that the quantum had not been appealed. There was therefore no violation of Article 10.", "references": ["2", "0", "5", "9", "3", "1", "7", "8", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants in application no. 68125/14 (Wetjen) are a mother and father and their son, born in 2011. The applicants in application no. 72204/15 (Schott) are a mother and father and their three daughters, born in 1999, 2002 and 2004 respectively. All the applicants are members of the Twelve Tribes Church (Zw\u00f6lf St\u00e4mme) who lived in a community of around 100 members of the church in Klosterzimmern. A second community with around 20 members was located in the nearby village of W\u00f6rnitz. 7.  In 2012 the press reported about the Twelve Tribes Church and its position on the right of parents to apply corporal punishment, especially caning. Furthermore, statements by a former member of the community were published, confirming that children had been punished with rods. 8.  In 2012 and 2013 the local youth office (Jugendamt) visited the community, and its spokespersons were invited to a meeting at the Bavarian Ministry of Education. Corporal punishment and the issue of compulsory schooling were discussed at the meeting. 9.  On 16 August 2013 the local youth office and the N\u00f6rdlingen Family Court received video footage from a television reporter showing ten different instances of corporal punishment in the community. The footage, filmed with a hidden camera, showed the caning of various children between the ages of three and twelve. None of the applicants was shown in the video footage. According to the television reporter, the person who carried out the punishment was not, in most cases, a parent of the child being punished. 10.  After receiving the video footage, the Family Court initiated a preliminary investigation and on 21 August 2013 heard six witnesses, all former members of the Twelve Tribes community. The witnesses confirmed that various forms of corporal punishment were used in the upbringing of children in the community. These included swaddling (pucken) a child from birth until the age of around three, involving wrapping the child up very tightly to suppress any urge to move. Starting from the age of about three, children would be disciplined by caning, which lasted until about the age of twelve. The witnesses further stated that children were punished by whichever adult was supervising the children at the time and that parents were pressured by the community to conform to the rules of upbringing. 11.  On 1 September 2013 the N\u00f6rdlingen Family Court, upon an application by the competent youth office, made an interlocutory order regarding all children in the Twelve Tribes community, including the applicant children. The court withdrew the applicant parents\u2019 rights to decide where their children should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht), and to take decisions regarding the children\u2019s health (Gesundheitsf\u00fcrsorge), schooling and professional training, and transferred those rights to the youth office. The court based its decision on its finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be subjected to corporal punishment. The court also ordered that the youth office, when taking the children into care, could have recourse to compulsion, request support from the police and be permitted to enter the premises of the Twelve Tribes community in Klosterzimmern. 12.  On 5 September 2013 the youth office took the community\u2019s children into care. They were supported by around 100 police officers, who, at the same time, searched the community\u2019s premises under an order from the Augsburg public prosecutor\u2019s office and seized seven wooden rods. 13.  The applicant children were subsequently examined but no physical signs of abuse or beating were revealed. 14.  The applicants B., C. and I. Schott were moved to a children\u2019s home. Since the applicant J. Wetjen was then only two years and five months old and was still being breastfed, he and his mother were housed together temporarily in a home under supervision. On 9 December 2013 J. Wetjen was taken from his mother and placed in a foster family. The mother had been ordered to wean her son two months beforehand. However, since she refused, the son was taken from her by force. 15.  The Family Court examined the applicant parents on 10 October 2013. The parents stated that they had restrained their son by swaddling, but denied that this amounted in any way to child abuse. They refused to answer any questions about caning, but quoted passages from the Bible, which justified such a practice. 16.  On 29 November 2013 the Family Court upheld its interlocutory order of 1 September 2013. On the basis of Articles 1631, 1666 and 1666a of the German Civil Code (see paragraphs 30\u201332 below), the court stated in its reasoning that there was a high probability that leaving the son in the community or returning him there would lead to him being subjected to corporal punishment, thus infringing his personal dignity and integrity, values protected by the German Basic Law (see paragraphs 26 and 27 below). It further found that the use of corporal punishment from such an early age would prevent the free development of his personality and instead teach unconditional obedience. The court based its assessment on the submissions of the parents, in which they had confirmed that they had disciplined their son. The court found that the statements by other children in parallel proceedings, the video footage and the statements of other witnesses confirmed that the disciplining of children in the community would include corporal punishment. Therefore, it was necessary to take the son out of the community as the option which least infringed the family\u2019s rights, but which ensured that he would not be caned or harmed in any other way. It held that even if the parents might be able to resist pressure from the community, they would not be able to ensure that other community members would not cane the child when supervising him. The court also initiated the main custody proceedings and commissioned a psychologist\u2019s expert opinion on the family. 17.  On 28 January 2014 the applicant parents were examined by the Munich Court of Appeal. The father stated that, in his opinion, a mild caning constituted neither violence nor child abuse. Both parents also continued to refuse to answer any questions about whether their son had been caned previously. The court decided against examining the applicant child owing to his age and the mental stress that a hearing would cause and instead heard the guardian ad litem (Verfahrensbeistand). 18.  On 5 March 2014 the Munich Court of Appeal upheld the Family Court\u2019s decision in essence. It overturned the decision on the withdrawal of the parents\u2019 right to take decisions regarding their son\u2019s schooling and professional training, because, owing to his age, there was no need for the withdrawal of such a right in an interim decision. The Court of Appeal found it established that the parents considered caning to be part of their son\u2019s upbringing and that the son would be caned if returned to his parents and the community. It based its finding on the statements of the parents and witnesses, and the guidelines in a leaflet entitled Our teachings on child training. The court further noted that bringing up children in this way was not justified by the parents\u2019 freedom of religion. It also found that there had been no other option entailing less of an infringement of the family\u2019s rights because up to that point the parents had not shown any willingness to refrain from disciplining their son, and greater assistance from the youth office would not ensure the safety of the son at all times. It further observed that only the opinion of the expert, expected in the main proceedings, would be able to determine the potential consequences of degrading educational methods aimed at unconditional obedience. 19.  On 5 May 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for adjudication, without providing reasons (1 BvR 770/14). 20.  The Family Court examined the applicant children on 9 October 2013. All three daughters stated that they would like to return to their parents and the community. The two younger daughters refused to answer any questions regarding being disciplined or caned, or about the schooling and health\u2011care system in the community. The oldest daughter confirmed that her two sisters had been caned and that she herself had been caned when she was younger. However, she also stated that this had stopped after her Bat Mitzvah. The applicant parents were examined on 15 November 2013. 21.  On 30 November 2013 the Family Court revoked its interlocutory order of 1 September 2013 concerning the parents\u2019 right to decide on the oldest daughter\u2019s place of residence and health, but upheld the rest of the decision. The court considered that it was very likely that the other two girls, if left in the community or returned to it, would be subjected to corporal punishment. The court based its assessment on written submissions from the parents, in which they confirmed that they had disciplined their children but denied beating or abusing them. The court observed that statements by the daughters and other children in parallel proceedings, the video footage and the statements of other witnesses had confirmed that the disciplining of children in the community might include corporal punishment. As in its decision in application no. 68125/14 (see paragraph 16 above), the court held that it had been necessary to take the children out of the community and that there had been no other less infringing measure. Regarding the oldest daughter, the court found that owing to her age there was no longer a risk that she would be caned. The court also initiated the main custody proceedings and commissioned a psychologist\u2019s expert opinion on the family\u2019s situation. 22.  In the beginning of December 2013 the oldest daughter was returned to her parents. She has been living with them in the community of the Twelve Tribes Church in Klosterzimmern since. 23.  On 5 March 2014 the Munich Court of Appeal upheld the Family Court\u2019s decision in essence. It overturned the decision on the withdrawal of the parents\u2019 right to take decisions regarding professional training for the two younger daughters because there was no need for the withdrawal of such a right in an interim decision. The Court of Appeal found it established that all three children had been caned and that there was a high probability that the two younger children would be caned again if returned to their parents and the community. It based its finding on the statements of the oldest daughter, which had been confirmed by the statements of the former members of the community and the guidelines in the leaflet Our teachings on child training. As in its decision in application no. 68125/14 (see paragraph 18 above) the court also noted that caning was not justified by the parent\u2019s freedom of religion and that there had been no other option entailing less of an infringement of the family\u2019s rights. It further observed that the wishes of the two girls (nine and twelve years old) did not prevent the taking of such a decision because only the expert opinion expected in the main custody proceedings would clarify how relevant the wishes of the girls were and the extent to which they had formed those wishes themselves. 24.  On 5 May 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicants for adjudication, without providing reasons (1 BvR 959/14). 25.  The applicants also appealed the form of execution ordered in the interlocutory order (see paragraph 11 above). The Court of Appeal detached that part of the appeal from the part concerning parental authority (see paragraphs 18 and 23 above), since both parts had to be challenged by distinct remedies and different procedural provisions were applicable. The appeal by the applicants in application no. 68125/14 was declared inadmissible by the Court of Appeal on 4 June 2014 for being belated. The appeal by the applicants in application no. 72204/14 was declared partly inadmissible and partly unfounded by the Court of Appeal on 13 August 2014.", "references": ["5", "7", "0", "8", "3", "2", "9", "6", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants in application no. 11308/16 (Tlapak) are a mother and father. Their son J. was born on 15 January 2012. The applicants in application no. 11344/16 (Pingen) are also a mother and father. Their two daughters A. and B. were born on 7 October 2009 and their son G. was born on 23 May 2013. All the applicants are members of the Twelve Tribes Church (Zw\u00f6lf St\u00e4mme) who lived in a community of around twenty members of the church in W\u00f6rnitz, Germany. A second community with around 100 members was located in the nearby village of Klosterzimmern. 7.  In 2012 the press reported about the Twelve Tribes Church and its position on the right of parents to apply corporal punishment, especially caning. Furthermore, statements by a former member of the community were published, confirming that children had been punished with rods. 8.  In 2012 and 2013 the local youth offices (Jugendamt) visited both communities and its spokespersons were invited to a meeting at the Bavarian Ministry of Education. Corporal punishment and the issue of compulsory schooling were discussed at the meeting. 9.  On 16 August 2013 the Klosterzimmern youth office and the N\u00f6rdlingen Family Court received video footage from a television reporter showing ten different instances of corporal punishment in the community in Klosterzimmern. The footage, filmed with a hidden camera, showed the caning of various children between the ages of three and twelve. According to the television reporter, the person who carried out the punishment was not, in most cases, a parent of the child being punished. 10.  On 3 September 2013 the Ansbach Family Court, upon an application by the competent youth office, made an interlocutory order regarding all children in the Twelve Tribes community in W\u00f6rnitz, including the applicants\u2019 children. The court withdrew the applicants\u2019 rights to decide where their children should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht), and to take decisions regarding their health (Gesundheitsf\u00fcrsorge), schooling and professional training, and transferred those rights to the youth office. The court based its decision on the above-mentioned video footage and the testimony of the television reporter and six former members of the Twelve Tribes community. It concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be subjected to corporal punishment in the form of caning and so-called \u201crestraining\u201d, involving holding a child\u2019s limbs tight and pressing his or her head down until the child had no strength left to cry and struggle. 11.  On 5 September 2013 the youth office took the community\u2019s children into care. They were supported by around thirty police officers, who, at the same time, searched the community\u2019s premises and found a wooden rod. 12.  The applicants\u2019 children were subsequently examined but no physical signs of abuse or beating were revealed. 13.  J. Tlapak was subsequently placed in a foster family. As he was still being breastfed, his mother was permitted daily visits to give him milk. 14.  A. and B. Pingen were also placed in a foster family. Their aunt\u2019s family was approved as fosterers and they were then placed with them. 15.  Since G. Pingen was then only one year and four months old and was also still being breastfed, he and his mother were placed together in a foster family. 16.  On 13 September 2013 the Ansbach Family Court heard the applicants and on 23 September 2013 it upheld its order of 3 September 2013 in an interim decision. 17.  On 2 December 2013 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the interim decision of the Family Court in essence, but set the decision aside to the extent it concerned the parental right to decide on schooling matters. Given the son\u2019s age, the court held that there was no need to decide on that issue in the interim proceedings. 18.  In 2015 the applicants moved \u2013 without their son J. \u2013 to the Czech Republic, where they have been living since. 19.  The Ansbach Family Court heard the applicants on 13 September 2013 and the applicants\u2019 daughters on 18 September 2013 in the foster family\u2019s home. The daughters reported that their parents had hit them on the hand with a rod as a form of corporal punishment. On 23 September 2013 the Family Court upheld its order of 3 September 2013. 20.  On 2 December 2013, upon an appeal by the applicants, the Nuremberg Court of Appeal reversed the decision to withdraw the right to decide where G. Pingen should live. The earlier decision on the daughters was upheld, with the proviso that the parents were to retain the right to take decisions on school matters and on their daughters\u2019 choice of education or training and career. 21.  The son was subsequently returned to the applicants, who moved first to Belgium and later to the Czech Republic, where they have been living since. The applicants\u2019 daughters are still in the care of the foster family (see paragraph 14 above). 22.  Upon an application made by the applicants on 9 September 2013 the Family Court initiated the main proceedings and, on 24 September 2013, it commissioned an expert opinion. 23.  After interviewing the applicants and observing a meeting between them and their son, the expert submitted a written opinion on 19 December 2013. He found that even though the applicants had a loving attitude towards their son, they considered corporal punishment with objects as an appropriate and necessary parenting method. Owing to their willingness to apply that method to their son, there was a likelihood bordering on certainty that if he remained with them, they would apply corporal punishment. This, the expert concluded, would significantly jeopardise the son\u2019s development and result in psychological problems. Overall, it was in the child\u2019s best interests to place him away from his parents to protect him from the applicants\u2019 parenting methods, which were dangerous for the child. Since their parenting was based on religious convictions, they were unwilling to abandon the parenting method of corporal punishment and lacked the will to cooperate with the authorities or accept help. Consequently, less intrusive measures could not be considered sufficient. 24.  Subsequently the applicants submitted a privately commissioned expert opinion, in which the court-appointed expert\u2019s approach and methodology was criticised. In addition, the applicants retrospectively withdrew their consent to being assessed by the court-appointed expert and to an assessment of their son. 25.  In separate proceedings the Family Court, on 1 August 2014, issued an interim decision in which it withdrew the applicants\u2019 parental right to decide on the son\u2019s assessment by the court-appointed expert and consented to such a measure. 26.  On 4 August 2014, the Family Court forwarded the privately commissioned expert opinion to the court-appointed expert, who responded to the criticism and gave details of his methodology in a letter of 15 August 2014. 27.  In a hearing on 19 September 2014 the court proposed an agreement between the applicants and the youth office, with the aim of returning their son to them. However, the applicants and the youth office did not agree on a settlement owing in particular to a disagreement about the son attending a state school and play therapy. Moreover, there were concerns about the parents attending a development course and assisting with medical measures. The youth office considered those aspects as essential and declined the partial settlement proposed by the applicants. 28.  After hearing the applicants\u2019 son in the home of the foster family where he had been placed on 21 October 2014, the Family Court decided on 22 October 2014 to withdraw the applicants\u2019 right to decide where their son should live and to take decisions regarding his health and schooling, and transferred those rights to the youth office, which had been appointed as supplementary guardian. 29.  The Family Court stated that it would be very detrimental to the best interests of the child if the son continued to live with the applicants owing to their parenting methods. Based, in particular, on the court\u2011commissioned expert opinion and the statements by the applicants during the court proceedings, the court concluded that there was a high, concrete probability that the son would be subjected to corporal punishment using physical objects over the course of several years. According to the expert, this would give rise to an expectation that the applicants\u2019 son would suffer from psychological issues. Even though separating the parents and the child constituted a severe interference with their right to a family under Article 6 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 53 below) and may possibly have negative consequences for the child, that interference was justified in the case at hand. Corporal punishment of the kind at issue was particularly degrading for a child. It was not only banned by Article 1631 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below) but also constituted an interference with a child\u2019s human dignity, protected under Article 1 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 50 below), and a child\u2019s right to physical integrity, protected under Article 2 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 51 below). 30.  The court also held that the risk to the child could not be averted using less drastic measures. Throughout the course of the proceedings the applicants had unreservedly advocated their parenting style and had refused to accept the opinion that the type of corporal punishment they endorsed was covered by the ban on violence under Article 1631 of the Civil Code. The physical effects of such punishment were only short-lived, which was why it would only be possible for the youth office to observe any such effects if it made unannounced visits and the child had \u2013 by chance \u2013 been punished immediately prior to such a visit. According to the expert\u2019s explanations, the psychological consequences could, by contrast, only be determined after a longer period of time and they were difficult to discern at first glance. Although the applicants had most recently indicated to the court that they were ready to refrain from corporal punishment in the future, the court regarded such statements as not being compelling since they had not provided any grounds. The Family Court, nonetheless, pointed out that the applicants were free to reach an out-of-court settlement with the youth office concerning the conditions under which the son could be returned after the proceedings had been concluded. However, the previous settlement proposal had been refused because the applicants had not been willing to agree to have their son take part in play therapy and attend a state school. 31.  In regard to the fact that the applicants had withdrawn their consent to being examined by the court-appointed expert after the expert opinion had already been submitted, both for themselves and their child, the court held that this did not render the expert\u2019s report unusable in the proceedings. While the court had given its own consent in place of the parents\u2019 as far as it concerned the son, the parents\u2019 actions on that point could not, in light of the state\u2019s obligation to protect children under constitutional law, hinder the use of the expert opinion in the proceedings. Allowing parents to reject expert opinions they disagreed with by retrospectively withdrawing consent to an examination would prevent any effective protection of children in family court proceedings. 32.  The applicants subsequently appealed against the decision of the Family Court. The Court of Appeal, after hearing the applicants, their son, the son\u2019s guardian ad litem, a representative of the youth office, the court\u2011appointed expert and the expert commissioned by the applicants, dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on 26 May 2015. 33.  In a decision of thirty-nine pages, the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicants\u2019 statements concerning corporal punishment, publications by the Twelve Tribes Church, the expert\u2019s opinion and the criticism of the report by the privately commissioned expert. Overall it confirmed the decision and reasoning of the Family Court of 22 October 2014. The court emphasised that not all individual violations of the right to a non-violent upbringing under Article 1631 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below) could justify a withdrawal of parental authority. However, there was a fear in the applicants\u2019 case that systematic caning with a rod would be the reaction whenever the child was deemed to have broken a rule. There was moreover already a threat to the child\u2019s best interests as he would live in constant fear of suffering physical pain and experiencing the resulting humiliation as psychological suffering. Beatings as such, the court held, constituted child abuse and misuse of parental authority. It was of no relevance whether or not lasting physical injuries occurred. 34.  The court further held that on account of their religious beliefs, the applicants were convinced that their child-rearing methods were legitimate. Accordingly, they were neither willing nor able to avert the danger to their child and the recent contradictory statements they had made could not be considered as credible. 35.  On 16 August 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint by the applicants (1 BvR 1467/15), without providing reasons. 36.  The Family Court, upon an application by the applicants dated 9 September 2013, initiated the main proceedings and on 24 September 2013 commissioned an expert opinion. 37.  After interviewing the applicants, their two daughters and the children\u2019s foster parents, and observing a meeting between the applicants and their children, the expert submitted a written opinion on 23 December 2013. He stated that the applicants and their daughters had confirmed that the parents had used a rod as corporal punishment on the daughters and that even though the applicants had a loving attitude towards their children, they considered corporal punishment using physical objects as an appropriate and necessary parenting method. Given the past incidents of corporal punishment and the applicants\u2019 general willingness to use that method on their children, it was virtually certain that they would subject them to corporal punishment again. The expert concluded that the applicants\u2019 rigid, authoritarian parenting style and their conviction that children should be raised to obey their parents by means of corporal punishment using physical objects from the age of three conflicted significantly with the best interests of the children and was also detrimental to the unimpaired development of their personality. He expected that such methods would likely result in psychological issues. Overall, it was in the best interests of the children to place them away from their parents. Since the applicants\u2019 parenting style was based on religious convictions, they were unwilling to abandon the parenting method of corporal punishment and were not fully prepared to cooperate with the authorities and accept help. Consequently, measures that infringed on their rights to a lesser degree could not be considered sufficient. 38.  Subsequently, the applicants submitted a privately commissioned expert opinion, in which the court-appointed expert\u2019s approach and methodology was criticised. In addition, the applicants retrospectively withdrew their consent to being assessed by the court-appointed expert and to the assessment of their three children. 39.  In separate proceedings the Family Court, on 1 September 2014, issued an interim decision in which it withdrew the applicants\u2019 parental right to decide on the children being assessed by the court-appointed expert and consented to the psychological examination. It also forwarded the privately commissioned expert opinion to the court-appointed expert, who responded to the criticism in it and gave details of his methodology in a letter of 1 October 2014. 40.  In a hearing of 29 September 2014 the parties discussed an agreement between the applicants and the youth office, with the aim of returning the daughters to the applicants and protecting all three children. However, the applicants and the youth office could not agree on a settlement as there was disagreement in particular on the children attending a state school and therapy. Moreover, the applicants were unwilling to remain in Germany under the supervision of the youth office for an extended period of time. 41.  After hearing the applicants and their daughters several times, including in parallel proceedings, the Family Court decided on 21 October 2014 to withdraw the applicants\u2019 right to decide where all three children should live and to take decisions regarding the children\u2019s health and schooling, and transferred those rights to the youth office, which had been appointed as supplementary guardian. Additionally, the court ordered the applicants\u2019 son to be handed over to the youth office. 42.  In its reasoning, which was similar to that in application no. 11308/14 (see paragraphs 29-31 above), the Family Court held that the applicants\u2019 parenting methods meant that it would be very detrimental to the best interests of all three children to continue to live with their parents. The court emphasised that the aim of Article 1666 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 55 below) was not to penalise past child abuse or views on parenting that were in contradiction to Article 1631 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below), but to prevent imminent threats to the best interests of children. Based, in particular, on the opinion by the court\u2011appointed expert and the statements by the applicants and their children, the court concluded that there was a high, concrete probability that the children would be subjected to systematic corporal punishment using physical objects, which would in turn be detrimental to the best interests of the children in physical and psychological terms. The severe interference with the applicants\u2019 right to a family under Article 6 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 53 below) by separating them from their children was nonetheless not only justified but also proportionate since the risk to the children could not be averted using milder means. Besides the problem of detecting corporal punishment through unannounced visits by the youth office (see paragraph 30 above), the court also pointed out that the applicants had consistently, over the course of the proceedings, shown a lack of willingness to cooperate with the youth office and had refused to accept state schools, both of which the court found necessary to prevent degrading corporal punishment and ensure the children\u2019s autonomous development. Furthermore, the court held that it could be expected that the applicants would leave Germany if their children were returned to them and thereby elude any orderly monitoring and supervision by the competent youth office. Lastly, the court concluded that the withdrawal of the consent to being examined by the court-appointed expert did not hinder the use of the expert opinion in the proceedings (see paragraph 31 above). 43.  The applicants subsequently appealed against the decision of the Family Court and applied for an interim measure to suspend the order to hand their son over to the youth office. 44.  On 15 December 2014 the Court of Appeal provisionally suspended enforcement of the Family Court\u2019s order on the son. The court held that given his age, one year and six months, and the fact that he was still being breastfed, enforcement would constitute an especially serious interference with the applicants\u2019 rights. In addition, the son\u2019s young age meant there was no imminent and sufficient risk of him being subjected to corporal punishment. 45.  During the appeal proceedings the applicants proposed a settlement to the Court of Appeal. The applicants would temporarily return to Germany and for two months they would gradually be reunited with their two daughters under the supervision of the youth office. At the end of that period, if the family reunification had been successful, the Family Court\u2019s decision would be set aside and the whole family would move to the Czech Republic. 46.  On 26 March 2015 the Court of Appeal conducted an oral hearing during which it heard, inter alia, the applicants, their daughters, the court\u2011appointed expert, the expert commissioned by the applicants and the children\u2019s guardian ad litem. The applicants\u2019 daughters stated that, even though they would like to see their parents more often, they would prefer living with their foster parents. Moreover, a representative of the youth office indicated during the hearing that the applicants had not distanced themselves from their previous parenting methods in a credible way and that therefore the youth office was not able to agree to the settlement they had proposed. 47.  On 10 June 2015 the Court of Appeal, in a detailed decision of forty\u2011five pages, rejected the applicants\u2019 appeal and confirmed the reasoning of the Family Court. The court held that corporal punishment with a rod, prohibited by Article 1631 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below), constituted the physical abuse of children and if applied regularly and repeatedly the competent authorities were obliged under Article 1666 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 55 below) to intervene and take the necessary measures in the best interests of the children. The applicants\u2019 daughters had consistently stated during the proceedings that they had been caned on a daily basis and the applicants themselves had confirmed that they had \u201cdisciplined\u201d their daughters with a rod. The court was convinced that the applicants would continue to use corporal punishment on their children in the future since that parenting method was already firmly established and was based on religious beliefs from which the applicants had not fundamentally distanced themselves. Their statements had shown that they, in essence, continued to approve of corporal punishment and considered it an appropriate parenting method. The fact that the applicants had recently acknowledged that their children had a right to a non-violent upbringing did not mean they had changed their attitudes to parenting in a permanent way; rather, that had only served a procedural purpose, namely to have their daughters returned to them as soon as possible. In the court\u2019s opinion, the applicants were only prepared to refrain temporarily from corporal punishment. The court was therefore unable to find that the applicants had changed their way of parenting and distanced themselves from corporal punishment in a manner which the court could regard as credible. Consequently, there was an imminent danger of systematic corporal punishment if the two daughters were returned to their parents. The danger also existed for the applicants\u2019 son as there was no fixed age when the applicants started \u201cdisciplining\u201d their children as they rather considered it a tool to enforce their parental authority. As the two-year-old son was expected to start his \u201cphase of defiance\u201d soon, it also had to be expected that the applicants would respond with caning. 48.  The Court of Appeal also confirmed that the applicants\u2019 withdrawal of their consent to being assessed did not prevent the courts from using the expert opinion as evidence and that there were no less severe measures available to avert the imminent detriment to the best interests of the children resulting from their parents\u2019 use of corporal punishment. In that regard, the court, inter alia, pointed to the fact that the applicants had already left Germany with their son and refused to return to live there permanently. The competent authorities would therefore from the very outset be unable to provide sufficient support to the family or effectively monitor the applicants\u2019 parenting methods. 49.  On 16 August 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint by the applicants (1 BvR 1589/15), without providing reasons.", "references": ["9", "7", "8", "5", "1", "2", "3", "0", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Gennadiy Mikhailovich Berkovich, was born in 1950 and lives in Moscow. He was represented before the Court by Ms M. Samorodkina, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 6.  In 1973 Mr Berkovich started working for the Scientific Research Electromechanical Institute, a State design bureau that developed air defence weapons. 7.  Mr Berkovich signed an undertaking concerning the non-disclosure of State secrets which contained a restriction on the right to go abroad. The employer had despatched Mr Berkovich on official missions to France (in 1993 and 1994), China (in 1996 and 2003) and Greece (in 2001 and 2004). On 9 September 1993 he was provided with a travel passport (\u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442), the identity document that entitles Russian citizens to leave the country and travel abroad. It was renewed on 16 December 1998 and then on 3 November 2003, both times for a five-year period. 8.  On 28 September 2004 Mr Berkovich terminated his employment. His employer retained his travel passport and refused to return it to him. 9.  On 25 July 2005 Mr Berkovich applied to the Passport and Visa Service of the Akademicheskiy District in Moscow for a new travel passport. On 16 December 2005 the head of the Passport and Visa Service refused his application. The refusal indicated that his right to obtain a travel passport was restricted until 26 February 2009 on account of his past access to State secrets. 10.  Mr Berkovich challenged the refusal before the Moscow City Court, relying on the fact that he had been previously allowed to travel abroad on official business. 11.  On 8 June 2006 the City Court gave judgment. It found that, even though the law provided that a refusal could be challenged before the Interagency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets, Mr Berkovich could not avail himself of that remedy because the Commission had not held any hearings since 22 June 2004 and had been disbanded by a Government resolution of 21 March 2005. The City Court upheld the restriction on Mr Berkovich\u2019s right to travel abroad, noting that, according to his former employer, he had last accessed confidential information in February 2004 and that the classified status of that information was not due to be reviewed until 2009. As to his previous official trips abroad, the City Court said:\n\u201cThe court has established that Mr Berkovich\u2019s work duties required him to travel abroad for official purposes more than once; each time [his employer] obtained for him through the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a travel passport, which was kept by the human resources department [of the employer] until its expiry.\nHis travel abroad \u2013 as an individual aware of State secrets \u2013 was organised in accordance with the procedure set out in [the internal documents of the employer].\nThe claimant was allowed to go abroad because his personal participation was required for the performance of the task and because it was impossible to send abroad other employees who were aware of State secrets to a lesser degree.\u201d 12.  On 1 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the City Court\u2019s judgment on appeal. 13.  Following the expiry of the restriction, on 3 April 2009 Mr Berkovich was issued with a travel passport. He used it to travel to Egypt, China, Greece, Croatia and Italy. 14.  The applicant, Mr Igor Borisovich Boldyrev, was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow.  From February 1987 to 6 February 2007 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 15.  Mr Boldyrev was the only son to his parents, who lived in Tallinn, Estonia. His father was born in 1929 and his mother in 1930, and they were both retired and disabled. During his military service Mr Boldyrev visited his parents more than ten times; each time he submitted a report to his military superior indicating the purpose of his visit and the dates and means of transport that he would be using. 16.  Following the termination of his military service, on 27 November 2007 Mr Boldyrev applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport. He also submitted medical certificates that attested to the poor health of his parents and justified his need to go and see them. 17.  By a letter of 22 December 2010, the Federal Migration Service notified him that his application had been refused on account of his previous awareness of State secrets during the period of his military service. His right to leave Russia was restricted until 22 January 2012. 18.  Mr Boldyrev challenged the refusal in court. 19.  By a judgment of 24 April 2008, the Moscow City Court upheld the travel ban as lawful. It held that the poor health of Mr Boldyrev\u2019s parents was of no legal significance. On 25 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld that decision on appeal. 20.  On 9 November 2009 Mr Boldyrev\u2019s mother died in Tallinn. He tried to obtain a travel passport to attend her funeral but received no response to his application. A travel passport was first issued to him in 2012. 21.  The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Ilchenko, was born in 1968 and lives in Moscow. From 1985 to 30 April 2009 he was a military serviceman employed in the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters of the Russian Army. 22.  On 29 December 2004 Mr Ilchenko signed a contract of employment, which contained a restriction on his right to leave Russia for a period not exceeding five years on account of his awareness of State secrets. In October 2006, the Main Directorate for International Co-operation of the Ministry of Defence issued a new travel passport for him, which he never used. 23.  Following his retirement in April 2009, on 13 September 2010 Mr Ilchenko applied to the Federal Migration Service in Moscow for a travel passport. He submitted that he needed to go abroad for rest and recreation and pointed out that he had already surrendered all classified material on 13 February 2009. 24.  By a letter of 22 December 2010, the Federal Migration Service notified him that his application had been refused on the following grounds:\n\u201cDuring the period of your service in the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters of the Russian Military Forces from November 2004 to date, you have been aware of State secrets; accordingly, your right to go abroad has been temporarily restricted until 13 February 2014 [on the basis] of a decision of the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters no. 312/3/196 of 8 October 2010.\u201d 25.  Mr Ilchenko challenged the refusal in court. 26.  On 3 March 2011 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow rejected his complaint. It examined the above-mentioned decision of 8 October 2010, according to which \u201cthe plaintiff\u2019s right to travel abroad for private purposes [would] be possible after 13 February 2014, but there [were] no objections to his leaving abroad on official missions arranged by organisations or companies affiliated with the Ministry of Defence.\u201d\nThe court found that the decision refusing the application had been made by the competent authority. 27.  On 10 October 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment, summarily endorsing its reasoning. 28.  Mr Ilchenko also challenged the compatibility of section 15(1) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and section 24 of the State Secrets Act with the Constitution. By judgment no. 14-P of 7 June 2012, the Constitutional Court rejected his complaint, holding as follows:\n\u201c1.  To recognise that the interconnected provisions of section 15(1) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and section 24 of the State Secrets Act do not contradict the Russian Constitution inasmuch as these provisions ... presuppose that a decision concerning a temporary restriction on the right to leave the Russian Federation may not be predicated solely on the formal grounds that are expressly mentioned in these provisions; such a decision should not have as its sole basis the established fact that the individual concerned has had access to particularly important or top-secret information classified as a State secret; the elements to be verified in every case should include the nature of the specific information which the individual has had access to [through] his work duties, the degree of confidentiality \u2013 including at the time when an application to competent authorities is being made in connection with a planned trip abroad \u2013 as well as the purpose of the trip and other circumstances which are relevant for determining that the said restriction was necessary.\u201d 29.  The applicant, Mr Vladimir Vitalyevich Litavrin, was born in 1965 and lives in the Moscow Region. 30.  From June 1986 to October 2008 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. In February 2004, with the consent of his commander and the Federal Security Service (FSB), he was issued with a travel passport, which he used to go abroad on private tourist trips in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 31.  Following the expiry of his travel passport in February 2009, on 24 March 2009 Mr Litavrin applied to the Federal Migration Service for its renewal. In October 2009 he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 15 December 2011. 32.  Mr Litavrin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Odintsovo Town Court of the Moscow Region on 7 September 2011 and the Moscow Regional Court on 1 December 2011. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 33.  The applicant, Mr Roman Aleksandrovich Lytin, was born in 1982 and lives in Moscow. From June 2006 to May 2010 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 34.  On 21 September 2010 Mr Lytin applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 24 February 2011, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 29 July 2014. 35.  Mr Lytin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, first by the Moscow City Court on 14 October 2011 and later by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 11 January 2012. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 36.  The applicant, Mr Aleksey Gennadyevich Khil, was born in 1965 and lives in the Khabarovsk Region. From August 1997 to 9 February 2009 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 37.  In September 2010, Mr Khil applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport. By a letter of 27 September 2011, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 27 November 2012. 38.  Mr Khil challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, first by the Khabarovsk Regional Court on 1 February 2012 and later by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 18 April 2012. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 39.  The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Yenin, was born in 1964 and lives in Sochi. He is a lawyer. From January 1997 to June 2011 he was a military serviceman in the FSB. 40.  On 27 December 2007 the Sochi division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued Mr Yenin with a travel passport valid for five years. In accordance with the regulations in force, the passport was kept in the human resources department of the FSB. 41.  Following his retirement on 25 June 2011, Mr Yenin repeatedly asked the FSB to return his travel passport because he wished to travel abroad for private reasons. His request was refused on the grounds that, by a report of 29 June 2011, his right to go abroad was restricted until 28 July 2015, that is, for a period of five years from his last contact with top-secret documents. It appears that the documents in question contained details of FSB informants. 42.  Mr Yenin challenged the restriction in court, seeking to have it lifted or reduced to a period of two and a half years. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Military Court of the Sochi Garrison on 24 January 2013 and the Military Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit on 7 May 2013. 43.  The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Garkusha, was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow. He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Yenin, a lawyer practising in Sochi (see paragraph 39 above). From July 2009 to October 2011 Mr Garkusha was a military serviceman in the FSB. 44.  On 6 February and 12 December 2012 he applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 26 December 2012, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 31 October 2016. 45.  Mr Garkusha challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Military Court of the Sochi Garrison on 14 March 2013 and the Military Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit on 26 June 2013. 46.  The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Burnayev, was born in 1980 and lives in Krasnodar. 47.  From November 2002 to August 2012 he was an investigator with the Krasnodar regional investigations department of the FSB. He had a travel passport and in 2008 travelled with his spouse to the United Arab Emirates for a holiday. 48.  On 22 April 2013 the chief of the Krasnodar regional office of the FSB decided that Mr Burnayev\u2019s right to travel abroad for private purposes should be restricted until 19 May 2016 on the grounds that he had previously had access to a top-secret investigative file concerning the theft of property committed by a Russian national on Russian territory. 49.  Mr Burnayev applied for a judicial review of that decision. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 12 July 2013 and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 23 October 2013. 50.  The applicant, Mr Sergey Viktorovich Samasadkin, was born in 1973 and lives in St Petersburg. 51.  From 1997 to 2009 he was a military serviceman in the Komi regional office of the FSB. His contract of employment provided that his access to State secrets would be terminated if he or his family members took up permanent residence abroad or started making an application to take up residence abroad. Termination of his access to State secrets would lead to early termination of his employment. 52.  Following his retirement in May 2009, his right to travel abroad for private purposes was restricted until 16 November 2012. 53.  In July 2012, anticipating the expiry of the restriction on his right to travel, he applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 1 August 2012, he was notified that his application had been refused. 54.  Mr Samasadkin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Syktyvkar Town Court on 25 September 2012 and the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic on 30 May 2013. Referring to section 15 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and the decision to restrict Mr Samasadkin\u2019s right to leave Russia, the courts held that the refusal to issue him with a travel passport had been lawful. 55.  On 17 December 2012 Mr Samasadkin was issued with a travel passport.", "references": ["7", "5", "1", "8", "2", "3", "9", "6", "0", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1978. At the time of the events he was a district police officer in the Kalyninskyy district police in Horlivka. As of February 2014, he has been serving a prison sentence in Menska prison no. 91. The second applicant is his wife who was born in 1984. She lives in Horlivka with her mother, the third applicant, who was born in 1951. The fourth applicant, the mother of the first applicant, was born in 1948 and died on 5 December 2010. The first applicant expressed wish to pursue his mother\u2019s complaints on her behalf. 7.  At the night from 18 to 19 June 2008, shortly after midnight, the second applicant had a conflict with a police officer, M., who was a colleague of her husband. 8.  The second applicant\u2019s account of the events was as follows. When walking in the street with a friend, B., she heard somebody running after them. That person pushed her on the shoulder. Having turned, she saw M., whom she knew. He was wearing plain clothes and appeared to be heavily drunk. When she asked him what the matter was, M. shouted that he would subject her to a body search, without explanation. He snatched her bag from her. Having searched its contents, he threw it on the ground. Then M. grabbed the second applicant by the neck and started strangling her. In reply to her protests, he noted that the local prosecutor was there next to him and that it was pointless to complain. He hit the second applicant twice in the head with something heavy, which, in her opinion, could have been a mobile phone. At that moment the first applicant telephoned his wife\u2019s friend B., who was then with her, to find out whether everything was fine (as his wife had not returned home at the expected time and was not answering his telephone calls). Having found out about the incident, the first applicant went there. M. threatened him in a rude manner with dismissal. He let the second applicant go only after two other police officers in plain clothes, who happened to be there, approached them. 9.  The second applicant\u2019s friend B. supported the above version of events. However, eventually she specified that M. had not been strangling the second applicant, but had simply held her and not let her leave. 10.  M.\u2019s version of the events was as follows. He was walking in the street with an acquaintance, P., a businessman, after the celebration of the professional holiday of police inspectors. They met two colleagues of M. and stopped to talk with them. Two women passed by. M. thought that one of them was a certain T., who was under administrative supervision and was not supposed to be out of her home so late. He went to ask her what she was doing there. However, having approached her, he realised that he had been mistaken. He recognised the second applicant and apologised for his mistake. The second applicant, who appeared to be heavily drunk, started insulting and pushing him. M. submitted that he had not touched her. As regards the possible origin of her injuries, he noted that she had had serious incidents in the past with her husband and that those injuries might have been inflicted by him. As regards the fact that the plastic bag that she had had in her hands had been torn, he explained it by her intense gesticulating. 11.  M.\u2019s version was supported by the statements of his friend P. and the two police officers, who had been there. 12.  Having come home, the second applicant called an ambulance. She was diagnosed with several bruises on her neck and situational neurosis. She explained that she had been strangled by a police officer. In the presence of an ambulance paramedic, the second applicant called the police. According to the Government, she did not mention that M. was a law-enforcement official. The second applicant contested that submission. 13.  In the morning on 19 June 2008 the second applicant was examined by a neuropathologist who diagnosed her with concussion and bruises on her neck, and prescribed outpatient medical treatment. 14.  On 28 June 2008 the Kalyninskyy police issued a ruling refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the second applicant\u2019s complaint. It noted that she had complained to the police at 1.05 a.m. on 19 June 2008 of having been hit by an acquaintance. As further stated in the ruling, it had been impossible to question her, as she had never been at home when visited by the police. 15.  On 9 July 2008 the second applicant complained about the incident to the Horlivka town prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Horlivka prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d). She requested that the investigation not be entrusted to the Kalyninskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d), given that one of its officials had allegedly been with M. at the time of the events and that M. had referred to that fact as a guarantee of his impunity (see paragraph 8 above). The second applicant submitted that there had been no attempts by the authorities to contact them with a view to hearing their version of the events. 16.  On 15 July 2008 the Horlivka prosecutor\u2019s office forwarded her complaint to the Kalyninskyy prosecutor. 17.  On 25 July 2008 the second applicant gave a written account of the incident to the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same date that authority quashed the refusal of 28 June 2008. It noted that the investigation had wrongly been entrusted to the Kalyninskyy police despite the fact that the second applicant\u2019s complaint concerned her alleged ill-treatment by one of its officers. 18.  On 28 July 2008 the police officer who had been on duty during the night from 18 to 19 June 2008 was disciplined for not having followed up the second applicant\u2019s call (see paragraph 12 above). 19.  On 1 August 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against M. under Article 365 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (exceeding individual power by engaging in violent or degrading treatment of a victim), having held that there were no constituent elements of a crime discernible in his actions. The prosecutor noted that the second applicant\u2019s allegation was supported by the statements of her husband and her friend. However, there were also statements of M. and the witnesses from his side, who denied any ill-treatment of the second applicant. The prosecutor therefore found her allegation to be unsubstantiated. It was also noted in the ruling that at the time of the events M. had been wearing civilian clothes and had not been acting as a law-enforcement official. Lastly, it was observed that the second applicant had ignored numerous summonses for questioning. 20.  On 4 August 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office annulled its refusal of 1 August 2008 as premature. It noted, in particular, that not all the relevant facts had been established. Furthermore, there had been no forensic medical expert examination of the second applicant. 21.  On 14 August 2008 the second applicant underwent such an examination, which documented no visible injuries. Having analysed her medical file, the expert concluded that she had sustained a bruise on her neck and a craniocerebral injury which led to concussion. Those injuries, assessed as insignificant, had resulted from \u201ccontact with blunt objects\u201d at the time indicated by the second applicant. 22.  On the same day the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office once again refused to open a criminal case against M. for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. It relied, in particular, on the witnesses\u2019 statements, according to which M. had not ill-treated the second applicant. Furthermore, the prosecutor noted that M. had not acted in his official capacity and that the injuries sustained by the second applicant had been insignificant. 23.  On 5 September 2008 a senior official of the same prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the above ruling as premature. He noted, in particular, that an additional forensic medical examination was required with a view to verifying the second applicant\u2019s allegation that she had been hit in the head with a mobile phone. 24.  On 15 September 2008 the prosecutor ordered such an examination of the second applicant with a view to answering the following questions: (1) how exactly could her injuries have been inflicted; (2) whether there were marks on her head possibly resulting from blows with a mobile phone; (3) whether she could have sustained the injuries in question in the circumstances as she alleged; and (4) when exactly she had sustained the injuries in question. 25.  On 9 October 2008 a forensic medical expert examination report was issued. It answered the above questions as follows: (1) the craniocerebral injury and the bruise on the neck had resulted from contact with blunt objects; (2) neither the examination of the second applicant nor the evaluation of the medical file had established any injuries to her head (apparently, implying visible injuries); (3) the second applicant\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted on her in the circumstances described; and (4) according to the medical documents, the second applicant could have sustained the injuries on 19 June 2008. 26.  On 19 November 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office delivered yet another ruling refusing to open a criminal case in respect of the second applicant\u2019s complaints. Having relied on the forensic medical examination reports and the witnesses\u2019 statements, the prosecutor stated that her allegation had not been sufficiently corroborated. 27.  On 20 April 2009 the Donetsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe regional prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) annulled the above ruling as premature and based on an incomplete investigation. 28.  On 5 May 2009 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against M. It was stated in the ruling that the forensic medical expert evaluations of 14 August and 9 October 2008 refuted the second applicant\u2019s allegations. Furthermore, the prosecutor noted that the second applicant had refused to give her account during the additional investigation. 29.  The second applicant challenged the above refusal before the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office (\u201cthe PGO\u201d) on at least three occasions (on 20 July and 8 October 2009 and on 4 January 2010). Her complaints were forwarded to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office. 30.  On 21 February 2010 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to her that it agreed with the lower prosecution authority\u2019s decision. As further stated in the letter, it was open for her to challenge that decision before the courts if she so wished. 31.  In May 2008 the first applicant underwent knee surgery. From 8 August to 2 September 2008 he underwent a follow-up course of outpatient medical treatment in Horlivka Hospital. 32.  On an unspecified date (illegible in the available copy) the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office sent a summons to the first applicant at his registered residence (his mother\u2019s home), instructing him to come to the prosecutor\u2019s office on 5 September 2008. It is not clear whether it was issued in the context of the criminal investigation in respect of the complaints by the first applicant\u2019s wife (see above) or whether it was rather related to the subsequent criminal proceedings against him. 33.  On 10 September 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal case against the first applicant on suspicion of abuse of power and forgery committed in his capacity as a law-enforcement official in January 2008. More specifically, on 14 March 2008 the local court had informed the prosecutor of some factual inaccuracies in a report on an administrative (minor) offence, which had been drawn up by the first applicant. The latter was suspected of having forged that report. 34.  On the same date the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office informed the first applicant of the above decision by a letter sent to the address where he was de facto living with his wife (separately from their parents). It was also noted in the letter that he had to come to the prosecutor\u2019s office to receive a copy of the decision and for questioning. 35.  Still on the same date, 10 September 2008, the prosecutor ordered the Kalyninskyy police to ensure the first applicant\u2019s presence for investigative measures. On 12 September 2008 the police informed the investigator that it was impossible to comply with the above order given that the first applicant had been found neither at the address of his usual residence nor at his mother\u2019s flat. When they had also gone to enquire about his whereabouts with his parents-in-law, the third applicant \u201chad attacked them hysterically\u201d, which made the police believe that the first applicant might be hiding there. 36.  On 13 September 2008 a judge of the Kalyninskyy Court ordered the first applicant\u2019s arrest with a view to bringing him before the court to examine the issue of a preventive measure in his regard. 37.  On 19 September 2008 the first applicant was declared wanted by the police. 38.  On the same date he wrote to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office that, following the incident with his wife, the Kalyninskyy police had been threatening him and his family with his dismissal, criminal prosecution, or even a fatal accident. He therefore sought that the Kalyninskyy prosecutor withdraw from the case. He also submitted that he was scared even to go to the hospital as some suspicious-looking persons had been loitering near his home. The first applicant indicated as his address that of his mother. 39.  On 22 September 2008 the investigator visited the first applicant\u2019s mother (the fourth applicant) at her home and asked her whether she knew where the first applicant was. She stated that he had been living separately from her for about two years and that she was not aware of his whereabouts. 40.  On 24 September 2008 she sent to the investigator the first applicant\u2019s request of 23 September 2008 to admit her to the proceedings as his representative and to give her a copy of the ruling of 10 September 2008 initiating the criminal investigation against him. In substantiation of that request, the first applicant stated that he was restricted in his movement following knee surgery. 41.  On 29 September 2008 the chief of medicine of Horlivka Hospital informed the investigator, in reply to the latter\u2019s enquiry, that the last time the first applicant had come to the hospital had been 15 September 2008 and that the hospital administration did not know how he could be reached. 42.  On 1 October 2008 the internal security unit of the Kalyninskyy police wrote to the prosecutor that it had information that the first applicant had been secretly visiting the flats of his parents and parents-in-law. 43.  On 3 October 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor wrote to the first applicant at his mother\u2019s address, indicating that the latter could not be admitted in the proceedings as his representative at such an early stage. The prosecutor indicated that the first applicant was on the wanted list and that he needed to show up to receive copies of the rulings in respect of the institution of the criminal proceedings against him and for his questioning. 44.  On 31 October 2008 the Kalyninskyy prosecutor sent another letter to the first applicant, informing him that another criminal case had been opened against him on that date on suspicion of abuse of power by a law-enforcement official and forgery in office and that he had to come to the prosecutor\u2019s office to get a copy of that decision and for questioning. 45.  During the period from October 2008 to January 2010 further eight criminal cases were opened against the first applicant on additional counts of abuse of office, as well as on suspicion of bribe-taking. He was suspected of having committed those offences in order to report better results to his superiors and thus be entitled to additional remuneration and promotions. The first applicant was informed of each such decision by a letter sent to his mother\u2019s address. 46.  On 25 March 2009 the first applicant complained to the PGO that his numerous requests for the Kalyninskyy prosecutor to withdraw had been ignored. He further submitted that he required protection measures as \u201ca person who had reported a crime\u201d. Lastly, the first applicant requested that the prosecutor annul the decision on placing him on the wanted list \u201cso that [he] could defend himself against the criminal charges and continue [his] medical treatment\u201d. 47.  On 13 May and 26 June 2009 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the first applicant that his complaints had been dismissed as unsubstantiated. 48.  On 29 June 2009 the first applicant was arrested at the address where he lived with his wife. The investigator relied on Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 78 below) and substantiated the arrest as follows: the first applicant had been on the wanted list since 19 September 2008, had impeded the establishment of the truth and had committed serious criminal offences. It was also noted in the arrest report that the first applicant was suspected of offences under Articles 364 \u00a7 3 (abuse of power or office by a law-enforcement official), 366 \u00a7 1 (forgery in office) and 368 \u00a7 2 (bribe-taking) of the Criminal Code. The investigator drew up a report on the explanation to the first applicant of his procedural rights. The first applicant refused to sign it. He also refused to make any submissions as regards the charges against him. 49.  On 30 June 2009 the Kalyninskyy Court extended the term of the first applicant\u2019s arrest to ten days on the grounds that the case file lacked information about his character. That ruling was not amenable to appeal. 50.  On 3 July 2009 the same court ordered the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure, \u201chaving regard to the seriousness and circumstances of the crimes committed and the character of [the first applicant]\u201d, without further details. 51.  On 6 July 2009 the first applicant appealed. He submitted that his remand in custody was not based on sufficient and relevant reasons. He noted that he had been arrested at his home, where he had been living for over two years, and that he had not absconded. He noted that the reasoning in support of his pre-trial detention had been overly formalistic. Thus, although the court had referred to his character, it had failed to specify what exactly in his character had justified his detention as the most appropriate preventive measure. 52.  On 21 July 2009 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the ruling of 3 July 2009 and released the first applicant subject to an undertaking not to leave the town. It found that the first-instance court had not given reasons as to the necessity to choose the strictest preventive measure. 53.  On 17 November 2011 the Kalyninskyy Court found the first applicant guilty of fraud, abuse of power in his capacity of a law-enforcement official, forgery causing grave consequences, and bribe-taking, and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment with a ban to occupy posts in law-enforcement authorities, and confiscation of his personal property. 54.  On 6 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment in the part concerning the forgery charge and remitted it to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. It upheld the judgment in the remaining part, having slightly reclassified some of the charges and having reduced the term of the first applicant\u2019s imprisonment to six years. 55.  On 9 October 2012 the Kalyninskyy Court again found the applicant guilty of forgery causing grave consequences and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The final sentence was six years\u2019 imprisonment, as the most severe of the applicant\u2019s punishments absorbed the more lenient one. In the absence of any appeals, the judgment became final. 56.  On 1 August 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters quashed the appellate court\u2019s ruling of 6 March 2012 in the part concerning the first applicant\u2019s conviction (the part concerning the remittal of the case to the first-instance court remained in force) and remitted the case for fresh appellate examination. 57.  On 3 December 2013 the appellate court upheld the judgment of 17 November 2011 in so far as it concerned the first applicant\u2019s conviction for abuse of power in his capacity as a law-enforcement official and his sentencing to six years\u2019 imprisonment. As regards the other charges (with the exception of that dealt with by the judgment of 9 October 2012 \u2013 see paragraph 55 above), they were slightly reclassified and the first applicant had the penalty in respect of that part removed. 58.  The case file does not contain any further information as regards the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. 59.  On 10 September 2008 the investigator applied to the Kalyninskyy Court for authorisation to search the first applicant\u2019s registered residence (the flat of the fourth applicant). It was stated in the application that on 27 January 2008 the first applicant had drawn up a report on an administrative (minor) offence in respect of unauthorised street trading by a private individual. As subsequently established, the information in that report had not been accurate, which had led to the institution of criminal proceedings against the first applicant on suspicion of abuse of power and forgery. The investigator considered that \u201csome items and documents relevant for establishing the truth\u201d in the case could be found in the first applicant\u2019s residence. 60.  On 11 September 2008 the Kalyninskyy Court in a final ruling, allowed the above application, having reiterated the investigator\u2019s reasoning and description of the search\u2019s scope. It relied on Article 177 of the CCP (follow the references in paragraph 78 below). 61.  On 12 September 2008 the investigator applied to the Kalyninskyy Court for authorisation to search the second applicant\u2019s registered residence (the flat of the third applicant). The text of the application was identical to that submitted on 10 September 2008 (see paragraph 59 above). 62.  On the same day the police knocked at the third applicant\u2019s door. She and her husband were at home, but did not let the police in. 63.  The third applicant\u2019s account of the events of 12 September 2008 is as follows. A group of nine to ten persons, including police officers and some suspicious-looking persons, came to her flat. They knocked at the entrance door in a violent manner, demanding to be let in. The third applicant\u2019s husband went out and asked them for a search warrant or another document authorising their actions, but no such document was produced. The police threatened the third applicant and her husband that they would break in and that they would find a pretext to criminally prosecute the entire family. They stayed on the stairs and in the yard and shouted for about three hours. 64.  According to the Government\u2019s version, three police officers went to the third applicant\u2019s flat. They informed her about the criminal proceedings against the first applicant and enquired as to his whereabouts. As she and her husband refused to cooperate, the police left. 65.  On 13 September 2008 the Kalyninskyy Court allowed the investigator\u2019s application of 12 September 2008 (see paragraph 61 above). Its ruling was identical to that delivered on 11 September 2008 (see paragraph 60 above). 66.  On the same day the police carried out a search at the flat of the third applicant. According to her, they broke the entrance door using an electric saw. The third applicant further alleged that the police had not shown a search warrant to her. Two attesting witnesses were present. According to the third applicant, they were acquaintances of the police officers. 67.  As indicated in the search report, it lasted from 5.20 p.m. to 7.04 p.m. The police seized a number of documents related to the first applicant\u2019s work. Furthermore, they seized a mobile telephone, which did not have a SIM card, together with its box. Lastly, they found and seized a package appearing to contain cannabis. According to the third applicant, it had been planted by the police. 68.  On 16 September 2008 the police conducted a search of the flat of the fourth applicant. They discovered and seized some documents which were deemed to be related to the criminal investigation in respect of the first applicant. According to the first and fourth applicants, those documents had been brought there by the police themselves the previous day. The fourth applicant submitted that the officers, whom she knew as colleagues of her son, had explained to her that, following an attack on their police station, they had not had a safe place to store the documents, which had been intended in any event for handing over to the first applicant. 69.  On 23 September 2008 an expert established that the package discovered in the third applicant\u2019s flat on 13 September 2008 contained cannabis. On 2 October 2008 the Kalyninskyy police refused to institute criminal proceedings in that regard, having held that it had been impossible to establish to whom the cannabis might have belonged. 70.  On 7 October 2008 the Kalyninskyy Court allowed another application to search the first applicant\u2019s registered residence (the flat of the fourth applicant) given that the investigator had information that the first applicant might be hiding there. 71.  On 11 February 2009 the police conducted a search of the fourth applicant\u2019s flat on the basis of the court ruling of 7 October 2008. As indicated in the search report, the police were searching for \u201citems, valuables and documents related to the criminal activity of [the first applicant]\u201d. The search did not discover anything of interest for the investigation. 72.  The third and fourth applicants requested many times that the Kalyninskyy Court provide them with copies of the rulings authorising the searches of their flats. The president of the court replied that the searches had been carried out in compliance with the CCP and that sending a copy of the respective court rulings was not provided for by the legislation. 73.  The third and fourth applicants also complained many times to the prosecution authorities of the unlawfulness of the searches. They submitted, in particular, that the police had been rude and intrusive, that the attesting witnesses had not been independent, and that it was not clear what the police had actually been looking for. 74.  On 23 December 2008 the Horlivka prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case in respect of the police officers involved in the operation of 12 September and the searches of 13 and 16 September 2008, with the generally couched reasoning that there had been no violations of law. It appears that the applicants were unaware of that decision. 75.  On 17 June 2009, following complaints by the third and fourth applicants, the Kalyninskyy prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the judge of the Kalyninskyy Court in respect of the rulings authorising the searches of their flats. 76.  On 20 November 2009 the third applicant got acquainted with the ruling of the Kalyninskyy Court of 13 September 2008 (see paragraph 65 above). It is not known whether, and if so when, the fourth applicant got access to the respective rulings of 11 September and 7 October 2008 (see paragraphs 60 and 70 above). 77.  On 5 June 2006 a local heating company initiated civil proceedings against the first and fourth applicants, who had their registered domicile at the same address, for debt recovery. The domestic courts found against the applicants. On 19 May 2008 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal on points of law by the first and fourth applicants on the grounds that they had not paid the court fees.", "references": ["5", "8", "0", "9", "3", "7", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and is currently detained in Czarne Prison in Poland. 6.  The applicant was placed in detention on remand at Nicosia Central Prisons on 14 September 2010 pending criminal proceedings against him before the Limassol District Court (case no. 25536/10). 7.  On 11 January 2011 the applicant was convicted of a number of offences (including burglary, theft, various road traffic offences and unlawful residence). On 24 January 2011 the court imposed four sentences ranging from six months\u2019 to two years\u2019 imprisonment, to run concurrently from 5 September 2010. 8.  The applicant was released on 18 May 2012 following the suspension of his sentence by virtue of a decree issued by the President of the Republic concerning a number of prisoners. 9.  In his application form the applicant, without specifying the exact period of his detention, submitted that he had been held in overcrowded cells at Nicosia Central Prisons, where there was only 0.5 to 1.7 sq. m of personal space for each detainee. He stated that the cells were cold and lacked adequate light. Furthermore, there were no toilets in the cells. He sometimes had to wait two to three hours to use the toilet, and, when the cells were locked, he had to urinate into a bottle and defecate into a waste bag. 10.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been detained from 14 September 2010 until his release on 18 May 2012 in three different parts of Nicosia Central Prisons. Between 14 September 2010 and 24 January 2011 he had been detained in Block 5, which accommodated remand prisoners. Following his conviction and sentence he had been transferred to Block 2B, where he had been detained between 24 January 2011 and 5 October 2011. On the latter date he had been placed in Block 2A, where he had been detained until his release on 18 May 2012. Both Block 2B and 2A accommodated sentenced prisoners. The Government provided copies of Nicosia Central Prisons\u2019 daily occupancy records (\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd) indicating the number of prisoners in each block per day. However, they submitted that no records were kept in relation to occupancy of particular cells in the blocks.\n(a)  Block 5: 14 September 2010-24 January 2011 11.  Block 5 could accommodate up to sixty-eight remand prisoners; it had thirty-four double occupancy cells measuring 6.21 sq. m, eight toilets and eight showers. Block 5 included Block 5A, which had twenty-three double occupancy cells of the same size as Block 5, accommodating forty-three remand prisoners. It was almost certain that during his detention in Block 5 the applicant had shared a cell with another inmate and that therefore he had had 3.10 sq. m of personal space.\n(b)  Block 2B: 24 January 2011-5 October 2011 12.  At the time the applicant had been detained there Block 2B had not yet been renovated. It had twenty-six double occupancy cells measuring 9.98 sq. m; two large cells measuring 19.55 sq. m, which accommodated five to seven detainees, and a common room which had been made into a dormitory for between twenty and fifty inmates. The dormitory measured 90 sq. m and had nineteen windows. Prisoners with short-term sentences had been kept in the dormitory. Block 2B had six toilets and six showers. 13.  Based on the daily occupancy records for the relevant period, the number of inmates in the block varied from 80 to 124 per day. The Government stated that it was possible that the applicant had spent time in all the different types of cells in this block during his detention. In the double occupancy cell the applicant would have had 4.99 sq. m of personal space; in the larger cell he would have had from approximately 2.8 to 3.9 sq. m, depending on whether he had shared the cell with five, six or seven inmates; and, lastly, in the dormitory he would have had from 1.8 sq. m to 4.5 sq. m of personal space, depending on the number of inmates detained there with him. If the applicant had been held in the dormitory in early spring or during the winter (see paragraph 49 below), he would have disposed of between 2.04 and 3.2 sq. m of personal space as the daily occupancy records indicated that the block had accommodated between 94 and 110 inmates per day during those periods.\n(c)  Block 2A: 5 October 2011-18 May 2012 14.  On 5 October 2011 the applicant was transferred to Block 2A, which had been renovated. The block had forty-one double occupancy cells, accommodating eighty-two prisoners. The cells measured 9.80 sq. m and thus the applicant had had 4.9 sq. m of personal space at his disposal. There were six toilets, six showers and three urinals.\n(d)  Additional information regarding the general conditions in the blocks 15.  The various parts of the prison were equipped with a central heating system which covered all the blocks and cells. The central air conditioning system which functioned in the summer months was in the corridors and there were individual electrical fans in the cells. All the cells had properly insulated windows, which provided natural light and ventilation. The dimensions of the windows varied. Detainees were free to move outside their cells in the closed prison, including the yard, workshops, kitchen and school from 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. (winter time) or to 6 p.m. (summer time). After that, the detainees could move freely within their blocks until 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 p.m. on weekends and public holidays. 16.  Following the 2012 report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cCPT\u201d) on its visit to Cyprus from 12 to 19 May 2008, the prison administration discontinued the practice of switching off cell bells during the night, hence detainees had access to the toilets during those hours (see paragraphs 26-27 and 30 below). The administration of the prison had issued order no. 32/2008 concerning prisoners having access to the toilet facilities whenever necessary. The order had also directed prison staff to check and ensure that the call panel in the warden\u2019s room was active at all times, especially during the evening, so that prisoners could be assisted and emergencies prevented. A violation of the order constituted a disciplinary offence. According to a letter by the prison director dated 27 February 2014, records were not kept of when cells were opened for toilet visits during the night, that is between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. However, a detainee could leave his cell for up to three toilet visits during that period.", "references": ["6", "8", "3", "9", "0", "2", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Moscow. He is a former FSB (Russian security service) officer. 5.  On 19 May 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Circuit found the applicant guilty of the disclosure of State secrets and the illegal possession of ammunition and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 6.  On 13 September 2004 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 7.  According to the Government, on 26 May 2005 the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation (the \u201cFSIN\u201d) decided that the applicant should serve his sentence in correctional settlement facility (\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u044f-\u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) no. IK-13 in Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk Region, located approximately 1,800 km away from his family home in Moscow. The Government did not submit a copy of this decision. 8.  On 19 August 2005 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil ordered the applicant\u2019s release on parole. The court heard a representative of the prison administration and the prosecutor, who considered the applicant\u2019s release on parole to be possible. The prosecutor did not appeal and on 29 August 2005 the relevant decision became final. On 30 August 2005 the applicant was released. 9.  On 31 August 2005 the prosecutor asked the District Court to reinstate the requisite time-limit to permit him to appeal against the decision of 19 August 2005, noting that he had received a copy thereof only five days after its delivery. 10.  On 1 September 2005 the District Court reinstated a time-limit for the prosecutor\u2019s appeal. The court relied on the relevant provision of the rules of criminal procedure which provided for such reinstatement if there had been a delay of at least five days before a party to the proceedings had received a copy of the impugned decision. 11.  On 16 September 2005 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 1 September 2005 and quashed the decision of 19 August 2005, remitting the matter for fresh consideration. 12.  On 18 September 2005 a group of police officers broke arrested the applicant in his flat in Moscow. 13.  On 21 September 2005 the applicant was transported back to correctional settlement facility no. IK-13 and was placed in a disciplinary cell. 14.  On 24 November 2005 the District Court re-examined the applicant\u2019s application for parole and dismissed it. 15.  On 15 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 24 November 2005 on appeal. 16.  Upon arrival at the facility on 28 July 2005 the applicant was placed in cell no. 8 in the disciplinary block. On 9 August 2005 he was transferred to one of the dormitories. He was released from the facility on 30 August 2005. 17.  Following his arrest on 18 September 2005, the applicant was taken back to the facility on 22 September 2005. Upon arrival, he was again placed in cell no. 8 in the disciplinary block. On 30 September 2005 he was transferred to one of the dormitories. 18.  According to the Government, cell no. 8 measured 8 sq. m and was equipped with four sleeping places. From 28 July to 8 August 2005 the applicant was detained in the cell alone and from 8 to 9 August 2005 two other inmates were held together with the applicant. The cell was equipped with both natural and artificial ventilation. 19.  At all times the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place and bed sheets. He was allowed two hours\u2019 exercise per day in a specially designated area. 20.  The cell had windows with opening vents. The metal bars on the windows did not prevent daylight from entering the cell. The electric light in the cell was on constantly and at night low-voltage bulbs were used to maintain lighting. The cell had central heating and a cold water supply system. There was a tank with boiled potable water. A 110 cm high brick wall and a plywood door separated the toilet from the living area of the cell. The distance between the toilet and the dining table/nearest sleeping place was at least 1.5 m. Hygiene and food provision both met the statutory standards. 21.  According to the applicant and statements from other inmates submitted by the applicant, cell no. 8 measured 2.5 m by 3.5 m and housed between 3 and 7 inmates. A large part of the cell was occupied by a cupboard where mattresses and pillows were stored during the daytime. No bed linen was provided. There was no toilet paper, soap or detergent for cleaning the toilet. There was no place to keep personal belongings. The cell was infested with mice and woodlice. The electric light was permanently on. 22.  In the summer, the cell was very hot and humid and the ventilation did not work. The electric lighting was insufficient. There was no drinking water available. The only source of water was a tap above the toilet, which was a hole in the floor. The tap water was used for \u201cflushing\u201d away faeces, washing and drinking. It was of very poor quality. The toilet was not separated from the living area of the cell. Once a week the inmates received a basin of hot water for washing their clothes. 23.  From 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. the bunk beds were folded up and attached to the wall. The inmates could only stand or squat, or sit on a narrow ledge which ran along the edge of the cell in order to let their feet rest. 24.  The inmates did not receive newspapers. Nor was there a radio in the cell. Food was of very poor quality and scarce. The daily outdoor exercise lasted between fifteen and forty minutes. 25.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecutor, alleging that detaining him in such a disciplinary cell was in contravention of the applicable laws. 26.  On 22 November 2005 the prosecutor dismissed the complaint. He advised the applicant that at the material time the facility did not have a quarantine area in which newly arrived convicts could be placed for the purpose of medical checks. He further informed the applicant that, following a report by the prosecutor, the administration had made the necessary arrangements to set up a proper quarantine area in the facility. Lastly, the prosecutor explained that the applicant was entitled to contest the prosecutor\u2019s findings in a court or before a superior prosecutor.", "references": ["7", "9", "6", "0", "5", "3", "8", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, Mr Sergey Marksovich Dudin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1962 and lives in Parfino, Novgorod Region. He is represented before the Court by Mr K. V. Pakin, a lawyer practising in Velikiy Novgorod. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 23 July 2007 the applicant was apprehended by police at the cargo terminal \u201cShushary\u201d in Saint Petersburg under suspicion of robbery. Later that day he was transferred to Krestsy, Novgorod Region. 7.  On 25 July 2007 the Krestetskiy District Court of Novgorod Region (the District Court) ordered pre-trial detention of the applicant. Subsequently the period of the applicant\u2019s detention was extended on 20 September and 2 November 2007. 8.  In the order of 2 November 2007 the District Court authorised extension of the applicant\u2019s detention \u201cuntil and including 24 December 2007\u201d. 9.  On 11 December 2007 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing for the applicant\u2019s trial in order to decide on his further detention. The relevant section of the operative part of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c[The court] ORDERED\nTo schedule a preliminary hearing in the criminal case of Mr Dudin ... on 25 December 2007 at 10.00 a.m. ...\nTo transfer [from the detention facility] the accused Mr Dudin for the hearing at the set date and time.\nTo keep the measure of Mr Dudin\u2019s restraint \u2013 pre-trial detention \u2013 unchanged.\u201d 10.  On 25 December 2007 between 10.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. the District Court held a preliminary hearing ordering the criminal case to be send to trial and the applicant\u2019s further detention. During the hearing the applicant and his representative raised the objection regarding unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention between 24 December 2007 and the time of the hearing, but the District Court dismissed it without advancing any specific reasons in this regard. The applicant appealed. 11.  On 21 February 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. In the relevant part the Regional Court\u2019s decision read as follows:\n\u201cMr Dudin\u2019s and his representative\u2019s arguments regarding unlawfulness of the detention ... at the moment of the adoption of the decision [are unfounded] ... [T]he present criminal case was transferred to court on 11 December 2007, i.e. within the period of [the accused\u2019s detention ordered during investigation] and according to section 2, Article 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code the period of the defendant\u2019s detention is calculated from the date when the case was transferred to court and until the judgment is pronounced and may not exceed six months.\u201d 12.  On 27 May 2008 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. On 10 July 2008 the conviction was upheld on appeal by the Novgorod Regional Court and the period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention between 23 June 2007 and the day of conviction was fully counted towards execution of his sentence. 13.  On 2 March 2011 the applicant was released before serving his full sentence on probation. 14.  The applicant lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation seeking non-pecuniary damages for his allegedly unlawful detention without a court order between 24 and 25 December 2007. 15.  On 24 April 2008 the Novgorodskiy Town Court of Novgorod Region found that between midnight 24 December 2007 and 11.00 a.m. on 25 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s detention was unlawful and violated his rights under Article 22 of the Russian Constitution and Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The applicant was awarded non-pecuniary damages of 2000 Russian roubles (50 euros). During the hearings the representative of the Ministry of Finance acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s detention during the abovementioned period was not secured by a court order. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior (intervening in the proceedings) admitted that the authorisation for the detention expired on 24 December 2007. The representative of the regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office (also intervening in the proceedings) maintained that the applicant\u2019s detention was lawful, but stated that any detention without a court order would be unlawful. 16.  On 11 June 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court annulled the lower court\u2019s judgment on appeal and adopted a new judgment dismissing the applicant\u2019s claims. The Regional Court argued that while the order of 2 November 2007 set the period of detention \u201cuntil and including 24 December 2007\u201d, the decision of 11 December 2007 to schedule a preliminary hearing to 25 December 2007 essentially ordered the detention until that date, because it left it \u201cunchanged\u201d (see paragraph 6 above).", "references": ["6", "0", "5", "4", "9", "7", "3", "1", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lived in Naberezhniye Chelny, Tatarstan Republic, before his conviction of an unrelated criminal offence. 5.  On 7 April 2008 the applicant notified the executive committee of Naberezhniye Chelny of his intention to hold a public event in the form of a hunger strike in front of the local prosecutor\u2019s office beginning from 21 April 2008. On the same day the applicant was informed that his notice did not comply with the requirements of the law. 6.  On 16 April 2008 the applicant lodged an addendum to his notice in which he indicated the place, the timing and the goal of the planned event as well as the information about its organiser. He also asked to ensure the protection of a tent (to be positioned near the prosecutor\u2019s office) from 9 p.m. to 9 a.m. daily and the twenty-four-hour presence of an ambulance at the venue of the event. 7.  On 17 April 2008 the head of the public relations department of the local executive committee informed the applicant that his planned public event amounted to a \u201cpicket\u201d within the meaning of the Public Events Act (hereinafter \u201cPEA\u201d). In breach of the PEA the notice about the event did not contain information about the number of participants or arrangements to be made for preventing disorder and providing medical aid during the event. The applicant was required to align his notice with the PEA in that connection but, according to the Government, he failed to do so. 8.  According to the applicant, on 22 April 2008 he started to hold a solo demonstration at noon and continued it until 4 p.m., when he was arrested by the police. 9.  According to the Government, on 22 April 2008 at 3.15 p.m. the applicant set up on the lawn in front of the prosecutor\u2019s office a tent and a poster reading \u201cHunger strike. Call for signatures\u201d. He gathered passers-by and voiced his claims to them. At 3.40 p.m. a police officer drew up a record of an administrative offence allegedly committed by the applicant. He was accused of the breach of the procedure for the organisation of public events, an offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cCAO\u201d). The case file was then submitted to a justice of the peace, who adjourned the hearing so that the applicant could retain a counsel. It is unclear whether the applicant was arrested by the police or otherwise deprived of his liberty at any moment prior to appearing before the justice of the peace. 10.  At 8 p.m. on the same day the applicant returned to the site near the prosecutor\u2019s office and resumed his demonstration. The police ordered him to terminate this allegedly unlawful public event, but he refused. They compiled an administrative offence record, stating that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the CAO; they also compiled an administrative arrest record (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f). The applicant was then taken to the central police station of Naberezhniye Chelny where he was detained until 24 April 2008 in the afternoon. 11.  On 24 April 2008 the justice of the peace of the 8th Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 1 of the CAO and imposed a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles ((RUB), equivalent to 27 euros (EUR) at the time). The court noted that the applicant had intended to hold a non-stop hunger-strike making use of posters for an indefinite period of time; on 22 April 2008 he had held an unlawful picket by way of setting up a tent and a poster reading \u201cHunger strike. Call for signatures\u201d as well as by gathering passers-by and \u201ccampaigning\u201d among them. In breach of the PEA he had failed to specify his arrangements for preventing disorder or providing medical aid during the event. Moreover, the applicant had intended to hold a twenty-four-hour picket in breach of the PEA\u2019s ban on public events between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The court concluded that the applicant breached the procedure for the organisation of his public event. 12.  The applicant appealed to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. By a decision of 7 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment of the justice of the peace. 13.  In separate proceedings, on 7 May 2008 the justice of the peace of the 1st Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the CAO. The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of testimony of two eyewitnesses and police officers, that at 8 p.m. on 22 April 2008 the applicant being aware of the administrative offence proceedings pending against him under Article 20.2 of the CAO, had nevertheless disobeyed the lawful police order to stop the picket being held in breach of the PEA. The court sentenced him to seven days of administrative detention. The applicant\u2019s detention from 9 p.m. on 22 April to 3.35 p.m. on 24 April 2008 counted towards his sentence of administrative detention. 14.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. On 8 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment in a summary manner. 15.  On 3 June 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory-review appeal against the judgment of 7 May 2008. On 8 July 2008 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed it, fully endorsing the findings of the lower courts.", "references": ["5", "4", "3", "0", "9", "2", "7", "8", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Viana do Castelo (Portugal). 9.  The applicant is a lawyer by training and an auditor by profession. From 1993 onwards, he was no longer authorised to practise as a lawyer. By a decision of the Bar Council of 24 September 1993, the applicant was suspended from the roll, as the exercise of the profession of lawyer was considered to be incompatible with his practising as an auditor. This decision was published in the Official Gazette in June 2000. When the applicant ceased his activity as an auditor in April 2016, he continued to be suspended from the Bar Council\u2019s roll until at least the end of 2016 as the result of a disciplinary sanction imposed on him for having practised as a lawyer while not being authorised to do so. 10.  On 28 February 2008, in the context of a set of civil proceedings in which he was nevertheless acting as a lawyer, the applicant criticised the decisions taken by the judge hearing the case, saying that they were not worthy of a judge and that a judge could not lie or omit the truth in the exercise of his functions. The judge in question filed a complaint for insult with the public prosecutor\u2019s office. It is not clear from the material before the Court on what basis the applicant was acting as a lawyer in the context of those proceedings given the suspension from the roll referred to above. 11.  On 10 February 2010 the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Baixo\u2011Vouga District Court filed the prosecution\u2019s submissions against the applicant on a charge of insulting a judge. As the applicant had not instructed a lawyer, the public prosecutor\u2019s office appointed counsel on the basis of Article 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) to conduct the applicant\u2019s defence. 12.  On 12 March 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Baixo\u2011Vouga Criminal Investigation Court for the opening of adversarial investigation proceedings (abertura de instru\u00e7\u00e3o; see paragraph 39 below). He also sought leave to replace his officially appointed defence counsel and represent himself. 13.  In an order of 7 September 2010 the court agreed to open the investigation but dismissed the request for officially appointed defence counsel to be replaced and for the applicant to conduct his own defence. It held that the applicant was not entitled to act in the proceedings without the assistance of defence counsel. The court held that under the provisions of Portuguese law, in particular Article 32 of the Constitution and Articles 64 \u00a7 3 and 287 \u00a7 4 of the CCP (see paragraphs 28, 33 and 40 below), the defendant had the right to be represented by independent counsel, a right which would not be made effective if self-representation were to be allowed. Referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law on the subject, the court found that a defendant who was a lawyer could therefore not act in proceedings as his own counsel. 14.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Coimbra Court of Appeal against the order of 7 September 2010, challenging the decision not to allow him to represent himself in the criminal proceedings. 15.  On 21 December 2010 the Coimbra Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It considered the appeal to be admissible despite the fact that it had been lodged by the applicant in person, as it concerned the very issue whether the applicant, as the defendant, was entitled to conduct his own defence. The Court of Appeal stressed that Portuguese law on criminal procedure did not allow the procedural status of defendant to be combined with that of defence counsel in the same proceedings. It required that the defendant be assisted by defence counsel at the hearing before the investigating judge and at the trial in all cases where the proceedings concerned could give rise to a custodial sentence or a public-safety detention order. This reflected the premise that the accused would be better defended when the defence was conducted by a legal professional trained in advocacy. The latter, unencumbered by the emotional burden weighing on a defendant, could provide a lucid, dispassionate and effective defence. The law on criminal procedure was thus intended not to place limits on the defence\u2019s action, but to support the proper defence of the accused. 16.  On 11 May 2012 the Constitutional Court decided that it was not necessary to adjudicate on the constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant in person, in which he had complained about the lower courts\u2019 refusal to grant him leave to represent himself. The Constitutional Court found that the appeal had been neither signed nor endorsed by court-appointed defence counsel. The latter had not replied to the Constitutional Court\u2019s query of 11 April 2012 as to whether she endorsed the constitutional appeal signed by the applicant himself. 17.  On 20 September 2012 the Baixo-Vouga investigating judge held a hearing (debate instrut\u00f3rio), of which the applicant had been notified in person. The judge had previously refused to adjourn the hearing at the applicant\u2019s request, finding that the Court of Appeal had already given a final ruling on the applicant\u2019s application to represent himself. The applicant failed to attend the hearing, at which his court-appointed counsel was present. The investigating judge confirmed the charge against the applicant and referred the case for trial (despacho de pron\u00fancia) before the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 18.  On 12 December 2013 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court, following a hearing which the applicant again did not attend but at which his court\u2011 appointed defence lawyer was present, found the applicant guilty of aggravated insult (see paragraph 50 below) and ordered him to pay 140 day\u2011fines of nine euros (EUR) each as well as the costs of the proceedings. 19.  The applicant, who at no point requested legal aid to cover the cost of his trial, court-appointed counsel or counsel of his own choosing, was ordered, in particular, to pay costs amounting to EUR 150 for his representation by court-appointed counsel. He did not pay these costs and the execution of the cost order was later discontinued for lack of assets which could be seized. 20.  In an order dated 1 May 2014 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the judgment as inadmissible, on the ground that the appeal had not been signed by court-appointed defence counsel or by a lawyer instructed by the applicant. It confirmed that, as had previously been decided in a final decision, the applicant, as the defendant, did not have the right to represent himself in the proceedings. 21.  By an order dated 18 November 2014 the Porto Court of Appeal, acting through its President, dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant in person against the order of the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 22.  The Court of Appeal reiterated that, according to Portuguese law and well-established case-law, defendants in criminal proceedings, even if they were themselves lawyers, could not represent themselves but had to be assisted by defence counsel. It stressed that, as had also been argued by the General Council of the Bar Association in Opinion No. E-21/97 (see paragraphs 59-60 below), the provision of a criminal defence constituted a public-order interest. Therefore, the right to a defence could not be waived, even if this meant imposing a defence lawyer on the accused. Moreover, in adversarial proceedings the powers vested by law in the defence were incompatible in many situations with the position of the defendant. This was also clearly the case at the trial, taking into account, for example, the places to be occupied in the courtroom, the wearing of a gown and the cross-examination of witnesses. 23.  The Court of Appeal noted that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly confirmed, in particular in judgments nos. 578/2001 and 196/2007 (see paragraphs 52-55 below), that this interpretation and the corresponding legislation \u2013 including Article 64 \u00a7 1 (d) of the CCP, which stipulates that only defence counsel can lodge appeals (see paragraph 33 below) \u2013 was in keeping with the Constitution. Likewise, this approach was not in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or of the Convention. In Portugal, the accused had an array of procedural rights which went beyond the minimum standards guaranteed by these international instruments. 24.  The Court of Appeal explained that Portuguese law on criminal procedure granted accused persons ample opportunity to defend themselves in person. The defendant had a very comprehensive right to intervene in person at any time in the proceedings in order to make requests, offer points of clarification, reply, explain or submit statements (see, in particular, Articles 61 \u00a7 1 (b), 98 \u00a7 1, 272 \u00a7 1, 292 \u00a7 2, 332, 341(a) and 343 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CCP; paragraphs 30, 42 and 44 below). He also had the right to be the last person to address the court, immediately following the pleadings and before delivery of the judgment (see Article 361 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, paragraph 45 below). There was a distinction between, and a dual safeguard emanating from, the mandatory instruction of a lawyer to ensure the accused\u2019s \u201ctechnical\u201d defence and the possibility for the accused to be present and to intervene in the proceedings. 25.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that, having no valid reasons to depart from an interpretation rooted in case-law and legal literature, Portugal had not amended its law in this regard either before or after the Views adopted in 2006 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see paragraphs 63 et seq. below). 26.  As the applicant had not appointed counsel following his application to have the order of 18 November 2014 quashed, the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court\u2019s judgment of 12 December 2013 became final on 6 January 2015. 27.  According to the material before the Court, the applicant did not call into question the qualifications or quality of the court-appointed lawyer at any stage in the proceedings before the domestic courts.", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "1", "6", "7", "0", "2", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and currently lives in Alexandria (Egypt). 6.  On 15 February 2010, while crossing the border between Serbia and Croatia with his wife, the applicant was caught by the Croatian customs authorities carrying the sum of 563,300 euros (EUR) which he had failed to declare, contrary to the law. The customs authorities immediately seized the EUR 560,000. 7.  On the same day the customs authorities instituted administrative\u2011offence proceedings (prekr\u0161ajni postupak) against the applicant before the Financial Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija, Financijski inspektorat \u2013 \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) for failing to declare EUR 560,000 \u2013 a sum exceeding EUR 10,000 \u2013 an administrative offence defined in section 40(1) of the Foreign Currency Act and section 74 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act. 8.  In his defence, the applicant explained that he and his wife had been visiting her daughter in Serbia who had recently had a serious attack of epilepsy, and submitted documentary evidence suggesting that his wife\u2019s daughter did indeed suffer from epilepsy. The money he had been carrying originated from: (a) a company called SCI (soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile immobili\u00e8re) M. registered in France, of which he was the director and the only member, from whose account he had withdrawn EUR 326,008.03 with a view to starting another business; and (b) the sale of their house in France (the remaining amount). The applicant submitted relevant documents as evidence of those transactions. He also explained that he had not wished to deposit the money in a bank account because, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, he had been afraid that his bank would go bankrupt and that he would lose most of that money, given that the French State only guaranteed up to EUR 50,000 of bank deposits. 9.  During the proceedings the Ministry requested information from the relevant authorities in Serbia, France and Italy. While the Italian authorities did not reply at all, the Serbian authorities informed the Ministry that neither the applicant nor his wife had been recorded in their register of suspicious transactions, and the French authorities only confirmed the authenticity of the transactions on which the applicant relied to prove the origin of the money he had been carrying. 10.  By a decision of 9 July 2010 the Ministry found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence in question and fined him 5,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). At the same time, the Ministry imposed a protective measure (za\u0161titna mjera) confiscating EUR 318,500 under section 69(2) of the Foreign Currency Act. 11.  On the basis of the documentary evidence, the Ministry established that: (a)  the company SCI M. had been founded in 2002 and recorded in the business and companies register in Strasbourg, and under French law its members were liable for its debts in proportion with their share in the company, that is, the applicant in respect of 99.75% and his wife in respect of 0.25%; (b)  on 6 July 2009 the applicant had indeed sold his house in France, and EUR 243,091.82 from the proceeds of sale had been paid into his bank account on 29 July 2009, from which he had first transferred EUR 30,000 to his company\u2019s account on the same day and then withdrawn EUR 211,500; and (c)  on 21 December 2009 the applicant, acting as the company\u2019s director, had sold its real estate, and EUR 326,008.03 from the proceeds of sale had been paid into the company\u2019s bank account on 19 January 2010, a sum which had been withdrawn by the applicant the next day. 12.  The Ministry held that the origin of the money which the applicant had failed to declare was irrelevant in relation to the commission of the offence of which he had been convicted or the imposition of the fine. However, that consideration was relevant in relation to the imposition of the protective measure of confiscation. 13.  In particular, the Ministry decided not to confiscate EUR 241,500 of the money which the applicant had not declared, because it found that this sum did indeed originate from the sale of his house in France. 14.  As regards the remaining EUR 318,500 (of the EUR 560,000 which had been seized), the Ministry held that this sum was part of the funds which the applicant had withdrawn from his company\u2019s bank account (EUR 326,008.03) on 20 January 2010 (see paragraph 11 above). The Ministry further held that: (a)  since there was no evidence that the applicant had borrowed that money from his company, by carrying it across border he had disposed of it as if it had belonged to him, which amounted to misappropriation of the company\u2019s funds, an offence punishable in every country; and (b)  he had failed to pay the relevant taxes in France on that amount. It therefore decided to confiscate that sum. 15.  The applicant appealed by arguing that: (a)  the evidence collected indicated that the French authorities had been aware of the transaction from which the confiscated sum originated, but had done nothing about it, which suggested that they considered that it originated from a legitimate source, (b)  the Ministry correctly assumed that he had not borrowed the confiscated sum from his company, as he had actually lent EUR 358,600.81 to his company in 2008 and 2009, for which he had submitted documentary evidence; (c)  under French law, he was fully liable for the debts of his company, the payment of which, including taxes, he therefore could not have avoided by misappropriating the company\u2019s funds as the Ministry implied; (d)  the Ministry had attempted to interpret foreign (French) law, and in such a complex area as tax and commercial law, about which it had known very little; and (e)  it was peculiar that the Ministry had confiscated for the benefit of the Croatian State budget the amount on which he had, in the Ministry\u2019s own view, not paid the relevant taxes in France. 16.  By a decision of 17 September 2010 the High Court for Administrative Offences (Visoki prekr\u0161ajni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the Ministry\u2019s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 17.  The applicant then, on 17 December 2010, lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutionally protected right of ownership. 18.  By a decision of 17 November 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible and served its decision on his representative on 2 December 2012. It found that, even though the applicant had relied on the relevant Articles of the Constitution in his constitutional complaint, he had not substantiated his complaint by any constitutional-law arguments, but had merely repeated the arguments raised in the proceedings before the Ministry and the High Court for Administrative Offences. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had been unable to examine the merits of his constitutional complaint. 19.  The relevant domestic and international law and practice is summarised in the case of Boljevi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 43492/11, \u00a7\u00a7 16-21, 31 January 2017. 20.  Under French law, a soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile immobili\u00e8re (SCI) is a civil (non\u2011commercial) company constituted for the ownership and management of real estate (Articles 1845 to 1870-1 of the French Civil Code). It is a legal entity, meaning it has a legal personality distinct from that of its members. The members are, however, liable for the debts of the company without limitation, meaning that they may be liable in relation to their personal assets (Article 1857 of the French Civil Code).", "references": ["2", "5", "1", "7", "3", "8", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 30 December 2004 an investigator decided to institute criminal proceedings in connection with alleged usury by the applicant, proscribed by Article 213 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d). 6.  On 10 January 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered a search of the applicant\u2019s apartment. 7.  On 20 June 2005 the applicant was formally charged under Article 213 \u00a7 2 (1) and (2) of the CC with performing usury as a profession which resulted in dire financial consequences for the injured parties. On the same day the investigator decided, as a preventive measure, to have the applicant give a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 8.  On 23 June 2005 the investigator decided to confiscate for security the applicant\u2019s property. 9.  On 10 August 2005 the investigator sent the bill of indictment to the Kentron and Nork-Marash district prosecutor (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) for approval but on 15 August 2005 the prosecutor refused to approve it and returned the case to the investigator for further investigation. 10.  On 15 October 2005 the investigator initiated another set of criminal proceedings, under Article 178 \u00a7 2 (2) of the CC, concerning the acquisition of property rights through fraud by the applicant. On the same day this case was merged with the case on usury. 11.  On 8 and 29 December 2005 respectively the investigator ordered forensic handwriting examinations to be conducted. The results of these examinations were received on 13 and 20 January 2006 respectively. 12.  On 7 March 2006 the investigator decided to amend the applicant\u2019s charges and to bring new charges against him under Article 178 \u00a7\u00a7 2 (2) and 3 (1), Article 182 \u00a7 3 (2), Article 213 \u00a7 2 (1) and (2), and Article 349 \u00a7 1 of the CC on account of fraud in large and particularly large amounts, extortion in particularly large amounts, usury performed as a profession which resulted in dire financial consequences for the injured parties, and forgery of evidence. 13.  On the same date the investigator lodged an application with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to have the applicant detained for a period of two months, which was rejected by the District Court. However, upon an appeal by the prosecutor, on 28 March 2006 the Court of Appeal overturned the District Court\u2019s decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months. 14.  On 29 and 30 March and 13 April 2006 the investigator lodged applications with the District Court for a search warrant and to confiscate information covered by bank secrecy. These applications were granted on 29 and 31 March and 13 April 2006. 15.  On 14 July 2006 the supervising prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and the case was sent to the District Court, which took it over on 24 July 2006. 16.  By the District Court\u2019s decision of 18 August 2006 the case was set for trial. Between 25 August 2006 and 11 October 2007, the court held twelve hearings which were adjourned because of the absence of victims and/or witnesses. In addition, on ten occasions the hearings were adjourned because of applications by the prosecutor or on the court\u2019s own motion, and on nine occasions because the applicant\u2019s applications were granted. On three occasions the court decided to have the absent witnesses and/or victims brought by force to the hearing. 17.  On 9 July 2007 the District Court granted an application by the applicant\u2019s counsel to have him released on bail. 18.  On 15 October 2007 the powers of the judge in charge of the applicant\u2019s case were suspended. On 1 November 2007 another judge took over the case and the examination of the case started anew. 19.  Between 21 November 2007 and 23 December 2010, the court held forty hearings which were adjourned because of the absence of the applicant or his lawyer or because of applications lodged by them. In addition, on thirty-five occasions the hearings were adjourned because of the absence of the victims or witnesses or because of applications lodged by them, and on thirty-two occasions because the prosecutor\u2019s applications had been granted or because the court had decided to adjourn the case of its own motion. On five occasions the court decided to have the absent witnesses and victims brought by force to the hearing. 20.  On 28 August 2009 and 12 October 2010 respectively the prosecutor decided to amend the charges and/or to bring new charges against the applicant. 21.  In March and June 2010 the District Court partially granted or refused applications, introduced by the applicant and one of the victims, requesting that it order a forensic examination. 22.  On 31 January 2011 the District Court gave judgement, finding the applicant guilty of five counts of the offences set out in Article 178 \u00a7 3 (1) (fraud), Article 182 \u00a7 3 (2) (extortion), Article 213 \u00a7 2 (1) and (2) (usury), and Article 349 \u00a7 1 (forgery of evidence) of the CC and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment, confiscated half of his property and imposed a fine of 400,000 Armenian drams (AMD). It appears that during the proceedings the District Court examined forty-seven witnesses, about thirty pieces of documentary evidence and five expert opinions, one of which was ordered by the District Court. 23.  The applicant and the prosecutor appealed against this judgment. 24.  On 3 October 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the appeals and upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment. 25.  The applicant\u2019s counsel lodged an appeal on points of law. 26.  On 21 November 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "5", "7", "1", "0", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bijela (Montenegro). 10.  On 29 September 1992, the applicant\u2019s father-in-law, Vu.Z., represented by his wife K.Z., concluded a contract with F.O. and H.A. for the exchange of his house in Dubrovnik for a house in Trebinje (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 11.  Vu.Z. died on an unknown date between 2001 and 2002. 12.  On 14 August 2002 the applicant\u2019s husband M.Z., who was a son of Vu.Z., represented by a certain M.\u010c. from Herceg Novi (Montenegro), brought a civil action in the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Dubrovniku) against F.O.\u2019s heirs and H.A., seeking to have the contract for the exchange of the houses declared null and void and to obtain the possession of the house in Dubrovnik. M.\u010c. was a practising lawyer in Montenegro. 13.  M.Z. claimed that the contract had contained incorrect information with regard to the legal status of the house in Trebinje and that K.Z. had not had the necessary authorisation to sign such a contract. He further alleged that the contract had been signed under duress because of circumstances arising from the war in Croatia. He also submitted that the difference in the values of the properties exchanged had been disproportionate in that the house in Dubrovnik was worth about 250,000-300,000 euros (EUR) and the house in Trebinje some EUR 80,000-90,000. Lastly, he stressed that it had been impossible for him to regularise his ownership of the house in Trebinje due to the irregularities in the contract. 14.  In his action, M.Z. indicated the value of the subject matter of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 10,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) (approximately EUR 1,300 at the time). 15.  On 16 August 2002 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (hereafter: \u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) invited M.Z. to clarify the circumstances relating to his legal representation, in particular by providing a valid power of attorney, and to provide some further documents concerning his claim. 16.  A first hearing in the case was held on 3 March 2003. At that hearing, the Dubrovnik Municipal Court instructed M.Z. to provide documents attesting to his standing as heir of Vu.Z. 17.  Further to this hearing, the parties exchanged pleadings and documentary evidence requested by the Municipal Court. 18.  At a hearing on 13 December 2004 the respondents insisted that the issue of M.Z.\u2019s representation by M.\u010c. needed to be clarified. The latter stated that he would no longer represent M.Z., who would instruct a lawyer in Croatia to represent him. 19.  A further hearing was held on 1 February 2005. M.Z. was represented by I.B., a lawyer practising in Dubrovnik (who is also representing the applicant in the current proceedings before the Court). At the hearing, the lawyer I.B. corrected some clerical omissions in the civil action and reiterated the arguments for declaring the contract null and void as set forth in the civil action, namely that the contract had been signed under duress, that the legal status and ownership of the house in Trebinje had not been properly stated and that there had been a disproportionate difference in the value of the properties. In reply to a question by the trial judge concerning the validity of the power of attorney issued by Vu.Z. to his wife K.Z. (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above), I.B. stressed that he did not consider that power of attorney to be invalid as an original had been deposited in the relevant register. The respondents challenged the arguments advanced on behalf of M.Z. on the basis that there were no grounds for declaring the contract null and void. 20.  At a hearing on 6 April 2005 the lawyer I.B. explained that following the termination of the hearing he would no longer represent M.Z., who would in future be represented by the applicant (his wife). At the same hearing, I.B. submitted two documents. In the first he requested that the validity of the power of attorney issued by Vu.Z. to his wife K.Z. (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 19 above) be examined on the grounds that there were doubts as to its authenticity. In the same document he asked that a preliminary measure (injunction) be issued preventing any disposal of the property in dispute. In the second document he explained that the value of the subject matter of the dispute had been set too low, and indicated the new value of the subject matter of the dispute at HRK 105,000 (approximately EUR 14,160 at the time). 21.  At the same hearing, the respondents contested the suggestion that there was any issue with the validity of the power of attorney, pointing out that at a hearing held on 1 February 2005 I.B. had not challenged that validity. The respondents also opposed the request for an injunction. Finally, they objected to the change of the value of the subject matter of the dispute, arguing that it had been increased only in order to enable the claimant to lodge an appeal on points of law. 22.  After hearing the parties\u2019 pleas, the Municipal Court questioned the respondents as witnesses. Following their questioning, at M.Z.\u2019s request the Dubrovnik Municipal Court adjourned the hearing in order to obtain the original of the impugned power of attorney and reserved its decision on the request for an injunction. No decision was adopted with regard to the change of the value of the subject matter of the dispute. 23.  On 25 April 2005 the Municipal Court ordered M.Z. to pay court fees of HRK 1,400 (approximately EUR 190 at the time) for bringing the civil action. It assessed the fees by reference to a value of the dispute set at HRK 105,000. 24.  At a hearing on 13 September 2005 the Municipal Court examined the materials available in the file, following which it concluded the hearing. 25.  By a judgment of 27 September 2005 the Municipal Court dismissed M.Z.\u2019s claim and the request for an injunction. It found that despite repeated attempts to summon M.Z. to the hearing, he had failed to appear without providing any valid reasons. Also, in the light of the parties\u2019 arguments, including on the issues regarding the power of attorney on the basis of which the contract had been concluded, it found no grounds to doubt the validity of the contract. The Municipal Court ordered that M.Z. was to bear all the litigation costs, including the expenses of the opposing parties, in the amount of HRK 25,931.10 (approximately EUR 3,480 at the time). It assessed the costs of the proceedings by reference to the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated at the hearing on 6 April 2005, namely HRK 105,000. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201c... [T]he costs of the proceedings were awarded to the respondents [and assessed] according to ... the value of the dispute indicated by the claimant (HRK 105,000 \u2011 (page 58 [of the case-file]) which this court accepted.\u201d 26.  On 12 December 2005 the first-instance court ordered M.Z. to pay court fees of HRK 1,400 for the judgment. It also assessed these fees by reference to a value of HRK 105,000 for the dispute. 27.  By judgment of 1 October 2009 the Dubrovnik County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Dubrovniku; hereafter: \u201cthe County Court\u201d) dismissed an appeal by M.Z. and upheld the first-instance judgment. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIn view of the fact that the [first-instance judgment] is challenged in its entirety, thus including also the decision on the costs of the proceedings, and although the appeal is not specified in that respect, [it is to be noted that] the decision on the costs of the proceedings is based on the relevant law and adequate reasons are provided.\u201d 28.  On 24 May 2010 M.Z. lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court challenging the findings of the lower courts. 29.  On 7 October 2010 M.Z. died. The proceedings were taken over by his wife Vesna Zubac, the applicant, as his heir. 30.  By a decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris, finding that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was below the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000 (approximately EUR 13,500 at the time). It held that the applicable value of the subject matter of the dispute was that set out in the claimant\u2019s statement of claim in the civil action. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cWith regard to section 40 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act if, in a situation referred to in subsection 2, it is obvious that the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated by the claimant is too high or too low, so that an issue arises concerning jurisdiction over the subject matter, the composition of the court, the type of proceedings, the right to lodge an appeal on points of law, the authorisation for representation or the costs of proceedings, the court shall, ex officio or upon the objection of the respondent, by the latest at the preparatory hearing or, if no preparatory hearing has been held, at the first session of the main hearing before the respondent has begun litigation on the merits of the case, quickly and in an appropriate manner verify the accuracy of the value specified and, by a decision against which no separate appeal is allowed, determine the value of the subject matter of the dispute.\nIt follows that when an action does not concern a sum of money the claimant is obliged to indicate the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute in the civil action, after which the claimant is not allowed to change the [indicated] value of the dispute. Only a court may set the value of the subject matter of the dispute, ex officio or if an objection is raised by the respondent, if it establishes that the value indicated in the civil action is too high or too low, by the latest at the preparatory hearing or, if no preparatory hearing has been held, at the main hearing before the examination of the merits.\nIn the present case the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in the statement of claim is 10,000 Croatian kunas.\nLater on, at the hearing of 6 April 2005, the claimant\u2019s representative indicated the value of the subject matter of the dispute at 105,000 Croatian kunas considering that it had been indicated too low in the civil action. However, the claimant did not amend the claim at the same time. The first-instance court did not adopt a decision on a new value for the dispute because the procedural requirements under section 40 (3) of the CPA [Civil Procedure Act] were not met.\nIt follows that the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute is the one indicated by the claimant in the civil action, namely 10,000 Croatian kunas, because the claimant was not allowed to change the indicated value if he did not amend his claim at the same time.\u201d 31.  By a decision of 10 November 2011 the Constitutional Court summarily declared a constitutional complaint by the applicant, complaining, inter alia, of a lack of access to the Supreme Court, inadmissible on the grounds that the case raised no constitutional issues. On 30 November 2011 it served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative.", "references": ["8", "4", "0", "6", "5", "2", "1", "7", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a legal entity, a local community of the Christian Baptist Church in the Republic of Poland operating on the basis of the Act of 30 June 1995 on Relations Between the Republic of Poland and the Christian Baptist Church Act (ustawa o stosunku Pa\u0144stwa Polskiego do Ko\u015bciola Chrze\u015bcijan Baptyst\u00f3w w RP \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe 1995 Act\u201d) with its seat in Wroc\u0142aw. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The case concerns a property with a four-storey building and another building dedicated to sacral purposes in Wroc\u0142aw. Before World War II the property was used by the Baptist Commune belonging to the Bund Evangelisch-Freikirchlicher Gemeinden in Deutschland operating on the territory of the German Reich. The property number was 1077/42. It measured 0.785 ha. 8.  On 4 September 1946 the Wroc\u0142aw Governor (Wojewoda Wroc\u0142awski) decided that the property in question should become subject to the applicant church\u2019s management (przej\u0119cie w zarz\u0105d) on the basis of section 2(4) of the 1946 Decree on abandoned property (dekret o maj\u0105tkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe 1946 Decree\u201d). 9.  In 1956 the applicant church lodged a request to be registered in the land and mortgage register as the owner of the property and the request was granted. The property was registered under the number 945. 10.  On 23 April 1959 the Minister of the Economy announced a new interpretation of section 2 (4) of the 1946 Decree. 11.  On 23 June 1959 the District Residential Buildings Board for Wroc\u0142aw-Krzyki (Dzielnicowy Zarz\u0105d Budynk\u00f3w Mieszkalnych) decided that all kinds of property which were subject to the church\u2019s management were to pass into the ownership of the State and ordered that the applicant church transfer the property in question to the State. The order did not concern the part of the property which was dedicated exclusively to sacral purposes. 12.  On 19 August 1966 a new land-register entry 35905 was opened for the property no. 1077/42. The land-register entry 945 was however not closed. 13.  In 1968 the property was registered under the land-register number 35905 was given a new plot number 9 and its area was recalculated. The new measurement was 0.371 ha. It appears that the plot number 9 constituted only a part of the previous property number 1077/42 and comprised only the building dedicated to sacral purposes. 14.  The remaining part of the original property number 1077/42, which comprised the four-storey building, was given new plot numbers 39 and 33/5. It measured 0.325 ha and a new land-register entry 63650 was opened for it. In 1977 the State was registered as the owner of this property and, after the reform of the local governments of 1990, the property was transferred to the City of Wroc\u0142aw. 15.  The present application concerns the right to the property referred to above in paragraph 14. 16.  On 9 May 1996 the applicant church requested that the Wroc\u0142aw Governor issue a decision confirming the applicant church\u2019s ownership of the property in question. It relied on the newly enacted 1995 Act (see paragraphs 47-50 below). 17.  On 12 September 1996 the Wroc\u0142aw Governor refused to issue a decision which would confirm that the property in question belonged to the applicant church. The Governor found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy a requirement laid down in section 39 of the 1995 Act, specifically that it had not possessed the property in question on the day of entry into force of the Act relied upon. The Governor further held that:\n\u201c... in the circumstances of the case, section 40 of the Act likewise cannot be applied because the property in question is located on territory which was not part of Poland before 1 September 1939. The fact that the property was owned by an organisational unit of the Baptist Church operating in the German Reich does not constitute a basis to claim return of ownership because its ownership was transferred to the State under the [1946 Decree].\u201d 18.  On 23 September 1996 the applicant church appealed against this decision to the Minister of the Interior and Administration. 19.  On 18 February 1998 the applicant church sent a letter to the Minister, specifying that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded and requested that the Minister issue a decision. 20.  On 1 July 1998 the Minister replied that the length of the proceedings was attributable to amendments of the 1995 Act and informed the applicant church that the relevant decision would be issued by 15 August 1998. 21.  This time-limit was not respected and therefore, on 12 January 1999, the applicant church lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint in respect of the alleged inactivity of the administrative authority. 22.  On 5 March 1999, before examination of the applicant church\u2019s complaint, the Minister of the Interior and Administration issued a decision, annulling the challenged decision and ordering the return of the case to the Governor. The Minister ordered that, when re-examining the case, the Governor should take into account the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act. 23.  In view of the fact that the Minister had issued a decision, on 28 April 1999 the applicant church withdrew the complaint of 12 January 1999 concerning the inactivity of the administrative authority. 24.  After remittal of the case, on 24 March 1999, the Governor of Lower Silesia (Wojewoda Dolno\u015bl\u0105ski) asked the Wroc\u0142aw Commune whether there was any property available which could be granted to the applicant church in return for the property in question. It appears that the Governor\u2019s letter was left without reply. 25.  On 29 May 1999 the Governor requested from the Minister of the Interior and Administration an official interpretation of the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act \u201cin view of the many doubts as regards the proper interpretation of this provision\u201d. 26.  On 20 June 2000 the Minister replied that, since the administrative authorities were bound by provisions of law binding on the day of decision, it was irrelevant that the applicant church\u2019s original request had been lodged when section 4 of the 1995 Act had had different wording. 27.  On 21 July 2000 the applicant church asked the Governor to issue a decision in its case, pointing out that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded. 28.  On 20 October 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint (za\u017calenie) with the Minister of the Interior and Administration that the Governor had exceeded the statutory time-limits and had failed to issue a decision on the merits or to justify the delay in the proceedings. 29.  On 7 December 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court about the alleged inactivity of the Governor. 30.  On 1 March 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration found the applicant church\u2019s complaint of 20 October 2000 well founded and ordered the Governor to issue a decision on the merits before 30 April 2001. 31.  On 30 April 2001 the Governor stayed the proceedings. 32.  On 7 July 2001 the applicant church appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings. 33.  On 17 December 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration allowed the appeal, finding that the proceedings should not have been stayed, annulled the challenged decision and returned the case to the Governor. 34.  On 12 March 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant church\u2019s complaint against the inactivity of the administrative authority and ordered the Governor of Lower Silesia to issue a decision on the merits within the time-limit of thirty days. 35.  On 21 June 2002 the Governor\u2019s office gave a decision and refused to return the property in question to the applicant church. It found that the applicant church, although registered as owner under the land-register number 945 and treated in the past by the administrative authorities as owner, had never in fact owned the property, which had only been left under the applicant church\u2019s administration (oddane w zarz\u0105d). 36.  On 12 July 2002 the applicant church appealed. 37.  On 23 September 2002 the Minister of the Interior and Administration annulled the challenged decision and returned the case for re-examination to the Governor. The Minister found, among other things, that the Governor had had no right to question the validity of the entry in the land register. 38.  On 23 February 2003 the applicant church complained to the Governor about the delay in the proceedings. 39.  On 8 February 2007 the Governor\u2019s office gave a procedural decision in which it held that owing to the particularly complicated nature of the case, the decision on the merits could not be issued within the statutory time-limits and set a new deadline for decision of 30 June 2007. 40.  On 18 June 2007 the Governor of Lower Silesia gave a decision on the merits and refused to return to the applicant church the property in question. The Governor relied on the amended 1995 Act and found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy the requirements laid down in section 4 of the Act, namely that it could not be a legal successor of the Church which had not operated on the territory of Poland before 1 September 1939. 41.  On 11 July 2007 the applicant church appealed. 42.  On 6 February 2008 the Minister of the Interior and Administration upheld the challenged decision. 43.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. 44.  On 12 September 2008 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church\u2019s complaint. 45.  On 10 November 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint against the Regional Administrative Court\u2019s judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court. 46.  On 13 October 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church\u2019s complaint. The judgment was served on the applicant church\u2019s lawyer on 6 January 2010.", "references": ["7", "5", "1", "2", "8", "6", "0", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Varna. 6.  The applicant and his wife divorced on 21 August 2006 pursuant to a court-approved agreement between the two of them. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant undertook to pay child support to the two children born during the marriage and agreed to his wife\u2019s keeping his family name after the divorce. 7.  Subsequently, the applicant learned that his former wife had conceived their second child, born in 2003, as a result of a relationship with another man during her marriage to the applicant. The applicant underwent a DNA test to determine whether he was the father of the younger child. The DNA test \u2012 the result of which the applicant received on 15 January 2007 \u2012 established that he was not the biological father of the second child. The results of this DNA test were never considered by a court. 8.  Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry \u2013 in 2004 \u2013 of the year-long limitation period counting from the child\u2019s birth or from learning thereof (see the section \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d below\u201d). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007. 9.  The applicant brought subsequent proceedings in which he sought to stop paying child support to the second child. On 20 May 2008 his claim was rejected by the Varna District Court, which found that it had not been proven that the applicant was not the child\u2019s father, given that he had not rebutted the legal presumption under Article 32 (1) of the Family Code 1985 (\u201cthe 1985 Code\u201d).", "references": ["9", "7", "2", "0", "8", "3", "1", "6", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Stara Zagora. 6.  On 18 August 2002 the police conducted a search of the applicant\u2019s home in Stara Zagora and discovered a certain quantity of cannabis. The applicant was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention on 30 August 2002. Criminal proceedings were brought against him. 7.  By judgment of 22 May 2003 the Stara Zagora Regional Court found the applicant guilty of the unlawful possession of 14.44 grams of cannabis and sentenced him to three-and-a-half years\u2019 imprisonment. The court decided to deduct the time spent in pre-trial detention from the sentence. 8.  The applicant appealed. 9.  By judgment of 13 October 2003 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal set aside the aforementioned judgment and reduced the sentence to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 10.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 11.  By decision of 6 April 2004, at the request of counsel for the applicant, the Supreme Court of Cassation replaced the pre-trial detention with a straightforward judicial supervision measure (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430) and ordered the applicant\u2019s release. 12.  The applicant was released on 7 April 2004, having spent one year, seven months and eight days in pre-trial detention. 13.  By judgment of 25 May 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 14.  On 23 September 2004 the applicant filed with the Sofia City Court an action for damages based on section 2(6) of the Law on State Responsibility for Damages against the Stara Zagora Regional Court, the Plovdiv Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the public prosecutor\u2019s office. In his statement of claim he submitted that the period of time which he had spent in pre-trial detention during the criminal proceedings against him had exceeded the length of the sentence imposed on him by the courts. He claimed 11,500 Bulgarian Lev (BGL) in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which he had sustained. An initial hearing was held on 30 November 2004 before the Sofia City Court. 15.  At the hearing on 11 October 2005 the representative of the Plovdiv Court of Appeal, Judge N.D., presented a copy of the judgment delivered on 3 October 2005 by the Stara Zagora Regional Court (see paragraph 27 below), and invited the Sofia City Court to adjourn the civil case until the end of the second set of criminal proceedings against the applicant. He emphasised that the applicant\u2019s action for damages should be dismissed on account of that fresh conviction. Pursuant to Article 182 paragraph 1 (g) of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), the court allowed that request on the grounds that the outcome of the second set of criminal proceedings might prove decisive for the outcome of the compensation proceedings. 16.  Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, the civil compensation proceedings resumed in January 2006. 17.  By judgment of 24 October 2006 the Sofia City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. The applicant appealed to the Sofia Court of Appeal. 18.  On 10 July 2007 that court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It noted that at the end of the second set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraphs 20-32 below) the applicant had been sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment and that that sentence had been combined with the prison sentence passed on him at the end of the first set of criminal proceedings. It further noted that the criminal courts had also deduced from the combined sentence the period of one year seven months which the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention during the first set of criminal proceedings, and found that therefore the length of the applicant\u2019s detention had not exceeded the sentence imposed on him. 19.  An appeal on points of law lay against that judgment, but the applicant did not avail himself of that option. 20.  On 14 October 2004 the Stara Zagora regional prosecutor\u2019s office drew up a formal indictment against the applicant and committed him for trial before the Stara Zagora Regional Court for narcotics trafficking during the period from 21 March 2000 to 14 March 2002. 21.  At the hearing on 18 October 2004 counsel for the applicant requested the transfer of the case to another regional court. She alleged that the judges of the Stara Zagora Regional Court were not impartial, on the grounds that their court was a respondent in the framework of the action for damages brought by the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). 22.  That request was dismissed by the trial court as ill-founded, on the following grounds: \u201cas regards the formal indictment presented, there is information to the effect that that indictment was received in the Sofia City Court on 29 September 2004, and there is no information to suggest that civil proceedings have been formally commenced by the court of first instance\u201d. The trial court further held that there had been no evidence of bias on the part of any of the two professional judges and the three lay judges sitting in the trial court, who had not been involved in the first set of criminal proceedings against the applicant. 23.  Nevertheless, the President of the trial court, who was also acting as Judge Rapporteur, decided to withdraw from the case on the grounds that he had sat on the trial bench which had previously convicted the applicant (see paragraphs 6-13 above). The hearing was adjourned to enable the defence to acquaint itself with the case file and the indictment. 24.  In his written observations of 21 October and 8 November 2004 in reply to the indictment, the applicant repeated his argument concerning the alleged bias on the part of all the regional court judges and requested their collective withdrawal and the assignment of the case to another court. He submitted that it had been in judges\u2019 interest to give him a prison sentence in order to prevent a finding against their court in the framework of the compensation proceedings before the Sofia City Court. 25.  At the 10 January 2005 hearing counsel for the applicant called once again for the withdrawal of all the regional court judges and the assignment of the case to another court of the same level of jurisdiction. That request was dismissed on the following grounds: none of the lawful reasons for the withdrawal of judges set out in Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been established in the present case; there was no evidence of bias on the part of the trial court judges, the case had been examined by a different court whose impartiality was unchallenged and the regional court had no means of influencing the outcome of the respective proceedings; and in any event, an appeal lay against the regional court\u2019s future decision in that criminal case. 26.  The regional court examined the criminal case of drug-trafficking between 10 January and 3 October 2005. It gathered material evidence and heard a number of experts and prosecution and defence witnesses. The court refused to summon two defence witnesses and to put specific questions to the prosecution witnesses as being irrelevant to the establishment of the facts. 27.  By judgment of 3 October 2005, the regional court found the applicant guilty of the unlawful purchase, possession and sale of a certain quantity of cannabis between March 2000 and March 2002, and sentenced him to sixteen year\u2019 imprisonment. The court decided to combine that sentence with that imposed at the end of the first set of criminal proceedings and to deduct the period spent in pre-trial detention between 2002 and 2004. 28.  On 17 October 2005 the applicant appealed to the Plovdiv Court of Appeal against the regional court\u2019s judgment. On several subsequent occasions his lawyer filed additional observations complaining of various procedural shortcomings on the part of the regional court and the investigating authorities and contesting that court\u2019s factual and legal findings. In her observations of 18 January 2006 counsel for the applicant complained of bias on the part of the judges of the court of first instance, inter alia on account of that court\u2019s refusal to transmit the case file to another court for assessment. 29.  The Plovdiv Court of Appeal examined the criminal case in a public hearing held on 23 January 2005. Counsel for the applicant did not request the withdrawal of the appeal court judges. That court heard a witness and accepted new written evidence presented by the defence. In her pleadings counsel complained, in particular, of the insufficiency of the evidence to convict the applicant, called for her client\u2019s acquittal and, in the alternative, sought the referral of the case to the lower-level court on grounds of procedural shortcomings. 30.  By judgment of 25 January 2006 the court of appeal set aside the regional court\u2019s judgment. It excluded some evidence as being in breach of defence rights, and two statements given during the preliminary investigation which the court of first instance had taken into account. It considered, however, that the other evidence gathered had confirmed that the applicant had been involved in cannabis trafficking, and found no other breach of the applicant\u2019s procedural rights. The court sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and upheld the part of the regional court\u2019s decision relating to the combination of sentences and the deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention. 31.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His lawyer submitted, inter alia, that the appellate court had not addressed the allegation of bias on the part of the court of first instance. 32.  By judgment of 16 November 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation set aside the 25 January 2006 judgment of the Plovdiv Court of Appeal, reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to three years\u2019 imprisonment, combined the latter with the sentence imposed during the first set of criminal proceedings and deducted the period spent in pre-trial detention during the first set of criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the applicant only had in fact to serve a seventeen-month prison sentence.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "7", "4", "8", "1", "2", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1985, 1988 and 1984 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Moscow. The third applicant lived in the Moscow region and died there on 10 December 2007. 6.  On 11 March 2007 elections to the Moscow City Duma were held. The applicants came to a polling station at about 10.30 a.m. They started to loudly criticise the elections and were immediately (at about 10.35 a.m.) arrested and brought to the Odintsovo police station. 7.  At 3.30 p.m. on the same day the local prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal proceedings against the applicants. It follows from its decision that at 10.30 a.m. on 11 March 2011 at polling station no. 1763 the applicants had unrolled banners, turned on smoke jets and distributed leaflets in an attempt to disturb the work of the polling station. Their unlawful actions had been interrupted by the police. 8.  At 6.30 p.m. on the same day the police started to draw up arrest records in respect of the applicants. According to those records the applicants were arrested at the Odintsovo police station. The first applicant was arrested at 6.30 p.m., the third applicant at 7.00 p.m. and the second applicant at 7.30 p.m. 9.  On 13 March 2007 the investigator asked the Odintsovo Town Court to remand the applicants in custody. 10.  During the hearings on the same day - which lasted from 11.30 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. for the first applicant, from 9.40 a.m. to 10.25 a.m. for the second applicant and from 10.30 a.m. to 11.25 a.m. for the third applicant \u2013 the judge heard the prosecutor, the applicants and their counsel. She also read the prosecutor\u2019s applications for remand. No other documents were examined at the hearings. 11.  On the same day, 13 March 2007, the Odintsovo Town Court ordered that the applicants be remanded in custody. The court found that the prosecutor\u2019s applications had been supported by evidence showing the necessity of placing the applicants in custody in view of the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the investigation. 12.  On the same day the applicants prepared their preliminary appeal submissions against the detention orders and asked the detention facility administration to dispatch them. It follows from a document issued by the detention facility administration that the first applicant\u2019s submissions were dispatched on 14 March 2007. However, the submissions by the second and third applicants were not dispatched until 23 March 2007. 13.  On 20 March 2007 counsel for the applicants lodged additional appeal submissions. They complained that they had not still received copies of the detention orders of 13 March 2007. They further argued that the Town Court had disregarded the fact that the offence imputed to the applicants was not a serious one, that they had permanent places of residence, had positive references and studied at a university. On the same day counsel asked for permission to study the case-file. Their request was however rejected because the case file had been taken by the judge who was currently on leave. 14.  On 27 March 2007 counsel for the applicants complained before the Odintsovo Town Court that the investigators had denied them access to the case file and had refused to give them copies of, in particular, the prosecutor\u2019s applications for remand and of the detention orders. 15.  On 29 March 2007 the second applicant received a copy of his detention order. The first and third applicants received copies of their respective detention orders on 30 March 2007. The delay in serving the detention orders on the applicants was due to the fact that the judge had sent the documents to the Mozhaysk detention facility, although the applicants were held at the Odintsovo detention facility. 16.  On 3 April 2007 the Odintsovo Town Court found that the investigators had unlawfully restricted counsel\u2019s access to the case file and had thereby violated the applicants\u2019 defence rights. However, it was not until 6 April 2007 that counsel were ultimately granted access to the case file. 17.  On 9 April 2007 counsel lodged additional appeal submissions in which they complained about the belated access to the case file. They further complained that the detention order had been based on insufficient reasons and that no time-limit for detention had been fixed. The evidence showing the existence of the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the investigation to which the Town Court had referred in its detention orders had not been examined during the hearings and the applicants had not been given an opportunity to challenge it. They also complained that the investigator who had lodged the application for remand had acted outside his competence and that the detention orders had been issued more than forty-eight hours after the arrest. Moreover, the applicants\u2019 arrest had been unlawful because the arrest records had been drawn with several hours\u2019 delay. Finally, the applicants asked to be brought to the courtroom for the appeal hearing. 18.  On 11 April 2007 the Moscow Regional Court held an appeal hearing. The applicants were not brought to the courtroom. On the same day the Regional Court quashed the detention orders of 13 March 2007. It found that the detention orders had been based on insufficient reasons. The Town Court had disregarded the facts that the charges were not serious, that the applicants had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence and studied at a university. There was no evidence that they had threatened witnesses or had attempted to destroy evidence. The Town Court\u2019s finding that the applicants might abscond, interfere with the investigation or reoffend had not been therefore supported by relevant facts. The Regional Court ordered the applicants\u2019 immediate release. 19.  Counsel for the applicants asked the court to give them copies of the appeal decisions so that they could bring it to the detention facility and have the applicants immediately released. Their request was refused. 20.  On 12 April 2007 counsel asked for a second time for copies of the appeal decisions. By letter dated 18 April 2007 the President of the Moscow Regional Court informed them that under the domestic law copies were to be sent by post to the detention facility, which had been done on 12 April 2007. Copies of the detention orders could not be given to counsel. 21.  On the same day, 12 April 2007, counsel asked the director of the detention facility to release the applicants, referring to the Regional Court\u2019s order to release them. However, the director refused to release the applicants because the appeal decisions had not yet been received by the detention facility. 22.  The appeal decisions were received by the detention facility on 13 April 2007. On the same day the applicants were released.", "references": ["4", "3", "5", "6", "8", "9", "0", "7", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1965 and 1966 respectively and live in Moscow. 6.  The applicant, who was one of the indirect beneficial owners of a company, arranged for it to be sold to another company. On 1 October 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud through the execution of a sham sales contract. It was alleged, in particular, that the company purchasing the applicant\u2019s company also belonged to the applicant and the price it paid had been unrealistically low. On 3 October 2013 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Taganskiy District Court\u201d) held a hearing to determine a preventive measure in respect of the applicant. The latter argued that he should not be detained by reliance on Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d), which prohibits the remanding in custody of people suspected or accused of offences committed within the sphere of their business activities. The Taganskiy District Court dismissed that argument in the following terms:\n\u201c... [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence aimed at making a profit which was unconnected to any business activity and had been organised by a group of people; [the offence being] punishable with up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment, some of the accomplices have not yet been identified and arrested.\u201d 7.  On 21 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 8.  On 28 November 2013 and 27 January 2014 the Taganskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention, repeating its previous findings. On 27 December 2013 and 18 April 2014 respectively the Moscow City Court upheld the above detention extensions on appeal. 9.  On 28 March 2014 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Ostankinskiy District Court\u201d) further extended the applicant\u2019s detention. As regards Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP, the District Court stated as follows:\n\u201cThe court dismisses the arguments of the defence and of [the applicant] himself that the offence of which he is accused was committed within the sphere of his business activity because, according to the current bill of indictment, he is accused of having committed an offence motivated by profit with the aim of misappropriating another\u2019s property by way of deception or abuse of trust, using an organised group, and on a particularly large scale. The court therefore concludes that the offence imputed to [the applicant] was not connected to the carrying out of a business activity, which is an independent activity undertaken at one\u2019s own risk with the aim of obtaining regular revenues from the use of possessions, the sale of goods, or the performance of works or services by people registered in such a capacity in accordance with the law.\u201d 10.  On 14 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the detention extension order of 28 March 2014. It held that the first-instance court had examined and dismissed with proper substantiation the applicant\u2019s argument that his alleged offence had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. 11.  On 10 April 2015 the Moscow City Court granted bail to the applicant. Upon deposit of the bail sum on 17 April 2015 the applicant was released. 12.  On 15 September 2014 a criminal investigation was opened into the misappropriation of the funds of an insolvent bank. On 23 September 2014 the applicant, who owned the bank, was arrested on suspicion of having transferred money out of the bank\u2019s account by acquiring unsecured promissory notes. 13.  On 25 September 2014 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Tverskoy District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant argued that he should not be detained, inter alia, because he was suspected of an offence committed within the sphere of his business activity. The Tverskoy District Court rejected the argument as follows:\n\u201c... the court takes the view that, as can be seen from the evidence in the case, the method and circumstances described in the decision to initiate the criminal investigation, and the actions of [the applicant] in misappropriating the funds in this case are not related to [a business] activity as defined in Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation\u201d. 14.  On 10 November 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that his alleged offences had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. In particular, the Moscow City Court held as follows:\n\u201c... the action of committing an offence by using another\u2019s funds and taking on obligations to the Bank\u2019s clients without any intention to comply with them, cannot be considered to be a business activity.\u201d", "references": ["4", "3", "8", "0", "7", "6", "1", "9", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  This application was lodged on 20 October 2008 by Svetlana Ivanovna Tsvetkova, who was born in 1972 and lives in Irkutsk. 5.  At 10 p.m. on 1 January 2008 Officer S. escorted the applicant to the police station, in accordance with Article 27.2 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) (see paragraph 67 below), on suspicion of shoplifting. 6.  Officer B. compiled an arrest record under Article 27.3 of the CAO (see paragraph 69 below). The administrative arrest record reads as follows:\n\u201cI, Officer B., ... compiled the present administrative arrest record in respect of: [the applicant\u2019s name, date of birth, address] ... who has been escorted to ... on 1 January 2008 at 10 p.m., on account of an administrative offence under Article [blank] of the CAO.\nReasons for the arrest (Article 27.3 of the CAO): [blank] ...\u201d 7.  According to the applicant, after she had been taken away by the police, her minor son (who had apparently been with her in the shop) had been left unattended in the cold. The applicant was then subjected to a humiliating body-search procedure and was asked to take off her clothes, remaining in her underwear. She was then kept with drunk people in a small cell with no seats and no toilet. 8.  In her application to the Court, the applicant specified that she had been released at 3 a.m. on 2 January 2008. In her observations before the Court, she specified that she had been released \u201cafter 4 a.m.\u201d. According to the Government, the applicant was released at 0.35 a.m. 9.  The applicant was not subsequently prosecuted for an administrative offence or a criminal offence. 10.  Considering that the police actions in respect of her and the degrading treatment to which she had been subjected were sufficiently serious so as to amount to a criminal offence, on 27 May 2008 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against officer S., referring, inter alia, to the unlawful deprivation of liberty. 11.  On 16 June 2008 an investigator refused to open a criminal case, finding that the officer had not committed any abuse of power, which was a criminal offence punishable under Article 286 of the Criminal Code. The investigator referred to a statement from B. affirming that the applicant had been taken to the police station on suspicion of theft. 12.  On 20 June 2008 a superior officer overruled the refusal to open a case. A new refusal was issued on 30 June 2008 by the same investigator. That was also then overruled. 13.  A further refusal was issued on 11 December 2008 and the applicant sought a judicial review. On 19 January 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk confirmed the refusal. On 26 February 2009 the Irkutsk Regional Court set aside the judgment, considering that the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the unlawfulness of her arrest had not been examined. 14.  The District Court then declined jurisdiction in favour of another court, but that was declared unlawful on appeal. 15.  On 8 May 2009 the District Court discontinued the case because on 7 May 2009 the impugned refusal to prosecute had been overruled by a superior officer. However, a new refusal was issued on 12 November 2009 as regards offences under Articles 285, 286 and 293 of the Criminal Code. This refusal was then upheld by a final judgment of the Regional Court on 9 September 2010. 16.  This application was lodged on 28 January 2011 by Aleksandr Vitalyevich Bgantsev, who was born in 1958 and lives in Volgograd. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms Y. Lepilina, a lawyer practising in the Volgograd Region. 17.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant\u2019s superior, Mr I., called the police to report that the applicant had used (unspecified) foul language at his work place. Officer O. ordered the applicant to accompany him to the police station. The applicant refused and said that nothing prevented the officer from compiling an administrative-offence record on the spot. The officer insisted, stating that it would be more convenient for him to do it at the police station. The applicant obeyed and was escorted to the police station at around 1 p.m. (in accordance with Article 27.2 of the CAO). At 3.40 p.m. he was subjected to the arrest procedure (Article 27.3 of the CAO). The arrest record reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] was escorted to the police station at: 3.40 p.m.\nOn account of: an administrative offence under: Article 20.1 of the CAO\nFor the purpose(s) of Article 27.3 of the CAO: for taking a decision.\u201d 18.  Officer O. compiled the administrative-offence record, which reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] used foul language in the presence of Mr I. and continued his unruly behaviour, despite being asked to stop. Thus, [the applicant] committed an offence under Article 20.1 of the CAO.\nWitnesses to the offence: Mr K.; Mr M.\u201d 19.  The applicant spent the night at the police station. 20.  On 31 August 2010 the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace, who held a hearing at which he examined the applicant, as well as I., K. and M. On the same day, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of minor hooliganism (Article 20.1 of the CAO) and sentenced him to five days of detention. 21.  The applicant started to serve the sentence on the same day, in the police station. Between 30 August and 4 September 2010 he was locked in cells measuring six square metres and accommodating, on average, four detainees. Each cell was equipped with two benches some 35 cm in width. There was no window and no ventilation system. The other detainees smoked cigarettes, which caused discomfort to the applicant, who was not a smoker. There was no bed or bedding. The applicant was not provided with food or allowed outdoors. Access to a toilet (which was apparently outside the cell) was available every four hours (or sometimes every eight hours). The applicant submitted written statements from three co-detainees in support of his allegations. 22.  The applicant was released at 3.40 p.m. on 4 September 2010. 23.  On 4 October 2010 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court of Volgograd held an appeal hearing and examined the applicant, I., K., M. and Officer O. The appellate court upheld the judgment of 31 August 2010. On 3 November 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgments following a review. 24.  This application was lodged on 1 February 2013 by Pavel Vladimirovich Andreyev, who was born in 1989 and lives in Syktyvkar. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms I. Buryukova, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. 25.  On 9 December 2011 the applicant distributed leaflets in various police stations, urging the police not to use force to disperse public gatherings which were to be held on 10 December 2011, after the contested elections to the State Duma earlier that month. 26.  At 11 p.m. the traffic police took the applicant to the police station on suspicion of evading military service. At 11.50 p.m. the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO on account of an unpaid fine of 300 roubles (RUB) (equivalent to 7 euros (EUR)) for a traffic offence. The charge concerning evasion of military service was not pursued. 27.  The arrest record reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] was escorted to the police station: at 11.30 p.m.\nOn account of an administrative offence: under Article 20.25 of the CAO.\nFor the purposes of Article 27.3 of the CAO: for compiling an administrative record.\u201d 28.  The applicant was not released after the administrative-offence record had been drawn up, but was instead placed in a detention centre at 2 a.m., for reasons which were not specified. 29.  At 3 p.m. on 11 December 2011 the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace, who then sentenced him to two days of detention for the offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO. The applicant was then taken back to the detention centre and was released at around 11.30 p.m. 30.  The applicant appealed. On 31 January 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the conviction. 31.  The applicant brought proceedings, under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), to challenge the deprivation of his liberty from 2 a.m. on 10 December 2011 to 3 p.m. the next day. By a decision of 12 May 2012, the Town Court discontinued the proceedings. On 2 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the decision. On 4 March 2013 the cassation instance of the same court confirmed it. The courts considered that while neither the CCP nor the CAO set out a separate procedure for challenging the measures of being escorted to the police station or of administrative arrest, arguments concerning those measures could be raised during an examination of the related CAO charges against the applicant, as well as in an appeal against a decision that had been taken on such charges. 32.  In separate proceedings, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation, arguing that Article 27.4 required that a record of administrative arrest was to specify reasons for the arrest; the record of his arrest referred to the need to compile the administrative-offence record; such record had been compiled late at night on 9 December 2011; thereby the justification for his arrest had been exhausted and could no longer justify his continued deprivation of liberty on 10 and 11 December 2011. The applicant concluded from the above that the unlawful deprivation of liberty on those dates served as a legal basis for obtaining compensation on account of the non-pecuniary damage suffered. 33.  By a judgment of 19 September 2012, the Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The court considered that the matters relating to his being taken to the police station and the ensuing administrative arrest had been examined in the CAO case and there were therefore no reasons to award compensation. On 20 December 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment. On 27 May 2013 the same court dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant, stating as follows:\n\u201c... [The applicant] was escorted to the police station for the compiling of a record of administrative offence ... With a view to the correct and expedient examination of the case, he was subjected to the measure of administrative arrest ... The actions of the police officers relating to the escorting and the arrest procedures were assessed by the courts dealing with the administrative charge and were, in substance, declared lawful ... The claimant\u2019s argument that the courts in a civil case should assess the lawfulness of the police actions is based on a wrong interpretation of the law ... It is not appropriate to challenge the procedure of administrative arrest within the procedure under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where there is a decision to engage the liability of a person for an administrative offence ...\u201d 34.  This application was lodged on 5 September 2014 by Aleksey Olegovich Dragomirov, who was born in 1980 and lives in Roslavl in the Smolensk Region, Russia. 35.  On various dates between 2001 and 2008, including from 9 to 11 June 2008 (see below), the applicant was kept in a temporary detention centre. According to him, the cells had no toilet; he had had to relieve himself in a bucket; there was no running water available in the cells, and no access to shower facilities. 36.  According to a written report by Officer S., at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 he arrested the applicant for being drunk and looking untidy in a public place, and took him to the police station where he then remained until he sobered up. It appears, however, that the applicant was actually arrested (apparently, by another officer) and then tested for alcohol intoxication around 6 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. respectively (see paragraph 38 below). On 10 June 2008 before a justice of the peace the applicant admitted that he had consumed vodka with a friend in the morning the day before but denied that he had appeared untidy at 2. 45 p.m. or had been drunk or otherwise behaving in a manner offending public morals or human dignity. On the same day, referring to S.\u2019s report, a medical report (the contents of which are not clear) and an arrest record, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of an administrative offence under Article 20.21 of the CAO on account of being drunk in a public place at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 while having an untidy appearance, thus offending human dignity and public morals. The justice of the peace sentenced him to five days of administrative detention. 37.  The applicant started to serve his sentence on 10 June 2008. 38.  The applicant appealed. On 11 June 2008 the Bolsheukovskiy District Court quashed the conviction and discontinued the case for lack of any evidence to confirm the facts as imputed to the applicant. The appeal court considered that there had been nothing to suggest that the applicant had had an untidy appearance which offended human dignity or public morals; around the same time the applicant had had an appointment at the prosecutor\u2019s office and no complaint had been made concerning his appearance or any state of drunkenness. The appeal decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe defendant was convicted of being drunk and looking untidy in a public place at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 ...\n[The applicant] stated that he had consumed vodka with a friend in the morning of 9 June 2008; had then attended a sauna, had put clean clothes, had had lunch and had then gone to attend a meeting in the district prosecutor\u2019s office; he had not seen any police officer at 2.45 p.m. ...\nMr Se. stated before the appeal court that he had had a meeting with [the applicant] at 3 p.m. While he could see that [the applicant] had consumed alcohol, he conducted himself, looked and spoke properly ...\nOfficer S. stated that he had been told on 9 June 2008 of [the applicant] being drunk but he had actually not seen him at 2.45 p.m. and had actually not effected his arrest at that time ...\nThe file contains a medical report compiled at 10.45 p.m. and the arrest record indicating that the defendant had been arrested at 6.05 p.m.\nThere is no other evidence in the file. The trial court relied on S.\u2019s report, the medical report and the arrest record. However, it has now been established that the defendant was examined and arrested much later than at 2.45 p.m. on 9 June 2008 ... S.\u2019s presentation of facts is not truthful and contradicts his earlier report. Shortly after that time the defendant was at the district prosecutor\u2019s office and testified before an investigator [Se.]. His appearance and conduct did not offend human dignity and public morals ... So it has not been established that the defendant committed any offence under Article 20.21 of the CAO ... The proceedings should be discontinued for lack of a corpus delicti ...\u201d 39.  The applicant was released on 11 June 2008. 40.  The applicant brought civil proceedings, seeking compensation in the amount of RUB 100,000 (equivalent to EUR 2,000) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage owing to the conditions of his detention and the unlawful penalty of administrative detention. By a judgment of 5 March 2014, the District Court awarded the applicant RUB 5,000 (EUR 100 according to the Bank of Russia rate on the relevant date) on the basis of the fact that the prosecution had been discontinued. On 4 June 2014 the Omsk Regional Court upheld that judgment. 41.  This application was lodged on 24 October 2014 by Viktor Grigoryevich Torlopov, who was born in 1963 and lives in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic. The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms I. Buryukova, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. 42.  Section 8 of the Public Events Act of 2004 banned public gatherings \u201cin the immediate vicinity of court buildings\u201d. Relying on that provision of the Act, in 2011 the Syktyvkar town administration decided to ban the holding of public events within a radius of 150 metres of any court, to be measured from the entrance to each court building in the town. 43.  At 9 a.m. on 12 October 2011, as part of a series of solo demonstrations held in late 2011, the applicant placed himself within a fenced-off area around the building housing the prosecutor\u2019s office. He was holding a poster that read \u201cThe prosecutor\u2019s office should return Stefanovskaya Square to demonstrators!\u201d. 44.  After ten minutes the police ordered the applicant to stop the demonstration because it was being held in the vicinity of the Town Court building. He was handcuffed and, allegedly, physical force was used against him. He was then taken to the police station and subjected to the measure of administrative arrest. The relevant record reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] arrived at the police station at \u201811.25\u2019 in connection with offences under: \u2018Article 20.2, Article 19.3 of the CAO\u2019\nFor (among the grounds listed in Article 27 of the CAO): for compiling a record of administrative offence ...\u201d 45.  The applicant was released at 8.30 p.m. He was later admitted to hospital. 46.  By a judgment of 6 December 2011, a justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 500 (equivalent to EUR 12 at the time). On 14 March 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment. However, on 23 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic set aside the above judgments and discontinued the case. The court considered that there had been no evidence that the place where the applicant had stood was assigned to the territory of the Town Court under the applicable laws and regulations. 47.  The applicant brought civil proceedings for compensation on account of the unlawful deprivation of his liberty on 12 October 2011. By a judgment of 12 February 2014, the Town Court dismissed his claim. On 24 April 2014 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment. The court observed as follows:\n(a)  Having regard to Articles 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention and the ruling of the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia dated 27 June 2013 (concerning the application of the Convention by courts of general jurisdiction), the police\u2019s action in taking the applicant to the police station had been proportionate and had pursued a legitimate aim; it had been of short duration, and had not involved any recourse to physical force.\n(b)  The measure of taking the applicant to the police station had been aimed at ensuring prosecution for an administrative offence, including the drawing up of an arrest record. 48.  This application was lodged on 30 September 2015 by Kirill Valentinovich Svetlov, who was born in 1990 and lives in Cherepovets in the Vologodsk Region. 49.  On 4 September 2015 the applicant\u2019s car was stopped by the police. The applicant was accused of an administrative offence under Article 12.7 of the CAO because he had no valid driving licence. The applicant was taken to the police station where he went through the procedure of being placed under administrative arrest. His mobile telephone was seized. 50.  According to the applicant, he was not informed of his procedural rights, including the right to remain silent, when he was pulled up by the police, or at the police station. 51.  On 6 September 2015 (a Sunday) the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace. At the hearing, the applicant asked for a lawyer. The judge adjourned the hearing for thirty minutes to allow the applicant to contact a lawyer. According to the applicant, during the break in the hearing, a guard took him to a metal cage where defendants were kept; the applicant had no access to a telephone. According to the Government, the applicant was not kept in a metal cage but in a room measuring some twelve square metres. 52.  According to the Government, after the adjournment the applicant waived his right to legal assistance and opted to defend himself. The applicant submitted that he had not made any such statement. 53.  The justice of the peace convicted the applicant of the offence and sentenced him to five days of administrative detention, to be counted from 4 September 2015. The justice of the peace stated that the applicant\u2019s guilt was confirmed by, inter alia, the record of administrative offence compiled by the police as well as by the applicant\u2019s guilty plea. The justice of the peace had dismissed as unsubstantiated his argument that as a military officer, he could not be sentenced to administrative detention. 54.  The applicant began his sentence the same day. 55.  On 8 September 2015 the applicant appealed. In his statement of appeal he mentioned that he had had difficulties with legal assistance since no law firms would be open on a Sunday. He was released on 9 September 2015. 56.  On 18 September 2015 the Cherepovets Town Court examined the applicant and upheld the judgment against him. It stated, inter alia, that the justice of the peace had not been provided with any proof that the applicant was a military officer. It is unclear whether the applicant adduced the relevant evidence in the appeal proceedings. 57.  The applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint. By decision no. 2732-O of 19 November 2015, the Constitutional Court held that the immediate execution of the sentence of administrative detention had not contravened the Constitution (see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d, paragraph 79 below). 58.  On 26 November 2015 the Vologda Regional Court dismissed an application by the applicant for review of the court decisions of 6 and 18 September 2015. 59.  On 1 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed a further application for review lodged by the applicant.", "references": ["8", "6", "7", "4", "0", "5", "9", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 21 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s wife, Ch., gave birth to a son, A. 7.  The family lived at the applicant\u2019s flat, where A. had his registered residence. He received ongoing paediatric care at the neighbourhood children\u2019s clinic and attended a neighbourhood nursery school. 8.  In November 2009 Ch. decided to leave the applicant. She moved back to her parents\u2019 residence and took A. with her. A. has been living with her ever since. 9.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant applied to the Justice of the Peace of the 339th Court Circuit of the Vostochnoe Dergunino District of Moscow for a residence order under which A. would live with him. He was instructed to make corrections to his claim, which he did on 8 April 2010. On the same day the case was transferred to the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow. It registered the case on 26 April 2010 and scheduled the first hearing for 13 May 2010. 10.  On 26 April 2010 Ch. lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which A. would live with her, and for an interim measure pending the proceedings. She claimed, in particular, that there was a risk that the applicant might kidnap A. and take him to Belarus, where his stepfather had a house. She stated that he had already tried to take A. away from her and had in particular attempted to pick him up from the boy\u2019s nursery school. 11.  On the same day, 26 April 2010, the Timiryazevskiy District Court allowed Ch.\u2019s request for an interim measure and forbade the applicant from contacting A. or picking him up from the nursery school without Ch.\u2019s prior permission. It held as follows:\n\u201cThe subject matter of the case is the residence of a child [A.] born in 2007. The parents have been unable to come to an agreement on this matter. The child is now living with his mother [Ch.]. The court therefore considers that the requested interim measure would be proportionate to the claim. Otherwise, failure to take interim measures might complicate or make impossible the execution of the forthcoming judgment.\u201d 12.  The applicant learned of the interim measure on 30 April 2010. On that day he came to visit A. at the nursery school and the teachers refused to let him see the boy, citing the interim order. 13.  In April and May 2010 the Lyublino and Dergunino childcare authorities examined the applicant\u2019s and Ch.\u2019s flats and found their living conditions satisfactory and suitable for a small child. 14.  The first hearing was scheduled for 20 May 2010 but it was adjourned until 24 May 2010 at the applicant\u2019s request. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 June 2010 but it was also adjourned until 23 June 2010 for the purposes of \u201cobtaining evidence\u201d. 15.  On 22 June 2010 the Lyublino childcare authority issued its report on the case. It considered that, by reason of his very young age, A. should reside with his mother. The childcare authority considered that it was particularly important for a child to be raised by the mother until the age of five or six. A lack of maternal care during that period, and in particular during the behavioural crises that a three-year-old typically undergoes, could result in the child developing negative character traits, such as stubbornness, surliness, hysterical reactions and inadequate social adaptation. The residence arrangements could be reconsidered after A. had reached the age of five or six years. 16.  On 29 June 2010 the Timiryazevskiy District Court ordered an expert psychological examination and adjourned the proceedings. The experts were asked their opinion on what residence arrangements would be in A.\u2019s best interests. 17.  On 6 July 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Moscow City Court against the decision of 29 June 2010 ordering an expert examination. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 29 July 2010 but was adjourned until 17 August 2010 because the parties did not appear. On 17 August 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the decision of 29 June 2010. The case file was sent to the experts on 8 September 2010. 18.  Meanwhile, as Ch. had prevented him from seeing A., the applicant applied to the childcare authority for a contact order. On 15 July 2010 the childcare authority rejected the application, referring to the interim measure imposed by the Timiryazevskiy District Court. 19.  On 9 August 2010 the District Court received by post the applicant\u2019s appeal, dated 6 May 2010, against the decision of 26 April 2010 ordering the interim measure. The applicant submitted that there had been no justification for the interim measure, which had been motivated solely by the prevailing belief that a child should be raised by the mother rather than the father. He further submitted that the interim measure was contrary to A.\u2019s best interests. A lack of contact with his father and the paternal family \u2013 A.\u2019s grandparents, uncle, aunt and cousins \u2013 to whom he was very attached might cause A. psychological trauma. It might, moreover, result in A.\u2019s estrangement from his father or, given his very young age, even his forgetting his father altogether. It also created a risk that Ch. might turn A. against his father. It might in turn mean that the results of any future expert examinations \u2013 and, by extension, any future judicial decision on the child\u2019s residence \u2013 would be biased against the applicant. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the interim measure breached his right to maintain contact with his son. 20.  On 17 September 2010 the Justice of the Peace of the 133th Court Circuit of the Mytichshinskiy District of the Moscow Region convicted Ch. of assault and battery, a criminal offence under Article 116 of the Criminal Code. In particular, the court found it established that on 20 June 2010 the applicant had approached Ch. and A. while they were playing at the local public beach and had hugged his son. Ch. had immediately snatched the boy away from him and had hit the applicant at least two times, causing him bodily injuries, before carrying the boy away. A fine was imposed on her. 21.  On 11 November 2010 the experts issued their report. They found that it would be beneficial for A. to maintain contact with both parents. He was equally attached to both of them. Both parents were equally capable of raising the child. The serious conflict currently persisting between the parents could negatively affect A.\u2019s psychological development. 22.  On 12 November 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Hearings were scheduled for 24 November and 7 December 2010 but could not take place because some of the participants did not appear. 23.  On 23 December 2010 the Dergunino childcare authority issued its report on the case. It found that A. should reside with his mother, referring to A.\u2019s young age and the fact that he had lived with his mother for some time already and was attending a neighbouring nursery school. 24.  During the hearing of 24 December 2010 the applicant lodged an objection against the judge of the Timiryazevskiy District Court, submitting that she (that is to say the judge) had stated on several occasions that she would rule against the applicant because according to the established practice of the Timiryazevskiy District Court a residence order was always made in favour of the mother. The judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection. 25.  On 18 January 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court allowed a request lodged by the applicant for the proceedings to be stayed; it accordingly stayed the residence order proceedings pending the criminal proceedings against Ch. 26.  On 26 January 2011 the Mytishchi City Court upheld Ch.\u2019s criminal conviction on appeal. The conviction acquired binding force. 27.  On 8 February 2011 the Moscow City Court quashed on appeal the decision of 26 April 2010 ordering the interim measure. It found that the interim measure had been unconnected to the subject matter of the case and had therefore been disproportionate. There had been no evidence that the execution of the forthcoming judgment might be complicated or impossible. By applying the interim measure, the judge had prejudged the case. The City Court remitted Ch.\u2019s request for an interim measure for fresh examination by the Timiryazevskiy District Court, which rejected it on 1 April 2011 as unsubstantiated. 28.  Meanwhile, on 16 March 2011 the childcare authority instructed Ch. that she should stop preventing A. from seeing his paternal family. 29.  On 30 March 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court granted the divorce of the applicant and Ch. 30.  On 7 April 2011 the Moscow City Court, acting by way of supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 26 January 2011 upholding Ch.\u2019s conviction and remitted the criminal case for fresh examination by the appellate court. 31.  On 12 April 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court resumed the residence order proceedings and held a hearing. 32.  During the hearings the applicant stated that he possessed a comfortable flat in a safe and ecologically clean neighbourhood, with parks and schools in the vicinity. Before the applicant\u2019s separation from his former wife, A. had attended a nursery school in that neighbourhood. The applicant also had a countryside residence. Being the owner of his own business, he had flexible working hours and could therefore devote a lot of time to his son. He had always paid child maintenance and his income permitted him to give the child a good education. There was a strong personal attachment between the applicant and his son; A. was also very attached to his paternal family \u2013 especially his cousin, who was of the same age. The applicant had positive character references: he was calm, polite and affectionate towards his son. By contrast, Ch. was aggressive and irresponsible. She had physically assaulted him in front of A. and had been criminally convicted in connection with that incident. She had also been convicted of the administrative offence of leaving the scene of a road accident and had had her driving licence suspended for a year. As could be seen from the documents submitted by the applicant to the court, she lived in a severely polluted and criminally unsafe neighbourhood in the vicinity of an oil refinery plant and a prison. Moreover, Ch. shared her flat with her mother, who smoked and abused alcohol and could therefore have a bad influence on A. Until recently, Ch. had prevented the applicant and his relatives from seeing A., and currently she allowed occasional contact only. 33.  The applicant\u2019s mother and sister stated that Ch. prevented them from seeing A. Ch. was often aggressive and occasionally abused alcohol. All her family smoked, even in the child\u2019s presence. A. was very attached to his father and obviously suffered from their forced separation. 34.  Ch. stated that the applicant would have no time to take care of the child as he was managing a business, was following a distance-learning course at a university and had earlier stated his intention of building a countryside residence. Ch. had a higher education and was working. The alleged defects in her character and behaviour to which the applicant had referred had been confirmed by his relatives only. 35.  A teacher from A.\u2019s current nursery school stated that she had seen the applicant once and that he had made a bad impression on her. On 30 April 2010 he had come to the nursery school and had told her that he wanted to take A. home with him. When she had refused to let him in, referring to the court order prohibiting any contact between them, he had become agitated and had talked about taking A. away with him when the children went out for a walk. 36.  The director of the nursery school gave a similar description of the incident. She said that the applicant had become angry when he had learned of the court decision ordering the interim measure, had asked for a copy of that measure and had called his lawyer. 37.  The following documents were submitted by the parties for the court\u2019s examination: (i)  the applicant\u2019s and Ch.\u2019s pay statements, (ii)  documents showing that the district where Ch. lived was among the most polluted districts of Moscow, (iii)  documents from the criminal case file against Ch., and (iv)  documents relating to A.\u2019s medical history and A.\u2019s pre-school education both at the applicant\u2019s place of residence prior to his parents\u2019 separation and at the mother\u2019s place of residence after the separation. 38.  On 12 April 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court granted Ch.\u2019s application for a residence order in her favour and dismissed a similar application by the applicant. It held as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the entirety of the evidence, the court finds that there is a very serious conflict between the parties as regards the child\u2019s residence arrangements, ... which has a negative impact on the child by creating a psychologically unhealthy and tense atmosphere around him. At the same time, each parent, taken alone, possesses moral, personal and other qualities rendering each of them capable of raising a small child. According to the expert report, the child is equally attached to both of them. It also follows from the expert report that the parents\u2019 improper behaviour towards each other may have negative psychological consequences for the child.\nThe court notes that [Ch.\u2019s] criminal conviction for assaulting [the applicant] has not yet acquired binding force. It however takes into account the criminal charges brought against her. It is clear that the incident was prompted by the personal hostility [between the applicant and Ch.] caused by a disagreement on the issue of their son\u2019s residence and education. In the court\u2019s opinion, these charges cannot constitute a decisive reason for making a residence order in favour of the father. There is an accumulation of reasons on the basis of which the court considers that the child should live with the mother.\nIn the present case the court is guided by the best interests of child [A.], who at the moment of the judgment has not yet reached the age of four years old and who has an established way of life. For a long time the child has lived with his mother at her place of residence and has attended a nursery school there. Given his age, a change of residence and a separation from the mother will have a negative impact on the child\u2019s general and psychological state.\nThe court considers that [the applicant\u2019s] arguments that the district where [Ch.] lives is polluted and that close members of her family smoke cannot serve as a basis for making a residence order in favour of the father because, as mentioned above, a change of residence will have a negative impact on the child. [The applicant\u2019s] arguments that he has better living conditions and a better financial situation than [Ch.] are not decisive for granting a residence order to the father either.\nThe childcare authorities are unanimous that it is in [A.\u2019s] interests to live with the mother. The court agrees with that finding.\nThe court also finds that [the applicant\u2019s] request for a residence order is at the moment premature. [The applicant] is entitled to apply for a reconsideration of the issue after A. has reached a more conscious age [\u043f\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0441\u044b\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u043e\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430].\u201d 39.  The applicant appealed, repeating the arguments he had raised before the District Court. He relied, in particular, on the right to equality between spouses. 40.  On 30 June 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 12 April 2011 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 41.  On 6 December 2011 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow found it established that Ch. was preventing the applicant and his family \u2013namely his mother, brother and sister \u2013 from seeing A. It held that A. was entitled to maintain contact with his father and his paternal family and determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicant should be able to have contact with A. (i)  on the first and third weekend of each month from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 8 p.m. on Sunday at the applicant\u2019s place of residence, in the mother\u2019s absence and with the right to attend outdoor activities for children, and (ii)  for two weeks during the summer and two weeks during the winter on dates agreed with the mother, provided that the child is in good health, with the right to leave Moscow and to go abroad. The applicant\u2019s mother, brother and sister should be able to have contact sessions with A. from 11 a.m. until 1 p.m. on the first and third Saturdays of each month at the applicant\u2019s place of residence. 42.  On an unspecified date the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 43.  On 2 February 2012 the Mytischy Town Court upheld Ch.\u2019s conviction for assault and battery on appeal.", "references": ["9", "7", "1", "3", "6", "2", "0", "5", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Nizhnevartovsk, in the Khanty-Mansiyisk Region. 5.  At the material time the applicant leased a flat in a block of flats in Noyabrsk (a town in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region). On 16 February 2006 at about 6 a.m. the applicant\u2019s neighbours called the police. They informed the police of loud screams that they had heard from the applicant\u2019s flat. Two police officers arrived at 6 a.m. and took the applicant to the Noyabrsk police station (\u201cthe police station\u201d). 6.  According to a logbook of people taken to the police station, the applicant arrived at the station at 7.05 a.m. and was handed over to an investigator \u201cfor further proceedings\u201d at 7.55 a.m. on 16 February 2006. According to the applicant, the investigator, Ch., repeatedly questioned him as \u201ca witness to the incident\u201d. 7.  According to the applicant, he was released on 16 February 2006 at about 11 p.m. and summoned to appear before the investigator the next day at 2 p.m. The applicant alleges that he was under the constant supervision of police officers between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. on 16 February 2006 and was not allowed to leave the police station. 8.  In 2011 the applicant sued the police station, claiming compensation for unrecorded detention. 9.  On 5 August 2011 the Noyabrsk Town Court of the Yamalo\u2011Nenetskiy Region dismissed his claim. 10.  On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. However, he was required to correct some errors in his claim. 11.  On 28 September 2011 the Noyabrsk Town Court returned the claim to the applicant, stating that he had failed to correct the errors in his claim. 12.  The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision. 13.  On 17 February 2006 the investigator opened a criminal investigation into an offence of rape. The applicant formally became a suspect. On the same day the investigator arrested him and drew up formal records of his arrest. Between 18 February 2006 and 22 June 2006 the applicant was kept in the temporary detention centre of the Noyabrsk police station (\u201cthe IVS\u201d). 14.  The applicant provided the following description of the conditions in the IVS. He was held in cell no. 9 measuring 15 sq. m. The cell housed between nine and twelve inmates who took it in turns to sleep. The overcrowding caused a lot of conflict and tension between the inmates. 15.  The window of the cell measured 0.6 m by 0.3 m and was covered with metal blinds blocking access to daylight and fresh air. There was no ventilation in the cell. The lack of air was aggravated by the detainees\u2019 smoking. 16.  There was no sink with a tap or toilet. The inmates had to use a bucket, which smelled very bad and was only emptied once a day in the morning. The bucket was not separated from the main area. The dining table was only 1.5 m away from the bucket. The detainees were provided with meals once a day. The quality of the food was completely unsatisfactory. There was not enough drinking water for everybody. 17.  The detainees were allowed to take a shower once every ten days for fifteen minutes, and there were three shower heads for nine to ten people. The drains in the shower room did not work, and the water temperature was not adjustable. There was no changing room, the detainees had to undress before the shower and dress after it in a corridor. Only twice during the applicant\u2019s detention in the IVS was he allowed to have outdoor exercise. 18.  The ceiling of the cell was covered with mould. The cells were infested with bugs, lice, cockroaches and rats, and the administration did nothing to disinfect the facility. 19.  It was cold in winter (there was a maximum temperature of 6\u02daC) and hot in summer (a maximum temperature of 45\u02daC). 20.  The detainees were provided with neither bedding nor items of personal hygiene. They were also unable to buy them in the IVS. Mattresses had tar stains, and there was no possibility to wash clothes. Inmates were not provided with newspapers, reading material, or any information concerning their rights. The applicant was held in a cell with persistent offenders and ill persons. 21.  On 15 June 2006 the Noyabrsk Town Court convicted the applicant of rape and sentenced him to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment in a \u201cstrict\u2011regime correctional colony\u201d. 22.  On 28 August 2006 the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment of 15 June 2006 on appeal. Between 29 September 2006 and 16 June 2011 the applicant served his sentence in correctional colony IK-8 located in Labytnangi, in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region.\n(a)  The applicant\u2019s account 23.  The applicant provided the following description of the conditions of his detention in the correctional colony, and submitted a detailed plan of the accommodation, with a description. The dormitory where he lived consisted of two sections measuring 132 and 144 sq. m respectively and accommodated 230 to 250 individuals. 24.  The sanitary facilities were extremely busy: all the detainees had to use five taps and four toilets. There was not enough water. Water was only available from 5 a.m. to 7 a.m. and from 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. While there was no running water, the detainees had two water tanks at their disposal \u2013 one which contained drinking water and the other which contained water which was not drinkable. Per day, they could use 50 litres of drinking water and 300 litres of water which was not drinkable. This was clearly not enough, since the water in the tanks would be used up by about 10 a.m. The toilets smelled extremely unpleasant, since there was no water to flush them after 10 a.m. 25.  The floor of the dormitory was based on a frame made of used railway sleepers impregnated with creosote. It smelled so strongly that the detainees had to leave the windows open permanently, even in winter, to get rid of the smell. The smell caused headaches and the open windows caused colds. The roof of the dormitory had at least eighteen visible leaks and there would be puddles on the floor if it rained. The dining room in the dormitory measured 32 sq. m and was equipped with one electric stove with four burners, one refrigerator and four sockets. The dormitory was infested with rats. 26.  The detainees were allowed to take a shower once a week for fifteen minutes, and there were ten shower heads for up to forty people. Just before the applicant\u2019s release, four extra shower heads were installed, but the time for washing was reduced to ten minutes. 27.  According to the applicant, in 2008 the detainees were provided with winter clothes only at the end of November when the temperature dropped below minus 28\u02daC.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 28.  As regards the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in IK-8 in Labytnangi, the Government submitted information which can be summarised as follows:\n \n \nPeriod of detention\n \n \nUnit no.\n \n \n \nDormitory surface area in sq. m\n \n \nNumber of sleeping places\n \n \nNumber of inmates assigned to the dormitory\n \n \nNumber of washbasins and lavatories\n \n29 September 2006 \u2013\n15 March 2007\n \n9\n330\nNo information\nNo information\n8 and 12\n \n15 March 2007 \u2013\n19 September 2008\n \n1\n143\nNo information\nNo information\n5 and 6\n \n19 September 2008 \u2013\n30 October 2009\n7\n321\nNo information\nNo information\n6 and 4\n30 October 2009 \u2013\n14 May 2010\n10 (accommodated in building previously occupied by units 7 and 8)\n321\n122\n119\n6 and 4\n18 May 2010 \u2013\n20 April 2011\n10\n321\n96\n95\n6 and 4\n25 April 2011 \u2013\n16 July 2011\n10\n321\n84\n81\n6 and 4 29.  They also submitted that the toilets had been separated from the canteen and dormitory, and the units had been naturally ventilated and regularly disinfected. No failures in the water or electrical supply system had been identified. Detainees had taken showers weekly and had been provided with food and clothes \u201cin accordance with the established schedule\u201d. 30.  On an unspecified date in 2010, while serving his sentence in the correctional colony, the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Noyabrsk police station and the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in the IVS in 2006. The applicant was not represented in those proceedings. 31.  On 23 July 2010 the Noyabrskiy Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in his absence. 32.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 23 July 2010. He complained in particular that he had not been allowed to personally address the court, despite a request he had made to this effect, and he asked the appeal court to arrange for him to attend the appeal hearing. 33.  On 25 November 2010 the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Regional Court upheld the decision of 23 July 2010 on appeal. It stated that the law did not make provision for transporting detainees to a civil court hearing.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "2", "6", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are Ms Zita Bistieva, who was born in 1976, and her three minor children, who were born in 2006, 2008 and 2013, respectively. The applicants live in Herne, Germany. 6.  In 2012 Ms Bistieva\u2019s husband, M.A., and their two elder children arrived in Poland. M.A. applied for asylum for himself and his family. 7.  On 6 March 2013 the head of the Aliens Office (Szef Urz\u0119du do Spraw Cudzoziemc\u00f3w) decided not to grant M.A. and his family refugee status and to expel them from Poland (decision no. PU\u2011420\u201137001/SU/2012). That decision was upheld by the Refugee Council on 10 May 2013 (no. RdU-133-1/S/13). No appeal was lodged before the administrative court. 8.  Soon afterwards the family fled to Germany, where Ms Bistieva\u2019s third child was born in July 2013. 9.  On 28 May 2013 the Polish authorities took over the jurisdiction over the family\u2019s case under Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (\u201cthe Dublin II Regulation\u201d). On 9 January 2014 Ms Bistieva and her three children were sent back to Poland. 10.  On 9 January 2014 the S\u0142ubice District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) ordered the applicants\u2019 committal until 8 April 2014 to the family wing of a guarded centre for aliens (Strze\u017cony O\u015brodek dla Cudzoziemc\u00f3w) in K\u0119trzyn. It was held that the applicants should be detained pending their expulsion, which had been ordered by the head of the Aliens Office (Szef Urz\u0119du do Spraw Cudzoziemc\u00f3w) on 6 March 2013 and in view of the risk that they might again flee the country. 11.  The information about the guarded centre for aliens in K\u0119trzyn which is presented in paragraphs 12-16 below, is derived from the reports of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, which resulted from their monitoring visits in 2012 and in January and February of 2014. 12.  The K\u0119trzyn centre was opened in 2008. At the material time, it only hosted families and unaccompanied children. In January and February 2014, 70 migrants were held there. That number included 13 men, 19 women and 38 minors. The majority of migrants in the centre were Russian nationals. The centre was surrounded with a high wall or fence with a single barbed wire on top. K\u0119trzyn was one of the two guarded centres in Poland which had done away with an additional barbed wire on the fence. Unlike in many other guarded centres, the one in K\u0119trzyn had outer but no inner bars on the windows and the windows in the day rooms (\u015bwietlica) were without any bars. Unlike in all other guarded centres, the bars allowed for windows to be opened sufficiently wide. 13.  The overall living conditions in the centre were assessed as good. Each family occupied one room which was equipped with basic furniture. They had, in principle, unlimited access to common areas in the building, which included, a dining room, a number of kitchenettes, laundry rooms and day rooms (equipped with a TV-set, board games, video games and toys, a small gym and a library (containing a large number of publications in Russian and other languages). Migrants in K\u0119trzyn had also access to outdoor recreational grounds for adults and children. Outdoor time was limited to one hour per day unless, a migrant participated in sport or other type of activities. 14.  Adequate medical care, including dental and psychological care, was provided in the K\u0119trzyn centre. 15.  The staff of that establishment had received particularly positive evaluation from its occupants. Many staff members spoke Russian, they were closely supervised by the governor, who regularly talked to the migrants. The security measures were much more relaxed than in other centres for aliens. The premises were clean and adapted to children. 16.  Education of migrant children and adults was provided on the centre\u2019s premises by the local authorities and pedagogy students from a nearby university. The classes of Polish, mathematics and geography were run by qualified teachers and the students either received school report cards or certificates of attendance. The classes were organised every day and, in early 2014, lasted from one hour to one hour and a half. In principle, children of all school ages and different language levels were mixed. Individual programmes had, occasionally been offered to those children who had previously studied in a Polish school. A wide range of outdoor and indoor activities, and events were available. They were run by staff members dressed in civilian clothing or visitors from the local school of music. 17.  Ms Bistieva appealed, arguing that the administrative detention of herself and her children was unjustified and disregarded the fact that her husband had stayed behind in Germany, having been hospitalised when his family was sent back to Poland. 18.  On 27 January 2014 the Warmi\u0144sko-Mazurski Governor (Wojewoda) refused to order the expulsion of Ms Bistieva\u2019s youngest child, which was sought by the head of the \u015awiecko Border Guard (Komendant Plac\u00f3wki Stra\u017cy Granicznej). It was held that the 2013 expulsion decision did not cover the child, who was born later in Germany and whose presence in Poland resulted from a decision of the German authorities. It followed that the child\u2019s presence in Poland, unlike that of the rest of his family, was not illegal. 19.  On 28 January 2014 Ms Bistieva applied for refugee status for herself and her three children. She also applied for a stay of the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision. 20.  On 4 February 2014 the K\u0119trzyn District Court decided to extend the detention of all the applicants at the guarded centre for aliens until 27 April 2014. The domestic court relied on the fact that the 2013 expulsion decision was enforceable despite Ms Bistieva\u2019s renewed asylum application and that the identification of the family members was being carried out by the Polish authorities. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 21.  On 5 February 2014 the Gorz\u00f3w Wlkp. Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) upheld the decision of 9 January 2014. It was held that the decision to place Ms Bistieva in administrative detention was justified because she was an illegal alien in Poland and she had crossed the German border illegally. The fact that she had minor children could not be considered as a sufficient reason for quashing the impugned decision. The guarded centre for aliens in K\u0119trzyn provided adequate living conditions and medical care to the family. Any inconvenience suffered by Ms Bistieva\u2019s family was the result not of their placement at the guarded centre but rather of Ms Bistieva\u2019s illegal immigration to Poland. 22.  On 19 February 2014 the head of the Aliens Office decided not to grant the application to stay the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision. It was noted that the decision covered all the applicants. The authority considered that Ms Bistieva\u2019s new application for asylum was likely to fail as it was based on similar grounds as the one rejected in 2013. The applicant did not appeal. On 11 March 2014 the head of the Aliens Office issued a corrigendum to that decision and removed Ms Bistieva\u2019s youngest child from its scope. 23.  It appears that on 20 February 2014 Ms Bistieva\u2019s husband was transferred to Poland and placed in the same guarded centre as the applicants. 24.  In view of the 2013 decision, which was enforceable, on 18 April 2014 the head of the Aliens Office discontinued the applicants\u2019 asylum proceedings (decision no. DPU-420-214/SU/2014). That decision was served on Ms Bistieva on 23 April 2014. She did not appeal. 25.  On 25 April 2014 the K\u0119trzyn District Court decided to extend the administrative detention of the applicants until 29 June 2014, given the discontinuation of the latest set of asylum proceedings. 26.  Ms Bistieva appealed, arguing that her youngest child was not an illegal alien and, as such, he could not be the subject of administrative detention. She also argued that her own and her other children\u2019s placement in the guarded centre was unjustified. 27.  On 22 May 2014 Ms Bistieva lodged a new application for asylum, also asking that the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision be put on hold. She argued that her application was justified because on 27 January 2014 the Warmi\u0144sko-Mazurski Governor had refused to order the expulsion of her youngest child and because, in a separate set of proceedings, on 25 April 2014 the Refugee Council (Rada do Spraw Uchod\u017ac\u00f3w) had granted refugee status to her father, mother and siblings. 28.  On 5 June 2014 the head of the Aliens Office decided to temporarily suspend the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision, until the delivery of a new decision, on the grounds that new circumstances had arisen in the case. 29.  On 6 June 2014 the Olsztyn Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 April 2014 extending Ms Bistieva\u2019s administrative detention. It was observed that the decision to extend the measure of administrative detention was justified by the need to secure the course of the proceedings concerning the refusal of refugee status and expulsion. It was also noted that the last relevant decision had been delivered by the head of the Aliens Office on 18 April 2014 and served on Ms Bistieva within the statutory time-limit. It followed that her detention was in accordance with the law. The domestic court held that section 107 of the 2003 Aliens Act had not been breached by the fact that the youngest child had been detained along with Ms Bistieva and the rest of the family even though his own expulsion had not been authorised by the Governor. It sufficed that the mother herself was covered by the 2013 expulsion decision and that the child was in her care. Separating Ms Bistieva from any of her children would be contrary to their best interests. Lastly, the court considered, without providing detailed reasons, that the possible alternative measure, namely placing the applicants at the aliens centre in Podkowa Le\u015bna and providing them with social care, was not called for in the circumstances of the case. 30.  On 12 June 2014 Ms Bistieva applied to be released from administrative detention. 31.  On 29 June 2014 the applicants were released. They started living in Warsaw. Later, on an unspecified date in August 2014 the applicants left for Germany. As submitted by their lawyer, they currently live in Herne. 32.  On 28 October 2014 the head of Aliens Office discontinued the applicants\u2019 asylum proceedings on the grounds that they had not appeared for questioning (decision no. DPU-420-1114/SU/2014). 33.  The applicants did not bring an action for compensation for unjustified detention in a guarded centre under section 407 of the Aliens Act of 12 December 2013.", "references": ["8", "3", "7", "5", "0", "9", "6", "1", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Stavropol. 6.  The applicant is the founder, sole owner and director of a limited liability company, Akvilon (\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u00ab\u0410\u043a\u0432\u0438\u043b\u043e\u043d\u00bb). Prior to the events described below, the company had been engaged in the grocery retail trade. 7.  On 30 November 2001 Akvilon purchased 5 tonnes of granulated sugar in 100 sacks on condition of delayed payment with a view to reselling it to Mr P. and Mr Pr. The two men made an oral agreement with the company to pay 55,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 2,000 euros (EUR)) in cash immediately upon receipt of the sugar. 8.  On the same date Mr V., the applicant\u2019s husband and a deputy director of Akvilon, transferred the sugar to Mr P. and Mr Pr., who then left under the pretext that they had to fetch more cash in order to be able to pay. Shortly thereafter, Mr V. complained to the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0433. \u041d\u0435\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c\u044b\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430) of the misappropriation by Mr P. and Mr Pr. of the sugar belonging to Akvilon. 9.  On 30 November 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted on suspicion of aggravated fraud in connection with the incident. The case was assigned to an investigator, Mr S., who granted the status of victim of a crime to the Akvilon company. 10.  Later that day, the investigator in charge found the five tonnes of sugar in garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr., in the amounts of 1.5 tonnes and 3.5 tonnes respectively. The two men admitted that they had no documents confirming that they had obtained the sugar legitimately, but insisted that they had paid the necessary amount in cash to a certain Ms Ya., who had promised to deliver the money to Akvilon and had then disappeared. The investigator acknowledged Mr P. and Mr Pr. as witnesses in the case and, without formally attaching the sugar, left it with them for safe storage. Both men gave written undertakings to store the sugar until a court decision was given on the matter. 11.  On 20 December 2001, following a complaint by Akvilon, the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the investigator, Mr S., to formally attach the sugar, to seize it from Mr P. and Mr Pr. and to deposit it with a neutral person for safe storage. 12.  On 11 January 2002 the investigator ordered the attachment and seizure of the sugar from the garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr., and its transfer to a third party for safe storage. On 15 January 2002 the order was executed and the attached sugar was included in the list of exhibits in the case. 13.  By a decision of 22 February 2002 the investigator, Mr S., declared Mr V., who acted as a representative of the Akvilon company, a civil claimant in the criminal case. 14.  On 6 August 2002, on the instructions of the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Stavropol Region, the investigating authorities transferred the sugar to the Akvilon company for safe storage. 15.  In late 2002 the criminal case was transferred to another investigator. 16.  By two decisions of 24 March 2003 the investigator in charge lifted the attachment order on the sugar and ordered that it be excluded from the list of exhibits in the case. The decisions stated that the investigation had established that, despite their written undertakings to store the sugar, Mr P. and Mr Pr. had sold it to third persons in December 2001. They had then, on 8 January 2002, purchased another lot of sugar in the amount of 1.5 and 3.5 tonnes respectively, which had subsequently been attached and included in the list of exhibits by Mr S. The decisions concluded that the sugar in question was not the object of the crime in the present case, and therefore its attachment should be lifted. It is unclear what happened to the sugar thereafter. 17.  On 31 March 2003 the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior decided not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr P. and Mr Pr. in connection with the fact that they had sold the sugar in breach of their written undertakings given to Mr S. The decision stated that the undertakings had not been legally binding, since when they had been given, the sugar had not been formally attached and included in the list of exhibits, and therefore there had been no legal grounds for Mr P. and Mr Pr. to refrain from selling it. 18.  By a decision of 18 April 2003 the investigator in charge ordered the withdrawal of Akvilon\u2019s victim status. The decision stated that it had been established during the investigation that on 30 November 2001 the Akvilon company had dispatched the sugar to the garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr. The two men had then delivered the stipulated amount in cash to a certain Ms Ya., who had negotiated the deal between them and Akvilon and had disappeared once in receipt of the money. The decision concluded that in view of the fact that it was Mr P. and Mr Pr.\u2019s money which had been stolen in the present case, rather than Akvilon\u2019s sugar, it was the former and not the company who were victims of the crime. 19.  On 6 March 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Stavropolskiy Region ordered that Akvilon again be granted the status of victim of a crime. 20.  On 29 March 2007 the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with misappropriation of Akvilon\u2019s property were suspended owing to the absence of those responsible. 21.  In 2002 Mr P. and Mr Pr. lodged a civil claim against the Akvilon company, seeking to have their title to, respectively, 1.5 and 3.5 tonnes of sugar attached by the investigating authorities acknowledged, the attachment order lifted and the sugar returned to them. 22.  By a decision of 17 April 2003 the Nevinnomyssk Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) discontinued the proceedings in so far as they had been brought by Mr Pr. on the grounds that he was officially registered as a businessman, and that therefore his dispute with Akvilon fell within the competence of a commercial court. It does not appear that this decision was appealed against or that Mr Pr. attempted to pursue the proceedings any further. 23.  As regards Mr P.\u2019s claim, after several rounds of proceedings, the Town Court granted it in a judgment of 21 May 2004. The court confirmed Mr P.\u2019s title to 1.5 tonnes of sugar, referring to the fact that he had purchased it on 8 January 2002. The court further established that the sugar belonging to Mr P. had been attached by the investigator, Mr S., and transferred to a third party and then to Akvilon for safe storage and that by the investigating authorities\u2019 decision of 24 March 2003 the attachment order had been lifted. The court thus concluded that Akvilon was under an obligation to return 1.5 tonnes of sugar to Mr P., who was its rightful owner. The judgment was not appealed against, and no enforcement proceedings were ever instituted. 24.  Throughout the investigation into the incident of 30 November 2001 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the supervising prosecutors alleging negligence on the part of the investigator, Mr S. In particular, she complained of his failure timeously to attach the sugar belonging to Akvilon and his decision to transfer it for safe storage to Mr P. and Mr Pr., individuals whom Akvilon had accused of fraud, with the result that the sugar had been lost and Akvilon had suffered pecuniary damage. 25.  In letters sent to the applicant in the period of 2002-04, the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor\u2019s office and the main investigating division of the Department of the Interior of the Stavropol Region stated, inter alia, that the investigator, Mr S., had indeed breached certain requirements of the criminal procedure legislation. They went on to say that he had been subjected to disciplinary sanctions in that connection, but that there were no grounds to bring criminal proceedings against him. 26.  Between April and July 2004 the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor\u2019s office took a number of similar decisions to dispense with criminal proceedings against Mr S. They stated, in essence, that although formally there were elements of an offence punishable under Article 293 of the Russian Criminal Code (professional negligence) in Mr S.\u2019s actions, that Article provided for criminal liability only if the damage caused by such negligence attained a minimum of RUB 100,000, whereas the pecuniary damage alleged by Akvilon had been lower than that amount. 27.  In 2003 Akvilon initiated proceedings before the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region against the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior, the Department of the Interior of the Stavropol Region and the Russian Ministry of the Interior. The company complained that the negligent actions on the part of the investigator, Mr S., during the investigation into the incident of 30 November 2001 had resulted in the loss of five tonnes of sugar belonging to the company. His actions had caused pecuniary damage to the company and had been detrimental to its business reputation, given that it had purchased the sugar on condition of delayed payment, which it had then been unable to fulfil. The company indicated that the pecuniary damage it had suffered to that date amounted to RUB 96,312, taking into account the current price of sugar. It also sought compensation for damage to its business reputation. 28.  After several rounds of proceedings, in a judgment of 22 October 2004 the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region dismissed the company\u2019s claims in their entirety. It noted that it had not been proven that the investigator, Mr S., had been negligent in performing his duties, given that it had been decided to dispense with criminal proceedings against him in that connection, and that therefore there was no causal link between his actions and the pecuniary damage alleged by the claimant company. The court also stated that since Mr S. had not disseminated any defamatory statements concerning Akvilon, there were no grounds to grant its claim for compensation for damage to its business reputation. 29.  On 30 November 2004 the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region quashed the first-instance judgment in so far as the applicant\u2019s claim for pecuniary damage was concerned, stating that the lower court finding as to the absence of a causal link between the pecuniary damage sustained by Akvilon and Mr S.\u2019s actions had been incorrect. The appellate court noted that the first-instance court had not taken into account that criminal proceedings against Mr S. in connection with the negligent performance of his duties had not been instituted only on the formal ground that the pecuniary damage inflicted on the claimant company by his actions had been below the statutory limit established in Article 293 of the Russian Criminal Code. The appellate court further found it established that \u201cit was on account of the unlawful actions of investigator S., who had transferred five tonnes of sugar belonging to the Akvilon company to other persons, that [the company] had been deprived not only of its property but also of the right to claim compensation for damage in the context of the criminal proceedings, as the investigator in charge had withdrawn the status of victim [from the company]\u201d. The appellate court considered it established that the company had proven the circumstances in which it had sustained pecuniary losses in the amount of RUB 96,312, and awarded the company the full amount claimed in respect of pecuniary damage, as well as RUB 8,619.42 for costs and expenses to be recovered from the Russian Ministry of the Interior at the expense of the Federal Treasury. The appellate court further upheld the judgment of 22 October 2004 in so far as it rejected the company\u2019s claim concerning compensation for damage to its business reputation. 30.  On 10 March 2005 the Federal Commercial Court of the North\u2011Caucasus Circuit, acting as a cassation instance, upheld the appeal decision of 30 November 2004. The court, however, reduced the award to RUB 55,000, noting that that sum represented the pecuniary losses sustained by Akvilon in 2001 (see paragraph 7 above). 31.  On 19 May 2005 the Supreme Commercial Court of Russia refused leave to apply for a supervisory review of the case. 32.  On 15 December 2004, following the decision of the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region of 30 November 2004, Akvilon was issued with a writ of execution and the enforcement proceedings were commenced. 33.  In a decision of 12 July 2005 the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region noted that on 10 March 2005 the Federal Commercial Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit had reduced the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage from RUB 96,312 to RUB 55,000 and ordered that the recovery of the amount of RUB 41,312 be discontinued. 34.  That decision was sent to the Russian Ministry of Finance, which then returned the writ of execution and the decision remained unenforced. 35.  On 23 October 2006, at the request of Akvilon, the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region issued it with another writ of execution for the amount of RUB 55,000 awarded in respect of pecuniary damage and RUB 8,916.42 awarded in respect of costs and expenses. 36.  On 25 October 2006 the new writ was sent to the Ministry of Finance for enforcement. 37.  On 4 July 2007 the Russian Ministry of Finance transferred the full amount due to Akvilon\u2019s bank account.", "references": ["5", "8", "7", "4", "2", "0", "6", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Region. 5.  On 22 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre where he stayed until 27 November 2009. 6.  Since 22 October 2009 he had been detained with more than 12 inmates in the cell no. 9 designed for 12 persons and had to take turns to sleep. A month after he had been transferred to another cell with the area of 6 square meters which he had shared with another inmate. 7.  The detention centre had no shower facilities or a place for outdoor walks. The applicant\u2019s cell was cold and damp, iron banks were not covered by mattresses. Toilets were not separated from the living area, and the persons using them were in full view of others. Food supply was inadequate, the applicant was served meals only once a day and had no drinking water from within the cell. 8.  The Government submitted that the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre comprised two cells: no. 5 with the area of 14.6 square meters for 3 inmates and no. 6 with the area of 18 square meters for 4 inmates. There was no overcrowding; the toilet had been separate by a shoulder length fence. The detainees may take a shower once a week. The temperature was 23oC, there were kettles with boiled water in the cells. 9.  On 26 October 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife, Mrs Liu, sought to visit the applicant but was refused. 10.  On 6 and 10 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife filed complaints with the Khabarovsk Prosecutor\u2019s Office stating that she had not been allowed to see the applicant. 11.  In August 2010 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, stating that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading, and that the prohibition on family visits was unlawful. 12.  On 9 February 2011 the Industrialnyy District Court of Khabarovsk dismissed his claim. Relying on the statements of a representative of the detention centre, the court held that the Internal Rules of the Administrative Detention Centres approved by the Decree of the Ministry of Defence of Russia of 6 June 2000 no. 605 dsp (\u201cthe Rules\u201d) did not make provision for family visits, and that the applicant\u2019s right to family life had not been breached as he had met his wife during court hearings. 13.  On 18 May 2011 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.", "references": ["9", "0", "8", "3", "6", "7", "2", "5", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant gave birth to a son, I., whose father was E., her partner. 7.  Following their separation in November 2010, the applicant and E. agreed that I. would live with the applicant and E. would visit him regularly. 8.  On 22 October 2013 E. took the boy to Grozny in Chechnya. 9.  The applicant followed them to Grozny, where she attempted to visit her son, but was prevented from doing so by E. 10.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for a residence order under which I. would live with her. She submitted that I. had lived with her from birth until his removal by his father the previous October. They were very attached to each other. She had a stable income, a spacious flat, good character references, and was capable of providing I. with everything necessary in terms of his living expenses, education and development. She also complained that since the removal she had made many attempts to visit her son, but E. had prevented her from seeing him. 11.  On 19 March 2014 the childcare authority of the Chertanovo District of Moscow visited the applicant\u2019s flat in Moscow and found the living conditions there suitable for a small child. 12.  On 19 March 2014 the Justice of the Peace of the 230 Court Circuit of the Chertanovo District of Moscow convicted E. of assault and battery, finding E. guilty of assaulting and injuring the applicant in August 2013, and sentenced him to a fine. 13.  On 9 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny visited E.\u2019s flat in Grozny and found that the living conditions there were suitable for a small child. The officials noted that E. lived in the flat with his mother A. and his son I. 14.  On 15 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny issued its report on the case. The report reiterated that E.\u2019s living conditions were suitable and further read as follows:\n\u201c[E.] works as a senior medical officer at [a private medical clinic] and, according to him, has a monthly income of 50,000 roubles ...\nThe child has been living with his father [E.] for a long time. His mother lives in Moscow and does not participate in his upbringing. The boy is very attached to the father and receives a lot of attention, tenderness and care. Bearing in mind the best interests of [I.], [the childcare authority of Grozny] considers that a residence order in respect of [I.] in favour of his father [E.] would not be contrary to the child\u2019s interests and would not hinder his contact with the mother.\u201d 15.  At the hearing concerning the applicant\u2019s application for a residence order, E. stated that I. had indeed lived with his mother until recently, but he was not at all attached to her. E. had financially supported them and had visited them regularly. The applicant was \u201cnot leading the right kind of life\u201d and she would have a bad influence on I. 16.  At the hearing, an official of the childcare authority of Grozny reiterated the findings contained in the report of 15 April 2014. 17.  On 17 April 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for a residence order in her favour. It held that a residence order in respect of I. should be granted to his father, even though he had not requested it. The court held as follows:\n\u201cArticle 196 \u00a7 3 of [the Code of Civil Procedure] provides that a court decides on the claims submitted by a claimant. However, the court may go beyond those claims in cases provided for by the federal law.\nArticle 65 of [the Family Code] provides that if no agreement can be reached, a dispute between parents must be decided by a court, having regard to the child\u2019s best interests.\nIt follows that the court may go beyond the parties\u2019 claims and make a residence order in respect of the child in favour of the father [E.].\nThe report of the childcare authority of Grozny no. ... of 15 April 2014 indicates that it is preferable to make a residence order in respect of the child [I.] in favour of his father [E.], and not to hinder his contact with his mother.\nThe available information shows that both parents have good character references from their employers and their neighbourhoods, have permanent employment, stable incomes, and real estate.\nAccording to inspection reports, the living conditions of both parents meet the conditions necessary for raising and accommodating a child.\nPoint 5 of Ruling no. 10 of the Plenary Supreme Court of 27 May 1998 enumerates, in line with Article 65 \u00a7 3 of [the Family Code], factors which must be taken into account when deciding on a dispute concerning a child\u2019s residence arrangements. These factors are the child\u2019s attachment to each of the parents and [any] siblings, the relationship between the child and each of the parents, the child\u2019s age, the parents\u2019 moral and other personal qualities and the possibilities each of them have for creating [proper] conditions for the child\u2019s upbringing and development (in the light of such considerations as each parent\u2019s occupation, employment schedule, and financial and family situation), and other factors defining the situation in each parent\u2019s place of residence. The Plenary Ruling stresses, in particular, that the better financial or living conditions of one of the parents cannot, in themselves, constitute a decisive reason for granting this parent\u2019s application for a residence order in his [or her] favour.\nThe better financial and living conditions of one of the parents (the claimant has a higher income and owns residential property in Moscow) cannot constitute a decisive reason for making a residence order in her favour and for rejecting the other parent\u2019s claim, because there are other factors.\nBy contrast, [the applicant] is a single mother who has one more child from her previous marriage: a daughter [R.] born on 25 June 1997. This age is most difficult, and requires special attention from the mother.\nBecause she works, on 2 September 2013 the claimant placed I. in a [nursery school] in Moscow, despite the fact that, by her own admission, he suffers from a congenital central neural system anomaly: dysgenesis of the corpus callosum.\nThe [factors considered] above indicate that [the applicant] is unable to create [proper] conditions for the child\u2019s upbringing and development. Because of her work, she does not have enough time to devote to her children. These circumstances could have a disastrous impact on the child\u2019s immature mind.\nIt has been established that the defendant occupies a managerial position at work. His income allows him to create comfortable financial and living conditions. He lives with his mother [A.], who helps to raise [I.]. The childcare authorities\u2019 report indicates that the child is attached to his father.\nThe defendant has not hindered [the applicant\u2019s] contact with the child.\nUnder Articles 56 and 57 of [the Code of Civil Procedure], each party must prove the circumstances on which [he or] she relies in support of [his or] her claims or submissions.\nIn the court\u2019s opinion, the claimant has not submitted evidence in support of her arguments in [the] adversarial proceedings.\u201d 18.  The applicant appealed. She complained, in particular, that the residence order had been granted to E. at the District Court\u2019s own initiative, as E. had never requested it. She further submitted that she was perfectly capable of providing I. with everything which he needed for his development. Her elder daughter was healthy and self-reliant and did not require any special attention. Her daughter would therefore not hinder her ability to take care of I.; on the contrary, she was of great help. The applicant had placed I. in a nursery school to give him a pre-school education and to further his social adaptation. His medical condition was not an obstacle to his attending a pre-school. The District Court\u2019s finding that she did not have enough time to take care of her children was not based on any evidence. Neither her working schedule nor that of E. had been examined. Nor had the court explained how, within such a short period of time, I. could have become more attached to his father than his mother, with whom he had lived from birth until his recent abduction. Lastly, the applicant complained that E. was preventing her from seeing her son. That fact had been confirmed by the childcare authorities\u2019 representative at the hearing, who had recounted E.\u2019s assertions that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 19.  On 3 July 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it was lawful, well-reasoned and justified. The judgment was based on the best interests of the child, taking into account his age, his attachment to the father, and the father\u2019s ability to create proper conditions for his son\u2019s upbringing and development. 20.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant that she had been prevented from seeing her son for a long time, by a letter of 7 August 2014, a deputy mayor of Grozny informed her that E. had stated to the childcare authorities that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 21.  By a letter of 12 September 2014, the head of the childcare authority of Grozny informed the applicant that the childcare official who had issued the report of 15 April 2014 had been disciplined. An internal inquiry had established that the report was based on incorrect and incomplete information. In particular, E.\u2019s statement that he had high income had not been checked. The finding that the applicant had not participated in I.\u2019s upbringing was not based on any evidence. The length of time I. had lived with each of the parents had not been established. Lastly, the fact that I. had a half-sister living with his mother had not been taken into account. The report of 15 April 2014 had therefore violated the applicant\u2019s rights and legitimate interests. 22.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, referring, in particular, to the letter of 12 September 2014. 23.  On 27 November 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the Presidium of that Court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. Relying, in particular, on the childcare authorities\u2019 report of 15 April 2014, the judge found that it was in I.\u2019s interests to live with his father. 24.  On 5 December 2014 E. died in a car accident. I continued to live with his paternal grandmother A. 25.  On 14 January 2015 the applicant applied to the Shali Town Court of the Chechen Republic (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d), asking that I. be returned to her. 26.  On 31 July 2015 the Town Court granted her application. The court held that I. should be taken away from A. and returned to the applicant, with whom he should live from that point onwards. On 12 November 2015 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 27.  On 24 November 2015 the Town Court issued a writ of execution. On the same day bailiffs initiated enforcement proceedings. 28.  On 28 November 2015 the bailiffs visited A. and ordered that she return I. to the applicant on 3 December 2015. When the bailiffs visited A. on 3 December 2015 to take I. away, A. and I. were not at home. The bailiffs visited A. again on 5 and 25 December 2015 and 4 February 2016, but could not find her or I. The childcare authorities also visited A.\u2019s address on several occasions, but found nobody at home. It was finally established that A. had moved out with I. 29.  On 24 December 2015 the bailiffs banned A. from leaving the country. 30.  On 10 February 2016 A.\u2019s and I.\u2019s names were put on the list of wanted persons. 31.  On 28 April 2016 I. was returned to the applicant by the police. On the next day the enforcement proceedings were closed.", "references": ["3", "6", "2", "0", "5", "8", "7", "1", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The Bektashi Order has existed and practised its religion in the respondent State for many centuries. The applicant association\u2019s headquarters were at the \u201cTeke Sersem Ali-Harabati Baba\u201d in Tetovo. Until the applicant association was refused registration in 2010 (see paragraphs 23-33 below), it practised its religion in full compliance with the relevant legislation applicable at the time. In the past, it was also known under the name \u201cIslamic Bektashi Community\u201d. 7.  On 31 July 1997 the Religious Communities and Groups Act (\u201cthe 1997 Act\u201d) entered into force. It repealed the Legal Status of Religious Communities Act 1977 (\u201cthe 1977 Act\u201d) and provided that the Commission for Religious Communities and Groups (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438 \u0441\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438 \u0438 \u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0438\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe Commission\u201d) would be responsible for dealing with religious matters, which up until then had been the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d). 8.  On 25 August 1997 the Commission requested that the applicant association submit a copy of its application (\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043e\u0434 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0430) to be listed in the register of the Ministry and the related certificate of registration (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0458\u0430\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) so that it could \u201ctransfer (into its register) the religious communities and groups of which the Ministry of the Interior had been notified (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0438)\u201d (section 35 of the 1997 Act, see paragraph 37 below). 9.  On 4 September 1997 the applicant association (under the name \u201cIslamic Bektashi Community\u201d in Tetovo) contacted the Ministry, seeking a copy of all relevant documents related to its application submitted in 1993. According to the applicant association, on 16 September 1997 it forwarded to the Commission all the documents obtained from the Ministry save for the certificate, which had never been issued. 10.  At the request of the applicant association, on 1 March 1999 the Ministry issued a certificate (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0430) attesting that on 17 February 1993 the applicant association (under the name \u201cIslamic Bektashi Community\u201d in Tetovo) had submitted an \u201capplication for registration\u201d (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) and other relevant documents. On 5 April 1999 the applicant association forwarded the certificate to the Commission. No information was provided as to the follow-up procedure, if any, concerning the Commission\u2019s request for the applicant association to be registered under section 35 of the 1997 Act. 11.  On 23 June 2000 the Commission issued a certificate (\u201cthe 2000 certificate\u201d), attesting that on 13 June 2000 the applicant association had filed \u201can application (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0430) in accordance with the 1997 Act\u201d. The certificate further stated:\n\u201cSince the statutory conditions are met, the Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia is listed (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430).\u201d 12.  By a decision of 18 July 2000, the State Statistics Office specified the applicant association\u2019s main activities (\u201cthe activities of religious organisations\u201d), its headquarters (the \u201cArabati Baba\u201d site); and attributed corresponding indexes and business codes. 13.  In a letter of 13 June 2002 sent to a trial court regarding unrelated proceedings, the Commission confirmed that \u201cthe Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia [had been] registered (\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430) ...\u201d 14.  In 2003 a local non-governmental organisation (\u201cthe Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation\u201d) published the \u201cDirectory of Religious Communities in Macedonia\u201d, which included the religious entities recorded in the Commission\u2019s register. The applicant association was listed on the basis of the 2000 certificate. 15.  On 20 February 2007 the Commission authorised the first applicant to carry out \u201creligious ceremonies and rituals on authorised premises of the Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia\u201d. 16.  On 28 September 2007 the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act 2007 (\u201cthe 2007 Act\u201d) entered into force. It came into operation on 1 May 2008 (section 36). It specified that the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe registration court\u201d) would be competent to deal with religious matters (section 11). It also provided that the Commission would transfer all documents regarding the existing religious entities recorded in its register to the registration court. All religious organisations registered by the Commission up until 1998 could retain their existing legal personality and status. 17.  On 10 June 2008 the applicant association, represented by a local lawyer, requested information from the Commission about its status. In reply the Commission stated that it had only been required to transfer to the registration court information regarding existing religious communities registered up until 1998. Since it had only been notified about the applicant association in 2000, the latter should have made an application for re\u2011registration in the Single Court Register (\u201cthe court register\u201d) in accordance with the 2007 Act. 18.  On 4 June 2009 the applicant association requested, under section 35 of the 2007 Act, that the registration court recognise its continuing legal status and record it in the court register. 19.  On 2 October 2009 the registration court dismissed the applicant association\u2019s request. Referring to section 35(1) of the 1997 Act, it held that \u201c[the Commission] had been obliged (\u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043da) to transfer to its register the religious communities and groups of which the Ministry had been notified up until the 1997 Act had entered into force. However, since the applicant association had not given notice to the Ministry, at the time, it had not been transferred to the Commission\u2019s records, as provided for in that provision.\u201d 20.  It further established that in June 2000 the applicant association had given notice to the Commission, which the latter had acknowledged with the 2000 certificate. That practice had been in compliance with decision U.br.223/97 of December 1998 (see paragraph 42 below), in which the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional the statutory provisions which had provided for registration of new religious entities conferring on them legal status. 21.  The court also established that the applicant association had never been recorded (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0448\u0430\u043d) and registered (\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430) by the Commission either before 1998, as required under section 35(2) of the 2007 Act, or up until the 2007 Act had entered into force. The applicant association had only given notice (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430) to the Commission in 2000. Consequently, the Commission had not been required, as specified in section 35(1) of the 2007 Act, to transfer the data \u201crecorded in its register\u201d to the registration court. That requirement concerned only registered religious organisations and not entities which were listed by the Commission. The court concluded that the applicant association had never obtained the legal status it sought to have recognised in the request. 22.  On 18 February 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed an appeal by the applicant association and upheld the established facts and reasoning given by the registration court. 23.  On 22 November 2010 the applicant association, represented by local lawyers authorised to act on its behalf by the second applicant, filed an application for registration in the court register as \u201cBektashi Religious Community of the Republic of Macedonia\u201d. It also enclosed several documents, including a description of the doctrinal sources. On 30 November 2010 the registration court requested further documents to complete the application. The applicant association submitted the requested documents. 24.  On 20 December 2010 the court refused to register the applicant association on the following grounds: (a) the name \u201cBektashi\u201d had already been used by another religious entity registered in the court register; (b) the doctrinal sources were the same as the doctrinal sources of another already registered religious entity; and (c) the applicant association had not submitted proof of ownership of the \u201cArabati Baba\u201d site in Tetovo, indicated as its headquarters in the application for registration. 25.  The applicant association appealed against this decision and asked the Court of Appeal to hold a public hearing. 26.  At a hearing held in private on 14 April 2011, the court allowed the applicant association\u2019s appeal and quashed the lower court\u2019s decision as it had not specified which registered religious entity used the name \u201cBektashi\u201d or which statutory provision forbade the use of identical doctrinal sources by multiple religious communities and groups. Furthermore, there was no statutory provision under which an application for registration could be refused owing to lack of proof of ownership of the headquarters of a religious community. 27.  On 27 May 2011 the registration court again refused to register the applicant association as its intended name contained the term \u201cBektashi\u201d, which had already been used by another religious entity, namely the \u201cEhlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia\u201d registered in the court register on 10 September 2010. The court stated that \u201cthe existing Act [did] not allow for the registration of a new religious entity under a name that [had] already been recorded in the register for another registered religious entity\u201d. Furthermore, its doctrinal sources were no different from the doctrinal sources of the Islamic Religious Community, which had existed for centuries and which had been registered in the court register on 14 November 2008. As to the doctrinal sources as described by the applicant association, the court stated as follows:\n\u201c... [they consist of] the Islamic religion and the teaching of the Holy Koran, which is supplemented and interpreted by the knowledge and practices of prophet Mohamed and Imam Ali, the Holy Ehlibeyt (the prophet\u2019s family) and the Holy Journey of Haji Bektash Veli ... it is about the sources of the Islamic religion, for which there is already a registered religious community ... whose teaching includes the Koran and the practices of Mohamed Aleyhisselam. According to Islamic teaching, Ali was his son-in-law and a member of the family (or ehlibeyt), the fourth elected caliph who ruled the Islamic state, and Haji Bektash Veli was the founder of the Bektashi Order of Islam and one of the prominent Islamic philosophers. In other words, the doctrinal sources of [the applicant association] are not at all different from the doctrinal sources of the ... Islamic Religious Community ...\nIn the court\u2019s opinion, the doctrinal sources are to be regarded as official insignia of a church, religious community or group within the meaning of section 10(1) of the 2007 Act. It would be a violation of [that provision] if they did not differ i.e. did not have specific characteristics, elements that were different from the doctrinal sources of the teachings of an already registered [religious entity].\u201d 28.  In such circumstances, the court held that the \u201csubstantive conditions\u201d for registration of the applicant association in the court register had not been fulfilled. Accordingly, it refused its application for registration under section 16 of the 2007 Act (see paragraph 38 below). 29.  The applicant association challenged the grounds on which the registration court had based the refusal of registration. It argued that there was no other religious entity registered under the same name. In this connection, it submitted that there were six registered religious entities that contained the term \u201cChristian\u201d in their name and two registered entities that used the term \u201cIslamic\u201d. The intention of the 2007 Act was not to ban the use of terms that had a generic and not exclusive meaning. Otherwise, it would mean that the law would only allow the registration of one religious entity containing the term Christian, Islamic, Bektashi, Jewish, Tarikat, Buddhist, Zen or Zoroastric. It also argued that it had sought registration as a religious community, as opposed to \u201cEhlibeyt Bektashi\u201d, which was registered as a religious group. Its intended name was substantially different from the name of that entity; it had existed for decades and centuries, as was evident from the directory and correspondence with various State institutions. As regards the doctrinal sources, it argued that they could not be regarded as official insignia within the meaning of section 10(1) of the 2007 Act. Doctrinal sources could be identical for multiple religious entities (as the Bible was common for Orthodox Christians and Catholics, and the Koran was common for the Islamic Religious Community, the Bektashi Order and Shia or Sunni Muslims). They were of an ideological nature and were not constant, nor could they be interpreted in that way. Official insignia concerned symbols (crosses, crescents, graphic symbols), a flag or a totem that represented something. In this connection, it stated that the interpretation which the court had given regarding its doctrinal sources, namely that they were identical to the doctrinal sources of all Islamic teaching, was wrong. The mere fact that the court had interpreted its doctrinal sources implied that the State was not separated from religion. Furthermore, if that interpretation had been based on some material, it had not been communicated to the applicant association. Nor had it been given the opportunity to present its views at a public hearing. In this connection, it requested that the Court of Appeal hold a public hearing. Lastly, it complained that the refusal of registration was discriminatory. 30.  At a hearing held in private on 17 November 2011, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. It held that although the intended name of the applicant association was not entirely identical to the name of the \u201cEhlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia\u201d, it contained the term \u201cBektashi\u201d, which was \u201cdecisive and represented a synonym for the religious entity\u201d. Consequently, the registration of the applicant association could create confusion among the believers. The Court of Appeal made no mention as to the lower court\u2019s findings regarding the doctrinal sources of the applicant association. It accordingly held that section 16 of the 2007 Act had been correctly applied. 31.  On 20 February 2012 the applicant association and the second applicant (and two other individuals) lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining that they had been discriminated against contrary to Article 110 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution. They summarised the factual background described above and reiterated the arguments raised in the appeal against the court\u2019s decision of 27 May 2011 (see paragraph 29 above). They complained that the use of the term \u201cBektashi\u201d could not be exclusive (like the use of \u201cChristian\u201d and \u201cIslamic\u201d). Furthermore, the registration of the \u201cEhlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia\u201d implied that the domestic authorities had implicitly accepted that the doctrinal sources of that religious group were allegedly identical to the teaching of the Islamic Religious Community. They requested that the Constitutional Court hold a public hearing (\u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430) in accordance with section 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 41 below). 32.  At a hearing held on 20 November 2012 in the absence of the parties, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal. The relevant parts of its decision (U.br.24/12) read as follows:\n\u201c... in the present case, the court considers that it should examine whether the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community violated freedom of religion and whether there are elements of discrimination on religious grounds.\nAs regards the first part of the question and having regard to section 9 of the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act, it appears that registration in the Single Court Register is a requirement for a religious entity to obtain legal status, but it is not a precondition for religious ceremonies, rituals and prayers, which believers ... can hold irrespective of whether they are organised as a registered religious legal entity.\nIn the present case, having regard to the arguments put forward in the application and the established facts, it appears that the applicants, who define themselves as members of the Bektashi Community, have freely practised their religion for many years. They participate in public life, communicate with State bodies, and participate in religious gatherings and conferences. This leads to the conclusion that, although they are not formally registered under the [2007 Act], they can practise their religion freely and hold religious ceremonies in accordance with the Islamic religion, without any pressure or persecution. Consequently, the applicants\u2019 freedom of religion has not been violated.\nIn order to reply whether there are elements of discrimination in the dismissal of the application for registration of the Bektashi Religious Community, the Constitutional Court assesses whether the courts which decided in the registration proceedings ... gave sufficient reasons and whether the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community was based on relevant and reasonable grounds, namely whether the refusal of registration pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a measure of proportionality between the means used and the aim pursued ...\u201d 33.  The court then referred to the grounds on which the registration court had based its decision and stated as follows:\n\u201c... the [registration] court refused to register the [applicant association] on two grounds: (1) the intended name of the [applicant association] contained the term \u2018Bektashi\u2019 which had been incorporated into the name of an already registered religious entity, the \u2018Ehlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia\u2019 ... and (2) its doctrinal sources were the same as the doctrinal sources of an already registered religious entity, the Islamic Religious Community.\nThe refusal to register the [applicant association] was based on grounds specified by law ... which, in the court\u2019s view, was correctly applied. The [dismissal decision was based on] section 10(1) of [the 2007 Act] ...\n The Constitutional Court endorses the findings of the first-instance court that the name and the doctrinal sources are official insignia of a religious entity and distinctive elements through which it is identified and recognised by the public ...\nThis particularly concerns smaller religious entities, namely [those] that ... manifest their distinctiveness through these two elements. Hence, equating the complainant [the applicant association] with another already registered religious entity can mislead the public, that is, it can confuse believers, which is at the same time itself a violation of their religious beliefs. It is not in dispute that the right of a religious entity to be registered should be secured in the context of freedom of religion, but nor should it violate the religious rights and feelings of the members of already registered religious entities.\n... Each religious entity, church, religious community or group has the right to be distinct and be recognised in public by its identity. The absence of such [distinctiveness] or competition leads to confusion and misunderstanding by the public.[Such is the case] if there are multiple similar entities which are in competition, indefinite parallelism and division.\nThe aim of the statutory requirement for the name and official insignia of religious entities, including doctrinal sources, not to be identical (\u043d\u0435\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u043e\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0458\u0430) ... is to prevent confusion among believers, incorrect perceptions, and lawful indefinite division of same-faith believers in several religious communities or entities. In the court\u2019s view, these aims are legitimate and necessary in order to protect the freedoms and rights of others, to secure religious tolerance and prevent religious conflicts, as part of ensuring public safety, which is the responsibility of the State.\nIn view of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court considers that the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community did not violate [the applicants\u2019] freedom of religion of the applicants, nor were they discriminated against on the basis of their religion.\u201d", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "6", "2", "0", "9", "8", "No Label", "7", "5"], "gold": ["7", "5"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Dubrovnik. 6.  On 21 October 2010, at 4:40 p.m. in Dubrovnik, police officers of the Criminal Police Department of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County Police (Odjel kriminalisti\u010dke policije Policijske uprave dubrova\u010dko-neretvanske) (hereinafter \u201cthe police\u201d) arrested the applicant on suspicion of drug abuse. 7.  According to the Government, the applicant resisted arrest and the police had to apply force in order to be able to bring him to the police station. During this process both the applicant and one of the police officers who had arrested him, S.D., sustained minor bodily injuries. 8.  According to the applicant, he did not resist arrest and did not sustain injuries during his arrest; rather, it was during his stay in the police station that the police officers ill-treated him in order to pressure him to make incriminating statements against his co-accused in the trial. 9.  The applicant was taken to the police station immediately after his arrest. At 9.40 p.m. he was examined by a doctor, who found that he had sustained minor bodily injuries \u2013 excoriations on his left elbow, on the left side of his chest and behind his left ear. Minor bodily injuries were also found on the police officer, S.D., who had arrested the applicant \u2013 specifically, excoriations on his right knee and elbow. During their medical examination the applicant and the police officer S.D. stated that they had sustained their injuries by falling to the ground. The doctor\u2019s report of the examination was forwarded to the police. 10.  According to a common report issued on the same day by the three police officers who arrested the applicant, S.D., L.D. and I.R., the applicant had resisted arrest and they had had to apply force in order to bring him to the police station. In particular, it was noted that the applicant had been found in a vehicle on the road and arrested. He had refused to step out of his vehicle, so S.D. had grabbed him by his left wrist and had applied the so\u2011called \u201cwristlock\u201d technique in order to get him out of his vehicle. At that point police officer L.D. had grabbed the applicant by his right hand in order to apply the so-called \u201celbow-lock\u201d technique, but due to the fact that the applicant had continued to resist all three of them had fallen to the ground. The applicant had tried to stand up and L.D. had kept him on the ground by pressing his knee against his back. The applicant had then been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a police vehicle. In the police vehicle the applicant had continued to resist and the police officer S.D. had applied the \u201celbow-lock\u201d technique and leaned him forwards in order to restrain him. By the time they had parked in front of the police station, one handcuff had come loose, so L.D. and I.R. had applied the \u201celbow-lock\u201d technique again. When they had entered the police station the applicant had once again fallen to the ground. Then the applicant had been seated in a room and had ceased to resist, so the police officers had stopped using force and removed his other handcuff. Lastly, it was noted that during the application of coercive measures the applicant and S.D. had sustained injuries which, according to the doctor\u2019s report, had been minor. 11.  On the same day a shift manager of the Criminal Police Department noted in a report that the applicant had actively resisted arrest and that S.D., L.D. and I.R. had applied coercive measures against him \u2013 bodily force, restraining techniques and handcuffing. It was also noted that the applicant had been examined by a doctor, who had found that he had sustained excoriations on his left elbow, on the left side of his chest and behind his left ear. The applicant signed the report and stated that he did not have any objections to the procedure that had been followed. 12.  On 25 October 2010 the chief of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County Police examined the information gathered in respect of the application of coercive measures against the applicant and found that they had been necessary, justified and lawful. 13.  According to a police report made on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, the applicant was informed of the reasons for his arrest and his right to remain silent, to hire a lawyer of his own choosing and to have a person of his choice be informed of his arrest. The report noted that the applicant had declined to hire a lawyer and that he had asked that his father be informed of his arrest. In this connection it was noted that the applicant\u2019s father had been contacted at 6.20 p.m. The applicant signed the report without making any objections to its contents. On the same day the police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant under a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. 14.  On 22 October 2010 at 9.45 a.m. the applicant was questioned by the police. In the report on his questioning it was noted that the applicant had been advised of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer of his own choosing who could be present during the questioning. In this connection it was noted that the applicant had declined to hire a lawyer. The applicant then gave a statement, explaining that in August 2010 he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. He also stated that between 2008 and 2010 he had on several occasions bought cocaine from a certain D.\u0160. He expressed regret for his actions. The questioning ended at 11.10 a.m. The applicant signed the report on his questioning without making any objections regarding its contents. 15.  On 22 October 2010 at 12 p.m. the applicant was brought for questioning before an investigating judge of the Dubrovnik County Court. A deputy Dubrovnik County State Attorney, K.K., was also present during the questioning. According to the report on his questioning, the applicant was twice advised by the investigating judge of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer of his own choosing, who could be present during the questioning. The applicant replied that he understood the advice and the grounds for his being under suspicion and maintained that he did not require a lawyer for that day\u2019s questioning and that he would give a statement to the investigating judge and answer questions. He then explained that in August 2010 he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines and that between 2008 and 2010 he had on several occasions bought cocaine from D.\u0160. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had been arrested the day before at 5 p.m. and that apart from the use of force during his arrest he did not have any objections about the police conduct during his stay in the police station. The questioning ended at 12:50 p.m. The applicant signed the report on his questioning without making any objections as to its contents. He was then released. 16.  On 29 October 2010 an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant and D.\u0160 on the reasonable suspicion of their having engaged in drug abuse. On 2 December 2010 the investigation was extended to encompass a third person, V.V. 17.  On 3 December 2010 the applicant hired a lawyer, D.P., to represent him. 18.  On 4 January 2011 the Dubrovnik County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Dubrovniku) indicted the applicant, D.\u0160., and V.V for drug abuse. 19.  On 3 May 2011 a hearing was held before the Dubrovnik County Court, which the applicant and his lawyer attended. The hearing was adjourned in order for V.V.\u2019s ability to follow the proceedings to be determined. 20.  The hearing of 7 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, was adjourned owing to the illness of the presiding judge. 21.  At a hearing held on 20 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the Dubrovnik Country Court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) established the identity of the defendants and the charges brought against them. The applicant stated that he understood the charges brought against him and the warnings regarding his rights given by the presiding judge and that he would present his defence and answer questions. He pleaded not guilty. He asked to give his defence at the end of the trial. Evidence was read out aloud, whereas certain evidence was excluded from the case file at the request of the defence. The trial court heard three witnesses. 22.  At a hearing held on 21 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the trial court heard I.G., a witness. 23.  At a hearing held on 1 July 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the trial court continued to hear I.G. and examined certain other evidence. The applicant\u2019s lawyer then proposed that the trial court examine the medical records of the applicant\u2019s father who allegedly suffered a stroke after learning of the applicant\u2019s arrest, as well as a medical certificate dated 27 January 2011 confirming that on 21 October 2010 the applicant had been examined by a doctor and that the doctor\u2019s report had been forwarded to the police. He also proposed that the trial court hear the applicant\u2019s sister and examine the power of attorney by which she had hired a lawyer to represent the applicant during the time that the investigating judge was questioning him. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, D.P., explained that this proposed evidence was relevant for the establishing of the conduct of the police against the applicant. D.H., the lawyer allegedly hired by the applicant\u2019s sister, who represented D.\u0160., the applicant\u2019s co-accused in the trial, stated that the power of attorney in question had been signed in his office on the night when the applicant had been held in the police station. The trial court examined the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s medical records and rejected the other proposed evidence, considering them irrelevant for the proceedings at that point. 24.  At a hearing held on 4 July 2011 the trial court heard the applicant\u2019s co-accused, D.\u0160. D.\u0160. stated, inter alia, that he had not sold drugs to the applicant and that he had learned from his lawyer, D.H., that the police had ill-treated the applicant in the police station and had beaten him. The trial court then heard the applicant. 25.  The applicant reiterated the part of his statement given to the investigating judge on 22 October 2010 concerning the criminal accusation against him, namely that he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. He retracted the part of his statement concerning the buying of cocaine from D.\u0160. He alleged that after he had been brought to the police station he had been physically and psychologically ill-treated and had been coerced to into giving such a statement to the investigating judge. He further alleged that the following morning his father and sister had come to the police station, and when he had seen his father crying, he had agreed to give his statement to the investigating judge. He explained that once he had been brought to the police station he had immediately confessed to being an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. However, when the police had started questioning him about D.\u0160. and the cocaine, he had asked for a lawyer. Later, at one point police officer L.D. had told him that D.H. had arrived at the entrance of the police station but had not been allowed to come in. He alleged that he had been beaten by police officers L.D., S.D. and I.R. 26.  When asked by the prosecutor, the applicant explained that during his arrest and transportation to the police station the police officers had used force against him and had beaten him. When further asked by the presiding judge and the lawyer, D.H., the applicant explained that even though on 22 October 2010 he had been advised by the investigating judge of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer, he had been afraid of the police officers who had brought him before the investigating judge, given that they had been the same police officers who had beaten him. The applicant\u2019s lawyer then asked that the applicant\u2019s sister be heard on account of a conversation that she had had with the police officer, L.D. He also asked that D.H. be heard and that the medical documentation relating to the injuries the applicant had sustained during his questioning by the police be examined. The trial court dismissed these requests, considering such evidence to be unnecessary. 27.  In a closing statement the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the trial court to take into account, when determining the applicant\u2019s sentence, the fact that he had confessed to his crime. The applicant reiterated his lawyer\u2019s statement and added that he intended to finish school and start working and would never repeat his actions. 28.  On 6 July 2011 the Dubrovnik County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. It also found D.\u0160. and V.V. guilty as charged and sentenced them to eight and two years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. In finding D.\u0160. guilty the trial court referred to, inter alia, the statement that the applicant had given to the investigating judge concerning his having purchased cocaine from D.\u0160. in the period between 2008 and 2010. It did not consider credible the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had given his statement to the investigating judge under police duress. It found that during the trial the applicant himself had alleged that he had given his oral statement to the investigating judge uninterruptedly, without the police officers being present, and after being advised of his right to hire a lawyer and to remain silent. In this respect it noted that the applicant had told the investigating judge that he had been ill\u2011treated by the police only during his arrest, and not during his stay in the police station. It considered that the fact that the applicant had changed the nature of his allegation was an attempt to help his co-accused D.\u0160 in the trial. 29.  The trial court dismissed evidence proposals relating to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in the police station, specifically that his sister be heard in respect of this allegation, finding that his sister had not been present during his arrest and transportation to the police station, and later on had not been in the same room with the applicant and the police officers. As to the criminal accusation against the applicant, the trial court found that the applicant had confessed to being an intermediary in the sale of amphetamines and it took his confession into account as a mitigating circumstance. 30.  The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In his appeal he stated that he had not resisted his arrest and had not sustained injuries during his arrest. He explained that once he had been brought to the police station he had immediately and voluntarily confessed to his crime. Therefore, he could have had no reason to resist the police only a few minutes beforehand. He further stated that the police had physically and psychologically pressured him into incriminating D.\u0160. and had denied him access to a lawyer. He alleged that he had given a statement to the investigating judge under duress applied by the police officers who had brought him before the investigating judge. He complained about the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his proposals regarding evidence relating to those circumstances. He lastly stated that, given that the trial court had believed the statement that he had given against D.\u0160. and had taken it into account when convicting D.\u0160., he should have been given a milder sanction. 31.  On 29 February 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction but reduced his sentence to one year\u2019s imprisonment. The Supreme Court found that in his appeal the applicant himself had stated that the police officers had had no reason to exert pressure on him given that he had immediately confessed his crime. As to the change of the applicant\u2019s line of defence during the trial, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this had probably been an attempt to help his co-accused, D.\u0160., in the trial, rather than constituting a credible reason for retracting his earlier statements. The Supreme Court lastly found that the applicant\u2019s statement had helped to convict D.\u0160. and that therefore his sentence was to be reduced to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 32.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that during his stay in the police station he had asked for a lawyer and that his sister and father had hired D.H. to represent him. However, he stated that the police had forced him to waive this right. He further complained that he had been ill-treated during his stay in the police station. He explained that he had not resisted arrest and had not been injured during his arrest, but during his stay in the police station when he had been forced to incriminate D.\u0160. 33.  On 7 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 18 November 2013.", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "8", "6", "9", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Warsaw. The second applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Apollo Beach, Florida, United States of America. 6.  The Foreign Debt Service Fund (Fundusz Obs\u0142ugi Zad\u0142u\u017cenia Zagranicznego \uf02d \u201cthe FOZZ\u201d) was established by the Law of 15 February 1989, which entered into force on 21 February 1989. It was a legal entity whose liabilities were guaranteed by the State Treasury. The task of the FOZZ was to collect and manage the funds earmarked for servicing Poland\u2019s foreign debt. Those funds were to be used to repay Poland\u2019s foreign debt. 7.  The FOZZ was managed by its Director General, who had statutory authority to independently represent the Fund and enter into contracts on its behalf. The first applicant was initially appointed Head of Domestic Operations and later Deputy Director General of the FOZZ. The second applicant was the Managing Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Universal Foreign Trade Company based in Poland. 8.  Criminal proceedings were instituted following a complaint lodged by J.T., a German national, at the Polish Consulate in Cologne. 9.  An investigation was opened on 7 May 1991. On 18 February 1993 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Warsaw Regional Court. He charged the first applicant and another individual, K.K., with misappropriation of public property and mismanagement. On 27 September 1993 the court decided to return the bill of indictment to the prosecutor so that certain shortcomings in the investigation could be rectified. 10.  On 19 January 1998 the prosecutor filed an updated bill of indictment with the Warsaw Regional Court. 11.  The first applicant was charged with misappropriation of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value committed with other persons as a continuous offence between March 1989 and February 1991. She was further charged with failure to perform her duties to the detriment of the FOZZ. 12.  The second applicant was charged with misappropriation of 1,557,178.05 US dollars (USD) to the detriment of the FOZZ committed with other persons as a continuous offence between July and September 1990. 13.  There were five other accused in the case. 14.  In February 1999 the applicants\u2019 case was assigned to Judge B.P. The trial started on 4 October 2000 and a number of hearings were held until October 2001. On 19 October 2001 Judge B.P. was appointed Minister of Justice and consequently the whole trial had to be restarted. 15.  On 19 October 2001 the President of the 8th Division of the Warsaw Regional Court asked the President of the Regional Court to assist the Division in finding a Regional Court judge from the appellate divisions who could hear the applicants\u2019 case. He stated that, owing to a lack of judges and the volume of work in the 8th Division, there were no judges who could examine the case in question swiftly. 16.  On 6 November 2001 the President of the Regional Court referred the request to the Board of the Regional Court (kolegium S\u0105du Okr\u0119gowego). She informed it that one of the judges, Judge A.K., had not agreed to a proposal by the management of the court to be transferred to the 8th Division to examine the FOZZ case. However, Judge A.K. stated that he would go if the Board took a decision in that regard. 17.  On 6 November 2001 the Board unanimously decided to transfer Judge A.K. from the 10th Appellate Division to the 8th Criminal Division with effect from 15 November 2001. It further decided to assign him to case no. VIII K 37/98. In a letter of 7 November 2001 the President of the Regional Court informed Judge A.K. of that decision. 18.  On 22 November 2001 the President of the 8th Criminal Division assigned Judge A.K. to case no. VIII K 37/98 \u201cin accordance with the decision of the Board of the Warsaw Regional Court\u201d. 19.  The new trial bench was composed of Judge A.K., acting as president, and two lay judges. A substitute judge and two substitute lay judges were also assigned to the case. 20.  The first hearing before the new bench was set for 30 September 2002. On that date Judge A.K. allowed journalists to record images and the identities of the defendants. He stated on that occasion that \u201cthere are forty million victims in this case, and society has the right to have images and personal information about the defendants\u201d. 21.  There were 224 hearings held in the trial court. Some 314 witnesses were heard, and a number of expert accounting reports and more than 1000 documents were examined. The files of the case were very voluminous. 22.  On 8 February 2005 the trial court finished hearing evidence in the case. 23.  On 29 March 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court delivered its judgment. Judge A.K. presented the main reasons for the verdict orally. 24.  The trial court convicted the first applicant of misappropriation of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value committed with other persons between March 1989 and December 1991 (Article 284 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Articles 12 and 294 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The trial court held that, in her capacity as Head of Domestic Operations and later Deputy Director General, she had misappropriated a total of USD 3,779,835.75 from the FOZZ for the benefit of herself and other entities (point III of the operative provisions of the judgment). With regard to that offence, the court sentenced her to five years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 25.  The trial court further convicted the first applicant of failure to perform her duties and of exceeding her authority between March 1989 and July 1990 (Article 217 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 4 of the Criminal Code of 1969). As a result of those failings the FOZZ had suffered damage of no less than 21,068,680.58 Polish zlotys (PLN) (point IV of the operative provisions of the judgment). With regard to that offence, the trial court sentenced her to three years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 26.  The trial court convicted the second applicant of misappropriation of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (USD 503,000) committed with other persons (Article 284 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 294 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, point VI.1 of the operative provisions of the judgment). With regard to that offence, the trial court sentenced him to two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 27.  It further convicted the second applicant of theft of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (USD 1,074,120) committed with other persons (Article 278 \u00a7 1 in conjunction with Article 294 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the judgment). With regard to that offence, the trial court sentenced him to two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 28.  The trial court gave the first applicant a cumulative sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment and the second applicant a cumulative sentence of three and a half years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. The trial court ordered the applicants to compensate the FOZZ for the damage caused. The first applicant was further ordered to pay compensation to the State Treasury. 29.  On 30 March 2005 Judge A.K., in view of the complexity of the case, requested the President of the Warsaw Regional Court to grant him an extension until 31 May 2005 for preparation of the written judgment. The request was granted. The judgment was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 5 May 2005. The operative part of the judgment runs to seventy pages and the reasoning to 830 pages. 30.  The reasoning included a short presentation of evidence by certain witnesses concerning the alleged financing of political parties by the FOZZ. It stated that the issue \u201chad not been relevant for the determination of the case\u201d. 31.  The reasoning further included a passage saying that \u201cin the court\u2019s assessment, the FOZZ trial has not, however, shown the important role played by the [second applicant] in the functioning of the FOZZ...\u201d. 32.  Subsequently, Judge A.K. requested that the Board of the Regional Court transfer him back to the 9th Appellate Division. On 17 May 2005 the Board granted that request in connection with \u201cthe termination of the FOZZ case in the 8th Criminal Division\u201d. 33.  The Law of 3 June 2005 on amendments to the Criminal Code (\u201cthe 2005 Amendment\u201d), which extended limitation periods, entered into force on 3 August 2005 (see paragraphs 108-117 below). 34.  It appears from the case file that the second applicant moved to the United States of America on an unspecified date. 35.  The applicants lodged appeals with the Warsaw Court of Appeal. They alleged that Judge A.K. had been assigned to their case in breach of Articles 350 \u00a7 1 (1) and 351 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d). They argued that since the composition of the trial bench had been unlawful the appellate court should have quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. They further alleged that Judge A.K. had been involved in the passing of the 2005 Amendment, which amounted to a breach of their right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. 36.  The second applicant alleged that Judge A.K. had lacked impartiality, referring to a statement made by him at the opening of the trial and certain passages in the reasoning showing that he had a negative attitude towards him. He also referred to statements made in an interview given by Judge A.K. to the weekly newspaper Newsweek Polska assuming the defendants\u2019 guilt and showing hostility towards the so-called \u201cwhite collars\u201d, who in his view should have been severely punished. 37.  The applicants also alleged that the trial court had violated the rules of criminal procedure and the rights of the defence in various respects. 38.  In the course of the appellate proceedings, the Warsaw Court of Appeal referred a legal question to the Supreme Court, seeking an interpretation of the provisions of the CCP concerning the assignment of a trial court judge to a given case and the consequences of an irregularly constituted trial bench for the outcome of appellate proceedings. 39.  The legal question read as follows:\n\u201cDoes the expression \u201ccourt improperly constituted\u201d in Article 439 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCP also concern a situation in which a court that ruled on a case included a judge who had been \u201callocated\u201d to the case by some other entity than the [one] authorised to do so by law, i.e. the president of a court (president of a division) assigning a judge \u2013 Article 350 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCP \u2013 in the manner specified in Article 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP.\u201d 40.  In a Resolution adopted on 17 November 2005, the Supreme Court replied as follows:\n\u201cThe assignment of members of a court in breach of the rules specified in Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP constitutes a relative ground of appeal (wzgl\u0119dna przyczyna odwo\u0142awcza) referred to in Article 438 \u00a7 2 of the CCP.\u201d 41.  In its legal question, the Court of Appeal noted that, in consequence of a decision adopted by the Board of the Warsaw Regional Court, the president of a division in that court had issued an order assigning Judge A.K. to hear case no. VIII K 37/98 pursuant to Article 350 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCP. The same court also noted that the manner of assigning members of the court in that case had violated the rules specified in Article 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP since Judge A.K. had not been on the list of judges from which a judge should have been selected, but had been \u201ctransferred\u201d to the 8th Division of the Warsaw Regional Court in order to hear case no. VIII K 37/98. 42.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the rules specified in Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP had been violated in the case. There had been a breach of Article 350 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, which consisted of a decision not entirely \u201cindependent\u201d in nature being taken by the president of a division to select Judge A.K. to hear the case, since that decision had been predetermined by an earlier decision of the Board of the Regional Court. There had also been a violation of Article 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, which consisted of disregarding the list of judges of the division and assigning as a member of the court a judge who had been \u201ctransferred\u201d from another division for that specific purpose, without indicating other valid reasons, as required by that provision. 43.  The Supreme Court then examined whether the above-mentioned breach of the rules specified in Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 could be regarded as the court being \u201cimproperly constituted\u201d within the meaning of Article 439 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCP. Pursuant to that provision, a finding that a court had not been properly constituted resulted in the judgment being automatically set aside on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that in previous cases the term had been applied in the following situations: where a court had been composed of a smaller or larger number of members than provided for by law; where lay judges had sat as members of a court instead of professional judges and vice versa; and where a member of a court had had no authority to examine a case in a given court. 44.  The Supreme Court emphasised that a violation of the rules on the assignment of members of a court contained in Articles 350 and 351 of the CCP did not \u2013 in itself \u2013 result in a situation where a court had examined a case in a composition not provided for by law or where a member of a court had had no authority to decide in a given case. On the other hand, if a decision by a president of a court (president of a division) had, in breach of Article 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, resulted in a court with a composition unknown in the law for a given category of cases or a person not authorised to examine cases in a given court being selected, such a flaw would have to be regarded as an automatic ground of appeal within the meaning of Article 439 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCP. However, in such a situation the procedural flaw would have to consist not only of a violation of Article 351 of the CCP, but also a violation of the provisions of the CCP concerning the composition of judicial benches and the competence of judges to examine cases in a given court. In such a situation, a violation of procedural rules would be of a qualified, double nature. 45.  That had not occurred in the case under consideration, in which only Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP had been violated. In the Supreme Court\u2019s assessment, a sole violation of the above-mentioned provisions should be regarded as a relative ground of appeal. Consequently, in order to allow an appeal based on a relative ground, an appellate court had to establish, at least, a hypothetical link between the alleged procedural violation and the content of the judgment within the meaning of Article 438 \u00a7 2 of the CCP. 46.  The Warsaw Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 25 January 2006. 47.  It quashed the first applicant\u2019s conviction in respect of the offence of failure to perform her duties and of exceeding her authority (point IV of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment). The reason given was that the offence had become subject to limitation on 17 July 2005, prior to the date of entry into force of the 2005 Amendment. 48.  The Court of Appeal further quashed the second applicant\u2019s conviction in respect of theft of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment). The principal reason given was the court\u2019s refusal to apply the 2005 Amendment to the relevant offence imputed to the second applicant. In consequence, the limitation period in respect of that offence had expired on 12 September 2005. 49.  The Court of Appeal accordingly quashed the cumulative sentences imposed on the applicants. It discontinued the part of the proceedings concerning the quashed convictions. The Court of Appeal also lowered the fines imposed on the applicants. 50.  The remainder of the trial court\u2019s judgment was upheld, including the first and second applicant\u2019s convictions for misappropriation of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (points III and VI.1 respectively of the operative part of the trial court\u2019s judgment). 51.  The Court of Appeal analysed the circumstances surrounding the assignment of Judge A.K. to the case. It found that the decision to assign him had simply been a consequence of the Board of the Regional Court\u2019s decision and not a sovereign act by the President of the 8th Division in the exercise of his powers under Article 350 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCP. Having regard to the above, the Court of Appeal found that the statutory rules on the assignment of judges set out in Articles 350 \u00a7 1 (1) and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP had not been respected. 52.  Having regard to the Supreme Court\u2019s Resolution of 17 November 2005, the Court of Appeal considered the effect of the breach of Articles 350 \u00a7 1 (1) and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP on the content of the trial court\u2019s judgment. 53.  The Court of Appeal examined the circumstances concerning the enactment of the 2005 Amendment extending limitation periods, which was relevant for some of the charges against the applicants. 54.  The bill had been introduced by a group of MPs from the opposition party, Law and Justice, on 21 February 2005, before the date of delivery of the trial court\u2019s judgment on 29 March 2005. The bill had made direct reference to the applicants\u2019 pending case. 55.  The intentions of the drafters had been confirmed during debates in the Special Committee for Codification Amendments of the Sejm (the Lower House of Parliament) and at the plenary session of the Sejm. One of the supporters of the draft bill had been the member of parliament (MP) Z. Ziobro, who had also acted as rapporteur in the course of the parliamentary debate on the bill. Judge A.K. had been serving at that time as an advisor to the Special Committee on his recommendation. 56.  The Court of Appeal observed that a judge could be appointed a member of the Minister of Justice\u2019s Criminal Law Codification Commission in accordance with the rules and procedures set out in the relevant Ordinance of the Council of Ministers. However, a judge was prevented from participating in parliamentary work on criminal law codification as an advisor chosen by an MP, parliamentary group or a political party. By doing so, a judge would in fact be acting as a lobbyist disclosing his political preferences. Such conduct was contrary to Article 178 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Organisation of the Courts Act. 57.  The Court of Appeal noted that, according to a letter from the Chancellery of the Sejm (see paragraph 97 below), Judge A.K. had not been an advisor to the Special Committee in connection with the work on the bill extending limitation periods. However, the court\u2019s analysis of some parliamentary records contradicted that assertion. It transpired from the minutes of a meeting of the Special Committee on 1 June 2005 that Judge A.K. had been present during a discussion on the bill. At that meeting Z. Ziobro MP, after the Committee had rejected his amendment to the bill, asked Judge A.K. \u201cwhether in this situation the FOZZ case would become time-barred\u201d. The Court of Appeal also referred to the minutes of the plenary session of the Sejm on 3 June 2005. At that session Z. Ziobro MP, replying to a question, stated that Judge A.K. had been permanent advisor to the Committee and presented verbatim the judge\u2019s position on an aspect of an amendment to the bill. 58.  The Court of Appeal, having regard to the parliamentary records, established that Judge A.K. had actively sought to influence the amending legislation to the detriment of the defendants, even though at the same time he had examined their case at trial. 59.  The Court of Appeal held as follows:\n\u201cIn the present case ... on the basis of the circumstances concerning the passing of the 2005 Amendment established in the course of the appellate proceedings, the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that the regulations contained in the Act had been adopted by the legislature, in particular, so that they could be applied to the pending proceedings in a specific case indicated in the reasons for the bill, and in addition, the judge hearing the case took part in the process of amending the law as an advisor, thus showing a lack of impartiality. Having regard to the foregoing, the application of the 2005 Amendment to the present case would have patently violated the standards of Articles 10 and 45 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention concerning the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal and would have had an obvious influence on the pertinent part of the judgment.\u201d 60.  The Court of Appeal decided not to apply the 2005 Amendment to that part of the case. It therefore found that the limitation period in respect of the offence of theft of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value imputed to the second applicant had expired on 12 September 2005 (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment). It held that his conviction in respect of that offence had to be quashed and that the relevant part of the proceedings had to be discontinued. 61.  Having regard to the foregoing, the Court of Appeal allowed the applicants\u2019 arguments concerning the flaws in the assignment of Judge A.K. to the case and the efforts of the judge to amend the legislation applicable to the case in the course of the trial and at the formal examination stage of the appeal. In the appellate court\u2019s view, the applicants had rightly pointed out that by accepting the role of advisor to the proponents of the bill amending the Criminal Code (extending limitation periods) Judge A.K. had shown a lack of impartiality. At the same time, Parliament, by failing to respect the rule of law, had encroached upon the competences of the judicial authorities and flouted the guarantees of a fair trial. 62.  The Court of Appeal underlined that the above shortcomings had only affected part of the trial court\u2019s judgment, namely the offence imputed to the second applicant (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment), for which the limitation period had been set to expire on 12 September 2005. Only in that part did there exist a logical and irrefutable causal link between the error in the assignment of Judge A.K. and his subsequent efforts to pass legislation amending the law to the detriment of the defendants in the case examined by him. 63.  As to the remainder of the case, the Court of Appeal did not establish that the above shortcomings had influenced the content of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Accordingly, it did not accept the applicants\u2019 submissions, which were aimed at having the judgment of the trial court quashed in its entirety. 64.  With regard to certain passages in the reasoning showing that Judge A.K. had a negative attitude towards the second applicant, the Court of Appeal found that many of them had been opinions based on fact and therefore could not be seen as showing a lack of impartiality towards the second applicant. However, the court agreed with the defence that the passage about the important role of the second applicant in the activities of the FOZZ had not been fact-based and was therefore inappropriate. Nonetheless, the statement was related to hypothetical behaviour of the second applicant which was unrelated to the charges against him and in any event had not influenced the content of the judgment. The second applicant had not substantiated either how the passage related to the financing of political parties by the FOZZ could show that Judge A.K. had had a negative attitude towards him, when that issue had not been examined by the trial court. With regard to the allegation raised by the second applicant of a lack of impartiality on the part of Judge A.K. in connection with his statement about the forty million victims in the case, the Court of Appeal found it to be groundless. It considered that the statement had to be seen in the proper context in which it was made, namely the trial court\u2019s determination to elucidate all the circumstances of the case. 65.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the remainder of the applicants\u2019 appeals. It examined various allegations concerning the rights of the defence and the rules of criminal procedure raised by the applicants and rejected them all as unfounded or as having no bearing on the content of the judgment. 66.  The Prosecutor General lodged a cassation appeal against the part of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment concerning the discontinuation of the proceedings against the second applicant in respect of the charge of theft of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment). The Prosecutor General argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in holding that the application of the 2005 Amendment to the offence in question would have breached Articles 10 and 45 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention on account of the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.K. In his view, the appellate court\u2019s finding had resulted in the relevant part of the proceedings being unjustifiably discontinued. 67.  The applicants also lodged cassation appeals. They challenged the Court of Appeal\u2019s finding that the uncontested breach of the rules concerning the assignment of Judge A.K. to their case could not have influenced the content of the trial court\u2019s judgment. In their view, the assignment of Judge A.K. in flagrant breach of Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP had resulted in their case not being examined by an impartial judge. 68.  They further challenged the Court of Appeal\u2019s finding that the established lack of impartiality of Judge A.K. resulting from his active involvement in the passing of the 2005 Amendment could only be relevant for some of the offences imputed to them. In their view, his lack of impartiality had affected the whole trial and therefore the trial court\u2019s judgment should have been quashed in its entirety. 69.  The second applicant also alleged that the Court of Appeal had not examined his arguments that Judge A.K. should have been removed from the case because of doubts as to his impartiality. 70.  The applicants repeated their allegations concerning various violations of the rights of the defence and the rules of criminal procedure committed by the trial court, which had allegedly not been duly examined by the Court of Appeal. 71.  On 21 February 2007 the Supreme Court gave judgment. It allowed the cassation appeal of the Prosecutor General and quashed the part of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment concerning the discontinuation of the proceedings against the second applicant, remitting that part of the case to it. It dismissed the cassation appeals filed by the applicants. 72.  The Supreme Court examined the applicants\u2019 allegation that the assignment of Judge A.K. in flagrant breach of Articles 350 \u00a7 1 and 351 \u00a7 1 of the CCP had resulted in their case not being examined by an impartial judge. It confirmed that Judge A.K. had been assigned to the applicants\u2019 case in breach of the above provisions. However, having regard to its Resolution no. I KZP 43/05 of 17 November 2005, the Supreme Court noted that it was necessary to examine whether the above flaw had influenced the content of the trial court\u2019s judgment. For that to be the case the judge would have to be interested in the case having a specific outcome by violating the rules of criminal procedure. 73.  In that connection, the Supreme Court first noted that behaviour which could raise doubts about the lack of impartiality of a judge hearing a case would have to arise up until delivery of the judgment by the judge in question. Secondly, it noted that the mere determination of the court in striving to conclude the proceedings before the expiry of the limitation period was not indicative of its partiality. The lack of impartiality of a judge had to manifest itself in restrictions on the procedural rights of a party, improper gathering of evidence or the imposition of an unjust sentence. However, the applicants had not provided concrete examples of such shortcomings and had limited themselves to general allegations. They had merely referred to one statement made by Judge A.K. about \u201cthe forty million victims\u201d, the passage in the reasoning of the trial court related to the financing of political parties by the FOZZ and the antagonism of political parties with which Judge A.K. and the second applicant respectively sympathised. 74.  With regard to the statement about \u201cthe forty million victims\u201d the Supreme Court paid attention to the context in which it had been made \u2013 at the first trial hearing on 30 September 2002 in which Judge A.K., the president of the bench, had allowed journalists to disseminate images and information about the identities of the defendants (see paragraph 20 above). In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, an analysis of the statement did not permit the conclusion that Judge A.K. had identified himself with the victims in the case under examination by him. The statement had indicated that it was society that was entitled to have images of the defendants. For the Supreme Court, the statement was another unnecessarily pompous statement by Judge A.K. which was not in itself proof of his lack of impartiality. It also noted that the defence had not reacted to this statement by requesting that he be removed from the case. Likewise, before the start of the trial the defence had not raised the issue of any of the members of the trial bench possibly having a negative attitude towards the second applicant. With regard to the passage related to the financing of political parties by the FOZZ, the Supreme Court noted that it did not point to a lack of impartiality on the part of Judge A.K. The judge had concluded in the reasoning that that issue had been irrelevant for the determination of the case. Having regard to the foregoing, the Supreme Court did not share the applicants\u2019 views about the alleged lack of impartiality of the trial court. 75.  The Supreme Court examined the applicants\u2019 arguments related to the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.K., which had allegedly ensued from his involvement in the passage of the 2005 Amendment. In that connection, the court noted that the bill had been introduced on 21 February 2005 and that only from that moment in time could one talk about his alleged involvement in the process. The bill had been introduced after the trial court had finished hearing evidence in the case (8 February 2005) and at a time when the trial had entered its final stages, with the closing statements by the parties. The court further noted that the parliamentary debate on the bill had effectively started in April 2005, after the trial court had delivered its judgment (29 March 2005). Accordingly, it could not be said that the trial hearing had coincided with the parliamentary debate on the bill. 76.  Furthermore, the 2005 Amendment had entered into force on 3 August 2005 and the limitation period with regard to one of the offences (point VI.2 of the operative part) had been set to expire on 12 September 2005. Accordingly, the consequences of the expiry of the limitation period and the entry into force of the law extending limitation periods had taken place in the course of the appellate proceedings. 77.  The Supreme Court concluded that Judge A.K.\u2019s involvement in the parliamentary debate on the bill had occurred after the trial had ended and thus could not have had any effect on the content of the judgment. It noted that the Court of Appeal must have embraced a similar view on that issue since it had not decided to quash the trial court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. 78.  Having regard to the above conclusion, the court noted that the principal issue before the Court of Appeal and now before it was the compatibility of the 2005 Amendment with the Constitution and the Convention, as well as the related problem of how the court should proceed in the event of a finding of incompatibility. 79.  With regard to the constitutionality of the 2005 Amendment, the Supreme Court referred to the established case-law of the Constitutional Court, which provided that limitation periods were not a subjective right (prawo podmiotowe) and therefore could be subject to change, including retrospectively. A change to a limitation period did not have a bearing on the criminalisation of a given act or the penalty that could be imposed. Rules on limitation periods did not provide guarantees for a person who committed an offence, but were established for the sake of punishment and were related to the State\u2019s criminal policy (referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 25 May 2004, case no. SK 44/03). 80.  With regard to the constitutionality of the 2005 Amendment related to the shortcomings of the legislative process, the Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeal that the conduct of that process indicated that the impugned legislation had been adopted with a view to influencing the outcome of a particular case. The Court of Appeal had analysed the issue from the perspective of the \u201cpartiality\u201d of Judge A.K., who had been involved in the preparation of the law partly determining the outcome of the case, but for the Supreme Court that issue had to been seen in a wider context. In fact, the Court of Appeal had analysed the issue of the \u201cpartiality of the legislature\u201d and understood it to mean an encroachment by the legislature on the competences of the judicial authorities by the former\u2019s involvement in the determination of a specific case by means of enacting legislation. 81.  The Supreme Court analysed whether \u201cthe partiality of the legislature\u201d had occurred in the applicants\u2019 case. It had regard to the reasons for the bill which, although very brief, had contained two paragraphs related to the FOZZ case. 82.  The Supreme Court noted that the parliamentary debate on the bill, both in the relevant Committee meetings and at the plenary session of the Sejm clearly indicated the existence of links between the need to enact the impugned legislation and the proceedings in the applicants\u2019 case. A statement made by Z. Ziobro MP during the debate on the bill in the Sejm on 22 March 2005 was relevant here (\u201cAmong the thousands of cases [threatened by the expiry of the limitation period] there is also this one, which outrages and shocks Polish public opinion the most, which ... became the instigator and final argument for the introduction of this bill, and that is FOZZ-gate and the real risk of the limitation period expiring in this case\u201d). Similarly, the statement made by J. Kaczy\u0144ski MP in the same debate left no doubt as to the intentions of the proponents of the bill (\u201cthere is a legal possibility of influencing these proceedings\u201d). 83.  In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the involvement of the legislature, with the support of Judge A.K., could support the allegation that the object of the 2005 Amendment had been to influence the outcome of the applicants\u2019 specific case. Such a situation in turn raised doubts about its conformity with Articles 2 and 10 of the Constitution. 84.  In the applicants\u2019 case, the Court of Appeal held that the 2005 Amendment was unconstitutional and for that reason, it independently decided not to apply it in the case. However, the Supreme Court found that in that respect the Court of Appeal had exceeded its competences. Instead of refusing to apply the unconstitutional legislation, it had been required to put a legal question to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the 2005 Amendment. In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, the Constitutional Court had the exclusive competence to declare legislation unconstitutional. 85.  For that reason, the Supreme Court quashed the part of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment concerning the discontinuation of the proceedings against the second applicant (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment) and remitted that part of the case to it. 86.  Following the Supreme Court\u2019s directions, on 31 August 2007 the Court of Appeal put a legal question to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the 2005 Amendment. 87.  The Court of Appeal submitted that \u201cFOZZ-gate\u201d had been mentioned throughout the parliamentary debate on the bill. It referred to the reasons for the bill and the statements made by the MPs, advisors and representatives of the Ministry of Justice in the course of debates of the Special Committee for Codification Amendments referring to the same case. In view of the above, the Court of Appeal considered that the 2005 Amendment had not been enacted as a general instrument of criminal policy, but followed from the legislature\u2019s desire to influence the outcome of a particular case. Such a situation amounted to an encroachment by the legislature on the competences of the judicial authorities. For the Court of Appeal, there were substantiated doubts about the compatibility of the 2005 Amendment with Articles 2 (rule of law principle) and 10 (separation of powers) of the Constitution. 88.  In its decision of 11 February 2009 (case no. P 39/07), the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings initiated by the legal question of the Court of Appeal on the grounds of ne bis in idem. It referred to an earlier judgment it had adopted on 15 October 2008 (case no. P 32/06), which was decisive for the case at issue. In that judgment the Constitutional Court held that the 2005 Amendment was compatible with the Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 118 and 125-126 below). 89.  The Constitutional Court noted that the Court of Appeal had not questioned the very extension of the limitation period or the possibility of applying extended limitation periods to offences committed before the entry into force of the amending legislation which had not become time-barred under the rules formerly applicable. The allegations of the Court of Appeal had instead concentrated on shortcomings in the legislative process, but without invoking any of the relevant constitutional provisions regulating that process. The Court of Appeal had focused on the context and the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the impugned legislation by referring to select statements of the persons taking part in the parliamentary debate on the bill and mentioning certain passages from the reasons for the bill. However, that issue had already been addressed in the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 15 October 2008 (see paragraphs 122-124 below). In that judgment, it had also underlined that the contested amendment had not influenced the judicial determination of the case. 90.  On 1 June 2009 the Court of Appeal gave judgment. 91.  It upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment with regard to the second applicant\u2019s conviction for theft of the FOZZ\u2019s property of a considerable value (point VI.2 of the operative provisions of the trial court\u2019s judgment). It only lowered the fine imposed on him in respect of that offence. 92.  Having regard to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 11 February 2009, the Court of Appeal ruled that it could not discontinue the criminal proceedings against the second applicant with regard to the above\u2011mentioned offence on account of the expiry of the original limitation period as had been decided in its first judgment. It would not be acceptable to refuse to apply a law whose constitutionality had been confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 93.  With regard to the allegations concerning the improper assignment of Judge A.K. to the case, the Court of Appeal, following the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment, held that that shortcoming had not affected the content of the trial court\u2019s judgment. It dismissed further arguments raised by the second applicant in his appeal against the trial court\u2019s judgment. 94.  The second applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment. He alleged, in particular, that the Court of Appeal had violated the provisions of the substantive criminal law related to his conviction under Article 217 \u00a7 2 of the old Criminal Code. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 95.  In issue no. 7 of 20 February 2005, Newsweek Polska published an article entitled \u201cPolish Di Pietro\u201d about the FOZZ trial, including an interview with Judge A.K. The relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201cJournalists divide judges into those who have \u201cpressure on the small screen\u201d and those who consistently refuse to comment. Judge A.K. has a reputation as one of the best lawyers in Poland, but also as a \u201cmedia stonewaller\u201d.. In the FOZZ trial he [has] a dual role: as a main judge and as a defender of what remains of the reputation of the administration of justice. The threat of the limitation period hangs over the indictment. ...\n\u201cJournalist: Are you afraid that you will not have enough time to correct the prosecutors\u2019 mistakes and sentence [those who are] guilty?\nJudge A.K.: I will not comment on the trial. This is not a commission of inquiry.\nQ: Perhaps it does not resemble a meeting of a commission [of inquiry], but don\u2019t you have the impression that you are participating in the theatre of the absurd? The defendants faint, pretend to be mentally ill...\nA: I have. What\u2019s even worse [is that] I feel too frequently that it is not the defendant in the hands of a court, but me in the hands of the defendant and his counsel. Frequently, a team of people is working on how to use too liberal a law to block the trial. Unfortunately, we have succeeded in creating a belief among criminals that they can go unpunished.\nQ: Do you think that opportunity makes a thief?\nA: Not an opportunity, but the lack of an inevitable and adequate punishment. Up until recently a criminal could still laugh in our faces, because even if, by a miracle, he was caught and sentenced, he could use the stolen money with impunity, and even boast about it. ...\nQ: They still brag that they transferred money to their wives and that nothing can be done to them.\nA: What we know about scandals is not even the tip of the iceberg. We already have [the] white-collar mafia. It is time to find efficient methods of detecting crimes and begin applying adequate punishments. ...\nQ: Even if we catch criminals more efficiently, where would we lock them up?\nA: We will stop spending money on implementing inefficient programmes, and build more prisons. Thanks to harsh punishments and a \u2018zero tolerance\u2019 [policy] even for minor crimes, it was possible to resolve the crisis in New York. Why shouldn\u2019t that idea work here?\u201d 96.  On 26 January 2006 Z. Ziobro, who had been appointed Minister of Justice in the meantime, gave an interview to a radio station. The transcript of the relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201cQ: Minister, your deputy, Judge [A.K.] has been criticised by the Court of Appeal\u2019s judges, who found that Judge [A.K.] had not been impartial in the case against \u017b. and [the first applicant].\nA: The Court of Appeal\u2019s judges were either misled or have been seriously mistaken because they have relied on false information.\nQ: Who could have misled them?\nA: Perhaps the defence lawyers, who raised certain arguments, not always properly, but always in the interest of their clients. ... The facts are that, firstly, Judge [A.K.] was not an advisor to the Law and Justice [party], but an advisor to the Sejm\u2019s [Special Committee for Codification Amendments], as were many other judges, including judges of the Supreme Court. No one is alleging that because of that those judges are not impartial, and rightly so. Secondly, Judge [A.K.] did not take part in the debate on the provision extending limitation periods. I am the author of this provision, I conceived this provision and presented it to J. Kaczynski, and I then consulted two law professors, with whom I cooperate, who are also members of [advisors to] the Sejm\u2019s committees, Professors M. and L.T., I think that both of them would confirm this.\nQ: But did you rely on Judge [A.K.]\u2019s opinion in this case or not?\nA: I could not have relied on Judge [A.K.]\u2019s opinion in this case, because in this case Judge A.K. did not give an opinion. In this case Judge [A.K.] was not at all an initiator of this idea. I was the author.\nQ: And you did not speak to him about this issue:\nA: No, I did not speak to Judge [A.K.] about this issue. In this case, I acted as Z. Ziobro MP, who seeing what was happening in the FOZZ case, concluded that limitation periods should be extended. And not only in the FOZZ case, but also in other cases ...\u201d 97.  An official note dated 21 July 2005 was submitted to the Warsaw Court of Appeal. It reads as follows:\n\u201cJudge A.K. was recommended by the deputy chairman of the Committee Z. Ziobro MP (PiS) to participate as an advisor in the work of the [Special Committee for Codification Amendments].\nBecause there is no custom in the Committee to appoint a permanent advisor, Judge A.K. was invited to many bills amending the criminal law on the instruction of Z. Ziobro MP.\nIt should be underlined that Judge A.K. was not the Committee\u2019s advisor in the legislative work on the deputies\u2019 bill amending the Criminal Code [extending limitation periods] (document no. 3785) at any stage of the work.\nJudge A.K. was present at the [Committee\u2019s] meeting on 1 June 2005 on the point concerning the above-mentioned bill, because he was waiting for the beginning [of a discussion on] of the third point for which he had been invited as an advisor (i.e. on the bill amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Execution of Sentences in respect of combating paedophilia ...)\nThe agenda of that meeting included a discussion on the amendments proposed in the second reading of the deputies\u2019 bill: 98.  It appears that Judge A.K. participated as an advisor to the Special Committee on two bills amending the Criminal Code. One of those bills was introduced by the President of the Republic in December 2001 and the other by the then opposition party, Law and Justice, in March 2002. The Sejm has not concluded the debate on those bills.", "references": ["5", "1", "4", "6", "7", "9", "0", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in St Petersburg. 6.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery committed in an organised group. 7.  On 5 June 2010 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody. The District Court relied on the particularly serious nature of the crime with which the applicant had been charged and his position on the merits of the arrest and the charges brought against him. The court also relied on the risk that he might flee from the investigating authorities and the court, exert pressure on victims, witnesses and other participants in the criminal proceedings, or otherwise hamper the administration of justice in the case. 8.  On 4 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 August 2010[1]. 9.  On 20 August and 23 August 2010, at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the District Court adjourned the review of the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 August and 24 August 2010, respectively. 10.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant retained another lawyer to defend him. The newly appointed lawyer joined the proceedings at 4 p.m. on the same day. 11.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the District Court to adjourn the hearing until 25 August 2010 so as to enable her to review the prosecution material and discuss her position with the applicant. The judge refused to adjourn the hearing until 25 August 2010, but granted a two-hour adjournment until 6 p.m. 12.  On 24 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 November 2010, having found no grounds for altering or lifting the custodial measure and having taken note of the particular complexity of the case. The applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that no investigative measures were being carried out with his participation was rejected with reference to the investigator\u2019s discretion to lead the investigation. 13.  The applicant appealed against the above decision, claiming, inter alia, that the two-hour adjournment of the hearing on 24 August 2010 had not permitted him to consult his lawyer in private; nor had it allowed his lawyer to have sufficient time to review the prosecution material. 14.  On 11 October 2010 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure, and it upheld the decision of 24 August 2010 on appeal. The City Court held that the two-hour adjournment granted by the District Court had been sufficient for studying the prosecution file consisting of 153 pages. Most of the file consisted of procedural documents concerning issues relating to the institution of the criminal proceedings, the extension of the time-limit for the investigation, the joinder of criminal cases, and documents which had been previously handed to the applicant. Besides, all these documents had been examined in the hearing on 24 August 2010. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint as to his inability to have a confidential exchange with his lawyer before the hearing of 24 August 2010, the City Court held that the applicant and his lawyer had been given the opportunity to communicate in the courtroom. However, they had refused to communicate in such conditions. This did not amount to a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to defence, because the applicant\u2019s lawyer could have had a confidential meeting with the applicant in the remand prison without any restrictions, and they could have developed their defence position beforehand. In any event, the hearing could not have been adjourned until 25 August 2010, since the time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention had been due to expire on 24 August 2010, and therefore the decision on the preventive measure had had to be taken before then. Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing. 15.  On the same date, 11 October 2010, charges in respect of two counts of large-scale robbery committed in an organised group under Article 161 \u00a7 3 (a) and (b) of the Russian Criminal Code were brought against the applicant. 16.  On 15 October 2010 the applicant and his lawyer were informed that the pre-trial investigation had been terminated, and on 16 November 2010 they were given access to the case file. 17.  On an unspecified date in November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 February 2011[2]. 18.  On 21 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that a review of the preventive measure was to take place on the following day. 19.  On 22 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer did not appear for the hearing. The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing owing to the lawyer\u2019s illness. However, the adjournment was refused. Legal aid counsel was appointed for the applicant. 20.  On 22 February 2011, reiterating the reasons which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant\u2019s case, the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 May 2011 pending examination of the case file. 21.  The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, about the refusal to adjourn the hearing so as to enable his lawyer to defend him. 22.  On 6 April 2011 the City Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure, and it upheld the decision of 22 February 2011 on appeal. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the alleged violation of his right to defence by the refusal to adjourn the hearing of 22 February 2011, the City Court held that the applicant\u2019s lawyer had failed to prove her sickness by providing a medical certificate. This made the examination of the issue of the applicant\u2019s detention in her absence lawful under domestic law, as legal aid counsel had been appointed for the applicant. Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing, the applicant by means of a video link from the remand prison. 23.  On 30 May 2011 the District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 August 2011 pending examination of the case file. The court noted that the grounds which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant\u2019s case had not changed, and referred to the considerable size of the case file, a case file which neither the applicant, nor his co-defendants or their lawyers had been able to examine in full. 24.  On 28 June 2011 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 25.  On 11 January 2013 the City Court acquitted the applicant of all charges in a jury trial. The judgment became final on 23 July 2013. 26.  Between 5 June 2010 and 29 July 2011 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-47/4 in St Petersburg. The prison was overcrowded. Thus, cell 76, measuring 18 sq. m, was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates, and cell 145, measuring 18 sq. m, was designed for eight people and housed up to ten individuals. Cell 164, measuring 15 sq. m, offered six places, and up to six detainees occupied those places. 27.  As mentioned above, on 6 April and 28 June 2011 respectively the City Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeals against the decisions of the District Court of 22 February and 30 May 2011 extending his detention. He participated in the appeals by means of a video link from the remand prison, where he was confined in a metal cage.", "references": ["5", "8", "3", "9", "7", "0", "4", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5.  On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6.  On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7.  According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo \u201cpickets\u201d (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u044b) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo \u201cpickets\u201d was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three\u2011day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8.  The applicants decided to hold their own solo \u201cpickets\u201d and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, \u00a7\u00a7 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9.  According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10.  At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, \u201cCAO\u201d). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11.  The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12.  On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a \u201cpicket\u201d involving fifty people. That \u201cpicket\u201d was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter \u201cPEA\u201d). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13.  On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14.  Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15.  On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16.  The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 \u00a7 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).", "references": ["5", "4", "6", "9", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in Chernivtsi in Ukraine in 1966. In 1984 she moved to Magadan in Russia (which is about 12,000 kilometres away from Chernivtsi), where she obtained a teaching degree and has been working as a school teacher for over twenty years. 7.  Her sister, K.T.O., a Russian national, also lived in Magadan for a certain period of time. In February 1993 K.T.O. gave birth to a girl, K.L.S., who is also a Russian national. In December 1993 K.T.O. together with K.L.S. moved to Chernivtsi, where her parents (the grandparents of K.L.S.) lived. Subsequently, the grandparents raised K.L.S. for about ten years. 8.  In 2004 the applicant\u2019s parents and K.L.S. moved to Ludinovo, the Kaluga Region in Russia (which is about 1,100 km away from Chernivtsi and about 11,000 km away from Magadan). In August 2007 K.L.S. moved to Magadan and, since that time, has lived together with the applicant in her flat. 9.  By a decision of 29 December 2007, the mayor of Magadan appointed the applicant as the guardian of K.L.S., on the grounds that the child\u2019s parents did not take care of her. 10.  On 20 February 2009 the Magadan Town Court allowed a claim by the applicant and deprived the parents of K.L.S. of their parental rights in respect of the child, on the grounds that they had failed to take care of her for over fifteen years. No appeal was lodged and on 11 March 2009 the judgment entered into force. No information was submitted to the Court as to whether the parents of K.L.S. had been informed of that judgment. 11.  In March 2007 K.T.O. gave birth to a boy, K.O.S., whose nationality was disputed by the parties. According to the material submitted by the applicant, K.T.O., who was raising the child alone, failed to take care of him. For that reason, in November 2008 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court (hereafter \u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Court\u201d) in Chernivtsi ordered his placement in care (an orphanage). In March 2010 the same court ordered the child\u2019s return to his mother. Subsequently, K.O.S. was taken to an orphanage on four other occasions. 12.  The applicant claims that she and her parents visited K.O.S. in Chernivtsi on several occasions and maintained \u201ca close family link\u201d with him. In particular, she referred to her parents\u2019 visits in April 2010 and May 2012 and her visit in August 2010. According to a copy of an undated letter from K.T.O., the applicant visited her and K.O.S. in Chernivtsi between 2010 and 2012 (no specific dates being indicated), and sent them parcels with food and clothes. 13.  In March 2012 K.O.S. was taken into care as his mother had left him alone in her flat for over twenty-four hours. 14.  On 5 July 2012 the Shevchenkivskyy Court deprived K.T.O. of her parental rights in respect of K.O.S., holding that she had not cared for him and had not played a part in his upbringing. No appeal was lodged and on 15 July 2012 the judgment entered into force. No information was submitted to the Court as to whether the parents of K.O.S. had been informed of that judgment. 15.  On 27 July 2012 K.O.S. was put on the list of children deprived of parental care who could be adopted. On 14 August 2012 the Executive Committee of the Chernivtsi Town Council gave K.O.S. the formal status of a child deprived of parental care. 16.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date in July 2012 K.L.S. had visited Chernivsti to meet K.O.S. She discovered that he had been placed in an orphanage and informed the applicant accordingly. The applicant decided to become her nephew\u2019s legal tutor (a guardian for children under fourteen). She informed the Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan of her wish to become a tutor, and started collecting documents and certificates to make a formal application. In particular, on 22 August 2012 her flat was inspected by representatives of the Magadan Public Health Service, who found that the flat had adequate hygienic and sanitary conditions for the applicant\u2019s family to accommodate K.O.S. 17.  In August and September 2012 the applicant made a number of telephone calls to the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi and to the orphanage, asking them to take into account that she wished to become K.O.S.\u2019s legal tutor, and that she was preparing the necessary documents to make a formal application. 18.  At the applicant\u2019s request, the Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan sent a letter to the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi informing them that she wished to become K.O.S.\u2019s legal tutor and that she had fulfilled her obligations as K.L.S.\u2019s tutor. The Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan also asked the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi not to consider other candidates for the role of K.O.S.\u2019s tutor. 19.  By a letter of 17 September 2012, the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi informed the Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan that they had received the information about the applicant\u2019s wish to become K.O.S.\u2019s legal tutor on 4 September 2012. The Childcare Service of Chernivtsi further informed the Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan: that a couple wishing to adopt K.O.S. had been given permission to establish contact with him prior to that date and had already submitted all the necessary documents for his adoption (see paragraphs 22-23 below); that an opinion in favour of that adoption would be issued; and that, on the basis of such an opinion, the couple would submit an adoption application to the Pershotravnevyy District Court in Chernivtsi (hereafter \u201cthe Pershotravnevyy Court\u201d). Lastly, the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi noted that the applicant had the right to lodge a tutelage application with the same court, and advised her to do so \u201cas soon as possible\u201d. 20.  On 10 October 2012 the Tutelage and Guardianship Service of Magadan issued an opinion stating that, given her personal situation and qualities, the applicant could become a legal tutor or guardian. 21.  On 22 October 2012 the applicant went to Chernivtsi, mainly to initiate procedures with a view to becoming K.O.S.\u2019s tutor and to meet him there. Ultimately, this was not possible, as he had been adopted by S.S.V. and S.O.V. prior to her arrival in Ukraine (see paragraph 26 below) and the Ukrainian authorities refused to help her to meet K.O.S. 22.  On 30 August 2012 a married couple, S.S.V. and S.O.V., who were on the list of persons wishing to adopt a child, were allowed to meet with K.O.S. at the orphanage. 23.  On 6 September 2012 they informed the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi that they wished to adopt K.O.S. and asked it to issue an opinion in favour of the adoption. 24.  On 19 September 2012 the Executive Committee of Chernivtsi, acting in the exercise of its childcare related functions, issued an opinion in favour of the requested adoption. According to the committee, S.S.V. and S.O.V. were physically fit and had sufficient funds and facilities to accommodate and take care of K.O.S. They had established contact and a good relationship with the child and, according to the orphanage\u2019s psychologist, the child wished to live in their family, although he could not give written consent as \u201che didn\u2019t understand what adoption was because of his age\u201d. It was also noted: that the child had a half-sister and an aunt who lived in Magadan; that in August and September 2012 the applicant and the Magadan authorities, respectively, had informed the Childcare Service of Chernivtsi of her wish to become the child\u2019s legal tutor; that the applicant had been informed in reply that she could lodge an application for tutelage with a district court; and that no such application had been lodged. Lastly, the opinion read that, generally, adoption was \u201cthe preferred form of [a child\u2019s] placement\u201d, and that, in the present case, the adoption would be appropriate and in the interests of the child. 25.  On 24 September 2012 S.S.V. and S.O.V. lodged an adoption application in respect of K.O.S. with the Pershotravnevyy Court. 26.  On 2 October 2012 the Pershotravnevyy Court, having examined the case at a closed hearing with the participation of S.S.V. and S.O.V. and representatives from the Childcare Service and the orphanage, delivered a judgment granting the adoption. It also ordered that K.O.S.\u2019s surname be changed to that of the adoptive parents and that S.S.V. and S.O.V. be registered respectively as his father and mother instead of his biological parents. 27.  The court essentially relied on the information contained in the opinion of the Executive Committee of Chernivtsi. The court held that the requested adoption was in the interests of the child in being raised in \u201cstable life conditions and in [an atmosphere of] harmony\u201d. 28.  The applicant was informed of the judgment of 2 October 2012 following a delay, though she did not specify how long the delay had been. 29.  On 1 February 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Chernivtsi Court of Appeal against that judgment, stating that it had violated her right to become her close relative\u2019s legal tutor and her right to submit arguments against the adoption. In particular, the applicant argued: (i) that the Pershotravnevyy Court had failed to take into account the fact that K.O.S. had close relatives, his half-sister and aunt, who had not been informed of the proceedings and had not taken part in them; (ii) that the Pershotravnevyy Court had not checked K.O.S.\u2019s nationality; (iii) that K.O.S. was a Russian national, as his biological mother had been a Russian national at the time when he had been born in 2007; (iv) that the procedure provided for in Ukraine\u2019s relevant international treaties in relation to the adoption of foreign nationals had not been followed; and (v) that the Pershotravnevyy Court had disregarded the fact that she had informed the Ukrainian Childcare Service of her wish to become K.O.S.\u2019s legal tutor and the fact that she had been preparing the necessary documents for this. 30.  On 18 March 2013 K.L.S. sent a letter to the Court of Appeal stating that she and the rest of her family (notably her grandparents and the applicant) had a close connection with K.O.S. and that he wished to live with them. 31.  On 4 April 2013 the Court of Appeal refused to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the judgment did not concern her right or interest in becoming the child\u2019s legal tutor, or any obligations in that regard which in principle could be the subject matter of a separate claim. 32.  The applicant appealed in cassation, mainly arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to examine her arguments and that she had been deprived of access to a court, in violation of the procedural rules. 33.  On 10 July 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal on the basis that it had not been demonstrated that the contested decision of the Court of Appeal was unlawful. 34.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions of 29 March 2016, on an unspecified date K.T.O. left Ukraine for Russia and she currently resides with her parents (the grandparents of K.O.S.) in Ludinovo. 35.  In December 2015 the Government submitted a copy of a verbatim record of an interview with K.O.S. which had been carried out by the childcare service in the locality where he had lived with S.S.V. and S.O.V. on 19 February 2013. According to that record, the child, inter alia, expressed the wish to continue living with his adoptive parents, who were present during the interview, and said that he had no aunt or uncle. The applicant contended that this information could not be accepted, as it had not been checked with her participation and contradicted other material in the case file.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "7", "1", "6", "2", "8", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were members of the National Bolsheviks Party. 5.  On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty Party members, including the applicants, entered the waiting area of the President\u2019s Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. 6.  They asked for a meeting with the President, the deputy head of the President\u2019s Administration Mr Surkov, and the President\u2019s economic advisor Mr Illarionov. They waved placards with \u201cPutin, resign!\u201d (\u00ab\u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d, \u0443\u0439\u0434\u0438!\u00bb) written on them through the window and distributed leaflets with a printed address to the President that listed ten aspects in which he failed to respect the Russian Constitution, and a call for his resignation. 7.  The intruders stayed in the office for one hour and a half until the police broke through the door and arrested them. 8.  On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicants\u2019 custody. 9.  On 15 and 16 February 2005 the applicants were charged with participation in mass disorders, an offence under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the statement of the charges, at 12.30 p.m. on 14 December 2004 forty Party members had effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. They had pushed away the guards at the entrance, knocked over two metal detectors and occupied room no. 14 on the ground floor. They had locked themselves in and blocked the door with a heavy safe. Until the arrival of the police, the Party members, including the applicants, had waved anti\u2011President placards through the office window, thrown out leaflets and chanted slogans calling for the President\u2019s resignation. They had stayed in the office for approximately one hour, destroyed office furniture and equipment and damaged the walls and the ceiling. 10.  On 20 June 2005 thirty-nine persons, including the applicants, were committed for trial before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. 11.  On 30 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court held a preliminary hearing. The court ordered, in particular, that all defendants should remain in custody pending trial. 12.  The trial started on 8 July 2005. Hearings were held on 11, 14, 27 and 29 July, 1, 3, 10, 12, 15, 19, 22, 23, 29 and 31 August, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 and 30 September, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 17 and 24 October and 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 22 November 2005. Hearings often continued until late in the evening. 13.  According to the applicants, the fast pace of the trial, coupled with the remand centre regulations prohibiting visits on weekends and allowing counsel to see no more than one client per day, prevented them from having a sufficient number of consultations with their counsel. On 1, 2 and 5 September 2005 the applicants asked the court that hearings be held less frequently. They complained that they were tired because on the hearing days they had to get up early. They could not consult a doctor as they left for the courthouse before the facility doctor\u2019s opening hours. They also often left the detention facility before breakfast and returned after supper. They did not therefore receive regular food. Nor could they have a walk in the exercise yard. Finally, they did not have sufficient time for meetings with counsel or relatives. The court rejected their requests and continued to schedule hearings almost every day. 14.  On 19 September 2005 counsel unsuccessfully complained, relying on Article 6 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention, that because of the frequent hearings they did not have sufficient time to meet with the defendants and prepare their defence. 15.  While in the courtroom the defendants were held in four metal cages. Counsel tables were placed at a distance of about 1.5 to 2 m from the cages. Police guards were stationed between the cages and the counsel tables. The applicants submitted a courtroom plan and photographs confirming that arrangement. 16.  According to the applicants, in the courtroom they could confer with their counsel only during short (two to five minutes) breaks in the hearings. The guards allowed only two counsel to approach the cages at the same time. Given that there were thirty-nine defendants and twenty-four counsel, the defendants could not effectively discuss the case with their counsel. The guards remained near the cages all the time and could hear the applicants\u2019 consultations with their counsel. 17.  The defendants asked the judge that conditions be provided in the courtroom for their confidential consultations with counsel. The prosecutor objected, claiming that the defendants could meet their counsel in private in the detention facility. The judge rejected the defendants\u2019 request, finding that the courtroom was not designed for confidential consultations with counsel. The defendants\u2019 meeting with counsel could be held in \u201csome other places\u201d. 18.  During the trial the applicants and their co-defendants stated that they had taken part in a peaceful protest against President Putin\u2019s politics. They had come to the President\u2019s Administration to meet the officials and hand over a petition that listed the President\u2019s ten failures to comply with the Constitution and contained a call for his resignation. They had entered the waiting area and, as the guards had attempted to stop them and had threatened them with violence, had locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. They had chanted slogans and distributed leaflets thereby expressing their opinion about important political issues. They denied destroying any furniture or offering resistance to the police. They claimed that the furniture had been destroyed by the guards and the police officers who had arrested them. 19.  The guards and the police officers testified that the defendants had forced their passage into the building by knocking down two metal detectors and had locked themselves up in one of the offices. They had resisted the attempts to force the door. After the door had been forced, the witnesses had seen that the furniture in the office had been damaged. As the defendants had refused to leave the office, they had been dragged out by force. 20.  Counsel for the defendants asked the guards questions about the names and positions of the persons who had given orders during the arrest operation, the number of persons involved in the arrest operation, the witnesses\u2019 exact positions and duties and about the substance of the orders they had received from their superiors. The witnesses refused to reply referring to the confidential nature of that information. 21.  Counsel asked the judge to take measures provided by law, such as a fine, in order to compel the witnesses to reply to the questions. They also asked that the questioning be continued in camera, given that confidential information was to be discussed. They argued that the questions were relevant and important for the defence because it was necessary to understand whether the police and the guards had acted within their powers. The judge rejected their requests, finding that there was no reason to believe that State secrets would be revealed during the questioning of the witnesses. In any event, the questions put by the defence were irrelevant. 22.  On 8 December 2005 the Tverskoy District Court found the applicants and their co-defendants guilty of participation in mass disorders. It held as follows:\n\u201c[The defendants], acting in conspiracy, committed serious breaches of public safety and order by disregarding established norms of conduct and showing manifest disrespect for society ... They effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the President of the Russian Federation\u2019s Administration building and took over office no. 14 on the ground floor... They then blocked the door with a heavy metal safe and conducted an unauthorised meeting, during which they waved the National Bolsheviks Party flag and placards, threw anti-[Putin] leaflets out [of windows] and issued an unlawful ultimatum by calling for the President\u2019s resignation, thereby destabilising the normal functioning of the President\u2019s Administration and preventing its reception personnel from performing their service duties, namely ... reception of members of the public and examination of applications from citizens of the Russian Federation ...\nWhile performing the above disorderly acts [the defendants] ... destroyed and damaged property in the offices of the reception area of the President\u2019s Administration building ...\u201d 23.  Given that the defendants had voluntary compensated the pecuniary damage caused by their actions and taking into account their positive references, the court sentenced the majority of them to various terms of imprisonment (ranging from one year and six months to three years) conditional on two or three years\u2019 probation. They were immediately released. Eight defendants, including five applicants (Mr Osnach, Mr Reznichenko, Ms Ryabtseva, Mr Tonkikh and Ms Chernova), were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from two years to three years and six months without remission. The court found that those defendants could not be released on probation, taking into account their active role in the commission of the offence, negative references and the fact that some of them had been earlier charged with administrative or criminal offences which however did not result in convictions. 24.  The applicants appealed. They complained, in particular, that their defence rights had been substantially curtailed. They also submitted that when determining the sentences the trial court had unlawfully taken into account the defendants\u2019 respective roles in the commission of the imputed offence, given that the charges brought against them were identically phrased and that the role and actions of each defendant had not been detailed. 25.  On 29 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal, finding that the charges had been brought in accordance with the procedure provided by law and the defence rights had been respected.", "references": ["9", "4", "0", "5", "8", "2", "1", "No Label", "6", "7", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Lunel. 6.  The applicant, a lawyer at the Montpellier Bar since 1978, acted for M.B., who was a civil party in the context of a judicial investigation opened in N\u00eemes following the death of his minor son. The latter was killed on the night of 2 March 2003 by F.C., a gendarme who used his firearm. 7.  In an indictment and partial discharge order of 26 June 2007 the investigating judge committed F.C. for trial before the Gard Assize Court on a charge of manslaughter. The investigating judge did not accept as justification either self-defence within the meaning of Articles 121 or 122 of the Criminal Code, or the use of firearms in accordance with the legislation or regulations under Article 174 of the Decree of 20 March 1903 (see, as regards those provisions, Guerdner and Others v. France, no. 68780/10, \u00a7\u00a7 37 and 41 et seq., 17 April 2014). The judge also committed two of F.C.\u2019s colleagues for trial before the Assize Court for having lied in their statements to him, given under oath. 8.  On 26 November 2007 the Investigation Division of the N\u00eemes Court of Appeal upheld the order but ordered that the two gendarmes charged with giving false testimony stand trial before the N\u00eemes Criminal Court rather than the Assize Court. 9.  The trial at the Assize Court began on 28 September 2009 and lasted for five days. The advocate-general requested a five-year prison term for the accused. It is not clear from the information available to the Court whether or not the sentence was to be suspended. 10.  In a judgment of 1 October 2009 the Assize Court acquitted F.C. 11.  Immediately after the verdict, at the exit from the courtroom, the journalists reporting on the case for, among others, France Bleu, RTL and the Midi Libre put questions to the parties\u2019 lawyers, and in particular to the applicant. Some of the coverage was streamed live on the Internet. The applicant first stated as follows:\n\u201c... the verdict is received by the victims and by the community to which they belong, it is patently obvious that this is disastrous in terms of social peace.\u201d 12.  Asked by one journalist whether it was a \u201clicence to kill\u201d, he replied as follows:\n\u201cWell, I\u2019m not sure you can say that. It\u2019s not necessarily a licence to kill. It\u2019s a refusal to face up to the reality in this country and to the existence of a two-speed society; not just a two-speed justice system, but actually a two-speed society at all levels. People are living in tower blocks cut off from city centres. For some, prosecution ends in conviction while others are acquitted. The entire social system needs to be revamped: we\u2019ve turned into a real American-style society which is on the brink of civil war.\u201d 13.  When asked by an RTL journalist \u201cBut weren\u2019t you expecting this verdict? Without really commenting on the verdict, weren\u2019t you afraid this would happen?\u201d, the applicant made the following statement:\n\u201cYes, of course. I always knew it was a possibility. With a white \u2013 all-white \u2013 jury on which not all communities are represented, combined with, let\u2019s face it, a very weak prosecution and a trial that was conducted in an extremely biased fashion, the door was wide open for an acquittal, it\u2019s no surprise.\u201d 14.  These last remarks were the subject of a letter from the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Montpellier Court of Appeal, dated 6 October 2009, to the chairman of the Montpellier Bar, seeking the latter\u2019s opinion \u201cin view of the outcry caused by this statement in judicial circles in N\u00eemes\u201d. 15.  On 1 December 2009, after the chairman of the Bar had found that the applicant\u2019s remarks were not offensive and did not go beyond the bounds of free criticism of a court decision, the Principal Public Prosecutor informed him of his decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant under Article 188 of the Decree of 27 November 1991 on the organisation of the legal profession (see paragraph 29 above). 16.  On 11 January 2010 the applicant gave evidence to the rapporteur of the Montpellier Bar Council. In particular, he stressed the need to put his remarks in context, as this was a sensitive case that had led to rioting in the working-class district where the victim had lived. He highlighted the length of the investigation, the fact that the gendarme had not been held in pre-trial detention and the disjoinder of the proceedings for false testimony concerning members of the gendarmerie patrol present on the day of the events, as well as the tensions during the five days of the hearing before the Assize Court. He denied making an accusation of racial and xenophobic bias, arguing that he had merely noted the absence of certain communities making up the French nation, in whose name criminal justice was administered. He added that he had not targeted the Assize Court, the prosecution or the defence. 17.  The President of the Assize Court and the advocate-general who had participated in the proceedings refused a request from the rapporteur to hear evidence. However, the rapporteur was able to hear evidence from one of the lawyers for the acquitted gendarme, Mr N.-P. The latter confirmed the atmosphere of heightened pressure and tension throughout the trial, which had also been experienced by the lawyers of the civil parties. He observed that when the verdict had been delivered there had been a tremendous outcry, with the cameramen rushing to capture the scene. All the lawyers had been very emotional and the applicant had no doubt used an unfortunate turn of phrase, intending only to point to the lack of representation of certain communities in the criminal-justice system. 18.  In parallel, in a judgment of 1 March 2010, the N\u00eemes Criminal Court sentenced the other two gendarmes to a one-month suspended term of imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 euros (EUR) for giving false testimony under oath. The court noted in particular that the false statements had been repeated over time, including before the investigating judge, and had been liable to influence the judge\u2019s decision in that they concerned essential circumstances pertaining to the charges or at least circumstances of relevance to the case. 19.  On 19 March 2010 the rapporteur sent her disciplinary investigation report to the chairman of the disciplinary board, the chairman of the Bar and the Principal Public Prosecutor. 20.  On 2 April 2010 the applicant was summoned to appear before the disciplinary board on the basis of Article 183 of the above-mentioned Decree of 27 November 1991 (see paragraph 29 below), \u201cfor having, in the public lobby outside the courtroom of the N\u00eemes Court of Appeal, seriously breached the essential ethical principles of the legal profession, and specifically those of discretion and moderation, by publicly making the following comments accusing the court and jury of racist and xenophobic bias\u201d.\n\u201cI always knew it was a possibility. With a white \u2013 all-white \u2013 jury on which not all communities are represented ..., the door was wide open for an acquittal, it\u2019s no surprise.\u201d 21.  The disciplinary board of the Bar associations attached to the Montpellier Court of Appeal, sitting in plenary session, held its hearing on 21 May 2010. Reiterating his statements, the applicant relied in particular on Article 10 of the Convention, arguing that his remarks had been made in the context of the defence of his client\u2019s interests as a civil party and within the ten-day period during which the Principal Public Prosecutor could appeal against the acquittal. 22.  On 11 June 2010 the disciplinary board delivered its decision. It found that the applicant\u2019s conduct had not been culpable and acquitted him. The disciplinary board considered that the remarks had to be placed in the dual context of the full statement and the circumstances in which they had been made. The words \u201ca white \u2013 all-white \u2013 jury\u201d had been supplemented by \u201con which not all communities are represented\u201d, and had not accused the jury of racial or xenophobic bias but, together with other factors, had stated the obvious truth that \u201cthe social background of jurors contribute[d], even unconsciously and without their integrity and intellectual honesty being in question, to their decision, which necessarily ha[d] an element of subjectivity\u201d. The disciplinary board stressed that the statements had been devoid of personal animosity and had reflected \u201cideas, opinions and information apt to contribute to a discussion or debate of public interest ... as part of a broader commentary on the decision of the Assize Court ...\u201d; this came \u201cwithin the scope of protection of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention\u201d. The disciplinary board further considered that the impugned statements had formed part of the defence of the interests of the applicant\u2019s client, since only the Principal Public Prosecutor could appeal against the acquittal verdict. They had therefore been intended \u201cto stimulate a public debate apt to influence the Principal Public Prosecutor\u2019s thinking ... and his decision whether or not to appeal against that verdict\u201d. Lastly, the disciplinary board noted that the statements had been \u201cmade orally ... during an on-screen interview. In the interests of efficiency and given the brevity of the broadcasts and the speaking time, it [had been] necessary to use concise or even \u2018shocking\u2019 and caricaturised language\u201d. 23.  The Principal Public Prosecutor appealed against the disciplinary board\u2019s decision. He requested that the applicant be barred from practising for three to six months. 24.  In his pleadings before the Court of Appeal the applicant argued that his remarks had been directed at the jury rather than at the reputation, integrity and intellectual honesty of its members (who, moreover, had not brought any proceedings against him), based on the sociologically indisputable fact that the jury did not represent the diversity of the entire national community although its decision necessarily involved an element of subjectivity. His role as a lawyer had not ended with the delivery of the verdict, since it was up to the Principal Public Prosecutor to decide whether to lodge an appeal. Lastly, the applicant regretted that the prosecutor had chosen to prosecute him for comments that formed part of a debate of public interest and were not contrary to public policy, rather than appealing against the acquittal decision as his client and the public had hoped. 25.  The Court of Appeal held, in a judgment of 17 December 2010, that the facts constituted a breach of the duties of discretion and moderation. It found as follows:\n\u201cOutside the courtroom, lawyers are not protected by immunity [of judicial speech] and the appropriate degree of their freedom of speech is no longer assessed in relation to the requirements of the exercise of the rights of the defence, but only in relation to freedom of expression.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeal noted that the statements had been made in public, inside the court building, but before the press and not in the course of judicial proceedings; at that juncture, the verdict had been known and the hearing was over. In the court\u2019s view, the cries from the public at the end of the hearing had been directed at the justice system, and the applicant had had a duty to exercise caution.\nThe Court of Appeal went on to find that, since all the members of the jury were French citizens, references to the colour of their skin did not relate to their social background or nationality but rather to their racial background. The term \u201cwhite\u201d, used in a repetitive and affirmative manner and without the intention to open a discussion or reflection on the matter, had racial connotations which cast aspersions and suspicion on the integrity of the jurors. The court further found as follows:\n\u201cAs the members of the jury form part of the Assize Court, composed of three professional judges and nine lay jurors, this amounts to discrediting the entire court and consequently the judiciary itself, by disregarding the other three members of the Assize Court and especially the collegial spirit whose very purpose is to avoid bias and afford enhanced procedural guarantees.\u201d\nIn the Court of Appeal\u2019s view, the remarks did not form part of the exercise of the rights of the defence, in the absence of any mention of the possibilities of appeal against the decision of the Assize Court. \u201cIn view of the nature and degree of the offence\u201d, the Court of Appeal imposed \u201cthe lightest possible disciplinary penalty \u2013 a warning\u201d on the applicant. 26.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In addition to the defence arguments already presented before the disciplinary body and the Court of Appeal, he argued that the latter had wrongly held that the statement had targeted the judiciary and the entire Assize Court, as the words \u201c... combined with \u2013 let\u2019s face it \u2013 a very weak prosecution and a trial that was conducted in an extremely biased fashion ...\u201d had not been mentioned in the indictment (see paragraphs 13 and 20 above). 27.  The advocate-general at the Court of Cassation concluded in his opinion that the judgment should be quashed on the basis of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, he stated that the remarks had not disclosed any attack or personal animosity but rather had constituted, in the immediate aftermath of a highly contested acquittal, an irrepressible outburst based on the factual observation of the jury\u2019s composition and echoing more general debates within society. Among those debates he mentioned the courts\u2019 treatment of police officers implicated in criminal proceedings, stating as follows:\n\u201cWe need only recall the judicial ramifications of two cases that caused a sensation and attracted widespread media coverage at the time of the proceedings resulting in the acquittal of gendarme C: [after] the pursuit and death of Zyed B and Bouna T in 2005 [triggered riots for weeks, the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal on 27 April 2011 to dismiss the case revived the debate], and the death of Ali Z in 2009. Following those events, in a report published on 2 April 2009, Amnesty International expressed concern about an increase in police violence and a lack of judicial action against the perpetrators. In addition to the \u2018low rate of prosecution of alleged perpetrators\u2019, according to the non-governmental organisation, there was a certain \u2018laxity\u2019 in the sentences imposed, leading to real impunity for the offences.\u201d 28.  In a judgment of 5 April 2012 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in the following terms:\n\u201cFirstly, the complaint alleging that the disciplinary body exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction is inadmissible for failure to produce the indictment.\nSecondly, having stated explicitly that, outside the courtroom, lawyers were not protected by the immunity conferred by section 41 of the Law of 29 July 1881, the Court of Appeal found that the impugned remarks had racial connotations casting aspersions and suspicion on the integrity of the jurors and thus amounted to a breach of the duties of moderation and discretion. It provided a legal basis for its decision merely to issue a warning to the lawyer, without laying itself open to any of the other complaints raised in the ground of appeal.\u201d", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "7", "5", "8", "2", "3", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Baku. 7.  The applicant is a well-known civil society activist and human rights defender. He is the Chairman and one of the co-founders of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (Se\u00e7kil\u0259rin Monitorinqi v\u0259 Demokratiyan\u0131n T\u0259drisi M\u0259rk\u0259zi \u2212 \u201cthe Centre\u201d), a non-governmental organisation specialising in the monitoring of elections. 8.  The applicant has actively taken part in election observation in Azerbaijan. He was also the Chairman and one of the co-founders of the Election Monitoring Centre (Se\u00e7kil\u0259rin Monitorinqi M\u0259rk\u0259zi), a non\u2011governmental organisation specialising in the monitoring of elections which was established on 19 February 2006. Following numerous attempts to acquire status as a legal entity under domestic law, the Election Monitoring Centre was finally registered by the Ministry of Justice on 1 February 2008. However, a few months later, in May 2008, the domestic courts ordered its dissolution at the request of the same ministry. The domestic proceedings relating to the registration and dissolution of the Election Monitoring Centre are the subject of an application pending before the Court (see application no. 64733/09). 9.  Following the dissolution of the Election Monitoring Centre, on 1 December 2008 the applicant and some of his colleagues founded the Centre (see paragraph 7 above), which has made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain State registration through applications to the Ministry of Justice. The domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to register the Centre is the subject of another application pending before the Court (see application no. 70981/11). 10.  The applicant has been involved in the preparation of various reports relating to the organisation of elections and general human rights situation in Azerbaijan. In particular, he has been a speaker at Council of Europe events and has cooperated with UN institutions. 11.  The Centre conducted both short-term and long-term observations of the last presidential elections, held on 9 October 2013, in cooperation with its partner organisation, the Volunteers International Cooperation Public Union (K\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcl\u0259rin Beyn\u0259lxalq \u018fm\u0259kda\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u0130ctimai Birliyi \u2013 \u201cthe Public Union\u201d) which has been registered as a legal entity by the Ministry of Justice. The Centre\u2019s preliminary report concerning the results of the elections, published on 21 October 2013, concluded that the presidential elections had failed to comply with democratic standards. 12.  On 29 October 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings in connection with alleged irregularities in the financial activities of the Centre and the Public Union. 13.  On 31 October 2013 a search was conducted at the Centre\u2019s office, during the course of which all the organisation\u2019s documents and electronic data storage devices were taken away by the prosecuting authorities. 14.  On 16 December 2013 the applicant was arrested and charged under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. The description of the charges consisted of a single sentence which was one page long. In particular, the applicant was accused of receiving since May 2013, as co\u2011founder and Chairman of the Centre, an \u201corganisation lacking State registration\u201d \u2212 with the complicity of S.B. and E.M., through the Public Union, which was a registered NGO \u2212 a number of grants, in the amount of 215,287 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) from the United States of America\u2019s National Democratic Institute resulting from certain grant agreements. He was accused of generating profit, \u201cby paying money to himself and other people involved in the projects in the guise of salaries and service fees\u201d despite the fact that the Centre did not have status as a legal entity. It was also stated that \u201cas an official, he had failed to register these grants with the relevant executive authority, even though he had a professional obligation to do so\u201d. Furthermore, he was accused of avoiding payment of taxes under Article 219 of the Tax Code in the amount of AZN 19,535, thus causing \u201csignificant damage to State interests protected by law, entailing grave consequences\u201d. 15.  On the same day the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court seeking the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial. The prosecutor justified his request by citing the gravity of the charges against the applicant, the fact that he did not live at the address where he was officially registered as a resident, and that there was a risk of his absconding from the investigation and obstructing the investigation\u2019s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings. In particular, the fact that the applicant had studied abroad, had frequently travelled to foreign countries, and was in constant contact with people living abroad constituted grounds for believing there was a risk of his absconding from the investigation. 16.  On 16 December 2013 the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The court cited the gravity of the charges and the risk of re-offending and justified its decision as follows:\n\u201cAfter having examined the request with the material of the case file and having heard the submissions of the investigator and the prosecutor in favour of the request and the submissions of the accused and his representative against the request, the court considers that the request should be granted.\nThe accused has been charged under Article 308.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan which constitutes a serious crime. The accused Anar Mammadli has also been charged with a criminal offence punishable by more than three years\u2019 imprisonment, and there is a strong likelihood that he will re-offend.\u201d 17.  On 18 December 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that his detention was unlawful. He complained, in particular, that there was no \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that he had committed a criminal offence and that no proof in this respect had been produced, that he had not been involved in any entrepreneurial activity, and that it was not forbidden by law to receive grants. He also pointed out that he had registered all the grants received with the relevant authorities as required by the domestic law. The applicant also complained that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial. He had complied with the investigation\u2019s requests all along and that the court had failed to justify his detention pending trial. Moreover, he was unable to obstruct the functioning of the investigation as all the documents relating to his activities had been in the possession of the investigation since the search of the Centre\u2019s office on 31 October 2013. 18.  On 23 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court\u2019s decision was lawful. The appellate court was silent as to the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned specific complaints and confined itself to noting that the applicant\u2019s personal situation \u2012 that he had a permanent place of residence, that he was married, that his family was financially dependent on him, and that he had a good reputation \u2012 did not constitute grounds for lifting the detention pending trial. 19.  On 20 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request to be released on bail or placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention, arguing that there was no \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that he had committed a criminal offence. He also claimed that there were no grounds justifying his continued detention. In particular, he had cooperated with the investigation all along and, although he often travelled abroad, he had never intended to abscond from the investigation. The applicant also pointed out that the domestic courts had failed to take into account his personal situation, namely that he had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence, and that his family were financially dependent on him. 20.  On 25 December 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding that the grounds justifying his detention, as specified in its decision of 16 December 2013, \u201chad not ceased to exist\u201d. 21.  On 26 December 2013 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 22.  On 30 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 25 December 2013, relying essentially on the same reasoning. 23.  Following a request dated 4 March 2014 from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for an extension of the period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, on 6 March 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by three months, until 16 June 2014. The court justified its decision by citing the complexity of the case and the fact that a number of investigative steps still needed to be carried out, meaning that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 24.  On 7 March 2014 the applicant appealed against this decision. He claimed, in particular, that there was no \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that he had committed a criminal offence and that the first-instance court had failed to justify the extension of his pre-trial detention. 25.  On 14 March 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 6 March 2014. The appellate court provided the same reasoning as the first-instance court. 26.  On 19 March 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office charged the applicant under Articles 179.3.2 (high-level embezzlement) and 313 (forgery in public office) of the Criminal Code, in addition to the original charges under Articles 192.2.2, 213.1 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code. The description of the allegations against him was slightly expanded, but essentially remained the same as that given on 16 December 2013 (see paragraph 14 above), with additional information alleging that the applicant had falsified various pieces of paperwork and minor contracts for services provided by a number of individuals (presumably in connection with various grant projects) and had not paid them in full as stipulated in the contracts. 27.  On 31 March 2014 the applicant again lodged a request with the court, asking the substitution of his detention pending trial with either house arrest or release on bail. In support of his request, he reiterated his previous arguments. 28.  On 1 April 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request. The court substantiated its decision by citing the gravity of the criminal charges against the applicant and the risk of his absconding from the investigation and obstructing its functioning. 29.  On 7 April 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 1 April 2014, providing the same reasoning as the first-instance court. 30.  In the meantime, on 5 April 2014 the applicant\u2019s case was sent to the Baku Court of Serious Crimes for trial. 31.  On 26 May 2014 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 32.  On 10 December 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. It was further upheld on 26 August 2015 by the Supreme Court. 33.  Following a presidentially decreed pardon on 17 March 2016, the applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence. 34.  The applicant\u2019s arrest and institution of criminal proceedings against him attracted significant public and media interest both inside the country and internationally. Immediately after his arrest, a number of domestic NGOs, as well as international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, condemned the authorities\u2019 actions, calling on them to drop \u201call politically motivated charges against him\u201d. 35.  On 17 December 2013, Janez Lenar\u010di\u010d, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, expressed his concern over the applicant\u2019s arrest. He noted that \u201cthe reported arrest of Anar Mammadli is disturbing as it endangers citizen election observation, the role of which in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes has been recognised by all OSCE participating States, including the Republic of Azerbaijan\u201d. 36.  On 20 December 2013 the Monitoring Committee co-rapporteurs for Azerbaijan of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressed their concern about the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicant. They stated that they had met him on several occasions during their fact-finding visits to Baku and at the Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, pointing out that \u201cthis decision on pre-trial detention may raise suspicions about politically-motivated justice which we denounced in our recent report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Azerbaijan\u201d. 37.  On 9 May 2014 Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and Margaret Sekaggya, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, condemned the arrest and criminal prosecution of the applicant. In particular, the UN Special Rapporteurs stated that they were seriously concerned that three human rights defenders, including the applicant, were being prosecuted in retaliation for their legitimate work documenting alleged widespread irregularities and human rights violations around the presidential elections of 9 October 2013. \u201cAll charges brought against them should be dropped and Mr. Mammadli should be released immediately\u201d. 38.  Following the arrest of the applicant and other human rights activists, a number of politicians from the ruling political party made comments about recently arrested NGO activists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan, describing them as spies or as being a \u201cfifth column\u201d for foreign interests and traitors, without specifically naming the applicant. Some examples of such comments can be found in the Court\u2019s judgment in Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan (no. 69981/14, \u00a7\u00a7 38-42, 17 March 2016).", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "8", "7", "9", "1", "4", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Glyka Nera. He is the executive director of the non-governmental organisation \u201cGreek Helsinki Monitor\u201d. 6.  On 26 January 2007, 11 February 2007 and 7 March 2007, Greek Helsinki Monitor published on its website some press releases, in which, inter alia, it welcomed the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for Greece and criticised the domestic authorities\u2019 responses to them. 7.  On 4 March 2007, E.T., in her capacity as General Secretary for Gender Equality of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, gave an interview which was published in a magazine included with a Sunday newspaper. In that interview the following statement was put to her:\n\u201cGreek Helsinki Monitor accuses you of withholding information and lying before the UN about the position of Roma women, minority women, and whether polygamy is practiced in Greece.\u201d E.T. gave the following answer:\n\u201cWhat they claim is extremely unfair. They lay the country open to criticism (\u03b5\u03ba\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) \u2013 because what they claim is false. No other NGO shares the Monitor\u2019s position. We, in our report, may not have fully documented everything, but no one can claim that Greece is an entirely patriarchic country and that nothing has been done all these years.\u201d 8.  On 1 April 2007 the same newspaper published a reply sent by the applicant, as executive director of Greek Helsinki Monitor, to E.T.\u2019s comments, in which he asked E.T. to document her statements. On 1 June 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor at the Athens First-Instance Court. He submitted that E.T. in the above-mentioned interview had made false statements about Greek Helsinki Monitor which amounted to slander committed through the press. The applicant expressed his wish to join the proceedings as civil party, initially for the amount of 100,000 euros (EUR), which he later reduced to EUR 44. 9.  Following an urgent preliminary inquiry, to which E.T. was requested to provide a statement as a suspect in the case, on 10 January 2008 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint and filed (\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5) it away, in accordance with Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, the prosecutor considered that the above-mentioned statements made within the context of the interview, did not constitute facts but value judgments and in any event, they did not overcome the necessary threshold of similar exchanges between various bodies. The prosecutor also added that Greek Helsinki Monitor had used the same expression, that is to say it had described statements included in reports prepared by the Greek Government as \u201cfalse\u201d, in various press releases, in a much more heated tone. 10.  On 6 February 2008, following an appeal by the applicant against the order by which his criminal complaint was filed away, the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal ordered E.T.\u2019s criminal prosecution for slander made through the press, considering that the above-mentioned statements were susceptible of harming the applicant\u2019s honour and reputation, not only individually, but also as representative of Greek Helsinki Monitor. 11.  On the basis of the above, E.T. was indicted and 25 June 2008 was set as the hearing date before the three-member Athens Magistrates\u2019 Court. On 26 May 2008 E.T. appealed against her indictment. On 17 June 2008 her appeal was dismissed by the Athens Council of Magistrate Judges. 12.  The new hearing date before the three-member Athens Magistrates\u2019 Court was set for 18 September 2008. On that date, at the beginning of the hearing of the case, E.T. raised for the first time an objection concerning lack of competence of the trial court, arguing that her status as a lawyer meant she could not have her case heard by a three-member magistrates\u2019 court. By judgment no. 53833/08 published on the same date, the said court declared itself not to have competence and referred the case to the three-member Athens Court of Appeal for misdemeanours (hereafter the \u201cCourt of Appeal\u201d). On 28 November 2008 the operative part of the judgment was corrected and on 6 April 2009, the case file was transmitted to the prosecution service at the Athens Court of Appeal, marked as extremely urgent. 13.  The new hearing date was set for 13 May 2009. On that date, the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to the court, requesting that the hearing be postponed as he could not attend it owing to other professional obligations. Additionally, K.D., a journalist who had interviewed E.T., had not been present and the applicant submitted that he considered her testimony essential. As a result, the Court of Appeal by its judgment no. 4044/09 postponed the hearing until 5 October 2009, citing a material witness\u2019s absence as the reason. On 5 October 2009 the case was not heard because the courts had not been sitting owing to the parliamentary elections that had taken place the previous day. 14.  The case was again set for hearing on 17 February 2010. On that date, E.T.\u2019s lawyer submitted certificate no. 2063/2010 of the Greek Parliament, according to which E.T. had been elected as a deputy in the parliamentary elections of 4 October 2009. On that basis, he applied to the court to have the proceedings suspended in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution in order for Parliament to give permission. The applicant objected to the suspension and filed written submissions in which he argued, inter alia, that it was not necessary for Parliament to grant leave for the criminal proceedings against E.T. as the acts for which she was accused had not taken place in the course of her parliamentary activities. He cited in that connection the Court\u2019s cases Tsalkitzis v. Greece (no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006) and Syngelidis v. Greece (no. 24895/07, 11 February 2010). He further stressed that the impugned acts would become time\u2011barred on 4 September 2010 and requested that the court proceed with examination on the merits of the case. 15.  The Court of Appeal, after having held deliberations in camera, published judgment no. 1656/2010 by which it suspended the criminal proceedings against E.T. until the Greek Parliament had granted leave and, if such leave were not granted or if no action were taken in the three\u2011month period from the submission of the prosecutor\u2019s request to the Greek Parliament, until her status as a parliamentarian ended. In respect of Article 62 of the Constitution and the applicant\u2019s objection, the domestic court held the following:\n\u201c... In addition, since Parliament has not granted leave, the prosecution is declared inadmissible if it concerns an offence committed when the defendant was a member of parliament. If, however, criminal proceedings were initiated prior to that, when the defendant was not a member of parliament, then they are suspended until the said leave is granted or until the defendant\u2019s status as a parliamentarian ends ... It should be noted that in the present case no matter arises concerning the interpretation of Articles 61, 62 and 20 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution ... and of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, so as for the court to rule that Parliament\u2019s leave is not required to conduct this trial because the above-mentioned act did not take place, according to the civil claimant\u2019s allegations, in the context of her parliamentary duties. That is because the prosecutable offence (slander for an interview that the defendant gave to a newspaper in her capacity as General Secretary for Gender Equality of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation) clearly does not concern a private dispute; it should be examined if it relates and is linked to the political activity of the defendant-deputy and in general to the exercise of her parliamentary duties. However, examination of this matter and, eventually, any conclusion thereof can only be carried out by the competent authority, the Greek Parliament ...\u201d 16.  The decision was published on the date of the hearing, that is to say 17 February 2010, and was finalised (i.e. entered in a special book at the registry of the criminal court) on 10 August 2010. On 13 August 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation requesting an examination of points of law of the said judgment. His request was rejected on the grounds that the Court of Appeal had rightly suspended the proceedings so that Parliament could grant leave, in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution. On 19 August 2010 the case file was transferred to the public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, who the next day sent it to the Minister of Justice. On 23 August 2010 the Minister of Justice transferred the case file to the Greek Parliament. 17.  On 24 October 2010 the Special Permanent Committee of Parliamentary Ethics of the Greek Parliament, having taken a deposition from E.T., ruled unanimously that the requirements of Article 83 \u00a7 3 had been met and thus E.T.\u2019s immunity should not be lifted. On 12 January 2011 the Plenary of the Greek Parliament dismissed the request for leave to continue the criminal proceedings. On 1 March 2011 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation notified the public prosecutor at the Court of Appeal of the outcome of Parliament\u2019s vote on granting leave. 18.  On 16 July 2012 the head of the General Directorate of Human Resources of the Greek Parliament notified the Ministry of Justice that E.T. had ceased to be member of parliament since 11 April 2012. On 26 October 2012 the Court of Appeal published judgment no. 8658/2012 in which it considered that the offence of which E.T. was accused had become time\u2011barred as more than forty-two months had passed since its alleged commission. It consequently ended the criminal prosecution. The judgment was finalised on 21 March 2013.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "0", "7", "4", "6", "9", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977. He is currently serving a life sentence in Dnipro. 5.  By the final domestic judgment of 16 July 2002, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other crimes. 6.  Until September 2004 the applicant was detained in the Cherkassy pre-trial detention centre (\u201cthe Cherkassy SIZO\u201d) in which, he stated, cells had been overcrowded and had lacked basic amenities. 7.  In October 2004 the applicant was transferred to Sokalska Correctional Colony no. 47 in Zhvyrka (\u201cthe Sokalska Colony\u201d), where he remained until 15 November 2007. 8.  The applicant stated that during his detention in the above Colony, one of his cellmates had been Mr V.M. Guk, a former applicant to the Court, with whom he had shared the cell for three years. Mr Guk\u2019s application has already been examined by the Court, which found, in particular, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of his detention in the above Colony (see Guk v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 16995/05, \u00a7\u00a7 83-86, 8 December 2016). 9.  According to the applicant, during his stay in the Colony he was held in a cell, in which the living space was \u201cextremely insufficient\u201d. As confirmation thereof, he referred to a written statement signed by Mr Guk, which he had submitted to the Court. According to that statement, the cell measured 3.7 by 3.4 metres (12.58 square metres) including a sanitary facility measuring 1.35 by 1.3 metres (1.76 square metres). 10.  The cell lacked basic amenities: no furniture for storage of personal belongings and food; a very small table; no rubbish container; and no toilet cleaners. The tap water was of a poor quality and water filters were not provided. Heating in the cell was inadequate; the air was damp and cold; the walls were covered with mould.\n(b)  Submissions by the Government 11.  According to the Government, the equipment in the applicant\u2019s cell corresponded to the domestic standards. Prisoners were provided with all necessary amenities. The quality of the tap water corresponded to the standards. The temperature in the cell was not less than 18 degrees Celsius and the air in the cell was neither damp nor cold. 12.  According to the applicant, the washing unit in the Colony had no changing facilities, so the prisoners had first to undress in their cells. A guard watched them wash and hurried them up. The prisoners had to shave with poor-quality razors. Prisoners with tuberculosis washed in the same unit as healthy prisoners; no disinfection measures were taken. Sick and healthy prisoners took their daily walks in the same courtyards, which were also small, damp and dark. 13.  Whenever the guards opened the cell, the prisoners had to retreat to its far corner, squat and put their arms behind their heads. When taken out of the cell, the applicant was handcuffed; he was required to walk in a squat or some other unnatural position; his head was covered with a black bag; handcuffs were not disinfected. 14.  Until April 2005 the prisoners had been required to roll up their mattresses in the morning. During the daytime they had been prohibited from lying down on the beds. 15.  In support of the above submissions, the applicant referred to the written statement of Mr Guk, which confirmed the procedure the prisoners had had to follow when the guards had opened the cell. It also stated that, when taken out of the cell, the prisoners had been handcuffed and escorted in a crouched position; a bag had often been put over a prisoner\u2019s head. Sick and healthy prisoners washed in the same unit and walked in the same courtyard. Mattresses on the beds had to be rolled up during the daytime. 16.  The applicant also stated that the administration had carried out searches of personal belongings, leaving them in disorder and often damaged; his watch had been stolen by an unidentified guard. Prisoners had not been provided with adequate medical assistance; they had been constantly ill-treated by the administration. In 2004-2005 the applicant had been regularly beaten by the guards. In 2004-2006 family visits had not been adequately organised. The applicant\u2019s correspondence with relatives had been reviewed and a number of his letters had disappeared.\n(b)  Submissions by the Government 17.  The Government stated that the washing unit had a changing room. Disinfection measures in the Colony had fully complied with the domestic standards. Prisoners with tuberculosis were detained in a separate cell; they washed after others, and the washing unit was disinfected afterwards. 18.  Whenever the cell was opened, the prisoners were required to retreat to its far end, but not to squat. When escorted out of the cell, they were handcuffed, but not required to walk in a squat or with the head covered with a bag; handcuffs were in a proper condition and their disinfection was not required. 19.  Searches were conducted pursuant to the relevant regulations, and there were no situations alleged by the applicant. Prisoners were not prohibited to use mattresses during the daytime.", "references": ["8", "4", "7", "6", "0", "3", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1962, respectively, and live in Baku and Absheron, respectively. 6.  The applicants are well-known civil society activists and lawyers specialising in the field of the protection of human rights. The second applicant has represented applicants in more than one hundred cases before the Court. 7.  At the time of the events in question the applicants were practising as lawyers on the basis of a special permit (licence) \u2013 issued by the Ministry of Justice (see paragraph 33 below) \u2013 to provide paid legal services. They regularly made various statements and published articles in the media, criticising the state of the legal profession in the country. 8.  On 28 December 1999 a new Law on Advocates and Advocacy Activity (\u201cthe Law\u201d) was adopted within the framework of a reform of the legal profession in the country. Under the Law, activity of legal counsel is to be provided by persons admitted to the ABA, and the defence of suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings falls under the exclusive domain of the legal profession (see paragraph 34 below). Article I of its transitional provisions, as in force at the material time, also provided that persons who on the date of the entry into force of the transitional provisions of the Law were members of the already existing Bar Association or who had a special permit to provide paid legal services had the right to be founding members of the ABA, without having to pass a qualification examination, subject to their complying with the requirements in respect of candidates for admission to practice as legal counsel (see paragraph 35 below). 9.  In November 2004 the constituent assembly of the ABA was held on the basis of the provisions of the Law, with the participation of members of the former Bar Association and lawyers holding a special permit. These participants were registered as founders of the ABA and they became its members. However, some lawyers practising on the basis of a special permit, including the applicants, were not invited to participate in the constituent assembly and their right to be founders of the ABA was not recognised. The applicants signed a petition alleging that holding the ABA\u2019s constituent assembly under these conditions had been illegal and instituted court proceedings in this respect. 10.  In the meantime, on 14 June 2005 new amendments to the transitional provisions of the Law were adopted providing for admission to the ABA of all lawyers holding a special permit, including those whose right to be founding members of the ABA had not been recognised, without passing a qualification examination, subject to their complying with the requirements in respect of candidates for admission to practice as legal counsel (see paragraph 36 below). 11.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the first applicant applied for admission to the ABA on the basis of the amendments of 14 June 2005 to the transitional provisions of the Law. 12.  On 27 January 2006 the Presidium of the ABA (Az\u0259rbaycan Respublikas\u0131 V\u0259kill\u0259r Kollegiyas\u0131 R\u0259yas\u0259t Hey\u0259ti \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Presidium\u201d) held a meeting at which it examined and then dismissed his application. It appears from a document entitled \u201cExtract from the record of meeting no. 2 dated 27 January 2006 of the Presidium\u201d and annex no. 1 to that document \u2013 signed by the head of the administration of the ABA, Z.A. \u2013 that the President of the ABA (A.T.) declared the meeting open and then the members of the Presidium questioned the first applicant about his stance on the functioning of the ABA, before dismissing his application. The transcript of the meeting, which was one page long, reads as follows:\n\u201cAfter giving the information about Annagi Hajibeyli [the first applicant] to the members of the Presidium, A.T. gives the floor to them for questions. I.S.: Mr Hajibeyli, you are one of the lawyers who brought an action in court asking for the invalidation of the constituent assembly of the ABA. What could you say about that?\n[The first applicant]: I suppose that the members of the Presidium are familiar with my opinion. I still maintain that the constituent assembly of the ABA was held in blatant breach of the requirements of the law. Moreover, numerous persons, who were entitled to be co-founders of the ABA, were unlawfully not allowed to attend the constituent assembly. A.T.: Mr Hajibeyli, your opinion is clear. Please wait outside. We want to discuss the question.\nMember of the Presidium [...]: One minute. I have a question.\n[The first applicant]: Please.\nMember of the Presidium: It follows that you consider this organ illegal. But why do you want to become a member of it?\n[The first applicant]: Irrespective of my stance on the constituent assembly of the ABA, the latter\u2019s creation and functioning is a fact. Unfortunately, Azerbaijani law allows for the creation of only one bar association. I want to practise as a legal counsel. That is why I applied for admission to this bar association. A.T.: Everything is clear. Please wait for the issuance of the decision.\nOne minute later the decision of the Presidium of the ABA rejecting Annagi Hajibeyli\u2019s application for admission to that organ was declared.\u201d 13.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the second applicant applied for admission to the ABA, relying on the amendments to the Law of 14 June 2005. 14.  On 19 November 2005 the Presidium held a meeting at which it examined his application but decided to dismiss it. It appears from the document entitled \u201cExtract from the record of meeting no. 27 dated 19 November 2005 of the Presidium\u201d (as well as annex no. 1 thereto) \u2013 signed by the head of the administration of the ABA, Z.A. \u2013 that A.T. declared the meeting open and then the members of the Presidium questioned the second applicant about his stance on the functioning of the ABA, before dismissing his application. The relevant parts of the transcript of the meeting, which is three pages long, read as follows:\n\u201cAfter giving the information about Intigam Aliyev [the second applicant] to the members of the Presidium, A.T. gives the floor to them for questions. I.S.: Mr Aliyev, you brought an action in court against the ABA. Are you going to withdraw your action after your admission to the ABA?\n[The second applicant]: I don\u2019t know other people\u2019s opinion, but personally I have no intention of withdrawing my actions against the ABA and the Ministry of Justice. Unfortunately, these actions remain unexamined by the courts because of pressure brought by the previously-mentioned organs. ... I.K.: You state in your writing in the media that one of the main reasons for the current catastrophic situation of the courts in Azerbaijan is the [poor state of] legal profession. We would like to know your opinion in this respect.\n[The second applicant]: I am still of the same opinion. I consider that one of the main reasons for the current catastrophic situation of the law and human rights in Azerbaijan is the absence of independent judicial power and legal profession in the country. ... A.A.: I have a great respect for Mr Aliyev as a person and lawyer. However, he published articles insulting the members of the ABA in the media and in Law Newspaper.\n[The second applicant]: Whom have I insulted? A.A.: You have insulted the ABA in your writings. You write that advocates are acting as intermediaries (vasit\u0259\u00e7ilikl\u0259 m\u0259\u015f\u011fuldurlar).\n... A.T.: The fact that you have stated that you will maintain your court actions against the ABA indicates that you don\u2019t recognise the lawfulness of the ABA.\n[The second applicant]: Firstly, my colleagues and I did not question before the courts the lawfulness of the ABA, but rather sought the invalidation of its constituent assembly, which was held in blatant breach of the requirements of the law. ... A.T.: You want to become a member of the ABA, but you bring an action against it?\n[The second applicant]: What does that mean? Is it forbidden to bring an action against the ABA? In your law, the right of legal counsels to bring an action against the ABA is provided for. A.T.: You are not yet a legal counsel.\n[The second applicant]: I have practised as a legal counsel for fifteen years and the State gave me a permit. In any event, what difference does being a legal counsel make? You are a legal counsel; how can you speak like that? Everybody has the right to bring an action against any organ, including the ABA. I.K.: It is not allowed to admit Intigam Aliyev to the ABA because of the stance that he has held about the current ABA.\n[The second applicant]: I will not be surprised if you refuse my admission to the ABA on account of my critical views about the functioning of the ABA and its directorate, although such a decision will be shameful. ... A.T.: Please, those who are in favour of the issuance of a decision refusing Intigam Aliyev\u2019s admission to the ABA should vote.\nBy a unanimous decision of the members of the Presidium of the ABA the admission of Intigam Aliyev to the ABA is refused.\u201d 15.  On 21 February 2006 the first applicant brought an action in the Nasimi District Court alleging that the Presidium\u2019s decision of 27 January 2006 had been unlawful. In particular, he argued that the Presidium had failed to substantiate its decision and had breached the transitional provisions of the Law. He further alleged the violation of his rights, as protected under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention, as a result of the refusal to admit him to the ABA. 16.  Following a series of procedural decisions concerning the admissibility of the action, at the beginning of 2007 the Nasimi District Court commenced examining the case on the merits. It appears from the transcript of the Nasimi District Court\u2019s hearing held on 7 February 2007, which was submitted to the Court by the first applicant, that the representative of the ABA at the hearing, I.K., stated, in reply to the first applicant\u2019s question concerning the grounds for the Presidium\u2019s decision of 27 January 2006, that the first applicant\u2019s replies to the questions and his previous statements had justified the decision of the Presidium\u2019s members. 17.  On 9 February 2007 the Nasimi District Court delivered its judgment on the merits. The court held that the first applicant\u2019s complaint should be dismissed because admission to the ABA was a matter which fell within the exclusive competence of the members of the Presidium and there had been no breach of law in the examination of the first applicant\u2019s request by the Presidium. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIt was established in the course of the court investigation that, while he disputed the decision of the Presidium, A. Hajibeyli [the first applicant] did not challenge the legality of that decision, but rather its motives. It follows that the issue argued by A. Hajibeyli in his application falls within the exclusive competence of the members of the Presidium and is related to their personal consideration and will.\nArticle 1 (III) of the Law on Advocates and Advocacy Activity of the Republic of Azerbaijan provides that the prohibition of any interference with or pressure on the professional activity of legal counsels and their [professional] association by the prosecutor\u2019s office, court, other State bodies, public associations, [or] any company, entity, organisation or official constitutes the basis of the legal profession.\nTherefore, given that the issue addressed by A. Hajibeyli in his application falls within the exclusive competence of the members of the Presidium and is subject to their consideration and will, any interference with that issue is not allowed by law.\u201d 18.  On 16 March 2007 the first applicant appealed against that judgment, alleging a violation of his rights, as protected under Articles 6, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In particular, he alleged that he had not been admitted to the ABA because of his statements about the functioning of the ABA and the poor state of the legal profession in the country. In support of his claim, the first applicant relied on the \u201cExtract from the record of meeting no. 2 dated 27 January 2006 of the Presidium\u201d (see paragraph 12 above) and the annex to that document. He also referred to the statements made by the representative of the ABA at the court hearings held before the Nasimi District Court, quoting the transcript of the above-mentioned court hearings. The first applicant further argued that the Presidium\u2019s decision of 27 January 2006 had been unlawful, as it had been contrary to the transitional provisions of the Law. In that regard, he pointed out that his candidacy for admission to practice as a legal counsel had met all the requirements for candidates for admission, as provided for by Article 8 of the Law. 19.  On 6 June 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. The appellate court was silent as to the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints relating to the breach of his right to freedom of expression. It further appears from the transcript of the Court of Appeal\u2019s hearing held on 6 June 2007, which was submitted to the Court by the first applicant, that the representative of the ABA, I.K., again stated at the hearing that the members of the Presidium had considered that the first applicant should not be admitted to the ABA because of his stance on the functioning of the ABA. His statement reads as follows:\n\u201cI.K.: You [the first applicant] have the transcript (stenoqram). After the examination of your documents, you were questioned by the Presidium, which then unanimously decided that A. Hajibeyli [the first applicant] should not be admitted [to practice as a legal counsel] because of his stance [on the functioning of the ABA]. I consider that the vote should be against [your admittance].\u201d 20.  On 14 August 2007 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal, reiterating his previous complaints. In support of his claims, he again referred to the extract from the record of meeting no. 2 dated 27 January 2006 of the Presidium and the annex thereto, as well as the transcripts of the court hearings held before the Nasimi District Court and the Court of Appeal. 21.  On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 6 June 2007. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision made no mention of the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints. 22.  On 2 December 2005 the second applicant brought an action in the Nasimi District Court, alleging that the Presidium\u2019s decision dated 19 November 2005 had been unlawful. In particular, he alleged a violation of his rights, as protected under Articles 6, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention. 23.  Following a series of procedural decisions concerning the admissibility of the action, at the beginning of 2007 the Nasimi District Court commenced its examination of the action on the merits. It appears from the documents in the case file that in the course of the proceedings before the first-instance court the second applicant and the ABA lodged various requests and applications, which were dismissed by the court. The ABA also lodged a counterclaim against the second applicant for defamation. 24.  On 11 August 2009 the Nasimi District Court delivered its judgment on the merits, dismissing both the claims of the second applicant and those of the ABA. As to the reasoning of the judgment concerning the second applicant\u2019s action regarding his admission to the ABA, it was similar to that of the Nasimi District Court dated 9 February 2007 (see paragraph 17 above). 25.  On 10 September 2009 the second applicant appealed against that judgment, alleging a violation of his rights, as protected under Articles 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In particular, he pointed out that he had not been admitted to the ABA because of his statements and articles about the poor state of the legal profession in the country. In support of his appeal, the second applicant relied on the document entitled \u201cExtract from the record of meeting no. 27 dated 19 November 2005 of the Presidium\u201d (see paragraph 14 above) and the annex thereto. He further argued that the Presidium\u2019s decision of 19 November 2005 had been contrary to the transitional provisions of the Law. 26.  On 2 November 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the judgment of the first-instance court had been lawful. The appellate court was silent as to the second applicant\u2019s particular complaints concerning the violation of his right to freedom of expression. 27.  On an unspecified date the second applicant lodged a cassation appeal, reiterating his previous complaints. 28.  On 18 June 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 2 November 2009. 29.  On 8 August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against the second applicant, Mr I. Aliyev, under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code, which are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). At that time the second applicant was representing not only the applicants in the present case, but also a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. 30.  On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigating authorities seized a large number of documents from the second applicant\u2019s office, including all the case files relating to the proceedings pending before the Court, which were in his possession and which concerned over 100 applications in total. The files relating to the present two applications were also seized in their entirety. The facts relating to the seizure and the relevant proceedings are described in more detail in a judgment relating to an application lodged by the first applicant (see Annagi Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, no. 2204/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21\u201128, 22 October 2015). 31.  On 25 October 2014 the investigating authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the files relating to the present applications, to the second applicant\u2019s lawyer.", "references": ["7", "5", "9", "2", "0", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Apeldoorn. 8.  In a judgment of 29 October 2008, the Zutphen Regional Court (rechtbank) convicted the applicant of the transportation of 2,800 grams of heroin and of seven counts of people trafficking (mensensmokkel) as defined in Article 197a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), committed jointly with other perpetrators. It sentenced him to a partially suspended term of 40 months\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 10.  On 19 July 2011 the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) gave its judgment, upholding the conviction for the offence of transporting heroin and also of four counts of people trafficking, and acquitting him on the three other counts. It sentenced him to 40 months\u2019 imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial detention. Based on the evidence submitted, the Court of Appeal found established that the applicant and his co-perpetrators had, for purposes of financial gain, between 10 November 2006 and 17 January 2007 facilitated the unauthorised residence of a total of 20 Iraqi migrants in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation (cassatie), the scope of which is limited to procedural conformity and points of law, with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). In his written grounds of appeal of 8 August 2013, the applicant raised, inter alia, a complaint regarding the four counts of people trafficking of which he had been convicted by the Court of Appeal. The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal had convicted him of facilitation of unauthorised \u201cresidence\u201d, as defined in Article 197a \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, whereas the evidence relied on by the Court of Appeal to uphold that conviction did not prove that the Iraqi migrants had had \u201cresidence\u201d in the Netherlands, Germany or Denmark. Instead, the evidence demonstrated that the applicant had organised and financed the Iraqi migrants\u2019 transportation to Denmark via the Netherlands and Germany, which had been intercepted on each occasion in Germany. As the migrants\u2019 stay in the Netherlands and Germany had only been brief and transitory, and given that they had never even entered Denmark, there was, according to the applicant, no proof of \u201cresidence\u201d in those countries. In that regard, the applicant referred to European Union law, namely Council Directive 2002/90/EG of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (hereinafter \u201cthe Directive\u201d) and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JBZ of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (hereinafter \u201cthe Framework Decision\u201d). Submitting that Article 197a of the Criminal Code had been amended in order to implement the Directive, the applicant argued that the notion of the facilitation of unauthorised \u201cresidence\u201d within the meaning of Article 197a \u00a7 2 should be understood as entailing a long-term stay, to be distinguished from \u201ctransit\u201d or \u201centry\u201d as defined in the first paragraph of Article 197a, which had been added to Article 197a when the Directive was implemented. The applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal in cassation did not include a request that the Supreme Court put a question to the CJEU for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary ruling. 12.  In his advisory opinion of 10 December 2013, the Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) to the Supreme Court expressed his view that the applicant\u2019s appeal should be dismissed with the exception of the first of the grounds of the appeal, which pertained to the length of the proceedings: the duration of the cassation proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, for which a reduction of sentence was to be applied. With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the evidence did not show that there had been any \u201cresidence\u201d of the migrants in the countries at issue, the Advocate General was of the opinion that Article 197a \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code called for a broad interpretation of \u201cresidence\u201d, as had been the case prior to the implementation of the Directive and the Framework Decision. Since that implementation was intended to broaden the scope of Article 197a of the Criminal Code, the second paragraph of that provision retained its broad meaning of \u201cresidence\u201d, thereby encompassing \u201ctransit\u201d. The separate penalisation in the first paragraph of Article 197a of the facilitation of unauthorised \u201ctransit and entry\u201d did not change the broad scope of paragraph 2. The Advocate General thus concluded that the applicant\u2019s complaint in this matter should be dismissed. 13.  On 24 December 2013, the applicant submitted written comments in reply to the Advocate General\u2019s advisory opinion (a so-called \u201cBorgers letter\u201d[1]) in which he made a tentative request for questions to be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling about the interpretation of \u201cresidence\u201d, \u201centry\u201d and \u201ctransit\u201d within the context of the Directive and whether the Directive contained minimum rules or constituted a general framework of terms, if the Supreme Court were to concur with the Advocate General. 14.  On 4 March 2014 the Supreme Court gave its judgment, which read:\n\u201c[the applicant\u2019s counsel] have submitted written grounds of appeal. That document is annexed to this judgment, of which it is a component part.\nThe Advocate General [...] has advised that the impugned judgment be quashed \u2212 but only as regards the prison sentence imposed, reducing it due to the violation of the right to adjudication within a reasonable time \u2212 and that the remainder of the appeal be dismissed.\nCounsel [for the applicant] have submitted a written reply.\u201d 15.  The Supreme Court went on to hold that the applicant\u2019s complaint that the cassation proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention was well-founded and that the sentence imposed on the applicant should be reduced as a consequence thereof. The Supreme Court further considered:\n\u201c4.  Assessment of the remaining grievances\nThe grievances cannot lead to cassation [of the impugned judgment] (de middelen kunnen niet to cassatie leiden). Based on section 81 (1) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie), this requires no further reasoning as the grievances do not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity or legal development.\u201d 16.  The Supreme Court thus quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment as regards the imposed sentence, reduced the sentence to 34 months\u2019 imprisonment, and dismissed the remainder of the grounds of appeal. No further appeal lay against the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment. 17.  Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act entered into force on 1 July 2012. It provides as follows (references to other domestic legislation omitted):\n\u201c1.  The Supreme Court may, after having taken cognisance of the advisory opinion of the Procurator General (gehoord de procureur-generaal), declare an appeal in cassation inadmissible if the complaints raised do not justify an examination in cassation proceedings (de aangevoerde klachten geen behandeling in cassatie rechtvaardigen), because the appellant party obviously has insufficient interest in the cassation appeal (klaarblijkelijk onvoldoende belang heeft bij het cassatieberoep) or because the complaints obviously cannot succeed (klaarblijkelijk niet tot cassatie kunnen leiden). 2.  The Supreme Court shall not take a decision as referred to in the first paragraph without first having taken cognisance of:\na.  [in civil cases:] the summons or request [introducing the cassation appeal] ... and the memorandum in reply (conclusie van antwoord) or the statement of defence (verweerschrift), if submitted;\nb.  [in criminal cases:] the written statement of the grounds of the cassation appeal (de schriftuur, houdende de middelen van cassatie) ...; or, as the case may be,\nc.  [in tax cases:] the written statement introducing the cassation appeal (het beroepschrift waarbij beroep in cassatie wordt ingesteld) ... and the statement of defence, if submitted. 3.  The cassation appeal shall be considered and decided by three members of a multi-judge Chamber (meervoudige kamer), one of whom shall act as president. 4.  If the Supreme Court applies the first paragraph, it may, in stating the grounds for its decision, limit itself to that finding.\u201d 18.  Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act reads:\n\u201c1.  If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint does not constitute grounds for overturning the impugned judgment and does not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity and legal development, it may, in giving reasons for its decision on such complaint, limit itself to that finding. 2.  The appeal in cassation shall be considered and determined by three members of a multi-judge Chamber (meervoudige kamer), one of whom shall act as president.\u201d 19.  In a judgment of 11 September 2012 (ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX0129) the Supreme Court clarified its understanding of sections 80a and 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act as applicable in criminal cases, which reads, as far as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c2.1.2.  The explanatory memorandum (memorie van toelichting) to the Bill that led to this Act (Parliamentary Documents, Lower House of Parliament (Kamerstukken II) 2010/11, 32 576, no. 3), includes the following:\n\u20181.  Introduction\nAim pursued by the Bill\nThis Bill aims to strengthen the role of the cassation procedure (versterking van de cassatierechtspraak) by establishing different and new requirements for lawyers who act as representatives before the Supreme Court and by introducing the possibility for the Supreme Court to declare inadmissible a cassation appeal at the beginning of the procedure. The Bill is intended to enable the Supreme Court to concentrate on its core tasks as a court of cassation. The adequate execution of these core tasks is under pressure as a result of cassation appeals being lodged in cases that do not lend themselves to a review in cassation, and because certain issues about which it would be desirable for the Supreme Court itself to pronounce do not reach the Supreme Court in time or at all. The establishment of quality requirements for counsel is aimed at ensuring that cassation appeals are accompanied by statements of grounds of appeal that are of decent quality.\n...\nAccelerated inadmissibility\nAnother measure [in addition to establishing new quality requirements for legal representatives] is the introduction of a mechanism for disposing of cases that goes beyond that of the current section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act. Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act enables the Supreme Court to limit the reasoning of the rejection of a cassation grievance to the finding that the complaint raised therein \u201cdoes not constitute grounds for overturning the impugned judgment and does not give rise to the need to determine legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity and legal development\u201d.\nSection 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act has in recent years played an important part in keeping the workload of the Supreme Court manageable. The Supreme Court now applies this provision in approximately half of its cases. However, the limits of its application are discernible. Moreover, section 81 is applied only at the end of cassation proceedings and, (invariably, in civil and criminal cases) after an advisory opinion from the Procurator General. However, the possibility of rejecting cases that have no prospect of success at an earlier stage of the proceedings and in a simple manner would constitute a considerable alleviation for the parties to the proceedings and the Supreme Court alike. ...\nPursuant to Article 118 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution (Grondwet), the Supreme Court is charged, in the cases and within the limits prescribed by law, with overturning judicial decisions that are contrary to the law (de cassatie van uitspraken wegens schending van het recht). The Bill explicitly does not seek to change the Supreme Court\u2019s task. Nor does [the Bill] involve a leave-to-appeal system in which a court has to give prior permission before a legal remedy can be used. The freedom of parties to lodge cassation appeals remains unimpaired. What is new is the latitude given to the Supreme Court to declare an appeal inadmissible on the (substantive) finding that the grounds of appeal submitted do not justify a detailed review in cassation proceedings (geen nadere beoordeling in cassatie rechtvaardigen). The appeal may, for instance, be manifestly ill-founded (klaarblijkelijke ongegrondheid), because the impugned ruling rests on two grounds, each of which is capable of supporting the decision by itself but only one of which is challenged, or there may be a lack of interest, for example because a ground for the appeal, although well-founded, cannot, after the overturning of the impugned ruling, lead to an outcome other than the one to which that ruling had led.\u2019\n... 2.2.2.  Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act does, however, bring about a change in cases in which an omission hitherto necessitated the overturning of the impugned ruling, even though the person bringing the cassation appeal did not actually have a sufficient interest \u2212 deserving to be respected in law (niet voldoende in rechte te respecteren belang) \u2212 in such an overturning and a possible rehearing after remittal or referral of the case. In this context, it is to be noted that the mere possibility \u2013 regardless of the reason for which the appeal is considered well-founded \u2013 that in that situation a different, and possibly more advantageous, ruling could be given (for example, a reduction of sentence pursuant to the length of the proceedings before and after remittal or referral of the case, or in relation to changed personal circumstances) cannot be considered an interest that deserves to be upheld in law in cassation proceedings.\n...\nConsequences for the content of the statement of grounds of appeal in cassation and the \u2018Borgers letter\u2019 2.6.1.  Pursuant to the second paragraph of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act the Supreme Court will not issue a decision of the kind referred to in the first paragraph without first having taken cognisance of the written statement of grounds of appeal in cassation ... If the \u2018selection at the gate\u2019 (selectie aan de poort) which the legislature has introduced by way of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act is to achieve its intended aim, then the lawyer who acts as legal representative, or the public prosecution service as the case may be, can reasonably be expected \u2013 in the words of the explanatory memorandum \u2013 to submit \u2018statements of grounds of appeal ... that are of decent quality\u2019.\n... 2.6.3.  Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act provides that in the cases referred to therein, the Supreme Court may declare the cassation appeal inadmissible after having heard the Procurator General. It must be presumed that the Procurator General will express his point of view as to the applicability of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act on a hearing day set by the judge in charge of the Supreme Court\u2019s list of cases (rolraadsheer) and also that if the Procurator General is of the opinion that the case lends itself to the application of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, he will express this point of view in writing. In that case, counsel for the person by whom or on whose behalf the appeal has been lodged may respond in writing to that point of view within a period of two weeks thereafter.\u201d 20.  In its judgment of 26 May 2015 (ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1332) the Supreme Court explained its practice as regards the application of sections 80a and 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act in relation to a request for referral to the CJEU made in that case. It held, as far as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c2.1.  The Supreme Court finds that the complaints raised do not justify an examination in cassation proceedings because the appellant party obviously has insufficient interest in the cassation appeal or because the complaints obviously cannot succeed. The Supreme Court will therefore \u2013 based on section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act and after having taken cognisance of the advisory opinion of the Procurator General \u2212 declare the appeal in cassation inadmissible. 2.2.1.  It is inherent therein (daarin ligt besloten) that the request contained in the written grounds of appeal to put a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union cannot be granted (voor inwilliging vatbaar). The reasons are as follows. 2.2.2.  A judgment in which the appeal in cassation is declared inadmissible or dismissed by application of and with reference to section 80a or 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act contains an abridged reasoning of that decision. Furthermore, such a judgment contains the conclusion that no issues arise that justify an examination in cassation proceedings or give rise to the need for a determination of issues in the interests of legal uniformity, legal development or legal protection. Since preliminary questions within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concern the interpretation of Community law and are issues of law (rechtsvragen), it is inherent in such a judgment that there is no need to put preliminary questions. The judgment also implies that the case in question concerns one of the situations where there is no need for such referral of preliminary questions, namely when the preliminary question raised is not relevant for the resolution of the dispute or can be answered in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice [of the European Union] or that no reasonable doubt exists as to the manner in which the question concerning the rules of Community law was to be resolved.\u201d 21.  Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (\u201cTFEU\u201d)[2] provides as follows:\n\u201cThe Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:\n(a)  the interpretation of the Treaties;\n(b)  the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union ...;\nWhere such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.\nWhere any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.\u201d 22.  On 25 November 2016, the CJEU published its (updated) Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2016/C 439/01), which reads, as far as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c3.  The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court. In so far as it is called upon to assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, it is for the national court or tribunal before which a dispute has been brought \u2013 and for that court or tribunal alone \u2013 to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.\u201d\nRelevant case-law of the CJEU 23.  In the case of S.r.l. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo S.p.a. v. Ministry of Health (C-283/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335), the CJEU received a request from the Italian Court of Cassation for a preliminary ruling. This request concerned the question as to whether the third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty[3] laid down an obligation to refer a matter which precluded the national court from determining whether the question raised was justified, or whether it made that obligation conditional on the prior finding of a reasonable interpretative doubt. 24.  In its judgment of 6 October 1982 the CJEU explained, firstly, as follows:\n\u201c... 6.  The second paragraph of that article [current Article 267] provides that any court or tribunal of a Member State may, if it considers that a decision on a question of interpretation is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. The third paragraph of that article provides that, where a question of interpretation is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 7.  That obligation to refer a matter to the Court of Justice is based on cooperation, established with a view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law in all the Member States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of Community law, and the Court of Justice. More particularly, the third paragraph of Article [267] seeks to prevent the occurrence within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community law. The scope of that obligation must therefore be assessed, in view of those objectives, by reference to the powers of the national courts, on the one hand, and those of the Court of Justice, on the other, where such a question of interpretation is raised within the meaning of Article [267]. 8.  In this connection, it is necessary to define the meaning for the purposes of Community law of the expression \u2018where any such question is raised\u2019 in order to determine the circumstances in which a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. 9.  In this regard, it must in the first place be pointed out that Article [267] does not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal. Therefore the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the interpretation of Community law does not mean that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to consider that a question has been raised within the meaning of Article [267]. ...\u201d 25.  The CJEU went on to observe that courts or tribunals against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy had the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain \u201cwhether a decision on a question of Community law [was] necessary to enable them to give judgment\u201d. It concluded that they were not obliged to refer a question of interpretation of Community law raised before them in the following situations: (1) where the question was not relevant, in the sense that the answer to the question, regardless of what it might be, could in no way affect the outcome of the case; (2) where the question was materially identical to a question which had already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or where previous decisions of the Court had already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue were not strictly identical; or (3) where the correct application of Community law was so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised was to be resolved (bearing in mind that before it came to this conclusion the national court or tribunal had to be convinced that the matter was equally obvious to the courts of the other member States and to the Court of Justice, and only if those conditions were satisfied could the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it). 26.  The judgment then concluded as follows (point 21):\n\u201c... the third paragraph of Article [267] of the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] is to be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court [of Justice], unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.\u201d 27.  In the case of Gy\u00f6rgy Katz v. Istv\u00e1n Roland S\u00f3s (C-404/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:553), the CJEU delivered its judgment on 9 October 2008 which, as far as relevant to the present case, reads:\n\u201c37.  [...] It is for the national court, not the parties to the main proceedings, to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. The right to determine the questions to be put to the Court thus devolves on the national court alone and the parties may not change their tenor [...].\u201d 28.  In its judgment of 9 November 2010 in the case of VB P\u00e9nz\u00fcgyi L\u00edzing Zrt. v. Ference Schneider (C-137/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659), the CJEU stated, as far as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c28.  [...] the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States instituted direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties [...].\u201d 29.  In the case of Lucio Cesare Aquino v. Belgische Staat (C-3/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:209), the CJEU gave judgment on 15 March 2017, stating, as far as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c43.  It follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as all other national courts as to whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. They are not therefore obliged to refer a question of the interpretation of EU law raised before them if the question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, whatever it may be, cannot have any effect on the outcome of the case [...]. 44.  Consequently, if in accordance with the procedural rules of the Member State concerned, the pleas in law raised before a court referred to in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be declared inadmissible, a request for a preliminary ruling cannot be regarded as necessary and relevant for that court to be able to give judgment.\u201d", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "8", "5", "7", "2", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Kaunas. 5.  In October 1991 the applicant asked the authorities to establish that her father had had 7.06 hectares of land in Kaunas Region before nationalisation. The applicant indicated that she and her sister were their father\u2019s heirs. It was indicated in her request that she and her sister would accept land in another location. A document proving that their father had owned 6.79 hectares of land was also attached to the request. 6.  It appears that the applicant and her sister agreed that the applicant had a right to have her property rights to 3.40 hectares of their father\u2019s land restored. 7.  On 3 March 1993 the authorities issued a document containing a decision to return 0.66 hectares to the applicant in natura and to return the remaining 2.74 hectares to her by paying compensation. 8.  On 16 March 1993 the Ministry of Agriculture repeated the authorities\u2019 decision of 3 March 1993 (see paragraph 7 above). 9.  In December 1993 and April 1994 the authorities decided to give the applicant eleven plots, each measuring 0.06 hectares. 10.  In February 2003 the Kaunas Land Reform Division informed the applicant that she could, before 1 April 2003, declare or change her intentions regarding the method by which her property rights would be restored. She was informed that property rights to land that had been an urban area were to be restored by: giving plots of land to the citizens who had buildings on those plots \u2013 the maximum plot size was limited to a 0.2 hectares; giving plots of land in cities and rural areas where a citizen did not have land, except for the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaip\u0117da, \u0160iauliai, Panev\u0117\u017eys, Alytus, Marijampol\u0117, Druskininkai, Palanga, Bir\u0161tonas and Neringa; legally voiding a citizen\u2019s liabilities to the State; and paying compensation in securities. 11.  In March 2003 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation \u201cin a convertible currency at world market prices\u201d (konvertuojama valiuta pasaulin\u0117mis kainomis) for the remaining 2.74 hectares of land. 12.  In January 2007 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation for the remaining 2.74 hectares of land or return a part of the land in natura. The applicant specified that monetary compensation should be paid in a \u201cconvertible currency at market prices\u201d. 13.  In September 2007 the authorities informed the applicant that they had addressed the Kaunas municipality regarding vacant plots of land in the area where her father had had the land, and had been told that the restitution process had to be carried out in accordance with the detailed plan for restitution approved in 1991. 14.  In July 2008 the applicant complained to the authorities that her previous requests (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) had gone missing. 15.  In November 2008 the applicant asked the authorities not to give her any land burdened by any kind of easement. 16.  In August 2009 the applicant wrote a letter to the authorities and stated that, in accordance with the Constitution, not only did she have a right to receive fair compensation for the land, but a vacant plot of land situated in the same area where her father\u2019s land had been had to be returned to her. She stated that she had to be paid compensation at market prices and in accordance with the land value map for 2009. She also wrote that if the land returned to her was burdened by any kind of easement, the authorities would have to pay her compensation at full market value for her inability to use it. It appears from the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court\u2019s decision that the authorities indicated in August 2009 that compensation at market prices was not possible (see paragraph 33 below). The value of 2.5469 hectares of land was assessed at 20,167 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 5,841 euros (EUR)) if the applicant preferred to acquire land in another area, and at LTL 32,267 (approximately EUR 9,345) if the applicant preferred compensation in securities (see paragraph 36 below). 17.  On 21 October 2009 the Kaunas County Administration changed the decision of 16 March 1993 on the restoration of the applicant\u2019s property rights (see paragraph 8 above) and decided that her property rights to the remaining 2.74 hectares of land would be restored at a later date. By that order, the applicant\u2019s property rights were restored by giving her two plots of land measuring 0.0807 hectares and 0.1124 hectares respectively. 18.  It appears from the courts\u2019 decisions that in June 2010 the authorities asked the applicant to make a decision regarding the method of restitution in respect of the remaining plot of land (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below). 19.  In June 2010 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation for the remaining 2.5469 hectares of land, plus 15% interest because she was the daughter of a military volunteer. 20.  In September 2010 the applicant asked the authorities to remove all the underground telecommunications cables that were situated on one of the plots of land that had been returned to her. 21.  On 4 October 2010 the authorities informed the applicant that the remaining plot of land of 2.5469 hectares was State redeemable, and she could be compensated for it by receiving securities or by a new plot of land of equal value in a rural area being transferred to her. The applicant was asked to inform the authorities about her decision before 18 October 2010. Should she fail to make a decision, the compensation would be paid in securities. 22.  On 13 October 2010 the applicant repeated her request to be paid monetary compensation plus 15% interest. Her letter also contained some other requests regarding increasing the size of one plot, transferring a pond (k\u016bdra) to her, and paying her compensation at market prices for another plot of land. 23.  The authorities replied in November 2010 that, when deciding on issues of restitution, they were obliged to follow the requirements of domestic law. The applicant was asked to come to the Kaunas City Land Reform Division on 6 December 2010 to deal with the issue of restoring her rights to the remaining part of her father\u2019s land. 24.  In December 2010 the Kaunas City Land Reform Division asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to prepare a plan of vacant land in the area where the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s land had previously been situated. The same month, the Kaunas Municipal Administration replied that it was not possible to prepare additional plans of vacant land, because the schemes relating to vacant plots of land had already been approved, and a similar request submitted by the applicant\u2019s son had already been examined. 25.  In November 2014 the authorities informed the applicant that as of 1 November 2014, Article 21 \u00a7 4 of the Law on Restitution provided that a citizen who had already asked for his or her property rights to a plot of land to be restored could, by 1 March 2015, express or change his or her wish regarding the form in which the ownership rights to the real property were to be restored, and choose a plot of forest of equal value, provided that a final decision on restitution had not been taken or, if taken, had not yet been executed or had been executed in part. 26.  The applicant started court proceedings, demanding compensation in respect of pecuniary damage from the Kaunas municipality. She alleged that the plot of land of 0.1124 hectares which had been returned to her (see paragraph 17 above) had electricity and gas equipment installed on it (see paragraph 20 above), and that she was prevented from using it. The applicant also asked the court to oblige the authorities to remove the underground telecommunications cables installed on her plot within two months of the court decision becoming final. 27.  On 22 June 2012 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had not complained about the decision of the authorities of 21 October 2009 by which her property rights to the specific plots of land had been restored (see paragraph 17 above). Moreover, the applicant had claimed that she was not able to use the land, more specifically, to construct buildings on it, but she needed to have a detailed plan of the land prepared in order to start any construction on the land, which she had not done. The court further held that the applicant\u2019s request that the authorities be obliged to remove the underground telecommunications cables was unfounded, because the cables had been installed in accordance with the provisions of domestic law. The applicant\u2019s claim was thus dismissed. 28.  The applicant appealed, and on 18 December 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court held that the applicant had signed a document informing her about the borders of the land and restrictions regarding its use. There was no information indicating that either the applicant or her representative had been misled by the authorities regarding the status of the land. Moreover, the State was not obliged to restore her property rights to land with no restrictions regarding its use. 29.  It appears that a plot of land measuring 0.0498 hectares which had been situated in the area where the applicant\u2019s father had had his land was sold to R.N. in 1994. In November 2011 the National Land Service informed the applicant\u2019s son that the purchase contract regarding the plot of land sold to R.N. in 1994 had been concluded in breach of the requirements of domestic law, and that the issue would be referred to a prosecutor. 30.  In January 2012 the Kaunas Division of the National Land Service informed the prosecutor that, in accordance with domestic law, one family could purchase or rent only one plot of land for construction of an individual home in the absence of an auction. If the family was provided with a plot of land before 15 March 1992, no other member of that family could acquire another plot of land for construction of an individual home without participating in an auction. R.N. had been provided with a plot of land of 0.06 hectares for construction of an individual home in 1992. In 1993 she had purchased that plot from the State. Moreover, in 1994 R.N. had been allowed to purchase another plot of land of 0.0498 hectares in the absence of an auction, which had not been allowed. In 2002 R.N. had sold the plot of land to R.Z. The prosecutor was thus asked to start court proceedings on the matter. 31.  In February 2012 the prosecutor decided that the National Land Service could start court proceedings, and referred the matter to it. Subsequently, the National Land Service lodged a complaint with the Kaunas District Court, asking it to annul the relevant administrative acts by which the plot of land of 0.0498 hectares had been provided to R.N. and to annul the purchase agreements regarding that plot. The complaint was dismissed by the Kaunas District Court on 8 July 2013 because the limitation period had expired (see paragraphs 49 and 51 below). That conclusion was upheld by the Kaunas Regional Court on 14 October 2013. 32.  On 13 March and 20 June 2013 the applicant brought a claim and an amended claim for LTL 30,000 (approximately EUR 8,688) in respect of non-pecuniary damage relating to the length of the restitution proceedings. She asked the court to oblige the authorities to restore her property rights within one month of the court decision becoming final, or to pay her fair monetary compensation, calculated in accordance with the land value map for 2013. The applicant also stated that she had sustained pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 3,616,598 (approximately EUR 1,047,439), but she was not asking for any award in this respect. 33.  On 7 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that there was no dispute that the applicant\u2019s rights to 2.5469 hectares had not been restored. However, it also held that her request for damages could only be satisfied if the State had acted unlawfully. The court stated that the national authorities had taken various steps: they had provided data about unoccupied land and had asked the applicant to decide how she wished her property rights to be restored. The applicant\u2019s requests submitted to the authorities for compensation \u201cin a convertible currency at world market prices\u201d and for compensation at market prices in accordance with the land value map for 2009 (see paragraphs 11, 12, 16, 19 and 22 above) could not constitute a proper way of expressing her decision, because such methods of compensation had not been defined in the domestic law. The court found that her property rights had not been restored because of her inactivity. As regards her request that the authorities be obliged to restore her property rights within one month, the court noted that she had to use an out-of-court procedure, and left that complaint unexamined. 34.  The applicant appealed and also asked to be awarded compensation in respect of pecuniary damage amounting to EUR 1,047,439. On 24 July 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court held that the first-instance court had been obliged to examine the applicant\u2019s request to have her property rights restored, but it had not examined all the documents submitted. It therefore returned the case to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court for fresh examination. 35.  On 24 February 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that on 9 October 1991 the applicant had submitted a request to have her property rights to 7.06 hectares of her father\u2019s land restored (see paragraph 5 above). In 1992 the applicant and her sister had agreed that the applicant had a right to have her property rights to 3.40 hectares of her father\u2019s land restored (see paragraph 6 above). The authorities had restored her property rights to 0.66 hectares of land on 16 March 1993 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), and on 21 October 2009 her property rights to another 0.1931 hectares of land had been restored (see paragraph 17 above). The latter decision indicated that the applicant\u2019s property rights to the remaining plot of 2.5469 hectares would be restored at a later date, when the land reform project had been prepared. No land reform project had been prepared, because the land in question was in an area that had been within city boundaries before 1 June 1995, so the indication in the decision about the land reform project being prepared had been a mistake. In June 2010 the applicant had been asked to choose the form of compensation (see paragraph 18 above), but she had sent several letters submitting requests that were not possible under domestic law.\nThe court further held that the authorities had examined numerous complaints submitted by the applicant and her son. The court further referred to the administrative proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s alleged inability to use one plot of land that had been returned to her (see paragraphs 26-28 above), and the civil proceedings regarding the sale of the plot of land of 0.0498 hectares to R.N., started by the National Land Service (see paragraphs 29-31 above). The court also noted that the applicant had been informed about the possibility of receiving a plot of forest of equal value (see paragraph 25 above). The court held that there was no dispute that the applicant\u2019s property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land had not been restored. However, the applicant\u2019s claims for compensation could only be satisfied if unlawful actions by the authorities had been established. The restitution process was carried out by the National Land Service and its territorial divisions. The court decided that, in the applicant\u2019s case, the authorities had carried out their functions by: sending information about the methods by which the applicant\u2019s rights could be restored; providing information about vacant land; and asking the applicant to express her choice as to the method of restitution. The relevant domestic law valid at the time the applicant had asked for compensation \u201cin a convertible currency at world market prices\u201d in March 2003 had provided that, before 1 April 2003, a citizen could declare or change the method of restitution. If no method was chosen, the authorities could choose for the citizen. The relevant domestic law valid at the time the applicant had asked for compensation at market prices and in accordance with the land value map for 2009 had provided that, before 31 December 2005, a citizen could change the method of restitution and choose compensation in securities instead of monetary compensation. The relevant domestic law valid at the material time when the case had been examined had provided that, until 1 March 2015, citizens could change the method of restitution and ask to have their property rights restored by being provided with a plot of forest of equal value in a rural area. If no method was chosen, property rights were restored by means of monetary compensation. The court held that the authorities could only choose the method of restitution for a citizen if he or she had not expressed his or her decision before 1 April 2003.\nIn the applicant\u2019s situation, the National Land Service had not issued any decision within the required six-month time-limit, and thus the applicant had a right to receive compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the applicant\u2019s right to have her property rights to 2.5469 hectares restored had not been denied, and decided to award her EUR 600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The remaining part of the applicant\u2019s complaint was dismissed as unfounded. 36.  The applicant, the National Land Service and the State, represented by the National Land Service, appealed. On 10 July 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was clear from the case material that there was no more vacant land in the area where the applicant\u2019s father had had his land. For this reason, the applicant\u2019s demand that the authorities be obliged to return her father\u2019s land in natura within one month of the court\u2019s decision becoming final (see paragraph 32 above) was unfounded. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that her father\u2019s plot of land of 0.0498 hectares had been sold to R.N. owing to unlawful actions by the National Land Service, the court held that this argument had been rebutted by the decisions issued by the domestic courts in other proceedings (see paragraph 31 above). As regards the length of the restitution process, the court decided that there was no information indicating that the authorities had acted unlawfully, and thus the first\u2011instance decision to award the applicant compensation of EUR 600 had been unfounded. In 1991 the applicant had expressed her wish to have her father\u2019s land returned to her in natura (see paragraph 5 above). In 2003 she had asked for compensation \u201cin a convertible currency at world market prices\u201d (see paragraph 11 above); in 2009 she had asked for compensation at market prices in accordance with the land value map for 2009 (see paragraph 16 above); in 2010 she had asked for compensation at market prices plus 15% interest (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above); and in 2015 she had stated that her choice as to the method of restitution had been expressed in 1991, and she was not going to change her mind (see paragraph 37 below). The authorities had informed the applicant several times that her requested methods of compensation were not possible under domestic law. In 2003 the applicant had been informed that if a citizen did not express a decision as to a method of restitution before 1 April 2003, the authorities had to issue decisions taking into account the method indicated in the citizen\u2019s last request (see paragraph 10 above). In June 2009 the authorities had indicated the method by which the compensation would be calculated and had stated that the value of the 2.5469 hectares of land which had to be restored to the applicant would be LTL 20,167 (approximately EUR 5,841) if the applicant preferred to acquire the land in another area, and LTL 32,267 (approximately EUR 9,345) if she preferred compensation in securities (see paragraph 16 above). In June 2010 the authorities had asked the applicant to choose the method of restitution: receiving either an area of land, forest or water of equal value (see paragraph 18 above). In October 2010 the authorities had repeatedly explained that the applicant could receive either a plot of land of equal value or compensation in securities, and should she fail to make a decision then she would be paid compensation in securities (see paragraph 21 above). In November 2010 the applicant had been asked to come to the Kaunas Division of the National Land Service to discuss the issue of restitution (see paragraph 23 above). In November 2014 the authorities had informed the applicant that it had become possible to have a plot of forest of equal value in a rural area (see paragraph 25 above). The court further held that the actions of the National Land Service had been lawful, considering that the applicant\u2019s requests had not been possible under domestic law. Moreover, the authorities had stated that a decision to pay the applicant monetary compensation would be issued. The court therefore decided to change the first-instance decision and not award the applicant any compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 37.  In February 2015 the applicant sent a letter to the authorities stating that she had expressed her decision on the method of restitution in 1991 when she had asked for the return of her father\u2019s land in natura. She also stated that she was not going to change her mind and would require her father\u2019s land to be returned to her. In March 2015 the authorities replied that the remaining part of the land to which the applicant\u2019s property rights had to be restored was State redeemable and could not be returned in natura. The authorities further stated that the applicant would be paid monetary compensation. The applicant replied to this letter in April 2015 and accused the authorities of unlawfully expropriating property. The authorities replied in May 2015 and repeated that it was not possible to return the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s land in natura. The applicant replied, stating that the authorities\u2019 letter contained no substantive reasons and could not be taken into account. The applicant stated that the issue of restitution in her case would be considered in the courts, and asked the authorities not to bother her with letters containing no substantive reasons. 38.  In November 2016 the authorities asked the applicant to come to a meeting on 5 December and familiarise herself with the draft decision restoring her property rights. 39.  On 6 December 2016 the National Land Service issued a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land by paying her monetary compensation of EUR 9,359. 40.  In March 2017 the applicant asked the authorities to provide her with copies of plans of vacant land plots situated in the area in which her father had had his land, and to explain how and when her father\u2019s land had been used. The authorities replied in April 2017 that the Kaunas Municipal Administration provided information in map form about vacant land that was not State redeemable. The relevant Kaunas division had to mark the borders of land which an owner had owned before 1940 in accordance with the information received from the Kaunas Municipal Administration. In the applicant\u2019s case, the Kaunas Municipal Administration had provided the relevant Kaunas division with information about vacant land plots. The Kaunas land reform division had then asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to prepare land plans. Two plots of land had been returned to the applicant in natura in 2009. In 2010 the Kaunas land reform division had asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to additionally examine whether there was vacant land in the area where the applicant\u2019s father had owned land before 1940, but it had been established that there was no more vacant land. 41.  The applicant lodged a claim with the domestic court, asking it to annul the decision of the National Land Service of 6 December 2016 by which her property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land had been restored and it had been decided that she would receive monetary compensation of EUR 9,359 (see paragraph 39 above). The applicant thought that the land that had not been returned to her had not been used for public use, and that the National Land Service had not provided any information as to why all of her father\u2019s land had not been returned in natura. 42.  On 21 August 2017 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaints. The court held that her father\u2019s land was not vacant, as it was occupied by cadastral areas with or without buildings, areas containing infrastructure that was relevant for roads, side roads, underground infrastructure and the protective zones surrounding them, and recreational areas. There was a public interest in using that land, thus the land was State redeemable and compensation had to be paid for it. The court further assessed the actions of the National Land Service and held that the authorities\u2019 actions had been lawful. This was because the applicant had not agreed with the information indicating that her father\u2019s land was not vacant, and because on one hand she had asked for her property rights to be restored in natura, and on the other hand had asked for compensation at \u201cmarket\u201d and \u201cworld market\u201d prices, although there was no such possibility under domestic law. Fair compensation was also a way to restore property rights, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 53 below). The value of the land had been calculated in accordance with the method approved by the Government (see paragraph 52 below), and the amount calculated for the applicant had been in accordance with that method. Moreover, the court referred to the case-law of the Court, where it had been established that no right to receive a higher amount of compensation was guaranteed under the applicable domestic law or by a decision of the domestic court (see paragraph 54 below). The compensation calculated for the applicant was in line with domestic law and the practice of the Court. 43.  In October 2017 the authorities asked the applicant to provide them with her account number so they could pay her the monetary compensation of EUR 9,359. In the event that the applicant failed to do that, the monetary compensation would be transferred to a notary\u2019s deposit account. 44.  In November 2017 the applicant sent a letter to the National Land Service stating that she would not give the authorities her account number. Should the compensation be transferred to her or the notary\u2019s account nevertheless, it would be transferred back to the authorities.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "4", "3", "2", "1", "0", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the owner and editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Bas\u0131m ve Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k. 7.  In August 2003 the applicant\u2019s company published a book entitled Patika \u2013 Gerilla An\u0131lar\u0131 IV (\u201cThe Path \u2013 Guerrilla Memoirs IV\u201d, hereinafter \u201cthe book\u201d). The editor of the book was a certain B.K. The 326-page book consisted of the memoirs of seventeen members of the PKK[1]. The authors of the memoirs described their lives in the PKK camps, in rural areas in both Turkey and Iraq, armed clashes with the Turkish security forces, and their ideology and opinions regarding the situation in Turkey. 8.  In September 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court launched an investigation into the book. On 30 September 2003 he asked that court to order the seizure of copies of the book on the grounds that certain passages on pages 7, 19, 23, 81, 106\u2011114, 139, 147, 152, 157-177, 203, 273, 277, 317, 321 contained propaganda in favour of the PKK. 9.  On the same day a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court made an interim order for the seizure of copies of the book. The judge considered that the passages referred to by the public prosecutor incited the use of methods of violence and terror, and thus constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 10 October 2003 an application by the applicant to set aside the order of 30 September 2003 was rejected. 10.  On 14 October 2003 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor cited a number of passages from pages 7, 19, 23, 81, 106-114, 139, 147, 152, 157-177, 203, 273, 277, 317, 321, and claimed that in those passages members of the PKK were depicted as heroes, and their acts and activities were praised. 11.  On 26 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the court referred to a number of passages on pages 19, 21, 81, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 134, 135, 139, 147, 163, 189, 197, 203, 273, 274, 277, 317 and 321, and considered that those passages constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. 12.  On 7 October 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment holding that the first-instance court should consider the provisions of the new Press Act (Law no. 5187) which had entered into force on 26 June 2004. It then remitted the case file to the Istanbul Assize Court, since, in the meantime, state security courts had been abolished. 13.  On 22 July 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and sent the file to the Beyo\u011flu Criminal Court. 14.  On 5 July 2006 the Beyo\u011flu Criminal Court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. 15.  On 19 October 2006 the Court of Cassation decided that the Istanbul Assize Court had jurisdiction over the case and sent the case file to that court. 16.  On 29 June 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant as charged. The court sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 416 Turkish liras (TRY). In its judgment, the court held:\n\u201cOn the basis of the examination of the book in its entirety, it has been observed that the book depicts the activities of members of the PKK-KADEK, the terrorist organisation, and their so-called impressions of the clashes between them and members of the security forces. The book consists of different chapters written by different people. The preface to the book contains the following:\n\u2018Our president Apo[2] states that the outcome of the war is very valuable ... While the history written and life created by bullets drip off pens, guerrillas go beyond the faraway corners of our land with their bags on the backs and their weapons in their hands ... We smile with a picture of war and, with a song, we add new [people] to those who have left us ...\u2019\nOn page 160, it is stated:\n\u2018We had to change the Anatolian People\u2019s Army for Emancipation in accordance with the needs of the Anatolian people. They did not know us as members of the PKK, and we were not established there. If we went there as the PKK, we could not win their hearts. Therefore, when we first arrived in the Black Sea region, we used the name Anatolian People\u2019s Army for Emancipation. Some people told us that they had never heard of our organisation, and they thought that we were a very good one. Some had difficulties, as they suspected us to be the PKK. We could not explicitly say that we were PKK members. Our president [Abdullah \u00d6calan] stated that he knew the people of the Black Sea, and advised us to raise consciousness through our attitudes and actions first, and then to tell them that we were PKK members, after they trusted us ...\u2019\nOn pages 106 and 107, it is stated:\n\u2018... I shared my joy with them by saying \u201cFriends, four vehicles belonging to the enemy were destroyed. They were burned.\u201d That day I forgot about my sleeplessness. I did not think about my tiredness, hunger or thirst as much as I had done before. I had only one wish: engaging in a clash and getting in a good shot with my weapon, which I had not used, although I had had it with me for long time.\u2019\n\u2018... [He asked] \u201cMy friend, is this your first [armed] clash?\u201d I said \u201cyes.\u201d \u201c[Armed] clashes are nice, aren\u2019t they?\u201d \u201cYes, they are.\u201d\u2018\u201d 17.  The Istanbul Assize Court considered that the above-mentioned passages and certain other passages on pages 19, 21, 81, 105, 108, 110, 113, 114, 134, 135, 139, 147, 163, 189, 197, 203, 273, 274, 277, 317 and 321 praised the armed clashes between PKK militants and the security forces, and those militants\u2019 acts. As a result, the court found that the book did not have any literary value. According to the assize court, the publisher had not aimed to publish a book of memoirs, but had had the intention of disseminating propaganda inciting the terrorist organisation and its militants to violence or other methods of terrorism. 18.  On 2 February 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment. The Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 29 June 2007 on the ground that a pre-payment notice had not been served on the applicant in accordance with section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and Article 75 of the Criminal Code. 19.  On 8 April 2011 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant, since the prosecution was time\u2011barred.", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "8", "9", "7", "5", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who were born in 1952 and 1954 respectively and live in the town of Belomorsk in the Republic of Karelia. 6.  On 1 December 2005 the applicants\u2019 son, Mr M. Lozovoy, was killed in St Petersburg. Criminal proceedings were instituted against a Mr O. on a charge of murder. 7.  On 18 January 2006 Ms L., an investigator of the Primorskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in St Petersburg, asked the head of the Primorskiy district police to identify relatives of the deceased; to establish their place of residence and to summon them to the prosecutor\u2019s office for the purpose of granting them victim status in the criminal case. 8.  A week later the applicants\u2019 son was buried under his full name in St Petersburg. A record in a cemetery registration log indicated that the body had been unclaimed. 9.  On 30 January 2006 the investigator, having concluded that it was impossible to identify relatives of the deceased, assigned the status of victim in the criminal case to a representative of the municipal authorities. The following day police officials informed the investigator that operative measures undertaken by them to identify Mr M. Lozovoy\u2019s relatives had not produced any results. 10.  On 2 February 2006 the applicants contacted Ms L. and informed her of their intention to come to St Petersburg to take part in the criminal proceedings. 11.  Despite that notification by the applicants, five days later Ms L. sent the criminal case file to the Primorskiy District Court for trial. 12.  Sometime later the applicants were invited to take part in the criminal proceedings in the capacity of victims. 13.  On 14 February 2006 the applicants were allowed to exhume their son\u2019s remains. Two days later they buried him in Belomorsk. 14.  On 6 June 2006 the Primorskiy District Court found Mr O. guilty of having murdered the applicants\u2019 son and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  On the same day, responding to the applicants\u2019 complaints about the authorities\u2019 failure to notify them of their son\u2019s death, the District Court issued an interim decision (\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) in respect of the investigator, Ms L. The decision, sent to the Primorskiy District Prosecutor, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\n\u201cMoreover, the [finding] that the investigator, Ms L., did not take sufficient steps to find relatives of the deceased and that measures undertaken [by her] were formalistic in character is not only confirmed by the fact that the decision assigning victim status to [a representative of the municipal authority] had been taken before the information was received from the police officials, but also by the fact that the criminal case-file material contained sufficient information about [the applicants\u2019 son] on the basis of which it was possible to establish the place of residence of his relatives ([there was] an explanation from Mr O. made on 1 December 2005, in which he had given information about the place of residence of [the applicants\u2019 son]; a statement made by Mr O. on 8 December 2005 in which he said that a criminal case against [the applicants\u2019 son] was pending before a court; statements by a witness, Ms A., who asserted that [the deceased\u2019s] mother had occasionally made telephone calls to [the deceased\u2019s] flat; a certificate on [the deceased\u2019s] criminal record from which it is apparent that the Primorskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of St Petersburg applied a measure of restraint in the form of a written undertaking in respect of [the applicants\u2019 son] in criminal case no. 137755; the material in the above-mentioned criminal case file contains a copy of [the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s] passport; and so forth).\nIt follows that the victims\u2019 rights envisaged by the law in force were substantially violated in the course of the preliminary investigation.\nRelying on Article 29 \u00a7 4 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, [the court] rules:\n-          that the violations of criminal procedural law committed during the preliminary investigation in the criminal case should be brought to the attention of the Primorskiy district prosecutor in St Petersburg;\n-          that the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg should be informed of the measures taken no later than a month after receipt of the present decision.\u201d 16.  In 2007 the applicants lodged an action against the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Relying on the Primorskiy District Court\u2019s interim decision of 6 June 2006, the applicants argued that as a result of the investigator\u2019s failure to promptly notify them of their son\u2019s death, they had sustained pecuniary damage, having been forced to pay for the exhumation and transport of their son\u2019s remains from St Petersburg to Belomorsk. In addition, they had suffered non-pecuniary damage as they had been unaware of their son\u2019s whereabouts for a long time and had been forced to initiate a search for him; they had been unable to properly say \u201cgoodbye\u201d to their son and to provide him with a decent burial; they had been forced to go through a two-week bureaucratic procedure to obtain permission to exhume their son\u2019s remains; and subsequently, after the exhumation, they had been forced to identify his disfigured remains. 17.  On 5 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the claim, having found that the investigator had not committed any unlawful actions and there had been no final decision by any domestic court establishing otherwise. 18.  On 20 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning.", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "6", "8", "7", "0", "1", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Berehove. 6.  In the early hours of 22 August 2004 M. was robbed and killed in Berehove, where the applicant was also living. On the same date the applicant and two other people, K.A. and St., were arrested on suspicion of robbing and killing M. 7.  According to the applicant, he was apprehended by the police task force at about 10 a.m. on 22 August 2004 in the apartment of his girlfriend and taken to the police station, where he was beaten up and threatened in an attempt to force him to confess to the robbery and murder of M. 8.  The case file contains two arrest warrants \u2013 one issued by a police officer and another one by the prosecutor investigating the murder (hereinafter \u201cthe investigator\u201d), both indicating that the applicant had been arrested by the above-mentioned officials on 22 August 2004 at 6.30 p.m. at their offices. The arrest warrant issued by the investigator indicates that the applicant acknowledged his guilt, had no observations regarding his arrest and that he wished to be legally represented. It bears the applicant\u2019s signature, with no comments. The lower part of the last page of the record contains a printed statement (\u201c\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043a\u0430\u201d) that was added later (it was dated 2007); this additional statement is signed by the investigator only and asserts that the applicant\u2019s relatives were informed of his arrest. The applicant alleged that his family had been informed of his arrest on the evening of the following day (that is to say 23 August 2004). 9.  After his arrest, the applicant signed a record, bearing no time, explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before he was first questioned. The relevant entry in the record indicates that the applicant expressed his wish to be represented by S., a lawyer who lived in Uzhhorod, some 70 kilometres from Berehove, and noted the address of the latter. 10.  At about 4 p.m. on 22 August 2004, according to the applicant, and from 9 until 10 a.m. on that day, according to the official record, the applicant was questioned as a suspect by the investigator in the presence of B., a lawyer. The record of the questioning noted that the applicant had been informed of his rights as a suspect from 6.30 until 6.45 p.m. on that day and that a separate procedural document existed in this respect evidencing that he had wished to be legally represented. The handwritten entry in the record furthermore stated that the applicant wanted to have B. as his lawyer and that he acknowledged in full his guilt in respect of the robbery and murder. During the questioning, the applicant provided details regarding the robbery and admitted that he had hit M. in the head with a bat during the robbery but that he had done so instinctively, in self-defence. The applicant did not state what had become of the bat \u2013 namely where or in what circumstances he had hidden the bat after the murder. The applicant and B. signed the verbatim record, making no objections as to its contents. B. then left. 11.  Later that day, from 8 until 8.30 p.m., the applicant took part in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the presence of a forensic expert, an investigator from the local police, two attesting witnesses and the investigator in the case. According to the Government, B. was apparently busy and was not able to participate in the reconstruction. No other lawyer was instructed to assist the applicant during this investigative step. According to the applicant, he repeated his request for S. to be called, but this was not done and he was forced by means of threats to testify. 12.  During the reconstruction, which commenced near the place where the bat used for the murder had been hidden, the applicant pointed to the exact place where the bat was; the bat was then uncovered and retained as evidence. A copy of the verbatim record of the reconstruction provided to the Court by the applicant indicates that he was informed of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. The verbatim record bears a handwritten \u201cnot\u201d next to the following printed \u201cagreed to testify\u201d. The relevant part of the text is not visible on the copy of the record provided by the Government. The record furthermore contains the applicant\u2019s statement that he had not been forced to testify by means of any psychological or physical violence. The applicant signed the record without indicating any objections as to its contents next to his signature. 13.  At an unspecified time on the same date St. and K.A were questioned as suspects. St., being represented by B. (the same lawyer who represented the applicant), acknowledged his guilt in respect of the robbery. He stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant carrying a bat when they had been entering the victim\u2019s house. K.A., having waived his right to legal assistance, admitted that he had taken part in the robbery. He furthermore participated, still unrepresented, in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime during which he stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant with a bat in his hands but had not seen who had murdered M. 14.  On 23 August 2004 the investigator appointed B. to represent the applicant, and St., and admitted him to the proceedings. 15.  On the same day the applicant, in the presence of B., participated in another videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the victim\u2019s house. The applicant admitted his guilt and gave further details about the robbery and murder. He reiterated that he had hit M. on the head with the bat and stated that another suspect in the case had helped him to hide the bat afterwards. 16.  On 26 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother signed a contract with the lawyer S. concerning her son\u2019s legal representation. On the same date S. contacted the prosecutor, who allowed S. to represent the applicant instead of B. The applicant furthermore made a written statement declaring that he was refusing the services of B. and wanted S. to act as his lawyer. 17.  On 8 October 2004 medical experts examined the applicant following his complaint that he had been ill-treated by the police. No injuries were discovered on the applicant\u2019s body. 18.  On 14 October 2004 the video recording of the reconstruction of the crime of 23 August 2004 was played to the applicant in the presence of S. The applicant retracted his earlier confession and explained that he had only given it because he had been threatened and beaten up by the police on 22 August 2004. 19.  On 2 September 2004, and 20 and 28 January and 17 February 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his defence lawyer but refused to give any evidence. 20.  On 19 January 2005 the prosecutors refused to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been beaten up by the police, having found the police officers\u2019 actions to be lawful. 21.  On 18 February 2005 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant \u2013 together with St. and K.A. \u2013 was charged with robbery and murder. It was established that another person, I.K., had also participated in the robbery, but as he had absconded, he would have to be tried separately. 22.  During the trial the applicant denied having participated in the robbery and the murder and refused to give any evidence. He stated that his earlier confessions to the crimes should not be admitted as evidence as they had been made under duress and in breach of his defence rights, including his right to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing. He also argued that the bat which had been retained as evidence and examined by experts during the investigation had not been the same bat as that which he had pointed out during the reconstruction. He supported his allegation by referring to the fact that in the verbatim record, the prosecutor had described the bat as blue, while the experts who had subsequently examined it had described it as grey. 23.  In April 2005 the police detained I.K. In the course of the trial St., A.K. and I.K all pleaded guilty to robbery but denied killing M. 24.  On 29 August 2006 the Zakarpattya Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the first-instance court, convicted the applicant of murder and robbery and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. St., A.K. and I.K. were also found guilty of robbery but acquitted of murder. The hearing was held in the presence of the applicant\u2019s new lawyer, D., who had replaced the lawyer S. on an unspecified date. 25.  The court based the applicant\u2019s conviction, among other evidence, on the confessions he had made during his questioning by the investigator on 22 August 2004, the reconstructions of the crime on 22 and 23 August 2004, the statements of his co-defendants that they had seen him with a bat in M.\u2019s house, and physical evidence, including an expert\u2019s report suggesting that the traces of blood found on the bat (the location of which had been pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime on 22 August 2004) could have belonged to M. 26.  By the same judgment, the court rejected as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s submissions that he had made his self-incriminating statements under duress, referring to the results of the medical examination of 8 October 2004 (see paragraph 17 above) and the prosecutors\u2019 decision of 19 January 2005 (see paragraph 20 above). 27.  The court also found no violation of the applicant\u2019s defence rights. It noted, inter alia, that on 22 August 2004 the prosecutor\u2019s decision to appoint B. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer had been lawful, because at the material time the applicant had not had a contract with S. for legal representation. It also observed that on 22 August 2004 the applicant had raised no objections to the questioning record. The court also suggested, without giving details, that there had been some technical errors in the procedural documents, in particular as regards the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning, but that they did not affect the fairness of the respective investigative actions. 28.  The court refuted the applicant\u2019s allegation that the bat retained as evidence had been switched with another (see paragraph 22 above), noting that the disparity in the bat\u2019s description by the experts and the prosecutor could have been explained by the fact that the latter was colour blind. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He stated, in particular, that he had not been represented by the lawyer of his choice, S., on 22 and 23 August 2004, but by B., who had been appointed by the investigator against the applicant\u2019s will. He further stated that he had not been assisted by any lawyer when he had been forced to confess during the crime reconstruction of 22 August 2004. He also complained about the fact that B. had represented him and his co-accused St. at the same time (see paragraph 13 above) \u2013 a conflict of interest (as there had been important discrepancies in their respective statements) that should have prevented him from being allowed to do so. 30.  On 12 April 2007 the Supreme Court, acting as the second-instance court, upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence in his presence. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer during the hearing, but he did not provide any further details in this regard. 31.  The Supreme Court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was proved, inter alia, by the statements he had made during his questioning of 22 August 2004 and during the reconstructions of the crime. It noted in this respect that those statements had been corroborated by other evidence, including the testimony of his co-accused, and concluded that the lower court had correctly admitted the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements as evidence. The court also noted that the details of the crime which the applicant had revealed in his statements could not have been known to him unless he had been the direct perpetrator. 32.  Without mentioning the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the alleged breach of his defence rights, the Supreme Court found no procedural violations during the proceedings serious enough to necessitate it quashing the judgment. 33.  On an unspecified date the applicant was released from prison.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "6", "4", "0", "8", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Vigonza (Padua). 7.  The applicant met his former partner, K.S., a Hungarian national, in 2008. They began living together in Abano Terme (Italy) and had a daughter, who was born on 15 September 2011. 8.  According to the applicant, after the baby was born K.S. began engaging in obsessive behaviour and their relationship deteriorated. 9.  In November 2011 K.S. spent a week in Hungary with their daughter. In December of the same year she again travelled to Hungary with the baby. It was agreed that the applicant would fetch them on 30 December and drive them back to Italy. While on his way to Hungary, the applicant was informed by K.S. that she did not intend to return to Italy. 10.  The applicant first returned to Italy (without having reached Hungary); he then set off again for Hungary, where (after arriving) K.S. initially denied him access to his daughter. After several days, K.S. allowed the applicant to see the baby and informed him that he could see her again, provided that he agreed to let his daughter stay in Hungary with K.S. and pay 500 euros (EUR) per month in child support. The applicant rejected this proposal and on 9 January 2012 returned to Italy. 11.  On 21 February 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the Venice Minors Court requesting that the court strip K.S. of parental authority over their daughter, order the return of the child to Italy and grant him exclusive custody. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a request with the Pest Central District Court for the child\u2019s return, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter, \u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d). 13.  On 13 September 2012 the Pest Central District Court found that K.S. was keeping the child in Hungary illegally and ordered that she return the child to the applicant\u2019s residence in Italy by 21 September 2012. Alternatively, the child should be handed to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest no later than 24 September 2012. 14.  Following an appeal by K.S., on 8 November 2012 the Budapest High Court upheld the decision of the Pest Central District Court and ordered that the child be returned to Italy by 30 November 2012 or to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest by 4 December 2012. 15.  Following a further appeal by K.S., that decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 22 January 2013; nevertheless, the child was not returned to the applicant. 16.  An enforcement order based on the second-instance decision of 8 November 2012 was issued on 21 January 2013 against K.S. The bailiff of the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court instructed the mother to comply with the final decision and return the child to the applicant within fifteen days and ordered her to pay a fine of 152,400 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately EUR 490). 17.  Criminal proceedings against K.S. were initiated in 2013 by the Padua public prosecutor and a European arrest warrant was issued against her. 18.  On 14 January 2013 the Venice Minors Court found that it had jurisdiction to examine the applicant\u2019s case pursuant to articles 8, 10, 11 and 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (see paragraph 49 below), allowed the applicant\u2019s application (see paragraph 11 above), stripped K.S. of her parental authority and, like its Hungarian counterpart, ordered the immediate return of the child to Italy. 19.  On 18 January 2013 the preliminary-investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) issued an arrest warrant against K.S. for the offence of international child abduction. 20.  On 23 January 2013 a European arrest warrant was issued against K.S. by the Padua Court. 21.  On 15 February 2013 the court bailiff sent a copy of the return order to the guardianship office of Mez\u0151t\u00far District in order to enable the said authority to serve it on K.S. and to inform her of the consequences of failing to comply with the order. 22.  On 28 February 2013 two members of the Mez\u0151t\u00far guardianship office\u2019s staff attempted to serve the order on K.S.; they were unsuccessful as they were unable to enter her home. As K.S.\u2019s post box was in a locked part of the building, they were not able to leave behind any notification either. They went to the registered address of K.S.\u2019s mother but they could not find anybody there either. They left behind a notification in the post box there informing K.S. of their attempt to enter her home and of the date of the next visit by guardianship office staff. 23.  On 4 March 2013 guardianship office staff again visited the registered permanent address of K.S. and the registered residential address of her mother but again failed to serve the enforcement order on her. 24.  In March 2013 the Department of International Private Law of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice conducted mediation proceedings through the legal representatives of K.S. and the applicant in order to try to reach an amicable agreement. 25.  On 6 March 2013 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory an application with the Budapest Prosecutor\u2019s Office for judicial assistance. The application was dismissed on 29 October 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) was not yet enforceable (see paragraph 31 below) and the requirement of dual criminality was not satisfied. 26.  On 20 March 2013 the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court allowed an application lodged by K.S. for the return order issued by the Budapest High Court (see paragraph 14 above) to be suspended, but this decision was subsequently quashed by the Szolnok High Court on 19 June 2013. On 16 October 2013 the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court refused another similar application lodged by K.S. Following an appeal by K.S., the latter decision was upheld by Szolnok High Court on 4 December 2013. 27.  On 5 September 2013 the deputy court bailiff, accompanied by police officers and guardianship office staff, visited K.S.\u2019s registered address and the residential address of her mother, but no one answered the door. 28.  On 20 September 2013 the bailiff attempted to serve the enforcement order at the same addresses, but with no success, as K.S. and her daughter had absconded. The guardianship office informed the court bailiff that they had no useful information concerning the whereabouts of K.S. and her daughter. 29.  On an unspecified date, K.S. lodged an application for the enforcement proceedings to be terminated; that application was refused by the Pest Central District Court on 4 October 2013. That judgment was upheld by the Budapest High Court on 10 December 2013. 30.  On 21 January 2014 an international search warrant was issued by the Mez\u0151t\u00far police. 31.  On 17 March 2014 the Szolnok District Court declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable. On 30 June 2014, following an appeal by K.S, that decision was quashed by the Szolnok High Court. 32.  The Mez\u0151t\u00far district prosecutor\u2019s office ordered an investigation in respect of K.S. concerning the unauthorised custody of a minor and the endangering of a minor on 17 February and 18 March 2014 respectively. 33.  On 5 May 2014 K.S. was summoned as a suspect, but she failed to appear. 34.  On 19 May 2014 an arrest warrant was issued against K.S. 35.  On 5 November 2014 the bailiff unsuccessfully tried to serve the enforcement order on K.S. at her registered residential address. Residents of the area were not able to provide any useful information to the bailiff. 36.  Following an appeal by the applicant against the Szolnok judgment of 30 June 2014 (see paragraph 31 above), on 25 November 2014 the K\u00faria declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable. 37.  On 23 December 2014 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance and requested that the Padua police be authorised to assist the local judicial police with the execution of the arrest warrant. On 18 March 2015 the Budapest Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed this application on the grounds that the conduct described in the criminal complaint could be classified as kidnapping under the Italian Criminal Code, but not under Article 190 of the Hungarian Criminal Code. 38.  On 10 and 12 March 2015 staff of the Mez\u0151t\u00far guardianship office visited K.S.\u2019s registered address and her mother\u2019s home, but their attempts to serve the enforcement order failed. 39.  The Government pointed out that several searches and other procedural actions had failed to generate any results. In order to identify K.S.\u2019s place of residence, they had checked the database of the National Health Insurance Fund and requested data from all those of the country\u2019s financial institutions that provided payment services. Moreover they had requested data from the mobile phone companies, the Hungarian State Treasury, the Hungarian tax and customs authorities, and regional and local tax and customs agencies; they had also run checks in the databases of companies providing card services to regular customers in the territory of Hungary. 40.  On 13 October 2016 the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court, during the criminal prosecution against K.S. for child abduction, heard M.A., the child\u2019s paediatrician. M.A. said that she had visited the child several times over the years. In particular, on 1 September 2016 she had issued a medical certificate which had been required for the child\u2019s enrolment in a kindergarten. 41.  By a letter dated 13 December 2016 the Italian Central Authority informed the applicant that the Hungarian authorities were still not able to execute the return order because they had still not identified K.S.\u2019s place of residence. 42.  At the hearing of 15 December 2016 the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court heard four of K.S.\u2019s relatives, who all stated that K.S. was living in hiding. 43.  On 20 April 2017 K.S. was acquitted by the Mez\u0151t\u00far District Court. The text of this judgment was not produced before the Court. 44.  The Mez\u0151t\u00far Attorney-General lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Szolnok High Court. 45.  On 10 May 2017 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance. This application was dismissed. 46.  According to the latest information received by the Court, in February 2018 the criminal proceedings against K.S. were still pending Szolnok High Court and the return order of the applicant\u2019s daughter had not yet been enforced.", "references": ["1", "9", "6", "3", "5", "0", "8", "2", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Kranj. 6.  In 2006 the Swiss law-enforcement authorities of the Canton of Valais conducted a monitoring exercise of users of the so-called \u201cRazorback\u201d network. The Swiss police established that some of the users owned and exchanged child pornography in the form of pictures or videos. Files containing illegal content were exchanged through the so-called \u201cp2p\u201d (peer-to-peer) file-sharing network in which each of the connected computers acted as both a client and a server. Hence, each user could access all files made available for sharing by other users of the network and download them for his or her use. Among the dynamic Internet Protocol (\u201cIP\u201d) addresses recorded by the Swiss police was also a certain dynamic IP address, which was later linked to the applicant. 7.  Based on the data obtained by the Swiss police, on 7 August 2006 the Slovenian police, without obtaining a court order, requested company S., a Slovenian Internet service provider (hereinafter \u201cthe ISP\u201d), to disclose data regarding the user to whom the above-mentioned IP address had been assigned at 1.28 p.m. on 20 February 2006. The police based their request on section 149b(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter \u201cthe CPA\u201d, see paragraph 36 below), which required the operators of electronic communication networks to disclose to the police information on the owners or users of certain means of electronic communication whose details were not available in the relevant directory. In response, on 10 August 2006 the ISP gave the police the name and address of the applicant\u2019s father, who was a subscriber to the Internet service relating to the respective IP address. 8.  On 12 December 2006 the police proposed that the Kranj District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office request the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court to issue an order demanding that the ISP disclose both the personal data of the subscriber and traffic data linked to the IP address in question. On 14 December 2006 such a court order was obtained on the basis of section 149b(1) of the CPA and the ISP gave the police the required data. 9.  On 12 January 2007 the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court issued an order to carry out a house search of the applicant\u2019s family home. The order indicated the applicant\u2019s father as the suspect. During the house search the police and the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court seized four computers and later made copies of their hard disks. 10.  Based on a conversation with the applicant\u2019s family members, of which no record is available, the police changed the suspect to the applicant. 11.  Reviewing the hard disks, the police found that one of them contained files with pornographic material involving minors. The police established that the applicant had installed eMule, a file-sharing program, on one of the computers by means of which he had been able to download different files from other users of the program and had also automatically offered and distributed his own files to them. Among the files downloaded by the applicant, a small percentage had contained child pornography. 12.  On 26 November 2007 the Kranj District prosecutor requested that a judicial investigation be opened against the applicant. 13.  In his defence before the investigating judge, the applicant argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the content of the files in question. He also argued that the ISP had unlawfully, without a judicial warrant, passed his data, including his address, to the police. 14.  On 5 March 2008 the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court, opened a judicial investigation against the applicant on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the criminal offence of displaying, manufacturing, possessing and distributing pornographic material under section 187(3) of the Criminal Code. The judge noted, among other things, that the applicant\u2019s father had been the holder of the identified IP address and that the applicant had allegedly been logging into the respective program under the name of \u201cBenet\u201d. 15.  On 17 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s counsel lodged an appeal against the decision to open a judicial investigation. He argued, inter alia, that the evidence concerning the identity of the user of the respective IP address had been obtained unlawfully. That information concerned the traffic data and should therefore not have been obtained without a judicial warrant. 16.  On 21 March 2008 an interlocutory panel of the court rejected the appeal finding that, although counsel had argued that the identity of the user of the IP address had been obtained unlawfully, he had not requested that certain documents be excluded from the file. 17.  On 29 May 2008, the Kranj District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an indictment against the applicant for the above-mentioned criminal offence. 18.  At the hearing of 8 October 2008 the applicant lodged a written request for exclusion of evidence obtained unlawfully, including the information concerning the user of the respective IP address obtained without a court order. 19.  On 5 December 2008 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s request, finding that the data concerning the user of the respective IP address had been obtained in compliance with section 149b(3) of the CPA. 20.  On 5 December 2008 the Kranj District Court found the applicant guilty of the criminal offence with which he had been charged. Based on the opinion of an expert in computer science, the District Court held that the applicant must have been aware of the 630 pornographic pictures and 199 videos involving minors which he had downloaded through p2p networks and made available for sharing with other users. The applicant was sentenced to a suspended prison term of eight months with a probation period of two years. 21.  Both the applicant and the district state prosecutor appealed against the first-instance judgment. The applicant challenged the facts as established by the District Court. He also alleged that the subscriber information the Slovenian police had acquired without a court order, and thus unlawfully, should have been excluded as evidence. Consequently, all the evidence based on such unlawfully acquired data should also have been excluded. 22.  On 4 November 2009 the Ljubljana Higher Court granted the appeal of the district state prosecutor in part, converting the applicant\u2019s suspended sentence into a prison term of six months. The applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed as unfounded. The Higher Court confirmed that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts of the case; moreover, it held that the data concerning the user of the IP address had been obtained lawfully, as no court order was required for such a purpose. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, reiterating that a dynamic IP address could not be compared to a telephone number which was not entered in a telephone directory, as a new IP address was assigned to a computer each time the user logged on. Accordingly, such data should be considered as traffic data constituting circumstances and facts connected to the electronic communication and attracting the protection of privacy of communication. The applicant argued that the Swiss police should not have obtained the respective dynamic IP address without a court order, and nor should the Slovenian police have obtained the data on the identity of the subscriber associated with the IP address without such an order. 24.  On 20 January 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, reasoning that given the general accessibility of websites and the fact that the Swiss police could check the exchanges in the p2p network simply by monitoring the users sharing certain contents, that is without any particular intervention in internet traffic, such communication could not be considered private and thus protected by Article 37 of the Constitution. Moreover, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, the Slovenian police had not acquired traffic data about the applicant\u2019s electronic communication, but only data regarding the user of a particular computer through which the Internet had been accessed. 25.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, reiterating the complaints adduced before the lower courts. 26.  The Constitutional Court asked the Information Commissioner to express her position on the issue. The Information Commissioner was of the view that the reason for obtaining the identity of an individual user of electronic communication was precisely that he or she communicated by means of more or less publicly accessible websites. In the Information Commissioner\u2019s view, it was impossible to separate traffic data from subscriber data, as traffic data alone did not make any sense if one did not ascertain who the person behind those data was \u2013 this latter information was thus considered to be an extremely important element of communication privacy. The Information Commissioner also highlighted that the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act in force at the material time required a court order regarding all data related to electronic communications, irrespective of whether they related to traffic or identification data. In the Information Commissioner\u2019s view, section 149b (3) of the CPA, which required only a written request from the police to obtain data on who was communicating, was constitutionally problematic. 27.  On 13 February 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, holding that his constitutional rights had not been violated. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was adopted by seven votes to two. Judge J. Sovdat and Judge D. Jadek Pensa wrote dissenting opinions. The decision was served on the applicant on 11 March 2014. 28.  The Constitutional Court pointed out, at the outset, that in addition to the content of communications, Article 37 of the Constitution also protected traffic data, that is any data processed for the transmission of communications in an electronic communications network. It considered that IP addresses were included in such traffic data. The Constitutional Court, however, concluded that the applicant, who had not hidden in any way the IP address through which he had accessed the Internet, had consciously exposed himself to the public and could not legitimately have expected privacy. As a result, the data concerning the identity of the user of the IP address were not protected as communication privacy under Article 37 of the Constitution, but only as information privacy under Article 38 of the Constitution, and no court order was required in order to disclose them in the applicant\u2019s case. 29.  The most relevant parts of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision are as follows (as translated into English on the Constitutional Court\u2019s website):\n\u201cReview of the objections regarding access to the complainant\u2019s IP address by the Swiss police 11. The second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution provides a higher level of protection than Article 8 of the ECHR as it requires a court order for any interference with the right to communication privacy ... The right to communication privacy determined by the first paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution primarily protects the content of the communicated message. ... In addition to the message content, the circumstances and facts related to the communication are also protected. In accordance with this view, in Decision No. Up-106/05, dated 2 October 2008 (Official Gazette RS, No. 100/08, and OdlUS XVII, 84) the Constitutional Court extended the protection provided by Article 37 of the Constitution also to such data regarding telephone calls that by their nature constitute an integral part of communication so that such data cannot be obtained without a court order. The mentioned Decision refers otherwise to telephone communication, but the same conclusion can be applied mutatis mutandis to other types of communication at a distance. The crucial constitutional review test for the review of the Constitutional Court whether a particular communication is protected under Article 37 of the Constitution is the test of the legitimate expectation of privacy. 12. Communication via the internet takes place, in principle, in an anonymous form, which is essential for the free development of personality, freedom of speech, and the expression of ideas, and, consequently, for the development of a free and democratic society. The privacy of communication protected by the strict conditions determined by the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution is therefore a very important human right that is becoming increasingly important due to technological advances and the related growing possibilities of monitoring. It entails individuals\u2019 legitimate expectation that the state will leave them alone also in their communication through modern communication channels and that they do not necessary have to defend themselves for what they do, say, write or think. If there is a suspicion of a criminal offense the Police must have the ability to identify the individuals who have participated in a certain communication related to an alleged criminal offense, because the perpetrators are harder to trace due to this principle of anonymity on the internet. The conditions under which the Police can carry out investigative actions and whether they need a court order, however, depend on whether such entail an interference with the right to communication privacy. 13. As was pointed out above, in addition to the content of communications, Article 37 of the Constitution also protects traffic data. Traffic data signifies any data processed for the transmission of communications in an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof. Such entails that the IP address is a traffic datum. The Constitutional Court must therefore answer the question whether the complainant legitimately expected privacy regarding this datum. 14. Two factors must be weighed in relation to this review: the expectation of privacy regarding the IP address and the legitimacy of this expectation, where the latter must be of such nature that the society is willing to accept it as legitimate. The complainant in the case at issue communicated with other users of the Razorback network by using the eMule application to exchange various files, including those that contained child pornography. With regard to the general anonymity of internet users and also the content of the files, the Constitutional Court has no doubt that the complainant expected that his communications would remain private, and he also certainly expected that his identity would not be disclosed. The question therefore is whether such expectation of privacy was legitimate. The complainant has not established that the IP address through which he accessed the internet was hidden in any way, and thus invisible to other users, or that access to the Razorback network (and thus to the content of the files) was in any way restricted, for example by passwords or other means. ... In contrast, in the complainant\u2019s case anyone interested in exchanging such data could have accessed the contested files, and the complainant has not demonstrated that his IP address was in any way concealed or inaccessible by other users of this network. This leads to the conclusion that this entailed an open line of communication with a previously undetermined circle of strangers using the internet worldwide who have shown interest in sharing certain files, while at the same time access to the IP addresses of other users was not limited to users of this network. Therefore, in the view of the Constitutional Court, the complainant\u2019s expectation of privacy was not legitimate; that which a person knowingly exposes to the public, even if from a home computer and the shelter of his or her own home, cannot be a subject of the protection afforded by Article 37 of the Constitution. In view of the foregoing, the contested standpoint of the Supreme Court does not raise concerns regarding constitutional law. Obtaining the data regarding the complainant\u2019s dynamic IP address does not interfere with his right to communication privacy determined by the first paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution taking into account all the circumstances of the case, therefore a court order was not necessary to access it. By his conduct the complainant himself waived his right to privacy and therefore could not have a legitimate expectation of privacy therewith.\n...\nReview of the objections regarding access to data on the user of a certain IP address 16. The complainant also challenges the standpoint of the Supreme Court that by its request to the service provider under the third paragraph of Article 149.b of the CPA the Police did not acquire traffic data, but only data regarding a particular user of a determined means of communication ... 17. In the case at issue, on 7 June 2006, on the basis of the third paragraph of Article 149.b of the CPA, the Police sent a request to the service provider for data regarding the user to whom IP address 195.210.223.200 was assigned on 20 February 2006 at 13:28. In the response, they received data regarding the user\u2019s name, surname, and address, while the time of the communication set to the nearest second was already known. Then on 14 December 2006 the Police also obtained an order issued by the investigating judge on the basis of the first paragraph 149.b of the CPA and the service provider also provided the traffic data on the basis of this order. The main issue for the Constitutional Court at this point is therefore whether obtaining the data regarding the identity of the user of a determined IP address falls within the framework of communication privacy. 18. In accordance with the position of the Constitutional Court in Decision No. Up-106/05, Article 37 of the Constitution also protects traffic data, i.e. data regarding, for example, who, when, with whom, and how often someone communicated. The identity of the communicating individual is one of the important aspects of communication privacy, therefore it is necessary to obtain a court order for its disclosure in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution. Despite this standpoint, the Constitutional Court decided that the complainant\u2019s allegation of a violation of Article 37 of the Constitution is unfounded in the case at issue. By his conduct, the complainant has himself waived protection of his privacy by publicly revealing both his own IP address as well as the content of his communications, and therefore can no longer rely on it as regards the disclosure of his identity. Since by such he also waived the legitimate expectation of privacy, the data regarding the identity of the IP address user no longer enjoyed protection in terms of communication privacy, but only in terms of information privacy determined by Article 38 of the Constitution. Therefore, by obtaining the data on the name, surname, and address of the user of the dynamic IP address through which the complainant communicated the Police did not interfere with his communication privacy and therefore did not require a court order to disclose his identity. In view of the foregoing, the contested position of the Supreme Court is not inconsistent with Article 37 of the Constitution, and the complainant\u2019s complaints in this part are unfounded.\u201d 30.  Judge J. Sovdat welcomed the Constitutional Court\u2019s departure from the Supreme Court\u2019s view that the information concerned had not amounted to traffic data. However, in her view, the police wishing to obtain identification of the subscriber should have requested a court order. She pointed out that the Constitutional Court\u2019s conclusion implied that the protection of privacy of traffic data was always dependent on the protection of the content of communication. Accordingly, traffic data concerning certain communication were protected as long as the content of that communication was protected. Consequently, an individual could not enjoy separate and independent protection of traffic data. Judge Sovdat disagreed with this view, pointing out that the applicant had not appeared in public under his own name, but only through the digits of his dynamic IP address. 31.  Judge Sovdat agreed with the Information Commissioner that the police had been interested not in the ownership of the device but in \u201cthe identity of the person communicating and precisely because he had been communicating\u201d. She endorsed the Commissioner\u2019s view that \u201cthe content of communication alone did not have any particular weight in the absence of identification of those communicating\u201d. She also pointed out that under sections 166 and 168 of the new Electronic Communications Act (\u201cECA-1\u201d, see paragraph 39 below), the Internet provider was not allowed to transfer the stored information without a court order. Compared with section 149b(3) of the CPA, the ECA was definitely more recent and therefore the decision of the majority ran contrary to the level of rights protection already achieved. 32.  Judge D. Jadek Pensa argued that the constitutional guarantees set out in Article 37 of the Constitution were aimed at strengthening the expectation of privacy in this area of life and preventing disproportionate interferences and an abuse of power by the executive. 33.  As regards the applicant\u2019s expectation of online anonymity, Judge Jadek Pensa argued that none of the data publicly disclosed by the complainant revealed his identity. In her view, anonymity was what prevented the police from linking a particular communication with a particular person \u2013 that is, linking a dynamic IP address and an individual with his or her name and address. She further argued that the question whether the applicant\u2019s manner of communication could lead to the conclusion that his expectation of privacy had not been objectively justified had to be approached by taking all the circumstances into account, including the law that had been in force at the relevant time. She explained that the ECA (sections 103(1(2)), 104(1) and 107 \u2013 see paragraphs 37 below) required Internet providers to delete traffic data as soon as they were no longer needed for the transfer of messages. Moreover, section 107 of the ECA provided that the secrecy of communication could be interfered with only on the basis of a decision by a competent authority. A letter from the police to an Internet provider could not be considered to amount to such a decision. Thus, even if section 149b(3) of the CPA could be interpreted as allowing the police to ask for information on an Internet subscriber, it should not apply in the situations covered by the ECA, which explicitly concerned the \u201cprotection of secrecy and confidentiality of electronic communications\u201d. Otherwise, the legislation would be contradictory. The judge concluded that the applicable legal framework could not therefore have led to the conclusion that the applicant, as a reasonably and sufficiently informed individual, could not have expected privacy; that is, he could not have expected that his anonymity would be protected. 34.  Judge Jadek Pensa went on to elaborate on the neutrality of traffic data, such as data on the user of a certain dynamic IP address:\n\u201c9. The traffic datum \u2013 the dynamic IP address that was assigned randomly at a given moment \u2013 as I understand it, reveals how the internet was used on some computer, because it is inextricably attached to a specific connection. ... This is because only the two data jointly communicate how the internet was used in a non-anonymised way, i.e. regarding internet use in connection with an identified person. This essential circumstance in my opinion negates the notion of the neutrality of the datum regarding a specific user of services for a certain (known) dynamic IP address that the police sought through the service provider - namely, the neutrality of the datum in terms of denying its ability to communicate anything more than the name and address of a certain person (who has a subscription contract with the service provider). Precisely because this datum is inseparably linked to a specific communication, the traffic datum falls within the scope of protected communication privacy. 10. Even if the service provider communicated to the police \u2018only\u2019 the data identifying a person who had a subscription contract with it, by doing so, as I understand it, the service provider in fact communicated (to put it simply) traffic data in an electronic communications network regarding this person. The police also, as I have already explained, wanted to determine more than just the name and surname of a certain person who had concluded a contract. Since, as I understand it, they asked for traffic data associated with a particular person they would have to proceed according to the first paragraph of Article 149.b of the CPA and obtain an order from the investigating judge.\u201d", "references": ["3", "8", "9", "1", "5", "6", "7", "2", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  At the material time, the applicant was a civil servant in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and a member of the local branch of the T\u00fcmbel-Sen trade union, which is affiliated to the KESK (Kamu Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikalar\u0131 Konfederasyonu \u2013 the Confederation of Public Employees\u2019 Trade Unions). 7.  In April 2008 two of the largest trade unions, namely the D\u0130SK (Devrimci \u0130\u015f\u00e7i Sendikalar\u0131 Konfederasyonu \u2013 Confederation of Revolutionary Workers\u2019 Trade Unions) and the KESK (Kamu Emek\u00e7ileri Sendikalar\u0131 Konfederasyonu \u2013 Confederation of Public Employees\u2019 Trade Unions) announced that they were planning a large scale demonstration in Istanbul for 1 May 2008 and that their members would be gathering to celebrate the Labour Day and to commemorate their friends who had lost their lives during the demonstrations of 1 May 1977. 8.  In May 2008 the applicant was informed that a disciplinary investigation had been initiated against him for being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 and he was asked to submit his defence submissions. The applicant explained that he had participated in a demonstration organised by his trade union on that day to celebrate International Labour Day. 9.  Subsequently, the applicant was given a warning as a disciplinary sanction owing to his being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 pursuant to section 125 of the Civil Servants Act (Law no. 657). 10.  On 13 May 2008 the applicant objected to the decision and requested its annulment. 11.  On 16 May 2008 the Disciplinary Board of the Istanbul Municipality dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection, finding that the contested decision was in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds to annul it.", "references": ["5", "8", "3", "0", "4", "1", "9", "6", "2", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, namely Aram Bas\u0131m ve Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k, at the time of the events giving rise to the present application. 7.  In June 2001 and March 2003 the applicant\u2019s company published two books entitled Da\u011flarda Ya\u015fam\u0131n Dili (\u201cThe Language of Life in the Mountains\u201d) and Tufanda 33 G\u00fcn (\u201c33 Days in the Deluge\u201d), respectively. 8.  On 29 August 2001 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code, on account of the publication of the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains. 9.  On 24 July 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged. 10.  On 1 May 2003 the Court of Cassation, on appeal, upheld the judgment of 24 July 2002. 11.  On 23 September 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court requested that the court revise its judgment of 24 July 2002 since Article 169 of the former Criminal Code had been amended on 7 August 2003. The Istanbul State Security Court accepted that request. 12.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, state security courts were abolished. The case against the applicant concerning the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 13.  On 16 August 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code on account of the publication of the book entitled 33 Days in the Deluge. According to the indictment, on pages 129, 130 and 135 the struggle of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah \u00d6calan, was praised and the applicant had therefore aided the PKK through the medium of the press. 14.  On 30 April 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the proceedings concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains and 33 Days in the Deluge. 15.  On 7 December 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK twice, because he had published two books, and sentenced him to a total of twenty months\u2019 imprisonment. With regard to the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, the assize court considered that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah \u00d6calan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The assize court furthermore found that the book allowed for the transmission of the opinions of the PKK to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation. 16.  On 25 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 7 December 2007, holding that the first-instance court should not have joined the two cases, since the case concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains was a re-qualification of the applicant\u2019s previous final conviction (uyarlama yarg\u0131lamas\u0131). 17.  On 7 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant once again under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on account of the publication of The Language of Life in the Mountains and sentenced him to a fine. 18.  On 3 June 2013 the Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment. 19.  On 13 November 2013 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the sentence pronounced in its judgment of 7 December 2009. 20.  In the meantime, the Istanbul Assize Court resumed the trial concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge following the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 25 June 2009. 21.  On 21 October 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK on account of the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. In its judgment, the assize court reiterated that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah \u00d6calan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The court held that the turns of phrase used on those pages were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention and constituted an abuse of the right to freedom of expression. The assize court further found that the book permitted the opinions of the PKK to be transmitted to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation and thus at destroying the unitary nature of the State of the Republic of Turkey. 22.  The applicant appealed. 23.  On 15 February 2012 the Court of Cassation decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, holding that the prosecution was time-barred.", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "5", "9", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Novska. He is of Albanian origin. 6.  In 1960 the applicant\u2019s parents fled Albania as political refugees and settled in Kosovo,[1] which was at the relevant time an autonomous province of Serbia. They were granted refugee status in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (\u201cthe SFRY\u201d). The SFRY was a federal State composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia (with two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo), Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia. 7.  The applicant was born in Kosovo soon after his parents\u2019 arrival to the SFRY. In 1979 the applicant, at the time seventeen years old, came from Kosovo to Croatia. He settled in Novska, where he has lived ever since. 8.  The applicant has no family in Croatia. Since moving to Croatia, his parents have died in Kosovo. For a while, the applicant maintained a relationship with his two sisters, who lived in Germany and Belgium (see paragraphs 21, 29 and 35 below). In 2014 he declared to the domestic authorities that his only close relative was his sister in Belgium, with whom he had lost contact (see paragraph 48 below). 9.  In 1987 the applicant applied for a permanent residence permit to the relevant police station in Novska. 10.  He was instructed by the Novska police that he should regularise his status in Kosovo, where he had been officially registered. However, as the applicant refused to do that, he was provided with a temporary residence permit in Novska for the period between 4 January and 30 June 1988, pending the determination of his request for a permanent residence permit. 11.  At the relevant time, the applicant possessed a certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo in 1988 indicating that he had been an Albanian national with the status of a foreigner holding a temporary residence permit in the SFRY. The certificate also indicated that the applicant\u2019s parents had been nationals of Albania living in the SFRY as refugees. 12.  On 2 February 1989 the Ministry of the Interior of the then Socialist Republic of Croatia informed the Novska police that the applicant\u2019s application for a permanent residence permit in the SFRY had been refused in accordance with the government policy according to which Albanian refugees should be instructed to apply for the SFRY citizenship. 13.  On 22 February 1989 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska police in connection with the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s instruction. He explained that he had been granted a temporary residence permit by the relevant authorities in Kosovo which was valid until July 1989. He also stated that he had attempted to travel to Germany but had not had a valid visa and had thus been refused entry. At the time he was waiting for a visa for Belgium. The applicant further explained that he hoped to be granted a permanent residence permit but that he was not interested in acquiring SFRY citizenship as that would not provide him with any security. He considered that by acquiring SFRY citizenship, he should be granted a flat or a house in private ownership just as one had been granted to his father when he had come from Albania as a refugee. However, as he would not be granted any property, he refused to apply for SFRY citizenship. 14.  On 23 February 1989 the Novska police informed the Ministry of the Interior that the applicant had refused SFRY citizenship. The report further explained that the applicant was employed in a garage of a private entrepreneur, M.R., and that he had several times contacted the Novksa police insisting that he be granted permanent residence. The report also indicated that according to the available information the applicant had secured a temporary residence permit from the authorities in Kosovo until July 1989. 15.  A further report of the Novska police to the Ministry of the Interior of 26 February 1990 indicated that the applicant was still living in Novska and working in a restaurant. As his temporary residence permit issued by the authorities in Kosovo had expired, he had been instructed to regularise his status. This report also contains a handwritten note dated 12 June 1990 according to which the applicant had come to the police station and presented an identity card for a foreigner with temporary residence status in the SFRY issued by the relevant authorities in Kosovo and valid until 5 November 1991. 16.  On 25 June 1991 the Croatian Parliament (Sabor Republike Hrvatske) declared Croatia independent of the SFRY, and on 8 October 1991 all ties between Croatia and the SFRY were severed. 17.  Meanwhile, war broke out in Croatia and the applicant was called up for mandatory civilian service with the local authorities. On 22 March 1992 the Novska police issued a permit to the applicant to move freely within the region of Novska-Kutina in order to perform his mandatory civilian service. The permit was valid until 31 December 1992. 18.  On 9 June 1992 the applicant applied for Croatian citizenship with the Novska police. He submitted that he had been living at his current address in Novska since 1980s, and that he had been a refugee from Albania. He also explained that he was working in a garage of a private entrepreneur, Z.A. 19.  On 20 July 1992 the Novska police forwarded the applicant\u2019s application to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) with a suggestion that it be granted. 20.  On 2 November 1992 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that they had failed to provide a report concerning the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances and information on his residence in Croatia. 21.  In connection with the above application, on 16 December 1992 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska Police. In his interview, the applicant explained that he had Albanian nationality as he had been a refugee from that country. He further explained that he had come to Novska in 1979 where he had first worked as a waiter until 1984. Between 1986 and 1989 he had worked as a car mechanic for a private entrepreneur, M.R., and since 1989 for Z.A. During the war he had worked as a car mechanic for the police and the army. He was not married and did not have children. He had a sister living in Germany and one living in Belgium. He also had a brother living in Kosovo and another brother living at an unknown place in Albania. His parents lived in Kosovo. 22.  On 18 December 1992 the Novska police informed the Ministry of the obtained information explaining that the applicant had lived in Novska as a foreigner since 1980 and that he had Albanian citizenship. 23.  In May 1993 the national intelligence agency informed the Novska police that there was nothing preventing the applicant from being allowed to acquire Croatian citizenship. 24.  According to the available information, the file concerning the applicant\u2019s application also contained a birth certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo on 23 December 1987 according to which the applicant did not have any nationality. 25.  On 14 June 1993 the Ministry issued an assurance that the applicant would obtain Croatian citizenship if he obtained a release or provided evidence that he had renounced his Albanian citizenship within a period of two years. In its reasoning to this assurance, the Ministry explained that the applicant had met all the necessary conditions to be granted the assurance and thus Croatian citizenship. It also referred to section 8a of the Croatian Citizenship Act (see paragraph 60 below). 26.  Upon the expiry of the above-noted period of two years, on 16 February 1995 the applicant lodged a new application for Croatian citizenship with the Novska Police. He explained that he was a national of Albania and that he had been living in Croatia since 1979. He was asking for Croatian citizenship in order to obtain legal certainty of his position. He stressed that he was ready to renounce his current citizenship and that he had nowhere to go back to in Kosovo. He also explained that he was employed as a car mechanic. 27.  Meanwhile, the applicant had obtained a permit for extended residence of a foreigner (he was considered to be an Albanian citizen) from the Novska police for the period between September 1993 and September 1994, which was first extended until September 1995 and then January 1996. He was also granted a driving licence on 14 April 1994 valid until 19 November 2027. 28.  In February 1995 the intelligence agency informed the Novska police that there was no bar to the applicant\u2019s acquiring Croatian citizenship. 29.  A report on the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances prepared by the Novska police on 8 March 1995 indicated that he had lived in Croatia since 1979. The report contains a statement that the applicant had an Albanian passport issued in Kosovo (then part of Serbia) and that he had allegedly disappeared from his place of residence during the war in Croatia. It also suggests that the applicant socialised with individuals of similar characteristics who were involved in trading of grey-market goods and repairing cars. Moreover, the report alleged that the applicant had never tried to regularise his status in Croatia. The report also indicated that the applicant\u2019s parents had died and that he had two sisters, who lived in Germany and Belgium. 30.  On 28 March 1995 the Novska police informed the Ministry that the applicant had had a registered residence in Croatia since September 1993 (see paragraph 27 above). 31.  On 3 August 1995 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for Croatian citizenship on the grounds that he did not have a registered residence in Croatia for an uninterrupted period of five years as required by section 8(1)(3) of the Croatian Citizenship Act (see paragraph 60 below). 32.  The applicant challenged the above decision before the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). He argued that he had had a registered residence in Novska since 1979 and that his personal circumstances had been well known to the Novska police. He also stressed that he was in employment and that he possessed an identity card and a driving licence issued by the Novska police. 33.  On 29 May 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action on the grounds that there was no evidence that he had had a registered residence in Croatia since 1979. In fact, according to the Novska police\u2019s report of 28 March 1995 (see paragraph 29 above), he had had a registered residence in Novska, as a foreigner with extended residence status, since 24 September 1993. In these circumstances, the Administrative Court considered that no available evidence suggested that the applicant had had an uninterrupted registered residence in Novska for a period of more than five years as required by section 8(1)(3) of the Croatian Citizenship Act. 34.  On 13 November 2001 the applicant asked the Ministry to grant him a permanent residence permit. He argued that he was employed and had sufficient means of subsistence and a strong interest to live in Croatia. Together with his application, the applicant provided the birth certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo on 23 December 1987 (see paragraph 24 above). He also provided his employment booklet according to which he had been employed in the periods between 1 July 1986 and 15 July 1987, 1 August 1987 and 1 December 1988, and 1 January 1989 and 31 December 1989 in the garage of M.R. 35.  A report on the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances prepared by the Novska police on 24 April 2002 indicated that the applicant was a national of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe FRY\u201d). According to the report, the applicant had settled in Novska in 1979 and had first worked in the garage of Z.A. until 1984; and then, between 1985 and 1990, in the garage of M.R. The report further indicated that the applicant was at that time unemployed and supported by his sisters in Germany and Belgium. He had lived in Novska for twenty-two years and had never left Croatia. The only document which he possessed was a driving licence. Up to that point he had been prosecuted only for a minor offence related to the status of aliens. 36.  On 29 April 2002 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that the applicant should also be interviewed in connection with his application. 37.  The applicant was interviewed by the Novska police on 10 June 2002. He explained that after he had been given an assurance of eligibility for Croatian citizenship (see paragraph 25 above) he had contacted the Albanian embassy several times. However, they had at first delayed their response and then dismissed his request. He had therefore been unable to obtain a certificate of renunciation of Albanian citizenship within the relevant period of two years. The applicant further explained how his second application for Croatian citizenship had been refused because he had not had a registered residence in Croatia for five years (see paragraphs 26\u201133 above). 38.  In his interview the applicant also stated he did not have a travel document of any country. So far he had always relied on his Albanian citizenship but whenever he had tried to obtain Albanian travel documents, he had been orally refused. The same was true for his attempts to obtain travel documents from the FRY. The applicant further explained that he did not have a family and was not married. He wanted to stay in Novska because there he knew a lot of people and would be able to make a living there. 39.  On 3 July 2003 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s application on the grounds that he did not meet the necessary statutory requirements under section 29(1) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act (see paragraph 61 below). In particular, he was not married to a Croatian national or an alien with a permanent residence in Croatia, and he did not have three years of uninterrupted employment in Croatia. The Ministry also held that there was no particular interest of Croatia in granting him residence under section 29(2) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act. The Ministry considered the applicant to be a national of Serbia and Montenegro. 40.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Administrative Court. He argued that the fact that he had previously been a national of Serbia and Montenegro and had resided in Croatia since 1979 qualified him for permanent residence in Croatia. The applicant also contended that it was difficult for him to find a formal employment as he did not have permanent residence permit for Croatia. 41.  On 17 August 2006 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action as unfounded. The Administrative Court held that the Ministry had properly established that the applicant had failed to meet the statutory requirements under section 29(1) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act as his employment booklet did not show that he had worked for an uninterrupted period of three years. Moreover, the Administrative Court considered that nothing in the circumstances of the case suggested that the applicant should be granted permanent residence under section 29(2) of that Act. 42.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the decisions of the lower bodies. He argued that he had continuously lived in Croatia since 1979 and that he had worked. He argued that he should have been granted permanent residence. 43.  Meanwhile, the applicant obtained a note from M.R., for whom he had worked, attesting that he had been employed by M.R. in the period between 1986 and 1989 and that he had proved to be a hardworking and responsible employee. M.R. also promised to employ the applicant again and to secure him accommodation should he be granted permanent residence. 44.  On 1 October 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded endorsing the reasoning of the Administrative Court. 45.  In the period between 26 July 2011 and 27 August 2013 the police three times temporarily extended the applicant\u2019s residence for periods of one year by reference to the humanitarian grounds under the Aliens Act (see paragraph 62 below). In the relevant decisions, the applicant was considered to be a national of Kosovo. 46.  When extending his temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds on 27 August 2013 for another year under section 65(1)(5) of the Aliens Act, the applicant was requested to provide a valid travel document as provided under section 52(4) of the Aliens Act (see paragraph 62 below). 47.  On 10 June 2014 the applicant again applied for an extension of his temporary residence permit. He argued that he did not have a travel document of Kosovo as he had not been there nor did he have any interest in going there. He explained that he just wanted to regularise his status in Croatia. 48.  In connection with his application for an extension of his temporary residence permit, in July 2014 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska police. A note on his interview indicated that the applicant was a national of Kosovo and that he had knowledge of the Albanian language. It also stated that the applicant had been employed by M.R. in the period between 1981 and 1991 and that during the war in Croatia he had worked for Z.A. repairing military and police vehicles until 1993. Since then he had been unemployed but had been earning money by helping out on the farms in the Novska area. His parents had died and the only close relative he had was a sister living in Belgium, with whom he had lost contact. The note further explained that the applicant\u2019s neighbours had been interviewed and that they confirmed that he had been a good and hardworking person. The note also indicated that the applicant had committed several minor offences for which he had been fined and a criminal complaint had been lodged against him in connection with a road accident in which he had been involved. 49.  On 30 July 2014 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that there were no grounds to extend the applicant\u2019s residence since he had failed to provide a valid travel document. 50.  The Novska police invited the applicant for an interview on 28 August 2014 at which he was informed of the Ministry\u2019s instruction. The applicant explained that he had come to Croatia in 1979 and had no connection to Kosovo. He had had the status of a refugee from Albania until he had reached the age of eighteen, since that status had been granted to his parents. He stressed that he had lived his whole life in Novska. He also promised to contact the embassy of Kosovo in order to obtain a travel document and asked the Novska police not to dismiss his request. 51.  On 16 September 2014 the Novska police dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the extension of his temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. It held that the applicant did not meet the requirements for granting further temporary residence status as he had failed to provide a valid travel document and the Ministry had not given its consent to an extension of his residence permit. 52.  On 7 October 2014 the applicant challenged the decision of the Novska police before the Ministry, relying on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. He argued that he had had SFRY citizenship, which he had lost in unclear circumstances following the dissolution of that country. As he had come from Kosovo to Croatia, it was possible that he was considered to be a national of Kosovo by the Croatian authorities, but in reality he did not have citizenship of that territory. The applicant also argued that he was not a classic alien but an individual who found himself in the very specific circumstances of the dissolution of the SFRY in a situation whereby he was no longer able to provide a valid travel document. He also contended that he had been erased from the register of domicile and residence in Croatia without ever being informed thereof. He was therefore unable to regularise his residence status in Croatia and thus to find employment, to move freely without valid documents or to travel, which was neither a lawful nor a proportionate interference with his Article 8 rights. Moreover, the applicant contended that there was a gap in the relevant domestic law as the status of individuals who found themselves in his situation following the dissolution of the SFRY was not regulated. Accordingly, a strict formal application of the Aliens Act could not lead to a solution in his case. 53.  On 30 January 2015 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It referred to the applicant\u2019s previous attempts to regularise his status in Croatia, which had all been unsuccessful. According to the Ministry, this showed that he had not been erased from the relevant registers without being informed. The Ministry further stressed that the applicant had been invited several times to provide a valid travel document and he had promised to contact the embassy of Kosovo in this connection but had failed to do so. Accordingly, in the Ministry\u2019s view, his arguments that he had not been a typical alien and that the relevant authorities had formalistically applied the relevant law had been misplaced. Moreover, there was a possibility for him to obtain a temporary travel document in order to travel to his country of origin so as to obtain a valid travel document. 54.  On 25 February 2015 the applicant challenged the Ministry\u2019s decision before the Zagreb Administrative Court. He contended that he had been a national of the SFRY and that he had had a registered residence in Novska since he had arrived there in 1979, which had been erased at a later stage. He also relied on his available birth certificate showing that he did not have any citizenship (see paragraph 58 below). He also reiterated his complaints of an unjustified infringement of his Article 8 rights by a decision of the administrative authorities and a breach of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. On 21 April 2017 the Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action endorsing the reasoning of the Ministry\u2019s decision. The applicant challenged these findings before the High Administrative Court (Visoki upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) and the proceedings are still pending. 55.  Meanwhile, on 4 September 2015 the Novska police granted the applicant temporary residence status on humanitarian grounds for a further year inviting him to provide a valid travel document. The Novska police held that the applicant was a national of Kosovo whose parents had come from Albania to Kosovo and that they had had the status of refugees in the SFRY. It also stressed that the Ministry had given consent to the extension of the applicant\u2019s temporary residence irrespective of the fact that he had not provided a valid travel document. 56.  On 4 October 2016 the Novska police extended the applicant\u2019s residence status on humanitarian grounds for a further year. It referred to the same reasons as cited above. 57.  According to the applicant\u2019s handwritten statement to his representative of 7 July 2015, he never had Albanian citizenship. He explained that he had contacted the Albanian embassy after he had been given an assurance that he had qualified for Croatian citizenship but they had told him that he had not been a national of that State (see paragraphs 25 and 37 above). The applicant further stressed that in his contacts with the police concerning the regularisation of his residence status, the police officers had always suggested that he had been an Albanian national. He also explained that he had been born in Kosovo and that his parents had had SFRY citizenship. He had come to Croatia in 1979. He simply wanted to regularise his status in Croatia. 58.  According to a birth certificate issued by the Kosovo authorities on 10 June 2009, the applicant\u2019s parents had had Kosovo nationality but the applicant did not have that nationality.", "references": ["9", "3", "1", "0", "7", "5", "2", "6", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  In 2006 the applicant moved to Norway after marrying C, an Iraqi national who had come to Norway in 1999. The couple\u2019s first daughter, A, was born in February 2008. Their second daughter, B, was born in June 2010. 6.  On 7 April 2009 the emergency unit at the child welfare authorities in F. municipality received a request to assist the police with an incident in which the applicant and C were having a heated argument in the presence of their child. A few days later, on 10 April, the police were called again. The applicant then said that C had hit her and tried to strangle her and A on the same day. C was arrested and placed in custody. The applicant and A were taken to a crisis centre. 7.  The next day, on 11 April, the applicant was admitted to hospital with pain and bleeding. She then consented to A being placed in an emergency foster home while she was in hospital. The applicant asked the hospital for protection during her stay, because she was afraid that C\u2019s family would come to the hospital to kill her. 8.  The applicant was discharged from hospital on 12 April 2009. She withdrew her consent to the emergency placement of A and they moved into a crisis centre. The child welfare authorities made a decision on assistance measures on 14 April 2009 and informed the applicant that they would be concerned about A\u2019s welfare if the applicant were to move back in with C. The applicant then stated that she did not wish to move back in with him. She wanted to have a domestic abuse alarm device if she moved back. 9.  On 16 April 2009 the applicant moved back home with A. She did not want to give evidence in the criminal proceedings against C, A\u2019s father, and refused to release her doctor from the duty of confidentiality. On 24 April 2009 C was released from custody and moved back home. A restraining order that had been imposed on him in relation to the applicant was lifted at her request. 10.  Taking into account that C had tried to strangle the applicant and A with an electrical cord (see paragraph 6 above), the child welfare authorities gave the applicant a choice between moving into a crisis centre with A or having her forcibly taken into care. On 29 April 2009 the applicant moved back into the crisis centre in F. with A. 11.  While at the crisis centre the applicant had a lot of contact with C by telephone. She expressed a wish to move back in with him with A, but also stated that he should not be at home at the same time as them. After she let C into the crisis centre on 6 May 2009, the centre no more wanted her to stay there. As the applicant expressed a wish to move back home to C, the child welfare authorities decided on 7 May 2009 to place A in an emergency foster home for the second time because they were of the opinion that the mother was unable to protect A from violence from her father. 12.  In a consultation at the emergency clinic that day, the mother denied that C represented a risk to her or the child and that he had previously hurt them. 13.  On 18 May 2009 the applicant moved into a crisis centre in O. This crisis centre was of the opinion that A should be returned to her. The child welfare authorities disagreed, and cooperation between the crisis centre and the authorities became difficult. In the end, A was returned to the applicant on 24 June 2009 and they then stayed together at the crisis centre. 14.  On 17 July 2009 the applicant and A moved back in with C. The child welfare authorities closed the case, but reopened it after the applicant\u2019s lawyer raised concerns (\u201cbekymringsmelding\u201d) and stated that mother and child still had great need of the authorities\u2019 help. On 29 July 2009 the authorities initiated assistance measures, including parenting guidance, couple therapy, a Norwegian language course for the applicant, and aggression management therapy for C. An application was also submitted for a kindergarten place for A. After a while the kindergarten raised concerns owing to A\u2019s high absence rate and the fact that many verbal expressions of anger were being directed at the staff by C. 15.  On 15 October 2009 the police raised additional concerns with the child welfare authorities after they had been called out to the hospital in F. The mother had been admitted the day before with a suspected ectopic pregnancy. C had taken A to the hospital and the police had regarded his behaviour as so aggressive and threatening towards the hospital staff that they had thought it appropriate to notify the child welfare authorities. C had influenced the applicant to discharge herself from hospital against medical advice. However, she had suffered heavy bleeding and had been readmitted. C had been banned from visiting her at the hospital. He was at home with A, about whom the police were concerned, as the father was aggressive and threatening towards the applicant and their daughter. 16.  On the following day, 16 October 2009, the child welfare emergency unit visited the family. C was very upset and angry, as he claimed that he had not consented to such a visit. 17.  In May 2010 the applicant attended an appointment at a crisis centre in O. According to the child welfare authorities\u2019 records, C had been \u201caggressive and out of control\u201d because of this meeting. 18.  In June 2010 the couple\u2019s second daughter, B, was born. 19.  On 2 September 2010 the City Court (tingrett) gave a judgment in which C was acquitted of violating Article 219 of the Penal Code on the maltreatment of family members, but convicted of some other offences. The counts in the indictment under Article 219 concerned the incidents in April 2009 (see paragraph 6 above). In the course of the criminal case, the applicant had withdrawn her previous statements concerning violence by C. 20.  On 17 November 2010 the child welfare authorities received a call from a crisis centre in S. informing them that the applicant and her two children had arrived there after C had been violent towards them and had threatened to kill the applicant. C had been arrested, but had then been released. The applicant had withdrawn her statement about his acts of violence and was preparing to go home. Based on this and previous incidents, the authorities decided to issue an emergency care order that day to place the children in an emergency foster home at a secret address. This was A\u2019s third emergency placement (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above). The order was approved by the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker \u2013 hereinafter also \u201cthe Board\u201d) the following day. 21.  On the same day, 18 November 2010, the applicant went to the crisis centre in O. At a meeting held there on 23 November 2010 she stated that she never wanted to return to C. The child welfare authorities emphasised that she could not have any contact with him once the children were returned to her. Initially, the authorities\u2019 intention was to return the children to the applicant at the crisis centre in S., where they would all stay. The specialist team in S. expressed concern about this solution, and the authorities decided that the children could not be returned until the applicant was settled in her own flat. They thought it would be unfortunate to return the children only to put them through another emergency placement if the mother moved back to C. 22.  On 25 November 2010 a restraining order was imposed on C in relation to the applicant. 23.  The parents appealed against the emergency care order of 17 November 2010 to the Board, which granted the appeal in part in a decision of 15 December 2010. The decision regarding the emergency placement was upheld, but the amount of contact with the children was increased and the decision not to inform the parents of the children\u2019s whereabouts was set aside. 24.  On 21 December 2010 the applicant moved from the crisis centre in O. to the crisis centre in S. She subsequently stayed at a crisis centre in G. from 5 January to 29 May 2011. 25.  An application for the children to be taken into care was first submitted to the Board by F. municipality on 23 December 2010. The municipality wanted consideration of the case to be postponed so that an expert assessment could be prepared, but the parents were opposed to this. The Board considered the case at a meeting from 8 to 10 March 2011. On 18 March 2011 the Board nevertheless decided to adjourn the case in order to appoint experts to carry out an assessment of it. The appointed experts were a specialist in educational and psychological counselling, L.M., and a specialist in clinical psychology, B.S. The experts\u2019 joint statement was submitted on 31 May 2011. 26.  The child welfare authorities wanted the contact sessions to be supervised and engaged trained personnel from a company to do so. The supervisers started their work on 8 April 2011 and submitted a report on 3 June 2011. 27.  C was dissatisfied with the work of the appointed experts (see paragraph 25 above), and therefore hired G.H., a specialist in child and adolescent psychology, as a private expert to observe contact sessions between the applicant and the children. G.H. submitted his report on 11 June 2011. 28.  The care order case was considered by the Board on 14 and 15 June 2011. 29.  The applicant stayed at the crisis centre in G. again from 14 to 30 June 2011, after which time she moved into her own flat in G. 30.  Before the Board reached a decision, the two children were abducted from a contact session with the applicant. The incident took place on 21 June 2011 at G. Volunteer Centre (\u201cfrivillighetssentral\u201d) in B. Two people wearing balaclavas and sunglasses forced their way in during the contact session, used an electroshock weapon on the applicant and abducted the children. The contact session was being supervised by a member of the company\u2019s staff (see paragraph 26 above). The staff member managed to escape through the veranda door and summon help. The applicant was injured and unconscious and was taken away to hospital by air ambulance. The children were found in a flat in H. the next day. C later admitted that he had been behind the abduction and that he had been in the vicinity when it had happened. 31.  The Board found out about the abduction before it made its decision, and it was therefore decided that there should be no contact between the children and the parents. The operative part of the Board\u2019s decision of 24 June 2011 read as follows:\n\u201c1.  F. municipality, represented by the child welfare authorities, shall take A, born ... February 2008, into care. 3.  A and B shall be placed in separate foster homes at secret addresses. A shall be placed in enhanced foster care [where foster parents have extensive support from the child welfare authorities]. 4.  No minimum level of contact between the mother and the girls is set out. If contact sessions are to take place, the child welfare authorities are authorised to supervise them. 5.  No minimum level of contact between the father and the girls is set out. If contact sessions are to take place, the child welfare authorities are authorised to supervise them.\u201d 32.  The decision was brought before the City Court (tingrett). When the hearing started, on 9 November 2011, the applicant was not present. Her counsel was there and argued that the case should be postponed. After the City Court had decided not to do so, the applicant\u2019s counsel left as he was of the opinion that he could not attend to the interests of his client. However, C informed the court that he was in touch with the applicant. She arrived later the same day at the court and stated that she had spoken to her counsel. She also argued that the case should be adjourned. When told that it had already been decided to continue the hearing, the applicant left the court. 33.  On 21 November 2011 the City Court upheld the Board\u2019s decision. As to the applicant and her counsel leaving the hearing, the court noted that it found it difficult to view this as anything but an attempt to force the court into postponing the case, although it did not find it clear why they wanted the case to be postponed. Based on the evidence presented to it, the City Court found it highly likely that C would attempt to abduct the children. Moreover, it was found to be the case that C was in control of the applicant and that she followed his orders. Among other things, the City Court referred to the fact that the applicant under the hearing had made herself unavailable to her counsel, but not to C. The City Court stated that the abduction risk might possibly be regarded differently when the criminal case against C had been heard by the court. At present, however, it took account of how C had declared that the abduction had been in the children\u2019s best interests and concluded that there should be no visiting rights. 34.  Instructed by the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 5 December 2011, a specialist psychologist, J.W., submitted an expert report in the case on 16 December 2011. 35.  The parents appealed to the High Court (lagmannsrett) against the City Court\u2019s judgment. 36.  On 8 March 2012 the applicant submitted an official complaint to the police against C in relation to rape, deprivation of liberty, and threats made in her flat. The applicant went to the crisis centre in G., but moved back to her own flat a few days later. C also contacted the applicant in G. later in March. A restraining order was imposed on him, and the applicant was moved to a secret address. 37.  The High Court appointed the clinical psychologist B.S. as expert (see paragraph 25 above). He submitted his report on 12 August 2012. The High Court then heard the case from 25 to 27 September 2012. The parents were present together with their counsel and gave evidence. Eight witnesses were heard, including two expert witnesses. B.S., the court-appointed expert, gave testimony. 38.  On 22 October 2012 the High Court rejected the appeal. It noted that a care order presupposed serious deficits in the applicant\u2019s caring abilities and though the applicant, if viewed in isolation, would have sufficient capacity to take care of the children with assistance of the child welfare authorities, the question was whether the children would be sufficiently protected from C. The applicant did not want further dealings with him. C\u2019s behaviour showed, however, that he was unwilling to respect her wish. As to contact rights, the High Court did not take a stance on whether a secure regime for visits could be established. At that time, there was in any event an obvious risk that C would again try to kidnap the children. 39.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett) was denied by the Supreme Court\u2019s Committee on Leave to Appeal (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg) on 19 December 2012. 40.  During the summer of 2013, the applicant was subject to threats from her half-brother, on paid assignment from C, in order to make her move back to Iraq. On 12 August 2013 she was granted divorce. The hearing of the criminal charges against C took place in September 2013. 41.  On 1 October 2013 the child welfare authorities applied to the Board for an order that the applicant and C have their parental responsibility in respect of A and B removed; parental responsibility would then be transferred to the authorities. The authorities also applied for the Board\u2019s authorisation of the foster parents\u2019 adoption of the children. The applicant applied to the Board for an order that A and B\u2019s placement in care be discontinued. 42.  On 3 October 2013 the District Court convicted C of abducting the children (see paragraph 30 above) and sentenced him to one year and seven months\u2019 imprisonment, of which six months were suspended. C appealed against the judgment. 43.  On 29 November 2013 the Board appointed B.S., the psychologist, as its expert. He submitted a report on 31 January 2014 (see paragraph 53 below). 44.  The case was heard on 10 and 11 February 2014. The Board sat with a chairperson who was qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a layperson, in accordance with the first paragraphs of sections 7-2 and 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below). The applicant was present with her legal aid counsel and gave evidence. C was in Iraq, but testified by telephone as a party to the case and was represented by his counsel. The appointed expert attended the proceedings and testified. One other witness was heard. 45.  In its decision of 25 February 2014, the Board noted that the previous care order case had been considered as directed against the applicant, as C had accepted that she had day-to-day care and control of the children. This situation had not changed, and C now supported the applicant\u2019s claim for revocation of the care order. 46.  The Board first reiterated the following from the High Court\u2019s judgment of 22 October 2012 concerning the children\u2019s placement in care (see paragraph 38 above):\n\u201cIn the High Court\u2019s opinion, seen in isolation, the mother will be capable of providing adequate care for the children, provided that adequate assistance measures are offered. The High Court understands that this opinion is shared \u2013 although to a varying extent \u2013 by all the experts who have appeared before [it].\u201d 47.  There was limited updated information about the applicant\u2019s situation at the time of the Board\u2019s decision, but it was clear that she had been granted a divorce from C. She had also passed a Norwegian language course and established a small social network in G. Seen in isolation, her ability to provide care thus appeared to have improved somewhat since the High Court hearing. 48.  On the other hand, the High Court had concluded that there were serious deficiencies in the applicant\u2019s ability to provide care because of the threat that C represented to her and the children. The Board made reference to the following passages from High Court\u2019s judgment:\n\u201c... the question at issue in this case is whether the children will be sufficiently protected against violence from their father if they are returned. It is very important to the father that the children grow up in accordance with their Kurdish background, and he is clearly willing to go to great lengths to achieve this, possibly also by using violent methods. He has stated that the purpose of the abduction was to take them to Iraq. ...\nAfter the presentation of the evidence, the High Court is in no doubt that the father is violent and represents a threat to the mother. ...\nBased on the facts described above, the High Court finds that there is a strong preponderance of likelihood of the father having committed violent acts against the mother, and that it is probable that he, or someone acting on his behalf, will be violent to the mother again. Among other things, [the court] points out that the expert witness J.W., who has assessed the violence described in the case in a cultural context, believes that the mother\u2019s \u2018life probably was [or] is in serious danger\u2019.\nThe mother and father are divorced, and the mother wants no further contact with the father. His behaviour as recently as in March this year in G. shows that he is not willing to respect the mother\u2019s wish to break off contact [with him]. In the High Court\u2019s opinion, there can be little doubt that the father\u2019s further contact with the mother will be harmful to the children and constitute a significant deficiency in relation to the children\u2019s safety if the care order is revoked.\u201d 49.  However, the High Court had stated in its judgment that the question of contact for the applicant could be seen in a different light if C were expelled from the country. This was because the security concerns described in the judgment would then not apply to the same extent. 50.  The expert appointed by the Board, B.S., had not carried out a new assessment of the applicant\u2019s ability to provide care in his report of 31 January 2014 (see paragraph 43 above). In a statement dated 11 February 2014 from the Child Welfare Expert\u2019s Commission (barnesakkyndig kommisjon), one of the two commission members had remarked that it would have been preferable for the mother to have been given an opportunity to comment on such a serious matter. It was also stated that it was expected that this would form part of the Board\u2019s consideration of the case. 51.  In his testimony before the Board, psychologist B.S. upheld his assessment given in the report of 31 January 2014 that, seen in isolation, the applicant\u2019s ability to provide care was sufficient for her to have care and control of the children with assistance measures in place. The Board agreed, and also made reference to the High Court\u2019s assessment of this issue (see paragraphs 38 and 46 above). Nothing in the case indicated that the applicant\u2019s ability to provide care had deteriorated since the High Court\u2019s hearing in 2012. If anything, it had to be deemed to have slightly improved. The applicant had testified before the Board and the Board considered that the issue had been adequately clarified. 52.  The children\u2019s father had been in Iraq for months, and had stated in his testimony as a party to the case that he was building a house and was engaged to be married to a new woman. He had no plans to return to Norway, and he planned to settle permanently in Iraq. The father had last been in Norway during the criminal proceedings against him in September 2013. His counsel stated that the conviction had not been formally served on C, but he had nonetheless appealed against it, and he added that he expected C to sign the letter accompanying the appeal soon, so that the High Court could consider it. 53.  In his expert report of 31 January 2014 to the Board, B.S. had given the following assessment of the situation:\n\u201cAccording to information received, the father is currently in Iraq. If he returns to [Norway], he must expect to be arrested to serve the prison term he was sentenced to for the abduction. [I do] not know if he would then be expelled from the country. The present situation resembles the situation that the High Court deemed to be associated with less risk for the children [(see paragraph 49 above)].\n[I do] not necessarily agree with the High Court\u2019s assessment. This is a complex issue, and to the extent that the question of risk can be clarified with a sufficient degree of certainty, that would require extensive investigation which would also involve the parents\u2019 relatives and other networks in countries other than Norway. That is far beyond the remit of the expert examination. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general reflections based partly on knowledge about what is common in the parents\u2019 culture, and partly on information provided by the parents themselves.\nThe children belong to the father\u2019s family. Not just to the father, but to his family. The mother has main responsibility for bringing up the children as long as they are regarded as children. It is therefore unproblematic for the father to accept that the children be returned to the mother to grow up with her. Once they are grown up, however, they will still belong to their father\u2019s family. They will be considered \u2018adult\u2019 long before the Norwegian age of majority; age of sexual maturity is a more relevant criterion than chronological age.\nFor a family that is concerned with the honour code, the actions of an adult daughter have a bearing on the whole family\u2019s honour. If she leads a life in conflict with the family\u2019s norms, particularly as regards her sexual life, this affects the whole family, which will lose all prestige in the eyes of the surrounding world. In extreme cases, the family may feel forced to track down the woman and kill her to restore the family\u2019s honour and prestige. This does not necessarily diminish with time and distance. Nor does this only apply in conservative religious families; it is more a question of culture than of religion. There are several examples of relatives tracking down women living in Western countries and committing so-called honour killings despite the family having lived in the West for many years and appearing to be modern and well-integrated.\nIf such mechanisms are at play in the father\u2019s family, the father\u2019s whereabouts are less important in relation to the risk. Nor will the risk diminish with time. The opposite may even be true. A and B are young children, and children are not in a position to disgrace their family. As they become older, keeping them under control may become much more important for the family than it is today. Preferably, they should be \u2018saved\u2019 before they have the opportunity to do anything wrong. The family could achieve this by organising another abduction and taking them to Iraq. If the children were nevertheless to bring dishonour on the family, or if the family assumed that to be the case because they lived outside the family\u2019s control, there is a possibility that A and B would risk being hunted for years and maybe even killed if their family found them.\nOn the basis of the above, [I am] of the opinion that the risk associated with disclosing A and B\u2019s whereabouts has not decreased, even though the father is abroad. This means that returning them to their mother would still entail a serious threat to their care situation, even if the mother, seen in isolation, may be able to provide proper care. Based on what is known about the mother from before, [I am] highly uncertain whether the mother would keep her and her children\u2019s identities secret from the father\u2019s family in the event that she was given a new identity and a secret address. In order for such an arrangement to be safe, the mother would probably have to break off all contact with her own family as well. It is neither realistic nor ethically justifiable to make this a condition.\u201d 54.  In the Child Welfare Expert\u2019s Commission\u2019s statement of 11 February 2014 (see paragraph 50 above), one of the two commission members had pointed out that the expert\u2019s conclusions as quoted above were not based on concrete knowledge about the situation in this family. The member had also stated that, when so much time was devoted to considerations on the family and situation in Iraq, this could easily give a wrong impression, even if doubts were also included in the report. This could easily lead to incorrect or false premises being established for the assessment of the risk associated with the mother\u2019s contact with the children in a situation where their biological father was not in the country. The other commission member had had no comments on the expert\u2019s report. 55.  The Board agreed that assessing the risk with a sufficient degree of certainty would require extensive investigation. This had not been done in this case, and the Board had no option but to base its assessment on the known facts. Based on the presentation of evidence, the Board agreed with the expert that his concerns regarding the risk had not been assuaged during the hearing before the Board. 56.  Firstly, the police still considered the children to be at high risk of being kidnapped. The police had not testified about this before the Board, but the Board had no reason to doubt the police\u2019s assessment. The Board had been informed that the foster families had to clear all visits outside the municipality with the police. At a time when the police\u2019s use of resources was under continuous evaluation, the Board saw no reason to believe that the level of protection was seen as excessive. 57.  Secondly, C had tracked down and raped the applicant in March 2012, and had also approached her later that month. In the summer of 2013 the applicant had received death threats from her half-brother, among other things, and she herself had stated that the threats had been made because C had paid her half-brother to do this. The applicant had informed the Board that she had been kept under surveillance for a prolonged period by her half-brother, who had come to Norway under an alias. She had reported this to the police, and the police had allegedly told her that her brother might possibly be expelled from Norway. However, she did not know his whereabouts. Since C had on two occasions and until quite recently used accomplices to put the applicant and/or the children in great danger, the Board considered C\u2019s actual location of less importance. There was also good reason to question whether he would stay away from Norway, given that he had appealed against the District Court\u2019s judgment in the criminal case (see paragraph 42 above). An appeal on the question of his guilt would be dismissed if he did not appear. 58.  Thirdly, C\u2019s mother in Iraq had stated that she would come to Norway if the children were not returned to the applicant. She had also said that her husband, A and B\u2019s paternal grandfather, was very ill and had been hospitalised as a result of the stress of the children being taken away from the family. These statements showed that the stress on the family as a result of the case did not seem to have diminished, but in fact still seemed to have a strong presence. The paternal grandmother\u2019s statement gave the impression that the children\u2019s fate was the family\u2019s responsibility, and not a matter that just concerned C. 59.  Fourthly, the Board considered it unlikely (\u201clite sannsynlig\u201d) that the applicant would be able to protect the children from their father if they were returned to her. When the children were younger, the applicant had repeatedly demonstrated that she was unable to protect herself and the children from C. She had moved back to C several times, despite having reported him to the police for violence against both herself and the children. He could not be prosecuted for these offences because the applicant either withdrew her previous statements or refused to make statements to the police. Since the abduction in 2011, C had contacted the applicant several times, and he had also been violent again. Despite knowing that C was behind the death threats and surveillance of her in the summer of 2013, she now believed that he did not represent a risk. It was difficult to say whether this was what the applicant actually believed or whether it had to do with her wish for the children to be returned to her. In any case, the applicant\u2019s statement indicated that she failed to realise how serious the situation was. 60.  The expert\u2019s assessment was that if the applicant were to have care and control of the children then she would probably have to break off all contact with her own family. The Board concurred with the expert\u2019s view. The applicant and C had reportedly grown up in the same neighbourhood, and the families knew each other. At least one member of the applicant\u2019s family had demonstrated that he was willing to carry out unlawful acts on behalf of C. The applicant\u2019s contact with her own family would therefore entail a significant risk of her and the children\u2019s whereabouts becoming known to C. The applicant had stated that she would be willing to break off all contact with her family if the children were returned to her. However, when at the same time she said that C was no longer a threat, it was difficult for the Board to envisage that she would be sufficiently motivated to make such a sacrifice. In the Board\u2019s assessment, C represented such a significant threat that the children would probably be at risk, even if the applicant managed to break off contact with her family. The Board referred to how C had over a period of several years demonstrated that he had both the means and the will to carry out his wishes. His rape of the applicant in March 2012, and the surveillance and death threats against her via an accomplice in the summer of 2013 showed that he had learnt nothing from the abduction in 2011. On the basis of the factors set out above, the Board assumed that, for the foreseeable future, C appeared to be prepared to use unlawful means to gain control over the applicant and the children. 61.  It had been argued before the Board, particularly by C\u2019s counsel, that the risk to the children would be lesser if they were with their applicant rather than placed in a foster family. The reasons given for this were that C and his family wanted the children to be returned to the applicant, and they would then be satisfied with the situation. The Board did not rule out the possibility that C and his family would be satisfied for a while and thus not represent any immediate threat if the children were returned. However, this had to be regarded as highly uncertain, and it would in any case depend entirely on how the applicant chose to live her life with the children. If she were to deviate from what was expected of her regarding how the children were raised, the children would again be at risk. Reference was made to the comment in the expert report that the children in a Kurdish family belonged to the father\u2019s family, and that, for example, the actions of an adult or sexually mature daughter would have a bearing on the whole family\u2019s honour. 62.  Overall, the Board found that it had been substantiated that the risk of the children and/or the applicant being subjected to criminal offences by C had remained virtually unchanged since the High Court had considered this issue in October 2012 (see paragraph 38 above). This meant that the risk associated with disclosing A and B\u2019s whereabouts had not decreased, even if C was currently in Iraq. The parents had argued that no attempts to abduct the children had been made since 2011, and this showed that the risk was significantly reduced. The Board did not share this view. According to the Board\u2019s assessment, this was because the children\u2019s whereabouts had not been disclosed and there had been a comprehensive security regime in place since July 2011. 63.  On the basis of the above, the Board concluded that the applicant had to be deemed permanently unable to provide the children with proper care, and falling within the scope of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below). This assessment also meant that her application for revocation of the care order pursuant to section 4-21 could not be granted. 64.  Since the Board concluded that the applicant was unable to provide proper care, it was not necessary to discuss whether the attachment criterion in section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below) was also satisfied. Considering how serious the case was and its profound importance to the parties involved, the Board nevertheless found grounds to discuss this issue, and started its assessment by seeking to clarify the children\u2019s functioning and care needs. 65.  The Board noted that A, the oldest daughter, had shown a lot of anger and had acted out during her initial period in foster care. She had been insecure, had not wanted her foster parents to leave her, and had slept next to her foster mother at night. She had wanted constant reassurance that she was to live in the foster home forever. This had improved considerably from approximately March 2013. Most of the anxiety had now gone, and the foster home interpreted this to mean that A now felt certain that she would not have to leave the foster home. A disliked events involving big crowds, such as end-of-term events. She had taken part in a leisure activity, but had stopped because she preferred to stay at home. The appointed psychologist, B.S., had stated before the Board that A had spontaneously told him during his visits that thieves had tried to steal her. The foster parents had told him later that A had not talked about this for a long time, and that they never talked about the abduction with A. The expert\u2019s interpretation was that A still appeared to have memories of her abduction. He also assumed that she had memories of her parents\u2019 turbulent marriage, since she was nearly three years old at the time of her emergency placement. 66.  Furthermore, the Board took into account that A had had several temporary placements, and psychologist B.S. had found her to be highly vulnerable with regard to new broken relationships. In his opinion, losing her foster parents would be a traumatic experience for A. 67.  The other daughter, B, had been six months old when placed in emergency care. She had arrived in the foster home when she was about a year old. The foster parents described her as a timid girl who only wanted to sit on her foster mother\u2019s lap. She would not let anyone get close to her except her foster mother, who could never leave a room without B following her. Gradually, the foster father had been allowed to get closer to her, first by sitting next to them while B sat on her foster mother\u2019s lap. Even at the time of the Board\u2019s decision, B had an extreme fear of losing her foster parents. In the autumn of 2013 the foster parents had gone away for the weekend. B had been to stay with an aunt who had children of the same age and whom B knew well and was fond of. The foster parents had prepared her thoroughly, telling her that they were going away for a few days, but that they would come back. When they had come to collect her, B had reacted with hysterical laughter that had turned into sobbing and crying. She had clung to her foster mother and repeated over and over again that they must never leave her again. Even now, four months later, B was still back at the stage where both the foster parents could not leave the room at once. She woke up two or three times during the night and said \u201cmummy\u201d, quietly at first. If she did not get a response immediately, she would stand up and shout \u201cmummy\u201d in a frightened voice. 68.  In his report, B.S. had concluded that A and B basically had normal abilities and were resourceful children who had developed well cognitively, socially and in terms of their motor skills. However, the children\u2019s previous experiences of their violent father, their dramatic abduction and broken relationships had made them particularly vulnerable with regard to new broken relationships. 69.  The expert had described to the Board a strong, secure and good attachment between the children and their foster parents. B had been living in the foster home since she was one year old, and she saw the foster parents as her mother and father. The same applied to A, even though she was three years old when placed in the foster home. She knew that she had another mother who loved her, but her strong attachment was to her foster home. The Board concurred with the expert\u2019s assessment, and found that the children had become strongly attached to the people with whom they were living and the environment in which they were living. In the Board\u2019s view, removing the children from their foster homes would constitute a serious trauma with the potential to do great harm. Both alternative conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below) were thus deemed to be fulfilled. 70.  As to adoption, the Board initially observed that the central question in the case was whether adoption would be in the children\u2019s best interests. Adoption was a highly invasive measure and, pursuant to case-law, particularly compelling reasons were required for consent to adoption to be granted against the biological parents\u2019 wishes. The decision had to be based on a concrete assessment, but also on general experience, as set out by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2007 page 561 (later brought before the Court, see Aune v. Norway, no. 52502/07, 28 October 2010 and paragraph 117 below):\n\u201cIn my opinion, a clear distinction cannot be drawn between general experience and individual considerations; general experience can be expressed with varying degrees of nuance, for example, based on the child\u2019s age when it was placed in the foster home and how long the placement has lasted and will last. The expert witness in this case has stated that, in his general experience, a foster home relationship is not the preferable option for the long-term placement of children who go to the foster home before forming an attachment to a biological parent; in such cases, adoption is in the child\u2019s best interests. In my opinion, considerable importance must be attached to such general, but nuanced experience. However, individual circumstances \u2013 which could weigh for or against adoption \u2013 must also be assessed in relation to general experience.\u201d 71.  The Board found the strict conditions set out by the Supreme Court fulfilled in this case. 72.  Research showed that adoption would generally give a stronger sense of security and belonging in a family situation than a foster placement. An adoption removed all doubts about where a child would grow up, and normally strengthened the attachment between the child and the adoptive parents. It was the Board\u2019s assessment that this general experience also applied in the present case. 73.  It was normally beneficial for children to have contact with their parents, even in cases where children had to live outside the home for various reasons. In principle, an adoption broke all legal ties between a child and his or her parents, and any continued contact with the biological family would normally be dependent on the adoptive parents\u2019 ability and wish to maintain such contact. 74.  Since the abduction, and following the Board\u2019s decision of 24 June 2011 (see paragraph 31 above), there had been no contact sessions between A and B and their parents for nearly three years at the time of the Board\u2019s decision of 25 February 2014. The Board therefore found that it had to be deemed that there was little attachment between the applicant and the children. This was particularly so in B\u2019s case, who was only six months old at the time of her placement in care on an emergency basis. After the emergency placement, B had had contact sessions with the applicant for about six months, but they had ended following the abduction. Therefore, no attachment could be said to exist between the applicant and B in a psychological sense. A, who had lived with the applicant for nearly three years, would probably have an attachment to her. However, this attachment also had to be deemed considerably weakened as a result of the prolonged interruption of contact. In addition, the attachment between the applicant and A probably had to be deemed tinged by a certain amount of insecurity as a result of the family situation with the violent father. 75.  In addition to the significantly weakened attachment, authorities that had previously considered the case had concluded that the high risk involved meant that contact between the children and their parents was not an option. The Board concurred with this assessment and found that it still applied. Stopping contact would therefore not have any major immediate consequences for the children, and such consequences, seen in isolation, did not constitute a strong argument against adoption. The security situation meant that the children\u2019s cultural background could not be maintained without a risk of their identities being exposed, and therefore cultural considerations could not be a strong argument against adoption either. 76.  The Board also found that the general arguments in favour of adoption applied to both A and B. In the Board\u2019s opinion, the extraordinary circumstances of their placement and the security situation gave added weight to these arguments. Adoption had clear advantages with regard to security. The children would be able to use their new names, which would mean that the risk of their identities being exposed would be significantly reduced. The foster families currently lived under a fairly strict security regime under which, for example, they could not leave the municipality without informing the police. The police\u2019s assessment was that the risk of another kidnapping remained high, and it was unavoidable that this would have a big impact on A and B\u2019s lives. Although adoption would not remove the risk entirely, the reduced risk of the children\u2019s identities being exposed would be highly beneficial. 77.  Based on the above factors, the Board found that adoption would be in A and B\u2019s best interests and that consent for adoption should be granted. 78.  The foster parents\u2019 identities were not known to the Board, and owing to security concerns they had not testified before it. This was largely why the Board had appointed expert B.S. to assess the foster parents\u2019 suitability. 79.  The foster parents had had daily care and control of A and B for nearly three years, which had to be considered a sufficient period in terms of assessing their suitability. 80.  B.S., the psychologist, had spoken very highly of the way the foster parents cared for A and B. He had described both foster homes of the two daughters as characterised by warmth, generosity and sensitivity to the children\u2019s needs. A\u2019s foster parents\u2019 counsellor had told B.S. that she considered the foster parents well suited as adoptive parents. Both children had developed a strong and secure attachment to their foster parents. They received the daily care, personal contact and security that they needed. The foster parents\u2019 suitability for the task had not been contested either \u2013 either by the applicant or by C. The Board saw no reason to doubt that the foster parents would also continue to take good care of A and B in the future, and that they were fit to bring up the children as their own. Owing to the children\u2019s age and development, obtaining their opinion was not an option. 81.  Based on the above, the Board found that the conditions set out in the Child Welfare Act were satisfied. 82.  In order to grant consent to the children\u2019s adoption, the Board also had to make a formal decision to remove the parents\u2019 parental responsibility. The Board endorsed the municipal child welfare authorities\u2019 proposal on this point, since removal of parental responsibility was necessary and in the children\u2019s best interests. On this basis, the Board consented to adoption in the parents\u2019 stead. 83.  The Board observed that the child welfare authorities had not proposed that there be an order on contact visits following the children\u2019s adoption, because of the security situation, and the applicant had argued that failing to ask the foster parents whether they would consent to her having contact constituted a procedural error. 84.  However, the Board found that even if the foster parents had given their consent for contact visits, that would be irrelevant, because such contact would entail too great a security risk. It had been clearly substantiated that there was a risk that C would try to find the children if there was provision for contact visits. Even if the applicant was prepared not to disclose information, the children could easily disclose information that would reveal their whereabouts and new names during contact with the mother. In the Board\u2019s opinion, the applicant would be at great risk of violence and threats from the father, in order for her to disclose such information. Contact visits could therefore not be considered in the children\u2019s best interests. 85.  Both parents requested that the case be reviewed by the City Court. 86.  The City Court reappointed B.S. as an expert. He delivered an updated report on 14 August 2014. Composed of one professional judge, one psychologist and one layperson, in accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 121 below), the City Court heard the case on 26 and 27 August 2014. The applicant attended with her legal aid counsel and testified. C\u2019s counsel attended, whilst C gave evidence by telephone from Iraq. The court-appointed expert was present on the second day of the hearing, and gave evidence. 87.  In its judgment of 9 September 2014, the City Court stated that removal of parental responsibility and adoption against the parents\u2019 wishes under section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act were very serious and invasive measures that required compelling reasons. The best interests of the children were the most important aspect, and the decision had to take account of this. 88.  The City Court agreed with the Board that removal of parental responsibility and adoption was nevertheless necessary in this case, and referred to the thorough grounds given by the Board for its decision. 89.  In addition, the City Court noted that the applicant\u2019s situation had improved since the Board\u2019s hearing. She had shown steady positive development and established an independent life for herself after the final breakdown of her relationship with C. The applicant was taking Norwegian language classes and undergoing training in order to improve her employment prospects. There was general agreement that, with assistance measures, she had the ability to care for children, but not two children with so traumatic a background as A and B. 90.  The girls had had many traumatic experiences. There was no doubt that C had committed serious violence against the applicant in the presence of the girls on a number of occasions. They had had to flee to different crisis centres together with the applicant. They had also moved back to a violent father with her. This had clearly been frightening for them and they were both marked by the experience, even today. 91.  The girls had been abducted by masked men during a contact session with the applicant. The men had injured the applicant, who had been hospitalised. The abduction had been planned by C, and the girls had been found with him in a flat in H. The plan had been to take the girls to Iraq. The abduction that their own father had put them through must have been a very frightening experience for them, one whose after-effects they were still struggling with. 92.  The abduction had resulted in broken relationships with their emergency foster parents when the girls had been placed in new emergency foster homes. That had necessarily been followed by another rupture when they had been placed in foster homes. As a result of their background, both girls had suffered from separation anxiety but had now become strongly attached to their foster parents. They clung to them and were afraid of losing their foster parents. 93.  The City Court reiterated the following from B.S.\u2019s report of 14 August 2014:\n\u201cThe ability to provide care must always be assessed in relation to the children\u2019s care needs. A and B have a history and display behaviour that means that they can no longer be assumed to just have the same ordinary care needs as other children their age. If the mother were to have care and control of the children, she would have to deal with the extensive additional challenges that returning them [to her] would entail. The mother\u2019s ability to reflect on the children\u2019s history and special needs seems to be limited. The expert has strong doubts as to whether the mother\u2019s ability to provide care is sufficient to meet A and B\u2019s needs in the short and long term. Returning them [to her] is therefore not assumed to be a realistic alternative if consideration for the children\u2019s best interests is to be the deciding factor.\u201d 94.  Before the City Court, expert B.S. upheld the recommendations he had made to the Board in his report of 31 January 2014 (see paragraphs 43 and 53 above). 95.  After visiting the children in their foster homes in January 2014, he had made the following statement in that respect about the children\u2019s attachment to their foster parents:\n\u201cWhen [I] last visited the foster homes, the children had started to form an attachment to their foster parents. This process has now progressed much further. [My] observations, the foster parents\u2019 statements and the foster home counsellor\u2019s assessments all point in the same direction: A and B have established strong attachments to their foster parents and perceive them as their psychological parents [(\u201csine psykologiske foreldre\u201d)].\nThe interaction between A and her foster parents was characterised by a calm, warm and intimate atmosphere. [She] related to the foster parents in the way you would expect of a child with a secure attachment to her parents. The foster parents were attentive and responded to her input, but were also clear about their expectations of her.\nB primarily related to the foster mother as her secure base for exploration. She was verbally active and spoke well, using varied language. She gave clear signals of what she wanted. The atmosphere in B\u2019s home and the interaction between her and her foster parents were the same as for A: calm, pleasant and characterised by warmth and closeness.\nThe children basically have normal abilities and are resourceful children who have developed well cognitively, linguistically, socially and with regard to their motor skills. At the same time, they have had experiences of an unusually frightening nature. They have experienced violence committed by the father against the mother, which is today considered to be as harmful to children as their being victims of violence themselves. The children may also have suffered violence at the hands of their father. Then came the broken relationship when they were taken into care, the dramatic abduction, the emergency foster home placement, and finally the foster home placement. Although the children do not have memories of these events that enable them to tell a coherent story, many observations show that they both have fragmentary memories. A\u2019s story about thieves who wanted to steal her in the other country and B\u2019s fear of a bad man can be assumed to be rooted in such memories.\nThese experiences have left the children particularly vulnerable to new broken relationships. They both display intense separation anxiety and cling to their foster parents. A has begun to relax more and seems to have achieved a sense of security that \u201cmummy\u201d and \u201cdaddy\u201d will always be there. B is in a new clingy period, triggered by the foster parents being away from her for a few nights some months ago.\nIn [my] opinion, there is no doubt that the children have a strong attachment to the people with whom they are living and the environment in which they are living. Being removed from them would constitute a serious trauma with the potential to do great harm, not least because of the vulnerability they have developed as a result of their experiences before the placement.\u201d 96.  The City Court deemed it out of the question to expose the children to the risk that returning them to the applicant would entail, and found that the conditions for this were not satisfied. They had not had any contact with their mother since the abduction on 21 June 2011. At the time of the court\u2019s examination, they had no attachment to her. The City Court had no doubt that the children had such an attachment to their foster parents that it would be harmful to them to be removed. 97.  Agreeing with the court-appointed expert, the City Court found it completely improbable (\u201chelt usannsynlig\u201d) that the parents would at any point in the future be in a position to make use of or exercise their parental responsibility. The situation was permanent, and it was in the children\u2019s best interests that the foster parents be given parental responsibility for them. 98.  It was sufficient for the removal of parental responsibility that the alternative requirement regarding attachment (as referred to in section 4-21 of the Child Welfare Act, see paragraph 114 below) was satisfied. The City Court nevertheless commented that there was still a risk with respect to C and his family. C had stated that the children meant everything to him, and the City Court did not rule out the possibility that he might make another attempt to take them to the Kurdistan-area if he found out about their whereabouts. The risk of this would increase significantly if the applicant were granted contact with her daughters again. 99.  The police had carried out a new threat assessment before the main hearing in August 2014. The following was stated in their report:\n\u201cThere is little doubt that the mother in particular, but possibly also the father, will continue to fight for parental responsibility in respect of their children. However, the police consider it improbable that they will find out where the children are under the current circumstances. The children are young and cannot make contact with the mother or father themselves.\nHowever, one should not underestimate the will the father has demonstrated to get his children back. The abduction on 21 June 2011 probably required a lot of planning, and he put considerable resources into executing the plan. In addition, the abduction showed a willingness to use violent means to achieve his goals.\nThe father himself stated to the police that he hired people to carry out the abduction. It is unclear what role the mother played in this, but given that she brought a large sum of money and a lot of clothes and other equipment to the meeting on 21 June 2011, it is not inconceivable that she might have known more than she told the police.\u201d 100.  The police had concluded that the threat level was moderate at that time because the parents did not know the children\u2019s whereabouts, but that this could change. The following had been stated in the conclusion:\n\u201cWhen applications are lodged for contact with the children, the threat situation could change significantly. The children have now reached an age where they could easily reveal the names of their foster parents and where they live. This applies regardless of where and how contact sessions are held. In addition, it is highly probable that the father, if he finds out that the mother has been granted contact with the children, may become active again. It is known that, in certain cultures, the father has a \u2018right\u2019 to the children when a marriage breaks down or similar situations arise. It was also an issue that he wanted to send the children back to his home country.\u201d 101.  The City Court found that it had been proved that a threat still existed which made it imperative to protect the children. It did not trust the applicant to be able to protect them against C if he were to become aware that she had contact with them. Nor did it trust C to accept that the children should remain in their foster homes. He had previously used accomplices and could do so again. Members of his own family could help him to take the children to the Kurdistan-area. In return for payment from C, the applicant\u2019s half-brother had also tried to threaten her into returning to their home country. 102.  The children could not be subjected to the risk of being abducted and taken to Iraq by people who were strangers to them. The City Court therefore also agreed to their identities remaining secret. This meant that there could be no contact with the applicant for fear that someone could reveal where they were living. If contact sessions were to take place, it would not be difficult to follow them home, regardless of what security measures were put in place. 103.  The City Court also agreed with the child welfare authorities that adoption offered many advantages compared with placement in a permanent foster home (see paragraph 76 above). Adoption provided a higher degree of stability (\u201ctrygghet\u201d), both for the foster parents and for the children. This was true in general, but it was particularly important to A and B, considering their history (\u201cbakgrunn\u201d). In this connection, it also had to be taken into consideration that the strict security measures that had been put in place to prevent another abduction had to be maintained. The children had changed their names and lived at secret addresses. 104.  The foster parents had a strong wish to adopt the girls. According to the court-appointed psychologist, B.S., both girls had been particularly lucky with their foster home placements. 105.  Both parents appealed to the High Court against the City Court\u2019s judgment. The applicant\u2019s appeal was not directed against the decision not to discontinue public care. In her declaration of appeal, she stated that she accepted that it had been a long time since her two children had been placed in their foster homes and that, having regard to their attachment at the time, she would not maintain the claim that they be returned to her. She appealed against the decision to remove her parental authority and authorise the children\u2019s adoption, and requested that the High Court grant her visiting rights. 106.  In a decision of 8 December 2014, the High Court unanimously refused to give the parents leave to appeal. 107.  The High Court noted that the reasons given for the City Court\u2019s judgment were relatively brief, but this was because that court had concurred with the reasons given by the Board. When looking at the Board\u2019s decision and the City Court\u2019s judgment jointly, there was no doubt (\u201cutvilsomt\u201d) that the children\u2019s best interests had been considered in a satisfactory and adequate manner. 108.  On the basis of the concrete circumstances of the case, the High Court considered that the decision was not flawed because the significance of the children\u2019s cultural background and identity had not been considered separately in the decision regarding what would be in their best interests. The same went for the question of sibling identity. The High Court found it clear that deciding to remove the parents\u2019 parental responsibility and granting consent to the children\u2019s adoption in this case was not in breach of Article 8 of the Convention or Articles 3 and 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 109.  As regards the assessment of the children\u2019s future situation with regard to security, the outcome was not central to the question of removal of parental responsibility and consent to adoption. As stated by the City Court, it was sufficient for the alternative requirement regarding attachment to be satisfied (see paragraph 98 above). This was not considered to be in dispute. Reference was made to the fact that before the High Court the applicant was no longer applying for the care order to be revoked, in view of the children\u2019s attachment to their foster homes. 110.  In any event, the High Court was of the view that there were no serious flaws in the City Court\u2019s assessment of the security situation. It did not constitute a procedural error that this question had not been examined further and that no expert witnesses with particular expertise in the foreign culture aspects of the case had been appointed. 111.  Based on the concrete circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the children had been violently abducted in 2011 and the applicant had been subjected to serious threats initiated by C as recently as 2013, there was, in the High Court\u2019s opinion, nothing to indicate that a further examination of the children\u2019s security situation would have led to a different conclusion. The City Court had based its assessment on the police\u2019s assessment that the level of threat against the children was currently moderate, since the parents did not know their whereabouts, but that the situation could change. The City Court had then carried out a concrete assessment of whether contact with the applicant could entail a risk of C initiating an abduction. In the High Court\u2019s view, this assessment had not been flawed, either in terms of the assessment of the evidence or the application of the law. 112.  The applicant appealed against the High Court\u2019s refusal to grant her leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 113.  On 5 February 2015 the Supreme Court\u2019s Committee on Leave to Appeal, composed of three Supreme Court Justices, rejected the appeal, unanimously finding that it had no prospects of success.", "references": ["8", "3", "2", "7", "5", "6", "9", "0", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Rijeka. 6.  On 10 December 1995 the applicant\u2019s employment as an unqualified worker was terminated as a result of her employer becoming insolvent. At that time she had twenty-four years and ten months of service (radni sta\u017e) recorded in her \u201cemployment book\u201d (radna knji\u017eica). 7.  The medical documentation submitted by the applicant shows that since 1993 she has been suffering from a psychiatric condition \u2013 depression and neurosis. The medical documents from various dates show her continuous incapacity of working. 8.  On 5 November 1996 the Regional Office of the Croatian Employment Bureau in Rijeka (Hrvatski zavod za zapo\u0161ljavanje, Podru\u010dna slu\u017eba u Rijeci, hereinafter \u201cthe Rijeka Employment Bureau\u201d) granted the applicant unemployment benefits in the amount of 410.89 Croatian kunas (HRK \u2013 about 55 euros (EUR)) for 468 days, starting from 11 December 1995. There was no appeal, so that decision became final. 9.  On 17 June 1997 the applicant lodged an application with the Rijeka Employment Bureau for the extension of the duration of unemployment benefits due to her ongoing temporary inability to work. She submitted a medical certificate that she had been ill and thus temporarily incapable of working. 10.  On 27 June 1997 the Rijeka Employment Bureau, relying on section 25(1)(2) of the Employment Act, renewed her entitlement to unemployment benefits until further notice. She was to receive HRK 441 (about EUR 59) per month. This entitlement was to continue unless any legally prescribed conditions for withholding the payments occurred before the entitlement period expired, or until her right to compensation ceased to exist. 11.  In December 1997 two additional pensionable years of service (sta\u017e osiguranja) were entered into the applicant\u2019s employment book. However, that did not mean that the applicant was actually employed, but only that contributions for her pension and invalidity insurance had been paid. Such contributions are regularly paid by employers. However, since the applicant was not employed, these contributions were paid by the Croatian Employment Bureau. 12.  On 26 May 1999 the Rijeka Employment Bureau provided the applicant with an \u201cemployment benefit card\u201d (kartica korisnika nov\u010dane naknade). 13.  On 27 March 2001 the Rijeka Employment Bureau terminated the applicant\u2019s entitlement to unemployment benefits with effect from 10 June 1998. It held that the deadline prescribed in section 25(1)(2) of the Employment Act had expired on 9 June 1998. 14.  On 3 April 2001 the Rijeka Employment Bureau established that the applicant was to repay it the amount of HRK 19,451.69 (about EUR 2,600). 15.  The applicant lodged appeals against both decisions with the Central Office of the Croatian Employment Bureau (Hrvatski zavod za zapo\u0161ljavanje, Sredi\u0161nja slu\u017eba, hereinafter \u201cthe Central Employment Bureau\u201d). She argued that she had the right to unemployment benefits until she retired. She also relied on her family circumstances and submitted that she was married and that her husband\u2019s pension was HRK 1400 (about EUR 188), and that they had a child of school age and an older son who was employed. However, that body dismissed both her appeals as unfounded on 11 May 2001 and 15 May 2001. It held that she had been entitled to unemployment benefits for as long as she had been unable to work, but subject to a limit of twelve months. 16.  On 25 July 2001 the applicant then lodged two administrative actions with the Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the Central Employment Bureau\u2019s decisions of 11 and 15 May 2001. She claimed that she had twenty-seven years of service, and as such was entitled to unemployment benefits until she was next employed or until she retired. 17.  On 22 September 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the claim concerning the decision of 11 May 2001 upholding the decision of 27 March 2001 (see paragraph 10 above) as ill-founded, endorsing the arguments and conclusions of the lower bodies. 18.  In a separate judgment of the same day the Administrative Court quashed the decision of 15 May 2001 which upheld the decision of 3 April 2001 by which the applicant had been ordered to repay the sum of HRK 19,451.69 (see paragraph 14 above). It instructed the parties to seek relief in civil proceedings before a competent municipal court. 19.  On 25 March 2005 the Rijeka Employment Bureau contacted the applicant by letter, proposing to reach an out-of-court settlement within fifteen days regarding the repayment of the unemployment benefits which she had received between 9 June 1998 and 27 March 2001, in total HRK 19,451.69. She was cautioned that the Rijeka Employment Bureau would otherwise be compelled to institute civil proceedings against her for repayment of the amount claimed. 20.  The applicant replied that she was in poor health, unemployed and without any income, and that in these circumstances she could not accept the obligation to repay the money sought. 21.  On 14 April 2009 the applicant lodged an application with the Rijeka Employment Bureau, seeking to overturn its 27 March 2001 decision to terminate her entitlement to unemployment benefits. It was dismissed on 29 June 2009 and this decision was upheld on appeal on 10 July 2009 as well as by the High Administrative Court on 5 July 2012. 22.  A subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicant was declared inadmissible on 19 December 2012. 23.  On 3 August 2005 the Rijeka Employment Bureau brought a civil action against the applicant for unjust enrichment, seeking repayment of HRK 19,451.69, together with statutory interest, on the basis of the unemployment benefits she had received between 10 June 1998 and 27 March 2001. 24.  On 16 November 2005 the applicant responded to the civil action, alleging, inter alia, that the Rijeka Employment Bureau\u2019s actions violated her human rights. She also submitted medical documentation demonstrating her fragile state of health, numerous health problems caused by her difficult personal situation due to long-term unemployment, the poverty in which she and her family lived, and her inability to work. She also brought a counterclaim against the Rijeka Employment Bureau, seeking payment of unemployment benefits from 31 January 2011 to the date of her future retirement, in the amount of HRK 55,680.15. 25.  On 26 June 2006 the Rijeka Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the Rijeka Employment Bureau\u2019s claim as unfounded, relying on section 55 of the Employment Mediation and Unemployment Rights Act (see paragraph 36 below). It held that the applicant could not be held responsible for the bureau\u2019s errors and negligence, particularly bearing in mind that she had not concealed any fact or misled it. The same court also rejected the applicant\u2019s counterclaim, given that a final and binding decision on her entitlement to unemployment benefits had already been adopted in the administrative proceedings, and that such a decision could not be contested in the context of civil proceedings. 26.  Both the applicant and the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged appeals against the first\u2011instance judgment. 27.  On 25 February 2009 the Rijeka County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment with regard to her counterclaim. It also allowed the Rijeka Employment Bureau\u2019s appeal and, relying on section 210 of the Civil Obligations Act, reversed the first-instance judgment in respect of the unjust enrichment claim, and ordered the applicant to pay HRK 19,451.69 plus statutory interest running form 3 August 2005 (the date of lodging the claim against the applicant) to the Rijeka Employment Bureau. It held that the applicant was obliged to return the amount in dispute in view of the fact that a legal basis for the unemployment benefits had ceased to exist on 10 June 1998. 28.  The applicant then lodged both an appeal on points of law and a constitutional complaint. 29.  On 28 April 2010 the Supreme Court declared her appeal on points of law inadmissible. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision. 30.  On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed both of her constitutional complaints as unfounded. It served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative on 27 March 2013. 31.  Meanwhile, on 5 December 2012 the applicant had replied to the Rijeka Employment Bureau\u2019s letter offering her an out-of-court settlement for the amount owed to be reimbursed in sixty instalments. She had stated that she was not able to repay the amount due because she was unemployed, in ill health and had no income. She asked the Rijeka Employment Bureau for debt relief. 32.  On 22 April 2013, before the Rijeka Municipal Court, the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged an application to enforce the Rijeka County Court\u2019s judgment of 25 February 2009 against the applicant. 33.  On 20 June 2013 the Rijeka Municipal Court issued a writ of execution in respect of the applicant\u2019s bank account(s). 34.  On 26 June 2013 the first-instance court ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of HRK 540 (about EUR 72), on account of the enforcement application and the writ of execution. 35.  By a letter of 14 August 2013 the Financial Agency (FINA) informed the first-instance court that there were no records of the applicant\u2019s active bank accounts. 36.  By a conclusion (zaklju\u010dak) of 30 September 2013 the Rijeka Municipal Court informed the Rijeka Employment Bureau about the Financial Agency\u2019s letter and ordered it to give the court information about the applicant\u2019s bank account or make a further proposal. 37.  On 22 October 2013 the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged an application to change the object of the enforcement (prijedlog za promjenu predmeta i sredstva ovrhe), and requested enforcement in relation to the applicant\u2019s movable property, given that she was unemployed and had no income, real property or motor vehicle. 38.  By a decision taken on 8 December 2014 the Rijeka Municipal Court declared the application of 22 October 2013 inadmissible on the basis that it was premature, since changing the object of enforcement is not possible before a writ of execution becomes final. 39.  The enforcement proceedings are still ongoing.", "references": ["6", "0", "3", "5", "4", "7", "2", "1", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in \u0141om\u017ca. 6.  On 7 August 2010 the applicant had a motorcycle accident in which he broke his right arm and right thigh. Between 13 and 22 December 2010 the applicant underwent an arthroscopy on his right knee. Between 25 January and 15 February 2011 the applicant underwent rehabilitation treatment in \u0141om\u017ca Regional Hospital and during this stay no dysfunction was diagnosed in his right foot. 7.  Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 8.  On an unspecified date, but not later than 27 March 2012, the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury/Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre for infringement of his personal rights, claiming that the prison healthcare system had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care during his detention and, moreover, that the cells had not met the minimum spatial requirement of 3 square metres per person and had been mouldy and infested with insects. He requested 200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation, the equivalent of approximately 48,300 euros (EUR). 9.  On 27 March 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) exempted the applicant from the court fees. 10.  On 20 January 2014 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant\u2019s legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 11.  The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the first-instance judgment. 12.  Following the defendant\u2019s appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Bia\u0142ystok Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts\u2019 opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.", "references": ["0", "8", "4", "6", "5", "7", "2", "3", "No Label", "1", "9"], "gold": ["1", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is a carrier of thalassemia disease. On an unspecified date, he contracted non\u2011reversible ischemia, which resulted in septic gangrene and the subsequent amputation of his right leg at the hip. He uses crutches, as he is neither eligible to have a prosthetic limb fitted, nor does he have the necessary financial means for such a procedure. The applicant also claims to be a drug user. 6.  On 1 May 2013 the applicant was arrested and then detained in Omonoia police station. On 7 May 2013 the public prosecutor ordered his pre-trial detention in Korydallos prison on the basis of decision no. 3386/2010 of the Three-Member Court of Appeal for Felonies (\u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2 \u0395\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u039a\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd) but he could not be admitted there as the prison was overcrowded. He was subsequently transferred back to Omonoia police station, where he remained until 28 May 2013. On that date he was transferred to Korydallos prison, where he stayed until 30 December 2013. He was subsequently transferred to Larissa prison, where he remained until 25 November 2014. On that date he was transferred to Korydallos prison, from where he was released the next day, that is to say 26 November 2014. 7.  On 13 November 2013 the applicant was convicted by the Three\u2011Member Court of Appeal for Felonies to a sentence of eight years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 euros for the offence of buying and selling drugs as a person not addicted to drugs (decision no. 5519/2013). 8.  The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention in Omonoia police station, where he had remained for a period of twenty\u2011seven days, had been very poor. He had been detained in a cell on the third floor measuring around 40 sq. m, which had held between seventeen and thirty detainees, and sometimes even more. The ventilation system had been dirty and inadequate. The cell had been filthy and unfurnished, with no beds and only a cement bench running along the length of three of the walls, which had accommodated six to eight people, including the applicant. The rest of the detainees had had no access to mattresses but slept on blankets laid on the floor. For a certain period, both male and female prisoners had been held in the cell until a certain organisation filed a complaint and the women were moved elsewhere. 9.  There had been only one shower and two floor-level toilets, one of which had not functioned. A guard had had to open the door of the cell every time the applicant needed to visit the toilet and sometimes its use had taken place in front of the other prisoners, since it had no door. He had not been provided with hygiene or cleaning products, nor had he had access to medical care despite his disability and the wounds to his leg, which had become worse owing to the conditions in which he had been detained. The food quality had been poor and he had drunk water directly from the sinks in the toilet area, without any glasses or cups. 10.  There had been no outdoor exercise or other occupational activities and, owing to the lack of space within the cell and his disability, the applicant had spent all day sitting on the cement bench. He had not had any access to a telephone or to any form of recreational activity such as television or radio. 11.  On 28 May 2013 the applicant was transferred to Korydallos prison, where he was initially admitted to the prison hospital for two days. His admission note recorded \u201cright leg amputated \u2012 unable to meet his own needs; ulcerated left tibia\u201d. On 30 May 2013 he was discharged from the prison hospital. The discharge note referred to \u201cthe right leg amputated, blood test HT 34.6%, HB 10.4 due to thalassemia minor\u201d. The applicant submitted that he had been asked to sign a declaration that he wished to stop his pharmaceutical treatment, but in fact he had never been provided with any. 12.  The applicant remained in Korydallos prison until 30 December 2013. He submitted that he had been placed in a cell with eight other prisoners instead of remaining in the hospital, where he could have received better treatment. Instead of being provided with a special bed adapted to his needs, he had had to sleep on the lower tier of a bunk bed on which he had barely been able to lie down, owing to his disability. The in-cell toilet was not screened off and its use had therefore been visible to the other prisoners. It was not adapted to his needs and its shape had made it very difficult for him to use, having only one limb. During his stay, he had not been regularly monitored by a doctor, nor had he ever been admitted to the prison hospital again after his first visit. The applicant argued that his medical situation had required him to be detained in a hospital; however, this had not been arranged, apart from the two days he had spent in the prison hospital upon his transfer to Korydallos. 13.  On 30 December 2013 the applicant was transferred to Larissa prison, where he remained until 25 November 2014. 14.  The applicant claimed that the conditions of detention had been very poor in that prison facility as well and that he had not received appropriate medical treatment. He had been placed in a cell along with many other prisoners, as the prison had been overcrowded, and he had not been provided with a special bed or special toilet facilities adapted to his needs. The cell had been filthy and insufficiently lit and ventilated. The toilet had been similar to the one in Korydallos prison. The applicant\u2019s access to outdoor exercise had been difficult and dangerous owing to his disability. 15.  The applicant submitted that he had not received appropriate medical treatment, that he had not been regularly monitored by a doctor, and that at no time had he been admitted to a hospital with access to nursing staff who would have taken appropriate measures to ensure that his needs were met. 16.  The Government\u2019s main submission concerning the applicant\u2019s detention in Omonoia police station was that it had not reached the level of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, the applicant had been detained in Omonoia police station from 8.30 p.m. on 1 May 2013 until 2 p.m. on 28 May 2013, that is to say for twenty-seven days. 17.  Omonoia police station had had five beds, all of which had pillows, mattresses and bed linen. The cell had been regularly cleaned and was intended for short-term detention only. 18.  Concerning the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in Korydallos, the Government submitted that during his imprisonment in Korydallos, the applicant had been regularly seen by a doctor. Apart from the initial two days from 28 to 30 May 2013, the applicant had been checked by doctors of various specialisms, according to his needs, on 9 November, 9 December and 19 December 2013. 19.  As regards the general conditions of his detention, the Government submitted that, in view of his disability, the applicant had been placed in cell no. 3, because it was situated on the ground floor. The cell measured 70 sq. m and had a capacity of twenty detainees. The records at the Government\u2019s disposal did not show the exact number of the applicant\u2019s fellow inmates but at the time of the Government\u2019s submissions the cell had accommodated seventeen detainees. 20.  There had been two toilets and a shower, and the detainees had had access to a yard measuring 30 sq. m. The cell had two windows ensuring sufficient light and ventilation, it had been heated and was generally in better condition than the rest of the prison cells. The wing had had a common room measuring 140 sq. m with plastic tables and a kitchen at the detainees\u2019 disposal. The cells had been regularly disinfected. 21.  The applicant had been transferred to Larissa prison on 30 December 2013, where he stayed for approximately eleven months. He had been detained in ward no. 2 on the ground floor, along with elderly detainees and detainees with disabilities. The ward was in the direct proximity of the doctor\u2019s office, it had measured 234.60 sq. m and, during the applicant\u2019s incarceration, had accommodated fifty-three detainees on average. 22.  The ward had four squat toilets and a sitting toilet, used by detainees with disabilities. It had had twenty-eight two-tier bunk beds, each with its own television. There were plastic tables and stools for everyone, as well as bedside tables and two fridges. It had been regularly disinfected and was cleaned on a daily basis. Light and ventilation were provided by five large windows. Additionally, the Government adduced examples of weekly menus during the applicant\u2019s incarceration and pointed out that the ward had had access to a yard. 23.  The inmates had had at their disposal numerous cultural and sports activities for their entertainment. Meals had been designed with the assistance of the prison doctor and special dietary needs had been accommodated. To demonstrate this point, the Government submitted examples of the various meals offered. 24.  There had been two psychologists at the prison who could be consulted at either the doctors\u2019 initiative or the detainees\u2019 request. The record submitted by the Government showed that the applicant had met with the prison psychologist twenty-seven times, and had been provided with financial, psychological and material assistance through the channel of the prison\u2019s Department of Social Service. 25.  The applicant had been provided with hygiene products, clothes, shoes and a card for making telephone calls. As regards his medical treatment, the applicant had been monitored by the prison doctors and had occasionally been transferred to Larissa hospital. In total, his medical record showed that he had been medically assisted on twenty-seven occasions either in-house or at the city hospital. 26.  The Government pointed out that the applicant had not referred to or adduced any evidence showing that he had submitted any request before the prison authorities concerning his complaints before the Court. They additionally submitted that in none of the medical documents did the applicant appear to have been a drug user, as he had falsely claimed in his application. Moreover, he had been convicted for buying and selling drugs as a non-user. Lastly, the applicant had benefited from a beneficial calculation of the days served, owing to his disability.", "references": ["8", "0", "2", "4", "9", "5", "3", "6", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Vsesvyatskaya. 6.  At the material time the applicant was a journalist at a Lithuanian weekly publication. 7.  He was also a civil activist. As was later established by the domestic courts, since approximately the summer of 1998 the applicant had identified himself as a member of an informal liberal democratic movement, Revolyutsionnoye Kontaktnoye Obyedineniye (\u201cthe Revolutionary Contact Union\u201d \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe RKO\u201d). Also, in the period from 2000 until 2004 the applicant was the founder, owner, publisher and editor-in-chief of a monthly newsletter entitled Radikalnaya Politika (\u201cRadical Politics\u201d). He determined the contents of the newsletter and published his own articles in it, as well as articles by people with similar views and excerpts from official and non-official sources of information and the mass media. He, himself, prepared each issue of the newsletter at his home address by typing it up on his personal computer, and then had it printed out and reproduced in multiple copies. The exact number of copies of each issue is unknown. The applicant then distributed the newsletter in person or through other unidentified individuals by selling it or giving it out for free at various places in Moscow. The articles touched, to a great extent, on the events in the Chechen Republic. 8.  An article headlined \u201cFrom the interview given by M. Udugov[1] to the Kavkaz Center press agency\u201d (\u201c\u0418\u0437 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0432\u044c\u044e \u041c. \u0423\u0434\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443 \u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u201d) mentioned the large-scale hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002[2] referring to it as \u201cthe action of Movsar Barayev\u2019s heroic Chechen rebels in Moscow\u201d (\u201c\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0433\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0435\u0432 \u041c\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0430\u0440\u0430 \u0411\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0435\u0432\u0430 \u0432 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u0435\u201d). It stated, in particular:\n\u201cRussia has clearly demonstrated that it is at war and permanently in danger of being hit by retaliatory blows, because its rulers have perpetrated a despicable attack on a sovereign State and are killing innocent civilians there. Even the western community is compelled to admit that Putin\u2019s Russia is waging a war aimed at the physical extermination of Chechens as an ethnic group.\u201d 9.  An article entitled \u201cInsanity [defence] of Budanov[3] [is] a guarantee of victory for Basayev[4]\u201d (\u201c\u041d\u0435\u0432\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0411\u0443\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u2013 \u0437\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433 \u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b \u0411\u0430\u0441\u0430\u0435\u0432a\u201d) commented on the case of a high-ranking Russian officer who was standing trial on charges of torture and murder for the strangulation of an 18-year-old Chechen woman and, in particular, on the judgment of the first-instance court by which the defendant had been found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. The article, of which the applicant was one of the authors, stated, in particular:\n\u201c... The whole of Chechnya is filled now with the same Budanovs \u2013 maniacs, bloodthirsty sadists, murderers and degenerates in epaulettes. Russia\u2019s whole occupying army consists of those Budanovs.\u201d 10.  It also stated that:\n\u201c... The fact that a [someone who posed a] danger [to] society, an insane maniac was in command of a regiment ... sets a new task before the revolutionary-democratic forces of Russia. From now on we should require immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of all commanders of the military and naval forces, service personnel of the Ministry of the Interior, the border guard, the police and the FSB, starting from a captain and finishing with the Commander-in-Chief \u2013 V.V.Putin.\u201d 11.  It also appealed:\n\u201cLet dozens of Chechen snipers take up their positions in the hills and the city ruins and hundreds and thousands of aggressors perish from their holy bullets! No mercy! Death to the Russian invaders!\u201d 12.  An article headlined \u201cAccomplices to the murderers of the Chechen people\u201d (\u201c\u041e \u0441\u043e\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u0443\u0431\u0438\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430\u201d), authored by a third person, commented on the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and contained the following paragraph:\n\u201cI, as a national of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (CRI), who is daily suffering from the Russian State Terror, can understand the reasons which pushed Chechen patriots to this extraordinary act. It had been brought about by the continuing attacks by Russia on the Chechen State and [the Chechen] people. There are no documents condemning the mass murder of nationals of the CRI, to say nothing of Russia\u2019s aggression against the Chechen State ... Chechen patriots, reduced to a state of despair by Russia\u2019s Terror, were compelled to commit this guerrilla act in Moscow, the capital of Russia. In so doing they pursued their sole goal, namely to alert the international community to the total genocide of the Chechen people being cynically committed by the Russian invaders\u201d. 13.  The same article mentioned the \u201cnational liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d. 14.  In an article headlined \u201cThe Chechen resistance is alive! Maskhadov has visited Dzhokhar and Argun\u201d expressions such as \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cPresident of the CRI\u201d, \u201cCommander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cthe capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar\u201d were used. 15.  In an article headlined \u201cIn memoriam, Salman Raduyev[5]\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u0421\u0430\u043b\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0432\u0430\u201d) the applicant wrote:\n\u201cChechen heroes are leaving ... Dudayev, Atteriyev, Khattab and today \u2013 Raduyev. As if they would be devoured by a scary black noisome abyss. And the name of this abyss is Russia.\u201d 16.  In the same article the applicant stated:\n\u201c... Salman Raduyev fought against Russia to his last breath, without making compromises with the murderers of his people. His life was an example of how one should fight against Russia. His death has become an example, amongst a million of such examples, of the immeasurable scoundrelism and perfidy of Russia, the pathological falsity and criminality of Russia as a State, as a civilisation, as a subject of history.\n...\nSalman Raduyev is the brightest page [in the history] of the heroic Chechen Resistance movement. He was a hero of an entire generation, not only in Chechnya, but also in Russia. His life and death are a guarantee that damned imperial Russia will be destroyed and the Chechens and all other peoples oppressed by it will finally obtain freedom. We will avenge you, Salman!\u201d 17.  In an article entitled \u201cA new joke by Vova\u201d (\u201c\u041d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0448\u0443\u0442\u043a\u0430 \u0412\u043e\u0432\u044b\u201d) the applicant stated:\n\u201cLawful convictions issued by the Sharia court of the CRI against national traitors are being executed rigorously.\u201d 18.  In the same issue of the newsletter the applicant reproduced information from the website regions.ru regarding a police operation by a unit of the regional Department of the Interior aimed at setting free Uzbek nationals who had been held in slavery by Russian nationals. The applicant headlined that article with the words \u201cRussians have slaves and dare to squawk something about Chechens\u201d (\u201c\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0442 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0441\u043c\u0435\u044e\u0442 \u0447\u0442\u043e-\u0442\u043e \u0432\u044f\u043a\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441 \u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0435\u0432\u201d). 19.  In the same issue the applicant published an article headlined \u201cOrthodox [believers] went completely nuts\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c \u043e\u0445\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043b\u0438\u201d) in which information had been given about some unidentified \u201cOrthodox theologians\u201d who, in a booklet called \u201cFoundations of the Orthodox Faith\u201d had allegedly claimed that \u201cJesus Christ [had been] crucified not by Jews but by Chechens\u201d. 20.  In an article headlined \u201c\u2018Chechen syndrome\u2019 inside out\u201d (\u201c\u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u043d\u0434\u0440\u043e\u043c \u043d\u0430\u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0442\u201d), the applicant wrote:\n\u201c... Most importantly, we realised with our hearts and skin that Freedom is, indeed, the most precious thing that a man has, the most precious treasure, the only thing worth dying for. And if [an individual is] lucky[, he or she will] take with [him or her]self to the other world at least some enemies, as selfless Chechen women do when they put on their \u2018shaheed belts\u2019. The life of a human is in any event brief and fragile and is only worth living if you are free. Otherwise it is better to die at once. As these Chechen women die.\u201d 21.  He went on as follows:\n\u201c... In supporting Chechnya at war, demonstrating our solidarity with Basayev, openly supporting Movsar Barayev in Moscow on the days of the \u2018Nord-Ost\u2019 [theatre siege], we crossed a line, a certain border, past which all connections to our past and the environment and people among which we had been born and grown up and lived broke down; we had trustingly considered ourselves to be part of them, until we read on a foreign, enemy website, and saw with our own eyes, all the awful details of the atrocities committed by [our] people in a tiny neighbouring mountain country. Hence, the Rubicon has been crossed, the choice has been made and there is no room to back off \u2013 we no longer have any other family than all peoples oppressed by \u2018our\u2019 Empire, than partisans fighting to be freed from its yoke, than famous warlords like Basayev and political parties which claim monetary compensation [from Russia] for their occupation and return of the territories Russia has annexed ...\u201d 22.  In the same article the applicant stated:\n\u201c... It is the bloody cannibalistic atrocity of this State towards a tiny and helpless mountain people that first brought this thought into our conscience: Russia must be destroyed forever, a State doing similar things to an entire nation should not exist at all!\u201d 23.  An article headlined \u201cChechnya shielded the Caucasus\u201d (\u201c\u0427\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0441\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u044e \u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u201d), authored by a third person, stated:\n\u201c... Maskhadov, Basayev, Khattab[6] and other heroes of the Chechen resistance courageously and firmly got in the way of Russia\u2019s aggression and, in fact, saved not only the independence of Chechnya but also its very existence, as well as the existence of other States in the Caucasus ...\u201d 24.  In an article entitled \u201cNo comments\u201d the applicant stated:\n\u201c... Putin\u2019s cheap propaganda can jabber as long as it wishes that Maskhadov is a bandit and that he is responsible for the \u2018Nord-Ost\u2019 [theatre siege] and the recent explosions in Tushino[7]. Anyone who shows at least some interest in contemporary Chechnya knows that it is Maskhadov who is the legitimate President of Chechnya. And until he is re-elected in accordance with the constitution of the CRI, and not the Russian constitution, any other \u2018presidents of Chechnya\u2019 are out of the question. Lawful elections of the president of the CRI under the constitution of the CRI of 1992 will only be possible when the CRI army, headed by Commander-in-Chief Maskhadov, defeats occupying Russia\u2019s illegal armed groups of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security Service, and chucks them out of the territory of independent Ichkeriya ...\u201d 25.  In an article headlined \u201cRetribution-2\u201d (\u201c\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u0435\u0437\u0434\u0438\u0435-2\u201d) the applicant stated:\n\u201c... Retribution for genocide will take place sooner or later. If we live up to it, we will be its witnesses and it would be good to become its punishing sword. Until then we are only capable of organising lamentably small candlelight vigils to commemorate all those killed and tortured in Chechnya, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland \u2013 from the White (Baltic) to the Black Seas \u2013 by our State which has become frenzied because of blood. It is impossible to live with this heavy burden in the soul, as the terrible knowledge of Russia\u2019s history requires retribution from all those who remain conscious. It is possible that the hands which hold a commemoration candle today will hold a gun tomorrow \u2013 it is hard to believe that but Lord help us to live in the happy time when this happens. For the time being we don\u2019t have any other weapons, except for the alarm bell of our words.\n... We remember and grieve for all those killed and tortured by \u2018our\u2019 Empire, hated by us. However, a better gift to all Chechens being exterminated will be not [to have] yet another meeting with candles to commemorate their genocide, but each blow struck \u2013 even though they are still weak, for now \u2013 against the criminal State which is killing them and depriving us of our freedom, mutilating our souls, striving to turn us into butchers and binding us with blood. \u2018Less words and more action\u2019 \u2013 this is the slogan of slogans of the day! Particularly given that there is much to be done for the radical anti-imperial opposition in the country!\u201d 26.  The article also read:\n\u201c... let Russia spit blood for yesterday\u2019s and today\u2019s genocide of the Chechen people \u2013 it serves it right, it deserved it. Let our commemoration candles at the meetings of 23 February turn into flaming torches, in whose purgatorial flames this rotten block, lying in the way of humankind, will burn!\u201d 27.  In the same article the applicant wrote:\n\u201c... As to the writing of inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops, one cannot overestimate the importance of those acts. From today on and until 14 [March 2004[8]] we have to strike persistently at one point: slaves, become free for at least a moment, do not participate in fake \u2018elections\u2019! We need not campaign among the limited circle of revolutionaries, human-rights activists, extremists, and members of radical and marginal social groups \u2013 they already know everything. Each direct and open appeal to ... the people other than politicised consumers of ... TV cud [\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u0438] is an open and powerful blow to the regime and will hasten its end ...\u201d 28.  In the same article the applicant also issued the following call:\n\u201c... We have to accumulate, hate and keep record of their crimes \u2013 the endless list of all those \u2018sweep operations\u2019, \u2018identity checks\u2019, \u2018counter-terrorist operations\u2019, gagging laws, unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions. It would also be good to make lists of all those who carried out a particular \u2018sweep operation\u2019 in a particular village, who instituted criminal proceedings, on whose information and on which date. It is known from the historical perspective that those people are most of all afraid of personal responsibility, which they would not be able to shift on to their commanders who had given illegal orders. One day executioners in uniforms and narks without uniforms in Moscow, as well as in Chechnya, will be held accountable to us for everything ...\u201d 29.  An article headlined \u201cKremlin looters\u201d (\u201c\u041a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043c\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u044b\u201d), authored by a third person, criticised the actions of the Russian Army in the Chechen Republic and, in particular, accused them of a large-scale extra\u2011judicial executions of civilians during a \u201csweep\u201d operation in a Chechen village in 1995. It also stated:\n\u201cIn Chechnya the Russian Army stopped existing as a military force of the State, having, once and for all, turned itself into a frenzied gang of looters and murderers; a herd intoxicated with drugs.\u201d 30.  In his \u201ceditorial note\u201d to the \u201cDeclaration of the Committee \u20182008: a free choice\u2019\u201d the applicant stated:\n\u201cWe, [the RKO] and Radikalnaya Politika, are united with the Committee and prepared to cooperate with them. Obviously, we are much more radical than them. We consider that we should not wait until 2008[9] and be worried about the Constitution but call on the people to overthrow and liquidate Putin\u2019s regime as soon as possible. We also don\u2019t consider it possible to preserve the contemporary Russian Federation as an integral State. However, we are for a common ground with all our allies, even those who are much more moderate.\u201d 31.  On the front page the following statement was published on behalf of the \u201ceditorial team\u201d:\n\u201cZelimkhan Yandarbiyev[10] died a hero and he will remain [a hero] in the memory of humankind, historians and grateful future generations. He fought the bloody Rusnya[11] as long as he could\u201d. 32.  In an article headlined \u201cThe price to be paid for genocide\u201d (\u201c\u0420\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0433\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0434\u201d) the applicant wrote:\n\u201cThe explosion in the Moscow metro[12] is justified, natural and lawful ... Chechens have a moral right to blow up everything they want in Russia, after what Russia and Russians have done to them; no objections regarding humanism or love for humankind can be accepted.\u201d 33.  In the same article the applicant stated:\n\u201cIt has been ten years since the Russian Federation and its people [began] a totally destructive genocidal war against the Chechen people, who before the war numbered only one million people\u201d. 34.  In an article headlined \u201cWill Russia be allowed to participate in the Summer Olympics in Athens?\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0443\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044e \u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044e\u044e \u043e\u043b\u0438\u043c\u043f\u0438\u0430\u0434\u0443 \u0432 \u0410\u0444\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0445?\u201d) the applicant wrote:\n\u201cRussia\u2019s bloody attack on the CRI led to, among millions of other similar bloody consequences, Russia\u2019s security forces\u2019 killing of the ex-President of the CRI, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had helped his people to repel this attack.\u201d 35.  In eight issues of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter, in a column entitled \u201cThe Good News\u201d (\u201c\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438\u201d), the applicant published information which he had copied from various news agencies\u2019 websites, such as Interfax, or websites like strana.ru and KMNews.ru. The information mostly concerned events such as deaths of federal servicemen or law-enforcement officers in the Chechen Republic; violent attacks and assaults on public officials or police officers in various regions of Russia; and so forth. 36.  On 23 February 2004 the applicant took part at an unauthorised meeting, where he displayed banners with slogans condemning the current political regime, such as: \u201cZakayev is not a terrorist, unlike Putin and Co.\u201d (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0435\u0432 \u043d\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442, \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0442 \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0430 \u0438 \u041a), \u201cEurope! Do not betray the Chechen resistance!\u201d (\u0415\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430! \u041d\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0439 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435!), \u201cRussian invaders \u2013 get out of Chechnya\u201d (\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u043a\u043a\u0443\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0442\u044b \u2013 \u0432\u043e\u043d \u0438\u0437 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u043d\u0438!), \u201cWhen will the Chechen people be freed and rehabilitated?\u201d (\u041a\u043e\u0433\u0434\u0430 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d \u0438 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u0431\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d \u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434?) and also a flag with the words \u201cRadical Party\u201d. 37.  On 10 March 2004, while participating in a meeting at Pushkin Square in Moscow, the applicant, personally and with the participation of an unidentified person, disseminated issues nos. 2 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter and informed people interested in it about the forthcoming issues, how to subscribe and other ways to financially support the newsletter, of which he was the editor-in-chief. 38.  On 18 December 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion that the views expressed in the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter amounted to appeals to extremist activities and incitement to racial, national, social and other hatred. 39.  A psychological-linguistic expert examination of the texts published by the applicant was carried out. In a report of 13 April 2004 the expert stated, in particular, that the impugned texts contained negative emotional assessments of Russia\u2019s servicemen; of people of Russian ethnicity; and of Orthodox believers. The report further mentioned that, by criticising Russia\u2019s actions in the Chechen Republic, the texts gave negative assessments of Russia, as a State; of the existing political regime; of Russia\u2019s army as a part of the machinery of the State. The report also pointed out numerous expressly negative words and expressions used by the applicants when describing Russia. It also mentioned that the impugned texts positively assessed and justified the actions and activities of a number of Chechen separatist leaders and fighters; terrorist attacks, including explosions, within the territory of Russia. 40.  On 26 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged with the above-mentioned offences and on an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for trial. 41.  At the trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. He confirmed that he had been the editor-in-chief and publisher of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter but argued that he had printed the newsletter only for himself and had not distributed it. He further argued that he had merely expressed his opinion regarding various political events in Russia, and, in particular, his civic position regarding the ongoing armed conflict in the Chechen Republic. In his words, he had never called for extremist activities or violent overthrow of the existing political regime in Russia; he had only called for a change of the leadership in the country. 42.  The District Court called and examined a number of witnesses, who submitted that they had bought the applicant\u2019s newsletter or seen him distribute it for free in public. It also examined the expert who had drawn up the report of 13 April 2004. The expert confirmed his conclusions made in the report. A number of witnesses on the applicant\u2019s behalf were also called and examined. 43.  The trial court further examined other pieces of evidence, including the expert report of 13 April 2004; written complaints from eight private individuals in which they had stated that the applicant\u2019s articles had aimed at inciting hatred and had contained insulting language in respect of Russians, Orthodox believers and law-enforcement officers; reports of seizure of issues of the applicant\u2019s newsletter; reports of a search of the applicant\u2019s flat and seizure of his computer; a report on the applicant\u2019s forensic psychiatric examination, which confirmed that he was fully able to understand the meaning of his actions and to control them. 44.  The District Court examined the applicant\u2019s arguments and those raised by his defence counsel and dismissed them as untenable on the facts of the case, with reference to the witness statements and other pieces of evidence.\n(b)  Judgment of 20 November 2006 45.  In a judgment of 20 November 2006 the District Court found the applicant guilty of \u201chaving publicly appealed to extremist activities through the mass media\u201d (Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code) and of having committed \u201cactions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity as well as at humiliating the dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of ethnicity, origin, attitude towards religion and membership of a social group, through the mass media\u201d (Article 282 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code). 46.  The trial court established the circumstances of the case, as summarised in paragraphs 6-7 above, and referred to the texts mentioned in the expert report of 13 April 2004 (see paragraph 39 above). It considered that the impugned texts had had a clear extremist leaning and incited actions prohibited by the Suppression of Extremism Act (see paragraph 69 below). In particular, in those texts the applicant had called for extremist acts, such as a forcible overthrow of the constitutional order and the President of Russia; had called for a breach of the territorial integrity of Russia; had justified and glorified terrorist acts; had called for violence against the Russian people and abased their dignity; and had incited religious discord by arguing that the Orthodox faith had been inferior and by insulting its followers. In those texts the applicant had used insulting language in respect of Russia as a State, the political regime in the country, and servicemen of Russia\u2019s armed and security forces. 47.  More specifically, the District Court observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had represented the conflict in the Chechen Republic as a war between two States \u2013 Chechnya and Russia; had approved of terrorist attacks carried out in Russia, and of the actions of criminals and terrorists aimed at the extermination of the Russian people as a nation. In this respect, the District Court referred to the applicant\u2019s relevant texts in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 16 above) and in issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above), stating that in those texts, while \u201cmentioning a number of persons implicated in terrorist and extremist activities\u201d, the applicant had used words and expressions aimed at creating positive public opinion about those persons and their criminal acts. 48.  The District Court also pointed out that \u201cthe texts of the applicant\u2019s articles contain[ed] positive assessment of the bombings in Russia perpetrated by Chechen terrorists as well as the acts of Chechen snipers from illegal armed groups who kill[ed] Russia\u2019s servicemen in Chechnya\u201d. In this respect, it quoted an extract from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 11 above) and extracts from issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 31-32 above). 49.  The trial court went on to note that the applicant had qualified Russia\u2019s actions in the Chechen Republic as aggression and had considered the Russian Army to be an occupying force. Accordingly, he \u201c[had] negatively assessed Russia\u2019s actions and those of Russia\u2019s armed forces; similarly negatively [the applicant had] assessed Russia as a State, the Russian Army as a part of the machinery of the State and Russia\u2019s servicemen as a social group\u201d. The District Court continued to state that, on the other hand, the applicant \u201c[had] represented the events in the Chechen Republic as a war waged by Russia against the Chechen people (the Chechen ethnic group) and as genocide against the Chechen people\u201d. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevant texts published in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraphs 8 and 12 above) and in issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). 50.  The District Court also observed that the applicant had justified and positively assessed the acts of Chechen rebel fighters, and that he had regarded the Chechen Republic as an independent State with its own President (A. Maskhadov), capital (Dzhokhar), constitution, armed forces and Commander-in-Chief, courts (Sharia courts) and legislation. In particular, in issue no. 1 (27), the applicant had interpreted the events in the Chechen Republic as \u201ca national liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d (see paragraph 13 above), referred to \u201clawful convictions of the Sharia court of the CRI\u201d (see paragraph 17 above), and mentioned \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cPresident of the CRI\u201d, \u201cCommander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cthe capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar\u201d (see paragraph 14 above). Also, in issue no. 3 (41) the applicant published a \u201cdecree by President Maskhadov\u201d and in the article \u201cNo comments\u201d he praised \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d as \u201cthe legitimate President of Chechnya\u201d (see paragraph 24 above). 51.  The District Court further referred to the texts in eight issues of the applicant\u2019s newsletter published in the column entitled \u201cGood news\u201d (see paragraph 35 above). It pointed out that the applicant had represented bad events in a positive way, that is to say as actions approved by the authors and by the applicant himself and as an example to be followed. The court pointed out that another example to be followed, according to the applicant, had been actions of Chechen women putting on \u201cshaheed belts\u201d; in the latter respect, the court quoted a relevant extract from the article \u201c\u2018Chechen syndrome\u2019 inside out\u201d (see paragraph 20 above). 52.  The District Court went on to observe that \u201cin all issues of his newsletter ... [the applicant had] wilfully made use of insulting characteristics, negative emotional assessments and attitudes towards ethnic, racial, national, religious and social groups\u201d. In particular, in respect of Russia as a State he had employed such negative emotional references as metaphors \u201cscary noisome abyss\u201d, \u201cbloody cannibalistic atrocity\u201d, \u201crotten block\u201d; humiliating characteristics \u201cimmeasurable scoundrelism, perfidy, pathological falsity\u201d and negative attitudes aimed at destruction (the metaphor \u201cto spit blood\u201d), which, according to the trial court, was a clear indication of an attitude aimed at inciting bloodshed. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevant extracts from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 15 above), issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraph 22 above) and issue no. 2 (40) (see paragraph 26 above). 53.  The District Court also considered that in the article headlined \u201cInsanity of Budanov, a guarantee of victory for Basayev\u201d, \u201cthe applicant [had] insult[ed ...] servicemen of the Russian Army and law-enforcement officers by launching an appeal to act criminally against them\u201d. In particular, the court stated that \u201cin that article [the applicant gave] an emotional and negative description of the servicemen of the Russian Army as a social group\u201d (see paragraph 9 above) and \u201c[made] an appeal for actions against [army] servicemen ..., such as requiring an immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of its commanders\u201d (see paragraph 10 above). In support of its relevant findings, the District Court also relied on an extract published in issue 2 (40) (see paragraph 29 above). 54.  It went on to state that \u201cby publishing and disseminating the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter [the applicant had] wilfully acted with a view to stirring up enmity and conflict, including armed conflict, on national, racial and religious grounds between citizens living in the European and Asian parts of the country and people living in the Caucasus\u201d. In this respect, the trial court referred to the applicant\u2019s \u201ceditorial note\u201d published in issue no. 2 (40) (see paragraph 30 above), observing that in that publication the applicant had \u201cdemonstrated a negative attitude towards the existing political system and Russia as a State\u201d. The trial court pointed out that \u201cthe stance taken by [the applicant] concerning the liquidation of the existing State regime (\u201cPutin\u2019s regime\u201d) presuppose[ed] not only actions in conformity with the constitution but also the possibility of deviating from it (\u201cto overthrow the regime, without really caring about the Constitution\u201d)\u201d. 55.  The court further noted that in the article \u201cRetribution-2\u201d the applicant had referred to \u201cthe following acts aimed against the State and the existing political regime in Russia: organisation of meetings concerning events in the Chechen Republic, participation in those meetings, writing inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops\u201d with the contents reflected in the relevant extracts of that article (see paragraph 25 above). The court also stated that \u201cthe applicant [had] also suggested carrying out other unlawful acts against the State and the political regime in the texts of his newsletters but [had] failed to specify which\u201d. 56.  The District Court then observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had \u201cintentionally appealed for records to be kept of such acts as \u2018sweep operations\u2019, \u2018identity checks\u2019, \u2018counter-terrorist operations\u2019, \u2018unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions\u2019, which he [had] qualified as \u2018crimes\u2019 and the persons who [had] carried them out as \u2018executioners in uniforms\u2019 and \u2018narks without uniforms\u2019\u201d. The court referred, in particular, to the applicant\u2019s appeal made in the relevant extract from the article \u201cRetribution-2\u201d (see paragraph 28 above). 57.  The trial court went on to note that in the article \u201cOrthodox [believers] went completely nuts\u201d (see paragraph 19 above) the applicant had made use of a heading carrying a negative and emotional assessment of the followers of the Orthodox denomination (\u201cwent nuts\u201d). However, in the court\u2019s words, \u201cthe content of the article [did] not correspond to its title, because it concern[ed] an isolated case (a statement that \u201cJesus Christ was crucified not by Jews but by Chechens\u201d, contained in a booklet called \u201cFoundations of the Orthodox Faith\u201d); this isolated case [was] generalised from and represented as a typical situation of Orthodox believers by virtue of using the impugned heading\u201d. In the same vein, the District Court pointed out that in issue no. 1 (27) the applicant had reproduced information concerning certain Uzbek nationals held in slavery by certain Russian citizens (see paragraph 18 above). The court noted that the applicant had entitled that article \u201cRussians have slaves and dare squawk something about Chechens\u201d and had represented an isolated fact to the readers as typical and characteristic of all Russians, whereby he had \u201cmade a negative and emotional assessment (\u2018to squawk\u2019) in respect of Russian citizens as a nation\u201d. 58.  Moreover, in issues nos. 1 (27) and 9 (35) the applicant had argued that \u201cOrthodox people [\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434] had been inferior by using insulting characteristics and negative emotional assessments of believers, discriminatory expressions in respect of the Orthodox denomination as a religion and stating that this religion, practised by Russians, should be abolished, thereby abasing the national dignity of the people practising [it]\u201d. According to the trial court, statements regarding the inferiority of the Orthodox faith had been made by the applicant in an attempt to stir up inter\u2011ethnic and racial conflicts in society so as to cause indignation in society and eventually to call for a change of the existing political regime. The court did not specify which particular articles in the above-mentioned issues contained those characteristics and assessments. 59.  Lastly, the court referred to the fact that \u201cat an unauthorised meeting on 23 February 2004 the applicant [had] called on individuals to support his movement by openly displaying banners with slogans condemning the regime\u201d (see paragraph 36 above) and during the meeting of 10 March 2004, \u201cto continue to commit crimes aimed at incitement to hatred and enmity among the population, abasement of dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of gender, nationality, language, origin or religious beliefs and membership of a social group, the applicant, personally and with a participation of an unidetified person, had distributed issues nos. 2 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter and had informed the persons interested in it about the forthcoming issues, how to subscribe and other ways to financially support the newsletter, of which he had been the editor-in-chief\u201d. In the trial court\u2019s view the applicant thus had called for extremist activities to be supported by way of their financing on a charitable basis. 60.  The District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that in the relevant articles he had made no appeals to extremist activities, and, in particular, that he had not called for the overthrow of the constitutional order nor stirred up inter-ethnic discord; and that he supported the constitutional order, the Russian Constitution and the Chechen people\u2019s right to self-determination and had merely availed himself of the right to freedom of expression. The trial court noted, with reference to the expert report of 13 April 2004, that the language used by the applicant in the impugned texts enabled the court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s actions had constituted criminal offences and that he had clearly abused his right to freedom of expression secured by the Russian Constitution. 61.  The District Court furthermore dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had been the author of only some of the articles held against him whereas the others had been written by other individuals. The court observed in this connection that the applicant had been the editor-in-chief of the newsletter and, in this capacity, had had the power to shape its editorial direction and he had been responsible for its content. 62.  As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicant, the District Court had regard to the state of his health and the fact that he had no criminal record, had positive references and had a dependant mother. At the same time it stressed the \u201chigh social danger\u201d posed by the applicant\u2019s offences and his personality and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also prohibited the applicant from practising journalism for three years to run concurrently. 63.  The applicant appealed, referring, among other things, to Article 10 of the Convention and stating that as the editor-in-chief of the impugned newsletter he had expressed in it his personal views concerning political events in Russia and his attitude, as a citizen of that country, to the war in the Chechen Republic. He had not made any appeals for extremist activities and had not declared the superiority of any one religion over another. Nor had he called for the overthrow of the constitutional order, but he had expressed the view that the Government should be changed. The applicant further pointed out that the number of copies of the newsletter in question had been so miniscule that the statements published therein had presented no public danger. He also argued that the measure of punishment imposed on him was excessively severe, given, in particular, the fact that he had no criminal record and had positive references from the place where he lived. 64.  On 23 May 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. It stated, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s newsletter had been a mass medium despite the low number of copies produced. It also considered that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts and assessed the adduced evidence and that the punishment imposed on the applicant had been justified in the circumstances of the case. 65.  The applicant was released on 21 March 2011 after he had served the prison sentence in full. In his submission, numerous requests by him for release on parole had been refused.", "references": ["3", "1", "9", "7", "8", "4", "2", "5", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants, Mr \u00d6mer Yaman (first applicant), Mr Mustafa \u00dcrek (second applicant), and Mr Kerem Bilen (third applicant) were born in 1956, 1967 and 1977 respectively. 7.  On 20 June 1999 the applicants were arrested in the course of a military operation in \u015e\u0131rnak. They were subsequently interrogated by the gendarmes in the absence of a lawyer. In their statements, the applicants accepted the charges against them and gave a detailed account of their involvement in the PKK (the Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation). 8.  On 23 June 1999 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. The first and second applicants were provided with an interpreter during their interrogation. Before the public prosecutor and the judge, the applicants denied the charges against them. They further stated that they had signed their gendarmerie statements without reading them. Following the questioning, the investigating judge remanded the applicants in custody. 9.  On 2 July 1999 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicants of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 10.  The proceedings resumed before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court and the first and second applicants were authorised to have the assistance of an interpreter. In their defence submissions before the trial court, the applicants retracted the statements they had allegedly made during the preliminary investigation stage. They submitted that the gendarmes had made them sign their statements without reading them. 11.  On 7 May 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court found the applicants guilty as charged and convicted them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. It further sentenced the applicants to life imprisonment. In convicting them, the court had regard to the applicants\u2019 statements taken by the gendarmes. 12.  On 25 March 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that during the trial certain witness statements, which had been taken on commission before other courts, had not been read out to the applicants for comment during the trial. The case was accordingly remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court. 13.  In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and therefore, the case against the applicants was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 14.  On 7 March 2005 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court complied with the decision of the Court of Cassation and witness statements that had been taken on commission were read out to the applicants for their comments. At the end of the trial, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 15.  On 17 June 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court for examination of whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5297) provided more favourable provisions for the applicants. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 16.  On 25 October 2005 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court once again convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Court, finding that this provision was more favourable to them than the corresponding provision of the new criminal code. 17.  On 30 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, holding in particular that certain documents which had been relied on by the first-instance court in its judgment were not of an official nature. 18.  On 24 April 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, after obtaining official copies of all the documents in the case file, convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 19.  On 11 December 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["7", "6", "1", "0", "5", "9", "8", "2", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Oslo, Norway. 5.  On 26 April 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and one other person in connection with a traffic accident which had resulted in death of a child. 6.  On 25 February 2003 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica convicted the applicant for endangering public traffic and sentenced him and his co-accused to one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the High Court in Podgorica quashed this judgment and remitted case back to the Court of First Instance. 8.  On 18 April 2007 the Court of First Instance adopted a new judgment and again convicted the applicant and his co-accused. But the court reduced the sentence to one year and four months\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  On 13 November 2009 the High Court further reduced the sentence of the applicant\u2019s co-accused, but upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance in respect of the applicant. 10.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent appeal against the judgment of the High Court was rejected on 14 June 2010. 11.  Following that rejection, on an unspecified date in 2010, the applicant lodged a further appeal on points of law (zahtjev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosna\u017ene presude) with the Supreme Court. 12.  On 26 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected this appeal. 13.  On 11 December 2010 the applicant lodged an action for fair redress (tu\u017eba za pravi\u010dno zadovoljenje) with the Supreme Court, complaining about the overall length of criminal proceedings. It was rejected on 31 December 2010. 14.  On 19 April 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s ultimate appeal.", "references": ["2", "9", "5", "6", "7", "1", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was born in 1967 in the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union and came to Russia in 1993. He is an apatride. 7.  On 31 July 2014 the applicant was arrested for vagrancy. On 2 August 2014 the Kalininskiy District Court in St Petersburg sentenced him to a fine and administrative removal from Russia. The court also directed that he should be detained until expulsion in the special facility for the detention of aliens in the Leningrad Region (\u0421\u0423\u0412\u0421\u0418\u0413 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u041f\u0431 \u0438 \u041b\u041e) in Krasnoye Selo. The decision described the applicant as being \u201ca native (\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0446) of the Tajikistan Republic\u201d. 8.  By letters dated 11 August and 18 November 2014, the Federal Migration Service asked the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow to issue a laissez-passer document enabling the applicant\u2019s return to Tajikistan. No reply was received. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant was fingerprinted. It was discovered that he had been registered in the police database under a different name. On 11 February 2015 the Federal Migration Service used that name to request a laissez-passer from the Embassy of Tajikistan. It did not receive a response. 10.  On 10 September 2015 the Federal Migration Service again attempted to obtain a travel document for the applicant using his original name. The Embassy did not reply. 11.  On 28 July 2016 the governor of the detention centre asked the Kalininskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the two-year limitation period in respect of the applicant\u2019s offence had expired. On 29 July 2016 the District Court granted the application. The applicant was released on 13 August 2016. 12.  While in detention, the applicant was held in standard six-person cells (Cells 509, 402, 516 and 615) measuring 27.4 square metres which were furnished with three two-tier bunk beds, six bed stands, six chairs and a table. Between October 2014 and February 2015 he was also held in a smaller cell (Cell 514, 13 sq. m, two beds) and a larger cell (Cell 315, 40.2 sq. m, four two-tier bunk beds). 13.  Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called \u201cclosed cell\u201d. The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell. 14.  The applicant complained about dim lighting, poor quality of food, insufficient outdoor exercise in cramped conditions, a lack of medical assistance and a shortage of meaningful activities. The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s allegations and submitted copies of contracts with the catering, cleaning and laundering companies and a copy of visitors\u2019 register from the medical unit.", "references": ["4", "7", "8", "9", "6", "0", "3", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lived in Nizhniy Novgorod. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Nizhniy Novgorod region. 6.  On 24 April 2004 a robbery took place at the offices of a company in Nizhniy Novgorod. On the same day the Nizhegorodskiy district police department of Nizhniy Novgorod opened a criminal case into the robbery. The Operational-Search Division of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation in the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit (\u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443 \u2013 \u201cthe ORB police unit\u201d, \u201cthe police\u201d or \u201cpolice officers\u201d) carried out operational-search activities in the case, including phone tapping. The results were declassified and transferred to S., an investigator from the investigation division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0413\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) in charge of the robbery case, on 2 June 2004. According to the police report, the robbery was committed by the applicant and five other individuals. On 4 June 2004 S. requested a court order to search the applicant\u2019s flat, on the grounds that he was suspected of committing the robbery. 7.  On 7 June 2004 Judge D. of the Nizhegorodskoy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod granted the investigator\u2019s request and ordered that the applicant\u2019s flat be searched, referring to the applicant as a suspect. 8.  From 6.18 to 7.56 a.m. on 8 June 2004 police officers searched the applicant\u2019s flat in his presence. They then took him to the offices of the ORB police unit in Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe police station\u201d). 9.  The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. His request for access to a lawyer was ignored. The police demanded that he confess to the robbery. He refused. Three of the officers who had arrested him were joined by other police officers, including K., Pr. and S. They subjected him to various forms of violence, such as punching and kicking him, blocking his airway by covering his mouth and nose with a rag, and tying him up in a painful position. They made him sit on the floor cross\u2011legged, with his hands cuffed behind his back and a bag put over his head so that he could not see anything. His feet were tied with a rope, which was connected to his neck and the handcuffs. The police officers pulled the rope to contort the applicant into a painful position, then sat on his back and jumped on him. When the applicant lost consciousness they poured water on him. He heard the officers tell each other not to leave any marks on his body. The investigator entered the room several times and demanded that the applicant write a confession. 10.  According to the applicant, his ill-treatment lasted for several hours until he wrote a confession statement as requested. 11.  According to the police records, the applicant confessed to committing the robbery with three other individuals at 9.30 a.m. on 8 June 2004. His confession was recorded in the form of a voluntary \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) by operational officer P. in room no. 329. The record stated that at 9.30 a.m. on 8 June 2004 the applicant had turned himself in to the police and reported that he had committed the crime. 12.  According to a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect in the robbery case, drawn up by S., the applicant was arrested at 9.40 a.m. on 8 June 2004, and the record was drawn up at the same time. Between 5.05 and 5.30 p.m. he was questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer appointed by S. The applicant refused to give statements, relying on his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. He was then placed in the temporary detention centre of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department. 13.  On 9 June 2004 the applicant was brought before Judge D. of the Nizhegorodskoy District Court, who granted the investigator\u2019s request for the applicant to be remanded in custody. According to the applicant, at the hearing in the presence of a lawyer appointed by his family, he complained to the judge that he had been ill-treated by police officers and had signed a confession statement as a result, but the judge did not take any action. 14.  According to the applicant, after the court hearing he was not placed in a remand centre as was normal practice. He was instead detained in the temporary detention centre of the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit police department for five days, before being placed in a remand centre, SIZO\u20111. According to the Government, the applicant was held in SIZO-1 from 9 June 2004. 15.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was charged with robbery and questioned as an accused by S. in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant pleaded his innocence and again refused to give statements. 16.  On 22 June 2004 the applicant was taken from SIZO-1 to the police station. According to him, police officers, in particular Ch., K., P. and Pr., again subjected him to ill-treatment to force him to give confession statements. 17.  On 24 June 2004 the applicant, through his lawyer, lodged complaints with the head of the remand centre, the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Presidential Human Rights Committee. He described suffering acts of violence at the hands of the police officers on 8 and 22 June 2004 (see paragraphs 9 and 16 above). He requested that action be taken and that he be placed under protection, adding that he could identify the police officers concerned. He stated that as a result of the violence he had confessed to a crime which he had never committed in a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d which had been dictated to him by the police officers and S. 18.  The applicant\u2019s account of events on 28 June 2004 is as follows. On 28 June 2004 the applicant was taken from SIZO-1 to the police station, where he was again subjected to ill-treatment and asked to give confession statements. Police officers, in particular Ch., K., P. and Pr., punched and kicked him and tied him up in painful positions. Both his legs were tied with a rope and pulled apart. As on the previous occasion on 22 June 2004, no investigative activities were carried out with the applicant. 19.  On 29 June 2004 the applicant asked a doctor at the remand centre to record the injuries allegedly inflicted on him the previous day, notably contusions to his chest which made it difficult for him to breathe and abrasions. At 11.20 a.m. the doctor, Ch., recorded circular abrasions on the lower third of both shins with a brown \u201cwet\u201d surface 1.5 to 2 centimetres wide. The doctor concluded that the injuries had been inflicted the previous day. The injuries were reported to the head of SIZO-1. 20.  On the same day the applicant, who had received no response to his previous complaint, lodged another complaint with the head of the remand centre stating that he had been beaten up at the police station on 28 June 2004, as a result of which he had sustained contusions to his ribcage and abrasions. He asked for an investigation into the incident and to be given a full medical examination. He stated that despite the severe pain in his chest the medical staff of the remand centre had refused to give him a proper medical examination. He asked the head of the remand centre to stop taking him to the police and to instead conduct any investigative activities at the remand centre in his lawyer\u2019s presence. 21.  On 30 June 2004 the applicant sent a second complaint to the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor, complaining that on 28 June 2004, in a room at the police station with the sign \u201cnos. 326-331\u201d on the door, police officers had beaten him up for several hours to force him to confess to crimes which he had not committed. Upon his return to the remand centre he had asked the medical staff to record his injuries. The applicant asked for the police officers to be prosecuted and stated that he could identify them. 22.  On 13 July 2004 a police officer, M., reported to the head of division no. 3 of the ORB police unit, which provided \u201coperational support\u201d in the applicant\u2019s criminal case, that three of the five people detained in the case had confessed to the robbery and had been cooperating with the investigation by uncovering further evidence of criminal activity by the group. According to operational information, the applicant had attempted to intimidate the co\u2011accused held in the same remand centre who had started cooperating with the investigating authority, thereby making them fear for their lives and health and hampering the investigation. The report recommended that the applicant be transferred to correctional colony IK\u201114. 23.  On 14 July 2004 S. ordered that the applicant be transferred to a unit functioning as a remand centre at IK-14 for the same reasons as those stated in the police report (see paragraph 22 above). 24.  It appears that the applicant was transferred there on 21 July 2004. 25.  The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. He was placed in a punishment cell for eighteen days. During this time he was beaten unconscious, to make him confess to a series of armed robberies, by several convicted prisoners acting on the police\u2019s instructions and with the connivance of the administration of IK-14. They punched and kicked him, hit him with a rubber truncheon and hung him upside down. Subsequently, for some time he was detained together with convicted prisoners. He was repeatedly visited by the police, in particular officers Ch. and P., who demanded that he confess to a series of robberies and beat him up when he refused. They also asked some of the convicts, in particular S.P. and A.V., to beat him up. After the beatings he could hardly move on his own. One convict, Z., threatened him with sexual violence if he did not sign confession statements. The staff of the medical unit at IK-14 allegedly refused him medical treatment. 26.  According to the applicant\u2019s medical records from IK-14, from 21 to 29 September 2004 he received inpatient treatment for a neurological disorder. 27.  On an unspecified date during his detention in IK-14 the applicant confessed to six crimes and his confessions were recorded as \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d. 28.  On 3 November 2004 at IK-14 the applicant reiterated his confession statements in the presence of S. and his lawyer. The statements were documented in a record of his questioning as an accused. According to the applicant, the confessions were the result of torture by the police and convicts, which he could not stand any longer. 29.  On 1 December 2004 S. ordered the applicant\u2019s transfer back to the remand centre on the grounds that the risk of him intimidating his co\u2011accused no longer existed since all necessary investigative measures had been carried out. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was transferred to SIZO-1. 30.  According to the Government, during his detention in IK-14 the applicant was held in a unit functioning as a remand centre. He was allowed short-term visits from his wife on 13 August and 24 September 2004. According to a letter of 29 July 2010 signed by the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor, the applicant was detained in a unit at IK\u201114 functioning as a remand centre from 6 August to 2 December 2004. 31.  The applicant submitted several envelopes with postage stamps in which he had sent letters to his family in November 2004. His handwritten address was indicated as unit no. 14 at IK-14. 32.  The applicant submitted to the Court the following witness statements recorded by a representative of the non-governmental organisation Committee Against Torture in Nizhniy Novgorod in February 2006:\n(i)  According to a statement by I.K., he was serving a sentence of imprisonment in unit no. 14 at IK-14, where he was informally given the task of monitoring discipline. In September 2004 the applicant, who was not a convicted prisoner like the others, was transferred to the unit. I.K. learned from B., who was high in the unofficial hierarchy of convicted prisoners in the unit, that the applicant had been transferred there so that he could be coerced into giving confession statements at the request of law\u2011enforcement officers by whatever means. The applicant had bruises under his eyes and haematomas on his head. He could hardly move on his own and was depressed. He was visited several times by officers from the ORB police unit. After the visits he had to seek others\u2019 help to get to his cell and looked very oppressed. On one occasion, after a visit, the applicant wrote a statement in which he described being tortured and beaten up during his interviews. I.K. handed the statement over to B. Later that day two convicts, A.V. and S.P., went to see the applicant and took him to a storage room. Through the thin plywood walls I.K. could clearly hear A.V. and S.P. yelling at the applicant and threatening him with physical and sexual violence if he kept complaining and refusing to write the statements which the police had asked him to give. On several other occasions I.K. heard one convict, Z., threaten the applicant with sexual violence if he refused to give statements. After the applicant had been coerced into giving several confession statements in a row he was no longer threatened and beaten up and soon left the colony. I.K. stated that he was ready to confirm his statements before the investigating authority and the courts, adding that he feared pressure from the police and the prosecutor\u2019s office.\n(ii)  According to a statement by G., he was serving a sentence of imprisonment in IK-14. In September 2004 the applicant, who was not a convicted prisoner like the others, was transferred to his unit. He had bruises under his eyes and complained of pain on both sides of his body and in his spine. On repeated occasions he was called for interviews by officers from the ORB police unit. The interviews began in the morning and lasted until evening. After the interviews the applicant was unable to move on his own and had fresh injuries, notably abrasions and bruises on his face. He explained that he had been beaten up by police officers. On one occasion three convicts, V., B. and Z., took him to a storage room. G. heard them yelling at the applicant and threatening him, demanding that he confess to some crimes and write confession statements as requested by the police officers. After that incident the applicant had several fresh bruises on his face.\n(iii)  According to statements by the applicant\u2019s wife, at the court hearing on 9 June 2004 the applicant looked very depressed. He had bruises on his head and abrasions on his wrists. When she visited him in IK-14 his face was bruised, he was dragging his leg behind him and had difficulty sitting down. He said that he was being detained with convicted prisoners in unit no. 14 and visited regularly by police officers demanding that he give confession statements in relation to serious crimes. During subsequent visits, on at least three occasions, the applicant looked like he had been beaten up, with abrasions and bruises on his face and head and bruises on his wrists. He had difficulty speaking, made long pauses and could hardly move. On one occasion, he said that he had signed several confession statements in a row as a result of torture. At one of the court hearings for the extension of his detention he complained of severe back pain.\n(iv)  According to the applicant\u2019s son, D.M., at the same hearing on 9 June 2004 the applicant looked very depressed and shocked. His face was swollen, his lips were smashed and he was walking with difficulty. He did not recognise his family. When visiting his father in IK-14 D.M. learned of the violence he had suffered at the hands of the police officers and convicts. 33.  The Government submitted extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records relating to the period of his detention, in particular:\n(i)  A form entitled \u201cexamination by a doctor on duty\u201d with the following pre-printed sections: \u201cheight\u201d, \u201cweight\u201d, \u201ccomplaints\u201d, \u201cpharynx and cutaneous coverings\u201d, \u201cheart and lungs\u201d, \u201carterial pressure\u201d, \u201ctuberculosis\u201d, \u201cvenereal diseases\u201d, \u201cmental diseases\u201d, \u201cviral hepatitis\u201d. The word \u201cheadache\u201d is written in the \u201ccomplaints\u201d section, while \u201cclean\u201d appears in the \u201cpharynx and cutaneous coverings\u201d section. The form does not give details as to which parts of the applicant\u2019s body were examined and where the examination took place. It is signed and dated 9 June 2004.\n(ii)  A form entitled \u201cbodily injuries upon arrival\u201d states that there were \u201cno bodily injuries\u201d on 9 April 2007 at IK-20. The form is signed and dated 9 June 2004 and contains a similar signature to the form described above. 34.  The investigating authorities carried out pre-investigation inquiries into the applicant\u2019s allegations of violence by the police and convicts acting on their instructions with the connivance of the administration of IK\u201114. No criminal proceedings were opened into his allegations. Details of the decisions taken by the investigating authorities are as follows. 35.  On 16 July 2004 an investigator from the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Nizhniy Novgorod refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 8 and 22 June 2004, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Relying on statements by S. and the police officers, who all denied the applicant\u2019s allegations, the investigator held that the applicant\u2019s allegations were not supported by evidence. 36.  On 23 August 2004 the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor found that decision lawful, well-reasoned and based on a comprehensive and impartial inquiry. 37.  On 6 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy deputy district prosecutor revoked the decision of 16 July 2004 as unlawful and ill-founded for failure to identify all the police officers concerned. 38.  On 2 August 2004 an investigator from the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 28 June 2004, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) in the actions of Ya., one of the police officers who had taken the applicant on 28 June 2004 from SIZO-1 to the police station and back. The investigator relied on statements by Ya. and S. denying any ill\u2011treatment of the applicant. The investigator held that there was no evidence that the abrasions on the applicant\u2019s shins, as described in the medical record of 29 June 2004, had been caused at the police station. 39.  On 6 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy district deputy prosecutor revoked that decision as unfounded for failure to identify all the police officers concerned. 40.  On 13 March 2006 an investigator from the district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a new decision refusing to open criminal proceedings against officer Ya., identical to the previous decision. On 31 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy district deputy prosecutor annulled that decision as unfounded. 41.  In the course of a new pre-investigation inquiry the applicant gave \u201cexplanations\u201d, describing in detail his alleged ill-treatment by police officers Ch., K., P. and Pr., and stating that he could identify several others. Pr. stated that after the applicant\u2019s arrest and before the arrival of the investigator in charge of the criminal case the police officers had interviewed the applicant. 42.  Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements denying any ill-treatment of the applicant, two more decisions refusing to open a criminal case against the police officers were issued on 10 April 2006 (annulled the same day) and 19 April 2006. 43.  On 8 April 2005 a deputy prosecutor from the Sukhobezvodnenskaya prosecutor\u2019s office, which supervised law observance in penal facilities, refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in IK-14, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. 44.  The decision stated that, according to the applicant, while in IK-14 he had been held in a punishment cell in a unit functioning as a remand centre and in unit no. 14 together with convicted prisoners, who had subjected him to psychological and physical violence to force him to give \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d. His allegations had included regular beatings by convicts A.A., B., M.K., S.P. and A.V., a member of the administration of IK-14, Captain V., and police officers, in particular P. and his subordinates. 45.  Relying on statements by police officers M., P. and Ya., the investigator S., convicts A.A., M.K., and A.V., and T., the head of the unit functioning as a remand centre, who all denied the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment, the deputy prosecutor held that the applicant\u2019s allegations were not supported by evidence. 46.  On the same day the head of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office division responsible for supervising investigations and inquiries reviewed the decision of the Sukhobezvodnenskaya prosecutor\u2019s office of 8 April 2005 and found it lawful and well-reasoned, stating that during his detention in IK-14 the applicant had confessed to six crimes, and \u201chis statements had been documented in records of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) which had been forwarded to the [Operational-Search Division of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation] in the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit (\u041e\u0420\u0411 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443)\u201d. 47.  The applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 8 April 2005, which were dismissed by various levels of prosecutor\u2019s office, as stated in a letter from an assistant Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation of 20 February 2006, and letters from the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 9 March and 10 April 2006. 48.  The applicant was tried by jury before the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court. At a preliminary hearing on 19 October 2005 he requested that the records of his questioning as an accused and some other records of investigative activities conducted in his case be excluded as evidence because the self\u2011incriminating statements recorded therein had been obtained from him under duress by police officers and convicts of IK-14. 49.  At the applicant\u2019s request the trial court heard two witnesses. The applicant\u2019s son S.I. stated that at his custody hearing, the applicant had been in a \u201cdelirious state\u201d, had had a swollen face, had been limping a lot and had been helped by others to move around. When S.I. had visited his father in IK-14 at the end of August 2004 he had had a bruise near one of the eyes, a cut lip, bluish hands and bruises and abrasions on his wrists. The applicant had written to his family in September or October 2004, asking them to lodge an official complaint regarding the beatings. However, he had then changed his mind and asked them not to do so. 50.  I.K. stated that he had served a sentence of imprisonment in IK-14. The day after his arrival the applicant had been admitted to the medical unit with complaints of pain in his back and leg. He had had bruises on his face which, according to him, had been inflicted on him by other convicts. The applicant had been taken out of the unit for visits regularly, about three times a month. I.K. had learnt from the applicant that the visitors had been the police. After the visits the applicant had been unable to walk up the stairs and had complained of pain in his head and back. 51.  The trial court found that the witness statements did not support the applicant\u2019s allegations. It noted that the disputed records had been signed by a lawyer and contained information about the applicant\u2019s procedural rights. In the court\u2019s opinion, the applicant\u2019s medical history, notably post\u2011traumatic encephalopathy, osteochondrosis of the cervical spine and a form of dystonia, which he had been diagnosed with in 1991, explained his complaints of headaches and pain in his back and legs. The court also relied on statements by S., who denied the applicant\u2019s allegations, and on the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. It held that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his confession statements had been given under duress were not based on fact and rejected his requests to have the impugned evidence declared inadmissible. 52.  On 8 June 2006 the applicant and his co-accused were convicted of theft and a series of armed robberies committed in 1998, 1999, 2002 and on 24 April 2004 by a criminal group led by two of the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused. The applicant was sentenced to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In sentencing the applicant the court applied Article 61 \u00a7 1 (i) of the Criminal Code, which provided that a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d, active cooperation in investigating a crime and exposure of other participants in a crime were extenuating circumstances which warranted a less severe punishment. 53.  The applicant appealed. He stated that after his arrest he had been beaten up by police officers and had given a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d under duress, which he had revoked at trial. His injuries had been confirmed by medical evidence. On 21 July 2004 he had been unlawfully transferred to correctional facility IK-14 under the pretext that he had intimidated his co-accused, which he had never done. He had been held in a punishment cell and then in a unit together with convicted prisoners who had subjected him to beatings as a result of which he had given self\u2011incriminating statements. This had been confirmed by witness I.K. 54.  On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment, correcting calculation errors by the trial court, and upheld the remainder of the judgment. Relying on the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings, it upheld the trial court\u2019s findings in relation to the applicant\u2019s allegations of police violence and his request for the evidence allegedly obtained under duress to be excluded. 55.  On 25 November 2013 the Varnavinskiy District Court of the Nizhniy Novgorod region reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to fifteen and a half years\u2019 imprisonment following amendments to the Criminal Code.", "references": ["8", "7", "6", "5", "0", "4", "2", "9", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was born in Uzbekistan. In 2003 his father, mother, brother and sister moved to Vladivostok in Russia and subsequently acquired Russian nationality, while he continued to live with his grandfather in Bukhara, visiting them in the summer months. After his grandfather had died and the applicant had finished the secondary school, in June 2011 he joined his family in Russia. 7.  The applicant took a mandatory blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. 8.  On 23 September 2011 the Consumer Protection Authority declared the applicant\u2019s presence in Russian undesirable (the \u201cexclusion order\u201d) on the ground that he was HIV-positive. 9.  By judgment of 19 December 2011, the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok rejected the applicant\u2019s challenge to the exclusion order, finding that it was issued in full compliance with Russian law. 10.  On 13 February 2012 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant left Russia to comply with the exclusion order.", "references": ["3", "1", "5", "9", "6", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Opaci. 6.  On 29 July 2009, the applicant was celebrating his birthday with a group of friends by a lake when they were attacked by S. who was intoxicated and carrying a hunting rifle. S. was angry because the applicant and his friends had allegedly ill-treated his uncle earlier. During the conflict, S. hit one of the applicant\u2019s friends with the barrel of his gun and fired four gunshots at the group\u2019s cars parked nearby. The applicant attempted to prevent S. from continuing shooting but was shot from a distance of some five metres into his right calf. The applicant\u2019s repeated attempts to disarm S. resulted in his receiving two more gunshots from a very short distance into his already wounded leg. 7.  As a result of the attack the applicant sustained serious injuries to his right leg which led to amputation of his leg above the knee. 8.  On 31 July 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted against S. on charges of hooliganism with the use of a firearm resulting in the causing of severe harm to the applicant\u2019s health. 9.  Between 1 and 10 August 2009 twenty-five witnesses were questioned and by 12 September 2009 most of the investigative measures were completed. 10.  On 12 August 2009 S. was declared a suspect in the criminal proceedings and on 29 December 2009 he was indicted. 11.  On 12 January 2010 S. was heard as an accused. He acknowledged his guilt, but refused to make any declarations. 12.  On 23 February 2010 the criminal case-file was remitted for examination from the C\u0103u\u0219eni Police Station to the Anenii Noi Police Station. 13.  Between March and December 2010 the Anenii Noi police conducted a new investigation into the circumstances of the case and carried out again all the investigative measures. 14.  On 14 December 2010 the case-file was transmitted to the Anenii Noi prosecutor\u2019s office with the proposal to be remitted to a court for consideration. 15.  On 20 December 2010 both the applicant and his representative were notified of the completion of the criminal investigation. 16.  On 30 December 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against S. The prosecutor\u2019s office found that according to Article 63(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person\u2019s status as suspect cannot be maintained longer than three months. Since S. was indicted on 29 December 2009, that is four months and seventeen days later, the indictment was unlawful. Therefore, all charges against S. were dropped and the proceedings discontinued. 17.  On 18 February 2011 at the request of the applicant\u2019s representative, the prosecutor general\u2019s office decided to annul its previous decision of 30 December 2010, and to resume the criminal investigation on the ground that new facts had been discovered. 18.  On 31 March 2011 the Rascani District Court upheld S.\u2019s objection against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 18 February 2011, ordering its annulment. The applicant and his representative were not summoned or informed about the proceedings.", "references": ["0", "5", "8", "9", "4", "7", "2", "3", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  On 2 October 2004 the B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Magistrates\u2019 Court issued a search warrant allowing the gendarmerie to conduct searches of public places and suspected persons in a designated area. 7.  Late at night on the same day, the gendarmerie carried out a search at the Sancak Hotel, which is owned by the applicant. The records drawn up afterwards noted that during the course of the search, a certain M.\u015e. had approached the plain-clothes officers outside the hotel and told them that he had a girl inside. It was then established that M.\u015e. trafficked women. He and a woman in the hotel were both taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 8.  The search records, which were prepared a few hours after the search and signed by the hotel\u2019s manager, showed that five women of foreign nationalities had been staying at the hotel with some men and that they had all been taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 9.  On 3 October 2004 the gendarmerie questioned several men as suspects and five women as victims. They all confirmed that they had been staying at the hotel for prostitution purposes. Some of the women were asked whether they knew of any complicity between the traffickers and the management of Sancak Hotel, to which they responded in the negative. 10.  On the same day the applicant was arrested and taken into the custody of the gendarmerie on suspicion of facilitating prostitution. 11.  On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.\u015e. before. 12.  On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel\u2019s manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13.  On 30 May 2005 the B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14.  On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15.  On 10 June 2005 the B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Magistrates\u2019 Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16.  The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17.  On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates\u2019 Court. That decision was final. 18.  On 24 May 2006 an official letter was sent to the applicant. It was indicated on the envelope that the applicant was invited to a hearing concerning his case, which would be held on 10 July 2006. The envelope did not show any confirmation that the letter had been served on him. 19.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that he had received a copy of the final decision at the registry of the B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Magistrates\u2019 Court on 11 July 2006. In support of his claim, he submitted a copy of the Assize Court\u2019s decision, on which a lawyer working at his office had noted that he had been served with the copy in person on that date. That document was later stamped and certified as an authentic copy by the registry of the domestic court. 20.  Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21.  On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22.  On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time\u2011limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Magistrates\u2019 Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor\u2019s claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.", "references": ["5", "4", "9", "1", "2", "8", "6", "7", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6.  On 17 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s son, Mr Pavel Agarkov, was taken to the Kaliningrad Emergency Hospital (\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u0438 \u0433. \u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430) with a severe head trauma. He lapsed into a coma a week later, and died on 1 February 2007. 7.  On 5 February 2007 the Moskovskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Kaliningrad (\u201cthe District Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) received a pre-investigation inquiry file containing evidence of the elements of a crime under Article 111 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code (intentional infliction of serious bodily harm causing the victim\u2019s death). 8.  The pre-investigation inquiry established that at about 5 a.m. on 17 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s son had started a fight with a certain V. In the course of the fight the applicant\u2019s son had inflicted several blows on V. with a wooden baseball bat. On the third blow the bat had struck a wall and had broken into two pieces. The applicant\u2019s son had continued to beat V. with his bare hands and kick him with his feet. V. had then managed to pick up a fragment of a broken bat and had hit the applicant\u2019s son several times on the head, causing the latter the physical injuries that resulted in his death on 1 February 2007. 9.  On 15 February 2007 an investigator of the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against V., being of the opinion that V. had acted in necessary self-defence. 10.  On 26 February 2007 the District Prosecutor set aside the above decision. Criminal proceedings into the death of the applicant\u2019s son were instituted on the same day (criminal case no. 030292/07). 11.  On 7 March 2007 V. confessed to having inflicted on the applicant\u2019s son bodily injuries which caused his death. On the same day a preventive measure in the form of an undertaking not to leave the town and to behave properly was imposed on him. 12.  On 14 March 2007 V. was charged with homicide committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary self-defence (Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). He was questioned as an accused and fully acknowledged his guilt in relation to the actions with which he was charged. 13.  On 19 March 2007 two fragments of the baseball bat were seized and examined by the investigator. 14.  On 22 March 2007 the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party. She was questioned by the investigator the same day, but could not submit any information regarding the circumstances of her son\u2019s death. During her additional questioning as a victim on 7 April 2007 she stated that her son had told her that he had been beaten by police officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad (\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0433. \u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430). 15.  The investigation established that on 17 January 2007 officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad had arrived at the scene of the incident in order to stop a disturbance of public peace caused by the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s unlawful actions. Upon his arrival at the police station the police officers, having assessed the victim\u2019s medical condition as critical, called an ambulance for him. 16.  On 6 April 2007 during an on-site verification of his testimony, V. demonstrated with the help of an assistant and an improvised object how the applicant\u2019s son had struck him with a wooden baseball bat, how this bat had broken when it struck the wall, and how he had afterwards inflicted several blows on the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s head with a fragment of this bat. 17.  On 23 April 2007 the forensic medical examination was carried out, establishing that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death had been caused by an open blunt traumatic brain injury accompanied by contused head wounds and bruises, haemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head, fractures of the skull bones, haemorrhages above and under the layers of mater, complicated by brain oedema and compression (forensic medical report no. 39/696). 18.  On 10 May 2007 the District Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and referred the case to the Moskovskiy District Court of Kaliningrad (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for examination on the merits. 19.  On 22 October 2007 the District Court returned the criminal case to the Prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of indictment and remedying of deficiencies that prevented examination of the case, in particular, the formulation of exactly how V.\u2019s actions had exceeded the limits of necessary self-defence. 20.  On 29 December 2007 the chief investigator from the Kaliningrad investigative division of the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Kaliningrad Region (\u201cthe Kaliningrad investigative division\u201d) discontinued the criminal proceedings, having arrived at the conclusion that the injuries resulting in the death of the applicant\u2019s son on 1 February 2007 had been inflicted by V. as actions of necessary self-defence. The decision was not supported by reference to any evidence. 21.  On 18 January 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh investigation. 22.  Subsequently, between 23 February 2008 and 29 October 2009 the criminal proceedings were discontinued and resumed on nine occasions. Three of the decisions, namely those of 23 February, 23 May and 30 June 2008, repeated word for word the previous decision of 29 December 2007. The following six decisions, namely the decisions of 22 November 2008 and 8 January, 20 February, 15 July, 29 August and 29 October 2009, reached the same conclusion, relying on:\n-  forensic medical report no. 39/696 of 23 April 2007 (see paragraph 17 above);\n-  statements by V. submitting that on 17 January 2007 he had had a fight with the applicant\u2019s son and had administered to the latter at least two blows to the head with a piece of broken baseball bat, following which he had called the police, who had taken the applicant\u2019s son to the police station;\n-  statements by witnesses T. and P. who were present at the scene of the fight and confirmed V.\u2019s statements;\n-  statements by police officer Erk, who arrived at the scene and saw the applicant\u2019s son squatting down, with blood streaming from his head and a bruise below his eye; he submitted that the applicant\u2019s son, V., T. and P. had been taken to the police station, following which an ambulance had been called for the applicant\u2019s son as his head was bleeding; no violence had been used against the latter;\n-  statements by duty officer Tr., who had received information about the fight and had seen the applicant\u2019s son brought to the police station in a state of alcoholic intoxication, with a lacerated wound in the region of one eye and several abrasions, following which an ambulance had been called to take him to hospital; he submitted that nobody in his presence had subjected the applicant\u2019s son to any beatings;\n-  similar statements by duty officer Ser.;\n-  statements by operative agent Mir., who saw the applicant\u2019s son at the police station with injuries to his body; he submitted that he had not seen anybody beating the applicant\u2019s son at the police station;\n-  statements by witness F., who arrived at the police station having been told that the applicant\u2019s son had been taken there; however, she had then been informed that the latter had been taken to hospital to be treated for his injuries; she further submitted that in the hospital the applicant\u2019s son told her that he had been beaten up by the police in the entrance to V.\u2019s house;\n-  statements by witness G., who had accompanied the applicant\u2019s son in his car to the scene of the fight; he submitted that the applicant had told him that he had a score to settle with a man called \u201cErik\u201d who had cooperated with the police; he had seen the applicant\u2019s son knock on a window and enter the building with a baseball bat in his hands; about fifteen minutes later he had seen the police arrive at the exit from the building; the applicant\u2019s son had been walking unassisted, he had not been handcuffed, but had been holding his head; one of the police officers had been holding a plastic bag containing two fragments of the baseball bat; the applicant\u2019s son had got into the police car and been taken to the police station; he had not seen anybody hitting the applicant\u2019s son or threatening him;\n-  statements by the applicant, who submitted that her son had told her that he had been beaten up by the police;\n-  statements by witness Min., who had heard about the fight from V.;\n-  statements by witness Mot., who had heard about the fight from T.;\n-  statements by neighbours Sukh. and Tishch., who knew nothing about the events in question;\n-  statements by witness Gor., the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s partner, who had been told by the applicant\u2019s son that he had been beaten by the police;\n-  statements by witness Ven., who was receiving treatment in the hospital at the time when the applicant\u2019s son was admitted and who submitted that the latter had told him that he had sustained the injuries through being beaten with a baseball bat;\n-  the police station\u2019s registration log, which contained no mention of the applicant\u2019s son being arrested on the 17 January 2007;\n-  expert report no. 366, according to which V. had an abrasion on his right forearm which could have been caused on 17 January 2007 by a blow from a hard blunt object;\n-  expert report no. 250 on the examination of a sample of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s skin from the left half of the parietal region of the head containing well-defined diffuse microinclusions of iron;\n-  expert report no. 52 of 2 July 2008 stating that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s open blunt brain injury had been caused by a combination of traumatic impacts in the region of the head which could have resulted from the circumstances described by V., that is to say by the infliction of multiple blows by a baseball bat fragment in the region of the head. 23.  In the meantime, the applicant repeatedly challenged the adequacy of the investigation alleging the involvement of police officers in the death of her son. In particular, she complained about the failure of the investigator to inform her of the decisions taken in the case and to explain the possible avenues for appeal. She further complained about the refusal of her requests for information about the exact time when V.\u2019s call was registered at the police station, the exact time when her son was brought to the police station and when the ambulance was called for him. The applicant also sought to have clarified the reasons why her son had not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident during the week before he lapsed into a coma, to obtain an expert examination of the bloodstains on his clothes which could have clarified whether he had been standing up or lying down when he sustained his injuries, and an expert examination which could have clarified the origin of metal particles found in the wounds of her son. 24.  In response to her complaints, the District Court on 18 August, 5 September, 26 September and 12 December 2008 found the investigator\u2019s refusals and lengthy inactivity unlawful and unjustified and ordered him to remedy the above deficiencies by conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation. 25.  On 16 December 2008 the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s clothes were seized from the applicant for expert examination. 26.  On 14 September 2009 the District Court found the investigator\u2019s inactivity unlawful, having noted that when taking the decision of 15 July 2009 the investigator had failed to comply with his own ruling of 10 July 2009 granting the applicant\u2019s requests. 27.  On 13 January 2010 the Deputy Head of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Kaliningrad Region set aside the decision of 18 January 2008 (see paragraph 21 above) as having been taken in violation of the criminal procedure. As a result, all the evidence obtained after 18 January 2008 was found inadmissible. 28.  On 15 January and 22 January 2010 forensic biological and forensic trace examinations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s clothes were ordered, which duly established that the latter had been in an upright position, or close to such a position, when the bloodstains appeared on his clothes (report no. 32 of 12 February 2010). 29.  On 22 January 2010 a forensic medical examination by an expert commission was ordered. The examination established that the open blunt traumatic brain injury inflicted on the applicant\u2019s son had been caused by at least five traumatic impacts, and that it could have arisen in the circumstances indicated by the accused V. during his questioning on 7 March 2007 and the on-site verification of his testimony on 6 April 2007 (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above) (report no. 13 of 9 February 2010). 30.  On unspecified dates the applicant and the witnesses were questioned for a second time and confirmed their previous statements. 31.  Between 14 February 2010 and 21 February 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued on five occasions on the grounds of absence of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V., and were subsequently resumed. 32.  On 4 May 2012 the District Court found the decision of 21 February 2012 unlawful and unsubstantiated. The District Court also found unlawful the investigator\u2019s failure to notify the applicant of the procedural decisions taken in reply to her requests. 33.  On 6 July 2012 the acting head of the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the decision of 21 February 2012. 34.  On 6 August 2012 the investigator for the Moskovskiy District from the Kaliningrad investigative division discontinued the criminal proceedings. The decision noted that the investigation had identified the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V. However, since the crime belonged to the category of minor crimes and had been committed over two years earlier, in 2007, V. was to be exempted from criminal liability pursuant to Article 78 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Criminal Code (exemption from criminal liability due to expiration of statutory time-limits for criminal prosecution). 35.  On 5 December 2012 the acting head for the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division took the decision to resume the proceedings in view of the necessity of conducting psycho-physiological expert examinations \u2212 using a polygraph \u2212 of the police officers who had brought the applicant\u2019s son to the police station so as to verify the veracity of their statements. 36.  According to information contained in the case file, the proceedings were still pending in December 2012. 37.  The case file contains no information regarding further developments in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death. 38.  On 28 December 2007 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers allegedly involved in the death of her son. 39.  On 6 June 2008 the chief investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers Erk., K., Tr. and Ser. of Kaliningrad\u2019s Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power by an official, actions of a public official which clearly exceed his or her authority). 40.  On 14 July 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry. In particular, the investigator was instructed to assess the actions of the police officers under Articles 125 (leaving without help a person in danger) and 306 (knowingly false accusation) of the Criminal Code. 41.  On 24 July 2008 the investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division again issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers. 42.  On 26 September 2008 the District Court found the above decision unlawful. The District Court established that no fresh inquiry had been conducted and that the instructions given in the decision of 14 July 2008 had not been complied with. 43.  On 18 November 2008 the Kaliningrad Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the decision of 26 September 2008 on appeal. 44.  On 8 February 2010 the Kaliningrad investigative division\u2019s investigator refused to open criminal proceedings against the police officers under Articles 125, 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were absent in their actions. 45.  On 19 August 2010 the District Court found the above decision lawful. The applicant did not appeal. 46.  On 25 December 2008 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate her son\u2019s death. 47.  On 31 March 2009 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. 48.  On 20 May 2009 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["3", "1", "7", "2", "4", "6", "5", "8", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 6.  On 8 March 2002 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 7.  On 9 March 2002 the applicant\u2019s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of her acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). 8.  On 11 March 2002 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant partially retracted her previous statements maintaining that she had given statements to the police under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre\u2011trial detention. 9.  On 18 March 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code. 10.  At a hearing held on 31 May 2002, the applicant gave evidence in person in the presence of her lawyer. She stated that she had left Turkey through her own means and that she went to Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Iran with the help of the people whose names she could not remember anymore. She further stated that she had stayed in camps in Greece and Iran. While she was at the camp in Iran she was not involved in many activities owing to her young age. She further maintained that she had wanted to return to Turkey due to her health condition and for family reasons. She further stated that she had turned back to Turkey through the mountains with the help of people who knew the area well. While the applicant was staying at her elder sister\u2019s house, she was arrested by the police. The applicant also claimed that she did not know any of the other accused in the case and that she had not received any training in the camps. Lastly, she stated that she had been called the code name \u201cAriel\u201d at the camp in Iran.\nWhen asked about her statements to the police, the applicant denied them, claiming that they had been taken under duress. When asked about her statements to the public prosecutor, she denied them except for the parts concerning her travel. When asked about her statements to the investigating judge, she denied them claiming once again that the police had put pressure on her. 11.  On 16 April 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced her to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  On 23 December 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "7", "9", "8", "5", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Perm. 6.  On 9 April 2007 at about 11 p.m. the applicant was stopped by the police and taken to the Dzerzhinskiy District Department of the Interior of the town of Perm (\u0414\u0437\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u041f\u0435\u0440\u043c\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe police station\u201d) for an identity check. 7.  After the applicant\u2019s identity was established the applicant was informed that he was wanted on suspicion of having committed a crime. 8.  On 10 April 2007 at 1 a.m. the applicant was placed in the cell for administrative detainees at the police station. At 9 a.m. he was handed over to a police officer, P. According to the applicant, P. subjected him to ill\u2011treatment by administering several blows to his chest, abdomen and face. 9.  Subsequently the applicant was interrogated by an investigator, B., in the presence of N. (the head of the police station), P., and Zh. (another police officer), as a witness in criminal case no. 1470 instituted on 8 March 2007 under Article 161 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (robbery). After his questioning the applicant was released. 10.  Immediately after his release on 10 April 2007 the applicant complained at the police station of having been beaten by P. 11.  On the same day the applicant went to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with bruising on the left side of his forehead. 12.  On 11 April 2007 the applicant complained of the beatings to the prosecutor\u2019s office. He was made to undergo an expert examination, which revealed the following injuries: bruises on the left side of his forehead, at the outer corner of his left eye and on the left side of his neck, and an abrasion behind his left ear. The expert concluded that the above-mentioned injuries could have been caused by his being hit by a hard blunt object(s) or by that object being drawn across the applicant\u2019s skin, possibly at the time and under the circumstances indicated by the applicant. 13.  On 9 June 2007 the investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of the town of Perm decided not to institute criminal proceedings against P., in the absence of any indication that a criminal act had been committed. Having questioned the applicant and others involved in the incident and having examined the medical evidence, the investigator found that there were no objective data confirming that the injuries had been inflicted by the police officer. The investigator noted, in particular, the discrepancies between the applicant\u2019s description of the alleged beatings and the injuries that he had actually sustained. 14.  On 27 June 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the court. 15.  On 2 July 2007 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Perm (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) declined to examine the applicant\u2019s challenge. 16.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 July 2007 the Perm Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the decision of 2 July 2007. 17.  On 24 August 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court held that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been substantiated by medical evidence. 18.  On 20 September 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 24 August 2007 (since it had been delivered in the absence of P.), and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 19.  On 9 October 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court pointed out that the decision in question had been based on the submissions of the police officers, without due assessment of the fact that the applicant, who had had no bodily injuries prior to his arrest by the police (as confirmed by I., A. and Pan.), had been diagnosed as having such injuries immediately after his release from the police station. 20.  On 13 November 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 October 2007 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 21.  On 29 November 2007 the District Court again held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court\u2019s reasoning was similar to that in respect of the judgment of 9 October 2007. 22.  Following an appeal by the district prosecutor on 20 December 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 29 November 2007 on appeal and referred the matter again for fresh examination by a different bench. 23.  On 30 January 2008 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The court found that the investigator had rightly come to the conclusion that there had been no objective information confirming the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment by the police officer, P., and that the above-mentioned conclusion had been reached on the basis of comprehensive evidence. 24.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned judgment on appeal.", "references": ["9", "5", "3", "6", "2", "8", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled. 5.  In 1977 a number of flats in a residential building located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, were assigned by the City of Moscow to the Ministry of Communications. The flats were used as temporary housing for foreign specialists seconded to the Ministry. In 1991 the flats were transferred to the Rostelekom Open Joint Stock Company, the Ministry\u2019s successor. On 18 February 2009 the flats were transferred from Rostelekom to the City of Moscow. It appears that the flats remained vacant. 6.  In 2008-2009 a group of people, including a police officer, a lawyer, a notary and several Rostelekom employees, forged documents pertaining to three flats located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, showing that the flats were owned by private individuals and, following their deaths, were inherited by their \u201cheirs\u201d. The relevant property deeds were forged by notary K. and then registered by the City Registration Department. Then the \u201cheirs\u201d sold the flats to private parties. Subsequently the flats were bought by the applicants. Each transaction with the flats was reviewed and approved by the City Registration Department. 7.  On 8 August 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the City\u2019s loss of title to the flats. 8.  On 7 December 2012 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) was recognised as a victim of the crime. 9.  On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow found nine defendants, including several Rostelekom employees, guilty of fraud. The court established, inter alia, that the defendants had forged the documents and had had unlawfully registered the flats as private property to the detriment of the City of Moscow. Notary K. was questioned as a witness. 10.  On 11 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 11.  According to the Government, notary K. was also found guilty of fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 12.  In 2014 the Housing Department brought civil actions seeking restitution of the flats. 13.  The Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims. The court invalidated the transactions in respect of the flats and the applicants\u2019 title to the flats and ordered their eviction. The court applied the domestic law provisions which allowed the owner to recover its property from a bona fide purchaser if the said property left the owner\u2019s possession against its will. The court considered that the City of Moscow had not had intent to divest itself of the flats and had a right to recover the stolen flats from the applicants. 14.  The Moscow City Court upheld the judgments of the District Court on appeal. As regards Ms Titova (application nos. 4919/16), the City Court discerned no evidence in the material of the case file that would substantiate her claim that she had bought the flat in good faith. The City Court took into account that she had bought the flat a month and a half after the previous transaction and that the purchase price of the flat had been obviously lower than its market value. In the City Court\u2019s view, Ms Titova, if having acted with due care and diligence, should have had doubts as to the legitimacy of seller\u2019s title and sale of the flat. 15.  Subsequently, the City Court refused to grant the applicants leave to bring a cassation appeal against the judgments in their respective cases. 16.  According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flats. 17.  The details pertaining to each case are summed up in Appendix II below.", "references": ["2", "6", "3", "0", "5", "1", "7", "8", "No Label", "4", "9"], "gold": ["4", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 in Abakan, the Khakassiya Republic. 5.  The applicant stood accused of theft and murder. On 22 November 2004 the Sayanogorsk Town Court in Khakassiya fixed, in the hearing held without the applicant\u2019s attendance, the opening date for the trial and ordered an extension of his pre-trial detention. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was convicted and given a custodial sentence. 6.  On 22 March 2005 the Constitutional Court held, in unrelated proceedings, that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be interpreted as guaranteeing the right of the defendant to take part in the hearing where the matter of detention was decided, to make submissions to the court and to produce evidence (Judgment no. 4-P, point 4 of the operative part). 7.  On 8 August 2013 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic quashed the Town Court\u2019s decision of 22 November 2004 in the part relating to the detention matter. Referring to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it found that the District Court had unlawfully extended the applicant\u2019s detention without giving him an opportunity to take part in the hearing or to make submissions to the court. 8.  The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for the unlawful detention from 22 November to 2 December 2004. By judgment of 16 September 2013, as upheld on appeal on 27 November 2013, the Abakan Town Court rejected his claim, holding that he was not eligible for compensation in respect of pre-trial detention because he had been found guilty and given a custodial sentence.", "references": ["0", "9", "4", "3", "7", "5", "6", "1", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Moscow. 6.  In May 2008 she married R.M. The couple settled in Moscow. 7.  On 23 July 2008 and 31 May 2012 the applicant gave birth to two children, a son and a daughter respectively. 8.  In January 2014 she and R.M. decided to separate. 9.  On 14 January 2014 R.M. took the children to the Republic of Ingushetiya without the applicant knowing. He left them with his parents (the paternal grandparents) and went back to Moscow. 10.  On 4 March 2014 the marriage between the applicant and R.M. was dissolved. 11.  On 11 March 2014 the applicant applied to the Izmaylovskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for a residence order in respect of the children. She also applied for child maintenance from R.M. 12.  On 25 June 2014 the District Court decided that the children should reside with their mother, the applicant. It further ordered R.M. to return the children to her and pay child maintenance. The judgment became final on 14 October 2014. 13.  However, R.M. refused to comply with the judgment. 14.  On 10 November 2014 the District Court issued a writ of execution. 15.  On 17 November 2014 the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in the Republic of Ingushetiya refused to institute enforcement proceedings since the debtor, R.M., resided in Moscow. 16.  On 24 November 2014 the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in Moscow opened enforcement proceedings. 17.  On 2 February 2015 the enforcement proceedings were transferred to the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in the Republic of Ingushetiya. 18.  On 12 February 2015 the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the above-mentioned decision before the District Court. 19.  On 8 April 2015 the District Court found the decision of 2 February 2015 to be unlawful. 20.  Meanwhile, on 23 March, 2 April, 14 April and 16 April 2015 a bailiff from the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service tried to enforce the judgment of 25 June 2014 without success: on 23 March and 16 April 2015 due to the emotional state of the children, on 2 April 2015 because the children were outside the territory of the Republic of Ingushetiya, and on 14 April 2015 because the applicant was absent. 21.  On 24 April 2015 the applicant challenged in court the lawfulness of the bailiffs\u2019 actions during the attempt to return the children to her on 16 April 2015, in particular: involvement of the wrong district childcare authority in the enforcement, refusal of a request by her to have the enforcement filmed, refusal to examine an objection by her concerning a psychologist participating in the enforcement, delay in notification of the enforcement, establishment during the enforcement of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s preferences as to his future living arrangements, as well as the bailiffs\u2019 inaction resulting in the failure to secure enforcement of the judgment of 25 June 2014. 22.  On 11 June 2015 the Magasskiy District Court of the Republic of Ingushetiya found the bailiffs\u2019 actions during the attempt to return the children to the applicant on 16 April 2015 to be unlawful. 23.  On 17 June 2015 a bailiff from the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service restricted R.M.\u2019s travel within the Russian Federation for six months. 24.  Meanwhile, according to the Government, on 16 June, 5 July, an unspecified date in July, 15 July and 17 August 2015 a bailiff from the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service informed the applicant that the enforcement was scheduled for 22 June, 6 July, 13 July, 27 July and 19 August 2015 respectively. On each of the five occasions R.M. took the children to the premises of the Sunzhenskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service. However, since neither the applicant nor her representative were present, the enforcement could not take place. 25.  According to the applicant, she was never informed of the enforcement dates scheduled for 22 June, 6 July, 13 July, 27 July and 19 August 2015. 26.  It appears from the case file that the notification of 16 June 2015 was sent to R.M.\u2019s address. The notifications of 15 July and 17 August 2015 were sent to the applicant\u2019s address, though there is no evidence to suggest that she received them. The case file contains no evidence that she was notified of the other two scheduled dates for carrying out the enforcement measures either. 27.  On 17 September 2015 the enforcement file was returned to the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in Moscow pursuant to the decision of the District Court of 8 April 2015 (see paragraph 19 above). 28.  On 6 October and 20 October 2015 a bailiff from the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in Moscow ordered R.M. to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014 by 13 October and 23 October 2015 respectively. He further visited R.M. at his place of residence in Moscow. It was established that the children were living with R.M.\u2019s parents in the Republic of Ingushetiya. 29.  On 23 October 2015 the deputy chief bailiff of the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service imposed an administrative fine on R.M. of 2,500 Russian roubles (RUB) for failure to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014. 30.  On 3 November 2015 a bailiff from the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service invited R.M. to the bailiffs\u2019 office on 10 November 2015 to provide explanations for his non-compliance with the judgment of 25 June 2014. 31.  On 10 November 2015 the bailiff imposed an execution fee on R.M. of RUB 5,000 for failure to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014. He was ordered to comply by 13 November 2015. 32.  On 20 November 2015 the deputy chief bailiff of the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service imposed a further administrative fine on R.M. of RUB 2,500 for failure to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014. 33.  On the same day the chief bailiff of the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service imposed an administrative fine on R.M. of RUB 1,000 for failure to comply with the lawful demands of the bailiffs. 34.  On 14 January 2016 the Commission for the Affairs of Minors and the Protection of Their Rights of the Severnoye Izmaylovo District in Moscow imposed an administrative fine on R.M. of RUB 2,000. 35.  On the same day the bailiff temporarily restricted R.M.\u2019s travel in view of his failure to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014, and ordered him to pay the imposed administrative fines. R.M. was invited to the bailiffs\u2019 office on 19 January 2016 to provide explanations for his reluctance to comply with the judgment of 25 June 2014, and was ordered to comply by 20 January 2016. 36.  At the applicant\u2019s request, on 3 February 2016 the bailiff launched a search for the children and restricted R.M.\u2019s right to drive. 37.  On 5 February 2016 the chief bailiff of the Izmaylovskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service imposed an administrative fine on R.M. of RUB 1,000 for failure to comply with the lawful demands of the bailiffs. 38.  On 13 April 2016 the bailiff telephoned R.M. and asked him to attend the bailiffs\u2019 office to provide explanations for his non-compliance with the judgment of 25 June 2014. He refused to do so. 39.  On 14 April 2016 the bailiff suspended the enforcement proceedings. 40.  According to the Government, on 5 May 2016 the bailiff informed the applicant that the enforcement was scheduled for 10 a.m. on 19 May 2016 at the children\u2019s place of residence in the Republic of Ingushetiya. However, since she failed to attend, the enforcement could not be carried out. 41.  According to the applicant, she was not informed of the enforcement scheduled for 19 May 2016. 42.  It appears from the case file that the notification of 5 May 2016 was sent to R.M.\u2019s address. 43.  The judgment of 25 June 2014 remains unenforced to date. The children continue to live with their paternal grandparents in the Republic of Ingushetiya.", "references": ["3", "7", "5", "2", "9", "1", "8", "0", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in B\u0103l\u021bi. 6.  On 5 February 2011 at 1.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested on suspicion of trafficking in human beings and placed in detention for a period of seventy-two hours, which is the maximum duration of detention under the Moldovan law before a detainee is brought before a judge. 7.  On 8 February 2011 at 10.20 a.m. the prosecutor applied to a judge for the applicant\u2019s remand in custody and at 2 p.m. the applicant was brought before a judge, who ordered his remand in custody for thirty days. It is not clear at what time the decision was adopted, but there is a handwritten note on it which states it had been presented to the applicant at 3.50 p.m., followed by the applicant\u2019s signature. 8.  The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued, inter alia, that the detention which had taken place before the court\u2019s decision of 8 February 2011 had been longer than seventy-two hours, which was the maximum duration provided for by law. He also submitted that he had not been given access to the materials in the case-file relied upon by the prosecutor when requesting his remand in custody. 9.  On 17 February 2011 the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court did not pay attention to the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had no access to the materials in the case-file. 10.  On 5 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to a judge for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention for another thirty days. A judge examined and upheld it on the same date. He ordered the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2011. 11.  On an unspecified date, the same judge issued a new decision rectifying the date of the validity of the applicant\u2019s order for remand in custody from 6 March to 6 April 2011. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 16 March 2011 the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal and quashed the decision of the lower court, after having found that the second decision modifying the date from 6 March to 6 April 2011 had not been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court found therefore that the applicant\u2019s detention had been unlawful since 6 March and ordered his immediate release. 13.  It appears from the materials contained in the case file that the applicant has been convicted at first instance and that the proceedings are still pending before the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal. According to the information provided by the parties, the applicant is currently wanted by the authorities.", "references": ["1", "7", "0", "8", "9", "5", "6", "4", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Lobnya, Moscow Region. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it transpired that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers, and there were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  At the time of the events the applicant was a first-year student at the faculty of culture studies of the State Academic University for the Humanities. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. According to him, he was beaten up by the police as they were dispersing the demonstration. 10.  At 4 a.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant was admitted to the emergency ward of Sklifosovskiy hospital where he was examined by a trauma doctor and a neurosurgeon. The examination revealed multiple bruises on the applicant\u2019s chest, spine, shoulders, knees and head. 11.  After the events of 6 May 2012 the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his studies. On 9 June 2012 he was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder and of using violence against the police during the demonstration of 6 May 2012. On the same day the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 9 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and information about the applicant\u2019s personality. The District Court noted, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s father was a Ukrainian national living in Ukraine, and that the applicant might therefore flee to avoid the investigation and trial. It concluded that those circumstances gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant, if he were at liberty, was likely to continue his criminal activity, influence witnesses, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, which was at an initial stage. 12.  On 18 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence) and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having torn a protection helmet off a police officer\u2019s head. 13.  On 11 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 9 June 2012. 14.  On 7 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow examined an investigator\u2019s request for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention. The applicant requested that an alternative preventive measure be applied pending trial, such as house arrest or a written undertaking not to leave a specified place. On the same day the District Court found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012. On 5 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision. 15.  On 2 November 2012 the Basmannyy District Court authorised a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 March 2013. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. On 3 December 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision. 16.  On 21 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were reformulated. It was additionally stated that the applicant had shouted insulting slogans and used metal barriers to obstruct the police; that at least three times he had thrown stones and pieces of tarmac at police officers and had once punched a policeman; and that he had also grabbed a police officer\u2019s uniform and had snatched a protection helmet from his hands. 17.  On 29 November 2012 Police Officer P. identified the applicant during an identification parade as a participant in the mass disorder and the person who had twice thrown pieces of tarmac at the police and tried to snatch the protection helmet from a policeman\u2019s hands. He specified that he had not seen whether the applicant had in fact succeeded in snatching the helmet or not. 18.  On 7 December 2012 the investigator of the Zamoskvoretskiy Inter\u2011district Investigation Committee of Moscow refused to open a criminal case into allegations made by the applicant that he had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by the police during his arrest. The investigator considered that the use of force by the police had been justified by the behaviour of the protesters, including the applicant, who had actively resisted their arrest and thrown various objects at the police officers. 19.  On 27 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 9 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as earlier, noting that the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. That decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 March 2013. 20.  On 22 April 2013 the Moscow City Court authorised a further extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 6 July 2013. The court noted that even though the applicant and his lawyer had already finished reading the case file, other defendants had not. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 21.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 22.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that \u201cthe reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed\u201d and that \u201cno other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings\u201d. The Moscow City Court upheld that extension order on 2 July 2013. 23.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court examined an investigator\u2019s request for an extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. The applicant presented a personal guarantee from a member of the State Duma in support of an undertaking by him to appear before the investigating authorities and the courts for the examination of his case. However, the District Court did not consider that guarantee and ordered that the applicant and his co-defendants be detained until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 24.  From 20 June 2012 until his conviction the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/5 in Moscow. There he was detained in cells no. 403 (until 20 May 2013, then from 27 May 2013 to 19 June 2013, and from 29 June 2013 to January 2014), no. 12 (until 25 May 2013), no. 317 (until 27 May 2013), and no. 4 (until 29 June 2013). 25.  The cells had the following characteristics:\n- cell no. 403: 40 sq. m. and ten sleeping places;\n- cell no. 12: 6.1 sq. m. and one sleeping place;\n- cell no. 317: 32.9 sq. m. and eight sleeping places;\n- cell no. 4: 48 sq. m. and twelve sleeping places. 26.  The parties agreed that the number of inmates in the cells had not exceeded the design capacity. They also agreed that the size of the cells and the number of detainees had allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 27.  The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in the cells. According to the applicant, prison cell no. 403 measured approximately 7 by 5 metres and housed ten inmates, including himself. The cell was inadequately lit and ventilated, was excessively hot in the summer and cold in the winter. The windows were too high to give sufficient light for reading or working with documents. A shower was allowed once a week and the lavatory pan was separated from the living space only by a plastic partition. The bed linen was old, and the beds were small for a man of his height. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. 28.  According to the Government, all of the cells had sanitary units with wash stands and the necessary furniture. The cells were equipped with ventilation, heating and lighting; the state of the sanitary facilities had been satisfactory; the bedding had been changed once a week; and the cells had been disinfected and subjected to pest control regularly. The applicant had been able to shower once a week and entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 29.  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back, and the Government\u2019s submissions in that regard, were identical to those in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-73). 30.  As regards the conditions of detention in the holding room of the Moscow City Court, the applicant submitted that the room had been poorly lit and that access to a toilet had been limited to once an hour. In addition, he had been required to strip naked and to perform sit-ups during the body search conducted in the holding room. 31.  The court proceedings began on 6 June 2013 in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued in hearing room no. 303 at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow. In January and February 2014 they took place in hearing room no. 410 at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (eight from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 32.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms, see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77). 33.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participating in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the trial on the merits. 34.  On an unspecified date Police Officer T., the alleged victim of the applicant\u2019s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that at some point he had been surrounded by the crowd and subjected to violence. T. stated that the applicant had tried to snatch the protection helmet from his hands. Another officer, M., also questioned as a witness, stated that the applicant had shouted something and thrown a stone or a piece of tarmac at a policeman. 35.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cBetween 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ...\nMoreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw pieces of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ...\nBetween 5.05 p.m. and 10 p.m. [the applicant] ... shouted insulting slogans and used metal barriers to block the police\u2019s movement ... thus preventing the arrest of the participants in the acts of mass disorder ... [The applicant], acting intentionally, at least three times threw stones and pieces of tarmac at police officers in a targeted manner ... and used violence against an unidentified police officer which did not endanger his life or health ... unidentified participants in the acts of mass disorder, acting intentionally, tore a protection helmet off an unidentified police officer\u2019s head and punched and kicked him several times in the head and body, meanwhile [the applicant] ... punched this police officer at least once.\n[The applicant] ... used violence against Police Officer T. which did not endanger his life or health ...\n... unidentified participants of the acts of mass disorder intentionally tore off [T.\u2019s] protection helmet, which [T.] continued to hold in his hands, and punched him in the head and body, whereupon [the applicant] intentionally grabbed [T.\u2019s] uniform and ... snatched the helmet from his hands.\n[The applicant] pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he had decided to attend the public gathering on 6 May 2012 ... When leaving the Malyy Kamennyy Bridge [the applicant] saw a lot of police officers equipped with bullet-proof vests, helmets and truncheons, which filled him with indignation. As nothing was happening on the stage, [the applicant] decided to return ... when leaving the venue he saw the police officers randomly arresting people while hitting them with truncheons ... [The applicant] was hit in the back three times with a truncheon. When he saw these violent acts by the police, [the applicant] approached the barriers where other protestors were standing and expressed his indignation ... Then ... he tried to leave the venue ... when somebody tore off his shirt. ... At some point [the applicant] came across police officer [T.] ... who was not wearing any helmet. [The applicant] tried to leave, but suddenly police officers ran up to him and started to beat him in the head and body, then they arrested him and ... took him to a police vehicle. [The applicant] insisted that he had committed no acts in respect of police officer [T.], had not seen his helmet and had snatched nothing from his hands.\n... the court considers the [defendants\u2019] arguments that they were protecting somebody from police officers or happened to be victims of the police\u2019s use of force as farfetched and aimed at mitigating their responsibility ...\u201d 36.  The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year under Article 318 \u00a7 1. The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 37.  The applicant appealed. He complained, in particular, that he had not used metal barriers to block the police\u2019s movement and insisted that he had been standing close to those barriers before the protestors had started to be arrested. The applicant also pointed out that the video records proved that he had not taken T.\u2019s helmet and had not used violence against him. In his opinion, the first-instance court had not assessed his statements about ill\u2011treatment by the police. 38.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 39.  The applicant was represented by a lawyer, Mr D., throughout the criminal proceedings at domestic level. On 11 January 2013 Mr D. sent the Court an introductory letter containing the outline of the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police on 6 May 2012 and of unjustified pre-trial detention. 40.  On 24 January 2013 the Registry of the Court acknowledged receipt of the introductory letter, registered under application no. 6312/13. The applicant was invited to return the completed application form within eight weeks of receipt of the Court\u2019s letter but no later than 21 March 2013. As no further correspondence had been received from the applicant, on 28 August 2013 the Registry of the Court asked him whether he was still being represented by Mr D. and reminded him to return the completed application form. 41.  On 18 September 2013 the Court received the completed application form, signed by a different lawyer, Mr Agranovskiy. It contained complaints about the conditions of detention in the remand prison, in the courtroom and during transfers to and from the prison, and of unjustified pre-trial detention.", "references": ["9", "4", "8", "6", "0", "5", "No Label", "7", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 2 June 2015 the applicant asked the Federal Migration Service to issue him a travel passport. His application was refused by reference to the fact that he had been convicted on two occasions and given suspended sentences which had not yet expired (see, for details, as regards the first conviction, Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, 23 February 2016, and, as regards the second conviction, Navalnyye v. Russia, no. 101/15, 17 October 2017). 7.  The applicant asked the court of general jurisdiction to overturn the refusal, relying in particular on the Court\u2019s finding of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in a similar case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria (no. 30943/04, 10 February 2011). 8.  On 30 September 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows:\n\u201cThe complainant\u2019s reference to the European Court\u2019s judgment of 10 February 2011 in the case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria is unsubstantiated because, in view of Mr Navalnyy\u2019s personality, there are clear indications of a real public interest that outweigh the [complainant\u2019s] right to freedom of movement.\u201d 9.  On 4 December 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment in a summary fashion. On 14 January 2016 the City Court corrected a clerical error in the date of the judgment. 10.  On 27 April 2017 the applicant was assaulted when leaving his office. The attacker threw green dye in his face and he suffered a chemical burn to his right eye. 11.  Faced with the risk of losing sight, on 3 May 2017 the applicant asked for authorisation to go to Spain for eye surgery. On the following day he was issued with a travel passport on humanitarian grounds.", "references": ["6", "4", "1", "0", "8", "9", "7", "3", "5", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited, is a limited liability company which produces theatrical performances in Maltese theatres. The second and third applicants are the two directors of the company. The fourth applicant is the artistic director of the theatrical production known as \u201cStitching\u201d, a play written by the Scottish playwright Anthony Neilson, originally published in 2002 in the United Kingdom by the publishing house Metheun Drama. The fifth as well as the third applicants are two actors engaged to perform in the mentioned production (as Stu and Abby, the main characters). 6.  In October 2008, the first applicant, via the second applicant, decided to produce the play Stitching for the theatre audiences in Malta, and proceeded to obtain the necessary performance licence from the author and his agent. The relevant authorisation was granted to the first applicant by the author and agent of the production following the payment of a fee. 7.  On 23 December 2008 the first applicant lodged an application with the Board for Film and Stage Classification (\u201cthe Board\u201d), in order for a rating certificate to be issued in terms of the Stage Regulations (see Relevant domestic law). The relevant fee was paid and a clean copy of the script submitted. 8.  At the same time, the first applicant entered into a reservation agreement with a theatre for eight dates between 13 February and 1 March 2009 and hired the third, fourth and fifth applicants in connection with the services for such play. 9.  On 20 January 2009 the Board issued a certificate (no. 0000043), which was received by the applicants on an unspecified date, stating that the play had been examined by its chairperson (T.F.) and that it was decided that it was \u201cBanned \u2013 Banned and disallowed\u201d. No reasons were provided for the decision. Before this Court the Government submitted a further classification certificate with the same conclusion, also dated 20 January 2009, which stated that the classifier was T.F., as well as C.X., A.M. and D.M. (the latter names added by means of an asterisk). The applicants submitted that they had never received the certificate submitted by the Government. The Government explained that the latter certificate was an internal document. 10.  On 23 January 2009 the first applicant, via the second applicant, sent an email, followed by a telephone call, to the chairperson of the Board enquiring about the decision. No reasons were provided by the chairperson. 11.  On 25 January 2009 the first applicant, via its legal counsel, sent a letter to the chairperson requesting a reconsideration of the decision in terms of Regulation 47 (1) of the Stage Regulations. 12.  By means of a letter of 29 January 2009 the Board informed the first applicant, via the latter\u2019s legal counsel, that the original decision was reconfirmed. The letter contained no reasons and did not list the names of the persons who had been involved in the review. 13.  On 31 January 2009 another letter was sent to the first applicant by the chairperson. It enclosed a document dated 30 January 2009 addressed \u201cto whom it may concern\u201d, which had been deposited with the Commissioner of Police, containing the reasons why the production was banned, namely:\n\u201c1.  Blasphemy against the State Religion \u2013 pages 10 and 17 5.  Reference to the abduction, sexual assault and murder of children \u2013 page 36\nIn conclusion, the play is a sinister tapestry of violence and perversion where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. The Board feels that in this case the envelope has been pushed beyond the limits of public decency.\u201d 14.  On 2 February 2009 the applicants filed a judicial protest against the chairperson, in her personal capacity and as Chairperson of the Board, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General claiming that the actions of the Board were illegal in so far as they constituted a violation of Article 39 of the Maltese Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. They considered the defendants responsible for any damage suffered. 15.  By 14 February 2009 (the day following what had to be the first performance date), no reply was received to the mentioned judicial protest. In consequence, the applicants called a press conference explaining the situation, noting that they were adhering to the law but that they were determined to perform the play at some stage. 16.  In the evening of the same day, the applicants and their legal counsel were summoned for questioning at the Police Headquarters. The applicants were sternly warned by a police inspector that they would face immediate arrest if they attempted to stage the play. 17.  Rehearsals for the production carried on unabated. According to the applicants around two hundred persons watched the rehearsals and none of them found the play objectionable. 18.  The Board\u2019s decision was not revoked and an invitation to the Chairperson to attend a rehearsal (as members of the Board sometimes did in connection with other performances) remained unanswered. 19.  On 3 March 2009 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that they had suffered a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. They also claimed damage and redress. Complaining under Article 6 they claimed that they did not have a fair hearing before the Board for Film and Stage Classification in so far as they had no hearing and no possibility to make submissions, nor were any reasons for the decision ever communicated to them. They also relied on the relevant provisions of the Maltese Constitution. 20.  By a decree of 20 October 2009 the court rejected a request for the production to be shown behind closed doors to the court and the defendants. 21.  During these proceedings the court heard several witnesses which it classified as (i) those who acted in the play and had thus read the script and performed it in rehearsals, (ii) persons who watched the rehearsals but did not read the script and (iii) the defendants who read the script but did not watch the rehearsal. 22.  The court heard the applicants, four witnesses (who had watched the rehearsals) produced by the applicants, namely, P.M. a consultant psychiatrist, J.S. an educator, child psychologist and actress, K.D. a tourism marketing executive and actor, a priest who was a former film classifier for the Archdiocese of Malta, as well as the author of the play. The latter testified that the play had been performed uninterruptedly in all parts of the world and extensively in Europe, during which time it had collected a number of awards. 23.  The author described the play as follows:\n\u201cA couple called Stewart and Abby, a very normal couple but however a couple who find themselves in relationship difficulties, there have been betrayals, they\u2019re wondering whether to continue with their relationship. Abby discovers that she is pregnant by Stewart and so a large part of the play is concerned with them discussing whether or not to have the child. Ultimately they decide to have the child but they decide to do so in order to save their relationship, one might say for somewhat impure motives, they feel that having this child will keep them together. However their relationship continues to disintegrate and at one point during a fight they are having between themselves when their attention is diverted elsewhere, the child is involved in an accident and then dies. Obviously this is a huge trauma for them and they are driven apart. They come back together again sometime later, maybe a year later and meet and for them their relationship is not quite finished and they come back together in their grief because they are the only other people who understand the depths of their grief. When they come together they can only do so in a perverted fashion, where Abby actually poses as a prostitute. She wants to make their sexual relationship a matter of commerce in order to distance herself from the emotions.\nWhat then ensues is a very violent and dark relationship, a kind of a punishment of themselves, confessions of their guilt. Eventually Abby is tipped into clinical mental illness and performs an act of self-mutilation which she believes will restore her to a virginal state, and that is what finally blows apart their relationship. In a final coda Stewart meets Abby sometime later when she has obviously received treatment for her mental illness and has in fact converted to Christianity and both of them decide to go their separate ways.\u201d 24.  He further testified as follows:\n\u201c(Concerning pornographic references) I would not for instance have used real pornographic pictures. I felt that that would be needlessly offensive for people however another director might chose to do so. ...\n(Concerning women in Auschwitz walking towards death) it should not be an unfamiliar concept that in their grief that couple confess to thoughts, to feelings that they feel guilty about. The play to some extent is about life and about death. When he talks about masturbating and using as his material pictures of women from Auschwitz, this is something that occurs when he is a small child, this occurs when he is a very young child. He says that it is the first time that he masturbated which would imply that it is reasonably early. At that time of life a young man is completely concerned with procreation, with the creation of life and he understands nothing of death, of mortality. So in fact that is what actually that phrase is about, the fact that he is confessing, he is saying I knew nothing about death, I did not look at the atrocity of life, I saw only the nudity. So it\u2019s actually nothing to do with Auschwitz, it\u2019s to do with sexual urges and it\u2019s to do with him, you know small children don\u2019t understand Auschwitz.\n(In reply to a court\u2019s question concerning the swearing/blasphemy (daag\u0127a)) well that\u2019s not a concept that ever crossed my mind. I\u2019m not a religious person.\n(Domestic court\u2019s question - Does the script allow the director to put aside certain references to things that could be described by people as hard? Will the text lose by the director leaving it out? ) I dare say that a director could remove one or two swear words but that would all have to be taken on the case by case basis, but largely speaking I would say they would suffer yes because there is a reason why every line is in every one of my plays. There\u2019s a reason for it and I\u2019m happy to stand here and justify them all day.\n(Domestic court\u2019s question - As far as Stitching is concerned an omission by the director could affect the whole performance?) Yes absolutely.\u201d 25.  P.M., a consultant psychiatrist, stated that in his opinion the play was a love story which unfortunately turned very badly. He explained that following the death of their son through their own negligence, the main characters had a relationship based on various fantasies, until the female character became mentally ill. It was a sad story, with however a redeeming feature, in that the two finally manage to get back a balance in their life. He testified that there was nothing pornographic in the story and the bad language was in the context of the emotions being felt by the couple. 26.  J.S., a child psychologist, stated that in her opinion the play concerned a tragedy of a couple going through a crisis, which reached its peak when their son had died in an accident. She explained that the couple tried to connect in ways which were not necessarily conventional. She considered that it was a sensitive play that called for a mature audience. In reply to a court\u2019s question concerning a specific part of the text, J.S. replied that she was not shocked because she could not dissociate her female gender from her being a psychologist. 27.  The priest (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) considered that he would have classified it for wise adults (bil-g\u0127aqal). He explained that when a person was suffering she or he \u201cmay lose it\u201d and enter into areas which decent people may object to. However, in his view that was the human reality. When one was ready to study illnesses and the suffering of people who were going through pain one must be democratic and tolerant and give society the chance to understand those not living normally. 28.  K.D. (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) testified that most of the dialogue was between two people who had certain hang-ups and inter personal problems, and who in a quest to get closer, nearly started a competition between them as to who was the more outrageous. Nevertheless, in his view, at some point one could tell that they were flirting with each other despite them being outrageous. 29.  The third applicant who was performing as Abby stated that she did not find the play offensive in any way, noting that the emotions were very real and that she felt that it was a love story. She also testified that no pornography was used as props. 30.  The applicants also submitted that the script could be purchased and read by any person in Malta, without hindrance. 31.  The defendants produced the witness testimony of the members of the Board and other individuals, as explained below. 32.  Another priest (who read the script but did not see the play) felt that the script was offensive in various parts and dehumanising. He was annoyed by the blasphemous words and the reference to the Moors murderer, and very annoyed at the reference to the Holocaust. Further, he considered that the woman was being put forward as an object, and while it was possible that it was her choice, he thought she was totally subordinate to the man. 33.  T.M. (a member of the Board who only read the script) had no doubt that it would have been better had they watched the theatrical production. He, however, explained that there were instances, such as the one in the present case, where the script was so objectionable, that he did not feel the need to watch it, since the two elements which he objected to (the words concerning Auschwitz and the passage about Fred and Rose Mary West) would always remain objectionable, no matter the way in which they were presented, be it a tragedy or a comedy. They would nonetheless remain offensive to certain sectors of Maltese society or indeed society anywhere. While shock was a legitimate theatrical weapon and may be used repeatedly, one could not offend other people\u2019s sensibilities. Both in the case of the holocaust and that of child murders, humanity was at stake, and the relevant passages offended the sense of decency one individual should have towards another. 34.  D.M. (a psychologist and member of the Board) found the script barely credible in so far as it was unlikely that a person would go through so many situations one after the other. While perversions did exist, this couple was being put forward as a normal couple. In his view a normal couple, a couple who went through a normal life experience such as the death of a child, would not react like the characters in the play, who for example, re\u2011enacted a killing which had greatly marked England. Further the scene concerning Auschwitz desecrated the memory of the persons who suffered. 35.  Another witness, a retired Chief Justice and professor of law (who only read the script), examined the play from the point of view of public morals. He considered that certain parts of the play were disgusting, such as that describing Auschwitz, and the blasphemous words. He explained that the word \u201cfuck\u201d combined with the word \u201cGod\u201d was unacceptable because it offended public morals, not only that of Catholics, but that of half the world. Thus, in his view those parts had to be deleted from the play. The parts concerning sex and sexual perversions, such as the part where the male figure wanted to pay the female figure to allow him to do certain things, disgusted him, but he considered that certain people could accept that. 36.  J.C., the member of the board who confirmed on appeal that the play should be banned considered that, apart from other concerns mentioned by other members of the board, it was not justifiable for a couple to do certain things in public just because they were going through a bad patch. It was not acceptable that a woman had to give her vagina to a man to show him she loved him. In his view, if one were to make the appropriate deletions to the script, there would be nearly nothing left, and he could not find anything positive about it. 37.  The Chairperson of the Board testified that there were entire scenes which she considered went against morality and were an affront and atrocious attack on human rights and the dignity of the individual. She was shocked and very annoyed by what she considered to be unadulterated pornography where the woman was becoming the man\u2019s absolute slave. She considered that the play in its entirety, and not one scene here and there, was objectionable and offensive. The fact that the play ended with the couple possibly deciding to have a baby, did not suffice to hold that the play had a positive message, given the preceding eighty (sic) pages. 38.  In an eighty-two-page judgment of 28 June 2010, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicants\u2019 claims. 39.  The court considered that the second applicant had no further interest than that of the director of the company, thus it sufficed that the company was an applicant, and he, thus, had no victim status in his own capacity. Nevertheless, the artistic directors as well as the actors were victims of the alleged violation, as persons who were giving life to a script by means of their artistic representation - a theatrical performance which was a form of expression for the purposes of Article 10. 40.  It rejected the Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies since the applicants\u2019 complaints concerned mainly issues of a constitutional and conventional nature, and thus were best dealt with by the courts of constitutional jurisdiction. For the purposes of the present case, the applicants were complaining of a human rights violation, and therefore an action for judicial review could not be an effective remedy in so far as it could not award the relevant damage, and could not order that the performance go ahead irrespective of the ban. 41.  As to the merits, the court made extensive reference to the Court\u2019s case-law, in particular Handyside v. the United Kingdom (7 December 1976, Series A no. 24), Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, Series A no. 295\u2011A) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) as well as prominent authors in the field of human rights. It considered that the decision of the Board to ban the play had been correct and in accordance with the law and established guidelines. The court, having read the entire script, could not tie the plot which the author wanted to transmit with the means employed to do so. In the court\u2019s view the author did not need to make use of such perversions in order to show the troubled reality of the characters. 42.  It considered that the Board was correct to conclude that the play in its entirety was offensive to Maltese society. Indeed the specific scenes referred to, as well as other parts of the play, were an affront to the dignity of the individual, which was an integral part of the civil and moral fabric (tessut) of the country. Even in a pluralistic and democratic society, such as the Maltese one, human dignity could not be trampled on, even if the aim was \u201cpresumably\u201d a genuine one. As problematic as the relationship of the couple might have been, one could not make extensive use of vulgar, obscene and blasphemous language to highlight perversions, vilify (ikasbar) the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, and vilify the respect towards a woman\u2019s dignity. It was not acceptable to publicise uncivil behaviour, which broke the law, debased the suffering of women during the holocaust, portrayed women as the object of sexual satisfaction, as well as ridiculed family life and the responsibilities parents have towards their children. A democratic society, while being tolerant, could not permit its values to be turned on their head in the name of freedom of expression. In the court\u2019s view, the stitching of a vagina as an act of sexual pleasure, bestiality, the depravity arising from the thought of a woman eating another woman\u2019s excrement, the pleasure obtained in raping children, the murder of children and sexual intercourse with parents of violated and murdered children, were unacceptable even in a democratic society. The court noted that under Maltese law, blasphemy was a contravention, and a person could not be immune from punishment simply because he or she was acting on stage. The Shoah, the court went on, \u201cwas a historical fact where innocent victims underwent unprecedented suffering. Instead of treating this sensitive and delicate subject...with due respect to the dignity of the victims, the character Stu shows only sexual depravity...the author permits the demeaning and humiliation of that tragedy totally out of context and for no other reason than for perversions. No matter how the text of the play is looked at, it runs aground on the reef of the inalienable dignity of the human person, and the court understands that this was the underlying reason for the Board\u2019s decision.\u201d 43.  The court rejected their complaint under Article 6 on the basis that the proper procedure had been undertaken, the applicants had been free to put forward their views in their request for reconsideration, which was carried out by another person [not present at first-instance] and no bias had been shown. 44.  The applicants appealed the first-instance judgment only in so far as it concerned the merits of their complaints, and asked the Constitutional Court to confirm the judgment in so far as it related to the second applicant\u2019s victim status. By a judgment of 29 November 2012, the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment and ordered the applicants to pay all costs. 45.  The Constitutional Court noted that the first-court had chosen to exercise its jurisdiction and rejected the defendants\u2019 objection of non\u2011exhaustion of ordinary remedies, which in the absence of an appeal on the matter had become final. Nevertheless, it noted that the applicants had not instituted judicial review proceedings of the administrative action in question (the Board\u2019s decision); thus they were not complaining that the Board\u2019s decision was based on improper motives or irrelevant considerations. Moreover, the ordinary court, in judicial review proceedings, could have also examined the reasonableness of the decision, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Thus, the applicants could no longer complain about the Board\u2019s decision ut sic, and people\u2019s opinions on the play were irrelevant given that the applicants considered the decision to be reasonable. 46.  As to the constitutional and conventional complaint raised by the applicants, the Constitutional Court held that the existence of the Board did not breach any of the applicants\u2019 rights, and indeed the applicants had not impugned the law establishing the Board. It further considered that freedom of expression had limits and that it was accompanied by duties and responsibilities. Both the Convention and the Constitution provided for inter alia the protection of morals and the reputation and rights of others, and the Maltese Constitution also included public decency, in the relevant provision. 47.  The Constitutional Court, having read the script, shared the first\u2011instance court\u2019s view about various scenes of the play. It considered that such scenes all throughout the play affected the morality and decency of the entire production, and it was within the Board\u2019s competence to assess that in line with the Regulations. The Constitutional Court had no doubt that there were phrases which constituted disparaging and insolent remarks towards more than one belief, towards women and towards the suffering of the Jews in the Second World War. 48.  Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law, in particular, Otto\u2011Preminger\u2011Institut v. Austria (\u00a7 47) it recalled that those who chose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, \u201cmust tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines.\u201d 49.  In its view the limits of decency had been breached due to the blasphemy which was an offence under Maltese law and to the vilification of the dignity of a people, of a woman, of children, and of the human being, as well as the extreme glorification of sexual perversion. These instances were so strong that they affected the play in its entirety and prevailed over any genuine aim presumably intended by the play. The court emphasized that the production despised the dignity of the individual, in particular sectors, such as women and children, whether because of their nationality or religion, and opined that even though the main characters were acting in this way because of tension, pressure and depression, such contempt could not be justified as art. In the court\u2019s view while art was a wide concept covering any type of manifestation of expression, it could not include language which was obscene and despised the trauma of a genocide, and which, in itself, was against the laws of the country. For a strong moral message to be portrayed it was possible to cause discomfort and annoy other persons, but not to the extent of insulting them because of their beliefs, their people, or simply because they were a woman or a child. 50.  Recalling that it was the duty of the State to protect the morality of the country, the Constitutional Court considered that the Board had fulfilled its duty. What was morally correct depended on the State and the relevant religion, and could not be determined universally. Thus, the fact that the production was performed elsewhere did not mean that it had to also be produced in Malta, particularly in the light of the laws in force in each country. This was precisely why states had latitude in applying certain restrictions on freedom of expression. 51.  It further noted that under the laws in force, the Board could ban the play, as opposed to classifying it for a mature audience. In any event it considered that adults, who could chose to watch the play in such a case, would also be deserving of protection, and thus limitations could also be necessary in such cases. It highlighted the states\u2019 duty to preserve the sensitivities of the silent citizen (as opposed to the vociferous ones, who inundated media forums) and considered that no remedy after the performance could heal any harm already done to society. Thus, in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the Board\u2019s decision was correct, was not capricious or exaggerated, and it corresponded to the need to protect public morality in Maltese society and the rights of others. 52.  The Constitutional Court concluded that it was not necessary to watch the play as the script was enough. In the absence of an Article 14 complaint, it was also unnecessary to compare the performance to other performances which had been allowed by the Board. The applicants having refused to make any changes to the text, despite its invitation to do so, the Constitutional Court confirmed that it would remain banned and that there was no breach of Article 10. 53.  In connection with their Article 6 complaint, the Constitutional Court held that the applicants did not institute judicial review proceedings and in any event there had been no breach of their rights. Furthermore, in their view there had been no determination of any civil right.", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "7", "2", "5", "9", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Grozny, Chechen Republic. 5.  According to the applicant, on 7 February 1999 the administrative authorities of the Leninskiy District of Grozny provided her with a housing allocation order no. 842 entitling her to occupy a one\u2011room municipal flat in Grozny. 6.  In 2005 the applicant was registered as living in that flat. 7.  In 2007 the authorities decided to conduct an examination of all allocation orders granting occupation of municipal accommodation. The applicant\u2019s housing allocation order dated 7 February 1999 appeared suspicious to the authorities and they commissioned an expert to verify its authenticity. The expert concluded that the allocation order was a forged document. In particular, the order did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued and the impress of a seal on the order had been made with the help of an improvised clich\u00e9 which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal. 8.  Upon receipt of this information the administration of Grozny brought court proceedings against the applicant seeking to declare the allocation order of 7 February 1999 null and void and to evict her from the flat in question. 9.  The applicant contested those claims. She submitted that the administration had issued her with the housing allocation order because she had been on the housing list and she was subsequently registered as living in that flat. She had not been aware of the fact that the order had not been printed in the printing office. She also asked to dismiss the claims as time\u2011barred because according to domestic law the housing allocation order could be declared null and void within three years after its delivery. 10.  The administration of the Leninskiy District of Grozny asked to grant the claims submitted by the administration of Grozny. The administration could not say whether the order had been in fact delivered to the applicant, since the archives had not been preserved. However, according to the civil servants of the administration, commissions on allocation of housing had been meeting once a month. The order no. 842 was issued on 7 February 1999. That would mean that 842 orders were issued from the beginning of 1999 until 7 February 1999. However, the administration of the Leninskiy District could not deliver such a number of housing allocation orders during one month. 11.  On 24 February 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) declared the housing allocation order of 7 February 1999 null and void and issued an order to evict the applicant. In particular, the District Court held as follows:\n\u201c...It follows from the materials of the case that the housing allocation order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 in respect of accommodation situated in Grozny...in the name of Darsigova Ruket Magomedovna has been issued as an assignment of housing.\nIt follows from the expert certificate No. 11 of 11 April 2008 that the above order was sent for an expert examination and the experts concluded that the order no. 842 of 7 February 1999 ... did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued. The impress of a seal of the Leninskiy District of Grozny [on the order] had been made with the help of an improvised clich\u00e9 which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal.\nIt follows from the expert report of 24 October 2008 no. 1397, 1398/1-2 that the formsheet of order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 had been made with the help of electrophotographic imaging on the copy machine. The colour used - dry toner.\nTherefore, the court has established that the title document order no. 842 of 7 February 1999 ...had not been made typographically.\nThose circumstances follow from the content of the statement of claim, parties\u2019 submissions in the court, they have not been contested by the parties and are confirmed by evidence submitted [to the court].\nThe request by the Administration of Grozny for restauration of the three-year time-limit for lodging of their claim for declaring the order null should be granted.\nThe court has assessed the whole of evidence submitted by the parties and finds that it is possible to grant the claimant\u2019s claim...\u201d 12.  In her appeal against the judgment of 24 February 2009 the applicant submitted that in taking the decision to evict her the District Court had not examined whether she had been in need of housing or not. In particular, the District Court had not taken into account that she had been provided with a one-room flat on the grounds that she had cumulated a very long term of service and had no other housing. 13.  On 9 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chechnya (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) upheld that judgment. In particular, the Supreme Court held as follows:\n\u201c...\nIt has been established in the court hearing that order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 issued by the administration of the Leninskiy District of Grozny to R.M. Darsigova and giving her the right to move in flat no. 40 at 42, Kadyrov street in Grozny was sent for an expert examination...The expert examination established that the order did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued. The impress of a seal of the Leninskiy District of Grozny [on the order] had been made with the help of an improvised clich\u00e9 which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal...\n...\nHaving regards to the above, the court of first instance had concluded that the claims submitted by the administration of Grozny had to be granted. In such circumstances, the civil chamber does not find any grounds for quashing the court decision ...\u201d 14.  After her eviction the applicant returned living to her mother\u2019s flat and on 26 July 2011 she was registered as living in that flat.", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "8", "6", "9", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were or are still detained in Korydallos Prison Hospital (\u201cthe Prison Hospital\u201d). They all suffer from HIV infection, apart from the third applicant who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 6.  The first applicant, Dimitrios Zabelos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 March 2014 until 17 June 2015, when he made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 7.  The second applicant, Adriatik Berberaj, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 April 2010 until 21 January 2011 and from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 8.  The third applicant, Dimitrios Berberidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital on 6 December 2012 and was released on 11 June 2015 following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 9.  The fourth applicant, Pola Honein, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 18 December 2012 until 1 July 2015. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 10.  The fifth applicant, Theodoros Iliopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 January 2013 until 2 June 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence. 11.  The sixth applicant, Marouf Kamoli, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 December 2013 until 19 May 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided by section 11 of Law no. 4274/14, having served two fifths of his sentence. 12.  The seventh applicant, Davit Khutsishvili, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 July 2014 until 27 October 2016. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. 13.  The eighth applicant, Roustam Konstantinidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 23 August 2013 until 14 December 2015. He was released following an application on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 4322/2015. 14.  The ninth applicant, Ioannis Machos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 November 2012. He was still in detention when the parties submitted their observations. 15.  The tenth applicant, Andreas Martzaklis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 28 May 2013 until 3 August 2015, when he was released after he lodged an application on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2016, and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 16.  The eleventh applicant, Saeed Hamo Moradyan, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 February 2013 until 27 January 2016, the date on which he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 17.  The twelfth applicant, Antonios Oikonomakos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 27 November 2013 until 30 September 2015, when he was released, having served one tenth of his sentence, on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained from 6 November 2015 until 23 December 2015 when he was released, having served two fifths of his sentence, on the basis of the same provision. 18.  According to the documents before the Court, the thirteenth applicant, Nikolaos Papadopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital for significant periods of time from 4 April 2014 until 16 July 2015. 19.  The fourteenth applicant, Spiridon-Xenofon Pirpiniadis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 20 December 2013 until 13 August 2015, when he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence. 20.  The fifteenth applicant, Sabri Sabrioglou, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2013 until 24 December 2014 and from 11 February until 20 October 2015. 21.  The sixteenth applicant, Dimitrios Samlidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 July 2014 until 26 February 2015, when he was released, after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 22.  The seventeenth applicant, Emmanouil Toufektsis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 October 2013 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 23.  The eighteenth applicant, Chrisovalantis Tsiriklos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 4 July 2013 until 8 July 2015, when he was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. He was again detained on 21 August 2015 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 24.  The applicants submitted that the Prison Hospital had been overcrowded which, in addition to causing poor sanitary conditions, had resulted in the deterioration of their already fragile health. They maintained that all of them had been detained in hospital wards which had measured 44 sq. m and which had been occupied by twelve detainees on average for the period between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the second and third applicants had been detained in cells measuring 17 sq. m and which had held four inmates. They further argued that they had not been able to move freely within the wards owing to the space occupied by furniture. In particular, bunk beds were not used in the Prison Hospital and extra furniture, such as medical equipment, was required; therefore half the area of each ward had been occupied by furniture, which had resulted in them having a personal space in which they could move freely of below 2 sq. m. 25.  The above-mentioned conditions had led them to receiving inadequate health care. There had been a high risk of infection with contagious diseases as there had not been effective separation of detainees according to the disease from which they had suffered. In addition, only four toilets had been available for the detainees in a total of five wards on the first floor. 26.  Meals had been insufficient and of poor quality and the absence of recreational activities had affected their psychological health. Central heating had been inadequate and collection of rubbish, especially in the kitchens, had not been sufficient, creating hygiene problems and resulting in bad smells and the presence of pests. The applicants also complained of the lack of medical staff and properly equipped laboratories for their medical examinations. In particular, during the period 2013-14 only one general practitioner had been available to the hospital. 27.  The applicants acknowledged that the conditions of their detention had improved in mid-2016 and that the medical-staff numbers had increased, resulting in conditions which met the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention but only for the period after June 2016. 28.  On 18 December 2014 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board under Article 6 of the Penal Code (Law No. 2776/1999), to which they have not received any reply to date. 29.  According to the Government, the Prison Hospital\u2019s official capacity was sixty patients and at the time of the applicants\u2019 detention the hospital had held between 180 and 220 patients. Specifically as regards the applicants, some of them had been detained in wards 7 and 8 on the first floor of the hospital and some others in wards 1, 2 and 3 on the second floor. The wards measured 44.40 sq. m each, and each of them hosted eight to thirteen detainees. Therefore, the personal space available to them ranged from 3.4 sq. m to 5.5 sq. m. It was also noted that toilets had been in the corridors, not inside the wards, which had remained unlocked so as to ensure unobstructed access to the bathrooms. 30.  The Prison Hospital was an establishment providing primary medical care by operating as a clinic. Detainees who required more intense or specialised care were referred to public hospitals, a procedure which was used for the third, fourth, ninth, fifteenth and seventeenth applicants. The patients were separated by disease. They were examined regularly by doctors and they were submitted often to general and specialised laboratory examinations. 31.  Wards were sufficiently ventilated and heated and had adequate natural light via six large windows. Hot water was ensured by solar water heaters and by boilers which operated for four hours per day. Wards were regularly cleaned by cleaning crews consisting of detainees and disinfected by specialist companies. The hospital\u2019s social service provided personal hygiene products to detainees who could not afford them. All wards and corridors had rubbish bins which were emptied regularly. 32.  As regards detainees\u2019 meals, they were designed under medical supervision to ensure that patients received all necessary nutrients. The Government submitted the menu of two random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 33.  According to the Government, detainees were not obliged to spend all day in the wards; on the contrary, they could move along the corridors and spend time in the yard. Various recreational activities were organised and detainees had had the opportunity to enrol in educational programmes since October 2015. Detainees were also granted days of leave that they could spend outside the prison hospital; the third, fifth and eleventh applicants had benefitted from such leave. 34.  Lastly, according to the Government, during 2015 and 2016 conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital were drastically improved. That was mainly due to measures taken to reduce overcrowding in prisons under Law no. 4322/2015, which provided for early release schemes. In November 2014 a women\u2019s ward had been opened at the hospital and work had been carried out to improve the facilities. In addition, new and updated medical equipment was procured and medical-staff numbers had been reinforced by the recruitment of three new doctors of various specialties. The Government specified that all the above-mentioned improvements had made the Prison Hospital a detention facility significantly different to the image given in the Greek Ombudsman\u2019s (\u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b7) report, which had been prepared on the basis of a visit in February 2012, that is to say on a date that had no relevance to the present case.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "9", "7", "5", "4", "0", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Skopje. 7.  In 1999 the applicant (eight years old at the time) and her family (parents and three siblings) fled Kosovo[1] and settled in the respondent State, where she has been living ever since. In 2005 she was granted asylum and a residence permit. She entered into a common-law partnership with a Macedonian national, with whom she has three minor children (the children also have Macedonian nationality). Her residence permit was extended each year until 3 February 2014, when the Ministry of the Interior terminated her asylum, holding that she was \u201ca risk to [national] security.\u201d The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. That the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. The decision further stated:\n\u201c[the applicant] is obliged to leave the respondent State within twenty days of receipt of the final decision.\u201d 8.  The applicant, through her lawyer, challenged the decision as arbitrary. She argued that there was no evidence that her presence in the respondent State represented a threat to national security. Furthermore, she had not been given an opportunity to challenge any such evidence. 9.  On 3 July 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Ministry, noting that the latter had obtained a classified written note (\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0448\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043a\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0434\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043b\u0438\u0432 \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442) from the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency (\u201cthe Intelligence Agency\u201d) indicating that she represented a threat to national security. The court did not provide any further details regarding that document. It ruled accordingly that the impugned proceedings had been lawful. 10.  The applicant\u2019s representative appealed against that decision before the Higher Administrative Court, reiterating the arguments raised previously. She further alleged that the wording used by the Administrative Court implied that there were some documents on which the impugned decision had been based. However, she had not been given an opportunity to have knowledge of or to comment on that evidence. 11.  By a decision of 1 July 2015, served on the applicant on 6 October 2015, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the Ministry\u2019s decision. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201c... [The Ministry] decided on the basis of ... classified information obtained from a relevant body (which) proves indisputably that her presence in (the respondent State) represents a threat to its security.\nThe Higher Administrative Court has examined the (applicant\u2019s) allegations ... that information provided by the relevant body within the Ministry of the Interior was not forwarded to her and her representative, but it considers them irrelevant ...\u201d 12.  In the proceedings before the Court, the Government submitted a redacted version of the classified note that the Intelligence Agency had sent on 19 September 2013 to the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant parts of the note read as follows:\n\u201c... following security checks of [the applicant], it has been established that recognition of her asylum status would be a threat to the (national) security of the [respondent State].\nIt has been established that her (hidden text) ... are perpetrators of tens of crimes (serious thefts, thefts and acts of concealment). The applicant was aware of and supported all crimes committed by her (hidden text) ... She has also been living in a common-law partnership with M.M. in order to obtain the monetary allowance to which she was entitled having been granted asylum.\nIn such circumstances, we are of the opinion that she should not be granted asylum in [the respondent State].\u201d 13.  On 11 November 2015 the Ministry granted a request by the applicant to leave the respondent State in order to obtain, as she had stated, documents from the Serbian authorities for marrying her common-law partner in the respondent State. She was allowed re-entry to the respondent State in January 2016, which was one month after the expiry of the time\u2011limit for returning to the respondent State. In February 2016 she contacted the Ministry with a view to submitting the relevant documents.", "references": ["4", "3", "9", "0", "6", "2", "1", "8", "5", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Steingrim Wolland, was born in 1961 and lives in Oslo, Norway. He ran a law firm in his own name in Oslo until his licence to practice was suspended as a result of the opening of bankruptcy proceedings against him personally in April 2009. 6.  On 9 March 2010, the prosecuting authority (\u00d8kokrim \u2013 The National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) issued charges (siktelse) against the applicant for aiding and abetting fraud in connection with art sales (kunstbedrageri), an application for a bank loan (l\u00e5nebedrageri), and forgery of documents in connection with the latter. 7.  On 10 March 2010 the Oslo City Court (tingrett), finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion (skjellig grunn til mistanke) in respect of the charges, decided at the request of the prosecuting authority to authorise that a search be carried out at the applicant\u2019s premises, including his office. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the City Court\u2019s decision. 8.  On 23 March 2010 the police were at the applicant\u2019s premises \u2013 his home and office. In accordance with Article 205 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below) a third party \u2013 a lawyer acquaintance of the applicant \u2013 was present. As there was a presumption that some material would be covered by the applicant\u2019s statutory legal professional privilege as a lawyer, and therefore be exempt from seizure pursuant to Article 204 \u00a7 1 (ibid.), documents were put in sealed bags instead of being searched for evidence by the police. The police also collected a hard disk and a laptop. The third party had no objections as to how the police had proceeded. 9.  Mirror copies (speilkopier) of the hard disk and laptop were taken; the hard disk and laptop were returned to the applicant two days later. 10.  On 3 May 2010, at the prosecuting authority\u2019s office, the applicant went through the paper documents that had been collected and sorted out those which he considered to be covered by legal professional privilege. This material was stored separately and placed under seal. 11.  On 5 January 2011 the prosecuting authority applied to the City Court to examine the paper material that had been collected at the applicant\u2019s premises and to have those documents that could lawfully be seized made available to it for search. As to the mirror copies, the prosecuting authority proposed that the City Court authorise a staff member at \u00d8kokrim\u2019s computer department to acquaint him or herself with the material. The prosecution authority would thereafter return to the City Court with an application for a decision on whether specific documents would be exempt from seizure owing to legal professional privilege. The City Court accepted this procedure (see, however, paragraph 31 below). Subsequently, the prosecuting authority, upon discussions with the applicant as to which keywords (s\u00f8keord) should be used when looking for documents on the mirror copies, made keyword-searches which gave results in 2,309 files. 12.  By a letter of 16 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer disputed the lawfulness of what he categorised as the \u201cseizure\u201d (\u201cbeslag\u201d), arguing that there had been no reasonable grounds for suspicion against the applicant and requested that the City Court quash the \u201cseizure\u201d decision and order that the collected material be returned to him. 13.  On 6 May 2011 the prosecuting authority submitted the 2,309 files from the mirror copies to the City Court for examination. 14.  In response to the letter from the applicant\u2019s lawyer of 16 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above), the City Court wrote a letter of 11 May 2011, pointing out that the procedure applicable to material allegedly covered by legal professional privilege had been set out by the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett) in its decision of 3 March 2011, reported in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2011 page 296 (see paragraphs 38-39 below). In line with that procedure, there were no grounds on which the City Court could at that time hold a court hearing devoted to the discontinuation of any \u201cseizure\u201d and return of the material. No seizure had been decided \u2013 the court was at the time carrying out the task of reviewing the material collected in order to decide on what should be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court would obtain the views of the parties in a hearing before making a formal decision as to whether to authorise the search of the prosecution. Its decision would be amenable to appeal. Since the handling of the case so far had taken considerable time, the City Court\u2019s examination would be expedited. 15.  The applicant and his lawyer disagreed with the City Court\u2019s description of the procedure to be followed. After further exchanges between the parties, the City Court reiterated in a letter of 22 July 2011 \u2013 which was formally a judicial decision amenable to appeal (see paragraphs 16-24 below) \u2013 that a decision on seizure had not yet been taken. There was a presumption to the effect that documents and other materials in the office of a private lawyer were subject to legal professional privilege. In such cases the court would first go through the material in order to examine what could be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court also informed the parties that it was about to complete this task, having examined each document. It also reiterated its disagreement with the applicant\u2019s view that before carrying out its perusal of the material it ought to consider anew whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against him, failing which its examination of the material would be unlawful, and that in the absence of such grounds it ought to return all the material to him with the seals intact. 16.  On 19 August 2011 the applicant appealed against the City Court\u2019s decision of 22 July 2011 not to examine the merits of his request to quash what was in his view a \u201cseizure\u201d, and to return the material. 17.  On 9 November 2011 the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) dismissed the appeal. 18.  The High Court, as had the City Court, reiterated that the relevant procedure for the search and seizure of material allegedly subject to legal professional privilege had been thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in Rt. 2011 page 296 (see paragraphs 14 above and 38-39 below). The City Court was at the time in the process of sorting out which documents could be lawfully searched by the prosecuting authority, and there had been no decisions on seizure taken. 19.  From the above it was apparent, in the High Court\u2019s view, that the applicant was not at that stage of the procedure entitled to have the question of whether to maintain the \u201cseizure\u201d in force (sp\u00f8rsm\u00e5let om opprettholdelse av beslaget) under Article 208 reviewed (see paragraph 37 below), and it could not see how him disputing the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion in his case could lead to a different result. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision contained no statements suggesting that the procedure should be different in such cases. Nor could the High Court find that there were other grounds, even if regard were had to Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention, as invoked by the applicant, suggesting that the accused had a wider right to judicial review in cases where he or she disputed the grounds for suspicion. 20.  The High Court also noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure contained several provisions conferring on the accused a right to judicial review in respect of enforcement measures taken in the form of search and seizure, inter alia could a decision by a court to the effect that documents were to be handed over to the prosecution authorities after perusal of the documents in accordance with Article 204 (see paragraph 37 below) \u2013 which was what the City Court was doing at the time \u2013 be appealed against. The High Court considered that the Convention did not give the applicant any rights to have the legality of searches and seizures judicially reviewed beyond what followed from the Code of Criminal Procedure. The search had been authorised by the City Court on 10 March 2010, finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against the applicant. The applicant had not filed any timely appeals against the decision and the search had been effectuated. 21.  From the reasoning above it also followed that the applicant\u2019s alternative submission that he ought to have a right to judicial review of whether there was a legal basis for an \u201congoing search\u201d (om det er grunnlag for en \u201cp\u00e5g\u00e5ende ransaking\u201d) could not succeed. 22.  It was also clear that the accused did not on a general basis have a right to judicial review of the reasons for the charges brought against him, whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion or not, regardless of the use of any enforcement measures. The existence of such reasons could be examined again but then only in connection with, for instance, future investigative measures where the latter were required. The Convention provisions relied on could not lead to any different result. 23.  Against this background, the High Court concluded that the City Court\u2019s procedure had suffered from no defects. Its decision of 22 July 2011 had been based on a correct approach to the handling of the material gathered at the applicant\u2019s premises. 24.  On 20 December 2011 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg), whose jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the High Court\u2019s procedure and interpretation of the law, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal in both respects. 25.  On 25 January 2012 the City Court held a hearing (see paragraph 14 above) on the issue of which materials could be sent to the prosecuting authority for it to search. In the court records it was registered that the court had informed the parties that it was desirable if a decision could be reached as soon as possible and preferably within a month. In a decision of 11 May 2012, it ruled that 1,264 documents collected from the data carriers could be handed over. The applicant accepted the decision with respect to 858 of the documents, but appealed in respect of the remaining 406 and some of the paper documents. The prosecuting authority also appealed. 26.  On 4 September 2012 the High Court dismissed the prosecuting authority\u2019s appeal and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal except for one issue relating to a bank account transcript. 27.  On 26 October 2012 the Supreme Court quashed the High Court\u2019s decision in so far as it had rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal (Rt. 2012 page 1639). It found, in essence, that the High Court had applied a too narrow understanding of what was lawyer\u2019s work (egentlig advokatvirksomhet) that could bring legal professional privilege into play. 28.  During its reconsideration of the case, the High Court, on 8 January 2013, concluded that thirty-six of the disputed 406 documents could be submitted to the prosecuting authority for it to search. On 22 May 2013 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the High Court\u2019s decision. 29.  On 11 June 2012 the applicant applied to have some of the material, including the mirror copies, returned to him. The City Court, on 18 September 2012, refused his application in so far as it concerned the mirror copies, but granted the other parts thereof. 30.  The applicant appealed against the decision to the High Court, which on 8 January 2013 ordered that the mirror copies were to be returned to the applicant unless the prosecuting authority promptly (relativt omg\u00e5ende) requested that the City Court examine them. It referred, inter alia, to the general obligation to ensure progress in investigations, as reflected in Article 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below). 31.  Upon an appeal by the prosecuting authority, the Supreme Court, on 27 June 2013 (Rt. 2013 page 968) agreed with the High Court that the prosecuting authority\u2019s continued possession of and searches on the mirror copies (see paragraph 11 above) had been unlawful. The mirror copies should, like the paper documents, have been placed under seal and transferred to the City Court without the prosecution authority having accessed material on them through keyword-searches. Unlike the High Court, however, the Supreme Court did not for that reason find that the copies should necessarily be returned to the applicant. It quashed the High Court\u2019s decision in order for that court to further assess the prosecuting authority\u2019s submissions that the copies should instead be kept with the City Court, as the High Court had not sufficiently considered that possibility. 32.  The prosecuting authority transferred the mirror copies to the City Court on 2 September 2013. 33.  When, on 20 May 2014, the High Court contacted the prosecuting authority, its decision concerning the mirror copies having been quashed by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 31 above), the authority responded by informing the High Court of the developments in the criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 35 below). It moreover stated that the seizure had been lifted on 28 May 2014 and requested that the case therefore be dismissed. The material could be deleted by the court or the data carrier could be handed over to the applicant. The applicant argued that the case should not be dismissed and requested that the High Court examine the merits of his application to have the mirror copies returned, in order for him to have a judicial review of whether his Convention rights had been violated. 34.  In a letter of 25 June 2014 the High Court set out its views on the matter. It stated, inter alia, that the case concerned the applicant\u2019s application to have the mirror copies returned. This request would be met if the copies were actually returned, which was what the prosecuting authority had proposed. This made it difficult to see why the applicant should have legal standing to require that the courts examine his application. Moreover, the court assumed that the applicant could obtain a review of his Convention claims in other ways. The case as concerned the mirror copies was ultimately dismissed on 22 August 2014. There is no information about the applicant having appealed against this decision. 35.  On 10 January 2013 the City Court acquitted the applicant of having obtained credit by way of fraud (l\u00e5nebedrageri) (see paragraph 6 above). On 12 June 2013 the High Court convicted him for having shown gross negligence in that respect. This judgment became final when the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeal Committee refused leave to appeal on 18 October 2013. The charges concerning forgery of documents (ibid.) were dropped on 11 February 2013. Some of the charges concerning aiding and abetting art fraud (kunstbedrageri) (ibid.) were dropped on 16 February 2011 and the remainder on 21 August 2013.", "references": ["7", "8", "3", "5", "0", "2", "1", "9", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1966, 1971, 1993 and 1996 respectively. The second applicant is the former spouse of the first applicant and the third and the fourth applicants are their children. The first, the third and the fourth applicants live in Lviv. The second applicant had his registered residence in Lviv as at the time when the application was lodged; his current whereabouts are not known. 5.  In August 2001 the second applicant, a military officer at the material time, was provided with a two-room flat for himself and his family in an accommodation hall owned by the Lviv Military Academy. Subsequently all four applicants obtained residence registration with the local authority as tenants of that flat. Since 2001 (and as at the time of the observations exchanges between the parties), the household was paying the relevant maintenance charges and other tenancy-related fees, which were calculated on the premise that the flat was occupied by four persons. 6.  On 28 November 2003 the second applicant was dismissed from military service on grounds of redundancy. The dismissal order stipulated that he was eligible for priority allocation of social housing from the waiting list managed by the Ministry of Defence. 7.  In 2005 the first and the second applicant divorced and the first applicant and her children were placed on the waiting list for social housing managed by the municipal authority. 8.  In August 2011 the Lviv garrison military prosecutor instituted eviction proceedings against the applicants. He referred, essentially, to the fact that the accommodation hall belonged to the Military Academy and was designed for the temporary housing of military personnel. Meanwhile, none of the applicants had any connection to the military or the Military Academy, which owned the building. 9.  On 15 November 2012 the Frankivskyy District Court in Lviv dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It found that the applicants had lawfully obtained the tenancy in connection with the second applicant\u2019s previous military service. Regard being had to the applicable legal provisions concerning the social protection of former military officers and their families, they could not be evicted from the accommodation hall without first being provided with other housing. In addition to that, the fourth applicant had still been a minor at the material time, and further legislation applicable to the protection of minors warranted the protection of her housing rights. 10.  Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order (\u201c\u043e\u0440\u0434\u0435\u0440\u201d), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants\u2019 occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society. 12.  On 20 November 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal. 13.  Subsequently, enforcement proceedings were instituted with a view to evicting the applicants. The parties have not informed the Court whether the eviction order has been enforced.", "references": ["8", "2", "0", "6", "5", "7", "1", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tirana. 7.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and two other co-accused on account of premeditated murder. The applicant was subsequently arrested by the authorities. 8.  On 21 July 1998 the applicant addressed a letter (k\u00ebrkes\u00eb) to the Kavaja District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) and the Kavaja district prosecutor (\u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d), stating that he had engaged A., a lawyer, to represent him before the district prosecutor during the investigation and during the trial proceedings. It appears that the applicant wrote this letter while he was in detention. 9.  On 1 November 1999 the District Court found the applicant not guilty and ordered his release. He had attended the trial and had been defended by A., his chosen lawyer. The two other co-accused were convicted and sentenced. 10.  On an unspecified date the two other co-accused and the prosecutor appealed against the District Court\u2019s decision of 1 November 1999. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant left Albania. It appears that the applicant was not informed of the appeals of the two other co-accused and the prosecutor, but apparently A. was so informed. 12.  On 28 February 2000 the Durr\u00ebs Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the District Court\u2019s decision and remitted the case for re\u2011examination. The applicant was represented by A. in his absence. 13.  On 21 April 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged by A. against the Durr\u00ebs Court of Appeal decision of 28  February 2000. 14.  On 26 December 2000, during the retrial proceedings, the District  Court convicted the applicant in absentia of premeditated murder and sentenced him to twenty-three years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was represented by lawyer A. (see paragraph 9), the decision stating that A. had been appointed by the court. The two other co-accused appealed. 15.  On 10 September 2001 and 14 December 2001 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 26 December 2000. The applicant had been represented in those proceedings by a new, court-appointed lawyer. 16.  On 14 April 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 17.  On 8 July 2005 the applicant was informed of his conviction in  absentia by his family members. He lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of 26 December 2000, arguing that he had never been informed of his conviction in absentia as he had been living abroad. The applicant was represented by K. as his counsel. 18.  On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor\u2019s appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 19.  Judge A.H., who had been a member of the District Court\u2019s bench that had delivered the judgment of 26 December 2000, also sat in the District Court\u2019s bench of 4 November 2005 that dismissed the applicant\u2019s application. Judges V.C. and Sh.M., who had been members of the Court  of  Appeal\u2019s bench that on 10 September 2001 had upheld the decision of 26 December 2000, also sat in the Court of Appeal\u2019s bench that dismissed his appeal on 29 September 2006. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by his lawyer, lodged a constitutional complaint in respect of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and the lack of impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal. 21.  On 16 March 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant\u2019s mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant\u2019s claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal", "references": ["2", "4", "7", "5", "6", "1", "0", "9", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The United Civil Aviation Trade Union (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) is a trade union registered in Budapest. Mr A. Csorba (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) is a Hungarian national who was born in 1970 and lives in Vecs\u00e9s. He is the President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union. 6.  On 12 October 2012 the second applicant applied to the Budapest police department for authorisation to hold a demonstration on the road leading to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport. He stated that the demonstration would be held on the hard shoulder of the road, which was not ordinarily used for traffic. The declared objectives of the demonstration were, inter alia, to draw the public\u2019s attention to the precarious financial situation in which the employees of the airport would find themselves if salary cuts envisaged by the company managing the airport were carried out. The event was scheduled to be held between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 17 October 2012. The second applicant also specified that it was expected that about fifty to 100 persons would participate in the event and that it was intended that speeches would be given and that an open letter would be read out. 7.  On 14 October 2012 the Budapest police department registered the application and informed the second applicant that, in order to clarify details regarding the programme of the demonstration and the number of police officers that would be required to secure the event, it was necessary to schedule a meeting with the organisers. 8.  The second applicant and the Vice-President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union met with the representatives of the Monor police department on the same day. The representative of the police department suggested that the demonstration be held at another location, since the planned venue would endanger traffic. The second applicant assured the police that the demonstrators would respect traffic rules, would only occupy the part of the road not used for traffic and would distribute flyers to car passengers, and that the organisers would call off or halt the demonstration if it was not in compliance with the relevant legal provisions. 9.  On 14 October 2012 the Monor police department forbade the demonstration. It was of the view that the planned demonstration would endanger traffic and would render the airport inaccessible, infringing passengers\u2019 right to leave the country. In any event, the demonstration would breach the traffic code, since those parts of the road not used for traffic were not supposed to be accessed by pedestrians or be used for parking. 10.  On 17 October 2012 the applicants requested judicial review of the decision, relying on their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly. They argued that a demonstration could only be forbidden on the grounds of a need to ensure traffic safety if there were no alternative means of access to the airport. In their view the demonstration would not constitute any greater hindrance to traffic than would roadworks. 11.  By a decision of 19 October 2012 the Budapest Surroundings High Court (Budapest K\u00f6rny\u00e9ki T\u00f6rv\u00e9nysz\u00e9k) dismissed their complaint, endorsing in essence the police department\u2019s reasoning (see paragraph 9 above).", "references": ["4", "2", "6", "0", "1", "8", "5", "3", "9", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Nova Gorica. 6.  The applicant was working as a cleaning lady when she allegedly developed serious medical complications in her left wrist, which could only partly have been addressed by surgery. This resulted in her using predominantly her right arm, which in turn resulted in the overburdening of that arm, giving rise to a number of medical problems. Because of these medical issues she was found, in 2006, to be incapable of further work and officially recognised as having a partial disability. 7.  On 30 December 2011 the applicant applied to the Pensions and Disability Insurance Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (\u201cthe Institute\u201d) for a disability allowance in respect of a physical impairment (nadomestilo za invalidnost \u2013 hereinafter \u201cdisability allowance\u201d). 8.  On 12 March 2012 the first-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Nova Gorica, issued a report to the effect that the applicant was not suffering from any physical impairment stipulated in the Self-Management Agreement on the List of Physical Impairments (Samoupravni sporazum o seznamu telesnih okvar \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe List\u201d; see paragraph 22 below). The commission \u2013 composed of an occupational medicine specialist, an orthopaedic specialist and a physical medicine and rehabilitation physician \u2013 based its opinion on an examination of the medical records submitted by the applicant and a clinical examination of the applicant. 9.  On 15 March 2012 the Nova Gorica unit of the Institute, relying on the opinion of the first-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for a disability allowance. A copy of the first-instance disability commission\u2019s opinion was attached to the decision. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 15 May 2012 the second-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Ljubljana, composed of an occupational medicine specialist and an orthopaedic specialist, examined the applicant\u2019s medical file and again issued a report to the effect that no physical impairment stipulated in the List could be found. 11.  On 7 June 2012 the Central Office of the Institute, referring to the conclusions of the second-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. A copy of the second-instance disability commission\u2019s opinion was attached to the decision. 12.  On 12 July 2012 the applicant initiated court proceedings against the Institute before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court seeking the annulment of the above-mentioned decisions taken by the Institute, arguing that the facts had been wrongly established, and that the procedure had not been properly conducted. She argued that because of the incapacity of her arms the functioning of her body was inhibited and greater efforts were required to satisfy her daily needs. She also argued that the opposing party should have more seriously examined all her medical problems. In her view her physical impairment amounted to at least 50% incapacity; however, the exact degree could only be determined by a medical expert. She accordingly proposed that a medical expert be appointed. 13.  On 6 September 2013 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for a disability allowance. It observed that its role was to check whether the impugned administrative decisions had been issued in a procedure that had complied with the procedural rules, and had been based on a proper establishment of fact and proper application of the law. It furthermore observed that the claimed physical impairment was a legally relevant fact, whose degree of severity under the relevant legal provisions (see paragraph 22 below) had to be proved in order for entitlement to a disability allowance to be established. After taking into account the documents in the file and the hearing of the applicant, the court found that the Institute had correctly established the facts. Referring to the findings of the disability commissions and its own direct observation of the applicant at the hearing, it concluded that the impairment to the applicant\u2019s health did not amount to a physical impairment within the meaning of the law. 14.  Considering the above-mentioned findings sufficient to reach its conclusion, the court refused the applicant\u2019s request for the appointment of a medical expert as unnecessary. 15.  On 17 October 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance court\u2019s finding. She argued that the impairment to both of her arms, her psychological illness and her headaches meant that the normal functioning of her organism was inhibited and that she had to exert greater efforts in order to perform daily tasks; that the List, which was out of date, could not possibly contain a complete list of all illnesses and injuries; that the first-instance court should not have relied on the opinions of the disability commissions and a doctor (opinions which the applicant had disputed); that the first-instance court should have appointed a medical expert, as requested by the applicant; that the applicant could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms. 16.  On 6 February 2014 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that the facts had been sufficiently established and the substantive law applied correctly. It also found that the refusal of the applicant\u2019s request for the appointment of an expert had not undermined the legality of the decision as that decision would not have been any different had an expert been appointed. The Higher Labour and Social Court further found the following:\n\u201cA court in a judicial social dispute ... assesses the correctness and lawfulness of the impugned administrative decisions [in question] and having regard to the dispute of the full jurisdiction [the court] when quashing [the administrative decisions] alone decides on the merits. Within the context of the judicial review of the administrative decisions [the court] is of course not obliged to accept evidence [submitted by] a forensic medical expert if the expert opinions of the disability commissions at first and second instance allow for the conclusion that the negative administrative decisions are correct and lawful because they are based on an assessment by both commissions which is convincing in view of the available medical documentation and the report of [the relevant] medical examination. Such a procedural situation is found in the present case, because in the opinion of the appeal court the expert bodies in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings correctly determined that the applicant had no physical impairment.\u201d 17.  The court furthermore found that physical impairments could not be determined contrary to what was provided in the List. Moreover, the question of whether a particular condition amounted to an impairment was different to the question of whether it amounted to a disability. In the applicant\u2019s case, although she had a recognised disability, this fact alone \u2013 without any functional problems in respect of inflexibility of joints \u2013 could not suffice to categorise her condition as one of physical impairment. The Higher Labour and Social Court agreed with the court of first instance that the disability commissions in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings had made the right assessment when concluding that the applicant had not suffered from any physical impairment. It also pointed out that the court had not been obliged to appoint an independent expert if it had been possible to conclude from the disability commissions\u2019 opinions that the Institute\u2019s decisions had been well-founded, as had been so in the instant case. 18.  The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law. She argued that her right to a fair trial had not been respected because the court had refused to appoint a medical expert and had assessed the applicant\u2019s condition itself, despite lacking the necessary medical knowledge. She had thereby been deprived of her only possibility to challenge the Institute\u2019s decisions. The applicant also drew attention to the fact that in numerous cases court-appointed experts had found the disability commissions\u2019 fact-finding to be erroneous. She moreover argued that the first-instance court should not have based its decision on the List. 19.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, holding that there were no grounds for allowing an appeal on points of law. 20.  On 21 July 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. She complained that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision had not been reasoned. She further argued that she could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms. Her only way of effectively challenging the Institute\u2019s decision would have been by way of appointing an independent medical expert; as had been proved in the past, independent medical experts had often reached findings contrary to those of disability commissions. She invoked Article 22 (equal protection of rights) and Article 23 (the right to judicial protection) of the Constitution. She also reiterated her complaint about the reliance on the List. 21.  On 10 December 2014 the Constitutional Court decided to not accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights which would have serious consequences for the applicant.", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "7", "4", "8", "5", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokast\u00ebr District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. Three other co\u2011defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7.  On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokast\u00ebr Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant\u2019s absence. 8.  On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant\u2019s extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction. 9.  On an unspecified date in October 2007 the applicant lodged his appeal. In the first place, he requested that his case be re-examined separately from that of his co-defendants on the grounds that he had not sought the use of the summary procedure. He relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s unifying decision no. 2 of 29 January 2003 (see paragraph 16 below). Secondly, he requested that a fresh examination of the evidence be conducted in his presence and that a number of witnesses be questioned. Thirdly, he maintained that the authorities had failed to inform him about the judicial proceedings before the first-instance court. 10.  On 17 December 2007 the Gjirokast\u00ebr Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction in absentia. The court ruled that the applicant had not put forward new evidence to change the outcome of those proceedings. His request had been directed against the probative value of evidence which had already been examined and decided upon. In upholding the conviction, the court relied on forensic evidence produced in 1997 and 1999 and on witness statements made in 2001 and 2002. The court further stated that the applicant had been duly informed as the authorities had issued a public notice. It finally noted that the summary procedure had been applied equally to all the defendants in accordance with the Supreme Court\u2019s unifying decision of 29 January 2003 (see \u201cRelevant domestic case law below\u201d). Separating the cases could not be considered as the district court had not decided on that issue. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision. He complained of a breach of his right to have witnesses questioned and evidence re-examined. He stressed the fact that in his appeal to the Court of Appeal he had asked for evidence to be obtained, including an identification parade, the questioning of a fourth person who had been present at the events, a face-to face confrontation between himself and the other co-defendants and so on. It had not been possible for him to obtain that evidence himself, only the courts or the prosecutor could have done that. The applicant also maintained the other complaints he had raised in his Court of Appeal case. 12.  On 5 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked any grounds of appeal as prescribed by law. 13.  On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court. 14.  On 9 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision that his appeal was inadmissible.", "references": ["9", "4", "8", "1", "6", "5", "2", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in Qesarat, Tepelen\u00eb, in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7.  On 14 January and 10 November 2005, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokast\u00ebr District Court and the Court of Appeal, respectively, convicted the applicant of attempted theft resulting in death in collusion with others and sentenced him to seventeen years\u2019 imprisonment. That decision became final on 9 February 2007 after the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. It appears that the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family throughout the court proceedings. 8.  It appears that on 30 March 2007 the applicant was extradited from Greece to Albania. 9.  On 3 May 2007 the Gjirokast\u00ebr District Court allowed a request by the applicant to appeal out of time and he lodged an appeal against his conviction in absentia. 10.  On 12 November 2007 the Gjirokaster Court of Appeal while requalifying the charges against the applicant on the basis of the evidence obtained during the proceedings in absentia, upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, ruling that it had become res judicata. 11.  By a final decision of 7 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction as decided in the Gjirokast\u00ebr District Court\u2019s decision of 2005, ruling that it had become res judicata and that the facts and law in the case had been examined previously. It further noted that leave to appeal out of time should not have been granted as the case had become res  judicata. 12.  On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, complaining, inter alia, about the fact that the domestic courts had not given him the possibility of a fresh factual and legal determination of the criminal charge. 13.  On 9 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision to dismiss his appeal.", "references": ["5", "7", "8", "0", "9", "6", "4", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Dolyna, a city in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region.\nIn December 1996 her mother obtained a share of land in the village of Kopytkove in the Zdolbunivsky district of the Rivne region (see paragraphs 11 to 14 below concerning the nature of shares of land and their subsequent conversion into plots). Following her mother\u2019s death in November 1999, the first applicant inherited that share and obtained a certificate confirming that she had become its new owner on 25 May 2000. On 10 January 2006 the Zdolbuniv District State Administration allocated a plot of land to her measuring 2.5917 hectares, zoned for use as an individual smallholding (\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u044f\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0435 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e, see paragraph 18 below for a description of zoning categories of agricultural land under Ukrainian law).\nThe applicant obtained a property certificate in respect of that land on 13 August 2007. She rented out 2.0917 hectares to a company under a lease registered on 30 May 2015 and due to expire on 10 November 2021, and 0.5 hectares to another company under a fifteen-year lease registered on 10 August 2016. According to the applicant, she receives rent in kind, either in grain or sunflower oil, depending on the crops grown on the land in a given year. 7.  The second applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ternopil.\nOn an unspecified date his mother obtained the right to a share of land in the village of Rakovets in the Zbarazh district of the Ternopil region. In November 2004 he inherited it from her. On 27 March 2008 the Zbarazh District State Administration allocated 3.41 hectares of agricultural land to him, zoned for commercial agricultural production (\u0442\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0456\u043b\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0435 \u0432\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0442\u0432\u043e). He obtained a property certificate on 22 July 2008.\nThe land is rented by a limited liability company. Since 2010 the second applicant has received rent in the following amounts:\nYear\nUAH\n(in total)\nUAH\n(per hectare)\nApproximate equivalent in EUR\n(per hectare)\n2010 8.  The applicants\u2019 land is subject to legislative restrictions on alienation and change of designated use, which are described in \u201cRelevant domestic material\u201d and, as regards their current state, in paragraph 22 below. 9.  Under the laws of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, prior to the enactment of the Land Code of 18 December 1990 (hereinafter \u201cthe Land Code\u201d), individuals and non-State entities could not own land and all land was owned by the State. 10.  Under Article 17 of the Land Code, local councils were authorised to transfer land to individuals and non-State entities. However, for a period of six years, those who acquired land could not sell or otherwise dispose of it (except in cases of inheritance). They could only transfer the property back to their local council. The courts could shorten this period if there was a valid reason for such a decision. 11.  In the 1990s a large proportion of the country\u2019s agricultural land was held by the former Soviet collective and State-owned farms which, under the Law of 14 February 1992 were renamed \u201ccollective agricultural enterprises\u201d (hereinafter \u201cCAEs\u201d or \u201ccollective farms\u201d). 12.  Presidential Decree no. 720/95 of 8 August 1995 provided for a programme of gradual reform of the CAEs through the issuance to their current and former members of shares of land, that is to say land entitlements in the form of shares of the whole land mass of the CAE expressed as a number of hectares but without a specific physical location or defined boundaries. The decree provided that the shares were to be distributed to current and former members of CAEs as well as to certain categories of workers employed in the social sector (education, medicine and so forth) in rural areas. While the decree gave members of the CAEs the ability to withdraw from their CAEs with their shares, the large-scale process of dissolving the CAEs through the issuance of shares did not actually start until 1999 (see next paragraph). 13.  Presidential Decree no. 1529/99 of 3 December 1999 accelerated the land reform by requiring the dissolution of all CAEs by April 2000, through the distribution of shares of land and other assets to their members. In the process of dissolving the CAEs, a large proportion of the rural population acquired shares of land. 14.  A large-scale process of converting the shares into physical plots of land (defined on the ground) was then organised. As a result of this process, millions of new owners were issued with ownership certificates relating to specific plots of land.[1] The land owned by the applicants underwent this process (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). 15.  According to Parliamentary Resolution no. 882-IV of 22 May 2003 summarising the provisional results of the land reform, during the process 6.87 million Ukrainians obtained shares of land and 3.17 million had them converted into plots of land. Parliament noted some difficulties in the issuance of shares of land and their conversion into plots of land, with some regions falling behind: only 13% of share owners obtained property certificates to plots of land in the Zhytomyr Region, while this figure stood at 96% in the Kirovograd Region. Some 107,000 shares were sold or otherwise disposed of by their new owners, which, according to Parliament, showed that they had not been adequately informed about the land reform and their rights and duties.[2]\nParliament observed that, due to a lack of funding, the Cabinet of Ministers was only planning to complete the share conversion and titling work by 2006, which made it impossible to introduce the land sales market from 1 January 2005, as the Land Code provided at the time (see paragraph 19 below). 16.  Law no. 2242-III of 18 January 2001 prohibited, until the enactment of a new Land Code, the alienation of shares of land, except in cases of inheritance and expropriation for public needs. 17.  On 25 October 2001 a new Land Code was enacted. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. 18.  Article 22 \u00a7 3 of the new Land Code defines the following categories of designated use for agricultural land: (i) individual smallholdings; (ii) land for fruit and vegetable growing; (iii) land for pasture and hay harvesting; (iv) land for commercial agricultural production; and (v) individual farming enterprises, that is to say commercial entities owned by individual farmers engaged in commercial agricultural production. 19.  Article 15 of the Transitional Provisions of the new Land Code provided that until 1 January 2005 individuals and non-State entities could not sell or otherwise transfer title to two categories of land in their ownership: (i) plots zoned for individual farming enterprises or for other commercial agricultural production and (ii) shares of land. Swap transactions, inheritance cases and expropriation for public needs were exempt from the ban. The ban, which has been subsequently extended and modified (see the Table in paragraph 21 below) is commonly referred to in Ukraine as the \u201cthe land moratorium\u201d (\u0437\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u0439). 20.  According to the Government, the transcript of the parliamentary session at which the new Code was passed shows that the moratorium was introduced in view of the need for additional time to form a land market with \u201cadequate\u201d prices and enact legislation necessary for the creation of such a market. In particular, according to the transcript, at the opening of the debate Member of Parliament V. Asadchev expressed his concern that, if rules of the Code concerning the transfer of land into private hands were to be adopted, this would create a few large landowners (\u0434\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0442\u044c \u043b\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0443\u043d\u0434\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0456\u0432) and transform the rest of the population into hired agricultural labour (\u0431\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0438). In presenting the draft Code for the vote, Ms K. Vashchuk, Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Committee for Land Affairs and Agriculture, stated that, in order to address concerns such as those expressed by the MP, the draft suspended the operation of all provisions concerning the sale of land until 2005, until laws on the creation of a land cadastre, land registration and others were passed and a State land bank was established.[3] 21.  The Land Code was amended on a number of occasions as to both the duration and scope of the original ban, as summarised in the Table below:\nTable Key legislative developments concerning the land moratorium\nNo.\nDate of the law \nEnd date of the ban\nChanges in the scope of the moratorium and other related changes\nSummary of the reasons given in the explanatory note to the draft law\n1\n06/10/2004\n01/01/2007\nSwap transactions involving land, including swaps of land for equity in companies, prohibited\nLegislation governing the land market had not yet been developed by the Cabinet of Ministers; technical work was needed to prepare the administrations for processing land transactions. The \u201cextension\u201d was needed to prevent \u201c impoverishment of the Ukrainian people\u201d and the buying up of land by Ukrainian and foreign tycoons (\u043c\u0430\u0433\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0438)\n2\n09/02/2006 \n \nContracts and powers of attorney envisaging future (after expiry of the moratorium) transfers of land subject to the moratorium declared invalid\nLegislation aimed at preventing circumvention of the moratorium through the issuance of powers of attorney by land owners to third parties authorising them to dispose of the land subject to the moratorium[4]\n3\n19/12/2006\n01/01/2008\nMoratorium extended, in addition to land for commercial agricultural production, to individual smallholdings (see paragraph 18 above); any change of designated use of the land subject to the moratorium forbidden; swap transactions involving a swap of one land plot for another allowed again\nDevelop private land ownership, ensure the unrestricted exercise of owners\u2019 rights, and ensure free circulation of land except in the cases provided for by law. The creation of a land market would allow transfers of land to more efficient users but in order to do so the market had to be subject to reasonable regulation. Such regulation should include: limits on changing the designated use, the imposition of criteria to qualify as a buyer of land, limiting the maximum plot sizes of certain land and the concentration of land in the hands of a single person and family etc.\n4\n28/12/2007 and 03/06/2008[5]\nUntil entry into force of the Land Cadastre Act and Land Market Act\nNo notable changes\nThe amendments were incorporated in omnibus bills covering mostly budgetary matters and containing a wide range of changes; there were apparently no specific comments made on the moratorium issue[6]\n5\n19/01/2010\nUntil entry into force of the Land Cadastre Act and Land Market Act, but not before 01/01/2012 \nNo notable changes\nLegislation regulating land relations had not yet been developed; technical work was needed to prepare administrations for processing land transactions. The \u201cextension\u201d was needed to prevent \u201cimpoverishment of the Ukrainian people\u201d and the buying up of land by Ukrainian and foreign tycoons\n6\n07/07/2011\nand 01/01/2013\n \n \nLand Cadastre Act was enacted and entered into force \n \n7\n09/12/2011\n \nParliament approved the draft Land Market Act at the first reading (see paragraph 40 below). It appears that no further progress on the bill was made\nIn the course of the parliamentary debate it was proposed to rename the Land Market Act the Circulation of Agricultural Land Act (\u201cthe CALA\u201d).[7]\n8\n20/12/2011\nUntil entry into force of the Land Market Act, but not before 01/01/2013\nNo notable changes\nThe Land Cadastre Act would enter into force on 1 January 2013 and the end of moratorium should be set for that specific date\n9\n02/10/2012\n \nChange of designated use was allowed where land was allocated to an investor under a production-sharing agreement\nEncourage investment under production-sharing agreements, particularly in the field of the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons\n10\n20/11/2012\nUntil entry into force of the CALA, but not before 01/01/2016\nThe law extending the moratorium instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to produce the draft CALA and submit it to Parliament within six months. \nEven though the draft Land Market Act had been approved at the first reading on 9 December 2011, it had not yet been passed into law. A change to the concept of that bill was envisaged, with the name changing to the CALA. An \u201cextension\u201d of the moratorium was needed to develop an effective mechanism for sales and overseeing sales of land and to prevent possible abuses\n11\n10/11/2015\nThe same as in row 10, but not before 01/01/2017\nThe law extending the moratorium instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to produce the draft CALA and submit it to Parliament by 01/03/2016\nLifting the moratorium in times of war and economic crisis would be a threat to national and food security and the threat of a loss of land, as an important national resource. A step-by-step roadmap for introducing agricultural land into circulation, which would be clear to the public, needed to be developed. The moratorium created difficulties in obtaining finance for agricultural production, and led to depopulation of the countryside. In order to solve these and other problems created by the moratorium, the CALA had to be passed and the land eventually introduced into circulation \n12\n06/10/2016\nThe same as in row 10, but not before 01/01/2018\nDraft CALA to be submitted by 01/07/2017 Apparently no such draft was submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers by this or the previously set deadlines, although two drafts of the CALA were submitted in 2016 by certain MPs (see paragraph 43 below)\nWhile the creation of a land market was a necessary element of the development of a market economy, the market had to be transparent and fair, competitive and efficient, and be able to prevent shadow transactions. Therefore the \u201cextension\u201d was needed to develop legislation regulating the land market[8]\n13\n07/12/2017\nThe same as in row 10, but not before 01/01/2019\nDraft CALA to be submitted by 01/07/2018\nAbolition of the moratorium in times of war and economic crisis without having in place legislation regulating the circulation of agricultural land would create risks for national and food security. A lifting of the moratorium had to be preceded by legislative work to encourage the creation of a network of strong farmers\u2019 enterprises and cooperatives. The prohibition on the sale of agricultural land was a barrier for attracting investment in the agricultural sector since land could not be used as security for loans, but its lifting could not be the end in itself and needed to be thought of as a measure to encourage investment in the agricultural sector without, at the same time, leading to landlessness among the rural population[9] 22.  As at today\u2019s date, the Transitional Provisions of the Land Code prohibit alienation in any form of most agricultural land, including of the categories owned by the applicants, except in cases of inheritance, swap transactions and expropriation for public use. They also prohibit any change in the designated use of such land, except where it has been allocated to an investor under a production-sharing agreement. Currently the Transitional Provisions state that those restrictions are to remain effective until the entry into force of the Circulation of Agricultural Land Act (\u201cthe CALA\u201d), but in any case at least until 1 January 2019. 23.  Article 13 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution of 1996 provides that land, its subsoil, air, water and other resources are the property of the Ukrainian people (\u0454 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u043a\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443). Article 13 \u00a7 4 requires the State to ensure protection of the rights of all property owners and economic players and social orientation of the economy. Article 14 \u00a7 1 provides that land is the main national asset, and is under the special protection of the State. Article 14 \u00a7 2 guarantees the right to land ownership and provides that land ownership may be acquired and exercised by citizens, legal entities and the State in accordance with the law. 24.  Article 22 provides that human and citizens\u2019 rights and freedoms are guaranteed and may not be diminished by the enactment of new laws or the amendment of laws that are already in force. 25.  Article 41 of the Constitution reads:\n \u201cEveryone shall have the right to own, use, or dispose of his or her property and the results of his or her intellectual or creative activities.\n...\nNo one shall be unlawfully deprived of the right to property. The right to private property shall be inviolable...\u201d 26.  On 17 February 2017 fifty-five Members of Parliament lodged an application with the Constitutional Court seeking to have the Law of 6 October 2016 reaffirming the moratorium declared unconstitutional.[10] They invoked Articles 13, 14, and 41 of the Constitution set out above as well as Articles 8 (the principle of the rule of law), 24 (non-discrimination), 42 (the right to enterprise), 48 (the right to a sufficient standard of living), and 64 (general provision concerning the restriction of constitutional rights) of the Constitution.\nOn 14 February 2018 the Constitutional Court rejected the application without examining it on the merits. It found the arguments presented in support of that application for abstract review insufficiently developed to permit the opening of the constitutional review proceedings and its substantive examination. It concluded that the application failed to meet the requirements of section 51 \u00a7 3 of the Constitutional Court Act which sets out the details an application must contain, namely the reasoning as to why the applicant considered a given provision unconstitutional.\nAccording to the information on the Constitutional Court\u2019s web site, as of 6 April 2018, which appears to be the most recent information publicly available on the date of examination of the case by the Court, there was no new application for constitutional review of the matter in question pending.[11] 27.  Article 281.3 of the Tax Code of 2010 exempts from property tax land rented to commercial agricultural producers benefitting from the simplified taxation regime.[12] Article 281.1.3 exempts old-age pensioners from the payment of land tax. 28.  Article 78 \u00a7 1 defines ownership as the right to possess, use and dispose of land. 29.  Article 81 \u00a7 2 and Article 82 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 provide that foreign nationals, stateless persons, foreign legal entities and legal entities with foreign capital can only own non-agricultural land of certain categories. 30.  Article 91 requires land owners to use land according to its designated use category, respect environmental rules, improve land fertility, respect neighbours\u2019 rights, and so forth. Article 143 provides that a court may order expropriation of land without compensation in cases of failure to respect the designated use of the land or rectify a serious breach of land protection rules despite a warning from the land protection authorities. 31.  Article 130 provides that land zoned for commercial agricultural production can only be acquired by a Ukrainian national with sufficient educational qualifications or experience to engage in agricultural production or by a Ukrainian legal entity which has agriculture listed in its articles of association among the types of business it can engage in. The municipality where the land is located, as well as its permanent residents, have a right of first refusal in respect of the land sold. 32.  Item 13 of the Transitional Provisions of the Code, as in force in 2001, provided that a single person or entity could not acquire more than 100 hectares of agricultural land. The Law of 6 October 2004 (the first extension of the moratorium \u2013 see row 1 of the Table in paragraph 21 above) extended that limitation to 1 January 2015. It expired on that date. However, given that most agricultural land could not be sold throughout the period, it would appear that the restriction never had much practical application. 33.  The Land Lease Act (section 21) provides that rent is set by agreement of the parties. However, Presidential Decree no. 92/2002 of 2 February 2002 instructed the Cabinet of Ministers and local executive authorities to take operational measures to ensure that the level of rent under land leases would be at least 3% of the land\u2019s estimated value. According to the statistics published by the State Land Cadastre Agency, in 2013 74.4% of leases provided for rent of at least 3% of the value.[13] 34.  Section 19 of the Land Lease Act provides that for the main categories of agricultural land, the term of lease cannot be less than seven years and, for any lease, cannot exceed fifty years. 35.  The State Land Cadastre Agency published certain statistics concerning the land lease market in Ukraine on which the parties relied in their submissions:\n(i)  as at 2013 there were 4,741,400 leases concerning shares of land in former CAEs or plots converted from former shares, covering 17.5 million hectares. Of them 35.5% were with entities which were successors of former collective farms, 14.2% with individual farming enterprises (see paragraph 18 above) and 50.3% with other entities. The national average rent was UAH 563.50 (around EUR 48 at the time). 52.2% of landlords were pensioners;[14]\n(ii)  as at April 2015 the number of leases rose to 4.8 million, the national average annual rent was UAH 727.6 per hectare (about EUR 29 at the time) and the average rent for the Rivne and Ternopil regions, where the first and the second applicant\u2019s land was located, were UAH 1068.80 and 546.10 per hectare (EUR 42 and 21 respectively).[15] 36.  On 31 May 2002, in his annual address to Parliament on the state of the nation, the President of Ukraine stressed the need to create the structure for an efficient and transparent land market by 2005, when the moratorium would expire. Important aspects were the creation of a transparent property registration system, introduction of the ability to use land as security for mortgage financing and completion of the conversion of shares of land into plots and the issuance of property certificates.[16] 37.  Coalition Agreements of 22 June 2006 and 29 November 2007[17] and an action programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of 16 January 2008[18] stated, in nearly identical terms, that the coalition and government had the following priorities: creation of the conditions for the functioning of the land market (issuance of ownership certificates, demarcation of boundaries of plots of land, putting the land cadastre into operation, land valuations, introduction of the mechanism for land market regulation) and then revocation of the moratorium. 38.  On 17 June 2009 the Cabinet of Ministers approved the outline of a State programme for the development of land relations until 2020. It noted a number of problems in land relations and listed a number of measures to resolve them, including the gradual introduction into circulation of land and rights to it and the creation and development of a land market. 39.  On 7 April 2011, in his annual address to Parliament on the state of the nation, the President of Ukraine stated that the moratorium was preventing the transfer of land to efficient owners, thus slowing down the development of the agricultural sector. Steps in order to introduce a regulated land market had to be taken urgently.[19] 40.  On 9 December 2011 Parliament approved the draft Land Market Act at the first reading (see paragraph 21 above).[20] The draft law provided that only citizens of Ukraine, municipalities and the State could acquire agricultural land. A single citizen would not be permitted to own more than 100 hectares of land zoned for commercial agricultural production or rent more than 6,000 hectares of such land in any one district or more than 5% of the land in any one region. The caps would also apply to those associated with the individual. The bill provided that owners of neighbouring land would have a right of first refusal in the event of alienation of agricultural land and that such land could not be sold for less than the price determined by an expert, a procedure to be regulated by law. Rezoning of formerly publicly owned agricultural land would be prohibited for ten years after acquisition. The bill also contained a number of other rules aimed at safeguarding the efficient use of agricultural land. 41.  On 3 July 2012, in his annual address to Parliament on the state of the nation, the President of Ukraine stated that that year, before revocation of the moratorium, a mechanism for the effective protection of the interests of agricultural producers and of food security of the country needed to be created and their effective functioning secured.[21] 42.  In his annual addresses to Parliament on the state of the nation in 2016 and 2017, the President of Ukraine made the following remarks concerning the land moratorium.\nOn 6 September 2016 he said:\n\u201cThe inability to freely sell and buy agricultural land unquestionably inhibits investment in agriculture, reduces and breaches the rights of the rural population, among other things, lease rights, taking the last remaining kopeks out of their pockets. This is axiomatic. However, I am also aware of public opinion on this matter and the position of the majority of parliamentary groups. I value and respect that. But how can we resolve this problem, my dear legislators? This is within your purview. Either to stick your head in the sand and change nothing or to work to create a land market in Ukraine with all the possible safeguards against any possible negative impact.\u201d[22]\nOn 7 September 2017 he said:\n\u201c.. In Estonia they have privatised everything: ports, telecommunications, aviation and even the railways. In Poland out of 8,500 State companies the State has kept only 41. And, by the way, their land has not been bought up by foreigners, despite the fact that the residents of those countries can easily buy and sell agricultural land.\nUntil now, Ukrainians have been deprived of that right. Millions of people formally own land but it has been decided for them that they are unable to handle it and an unconstitutional moratorium was introduced. Why then do we allow people to sell their flats? Because you know, by this logic, someone could come along and buy them all up.\nAs a statesman, in making decisions I must have regard to public opinion. For now, unfortunately, it has been formed by the populists. I am not going to put pressure on Parliament to adopt the land reform, I will not do it. But I am asking you to make a resolution, for now at least a silent one, in your minds, in favour of such a reform. Enact such laws which would assuage the phobias, which would remove all the objections, introduce all the necessary safeguards, introduce minimum prices, make registers transparent, protect the rural population but also give them freedom. I am asking you to set, I invite you to set, a specific date when all of this could be launched, even if not today.\u201d[23] 43.  On 3 April 2017 the Cabinet of Ministers approved its mid-term action plan for up until 2020 and its priority action plan for 2017. The 2020 plan describes the continuing maintenance of the moratorium as one of the main problems in the agricultural sector that deprives a large number of Ukrainian citizens of the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to property and obstructs the development of the agricultural market. The plan provides that the problem created by the moratorium could be resolved through nationwide discussion and the introduction of a land market based on a model acceptable to the population. The 2017 plan stated that the draft CALA would be submitted to Parliament in the second quarter of 2017. However, it appears that no such bill has been introduced.[24] 44.  The Government submitted information about protest actions led by farmers in early October 2016 in a number of regions, including highway blockades. The farmers called for the restoration of tax benefits for the agricultural sector. One of their demands was also to reaffirm the land moratorium. 45.  It appears from the material available to the Court on the legislation of member States of the Council of Europe that none of the thirty\u2011two member States surveyed has a general ban on the sale or any other form of alienation of agricultural land. The same can be said about the two non\u2011member States surveyed, Canada and the United States of America. 46.  Although twenty-two of the thirty-two member States surveyed have undergone a land-reform programme since 1990 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany (after unification), Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), none of those States have since that time imposed such a general ban, even though some used to impose time-limited restrictions on the resale of land acquired as a result of privatisation, for example three years in Armenia and ten years in Russia (according to pre\u20112001 legislation). 47.  However, in many of the member States surveyed transfers of agricultural land are subject to a number of restrictions and conditions. 48.  Thus, in seven of the member States surveyed (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), the transfer of ownership of agricultural land must be authorised by a special government body. Generally speaking, the authorisation procedure is normally aimed at preserving the effective use of the land for agriculture, so that for example in Austria for the authorisation to be issued the buyer needs to provide assurances that he or she will actually cultivate the acquired land. In another example, in Norway a typical condition on which authorisation is granted may be that the buyer must move onto the land and live on it for five years. In a further three member States (Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) some categories of buyers, notably those already engaged in farming or their family members, are exempted from the authorisation procedure. 49.  In seven of the member States surveyed (Austria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia), qualifications or prior experience in the agricultural sector on the part of the buyer are required for the transfer of ownership of land or to confer priority over other buyers. Some States, such as Estonia, Poland and Sweden, generally authorise only individuals, and not legal entities, to acquire agricultural land of a certain size and subject acquisition by legal entities to additional conditions, such as the need to obtain a permit. 50.  More than half of the member States surveyed \u2013 eighteen out of thirty-two, namely Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia \u2013 have pre-emption laws, securing a right of first refusal mostly to co-owners, close family members, neighbouring or other farmers, tenants, agricultural enterprises, municipalities and in some cases the State. 51.  In nine of the member States surveyed (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, the Russian Federation and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), agricultural land cannot generally be sold to foreign persons. In addition, the majority of the surveyed former Soviet Union and other Central and East European member States make a distinction between European Union nationals, who generally can acquire agricultural land subject to compliance with other restrictions and after the expiry of certain time-limited transitional periods, and third-country nationals, for whom restrictions are more severe (for example, the requirement to obtain a special permit in Estonia and a ban on ownership by third-country nationals in Hungary). However, these restrictions are subject to exceptions, notably in cases of inheritance and where more liberal rules are provided by international agreements. A special regime may thus be in place with member States of the European Economic Area and of the Organisation for Economic Co\u2011operation and Development. 52.  In eight of the member States surveyed (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) there are restrictions on the size of agricultural land that can be disposed of. Generally, these States impose caps on the maximum amount of land which can be owned by the same person (ranging from 300 hectares in Hungary to 10% of the agricultural land area in a territorial unit in Russia) although some also limit the minimum size of land parcels, seeking to prevent excessive subdivision of land below a certain size. 53.  Certain States have particular procedures in place for the sale of agricultural land. For instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina requires land most suitable for agriculture to be sold at public auctions. States, such as Italy, which have pre-emption laws, also have in place detailed procedures aimed at ensuring the effective exercise of pre-emption rights. 54.  Special restrictions also exist in certain sensitive areas such as border areas and areas adjacent to military installations (for example, in Greece and Serbia).", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "6", "5", "8", "0", "7", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Prague. 7.  On 17 October 2003 he married B., a Ukrainian national, in Prague. On 23 May 2004 their son, the second applicant, was born. 8.  Between 2004 and 2007 the applicants and B. lived together as a family at the first applicant\u2019s residence in Prague. 9.  In 2007 the couple divorced. B. continued to live with the child at a different address in Prague. 10.  By the decision of the Prague 10 District Court adopted on 6 November 2008, which was upheld on appeal on 19 May 2009, the first applicant and B. were granted alternating custody of the second applicant (with a change of parent each week). 11.  On 27 June 2009 B. took the second applicant at her residence pursuant to the above alternating custody scheme. Without the consent of the first applicant, she moved to Ukraine with the second applicant and settled in Demeshkivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk Region. 12.  The first applicant initiated a procedure under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980 (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d) for the return of the second applicant to the Czech Republic. 13.  In October 2009 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department of Justice, acting in the interests of the first applicant, lodged a claim with the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court for the return of the second applicant to the Czech Republic, pursuant to the Hague Convention. 14.  On 2 July 2010 the court granted the claim, finding that the removal of the second applicant from the Czech Republic and his retention in Ukraine had been wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The court ordered B. to return the child to the first applicant\u2019s residence in the Czech Republic. The child was to be returned by B. whilst accompanied by the first applicant. 15.  On 14 September 2010, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on appeal, and it became enforceable on that date. 16.  On October 2010 B. lodged an appeal on points of law. 17.  On 25 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine suspended enforcement of the return order, pending the examination of the appeal on points of law. 18.  On 15 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed B.\u2019s appeal on points of law, finding no proof that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the law or violated any procedural rules. 19.  Further to its earlier decision granting the parents alternating custody of the second applicant, the Prague 10 District Court reconsidered the matter in the light of new developments in the case, especially the child\u2019s abduction by B., his retention in Ukraine, and the first applicant\u2019s lack of access to the child. On 10 November 2010 that court found that it was in the child\u2019s best interests to live with the first applicant, who was therefore granted the sole custody of the child. 20.  On 28 June 2011 that decision was upheld on appeal. 21.  On 9 December 2013 the Halych District Court of Ivano-Frankivsk Region decided B.\u2019s claim concerning determination of the second applicant\u2019s place of residence. The court noted that the judgment of 2 July 2010 ordering the return of the child had not been enforced, and found that the child had in the meantime settled in a new environment in Ukraine. In that regard the court referred to the psychological and pedagogical report which concluded that the child was attached to his mother and that discussion about his father caused him feelings of fear. It also examined reports by the local childcare authorities suggesting that the child should live with his mother. The court found that the child was being given appropriate care by his mother and that it would be in his best interests to stay with his mother. It therefore ruled that the child should live with B. at her place of residence in Ukraine. 22.  The first applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the Ukrainian court did not have competence to determine the child\u2019s place of residence because the custody rights had to be determined by the Czech authorities. 23.  On 6 March 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court, finding that the child had settled in a new environment since his arrival in 2009 and that B. was entitled to bring that action in order to ensure the best interests of the child. 24.  The first applicant did not appeal on points of law against that decision. 25.  On 27 September 2010 the bailiffs of the Halych District Department of Justice started proceedings to enforce the judgment ordering the return of the child and contacted the parties to that effect. During the short period allowed for the voluntary execution of the return order, B. refused to comply with it. For that reason, on 6 October 2010 she was ordered to pay a fine of 170 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1]. Two days later, she was ordered to pay a further fine of UAH 340[2]. 26.  On 3 November 2010 the Halych District Court of Ivano-Frankivsk Region dismissed the bailiffs\u2019 request to put the child on the search list. The court found that there was no evidence that the bailiffs had made attempts to identify the whereabouts of B. and the child. The hearing was attended by B., who submitted that the child was living with her and that she had not received any notices from the bailiffs concerning the enforcement of the return order. 27.  As B. continued to avoid the enforcement of the judgment, in November 2010 the bailiffs requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against her on charges of deliberate non-compliance with a court decision under Article 382 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which provided for a maximum penalty of three years\u2019 imprisonment. 28.  On 25 January 2011 the bailiffs, accompanied by the police, a vice\u2011consul of the Czech Republic and the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, visited state school no. 7 in Kalush after receiving information that the second applicant was a pupil there. There they met the second applicant, B. and B.\u2019s lawyer. B. initially agreed to move to the Czech Republic and settle there and to bring the second applicant to live with her. Several days later B. informed the other parties that she had changed her mind. 29.  As B. and the child could not be found at their residence and the child\u2019s whereabouts were unknown, the bailiffs requested that the court put the child on the search list and place him temporarily in care. On 23 August 2011 the Halych District Court granted the requests. However, on 29 September 2011 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal examined an appeal lodged by B. and partly quashed that decision as regards the temporary placement of the child in care, considering \u2013 in view of the submissions by the local childcare authority \u2013 that such a measure would be excessive and detrimental to the child. 30.  On 21 November 2011 B. informed the bailiffs that she and the child were living at their home in Demeshkivtsi. However, when the bailiffs attempted to enter the house on 28 November 2011, B. refused to open the door. 31.  As B. and the child were not present at their address when the bailiffs made further visits, the bailiffs applied to the court to have them put on the search list and to have the child placed in temporary care. On 5 March 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court refused to grant the requests, holding that the bailiffs had not taken sufficient steps to identify the whereabouts of B. and that the child was living in suitable conditions which made it unnecessary to place him in temporary care. The court heard B., who was present for the hearing and who informed the court that she and the child were living in Kalush in a flat of suitable quality and that the child was still attending school no. 7 in that town. The court also examined submissions from the local childcare authorities to that effect. 32.  On 26 March 2012 the bailiffs discovered that the child \u2013 who by now was almost eight years old \u2212 had stopped attending school and was being instructed at home by a teacher from the Kalush school. 33.  On 5 July 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court refused to grant the bailiffs\u2019 requests to put B. and the child on the search list and to place the child in temporary care. That decision was appealed against and on 4 October 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal granted their requests. However, B. lodged an appeal on points of law and on 26 December 2012 the Higher Specialised Court on Civil and Criminal Matters upheld the first-instance court\u2019s ruling and dismissed the bailiffs\u2019 requests. It found that the judgment of 2 July 2010 to return the child to Czech Republic did not include the requirement to remove the child from B., who was \u201cthe debtor\u201d in the enforcement proceedings. The court held that the bailiffs had the power to impose fines on B. and to request other measures of legal liability. However, if the judgment could not be executed without the \u201cdebtor\u201d, the bailiffs would have to terminate the enforcement proceedings. 34.  On 7 February 2013 the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings, noting that B. had been subjected to fines in those proceedings and that on 18 May 2011 she had been convicted of the crime of non\u2011compliance with a court decision and had been punished with a fine of UAH 1,000[3]. On 5 September 2013 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal reversed the bailiffs\u2019 decision, finding that the enforcement measures had been insufficient. 35.  On 20 June 2014 the bailiffs once again discontinued the enforcement proceedings. On 22 August 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court reversed the bailiff\u2019s decision as unfounded. However, in response to an appeal lodged by B., on 16 December 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 22 August 2014 and ordered a fresh hearing in the first-instance court. On 23 February 2015 the first-instance court upheld the bailiffs\u2019 decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings. On 9 April 2015 the Court of Appeal quashed the bailiffs\u2019 decision and ordered further enforcement proceedings.", "references": ["2", "3", "9", "5", "0", "8", "7", "1", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 6.  On 11 December 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having murdered his former partner. 7.  On 13 December 2010 he was charged before the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Inquiry, with inter alia, wilful homicide. He was remanded in custody thereafter. 8.  It appears from the acts of the proceedings that from the applicant\u2019s arraignment until August 2012, the applicant filed ten requests for bail which were all rejected after the relevant submissions were made, including oral hearings. Apart from the hearings related to the bail applications and other specific requests, fourteen hearings were held where scores of witnesses gave evidence and another six hearings were held where nothing happened and the case was adjourned. 9.  In the meantime on 10 April 2012 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. He complained of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in so far as he had been detained for more than fifteen months since his arrest. 10.  By a judgment of 27 June 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. By a judgment of 23 November 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and confirmed the appealed judgment. 11.  After the applicant had been held in custody for the maximum period of detention allowed by law, he became entitled to bail in accordance with Article 575(6)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code (see relevant domestic law). 12.  Consequently, following his request of 17 August 2012, by a decree of 22 August 2012, the Court of Magistrates granted the applicant bail subject to the following conditions: that he appears for all the scheduled hearings in the criminal proceedings; that he does not go abroad or abscond; that he does not contact or approach, directly nor indirectly, witnesses for the prosecution; that he does not commit a crime of a voluntary nature while released on bail; that he present himself at the District Police Station every day between eight a.m. and eight p.m.; that he be home not later than ten p.m. and that he does not leave home before six a.m. of the following day; that he inform the Police of any change of address by not later than twelve hours of such a change; that he deposit by way of security the amount of 15,000 euros (EUR) in the court registry; and that he undertake a personal guarantee of EUR 25,000. In the event of any bail condition being breached, the entire amount of EUR 40,000 would be forfeited in favour of the State. 13.  On 3 September 2012 the Attorney General appealed against the decision of 22 August 2012, as he considered the conditions too lenient and that they would not serve as a sufficient deterrent against absconding or interfering with the proper administration of justice. He requested the court to set a higher deposit reflecting the nature of the crimes with which the applicant was accused and to amend the conditions by disallowing the applicant to be in locality R. where the victim and her family resided. 14.  On 6 September 2012 the applicant objected to the Attorney General\u2019s appeal, noting that he had remained in detention precisely because he could not fulfil the conditions imposed. At the same time he filed an application requesting the court to reduce the amount to be deposited by him. He explained that since he had been detained for more than twenty months he was unemployed, and thus he could not pay the relevant amount. He submitted two documents showing that he received unemployment benefits in the sums of EUR 1,262.22 and EUR 1,573.34 in 2009 and 2010 respectively and offered to explain his financial situation ( if necessary with further documentary evidence) during an oral hearing. It appears from the acts of the proceedings that he then submitted tax assessment forms of the previous twelve years. 15.  By a decision of 7 September 2012 the Criminal Court, having examined the documents submitted by the applicant, rejected the Attorney General\u2019s request to increase the deposit but added the condition that the applicant could not be in the vicinity of locality R. It also rejected the applicant\u2019s request considering that the Court of Magistrates had correctly applied its discretion. 16.  On 9 October 2012 the applicant filed another application requesting the court to reduce the amount of the deposit. He complained that although he had been in detention for twenty-two months, and was entitled to bail, he had nevertheless remained in detention since he (and his family) could not afford to pay such an excessive amount by way of deposit. He further noted that the main witnesses had already been heard in the committal proceedings. 17.  On 10 October 2012 the Attorney General objected to the applicant\u2019s new request, noting that the applicant was not reliable, and that his inability to pay the deposit showed that he would be unable to pay the personal guarantee if he were to breach his conditions. Moreover, the family of the victim, particularly her daughter, lived in fear of the applicant. 18.  By a decree of 18 October 2012, having seen the request and the reply submitted by the Attorney General, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s request. 19.  On 4 December 2012 the applicant filed another application requesting the court to reduce the amount that he had to deposit. He noted that he had remained in detention for three and half months since the decree granting him bail due to his inability to pay. The Attorney General objected in view of the seriousness of the crime. 20.  On 7 December 2012 the court again rejected the applicant\u2019s request; it noted that its previous decisions had determined the deposit in order to strike the requisite balance between, on the one hand, the seriousness of the crime and the potential punishment, and, on the other hand, the obligation of the accused to fulfil the imposed conditions. 21.  On 29 January 2013 the applicant filed yet another application requesting that the amount of deposit be reduced. He noted that he had been in detention for another five months since the decree granting him bail, and yet he was still not in a position to benefit from such bail - to which he was entitled by law - since he could not pay the deposit imposed. The Attorney General objected considering that the amount imposed was adequate in view of the severity of the crime and the circumstances of the case. On 5 February 2013 the applicant filed a note reiterating his request. 22.  By a decree of 5 February 2013 the court, having considered the parties submissions, as well as its decree of 7 December 2012, was of the view that it should not alter the considerations made in the latter decision. It, thus, rejected the applicant\u2019s request. 23.  On 22 July 2013 the applicant requested the court to accept his mother Ms J.G. (and other relatives) as surety in lieu of the deposit. He referred to a property the relatives had inherited which they were willing to put forward as a guarantee instead of the deposit. The Attorney General requested that the applicant submit relevant evidence of the inheritance and the value of the property and that the court hear relevant witnesses in this connection, before making his final submissions. He further highlighted that a public deed would be required for the purposes of the relevant hypothec. 24.  On 30 July 2013 the applicant submitted all the relevant documents concerning the property at issue which was valued at EUR 95,000. 25.  On 2 August 2013 the court accepted that the applicant\u2019s mother stand as surety by means of a hypothec on the above-mentioned property which she owned together with other relatives. Such property was to serve as a guarantee for the applicant observing the conditions imposed; in the event of a breach of any of those conditions, the property would be forfeited in favour of the Government of Malta. 26.  Subsequently on 6 August 2013 the applicant having signed a personal guarantee of EUR 25,000 and his mother having effected the relevant hypothec as guarantee, the applicant was released from custody after thirty-two months of pre-trial detention. 27.  In the meantime the committal proceedings and hearing of witnesses continued throughout this time; further witnesses were heard during three hearings and another four hearings were adjourned. On 31 July 2013 the prosecuting authority had declared that it did not have further evidence to produce. 28.  In the meantime on 6 February 2013 the applicant instituted a new set of constitutional redress proceedings, complaining of a violation of Article  5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in connection with the \u201cexorbitant sum\u201d requested (in particular reference to the sum set as deposit) which did not allow him to effectively enjoy bail. 29.  By a judgment of 3 July 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicant\u2019s claims.\nIt held that when a court accepted that an applicant had to be granted bail, that court had to establish the proper conditions which the applicant had to satisfy to be released and yet appear for court proceedings. If the guarantees included the deposit of a sum of money, such pecuniary condition had to be considered by reference to the person of the accused and his means as well as his relation with the person who would act as his surety. The court referred to the Court\u2019s judgment of Iwanczuk v. Poland (no. 25196/94, \u00a7 66, 15 November 2011) where it had been held that the accused whom the judicial authorities declared themselves prepared to release on bail must faithfully furnish sufficient information, that can be checked if need be, about the amount of bail to be fixed. The court noted that the applicant did not satisfy this obligation. It was his duty to provide the courts with information on his income, savings and list his assets. Nevertheless, the applicant had only provided copies of self-assessment forms for purposes of income tax for the years between 1998 and 2011. According to the court, if an applicant argued that the deposit was too high, he had to show the court what he could afford by providing a list of his assets and property, even if this meant that he had to conduct researches in the Public Registry, and provide the relevant documentation. In its view an applicant had to show not only that he did not have the necessary means to deposit the sum requested but also that he was in an objective impossibility of finding the necessary means. He further had to show that he was unable to find persons who offered to act as surety. It was only when all this was shown that an applicant would have satisfied his duty to furnish sufficient information, thus enabling the court to make an objective assessment. 30.  In the court\u2019s view, in the present case, bearing in mind the seriousness of the crime and the potential punishment, the applicant had not brought enough evidence before the courts of criminal justice to substantiate his claim that those courts had imposed excessive conditions (including that referring to the amount of deposit). It further noted that the Constitutional Court [in the first round of proceedings] had not been convinced that there would be no tampering with evidence. Indeed even though the collection of evidence had come to an end, one had to guarantee that the evidence remained intact and thus relevant guarantees were necessary. 31.  The applicant appealed. 32.  By a judgment of 31 January 2014, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first court. 33.  The Constitutional Court referred to its judgment in the case The Police v. Austine Eze and Osita Anagboso Obi, of 25 October 2013, where it had held that there must be proportionality between the amount to be deposited by the applicant for his release on bail and his financial circumstances. The level of bail set out should not be too high and it should ensure the presence of the accused at the various stages of the criminal proceedings. It also made reference to the Court\u2019s judgment in Mangouras v. Spain ([GC], no. 12050/04, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2010) as well as the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment Salvatore Gauci v. Attorney General, of 31 July 1998, where it had been held that in establishing the amount to be deposited as security, the court must also consider other circumstances such as the seriousness of the offence and the danger to society. 34.  The Constitutional Court held that the onus of proving that the amount of deposit was too high for the applicant when considering his financial means lay with the applicant himself. An applicant must provide information to the court on his financial situation and on the real possibility of finding a surety able to guarantee the observance of the conditions imposed. In the present case, the Constitutional Court held that the latter option had not been contemplated by the applicant and it was only after various requests to have the amount reduced that he eventually proposed his mother to act as a surety. It noted that although the applicant\u2019s mother did not own the tenement she had used for the purposes of the guarantee, it was already in her possession for a period of time before the last application for the reduction of the amount was filed. Thus, the applicant could not argue that he could not have taken this course of action before. Although the applicant relied on the Court\u2019s judgment of Iwanczuk (cited above), where a violation had been found on the basis that it took four months for the Polish authorities to adjust the conditions for bail, the Constitutional Court held that (even if this were the case), the applicant \u2013 who was legally represented \u2011 had not explored all avenues to satisfy the courts with an adequate guarantee for the observance of the conditions of bail. No explanation as to why he only obtained a guarantee in the form of a surety at a subsequent stage was provided by the applicant. 35.  Noting that the applicant had stated that at times he worked as a bus driver and as a horse trainer, apart from other activities, the Constitutional Court distinguished the applicant\u2019s case from that of a person who was living on relief payments. The fact that the applicant had at times worked and had a salary or wage made the need to provide information to the court on his means more relevant. 36.  On the fixing of the amount of the deposit, the Constitutional Court referred to Article 576 of the Criminal Code (see relevant domestic law below) which provided the factors to be considered for this purpose. Under Maltese law these included the seriousness of the offence and the applicable punishment. The Constitutional Court considered that although the law also referred to the financial situation of the person accused, this factor was not to be taken in isolation \u2013 it was for the court fixing the amount of deposit to consider all the factors taken together and not separately. In the present case bearing in mind those factors, the amount of deposit of EUR 15,000 was justified especially since the law provided for the opportunity to provide a surety \u2013 a course of action subsequently undertaken by the applicant. 37.  In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the criminal courts\u2019 concern that the applicant did not give the necessary guarantees that there would not be any tampering with evidence, subsisted throughout the whole criminal proceedings. 38.  By a decision of 7 April 2014 the applicant was found guilty of breaching his bail conditions and his bail was revoked. Further bail requests were lodged and rejected until 26 January 2015 when a bill of indictment was issued against the applicant. From August 2013 until his indictment some ten hearings were held where nothing happened and the case was adjourned. 39.  On 16 June 2015 the Criminal Court was informed that a plea bargain had been concluded between the applicant and the prosecution. 40.  On 20 July 2015, following the applicant\u2019s admission to all the charges against him, the Criminal Court pronounced a guilty verdict and sentenced the applicant to thirty-five years imprisonment and to the payment of court experts\u2019 fees.", "references": ["6", "5", "9", "3", "4", "0", "1", "8", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Koper. 6.  After going missing on 4 November 2007, X was found dead near the local Komen-Branik road, close to the town of Komen, on the morning of 5 November 2007. He had been repeatedly stabbed and cut with a knife and then run over by a car. The police were called to the scene, as were the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge. 7.  On examining the crime scene, X\u2019s mobile telephone was found in his car. The incoming and outgoing calls and the text messages sent to and from X\u2019s telephone number were checked by police officers at the scene. It appeared from the telephone records that on 4 November 2007 X had communicated only with a person using a certain telephone number, from which a message of an explicitly sexual nature had also been sent to X. After the telephone directory was checked it was established, presumably by the police, that the telephone in question belonged to a woman who happened to be the applicant\u2019s grandmother, with whom, as established on the basis of the official records, the applicant lived. Furthermore, having been informed that X\u2019s mobile telephone had been found, the district state prosecutor requested the duty investigating judge to order the S company \u2013 the mobile network operator in question \u2013 to produce records of telephone calls made and text messages sent from the telephone. 8.  On the same day (5 November 2007) the investigating judge of the Koper District Court issued an order for a search of X\u2019s home and ordered the S company to provide data concerning communication undertaken via X\u2019s mobile telephone. The S company on the same day submitted to the Koper District Court a disk containing X\u2019s telephone records. 9.  On the morning of 6 November 2007 the police stopped the applicant\u2019s car and subjected him to a so-called \u201csecurity check\u201d (varnostni pregled), finding a knife (allegedly bearing traces of what could be blood) and a mobile telephone in the applicant\u2019s pocket. After examining his telephone they established that he had used the aforementioned telephone number from which the aforementioned calls had been made and the aforementioned message sent to X. They seized these objects and arrested the applicant. 10.  On the same day (6 November 2007), relying mostly on information found in X\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s telephones pointing to a link between X and the applicant, the investigating judge issued a search order in respect of the applicant\u2019s home and the cars he was using. The state prosecutor furthermore requested that a court order for the obtaining of the applicant\u2019s comprehensive telephone records be issued. 11.  On 7 November 2007 the investigating judge issued an order that the M company \u2013 a mobile network operator \u2013 provide data concerning the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone record. The M company provided a disk containing the requested data on the same day. 12.  In the course of the preliminary inquiry, the investigating judge ordered a post-mortem examination of X, a DNA analysis and a comparison of biological traces found on the applicant\u2019s clothes and other objects seized during the home search with those found on X\u2019s body. She also ordered a medical examination of the applicant with a view to establishing any injuries. 13.  The applicant, represented by counsel, was heard on 8 November 2017 and was subsequently detained on remand. 14.  On 16 November 2007 the investigating judge opened a judicial criminal investigation against the applicant in respect of the criminal offence of aggravated murder. She, inter alia: ordered that a reconstruction be carried out at the crime scene; appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to examine the applicant and prepare opinions; ordered forensic experts in vehicle science and car crash investigations to prepare reports on specific aspects of the case; and again ordered that the M company and the S company provide traffic data relating to X\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s telephones. She also examined a number of witnesses. 15.  On 29 November 2007 the applicant was, at his request, heard by the investigating judge, to whom he admitted to running over X, but submitted that this had merely been an accident. 16.  On 24 December 2007 the state prosecutor filed an indictment for aggravated murder against the applicant, alleging that he had killed X by stabbing him thirteen times and cutting him at least nine times on his head, neck, chest and other parts of the body and running over him in his car. 17.  Following his unsuccessful objection to the indictment, the applicant was put on trial for aggravated murder. A number of hearings were held at which witnesses, experts and evidentiary material were examined and various expert reports ordered and subsequently read out. 18.  On 10 June 2008 the Koper District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years in prison. 19.  On 12 December 2008 the Koper Higher Court, after an appeal by the applicant, quashed the first-instance judgment, finding that the lower court had failed to clarify the facts surrounding a possible shoe imprint on the victim\u2019s back, which could have indicated the presence of a third person at the scene of the crime. The case was remitted to the Koper District Court for fresh examination. 20.  In the retrial proceedings, several hearings were held and the applicant lodged an application for the exclusion of all evidence from (i) the records of the crime-scene investigation until (ii) the records of the last hearing in the first set of proceedings, on the grounds that that evidence had allegedly been tainted by the unlawful examinations of his and X\u2019s telephones. He argued that the examinations of his and X\u2019s telephones had violated his and X\u2019s rights under Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 above) and that the relevant court orders had been issued a week too late. He also requested that the police officers who had subjected him to a security check (see paragraph 9 above) and arrested him be examined in this connection. Both requests were refused by the court. 21.  On 4 September 2009 the Koper District Court convicted the applicant for the aggravated murder of X and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. In view of (i) the expert opinions regarding the shoe traces on X\u2019s back which had led to the conclusion that the presence of another person at the crime scene prior to X\u2019s death could not be excluded, and (ii) the fact that the knife with which X had been stabbed and cut had not been found, the Koper District Court held that there was insufficient proof that the applicant had stabbed and cut X. However, the court found on the basis of the forensic medical evidence that X had still been alive before he had been run over by the car and that the injuries to X\u2019s chest, spine and aorta, which had been the direct cause of his death, had been caused by the applicant having intentionally run him over with his car. It further found it proven on the basis of the evidence at the scene \u2013 such as (i) a piece of rubber tube belonging to the applicant\u2019s car, (ii) the applicant\u2019s biological traces found on X\u2019s body, (iii) X\u2019s biological traces found on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s clothing (which was blood-stained) and on the outside of the applicant\u2019s car \u2013 that the applicant had been beyond doubt at the crime scene and had had contact with X. Referring, in particular, to the findings of the experts in vehicle science, who had performed reconstructions at the scene testing the applicant\u2019s versions of events, the court discounted the possibility that the applicant had run over X by accident. The court furthermore found that the applicant and X had known each other, which was confirmed by the applicant\u2019s statements as well as by telephone records and witness testimony. Lastly, the court referred to the telephone records, together with other evidence such as medical evidence and X\u2019s petrol bill, when elaborating on the time of death, finding that it had undoubtedly occurred on 4 November 2007 \u2013 probably sometime after 6.24 p.m., when the last (missed) call from X\u2019s telephone had been recorded on the applicant\u2019s telephone. 22.  As regards the procedural decisions taken during the proceedings the court gave the following explanation:\n- It refused a request lodged by the applicant for access to the police notes on the examination of his telephone because it would have been unlawful to include in the file evidence obtained without a court order.\n- In view of the foregoing conclusion that the examination of the applicant\u2019s telephone could have not been admitted to the file, the court refused as unnecessary a request by the applicant for the examination of the officers who had seized the applicant\u2019s telephone (see paragraph 20 above).\n- As regards the exclusion of evidence (see paragraph 20 above) the court explained that the applicant had become a subject of investigation following the examination of the data in X\u2019s telephone, which had not interfered with the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 below). It further noted that the examination of the applicant\u2019s telephone had amounted to a violation of the said provision but carried no evidentiary weight, as at that point the police had already obtained the necessary information from X\u2019s telephone. In addition, the court noted that the results of this examination had not been included in the file and had not been relied on by the court. 23.  On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the judgment had violated his defence rights. In particular, he alleged that the district court should have excluded all evidence from the file because it had been based on the police\u2019s examinations of X\u2019s and his own mobile telephone without the necessary court order. He further stated as follows:\n\u201cIt is irrelevant that the police, by [their] unlawful interference with [X]\u2019s mobile telephone, did not directly violate the appellant\u2019s right under Article 37 of the Constitution [\u201cPrivacy of correspondence and other means of communication\u201d], because the fact remains that the police obtained that evidence (data from [X]\u2019s mobile telephone) without a court order \u2013 that is to say unlawfully.\u201d 24.  The applicant moreover argued that the examination of X\u2019s telephone alone had not adduced enough evidence to arrest the applicant and that that had been possible only after the applicant\u2019s telephone had been examined. Thus, in his view, the impugned judgment should not have concluded that the examination of his telephone had had insignificant evidentiary value. 25.  On 27 January 2010 the Koper Higher Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal in part and reduced his sentence to nine years in prison. The court agreed with the applicant that the act of which he had been convicted \u2013 that is to say running over X with his car \u2013 did not in itself constitute murder with aggravating factors (that is to say aggravated murder), as the first\u2011instance court had not proved that X had sustained severe physical pain or psychological suffering. However, all the other applicant\u2019s complaints, including the one regarding the unlawful examinations of his and X\u2019s mobile telephones, were dismissed. 26.  As regards the examination of X\u2019s telephone the higher court found that, regardless of whether the police officers had examined X\u2019s telephone before the issuance of the court order, what was crucial was that they had received the court order for the telephone records to be produced before they had identified and located the applicant. Therefore, the examination of X\u2019s mobile telephone, which had constituted an urgent step in the police inquiry, had not been conducted in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to protection of the privacy of communication. As regards the examination of the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone, the higher court agreed with the lower court that \u201cthe examination of the applicant\u2019s telephone [had been] ... unconstitutional, but this violation had not been important in the evidentiary sense\u201d. The higher court also upheld the lower court\u2019s decision not to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of the applicant\u2019s telephone. 27.  On 8 April 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining of, inter alia, the allegedly unlawful examinations of X\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s telephones and reiterating the arguments he had put forward in his appeal (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). In particular, he argued that the police had obtained crucial evidence \u2013 that is to say the message with explicitly sexual content \u2013 when examining X\u2019s telephone without having a court order to do so, and that his arrest had been based on a subsequent unlawful examination of his telephone. 28.  On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. Firstly, as regards the police examination of X\u2019s mobile telephone, the Supreme Court pointed out that the applicant had not even argued that the examination of X\u2019s telephone had directly violated his own right to privacy. While not excluding the possibility that the examination of a deceased\u2019s person\u2019s telephone might impinge upon the most intimate spheres of his or her dignity, it considered that in the case at hand it had not interfered with X\u2019s right to privacy, as personality rights ceased at death. Neither had, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s own constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights been interfered with, as the examination had not revealed his identity. Moreover, the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge had been present at the scene of the crime when the police had discovered the telephone in X\u2019s car, and the applicant had been arrested only after the court order for the examination of X\u2019s telephone had been issued. The Supreme Court concluded that the police\u2019s examination of X\u2019s mobile telephone had not interfered with the applicant\u2019s right to privacy and that the impugned examination had not been causally related to the incriminating evidence. 29.  Secondly, with regard to the police\u2019s examination of the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone, the Supreme Court noted that it had been undertaken without a court order and referred to the Koper Higher Court\u2019s finding that the examination had been unconstitutional. However, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, the information on whether the text message with sexual content had been sent from the applicant\u2019s telephone would have inevitably been discovered, either (i) by means of a simple call to the number from which the message had been sent, (ii) by checking the applicant\u2019s telephone\u2019s SIM card (for which, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, no court order would have been necessary), or (iii) on the basis of a court order, which had in point of fact later been issued. In view of this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered that, regardless of the fact that the police had examined the applicant\u2019s telephone without a court order, the identification of the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone number as the one from which the text message in question had been sent did not constitute inadmissible evidence that should have been excluded from the case file. 30.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, reiterating the allegations made in his previous appeals. Relying on Article 37 (see paragraph 32 below) the applicant argued that the examinations of his and X\u2019s telephone had been unlawful and that the examination of his telephone had violated the aforementioned provision, as well as Article 8 of the Convention. Relying on Article 15 of the Constitution (again, see paragraph 32 below), the applicant argued that the lower courts should have excluded the evidence obtained unlawfully. In particular, as regards the examination of X\u2019s telephone, the applicant argued that he \u201chad not sought redress for the violation of X\u2019s right to privacy (mental integrity) and freedom of communication as he had not been entitled to do so [... but rather] had exclusively pointed out that the violation had occurred and the [trial] court had based its decision [to convict the applicant] on the consequences of that violation ...\u201d In this connection he, referring to X\u2019s \u201cright to piety\u201d (pravica do pietete), disputed the Supreme Court\u2019s view that X\u2019s right to privacy had ceased with his death and pointed out that a court order had been nevertheless subsequently issued. With regard to the Supreme Court\u2019s finding that the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered, the applicant argued that the domestic law contained a strict rule requiring the exclusion of all evidence obtained by means violating human rights (\u201cthe domestic exclusionary rule\u201d). He furthermore argued that there had been a violation of Article 29 (see paragraph 32 below) of the Constitution because the first-instance court refused to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of his telephone. 31.  On 28 January 2013 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for consideration, pursuant to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 37 below).", "references": ["1", "8", "0", "7", "2", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7.  In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences. 8.  On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor\u2019s charges was acknowledged by the applicant\u2019s officially appointed lawyer. 9.  It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer. 10.  On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced. 11.  On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (k\u00ebto k\u00ebrkime nuk kan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb mundur kapjen e t\u00eb pandehurit pasi ai rezulton t\u00eb ket\u00eb ikur n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb paditur). 12.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial. 13.  On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durr\u00ebs District Court. 14.  On 2 June 1999 the applicant\u2019s father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts. 15.  The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d). 16.  On 15 February 2000 the Durr\u00ebs District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony. 17.  The applicant\u2019s family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durr\u00ebs Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 19 April 2000. 19.  On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania. 20.  On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania. 21.  On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia. 22.  On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia. 23.  On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court\u2019s reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court\u2011appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "2", "6", "4", "9", "1", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Osijek. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant\u2019s grandmother\u2019s death, the applicant\u2019s relative, M.J., and the applicant\u2019s father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Zaboku). 8.  On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 9.  In the proceedings before the first-instance court, on 5 November 2007 the applicant contested the value of the dispute and suggested that it be set at HRK 300,000. 10.  At the hearing held on 23 January 2008 the applicant, inter alia, withdrew her objection to the value of the dispute as indicated by the claimant, and stated that she agreed with it. 11.  In its judgment of 25 April 2008 the Zabok Municipal Court accepted M.J.\u2019s claim. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Zlatar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zlataru) and on 16 September 2009 the second-instance court dismissed her appeal as ill-founded, upholding the first-instance judgment. 13.  On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts\u2019 judgments. 14.  On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.\u2019s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter \u201cthe issuance of a clausula intabulandi\u201d). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000.\nPursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim.\nIn the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims].\nGiven that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible.\u201d 15.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that M.J.\u2019s action had two aspects which could not be separated, and that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision finding that the case concerned two separate claims had therefore been arbitrary and had violated her right to a fair hearing, in particular her right of access to the Supreme Court, as guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution. 16.  On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It held that the applicant in her constitutional complaint \u201cdid not demonstrate that the Supreme Court had failed to respect the provisions of the Constitution concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely that it had applied relevant law in an arbitrary manner\u201d and that therefore \u201cthe present case did not raise a constitutional issue.\u201d Its decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 3 March 2011.", "references": ["4", "6", "0", "1", "5", "9", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is detained in Rezina. 6.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on an unknown date some 10 years prior to the relevant events and is serving his sentence in prison no. 17 in Rezina. On 16 March 2011 the prison administration found a mobile phone in his cell. Since this is an object possession of which is prohibited by prison rules, on 23 March 2011 the prison administration sanctioned him with a reprimand. 7.  On 26 July 2011 the prison board decided that the applicant was always to be handcuffed when moving outside his cell. An extract from the decision of the prison board issued to the applicant noted that the prison board had \u201cexamined [the applicant]\u201d and had decided to apply handcuffs. No further reasons were given and the length of the period for which the measure was to apply was not specified. It appears from the applicant\u2019s submissions that the measure was revoked at an extraordinary meeting of the prison board five months after it was imposed. 8.  On 28 July 2011 the applicant asked the prison administration on what grounds the prison board had decided that he should be handcuffed. On 3 August 2011 he was informed that the sanction had been applied on the basis of order no. 4 of the Prisons Department (see paragraph 17 below). No further details were given. 9.  In a letter dated 26 September 2011 the Prisons Department informed the applicant, in response to his request, that the use of handcuffs and other restraints was prescribed by the Regulation Concerning the Serving of Sentences, adopted by Government Decision no. 583 of 26 May 2006 (\u201cthe Regulation\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 14 and 16 below). 10.  Also on 26 September 2011 the applicant challenged the prison board\u2019s decision before the investigating judge, arguing that he had been sanctioned twice for the same offence, contrary to the express legal requirements, and that he had not been informed of the reasons for the decision to handcuff him. He noted that handcuffing was a sanction and relied on the reply of the Prisons Department (see the preceding paragraph) in arguing that that sanction could only be applied on the basis of the Regulation and not some secret order. None of the circumstances in respect of which the Regulation provided for the use of handcuffs had been cited by the prison board. 11.  In their submissions to the court, the prison administration argued that the sanction had been lawfully applied and that the applicant had been properly informed. The prosecutor, who also participated in the hearing, added that the sanction had been necessary in order to prevent the applicant posing any danger to other detainees. 12.  On 25 November 2011 the Rezina District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as unfounded. It found that the measure in question had been applied lawfully and in order to prevent the applicant posing any danger to other detainees. That decision was final. 13.  The applicant attempted to have the decision quashed by using an extraordinary remedy, but on 3 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice refused his request. 14.  Under Article 593 of the Regulation Concerning the Serving of Sentences, adopted by Government Decision no. 583 of 26 May 2006 (\u201cthe Regulation\u201d), only one sanction may be applied in respect of a disciplinary offence. 15.  Under Article 95 of the Regulation, as modified on 26 September 2008, persons serving life imprisonment shall be handcuffed when moving outside their cells if it is established during the last evaluation that the absence of such a measure will pose an immediate danger to other detainees, prison staff or other persons. Evaluations of this kind shall be carried out at least once every six months. 16.  Under Article 219 of the Regulation, a detainee may be handcuffed if (i) he or she physically resists prison staff or \u201cis infuriated\u201d (until he or she calms down), (ii) he or she refuses to move under escort, (iii) there are grounds for believing that there is a risk of the detainee escaping, (iv) he or she attempts suicide or self-mutilation, or attacks other detainees (until the detainee calms down), or (v) during the escorting of a detainee after his or her escape and subsequent apprehension. 17.  According to the Government, order no. 4 of the Prisons Department adopted on 13 January 2009 provides, in section 39/1, that the prison board may decide on whether there is any need to handcuff a person sentenced to imprisonment for life or whether to remove handcuffs from such a person, depending on the degree of danger posed by him or her. 18.  The European Prison Rules (annex to Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States of 11 January 2006), in so far relevant, read as follows:\n\u201c... 68.2 Handcuffs, restraint jackets and other body restraints shall not be used except:\na. if necessary, as a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided that they are removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or administrative authority, unless that authority decides otherwise; or\nb. by order of the director, if other methods of control fail, in order to protect a prisoner from self-injury [or] injury to others or to prevent serious damage to property, provided that in such instances the director shall immediately inform the medical practitioner and report to the higher prison authority. 68.3 Instruments of restraint shall not be applied for any longer time than is strictly necessary.\n...\u201d 19.  The relevant parts of the 25th General Report (April 2016) of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT/Inf (2016) 10) provide as follows:\n\u201cThe basic objectives and principles for the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners 74. In the CPT\u2019s view, the objectives and principles for the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners enunciated by the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation Rec (2003) 23 on the management by prison administrations of life sentence and other long-term prisoners remains the most pertinent and comprehensive reference document for this group of prisoners. In summary, these principles are:\n...\n- the normalisation principle: life-sentenced prisoners should, like all prisoners, be subject only to the restrictions that are necessary for their safe and orderly confinement;\n...\nConclusion 81. The CPT calls upon member states to review their treatment of life-sentenced prisoners to ensure that this is in accordance with their individual risk they present, both in custody and to the outside community, and not simply in response to the sentence which has been imposed on them. In particular, steps should be taken by the member states concerned to abolish the legal obligation of keeping life-sentenced prisoners separate from other (long-term) sentenced prisoners and to put an end to the systematic use of security measures such as handcuffs inside the prison.\u201d", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "6", "8", "0", "4", "3", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Kostino, Kirov Region. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act. The applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the grounds and the length of his detention on remand, the poor conditions of detention and the lack of medical assistance in the remand prison were examined in the case Kovyazin and Others v. Russia (nos. 13008/13 and 2 others, 17 September 2015). 10.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was working part-time as a videotape operator for a local newspaper Vyatskiy Nablyudatel. On 4 May 2012 he received an assignment from the newspaper chief editor to attend the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square and to take a video footage of the event. 11.  According to the applicant, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square, filmed the event and did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and to work for the newspaper. 12.  On 5 September 2012 the applicant was arrested and charged under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence). He was accused of having breached public order during the demonstration on 6 May 2012, in particular, of having turned over portable toilet cabins and having piled them on the road to build a barrier obstructing the riot police. 13.  On 7 September 2012 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention where he remained one year and three months. It was found to be unjustified by the Court in the case of Kovyazin and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 79-93). 14.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 15.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303. It was equipped with metal cages, in which nine defendants, including the applicant, sat during the hearings. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77). 16.  On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act, which exempted persons suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code from criminal liability. 17.  On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.", "references": ["7", "3", "0", "5", "8", "2", "4", "6", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  According to an incident report prepared by eight police officers on 28 May 2004, the authorities had obtained intelligence which suggested that at 3 p.m. on 28 May 2004 two members of the PKK (Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan, an armed illegal organisation) would go to Adana, a big city in southern Turkey, on a motorbike in order to carry out terror attacks in shopping malls, the police headquarters and the courthouse. According to the intelligence, the code names of the two persons were \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d and \u201cBotan\u201d, and before carrying out the attacks they would meet outside a mosque in Adana. 8.  Police officers, who had started taking security measures to stop and apprehend the two persons outside the mosque in question, received information at around 2.30 p.m. on 28 May 2004 that a red motorbike with two persons on it had been observed and was on its way towards the mosque. However, on their arrival outside the mosque the persons on the motorbike noticed the police presence in the area and drove on without stopping. The police officers gave chase in police cars and \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d, who was sitting on the back of the motorbike, drew his pistol and pointed it at a police car. The police car then hit the motorbike and the two persons fell to the ground. \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d stood up and fired at the police officers. The police officers returned fire and \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d fell to the ground. When the police officers realised that he was injured, they called an ambulance and sent him to hospital. The driver of the motorbike managed to flee the scene after falling from the motorbike. 9.  The second suspect, \u201cBotan\u201d, was arrested outside the mosque by a number of different police officers while he was waiting for \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d. He was subsequently identified as M.G.A. 10.  It appears from another report prepared by different police officers that at 3 p.m. on the same day a police chief and three police officers arrived at the scene of the incident after \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d had been shot but before he was taken to hospital. The four police officers noticed a pistol of 9 mm calibre with five bullets inside lying some 1.5 to 2 metres away from \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar.\u201d When the four police officers searched a bag they noticed on the motorbike they found a hand grenade. According to the report, the pistol, the hand grenade and the motorbike were then taken away by the four officers in order not to hinder the flow of traffic and to prevent panic among the public, as the incident had occurred on a busy street. 11.  \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d was admitted to the hospital at 3 p.m. The doctors noted a bullet entry wound on his back and considered his condition to be life-threatening. He was taken into the operating theatre. Police officers at the hospital carried out a search of the pockets of the clothes worn by \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d and found 900 United States dollars and a handwritten note containing the scribbled words \u201c800 g. potassium chloride\u201d and \u201csusceptible to friction and impact\u201d. Neither his name nor his code name was written in any of the hospital records as they were not known to the hospital personnel at the time. 12.  Crime-scene investigators arrived at the scene of the incident at 3.10 p.m. on the same day and conducted a search. According to a report prepared by the crime-scene investigators at 6.45 p.m. the same day, the motorbike was still at the scene of the incident on their arrival. During their search the crime-scene investigators found two 9 mm spent bullet cases and secured them as evidence. It was stated in the report that there were no other items of evidence such as \u201ca bullet, blood[stains], [or] bullet marks\u201d. It was also stated in the same report that swab samples had been taken from the hands of the injured person after his operation at the hospital. 13.  According to a police report, on the same evening the driver of the motorbike, who was subsequently identified as M.N.B., was arrested by police officers. Moreover, on the same evening a certain M.K., who was suspected of having provided logistical support to the two men, was also arrested. M.K., who was shown a photograph of \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d that had been taken at the hospital, identified him as a person who had stayed at his house together with M.N.B. on the evening of 27 May 2004. 14.  The pistol found next to \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d was examined by the forensic authorities and it was established that it had been used in another armed attack in Adana on 18 March 2004. The two spent bullet cases found at the scene (see paragraph 12 above) were also examined and it was established that they had been discharged from that pistol. 15.   On 30 May 2004 \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d died at the hospital. His body was transferred to the Forensic Medicine Institute in order that a post-mortem examination could be carried out. 16.  At 6.45 p.m. on 31 May 2004 M.N.B. was questioned at a police station. He told police officers that on 28 May 2004 \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d had asked him to give him a lift to Sabanc\u0131 Mosque and that he had complied with that request. On their way to the mosque, \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d had asked him to take him to the courthouse instead, and shortly afterwards their motorbike had been hit by a car from behind and he had fled the scene. 17.  On 1 June 2004 the prosecutor sent a letter to the hospital and asked for \u201cthe clothes of the as yet unidentified person who [had] died at the hospital on 30 May 2004\u201d to be sent to him so that they could be forwarded to the forensic authorities for examination. On the same day the hospital informed the prosecutor that the clothes had been given to the police officers at the hospital when the injured person had been taken into the operating theatre. On the same day the prosecutor wrote to the police headquarters, asking them to return those clothes to his office urgently. In their reply of 3 June 2004 the police informed the prosecutor that the clothes had not been \u201chanded over to the police headquarters\u201d. 18.  The police forensic laboratories prepared a report on 2 June 2004 pertaining to the examination of swab samples which had apparently been taken from the hands of M.N.B., M.K., M.G.A and a certain \u0130.T. and which had been sent to the laboratory \u201cin an envelope\u201d. It was established in the report that there were gunpowder residues on the swab samples taken from the hands of M.N.B. and \u0130.T. No gunpowder residues had been found on the swab samples taken from the hands of M.K. or M.G.A. 19.  On 3 June 2004 the applicant went to the hospital, where he was shown the body of \u201cK\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015eiyar\u201d which he identified as that of his son, \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek, born in 1979. The applicant stated that his son had been studying at a university in Ankara and that he and his family had not heard from him in six years. The applicant added that he had been informed by an anonymous telephone caller the previous day that his son had been killed in Adana. The body of his son was released to the applicant the same day. 20.  On the same day the police informed the prosecutor that the person who had initially been considered to be \u0130.T. and had been referred to as \u0130.T. in the Police Laboratory\u2019s report of 2 June 2004 (see paragraph 18 above) was in fact the applicant\u2019s son, \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek. 21.  Also on the same day, the Adana Branch of the Human Rights Association, a non-governmental organisation, submitted a petition to the prosecutor\u2019s office. It was alleged in the petition that the shooting incident had taken place outside its offices and been witnessed by a number of people. According to those eyewitnesses, an unmarked car following a motorbike had drawn up next to the motorbike and the car\u2019s door had opened, causing the two passengers on the motorbike to fall to the ground. One of the persons had stood up and started to run away and a person who had come out of the unmarked vehicle had put his knee in the small of the back of the person on the ground and fired two bullets into his back. That person had then collected the two spent bullet cases discharged from his pistol and put them in his coat pocket. Afterwards, according to the Human Rights Association, instead of taking the injured person to hospital, they had hauled him into a car and taken him to a number of locations. The other person on the motorbike, M.N.B., had tried to flee the scene but had been apprehended by the police and taken to a police station, where he had been subjected to serious ill-treatment. The petitioners requested the prosecutor to carry out an in-depth investigation into their allegations and to ensure that a detailed post-mortem examination would be conducted on the body. 22.  On 16 June 2004 the prosecutor asked the Adana police headquarters to provide the names of the police officers who had been involved in the shooting incident on 28 May 2004 and to ensure their attendance in his office for questioning. The prosecutor also asked to be provided with copies of the forensic reports pertaining to the examinations conducted on the weapons used during the incident. The prosecutor was subsequently provided with the forensic reports summarised above (see paragraphs 14 and 18). The police also informed the prosecutor that the pistol used by the police officer in the shooting had not been forensically examined. 23.  On 6 July 2004 the prosecutor questioned T.S., one of the police officers who had been at the hospital when the applicant\u2019s son had been taken there. T.S. told the prosecutor that, although he had secured as evidence the money and the other items found in the pockets of \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek, he had not taken away his clothes. 24.  K.K., also a police officer, who was questioned the following day, told the prosecutor that \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek\u2019s clothes had been removed before \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek had been taken into the operating theatre and that they had then been taken away by a plainclothes police officer, D.A.Y., in a black plastic bag. K.K. also gave the prosecutor a copy of the hospital ledgers, according to which the clothes had been handed over to a police officer. The prosecutor was subsequently informed on the same day that D.A.Y. had left for his annual leave for a month and could not therefore be questioned. 25.  On 7 July 2004 the police headquarters forwarded to the prosecutor the names of the eight officers who had taken part in the incident of 28 May 2004 and who had also prepared the incident report on the same day (see paragraphs 7\u20118 above). 26.  On 9 July 2004 seven of the eight police officers mentioned in the preceding paragraph were questioned by the prosecutor as witnesses, while the eighth officer, D.\u00d6. \u2013 a police chief \u2013 was questioned as a suspect. D.\u00d6. told the prosecutor that the police had received intelligence on the day in question that two terrorists would carry out bomb attacks in Adana and that they had therefore taken the necessary precautionary measures around a mosque, where the two terrorists were to meet. When a motorbike with two persons on it fitting the description given to the police had arrived outside the mosque, the persons on the motorbike had noticed the police presence and driven on without stopping. D.\u00d6. and his seven colleagues in two unmarked police cars and a police motorbike had then given chase. As the person sitting on the back of the motorbike had drawn his pistol and aimed it at the officers riding on the police motorbike and in the other police car, D.\u00d6. had asked the driver of the vehicle in which he was travelling to approach the motorbike from its side and to hit it. The driver had complied and the two persons on the motorbike had fallen to the ground. D.\u00d6. had then got out of the car and told the two persons to surrender. The driver of the motorbike had managed to run away and the second person on the motorbike had fired two rounds towards D.\u00d6. D.\u00d6. had then fired towards him and at that moment one of the other police officers had jumped on the person and apprehended him. No other police officer had fired a weapon during the incident. Upon realising that the person had been injured, he and his colleagues had called an ambulance and transferred that person to hospital. D.\u00d6. denied the allegation that he had put his knee in the small of the back of the person on the ground and fired two bullets into his back (see paragraph 21 above), and told the prosecutor that if he had not shot the person, the person would have shot him. He had therefore acted within the statutory limits regulating the use of force and had not intended to kill the person. 27.  The remaining seven officers made similar statements and denied the allegation that M.N.B. had been arrested at the place of the incident or that he had been ill-treated. 28.  On 13 July 2004 the applicant joined the criminal investigation as an intervener. 29.  A security guard who had been on duty at the hospital on 28 May 2004 told the prosecutor on 14 July 2004 that the applicant\u2019s son had been taken into the operating theatre with his clothes on and that shortly afterwards the personnel in the operating theatre had removed those clothes and given them to plainclothes police officers from the anti-terrorism department waiting at the hospital. Although the contents of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s pockets had been listed in an official document (see paragraph 11 above) and then handed over to the police officers, the clothes had not been listed in the document. 30.  On 16 July 2004 the prosecutor filed an indictment with the Adana Assize Court (hereinafter \u201cthe trial court\u201d) and charged the police chief, D.\u00d6. (see paragraph 26 above), with the offence of manslaughter on account of the killing of the applicant\u2019s son. In the same indictment the prosecutor charged two other police chiefs with the offence of ill-treatment in respect of M.N.B.\u2019s allegations (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant joined the criminal proceedings as an intervener. 31.  On 27 August 2004 Amnesty International urged the national judicial authorities to carry out an effective investigation and to establish the full circumstances of the incident. The United Nations\u2019 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions also requested the Turkish Government to be provided with information concerning the killing. 32.  During the hearing held on 21 December 2004 the applicant, with the assistance of the lawyers representing him, submitted his written observations to the trial court. The applicant argued that the version of the events concerning the shooting proffered by the defendant police officer did not represent the truth. He maintained that his son had been unarmed at the time of the shooting and alleged that the police officers had shot him at close range. He alleged that the police officers had been covering their tracks by destroying the evidence and that the clothes his son had been wearing at the time of his shooting had been taken away and lost by the police officers. The applicant also argued that, before the crime-scene officers had arrived at the scene of the incident, important evidence had been removed by another group of police officers (see paragraph 10 above). Moreover, although according to the report prepared by those police officers both pistols, the hand grenades and the motorbike had been taken away by them before the arrival of the crime-scene officers, according to the crime\u2011scene officers\u2019 report the motorbike had still been at the scene on their arrival (see paragraph 12 above). 33.  The applicant also criticised the method by which swab samples had been taken from the hands of his son. He argued in that connection that swab samples taken from the hands of a number of persons had been put in the same envelope (see paragraph 18 above) as that containing his son\u2019s swab samples, which had caused the various swab samples to contaminate each other. Moreover, the forensic report pertaining to the examination of the swab samples allegedly taken from the hands of his son had not mentioned his son\u2019s name but the name of \u0130.T. It was not possible, therefore, to accept that the swab samples with gunpowder residue had been taken from the hands of his son. The applicant informed the trial court that \u0130.T. had been on trial for terrorism-related offences and that it would not have been logical for his son to carry a wanted person\u2019s identity card. The applicant also informed the trial court that \u0130.T. had been killed by the security forces on 29 June 2004. 34.  The applicant argued that inconsistencies and irregularities such as the foregoing cast doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the investigation and showed that the police officers had manipulated the evidence. In this connection the applicant argued that it was highly suspicious that the bullet and the spent bullet case discharged from the defendant police chief\u2019s pistol had not been recovered; in fact, there was no mention in any of the crime scene reports that the forensic authorities had even searched for that bullet or the spent bullet case. Similarly, the defendant police officer\u2019s pistol had not been subjected to any forensic examinations after the incident. 35.  During the trial M.N.B. maintained that on the day in question he had been about to go to Adana city centre on his motorbike when the applicant\u2019s son had asked him for a lift. While riding the motorbike towards the city, he had stopped at a set of traffic lights and at that moment a car had hit them and they had fallen to the ground. At the time he had thought that they were about to be robbed and had panicked. Then he had heard gunfire and seen \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek falling to the ground. A number of men had then apprehended both him and \u015eiyar. M.N.B. denied that \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek had been armed or that he had fired at the police officers or that he had been carrying a bag on the motorbike (see paragraph 10 above). 36.  On 3 December 2004 the report pertaining to the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the applicant\u2019s son on 30 May 2004 was forwarded to the trial court. According to the report, there was a bullet entry hole under his left armpit and a bullet exit hole in the right scapula. The doctors considered that death had been caused by the destruction of the internal organs and the ensuing medical complications. It was also stated in the post-mortem report that the applicant\u2019s son had been shot through his clothes and that the distance from which he had been shot could not therefore be calculated, since the clothes worn by the deceased at the time of his shooting would have to be examined in order establish that distance. 37.  During one of the hearings K.K. \u2013 the police officer who had told the prosecutor on 7 July 2004 that \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek\u2019s clothes had been taken away from the hospital by his colleague, D.A.Y. (see paragraph 24 above) \u2013 was examined by the trial court. This time K.K. told the trial court that \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek had gone into the operating theatre with his clothes on and that his clothes had never been handed over to a police officer afterwards. The lawyers representing the applicant argued, in response, that the information in K.K.\u2019s statement of 7 July 2004 had been unambiguous and alleged that K.K. had changed his story to protect his fellow colleagues. They stated that they would lodge a formal complaint against K.K. and his colleagues for obstructing the course of justice. 38.  Subsequently the applicant\u2019s lawyers informed the trial court that at their instigation an investigation had been opened into their allegations against the police officers and that a number of people working at the hospital at the time of the events had been questioned by a prosecutor. During the questioning the hospital personnel had told the prosecutor that \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek\u2019s clothes had been removed in the operating theatre and handed over to the police officers, who had been very anxious to take them away. The lawyers argued that the insistence of the police officers on taking the clothes away and their subsequently losing them proved that there had not been a shootout between \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek and the police officers but that the police officers had shot \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek at close range. 39.  The defendant police officer, D.\u00d6., submitted his final written defence arguments to the trial court and maintained that the lack of burn marks around the bullet entry hole showed that he had not shot \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek at close range. \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek had not heeded his warnings to surrender and had instead opened fire on him. Thus, by shooting back he had acted in self-defence. 40.  In his submissions to the trial court the prosecutor also argued that the defendant police officer had acted in self-defence. 41.  On 6 March 2007 the applicant submitted his final arguments to the trial court. He repeated his earlier arguments and complaints and alleged that his son had been shot at close range. He invited the trial court to examine the autopsy report in detail with a view to establishing the distance from which his son had been shot. He submitted that the clothes his son had been wearing had been taken away by police officers with a view to hiding the fact that they had shot his son at close range. He argued that in the absence of the clothes, the sizes of the bullet entry and exit holes could help to ascertain the distance from which his son had been shot. The applicant also informed the trial court that the police officers working at the hospital had since been indicted and put on trial for neglecting their duties by losing his son\u2019s clothes. 42.  In its judgment of 6 March 2007 the trial court acquitted the defendant police officer, as it considered that the police officer had acted in self\u2011defence and had used proportionate force. The trial court concluded that the applicant\u2019s son had been a member of a terrorist organisation and had come to Adana to carry out terrorist attacks. When the police officers had given chase to the motorbike, he had fired two rounds towards the police officers. The defendant police officer had then fired one round and injured the applicant\u2019s son, and he had subsequently died in hospital. After the incident the police officers had found explosives in a bag on the motorbike. The pistol used by the applicant\u2019s son and two spent cartridges had also been recovered at the site of the incident. The clothes worn by the applicant\u2019s son at the time of the shooting had got lost during \u201cthe commotion at the hospital\u201d and it had not therefore been possible to establish the distance from which he had been shot. However, as there had been no burns or gunpowder on and around the injury, it was apparent that he had not been shot at close range. 43.  The applicant appealed against the judgment and repeated his earlier arguments. He complained that his arguments concerning defects in the investigation had not been taken into account by the trial court. Given that there was a large amount of evidence in the file showing that the clothes had been taken away from the hospital by the police officers, the conclusion reached by the trial court, namely that the clothes had got lost during \u201cthe commotion at the hospital\u201d, was clearly wrong. The applicant also criticised the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the shooting had not been carried out at close range because there had been no burn marks around the injury, and argued that no such conclusion could be reached in the absence of the clothes. 44.  The appeal lodged by applicant against the judgment was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 5 March 2009. In its one-page decision the Court of Cassation stated that the applicant\u2019s arguments that there had been failures in the investigation were not convincing. The decision was returned to the registry of the Adana Assize Court on 15 April 2009. 45.  In the meantime, the criminal proceedings which had been brought against three police officers and a private security guard for having neglected their duties by losing \u015eiyar Perin\u00e7ek\u2019s clothes ended in their acquittal on 7 February 2007. The applicant appealed against their acquittal on 8 February 2007. On 6 June 2011 the Court of Cassation declined to examine the appeal as the offence in question had become statute-barred, and discontinued the criminal proceedings.", "references": ["6", "3", "8", "1", "5", "9", "4", "7", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1963 and 1965 respectively and live in \u0130zmir. They are brother and sister. Their respective children, Sibel Sart\u0131k and Nergiz \u00d6zer, aged 24 and 15 respectively, were killed by soldiers on 19 January 2005 in south-east Turkey. During the same incident the soldiers also killed three other young people, aged 13, 16 and 22 (see G\u00fclbahar \u00d6zer and Others v. Turkey, no. 44125/06, 2 July 2013). The bodies of those three individuals were subsequently handed over to their families, who buried them in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  On 23 January 2005 the prosecutor ordered the release of the bodies of the applicants\u2019 two children. The applicants took the bodies from the morgue in order to take them to the city of Siirt, where they wanted to bury them and where their graves had already been prepared with the help of the municipal officials. 7.  On the same date the governor of Siirt issued a decision stating that crowds had gathered at the cemetery in Siirt and had attacked the municipal workers who were preparing the graves. Subsequently, the incidents at the cemetery had escalated and turned into \u201cunlawful demonstrations\u201d. Therefore, \u201cin order to prevent any unwanted consequences\u201d, the governor decided to order the burial of the applicants\u2019 children in the two villages named in the respective birth register records of the two deceased. 8.  While the applicants, together with the coffins of their two children, were on their way to Siirt, their vehicles were stopped by gendarme soldiers who told the applicants that they were not allowed to bury their children in Siirt. The soldiers told the applicants that, in accordance with the decision taken by the Siirt governor, the bodies would be buried in two other villages. The applicants told the soldiers that they had no connection with the two villages in question which, in any event, had been evacuated by soldiers in the 1990s. They stated that they wanted to bury their children side by side in their family cemetery in Siirt. Despite their objections, the bodies of the two children were confiscated and taken away by the soldiers. 9.  The same day the second applicant made an official request to the office of the governor and asked for permission to bury the children in the city of Batman instead. This request was refused but the governor amended his decision so that the applicants\u2019 children could be buried in the same cemetery in the town of Eruh, instead of being buried in two separate villages as he had previously ordered. In accordance with that decision, the applicants\u2019 children were buried by the authorities in the municipal cemetery in Eruh at 1.45 a.m. on 24 January 2005 without any religious ceremony. 10.  On 11 March 2005 the applicants brought a case before the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court and asked for the Siirt governor\u2019s decision to be annulled. They also requested that the Administrative Court issue an interim measure allowing them to exhume the bodies before they decomposed, and to bury them in a cemetery of their choice. The applicants agreed, in particular, that it was important and necessary to maintain public order. However, they argued that the governor\u2019s decision had completely disregarded the moral values of their society and had aroused anger. The news that their children would not be buried in Siirt and that their bodies had been confiscated by the soldiers had caused an upsurge of emotion in the people waiting at the cemetery in Siirt and as a result they had attacked members of the security forces and local shops with sticks and stones. When the security forces responded to those attacks heavy handedly, scores of people had been injured and more than a hundred people had been arrested. All of that unrest had been caused by the governor\u2019s unlawful decision. No such incidents had taken place during the burial of the three other individuals who had been killed at the same time as their children. In their complaint the applicants also referred to their rights under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. 11.  On 30 March 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court rejected the case. It noted that the governor\u2019s decision had been based on section 11/C of the Law on the Administration of Provinces, which provided that the governor had a duty to maintain peace and public order in the province under his responsibility. The decision had been taken because the people who had gathered at the cemetery in Siirt and who were waiting for the bodies to arrive had thrown stones at municipal workers and members of the security forces. The decision to bury the bodies in the town of Eruh had therefore been taken with a view to maintaining public order. The Administrative Court considered that, although the applicants had the right to bury their children in a cemetery of their choice, the refusal to permit them to do so had been in compliance with the restrictions set out in the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention and in section 13 of the Turkish Constitution. 12.  The applicants appealed against the decision and maintained that the incidents at the cemetery referred to by the Administrative Court had only occurred after the crowds had found out about the authorities\u2019 refusal to allow them to bury their children in Siirt. They repeated their argument that the three others killed by the soldiers at the same time as their children had been buried by their families in Diyarbak\u0131r without incident. The applicants also reiterated their request for an interim measure. 13.  The request for an interim measure was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 December 2006. In a decision of 24 October 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court also rejected the appeal lodged by the applicants against the decision of the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court. In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the incidents at the Siirt Cemetery had begun when the people who had gathered there had insisted that the applicants\u2019 two children be buried next to the graves of members of the PKK. 14.  The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was communicated to the applicants on 19 March 2009.", "references": ["5", "1", "0", "3", "9", "6", "7", "2", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Trinca. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  Having divorced his wife, the applicant has continued to live in an annex to the same house as her and their children, some of whom are adults. He has a hostile relationship with them and all of his former in-laws. 8.  On 30 May 2005 he wrote to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, listing the many complaints that he had previously lodged with various authorities (including the police) of having been ill-treated by his ex-wife and children, the destruction of his property by them, and the failure of the local police to react in any manner. In reply, on 21 June 2005, he was informed that the local prosecutor\u2019s decision not to initiate a criminal investigation had been annulled; the case was then sent for re-examination by the local prosecutor\u2019s office. 9.  On 31 March 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who found an excoriation on his right hand. He explained that he had been struck by his son. 10.  On 15 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who determined that three of his teeth were loose and found a contusion of one of the fingers on his right hand. He explained that he had been again struck by his son. On 26 June 2006 the Edine\u021b prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that it had decided not to initiate an investigation into the alleged attack by his son (D.V.). 11.  The applicant lodged another complaint with the Edine\u021b prosecutor\u2019s office on 31 August 2006, stating that he had been again attacked by his children and ex-wife; during that attack they had also threatened to kill him and destroy or throw away his property if he did not leave the house. He lodged a further complaint on 19 September 2006, but was subsequently informed that it had been decided not to initiate a criminal investigation. 12.  In a letter dated 12 December 2006 the head of Edine\u021b police station informed the applicant\u2019s brother that, on a date not indicated in the letter, \u201ca cautionary discussion\u201d had been conducted with the applicant\u2019s ex-wife and that she had been \u201cofficially warned to change her conduct\u201d towards the applicant and his brother. 13.  On 27 December 2006 the applicant\u2019s ex-wife and children allegedly assaulted him at their home. His left elbow was allegedly broken. According to the applicant, he called the police immediately after the incident and was told that they did not deal with such matters. The next day he went to the local doctor, B., who referred him to Edine\u021b Polyclinic for examination (including an X-ray examination, which was carried out on 28 December 2006). With the results of that examination he went to a medical expert on 29 December 2006. 14.  According to a medical report dated 29 December 2006 the applicant sustained a fracture of the upper third of the radial bone in his left elbow, as confirmed also by the X-ray images. The injury was considered to be of medium severity and requiring more than twenty-one days of treatment. According to the report, the injury had been caused by a blunt object, possibly in circumstances such as those described by the applicant. According to medical documents submitted by the applicant, he saw a doctor, T., on 28 and 29 December 2006, and on 4 and 17 January, 7 and 22 February and 6 March 2007 and was given prescriptions for medicine to treat his left elbow. 15.  On 5 January 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police about ill-treatment by his ex-wife and three of his children, including D.V. On 12 January 2007 he was informed that it had been decided not to initiate a criminal investigation. On 29 January 2007 the investigating judge of the Edine\u021b District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the facts complained of were being investigated by the Edine\u021b police. On 2 February 2007 a prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by his ex-wife and children (including D.V.). On 1 March 2007 he was officially recognised as the victim of the alleged crime. 16.  On 6 March 2007 the prosecutor requested that a new expert medical report be drawn up in order to assess the severity and origin of the applicant\u2019s injury. He noted that the applicant had alleged that he had been struck by his ex-wife and children (including D.V.). On the same day a new medical report was drawn up which confirmed the previous report\u2019s findings. 17.  On 23 March 2007 the prosecutor interviewed a witness who stated that he had worked with the applicant on 12 January 2007, cutting wood at the local priest\u2019s house. He had not seen any injury or sign of pain on his hand. A similar statement was given on 3 March 2007 by another participant in the wood-cutting. Another witness stated that he had seen the applicant cutting wood on 12 January 2007 at the local priest\u2019s house, while three other persons were taking a rest. On 10 April 2007 T., the doctor who had seen the applicant on 28 December 2006 (see paragraph 14 above), was questioned as a witness and declared that he had seen a contusion on his body and another contusion on the left elbow, but had not identified any broken bones. He stated that the description contained in the medical report dated 29 December 2006 of the X-ray images taken on 28 December 2006 (see paragraph 14 above) was incomplete, as it did not indicate the exact location of the broken bone. T. himself did not see in the X-ray any sign of such trauma. 18.  On 2 May 2007 the prosecutor ordered another medical report to be prepared by a medical commission, because the applicant\u2019s wife disagreed with the results of the first two reports and argued that he had been fit after the alleged assault. On 7 May 2007 the head of the Forensics Department at the Centre of Forensic Medicine (\u201cthe Centre\u201d) asked the prosecutor to submit the X-rays of the applicant\u2019s elbow in order to allow the report to be prepared. In the absence of a reply, the doctor repeated his request on 14 September 2007, adding that the report could not be prepared without the X-ray results. 19.  On 20 September 2007 the applicant was questioned by the investigator, who proposed that he submit the X-ray images taken on 28 December 2006 for examination by the medical commission. The applicant refused, stating that he did not trust the police. 20.  On 4 December 2007 the Centre returned all relevant documents to the prosecutor, informing him that, in the absence of the applicant\u2019s X-ray results, it had been impossible to carry out the examination. 21.  On 19 March 2008 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that the applicant had often provoked quarrels with his ex-wife and children, and that they denied having caused him any injuries (they were examined as witnesses on 19 January and 8 February 2007, and on 15 March 2008.) The prosecutor also referred to the statement given by doctor T. (see paragraph 17 above), whom the applicant had asked for help and who had found bruising on the applicant\u2019s body and on his left elbow, but no bone fractures. The prosecutor furthermore noted that the applicant had only gone to the medical expert on 29 December 2006 and not immediately after the incident. Lastly, the applicant had refused to submit his X-ray results, thus preventing the medical commission from drawing up its report. 22.  On 10 April 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor annulled the decision of 19 March 2008 as premature and taken without the origin of the applicant\u2019s injury having been established. 23.  On 17 May 2008 the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it earlier. On 23 June 2008 the investigating judge of the Edine\u021b District Court annulled that decision. The judge found that the investigator had ignored the prosecutor\u2019s conclusion in the decision of 10 April 2008 and had limited his investigation to interviewing the applicant\u2019s children and members of his ex-wife\u2019s family, who all had a hostile relationship with him and who, moreover, had given somewhat different versions of the incident of 27 December 2006. Furthermore, one of the doctors (T.) had been interviewed only superficially, another doctor who had seen the applicant after the incident had not been interviewed at all, and a third doctor who had taken the X-ray of the applicant\u2019s elbow had also not been interviewed. Another expert medical report had been ordered on 2 May 2007 without first observing the victim\u2019s rights, such as being able to contribute to the questions asked of the experts. Lastly, the applicant had not been informed that he could submit the X-ray results directly to the Centre. 24.  On 21 November 2008 the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it earlier. On 3 December 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor annulled that decision for reasons similar to those relied on by the investigating judge (see paragraph 23 above). He also found that the investigative actions had been \u201cextremely superficial\u201d and had had a \u201ctendentious, unilateral character\u201d. 25.  On 20 March 2009 the applicant agreed to submit the X-rays taken on 28 December 2006 to the investigator. On 7 April 2009 the prosecutor ordered that a new expert medical report be drawn up by the Centre, to be based on those X-rays. 26.  On 21 October 2009 the Centre informed the prosecutor that the applicant\u2019s X-rays were of poor quality and that the applicant would have to have a new X-ray taken. On 2 December 2009 the applicant was asked to undergo a fresh X-ray examination. The medical commission drew up its report on 9 December 2009 and found signs of a fracture in the upper third of the applicant\u2019s radial bone in his left elbow. The commission also concluded that this type of injury could have been caused in the manner described by the applicant, but could also have been self-inflicted. 27.  On 30 June 2010 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it previously, adding that the medical reports did not exclude the possibility that the injury had been self-inflicted. That decision was confirmed by a higher-ranking prosecutor on 17 December 2010. 28.  On 25 July 2011 the investigating judge of the B\u0103l\u021bi District Court upheld the decisions of 30 June and 17 December 2010. The judge found that the investigator had undertaken all possible measures to investigate the case, and that the witnesses had not confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of the events and had even contradicted it by stating that on 12 January 2007 they had been out cutting wood with the applicant and had not observed any injury to his elbow. 29.  In a medical report dated 15 August 2007 a doctor recorded an oval light-violet ecchymosis measuring 6 cm by 4 cm on the applicant\u2019s forehead and an excoriation measuring 2 cm by 1 cm and covered with a red crust, as well as pain in the cervical column and the right side of the thoracic region. The applicant explained that he had been beaten by his ex-wife and daughter. 30.  In another medical report dated 21 August 2007 a doctor recorded an excoriation on the applicant\u2019s head measuring 2 cm by 1.5 cm and covered with a red crust. He explained that he had been hit on the head by his ex-wife the day before. 31.  The applicant submitted similar medical reports, dated 13 September and 12 November 2007, which recorded various excoriations and bruises. Each time he explained that he had been beaten by his ex-wife and children.", "references": ["5", "3", "8", "4", "7", "9", "0", "6", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  In the former Yugoslav socialist regime all employees contributed to housing funds. The funds thus obtained were used, inter alia, to build blocks of flats. The flats were distributed to employees, who acquired protected tenancies in respect of them and other already existing socially owned flats. Each publicly owned company drew up a list of persons to be granted specially protected tenancies. When a person on such a list was granted a specially protected tenancy, his or her housing needs were considered to have been met and his or her name would be removed from the list. 7.  The applicant was employed by a socially owned company, S. All employees of S. paid contributions to a housing fund in the amount of 3% of their monthly salaries. 8.  On 31 October 1988 company S. granted the applicant a specially protected tenancy of a flat measuring 65.08 square metres in the Zagreb suburbs, with the right to occupy it together with her husband and two daughters. However, since that decision was not yet final, company S. entered into an agreement with the applicant on 7 December 1988 giving her the right to move into the flat with her family and to care for that flat. The applicant moved into the flat and has been living there ever since. 9.  The decision to grant the applicant a specially protected tenancy was challenged by three other employees and quashed by the Zagreb Basic Court of Associated Labour (Osnovni sud udru\u017eenog rada u Zagrebu). 10.  On 27 March 1990 the housing committee of company S. drew up a priority list for the distribution of flats. The applicant was the first on the list. On 23 April 1990 the company\u2019s workers\u2019 council approved the priority list. On the basis of that list she was entitled to have a decision allocating a flat to her issued. On 27 April 1992 the flats of the company S. were transferred for management to the Zagreb Municipality. 11.  On 9 and 15 May 1990, respectively, two other employees of company S. brought an action before the competent court, seeking to have the priority list declared null and void. Competence in the matter was subsequently transferred to the Zagreb Municipal Court, which on 3 February 1999 dismissed the claims on the merits since there was no possibility under the relevant law to bring such an action at all. A civil action could be brought to challenge the decision on allocation of a flat but not to challenge a priority list. 12.  On 23 June 2004 the Zagreb County Court amended the judgment of 3 February 1999 so as to declare the actions inadmissible on the same grounds, namely that the priority list could not be challenged before a court of law. 13.  Meanwhile, on 3 June 1991 Parliament had enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo), which abolished the specially protected tenancies and regulated the sale of socially owned flats previously let under a specially protected tenancy. 14.  On 29 November 1995 the applicant asked the Zagreb Municipality as the owner of the flat to conclude a contract for the sale of the flat with herself as the buyer. The Zagreb Municipality did not take any decision within the prescribed time-limit of sixty days. 15.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant re-submitted to the Zagreb Municipality her request to purchase the flat she occupied. The request was refused on 6 July 2005 because she had not been granted a specially protected tenancy in respect of that flat. 16.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against the City of Zagreb, which in the meantime had become the owner of the flat she occupied, seeking a judgment in lieu of the contract of sale of the flat in question. 17.  The claim was dismissed by the Zagreb Municipal Court on 18 June 2007 on the grounds that the applicant had not acquired a protected tenancy of the flat in question, since the priority list did not constitute a decision on the granting of protected tenancies within the meaning of the Housing Act. 18.  The judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court on 8 April 2008. The court held that the applicant did not have a final decision on allocation of the flat to her. 19.  In a subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, she complained that her right to equality before the law, her right to an appeal as well as her right to a fair trial had been violated. She argued that she had been the first on a priority list drawn up by company S. for the distribution of flats.  The only reasons she had not been formally granted a specially protected tenancy of the flat she had been occupying were the challenge of the priority list by her co-workers and the delay in the civil proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court. However, once those proceedings had ended, all of the conditions for recognition of her specially protected tenancy of the flat at issue had been met. The one-year validity of the priority list was to be counted from the date of its being confirmed, which in the applicant\u2019s case had occurred when the national courts had dismissed all the objections concerning that list. By not recognising her right to a specially protected tenancy, the national authorities had deprived her of the possibility to purchase the flat she occupied under favourable conditions. She also relied on some other decisions of the Constitutional Court whereby it had granted protection to persons in situations comparable to her own. 20.  On 11 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint on the grounds that the findings of the lower courts that she had not acquired a specially protected tenancy of the flat at issue had been correct. It further held that the decisions the applicant had relied on concerned persons who had had specially protected tenancies which they had subsequently lost.", "references": ["7", "6", "3", "1", "8", "0", "4", "2", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1975 and 1976 and live in Cahul and Cetireni respectively. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicants were convicted by Moldovan courts and, at the time of the events, were serving their sentences in prison no. 8 situated in the town of Tighina (Bender), in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The town is situated in the security zone under the control of peacekeepers from Moldova, Russia and the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d)[1]. Prison no. 8 is under the exclusive control of the Moldovan authorities. By October 2003 some 236 people were detained there; some of them, such as the applicants, were ill with tuberculosis. 8.  On 23 September 2002 the Bender local administration, which is subordinated to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity, water and heating supplies. As a result, the detainees were deprived of conditions of basic hygiene, and the food they received did not meet the minimum standards of quality. 9.  The prison authorities informed the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President\u2019s Office, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Red Cross and the Council of Europe, as well as local human rights organisations, with a view to obtaining assistance in resolving the problem arising from the disconnection from the town\u2019s utilities network. 10.  On 12 August 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office (which forms part of the official Moldovan authorities) informed the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe CHDOM\u201d), for which the applicant\u2019s representative worked, that, as a result of pressure from the OSCE, the Bender authorities had reconnected the prison to the electricity and water supply systems on 23 February 2003. On 10 July 2003 the last of the people who were ill with tuberculosis were transferred to a newly-built hospital wing in Pruncul prison hospital, situated in Moldova. According to the head of prison no. 8, some 236 healthy detainees, including the applicants, remained in the prison after that date. However, also on 10 July 2003, the local authorities disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity and water supply systems again, without any warning. The \u201cMRT\u201d authorities insisted that the prison needed to be closed down. 11.  On 15 September 2004 Mr Pocasovschi (the first applicant) was transferred to another prison. He was released on parole on 14 April 2005. Mr Mih\u0103il\u0103 (the second applicant) was transferred to another prison on 1 March 2004 and was released on parole on 28 March 2005. 12.  On 21 July 2003 the applicants\u2019 representatives asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities systems. On 12 August 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office replied in general terms, describing the difficult situation with regard to prison no. 8 and the unsuccessful negotiations with the local authorities. 13.  On 29 August 2003 the CHDOM asked the Bender District Court (which is part of the Moldovan court system) to order the prosecutor\u2019s office to remedy the human rights violations taking place in prison no. 8. 14.  On 7 October 2003 the head of prison no. 8 informed the court that, owing to insufficient access to water and electricity, detainees in his institution could not receive appropriate medical assistance or food of a sufficient standard, or maintain proper hygiene. 15.  On 31 October 2003 the Bender District Court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities supply. That decision was upheld by the Bender Court of Appeal on 18 December 2003. 16.  According to the Moldovan Government, on 18 November 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office contacted the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities with a view to prosecuting those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities. It also informed the Joint Control Commission (see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) of the need to include the subject on its agenda. On 20 December 2003 the \u201cMRT\u201d prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal investigation on the ground that no crime had been committed. 17.  On 19 January 2004 the relatives of two of the detainees made another complaint to the CHDOM regarding the inhuman conditions of detention in prison no. 8. That letter was forwarded to the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President of the Republic of Moldova and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, along with a request to take all necessary steps to immediately improve the conditions of detention. 18.  On 1 March 2004 the CHDOM asked the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office what action had been taken pursuant to the above-mentioned court decisions. On 12 March 2004 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office replied that all the material was at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which was dealing with the case. 19.  On 15 March 2004 the Ministry of Justice informed the CHDOM that the State was making all necessary efforts to ensure acceptable conditions of detention at prison no. 8, and that, at that time, the conditions of detention at that prison did not differ from those at other prisons in the Republic of Moldova. 20.  On 20 April 2004 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the CHDOM that it had lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice against the decisions of 31 October 2003 and 18 December 2003. On 3 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld those decisions. 21.  On 1 June 2009 the CHDOM asked the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office what actions had been undertaken after the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 3 August 2004. On 14 July 2009 the Bender Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied that the actions of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities could not be investigated by the Moldovan authorities as long as the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities de facto controlled the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d. 22.  On 15 March 2004, on behalf of 141 detainees in prison no. 8, including the applicants, the CHDOM lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Justice, asking for the finding of a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention. The detainees had authorised the organisation to act on their behalf. The CHDOM also asked for an improvement in the conditions of detention and for the payment of compensation in the amount of 15,000 Moldovan lei (MDL \u2013 approximately 1,000 euros (EUR) at the time) for each detainee. 23.  On 16 and 22 April 2004 the President of the Bender District Court asked the Supreme Court of Justice to decide whether the case should be examined by another court. On 19 May 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the request and left the case with the Bender District Court. 24.  On 18 June 2004 the Bender District Court decided to transfer the case to the Buiucani District Court in Chi\u015fin\u0103u, in accordance with territorial competence principles. The claimants (the detainees) and their representatives were not consulted. On 22 June 2004 the CHDOM challenged that decision. On 14 July 2004 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 18 June 2004 and ordered the urgent examination of the case by the Bender District Court. 25.  On 28 December 2004 the Bender District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not satisfy legal requirements. On 1 February 2005 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision. 26.  After February 2005 many of the 141 detainees who were plaintiffs in the above-mentioned civil action were transferred to other prisons in various parts of the country, which made it more difficult for the CHDOM to obtain confirmation of each individual\u2019s power of attorney, as requested by the Bender District Court. In such circumstances, the CHDOM selected nine cases (including those of the applicants in the present case) with which to continue the proceedings. Since the individuals concerned were also detained in separate prisons, the CHDOM made an application for their cases to be examined separately, an application which the Bender District Court refused on 11 November 2005. 27.  On 26 April 2006 the Bender District Court rejected the CHDOM\u2019s application to summon as defendants the individuals from the relevant local \u201cMRT\u201d authorities in Bender responsible for violating the detainees\u2019 rights. On an unknown date in June 2006 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision and ordered the summoning as defendants of A.P., A.M. and V.M., the heads of the relevant local \u201cMRT\u201d authorities in Bender. According to the applicants, none of these individuals was summoned by the Bender District Court. 28.  On 15 December 2006 the judge who had been examining the case withdrew from it. On 18 May 2007 the judge who had taken over the case also withdrew from it. Subsequently, all other judges of the Bender District Court withdrew, allegedly for fear of persecution by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. As a result, the Bender Court of Appeal was asked to decide which other court could examine the case. On 13 November 2007 the Bender Court of Appeal decided that the case should be examined by the Anenii-Noi District Court. 29.  On 26 December 2007 the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not fulfil certain legal requirements. It found in particular that there was a lack of valid powers of attorney in favour of the CHDOM. 30.  On 6 March 2008 the CHDOM lodged a reformulated court action in accordance with the legal requirements. It also asked for the Russian Government to be summoned as a defendant in the case, as it had de facto control over the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d. It claimed EUR 10,000 and EUR 7,000 respectively for the breach of the applicants\u2019 rights. On the same date the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because the powers of attorney issued by the detainees in favour of the CHDOM had expired. 31.  On 20 May 2008 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 6 March 2008, noting that, in the applicants\u2019 cases, the powers of attorney had been renewed. 32.  On 18 June 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adjourned the hearing because of the absence of a representative of the Ministry of Justice. The same thing occurred on 29 October 2008. The court also informed the CHDOM that, in a letter dated 2 July 2007, the Ministry of Justice had informed the court that a representative of the Russian Federation could only be summoned via the Ministry of Justice. 33.  On 30 December 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adopted a judgment in which it allowed the applicants\u2019 claims in part. It awarded each of them damages in the amount of EUR 200, to be paid by the Moldovan Ministry of Finance, and EUR 500, to be paid by the Russian Ministry of Finance. 34.  On 30 June 2009 the Bender Court of Appeal quashed that judgment in part. It found that, following the prison\u2019s disconnection from the utilities, the prison administration had no longer been able to offer food or medical treatment for tuberculosis which was of an adequate quality; there had been no access to showers, a very poor situation concerning personal hygiene, and only two hours of electricity per day, ensured by a low-power generator. None of the complaints made to the State authorities had resulted in an improvement in the conditions of detention until much later, as established in 2008. The court acknowledged a breach of the applicants\u2019 right not to be held in inhuman conditions of detention, and increased the award in favour of each of them to MDL 20,000 (EUR 1,266 at the time). It also found that the Russian Federation could not be a defendant in Moldovan courts unless it expressly agreed to that, which was not the case here. 35.  On 27 April 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law in part, and amended the judgment of the lower court. It analysed in detail the length of the civil proceedings (between 22 March 2004 and the date of adopting its own judgment on 27 April 2010), the complexity of the case, how the parties and the courts had contributed to the length of the proceedings, as well as the significant interest at stake for the applicants. The court found that, despite the applicants\u2019 representatives\u2019 actions contributing to the overall length of the proceedings (twenty-six out of the sixty-seven months), a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time had taken place, requiring additional compensation which it set at MDL 6,000 (approximately EUR 358 at the time). It did not amend the remainder of the lower court\u2019s judgment. 36.  The Moldovan Government submitted a long list of actions concerning their efforts to assert their sovereignty over the \u201cMRT\u201d territory and ensure that human rights were observed in the region. They also submitted copies of documents concerning prison no. 8 in Tighina/Bender specifically, raising in particular the issue of the prison being disconnected from utilities within the framework of the \u201c5+2\u201d negotiations process (between the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the USA, in addition to Moldova and the \u201cMRT\u201d) and with various international organisations.\nII.  RELEVANT REPORTS OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON\u2011GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 37.  Relevant reports of various inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the \u201cMRT\u201d have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 11138/10, \u00a7\u00a7 61-68, ECHR 2016).", "references": ["7", "5", "3", "2", "9", "8", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Tbilisi. 5.  On 29 March 2006 the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal on 30 June 2006. Pursuant to Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Electoral Code and Article 28 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution, the applicant was debarred, as a convicted prisoner, from participating in any elections. 6.  On 25 July 2007 the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the ban under Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Electoral Code in relation to Article 28 of the Constitution. He referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on prisoners\u2019 voting rights and submitted, among other things, that he would be unable to participate in the parliamentary elections in 2008. 7.  On 31 March 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible in view of an identical restriction contained in the Constitution. It noted the following:\n\u201cIt would be absolutely futile for the Constitutional Court to abolish the impugned provision [Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Electoral Code] as this will not relieve the complainant of the restriction placed upon him by Article 28 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution. To achieve [this latter result] it would be necessary to introduce amendments with respect to the relevant provision of the Constitution, which is beyond the Constitutional Court\u2019s competence. ...\n... the Parliament of Georgia has directly copied the prohibition contained in Article 28 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution into Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Electoral Code. The impugned provision is [thus] analogous to the rule contained in Article 28 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution and its constitutionality \u2012 which implies the assessment of a constitutional norm\u2019s constitutionality \u2012 is not within the Constitutional Court\u2019s jurisdiction.\u201d 8.  As a result, the applicant was unable to vote in the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008.", "references": ["9", "7", "4", "1", "0", "5", "8", "3", "6", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "6.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 7.  On 5 April 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe Vyborgskiy District Court\u201d) declared the applicant legally incapable in her absence. The applicant submitted that she had only learnt about that judgment on 19 April 2004. She lodged her appeal twice, accompanied by requests that the court reset the time-limit for lodging the appeals. On 11 October 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s latest request that the court examine her appeal. On 22 December 2004 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision on appeal. 8.  On 27 February 2009 the Constitutional Court of Russia declared unconstitutional the practice of divesting people of their legal capacity in their absence, unless their absence resulted from specific circumstances. 9.  On 8 June 2009 the applicant sought the reopening of her case in view of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 27 February 2009. After an initial refusal, on 24 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 5 April 2004 and remitted the applicant\u2019s case for a fresh examination. 10.  On 26 November 2009 the Vyborgskiy District Court discontinued the incapacitation proceedings, as the plaintiff, the applicant\u2019s daughter, had failed to attend. The applicant thus regained her legal capacity. 11.  On 7 March 2008 an emergency doctor was called to attend to the applicant and found that she required hospitalisation. A psychiatrist examined the applicant on her admission to the hospital and confirmed that she was in need of in-patient care. 12.  On 10 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s brother, who was her legal guardian at the relevant time, consented to her confinement. Four days later his status as a legal guardian was cancelled and transferred to the hospital. On 31 March 2008 the hospital, in that capacity, agreed to the applicant\u2019s involuntary confinement. 13.  According to the applicant, the hospital dismissed her requests to be discharged, and she was not allowed to use a mobile phone, send correspondence or receive visitors. When the applicant contacted her lawyer allegedly seeking to update her application before the Court and to challenge her involuntary confinement, he attempted to meet her at the hospital on 13 March and 1 April 2008, but was refused permission to do so. 14.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer then lodged a complaint against the hospital, asserting his right to communicate with his client. The lawyer supported his complaint with a copy of the power of attorney that the applicant had issued to him on 21 June 2005 for her application to the Court. On 9 February 2009 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe Primorskiy District Court\u201d) dismissed the complaint, having noted that the applicant lacked legal capacity to appoint a lawyer. 15.  On 10 March 2009 an expert commission issued a two-page report diagnosing the applicant with schizophrenia. It relied on the applicant\u2019s medical history since 2001 and her state of health leading to her hospitalisation in 2008. The experts further stated that during her stay at the hospital, the applicant had been avoiding contact; she had been complaining about her confinement; she had remained suspicious and negative and had maintained her delusional ideas about her neighbours, doctors and other patients. They concluded that the applicant required further psychiatric treatment in the hospital. 16.  On the same day the Primorskiy District Court held a hearing concerning the applicant\u2019s involuntary treatment in the psychiatric hospital. The applicant\u2019s doctor presented to the court the expert commission\u2019s report of 10 March 2009 and her own opinion confirming that the applicant needed compulsory treatment in the hospital. The applicant was absent from the courtroom during that presentation, but her State-appointed lawyer, Ms L., was present. After the presentation the applicant was brought into the courtroom and was informed about her rights. She then said that she wanted to go home and did not wish to continue her treatment. The judge did not ask her any other questions. Ms L.\u2019s only intervention during the whole hearing was to state that she \u201chad no objections\u201d to the applicant\u2019s continued confinement in the psychiatric hospital. The Primorskiy District Court concluded that the applicant required involuntary treatment in the hospital. 17.  On 21 April 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 9 February 2009, having flagged a violation of counsel\u2019s right to meet with his client. On 25 May 2009 the applicant met her lawyer. 18.  On 8 June 2009 the applicant asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 June 2009 the District Court rejected the request. 19.  On 15 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 30 June 2009 and reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court examined the appeal and found the applicant\u2019s involuntary treatment lawful. 20.  Once the applicant had regained her legal status on 26 November 2009 (see paragraph 10 above), she refused to continue her treatment in the hospital and was discharged on 31 December 2009. 21.  On 11 November 2010 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe Petrodvortsovyy District Court\u201d) declared the applicant legally incapable. It noted that in view of the fact that Russian law did not provide for partial incapacitation to take into account the degree of a person\u2019s mental disorder, it had no alternative but to deprive the applicant of her full legal capacity. On 17 March 2011 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, having fully endorsed the Petrodvortsovyy District Court\u2019s reasoning. 22.  On 27 June 2012 the Constitutional Court of Russia examined a complaint lodged by the applicant in relation to her incapacitation and invited Parliament to amend the legislation and introduce the possibility of partial incapacitation (see paragraph 39 below). On 30 December 2012 the Russian Civil Code was amended accordingly; the entry into force of the amendment was delayed until 1 March 2015 (see paragraph 40 below). 23.  Following the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling, on 26 March 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court remitted the applicant\u2019s case for a fresh examination. However, on 6 August 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court confirmed its previous decision stripping the applicant of her full capacity, having stated that the amendment to the law had not yet entered into force. On 28 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 24.  On 29 June 2009 the Promyshlennyy District Court of Stavropol, acting in the applicant\u2019s absence, stripped him of legal capacity. The judgment of 29 June 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 25.  In October 2012 the applicant sought the restoration of his legal capacity. On 6 March 2013 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region (\u201cthe Kochubeyevskiy District Court\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. On 4 June 2013 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. 26.  On 25 July 2016 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court granted the applicant\u2019s application to be declared partially capable. 27.  On 27 January 2009 the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow (the \u201cKoptevskiy District Court\u201d) declared the applicant legally incapable in his absence. The judgment of 27 January 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 28.  On 20 January 2013 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 27 January 2009, having asked a court to reset the time-limit for lodging the appeal as he had not been informed about the incapacitation proceedings, had not attended them and had not received a copy of the judgment. 29.  On 14 February 2013 the Koptevskiy District Court reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal. On 10 September 2013 the Moscow City Court quashed that decision and dismissed the applicant\u2019s request to have the time-limit for submitting his appeal reset. 30.  On 7 August 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court of the Moscow Region (\u201cthe Dmitrovskiy District Court\u201d) divested the applicant of full legal capacity in his absence. The judgment of 7 August 2003 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 31.  The applicant allegedly learnt that he had been stripped of legal capacity only in 2012. On 24 December 2012 he asked the Dmitrovskiy District Court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 7 August 2003. On 22 January 2013 the Dmitrovskiy District Court dismissed the request. 32.  On 29 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 22 January 2013. It reset the time-limit and at the same hearing examined the merits of an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 7 August 2003. Having found that in 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court had examined the applicant\u2019s case in his absence despite the lack of any information on the applicant\u2019s ability to attend, the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 7 August 2003. It then proceeded to re-examine the merits of the case. After having heard the parties and basing its findings on a medical expert report of 2003, the Moscow Regional Court again declared the applicant legally incapable. 33.  On 4 September 2006 the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Zyuzinskiy District Court\u201d) declared the applicant legally incapable. The applicant, who was being treated in a psycho-neurological facility at the time, did not attend the hearing. 34.  The applicant allegedly only learned about that judgment in 2013. She asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal in view of the lack of notification about the proceedings and her absence from the hearing. 35.  On 24 October 2013 the Zyuzinskiy District Court refused to reset the time-limit, having also noted that the Russian law in force at the material time had not called for the mandatory presence of the applicant at the court hearing. On 28 January 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 24 October 2013 on appeal.", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "0", "6", "1", "7", "No Label", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Senica. 6.  On 3 October 2006 the applicant and three others were charged with extorting money from P. P. 7.  On 6 October 2006 the Senica District Court (okresn\u00fd s\u00fad) remanded the applicant and two of his alleged accomplices in custody from 3 October 2006 onwards. The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, that the offence had been committed in an organised way, and that therefore there was a risk that he could put pressure on witnesses, contact other perpetrators and tamper with evidence. The court relied on the testimony of P.P., who allegedly had been warned by one of the applicant\u2019s accomplices about instructions from the applicant not to cooperate with the police. On 24 October 2006 the Trnava Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd s\u00fad) dismissed an interlocutory appeal (s\u0165a\u017enos\u0165) by the applicant. 8.  On 6 December 2006 a police investigator charged the applicant and fifteen other people with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group. The applicant was also charged with aggravated coercion, extortion, and causing bodily harm. 9.  On 22 December 2006 the Pezinok Special Court (\u0161peci\u00e1lny s\u00fad, hereafter \u201cthe Special Court\u201d), where the case had been transferred in the meantime owing to the organised nature of the crimes, dismissed an application by the applicant for release. It relied on the particularly serious and organised nature of the offences he was charged with, and held that there was a real danger that he might influence witnesses and contact other perpetrators in order to tamper with evidence. On 17 January 2007 the Supreme Court (Najvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed s\u00fad) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 10.  On 16 March 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 October 2007. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had been operating for several years, and that not all of the members of that criminal group had been identified. The court pointed out that the criminal investigation was particularly complex. On 28 March 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 11.  On 17 April 2007 the police investigator charged the applicant with another count of extortion. 12.  On 11 June 2007 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It relied on the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against him. The court took into account the complexity of the criminal investigation, finding that there had been no undue delays. On 22 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 13.  On 14 September 2007 the applicant was charged with two other counts of extortion. 14.  On 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 April 2008, and extended the grounds for his detention by including the risk of his reoffending. It held that it was reasonable to suspect that, if released, the applicant would continue his criminal activities, taking into account: the motives for such activities and their duration and extent; the methods of intimidation and violence used by the criminal group; the hierarchical and organised nature of the group; and the fact that not all of the members of the group had been identified. On 26 September 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 15.  On 17 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 7 July 2008. The Special Court added that his detention assisted the investigation, since the victims were willing to testify, but still not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. On 26 March 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 16.  The applicant was indicted before the Special Court on 13 June 2008. The bill of indictment concerned sixteen criminal acts, eighteen defendants and fourteen victims. The applicant was charged with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, aggravated coercion, causing bodily harm, and ten acts of extortion. All the crimes were qualified as particularly serious crimes. The sums extorted ranged from 10,000 to 33,000 euros (EUR). 17.  On 25 June 2008 the Special Court examined the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. It pointed out that, according to the indictment, he was allegedly the leader of a criminal group, a group which had been conducting criminal activities for six years against people who were victims and witnesses in the trial, by means of threats and the use of physical and psychological violence. On 4 July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 18.  On 6 October 2008, when conducting a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment, the Special Court again reviewed the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. On 15 October 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 19.  On 16 July 2009 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It held that several witnesses were afraid to testify against him in his presence and had thus been heard in his absence. In particular, one witness had been contacted and threatened by unknown persons in an attempt to get him to change his testimony. The court also took into account that not all the witnesses had been heard by the trial court. On 19 August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 20.  On 27 May 2010 the Special Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 13 December 2010. The court limited the grounds for his detention to the risk of his reoffending, because the trial court had already heard all witnesses. It stated that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had operated systematically for several years, and therefore it was reasonable to assume that, if at liberty, he might continue with the criminal activities. The court further held that it was essential to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial. 21.  On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 22.  On 23 June 2010 the applicant was convicted by the Special Court of establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, four acts of extortion, three acts of aggravated coercion and fraud and was sentenced to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. He remained in detention pending the outcome of an appeal. 23.  On 13 September 2010 a request for release lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Special Court. The Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant on 6 October 2010. 24.  On 22 November 2010 the Supreme Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 April 2011. 25.  On 11 February 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against his conviction, which thereby became final. The applicant started to serve a prison sentence, and the time spent in detention was taken into account when calculating his prison term. 26.  On 10 August 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00e1 s\u0165a\u017enos\u0165) against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 10 June 2010 to dismiss his interlocutory appeal (see paragraph 21 above). Among other things, he complained that his detention was no longer justified, that it had lasted an excessively long time, and that the Supreme Court had not answered all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal (\u201cthe first constitutional complaint\u201d). He complained under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and under their constitutional equivalents. 27.  On 17 December 2010 he filed another constitutional complaint, alleging a lack of speediness in relation to the judicial review of his detention by the decisions of the Special Court of 13 September 2010 and the Supreme Court of 6 October 2010 (\u201cthe second constitutional complaint\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 23 above). 28.  On 27 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00fd s\u00fad) accepted a part of the applicant\u2019s first constitutional complaint for further examination, including the complaint regarding the length of his detention. It held that the formal requirements under sections 20 and 50 of the Constitutional Court Act had been satisfied. At the same time, it dismissed the rest of the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. 29.  On 18 January 2011 the Constitutional Court accepted the second constitutional complaint for further examination, and joined the proceedings relating to the first and the second constitutional complaint. 30.  On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It held that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 10 June 2010, had failed to respond to all of the applicant\u2019s arguments. Although the Supreme Court had examined in detail the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the grounds for his detention, it had failed to respond to his other arguments, such as one about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal reviewing his detention, and another about alleged shortcomings in his representation during the judicial review, and thus the court had breached Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.\nThe Constitutional Court further held that the judicial review of the applicant\u2019s detention between 13 September and 6 October 2010 had not been sufficiently speedy, and found another violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention on this account.\nIt quashed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 10 June 2010 and awarded the applicant EUR 4,500 as just satisfaction. It did not order his release, since the applicant had been convicted in the meantime and had started to serve a prison term.\nThe Constitutional Court considered it unnecessary to examine the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints, including the one under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention. 31.  Between the applicant\u2019s arrest and the completion of the pre-trial investigation, the authorities conducted interviews with eighteen defendants, interviewed fifteen victims and twenty\u2011three witnesses, commissioned five expert opinions, analysed telecommunication recordings, conducted home searches and identity parades, and gathered a large amount of documentary evidence. 32.  Between the lodging of the indictment with the trial court and the applicant\u2019s conviction by the court of first instance, the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days. The hearings were scheduled on a monthly or near monthly basis. 33.  On 18 September 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court appointed a substitute defence lawyer for the applicant to prevent the obstruction of court hearings. 34.  On 15 December 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court fined two of the applicant\u2019s defence lawyers: one for failing to appear at three court hearings, and the other for obstructing justice.", "references": ["1", "7", "0", "4", "8", "9", "6", "3", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploie\u015fti. 5.  In 1975 a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group. 6.  On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farca\u015f and Others v. Romania, no. 67020/01, \u00a7\u00a7 7-22, 10 November 2005). 7.  In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Bra\u015fov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation \u2013 ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8.  On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9.  On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 10.  Meanwhile, on 31 March 2004 company R. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy. 11.  On 28 April 2004 the Bac\u0103u County Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants\u2019 claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloul creditorilor, hereinafter \u201cthe register of claims\u201d). 12.  The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditori privilegia\u0163i). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims. 13.  Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (crean\u0163e privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (crean\u0163e chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bac\u0103u County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan. 14.  On 11 October 2007 the Bra\u015fov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18 October 2007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants\u2019 absence, it adjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1 November 2007; it found against the applicants. 15.  On 23 January 2008, in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 20 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolven\u0163\u0103, \u201cthe Bulletin\u201d). 16.  On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment\u2019s date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4 February 2008. On 13 February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post. 17.  Before the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal, the applicants argued that, as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published. 18.  In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Bra\u015fov County Court\u2019s judgment had been published (see paragraph 15 above). Relying on the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph 21 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure. 19.  On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph 13 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.", "references": ["4", "2", "9", "1", "0", "7", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 7.  The applicant is the chief executive officer of a large Moldovan company specialised in the importation of medical equipement. 8.  On 8 April 2015 he was arrested by the National Anti-Corruption Center (NAC) in connection with a crimial investigation opened in November 2014. He was charged with bribery in the context of public auctions. Searches were conducted at the applicant\u2019s home and at the headquarters of his company and numerous documents, computers and mobile phones were seized by the investigators. 9.  More than twenty persons were accused in the same criminal case. Among them were the former Minister of Health and hospital directors. Many of them were apprehended and later released by the NAC or by the courts. As of July 2015, the applicant was the only accused who was kept in custody. 10.  After arrest the applicant was placed in the NAC detention facility. Between 8 April and 8 October 2015 the applicant was detained in custody. Between 8 October and 4 November 2015 he was detained under house arrest. 11.  The need for the applicant\u2019s detention was justified by the prosecutors in the following way: that the applicant could abscond; he could influence witnesses; he could collude with other co-accused persons; and because the offence imputed to him was sanctioned with imprisonment of up to ten years. All of the prosecutors\u2019 applications for the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention were identical. 12.  The applicant argued every time that he was ready to give up his passport and that there were no reasons to believe that he would attempt influencing witnesses or hindering the investigation. The reasons relied upon by the prosecutors in favour of detention were stereotyped and there was no evidence that he intended to abscond or do other things imputed to him. He also argued that he had a family, children, a permanent employment and a permanent abode. 13.  On 10 April 2015 the Buiucani District Court issued a detention order for a period of thirty days arguing that the applicant did not produce guarantees in favour of an undertaking not to hinder the good unfolding of the investigation if no detention was applied. That decision was later upheld by the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal, which added that there was also a risk of the applicant\u2019s reoffending. 14.  On 7 May 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention by twenty-five days relying on the same grounds as before. The applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 14 May 2015. The Court of Appeal used the same arguments as the first time and added that one of the reaosons to hold the applicant in custody was to protect other persons involved in the proceedings from his violent actions. 15.  By decisions dated 1 and 26 June, 21 July 2015 and 15 August 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention for twenty\u2011five days each time. The court relied on similar reasons as before. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals arguing that the applicant\u2019s defence did not prove the fact that the applicant did not intend to abscond or hinder the investigation. In a decision of 11 June 2015 the Court of Appeal held for the first time that there was a risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding. 16.  On 15 and 29 September 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged again the applicant\u2019s detention by twenty and eight days, respectively. It argued that the risk of absconding was justified by the gravity of the offence and that the prosecutor had presented evidence in support of the claim that the applicant may hinder the investigation. The court did not state what that evidence was. On 6 October 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged again the applicant\u2019s detention by ninety days. 17.   On 8 October 2015 the Court of Appeal examined the appeals lodged by the applicant against the decisions of 29 September 2015 and 6 October 2015. In its first judgment it dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal after finding that all the risks enumerated by the first-instance court persisted. However, when examining the appeal against the second decision, the same panel of judges considered that the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding was no longer justified and that there were no new reasons to consider necessary the applicant\u2019s continued detention. Therefore, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant\u2019s house arrest. 18.  On 4 November 2015 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request and asked for the revocation of the house arrest. On the same date the Buiucani District Court accepted the applicant\u2019s request and ordered his release from house arrest. 19.  On 9 April 2015, on the second day of his detention, the applicant felt an accute pain in the region of his lower back. At 10.46 p.m. an ambulance was called for the applicant. The doctors diagnosed the applicant with \u201clumbar radicular syndorme with pronounced algic syndrome\u201d and prescribed him hospitalisation. However, the prison administration refused to follow the doctors\u2019 prescription. 20.  Several hours later, on 10 April 2015 between 3 and 4 a.m. the applicant started experiencing again pain and asked for an ambulance to be called. An ambulance was called only at 9.27 a.m. The doctors repeated the same diagnosis and prescribed again hospitalisation. However, the prison administration refused to follow the doctors\u2019 prescription. 21.  At 10.10 a.m. an ambulance was called again for the applicant. This time the doctors diagnosed the applicant with \u201cartherial hypertension of third degree\u201d, \u201cdiscopathie with agravated algic syndrome\u201d and \u201clumbar radiculopathy\u201d (sensory and/or motor deficit). Hospitalisation was again prescribed, but the prison administration refused to follow the doctors\u2019 prescription. 22.  At 11.44 a.m. an ambulance was called again for the applicant. The doctors diagnosed again \u201clumbar radiculopathy\u201d and discopathie with a possible lesion of the nerve. The doctors reiterated the urgent need for hospitalisation, but the administration refused again. 23.  At 2 p.m. the administration invited several doctors from the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery who confirmed the initial diagnosis and the urgent need for hospitalisation. Only after that, the prison administration allowed the applicant\u2019s transfer to a hospital. 24.  On 11 April 2015 the applicant was operated on his spine at the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery. He remained in hospital until 21 April 2015, when he was moved to a prison hospital. 25.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant was examined by a commission of five doctors who diagnosed him with cholecystitis and fequent biliary colic. They recommended him surgical removal of his gall bladder within maximum seven days. 26.  After that date the applicant and his lawyers submitted numerous requests and complaints to different authorities seeking the approval of his surgery. It was only on 3 August 2015, after the applicant\u2019s condition drastically deteriorated, that his transportation to a normal hospital was approved. He had high fever and presented a swelling. After three days of preparations, he was subjected to surgery on 6 August 2015 and remained in intensive care for another week.", "references": ["8", "4", "6", "9", "0", "5", "7", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1939 and 1944 respectively and live in Dumbr\u0103vi\u021ba, Timi\u0219 County. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011) and \u015eandru and Others v. Romania (no. 22465/03, \u00a7\u00a7 7-47, 8 December 2009). 6.  Between 17 and 28 December 1989 many people, including the applicants\u2019 son, participated in anti-communism demonstrations in Timi\u0219oara, Bucharest and other cities in Romania. 7.  The applicants\u2019 son was killed by gunfire on 23 December 1989 in Timi\u0219oara. 8.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was also registered with the highest prosecutor\u2019s office \u2013 the military prosecutors section \u2212 under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9.  In cases concerning the events in Timi\u0219oara, a separate investigation was carried out under file no. 11/P/1996, culminating in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military officers by a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of 3 April 2007, which became final on 15 October 2008. As is apparent from the documents submitted by the parties, the death of the applicants\u2019 son did not form part of this investigation, but in the court proceedings the first applicant nonetheless lodged a civil claim regarding his son\u2019s death during the December 1989 events. The court dismissed it on the grounds that he had failed to submit documents substantiating this claim. 10.  As acknowledged by the Government, both applicants are parties in the main criminal investigation file. On 26 June 2013 they brought civil claims before the prosecutor requesting the right to participate, being civil parties in this file. The applicants had first made statements and raised civil claims in criminal investigation files other than file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014) on 11 January 1990 and 1 March 2000. The parties did not inform the Court whether these files had been joined to the main criminal investigation (see paragraph 8 above). 11.  The most important steps taken by the prosecutors in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41) and Anamaria\u2011Loredana Or\u0103\u0219anu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, \u00a7\u00a7 10\u201111, 7 November 2017). Further developments are as follows. 12.  On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main investigation, finding that the offences of homicide and instigation to homicide of which the applicants\u2019 son had been a victim had become statute\u2011barred. 13.  Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it is apparent from the prosecutor\u2019s office website that it was subsequently quashed and to date the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Anamaria\u2011Loredana Or\u0103\u0219anu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 11).", "references": ["3", "4", "8", "5", "1", "9", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and is detained in Atyrau, Kazakhstan. 5.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, he left Kazakhstan in 2008 and lived in Saudi Arabia and Syria as a student until June 2011. He did not wish to return to his country as a number of people had been detained on charges of religious extremism in Kazakhstan and some of his friends had left the country after coming under pressure from the Kazakhstan government because of their political and religious identity. 6.  In June 2011 the applicant arrived in Turkey. The Government submitted that subsequent to his arrival in Turkey, two entry bans were issued against him on the grounds that he was suspected of having provided logistical support to foreign nationals who were engaged in international terrorism. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant was taken into police custody and thereafter transferred to the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre with a view to his removal to Kazakhstan. As the applicant applied for asylum while in detention, on 28 October 2011 he was released pending the determination of his asylum application. On the same day he was notified that he should go and reside in Denizli province. 8.  On 4 November 2011 the applicant lodged his asylum application again \u2013 this time with the Denizli Governor\u2019s Office. On the same day a police officer from Denizli Security Headquarters held a preliminary interview with the applicant. The applicant stated that he had learned that he was being sought for by the Kazakhstan authorities on terrorism charges and asked to be granted leave to stay in Turkey. He submitted that his removal to Kazakhstan would expose him to a risk of death. According to a report dated 22 November 2011 concerning the applicant\u2019s interview of 4 November 2011, the interpreter who was appointed by the police authorities noted that the applicant spoke Turkish. 9.  On 28 November 2011 the applicant was notified that his asylum application had been rejected. According to the report of 22 November 2011, the police officer who had interviewed the applicant found that the latter had failed to submit any concrete evidence concerning his nationality, identity and the problems he had experienced in Kazakhstan. The officer, however, found it established that the applicant feared to be returned to his country and that it was known to the Turkish authorities that he would be prosecuted if returned to Kazakhstan. 10.  On 29 November 2011 the applicant objected to the rejection of his asylum application. He once again submitted that he would be exposed to a real risk of death if he were to be removed to Kazakhstan. 11.  According to the Government\u2019s submissions, on 26 December 2011 his objection was dismissed. 12.  On 12 January 2012 the applicant lodged an application to be allowed to leave Turkey with the Denizli Security Headquarters and informed the police that he had been offered a visa to enter and live in Egypt. 13.  On 18 January 2012 the police authorised the applicant to leave the country. 14.  According to a document dated 6 January 2012 sent by the Deputy Director of the General Police Headquarters to a number of police authorities, during a meeting held on 4 January 2012 the ambassador of Kazakhstan in Ankara requested the Turkish Interior Minister to extradite Kazakhstan nationals who had been involved in terrorist acts and in respect of whom Kazakhstan had issued wanted notices (\u201cRed Notices\u201d) via Interpol. A formal extradition request in respect of such persons was submitted by the Kazakhstan embassy in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 31 December 2011. According to the document prepared by the embassy, the applicant and four other persons were members of the \u201cIslamic Jihad Union\u201d, a terrorist organisation which carried out terrorist attacks in the western region of Kazakhstan. They had been detained by the Turkish authorities upon receipt of a Red Notice via Interpol by Kazakhstan. The embassy pointed out that subsequent to their asylum claims, four of those persons, including the applicant, had been released from detention in Turkey. The Kazakhstan authorities considered that these five persons had been in the process of preparing a new terrorist attack in their country and that following their release four of them had organised a terrorist attack in the Atyrau province of Kazakhstan, in co-operation with another terrorist organisation, Jund al-Khilafa (\u201cSoldiers of the Caliphate\u201d). The embassy accordingly requested the Turkish authorities not to grant asylum to them and to extradite them to Kazakhstan. 15.  On 19 January 2012, while he was waiting at Istanbul Atat\u00fcrk Airport to board a flight to Egypt, the applicant was taken into police custody on the basis of the extradition request submitted to the Turkish authorities by the Kazakhstan embassy. 16.  On 23 January 2012 the Interpol-Europol department attached to the General Police Headquarters informed the Ministry of Justice and a number of security departments that a Red Notice had been issued by Kazakhstan via Interpol in respect of the applicant on the basis of terrorism-related offences. 17.  On 24 January 2012 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Magistrates Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention within the context of the extradition proceedings for a period of forty days. The applicant was then placed in detention in Maltepe Prison, in Istanbul. 18.  On 25 January 2012 the applicant lodged a petition with the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court and challenged his detention. In his petition, he stated, inter alia, that a person who would be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment in his country of origin should not be extradited to that country. 19.  On 27 January 2012 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s petition challenging his detention. 20.  On 28 February 2012 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court rejected the extradition request submitted by the Kazakhstan authorities. During the hearing held on the same day the assize court did not find it necessary to appoint an interpreter for the applicant as he spoke Turkish. According to the reasoning contained in the court\u2019s decision, in his defence submissions the applicant had contended that he had been wrongly accused of being a member of al\u2011Qaeda or Islamic Jihad and had asked the court not to extradite him to Kazakhstan. The Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court held that the applicant could not be extradited to Kazakhstan because the charge against him in Kazakhstan fell within the scope of one of the offence categories, precluding extradition, listed in Article 18 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time (see paragraph 30 below). The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s release from detention. The decision of 28 February 2012 became final as no appeal was lodged against it. 21.  On 28 February 2012 the applicant was released from prison but was immediately transferred to the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre in Istanbul. According to a document dated 29 February 2012, the applicant was informed that he was being held pending the outcome of the deportation procedure conducted in this respect. 22.  On 7 March 2012 the Deputy Director of General Security ordered the Istanbul Police Headquarters to deport the applicant. 23.  On 12 March 2012, while in detention, the applicant appointed his representatives to undertake the necessary legal and procedural actions on his behalf before the domestic authorities and the Court by way of a issuing a power of attorney before a notary public. 24.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, on 21 March 2012, when Mr Y\u0131lmaz, one of his representatives, went to the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre to meet him, he was orally informed by officers at the centre that the applicant had been deported to Kazakhstan on 12 March 2012. 25.  Upon a request by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 31 May 2012 the Istanbul Police Headquarters sent a letter to the applicant\u2019s lawyer informing him that the applicant had been deported to Kazakhstan on 12 March 2012. 26.  In a letter dated 10 May 2014, Mr Y\u0131lmaz submitted that the applicant had been remanded in custody and placed in Atyrau Prison upon his return to Kazakhstan. The lawyer stated that he did not have information as to whether the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in Kazakhstan given that the applicant\u2019s family members had refrained from answering his questions regarding that matter during their telephone conversations with him. 27.  Between 28 February and 12 March 2012 the applicant was detained at the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre. The applicant claimed that the centre had been overcrowded at the time of his detention. He had not been allowed exercise outdoors or any other type of social activity throughout his detention. The applicant further alleged that there had been hygiene problems at the centre and that the quantity of the food provided had also been poor. 28.  The Government submitted that the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre, where the applicant had been held, had a capacity of 300 persons and that a total of between 100 and 140 persons had been held during the period between 28 February and 12 March 2012. Detainees were accommodated on three floors: the first two floors were reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. There were four dormitory rooms on the first floor, respectively measuring 50, 58, 76 and 84 sq. m. On the second floor there were five dormitories measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 sq. m. There was a total of 120 bunk beds in the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms received natural light. There were also five showers and six toilets per floor, as well as a cafeteria measuring 69 sq. m, where breakfast, lunch and dinner were served daily on each floor. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise if the physical conditions and the number of staff available allowed. A doctor was present on the premises every week and the detainees also had access to medical care in cases of emergency. As for the hygiene in the facility, there were six cleaning staff working full time.", "references": ["5", "6", "8", "3", "9", "0", "7", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1989 and is detained in Atyrau, Kazakhstan. 7.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, he lived in Atyrau, Kazakhstan until 2010. Between January and November 2010 the applicant was constantly harassed by the police, taken into police custody and ill-treated. In January 2010 he was asked to go to a police station as a friend of his had informed the police that the applicant had witnessed a fight between him and another friend of the applicant. On that day a statement was taken from him by the police. The next day he was once again invited to the police station, where, this time, he was beaten by the police. Subsequently, he was also accused of forcing a girl to worship in the Muslim manner and of raping her. He was eventually released from police custody. The applicant considered that he had been subjected to ill-treatment because he was a practising Muslim who worshipped and who wore a beard. On 27 November 2010 the applicant left Kazakhstan and arrived in Turkey. He then went to Syria twice and also to Georgia. On 21 May 2011 the applicant re-entered Turkey on a tourist visa. 8.  On 9 June 2011 with a view to requesting a residence permit in Turkey, the applicant went to the Istanbul police headquarters, where he was arrested. The Government submitted that (i) subsequent to his arrival in Turkey 21 May 2011, an entry ban was issued in respect of the applicant, as he was considered to constitute a threat to national security, and (ii) he was detained with a view to his deportation. 9.  On the same day the applicant was transferred to the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre. 10.  On unspecified dates the applicant applied to the national authorities and to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), asking to be recognised as a refugee. 11.  On 15 June 2011 a police officer conducted an interview with the applicant in the context of his application to be granted asylum. 12.  On 28 June 2011 the applicant was notified by the police that his asylum application had been rejected. 13.  On 29 June 2011 the UNHCR issued an asylum-seeker certificate to the applicant. 14.  On 5 July 2011 one of the applicant\u2019s representatives, Mr A. Y\u0131lmaz, lodged an objection to the decision to reject the applicant\u2019s asylum application with the police department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the Istanbul police headquarters. The lawyer asked the authorities to review their decision and to conduct a second interview with the applicant. 15.  On 11 July 2011 Mr A. Y\u0131lmaz lodged an application with the Istanbul Magistrates\u2019 Court for his client\u2019s release. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also stressed that the applicant was being kept in poor detention conditions. He received no response to his application. 16.  On 16 August 2011 the police conducted a second interview with the applicant, during which he claimed that he would be exposed to a real risk of death and duress at the hands of the police if deported to Kazakhstan. In his statement, the applicant claimed that he had already been ill-treated by the police in Kazakhstan and that the authorities had imprisoned religious people like him on false accusations. 17.  On 22 and 25 August 2011 Mr A. Y\u0131lmaz lodged two further applications with the police for his client to be released. He submitted that the applicant was being sought for by the Kazakhstan authorities for political reasons and that he would be persecuted on the basis of his religious convictions and subjected to torture and ill-treatment if deported to his country. In support of his petition dated 22 August 2011, the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a document showing that the applicant was being sought for by the public authorities in Atyrau on suspicion of having committed the offence of \u201chooliganism\u201d, proscribed by Article 257 \u00a7 3 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code, as in force at the material time. He also submitted a copy of a page of a newspaper published in Kazakhstan in April 2011 according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. 18.  On 13 September 2011 the applicant was released from the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre. The applicant was ordered to go and live in the province of Sakarya pending the determination of his asylum application. 19.  On 29 September 2011 the applicant went to Sakarya, where he lived until 15 March 2012. 20.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant was granted a residence permit, valid until 20 May 2012. 21.  On 3 November 2011 the Interpol\u2011Europol Department attached to the General Police Headquarters requested the Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department (also attached to the General Police Headquarters) to provide information regarding the applicant, noting that he was sought for by the prosecuting authorities and the Interpol bureau of Kazakhstan as he was suspected of having committed an offence in that country. On 1 December 2011 the deputy head of the Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department informed the Interpol\u2011Europol Department that the applicant had requested asylum and was residing in Sakarya and that on 24 October 2011 a further entry ban had been issued in respect of him after the applicant had been prosecuted for \u201chooliganism\u201d. The Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department requested the Interpol\u2011Europol department not to provide any information to the Kazakhstan authorities, in the interests of the safety of the applicant and his family members in Kazakhstan. 22.  On 15 March 2012 the applicant was served with a document informing him that his asylum application had been rejected on 2 March 2012 and that he could not benefit from subsidiary protection either. The document informed him that he was banned from entering Turkish territory and that if he attempted to enter Turkish territory, he would be deported. On the same day the applicant was detained. 23.  On 16 and 19 March 2012 Mr A. Y\u0131lmaz lodged two applications with the Ministry of the Interior requesting that his client be released. The lawyer noted that he had received a phone call from the applicant, who had stated that he would be deported to Kazakhstan, where he would be subjected to torture. 24.  On 19 March 2012 the applicant was deported to Kazakhstan. 25.  In a letter dated 27 May 2013, Mr Y\u0131lmaz submitted that the applicant had been transferred to the custody of Kazakhstan\u2019s security forces upon his return to Kazakhstan and had then been remanded in custody in Atyrau Prison. The lawyer stated that he did not have information supported by any document as to whether the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in Kazakhstan. 26.  On 22 March 2012 Mr A. Y\u0131lmaz lodged an application with the Ankara Administrative Court for the annulment of the decisions of the Ministry rejecting the applicant\u2019s asylum application and to deport the applicant from Turkey. He requested a stay of execution of the decision to deport the applicant, pending the proceedings before the Ankara Administrative Court. In support of his petition, the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a number of documents to the Ankara Administrative Court, including a document downloaded from the Atyrau police department website, according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. The document, which was also submitted to the Court, contained the applicant\u2019s name, photograph and the charge brought against him (\u201chooliganism\u201d, under Article 257 \u00a7 3 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code). He also submitted the newspaper page (see paragraph 17 above), which he had already submitted to the police on 22 August 2011 and according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. 27.  On 11 May 2012 the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the request for a stay of execution in respect of the applicant\u2019s deportation. 28.  On 13 February 2013 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the application lodged by the applicant on 22 March 2012. In its judgment, the administrative court noted that according to information obtained from the National Intelligence Organisation (Milli \u0130stihbarat Te\u015fkilat\u0131), the applicant was involved in international terrorism and had carried out terrorist activities when he had been in Turkey. The Ankara Administrative Court further noted that the applicant\u2019s asylum application had been rejected as the administrative authorities had found that there had not been any basis for the applicant\u2019s fear of persecution and that he had not met the conditions for being considered a refugee. On the basis of the documents in the case file, the Administrative Court concluded that the administrative decision to reject the applicant\u2019s asylum application and to deport the applicant from Turkey had been lawful. 29.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 27 April 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 13 February 2013. 30.  Between 9 June and 13 September 2011 the applicant was detained at the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre. The applicant claimed that the centre had been overcrowded at the time of his detention. He had not been allowed exercise outdoor or any other type of social activity throughout his detention. The applicant further alleged that there had been hygiene problems at the centre and that the quantity of the food provided had also been poor. 31.  The Government submitted that the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre where the applicant had been held had a capacity of 300 persons and that a total of between 100 and 150 persons had been held during the period between 9 June and 13 September 2011. Detainees were accommodated on three floors: the first two floors were reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. There were four dormitory rooms on the first floor, measuring 50, 58, 76 and 84 sq. m. On the second floor there were five dormitories measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 sq. m. There was a total of 120 bunk beds in the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms received natural light. There were also five showers and six toilets per floor, as well as a cafeteria measuring 69 sq. m, where breakfast, lunch and dinner were served daily on each floor. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise if the physical conditions and the number of staff available allowed. A doctor was present on the premises every week and the detainees also had access to medical care in cases of emergency. As for the hygiene in the facility, there were six cleaning staff working full time and cleaning products, such as soap, were provided on a regular basis.", "references": ["4", "7", "8", "9", "5", "3", "0", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chi\u015fin\u0103u. 6.  On 23 July 2007 the R\u00e2\u0219cani District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for thirty days. He was charged with the offence of robbery, taking of hostages and blackmail while in Ukraine, in 1997 and 1998. The applicant was residing at the material time in Brussels, Belgium. 7.  On 18 November 2008, the applicant was arrested in Brussels at the Moldovan authorities\u2019 request and placed in a Belgian prison pending extradition to Moldova. 8.  On 5 October 2009 the applicant was extradited to the Moldovan authorities. On the same day he was brought before a judge (Centru District Court), who ordered his detention on remand. 9.  On 25 December 2009 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for ninety days. 10.  From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was prolonged every three months. Each time, the reasons for his detention were that it was an exceptional case, that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed serious offences punishable by imprisonment, that the criminal case was complex and that if released the applicant could interfere with the investigation, influence the witnesses and victims, re-offend or abscond (as he had earlier been declared a wanted person). 11.  On 20 May 2010 the applicant made a habeas corpus request, asking for his detention to be replaced with a preventive measure other than deprivation of liberty. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also raised a complaint about the impossibility to consult the applicant during the court hearings while not seated at the same desk next to him. He also complained about the denial by the court\u2019s registry of the applicant\u2019s request to receive copies of his case file. On 17 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s claims and on 21 June 2010 it prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention warrant for another ninety days, relying on exactly the same reasons as before. 12.  On 22 February 2012 the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal, acting as a court of first instance, acquitted the applicant and ordered his release from detention. The court noted that its judgment could be challenged by an appeal on points of law within fifteen days. 13.  On 6 April 2012 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 22 February 2012. In the appeal the Prosecutor\u2019s Office made reference to Article 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant objected that the appeal had been lodged out of time. Nevertheless, on 21 December 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld it and reopened the proceedings. The Supreme Court did not refer to the applicant\u2019s objection that the appeal had been lodged out of time. 14.  The proceedings ended on 30 December 2015, when the Buiucani District Court found the applicant guilty, but discontinued them on the ground of statutory time-limit. 15.  The applicant was detained from 5 October 2009 to 23 October 2009 in the Department for Combating Organised Crimes. He was placed in a remand facility situated in a basement. The total surface was of 3 square metres, with no bed, chair, toilet facilities or washstand. He slept for four days on a concrete floor, using a bucket for his needs. In addition, the applicant had no daily walks outside his cell. 16.  Four days later, the applicant was moved to cell no. 6 of the same detention facility. He was detained with two other inmates in a cell measuring 9 square metres for fifteen days. The applicant was held in similar conditions of detention as described above. He also claims that he was fed only once per day with soup and a slice of bread. During twenty days of detention he had access to the showers only once. 17.  On 23 October 2009 the applicant was transferred from that remand facility to prison no. 13 (Chi\u0219in\u0103u). He was placed for three days in cell no. 38 with a total surface of 12 square metres. The applicant was detained with seven to twelve other inmates. In particular, the applicant describes his conditions of detention as follows: the cell was equipped with twelve wooden beds, it was not heated, the quality of food was very poor, there was a lack of ventilation, worsened by the inmates\u2019 smoking directly in the cell, and poor lighting. 18.  On 27 October 2009 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 78 measuring 30 square metres. He was detained there with twelve other detainees. The cell was equipped with twelve wooden beds. 19.  On 5 December 2010 the applicant was transferred from prison no. 13 (Chi\u0219in\u0103u) to prison no. 11 (B\u0103l\u021bi), where he was detained until the date of his acquittal by the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal on 22 February 2012. On the date of his arrival he was not fed. He was placed in cell no. 6 with a total surface of 21 square metres. The applicant was detained with fourteen to nineteen other inmates. The cell was equipped with only fourteen beds and the detainees had to sleep in turns. The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows: toilet insufficiently separated from the cell, lack of a washstand, lack of water and ventilation, lack of adequate lighting, damp and cold cell. 20.  On 30 December 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office complaining about the poor conditions of detention. In a reply dated 10 January 2011, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that his complaint about the poor conditions of detention was well founded and that following a control carried out in Prison No. 11 multiple breaches of the law had been discovered. The prison administration was asked to remove the shortcomings found. It does not appear that any change in the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention occurred after the Prosecutor Office\u2019s involvement. 21.  On 15 January 2011 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 21 with a total surface of 16 square metres. The applicant was detained along with fifteen to seventeen other inmates and they had to sleep in turns as the cell was equipped with only twelve beds. The conditions of detention as described by the applicant were as follows: lack of bed linen, clothing and hygiene products, inadequate quality of food, lack of medical assistance. The applicant also contends that he was bitten by parasitic insects present in the cell. 22.  The applicant complained to the domestic courts and the investigating authority about the inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. On 20 January 2011 the B\u0103l\u021bi Prosecutor\u2019s Office acknowledged the existence of the inhuman conditions of detention in prison no. 11 (B\u0103l\u021bi).", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "4", "0", "7", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  On 17 March 2010 the applicant was arrested by police office and charged with fraud and forgery of official documents. She was placed in the detention centre of the General Directorate for Fighting Organised Crime of the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe GDFOC\u201d). 7.  According to the applicant, she was held there in an underground cell which offered substandard conditions of detention. 8.  The applicant further submitted that she was transferred to Prison no. 13, where she was detained in a cell with sixteen other inmates and was subjected to passive smoking. She was not provided with bedding and was not able to sleep normally. The cell was infested with vermin and the food was of a very poor quality. 9.  According to the Government, the applicant was transferred from the detention facility of the Ministry of the Interior to Prison no. 13 on 29 March 2010. On 30 March 2011 she was released from detention and was placed under house arrest. On 26 January 2012, after having been declared a wanted person, the applicant was again arrested and again placed in detention in Prison no. 13. On 19 September 2012 she was released from prison and was placed under house arrest. On 5 June 2013 the applicant was again placed in detention in Prison no. 13. On 10 June 2013 the Centru District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced her to thirteen years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The case was pending before the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal at the time of the parties\u2019 observations. 10.  According to the Government, during her detention in Prison no. 13 after 5 June 2013 the applicant was held in cells nos. 108 and 110, each designed to hold eight detainees and measuring 18 sq. m, and in cell no. 109 designed to hold six detainees and measuring 18 sq. m. Cell no. 109 was lit by a 100-W bulb and had a window, as well as a tap and a toilet separated from the rest of the cell by a partition. All the cells were regularly disinfected. 11.  On 26 February 2003 the applicant was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma (\u201cNHL\u201d \u2013 a type of blood cancer). This disease affected her spleen, bone marrow and lymph nodes. She was also diagnosed with chronic hepatitis. 12.  According to the applicant, while being detained in the detention facility of the GDFOC, her medical treatment was interrupted and the GDFOC administration refused to transfer her to a hospital. After she had been transferred to Prison no. 13, she was not provided the medical assistance required for her condition. 13.  According to the applicant, while in detention, her state of health deteriorated. In both detention facilities there was no specialist oncologist and chemotherapy was unavailable. The applicant undertook her last chemotherapy session in a specialist civilian hospital in April 2013 while under house arrest. Following an enquiry lodged in December 2013 by the applicant\u2019s lawyer about the medical care received by the applicant while in detention, the Prisons Authority replied on 14 February 2014 that she had been registered as an oncology patient since 5 June 2013 and had been provided with medical treatment in line with her diagnosis. 14.  According to two extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records dated 26 June 2014 and 9 July 2015 and signed by the head and the deputy head of the medical unit of Prison no. 13, the applicant was in need of specific medical treatment from the Institute of Oncology and her medical condition was qualified as being of medium seriousness. 15.  The Government submitted that from 24 April 2010 to 9 July 2012 the applicant had refused on several occasions to be hospitalised either in the prison hospital (Prison no. 16) or in the medical section of Prison no. 13. On two occasions the applicant had refused to undergo inpatient treatment at the Institute of Oncology, which was a specialist civilian hospital. The applicant had been examined on several occasions by a therapist and a haematologist and given medical treatment. Every year, the Prisons Authority concluded a service contract, with a budget amounting to 35,000 Moldovan lei (MDL \u2013 approximately 1,555 euros (EUR)), with the Institute of Oncology. Accordingly, specific types of treatment such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy were available. 16.  The Court refers to the relevant material cited in its previous case-law concerning the Republic of Moldova (see, for instance, Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353/06, \u00a7\u00a7 50-61, 15 September 2015, and Valentin Ba\u015ftovoi v. Republic of Moldova, no. 40614/14, \u00a7\u00a7 13-14, 28 November 2017). 17.  In its reports for 2013, 2014 and 2015 on conditions of detention, the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe Human Rights Centre\u201d, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found serious problems in Prison no. 13, notably concerning overcrowding, food quality, ventilation and access to daylight. In view of its findings it recommended in its reports for 2014 and 2015 that Prison no. 13 be closed or, if that was not possible, that the conditions of detention there be urgently improved. 18.  The relevant parts of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) report concerning its visit to the Republic of Moldova between 14 and 25 September 2015 read as follows:\n\u201c44.  Prison no. 13 in Chi\u0219in\u0103u has been visited by the Committee on several occasions. Being one of the oldest prisons in the country (dating from the 1850s), its replacement by a new prison establishment has long been planned. The delegation was informed during the 2015 visit that the opening of a new 1,500-place remand prison in the Chi\u0219in\u0103u area, financed in large part by a loan from the Council of Europe Development Bank, was now envisaged for June 2018.\nChi\u0219in\u0103u Prison, with an official capacity of 1,000 places, remains the largest prison establishment in the Republic of Moldova and operates primarily as a remand facility, with a very high turnover of prisoners (according to the management, between 13,000 and 15,000 prisoners were admitted to the prison every year). At the time of the visit, the establishment was accommodating 1,186 inmates in three separate accommodation blocks, including 81 female adults and 22 male juveniles. The inmate population also included 56 sentenced prisoners (who mainly worked in the prison\u2019s general services) and two persons serving administrative sanctions. In addition, eight life-sentenced prisoners were temporarily held in the establishment as they had a case pending before a court in Chi\u0219in\u0103u.\n... 45.  At the time of the 2015 visit, the Moldovan prison population had increased by some 1,300 inmates as compared to the CPT\u2019s previous visit in 2011 and stood at approximately 7,770 (some 20% on remand). This represents an incarceration rate of some 220 per 100,000 inhabitants \u2013 one of the highest among Council of Europe member states. The Moldovan authorities recognised that the size of the prison population and the resulting overcrowding in prisons constituted a major challenge. Indeed, the delegation observed for itself that the national standard of at least 4 m2 of living space per prisoner was far from being met in most of the prison establishments visited; in particular at Chi\u0219in\u0103u and Soroca Prisons, the levels of overcrowding had reached disturbing proportions. In this context, the delegation was told by the authorities that the increase in the number of prisoners was largely attributable to the rising re-offending rates and excessive resort to remand detention, as well as to reluctance on the part of judges to grant early conditional release. 46.  The CPT recommends that the Moldovan authorities make vigorous efforts \u2013 in consultation with the prosecutorial and judicial authorities \u2013 to eradicate prison overcrowding, in the light of the above-mentioned remarks. In so doing, the authorities should be guided by the relevant Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: Recommendation R (99) 22 concerning prison overcrowding and prison population inflation, Recommendation Rec(2000)22 on improving the implementation of the European rules on community sanctions and measures, Recommendation Rec(2003)22 on conditional release (parole), Recommendation Rec(2006)13 on the use of remand in custody, and Recommendation Rec(2010)1 on the Council of Europe Probation Rules.\n... 74.  The women\u2019s section at Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prison displayed shortcomings similar to those observed in the men\u2019s accommodation areas, notably as regards state of repair, access to natural light and living space (for example, eight prisoners in a cell of some 20 m2). It is also a matter of concern that, like their male counterparts, female prisoners generally spent 22 hours confined to their cells; they were usually not offered any other activity apart from two hours of outdoor exercise per day. In this context, the recommendation and the comment made in paragraphs 60 and 62 should be read as applying also to female prisoners at Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prison. 75.  In both prisons, the delegation received complaints from female prisoners regarding difficulties in obtaining hygiene products. Further, female prisoners at Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prison, as well as inmates under the initial regime at Rusca Prison, were entitled to shower only once a week.\nThe CPT recommends that steps be taken at Chi\u0219in\u0103u and Rusca Prisons to ensure that female prisoners have access to sufficient quantities of personal hygiene products; the specific hygiene needs of women should be addressed in an appropriate manner. Steps should also be taken in these prisons to allow female prisoners more frequent access to shower facilities, taking into account Rule 19.4 of the European Prison Rules.\u201d", "references": ["7", "9", "0", "5", "6", "8", "2", "3", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Canada. 7.  The applicant\u2019s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as set out in his application form, is the following. 8.  On 27 February 2011, while in front of an automated teller machine (\u201cATM\u201d), the applicant was attacked from behind by a police officer and was illegally arrested without a warrant. He was then taken to the police station where he was detained for six hours. Throughout his detention his hands were handcuffed behind his back. 9.  During this period he was tortured by members of the police with the aim of forcing him to confess to the offence of theft through the use of a forged credit card. The applicant was repeatedly beaten with a wooden stick all over his body and his head until he lost consciousness, beaten with a metallic chair while lying on the floor, punched on the body and face and kicked and punched on the head, nose and mouth, causing one of his teeth to break. He also received blows to the region that the police officers had been informed he had been operated on (the applicant does not give any clarifications in this respect). The above acts were accompanied by death threats. The officers refused to give him his asthma medicine. They also refused to take him to hospital until his lawyer at the time, C.H., intervened. 10.  At around 3.30 p.m. the same day, following C.H.\u2019s request, the applicant was taken to hospital because of his injuries. He overheard the police officers telling the doctor that he had fallen to the ground. One of the police officers then took the doctor aside and started talking to him in private. The applicant was not given painkillers by the doctor until the Honorary Consul of Canada in Cyprus (\u201cthe Canadian Consul\u201d) visited him. The Canadian Consul asked the attending doctor the reasons for which the applicant had ended up in hospital and was in such a bad condition. The doctor informed her that there was nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had simply examined his pancreas. No other explanation was given. 11.  On 27 February 2011 the police were informed by a card payment and processing company of illegal withdrawals with a fake credit card from an ATM of a bank in Limassol. Special Constable G.S. from the police traffic department, who was on motorcycle patrol in the area, arrived at the scene and spotted the applicant in front of the ATM. G.S. was in uniform and wearing a helmet. According to G.S.\u2019s account of the events, he approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder. He then said \u201cpolice\u201d and asked him, both in Greek and in English, to identify himself. The applicant did not reply but hit him on the head and stomach and then ran away. G.S. chased the applicant, who at some point fell on the pavement and hit his head. A struggle ensued. G.S. did not hit the applicant but merely tried to handcuff him by holding him with his hands and by pushing him. Special Constable P.K. arrived at the scene and assisted G.S. in arresting the applicant. The applicant was arrested for the flagrant criminal offences of assaulting a police officer and resisting lawful arrest (sections 244 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). Two officers of the Crime Prevention Squad (\u039f\u03c5\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03a0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b7\u03c2 \u0395\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u2013 \u201cthe CPS\u201d), Special Constable C.S. and Senior Constable S.M., arrived at the scene. According to them, when they arrived they found the applicant and G.S. on the ground. The fake credit card had been retained by the ATM and was subsequently retrieved. 12.  After the applicant was handcuffed, he was handed over to C.S. and S.M., who drove the applicant to the police station. 13.  Upon arrival at the police station around 9.30 a.m. the above officers handed over the applicant to Constable P.P., who carried out a body search and confiscated objects found on him, including the amount of 10,000 euros (EUR) in EUR 50 notes. The applicant was then transferred to the Economic Crime Investigations Office (\u0393\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u0394\u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u039f\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd \u0395\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u2013 \u201cthe ECID\u201d) where P.P. passed everything he had found on the applicant on to Constable E.L. The applicant was handed over to Constable F.O., who also carried out a body search. At 10 a.m. F.O. handed over the applicant to Inspector I.S., the head of the ECID. At 11.30 a.m. F.O. returned and kept the applicant under his supervision. At 11.45 a.m. the applicant was allowed to call his lawyer, C.H. At 12 noon F.O. handed over the applicant to Constable M.P., who had been appointed as investigator in the case. 14.  Between 1 p.m. and 1.30 p.m. the applicant was interviewed by M.P. with the assistance of an interpreter, S.K. During the interview, only one other officer entered the interview room, Constable A.P. 15.  At the end of the interview, around 1.35 p.m., the applicant was taken to the detention facilities in the station where Constable C.T. carried out a body search. He recorded injuries in the applicant\u2019s prisoner record. These were: abrasions on the left part of the applicant\u2019s forehead (\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) and left shoulder blade (\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7). The applicant was taken to a cell at approximately 1.45 p.m. 16.  The applicant was visited by his lawyer, C.H., from 3.05 p.m. until 3.30 p.m. Before leaving the station, C.H. complained to the head of the detention facility, Sergeant P.H., that the applicant had been ill-treated during his arrest, transfer to the station and questioning. 17.  At approximately 3.50 p.m. the applicant was taken to Limassol General Hospital by Constable C.K. and Special Constable D.Y. 18.  In the meantime, at 3.30 p.m., the District Court of Limassol issued an arrest warrant on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion based on evidence that the applicant had been involved in a number of offences, including, inter alia, various forgery and theft-related offences, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and resisting lawful arrest. At approximately 4.45 p.m. while the applicant was at the hospital he was presented with the arrest warrant and was detained on that basis. The applicant was guarded by officers at the hospital. 19.  The applicant was discharged from hospital at 11.20 p.m. and was taken back to the detention facilities at the police station. 20.  The next day the applicant was taken to the District Court of Limassol, which ordered his detention on remand for eight days. The court ordered that during his detention the applicant be provided with medical care and treatment and, if need be, that he be taken to hospital. 21.  On 8 March 2011 the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand by a further eight days. 22.  On 16 March 2011 the court ordered his detention pending trial (see paragraph 64 below). 23.  On the day of his arrest, at approximately 4 p.m., the applicant was examined by a pathologist, Dr A.K., at the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital. The applicant complained of loss of consciousness after being beaten, dizziness, nausea, a severe headache, neck pain, and a pain in his knee. The pathologist carried out a physical examination. He found that the applicant had a cephalohaematoma (\u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1) in the right temporal region; abrasions in the parietal area; abrasions and mild oedema on his nose; bruising of his lower lip; a broken upper incisor (\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf/\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ac\u03bd\u03c9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2); a bruise on the left hemithorax with sensitivity and a few abrasions; oedema and abrasions on both wrists (\u03c0\u03b7\u03c7\u03b5\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bc\u03c6\u03ce); a few abrasions on the knees, with no evidence of inflammation; pain during the examination of the movement of the right knee; sensitivity of the upper thoracic vertebra and the upper lumbar spine. The CT scans of the brain, the facial bones and the cervical spine showed no injuries or fractures. There was only loss of neck curve (\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c7\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1). Furthermore, the X-ray of the thorax and the right knee did not reveal any fractures or fluid in the thorax or the pneumothorax. A splint was placed on the applicant\u2019s right knee and he was prescribed analgesics. The doctor\u2019s final diagnosis was cranio-cerebral injury (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7), neck strain (\u03b8\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c7\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), bruising on the thorax (\u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b8\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1), bruising on his knee (\u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5), and a broken tooth (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae \u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2). 24.  The applicant was also examined by a general surgeon, Dr C.T. The applicant complained of neck and chest pain, a headache and pain in the thoracic spine. The doctor observed that the physical examination (\u03b7 \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03b5\u03be\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7) was within physiological limits (\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd). The surgeon ascertained that the applicant had marks from blows, mainly on his chest and face.\n(b)  Subsequent medical examinations\n(i)  Limassol General Hospital 25.  On 1 March 2011 the applicant was taken to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital owing to vomiting and dizziness. He was examined by Dr Y.I., who observed that the applicant\u2019s external injuries were still there. The results of the physical and clinical examinations were normal. In his report the doctor stated that the applicant had been discharged from hospital at 7 p.m. \u201cfeeling very well\u201d. He referred the applicant for an orthopaedic examination the next day. 26.  On 2 March 2011 the applicant was taken back to the hospital for examination by an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. P.T. The applicant complained that he had been hit; he also complained of pain in the lumbar spine and an injury to the right knee. Dr P.T. did not ascertain any bone damage or neurological symptomatology (\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1). He suggested rest and prescribed analgesics.\n(ii)  Medical examination by a private practitioner 27.  On 7 March 2011, following a request by the Canadian Consul, a private practitioner, Dr. S.J \u2013 a traumatologist orthopaedic surgeon \u2013 visited the applicant at the police station and carried out a medical examination. In his report dated 10 May 2011 he stated, in the original English, as follows:\n\u201cI visited the patient on the 7th of March 2011 in the central police station of Limassol. He was complaining of multiple injuries causing him severe pain which did not allow him to come to rest especially at night.\nDuring my clinical examination carried out on that day, the patient had restriction in motion due to pain especially during maximal flexion and extension of the lower back. He had pain sensation during the palpation of the soft tissue without any external injuries observed. Further he had a bruise measuring 10 x 5 cm at the left side of the chest at the auxiliary line height which gave him pain during palpation, compression and maximal inspiration.\nMr Kabbara further had restriction of motion and muscular tension at the cervical spine region without any pathologic neurologic observation. The patient had a loss of half the left upper incisor tooth with no mobility dysfunction of the jaw.\nDue to the above injury, Mr Kabbara described severe pain especially in the evening which did not allow him to sleep. I prescribed him anti-inflammatory pain killers on a regular basis. If there was no response to the medication I advised him to contact me again.\u201d 28.  On 27 February 2011 Special Constable G.S. also went to Limassol General Hospital, where he was examined by a general practitioner, Dr V.D. He complained that, while he had been trying to arrest someone, he had received a punch on the head. As, however, he had been wearing a helmet there had been no bruising. He also complained that he had been kicked in the stomach, had fallen backwards to the ground and hit the right side of his hip. X-rays, scans and tests were carried out and he was diagnosed with a strain (\u03b8\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7) of his lumbar spine. The doctor also found that his kidney was not in its normal position. She instructed that G.S. be examined by an orthopaedic specialist and a nephrologist. G.S. was prescribed nine days\u2019 sick leave. 29.  On 1 March 2011 the applicant reported the alleged ill-treatment to the High Commission of Canada. 30.  On the same day the Canadian Consul visited the applicant while at the hospital with her assistant. The applicant told her that he had been ill\u2011treated. Her assistant took a written statement from the applicant which reads, in the original English, as follows:\n\u201cTO CANADIAN AUTHORITIES\nOn Sunday Feb 27 at approx. 9.20 am, I was attacked from a policeman from behind and trying to protect myself, my elbow hit him at Athinon street. Then a number of the policemen (3-4) started kicking me on the head and immobilized me and hand\u2011cuffed me. I passed out (first time), woke up in a police car and all the way to the Police Station I asked to contact my lawyer and the Canadian Consulate but they refused and they hit me more. At the police station, Mr [G] hit me. They took me upstairs to the Financial Crime Department. I asked again to contact my Consulate or my lawyer and they refused. I was then taken to another room where Mr [M] was. Four policemen walked in and hit me. They took a chair and broke it over my right leg. They also hit me on the head with the chair several times. I fell down and then I was asked where I live. I said I don\u2019t want to say anything without my lawyer. They hit me again and broke my tooth. I was tortured and my human rights were violated. I was also threatened to be killed by high-leveled people. I am now afraid of my life. This continued for about 4 hours until finally I got in touch with my lawyer and sent to the hospital.\u201d 31.  On 2 March 2011, in the light of the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s complaint (see 16 paragraph above), the Limassol police appointed an investigating officer, Police Chief Inspector M.M., who was in charge of the Ayios Ioannis police station in Limassol, to conduct an administrative investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint. 32.  On 3 March 2011 the Canadian High Commissioner in Cyprus sent a note verbale reporting the ill-treatment of the applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requesting that the applicant\u2019s complaint be investigated. 33.  An investigation was conducted by M.M. and a report was prepared. M.M. secured copies of written statements contained in the criminal file gathered for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 64 below) as well as statements from all the officers who had come into contact with the applicant, directly and indirectly, during his arrest and detention. The statements were not question and answer statements. 34.  The applicant refused to provide a written statement claiming that he could not trust the police and informed M.M. that his lawyer and the Canadian Consul had been informed of the details of his ill-treatment. 35.  Special Constable G.S., in his statement of 27 February 2011, stated that on that day at around 9.13 a.m. while he had been on motorcycle patrol he had received a message concerning an illegal cash withdrawal from an ATM. He had immediately gone to the bank concerned. On arrival he had spotted an unknown person who had appeared to be withdrawing money from the ATM and putting it in the left pocket of his tracksuit top. G.S. had got off the motorcycle. He had approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder, had said \u201cpolice\u201d and had then asked the applicant both in Greek and in English to give him his identity card so he would be able to ascertain his identity. The applicant had not replied but instead had turned towards him and attacked him by pushing him backwards with both hands. G.S. had tried to immobilise him. The applicant had then punched his police helmet with his right hand and kicked him in the stomach, causing G.S. to lose his balance. G.S. had fallen backwards on the pavement. The applicant had fled and G.S. had chased him. The applicant, while running, had lost his balance and had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. G.S. had tried to immobilise him and a struggle had ensued between the two. Attempting to resist arrest, the applicant had pushed G.S. and hit him with his hands. Special Constable P.K had arrived at the scene. With his help, and using proportionate force in the circumstances, G.S. had arrested and handcuffed the applicant. He had drawn the applicant\u2019s attention to the law but the applicant had not replied. Two members of the CPS had arrived and he had handed over the applicant to them. G.S. had then gone to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital, where he had been examined by Dr V.D. 36.  The most relevant written statements of other officers read as follows:\n(i)  Constable P.P., who had been the first to receive the applicant at the police station, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and described what he had found on the applicant, which included EUR 10,000. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.\n(ii)  Constable E.L., who had seen the applicant when Officer P.P. had entered her office to give her the applicant\u2019s possessions, in her statement of 27 February 2011 stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn.\n(iii)  Special Constable P.K. who had been on traffic patrol on the day of the events, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had been on the ground with an unknown man. G.S. had asked him to pass him the handcuffs so he could handcuff the applicant as he had been resisting arrest. Then he had gone to the ATM and found five withdrawal receipts of EUR 2,000 each, which he had subsequently given to Constable P.P. when they had arrived at the station. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.\n(iv)  Constable C.T., who had received the applicant at 1.35 pm. at the detention centre at the station to put him in his cell, in his statement of 3 March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had noted that the applicant had had an abrasion on the left frontal area (\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) and behind the left shoulder. He had locked the applicant in the cell at 1.45 p.m.\n(v)  Sergeant P.H. in his statement of 3 March 2011 stated that he had seen the applicant at 1.35 p.m. when M.P. had brought him to the station\u2019s detention facilities and he had then given instructions to Constable C.T. to carry out a body search. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, C.H, had visited the applicant and at 3.05 p.m. had informed P.H. that the applicant had complained to him that he had been beaten by police officers during his arrest and questioning and had wanted the complaint to be reported. He had also requested that the applicant be sent to the hospital. P.H. had immediately given instructions to this effect and within little time the applicant had been taken to the hospital and the complaint of ill-treatment had been reported. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.\n(vi)  Inspector I.S. in his statement of 11 March 2011 stated that he had noticed that when the applicant had arrived at the station he had had injuries on the face which according to Officer G.S. had been caused when he had tried to arrest the applicant. He had also noticed that the applicant\u2019s clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn. The applicant had not complained to him that he had been hit nor had he been hit by anyone.\n(vii)  Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. S.M. then took the applicant along with Special Constable C.S. in the police car to the police station where at 9.30 a.m. he handed him over to Constable P.P. The applicant had minor abrasions and bruises and his clothes were messy.\n(viii)  Special Constable C.S., who had accompanied the applicant to the police station with Senior Constable S.M., in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.\n(ix)  Constable A.P., who had seen the applicant during his interview with M.P., in his statement of 14 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on his face and that he had been informed by M.P. that this had been caused during his arrest.\n(x)  Constable F.O. in his statement of 15 March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had not found anything suspect (\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf) on the applicant. He also stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face and had told him that he had been hit by an officer. Furthermore, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit bottoms torn.\n(xi)  Constable M.P., who had interviewed the applicant at the station, in his statement of 17 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on the face and when he had asked the applicant how the latter had got them, the applicant had told him that he had been hit during his arrest. During the interview, constable A.P. had entered in the room and M.P. had informed him of the applicant\u2019s statement and his injuries. At 1.35 p.m. M.P. had taken the applicant to the detention facilities. 37.  According to the findings of the investigator in his report of 26 April 2011, the applicant had been uncooperative from the beginning of his detention and refused to provide a written statement and answer any questions during his interview. He had also refused to cooperate with the investigator himself and to give a statement concerning his ill-treatment allegations. He had told the investigator that he did not trust the police. In view of the above, it could not be excluded that the complaint had been made to further the applicant\u2019s own interests. According to Inspector I.S., who had supervised the applicant\u2019s questioning in relation to the criminal case against him, no member of the police had ill-treated or used any kind of violence against the applicant during his detention and questioning. The only contact the applicant had had with a member of the police had been during his struggle with the police officers when attempting to flee arrest. In his report, the investigator noted that Special Constable G.S. had been injured while trying to arrest the applicant and that he had been put on sick leave by the doctor who had examined him at the hospital. 38.  The report concluded that none of the applicant\u2019s allegations regarding ill-treatment had been proven and that the case should be closed. 39.  The Limassol divisional police headquarters and the Chief of Police agreed with the conclusions. 40.  On 26 May 2011 the Ministry of Foreign affairs informed the High Commissioner of Canada of the findings of the investigation. 41.  By a letter dated 14 July 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Attorney General, requesting that an independent investigation be conducted into his client\u2019s complaint and that the officers responsible be brought to justice. The next day the Attorney General referred the applicant\u2019s complaint to the president of the IAIACAP ordering an investigation. 42.  On 20 July 2011 the IAIACAP appointed a lawyer, Mr A.S., as investigator. 43.  On 10 October 2011 the investigator prepared a report with a summary of the statements obtained and his findings. 44.  In the course of the investigation, the investigator singled out four police officers as suspects. These were G.S., P.K., S.M. and C.S. Statements in the form of questions and answers were obtained from these officers. He also took statements from the applicant and twenty-four other persons, including the officers who had been in touch with or seen the applicant on the day of the alleged ill-treatment, the interpreter, the doctor who had examined G.S., Dr V.D. (see paragraph 28 above) and three of the doctors who had examined the applicant, namely, Dr A.K. and Dr C.T. from Limassol General Hospital and Dr S.J., the private practitioner (see paragraphs 23, 24 and 27 above). 45.  The applicant gave a statement to the investigator on 23 August 2011, adopting the content of a handwritten statement he had prepared in June 2011 for his lawyer. In his written statement the applicant alleged that on 27 February 2011 at 9.15 a.m. he had been trying to familiarise himself with the ATM in case he would ever need to use his own cards and check the balance of his account. He had, inter alia, a credit card in his name on him and EUR 10,000, which had been given to him by his lawyer at the time, C.H. This was the cash bail that had been returned from the court in another case against him. At 9.20 a.m. he had been suddenly attacked from behind by someone who had been wearing a helmet and who he had not recognised. This person had not identified himself. The applicant had thought that it had been a robbery. This person had choked him from behind. The applicant had been scared and had defended himself. He had then been attacked by a second person in civilian attire. They had started hitting the applicant on the head and the back with a small wooden stick. The applicant had fallen to the ground and lost consciousness. The officers had woken him up by throwing water on his face. He had woken up in a brown jeep, handcuffed. He had then realised that he had been intercepted by the police. The officers had slapped and punched him on the face and body all the way to the police station. They had been asking him about money and credit cards but had not asked him to identify himself. Nor had they shown him any documents in respect of his arrest and informed him of his rights. They had taken everything he had had on him including his asthma inhalers. They had refused to allow him to talk to his lawyer or with an official from the Canadian embassy. He had been taken to the station at approximately 10 a.m. He had been received by the head of the police, \u201cMr Y.\u201d, an officer acting as an interviewer, \u201cMr M.\u201d, and two other officers \u201cMr P.\u201d and \u201cMr A.\u201d. In the interview room there had been officers of the CPS and another officer, \u201cV.\u201d. Officer M. had asked him questions. The applicant had refused to reply, saying that he would do so only in the presence of his lawyer. At that point the officer who had attacked him at the ATM had started beating and \u201ctorturing\u201d him while he had been unable to defend himself, as he had still been in handcuffs. He had kept asking them to stop and let him contact his lawyer. They had continued to punch and beat him using the same small wooden stick used before (he clarified that this had been a small baseball bat). He had asked for his asthma inhalers and tried to tell them that he had had back surgery. He had been very scared and had started breathing heavily. They had hit him on the back and on his right knee with a metallic chair with blue handles. They had beaten him with that chair and kicked him savagely on the head while asking him questions. The applicant stated that he had lost consciousness for a while and he had woken up after water had been thrown on his face. 46.  At approximately 1 p.m. the applicant had called his lawyer; before that they had warned him not to tell him anything. The applicant had spoken to his lawyer and had informed him of the ill-treatment. He had then been taken back to the interview room where the officers had continued to beat him. He had fallen to the floor again with his hands behind his back. One of the officers had stood on his handcuffs while another one had kicked him. Because of the kicks to the head the applicant had become very dizzy, bleeding from his face, nose and mouth. His front tooth had broken from the punches. He had also had a small asthma attack. Although Officer M. had not physically abused him he had not intervened to stop the ill-treatment. Two female officers of the ECID had also witnessed his ill-treatment. The applicant said that he had asked the head of the police to take him to hospital but he had refused. At around 3 p.m. they had taken him to the detention facility in the station. His lawyer had come to visit him and when he had seen the state of him he had made a complaint of ill-treatment to the officers and asked that the applicant be taken immediately to hospital. During his transfer to the hospital the applicant had been punched by one of the two police officers who had been escorting him. The officer had also threatened that his boss Mr Y. would put him in prison if he did not withdraw his complaint. When he had arrived at the hospital at 3.30 pm. one of the officers had lied to the doctor and had told him that he had fallen on his face. The other police officer had then taken the doctor aside and talked to him alone. The doctor had refused to give him painkillers. He had only given those when the Canadian Consul had come to visit him. 47.  The applicant alleged that he could identify the individuals responsible for his ill-treatment. 48.  In their statements provided to the criminal investigator, the police officers denied ill-treatment and maintained their original version of events. Some of the officers could not remember whether the applicant had had injuries or what type of injuries he had had and therefore were not able to answer the investigator\u2019s questions in this connection. The most relevant statements were as follows:\n(i)  Sergeant P.H., who had made no mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 26 August 2011 stated that when the applicant had been brought to the detention facilities he had noticed that he had been upset (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) and red in the face. He had not noticed whether his clothes had been torn.\n(ii)  Constable A.P in his statement of 29 August 2011 stated that he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had on his face or whether his clothes had been torn.\n(iii)  Constable P.P., who had not made any mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that:\n\u201c... there were areas which indicated that [the applicant] had fought with someone, without however bearing any external injuries. He had dishevelled hair, his clothes were creased, but not torn, and he was red owing to tiredness, but not owing to blows.\u201d\n(iv)  Constable C.T. in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that the applicant had had an abrasion on part of left frontal area and on the left shoulder blade. He could not remember if any of the applicant\u2019s clothing had been torn.\n(v)  Constable M.N., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that he had noticed that the applicant had had various injuries (\u03c7\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) but he could not remember whether they had been on the face or the body.\n(vi)  Constable I.K., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 1 September 2011 stated that the applicant had been in a wheelchair at one point because he had claimed he had not been able to walk and that he had, with the assistance of the other officer guarding him, helped him onto a bed. He had noted that the applicant had had some small scratches on his face and one of the hands.\n(vii)  Constable F.O. in his statement of 5 September 2011 stated that owing to the passage of time he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had nor where the tracksuit had been torn.\n(viii)  The interpreter S.K. in her statement of 12 September 2011 stated that she had arrived before 1 p.m. and had translated from 1 p.m.-1.30 p.m. and that the applicant had had a bruise on his face near his eye and his trousers had been torn. In her presence no officer had hit or threatened him.\n(ix)  Inspector I.S. in his statement of 13 September 2011 stated that:\n\u201c[I]t was like when someone\u2019s face is rubbed against the ground. I think that he had something similar on his hands.\u201d\n(x)  Special Constable P.K. in his statement of 15 September 2017, when asked about whether he had noticed injuries stated that the time of the events, stated that he had been concentrating on helping handcuff the applicant and had not noticed.\n(xi)  Constable M.P. in his statement of 18 September 2011 stated that he could not remember the applicant\u2019s teeth or what type of scratches the applicant had had on his face.\n(xii)  Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that:\n\u201c[The applicant\u2019s] face was red as if he had been running and [he] was short of breath. With regard to the minor-abrasions and bruises, these were definitely not black marks but mild redness.\u201d\n(xiii)  Special Constable C.S., who had previously made no mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance, in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that:\n\u201c[The applicant] was to begin with, unkempt, messy as to his clothes, his hair was also tousled (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1) and his face was red. He did not have bruising (\u03bc\u03b1\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1) however, nor did I see scratches.\u201d 49.  In his report dated 10 October 2011 the investigator found, taking into account the evidence at hand, that the applicant\u2019s testimony had been unconvincing in many respects and contradicted solid evidence:\n- his assertions as to what he had been doing at the ATM and why he had had EUR 10,000 in his possession were very difficult to believe.\n- based on the police officers\u2019 testimony, the investigator noted that on the day of the arrest, the officers who had arrested the applicant had been in uniform and had not had batons as they had been simple traffic officers.\n- the applicant had been taken to the police station in a white saloon police car; the Limassol CPS did not have brown jeeps.\n- the applicant had stated that they had taken everything from him in the car yet according to the evidence given by Constable P.P. everything had been taken from the applicant at the station.\n- the applicant had described a savage beating but had stated that during an interval he had spoken to his lawyer, C.H.. The investigator considered it odd that the officers, knowing that the applicant had spoken to his lawyer, would have continued to beat him after the call as he had alleged. C.H. had refused to give a statement.\n- all of the police officers denied having ill-treated the applicant, and the interpreter, an independent witness, had stated that during her presence the applicant had not been ill-treated.\n- the applicant had alleged that the ill-treatment had continued until 3 p.m., but in his prisoner record it had been recorded that he had been taken to a cell in the detention facilities of the station at approximately 1.45 p.m.\n- the applicant had claimed that the doctor at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers but this had been refuted by Dr A.K. and was in contradiction with the hospital records of Dr C.T. 50.  The investigator considered it unlikely that officers of the CPS would have interrogated a suspect for offences under the authority of the another unit, the ECID, and that they would have ill-treated the applicant in the car given the close distance between the scene of arrest and the police station, which was only about 1 to 1.5 km. Furthermore, the description of certain people given by the applicant did not correspond to the officers working for the CPS. On this basis the investigator concluded there had not been police officers from the CPS in the interview room. 51.  The investigator also noted that the allegation that the applicant had been beaten and threatened by one of the two officers escorting him to the hospital was surreal as those officers had not been aware of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint. 52.  The investigator pointed out that Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force against the applicant: following the applicant\u2019s violent reaction he had pushed the applicant with his hand somewhere between his chest and neck and had also used some wrestling holds (\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2) in order to turn him round and handcuff him. Furthermore, when the applicant had tried to flee he had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. This version of events could justify the injuries on the applicant\u2019s face and his right knee but the investigator stated the he could not accept it easily. He stated that he was puzzled by the fact that Constable P.P., who had seen the applicant just before he had been led to the offices of the ECID, had noticed no exterior wounds other than the fact that the applicant was red. This was in line with G.S.\u2019s statement that he had not hit the applicant. 53.  Bearing in mind the above, the investigator concluded that G.S. had not used excessive force to arrest the applicant and that neither criminal nor disciplinary proceedings against him were merited. 54.  The investigator pointed out that this did not mean that he accepted the facts as described by all the officers as, on the basis of their version of the events, one would expect that the applicant would have had fewer injuries. At the same time, he did not accept the applicant\u2019s version of the facts as on the basis of his version, it would have been expected that he would have had more injuries. 55.  The report concluded that there was no concrete evidence justifying criminal or disciplinary charges against any of the officers. The investigator noted that although he had been troubled by the case, the applicant had not helped him in his task, as his account had been full of inconsistencies and improbabilities (\u03b1\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2). 56.  The investigator transmitted his report and findings to the president of the IAIACAP. The latter prepared a report dated 16 November 2011 adopting the investigator\u2019s findings. He noted, however, that he did not accept the evidence that had been given stating that the applicant did not bear exterior injuries or abrasions, as this was contrary to the findings of the doctors; nor did he accept that the applicant was merely red due to tiredness but not due to blows. Nonetheless, he observed that on the basis of these injuries it could not be concluded that the force used had been disproportionate under the circumstances. He therefore could not suggest that criminal or disciplinary action be taken against the four officers in question. He also considered that even if an identity parade had been held, he doubted that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the investigation, in view of the applicant\u2019s conduct. The struggle between officer G.S and the applicant had been expected (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7) in order for the applicant to avoid arrest at the moment he had been appropriating a large sum of money. 57.  The president of the IAIACAP concluded that despite the fact that the quality of the evidence at hand had not been satisfactory, the commission of neither disciplinary nor criminal offences had been established. 58.  Both reports and the file of the case were submitted to the Attorney General for a decision. 59.  On 13 February 2012 the Attorney General concluded that although a certain degree of force had been used against the applicant, this had been necessary under the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing arrest. He concluded on this basis that the prosecution of any member of the police was not warranted and instructed that the file be closed. 60.  In his decision he stated that it appeared from the evidence that Special Constable G.S. had asked the applicant, who at the time had been at the ATM machine, for his particulars. The applicant had reacted and had hit the police officer in an attempt to flee. The applicant had explained his behaviour by stating that he had thought it had been a robbery. Special Constable G.S. had, however, been in uniform as had been the officer who had subsequently come to help. 61.  The Attorney General further observed that the applicant\u2019s explanations concerning his attempt to flee and the money found in his possession as well as his allegations as to the injuries sustained and his alleged ill-treatment going to and at the police station did not correspond to the reality. Furthermore, his allegation that the doctor who had examined him at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers had been refuted by the doctor. Most of the applicant\u2019s statement appeared to be imprecise and untrue. Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force: following the applicant\u2019s violent reaction he had used proportionate force in the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing until help arrived. As a result not only had the applicant been injured but the officer himself, who had also had to go to hospital, had been. In addition, the applicant had claimed that he had been tortured by members of the police during his transfer to the police station and before the arrival of his lawyer, C.H. The latter, however, had refused to give a statement. The applicant\u2019s allegations had been disputed by all the members of the police involved. 62.  By a letter dated 16 February 2012 the Attorney General informed the applicant of his decision. 63.  By a letter dated 7 March 2012 to the Attorney General, the applicant\u2019s lawyer expressed his disappointment concerning the conclusions of the investigation and pointed out that no explanation had been given, at least in respect of the ill-treatment the applicant had been subjected to at the police station while handcuffed and as a result of which he had ended up in hospital. He noted in this connection that the Canadian Consul had ascertained the applicant\u2019s condition whilst the independent medical report by the private practitioner corroborated the applicant\u2019s allegations. Lastly, he informed the Attorney General of his intention to lodge an application with the Court on behalf of the applicant. 64.  In the meantime, the applicant was charged with 439 counts of different offences and criminal proceedings were instituted against him before the District Court of Limassol (case no. 4474/11). The charges were subsequently reduced to three, namely theft, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (to Special Constable G.S.) and resisting lawful arrest (sections 20, 255 (1)-(3), 262, 243 and 244 (a) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). 65.  On 14 September 2012 the court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and found the applicant guilty on all counts. On 19 September 2012 it imposed sentences of imprisonment of one year, one month and two months respectively for each offence to run concurrently. The time the applicant had already been in detention counted towards the sentence. 66.  The court found that the applicant\u2019s testimony had been completely unreliable and unconvincing and that he had made a poor impression as a witness both in terms of the quality of his testimony and his credibility. He had made serious contradictions; his allegations were unsubstantiated, lacked logic and were contrary to hard evidence. It therefore dismissed his evidence as being false. The court also noted that the defence had made claims concerning certain of the prosecution witnesses which, however, it had not put to the witnesses themselves during cross-examination in order to give them the opportunity to at least comment. Similarly, although allegations had been made by the defence against some of the prosecution witnesses, it did not itself provide any evidence in this connection. 67.  With regard to the allegations of ill-treatment raised by the applicant, the court pointed out, inter alia, that the applicant had failed to submit a medical report with reference to his alleged injuries and had only produced a receipt for the medical examination by Dr S.J. He had also failed to call Dr S.J. as a witness. His allegations therefore remained completely unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the CCTV footage contradicted his allegation that he had been attacked at the ATM and that he had not seen that G.S. had been a police officer. The footage showed the applicant in front of the ATM with his body and head turned towards officer G.S., who was also looking at him. G.S. had been in police motorcycle uniform and the word \u201cpolice\u201d in capitals was on his uniform across his chest. 68.  On 27 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 197/2012) against his conviction. This was dismissed on 19 February 2013. 69.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal concerning his alleged ill-treatment, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the first\u2011instance court pointing to the complete lack of medical evidence on the part of the defence. It also noted that the Canadian Consul who had visited the applicant in hospital had not been called by the defence as a witness. 70.  Following the dismissal of his appeal, the applicant was deported from Cyprus and was put on the authorities\u2019 \u201cstop list\u201d (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 71.  On 9 April 2013 the Attorney General appointed two new investigators to reinvestigate the applicant\u2019s complaints. The Attorney General\u2019s office, upon re-examination of the file, spotted gaps in the investigation and particular omissions and inconsistencies in the reports. Furthermore, his office had been informed by the investigator A.S. that after the conclusion of the investigation, he had had an informal conversation with Inspector I.S, the head of the ECID of the Limassol CPS, who had confided in him that the applicant had been ill-treated while at the police station. 72.  The investigators singled out nine officers as suspects: Inspector I.S., Senior Constable S.M., Special Constables G.S., C.S. and P.K, and Constables M.P., A.P., F.O. and E.L. In the course of the investigation, the investigators took statements from forty-nine persons in addition to the nine abovementioned officers. This included all the individuals that had been interviewed by A.S. in the previous investigation, all the doctors that had examined by the applicant, a number of other officers and various individuals who either had personal knowledge of the facts or were suspected of having such knowledge, such as the Canadian Consul and her assistant. They were not able to get into contact with the applicant despite getting in touch with his lawyer. According to the investigators, the applicant\u2019s previous lawyer, C.H., had asked for documents and witness statements in order to give a statement but the investigators considered that this would jeopardise the investigation and the ascertainment of the truth. The investigators did not assent and as a result he did not give a statement. The investigators also obtained documentary and other evidence related to the applicant\u2019s case. These included, inter alia, photographs from the area near the ATM, CCTV footage from the bank relating to the day of the alleged ill-treatment, copies from police diaries kept at the police station and the record of the criminal proceedings before the District Court of Limassol and the Supreme Court. 73.  In her statement of 22 April 2013 to the investigators the Canadian Consul submitted that when she had arrived at the hospital on 1 March 2011 the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip and had been in the process of being moved to a bed. She had seen a big bruise on his left shoulder and other bruises on his body. He had had a broken tooth, his right leg had been bandaged and he had not been able to walk. He had had a head injury (\u03c7\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1) and bruises on the face. The applicant had informed her that he had been ill-treated by police officers during his transfer to and for four hours at the police station in order to force him confess to a crime he had not committed. She had asked to speak to a doctor. The doctor had informed her that there had been nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had been responsible only               for examining the applicant\u2019s pancreas. She would have to talk to the doctors who had examined him earlier for further information. She had also asked her assistant to take a statement from him. 74.  The Consul\u2019s assistant, in her statement of 3 June 2013 to the investigators, stated that when they had arrived at the hospital the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip. He had then been moved to a bed. He had had injuries on the face and looked injured, but she could not remember the exact injuries and she had not taken notes at the time. One of his front teeth had been half broken and he had had a bandage on his right knee. He had also been on a drip. The applicant had said he had been ill\u2011treated by the police. The doctor had told the Consul that the applicant had had no severe internal injuries, but had not been able to give her more information as he had only been responsible for examining the applicant\u2019s pancreas. She had taken a statement from the applicant on the Consul\u2019s instructions. 75.  A number of the officers interviewed refused to provide answers to the investigators, reconfirmed their previous statements or stated that they could not recall the events. Inspector I.S. denied the occurrence of a discussion between him and the investigator A.S. 76.  At the end of their investigation the investigators prepared a lengthy report on the investigation procedure and their findings 77.  In their report the investigators pinpointed a number of deficiencies in the investigation of the case from the very beginning on the part of the police and the first investigation by the IAIACAP. In particular, they noted the following. 78.  First of all, Inspector I.S., who had at the time been in charge of the ECID, ought to have given instructions that the applicant\u2019s injuries be photographed when he had arrived at the station. This had not been done. Nor had the applicant\u2019s clothes been taken as evidence. If these steps had been carried out, it would have been possible to determine what had really happened. 79.  With regard to the administrative investigation, the investigators first of all stressed that such investigations by the police themselves, following complaints that could on the face of it constitute criminal offences, were problematic and that such complaints should be from the very beginning transferred to the IAIACAP. In addition, they observed that there had been a number of omissions in the context of this investigation: the investigator M.M. had failed to ask the officers about the applicant\u2019s injuries and how they had happened; nor had he asked constable P.P., who had been the first officer to receive the applicant at the police station at 9.30 a.m., if the applicant had had any injuries on him at the time; he had merely filed (\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5) P.P.\u2019s statement; he had also not taken any investigative steps with regard to the applicant\u2019s injuries \u2013 he had filed the medical report of the pathologist Dr A.K., which referred to the applicant\u2019s injuries and had not sought to obtain a medical report by Dr S.J., who had visited the applicant in hospital. Lastly, he had not asked for a medical report from Dr V.D., who had examined special constable G.S. 80.  In so far as the first investigation by the IAIACAP was concerned the investigators noted that investigator A.S. should have tried to elucidate significant inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s allegations and statements when he had had the opportunity to do so and when the events had still been fresh. Furthermore, in view of the content of the applicant\u2019s statements, the investigators considered that an identity parade had been called for and, in fact, both the investigator A.S. and the IAIACAP had been under a legal obligation to conduct an identity parade whatever the result. The failure to do so had led to the possible loss of important evidence 81.  According to the investigators, the CCTV footage ought to have also been closely examined by investigator A.S. as it showed that the facts as described by Special Constable G.S. as to the way he had approached the applicant at the ATM had been true, thus contradicting the applicant\u2019s version of events up to that point. In the footage G.S. can be seen approaching the applicant from behind; the applicant then turned his head and saw him. G.S can be seen touching the applicant\u2019s left shoulder with his hand. The applicant almost immediately pushed him. The CCTV did not record the rest. 82.  Lastly, the investigators expressed their concern about the fact that the investigator A.S had kept the I.S.\u2019s admission to himself and had not informed the IAIACAP or the Attorney General immediately. He had therefore withheld important evidence.\n(b)  With regard to applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations 83.  The investigators first noted the difficulties they had encountered in their investigation of the case which were mainly attributed to the passage of time as well as the fact that they had been unable to interview the applicant in order to receive further clarifications. 84.  After assessing the evidence before them, they concluded that the force used during the applicant\u2019s arrest had not been excessive and had been reasonable and necessary and that it had caused certain injuries especially to the applicant\u2019s face and knee. 85.  With regard to the evidence before them, they noted inter alia, the differences between certain of the officers\u2019 statements concerning the state of the applicant and the existence or degree of his injuries. They also pointed out that the doctors who had later examined the applicant at the hospital had found greater injuries than those described by the officers. The doctors had not, however, recorded wounds on the left shoulder blade as had been recorded in the prisoner record by Constable C.T. (see paragraph 15 above and compare to paragraphs 23-25 and 27 above). Furthermore, the Canadian Consul in her statement had described injuries which had not corresponded to those in the medical report of Dr Y.I., who had seen the applicant on the same day as her. 86.  The investigators considered that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Law no. 235/1990 (see paragraph 98 below) was applicable in the case: it was presumed that the person responsible for ill\u2011treatment was the person in charge of the police station and the questioning for the investigation of the case in relation to which an arrest and/or detention was made unless an explanation was given for the cause of the injuries. Thus, according to the investigators there was sufficient evidence allowing the criminal prosecution of Inspector I.S. The same applied in respect of Constable M.P., who had been accused by the applicant of having been present during his ill-treatment but of not having done anything to stop it and of having ignored his request to be taken to hospital. 87.  The investigators did not suggest the criminal prosecution of other members of the police owing to insufficient evidence. They also noted in this connection that some of the officers in question, namely Constables A.P., E.L. and P.P. and Special Constables G.S. and P.K., had given evidence before the District Court and had not been accused of ill-treating the applicant by the defence in the context of these proceedings despite the applicant\u2019s allegations in this connection. Although they considered that disciplinary offences had been committed by various members of the police they had been appointed to carry out a criminal investigation into the case and thus could not deal with these. 88.  Lastly, they referred to the findings of the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against the applicant noting that the applicant had not substantiated his ill-treatment allegations in the proceedings and pointed to the serious inconsistencies in his evidence and the failings by the applicant\u2019s defence counsel. They considered that this fact had to be taken into account when deciding on whether the applicant should be summoned as a witness for the prosecution if it were decided to prosecute any of the officers. 89.  On 9 July 2013 the investigators\u2019 report was delivered to the Attorney-General. 90.  On 29 November 2013 the file was returned to the investigators with the request that they consult a forensic expert in order to establish how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted. The investigators were also instructed that questions be prepared and forwarded to the prosecuting authorities in Canada to obtain answers from the applicant. 91.  On 10 January 2014 the forensic experts who had been contacted by the investigators concluded that they were unable to establish on the basis of the documents and photos how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted \u2013 whether they had been inflicted by ill-treatment or from another cause such as falling to the ground. They would have been in a better position if they had been called to examine the applicant on the day he had presented with the injuries. 92.  In the meantime, on 3 January 2014, the investigators prepared a request for legal assistance by the Canadian authorities, asking that a statement be provided by the applicant. Their questions to the applicant were included in writing. An email exchange followed between the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the Attorney General\u2019s office. It transpires from this that the applicant\u2019s lawyer refused to provide the authorities with the applicant\u2019s address and telephone number, which were necessary for the purposes of the request for legal assistance. He insisted instead that the Cypriot authorities pay for the applicant\u2019s expenses to travel to Cyprus to provide a statement or that the Cypriot authorities go to Canada to see him. As such, the request for legal assistance was not submitted and the applicant was subsequently not called to Cyprus. 93.  On 11 June 2014 the Attorney General concluded that the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by the reasonable force during the applicant\u2019s arrest and/or by the applicant\u2019s fall could not be excluded. Similarly, it could not be excluded that they had been caused by ill\u2011treatment at the police station. He disagreed with the investigators\u2019 suggestion that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Law no. 235/1990 (see paragraphs 86 above and 98 below) was applicable as in the circumstances of the case it had not been established that the injuries the applicant had had after his transfer to the police station, had not been present before and/or had not been caused during his arrest. From an examination of all the evidence in the case the Attorney General ascertained that the applicant\u2019s credibility had been irreversibly damaged. He referred, in particular, to the fact that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been dismissed by the Limassol District Court in the criminal case against him. His grounds of appeal had also been rejected by the Supreme Court, including the ground challenging the first-instance court\u2019s findings on this point. In addition, the Attorney General pointed out that the applicant\u2019s version of events had been refuted by other independent and credible evidence. 94.  In so far as the investigator in the first investigation had informed the second investigator of the admission of Inspector I.S., this did not have any bearing on the Attorney General\u2019s opinion that the applicant was an unreliable witness. This, in combination with the fact that it had not been clarified which of the officers had allegedly ill-treated him, led to the conclusion that it was extremely difficult to establish the commission of any offences by any of the officers. 95.  Based on the above, the Attorney General concluded that the criminal prosecution of any individual was not justified.", "references": ["3", "5", "8", "0", "7", "9", "6", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 2007 respectively and live in \u0130zmir. 6.  On 25 October 2008, as the first applicant was driving in \u0130zmir with his wife and one year-old daughter in the back seat, he lost control of his car when the road curved into a sharp bend. As a result, the car dropped into an empty concrete canal running along the right-hand side of the road, some five to six metres below the level of the road. The first applicant\u2019s wife, Ye\u015fim \u00c7ak\u0131r, lost her life at the spot and his daughter (the second applicant) was slightly injured. 7.  The accident report \u2013 prepared on the same day by the traffic police on the basis of their findings and the statements of the first applicant \u2013 indicated that after the first applicant had lost control of the vehicle on the bend, it had first crashed into the metal barrier alongside the road, and had then fallen over the barrier into an empty canal. The report specified that the crash barrier at that particular spot had been damaged prior to the accident. It also indicated that a road sign warning of a sharp bend ahead had been in place at the time of the accident. 8.  After the accident the first applicant was taken to a police station to give a statement. He told the police that as he had been approaching the sharp bend, he had felt his car skidding to the left. When, at the same time, he had noticed another car approaching him from behind on his left, he had first applied the brakes and had then swerved his car to the right, at which point he had lost control of the car and hit the crash barrier on the right side of the road. However, since the barrier had been damaged prior to the incident, it had not stopped the car and, therefore, the car had dropped down into the empty canal. He claimed that he had lost control of the car as a result of the dangerous bend in the road. 9.  On the same date, the police also took a statement from M.S, an eyewitness. M.S. told the police that as he had been driving down the opposite side of the road, he had seen the first applicant\u2019s car suddenly swerve to the right, after which it had hit the crash barrier on its right-hand side and had dropped down the side of the road. 10.  Later the same day the \u0130zmir public prosecutor questioned the first applicant in connection with the accident. The first applicant admitted before the public prosecutor that he had lost control of the car as he had been taking the bend. He said that, for a reason unknown to him, his car had skidded. He claimed that the road had not been wet, but there had been some slippery substance on it, like sand. 11.  On 28 October 2008 the \u0130zmir public prosecutor\u2019s office filed a bill of indictment with the \u0130zmir Assize Court against the first applicant, for causing death and bodily injury by negligence. 12.  At the first hearing held before the \u0130zmir Assize Court on 15 December 2008 the first applicant stated that as he had been driving along the road at a normal speed, his car had started skidding to the left for an unknown reason, and that he had swerved the car to the right to avoid hitting the car approaching him from the opposite lane on the left. He did not ask the court to carry out an additional investigation into the incident, but stated that the fatal accident had taken place as the crash barrier alongside the road, which was supposed to have been able to stop the car, had been badly damaged. 13.  At the same hearing, the \u0130zmir Assize Court decided that although the first applicant had been charged with causing death and bodily injury by negligence and that his negligence in that regard had been established, there was no need to subject him to a criminal penalty as it could be accepted that he had been aggrieved by the accident, which had resulted in the death of his wife, to a sufficient degree within the meaning of Article 22 \u00a7 6 of the Turkish Criminal Code. That judgment, which was not appealed against by the first applicant, became final on 23 December 2008. 14.  In the meantime, on 17 November 2008 the first applicant applied to the \u0130zmir Magistrates\u2019 Court for a declaratory judgment in order to establish (i)  whether and to what extent the state of the crash barrier alongside the road had contributed to the fatal accident and whether the barrier had been repaired after the accident; and (ii)  whether there had been any structural problems with the road, such as unusual sloping. 15.  The expert report submitted to the \u0130zmir Magistrates\u2019 Court on 5 December 2008 made the following findings:\n-  the crash barrier at the bend in question had been damaged prior to the accident and the damaged parts of it had not been repaired after the accident;\n-  there was a slight dent in the road right by the damaged barrier; however, there was no structural problem with the slope of the road surface. 16.  On 2 March 2009 the first applicant applied for compensation from the General Directorate of Highways (\u201cthe General Directorate\u201d) and the Municipality of \u0130zmir (\u201cthe Municipality\u201d) in connection with the road traffic accident that had claimed his wife\u2019s life. According to him, it was evident from the traffic accident report that the crash barrier at the site of the incident had been damaged prior to the incident, which suggested that other road accidents had taken place at that same spot. He argued that the defective state of the barrier, which had been put in place to prevent cars from dropping down the side of the road in the event of impact, had greatly aggravated the outcome of the accident. Had the barrier been repaired prior to the accident, it would most probably have prevented the car, which had been travelling within the legal speed limit, from dropping down into the canal, in which case his wife would possibly not have sustained fatal injuries. He further claimed that the fact that there had been other accidents at the same spot in the past suggested a structural problem with the road. 17.  Both the General Directorate and the Municipality denied responsibility for the maintenance of the crash barrier at issue. 18.  On 20 May 2009 the applicants brought an action for compensation before the \u0130zmir Administrative Court against the Municipality alone, arguing that the latter had been responsible for Ye\u015fim \u00c7ak\u0131r\u2019s death on account of its failure to repair the crash barrier in a timely manner, as well as the possible structural problems with the road. The applicants submitted to the Administrative Court as evidence the expert report ordered by the \u0130zmir Magistrates\u2019 Court (see paragraph 15 above). 19.  The Municipality once again denied responsibility for the maintenance of the crash barrier in question, but also stated that in any event, sole responsibility for the accident lay with the first applicant, who had lost control of his car despite the road signs warning of a sharp bend ahead. 20.  In their response to the Municipality, the applicants repeated that the state of the roadside barrier showed that other accidents had happened at that exact spot on previous occasions, which in turn suggested a structural problem with the road, such as an unusual sloping towards the side. They requested an expert examination on that matter. 21.  By an interim decision dated 18 February 2010 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court requested a copy of the criminal case file, as well as detailed information from the Municipality and the General Directorate in order to be able to determine which of those authorities had been responsible for repairing the crash barrier. It appears from the information submitted by the authorities that the repair work in question fell under the responsibility of the Municipality. 22.  On 16 April 2010 the applicants once again requested an expert examination of the road in order to establish any structural problems that may have triggered the accident. They also asked the Administrative Court to find out how many accidents had happened on that road in the past. It appears that the Administrative Court did not obtain the information requested by the applicants. 23.  Relying mainly on the findings in the traffic accident report and the statements of the first applicant, on 27 May 2010 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court found that the first applicant bore sole responsibility for the accident in question, as he had lost control of his car while taking the bend, despite a sign warning of the sharp bend ahead. It therefore rejected the applicants\u2019 claims against the Municipality. 24.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. They argued that the judgment was based solely on the traffic accident report, and that a technical expert opinion was required to be able to ascertain whether the first applicant had lost control of his car as a result of an anomaly in the road. They also argued that although the roadside barrier had been damaged to the point of completely losing its protective capacities, the Administrative Court had not taken that factor into account in assessing the Municipality\u2019s responsibility for the accident. 25.  On 25 January 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the \u0130zmir Administrative Court.", "references": ["1", "7", "8", "3", "6", "4", "9", "5", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 6.  The facts of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody were established in a judgment of the Novocheboksarsk Town Court of the Chuvash Republic (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) of 22 August 2008 and upheld on 11 November 2008 by the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic. The facts are as follows. 7.  On 10 April 2007 the applicant was stopped by police officers on a street near his home and taken to district police station no. 1 of Novocheboksarsk to have his identity checked. At the police station a district police officer (\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043a\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0443\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438), Officer M. from the Novocheboksarsk town police station, who wore a police uniform, threatened the applicant by saying that a criminal case against him would be opened, grabbed him by his clothing, violently pushed him backwards against a wall several times and punched his left ear. 8.  According to a forensic medical expert\u2019s report, the applicant had a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum with a haemorrhage, which caused a short-term \u2013 lasting between six and twenty-one days \u2013 health disorder. Accordingly, this qualified as \u201cinsignificant\u201d health damage. 9.  Officer M. was convicted under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with the use of violence) and sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment and a two\u2011year ban on exercising official power. 10.  In January 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim in the amount of 312,487 Russian roubles (RUB) against the Ministry of Finance of the Chuvash Republic in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued, inter alia, that his ill\u2011treatment by the police had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d), and that, in accordance with the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 5 of 10 October 2003, the domestic courts were to apply the Convention in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe Court\u201d). He also argued that, in calculating the amount of compensation due in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for a violation of the Convention, the domestic courts therefore had to take into account the sums awarded by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention in similar cases. He stated that his claim had been calculated based on the sum awarded by the Court in the case of Ribitsch, in which a violation of Article 3 of the Convention had been found on account of inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336). 11.  On 6 April 2009 the Town Court allowed the applicant\u2019s civil claim in part. It noted that, under Article 61 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment in a criminal case which had become enforceable was binding on a court examining the civil-law consequences of the acts of a person against whom the judgment had been delivered, in so far as it established whether those acts had taken place and whether they had been committed by that person. Article 53 of the Constitution and Articles 151 and 1069 of the Civil Code provided for State liability for harm caused to individuals by State agents. Relying on Articles 1099-1101 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and section 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 10 of 20 December 1994, the Town Court held that RUB 20,000 would be just and reasonable satisfaction for the applicant\u2019s mental suffering as a result of his ill-treatment by the police officer, treatment which had undermined his honour and dignity and caused him insignificant health damage. 12.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, fully endorsing the Town Court\u2019s calculation of the amount of compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. It disagreed with the applicant that, in determining the amount of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage, the domestic courts had to be guided by the amounts of such compensation awarded by the Court in similar cases, stating as follows:\n\u201cIndeed, in accordance with Article 15 \u00a7 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and international agreements of the Russian Federation are an integral part of [the Russian Federation\u2019s] legal system. However, this does not mean that the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage determined by the European Court of Human Rights in a specific case has a binding effect on national courts examining other cases where a violation of similar norms and principles can be found. The determination of the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in specific cases is the prerogative of national courts examining such cases.\u201d", "references": ["2", "3", "9", "5", "4", "0", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant is a Roman Catholic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo. 5.  By decision of 9 May 2003, which became final and binding on 4 September 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Chamber\u201d) found that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had discriminated against the applicant in its enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. In order to remedy the situation it ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the relocation of public schools housed in the Archdiocese High School building in Travnik, and to reinstate the applicant in the premises within one year. The Chamber rejected a request by the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6.  By an agreement of 21 May 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook to reinstate the applicant in the impugned premises by 1 July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the Travnik Municipal Council adopted the implementing decisions, and also one of the public schools was moved from the premises. 7.  On 23 June 2010 the Travnik Municipal Council issued a writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o izvr\u0161enju). On 5 October 2011 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 17 October 2011 the Travnik Municipal Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 16 May 2012 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 3 July 2012 the Travnik Municipal Court held that the decisions of the Chamber were not subject to enforcement proceedings. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (28 August 2017), the Travnik Cantonal Court had not yet ruled on the matter. 8.  On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fully enforced the decision of 9 May 2003. 9.  On 17 February 2017 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the public school remaining in its premises, requesting its relocation, as well as damages for the use of the premises for the period between 1 February 2014 and 1 June 2017. 10.  On 14 July 2017 the Municipal Court in Travnik rendered a judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour, rewarding in full its claims finally specified in the proceedings, namely 270,360 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for pecuniary damages and 6,713 BAM for costs and expenses. The Municipal Court also ordered the respondent to vacate the applicant\u2019s premises within 30 days from receiving the judgment. On 20 December 2017 the Cantonal Court in Novi Travnik upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (20 February 2018), the Central Bosnia Canton submitted a revision petition to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the final judgment in these proceedings. It also appears that the public school has still not been relocated.", "references": ["8", "6", "7", "2", "1", "4", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5.  The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Bra\u0219ov and Vi\u0219ina which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s offices from several cities opened criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators, including the applicants\u2019 injury or their close relatives\u2019 death during these events. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). In a number of cases the prosecutor decided between 1991 and 1996 not to open an investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. These cases were further examined in the main criminal investigation file irrespective of a formal decision ordering re-opening, applicants being questioned by the prosecutor and raising civil claims, according to the circumstances of each case. 7.  The most important procedural steps were described in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41), and also in Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania (nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, \u00a7\u00a7 6-15, 12 April 2016). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are shown below. 8.  On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty, and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the occurrences could not be classified as offences and some were res judicatae (see Anamaria-Loredana Or\u0103\u0219anu and Others v. Romania [Committee], no. 43629/13, \u00a7 11, 7 November 2017). 9. The decision of 14 October 2015 was annulled by a Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation in file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 10.  On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor\u2019s office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 11.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (submitted by the parties on 13 April 2017 and 19 May 2017), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.", "references": ["7", "8", "3", "4", "6", "1", "9", "5", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  On 23 January 1998 he was arrested on suspicion of manslaughter. 7.  On 24 October 2000 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  Subsequently, the applicant was further convicted, by virtue of the judgment of the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court of 24 December 2004, of refusal to comply with an order of a prison officer at the prison where he was serving his murder sentence. His initial term of imprisonment was consequently extended by one year. 9.  On 6 January 2006 the applicant was placed in Tbilisi prison no. 7(\u201cprison no. 7\u201d) to serve the sentences referred to in paragraphs 7-8 above. 10.  On 8 August 2006, at approximately 7.30 p.m., prison officers entered the applicant\u2019s cell (no. 2) to conduct a surprise search. All the inmates, including the applicant, were ordered to vacate the cell and wait in the adjacent corridor for the search to finish. 11.  The search was filmed by a cameraman from the Prison Service (\u201cthe video recording\u201d). Upon completion of the search, a prison officer drew up a written report, according to which a penknife had been discovered \u201cunder the mattress on a bed in the cell\u201d; the knife was seized as evidence. It later became apparent that the bed in question belonged to the applicant. The applicant was never presented with the written record on the discovery of the knife and thus did not sign the document. 12.  On 11 August 2006 the applicant was charged with possessing an item prohibited under the prison regulations (the offence proscribed by Article 378 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code), and on 4 September 2006 the prosecutor sent the case to the Tbilisi City Court for trial. 13.  The trial started on 12 February 2007. The prison officers who had conducted the search on 8 August 2006 were summonsed by the trial court as witnesses for the prosecution. 14.  On the same day, 12 February 2007, the applicant applied to have the Tbilisi City Court examine the seven inmates who had been sharing cell no. 2 with him at the material time. He explained that the cellmates could describe the exact circumstances in which the search of the cell had been conducted. That information was essential for the purposes of assessing whether or not the search had been conducted in a manner involving an abuse of his rights. He brought the court\u2019s attention to the fact that the charge against him was based only on the statements of the prison officers who had conducted the search in question, and who had already been summonsed as witnesses for the prosecution, and that the cellmates had never been interviewed at the pre-trial stage. The applicant referred in that regard to the principle of the equality of arms and his right to have witnesses on his behalf give testimony under the same conditions as those against him, within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. He also cited Article 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pursuant to which the trial court was obliged to take all necessary procedural measures aimed at the establishment of the relevant circumstances of the case in a comprehensive and objective manner. 15.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s application, the prosecutor argued that examining the cellmates would not be justified, given that all of them were serving criminal sentences. However, the prosecutor reaffirmed the importance of examining the prison officers who had conducted the search of the cell on 8 August 2006. 16.  Having heard the parties\u2019 pleadings, the Tbilisi City Court decided by its ruling of 12 February 2007 to refuse the applicant\u2019s application for the cellmates to be examined as unsubstantiated. The court stated that the accused had not sufficiently demonstrated the necessity for summonsing those witnesses who, it should be noted, were not trustworthy people as they had criminal convictions. 17.  As is apparent from the transcript of the trial, when questioned in the period between 12 and 21 February 2007 by the trial court as witnesses for the prosecution, the prison officers gave statements concerning the exact circumstances in which the knife had been discovered that were somewhat different. In particular, one of the officers submitted that the knife had been found \u201cin the bed, between the mattress and the blanket, closer to the footboard\u201d while another stated that it had been hidden \u201cin [the applicant\u2019s] bed, between the mattress and the sheet, closer to the headboard, near the pillow\u201d; yet another officer stated that \u201cthe knife fell onto the floor the moment we took the mattress off the bed\u201d. That inconsistency was seized upon by the applicant before the trial court. The prison officers also submitted that, in so far as the door of the cell had been left open during the search, the cellmates could have observed the process from the adjacent corridor (see paragraph 10 above). 18.  The video recording was shown during the trial on 23 February 2007. The applicant objected that the recording did not necessarily establish that the knife had fallen from his mattress (the recording is described in more detail in paragraphs 25-26 below). As is apparent from the transcript of the trial, the public prosecutor conceded that the video recording of the search did not establish with certainty where exactly the knife had been found. However, the prosecutor argued again that the prison officers\u2019 statements before the trial court confirmed that the knife had been discovered in the applicant\u2019s possession. 19.  The applicant further complained during his last pleading before the trial court on 23 February 2007 of the inability to have the witnesses on his behalf, the seven cellmates, examined under the same conditions as those for the prosecution. Notably, he argued that, even assuming that the knife had indeed been found in his bed by the prison officers, that fact did not necessarily mean that he had owned it; the prohibited item could have been discreetly planted in his bed by a cellmate or cellmates the moment the prison officers entered the cell with the intention of conducting a search. Therefore, in order for the trial court to obtain the fullest possible picture of the situation, it was essential to examine all of his cellmates. He also reiterated that his cellmates might have been a source of information about any possible abuses committed by the prison officers during the search. 20.  By a judgment of 1 March 2007 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of possessing a prohibited item in prison (the offence proscribed by Article 378 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to three years in prison. The court confirmed that the prison officers\u2019 statements, the video recording and the written record of the search of the cell and the seizure of the knife constituted the incriminating evidence. 21.  On 30 March 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 1 March 2007, reiterating all the arguments that he had made during the trial. In particular, in his complaint about the lower court\u2019s refusal to examine his cellmates, he asked the Tbilisi Court of Appeal to do so. Reiterating his previous arguments as to why he considered the cellmates to be important witnesses (see paragraph 19 above), he argued that, without examining them, it would not be possible for the appellate court to establish objectively the real circumstances surrounding the search of 8 August 2006. The applicant also requested that the video recording be reviewed by the appellate court as it did not necessarily establish that the knife had been found in his bed. 22.  The public prosecutor\u2019s office also appealed against the sentence imposed by the judgment of 1 March 2007, requesting that, given the applicant\u2019s previous criminal record, a more severe punishment be imposed. 23.  By a judgment of 3 October 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld that of the public prosecutor. As regards the applicant\u2019s procedural application for summonsing his cellmates as witnesses, the appellate court rejected it as unsubstantiated. It further confirmed that the criminal case file contained sufficient incriminating evidence against him. The court, informed by the consideration of the applicant\u2019s previous criminal record, decided to increase the sentence from three to four years. 24.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating all his above-mentioned complaints and arguments, was rejected as inadmissible by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 11 February 2008. The cassation court dispensed with an oral hearing and delivered its final decision on the basis of the written procedure only. 25. The recording showed how several plain-clothes individuals, identifiable as prison officers by their manner, conducted a search of a prison cell. 26.  In one of the scenes, the officers took the mattress, whose cover seemed to be intact, from the metal bed frame in the cell. Holding it approximately 1 metre above the floor, the officers started examining the mattress with their hands and a metal detector. Suddenly, there was a sound of metal hitting the floor, and an officer picked up an object, which resembled a small penknife. It was not clear from the recording whether or not that object had fallen from the mattress. 27.  According to the medical documents available in the case file, on 7 November 2007 the applicant complained for the first time to the prison administration of a high fever and a dry cough. On 10 November he was transferred to the prison hospital. 28.  Between 10 and 13 November 2007 the applicant was subjected to a number of laboratory tests, including a full biochemical analysis of his blood samples, and consultations with various medical specialists. The resulting opinion, dated 13 November 2007, diagnosed the applicant with pulmonary tuberculosis (TB), with the upper part of his left lung already seriously affected by the disease (in an advanced stage of disaggregation). The applicant was occasionally coughing up blood. The opinion further diagnosed the applicant with viral hepatitis C (HCV), with the disease in its early stage at that time. 29.  Having regard to the medical opinion of 13 November 2007, a panel of doctors of the prison hospital elaborated a treatment plan for the applicant\u2019s TB and HCV. Notably, given the stages of the two diseases at that time and the known side-effects of the anti-TB and anti-HCV drugs, the doctors recommended that the applicant firstly be provided with anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course \u2013 the treatment strategy for detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation). He was prescribed daily doses of conventional antibiotics such as isoniazid (300 mg), ethambutol (1,100 mg), rifampicin, pyrazinamide (1,600 mg) and streptomycin (1,000 mg). Only upon completion of the anti-TB treatment, could the applicant start receiving, in the doctors\u2019 view, antiviral drugs for his HCV, such as interferon alpha-2b and ribavirin; the exact dosage of the intake of the latter drugs were to be determined in due course. 30.  According to his medical file, the applicant started receiving the anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme from 13 November 2007. During the intensive period of the treatment, which lasted three months, the applicant was kept in the prison hospital under the close supervision of medical personnel with the appropriate training. Upon completion of the intensive phase of the treatment, the applicant was transferred on 12 February 2008 back to prison no. 7, where he continued his course of antibiotics under the supervision of a doctor of that prison for an additional five months. 31.  Throughout his treatment, both at the prison hospital and in prison no. 7, the Prison Service arranged regular tests of the applicant\u2019s sputum culture and bacterial sensitivity to be carried out by the National Centre for Tubercular and Lung Diseases. The results of those tests showed that the sputum culture was already negative and also established that the applicant\u2019s TB bacteria were still sensitive to the administered antibiotic drugs, which confirmed the suitability of the ongoing treatment. 32.  Upon completion of the DOTS programme on 13 January 2008, the applicant\u2019s sputum culture was subjected to another set of comprehensive laboratory tests, the results of which confirmed that TB bacilli were no longer present in the applicant\u2019s organism. The results of an X-ray examination of the applicant\u2019s thorax further confirmed that there were no new tubercular signs in the applicant\u2019s lungs. 33.  Subsequently, on 5 December 2008 and 11 February 2010, the applicant repeatedly underwent additional medical check-ups, which included the relevant laboratory tests and X-ray examinations, the results of which excluded any signs of a recurrence of the tuberculosis. 34.  In May 2010, in line with the medical opinion of 13 November 2007 (see paragraph 28 above), the Prison Service arranged for a full biochemical analysis of the applicant\u2019s blood for the purpose of elaboration of a specific treatment plan for his HCV. The results of the blood analysis, dated 17 May 2007, showed that the viral activity in the applicant\u2019s organism was low. 35.  Based on the above-mentioned blood test, an infectologist and a hepatologist called in by the Prison Service from civilian hospitals prescribed the applicant on 2 June 2010 a specific dosage of the relevant anti-HCV drugs. He was extensively informed by the doctors of the possible strong neurological side-effects of the prescribed drugs. Having regard to those side-effects, as well as the fact that the viral activity of the HCV was still low at that time, the applicant decided to postpone the treatment. He wrote a note to that effect, which was dated 2 June 2010. 36.  The case file does not contain any other information on the applicant\u2019s state of health as of June 2010.", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "6", "0", "4", "8", "2", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Batelov. 6.  In 1965 he had a sexual relationship with a woman who gave birth to a daughter, Z., on 2 March 1966. 7.  As the applicant denied that he was the father, Z.\u2019s legal guardian brought proceedings on her behalf in the Jihlava District Court (okresn\u00ed soud) for a declaration of paternity. 8.  After giving birth to Z., but before initiating the aforementioned proceedings, the mother married another man. 9.  On 23 April 1970 the District Court found that the applicant was Z.\u2019s father and ordered him to contribute to her maintenance. 10.  The court reached its finding after hearing evidence from several witnesses. It also had regard to documentary evidence and took into consideration the results of a blood test known as a \u201cbio-hereditary test\u201d (d\u011bdicko-biologick\u00e1 zkou\u0161ka). In addition, it established that the applicant had had intercourse with the mother sometime between 300 and 180 days before Z.\u2019s birth. In such cases, a presumption of paternity arose under Article 54 of the Family Code, unless there were clear grounds to rebut the presumption. Another man had also had intercourse with the mother at the crucial time, however, the blood test established that he was not the father. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Brno Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) and requested another expert opinion. The Regional Court denied the request because the facts had been proved to a sufficient degree. It eventually upheld the judgment of the District Court on 2 June 1970, which became final on 10 June 1970. 12.  In 2011 the applicant requested that the Prosecutor General (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed st\u00e1tn\u00ed z\u00e1stupce) challenge his paternity in court. By a letter of 21 June 2011 he was informed that the requirements of Article 62 of the Family Code to initiate such proceedings had not been met. Z., by that time an adult, did not want to challenge paternity, it was not in her interests and the applicant had not produced any expert evidence credibly disproving it. 13.  On 29 February 2012 the applicant and Z. underwent a DNA examination. The resulting report of 19 April 2012 unequivocally confirmed that the applicant was not Z.\u2019s father. 14.  On 9 May 2012 the applicant submitted a new request to the Prosecutor General to challenge his paternity in court. 15.  On 12 September 2012 the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that the determination of his paternity had been decided by the Jihlava District Court under Article 54 of the Family Code and that therefore the prosecution service could not initiate proceedings under Article 62 and 62a of the Family Code. The Prosecutor General only had that specific competence as regards statutory presumptions of paternity under Articles 51 \u00a7 1 and 52 of the Family Code. When paternity had been established by a judicial declaration under Article 54 of that Code and the judgment had come into legal force, as in the applicant\u2019s case, the law did not provide for any possibility to challenge it. 16.  Relying on his rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) against the Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 12 September 2012. He maintained that he had proved that he was not Z.\u2019s biological father and requested that the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) order the Prosecutor General to initiate proceedings and challenge his paternity. He also argued that Articles 61 \u00a7 1 and 62 \u00a7 1 of the Family Code were unconstitutional. 17.  On 13 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. It noted that his paternity had been established by a judicial decision which had come into legal force and stated, inter alia, that the competence of the Prosecutor General could only apply if all the legal requirements had been fulfilled, which was not, however, the applicant\u2019s case.", "references": ["7", "8", "3", "0", "1", "9", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 years of birth and home addresses are listed in the Appendix. 5.  The applicants are civil society activists. They are board members of the civic movement NIDA, a non-governmental organisation established by a group of young people in February 2011. According to its manifesto, NIDA wants liberty, justice, truth and change in Azerbaijan and it rejects violence and uses only non-violent methods of struggle. NIDA is governed by a board of members composed of seven people. The first, second and fourth applicants are also co-founders. 6.  In January and March 2013 a number of peaceful demonstrations were held in Baku in protest against the death of soldiers in the Azerbaijani army in non-combat situations. The demonstrations were organised through social media and the applicants and other members of NIDA actively participated in organising and conducting them. One of the demonstrations was scheduled for 10 March 2013 in the city centre. 7.  On 7 March 2013 three members of NIDA (S.N., B.G. and M.A.) were arrested by agents of the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d). Domestic proceedings concerning the arrest and pre-trial detention of S.N. and M.A. are the subject of other applications pending before the Court (see applications nos. 70106/13 and 65583/13). 8.  On 8 March 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the MNS made a joint public statement to the press, stating that \u201cillegal attempts to undermine the social-political stability established in the country have recently been made by some radical destructive forces\u201d (son d\u00f6vrl\u0259r radikal y\u00f6n\u00fcml\u00fc b\u0259zi destruktiv q\u00fcvv\u0259l\u0259r t\u0259r\u0259find\u0259n \u00f6lk\u0259d\u0259 b\u0259rq\u0259rar olmu\u015f ictimai-siyasi sabitliyin pozulmas\u0131na y\u00f6n\u0259lmi\u015f qanunazidd c\u0259hdl\u0259r g\u00f6st\u0259rilir). The statement was also public confirmation that S.N., B.G. and M.A. had been arrested for planning to incite violence and civil unrest during the unlawful demonstration scheduled for 10 March 2013. It also said that criminal proceedings had been instituted against S.N., B.G. and M.A. as narcotic substances had been found in their flats. It further stated that nineteen Molotov cocktails had been found in B.G.\u2019s flat, three Molotov cocktails had been found in S.N.\u2019s flat and twenty-eight leaflets worded \u201cDemocracy urgently needed (t\u0259cili demokratiya t\u0259l\u0259b olunur), tel: + 994, address: Azerbaijan\u201d had been found in M.A.\u2019s flat. In that connection, the statement said that \u201cit was established during the preliminary investigation that since mid-2012 all three individuals, being addicted to narcotic substances and becoming members of NIDA through the Internet, had actively participated in a number of illegal activities of the organisation and prepared a flammable liquid known as Molotov cocktails, found in their flats\u201d (\u0130lkin istintaqla m\u00fc\u0259yy\u0259n edilmi\u015fdir ki, h\u0259r \u00fc\u00e7 \u015f\u0259xs 2012-ci ilin ortalar\u0131ndan etibar\u0259n internet vasit\u0259sil\u0259 \u201cNida\u201d v\u0259t\u0259nda\u015f h\u0259r\u0259kat\u0131n\u0131n \u00fczvl\u0259ri v\u0259 narkotika alud\u0259\u00e7isi olmaqla, t\u0259\u015fkilat\u0131n bir s\u0131ra qanunsuz t\u0259dbirl\u0259rind\u0259 f\u0259al i\u015ftirak etmi\u015f v\u0259 ya\u015fad\u0131qlar\u0131 m\u0259nzill\u0259rd\u0259n a\u015fkar edilmi\u015f \u201cMolotov kokteyli\u201d adlanan tez al\u0131\u015fan maye onlar t\u0259r\u0259find\u0259n haz\u0131rlanm\u0131\u015fd\u0131r). 9.  On the same day NIDA made a public statement, saying that the arrest of S.N., B.G. and M.A. had been politically motivated and had aimed to silence the protesters by creating a feeling of fear among them before the demonstration of 10 March 2013. 10.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on the basis of the investigator\u2019s decision of 8 March 2013 twenty-two Molotov cocktails found in the flats of S.N. and B.G. were submitted for an expert examination, which began on 12 March 2013. Expert report no. 4503/04, dated 10 April 2013 and signed by two experts, concluded that twenty of the Molotov cocktails \u201cwere only flammable (incendiary) tools which could not be considered explosive devices\u201d. The report further stated that the two remaining Molotov cocktails could be considered explosive devices because there had been a syringe with gunpowder attached to the bottles. 11.  On 14 March 2013 the first applicant, on 30 March 2013 the third and fourth applicants and on 1 April 2013 the second applicant were arrested and taken to the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 12.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on the respective dates of their arrest the applicants were informed that they had been charged with an offence under Article 228.3 (illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation and carrying of arm, its accessories, supplies, explosive substances and devices by an organised group) of the Criminal Code. The decisions charging the applicants were made on various dates but by the same investigator. They were identical in their wording except for the name of the person charged. The description of the charges consisted of a single sentence half a page long. The relevant part of the decision concerning the first applicant stated:\n\u201c... Rashad Zeynalabdin oglu Hasanov has been charged on the basis of sufficient charging evidence because in early March 2013 in Baku, in an organised group with B.G., S.N. and others with whom he had close ties, [he] unlawfully obtained twenty\u2011two glass bottles of explosive devices known as Molotov cocktails, which are prepared with flammable liquid petrol as an explosive substance by inserting a cotton rag preventing the liquid from dispersing and evaporating, as well as acting as a fuse, [and arranged storage] until 7 March 2013 by giving nineteen of them to B.G. who lives in ... and three of them to S.N. who lives in ...\nThrough these actions, Rashad Zeynalabdin oglu Hasanov committed a criminal offence under Article 228.3 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.\n...\u201d 13.  On the respective dates of their arrest the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan requested that the courts remand each applicant in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri). In each case, the prosecutor used the exact same wording as in the decisions charging the applicants. 14.  On the same dates the applicants were brought before a judge of the Nasimi District Court. Referring to the official charges brought against them and the prosecutor\u2019s requests to remand them in custody, the judges ordered their detention for a period of three months. It appears from the transcripts of the court hearings before the Nasimi District Court available in the case file that the applicants denied the charges against them, stating that their arrest was related to their social and political engagement. Although the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decisions were delivered on various dates and by different judges, their wording was almost identical. Each time, the judges justified the applicants\u2019 detention pending trial by the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that if released they might abscond or obstruct the investigation. Moreover, in respect of the first applicant, the judge also noted that the first applicant had avoided the investigation until his arrest on 14 March 2013 because he had been wanted by the police since 10 March 2013 on the basis of the investigator\u2019s decision charging him with a criminal offence under Article 228.3 of the Criminal Code. 15.  On various dates in March and April 2013 the applicants appealed against the decisions ordering their pre-trial detention. They complained that there was no evidence that they had committed a criminal offence and there had been no justification for their detention pending trial. The first applicant also submitted that he had never been informed of any decision of the investigator charging him with a criminal offence until his arrest on 14 March 2013. In that connection, he pointed out that between 10 and 14 March 2013 he had not gone into hiding and had actively participated in the political life of the country, giving an interview to a newspaper and participating in the gathering of a political movement. 16.  On various dates in March and April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals, finding that the detention orders were justified. In that connection, the appellate court held that the Nasimi District Court had correctly taken into account the seriousness of the criminal offence attributed to the applicants and the likelihood that if released they might abscond or obstruct the normal functioning of the investigation. 17.  On 26 April 2013 the first applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre\u2011trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his detention was not justified and that there was no reason for it to continue. In support of his request, he pointed out that he had a permanent address, had never been convicted, and that there was no risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigation. 18.  On 27 April 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding it unfounded. 19.  On 3 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 20.  On 29 May 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention of three months, submitting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 21.  On 30 May 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention pending trial until 7 September 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the complexity of the case, the gravity of the charges, and the likelihood that if released the first applicant might abscond or obstruct the investigation by influencing those participating in the criminal proceedings. 22.  On 3 June 2013 the first applicant appealed against that decision. He complained, in particular, that there was no evidence that he had committed a criminal offence and that the first-instance court had failed to justify the extension of his detention pending trial. 23.  On 6 June 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 30 May 2013. 24.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 25.  On 26 April 2013 the second applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre\u2011trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that there was no risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigation and that the courts had failed to take his personal situation into consideration. 26.  On 30 April 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding it unfounded. 27.  On 6 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 28.  On 20 June 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the second applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of three months. In that connection, he submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 29.  On 24 June 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by three months, until 1 October 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the complexity of the case, the gravity of the charges and the need for additional time to carry out further investigative measures. 30.  On 27 June 2013 the second applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no evidence that he had committed a criminal offence and that the Nasimi District Court had failed to justify his continued detention. 31.  On 1 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extension of the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial was justified. 32.  On 15 July 2013 the second applicant again lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre-trial detention, reiterating his previous arguments. 33.  On 17 July 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding that the grounds for his pre-trial detention had not changed. 34.  On 25 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 35.  On 17 September 2013 the prosecutor lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the second applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months. The prosecutor gave as the reason for the need to extend the detention the complexity of the case and the need for more time for the accused and his lawyer to familiarise themselves with the material in the case file. 36.  On 18 September 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by two months, until 1 December 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the complexity of the case, the gravity of the charges, the need for additional time to carry out further investigative measures and the likelihood that if released the second applicant might abscond or obstruct the investigation by influencing those participating in the criminal proceedings. 37.  On 27 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. 38.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 39.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on an unspecified date in May 2013 the third applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre-trial detention. In that regard the Court notes that it explicitly requested the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention; they failed to do so. 40.  On 17 May 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding that there was no need to use an alternative preventive measure to custody. 41.  On 23 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 42.  On 20 June 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the third applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of three months, submitting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 43.  On 22 June 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the third applicant\u2019s remand in custody by three months, until 30 September 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the gravity of the charges, the risk of his reoffending, and the likelihood that if released he might abscond or obstruct the investigation. 44.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on an unspecified date in June 2013 the third applicant appealed against that decision. The Government did not make a copy of the appeal available to the Court. 45.  On 27 June 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extension of his detention pending trial was justified. 46.  On 30 July 2013 the third applicant again lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre-trial detention. He claimed that his continued detention was not justified and that no investigative measures had been carried out since the beginning of his pre-trial detention. 47.  On 31 July 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request. 48.  On 7 August 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. 49.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 50.  On 15 April 2013 the fourth applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre\u2011trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that there was no risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigation and that the courts had failed to take his personal situation into consideration. 51.  On 17 April 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request. 52.  On 22 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 53.  On 20 June 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the fourth applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of three months, submitting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 54.  On 24 June 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the fourth applicant\u2019s remand in custody by three months, until 30 September 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the complexity of the case, the need for additional time to carry out further investigative measures and the possibility of the fourth applicant\u2019s absconding or influencing persons participating in the criminal proceedings. 55.  On 25 June 2013 the fourth applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no evidence that he had committed a criminal offence and that the first-instance court had failed to justify his continued detention. 56.  On 4 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extension of his detention pending trial was justified. 57.  On 7 August 2013 the fourth applicant again lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre-trial detention or to be released on bail. He submitted in support of his request that there was no reason justifying his continued detention and that the courts had failed to take into account his personal situation. 58.  On 13 August 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding that there was no need to use an alternative preventive measure to custody. 59.  On 22 August 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. 60.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on an unspecified date in September 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the fourth applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months. The Government did not make a copy of the request available to the Court. 61.  On 18 September 2013 the Nasimi District Court decided to extend the fourth applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of two months, until 30 November 2013. 62.  On 19 September 2013 the fourth applicant appealed against that decision, complaining that there was no justification for his continued detention. He reiterated that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that the first-instance court had failed to justify its decision. 63.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on 4 October 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 18 September 2013. The Government did not make a copy of the appellate court\u2019s decision available to the Court. 64.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 65.  It appears from the documents in the case file that in September 2013 the applicants were additionally charged with new criminal offences under Articles 28 (preparation of a crime) and 220.1 (mass disorder) of the Criminal Code. The Government did not make the investigator\u2019s decisions in this respect available to the Court. 66.  On 6 May 2014 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes found the applicants guilty on all counts and sentenced the first applicant to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment, the second applicant to eight years\u2019 imprisonment, the third applicant to seven years\u2019 imprisonment and the fourth applicant to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. 67.  On 16 December 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 68.  On 2 June 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s judgment in respect of the first and third applicants. 69.  On 15 October 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s judgment in respect of the second and fourth applicants. 70.  In the meantime, on 29 December 2014 the second and third applicants were released from serving the remainder of their sentence after being pardoned by a presidential decree. 71.  On 17 March 2016 the first and fourth applicants were also released from serving the remainder of their sentence after being pardoned by a presidential decree.", "references": ["4", "9", "0", "5", "6", "8", "7", "3", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kumanovo. 6.  The applicant had been in pre-trial detention since 21 October 2008 in connection with proceedings (\u041a\u041e\u041a \u0431\u0440. 3/09) related to a suspicion of criminal conspiracy (\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043a\u043e \u0437\u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) and abuse of office (\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0438 \u043e\u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) when, on 26 December 2009, the investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435, \u201cthe trial court\u201d) opened a new investigation in respect of him and fourteen other people. The new investigation related to allegations of criminal conspiracy, abuse of office and extortion (\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0443\u0434\u0430) related to alleged money laundering and the unlawful acquisition of property (\u041a\u041e\u041a \u0431\u0440. 17/10). 7.  At the same time the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be held in pre-trial detention for thirty days, starting from 25 December 2009. The order applied also to thirteen other suspects and was based on all three grounds specified in section 199(1) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430, Official Gazette no. 15/2005 \u2013 \u201cthe Act\u201d), namely a risk of absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. As to the risk of absconding and reoffending, the judge relied on the gravity of the charges, the potential penalty, the circumstances under which the alleged offences had been committed and the links between the suspects. She further held that there was a risk of interference with the investigation if the suspects were released as the investigation had just begun and there were a number of investigative actions pending, including the questioning of witnesses. 8.  The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that he had already been held in detention in relation to the other set of criminal proceedings and the reasons provided by the investigating judge were not relevant and sufficient to justify another detention order. 9.  On 30 December 2009 a three-judge panel of the trial court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and endorsed the investigating judge\u2019s findings. As to the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding, the panel, in addition to the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty, took into account his previous history of being in \u201cconflict with the law\u201d (\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0445\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0430\u0453\u0430\u043b \u0432\u043e \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0440 \u0441\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0442) and the fact that there were parallel criminal proceedings against him for similar criminal offences. The panel considered that the fact that the applicant had a family and three children who were still minors could not suffice as a guarantee of his presence during the proceedings. The panel took note of the detention order in the other set of proceedings, but held that the question concerned two separate and independent sets of criminal proceedings. In the light of all the circumstances, the court was of the opinion that a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention had been warranted. 10.  On 21 January 2010 a three-judge panel ordered a thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and some of the other suspects. The extension was ordered on all three grounds of the Act. The panel based its decision on the same reasons as before. It also referred to the applicant\u2019s possessions in the respondent State, and considered that, in the circumstances, there were insufficient guarantees to ensure his presence during the proceedings. 11.  Appeals by the applicant were dismissed by the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435, \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) on 8 February 2010. The Court of Appeal reiterated that the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty and the fact that the suspects had acted as a well\u2011organised group indicated a risk of flight and of reoffending if the applicant were to be released. It further held that there was a risk of interference with the investigation in view of the fact that some of the witnesses and suspects who were still at large had not yet been examined. 12.  On 22 February 2010 a three-judge panel ordered another thirty-day extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the same grounds as before. 13.  On 23 March 2010 the applicant and the other suspects were indicted before the Skopje Court of First Instance. The applicant was charged with money laundering, abuse of office and extortion. In the course of the proceedings, the prosecutor withdrew the charge of abuse of office and amended the extortion charge to one of violence (\u043d\u0430\u0441\u0438\u043b\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e). 14.  On 24 March 2010 a three-judge panel ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and other accused. The panel excluded the risk of interference with the investigation from the list of grounds for the detention since the investigation had been completed and an indictment lodged. It reiterated the arguments justifying the applicant\u2019s detention on the grounds of the risk of absconding and reoffending. 15.  On 12 April 2010 the Court of Appeal partially overturned the panel\u2019s decision in relation to its reliance on the possibility of reoffending. It held that there was no risk of reoffending given that the applicant and his co-accused had been detained. However, the Court of Appeal upheld the panel\u2019s finding regarding the risk of absconding and held that a further extension of the detention order had been justified on the basis of the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. 16.  Three-judge panels ordered further extensions of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and the other co-accused on 23 April, 19 May, 21 June, 22 July, 20 August, 20 September, 20 October, 18 November, 17 December 2010 and 17 January 2011. In each order the panel provided the following reasoning regarding the risk of absconding:\n\u201cThe material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the reasonable suspicion that the accused have committed the crimes with which they are charged. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences with which the accused have been charged, as well as the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty ... the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the accused are released. The risk of flight is further supported by the financial circumstances of the [accused] ... [the applicant] ... has been in conflict with the law ... The panel has taken into consideration the fact that the accused have families and children, and that [the applicant] has immovable property in his name, but it considers that the accused\u2019s family and material situation are insufficient guarantees of their presence at trial ...\u201d 17.  The applicant appealed against the extension orders, arguing, inter alia, that the panels had not given sufficient reasons to substantiate the risk of his absconding, given that they had only relied on the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. The panels had referred to his family situation and possessions, without providing an explanation for why they considered that those circumstances were not sufficient to guarantee his presence at trial. Lastly, the applicant sought his release and the replacement of the detention order with a more lenient measure, such as house arrest. 18.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the three\u2011judge panels had given sufficient reasons for the applicant\u2019s continued detention. In decisions dated 13 May and 16 December 2010 the Court of Appeal stated:\n\u201cThe court considers that the circumstances related to the type, gravity and the specific circumstances of the criminal offences with which the accused has been charged, the manner in which the criminal offences were committed and the potential penalty, indicate a risk of flight if the accused is released in order to avoid eventual criminal responsibility for the criminal offences in question, as the first-instance court rightfully decided, providing sufficient reasoning, which this court finds acceptable. In that connection, the allegations made by the accused in his appeal are of no relevance and cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence that the accused, if released, will not abscond.\nIn that connection, the court took into account the accused\u2019s request to replace detention with house arrest or another, more lenient, measure ... but the court has dismissed that request because in its view, at this stage of the proceedings, custody in prison is the only effective measure to exclude the risk of the accused absconding ...\u201d 19.  Meanwhile, the applicant made several unsuccessful applications for release on bail. On 14 May 2010 he applied to the Skopje Court of First Instance for the detention order to be replaced with release on bail. As a guarantee he offered immovable property owned by third persons, valued at an estimated 860,221 euros (EUR), and offered to give his passport to the court as a further guarantee. 20.  On 26 May 2010 a three-judge panel rejected the applicant\u2019s bail application. On 3 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the panel\u2019s decision. It held that the guarantees offered by the applicant were not sufficient to ensure his presence during the proceedings, given the gravity of the charges, the potential penalty and the complexity of the proceedings, which involved many defendants and a large volume of evidence. It also took note of the fact that the applicant had been convicted at first-instance in a separate set of criminal proceedings on similar charges. 21.  On 23 July 2010 the applicant again applied for release on bail because his wife had had an operation and was unable to take care of their children. As security, he offered immovable property owned by third persons (accompanied by written statements by the owners certified by a notary public), whose value was estimated at EUR 1,230,614. Furthermore, another person offered to make a court deposit of EUR 100,000. 22.  On 6 August 2010 a three-judge panel refused the applicant\u2019s request, finding that the nature and the amount of bail offered by the applicant did not offer sufficient guarantees for his presence during the proceedings. On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, relying on the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty and the complexity of the proceedings. It also took into account his previous history of being in conflict with the law and the fact that he had been convicted for similar offences by a first-instance judgment in another set of criminal proceedings. 23.  On 25 October 2010 the applicant again applied for release on bail. He offered security of immovable property owned by third persons of an estimated value of EUR 1,230,614 and a court deposit of EUR 110,000. On 10 November 2010 a three-judge panel once again refused his bail application, relying on the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. Additionally, it stated that the applicant had already been convicted in a separate set of criminal proceedings and sentenced to an effective prison sentence, although that conviction was still under appeal. The fact that the applicant had a family and possessions in the respondent State could not provide sufficient guarantees of his presence during the proceedings. Lastly, the applicant was advised that he could lodge an appeal against the decision with the Court of Appeal. 24.  The applicant appealed against the panel\u2019s decision. On 6 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld his appeal and overturned the panel\u2019s decision. The court granted bail as requested and ordered the annulment of the applicant\u2019s detention after the guarantee had been deposited. It further ordered that the applicant be put under house arrest. The Court of Appeal considered that the proposed bail was a sufficient guarantee of the applicant\u2019s presence during the proceedings, given his personal circumstances and the gravity of the charges. 25.  On 9 December 2010 the public prosecutor lodged a request for the protection of legality (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0448\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430) with the Supreme Court. On 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s request and overturned the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 6 December 2010, declaring the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that the Criminal Proceedings Act explicitly excluded the possibility of an appeal against a panel decision dismissing a request for release. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had not been allowed by law to decide on the merits of the applicant\u2019s appeal and should have rejected it as inadmissible. 26.  On 26 January 2011 the Skopje Court of First Instance convicted the applicant of the charges against him and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also decided that he should remain in custody until the judgment had become final. The conviction was upheld on appeal.", "references": ["8", "0", "6", "9", "3", "4", "7", "5", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1965 and 1964 respectively and live in Plovdiv. 6.  On 14 March 1998 a 26-year-old woman, S.D., lodged a complaint with the Plovdiv police stating that she had been abducted, held captive and raped by the two applicants the previous day. 7.  On the same day, criminal proceedings for rape were instituted against a person or persons unknown. S.D. underwent a medical examination, which revealed several bruises on her head, neck, arms and knees. The doctor stated that there were no other physical marks or biological evidence from which it could be conclusively determined that S.D. had had sexual intercourse. When questioned by the investigator, S.D. explained that the applicants had forced her to accompany them into premises in Plovdiv city centre, where they had ill-treated and raped her. 8.  On 18 March 1998 S.D. was questioned again. She withdrew her initial statement, explaining that she wanted to keep her peace, that she was not feeling well and that she had personal problems. 9.  On the same day, the investigator questioned Mr Momin as a witness. Mr Momin explained that S.D. had accompanied him and the other applicant to a caf\u00e9 in Plovdiv city centre early in the morning of 13 March 1998, but he denied having had sexual intercourse with her. He added that, as far as he knew, Mr Dimitrov had not had sexual intercourse with S.D. on that day either. Both of them had then accompanied S.D. back to her home. 10.  On 24 March 1998 Mr Dimitrov was also questioned as a witness. He stated that, on the morning of 13 March 1998, he and the other applicant had planned to go for coffee in Plovdiv city centre, that he had also decided to invite S.D., with whom he had previously had an intimate relationship, and that she had accepted the invitation. After they had entered the premises, which were being refurbished, he had had consensual sex with S.D. while Mr Momin had gone out to buy coffee nearby. Shortly afterwards, he, S.D. and Mr Momin had taken a taxi, which had dropped Mr Momin off at his workplace and S.D. at her home. 11.  On 29 January 1999 S.D. was questioned again. She stated that she had had an intimate relationship with Mr Dimitrov in the past. On 13 March 1998 she had gone with the two applicants to premises in Plovdiv city centre for a coffee, and on arriving there, they had found that the coffee machine was not working. Mr Momin had then gone out to buy three coffees. S.D. stated that while he was out, she had had consensual sex with Mr Dimitrov and that later on, after drinking the coffees brought back by Mr Momin, the three of them had taken a taxi and she had returned home. The following day, under pressure from her relatives and to take revenge on Mr Dimitrov, who had admitted to her that he was married, she had lodged a complaint with the police against him and Mr Momin. 12.  On 1 February 1999 the investigator sent the file to the district prosecutor\u2019s office, attaching his opinion to the effect that the criminal proceedings could be discontinued in the absence of a criminal offence. 13.  On 10 March 1999 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation returned the file to the investigator for further inquiries. That order was set aside on 26 April 1999 by the Plovdiv district prosecutor\u2019s office, which ordered the prosecutor in charge of the investigation, I.P., to carry out a number of additional investigative measures himself. 14.  On 12 April 2000 S.D. sent a letter to the prosecutor I.P. reiterating her wish to withdraw her initial statement and asking him to discontinue the proceedings. She also informed him that she was very ill and undergoing chemotherapy. 15.  On 12 May 2000 the prosecutor I.P. formally charged Mr Dimitrov with the rape of S.D. 16.  On 18 December 2000 the prosecutor I.P. asked the Plovdiv District Court to question S.D. under Article 210a \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the grounds that her testimony was of particular importance to the investigation. 17.  On 19 December 2000 at 9.40 a.m., in the presence of the prosecutor I.P., a judge of the Plovdiv District Court questioned S.D. The judge noted that Mr Dimitrov had been informed of this procedure in a letter from Plovdiv no. 4 police station. 18.  During questioning, S.D. altered her previous statement and reiterated her original version of the events, according to which she had been kidnapped, taken captive and raped by the two applicants. In particular, she stated that Mr Dimitrov had picked her up from her home on the morning of 13 March 1998 and had forced her into a taxi where Mr Momin was sitting inside. Both applicants appeared to have consumed alcohol. The taxi had dropped them off at a caf\u00e9 that was being refurbished in Plovdiv city centre; she had tried to escape, but Mr Dimitrov had hit her on the neck and pushed her inside, where he had forced her to undress and had hit her on the head several times. She had then suffered an episode of hypoglycaemia, from which she had recovered by taking several sachets of sugar found by the two applicants. Then she had had non-consensual sex twice with Mr Dimitrov and once with Mr Momin. Afterwards, she had been taken home in a taxi paid for by the applicants. She had lodged a complaint the following day, after confiding in her family. 19.  S.D. explained that she had withdrawn her original statement because she had been threatened by Mr Dimitrov and other people close to the two applicants. Immediately after a chemotherapy session she had received a visit from a lawyer, Ms N., who had apparently been sent by the same people. The lawyer had persuaded her to sign the letter retracting her original statement and withdrawing her complaint, and the letter had then been sent to the prosecutor in charge of the investigation (see paragraph 14 above). S.D. added that she had cancer, but was feeling well. 20.  On 20 April 2001 both applicants were charged with the abduction, false imprisonment and rape of S.D. 21.  On 3 May 2001 counsel for both applicants, Mr S., requested that his clients be confronted individually with S.D. His request was rejected on 2 July 2001 by the prosecutor I.P., on the grounds that this was a non-compulsory investigative measure which, moreover, was not necessary for the establishment of the facts of the case at hand. 22.  On 25 June 2001 S.D. died of her illness. 23.  On 11 February 2002 the district prosecutor\u2019s office drew up the indictment and committed both applicants for trial. They were accused of having abducted S.D., held her captive, issued death threats against her and raped her. 24.  The Plovdiv District Court examined the criminal case between 14 January 2004 and 21 February 2007. It decided to admit S.D.\u2019s statement of 19 December 2000 in evidence. The record of the questioning was accordingly read out in court. The court also heard evidence from the two applicants, the three police officers who had attended to S.D. when she had lodged her complaint, the victim\u2019s relatives and three other witnesses. In addition, it heard the opinion of a medical expert on the nature and origin of the injuries found on S.D.\u2019s body during her medical examination on 14 March 1998. The applicants, represented by lawyers of their choosing, challenged the evidence against them, adduced evidence in their defence and sought their acquittal. 25.  In a judgment of 21 February 2007 the Plovdiv District Court found Mr Dimitrov guilty of raping S.D. and acquitted him on the other charges. He was given a suspended sentence of three years\u2019 imprisonment. The court acquitted Mr Momin on all the charges. 26.  In the reasoning set out in its judgment, the District Court held that the only fact that could be established from the evidence gathered was that S.D. had had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Mr Dimitrov. It based that conclusion in particular on the two defendants\u2019 statements, part of S.D.\u2019s statement, the findings of the expert medical opinion and the statements of the other witnesses questioned. It rejected the rest of S.D.\u2019s evidence. In that connection, the court noted that the victim had changed her account during the investigation, that it had not had the opportunity to examine her in person, that the other witnesses had portrayed S.D. in a negative light, that her statement had been given two years after the events and that it contradicted the other statements and the findings of the medical examination performed on S.D. the day after the events in question. 27.  Mr Dimitrov and the public prosecutor\u2019s office both appealed. 28.  The Plovdiv Regional Court heard the case between 27 June and 4 July 2007. It ordered two expert medical opinions on the basis of the evidence to establish the process and causes of an episode of hypoglycaemia, and to check the accounts given by S.D. and Mr Dimitrov as to the cause of the injuries found on S.D.\u2019s body during her initial medical examination. The applicants, represented by lawyers of their choosing, challenged the evidence against them, including the admissibility and credibility of the victim\u2019s statement of 19 December 2000, and sought their acquittal. 29.  In a judgment of 4 July 2007 the Plovdiv Regional Court overturned the first-instance judgment and found both applicants guilty of having abducted S.D., held her captive, issued death threats against her and raped her. Mr Dimitrov was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment and Mr Momin to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 30.  In the reasoning set out in its forty-four-page judgment, the Regional Court established the facts of the case as follows. At the material time S.D. had been suffering from diabetes. She was separated from her husband and lived with her son at her grandmother\u2019s house. She knew Mr Dimitrov as she had previously had an intimate relationship with him. She also knew Mr Momin, who worked in a shop near her home. On the morning of 13 March 1998, after consuming alcohol the previous night, the two applicants had taken a taxi to S.D.\u2019s home. Mr Dimitrov had called S.D. and she had come out of the house. He had then grabbed her by the hand, threatened her and forced her into the taxi, where the other applicant, Mr Momin, was waiting for them. The taxi had dropped them all off in front of a bar that was being refurbished in Plovdiv city centre. Mr Dimitrov, who had the keys, had opened the door and let Mr Momin in first, before pushing S.D. inside. The two applicants had then forced S.D. to undress. Mr Dimitrov had threatened her and hit her several times. S.D. had suffered an episode of hypoglycaemia, and the applicants had made her swallow the contents of several sachets of sugar. They had carried on threatening her, holding her down and beating her, and in that way had forced her to have sex with each of them. Subsequently, they had all left the premises in a taxi, which had dropped the applicants off at a restaurant and S.D. at her home. She had confided in her relatives, who had persuaded her to alert the police. During the subsequent investigation, S.D. had been threatened by Mr Dimitrov and people close to the two applicants in an attempt to make her withdraw her statement. Under pressure, S.D. had changed her version of events during the course of the investigation. She had then become seriously ill. The pressure on S.D. had increased further: she had been persuaded by a lawyer, apparently sent by Mr Dimitrov\u2019s employer, to sign a declaration withdrawing her statement and her complaint; the declaration had then been sent to the investigating bodies. S.D. had subsequently been questioned by a judge, had retracted her original statement and had given evidence about the pressure exerted on her during the investigation. On 25 June 2001 S.D. had died. 31.  The Regional Court based its findings of fact on S.D.\u2019s statement of 19 December 2000, the statements by the three police officers who had attended to her at the police station the day after the events and had carried out the initial investigative steps, the statement by S.D.\u2019s husband and a certain V.M., part of the statements by the applicants and Mr Dimitrov\u2019s employer, the findings of the site inspection report and the photographs taken in the course of the inspection, various items of documentary evidence, the findings of the initial medical examination of the victim and the two additional medical examinations, and the two psychiatric examinations of the applicants. 32.  The Regional Court devoted six pages of its reasoning to an analysis of S.D.\u2019s statement of 19 December 2000. It accepted the statement in its entirety, finding it to be coherent, logical, precise, specific and consistent with the details emerging from the other material admitted in evidence. 33.  The Regional Court noted firstly that S.D. had had no cause to make false accusations against the applicants; it rejected as ill-founded and illogical the applicants\u2019 accounts to the effect that S.D.\u2019s statement had been influenced by her relatives, or even motivated by a desire for revenge or a feeling of jealousy. 34.  Next, the Regional Court found that the statement in question was credible in that it was consistent with those given by the police officers who had registered the victim\u2019s complaint and had observed her psychological and physical state on the day after the events. It added that the statement was also consistent with the findings of the medical examinations and expert opinions and the findings noted in the site inspection report. 35.  The Regional Court further noted that, although two years had elapsed between the events and the questioning of S.D., her statement was very detailed. It found that her alteration of her version of events in the course of the investigation had been due to the pressure exerted on her by the applicants and people close to them. 36.  The Regional Court lastly noted that both applicants and two of the defence witnesses, who had close links to them, had tried to discredit S.D. by accusing her of amoral behaviour. It rejected their evidence and found that the evidence given by S.D.\u2019s husband was credible in this respect. By describing S.D. as a caring mother and a person whose behaviour and way of life were in no way morally objectionable, the husband had, despite being separated from her, given testimony from which a positive psychological image of S.D. could be formed. 37.  Both applicants appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation. Among other things, they challenged the admissibility and credibility of S.D.\u2019s statement of 19 December 2000. 38.  In a judgment of 7 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals as to the establishment of the facts and the defendants\u2019 guilt, and upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment in respect of those issues. However, it decided to reduce the applicants\u2019 sentences to five years\u2019 imprisonment for Mr Dimitrov and four years for Mr Momin. 39.  The Supreme Court of Cassation found that the applicants\u2019 right to participate in the questioning of S.D. on 19 December 2000 had not been violated. In particular, it noted that, although Mr Dimitrov had yet to appoint a lawyer at that time, he had been informed of S.D.\u2019s questioning and had therefore had the opportunity to take part. With regard to Mr Momin, at that stage of the investigation he had yet to be charged and he had therefore not been entitled to participate in the questioning of S.D. 40.  The Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicants\u2019 arguments challenging the credibility of S.D.\u2019s statement. It found that the Regional Court had correctly accepted the statement in its entirety after testing its credibility by comparing it with the other evidence gathered. It noted that the Regional Court had examined and rejected all the arguments casting doubt on the statement. It further held that the Regional Court had established the facts on the basis of all the evidence and that, on that basis, S.D.\u2019s statement was \u201can important element, but not the only element\u201d in establishing Mr Dimitrov\u2019s guilt and \u201cthe main evidence\u201d in establishing Mr Momin\u2019s guilt.", "references": ["7", "0", "8", "4", "5", "6", "1", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is engaged in the cultivation of mussels in Castlemaine harbour in Co. Kerry, one of several sites in Ireland where this commercial activity is exercised. Its business involves fishing for mussel seed (i.e. immature mussels) within the harbour each year and transporting them for cultivation in another part of the harbour. It has conducted this activity at Castlemaine harbour since the late 1970s. 6.  In Ireland, mussel seed fishing takes place during the summer period, the exact dates being determined each year by statutory instrument. This activity is subject to obtaining the relevant leases, licences, authorisations and permits (see under \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). The competent authority in this respect is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine (hereinafter \u201cthe Minister\u201d, and \u201cthe Department\u201d for the corresponding Government Department). In order to engage in this activity, operators must be in possession of an aquaculture licence, which has a validity of ten years. A sea-fishing boat licence is required, and the boat used must be entered in the Register of Fishing Boats. Operators must also hold an authorisation to fish for mussel seed, issued annually by the Minister (see under \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). 7.  Subsequent to the facts giving rise to this application, an additional requirement was introduced pursuant to EU law. Where mussel fishing is carried out in an environmentally protected area, a \u201cNatura permit\u201d must also be obtained (see paragraph 20 below). 8.  According to the Government, a total of 41 authorisations were issued in 2008 to Irish sea-fishing boats to fish for mussel seed, four of which operated in Castlemaine harbour on behalf of six mussel aquaculture operators. 9.  In 1993, the competent authorities published a notice in the national press announcing the intention to classify twelve sites, including Castlemaine harbour, as a special protection area (SPA) within the meaning of the domestic legislation transposing Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (\u201cthe Birds Directive\u201d, OJ 1979 L 103, p. 1). The notice indicated that it was not envisaged that this would change the usage of the sites concerned. The harbour\u2019s SPA classification took effect in 1994. The applicant company continued its activities each year, obtaining the necessary licences and permits. 10.  In 2000, the domestic authorities designated Castlemaine harbour a special area of conservation (SAC) within the meaning of the domestic legislation transposing Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (\u201cthe Habitats Directive\u201d, OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7). As it was now subject to the two EU directives, it had the status of a \u201cNatura 2000\u201d site. 11.  Dating back to the late 1990s, the European Commission was of the view that Ireland and several other then EC Member States were not fulfilling their obligations under EC environmental law, and specifically in relation to the two directives referred to above (references hereafter will generally be to EU and not EC law). Between 11 November 1998 and 18 April 2002, it addressed to the Irish authorities four letters of formal notice warning that Ireland had failed to correctly transpose and apply those two directives. Following three reasoned opinions issued in October 2001 and July 2003, the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Ireland in September 2004, pursuant to Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU). It sought a declaration that Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under several provisions of the directives, namely Articles 4(1), (2) and (4), and 10 of the Birds Directive, and Article 6(2) to (4) of the Habitats Directive. One specific aspect of these proceedings concerned the authorisation of aquaculture in protected areas without the requisite prior assessment of the environmental impact of such activities. 12.  On 13 December 2007 the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter \u201cthe CJEU\u201d) delivered its judgment in Commission v. Ireland (C\u2011418/04, EU:C:2007:780), declaring that Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under the aforementioned directives in a number of respects. It held, insofar as relevant to the present case:\n\u201c236.  ... [R]egarding the aquaculture programmes, the Commission relies, essentially, on the Review of the Aquaculture Licensing System in Ireland carried out in 2000 by BirdWatch Ireland as the basis for its view that Ireland has systematically failed to carry out a proper assessment of those projects situated in SPAs or likely to have effects on SPAs, contrary to Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive. In that context, it emphasises the importance of a prior assessment for the purpose of weighing the implications of a project with the conservation objectives fixed for the SPA concerned. 237.  The Court notes that that study covered 271 authorisations for aquaculture programmes issued by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources during the period from June 1998 to December 1999 and 46 applications yet to be decided on. Moreover, 72 licences and nine pending applications concerned aquaculture programmes situated inside or near an SPA. The authorisations issued concern, in 84% of the activities authorised in SPAs, oyster and clam farms. 238.  It should also be borne in mind that, under the first sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site is to be made subject to an appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site\u2019s conservation objectives if it cannot be excluded, on the basis of objective information, that it will have a significant effect on that site, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects (Case C\u2011127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I\u20117405, paragraph 45). 239.  The study carried out by BirdWatch Ireland refers to a number of potential negative effects of shellfish farming, including the loss of feeding areas and disturbances caused by increased human activity and states that, even when an aquaculture programme is inside an SPA, very little protection is provided for bird habitats. Ireland, for its part, does not allege that no aquaculture programmes have any effects on SPAs. 240.  It follows that the authorisation procedure ought to have included an appropriate assessment of the implications of each specific project. It is clear that Ireland merely stated, without offering further explanation, that the Irish scheme for authorising mollusc farms, including the provisions on consultation, does in fact provide for detailed consideration of all aspects of an aquaculture development project before a decision is taken on authorisation. 241.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Ireland fails to ensure systematically that aquaculture programmes likely to have a significant effect on SPAs, either individually or in combination with other projects, are made subject to an appropriate prior assessment. 242.  This finding is supported by the fact that Ireland has not put forward any specific scientific studies showing that a prior, detailed ornithological study was carried out, in order to challenge the failure to fulfil obligations alleged by the Commission. 243.  Under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site concerned of the plan or project implies that, prior to its approval, all aspects of the plan or project which can, by themselves or in combination with other plans or projects, affect the site\u2019s conservation objectives must be identified in the light of the best scientific knowledge in the field. The competent national authorities are to authorise an activity on the protected site only if they have made certain that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site. That is the case where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects (see Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, paragraph 61).\u201d 13.  At or around the same time, the CJEU found that the Netherlands, France, Finland, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal had similarly violated their EU obligations. 14.  In view of the judgment, the Minister considered that it was not legally possible to permit commercial activity in the sites concerned until the necessary assessments had been completed. Accordingly, when granting authorisation for mussel seed fishing for the period 9 June to 1 July 2008, he prohibited it in 24 locations around the Irish coast, including Castlemaine harbour (Statutory Instrument No. 176 of 2008, adopted on 6 June 2008). The applicant company was informed of the situation by an official of the Department on 6 June 2008. It wrote to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) that same day to underline the threat to the livelihood of those affected. It recalled the terms of the notice published in 1993 (see paragraph 9 above), and explained that it had just purchased a new boat at a cost of 1 million euros. The applicant company received a reply from the Department dated 2 July 2008. This explained that baseline data for the area had to be gathered in order to perform the assessment required by the Habitats Directive, as interpreted by the CJEU. It indicated that Castlemaine harbour had been given priority for the exercise and that work had already begun to collect the necessary data. It added that the authorities would be seeking the agreement of the European Commission to allow aquaculture to resume on an interim basis. 15.  The following month the applicant company was issued an authorisation to fish for mussel seed in the harbour, with a starting date of 23 August 2008. The authorisation was subject to a number of conditions, including that it did not allow the holder to fish for mussel seed in an area or areas where this activity had been prohibited. On that same date, the temporary prohibition on mussel seed fishing at Castlemaine harbour, and at 21 other locations around the State, was maintained in force by Statutory Instrument No. 347 of 2008. The temporary prohibition only applied to mussel seed fishing; it did not prevent the harvesting of mussels previously fished and laid on farms for cultivation. 16.  The applicant company wrote to the Department on 28 August 2008, warning that the supply of mussel seed in the harbour was being consumed by predators and that it would hold the Department responsible for all losses incurred. It requested a satisfactory resolution within ten days, failing which it would take advice about legal action. 17.  On 3 October 2008, following successful negotiations between the Department and the Commission (see further below), the Minister issued Statutory Instrument No. 395 of 2008 removing Castlemaine harbour from the list of locations where mussel seed fishing was prohibited. The applicant company was therefore able to commence mussel seed fishing on the date the instrument came into operation, namely 5 October 2008. By that stage, however, natural predators had decimated the mussel seed. Since mussels need two years to grow to maturity, the financial consequences of the temporary prohibition on mussel seed fishing in Castlemaine harbour in 2008 were only felt in 2010. That year, the applicant had no mussels for sale, representing a loss of profit that it estimated at 289,599 euros. 18.  According to the applicant company, there was no viable replacement for local mussel seed. Previous attempts to bring in mussel seed from other sites had not proved successful due to the high mortality of the seed and to the transport costs involved. It argued that it was therefore wholly dependent on the use of local resources. The applicant company further explained that if there had been any forewarning of the restriction on mussel seed fishing in 2008, it would not have made such a major investment in a new boat purchased in May of that year. 19.  In 2009, the harbour was opened for mussel seed fishing from 30 April to 14 May, and from 15 September to 23 December. The applicant company was able to gather the usual amount of mussel seed. 20.  In August 2009, in accordance with EU law, the Minister introduced an additional requirement for fishing in SACs or SPAs, a fisheries Natura permit. 21.  In 2010, the periods authorised for mussel seed fishing in the harbour were from 29 April to 25 May, and from 30 August to 2 December. The applicant company was not able to operate during the first period, as it had not yet obtained such a fisheries Natura permit. When it eventually recommenced fishing at the end of August, the mussel seed had once again been depleted by predators, although the applicant company acquired some tonnage. It estimated its loss of profits for that year at 119,941 euros. 22.  The Government provided the following explanations of the action taken following the CJEU judgment, which the applicant company did not dispute. They indicated that even before the delivery of the CJEU\u2019s judgment they had commenced a process to determine how fisheries should be assessed in compliance with the relevant EU directives. Following that judgment, the Department immediately began the process of ensuring compliance with EU law in the fisheries sector. This process involved the domestic bodies with responsibilities for fisheries (Bord Iascaigh Mhara \u2013 BIM), marine research (Marine Institute) and nature conservation (National Parks and Wildlife Service \u2013 NPWS). Within one month of the judgment being handed down, BIM prepared a paper in January 2008 on the distribution of bi-valve (dredge) fisheries with the potential to lead to disturbance or significant disturbance of habitat, including the fishing of mussels. 23.  At a meeting in February 2008 between the NPWS and the EU Commission, the latter underlined the need to comply with the judgment by conducting the requisite assessments for aquaculture, and in so doing addressing the cumulative effects of other activities that could adversely affect Natura 2000 sites. While the Commission recognised the need for some flexibility, and the small scale of much of Irish aquaculture, it considered that the onus was on Ireland to initiate a robust, proportionate and scientific process. 24.  In April 2008, the relevant domestic bodies agreed on the need for an alternative approach to assess inshore fisheries on an interim basis, pending the collection of baseline data allowing the appropriate assessment required by EU law. To this end, a series of steps was proposed. The following month, BIM prepared a working document on fisheries in Natura 2000 sites, which included a case study of Castlemaine harbour. The study considered that the consequences of mussel seed fishing on the site were negligible. According to the applicant company, this assessment was consistent with that set out in a draft consultation document which had previously been prepared in 2000 by the Government Department with responsibility for heritage, of which the NPWS was then part. 25.  On 30 July 2008 Ireland sent to the Commission its official response to the CJEU judgment. It acknowledged that assessments were required in relation to fisheries, and that the necessary baseline data had to be collected at the sites in question. The response also indicated that the Irish authorities would seek the Commission\u2019s approval for an interim approach. 26.  In early September 2008, the Marine Institute submitted to the Department a finalised study entitled \u201cFisheries in Natura 2000\u201d. The Department was hopeful that the Commission would tolerate an interim approach to the activities in Castlemaine harbour, where the situation was time critical. The same month, the NPWS warned that in the absence of sufficient funding and staff it could not provide the necessary assurances to the Commission. It informed the Department that the assessments available to date were not adequate, and that the Commission shared this view. Additional studies were needed. The Commission\u2019s stance was that it was prepared to give its temporary agreement to fishing at Castlemaine harbour if the additional studies were submitted and if Ireland gave an undertaking to meet the terms of the judgment over a three-year period. 27.  On 2 October 2008 the NPWS sent to the Commission an interim assessment of mussel seed fishing in Castlemaine harbour, indicating that on the basis of its assessment this activity was not likely to have a significant impact on the site. The Commission agreed that, on the basis of this interim assessment, fishing could be allowed in the harbour for 2008 only, on condition that Ireland submit more detailed assessment procedures with a view to allowing fishing there in future. The Commission sought confirmation that there was an adequate basis in domestic law to ensure fishing activities remained in compliance with the directives. It requested amendments to certain aspects of the assessment, and it also requested a monitoring report. From that point it was considered legally possible to open Castlemaine harbour. The Minister signed the Statutory Instrument (No. 395 of 2009) the next day, 3 October 2008, allowing mussel seed fishing to recommence on 5 October 2008 (see paragraph 17 above). 28.  In late 2008 and early 2009 the Commission maintained its robust stance, requiring a long-term plan to achieve compliance in order for the interim approach to continue. The NPWS indicated the likelihood of a negative assessment due to a decline in several bird populations, and pointed to the need for additional surveys of the site. 29.  In January 2009 the Irish authorities assured the Commission of its commitment to a verifiable three-year plan to achieve compliance with the directives as regards fisheries and aquaculture. They indicated an allocation of 2 million euros over the period 2009-2010 for a wide-ranging exercise to collect baseline data. In March 2009, Ireland submitted its \u201croadmap to compliance\u201d with the judgment to the Commission. The latter approved an interim approach to assessment, based on best available data and the collection of limited additional data in the time available, and subject to stringent management and control arrangements. 30.  There was further engagement between the Irish authorities and the Commission during 2009 and 2010 regarding compliance with the CJEU judgment and the relevant directives. Public consultation was also required in relation to the regulatory changes that had to be made. 31.  The appropriate assessment of Castlemaine harbour was completed in April 2011 by the Marine Institute. Running to over 130 pages, it assessed the effects on the site of the different types of aquaculture carried out there and concluded that there was no reason to anticipate any environmental disturbance from mussel fishing. This was one of multiple assessments which the respondent State had to undertake in light of the CJEU judgment. 32.  Along with another local company, which was not directly involved in the cultivation of mussels but was a downstream retailer and exporter, the applicant company instituted proceedings in the High Court in February 2009 against the State. It relied on a series of grounds, notably breach of legitimate expectation, operational negligence and breach of the constitutional right to earn a livelihood. 33.  In view of the State\u2019s delay in delivering a defence to the claim, the applicant company brought a motion for judgment in default of defence, which was heard and concluded on 13 July 2009. The State delivered its defence on 6 August 2009. 34.  In October 2009 the applicant company sought discovery of documents on a voluntary basis. It then applied to the Master of the High Court, on 14 December 2009, for an order of discovery, pursuing the matter before him in April, May and July 2010. The Master gave his ruling on 7 July 2010, which the applicant company appealed against to the High Court. It was granted an order of discovery on 18 October 2010, directing the State to provide a variety of documents within eight weeks. The State swore an affidavit of discovery on 7 January 2011. It swore a supplemental affidavit of discovery the following year, on 17 October 2012. 35.  The applicant company issued an amended statement of claim on 19 August 2011, which referred to the restrictions applied in 2009 and 2010 as well. 36.  On 1 September 2011 the applicant company set the action down for trial and certified it ready for hearing. Over the following months there were some exchanges of correspondence between the applicant company\u2019s solicitor and the Chief State Solicitor in relation to the hearing of the action. On 9 May 2012 the applicant company requested a hearing date. 37.  The hearing took place over eight days in November 2012. Judgment was given on 31 May 2013. 38.  The High Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial judge accepted their evidence that it would not have been viable for the applicant company to purchase mussel seed from operators based in other locations. He first found that there had been a breach of legitimate expectation, stating:\n\u201c[T]here was a representation made to the plaintiffs in both the government notice and the newspaper notice of 1993. There was comfort given. What happened from then onwards, the annual allocation of seed collection authorisations and the constant refurbishing of the plaintiffs business gave rise to a pattern of events where the plaintiffs had good reason to rely upon the comfort given to them that there would not be a summary closure of their business without some good scientific reasons or without some consultation process before doing so.\u201d 39.  The High Court also found that there had been \u201coperational negligence\u201d due to the failure of the authorities to carry out the necessary scientific tests or monitoring that would have provided the data required by EU law. It considered that the failure to undertake these steps was a mistake of law by the Minister, which led to the denial of the applicant company\u2019s access to the harbour for a period in 2008, causing financial loss. The trial judge accepted the evidence presented by the applicant company that it would have been possible to conduct the requisite analysis within two months. Had that been done, there would not have been any disruption of the applicant company\u2019s activities. 40.  The applicant company claimed compensation for lost profits caused by the restrictions in 2008 and 2010, which it estimated at 289,599 euros and 119,941 euros respectively, making a total claim of 409,450 euros. The State challenged both the basis for the applicant company\u2019s calculations and the quantum of damages sought. The High Court decided that the applicant company\u2019s claim should be reduced by roughly one third. This resulted in an award of 275,000 euros for its losses over the two years in question. It awarded the other local company 125,000 euros. 41.  The State appealed both on the issues of liability and the quantum of damages awarded. It filed its notice of appeal with the Supreme Court on 16 July 2013. The applicant company brought a cross appeal in relation to the estimation of damages. A stay issue was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court on 4 October 2013. On 21 July 2014 the State certified that the appeal was ready for hearing. The appeal was granted priority by the Chief Justice on 31 July 2014. The hearing took place on 29-30 April 2015, and judgment was given on 22 February 2016. 42.  The Supreme Court was unanimous in overturning the High Court\u2019s ruling on legitimate expectation. Addressing this issue, Clarke J, with whom the other members of the court agreed, stated:\n\u201c10.7  ... [T]he only representation which it can be said was expressly made by the Minister ... was to the effect that \u201cit is not envisaged\u201d that there would be any restriction on traditional activities. That statement was made in April 1993, and was in the context both of developing European environmental legislation and also in the context of the process leading to the identification of areas within Ireland which would be designated for the purposes of that European legislation. It could not be said to amount to a clear commitment on the part of the Minister that there could never be any adverse consequences. What the consequences were going to be of the designation of an area for European environmental purposes was a matter of European law. 10.8  As events unfolded, it became clear that the Minister did not have the legal authority, as a matter of European law, to allow for the uninterrupted continuance of traditional activities in protected areas unless and until an appropriate assessment had been carried out. ... The Minister could give no greater assurance than that, in the then view of the Minister, it was not envisaged that there would be problems for traditional activities.\n... 10.10  Next, reliance is placed on the fact that, as found by the trial judge, the ongoing activities of [the applicant company] were carried out to the knowledge of the Minister and on the basis of annual legal measures put in place by the Minister which facilitated the so-called opening of the harbour. However ... the fact that there may have been an error in the past cannot create a legitimate expectation that that error will be continued into the future. The fact that the Minister was mistaken in his view that traditional activities, of which the Minister undoubtedly knew, could continue provided that the Minister put in place the appropriate legal measures, and was also in error about the fact that those legal measures could be put in place in conformity with European law without carrying out an appropriate assessment, cannot create a legitimate expectation to the effect that that situation would continue. 10.11  While there undoubtedly was significant expenditure, and while the incurrence of expenditure on foot of a representation may form part of the Court\u2019s assessment in determining whether it would be appropriate to allow a public authority to resile from a representation made, expenditure will not be relevant if there was no legitimate expectation in the first place. 10.12  ... As interpreted by the [CJEU], a permission for activity in a protected area can only be given when there is an appropriate assessment. An appropriate assessment requires that, on a scientific assessment, risk be excluded. The Minister was required, therefore, as a matter of European law, to be concerned not with unproven risk but rather with proven absence of risk.\u201d 43.  On the issue of operational negligence, three of the five judges upheld the State\u2019s appeal. Two members of the majority gave judgment. 44.  MacMenamin J observed that strong policy considerations arose in the case. The question of how to afford redress to individuals who had suffered the detrimental effects of wrongful actions by the executive was a legitimate concern. Yet changes in the law of negligence and reformulations of State liability must be carefully and incrementally approached with a clear view as to their long-term consequences. While there undoubtedly was a strong public interest in ensuring a proper balance between private and public rights and duties, there was a stronger public interest in ensuring that government can actually function, and that administrators were not impeded in making decisions through fear of a morass of litigation. The courts should not become a form of surrogate unelected government, second guessing prima facie lawful government actions in areas of discretion that did not raise questions of exceeding statutory powers. Reviewing the established domestic jurisprudence, he concluded that operational negligence had not been accepted in Irish law. He considered that in the present case the High Court had identified a tort with such broad headings lasting over so many years that it was questionable whether there was a justiciable controversy at all. It was impossible to say whether it was a tort committed by act or by omission. It was unclear at what point in time the Minister had acted wrongfully in relation to the plaintiffs. It might be said that, by allowing aquaculture to continue prior to 2008, the Minister had actually had regard to the applicant company\u2019s interests, even at the cost of failed adherence to EU law. He further observed:\n\u201c36.  There then arises a further unavoidable question, that is, whether, if the Minister had, in fact, acted between 2000 and 2008, the respondents would inevitably have incurred significant losses, by a similar necessary suspension of activity in Castlemaine Harbour, as occurred from 2008 onwards, in order to obtain appropriate baseline data? If the detailed surveys complained of were necessary to establish the baseline, one is only left to speculate as to how these surveys could have been carried out without exactly the same or similar cessation of activity in the harbour, albeit in earlier years.\u201d 45.  He then referred to the legislative complexity of the situation, which involved provisions of EU law, as well as primary and secondary domestic legislation, and to the complexity of the situation that the State faced in the aftermath of the infringement judgment of the CJEU. It was not just and reasonable to impose liability in the circumstances of the case. He did not consider that the Minister had owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs in 2008. The Minister had been aware of their situation, but also of the situation of other businesses in other parts of the country which had been placed in the same predicament. Nearly 150 Natura 2000 surveys had to be carried out in the period 2008-2010. It could not be said that the duty to the plaintiffs outweighed the duty to comply with EU law. Identifying the appropriate standard of care was problematic too. A further conceptual difficulty lay in the idea of imposing liability on the State for acts that were carried out by valid legal instruments for the purpose of implementing a legal duty. MacMenamin J also pointed out that the tort as found in the judgment under appeal did not derive from a Francovich breach of EU law (C-6/90 and C\u20119/90, EU:C:1991:428) but rather from the damage allegedly caused by the implementation of EU law after a breach thereof was identified by the CJEU. The fallacy in the case was to seek to isolate some private duty owed to the plaintiffs by the Minister from his overarching public duty to comply with and implement EU environmental law. 46.  Charleton J, concurring, noted that under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, the Minister had no discretion at all. He underlined three salient facts. First, many of the approximately 140 sites designated under the Habitats and Birds Directives were places of commercial activity of some sort. Following the ruling of the CJEU, emergency measures had to be taken to allow economic operators some latitude for the continuation of even limited business activity within the sites. This was done essentially by Irish public servants negotiating with the Commission. There were about forty sea-based sites, including Castlemaine harbour. Second, the State had not given a firm undertaking that the new environmental classification of Castlemaine harbour would not affect the applicant company\u2019s activities. Third, the closing and opening of the harbour was done by valid statutory instruments. He considered that this ruled out any question of liability in negligence. 47.  He then referred to the primary legislation governing fishing, the main objective of which was the conservation and rational management of the national fish reserves. This point was central to where any duty of care might lie. The starting point in the tort analysis had to be whether the Minister had owed a duty of care to the applicant company. There was a need for caution in holding that the public authorities owed a duty of care in particular circumstances, since it could greatly hinder their normal functioning. There were other means to deal with improper conduct by a public body, such as judicial review and the tort of misfeasance in public office. He reiterated that the authorities had not had any choice; the Minister had acted as prescribed by EU law. At most, it might be said that there was some choice to be made about whether to give priority to some of the affected sites over the others. Yet it was hard to argue that Castlemaine harbour was more deserving than the other locations. Concentrating resources on some sites would have left operators in other sites waiting longer. The State had instead adopted a strategy of vigorous negotiation with the Commission to attempt to salvage whatever could be recovered for the benefit of users of all of the sites concerned. 48.  The concept of operational negligence had not yet been accepted as part of domestic law. It would mean a lack of certainty in the law, and make public decision-making subsidiary to the views of experts at several removes from the pressures of government. It would mean arrogating broader functions to the courts than provided for in the Constitution. The Minister had exercised powers based on statute and each decision had been correctly expressed through a statutory instrument. Given the general conservationist aims of the primary legislation, there was no statutory duty in favour of the applicant company. There was no discretion vested in the Minister to exempt any economic actor from EU rules. There was no duty of care towards the applicant company that could found an action in negligence. Instead, the duty of care was towards the wider community, expressed as the protection of the environment. 49.  Writing for the minority, Clarke J considered that the High Court judgment, insofar as it concerned negligence, should be upheld as regards the events of 2008. Concerning the events of 2010, he noted that the applicant company had not provided evidence allowing a causal link to be established between the alleged failure on the part of the Minister and its inability to conduct its business that year. It therefore had no cause of action against the State in this respect. 50.  Applying the relevant principles to the case, Clarke J clarified that there could not have been a duty on the Minister in 2008 to refrain from closing the harbour until an appropriate assessment had been carried out, as this would have been contrary to EU law. To the extent the harbour could be opened, this was only permissible in accordance with the interim measures agreed with the Commission. The real question was therefore:\n\u201c15.4  ... In the light of developments in European law, did the Minister owe a duty of care to those who, to his knowledge (and up to then with his permission), were carrying out activities in protected areas, to ensure that he had appropriate survey(s) and other scientific evidence available to enable a decision to be made for the purposes of considering whether to permit the continuance of traditional activities and, should appropriate evidence be found to be present, to allow those activities to be authorised?\u201d 51.  He considered that on the facts of the case the necessary elements of foreseeability and proximity were present. The Minister was well aware of the activities taking place in Castlemaine harbour. He was also aware, in light of the statement published in 1993, that there was a potential issue that might arise in relation to such activities. Therefore, the Minister had been fully aware that any failure to place himself in a position to make a sustainable decision about the continuance of traditional activities in the sites concerned could have a significant effect on those involved in them. A private party in an analogous position would undoubtedly have been held to have a duty of care towards such persons. He further noted that it must have been clear to the Minister for some time prior to the CJEU judgment that there was a risk that the position taken by the Commission would be upheld over that of the State. In that eventuality, there would be an immediate problem due to the absence of the necessary scientific data for the appropriate assessment to be made, leading to at least the temporary interruption of the activities of the applicant company and others operating in protected areas. These formed a small and defined group of persons that, to a large extent, were actually known to the Minister and the Department. 52.  As to the presence of any countervailing policy factor, he reiterated that the case did not concern matters of policy, discretion or adjudication. It did not touch upon the allocation of resources or the making of statutory decisions. It was about the purported duty of the Minister to take reasonable steps to ensure that he would be in a proper position to make a decision under European law and any relevant Irish measures. He clarified that he did not necessarily disagree with the view of MacMenamin J that no specific duty of care on the Minister had arisen in the period after the CJEU judgment. At that stage, the authorities had found themselves on the back foot, with many decisions to be made about the allocation of the resources needed to conduct appropriate assessments at the sites concerned. But the actions and decisions in 2008 and later were not relevant to the duty of care as he had defined it:\n\u201c15.31  ... [T]he Minister got it wrong by failing to put in place measures to secure the appropriate scientific data to enable an appropriate assessment to be carried out long after it had become clear, by reason of the position adopted by the Commission, that there was, to put it at its mildest, a significant doubt as to whether the Minister\u2019s position was correct.\n... 15.33  ... [I]t seems to me that the duty of care which I suggest should be held to lie on the Minister does not derive from any balancing exercise at all and does not involve any aspect of the undoubted over-arching public duty which the Minister was obliged to perform. Against what can it be said that the Minister was balancing when he decided not to assemble the necessary scientific information and data (despite the Commission\u2019s reasoned opinion) prior to the decision of the ECJ? What over-arching public duty would have been in any way impaired by the collection of such data? There is no evidence to suggest that the failure to assemble the necessary data was based on any decision involving policy, discretion or adjudication.\u201d 53.  Finally, he did not agree with the majority that the applicant company\u2019s business would have been interrupted in any event if the Habitats Directive had been correctly implemented at an earlier point in time. According to Clarke J, the evidence accepted by the High Court was that the necessary data could have been collected and analysed in a relatively short period of time, avoiding any interruption of the applicant company\u2019s usual activities. There was thus a causal link between the failure to assemble the relevant data and conduct the assessment at an earlier point in time, and the interruption of the applicant company\u2019s activities in 2008. 54.  In relation to damages, Clarke J noted that there were many points of disagreement between the applicant company and the State over the manner in which the former\u2019s losses should be properly assessed. He considered that the difficulties with the evidence and the figures would have made it impossible for the Supreme Court to conduct a fair and just calculation. Had the State\u2019s appeal been rejected, the proper course would have been to remit the question of damages to the High Court for reassessment.", "references": ["0", "4", "8", "5", "7", "1", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 6.  The applicants were employees of a municipal education institution. 7.  On 13 June 2001 they brought proceedings before the Kolomna Town Court of the Moscow Region (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) against their employer and the town administration seeking recovery of unpaid wages and taxes to various social funds. 8.  On 13 July 2004 the Kolomna Town Court issued a first-instance judgment on the merits of the case. On 22 September 2004 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 9.  On 7 July 2005 the Town Court granted the applicants\u2019 claims awarding each of them a certain amount against their employer (see Appendix I). The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow Regional Court on 28 September 2005. 10.  Between 26 June 2001 and 7 July 2005 the court hearings were adjourned twenty-five times due to the respondents\u2019 or one of the respondents\u2019 failure to appear, eighteen times on the claimants\u2019 request and eleven times pursuant the requests by the defendants; four times the first\u2011instance court adjourned the case as the respondent authorities had been requested to submit additional documents. Moreover, on 11 June 2002 the proceedings were suspended pursuant to a decision by the domestic court on account of the claimants\u2019 alleged failure to appear; on 4 February 2003 that decision was quashed by the appeal court, due to the first-instance court\u2019s failure to notify the applicants of the hearing date. Thus, the period attributable to the authorities amounts to over one year. 11.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the employer institution was liquidated. On 18 October 2005 the relevant record was made into the State Register of Legal Entities. 12.  According to the Government\u2019s submissions of 19 July 2011, on 30 June 2006 the judgment of 7 July 2005 was partially enforced in respect of certain applicants, as specified in Appendix I.", "references": ["7", "1", "6", "2", "5", "0", "4", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1915 and lived in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Vilnius. The third applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Pagiriai in the Vilnius Region. The fourth applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vilnius. 7.  On various dates in 1991 the applicants or their relatives applied for restoration of their property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 8.  On 8 September 1992 the Vilnius District Court acknowledged that I.B. (the first applicant\u2019s husband and the second applicant\u2019s father) had a right to have his property rights to a plot of land in the village of Kry\u017eiokai, near Vilnius, restored. 9.  On 8 July 1993 the same court acknowledged that the fourth applicant had a right to have her property rights to a plot of land in Kry\u017eiokai restored. 10.  On 24 April 1996 the Seimas passed a law amending the administrative boundaries of certain municipal areas. Under that law, certain villages around Vilnius, including Kry\u017eiokai and Vaidotai, became part of the Vilnius city municipality. 11.  On 21 May 1998 the administrative authorities acknowledged that the third applicant had a right to have her property rights to a plot of land in Vaidotai restored. 12.  On 20 December 2002 the Government approved a plan of forests of national importance (valstybin\u0117s reik\u0161m\u0117s mi\u0161kai) covering the whole country. It included forests situated in the former villages of Kry\u017eiokai and Vaidotai. 13.  On 7 May 2003 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored I.B.\u2019s property rights (see paragraph 8 above) by giving him 5.40 hectares of land in Kry\u017eiokai. As he had died in 1992, the first applicant was issued a certificate of inheritance in respect of the plot on 27 June 2003. On 16 October 2003 she gifted it to the second applicant. 14.  On 28 July 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have I.B.\u2019s property rights to 0.25 of the 5.40 hectares given to him annulled (see paragraph 13 above). The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service (Valstybin\u0117 mi\u0161kotvarkos tarnyba), 0.25 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above), it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor noted that the forest had been included in the plan of forests of national importance adopted by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), that is before the VCA had adopted its decision to give that land to I.B. In view of the circumstances, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling I.B.\u2019s property rights to that part of the land, the first and second applicants\u2019 property rights to it also be annulled. 15.  The applicants disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. They submitted that I.B. had acquired property rights in good faith, having lawfully participated in the restitution process carried out by the authorities, and their annulment many years later would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The applicants further submitted that Kry\u017eiokai had been a rural area until 1996 (see paragraph 10 above) and the restoration of property rights had complied with the regulations concerning rural areas. They also submitted that, according to the Real Estate Register (Nekilnojamojo turto registras), their land was classified as agricultural and not forest, and the data of that Register had to be considered accurate until proven otherwise. 16.  The VCA also disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It submitted that I.B.\u2019s property rights had been restored in accordance with Government regulations adopted in 1998 and 2000 which had set out the rules of land reform in rural areas. The VCA argued that restoration of property rights was a continuous process and thus had to be carried out in accordance with the legislation in force when it began and not that which was adopted later. The VCA also submitted that the decision to restore I.B.\u2019s property rights had been taken in coordination with other authorities, including the Vilnius Forest Authority (Vilniaus mi\u0161k\u0173 ur\u0117dija), and they had not presented any objections. 17.  The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, asked the court to allow the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It argued that the VCA\u2019s decision to restore I.B.\u2019s property rights had been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions stating that urban forests could only be owned by the State, and thus had to be annulled. 18.  On 17 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. The court observed that the Constitution and other legislation established that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). It quoted at length case-law of the Constitutional Court which emphasised the importance of forests to the environment and the obligation of the State to protect them in the public interest (see paragraphs 99-102 below). 19.  The Vilnius Regional Court noted that the former village of Kry\u017eiokai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above). Therefore, in line with the Law on Forests, any forest in that area was urban forest (see paragraph 89 below). The court further noted that in 2002 the forest situated on the plot given to I.B. had been included in a Government\u2011approved list of forests of national importance. Accordingly, when the VCA had adopted the decision to give that plot to I.B. (see paragraph 13 above), the forest situated on it had already been recognised as a forest of national importance. Therefore, the restitution had not been carried out in accordance with the law. The court held that, in such circumstances, I.B.\u2019s and the applicants\u2019 property rights could not take priority over the public interest and had to be annulled. 20.  However, the court observed that, according to the Real Estate Register, the area covered by forest on the applicants\u2019 plot amounted to 0.187 hectares and not 0.25 hectares as claimed by the prosecutor, and the data of that Register had to be considered accurate until proven otherwise. It therefore annulled I.B.\u2019s property rights to 0.187 hectares of land, as well as the applicants\u2019 rights to that part of the plot. 21.  The prosecutor lodged an appeal against that decision and submitted that when determining the area covered by forest, the court should have relied on the data provided by the State Forest Management Service and not the Real Estate Register. The Ministry of Environment lodged a similar appeal. 22.  The applicants and the VCA also lodged appeals. They argued that the VCA\u2019s decision had complied with all the relevant legislation in force when it had been adopted, so it had to be considered lawful. They also submitted that the court had not addressed the argument that in the process of restoration of property rights Kry\u017eiokai had to be regarded as a rural area and not a city. The applicants also submitted that the annulment of their property rights and the requirement for them to return the land to the State would cause them serious difficulties and should therefore not be implemented (see paragraph 95 below). 23.  On 25 February 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the appeals lodged by the prosecutor and the Ministry of Environment and dismissed those lodged by the applicants and the VCA. It reiterated that the Constitution and several laws prohibited the transfer of forests of national importance from the State into private ownership on any basis whatsoever, including restoration of property rights (see paragraphs 86 and 88\u201191 below). Accordingly, it was immaterial that, as submitted by the VCA, its decision complied with certain regulations adopted during the restitution process. The Court of Appeal considered that the first-instance court had correctly found that the forest on the plot given to I.B. was urban forest and therefore a forest of national importance, and thus property rights in respect of that part had to be annulled. However, it stated that when determining the area covered by forest the information had to be taken not from the Real Estate Register but from the Register of Forests (Mi\u0161k\u0173 kadastras), which was administered by the State Forest Management Service. According to the latter, the plot given to I.B. included 0.25 hectares of forest. The Court of Appeal therefore partly amended the decision and annulled I.B.\u2019s property rights to 0.25 hectares of land, as well as the applicants\u2019 rights to that part of the plot. It dismissed as unfounded the applicants\u2019 argument that such a decision would cause them serious difficulties.\nThe Court of Appeal ordered the applicants and the VCA to pay the State\u2019s legal costs. 24.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. On 25 May 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 25.  On 1 September 2008 the prosecutor lodged a further claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have I.B.\u2019s property rights to another 1.73 hectares of the 5.40 hectares given to him annulled (see paragraph 13 above), on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants\u2019 property rights to that part of the plot annulled. The prosecutor presented similar arguments as in the previous proceedings (see paragraph 14 above). The applicants, the VCA and the Ministry of Environment also submitted essentially the same arguments as in the previous proceedings (see paragraphs 15-17 above). 26.  On 13 May 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It noted that the presence of forest on the plot of land given to I.B. had been confirmed by the data in the Register of Forests. It also noted that that forest was included in the list of forests of national importance created in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above). The court observed that even though restoration of property rights was a continuous process and included the preparation of various documents, the final decision to restore property rights had to comply with the law in force at the time of the adoption of that decision. It concluded that the VCA\u2019s decision to give the plot to I.B. (see paragraph 13 above) had been contrary to the Constitution and other legislation providing that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). Accordingly, it annulled I.B.\u2019s property rights to 1.73 hectares of the land, as well as the applicants\u2019 rights to that part of the plot. The court observed that there was no dispute that I.B. had retained the right to restoration of his property rights, and the State was thus under an obligation to restore his rights to 1.73 hectares of land. 27.  The applicants and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision. They argued that the VCA\u2019s decision had been based on various administrative and procedural acts according to which the forest on the applicants\u2019 plot had not been considered a forest of national importance, and thus had been lawful. The prosecutor and the Ministry of Environment contested the appeals. 28.  On 6 April 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals submitted by the applicants and the VCA and upheld the decision of the first-instance court in its entirety. It stated that the first-instance court had been correct in finding that the forest on the applicants\u2019 plot was a forest of national importance and could thus only belong to the State. 29.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. On 9 July 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 30.  According to the Government, on 11 May 2010 the VCA informed the applicants that there was no possibility of restitution in kind because there was no vacant land in the relevant area. According to the applicants, on 19 October 2010 they sent a letter to the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \uf02d hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d) stating that they were of advanced age and did not \u201chave the energy or state of health to look for vacant land in the Vilnius area\u201d. Copies of the VCA\u2019s and the applicants\u2019 letters have not been submitted to the Court. 31.  On 23 February 2012 the applicants received a letter from the NLS confirming that, after the courts had annulled I.B.\u2019s property rights to 1.98 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It also stated that there was no more vacant land in the former village of Kry\u017eiokai and that I.B.\u2019s property rights could be restored by: (i) assigning a plot of land or forest equal in value to the land held previously; (ii) providing securities; (iii) discharging liabilities to the State; (iv) transferring, free of charge, a new plot of land equal in value to the land held previously for the construction of an individual home in the city or rural area where the previously held land was situated; or (v) providing monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). The applicants, as I.B.\u2019s heirs, were asked to inform the authorities of their choice as to the form of restitution. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to this letter. 32.  On 24 July 2012 the applicants received another letter from the NLS which again confirmed that, after the courts had annulled I.B.\u2019s property rights to 1.98 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It stated that there was a possibility for the applicants to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). They were also informed that there remained about 0.10 hectares of vacant land in the former village of Kry\u017eiokai, so if they wished to receive a plot in that area, their request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 33.  On 21 August 2012 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS. They submitted that the annulment of their property rights to 1.98 hectares of land had caused them pecuniary damage in the amount of 331,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \uf02d approximately 95,900 euros (EUR)), according to an assessment of the value of the land carried out in May 2012. In the applicants\u2019 view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicants asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when they might expect to receive one. They also stated that they would agree to receive a plot of land in Kry\u017eiokai but would first want to know its exact location. The applicants stated that they did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 34.  On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive 1.98 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The second applicant took part in that meeting and chose three plots, measuring a total of 0.3627 hectares. She was offered more plots but refused them because there were electricity installations on them. The minutes of the meeting, approved by the NLS, stated that the next meeting of candidates would be held on 16 April 2013 and those who had not chosen their plots yet, including the second applicant, would be invited to participate. The Court was not provided with any information as to whether that meeting took place, whether the applicants were invited to attend and whether they did so. 35.  On 21 August 2014 the NLS adopted a land plan of the aforementioned areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. The applicants were included in the list and were entitled to receive four plots of land, measuring a total of 0.4035 hectares. 36.  On 7 October 2015 the first applicant died. The second applicant was issued a certificate of inheritance on 3 August 2016. 37.  On 29 January 2016 the NLS adopted a decision to restore I.B.\u2019s property rights by giving him five plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 0.7883 hectares. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 1.1917 hectares would be restored later. 38.  On 26 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. I.B. was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.1917 hectares of land. On 18 May 2016 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in those areas. The second applicant took part in that meeting and chose two plots, measuring a total of 0.18 hectares. It does not appear that she was offered any more plots in that meeting. 39.  On 31 August 2017 the NLS adopted a land plan of several areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. I.B. was included in the list and was entitled to receive two plots of land, amounting to a total of 0.18 hectares. 40.  According to the latest information provided to the Court, the first and second applicants\u2019 property rights to 1.1917 hectares of land have still not been restored. 41.  On 6 April 2004 the VCA restored the third applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her and another candidate, G.D., joint ownership of 0.52 hectares of agricultural land and 2.12 hectares of forest in Vaidotai. The third applicant\u2019s share of the jointly owned forest was one hectare. 42.  On 9 April 2009 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Vilnius City Second District Court, seeking to have the applicant\u2019s and G.D.\u2019s property rights to the 2.12 hectares of forest annulled (see paragraph 41 above). The prosecutor submitted that the forest was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above) and was thus considered a forest of national importance which could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor noted that the forest in question had been included in the plan of forests of national importance adopted by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), that is before the VCA had adopted its decision to give that forest to the applicant and G.D. Accordingly, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. 43.  The applicant disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. She submitted that the VCA\u2019s decision to give the forest to her and G.D. had been taken in line with the law in force at the material time and in coordination with the relevant authorities, including the Vilnius Forest Authority. The applicant also argued that, in line with the case-law of the Constitutional Court, forests which belonged to private individuals and were subsequently declared to be of national importance did not have to be taken into State ownership, as owners\u2019 rights could be restricted in order to protect the forest. She therefore asked the court to protect her property rights. 44.  The VCA also disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It submitted that the restoration of property rights to the land in the former village of Vaidotai had been carried out in line with the regulations applicable to rural areas. It also submitted that the decision to give the forest in question to the applicant and G.D. had been based on several administrative acts adopted in 2000, and so the decision could not be annulled as long as those acts remained in force. 45.  The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, asked the court to allow the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It argued that at the time when the VCA had adopted the decision to give the forest to the applicant and G.D., the forest had officially been urban forest (see paragraph 10 above) and had been included in the list of forests of national importance (see paragraph 12 above). Accordingly, the VCA\u2019s decision had been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below) and had to be annulled. 46.  On 4 March 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It reiterated that, in line with the Constitution and the Law on Forests, urban forests were considered forests of national importance and could only belong to the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The court also emphasised the importance of forests to the environment and the obligation of the State to protect them in the public interest. It then noted that the former village of Vaidotai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above), so any forests within that area were urban forests. The court also observed that the forest given to the applicant and G.D. had been included in the list of forests of national importance approved by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above). Accordingly, the VCA\u2019s decision to give that forest to the applicant and G.D. had been adopted after the forest had already become a forest of national importance (see paragraph 41 above). The court held that it was immaterial whether other administrative acts on which the VCA\u2019s decision had been based remained valid (see paragraph 44 above) because property rights had been restored to the applicant and G.D. by that decision and not by any other acts. The court therefore annulled the applicant\u2019s and G.D.\u2019s property rights to the 2.12 hectares of forest. 47.  The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision, raising essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above). In addition, the applicant submitted that her property rights to the forest in question had been challenged four years after it had been given to her, and thus she had lost the opportunity to have her property rights restored because there was almost no vacant land left in Vilnius or the surrounding area. 48.  On 13 August 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision in its entirety. It considered that that court had been correct in finding that the forest in question was a forest of national importance and that the VCA\u2019s decision had thus been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions prohibiting the transfer of such forests into the ownership of private individuals. In response to the applicant\u2019s argument that she had lost the opportunity to have her property rights restored (see paragraph 47 above), the Vilnius Regional Court stated that Lithuanian law provided for partial restitution, and that where it was impossible to restore property rights in natura, it could be done in other ways, including by monetary compensation (see paragraphs 92 and 97 below). Therefore, the court considered that the applicant had retained the right to have her property rights restored in one of the forms provided for by law. 49.  The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals on points of law, relying on essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 43, 44 and 47 above). In addition, the applicant submitted that she had acquired the property in good faith and that ordering her to return it to the State would cause her serious difficulties (see paragraph 95 below). She argued that she could no longer receive a plot in the same area because there was no more vacant land there and that she would not receive fair compensation either because property prices had decreased. The applicant submitted that the public interest to protect forests could be achieved in other ways, such as by imposing on her special conditions for use of the forest. 50.  On 5 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on points of law and upheld the findings of the lower courts. It observed that restoring property rights to forests in valuable areas had been prohibited since the beginning of the restitution process in Lithuania. Accordingly, individuals could not have a legitimate expectation to acquire property rights to such forests. It also stated that the VCA, as the institution in charge of restoration of property rights, was under an obligation to ensure that its decisions complied with all relevant legislation adopted throughout the entirety of the restitution process. 51.  The Supreme Court reiterated that when a transaction was annulled, the parties had to return to one another everything that they had received from that transaction (see paragraph 94 below). It stated that the lower courts had not identified any exceptional circumstances why that rule should not be applied in the present case, nor had the applicant pointed to any such circumstances. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant had retained the right to have her property rights restored in accordance with the law, so her argument that she would experience serious difficulties (see paragraph 49 above) had to be dismissed as unfounded. 52.  On 7 April 2010 the applicant sent a letter to the VCA seeking to be given a plot of land in the former village of Vaidotai. On 11 May 2010 the VCA informed the applicant that there was no vacant land in Vaidotai and asked her to choose another form of restitution (see paragraph 92 below). 53.  On 29 October 2010 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she was 78 years old and did not \u201chave the energy or the state of health to participate in the complicated restitution process for a second time\u201d. The applicant stated that she had lost her property because of the unlawful actions of the VCA, therefore the NLS, as the VCA\u2019s successor, had to compensate her for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which she had sustained. She asked the NLS to provide her with a list of plots of land equal in value in the Vilnius city area to which her property rights could be restored. 54.  On 13 December 2010 the NLS informed the applicant that, in accordance with the law, her property rights could be restored by assigning her a plot of land equal in value to the land held previously or by providing securities, but that there was no possibility of her receiving a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a city. The letter provided the address of a website on which the applicant could find information about vacant plots of land, and she was asked to submit a request to the municipal authorities indicating the area in which she wished to receive a plot equal in value. It was also stated that if she was dissatisfied with the response given, she could lodge a complaint with the director of the NLS. 55.  On 16 December 2011 the applicant sent a request to the NLS for compensation in securities. On 1 February 2012 she received a reply informing her that compensation in the form of securities was temporarily unavailable. 56.  On 6 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the town of Trakai. On 30 May 2012 in a letter to the NLS she reiterated her wish to receive a plot in Trakai and stated that she also wished to receive a plot of land in Vilnius, but did not wish to have her property rights restored by monetary compensation. 57.  On 23 July 2012 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant confirming that, after the courts had annulled her property rights to one hectare of land (see paragraph 41 above), she had retained the right to have those property rights restored. She could be given a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius or Trakai, but there were many other candidates waiting to receive plots in those areas (4,806 and 94 respectively, and the land plan for Trakai had not been prepared yet), therefore the restitution process would take a long time. She was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city or monetary compensation. She was also informed that there remained some vacant land in the former village of Vaidotai, so if she wished to receive a plot in that area, her request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared.\nIt is unclear whether the applicant replied to that letter or submitted any requests concerning the form of restoration of her property rights. 58.  On 7 October 2013 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.12 hectares of land. On 9 October 2013 she was sent an invitation to attend a meeting of candidates on 22 October 2013. She did not take part in that meeting. On 24 October 2013 she was sent an invitation to attend a meeting of candidates on 6 November 2013. She did not take part.\nThe applicant submitted to the Court that she had not been informed of those meetings. 59.  On 5 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.12 hectares of land. On 22 April 2016 the NLS held a meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in those areas. Her representative took part in the meeting but did not provide a form of authority. 60.  On 17 May 2016 the NLS held another meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in the aforementioned areas. The applicant participated in that meeting but did not choose any of the plots offered to her. The minutes of the meeting do not indicate the reasons for her refusal.\nThe applicant submitted to the Court that the plots offered to her had had electricity installations on them and had therefore been \u201cworthless\u201d. 61.  According to the latest information provided to the Court, the third applicant\u2019s property rights to one hectare of land have still not been restored. 62.  On 10 December 2003 the VCA restored the fourth applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 2.67 hectares of land in the villages of Kry\u017eiokai and Naujaneriai. On 25 April 2005 she sold 1.5 hectares of the land given to her in Kry\u017eiokai to another individual, J.S., for LTL 495,000 (approximately EUR 143,400). The sale agreement was certified by a notary. 63.  On 15 December 2008 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.15 of the 2.67 hectares given to her annulled (see paragraph 62 above). The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, the 0.15 hectares were covered by forest. Since it was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above), it was considered a forest of national importance and could thus only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant\u2019s property rights, the sale agreement between her and J.S. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 64.  The applicant disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. She submitted that there had not been any forest on the land before its nationalisation, and if a forest had grown there afterwards, that should not preclude the restoration of her property rights. She also submitted that she had not acted unlawfully, so the property could not be taken from her. The applicant argued that if authorities or officials had acted unlawfully, the State should have to buy the land from her, and that the public interest should be protected without prejudice to her rights. 65.  The VCA also disputed the claim. It argued that the applicant\u2019s property rights had been restored in accordance with the legislation in force at the material time, and that the decision had been taken in coordination with various authorities, including the Ministry of Environment and the Vilnius Forest Authority, which had not presented any objections. 66.  The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, supported the prosecutor\u2019s claim. 67.  On 29 March 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. It observed that even though the Real Estate Register did not contain information about the presence of forest on the applicant\u2019s land, it had been proven by the data provided by the State Forest Management Service. The court reiterated that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below), and that forests situated in cities were considered forests of national importance, irrespective of whether they had been officially designated as such (see paragraph 102 below). It observed that the former village of Kry\u017eiokai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above). Accordingly, the court held that the VCA\u2019s decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights had been unlawful and had to be annulled. 68.  Finding that the applicant had not had a right to acquire the 0.15 hectares of land in question, the Vilnius Regional Court held that, consequently, she had had no right to sell the land, and thus the sale agreement between her and J.S. in the relevant part also had to be annulled. In accordance with the Civil Code, J.S. was ordered to return 0.15 hectares of land to the State, and the applicant was ordered to return LTL 49,500 (approximately EUR 14,340) to J.S. (see paragraph 94 below). The court noted that the applicant had retained the right to restoration of her property rights, and that the restitution process had to be \u201ccontinued at the expense of the VCA or its successor, by finalising (and not starting afresh), in the same order of priority, the restitution process that had already begun\u201d. It accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that she might face financial difficulties as a result of having to return money to J.S. because she no longer had the necessary amount. The court gave the applicant six months from the date on which the decision became final to return the money to J.S. It observed that it had no authority to directly order the VCA to complete the restoration of the applicant\u2019s property rights within that period of time, but that \u201cthe activity of the VCA or its successor in the restitution process could constitute grounds for reducing the possible expenses of that institution, if [the applicant and J.S.] were found to have suffered losses as a result of unlawful acts established in the present decision ... and had to be compensated\u201d. 69.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraph 64 above). She also argued that the order to pay the money to J.S. should not have been imposed on her but on the VCA, since it was the latter which had acted unlawfully. 70.  On 7 February 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court in its entirety. The court stressed that forests of national importance could not be transferred into private ownership on any basis whatsoever, including restitution of nationalised property (see paragraph 101 below). It stated that the institutions responsible for adopting decisions on restoration of property rights had to verify whether all the conditions for restitution provided by law were complied with and, when deciding to restore property rights in natura, whether the property in question was not a type which could only belong to the State. Accordingly, the VCA, when adopting the decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights, had been under an obligation to verify whether that decision complied with the law in force at the time of its adoption. 71.  The Court of Appeal held that the finding that the applicant\u2019s property rights had been restored in contravention of the law enabled it to consider that she had acquired those property rights in bad faith (nes\u0105\u017eininga \u012fgij\u0117ja). It stated that the applicant and J.S. \u201ccould not be considered bona fide acquirers merely because the land in question had become private property as a result of a decision adopted by a public authority\u201d. It also stated that when an individual knew or ought to have known that an administrative decision might be contrary to the law, he or she could not rely on his or her good faith. 72.  The Court of Appeal further observed that even though the unlawful restoration of property rights had been the result of a decision adopted by the VCA, under the law it was not possible to order the VCA, and not the applicant, to return the money paid for the plot in question to J.S. (see paragraph 69 above). The court considered that requiring J.S. to return the plot to the State and the applicant to return the money to J.S. would not cause \u201cserious difficulties for the defendants\u201d (see paragraph 95 below). It also reiterated that the applicant had retained the right to restoration of her property rights in one of the forms provided for by law. 73.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 29 March 2011 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 74.  On 25 October 2011 the applicant paid LTL 49,500 to J.S. 75.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the NLS confirming that she had retained the right to have her property rights to 0.15 hectares of land restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in Kry\u017eiokai and that her property rights could be restored by: (i) assigning a plot of land or forest equal in value to the land held previously; (ii) providing securities; (iii) discharging liabilities to the State; (iv) transferring, free of charge, a new plot of land equal in value to the land held previously for the construction of an individual home in the city or rural area where the previously held land was situated; or (v) providing monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). The applicant was asked to inform the authorities of her choice as to the form of restitution. 76.  On 7 March 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she had suffered pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 49,500 as a result of the actions of the authorities. The applicant expressed her wish to be given a plot of land of 0.15 hectares, and if the value of that plot was lower than LTL 49,500, that the difference be paid to her as damages. 77.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS. It stated that there was a possibility of her receiving a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in that area, the restitution would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city or monetary compensation. She was also informed that there was a possibility for her to receive land in Kry\u017eiokai, so if she wished to receive a plot in that area, her request would be considered when the land plan had been prepared. 78.  On 21 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. She reiterated that the annulment of her property rights to 0.15 hectares of land had caused her pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 49,500. In her view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicant asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when she might expect to receive one. If she could not be given such a plot, she wished to receive compensation of LTL 49,500. The applicant stated that she did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 79.  On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 0.15 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, she refused the plot which was offered to her and stated that she wished to wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in her case. 80.  On 26 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 0.15 hectares of land. 81.  On 27 April 2016 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant inviting her to attend a meeting of candidates on 18 May 2016 in which she would be offered a plot. The applicant did not take part in that meeting. 82.  On 18 May 2016 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant inviting her to attend a meeting of candidates on 1 June 2016 in which she would be offered a plot. It is unclear whether the applicant took part in that meeting. 83.  According to the latest information provided to the Court, the fourth applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.15 hectares of land have still not been restored.", "references": ["1", "8", "4", "6", "3", "0", "7", "5", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant is a Russian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Volzhskiy, in the Volgograd Region. 8.  In March 1994 she was granted Russian citizenship and the Russian embassy in Bishkek put a stamp in her Soviet passport to this effect. 10.  On 14 July 2001 she obtained a new Russian \u201cinternal passport\u201d (a citizen\u2019s identity document for use inside Russia). 11.  In 2006 the first applicant applied to the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for an \u201cinternational passport\u201d required for foreign travel. 12.  On 11 April 2006 an official from the FMS seized her Russian passport, which was later destroyed. The FMS referred to a report of 26 January 2006 on a check carried out by the agencies of the interior, according to which the first applicant had never properly acquired Russian citizenship and therefore had no right to be in possession of a Russian passport. The report stated, in particular, that whereas the first applicant had been issued with a Russian passport on 14 July 2001, she was not registered in the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a person who had acquired Russian citizenship. Furthermore, according to a letter of 18 October 2015 from the Russian embassy in Kyrgyzstan, it had no records on her obtaining Russian citizenship either. Accordingly, she had been issued with a Russian passport erroneously in 2001. 15.  In a response of 27 October 2006 the Volgograd Region prosecutor\u2019s office stated that the FMS was not competent to seize passports, something which only the agencies of the interior could do; that the first applicant\u2019s passport had been seized in breach of the law; and that the prosecutor\u2019s office recommended that the FMS rectify the situation. 16.  On 20 March 2007 the FMS issued report no. 37 to the effect that the first applicant had never properly acquired Russian citizenship, and that a Russian passport had been issued to her unlawfully. 18.  On 28 May 2007 the Volzhskiy Town Court found in favour of the first applicant and held that the check which had been carried out by the agencies of the interior had been unlawful. 19.  The decision was subsequently quashed by means of supervisory review and the case was remitted for fresh examination. 21.  However, the FMS did not set aside the decision to seize the first applicant\u2019s passport, and a new passport was not issued to her either. 22.  The first applicant again instituted court proceedings, this time for a finding that the seizure of her passport had been unlawful. 23.  On 4 April 2008 the Volzhskiy Town Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint. It accepted the FMS\u2019s arguments that she had never acquired Russian citizenship, although it also found that the FMS officials\u2019 actions of 11 April 2006 had been procedurally incorrect, as the FMS did not have competence to seize passports. 26.  The first applicant then instituted another set of court proceedings against the FMS concerning its inaction in relation to issuing her with an identity document. She also contested the FMS report no. 37 of 20 March 2007. 30.  On 14 April 2009 she was granted Russian citizenship under a simplified procedure on the basis of a FMS decision of 16 March 2009 to this effect. 33.  According to the second applicant, between 1987 and 2010 he lived in the Rostov Region. Initially, he had a Soviet Union passport issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia. 34.  On 23 December 1998, in accordance with the procedure then in force, the second applicant was issued with an insert for his passport (\u0432\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u044b\u0448) specifying that he was a citizen of the Russian Federation. 35.  On 19 February 2002 the Passport and Visa Directorate of Police Office no. 1 of Taganrog, in the Rostov Region, issued the second applicant with a Russian passport. 37.  On 18 January 2010 the second applicant applied to the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma to register his place of residence. 38.  According to the Government, owing to doubts as to whether the second applicant had been issued with a Russian passport in accordance with the established procedure, the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma sent a request to the FMS of the Rostov Region. 39.  On 30 June 2010 the FMS of the Rostov Region issued a certificate which reads, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cOn 19 February 2002 [the second applicant] was issued with [a Russian passport] following the exchange of [his passport] issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia.\nIn section 8 of the application for issue (exchange) of [the second applicant\u2019s] passport it is noted \u2018RF citizen according to section 13(1)\u2019.\nAccording to the information [available to the FMS of the Rostov Region], [the second applicant] has not been registered at the address [in Taganrog] since 17 February 2010, as he has moved to Kostroma.\nIn the database of [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], available to the FMS of the Rostov Region, there is no information as to whether [the second applicant] has obtained Russian citizenship.\nA copy of [the second applicant\u2019s] passport issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia contains a [glued] insert issued by the Department of the Interior of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don on 21 December [year illegible] to the effect that [the second applicant] is a citizen of the Russian Federation in accordance with section 13(1) of the Russian Citizenship Act of 28 November 1991.\nOn 29 January 2010 ... a request was sent to [the FMS of the Rostov Region] to confirm that [the second applicant] had Russian citizenship.\nAccording [to the information received], the issue of the above insert to [the second applicant] and its lawfulness or otherwise is [not] [section illegible] confirmed ...\nThe decision to issue [the second applicant] with [a Russian] passport was made ... by [V.], former head of the Passport and Visa Directorate of Police Office no. 1 of Taganrog, in the Rostov Region, who on 26 April 2004 was ... dismissed from service because she had reached retirement age.\nIt appears to be impossible to question [V.] concerning the circumstances of the issue of the Russian passport [to the second applicant], since she is absent from her place of residence.\nAccordingly, [V.] ... issued [the second applicant] with a Russian passport in the absence of documents confirming that he was a Russian citizen, and without checking the documents presented for the issue (exchange) of the passport, in breach [of the rules] then in force.\nThe above circumstances allow the supposition that [V.] might have had an interest in issuing [the second applicant] with a Russian passport in breach of the established rules, which constitutes an offence punishable under Article 286 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, it may be conjectured that [the second applicant] presented a passport [issued in 1981] which contained wrong information to the effect that he had Russian citizenship.\nOn the basis of the foregoing, [it is proposed] ... to consider that [the second applicant\u2019s passport] was issued in breach of the established rules ...\u201d 40.  On 22 July 2010, when the second applicant turned 45, in accordance with the applicable procedure, he applied to the FMS to exchange his passport. 41.  The second applicant received a verbal refusal to issue him with a new passport. According to the official who notified him of the refusal, the second applicant had failed to prove that he had had a permanent place of residence in Russia on 6 February 1992 (see paragraph 57 below), and he had only had a registered place of residence in Russia since February 2002. 42.  On 28 July 2010 the second applicant provided the Kostroma Region FMS with a written explanation to the effect that between 1989 and 2002 his place of residence had been registered in Rostov-on-Don, although he had actually been living with his partner, M., in the Krasnodar Region. 43.  On 13 August 2010 the Residential Registration Department of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don provided the second applicant with a certificate confirming that he was not registered in the Leninskiy District and there was no information about him in the archives either. 44.  On 23 September 2010 the Krasnodar Region FMS informed the Kostroma Region FMS that its archives contained no information about the second applicant, and that it appeared to be impossible to question M. because she was absent from her place of residence. 45.  On 27 September 2010 the Kostroma Region FMS issued a decision to the effect that the second applicant was not a Russian citizen. With reference to the certificate of 30 June 2010 issued by the FMS of the Rostov Region, the decision stated, in particular, that according to the enquiries carried out, the second applicant\u2019s Russian passport had been issued in breach of the applicable rules. It further stated that it had proved impossible to obtain documentary evidence that the second applicant had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992, and the stamp in his passport only confirmed that he had been registered as resident in the Rostov Region from 15 February 2002 to 17 February 2010. The decision also noted that the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained no information as to whether the second applicant had obtained Russian citizenship. Accordingly, the enquiries made had obtained no evidence that the second applicant had acquired Russian citizenship or that he had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992. 47.  At a hearing on 20 October 2010 a representative from the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma stated, in particular:\n\u201cOn the basis of the written instructions from the FMS that there should be an urgent check on all passports previously issued to individuals not born in the territory of the Russian Federation, we sent a request for information to the FMS of the Rostov Region. The FMS of the Rostov Region sent a certificate confirming that the [second applicant\u2019s] passport should be considered as having been issued in breach of the applicable rules. I sent a report stating that it was necessary to obtain corroboration that [the second applicant] either had or did not have Russian citizenship. The head of the FMS ... issued a decision to the effect that [the second applicant] was not a Russian citizen. [The second applicant] was invited to familiarise himself with that decision. [I]t was suggested that he apply for a residence permit and subsequently Russian citizenship, under a simplified procedure.\nIn 2004 the FMS issued instructions for checks to be carried out only in respect of individuals who had applied to exchange their passports. [The second applicant] applied [to exchange his passport], and I discovered that he had not been born in the territory of the Russian Federation, and sent the request. [His] passport was not seized: the FMS did not issue instructions to this effect, so that people would not be left without [an identity] document.\u201d 48.  On 21 October 2010 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma upheld the decision of the FMS. It noted that, as a result of a check carried out pursuant to sections 51 and 52 of the 2002 Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation, the FMS had found that the second applicant had been issued with a Russian passport in breach of the applicable rules, and was not entitled to Russian citizenship. In particular, it had not been confirmed that he had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992. This justified the refusal to exchange his passport. The court also noted that the reports of the checks carried out by the FMS had not been appealed against or set aside in accordance with the established procedure, and that they were not the subject of the court\u2019s examination in those proceedings. 49.  The court further dismissed the second applicant\u2019s argument that the fact that he had been using the previously issued Russian passport for eight years constituted a valid reason to exchange the passport. The court likewise dismissed his argument that he had not violated any laws or regulations in 2002, when he had been issued with the Russian passport. The court found that his passport was invalid regardless. 51.  On 6 December 2010 the Kostroma Regional Court upheld the decision. The appeal court noted, in particular, that the certificate issued by the Rostov Region FMS on 30 June 2010 showed that a Russian passport had been issued to the second applicant on the basis of a certificate of 23 December 1998 issued by the Department of the Interior of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don confirming that he was a Russian citizen in accordance with section 13(1) of the 1991 Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation. However, the legal validity of that certificate had not been confirmed. It further noted that, according to the results of the enquiries carried out in the places indicated by the applicant as his places of residence in Russia between 1989 and 2002, no confirmation of his registration and residence as of 6 February 1992 had been received with respect to any of the addresses indicated. 52.  The appeal court also noted that the second applicant\u2019s argument that he had not been informed about the report issued following the check carried out by the FMS, and that therefore he could not have appealed against it, had not affected the lower court\u2019s conclusions. 53.  On 25 March 2013, following the entry into force of Law no. 182\u2011FZ on Amendments to the Russian Citizenship Act of 12 November 2012, the second applicant applied for Russian citizenship.", "references": ["5", "3", "7", "2", "0", "8", "9", "1", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  In 2005 the applicant, an information technology specialist, moved from Kazakhstan to the Krasnodar Region in Russia to live with his parents and brother, O.Z., who were Russian citizens. He resided there on the basis of visas and temporary residence permits. 6.  In January 2007, the applicant married Ms M.K., a Russian national, with whom he had a son in June 2009. 7.  On 23 December 2008 the Kazakh authorities provided the applicant, upon his request, with an official statement certifying that he had no criminal record in Kazakhstan. The applicant had requested the document with view to applying for Russian nationality through the simplified procedure for spouses of Russian nationals. 8.  In January 2009 the applicant submitted his application for Russian nationality to the Federal Migration Service in the Krasnodar Region (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043a\u0440\u0430\u044e (\u0424\u041c\u0421)) (hereinafter \u201cthe Krasnodar FMS\u201d). 9.  In May 2009 the Krasnodar FMS rejected the application, referring to information provided by the Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSB\u201d) that the applicant posed a threat to Russia\u2019s national security. 10.  On 13 August 2009 the FSB informed the applicant about a decision it had made on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on prohibiting him from re-entering the country until July 2014 (hereinafter \u201cthe exclusion order\u201d). The applicant was to leave Russia within fifteen days of receipt of the letter. He was not provided with the reasons for the decision, its date or number. 11.  On 13 November 2009 the applicant appealed against the exclusion order to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Krasnodar, which forwarded it for examination to the Krasnodar Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), which had jurisdiction under domestic legislation to look at cases involving State secrets. In his complaint, the applicant alleged, inter alia, that the exclusion order was arbitrary, that it had been taken on the basis of undisclosed information and that his removal from Russia would disrupt his family life. In particular, the applicant stated that he was ethnically Russian, had no connection with Kazakhstan and that his wife and child, as well as his brother and parents, were Russian nationals residing in Russia. He was the family breadwinner and his exclusion would entail distress and financial hardship for his wife and son. 12.  On 24 March 2010 the Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeal in camera. The applicant testified before the court and stated that in 1999 his brother O.Z. had been prosecuted by the United States\u2019 authorities for a computer crime perpetrated in that country; after serving his sentence in the United States, in 2004, his brother had returned to Russia, of which he was a national, and had been offered a job by the FSB. Meanwhile, the applicant and his parents had been pressured by the Kazakh security services to convince his brother to return to Kazakhstan and collaborate with them. Shortly thereafter, in 2005, the Kazakh authorities had opened a criminal case against the applicant on suspicion of computer fraud. Later that year, due to the Kazakh authorities\u2019 pressure and his Russian ethnic origin, the applicant had decided to move to Russia. In 2006, the Kazakh authorities had pardoned the applicant and his criminal record had been expunged. The applicant stressed that throughout his time living in Russia he had been a law-abiding person, had been in full compliance with immigration regulations and had a wife and child who were Russian nationals. He pointed out that he was an ethnic Russian, that he did not speak Kazakh, had no family in that country, and that he had neither a place to live in Kazakhstan nor the financial means to move there with his wife and infant son. 13.  Also at the hearing on 24 March 2010, the applicant\u2019s counsel requested that the court examine the factual grounds for the exclusion and allow him to access the documents which had served as its basis. He stressed that the FSB had failed to produce a single item of evidence to substantiate their allegations about the threat the applicant posed for national security. Referring to the case of Liu v. Russia (no. 42086/05, 6 December 2007), he pointed out that the authorities had to provide evidence proving the applicant was a threat to national security, given that the sanction against him, the five-year exclusion, would lead to the disruption of his family life. The court examined and dismissed the request, stating that as the matter was within the FSB\u2019s exclusive competence it fell outside the scope of judicial review. From the documents submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the FSB presented the Regional Court with any evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s case, other than its letter to the applicant of 13 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and copies of the relevant legal provisions governing the activities of the FSB and the applicable immigration regulations. 14.  On the same date, 24 March 2010, the Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the exclusion order. Its decision stated, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c ... in July 2009 the Federal Security Service took a decision on the undesirability of Mr Zezev\u2019s presence (residence) in the Russian Federation and on prohibiting his re-entry into the country until July 2014 ...\nIn his complaint, Mr Zezev seeks to have the decision of the Federal Security Service declared unlawful and for it to be overruled, referring to the following:\nHe has resided in the Russian Federation for five years. He has never committed any crime, either in Russia or Kazakhstan. He does not have a criminal record. His character has been described in positive terms. He does not represent a threat to the security of the Russian Federation. He does not have a place to live in Kazakhstan. He is ethnically Russian and wants to work and live in Russia. The FSB\u2019s decision is unlawful and unsubstantiated ...\n... [According to the applicant] the court should examine [his] case in the light of the right to respect for his private and family life and respect for a citizen\u2019s choice of the place for his family life. There is no evidence of any alleged criminal activities ...\n... the FSB decided on the undesirability of Mr Zezev\u2019s presence (residence) in Russia and on prohibiting his re-entry into the country until July 2014.\nThe application of such preventive measures is within the Federal Security Service\u2019s scope of discretion.\nThe decision [in respect of the applicant] was taken by FSB officials within the scope of their authority and the procedure defined by federal legislation and was approved by the competent official.\nGiven the circumstances, Mr Zezev\u2019s request to have the FSB\u2019s decision on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition on his re-entry until July 2014 declared unlawful should be rejected ...\u201d 15.  On 5 April 2010 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). He referred, in particular, to the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 8 of the Convention concerning the right to respect for family life. He stated that the Regional Court had failed to examine whether the FSB decision had been substantiated by proof. He pointed out that the FSB had not furnished any evidence to the court of alleged activities by him that posed a threat to national security. The applicant further stated that even though he was a Kazakh national he was an ethnic Russian, did not speak Kazakh, and had nowhere to live in Kazakhstan as his parents had also moved to Russia in 2005. He further stressed that he had married a Russian national in 2007 with whom he had had a son in 2009 and that all his family members were Russian nationals. Lastly, the applicant pointed out that he was the sole breadwinner for his wife and infant child. 16.  On 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment stating, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c...On 22 July 2009 the Federal Security Service issued a decision on the undesirability of the presence (residence) of the Kazakh national Mr Zezev in the Russian Federation and on the prohibition of his re-entry ...\nIn the cassation appeal Mr Zezev seeks to have the judgment of the Krasnodar Regional Court overruled as unlawful.\nThe court sees no basis for granting that request ...\nWhen deciding to reject Mr Zezev\u2019s request, the Regional Court had in its possession information which served as the basis for the [FSB] order.\nMr Zezev\u2019s arguments concerning the unlawfulness of the FSB order were examined by the Regional Court.\nIn those circumstances, the Chamber finds that the applicant\u2019s right to a proper defence was fully complied with and that the reasons for the decision concerning the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition of his re-entry, which was taken owing to the real threat he posed to national security, have been confirmed by concrete facts.\nAs for the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning a violation of his private interests as a result of the decision on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition of his re-entry, the Chamber does not agree with him as it finds that in the circumstances of the case public interests should outweigh private interests.\nIn those circumstances, the decision of the Krasnodar Regional Court should remain unchanged ...\u201d 17.  On 17 August 2010 the FMS issued an order for the applicant\u2019s deportation. It appears from the case file that the sanction was not enforced as, according to the applicant, he informed the local authorities that he had an application pending before the Court. He continued to reside in Russia. 18.  In May 2011 the applicant and his wife had another child. 19.  On 19 November 2013 the police arrived at the applicant\u2019s home and fined him for a breach of immigration regulations under Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe COA\u201d). Then the police detained him on the spot and took him to the court. 20.  The applicant was then taken to the Sovetskiy District Court in Krasnodar, which on 21 November 2013 ordered his deportation and placed him in a special centre for the detention of foreigners. 21.  On 26 December 2013 the applicant was deported from Russia. 22.  On an unspecified date in February 2014 the applicant attempted to re-enter Russia but was informed at the border that he was banned from entering until 31 July 2014. 23.  The applicant has submitted that on 30 July 2014 police officers arrived at his wife\u2019s home in Russia and informed her that he was wanted on suspicion of a crime. The applicant\u2019s wife explained that he had been deported from Russia in December 2013. 24.  It is unclear whether the applicant returned to Russia after the expiry of his re-entry ban on 31 July 2014. According to the Government, the applicant neither applied for a temporary residence permit nor sought Russian nationality between 2014 and 2016. 25.  In their submission to the Court, the Government stated that on 12 December 2008 and 25 November 2012 the applicant was fined for being intoxicated in public and then on 19 November 2013 for a violation of immigration regulations (see paragraph 19 above). The Government further stated that on 31 July 2014 the police in Krasnodar had opened a criminal case against the applicant on suspicion of involvement in computer fraud. As of October 2016 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending. 26.  In reply to a request by the Court for a copy of the documents which served as the basis for the decision to exclude the applicant, the Government only furnished a thirteen-page copy of the transcript of the hearing of the applicant\u2019s appeal by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 24 March 2010 (see paragraphs 12-14 above).", "references": ["9", "3", "0", "1", "6", "7", "8", "5", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Prague. 6.  In 2004 the applicant arrived in Russia, where in 2005 she married Mr I.P., a Russian citizen, with whom in 2009 she had a daughter, also a Russian national. The applicant and her family lived in St Petersburg. 7.  The applicant lived in Russia on the basis of regularly extended residence permits. On 17 February 2010 the St Petersburg department of the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter \u201cthe FMS\u201d) issued the applicant with a five-year residence permit valid until 17 February 2015. 8.  On 15 October 2013 the applicant applied for Russian citizenship. 9.  On 18 March 2014 the St Petersburg department of the Federal Security Service (hereinafter \u201cthe FSB\u201d) issued a report stating that the applicant posed a national security threat and that her application should therefore be rejected. 10.  On 28 March 2014 the FMS rejected the applicant\u2019s citizenship application on the grounds that she posed a threat to national security. 11.  On 17 June 2014 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 23 June 2014) the FSB wrote to the FMS recommending that they revoke the applicant\u2019s residence permit. 12.  On 21 July 2014 the FMS revoked the applicant\u2019s residence permit, referring to the FSB\u2019s recommendation. The decision stated, in particular, that in view of information received from the FSB, the applicant\u2019s residence permit must be revoked under section 9(1)(1) of the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners in the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe Foreigners Act\u201d), which provided that a resident permit issued to a foreign national should be revoked if he or she advocated a radical change in the constitutional order of the Russian Federation or otherwise posed a threat to the security of the Russian Federation or its citizens. 13.  On 5 August 2014 the applicant was informed by FMS that this revocation decision had been taken. No explanation was provided. She was further informed that she had to leave Russia within fifteen days of the decision (that is, no later than 5 August 2014) and would be subjected to deportation should she fail to comply. A foreign national who had been deported or administratively removed from Russia was not allowed to re-enter the country for five years following such deportation or removal (section 27 \u00a7 2 of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation, no. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996, as amended on 1 April 2014, \u201cthe Entry Procedure Act\u201d). 14.  On 23 August 2014 the applicant and her daughter left Russia. 15.  The applicant instituted two sets of proceedings in an attempt to obtain a judicial review of the decision to revoke her residence permit. 16.  On 6 August 2014 the applicant complained before the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d), alleging that the decision to annul her residence permit had been groundless. It had violated her right to respect for her family life, as it had compelled her to leave Russia where her husband and minor child were living. The applicant urged the District Court to stay the enforcement of the decision until her complaint had been examined. 17.  On 8 August 2014 the District Court refused to stay the enforcement of the decision. The applicant appealed and on 12 November 2014 the St Petersburg City Court (hereinafter \u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the District Court\u2019s refusal (see paragraph 21 below). 18.  On 14 August 2014 the applicant\u2019s counsel asked the District Court to request a copy of the FSB report of 18 March 2014 (see paragraph 9 above) on which the decision to revoke the residence permit had been based. The request was refused. 19.  On 19 August 2014 the District Court examined the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the revocation of her residence permit and rejected it. In its decision, the court did not refer to any documents which had served as the basis for the impugned decision, other than mentioning that the measure had been imposed following the FSB\u2019s recommendation of 17 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The court noted that the FMS was the proper authority to impose the measure and that the relevant procedure had been complied with. It emphasised that the factual information which had served as the basis for the decision was not amenable to judicial scrutiny and that the scope of the court\u2019s review was limited to assessing whether the statutory procedure had been complied with. As to whether the measure amounted to an interference with the applicant\u2019s family life, the court noted that it was open to the applicant to obtain a visa so that she could come to Russia to visit her family. The court neither examined the effect of the impugned measure on the applicant\u2019s family life, nor balanced the public and private interests involved, but stated, in particular:\n\u201c... given that the residence permit of Ms Gaspar was revoked on the basis of her actions representing a threat to the security of the Russian Federation ... which necessitates taking measures by the Russian Federation for the protection of its interests and those of its citizens, the court believes that when taking the impugned decision, the Federal Migration Service balanced public and private interests.\u201d 20.  The applicant\u2019s counsel appealed against the above-mentioned decision to the City Court, stating, amongst other things, that the District Court had unlawfully refrained from judicial scrutiny of the factual circumstances which had served as the basis for the measure imposed on the applicant. He further stated that no evidence whatsoever had been produced in order to prove that the applicant posed a security threat, and she had been given no opportunity to refute those allegations. Lastly, he argued that the District Court had failed to properly examine the interference with the applicant\u2019s family life and to balance the interests at stake. 21.  On 12 November 2014 the City Court upheld the decision of 19 August 2014, stating that the District Court had duly examined the necessary legal basis for the measure and that its decision had been lawful and reasonable. As for the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to respect for family life, the court stated:\n\u201c... the allegations of the applicant\u2019s representative that the implementation of the impugned decision [to revoke the residence permit] would lead to the destruction of the family, cannot serve as the basis for overruling it. These arguments were examined by the court of first instance and were duly rejected.\u201d 22.  On 9 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s counsel challenged the legality of the FSB report of 18 March 2014 and its recommendation of 17 June 2014, claiming that those documents had been the basis for the decision to revoke the residence permit. He asked the courts to get hold of a full copy of the FSB report and other relevant documents in order to examine them at a hearing. 23.  On 10 November 2014 the complaint was forwarded to the City Court, as the domestic regulations stipulated that the courts at regional level were to examine cases involving State secrets. 24.  On 18 December 2014 the City Court examined the complaint in camera. It held that the FSB report and the recommendation had been issued in accordance with the statutory procedure and that they had therefore been lawful. At the hearing, the applicant\u2019s counsel asked the City Court to examine the factual grounds for the decision to exclude the applicant and to urge the FSB to produce evidence showing that the applicant indeed posed a threat to national security. The City Court dismissed the request, stating that as the matter was within the FSB\u2019s exclusive competence, it fell outside of the scope of judicial review and that \u201cthe evidence presented to the court did not disclose a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights by the FSB\u201d. In its decision, the court stated, in particular:\n\u201c... the allegations of the applicant\u2019s representatives concerning the failure of the representatives of the Federal Security Service to submit proof showing the necessity to send the impugned letter [recommending that the residence permit be revoked] to the Federal Migration Service are unsubstantiated, as the Federal Security Service\u2019s information note on Ms Gaspar as presented to the court does not contain any such information.\u201d 25.  The applicant\u2019s counsel appealed against the above-mentioned decision to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). He alleged, in particular, that the City Court had rejected the complaint without having properly examined its subject matter, as a full copy of the FSB report and other documents on which the revocation had been based had not been furnished at the hearing. Counsel stated that neither he nor the applicant had been given the chance to familiarise themselves with the contents of the FSB report or with any other documents containing details concerning the nature of the applicant\u2019s activity which allegedly posed a risk to national security. Lastly, counsel stated that the decision at issue had disrupted the applicant\u2019s family life. In a separate request, he asked the Supreme Court to retrieve a full copy of the report and the relevant documents. 26.  On 29 April 2015 the Supreme Court examined the appeal in camera and upheld the decision of the City Court. Prior to the hearing, the applicant\u2019s counsel had signed a confidentiality undertaking not to disclose the information examined in the course of the hearing. The FSB provided the court with a copy of its report of 18 March 2014. The Supreme Court perused it and found it lawful. It further held that the information contained in the report was a State secret and that it could not be disclosed. Consequently, the applicant\u2019s counsel was not allowed access to the document, in spite of the confidentiality undertaking. In response to the applicant\u2019s grounds for appeal, the Supreme Court held as follows:\n\u201c... the applicant\u2019s argument concerning a violation of her right to respect for private and family life by the [FSB] decision cannot be taken into account, as this decision did not concern the applicant\u2019s entry into the Russian Federation to see her family members who were Russian nationals in Russia ...\n... the State has the right to take decisions limiting certain rights of foreign citizens, including the right to request residence permits and the right to request the nationality of that State, in the interests of the public, including that of national security. The [lower] court concluded correctly that the guarantees provided to the applicant by the Russian legislation and international laws had been respected in full.\nTherefore, the impugned decision is lawful and substantiated, and the appeal against it does not provide reasons to overrule it ...\u201d 27.  In reply to the Court\u2019s request for the information and documents that served as the basis for the decision to revoke the applicant\u2019s residence permit, including the FSB\u2019s recommendation of 17 June 2014, the Government furnished copies of two documents totalling six pages: the FMS\u2019s decision to reject the applicant\u2019s Russian citizenship application of 28 March 2014 (see paragraph 10 above), and the decision of 21 July 2014 to revoke her residence permit (see paragraph 12 above).", "references": ["9", "5", "2", "6", "8", "7", "0", "3", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  On 10 May 1999 a certain \u0130.\u00d6. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, claiming that he had issued an uncovered cheque dated 26 April 1999. 7.  On the same date the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office indicted the applicant in the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Criminal Court of First Instance under section 16 (1) of Law no. 3167 \u2013 in force at the material time \u2013 for issuing an uncovered cheque. The cheque bore the applicant\u2019s name underneath the name of the company of which he was president of the executive board, and the address of the company on the cheque was indicated as being \u201c... Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y / Istanbul\u201d. 8.  On 2 September 1999 the trial court held a preparatory hearing (tensip) and ordered that a summons be served on the applicant. 9.  On 6 October 1999 the trial court sent a copy of the bill of indictment, together with the notice of the first hearing, to the address written on the cheque. On the same day the trial court asked the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office to confirm the applicant\u2019s identity and enquire about his full address and provide it with this information. 10.  On 7 October 1999 the summons was returned on the grounds that the applicant had left that address, leaving \u201cP.K. [post box] 5 Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y\u201d as an alternative address. 11.  Within the context of the enquiries to find out what the applicant\u2019s new address was, it appears that the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office asked the police and the mayor of the neighbourhood (muhtarl\u0131k) to collect information. In that connection, the police went to the address written on the cheque and concluded that the applicant had left it. According to the information received from the mayor of the neighbourhood, the applicant had left that address without giving any notification. 12.  On 14 February 2000 the trial court held the first hearing in the absence of the applicant. The court decided to authorise his detention in absentia (tevkif m\u00fczekkeresi) with a view to obtaining his statements, under Article 223 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, in force at the material time. 13.  Between 14 February 2000 and 13 October 2004 the trial court waited for the detention order to be executed. 14.  On 11 October 2001, while the criminal proceedings were ongoing, another court in Istanbul, namely the Ba\u011fc\u0131lar Criminal Court of First Instance, sent a summons to the applicant\u2019s home address \u2013 \u201c... Avc\u0131lar / Istanbul\u201d \u2013 requiring him to give evidence as a complainant in another set of criminal proceedings. 15.  On 16 July 2001, in another set of criminal proceedings, the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece public prosecutor\u2019s office delivered a decision not to prosecute, in which it also indicated the applicant\u2019s address as being \u201c... Avc\u0131lar / Istanbul\u201d. 16.  On 26 May 2003 the trial court once again attempted to serve the summons at the address written on the cheque, but failed to do so for the same reasons. 17.  On 21 June 2004 the trial court decided to serve the summons at the same address, in accordance with section 35 (4) of the Notification Act (Law no. 7201). 18.  On 13 October 2004 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a fine (a\u011f\u0131r para cezas\u0131) of 500,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL). That judgment was served on the applicant on 30 October 2004. The seven-day time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment expired, and in the absence of an appeal it became final. 19.  On an unspecified date in 2006 several police officers from the Firuzk\u00f6y police station in Avc\u0131lar, Istanbul, went to the applicant\u2019s apartment with an arrest warrant and invited him to attend the police station. At the police station, the applicant was informed that an arrest warrant had been issued against him following his conviction by a criminal court, and that he would be put in prison unless he paid the 500 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] fine previously imposed by the court. The applicant, who was unaware of any criminal proceedings against him, requested the details of the judgment in question and applied to the registry of the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Criminal Court of First Instance for further information. 20.  Upon examining the relevant case file at the registry of the first-instance court, the applicant discovered that he had been charged and convicted in absentia for issuing an uncovered cheque on 27 April 1999 and sentenced to a fine of TRY 500[2], an amount corresponding to the amount of the cheque. Moreover, the judgment, which had been delivered on 13 October 2004 by the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Criminal Court of First Instance, had become final in the absence of an appeal. 21.  On 5 May 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Criminal Court of First Instance, challenging the judgment in question on the grounds that it had been delivered in his absence and the accusations against him were ill-founded. He emphasised that he had not received any notice of the criminal proceedings or the judgment, not even when he had gone to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office three months prior to the delivery of the impugned judgment to obtain his criminal record details for an unrelated matter. He added that the claimant in the criminal proceedings, \u0130.\u00d6., was his former girlfriend, and that he had given her a blank cheque as a guarantee that he would discharge their joint debt to a bank. They had in fact signed an official document on 12 March 1998 in the presence of a lawyer confirming that \u0130.\u00d6. would only be entitled to cash this cheque if the applicant failed to discharge their joint debt to the bank. Upon settling the debt with the bank, the applicant had requested that \u0130.\u00d6. return the blank cheque to him, but \u0130.\u00d6. had failed to do so, alleging that she had lost it. He had accordingly reported the cheque as missing to the bank, and had asked to be notified in the event of any attempts to cash it. On 27 April 1999, very shortly after his move to a new address, his former girlfriend had apparently attempted to cash the cheque, and when the cheque had not cleared, had brought a criminal complaint against him. Despite his instructions, he had not been contacted by his bank when the cheque in question had been deposited by \u0130.\u00d6., nor had he been advised that the cheque had bounced. 22.  On the same day the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Civil Court of First Instance issued a summary judgment dismissing the applicant\u2019s appeal as lodged out of time. It held that the judgment of 13 October 2004 had been duly served on him on 30 October 2004 in accordance with section 35 of Law no. 7201, and the appeal should therefore have been submitted by 8 November 2004. 23.  On 22 May 2006 the applicant appealed against the summary judgment, reiterating the arguments he had previously submitted to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Civil Court of First Instance. He emphasised that, although his accurate address details could easily have been obtained from the mayor of the neighbourhood, the judgment of October 2004 had been served at the address which his company had moved out of on 15 April 1999. In his absence, it had apparently been posted on the door of the building. He therefore requested that the judgment which had been delivered in his absence be quashed or rectified. 24.  On 21 September 2006 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation delivered her opinion on the applicant\u2019s appeal, where she requested that the first-instance court\u2019s judgment of 5 May 2006 be quashed on account of the unlawful service of the initial judgment rendered in his absence. 25.  On 2 October 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, holding that the judgment in question had been duly served on the applicant in accordance with section 35 of Law no. 7201 on Notifications. 26.  On 8 November 2006, in accordance with Article 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant requested that the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodge an application to have the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision set aside. 27.  It appears that the applicant was imprisoned on 24 November 2006 on account of his failure to pay the fine of TRY 500 imposed by the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Criminal Court of First Instance on 13 October 2004. 28.  On 26 November 2006 the applicant was conditionally released. 29.  On 1 December 2008 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant\u2019s application under Article 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, maintaining that the applicant\u2019s arguments had already been examined by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 2 October 2006.", "references": ["9", "4", "2", "7", "8", "6", "0", "1", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in Vilnius. 6.  The applicant lived with V.K. They raised two boys, Ra.K. and Ro.K. (also see paragraphs 54-58 below), born in 2002 and 2004 respectively. 7.  In April 2011 the applicant\u2019s and V.K.\u2019s family was put on the list of families at social risk. Both parents were later warned for not having fulfilled their parental duties properly. According to the social services, later that year V.K. was allocated social housing; she had no property of her own. 8.  By a judgment of 20 October 2011, the Kaunas City District Court convicted the applicant of having caused physical pain to each of the boys (Article 140 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code) and of attempting to influence a witness (Article 233 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code \u2013 see paragraph 69 below). The court established that in 2009 the applicant had several times been physically violent towards Ra.K. and Ro.K. The court relied on statements given by social workers who had seen bruises on the boys\u2019 bodies and in whom the children \u2013 who since 15 October 2009 had been living in a care institution \u2013 the \u201cPastog\u0117\u201d children\u2019s home, because V.K. could not guarantee their safety at home \u2013 had confided. The court also referred to the testimony which the children had given to forensic psychiatrists, statements given by police officers, and V.K.\u2019s testimony. The psychiatrists had concluded that the children were afraid of the applicant; they had openly told them that he had been beating them. The psychiatrists recommended that the children not be questioned further [during those criminal proceedings] in order to avoid the applicant exerting an influence on the children\u2019s testimony, bearing in mind the fact that \u2013 while visiting the children in the children\u2019s home \u2013 he had already asked them not to recount his actions. The psychiatrists had no objective or subjective information indicating that V.K. had exerted any influence on the children\u2019s testimony. 9.  The Kaunas City District Court also established that on 4 November 2010 the applicant had caused negligible health impairment to V.K. by inflicting bruises and scratches to her head, belly, elbow and knee, and that although a pre-trial investigation in that regard had been discontinued, V.K. had been informed that it was possible for her to bring a private prosecution against the applicant under Article 140 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 69 below). The court also established that the applicant had attempted to influence V.K. to change her testimony by threatening her, even after the start of the court proceedings in the case concerning the alleged physical violence against the two boys. Having noted that the applicant had three prior convictions, the records of which had not yet expired, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to deprivation of liberty for ten months. However, given that pending the trial the applicant had been detained from 29 November 2010 until 20 October 2011, the court deemed that he had already served his sentence. Accordingly, the applicant was released in the courtroom. 10.  As it transpires from the documents in the case file, in July 2011 V.K. lodged a complaint with a prosecutor, alleging that the applicant had shown pornographic films to their children and had sexually abused their children in their home. When questioned by the pre-trial investigator on 29 July 2011, V.K. stated that the abuse had taken place during the period between 24 April 2009, when V.K. had been treated as an in-patient in hospital for an illness unrelated to this case, and 15 October 2009, when V.K. had moved to a social care home (nakvyn\u0117s namai) in Kaunas and the children had been placed in the Pastog\u0117 children\u2019s home. V.K. also stated that she had learned about this abuse on 27 May 2011, when her sons had confided in her after confiding in her family members Z.S. and V.F. (see also paragraph 14 below). 11.  On 29 July 2011 V.K. confessed to the pre-trial investigator that Ra.K. was not the biological son of the applicant and that she and the applicant had only agreed that they would give the applicant\u2019s surname to Ra.K. in order to obtain social benefits (see also paragraphs 54-58 below). 12.  V.K. was again questioned on 18 August 2011. She confirmed that she had known about her obligation to deliver the children for questioning on 22 August 2011 and promised to deliver them (see paragraph 17 below). 13.  In summer 2011 the investigators found in the applicant\u2019s possession a number of DVD disks of pornographic content, containing one file depicting a child under the age of fourteen, and fifteen files depicting a child under the age of eighteen. 14.  On 5 August 2011 the investigator questioned a number of witnesses. Among those witnesses was Z.S. (the mother of the husband of V.K.\u2019s sister). Another witness was V.F. (Z.S.\u2019s daughter). These two witnesses stated that they had learned on 27 May 2011 from Ra.K. and Ro.K. that the applicant had showed them pornographic films and that he had also abused them sexually by asking them to perform oral sex on him \u2013 as shown in those films. Also on 27 May 2011 Z.S. and V.F. had given the same information to the boys\u2019 mother, V.K. 15.  When questioned, A.A., one of the boys\u2019 schoolteacher, told the pre\u2011trial investigator that she had not noticed any alarming changes in the boys\u2019 behaviour. Neither had she observed any improper behaviour on the part of the applicant towards that boy. Another witness, a former work colleague of the applicant, stated that the applicant had raised the boys together with V.K.; he added that they had had family quarrels, but that that was nothing exceptional. According to that witness, the applicant had taken good care of the two boys. 16.  On 17 August 2011 the prosecutor wrote to V.K., informing her that the two boys were to be questioned by the pre-trial investigation judge. V.K. was informed that she had an obligation to bring her sons for questioning and that she had a right to be present during that questioning. 17.  On 22 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s sons were questioned at the premises of the Kaunas police. The records indicate that persons who arrived at the police station were: a Kaunas City District Court judge, the prosecutor, the pre-trial investigator, a representative of the child welfare authority, a psychologist from Kaunas police and the boys\u2019 mother, V.K. Those people agreed that the boys would be questioned and that a video and audio recording would be made. The questioning itself took place in a special room for the questioning of children (vaik\u0173 apklausos kambarys); the boys were questioned by the psychologist, and it appears that no other person was in that room during the boys\u2019 questioning. The psychologist assured the boys that the content of their testimony would be known only to the judge. The boys described the details of how the applicant had sexually abused them in 2009. One of them, Ro.K., who at that time was seven years old, stated that \u201cI am aware that I should not perjure myself (\u017einau, kad neb\u016bt\u0173 melaging\u0173 parodym\u0173)\u201d because \u201cmy mother said so\u201d. He also told the psychologist that the mother had also told him that \u201cif I and my brother say nothing, and are silent, then our father [the applicant] would be released from prison, and our mother would be put in prison\u201d. The boy said that he was not angry with his father; he only wanted for his father not to know where he and his brother lived. 18.  On 31 August 2011 the applicant was charged with the sexual assault of a young child (Article 150 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code). On 26 May 2012 final criminal charges under Articles 150 \u00a7 4, 153 and 309 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 4 were served on the applicant (see paragraph 69 below). 19.  On 23 September 2011 the Kaunas City District Court ordered a forensic psychological examination of Ra.K. and Ro.K. Two forensic experts \u2013 a child psychologist and a child psychiatrist \u2013 then questioned the boys in Vilnius between 20 October and 21 November 2011. The experts concluded that the children were able to remember events that had taken place in 2009. The children had no tendency to fantasise or to imagine things. The psychologists, however, emphasised that the boys\u2019 testimony could have been affected by the long period of time \u2013 two years \u2013 that had elapsed since the events in question. Moreover, both parents exerted both direct and indirect sway over the children: V.K.\u2019s direct and indirect influence was illustrated by Ro.K.\u2019s statements that his mother would go to prison if he stayed silent (see paragraph 17 above), and the applicant\u2019s indirect impact on the children was illustrated by the fact that they feared physical violence. The psychologists recommended that the boys not take part any further in the pre-trial investigation, and nor in the court proceedings, because this would be too stressful for them. 20.  On 23 November 2011 the applicant was arrested. He was searched and placed in pre-trial detention, where he remained until his conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 51 below). 21.  When questioned by the pre-trial investigator on 24 November 2011, V.K. stated that she was very much afraid of the applicant. She noted that in the past he had been physically violent towards her and the children. Having learned that he had been released from prison on 20 October 2011 (see paragraph 9 in fine above), she feared retaliation and that he would search for her and for the children in order to make them change their testimony in the proceedings regarding the alleged sexual violence. 22.  On 25 November 2011 V.K. gave her agreement to the child welfare authority that both children would be placed in a care institution. 23.  As later confirmed by the child welfare authority during the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant, on 5 December 2011 the Kaunas Municipality gave temporary guardianship of Ra.K. and Ro.K. (laikinoji globa) to a children\u2019s home (vaik\u0173 globos namai) in K\u0117dainiai, because from 1 December 2011 onwards V.K. could not be located and the children\u2019s parents could not take care of them. The children were placed in the children\u2019s home in K\u0117dainiai. 24.  In December 2011 the applicant asked the prosecutor to organise a confrontation (akistata) between him and V.K. The prosecutor refused the request, considering that there were no essential discrepancies between their respective testimony. Moreover, according to the prosecutor, \u201cV.K.\u2019s testimony [was] not the only evidence on the basis of which the question of the applicant\u2019s criminal liability would be decided\u201d. The prosecutor likewise denied the applicant\u2019s request that a confrontation be staged between him and the witnesses V.F. and J.S., deeming that there were no essential contradictions between their and the applicant\u2019s respective versions of events. By a final ruling of 8 February 2012 a pre-trial investigation judge of the Kaunas City District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. 25.  On 11 January 2012 the applicant asked the prosecutor to be allowed to take a polygraph test, in order to prove that he had been \u201csmeared\u201d by V.K. The prosecutor dismissed the request, stating that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not permit polygraph test results to count as evidence. 26.  On 20 March 2012 the applicant lodged a written request for the prosecutor to stage a confrontation between him and the two children. He argued that they had incriminated the applicant when questioned by the experts only because they had been swayed by their mother. The applicant accordingly requested that a new forensic examination of the children be undertaken now that the boys resided at the children\u2019s home and were free of their mother\u2019s influence. He drew the prosecutor\u2019s attention to the civil court\u2019s decision of 2 November 2011 whereby the court had acknowledged that V.K. had acted dishonestly (see paragraphs 54-58 below). The applicant also asked the prosecutor to obtain the applicant\u2019s previous criminal file (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above), alleging that already in the course of those proceedings witnesses had stated that V.K. had been \u201ccoaching\u201d (moko) the children what to say to the authorities, as was the case in the present proceedings. The applicant emphasised that the case-file material in respect of the previous criminal case also contained the records of the questioning of his children, and that from that material it was plain that V.K. had been lying. He also asserted that the earlier material proved that in autumn 2009 V.K. had already planned to accuse the applicant of sexually abusing his children. The applicant requested that a psychiatric examination (psichiatrin\u0117 ekspertiz\u0117) be performed on V.K. 27.  On 6 April 2012 the prosecutor refused the applicant\u2019s requests. He considered that a confrontation between the applicant and the two children could be a traumatic experience for the latter. The prosecutor also considered that there were no grounds for ordering a fresh psychiatric examination of the two boys, because, in his view, the earlier expert reports had been properly reasoned, comprehensive, and had raised no doubts. The prosecutor also refused the applicant\u2019s request that the material relating to his previous criminal conviction be added to the file pertaining to the instant case, noting that the judgment regarding his earlier conviction (nuosprendis) had been added to his case file, but holding that other material from the earlier criminal case file had not constituted evidence directly relevant to the circumstances being investigated in the instant criminal case. Lastly, the prosecutor considered that there was no information in the file which could lead one to doubt the testimony of V.K. or her credibility. 28.  On 23 April 2012 that decision was upheld by the pre-trial investigation judge of the Kaunas County District Court, whose decision was non\u2011appealable. The judge considered that the prosecutor was free to choose which pre-trial investigation actions to undertake, and that he did not have to comply with the parties\u2019 requests which were not obligatory to him (Article 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 70 below). For the judge, the prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing the applicant\u2019s request had been properly reasoned and lawful. 29.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s complaint about V.K.\u2019s lack of interest in her sons, in April 2012 the Children\u2019s Rights Ombudsman, E.\u017d., informed him that as at that time V.K. had not visited their sons at the children\u2019s home, she was not interested in their lives, and she was keeping her residential address secret. The child welfare specialists of Kaunas and K\u0117dainiai tried to establish V.K.\u2019s residential address and intended to ask a court to limit V.K.\u2019s parental rights in respect of the two boys. 30.  On 28 May 2012 the pre-trial investigator repeatedly refused to join the material contained in the applicant\u2019s earlier case file (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) to the file relating to the instant case of sexual violence. She reasoned that joining the two sets of material \u201c[was] not possible because in [the earlier] criminal case the pre-trial investigation had been terminated and that case [had] already been examined in court\u201d. 31.  By a final decision of 1 June 2012 the Kaunas City District Court refused the applicant\u2019s request for the prosecutor to be removed as not impartial. 32.  On 9 August 2012 the prosecutor drew up a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with having systemically and on an unknown number of occasions using physical violence towards his sons and then, having subjected them to his will, forced them to orally appease his passion, which amounted to a crime under Article 150 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor also charged the applicant under Article 309 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code with possession of pornographic materials depicting children and with showing those materials to Ro.K. and Ra.K. (see paragraph 69 below). 33.  Once the criminal file was transferred to the Kaunas Regional Court, the applicant \u2013 during a hearing of 17 September 2012 \u2013 complained that the prosecutor had ignored his numerous requests, including a request for him to ensure that V.K. would not accompany their children to their examination by the experts (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). He maintained that V.K. should be questioned in court. 34.  On 4 October 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court considered that V.K. should be questioned, \u201cbecause her testimony [was] important for the criminal case\u201d. When V.K. did not appear at three court hearings held on 17 September, 27 September and 4 October, the court ordered the police to find her and bring her in. 35.  In October 2012 the police informed the court that they could not locate V.K., because since 15 February 2012 she had been on the list of persons without a place of residence and no one had answered the door at V.K.\u2019s last known place of residence. She could not be reached by telephone either. The police noted that \u201crecently\u201d V.K. had been hiding from the pre-trial investigator in the applicant\u2019s case and had not given details of how she could be reached. 36.  On 20 September 2012 the applicant asked the trial court for two social workers, J.J. and A.P., who had seen his family in 2009, be summoned and examined. The trial court secured their attendance, and on 4 October 2012 those two social workers testified that they had not observed the children talking about sex or stating that they had been violated sexually. On the same day the applicant asked that another witness, D.V., who was a family friend, be examined. The court granted the request and D.V. testified in court that there had been fights between the applicant and V.K., but that the children had not shown any interest of a sexual nature. 37.  On 23 November 2012, in court proceedings that were closed to protect the rights of the children, the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of sexual violence against his children. The applicant and his lawyer took part in the court hearings. The applicant questioned the two witnesses, Z.S. and V.F., the cross-examination of whom the prosecutor had refused earlier (see paragraphs 14 and 24 above). Other witnesses \u2013 Ra.K.\u2019s and Ro.K.\u2019s teachers and their guardians at the children\u2019s home \u2013 testified in court that the two boys were serious and honest. Those witnesses stated that the boys had told them that the applicant had been physically violent, but that they had not mentioned having been abused sexually. The applicant did not confess to committing sexual abuse. However, the court found him guilty on the basis of the testimony that Ra.K. and Ro.K. had given to the pre-trial investigation judge on 22 August 2011 (see paragraph 17 above). The trial court also gave weight to the testimony that the boys had given to the child psychologist and the child psychiatrist (see paragraph 19 above). The trial court noted that, according to those experts, Ra.K. and Ro.K. were not prone to fantasising; the children were also able to understand and remember the facts on which the charges of sexual assault against the applicant were based. The court\u2019s verdict was also based on the testimony of Z.S. and V.F. In reply to the applicant\u2019s argument that V.K. had pressured her sons to testify against him, the trial court noted that Z.S. and V.F. had been the first people the boys had told about the abuse; they had only told their mother later. There was no evidence in the file that V.K. had influenced the boys\u2019 testimony. Lastly, the trial court noted that the applicant had acknowledged having been physically violent towards his sons, which was confirmed by the earlier judgment under which the applicant had been convicted of acts of violence (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). 38.  The trial court convicted the applicant of committing sexual assault against a young child (Article 150 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code) and of possession of pornographic material depicting a child or presenting a person as a child (Article 309 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to eleven years of deprivation of liberty. 39.  However, the trial court acquitted the applicant of crimes listed under Articles 153 and 309 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code because the applicant had denied committing those crimes and it was impossible to establish from the children\u2019s testimony which pornographic films the applicant had shown to the children and when he had shown them. 40.  The applicant appealed, insisting that the trial court should not have relied on his sons\u2019 testimony because they had been swayed by their mother, who had been living with them at the relevant time and who had accompanied them to the questioning of 22 August 2011 (see paragraph 17 above). The applicant emphasised the fact that V.K. had \u201cconsciously (s\u0105moningai)\u201d avoided coming into contact with the law enforcement authorities. He was also dissatisfied with the fact that during both the pre\u2011trial investigation and the trial the authorities had denied him the possibility to add to the new criminal file the material from the previous criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). The applicant claimed that the reports by child psychiatrists ordered during proceedings in respect of the earlier case against the applicant contained information about the applicant\u2019s behaviour towards his children in 2009. He stated that in those reports the psychologists had confirmed that the children had described the situation openly, without hiding anything. He could be understood as implying that at that time the children had not mentioned any sexual violence exerted against them by the applicant. The applicant also submitted that the expert reports produced in 2011 had been inconclusive, but had not been examined at the courtroom. 41.  By letters of 28 December 2012 and 20 May and 23 August 2013, as well as during the appellate court hearing of 25 October 2013, the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to make sure that V.K. would be summoned to appear before the Court of Appeal so that he could question her. The applicant pointed out that he had been wrongfully accused of exerting sexual violence towards his children by V.K., and that, because he had not been able to have her cross-examined, he had not had a fair trial. 42.  On 20 May 2013 the applicant also provided the Court of Appeal with (i) a number of documents from the Pastog\u0117 children\u2019s home and (ii) V.K.\u2019s written explanations to the child welfare authorities. The applicant submitted that those documents proved that V.K. had intended to wrongfully accuse the applicant, and that she had \u201cgot rid of the children (atsikrat\u0117) immediately after (vos tik po)\u201d they had been questioned and the expert examinations had been concluded, on 23 November 2011 (see paragraphs 19, 22 and 23 above). The applicant asked the Court of Appeal to add those documents to the case file. 43.  During the hearing of 6 June 2013 before the Court of Appeal the applicant reiterated his request that V.K. be summoned for examination. He provided documents relating to V.K.\u2019s place of work and the conclusions reached by the Children\u2019s Rights Ombudsman (see paragraph 29 above). The appellate court added those documents to the file. The prosecutor agreed with the applicant\u2019s request for V.K. to be summoned and examined. The prosecutor noted that since the applicant had provided documents regarding V.K.\u2019s place of work, \u201cit was possible to take measures to determine V.K.\u2019s place of residence and to try to summon her for examination before the court\u201d. The Court of Appeal decided to examine the evidence, and to grant the applicant\u2019s request and to summon V.K. for examination. 44.  Exercising his right to conduct his defence, the applicant also lodged a number of other requests. However, the Court of Appeal refused each and every one of them. In particular, the court considered irrelevant the applicant\u2019s request for the summons of one of his children\u2019s school teacher, his neighbours, and doctors who had treated V.K. because although those people could provide information about interaction within the applicant\u2019s family, \u201cnone of them could provide information about the circumstances of the crime committed\u201d. Similarly, although requested by the applicant, so far it had not been necessary to call and question the forensic experts who had examined the two children (see paragraph 19 above), because the reports issued by those experts had been provided and the court had a right to examine them and to rely on them. The Court of Appeal considered that it could always come back to the applicant\u2019s request for the cross-examination of the experts in court, should it consider that those expert reports needed clarifying. As for the applicant\u2019s request that certain documents be added (see paragraph 42 above), the appellate court stated that those concerned only V.K.\u2019s personality, and were therefore unrelated to the applicant\u2019s crime. Lastly, the appellate court deemed that the applicant\u2019s request for the addition to the current case file of materials \u2013 the minutes of court hearings and the children\u2019s psychological reports from the applicant\u2019s earlier criminal case file (see paragraph 8 above) \u2013 was without purpose (netikslingas) because those materials concerned the applicant\u2019s earlier crime. 45.  During the appellate court hearing of 25 October 2013 the applicant repeated his request for V.K. to be cross-examined in court, stating that this was indispensable if his right to a fair trial were to be respected. In his view, she had accused him of committing sexual crimes against the children and had coached them to lie in this respect. He underlined that he had had no possibility to question V.K. before the trial court. 46.  The Court of Appeal noted that a summons had been sent to V.K. to two different addresses in K\u0117dainiai and in Kaunas, but that these had been returned to the court marked \u201cdoes not live at this address (negyvena)\u201d and \u201cuncollected (neatsi\u0117m\u0117)\u201d. Another summons had been sent to V.K.\u2019s workplace; however, the office administrator had explained in writing that V.K. was on maternity leave. The Court of Appeal also had information that V.K. was registered as living within the Kaunas Municipality, but no specific residential address for her was registered. The social insurance authorities informed the court that V.K. was on maternity leave and was receiving maternity benefits, but there was no information about her place of residence. 47.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer also asked the appellate court to take measures to ensure that V.K. be found. He noted that the Court of Appeal had initially realised (suprato) that V.K. had to be examined (see paragraph 43 above), but had later backtracked on that issue. The lawyer also considered that the Court of Appeal should have reopened the examination of the experts\u2019 conclusions, because, in his view, they also contained certain statements by the experts acquitting the applicant. 48.  The prosecutor considered that the case could be heard without V.K., \u201cbecause the court [had] exhausted all the possibilities\u201d for ensuring that she be found and examined before the court. 49.  Having discussed the issue, the Court of Appeal decided that the proceedings could continue without V.K.\u2019s participation, deeming that the court had taken all possible measures to locate her. The Court of Appeal also stated that the trial court had not relied on V.K.\u2019s testimony when finding the applicant guilty. 50.  The appellate court then proceeded to examine the evidence in the case, which, as it transpires from the minutes of the Court of Appeal hearing, consisted of reading out the forensic expert reports (see paragraph 19 above). It also dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for the court records (bylos teisiamojo posed\u017eio protokolus) of the applicant\u2019s criminal case of 2011 (see paragraph 8 above) to be added to the evidence. Although the applicant submitted that those records showed that at that time V.K. had lied to the court, and also asserted that at that time the prosecutor had noted that V.K. had had a prior conviction for perjury, the Court of Appeal considered that that document had no direct connection with the present case. Furthermore, the copies of the court records, as provided by the applicant, had not been certified as authentic, which constituted further grounds for rejecting the applicant\u2019s request. 51.  By a ruling of 9 December 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It observed that notwithstanding the trial court\u2019s and the appellate court\u2019s efforts to summon V.K. for questioning, she could not be located. Even so, the applicant\u2019s guilt was proved by other pieces of evidence in the case, all which were consistent with each other. According to the psychologists, Ra.K. and Ro.K. did not have a tendency to fantasise, which would have precluded them from accurately depicting the facts. When questioned by the pre-trial investigation judge and by forensic experts, the boys were mature enough to understand what had happened to them, given that they were then seven and nine years old. Even though the applicant asserted that Ra.K. and Ro.K. had been influenced by their mother, V.K., the applicant\u2019s power over them was equally strong. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s accusation that V.K. had had a motive for inciting the boys to accuse their father of sexual violence and for influencing their testimony. For the appellate court, even though V.K. had accompanied the boys to their questioning, she had not taken part either in the boys\u2019 questioning by the pre-trial investigation judge or in their questioning by the forensic experts. Likewise, although the pre-trial investigation had been opened on the basis of a complaint by V.K. in July 2011, the charges against the applicant had been brought only after the boys\u2019 questioning in August 2011, when credibility of V.K.\u2019s complaint had been verified. Even so, the trial court had not relied on V.K.\u2019s testimony in finding the applicant guilty. The Court of Appeal also found that the statements given by the witnesses Z.S. and V.F. about what the applicant\u2019s children had told them were basically identical and consistent with other evidence, such as psychiatrists\u2019 reports; therefore, there was no reason not to believe those statements. Even though the applicant had tried to challenge those two witnesses as not being impartial, asserting that they were members of V.K. family, the appellate court found no objective basis for believing that those two witnesses had had any motive for incriminating the applicant. Moreover, neither of the two witnesses was a \u201cclose relative\u201d of V.K. within the meaning of that term under Lithuanian criminal law (see paragraph 69 below). Lastly, it was the court\u2019s prerogative to decide what evidence to take into account. As for the applicant\u2019s request that his neighbours, his sons\u2019 teachers and his work colleagues be questioned in order to prove that in 2009 he had worked long hours and had therefore had no practical opportunity to sexually abuse his children, the Court of Appeal deemed that there was no reason to believe that the testimony given by those people would outweigh the entirety of the rest of the incriminating evidence in the case, which for that court was consistent. 52.  On 15 January and on 26 February 2014, the applicant lodged two appeals on points of law, which he drafted himself. He argued, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention, in that the trial and appellate courts had refused his request that the witnesses for the defence be summoned and examined under the same conditions as those under which the prosecutor\u2019s witnesses had been examined. In particular, even though the Kaunas Regional Court had ordered that V.K. be summoned to the hearing, the police had never executed that instruction, notwithstanding the fact that V.K. had been receiving welfare benefits from the Kaunas social care authorities. As a result, V.K. had never been examined in the courtroom. The applicant also pointed out the fact that V.K. had only come to the police three months after she had learned about the alleged abuse of their children; later, she had abandoned their children immediately after they had been questioned by the authorities. The applicant reiterated his contention that his conviction had mainly been based on the testimony of witnesses who were V.K.\u2019s relatives. The applicant\u2019s appeals on points of law also indicate that he had added to them the court records from his 2011 trial where, according to the applicant, the prosecutor had mentioned V.K.\u2019s prior conviction for perjury. 53.  On 19 February and 11 April 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s appeals on points of law, holding that they did not raise questions of law. 54.  In July 2011 V.K. started civil court proceedings, asking that the applicant be required to pay child support in respect of her two children, Ro.K. and Ra.K. During the court hearings it came to light that the applicant was the biological father of only one of those children \u2013 Ro.K. In court V.K. confessed to having lied in her civil lawsuit, and acknowledged that the biological father of Ra.K., born in June 2002, was a certain man whose surname she did not remember. V.K. also stated that she had started closely communicating (artimai bendrauti) with the applicant in August 2002, and had asked him to agree to give his surname to the boy so that she could receive social benefits. Afterwards, on 3 May 2004 a son, Ro.K., had been born to them. V.K. testified that the applicant had taken care of both children. V.K. also stated that she did not work, received social benefits, and lived not in the social housing allocated to her in K\u0117dainiai, but in a rented flat in Kaunas. She acknowledged that from October 2009 until February 2011 both boys had lived in the Pastog\u0117 children\u2019s home and that they had been taken care of by the State, but nevertheless asked that the applicant should be ordered to pay her child support in respect of the previous three years. 55.  In its decision of 2 November 2011 the K\u0117dainiai District Court held that V.K. had been \u201cdishonest (nes\u0105\u017eininga)\u201d, because she had misled the authorities about the true paternity of her son Ra.K. in order to cheat them into granting her social benefits. To make matters worse, she had also withheld from the court the fact that the boys had been in the care of the State between 2009 and 2011, and had claimed child support for this period during which she had not been actually taking care of them. 56.  The court nevertheless awarded V.K. monthly child support of 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 90 euros (EUR)) in respect of the applicant\u2019s child, Ro.K., to be paid by the applicant until he came of age, as well as child support in the amount of LTL 1,200 (EUR 350) due for the four-month-period between March and July 2011 (that is to say from the day on which the boy had ceased to be cared for by the State until the day on which V.K. had lodged her lawsuit). As to the other child, Ra.K., the court held that V.K.\u2019s claim had to be dismissed because, in the light of the established circumstances, the record in the case file testifying to the applicant being Ra.K.\u2019s father was not sufficient to give rise to legal consequences, since the purpose of that record was not to confirm the paternity but to obtain welfare benefits. 57.  In 2012, the child welfare authority in K\u0117dainiai lodged a civil claim, seeking that the applicant be required to reimburse it for the money it had spent in respect of Ro.K. The authority pointed out that on 25 November 2011 V.K. had brought both boys to them and had signed an agreement that both children would be placed in the children\u2019s home in K\u0117dainiai (see paragraph 22 above), stating that she planned to move abroad. For that reason, in December 2011 the K\u0117dainiai Municipality had granted temporary guardianship (laikinoji globa) in respect of both boys to the children\u2019s home. The representative of the child welfare authority also stated that during the hearing of 2 November 2011 V.K. had confessed that the applicant was not Ra.K.\u2019s biological father (see paragraph 55 above). Despite being aware of this fact, the applicant had taken no steps to challenge or to annul his status as Ra.K.\u2019s father. On the contrary, he had written letters in which he recognised both boys as his sons and promised to live with them and to take care of them when he was released from prison. The representative of the child welfare authority also pointed out that V.K. had placed the children in the children\u2019s home in K\u0117dainiai \u201cby deceit (apgaule)\u201d; she had also refused the social housing offered to her and deregistered from her official place of residence in K\u0117dainiai. According to information received from the charity organisation Caritas, V.K. had also stolen things (dirbdama apsivog\u0117) at her workplace; she lived somewhere in Kaunas and did not work, and she also was keeping her actual residential address secret. 58.  On 23 July 2012 the K\u0117dainiai County District Court allowed the claim. It noted that the applicant was detained pending the criminal case, and V.K. would not visit her children in the children\u2019s home \u2013 she \u201cwas not interested in their lives (nesidomi j\u0173 gyvenimu)\u201d and was hiding her place of residence. Given that the applicant had not challenged his paternity of Ra.K., he had all the paternal rights and obligations provided by the law, including the duty to financially support the children (see paragraph 71 below). The court thus ruled that the applicant and V.K. should each pay LTL 300 in respect of each child to the children\u2019s home, until the children came of age. 59.  During the course of the applicant\u2019s arrest on 23 November 2011 (see paragraph 20 above), a body search was performed on him and certain objects, such as his telephone, comb and spectacles were taken. The applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in Kaunas. 60.  It transpires from 25 January 2012 letter from the prosecutor to the applicant that as early as in November 2011 the applicant wrote to the Committee on Legal Affairs (Teis\u0117s ir teis\u0117tvarkos komitetas) of the Seimas, complaining about the non-return of his spectacles. The Committee forwarded the applicant\u2019s complaint to the prosecutors, and it reached the Kaunas regional prosecutor\u2019s office on 2 January 2012. Afterwards, on 25 January 2012 the prosecutor wrote to the applicant that a pre-trial investigation officer would resolve the issue. 61.  As can be seen from later court rulings, on 20 March 2012 the applicant submitted a number of requests to the prosecutor, including a repeated request that his spectacles be returned to him. On 6 April 2012 the prosecutor ordered the pre-trial investigator to look into the matter, and the investigator returned that item to the applicant on 20 April 2012. 62.  The applicant later started civil proceedings for damages, claiming that the taking away of his spectacles had caused him physical and emotional suffering. He asserted that without spectacles he had had difficulties in reading and writing, and that therefore his eyesight had deteriorated. The absence of spectacles had also resulted in difficulties in communicating with others. 63.  By a decision of 26 February 2015, the Vilnius City District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim, and awarded him EUR 1,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It held that by taking away the applicant\u2019s spectacles the authorities had breached the applicant\u2019s property rights, as protected under Article 23 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, taking away the applicant\u2019s spectacles had been not only unlawful, but had also caused him inconvenience in his private life, which in itself had been \u201ca traumatic experience\u201d and had also \u201cdegraded his human dignity (sumenkino \u017emogi\u0161k\u0105j\u012f orum\u0105)\u201d, although the court did not elaborate further. 64.  The applicant appealed. He argued that the pre-trial investigator had intentionally ignored his numerous oral and written requests for the spectacles to be returned to him because she had understood that without spectacles he would have difficulties in reading the documents in his criminal file. The applicant also stated that the Kaunas remand facility had not had an ophthalmologist on its staff, and that the pre-trial investigator had not allowed him to be sent to Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison in Vilnius (which had had an ophthalmologist) on the grounds that this would extend the criminal investigation. Being detained, he had had only limited possibilities to defend his rights, and his complaints to the State authorities for a long time had remained unanswered. The applicant asked that the sum awarded in non-pecuniary damages be raised. 65.  The State authorities responsible for the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention asked that the applicant\u2019s civil claim be dismissed. 66.  On 22 February 2016 the Vilnius Regional Court partly amended the lower court\u2019s decision. The appellate court noted at the outset that certain provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure applied to the applicant\u2019s civil claim (see paragraphs 72 and 73 below). The appellate court acknowledged that there had been no legal grounds for the applicant\u2019s spectacles being taken away. However, the court also pointed out that there was no information in the file to the effect that the spectacles which had been taken away during the applicant\u2019s search had been prescribed by a doctor. The court noted that, pursuant to Article 45 of the Law on the Execution of Pre-trial Detention (see paragraph 74 below), people in detention were entitled to the same level of medical care as those outside prison, and that healthcare services operated in remand facilities. Accordingly, if the applicant had had problems with his vision, he could have asked the authorities to have his eyesight checked, an opportunity of which he had not availed himself. In this connection the appellate court dismissed as unproven the applicant\u2019s argument that, in order to be seen by an ophthalmologist, he would have had to be transferred from a remand facility in Kaunas to Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison in Vilnius, and that the investigator had refused to send him there for examination. Moreover, it was clear from the criminal case file that he had been able to write during the period in detention that he spent without his spectacles. The court noted that on 9, 12, 20 and 27 December 2011 the applicant had submitted various requests to the pre-trial investigator. He also had corresponded with other persons. Having small handwriting, the applicant had successfully managed to write between the lines of a small-squared page. The court also underlined that the applicant\u2019s claim that his eyesight had become worse had not been substantiated by medical documents. Lastly, the duration of the time when the applicant had been without spectacles could have been significantly shorter had he acted in a proactive manner and asked the authorities to return them in a timely fashion. The court considered that there was no proof in the file that the applicant had asked for the return of his spectacles earlier than on 20 March 2012. In sum, since the inconvenience caused to the applicant could have been easily resolved had he shown some initiative, and given that his need for spectacles had not been proved, the appellate court considered that an acknowledgement that the spectacles had been taken away constituted sufficient compensation for the damage suffered. 67.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He submitted, inter alia, that the pre-trial detention facility in Kaunas had not had an eye doctor on its staff, and that therefore he had had no opportunity to obtain spectacles in detention. This had caused the applicant serious physical suffering. The applicant relied on the Court\u2019s judgments in Kud\u0142a v. Poland ([GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XI) and Mandi\u0107 and Jovi\u0107 v. Slovenia (nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011). 68.  By a ruling of 17 May 2016 the Supreme Court refused to accept the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law for examination, as not raising questions of law.", "references": ["4", "5", "2", "7", "6", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company was set up in 1998 as a limited liability company. Its founders and sole shareholders were Ms Zhaneta Pavlovska and Mr Rasko Pavlovski. It traded in scrap metal and for that purpose it purchased waste aluminium, copper, iron and other metals, processed them and then offered the product for sale. 6.  The applicant was registered for the purposes of the Value Added Tax Act (the \u201cVAT Act\u201d) and declared VAT on all invoices issued. VAT was also declared on all incoming invoices. This made it possible for the applicant company periodically to request VAT deductions from the State, which it did (in accordance with the rules of the \u201ctax credit\u201d system). 7.  Until the subsequent events, the applicant company had been submitting regular tax returns to the tax authorities, notifying the State of its VAT calculations, payments and deductions. The State had processed the tax returns without indicating any wrongdoing or additional amounts due on the part of the applicant company. 8.  On 22 September 2009 the Internal Revenues Office, regional directorate \u2013 Skopje (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438, \u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435 \u2013 \u201cthe IRO\u201d) issued an order to audit the applicant company for the purposes of VAT. The audit took place over several days during the months of October and November 2009 and took into account the period between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2009. 9.  On 6 November 2009 a tax assessment was compiled by the IRO. It was established that the applicant company\u2019s suppliers were registered for the purposes of VAT but some of them had not declared or paid VAT to the State, even though it had clearly been declared in the invoices sent to the applicant company. That finding was based on earlier audits of those companies, which remained without further specification. The audit further established that some of the invoices did not contain the addresses of the suppliers. Lastly, the audit found that all invoices from the suppliers had been paid in full by the applicant company and that VAT had been declared on all invoices from the applicant company. On account of the above issues related to the applicant company\u2019s suppliers, the audit concluded that the applicant company had failed to meet the conditions necessary to benefit from the VAT deductions it had received. 10.  Relying on the tax assessment conducted earlier, on 20 November 2009 the IRO issued two decisions in respect of erroneous calculation of VAT, ordering the applicant company to pay an additional 3,827,546.00 Macedonian denars (MKD, around 62,000 euros (EUR)) in VAT. According to the IRO, those were the amounts the applicant company had unlawfully deducted from its tax obligations during the period 2005-07. An appeal lodged against those decisions had no suspensive effect. 11.  The applicant company lodged an appeal with the Minister of Finance against the decisions of 9 December 2009. In the appeal it stated that it had met all of its VAT obligations stemming from the suppliers\u2019 invoices and that it could not be held responsible for the suppliers\u2019 mistakes. 12.  On 8 February 2010 the Minister of Finance dismissed the appeal, reiterating the same findings and reasoning as in the audit report. 13.  On 22 March 2010 the applicant company received a written reprimand from the IRO. The reprimand stipulated the full amount, including interest, to be paid by the applicant company. It amounted to MKD 6,059,124 (around EUR 100,000). 14.  On 23 April 2010 the applicant company lodged an administrative action with the Administrative Court (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434). 15.  On 29 April 2010 the IRO blocked the applicant company\u2019s bank account pursuant to the payment decisions. 16.  By a decision of 28 March 2011 the Administrative Court remitted the case to the Ministry of Finance, having found that the second-instance decision had been issued by an unauthorised person acting in the name of the Minister. 17.  On 26 May 2011 the Ministry of Finance again dismissed the appeal of the applicant company, reiterating the findings from the audit. 18.  On 22 July 2011 the applicant company lodged another administrative action. 19.  On 1 March 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the action. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n\u201c... the cumulative conditions to obtain a deduction ... were not met. Specifically, the income of the applicant company was created by companies which failed to meet their legal obligations in relation to the payment of VAT ...\nIn the deliberations the court took into account the claims by the appellant that it was wrongfully deprived of the right to claim VAT deductions because the errors found in the tax assessment had pertained to other [companies] ... These claims were rejected by the court ... inter alia taking into account that it is in the interests of every taxpayer to know and be aware of those with whom they engage in business.\u201d 20.  On 17 September 2013 the applicant company appealed to the Higher Administrative Court (\u0412\u0438\u0448 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434). 21.  In a final judgment of 13 March 2014 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the findings and conclusions of the tax authorities and stated the following:\n\u201c... [T]he appellant failed to fulfil the cumulative conditions prescribed in sections 33 and 34 of the VAT Act to obtain a VAT deduction specifically because the monetary inflow of the appellant as a taxpayer was done by other taxpayers who failed to meet their obligations to declare or pay tax.\n...\nThe court examined the complaint that all of the outstanding issues in the audit reflected errors committed by third parties and that the appellant should not be forced to bear the obligations of third parties ... but dismissed them ... having in mind that every taxpayer has an interest to enter into relations with other subjects.\u201d 22.  On 2 February 2017 the applicant company was removed from the register of companies and ceased to exist. According to a document issued by the register of companies, it was removed in accordance with section 552-B of the Companies Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0442\u0432\u0430), specifically for not having submitted an annual financial statement (\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0440\u0448\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043a\u0430) to the authorities for the year 2014. 23.  The applicant company\u2019s bank account remained blocked by the IRO until 10 April 2017, when it was closed. Due to lack of funds on the account, the IRO failed to collect any money from the applicant company. 24.  On 9 December 2011 the prosecution for organised crime (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0433\u043e\u043d\u0435\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043d \u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b \u0438 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) filed an indictment against several individuals for criminal enterprise, abuse of office and tax evasion. The indictment encompassed the individuals responsible for several, but not all, of the applicant company\u2019s suppliers. It was alleged that the individuals used the supplier companies to issue fake invoices which were not the result of real commercial activity. The supplier companies as legal entities were not directly indicted. The domestic courts found the accused guilty of the offences by a judgment of 29 March 2013, which became final on 9 January 2014.", "references": ["8", "7", "1", "6", "3", "4", "5", "2", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Riga. At the material time he was the chairman of the supervisory board of a Latvian bank \u2013 Latvijas Kr\u0101jbanka (\u201cKr\u0101jbanka\u201d or \u201cthe Bank\u201d). The State held 32.12% of its shares. 6.  A.L. was one of the shareholders of Kr\u0101jbanka. He was also the President of the Bank until January 2002, when he voluntarily stepped down from this position. In November 2002 he was elected as a member of the Latvian Parliament (Saeima), representing a newly established political party, Latvijas Pirm\u0101 Partija (the Latvia\u2019s First Party \u2013 also referred to below as the \u201cPastors\u2019 Party\u201d), which had been established in the same year. 7.  At the material time an advertising agency, Z., was contracted by both Kr\u0101jbanka and the Latvia\u2019s First Party to provide certain advertising services. 8.  Neatkar\u012bg\u0101 R\u012bta Av\u012bze (\u201cNRA\u201d) was one of the main daily newspapers in Latvia at the material time. It was published by a joint-stock company, Preses Nams (until 2 January 2003) and, subsequently, by the limited liability company Mediju Nams. 9.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant prepared a report on the advertising and marketing expenses incurred by Kr\u0101jbanka in 2001 and the first seven months of 2002, which he then presented to the Bank\u2019s supervisory board. His report was based on information which he had requested from the heads of the marketing and economics departments. According to the applicant\u2019s report, the Bank had transferred substantial sums for advertising and marketing services to, inter alia, Z., for which no supporting documents could be found. This raised suspicions that the Bank\u2019s funds had been misappropriated. The parties did not provide the Court with a copy of the applicant\u2019s report, nor any further details of that report. 10.  On 2 October 2002 the Bank\u2019s supervisory board held an extraordinary meeting and ordered an internal audit to verify the applicant\u2019s findings. At a meeting of 16 October 2002 the head of the internal audit department informed the supervisory board that no undocumented advertising and marketing expenses had been incurred. In response to press reports (see paragraphs 13 et seq. below), the internal audit had verified all deals concluded with Z. in 2002; the internal audit in relation to 2001 was ongoing. The information published in the press had not been confirmed. The conclusions of the final report, dated 30 October 2002, indicated that in 2001 no undocumented advertising and marketing expenses had been incurred. All contracted services had been received, but on some occasions no supporting documents have been kept (for example, copies of certain advertisements in the press and some printed material \u2013 such as concert posters and tickets \u2013 were no longer available). 11.  On 16 October 2002 the supervisory board ordered an additional external audit. In May 2003 the audit agency in its report concluded that while the advertising and marketing expenses incurred in 2001 (755,000 Latvian lati (LVL), approximately 1,074,268 euros (EUR)) and 2002 (LVL 555,000, approximately EUR 789,694) had been greater than in previous years (in 1998 the figure had been LVL 374,000, approximately EUR 532,154; in 1999, LVL 324,000, approximately EUR 461,010; and in 2000, LVL 640,000, approximately EUR 910,638), this could be explained by the fact that the Bank had been in the process of changing its corporate identity during the period under consideration. This process had continued while the external audit was being carried out and the Bank had incurred more expenses in this regard. All contracts with Z. had been approved and signed by the Bank\u2019s highest management. The external audit concluded that there was no evidence that payments had been made for services or goods that had not been received or that the payments had exceeded the value of the services received. No personal links had been found between A.L. or the Bank\u2019s staff members and the advertising companies. There was no evidence that the staff members had been forced to work with the particular service provider or to prepare documents for services which the Bank had not received. 12.  Meanwhile, A.L. applied to have criminal proceedings instituted in respect of the alleged intentional dissemination of false information about him. By a final decision of 13 August 2003 the prosecution refused to institute criminal proceedings. The information and conclusions, which the applicant had provided to the journalists, had been based on erroneous findings contained in the applicant\u2019s initial report on the advertising and marketing expenses. However, there was no evidence that the applicant had intentionally disseminated false information about A.L. The latter was informed of his right to lodge a civil claim in that regard. 13.  Between August 2002 and May 2003 NRA published numerous articles on various topics of public interest concerning the 2002 parliamentary elections. It appears that NRA journalists contacted the applicant for a comment shortly after the meeting of 2 October 2012 of the Bank\u2019s supervisory board had taken place. 14.  In their submissions to the Court, the parties disagreed on the manner and form in which the applicant had provided the respective information to the NRA journalists. The Government stated that the applicant had provided this information to the journalists on several occasions, and that his comments, which had contained concrete descriptions of A.L.\u2019s actions, had been provided in the form of facts susceptible of proof. The applicant, however, stated that he had only on one occasion provided a short comment to the journalists via telephone about the issues discussed at the meeting of the Bank\u2019s supervisory board. Furthermore, the comments had constituted merely his own opinion about Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s management; they had still needed to be verified by the Bank\u2019s internal audit. 15.  The following excerpts are from nine articles, which were published between 3 and 23 October 2002, and which were based on the information provided by the applicant in this regard: 1.  \u201c \u2018Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s former management accused of fraud\u2019\n...\n[Since] the beginning of 2001, [LVL] 522,000 has been transferred [to finance] [Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s] advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation \u2013 the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds etc. \u2013 has been provided ... [T]he transfer of this sum in an unknown direction (nezin\u0101m\u0101 virzien\u0101) actually amounts to the destruction of the Bank\u2019s [available] assets. ... As [the applicant] suggested to [NRA], either \u2018somebody is receiving this paid money back\u2019 or Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s money is being used to create advertising of a completely different kind than that indicated in the available documents. \u2018This is money that has been stolen from the shareholders\u2019, [the applicant] stated. ... Moreover, significant advance payments were made [for services to be provided within a year] shortly before [a] change in Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s management at the beginning of [2002]. The supervisory board has ordered an internal audit to discover where these funds have disappeared to ... Documents in the possession of [NRA] show that the role of A.L. in the affair of the strange advertising [funds] transfers could be quite significant ... The [Bank\u2019s] public relations unit has dispatched [LVL] 168,000 to who knows whom and who knows where. The Bank\u2019s marketing department stands out even more blatantly. Of a total of [LVL] 743,000 spent, no documentary evidence exists regarding the expenditure of [LVL] 356,000.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 3 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P. and E.L.: \u201cKr\u0101jbanka\u2019s former management accused of fraud\u201d.) 2.  \u201cThis week, Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s current officials discovered massive excess expenditure on advertising that was allowed during the period of management of A.L. and V.K. \u2013evidently these persons had been advertising themselves at the expense of Kr\u0101jbanka.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 5 October 2002 edition, article written by R.R. and U.D.: \u201cThe Pastors\u2019 Party \u2013 a \u0160lesers\u2019 family enterprise\u201d.) 3.  \u201c \u2018Advertising for the Pastors\u2019 Party \u2013 with Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s money\u2019\n...\nThe advertising agency, Z., responsible for creating the Latvia\u2019s First Party\u2019s pre\u2011election campaign, is one of the companies to which Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s former management transferred several hundred thousand [Latvian] lati at the beginning of [2002]. The transfer was carried out without documentary certification as an advance payment for advertising services ... [NRA] has already announced that since the beginning of 2001, Kr\u0101jbanka has transferred [LVL] 522,000 [to finance] its advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation is available. ... As [the applicant] admitted to NRA, Z. was the very agency to which more than [LVL] 200,000 of Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s funds was transferred at the beginning of [2002] as an advance payment; [details of the] subsequent expenditure [of those funds] are unknown. \u2018It is possible that this is the money that provided the foundation for the Latvia\u2019s First Party\u2019s sizable advertising campaign\u2019, admitted [the applicant]. ... Documents in the possession of NRA show that the role of A.L. in the affair of the strange advertising [funds] transfers could have been rather significant.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 12 October 2002 edition, article written by K.P. and E.L.: \u201cAdvertising for the Pastors\u2019 Party \u2013 with Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s money\u201d.) 4.  \u201c[The applicant] confirmed to [NRA] that the advertising agency, Z., the creator of Latvia\u2019s First Party\u2019s advertising campaign, is one of the companies to which the former management of Kr\u0101jbanka transferred more than [LVL] 200,000 at the beginning of [2002] without documentary certification as an advance payment for advertising services. It has already been reported that since the beginning of 2001, Kr\u0101jbanka has transferred [LVL] 522,000 [to finance] its advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation \u2013 the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds, etc. \u2013 has been provided.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 15 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: \u201cKr\u0101jbanka\u2019s President concerned about his reputation\u201d.) 5.  \u201c \u2018Crisis within Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s Management\u2019\n...\nThe scandal revolving around the potentially unlawful activities of A.L., the former President of Kr\u0101jbanka, has reached its culmination. ... A.L. has a negative opinion of [NRA\u2019s] publications to date regarding the action of Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s former management in transferring hundreds of thousands of [Latvian] lati to advertising firms without documentary certification in respect of the expenditure of that money ... [NRA] has already repeatedly written about the long-standing battle among Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s shareholders, during which A.L. was accused several times of potentially unlawful actions ... This, however, has not prevented the friends of A.L. from resorting to extreme methods. [NRA] was informed by [the applicant] that ... at the last meeting of the supervisory board, a member of \u2018A.L.\u2019s group\u2019, V.D., asked him in a forthright manner: \u2018Have the folks from Ventspils insured your property?\u2019 \u2018This is an unprecedented event \u2013 the chairman of the Bank\u2019s supervisory board being blatantly threatened!\u2019 admitted [the applicant]. He believes that A.L. is now speculating that he will soon be afforded immunity as a member of [parliament], preventing him from being criminally prosecuted without a majority vote of [the Parliament] ... Commenting on the value of marketing, advertising and public relations contracts, [the applicant] admitted that even though it is necessary to carry out in-depth market research, during A.L.\u2019s era various procedures were breached and payments were made whose sums currently cannot be precisely determined ... NRA has already written that [LVL] 522,000 has been transferred [to finance Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s] advertising and marketing activities since the beginning of the year 2001, in respect of which no documentation \u2013 the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds, etc. \u2013 has been provided ... Additionally, doubts lie in respect of A.L. that certain actions regarding the administration of certificate accounts were also contrary to the interests of both the Bank and the State.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 18 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: \u201cCrisis within Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s management\u201d.) 6.  \u201c[NRA] has already reported that the actions of A.L. as the President of Kr\u0101jbanka are being questioned in relation to advertising contracts concluded in the amount of several hundreds of thousands of [Latvian] lati. These contracts have no documentary corroboration regarding the specific measures [financed by] the money in question.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 19 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P., E.L. and L.T.: \u201cRep\u0161e: the Minister must be morally clean\u201d.) 7.  \u201cNRA has already reported that in 2001, when A.L. was still the President of Kr\u0101jbanka, [LVL] 522,000 was transferred without documentation, apparently for Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s advertising and marketing activities, of which [LVL] 200,000 went to the advertising agency, Z., which also happened to be responsible for creating Latvia\u2019s First Party\u2019s pre-election campaign.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 22 October 2002 edition, article written by B.L.: \u201cParties divide money portfolios!\u201d) 8.  \u201cIt is possible that during A.L.\u2019s term of office [LVL] 522,000 was transferred [to finance] Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which the relevant documentation has not been provided.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 22 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: \u201cKr\u0101jbanka goes against A.L. at the prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d.) 9.  \u201c[NRA] has already written that [LVL] 522,000 was transferred in 2001, without any accompanying documentation, apparently for [Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s] advertising and marketing activities, of which [LVL] 200,000 [went] to the advertising agency, Z., which was responsible for creating Latvia\u2019s First Party\u2019s pre-election campaign.\u201d (Information published in NRA, 23 October 2002 edition, article written by B.L.: \u201cMillionaires compete for power\u201d.) 16.  On 28 July 2003 A.L. lodged a claim against the applicant and the publishers of NRA seeking compensation and the retraction of a total of thirty\u2011one allegedly defamatory articles. He also indicated that the applicant had provided false information to NRA, which had formed the basis of the above-mentioned nine articles (see paragraph 15 above). 17.  During a hearing of 16 January 2004 the applicant admitted before the first-instance court that the information concerning the possible misappropriation of Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s funds, which he had provided to NRA, had proved to be incorrect. He made the following statements:\n\u201cThe information [was] wrong, unfounded. [As part of my duties] I was carrying out my task of managing [the Bank\u2019s] activities. I was not interested in A.L.\u2019s private life. I have always respected him. I tried to organise [my] work correctly.\nAs to the mistake regarding numbers, there was one, and I apologise to A.L. and to the journalists. A.L. worked at the Bank and worked in accordance with [its] budget. A.L. made decisions. There were others responsible for [the Bank\u2019s] budget. [The Bank] did not overpay for [its] advertisements.\nThe mistake regarding numbers could not have offended A.L.\u2019s honour and dignity.\nThere were no public statements; maybe there were other [people] who [provided more information to the press].\u201d 18.  On 3 October 2005 the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa) delivered its judgment, dismissing the claims against the applicant. The court concluded that the nine articles in question (see paragraph 15 above), which had been based on the information provided by the applicant, had reported his personal opinion about the functioning of Kr\u0101jbanka and its management, which could not be considered defamatory. Moreover, no claim for defamatory information to be retracted was lodged against the applicant. The claims against both publishers of NRA (Preses Nams and Mediju nams) were partly upheld in so far as they concerned six out of the nine articles which had been based on information provided by the applicant and six other articles reporting on other matters. 19.  On 28 May 2007 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Civillietu tiesu pal\u0101ta) \u2013 after appeals by A.L., Preses Nams, and Mediju nams \u2013 re-examined the case and delivered a new judgment. The judgment took immediate effect. 20.  The appellate court noted that at the material time the press and other mass media had been widely reporting on the 2002 parliamentary elections \u2013 that is to say the political parties and their leaders, including the newly-established political party, of which A.L. was one of the leaders. He had stood for election, his candidacy had been widely advertised and it had been, accordingly, examined by the press and other mass media. NRA had published a series of articles about the money spent on the pre-election advertising of the Latvia\u2019s First Party, linking the source of these funds to Kr\u0101jbanka and its former President, A.L. It had been reported that during his time in office, LVL 522,000 had been transferred for advertising and marketing purposes without any documentary proof thereof having been preserved and that this had been considered to constitute a misappropriation of the bank\u2019s funds. These funds had been spent on the party\u2019s large-scale advertising; as the applicant had put it: \u201c[T]his money has been stolen from the shareholders\u201d. The nine articles had also contained other information provided by the applicant \u2013 that during A.L.\u2019s time in office, there had been breaches not only in relation to the advertising expenses, but also other breaches in respect of banking operations, payments without approval, the administration of certificate accounts against the interests of the Bank and the State. 21.  The appellate court stated that the information contained in those articles about the use of Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s funds and transactions had been provided by the applicant (who had mentioned specific sums), and that the articles had contained references to his statements. 22.  The appellate court found that since the applicant had provided this information to NRA journalists, he had to bear responsibility for giving and disseminating false information. The court held that this information had not corresponded to the facts and that this had been acknowledged by the applicant himself during the hearing before the first-instance court (see paragraph 17 above). This had also been confirmed by the results of the external audit and by the prosecution (see paragraphs 11 and 12). 23.  The court also held that the journalists had not had a responsibility to verify the accuracy of the provided information, since the applicant\u2019s status as the chairman of the supervisory board of Kr\u0101jbanka had created a legitimate expectation that the provided information was correct. 24.  Lastly, the court found that, even if the margin of permissible criticism in respect of A.L. as a member of parliament was necessarily a wider one than would normally be the case, the false information had nevertheless offended his honour and dignity, as it had contained serious allegations of unlawful activities and had given the impression that A.L. was a dishonest person. 25.  Given the above, and in view of the seriousness of the interference and the applicant\u2019s position in the Bank, the court ordered the applicant to pay compensation to A.L. in connection with the nine articles in the amount of LVL 10,000 (approximately EUR 14,229), together with statutory interest (6% per annum). 26.  In addition, the court upheld the claim against Preses Nams alone in respect of one other article, and ordered it to pay compensation in the amount of LVL 5,000 (approximately EUR 7,114), together with statutory interest (6% per annum). 27.  The applicant and Preses Nams were also ordered to pay A.L.\u2019s legal costs in the amount of LVL 495 (approximately EUR 704) and LVL 375 (approximately EUR 534) respectively. 28.  The appellate court dismissed A.L.\u2019s claims against Preses Nams and Mediju Nams as regards all the other articles that had not been based on any information provided by the applicant. 29.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ts). He did not contest that the information he had provided to the journalists had turned out not to be supported by evidence. However, this information had constituted his evaluation of the actions taken by Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s management as a whole. He had not directly mentioned A.L. by name, surname or his position when giving the information to the journalists. His allegations regarding the misappropriation of Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s funds could only have infringed the interests of the Bank as a legal entity; it could not have offended the honour and dignity of certain executives, who had been under an obligation to inform the supervisory board and the mass media of the truth. Furthermore, the applicant had provided the information in the form of a supposition by indicating that it still needed to be verified by the Bank\u2019s internal audit. It was the NRA journalists who had linked the applicant\u2019s report with the allegations of wrongdoing by A.L. Thus, the applicant could not be held responsible for the manner in which the journalists had decided to present this information, since he had had no means of influencing this. 30.  On 30 January 2008 the Senate of the Supreme Court delivered a new judgment, which in essence upheld the appellate court\u2019s judgment. The relevant parts of the judgement read as follows:\n\u201c[The appellate court\u2019s] conclusion that the applicant had disseminated defamatory and false information was supported by the applicant\u2019s own submissions before the first-instance court, in which he admitted that he had provided incorrect information to [the journalists] ... . The fact that this information was not truthful was confirmed by [the audit agency and the prosecution].\nThe applicant in his appeal on points of law did not contest these findings. ... He merely noted that he was a source and could not influence the evaluation given by the journalists.\nHaving examined the testimony of [the NRA journalists], the appellate court found that the false information provided by the applicant had related not to Kr\u0101jbanka\u2019s management, as the applicant indicated, but specifically to A.L., as the then President of the Bank, thus infringing his honour and dignity. ...\n[The appellate court] found that the journalists had had no reason to doubt the credibility of the information, as it had been provided by the applicant [in his capacity as] chairman of the supervisory board of Kr\u0101jbanka, and his position had undoubtedly created a legitimate expectation that this information was true ... Accordingly, the appellate court rightly held that the journalists had had no obligation to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the applicant. ... A.L. had requested compensation in the amount of LVL 10,000 from [the applicant]. By granting his claim, the [appellate] court, taking into account the scope of the distributed information and its audience, rightly considered it justified.\u201d\nThe Senate of the Supreme Court also upheld the claim against Preses Nams alone in respect of one other article; they held that A.L.\u2019s honour and dignity had not been offended in other articles. The appellate court had referred to the Court\u2019s case-law and had taken into account A.L.\u2019s status and the fact that he had refused to offer comment. The appellate court had correctly applied the relevant principle that the journalistic freedom also covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation; the Senate referred to a/s Diena and Ozoli\u0146\u0161 v. Latvia (no. 16657/03, \u00a7 84, 12 July 2007) in this regard.\nReferring to section 2352a of the Civil Law and section 29(3) of the Law on the Mass Media, the Senate of the Supreme Court ordered the applicant (who had disseminated that defamatory information), and not Preses Nams, to retract the relevant parts of the articles in question (see paragraph 15 above). The latter, however, still remained obliged to publish the retracted information.", "references": ["2", "5", "7", "1", "0", "4", "3", "8", "No Label", "6", "9"], "gold": ["6", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Mersin. 5.  On 30 December 2011 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda for that organisation. 6.  On the same day, the applicant was brought before the investigating judge who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the nature of the offences, and the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences, and the risk of absconding. 7.  On 28 March 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an objection against the decision dated 30 December 2011 ordering the applicant\u2019s detention and requested his release. On 29 March 2012 the Mersin Magistrates\u2019 Court dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. On 16 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed a further objection against that decision. On 17 April 2012 the Mersin Criminal Court with General Jurisdiction dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 8.  On 5 September 2012 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 9.  On 10 September 2012 the Adana Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, accusing him of being a member of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda in its favour. 10.  According to the latest information in the case file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before an assize court.", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "6", "5", "9", "8", "7", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Podgorica. 5.  Between 3 December 2002 and 15 September 2003 the daily newspaper Dan published several articles about a human trafficking case in Montenegro, in which the applicant\u2019s name was mentioned in various contexts. 6.  On 22 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the publisher of the said newspaper, seeking compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage due to violation of his honour and reputation caused by the publishing of untrue information about him. 7.  On 4 June 2010, following a remittal, the Podgorica First Instance Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant, ordering the publisher to pay the applicant 8,000 euros (EUR) in non-pecuniary damages and to publish the judgment in Dan, the daily newspaper in question. 8.  On 22 October 2010 the Podgorica High Court amended this judgment by awarding the applicant EUR 4,000 as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, which judgment was served on the applicant on 29 November 2010. 9.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 14 January 2011. 10.  On 7 April 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2011.", "references": ["1", "0", "5", "6", "8", "7", "2", "4", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Siirt. 5.  On 9 January 2009 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and disseminating its propaganda. 6.  On 13 January 2009 the applicant was brought before the Siirt Magistrates\u2019 Court, who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences. 7.  On 3 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an objection against the above decision on the applicant\u2019s detention and requested his release. 8.  On 6 August 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating terrorist propaganda, and aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. 9.  On 10 August 2009, at the end of the preparatory hearing, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court decided to prolong the applicant\u2019s detention on the basis of the case-file. 10.  On 8 September 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court ex officio examined the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 11.  On 1 October 2009, at the end of the first hearing before the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, the applicant was released pending trial. 12.  On 31 December 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. No appeal was filed and the judgment became final on 8 January 2010.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "0", "7", "3", "4", "6", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor\u2011in-chief of \u00dclkede \u00d6zg\u00fcr G\u00fcndem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6.  On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled \u201cAnalysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly\u201d was published in \u00dclkede \u00d6zg\u00fcr G\u00fcndem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah \u00d6calan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7.  On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article:\n\u201c... Abdullah \u00d6calan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]\u201d.\nThe public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah \u00d6calan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8.  During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9.  On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10.  The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court\u2019s judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11.  On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12.  On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13.  The applicant appealed. 14.  On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15.  According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802.", "references": ["0", "9", "5", "7", "4", "8", "2", "1", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1987 and 1985, respectively, and live in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 8.  On 5 April 2007 the applicants attended a concert performed by a band called \u201cGrup Yorum\u201d in Hozat. During the concert they chanted certain slogans, such as \u201cRevolutionary prisoners are immortal\u201d (\u201cDevrimci tutsaklar \u00f6l\u00fcms\u00fczd\u00fcr\u201d), \u201cRevolutionary prisoners are our honour\u201d (\u201cDevrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur\u201d). 9.  On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court charging the applicants with disseminating propaganda in favour of the \u201cDHKP/C\u201d (Revolutionary People\u2019s Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the first applicant had chanted the slogan \u201cRevolutionary prisoners are our honour\u201d (\u201cDevrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur\u201d) during the concert. As regards the second applicant, the public prosecutor alleged that he had chanted the following slogans during the same concert: \u201cMahir, H\u00fcseyin, Ula\u015f; Fight until emancipation\u201d[1] (\u201cMahir, H\u00fcseyin, Ula\u015f; Kurtulu\u015fa kadar sava\u015f\u201d); \u201cMartyrs of the revolution are immortal\u201d (\u201cDevrim \u015fehitleri \u00f6l\u00fcms\u00fczd\u00fcr\u201d); \u201cRevolutionary prisoners are our honour\u201d, \u201cVictory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance\u201d (\u201cDa\u011flarda zafer, cephede kurtulu\u015f; ya\u015fas\u0131n zafer, ya\u015fas\u0131n direni\u015f\u201d). 10.  During the criminal proceedings against them, the applicants stated that they had attended the concert of 5 April 2007 and had sung along with the musicians but had not chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. 11.  On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment each. In its judgment, the assize court considered it established, on the basis of a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, a report on the video recording, the indictment, the applicants\u2019 defence submissions and the public prosecutor\u2019s observations on the merits of the case, that the applicants had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert in question had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C and that the applicants had chanted slogans that were used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 12.  The applicants appealed. 13.  On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 14.  On 13 and 14 September 2011 the applicants were informed that they had to start serving their prison sentences within ten days. According to the applicants\u2019 submissions, which were not contested by the Government, upon receipt of the summons to serve the prison sentences, both applicants duly served them.", "references": ["0", "5", "9", "8", "2", "7", "1", "3", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ankara. At the relevant time he was a professor of translation in the Faculty of Science and Literature of the University of Mersin (\u201cthe faculty\u201d). He specialised in the German language. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant was invited to Istanbul to take part in a television programme that was due to be broadcast live on a public channel on Saturday 31 March 2001. The programme consisted of a debate on the topic of \u201cThe cultural structure of the European Union and the traditional structure of Turkey \u2013 Comparing identities and modes of behaviour \u2013 Likely problems and suggested solutions\u201d. 7.  On 27 March 2001 the applicant informed the director of the translation course that he had been invited to take part in the above-mentioned programme. 8.  On the same day the course director wrote to the dean of the faculty informing him that the applicant had been invited to take part in a television programme. In his letter he also expressed doubts as to whether there was a link between the applicant\u2019s specialist field and the subject of the programme and whether the applicant\u2019s invitation to take part in a personal capacity was in keeping with the university\u2019s principles. 9.  On 30 March 2001 the dean of the faculty informed the director of the translation course that it had been decided that the applicant\u2019s participation in the programme in question was not appropriate. The applicant was informed of the dean\u2019s decision the same day. 10.  On 31 March 2001 the applicant nevertheless took part in the programme in Istanbul. 11.  In letters dated 2 and 5 April 2001 to the dean of the faculty, the applicant asked why his participation in the broadcast of 31 March 2001 had not been considered appropriate in spite of his past work on the subject covered by the programme. He added that it would have harmed his professional standing and reputation for reliability if he had withdrawn from the programme at short notice when he had already agreed to take part. He also maintained that he had been entitled to take part in the event, citing his academic freedom in that regard. 12.  In a letter to the applicant dated 9 April 2001 the dean of the faculty replied that the applicant had not been entitled to take part in the event without the authorities\u2019 permission. He added that the director of the translation course had expressed misgivings as to whether the applicant was sufficiently familiar with the topic of the programme of 31 March 2001, and that the view of the course director had been taken into account in the decision to refuse authorisation. 13.  On Saturday 14 April 2001 the applicant took part in another programme in the same series, following an international conference held in Istanbul from 11 to 13 April 2001 which the dean of the faculty had authorised him to attend. 14.  On 27 April 2001 a disciplinary inquiry was opened concerning the applicant on the grounds that he had twice taken part in the programme in Istanbul without the university\u2019s authorisation. 15.  On 26 June 2001 the commission of inquiry published its report. It noted at the outset that the applicant had been authorised to take part in events outside his city of residence on twelve occasions during the 2000/01 academic year, but that his request for authorisation concerning the programme of 31 March 2001 had been refused in view of the opinion of the course director, who considered that the topic of the programme was not directly linked to the applicant\u2019s specialist field. As to the applicant\u2019s participation in the broadcast of 14 April 2001, the commission noted that the dean of the faculty had authorised the applicant to attend an academic gathering to be held from 11 to 13 April 2001 in Istanbul, and that this authorisation had not covered 14 April 2001. The commission considered in that regard that not even research professors should take part in programmes of this type without supervision or authorisation, and that universities had to uphold academic ethics. It went on to find that the applicant\u2019s participation in two television programmes in Istanbul on 31 March and 14 April 2001, without authorisation from his university, amounted to leaving his city of residence without authorisation, an offence punishable under regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations for managers, lecturers and officials in higher education institutions (\u201cthe disciplinary regulations\u201d). It therefore proposed, by way of a penalty, that the applicant\u2019s salary be reduced by one-eighth, under regulation 4(d) of the above-mentioned regulations. 16.  On 2 July 2001 the dean of the faculty decided to reduce the applicant\u2019s salary by one-eighth for leaving his city of residence without authorisation, an offence punishable under regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations. 17.  On 20 July 2001 the applicant applied to the University Vice\u2011Chancellor for reconsideration of that decision and requested that the sanction be lifted. 18.  On 8 August 2001 the Vice-Chancellor decided to lift the sanction of a reduction in salary and to impose a less severe penalty on the applicant, in the form of a reprimand under regulation 16 of the disciplinary regulations. 19.  On 25 October 2001 the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision. He referred to his academic freedom, which he claimed was provided for in the Constitution, as justification for his participation in the television programme in question, pointing out that the programme had been broadcast on a public-service channel. He also argued that regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations was liable to be wrongfully applied by managers and that the perimeter of a city no longer had the same significance in view of modern means of transport and communication. Lastly, he argued that the programme of 14 April 2001 had been a follow-up to the conference of 11 to 13 April 2001, which he had been authorised to attend, and that the people invited to appear on the programme had been participants in the conference. 20.  On 29 May 2002 the Adana Administrative Court (\u201cthe Administrative Court\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, finding that the decision to penalise him had not been unlawful. The court noted in that regard that it was beyond dispute that, on 31 March 2001, the applicant had left his city of residence despite the refusal of his request to take part in the television programme in question. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s remaining arguments gave no reason to suppose that the decision to impose a sanction had been defective. 21.  On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He complained, in particular, that the Administrative Court\u2019s examination of his claims had been inadequate. 22.  On 31 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment. It found that the reasoning of the decision had been in conformity with the procedure and the law and that there were no grounds for quashing the decision.", "references": ["5", "8", "9", "2", "0", "4", "7", "1", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1974, 1978 and 1980 respectively. They all live in Sri Lanka. The first applicant lives in Colombo, the second applicant in Kochchikade, and the third applicant in Pannipitiya. 7.  The applicants all went to Cyprus for employment purposes. 8.  The first applicant arrived in Cyprus on 20 April 2001 in order to take up employment as a domestic worker. He was granted a temporary residence permit, initially until 20 April 2005. This was renewed until 10 May 2011. 9.  The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days\u2019 prior notice to the holder. 10.  During the above period the applicant left Cyprus twice to go back to Sri Lanka: on 12 November 2001 and in January 2004. The first time, he stayed in his home country for about eleven months, and the second time, he stayed for just over a month. On 21 February 2004, during his second visit home, he married a Sri Lankan national. 11.  His wife joined him in Cyprus on 16 September 2004, in order to work as a housemaid. She was granted a temporary residence permit until 16 September 2008. 12.  On 13 December 2007 their daughter was born. 13.  On 17 September 2008 the first applicant\u2019s wife abandoned her work and her place of residence. Her whereabouts at the time were not known to the authorities. She had not applied for the renewal or extension of her temporary residence permit, which had expired the day before. 14.  On 10 December 2008 all competent authorities were given orders by the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit to trace the first applicant\u2019s wife. 15.  On 30 November 2010 a lawyer acting on behalf of the first applicant\u2019s wife wrote to the Minister of the Interior requesting a visitor\u2019s residence permit for her based on humanitarian grounds, a permit of the same duration as that held by her husband. The lawyer noted that the couple had a young daughter, that both the wife and the daughter were supported by the first applicant, and that she could not return to Sri Lanka without him, as she did not have family there with whom she and her daughter could stay. She also needed time to obtain travel documents for their daughter. The lawyer informed the authorities that the couple\u2019s intention was that the whole family would return to Sri Lanka upon the expiry of the first applicant\u2019s temporary residence permit. 16.  The second applicant arrived in Cyprus on 5 February 2010 and was granted a temporary residence permit until 4 May 2010. This was renewed until 19 October 2011. 17.  The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days\u2019 prior notice to the holder. 18.  The third applicant arrived in Cyprus on 4 March 2002. He was granted a temporary residence permit until 3 May 2002. This was renewed until 12 February 2009. Following the expiry of his permit, he remained in Cyprus on an irregular basis. The third applicant submitted that he had applied for a renewal of his permit. 19.  The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days\u2019 prior notice to the holder. It also stated that it was final and non-renewable. 20.  According to the first and second applicants, on 6 January 2011, while in the first applicant\u2019s car, they passed through the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia and saw a group of Sri Lankans. They got out of the car and saw people holding swords and iron rods. Fearing for their lives, they abandoned the car and ran in different directions. The second applicant was injured during the clashes: his index finger was cut off and his middle finger injured. After the clashes, the first applicant took the second applicant to the Nicosia General Hospital, where the latter underwent surgery. According to the second applicant, the police came to the hospital and arrested him. He remained in the hospital after the operation, and on 9 January 2011 he was taken to Lakatamia police station, where he was detained. According to the first applicant, on the morning of 7 January 2011 six people who had taken part in the clash attacked his residence and threatened to kill him if he went to the police. However, half an hour later, when he went to the police station to report the incident, he was arrested and detained on suspicion of being involved in the clashes. 21.  According to the third applicant, he was also passing by that area with his car and stopped to see what was going on, but, fearing for his life, he ran away and left his car behind. He informed his employer and the latter informed the police about the clash. The police asked the third applicant to come to the police station to make a statement and take his car back. On 7 January 2011 the third applicant went to Lakatamia police station and was arrested and detained on suspicion of being involved in the clashes. 22.  On the evening of 6 January 2011 the police received information that about twenty aliens carrying offensive weapons (swords, clubs and Molotov cocktails) were in the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia. The police immediately went to the site and discovered that a number of aliens had attempted to set fire to a house there by throwing Molotov cocktails at it. The police carried out an investigation into the events. They examined and collected evidence found in the area (including the first and third applicants\u2019 cars). They reached the conclusion that the applicants, along with six other individuals from Sri Lanka, were likely to have been involved in the clash. A number of suspects, including the second applicant, had sustained injuries which had been treated at Nicosia General Hospital. 23.  On 7 January 2011 the police arrested all nine Sri Lankans, including the applicants, on the basis of arrest warrants issued on the same day by the Nicosia District Court under section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) and Article 11(3) of the Constitution, on reasonable suspicion that they had taken part in a fight in a public place, contrary to section 89 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154). 24.  On 8 January 2011 the Nicosia District Court convened at Nicosia General Hospital. The applicants were remanded in custody for six days under section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Law and Article 11(5) and (6) of the Constitution, to enable the investigation into the commission of various criminal offences to be concluded. The offences included: intending to inflict grievous bodily harm, unlawful wounding, an unlawful attempt to set fire to a building, and taking part in a fight in a public place (sections 228, 315 and 89 of the Criminal Code). The first applicant was detained in Paphos Gate police station in Nicosia, and the second and third applicants in Lakatamia police station. 25.  On 13 January 2011 the police investigation file, which included written statements by the applicants concerning the incident, was transmitted to the Attorney General. The Nicosia Crime Investigation Department informed the Attorney General that that there was sufficient evidence against all the nine individuals arrested, including the applicants, in relation to the offence of taking part in a fight in a public place contrary to section 89 of the Criminal Code, but not as regards the remaining offences, which were more serious. The third applicant had also committed the offence of staying in Cyprus unlawfully, as his temporary resident permit had expired on 12 February 2009. At the suggestion of the police, the Attorney General decided not to prosecute the applicants, but to deport them instead. 26.  On 14 January 2011 the residence permits of the first and second applicants were revoked by the Director of the Civil Registry and Migration Department under section 6 of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105), on the grounds that their conduct had posed a danger to the public order of the Republic. Deportation and detention orders were issued against the applicants on the same day: under section 6(1)(g) of the above Law in respect of the first and the second applicants, on the grounds of public order, and under section 6(1)(k) in respect of the third applicant, on the grounds of unlawful stay. 27.  On the same day three letters were prepared by the Minister of the Interior informing the applicants of the decision to detain and deport them. The letters stated that the applicants were illegal immigrants: the first and second applicants under section 6(1)(g) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, because their \u201cconduct had been considered dangerous for reasons of public order\u201d, and the third applicant by virtue of section 6(1)(k), on the grounds of \u201cillegal stay\u201d. Consequently, their temporary resident permits had been revoked and deportation and detention orders had been issued against them. 28.  Consequently, on 14 January 2011, upon the expiry of the remand warrant, the applicants were released but re-arrested at once on the basis of the deportation and detention orders that had been issued against them. The Government submitted that, in accordance with standard police practice, the applicants would have been informed orally of the decision not to prosecute them and the decision to deport them. Although the Government did not have evidence as to the exact date on which the applicants were notified of the letters of 14 January 2011 or the exact manner in which they were notified, this happened sometime between 14 and 18 January 2011. 29.  On 18 January 2011 a Cypriot lawyer acting on behalf of the applicants sent two letters by fax to the Minister of the Interior, referring to the letters of 14 January 2011 sent to the applicants. He objected to the deportation of the first and second applicants; he also requested a review of the decision taken with regard to the third applicant. The lawyer requested a meeting to discuss the matter with the above-mentioned Minister. 30.  The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 case had then been reviewed by the Minister of the Interior, who had noted their lawyer\u2019s objection, read the administrative file and maintained the decision to deport the applicants. 31.  Although the first applicant called his wife several times during his detention, she did not come to visit him at the police station. 32.  The first and third applicants were deported on 19 January 2011 and the second applicant was deported on 21 January 2011. 33.  There were signed notes by a police officer on the copies of the letters of 14 January 2011 stating that the letters had also been served on the applicants on the day they were deported. 34.  The applicants were included on the authorities\u2019 \u201cstop list\u201d (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 35.  The documents submitted by the Government indicate that the first applicant\u2019s wife continued to stay in Cyprus illegally following her husband\u2019s deportation. On 3 December 2012 she lodged an asylum application, which was dismissed on 31 January 2013. She left Cyprus for Sri Lanka on 5 July 2013 and she was included on the authorities\u2019 \u201cstop list\u201d (see paragraph 34 above). She returned to Cyprus that same month with a new passport with different identity details, and was granted a residence and employment permit until 15 November 2016. However, the authorities realised that she was the same person and arrested her on 10 September 2014 with a view to her deportation. No further details have been given by the Government in this respect.", "references": ["3", "9", "5", "7", "1", "8", "6", "0", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kilis. 6.  On 17 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a civil servant. She was successful in the examination and on an unspecified date she was informed by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister\u2019s office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e (T\u00fcrkiye Elektrik Da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m A.\u015e. \u2013 Turkish Electricity Distribution S.A.), a State-run electricity company. 7.  On an unspecified date TEDA\u015e informed the applicant that she would not be appointed to the post in question as she did not fulfil the requirements of \u201cbeing a man\u201d and \u201chaving completed military service\u201d. 8.  On 4 September 2000 the applicant lodged an action against TEDA\u015e with the Gaziantep Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Kilis Branch of TEDA\u015e not to appoint her to the post in question and a stay of execution of this decision. 9.  On 9 May 2001 the Gaziantep Administrative Court ordered the stay of execution of TEDA\u015e\u2019s decision not to appoint the applicant as a security officer. The court considered that \u201cbeing a male\u201d was not a requirement for the post. 10.  On 23 July 2001 the applicant was offered a contract by the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e subject to a probationary period of six months. On an unspecified date the applicant took up her duties. 11.  On 4 October 2001 the Gaziantep Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e. The court held that the requirement of \u201chaving completed military service\u201d should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDA\u015e. It further noted in that connection that since there had not been a specific requirement to recruit only male candidates for the said post, the fact that the applicant had been rejected solely on account of her sex had been unlawful. 12.  On 28 January 2002 TEDA\u015e lodged an appeal against the judgment of 4 October 2001, requesting that the Supreme Administrative Court order a stay of execution of the judgment of the Gaziantep Administrative Court and subsequently quash it. 13.  On 12 April 2002 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court granted the stay of execution of the judgment of 4 October 2001. 14.  On 11 June 2002 TEDA\u015e informed the applicant that her contract of employment had been terminated on 27 May 2002 by virtue of the Supreme Administrative Court decision of 12 April 2002. 15.  On 26 December 2002 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of 4 October 2001. The Supreme Administrative Court considered that given that there had been a requirement of \u201chaving completed military service\u201d, the post had been reserved for male candidates only. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore found that the decision not to appoint the applicant to the post had been in accordance with the law. 16.  On 23 October 2003 the Gaziantep Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case by following the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court. 17.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 23 October 2003 and argued that the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s interpretation, namely that the post in question must have been reserved only for male candidates given that there was a requirement to complete military service, ran counter to the principle of equality and the State\u2019s positive obligation to ensure non\u2011discrimination between men and women. In support of her arguments, the applicant maintained that this obligation was set out not only in Article 10 of the Constitution but also in Article 2 \u00a7 d of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as well as Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. She further argued that it was of no importance to dwell on whether the post in question had been reserved for male candidates only, since such a reservation itself would be contrary to the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex in access to employment as set out in the relevant international instruments and European Union regulations. On 16 November 2017 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court unanimously upheld the decision of 23 October 2003, without replying to the arguments of the applicant. 18.  On 6 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions (Dan\u0131\u015ftay \u0130dari Dava Daireleri Genel Kurulu), the composition of which included some members of the Twelfth Division, delivered a decision in favour of R.B., who, like the applicant had been a female candidate for TEDA\u015e whose application to be appointed to the post of security officer had been rejected by TEDA\u015e on account of not fulfilling the requirements of \u201cbeing a male\u201d and \u201chaving completed military service\u201d. The General Assembly held that the requirement of \u201chaving completed military service\u201d should be considered to apply only to male candidates. It found, however, that it was unlawful to refuse to appoint R.B. on that ground. 19.  On an unspecified date, the applicant applied for rectification of the decision of 16 November 2007, and maintained the arguments she had submitted during appeal (see paragraph 17 above). Relying on the right to a fair hearing, she argued that her submissions concerning the prohibition of discrimination were also supported by the findings of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in its decision concerning the case of R.B.; she therefore requested the Supreme Administrative Court to rectify its decision of 16 November 2007. 20.  In the rectification proceedings the judge rapporteur of the Twelfth Division submitted his written opinion on the merits of the case and argued, inter alia, that the decision of 16 November 2007 should be rectified in the light of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions of 6 December 2007 in the case of R.B. He also noted in that connection that Turkey had ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and that pursuant to its Article 11, the State was bound to take all appropriate measures to ensure, inter alia, the right to the same employment opportunities on a basis of equality of men and women, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment. 21.  On 24 June 2009 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the rectification of its previous decision, holding that none of the reasons put forth by the applicant for rectification fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for rectification indicated in section 54 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577) and that its previous decision was in accordance with law and procedure. Therefore the Gaziantep Administrative Court\u2019s decision of 23 October 2003 became final.", "references": ["9", "6", "5", "7", "0", "1", "2", "No Label", "8", "3", "4"], "gold": ["8", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are serving either life sentences or a lengthy period of imprisonment in different prisons in Bulgaria. 5.  The applicant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in November 2011. As it transpires from documents in the file, pursuant to an order of the prison governor referring to section 248(1)(1) of the 2009 Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act (see paragraph 18 below), on 29 July 2011 the applicant was placed in isolation in Burgas Prison, in a permanently locked cell without the possibility to take part in collective activities. The applicant described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. He was kept in isolation since 29 July 2011, without running water and toilet in his cell. He had to use the same bucket to relieve himself and as a chair at meal times as he ate in the cell. The heating was insufficient in winter and the temperature was excessively high in the cell in summer. There was poor ventilation and poor natural light in his cell. Also, the light in his cell was kept on during the entire night, the cell was infested with rats and cockroaches, and the latter sometimes also reached his food. On an unspecified date before July 2016 the applicant was transferred to Varna Prison and he has not complained about the conditions there. 6.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final decision by the Supreme Court of Cassation of 10 November 2005. He complained about the conditions under which he has been serving his sentence since 12 July 2007 when he had been transferred to Plovdiv Prison. He described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. There has been no running water or toilet in his cell which measured about 6 square metres. He has had to use a bucket to comply with the needs of nature in his cell; he has also been taking his food in the cell. The cell was overly humid, which was not mitigated by the fact that he has had to hang his clothes to dry there after washing them. The ventilation was poor, which aggravated the repugnant smell coming out of the sewers situated close to his cell. In the summer the temperatures were very high and in the winter the heating was switched off at around 6 p.m. as a result of which it became very cold in his cell. 7.  In addition, between 2007 and 2011 he had been kept under the very impoverished and restrictive \u201cspecial regime\u201d, alone in a cell. According to the applicant, while his regime was formally changed from \u201cspecial\u201d to the lighter \u201cstrict\u201d one on 6 June 2011, in reality the restrictions and inadequate conditions in which he has been detained did not change. He has been handcuffed systematically upon leaving his cell. 8.  The applicant was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 26 July 2004 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation. He complained about the \u201cspecial regime\u201d and inadequate material conditions of detention in which he has been serving his sentence since 24 January 2012 in Varna Prison. The period of detention of this applicant before that date was subject to examination in an earlier Court\u2019s judgment in which it found a violation of Article 3 on account of the excessively strict prison regime and poor conditions of detention (see Iordan Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 22926/04, \u00a7 128, 24 January 2012). 9.  The applicant submitted that he has been serving his sentence in isolation from the surrounding world, namely in a permanently locked cell. He has not been involved in any collective activities or provided with work and has been denied contact with prisoners who are serving sentences lighter than life imprisonment. Every time he was taken out of the high security zone, he has been hand-cuffed. The authorities have not carried out meaningful assessments of the need to keep him serving his sentence under the \u201cspecial regime\u201d. Thus, their assessments did not involve an analysis of his psychological and physical state, or of his attitude and demonstrated willingness to change, and were not conducted by specially-trained personnel. 10.  As to the material conditions in which he has been kept since 24 January 2012, the applicant submitted that, although a toilet had been installed in his cell in August 2012, it stands at about 45 cm from his bed. As the toilet has not been separated from the rest of the space, he has had the intrusive feeling of living in a toilet. Given that the prison administration has been refusing to provide hygienic products for cleaning the toilet, such as brushes and washing products, the toilet has been unusable. The overall hygiene in the cell and the common spaces has been extremely poor, with cockroaches and rats roaming about. 11.  On 10 June 2011 the first instance court sentenced the applicant to a whole-life sentence, which was confirmed by the appellate court on 27 June 2013. The Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the whole-life imprisonment sentence in a final judgment of 21 May 2014. 12.  The applicant submitted, and the Government did not comment on, that he has been kept in a permanently locked cell in Pazardzhik Prison, isolated from the rest of the prison population and only allowed to communicate with other life prisoners during the one-hour daily physical exercise he took outside his cell. There has been no running water or toilet in his cell which measures less than 6 square metres. The hygiene in the cell has been very poor and there have been cockroaches and bed bugs, and the prison administration has done nothing to get rid of them. As there is no table in his cell the applicant has been eating over a newspaper spread over his bed. While the natural light which reached the cell has been extremely weak, the artificial light has been kept on throughout the night. The temperature in the cell was inadequate, fluctuating between extremes in the summer and winter.", "references": ["7", "6", "4", "9", "3", "2", "8", "5", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Argenteuil. 6.  On Tuesday 9 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s father, Mr Ali Ziri, who was 69 years old, and A.K., who was 60, set off in the latter\u2019s vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages. A.K. was driving. At about 8.35 p.m. a police patrol from the Argenteuil station, consisting of officers V.P., B.G. and J.C., having noticed that the car was being driven erratically, waved it down. 7.  In the light of the parties\u2019 submissions and the documents in the file, Mr Ziri was asked to get out of the vehicle but refused and began insulting one of the police officers, who decided to arrest him for resistance. The officer grabbed Mr Ziri by the arm and he fell backwards onto the ground, landing on his backside. Officers B.G. and J.C. lifted him up, each taking one arm, and forcibly handcuffed him. Mr Ziri was then placed in the back of the police car together with A.K. and officer B.G., with V.P. at the wheel and J.C. in the passenger seat. Even before the car set off, A.K. insulted and spat at officer V.P. After telling him three times to calm down, unsuccessfully, officer B.G. immobilised him by bending him over, with his head touching his knees. When he saw this, Mr Ziri tried to strike B.G. Officer J.C. then turned round on his seat, with his back to the windscreen, to force Mr Ziri to bend over by pressing his two hands onto the latter\u2019s back, thus using the so-called \u201cdouble-seated embrace\u201d technique. Mr Ziri remained in that position for the rest of the journey to the Argenteuil police station, which lasted \u2013 according to the time between the first radio call made by officer V.P. and the arrival \u2013 between three minutes twenty-five seconds and five minutes. 8.  On their arrival at the police station, at 8.46 p.m., officer B.G. tried to take Mr Ziri out of the vehicle with the assistance of a few colleagues, by pulling him with both hands under his shirt, while pressing one of his feet against the rim of the car. Mr Ziri was thus extracted and he hit the ground. He was then picked up by the officers, who immobilised his four limbs, and was carried, apparently without reacting and with his head hanging down, into the building. 9.  Inside the police station Mr Ziri and A.K. were taken into the transit room and laid out flat, on their stomachs and in a safe lateral position (this is not clear from the file) with their hands cuffed behind their backs. They vomited several times. Referring to the findings of the National Security Ethics Commission of 17 May 2010 (see paragraph 30 below), the applicant added that a large number of police officers witnessed the events. 10.  At 9.15 p.m., half an hour after the arrival at the police station, the officer in charge asked a team of four officers to take both men to hospital. Still in handcuffs, they were allegedly taken on foot to the police van, where they waited for 45 minutes before being driven to hospital. 11.  Mr Ziri and A.K. arrived at the hospital \u2013 about 2 km from the police station \u2013 between 10.05 p.m. and 10.09 p.m. One of the officers called for a stretcher on which Mr Ziri was laid, on his back, without handcuffs. While waiting for the medical staff, the officers noted that Mr Ziri was vomiting and choking on his vomit. He moved into or was placed in a safe lateral position until the nurses arrived. 12.  A doctor examined Mr Ziri at 10.45 p.m. and noted that he was in a state of cardiac arrest. He was taken to intensive care, where he never regained consciousness. 13.  It can be seen from the judgment of the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal of 12 December 2014 (paragraphs 39-41 below) that a certificate drawn up by Argenteuil Hospital on 10 June 2009 at about 12.30 p.m. recorded the following details of Mr Ziri\u2019s condition when he arrived in intensive care:\n\u201ca reactive coma with non-reactive bilateral mydriasis, abolition of corneal reflexes, no coughing, persistence of spontaneous ventilation, periorbital bruising to right eye with skin abrasion of the right cheekbone, skin abrasion on the right kneecap, bruising on the left side of the lower thorax, 1 cm bruise on the left forearm, and an alcohol concentration of 2.4 grams per litre of blood at 11.30 p.m.\u201d 14.  It can be seen from the same judgment that later that day, on 10 June 2009, at 2 p.m., Mr Ziri was also examined by Dr R., a forensic medical examiner. He observed that the neurological prognosis was negative owing to a lack of signs of awakening and the duration of the coma, noted the same bruising and skin abrasion as those indicated on the medical certificate, and recorded the hypothesis of the intensive care unit staff that Mr Ziri had succumbed to \u201chypoxia linked to choking in the context of vomiting with cardio-respiratory arrest then coma\u201d. 15.  Mr Ziri died of a second heart attack at 7.30 a.m. on 11 June 2009. A procedure to establish the cause of death was opened at 10 a.m. that same day and the testimony of the doctor who had examined him on his arrival at the hospital was immediately sought. 16.  The first autopsy, carried out by Dr R. on 11 June 2009 at the request of the public prosecutor of Pontoise, found that the superficial skin injuries were unrelated to the cause of death. The autopsy report indicated the presence of an arrhythmogenic hypertrophic cardiomyopathy of the right ventricle associated with veno-occlusive disease with signs of pulmonary hypertension. It went on to say that Mr Ziri\u2019s death was potentially due to decompensation of pre-existing pulmonary and cardiac conditions in a context of acute alcoholism, stating that each of the pulmonary and cardiac lesions taken separately could have been a cause of sudden death, especially in association with inebriation. He also raised the issue of medical responsibility, noting that a long period had elapsed between the time when Mr Ziri was reported to be unwell and the time he was examined, forty-five minutes later. 17.  On 22 June 2009 a preliminary police investigation was opened against persons unknown on a charge of manslaughter. 18.  At the public prosecutor\u2019s request, Dr D., an expert cardiologist, carried out an examination based on the medical file. In his report of 2 July 2009 he stated that \u201cthe most likely hypothesis was that of ventricular arrhythmia on top of undiagnosed cardiomyopathy, decompensated on account of moderate hypoxia, electrolyte disturbance due to alcohol and vomiting\u201d. He added that if Mr Ziri had been treated by a nurse on his arrival at Argenteuil Hospital, the clinical appearance, the constant symptoms and the usual complementary tests would have resulted in his being placed under immediate medical surveillance in order to prevent or remedy the cardiorespiratory failure. He concluded that the delay of forty to forty-five minutes between his admission to hospital and his treatment had contributed to his death. 19.  On 6 July 2009 a confrontation was organised between the nurse and the doctor who had both treated the applicant\u2019s father in the emergency unit. 20.  On 7 July 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the case on the grounds that no offence had been committed, in the absence of sufficient evidence to engage the liability of the police officers or the hospital staff. 21.  However, a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, had been lodged by Mr Ziri\u2019s family, including the applicant. According to the complaint, A.K. had stated that both he and Mr Ziri had been subjected to violence and that this could have been the cause of the latter\u2019s death. 22.  A judicial investigation against persons unknown on the same charge of manslaughter was then opened, on the basis of the public prosecutor\u2019s application of 8 July 2009. 23.  On 16 July 2009, at the request of counsel acting for Mr Ziri\u2019s family, the investigating judge ordered a fresh autopsy. It was carried out on 17 July by Dr L. and Dr T., forensic medical examiners. Dated 20 July 2009, their report refers to \u201cmultiple hematoma on the right, antero-lateral and posterior half of the body, multiple hematoma on right upper and lower limbs, some of this bruising [possibly] corresponding to restraint-related injuries\u201d. It further found that there had been no fracturing of the skull or any other part of the body, \u201csuperficial erosion and hematoma on the front, suggestive of frontal pressure\u201d, \u201clungs indicating mechanical asphyxia\u201d and \u201cpressure on the right side of the back and thorax, shoulder and right arm\u201d. It thus concluded:\n\u201cDeath from probable anoxia in a multi-factor context. Toxicological and anatomical pathology analyses are indispensable, together with a study of the medical file and procedure for the purpose of any useful synthesis\u201d. 24.  On 17 July 2009 the investigating judge asked the same doctors to carry out an autopsy. In their report of 31 August 2009 they indicated that they had found the following, based on a review of the anatomical pathology slides taken from the autopsy samples, a study of the hospitalisation report and their own observations: the presence of multiple bruises on the back, right side of the chest and lower limbs, some of which may be related to restraint; no traces of alcoholism in the liver; no signs of intra-bronchial regurgitation; absence of Mendelson\u2019s syndrome in anatomical pathological examinations; cardiac lesions consisting of an area of old sub-endocardial fibrosis with some small isolated areas, without recent myocardial ischemia and without significant coronary impairment. They thus concluded:\n\u201cZiri Ali, aged 69, died of hypoxic cardiac arrest by multifactorial suffocation (pressure on the back and front and known vomiting).\u201d 25.  On the same day, observing that it could be presumed from the autopsy that the cause of Mr Ziri\u2019s death arose before his arrival at the hospital and could in particular be related to his arrest, the investigating judge ordered the transfer of the file to the public prosecutor. 26.  The prosecutor made a supplemental application on 23 September 2009 for the investigation to be extended to charges of manslaughter by wilful assault committed by a person vested with public authority. 27.  A final forensic assessment was requested of Dr P., anaesthetist and emergency doctor. He was asked, in the light of all the evidence in the judicial investigation file and Mr Ziri\u2019s medical records, to determine the causes of death, to ascertain whether any actions taken by the police during the arrest, transfer and custody could have caused the death, and to indicate whether the hospital treatment and medical procedures had followed the rules or could have contributed to the death. In his report of 15 April 2011, Dr P. observed that the successive expert opinions had ruled out, on the one hand, a medical cause of death \u2013 either by decompression of pre-existing pulmonary and cardiac pathologies in a context of acute inebriation, or by an inhalation of the gastric contents into the bronchial system capable of creating acute asphyxia \u2013 and, on the other hand, a traumatological cause in spite of the multiple bruising, in the absence of major traumatism, notably cranial. He upheld the hypothesis of a cardiac repercussion of an acute hypoxic episode. He relied in this connection on the statements of the police, who said that they had been forced to immobilise Mr Ziri by acts of restraint. Such restraint was capable of leading to respiratory blockage and therefore a difficulty, or even an impossibility, of oxygenation during a certain period, likely to result, in an elderly person, a greater hypoxic repercussion than in a young person, as well as cardiac arrhythmia. According to the expert, the autopsy data and the anatomical pathology analyses made this hypothesis likely. He also took the view that the treatment of Mr Ziri at the hospital had been \u201cin accordance with normal practice\u201d. He concluded as follows:\n\u201c...\n\u2013 The electromechanical dissociation observed in the emergency department ... is secondary to a major cardiac rhythm disorder, itself secondary to a hypoxic episode related to being immobilised and repeated vomiting.\n\u2013 Regardless of the extent of Mr Ziri\u2019s aggressiveness, he was a 69-year-old man whose lack of judgment led to conduct that was not without consequences for his state of health.\n\u2013 Given Mr Ziri\u2019s condition upon his arrival at hospital, his reason for admission, the influence [sic] at that time, and the cause identified for the cardiac arrest, the treatment was in accordance with standard practice. Under these conditions, it is scientifically impossible to say that the immediate treatment of Mr Ziri, as soon as he arrived in the emergency department, would have changed the prognosis.\u201d 28.  As indicated in the judgment of the Rennes Court of Appeal of 12 December 2014 (see paragraphs 39-41 below) and the documents in the file, A.K. had been questioned the next day, and the day after that, by the police investigators, and also on 20 October 2009 by officers from the National Police Inspectorate (Inspection g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la police nationale \u2013 \u201cIGPN\u201d). It is also apparent that officers B.G., V.P. and J.C. were questioned on several occasions, in particular by the IGPN, together with other police officers, four individuals who had been present at the arrest of Mr Ziri and A.K. and five individuals who had been at Argenteuil police station at the same time as the latter. In addition, the radio messages exchanged between officers B.G., V.P. and J.C. and Argenteuil police station at the time when they were transferring Mr Ziri and A.K had been included in the evidence, as had the images of their arrival recorded by the police station\u2019s CCTV system. 29.  On 17 May 2010 the National Commission on Security Ethics (Commission nationale de d\u00e9ontologie de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u2013 \u201cCNDS\u201d) issued an opinion on the facts. 30.  In that opinion the Commission began by indicating that it was not in a position to pursue its investigations concerning the allegations that Mr Ziri and A.K. had been struck, as it had not had access to the report of the second autopsy or to the file of the judge\u2019s investigation. On the other matters, the report reads as follows:\n\u201cAs regards the extraction from the police vehicle:\nThe images recorded by the CCTV camera located in the courtyard of the police station established that the vehicle carrying Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. stopped in the yard at 20.46 and 37 seconds, that the constable J.C. first violently pulled Mr [Ziri] by the neck, but clearly he was not moving; she was then joined by five colleagues and all together they got Mr Ziri onto the ground at 20.46 and 52 seconds, so the operation lasted 15 seconds.\nIn view of the charges against Mr [Ziri] (rebellion), his manifest state of drunkenness (2.4 grams of alcohol per litre of blood), his age (69 years), the fact that he was handcuffed behind his back and was sitting in the back of a police vehicle stationed in the yard of a police station, the Commission took the view that he posed no danger, neither for himself nor for the ten officials present around the vehicle.\nThe precipitation and violence with which Mr [Ziri] was removed from the vehicle was disproportionate and constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment.\nRegarding his restraint on the ground while lying down:\nThe statements of the officers, as contained in the preliminary police investigation file or made during questioning by the commission, are inconsistent as to the state of consciousness of Mr [Ziri]. All the officers questioned by the commission indicated that he had been vociferous and insulting, but the senior police officer who met Mr [Ziri] to notify him of his rights indicated in a report drafted on 9 June at 8.50 p.m. as follows: \u2018In response to our questions, he answered only by gurgles. ... let us ask the intervening officers to transfer him immediately to Argenteuil Hospital, for medical examination and issuance or not of a certificate of non-admission\u2019. The same officer, when questioned the next day, on 10 June 10 at 2 p.m. said: \u2018The individuals were talking and even insulting us in A.K.\u2019s case\u2019.\nIt is possible that the arresting officers\u2019 collective reading of the interview records before the Commission, in the presence of the Chief Superintendent, Head of District (according to whom \u2018those documents being personal, they can use them as they see fit\u2019), in the corridors of the Commission, is not unconnected with the question of the consistency of the accounts made before it.\nIt can be seen from all the testimony gathered during the preliminary police investigation and by the Commission that Mr [Ziri] vomited as soon as he entered the police station. Constable D., when questioned on 10 June at 4.25 p.m., indicated: \u2018We put him on the ground, in a safe lateral position. He could not stand up or even stay sitting. What\u2019s more, he was vomiting. I in fact left immediately afterwards as I had vomit on my shoes ...\u2019.\nThe Commission has tried to establish the length of time during which Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. remained on the floor, face down, in their vomit, handcuffed behind their back: it was between thirty minutes and one hour and fifteen minutes. In fact, the officers questioned indicated that the order to take the persons concerned to hospital had been given at 9.15 p.m.. Immediately, the officers had put them into their vehicle, apparently waiting there until 10 p.m., arriving at hospital between 10.05 p.m. and 10.09 p.m.. In order to check the times, the Commission asked for a copy of the video-recording of their departure, but was unsuccessful as it had not been kept. According to the police record of 10 June 2009, at 1.50 a.m., of sergeant B.L., his team took charge of Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. at 10 p.m. and arrived at hospital at 10.05 p.m..\nThe Commission considers that it is highly unlikely that the officials considered it necessary to extract Mr [Ziri] from the vehicle that took him to the police station in 15 seconds and then to put him in another vehicle and make him wait there for 45 minutes.\nThe Commission has serious doubts about the statements of the officers who put Mr [Ziri] in the van that would take them to hospital, according to which Mr. [Ziri] was sitting on the back seat, where he had remained without difficulty for the entire journey, while all the officers present at the police station say that he was not able to sit or stand, thus explaining why he was lying on the floor all the time.\nIn these circumstances, the Commission takes the view that the fact of leaving Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K., aged 69 and 60 respectively, lying on the floor of the police station, handcuffed behind their backs, in their vomit, within sight of all the police officers present, who could see that they were in distress, for approximately one hour, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.\nConcerning the care provided in the hospital:\nThe choice to place Mr [Ziri] on his back on a stretcher in the hospital, while he was vomiting, rather than in a safe lateral position, is indicative of a lack of knowledge of first aid rules. as confirmed by Mr A.U., who had not followed such training for twelve years. This unsuitable and dangerous position favoured the occurrence of aspiration and the inhalation of gastric fluid, which probably contributed to the death of Mr A.Z., or even caused it directly. ...\u201d 31.  In conclusion the Commission called, in particular, for \u201c disciplinary proceedings to be brought against the police officers who used force disproportionately and with precipitation to extract Mr [Ziri] from the police vehicle on his arrival at the police station, and against those who left two men, aged 60 and 69, handcuffed behind their backs, lying on the floor, with their faces in their vomit, for about one hour, without reacting\u201d. 1.  The judge\u2019s decision of 15 October 2012 and the judgment of the Investigation Division of the Versailles Court of Appeal of 18 February 2014 32.  A notice that the judicial investigation had concluded was issued to the parties on 22 June 2011. 33.  On 29 June 2011 the civil parties asked the investigating judge personally to hear testimony from all the witnesses in the case and also, having placed them under judicial investigation, officers J.C., B.G. and V.P (or in the case of the first two, at least as assisted witnesses); they also asked the judge to order, in the presence of all the ordinary witnesses, of any assisted witnesses, of any individuals under judicial investigation, of the public prosecutor, of the lawyers of the civil parties and of Dr L. and T., a viewing of the video of the arrival at the police station and a reconstruction of the events. 34.  Those requests were rejected by the judge\u2019s decision of 22 July 2011, on the grounds that testimony had already been taken in a precise and detailed manner and that the civil parties had not indicated any points which had not been raised, that it was for the investigating judge to decide on the choice of status \u2013 whether a person should be placed under judicial investigation or be an assisted witness \u2013 without this having any bearing on the establishment of the truth, that the viewing of the video in the presence of witnesses was capable of undermining the sincerity of their testimony, and that, in the absence of any person under judicial investigation or assisted witness, a reconstruction could not take place solely in the presence of witnesses or experts. 35.  A fresh notice of the conclusion of the judicial investigation was issued on 2 September 2011 and on 15 October 2012 the investigating judge decided to discontinue the proceedings, on the grounds that \u201cthe investigation [had] not established any acts of wilful violence which might have been the direct or indirect cause of Mr Ali Ziri\u2019s death, or any direct or indirect fault attributable to anyone who intentionally caused the death\u201d. 36.  That discontinuance decision was upheld by the Investigation Division of the Versailles Court of Appeal, on an appeal lodged by the civil parties, in a judgment of 28 February 2013. 37.  Relying in particular on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 28 February 2013. 38.  On 18 February 2014 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation set aside the judgment on the grounds that the Investigation Division had failed to \u201cascertain that the restraint techniques used [against Mr Ziri] had not been excessive in the light of the person\u2019s conduct or whether the assistance provided had been appropriate\u201d. It referred the case and the parties back to the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal. 39.  In a judgment of 12 December 2014 the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal held that there was no need to supplement or continue the investigation and upheld the discontinuance decision of 15 October 2012. 40.  It noted that the forensic assessments had set out different hypotheses and had reached diverging conclusions, making it impossible to identify any single definite cause of Mr Ziri\u2019s death. It found, however, that as the death had occurred following his arrest by the police, it had to ascertain \u201cwhether the police intervention had played, by acts of wilful violence or at least by wrongful conduct, any causal role in the death\u201d. It observed that \u201cwhilst, according to the experts, the marks and bruising that might correspond, in some cases, to wounds caused by restraint could not have caused the death of Ali Ziri, there was no evidence to show, or even to suggest, that Ali Ziri had been struck intentionally at any time by the police officers\u201d. It further noted that the statements of A.K. to the effect that Mr Ziri had sustained such acts of violence were not only contradictory but also contradicted by those of individuals who had been present at the time of the arrest and by those of a man who had met him in Argenteuil police station. It lastly observed that there was nothing to show that any acts of violence had been committed by the police officers in the van, on the journey between the police station and the hospital. It concluded from this that the only times when Mr Ziri might have been subjected to acts of violence had been during the journey in the police car between the place of arrest and the police station, or on his arrival at the police station. 41.  The court noted in this connection that, in his forensic assessment of 15 April 2011, Dr P. indicated that the restraint techniques applied on Mr Ziri \u2013 the use of the so-called \u201cdouble-seated embrace\u201d position \u2013 was capable of \u201cleading to respiratory blockage and therefore a difficulty, or even an impossibility, of oxygenation during a certain period, which would not have had any repercussions for a young person but was likely to entail cardiac consequences ... in an elderly person, with a lesser degree of thoracic compliance\u201d. Taking the view that it had therefore to \u201cascertain whether the treatment of [Mr Ziri] in the police vehicle constituted a fault which had triggered his death\u201d, it found as follows:\n\u201cIt can be seen from the statements [of B.G., V.P. and J.C.], from the audio recording of the messages exchanged during the journey and from the testimony of the police officers who intervened on arrival at the police station, particularly Lieutenant [S.M.], that the journey, lasting five minutes, had been very agitated and that both [A.K.] and Ziri had been behaving dangerously.\nIt was after [A.K.] had spat at the driver that [B.G.], fearing for the safety of all the occupants, forced down his head and chest. In doing so he left space between himself and Ali Ziri, who took advantage of this to try to head-butt him, thus triggering, for the same safety reasons, the intervention of [J.C.] who, turning round on his seat, grasped him under the armpits and held his head down against his knees.\nContrary to the assumption made by the National Commission on Security Ethics, in its report, Ali Ziri\u2019s agitation thus described, while he was probably unsuccessful in attempting to head-butt, on account of his corpulence and the fact that he was handcuffed, was likely, in view of his state of drunkenness and restlessness.\nHis state of extreme agitation inside the vehicle is confirmed by the fact that the driver, unusually, placed a call by radio to request the opening of the gate to the police station courtyard, which was normally opened by a member of the patrol who would get out of the vehicle to type in the access code, and it is also confirmed by Lieutenant [S.M.] who was in the porch waiting for the patrol to arrive.\nThe statement of [V.P.], the driver, and the audio recording of the messages enable an estimate of three to four minutes to be made for the time during which [A.K.], then Ziri, were restrained in that manner, as [V.P.] indicated that he had sent the message, at 20.43 before arriving at the police station at 20.46, just after the immobilisation.\nIt can be seen from those particulars that in the light of the state of agitation and rebellion of the individuals arrested, whose conduct, in the confined space of a vehicle, close to the driver, was highly dangerous for the safety of all passengers and other road users, the immobilisation techniques applied for a few minutes by the police officers, whose professional attitude is not in doubt and is attested by the witnesses to the arrest, did not constitute excessive restraint. The police thus made use only of the degree of force strictly necessary to control the individuals and no fault, voluntary or involuntary, can be imputed to them, and in particular not to [JC], the officer who actually immobilised Ali Ziri.\nThe video recording of the arrival at the police station shows, once again, that it was only because of his resistance that he was forced out of the vehicle and then carried onto the premises to be laid on the floor. While the various statements show that he had trouble standing and confirm his state of inebriation, none of them ... mention a state of unconsciousness, this only being noted at the hospital shortly before the intervention of Dr [M.]. In addition, forensic experts dismissed the idea of any repercussion as a result of Ali Ziri\u2019s hitting his head on the ground when removed from the vehicle.\nNor is it apparent from the report of the National Commission on Security Ethics, which has been added to the file, that there were any acts of violence that could have led to the death of Ali Ziri.\nThe Commission states that it has not been able to continue its investigations into the direct acts of violence alleged by [A.K.], those allegations having been refuted by the judicial investigation, as indicated above.\nIt is, moreover, at odds with the facts for the Commission to state that Ali Ziri was placed on his back on a stretcher in the hospital, from which it inferred that this unsuitable and dangerous position had favoured the occurrence of aspiration and the inhalation of gastric fluid, which had contributed to the death; whereas, in reality, he had placed himself or had been placed by the police officer, with the approval of the nurse ... in a safe lateral position, and choking by aspiration is not the cause of death.\nWhile the Commission expresses the opinion that inhuman and degrading treatment was constituted as a result of the precipitation and violence with which Ali Ziri was extracted from the vehicle, and also by the fact of leaving the two men, aged 60 and 69, lying on the floor of the police station, handcuffed behind their backs, in their vomit, within view of all the officials for about an hour, it does not follow from this opinion, given the circumstances of the arrival at the police station analysed above, that any of the acts in question could have led to the death of Ali Ziri.\nIn addition, according to [the] hospital reception and orientation nurse, Ali Ziri\u2019s condition was not a concern and did not require special attention. He was conscious and responded to basic instructions and his case was not a priority. The expert [P.] indicated that a sound initial assessment of his condition had been made and that the aggravation of this condition within less than one hour was exceptional. While the expert expressed surprise that the police, although they were not in charge of his medical supervision, nevertheless failed to sound the alarm when Ali Ziri\u2019s condition worsened, Dr [M.] indicated that in the absence of medical knowledge the police officers might have thought that he was sleeping.\nConsequently, as his condition had not caused any concern to the medical professionals upon his arrival at the hospital and had been assessed as normal given his state of inebriation, and as the police might not have realised that his condition had worsened \u2013 exceptionally rapidly according to the expert \u2013 no negligent failure to provide assistance that could have led to or contributed to the death of Ali Ziri can be imputed to the police.\nTherefore, in this presence of the evidence from the judicial investigation, the demands of both the civil parties and the public prosecutor\u2019s office that the investigation be continued or that additional enquiries be ordered do not appear useful for the purpose of establishing the truth.\nThe judicial investigation has not revealed sufficient evidence to show that the charges investigated by the investigating judge, or any other charges, are made out, and no additional enquiries would appear useful.\nIn these circumstances, the decision must be upheld.\u201d 42.  Relying in particular on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of 12 December 2014. 43.  On 16 February 2016 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal by a judgment giving the following reasoning:\n\u201c... in upholding the discontinuance decision, the judgment notes that it could be seen from the statements of the police officers who were part of the patrol team, from the recording of the messages exchanged during the journey between the place of the arrest and the police station, and the testimony of the police officers who intervened on arrival at the police station, that this journey had been particularly agitated and that the acts of restraint used against [M. Ziri] had been made necessary by the state of agitation and rebellion of those arrested, whose conduct, in the confined environment of a vehicle, close to the driver, was highly dangerous for the safety of all the passengers and of other road users; the court added that the immobilisation techniques applied for a few minutes by the police, whose professional conduct could not be called into question and was attested by the witness to the arrest, did not constitute an excessive degree of restraint.\nIn the light of the above and the conclusion that the police made use only of the degree of force strictly necessary, and since an assessment of the evidence shows that the investigation has been comprehensive, the Investigation Division justified its decision ...\u201d", "references": ["6", "9", "7", "1", "5", "8", "4", "2", "3", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a bank with its registered office in Vienna. According to the information available to the Court, the applicant company has been in liquidation since November 2016 and the proceedings have not yet been terminated. 6.  The applicant company purchased and kept shares in deposit, predominantly shares in the IF company (hereafter \u2013 \u201cIF\u201d), for third parties. The applicant company and IF were related to each other; the management board partly consisted of the same persons and staff employed by the applicant company were provided to IF. The A. company, an investment advisor, functioned as an important distribution partner of the applicant company. 7.  Due to a significant, successive loss in value of the shares purchased in IF, starting from the second half of 2007, numerous court proceedings were instituted against the applicant company. 8.  Following consultations with the A. company, F.M. and H.H. ordered the applicant company, between 2006 and 2008, to purchase and keep IF shares in deposit. 9.  In 2009 F.M and H.H. filed a civil action against the applicant company and requested the annulment of their share purchase. IF joined the proceedings as an intervening party (Nebenintervenientin) on the side of the applicant company. 10.  On 6 April 2012 the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht Wien) granted the action and ordered the applicant company to repay F.M. and H.H. the amount invested in exchange for the shares acquired by them. The Commercial Court found that F.M. and H.H. had not been adequately informed about the risks of such a share purchase by the A. company and that the applicant company was to be held accountable for the inadequate information given, having regard to the close professional ties between these two companies. 11.  On 20 September 2012 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) granted the applicant company\u2019s appeal, finding in essence that any inadequate advice given to F.M. and H.H. by employees of the A. company could not be attributed to the applicant company. 12.  Thereupon, F.M. and H.H. filed an ordinary appeal on points of law (ordentliche Revision). 13.  On 17 June 2013 the Supreme Court (the Second Section), sitting as a five-judge panel, granted the ordinary appeal on points of law and restored the Commercial Court\u2019s judgment of 6 April 2012. It considered that due to the close professional ties, the applicant company had had a significant interest in selling IF shares. For that reason, employees of the A. company had been provided with inadequate information material. The Supreme Court hence found that the applicant company had been liable for the inadequate advice given to F.M. and H.H. 14.  On 12 August 2013 the applicant company filed an action for nullity (Nichtigkeitsklage) under section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 25 below). It claimed that Judge N., who had been one of the five judges sitting on the Supreme Court\u2019s panel, had been biased because he had himself purchased shares in IF whose value had dropped, following advice by the A. company. Moreover, Judge N. had previously declared himself biased in comparable cases concerning the purchase of shares in IF. The Supreme Court had accepted Judge N.\u2019s withdrawal from all these cases. According to the respective decisions, Judge N. had even considered filing an action on account of the losses he had suffered due to his acquisition of the shares, with the applicant company being one of the parties against whom such an action might potentially be introduced. He had thus been subjectively and objectively biased, which constituted a reason for challenge under section 19 \u00a7 2 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction (Jurisdiktionsnorm) (see paragraph 21 below). As Judge N. had not withdrawn from the case at hand, there had been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 15.  The applicant company further explained that it had only learned about the composition of the panel \u2013 and thus the involvement of Judge N. in the proceedings at issue \u2013 when the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment had been served on the applicant company. It had thus not been possible for the applicant company to challenge Judge N. for bias prior to the delivery of the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment. 16.  On 4 September 2013 the Supreme Court (the Seventh Section) excluded Judge N. from taking part in the proceedings concerning the applicant company\u2019s action for nullity. 17.  On 27 November 2013 the Supreme Court (the Second Section) decided on the applicant company\u2019s action for nullity. It confirmed that Judge N. had purchased shares in IF prior to their decrease in value. In 2009 Judge N. had offered his shares to a litigation funder (Prozessfinanzierer) in order to introduce possible actions against IF or other persons and entities involved. For this reason Judge N., even though he had not considered himself personally biased, had withdrawn from at least two cases concerning IF shares (see the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions of 14 May 2010, 9 Nc 13/10a, and of 26 November 2012, 9 Nc 38/12f). However, after the litigation funder had terminated the contract with Judge N., the latter had decided not to pursue any claims against IF and had, furthermore, no longer considered it necessary to withdraw from cases dealing with these shares. 18.  Following these explanations, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s action for nullity, holding that a decision which had become final could only be contested under section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that a judge who had taken part in the decision had been excluded by law from exercising his or her office (see paragraph 25 below). In contrast, bias of a judge (referring to its decision of 13 November 2013, 7 Nc 19/13y, see paragraph 20 below) did not constitute a ground for nullity. The Supreme Court pointed out that it had recently held, in a case concerning arbitration law, that only in particularly grave cases, where the reason for challenge came close to a reason for exclusion under section 20 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction, could an exception be made (see paragraph 27 below). In the present case, however, no such particularly grave reason had been shown, since the participation of a judge who had in the past considered filing an action against one of the parties to the proceedings was not comparable to a ground enumerated in section 20 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction (see paragraph 21 below). Lastly, the Supreme Court held that no issues arose under Article 6 of the Convention. 19.  In other proceedings concerning an action brought against the applicant company (by a different person) in connection with the purchase of shares in IF, the applicant company filed an extraordinary appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 29 November 2012 with the Supreme Court and subsequently challenged Judge N. for bias in those proceedings. 20.  On 13 November 2013 the Supreme Court (the Seventh Section, 7 Nc 19/13y) granted the applicant company\u2019s challenge and declared Judge N. biased, since his impartiality could appear open to doubt. The fact that Judge N. had in the past withdrawn from two comparable cases due to the acquisition of shares in the same company gave rise to doubts as to his impartiality, notwithstanding that he no longer intended to file any civil action in this regard. The fact that he had withdrawn of his own motion from previous cases increased fears as to Judge N.\u2019s impartiality and rendered such doubts objectively justified, even if he did not consider himself personally biased.", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "5", "7", "6", "1", "8", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1942 and 1969 respectively. The first applicant lives in Gabrovo and the second applicant lives in Varna. 5.  Mr Ts. Mihalev, father of the first applicant and grandfather of the second applicant, owned a machinery factory in Gabrovo, which was nationalised in 1947. After the nationalisation the property was allocated for use to a State-owned enterprise, which in 1991 was transformed into a State-owned company named T.. Under domestic law, such a transformation entailed the newly-created company becoming, in principle, the owner of the assets which had until then been allocated to it for use and management; some assets allocated to State-owned enterprises or companies could nevertheless be the subject of restitution (see paragraph 15 below). 6.  After the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Restitution Act\u201d, see paragraphs 15-16 below) came into force in 1992, the first applicant and his brother asked the mayor of Gabrovo to strike the factory building out of the register of State properties. Their request was allowed in a decision of the mayor of 28 August 1992, which explicitly referred to the Restitution Act. On that basis in 1993 the first applicant and his brother obtained a notary deed, which also stated that the property had been subject to restitution under the Restitution Act. 7.  In 1994 the first applicant and his brother concluded a rent contract with company T., which undertook to pay rent in exchange of the use of the building. The term of the contract was extended on several occasions, the last of which in 2002. 8.  In 1997 the first applicant\u2019s brother transferred his share in the building to his daughter, the second applicant. 9.  After the entry into force of the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Compensation Act\u201d, see paragraph 17 below), in January 1998 the first applicant and his brother applied to receive compensation for moveable properties such as industrial equipment and materials which had been nationalised together with the factory. In a decision of 21 December 1999 the Minister of Economy awarded them compensation for these properties, noting in addition that the factory building had been the subject of restitution and no compensation was due for it. That decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 September 2002, after the first applicant and his brother sought its judicial review, contesting the manner of compensation. Eventually, in 2005 they received compensation bonds with a face value of 19,494 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 9,970 euros (EUR)). 10.  Company T. was privatised in 2003 and the new management stopped paying rent to the applicants for the factory building, arguing that it had in fact never been subject of restitution. 11.  In January 2009 company T. brought proceedings against the applicants, claiming to be the factory building\u2019s owner. It argued that the restitution of the property had not taken place, because the preconditions under the Restitution Act had not been complied with, and that it had become the owner of the building as a result of its transformation into a company (see paragraph 5 above). 12.  In a judgment of 27 October 2009 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed the claim. However, on 17 May 2010 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and allowed the action against the applicants, finding that the preconditions for restitution had indeed not been met. On the basis of expert evidence and witness testimony, it concluded that after the nationalisation the building had been modified in a manner and to a degree which meant that in 1992 it had not existed in its state prior to 1947. Accordingly, the applicants could not rely on restitution and company T. had become the owner of the building on the strength of its transformation from a State-owned enterprise into a company in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above). In a final decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law. 13.  In June 2011 the applicants applied to the Gabrovo regional governor to receive compensation for the factory building under the Compensation Act. In a decision of 19 July 2011 the governor dismissed their request, as it had not been submitted within the time-limit provided for under that Act (see paragraph 17 below). After the applicants applied for its judicial review, the governor\u2019s decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14 June 2012.", "references": ["4", "0", "6", "3", "2", "8", "7", "5", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Athens. 5.  On 21 September 2013 the applicant was arrested in Athens for possession of a fake French passport. He was taken to a public prosecutor, who initiated criminal proceedings against him. 6.  On 24 September 2013 the applicant was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment for use of a false instrument, giving false unsworn testimony, and illegally entering the country (judgment 46181/2013 of the three-member Athens Court of First Instance). The execution of the sentence was suspended following an appeal by the applicant after the pronouncement of the judgment. 7.  On 25 September 2013 the applicant was arrested again and put in administrative detention with a view to being expelled from the country (decision no. 538848/1-\u03b1/25.9.2013 of the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica (\u03a5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03cd\u03b8\u03c5\u03bd\u03c3\u03b7 \u0391\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03c0\u03ce\u03bd \u0391\u03c4\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03c2). 8.  On 28 September 2013 the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion on the grounds that he had entered the country illegally, did not possess a valid residence permit, was considered to pose a danger to public order, and had been convicted by a criminal court for possession of false documents. Moreover, that authority decided not to give the applicant a deadline to leave the country of his own free will, but to keep him in detention until the expulsion order was executed, for a period not exceeding six months, because the applicant posed a danger to public order, for the reasons mentioned above. 9.  According to the applicant, he was informed of those decisions on 30 September 2013. He also claimed that he had submitted objections to his detention via a fax sent by his lawyer on 27 September 2013, objections which had not been registered. In those objections, he had included a request for international protection. 10.  On 4 October 2013 the applicant appealed against the expulsion decision to the Director of the Aliens Division of Attica, submitting at the same time a request for international protection. On 7 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s request for international protection was sent to the Asylum Department. His appeal against the decision ordering his expulsion was dismissed the next day. 11.  On 8 October 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention before the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance (\u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u03a0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u0391\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u03ce\u03bd) (his first set of objections). He claimed, inter alia, that he had already submitted objections before the expulsion decision had been issued, but those had not been taken into consideration. Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in Tabesh v. Greece (no. 8256/07, 26 November 2009), he argued that his detention was unlawful, since his expulsion to Syria was not possible, given the ongoing intensive military action taking place there. He also claimed that he was an asylum seeker and that his conditions of detention in Zografou police station were very poor. 12.  On 10 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s objections were rejected by the President of the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance. In her reasoning, she noted that it was not clear whether the applicant had in fact submitted the first objections, that up to that date he had not submitted any proof that he was Syrian, and that he could request asylum before the head of Zografou police station. She also noted that the legality of the applicant\u2019s detention was not affected by the conditions of his detention, which in any event were tolerable, taking into account the difficult financial situation of the country and the fact that little time had elapsed since the applicant\u2019s arrest (judgment no. 5563/2013). 13.  On 18 October 2013 the applicant was transferred to the Attica Regional Asylum Service, before which he reiterated his asylum request. On the same date the Director of the Attica Aliens Directorate issued a decision modifying the legal basis of the applicant\u2019s detention and basing it instead on the grounds that he posed a danger to public order and/or national security and that his detention was necessary for the speedy determination of his application for asylum. In addition, the decision suspended the applicant\u2019s expulsion order (decision no. 538848/1-Z). The applicant contested the date of the above-mentioned decision before the domestic authorities, and claimed that it had been issued several days later and backdated. 14.  On 21 October 2013 the applicant gave his Syrian identity card to Zografou police station. He also claimed that he had submitted via his lawyer a request to be informed of the decision by which he had been detained, or to be set free if such a decision did not exist. 15.  On 23 October 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention, asking for judgment no. 5563/2013 to be revoked (his second set of objections). In his application, he referred, inter alia, to the fact that he had proved his Syrian nationality by giving his identity card to the police, and that he should be set free, as his expulsion could not be achieved. He also referred to the submission of his asylum request to the Asylum Service on 18 October. In addition, he maintained that he had a permanent address, submitting a lease contract concluded by his brother and an affidavit signed by his brother confirming that he would provide him with accommodation. 16.  On 25 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s application was dismissed by the President of the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance. In her reasoning, she observed that the applicant had not yet been registered as an asylum-seeker, but the procedure was ongoing, taking into account a document dated 24 October 2013 from the Aliens Division of Attica which said that the applicant had expressed his wish to request asylum on 7 October 2013, but this had not yet been registered by the new Asylum Service. She also noted that the lease did not prove that the applicant had a permanent address, because he could easily change his address in view of the fact that he had already been arrested for an offence (judgment no. 5772/2013). 17.  On 1 November 2013 an interview concerning the applicant\u2019s asylum request took place before the Attica Regional Asylum Service. 18.  On 8 November 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention with the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance, asking for judgments no. 5563/2013 and 5772/2013 to be revoked (his third set of objections). He referred to a deterioration of his health and asked to be released on the additional grounds that, in accordance with a circular order issued by the Greek police, even Syrians who had not requested asylum should not be put in detention. He also submitted complementary observations contesting the date of the decision modifying the legal basis of his detention. 19.  On 13 November 2013 his application was dismissed (judgment no. 5935/2013). In her reasoning, the president of the court noted that the applicant had been admitted to hospital on 9 November 2013 and had been discharged with medication, showing \u201cno signs of major active psychopathology\u201d. She further ruled that the applicant\u2019s objection regarding the date of the document modifying the legal basis of his detention was unsubstantiated. 20.  On 12 November 2013 the applicant was granted refugee status (decision no. 10664/2013) and was released the next day, following the revocation of return decision no. 538848/1-\u03b2 that had been issued on 28 September 2013. 21.  On 27 November 2013 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the decision dated 28 September 2013 of the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica by which it had been decided that he would be returned to his country of origin and that he would be detained with a view to being expelled. The application for annulment was dismissed owing to the fact that it had not been signed by a lawyer and the relevant fee had not been paid. 22.  The applicant submitted that his conditions of detention in Zografou police station had been very poor. He had been detained in a basement, which had been damp and inadequately ventilated. The cell had been filthy and overcrowded. The food provided had been of very poor quality. He had not had access to outdoor exercise or other recreational activities. The above-mentioned conditions had created a risk of contagious diseases. In addition, medical treatment had not been provided. In view of the above, the applicant\u2019s physical and emotional health had deteriorated. 23.  The Government submitted that the detention facilities at Zografou police station were located in the basement of the police station and consisted of three dormitories, each measuring 12 sq. m with a capacity of three detainees. There was also an additional space, measuring 7.67 sq. m, outside the dormitories. It had a toilet and a shower with hot water, which detainees could access throughout the day and night. Beds were not allowed in the detention area; however, every detainee had at his disposal a mattress in good condition and two or three blankets which were frequently washed and replaced. 24.  The area was adequately lit, ventilated and heated; in addition, it had fans outside the dormitories to be used during the summer months. The number of detainees at the time the applicant had been held there had varied; however, it had never exceeded the capacity of nine detainees. The premises were cleaned every day by a cleaning company, and they were disinfected once a month. Food was provided three times a day by an external restaurant. 25.  International organisations and non-governmental organisations had free access to the premises. Detainees could be visited twice a day by friends and relatives, and had unobstructed access to television and pre-paid phones. 26.  The applicant\u2019s needs had been taken care of; in particular, he had been transferred to the psychiatric ward of Sotiria Hospital in Athens, where he had been examined by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist had concluded that the applicant did not present any major active psychopathology, and had prescribed him medication for anxiety.", "references": ["8", "4", "7", "6", "5", "9", "3", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  A list of the applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6.  The applicants spent a certain number of hours (see the Appendix) in police custody before their arrests were recorded. Their subsequent complaints to the national authorities were dismissed. 7.  At about 10 p.m. on 18 July 2005 the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station, where he was subjected to a body search and questioned. 8.  At 5.10 a.m. on 19 July 2005 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of drugs possession. At 7.10 a.m. an arrest record was drawn up, following which the applicant was questioned as a suspect. 9.  On 20 July 2005 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered that the applicant should be remanded in custody. 10.  The applicant challenged the lawfulness of the above-mentioned decision, claiming that in violation of domestic law, the record of his arrest had been drawn up nine hours after he had been brought to the police station instead of three hours. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, this rendered his subsequent remand in custody unlawful. 11.  On 9 August 2005 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) found the above-mentioned decision lawful. The appellate court held that the custodial measure had been applied in accordance with domestic law and that the belated drawing up of the arrest record as such could not serve as grounds for releasing the applicant from custody. 12.  On 15 September 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 31 October 2005. 13.  On 22 November 2005 the City Court upheld that decision on appeal. The court acknowledged the fact that the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest had been drawn up after the expiry of the three hours permitted by domestic law. It held, however, that that violation could not automatically lead to the refusal of the investigator\u2019s requests for the application of a custodial measure and its further extension. 14.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant threatened a taxi driver with a knife. When the car stopped, two acquaintances of the taxi driver seized the applicant and held him until the arrival of the police. Police officers handcuffed the applicant and took him to a police station at about 4 a.m. 15.  At about 7 a.m. an investigator opened a criminal investigation into robberies carried out against taxi drivers. At around 9.30 a.m. a police officer talked to the applicant, who allegedly confessed to having committed those robberies. As the applicant was in a state of alcohol-induced intoxication, it was allegedly suggested to him that he wait for the investigator in the hall of the police station while he sobered up. In the meantime the investigator interviewed the victims. At 6 p.m. the investigator drew up an arrest record and questioned the applicant as a suspect. 16.  On 30 June 2007 the Norilsk District Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. 17.  From October 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office repeatedly terminated the criminal investigation following complaints of unlawful detention lodged by the applicant. The latest relevant decision was taken on 28 April 2008. On 30 June 2008 the District Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 28 April 2008. The court established that the applicant had been taken to the police station at about 4 a.m. on 28 June 2007 and that the arrest record had been drawn up at 6 p.m. the same day. On the basis of the testimonies given by the applicant and police officers, the court found that the applicant had spent a considerable time in the hallway of the police station without attempting to leave it. The District Court concluded as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the [rules of criminal procedure] that detention should be understood as the restriction of movement of a person placed in a special room under the constant control of law-enforcement personnel.\nSuch restrictions were not applied in respect of [the applicant]. He became a suspect in a criminal investigation only after the investigator Ch. drew up his arrest record at 6 p.m. on 28 June 2007.\nRegard being had to the above and on the basis of the inquiry conducted, the investigator K. has rightfully concluded that [the applicant] when present at [the police station] had not been restricted in movement and that he had been able to leave the premises. However, he had not done so, which should be interpreted as his staying at [the police station] of his own free will.\u201d 18.  On 23 September 2004 the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station. On 24 September 2004 he was questioned as a witness in a murder investigation. 19.  It appears that on 24 September 2004 the applicant was charged with the administrative offence of disorderly conduct, but administrative proceedings were not pursued. 20.  At 9.55 p.m. on 27 September 2004 an arrest record was drawn up in which it was noted that the applicant was suspected of a criminal offence. On 28 September 2004 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Omsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. 21.  On 1 November 2006 the Omsk Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of theft, robbery and murder, and sentenced him to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment, running from 23 September 2007, the date of his actual arrest. On 19 December 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 22.  On 27 June 2005 the applicant had sought the criminal prosecution of the police for unlawful detention, alleging ill-treatment from 23 to 27 September 2004. His request had been refused on 7 July 2005 and the applicant had challenged the refusal before a court. On 28 January and 22 April 2010 the District Court and the Regional Court respectively dismissed his court action. Both courts considered the police officers\u2019 actions as lawful and the allegations of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. 23.  The applicant sought damages for his unlawful detention. On 24 February and 27 July 2011 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Omsk and the Regional Court acting on appeal respectively dismissed his claims. The courts found no evidence of unlawful actions against the applicant. 24.  On 10 April 2007 an unidentified person broke into the flat of Mr I.K., a police officer, threatened him with a scalpel, took a few valuables and absconded. On the same date a criminal investigation was initiated into the matter. 25.  At about 5.50 a.m. on 11 April 2007 two police officers took the applicant from his flat to a police station. He was questioned about his whereabouts the previous day. At 11.40 a.m. the applicant participated in an identification parade as a result of which he was identified by the victim, Mr I.K. 26.  At 2.05 p.m. the police drew up an arrest record, according to which the applicant had been detained at 2 p.m. on 11 April 2007 on suspicion of armed robbery. According to the applicant, he was only then informed of the reasons for his arrest. 27.  On 12 April 2007 the Avtozavodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod ordered that the applicant should be remanded in custody. 28.  On 11 October 2007 the applicant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. He appealed against his sentence, pointing out, in particular, that he had been unlawfully detained at the police station for eight hours on 11 April 2007 and had not been promptly informed of the charges against him. 29.  On 1 February 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the sentence on appeal, stating, amongst other things, that \u201c... no violations of criminal procedure took place during the applicant\u2019s arrest\u201d. 30.  At 7.25 p.m. on 16 March 2007 the applicant was arrested during a test purchase of drugs. At 11.30 p.m. on 18 March 2007 an arrest record was drawn up. 31.  On 10 January 2008 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Orenburg convicted the applicant and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment running from 16 March 2007. The applicant appealed against the judgment, complaining of, among other things, his unrecorded detention for two days, ill-treatment by police officers during those two days and the inadmissibility of evidence collected during those days. On 21 February 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed those complaints as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 10 January 2008. 32.  The police arrested the applicant at about 12 noon on 8 July 2011. His arrest record was drawn up at 9.25 p.m. 33.  On 10 July 2011 the Zasviyazhskiy District Court of the Ulyanovsk Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. The District Court rejected the argument about the actual time of arrest on the grounds that at 12 noon the applicant had been \u201cconveyed\u201d to a police station rather than arrested. On 14 July 2011 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 34.  The applicant was arrested at about 5.10 p.m. on 11 October 2010. An arrest record was drawn up at 2.25 a.m. on 12 October 2010. On 13 October 2010 a justice of the peace found the applicant guilty of taking drugs without a medical prescription and sentenced him to one day\u2019s administrative detention, running from 2.40 a.m. on 12 October 2010. 35.  On 13 October 2010 the Volzhskiy District Court of the Volgograd Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. The District Court relied on the fact that the applicant was suspected of a serious drug-related crime, was a drug addict, and might obstruct the investigation and reoffend. The applicant did not appeal against the detention order. 36.  On 6 December 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention. It reiterated that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and had no official sources of income. The District Court also rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release on bail using his mother\u2019s flat as a caution because he had not produced documents proving the kinship between the applicant and his mother, nor had he proved that she owned the flat or that she was prepared for it to be used as a guarantee. On 17 December 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the court order on appeal. The Regional Court found that the fact that the applicant had no criminal record, had a permanent residence, employment, positive references and an under-age child, had formerly participated in military service and was undergoing hospital treatment were insufficient to warrant his release in view of the severity of the charges against him. 37.  On 1 March 2011 the District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on the grounds that he might reoffend and obstruct the investigation. On 5 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the court order on appeal. 38.  On 7 April 2011 the District Court ordered a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. 39.  On 31 May 2011 the District Court convicted the applicant. The applicant appealed against the judgment, complaining of, among other things, his unrecorded detention. On 26 July 2011 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 40.  On 20 May 2015 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court (\u201cthe Presidium\u201d) quashed the judgment of 31 May 2011 and the appeal decision of 26 July 2011 on the grounds that the trial judge had earlier adjudicated the case of his co-accused. The Presidium remitted the applicant\u2019s case for re-trial and ordered his detention. On 1 December 2015 the District Court convicted the applicant of drug dealing. On 16 February 2016 the Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 41.  The applicant was arrested by the police at about 6 p.m. on 7 September 2011. An arrest record was drawn up at 5.25 p.m. on 8 September 2011. It indicated the time of the actual arrest as 4.35 p.m. on 8 September 2011. 42.  On 10 September 2011 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. On 27 September 2011 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The national courts found that the applicant had been arrested in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 43.  On 26 November 2010 police officers took the applicant to a police station. On 28 November 2010 the applicant was questioned as a witness in respect of the murder of three people. On 29 November 2010 the applicant made a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) in which he confessed to the three murders. On 30 November 2010 a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up. 44.  On 5 May 2011 the prosecuting authorities rejected a request by the applicant to open a criminal case against the police for, inter alia, his unacknowledged detention. On 8 June 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed a complaint by the applicant about the refusal of 5 May 2011 to open a case. The District Court found that on 26 November 2010 the applicant had been taken to the police station and questioned, along with many others, as a witness. It further established that at 11 p.m. on 29 November 2010 he had made a statement of surrender and confession, and that only after that had he been arrested and questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer. The District Court therefore held that no criminal procedure rules had been broken. On 4 August 2011 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld that judgment on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court. 45.  On 18 October 2011 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment starting from 27 November 2010. The trial court considered that despite the arrest record of 30 November 2010, the applicant had actually been arrested on 27 November 2010. On 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. 46.  On 15 January 2010 Ms A. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant. At 4.20 p.m. on the same date the applicant was taken to a police station and questioned. An official arrest record was drawn up on 16 January 2010. 47.  On 30 April 2010 the Usinsk District Court of the Komi Republic (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) convicted the applicant as charged. On 13 July 2010 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) upheld the conviction on appeal. 48.  The applicant asked that 15 January 2010 be recognised as the date of his actual arrest and that the prison term start running from that date. On 13 May 2013 the District Court rejected his claims as unfounded. It accepted that the police had indeed taken the applicant to the police station on 15 January 2010, but considered that he had been questioned as a witness on that date and had not been actually detained until his arrest record had been drawn up the following day. On 23 August 2013 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. 49.  At 8.05 p.m. on 28 December 2012 the police arrested the applicant on a train going to Moscow and placed him in custody. An arrest record was drawn up at 11.25 p.m. the same day. On 30 and 31 December 2012 two police officers accompanied the applicant by train to the town of Tyumen. On 1 January 2013 a new arrest record was drawn up, indicating 6.50 a.m. as the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest. According to the applicant, the initial arrest record of 28 December 2012 had disappeared from his case file. On 2 January 2013 the Kalininskiy District Court of Tyumen ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. The court omitted to examine the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention prior to 1 January 2013. On 24 January 2013 the Tyumen Regional Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the detention order, having found that his arrest and detention had been lawful. 50.  At about 4 p.m. on 12 November 2013 the applicant was arrested by the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d). It appears that he spent the following thirty-four hours handcuffed, first in the FSB officers\u2019 car and then on police premises. He was allegedly denied access to any means of communication or to legal assistance. At 1 a.m. on 14 November 2013 a criminal case was opened against him on charges of fraud. At 2.30 a.m. on 14 November 2013 an arrest record was drawn up. Later that day, at 5.30 p.m. according to the applicant, the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered his detention. The District Court rejected a complaint lodged by the applicant of unrecorded detention. On 27 November 2013 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the detention order on appeal. The City Court noted that during the thirty-four hours between the applicant\u2019s actual arrest and his formal arrest as a suspect, he had been \u201cconveyed\u201d to the investigator. 51.  At about 11 p.m. on 21 September 2014 the police arrested the applicant and took him to a police station. According to the applicant, the police established his identity and place of residence, questioned him, photographed him and took fingerprints. He had not been informed about his rights or the reasons for his arrest. He was released at 6 a.m. on 22 September 2014. 52.  At 5 a.m. on 23 September 2014 the police took the applicant from his house to a police station for identification by the victim and questioning. The applicant was not provided with legal assistance. At 9 p.m. an investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest for the criminal offence of disorderly conduct. At 9.30 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a suspect without legal assistance. It appears that a lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s family was not allowed to see his client. 53.  On 25 September 2014 the Troitskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s detention in view of the gravity of the charges against him, his permanent residence outside of Moscow, and the fact that he was unemployed and had no dependants. The applicant appealed against the court order, complaining, in particular, that the police had failed to inform him about his rights and to provide him with legal assistance. On 31 October 2014 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the detention order on appeal. 54.  On 1 October 2014 an investigator charged the applicant with murder and questioned him in the absence of the lawyer hired by his family. 55.  On 21 November 2014 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) extended the detention of the applicant and his co-defendants. The applicant appealed, complaining that the extension order had been based on the same reasons as before and had been issued in respect of all co\u2011defendants without examining their particular situations. On 16 December 2014 the City Court upheld the extension order, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. On 20 January 2015 the District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on the same grounds. It appears that an appeal lodged by the applicant against that detention extension order was dismissed.", "references": ["7", "4", "1", "0", "3", "5", "8", "6", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Orsk. 5.  On 28 May 2005 the applicant, who was walking home after an evening drinking, was stopped on the street by police officers from the patrol and inspection service and driven to the Sovetskiy district police station of Orsk (\u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u041e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430). He attempted to run away, but was stopped and assaulted by the police officers, who kicked him in the stomach. He felt unwell and lost consciousness. The police officers placed him in a cell and did not react when he demanded that they call an ambulance. 6.  The applicant was released the next morning. On the evening of 29 May 2005 he was admitted to hospital with internal bleeding. He spent six weeks in hospital. 7.  According to forensic medical expert report no. 3634 of 25 July 2005, the applicant had blunt abdominal trauma with a ruptured intestine, which had provoked the development of serofibrinous peritonitis. This injury had been caused by impact with a hard, blunt object, possibly one to two days before the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation, and had caused him \u201cserious health damage\u201d. The applicant also had abrasions on his back and forearms, and circular abrasions on his wrist joints, which had originated from impact with hard, blunt objects during the same period, and had not caused him any \u201chealth damage\u201d. 8.  Forensic medical expert report no. 5684 of 14 December 2011 contained similar information concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries. The expert considered that the injuries had been caused several hours to several days before the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation. The expert excluded the possibility that they had been caused as a result of him falling over. 9.  On 29 May 2005 the Orsk police received information about the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation in Town Hospital no. 2 with blunt abdominal trauma and abrasions on his body. 10.  On 14 June 2005 an investigator from the Orsk Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal case under Article 111 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (physical assault causing \u201cserious health damage\u201d). 11.  On 11 July 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 12.  On 14 October 2005 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended under Article 208 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, owing to the inability to identify the individuals to be charged. 13.  On 31 January and 25 April 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was restarted, in view of the need to take additional investigative measures. 14.  On 1 March and 18 July 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended again, on the same grounds as before. 15.  In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against various State authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 6,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his ill\u2011treatment at the police station and the lack of an effective investigation into his complaint. 16.  On 24 July 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orsk allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and awarded him RUB 150,000 (the equivalent of about 3,800 euros) in compensation. It established that the applicant had been taken into police custody in good health and that his injuries had been caused at the police station, since the State authorities had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the injuries or any evidence showing that he could have sustained them elsewhere. 17.  On 9 October 2012 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["6", "2", "8", "3", "7", "9", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Foc\u015fani. 7.  At the material time the applicant was a local correspondent for the national daily newspaper Rom\u00e2nia liber\u0103. The applicant\u2019s articles covered various fields, including investigations into the activities of the armed forces and the police. 8.  In the summer of 2004 secret documents were leaked, accidentally or deliberately, from the Romanian unit of an international military base in Afghanistan. The leak consisted mostly of copies of documents produced by the Romanian unit and classified as secret. The documents referred to the military operations of the Romanian troops at the said base in 2002 and 2003, such as operations orders or military maps. Copies of secret documents produced for the use of the Romanian unit by a military unit belonging to another country were also leaked. 9.  In March 2005 three Romanian journalists, including O.O., who was working for Rom\u00e2nia liber\u0103, were kidnapped by a terrorist group in Iraq. Their release in May 2005 was negotiated by the Romanian State and an investigation was immediately started by the Romanian authorities. The following year the media extensively reported on this case and the role played by the authorities. 10.  On 31 January 2006 O.O., together with other journalists, participated in a television show on a national channel. They criticised the authorities\u2019 negligence in allowing leaks of secret sensitive military information and mentioned the existence of a compact disc (\u201cCD\u201d) with secret documents belonging to a Romanian military unit in Afghanistan. When the host of the show questioned the authenticity of the information on the CD, O.O. showed his computer to the camera. Some of the documents, including several military maps with the positions of the Romanian troops, were thus made visible to the public. 11.  The journalists speculated as to whether such information could have reached terrorists too and demanded an investigation in order to establish whether the leaks had been voluntary. O.O. also said that although at that stage, the information no longer posed a threat to the lives of Romanian soldiers, it could have more serious implications in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. 12.  During the show it was mentioned that the newspapers Rom\u00e2nia liber\u0103 and Ziua had received the secret information in question but had decided not to publish it, fearing possible damage to national security. 13.  On 7 February 2006 the national daily newspapers, Rom\u00e2nia liber\u0103 and Ziua, published articles drawing attention to the fact that confidential information which could threaten national security had been leaked from a military unit under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. 14.  On 8 February 2006 O.O. participated in a radio show together with the chairman and vice-chairman of the Defence Commission of the Romanian Senate, the director of Ziua and an investigative journalist from a national newspaper. The show followed a day of discussions and explanations about the leak of secret documents given by the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the Information Department of the Army before the Defence Commission of the Senate. When asked how they had obtained the documents in question, O.O. refused to disclose his source, while the director of Ziua stated that he had received them anonymously. The chairman of the Defence Commission mentioned that the security of classified information had been one of the main chapters in Romania\u2019s negotiations for joining NATO. He emphasised the importance of the Ministry of Defence undertaking a thorough investigation in connection with the leak, which put into play Romania\u2019s credibility as a member of NATO. 15.  On 3 March 2006 the Minister of Defence held a press conference during which he announced that an internal inquiry into the leak of classified information had been finalised and that seventy-nine members of the army were being punished with disciplinary sanctions. Further investigations were being conducted by the prosecutors with respect to two other members of the army. The minister also confirmed the fact that he had been informed about the leak by the Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Rom\u00e2n de Informa\u0163ii) in October 2005 and that the specialised army departments had immediately started preliminary verifications. 16.  On 7 February 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice opened of its own motion an investigation on the basis of the articles published the same day in Rom\u00e2nia liber\u0103 and Ziua (see paragraph 13 above). At the same time, the Ministry of Defence informed the same prosecutor\u2019s office about the leak of information from within its structures. 17.  Shortly afterwards the prosecutor decided to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and four other people (P.I. \u2013 a former member of the armed forces, O.S. \u2013 a journalist, E.G. and I.M.) for disclosing classified information on national security under Article 169 of the Criminal Code, and for the gathering and sharing of secret or confidential information under Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991 on national security. 18.  Authorisations had been issued for the interception of telephone calls made from the phone numbers belonging to E.G., I.M. and P.I., as well as for the surveillance of E.G. and I.M. and the ambient recording of their discussions. As a result, transcripts of discussions between the applicant and E.G. and I.M. had been included in the investigation file. 19.  At 4.30 p.m. on 16 February 2006, after his house had been searched by the police and the hard drive of his computer seized, the applicant was taken into police custody. 20.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was authorised by a judge for a period of ten days. An appeal lodged by the applicant against the measure was allowed and he was released on 18 February 2006. 21.  The prosecutor established that at the beginning of July 2005 O.S., a journalist specialised in military issues, working for local newspapers in Foc\u015fani, had received on a CD a copy of the secret military documents leaked in 2004. At that time, three people, including P.I., had been in possession of the above-mentioned documents. On 2 July 2005 O.S. had met the applicant and had given him a copy of the CD. 22.  A list of the applicant\u2019s telephone calls showed that on 4 July 2005 he had called the head of the public relations department of the Romanian Armed Forces. In the following months, both the applicant and O.S. had discussed the content of the CD with other journalists and on several occasions with employees of the Romanian Armed Forces and of the Romanian Intelligence Service. 23.  The investigation further established that by the end of 2005 the applicant had shown the content of the CD to a few people and had given a copy of the CD to E.G. and I.M., who the applicant believed were former members of the police. Furthermore, in January 2006 O.O. (see paragraph 10 above) went to Foc\u015fani and met the applicant and O.S., who showed him the documents. 24.  In a statement given before the prosecutor on 16 February 2006, the applicant said that he could not remember having discussed the secret documents with O.O. He also said that as soon as he had found out about the information in question, he became interested in it as a journalist. Because there were doubts about the authenticity of the documents, he had had to contact a number of people in order to verify the information. It was in that context that he had discussed and shown the said documents to E.G. and I.M., who had let him believe they had connections with high-ranking politicians. He acknowledged that he might have told some of his friends that he had seen secret documents in order to be given more credit as an investigative journalist. 25.  On 2 July 2007 the head of the Romanian Armed Forces informed the chief prosecutor of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice that the documents which formed the object of the investigation and which had been issued by the Romanian army, and had been compromised by their publication in the media, had been de-classified. 26.  On 15 August 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided that \u201cby receiving (obtaining) from O.S. a CD that he [had] watched three times; by saving on the hard drive of his computer the information classified as State secret and work secret and by giving the CD to I.M. and E.G., outside the legal framework set forth by the provisions of Law no. 182/2002 and Government Decision no. 585/2002\u201d, the applicant had committed, in a continuous form, the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. The prosecutor decided, however, not to indict the applicant but to sanction him with an administrative fine of 800 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 240 euros (EUR)). The applicant was further ordered to pay part of the judicial costs incurred in the investigation in the amount of ROL 1,912 (EUR 572). The prosecutor also ordered the confiscation of the hard drive seized from the applicant on 16 February 2006. 27.  The prosecutor\u2019s decision was based on the Romanian legal framework on classified information, which was held to include Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of classified information, Government Decision no. 585/2002 approving national standards for the protection of classified information, Government Decision no. 781/2002 on the protection of professional secrets and Law no. 51/1991 on national security. The decision further mentioned that the applicant had received the secret military information and had proceeded to verify its nature and importance. He had further shared the information with other people. From the elements in the file, the prosecutor concluded that the purpose of the applicant\u2019s actions was just to make himself more visible as an investigative journalist and not to serve the public interest. Noting that the protection of classified information was an obligation incumbent only on authorised personnel, the prosecutor nevertheless considered that information concerning national defence was classified and could not be of public interest, as provided for by Article 12(1)(a) of Law no. 544/2001 on access to public information. As a result, although anyone unauthorised in the field of national defence \u2013 such as a journalist \u2013 was not bound by a duty to protect this type of information, he or she did not have the right to disclose it to the public. 28.  In view of the above, the prosecutor considered that the applicant had acted with intent to disclose classified information outside the above-mentioned legal framework. However, the prosecutor considered that the crimes committed by the applicant and the other four suspects were not serious enough to require the pursuit of the criminal investigation. In this connection, the prosecutor noted firstly that the information in dispute was not likely to endanger national security but only to harm the interests of the Romanian State and its armed forces. In addition, the information was outdated and hence was no longer likely to endanger the Romanian military structures in Afghanistan. The information in question had already been \u201ccompromised\u201d (disclosed by a member of the armed forces to a civilian) as early as the summer of 2004, with no measures having been taken by the institution concerned. The prosecutor also mentioned that the actions undertaken by O.S and the applicant in order to gather information concerning the content, nature and importance of the secret documents in question, by contacting active or reserve members of the armed forces or other journalists were part of the working methods of investigative journalists and did not necessarily present a danger for society. 29.  The applicant complained against that decision to the superior prosecutor, who rejected the complaint as ill-founded on 6 November 2007. 30.  On 3 December 2007 the applicant complained against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. He submitted that he had been wrongfully found guilty of the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. In his opinion, that Article, as well as the entire law, imposed obligations only on people authorised to work with secret information. He contended that he had not made any steps to gather military secrets but had merely passively received information that was already in the public domain. Invoking Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that the Court had already decided that once information concerning national security had entered the public domain, it was difficult to justify the imposition of sanctions for its publication. He therefore urged the court to acknowledge that his actions could not be regarded as crimes. 31. On 5 February 2008 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint as ill-founded. The court held that the facts established during the investigation had led to the conclusion that the applicant had secretly transmitted the CD containing secret information to other people he knew, avoiding handing it over to the competent authorities of the Ministry of Defence or the Romanian Intelligence Service. The court further held:\n\u201cThe accused\u2019s capacity as a journalist cannot exonerate him from the commission of this crime because anyone who finds out about secret military information does not have the right to publish it since this might endanger the lives of soldiers, officers in the conflict environment. But the applicant, by the means described above, covertly shared the secret information, which could have reached people interested in putting military structures in danger.\nThe accused did not even wish to use his profession in order to bring to the public\u2019s knowledge the leak of information, as he failed to ask the newspaper for which he worked to make public the breach of state secrets in the military (obviously the military secret information could not have been published).\nThe freedom of the press invoked by the accused cannot give a journalist the right to make public, to unofficial people, secret military information, because this may endanger the right to safety of certain military structures.\u201d 32.  The applicant was ordered to pay court fees in the amount of ROL 50 (EUR 13). 33.  The applicant appealed against that judgment. He alleged that the information in dispute had already been in the public domain at the time it had been brought to his attention. He submitted that the prosecutor\u2019s decision had breached his freedom of expression in an attempt to cover up an embarrassing situation for the authorities, who had allowed the information to be leaked to the public. 34.  On 23 March 2009 the High Court of Cassation and Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint with final effect. The court held that Article 19 of Law 51/1991 applied to anyone who gathered and shared secret information outside the legal framework. It further held that the applicant had not contested the fact that he had come into possession of secret information which he had then shared with other people outside the legal framework. Moreover, he had done this with direct intent. Considering that the information in question had not been in the public domain, the court held that journalists coming into possession of such information must submit it to the competent authorities and were allowed by law to share with the public only the failure of the institution concerned to protect its confidentiality. Having failed to act in that way, the applicant had committed the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. The court concluded that the prosecutor had correctly considered that the crime had not, however, attained the degree of seriousness to require criminal sanctions. 35.  The applicant was ordered to pay court fees of ROL 200 (EUR 47).", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "7", "5", "8", "9", "4", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Taurag\u0117 region. 6.  Since 1999 she has been diagnosed with several mental disorders, such as schizo-affective disorder, depression, mania, and panic disorder. She has been admitted to psychiatric hospitals multiple times. However, during the events described below, she retained full legal capacity (see paragraph 37 below). 7.  From February to September 2014 the applicant was given administrative penalties for insulting another person in a public place (minor hooliganism under Article 174 of the Code of Administrative Offences), for threatening a teenager with an electroshock device and for scaring a minor (infringement of children\u2019s rights under Article 1813 of the Code of Administrative Offences). 8.  In 2013 the applicant bought a tear-gas dispenser. According to her, she had done so in order to defend herself against some inhabitants of her village who often insulted her because of her mental illness. On 16 November 2013, at around 7.30 p.m., the applicant sprayed tear gas at a fifteen-year-old called E. It appears that the tear gas caused E. physical pain but she did not suffer any injuries. 9.  The Taurag\u0117 police opened a pre-trial investigation against the applicant for breach of public order under Article 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. Between November 2013 and January 2014 the police interviewed E. and several other teenagers who had been with her on the evening of 16 November 2013. They all stated that on that evening they had been \u201changing out\u201d near one of the residential buildings in the village when E. had decided to go to another friend\u2019s house. When she had started walking, the applicant had suddenly appeared from around the corner, quickly approached E. and sprayed her in the eyes with tear gas. E. herself and the other interviewed teenagers stated that although E. had had some verbal conflicts with the applicant in the past, on that evening she had not done anything to provoke the applicant. 10.  On 18 December 2013 the police asked a court psychiatric centre in Klaip\u0117da whether, in the light of the applicant\u2019s history of mental illness, it was necessary for her to undergo a psychiatric assessment in order to determine whether she could be held criminally responsible for the offence. A psychiatric expert, having examined the applicant\u2019s medical file, concluded that such an assessment was necessary. 11.  On 10 January 2014 the applicant was served with an official notice that she was suspected of having committed the offence provided under Article 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. She was given State\u2011guaranteed legal aid. She was interviewed on that same day and admitted to having sprayed tear gas at E. However, she claimed to have done so in self\u2011defence \u2013 she stated that on the evening of 16 November 2013 E. had kicked the door of her apartment and had thrown a stone at her window. 12.  On 28 March 2014 the Taurag\u0117 district prosecutor informed the applicant and her lawyer that, in line with Article 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 42 below), it was necessary for the applicant to undergo a psychiatric assessment. The prosecutor appended a list of questions to be submitted to the psychiatric expert and informed the applicant and her lawyer that they had the right to submit additional questions and material for the assessment, as well as to ask for the appointment of a particular expert. The applicant and her lawyer did not respond. 13.  On 3 April 2014 the Taurag\u0117 District Court ordered a psychiatric assessment of the applicant. A copy of that order has not been provided to the Court. The applicant later submitted to the domestic courts that she had not been notified of it (see paragraph 22 below). 14.  It transpires from the parties\u2019 submissions that on the morning of 15 April 2014 the applicant was present at the Taurag\u0117 police station for unspecified reasons, when two police officers handcuffed her, took her to a police car and drove her to the court psychiatric centre in Klaip\u0117da, approximately 110 kilometres from Taurag\u0117. 15.  A report drawn up on that same day by one of the officers who had seized the applicant read as follows:\n\u201cI hereby inform that on 15 April 2014 during the general morning meeting of the Prevention Sub-division, an oral instruction was received from [the chief] to execute the order of the Taurag\u0117 District Court, which ordered that [the applicant] be brought (atvesdinti) to the Klaip\u0117da court psychiatric centre where she was to undergo a psychiatric assessment, in connection with an ongoing pre\u2011trial investigation. [The chief] announced that [the applicant] was waiting outside the Operative Management Division.\nAt around 8.40 a.m., together with [Officer D.P.], we ordered [the applicant to] go with the police officers into a police car, so that she could be taken to the Klaip\u0117da court psychiatric centre to undergo a psychiatric assessment. However, [the applicant] mockingly responded that police officers did not have the right to take her anywhere, and threatened to have everyone who touched her fired. It was repeated several times [to the applicant] that coercion and special measures could be used against her for refusing to comply with lawful orders of police officers. As [the applicant] was not paying attention to these warnings, I took her hand, but [she] tried to bite my left palm; she did not succeed, so I did not need medical help. [The applicant] began to resist by jostling, stiffening her hands, and trying to get away. By doing so [she] resisted and disobeyed lawful orders. As [the applicant] continued disobeying officers\u2019 lawful orders, with the help of [three other officers] [she] was handcuffed and taken to a [police] car.\u201d\nOne of the other officers who had participated in the applicant\u2019s seizure submitted a report with essentially the same wording. 16.  It is not clear when the applicant was released from the court psychiatric centre and how she returned to her home. The Government submitted that the psychiatric assessment had been completed on the same day and the applicant had not been detained any longer (see paragraph 64 below). 17.  According to the applicant, the police officers did not explain to her why she was being seized and did not draw up a record of provisional arrest (see paragraph 61 below). 18.  On 15 April 2014 the applicant was examined by two court\u2011appointed psychiatrists. The report of the assessment, drawn up on that same day, stated the following:\n\u201cThe patient was brought to the assessment by police officers. At the beginning of the assessment she was hostile, outraged by the behaviour of the police, she spoke in a raised voice and refused to provide her anamnestic data. Having calmed down, she provided information about the main events of her life but her narration was characterised by strong emotional reactions (afektas) [which were] inappropriate to the situation, elevated mood and overestimation of herself. She had no complaints about her health, she thought that she was healthy and did not need any help.\n...\nThe patient\u2019s mental state during the assessment. [She had] a complete grasp of the time, the place and herself (orientuota pilnai laike, vietoje ir savyje). [She was wearing] bright make-up and clothes. At the beginning of the assessment [she was] outraged and loudly expressed dissatisfaction that police officers had brought her to the assessment by force, without her consent. She understood the purpose of the assessment. She stated that she did not have any illnesses and did not require treatment. She actively expressed discontent with the law-enforcement authorities and the inhabitants of her area. The patient\u2019s mental condition is characterised by angry mania: joyful moods [which are] not appropriate to the situation, accelerated [mental] associations, excessive activity, at the same time expressions of anger, irritation, short temper. When talking about the major events in her life, she overestimates herself, underlines her achievements in her former professional life, her significant role in educating children at school. She expresses anger at the lifestyle of asocial families in the neighbourhood and the wider area [and says that] she is ready to not put up with it and to fight against it. [She does not display] a critical view of her illness (be esmin\u0117s kritikos susirgimo at\u017evilgiu). She speaks loudly about the criminal allegations against her, denies them and blames the victim, her parents and the surroundings.\u201d 19.  The report concluded that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder \u2011 schizo-affective disorder with a type of mania (l\u0117tinis psichikos sutrikimas \u2011 \u0161izoafektinis sutrikimas, manijos tipas), that because of that disorder she had been incapable of understanding and controlling her actions at the time of the alleged criminal offence, and that those circumstances persisted at the time of the assessment. The psychiatrists recommended that the applicant not be called before a court, nor subjected to any procedural measures, and that she be admitted to Roki\u0161kis Psychiatric Hospital for compulsory inpatient treatment. 20.  On 22 April 2014 an administrative-violation report was drawn up against the applicant for having violently resisted police officers on 15 April 2014 (see paragraph 14 above). The Taurag\u0117 District Court held an oral hearing on 2 June 2014 in which the applicant was present. Relying on the abovementioned psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), the court discontinued the administrative proceedings on the grounds that the applicant could not be held liable for the offence. 21.  On 3 June 2014 the prosecutor referred the case to the Taurag\u0117 District Court and asked the court to order compulsory medical treatment for the applicant (taikyti priver\u010diam\u0105sias medicinos priemones). 22.  On 11 June 2014 the applicant sent a letter to the Taurag\u0117 District Court, stating that she was not aware whether there were any ongoing criminal proceedings against her and asking the court to inform her of any such proceedings and of her procedural status in them. She also stated that she had not been notified of any court order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will (see paragraph 13 above) and asked to be provided with a copy of such an order. The following day the applicant received a response from the court informing her of the proceedings concerning compulsory medical treatment (see paragraph 21 above). The court also stated that the file of that case did not contain any order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will. 23.  On 17 June 2014 the applicant sent another letter to the Taurag\u0117 District Court. In it she asked to be given an opportunity to attend the court\u2019s hearing in the case concerning compulsory medical treatment which would be held on 30 June 2014. She did not receive any response from the court. 24.  On 26 June 2014 the applicant was voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Klaip\u0117da. 25.  On 30 June 2014 the Taurag\u0117 District Court held a hearing in the case against the applicant concerning compulsory medical treatment. The applicant was absent from the hearing but her lawyer was present. 26.  The court heard one of the psychiatrists who had examined the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). He gave the following responses to the questions submitted to him by the judge and the applicant\u2019s lawyer (the questions were not included in the minutes of the hearing):\n\u201cI stand by my responses given in the assessment report.\u201d\n\u201cAs of this moment, I cannot say if procedural steps can be conducted with [the applicant]. As I understand from [the documents provided by the court], she is currently undergoing treatment ... I understand that she underwent treatment already in May ... at a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was not effective because [later] she was hospitalised again. I think that it is necessary to order compulsory medical treatment.\u201d\n\u201cRight now I cannot say precisely if inpatient treatment at Roki\u0161kis Psychiatric Hospital is necessary because she is currently being treated at [Klaip\u0117da hospital]. [It appears] that that treatment is not sufficiently effective. I recommend inpatient treatment.\u201d\nThe psychiatrist also stated that the treatment provided to the applicant at the Klaip\u0117da hospital constituted \u201cpsychiatric supervision\u201d (psichikos prie\u017ei\u016bra) which was different from compulsory treatment; the applicant had undergone outpatient treatment before and it had not been effective. He further considered that compulsory treatment was necessary because the applicant lived alone and refused to take medication, and there was nobody to take care of her if her mental health deteriorated. 27.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer argued before the court that since the psychiatric assessment the applicant\u2019s mental health had improved considerably because she was undergoing treatment (see paragraph 24 above). He submitted that it would not be appropriate to order compulsory treatment without examining the effects of that treatment and that it was therefore necessary to conduct a fresh psychiatric assessment. 28.  On 1 July 2014 the Taurag\u0117 District Court adopted a one-and-a-half page decision ordering the applicant\u2019s inpatient treatment under general supervision at Roki\u0161kis Psychiatric Hospital (see paragraph 46 below). The court held that the applicant\u2019s guilt in respect of the criminal offence had been proved by witness testimonies and the applicant\u2019s own statements (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). It then referred to the findings of the psychiatric assessment that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder which rendered her incapable of understanding and controlling her actions, unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation and the hearing, and for which she required hospitalisation (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The court also cited the statements of the psychiatric expert given during the hearing, who also recommended compulsory inpatient treatment for the applicant (see paragraph 26 above). It concluded that at the time of the offence, as well as at the time of the decision, the applicant could not be held criminally responsible (buvo ir \u0161iuo metu yra nepakaltinama). The court exempted the applicant from criminal responsibility and ordered her hospitalisation at the psychiatric hospital in Roki\u0161kis. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. She submitted that she had been informed of the possibility to subject her to compulsory treatment only on 12 June 2014 (see paragraph 22 above) and complained that she had not been summoned to the hearing, despite having expressed a wish to attend (see paragraph 23 above). She complained that the first\u2011instance court had not adequately assessed her mental condition because it had not examined her in person, had not heard evidence from the doctor treating her and had not ordered a fresh psychiatric assessment, despite the fact that since June 2014 she had been voluntarily undergoing psychiatric treatment. The applicant pointed out that the psychiatrist interviewed by the court had acknowledged that he had been unable to comment on her mental condition at the time of the hearing (see paragraph 26 above). The applicant further complained about the court\u2019s decision to hospitalise her rather than order outpatient treatment. She submitted that the court had not assessed whether she had posed a danger to society \u2013 the applicant submitted that the offence which she had committed had not been serious and that she had committed it because of the pre\u2011existing conflict between E. and herself and not because of her mental disorder, so the disorder had not made her a danger to others. The applicant also complained about the court\u2019s decision to commit her to a hospital in Roki\u0161kis (more than 200 kilometres from Taurag\u0117) and not one which was closer to her home. 30.  In the appeal the applicant also raised complaints about being taken for a psychiatric assessment without her consent on 15 April 2014. She submitted that she had not been informed that a psychiatric assessment had been ordered and had not been provided with a court order to that effect, that a record of provisional arrest had not been drawn up, a lawyer had not been present during the assessment, and she had not been informed about her right to request the removal of experts. She also submitted that the experts\u2019 conclusions had not indicated what kind of assessment had been performed and that they had not been adequately reasoned. 31.  On 26 September 2014 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court held a hearing in which the applicant was absent but her lawyer was present. 32.  On that same day the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court adopted a decision which was slightly over two pages long and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established all the essential circumstances of the case and had adequately reasoned its findings. The court considered that the danger posed by the applicant to society had been proved by the conclusions of the psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above) and the psychiatrist heard by the first-instance court (see paragraph 26 above). It also observed that the applicant had been previously treated in psychiatric hospitals seventeen times, which demonstrated that the treatment had not led to any long-term improvement of her mental health. The court concluded:\n\u201cAll the aforementioned circumstances demonstrate that [the applicant] is a danger to society, her actions present a threat to others, [and] she cannot ensure adequate medical treatment and care for herself because she lives alone, so outpatient treatment would not be sufficient.\nThe appellate court considers that the arguments in [the applicant\u2019s] appeal confirm that she cannot critically assess her disorder [and] does not understand the danger presented by her mental condition, nor the need for treatment (apeliaciniame skunde nurodomi argumentai patvirtina, jog ji n\u0117ra kriti\u0161ka savo ligos at\u017evilgiu, nesuvokia savo psichin\u0117s b\u016bkl\u0117s pavojingumo ir poreikio gydytis).\u201d\nThe court did not address the arguments presented in the applicant\u2019s appeal (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above) any further. 33.  On 31 October 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal on points of law submitted by the applicant on the grounds that it raised no important legal questions. 34.  On 13 November 2014 the applicant was taken by the police to the psychiatric hospital in Roki\u0161kis for compulsory treatment. On 22 May 2015 the Roki\u0161kis District Court ruled, on the basis of the information provided by the hospital, that her mental health had not sufficiently improved, and extended the hospitalisation; the applicant did not appeal against that decision. On 6 November 2015 that same court found that the applicant\u2019s mental health had sufficiently improved, ended her hospitalisation and ordered compulsory outpatient treatment. On 25 April 2016 the Taurag\u0117 District Court, relying on the recommendation of the doctor in charge of the applicant\u2019s treatment, ended her compulsory outpatient treatment. 35.  On 27 September 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Psychiatric Hospital asked a court to order the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation. It submitted that the applicant had been taken to the hospital by the police, at the referral of a psychiatrist in Taurag\u0117, because her mental health had deteriorated. On that same day the \u0160ilut\u0117 District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation for thirty days. 36.  On 28 November 2016 the Taurag\u0117 District Court found the applicant guilty of terrorising others and breaching public order, but considered that she could not be held criminally responsible and thus ordered her psychiatric hospitalisation. However, on 13 April 2017 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court quashed that decision. It found that those offences had not been committed, and discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. 37.  In May 2017 the social-care authorities of the Taurag\u0117 municipality applied to a court to restrict the applicant\u2019s legal capacity in certain areas, relying on her mental disorder and her inability to take proper care of herself. The applicant objected to that request. On 10 August 2017 the Taurag\u0117 District Court, in a hearing in which the applicant and her lawyer were present, declared the applicant legally incapacitated in certain areas, and partly restricted her legal capacity in certain other areas.\nAccording to the information submitted to the Court, the applicant appealed against that decision and at the time of the present judgment the appellate proceedings were pending. 38.  On 17 November 2014 the Taurag\u0117 District Court found E. (see paragraph 8 above) guilty of hitting the applicant in the face and causing her minor bodily harm. The court found that on 3 April 2014 the applicant had tried to take E.\u2019s mobile phone from her and had scratched her face, and E. had then hit her. The court considered that E.\u2019s actions could not be characterised as self-defence but as a deliberate attempt to injure the applicant. E. was sentenced to four months\u2019 deprivation of liberty. The applicant was awarded 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 87 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "references": ["1", "4", "9", "5", "3", "7", "0", "8", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1964, 1991 and 1982 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Timi\u015foara, while the third applicant lives in Lantosque (France). The applicants are the wife, the daughter and the niece of S.T. respectively. 6.  On 13 March 2014 a criminal investigation was opened by the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) against S.T., a medical doctor and employee of a State pension office, on suspicion of bribe-taking. On the same day a search was conducted at the common residence of S.T. and the first applicant, in the first applicant\u2019s presence, accompanied by her lawyer. Documents and money found on that occasion were seized. The first applicant objected to that measure, claiming that some of the assets seized did not concern the ongoing investigation. The objection was included in the search record drawn up by the police on the spot and signed by the first applicant and her lawyer. 7.  According to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 17 March 2014 the movable assets taken away at the search of 13 March, as well as other movable and immovable assets belonging to S.T. and his wife (the first applicant), had been seized under Article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code (see paragraph 36 below) for the purpose of subsequent special and extended confiscation provided for by Article 1121 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below). The decision listed, among the assets found during the searches conducted in the case, the sum of 107,915 euros (EUR) found in cash. Cash in other currencies had also been seized as well as several items belonging to the second applicant. The prosecutor based the decision on the nature of the crimes under investigation and the need to recover the damages, as well as on the need to investigate possible money-laundering crimes. 8.  On 19 March 2014 S.T. was handed a copy of the seizure decision of 17 March 2014 in the presence of his lawyer. On that occasion, after he had been informed of his rights and obligations, he stated that he had no observations or objections in connection with the seizure. 9.  On 20 March 2014 the second applicant, represented by her lawyer, was informed of her rights and obligations in connection with the seizure of her property and received a copy of the decision of 17 March 2014. 10.  On 25 March 2014 the second applicant, represented by two lawyers of her choice, lodged a complaint with the Cara\u015f-Severin County Court against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 17 March 2014. She claimed that the seizure of assets for the purpose of subsequent special or extended confiscation provided for by Article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, taken together with Articles 112 and 1121 of the Criminal Code, could be ordered only with respect to assets belonging to a suspect or accused. She further explained that the assets listed in the prosecutor\u2019s seizure decision included two flats, two garages and two cars, which had been lawfully acquired by her with money lent by members of her family and should not have been seized. She joined copies of sale contracts and a written statement given by a member of the family. 11.  On 10 April 2014 the Cara\u015f-Severin County Court decided with final effect that the seizure decision of 17 March 2014 had been in compliance with the provisions of Article 249 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code (see paragraph 36 below), which clearly stipulated that measures such as seizure may be ordered with respect to assets belonging not only to the suspect or accused, but also to any other person. Furthermore, the second applicant had not proved that she had an income or that she had purchased the assets in question with her own money. Therefore, taking into account also the fact that the prosecutor mentioned in the impugned decision that there were suspicions of money laundering, the court concluded that the seizure measure had been lawful and justified for all the assets concerned. 12.  On 26 May 2014 S.T. was indicted on 291 counts of bribe-taking committed between 3 February and 13 March 2014 in his capacity as an employee in a public institution, more specifically the chief expert on matters regarding capacity to work and invalidity at the Cara\u015f-Severin County State Pension Office (Casa Jude\u0163ean\u0103 de Pensii Cara\u015f-Severin). 13.  On 23 October 2014 S.T. admitted his guilt in a statement before the Arad County Court. He chose to benefit from the special fast-track procedure provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code for such situations. 14.  In his written plea submitted to the court, S.T. explained that some of the assets seized by the prosecutor belonged to his wife and daughter (the first and second applicants), who had not committed any criminal acts. In addition, he alleged that his family\u2019s assets had been acquired with funds obtained from real-estate transactions in 2007 and 2013, and that the prosecutor had failed to prove that the seized assets had been unlawfully acquired. He also mentioned that out of the money seized in cash, the sum of EUR 40,400 had come from the sale of a flat in 2013. A copy of a contract had been submitted in support of that allegation, showing that a flat owned jointly by S.T. together with the first and third applicants had been sold for EUR 40,400. In conclusion, he asked the court to exclude the assets belonging to his family from the confiscation order. 15.  On 6 November 2014 the Arad County Court found S.T. guilty on all counts of bribe-taking and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment, the minimum sentence applicable in the light of his admission of guilt. 16.  On the basis of the provisions of Article 289 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below), the court also ordered the confiscation of various amounts of money and goods received by S.T. as bribes during the above-mentioned period and which had been seized during the investigation. 17.  In addition, the court decided to apply the provisions of Article 1121 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (m), 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below) and to confiscate, on the grounds that they had been acquired as a result of S.T.\u2019s criminal activity, additional money and property belonging jointly to S.T. and the first applicant (the equivalent of EUR 124,000 in cash in various currencies, a dental practice, a flat and a vehicle), as well as property belonging to the second applicant (a flat and two vehicles). All confiscated property had been previously seized by virtue of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 17 March 2014. 18.  In reply to S.T.\u2019s arguments concerning the assets belonging to his family, the court held that the total value of the seized property could not be justified by the lawful income earned by S.T. together with the first applicant in the five years before the commission of the crimes in question. In addition, the second applicant was a student and did not have any income. An analysis of the documents and expert reports included in the file showed that the annual income of S.T. and his wife, the first applicant, amounted to EUR 35,000, whereas the value of the assets acquired by the family in the preceding five years \u2013 the equivalent of EUR 300,000 in bank accounts or in cash, fifteen flats and plots of land, five garages and four vehicles \u2013 grossly exceeded their lawful income. However, referring to Decision no. 356 of 25 June 2014 of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 37 below), the District Court explained that the confiscation measure would apply only to the assets acquired after April 2012. The court therefore decided to lift the seizure order in respect of the assets belonging to the family which did not fall within the scope of the case, having been acquired before April 2012. 19.  S.T. and all the applicants lodged appeals against the judgment of 6 November 2014. 20.  In her reasons for appeal, the third applicant explained that she had asked her uncle, S.T., to keep for her the EUR 40,400 she had obtained from the sale of her flat in 2013. She claimed that that amount had been found in S.T.\u2019s residence during the search of 13 March 2014 and had been wrongfully confiscated by the Arad County Court. 21.  The first two hearings were scheduled for 19 January and 16 February. The applicants\u2019 lawyer requested the postponement of the trial because she could not be present. The next hearing was scheduled for 16 March 2015. 22. On 10 March 2015 the prosecutor submitted to the file a report prepared by the National Integrity Agency (Agen\u0163ia Na\u0163ionala de Integritate), verifying the assets statements submitted by the first applicant, on the basis of Law no. 176/2010 on integrity in the exercise of functions in public office. The report concluded that there were serious discrepancies between the first applicant\u2019s lawful income and her assets, and said that the information would be sent to the commission for the verification of assets of the Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal for a decision on the further steps to be taken. 23.  The applicants submitted to the file an accountant\u2019s report which provided a calculation of the net income earned by S.T. and the first applicant from their salaries between 1991 and 2014. The total amount determined by the accountant was EUR 281,071. They also submitted numerous copies of sale contracts for various properties, as well as a written statement from C.T., a family member who declared that he had lent money to the second applicant. 24.  At the hearing of 16 March 2015 the applicants\u2019 lawyer requested that another person be invited to testify as a witness before the court that he had also lent money to the second applicant. With respect to the first applicant, the lawyer applied to the court for an accountant\u2019s report in order to establish the exact difference between her lawful income and the value of the property confiscated from her, taking into account the family\u2019s expenses. 25.  The requests were discussed during the hearing, in the presence of all parties. The prosecutor argued that the request to hear a witness should be rejected, since the family\u2019s income could not be established with witness statements. 26.  The court of appeal decided to refuse the requests, holding that there were enough elements in the file allowing for the exact calculation of both the family\u2019s income and the value of their assets. In any case, the court held that several hearings had taken place in the appeal proceedings and the applicants had had enough time at their disposal to prepare their defence and submit written evidence. 27.  On the merits of their appeal, the applicants\u2019 lawyer argued that all property confiscated had been acquired from the legal income earned jointly by S.T. and the first applicant. In this connection, he referred to the accountant\u2019s report included in the file. As regards the sum of EUR 40,400, the lawyer explained that it had been confiscated by mistake, since it belonged in fact to the third applicant, who had asked her uncle, S.T., to keep it for her. The money had come from the sale of a flat belonging to the third applicant. The lawyer concluded that the confiscation of property belonging to the applicants had been an unlawful and excessive measure. 28.  The court postponed the pronouncement of the judgment to 24 March 2015. 29. In the meantime, the first and second applicants submitted written pleadings complaining that the second applicant had never been summoned to appear before the Arad District Court and had never been asked by the courts to submit evidence on how she had acquired the confiscated property. They also claimed that all their assets had been acquired through the efficient management of the family\u2019s lawful income. 30.  On 24 March 2015 the Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. The court held that from the high number of criminal acts committed by S.T. it could be inferred that he had established a habit in taking bribes which could have started long before the period that had been investigated. At the same time, S.T. and his family, the first and second applicants, had accumulated a considerable fortune in the past five years. The Court of Appeal further observed that it was clear from the evidence in the file that part of the confiscated goods were the direct proceeds of S.T.\u2019s crimes, whereas other assets belonged to the first and second applicants. The court concluded that it could be inferred from an analysis of the lawful income of the first applicant and the lack of income of the second applicant that the assets found in their names had also been acquired through S.T.\u2019s criminal activity. 31.  The Court of Appeal observed that there was a considerable discrepancy between the family\u2019s lawful income and its assets, and that S.T. and the applicants had not supplied proof that the confiscated assets had been lawfully acquired. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cBetween 03.02.2014 and 13.03.2014 while the defendant was under surveillance he received various sums of money and other goods from 291 people who had come to his office for a medical examination in order to obtain a decision on retirement due to loss of capacity to work or to obtain an official certification of their degree of disability in order to benefit from social security benefits. As the lower court also held, the defendant has confessed to all the charges against him and he has been convicted to three years\u2019 imprisonment.\nAs a result of this criminal conviction, the first-instance court considered that the requirements of Article 1121 of the Criminal Code had been fulfilled and ordered the extended confiscation of money, flats and vehicles, items which had a value exceeding the income of the defendant and his family in the last five years ....\nAs regards the income of the defendant and his family, the court observes that he submitted an accountant\u2019s report showing the family\u2019s income starting with January 1991, but without mentioning their expenses for the same period.\nIn order to establish whether there was a discrepancy between the family\u2019s income and their properties and other goods acquired, the court must compare the amounts of money spent during the period of the acquisition of the properties in question with the income. Based on the documents submitted to the file, including an evaluation report submitted by the National Integrity Agency on 10 March 2015, the court concludes that there is a significant difference between the income and the assets accumulated. The above-mentioned report evaluated especially the assets acquired by the defendant\u2019s wife [the first applicant] mostly from her salary. Even if this salary had been higher than the defendant\u2019s and even assuming that they also had earnings from real-estate transactions, they could not have accumulated enough money to acquire such a large number of properties and vehicles.\u201d 32.  As regards the second applicant, the court held that she was currently a student and there was no proof in the file to show that she had ever had an income. Her allegations that the property found in her name had been acquired from donations from other members of the family had not been proved. Therefore, the conclusion of the first-instance court that the property she owned had been purchased with money from her parents was considered correct. 33.  As regards the appeal submitted by the third applicant, the court held that no evidence had been submitted to the file to show that EUR 40,400 belonged to her and had been given to S.T. for safekeeping. 34.  The Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal concluded with final effect that the first-instance court had correctly applied the legal provisions in the case and had even decided to lift the seizure order in respect of certain items.", "references": ["7", "4", "1", "6", "2", "5", "0", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were all employees of the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions in Serbia. Because of the hardships prison staff endure during service at penal institutions in Serbia, Serbian law provides that they are eligible for certain employment benefits, such as benefits concerning the calculation of their old-age pensions and salary increases. 7.  In general, pension and work-related issues in Serbia are regulated by two laws: 1) the Old-Age Pension and Disability Insurance Act (Zakon o penzionom i invalidskom osiguranju, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 34/2003, as amended); and 2) the Labour Act (Zakon o radu, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 24/2005, as amended). However, in regards to employees of correctional facilities, pension and work-related issues are also regulated by: 1) the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act (Zakon o izvr\u0161enju krivi\u010dnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no. 85/2005, amendments published in the Official Gazette no. 72/2009); and 2) the Directive on personal coefficients for the calculation and payment of salaries to individuals employed within the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions (Uredba o koeficijentima za obra\u010dun i isplatu plata u Upravi za izvr\u0161enje krivi\u010dnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no. 16/2007, amendments published in the Official Gazette nos. 21/2009, 1/2011 \u2013 Constitutional Court decision (implementing decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 November 2010), 83/2011 and 102/2011 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Directive\u201d). 8.  Under Article 262 of the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act, the director and other employees of the directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions are entitled to an accelerated accumulation of pension rights: this means that twelve months of full-time employment is counted as sixteen months of full-time employment in the civilian economy when their old-age pensions are calculated. Also, the personal coefficient of employees in correctional facilities may, according to the said Article, be increased by up to 30%. The posts to which the accelerated accumulation of pension rights applies are determined by the minister responsible for the judiciary and the minister responsible for pension and disability insurance. 9.  In accordance with Article 7 \u00a7 3 of the Directive, in the period between 1 January 2007 and 14 January 2011 the personal coefficients of the applicants and their colleagues were increased by 10% instead of 30% as provided by the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act. 10.  On 18 November 2010, the Constitutional Court adopted a decision (no. IU 63/2007) stating that Article 7 \u00a7 3 of the Directive was unconstitutional. The said Article was struck down. The amendments to the Directive entered into force on 14 January 2011. As of 14 January 2011 the personal coefficients were increased by 30%. 11.  Between 1 January 2007 and 14 January 2011, while this unconstitutional norm (neustavna odredba) was in force, the employees of the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions received lower salaries that they had been entitled to. For that reason, their old-age pensions were also reduced. 12.  Throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013 the applicants, as well as many of their colleagues, lodged with various courts of first instance (osnovni sudovi) separate civil claims against the Republic of Serbia, asking for compensation for the damage caused while the four-year-long unconstitutional norm pertained. 13.  Some of the courts of first instance upheld the claimants\u2019 applications for compensation, while others dismissed them. Decisions of the courts of first instance were appealed against either by claimants or the defendant. 14.  Certain claimants were successful before the courts of appeal; yet all the applicants were unsuccessful. In particular, the applicants\u2019 complaints were rejected by the courts of appeal in Belgrade and Kragujevac for the applicants\u2019 failure to pursue the proper avenue of redress. In the view of these courts the applicants should have first initiated administrative proceedings and afterwards lodged a complaint with the civil courts. In any event, the Belgrade and Kragujevac Courts of Appeal also held that they did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicants\u2019 cases. 15.  In contrast, in the following cases other courts of appeal or chambers thereof ruled in favour of the applicants\u2019 colleagues:\n1) The Kragujevac Court of Appeal (for example: decisions nos. G\u017e1. 43/11 of 15 March 2011 and G\u017e1. 3034/14 of 2 October 2014);\n2) The Ni\u0161 Court of Appeal (for example: G\u017e1. 2444/13 of 27 December 2013);\n3) The Novi Sad Court of Appeal (for example: G\u017e1. 3549/13 of 24 December 2013 and G\u017e1. 2379/14 of 7 November 2014). 16.  In the above-mentioned decisions the courts of appeal upheld the claimants\u2019 requests, stating that the applicants\u2019 colleagues should be paid the differences in their salaries together with interest on the unpaid amounts, and the contributions in respect of the their old-age pensions, for the period during the which unconstitutional norm had been applied.\n(b)  Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (Vrhovni kasacioni sud) no. Rev.2 393/2013 of 26 September 2013 17.  Given the differences in adjudication on the matter, on 27 March 2013 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal requested, in accordance with Article 395 of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parni\u010dnom postupku, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia \u2013 OG RS \u2013 125/04 and 111/2009), that the Supreme Court of Cassation amend its judgment no. G\u017e1-2352/12 of 12 December 2012 and harmonise the case-law of the courts of appeal in matters concerning the payment of the differences between the salaries claimants had received and those they had been entitled to. 18.  On 26 September 2013, in response to the said request, the Supreme Court of Cassation found, acting in accordance with Articles 395 and 399 of the Civil Procedure Act, that there was an interest of general concern to deal with this issue. It held that the Novi Sad Court of Appeal in delivering the judgment of 12 December 2012 had incorrectly applied and interpreted domestic law. The Supreme Court of Cassation held that the judgment should have been rendered in the claimant\u2019s favour and, accordingly, set the judgment of the Novi Sad Court of Appeal aside. 19.  After the impugned decision, the Courts of Appeal in Novi Sad, Ni\u0161 and Kragujevac assumed the following approach:\n\u201c... as the Supreme Court of Cassation explicitly stated in its decisions nos. Rev. 2 br. 393/2013 of 26 September 2013 and Rev. br. 983/2012 of 26 September 2013, State organs [were engaging in what had to be considered] unlawful work, as the Constitutional Court failed to adopt a decision [regarding] in which manner the consequences of the unconstitutional norm should have been overcome[, and] the Government of the Republic of Serbia, as the regulatory authority, within the scope of their jurisdiction did not secure the execution of the impugned decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the disputed period during which the claimant\u2019s salary was unconstitutionally and illegally reduced, the claimant had a right to lodge a claim for compensation for damage with the civil courts, and the civil courts are in charge of deciding on the matter in accordance with Article 1 of the Civil Procedure Act.\u201d (cited from the judgment no. G\u017e1. 2444/13 of 27 December 2013, p. 4)\n(c)  Decisions of the Constitutional Court 20.  In the period between 26 September 2012 and 13 May 2014 the applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court. 21.  They complained, inter alia, of the inconsistent domestic case-law of the Serbian courts which had caused the rejection of their claims and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by their colleagues. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention or Articles 32 and 36 of the Constitution (provisions that correspond to Article 6 of the Convention) the applicants asked the Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of legal certainty as an integral part of the right to a fair trial. 22.  Between 23 October 2014 and 25 March 2015, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals as unsubstantiated. 23.  The facts relating to each applicant may be summarised as follows:\n(a)  As regards application no. 27471/15 (Ms Aleksandra Mirkovi\u0107 \u2013 the first applicant) 25.  On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court (Prvi op\u0161tinski sud) in Belgrade asking for payment of the difference between the salary she had received and the one she had been entitled to. 26.  On 3 June 2013 the first-instance court rejected her claim. On 3 October 2013 the Belgrade Court of Appeal upheld that judgment following an appeal by the applicant. 27.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 25 November 2013 complaining, inter alia, of the existence of inconsistent domestic case-law of Serbian courts, in particular the rejection of her own claim and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by her colleagues, and asked the Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of judicial certainty as an integral part of her right to a fair trial. She provided the Constitutional Court with copies of several judgments in support of her allegation regarding the inconsistent case-law. 28.  On 12 June 2014 she provided the Constitutional Court with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 29.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal and decided not to evaluate the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 because it had been adopted after the judgment of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 3 October 2013 had been adopted in the applicant\u2019s case (Ustavni sud nije posebno cenio imaju\u0107i u vidu da ona poti\u010de iz perioda nakon dono\u0161enja osporene presude Apelacionog suda u Beogradu G\u017d1 556/13 od 3. oktobra 2013. godine.)\n(b)  As regards application no. 27288/15 (Ms Biljana Sari\u0107 \u2013 the second applicant) 30.  At the relevant time, the second applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 8 February 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15 May 2013. 31.  On 24 July 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 32.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(c)  As regards application no. 27751/15 (Ms Sanja Popovi\u0107-Radivojevi\u010b \u2013 the third applicant) 33.  At the relevant time, the third applicant was an employee of Juvenile Detention Centre (Kazneno-popravni zavod za maloletnike) in Valjevo. On an unspecified date in 2011, she lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Valjevo. On 16 March 2012 the Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgment was overturned by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15 August 2012. 34.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional Court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Kragujevac Court of Appeal had accepted a similar claim to her own. 35.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for failure to adequately substantiate her complaint. In particular it held that one relevant judgment submitted by the applicant could not amount to proof of either profound or long-standing differences in the adjudication of the courts\u2019 ruling at final instance in cases similar to the applicant\u2019s.\n(d)  As regards application no. 27779/15 (Mr Branislav Markovi\u0107 \u2013 the fourth applicant) 36.  At the relevant time, the fourth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela (Kazneno-popravni zavod Po\u017earevac-Zabela). On 14 July 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On 8 February 2012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 29 August 2012. 37.  On 13 November 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts had allegedly accepted claims similar to his own. 38.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated.\n(e)  As regards application no. 27790/15 (Ms Milica Bogi\u0107evi\u0107 \u2013 the fifth applicant) 39.  At the relevant time, the fifth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. On 23 January 2013 the First Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 19 March 2014. 40.  On 13 May 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Novi Sad Court of Appeal had accepted a claim similar to her own. 41.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for the same reason as in the case of the third applicant.\n(f)  As regards application no. 27288/15 (Ms Gordana Maslovari\u0107 \u2013 the sixth applicant) 42.  At the relevant time, the sixth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 25 December 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 20 March 2013. 43.  On 17 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 44.  On 30 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(g)  As regards application no. 28418/15 (Mr Velimir Vidi\u0107 \u2013 the seventh applicant) 45.  At the relevant time, the seventh applicant was an employee of Penitentiary institution in Belgrade-Padinska Skela (Kazneno-popravni zavod u Beogradu \u2013 Padinska Skela) and the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On 30 November 2011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 3 December 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 1 March 2013. 46.  On 16 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 21 March 2014. 47.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(h)  As regards application no. 30893/15 (Mr Neboj\u0161a Nejkovi\u0107 \u2013 the eighth applicant) 48.  At the relevant time, the eighth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2013 he lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. His complaint was rejected on 21 August 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 30 October 2013. 49.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 27 February 2014. 50.  On 13 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(i)  As regards application no. 30906/15 (Ms Aleksandra Pe\u0161i\u0107 \u2013 the ninth applicant; and Ms Jelena Jevremovi\u0107 \u2013 the tenth applicant) 51.  At the relevant time, the ninth and the tenth applicants were employees of Penitentiary institution in Po\u017earevac (Kazneno-popravni zavod za \u017eene). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On 13 January 2012 the Basic Court ruled in their favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 4 April 2013. 52.  On 21 May 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 27 February 2014. 53.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(j)  As regards application no. 32933/15\n(i)  Mr \u017deljko Gradi\u0161ka \u2013 the eleventh applicant 54.  At the relevant time, the eleventh applicant was an employee of the women\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On 24 February 2012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 16 October 2013. 55.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He subsequently amended the appeal with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 56.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal because in its view the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation could not have been considered as proof of inconsistent case-law of courts ruling at final instance (revizijsko re\u0161enje ne mo\u017ee biti dokaz o razli\u010ditom postupanju sudova najvi\u0161e instance).\n(ii)  Mr Milan Vu\u010di\u0107evi\u0107 \u2013 the twelfth applicant 57.  At the relevant time, the twelfth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. His complaint was rejected on 2 October 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 22 November 2012. 58.  On 15 January 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had allegedly accepted claims similar to his own. 59.  On 23 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The Constitutional Court failed to separately address his complaint concerning the divergent case-law.\n(iii)  Mr Dra\u0161ko Veljkovi\u0107 \u2013 the thirteenth applicant 60.  At the relevant time, the thirteenth applicant was an employee of Kraljevo District Prison (Okru\u017eni zatvor u Kraljevu). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Kraljevo. On 23 December 2011 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Kragujevac Court of Appeal on 12 March 2013. 61.  On 13 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On several occasions, between 30 December 2013 and 19 August 2014, he amended the appeal, adding copies of a few other judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had accepted claims similar to his own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 62.  On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(k)  As regards application no. 35780/15 (Ms Branislava Stojanovi\u0107 \u2013 the fourteenth applicant) 63.  At the relevant time, the fourteenth applicant was an employee of the women\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2012 she lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. Her complaint was rejected on 22 May 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 13 September 2012. 64.  On 22 October 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She subsequently amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 65.  On 29 January 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(l)  As regards application no. 40646 (Ms Nevenka Bijeli\u0107 \u2013 the fifteenth applicant; Ms Vesna Vulevi\u0107 \u2013 the sixteenth applicant; and Ms Zorica Jovanovi\u0107 \u2013 the seventeenth applicant) 66.  At the relevant time, the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the seventeenth applicants were employees of the women\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. Their complaint was rejected on 29 May 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 11 September 2013. 67.  On 16 October 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They subsequently amended the appeal, adding copies of a few other judgments in which the civil courts ruling at final instance had accepted claims similar to their own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 68.  On 11 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.\n(m)  As regards application no. 55066/15 (Mr Dejan Stepanovi\u0107 \u2013 the eighteenth applicant) 69.  At the relevant time, the eighteenth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 26 February 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 5 June 2013. 70.  On 5 August 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 71.  On 25 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.", "references": ["5", "6", "4", "1", "9", "8", "7", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Gy\u00e1l. 7.  On 26 February 2011 the Pest Central District Court remanded the applicant in custody under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on suspicion of aggravated murder within the meaning of Article 166 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. It summarised the suspicions against him, referred to police reports, an autopsy report, the victim\u2019s medical documents, examinations of various exhibits and witness testimonies, and concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had poisoned the victim on 8 April 2010. The court found it established that there was a need for the applicant\u2019s detention, because otherwise he would tamper with evidence by exerting pressure on the witnesses, as evidenced by his previous conduct whereby he had threatened them. It dismissed an argument by the applicant that he had committed the criminal offence more than a year before, thus the prosecutor\u2019s office had erred in stating that he could tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. The court also held that the applicant\u2019s \u201cunclear\u201d financial situation and the severity of the possible punishment demonstrated that there was a risk of his absconding. The court gave no consideration to an application by the applicant\u2019s lawyer for the applicant to be placed under house arrest. 8.  An appeal against that decision was dismissed on 3 March 2011. 9.  On 21 March 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 26 May 2011. It noted again that because of the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that the applicant had neither a permanent address nor a regular income, there were grounds to believe that he would abscond. The court held that there was a risk of his interfering with the investigation if he were to threaten the witnesses or destroy physical evidence. 10.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions for pre-trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was no risk of his absconding or influencing witnesses. He argued that his well-established personal circumstances \u2013 the fact that he lived with his common-law wife and two children, his parents, and his brother\u2019s family \u2013 and the fact that he had no criminal record excluded the risk of his absconding. He further submitted that he had cooperated with the investigating authorities. Alternatively, the applicant requested that he be released and placed under house arrest. 11.  The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 15 April 2011, and the court\u2019s reasoning was that the public interest in the applicant being detained was more important than his interest in his right to liberty being respected. 12.  On 23 May 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 26 August 2011. The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention. It emphasised that there was a risk of his absconding, owing to the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that he had no declared employment and had previously not been reachable at his permanent address. It added that, if released, the applicant might influence the witnesses or destroy evidence. 13.  On 22 June 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld that decision. 14.  On 24 August 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 26 November 2011 under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) (risk of absconding) and (c) (risk of collusion) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the risk of absconding, the court found that although the applicant had previously not been reachable at his permanent address and had only had temporary jobs, his temporary residence had been known and he had no criminal record. However, given the seriousness of the potential punishment and his \u201cunstable\u201d financial circumstances, his presence at the proceedings could only be ensured through the most restrictive measure. As regards the risk of collusion, the court dismissed an argument by the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the prosecution authorities should have questioned all the witnesses by that stage of the proceedings. It held that although the majority of the witnesses had been heard, further questioning could still be necessary. 15.  On 26 August 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended on a number of occasions. In particular, on 23 November 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended his detention until 26 February 2012. The court found that he had failed to attach a \u201chosting declaration\u201d (befogad\u00f3 nyilatkozat) and a declaration of his host\u2019s financial capacity to his application to be placed under house arrest. According to the court, although the investigation was about to conclude, based on previous witness testimonies, there was a risk that the applicant would intimidate witnesses. It also held that this last reason could justify the applicant being detained until the closure of the investigation. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 1 December 2011. Although by that time the applicant had submitted a hosting declaration, the appeal court objected to his release for the reason that he had not provided a declaration of his host\u2019s financial capacity. 17.  Furthermore, on 24 February 2012 the Budapest High Court held that the unclarified financial situation of the applicant and the seriousness of the crime substantiated the risk of his absconding. It also found, without giving further reasoning, that there were still grounds to believe that at that stage of the proceedings the applicant would influence the witnesses. In an appeal, the applicant argued that the investigating authorities had implemented no procedural measures, the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy, and previously he had always been reachable at his temporary residence. As regards the risk of his influencing witnesses, the applicant submitted that no such risk could be established two years after the alleged criminal offence. On 8 March 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, stating that the investigation was being conducted in a timely manner and witness testimonies had previously evidenced that the applicant had tried to exert pressure on the witnesses. 18.  On 25 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended by the Budapest High Court until 26 June 2012. The court maintained that, under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his detention was still necessary because of the risk of his absconding. It considered that the applicant had no \u201cfinancial or essential\u201d ties counterbalancing the risk of him escaping an eventual serious punishment. Although he had family ties, a child who was a minor, and a relative willing to give assurances to provide for him if he were released, given the seriousness of the charges, the gravity of the possible punishment and his unstable financial circumstances, there was a real risk that he would abscond. However, the court did not find that the risk of collusion (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was substantiated, since there was no way to influence any of the investigative measures which the prosecution had relied on. In particular, the witness who the investigating authorities still intended to hear was unlikely to testify, given the fact that he was ill and unreachable. The court also considered that although it was likely that the applicant\u2019s acquaintances and relatives had tried to influence witnesses in the two years following the commission of the crime, there was no reliable information that this had actually taken place, and a hypothetical risk of further attempts to do so could not substantiate the risk of collusion. 19.  That decision was upheld on appeal on 7 May 2012. 20.  On 22 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended until 26 August 2012. The court agreed with the applicant\u2019s argument that his unsettled personal circumstances could not be relied on to justify his detention after the passing of a lengthy period of time following his arrest. It nonetheless held that, in the absence of any financial ties, his family ties could not counterbalance the risk of his absconding, also having regard to the severity to the potential punishment. 21.  That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 28 June 2012, and an appeal by the applicant to the effect that less restrictive measures could be applied in his case was dismissed. 22.  The Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on 21 August 2012, reiterating the same arguments as before. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments that no investigative measure had been implemented for a considerable period of time. It also found that the hosting declaration of the applicant\u2019s family member, the fact that he was raising a child who was a minor, and the fact that his legal residence had also been clarified were irrelevant, and did not diminish the risk of his absconding. The second-instance court upheld the decision on 24 August 2012. 23.  On 24 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended again for a month under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Budapest High Court expressed doubts as to whether there was enough evidence to conclude that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime. It dismissed an argument by the prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant would hinder the investigation. It considered that, irrespective of the seriousness of the charges, it appeared that there was less risk of his absconding, since he was raising two children who were minors and he had no criminal record. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment but extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months. 24.  On 21 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended; the Budapest High Court again referred to the fact that, at the time of his arrest, the applicant had been unreachable at his permanent address and had been earning a living from temporary jobs, which, taken together with the severity of the potential punishment, substantiated the risk of his absconding. The decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2013. 25.  On 22 February 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from pre-trial detention and placed him on bail under house arrest. According to that decision, besides the suspicion against the applicant, the only grounds for restricting his liberty were the risk of his absconding, given the gravity of the offence, and this in itself could not justify his continued pre-trial detention. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance decision and placed the applicant in detention on 28 March 2013. It noted that, given the seriousness of the offence, there was a danger of his absconding, irrespective of his family ties. 26.  On 23 April 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from detention upon his giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Relying on the Court\u2019s case-law, the High Court found that pre\u2011trial detention could only serve as a measure of last resort, and the applicant\u2019s continued detention would only serve as an anticipated punishment. The decision was overturned by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 26 April 2016, and the applicant was placed in detention for the same reasons as those given before. 27.  On 17 June 2013 the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office preferred a bill of indictment. 28.  On 25 June 2013 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until the date of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding), for essentially the same reasons as those given before. 29.  On 28 January the applicant applied for release, but the application was dismissed on 18 February by the Budapest High Court on the grounds that, given the gravity of the offence and the complexity of the case, pre\u2011trial detention did not constitute an anticipated punishment. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 18 February 2014. A further application by the applicant of 18 April 2014 was dismissed on 8 April 2014 (the dismissal was upheld by the second-instance court on 24 April 2014) on the grounds that the applicant had not relied on new circumstances warranting his release. 30.  The applicant\u2019s detention was reviewed on 16 July 2014 by the Budapest Court of Appeal. It held that the gravity of the offence, the applicant\u2019s lack of financial resources and essential ties, and the fact that he had only notified the authorities of his place of residence once he had been placed in detention substantiated the risk of his absconding. 31.  On appeal, that decision was upheld by the K\u00faria on 24 September 2014, which endorsed the reasons given by the lower court. The K\u00faria also found that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was both necessary and proportionate, and no less restrictive measure would be sufficient to ensure the purpose of the criminal proceedings. 32.  On 29 October 2014 the applicant was found guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment by the Budapest High Court.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "6", "8", "1", "3", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  On 6 August 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers decided that Kryvorizhstal State Metallurgical Enterprise (hereinafter \u201cKryvorizhstal\u201d) was to be privatised. At the time Kryvorizhstal was one of the world\u2019s largest steel manufacturing companies, employing about 60,000 people and producing about 20% of Ukraine\u2019s annual steel supply. On 4 November 2003 the Ministry of Economy and European Integration included Kryvorizhstal in a list of State-owned assets which were to be privatised. Subsequently, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market adopted decisions designed to ensure the privatisation of the enterprise. 7.  The applicant company was founded in April 2004 by nine private companies, five of which were owned or controlled by A., one of the leaders of the Party of Regions. Members of that party held the majority of posts in the Cabinet of Ministers in the period 2003-2004, including the post of Prime Minister. The remaining four companies were owned or controlled by P., the son-in-law of Mr L. Kuchma, the second President of Ukraine who held the post from 19 July 1994 to 23 January 2005. 8.  On 12 May 2004 the State Property Fund (\u201cthe Fund\u201d) announced a bidding competition for the purchase of 93.02% of the share capital of Kryvorizhstal. A condition of bidding was that a bidder had to have produced one million tons of charcoal of Ukrainian origin and two million tons of steel in Ukraine in each of the three years preceding the competition. The applicant company took part in that competition. 9.  Out of six bids submitted by various companies, the Fund selected bids by the applicant company and Consortium Industrial Group, finding that these companies satisfied the conditions of the competition. 10.  On 14 June 2004 the applicant company was declared the winner (successful bidder) of the bidding competition. On the same day the applicant company concluded a purchase contract with the Fund and paid 4,260,000,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH), the equivalent of about 608,000,000 euros (EUR) at the time, for the shares at issue. The shares were transferred to the applicant company\u2019s deposit account at ING Bank Ukraine. 11.  On 23 July 2004 the applicant company appointed T. to represent it as the owner of the Kryvorizhstal shares and to complete the formalities of the transfer pursuant to the contract of 14 June 2004. 12.  Without any further specification or evidence, the applicant company stated that it had invested substantial financial resources in Kryvorizhstal during the period of its control. 13.  The lawfulness and transparency of the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal was contested by the political opposition, whose leaders in 2004 were Mr V. Yushchenko, Mrs Y. Tymoshenko and Mr O. Moroz. In their public statements, they all accused President Kuchma, P. and A. of fraud, and called for the enterprise to be returned to the State. 14.  During the 2004 presidential election campaign the issue was debated by two main rivals, Mr Yushchenko and Mr Yanukovych. Mr Yanukovych, whose candidature was openly supported by President Kuchma and A., insisted that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been lawful and fair. 15.  Between late November 2004 and January 2005 a series of protests took place in the immediate aftermath of the run-off vote of the 2004 election, an election which, according to numerous national and international reports, was compromised by massive corruption, voter intimidation and direct electoral fraud. These events are commonly known as the Orange Revolution. 16.  Following the revote of 26 December 2004, Mr Yanukovych lost the election to Mr Yushchenko, who became the third President of Ukraine on 23 January 2005. On 24 January 2005 Mrs Tymoshenko was appointed to the post of interim Prime Minister. On 4 February 2005 the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) approved the appointment of the new Cabinet of Ministers, headed by her. The Party of Regions formed the parliamentary opposition. 17.  According to different media reports submitted by the applicant company, between January and April 2005 President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko made public statements that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been unlawful, and that the enterprise would be returned to the State and subsequently resold. 18.  In particular, in an interview of 26 January 2005 Prime Minister Tymoshenko said that \u201cUkrainian enterprises, like Kryvorizhstal, which had blatantly been stolen, had to be returned to the State.\u201d 19.  On 4 February 2005 President Yushchenko made the following statement when addressing the Verkhovna Rada:\n\u201c...I promise that fair privatisation will be carried out this year. Those facilities which were stolen, starting with Kryvorizhstal, will be returned to the State ...\u201d 20.  On 12 February 2005 the Cabinet of Ministers revoked its decision of 6 August 2003 by which the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been launched. On 15 February 2005 the Fund also revoked its decisions concerning the privatisation. 21.  On 8 June 2005 the State took control of Kryvorizhstal, pursuant to commercial court decisions declaring its privatisation unlawful (see paragraphs 51-53 and 56-57 below). By a decree of 11 June 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers declared the contract of 14 June 2004 invalid and withdrew the Kryvorizhstal shares from the applicant company. 22.  On an unspecified date the money paid for the shares in the enterprise in 2004 was returned to the applicant company. 23.  By two decrees of 23 June 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers launched the procedures for resale of 93.02% of Kryvorizhstal\u2019s share capital. On 9 August 2005 it approved the bidding conditions. The next day the bidding competition was officially announced. 24.  The applicant company did not participate in the competition. Instead, it challenged the authorities\u2019 decrees issued in February and June 2005 before the commercial courts and the courts of general jurisdiction, but to no avail. The applicant company did not provide any further details of those proceedings. 25.  On 24 October 2005 the bidding competition was completed by an auction, which was broadcast live by major television stations. Mittal Steel Germany GmbH was declared the successful bidder. On 28 October 2005 it concluded a purchase contract with the Fund and became the new owner of 93.02% of Kryvorizhstal\u2019s share capital, for the price of UAH 24,200,000,000, the equivalent of about EUR 3,964,021,752 at the time. Eventually, Mittal Steel Germany GmbH was succeeded by ArcelorMittal Duisburg GmbH, which, according to the documents submitted by that company, made significant investments in Kryvorizhstal. 26.  According to the applicant company, after the 2004 election A. was targeted for his political expression and association. In particular, companies which he owned or controlled were subjected to various checks by the authorities. The authorities allegedly attempted to nationalise some of those companies, though they were unsuccessful. The applicant company submitted copies of several petitions to the domestic authorities made by third parties with a view to preventing the nationalisation of those companies. 27.  On 28 May, 3 and 11 June 2004 respectively, three private individuals, N., a lawyer practising in Kyiv, S. and Kh., members of Parliament, lodged with the Golosiivskyy District Court of Kyiv three separate administrative law complaints against the decisions of the Fund and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition, contending that those decisions had violated the right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State property. 28.  On an unspecified date the President of the Kyiv Court of Appeal transferred the case to the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d). By separate decisions of 8 and 14 June 2004, the latter court refused to consider those complaints, and ordered that its decisions be immediately \u201cenforced\u201d. No copy of those decisions was provided to the Court. 29.  On 2 August 2004 the Kyiv Court of Appeal changed the decisions of 8 and 14 June 2004 in part by excluding the provisions concerning their immediate enforcement. 30.  On 14 June 2004 I., a private individual, and N. lodged with the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv a claim against the Fund, the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, and ING Bank Ukraine, challenging the validity of their decisions and actions in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal. On an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Pecherskyy Court. 31.  At the claimants\u2019 request, the applicant company was invited to participate in the proceedings as a third party. By letters of 20 October and 25 November 2004, the Pecherskyy district prosecutor applied to the court for leave to participate in the case to represent the interests of I. and those of the State. The prosecutor\u2019s application was granted. 32.  On 25 June 2004 Consortium Industrial Group, the losing party in the 2004 bidding competition, instituted proceedings in the Kyiv Commercial Court against the applicant company, the Fund, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, challenging the validity of the authorities\u2019 decisions adopted in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. It contended that the 2004 bidding competition had been unlawful and unfair. 33.  In particular, Consortium Industrial Group argued that the shares in Kryvorizhstal had not been issued in accordance with the law; that the competition had not been announced in due time; that the conditions of the competition had been too narrow and restrictive, thereby limiting the circle of potential bidders and disrespecting the statutory right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State assets; that the shares should have been sold through the stock exchange; and that its total offer, including the money it had planned to invest in Kryvorizhstal, had been higher than the amount paid by the applicant company for the shares in the enterprise. It also argued that, because the complaints by three private individuals against the decisions concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition had been ongoing before the courts in the period May-June 2004, any decision adopted between 8 and 14 June 2004 in relation to the competition had been invalid. 34.  On 5 July 2004 the applicant company lodged a counterclaim against the other parties to the proceedings, asking the court to endorse its right to 93.02% of the Kryvorizhstal shares. 35.  By a procedural ruling of 20 July 2004, the Kyiv Commercial Court found that the Office of the Prosecutor General had to participate in the proceedings, and ordered it to designate a representative in the proceedings. Notwithstanding that ruling, no prosecutor appeared before the Kyiv Commercial Court or the Higher Commercial Court in 2004. 37.  On 19 August 2004 the Kyiv Commercial Court, having considered the arguments of Consortium Industrial Group in detail, dismissed them as unsubstantiated and found that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been carried out in accordance with the relevant legislation. The court held, inter alia, that citizens\u2019 rights to participate in the privatisation had not been restricted, since they had been free to establish companies and participate in the competition through such companies. It also stated that the complaints by the private individuals against the competition had not been lodged in accordance with the law, and thus had had no suspensive effect. The court further endorsed the applicant company\u2019s property rights over the Kryvorizhstal shares, and banned any actions by the defendants which could violate these rights. 39.  On 22 October 2004 the Higher Commercial Court held a hearing in the presence of the parties\u2019 representatives and upheld the judgment of 19 August 2004. The parties made no appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of 22 October 2004. 40.  On 7 February 2005 the Prosecutor General lodged a cassation appeal in the interests of the State with the Supreme Court, alleging that the contested decisions of the Kyiv Commercial Court and the Higher Commercial Court concerned the rights and obligations of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prosecutor General sought an extension of the time-limit for lodging his appeal, stating, without giving any further details, that he had missed it since he had only become aware of the decision of 22 October 2004 in the course of examining a complaint by S. to the Prosecutor General. According to the Government, the Office of the Prosecutor General had received that complaint on 30 December 2004, and it had been directed mainly against the decision of the Higher Commercial Court of 22 October 2004. 41.  In his appeal, the Prosecutor General mainly challenged the application of the law by the Kyiv Commercial Court and the Higher Commercial Court, and alleged that those courts\u2019 decisions had been inconsistent with a decision of the Supreme Court in a similar case. He also stated that the courts had failed to invite the Cabinet of Ministers to take part in the proceedings, although the subject matter had concerned its functions under the relevant privatisation regulations. 42.  On 17 February 2005 the Supreme Court granted the extension requested and opened the proceedings on the merits of the Prosecutor General\u2019s cassation appeal. No copy of that procedural ruling was provided to the Court. 43.  On 1 March 2005 the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the Prosecutor General, quashed the decisions of the lower courts, and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It found that under Ukrainian law neither Consortium Industrial Group nor the applicant company had been eligible to participate in the 2004 bidding competition; that the competition had not been announced in due time, as required by law; and that the lower courts, when allowing the applicant company\u2019s counterclaim, had erred in applying the rules of procedure, which stated that no counterclaim could be lodged by a defendant against another defendant in the proceedings. 44.  On 21 March 2005 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged with the Kyiv Commercial Court, to which the case had been remitted, a claim in the interests of the State and on behalf of the Fund against the applicant company, the Ministry of Industrial Policy, and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market. His claim was directed against the decisions concerning the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. He also sought the return of the Kryvorizhstal shares to the Fund, and asked the court to seize the shares as a temporary measure until the dispute was finally resolved. 45.  The Deputy Prosecutor General argued that the 2004 bidding competition had not been organised in a lawful and fair way, particularly regarding the conditions which the potential bidders had had to satisfy. He further submitted that the bidders whose offers had been chosen had not satisfied the legislative requirements for participating in that competition. 46.  On 23 March 2005 the court held a hearing in camera at which it decided to open the proceedings and invite the parties to submit their arguments on the case. It also scheduled the next hearing for 1 April 2005. 47.  On 1 April 2005 the court ordered that ING Bank Ukraine, where the shares at issue had been deposited, participate in the case as a defendant. The Office of the General Prosecutor was granted leave to take part in the proceedings as a third party on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers. 48.  On 15 April 2005 the applicant company requested that the court allow journalists to attend the hearings in the case. The court rejected that application, finding that the journalists had not obtained official authorisation from the court administration. 50.  On 21 April 2005 a copy of the Pecherskyy Court\u2019s decision of 21 April 2005 (see paragraph 83 below) was included in the case file and examined by the court at a hearing on the same day. 51.  On 22 April 2005 the court delivered a judgment in the case whereby it allowed the claims of Consortium Industrial Group and the Office of the Prosecutor General, which it found to be of the same nature. It annulled the authorities\u2019 decisions concerning the 2004 privatisation and the contract of 14 June 2004, and ordered the Fund to return the money paid by the applicant company for the Kryvorizhstal shares. The applicant company\u2019s counterclaim was rejected, and it was ordered to return the shares to the Fund and pay UAH 1,903, the equivalent of about EUR 291 at the time, to the State for costs and expenses. 52.  The court held that the Fund had failed to announce the competition in due time; that it had unlawfully introduced a condition concerning the production of charcoal and steel; that the Fund had failed to set out specific conditions of sale of certain number of the Kryvorizhstal shares outside the bidding competition; that the Fund\u2019s decisions issued between 8 and 14 June 2004 in relation to the competition had been invalid, as the complaints of three private individuals against the decisions concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition had been ongoing before the courts during that period; and that the applicant company and Consortium Industrial Group had unlawfully been allowed to participate in the competition. 53.  By a procedural ruling of 28 April 2005, the same court seized the shares at issue. On the same day, bailiffs started enforcement proceedings in respect of that ruling. 54.  The applicant company appealed against the judgment of 22 April 2005 and the ruling of 28 April 2005. According to the text of the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 2 June 2005 (see paragraph 56 below), the applicant company contended that the Kyiv Commercial Court had wrongly established the circumstances of the case, and that it had erred in applying the law. The applicant company further challenged the lawfulness of the bailiffs\u2019 actions as regards enforcement of the ruling of 28 April 2005. No copy of the applicant company\u2019s appeal was provided to the Court. 55.  In the appeal proceedings, the applicant company asked the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal to suspend the proceedings before the commercial courts pending the outcome of the proceedings before the courts of general jurisdiction (see paragraphs 81-87 below). The court rejected that application on the grounds that the latter proceedings were not decisive for the outcome of the commercial case. 56.  On 2 June 2005 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal changed the judgment of 22 April 2005 in part. In particular, the appeal court found that the claims by Consortium Industrial Group had to be rejected, as it had not been eligible to participate in the 2004 bidding competition. The applicant company\u2019s appeal was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 57.  By the same decision, the appeal court annulled the ruling of 28 April 2005 for non-compliance with the procedural rules, and refused to consider the applicant company\u2019s complaints against the bailiffs, on the basis that the matter fell outside its jurisdiction. The court further ruled to seize the Kryvorizhstal shares for the purpose of securing the claim by the Office of the Prosecutor General. 58.  The applicant company appealed in cassation. No copy of the cassation appeal was provided to the Court. 59.  On 21 July 2005 the Higher Commercial Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s cassation appeal as unsubstantiated. 60.  On 31 August 2005 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s further cassation appeal. No copy of that appeal was provided to the Court. 61.  In the course of the proceedings before the commercial courts between February and June 2005 the applicant company challenged the impartiality of the judges and the courts dealing with its case on a number of occasions, alleging that their decisions and actions were influenced by government officials. According to the text of the judgment of the Kyiv Commercial Court of 22 April 2005 and the decision of the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal of 2 June 2005 (see paragraphs 51-52 and 56\u201157 above), the applicant company\u2019s procedural applications were rejected as unsubstantiated. No further explanation in that regard was given by the courts. 62.  After 1 March 2005, and while the applicant company\u2019s case was being considered by the commercial courts, the President and the Prime Minister made a number of public statements concerning the proceedings. The applicant company submitted different media reports reproducing and/or interpreting those statements. The Government argued that some of the reports had not interpreted the statements accurately. In particular, they referred to the reports concerning the Prime Minister\u2019s press conference of 5 April 2005, at which she had made statements as to when the ongoing proceedings before the Kyiv Commercial Court might be completed. 63.  According to a number of other reports, at a press conference of 11 April 2005 the Prime Minister said:\n\u201c... Facilities such as Kryvorizhstal ... I think that today the [authorities] are involved in the court proceedings concerning the return of those assets to the State. We are confident that we have a clear position [in relation to the case], and these enterprises will be returned to the State ...\u201d\nIn an interview of 14 April 2005 the President stated:\n\u201c... If the owners refuse to cooperate voluntarily, we will go down the legal route and will undoubtedly win [the case]. [However,] this will take several months...\nThe facility has been stolen, and the cost of that theft is several billion [United States] dollars. For me, this is a fact...\nWe prepare the terms of a new [bidding] competition...\u201d 64.  On 23 April 2005, commenting on the possibility that the applicant company could appeal against the judgment of 22 April 2005, the Prime Minister stated:\n\u201c... This will be an important decision by the appeal [court]. It will be evidence not only of the court\u2019s objectivity, but also of the [past] negotiations behind closed doors between various representatives from the authorities and the business...\u201d 65.  In July 2004 Consortium Industrial Group instituted proceedings in the Pecherskyy Court against the applicant company, the Fund, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, challenging the validity of the authorities\u2019 decisions issued in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. Consortium Industrial Group relied mainly on the same circumstances and considerations referred to in its claims before the commercial courts. Its claims before the courts of general jurisdiction contained an additional element \u2013 a challenge to the validity of T.\u2019s appointment on 23 July 2004 as the applicant company\u2019s representative in the procedures following the 2004 bidding competition. 66.  T. took part in the proceedings as a defendant. Kryvorizhstal participated in the proceedings as a third party. 67.  On 25 August 2004 the court delivered a judgment dismissing the claims of Consortium Industrial Group. For the most part, it contained identical reasons to those in the judgment of the Kyiv Commercial Court of 19 August 2004 (see paragraph 37 above). 68.  On 1 and 27 December 2004 respectively the Kyiv Court of Appeal and a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 25 August 2004. 69.  On 9 February 2005 N. lodged an application for review of the above case with the Pecherskyy Court, in the light of newly discovered circumstances. In particular, she argued that the findings concerning the right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State assets contained in the judgment of 25 August 2004 had been contrary to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 December 2004 (see paragraph 99 below). She also contended that the courts had not been aware of the fact that the decisions of the Pecherskyy Court of 8 and 14 June 2004 had been challenged on appeal, and thus they had not become final before 2 August 2004. 70.  N.\u2019s application was dealt with by the same judge of the Pecherskyy Court who had sat in the main proceedings. 71.  By a telegram of 15 February 2005, the court informed the applicant company that the next day it would hold a hearing, at the request of N.. 72.  On 15 February 2005 the applicant company lodged with the court an application to consult the case file. The application was not granted. 73.  On 16 February 2005 the court held a hearing on the merits of N.\u2019s application. Consortium Industrial Group, T., the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market and Kryvorizhstal, who had been the parties to the main proceedings, did not take part in the hearing. 74.  The representatives of the applicant company requested leave to consult the case file and the adjournment of the hearing on the grounds that they had not been informed about the merits of the application before the hearing, and accordingly had not been able to prepare for it. They also sought the withdrawal of the judge dealing with the case, challenging her impartiality. 75.  The judge rejected the applications by the applicant company\u2019s representatives, and read out the application by N. 76.  The applicant company\u2019s representatives objected to the application, arguing that N. was not entitled to ask for a review of the case, since she had not been a party to the original proceedings, and there were no newly discovered circumstances or other reasons capable of warranting the reopening of the proceedings. 77.  The applicant company\u2019s representatives did not receive a copy of the application either before or during the hearing. 78.  On 17 February 2005 the court allowed the application. It found that the right of every citizen, including that of N., to participate in privatisation and challenge its lawfulness had been confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 December 2004. It also held that the ruling of 8 June 2004 on N.\u2019s complaint concerning the 2004 competition had not entered into force at the time when the competition had taken place, and thus it could not have served as one of the grounds for rejecting the claims by Consortium Industrial Group. 79.  The court quashed its judgment of 25 August 2004 and held that the higher courts\u2019 decisions of 1 and 27 December 2004 were no longer valid. 80.  On an unspecified date the case was transferred to another judge of the Pecherskyy Court for fresh examination. 81.  On 28 February 2005, following an application by N., the Pecherskyy Court decided to examine the claims of I., N., and Consortium Industrial Group (see paragraphs 30 and 65 above) jointly, holding that they were of the same nature and concerned the same defendants. 82.  On an unspecified date the applicant company lodged an application for review of the ruling of 17 February 2005 with the same court, in the light of newly discovered circumstances. 83.  On 21 April 2005 the court granted the application by the applicant company, quashed the ruling of 17 February 2005, and rejected N.\u2019s application of 9 February 2005 on the grounds that she had not participated in the original proceedings concerning the claims by Consortium Industrial Group. 84.  By a separate ruling of the same date, the court rejected the claims by I. and N., finding that they had not participated in the 2004 bidding competition and did not have an arguable claim in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. The court held that their claims represented a disguised attempt to settle a dispute between legal entities falling within the jurisdiction of commercial courts. 85.  By decisions of 20 and 27 July 2005, the Kyiv Court of Appeal quashed the ruling of 21 April 2005, stating that, in the light of newly discovered circumstances, the ruling of 17 February 2005 was not to be reviewed, and that, with regard to Article 6 of the Convention, the Pecherskyy Court had unlawfully limited I.\u2019s and N.\u2019s right of access to a court. 86.  On 15 October 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of cassation, upheld the decisions of 20 and 27 July 2005. 87.  The case was remitted to the Pecherskyy Court, which on 6 February 2008 decided not to examine the claim of Consortium Industrial Group, because its representatives had failed to appear before the court. 88.  No appeal was lodged against the decision of 6 February 2008. According to the Government, on the basis of that decision the joined proceedings before the courts of general jurisdiction were terminated. The applicant company did not contest this.", "references": ["7", "2", "1", "6", "4", "5", "8", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was founded in 1990 and has its seat in Podgorica. The second applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Podgorica. The second applicant is the first applicant\u2019s founder, executive director, and the owner of 99.2698 % of its shares. The remaining 0.7302% is owned by the second applicant\u2019s wife and son. 6.  On 3 August and 11 November 1998 respectively the first applicant concluded two contracts with the Development Land Social Fund (Dru\u0161tveni fond za gra\u0111evinsko zemlji\u0161te, poslovni prostor i puteve Podgorica). Under the first contract the first applicant obtained the right to use (pravo kori\u0161\u0107enja) four plots of development land (gra\u0111evinsko zemlji\u0161te) with a total surface of 11,443 m2, on which it planned to build a shopping centre and an office building. The second contract concerned the communal charges for the necessary infrastructure on the land at issue (naknada za ure\u0111enje gra\u0111evinskog zemlji\u0161ta). On an unspecified date thereafter the four plots of land were joined into one, marked as no. 2090/1036. Pursuant to sections 419 and 420 of the Property Act 2009 (see paragraph 61 below) the first applicant became the owner of the land at issue on 9 December 2011. 7.  On 15 April 2005 the Property Administration (Uprava za nekretnine) issued a decision by which it divided the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 into two, one of which kept the number 2090/1036 and had 11,365 m2, and another one which was registered as no. 2090/1220 and which had 77 m2. 8.  On 3 March 2016 the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 was further split into two, the smaller part of 44 m2 becoming a cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1581. The bigger part kept the number 2090/1036 and measured 11,321 m2. 9.  On an unspecified date in 2004 the first applicant\u2019s plan for the shopping centre and the office building was registered in a Detailed Urbanistic Plan (Detaljni urbanisti\u010dki plan, \u201cDUP\u201d). 10.  In December 2004 the DUP for the relevant area was changed, one of the changes being that the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 and an adjacent plot of land of 1,557 m2, owned by the Municipality, were joined into one urban plot (urbanisti\u010dka parcela). 11.  On 6 June 2005 the President of the Municipality decided to change the relevant DUP further, which decision entered into force on 7 July 2005. Construction in the area was prohibited thereby for the next 90 days except in case of those investors who had already obtained a building permit prior to this decision. 12.  On 6 October 2005 another decision was issued, providing that the DUP would be changed within 90 days and construction was further prohibited until the adoption of a new DUP but up to one year at most. The ban did not apply to the investors who had already obtained a building permit. This decision entered into force on 14 October 2005. 13.  On 20 January 2006 a new decision to change the DUP was issued, revoking the previous two decisions. As regards its contents it corresponded to the decision of 6 October 2005. It entered into force on 23 January 2006. 14.  On 21 July 2006 a new DUP was issued; it entered into force on 29 July 2006. Thereby the adjacent plot of land that had previously been added to plot no. 2090/1036 was apparently split into three: two parts became parts of two newly-formed urban plots of land and the third part remained attached to the applicant\u2019s land and would appear to be part of a traffic route (saobra\u0107ajnica). It would also appear that in this urban plot of land the DUP planned the construction of two buildings instead of the shopping centre planned by the first applicant. 15.  On 28 July 2010 a new decision to change the DUP was issued. 16.  On 16 May 2013 the DUP was changed again, apparently providing for the construction of buildings similar to those initially planned to be built there by the applicants. 17.  Following the changes of the DUP in December 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), on 25 January 2005 the first applicant contacted the Property Secretariat (Direkcija za imovinu; \u201cthe Secretariat\u201d) in the Podgorica Municipality. It sought to \u201ccomplete\u201d the urban plot, that is to buy the adjacent cadastral plot of land which had been added to its own land, thus forming one urban plot of land; having received no reply it renewed its request on 23 May 2005 and 2 August 2005. 18.  On 27 January 2005 the Spatial Planning Secretariat of Podgorica Municipality issued Urban Technical Conditions, which stated that the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 was smaller than the relevant urban plot and that it needed to be \u201ccompleted\u201d (potrebno je izvr\u0161iti njeno dokompletiranje). 19.  On 23 February 2005 the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) granted the first applicant a location for the construction of business premises on plot no. 2090/1036, in accordance with the 2004 DUP. The decision specified that the Urban Technical Conditions of 27 January 2005 were a constituent part of this decision. 20.  On 15 August 2005 the first applicant appealed, having received no reply from the Secretariat. The same day the Secretariat informed the first applicant that no completion of plots could be done given that the revision of the DUP was ongoing at the time, which meant \u201curbanistic re\u2011consideration of the area\u201d at issue. 21.  By 6 April 2017 there had been at least seven remittals, either by the Municipality\u2019s Chief Administrator (as the competent second-instance body) or the Administrative Court. 22.  In the course of these proceedings, on 2 September 2016 the Secretariat enquired at the Property Administration if the same urban plot of land, as it had existed at the time when the first applicant had first filed a request for completion, could be formed again. On 23 September 2016 the Property Administration replied that the size of the said plot of land had been changed in the meantime and that there was no basis for re-forming the urban plot as it once had been. 23.  On 6 April 2017 the Secretariat dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request again. On 19 May 2017 the Chief Administrator upheld this decision, considering that due to the changes of the planning documents the completion of the said plot of land could not be done and that therefore the first applicant\u2019s request had been correctly dismissed. On 23 June 2017 the first applicant instituted an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court, which would appear to be still pending. 24.  On 11 July 2005 the first applicant requested the Agency for Construction and Development of Podgorica (Agencija za izgradnju i razvoj Podgorice; \u201cthe Agency\u201d), a legal successor of the Development Land Social Fund, to calculate the final communal charges for the urban plot no. 2090/1036. 25.  On 20 July 2005 the Agency replied that the calculation could not be made due to the construction ban. 26.  On 26 July and 6 September 2005 the first applicant urged the Agency to make the necessary calculation, submitting that the ban applied only to construction and not to the calculation of charges. 27.  On 13 September 2005 the first applicant made its own assessment of the communal charges in the amount of 131,324.65 euros (EUR) and made the payment. The payment was returned the next day as it had been made \u201cwithout cause\u201d (upla\u0107en bez osnova). 28.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant repeated its request to the Agency on several occasions, including between 5 and 14 October 2005, submitting that the construction ban as the basis for refusal was unlawful and/or the ban was not in force at the relevant time. 29.  By 1 December 2005 the applicant\u2019s request had been refused by the Agency at least four times on the grounds that construction was banned pursuant to either the decision to change the DUP of 6 June 2005 or the decision of 6 October 2005. The Agency also held that the calculation could not be done as the first applicant had no building permit. 30.  On 1 December 2005 the second-instance body rejected the first applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that this was not a matter for administrative proceedings. The first applicant initiated an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court in this regard but in view of the opinion of the second-instance body it withdrew that claim, and instead pursued the proceedings before the Commercial Court.\n2   Judicial proceedings 31.  On 16 September 2005 the first applicant instituted proceedings before the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Podgorica against the Agency for refusing to calculate the communal charges. 32.  On 7 April 2006 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the first applicant and ordered the Agency to calculate the charges. The court considered in particular that the first decision to change the DUP, which prohibited construction, had entered into force on 7 July and expired on 5 October 2005, while the next decision had entered into force on 14 October 2005. Therefore, there had been no construction ban before 7 July 2005 or between 5 and 14 October 2005, when the first applicant requested the communal charges to be calculated and when the Agency was bound to calculate them. The court also noted that the Agency\u2019s reasoning for refusing the first applicant\u2019s request, notably that \u201cthe calculation [could] not be done as the first applicant had no building permit\u201d was illogical, since the calculation of charges was a pre-condition for getting a building permit. 33.  The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld the previous decision on 18 April and 29 December 2008 respectively. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the first applicant had been granted the location for construction by the competent Ministry before it was decided that the DUP would be changed and that a decision to change the DUP could not affect the investors who had already been granted a location. 34.  On 6 August 2008 the Agency calculated the charges. It provided for a new contract to be concluded with the first applicant, which specified that pursuant to the 1998 contract the applicant had already paid a certain amount and that the remaining amount to be paid was EUR 269,309.83. 35.  On 13 October 2008, upon the first applicant\u2019s request, the Commercial Court issued an enforcement order, which provided that the Agency would calculate the charges within 30 days or it would face a penalty of EUR 550, and would have to calculate the charges within the following 15 days. 36.  On 20 October 2008 the first applicant received the above calculation from the Agency. On 22 October 2008 it requested that the contract specify in accordance with which DUP the construction would be undertaken. 37.  On 27 October 2008 the Agency replied that the first applicant\u2019s request was outside the Agency\u2019s competence and that the first applicant should address bodies in charge of urban planning in that respect. On 28 October 2008 the Agency notified the Commercial Court that it had complied with its judgment and the enforcement order. 38.  On 10 November 2008 the first applicant informed the Commercial Court that it did not consider the relevant judgment enforced as it had \u201cserious objections\u201d to the documents submitted by the Agency due to which it had not signed them. 39.  On 16 February 2009 the Agency informed the Commercial Court that the first applicant had no objections in respect of the calculation itself, and noted that no statute provided for an obligation or a possibility for the first applicant to sign the calculation. 40.  On 8 July 2005 the first applicant requested a building permit for the shopping centre from the Ministry. 41.  On 26 July 2005 the first applicant notified the Ministry that the Agency was refusing to calculate the charges and asked the Ministry to urge that the Agency do so. On 12 August 2005 the Ministry responded that it had no competence as regards matters relating to the calculation of the charges. 42.  On 14 September 2005 the first applicant informed the Ministry that it had done the calculation itself and had made the payment (see paragraph 27 above). 43.  On 23 September 2005 the Ministry dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that it had not paid the communal charges or completed the urban plot pursuant to the Urban Technical Conditions. 44.  On 18 November 2005 the first applicant instituted an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court. It submitted, inter alia, that the requirement to buy an adjacent plot of land had been introduced in addition and was unnecessary given that the shopping centre was planned entirely on the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036. It also maintained that the refusal to calculate the charges was groundless as the ban related to construction only and not to the calculation of the charges, and that it was a deliberate obstruction. 45.  On 29 December 2005 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s claim on the grounds that there was no contract between the first applicant and the Agency concerning the communal charges, that the first applicant had failed to submit all the evidence required by the relevant statutory provision in order to obtain a building permit, and it had failed to obtain an adjacent plot of land as required by the Urban Technical Conditions. The court did not deal with the first applicant\u2019s explicit submission that the said requirements were unlawful and/or unnecessary. 46.  On an unspecified date thereafter the first applicant lodged a request for judicial review before the Supreme Court, maintaining that there was a contract between itself and the Agency concluded in 1998. It also submitted that the courts had blamed the first applicant for not paying the charges and completing the plot, even though it had done everything it could to comply with these requests, and had actually complained about the unlawfulness of the relevant State bodies\u2019 refusal to cooperate in these matters. 47.  On 2 March 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the previous decision, considering that the first applicant had indeed failed to submit proof that it had paid the communal charges and completed the urban plot as requested. 48.  On 29 August 2014, following the change of the DUP in 2013, the first applicant requested a building permit for \u201ccentral activities building\u201d (za izgradnju objekta centralnih djelatnosti). On 27 July 2017, after five remittals, the proceedings were still pending. 49.  Between 15 August 2005 and 20 September 2006 the first applicant filed three motions with the Constitutional Court for the assessment of the constitutionality and legality of the decisions to change the DUP issued on 6 June 2005, 20 January and 21 July 2006 respectively. 50.  On 30 January 2006 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings (obustavlja se postupak) upon the first motion as the impugned decision of 6 June 2005 was no longer in force. 51.  On 6 December 2006 and 27 June 2007, respectively, the Constitutional Court rejected the other two motions. 52.  The DUP in the area at issue was subject to changes in 1990, 1996, 1997, 1999 (the changes in 1999 were done pursuant to the first applicant\u2019s request to that effect), 2002 (entered into force in 2003), 2004 (entered into force in 2005), 2006, 2010 and 2013. The purpose of the land also changed over time, from \u201csports and recreation\u201d to \u201ccentral activities\u201d (centralne djelatnosti). 53.  Between 8 February and 8 July 2005 the first applicant obtained a number of permits related to the planned construction of the shopping centre (electro-energetic, water supply, sanitation, geo-mechanic, urbanistic, as well as those related to fire safety, environmental protection, workplace safety, traffic, etc.). 54.  Between January and August 2005 there were at least four other requests relating to the land in respect of which the DUP was changed (three of which were also for completion of relevant plots of land). In all four cases the claimants were informed that their requests could not be met in view of the changes which the DUP was undergoing. 55.  On 14 August 2006 the Ministry sent a letter to the mayors of all Municipalities. The letter stated, in substance, that \u201ccertain local government units\u201d interpreted section 33 of the Spatial Planning and Development Act (Zakon o planiranju i ure\u0111enju prostora) (see paragraph 69 below), which provided for a possibility of a construction ban where appropriate, in a way that was incompatible with its contents, essence and meaning. The Ministry further explained that a decision on \u2018a construction ban\u2019 related exclusively to a ban on issuing a decision granting a location, as a document on the basis of which a building permit was issued, and that in a case where the decision on location had been issued prior to the construction ban, the competent body had a duty to issue a building permit to an investor, provided that the conditions provided in section 34 of the Construction Act (Zakon o izgradnji objekata) were fulfilled, regardless of whether the construction ban in the relevant area was in force. 56.  Between 1 August and 8 December 2006 the first applicant was granted a location and was issued urban planning conditions for the construction of a warehouse in another part of Podgorica. It also obtained other relevant consents (concerning water supply, electricity, fire protection, traffic, ecology, sanitation, etc.) and the Ministry\u2019s urbanistic consent to technical documentation. On 28 December 2006 it concluded a contract with the Agency concerning the charges, and on 10 January 2007 it obtained a building permit for that location. By 17 December 2007 it had built the warehouse and obtained a permit to use it (upotrebna dozvola). 57.  On 27 August 2015, following the first applicant\u2019s proposal to that effect, a meeting was held between the representatives of the first applicant and the Agency. The Agency undertook to study the first applicant\u2019s submissions in relation to the urban plot of land no. 2090/1036, including the one that it had not been allowed to honour all the obligations. It would appear, however, that the first applicant never received any response from the Agency.", "references": ["7", "0", "4", "6", "2", "5", "8", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first and second applicants were born in 1953 and 1954 respectively. The first applicant lives in Munich and the second in Erding. 7.  The applicants are half-brothers. On 21 May 1993, following a criminal trial based on circumstantial evidence, they were sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1991 murder of W.S, a very popular actor. They lodged an appeal on points of law which was dismissed in 1994. On 1 March 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain their constitutional appeals (nos. 2 BvR 2017/94 and 2039/94) against the decisions of the criminal courts. An application to the Court lodged by the applicants concerning those proceedings (no. 61180/00) was rejected on 7 November 2000 by a three-judge committee on the grounds that the applicants had not lodged their constitutional appeals in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the Federal Constitutional Court Act (unpublished decision). 8.  The applicants lodged several applications for the reopening (Wiederaufnahme) of the proceedings, the most recent of which was submitted in 2004 and rejected in 2005. In the context of those proceedings the applicants contacted the press, providing them with documents connected to the reopening proceedings and other unspecified documents. 9.  The first and second applicants were released on probation in August 2007 and January 2008 respectively. 10.  On 14 July 2000 the radio station Deutschlandradio \u2013 a public-law entity \u2013 published a report entitled \u201cW.S. murdered 10 years ago\u201d. The report stated as follows, giving the applicants\u2019 full names:\n\u201cFollowing a six-month trial based on circumstantial evidence S.\u2019s partner, W., and the latter\u2019s brother, L., were sentenced to life imprisonment. Both continue to this day to protest their innocence, and this year had their application for a retrial rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court.\u201d 11.  The transcript of this report remained available on the archive pages of the radio station\u2019s website, in the section entitled \u201cOlder news items\u201d, under Kalenderblatt, until at least 2007.\n \n(b)  The Regional Court and Court of Appeal rulings 12.  On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicants brought proceedings against the radio station in the Hamburg Regional Court, requesting that the personal data in files concerning them that had appeared on the station\u2019s website be rendered anonymous. 13.  In two judgments of 29 February 2008 the Regional Court granted the applicants\u2019 requests, under Articles 823 \u00a7 1 and 1004 (by analogy) of the Civil Code (see \u201cDomestic law\u201d, paragraphs 48-49 below). The Regional Court held in particular that the applicants\u2019 interest in no longer being confronted with their acts so long after their conviction outweighed the public\u2019s interest in being informed about the applicants\u2019 involvement in those acts. 14.  By two judgments of 29 July 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld the judgments, finding that the provision of these old news items had infringed the applicants\u2019 personality rights. In that regard it noted in particular that in 2007 the applicants, who were about to be released, had been entitled to special protection enabling them to no longer be confronted with their criminal acts in view of their aim of reintegrating into society. The court found that they were no longer required to accept these reports being made available to the public, given that they had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime and had thus been sanctioned by society, and that the public had been sufficiently informed of the case. Furthermore, the interference with the exercise of the radio station\u2019s right to freedom of expression had been minimal, as dissemination of the material had not been prohibited but had merely been made subject to the condition that the applicants should not be mentioned by name. 15.  The Court of Appeal observed that the fact that material on the Internet was often made permanently available to users and that the information was visibly old did not alter that conclusion. It noted that, for the person requesting anonymity, whether the report in which his or her identity was disclosed was recent or old made no difference. On the other hand, what was decisive for the person\u2019s reintegration into society was whether or not the information mentioning his or her name was still accessible, even though material published on the Internet was generally less widely disseminated than that broadcast on television or radio or in the press. The Court of Appeal also noted the risk that other persons, such as a neighbour, an employer or co-workers, could identify the applicants\u2019 names and contribute to a further spread of old material about the applicants\u2019 involvement in the crime, thereby jeopardising their resocialisation. 16.  The Court of Appeal further stated that the fact that the applicants had turned to the public during the most recent reopening proceedings in 2005 \u2013 thereby giving rise to reports on them and on those proceedings \u2013 did not alter its conclusions, as the applicants had acted in a specific context which had ended with the completion of the reopening proceedings. The Court of Appeal added that the radio station was thus responsible for the interference with the applicants\u2019 rights and that it could not argue that the information in question was contained only in digital archives. In the court\u2019s view, the archived information was accessible in the same way as any other information available on the radio station\u2019s website. The Court of Appeal also noted that the obligation to render material anonymous would not result in falsifying the historical truth as it was only a question of omitting a detail from the report. 17.  The Court of Appeal gave the radio station leave to appeal on points of law.\n(c)  The judgments of the Federal Court of Justice 18.  In two leading judgments of 15 December 2009 the Federal Court of Justice upheld the appeals on points of law lodged by the radio station (nos. VI ZR 227/08 and 228/08), and quashed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Regional Court. The Federal Court of Justice began by observing that the provision of the impugned material constituted interference with the exercise of the applicants\u2019 right to protection of their personality (allgemeines Pers\u00f6nlichkeitsrecht) and their right to privacy under Articles 1 \u00a7 1 and 2 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law and Article 8 of the Convention. Those rights had to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press as guaranteed by Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law and Article 10 of the Convention (see \u201cDomestic law\u201d, paragraph 46 below). Owing to its particular nature, the scope of the right to protection of personality was not defined in advance but had to be assessed by weighing it against the divergent interests at stake; in order to do so the courts had to take into account, in particular, the specific circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 19.  In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal had not taken sufficient account of the radio station\u2019s right to freedom of expression and of the public\u2019s interest in being informed, which formed part of the radio station\u2019s mission. Referring to the criteria established in that regard by the Federal Constitutional Court and its own case-law, the Federal Court of Justice observed in particular that truthful reports could infringe personality rights where the damage they caused outweighed the public\u2019s interest in knowing the truth, for instance when dissemination had a significant impact or when the report stigmatised the person concerned and thus had the effect of isolating him or her socially. However, reports concerning criminal offences were part of contemporary history, which the media had a responsibility to report on. In that regard the Federal Court of Justice observed that the more a case went beyond the scope of ordinary criminal behaviour, the greater the public interest in being informed about it. In the case of reports on topical events, the public\u2019s interest in being informed generally took precedence over the right of the person concerned to protection of his or her personality. In the Federal Court of Justice\u2019s view, anyone who broke the law and harmed others should expect not only to receive criminal sanctions, but also to be the subject of reports in the media. 20.  The Federal Court of Justice went on to find that, over time, the interest of the person concerned in no longer being confronted with his or her wrongdoing acquired greater weight. Indeed, once the perpetrator of a crime had been convicted and the public had been sufficiently informed, repeated interference with the right to protection of personality could no longer be easily justified, in view of the interest of the person concerned in being reintegrated into society. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court and this Court\u2019s judgment in \u00d6sterreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria (no. 35841/02, \u00a7 68, 7 December 2006), however, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that even if offenders had served their sentence, they could not claim an absolute right no longer to be confronted with their wrongdoing. The courts were called upon to consider the seriousness of the infringement of the right to personality and the offender\u2019s interest in resocialisation; in that regard, account had to be taken of the way in which the person concerned was presented in the report and, in particular, the extent of its dissemination. 21.  Applying these principles to the case before it, the Federal Court of Justice held that the applicants\u2019 right to protection of their personality should yield to the radio station\u2019s right to freedom of expression and the public\u2019s interest in being informed. It acknowledged that the applicants\u2019 interest in no longer being the subject of reports concerning their crime was considerable, since the crime had been committed a long time previously and they had been released from prison, the first applicant in August 2007 and the second in January 2008. However, in the view of the Federal Court of Justice, in the circumstances of the case the impugned passage from the report of 14 July 2000 did not affect the applicants\u2019 personality rights in a significant manner (erheblich), as it was not liable to cause them to be \u201cpilloried for all time\u201d or to draw them into the spotlight (ins Licht der \u00d6ffentlichkeit zerren) in a way that would stigmatise them again as criminals. 22.  The Federal Court of Justice first noted that the impugned passage gave a truthful account of a murder \u2013 of a very popular actor \u2013 that had been the focus of public attention. It noted that the passage recounted, with restraint and objectivity, the circumstances of the crime, the applicants\u2019 conviction and the trial. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the passage in question did not stigmatise the applicants as the perpetrators of the crime or as murderers, but stated that the two brothers had been convicted of murder after a six-month criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence and that they continued to protest their innocence; this left it open to the reader to conclude that they had been wrongly convicted. The Federal Court of Justice found that there was therefore no doubt that, on the day on which the transcript of the report had been posted on the radio\u2019s website, the identification of the applicants in the radio programme had been justified in view of the seriousness of the crime, the fact that the victim had been well known, the considerable public attention the crime had received and the fact that the applicants had tried after 2000 to have their convictions quashed using all conceivable remedies (alle denkbaren Rechtsbehelfe). 23.  The Federal Court of Justice added that the way in which the transcript of the report had been posted on the Deutschlandradio portal had resulted in limited dissemination. In its view, unlike the prime-time television report that had been the subject of a leading judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 June 1973 (no. 1 BvR 536/72 \u2013 the Lebach judgment), the impugned transcript could be found on the Internet portal only by Internet users actively seeking information on the subject in question. It would not have been found on the radio station\u2019s Internet pages devoted to news items that might be immediately obvious to Internet users; the latter would have had to search under the heading \u201cOlder news items\u201d (Altmeldungen), and the transcript would have been marked as such in a clear and visible manner. 24.  The Federal Court of Justice also pointed out that the public had a legitimate interest not only in being informed about current events, but also in being able to research past events. Hence, in exercising their freedom of expression the media fulfilled their task of informing the public and helping to shape democratic opinion, including when they made older material available to Internet users. This was particularly true in the case of the radio station in question \u2013 a legal entity governed by public law \u2013 whose mission included the creation of archives. The Federal Court of Justice considered that a blanket prohibition on access or an obligation to delete any reports concerning offenders named in an Internet archive would result in the erasure of history and in wrongly affording full immunity to the perpetrator in that regard. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, offenders could not claim such a right. 25.  Lastly, the Federal Court of Justice noted that a ban such as that sought by the applicants would have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and freedom of the press: if they were prohibited from making available to Internet users transcripts of old radio programmes whose legality had not been challenged, media outlets such as Deutschlandradio would no longer be able to fulfil their task of informing the public, a task entrusted to them under constitutional law. The resulting obligation for the radio station to regularly check all its archives would unduly restrict its freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In view of the time and personnel that such checks would entail, the Federal Court of Justice found that there was a real risk that Deutschlandradio would cease to archive its reports or would omit information \u2013 such as the names of the persons concerned \u2013 that might subsequently make such reports unlawful, even though the public had an interest worthy of protection in having access to it. 26.  The Federal Court of Justice added that the principles established by the data-protection legislation led it to the same conclusion. In that connection it observed that the provision of the impugned information fell within the scope of the media privilege enshrined in the second sentence of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law. Consequently, the provision of the information on the radio station\u2019s website was not subject to the consent of the person concerned or to express authorisation by law. If they were deprived of the possibility of collecting, processing and using personal data without the consent of the person concerned, neither the press nor radio stations would be able to carry out their work as journalists and would thus be unable to perform the tasks recognised and guaranteed by Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law, Article 10 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Those tasks included not only posting reports online, but also ensuring their ongoing availability, notwithstanding the time that had elapsed since the transcript had first been posted (nine years in the present case). The Federal Court of Justice added that the radio station had posted the transcript of the report online solely for journalistic purposes and that it had therefore acted within the remit entrusted to it by constitutional law, namely to inform the public and help shape democratic opinion in the exercise of its freedom of expression.\n(d)  The Federal Constitutional Court ruling 27.  On 6 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 535/10 and 547/10). 28.  The Internet portal of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel contained a file entitled \u201cW.S. \u2013 hammered to death\u201d. The file included five articles that had appeared between 1991 and 1993 in the print and online editions of the magazine. Access to the file was subject to payment. The articles in the file gave a detailed account of the murder of W.S., his life, the criminal investigation and the evidence gathered by the prosecuting authorities, the criminal trial and, in the case of issue no. 49/1992 of 30 November 1992, certain details of the applicants\u2019 lives, including their full names. The article stated that the second applicant came from a broken (zerr\u00fcttet) family of six children from a named Bavarian village, that he had been placed in a home at the age of five, where he had learned what it was to be homosexual and, especially, how best to sell himself. It was also reported that he had worked as a hairdresser and a taxi driver before being employed at a petrol station owned by Mrs W., a wealthy childless widow who was a friend of W.S.\u2019s mother and who had adopted him when he was twenty-four years old. As to the first applicant, according to the article he worked for a modest salary in the brewery managed by his half-brother. The article also gave some details provided by the witnesses during their testimony, in particular regarding how the first applicant was viewed by his half-brother. 29.  Two of the articles in the file (published in issues nos. 39/1992 of 21 September and 49/1992 of 30 November 1992) were accompanied by photographs, one showing the two applicants in the courtroom of the criminal court, another showing the first applicant with a prison officer, and a third showing the second applicant with W.S.\n(b)  The rulings of the Regional Courts and the Court of Appeal 30.  In 2007, on an unspecified date, the applicants made an application for legal aid to the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court with a view to bringing proceedings against the magazine Der Spiegel. 31.  On 4 June 2007 the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court dismissed the application on the grounds that it did not have sufficient prospects of success. 32.  The applicants then brought a similar application before the Hamburg Regional Court, which granted them legal aid. 33.  In two judgments of 18 January 2008 the Hamburg Regional Court granted the applicants\u2019 request and ordered the magazine to put an end to the public\u2019s access to the impugned file in so far as it included photos of the applicants and named them. 34.  On 29 July 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Regional Court on the same grounds as those set out in its other judgments of the same day (see paragraphs 14-16 above). It specified that the applicants had the right to bring proceedings against the magazine in the Regional Court in which their application was most likely to succeed.\n(c)  The judgments of the Federal Court of Justice 35.  On 9 February 2010 the Federal Court of Justice allowed the appeals on points of law lodged by Der Spiegel (nos. VI ZR 244/08 and 243/08) and dismissed the applicants\u2019 claims.\n(i)  The reasoning regarding the articles 36.  With regard to the press articles contained in the file at issue, the Federal Court of Justice adopted essentially the same reasoning as in its judgments of 15 December 2009 (see paragraphs 18-26 above). As to the content of the articles in question it observed that, contrary to the applicants\u2019 claims, the articles did not characterise them as murderers in a provocative manner, but stated that the applicants had been accused of murder and that they had been convicted as charged. The Federal Court of Justice added that the articles in question reported on the applicants\u2019 attitude towards the acts of which they were accused and recalled certain circumstances that had not been elucidated; this left it open to readers to conclude that the applicants had been wrongly convicted. As to the extent of dissemination of the reports, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that consultation of the file was subject to payment, which further restricted its accessibility. It reiterated that offenders were not entitled to obtain a blanket ban on viewing a report concerning named offenders or an obligation to erase such reports. This was especially true in the case of a serious capital crime that had attracted particular public attention.\n(ii)  The reasoning regarding the photos 37.  On the subject of the impugned photos, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that it had developed a concept of graduated protection (abgestuftes Schutzkonzept) based on sections 22 and 23 of the Copyright Act (see \u201cDomestic law\u201d, paragraph 50 below), which it had clarified following the Court\u2019s judgment in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI), in response to the reservations of principle which the Court had expressed in that judgment. It observed that, according to that concept of protection, the publication of images of persons who \u2013 on account of their importance in contemporary history \u2013 were in theory required, under section 23(1)(1) of the Copyright Act, to tolerate the publication of photos of themselves was nevertheless unlawful if the legitimate interests of the person concerned were infringed (section 23(2)). There could be no exception to the obligation to obtain the consent of the person in question unless the report concerned an important event of contemporary history (the court cited Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, \u00a7\u00a7 29-35, ECHR 2012). 38.  Applying these criteria to the case before it, the Federal Court of Justice noted that the photos showed, firstly, the applicants in the dock in the courtroom of the Regional Court; secondly, the first applicant accompanied by a prison officer; and, finally, the second applicant with W.S. It considered that the photos illustrated the articles and underlined the authenticity of the reports, and that, since they had been taken in the context of the event being reported on (the criminal trial), a fact which generally made their publication lawful, they did not affect the applicants more than a photo showing their profile and taken in a neutral context. The Federal Court of Justice observed that the photos in question did not portray the applicants unfavourably or intrude on their intimate sphere, and that their distribution did not \u201cpillory [the applicants] for all time\u201d or present them to the public in a way that stigmatised them again as criminals. The photos \u2013 which dated back to 1992 and showed only the applicants\u2019 appearance as it had been at that time \u2013 accompanied articles that were clearly identified as old reports with a limited impact. The Federal Court of Justice concluded that, in view of all the circumstances of the case, the applicants had no legitimate interest, within the meaning of section 23(2) of the Copyright Act, in prohibiting the publication of the photos.\n(d)  The Federal Constitutional Court ruling 39.  On 6 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 924/10 and 923/10). 40.  In 2007, on an unspecified date, the applicants brought proceedings against the daily newspaper Mannheimer Morgen in the Hamburg Regional Court. On the newspaper\u2019s Internet portal (www.morgenweb.de), under the heading \u201cOlder news items\u201d, was a news item dated 22 May 2001 which was available until 2007. Only persons with special access rights, such as subscribers and purchasers of certain other printed media, could access this section. However, all Internet users had access to a \u201cteaser\u201d indicating the subject matter of the items available in that section. The teaser referring to the news item of 22 May 2001 gave the full names of the applicants and read as follows:\n \u201cThe proceedings against the two convicted murderers of the very popular actor W.S. will not be reopened for the time being. The Augsburg Regional Court reportedly rejected an application for reopening by the brothers W.W. and M.L. They are expected to appeal against that decision to the Munich Court of Appeal.\u201d 41.  In two judgments of 16 November 2007 the Regional Court granted the applicants\u2019 request. 42.  On 19 August 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld these judgments on the same grounds as those set out in its judgments of 29 July 2008 (see paragraphs 14-16 above). 43.  On 20 April 2010 the Federal Court of Justice allowed the appeals on points of law lodged by the newspaper (nos. VI ZR 245/08 and 246/08) and dismissed the applicants\u2019 claims on the same grounds as those set out in its judgments of 9 February 2010 (see paragraphs 35-36 above). 44.  On 23 June 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 1316/10 and 1315/10). 45.  The Federal Court of Justice subsequently reaffirmed its case-law in other proceedings instituted by the applicants (nos. VI ZR 345/09 and 347/09 of 1 February 2011, nos. VI ZR 114/09 and 115/09 of 22 February 2011, and no. VI ZR 217/08 of 8 May 2012 concerning the second applicant). In a judgment of 22 February 2011 concerning the second applicant and relating to an article published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung daily newspaper on 14 January 2005, the Federal Court of Justice noted that, according to the findings of the Regional Court, the applicant had contacted the S\u00fcddeutsche Zeitung daily newspaper in August and November 2004 and requested it to continue reporting on him. The newspaper had responded to the request by publishing an article (containing text and photos) about the second applicant. The Federal Court of Justice concluded that, under these circumstances, the public\u2019s interest in being fully (umfassend) informed about the criminal act in question had not weakened or, at least, had resumed in the summer of 2004. This was further demonstrated by the numerous reports regarding the second applicant that could be found until June 2006 on the website of his criminal lawyer. Hence, the applicant had at that time been in the public eye and had not been unlawfully drawn into the spotlight by the publication of the article (no. VI ZR 346/09).", "references": ["8", "7", "3", "5", "0", "9", "2", "1", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the village of Tsereteli, Marneuli Region, Georgia. 6.  On 1 December 2005 a certain individual, Ms K., applied to the Governor of the Marneuli Region for the permit necessary for the construction of a petrol station on a plot of land situated in the region. The Governor assigned the examination of the application to the applicant, his deputy, who was responsible for the development of the region\u2019s infrastructure and the management of State lands. 7.  A meeting between the applicant and Ms K. took place on the same day, 1 December 2005, in the former\u2019s office. According to the official version of events, during the meeting, when Ms K. enquired about the necessary documents and applicable procedure for the issuance of the construction permit, the applicant replied that, apart from the necessary formalities, she would also need to make a pay-off (\u10e5\u10e0\u10d7\u10d0\u10db\u10d8) to the amount of 30,000 United States dollars (USD); of this amount, USD 20,000 would be the share of the Governor himself, whilst the rest would be divided between the applicant and representatives from the various agencies involved. 8.  On 6 December 2005 Ms K. informed the Department of Constitutional Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cthe DCS\u201d) that the applicant had requested a bribe from her in return for a promise to assist her in obtaining the requisite construction permit. She expressed her readiness to cooperate with the DCS. The authority immediately opened a criminal case into Ms K.\u2019s allegations (\u201cthe bribery case\u201d). 9.  Still on 6 December 2005, the General Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) issued the DCS with a general authorisation to remain in charge of the bribery case and to conduct all types of investigative measures necessary. 10.  By rulings dated 7 December 2005, the Tbilisi City Court authorised secret video surveillance of the applicant\u2019s meetings with Ms K., as well as the tapping of their telephone conversations. 11.  On 8 December 2005 Ms K. bought a plot of land from another private individual, Ms N. (hereinafter \u201cthe sales agreement\u201d), for the purpose of constructing a petrol station on it. On the same day, the applicant contacted a notary and the head of the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region, requesting them, respectively, to certify the sales agreement and to register, in an expedited manner, the plot in Ms K.\u2019s name. 12.  On 12 December 2005 Ms K. brought to the applicant\u2019s office the sales agreement and a record from the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region confirming her title to the newly acquired plot of land. During that second meeting, which was secretly filmed by Ms K., the applicant reiterated his request for a bribe. He asked her to bring USD 10,000 as a down payment, emphasising that this sum was not supposed to cover any official fees or charges prescribed by law for the issuance of a construction permit. Ms K. promised to bring the sum the following day. 13.  On 13 December 2005 Ms K. brought USD 10,000 to the applicant in cash. The banknotes had been pre-marked with a special substance by the DCS. The meeting took place in the applicant\u2019s office, and it was secretly filmed by Ms K. and closely supervised by the DCS. As soon as Ms K. handed over the money to the applicant, DCS officers entered the room and arrested the applicant. 14.  A search of the applicant\u2019s person was conducted on the spot, which led to the discovery of the banknotes in the right inner pocket of his suit. The law-enforcement officers immediately examined the banknotes using a special lamp and observed the marks made by a substance previously applied by the DCS. The same substance was also detected on both of the fingers of the applicant\u2019s hands and on the clothing of his suit. The accuracy of these findings was later confirmed by a forensic chemical examination. 15.  On 14 December 2005 the applicant was charged, under Article 338 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Criminal Code of Georgia, with the crime of requesting a bribe in a large amount. 16.  The results of an examination of the secret recordings of the various meetings between the applicant and Ms K. confirmed the authenticity of those recordings. On 8 February 2006 the investigator in charge of the case acquainted the applicant and his lawyer with the results of the above\u2011mentioned forensic examinations. The accused party did not contest that evidence. 17.  When questioned by the Bolnisi District Court, the applicant, who was represented by two lawyers of his choice, complained that he had been entrapped by the DCS. He stated that he had never had any intention of accepting a bribe but had been helping Ms K. out of good will, as he had considered her to be a distant relative. He confirmed that he had been assisting Ms K. in the various administrative formalities related to the purchase of the relevant land. The applicant furthermore admitted to having received money to the amount of USD 10,000, from the applicant, but added that the sum had been meant to be transmitted to a construction company as an advance payment for its upcoming construction of the petrol station. He stated that he could not explain why Ms K. would have wished to induce him to accept a bribe. 18.  When questioned by the trial court for the first time on 20 April 2006, Ms K. stated that she had met the applicant in his office and informed him of her intention to construct a petrol station. She had falsely presented herself as his distant relative in order to obtain the applicant\u2019s favour more easily. Ms K. confirmed that the applicant had then assisted her with the relevant administrative formalities with the notary and the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region. As to the sum of USD 10,000, Ms K. stated \u2013 reiterating the applicant\u2019s version of events \u2013 that it had been intended that the money would be paid through the applicant\u2019s offices to a private construction company in relation to the ongoing construction project of a petrol station. Ms K. emphasised that she had never been sure that the applicant had intended to retain any part of the above-mentioned sum for his personal benefit. Nevertheless, still suspecting that there might have been illegal intent involved in the applicant\u2019s wish to be involved in the money transfer, Ms K. had decided to inform the DCS of her conversation with the applicant. 19.  On 2 May 2006 the prosecutor in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case instituted criminal proceedings against Ms K. for giving conflicting witness statements, on the grounds of the alleged inconsistency between the statements that Ms K. had originally given to the DCS during the investigation stage and those given before the trial court on 20 April 2009. 20.  On 3 May 2006 Ms K. requested that the Bolnisi District Court hear her again in relation to the applicant\u2019s case, stating that she had forgotten to testify in respect of a number of significant factual details when the court had previously heard her on 20 April 2006. 21.  On 17 May 2006 Ms K. lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office in respect of the initiation of the criminal proceedings against her (see paragraph 19 above). She submitted that the statements she had given to the trial court on 20 April 2006 had been truthful and had fully reflected the content of her several meetings with the applicant, which could have been verified by examining the relevant secret video and audio recordings. 22.  When questioned by the trial court on 23 June 2006, both the notary who had certified the sales agreement and the head of the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region confirmed that the applicant had been urging them to expedite the registration of Ms K.\u2019s title to the plot of land on which a petrol station was scheduled to be constructed. The two witnesses furthermore stated that the plot still constituted Ms N.\u2019s property, given that the sales agreement had been annulled shortly after having been concluded. 23.  Allowing a request lodged by the applicant on 23 June 2006, the trial court admitted to the criminal case file as evidence a recording of a television programme and a newspaper article in which Ms K. had publicly acknowledged having been an DCS undercover agent in four other unrelated criminal cases. 24.  On 7 July 2006 Ms K., who at that time had already been placed in pre\u2011trial detention in relation to the criminal proceedings instituted against her for giving conflicting witness statements, was heard by the Bolnisi District Court for the second time. She confirmed the statements that she had given during the investigation stage. Namely, she testified that the applicant had clearly requested her to pay \u201cunofficially\u201d the sum of USD 30,000 in return for promised assistance with the construction project, of which sum USD 20,000 was supposed to go, according to the applicant, to the Governor. She stated, however, that she did not know whether the applicant had any intention of retaining any part of the remaining USD 10,000 for his personal benefit. Ms K. also confirmed that the applicant had indeed conducted negotiations with a number of construction companies on her behalf at that time. 25.  Ms K. did not deny that, prior to her involvement in the case against the applicant, she had acted as an undercover agent for the DCS in four other unrelated cases. She further stated before the trial court that she had already acted as an undercover agent of the DCS when she had approached the applicant for the first time on 1 December 2005. She stated that the initial objective of that undercover anti-criminal operation, led by the DCS, had been to expose the criminal activity of the Governor of the Marneuli Region. Notably, the DCS had been in possession of information that the Governor had been prone to requesting bribes in return for providing various public services. It was only after that initial plan had failed that the law-enforcement agency\u2019s attention had shifted towards the Governor\u2019s deputy, the applicant. Ms K. also stated that the sales agreement in respect of the plot of land had been annulled shortly after the applicant\u2019s arrest, as it had in fact been a fictitious transaction concluded under the DCS\u2019s close supervision. According to Ms K.\u2019s statements, Ms N. had also been collaborating with the DCS at that time, and the first meeting between Ms K. and Ms N. had taken place on the DCS\u2019s premises. 26.  On 7 July 2006 the applicant requested the trial court to summon Ms N. as an additional witness so that he could question her in relation to her purported collaboration with the DCS and role in the sequence of the events which had led to the initiation of the criminal proceedings against him (see the preceding paragraph). In reply, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office claimed that it had already attempted to summon Ms N. as a witness, but that the latter\u2019s whereabouts were unknown. Relying on that standpoint, the Bolnisi District Court ruled that it was objectively impossible to summon Ms N. as a witness. 27.  By a judgment of 17 July 2006, the Bolnisi District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. The court stated that the collection of the evidence in the case file \u2013 the statements given during the trial by Ms K., the notary and the head of the Land Registry; the judicially authorised secret video and audio recording; and the results of the personal search of the applicant on 13 December 2005 and of the forensic chemical and phonoscope examinations \u2013 confirmed the applicant\u2019s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As regards the applicant\u2019s statement that the money discovered on his person (USD 10,000) had not been a bribe but a valid advance payment for preparatory works associated with Ms K.\u2019s construction project, the District Court answered that this was not supported by the totality of the collected evidence; it did not provide any additional explanation in that respect. As to the applicant\u2019s argument that he had been induced to commit the offence in question by Ms K., who had been an agent provocateur of the DCS, the court did not address that argument at all. 28.  On 15 August 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Court of Appeal against his conviction, reiterating his complaint alleging entrapment and reasserting his version of events. 29.  On 18 October 2006 the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal began. During a hearing held on 8 November 2006, the applicant \u2013 referring to statements given by members of his family that they had recently seen Ms N. at her house \u2013 the applicant requested the appellate court to summon the latter so that he could finally question her. The appellate court granted the applicant\u2019s request. 30.  Ms N. was scheduled to appear before the appellate court on 1 December 2006, but failed to do so. The applicant noted that his family members, who were living in the same village (Orjonikidze) as Ms N., had approached her and asked her to testify before the court, but the latter had refused the request in a resolute manner. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office noted that it had been unable to secure Ms N.\u2019s appearance but promised to do so for the next hearing, which was scheduled for 6 December 2006. 31.  On 2 December 2006 Ms N. submitted a written statement to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. Noting that she had recently learned of the ongoing examination of the applicant\u2019s criminal case, she stated that she was unable to appear as a witness before the appellate court because of her difficult family situation. Ms N. stated, in particular, that her aged mother had been seriously ill and remained under her constant supervision. 32.  On 6 December 2006 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office presented a handwritten letter from Ms N.\u2019s neighbours dated 4 December 2006, according to which the witness had long abandoned her house in the village and her current whereabouts were unknown. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal ruled that it was objectively impossible to summon Ms N., as her whereabouts could not be identified. 33.  By a decision of 6 December 2006, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld his conviction of 17 July 2006 in full. As with the first-instance court, the applicant\u2019s argument about his alleged entrapment by the victim, the DCS\u2019s agent provocateur, was left unanswered by the appellate court. The appellate court rejected as unfounded the applicant\u2019s argument that the USD 10,000 had been meant to be used as an advance payment for construction works. The court noted in this connection that by the time the applicant had received the sum from Ms K. the construction permit had not been issued, and neither had an architectural plan and expenditure estimate been drawn up. 34.  On 16 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Georgia, rejecting an appeal by the applicant on points of law as inadmissible, finally terminated the proceedings. 35.  On 24 November 2008 the applicant was granted early release from prison under a presidential pardon.", "references": ["2", "5", "9", "7", "6", "4", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Thessaloniki. He is a taxi driver by profession. 6.  In December 2007 the applicant published an article in a local newspaper, Chortiatis 570. The article\u2019s title was \u201cThe ludicrousness of power\u201d and stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cIt is known to more or less all of us how some people, fellow citizens or neighbours, especially the latter, act when they think that interests of any kind which they have had \u2018since the beginning of time\u2019 are affected ... when these same people get involved in politics and take up a little post, owing to there being a lack of other interested people who are all too often more capable. Because those people will serve petty political \u2013 but mostly their own personal \u2013 interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises ... Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday ... Those who, when placed in paid positions in charge of local executive bodies, and especially in the local municipality of Filyro, are the same people who consider that their land has suddenly become bigger, and claim a little of the public space between their land and the street. In this space, which they consider to belong to their yard, they plant trees, as if they suddenly have a mania for saving the environment ... they construct their buildings (in our case, a gazebo with a tiled roof) a little further from the limits of their land, saying with impudence that it is not they who are to blame for this, but \u2018the bad Albanian\u2019 to whom they assigned [the building work]. So, in order to hinder any \u2018reckless\u2019 neighbours or other visitors who [have] the audacity to park their cars in the area between the limits of their land and the street, that is to say in the remaining public space, they put TREES-OBSTACLES. Because they care about any accidents that may happen \u2013 not, of course, owing to someone\u2019s choosing to walk or park his or her car there, but owing to the fact that the height of this construction, which accidently (as they claim) juts out of their land, is such that any unsuspecting person runs the risk of getting head injuries when he or she steps out of his or her car ... As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people who come into the PAVLIDIS area in PHILYRO in order to work, from the number plates of the cars. [These people] find themselves faced with criminal complaints, because they dare to park where all the others park ...\u201d 7.  The head of the local council, E.P., filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for slanderous defamation via the press. 8.  On 24 September 2008 the three-member first-instance criminal court of Thessaloniki (\u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2 \u03a0\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bf) held a hearing in the case. The applicant argued that, under Article 367 of the Criminal Code, his act had not been wrongful, as what he had written in the published text was true. Furthermore, relying on Article 367 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, he argued that he had written this with a legitimate interest in the case, which was his belief that E.P. had used her position as an elected member of the local council in order to plant trees and construct a pavement in front of her house without permission. The court held that the complainant could be identified from the content of the article, and found the applicant guilty of slanderous defamation via the press. It sentenced him to a six-month suspended prison sentence (decision no. 6484/2008). The applicant appealed against that decision. 9.  On 28 May 2009 the three-member Thessaloniki Court of Appeal (\u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2 \u0395\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) changed the charges from slanderous defamation to insult (\u03b5\u03be\u03cd\u03b2\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7), and found the applicant guilty of insult via the press. It sentenced him to a four-month suspended prison sentence (decision no. 2830/2009). The applicant appealed on points of law on grounds including, inter alia, a lack of sufficient reasoning as to the rejection of his argument under Article 367 of the Criminal Code, which he had repeated in the Court of Appeal. 10.  On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation (\u0386\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a0\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) quashed the judgment which had been appealed against, on the grounds of a lack of reasoning, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (decision no. 905/2010). 11.  On 13 July 2010 the Court of Appeal held a new hearing in the case. The applicant argued again that his act had not been wrongful, as what he had written in the published article was true, and he had written with a legitimate interest in the matter. The Appeal Court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument and held the following:\n\u201c... Considering the above-mentioned content of the article and the then ongoing dispute between the parties and especially their personal confrontation at the City Council, it is at the outset clear and without a doubt that the references (facts and characterisations) solely and exclusively concern the complainant. Furthermore, from the impugned article it is apparent that in it the following facts are included: that the complainant 1) had built a gazebo with a tiled roof on her land and that a part of the roof jutted out onto the street; 2) had built a pavement and had planted trees in a public space; 3) threatened to sue persons (who were proven to be the drivers of the defendant) who dared to park in a place where other residents also parked their cars. It is also apparent that these facts are accompanied by adverse judgments against her and that those facts are connected to her in her capacity as head of the local council, that is to say that her above-mentioned actions had taken place arbitrarily and in abuse of her position at Chortiatis Municipality. It was proved that the above-mentioned facts which the defendant disseminated to others via the local press were true, as the complainant admitted ... It was also proved that a) the above-mentioned facts that the defendant disseminated in the above-mentioned way could harm, seen objectively, the honour and reputation of the complainant, also in view of her aforementioned capacity in conjunction with the fact that the dissemination took place via the local press and became known to an indefinite number of people; b) the defendant knew that the disseminated facts were capable of harming the honour or reputation of the complainant, and c) the defendant wanted to make such a dissemination harming her honour and reputation. It follows that, in the present case, the above-mentioned elements objectively and subjectively constitute the criminal act of simple defamation (Article 362 of the Criminal Code) which, however, goes without punishment, under Article 366 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, taking into account the way the above-mentioned defamation was expressed, and in the circumstances which were previously detailed, the court concludes that there was an intention to insult, and for this reason the defendant must be punished for this act. In particular, the court bases its conclusion on the fact that the applicant presented the above-mentioned true facts along with unacceptable value judgments and references to the complainant\u2019s public post, such as, \u2018Because those people will serve petty political \u2013 but mostly their own personal \u2013 interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises\u2019, and unfamiliar characterisations such as, \u2018Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday\u2019, or, \u2018As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people from the number plates of the cars\u2019. Lastly, the defendant\u2019s separate argument that he committed this act with a legitimate interest must be dismissed as unfounded, as the above-mentioned expressions included in the article \u2018The ludicrousness of power\u2019, which the defendant published in the newspaper Chortiatis 570, indicate that he intended to insult the complainant. These phrases were not necessary in this case for the expression of the defendant\u2019s desire to protect the legitimate interest upon which he relied, and he could have used other phrases such as: \u2018they try to serve their [own] personal interests\u2019 instead of, \u2018Because those people will serve petty political \u2013 but mostly their own personal \u2013 interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises\u2019; or the phrase, \u2018the elected public persons\u2019 instead of, \u2018Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday\u2019; as well as the expression, \u2018as bailiffs, they know how to find other people\u2019s data\u2019, instead of, \u2018As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people from the number plates of the cars\u2019 ...\u201d 12.  Based on the above, the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of insult via the press and sentenced him to a two-month suspended prison sentence (judgment no. 2712/2010). The applicant appealed on points of law. 13.  On 23 February 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law (decision no. 351/2011). The court held that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had included sufficient reasoning. In addition, it had been correct to dismiss the applicant\u2019s argument that he had acted with a legitimate interest as it had held that the applicant had intended to insult E.P and that he had used expressions which had not been necessary for defending his alleged legitimate interest, adding at the same time which expressions could have been used instead. The decision was finalised (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae) on 24 March 2011. 14.  In addition, in 2008 E.P. lodged a civil action for damages against the applicant. The Thessaloniki multi-member First-Instance Court by its judgment no. 697/2011 ordered the applicant to pay 5,000 euros (EUR) to E.P. Following the applicant\u2019s appeal, the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to pay EUR 2,500 (judgment no. 119/2014). The judgment became final and the applicant paid to E.P. EUR 2,500 and EUR 1,913.77 in interest.", "references": ["4", "7", "0", "3", "5", "9", "1", "8", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant companies have their registered offices respectively in Bari (G.I.E.M. S.r.l.), Rome (Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. and R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l.), and Pellaro (Reggio di Calabria) (Falgest S.r.l.).\nMr F. Gironda was born in December 1959 and lives in Pellaro. 8.  The applicant company owned a plot of land in Bari on the coast at Punta Perotti, with a total area of 10,365 sq. m, adjacent to land belonging at the time to a limited liability company Sud Fondi S.r.l. The land was classified as suitable for building in the general land-use plan (piano regolatore generale) in respect of two plots, the rest being earmarked for use by small businesses according to the plan\u2019s specifications. 9.  In By-Law no. 1042 of 11 May 1992 the Bari municipal council approved a site division and development plan (piano di lottizzazione \u2011 hereinafter \u201csite development plan\u201d) submitted by Sud Fondi S.r.l. The plan provided for the construction of a multi-purpose complex, comprising housing, offices and shops. According to the applicant company, its land was automatically incorporated into the development plan by the municipal council. 10.  On 27 October 1992 the Bari municipal authority asked the applicant company if it wished to be party to a site development agreement in order to be able to build on the land. If its response was negative, the authority would have to expropriate the land under Law no. 6 (1979) of the Apulia Region. 11.  On 28 October 1992 the applicant company informed the Bari municipal authority that it wished to participate in a site development agreement. The authority did not reply. 12.  On 19 October 1995 the Bari municipal authority issued a building permit to Sud Fondi S.r.l. 13.  On 14 February 1996 Sud Fondi S.r.l. began the building work, which had mostly been completed by 17 March 1997. 14.  On 27 April 1996, following the publication of a newspaper article about the building work carried out near the sea at Punta Perotti, the public prosecutor of Bari opened a criminal investigation. 15.  On 17 March 1997 the public prosecutor ordered a temporary measure restraining disposal of property in respect of all the buildings in question. He also added the names of certain individuals to the register of persons prosecuted, including those of the authorised representative of Sud Fondi S.r.l. and the managers and foremen responsible for the building work. In his decision the public prosecutor expressed the view that the locality known as Punta Perotti was a protected natural site and that the building of the complex was therefore illegal. 16.  The representatives of Sud Fondi S.r.l. challenged the temporary restraining measure before the Court of Cassation. In a decision of 17 November 1997 that court declared the measure null and void and ordered the return of all the buildings to their owners, on the ground that it was not prohibited to build on the site according to the land-use plan. 17.  In a judgment of 10 February 1999 the Bari District Court acknowledged the illegality of the buildings erected at Punta Perotti as they had been built in breach of Law no. 431 of 8 August 1985 (\u201cLaw no. 431/1985\u201d), which prohibited the granting of planning permission in respect of sites of natural interest, including coastal areas. However, since in the present case the local authority had issued the building permits, and in view of the lack of coordination between Law no. 431/1985 and the regional legislation, which was incomplete, the court found that no negligence or criminal intent could be imputed to the defendants. All the defendants were thus acquitted on the ground that the mental element of the offence had not been made out (\u201cperch\u00e9 il fatto non costituisce reato\u201d). 18.  In the same judgment, finding that the development plans were materially in breach of Law no. 47/1985 and illegal, the Bari District Court ordered, in accordance with section 19 of that Law, the confiscation of all the developed land at Punta Perotti, including that belonging to the applicant company, together with the buildings thereon, and the incorporation of the property, without compensation, into the estate of the municipal authority of Bari. 19.  In an order of 30 June 1999 the Heritage Minister (Ministro dei beni culturali) prohibited any building in the coastal area near the city of Bari, including at Punta Perotti, on the ground that it was a site of significant natural interest. That measure was declared null and void by the Regional Administrative Court the following year. 20.  The public prosecutor appealed against the judgment of the Bari District Court, calling for the defendants to be convicted. 21.  In a judgment of 5 June 2000 the Bari Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the court below. It found that the granting of planning permission had been legal, in the absence of any ban on building at Punta Perotti, and there having been no appearance of illegality in the procedure for the adoption and approval of the site development agreements. 22.  The Court of Appeal thus acquitted the defendants on the ground that no material element of an offence had been made out (\u201cperch\u00e9 il fatto non sussiste\u201d) and revoked the confiscation measure in respect of all the buildings and land. On 27 October 2000 the public prosecutor appealed on points of law. 23.  In a judgment of 29 January 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision without remitting it. It acknowledged the material illegality of the site development plans on the ground that the land in question was subject to an absolute ban on building and to a landscape protection measure, both provided for by law. In that connection, the court noted that at the time the development plans had been adopted (20 March 1990), Regional Law no. 30/1990 on landscape protection had not yet entered into force. Consequently, the applicable provisions in the present case were those of Regional Law no. 56 of 1980 (on land use and development) and National Law no. 431/1985 (on landscape protection). 24.  The Court of Cassation observed that Law no. 56/1980 in fact imposed a prohibition on building within the meaning of section 51(F), from which the circumstances of the case allowed no derogation, because the site development plans concerned plots of land that were not situated within the city limits. The court added that, at the time when the site development agreements were adopted, the land in question was included in an implementation plan (piano di attuazione) for the general land-use plan which post-dated the entry into force of Regional Law no. 56/1980. 25.  The Court of Cassation noted that in March 1990 (see paragraph 23 above), at the time when the site development plans had been approved, no implementation scheme (programma di attuazione) had been in force. In that connection the court referred to its case-law to the effect that an implementation scheme had to be in force at the time of the approval of site development plans (Court of Cassation, Section 3, 21 January 1997, Volpe; 9 June 1997, Varvara; 24 March 1998, Lucifero). The reason for this was \u2011 again according to the case-law \u2013 that once an implementation scheme had expired, a building ban which had been discontinued by the scheme would become effective once again. Consequently, it was necessary to find that the land in question had been subject to a building ban at the time of the approval of the site development plans. 26.  The Court of Cassation further referred to the existence of a landscape protection measure, under section 1 of National Law no. 431/1985. In the present case, as the competent authorities had not issued a notice of conformity with the requirements of landscape protection (that is, neither the nulla osta approval issued by the national authorities attesting to such conformity \u2013 under section 28 of Law no. 150/1942 \u2013 nor the prior approval of the regional authorities under sections 21 and 27 of Law no. 150/1942, nor the approval of the Regional Planning Committee under sections 21 and 27 of Regional Law no. 56/1980). 27.  Lastly, the Court of Cassation noted that the site development plans concerned only 41,885 sq. m, whereas, according to the specifications of the general land-use plan for the city of Bari, the minimum area was set at 50,000 sq. m. 28.  In the light of those considerations, the Court of Cassation thus found that the site development plans and building permits had been illegal. It acquitted the defendants on the grounds that they could not be found to have negligently or intentionally committed offences and that they had made an \u201cunavoidable and excusable mistake\u201d in the interpretation of the regional legislation, which was \u201cobscure and poorly worded\u201d and interfered with the national law. The Court of Cassation also took into account the conduct of the administrative authorities, and in particular the following facts: on obtaining the building permits, the defendants had been reassured by the director of the relevant municipal office; the site-protection prohibitions with which the construction project was at odds did not appear in the land-use plan; and the competent national authority had not intervened. Lastly, the Court of Cassation found that in the absence of any investigation concerning the reasons for the conduct of the public bodies, it was not possible to speculate on those reasons. 29.  In the same judgment the Court of Cassation ordered the confiscation of all the buildings and plots of land, on the ground that, in accordance with its case-law, the application of section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985 was mandatory in the case of illegal site development, even where the property developers had not been convicted. 30.  The judgment was deposited in the court Registry on 26 March 2001. 31.  In the meantime, on 1 February 2001 the applicant company had again asked the Bari municipal authority for permission to enter into a site development agreement. 32.  On 15 February 2001 the Bari municipal authority informed the applicant company that, following the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 29 January 2001, the ownership of the land at Punta Perotti, including that belonging to the applicant company, had been transferred to the municipality. 33.  The criminal proceedings described above gave rise to another application to the Court (see Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others v. Italy, no. 75909/01, 20 January 2009). 34.  On 3 May 2001 the applicant company applied to the Court of Appeal of Bari seeking the return of its land. It alleged that, in line with case-law of the Court of Cassation, the confiscation of property belonging to a third party in relation to criminal proceedings could be ordered only to the extent that the latter had participated in the commission of the offence, in terms of either material or mental elements. 35.  In a decision of 27 July 2001 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant company\u2019s appeal. 36.  The public prosecutor appealed on points of law. 37.  In a judgment of 9 April 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Bari Court of Appeal and remitted the case to the Bari District Court. 38.  The applicant company lodged an interlocutory application for review of the enforcement order, seeking the return of its land. 39.  In a decision deposited in the court\u2019s Registry on 18 March 2004, the Bari preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) dismissed the applicant company\u2019s application. He first observed that the company\u2019s grievances concerned neither the existence nor the formal lawfulness of the impugned measure, which was a mandatory administrative sanction that the criminal court was also entitled to impose in respect of the property of third parties which had not taken part in the commission of the offence of unlawful site development offence. The judge found that the public imperative of protecting land had to prevail over the individual interests. 40.  The applicant company appealed on points of law. It emphasised that no construction work had actually been carried out on its land, which had not been the subject of a building permit. By its very nature, it argued, a confiscation measure should be directed solely against land upon which unlawful construction had taken place. 41.  In a judgment of 22 June 2005, deposited in the court\u2019s Registry on 18 January 2006, the Court of Cassation, finding that the Bari preliminary investigations judge had addressed all the points in dispute giving logical and correct reasons, dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law. The court noted that the confiscation of the applicant company\u2019s land had been compliant with its settled case-law whereby the measure provided for in section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985 was a mandatory administrative sanction imposed by the criminal court on the basis of the incompatibility of the situation of the property in question with the legislation on unlawful site development, even where the defendants had been acquitted. Property owners who were not parties to the criminal proceedings and who claimed to have acted in good faith would be entitled to seek redress before the civil courts. 42.  According to the information provided by the parties, in October 2012 the Bari municipal authority, having regard to the principles set out and the violations found by the Court in its Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others judgments (merits and just satisfaction, no. 75909/01, 10 May 2012), asked the Bari District Court to return the confiscated land to the applicant company. In a decision of 12 March 2013 the preliminary investigations judge of that court revoked the confiscation measure and ordered the return of the land on account of the fact that, first, the Court had found a violation of Article 7 of the Convention in Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others and, secondly, that the company was to be regarded as a bona fide third party because none of its directors had been found liable for the offence of unlawful site development. The judge\u2019s decision was entered in the land register on 14 June 2013 and the applicant company was thus able to recover its property on 2 December 2013. 43.  On 7 April 2005 the applicant company had applied to the Bari District Court, seeking compensation for the damage it had sustained as a result of the conduct of the Bari municipal authority and the consequences for the company\u2019s assets. It reproached the municipal authority for: (1) failing to adopt an alternative to the land-use plan; (2) failing to clarify the existence of the constraints arising as to the authorised use of the areas concerned by the site development at issue; and (3) approving site development procedures which had apparently been lawful but had led to the confiscation of the land and had caused a significant economic loss.\nAccording to the information provided by the parties, the proceedings were still pending, as the expert\u2019s report evaluating the damage, estimated at 52 million euros by the applicant company, had not yet been filed. 44.  The applicant company R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. was the owner of land suitable for building with an area of 33 hectares at Golfo Aranci. 45.  Under the municipal development scheme (programma comunale di fabbricazione) for Golfo Aranci, approved on 21 December 1981, the land in question belonged to zone F \u2013 classified as a tourist zone \u2013 and was suitable for building within a given volume. It was possible to exceed that volume in the context of hotel or hotel-type development. 46.  Wishing to build a hotel-type residential complex for tourists with a number of accommodation units (produttiva alberghiera), R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. submitted a site development plan (piano di lottizzazione) to the competent authorities. 47.  On 27 March 1991, under section 13 of Regional Law no. 45 of 1989, the Sardinia Region issued its nulla osta approval for building at a minimum distance of 150 metres from the sea, provided that once erected the buildings would actually be used for tourist accommodation. That obligation had to be recorded in the land register. 48.  On 29 November 1991 the Sardinia Region granted the landscape transformation permit, under Law no. 431/1985 and section 7 of Law no. 1497/1939, to R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. (see paragraphs 93-96 below). 49.  The municipality of Golfo Aranci approved the site development plan with final effect on 17 December 1991. 50.  On 22 April 1992, subject to the regional approval, the municipality of Golfo Aranci authorised the mayor to issue a derogating building permit allowing a greater construction volume than that provided for by its municipal development scheme, for the purposes of a hotel-type structure (opere alberghiere ricettive). The file shows that the site development plan concerned an area of 330,026 sq. m. 51.  On 17 July 1992 the Sardinia Region issued its final approval of the plan. 52.  In the meantime, on 22 June 1992, Regional Law no. 11/1992 had entered into force. It removed the possibility of derogating from the prohibition on building near the sea and fixed the minimum distance at 2 kilometres for dwellings and 500 metres for hotels. As regards buildings intended for hotel-type use, such as the hotel-type residential complexes for tourists in the present case, they were to be treated as dwellings. Under the same law, the minimum distance of 2 kilometres thus had to be maintained, except in the cases where, before 17 November 1989, a site development agreement had already been signed and the infrastructure work had already begun. 53.  On 17 July 1992 the Sardinia Region authorised the mayor to grant a building permit to R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. by way of derogation from the municipal land-use plan. 54.  On 13 August 1992 the mayor of Golfo Aranci and R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. entered into a site development agreement. Under Article 10 thereof the buildings erected on the site would continue to be used for tourist-hotel purposes and could not be sold off in separate units for a period of twenty years. The agreement stipulated that the development plan was compliant with section 13 of Regional Law no. 45/1989 and with the other planning regulations; it certified that the applicant company had paid a deposit of an amount equivalent to the total cost of the amenities. That work was to be paid for by the applicant company, which would also be required to assign 30% of the land free of charge to the municipality for the primary infrastructure (urbanizzazione primaria). 55.  On 31 August 1992 the municipality of Golfo Aranci issued a permit for the primary infrastructure. On 23 November 1992 the municipality issued the building permit for the construction work. 56.  On 19 February 1993, following the entry into force on 22 June 1992 (see paragraph 52 above) of Regional Law no. 11/1992, amending Regional Law no. 45/1989, the regional authority revoked certain permits that had been granted under the previous legislation. The applicant company was not affected. 57.  The work began in 1993. In 1997 eighty-eight housing units, less than one third of the total number, had been built. A number of them had been sold to individuals, subject to a clause stipulating that the property had to remain assigned, for a number of years, for tourist-hotel use. 58.  On 28 January 1995 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l., which was seeking new partners to optimise the project and share the risks, asked the municipal authority whether the sale of the buildings to third parties was compatible with the development agreement. On 14 February 1995 the municipal authority stated that the agreement had been drafted clearly enough; it therefore did not need clarification. It gave a favourable opinion as to the possibility of selling the buildings, but not in single units and provided the intended use of the properties remained unchanged. 59.  On 11 March 1996 the municipal authority, again approached by the applicant company, confirmed the opinion issued on 14 February 1995. 60.  At an unknown date, R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. entered into a preliminary contract of sale with Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. concerning part of the land covered by the development agreement and certain buildings erected in the meantime. In addition, on 15 January 1996, Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. entered into an agreement (contratto di appalto) with R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. under which the latter undertook to carry out construction work on the land forming the object of the preliminary contract of sale. 61.  With a view to becoming the owner of the land and buildings, on 26 February 1997 Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. also signed agreements with a travel agent for the purpose of renting out units on a weekly basis. 62.  On 22 October 1997 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. sold to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. 36,859 sq. m of land and the buildings known as \u201cC2\u201d, namely sixteen units for residential-tourist use. In addition to the buildings R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. assigned the construction rights to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. The price of the transaction was fixed at 7,200,000,000 Italian lire (ITL), equivalent to 3,718,489.67 euros (EUR). 63.  In November 1997 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. was the owner of sixteen housing units and the plots of land covered by the site development plan, with the exception of plot no. 644 and those previously sold to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l., which was the owner of the land it had purchased and of sixteen units. 64.  On 26 March 1998 the municipal authority approved the transfer (voltura) of the building permit concerning the land and buildings purchased by Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. 65.  On 3 April 2006, further to a request by R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. for a planning certificate in respect of the relevant property for the period 1990\u20111997, the municipal authority stated that the development agreement signed with R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. and the permits granted were compatible with the planning regulations in force at the material time, and in particular with Regional Law no. 45/1989, and it therefore considered that the offence of unlawful site development was not made out in the circumstances. 66.  In 1997 the public prosecutor of Olbia opened a criminal investigation in respect of Mr M.C. and Mr L.C., the legal representatives of the applicant companies. They were suspected of a number of offences, including that of unlawful site development within the meaning of section 20 of Law no. 47/1985 for building too close to the sea and without planning permission, together with fraud for changing the intended use of the properties in breach of the development agreement. 67.  On 20 November 1997 a court order restraining disposal of property was imposed on the land and buildings. 68.  In a decision of 17 January 2000 the Sassari District Court returned the land and buildings to their rightful owners. 69.  In a judgment of 31 March 2003 the Olbia District Court acquitted M.C. and L.C. on the merits in respect of all the offences, with the exception of that of unlawful site development, the prosecution of which was declared statute-barred. 70.  Having regard to the entry into force of Regional Law no. 11 of 1992 (see paragraph 52 above) and the new minimum distance from the sea introduced therein, the District Court took the view that the municipality of Golfo Aranci should never have issued the building permits and that the previously issued authorisations could not legitimise the situation. The building permits were thus in breach of the law or, at least, ineffective (inefficaci). Although erected in accordance with the permits issued by the municipal authority, the constructions were thus incompatible with the statutory provisions and their existence thus constituted unlawful site development. In addition, the sale of the housing units to individuals cast doubt on their continued use for tourist-hotel purposes and this change of purpose also placed the buildings in breach of the law. In conclusion, the District Court ordered the confiscation of the property previously placed under a restraining order and the transfer of ownership to the municipality of Golfo Aranci within the meaning of section 19 of Law no. 47/1985. 71.  As regards, in particular, the charge of fraud, the court took the view that the offence was not made out because there had been no financial loss to the municipality, since the cost of the infrastructure work remained the same even if the intended use changed. In addition, the mental element, that is to say the existence of intent to defraud the municipality, had not been proved in view of the fact that the sale had been carried out as a result of the financial difficulties of R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. Moreover, the court pointed out that the municipal authority had issued the company with a favourable opinion as regards the sale of the buildings. 72.  In a judgment of 11 October 2004 the Cagliari Court of Appeal upheld the Olbia District Court\u2019s finding of dismissal (non doversi procedere) in respect of the offence which was statute-barred and reiterated that the municipality of Golfo Aranci should not have issued the building permits, which were illegal and in any event ineffective. The constructions erected were de facto incompatible with the regional legislation prohibiting them. In addition, between March 1995 and November 1997 most of the housing units had been sold off, thus changing their intended use. As to the charge of fraud, the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal of the applicant companies\u2019 legal representatives on the basis of the same considerations, on this point, as those of the District Court. It confirmed the confiscation order. 73.  Mr M.C. and Mr L.C. appealed on points of law but their appeal was dismissed by the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 15 February 2007. 74.  According to the information provided by the Government, on 29 July 2015 the individual purchasers of the confiscated property still retained full possession. Shortly before that, on 21 May 2015, a resolution of the municipality of Golfo Aranci had acknowledged the genuine interest of the community in keeping the confiscated complex, referring in particular to the possibility of using the housing to cope with situations of urgency in the event that the local authorities should decide to assign the use of the property, directly or indirectly, for rent by persons with low income. 75.  The company Falgest S.r.l. and Mr Filippo Gironda were the co\u2011owners, each with a 50% interest, of a plot of land at Testa di Cane and Fiumarella di Pellaro (Reggio di Calabria) with a total surface area of 11,870 sq. m. The land-use plan provided solely for the possibility of building hotel-type residential complexes for tourists on that land. 76.  On 12 October 1994 the applicants applied for a building permit to erect a tourist residential complex consisting of forty-two houses and sports facilities. 77.  On 15 September 1997 the municipality of Reggio di Calabria issued the building permit. 78.  After verification by the municipality, a number of variations from the plan were noted. The municipality ordered the suspension of the work on 26 January 1998. 79.  On 29 January 1998 the applicants filed an amended plan (variante in corso d\u2019opera), which provided for fewer houses (forty instead of forty\u2011two) and restricted the construction area. This amended plan sought to regularise the work as already carried out, within the meaning of Law no. 47/1985. 80.  On 10 February 1998 the mayor of Reggio di Calabria cancelled the order suspending the work on the ground that the discrepancies in relation to the initial construction project could be regularised by means of the amended plan submitted in respect of ongoing work under section 15 of Law no. 47/1985. 81.  On 1 October 1998 the inspector of the municipality of Reggio di Calabria noted that the work was in conformity with the amended plan. The work was pursued. 82.  In 2002 the public prosecutor of Reggio di Calabria opened an investigation in respect of Mr Gironda, in his capacity as co-owner of the property, and five others: a director of the company, two signatories to the development project and two foremen. They were all suspected of committing a number of offences, in particular that of unlawful site development within the meaning of section 20 of Law no. 47/1985. 83.  In a judgment of 22 January 2007 the Reggio di Calabria District Court acquitted all the defendants on the merits (perch\u00e9 il fatto non sussiste) in respect of all the charges, except for the offence of unlawful site development, the prosecution of which it declared statute-barred. The court noted that the project had provided for the construction of residences for hotel-type tourist accommodation. However, the structural specifications of the buildings (caratteristiche strutturali) and the evidence suggested that the real purpose of the project was the sale of houses to individuals, thus casting doubt on the intended hotel-type tourist use. This change of purpose rendered the site development unlawful. In conclusion, the court ordered the confiscation of the land and buildings and the transfer of the property to the municipality of Reggio di Calabria under section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985. 84.  In a judgment of 28 April 2009 the Reggio di Calabria Court of Appeal acquitted the applicants on the merits (perch\u00e9 il fatto non sussiste) in respect of all the charges, including that of unlawful site development. It revoked the confiscation of the property and ordered its return to the owners. 85.  The Court of Appeal took the view, in particular, that the approved project was compatible with the land-use plan and the planning regulations. Given that there had been no preliminary or final contract of sale, there was no evidence of any change in the purpose of the constructions and therefore no unlawful development. 86.  In a judgment of 22 April 2010, deposited in the Registry on 27 September 2010, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal without remitting it, finding that the change in purpose of the constructions was proved by statements made by third parties and by documents in the file. For the Court of Cassation, the offence of unlawful site development (the prosecution of which was statute-barred, entailing the dismissal of the case) had thus indeed been knowingly committed by the defendants. Consequently, the property in question again became subject to the confiscation order made at first instance by the Reggio di Calabria District Court. The acquittals were maintained. 87.  According to an expert\u2019s report of 5 May 2015, the expert having been appointed by the applicants, the complex confiscated from the latter was in an advanced state of abandonment and neglect. In the applicants\u2019 submission, the municipal authority, which was the owner of the property, had not carried out any work to keep the open spaces maintained.", "references": ["6", "1", "5", "4", "0", "7", "2", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The cases concern the 1982 State internal premium loan bonds (\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432\u044b\u0438\u0433\u0440\u044b\u0448\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0439\u043c\u0430 1982 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430 - \u201c1982 premium bonds\u201d) which are in the applicants\u2019 possession. The applicants submitted lists of serials numbers or photocopies of their bonds. 7.  On 30 December 1980 the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decided to issue bonds of an internal premium loan to finance certain State programmes. The bonds had nominal values of 25, 50 and 100 Soviet roubles (SUR). Their period of circulation was set at twenty years, from 1 January 1982 to 1 January 2002, and they were redeemable at any time during the term of the loan with interest at 3% per annum. Soviet citizens could either buy the 1982 premium bonds with their own money or obtain them in exchange for bonds from an earlier 1966 State internal premium loan. The average monthly wage in 1982 was SUR 177.30 across all branches of the economy plus SUR 68.70 in various social benefits (People\u2019s Economy of the USSR 1982, a statistical yearbook by the USSR Central Statistics Directorate, Moscow, 1983). 8.  By the late 1980s the Soviet economy was suffering from a structural imbalance due a rapidly increasing money supply and decreasing availability of consumer goods sold at State-controlled prices. In January 1991 the USSR Government freed 40% of prices and carried out a monetary reform eliminating the largest banknotes in circulation and restricting the withdrawal of money from bank deposit accounts to SUR 500 a month. This led to a two to threefold increase in prices. On 22 March 1991 the USSR President issued Decree no. UP-1708, ordering a one-time increase to savings instruments, including the 1982 premium bonds, of 40% to offset the price rise. 9.  On 26 December 1991 the USSR was dissolved by Declaration no. 142-N of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The declaration invited the heads of newly independent States to reflect on the issues of succession. 10.  On 19 February 1992 the Russian Government issued Resolution no. 97, recognising its succession in respect of the obligations of the former USSR under the 1982 loan:\n\u201c1.  To confirm succession of the [Russian] Government in respect of the obligations of the former USSR vis-\u00e0-vis Russian Federation citizens arising out of the bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan.\n... 6.  To give Russian Federation citizens who are holders of bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan the right to voluntarily exchange their bonds against State securities, including 1992 Russian internal premium loan bonds, shares in the Savings Bank ... and also to credit the proceeds of sale of the bonds into deposit accounts open in the Savings Bank ... from 1 October 1992 ...\u201d 11.  Between 1995 and 2000 a series of Russian laws and regulations were passed which provided for the conversion of Soviet securities, including the 1982 premium bonds, into special Russian promissory notes nominated in \u201cpromissory roubles\u201d (DOR) (for details, see Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, no. 15578/03, \u00a7\u00a7 16-21, 2 December 2010). 12.  From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429\u2011FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016. 13.  The applicants applied to the Russian financial authorities and the courts, seeking the redemption of their bonds. Their claims were rejected on procedural and substantive grounds. Mr Ruzanov\u2019s claim was allowed at first instance but the judgment was later overturned on appeal. On 5 May 2014 Mr Israfilov obtained a decision from the Leninskiy District Court in Makhachkala, requiring the Russian Government to convert his bonds into special promissory notes. 14.  Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova\u2019s claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia\u2019s internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.", "references": ["0", "6", "7", "5", "8", "1", "4", "3", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in R\u00e2mnicu-V\u00e2lcea. 5.  In 1993 the applicant married N.E.C. and their daughter M.A. was born in 2001. Following the couple\u2019s divorce on 28 February 2007, the mother was granted physical custody of the child. As the parents had reached an agreement regulating the applicant\u2019s contact with the child, the visiting rights were not discussed in the divorce proceedings. 6.  Until December 2009, the applicant had unhindered opportunity to talk to his daughter on the phone and to take her to his home whenever he wished. After that date, N.E.C. stopped answering the phone and the only possibility for the applicant to see his daughter was outside her school. 7.  Consequently, on 7 July 2011 the applicant instituted contact proceedings before the R\u00e2mnicu-V\u00e2lcea District Court, as a result of which on 16 December 2011 a visiting schedule was established in favour of the applicant. 8.  N.E.C. appealed, arguing that the applicant had never been prevented from visiting the child but that since the divorce he had not visited her more than once every three months and had not contributed in any way to the continuous medical treatment she required. During the proceedings the parties reached an agreement about the visiting schedule. On 17 May 2012 the County Court questioned M.A. and noted:\n\u201cThe parents divorced about 5-6 years ago and after that she often used to visit her father up until about 6 months ago, when her mother stopped allowing her to answer the phone, because the father only wanted to make [N.E.C.] angry. Since then, she can no longer answer the phone and her father has not seen her.\nFrom her mother\u2019s accounts, she understood that her father was a bad person who caused trouble to [N.E.C.] as they both had businesses selling the same products, and her father had taken away her mother\u2019s employees by promising them higher salaries.\nShe does not wish to visit her father because that would make her mother upset and she does not want that because she cares a lot about her mother. Her mother does not wish her to visit her father, who has a new family and a small child. (...).\u201d 9.  In a decision of 15 June 2012 (hereinafter \u201cthe contact order\u201d) the County Court took note of the parents\u2019 agreement as to the visiting schedule and considered that it was beneficial for the child to maintain contact with her father. 10.  N.E.C. lodged an appeal on points of law, unhappy that the child would have to go to the applicant\u2019s home. In a final decision of 19 November 2012 the Pite\u015fti Court of Appeal upheld the County Court\u2019s decision. It noted that the child was used to going to her father\u2019s home and continuing this habit would help consolidate their relationship. It found:\n\u201cThe consolidation of the relationship between the applicant and the minor by means of complying with the County Court\u2019s decision is even more necessary since, from the report of the interview with the minor, it appears that the minor had been visiting her father after the parents\u2019 separation until about six months before the hearing, [when the mother] stopped allowing her to talk on the phone with the applicant; from the same report it appears that the minor does not wish to see her father in order not to upset her mother.\nIn these circumstances, the [County Court] has correctly decided that the visits should take place in the applicant\u2019s home, in order to allow the normal parental ties to develop and to avoid the possibility of inculcating feelings of hatred towards the father, which would run counter to the child\u2019s harmonious psychological development.\u201d 11.  As N.E.C. continued to oppose any contact with the child, on 13 March 2013 the applicant contacted a court bailiff and started enforcement proceedings. On 23 March 2013 the application was allowed by the Brezoi District Court, which ordered enforcement of the contact order. 12.  The bailiff invited N.E.C. to bring the child to his office on 5 April 2013, which she failed to do. On 3 May and 7 June 2013 and on 7 March 2014 he went to her home together with the applicant, the police and representatives of the V\u00e2lcea Directorate General on Social Welfare and Child Protection (\u201cthe child protection authority\u201d). On each occasion they found no one there, despite prior notification. 13.  On 11 April 2013, at the applicant\u2019s request, the bailiff lodged with the Brezoi District Court an application for penalties against N.E.C., under the provisions of Article 905 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 27 below). N.E.C. reiterated that, as M.A. was refusing to see her father, she would not agree that the child be taken against her will to the applicant\u2019s home. On 20 June 2013 the court ordered N.E.C. to pay a fine of 500 Romanian Lei (RON \u2013 approximately 115 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) for each day of non-enforcement of the contact order, starting from the date on which the District Court decision was notified to her. The District Court reiterated the findings of the report of 17 May 2012 concerning the interview with M.A. (see paragraph 8 above) and found that the mother was responsible for the failure to enforce the visiting schedule. It found:\n\u201cFrom the same report it appears that, although the minor likes to visit her father, she does not wish to do so any more because she does not want to upset her mother.\nThe court concludes that the non-enforcement of the obligation set down in the contact order is caused exclusively by the debtor and there is no evidence to show that the minor herself would refuse in absolute terms contact with the creditor or that she would manifest aversion towards him.\u201d 14.  On 21 August 2013, acting on an application lodged by the bailiff under Article 188 \u00a7 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below), the Brezoi District Court fined N.E.C. RON 100 (approximately EUR 22 at the relevant time) for obstructing the enforcement proceedings. 15.  Meanwhile, on 18 August 2014 the bailiff noted that N.E.C. was continuing to reject the visiting schedule and concluded that the enforcement had become objectively impossible. Consequently he terminated the enforcement proceedings and lodged a criminal complaint against N.E.C. (see paragraph 20 below) under the provisions of Article 911 \u00a7 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). 16.  The applicant objected to the stay of execution and asked the Brezoi District Court to compel the bailiff to continue the enforcement proceedings. He also argued that the provisions of the CCP allowing the bailiff to stay the execution while a criminal complaint was ongoing were unconstitutional in so far as it allowed the debtor \u2212 in bad faith \u2212 to stay or obliterate the enforcement efforts and to manipulate the child\u2019s behaviour to the point of rejecting the non-custodial parent. He did not otherwise contest the findings of the bailiff\u2019s report. On 22 May 2015 the Brezoi District Court dismissed his objection on the grounds that it had become objectively impossible to enforce the court order and that the bailiff had correctly stayed the enforcement once the prosecutor\u2019s office had taken over the case. On 22 March 2016 the appeal lodged by the applicant was also dismissed as unfounded by the V\u00e2lcea County Court. The latter found that the bailiff had complied with all the obligations arising from Articles 909-913 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). Later on, in its decision no. 299 of 12 May 2016, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint raised by the applicant (see paragraph 30 below). 17.  On 4 March 2014 the applicant asked the District Court to quantify the amount of damages to which he was entitled under Article 905 \u00a7 4 of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below). N.E.C. maintained that it had been the applicant who had distanced himself from the child and that due to the break-up of the father-daughter relationship it was impossible to comply with the contact order at that time. On 25 September 2014 the District Court ordered N.E.C. to pay the applicant RON 9,200 (approximately EUR 2,100 at the relevant time). The latter could not obtain this payment as N.E.C. had sold all her possessions and had not declared any fixed income. 18.  On 6 January 2015 the applicant asked the child protection authority to seek a court order for three months of psychological counselling for his daughter, reiterating that N.E.C. was alienating M.A. from her father. On 9 January 2015 the child protection authority refused to intervene since the bailiff had not recorded in his report that the child had opposed the enforcement \u201cin absolute terms\u201d, as required by Article 912 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). 19.  On 14 January 2015 the applicant reiterated his request for psychological counselling. In addition, he asked that the relationship between the parties involved be monitored for a period of six months and that N.E.C. be fined for the delays in executing the contact order. The child protection authority\u2019s inspectors met N.E.C. on four occasions: on 29 January, 11 March, 23 April, and 17 July 2015. Subsequently, in a letter of 22 July 2015 the authority informed the applicant that N.E.C. had not allowed them to talk with the child about her relationship with her father. The child protection authority advised as follows:\n\u201cIn view of the fact that for the past four years your relationship with your daughter has only consisted of a few isolated encounters, we consider that reinitiating the father\u2011daughter relationship must be done gradually, bearing in mind the child\u2019s wishes, her school programme and her extra-curricular activities. (...)\nFor the time being, [N.E.C.] considers that it is not in the child\u2019s best interest to reinitiate the father-daughter relationship and refuses to lend her support to this end.\nIn the light of the above, we consider that it is important for the child that both you and your former spouse try to improve your communication and that you change your current attitude (complaints before courts and other institutions, enforcement proceedings (...)), in order to overcome the conflicts and to offer your daughter the support and reassurance that she requires at this age.\u201d 20.  Acting upon the criminal complaint lodged by the bailiff on 18 August 2014 (see paragraph 15 above), the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the V\u00e2lcea County Court started an investigation into the commission of the offence of a breach of a court judgment (nerespectare a hot\u0103r\u00e2rii judec\u0103tore\u015fti). 21.  On 4 March 2015 the prosecutor changed the legal classification of the alleged facts into the offence of a breach of custody measures (nerespectarea m\u0103surilor privind \u00eencredin\u0163area minorului). 22.  On 4 January 2016 the prosecutor interviewed M.A. in the presence of N.E.C.\u2019s lawyer and a psychologist from the child protection authority. M.A. refused to re-establish contact with her father and expressed her belief that her father was only trying to hurt her mother through his actions because of their work-related conflicts, of which she had been partially informed by her mother. She said:\n\u201cI believe that by his actions my father wants, in reality, to hurt my mother. Yesterday I discussed this subject with my mother, as I had done once before, and she told me that she did not wish to trouble me, as those were work-related problems created by my father. It might be that through his actions my father wants to hurt my mother. I know some aspects, but not too much about the conflict between my parents concerning my mother\u2019s work.\nIt is possible that my father started these actions because he loves me and wishes to know me.\nI no longer want to know him or to have personal relations with him. (...)\nI think it would be best if my father left me alone. (...)\nIt is true that my mother has never said bad things about my father, but she has never encouraged me to have personal ties with him either.\u201d 23.  On 22 April 2016, acting at the prosecutor\u2019s request, the psychologists from the child protection authority assessed M.A. They noted in their report that M.A. refused to see her father because she had been disappointed by the manner in which he had tried to get in touch with her, namely via the authorities, thereby causing upset to her mother. The expert did not consider that counselling for M.A. would be beneficial for re-establishing the relationship between the applicant and his daughter. He recommended psychological support for the parents. 24.  On 24 February 2017 the prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation on the grounds that it had not been established beyond any doubt that N.E.C. had acted in such a manner as to repeatedly prevent the applicant from seeing his daughter and that the lack of communication was caused by M.A.\u2019s unequivocal wish and will. 25.  On 18 April 2017, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the prosecutor in chief of the prosecutor\u2019s office upheld the above decision. However, in a decision of 3 October 2017 the R\u00e2mnicu V\u00e2lcea District Court allowed a complaint lodged by the applicant, quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision and sent the case back to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further examination. The court considered that, because of the mother\u2019s influence over her, the child might suffer from parent alienation syndrome which constituted a form of psychological abuse; in order to clarify this aspect, further psychological investigation was needed. 26.  In 2016, the applicant resumed contact with his former spouse, through the offices of a new bailiff. He tried to visit her home in order to see the child on 6 May, 3 June, 1 July, and 5 August 2016. On 6 April 2017 he asked N.E.C.\u2019s opinion as to what would be the appropriate method for him to re-establish contact with his daughter.", "references": ["0", "5", "1", "2", "3", "7", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Oryol. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-7 in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region. 6.  The applicant, his partner and his mother were living in Oryol when the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes. 7.  On 2 December 2009 the Federal Penal Authority (\u201c\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439\u201d, \u201cthe FSIN\u201d) of Russia sent a telegram to the FSIN department for the Oryol Region (\u201cthe Oryol FSIN\u201d) instructing the latter to send each month up to forty people detained in remand prisons and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a strict-regime facility to the Krasnoyarsk Region. The instruction was valid as of 1 December 2009 until further notice. 8.  On 7 December 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court of Oryol convicted the applicant of drug-related crimes and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment in a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility. On 2 February 2010 the Oryol Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 9.  Acting on the basis of the FSIN of Russia\u2019s instruction of 2 December 2009, on an unspecified date the Oryol FSIN decided, in view of the overcrowding in the post\u2011conviction detention facilities in the Oryol Region, that the issue of which particular facility the applicant would be transferred to should be resolved by the FSIN department for the Krasnoyarsk Region (\u201cthe Krasnoyarsk FSIN\u201d). The latter allocated the applicant to IK-7, a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region (about 4,200 km from Oryol), to serve his sentence. The applicant has been detained there since 20 April 2010. 10.  The applicant has repeatedly asked the penal authorities at different levels to transfer him to a detention facility located closer to Oryol so that he could effectively maintain family ties while serving his sentence. 11.  On 12 November 2010 the FSIN of Russia rejected the applicant\u2019s request, informing him that, under Article 81 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (\u201cthe CES\u201d), in the absence of exceptional circumstances convicts were to serve their prison term in its entirety in the same detention facility, and that there were no such exceptional circumstances in the applicant\u2019s case. They noted as follows:\n\u201c[a]s regards maintaining the convict\u2019s social ties, the right to receive visits and parcels as well as the right to correspondence and phone calls should be realised in accordance with the laws on execution of sentences in force and does not depend on the place in which he is serving the sentence.\u201d 12.  The applicant brought civil proceedings against the Oryol FSIN, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage caused by their decision to transfer him to a penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region in breach of his right, under Article 73 \u00a7 1 of the CES, to serve his prison sentence in his home region, which had adversely affected his capacity to maintain his family and social ties. 13.  On 3 August 2012 the Zavodskoy District Court of Oryol dismissed the claims for damages with reference to Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the CES and Ruling No. 1700-O-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia. The court held that the Oryol FSIN\u2019s decision had been lawful because between December 2009 and February 2010 the penal facilities in the Oryol Region had been overcrowded. It also noted that the defendant had acted in accordance with the FSIN of Russia\u2019s instructions. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s argument regarding his difficulties in maintaining family ties because of the distance between his family home and the detention facility. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment. 14.  Between July 2011 and October 2013 the applicant\u2019s partner made long-term family visits to IK-7 on six occasions. In 2014 she gave birth to the couple\u2019s daughter. While in IK-7, the applicant received a number of parcels and phone calls from his mother and partner.", "references": ["3", "2", "6", "5", "7", "8", "0", "1", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1965 and 1954 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5.  Both applicants were ill-treated and injured on 21 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The first applicant suffered injuries that needed eight days of medical care and the second applicant was beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened ex officio investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7.  In the meantime, an ex officio investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation of a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military and public officials by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. The injured parties, including the applicants, did not participate in that procedure, as the Government acknowledged. 8.  As regards the offence of abusive conduct, the military prosecutor\u2019s office decided on 9 March 1994 (in respect of the first applicant) and 28 October 1994 (in respect of the second applicant) not to open a separate ex officio investigation on the grounds that the offence of abusive conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the second applicant on 4 October 2001. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants\u2019 injury. 9.  Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants\u2019 respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard the applicants who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and homicide as an attempt raised on account of their ill-treatment and injury during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant requested on 5 January 2005 and on 4 August 2008 to participate in these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of his case to be pursued by the military prosecutor\u2019s office. In the main criminal investigation, the second applicant gave a statement on 4 October 2001 and lodged a civil claim on 17 May 2005, asking for the punishment of those responsible. 10.  The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011) and Anamaria\u2011Loredana Or\u0103\u0219anu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] (nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, \u00a7\u00a7 10\u201111, 7 November 2017). 11.  On 14 October 2015, as regards the second applicant, the military prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision only in respect of the offence of instigation to illegal deprivation of liberty by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s decision of 10 May 1991, failing to decide the offence of homicide as an attempt or her injury, as complained of (see paragraph 7 above). No decision was taken in respect of the first applicant. 12.  Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it can be seen from the military prosecutor\u2019s office website that it was subsequently quashed. Thus, on 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation regarding the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. To date, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing.", "references": ["4", "8", "5", "7", "0", "2", "3", "9", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Gdynia. 5.  On 2 January 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed homicide together with other persons. 6.  On 5 January 2007 the Gdynia District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) remanded him in custody. The court stressed the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given that extensive evidence had still to be obtained in the case. It also referred to the fact that the proceedings in question concerned several alleged accomplices. The court further relied on the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed on the applicant. 7.  On 12 February 2007 the applicant applied for the preventive measure to be lifted or varied. On 15 February the District Prosecutor refused the request, finding that the grounds for the imposition of this measure remained valid. 8.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended by decisions of the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) of 20 March, 19 June and 21 August 2007. The applicant appealed against all of those decisions. His appeals were dismissed by the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) on 4 May, 1 August and 19 September 2007 respectively. The courts repeatedly relied in their decisions on the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the likelihood of a severe prison sentence being imposed on him and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to obtain further expert evidence. 9.  On 17 September 2007 the applicant again applied for release. His application was refused on 21 September 2007 by the Gdynia District Prosecutor. 10.  On 27 November 2007 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 31 March 2008. The applicant appealed, unsuccessfully. 11.  On an unspecified date in late 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with homicide committed together with two other co-accused. 12.  The applicant\u2019s detention was continually extended during the course of the trial. 13.  On 4 August 2008 the applicant requested the court to release him on health grounds. On 19 August 2008 the trial court refused his request. It relied on the medical certificate issued by a prison doctor, stating that the applicant could be adequately treated in detention. 14.  On 25 September 2008 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. IV 457/07). The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. He lodged an appeal. 15.  On 13 May 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 45/09). 16.  The applicant\u2019s detention was continually extended by the domestic courts, pending his appeal and in the course of the retrial. In particular, on 24 August 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court extended his detention until 31 December 2009. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 23 September 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision, finding that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question persisted, despite the fact that the judgment convicting the applicant had been quashed. The Court of Appeal further considered that the Regional Court had correctly relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty as the principal ground for the applicant\u2019s continuing detention and on the risk of the obstruction of the proceedings. 17.  On 16 March 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 48/09). The applicant was again convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 18.   On 10 November 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 277/10). 19.  On 23 March 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention, reiterating the grounds given in its initial decisions. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 20.  During the retrial proceedings the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court held fifteen hearings in total. 21.  On 12 July 2012 the court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 210/10). The applicant was again convicted and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. He lodged an appeal against that judgment. 22.  On 26 October 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 December 2012. On 13 November 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. It considered that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the offences with which he had been charged had been supported by the non-final judgment of 12 July 2012, in which he had been convicted and had received a severe sentence. The court also held that further detention on remand was the only preventive measure capable of securing the proper course of the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment. 23.  On 6 June 2013 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal (case no. II AKa 84/13). The appellate court upheld the conviction but reclassified the offence as involuntary manslaughter (nieumy\u015blne spowodowanie \u015bmierci). The applicant\u2019s sentence was reduced to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day.", "references": ["3", "7", "0", "8", "1", "9", "6", "4", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1993 and lives in Skopje. 6.  At about 1.00 a.m. on 11 February 2012 a physical altercation took place at a night club in Skopje involving the applicant, a certain R., and several other young men. As a consequence, R. suffered injuries to his nose and face and was taken to hospital by his friends. He was released later that same night. 7.  The police were called to the scene and drew up an official \u201cnote\u201d (\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0448\u043a\u0430) in which the event was described as a fight involving the applicant, R. and a certain P. 8.  On 11 June 2012 an investigating judge (\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0458\u0430) opened an investigation against the applicant, with oral evidence being provided by the applicant, R., and witnesses J. and K., the latter being friends of R.\u2019s. In their statements they all maintained that on the evening in question R. had been attacked by the applicant. 9.  In the course of the investigation, on 6 September 2012 the applicant gave an oral statement and proposed that an eyewitness, P. (see paragraph 7 above), be questioned as a witness on his behalf. In his statement he claimed that during the initial provocations by R. and his friends, P. had been in the toilet but that towards the end of the altercation P. had been present and had witnessed the event and had even grabbed hold (\u201c\u0434\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0440\u0436\u0438\u201d) of one of the witnesses. The applicant maintained that he was the one who had been attacked by R., J. and K. and that he had acted in self-defence. 10.  The investigating judge commissioned an expert report regarding the nature and intensity of the injuries suffered by R., which was compiled on 26 September 2012 by G.A., a traumatology surgeon (\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442 \u0445\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0440\u0433 \u2011 \u0442\u0440\u0430\u0443\u043c\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433). According to the expert report, the injuries suffered by R. fell to be classified in the domestic law category of \u201cgrievous bodily injury\u201d (\u0442\u0435\u0448\u043a\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0441\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430). 11.  On 4 October 2012, the applicant was indicted before Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201c\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435 I\u201d \u2013 \u201cthe trial court\u201d) for causing \u201cgrievous bodily injury\u201d. The prosecution proposed that R. and two witnesses, J. and K., be questioned. The expert report (see paragraph 10 above) was also adduced as evidence. 12.  The applicant lodged an objection against the indictment on 22 November 2012. In his objection he reiterated his request that the eyewitness P. be questioned, as well as two more witnesses, M.K. and B. It was proposed that M.K. testify as an eyewitness to the event and B. testify to the fact that the applicant had come under attack by the same group on a previous occasion, which B. had prevented. 13.  The objection was dismissed by a panel of Skopje Court of First Instance on 29 November 2012. 14.  At a public hearing before the trial court which took place on 12 February 2013, evidence was given by the applicant, and by R., J. and K. In his statement, witness J. said that during the altercation, P. (the witness proposed by the applicant) had launched himself (\u201c\u043c\u0443 \u0441\u0435 \u0444\u0440\u043b\u0438\u201d) at K., the other witness. 15.  At the same hearing the defence reiterated its request that P. and M.K. be questioned as eyewitnesses to the event. The trial court refused the request on the grounds that neither P. nor M.K. had been an eyewitness to the event. It also pointed out that M.K. had not been mentioned before in the other witnesses\u2019 statements or at any time during the proceedings. At the same hearing, the trial court accepted a request from the defence to examine the official police note of the event (see paragraph 7 above). 16.  At the subsequent public hearing, which took place on 19 March 2013, the expert G.A. gave oral evidence. He was cross-examined by the defence counsel with regard to his competence to classify injuries. At this hearing, the same evidentiary requests were reiterated by the defence regarding P. and M.K. It was further proposed that another witness, M.R., be questioned and that a fresh expert examination be commissioned by the trial court because the present one was inconclusive and had been compiled by a traumatology expert. In this regard, it was submitted that due to the nature of the injuries in question, an expert opinion by an ENT (ear, nose and throat) specialist should be commissioned. It was also requested that a neuro-psychiatric specialist prepare an expert opinion in respect of the applicant\u2019s psychological state on the evening of the altercation in order to establish his mental capacity at the time of the events in question. 17.  At the same hearing the trial court refused all requests by the defence, stating:\n\u201cThe defence\u2019s request to question witnesses M.R., P. and M.K. is refused for the same reasons as stated in the minutes of 12 February 2013. Since there has already been an expert report commissioned in the case, further requests for the commissioning of additional expert reports are refused, and the court is already in possession of sufficient evidence to establish the facts in the case.\u201d 18.  Closing arguments were also delivered at that hearing, in which the applicant complained that all the evidentiary testimony proposed on his behalf had been rejected by the trial court and he had therefore been prevented from proving his case. 19.  On the same day the trial court delivered a judgment, finding the applicant guilty and sentencing him to a suspended prison sentence of one year. The trial court based its findings on the expert report, the statement given by R. and the statements given by the two witnesses J. and K. Although the trial court in its reasoning accepted that there had been a third person, the applicant\u2019s friend, involved in the altercation, it considered that the defence\u2019s arguments contradicted the other evidence put before it sufficiently, thereby showing that the applicant was guilty of the offence he had been charged with. 20.  The applicant submitted two appeals, one through a lawyer on 17 April 2013 and another personally on 22 April 2013. In the appeals it was stated that none of the witnesses proposed by the defence had been questioned by the trial court and none of the expert opinion requests had been accepted, effectively rendering the taking of evidence in the case completely one-sided. It was further stated in the appeals that the commissioned expert opinion was inconclusive with regard to the type of injury suffered by R., meaning that the trial court could therefore not ascertain whether that type of injury contained the elements of \u201cgrievous bodily injury\u201d. 21.  On 11 July 2013 the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u201cthe appellate court\u201d) held a public hearing. At the hearing a representative of the High Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u0412\u0438\u0448\u043e \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e) proposed that the appeals should be allowed and the case remitted because of omissions made by the trial court in respect of the expert report. 22.  On the same day the appellate court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cIn the appeals it is stated that the defence\u2019s request to question P. as a witness was wrongfully rejected and that it could have significantly contributed to different conclusions with regard to the facts ... [T]his court finds that the request was rightfully rejected by the lower court because the witness P. was not an eyewitness to the event in question, which is supported by the statement of the accused given at the investigation stage ...\n... from the statement [of R.] ... which finds support in the statements given by J. and K., it can be concluded that on the evening in question the accused insulted R., the accused then hit R. over the head with a glass. ... R. fell down, losing consciousness and K. ran to his aid, but was hindered by a friend of the accused ...\u201d 23.  This judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 3 September 2013.", "references": ["7", "4", "9", "1", "5", "2", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sofia. The second applicant was registered in 1992 and has its registered place of business in Sofia. 6.  At the time of the events in question the first applicant was registered as a sole trader. At that time the main commercial activity of the two applicants was trade in medicaments. 7.  In February and March 2006 the first applicant sold medicaments to a company called K., for which she was paid 22,043.23 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 11,275 euros (EUR), in total. 8.  Between December 2005 and April 2006 the second applicant also sold medicaments to K., receiving a total of BGN 33,344.05 (the equivalent of EUR 17,055) by way of payment. 9.  In September 2006 other companies which were creditors of K., including E., applied for the commencement of insolvency proceedings against K. Their request was allowed in a judgment of 17 November 2006 of the Plovdiv Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), which declared company K. insolvent, opened insolvency proceedings and appointed a trustee. It noted that K. had ceased its payments to E. and other creditors in October 2005, and held that the initial date of the company\u2019s insolvency was therefore 30 October 2005. 10.  In January 2007 the trustee prepared the first list of K.\u2019s creditors, which included company E. 11.  In May 2007 company E. brought proceedings against the first applicant under section 646(2) of the Commerce Act, as in force at the time (see paragraph 25 below), seeking to have the payments K. had made to her during the so-called \u201csuspect period\u201d \u2013 the period between the initial date of insolvency as declared by the Plovdiv Regional Court and the commencement of the insolvency proceedings (the payments described in paragraph 7 above) \u2212 declared null and void and the sum received by her returned to the insolvency estate. 12.  The action was allowed in a judgment of the Regional Court of 31 October 2007. Observing that it was undisputed that K. had paid the first applicant BGN 22,043.23 during the \u201csuspect period\u201d, and without analysing the matter any further, it ordered her to pay back this sum to the insolvency estate, plus default interest. 13.  That judgment was upheld on 12 March 2008 by the Plovdiv Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). 14.  The Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment was enforceable and, at the request of K.\u2019s trustee, a bailiff opened enforcement proceedings against the first applicant for the sums due to the insolvency estate. In December 2008 the applicant settled that debt, which also included interest and costs and expenses related to the enforcement proceedings. 15.  In the judicial proceedings against the first applicant, in a final decision of 21 January 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination an appeal on points of law lodged by her. 16.  In April 2007 company E. brought proceedings against the second applicant under section 646(2) of the Commerce Act, as in force at the time (see paragraph 25 below), seeking to have the payments K. had made to it during the \u201csuspect period\u201d between 30 October 2005 and 17 November 2006 (payments described in paragraph 8 above) declared null and void and the sum received by the applicant returned to the insolvency estate. 17.  The action was allowed in a judgment of 23 January 2008 of the Regional Court. While it acknowledged that the transactions between the second applicant and K. had not damaged the latter\u2019s interests, because K. had received equivalent goods in exchange for its payments to the applicant, the Regional Court added that the Commerce Act \u201cdid not take account\u201d of such considerations. It thus ordered the second applicant to pay back to the insolvency estate the sum of BGN 33,344.05, plus default interest. 18.  Upon appeal by the second applicant, on 10 June 2008 that judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which stated once again that section 646(2) of the Commerce Act did not require any proof that the contested payment had damaged the interests of K.\u2019s remaining creditors; such damage, as well as the knowledge about it, were to be considered \u201cpresumed\u201d. 19.  Since the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment was enforceable, a bailiff opened enforcement proceedings against the second applicant for the sums owed by it to the insolvency estate. The second applicant settled that debt, which included interest and costs and expenses related to the enforcement proceedings, in October 2008. 20.  In the main judicial proceedings against the second applicant, in a final decision of 29 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination an appeal on points of law lodged by it. 21.  In the insolvency proceedings against K., the majority of its assets were distributed among its creditors between November 2007 and October 2008. In two decisions delivered in November and December 2008 the trustee in bankruptcy added the State to the list of creditors, with claims exceeding BGN 5,000,000. As the State was a privileged creditor, almost all payments from the insolvency estate after that were made to it, but a substantial proportion of the debts owed to it by K. nonetheless remained unpaid. 22.  The applicants did not make use of the possibility afforded to them by section 648 of the Commerce Act (see paragraph 29 below) to join the insolvency proceedings as creditors of K. Two other companies in a similar situation \u2013 they had also been obliged to return sums to the insolvency estate on the basis of section 646(2) of the Commerce Act \u2013 did join the insolvency proceedings, but received no part of the sums owed to them. 23.  The insolvency proceedings continued until 2014, when company K. was wound up.", "references": ["3", "0", "5", "8", "7", "6", "1", "4", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1970 and live in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  On 29 January 2008 the applicants were involved in a street protest as a result of which they were arrested and detained for six hours and forty\u2011five minutes. On 18 December 2008 the first applicant was again involved in a street protest, as a result of which he was arrested and detained for approximately four hours and a half. Later both applicants were acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. The facts concerning those protests were described in detail in M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, \u00a7\u00a7 6-58, 2 November 2010. 7.  On 29 January 2009 the first applicant organised again a street protest and was arrested again and detained for some six hours. Later the applicant was acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. 8.  On 2 November 2010 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi (cited above), in which it declared inadmissible the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the alleged breaches of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention on the ground of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi (cited above, \u00a7 75). 9.  After that, the applicants brought a civil action under Law 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking compensation in respect of the breach of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention in regard to all three street protests of 2008 and 2009. 10.  By a final judgment of 6 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged the breach of the applicnts\u2019 rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention and awarded them the equivalent of 900 and 270 euros (EUR), respectively.", "references": ["3", "8", "9", "0", "5", "1", "6", "4", "No Label", "7", "2"], "gold": ["7", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1983, 1973, 1983, 1986, 1984 and 1984. Mr Ya\u015far \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan lives in Ankara. The other applicants live in Samsun. According to the applicants\u2019 submissions, which were not contested by the Government, at the time of the lodging of the application, they were serving the prison sentences arising out of their criminal convictions which gave rise to the present application. 7.  On 17 and 18 June 2005 seventeen members of the Maoist Communist Party (hereinafter \u201cthe MKP\u201d), an illegal organisation, were killed in a rural area within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Ovac\u0131k, near the city of Tunceli, by members of the security forces. 8.  On 21 June 2005 a gathering was held in protest at the alleged unlawful killings of 17 and 18 June 2005 in Samsun. University students from the Samsun Ondokuz May\u0131s \u00dcniversitesi, including the applicants, gathered in front of the building of the Black Sea Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Association (Karadeniz Temel Haklar ve \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fckler Derne\u011fi) where a press statement was read out. 9.  On 8 July 2005 one of the applicants, Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan, attended another reading out of a press statement in Samsun. The press statement concerned the killings of 17 and 18 June 2005, the arrest of a number of persons subsequent to the reading out of the press statement on 21 June 2005 and the alleged unlawful killing of a detainee by the police. 10.  On 21 February 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against twenty-three people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the MKP, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering of 21 June 2005, slogans such as \u201cLong live revolutionary solidarity\u201d (\u201cYa\u015fas\u0131n devrimci dayan\u0131\u015fma\u201d), \u201cWe have paid a price. We will make them pay a price.\u201d (\u201cBedel \u00f6dedik, bedel \u00f6detece\u011fiz.\u201d), \u201cMurderer State\u201d (\u201cKatil devlet\u201d), \u201cRevolutionary martyrs are immortal\u201d (\u201cDevrim \u015fehitleri \u00f6l\u00fcms\u00fczd\u00fcr.\u201d), \u201cMartyrs are immortal\u201d (\u201c\u015eehit nam\u0131r\u0131n\u201d), were chanted and the applicants participated in the gathering. The public prosecutor further noted that Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan had participated in the gathering of 8 June 2005, during which the following slogans had been chanted: \u201cNo emancipation alone, either all of us or none of us.\u201d (\u201cKurtulu\u015f yok tek ba\u015f\u0131na, ya hep beraber ya hi\u00e7birimiz.)\u201d, \u201cArrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us.\u201d (\u201cTutuklamalar, provakasyonlar, bask\u0131lar bizi y\u0131ld\u0131ramaz.\u201d), \u201cWe will resist and succeed\u201d (\u201cDirene direne kazanaca\u011f\u0131z.\u201d), \u201cWe have paid a price; we will make them pay a price.\u201d \u201cBedel \u00f6dedik, bedel \u00f6detece\u011fiz\u201d). 11.  On 31 March 2009 the Ankara Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, except for Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan, who was sentenced to twenty months\u2019 imprisonment. As regards the gathering of 21 June 2005, the assize court found it established that the slogan \u201cMartyrs are immortal\u201d had been chanted by Mr K\u00fcr\u015fad Arslan, Ms Dilek K\u00f6mpe, Mr Olcay Bayraktar and Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan and that the slogans \u201cThe murderer state will pay the price\u201d, \u201cRevolutionary martyrs are immortal\u201d and \u201cLong live revolutionary solidarity\u201d had been chanted by Mr Ya\u015far \u00c7al\u0131\u015fkan, Mr K\u00fcr\u015fad Arslan and Ms Dilek K\u00f6mpe. The court also found it established that all the applicants except for Mr Olcay Bayraktar had chanted the slogan \u201cWe have paid a price; we will make them pay a price\u201d and that Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan had carried a banner bearing the slogan \u201cOvac\u0131k Martyrs are immortal\u201d. As regards the gathering of 8 July 2005, the court noted that Mr Ahmet Do\u011fan had chanted the slogans \u201cArrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us.\u201d, \u201cWe will resist and succeed\u201d and \u201cWe have paid a price; we will make them pay a price.\u201d during that public gathering. 12. In its judgment, the Ankara Assize Court referred to Article 10 of the Convention as well as to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of S\u00fcrek v. Turkey (no. 1) ([GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999\u2011IV) and the report of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Karata\u015f v. Turkey (no. 23168/94, Commission\u2019s report of 11 December 1997). The court held that by chanting the above-mentioned slogans the applicants had not exercised their democratic rights but had glorified terror by adopting the style of discourse of terror organisations and that they had not distanced themselves from violence. In the court\u2019s view, by chanting those slogans the applicants had not intended to find a solution to a problem but had praised and glorified the source of the problem, that is to say, the terrorist organisations concerned. Hence, the applicants had incited terror. The Ankara Assize Court concluded that chanting the slogans in question could not be considered as falling within the scope of the right to freedom of expression. 13.  On 8 July 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 31 March 2009 in so far as it concerned the applicants\u2019 conviction. 14.  On unspecified dates the applicants served their prison sentences.", "references": ["5", "4", "2", "8", "7", "9", "3", "0", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and was detained at the K\u0131r\u0131kkale F\u2011type prison when the application was lodged. 5.  On 1 October 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being member of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On 5 October 2004 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Ankara Assize Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the severity of the envisaged penalty. 7.  On 15 March 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation. 8.  On 31 January 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. The court ordered the continuation of his detention. 9.  On 6 May 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment. The case was accordingly remitted to the Ankara Assize Court for further examination. 10.  On 10 November 2009 the 11th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 11.  On 10 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 10 November 2009. On 21 December 2009 the 12th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 28 August 2012 the Ankara Assize Court once more convicted the applicant and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 13. On 8 July 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "6", "1", "8", "5", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1964, 1957 and 1947 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Ankara. The second applicant left Turkey subsequent to his criminal conviction giving rise to the present application. 6.  On 21 August 2006 the applicants took part in a religious ceremony (mevl\u00fct)[1] on the premises of the Alt\u0131nda\u011f district branch of the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi \u2013 \u201cthe DTP\u201d) in Ankara, at which they paid tribute to three members of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, who had been killed by the security forces. One of the deceased was the first applicant\u2019s nephew. The second applicant was the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP at the relevant time. The third applicant was a member of the DTP and a friend of the first applicant. 7.  On 23 November 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicants and a number of other persons with dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), on account of their participation in the ceremony of 21 August 2006. According to the indictment, during the ceremony photographs of the deceased and the PKK\u2019s flag were displayed at the venue and a film about the lives of the deceased was shown. In addition, the second applicant, the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP, made the following statement:\n\u201cOur fears and worries continue. People are still being killed. In such a context, we would like this mevl\u00fct to be a moment of peace and fraternity.\u201d 8.  On 24 September 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and sentenced them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment each. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, firstly, that the persons in whose memory the ceremony had been held were members of a terrorist organisation and that they had been killed by the security forces during an operation against that organisation. It also took the view that the choice of venue for the ceremony \u2013 the premises of a political party \u2013 and the fact that the PKK flag had been spread over the tables and photographs of members of the organisation had been displayed, contributed to raising serious doubts as to the applicants\u2019 submissions that they had taken part in the ceremony in observance of their religious duties. The court considered that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda given that they had shared the feelings of mourning and sorrow for the deceased who had been involved in terrorism. It further considered that the venue where the ceremony had been held had turned into a propaganda venue in favour of the PKK. 9.  Following an appeal lodged by the applicants, their conviction was upheld by a final decision of the Court of Cassation on 8 March 2010. 10.  The first and third applicants served their prison sentences.", "references": ["1", "0", "9", "8", "7", "6", "2", "3", "4", "No Label", "5"], "gold": ["5"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and is detained in Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility. 7.  On 11 May 2009 the State criminal police bureau started a pre\u2011trial investigation into allegations that an armed criminal organisation was active in Vilnius Region. It was suspected that the said organisation was armed with firearms and possessed and distributed large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances (for the general factual background, see Lisovskij v. Lithuania, no. 36249/14, \u00a7 6, 2 May 2017). 8.  In the context of that investigation, on 15 December 2009 some of the members of the organisation were arrested and in the course of imposing coercive measures on them it was established that the applicant also possibly belonged to the organisation. 9.  On 23 February 2010 the applicant was arrested and officially notified that he was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation armed with firearms. 10.  On 24 February 2010 the Vilnius District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for two months. The court considered that the available evidence was sufficient to hold that the applicant may have committed the crimes of which he was suspected. It held that the applicant might commit new crimes because he: was suspected of having committed a very serious crime that could lead to a long period of imprisonment; had no strong social ties; was unemployed and not enrolled in an educational institution; was not married; had been convicted two times before for crimes concerning the illegal possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances (which constituted a negative character trait); and acknowledged that he had been using narcotic and psychotropic substances. Moreover, there was a risk that the applicant might try to abscond, given that he had relations abroad. The court also found that the applicant might interfere with the criminal investigation because he was living with another suspect in the case, was buying narcotic and psychotropic substances from other persons, his role in the criminal organisation was quite active and there was a risk that he might try to influence other witnesses or suspects or that those persons might try to influence him. The court also stated that the case was extremely complex and a number of procedural actions had to be performed. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 11.  On 22 April 2010 the Vilnius Region District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 10 above). In addition, the court noted that the case against the applicant was complex and of a large scale, and that a number of investigative actions had to be carried out, including the determination of the applicant\u2019s role in the criminal organisation and his relationship with other suspects. The court also observed that although during the applicant\u2019s detention no investigative actions had been carried out with regard to the applicant, the records of the pre-trial investigation showed that various investigative actions had been performed in order to establish grounds for the suspicion in respect of the applicant (vehicles had been inspected, a chemical analysis of the substances found during the search of the applicant\u2019s flat had been performed, expert conclusions had been received, and other suspects \u2013 who had given testimony about the applicant \u2013 had been questioned). It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12.  On 20 July 2010 the Vilnius Region District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further month. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). In addition, the court noted that intensive investigative actions had been undertaken, without limiting the pre-trial investigation to the actions solely against the applicant. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 13.  On 20 August 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. It relied on essentially the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 10 above). However, the court held that there was no indication that the applicant might try to interfere with the criminal investigation, so it decided to strike it out from the list of grounds on which the applicant had been detained. Nevertheless, the grounds for detention listed in domestic law were alternatives \u2013 that is to say the existence of only one was enough for detention on remand to be imposed. The court also noted that in the course of the past three months, numerous procedural actions had been carried out: a number of suspects had been questioned, eyewitnesses had been identified, additional questioning of suspects had taken place, verification of testimony given at the crime scene had taken place, items significant for the pre-trial investigation had been examined, additional tasks (including the investigation of certain objects) had been scheduled, descriptions of the suspects had been collected. The court was convinced that sufficient grounds to prolong the applicant\u2019s detention on remand existed. 14.  The applicant appealed against that decision and applied for the imposition of a different restrictive measure. He argued that before his arrest he had had a permanent place of residence with his father and a permanent income because he had been working as a long-distance driver, and that he had strong social ties and had not known any of the other suspects. He also claimed that the investigation was inactive and that there were no grounds to further detain him. However, on 16 September 2010 the applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The court stated that when ordering detention on remand, a court was not establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt, and that the standard of evidence required for detaining him was thus lower. The court considered that there was enough information to believe that the applicant had committed the crimes he had been accused of. The court also agreed that the applicant might abscond or commit new crimes. Moreover, the court stated that it could not impose a more lenient restrictive measure because it could only uphold or quash the first-instance decision. The court also observed that, under domestic law, detention on remand could last longer than six months only when the case was especially complex or of a large scale. It found that in the applicant\u2019s case those conditions had been met: the investigation concerned a criminal offence committed by a criminal organisation, there were more than fifty suspects, and it was necessary to carry out numerous investigative actions. 15.  On 23 November 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decisions and noted that the procedural action that had been taken had been the same as that listed in its previous decision (see paragraph 13 above). 16.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for a different restrictive measure to be imposed. He claimed that he was not guilty and that in the nine months of his detention the officers had not presented any proof of his guilt. He also denied the risk of his absconding because it was in his interests that the court examine his case on the merits and acquit him. The applicant denied that he would commit new crimes just because he was unemployed. It was the applicant\u2019s view that if that were so then every unemployed person could be detained. He also claimed that his previous conviction should not have been taken into account when prolonging his detention on remand because he had been paying a fine imposed on him in that case and no one could be punished for the same offence twice. He also had a father and a brother, which showed his strong social ties. Finally, he had only been questioned twice in the nine months he had been detained. 17.  On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It reiterated the previous findings (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above) but also noted that the applicant\u2019s criminal activities had lasted for a long time and that he had been making money from them. The court also noted that the applicant had been additionally questioned on 15 and 17 November 2010, that another suspect had been questioned twice as well, and that DNA and dactyloscopy examinations had been scheduled. 18.  On 23 February 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decisions (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above). In addition, the court held that there were over forty suspects in the case; numerous investigative actions had been performed: suspects had been arrested and questioned; witnesses had been questioned; eyewitnesses had been identified; items relevant for the investigation had been examined; characteristics of the suspects had been collected; and material gathered in the pre-trial investigation had been divided into two parts (and the material gathered in the first part had already been transferred to a court for examination on the merits). 19.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that a different restrictive measure be imposed. On 31 March 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 23 February 2011. It relied on essentially the same grounds as those given before (see paragraph 17 above). The court also stated that the applicant\u2019s argument that he had only been questioned twice during the pre-trial investigation could not be assessed in the light of a delay in the proceedings caused by the extreme complexity of the case and the intensity of the pre-trial investigation. Moreover, the offences committed by the applicant had not been incidental; rather, they had been committed over a long period of time. The applicant\u2019s argument that he had a father and a brother with whom he had strong social ties could not be deemed to outweigh the public interest in his remaining in detention. 20.  On 19 May 2011 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and of possession of a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them. 21.  On 20 May 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 18 above). In addition, the court held that there were fifty-eight suspects, of whom twenty were granted the status of a suspect, and that numerous procedural actions had been performed. 22.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that it be quashed. On 16 June 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 20 May 2011. 23.  On 1 August 2011 the prosecutor referred the bill of indictment and the case to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 24.  On 18 August 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 21 above). It added that the applicant had been working as a long-distance driver for eight years and had been travelling to Russia constantly; there was thus a danger that he could abscond. Moreover, the court held that the applicant might try to interfere with the proceedings and that thirty-three persons stood accused. 25.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that it be quashed. On 14 September 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 18 August 2011. The court, however, decided that the first-instance court had wrongly concluded that the applicant might interfere with the proceedings and removed this ground from the list of grounds for extending the applicant\u2019s detention. The court furthermore held that there were no grounds to believe that the case was being delayed and it also observed that the criminal case had already been referred to the court for examination on the merits. 26.  On 21 November 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 24 above). It added that there were thirty-three co-accused in the criminal case against the applicant and that the case was complex. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 27.  On 23 February 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 26 above). In addition, it stated that the case file comprised ninety-six volumes of material; the standpoints of the co-accused were not clear because all of the co-accused had stated that they would give their testimony at the end of the proceedings; and the hearings were planned in advance and their schedule was extremely intense. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 28.  On 17 May 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 27 above). 29.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. He claimed that he had been detained for twenty-seven months and had not been questioned once. The applicant furthermore submitted that the searches of his home had not revealed any trace of narcotic or psychotropic substances, the identity of persons to whom he had allegedly sold the substances had not been established, other co-accused had not recognised him as a person whom they knew and the whole accusation against him had been based on the testimony of a drug addict. The applicant also stated that he had a father and could live with him. 30.  On 14 June 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 17 May 2012. The court held that it could not conclude that the proceedings had been protracted because the case had been transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits and because of that, in the course of criminal proceedings the duration of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand had not been limited. 31.  On 22 August 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 28 above). 32.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 11 September 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court stated that the case was being examined before the first-instance court on the merits and that the evidence had been examined; the applicant\u2019s allegations that no investigative actions had been performed in respect of him were thus unfounded. 33.  On 22 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 31 above). In addition, the court noted that the case file comprised 104 volumes, there were thirty-three co-accused and the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the schedule. 34.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 21 December 2012 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings that the applicant might abscond, that the criminal case was complex (it had 106 volumes and thirty\u2011three co-accused), and that it was not possible to achieve the purpose of Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 35.  On 15 February 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 33 above). In addition, the court noted that the criminal case had 107 volumes and thirty\u2011two co-accused, and that the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the very intense schedule. 36.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 5 March 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings. 37.  On 14 May 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 35 above). In addition, the court noted that the case filed contained 114 volumes and thirty-two co-accused and that the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the schedule. 38.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 28 May 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings. 39.  On 21 August 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 37 above). In addition, the court stated that the case file comprised 116 volumes, and that the case involved thirty-two co-accused and was extremely complex. 40.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for a less restrictive measure to be imposed. On 5 September 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings. 41.  On 15 November 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 39 above). In addition, the court stated that the case file comprised 118 volumes and that the case was extremely complex. Moreover, the criminal case was at the end of its examination before the first-instance court and the closing arguments had begun. 42.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for the imposition of a less restrictive measure. On 6 December 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings. 43.  On 17 February 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court decided not to extend the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and instead imposed house arrest. The court held that his previous convictions had been for non-violent crimes and that although he was not married, he had a family and relatives who had taken care of him even during his detention (by means of calls and visits), which showed that he had strong social ties. Although the applicant had been born in Russia and worked as a long-distance driver, his father lived in Vilnius, so the risk of his absconding was low. The court also stated that over the four years of the pre-trial investigation the relevant data had been collected and the final speeches were already taking place in the criminal case. The court thus decided to impose house arrest for six months and obliged the applicant to stay at his place of residence between 11 p.m. and 9 a.m. and not to communicate with certain people. 44.  Between the applicant\u2019s arrest on 23 February 2010 until the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 1 August 2011 (see paragraphs 9 and 23 above) the authorities conducted six interviews with the applicant, seized and examined his car and other belongings, and ordered a forensic examination of various items seized from the applicant. Moreover, the authorities received fifty expert reports; there were fifty examinations of the objects found in the course of the pre-trial investigation; twenty searches were performed, thirty restrictive measures were imposed, the suspects were questioned 194 times, eight persons were arrested, forty-four witnesses were questioned, the authorities conducted 196 eyewitness identifications, various witnesses and suspects visited the crime scene twenty-four times to give testimony, a search warrant was issued in respect of one suspect and a request for extradition was sent to Israel regarding another suspect. 45.  Between the transfer of the case to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits on 1 August 2011 and the decision on 17 February 2014 to impose house arrest on the applicant, a total of sixty\u2011five hearings were coordinated in advance and scheduled, and nineteen of those hearings were either cancelled or adjourned:\n(a)  From 1 August 2011 until 26 June 2012 twenty-two hearings were scheduled (one each month from October 2011 until January 2012, three in February 2012, three in March 2012, four in April 2012, three in May 2012 and five in June 2012); four of them were adjourned (one in February 2012, two in April 2012 and one in June 2012) and one was cancelled (in May 2012);\n(b)  From 12 September 2012 until 7 June 2013 thirty-three hearings were scheduled (three each month from September 2012 to March 2013, six in April 2013, three in May 2013 and three in June 2013); seven of them were adjourned (one in December 2012, one in February 2013, three in March 2013 and two in April 2013), and three of them were cancelled (one in February 2013 and two in April 2013);\n(c)  From 13 September 2013 until 17 February 2014 ten hearings were scheduled (two each month from September 2013 until November 2013, one in January 2014, and two in February 2014); three of them were adjourned (one in September 2013, one in October 2013, and one in February 2014) and one of them was cancelled (in October 2013). 46.  The main reasons for the adjournment or cancellation of hearings were illnesses of members of the court, lawyers or co-accused or the failure of some of the co-accused to appear; on one occasion one of the co-accused did not have a lawyer, on one occasion one of the members of the court had to attend a funeral, and on several occasions lawyers for the co-accused were unable to attend (for various reasons). During the forty-six hearings which were held, the court heard testimony from the co-accused, witnesses and victims, played audio and video recordings, and read out case material. 47.  On 22 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court convicted the applicant of participation in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and of possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them (Articles 249 \u00a7 2 and 260 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, respectively). The applicant was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and he was ordered to pay a fine of 4,443 euros (EUR). It was decided to continue his house arrest until the start of the execution of the judgment. 48.  The applicant appealed against his conviction, and so did the prosecutors. The prosecutors asked the court to re-categorise the applicant\u2019s offence and to hold that he had participated in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and that he had possessed a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them, and to increase the length of the imposed prison sentence to thirteen years. The applicant complained that the first-instance judgment had been unlawful and unfounded and that it had been based on controversial, inaccurate, illogical testimony given by one person. He also complained that the first-instance court had not identified the indications that he had belonged to a criminal organisation, the relationships between the members of that criminal organisation, and the specific actions they had performed. Lastly, the mere fact that some narcotic and psychotropic substances had been found in his room during the search did not mean that he had had the intention of distributing them. 49.  On 24 April 2017 the Court of Appeal held that although during the search of the applicant\u2019s room the amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances found had not been large, he had known that a certain D.J. had stored large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances in the same flat. Moreover, testimony of witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been distributing the narcotic and psychotropic substances. The court thus decided to re-categorise the applicant\u2019s offence under Article 260 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to twelve years of imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of EUR 4,443. 50.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He claimed that there was no evidence that he had committed the offences at issue, that the lower courts had failed to examine all the relevant circumstances of the case, that their judgments had been based on incorrect assumptions, and that he had not known about any arms used by the criminal organisation or about narcotic and psychotropic substances being kept in the flat that he had been living in. He also complained about the length of the criminal proceedings, given that the offences he had been convicted of had been committed before 2010, and yet the criminal proceedings were still on-going. 51.  On 9 January 2018 the Supreme Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and allowed it in part. The court held that the lower courts had drawn the right conclusions about the applicant\u2019s criminal activities. However, the Supreme Court assessed the sentence imposed in the light of the applicant\u2019s complaint about the length of criminal proceedings against him. The court held that the proceedings in respect of the applicant had lasted from 23 February 2010, when he had been arrested, until the adoption of the present judgment \u2013 that is to say seven years, eleven months and fourteen days, which was an extremely long period of time and could only be justified by exceptional circumstances. The court noted that the case had been extremely complex because there had been thirty-two co-accused, the case file had comprised 138 volumes, the first\u2011instance judgment had amounted to 480 pages and the judgment of the appellate court had amounted to 197 pages. In such a case the length of proceedings could be justified, but only if the relevant authorities reacted to the complexity of the case appropriately and undertook all relevant measures without undue delays. The court held that in the instant case the process followed by the Court of Appeal had not been effective. The first\u2011instance judgment had been delivered on 22 May 2014, and the case had been received at the Court of Appeal on 10 November 2014. However, at the first hearing on 19 February 2015 the Court of Appeal had decided to adjourn the case until 7 October 2015. During the hearing on 6 November 2015 the Court of Appeal had decided to apply to the relevant German authorities to be allowed to question one witness in Germany, and the next hearing was scheduled for April 2016. The reply from Germany had been received by the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2016; however, during the hearing on 7 April 2016 the next six scheduled hearings had been cancelled owing to the fact that the lawyers of eleven of the co-accused had been involved in other cases. The Court of Appeal had delivered its judgment on 24 April 2017. The length of the criminal proceedings in the present case was extremely important because the applicant had been detained on remand for almost four years. The Supreme Court held that in accordance with the case-law of the Court, the fact that the applicant had been held in detention on remand for such a long period of time, required particular diligence on the part of the authorities dealing with the case to administer justice expeditiously. The Supreme Court made references to the case\u2011law of the Court (Mato\u0144 v. Poland [Committee], no. 30279/07, \u00a7 29, 9 June 2009; Paskal v. Ukraine, no. 24652/04, \u00a7 58, 15 September 2011; Pawlak v. Poland [Committee], no. 28237/10, \u00a7 46, 13 January 2015; and Tomczyk v. Poland, no. 7708/12, \u00a7 41, 13 January 2015). The Supreme Court thus held that the unjustifiable length of criminal proceedings constituted grounds to impose a more lenient sentence on the applicant and ordered the applicant\u2019s imprisonment for eleven years and six months and ordered him to pay a fine of EUR 4,443. 52.  The applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts for 100,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately EUR 28,962) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of his detention in allegedly inadequate conditions in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. He alleged overcrowding. 53.  On 23 September 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that for 1,159 days the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells and awarded him LTL 5,795 (approximately EUR 1,678) in compensation. 54.  The applicant appealed and on 18 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court increased the amount of compensation to LTL 11,700 (approximately EUR 3,389). 55.  The applicant lodged a claim before the domestic courts and asked that he be awarded LTL 50,000 (approximately EUR 14,481) in non\u2011pecuniary damages for detention in inadequate conditions from 24 February 2010 until 17 February 2014 in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. He alleged that the cells had been overcrowded, and cold and humid in winter and hot in summer; he also alleged that the cells had suffered from dampness and mould. 56.  On 9 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had already received compensation for the period from 24 February 2010 until 13 May 2013, and decided to terminate the case in respect of this period. As regards the remaining period of time, the court considered that for 248 days the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells and awarded him approximately EUR 1,437 in compensation. The domestic courts dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding other sanitary conditions as unfounded. 57.  The applicant appealed and on 6 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court of 9 January 2015.", "references": ["7", "3", "5", "0", "9", "6", "8", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1969, 1977 and 1980, respectively, and are currently absconding from the Moldovan authorities. 6.  At the time of the events, the applicants were police officers. According to the materials of the domestic judgments, the applicants found out that a person from the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, P., intended to come to Chi\u0219in\u0103u on 8 December 2010, carrying a large amount of cash money, in order to conclude a transaction concerning immovable property. On 8 December 2010, the applicants attempted to apprehend P. in the staircase of an apartment block building. P. managed to escape, however he was chased and apprehended by the applicants, was thrown to the ground and severely beaten up until he lost consciousness. After that, he was carried by the applicants and put into a car. Several persons witnessed P.\u2019s apprehension and beating. P. was never seen alive after that and several years later his body was found in a well. 7.  The applicants claimed that they believed P. to be a criminal and intended to take him to the police station for questioning. After chasing him, they arrested him and drove him to the police station. However, P. managed to escape from their car at a busy road crossing and ran away after having waded across a small river. They submitted that they did not chase him again because the traffic light turned green and because they did not want to soil their cloths chasing P. across the river. 8.  On 7 February 2011 the applicants were arrested and charged with kidnapping, murder and abuse of their authority as police officers. 9.  The same day the public prosecutor applied to the Centru District Court for a warrant for the applicants\u2019 detention in custody. The reasons relied upon by the public prosecutor were that the applicants could abscond from prosecution, interfere with the criminal investigation and re-offend. The applicants\u2019 representative sought access to the materials submitted by the public prosecutor in support of his requests but to no avail. 10.  The same day the Centru District Court issued a detention order for thirty days. In court the applicants argued that the allegations presented by the public prosecutor were not supported by any facts or materials and that no materials whatsoever were presented by the prosecution. The court found that in view of the gravity of the accusations against the applicants, of the fact that the investigation was at its initial stage and of the applicants\u2019 position in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there was a serious risk of absconding and of interfering with the investigation by influencing witnesses, misleading the investigation and increasing the volume of work. 11.  On 9 February 2011 the applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the orders for detention lacked reasoning and that the court had relied only on suppositions. The applicants further noted that the court had refused to provide their representative with any materials from the file other than the prosecutor\u2019s requests. 12.  On 17 February 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals. The court found that the materials in the file provided sufficient grounds for a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had committed the crimes they were charged with. The risk of interference with the investigation was determined by the fact that the investigation had just started and the risk of absconding resulted from the fact that the applicants were police officers and thus knew how the investigating authorities operated. The Court of Appeal did not answer the applicants\u2019 complaint about the alleged lack of access to the materials in the case-file, relied upon by the first instance court to order their detention. 13.  On 5 March 2011 the Centru District Court extended the applicants\u2019 detention by thirty days for the same reasons as it had done earlier. The court noted that on this occasion the applicants\u2019 representative had been given access to the materials in the file. 14.  The applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the investigation was not advancing as claimed by the public prosecutor and that the risk of interference could just as well be mitigated by the applicants\u2019 house arrest. On 14 March 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Centru District Court of 5 March 2011 for the same reasons as it had done earlier. 15.  On 16 March 2011 the charges of murder were dropped in respect of all applicants because the victim\u2019s body was not yet found. On 29 March 2011 the case was committed for trial. 16.  On 29 March 2011 the prosecutor applied for the extension of the applicants\u2019 detention by ninety days. The prosecutor cited the same reasons as before: risk of absconding, of interfering with the investigation and of re\u2011offending. 17.  On 7 April 2011 the applicants lodged a habeas corpus request, arguing that the risk of interfering with the investigation was no longer valid because the criminal investigation had been concluded and that there had not been any evidence indicating that the applicants might abscond. 18.  The same day, judge V. of the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court extended the applicants\u2019 detention by ninety days considering that the three risks invoked by the public prosecutor resulted from the character of the charges against the applicants. 19.  The applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the court had failed to refer to any evidence in support of the alleged risks justifying their detention. 20.  On 20 April 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court of 7 April 2011. The court relied on the fact that the applicants were police officers and considered that they could influence the witnesses or destroy evidence. The court also cited the risk of absconding. 21.  On 10 May 2011 the applicants lodged a habeas corpus request, arguing that there were no grounds to assume that the applicants would abscond, re-offend or interfere with the trial. 22.  On 25 May 2011 judge V. had withdrawn from the case because he had previously worked together with the third applicant. It is not clear from the materials of the case-file in which manner that fact affected judge V.\u2019s impartiality and when did he realise that. 23.  On 6 June 2011 the applicants lodged another habeas corpus request, noting that their previous request had still not been examined. They argued that, on 25 May 2011, judge V. had withdrawn from the case, whereas his ineligibility had existed on 7 April 2011, when he had ordered the extension of their detention and thus affected the lawfulness of that order. 24.  On 5 July 2011 judge M. from the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court extended the applicants\u2019 detention by ninety days for the same reasons as had been done earlier. The court rejected the applicants\u2019 habeas corpus request of 6 June 2011 by noting that none of the previous grounds for detention had lost their validity because the trial had not yet started. The court did not make any reference to the habeas corpus request of 10 May 2011. 25.  On 6 July 2011 the applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the court had not examined their habeas corpus requests \u201cspeedily\u201d as required under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention and had not replied to their contention that the detention order of 7 April 2011 had been unlawful because it had been ordered by judge V. who lacked impartiality. 26.  On 15 July 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court of 5 July 2011 for the same reasons as it had done before. 27.  On 30 September 2011 the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court acquitted the applicants of all charges and released them in the court room. 28.  On 11 March 2013 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal quashed that judgment, convicted the applicants of kidnapping and abuse of office and sentenced them to seven years of imprisonment. On 12 November 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld that judgment in absentia. 29.  It appears that on an unspecified date after the victim\u2019s body was found, a new set of criminal proceedings based on murder charges was initiated against the applicants. The parties did not inform the Court about the outcome of those proceedings.", "references": ["3", "8", "1", "9", "4", "7", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  On 6 March 2006 the applicants were taken into police custody on suspicion of aiding and abetting the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party), an illegal armed organisation. 6.  On 7 March 2006 the applicants were brought before a judge at the Ankara Assize Court. They were mainly questioned about their participation in a number of demonstrations and about various CDs, documents, books and periodicals that had allegedly been found by the police in their homes. The applicants denied the veracity of the allegations that they had acted in support of an illegal organisation. In particular, although they all accepted that they had participated in legally organised demonstrations, they denied having chanted illegal slogans or slogans in favour of an illegal organisation. They also claimed that the material found in their homes had not been illegal. In particular, Necla \u00c7omak claimed that the documents found in her home were related to a legal association, namely the Working Women\u2019s Association (Emek\u00e7i Kad\u0131nlar Derne\u011fi). 7.  On the same day the Ankara Assize Court ordered the detention of Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r, Deniz Bak\u0131r, Alihan Alhan, Necla \u00c7omak, Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Latife Canan Kaplan and U\u011fur G\u00fcd\u00fck. The other applicants were released. 8.  On 22 March 2006 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Assize Court against the applicants. In the indictment, the public prosecutor noted that the applicants had participated in two demonstrations organised by trade unions and non-governmental organisations held on 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 with the authorisation of the governor\u2019s office. He further noted, on the basis of video footage provided by the police, that the applicants had carried banners on behalf of the ESP (the Socialist Platform of the Oppressed) and the SGD (Socialist Youth Association), which, according to information on the Internet, were connected to the MLKP. The applicants were charged with membership of an illegal organisation under Article 220 \u00a7 7 and Article 314 of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 18 May 2006 the Ankara Assize Court held the first hearing in the case. The applicants conceded before the court that they had participated in the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 but stressed that those demonstrations had been legal. As to the documents, periodicals, books and CDs found in their homes, the applicants maintained that none of the material they had had was illegal, and that they did not accept the content of the search-and-seizure reports prepared after the searches conducted in their homes, as those reports had not been drafted in their presence. 10.   During the hearing held on 22 June 2006, Latife Canan Kaplan, U\u011fur G\u00fcd\u00fck and Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r were released pending trial. 11.  Between 18 May 2006 and 17 January 2007 the Ankara Assize Court held nine hearings. 12.  On 17 January 2007 the Assize Court convicted Deniz Bak\u0131r, Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Necla \u00c7omak and Alihan Alhan of membership of a terrorist organisation under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code. Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Necla \u00c7omak and Alihan Alhan were sentenced to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. Deniz Bak\u0131r was sentenced to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The rest of the applicants were convicted of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and sentenced to one year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment each. 13.  On 27 September 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that the applicants had not had an opportunity to submit their defence submissions in relation to the classification by the Assize Court of their acts under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 14.  Between 6 February and 22 October 2008 the Ankara Assize Court held seven more hearings. On 22 October 2008 the court issued a judgment containing the same conclusions and sentences as in its judgment of 17 January 2007. It also ordered the release of Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Necla \u00c7omak and Alihan Alhan, taking into account the period of time that they had spent in detention and the length of the sentences imposed on them.\n15  In its judgment, the Assize Court noted that although the ESP and the SGD were legal entities, their activities were in line with those of the MLKP. The court observed that members of the ESP and SGD regarded members of the MLKP who had been killed by the security forces or during hunger strikes as \u201cmartyrs\u201d and that they had organised commemorative ceremonies for them. The court further observed that the declarations issued by the MLKP on the Internet were consistent with the aims of the ESP and the SGD. The court hence considered that the ESP and the SGD appeared in the legal domain on behalf of the MLKP and had an organic relationship with it. The court found it established, on the basis of the conduct of members of the ESP and the SGD and having regard to the documents found in the accused\u2019s homes, that ESP and SGD members were carrying out activities in line with the strategies of the MLKP and had been holding legally authorised demonstrations in favour of that organisation on the pretext of exercising their democratic rights. 16.  In convicting the applicants, the Ankara Assize Court noted that all the applicants except Sel\u00e7uk Mart had participated in the demonstration of 17 December 2005. As regards Sel\u00e7uk Mart, the court observed that he had attended the demonstration of 19 February 2006. The court found it established that the applicants had chanted the following slogans during the demonstration held on 17 December 2005: \u201cM-L-K-P\u201d, \u201cYa\u015fas\u0131n partimiz MLKP\u201d (\u201cLong live our Party, MLKP\u201d), \u201cDevrimin zaferi, biji MLKP\u201d (\u201cVictory to the revolution, long live the MLKP\u201d), \u201c\u0130\u015f\u00e7iler partiye, MLKP\u2019ye\u201d (\u201cWorkers join the party, join the MLKP\u201d). The court further found it established that Necla \u00c7omak and U\u011fur G\u00fcd\u00fck had chanted the slogan \u201cYa\u015fas\u0131n 1. K\u00fcrdistan konferans\u0131\u201d (\u201cLong live the first Conference of Kurdistan\u201d). Lastly, the court noted that Sel\u00e7uk Mart had chanted the slogan \u201cD\u0131sa d\u0131sa serhildan MLKP K\u00fcrdistan\u201d (\u201cRise up again and again, MLKP Kurdistan\u201d) during the demonstration of 19 February 2006. 17.  The Assize Court further noted that Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i and Mehmet Ali Tosun had been wearing clothes and carrying pennants with \u201cESP\u201d on them during the demonstration of 17 December 2005, and that U\u011fur G\u00fcd\u00fck and Sel\u00e7uk Mart had been wearing clothes and hats with \u201cSGD\u201d on them. The first\u2011instance court also noted that Serdar K\u0131r and Necla \u00c7omak had had red ribbons attached to their arms and that the latter had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court further found it established that Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r had given a clenched-fist salute during the demonstration. 18.  The Assize Court also noted that Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bak\u0131r had been taken into police custody in the past on account of their participation in various public meetings. There were also several police records in respect of Necla \u00c7omak. Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bak\u0131r had also previously been remanded in custody. The court further noted that books which had previously been the subject of seizure orders had been found in the homes of Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Necla \u00c7omak, Filiz Ulu\u00e7elebi and Mehmet Ali Tosun. Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i had also had written material regarding the ESP and SGD. Necla \u00c7omak had been in possession of notes on the illegal organisation and leaflets which belonged to the ESP. 19.  The Assize Court concluded that Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Necla \u00c7omak, Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bak\u0131r should be convicted as members of the MLKP because they had aided that illegal organisation. The court found it established that those applicants had directed the crowds, incited people to chant slogans in favour of the MLKP, carried banners, prepared organisational documents and been previously involved in activities in favour of the MLKP. The court considered that those applicants\u2019 acts represented continuity and diversity, and that they had an organic relationship with the MLKP. The court held that the applicants had aided the MLKP by acting and directing other people to act \u201cin a manner planned by\u201d that organisation. It convicted them under Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 20.  As regards Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r, U\u011fur G\u00fcd\u00fck, Latife Canan Kaplan, Serdar K\u0131r, Sel\u00e7uk Mart, Mehmet Ali Tosun, Filiz Ulu\u00e7elebi and Mesut A\u00e7\u0131kal\u0131n, the Assize Court noted that they had chanted slogans and carried banners and flags in favour of the MLKP during the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 or 19 February 2006 and had been in possession of banned books and documents in favour of that organisation. The court found that those applicants\u2019 acts had constituted propaganda in favour of the MLKP and thereby propaganda inciting people to commit violence or other methods of terrorism. They were therefore convicted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 22.  On various dates between 10 March 2009 and 12 July 2012 all the applicants except Necla \u00c7omak served the prison sentences imposed on them. 24.  On 2 November 2012 the Ankara Assize Court revised its judgment of 22 October 2008 pursuant to Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012, in respect of Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Alihan Alhan, Deniz Bak\u0131r, Necla \u00c7omak, Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r, Serdar K\u0131r, Sel\u00e7uk Mart and Filiz Ulu\u00e7elebi. The court decided to reduce the sentences imposed on Metin K\u00fcrek\u00e7i, Alihan Alhan, Deniz Bak\u0131r and Necla \u00c7omak pursuant to Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code, to two years and one month\u2019s imprisonment. As regards Levent \u00c7ak\u0131r, Serdar K\u0131r, Sel\u00e7uk Mart and Filiz Ulu\u00e7elebi, the Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the sentences imposed on them under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, in accordance with provisional section 1 of Law no. 6352. The suspension was for a period of three years, on condition that they did not commit an offence when expressing ideas and opinions through the medium of the press or other media, or by any other means.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "8", "9", "5", "4", "1", "3", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently in the Netherlands. 6.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant left his home in Salouin[1] (Morocco), where he had been living with his parents, for the Netherlands. He went to the Netherlands to visit family but overstayed his tourist visa, which was valid until 24 August 2012. During his stay in the Netherlands he lived with his brother and the latter\u2019s family in Amsterdam. 7.  According to an official report (ambtsbericht) drawn up by the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst \u2013 \u201cthe AIVD\u201d) dated 14 September 2014, information provided by a generally reliable source indicated that a certain Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands, had sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (\u201cISIS\u201d), and that he was trying to obtain a firearm with which to attack the Netherlands police. The information also contained two telephone numbers used by that person. The official report further stated that it appeared from the AIVD\u2019s own investigation that the person was the applicant, that he was not registered in the Netherlands and that he did not have a valid residence permit. 8.  On 15 October 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed acts in preparation of terrorist offences and placed in police custody. The house where he had been staying was searched by the police, who found and seized notes containing, inter alia, instructions on how to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and a written pledge to ISIS. Furthermore, the police seized a computer and found on the applicant\u2019s Facebook account conversations in which he had made enquiries into how to make IEDs, projecting himself as a supporter of ISIS and expressing his wish to join the jihad in Syria. 9.  On 5 November 2014 the Netherlands investigating authorities sent a request for mutual legal assistance (rechtshulpverzoek) to the competent Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation against the applicant, requesting, inter alia, the examination of a number of bank accounts and bank cards. The request contained the number of the applicant\u2019s national identity card and specified that the criminal investigation concerned suspicion of (preparation of) murder with a terrorist motive, participation in a criminal organisation with a terrorist aim, preparation of a terrorist offence, and financing of terrorism. On 20 April 2015 a supplementary request was sent to the Moroccan authorities. 10.  The applicant\u2019s remand in custody was extended. Criminal proceedings against him commenced on charges of several preparatory acts of terrorism, including the criminal offence defined in Article 134a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), namely the acquisition of information and know-how in preparation of the commission of a terrorist offence. 11.  In April 2015 several articles, written in Dutch, Arabic and English, about the dismantling of a terrorist cell and arrest of its members in Selwane were published on Internet news sites. Those articles also mentioned the arrest in the Netherlands of a Moroccan living there, who was planning attacks in the Netherlands and who had links with that terrorist cell. Some of the articles also stated that information provided by the Moroccan intelligence agency (the General Directorate of Surveillance of the National Territory \u2013 \u201cthe DGST\u201d) to the AIVD had led to the person\u2019s arrest in the Netherlands. 12.  On 8 September 2015 the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) acquitted the applicant of all charges. It found that his intent to commit terrorist offences had not been proven in the light of evidence presented by him showing that his chat messages had been meant to impress and show off. His acquittal was reported by various media outlets in the Netherlands. One of those reports stated that, according to his lawyer, the applicant intended to apply for asylum in the Netherlands, as he feared that, in the event of his removal to Morocco, he would be detained in Morocco as a terror suspect. The public prosecutor (officier van justitie) appealed against the acquittal. 13.  On 20 June 2016 the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague quashed the impugned judgment, convicted the applicant of having committed the offence under Article 134a of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant\u2019s intent to acquire information and know-how in order to use it in the commission of a terrorist offence was found proven on the basis of numerous chat messages and written notes. Referring to the systematic and radical nature of those messages and given the relatively long period during which the applicant had been engaged in the internet conversations, the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that he had merely been trying to impress and show off. 14.  The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). On 21 March 2017 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible, providing summary reasoning in application of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). 15.  On 28 August 2015 the applicant\u2019s remand in custody came to an end and he was placed in immigration detention (vreemdelingenbewaring). On the same day he applied for asylum, claiming that, if removed to Morocco, he would, inter alia, run the risk of being arrested by the Moroccan secret service, detained in inhumane conditions and tortured, as the Moroccan authorities considered him to be a terrorist. 16.  In support of his claim, the applicant referred to various press articles about the criminal proceedings against him in the Netherlands, as well as to several Internet news articles written in Dutch, Moroccan and English about a terrorist cell in Salouin \u2012 the town where he had been living before going to the Netherlands \u2012 which had been dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in April 2015. Some articles also mentioned that a member of that terrorist cell who was residing in the Netherlands had been arrested. According to the applicant, they had been referring to him (see paragraph 11 above). Although the applicant denied that he had any contacts with this cell, he stated that because of these allegations he will be associated with these Moroccan suspects of terrorism. 17.  The applicant further submitted that he had learned from his family in Morocco that two acquaintances from his place of birth, Driouch named \u201cA.M.\u201d and \u201cB.M.\u201d, had been arrested by the Moroccan security service in March or April 2014. According to the applicant, this was a strong indication that he too was a target of the Moroccan security service. 18.  By a letter of 15 October 2015, the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie) requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) to conduct an investigation in Morocco in relation to the applicant\u2019s asylum application. In so far as relevant for the instant case, the letter contained the following questions:\n\u201c1)  Is [the applicant] known by his stated identity ... at his last known address in Morocco ... in Salouin, region of Nador?\n2a)  The report about the dismantling of a terrorist cell appeared in Moroccan and international media on 13 April 2015. When were the members of the Moroccan terrorist cell arrested?\n2b)  Are A.M. and B.M. among those who were arrested? If so, are they from [the applicant\u2019s] birth place, namely Driouch?\n2c)  Is it known whether [the applicant] and the persons mentioned under 2b) know each other?\n3)  Are the persons mentioned under 2a) still detained since their arrest in April 2015? If so, what are the charges? If not, when were they released?\n4)  Is [the applicant] known by name in the media in Morocco as the member residing in the Netherlands of the terrorist cell dismantled in Morocco (as referred to in question 2a)?\n5a)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation of the terrorist cell (as meant in question 2a)?\n5b)  Is there a charge against [the applicant]? If so, what is the charge?\n5c)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in relation to offences other than those mentioned under 5a? If so, in relation to what offences is he being searched for? Has he been convicted of those offences and, if so, what is the sentence?\u201d 19.  In reply to the above request, a person-specific official report (individueel ambtsbericht) was released on 3 December 2015 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The relevant part of the report stated as follows:\n\u201cQuestion 1:\nThe address ... in Salouin, region of Nador, is [the applicant\u2019s] last known address in Morocco.\nQuestion 2:\na)  The members of the Moroccan terrorist cell were all arrested on 13 April 2015.\nb)  A.M. and B.M. do not find themselves in the group [of persons] arrested on 13 April 2015.\nAdditional information: the above-cited names are not necessarily the actual names of the persons. In the group of persons, there is an A. and a B.. However, these persons do not have the surname M.\nc)  This question cannot be answered in the light of the above.\nQuestion 3:\nAt the time of the investigation, the persons referred to in 2a) were still detained. The charge is:\n\u2018the establishment of a criminal organisation which supports jihadist ideology, in particular by planning to assassinate persons with opposing religious convictions\u2019 (\u2018la constitution d\u2019une bande criminelle adepte de la pens\u00e9e djihadiste, projetait notamment l\u2019assassinat de personnes aux convictions religieuses contraires\u2019).\nQuestion 4:\n[The applicant] is not mentioned by name in the media reports. It was mentioned in the media reports that a Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands had been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities.\nAdditional information: nor were the other persons who were arrested on 13 April 2015 mentioned by name in the media reports. ...\nQuestion 5:\na)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation as referred to in question 2.\nb)  No, at the time of the investigation, there was no charge against [the applicant].\nc)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of a criminal investigation into offences other than those as referred to by question 5a.\u201d 20.  By letter of 12 January 2016, in reply to a request for further clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:\n\u201cThere are no indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015. There are also no indications of a charge against [the applicant] or indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation of facts other than those referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015.\u201d 21.  The asylum application was rejected by the Deputy Minister on 21 July 2016. In addition, an entry ban (inreisverbod) of twenty years was imposed on the applicant, the Deputy Minister holding that he posed a threat to public safety on account of his criminal conviction and information from the Netherlands security service that he posed a danger to national security. Furthermore, and referring to the person-specific official report of 3 December 2015, the Deputy Minister held that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he faced a real and personal risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in Morocco. The applicant was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities, nor had he been charged with any criminal offences there. The Deputy Minister found that the applicant\u2019s fear of being arrested, tortured and detained was based on general reports and assumptions. The Deputy Minister referred to earlier experiences with young Moroccan men who had stood trial in the Netherlands on charges related to Islamic terrorism and who had been removed to Morocco. None of them had encountered any problems from the side of the Moroccan authorities that could be regarded as relevant from an asylum-law perspective. On this point, the Deputy Minister referred to an article published on 10-11 September 2011 in the Netherlands daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad about the experiences of four convicted members of the Islamist terrorist \u201cHofstad group\u201d (Hofstadgroep) who, after having served their sentence in the Netherlands, had been removed to Morocco. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep) with the Regional Court, submitting in addition to his previous submissions, inter alia, a copy of an email from his Moroccan attorney, E.I., and extracts from a Moroccan police report dated 24 April 2015 concerning a criminal investigation in respect of several persons, including one \u201cB.B.\u201d (previously referred to by the applicant as \u201cB.M.\u201d). The police report stated that B.B. was the person behind the radicalisation of his neighbour (the applicant), who was being detained in the Netherlands in connection with terrorism. It further stated that, after the applicant\u2019s departure to the Netherlands, they had remained in contact by telephone and that in their conversations, the applicant had indicated his wish to buy a firearm, and that he intended to learn how to make explosives for use in a terrorist act in the Netherlands. 23.  On 14 February 2017 the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Rotterdam, dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned decision. As regards the applicant\u2019s reliance on Article 3 of the Convention, it held as follows:\n\u201c6. [The appellant] argues that on return he will be at a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. He fears that he will be detained and ill-treated because \u2013 due to media reports \u2013 he is being linked by the Moroccan authorities to terrorist groups and terrorist activities. On this point [the appellant] refers to various documents. In addition, [the appellant] argues that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up and, in addition, as it lacks clarity. 6.1.  The court states at the outset that it is in principle for [the appellant] to make out a plausible case that he is running a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. [The appellant] has submitted a number of documents in substantiation of his claim. In addition, [the Deputy Minister] has met [the appellant] halfway in the discharge of the burden of proof which rests on the latter by having the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct an investigation which has resulted in a person-specific official report. The court will discuss below [the appellant\u2019s] documents and the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6.2.  [The appellant] has submitted media reports about a terrorist cell that intended to commit attacks in the Netherlands and about a Moroccan man, [name of appellant], who was arrested in October 2014 in the Netherlands on suspicion of terrorism and convicted by the Court of Appeal. [The appellant] also submitted documents about a Moroccan Dutchman who had been interrogated and tortured in Morocco and referred to information from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about torture and ill-treatment of detainees and unfair proceedings for terrorist suspects in Morocco. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted an email message from his Moroccan lawyer about the negative attention which [the applicant] will attract upon return and a copy of (part of) an official report of the police in Morocco in the terrorism case of B.B. in which [the appellant\u2019s] name is mentioned. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted part of a judgment of the [Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris] concerning G.H., who is suspected of terrorist activities and [the appellant] claims that this person has been convicted again in Morocco for the same set of facts. 6.2.1.  In so far as it appears from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is known as a terror suspect or has been convicted of facts relating to terrorism, the court considers that this has already been found credible by [the Deputy Minister]. The circumstance that, because of media reports about this, [the appellant] is known in the Netherlands and Morocco does not mean that therefore he runs a real risk of serious harm when he returns to Morocco. [The appellant] fears that, because of being known [by those authorities], he will upon return be arrested and ill-treated by the Moroccan authorities, but for substantiation purposes has not submitted documents concerning [himself]. [The appellant] has pointed to general information about the treatment of detainees in Morocco and about the proceedings in respect of terrorist suspects, but this information is only relevant if it is plausible that [the appellant] upon return will be arrested or prosecuted for terrorism. In the court\u2019s opinion, [the Deputy Minister] has not unjustly adopted the position that [the appellant] has not made out a plausible case. In the email message from [the appellant\u2019s] Moroccan lawyer submitted by [the appellant], this lawyer reports that [the appellant] will be tried when transferred to Morocco, even though he has already been tried in the Netherlands, and refers to two decisions in which the same person was convicted both in France and in Morocco for the same facts. This means that the email message contains no more than a statement from [the appellant\u2019s] lawyer, without specific further substantiation relating to [the appellant] from which it follows that [the appellant] will be prosecuted in Morocco. Reference is only made to a case of another person convicted in France, but no documents have been submitted showing that this person has been convicted of the same facts in Morocco. Nor have documents been submitted from which it can be deduced that [the appellant] finds himself in the same situation. It can further not be concluded from the copy of (a part of) a report of the Moroccan police, submitted by [the appellant], that [the appellant] is being searched for in Morocco as a suspect of terrorism. As pointed out rightly by [the Deputy Minister], the document only contains information about the activities of the suspect B.B., including the influencing of [the appellant], but it does not appear from the document that [the appellant] is involved in any criminal proceedings. However, triggered by what [the appellant] has presented about the terror cell dismantled in April 2015, of which B.B. was a member, [the Deputy Minister] asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a person-specific official report, which will be discussed below. 6.3.1.  According to the constant case-law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) (including the ruling of 29 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2171), an official report from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the situation in a country is an expert opinion for the Deputy Minister for the exercise of the latter\u2019s powers. If it provides information in an impartial, objective and transparent manner with an indication, in so far as this is responsible, of the sources from which this information is derived, the Deputy Minister may, in making a decision, assume the correctness of this information, unless there are concrete reasons for doubting that accuracy. As regards person-specific official reports, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division has considered that, if a person-specific official report contradicts the asylum claim which it concerns, it is for the alien concerned to refute the official report. 6.3.2.  [The appellant\u2019s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up, fails. On 8 December 2015 the Deputy Minister carried out a REK-check, which entails [the Deputy Minister] assuring himself that the person-specific official report has been drawn up with due care and is comprehensible. The outcome of the REK check was that this could not be concluded. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked for further clarification, [in response] to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented, by letter of 12 January 2016, the person-specific official report. On 14 January 2016 a fresh REK check was carried out and it was concluded that the person-specific official report was comprehensible but that, procedurally, due care had not been exercised in preparing the report, as the investigation in Morocco had taken place without using a trusted local advisor (vertrouwenspersoon). Although in the case of an asylum application this falls short of due care, the court finds that in this case [the Deputy Minister] did not have to see reason for not taking into account in the decision making the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as [the Deputy Minister] has given sufficient reasons for holding that the interests of [the appellant] were not harmed by this failure to exercise due care. [The Deputy Minister] has indicated that the use of a trusted local advisor is to ensure that the authorities of the country of origin are not informed of the alien\u2019s stay in the Netherlands and of his asylum application, whereas in this case it can be assumed that the Moroccan authorities, due to reports in the media there, are already aware [of this circumstance]. On this point [the Deputy Minister] has referred to a number of media reports. [The appellant] has not argued or further substantiated that that knowledge by the Moroccan authorities will lead to problems. Also for the remainder, [the appellant] has not indicated why his interests would have been harmed by the lack of due care in the preparation of the person-specific official report. 6.3.3.  The person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, inter alia, that the members of the terrorist cell dismantled on 13 April 2015, which is mentioned in the coverage referred to by [the appellant], were all arrested on that date. This group does not include A.M. or B.M. as mentioned by the applicant, but these names are not necessarily the names of the persons. The group does include an A. and a B., but not with the family name M. In addition, the person-specific official report states that these persons were still in detention at the time of the investigation and that neither [the appellant] nor these persons were mentioned by name in press reports about the dismantled terror cell. It is indeed mentioned in press reports that a Moroccan staying in the Netherlands has been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities. Finally, it has been included in the person-specific official report that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the dismantled terror cell, that at the time of the investigation no charge had been brought against [the appellant] and that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. 6.3.4.  [The appellant\u2019s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it contains unclear points, also fails. In the opinion of the court, [the appellant] has not presented any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of the person-specific official report. [The appellant] has argued that it is unclear to what extent the [Moroccan] investigating judge (onderzoeksrechter) is competent to make statements about [the appellant]. In the first place, this mere remark does not comprise a concrete argument as mentioned above. Irrespective of this, the court considers that, on the basis of the underlying materials of the person-specific official report which the court has consulted, it can be assumed that the investigating judge in question is competent and able to provide the information given. Also the mere assertion of [the appellant] that it is odd that the investigating judge, who apparently holds all information on terrorism cases, is not asked whether [the appellant] is being searched for, is not a concrete argument in the above sense. Moreover, it follows from question 5 in the letter from [the Deputy Minister] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 15 October 2015 that the Ministry has been asked both whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the arrested terror cell and whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. Also, the unclear assertions made by [the appellant] about the names of the persons arrested, mentioned in the person-specific official report and the notion \u2018at the time of the investigation\u2019 offer no concrete reasons to doubt the accuracy of the person-specific official report. The term \u2018at the time of the investigation\u2019 cannot be read otherwise than that the question has been answered by the investigating judge on the basis of the state of affairs at the time of the investigation. Incidentally, [the appellant] has not argued that the state of affairs would be different at a different (later) point in time. As to the names of the arrested persons, the person-specific official report already states that the names may also be different. Also on this point the court sees no reason for doubting the correctness [of the official report]. As the document from the criminal case file submitted by [the appellant], which possibly refers to him, is of a much earlier date than the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not plausible that this reference has given the Moroccan authorities cause to open a criminal investigation against [the appellant]. This is [therefore] not a concrete reason for doubting the correctness and completeness of the person-specific official report. 6.4.  In addition to the person-specific report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [the Deputy Minister] has also referred to experiences made with young Moroccan men (including members of the Hofstad group) who had been the subject of a terrorism trial in the Netherlands and/or constituted a danger to Dutch national security in connection with involvement in Islamic terrorism and/or jihad and for that reason [had been] returned to Morocco. According to [the Deputy Minister], no signals to be taken seriously have been received from them that, upon their return, they had encountered problems, relevant from an asylum-law perspective, from the side of the Moroccan authorities. The court notes that [the appellant] has not rebutted this in a substantiated manner and finds that [the Deputy Minister] has correctly taken this into account in his assessment. In this respect, the court refers to the ruling of the [Administrative Jurisdiction] Division of 5 October 2016 (ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2692). [The appellant] has not established that the Moroccan authorities will act differently in his case. 6.5.  The court concludes that it follows from the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that [the appellant] is not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation concerning the dismantled terror cell or other facts and that [the appellant] has not put forward any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of this information. Nor can it be deduced from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities and/or will be detained and tortured upon return. This can also not be inferred from previous experiences in similar cases. Thus the fear alleged by [the appellant] upon return has not been made plausible. In view of this, [the Deputy Minister] rightly took the view that [the appellant] has not established that, upon return, he will run a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. ...\u201d 24.  The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) against the Regional Court\u2019s decision with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State). He also requested a provisional measure (voorlopige voorziening), namely to stay his removal pending the outcome of the further appeal. Neither a further appeal nor a request for a provisional measure has automatic suspensive effect. 25.  On 21 February 2017 the applicant asked the Court to apply an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to stay his removal to Morocco. The determination of that request was adjourned by the Court on the same day and the Government were requested to submit factual information. 26.  On 22 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the applicant\u2019s request for a provisional measure by revoking the order to expel the applicant to Morocco scheduled for 25 February 2017. In view of that decision, the Court decided on 23 February 2017 to suspend until further notice the determination of his Rule 39 request. 27.  On 28 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant\u2019s further appeal. It held that under section 91 \u00a7 2 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), no further reasoning was called for, as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring determination in the interest of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against this ruling. On the same day the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant\u2019s request for a provisional measure. 28.  On 2 March 2017 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that the applicant\u2019s removal to Morocco had been scheduled for 4 March 2017. 29.  On 3 March 2017 the Court applied Rule 39 for a period of four weeks and requested further factual information from the Government. The requested information was received on 22 March 2017. 30.  The Government informed the Court that in the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant information had been exchanged between the Moroccan and the Dutch authorities through a legal assistance request submitted by the Dutch authorities on 5 November 2014 and a supplementary request on 20 April 2015 (see paragraph 9 above). They added that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst), in establishing that there was no Article 3 risk for the applicant were he to be removed to Morocco, had taken into account that the Moroccan authorities had been apprised of the criminal proceedings and that they were likely to be aware of the outcome thereof. The Government added that the Moroccan authorities had not sought the applicant\u2019s extradition. The Government had not sought specific guarantees from the Moroccan authorities as they took the view that the applicant\u2019s removal would not result in a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The authentic and valid ID-card held by the applicant was sufficient for him to be accepted onto a flight to Morocco. No special procedure had been put in place for his removal, but during his transfer he would be accompanied by officers of the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) and after arrival he would be handed over to the authorities at the destination airport. The Government lastly informed the Court that they had not been able to obtain further information regarding the criminal proceedings against the members of the terrorist cell which had been dismantled in Morocco in April 2015. 31.  On 29 March 2017 the applicant informed the Court that, through his Moroccan attorney E.I., he had been able to obtain a copy of the judgment by which B.B. and eight others had been convicted of, inter alia, the establishment of a terrorist group loyal to the Islamic State intended to commit terrorist activities against the public order of Morocco. B.B. had been sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment in Arabic, which runs to twenty-three pages, contains the following passage:\n\u201cB.B. has several connections with jihadis. In particular, he recruits young men in his area for his terrorist organisation. In 2015 a befriended policeman in Nador informed B.B. \u2013 after receiving secret Government information \u2013 that he should break off his contact with people involved with terrorist organisations, including amongst others [the applicant\u2019s name] who lives in the Netherlands.\u201d 32.  On 30 March 2017 the interim measure under Rule 39 staying the applicant\u2019s removal to Morocco was extended for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. 33.  On 15 November 2017 the Government submitted a copy of a judgment given on 21 December 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat Court of Appeal for Terrorism Cases on an appeal lodged by G.H. (see paragraph 23 above at point 6.2) \u2013 assisted by the attorney E.I. \u2013 against a judgment given on 10 March 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat First Instance Court for Terrorism Cases. The appellate court overturned the impugned judgment, finding that pursuant to Article 707 of the Moroccan Criminal Code, which contains the ne bis in idem rule, the appellant could no longer be tried for facts in respect of which he had already been convicted by a criminal court in France and had already served the sentence imposed by that court. Consequently, it acquitted him of the charges of the establishment of a criminal group for the preparation and commission of terrorist offences, illegal use and possession of fire arms and ammunition in the context of a joint project aimed at endangering public order, and inciting and persuading others to commit terrorist offences. It did, however, convict him of complicity in providing support to those who commit a terrorist offence and imposed a conditional one-year prison sentence.", "references": ["9", "2", "8", "7", "3", "5", "0", "6", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batman. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the head of the Batman branch of the People\u2019s Democratic Party (DEHAP) and subsequently the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP). 5.  On unspecified dates in 2005 and 2006 the Batman public prosecutor\u2019s office initiated at least four criminal investigations against the applicant. On 18 October 2005, 6 December 2005, 1 February 2006 and 23 March 2006 the applicant made statements before the Batman public prosecutor in relation to his attendance at a number of public meetings. 6.  In particular, when he was questioned on 18 October 2005 the applicant was asked about his participation in an event commemorating a number of deceased members of the PKK (Kurdish Workers\u2019 Party, an illegal armed organisation) held on 22 August 2005. The applicant responded that he had become aware of that event when demonstrators had started to march to the cemetery where the deceased were buried. As he was the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP, he had attended the march in order to keep the demonstrators under control and to prevent any possible disturbances in the town. 7.  When questioned on 6 December 2005, the applicant stated that on 17 August 2005 he had been the head of the DEHAP branch in Batman and that he had not praised the leader of the PKK in his speech. The applicant added that although Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK, was in prison, he was regarded as a political actor by the local population. The applicant\u2019s intention had been to express that social fact and he was against any kind of violence. When the public prosecutor reminded him of the violent acts of the PKK, the applicant once again stated that he was against violence regardless of whom it emanated from. 8.  On 1 February 2006 the Batman public prosecutor asked the applicant why he had referred to the PKK leader as \u201cEsteemed/Mr (Say\u0131n) \u00d6calan\u201d during one of his speeches. The applicant responded that he had used the word \u201cSay\u0131n\u201d as a matter of courtesy. He stated that he had not intended to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK or to praise a criminal. 9.  Lastly, on 23 March 2006 the applicant was questioned by the Batman public prosecutor in the context of a criminal investigation opened against him on suspicion of membership of the PKK. He stated that he had participated in several demonstrations and readings of press statements in his capacity as the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP and the DTP, and that he had not committed any offence during those events. He denied the veracity of the allegation that those public meetings had been organised in accordance with the instructions of the PKK. When he was asked about a sentence condemning both the death of Turkish soldiers and PKK members which he had uttered during a speech, the applicant stated that he would utter that sentence again without hesitation. He also stated that the petition campaign entitled \u201cI accept Abdullah \u00d6calan as a political actor\u201d had not been started upon the instructions of the PKK. He accepted that he had demanded an end to the solitary confinement of Abdullah \u00d6calan and addressed the latter as \u201cEsteemed/Mr (Say\u0131n) \u00d6calan\u201d. However, he denied the allegation that he had had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour the PKK. The applicant contended that he had attended the demonstrations and meetings in question in order to control the crowds and to prevent any possible disturbances. Lastly, he claimed that his aim was to contribute to peace and democracy. 10.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant was brought before the Batman Magistrates\u2019 Court and questioned in respect of his involvement in a demonstration held on 16 February 2006 in Batman. He submitted that he had attended the demonstration with a view to preventing violence, since he was the head of the DTP at the material time. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody. 11.  On 24 March 2006 the Batman public prosecutor decided to transfer the investigation to the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor\u2019s office, holding that the offence which the applicant had committed, namely membership of a terrorist organisation and carrying out membership activities, was not within his office\u2019s jurisdiction. 12.  On 26 April 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, charging the applicant and a certain M.G., under Article 220 \u00a7 8 of the Criminal Code, with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK on ten occasions. In the indictment the public prosecutor listed a total of ten marches and demonstrations which the applicant had attended. He noted that during those marches and demonstrations, demonstrators had chanted slogans and carried banners praising the PKK and its leader, Abdullah \u00d6calan, and that the applicant had made speeches in Kurdish at nine of those ten assemblies. 13.  On 30 May 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant contended that he was the head of the Batman branch of the DTP. Although he had participated in the public meetings indicated in the indictment, he had not chanted any slogans or carried banners containing illegal expressions. He further submitted that he had not directed demonstrators to commit any illegal acts. The applicant stressed that in general he attended such public meetings at the request of the security forces, since the latter asked him to be present in order to prevent any possible clashes between themselves and the demonstrators. 14.  During the second hearing held on 18 July 2006 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The public prosecutor contended that the applicant had attended various illegal public meetings between 19 February 2005 and 16 February 2006 and that he had made speeches in which he had praised the PKK and its leader. The public prosecutor alleged that those events had been organised either in line with the policies of the PKK or under its instructions with a view to supporting that organisation. Taking into account the intensity, variety and continuity of the applicant\u2019s activities, the public prosecutor considered that the applicant\u2019s acts constituted knowingly and willingly aiding the PKK. He then asked the Assize Court to convict the applicant under Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of membership of the PKK. 15.  On 26 September 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held the fourth and the last hearing in the case and convicted the applicant and his co\u2011accused of membership of an illegal organisation under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code on the basis of Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7 3 of the same Code, finding it established that the applicant had knowingly and willingly aided the PKK. The applicant was sentenced to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment of the Assize Court, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the indictment dated 26 April 2006 it was alleged that Abdulcelil \u0130mret had committed the following acts: 1.  Attendance at the reading out of a press statement and an illegal march held on 19 February 2005 in the Mem-u Zin Park in Batman during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah \u00d6calan; 2.  Attendance at the event commemorating a deceased PKK member held in the Batman cemetery on 31 March 2005, making a speech in Kurdish and making participants say prayers in Kurdish; 3.  Attendance at the reading out of a press statement at the Batman branch of DEHAP on 16 August 2005 regarding the petition campaign entitled \u201cI accept Abdullah \u00d6calan as a political actor\u201d; 4.  Attendance at the illegal demonstration held on 22 August 2005 to commemorate seven members of the PKK killed by the security forces in an armed clash which had occurred in Batman; 5.  Attendance at the demonstration organised by DEHAP and held on 9 November 2005, during which the demonstrators chanted illegal slogans, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 6.  Attendance at the demonstration held on 16 November 2005 during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah \u00d6calan and carried banners, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 7.  Attendance at the demonstration held on 30 November 2005 protesting against the attempts to close down ROJ TV, the alleged solitary confinement of Abdullah \u00d6calan and the statement by Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP (People\u2019s Republican Party) regarding the events that had occurred in Y\u00fcksekova during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of Abdullah \u00d6calan, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 8.  Attendance at the reading out of a press statement and at a march held on 21 December 2005 protesting against the solitary confinement of Abdullah \u00d6calan, during which the demonstrators chanted illegal slogans and carried banners, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 9.  Attendance at the march and the reading out of a press statement held on 8 February 2006 in Batman, during which illegal slogans were chanted, and making a speech in Kurdish; 10. Attendance at the illegal demonstration and the reading out of a press statement held on 16 February 2006 close to the DTP Batman branch, during which illegal slogans were chanted and banners were carried, and making a speech in Kurdish;\n...\nIn his defence submissions Abdulcelil \u0130mret stated that he had participated in the demonstrations and the reading out of press statements mentioned in the indictment but that he had neither chanted slogans nor carried banners. He stated that he had not directed demonstrators to chant slogans or to carry banners.\nAbdulcelil \u0130mret submitted that he had attended those meetings at the request of the security forces and that the latter had asked him to warn the crowds not to resist them and to work with them with a view to preventing possible disturbances.\n...\nThe file contains police reports, photographs and video recordings of the events which the accused attended and the speeches he made.\nOn the basis of the evidence in the file, it has been understood that during all the demonstrations and marches held in Batman which Abdulcelil \u0130mret attended, slogans in favour Abdullah \u00d6calan were chanted and the demonstrators carried banners. It has also been understood that the speeches made by the accused praised Abdullah \u00d6calan.\nIt is established that the accused attended the public meetings in question and organised them.\nAlthough the accused submitted that their aim had been to prevent clashes between the demonstrators and the security forces and [that they] had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK when they had participated in the demonstrations and marches in question, taking into account the content of the case file and their acts during those meetings, their defence submissions have been found to be baseless.\nAs a result of the trial and in the light of the evidence,\nIt has been established that Abdulcelil \u0130mret worked as the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP and that subsequent to the closure of DEHAP he was the head of the Batman branch of the DTP.\nHe attended ten marches and demonstrations held between 19 February 2005 and 16 February 2006, organised by the above-mentioned political parties. Illegal slogans were chanted and illegal banners were carried during those meetings. In some of those meetings, Abdulcelil \u0130mret read press statements containing expressions praising Abdullah \u00d6calan. All of the marches and demonstrations in question were illegal within the meaning of section 23/b of the Marches and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911).\n...\nIt has been established that all of those marches and demonstrations were organised in line with the \u2018Democratic Political Struggle\u2019 strategy adopted by the PKK recently; that the media broadcasts in line with the PKK\u2019s strategies had announced those marches and demonstrations prior to them, and that the same media organs had used those demonstrations as propaganda materials after they had been held.\nAbdulcelil \u0130mret and M.G. organised several illegal demonstrations in line with the PKK\u2019s instructions and during those demonstrations they addressed the demonstrators who chanted slogans and carried banners containing expressions in favour of the PKK and Abdullah \u00d6calan. In their speeches the accused praised the PKK\u2019s leader. Taking into account the continuity and nature of their acts, it is considered that those acts went beyond the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a [terrorist] organisation and amounted to the offence proscribed by Article 220 \u00a7 7 of the Criminal Code, that is to say, \u2018knowingly and willingly aiding an illegal organisation without being in the hierarchical structure\u2019. Therefore, it has been decided to convict the accused under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code.\n...\u201d 16.  On 13 April 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment. 17.  By Law no. 6352, which entered into force on 5 July 2012, paragraph 7 of Article 220 of the Criminal Code was amended. The applicant applied to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court requesting it to examine whether the amended version of that provision could be considered to be in his favour and, if so, whether the execution of his sentence could be suspended. He added that he was currently serving his prison sentence. 18.  On 16 August 2012 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court decided to reduce the applicant\u2019s sentence to five years, two months and fifteen days\u2019 imprisonment. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to have the execution of his sentence suspended.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "4", "9", "1", "6", "3", "2", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "4.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 5.  The applicants complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences following entrapment by State agents. In application no. 48523/15, the applicant also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention. As regards application no. 3436/15, on 31 October 2013 the Levokumskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region found the applicant guilty of three counts of an attempted drug sale \u201ccommitted with the same intent\u201d on 10 and 17 May and 19 June 2013, as well as declared him guilty of unlawful purchase and storage without an intent to sell of a large quantity of drugs, seized from him on 19 June 2013. The applicant was sentenced to ten years and a month of imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by the Stavropol Regional Court on 23 January 2014. In May 2015 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Stavropol Region asked the Presidium of the Regional Court to amend the conviction by excluding episodes of 17 May and 19 June 2013 \u201cin view of the lack of a criminal conduct [in the applicant\u2019s actions]\u201d and to uphold the conviction in respect of the episode on 10 May 2013. The Deputy Prosecutor argued, in particular, that the \u201coperative experiment\u201d in the course of which the applicant had sold drugs on 10 May 2013 had been properly authorised by the acting head of the district police department and had been recorded, and thus there was no need to perform subsequent \u201coperative experiments\u201d in the form of the test purchase on 17 May and 19 June 2013. On 30 June 2015 the Presidium of the Stavropol Regional Court accepted the Deputy Prosecutor\u2019s request for the revision of the final conviction by virtue of Article 401 of the Russian Criminal Code, annulled the conviction in respect of the two episodes of drug sale on 17 May and 19 June 2013, declared the applicant guilty of an attempted drug sale on 10 May 2013 and sentenced him to eight years and one month of imprisonment. The Presidium noted that having conducted \u201cthe operative experiment\u201d on 10 May 2013 the police had already established and recorded the applicant\u2019s criminal activity. However, the police officers had not prevented the applicant\u2019s subsequent criminal activities and \u201chad again, on 17 May and 19 June 2013 performed similar operative measures\u201d. The Presidium concluded that the applicant\u2019s conviction of episodes of 17 May and 19 June 2013 had therefore been based on unlawfully obtained evidence and thus should be voided. As regards the episode on 10 May 2013, it observed a video recording of the \u201ctest purchase\u201d and noted that the applicant had talked about future drug sales. It then read out a statement by a witness M. who had testified that \u201cthe buyer had not incited anyone to sell drugs\u201d when they were in the \u201ccompany drinking alcohol\u201d. The Presidium concluded that there was no indication of the police entrapment on 10 May 2013.\nDOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 6.  Title 3, Section XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (here and after \u2013 the CCrP) of 2002 (\u201cProcedure for review at second instance\u201d) (\u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 3, \u0420\u0430\u0437\u0434\u0435\u043b XIII \u201c\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435 \u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0438\u201d) stipulates in Article 390 \u00a7 2 that the decisions taken by the second-instance courts on appeal acquire binding force immediately. 7.  On 29 December 2010 Federal Law no. 433-FZ, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, amended the Code by introducing a new Chapter 47.1 (\u201cCassation procedure\u201d) (\u201c\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0438\u201d). 8.  Article 401.2 (\u201cRight to lodge a cassation appeal\u201d) of the Code prescribed a list of persons who were entitled to lodge a cassation appeal against any judicial act. Paragraph 3 of the same Article introduced a one\u2011year time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against a judicial act which had become final and provided for a possibility to reset that time\u2011limit on certain grounds. 9.  The new Article 401.6 provided safeguards against cassation revision of final judgments and decisions where revision could aggravate the situation of a convicted person, an acquitted person, or a person in respect of whom a criminal prosecution had been terminated. First, such revision was possible only within one year after these judgments or decisions had become final. Second, the cassation appeals were further restricted by the substantive criterion allowing a review only if a judgment breached the law \u201cto an extent which distorted the essence and meaning of a judicial decision as an act of administration of justice\u201d. 10.  On 19 December 2014 the State Duma adopted Federal Law no. 518-FZ, approved by the Council of the Federation on 25 December 2014, and signed by the President on 31 December 2014. The Law amended Article 401.2 of the Code by removing any time bars for lodging cassation appeals. The provisions of Article 401.6 remained in force. 11.  The CCrP provides for a possibility to reopen proceedings in a criminal case when a violation of a Convention right has been found by this Court. The relevant provisions read as follows:\nArticle 413.  Grounds for reopening of proceedings in a criminal case due to new or newly discovered circumstances\n\u201c1. Final judgments ... may be annulled and the proceedings in a criminal case reopened due to new or newly discovered circumstances ...\n... 4. New circumstances are ...\n...\n2) A finding by the European Court of Human Rights of a violation of [Convention provisions] during consideration of a criminal case by a Russian court ...\u201d\nArticle 415. Initiation of [revision] proceedings\n \u201c5. The Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation revises ... [judgments] under circumstances listed in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article 413 of the Code upon application by the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation within one month. Having considered the [above] application, the Presidium ... annuls or alters the judicial decisions in a criminal case in line with ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights ...\u201d\nArticle 419. Proceedings in a criminal case after annulment of judicial decisions\n\u201cJudicial proceedings in a criminal case after annulment of judicial decisions due to new or newly discovered circumstances and the lodging of appeals against new judicial decisions follow the general rules [established by the Code].\u201d 12.  In 2016 the Russian Supreme Court published an extensive report summarising the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention has been found in view of the applicants\u2019 conviction as a result of the police entrapment. It has since issued a number of similar interpretative summaries of the Court\u2019s case-law on this subject. In addition, relying on Article 415 \u00a7 5 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court has regularly authorised the re-opening of criminal proceedings in view of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention following the Russian courts\u2019 failure to effectively conduct the review of the defendants\u2019 arguments that the criminal offence had been committed as a result of the police entrapment (see for example the Presidium\u2019s decision no. 28-P17 issued on 12 April 2017 in response to the Court\u2019s decision in the case of Ulyanov and Others v. Russia [Committeee], nos. 22486/05 and 10 others, 9 February 2016).", "references": ["0", "5", "2", "8", "6", "7", "1", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in \u0130zmir. 5.  In March 2002, the applicant, who was a working as a civil servant, was dismissed due gross misconduct. He applied to the administrative courts to have the annulment of that decision. In the course of the proceedings, on 4 July 2006 Law no. 5525, granting amnesty to civil servants who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings, entered into force. Accordingly, in the light of this new amnesty law, on 10 April 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court decided that there was no need to examine the merits of the case. 6.  In the meantime, on 30 September 2005 the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant had ended with the decision of the criminal court, convicting him of abuse of office. 7.  Following the entry into force of the amnesty law, the applicant applied to the administration and asked to be reinstated. His request was refused on 19 December 2006. The applicant initiated proceedings to have the annulment of that decision. 8.  By a decision dated 8 January 2008, the Ankara Administrative Court found in line with the applicant\u2019s claims and decided to annul the decision of the authorities by which they had refused to reinstate the applicant. 9.  Following appeal, the case was transferred before the Supreme Administrative Court. In the course of the proceedings, the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Administrative Court filed his written opinion. This opinion included substantial grounds on the merits of the case with a proposal to quash the decision of the first instance court. On 25 May 2009, relying also on the opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 8 January 2008. In particular, the appeal court referred to its previous leading case which had been delivered on 17 October 2008 on a similar case and held that the amnesty law did not put an obligation on the administration to reinstate the applicant. 10.  The case was accordingly remitted before the Ankara Administrative Court. On 9 October 2009 the first instance court adhered to the judgment of the appeal court and dismissed the applicant\u2019s case. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 November 2009.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "0", "5", "6", "2", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1990, 1988 and 1957, respectively and live in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 5.  The first and the second applicants were arrested on 8 and 9 April 2009, as a result of the mass protest which took place in Chi\u0219in\u0103u after the elections of 5 April 2009. They were placed in detention for ten and seven days respectively. Later the charges against them were dropped. 6.  The third applicant was accused of fraud and placed in detention pending trial between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005, i.e. for nine days. Later the charges against him were dropped. The Government disputed the fact that the third applicant was detained between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 7.  On different dates the applicants brought civil actions under Law No. 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking 115,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 6,765 euros (EUR)), MDL 600,000 (the equivalent of EUR 36,700) and MDL 80,000 (the equivalent of EUR 4800), respectively, in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. On 11 December 2013, 3 July 2013 and 28 May 2014 respectively, the Supreme Court of Justice concluded that the applicants\u2019 detentions had been unlawful and in breach of Article 5 of the Convention and awarded them MDL 15,000 (the equivalent of EUR 835), MDL 7,000 (the equivalent to EUR 428) and MDL 6,000 (the equivalent of EUR 317) respectively as compensation for the damage caused. The domestic courts found inter alia that the third applicant had been detained between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 8.  In addition, the first and the second applicants were part of a group of persons considered to be victims of the events of April 2009 and were awarded by two Government decisions MDL 10,000 (the equivalent of EUR 625) and MDL 7000 (the equivalent of EUR 444), respectively.", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "7", "8", "5", "6", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kayseri. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant, who was a sergeant in the Army had a traffic accident in 2007 and was declared \u201cdisabled\u201d (Adi mal\u00fcl\u201d). 7.  On unspecified date, the applicant requested the General Directorate of Pension Fund (the Fund) (\u201cEmekli-Sand\u0131\u011f\u0131\u201d) to modify his retirement statute as service-disabled (\u201cvazife mal\u00fcl\u00fc\u201d), but the fund rejected that request. 8.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the Fund\u2019s decision. 9.  On 22 May 2008 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 10.  On 11 September 2008 the applicant\u2019s rectification request was rejected. 11.  During the proceedings, namely on 12 May 2008 and 29 July 2008 the Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Military Administrative Court filed lengthy written opinions on the case. However these opinions were not communicated to the applicant.", "references": ["7", "5", "1", "4", "8", "2", "0", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  At the time of the events he was a lawyer practising in that city. 7.  On 18 April 2000 the applicant was questioned by the public prosecutor at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. The contents of a computer disk holding detailed information on the applicant\u2019s background, which had been obtained by the security forces in a house belonging to Hizbullah, and police statements of four people, all of whom were accused of being members of the same illegal organisation, were read out to him during the questioning. The applicant denied having any affiliation with the illegal organisation and contested the accuracy of the evidence presented to him. He maintained that he had assisted certain members of Hizbullah as a lawyer and that he always acted within the limits of his profession, without directing those people\u2019s submissions as alleged. He further maintained that certain information in the illegal organisation\u2019s background report, such as the ages of his siblings, was wrong and that this in itself proved that he had not provided the information. He did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during questioning. 8.  On the same day the applicant gave statements before the investigating judge of the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, this time together with his business partner, who was accused of being a member of the same illegal organisation. He reiterated his submissions given to the public prosecutor and added that the fact that he had provided legal assistance to some members of the illegal organisation might have been perceived as a demonstration of support by certain people. The investigating judge refused the public prosecutor\u2019s request for the applicant\u2019s detention and decided that he should be released pending trial. 9.  The following day, on 19 April 2000, the public prosecutor objected to the applicant\u2019s release. The applicant was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant issued by the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court. 10.  On 20 April 2000 the applicant was taken before the investigating judge, who decided that he should be detained on remand. 11.  On the same day the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation. He relied on the police statements of the four witnesses as well as the background information obtained from the computer disk. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s lawyers lodged a petition with the trial court. They argued that there was no evidence against the applicant in that all of the witnesses relied on by the prosecution had denied their statements later on. They further stated that the background information obtained from the computer disk was not reliable. 13.  At the hearing on 30 May 2000 the applicant\u2019s lawyers once again challenged the use of the background information obtained from the computer disk, arguing that it was unreliable in that the disk had been de-encrypted and the information extracted in their absence. During the same hearing, the court noted that the four witnesses, who had mentioned the applicant in their police statements, had denied those submissions during the subsequent stages of the proceedings against them. The court held that the applicant should be released pending trial. 14.  On 3 September 2001, following statements made by a certain M.S.B., the public prosecutor drew up another bill of indictment against the applicant, once again accusing him of membership of an illegal organisation. The allegations put forward by this latter indictment were joined with the case which was already pending before the State Security Court. 15.  At the hearing on 4 December 2001, during which the applicant was not present, M.S.B.\u2019s police statements were read out. On 30 April 2002 the court noted that M.S.B. had denied those statements at a later point. 16.  On an unspecified date the public prosecutor submitted his written observations to the court. He argued that the applicant\u2019s guilt was proven by various items of evidence, namely the background report prepared in respect of him, which contained detailed personal information, as well as the background reports and police statements of several other members of Hizbullah. In that connection, he referred to the statements of a certain N.S., who had maintained before both the police and the public prosecutor that the applicant had been a recruiter for the illegal organisation, had given courses to new members and had been in charge of certain cells. The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant\u2019s name had been mentioned in the background reports of several members, including a certain \u015e.A. 17.  On 18 November 2003 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied for the expansion of the investigation and the cross-examination of the witnesses who had confirmed the applicant\u2019s membership of Hizbullah. He mentioned, in particular, the names of N.S. and \u015e.A., who had given statements against the applicant. The applicant\u2019s lawyer further challenged the credibility of these two witnesses\u2019 statements. In that connection, he argued that N.S. had not repeated his police statements against the applicant at a later point as alleged by the public prosecutor in his written opinion. The lawyer further noted that \u015e.A. had claimed to have taken courses run by the applicant until the latter started his military service and asked the trial court to obtain information as regards the dates the applicant had served in the army in order to prove that those allegations were not credible. 18.  On 27 January 2004 the court refused the application for the expansion of the investigation, without stating anything as regards the cross-examination of witnesses. 19.  On 23 March 2004 the applicant applied to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959). 20.  During the course of the proceedings, the State Security Courts were abolished and the case was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 21.  At the hearing on 21 February 2006 the Assize Court read out the police statements of \u015e.A., in which he had claimed that the applicant had acted as a mentor within the illegal organisation and had given courses to other members, including him, which had ended when the applicant had started his military service. The trial court stated that although \u015e.A. had reiterated his submissions in so far as they concerned himself before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, he had not mentioned the applicant after his questioning by the police. The court nevertheless added the statements of N.S. and \u015e.A. to the case file. The applicant\u2019s lawyers maintained that they did not accept the statements against the applicant. 22.  On 18 April 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The court relied on certain information obtained from the computer disk, namely the background report on the applicant and reports concerning other members, as well as the statements of N.S. and \u015e.A. It also refused the applicant\u2019s application to benefit from Law no. 4959, finding that he had not disclosed any information about the structure of the illegal organisation. 23.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He argued that the trial court had failed to hear evidence from N.S. and \u015e.A. despite his requests to that effect and that he had been deprived of the possibility to put his questions to them. 24.  On 19 November 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court.", "references": ["8", "2", "0", "6", "4", "9", "1", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  Mr Vasilevskiy was born in 1973 and lives in Blagoveshchensk. 6.  Mr Vasilevskiy stayed in detention for longer that he should have because the sentencing courts did not count the time he had spent in pre-trial detention towards the overall duration of his sentence, in breach of the applicable domestic provisions. In response to Mr Vasilevskiy\u2019s repeated complaints, on 7 May 2007 the Belogorskiy District Court in the Amur Region corrected the error and acknowledged that his sentence had expired on 26 February 2006. Mr Vasilevskiy was released on 13 June 2007. He sought compensation for 472 days during which he had been wrongfully detained. 7.  On 13 December 2013 the Blagoveshchensk Town Court in the Amur Region awarded him 150,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 3,320 euros (EUR) at the then-applicable exchange rate) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Mr Vasilevskiy lodged an appeal, submitting in particular that that sum was substantially lower than that which the Court would have awarded in a similar case. 8.  On 28 February 2014 the Amur Regional Court dismissed his appeal. As regards the level of compensation, it held that the Town Court had \u201chad regard to the case-law of the European Court but had correctly determined the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the light of the requirements of Russian law\u201d. 9.  Mr Bogdanov was born in 1981 and lives in the Novgorod Region. 10.  On 30 March 2007 Mr Bogdanov was convicted of supplying drugs on four separate occasions in 2006 and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. On 20 March 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation acknowledged, referring to the Court\u2019s case-law under Article 6 of the Convention, that the police had incited Mr Bogdanov to commit the last three of the four offences. It declared that part of evidence inadmissible, voided his conviction in that part, reduced his sentence to six years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his immediate release. 11.  By that time, Mr Bogdanov had spent 119 days in custody over and above the adjusted six-year sentence. He sought to recover damages in respect of his wrongful imprisonment. 12.  On 13 March 2014 the Valdayskiy District Court in the Novgorod Region awarded him RUB 80,000 (EUR 1,576). However, on 9 July 2014 the Novgorod Regional Court reduced the award to RUB 15,000 (EUR 324), referring to the \u201ccircumstances in which the criminal proceedings had been instituted\u201d and the \u201ccategory of offence that Mr Bogdanov had been charged with\u201d. On 30 September 2014 the Regional Court rejected a cassation appeal lodged by Mr Bogdanov.", "references": ["5", "6", "1", "0", "9", "3", "8", "4", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1982 and 1983 respectively and are currently serving sentences in penal facilities in the Republic of Komi and the Murmansk Region respectively. 7.  On 25 and 19 September 2002 respectively the applicants were arrested in Grozny in the Chechen Republic and taken to the Operational\u2011Search Division of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit (\u041e\u0420\u0411-2 \u0421\u041a\u041e\u0423 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u042e\u0424\u041e \uf02d hereinafter \u201cORB-2\u201d). After their arrest they were taken to the temporary detention facility at ORB-2 (hereinafter \u201cthe IVS\u201d). Official records of the applicants\u2019 arrest were drawn up on 30 and 24 September 2002 respectively. Throughout this time the applicants remained without legal assistance. Their families were unaware of their whereabouts. 8.  According to the applicants, for several days during their unrecorded detention they were repeatedly ill\u2011treated by officers of ORB-2 and forced into confessing to being members of an illegal armed group in Grozny, and to the murders of several people, including police officers and military servicemen. 9.  The applicants described in detail the circumstances of the alleged ill\u2011treatment. They submitted, in particular, that the officers of ORB-2 had punched and kicked them, beat them up with truncheons, administered electric shocks while putting gas masks or plastic bags over their heads, and had threatened them with rape and blackmail. According to the second applicant, he was also beaten over the head with a plastic bottle filled with water while his head was pressed against the floor. Furthermore, the perpetrators jumped on his head with all their weight, burnt his back with cigarette butts, beat his fingers with a varnished stick while his hands were pressed against a table, and threatened to pierce his hands with staples and shoot him. The applicants alleged that two of the perpetrators had been officers Yakh. and Gul. 10.  Once the applicants\u2019 arrests were formalised, they reiterated their confession statements in the presence of the chief investigator, S., and two legal aid lawyers, Ts. and D. The applicants confirmed that they had made their statements voluntarily. According to them, officers Yakh. and Gul. were both present during their interviews. 11.  When questioning the second applicant on 24 September 2002 in the presence of D. and officer Yakh., S. lifted up his shirt and saw marks of beatings on his back (bruises, marks from electric wires and swellings). When asked how they had been caused, the second applicant said that he had fallen down the stairs. Several days later he told D. that he had received the injuries in a fight with his brother. 12.  On 18 and 22 December 2002 respectively the applicants were transferred from the IVS to remand prison IZ-20/2 in Chernokozovo in the Naurskiy District of northern Chechnya. 13.  The Government failed to submit the applicants\u2019 medical documents for the period between September and December 2002, relying on the fact that they must have been destroyed following the expiry of their storage time-limit. 14.  The Government provided a copy of a register of medical examinations of persons admitted to IZ-20/2 in the period between 26 November 2002 and 4 October 2003. The entries concerning both applicants state \u201cno bodily injuries\u201d. 15.  After their transfer to the remand prison in December 2002 the applicants made several complaints to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic of their having been subjected to torture while in police custody at ORB-2. However, the institution of criminal proceedings was refused. On 3 December 2003 the investigator S. submitted as follows:\n\u201cFollowing their transfer to the SIZO in Grozny there was a flow of complaints and applications. At the present time I cannot remember the exact dates when the decisions on the applicants\u2019 complaints and applications were made.\u201d 16.  On 14 and 18 April 2003 S. refused to institute criminal proceedings into the second applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment. The decisions were taken on the basis of statements by officers Gul. and Yakh., who denied using any physical force against him. It appears that a further complaint of ill-treatment submitted on 9 July 2003 to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic received no reply. 17.  On 25 November 2003, during the course of the trial, the applicants complained to the court that during their unrecorded detention (between 25 and 30 September in respect of the first applicant and between 19 and 24 September in respect of the second applicant) they had been subjected to torture involving electric shocks, gas masks, beatings and threats by officers of ORB-2 and forced into making a confession. The applicants alleged that one of the perpetrators had been the chief operational officer, Yakh. 18.  On the same day the Rostov Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) requested the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic to conduct an inquiry into the applicants\u2019 allegations. 19.  On 8 December 2003 D., an investigator from the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Grozny, having questioned S. (the investigator in charge of the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case against the applicants), Yakh. (the chief operational officer of ORB-2), T. (the legal aid lawyer for the applicants\u2019 co-defendant) and Ts. (the legal aid lawyer for the first applicant), as well as M. (an attesting witness in several investigative activities), refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. The decision, in so far as it concerns the applicants, reads as follows:\n\u201c[S.] submitted that he had been in charge of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case [against the applicants] and that operational assistance had been provided by officers of [ORB-2], including the chief operational officer, Yakh.\nAfter their arrest [the applicants] were placed in the temporary detention facility at [ORB-2], following which they were transferred to remand prison [illegible]. ... During the initial pre-trial investigation [the applicants] made no complaints of having been subjected to any unlawful methods of investigation. However, they subsequently made [relevant] complaints, which were decided by [S.] in the framework of the criminal case under investigation. On each occasion the [applicants\u2019] arguments were not objectively confirmed and it was decided [that a criminal investigation would not be instituted]; he could not remember the dates of the relevant decisions ... [The applicants made their statements of their own free will; they were not subjected to any violence; all investigative measures were carried out with the participation of legal aid lawyers].\nThe legal aid lawyer Ts. submitted that she had represented [the first applicant] from 30 September 2002 until the end of the preliminary investigation. During the course of the preliminary investigation [the first applicant] had not complained of having been subjected to unlawful methods of investigation and physical violence, and Ts. had not lodged any complaints of ill-treatment with the prosecutor\u2019s office on [the first applicant\u2019s] behalf.\n...\n[Yakh.] submitted that ... no physical violence had been used against [the applicants] by the officers of [ORB-2], and that [the applicants] had made their statements of their own free will.\u201d 20.  On 9 December 2003 the presiding judge received a copy of the above-mentioned decision and read it out in court. 21.  The trial court further questioned S. and the attesting witness M., who submitted that no physical force had been used against the applicants, who had made all their statements voluntarily and without coercion. S. admitted that when he had questioned the applicants at ORB-2 they had been handcuffed to the radiator to prevent them escaping. 22.  On 18 and 30 December 2003 and 12 April 2004 the applicants\u2019 lawyer asked the trial court to exclude the evidence obtained from the applicants under torture, but the requests were dismissed. 23.  During the submissions the presiding judge allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against the applicants in so far as it concerned a change to the date of the alleged murder of P. (from 30 to 29 May 2001). 24.  On 11 May 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicants, along with another co-defendant, of membership of an illegal armed group, several counts of murder, attempts on the life of law-enforcement officers and illegal possession of firearms. They were sentenced to twenty\u2011five years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicants\u2019 conviction was based on self\u2011incriminating statements given by the defendants during the pre-trial investigation in the period between September and December 2002 while they had been on the premises of ORB-2 (records of their questioning as suspects, records of their questioning as accused, records of confrontation between the parties, records of crime-scene examinations), and the findings of forensic medical examinations. The court also relied on statements by prosecution witnesses, including Ts., L. and K., and victims, although these did not link the applicants to the crimes they had been charged with. Despite the court\u2019s rulings, most of the prosecution witnesses and the victims did not attend the trial. Having regard to the challenging social situation in the Chechen Republic, where the witnesses in question lived, the court used the statements obtained from them at the pre-trial stage as evidence. The defence witnesses were all heard during the trial and provided alibis for the applicants. The court, however, excluded their testimony, as they were all either their relatives or friends. The court decided that the applicants\u2019 sentences should start to run from 25 and 19 September 2002 respectively. 25.  The applicants appealed, claiming, inter alia, that they had been subjected to ill-treatment during the pre-trial investigation and convicted on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, that they had not been afforded an opportunity to examine the prosecution witnesses and the victims, and that during the submissions the presiding judge had allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against them, thereby violating their right to defence. Attached to the second applicant\u2019s appeal were witness statements by D., the legal aid lawyer who had represented him during the pre-trial investigation. The relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201cOn 24 September 2002, when [the second applicant] was being questioned as a suspect, we saw that his back was covered in bruises. I agreed to make the relevant submissions to the [Regional Court]. However, somebody has misled the trial court, stating that I had \u201cflatly refused to make any depositions\u201d. I was not questioned during the pre-investigation inquiry, nor [did I] give any depositions to anybody except the lawyer [representing the applicants during the trial].\u201d 26.  On 18 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal and reduced the applicants\u2019 sentences to twenty-three and twenty\u2011four years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. The court held that the applicants\u2019 allegations had been reasonably found to be unsubstantiated, and that the difficult social situation in Chechnya could account for the inability to secure the attendance of the prosecution witnesses and victims. The appellate court found that the amendment of one of the charges against the applicants had not violated the applicants\u2019 right to defence since, in any event, in the statements made during the pre-trial investigation they had mentioned having committed the crime \u201cin around the spring of 2001\u201d and furthermore during the trial had denied committing it at all. 27.  On 25 October 2013 the Ust-Vymskiy District Court of the Republic of Komi reviewed the first applicant\u2019s sentence in line with amendments to the criminal law and reduced it to twenty-two years\u2019 imprisonment. 28.  Following communication of the applicants\u2019 complaint of ill\u2011treatment to the Government in October 2011, on 6 December 2011 the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district of Grozny quashed as unlawful and unsubstantiated the decision of 8 December 2003 refusing to institute a criminal investigation into the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment. An additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered, so that the applicants could be questioned concerning the circumstances of the alleged ill\u2011treatment, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the ill-treatment and any requests made for medical assistance in this connection. 29.  The case file contains no further information about the outcome of the additional pre-investigation inquiry. 30.  Following the applicants\u2019 conviction, in September 2004 their families requested the head of the Rostov Regional Department of the Russian Federal Penal Authority (\u201cthe FSIN\u201d) to allocate them to penal facilities in regions adjacent to their home region, the Chechen Republic. 31.  In November 2004 the first applicant was allocated to a strict-regime correctional colony in the Republic of Komi, located over 3,000 kilometres from the Chechen Republic. 32.  In December 2004 the second applicant was allocated to a strict\u2011regime correctional colony in the Omsk Region, located over 3,400 kilometres from the Chechen Republic. 33.  On 22 August 2005 the first applicant\u2019s family asked the head of the FSIN to transfer him to a penal facility in a less remote region. They referred, in particular, to his state of health (tuberculosis) and indicated that appropriate facilities were available in the Republic of Kalmykia. Their request was rejected. 34.  The second applicant and his family lodged requests with the Omsk regional prosecutor, the head of the FSIN, the Prosecutor General of Russia and the Ombudsman for the Omsk Region seeking the applicant\u2019s transfer to a less remote penal facility. They argued that he was serving a twenty\u2011four year sentence over 3,400 km from his home region, and that his parents had difficulties travelling long distances in view of their advanced age. It was likely that over time they would be unable to travel and would have no opportunity to visit their son. 35.  In May 2006 the FSIN refused the second applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that there were no strict-regime penal facilities in the Chechen Republic and no exceptional circumstances preventing him serving his sentence in the Omsk Region. Reference was made to Article 73 \u00a7 2 and Article 81 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (\u201cthe CES\u201d). 36.  On 18 July 2006 the applicants and their families complained to the Supreme Court of Russia that the applicants were being detained in penal facilities far from their home region and asked it to facilitate contact. The complaint reached the court on 28 July 2006. The case file contains no further information as to the outcome of this request. 37.  On 4 December 2006 the second applicant asked the Prosecutor General of Russia to transfer him to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic or a nearby region. He pointed to difficulties in terms of family visits and contact. 38.  On 15 March 2007 the FSIN again rejected the second applicant\u2019s request. 39.  On 30 July 2009 the FSIN rejected the first applicant\u2019s request to be transferred to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic, with reference to Article 73 \u00a7 4 and Article 81 \u00a7 2 of the CES. 40.  Subsequently, on an unspecified date the second applicant was transferred from the correctional colony in the Omsk Region to a correctional colony in the Murmansk Region, located over 3,700 km from the Chechen Republic.", "references": ["8", "6", "7", "9", "2", "5", "0", "No Label", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["1", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr \u0130rfan D\u00fcndar and Mr F\u0131rat Ayd\u0131nkaya, were born in 1972 and 1979 respectively and live in Istanbul. At the material time, the applicants were the legal representatives of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation. 6.  On 29 and 30 April 2004 the newspaper \u00dclkede \u00d6zg\u00fcr G\u00fcndem published two interviews with the applicants. The interviews contained the applicants\u2019 statements following meetings with their client, Abdullah \u00d6calan, in prison. The first interview was included in two articles in the issue of 29 April 2004 entitled \u201cLawyers convey Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s opinions concerning developments within the KONGRA-GEL[1]\u201d and \u201cThe pain of change\u201d. The second interview published on 30 April 2004 was entitled \u201cAbdullah \u00d6calan is an opportunity for Turkey\u201d and \u201cAbdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s opinions are important for an enduring peace\u201d. 7.  In their interviews published on 29 April 2004 in the two articles cited above, the applicants commented on the following issues: the difficulties they encountered in getting to \u0130mral\u0131 island, where Abdullah \u00d6calan was detained, their need to have a meeting with their client prior to the hearing to be held before the European Court of Human Rights on 9 June 2004, their client\u2019s state of health , the alleged fake news published in some newspapers regarding the applicants\u2019 meetings with their client, their client\u2019s opinions regarding the current state of politics in Turkey, in particular his view that democrats in Turkey should form a coalition with a view to establishing social peace and enabling Turkey\u2019s access in European Union, Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s views on the conflicts occurring within the KONGRA\u2011GEL, and in particular, his views that democratisation of the \u201cKurdish organisations\u201d would allow the State of Turkey to be more democratic, his opinions on the pro-Kurdish legal political parties, and his view that individuals should liberate themselves before trying to liberate others. 8.  In the interview published the following day, 30 April 2004, the applicants made statements on the following issues: Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s criticism of the failure of the pro-Kurdish political groups during the municipal elections held on 28 March 2004, the view of Abdullah \u00d6calan and his lawyers that \u201cthe Kurdish movement\u201d had failed to take into account Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s opinions and projects, the criminal and disciplinary investigations and the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicants for disseminating their client\u2019s views, Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s criticism of \u201cKurdish organisations\u201d, problems between Abdullah \u00d6calan and the leaders of the \u201cKurdish movement\u201d, the applicants\u2019 role both as legal and political representatives of Abdullah \u00d6calan and their meetings with individuals close to the State of Turkey as well as representatives of foreign States on behalf of their client, and the applicants\u2019 view that Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s opinions offered an opportunity for resolving the Kurdish issue in a democratic/political manner and that his opinions had transformed the State of Turkey. 9.  On 30 April 2004 the public prosecutor at the now defunct Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), charging the applicants with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL on account of the interview published on 29 April 2004. In the indictment, the applicants were accused of acting on \u00d6calan\u2019s instructions and conveying messages from him about the PKK\u2019s strategy. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicants before the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  On 7 May 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a second bill of indictment against the applicants, again charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on account of the interview published in the 30 April 2004 issue of the newspaper. 11.  On 24 August 2004 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicants owing to the factual and legal similarities between them. 12.  During the proceedings the applicants maintained that they had made the statements with a view to providing information to the press, since the case against Abdullah \u00d6calan had attracted media interest, but that they had been misquoted to a certain extent in the newspaper. They stressed that they had not acted with the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of any illegal organisation. 13.  On 18 February 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA\u2011GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. It sentenced them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment each, but decided to suspend pronouncement of their convictions on condition that they did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14.  In its judgment, the Istanbul court held that the applicants had overstepped the limits of the lawyer-client relationship and made statements in a manner that induced and promoted the adoption, dissemination and enrootment of Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s opinions in society. The first-instance court considered that in the light of the applicants\u2019 role, the readers they targeted, the aim of the publication, and the manner in which their applicants\u2019 interviews were perceived by the readership, the interviews could not be deemed to be protected by the right to freedom of expression or the privilege of the lawyer-client relationship. The court further considered that the right to freedom of expression carried with it duties and responsibilities and could be restricted for the purpose of protecting national security and territorial integrity in a democratic society. The Istanbul Assize Court concluded that the reported interviews were aimed at disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and found the applicants guilty. 15.  On 20 September 2010 the applicants\u2019 objection to the assize court\u2019s judgment was dismissed by the same court.", "references": ["1", "7", "0", "8", "3", "9", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Split. 5.  On 16 January 1961 the Municipal Institute for Social Insurance in Split (which later became the Croatian Pension Fund and is therefore hereinafter referred as such) awarded the applicant, as its employee, the specially protected tenancy (stanarsko pravo) of a socially-owned flat in Gajeva Street in Split, with a surface area of 37 square metres. 6.  On 19 April 1969 the applicant married a certain M.M. and went to live in the flat in respect of which he held a specially protected tenancy. 7.  On 2 October 1972 the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army awarded the applicant\u2019s husband, as a serviceman, a socially-owned flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street in Split, with a surface area of 62 square metres, with a view to satisfying the housing needs of him and his family (the applicant and their two sons, who were both less than two years old at the time). 8.  The applicant, her husband and their two sons moved into that flat some time in 1973. Pursuant to the relevant legislation (see paragraph 45 below), the applicant thereby, as her husband\u2019s wife, automatically became a co-holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. 9.  Once the applicant moved out from the flat in Gajeva Street her brother moved in. He remained living there with his family until 1982, when he moved out. 10.  The applicant stated that in May 1982 she had moved out of the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street and returned to the flat in Gajeva Street to live there with her elderly mother and to take care of her. She stated that she had lived there until her eviction on 16 May 2012 (see paragraph 38 below). 11.  On 22 June 1982 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund, as the provider of the flat in Gajeva Street, for permission to exchange the flats in Gajeva and \u0160imi\u0107eva Streets for a single, larger flat, a possibility provided for under section 49(3) of the 1974 Housing Act (see paragraph 48 below). 12.  On 30 June 1982 the Croatian Pension Fund refused its consent for the exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. It held that the applicant had been for many years using two socially-owned flats, which was contrary to the law (see paragraph 45 below). 13.  The applicant then instituted administrative proceedings before the relevant first-instance administrative authority charged with housing affairs (hereinafter \u201cthe first-instance housing authority\u201d), applying for permission to exchange the two flats for a single, larger one (see paragraph 48 below). The Croatian Pension Fund, for its part, on 13 July 1982 instituted administrative proceedings before the same authority, seeking her eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street. The two administrative proceedings were subsequently joined. 14.  At the hearing held on 16 September 1982, the applicant stated that after her brother had moved out of the flat in Gajeva Street she had moved in with her mother who was, owing to her age, in need of care and no longer able to live alone (see paragraphs 9-10 above). 15.  By a decision of 17 December 1982, the first-instance housing authority dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an exchange of flats, and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. That authority held:\n-  that she had permanently left the flat in in Gajeva Street in 1969, thereby losing her specially protected tenancy of that flat,\n-  that once her brother had moved out the applicant had indeed moved back into the flat in May 1982 (see paragraphs 9-10 and 14 above) but had not thereby re-acquired the specially protected tenancy of the flat.\n-  that it was therefore not possible to grant her permission for an exchange of flats because she no longer held a specially protected tenancy in respect of one of the two flats involved in the desired exchange. 16.  Following an appeal by the applicant, by a decision of 20 May 1983 the relevant second-instance administrative authority quashed the first\u2011instance decision and remitted the case. It held that the applicant retained the status of a holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. Instead of seeking her eviction, the first-instance housing authority should have followed the procedure stipulated for situations where a tenant held a specially protected tenancy in respect of two flats (see paragraph 48 below). That procedure provided for the possibility of exchanging the two flats for a single one if neither flat satisfied the housing needs of the tenant\u2019s household (but would if taken together). It instructed the first-instance housing authority to examine whether the flats in Gajeva and/or \u0160imi\u0107eva Streets satisfied the housing needs of the applicant and her family. 17.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority established that the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had fully satisfied the applicant\u2019s and her family\u2019s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 10 October 1984, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 18.  By a decision of 1 February 1985 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 10 October 1984. 19.  The applicant then brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 6 June 1985, quashed the second-instance decision of 1 February 1985 for incomplete facts and remitted the case for fresh examination. 20.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority, after collecting relevant evidence and thereby completing its earlier factual findings, again held that the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had fully satisfied the applicant\u2019s and her family\u2019s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 6 November 1987, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 21.  By a decision of 31 May 1988 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 6 November 1987. 22.  The applicant then again brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 22 December 1988, quashed the second-instance decision of 31 May 1988. The court held that the issue of whether the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had fully satisfied the applicant\u2019s and her family\u2019s housing needs had to be determined by applying relevant military housing standards and not general housing standards, given that the flat in question had been awarded to her husband as a serviceman (see paragraph 7 above). 23.  In the resumed administrative proceedings, on 25 May 1992 the applicant withdrew her application for an exchange of flats, stating the passage of time and changed family circumstances as the reasons for her withdrawal. In particular, she stated that she had in the meantime divorced (see paragraph 39 below). 24.  By a decision of 1 June 1992 the first-instance housing authority discontinued the proceedings in so far as they concerned the applicant\u2019s application for an exchange of flats. It also ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had satisfied the applicant\u2019s and her family\u2019s housing needs even according to the relevant military housing standards. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that her specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street had never been terminated and that the first-instance housing authority had not taken into account her changed circumstances \u2013 that is to say her divorce and the fact that she had not been using two flats. 25.  By a decision of 14 January 1993 the relevant ministry, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision of 1 June 1992. 26.  The applicant then, for the third time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 26 May 1993. 27.  Following a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za za\u0161titu zakonitosti) by the Principal State Attorney, on 12 July 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Court and the administrative authorities had wrongly applied the relevant military housing standards to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court also held that the issue of whether the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had satisfied the applicant\u2019s and her family\u2019s housing needs had to be determined having regard to the circumstances existing at the time she had moved into that flat in in 1973 and that the subsequent change in circumstances was of no relevance. 28.  In the resumed proceedings, by a decision of 6 December 1999 the first-instance housing authority again ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that at the time that she had moved into the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street the latter flat had satisfied her and her family\u2019s housing needs, having regard to the relevant military housing standards. That authority also reiterated that the subsequent changes in her family situation were irrelevant. 29.  On 29 March 2000 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision, which thereby became definitive and enforceable. 30.  The applicant then, for the fourth time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 12 June 2003. 31.  The Principal State Attorney then again lodged a request for the protection of legality. 32.  By a judgment of 16 September 2004 the Supreme Court allowed that request, quashed the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that, because the proceedings concerned the applicant\u2019s eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street, the issue of whether the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street had satisfied her and her family\u2019s housing needs had to be determined in accordance with general and not military housing standards. 33.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 12 May 2005 the Administrative Court again dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. 34.  The applicant then, on 3 April 2006, lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a violation of her constitutional right to fair procedure. She argued, inter alia, that the administrative and judicial authorities had not taken into account the fact that she had divorced her husband and thus had no longer needed to exchange the flats nor the fact that she had not been using two flats. She also mentioned that she had been living in the flat in Gajeva Street together with her son, D.M., and his family (his wife and daughter), as members of her household. 35.  On 13 December 2006 the Constitutional Court issued an interim measure whereby it temporarily postponed the enforcement of the first\u2011instance decision of 6 December 1999 (see paragraph 28 above) pending the adoption of its decision on the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. 36.  By a decision of 13 July 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. 37.  Meanwhile, on 14 March 2003 the first-instance housing authority issued an enforcement order with a view to executing its decision of 6 December 1999 and evicting the applicant by force (see paragraph 28 above). 38.  The enforcement was postponed following several judicial decisions. A first attempted eviction took place on 28 November 2006 but it was agreed to postpone it, the applicant being in poor medical condition. On 16 May 2012 the applicant was evicted. The records drawn up by the enforcement officer show that the applicant was present during both the attempted eviction and the actual eviction. 39.  By a judgment of 30 March 1992 the Split Municipal Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and her husband. 40.  On 8 May 1992 the applicant obtained a declaratory judgment by the same court whereby she was declared the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street. The judgment was rendered in the context of civil proceedings she had instituted against her husband and was based exclusively on her husband\u2019s admission of her claim, that is, without taking any evidence. 41.  On 9 January 1996 the applicant\u2019s former husband M.M. purchased the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street from the State and thereby became its sole owner \u2013 a possibility open to all holders of specially protected tenancies of socially-owned flats under the Specially Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act of 1991. Beforehand, on 27 November 1995 the applicant and her husband concluded an agreement whereby they both agreed that he was the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of that flat. 42.  It would appear that before selling the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street to the applicant\u2019s husband, on 13 November 1995 the Ministry of Defence, as the State authority responsible for management of the flat at the time, conducted an on-spot inspection of the flat. Enclosed with the minutes of the inspection was a statement by the tenants\u2019 board that, along with M.M. and his two sons, a wife (that is to say the applicant) was also living in the flat as an unregistered member of the household. 43.  The Government submitted that the applicant was currently living in the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street owned by her former husband M.M. In support of their contention they furnished a certificate of domicile which indicates that since 19 September 2012 the applicant has had her domicile registered at the address of the flat in \u0160imi\u0107eva Street. The certificate also indicates that before that date she had had her registered domicile at the address of the flat in Gajeva Street since 9 August 1962. 44.  The Government furnished evidence that the applicant was the co\u2011owner of a number of properties in the Split area, including two houses.", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "6", "5", "7", "9", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and at the time of introduction of the application to the Court he was detained in Diavata Prison. 6.  The applicant is serving a life sentence for drug dealing. He was initially placed in Diavata Prison from 1 October 2014 until 24 November 2015. On that date he was transferred to Malandrino Prison, from where he was transferred back to Diavata Prison on 9 May 2016. Lastly, on 20 December 2016 he was transferred back to Malandrino Prison. 7.  The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 8.  Apart from the overcrowding, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had been very poor. Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate. Sanitary facilities and supplies had been old, broken and insufficient to ensure the detainees\u2019 well\u2011being and personal hygiene. Heating had been provided only for one hour per day from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m., while hot water during winter had been provided for two hours per day and had not sufficed for all detainees. They had been forced to wash themselves using buckets of water, as the water pressure in showers had been insufficient. In each ten-person cell there had been five bunk beds, five stools, a small table and five side tables but no lockable space for personal belongings. In the four-person cell there had been two bunk beds and two stools. The mattresses had been old, mouldy and smelly, and sheets and towels had not been provided. 9.  In general, detainees had lacked access to cultural, recreational and sports activities. They had had to rely on visits from friends and family in order to obtain any newspapers or magazines, which had intensified their feeling of isolation. The hours that they had been allowed to spend in the corridors had been insufficient, taking into account that they had coincided with the meal times as well as with the times they had been allowed to receive visits or make phone calls. The yard had included a football field but no balls had been provided to the detainees and the yard had not offered any opportunities for spending time creatively. The applicant further complained of the quantity and the quality of the food, claiming that it had been repetitive and lacking any nutritional value. 10.  Lastly, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had led him having several cardiac arrests. 11.  The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m. 12.  As regards the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Government argued that the prison had had a central heating system, in addition to the electric heating devices that had been provided to each cell. The cell in which the applicant had been detained had had large windows. Detainees had had access to hot water and had been provided regularly with personal hygiene products. The cells had been regularly disinfected. As regards prisoners\u2019 meals, the Government submitted the menu of various random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 13.  The Government submitted the applicant\u2019s medical file in order to prove that the applicant had already suffered from cardiac conditions when his incarceration had started. The applicant\u2019s medical needs had been fully fulfilled during the time he had spent in Diavata Prison either by visits to the prison doctor or by his transfer to nearby hospitals. Lastly, the applicant had been granted fifteen days of leave in order to take matriculation exams.", "references": ["4", "3", "9", "2", "6", "0", "7", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Montana. 6.  On 20 August 1997 the applicant\u2019s daughter was killed in a traffic accident. Several other people were killed or injured as well. The accident was the fault of H.H., a lorry driver. 7.  Criminal proceedings were opened against H.H. and in 1998 he was indicted and brought to court. At the first court hearing the relatives of the other victims brought civil claims against H.H. and his employer. The applicant did not bring such a claim. 8.  In a judgment of 30 June 1999 the Vidin Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) convicted H.H. of negligently causing the deaths of several people, including the applicant\u2019s daughter, and injuring others, and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. It allowed the civil claims, finding H.H. and his employer jointly liable to pay damages to the civil parties. 9.  Upon appeal, the Regional Court\u2019s judgment was quashed on 19 April 2000 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). Finding serious breaches of the procedural rules, it remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities, so that it could be restarted from the stage of the preliminary investigation. 10.  On an unspecified date in 2000 or 2001 the prosecution prepared a new indictment against H.H. and he was once again brought to court. 11.  The first court hearing was held on 30 March 2001. The Regional Court accepted for examination a civil claim against H.H. and his employer brought by the applicant, and recognised her as civil party to the proceedings. 12.  In a judgment of 18 September 2002 the Regional Court convicted H.H. of causing the deaths of several people and injuring others, and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. In addition, it awarded damages to the remaining civil claimants \u2013 damages due jointly from H.H. and his employer \u2013 but it did not make any decision in respect of the applicant\u2019s claim. 13.  On 12 March 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld H.H.\u2019s conviction, reducing his sentence. That part of the judgment became final on 8 October 2003 when it was upheld by the Supreme Court of Cassation. However, as concerns the civil claims, the Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It reasoned that the Regional Court had committed serious procedural breaches by, among other things, not taking a decision on the applicant\u2019s claim. 14.  The Regional Court examined the case for a third time, only in relation to the part concerning the civil claims, and on 6 April 2004 gave a judgment. It ordered H.H. and his employer to pay damages to the civil parties, including 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN \u2013 the equivalent of 5,100 euros (EUR)), plus default interest, to the applicant. 15.  Upon an appeal by H.H. and his employer, on 8 March 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment in so far as it concerned the award made to the applicant, and discontinued the examination of her claim. It found that that claim was inadmissible, on the grounds that it had been submitted outside the time-limit provided for in Article 61 \u00a7 4 of the 1974 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 22 below). It pointed out that the requirement under that provision that a claim should be brought before the commencement of the examination of a case by a court had to be interpreted as referring to the initial examination by a court of first instance. The applicant had brought her claim during the subsequent examination of the case, after its remittal. 16.  Upon an appeal by the applicant, that conclusion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 4 March 2007. 17.  On 22 August 2007 the applicant brought a tort action against H.H. and his employer before the civil courts. She claimed BGN 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus default interest as of 20 August 1997. 18.  In a judgment of 17 July 2008 the Sofia District Court dismissed the claim. It held that the applicant\u2019s inadmissible civil claim brought in the context of the criminal proceedings could not have interrupted the running of the relevant limitation period, which was five years. Only a claim brought in accordance with the relevant procedural requirements and subsequently found to be well-founded could have had such an effect. In addition, even if the running of the limitation period could be considered to have been interrupted by the applicant\u2019s bringing her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings, that interruption had been retroactively invalidated by the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 8 March 2006 finding that the claim was inadmissible and discontinuing the proceedings. Accordingly, the running of the limitation period \u2013 which had started in 1997 because the perpetrator\u2019s identity had been known immediately after the accident in which the applicant\u2019s daughter had died \u2013 had never been validly interrupted. The applicant\u2019s claim for damages, brought ten years later, was time-barred. The applicant had brought her claim before a tribunal, namely the criminal court, which had been barred from examining it; this meant that this tribunal had had to transfer the claim to the civil courts with jurisdiction, but this had not been done. 19.  The applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by a judgment of the Sofia City Court of 13 March 2009. While it considered the applicant\u2019s claim well-founded in principle, since the tort resulting in the liability of H.H. and his employer had been proven, that court agreed that the claim was time-barred. It pointed out that the applicant\u2019s bringing her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings could only have interrupted the running of the relevant time-limit if the claim had been allowed. However, after the proceedings had been discontinued, in the absence of recognition of the applicant\u2019s right to receive damages, the time-limit had to be considered to have never been interrupted. The applicant had to bear the adverse consequences of having brought her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings in breach of the rules, and this was so notwithstanding the fact that the claim had been, erroneously, initially accepted for examination by the Regional Court. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a final decision of 9 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal for a cassation review.", "references": ["1", "4", "5", "6", "2", "0", "9", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bielsk Podlaski. 5.  The facts of the case were not in dispute and may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was detained in Siedlce Prison from 26 January to 19 April 2007 and from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 7.  The applicant submitted that, during his detention in Siedlce Prison, he had been held in cells where the amount of space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2. He also submitted that he had been held in cells with smokers. Moreover, he raised the problems of humidity, lack of hygiene and warm water and limited access to make telephone calls. 8.  The domestic courts found that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell during his detention in Siedlce Prison from 15 July to 15 October 2009 (91 days), when he had been assigned to cell no. 616 (15.94 m\u00b2) with 5 other prisoners (2.65 m\u00b2 per person). 9.  The courts further found that the toilet areas had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells in compliance with the relevant law. The toilet annex had only cold running water. It was further noted that the cells were adequately equipped. The applicant was held in cells in accordance with his declaration about his tobacco habits. 10.  On 13 July 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in an overcrowded cell in Siedlce Prison. He claimed 43,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (10,750 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 11.  On 30 May 2014 the Siedlce District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It confirmed, however, that the applicant had been detained temporarily in an overcrowded cell, from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 12.  On 17 February 2015 the Siedlce Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "5", "4", "3", "0", "9", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Strzelce Opolskie Prison. 6.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was detained in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 8.  The parties\u2019 statements relating to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 are to a large extent contradictory. 9.  The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2. 10.  In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells only on 20 April, 18 and 19 May 2009. 11.  In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant (see paragraphs 14-16 below), the domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 12.  Regarding the conditions of detention in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre, the domestic court established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 13.  Regarding the conditions of detention in Wojkowice Prison, as established by the domestic courts, the toilets were separated from the cell\u2019s living area, every prisoner had his own bed, a stool and access to cold running water. The prisoners had basic hygiene products at their disposal. The ceiling was infested with humidity. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 14.  On 24 February 2012 the applicant brought a civil action for the infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate living conditions in Wojkowice Prison from November 2005 to July 2006 and from January to March 2007, in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and, subsequently, again in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the statutory minimum of 3 m\u00b2. He claimed 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 15.  On 18 December 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in cells above the minimum statutory standard. As regards the remainder of the period, the claim was time-barred as lodged outside the three-year period of statutory limitation. 16.  On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court\u2019s judgment and allowed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant\u2019s submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN 1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant.", "references": ["3", "7", "5", "8", "4", "2", "6", "9", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Ms Mariya Vladimirovna Alekhina, was born in 1988. The second applicant, Ms Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova, was born in 1989. The third applicant, Ms Yekaterina Stanislavovna Samutsevich, was born in 1982. The applicants live in Moscow. 6.  The three applicants are members of a Russian feminist punk band, Pussy Riot. The applicants founded Pussy Riot in late 2011. The group carried out a series of impromptu performances of their songs Release the Cobblestones, Kropotkin Vodka, Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest and Putin Wet Himself in various public areas in Moscow, such as a subway station, the roof of a tram, on top of a booth and in a shop window. 7.   According to the applicants, their actions were a response to the ongoing political process in Russia and the highly critical opinion which representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, including its leader Patriarch Kirill, had expressed about large-scale street protests in Moscow and many other Russian cities against the results of the parliamentary elections of December 2011. They were also protesting against the participation of Vladimir Putin in the presidential election that was due in early March 2012. 8.  The applicants argued that their songs contained \u201cclear and strongly worded political messages critical of the government and expressing support for feminism, the rights of minorities and the ongoing political protests\u201d. The group performed in disguise, with its members wearing brightly coloured balaclavas and dresses, in various public places selected to enhance their message. 9.  Following a performance of Release the Cobblestones in October 2011, several Pussy Riot members, including the second and third applicants, were arrested and fined under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences for organising and holding an unauthorised assembly. On 14 December 2011 three members of the group performed on the roof of a building at temporary detention facility no. 1 in Moscow. The performance was allegedly held in support of protesters who had been arrested and placed in that facility for taking part in street protests in Moscow on 5 December 2011. The band performed Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest and hung a banner saying \u201cFreedom to Protest\u201d on it from the roof of the building. No attempt to arrest the band was made. A video of the performance was published on the Internet. 10.  On 20 January 2012 eight members of the band held a performance entitled Riot in Russia at Moscow\u2019s Red Square. The group sang a song called Putin Wet Himself. All eight members of the band were arrested and fined under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the same as before. 11.  In response to the public support and endorsement provided by Patriarch Kirill to Mr Putin, members of Pussy Riot wrote a protest song called Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away. A translation of the lyrics is as follows:\n\u201cVirgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away\nDrive Putin away, drive Putin away\nBlack robe, golden epaulettes\nParishioners crawl to bow\nThe phantom of liberty is in heaven\nGay pride sent to Siberia in chains\nThe head of the KGB, their chief saint,\nLeads protesters to prison under escort\nSo as not to offend His Holiness\nWomen must give birth and love\nShit, shit, holy shit!\nShit, shit, holy shit!\nVirgin Mary, Mother of God, become a feminist\nBecome a feminist, become a feminist\nThe Church\u2019s praise of rotten dictators\nThe cross-bearer procession of black limousines\nA teacher-preacher will meet you at school\nGo to class - bring him cash!\nPatriarch Gundyaev believes in Putin\nBitch, better believe in God instead\nThe girdle of the Virgin can\u2019t replace rallies\nMary, Mother of God, is with us in protest!\nVirgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away\nDrive Putin away, drive Putin away.\u201d 12.  On 18 February 2012 a performance of the song was carried out at the Epiphany Cathedral in the district of Yelokhovo in Moscow. The applicants and two other members of the band wearing brightly coloured balaclavas and dresses entered the cathedral, set up an amplifier, a microphone and a lamp for better lighting and performed the song while dancing. The performance was recorded on video. No complaint to the police was made in relation to that performance. 13.  On 21 February 2012 five members of the band, including the three applicants, attempted to perform Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away from the altar of Moscow\u2019s Christ the Saviour Cathedral. No service was taking place, although a number of persons were inside the Cathedral. The band had invited journalists and media to the performance to gain publicity. The attempt was unsuccessful as cathedral guards quickly forced the band out, with the performance only lasting slightly over a minute. 14.  The events unfolded as follows. The five members of the band, dressed in overcoats and carrying bags or backpacks, stepped over a low railing and ran up to the podium in front of the altar (the soleas). After reaching the steps, the band removed their coats, showing their characteristic brightly coloured dresses underneath. They also put on coloured balaclavas. They placed their bags on the floor and started taking things out of them. At that moment the video recorded someone calling out for security and a security guard then ran up the steps to the band. The band member dressed in white, the third applicant, pulled a guitar from her bag and tried to put the strap over her shoulder. Another guard ran up to the second applicant and started pulling her away. Moments later the band started singing the song without any musical accompaniment. The guard let go of the second applicant and grabbed the third applicant by the arm, including her guitar, at the same time calling on his radio for help. The radio fell out of his hand but he did not let go of the third applicant and pushed her down the steps. While the third applicant was being pushed away by the guard, three of the other band members continued singing and dancing without music. Words such as \u201choly shit\u201d, \u201ccongregation\u201d and \u201cin heaven\u201d were audible on the video recording. At the same time the second applicant was trying to set up a microphone and a music player. She managed to turn the player on and music started playing. A uniformed security guard grabbed the player and took it away. At the same time four band members, including the first two applicants, continued singing and dancing on the podium, kicking their legs in the air and throwing their arms around. Two cathedral employees grabbed the first applicant and another band member dressed in pink. She ran away from the security guard, while the second applicant kneeled down and started making the sign of the cross and praying. The band continued singing, kneeled down and started crossing themselves and praying. 15.  Cathedral staff members escorted the band away from the altar. The video-recording showed that the last band member left the altar one minute and thirty-five seconds after the beginning of the performance. The guards accompanied the band to the exit of the cathedral, making no attempt to stop them or the journalists from leaving. 16.  A video containing footage of the band\u2019s performances of the song, both at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo and at Christ the Saviour Cathedral, was uploaded to YouTube. 17.  On 21 February 2012 a deputy director general of private security company Kolokol-A, Mr O., complained to the head of the Khamovniki district police in Moscow of \u201ca violation of public order\u201d by a group of unidentified people in Christ the Saviour Cathedral. Mr O. stated that at 11.20 a.m. that day unidentified individuals had screamed and danced on \u201cthe premises of the cathedral\u201d, thus \u201cinsulting the feelings of members of the church\u201d. The individuals had not responded to reprimands by churchgoers, clergymen or guards. 18.  A similar complaint was lodged three days later by the acting director of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral Fund, Mr P. He called the applicants\u2019 conduct disorderly, extremist and insulting to Orthodox churchgoers and the Russian Orthodox Church. Mr P. also stated that the band\u2019s actions had been aimed at stirring up religious intolerance and hatred. Printouts of photographs of the band\u2019s performances and the full lyrics of Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away, downloaded from the group\u2019s website, were attached to the complaint. 19.  On 24 February 2012 the police instituted criminal proceedings. Cathedral staff members and guards were questioned. They stated that their religious feelings had been offended by the incident and that they could identify three of the band members as they had taken off their balaclavas during the performance. 20.  On 3 March 2012 the second applicant was arrested. The first applicant was apprehended the following day. They were charged with the aggravated offence of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.\nThe third applicant was also stopped by the police in the street and taken in for questioning on 3 March 2012. She had no identification documents and did not provide her real name, instead identifying herself as Ms Irina Vladimirovna Loktina. Her mobile telephone and a computer flash drive were seized and she was released after the interview. 21.  On 5 March 2012 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow issued separate detention orders to remand the first two applicants in custody until 24 April 2012. In terms of the circumstances precluding the application of a less stringent measure to the applicants, the court cited the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty they faced, the \u201ccynicism and insolence of the crime\u201d the applicants were charged with, their choice not to live at their places of permanent residence, their lack of permanent \u201clegal\u201d sources of income, the first applicant\u2019s failure to care for her child and the second applicant\u2019s right to move to and reside in Canada. It also cited the fact that certain members of Pussy Riot were still unidentified or on the run. 22.  The detention orders became final on 14 March 2012, when the Moscow City Court upheld them on appeal, fully endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. 23.  The third applicant was placed in custody on 16 March 2012 by the Taganskiy District Court after finally being identified by the police and charged with the same criminal offence as the first two applicants. The District Court found that the risks of the third applicant absconding, reoffending and perverting the course of justice warranted her detention. Those risks were linked by the court to the following considerations: the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty she faced, her unwillingness to identify other members of the band, her lack of a permanent legal source of income, and her use of an assumed identity while communicating with the police on previous occasions. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 28 March 2012. 24.  By three separate detention orders issued on 19 April 2012 the Taganskiy District Court further extended the applicants\u2019 detention until 24 June 2012. Citing the grounds it had used to substantiate the need for the applicants\u2019 placement in custody, the District Court concluded that no new circumstances warranting their release had come to light. It also noted the first applicant\u2019s blanket refusal to confess to the offence with which she had been charged or to any other act prohibited by the Russian Criminal Code. It also stated that the applicants\u2019 arrests had only been possible due to searches conducted by the Russian police as it had not been possible to find them at their places of permanent residence. 25.  On 20 June 2012 the Taganskiy District Court once again extended the applicants\u2019 detention, citing the same reasons as in the previous detention orders. On 9 July 2012 the Moscow City Court agreed that it was necessary to continue holding the applicants in custody. 26.  In a pre-trial hearing on 20 July 2012 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow allowed an application by a prosecutor for a further extension of the applicants\u2019 detention, finding that the circumstances which had initially called for their being held on remand had not changed. The applicants were to remain in custody until 12 January 2013. The District Court dismissed the arguments the applicants put forward pertaining to their family situation (the first two applicants had young children), the fragile health of the second applicant, the fact that the three applicants had registered their places of residence in Moscow and that the criminal proceedings against them were already at a very advanced stage. The court also refused to accept personal written sureties given by fifty-seven individuals, including famous Russian actors, writers, film producers, journalists, businessmen, singers and politicians. 27.  On 22 August 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 20 July 2012, considering it lawful and well-founded. 28.  In the meantime, investigators ordered expert opinions to determine whether the video-recording including the performance of Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away downloaded from the Internet was motivated by religious hatred, whether the performance of the song at the cathedral could therefore amount to incitement of religious hatred, and whether it had been an attack on the religious feelings of Orthodox believers. In the first two reports, commissioned by a State expert bureau and issued on 2 April and 14 May 2012 respectively, five experts answered in the negative to those questions. In particular, the experts concluded that the applicants\u2019 actions on 21 February 2012 at Christ the Saviour Cathedral had not contained any signs of a call or an intention to incite religious hatred or enmity. The experts concluded that the applicants had not been violent or aggressive, had not called for violence in respect of any social or religious group and had not targeted or insulted any religious group. 29.  A third expert opinion subsequently requested by the investigators from directly appointed individual experts produced an entirely different response. In a report issued on 23 May 2012 three experts \u2013 a professor from the Gorky Institute of World Literature, a professor at the Moscow City Psychological Pedagogical University, and the President of a regional NGO, the Institute of State Confessional Relations and Law \u2013 concluded that the performance and video had been motivated by religious hatred, in particular hatred and enmity towards Orthodox believers, and had insulted the religious feelings of such believers. 30.  On 20 July 2012 the three applicants were committed to stand trial before the Khamovnicheskiy District Court. The trial was closely followed by national and international media. 31.  The trial court dismissed numerous complaints by the applicants related to the negative impact of security measures in place at the courthouse on their right to communicate freely with counsel and to prepare their defence. In particular, in applications to the trial court of 23 July 2012 for time for a confidential meeting with their lawyers, they stated that confidential communication was impossible because of the presence of police officers and court ushers around the dock. The applicants raised the issue again in a similar application on 24 July 2012, which was repeated at a hearing on 30 July 2012. 32.  The applicants provided the following description of the hearings. Throughout the trial they were held in an enclosed dock with glass walls and a tight-fitting door, which was commonly known as an \u201caquarium\u201d. There was insufficient ventilation inside the glass dock and it was hard to breathe, given the high summer temperatures. A desk for the applicants\u2019 lawyers was installed in front of the dock. There was always high security around the dock, which at times included seven armed police officers and a guard dog. Colour photographs of the courtroom submitted by the applicants show police officers and court ushers surrounding the dock, either behind or close to the defence lawyers\u2019 desk. Some photographs show female police officers positioned between the lawyers\u2019 desk and the glass dock containing the applicants. The applicants had to use a small window measuring 15 x 60 cm to communicate with their lawyers, which they had to bend down to use as it was only a metre off the ground. The applicants had to take turns to speak to their lawyers as the window was too small for all three to use it simultaneously. According to the applicants, confidential communication with their defence team was impossible as a police officer always stood nearby monitoring their conversations and any documents which were passed between them. Furthermore, a dog was present in the courtroom, which was at times particularly disturbing as it had barked during the hearings and behaved restlessly. 33.  According to the applicants, it was virtually impossible to communicate with their lawyers outside the courtroom as they were taken back to the detention facility at night, when it was too late to be allowed visitors. 34.  The lawyers applied several times to the District Court for permission to hold confidential meetings with the applicants. The lawyers and applicants also sought an adjournment of the hearings to give the defence an opportunity to consult their clients in private, either in the courthouse or in the detention facility, but those requests were fruitless. 35.  Similarly, the court dismissed applications to call the experts who had issued the three expert reports or to call additional experts, including art historians and specialists in the fields of contemporary art and religious studies, who could have provided opinions on the nature of the performance on 21 February 2012. The defence\u2019s challenges to the third expert report issued on 23 May 2012 were also unsuccessful. 36.  According to the applicants, when there were hearings they were transported from the detention facility to court in a prison van: they were usually transported in a small vehicle when being taken to the courthouse in the morning and in a bigger one when being taken back to the detention facility in the evening. The bigger van consisted of two long sections so men and women could be transported separately. The vans had two or three compartments separated by metal partitions, each designed to accommodate one inmate. The common area of the vans was equipped with benches, while the roof was so low detainees could not stand up. The space in the common compartment of the smaller van was no more than 2 sq. m and was designed for four people, while the space in the bigger van was approximately 5 sq. m. 37.  According to the applicants, they were transported in single-person compartments to their custody hearings and in common compartments later on. Most of the time the vans were overcrowded, with detainees sitting directly against each other, with squashed up legs and shoulders. The bigger vans transported between thirty and forty detainees, making a number of stops at various Moscow facilities to pick up detainees. The vans were sometimes so full that there was no place to sit. Smoking was not prohibited but many detainees did do so. The second and third applicant had severe headaches as a result of the conditions of transport. 38.  The temperature in Moscow at the time of the trial was as high as 30oC, while inside the vans it reached 40oC. The natural ventilation in the single-person compartments was insufficient and the system of forced ventilation was rarely switched on. When it was switched on, it was only for a very short time because of the noise it made and so it was hardly ever used. A fan was switched on during the summer but did not make the conditions of the cramped space any more bearable. 39.  The journey to the courthouse usually took two to three hours, but could sometimes last as long as five hours. Detainees were not allowed to use the toilet unless the police van drove past the Moscow City Court, where inmates were allowed to relieve themselves. 40.  On the days of court hearings the applicants were woken up at 5 or 6 a.m. to carry out the necessary procedures for leaving the facility and were only taken back to the detention facility late at night. The applicants missed mealtimes at the detention facility because of such early departures and late returns. 41.  On leaving the detention facility in the morning they received a lunch box containing four packets of dry biscuits (for a total of eight each), two packets of dry cereal, one packet of dry soup and two tea bags. However, it was impossible to use the soup and tea bags as hot water was only made available to them five minutes before they were taken out of their cells to the courtroom, which was not enough time to eat. 42.  The applicants were forbidden to have drinking water with them during the hearings: requests for short breaks to drink some water and use the toilet were regularly refused, which caused them physical suffering. 43.  On 1 August 2012 an ambulance was called twice to the court because the applicants became dizzy and had headaches owing to a lack of food, water, rest and sleep. They were both times found fit for trial.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 44.  The Government provided the following information concerning the vehicles in which the applicants had been transported to and from the courthouse:\n \nVehicle\nArea and number of compartments\nNumber of places\nKAMAZ-4308-AZ\n2 common compartments\n2 single-occupancy compartments\n32\nGAZ-326041-AZ\n1 common compartment\n3 single compartments\n7\nGAZ-2705-ZA\n2 common compartments (1.35 sq.m each)\n1 single compartment (0.375 sq.m)\n9\nGAZ-3221-AZ\n2 common compartments (1.44 sq.m each)\n1 single compartment (0.49 sq.m )\n9\nGAZ-3309-AZ\n2 common compartments\n1 single compartment (total area 9.12 sq.m)\n25\nKAMAZ-OTC-577489-AZ\n2 common compartments (4.2 sq.m each)\n2 single compartments (0.4 sq.m each)\n32\nKAVZ-3976-AZ\n1 common compartment (5 places)\n6 single compartments (total area 6.3 sq.m)\n11 45.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that between 20 July and 17 August 2012 the applicants were transported between Moscow\u2019s SIZO-6 remand prison and the Khamovnicheskiy District Court twice a day for fifteen days. The trips lasted between thirty\u2011five minutes and one hour and twenty minutes. The trips back from the court lasted between twenty minutes and four hours and twenty minutes. 46.  According to the Government, the daytime temperature in Moscow in July and August 2012 only reached 30oC on 7 August 2012 and that, furthermore, the mornings and evenings, when the applicants were transported, were cooler than the temperature at midday. All the vehicles underwent a technical check and were cleaned before departure. They were also disinfected once a week. The passenger compartment had natural ventilation through windows and ventilation panes. The vehicles were also equipped with a system of forced ventilation. The passenger compartment had artificial lighting in the roof. The Government provided photographs of the vehicles and extracts from the vehicle logs to corroborate their assertion that the number of passengers never exceeded the upper limit on places given in the table in paragraph 44 above. People transported in such vehicles could use toilets in courthouses that were on the vehicles\u2019 route. 47.  The Government submitted that the area at the Khamovnicheskiy District Court where the applicants had been held before the hearings and during breaks consisted of six cells equipped with benches and forced ventilation. A kettle had also been available to them. The Government provided reports by the officers on duty at the Khamovnicheskiy District Court on the dates of the applicants\u2019 hearings to corroborate their statement that the applicants had always been provided with a lunch box and boiling water when being transported to court. 48.  On 17 August 2012 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court found the three applicants guilty under Article 213 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code of hooliganism for reasons of religious hatred and enmity and for reasons of hatred towards a particular social group. It found that they had committed the crime in a group, acting with premeditation and in concert, and sentenced each of them to two years\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court held that the applicants\u2019 choice of venue and their apparent disregard for the cathedral\u2019s rules of conduct had demonstrated their enmity towards the feelings of Orthodox believers, and that the religious feelings of those present in the cathedral had therefore been offended. While also taking into account the video-recording of the song Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away, the District Court rejected the applicants\u2019 arguments that their performance had been politically rather than religiously motivated. It stated that the applicants had not made any political statements during their performance on 21 February 2012. 49.  The District Court based its findings on the testimony of a number of witnesses, including the cathedral employees and churchgoers present during the performance on 21 February 2012 and others who, while not witnesses to the actual performance, had watched the video of Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away on the Internet or had been present at the applicants\u2019 performance at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo (see paragraph 12 above). The witnesses provided a description of the events on 21 February 2012 or of the video and attested to having been insulted by the applicants\u2019 actions. In addition, the District Court referred to statements by representatives of various religions about the insulting nature of the applicants\u2019 performance. 50.  The District Court also relied on the expert report issued on 23 May 2012, rejecting the first two expert reports for the following reasons:\n\u201c... [the expert reports issued on 2 April and 14 May 2012] cannot be used by the court as the basis for conviction as those reports were received in violation of the criminal procedural law as they relate to an examination of the circumstances of the case in light of the provisions of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code \u2013 incitement to hatred, enmity or disparagement, as can be seen from the questions put [to the experts] and the answers given by them.\nMoreover, the expert opinions do not fulfil the requirements of Articles 201 and 204 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. The reports lack any reference to the methods used during the examinations. The experts also exceeded the limits of the questions put before them; they gave answers to questions which were not mentioned in the [investigators\u2019] decisions ordering the expert examinations. The reports do not provide a linguistic and psychological analysis of the lyrics of the song performed in Christ the Saviour Cathedral, and the experts did not carry out a sentiment analysis and psychological assessment of the song\u2019s lyrics in relation to the place where the crime had been committed (an Orthodox church). [The experts] examined the lyrics of the song selectively. Given the lack of a linguistic and psychological analysis of the lyrics of the song performed in Christ the Saviour Cathedral, the experts made an unfounded and poorly reasoned conclusion, which runs counter to the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the victims of the crime, who expressed an extremely negative view of the events in Christ the Saviour Cathedral and of the video-recording.\u201d 51.  On the other hand, the District Court found the expert report of 23 May 2012 to be \u201cdetailed, well founded and scientifically reasoned\u201d. The experts\u2019 conclusions were seen by the court as substantiated and not open to dispute, given that the information received from the experts corresponded to the information received from other sources, such as the victims and the witness statements. The court also stressed that it would not call the experts or authorise an additional expert examination as it had no doubts about the conclusions made in the report in question. 52.  The District Court\u2019s main reasons for finding that the applicants had committed hooliganism motivated by religious hatred were as follows:\n\u201cThe court cannot accept the defence\u2019s argument that the defendants\u2019 actions were not motivated by religious hatred and enmity or hatred against a social group.\nThe court finds that the defendants\u2019 actions were motivated by religious hatred for the following reasons.\nThe defendants present themselves as supporters of feminism, a movement for equality between women and men.\n...\nAt the present time people belonging to the feminist movement fight for equality of the sexes in political, family and sexual relations. Belonging to the feminist movement is not unlawful and is not a criminal offence in the Russian Federation. A number of religions, such as the Orthodox Church, Catholicism and Islam, have a religious, dogmatic basis incompatible with the ideas of feminism. And while feminism is not a religious theory, its adherents interfere with various areas of social relations such as morality, rules of decency, family relations, sexual relations, including those of a non-traditional nature, which were historically constructed on the basis of religious views.\nIn the modern world, relations between nations and nationalities and between different religions must be built on the principles of mutual respect and equality. The idea that one is superior and the others inferior, that a different ideology, social group or religion are unacceptable, gives grounds for mutual enmity, hatred and personal conflicts.\nThe defendants\u2019 hatred and enmity were demonstrated in the court hearings, as was seen from their reactions, emotions and responses in the course of the examination of the victims and witnesses.\n...\nIt can be seen from the statements of the victims, witnesses, defendants and the material evidence that Pussy Riot\u2019s performances are carried out by way of a sudden appearance by the group [in public places] with the band dressed in brightly coloured clothes and wearing balaclavas to cover [their] faces. Members of the group make brusque movements with their heads, arms and legs, accompanying them with obscene language and other words of an insulting nature. That behaviour does not respect the canons of the Orthodox Church, irrespective of whether it takes place in a cathedral or outside its walls. Representatives of other religions and people who do not consider themselves believers also find such behaviour unacceptable. Pussy Riot\u2019s \u2018performances\u2019 outside religious buildings, although containing signs of clear disrespect for society motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred of a specific social group, are not associated with a specific object and therefore amount to a violation of moral standards or an offence. However, placing such a performance within an Orthodox cathedral changes the object of the crime. It represents in that case a mixture of relations between people, rules of conduct established by legal acts, morality, customs, traditions which guarantee a socially tranquil environment and the protection of individuals in various spheres of their lives, as well as the proper functioning of the State and public institutions. Violating the internal regulations of Christ the Saviour Cathedral was merely a way of showing disrespect for society, motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group.\nThe court concludes that [the applicants\u2019] actions ... offend and insult the feelings of a large group of people in the present case in view of their connection with religion, [their actions] incite feelings of hatred and enmity and therefore violate the constitutional basis of the State.\n[The applicants\u2019] intention to incite religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a specific social group in view of its connection with religion, in public, is confirmed by the following facts.\nA so-called \u2018punk prayer\u2019 was carried out in a public place \u2013 Christ the Saviour Cathedral. [The applicants] knowingly envisaged a negative response to that performance on the part of society as they had prepared bright, open dresses and balaclavas in advance and on 21 February 2012 publicly and in an organised group carried out their actions, which were motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group in view of its connection with religion.\n ...\nGiven the particular circumstances of the criminal offence, its nature, the division of the roles, the actions of the accomplices, the time, place and method of committing the offence of hooliganism, that is to say a gross violation of public order committed by a group of people acting in premeditated fashion and in concert, and which demonstrated an explicit lack of respect for society motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group, the court is convinced that [the applicants] were correctly charged with the [offence] and that their guilt in committing [it] has been proven during the trial.\n[The applicants\u2019] actions are an obvious and gross violation of generally accepted standards and rules of conduct, given the content of their actions and the place where they were carried out. The defendants violated the generally accepted rules and standards of conduct accepted as the basis of public order in Christ the Saviour Cathedral. The use of offensive language in public in the vicinity of Orthodox icons and objects of worship can only be characterised as a violation of public order, given the place where those actions were carried out. In fact, there was mockery and humiliation of the people present in the Cathedral, a violation of social tranquillity, unauthorised and wilful entry into the cathedral\u2019s ambon and soleas, accompanied by intentional, stubborn and a lengthy period of disobedience to the reprimands and orders of the guards and churchgoers.\n...\nThe court dismisses [the applicants\u2019] arguments that they had no intention to incite religious hatred or enmity or to offend the dignity of a group of people because of their religious beliefs, as those arguments were refuted by the evidence in the case. ...\nAlthough the members of Pussy Riot cite political motives for their actions, arguing that they have a positive attitude to the Orthodox religion and that their performance was directed against the uniting of Church and State, their words are refuted by their actions, lyrics and articles found [in the course of the investigation].\nThe defendants\u2019 arguments that their actions in the cathedral were not motivated by hatred or enmity towards Orthodox churchgoers and Christianity, but were governed by political considerations, are also unsubstantiated because, as can be seen from the victims\u2019 statements, no political claims were made and no names of political leaders were mentioned during the defendants\u2019 acts of disorder in the Cathedral.\u201d 53.  Citing the results of psychological expert examinations commissioned by investigators, the District Court noted that the three applicants suffered from mixed personality disorders, which did not affect their understanding of the criminal nature of the act they had carried out in the cathedral and did not call for psychiatric treatment. The psychiatric diagnosis was made on the basis of the applicants\u2019 active social position, their reliance on their personal experience when taking decisions, their determination to defend social values, the \u201cpeculiarity\u201d of their interests, their stubbornness in defending their opinion, their confidence and their disregard for social rules and standards. 54.  As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicants, the District Court ruled as follows:\n\u201cTaking into account the gravity and social danger of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the object and reasons for committing the offence, and [the applicants\u2019] attitude towards their acts, the court believes that the goals of punishment, such as the restoration of social justice, the correction of people who have been convicted and the prevention of the commission of new offences, can only be achieved by sentencing them to prison and their serving the sentence ...\u201d 55.  The two-year prison sentence was to be calculated from the date of arrest of each of the applicants, that is from 3, 4 and 15 March 2012 respectively. 56.  On 28 August 2012 the applicants\u2019 lawyers lodged an appeal on behalf of the three applicants and on 30 August 2012 the first applicant submitted an additional statement to her appeal. She stated, in particular, that throughout the trial she and the other accused had not been able to have confidential consultations with their lawyers. 57.  On 10 October 2012, the Moscow City Court decided on the appeals by upholding the judgment of 17 August 2012 as far as it concerned the first two applicants, but amended it in respect of the third applicant. Given the third applicant\u2019s \u201crole in the criminal offence [and] her attitude towards the events [of 21 February 2012]\u201d, the City Court suspended her sentence, gave her two years\u2019 probation and released her in the courtroom. The Moscow City Court did not address the issue of confidential consultations between the applicants and their lawyers. 58.  On 23 December 2013 the first and second applicants were released from serving their sentence under a general amnesty issued by the Duma on 18 December 2013, the Amnesty on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 59.  On 9 January 2014 the third applicant was also amnestied. 60.  On 8 February 2013 the Ombudsman, on behalf of the second applicant, applied to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court for supervisory review of the conviction. He argued, in particular, that the applicants\u2019 actions had not amounted to hooliganism as they could not be regarded as inciting hatred or enmity. Breaches of the normal functioning of places of worship, insults to religious feelings or the profanation of religious objects were administrative offences punishable under Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 61.  On 15 March 2013 Judge B. of the Moscow City Court refused to institute supervisory review proceedings. 62.  In a letter of 28 May 2013 the President of the Moscow City Court refused to review the decision of 15 March 2013. 63.  On 8 November 2013 the Ombudsman submitted an application for supervisory review to the Supreme Court. As well as the arguments set out in the previous application, he added that public criticism of officials, including heads of State, the government and the heads of religious communities, was a way of exercising the constitutional right to freedom of speech. 64.  On unspecified date the first and second applicants\u2019 representatives also applied for supervisory review to the Supreme Court on their behalf. They argued, inter alia, that the applicants\u2019 actions had amounted to political criticism, not incitement to hatred or enmity on religious grounds or towards any social group. Furthermore, they pointed to a number of alleged breaches of criminal procedure in the course of the trial. 65.  On 10 December 2014 the Supreme Court instituted supervisory review proceedings upon the above applications. 66.  On unspecified date the third applicant also applied for supervisory review of her conviction. 67.  On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court instituted supervisory review proceedings upon her application. 68.  On an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court for supervisory review. 69.  On 4 April 2014 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court reviewed the case. It upheld the findings that the applicants\u2019 actions had amounted to incitement to religious hatred or enmity and dismissed the arguments concerning breaches of criminal procedure at the trial. At the same time, it removed the reference to \u201chatred towards a particular social group\u201d from the judgment as it had not been established which social group had been concerned. It reduced each applicant\u2019s sentence to one year and eleven months\u2019 imprisonment. 70.  The group uploaded a video of their performance of Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo and at Christ the Saviour Cathedral to their website http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com. It was also republished by many websites. 71.  On 26 September 2012 a State Duma member, Mr S., asked the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation to study the video of the group\u2019s performance, to stop its dissemination and to ban the websites which had published it. 72.  As a result of that assessment, on 2 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy Inter-District Prosecutor applied to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for a declaration that the Internet pages http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/8459.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5164.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5763.html and http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5497.html were extremist. They contained text posted by Pussy Riot, photographs and videos of their performances, including videos for Riot in Russia, Putin Wet Himself; Kropotkin Vodka; Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest; Release the Cobblestones and Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away (see paragraph 11 above and Appendix for lyrics). The prosecutor also sought to limit access to the material in question by installing a filter to block the IP addresses of websites where the recordings had been published. 73.  After learning of the prosecutor\u2019s application through the media, the third applicant lodged an application with the District Court on 12 November 2012, seeking to join the proceedings as an interested party. She argued that her rights as a member of Pussy Riot would be affected by any court decision in the case. 74.  On 20 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court dismissed her application, finding as follows:\n\u201c Having considered [the third applicant\u2019s] argument that a decision issued in response to the prosecutor\u2019s request could affect [her] rights and obligations, the court finds this argument unsubstantiated because the judgment of 17 August 2012 issued by the Khamovnicheskiy District Court in respect of the third applicant became final on 10 October 2012; [she] was found guilty by that judgment under Article 213 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code of hooliganism committed in a group acting in premeditated fashion and in concert. That judgment can be appealed against by way of supervisory review in entirely different proceedings.\n[The third applicant\u2019s] argument that charges related to a criminal offence under Article 282 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Russian Criminal Code were severed from [the first] criminal case cannot, in the court\u2019s opinion, show that [her] rights and obligations would be influenced by the court\u2019s decision issued in respect of the prosecutor\u2019s request because there is no evidence that [she] took any part in disseminating the materials published on the Internet sites identified by the prosecutor [.] [T]here is no evidence that [she] owns those websites either.\nTherefore the court concludes that an eventual decision on the prosecutor\u2019s request for the materials to be declared extremist will not affect [the third applicant\u2019s] rights and obligations; and therefore there are no grounds for her to join the proceedings as an interested party.\u201d 75.  On 28 November 2012 the third applicant appealed against that decision. 76.  On 29 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court ruled that video content on http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com was extremist, namely the video-recordings of their performances of Riot in Russia, Putin Wet Himself; Kropotkin Vodka; Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest; Release the Cobblestones and Punk Prayer \u2013 Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away. It also ordered that access to that material be limited by a filter on the website\u2019s IP address. Relying on sections 1, 12 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act and section 10(1) and (6) of the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information, the court gave the reasons for its decision and stated as follows:\n\u201cAccording to section 1 of [the Suppression of Extremism Act], extremist activity is deemed to be constituted by, inter alia, the stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord; propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violations of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person\u2019s social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; public appeals to carry out the above-mentioned acts or the mass dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof with the aim of mass dissemination.\n...\nResults from monitoring the Internet and of a psychological linguistic expert examination performed by experts from the Federal Scientific Research University\u2019s \u2018Russian Institute for Cultural Research\u2019 state that the Internet sites http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/8459.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5164.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5763.html and http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5497.html contain video materials of an extremist nature.\nThat conclusion is confirmed by report no. 55/13 of 26 March 2012 on the results of the psychological linguistic expert examination performed by experts from the Federal Scientific Research University\u2019s \u2018Russian Institute for Cultural Research\u2019.\nThe court concludes that free access to video materials of an extremist nature may contribute to the incitement of hatred and enmity on national and religious grounds, and violates the rights of a specific group of individuals \u2013 the consumers of information services in the Russian Federation.\nThe court accepts the prosecutor\u2019s argument that the dissemination of material of an extremist nature disrupts social stability and creates a threat of damage to the life, health and dignity of individuals, to the personal security of an unidentified group of individuals and disrupts the basis of the constitutional order of the State. Accordingly, the aforementioned activities are against the public interests of the Russian Federation.\n...\nTaking the above-mentioned circumstances into account, the court finds that the prosecutor\u2019s application is substantiated and should be allowed in full.\u201d 77.  The third applicant appealed against the decision of 29 November 2012. 78.  On 14 December 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court rejected the third applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 20 November 2012 on the grounds that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for a possibility to appeal against a decision to deny an application to participate in proceedings. 79.  On 30 January 2013 the Moscow City Court dismissed an appeal by the third applicant against the decision of 14 December 2012. It found that under the Code of Civil procedure no appeal lay against a court decision on an application to join proceedings as an interested party. It noted, furthermore, that the applicant would be able to restate her arguments in her appeal against the decision on the merits of the case. 80.  On the same date the Moscow City Court left the third applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 29 November 2012 without examination. The appellate court stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... the subject in question was the extremist nature of the information placed in the Internet sources indicated by the prosecutor and the necessity to limit access to them[.] [A]t the same time, the question of [the third applicant\u2019s] rights and obligations was not examined, the impugned decision did not limit her rights, and she was not a party to the proceedings begun upon the prosecutor\u2019s application.\nTaking into account the foregoing, [the third applicant\u2019s] allegations contained in her appeal statement concerning alleged breaches of procedural rules on account of the failure to allow her to participate in proceedings which violated her rights and legal interests are unfounded and are based on an incorrect interpretation of the rules of procedural law.\nTherefore ... [the third applicant] has no right to appeal against the above decision.\u201d", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "5", "9", "4", "No Label", "6", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["6", "1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chi\u0219in\u0103u and Cau\u0219eni and the remaining applicants live in Bender. 6.  On 14 June 2006 officers Mang\u00eer, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d)[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station. 7.  The other two applicants (officers Da\u0163co and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival. 8.  The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol). 9.  On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Da\u0163co and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest. 10.  On 18 June 2006 officer Mang\u00eer was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion. 11.  On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mang\u00eer to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities released officers Mang\u00eer and Condrea. The head of the \u201cMRT\u201d secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had \u201cgiven assurances\u201d that Moldovan authorities would not \u201ckidnap people\u201d in the \u201cMRT\u201d. 12.  The applicants were accused in the \u201cMRT\u201d media of being members of \u201cblack squadrons\u201d created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the \u201cMRT\u201d secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap \u201cMRT\u201d politicians. Officers Pohila, Da\u0163co and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed. 13.  Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called \u201cPalestinian hanging\u201d for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter. 14.  The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ila\u015fcu had been detained (for more details see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004\u2011VII). 15.  During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors. 16.  After the applicants\u2019 release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued. 17.  The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mang\u00eer, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "3", "8", "9", "0", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Sverdlovsk region. The second applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vladivostok. 7.  In July 2012 the first applicant\u2019s employer, the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Primorskiy Region, provided him with a flat and concluded a tenancy agreement with him. The second applicant was included in the agreement as a member of the first applicant\u2019s family. 8.  In August 2012 the second applicant was classified as having a first\u2011degree disability. 9.  On 7 October 2014 the first applicant retired from the prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same date he applied to the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation with a request for the transfer of the title to the flat in question to him. 10.  On 8 October 2014 criminal proceedings were initiated against the first applicant in respect of a suspected criminal offence. On the same date he was arrested and on 10 October 2014 he was detained pending investigation. On an unspecified date in 2016 the first applicant was released and placed under house arrest. 11.  On 21 November 2014 the first applicant\u2019s request for the transfer of the title to flat in question to him was refused. 12.  On 25 November 2014 the first applicant received notice to vacate the flat by 5 December 2014. 13.  On 26 November 2014 the first applicant\u2019s brother received notice to vacate the flat (the notice was addressed by the prosecutor\u2019s office to the second applicant). 14.  In December 2014 the prosecutor\u2019s office brought eviction claims against the applicants on the grounds that the first applicant no longer worked for the prosecutor\u2019s office and that therefore, he and his family had to vacate the flat. 15.  The first applicant contested those claims. He submitted that it would be unlawful to evict him and his mother because he, as a retired prosecutor, had a right to acquire ownership of the flat in question. He and his mother had no other housing. In addition, his mother was a retired person and had a first-degree disability. 16.  On 27 February 2015 the Frunzenskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the eviction claims. The prosecutor\u2019s office appealed against that judgment to the Primorskiy Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d). 17.  On 8 June 2015 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 February 2015 and delivered a new decision ordering the applicants\u2019 eviction, with no alternative accommodation being provided. The first applicant was represented by a lawyer, K. The second applicant was not present and was not represented in those proceedings. In particular, the Regional Court found that the first applicant and his mother had been provided with a flat for the period of the first applicant\u2019s service in the prosecutor\u2019s office. Under domestic law and the terms of the agreement, the tenants had had to vacate the housing after the termination of the agreement and in the event of their refusal they had had to be evicted with no alternative accommodation being provided. As at the date of the examination of the eviction claims the first applicant had not applied to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation for title to the flat in question to be transferred to him; therefore, the District\u2019s Court conclusion as to the absence of any obstacles to the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant was in conflict with the circumstances established in the case. As at the date of the examination of the prosecutor\u2019s appeal the question regarding the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant had not been decided. 18.  The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal against that decision with the presidium of the Regional Court. He complained that the hearing of 8 June 2015 had been held in his absence and that as a result he had been evicted from the only accommodation he had had. 19.  On 22 July 2015 a judge of the Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Regional Court for examination on the merits. The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 20.  On 22 September 2015 the second applicant was evicted from the flat. 21.  On 30 September 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for examination. 22.  In June 2015 the first applicant\u2019s brother (Mr D. Pylayev) initiated court proceedings for the second applicant to be deprived of legal capacity and for him to be appointed as her guardian. 23.  On 11 May 2016 the District Court declared that the second applicant lacked legal capacity because she was suffering from illness. In particular, the District Court based its decision on an expert report dated 25 January 2016 which had established that she had been suffering from a mental handicap since 2010 and as a result had not been able to understand or control her actions. That judgment entered into force on 14 June 2016. 24.  On 29 June 2016 the local public health department appointed the first applicant\u2019s brother as her guardian.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "3", "5", "8", "0", "1", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Orenburg. 5.  The facts of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment were established in a judgment of the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg of 15 December 2011, as upheld on 14 February 2012 by the Orenburg Regional Court, and are as follows. 6.  At around 7 p.m. on 30 August 2009 the applicant was arrested at a bus stop by police officers of the criminal investigation unit and taken to a police station in Orenburg (\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u0433. \u041e\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443). From 8 p.m. to midnight on 30 August 2009, and from 12 noon to 6 p.m. on 31 August 2009, police officers K. and M. subjected the applicant to physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession from him about a drug-related crime which they suspected him of having committed. 7.  The facts of the ill-treatment on 30 August 2009 were established as follows. Officers K. and M. pushed the applicant to the floor and punched and kicked him numerous times in the head, face, chest, arms and legs. K. placed a plastic bag over his head, closing off his access to air, while M. held him down. As regards the ill-treatment on 31 August 2009, officers K. and M. punched the applicant numerous times in the head and threatened to detain him. 8.  At 8 p.m. on 31 August 2009 the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs and placed in a temporary detention facility. 9.  On 2 September 2009 the applicant was released after giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. On the same day he sought medical help at a traumatology centre (TP no. 2). According to his medical records, he had abrasions on his forearms, a bruise under his right eye, a bruise in the left lumbar region and abrasions on his legs. 10.  On 3 September 2009 the applicant made a complaint to the Orenburg regional investigative committee regarding his ill\u2011treatment. 11.  On 4 September 2009 he underwent a forensic medical examination ordered by the investigation authority. According to report no. 6368, he had the following injuries: (i) a haematoma (swelling) of the soft tissues in the parietal region of the head, measuring 4 by 3 cm; (ii) four bruises of indefinite form on the right infraorbital region of the face, on his neck, on the left side of his chest and around the right iliac (hip) bone, measuring up to 4 by 3 cm each; and (iii) seventeen abrasions, some linear and some of indefinite form, on both forearms, his right hip and left lower leg, measuring from 0.8 by 0.5 cm to 2.5 by 1 cm each. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had resulted from being struck repeatedly with a hard, blunt object with a limited surface area on the day of the alleged incident, and had not caused any \u201chealth damage\u201d. Subsequent forensic medical expert reports of 4 December 2009 and 21 October 2010 came to similar conclusions. It was stated in the first of those reports that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by at least twenty traumatic blows to his body. 12.  Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13.  The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed. 14.  On 31 November 2009 criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 228 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (possession of large quantities of drugs) were terminated for absence of a crime, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15.  In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 2,655,936 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his unlawful detention and ill\u2011treatment in police custody by K. and M. 16.  On 28 June 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and awarded him RUB 20,000. In determining the amount of compensation, the court found that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of the police officers\u2019 actions and had experienced physical and mental suffering, but that this had not caused him any \u201chealth damage\u201d. 17.  The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Orenburg Regional Court, which on 19 September 2012 increased the amount of compensation to RUB 80,000.", "references": ["5", "2", "3", "6", "8", "0", "4", "7", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and before his conviction lived in Izhevsk. 6.  According to the applicant, on 18 February 2005 the police carried out a search of the applicant\u2019s flat in connection with the murder of a law\u2011enforcement officer, which took place during the night of 7-8 February 2005. 7.  On 3 March and 10 March 2005 the police interviewed the applicant, in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, about the circumstances of the murder case under investigation. No suspicions were raised against the applicant. 8.  At 6 p.m. on 22 March 2005 the applicant was apprehended on the street in Izhevsk and taken to the Ustinovskiy district police station of Izhevsk (\u0423\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u0418\u0436\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u2013 \u201cIzhevsk police station\u201d). He was allegedly beaten and coerced into confessing to having committed the murder and to signing a record of his surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). 9.  According to that record, at 9.50 p.m. on 22 March 2005 in office no. 312 at Izhevsk police station, a police officer, M., obtained from the applicant a confession to the crime, in accordance with Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. In particular, the record stated that at the beginning of February 2005 the applicant had been drinking alcoholic beverages in the company of a certain S. after work. At an unspecified time after midnight he left S.\u2019s flat. On his way home he entered a nearby house to urinate. There he saw a man who made a rude remark about the applicant\u2019s behaviour. The man was also drunk. They began to fight, in the course of which the applicant hit the man several times on the head with a knife handle, and also punched and kicked him. The latter fell down the stairs. When the applicant left the man was still lying on the ground floor. The record further stated that the confession had been handwritten by the applicant himself without any coercion on the part of police officers, and that the applicant had been informed of Article 51 of the Constitution (the right not to give self-incriminating statements), which he had understood. 10.  The applicant furthermore wrote a similarly worded confession addressed to the Prosecutor of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 11.  At 00.05 a.m. on 23 March 2005 a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up. He was formally assigned the status of a criminal suspect and was informed of all his rights, including the right to remain silent, the right to a lawyer and the right not to incriminate himself. The record contained the applicant\u2019s handwritten note to the effect that he accepted his arrest, as he had committed a murder on 8 February 2005. The record further contains the applicant\u2019s request for access to his lawyer. 12.  Later on the same day, 23 March 2005, the applicant was provided with a legal-aid lawyer and questioned as a suspect. During the questioning the applicant retracted his confession, asserting that it had been given as a result of coercion and in the absence of a lawyer. He consistently repudiated his confession throughout the ensuing proceedings. 13.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was made to undergo a forensic medical examination, which revealed no injuries on his body aside from a scar on the edge of his hairline dating back two to three months (forensic medical examination report no. 2672). 14.  On 27 March 2005 the applicant was remanded in custody and transferred to the Izhevsk SIZO-1 remand prison. 15.  On 29 March 2005 charges of murder were brought against the applicant. 16.  On 22 April 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Izhevsk, alleging that he had been ill-treated. 17.  On 27 May 2005 an investigator from the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. 18.  On 25 July 2005 the criminal case against the applicant was submitted to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya for trial. 19.  On 22 August 2005 the trial against the applicant commenced. 20.  Before the court the applicant denied committing the murder and reaffirmed that his confession had been given under pressure from police officers and in the absence of his lawyer. 21.  On 19 December 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The court based the conviction on the following evidence:\n-  statements by a police officer, M., who had been involved in the investigation and who had submitted that (i) in the course of the investigation it had been determined that the murder had been committed by the applicant; and (ii) the latter had been apprehended and brought to Izhevsk police station, where he had voluntarily confessed to having committed the murder of G. and had written a statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), describing the details of the committed crime; no violence had been exerted on the applicant;\n-  statements by a police officer, N., involved in the investigation of the murder, who submitted that (i) in the course of the investigation it had been determined that the crime had been committed by the applicant; (ii) in March 2005 the latter had been brought to the police station, where he had confessed to the murder; and (iii) a statement of surrender and confession had been drawn up in which the applicant had described in detail the circumstances under which he had committed the murder;\n-  statements by a police officer, O., who submitted that (i) on 8 February 2005 he had participated in the inspection of the scene of the murder of G.; (ii) it had been established that the applicant had been involved in the crime; (iii) in March 2005 the applicant had been brought to Izhevsk police station, where he had confessed to the murder (his confession had been recorded in the statement of surrender and confession); and (iv) no violence had been applied to the applicant.\n-  a statement by a police officer, S., who had participated in the inspection of the crime scene on 8 February 2005 \u2013 he submitted that (i) during the check it had been established that a man nicknamed \u201cGunya\u201d [the applicant] could have committed the crime; (ii) the applicant had been apprehended by the police; (iii) the applicant had been interrogated at about 9 p.m. on 22 March 2005 by M., O., P. and himself; (iv) in the course of the interrogation the applicant had confessed to having committed the murder; and (v) no violence had been applied to him;\n-  statements by a police officer, Nam., who submitted that he had learned from police officer M. that the applicant had confessed to having committed the murder of G.;\nThe above statements were found to be confirmed by the applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession of 22 March 2005 and by statements by independent witnesses in the case, specifically:\n-  statements by an anonymous witness, \u201cAkulov\u201d, to whom the applicant had supposedly confided about the murder on 8 February 2005; during the trial \u201cAkulov\u201d had been placed in a separate room, and questions from the parties had been asked through a court bailiff; the parties had heard the witness\u2019s answers by means of a radio communication device with acoustic shielding;\n-  statements by a witness, M., who had been detained together with the applicant at Izhevsk police station during the night of 22-23 March 2005, and whom the applicant had supposedly told about his having committed the murder of a police officer;\n-  statements by a witness, S., who submitted that (i) he had worked with the applicant as a painter and decorator since 2003; (ii) they had been drinking alcoholic beverages after work on 7 February 2005 until 10 p.m., after which they had each gone home; (iii) the following morning at 8 a.m. he had picked the applicant up and gone to work with him; (iv) he had found out about the murder of G. on the evening of 8 February 2005 from a certain M. and later from the police; (v) the applicant had had his right arm in plaster since January 2005, which had not prevented him from working; (vi) that the applicant had had a folding knife, which he had lost in January 2005; and (vii) that the applicant had been nicknamed \u201cGunya\u201d;\n-  statements by a witness, Ts., the applicant\u2019s colleague and neighbour, who submitted that (i) he had been drinking alcoholic beverages with the applicant and S. until 10 p.m. on 7 February 2005, following which he had left while the applicant and S. had stayed on; (ii) he had found about the murder on 8 February 2005 from the police; (iii) he had known that the applicant was suspected of that murder;\n-  statements by other witnesses with no interest in the outcome of the case;\n-  the applicant\u2019s handwritten statement of 22 March 2005 addressed to the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office describing the circumstances of the murder;\n-  the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest, in which the applicant noted that he accepted his arrest, as he had committed a murder;\n-  records of forensic biological examinations, which did not exclude the possibility that the traces of blood on the applicant\u2019s coat could have been the victim\u2019s; the conclusions of those forensic biological examinations were confirmed by the record of the crime-scene examination and the record of the forensic medical examination of the victim\u2019s corpse;\n-  records of forensic chemical examinations of the fibres discovered at the crime scene, the origin of which could not be excluded as being from the clothes worn by the applicant at the time of the murder;\n-  the record of the forensic medical examination, which concluded that the applicant\u2019s having a plastered right arm did not exclude the possibility of him administering active purposeful actions with that arm;\n-  the record of the applicant\u2019s forensic psychiatric examination. 22.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation that his confession had been obtained through ill-treatment, referring to the statements made by the police officers and to expert report no. 2672, which had not recorded any injuries on the applicant\u2019s body. 23.  The applicant appealed against the conviction. In his statement of appeal he submitted, in particular, that his confession was inadmissible evidence, as it had been obtained under duress and in the absence of a lawyer. 24.  On 14 June 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the appeal. It endorsed in full the trial court\u2019s decision concerning the admissibility of the statement of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession. The Supreme Court held, in particular, that the law did not require the presence of a lawyer at the moment of giving a confession. 25.  On 4 July 2006 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony IK-8 of the Republic of Udmurtiya to serve his sentence. 26.  On 19 August 2006 the applicant was transferred to the IZ-16/2 remand centre of Kazan with ankle-joint oedema, skin erosion and fever. 27.  On 30 August 2006 the applicant was transferred to the surgical unit of that facility for medical treatment. 28.  On 25 October 2006 the applicant was transferred to penal institution LIU-19 of the Republic of Mordoviya (a medical penal establishment designed for the treatment and detention of drug addicts, alcoholics, and HIV- and tuberculosis-infected prisoners), where he underwent compulsory treatment for drug addiction until 21 November 2008. 29.  According to the applicant, there had been a high percentage of HIV\u2011positive detainees in the facility, some of whom had worked with the applicant at the facility\u2019s sewing workshop. The applicant believed, therefore, that he had faced a serious risk of contamination via the working utensils (for example, scissors and sewing needles).", "references": ["7", "5", "8", "0", "2", "9", "4", "6", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in K\u00f3pavogur. At the material time he was a well-known personality in Iceland who for years had published articles, blogs and books and appeared in films, on television and other media, under pseudonyms. 6.  Some of the applicant\u2019s published views attracted some attention, as well as controversy. These included, inter alia, his views about women and their sexual freedom. In some instances his criticism had been directed towards named individuals, often women, and in some cases his words could have been construed to mean that he was in fact recommending that they should be subjected to sexual violence. The applicant had often justified such conduct by stating that the material had been meant in jest and that those who criticised him lacked a sense of humour (see Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, no. 24703/15, \u00a7 16, 7 November 2017). 7.  In November 2011, an 18-year-old woman reported to the police that the applicant and his girlfriend had raped her. In January 2012 another woman reported to the police that the applicant had committed a sexual offence against her a few years earlier. Upon the completion of the police investigation the Public Prosecutor, on 15 June and 15 November 2012, dismissed the cases in accordance with Article 145 of the Act on Criminal Procedures, because the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction. The applicant submitted a complaint to the police about false accusations made against him by the two women. This case was also dismissed. 8.  On 22 November 2012 Monitor, a magazine accompanying Morgunbla\u00f0i\u00f0 (a leading newspaper in Iceland), published an interview with the applicant. A picture of the applicant was published on the front page, and in the interview the applicant discussed the rape accusation against him. The applicant stated several times that the accusations were false. He stated, inter alia, that it was not a priority for him for the girl\u2019s name to be disclosed and that he was not seeking revenge against her. He accepted that, having placed himself in the media spotlight, he had to tolerate publicity which was not always \u201csunshine and lollipops\u201d but criticised the way the media had covered his case. When asked about the girl\u2019s age, he responded that the girl had been in a club where the minimum age had been 20 years and that it had been a shock to find out later that she had been only 18 years old. When asked about his complaints against the girl for allegedly wrongful accusations, he stated again that he was not seeking revenge against those who had reported him to the police, but that it was clear that they had had ulterior motives. He hoped that the police would see that it was important to have a formal conclusion in the case and that the documents in the case were \u201cscreaming\u201d conspiracy. 9.  On the same day a Facebook page was set up for the purpose of protesting about the interview and encouraging the editor of Monitor to remove the applicant\u2019s picture from its front page. Extensive dialogue took place on the site that day. Later that day, X posted a comment on the above\u2011mentioned Facebook page which stated, inter alia: \u201cThis is also not an attack on a man for saying something wrong, but for raping a teenage girl ... It is permissible to criticise the fact that rapists appear on the cover of publications which are distributed all over town ...\u201d. 10.  On 28 November 2012, the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to X requesting that she withdraw her statements, admit they were unfounded, apologise in the media and pay the applicant punitive damages, which would be donated to charity. By letter the following day, X\u2019s lawyer opposed the applicant\u2019s claims and submitted that the impugned statements were not defamatory. Furthermore, the lawyer informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that X had removed the statement in question from Facebook. 11.  On 17 December 2012, the applicant lodged defamation proceedings against X before the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk and asked for her to be punished, under the applicable provisions of the Penal Code, for publishing the statements in question. The applicant further requested that the statements \u201cThis is also not an attack on a man for saying something wrong, but for raping a teenage girl ...\u201d and \u201cIt is permissible to criticise the fact that rapists appear on the cover of publications which are distributed all over town ...\u201d be declared null and void. Moreover, the applicant requested that X be ordered to pay him 1,000,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately 8,800 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, ISK 150,000 (approximately 1,300 EUR) for the cost of publishing the main content and the reasoning of the final judgment in the case in the media under Article 241 of the Penal Code, and the applicant\u2019s legal costs. 12.  By a judgment of 1 November 2013, the District Court found that X\u2019s comment on Facebook had been defamatory and declared the statements null and void. However, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for the imposition on X of a criminal punishment under the Penal Code, as well as rejecting the claim to have X carry the cost of publishing the main content and reasoning of the judgment in a newspaper. Furthermore, the District Court did not award the applicant non-pecuniary damage and concluded, finally, that each party should bear its own legal costs. 13.  The judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201c... The [applicant] claims damages in the amount of ISK 1,000,000 and bases his demand on the general rules of tort law and on Article 26 of Act no. 50/1993 [Tort Liability Act]. According to the aforementioned, it is clear that [X] made defamatory insinuations about [the applicant]. However, when assessing the damage suffered by [the applicant], it has to be taken into account how [the applicant] has built a certain reputation by his conduct in public. Notwithstanding the extensive disputes about his comment made under the name of Gillz, it cannot be seen that he took a clear stand against sexual violence until complaints against him materialised. Nevertheless [the applicant] had full reason to clarify his situation in this respect, taking into account that material stemming from him is often very ambiguous and provocative, and could easily be interpreted as an incitement to this type of violence.\nWhen assessing the possible damage to [the applicant], the distribution of the comments which was, as stated before, limited to the distribution entailed in publications on the said Facebook page, together with hundreds or thousands of other comments, has to be taken into account. Additionally, the comments were removed from the website when [the applicant] so requested.\nLastly, it should be considered that by declaring the comments null and void, as this judgment concludes, [the applicant] has received full judicial satisfaction.\nIn light of all the above-mentioned considerations there is no reason to order [X] to pay non-pecuniary damages.\nFurthermore, [the applicant\u2019s] claim to have [X] carry the cost of publishing the main content and the reasoning of the judgment in a newspaper will not be accepted. The impugned comment was published on a Facebook page and therefore it is not necessary to incur the costs of publishing the judgment in any other way.\nIn light of the conclusion of the judgment, and taking account of all the facts, it is appropriate that each party bears its own legal costs [er r\u00e9tt a\u00f0 m\u00e1lskostna\u00f0ur falli ni\u00f0ur].\u201d 14.  By judgment of 18 December 2014 the majority of the Supreme Court (two out of three judges) upheld the District Court\u2019s decision to declare the statements null and void. Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision not to award damages to the applicant and that each party should bear its legal costs. In its assessment regarding that issue the Supreme Court referred to Article 73 (3) of the Constitution, the principle of proportionality and the reasoning of the District Court. 15.  The dissenting judge agreed with the majority to declare the impugned statements null and void. However, the judge found that the criteria set out in the Tort Liability Act for the granting of non-pecuniary damages were fulfilled in the case and the applicant should be awarded 200,000 ISK in non-pecuniary damages as well as his legal costs before the District Court and the Supreme Court.", "references": ["8", "0", "7", "3", "1", "6", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1956, 1952, 1975, and 1980 respectively. The first applicant lives in Tivat and the second, third and fourth applicants live in Kotor. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 1 September 2009 the first and second applicants and the father of the third and fourth applicants instituted civil proceedings against the State, seeking that they be recognised as owners of two plots of land in the coastal zone (u zoni morskog dobra). They submitted, in particular, that the land at issue had been lawfully owned by their father, but that without any legal basis the State appeared as the registered owner thereof in the Real Estate Registry, and that they should be declared owners as their father\u2019s legal successors (kao pravni sledbenici). 8.  On 2 March 2010 the Real Estate Administration in Tivat (Uprava za nekretnine, podru\u010dna jedinica Tivat), acting upon the first applicant\u2019s request, issued a decision allowing the division into two of an adjacent plot of land, a forest in the coastal zone, the registered owner of which at the time was the Municipality. The Municipality remained registered as the owner of one part of it, whereas the other part was registered in the name of the applicants\u2019 predecessor (the father of the first and second applicants, and the grandfather of the third and fourth applicants). 9.  On 21 November 2011, after a remittal, the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled against the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants\u2019 father. The court found that the land at issue had indeed been owned by their predecessors, notably their father, grandfather and grand-grandfather, but that they had not proved that they had inherited it when their last predecessor had died in 1997. Notably, the court considered that the land at issue was in the coastal zone and thus State property pursuant to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act of 1992 and \u201csection 13 and other sections\u201d of the State Property Act (see paragraphs 21 and 24 below), and that the claimants could not claim the right to property in respect of such land. The court made no reference to section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act (see paragraph 22 below). As regards the State\u2019s submission that the land had been nationalised, the court noted that the contents of the decisions relied on by the State could not be clarified. Notably, the State Archive (Dr\u017eavni arhiv) informed the court, on 4 October 2010 and 26 August 2011, that the case files and decisions Dn 428/90 and Dn 615/92, referred to by the State, had not been found in that institution. Finally, the court considered that the Real Estate Administration decision of 2 March 2010 (see paragraph 8 above) was \u201cof no particular influence\u201d (bez posebnog uticaja) given that it related to a different plot of land which was not the subject of these proceedings. 10.  In their appeal the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants\u2019 father confirmed that the said land had not been in their predecessor\u2019s estate when he died, which was exactly the reason why they had initiated these proceedings. They also submitted that: (a) section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act had never been complied with even though it was indisputable that their predecessor had lawfully owned the land; and (b) the relevant legislation did not prohibit private ownership of land in the coastal zone, and referred to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act and section 20 of the Property Act 2009 (see paragraphs 21 and 19 below). They reiterated that the adjacent plot of land, also a forest in the coastal zone, was privately owned, by them, and submitted the decision of the Real Estate Administration of 2 March 2010. They maintained that the first-instance court\u2019s reasoning that the said decision was of no influence indicated legal uncertainty, given that the same legal issue was treated differently without any explanation in that regard. 11.  On 6 April 2012 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) upheld the first-instance judgment. It found that the land at issue was indisputably forest in the coastal zone, that it was State property pursuant to section 13 of the State Property Act and that the claimants therefore could not claim ownership. The court further held that even assuming that the claimants had had ownership of these plots of land, they had lost it \u201cin accordance with the State Property Act and the Coastal Zone Act. In support of this was also section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act, relied upon by the claimants, which provided that the owners of land in the coastal zone, who had obtained it in a lawful manner before that Act entered into force and which was duly registered in the Real Estate Register as private property, were entitled to compensation in case of an expropriation\u201d. The High Court made no reference to the decision of 2 March 2010 and the status of the adjacent plot of land, or as to whether the claimants could have inherited the land. 12.  On 11 October 2012 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) upheld the previous judgments. The court made no explicit reference to the adjacent plot of land and the decision of 2 March 2010. It held as follows:\n\u201cAs the real estate at issue is in the coastal zone regime \u2013 common resource (dobro od op\u0161teg interesa), the lower courts correctly applied the substantive law when they ruled in the said way. Notably, pursuant to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act, which had been in force until State Property Act entered into force (Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 21.09), coast is owned by the State and could not be object of the private property.\nThe claimants were wrong to consider that the issue was to be resolved by means of section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act. That provision regulated the rights of the owners of land in the coastal zone who had obtained the property thereof before that Act entered into force by providing that they were entitled to compensation in case of an expropriation [...]. That means that the land did not remain in the private property regime, but became State property by the law itself.\nLikewise, section 20(2) of the Property Act 2009 is inapplicable to the present case as it cannot be retroactively applied to relations which had arisen before it came into force. Exceptionally, the right to property over a coastal zone can be acquired only after it entered into force.\u201d 13.  On 25 December 2012 the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants\u2019 father lodged a constitutional appeal. They submitted, inter alia, that it was not true that land in the coastal zone could not be privately owned, as numerous plots of land in that zone were private property, including the plot of land adjacent to the one at issue, which was owned by them. They invoked the right to a fair trial and the right to property, and reiterated the importance of legal certainty. 14.  On 23 July 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal. It held that the lower courts\u2019 assessment \u201cwas based on a correct application of substantive law and a constitutionally acceptable interpretation thereof, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention\u201d. As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the court held that a claim which had been dismissed because the claimants did not meet statutory conditions was not considered a possession that could constitute property rights, and thus there could be no violation of such a right either. This decision was served on 13 October 2014 at the earliest. 15.  On 16 December 2014 the third and fourth applicants\u2019 father died, leaving the third and fourth applicants as his heirs. 16.  On 27 May 2015 the Supreme Court issued a general legal opinion (na\u010delni pravni stav) relating to the use of land in the coastal zone. In reaching this opinion, the Supreme Court analysed the relevant domestic legislation, including the Constitution, the Coastal Zone Act 1992, the Property Act and the State Property Act. It found, inter alia, that section 20(2) of the Property Act provided that exceptionally coastal zone can be privately owned, while at the same time section 22(3) of the same Act provided that the coast cannot be privately owned. It also found that the conditions under which the coastal zone can be privately owned are not provided for by law (nisu zakonom odre\u0111eni), \u201cwhich leaves open numerous questions on practical implementation\u201d. The court concluded that \u201cby analysing [the relevant legislation] it can be concluded that acquiring private property rights in respect of the coastal zone is not possible save in exceptional cases which are not defined by legislation. It can also be concluded that the issue of lawfully acquired rights in respect of the coastal zone is not regulated in a precise and clear manner...\u201d, but that it was a fact that there were lawfully acquired property rights over the coastal zone, as indicated by section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act.", "references": ["5", "4", "6", "8", "7", "1", "2", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, Malta. 6.  The applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for drug-related offences. On 3 December 2009 he was sentenced to sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment and fined 40,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The punishment was confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 19 September 2013. 7.  The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8.  The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as \u2018triple\u2011barred windows\u2019). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The \u201cenvironment\u201d was squalid and had a bad smell. 9.  In the period during which he had been placed in cell no. 45, the applicant had had to suffer the fumes and excessive heat from the bakery close to his cell, which fumes and heat poured into his poorly ventilated cell. The applicant also described the cell as being nearly underground and as structurally condemned. Due the triple-barred windows he could barely see outside. In winter the cell was very humid and cold. 10.  When, on 26 December 2014, he moved to cell no. 70 (see paragraph 7 above), which was very small and had very little ventilation; the applicant felt claustrophobic. Furthermore, he claimed to hardly ever having had access to running water. 11.  According to the applicant, in Division 2 the food was of a very poor quality, non-nutritious, and portions were too small. Additionally, the food quality was so terrible that between 1 and 4 September 2015 prisoners had to be taken to hospital as a result of food poisoning. The applicant claimed that the kitchen was so dirty that mice were found dead in it. 12.  The applicant complained that there was no combined automated toilet\u2011flushing system installed. Therefore, inmates had to flush their own personal toilet by means of a water bucket which was provided to them. Moreover, at times there was no access to running water in the cell. Access to water was limited in general, and water available was not potable. While inmates were permitted to buy bottled water, they were forced to reduce their daily intake when they were short on cash. 13.  As to the showers, hot water was often not available and the water was dirty. The applicant submitted that there were not enough showers, with one of the showers having a broken and cracked tray that could cause injury if one were not careful. He alleged that, for all the inmates in Division 2, only one shower was available most of the time, with two showers being available during the summer months. 14.  The applicant claimed that the cost to make telephone calls was very high and had been increased on 3 December 2014. He had complained to the prison authorities to no avail. 15.  He complained that the prison allowance given to detainees was too little. This made everything available at the tuck shop excessively expensive. It inevitably also impacted the inmates\u2019 ability to buy bottled water and make telephone calls. 16.  The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member. 17.  Petitions were filed in regard to these conditions. Furthermore, some of his fellow inmates had lodged constitutional cases concerning the situation. However, none led to any change.", "references": ["4", "0", "6", "2", "9", "3", "7", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Bezhetsk, Tver Region. 6.  On 10 July 2005 the body of B., a police driver with the Ruza District Police Department of the Moscow region (\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0443\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438), was found with multiple injuries near the village of Baranovo in the Ruza District. The next day the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal investigation into B.\u2019s murder. 7.  On 11 July 2005 at night the applicant was arrested in P.\u2019s house by three police officers. According to him, he did not resist the arrest, but the police officers kicked and punched him on the legs, in the kidneys and around the groin region at least seven times. After the arrest he was taken to a temporary detention facility (IVS) located on the premises of the Ruza district police department. Then two police officers took him out of the cell and led him to a room. There one of the officers hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon all over his body about twelve times. Then they brought him back to the IVS cell. Soon afterwards another officer entered the cell and punched the applicant in the face and body about five times. During the ill-treatment the officers demanded that the applicant confess to B.\u2019s murder. 8.  At 4.05 a.m. on 11 July 2005 in the IVS, L., an investigator with the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest. Between 3.05 p.m. and 5.20 p.m. the applicant was examined as a suspect in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, K., in the IVS. The applicant confessed to the crime, stating that he had inflicted several blows to the victim\u2019s body. It was stated in the record of the interview that the applicant had been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution not to incriminate himself. 9.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s family members were notified of his arrest. They retained a lawyer, R., who came to see the applicant on the same day. According to the applicant, the prosecutor of the Ruza district denied R. access to him on the grounds that the latter was being examined as a suspect in the presence of the State-appointed lawyer at that moment. 10.  On the evening of 11 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother saw the applicant appearing in a television programme, Vremechko. According to her, he could hardly move and bore evident signs of ill-treatment. At 10.35 p.m. on the same day, R. sent a telegram to the Ruza district prosecutor\u2019s office asking for a meeting with the applicant. He also requested the medical examination of the applicant, who had been allegedly subjected to ill-treatment in the IVS. The next day R. repeated these requests in another telegram sent to the Moscow Region prosecutor\u2019s office. 11.  On 12 July 2005 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Ruza District Court, who ordered that he be placed in pre-trial detention. R., who represented the applicant at the hearing, submitted that the latter had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers from the moment of his arrest. The prosecutor responded that the telegrams sent by R. containing these allegations had been received and that there would be an inquiry into them. 12.  According to the applicant, during the hearing on 12 July 2005 he had informed the judge and the prosecutor of his ill-treatment by police officers and had showed them traces of the beatings. However, they had remained unresponsive, not reacting to his allegations. After the hearing the escorting guards had taken the applicant to the first floor of the courthouse and subjected him to ill-treatment. They had punched him in the kidney region, demanding that he confess to the crime. The beatings had continued for about ten minutes, with breaks; afterwards the applicant had been taken to the IVS. 13.  On 13 July 2005, following a meeting with the applicant, R. lodged an application with the Ruza district prosecutor\u2019s office for the applicant\u2019s immediate transfer to a remand centre in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region. He stated that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police at the Ruza district police department and that the implicated police officers could interfere with the investigation of this incident. He sent a similar complaint to the Moscow Region prosecutor\u2019s office on the following day, adding that three of B.\u2019s brothers had worked at the Ruza district police department at the time of the applicant\u2019s detention in that facility. According to the applicant, he was transferred to remand centre IZ\u201150/4 in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region only on 24 July 2005. 14.  On 12 and 13 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Moscow regional prosecutor of his alleged ill-treatment by police officers during his apprehension, while in police custody and while in the courthouse. 15.  On 14 July 2005 a forensic medical expert from the Ruza Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator from the prosecutor\u2019s office. The expert recorded the following injuries: (i)  two bruises on the eyelids measuring 3 cm by 2.5 cm and 2.5 cm by 1.5 cm; (ii)  a bruise on the chin measuring 3 cm by 3 cm, with abrasions on its surface 1.5 cm by 1.5 cm in size; (iii)  eleven bruises on the back measuring from 0.3 cm by 0.7 cm to 7 cm by 1.5 cm; (iv) nineteen bruises on the chest and stomach measuring from 1 cm by 1 cm to 2 cm by 13 cm; (v) two abrasions on the left leg (from the knee to the foot) measuring 1 cm and 5 cm long, respectively, and (vi) a 6-cm-long abrasion on the internal side of the left hip. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted during his arrest and while he had been in police custody by police officers who had punched and kicked him and beaten him with a truncheon. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the date and in the circumstances described by the applicant with a hard blunt object of limited surface area. He specified that bruises could have been inflicted with a hard blunt object of an elongated shape, and that the applicant\u2019s injuries were unlikely to have been caused by his falling from his own height. 16.  On 21 July 2005, following a pre-investigation inquiry, a deputy prosecutor of Ruza refused to institute criminal proceedings against two police officers, Sh. and D.K., for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions, and against unidentified police officers for lack of evidence of a crime in their actions. He found, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been the result of the lawful use of force by Sh. and D.K. when apprehending the applicant, who had resisted arrest. They stated that they had used force lawfully during the applicant\u2019s arrest and submitted that they had had to lay him down on the floor, and while handcuffing him, had pressed their knees into his back to keep him still. The decision stated that P., who had been present during the applicant\u2019s arrest, had not confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. The deputy prosecutor also considered that the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in the IVS by unidentified police officers had not been confirmed. He relied on the statements of officers U., B. and V.P. (who had been on duty in the IVS on 11 July 2005) and denied any malpractice in respect of the applicant. 17.  In August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor made a submission (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the head of the Ruza district police department, requiring him to conduct an internal inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by unidentified police officers in the IVS and to subject those responsible to disciplinary proceedings. 18.  R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 21 July 2005 with the Ruza District Court. On 16 August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor annulled the decision of 21 July 2005 and ordered an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment. In his decision the prosecutor held that the investigator should adduce the results of the ongoing internal inquiry into the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention in the IVS, verify the applicant\u2019s allegations, and assess them. 19.  By an order of 22 August 2005 the head of the Ruza district police department reprimanded officers U. and B., who had been on duty in the IVS when the applicant had been brought there, for lack of diligence. He found that \u2013 in breach of the law on the pre-trial detention of suspected and accused persons \u2013 on 11 July 2005 two unidentified police officers had taken the applicant out of the cell and subjected him to ill-treatment. 20.  On 26 June 2006 R. lodged a request with the Ruza town prosecutor to inform him of the results of the additional inquiry. On 30 June 2006 the prosecutor provided him with a copy of a decision issued by an investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office dated 23 August 2005 refusing to open criminal proceedings against the police officers. The investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office, N., maintained the findings made in the decision of 21 July 2005. 21.  In August 2006 R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 23 August 2005 with the Ruza Town Court. He argued that the investigating authority had failed to explain the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries. 22.  On 9 October 2006 the Ruza District Court decided that the above\u2011mentioned decision had been unlawful and unsubstantiated and that an additional inquiry was needed. It held that the investigator had failed to address the instructions given by the prosecutor in his decision of 16 August 2005 \u2013 in particular, to take all necessary measures to identify the culprits and to hold them criminally responsible. 23.  According to the Government, on 26 October 2006 the investigator of the Ruza Town Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a new decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings against police officers. However, they failed to produce a copy of this decision. According to the applicant, neither he nor his lawyer was notified about it. 24.  On 28 February 2006 a jury trial against the applicant and his co\u2011defendant began before the Moscow Regional Court. The applicant pleaded not guilty. At the hearing of 14 March 2006, L., who represented the applicant during the trial, requested that the record of the applicant\u2019s interview as a suspect be declared inadmissible and excluded from the body of evidence. He submitted that the statements made in the course of that interview had been obtained by means of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, who had not acted in the applicant\u2019s best interests. L. also requested to examine the report of 14 July 2005 containing the results of the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination. 25.  The trial court refused both requests, noting that the allegations of ill-treatment by the police officers were unconfirmed. It relied on the refusal of 23 August 2005 to open a criminal case on account of the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 20 above), which had gone unchallenged at the time. The court also noted that the applicant had not objected to the participation of K., the State-appointed lawyer, in the proceedings and had made no remarks in the interview record to the effect that he had rejected his services. Furthermore, the court considered that the contents of the report by forensic medical expert did not constitute part of the factual circumstances to be determined by the jury. It therefore allowed to be read out before the jury the record of the applicant\u2019s interview as a suspect of 11 July 2005. 26.  On 11 April 2006 the jury found the applicant guilty of battery, the misappropriation of a car, murder, the causing of intentional damage to property, and the acquisition of property obtained in a criminal manner. The Moscow Regional Court sentenced him to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Russian Supreme Court, complaining, inter alia, that the initial statements that he had given during the investigation had been inadmissible. 28.  On 13 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Moscow Regional Court. It stated that the trial court had duly assessed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, noting that the applicant had never denied the use of force by the police to restrain him during his apprehension. 29.  On 12 October 2007, at the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s request, the Ruza prosecutor\u2019s office re-opened the criminal case on account of newly discovered circumstances \u2013 namely certain information in the victim\u2019s medical records. However, the proceedings were terminated on 25 October 2007, and (following an appeal by the applicant\u2019s lawyer) by a final decision of 18 February 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that decision.", "references": ["4", "5", "2", "8", "9", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The 1,646 applicants natural persons live in the villages of Doro\u021bcaia, P\u00eer\u00eeta, Molovata Nou\u0103, Pohrebea and Cocieri, situated on the left bank of the Dniester in the region of Dub\u01cesari. These villages are under Moldovan control. Part of the land belonging to the applicants is situated in areas near these villages, across a road which links the northern and southern parts of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Transdniestrian Republic\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d \u2013 see for more details Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8\u201142, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). That road, which cuts through two zones controlled by the Moldovan Government, is controlled by the authorities of the \u201cMRT\u201d. 7.  The applicants obtained titles to these plots of land from Moldova as part of the \u201cPam\u00e2ntul\u201d (Land) privatisation programme. In a letter dated 2 December 1999 the \u201cMRT\u201d local administration informed the Moldovan Department of privatisation that it \u201cdid not have any objections to the creation, on the basis of agricultural entities in the villages of Doro\u021bcaia, P\u00eer\u00eeta, Molovata Nou\u0103, Co\u0219ni\u021ba and Cocieri, the lands of which are situated on the territory of the [\u201cMRT\u201d], of peasant farms within the framework of the \u2018Pam\u00e2ntul\u2019 reform\u201d. 8.  Title to some of the land was subsequently transferred to others through gift or inheritance. The details of each applicant natural person are set out in Annexes nos. 1-9. 9.  The applicants Posedo-Agro S.R.L., Agro-Tiras S.R.L. and Agro\u2011 S.A.V.V.A. S.R.L. are companies which rented land from owners during the relevant period of time. 10.  On 15 August 2007 the applicant company Posedo-Agro S.R.L. ceded all of its rights and obligations to Serghei Popa Farming Proprietorship (FP). Both of those companies are solely owned by Mr Serghei Popa. On 30 October 2007 Posedo-Agro S.R.L. was liquidated. On 10 October 2013 Serghei Popa FP asked the Court to substitute itself for the original applicant company in respect of application no. 41569/04 and declared that it maintained that application before the Court. 11.  The applicants\u2019 main source of income is the working of the land owned or rented by them. In order to reach their land, they have to cross the road controlled by the authorities of the \u201cMRT\u201d. 12.  Between 1992 and 1998 the applicants used the land in question or rented it without interference. In 1998 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities set up checkpoints to monitor the movement of agricultural products across the \u201cborder\u201d coinciding with the above-mentioned road. From then on the applicants had to pay various taxes and fees to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. 13.  In August 2004 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities declared that the land owned or rented by the applicants was the property of the \u201cMRT\u201d. The applicants could continue working it, on condition that they paid rent to the local \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. The applicants refused to sign rental contracts because they were already the lawful owners (or renters) of that land. As a consequence, all access to their land was blocked and the harvest was lost. Some of the agricultural machines belonging to those who tried to work their land were also seized. No work was done on the land in the following two years, which made it difficult to bring it back to its former capacity. 14.  The applicants made numerous complaints to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, asking for a right of passage. Such a passage was refused because the authorities considered the land in question to be the property of the \u201cMRT\u201d. 15.  The applicants also complained to the Moldovan authorities, who replied that they had no means to compel the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities to allow them free passage. They asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to start a criminal investigation against the people responsible for blocking the applicants\u2019 access to their land. 16.  The applicants complained to the Russian embassy in Moldova and to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the \u201cOSCE\u201d), to no avail. On 26 April 2005 a group of landowners, including some of the applicants, protested in front of the Russian embassy in Moldova, asking the authorities of that State to intervene as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region. A similar protest took place on 11 May 2005. 17.  The applicant company Agro-S.A.V.V.A. S.R.L. submitted a document issued by the Moldovan tax office, which showed that it had paid tax on plots of land rented from 281 owners. According to a certificate from the mayor of P\u00eer\u00eeta village, the applicant company had rented plots of land (104 hectares) from people in the village between 1998 and 2006. The applicant company also submitted copies of its tax and statistics reports for 2004, as well as an audit report by a company called Total Consulting dated 15 November 2013, which showed that in 2004-2005 the applicant company cultivated 359 hectares of land, of which 104 hectares were situated in the area concerned by the present case. On 3 May 2005 the applicant company complained to Dub\u0103sari Regional Council (a Moldovan local authority) about the situation, and it confirmed on 17 May 2005 that it was unable to cultivate 105 hectares of land rented from 320 landowners. Similar complaints and requests to allow cultivation of the land were made to the \u201cMRT\u201d local authorities, for instance on 19 July 2005. 18.  The applicant company Agro-Tiras S.R.L. submitted a certificate from the mayor of Molovata Nou\u0103 village dated 11 October 2004, confirming that it rented 450 hectares of land from the villagers there, all of which were situated across the road, between Dub\u0103sari and R\u00eebni\u021ba (the relevant area). According to a decision of the \u201cMRT\u201d Customs Office of 15 October 2004, a tractor with agricultural accessories and 5.8 tonnes of wheat had been seized from the applicant company owing to a failure to properly declare the importation of such items into the \u201cMRT\u201d. According to the decision, the tractor was travelling from Molovata Nou\u0103 village in the direction of \u201cplots of land of the \u2018MRT\u2019 under Moldovan jurisdiction\u201d. 19.  According to a certificate dated 13 November 2013 from the mayor of Cocieri village, the applicant company Posedo-Agro S.R.L. rented land from 782 villagers during the period 2004-2006. The applicant company submitted a copy of a decision taken by the \u201cMRT\u201d Customs Office of 4 August 2004, which stated that 16 tonnes of barley had been seized from it owing to a failure to properly declare the importation of such items into the \u201cMRT\u201d. A fine (approximately 1,450 United States dollars (\u201cUSD\u201d)) equal to the market price of the barley was imposed and additional costs had to be covered, otherwise the truck carrying the barley, which had also been temporarily seized on 30 July 2004, would be confiscated. A similar decision was taken on 16 August 2004, by which the applicant company lost 6.1 tonnes of apples. It also had to pay a fine (approximately USD 250) equal to the market price of the apples or risk the confiscation of three tractors temporarily seized on 11 August 2004. According to a certificate dated 12 October 2004, the applicant company rented 1,377 hectares of land from 820 people in Cocieri, of which 1,256 hectares were situated in the area concerned by the present application. On 4 August 2004 the applicant company complained to the Moldovan Government, the OSCE and the Dub\u0103sari prosecutor\u2019s office (belonging to the \u201cMRT\u201d) about the fine and seizure, stating that it rented 1,256 hectares of villagers\u2019 land situated in the relevant area and that despite having temporary registration with the \u201cMRT Customs Office\u201d it was not allowed to take the harvest to storage. 20.  According to the Moldovan Government, the Moldovan Parliament passed a number of laws aimed at compensating the inhabitants of villages under Moldovan control on the left bank of the Dniester (in the area concerned by the present cases) for losses caused by various actions of the \u201cMRT\u201d. The compensation included differences in natural gas and electricity prices, increasing pensions, giving tax breaks and preferential credits to agricultural companies in the region, and allocating diesel fuel for agricultural activities. Moreover, a number of laws and decisions were implemented in 2004-2007 providing for the payment of compensation to villagers who had sustained losses owing to their inability to cultivate their land in the relevant area, with the total amount of aid reaching almost 39 million Moldovan lei (MDL) (approximately 2.3 million euros (EUR)). In 2006 the Moldovan authorities managed to negotiate with the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities a temporary \u201cMRT\u201d registration mechanism for owners of land in the relevant area, which allowed them to cultivate the land and be exempt from making payments to the \u201cMRT\u201d. The temporary registration system is renewed each year in negotiations between Moldova and the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities.", "references": ["6", "8", "7", "1", "0", "2", "3", "5", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants live in Moscow.  The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant and of Ms Anna Politkovskaya, who was born in 1958 and died in 2006. The third and fourth applicants are Anna Politkovskaya\u2019s children. 6.  Anna Politkovskaya was a well-known investigative journalist who made a name for herself covering alleged violations of human rights in the Chechen Republic committed in the course of the counterterrorism operation in the region, an operation widely known as the \u201cSecond Chechen War\u201d. Ms Politkovskaya was also an adamant critic of President Putin\u2019s politics. 7.  On 7 October 2006 Anna Politkovskaya was fatally shot in the lift in her block of flats in Moscow. A Makarov pistol with a silencer and bullet cartridges were found on the stairs. 8.  On the same date the prosecutor\u2019s office of Moscow opened a criminal investigation in case no. 18/377485-06 under Article 105 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Russian Criminal Code (\u201cmurder of a person committed in connection with his or her professional or civic duties\u201d). Later, the case was transferred to the department for the investigation of particularly important cases of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for investigation. 9.  At an early stage of the investigation investigators inspected the crime scene, collected footage from surveillance cameras located in the vicinity, and examined logs of telephone connections made in the area around the time of the killing. 10.  On 9 October 2006 forensic experts established that the death had been caused by gunshot wounds to the victim\u2019s head, chest and right leg. On the same date a death certificate was issued. 11.  On 12 October 2006 the fourth applicant was granted victim status. Later, the third applicant received such status as well. 12.  Seeking to discern the motive for the crime, the investigation studied Anna Politkovskaya\u2019s critical publications to establish against whom they had been targeted. They also questioned Ms Politkovskaya\u2019s colleagues, friends and family as witnesses. In the Government\u2019s submission, as a result of such actions, the investigation established that Anna Politkovskaya had met \u201ca well-known Russian former politician\u201d in London, and that unnamed person had proposed that she publish articles \u201cto discredit the leadership of the Russian State, which she [had] refused to do, to his dislike\u201d. 13.  On 27 August 2007 the Prosecutor General of Russia stated at a press conference that there had been serious progress in the investigation of Ms Politkovskaya\u2019s killing, and that ten people had been arrested in connection with the investigation. Another official of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office stated that a certain P.R. had been arrested. On 28 August 2007 the Tvoy Den\u2019 newspaper (\u201c\u0422\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0414\u0435\u043d\u044c\u201d) published a list of people arrested in connection with Ms Politkovskaya\u2019s murder, and commented that there were known hitmen among those detained. On 29 August 2007 a press officer of the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) disclosed to the public a list of ten people detained in connection with Anna Politkovskaya\u2019s assassination. 14.  In the course of August 2007 four people, D.M., I.M., S.Kh. and P.R., were arrested in connection with the assassination. Two brothers, D.M. and I.M., had made phone calls near Ms Politkovskaya\u2019s building; their car had been seen leaving the area on the day of the killing. Later, the investigation established that fibres found in their car were identical to those left on the murder weapon. S.Kh., a police officer, was arrested on the basis of a witness statement by D.P., also a police officer. P.R. was an officer of the FSB (Federal Security Service) who had known S.Kh. for a long time. 15.  In June 2008 D.M., I.M. and S.Kh. were formally charged with contract killing in conspiracy with others. S.Kh. was regarded as the leader of the organised criminal group. P.R. was charged in the same set of proceedings with abuse of powers and extortion. 16.  At some point R.M., a brother of D.M. and I.M. whom the investigation suspected to be implicated in the assassination, fled Russia on a forged passport. As appears from the applicants\u2019 and the Government\u2019s respective submissions, the forged passport was issued by staff of a department of the interior. 17.  At some point R.M.\u2019s name was put on an international wanted list. On 16 June 2008 a criminal case against R.M. was severed from the case against S.Kh., P.R., D.M. and I.M. 18.  In June 2008 the investigators prepared a case against S.Kh., P.R., D.M. and I.M. to be transferred to a court. The applicants requested that the case file remain with the investigators. In their view, the investigation was incomplete, and sending the case file to a court would be premature. Nevertheless, the case file was transferred to the Moscow Circuit Military Court (\u201cthe Circuit Court\u201d) for a jury trial. 19.  In the course of court hearings in the period 2008-09 D.P., a high\u2011ranking officer of the Moscow City Department of the Interior, was questioned as a witness for the prosecution. He submitted that, acting in his professional capacity, he had organised and conducted surveillance on Anna Politkovskaya shortly prior to her assassination. A certain L.-A.G. was also questioned as a witness. 20.  At an unspecified point in time in the period 2008-09, the investigation included a summary of its findings in the case material, which the applicants referred to as a \u201cpresentation\u201d. In particular, the summary contained details regarding Anna Politkovskaya, including the fact that she had had American nationality. The \u201cpresentation\u201d was never shown to the jury. 21.  On 19 February 2009, having heard the prosecution and the defence, the jury delivered a not-guilty verdict in respect of S.Kh., P.R., D.M. and I.M. 22.  On 20 February 2009 the Circuit Court acquitted S.Kh., P.R., D.M. and I.M. The prosecution appealed. The third and fourth applicants decided not to appeal against the acquittal. 23.  On 25 June 2009, in the appeal proceedings, the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the judgment of 20 February 2009 and remitted the case to the Circuit Court for fresh examination. 24.  On 5 August 2009 the third and fourth applicants requested that the Circuit Court remit the case to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. On 7 August 2009 the Circuit Court dismissed the application. The applicants appealed. 25.  On 3 September 2009 the Supreme Court granted the third and fourth applicants\u2019 application, and the case was transferred to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. 26.  On unspecified dates the charges against P.R. were dropped; L.\u2011A.G. was indicted. 27.  On 31 May 2011 R.M., who had spent some time hiding in Belgium, was arrested in the Chechen Republic. 28.  According to the applicants, at an unspecified point in time a certain O.G. informed them that he had information which was crucial for the investigation, and that he was willing to testify as a witness. At the applicants\u2019 request, an investigator questioned him. O.G. stated that D.P. was implicated in the murder. According to the Government, the investigator in charge of the case attempted to find O.G., but could only gather evidence from him after he had been informed of the witness\u2019s whereabouts in Ukraine. 29.  On 26 August 2011 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered D.P.\u2019s placement in custody. 30.  On 31 August 2011 D.P. entered a guilty plea with the investigating authorities. He claimed that his acquaintances, L.-A.G. and S.Kh., had proposed that he organise unauthorised surveillance of Ms Politkovskaya. L.-A.G. had expressed his intention to kill the journalist and had said that D.P. could take part in the preparation for the assassination for a fee, which D.P. had accepted. Having received a large sum of money and instructions from L.-A.G., he had bought a pistol with a silencer from a stranger and passed it on to R.M. In the Government\u2019s submission, L.-A.G. had not reported the motives for the killing, but had \u201cmentioned that the crime [had been] ordered by a well\u2011known person living in the United Kingdom\u201d. 31.  On 29 August 2012 the criminal case against D.P. was severed and a separate investigation was created; the applicants disagreed with that decision. On 14 December 2012 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) sentenced D.P. to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicants appealed against the judgment, arguing that the sentence was too lenient. On an unspecified date D.P.\u2019s conviction was upheld on appeal. 32.  At some point the case file against S.Kh., R.M., D.M., I.M. and L.\u2011A.G. was transferred to the City Court for trial. 33.  On 20 June 2013 the City Court commenced a jury trial of S.Kh., R.M., D.M., I.M. and L.-A.G. 34.  On 14 November 2013 the jury was dismissed for the reason that only eleven jurors out of twelve appeared in the courtroom. 35.  On 14 January 2014 hearings before a new composition of the jury commenced. 36.  On 29 May 2014 the jury delivered a verdict finding all five co\u2011accused guilty of Anna Politkovskaya\u2019s murder. They also found R.M. guilty of kidnapping a third party in October 1996. 37.  On 9 June 2014 the City Court delivered a judgment. It found that L.-A.G. had \u201caccepted an offer from an unidentified person who had been dissatisfied with publications by Anna Politkovskaya in Novaya Gazeta concerning violations of human rights, the embezzlement of State property, and abuse of public office by civil servants\u201d \u2013 an offer of a fee of at least 150,000 United States dollars to organise the journalist\u2019s killing. L.\u2011A.G. had then involved his nephews, R.M., D.M., and I.M., as well as \u201ca person in respect of whom the criminal case had been severed\u201d and his acquaintance S.Kh. in the preparation for the killing. On the basis of the jury\u2019s guilty verdict, the City Court characterised the murder as one committed by an organised group for a fee in connection with the victim\u2019s performance of her professional and civic duties. It also found that L.\u2011A.G., R.M. and D.M. were guilty of illegal arms operations. It refused to terminate the proceedings against R.M. regarding the events of 1996 under the statute of limitations, because the latter had been wanted in connection with those events since 1997, and found him guilty of kidnapping and extortion. The City Court sentenced L.\u2011A.G. \u2013 regarded as the organiser of the killing \u2013 and R.M. \u2013 regarded as the hitman \u2013 to life imprisonment. D.M. and I.M. were sentenced to fourteen and twelve years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. S.Kh. was sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. Civil claims by the third and fourth applicants were resolved as follows. The third and fourth applicants were each awarded 700,000 Russian roubles ((RUB) \u2013 approximately 14,790 euros (EUR)) to be paid by L.-A.G. and R.M. respectively, RUB 500,000 (approximately EUR 10,570) to be paid by S.Kh., and RUB 300,000 (approximately EUR 6,340) to be paid by D.M. and I.M. respectively. 38.  The defendants appealed against the conviction. 39.  On 26 June 2015, in the appeal proceedings, the Supreme Court of Russia found that the guilty verdict was based on a thorough examination of the evidence. Upholding the conviction as a whole, the Supreme Court slightly mitigated the sentence regarding illegal arms operations in respect of L.-A.G., R.M. and D.M. However, pursuant to the rules on combining sentences for multiple offences, this did not affect L.\u2011A.G.\u2019s and R.M.\u2019s life sentences. D.M.\u2019s term of imprisonment was reduced to thirteen years and nine months. 40.  In the Government\u2019s submission, the investigation into Anna Politkovskaya\u2019s killing has not been terminated. They provided copies of the City Court\u2019s judgment of 9 June 2014 and the Supreme Court\u2019s appeal judgment of 26 June 2015.", "references": ["2", "6", "1", "5", "9", "7", "4", "3", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1964 and 1973 respectively and are detained in Corradino Correctional facility, Paola, Malta. 6.  The first applicant is a Venezuelan national who has been detained in Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, since September 2009. He is serving a ten\u2011year prison sentence following a judgment of 21 March 2012. Since 10 January 2013 he has been detained in Division 3, cell no. 148. The first applicant has never asked for a transfer because, although there were prospects that he would be transferred to a division with an automated flushing system, this would also have meant that he would lose his individual cell and be placed in a dormitory, to the detriment of his privacy. 7.  The first applicant submitted that his cell has one window and one air vent. The latter is clogged with dirt and debris and his cell window is positioned too high up, meaning that he therefore has to climb onto the sink to open or close it. He stated that the cell does not have adequate ventilation and it is subject to high temperatures in the summer and low temperatures in the winter. He alleged that he had not been provided with a heater during the winter and that his requests to this effect had been turned down. The prison authorities had provided him only with one blanket, other blankets and clothes having been received from NGOs. In the summer, when the temperature ranges between 35 and 40 degrees Celsius, the two fans purchased by the first applicant do not suffice as they merely circulate hot air, which is made worse in the absence of proper ventilation. 8.  He also claimed that he has to use a bucket to flush his toilet. Given the low water pressure, it takes time to fill a bucket and sometimes more than one bucket is necessary to flush the toilet, making the situation deplorable, especially in the summer. 9.  As the building housing the Division is more than 150 years old, the ceiling releases dust, which is allegedly harmful to the first applicant\u2019s lungs. 10.  The first applicant submitted that he does not have access to drinking water, since the tap water is rusty and filthy, and he therefore has to purchase drinking water. However, his job in prison pays only 0.60 euro (EUR) cents per day and in the summer he drinks three six packs of water a week, at considerable cost. The Government submitted that the first applicant received EUR 34.77 every four weeks in so\u2011called \u201cgratuity\u201d remuneration and from the \u201cWork and Pay\u201d scheme, with which he had been involved since 2015. They stated that at the tuck shop a six\u2011pack of water cost EUR 2.24 and an individual bottle EUR 0.38. 11.  The second applicant, who is a national of the Dominican Republic, has been detained in Corradino Correctional Facility since 24 November 2009. He is serving a nine-year prison sentence following a judgment of 15 October 2012. Since 27 January 2012 he has been detained in Division 3, cell no. 155 (with the exception of one day \u2011 3 October 2015 \u2011 spent in Division 6). 12.  According to the Government, following communication of the complaint, the second applicant was asked whether he wanted to be transferred to another division and replied in the negative. 13.  The second applicant submitted that his cell window is at a height of more than two metres and it is very difficult to open without endangering one\u2019s life. Its metal protective bars make it difficult for the cell to admit any natural light. Although there are two openings for the purposes of ventilation, one of them is blocked and there is therefore not sufficient ventilation. 14.  The second applicant alleged that the water is not drinkable; he therefore has to purchase it. The Government submitted that the second applicant received EUR 41.58 every four weeks in so-called \u201cgratuity remuneration\u201d and from the \u201cWork and Pay\u201d scheme, with which he had become involved prior to 2015. 15.  The dust which falls from the cell\u2019s ceiling allegedly affects the second applicant, who suffers from asthma. The Government submitted that the amount of dust falling from the ceiling of his cell was not abnormal, but was what emanates naturally from Maltese stone. They noted that the second applicant had never asked for materials to paint his cell. 16.  The second applicant also submitted that because of the humidity in his cell and the fact that he does not have a heater, he frequently catches the flu during the winter months. The Government submitted that the cell was humid because the second applicant had blocked his vent with a towel and did not undertake any maintenance of his cell. 17.  The second applicant noted that the light both inside and outside the cell is very poor, making it difficult for him to read. The Government noted that the second applicant had a ceiling light and another wall\u2011mounted light, as well a portable lamp which he had acquired. Natural light came in through three skylights and artificial light was provided through bell lamps of 400W each. The second applicant also claimed that the spiral staircase is not appropriate in the case of an emergency, since a stretcher could not be carried down it and it would not be possible to evacuate people two at a time. In this connection the Government submitted that other options were available should an emergency arise, such as the use of the walkway between the divisions.", "references": ["9", "4", "2", "0", "5", "6", "8", "3", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1937, 1934 and 1941 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Sofia. 5.  The applicants\u2019 fathers owned printing houses in Sofia, which were nationalised by the Communist authorities in 1949 and 1950. After that their assets were taken over by a State-owned printing house. In 1991 the latter was registered as a State-owned company, currently named \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD. The company is managed by the Minister of Education. Among the tasks of the company is the printing of school textbooks. 6.  In 1997 Parliament adopted the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Compensation Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 23 below). 7.  In March 1998 the first and second applicants and their mother applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. As to the manner of compensation, they expressed preference to receive shares in \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD. In a decision of 14 June 1999 the Minister of Education allowed their request, stating that the exact number of shares to be awarded would be determined after a valuation of the assets of the former printing house. 8.  Despite that, in another decision dated 3 July 2000 the Minister rejected the request for compensation. That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 24 June 2002, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous one, which had become final. 9.  After that an expert prepared a valuation of the nationalised property, which was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 5 June 2003. It stated that the first and second applicants and their mother were entitled to compensation for 57,932 Bulgarian levs (BGN, equivalent of 29,630 euros (EUR)), which equalled 579 shares in \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100 (EUR 51). 10.  However, on 26 August 2003 the Minister adopted another decision, stating that the applicants and their mother were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. He relied in particular on the fact that \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Act 2002 (hereinafter \u201cthe Privatisation Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 24 below). Once again, that decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court, in a final judgment of 18 October 2004, as it impermissibly modified the previous decisions awarding the first and second applicants and their mother compensation in the form of shares, which had become final. The domestic court held in particular that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification. 11.  In 2006 the first and second applicants and their mother filed with the Minister of Education and other State bodies several complaints, requesting that the compensation procedure be completed. In a letter dated 7 April 2006 the Council of Ministers (Government) informed them that the Ministry of Education was seeking \u201ca lawful solution\u201d, which \u201cwould not infringe upon the public interest and would not be in breach of the [Privatisation Act]\u201d. In another letter dated 30 August 2006 the parliamentary Committee on Petitions informed the applicants and their mother that it had urged the Minister of Education to find a solution, pointing out that with the enactment of the Compensation Act Parliament had sought \u201cto restore historical justice\u201d. 12.  The first and second applicants\u2019 mother passed away in 2007 and was succeeded by them. 13.  In August 1998 the third applicant, her mother and her sister applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. They stated that they preferred to receive shares in \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD. 14.  Their request was allowed by the Minister of Education in a decision of 22 December 1998. 15.  In 1999, 2001 and 2003 an expert drew up three valuations of the expropriated property. The last of them, stating that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were entitled to compensation for BGN 26,309 (the equivalent of EUR 13,460), equalling 263 shares in \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100, was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 6 June 2003. 16.  Despite the above developments, in another decision dated 26 August 2003 the Minister stated that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. As in the procedure described above concerning the first and second applicants, he relied on the fact that the company had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation Act (see paragraph 24 below). That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 31 March 2004, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous decisions concerning the compensation to be provided, which had become final. The domestic court again held that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification, as it was not applicable to pending compensation proceedings. 17.  The third applicant\u2019s mother and sister passed away in 2006 and 2004 respectively, leaving the third applicant her father\u2019s only surviving heir. 18.  In 2007 the Ministry of Education requested the Privatisation Agency to authorise the transfer to private parties of shares in \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD. The authorisation, related to the claims of all applicants, was given on 23 April 2008. 19.  The Ministry took no further measures to complete the compensation procedures. 20.  In 2011 the third applicant wrote a letter to the executive director of \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD, urging him to enter into the company register her shareholding and to present to her copies of all decisions taken by the company\u2019s general meeting after 2003. She received no response. 21.  In a decision of 5 March 2013 the Council of Ministers authorised the sale by \u2018Obrazovanie i nauka\u2019 EAD of real properties owned by the company (such an authorisation was required by law). The applicants applied for the judicial review of that decision, arguing that it affected their rights as shareholders. In a judgment of 27 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed their application, noting that they were not shareholders in the company, since the compensation procedures had not been completed with the actual transfer of shares to them in accordance with the law.", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "4", "1", "8", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Skopje. At the time of the events he was vice-president of the SDSM opposition party and a member of parliament. The present applications concern criminal libel proceedings brought against the applicant by Mr S.M., who at the time was a senior member of the then ruling political party and at the same time head of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency (\u201cthe Agency\u201d). According to the Internal Affairs Act (sections 24 and 25), the head of the Agency is appointed by the Government and is accountable to it and the competent Minister. The impugned proceedings concerned statements made by the applicant at press conferences held at his political party\u2019s headquarters. 7.  On 14 December 2007 the applicant held a press conference that was broadcast by the main news programme of the A1 television channel, which had national coverage and was the most popular channel at the time. The relevant part of the applicant\u2019s statement at the press conference reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the year and a half he has formally been head of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency and practically the head of the police, has M. (the plaintiff\u2019s surname), abused his powers in order to influence the Macedonian Stock Exchange and have timely information to enable him to obtain a profit? Is there any truth in the rumours (\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0438\u043d\u0438), which have become stronger, that police wiretapping equipment is being misused for trading on the Stock Exchange? ...\u201d 8.  The applicant submitted a transcript of the broadcast, which was also viewed at the trial (see paragraph 11 below). Besides the information described above, the transcript included a journalist suggesting that the applicant\u2019s political party had asked the head of the Public Revenue Office whether Mr S.M. had paid taxes on his property, which had been assessed as being worth several million euros (EUR). The same programme also gave Mr S.M.\u2019s reply, denying the allegations and stating that the money in question had been transferred to the respondent State from a foreign bank account. The transcript of the broadcast was published on the channel\u2019s website on the same day under the headline: \u201cSDSM: M. has wrongfully used wiretapping equipment\u201d. 9.  The applicant submitted articles published over the following days on the channel\u2019s website, which described the subsequent exchange of comments and replies between the applicant and his political party, on the one hand, and various State institutions on the other. The articles stated that the applicant\u2019s political party had asked the relevant institutions to investigate the origin of Mr S.M.\u2019s assets and that the Ministry of the Interior had requested that it submit any evidence in support of its allegations. 10.  On 1 February 2008 Mr S.M. brought private criminal proceedings accusing the applicant for libel, which was punishable at the time under Article 172 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. He claimed that the applicant\u2019s statement at the press conference (see paragraph 7 above) had contained defamatory allegations about him. The applicant did not submit any comments in reply. 11.  The Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) scheduled twelve hearings. The applicant, who was legally represented, did not personally attend any of the scheduled hearings. Several hearings were adjourned owing to the applicant\u2019s work in Parliament. At the trial, the court heard Mr S.M. and was provided with audio-and video-recordings of the programme on A1. The relevant part of the transcript of the hearing of 24 March 2009, when the court examined that material, reads as follows:\n\u201c... The court views ... the video and audio-recording of the news programme broadcast on A1 television on 14 December 2007 on which ... there is a photo of the plaintiff S.M. and the voice of a journalist who states the following:\n\u2018The (SDSM) ask(s) whether the head of the (Agency), S.M., earned hundreds of thousands of euros by misusing police wiretapping equipment for trading on the Stock Exchange. Their suspicions are based on a declaration of assets (\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043d \u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442), which S.M. submitted half a year ago, in which he specified that he possessed shares valued at EUR 300,000. SDSM ask(s) whether M. obtained any of that property during the nine months he has been in office, without submitting a declaration, and whether that was the reason for his failing to submit the declaration within the first nine months of his mandate\u2019\nThe recording continues with a photograph of [the applicant] at a stand in front of the SDMS logo and states that [statement described in paragraph 7 above] ...\nThe video material continues with a commentary by the journalist stating that:\n\u2018S.M. replied to the allegations by SDSM by saying that the money in question was linked to a lawful business which he had abroad\u2019 and the tape continues with the plaintiff\u2019s statement ...\u201d 12.  The defence did not submit any evidence (including the evidence described in paragraphs 8 and 9 above). In the concluding remarks, the applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that the applicant had made the impugned statement in an interrogatory form and as the vice-president of an opposition political party, which had the role of expressing concerns about and assessing the work of State officials. 13.  On 3 November 2009 the trial court, sitting as a single-judge (Judge V.M.), found the applicant guilty of defamation and fined him EUR 1,500 with seventy-five days\u2019 imprisonment in default. It also ordered him to pay court fees of EUR 30 and a further EUR 230 to cover Mr S.M.\u2019s costs. The court further ruled that the operative part of the judgment should be published at the applicant\u2019s expense via A1 television\u2019s news programme. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... The accused is the vice-president of SDSM ...\n... [the applicant] said [the words described in paragraph 7 above] from a podium which had the SDMS logo behind it ...\n... a statement ... must contain certain facts and ... be false ... The fact of that which ... is expressed or disseminated being false constitutes the core of the criminal offence of libel. Consequently, a victim is not required to prove that a defamatory statement is false, rather the accused is obliged to prove (the veracity of) what was said ...\n... based on the audio and video material to hand the court finds that [the applicant] made statements about [Mr S.M.] in a form capable of persuading an ordinary viewer ... that they are truthful ...\n... the court does not deny that questions can be put to and answers sought from State officials ... It is true that every person, including a member of a political party, as is [the applicant], has the right to put questions of public interest, to criticise the work of the Government and to express concerns about someone who holds the highest office in the executive. This makes the victim a \u2018legitimate target\u2019 of constructive criticism and public debate, but not of statements and assertions that had no factual basis, as in the present case.\n... the court cannot accept, as contrary to the evidence, [the applicant\u2019s] defence that the allegations were made in an interrogatory form (in an attempt) to obtain an answer from the victim as a State official. (Given) the manner in which the applicant expressed his allegations and other circumstances, the court has found that the [applicant\u2019s] allegations are false and (represent) an assertion made in an interrogatory form, which have had a considerable effect on the claimant\u2019s reputation and dignity. The defence cannot rely on Article 176 of the Criminal Code and (claim) that the (impugned) expression should have been examined in the context of the position he held, namely vice-president of an opposition political party. Such a status does not entitle him to express or disseminate untruthful allegations which are detrimental to the reputation and dignity of a third party.\n... the court considers that the fact that [the applicant] has already been convicted by a final judgment of the same offence is an aggravating factor ...\u201d 14.  On 11 May 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal, sitting as a three-judge panel composed of Judges M.S., L.I.Sh. and S.K., upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning. 15.  Based on legislative amendments of November 2012, on 12 February 2013 (see paragraph 36 below) the trial court stayed the execution (\u0441\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0440\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) of the sanction (a fine) imposed on the applicant. 16.  The applicant paid Mr S.M.\u2019s costs for the criminal proceedings. He did not pay the court fees and did not publish the trial court\u2019s judgment via A1, which ceased to exist in 2011. 17.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in which he complained that his conviction had violated his right to freedom of expression. He reiterated his arguments that he had been punished for a question that he had raised at a press conference that had been held on behalf of his political party. The question had been addressed to the public and had been based on information submitted to his political party about suspected irregularities in the work of a State official. The aim had been to stimulate public debate on whether the official had been diligent in performing his official duty. 18.  By a decision of 23 February 2011 (served on the applicant on 30 March 2011), the Constitutional Court by a majority dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It noted that he had not attended any of the scheduled hearings and held that freedom of expression was not absolute and could be restricted in accordance with the law. In that connection, it referred to Article 172 of the Criminal Code, which punished the dissemination of untrue information that could affect the reputation and dignity of a third party. The court further held that:\n\u201cThe way in which [the applicant] expressed his opinion (\u043c\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0435\u045a\u0435) in public concerning the performance of public duties by a public official (in an interrogatory form, as a member of an opposition political party, from a political party\u2019s podium (\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430), the consequences of his public action ...), without trying to prove the veracity of his question or statement, taken as a whole, represents an action which only appears to fall within the ambit of the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, but in substance it affects the reputation and dignity of the citizen who holds that public office at the time and violates those values. Accordingly, the statement lost the attributes of the freedom (of thought and public expression of thought) and (represents) an abuse of (that freedom).\u201d 19.  In comments submitted in reply to the Government\u2019s observations (November 2015), the applicant informed the Court that Mr S.M. had brought civil proceedings against him after his conviction, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The claim was examined at three levels of jurisdiction. By a final judgment of 9 April 2014 the applicant was ordered to pay 550,000 Macedonian denars (MKD) plus interest in respect of non-pecuniary damage and MKD 46,180 for the trial costs incurred by Mr S.M. in the compensation proceedings. 20.  On 9 September 2007 the applicant held a press conference at SDSM\u2019s offices regarding the public sale of State-owned building land in the central area of Skopje, where the construction of a hotel was planned. It was broadcast on local television news. According to a transcript of the entire press conference (evidence not submitted to the criminal courts), the applicant presented the events involved and information obtained from the State authorities regarding the sale in question. He further detailed the conclusions of research done by his political party, showing that the company that had been selected was incorporated in the respondent State at the same address as O. Holding (a local company) and was partly owned by a company which had business ties with O. Holding. In that connection, he alleged that a deal had been done so that \u201cthe land would be given to people who had close family or party ties\u201d with the Prime Minister. As described in the trial court\u2019s judgment (see below), the applicant stated that:\n\u201cThe attractive location behind the \u2018Ramstor\u2019 shopping mall planned for the construction of a hotel was granted to a company supported (\u0437\u0430\u0434 \u043a\u043e\u0458\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0438) by O. Holding ... After the revelation of this megascandal, the biggest dilemma is whether the Academy Award for the most corrupt politician should be given to the Prime Minister or his cousins? To those who created or to those who carried out the deal?\u201d 21.  By a press release of the same date (9 September 2007) sent \u201cin relation to the press conference held by the political party SDSM and with a view to provide the public with objective and correct information\u201d the Ministry of Transport and Communication informed the media about the procedure and the selected company. 22.  In reply to a request for information, SDSM notified the public prosecutor on 1 October 2007 about the company that had been selected (it was registered at the same address as O. Holding and its manager was a former O. Holding employee), alleging that it had not met the requirements of the sale. It further requested that the public prosecutor investigate whether the transaction had been in conformity with the Anti-Corruption Act. 23.  On 19 September 2007 Mr S.M. brought private criminal charges, accusing the applicant of making (see paragraph 20 above) defamatory allegations about him. He denied ever having had any connection, private or professional, with the public sale of the land. He had also not signed the sale contract with the company that had been chosen. The applicant did not submit any comments in reply. 24.  The trial court scheduled seventeen hearings. The applicant was represented by a lawyer, but did not attend any of the scheduled hearings in person. Some of the scheduled hearings were adjourned because the court bailiff was unable to serve summonses on the applicant. At the trial, the court heard Mr S.M. and viewed audio and video material of television coverage of the applicant\u2019s statement. The defence did not submit any evidence, not even the information submitted to the public prosecutor (see paragraph 22 above). 25.  On 23 February 2011, after one remittal, the trial court, sitting as a single-judge (Judge D.G.I.), convicted the applicant of defamation. It fined him EUR 1,000 with one hundred days\u2019 imprisonment in default, ordered him to pay a court fee of EUR 30 and a further EUR 375 to cover Mr S.M.\u2019s trial costs. Relying on the latter\u2019s testimony, the court held that the applicant\u2019s allegations had concerned Mr S.M., regardless of the fact that he had not been identified by name. That was because the applicant had previously given false statements about Mr S.M. and had often referred to him as \u201cthe Prime Minister\u2019s cousin\u201d. Mr S.M. admitted that he had had contact with the managers of O. Holding, although that had been as friends. He had had no cooperation with them in business terms or been involved in any way in the construction of the hotel. 26.  The relevant parts of the trial court\u2019s judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... the court considers ... that [the applicant\u2019s] [statement described in paragraph 20 above] could have a considerable effect on the complainant\u2019s reputation and dignity ... since he is the holder of a public office and (such) statements are disseminated quickly and aggressively in public.\nThat the complainant was not identified by his full name by the [applicant] is irrelevant since the relevant circumstances clearly and unequivocally suggest that the matter concerned [Mr S.M.]. Furthermore, the news presenter identified the complainant by his surname.\n... The [applicant\u2019s] assertion, (which he made) as vice-president of a political party, contained untrue allegations about the complainant susceptible of violating his honour and reputation ... [The statement in question] was not substantiated with any evidence because the private complainant, as head of the Agency, does not have the competence to participate in the public sale of State-owned land and the accused did not present any evidence that [Mr S.M.] was privately involved in the sale transaction in question ...\u201d 27.  On 18 May 2011 a three-judge panel (Judges Z.N., L.I.Sh. and G.S.) of the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant in which he had complained, inter alia, that the complainant had not been identified in his statement, which had been made in an interrogatory form and in a political context and, accordingly, not punishable, as specified in Article 176 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). The court upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment, finding that the applicant had made a false assertion (\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0435\u045a\u0435 \u0441\u043e \u043d\u0435\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0430) about the complainant. It continued:\n\u201cIt is a statutory presumption that a statement of fact harmful to the honour and reputation of a third party is untrue. The burden of proof therefore rests with the accused to prove that the assertion is true. Accordingly, [the applicant] was required to prove that his statement was true, which is not the case ... The contents of the statement, the time, place and way in which it was given imply that it was serious and that it could objectively create a perception in the minds of third parties about certain facts. This court finds [the statement] defamatory since the factual assertion contained therein was able objectively to affect the reputation and dignity of the private complainant.\u201d 28.  On 12 February 2013 the trial court stayed the execution of the fine it had imposed (see paragraph 36 below). The applicant paid the court fees and the trial costs incurred by Mr S.M., who did not claim compensation for damage in respect of this criminal conviction for defamation. 29.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in which he claimed that as a representative of a political party he had been required to bring to light information that had been brought to his attention. He had not made a factual statement but had raised a question regarding allegations of corruption. 30.  By a decision of 12 September 2012 (served on the applicant on 1 October 2012) the Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for protection of the right to freedom of expression. The court held that:\n\u201cIn the concrete case, the court ... punished [the applicant] ... as a necessary measure for the protection of the reputation, dignity and authority of another person. That was because [the applicant], by relying on freedom of public expression, interfered with the protected right of another person, namely Mr S.M ...\n[The applicant] is a member of parliament and vice-President of the SDSM and he made the statement in SDSM\u2019s headquarters (if the statement had been given in Parliament, he would have enjoyed immunity and private charges would not have been possible). Although freedom of expression is important for all, it is particularly important for representatives of the people ... Therefore, interference with a Member of Parliament\u2019s freedom of expression calls for the closest scrutiny by the court.\nAnalysis must be made ... of whether (the applicant\u2019s) conviction and sanction represent a justified restriction of his rights and freedoms ... namely whether the courts struck a fair balance between the need to protect the reputation and dignity of the victim and [the applicant\u2019s] freedom of public expression. The freedom of political debate is not of an absolute nature ... the court notes that the impugned statement concerns the public sale of State-owned building land ... and should be considered in the context of a debate concerning an issue of public interest, which in particular was of prime political interest ...\nThe court considers that the veracity of the statement ... was of primary importance for the courts. Those courts ... established that [the applicant\u2019s] statement was not true or that there was no evidence to prove the contrary.\n... the court has the right and duty to assess whether the courts enabled [the applicant] to prove the veracity of (his) statement. In this connection the court finds that [the applicant] was able, during the entire proceedings, to present evidence as to the veracity of his statement. In the absence of proof to confirm the veracity (of the statement) or the existence of a strong basis for it to be regarded as truthful, the court must accept the courts\u2019 findings that the statement was false.\nDespite the fact that the statement is part of a public debate, the question is whether (it) ... had any impact or was relevant for the public as a contribution to a better understanding of the issue subject to public debate ...\nThe way in which the (applicant) expressed his opinion (\u043c\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0435\u045a\u0435) in public concerning the performance of a public office by a public official (in an interrogatory form, as a member of an opposition party, from the podium (\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430) of the political party, the consequences of his public action ...) without trying to prove the veracity of his question or statement, taken as a whole, represents an action which only appears to fall within the ambit of the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, but in substance it affects the reputation and dignity of the citizen who holds the public office at the time and violates those values. Accordingly, the statement lost the attributes of the freedom (of thought and public expression of thought) and (represents) an abuse of (that freedom).\u201d 31.  By a judgment of 20 May 2008 the trial court, sitting as a single\u2011judge (Judge D.G.I.), had found the applicant guilty of making defamatory allegations about the then Minister for Transportation and Communications regarding the public sale of the same State-owned land subject to application no. 24133/13 above. The applicant was convicted and fined EUR 1,000 for the following statement, which was made at a press conference on 12 September 2007 at the offices of his political party:\n\u201c... by selling land to a company that does not fulfil the (statutory) conditions, Minister J. obviously committed a criminal offence-abuse of office. We therefore expect that the public prosecutor will immediately lodge an indictment\u201d. 32.  As explained in the judgment, the court established that when the applicant had made the statement, the procedure for the public sale of the land was still ongoing, namely the relevant standing committee within the Ministry had not yet submitted its proposal to the Minister about the best bidder. The Minister had then granted the land to the best bidder in December 2007. Furthermore, several institutions, which had reviewed the work of the committee, had not found any irregularities. The court did not accept the applicant\u2019s defence (he did not attend any of the scheduled hearings) that his statement had been an expression of a reasonable suspicion about the public sale of the land. The court refused the following defence applications: to examine a member of the standing committee; to admit committee minutes in evidence regarding the public sale; and to hear information from the public prosecutor about the committee\u2019s work. It held that the proposed evidence concerned the committee\u2019s work which was not the subject of the proceedings. A three-judge panel of the Skopje Court of Appeal (Judges M.S., L.I.Sh. and V.Dz.) upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. Both courts considered that the applicant had made the statement in his own name and not on behalf of his political party.", "references": ["0", "4", "9", "7", "3", "1", "5", "2", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Riga. 6.  On 17 October 2000 the Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work (Vesel\u012bbas un darbsp\u0113ju ekspert\u012bzes \u0101rstu komisija) granted the applicant a disability status of category 3 (the least severe level of disability) on the grounds of a visual impairment. 7.  On 16 October 2001 following an examination the Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work declined the applicant\u2019s request to prolong her disability status. 8.  On 9 November 2001 this decision was upheld by the State Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work (Vesel\u012bbas un darbsp\u0113ju ekspert\u012bzes \u0101rstu valsts komisija, hereinafter \u2011 the Commission) and on 5 December 2001 by an extended composition of that Commission. 9.  The applicant challenged the decision of the Commission before a court. On 22 April 2002 the Riga City Zemgale District Court declined the claim. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 30 July 2004 the Regional Administrative Court annulled the decision of 5 December 2001 due to lack of reasoning and ordered the Commission to carry out a new examination. On 30 November 2004 this judgment was upheld by the Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court. 11.  On 11 January 2005, following a new examination by an extended composition, the Commission again refused to grant the applicant the status of a disabled person. 12.  On 9 January 2006 the applicant brought a claim to the Administrative District Court challenging the Commission\u2019s decision and requesting to be granted the status of a disabled person from 16 October 2001. 13.  On 29 September 2006 the Administrative District Court declined the applicant\u2019s claim. This judgment was upheld by the Regional Administrative Court. 14.  The Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court two times quashed the judgments of the Regional Administrative Court for its failure to follow the interpretation of the domestic law given by the Supreme Court. 15.  On 24 November 2010 the Regional Administrative Court declined the applicant\u2019s claim, and on 14 March 2011 the Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court refused to institute cassation proceedings.", "references": ["9", "2", "6", "7", "5", "4", "0", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Batumi. 6.  On 16 February 2004 the applicant\u2019s son, G.B., fell off a crane while fixing electric cables. He was admitted to the intensive care unit of Batumi Hospital No. 1 (\u201cthe hospital\u201d). His injuries included a fractured skull and brain damage. 7.  On 28 February 2004 doctors observed that G.B. had gastrointestinal bleeding and he was given the relevant treatment. On 5 March 2004 he was transferred to a general medical ward as there had been an improvement in his condition. 8.  On 6 March 2004 G.B.\u2019s state of health deteriorated and he was transferred back to the intensive care unit because of a bleeding duodenal ulcer. Urgent surgery was performed on 10 March 2004 to stop the bleeding, but he died on 14 March 2004. 9.  It appears from the criminal case files that the applicant refused to allow an autopsy of G.B.\u2019s body. 10.  On 17 February 2004 the hospital informed the Batumi police that G.B. had been admitted with traumatic injuries. An investigator visited the hospital but was unable to question him in view of his state of health. 11.  On 24 March 2004 the investigator returned to the hospital to enquire about the incident of 16 February 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) and was informed that the applicant\u2019s son had died. An investigation was launched into G.B.\u2019s death and the applicant was questioned the following day. 12.  On 2 April 2004 the investigator ordered an examination by a panel of experts of the Forensic Bureau under the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (\u201cthe forensic bureau\u201d) of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (\u201cAAR\u201d) in order to determine the exact cause of G.B.\u2019s death. The examination was carried out between 6 April and 18 June 2004. The report that followed (\u201creport no. 9-k\u201d or \u201cthe first report\u201d) stated as follows:\n\u201c1. As ... no autopsy was performed upon [G.B.\u2019s] death, the exact cause of his death is unknown to the ... panel [even though] the [related] medical records indicate abdominal bleeding ... 4. We consider that a medical error was committed with respect to G.B.\u2019s treatment in terms of the timing of the surgery, which was caused by an incorrect assessment of the clinical, endoscopy and laboratory data.\u201d 13.  On 23 June 2004 a criminal medical negligence case was opened against the relevant doctors of the hospital, in which the applicant was granted victim status. 14.  The experts of the forensic bureau who had participated in the panel examination (see paragraph 12 above) were questioned as part of the investigation. The majority confirmed the earlier findings, stating that the therapeutic treatment had been adequate, but an assessment of the delay in surgery was the exclusive competence of a surgeon on the panel. The latter reiterated the findings of the report that the surgery had been delayed in view of several previously registered relapses of bleeding. He added however that this might not have made any difference to the fatal outcome. 15.  The head of the expert panel further stated that a conclusive finding on the exact cause of death could not be reached without a forensic examination of the body. 16.  On 7 July 2004, relying on the findings of the expert panel, a prosecutor applied to the first-instance court for permission to exhume G.B.\u2019s body in order to determine the exact cause of his death. The request was granted on 8 July 2004. 17.  On 14 July 2004 the applicant refused to allow the exhumation despite being warned of its importance for the case. 18.  On 2 August 2004 the case was closed as the prosecuting authority was unable to establish a causal link between the alleged medical negligence and G.B.\u2019s death without an exhumation of his body. 19.  On 4 August 2004, relying on the findings of the panel of experts in report no. 9-k (see paragraph 12 above) the Batumi city prosecutor wrote to the Minister of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the AAR. He noted that despite the closure of the investigation, the family\u2019s resistance to allow an exhumation of the body to determine the precise cause of death, and the inability to establish criminal responsibility on the part of the doctors in question, the conclusion of the panel of experts that a medical error had been committed in the course of G.B.\u2019s treatment called for \u201cthe implementation of adequate measures to prevent similar violations.\u201d 20.  On 27 September 2004, referring to the findings of the prosecutor and the panel of experts in report no. 9-k concerning the medical error committed in the course of G.B.\u2019s treatment, the director of the hospital dismissed the neurosurgeon who had been in charge of G.B.\u2019s treatment (\u10db\u10d9\u10e3\u10e0\u10dc\u10d0\u10da\u10d8 \u10d4\u10e5\u10d8\u10db\u10d8) and reprimanded two intensive care specialists and a surgeon. 21.  On various dates the applicant asked for the investigation to be reopened. 22.  On 1 August 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office granted the applicant\u2019s request and reopened the investigation under Article 130 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (the offence of abandoning a patient in distress, see paragraph 51 below). 23.  Several witnesses were questioned, including the then director and deputy director of the hospital, who had considered the family\u2019s resistance as grounds for not carrying out an autopsy upon G.B.\u2019s death. 24.  On 21 September 2006 the investigator obtained a second exhumation order from the court in order to determine the exact cause of G.B.\u2019s death. The applicant once again refused to allow implementation. 25.  On 4 January 2008 the prosecutor terminated the case as there was no proof causally linking the medical error with G.B.\u2019s death. It does not appear that the applicant appealed against that decision, despite it being amenable to appeal within fifteen days of service upon the parties. 26.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim with the Batumi City Court against the hospital, its medical staff and the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the AAR. She argued that her son\u2019s death had been caused by medical negligence, namely incorrect and delayed treatment of his gastroduodenal bleeding. 27.  Between 18 and 28 October 2004, at the request of the Batumi City Court, the Quality Control Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (\u201cthe inspectorate\u201d) implemented an inspection of the hospital in connection with G.B.\u2019s death, which was carried out by a panel of experts. They reached the following conclusions (\u201cthe second report\u201d):\n\u201cThe institution is carrying out medical practice without a licence in the following fields: cardiology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, proctology, urology, paediatrics, epidemiology, clinical transfusion and expert assessments of temporary incapacitation.\nIn relation to patient G.B., non-licensed activity was carried out in the following fields: cardiology and clinical transfusion.\nOut of the 29 doctors who took part in patient G.B.\u2019s treatment, the invited specialists ... in endoscopy and ophthalmology do not hold a licence to practise medicine. A neurosurgeon (currently dismissed from the post) and an intensive care specialist are practising medicine independently despite being ... junior doctors. The doctor ... working as a transfusion specialist is a certified paediatrician ...\n... [I]t is evident that the surgery, the sole purpose of which was to definitively determine the cause of bleeding and stop it, was carried out too late. It is difficult to determine whether the scope of the surgery was adequate, as it is impossible to determine the exact location of the ulcer (there is no forensic pathology examination report concerning the body and the two endoscopy specialists reached different conclusions concerning the ulcer\u2019s location).\nIt is also worth mentioning that a pathomorphological analysis of the material obtained during the surgery was not carried out...\u201d 28.  An undated study of the relevant medical files, ordered by the inspectorate from a professor of surgery at the Tbilisi State Medical University (\u201cthe third report\u201d) noted the difficulty of making categorical claims in the absence of an autopsy of the body. It nevertheless pointed to a lack of adequate supervision by a surgeon, despite the relapses of abdominal bleeding, inadequacies in the choice of treatment, and a lack of appropriate diagnostic measures for the timely detection and possibly even aversion of the otherwise risky surgery. Stressing that it was conventional treatment methods that had been insufficiently explored, the report continued to note that it would be incorrect to make a categorical assertion, such as in the first report, as regards the medical error in relation to the delay in the otherwise high-risk surgery. 29.  On an unspecified date two experts of the forensic bureau gave statements to the court and confirmed the findings of the first report that a medical error had been committed in terms of the delay in surgery. They further indicated that the cause of G.B.\u2019s death, according to the medical records, was gastroduodenal bleeding which could have been averted by timely and adequate medical treatment. 30.  On 20 January 2006, relying on the expert reports and the medical documentation available in the case files, the Batumi City Court ruled in favour of the applicant. It concluded that the doctors of the hospital had been responsible for a medical error resulting in the patient\u2019s death. It further noted that the participation in the patient\u2019s treatment of doctors not holding the appropriate medical licences reinforced the conclusion that he had not been offered adequate medical care. The court took the decision of the hospital director of 27 September 2004 dismissing the neurosurgeon in charge of G.B.\u2019s treatment and reprimanding two intensive care specialists and a surgeon (see paragraph 20 above) as acknowledgment that medical negligence had been committed in the course of G.B.\u2019s treatment. 31.  The applicant was awarded 2,756 Georgian laris (GEL, approximately 1,070 Euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage. Relying on section 10 of the Patient Rights Act (see paragraph 46 below) the court also awarded non-pecuniary damages in the amount of GEL 6,000 (approximately EUR 2,331). As the contract concerning G.B.\u2019s treatment had only been concluded with the hospital, the latter was found to be the only appropriate respondent and was accordingly ordered to pay the corresponding amount. Both the applicant and the hospital appealed, disagreeing with the court\u2019s assessment of the facts and the scope of the award. 32.  On 9 February 2007 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s reasoning. It noted as follows:\n\u201cBased on an analysis of the evidence before it, the appellate court concludes that in the course of Mr G.B.\u2019s treatment in [the hospital] the medical negligence of the medical staff (insufficient attention towards the patient, misdiagnosis) caused harm to a person\u2019s health and eventually caused the patient\u2019s ... death.\u201d 33.  The appellate court continued to note that:\n\u201cIn addition to establishing that harm was caused to a person\u2019s health as a result of the medical negligence of the [hospital] staff, it can also be established from the case files that [the hospital] was carrying out unlicensed activities in a number of medical fields and at the same time some of the medical staff did not have authorisation to practise medicine independently, in violation of the requirements of the [relevant legislation]...\u201d 34.  The Kutaisi Court of Appeal further found the hospital to be the only appropriate respondent to pay the damages in respect of the medical negligence of the doctors. As regards who should be held responsible for the hospital and its doctors operating without the necessary licences, it was noted that:\n\u201cThe Ministry of Health of the AAR cannot be held responsible in the present case ... for [the hospital] operating in certain medical fields without the requisite licences considering that, in accordance with section 54 of the Health Care Act, the issuance of such licences is [the exclusive competence] of the Ministry of Health of Georgia.\nAccordingly, the claim for ... pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages with respect to the Ministry of Health of the AAR is groundless.\u201d 35.  The appellate court upheld the lower court\u2019s award of non\u2011pecuniary damages and increased the amount of pecuniary damages to GEL 6,953 (approximately EUR 2,701). 36.  Both parties appealed, disagreeing with the court\u2019s assessment of the facts and the scope of the award. 37.  On 14 May 2008 the Supreme Court adopted a decision without holding an oral hearing. Referring to the evidence available in the case files, the court found that despite the fact that the exact cause of death could not be determined without an exhumation of the body, the case files confirmed that gastroduodenal bleeding was the cause of death and that a medical error had been committed in terms of the surgery and an incorrect assessment of the various data. 38.  The Supreme Court further upheld the lower courts\u2019 findings that the hospital had been carrying out unlicensed medical activities and noted as follows:\n\u201cIt is confirmed ... that [the hospital] was carrying out unlicensed medical activities in the following fields: cardiology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, proctology, urology, paediatrics, epidemiology, clinical transfusion and expert assessments of temporary incapacitation. Unlicensed medical activities performed in respect of Mr G.B. were in the following fields: cardiology and clinical transfusion. Of the medical staff invited to treat ... Mr G.B. ... the endoscopy specialist and ... an ophthalmologist did not have a certificate [authorising them] to practise medicine. [Those] appointed as junior doctors ... the neurosurgeon (currently dismissed) and ... the intensive care specialist were practising medicine independently. The doctor ... certified as a paediatrician was working as a transfusion specialist. The Court of Cassation upholds the views of the appellate court that this gave rise to a violation of ... the Health Care Act and ... the Medical Practice Act.\u201d 39.  The Supreme Court noted that the Ministry of Health of Georgia was the entity responsible for issuing licences to medical institutions and that the applicable legislation did now allow medical institutions and individual doctors to practise medicine without requisite licences (see paragraphs 44\u201145 below). It did not elaborate on whether responsibility could be attributed to the respondent Ministry of Health of the AAR. 40.  The award of pecuniary damages in the amount of GEL 6,953 (approximately EUR 2,701) was upheld. 41.  As regards the question of non-pecuniary damages, the Supreme Court found that domestic law did not entitle the applicant to receive an award for non-pecuniary damage for the death of her son. In particular, it observed as follows:\n\u201cUnder Article 1007 of the Civil Code, harm caused to a person\u2019s health during his or her treatment at a medical institution (a result of surgery or misdiagnosis etc.) shall be compensated on a general basis. In accordance with Article 413 of the Civil Code, monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damage may be requested only in the cases expressly provided for by law, in the form of reasonable and fair compensation. The Civil Code does not define moral (non-pecuniary) damage... Under Article 413 of the Civil Code, not all types of moral harm (mental suffering) shall be compensated, even if there is no doubt as to its existence, only those for which compensation is expressly provided for by law... Accordingly, in accordance with the practice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, non-pecuniary damage resulting from the infringement of the right to life of a person\u2019s husband, child or other relative shall not be compensated as it is not expressly provided for by law...\u201d 42.  The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court\u2019s interpretation that the right to claim non-pecuniary damages under section 10(a) of the Patient Rights Act also applied to the death of a relative, and noted that that right was strictly personal. The Supreme Court therefore rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages, noting that:\n\u201cIt is undisputed that a parent is subjected to moral pain as a result of the death of a young child, but it shall not be compensated considering that it is not expressly provided for by the law in force.\u201d", "references": ["3", "8", "9", "1", "5", "4", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Z. Owing to problems in her family, between 2000 and 2004 she lived with a foster family. Then she moved to a public home for children and young persons, where she stayed until she completed her professional training as a waiter. 6.  On 27 September 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Z. police against a certain T.M., a former policeman, alleging that in the period between the summer of 2011 and September of the same year he had physically and psychologically forced her into prostitution. He had given her a mobile telephone so that clients could contact her and had driven her to meet clients in various places. He had also forced her to give sexual services in the flat where they had lived together. During that whole period she had been under the control of T.M. When she had refused to give sexual services to other men, he had physically punished her. After she had left him, he had threatened her and her family and had attempted to contact her through a social-networking website. 7.  The criminal record of T.M. showed that in 2005 he had been convicted of the criminal offences of pandering and rape and sentenced to six years\u2019 and six months\u2019 imprisonment. He was released from prison on a conditional leave in May 2009 and the conditional leave expired in June 2010. 8.  The Z. County State Attorney\u2019s Office opened an investigation in respect of T.M. On 10 October 2012, following an order by the Z. County Court, the police conducted a search and seizure of T.M.\u2019s premises, where they found, inter alia, several pieces of automatic rifles, a number of mobile phones and condoms. 9.  On 16 October 2012 the applicant gave her evidence to the prosecuting authorities. She said that T.M. had first contacted her at the beginning of 2011 through a social-networking website and that he had already known her mother and introduced himself as a friend of her parents. She had met T.M. on various occasions in caf\u00e9s and she had asked him to help her in finding a job. T.M. had told her that he could find a job for her as a waitress or a shop assistant.\nOne day at the beginning of July 2011 he had told her that he would take her to one of his friends who could help her in finding a job. When they had arrived at the house of that man T.M. had told the applicant to go to a room with him. The man had then told the applicant that he had expected sexual services from her. The applicant had said that she had not wanted to do it. That man had also told her that he had answered an advertisement on the Internet under the name Smokvica (\u201clittle fig\u201d) and that T.M. had told him that T.M. and the applicant had been a husband and wife who \u201c[had done] such things together\u201d. T.M., who had been eavesdropping outside the room, had stormed into the room and started to shout at her and slap her and had then told her that she had been there with a purpose, that she should not have behaved like that. The man had secretly given her 400 Croatian kunas (HRK); when she had told T.M. about that, he had then taken that money from her.\nAt that time she had still lived with her friend K.\u010c. who had no knowledge of the events at issue. T.M. had again contacted her and told her that they had needed to talk about what had happened. She had agreed to meet him but they had not discussed what had happened. A few days later T.M. had given her a mobile telephone so that clients seeking sexual services could contact her. T.M. had also told the applicant that she had had to give her physical description to men who would contact her and charge HRK 400 for half an hour of sexual services or HRK 600 for an hour, and that she had had to give half of that money to T.M.\nThe applicant also said that she had acquiesced to all that because she had been scared of T.M. and that he had threatened to tell all to her parents.\nSome ten days after that T.M. had rented a flat, where the applicant and T.M. had then lived together. She had provided sexual services in that flat and on five to six occasions T.M. had driven her to clients. During the period in question she had had about thirty clients. Since T.M. had lived in the same flat with her, he had controlled everything she had been doing.\nWhen she had refused to have sexual intercourse with him or when he had been dissatisfied with the manner in which she had given sexual services to clients, T.M. had beaten her. He had beaten her every couple of days.\nQuestioned as to why she had not contacted the police earlier, the applicant answered that she had been afraid of T.M. Once, when he had been out of the flat and had left the key, the applicant had called her friend M.I., who had known that the applicant had been giving sexual services to men for money. The applicant had asked M.I. to help her escape.\nAfter that M.I.\u2019s boyfriend, T., had arrived by taxi, helped the applicant to collect her things and taken her to M.I.\u2019s home. She had stayed with M.I. for about ten days.\nThe applicant also said that T.M. had told her that he had previously had a girlfriend, A., whom he had \u201ctreated in the same way\u201d and later on he had told her that after her, the applicant, he had had another girlfriend whom he had \u201chelped in it\u201d. T.M. had told the applicant that he had filmed those girlfriends and punished them when they had been \u201cinsolent\u201d. 10.  On 6 November 2012 M.I. gave her evidence to the prosecuting authorities. She said that she had never met T.M. but that the applicant was her friend and she had known her for some two years. M.I.\u2019s last contact with the applicant, before the applicant had come to her flat, had been some eight or nine months previously. M.I. had known already at the end of 2010, beginning of 2011 that the applicant had been giving sexual services for money because the applicant had told her so.\nAt the end of summer 2011 the applicant had suddenly come to her home with a bag containing her things. M.I. had then learned that the applicant had agreed with M.I.\u2019s mother to come to stay with them, but did not know any details since she (M.I.) was not in very good relations with her mother.\nThe applicant had told her about T.M., from whom she had escaped because she had no longer wished to be involved in prostitution \u201cfor him\u201d. Before the applicant had come to her flat M.I. had not known where or for whom the applicant \u201cdid that\u201d. Only then had M.I. learned that the applicant \u201chad being doing it for T.M.\u201d. The applicant had been very distressed and scared. She had told M.I. that T.M. had repeatedly beaten her; watched her through a key lock when she had been giving sexual services to clients and afterwards also beaten her for \u201cnot being in a position he had approved of\u201d. M.I. also said that in her understanding the applicant had voluntarily given sexual services because she had needed money. The applicant had told her that she had had an agreement with T.M. to work for him and to share the money, that she had had a mobile telephone for clients to call her and that there had been a small ad through which she had been contacted for appointments by clients. The applicant had said that T.M. had given her that mobile telephone and placed the advertisement. M.I. also said that she could not remember if the applicant had told her that she had opposed T.M. It was true that the applicant had said that she had not wished to \u201cdo it\u201d but in M.I.\u2019s understanding that had rather meant that the applicant had been \u201cdoing it\u201d because she had had no other means to earn money. The applicant had also told her that T.M. had slapped her for very minor reasons which she (the applicant) had not expected. When she had refused sexual relations with him T.M. would beat her and the applicant had not known what would make him \u201cexplode again\u201d. T.M. had also told the applicant that he had had another girlfriend who had worked for him and whom he had also beaten. The applicant told M.I. that she had used the opportunity to run away from T.M. when he had been out of the flat where they had lived. M.I.\u2019s boyfriend, T.R., had told her that he had spoken with the applicant but he had not given any details. M.I. had broken up with him a week after that but still had his address. M.I. also said that the applicant had stayed with her and her mother for several months and that T.M. had continued to contact the applicant through a social-networking website and had threatened her as well as her mother. He had also sent messages, saying that he had loved her and asking her to come back to him. 11.  On 6 November 2012 the Z. County State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted T.M. in the Z. Criminal Court on charges of forcing another to prostitution, as an aggravated offence of organising prostitution under Article 195 of the Criminal Code. 12.  On 21 December 2012 the applicant was officially given the status of victim of human trafficking by the Office for Human and Minority Rights of the Government of Croatia (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Ured za ljudska prava i prava nacionalnih manjina). On the same day the police contacted the Croatian Red Cross and its employees informed the applicant of her rights (accommodation, medical check-ups, psycho-social support, legal aid and material support). The applicant told them that she was not interested in the right to safe accommodation since she lived with her mother and sister. According to the Government the applicant contacted the Croatian Red Cross on twelve occasions between 17 January 2013 and 24 April 2015. She received psycho-social support through individual counselling and material support. The Croatian Red Cross also organised individual counselling for the applicant with a psychologist in the Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy. Further to this the applicant was provided legal aid by a non-governmental organisation, the R. Centre, within the legal-aid scheme supported by the State. 13.  The summons served on the applicant contained detailed information on her rights as a victim, such as psychological and practical support and of the possibility to contact the Department for Organising and Providing Support for Witnesses and Victims within the Z. Municipal Criminal Court. Contact details of that Department were also provided. 14.  At hearings held on 13 January and 15 February 2013 T.M. gave his evidence. He denied that he had forced the applicant into prostitution. He confirmed that he had contacted the applicant through a social-networking website because he had recognised her surname since he had known her parents. He had also known that the applicant\u2019s mother had been a prostitute. T.M. and the applicant had started to see each other and the applicant had told him that she had had no money and needed a job and that she had some debts. The applicant had also told him that previously she had given sexual services for money and had kept telephone numbers of her clients and asked him whether he could take her sometimes to those clients, which he had done.\nHe confirmed that he had been in a relationship with the applicant during that time. However, he had not lived with her in the flat she had rented but only sometimes spent a night there. He had had the keys of that flat and the applicant had had them as well and she had been free to come and go as she liked. He had also been in the flat on some of the occasions when the applicant had given sexual services there. He had known that the applicant had charged HRK 400 for half an hour and HRK 600 for a full hour but these prices had been set by her and not him. Initially he had lent her some money and from that sum she had bought a mobile telephone on which clients could contact her. Later on she had returned the money she had borrowed from him. She had also given him some money even though he had been reluctant to take it but she had insisted telling him that it had been for petrol. However, it had mostly been he who had given money to the applicant because she had constantly complained that she had had no money.\nHe admitted that he had slapped the applicant once when they quarrelled about her refusal to work in a bakery.\nHe also said that he had found her a job in a restaurant but that after he had told her about it she had disappeared. 15.  Both the applicant and M.I. gave their evidence at a hearing held on 29 January 2013. A lawyer was provided to the applicant by the R. Centre. Before giving her evidence the applicant told the trial court that she feared the accused. The accused was then removed from the courtroom and the applicant gave evidence in his absence. 16.  The minutes of that hearing indicate that the applicant repeated her statement given on 16 October 2012 (see paragraph 9 above) and also said that T.M. had told her that he had been a former policeman and together with her father in the war. Her father had confirmed that and had said that T.M. was \u201can okay person\u201d. Her mother on the other had told her that he was not a reliable person.\nAfter the first time T.M. had driven her to give sexual services to another man, she had sat in the backseat of his car. T.M. had been very angry and had been nagging her and at one moment he had stopped the car and slapped her. She had exited the car, attempting to run away but he had caught up with her and taken her back to the car.\nShe had agreed to meet him the next day because he had told her that they would discuss what had happened but they had not.\nShe had been afraid of him and for that reason had agreed to give sexual services to other men and also because he had threatened her that he would \u201ctell all\u201d to her parents and that he would \u201ccram her mother into prison\u201d. T.M. had found the flat to rent, but the applicant had signed the contract and paid the rent for the flat. She had not had the keys to that flat.\nEven though on three to four occasions he had allowed her to leave the flat alone to go to a nearby shop, she had not dared to flee because T.M. had followed where she had been going from the balcony and she had been scared of him. He had set some rules for her: she had been forbidden to talk with the clients; the clients had not been able to touch her; and she had been allowed to give sexual services only in the manner ordered by T.M. When she had refused to have sexual intercourse with him or when he had been dissatisfied with the manner in which she had given sexual services to clients, T.M. had beaten her.\nQuestioned again as to why she had not contacted the police earlier, the applicant said that T.M. had told her that he had \u201cconnection\u201d at the police and that he would very soon learn if she reported \u201canything\u201d.\nQuestioned as to why she had not attempted to run away when T.M. had driven her to the clients the applicant said that she had been sure that T.M. would have found her and that she had been allowed to stay with the clients for exactly twenty-nine minutes.\nWhen the applicant had called her friend M.I., who had known that the applicant had been giving sexual services to men for money, the applicant had asked M.I. to help her escape. She had also spoken with M.I.\u2019s mother. T.M. had continued to contact her through a social-networking website, at first sending her love messages and then threatening to tell all to her parents. Then T.M. had sent a letter to the authorities, accusing the applicant\u2019s mother of neglecting the applicant\u2019s younger sister. Her mother had been asked to come to a police station on that account. The applicant had then decided to contact the police.\nThe applicant also explained that she had been very much scared of T.M., that she had feared for her life because he had threatened to \u201cbeat her to death\u201d. T.M. had also threatened her with publishing naked photographs of her. She had agreed to being photographed because she had been scared of him. T.M. had also told her that as a former policeman he had known a lot of policemen and if she had reported him he would have fabricated stories about her.\nLater on she had learned from her mother that T.M. and her mother had lived together for a while and that a former girlfriend of T.M. had reported him to the police for forcing her to give sexual services to other men. 17.  M.I. repeated her statement given before the prosecuting authorities (see paragraph 10 above). 18.  On 15 February 2013 the Z. Criminal Court acquitted T.M. on the grounds that although it had been established that he had organised a prostitution ring in which he had recruited the applicant, it had not been established that he had forced her into prostitution. However, he had only been indicted for the aggravated form of the offence at issue and thus he could not be convicted for the basic form of organising prostitution. In finding this, the trial court in particular noted that it could not give sufficient weight to the applicant\u2019s testimony because her statement had been incoherent, she had been unsure and that she had paused and hesitated when speaking. At the same time, given that there was no other conclusive evidence, it applied the in dubio pro reo principle and acquitted T.M. The relevant part of the first-instance judgment reads:\n\u201cOn the basis of the evidence given by the accused and the victim in these criminal proceedings the following facts have been established: that the accused and the victim met through the social network Facebook when the accused contacted the victim; ... that the accused gave a mobile telephone to the victim so that she could be contacted by the clients with whom she discussed providing sexual services; that the victim indeed did provide sexual services in the flat where she lived with the accused; that on five or six occasions the accused drove the victim to the addresses of clients where she provided sexual services; that the victim charged for providing sexual services the sum of HRK 400 for half an hour and the sum of HRK 600 for an hour ...\u201d 19.  The State Attorney\u2019s Office appealed against this decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred in its factual findings concerning the charges against T.M. when it did not accept the applicant\u2019s testimony. 20.  On 21 January 2014 the Z. County Court dismissed the appeal of the State Attorney\u2019s Office and upheld the first-instance judgment, endorsing its reasoning as well as the facts as established by the trial court. That decision was served on the applicant on 28 February 2014. 21.  On 31 March 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining about the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms had been applied in her case. She relied on Articles 14, 23, 29 and 35 of the Constitution (see below paragraph 23) and Articles 3, 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. In particular, she alleged that the national authorities had not properly investigated and addressed the element of force. Also, owing to the failure of the authorities to reclassify the offence, T.M. had not been convicted of any offence, to the applicant\u2019s detriment. She further stressed that she had not been provided with any psychological help or assistance during the court hearing to help cope with the fear and pressure she had felt from T.M. while testifying, which all resulted in her testimony being regarded as incoherent by the trial court. The applicant also alleged a failure of the authorities to secure effective respect for her private life in particular through the domestic court\u2019s inadequate assessment of all the relevant circumstances in which she had been recruited to T.M.\u2019s prostitution ring. 22.  On 10 June 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had not had the right to bring a constitutional complaint concerning the criminal proceedings against T.M. since these proceedings had concerned a criminal charge against him. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 1 July 2014.", "references": ["7", "6", "8", "3", "9", "1", "0", "5", "4", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Warsaw. 5.  On 29 November 2012 the Warsaw-Wola District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on suspicion of drug dealing, as well as facilitating and benefiting from prostitution, committed in an organised criminal group. The domestic court relied on a strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question, on the fact that he faced a severe penalty and that he was suspected of acting with accomplices. The likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question was established, in particular, on the basis of the testimony of a key prosecution witness (the so-called \u201ccrown witness\u201d). 6.  On 8 January 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. It stressed that the sole fact that the applicant faced a severe penalty and had been suspected of committing offences in an organised criminal group justified a suspicion that, if released, the applicant would try to obstruct the proceedings by influencing witnesses or his accomplices. 7.  The applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 21 February, 27 May and 8 August 2013. In these decisions, the court repeated the reasons originally relied on. In its decision of 21 February 2013, the Warsaw Regional Court further noted that the case against the applicant was complex, and indicated a number of steps that still had to be taken in order to terminate the investigation. The court noted that not all of those steps required the applicant\u2019s detention and urged the prosecutor to accelerate the proceedings. 8.  The applicant appealed against all these decisions, without success. 9.  On 21 November 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) ordered a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. It relied on the same grounds as previously given for his detention. The applicant appealed. The decision was upheld on appeal on 12 December 2013. 10.  The bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The applicant was charged with ten offences committed in an organised criminal group and \u2013 in the case of some of the offences \u2013 as a re-offender. The charges included facilitating prostitution by renting an apartment to prostitutes and collecting money from them, and a number of counts of drug possession and distribution. The bill of indictment concerned altogether seventeen accused, charged with 150 offences. Later, the number of accused in the proceedings dropped to fourteen. The prosecutor requested that the court hear over 90 witnesses, including five \u201ccrown witnesses\u201d. 11.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court\u2019s decisions of 10 January and 7 May 2014 and by the Warsaw Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions of 30 December 2014, 28 April, 27 August and 26 November 2015, and of 25 February and 25 May 2016. The domestic courts continued to rely on the same grounds for detention as in their previous decisions. They also stressed the complexity of the case and the links between the co-accused within an organised criminal group which, according to the domestic courts, justified a suspicion that, if released, they would attempt to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. 12.  The appeals by the applicant against decisions extending his detention and all his applications for release were unsuccessful. 13.  On 9 May 2016 the trial court ordered the applicant\u2019s release on bail for 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)). The applicant appealed against this decision, contesting the amount of bail as excessive. On 25 May 2016 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the decision. It underlined that the amount of bail had to take into consideration not only the financial situation of the applicant, but also the gravity of the charges against him. The court also stated that it had taken into consideration the fact that the applicant had abused his procedural rights in order to obstruct and delay the proceedings. It indicated that the amount in question had to be such that the prospect of its loss would constitute a genuine deterrent against any illegal activities which, until that moment, had been prevented by the applicant\u2019s detention. 14.  On 30 May 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court again ordered the applicant\u2019s release on bail of PLN 80,000. It also imposed a prohibition on leaving the country. The applicant paid the security required by the court and was released on 31 May 2016. 15.  The case against the applicant and his co-accused appears to be pending before the Warsaw Regional Court (no. XII K 1/14). The material includes 188 volumes.", "references": ["8", "4", "3", "7", "9", "0", "1", "5", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  She is a civil servant working for the Ministry of Environmental Protection (hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) as a State inspector. She suffers from cardiac problems, including a heart rhythm disorder. 7.  According to the applicant, on 10 January 2012 H.A., her head of division, and A.K., his deputy, used violence against her in H.A.\u2019s office. In particular, they assaulted her, grabbed her hands, insulted her and forcibly took a document concerning her which she had taken in to them in order to write down her objections. As a result of the violence she fainted, sustained bodily injuries, received numerous bruises on her hands and was seriously humiliated. 8.  On 12 January 2012 the applicant filed a written report with the head of staff of the Ministry, giving a detailed account of what had happened. She stated, inter alia, that she had returned her appraisal report for the second half of 2011 to H.A. since she had disagreed with the assessment received. On 10 January 2012 she had been informed by one of her colleagues that H.A. wanted to see her in his office. During their meeting, H.A. had given her the appraisal report and asked her why she had not signed it. She had responded that she wanted to discuss it. H.A. had refused to provide any clarifications, stating that he was the one to make decisions and would submit the report to the relevant division without her signature. H.A. had then ordered her to return the appraisal report, which she had refused to do, stating that she would write down her objections, sign the document and then return it to him. When she had been about to leave, H.A. had immediately closed and locked the door to his office and had started to approach her, shouting that she was a thief and had stolen a document from his office. Using physical violence and personal insults, he had tried to take the papers from her. After she had called for help, A.K. had entered the office and instead of diffusing the situation had also insulted her and ordered her to hand him the documents. The two of them had grabbed her hands, causing her serious pain, and forcibly taken away the papers. As a result of the stress and pain she had fainted for a short period of time, after which she had been told that she could leave as there was nothing else to discuss. She concluded by stating that as a result of the violent behaviour of H.A. and A.K. she had suffered injuries, health problems and serious distress. She requested that the relevant measures be taken in accordance with the law. 9.  After the incident, the applicant felt unwell and underwent a medical examination. She was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and Wolff\u2011Parkinson-White syndrome (a heart rhythm disorder) and was put on sick leave from 13 to 27 January 2012. 10.  On 14 January 2012 the applicant reported the incident to the police, stating that on 10 January 2012 she and H.A., her head of division, had had an argument during which he had been violent and caused her bodily harm. She made a statement giving an account of events similar to that in her report to the head of staff of the Ministry. 11.  The investigator ordered a forensic medical examination the same day to determine whether the applicant had any bodily injuries and, if so, their nature, origin, seriousness and the time and manner of their infliction. 12.  On 15 January 2012 H.A. gave a statement to the police. In particular, he stated that the applicant had refused to return her appraisal report to him, after which he had left his office, closed the door and called A.K., asking him to come to see him with the other employees. During that time the applicant had kept shouting and swearing. She had called their superior to say that he had locked her in. He denied harassing the applicant either physically or verbally and said that she had used foul language. 13.  On the same day A.K. made a statement and similarly denied using violence against the applicant. Between 16 and 25 January 2012 a number of the applicant\u2019s colleagues who were at work on the day of the incident were questioned and denied that H.A. and A.K. had been violent towards the applicant. 14.  On 18 January 2012 the forensic medical examination was completed. The relevant parts of the expert\u2019s opinion read as follows:\n\u201cComplaints: At present [the applicant] complains of a nervous breakdown.\nResults of personal examination: An irregularly shaped, non-homogenous, greenish\u2011yellow ecchymosis measuring 6 x 2 cm is present on the mid-third of the inner right upper arm. Two similar round-shaped ecchymoses are present on the inner surface of the same area measuring 1 cm in diameter: on the mid-third of the inner left upper arm measuring 1 cm in diameter; on the lower third of the inner left upper arm measuring 2 x 1 cm and 1.5 x 1.2 cm and on the mid-third of the outer left forearm measuring 2.5 x 1.5 cm.\nConclusion: [The applicant\u2019s] bodily injuries in the form of ecchymoses [around] the right and left upper arms and the left forearm have been inflicted with blunt, hard objects possibly in the period mentioned; [the injuries] taken separately as well as all together do not contain elements of [short-term] damage to health.\u201d 15.  On 24 January 2012 the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. She stated that she had no objections to the opinion of the forensic medical expert and intended to pursue her complaint. 16.  On 25 January 2012 the investigator took another additional statement from the applicant. The relevant parts read as follows:\n\u201cQuestion: In the course of collecting evidence H.A. and A.K. said that they did not hit you and did absolutely not grab your hands. What can you say about this?\nAnswer: ... I do not know why H.A. and A.K. said that but it is logical that they would deny committing such acts. I will reiterate once again that H.A. and A.K. pulled and pushed me and grabbed my hands thus causing me injuries.\u201d 17.  On 27 January 2012 the investigator took a further additional statement from the applicant. She stated:\n\u201cI inform you that since the time I [went] to the police ... [H.A.] and [A.K.] have not even apologised; moreover, they have created such an atmosphere that it is impossible to work, since other employees ignore me and avoid contact with me for fear of losing their jobs. Since H.A. and A.K. are continuing this kind of behaviour, abusing their official capacity, in the circumstances I am unable to reconcile with them. I am complaining and requesting that H.A. and A.K. be prosecuted. I also wish to add that because of their actions I have had health problems and as a result have been on sick leave from 13 to 27 January ...\u201d 18.  On 28 January 2012 H.A. was questioned again and stated, inter alia, that the applicant had made a false statement. He had never harassed her or grabbed her hands and had remained seated in his chair until she had left. As for the injuries discovered on the applicant\u2019s body, H.A. stated that he had never touched her and did not know how they had been inflicted. 19.  It appears that no decision was taken by the investigator for about a month. 20.  On 24 February 2012 the applicant sent a written request to the head of the Marash Division of the Central Police Department for criminal proceedings to be brought against H.A. and A.K. She stated in her request, inter alia, that she had been informed of the provisions of Article 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which criminal proceedings could only be instituted on the basis of a complaint by her. She further stated that she had not reconciled with H.A. and A.K. and was calling for them to be prosecuted. On the same date the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. A further additional statement was taken from her on 27 February 2012. 21.  On 1 March 2012 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to refuse to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. on the grounds that no crime had been committed. It was suggested that the applicant had perceived the events subjectively and that her supervisors had never used violence against her. 22.  On 5 March 2012 the investigator refused to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements with regard to the incident. It further stated that the evidence collected had revealed that on 10 January 2012 first H.A. and then A.K., who had gone to the latter\u2019s office, had tried to calm the applicant down, as she had been insulting H.A. During the incident A.K. had caught hold of her hand and taken the document that she had taken from H.A. Intentional infliction of bodily harm was punishable under Article 118 of the Criminal Code, but negligent infliction of bodily harm was not punishable. In the case at hand the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by H.A. and A.K.\u2019s negligence; it had not been established that they had intentionally caused her injuries. 23.  On 13 March 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor against the investigator\u2019s decision. She argued, inter alia, that contrary to what was stated in the decision she had described in detail how she had been treated. In particular, she had submitted that first H.A. had grabbed her hands using force, harassed her and locked her in his office so that she could not leave. Thereafter A.K. had come in and also assaulted her. The applicant complained that the conclusion in the investigator\u2019s decision, according to which H.A. and A.K. had caused her injuries by negligence, could not be substantiated and pursued the purpose of exonerating public officials from responsibility. She further complained that, as a result of deliberate violence on the part of H.A. and A.K., she had experienced severe emotional suffering as a woman since her superior had debased her and caused her serious bodily harm without good reason, right in the workplace. In addition, the applicant stated that the incident had taken place in the workplace and naturally all the witnesses questioned by the investigator were the subordinates of H.A. and A.K. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would be questioned as witnesses and warned about criminal liability for making false statements. 24.  H.A. also lodged a complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision, claiming that it had not been established that he or A.K. had ever hit the applicant. 25.  On 15 March 2012 the prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint and allowed H.A.\u2019s complaint. In particular, the prosecutor upheld the investigator\u2019s refusal to institute criminal proceedings but changed the grounds for it, stating that no crime had been committed involving H.A. and A.K. The decision stated that no evidence had been obtained that would establish that H.A. and A.K. had inflicted injuries on the applicant, except her own unspecified and contradictory statements. As regards the applicant, the decision stated, inter alia, that because the stress she had suffered as a result of the incident in H.A.\u2019s office she had perceived and described what had happened in a subjective manner. In these circumstances, her contradictory statements did not correspond to the evidence gathered but that did not create grounds for prosecuting her for false accusations. 26.  On 4 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d), requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted. She reiterated her previous arguments and complained, in particular, that the question of her injuries had not been addressed at all in the prosecutor\u2019s decision, which had ignored the results of the forensic medical examination. In the end, it had never been established who had inflicted her injuries. The applicant further complained that the prosecution had relied on the statements of subordinates of those who had committed the offence in question. Their statements could not be considered objective and reliable in view of the serious fear of those concerned losing their jobs. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would have the procedural status of witnesses and would be warned about criminal liability for making false statements. 27.  On 18 May 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. In doing so, it found that the disputed decision had been lawful, while the applicant\u2019s arguments stemmed from an individual and subjective interpretation of the events in question and the procedural measures undertaken in relation to them. 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court\u2019s decision. She argued, inter alia, that it had failed to examine her arguments. In particular, the issue of the existence of a number of injuries on her body as established by the forensic medical examination had not been addressed at all. 29.  On 12 July 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and fully upheld the District Court\u2019s decision. In doing so, it stated that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements about the circumstances of the incident which had not been corroborated by other evidence, namely the statements of H.A., A.K. and others questioned in relation to the incident. 30.  On 2 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She argued that the decisions of the District Court and the Criminal Court of Appeal had failed to explain the existence of injuries on her body or the fact that H.A. had locked her in his office. She also reiterated her arguments in relation to the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and the unreliability of the statements made by her colleagues. 31.  On 6 September 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["2", "4", "9", "5", "6", "3", "0", "7", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant organisation is a public notary professional association and has its main office in Bucharest. 8.  According to the applicant organisation, on 13 December 2007 approximately thirty police officers dressed in civilian clothes entered its premises. They informed a receptionist that they were clients. The receptionist asked them to leave the premises and to wait outside, but they refused. 9.  Eventually two of the officers disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers and proceeded to seize an original sale contract that had been signed by two private parties and had been notarised by D.O.R. One of the private parties in question was suspected by the police of being part of an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. 10.  The police officers also seized a number of documents, including the sale contract and original documents concerning the aforementioned private parties. Moreover, the police officers seized the fees and taxes that had been paid by the private parties for the services rendered by the applicant organisation. Furthermore, the police officers took statements from the applicant organisation\u2019s employees. 11.  According to the report produced and signed by the two police officers on the same date, they seized 8,943 euros (EUR), the amount paid in income tax by the private party selling the immovable property, and EUR 1,000 and 12,215 Romanian Lei (RON \u2013 approximately EUR 3,470), representing public notary fees and the applicable tax for the registration of the sale in the immovable property register. 12.  On 23 April 2008 the applicant organisation, legally represented by D.O.R., brought criminal proceedings against the two police officers (see paragraph 9 above) for unlawful home intrusion and abuse of office against private interests. Furthermore, it asked for the report produced by the police officers on the day of the incident to be annulled and for the original documents and for the relevant fees and taxes seized to be returned. 13.  On 27 March 2009 the Bucharest prosecutor\u2019s office noted that the police officers had seized the relevant documents and sums of money without an express order to do so having been issued by the prosecutor charged with the case because the police officers had at the time been carrying out an operational mission aimed at catching suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence. Moreover, according to the available evidence, an official order from the prosecutor would in any case not have been necessary in this regard because the seized documents and sums of money had been turned over to the officers without any objections. 14.  On 11 August 2009 a prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation opened against the two police officers on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. She held that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. A large number of police officers had been mobilised for an operation aimed at catching the suspects red\u2011handed. The two police officers had entered the premises of the applicant organisation, disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers, and proceeded to seize the relevant documents and fees. Consequently, the police officers had acted in their professional capacity in order to fulfil their professional duties and with the aim of investigating cases they had been working on. Their presence on the applicant organisation\u2019s premises had not amounted to the offence of unlawful home intrusion because the premises of the applicant organisation constituted by their nature a public area and the event in question had occurred during working hours. Moreover, the elements of the offence of abuse of office against private interests had not been met. Consequently, no damage had been caused given that the valuables seized by the officers had concerned the commission of offences. 15.  The applicant organisation challenged the prosecutor\u2019s decision before the superior prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 16.  On 31 August 2009 the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s challenge as ill-founded. 17.  On 21 September 2009 the applicant organisation lodged an appeal against the prosecutor office\u2019s decisions with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. It argued, among other things, that the police officers had entered its premises in breach of Article 27 \u00a7 2(b) of the Romanian Constitution (see paragraph 32 below). They had not been seeking to protect other people\u2019s property and in any event they could have done that by taking property preservation measures (that is to say take measures to prevent the re-sale or use of the property \u2013 indisponibilizarea bunului). Moreover, the two above-mentioned police officers had entered the premises accompanied by their colleagues and had remained there outside the applicant organisation\u2019s working hours. Also, they had unlawfully seized the public notaries\u2019 professional fees and returned them to the private party who had been the victim of the alleged fraud. Furthermore, they had failed to include in the report produced on the day of the incident the applicant organisation\u2019s objections against (i) the police officers\u2019 presence on its premises, (ii) the seizure of fees and (iii) the questioning of its staff members, who had been bound by rules concerning professional secrecy. 18.  On 2 November 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s appeal and upheld the prosecutor office\u2019s decisions. It considered that the two police officers, accompanied by other colleagues, had carried out an operational mission seeking to catch suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence and to gather evidence. In this connection they had surveyed the suspected criminal group and after a sale contract had been signed, they had asked D.O.R. to turn over all the documents and sums of money connected to the sale. D.O.R. had relinquished all the documents connected to the sale contract in question and the relevant public notaries\u2019 professional fees and taxes without any objection. 19.  With regard to the lawfulness of the police officers\u2019 presence on the applicant organisation\u2019s premises, the court held that the said premises did not constitute a home, room, annex or closed area attached to a home or a room and that entering such premises had therefore not constituted the offence of unlawful home intrusion. It considered that in classifying the latter act as an offence, the legislature had been concerned only with entering or refusing to leave areas which were closely connected to a person\u2019s private life and where the person concerned conducted activities away from the eyes of the public which were closely related to his or her personal life. A public notary\u2019s office did not comply with the aforementioned criteria because it was a place for a professional activity, open to the public during working hours and designed for a public activity. Moreover, the relevant domestic legislation concerning public notaries did not impose on interested individuals special rules in respect of entering a public notary\u2019s office. The two police officers\u2019 presence on the applicant organisation\u2019s premises had not constituted any other offences either. They could have protected the victims\u2019 property by taking property preservation measures only after establishing that an offence had been committed. 20.  The court also held that the seizure of the relevant documents and sums of money had been justified and lawful because they amounted to evidence which could be used in criminal proceedings and could clarify the circumstances of a criminal case. In addition, D.O.R.\u2019s statement that the police officers had failed to mention his objections in the report produced on the day of the incident was relatively untrustworthy, given that as a public notary he was aware that he could have asked for any objections voiced by him to be included in the report; otherwise he could have refused to sign the said report. 21.  The court furthermore held that the police officers who had asked the employees of the applicant organisation to give statements had not breached the relevant domestic rules concerning professional secrecy because the information provided by the said employees with regard to the commission of an offence had not amounted to them being formally heard as witnesses in the case. Moreover, the domestic rules concerning professional secrecy applicable to employees of a public notary\u2019s office had not prevented them from providing relevant information or from allowing access to documents to anyone proving a legitimate right or interest, such as police officers exercising their professional duty. 22.  The court concluded that the applicant organisation was mainly unhappy with the fact that the sale contract and the public notaries\u2019 professional fees seized by the police officers had been returned to the alleged victims of the offence and not to the organisation. The court considered, however, that such a measure could not be contested by way of an appeal against the prosecutor office\u2019s decisions but rather by a complaint lodged with the prosecutor\u2019s office against the acts and measures taken by the police officers. 23.  The applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law (recurs) against the judgment and reiterated in part the arguments raised before the first-instance court. In addition, it argued, inter alia, that according to the Court\u2019s case-law the fact that the police officers had entered its premises and subsequently had refused to leave amounted to a breach of its rights, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The operation had not concerned the commission of an offence, as the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation had not been a forged one. The statements given by its employees could not be categorised as mere information and had in fact amounted to witness testimony. According to the relevant rules concerning professional secrecy, only specially assigned magistrates could access public notary documents and police officers could therefore not be considered to constitute persons who could legitimately justify such access. Also, the first-instance court\u2019s finding that the applicant organisation could have vented its discontent with the unlawful seizure of its fees by the police officers by means of a complaint against the acts and measures taken by the police officers (rather than by means of a criminal complaint lodged against the perpetrators \u2013 see paragraph 22 above) had amounted to a breach of its right of access to court. 24.  By a final judgment of 25 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s appeal on points of fact and law and upheld the decisions of the prosecutor\u2019s office and the judgment of the first-instance court. It held, among other things, that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation and in their professional capacity. According to the relevant criminal procedure rules, police officers were entitled and had a duty to carry out operations seeking to identify and investigate unlawful acts and to gather and seize relevant evidence. Furthermore, any natural and legal person had a duty to turn over impugned evidence. The applicant organisation\u2019s submissions that the police officers had entered its premises outside working hours and had acted unlawfully in seizing the relevant documents, taxes and fees were unsubstantiated. 25.  On 15 January and 11 June 2008 \u2013 within the framework of the criminal investigation initiated by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud \u2013 the applicant organisation lodged a complaint with the Bucharest Prosecutor\u2019s Office in respect of the acts and measures taken by the police officers. It asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to quash the acts and measures taken by the police officers and to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and of the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers. In addition, it stated that if the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to order the return of the relevant fees the applicant organisation would join the criminal proceedings opened against the criminal group as a civil party. 26.  On 8 July 2010 the Bucharest Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant organisation that the criminal case in question had been referred to the domestic courts which had the authority to examine its requests. 27.  On 3 August 2010 the applicant organisation informed the Bucharest County Court that it had joined as a civil party the criminal proceedings opened by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud. It asked the court to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and to order the defendants to return the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers and to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 28.  On 30 November 2010 the Bucharest County Court convicted the members of the organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud and annulled the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation. In addition, it dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s requests for the return of the original documents produced by it and the relevant fees and taxes on the grounds that the documents in question had been annulled and the relevant fees and taxes returned to the private party who had sold the property and who had been the victim of the offences committed by the criminal group. Moreover, the applicant organisation had not proved that it had suffered non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The applicant organisation appealed against the judgment. 30.  On 17 November 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s appeal. It held, inter alia, that if the applicant organisation considered that it had suffered some damage following its validation of the subsequently annulled sale contract, it could initiate proceedings in tort before the civil courts and prove the alleged damage. Given the offences which were the object of the criminal case at hand, the applicant organisation could not be awarded damages within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 31.  There is no evidence in the file that the applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment of the second\u2011instance court.", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "7", "8", "5", "3", "6", "No Label", "4", "9"], "gold": ["4", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mykolayiv. 6.  The applicant married O. in 2006. The spouses lived in Mykolayiv. On 21 March 2007 their daughter S. was born. In August 2007 the couple separated. O. continued to live with the child at a different address in Mykolayiv and that place of the child\u2019s residence was not, at that time, a matter of dispute between the parents. 7.  On 15 April 2009 the Leninsky District Court of Mykolayiv, in response to an application from O., pronounced the couple\u2019s divorce. 8.  On 4 June 2009, in response to a claim brought by the applicant against O. concerning hindrance of access to the child, the Leninsky District Court of Mykolayiv granted the applicant rights of access to his daughter. It ordered that the applicant should be granted an opportunity to see his daughter no less than three times a week, including overnight stays with the applicant, the dates and times thereof to be fixed by mutual agreement in advance. 9.  On 13 July 2009 the local police examined the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning threats which O. regularly made when the applicant went to see the child, as well as O.\u2019s refusal to let the child stay overnight with him and her restriction on the amount of time which the applicant could spend with the child. The police refused to open criminal proceedings because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 10.  In the autumn of 2009 O. and S. moved to Selydove in the Donetsk Region. The distance between Mykolayiv and Selydove is about 600 kilometres by road. In view of that, the applicant initiated civil proceedings asking the court to determine that the child should live with him in Mykolayiv. That claim was dismissed as unfounded by the courts with the final decision being taken by the Higher Specialised Court on Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe HSCU\u201d) on 1 August 2011. 11.  On 20 October 2009, at the applicant\u2019s request, the Mykolayiv State Bailiffs\u2019 Service opened proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment of 4 June 2009. However, on 22 October 2009 the bailiffs\u2019 decision was quashed since the procedure for enforcement of a court judgment of that kind was not specified by law. 12.  On 19 November 2009 the applicant arrived in Selydove, where O. allowed him to see the child for about one hour. On 27 January 2010, when O. and S. arrived for a short stay in Mykolayiv, the applicant attempted to see his daughter, but O. refused to let him take the child overnight. On 20 October 2011 when the applicant arrived in Selydove and attempted to collect the child from the childcare centre, O. arrived and took back the child. The applicant\u2019s complaints to the police on account of those incidents were dismissed because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 13.  On 28 March 2012 the applicant submitted to the Selydove State Bailiff\u2019s Service a writ of execution of judgment dated 4 June 2009. On 29 March 2012 the State bailiff opened the enforcement proceedings. On 9 April 2012 in the presence of the applicant, O. and two witnesses, the State bailiff read out the operative part of the judgment of 4 June 2009 and issued a resolution on termination of the enforcement proceedings, considering that the judgment had been fully enforced by so doing. 14.  The applicant brought a challenge in the courts against the termination of the enforcement proceedings. The courts upheld the bailiffs\u2019 decision, finding that it had been taken in accordance with the law. The final decision was taken by the HSCU, which on 3 August 2012 dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 15.  On 20 November 2012 in proceedings concerning child support allowances, the applicant admitted that he took the child to Mykolayiv to live with him for about one or two months per year. 16.  In January 2013 the applicant brought a claim for damages against O. for obstructing enforcement of the judgment of 4 June 2009 granting him access rights. The courts dismissed the claim for lack of proof. The final decision in those proceedings, rejecting the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, was delivered by the HSCU on 14 June 2013. 17.  On 21 June 2013 the Leninskyy Dstrict Police Department in Mykolayiv opened criminal proceedings following the applicant\u2019s complaint that O. had refused to comply with the judgment of 4 June 2009. On 10 December 2014 the police terminated the criminal proceedings because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. The applicant challenged that decision in the court. On 1 April 2015 the Leninskyy District Court of Mykolayiv quashed the decision of 10 December 2014 after finding that the investigator had failed to substantiate his conclusion. The criminal investigation was resumed. 18.  In 2014 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in Selydove Town Court seeking to determine anew his access rights in view of the impediments caused by O. On 12 January 2014 his claim was dismissed as unfounded. However, on 8 December 2015 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. It found that O. had prevented the applicant from properly exercising his access rights and ruled that the applicant should be given the opportunity of spending one month with his daughter during the summer and one week during the winter school holidays every year until she attained the age of majority. 19.  On 26 May 2016 the Selydove department of State bailiffs\u2019 service opened enforcement proceedings in relation to the judgment of 8 December 2015. On 10 June 2016 the bailiffs notified O. about the judgment of 8 December 2015. 20.  In spring 2014 illegal armed groups associated with two self\u2011proclaimed entities known as the \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d and the \u201cLuhansk People\u2019s Republic\u201d started operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, seizing control of certain parts of those regions by force. Ukrainian Government forces launched a military anti-terrorist operation against them. A ceasefire line was later put in place. Selydove is in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government, about twenty-five kilometres from the ceasefire line, and was included in the list of locations where the military anti\u2011terrorist operation was being conducted. According to information provided by the Government, in April 2014 certain movements of illegal armed groups had been registered in Selydovo, but no active military operations had ever taken place in that area. 21.  In August 2014 the applicant lodged a claim with the Selydove Court seeking a declaration that O. was unlawfully failing to cooperate in executing the judgment of 4 June 2009 granting the applicant access rights. He also asked the court to determine that the child\u2019s place of residence should be his home in Mykolayiv. He argued that O. was unemployed and had no source of independent income, and that the child was fully dependent on the child support payments which the applicant was duly making. He also argued that it was dangerous for the child to continue to reside in the proximity of a theatre of armed conflict. Moreover, there was a risk that the conflict might spread to Selydove. In support of the latter assertion the applicant cited media reports according to which representatives of the so-called \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d were threatening to capture all the territory of the Donetsk Region. 22.  On 5 May 2015 the Selydove Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. The court established that the applicant was employed and had good references from his employer, and had no recorded mental health or addiction problems. The court quoted a report compiled by the child protection authority in Mykolayiv, according to which the applicant could provide secure, well\u2011equipped accommodation suitable for a child, and had stable employment and income. However, the applicant had failed to prove that O. had no independent income or had failed to perform her parental duties or was engaged in unlawful or immoral conduct. The court also stated that the applicant had not substantiated the allegation that the child\u2019s life was in danger and the mere fact of anti-terrorist military operations taking place in the region did not prove that risk. 23.  On 4 August 2015 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the Selydove Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate the allegations that the child\u2019s place of residence should be changed. 24.  On 23 December 2015 the HSCU upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. It stated that the Selydove Town Court had correctly established the relevant facts and had properly applied the law. The HSCU agreed with the lower courts\u2019 conclusion that separating the child from the mother had not been justified.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "9", "6", "8", "2", "1", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Naberezhnyye Chelny. 5.  The applicant was a police officer. On 1 November 2004 he was arrested on suspicion of having extracted a bribe. 6.  On 10 November 2005 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic convicted the applicant and sentenced him to imprisonment. He stayed under the obligation not to leave his place of residence in Naberezhnyye Chelny until the conviction became final. He could leave his place of residence only upon the summons from the investigator or the court. 7.  Several parties to the criminal proceedings, including the applicant, appealed against the conviction. The case was forwarded to the Russian Supreme Court in Moscow, 1,000 km away from Naberezhnyye Chelny. The applicant never received any summons to the appeal hearing due to the Supreme Court\u2019s mistake in the postal code. Neither did he receive copies of the statements of appeal filed by the prosecutor, by the co-accused, G., and the latter\u2019s lawyer. 8.  On 28 February 2006 the conviction was upheld by the Russian Supreme Court. The prosecutor and G.\u2019s lawyer attended the appeal hearing. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present. 9.  In 2011 the applicant lodged a compensation claim for non-pecuniary damages caused by poor conditions of detention. In the text of his claim the applicant explicitly asked the court to consider the claim in his absence. On 14 April 2011 the Bugulminskiy Town Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed his claim. The applicant received the notification of the time and date of the hearing after the hearing had actually taken place. 10.  The first-instance judgment was upheld on 4 July 2011 by the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic. The applicant had been notified of that hearing on 29 June 2011.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "7", "2", "4", "6", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained. 6.  In early August 2009 preliminary proceedings were initiated against the applicant based on the suspicion that he had committed violent acts against his spouse, R.K. On 6 August 2009 R.K. was examined at the request of the public prosecutor\u2019s office by the investigating judge, W., after the latter had decided, at the suggestion of the public prosecutor\u2019s office, to exclude the applicant from the hearing under Article 168c \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since there was a risk, given the nature of the reported offences, that R.K. would not testify or would not tell the truth in the applicant\u2019s presence. 7.  On 7 August 2009 the investigating judge, at the request of the public prosecutor\u2019s office, issued an arrest warrant for the applicant and also assigned counsel to him. 8.  On 25 September 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. On 15 October 2009 the Arnsberg Regional Court assigned a lawyer of his choice as his counsel. 9.  On 3 May 2010 the Arnsberg Regional Court opened the main proceedings against the applicant. R.K., who was also summoned to appear on that date, informed the court that she did not wish to give evidence. 10.  At the hearing of 28 May 2010, the investigating judge was examined on the evidence he had obtained from his examination of R.K. on 6 August 2009. The Regional Court rejected an objection by the applicant\u2019s counsel on the grounds that it was permissible to examine the investigating judge even if the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached by R.K.\u2019s examination. Only when adjudicating the case could it be decided whether the investigating judge\u2019s statements could be admitted as evidence or not, which, in line with the Court\u2019s case-law, would depend on whether it had been corroborated by other significant factors independent of that evidence. 11.  At that same hearing, Officers Ra. and R\u00fc. were examined as witnesses with regard to the description of events given to them by R.K. when they had arrived at M.\u2019s home on 2 August 2009 (see paragraphs 27\u201128 below). The applicant\u2019s counsel objected to the use of the evidence obtained from the examination of these two witnesses on the grounds that \u201cthe depicted facts cannot be separated chronologically and sequentially\u201d. 12.  At the hearing of 10 June 2010, R.K. stated that she did not consent to the use of the evidence which she had provided to the investigating judge, to Officers Ra. and R\u00fc. and to the court-appointed medical expert; nor did she consent to the use of the results of the medical examination. 13.  On 28 June 2010 the Regional Court convicted the applicant on four counts of dangerous assault, one of these in concurrence with coercion, as well as of maliciously inflicting bodily injury in concurrence with attempted coercion, of coercion and of wilful driving without a licence. The Regional Court sentenced the applicant to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. In addition, it ordered his subsequent preventive detention, finding that the applicant had a dissocial personality disorder and that there was a very high likelihood that he would commit similar offences in the future. 14.  In the 1990s, the applicant was convicted several times of, inter alia, several different counts of assault against his respective partners at different times. He met his third wife, R.K., in the summer of 2008. Their relationship was from the outset marked by the applicant\u2019s violent behaviour towards R.K., which escalated in July 2009. 15.  On 31 July 2009 in their marital home the applicant asked R.K. about her past sex life. He then beat her on different parts of her body and kicked her. Following this he asked her to go to the basement and, while going there, stubbed out a cigarette on her neck. When they arrived in the basement, he asked her to write a letter to the wife of a former lover of hers and to confess to adultery. When R.K. refused, he delivered several blows all over her body, including her head and face, and also beat her with a wooden hiking pole. R.K. then promised to write the letter. The following evening the applicant asked her again to write the letter and delivered blows with his fist, primarily to her head. After having left R.K. alone in the living room, the applicant later returned with a mattress and demanded that she undress and to lie down on her stomach. He then beat her with a thin rope on her back, before forcing her to carry out sexual acts on herself. 16.  On the morning of 2 August 2009, R.K. started to write the said letter by hand. When reading the draft, the applicant was angry about its content. R.K. stated that she would write it again. The applicant delivered blows with his fist, mostly to her head, and also beat her with his shoes on the back of her head. He then stubbed out a cigarette on her left breast. R.K. tried to run away but fell down in the hallway. The applicant then choked her so that she could not breathe. In unknown circumstances, R.K. managed to escape and ran into the street in panic, crying for help. 17.  There, she ran into S. and Ke., the latter telling her to go to the home of the M. family. She ran over and rang the bell. M. opened the door and let her in. Ke. [probably S., see paragraphs 24 and 26 below] went to the house of the Sch. family and called the police from there. During that call, Mr and Ms Sch. went outside and saw the applicant leave the home and drive off. They reported the number plate of the car to Ke. [S., see above], who passed it on to the police. Inside the house, M.\u2019s mother gave R.K. a towel, which she put on the back of her head, from where she was visibly bleeding. A few minutes later two police officers, Ra. and R\u00fc., arrived. 18.  On that same day, R.K. was admitted to a women\u2019s shelter. She showed the counsellor there, N., several marks of injury on her head and other parts of her body and described the bodily harm and coercion to which the applicant had subjected her in the period from 31 July to 2 August 2009. 19.  The investigating judge, W., stated that he had questioned R.K. for some two hours on 6 August 2009 at the request of the public prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph 6 above). She had described a multitude of acts of domestic violence in the course of the marriage, which had increased over time, and repeatedly stated that she loved the applicant, which was why she had not come forward before. The violence between 31 July and 2 August 2009 had constituted an escalation and had been too much for her, rendering their living together impossible, which was why she was now ready to testify against the applicant. She had described the events of between 31 July and 2 August 2009 as several acts of torment stretched out over the whole weekend with some breaks in between. He had asked her about every single incident, to which she had given definite and detailed accounts of each, including beatings with a rope, a wooden hiking pole and shoes, as well as being forced to carry out sexual acts on herself. Her account had been consistent and she had not been evasive, maintaining eye contact throughout. She had repeatedly stated that the applicant had beaten her between 31 July and 2 August 2009 in connection with a letter which the applicant had wanted her to write to the wife of a former lover of hers; she had started to write that letter by hand.\n(b)  Subsequent actions of R.K. 20.  R.K. later retracted her statements as reported by the investigating judge and made voluntary disclosures on 2 December 2009 and on 20 April 2010 to the police for having wrongfully incriminated the applicant, claiming that he had not been at home between 31 July and 2 August 2009 and that a third person had injured her. On 23 April 2010 R.K. submitted a written statement to the Regional Court retracting the voluntary disclosures of 2 December 2009 and 20 April 2010.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s statements 21.  The only statement the applicant made during the trial was to confirm that he did not have a driving licence. He did not comment on the remainder of the charges against him.\n(d)  Further evidence 22.  N., the women\u2019s shelter\u2019s counsellor, testified that she had received a copy of the police report and had discussed the report and the events with R.K. when she had been admitted to the shelter on 2 August 2009 in a severely traumatised state. R.K.\u2019s statements had been consistent with the police report. She had provided a detailed account of all the incidents that had taken place between 31 July 2009 and 2 August 2009, and had consistently named the applicant as the perpetrator. That same evening, she had also showed her her injuries, in particular bleeding head wounds, burn marks on her left breast and neck, and several bruises and weals on her back. N. had discussed the violent events with R.K. up until the former\u2019s examination before the Regional Court. Throughout these discussions, R.K.\u2019s account had been consistent. 23.  Re.K., R.K.\u2019s son, who had been born in 1997, stated that on 2 August 2009 he had been in his room from where he had heard the applicant and R.K. having an argument and screaming. He had later learned that his mother had been at a neighbour\u2019s home, where he had met her together with the police officers. His mother had been pressing a cloth against her head. He had then gone to the hospital together with her. He had not seen what had happened in the house and had, overall, not noticed much of the events that had occurred that weekend. 24.  S., a witness, said that he had been at a local sports meeting with another witness, Ke., on 2 August 2009. At around midday, when they had been walking in the direction of the village, R.K. had run towards them on G. Street, shouting \u201cHelp! Help! My husband is going to kill me!\u201d R.K. had been so shocked and disturbed that she had not been able to speak clearly. S. had advised her to go to the home of the M. family. He himself had then gone to the home of the Sch. family to call the police. While he had been on the phone to the police, Ms Sch. told him that the applicant had driven off. Ms Sch. had then given the registration number to S., who passed it on to the police. When S. had gone back outside, he had met Re.K., who had been shaking, and had asked him about R.K. He had then led the police to the house of the M. family. When the door had opened, he had seen R.K. sitting on the stairs, with a bloody cloth pressed on her head. The police then took charge and he left the scene. 25.  M., a witness, stated that one Sunday, the doorbell rang. R.K. was standing outside, shouting \u201cMy husband, my husband! He\u2019s out to get me. He mustn\u2019t see me.\u201d R.K., who had been terrified, immediately entered the house and sat down on the stairs. She had been bleeding from her head. Later, the police had arrived and called an ambulance. M.\u2019s mother added that she had given R.K. a towel for her bleeding head wound and that R.K. had repeatedly expressed fear of her husband. She had never seen a woman so terrified before, which had overwhelmed her so much that she had not asked R.K. about what had happened. 26.  Ms Sch., a witness, testified that S. had rung her door bell on 2 August 2009. S. had told her that he had had to call the police as it had seemed that the applicant had harmed his wife. She had then gone outside her house and looked towards the applicant\u2019s house located only a few metres away. She had observed the applicant leaving his house and driving off. She had told that to S., who had asked her to spell out the car\u2019s number plate, which she had done. Mr Sch. made similar statements. 27.  Officers Ra. and R\u00fc. explained that they had been patrolling together on 31 July 2009 when they had received the call to drive to the village B., where a woman had run out of a house screaming and had been hiding at a neighbour\u2019s residence. Several persons had been present when they had arrived at the scene, informing them that R.K. had been at the house of the M. family. When they had gone there, they had found R.K. in shock, pressing a cloth to the back of her head. When Ra. had asked her what had happened, she had stated that her husband had beaten her. R.K. had then given additional evidence, which was later discarded (see paragraph 34 below). She had had a bleeding wound on the back of her head and visible facial bruising. In the beginning, she had been shaking so much that it had not been possible to question her. 28.  A draft letter to the wife of a former lover of hers, in which R.K. stated that she wanted to clear up her life and that adultery was a sin, was read out before the Regional Court. Officer Ra. had stated that R.K., after having made her statement to the police and having been examined in hospital, had asked to be admitted to a women\u2019s shelter. She had requested that they stop by the marital home beforehand and for the police officers to accompany her. Besides taking some of her belongings, she had given the letter to Ra. and asked him to keep it. Ra. had included the letter in the case file. 29.  Another letter by R.K. of 26 September 2009, addressed to the applicant, was read out before the Regional Court, in which she described examples of acts committed by him from 31 July 2009 onwards, reporting the assaults, humiliations and sexual acts to which she had submitted for fear of receiving even more blows. 30.  The Regional Court relied, inter alia, on the testimony R.K. had given at her examination by the investigating judge. It considered that the applicant had rightly been barred from attending that hearing. However, since Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention guaranteed the applicant\u2019s right to examine or have examined witnesses against him, defence counsel should have been appointed for the applicant so that the latter could examine R.K. at that hearing. Yet, the mere fact that neither the applicant nor his counsel had had the opportunity to cross-examine R.K. did not automatically constitute a breach of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. It was decisive whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the manner in which evidence had been taken and assessed, had been fair. Where the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine a witness had been a result of procedural errors imputable on the judiciary, as in the present case, the Court found a breach of the Convention where the conviction had been based to a decisive extent on the evidence of the untested witness. A conviction could thus only be based on untested evidence where it was corroborated by other significant factors independent of that evidence. In the present case, the applicant\u2019s conviction could be based on R.K.\u2019s statements as reported by the investigating judge, for they were corroborated by other significant factors independent of them. 31.  In this regard, the Regional Court referred to R.K.\u2019s letter of 26 September 2009, in which she had described examples of acts committed by the applicant from 31 July 2009 onwards, reporting the assaults, humiliations and sexual acts to which she had submitted for fear of receiving even more blows (see paragraph 29 above). Her statement that the applicant had struck her in order to make her compose a letter to the wife of a former lover of hers had been corroborated by the draft letter with the content she had described which she had given to Ra. (see paragraph 28 above). Both letters had been admitted as evidence, as a witness\u2019s written statements could be admitted even in a case where he or she lawfully refused to give evidence at trial. 32.  Moreover, witness N. of the women\u2019s shelter in which R.K. had sought refuge had, on the day of R.K.\u2019s admission to the shelter, observed wounds in the head area, some of which had been bleeding, and burn marks on R.K.\u2019s left breast and neck as well as various bruises and weals on her back which R.K. had shown her. During her stay in the shelter, R.K. had repeatedly described to N. the details of the applicant\u2019s violent acts (see paragraph 22 above). 33.  Re.K., R.K.\u2019s son, who was in the marital home on 2 August 2009, stated that he had heard the applicant and R.K. having an argument and screaming (see paragraph 23 above). Other witnesses reported that R.K. had run into the street in panic that day, with a bleeding wound on the back of her head, and had subsequently sought refuge with the M. family until the police had arrived, while the applicant had been seen leaving the house and driving off following that (see paragraphs 24-27 above). Therefore, the Regional Court was convinced that R.K.\u2019s subsequent voluntary disclosures, in which she had mainly claimed that the applicant had not been at home and which she had subsequently retracted (see paragraph 20 above), had not been truthful. 34.  R.K.\u2019s initial statements to Officers Ra. and R\u00fc., as reported by them (see paragraph 27 above), were possible to admit as evidence despite R.K. subsequently invoking her right to remain silent, as they were to be qualified as a \u201cspontaneous utterance\u201d. At the same time, the Regional Court did not take into account the additional evidence given to the police by R.K. (see paragraph 27 above), as the police had not been sure at which point they had informed her of her right to remain silent. 35.  On 29 June 2010 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment. He argued that evidence obtained in breach of the right of confrontation enshrined in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention must never be admitted, regardless of its importance. The importance of the untested evidence in relation to the other evidence used by the court must not be decisive. Nor did it matter whether the court of first instance had undertaken a particularly careful examination of the evidence of the untested witness, as the breach of the right of confrontation could not be counterbalanced. Furthermore, in the light of R.K.\u2019s subsequent invocation of her right to remain silent, the Regional Court had wrongly admitted the evidence given by the police officers Ra. and R\u00fc. R.K.\u2019s statements to the police officers had not been a \u201cspontaneous utterance\u201d, as the latter had been called to the scene because a woman had run out of a house screaming and had been hiding at a neighbour\u2019s house and had, on arrival, asked her what had happened (see paragraph 27 above). 36.  In a written submission of 8 November 2010 the Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the examination of the investigating judge, resulting in the use of the untested evidence given by R.K., had not rendered the proceedings unfair. The evidence given by R.K. to the investigating judge had been corroborated by other significant factors independent of her evidence. Moreover, the Regional Court had counterbalanced the limitation of the applicant\u2019s defence rights through a particularly careful and critical assessment of the evidentiary value of that testimony. 37.  On 16 December 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as ill-founded, finding that the review of the Regional Court\u2019s judgment had not revealed any legal errors that had been detrimental to the applicant. 38.  On 11 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that his right of confrontation had been infringed when the investigation judge had examined R.K. without him or his counsel having had the opportunity to be present and to question her. It had been unlawful to admit her testimony, as reported by the investigating judge, as evidence and to use it to convict him. It was not sufficient to take the violation of his right of confrontation into consideration as part of the evidentiary assessment by attaching less evidentiary value to the untested testimony and by requiring that it be corroborated by other significant pieces of evidence. Similarly, it was unlawful to admit as evidence the statements of the two police officers, as R.K.\u2019s statement, which they reported, was not a \u201cspontaneous utterance\u201d. 39.  In a written submission of 22 August 2011 the Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the Regional Court had sufficiently taken the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention into account. 40.  On 4 April 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons.", "references": ["4", "5", "8", "6", "9", "1", "2", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  On 10 September 2003 the applicant was dismissed from a printing company. He brought proceedings against his employer. 7.  At the preparatory hearing of 26 December 2003 the Didube\u2011Chugureti District Court in Tbilisi (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) scheduled the main hearing for 3.30 p.m. on 28 January 2004. The preparatory hearing was attended both by the applicant and his lawyer. On 22 January 2004 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the court informing that he was due to attend a hearing for an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Georgia at 3 p.m. on 28 January 2004 and therefore could not be present. He requested that the hearing be adjourned. No reply followed. 8.  The District Court held the hearing on 28 January 2004 as planned. The applicant appeared and submitted that, as he was not a lawyer, he would be unable to argue his case in the absence of his representative. He requested that the hearing be adjourned so that he could be represented by his lawyer. Counsel for the opposing party objected to the request and asked the first-instance court to issue a default judgment against the applicant. The record of the hearing shows that the judge warned the applicant that, if he refused to take any further part, \u201cthe court would give a decision in absentia\u201d. The applicant, however, repeated that he would be unable to present his case without his lawyer. 9.  According to the record of the hearing, the District Court did not consider the applicant\u2019s request for an adjournment. It ruled that his refusal to participate in the hearing equated to a failure to appear in court within the meaning of Article 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 20 below). In view of the above, and concluding that the applicant had been duly summoned to the hearing in accordance with Articles 70 to 73 of the CCP, the judge issued, in accordance with Article 229 \u00a7 1 of the CCP (see paragraph 20 below), a default judgment rejecting the applicant\u2019s action without examining it or giving any reasons. 10.  The decision stated in its operative part that an application to set aside the judgment could be made to the same court within ten days. 11.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an application to set aside the judgment, enclosing a letter from the Supreme Court dated 5 February 2004 confirming that he had participated in the hearing of an appeal on points of law at 3 p.m. on 28 January 2004. He argued that his involvement in the examination of another case was a \u201cvalid reason\u201d for his absence (see Articles 233 and 241 of the CCP as cited in paragraph 20 below). 12.  On 19 March 2004 the same District Court judge confirmed his own decision of 28 January 2004. He found that the applicant had been summoned to the hearing in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 70 to 78 of the CCP, and pointed out that there was no legal requirement to also summon a party\u2019s lawyer. When he had appeared before the court, the applicant had stated that he objected to the examination of the case without his lawyer present and had refused to take part in the hearing. As conduct of that sort equated to a failure to appear under Article 232 of the CCP and none of the circumstances provided for by Article 233 of the CCP had been established, the judge decided that Article 241 of the CCP should not be applied to set aside the default judgment. 13.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 19 March 2004. On 16 July 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) found that, in breach of Article 72(z) of the CCP, the applicant and his lawyer had not been properly warned of the consequences of not appearing before the court. Moreover, at the hearing on 28 January 2004 the District Court had not properly explained to the applicant what a default judgment would mean for him. The Regional Court considered that, as the applicant was not a lawyer, he could not have known that a decision in absentia would necessarily be to his detriment. Therefore, as the caution provided for in Articles 70 to 78 had not been issued in the present case, the Regional Court held that there were grounds, under Articles 233 and 241 of the CCP, for setting aside the decision of 19 March 2004. The applicant\u2019s appeal was thus remitted to the District Court for re-examination. 14.  The applicant\u2019s former employer lodged an appeal on points of law against the appeal judgment. 15.  On 2 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Georgia found that, contrary to the Regional Court\u2019s assertion, the applicant had been informed in the hearing notice of the consequences of a failure to appear. There had therefore been no violation of Article 72(z) of the CCP. The Supreme Court also found that, according to the record of the hearing of 28 January 2004, the judge had warned the applicant that \u201cin the event of a refusal to take part in the hearing, a decision [would] be given in absentia\u201d. The applicant had therefore been sufficiently informed of the consequences of his conduct. Lastly, the Supreme Court pointed out that a court could give a decision in absentia if a lawyer or a party failed to appear at a hearing, on condition that the party had been summoned in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 70 to 78 of the CCP. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 16 July 2004 and remitted the case. 16.  On 10 May 2005 the Regional Court followed the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning and added that the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s involvement in another hearing was not a \u201cvalid reason\u201d for setting aside the decision in absentia, given that Article 232 of the CCP did not specify on what grounds a party could refuse to take part in a hearing. According to the Regional Court, this meant that any refusal to take part in the hearing was unjustified. It therefore upheld the decision of 19 March 2004. 17.  An appeal on points of law by the applicant was dismissed on 16 September 2005. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 241 contained an exhaustive list of the grounds on which a default judgment could be set aside. It further concluded, in contrast with the finding of the Regional Court on 16 July 2004, that the applicant had been duly informed of the consequences of his failure to appear at the hearing. Thus, this argument could not have served as a valid basis for a re-examination of the case in accordance with Article 241 of the CCP. 18.  Nor did the applicant\u2019s refusal to participate in a trial for whatever reason, according to the Supreme Court, merit a re-examination of the case. It emphasised in this connection that the refusal to participate equated to a failure to appear in terms of its legal consequences. 19.  No appeal lay against the above decision of the Supreme Court.", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "2", "4", "6", "5", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in K\u00f6thel. 6.  In 2004 the applicant began a relationship with X, a married woman who continued to live with her husband, with whom she had six children. In early 2006, X became pregnant and disclosed this to the applicant. In October 2006, she gave birth to a girl. Shortly after, the relationship with the applicant ended. 7.  X and her husband, the girl\u2019s legal father, refused the applicant\u2019s subsequent initiatives to have contact with the child. They disputed that the applicant was the biological father but refused to consent to paternity testing. 8.  The applicant initiated various proceedings to establish his legal paternity, to have biological paternity testing conducted and to obtain joint custody. His requests were to no avail. 9.  On 21 December 2010 the applicant applied to Obernburg Family Court to obtain regular contact with the child, referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Anayo v. Germany (no. 20578/07, 21 December 2010) delivered on the same day. He claimed to be the child\u2019s biological father and offered to prove this claim by means of an expert\u2019s report. In addition, he made a sworn declaration that he had had sexual intercourse with X around the time of conception. 10.  On 9 May 2011 the Family Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. It held that the applicant\u2019s paternity had not been established and that, consequently, he could not be granted contact. 11.  On 14 June 2011 the applicant appealed. On 16 November 2011 he supplemented his appeal, mainly relying on the Court\u2019s judgment in the case Schneider v. Germany (no. 17080/07, 15 September 2011) and requested contact with the child at least once a month, initially under supervision. 12.  On 1 December 2011, the Court of Appeal orally heard the applicant and the child\u2019s legal father. The latter declared that he knew about the relationship between his wife and the applicant and also assumed that there had been sexual contact. In October 2005 the mother had told him and the children that her relationship with the applicant was terminated although he could not rule out, and indeed considered it likely, that she had continued the relationship without his knowledge. He had learned of his wife\u2019s pregnancy in February 2006 and concluded that he was the father. In December 2006 the applicant had told him on the telephone that he was the child\u2019s father. At that moment, the mother had felt relieved that the time of secrets was over. This moment had been a breakthrough for them as a couple and their relationship had improved subsequently. The child had been desired by both. Even assuming that the applicant were the child\u2019s father, he would not agree to any contact because the applicant had caused them much suffering and had to bear the consequences of his behaviour. The proceedings the applicant had instituted were a burden for the couple but did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife, but had rather consolidated it. Everyone in the family but the child knew that the applicant believed that he was the child\u2019s father. 13.  On 9 February 2012 the Court of Appeal orally heard the child\u2019s mother. At the end of the hearing it informed the parties that it considered contact with the applicant not to be in the child\u2019s best interest for the time being and suggested that the applicant withdraw his appeal. 14.  On 21 June 2012 the child\u2019s appointed guardian ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger), a psychologist, furnished a detailed written statement concluding that contact with the applicant would be detrimental to the child\u2019s well\u2011being at this age. 15.  On 17 August 2012 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion on the question of whether contact would be detrimental to the child or would at least serve her best interest; to hold an oral hearing where the guardian ad litem should explain her written statement; to conduct a paternity test and to hear the child. 16.  On 28 September 2012, the Court of Appeal informed the parties that it considered it necessary to hear the child. The child\u2019s guardian ad litem opposed this. She submitted, inter alia, that the child had no knowledge of the applicant\u2019s claims, that the latter could not prove his fatherhood in the absence of a legal basis and that the child\u2019s legal parents had not submitted any proof of their allegations that the mother\u2019s husband was also the child\u2019s biological father. 17.  On 29 October 2012 the Court of Appeal heard the six\u2011year\u2011old child in the presence of her guardian ad litem only. According to the minutes, the child was aware - without knowing the real reasons - that her parents were in dispute with the applicant, who wanted to visit her or wanted her to visit him, but that neither her parents nor herself agreed to this. 18.  On 19 November 2012 the guardian ad litem submitted that the child\u2019s hearing confirmed her written statement of June 2012. 19.  On 21 November 2012 the applicant commented on the child\u2019s hearing, submitted a private expert opinion and requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion regarding contact rights and to appoint a new guardian ad litem. He further asked the Court of Appeal to inform the child about his application during a new hearing. He added that in the event that his appeal were to be denied, he should receive a written report on the child\u2019s development and two recent photographs every six months.\n(b)  The decision of the Court of Appeal 20.  On 13 December 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s requests. It observed, at the outset, that the applicant could not rely on Article 1684 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code as he was not the child\u2019s legal father. He could not rely on Article 1685 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code either, because he had never borne any actual responsibility for the child. The Court of Appeal then addressed the question of whether Article 1685 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code could be interpreted, in the light of the Court\u2019s judgments Anayo and Schneider (cited above), as assuming that a father who was able to prove that he had seriously tried to bear actual responsibility but failed to do so because of the mother\u2019s or legal parent\u2019s resistance, could be considered as having borne actual responsibility within the meaning of this Article. 21.  This question could, however, be left open because contact had in any event to serve the child\u2019s best interest. In this respect the Court of Appeal held that it was already contrary to the child\u2019s best interest to address the preliminary question of whether the applicant was the child\u2019s biological father. The child was living in a well-organised and emotionally stable family unit consisting of a father, a mother and other children. The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was convinced that this family union would be destroyed if the applicant\u2019s paternity were established and contact rights ordered. The hearing of the child and the legal parents had shown that in the child\u2019s perception of the world, there was only one father, the mother\u2019s husband. There were no indications that the latter did not assume his role as a father towards the child or assumed it differently than towards his other children. The child was well-integrated in the family, where she felt protected and secure. This assessment was also consistent with the conclusions of the child\u2019s curator ad litem. 22.  The Court of Appeal feared that clarifying the question of paternity bore the risk that the family unit would break up, which would have considerable negative consequences on the child because she would lose her essential attachment figures. As it had indicated after the hearing, it held it to be more likely that the applicant was the child\u2019s biological father. This question could, however, ultimately only be determined by a paternity test, to which the child\u2019s legal parents were opposed. The mother affirmed that her husband was the biological father of her daughter and both stood firm against the applicant. According to the Court of Appeal it resulted from the hearing that the legal father trusted, in principle, his wife\u2019s assertions but at the same time had doubts as to his paternity, although he had not explicitly expressed them. In spite of these doubts, and the long-lasting court proceedings, he did not put in question his wife\u2019s statements. The Court of Appeal received the impression that the spouses had barricaded themselves against the applicant as if they were in a corral, as had shown the legal father\u2019s declaration that the legal proceedings did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife but had rather consolidated it. The Court of Appeal concluded that the legal father could live with this uncertainty, and that his attitude had no consequences for the child. If, however, the applicant\u2019s biological paternity were to be established, the legal father would realise that his long-standing trust in his wife was not justified. It was not possible to predict the legal father\u2019s reaction, but the manifest risk that the spouses\u2019 marriage would break up could not be dismissed in view of the couple\u2019s past difficulties. The couple\u2019s separation would amount to the breaking-up of the child\u2019s family unit and the loss of her relationships, which would endanger her well-being. 23.  The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was aware that, in view of the importance of the child\u2019s well-being, it could be a long time before the preliminary question of paternity could be clarified and years before contact rights could be granted. This might evolve once the child started to ask questions, but for now it was not in her best interest to be confronted with the paternity issue. It was therefore not advisable to tell her about the applicant\u2019s allegations or to substitute the child\u2019s guardian ad litem. 24.  The Court of Appeal went on to say that, even assuming that the applicant was the child\u2019s biological father, contact with the applicant was not in the child\u2019s best interest. Due to the highly emotional conflicts between the legal parents and the applicant, and the fact that the applicant had not ruled out that he might tell the child that he was her biological father if he saw her, contact would jeopardise the child\u2019s well-being. Therefore it was not advisable to order an expert opinion regarding the question of whether and how the child would deal with two fathers or whether it was in general advisable to grant children contact with their biological fathers at an early stage. These issues had to be assessed in the light of the extremely tense relations between the applicant and the child\u2019s legal parents, and in view of the predictable consequences for the child if contact were granted. The Court of Appeal added that it could decide on these questions on its own after having orally heard the persons involved, and based on the written statements of the guardian ad litem, an experienced psychologist well-known from other proceedings. 25.  As regards the applicant\u2019s request for information the Court of Appeal held as follows:\n\u201cThe applicant\u2019s request for information, claimed in the alternative in his lawyer\u2019s submissions of 21 November 2012, does not exist. Such claim cannot be based on Article 1686, 1st sentence, of the Civil Code because the applicant is not, as required by this provision, the child\u2019s legal father. Whether the provision can be interpreted in the light of the above mentioned decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as assuming that a biological father can also claim a right for information, can be left open: that would require addressing the preliminary issue of whether the applicant was the child\u2019s biological father. It has already been shown that clarifying this question by ordering a paternity test would be contrary to the child\u2019s well-being.\u201d 26.  On 11 February 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection alleging a violation of the right to be heard. 27.  Previously, on 28 January 2013, the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 1 BvR 844/13). 28.  On 18 July 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that on 13 July 2013, the Law for the strengthening of the rights of biological but not legal fathers had entered into force which, pursuant to Article 1686a of the Civil Code, provided a new possibility for biological fathers to be granted contact and information rights even if they had no social and family relationship with the child (see paragraph 32 below). It added that in court proceedings concerning the enforcement of such rights, the determination of the preliminary question of paternity could be necessary, pursuant to Article 167a \u00a7 2 of the Family Matters Act (see paragraph 33 below). It enquired of the applicant whether, under these circumstances, he would withdraw his constitutional complaint. 29. On 13 August 2013 the applicant replied that he would maintain his complaint because, even under the new law, he would not have obtained a more favourable decision. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal had rejected his request for contact rights, even assuming that he was the child\u2019s biological father, since contact did not serve the child\u2019s well-being. The Court of Appeal had thus already decided in the light of the new Article 1686a of the Civil Code. The applicant added that the same reasoning applied to his request for information. Given that, in its view, the determination of paternity would endanger the family unit, the Court of Appeal would refrain from ordering a measure of examination because the legal parents could not reasonably be expected to undergo any examination, under Section 167a \u00a7 2 of the Family Matters Act. 30.  On 21 September 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.", "references": ["9", "5", "6", "7", "1", "8", "0", "2", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Cadiz. 6.  On 2 March 2009 the Hamburg District Court, after having served a summons on the applicant to appear at the address that he had at that time in Hamburg, convicted the applicant of assault and sentenced him to forty day\u2011fines of 25 euros (EUR) each and allowed him to pay his fine in instalments in the light of his economic situation. The District Court had, at the applicant\u2019s request, authorised Mr Arif \u2013 at that time still a law student \u2013 to act as defence counsel under Article 138 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below). 7.  The applicant and the public prosecutor lodged appeals. The prosecutor\u2019s appeal was directed merely against the sentencing. Thereafter, the applicant moved to Spain to work as a chef in a hotel and communicated his new address to the court. 8.  On 24 April 2009 the Hamburg Regional Court withdrew the authorisation of Mr Arif to act as defence counsel, while at the same time rejecting the application lodged by Mr Arif for the applicant to be released from the obligation to appear in person at the appeal hearing. This decision was served on the applicant in Spain. 9.  Also on 24 April 2009 the Regional Court fixed the date for the oral hearing of the applicant\u2019s appeal to 9.10 a.m. on 13 May 2009. It decided to serve the summons on the applicant via public notification because the applicant had moved abroad. The summons was displayed on the court\u2019s noticeboard from 27 April until 12 May 2009. 10.  On 12 May 2009 Mr Arif learned by telephone of the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of that same day to overturn the Regional Court\u2019s decision in respect of his authorisation to act as counsel for the applicant and of the appeal hearing having been scheduled for the next morning. He applied by fax for the hearing to be adjourned, citing the fact that he was going to be out of town the next day. He furthermore asked that documents from the case file \u2013 in particular the public prosecutor\u2019s appeal \u2013 be sent to him. The presiding judge ordered that a copy of that appeal and of the decision to serve the summons of the applicant by public notification be sent to the applicant\u2019s lawyer. This proved impossible, as the lawyer\u2019s fax machine had no receiving function. The lawyer was offered access to the file at the courthouse the following day at 8 a.m. (that is to say immediately before the hearing), which he declined, stating that he would be out of town. 11.  On 13 May 2009 the Regional Court refused, in a separate decision, an application lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer for the appeal hearing to be adjourned. It stated that the lawyer had waived his right to be summoned within the respective time-limit because he had known about the date of the appeal hearing (as evidenced by his fax of the previous day), and that the properly summoned applicant had failed to appear without providing any reason. Simultaneously, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal without an assessment of the merits, in accordance with Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), because he had not appeared at the appeal hearing (without any sufficient excuse, and despite having been summoned), nor had he been represented by a lawyer in a permissible manner. 12.  On 10 March 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the restoration of the status quo ante. It found that the requirements for the serving of a summons by means of public notification, as set out in Article 40 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), had been met. The applicant\u2019s lawyer had waived his right to be summoned, and his application for an adjournment had not relied on the failure to comply with the time-limit for serving a summons but had rather invoked scheduling problems, which he had not described in greater detail. 13.  On 15 April 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It considered that the applicant had been properly summoned to the appeal hearing because the requirements for service by public notification, as set out in Article 40 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been met. The summons to attend the hearing before the District Court had been served on the applicant\u2019s previous address in Germany and he had lodged the appeal in question. As regards his interest in having the District Court\u2019s judgment reviewed, it had been his responsibility to ensure that it was possible for the summons to appear at the appeal hearing to be served in Germany. As a result of his move to Spain it had not been possible to serve the summons at his previous address in Hamburg. It had thus been acceptable for the summons to be served by public notification. There had been neither an obligation to undertake an attempt to serve the summons at the applicant\u2019s new address abroad prior to serving it via public notification nor one to notify him at that address that the summons had been served by public notification. The applicant had also not specifically authorised (under the first sentence of Article 145a \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) his lawyer to receive summonses (see paragraph 19 below). Moreover, the applicant had not convincingly shown that he had been prevented through no fault of his own from appearing at the appeal hearing, as required by Article 44 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), because the applicant\u2019s lawyer had not provided an affidavit to support his claim that he had advised the applicant, on 12 May 2009, that the latter did not need to attend the hearing because he had not been summoned. As his appearance in person had been ordered (see paragraph 8 above), it had not been possible to carry out the appeal hearing in his absence. 14.  On 16 July 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 13 May 2009 as ill-founded, finding that the review of the Regional Court\u2019s judgment had not revealed any legal errors that had been detrimental to the applicant. 15.  On 16 November 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 2147/10). The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 10 December 2010. 16.  Following communication of the case and unsuccessful friendly settlement negotiations, on 8 July 2016 the Government informed the Court of their intention to resolve the issue raised by the application. They produced a unilateral declaration, in which they acknowledged violations of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and/or 3 (c), as well as Article 6 \u00a7 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention and offered to pay the applicant a sum to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together with any costs and expenses. The Government requested that the Court strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 17.  By a letter to the Court of 30 August 2016 the applicant indicated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration. The aim he pursued with the present application was a reopening of the criminal proceedings against him and a subsequent acquittal. He argued that, under domestic law, such a reopening could not be achieved if the Court struck the case out of its list, but required a judgment finding a violation. Furthermore, the compensation offered was insufficient. 18.  By a submission of 14 October 2016 the Government confirmed that there was \u2013 and in fact, there still is \u2013 no case-law of the domestic courts regarding whether Article 359 no. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the reopening of criminal proceedings following a judgment of the Court finding a violation (see paragraph 19 below), also applies to violations acknowledged by the Government by way of a unilateral declaration. This question was for the domestic courts to assess. They acknowledged that the provision had, in practice, been construed narrowly.", "references": ["6", "1", "5", "7", "0", "4", "8", "9", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in Lithuania in 1980 and lives in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 7.  The applicant left Lithuania for Slovenia on 2 March 2002. 8.  On 13 March 2002 at 10.43 a.m. the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being involved in a robbery at the Radovljica branch of Gorenjska Bank. 9.  The robbery had taken place at 9.30 a.m. on the same day. It had involved four men, while three others had assisted in its organisation. The four robbers wore masks. One of them carried a handgun and waited at the entrance, holding three clients at gunpoint. The others jumped over the counter and overpowered two bank employees while one of the robbers emptied the tills. After taking the money, the robbers fled by car towards the railway station. Informed of the bank robbery, the police searched the area. They discovered an abandoned car in nearby woods and soon after saw four men, including the applicant, running away. One of the men, later recognised as A.V., was seen carrying a bag, which he dropped when the police officers approached. The bag was found to contain some of the money stolen from the bank, a handgun and two masks. One of the masks had biological traces belonging to the applicant and another man (E.B.). 10.  All four men were arrested and were later identified as the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. They were all Lithuanian nationals. 11.  At 2 p.m. on the same day, 13 March 2002, the applicant was taken into police custody. It appears from the decision authorising that measure that the applicant, at the time \u201can unidentified person\u201d, was immediately informed, in Russian, of the reasons for his arrest, and his right to remain silent, to request a lawyer and to have family members informed of his arrest. It can also be seen from this decision that a registered interpreter, A.G., interpreted for him from and into Russian and that the applicant did not request a lawyer. The decision was notified to the applicant at 5.20 p.m. He refused to sign a document acknowledging receipt of that decision, without providing any reasons for his refusal. 12.  On the same day three other Lithuanian nationals, L.K., N.U. and G.V., were arrested on suspicion of aiding and abetting the robbery. 13.  On 15 March 2002 the applicant and six other suspects were questioned by the investigating judge of Kranj District Court. The judge informed the applicant of the charges against him, his right not to incriminate himself and his right to remain silent, and also his right to be assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing. As the applicant did not appoint a lawyer, the court assigned D.V. as counsel. During the proceedings, interpreting into Russian and from Russian into Slovenian was provided by A.G. According to the record of the questioning, when asked whether he understood his rights and agreed to the appointment of counsel, the applicant started to cry. The excerpt containing the applicant\u2019s statement reads as follows:\n\u201cI say that I have a young child. This child will have nothing to eat because our situation is very difficult. I have always worked; I have never done anything like this. I came to Slovenia because I wanted a job.\nI want to see my child.\nWhen asked when I came to Slovenia, I say that I do not remember.\nWhen asked if he can describe the robbery, the accused is silent and does not answer.\nWhen asked whether I am ready to give my personal data, I state that I was born in Lithuania and that my name is Danas.\nI say that I will not provide my family name because I am ashamed.\nWhen asked, why I am ashamed, I say that I am scared. I am scared that I will never see my child again. What have I done?\nWhen asked what he has done to make him scared he will not to see his child again, the accused does not answer, instead he starts crying more.\nWhen asked by the public prosecutor whether I would answer any more questions, I say no.\nWhen asked whether I would answer questions from my counsel, I nod and say yes.\nWhen asked how old I am and whether I have children, I answer that I am 21 and have one child, who means the whole world to me.\nWhen asked what circumstances I live in, I say that it is very difficult in Lithuania. The circumstances are difficult. I have no job and no money.\nWhen asked how long I have been in Slovenia, I say that I do not know exactly. I think that it has been about a week and a half.\nWhen asked who he arrived in Slovenia with, the accused responds by crying.\nThere are no other questions for the accused.\nWhen asked whether anyone should be informed about the detention, I say that I do not have any relatives, and I do not know where my wife and child are currently.\nThe defence is hereby concluded.\u201d 14.  Another suspect, A.V., described the robbery and the events leading up to it when questioned by the investigating judge. He explained that he and the applicant had travelled to Slovenia together. They had met L.K., who had approached them in a fast-food restaurant when he had heard them speaking Russian. They had gone with him to Bled and met M.K., E.B., N.U. and G.V. a few days before the robbery. After running out of money, they had decided to rob the bank in question. 15.  During the questioning of the applicant by the investigating judge, the applicant\u2019s counsel set out reasons for opposing the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant stated on record that he agreed with what had been said by his counsel. 16.  Following the questioning, the investigating judge ordered the detention of all seven suspects. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 18 March 2002. His counsel appealed against that decision, and also against the subsequent prolongations of the applicant\u2019s detention, but was unsuccessful. 17.  On the day of the above-mentioned questioning, 15 March 2002, the investigating judge gave permission for the interpreter A.G. to visit the applicant and some of his co-accused in order to assist them in their consultations with their counsel. 18.  A decision opening a judicial investigation against the seven suspects was issued on 26 March 2002 but was quashed on appeal by a panel of three judges. The judges found that although the details of the allegations against the suspects had been provided in the detention orders, they should also have been fully included in the decision to open an investigation. 19.  The questioning of witnesses took place on 2, 3 and 4 April 2002. The applicant and the other six suspects were informed in Russian about their right to attend the questioning. The applicant did not attend those sessions, but his counsel attended them all. The transcripts of the witness statements were translated into Russian and given to the applicant on 19 April 2002. 20.  On 8 April 2002 a new decision opening a judicial investigation against the seven accused was issued. It was later challenged unsuccessfully on appeal. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 10 April 2002. On the same day a remand hearing was held at which the applicant, with the assistance of the interpreter A.G., stated that he could not leave the country as he had no passport, that he wanted to wait until the proceedings were over and that he agreed with what had been said by his counsel at the hearing. 21.  On 11 April 2002 A.G. informed the Kranj District Court that all the defendants had requested that the transcripts of the witness statements be translated into Russian. 22.  On 12 April 2002 the investigating judge decided that the statements given by the suspects to the police should be excluded from the case file as the court could not rely on them. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 16 April 2002. 23.  On 17 April 2002 an identification parade was organised and one witness identified the applicant as a person who had visited the bank two days before the robbery. 24.  On 28 May 2002 the district prosecutor lodged an indictment, charging the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. with robbery, one count of theft of a motor vehicle and two counts of attempted theft of a motor vehicle. L.K., N.U. and G.V. were charged with aiding and abetting the robbery. The indictment was translated into Russian and challenged unsuccessfully by the applicant\u2019s counsel. 25.  On 10 and 11 July 2002 the Kranj District Court held a hearing at which two Russian interpreters were present. The record of the hearing shows that the charges were read out to the defendants, who were also notified of their right not to incriminate themselves and their right to remain silent. The transcript reads as follows:\n \u201cwe, the defendants, state that we understand the content of the charges.\n...\nwe, the defendants, understand the notification of our rights.\u201d 26.  At the hearing A.V. changed his statement and claimed that a man had offered to find work for him and the applicant. Once they had given him their passports, he had demanded that they take part in the robbery. The applicant had, according to A.V.\u2019s latest account, been too scared to participate, so they had left him in the woods to wait for them. The applicant gave a similar account of events, claiming that he had not been among those who had robbed the bank but had waited for their return in the woods. According to the record of the hearing, the applicant answered questions from the district prosecutor, the presiding judge, his own counsel and counsel for one of his co-defendants. 27.  In addition to questioning the defendants, the court also examined a number of witnesses. It can be seen from the record of the hearing that the applicant had trouble with the interpreting of one of the witness statements and could only understand it when he read it. He put questions to the witnesses and commented on witness statements about the height of the robbers, and on police officers\u2019 statements concerning mobile telephones they had seized and the number of people who had fled the scene of the robbery. He also referred to the indictment and commented on allegations about the whereabouts of the stolen money. 28.  On 12 July 2002 the applicant\u2019s partner was given permission to visit him in Ljubljana Prison. 29.  On 16 July 2002 a hearing was held at which the defendants gave closing statements. The transcript includes the following record of the applicant\u2019s statement:\n\u201cI agree with what has been said by my defence counsel. There is no evidence that I robbed the bank. The only evidence against me is the hair found in the cap, but I have already explained about the hair in the cap and why that cap happened to be on my head. Two men cannot be in a bank wearing the same cap. A person cannot be forced into something like that; nobody forced me. I was not in the bank.\n...\nI am sad that you consider me to be an offender; you can only sentence me for what I actually did and not for what I did not do. I ask that account be taken of my family situation and that I be sentenced accordingly, but not to imprisonment.\u201d 30.  On 16 July 2002 a five-member bench of the Kranj District Court convicted the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. of robbery and acquisition of unlawfully gained property (a stolen car). The applicant and M.K. were sentenced to eight years and four months in prison, E.B. received a sentence of eight years and seven months, while A.V. was sentenced to five years and four months in prison. L.K., N.U. and G.V. were found guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 31.  The judgment contains about twenty pages of reasoning in which the court also responded to arguments relating to the use of Slovenian or Croatian during the robbery. The court noted that not many words had been spoken during the robbery, that all four defendants charged with robbery spoke Russian and were for that reason assisted by Russian interpreters, that they also knew some words in Slovenian as demonstrated during the hearing and that they could have intentionally used words resembling Slovenian. 32.  On the same day, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended. The written decision with a Russian translation were notified to the applicant on the following day. 33.  On 2 August 2002 the judgment with a translation into Russian were also notified to the applicant. 34.  On 6 August 2002 the applicant\u2019s counsel appealed against the District Court\u2019s judgment. He complained about alleged shortcomings in the police investigation, the assessment of evidence and his client\u2019s sentence, but did not raise any complaint regarding the applicant\u2019s understanding of the Russian interpreting provided to him. 35.  On the same day the applicant also lodged an appeal, which was composed of five pages of argument written by hand in Slovenian with the assistance of fellow inmates. The applicant complained about the first-instance court\u2019s assessment of the evidence and about his sentence. He maintained that he had known about the robbery but had not taken part in it. 36.  On 14 November 2002 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that A.V. had given a detailed and incriminating description, while having legal assistance, that the applicant had been assisted by counsel who had been appointed for him and by an interpreter at his first appearance before the investigating judge, and that there was no indication that the applicant had not been informed when arrested of the reasons for his arrest in a language he had understood. The court was of the view that if the applicant had not understood the reasons for his arrest he would have mentioned it during his questioning by the investigating judge. The applicant was issued with a Russian translation of the judgment, by which his conviction acquired the force of res judicata. 37.  On 23 February 2003 the applicant sent an application entitled \u201can appeal to the Supreme Court\u201d to the Kranj District Court. The application was written in Lithuanian, with the exception of an introductory explanation in Slovenian, in which the applicant informed the court that he spoke neither Russian nor Slovenian, adding that he understood a little Russian but could not write in it. In the rest of the document the applicant complained about the assessment of the evidence by the lower courts and alleged that his right to use his own language in the criminal trial had been violated. He also alleged that during his first questioning he had not been represented by counsel or provided with an interpreter. Thus, he had not understood the reasons for his arrest. He also submitted that he had stated at the hearing that he did not understand Russian very well. Despite those issues, the Kranj District Court had not provided him with a Lithuanian interpreter. 38.  On 24 March 2003 the Kranj District Court instructed the applicant to submit his appeal, which it treated as an application for the protection of legality (an extraordinary remedy by which to challenge the legality of final decisions), in Russian, finding that he had used that language throughout the criminal proceedings and in communication with his counsel. It appears from the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 24 March 2005 (see paragraph 41 below) that the Kranj District Court had ordered that the appeal be drafted in Russian after ascertaining that there were no Lithuanian interpreters registered in Slovenia and that translation from that language would therefore have required the assistance of the nearest Lithuanian Embassy. The letter instructing the applicant to submit his application in Russian, and a Russian translation of that letter, were notified to the applicant on 4 April 2003. As the applicant did not reply, on 29 April 2003 the District Court rejected his application as incomprehensible. The decision and a Russian translation were notified to the applicant on 21 May 2003. 39.  On 20 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision, alleging that the Kranj District Court had violated his defence rights and his right to use his own language and script. He explained that he could not speak or understand Russian very well, and in particular was not able to read decisions and other documents in Russian owing to the different characters, and that he had thus been prevented from effectively defending himself. His constitutional complaint and additional submissions were handwritten in Slovenian. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Kranj District Court replied to the applicant\u2019s allegations, submitting that he had at no time stated that he had trouble understanding Russian. 40.  On 30 November 2004 the applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice, written in Slovenian, asking for an explanation as to why he had not had a Lithuanian interpreter at his trial. The letter was forwarded to the Kranj District Court. It replied on 28 December 2004, explaining that the applicant had used Russian to communicate with the court and with his counsel at all stages of the first-instance proceedings. 41.  On 24 March 2005 the Constitutional Court delivered its decision. It observed that the applicant\u2019s situation was an exceptional one, in that he was not required to properly exhaust remedies in respect of the Kranj District Court\u2019s decision. In its view, the applicant, who was detained at the time, could not have been expected to challenge the impugned decision by means of a standard appeal as he had stated that he could not understand the language in which the decision had been written. The Constitutional Court went on to examine the complaint on the merits, finding in favour of the applicant. It noted that the law afforded special protection to a defendant\u2019s right to use his or her own language and script after detention. The person\u2019s own language would in principle be his or her mother tongue but, if the person had a command of another language, the use of the latter could suffice for oral communication in the proceedings. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the District Court\u2019s view that a defendant who was in custody and who had used a certain language in oral proceedings should also submit written submissions in that language, finding that written communication required a higher level of language proficiency. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had been assisted by a Russian interpreter in the first-instance proceedings, which had mainly involved oral communication. After an appeal, proceedings were typically in writing and the accused no longer benefited from the assistance of court-appointed counsel. The Constitutional Court therefore found that the applicant, who had explained in his submissions to the Supreme Court that he could not write in Russian, should be allowed to submit them in his own language. It therefore concluded that the court below had violated the applicant\u2019s right to use his own language in the proceedings, as explicitly provided for by section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act and as guaranteed by Article 62 of the Constitution. It annulled the Kranj District Court\u2019s decision of 29 April 2003 (see paragraph 38 above) and remitted the applicant\u2019s application for the protection of legality for fresh consideration. 42.  In the remitted proceedings, the Kranj District Court obtained a Slovenian translation of the applicant\u2019s application for the protection of legality and referred it to the Supreme Court. 43.  On 26 January 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the protection of legality as unfounded. The Supreme Court established on the basis of the case file that immediately after placing the applicant in police custody, the police had informed him, with the assistance of the Russian interpreter, of the reasons for his arrest and his right to a lawyer. When questioned by the investigating judge, the applicant had also been assisted by the Russian interpreter and his court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court found that there was no indication in the file that the applicant had been informed of his right to use his own language in the proceedings, either by the investigating judge or by the Kranj District Court. It also found no indication that the applicant had given any statement concerning that right. However, the lack of such notification, did not, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, undermine the legality of the final judgment, because the applicant had been assisted by a Russian interpreter and by counsel. The record of the hearing had contained no indication that he did not understand Russian. Moreover, the court noted that neither the applicant nor his counsel had raised any issue of a lack of understanding of Russian. The applicant was issued with an original copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment and a Lithuanian translation. 44.  On 10 June 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment, complaining that, while he had a rough understanding of Russian, he could not defend himself orally in that language, let alone in writing. In particular, he alleged that he had not been afforded an opportunity to defend himself in a language that would allow him to clarify the facts of the case and to respond effectively to the charges. He alleged that he had drawn the court\u2019s attention to that fact but that his remark had not been recorded. In addition, the applicant complained that certain documents submitted in evidence had been in Slovenian and had therefore been incomprehensible to him, thus hindering his defence. 45.  On 1 September 2007 the applicant was released on parole. 46.  On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed (zavrne) the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It observed, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cAll the complaints relate to the proceedings before the first-instance court. From the questioning by the investigating judge until the end of the trial, including during the appeal proceedings, the applicant was represented by counsel with whom he succeeded in communicating in Russian (that fact was not disputed by the applicant in his constitutional complaint). In his appeal against the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, the applicant did not mention the issues raised in the constitutional complaint but instead complained about police procedure, which is not a matter complained of in the constitutional proceedings. Only in his request for the protection of legality, lodged in his own language, and in his constitutional complaint, did the applicant complain of a breach of his right under Article 62 of the Constitution owing to the conduct of the District Court, which had ignored his remarks about his trouble understanding Russian ...\nHaving regard to the foregoing and to the content of the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court examined whether the Supreme Court\u2019s view ... violated the applicant\u2019s right to use his own language provided for in Article 62 of the Constitution and whether there had been a breach of his defence rights under the first line of Article 29 of the Constitution.\n...\nIn accordance with section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a court should inform a suspect or accused of the right to use his own language. The notification and the statement of the suspect or accused should be recorded in the hearing transcript in its entirety. The omission of such a notification or a lack of record of such a notification or statement can give rise to a material breach of the rules of criminal procedure under paragraph 2 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act (that is, if such a violation affected his ability to defend himself). However, if the court acts contrary to an explicit request of a suspect or accused to use his own language and to follow the hearing in that language, the court commits a material breach of the rules of criminal procedure in an absolute sense under paragraph 1 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act.\nIn the reasoning of the judgment [the Supreme Court] noted that there was no indication in the record of the hearing that the applicant had mentioned that he had not understood Russian or that he or his counsel had requested the use of the applicant\u2019s native language at the hearing. Nor had the latter issue been raised in the application for the protection of legality. ... The allegation that the court had failed to include the applicant\u2019s statement in the record of the hearing was made for the first time in the constitutional complaint. The Supreme Court convincingly established circumstances that show that the applicant understood Russian well enough to receive a fair hearing using that language ... When considering the right to a fair trial it is important to note (and this also the Constitutional Court\u2019s view) that in his application for the protection of legality the applicant did not raise a complaint that he had not been informed of his right to use his native language. Nor did he complain of that in his constitutional complaint.\n... The impugned judgments therefore do not violate the right of the applicant guaranteed in Article 62 of the Constitution ... Having regard to the above findings and the fact that throughout the proceedings the applicant was assisted by counsel with whom he succeeded in communicating, his complaint that his defence rights guaranteed by Article 29 [of the Constitution] had been violated must likewise be dismissed.\nThe complaint that some of the evidence in the proceedings was in Slovenian, thus preventing him from familiarising himself with it and defending himself, was not pursued in the proceedings before the lower courts. He has therefore failed to exhaust remedies in that regard ...\u201d 47.  The fees declared at the end of the trial by the interpreter and the applicant\u2019s counsel, and paid for by the State, show that various services were provided to the applicant. Apart from interpreting during the investigation and court hearings, and the written translation of documents, A.G. took part in certain meetings between the applicant and his counsel. The lawyer visited the applicant in the remand prison for consultation purposes on 8 April (forty-five minutes), 2 August (thirty minutes) and 13 September 2002 (twenty minutes), assisted by A.G., as well as on 9 July 2002 (twenty-five minutes), though it is not clear whether on the latter occasion A.G. was present. The lawyer also assisted the applicant during his court appearances. He also lodged applications for remedies on his client\u2019s behalf in the proceedings at first and second instance. 48.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia read as follows:\nArticle 29\n(Legal Safeguards in Criminal Proceedings)\n\u201cAnyone charged with a criminal offence must, in addition to absolute equality, be guaranteed the following rights:\nthe right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence;\nthe right to be present at his trial and to conduct his own defence or to be defended by a legal representative;\nthe right to present all the evidence that is to his benefit;\nthe right not to incriminate himself or his relatives or those close to him, or to admit his guilt.\u201d\nArticle 62\n(Right to Use One\u2019s Own Language and Script)\n\u201cEveryone has the right to use his own language and script as provided by law in the exercise of his rights and duties and in procedures before State and other authorities performing a public function.\u201d 49.  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 63/94 with the relevant amendments) governing the use of languages in criminal proceedings read as follows:\nSection 4\n\u201c(1) Any arrested person shall be advised immediately, in his native language or in a language he understands, of the reasons for his arrest. An arrested person shall immediately be instructed that he is not bound to make any statements, that he is entitled to the legal assistance of counsel of his own choosing and that the competent body is bound to inform his immediate family of his arrest at his request.\n...\nSection 7\n(1) Charges, appeals and other submissions shall be filed with the court in the Slovenian language.\n...\n(3) A foreigner who has been deprived of his freedom shall have the right to file submissions with the court in his own language; in other cases foreign subjects shall be allowed to file submissions in their own language solely on the condition of reciprocity.\u201d\nSection 8\n\u201c(1) Parties, witnesses and other participants in the proceedings shall have the right to use their own languages in investigative and other judicial actions and at the main hearing. If a judicial action or the main hearing is not conducted in the language of those persons, an oral translation of their statements and of the statements of others, and a translation of documents and other written evidence, must be provided.\n(2) Persons referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be informed of their right to have oral statements and written documents and evidence translated for them; they may waive their rights to translation if they know the language in which the proceedings are being conducted. The fact that they have been informed of their right, as well as their statements in that regard, should be placed on record.\n(3) Translations shall be done by a court interpreter.\u201d\n(b)  Grounds of appeal 50.  The relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning grounds of appeal reads as follows:\nSection 371\n\u201c(1) A material breach of the provisions of criminal procedure shall be deemed to exist:\n...\n3) ... where the defendant, counsel, the injured party acting as prosecutor or the private prosecutor was, notwithstanding his request, deprived of his right to use his own language during investigative or other court actions or at the main hearing and his right to follow the proceedings in that language (section 8) ...;\n...\n(2) A material breach of the provisions of criminal procedure shall also be deemed to exist if in preparation for a hearing or in the course of a hearing or in giving judgment the court omitted to apply a provision of this Act or applied it incorrectly, or if in the course of the hearing the court violated the rights of the defence, such that the act or omission influenced or might have influenced the legality and regularity of the judgment.\u201d 51.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (\u201cthe Charter\u201d) enshrines the right to a fair trial (Article 47) and respect for the rights of the defence (Article 48(2)). 52.  On 30 November 2009 the Council of the European Union adopted a Roadmap for strengthening the procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings (\u201cthe Roadmap\u201d). The Roadmap gave rise to Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (\u201cDirective 2010/64/EU\u201d). Directive 2010/64/EU lays down common minimum rules to be applied within the European Union for the purposes of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and in proceedings for the execution of the European arrest warrant. It came into force on 15 November 2010. 53.  The following recitals of Directive 2010/64/EU are relevant:\n\u201c...\n(7) Strengthening mutual trust requires a more consistent implementation of the rights and guarantees set out in Article 6 of the ECHR. It also requires, by means of this Directive and other measures, further development within the Union of the minimum standards set out in the ECHR and the Charter.\n...\n(9) Common minimum rules should lead to increased confidence in the criminal justice systems of all Member States, which, in turn, should lead to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust. Such common minimum rules should be established in the fields of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings.\n...\n(14) The right to interpretation and translation for those who do not speak or understand the language of the proceedings is enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. This Directive facilitates the application of that right in practice. To that end, the aim of this Directive is to ensure the right of suspected or accused persons to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings with a view to ensuring their right to a fair trial.\n...\n(17) This Directive should ensure that there is free and adequate linguistic assistance, allowing suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings fully to exercise their right of defence and safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings.\n...\n(19) Communication between suspected or accused persons and their legal counsel should be interpreted in accordance with this Directive. Suspected or accused persons should be able, inter alia, to explain their version of the events to their legal counsel, point out any statements with which they disagree and make their legal counsel aware of any facts that should be put forward in their defence.\n...\n(21) Member States should ensure that there is a procedure or mechanism in place to ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. Such procedure or mechanism implies that competent authorities verify in any appropriate manner, including by consulting the suspected or accused persons concerned, whether they speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter.\n(22) Interpretation and translation under this Directive should be provided in the native language of the suspected or accused persons or in any other language that they speak or understand in order to allow them fully to exercise their right of defence, and in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.\n...\n(24) Member States should ensure that control can be exercised over the adequacy of the interpretation and translation provided when the competent authorities have been put on notice in a given case.\n...\n(30) Safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings requires that essential documents, or at least the relevant passages of such documents, be translated for the benefit of suspected or accused persons in accordance with this Directive. Certain documents should always be considered essential for that purpose and should therefore be translated, such as any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment. It is for the competent authorities of the Member States to decide, on their own motion or upon a request of suspected or accused persons or of their legal counsel, which other documents are essential to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and should therefore be translated as well.\n...\n(32) This Directive should set minimum rules. Member States should be able to extend the rights set out in this Directive in order to provide a higher level of protection also in situations not explicitly dealt with in this Directive. The level of protection should never fall below the standards provided by the ECHR or the Charter as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the European Union.\n(33) The provisions of this Directive that correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR or the Charter should be interpreted and implemented consistently with those rights, as interpreted in the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.\u201d 54.  Article 2 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads, in its relevant part, as follows:\nRight to interpretation\n\u201c1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, without delay, with interpretation during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary interim hearings. 2. Member States shall ensure that, where necessary for the purpose of safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings, interpretation is available for communication between suspected or accused persons and their legal counsel in direct connection with any questioning or hearing during the proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other procedural applications.\n... 4. Member States shall ensure that a procedure or mechanism is in place to ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. 5. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in national law, suspected or accused persons have the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for interpretation and, when interpretation has been provided, the possibility to complain that the quality of the interpretation is not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.\n... 8. Interpretation provided under this Article shall be of a quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their right of defence.\u201d 55.  Article 3 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads, in its relevant part, as follows:\nRight to translation of essential documents\n\u201c1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are, within a reasonable period of time, provided with a written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 2. Essential documents shall include any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment.\n... 5. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in national law, suspected or accused persons have the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for the translation of documents or passages thereof and, when a translation has been provided, the possibility to complain that the quality of the translation is not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.\n... 7. As an exception to the general rules established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6, an oral translation or oral summary of essential documents may be provided instead of a written translation on condition that such oral translation or oral summary does not prejudice the fairness of the proceedings. 9. Translation provided under this Article shall be of a quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their right of defence.\u201d 56.  Article 5 \u00a7 1 of Directive 2010/64/EU deals with the quality of interpretation and translation, providing as follows:\n\u201c1. Member States shall take concrete measures to ensure that the interpretation and translation provided meets the quality required under Article 2(8) and Article 3(9).\u201d 57.  Furthermore, Article 7 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads:\nRecord-keeping\n\u201cMember States shall ensure that when a suspected or accused person has been subject to questioning or hearings by an investigative or judicial authority with the assistance of an interpreter pursuant to Article 2, when an oral translation or oral summary of essential documents has been provided in the presence of such an authority pursuant to Article 3(7), or when a person has waived the right to translation pursuant to Article 3(8), it will be noted that these events have occurred, using the recording procedure in accordance with the law of the Member State concerned.\u201d 58.  On 22 May 2012 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted another directive relating to the measures set out in the Roadmap, namely Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings (\u201cDirective 2012/13/EU\u201d). It entered into force on 21 June 2012. 59.  The following recitals of Directive 2012/13/EU are relevant:\n\u201c(25) Member States should ensure that, when providing information in accordance with this Directive, suspects or accused persons are provided, where necessary, with translations or interpretation into a language that they understand, in accordance with the standards set out in Directive 2010/64/EU.\n...\n(35) Where information is provided in accordance with this Directive, the competent authorities should take note of this in accordance with existing recording procedures under national law and should not be subject to any additional obligation to introduce new mechanisms or to any additional administrative burden.\n(36) Suspects or accused persons or their lawyers should have the right to challenge, in accordance with national law, the possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide information or to disclose certain materials of the case in accordance with this Directive. That right does not entail the obligation for Member States to provide for a specific appeal procedure, a separate mechanism, or a complaint procedure in which such failure or refusal may be challenged.\n...\n(38) Member States should undertake all the necessary action to comply with this Directive. A practical and effective implementation of some of the provisions such as the obligation to provide suspects or accused persons with information about their rights in simple and accessible language could be achieved by different means including non-legislative measures such as appropriate training for the competent authorities or by a Letter of Rights drafted in simple and non-technical language so as to be easily understood by a lay person without any knowledge of criminal procedural law.\u201d 60.  The relevant parts of Articles 3, 4 and 8 of Directive 2012/13/EU provide as follows:\nArticle 3\nRight to information about rights\n\u201c1. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons are provided promptly with information concerning at least the following procedural rights, as they apply under national law, in order to allow for those rights to be exercised effectively:\n(a) the right of access to a lawyer;\n(b) any entitlement to free legal advice and the conditions for obtaining such advice;\n(c) the right to be informed of the accusation, in accordance with Article 6;\n(d) the right to interpretation and translation;\n(e) the right to remain silent. 2. Member States shall ensure that the information provided for under paragraph 1 shall be given orally or in writing, in simple and accessible language, taking into account any particular needs of vulnerable suspects or vulnerable accused persons.\u201d\nArticle 4\nLetter of Rights on arrest\n\u201c1. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons who are arrested or detained are provided promptly with a written Letter of Rights. They shall be given an opportunity to read the Letter of Rights and shall be allowed to keep it in their possession throughout the time that they are deprived of liberty.\n... 5. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons receive the Letter of Rights written in a language that they understand. Where a Letter of Rights is not available in the appropriate language, suspects or accused persons shall be informed of their rights orally in a language that they understand. A Letter of Rights in a language that they understand shall then be given to them without undue delay.\u201d\nArticle 8\nVerification and remedies\n\u201c1. Member States shall ensure that when information is provided to suspects or accused persons in accordance with Articles 3 to 6 this is noted using the recording procedure specified in the law of the Member State concerned. 2. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons or their lawyers have the right to challenge, in accordance with procedures in national law, the possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide information in accordance with this Directive.\u201d 61.  Both of the aforementioned directives were incorporated into the Slovenian legal system by means of an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette, no. 87/2014), which was passed on 21 November 2014 and became applicable as of 20 March 2015.", "references": ["2", "8", "5", "4", "1", "7", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in V\u00e1c. 6.  He was awarded a disability pension on 6 May 1995. Since he had accrued service periods in both Hungary and Austria, his pension was established accordingly, both under the Act no. LXXXI of 1997 on Social Security Pension Benefits (\u201cthe 1997 Pensions Act\u201d) and the Social Security Agreement between Hungary and Austria. On 1 May 2004 (the date of Hungary\u2019s accession to the EU) his monthly pension was 74,361 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 250 euros (EUR)). 7.  On 18 April 2006 he requested a review of his pension rights in accordance with Article 94(5) of Regulation 1408/71/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community (hereinafter \u201cthe Regulation\u201d). The provision stipulated that the rights of a person to whom a pension had been awarded prior to the entry into force of the Regulation could, at the request of the person concerned, be reviewed, taking into account the provisions of the Regulation. With regard to the applicant, the date of \u201centry into force\u201d was Hungary\u2019s EU accession. 8.  On 1 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s monthly pension was reviewed by the Budapest and Pest County Pensions Board (F\u0151v\u00e1rosi \u00e9s Pest Megyei Nyugd\u00edjbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g), acting as a first-instance pension authority. The applicant\u2019s pension was increased to HUF 134,566 (approximately EUR 449) per month with effect from 1 May 2004. 9.  On 7 September 2006 the applicant appealed against that decision, because the pension authority had calculated an overlap period (during which he had worked in Austria but had also had to pay social security contributions in Hungary) as a mere Hungarian service period with a very low average salary. 10.  Despite the appeal, the decision was implemented with immediate effect and the applicant received HUF 1,996,104 (approximately EUR 6,650) in arrears. 11.  On 16 January 2007 the Central Hungary Regional Pensions Board (K\u00f6z\u00e9p-Magyarorsz\u00e1gi Region\u00e1lis Nyugd\u00edjbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g), acting as a second-instance pension authority, increased the applicant\u2019s monthly pension to HUF 135,450 (approximately EUR 452) with effect from 1 May 2004. For the period 1 May 2004 to 28 February 2007 he received a total of HUF 42,065 (approximately EUR 140) in arrears and interest. 12.  The applicant challenged the final administrative decision in court and requested that a question concerning the correct interpretation of the Regulation be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (\u201cCJEU\u201d) for a preliminary ruling. 13.  On 12 October 2007 the Budapest Labour Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action and upheld the pension authority\u2019s decision. 14.  The applicant lodged a petition with the Supreme Court for review of the Budapest Labour Court\u2019s judgment. On 6 March 2009, in the review proceedings, he submitted written pleadings to the Supreme Court.\nThe pleadings were not submitted to the Court in the present proceedings and the parties\u2019 submissions differed as to the content of the document containing them. According to the Government, the applicant withdrew his request for a preliminary ruling on that date, whereas the applicant alleged that he had only submitted that the reference to the CJEU was not necessarily inevitable, provided that his interpretation of EU case-law was followed. However, in his view, this did not amount to a withdrawal of the request for a reference for a preliminary ruling. 15.  On 3 June 2009 the Supreme Court reversed the Budapest Labour Court\u2019s judgment and ordered new proceedings, insisting that the EU law principle concerning the prevention of overlapping of benefits be taken into account.\nIn response to the applicant\u2019s request for a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Supreme Court held that the procedure appeared to be unnecessary \u201cbecause the conditions had not been fulfilled\u201d. 16.  In the case remitted to it, the Labour Court quashed the decision of the pension authority and instructed it to recalculate the applicant\u2019s pension in accordance with EU rules (without counting the overlap period as a mere Hungarian service period). The judgment became final on 19 March 2010. 17.  On 7 July 2010 the Central Hungary Regional Pensions Board adopted a new decision in accordance with the instructions of the Budapest Labour Court and increased the applicant\u2019s monthly pension to HUF 139,545 (approximately EUR 465) with effect from 1 May 2004. The decision ordered the payment, in arrears, of the difference between the pension due and the amount already paid.\nThe 1997 Pensions Act provides that if a pension authority has made a mistake to the detriment of an applicant, the difference is to be paid for only the last five years preceding the date the mistake was discovered (the duration of the statutory limitation period). Payment of the difference was therefore ordered for the period after 19 March 2005 only (namely from the date exactly five years before the date on which the Labour Court\u2019s judgment became final, see paragraph 16 above). The amount paid to the applicant in arrears and interest was HUF 581,515 (approximately EUR 1,940). 18.  On 23 July 2010 the applicant appealed against the decision, claiming the arrears for the whole period following Hungary\u2019s EU accession. 19.  On 11 November 2010 the Pension Appeals Board (Nyugd\u00edjbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si Jogorvoslati Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g) amended the decision of 7 July 2010 (see paragraph 17 above), reduced the applicant\u2019s monthly pension to HUF 138,170 (approximately EUR 460) with effect from 1 May 2004, but limited payment to the period following 19 March 2005. 20.  The Appeals Department of the National Pensions Administration (Orsz\u00e1gos Nyugd\u00edjbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si F\u0151igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g Jogorvoslati F\u0151oszt\u00e1ly) conducted a repeated second-instance review and, in a decision dated 5 November 2011, amended the decision of 11 November 2010 (see paragraph 19 above). It increased the applicant\u2019s monthly pension to HUF 139,605 (approximately EUR 465) with effect from 1 May 2004, retaining however the limitation of payment as regards the period preceding 19 March 2005. 21.  The applicant requested a court review of the pension authority\u2019s decision of 7 July 2010, as amended by the decisions of 11 November 2010 and 5 November 2011. He relied on Article 94(6) of the Regulation. 22.  On 29 February 2012 the Budapest Labour Court upheld the pension authority\u2019s decisions (see paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 above). 23.  On 22 March 2012 the applicant submitted a petition for review of the Budapest Labour Court\u2019s judgment. He argued that domestic law was to be interpreted and applied in conformity with EU law, of which the relevant provision, Article 94(6) of the Regulation, was directly applicable and had direct effect in the case. He contended, in essence, that he had a right, as acknowledged in the decisions of the pension authority, to an adjusted pension for the whole period following 1 May 2004. The national rule restricting the very payment of that pension to a shorter period of time constituted a \u201climitation of rights\u201d prohibited by the Regulation. He was of the opinion that the Budapest Labour Court\u2019s judgment, in giving precedence to the rule of national law over the relevant provision of the Regulation, had violated the principles of primacy and effectiveness of EU law.\nIn his petition for review, the applicant did not request that the case be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling; instead, he requested what he considered to be a correct application of Article 94(6) of the Regulation. Nevertheless, he argued that the Budapest Labour Court\u2019s judgment had violated Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (\u201cEC Treaty\u201d, now Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (\u201cTFEU\u201d)), without providing a detailed explanation on this point. 24.  On 26 June 2013 the K\u00faria upheld the judgment of the Budapest Labour Court.\nBoth the Budapest Labour Court and the K\u00faria reasoned that the Regulation concerned only the acquisition of rights but not the actual payment of allowances. In the courts\u2019 view, the applicant had indeed acquired a right to an amended pension from 1 May 2004 and his rights in this regard were not subject to any forfeiture or limitation; it was only the actual payment of the increased amount which had been limited. In the courts\u2019 opinion, therefore, the relevant provisions of the 1997 Pensions Act and those of the Regulation did not conflict.\nAs regards the applicant\u2019s argument concerning the alleged violation of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the K\u00faria\u2019s judgment did not contain any reasoning. 25.  In parallel to the litigation described above, on 2 February 2008 the applicant lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the rules of the 1997 Pensions Act were in conflict with EU law. On 4 October 2010 the court rejected the petition, stating that it lacked competence to examine an alleged conflict between Hungarian and EU law (see decision no. 126/E/2008 of the Constitutional Court). 26.  The relevant part of Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary provides:\n\u201c(1)  Everyone shall have the right to have any charge against him or her, or his or her rights and obligations in any litigation, adjudicated within a reasonable time in a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial court established by an Act.\n...\u201d 27.  Section 80(1) of the 1997 Pensions Act provides as follows:\n\u201cIf, following the examination of a pension request, it turns out that the pension authority violated the applicable law and ... the pension established or disbursed was therefore unduly low, then the arrears and ... interest shall be paid for the five-year period preceding the establishment of the violation.\u201d 28.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. III of 1952), as in force at the material time, provided as follows:\nArticle 155/A\n\u201c(1)  The court may request the [CJEU] for a preliminary ruling in accordance with the rules laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community.\n(2)  The court shall make a reference for a preliminary ruling by order (v\u00e9gz\u00e9s) and shall [simultaneously] stay the proceedings. In the order, the court shall specify the question for which a preliminary ruling is requested and describe the circumstances of the case and the relevant domestic law inasmuch as it is necessary for answering the question referred to the [CJEU]. The order shall be notified to the [CJEU] and, for information, to the Minister in charge of justice at the same time.\n(3)  No appeal lies against a court decision making a reference for a preliminary ruling or dismissing a request for a reference for a preliminary ruling.\u201d\nArticle 272\n\u201c(2)  The petition for review shall specify the decision that is the subject thereof and the substance of the decision requested; furthermore, it shall set out the alleged infringement, specify the legal provision that has been breached and explain the reasons why the impugned decision requires modification.\u201d\nArticle 275\n\u201c(2)  The K\u00faria may review a final decision only within the framework of the petition for review ... unless it decides to dismiss the action of its own motion, or if the court that rendered the decision had not been properly formed, or if a judge who should have been disqualified by law took part in rendering the decision.\u201d 29.  In leading case no. BH 2015.7.203 the K\u00faria held as follows:\n\u201cA petition for review does not meet the requirements [of the Code of Civil Procedure] if, for the purposes of the specification of the infringement, it contains only a general reference to [certain] Chapters ... of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for review cannot be examined on the merits if the party specifies the infringed legal provision but does not provide any reasoning in that connection.\u201d 30.  In leading case no. BH 2016.12.342 the K\u00faria held, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cA petition for review may only be examined on the merits if[, in addition to a pure reference to the allegedly violated legal provision,] the petitioning party also describes the substance of the infringement, explains his or her legal opinion thereon and sets out the reasons supporting his or her argument.\u201d 31.  In leading case no. BH 1995.2.99 the K\u00faria held, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cThe petition for review must specify the alleged infringement concretely; it is not sufficient to refer to previous submissions.\n...\n[The petitioning party] did not set out the reasons on which he relied in challenging the final judgment; he only referred to the content of his appeal [against the first-instance judgment]. However, the petition for review is an independent, extraordinary remedy[. Given] its special nature, references to previous submissions are not accepted.\u201d 32.  Section 46(1) of the Constitutional Court Act (Act no. CLI of 2011) provides as follows:\n\u201cIf the Constitutional Court, in proceedings conducted by it in the exercise of its competences, declares an omission on the part of the legislature that results in a violation of the Fundamental Law, it shall call upon the organ responsible for the omission to take action and set a time-limit for that.\u201d 33.  The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision no. 7/2013 (III.1) AB of 1 March 2013 read as follows:\n\u201c[26]  The Fundamental Law of Hungary, having entered into force in January 2012, imposes on the Constitutional Court the ... task of reviewing the conformity of judicial decisions with the Fundamental Law. In accordance with Article 24 (2) (d) of the Fundamental Law and section 27 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring judicial decisions\u2019 conformity with the Fundamental Law. In determining whether a judicial decision is or is not in conformity with the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court actually acts in order to redress a violation of a right enshrined under the Fundamental Law, hence it acts in protection of the Fundamental Law ...\n...\n[30]  In its decision no. 61/2011 (VII.13) AB the Constitutional Court took the principled stance that \u201cin the case of certain fundamental rights, the Constitution specifies the substance of a fundamental right in the same way as international instruments (for example the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights) do. In such cases, the level of protection to be afforded by the Constitutional Court to the fundamental right should in no way be lower than the level of international protection afforded to the given right (typically by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg)\u201d ... Based on this consideration, the Constitutional Court has reviewed the case-law of the [European] Court [of Human Rights] on the right to a reasoned court decision, which it also finds applicable in interpreting the right enshrined in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law.\n...\n[33]  3. The right to a reasoned court decision ... arises in the context of the constitutional requirement of a fair trial, specified in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law. ... The Constitutional Court is to examine whether the procedural laws prescribing the duty of giving reasons were or were not applied in conformity with the requirements set forth in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law ...\n[34]  ...The constitutional requirement of giving reasons, being examined by the Constitutional Court, is inherent in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law and determines the limits of the courts\u2019 margin of appreciation, notably by requiring courts to give reasons for their decisions, in conformity with the procedural laws. The constitutional violation of the duty to give reasons means the application of this procedural rule is not in conformity with the Fundamental Law ... The constitutional requirement of a fair trial demands, as a minimum, that the courts should, with due care, examine the parties\u2019 observations made on the relevant parts of the case and should include an assessment of those observations in their decisions ...\n...\n[40]  In the light of the above considerations, the Constitutional Court finds, on the merits, that the high court ... examined the questions ... concerning the relevant circumstances of the case and gave appropriate reasons as regards its conclusions.\n[41]  The Constitutional Court therefore dismisses this part of the constitutional complaint.\u201d 34.  In a complaint adjudicated by the Constitutional Court on 19 May 2014 (decision no. 3165/2014 (V. 23) AB), the complainant argued that the K\u00faria had failed to comply with its obligation to refer a question on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling and to provide adequate reasons for its decision not to do so (see paragraph 5 of the decision).\nThe Constitutional Court held that the competence to decide whether a reference for a preliminary ruling was necessary in the circumstances was vested solely in the judge hearing the particular case and the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to overrule such decisions. It rejected the complaint as inadmissible and did not address the issue of adequate reasoning. 35.  On 14 July 2015 (decision no. 26/2015 (VII. 21) AB) the Constitutional Court examined a complaint regarding a final judgment of the Budapest High Court concerning its failure to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling and to provide reasons for its decision not to do so.\nFollowing an analysis of the CJEU\u2019s relevant case-law, the Constitutional Court found that, in the case at issue, the question proposed by the claimant related to the qualification and interpretation of domestic law (which, in the claimant\u2019s view, contradicted EU law), rather than to the interpretation of the applicable EU law provision itself. In these circumstances, the Constitutional Court shared the Budapest High Court\u2019s opinion that there had been no need for a reference for a preliminary ruling.\nIt observed that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure as in force at the relevant time, the courts were not required to give reasons for not making a reference to the CJEU. It held that such a situation \u2013 that is to say, if the courts did not adopt a formal decision complete with reasons when they refused to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling \u2013 violated parties\u2019 rights to a fair trial. Accordingly, it declared that there had been an omission on the part of the legislature resulting in a violation of the Fundamental Law (see paragraph 32 above), and invited Parliament to amend the relevant legislation by 31 December 2015.\nHowever, the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision did not find the Budapest High Court\u2019s particular judgment unconstitutional on account of the court\u2019s failure to provide reasons for the non-referral \u2013 indeed, it did not contain any arguments related to the lack of reasons in that particular judgment. 36.  In accordance with the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision no. 26/2015, Article 155/A (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 28 above) was amended as of 4 December 2015 with the following additional wording:\n\u201cIf the court dismisses a request for a reference for a preliminary ruling, it shall formulate its decision in the form of an order (v\u00e9gz\u00e9s). The court is obliged to give reasons for that decision, by the latest in its decision on the merits that concludes the proceedings.\u201d 37.  In decision no. 3082/2016 (IV. 18) AB adopted on 12 April 2016 the Constitutional Court noted obiter dictum, in connection with a particular case, that the court hearing the case at issue had observed its obligation to provide reasons for not making a reference to the CJEU. 38.  The relevant part of Article 267 of the TFEU[1] provides:\n\u201cThe [CJEU] shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:\n(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;\n(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union;\nWhere such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.\nWhere any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. ...\u201d 39.  In applying that provision, the CJEU has held that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of interpretation of EU law (rather than a question relating to the validity of a Community act, see the judgment in Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, C-461/03, judgment of 6 December 2005, ECR I-10513, \u00a7 19) is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the CJEU, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the CJEU (acte \u00e9clair\u00e9) or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair). The CJEU has also held that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the EU (see Srl Cilfit and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 283/81, judgment of 6 October 1982, ECR 3415, \u00a7 21, and X v. Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v. Staatssecretaris van Financi\u00ebn, joined cases C-72/14 and C\u2011197/14, judgment of 9 September 2015, \u00a7 55). With that proviso, the CJEU also held that it was for the national courts against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy under national law, to take responsibility upon themselves independently for determining whether the case before them involves an acte clair (see X and van Dijk, cited above, \u00a7 59). 40.  As regards the specific characteristics of EU law, the CJEU emphasised, among other aspects, that EU law used terminology which was unique to it and that the legal concepts did not necessarily have the same meaning in EU law as in the law of the various member States. It also stressed that every provision of EU law must be placed into context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, having regard to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question was to be applied (see Cilfit, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 19 and 20). 41.  The CJEU also defined the meaning of the expression \u201cwhere any such question is raised\u201d contained in the third paragraph of Article 267 of the TFEU (see Cilfit, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 8-9). It later summarised its settled case-law on this point as follows (see Belgische Petroleum Unie VZW and Others v. Belgische Staat, C-26/11, judgment of 31 January 2013, \u00a7\u00a7 23\u201124):\n\u201c23.  ... [I]t should be borne in mind that the fact that the parties to the main action did not raise a point of European Union law before the referring court does not preclude the latter from bringing the matter before the [CJEU]. In providing that a request for a preliminary ruling may be submitted to the [CJEU] where \u2018a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member state\u2019, the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU are not intended to restrict this procedure exclusively to cases where one or other of the parties to the main action has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of European Union law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the court or tribunal itself, which considers that a decision thereon by the [CJEU] is \u2018necessary to enable it to give judgment\u2019 ... 24.  Moreover, according to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.\u201d\nThe CJEU further held, in the case of Lucio Cesare Aquino v. Belgische Staat (C-3/16, judgment of 15 March 2017, \u00a7 43), that:\n\u201c[i]t follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as all other national courts as to whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment.\u201d 42.  Article 94(6) of the Regulation 1408/71/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community, as in force until 1 May 2010, provided as follows:\n\u201cIf an application referred to in paragraph 4 or 5 [in particular, an application for the review of a pension awarded prior to the entry into force of this Regulation] is submitted within two years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the rights acquired under this Regulation shall have effect from that date, and the provisions of the legislation of any Member State concerning the forfeiture or limitation of rights may not be invoked against the persons concerned.\u201d\nIt appears that the interpretation of that provision has so far not been the subject of a preliminary ruling of the CJEU.[2]", "references": ["4", "2", "7", "1", "8", "9", "0", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and is detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 7.  On 25 June 2004 the police searched the applicant\u2019s residence and found a quantity of cannabis plants, a canopy, foil and two electric lamps on the roof. 8.  The police informed the applicant that he was being charged by the Attorney General, before the Criminal Court, with (i) cultivation and (ii) aggravated possession (not for his exclusive use) of cannabis. 9.  A court-appointed expert found that the weight of the dried cannabis leaves found amounted to 3,416.20 grams, from which 6,832 cannabis \u2018reefers\u2019 could be made or 11,382 \u2018sticks of cannabis\u2019. 10.  During the trial by jury the applicant, who suffered from chronic depression and severe back pain, admitted the first charge. 11.  By a judgment of 5 March 2008 the applicant was found guilty of both charges (the verdict was unanimous in relation to the first charge, and seven votes to two in relation to the second charge) and was sentenced to a term of twelve years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The fine was to be converted into a further eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment if it remained unpaid. In determining the punishment, the Criminal Court noted that, according to the law, if, having considered the age of an accused, his previous conduct, the quantity and quality of the drug in question, as well as all other circumstances, or if the jury\u2019s verdict was not unanimous, it considered that the punishment of life imprisonment would not be adequate, it could sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment of between four and thirty years and a fine of between approximately EUR 3,330 and EUR 116,500. In the present case, it considered the conduct of the applicant, the fact that there was agreement that the second charge would be absorbed by the first charge for the purposes of punishment, and the punishments handed down in similar cases. 12.  By a judgment of 12 March 2009 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the first-instance judgment. 13.  On 9 November 2010, the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Article 6 \u00a7 1 about, inter alia, the discretion of the Attorney General as public prosecutor to decide in which court to try an accused. 14.  On 10 October 2012 the case was adjourned for judgment. On 11 February 2013 (following the judgment of the Court in Camilleri v. Malta, no. 42931/10, 22 January 2013) the applicant asked to add a complaint under Article 7 in connection with the discretion of the Attorney General. 15.  By a decree of 12 February 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the request to suspend the determination of the case and to allow the applicant to add a complaint under Article 7 of the Convention, given that the stage of collection of evidence and pleadings (dibattiment) had come to an end. 16.  By a judgment of 21 March 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. Having rejected all other complaints by the applicant, it considered that it was not necessary to determine the complaint concerning the discretion of the Attorney General (under Article 6). 17.  By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and confirmed the first\u2011instance judgment. As to the complaint about the Attorney General\u2019s discretion, the Constitutional Court considered that the Court had found a violation of Article 7 in that connection (giving no remedy), but had not determined the matter under Article 6. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, such a finding which related to the lack of foreseeability of the law could not cast doubt on the fairness of the proceedings in general which would paralyse the entire judicial system. Furthermore, local case\u2011law had previously established that such a discretion did not breach an applicant\u2019s fair trial rights. The Constitutional Court also noted that there was no reason to alter the first-instance court\u2019s discretion regarding not allowing the addition of the complaint under Article 7, at a time when the collection of evidence had closed.", "references": ["2", "9", "1", "3", "4", "6", "7", "5", "8", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Nova Pazova. 6.  From 1991 until 2001 the applicant lived with M.K. The couple had two children, a daughter, J.G., born on 20 January 1992 and a son, M.G., born on 28 July 1994. 7.  M.G. has a moderate intellectual disability. 8.  By a decision of the Stara Pazova Social Care Centre (\u201cthe Social Care Centre\u201d) of 9 January 2001, custody of the children was given to M.K. By the same decision the applicant was given contact with the children every other weekend from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday and during the first half of the summer and winter school holidays. The decision provided that the applicant had to collect and return the children outside M.K.\u2019s family home. 9.  On 30 June 2005 the Social Care Centre suspended the enforcement of the decision of 9 January 2001 at the applicant\u2019s request, as he intended to assert his parental rights in judicial proceedings. 10.  On 11 August 2005 the applicant applied to the Stara Pazova Municipal Court for sole custody of the children. 11.  On 27 December 2005 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court issued an interim contact order giving the applicant contact with the children every other weekend from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday and during the first half of the summer and winter school holidays. The order was to remain in force until the final resolution of the custody proceedings. 12.  On 2 February 2006 the interim contact order was upheld by the Sremska Mitrovica District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 13.  On 11 September 2008 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court decided that the applicant\u2019s civil claim had to be considered withdrawn because neither he nor M.K. had given valid reasons for their failure to attend the main hearing that day. On 11 December 2008 the District Court upheld that decision. 14.  On 17 October 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court Stara Pazova Judicial Unit (the Stara Pazova Municipal Court having ceased to exist following the 2010 judicial reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court\u201d) revoked the interim contact order of 27 December 2005 given that the custody proceedings had terminated on 11 December 2008. The applicant was ordered to pay 30,625 dinars (approximately 257 euros (EUR)) to M.K. in legal costs together with statutory interest. That decision became final on 10 November 2011. 15.  On 18 January 2006, at the applicant\u2019s request, the Stara Pazova Municipal Court ordered enforcement of the interim contact order (see paragraph 11 above) by a court bailiff. The enforcement order was upheld by the District Court on 17 March 2006. 16.  On 20 January 2006 a first attempt to enforce the contact order was made. A bailiff went to M.K.\u2019s home, but J.G. refused to see the applicant. M.G. wanted to see him, but M.K. refused to let him go without his sister. 17.  J.G. and M.G. stayed with the applicant for the weekend of 7 to 9 April 2006. 18.  In another attempt to enforce the contact order on 21 April 2006, the bailiff and the applicant went to M.K.\u2019s home. The children\u2019s maternal grandmother Z.K.V. told them that M.K. and the children were away. In later criminal proceedings against M.K. (see paragraph 45 below), it was established that the applicant had not been meant to have contact that weekend as it had been the third weekend in the month. 19.  On 5 May 2006 another attempt was made to enforce the interim order, but M.K. told the bailiff that the children did not want to see the applicant. 20.  On 19 May 2006, in another attempt to enforce the contact order, M.K. informed the bailiff that the children were on a school trip. The applicant, who was also present, requested the assistance of the police at the next enforcement attempt. 21.  On 2, 16 and 23 June, 14 July and 22 September 2006 other attempts to enforce the contact order were made. At every attempt J.G. refused to see the applicant and M.K. did not want to let M.G. go alone. 22.  On 5 July 2006 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court fined M.K. 5,000 dinars for non-compliance with the enforcement order of 18 January 2006 (see paragraph 15 above). 23.  On 27 October 2006 J.G. again refused to see the applicant, despite M.K.\u2019s insistence that she should go. As before, M.K. refused to let M.G. go without his sister. 24.  On 10 November 2006 the enforcement was attempted in the presence of a police officer, the bailiff and the applicant. J.G. refused to see the applicant and M.K. refused to let M.G. go alone. 25.  On 24 November, 8 and 22 December 2006 J.G. again refused to see the applicant, and M.K. refused to let M.G. go alone. Furthermore, on the latter date M.K. threatened to press criminal charges against the bailiff and the applicant. 26.  On 4 April 2007 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court heard J.G. and M.G. in the presence of a child psychologist from the Social Care Centre. The children stated that they did not want to have contact with their father because they were afraid of him. J.G. said that the applicant had yelled at her before and that once, when they had been in a coffee bar together, he had snatched her mobile phone from her hand. Another time, when they had been playing in the swimming pool in their mother\u2019s garden, the applicant had grabbed M.G. and taken him to a coffee bar, threatening not to return him. 27.  On 11 September 2008 the custody proceedings were terminated because the applicant and M.K. failed to attend the main hearing without valid reasons (see paragraph 13 above). 28.  On 3 February 2009 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court decided to obtain an opinion and recommendation from the Social Care Centre concerning the continuation of the enforcement proceedings and the possible harm it might have on the children\u2019s development. 29.  In its opinion of 30 March 2009 the Social Care Centre reported that the relationship difficulties between the applicant and M.K. had persisted after their separation and had transformed into arguments over parental rights. Moreover, J.G. had developed strong resistance to her father. She was ashamed and afraid of him because of his behaviour during the time the family had lived together. In addition, M.G. did not want to see the applicant without his sister. The Social Care Centre further reported that M.K. was unable to give support to her children in order to overcome the difficulties in maintaining contact with their father. She claimed that she had not forbidden the children from having contact with him, but was unable to influence her daughter\u2019s opinion. However, M.K. had never expressed the desire to attend counselling or any other specialist therapy, even though it had been suggested several times. 30.  In the past three years the applicant had not once seen J.G., but submitted that he had occasionally met with M.G. at his school during the recess. In such circumstances he had been unable to exercise his parental rights and had had no other way of maintaining contact with his children. The absence of contact had made it impossible for him to create a good interaction with his children. The opinion concluded that the continuation of the enforcement proceedings would put additional pressure on the children and create even greater resistance, particularly in J.G. It suggested the use of other methods provided for by law to create the conditions to enable the father to exercise his parental rights. 31.  On 14 August 2009 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court scheduled a meeting between the applicant and the children for 4 September 2009 at M.K.\u2019s home in the presence of a bailiff and social workers. 32.  On 4 September 2009, in the presence of a psychologist and a social worker, a bailiff and the applicant, J.G. and M.G., both visibly distressed, stated that they did not want to see the applicant. 33.  On 25 February 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court (see paragraph 14 above) held a hearing at which M.K., J.G., M.G. and the applicant were heard separately. A psychologist and a social worker from the Social Care Centre were also present. The court noted that shortly before the hearing an ambulance had had to be requested for M.G., who had been displaying signs of an anxiety attack. At the hearing J.G. and M.G. stated that they did not want to have contact with their father and that he was violent towards them. J.G. said, in particular, that the relationship with her father and his attempts at maintaining contact had affected her psychologically (she was afraid to go outside the home alone at night). She said further that the applicant exerted a psychological pressure on M.G. After meeting his father M.G.\u2019s behaviour always changed and he would say offensive things to his mother and grandmother. M.K. stated that she had not obstructed the enforcement of the contact order \u2013 the children had not wanted to see the applicant. The social worker stated that at the court\u2019s request the Social Care Centre would submit a proposal on the possibility of maintaining contact between the applicant and M.G., who was still a minor. The applicant insisted on continuation of the enforcement. 34.  On 1 March 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court ordered the Social Care Centre to hear the applicant, M.K. and M.G. separately concerning the possibility of maintaining contact between the applicant and M.G. and to prepare an opinion on M.G.\u2019s physical and mental health and development. In particular, the court referred to M.G.\u2019s statements given at the hearing of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 33 above) and the fact that he had suffered an anxiety attack before that hearing. While the applicant, as a parent, had the right to maintain contact with his child, M.G.\u2019s wishes, needs and best interests had to be taken into account. In a situation where M.G. refused to see his father, the court considered that it was in everyone\u2019s interests to realise the contact gradually with the assistance of the Social Care Centre until the conditions for uninterrupted enforcement of the contact order were created. 35.  On 26 May 2011 the Social Care Centre submitted its opinion to the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court. It stated that M.G. had a moderate intellectual disability and needed help with dressing, personal hygiene and feeding himself. He was very close to his mother and sister, and felt loved and accepted by them. M.K. stated that she was not preventing M.G. from seeing his father, but feared for his health. She believed that M.G. was afraid of his father because of two previous incidents. According to M.K., on one occasion the applicant had grabbed M.G. from their garden; another time he had allegedly forced open M.G.\u2019s mouth to check his teeth. The opinion stressed, however, that according to the information submitted by M.G.\u2019s school, he had occasionally met his father at school. The meetings had always been warm and affectionate and M.G. had never displayed any signs of fear or anxiety. According to the opinion, the applicant was very keen to maintain contact with his children and cooperate with the Social Care Centre. It was suggested that a meeting be organised between M.G. and the applicant at the Social Care Centre in the presence of the social workers. 36.  On an unspecified date thereafter, the applicant, M.K. and the social workers agreed that the meetings between the applicant and M.G. would be held every Monday at 11 a.m. M.K. was to take M.G. to the Social Care Centre. The first meeting was scheduled for 2 June 2011. 37.  On 31 May 2011 the children\u2019s maternal grandmother Z.K.V. informed the Social Care Centre that M.G. was in Greece with his mother. 38.  A further meeting was scheduled for 13 June 2011. 39.  On 13 June 2011 the applicant met with M.G. at the Social Care Centre in the presence of the social workers. The meeting lasted one hour and passed pleasantly. M.G. talked and laughed with his father. Later that day M.K. informed the Social Care Centre that M.G. had been upset after the meeting so she had had to call an ambulance. This was confirmed by a doctor on duty at the time. 40.  The next meeting, scheduled for 20 June 2011, was cancelled because M.K. informed the Social Care Centre that she was unwell and had no one to take M.G. to the meeting. Several minutes later Z.K.V. called the Social Care Centre and was verbally aggressive towards a person dealing with the case. After being informed that the meeting had been cancelled, Z.K.V. and J.G. took M.G. to the centre and were verbally aggressive towards the social workers present. M.G. was frightened and confused. 41.  The next meeting was scheduled for 27 June 2011. There is no information in the case file as to whether or not it was held. 42.  On 28 June 2011 the Social Care Centre created a meeting schedule for July and August 2011. The applicant was to see M.G. every Monday between 11 a.m. and 12 noon at the Social Care Centre. It would appear that those meetings were held without any problems. 43.  On 15 November 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court terminated the enforcement proceedings initiated on 18 January 2006 (see paragraph 15 above). The applicant was ordered to pay 28,125 dinars (approximately EUR 236) to M.K. in legal costs. 44.  On 24 December 2015 the Stara Pazova Basic Court (which had been re-established and renamed in the 2014 judicial reform; see paragraph 14 above), at M.K.\u2019s request, ordered enforcement of the decision of 15 November 2011. In addition to the legal costs ordered by that decision, the applicant was ordered to pay enforcement costs of 10,225 dinars (approximately EUR 85), to be deducted from his disability pension. On 5 April 2016 the appeals chamber of the Stara Pazova Basic Court upheld the decision of 24 December 2015. 45.  On 12 October 2007 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court found M.K. guilty of non-compliance with the interim contact order and ordered her to pay sixty day-fines of 500 dinars (approximately EUR 6.40) each. The court held that M.K. had obstructed the enforcement of the interim contact order of 27 December 2005 by preventing M.G. from seeing his father without J.G. She had thus prevented the applicant from having contact with his son, except on one occasion when he had not had the right to visit him (see paragraph 18 above). The court considered that M.K. had not prevented J.G. from seeing the applicant and that J.G.\u2019s resistance was due to her personal conflict with him. The applicant was instructed to submit his claim for damages in civil proceedings. 46.  On 29 July 2008 the Sremska Mitrovica District Court upheld the judgment of 12 October 2007 and it became final. 47.  On 28 March 2013 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court acquitted M.K. and Z.K.V. of charges of non-compliance with the interim contact order concerning the incident of 20 June 2011 (see paragraph 40 above).", "references": ["0", "6", "7", "2", "5", "8", "9", "3", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are:\n(1) Mr Ibragim Alikhanov, who was born in 1930,\n(2) Ms Muslimat Alikhanova, who was born in 1936 and\n(3) Ms Tamara Alikhanova, who was born in 1976.\nThe first and second applicants live in the village of Ruguzh and the third applicant in the village of Gurik, Republic of Dagestan, a region neighbouring the Chechen Republic. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Amirkhan Alikhanov, who was born in 1974; the third applicant is his wife. 6.  The circumstances of the case can be summarised as follows. 7.  On 23 December 2004 Mr Alikhanov was driving on an errand on the road between Khasavyurt and Makhachkala, Dagestan. During the ride he twice called his brother, Mr A. When he called the second time, he said that he was approaching the stationary traffic police checkpoint near Makhachkala and that he would soon arrive at his brother\u2019s place. However, he never arrived. 8.  Early on the following day, 24 December 2004, Mr A. went to the \u201cMars-20\u201d traffic checkpoint on the northern outskirts of Makhachkala to find out whether the traffic police officers had information about either his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, or his dark-red VAZ 2108 car with registration number B 235 CC 05 \u0420\u0423\u0421. The police officers who had been on duty on the night of 23 December 2004 told him that during the evening of 23 December 2004 several men in police uniforms and balaclavas had arrived at the checkpoint in three VAZ cars (the 2107, 21099 and 2121 models). The men, who had introduced themselves as officers of the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit (\u0423\u0411\u041e\u041f \u2013 \u201cthe Organised Crime Unit\u201d) had apparently been waiting for someone to go through the checkpoint. The staff of the checkpoint did not note their cars\u2019 registration numbers. As Amirkhan Alikhanov had been passing through the checkpoint, the officers from the Organised Crime Unit had stopped him and asked to open his car boot. Then they had grabbed him and forced into one of their vehicles. One of the officers had got in Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s car and they had all driven off with him and his car to Makhachkala, the capital city of Dagestan.\n(b)  Subsequent developments 9.  At 3.21 p.m. on 26 December 2004 Mr A. received a phone call from an unidentified person who said that if he wanted to see his brother alive he should bring 25,000 United States dollars (USD) at 10 p.m. on 28 December 2004 to Khasavyurt bus station. 10.  At 12.59 p.m. on 28 December 2004 the same person called Mr A. and told him that he should now add a zero to the amount \u2013 meaning that Mr A. would have to pay USD 250,000. Both phone calls were made from the same telephone number, which the applicants noted down. On the following day they informed the law-enforcement authorities about the phone calls (see paragraphs 18-20 below). 11.  In April 2005 the first applicant and Mr A. received information from an unspecified source about six bodies found in the forest near the village of Zamay-Yurt, in the Chechen Republic, and immediately went there. According to the locals and certain police officers from Zamay-Yurt, the bodies had been buried in the village cemetery in accordance with Muslim traditions. In a shed at the cemetery, the applicants found Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s clothes, which were covered in blood and pierced with bullet holes. Mr A. collected them and took them to the authorities for DNA testing (see paragraphs 46, 49-50 and 53-54 below). 12.  According to the applicants, residents of Zamay-Yurt told them that on 25 January 2005 the federal forces had staged a mock fight in the forest: they had shot at dead bodies that they had brought with them. The locals, who had subsequently buried the bodies at the cemetery, said that the bodies had had traces of torture: cigarette and soldering iron burns, pulled out nails, cut off or shot off fingers and noses, kneecaps shot through, and ears. From the state of the corpses, it was evident that all of the six persons had been starved. Furthermore, each body had had a broken right collarbone and traces of a single, execution-style shot to the head. 13.  An article about the discovery of the bodies was published in the Novoye Delo newspaper on 29 April 2005. 14.  On 11 January 2006 the Dagestan Civil Registry issued a death certificate in respect of Amirkhan Alikhanov, stating that he had died on 23 December 2004 in Zamay-Yurt. 15.  The Government submitted that on 23 December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been abducted from the traffic police checkpoint by unidentified persons, as described by the applicants. However, contrary to the applicants\u2019 submissions, his body had never been found. The conclusions of the forensic expert examination referred to by the applicants concerning the identity of the body found next to Zamay-Yurt had been indecisive, as there had not been enough DNA material on the clothing found at the cemetery. The Government did not submit any information or theories concerning the possible whereabouts of Amirkhan Alikhanov after the abduction. At the same time, they stated that the domestic authorities had looked into the possibility of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s involvement with illegal armed groups in the Chechen Republic. 16.  In their submission on the admissibility and merits of the application, the Government confirmed that a report on the discovery of six bodies next to Zamay-Yurt had been broadcast on a federal television channel. The report had shown bodies of bearded men in camouflage uniforms and military boots, with firearms and ammunition next to them. It had been impossible to identify the corpses by their faces owing to bullet wounds to their heads. The broadcast had demonstrated the willingness of the local authorities not to cover up the incident in Zamay-Yurt and had proved that State agents could not have been involved in the alleged abduction. 17.  In reply to the Court\u2019s request for a copy of the investigation file in respect of criminal case no. 55826, which had been opened into the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov, the Government furnished its contents, which ran to 266 pages. Some of the documents were either missing or partially illegible; most of the documents bore double numbering (that is to say each page bore its original number and also a number ascribed to it when it had been added to the case file). The information contained in the documents submitted can be summarised as follows. 18.  On 29 December 2004 the investigators from the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Makhachkala (\u201cthe investigators\u201d) questioned Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s brother, Mr A., who stated that on 23 December 2004 his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, had been abducted at the \u201cMars-20\u201d traffic police checkpoint \u201cby servicemen from the Organised Crime Unit\u201d. B.P., a police officer known by the nickname \u201cStariy\u201d, who had been on duty at the checkpoint at the time, had related the incident\u2019s details to him. On 26 December 2004 he had received a phone call during which the caller suggested to him that he pay USD 25,000 in exchange for his brother. Then on 28 December 2004 the same person had called him again from the telephone number 8-906-447-6785 and had told him that the amount of the demanded ransom had gone up by ten times because Mr A. had complained to the police about the abduction. 19.  On 14 January 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the statement given on 29 December 2004. In addition, he stated that Mr B.P., who had been on duty at the traffic police checkpoint, had told him that the abductors had introduced themselves as officers from the Organised Crime Unit and that two traffic police officers from Makhachkala had been with them. The abductors from the Organised Crime Unit had taken Amirkhan Alikhanov away, while one of the traffic police officers had taken his car. After that, he and his relatives had searched for Amirkhan Alikhanov at various police stations and remand prisons, but to no avail. On 26 December 2004, he had received a phone call from the number 8-906-447-6785 during which the caller had made a ransom demand of USD 25,000. On 28 December 2004, the same person had called again from the same number and had requested a ransom, the amount of which had gone up ten times after Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s relatives had failed to cooperate. Mr A. stressed that his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, had been abducted by servicemen from the Organised Crime Unit. 20.  On 15 January 2005 the investigators questioned another relative of Amirkhan Alikhanov, Mr Al., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to those of Mr A. According to Mr Al., Amirkhan Alikhanov had been abducted by police officers from the Organised Crime Unit, with the assistance of two traffic police officers. 21.  On an unspecified date in January or February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Dzh.G., the owner of telephone number 8-906-447-6785, who stated that he had not used that number and had no information about the abduction as in December 2004 he had lent his passport to a stranger at the mobile telephone shop for the purchase of a SIM card with that telephone number. 22.  On 1 February 2005 the investigators questioned the neighbourhood police officer, Mr R.Sh., who stated that the area of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s residence was under his supervision and that he had known Amirkhan Alikhanov since childhood. To his knowledge in December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested by the police for unknown reasons. 23.  On 22 February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr N., another brother of Amirkhan Alikhanov, who stated that as he resided in another region of the Russian Federation, he had learned of the abduction from his relatives. 24.  On 27 February 2005 the investigators questioned the third applicant, who stated that she had learnt of her husband\u2019s abduction from her relatives. According to rumours in their village, Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested for causing someone\u2019s death in a traffic accident. 25.  On 28 March 2005 the investigators questioned a police officer, A.Kh., who stated that at about 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004 he had been on duty at the \u201cMars-20\u201d traffic checkpoint when two traffic police officers in a red and white police VAZ 2107 car with the beacon light (that is to say flashing roof lights) and the blue registration plate of the Makhachkala traffic police department had arrived at the checkpoint. The witness had no recollection of the events afterwards and stated that he had already been interviewed about the incident during the internal inquiry carried out by the internal security department of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior. 26.  On 28 March 2005 the investigators also questioned another traffic police officer, Mr A.Kh., whose statement concerning the abduction was not furnished to the Court. 27.  On 29 March 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., who stated that on 25 March 2005 he had learned that in Zamay-Yurt in Chechnya, at some point in January or February 2005, federal servicemen had conducted a special operation and killed six persons. This information had been broadcast during the news programme of one of the federal television channels. On the same date he and his relative, Mr A.G., had gone to that village, where in a shed next to the cemetery they had found various pieces of clothing. Among them he had identified and collected those of his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov. Then a local resident had shown to them the three graves where the six bodies had been buried. According to the village residents, 28\u201129 January 2005, they had heard intensive shooting during a special operation conducted by the federal forces in the vicinity; the servicemen had allegedly brought with them the six persons whom they had allegedly shot there during the special operation and had then buried their bodies. A local hunter had seen the servicemen burying the bodies and informed the local law enforcement authorities of this. Then those bodies had been exhumed and examined by the local prosecutor\u2019s office; subsequently, they had been given to the locals for burial. The local residents had buried the bodies but had kept the clothing for identification. 28.  On 5 April 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., who, inter alia, again described the circumstances of the discovery of the clothes of his abducted brother in Zamay-Yurt and stated that according to the local residents, a special operation had been conducted there at the end of January 2005 during which six people had been killed and then buried by federal servicemen. One of the local residents, whose identity Mr A. would not provide out of fear for this person\u2019s safety, had told them that at the end of December 2004, two of his relatives had been abducted by servicemen next to the local mosque and that both bodies had subsequently been found among the six corpses at the cemetery. 29.  On 11 April 2005 the investigators questioned Mr S.Sh., who stated that his wife, Ms P.N., had assisted the brothers of the abducted Amirkhan Alikhanov in their search for him. On 4 February 2005 she had left the house with a large amount of cash to continue searching for Amirkhan Alikhanov and had not returned. All his attempts to contact her on her mobile telephone had been to no avail. However, on 7 March 2005 a relative of his, Ms A., had managed to have Ms P.N. answer her telephone for a few seconds; behind his wife she had heard a man asking who was calling \u2013 then the connection had been cut off. According to Mr S.Sh., his wife\u2019s disappearance was directly related to that of Amirkhan Alikhanov, and both of them had been abducted by the same persons. 30.  On an unspecified date in April 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., whose statement was similar to the ones he had given before. 31.  On 18 May 2005 the investigators questioned A.A., a police officer, who stated that he worked for the Organised Crime Unit in Makhachkala. He denied having any information about the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov and stated that the allegations of his participation in Mr Alikhanov\u2019s abduction were unsubstantiated. 32.  On 20 May 2005 the investigators questioned another police officer from the Organised Crime Unit, A.M., who also stated that he had no information concerning Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction. At the same time, he stated that at the end of December 2004 he had met Mr A. and Mr Al., who had told him about the abduction and had asked him \u2013 in return for money \u2013 to assist them in their search for their relative, Mr Alikhanov. He had refused and had simply informed them (free of charge) that Amirkhan Alikhanov had not been detained on the premises of their unit. 33.  On 5 July 2005 the investigators questioned forensic expert Ms T.I., who stated that her findings, as stated in the forensic report (see paragraph 53 below), had not with absolute certainty established that the blood on the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt had been related to that of the first applicant; their facilities had been limited in their capacity to establish such conclusions. A generic expert evaluation would have helped to draw more certain conclusions. 34.  On 7 July 2005 Mr A. requested that the investigators question five police officers concerning their possible involvement in Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction. The investigators agreed on 14 July 2005 to grant his request. However, from the documents submitted it does not appear that any of those officers were subsequently questioned. 35.  On various dates in July and then in September 2005 the investigators questioned five of the police officers listed as drivers of the police cars in December 2004 (see paragraph 51 below). All of them denied having any information about the abduction. 36.  On 8 August 2005 the investigators questioned a traffic police officer, A., who, according to Mr A., had been present at the traffic police checkpoint during his brother\u2019s abduction. The officer confirmed his presence on 23 December 2004 at the checkpoint but denied having any information about the incident. 37.  On 15 August 2005 the investigators questioned V.M., the police officer, who stated that he had assisted the applicants in their search for Amirkhan Alikhanov. According to the witness, he had accompanied Mr A. on 24 December 2004 when the latter had gone to various law-enforcement agencies looking for his brother. A few days after the abduction, they had received information that A.A. had participated in the abduction. Then, the witness had spoken with A.A.; the latter, having confirmed that he had been at the \u201cMars-20\u201d checkpoint on the date of the abduction, had denied his involvement in the incident. 38.  On 28 December 2004 the first applicant complained to the Dagestan Prosecutor, requesting that an investigation into the circumstances of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction be opened and that the traffic police officers who had been manning the checkpoint at the time of the events be questioned. 39.  On 30 December 2004 the investigators examined the crime scene at the checkpoint. No evidence was collected. 40.  On 7 January 2005 the investigators sent a number of requests for information to various police stations and remand prisons in Dagestan, asking whether they were holding Amirkhan Alikhanov in detention. 41.  On 8 January 2005 the investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction. 42.  On 11 January 2005 the investigators wrote to the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior asking for assistance in establishing the circumstances of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction. The request stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cThe [preliminary] investigation file containing material collected in connection with the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov at the traffic police checkpoint ... has been forwarded to you for the organisation of an inquiry.\nMr B.P., who is a traffic police officer, claimed that at about 6.30 p.m. on 23 December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been detained by servicemen of the Organised Crime Unit at the \u201cMars-20\u201d traffic checkpoint and taken in the direction of Makhachkala, while the police officers of the traffic police unit from Makhachkala had taken away his VAZ 2108 car ...\nHowever, senior officials of the Organised Crime Unit and of the Makhachkala Department of the Interior denied that Amirkhan Alikhanov had been taken to their [respective] premises. Meanwhile, officer B.P. (\u201cStariy\u201d) claimed that he knew one of the officers[that is to say abductors], and that he would be able to identify him.\nGiven the circumstances, it is necessary to conduct an inquiry into the officers of the Organised Crime Unit and the Makhachkala Department of the Interior and to facilitate the identification by Mr B.P. of their personnel \u2013 [firstly] from photographs and then from a line-up ...\u201d 43.  On 12 January 2005 the investigators requested that the Khasavyurt prosecutor\u2019s office assisted them in establishing the circumstances of the abduction by sending an officer to various law-enforcement agencies in that town to enquire whether Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested, detained or taken through local checkpoints by their agents. 44.  On 14 January 2005 the investigators quashed the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings as unlawful and opened criminal case no. 55826 to investigate the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov. 45.  On 27 February and 11 March 2005 the third and first applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 46.  On 29 March 2005 the investigators collected from Mr A. the clothes found by him next to Zamay-Yurt. 47.  On 1 April 2005 the investigators sent an assistance request to the Khasavyurt department of the Organised Crime Unit. The request stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cAccording to the contents of the criminal case file, on 23 December 2004, on his way from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, Amirkhan Alikhanov was stopped at the \u201cMars-20\u201d traffic police checkpoint by traffic policemen from Makhachkala ... . During the check of his identity documents a VAZ-2107 pulled over... [and] three unidentified men in balaclavas got out of it, grabbed Amirkhan Alikhanov, forced him into their car and drove off to Makhachkala. One of the traffic police officers from Makhachkala followed them in Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s car ...\nOn 29 March 2005 the brother of the abducted person, Mr A., informed the investigators that he had received a phone call from a man who had seen a television programme about a special operation conducted by the federal forces in the Nozhay\u2011Yurt district [in the Chechen Republic], during which six persons had been killed and that two of the six bodies had been identified by relatives ... .\nMr A. had found [there] and brought to us the clothes of the abducted Amirkhan Alikhanov.\nIt is necessary to establish whether Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s body was among the six bodies ... .\u201d 48.  On 11 April 2005 criminal case no. 55826 (opened in connection with the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov) was joined with criminal case no. 558270 (opened in connection with the disappearance of Ms P.N.). The relevant decision stated, among other things, the following:\n\u201c... The investigation established that the crimes committed against Amirkhan Alikhanov and Ms P.N. were interconnected.\nThe husband of the disappeared Ms P.N., Mr S.Sh., stated that after the disappearance of Amirkhan Alikhanov, his wife (Ms P.N.) and the brothers of Amirkhan Alikhanov (Mr A. and Mr Al.) had been actively involved in the search for him; on several occasions she had visited the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit, where she had had meetings with their operational search officers. On the date of her disappearance she had been expecting a phone call from the head of the anti-kidnapping unit, Mr Gerey; for that meeting she had had a large amount of money in cash on her.\nMr S.Sh. believes that his wife\u2019s disappearance [is connected] with officers of the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit and Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction.\nAs far as Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s abduction is concerned, [the investigation] established that an officer from that department, A.A., had participated in the abduction. The investigators had issued an arrest warrant against him, but superiors at the Organised Crime Unit had obstructed A.A.\u2019s meetings with the investigators.\nTherefore, there are sufficient grounds to believe that both crimes were committed by the same group of persons ... .\u201d 49.  On 11 April 2005 the investigators ordered an expert examination of the clothes found by Mr A. in Zamay-Yurt, and on 27 April 2005 they ordered their forensic expert examination (see paragraph 54 below). 50.  On various dates in April and May 2005 the investigators obtained saliva and blood samples from Mr A. and the first applicant for genetic expert evaluation and a DNA comparison with the blood on the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt. 51.  On 30 May 2005 the traffic police unit of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior replied to a request for information from the investigators dated 26 April 2005 and provided them with a list of eight service vehicles used by the traffic police officers in December 2004. 52.  On 3 June 2005 the Russian Prosecutor General replied to the applicants\u2019 request for information, stating that the Nozhay-Yurt District Prosecutor\u2019s Office in Chechnya had opened a criminal case in connection with the discovery of unidentified bodies at the Zamay-Yurt cemetery. The brother of Amirkhan Alikhanov, Mr A., had identified the clothes on one of the bodies as those that had been worn by Amirkhan Alikhanov on the day of his abduction. A DNA test of the clothes had been commissioned. The Nozhay-Yurt District Prosecutor\u2019s Office had also been instructed to identify the bodies with the aid of photographs. 53.  On 20 June 2005 the expert examination of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt issued a report, according to which the first applicant\u2019s equilocal genes were similar to those found on the clothes. On the same date, 20 June 2005, the investigators ordered a genetic expert evaluation to establish that the blood on the clothes was that of the first applicant\u2019s relative. The results of this examination were not furnished to the Court. 54.  On 31 August 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic expert examination of the comparison of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt with the description thereof contained in Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s medical record kept in the local hospital. On 29 September 2005 the results of the examination were issued, the contents of which were not furnished to the Court. 55.  On 14 September 2005 the Dagestan Prosecutor\u2019s Office suspended the investigation for failure to identify the culprits. 56.  Between 7 and 29 September 2005 an expert evaluation of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt was conducted. According to the report of that examination, dated 29 September 2005, the clothes belonged to Amirkhan Alikhanov. 57.  On an unspecified date in September 2005 the investigators informed the applicants that the investigation had been suspended. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n\u201c... Criminal case no. 55826 into the abduction of [Mr Amirkhan] Alikhanov ... was opened on 14 January 2005 ...\nThe investigation has established that at approximately 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004, when [Mr Amirkhan] Alikhanov was driving his VAZ 2108 car from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, he was stopped at the \u201cMars-20\u201d ... checkpoint ... and taken to an unknown destination by unidentified men in camouflage uniforms.\nThe investigation has not established the involvement of any law-enforcement officers in the abduction.\nFrom the [witnesses\u2019] statements, the items seized, replies to requests, the report on DNA expert evaluation no. 18 of 20 June 2005 and the report on biological test no. 369 of 29 September 2005, it can be seen that [Amirkhan] Alikhanov was killed near the village of Zamay-Yurt ... when resisting the Chechen servicemen, who were conducting a special operation.\nAt present the criminal case is suspended on account of the failure to identify the perpetrators of [Amirkhan] Alikhanov\u2019s abduction.\u201d 58.  On 8 November 2005 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicants that they had received for investigation from another prosecutor\u2019s office the criminal case file concerning the discovery of six unidentified male bodies in the forest two kilometres to the east of the village of Zamay-Yurt. The case file contained no information on the identification of the bodies, which had been buried as unidentified. There was no information regarding whether the body of Amirkhan Alikhanov had been among them. 59.  On 30 November and then on 12 December 2005 the applicants requested that the Dagestan Prosecutor exhume the bodies found in Zamay\u2011Yurt for post-mortem examination, including the establishment of the cause of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s death. No reply was given to those requests. 60.  On 28 December 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicants that on 17 July 2005 the criminal case file concerning the discovery of Amirkhan Alikhanov\u2019s body had been transferred to the military prosecutor\u2019s office of the United Group Alignment (the UGA). 61.  On 7 March 2006 the Russian Prosecutor General replied to the first applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the investigators\u2019 failure to effectively investigate the abduction. The letter stated, among other things, the following:\n\u201c ... the contents of the criminal case file show that at about 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004, on his way from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, Mr A. Alikhanov was stopped at the permanent \u201cMars-20\u201d checkpoint for an identity check. At that moment, a VAZ 2107 vehicle pulled over, and the unidentified persons in balaclavas who had arrived in it detained Mr Alikhanov, took him into their vehicle and drove away in the direction of Makhachkala.\nThe traffic police officers who had been manning the checkpoint were questioned by the investigation and stated that the persons who had detained Mr Alikhanov had been, in their opinion, servicemen of the Organised Crime Unit, as they had had special service documents on them ... .\nIn the course of the proceedings, the investigators received information concerning Mr Alikhanov\u2019s murder and the finding of his body among six corpses found on 28 January 2005 on the outskirts of Zamay-Yurt in the Nozhay-Yurt district in Chechnya.\nIn order to verify this information, a genetic expert evaluation was ordered; it concluded that there was a match of your genome with the one found on the clothes in the shed at the Zamay-Yurt cemetery \u2013 that is to say the possibility of it belonging to your son, Amirkhan Alikhanov, could not be excluded.\nAccording to the information provided by the military prosecutor\u2019s office of the UGA, the six corpses ... had belonged to members of illegal armed groups eliminated during clashes with the federal forces between 25 and 26 January 2005 ...\nIn order to verify the identity of one of those corpses as that of Amirkhan Alikhanov, the military prosecutor\u2019s office is carrying out an additional check into the matter ... .\u201d 62.  On 8 June 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. It appears to be still pending.", "references": ["8", "9", "6", "7", "3", "4", "5", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1969 and 1964 respectively and live in Sandnes, Norway. 7.  The second applicant went to Sweden in the 1980s and met the first applicant in 1993. They have three children, A (born in December 2002), B (born in December 2003) and C (born in February 2007). The second applicant also has a son, D (born in 1989), from a previous relationship, who has lived with the applicants. The applicants lived in the city of Link\u00f6ping until May 2007 when the first applicant travelled to Iran with the children. 8.  In February 2007, staff at the Neonatal Unit at the University Hospital in Link\u00f6ping, where C was treated after her birth, contacted the Link\u00f6ping Social Council (socialn\u00e4mnden) due to concerns about the family. The staff had observed that the first applicant had difficulties in understanding C\u2019s needs and lacked ability to read her signals. Moreover, she was very withdrawn and took no initiative to feed C or change her nappy. The staff had suggested that she consult a psychiatrist, but the first applicant had refused. Furthermore, when the second applicant had visited the hospital with A and B, the children had been noisy and unruly and staff had had to intervene to calm them. When the staff had informed the applicants about their concern for the children and their intention to contact the social services, the second applicant had responded aggressively. 9.  On the basis of the information from the hospital, the Social Council started an investigation into the family\u2019s situation in accordance with Chapter 11, Section 1, of the Social Services Act (socialtj\u00e4nstlagen, 2001:453). They contacted persons from the Neonatal Unit, the primary health care clinic for children and the women\u2019s clinic, as well as A and B\u2019s child-minder, all of whom expressed great concern about how the applicants were coping with their family situation and described how they had failed to provide A and B with the necessary structure and rules. The Social Council repeatedly offered the applicants placement in an investigation home, but the applicants refused. Instead, they agreed to have a team from the Social Council visit their home on a number of occasions. It was further decided that the whole family should undergo psychiatric examinations. 10.  However, it would appear that the applicants repeatedly refused to let the Social Council team enter their home and, from mid-April, before the investigation was completed, the applicants stopped all contact with the team and informed them that they did not intend to undergo psychiatric examinations. The Social Council unsuccessfully tried to re-establish contact with the applicants. In late May 2007, the first applicant and the children left their home, allegedly to spend time with friends. Several persons who were normally in contact with the applicants expressed concern about the children\u2019s situation and the fact that their whereabouts were unknown to them. 11.  On 11 September 2007, the Social Council decided to take all three children into public care immediately, on a provisional basis, by virtue of Section 6 of the Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons Act (lagen med s\u00e4rskilda best\u00e4mmelser om v\u00e5rd av unga, 1990:52; hereafter \u201cthe 1990 Act\u201d). On 21 September 2007, the Administrative Court (l\u00e4nsr\u00e4tten, as of 15 February 2010 f\u00f6rvaltningsr\u00e4tten) confirmed the decision of the Social Council, as did the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarr\u00e4tten) and the Supreme Administrative Court (H\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen) upon further appeal. However, the decision was never enforced since it turned out that the first applicant and the children were in Iran. Friends of the applicants informed the Social Council that the first applicant was afraid to return to Sweden since she feared that her children would be taken into public care. Thus, on 13 February 2008 the Social Council cancelled the care order since it could not be enforced. The first applicant and the children stayed in Iran until October 2008 when the whole family moved to Sandnes in Norway. 12.  In May 2009, the local Norwegian Social Council was contacted by A\u2019s school because he had told the school that both he and B had been beaten by the second applicant. The applicants denied the accusations. The Norwegian Social Council decided to initiate an investigation during which it was agreed that the second applicant would live away from the home and that a Social Council Unit would visit the family daily. On 16 May 2009, the applicants and their children disappeared. Subsequently, the second applicant telephoned, from a Swedish telephone number, the Norwegian Social Council, which in turn contacted the Swedish authorities as it suspected that the family might be in Sweden. Moreover, an anonymous person had telephoned the Swedish Social Council to express serious concerns about the children who, according to this person, were at an address in Link\u00f6ping. When the Social Council staff went to the address given, the family was not there but their luggage was in the apartment. Consequently, on 25 May 2009, the Social Council decided to take A, B and C into immediate public care on the basis of its previous investigation and since it feared that the family would again leave for Iran. 13.  On 28 May 2009, the applicants and their children were stopped at Stockholm Airport on their way to Iran and a team from a Social Council close to the airport assisted in the enforcement of the care order. The report made by the Social Council team which picked up the children at the airport described a chaotic situation. The first applicant and B and C had been apathetic while A had been hyperactive. The second applicant had mostly been on the telephone. Neither the first nor the second applicants had reacted when the team had taken the children away with them. A, B and C were all placed in a foster home (familjehem) together, but later A was moved to a separate foster home since he was hyperactive and required special attention. 14.  On 10 June 2009, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court confirmed the Social Council\u2019s decision to take the children into immediate public care. 15.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal which, on 6 August 2009, struck the case out since, in the meantime, the children had been taken into public care (see paragraph 20 below) and the immediate public care order thereby had lapsed. 16.  On 25 June 2009, the Social Council applied to the Administrative Court for a public care order in respect of all three children, in accordance with Section 2 of the 1990 Act. The Council maintained that the applicants had shown a serious lack of ability to care for their children, that there was a clear risk of impairment of their health and development if they were not protected and that the applicants opposed the planned necessary care. It submitted a comprehensive investigation report into the family\u2019s situation in support of its request. The report was based, inter alia, on submissions from the children\u2019s temporary foster homes, the local health care service, reports based on psychiatric examinations of the children, notes from the Child and Youth Psychiatric Clinic (Barn- och ungdomspsykiatrin; hereafter \u201cBUP\u201d) and information from relatives and the Norwegian Social Council. 17.  According to the report, none of the children had been accustomed to structure or routines. A maintained that he had been beaten by the second applicant and B had told her foster home that she, A and the first applicant had all been beaten by the second applicant. It was mainly the first applicant who had cared for the children. Hospital and Social Council staff, as well as relatives, had for a long time been worried about her psychological health and encouraged her to seek help. She had denied that she needed help and had refused all treatment. All of the children had lacked communication and emotional response from their parents, which had affected their psychosocial development and their ability to interact socially with other children as well as adults. A was hyperactive and had difficulties following rules and functioning in social situations. His behaviour corresponded to several of the symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). B was remarkably silent and withdrawn. Psychiatrists had assessed that she was traumatised and had recommended therapeutic treatment combined with a safe environment where she did not have to deny her experiences. Both she and C were behind in their language development and lacked the ability to express their emotions. Several instances had, over the years, emphasised the children\u2019s need for emotional contact with the applicants. The second applicant had failed to compensate for the first applicant\u2019s inability in this regard and neither of the applicants had managed to establish routines for the children\u2019s basic needs such as food, hygiene, clothes and necessary medical care. Thus, the applicants\u2019 ability to care for their children properly was questioned. The applicants\u2019 impulsive behaviour had led to an unstable and insecure living situation for the children, such as when they had suddenly decided to move to Iran. There was an imminent risk that the applicants would again travel to Iran with their children. All of the children were in need of stability and an environment with clear rules and structure, including stable adults who could compensate for their previous lack of emotional care. 18.  The applicants disputed that public care was needed. They submitted that they were capable parents who cared for and loved their children. They had cooperated with the Social Council in 2007 but had been treated inappropriately and disrespectfully by the authorities. They had not fled to Iran but had gone there to visit family, as they did every year. They submitted documentary evidence including medical certificates. According to a Chief Physician at Link\u00f6ping University Hospital Women\u2019s Clinic, the first applicant had accepted special assistance offered to her after the birth of all three children and had kept to this commitment. It had been noted that she felt great affection for her children. Moreover, according to a physician at the applicants\u2019 local health centre, all the children had demonstrated the ability to make emotional contact and had behaved in a way appropriate for their age. 19.  The legal representative assigned to defend the children\u2019s best interests supported the Social Council\u2019s stance. He had met all three children and, according to him, the information contained in the investigation gave reason for grave concern for the children\u2019s situation. The parents\u2019 lack of ability to understand their children\u2019s needs, as well as the information about abuse, meant that it was necessary to take the children into public care to ensure that they received proper care. 20.  On 20 July 2009, after holding an oral hearing where the applicants and several witnesses were heard, the Administrative Court granted a public care order in respect of each of the three children. It found that, on the basis of all the material in the case, it had been shown that the applicants lacked the ability to care for their children and to understand their needs. This inability had already impaired the children\u2019s health and development in important areas. In the court\u2019s view, there was a real risk of further damage unless the children were given proper care to meet their special needs. Since the applicants did not agree to voluntary care, it was necessary to take the children into public care. 21.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining that public care was not necessary for any of their children. They denied that either of them had ever hurt the children and stressed that the public prosecutor, in July 2009, had decided to discontinue a preliminary investigation against the second applicant concerning child abuse. Moreover, there was no medical evidence substantiating any accusations of physical violence. They emphasised that all three children were healthy and behaved in a manner appropriate for their age. They welcomed the fact that A\u2019s condition had been diagnosed and were willing to accept appropriate help from the Social Council. The reasons for their decision to travel to Iran in May 2009 were that the second applicant\u2019s father had fallen seriously ill and to spend their holidays there. They submitted, inter alia, further medical certificates and an assessment of the Social Council\u2019s investigation issued by an associate professor. 22.  The Social Council contested the appeal. It stated that A had been diagnosed with ADHD and Oppositional Defiant Disorder and emphasised that he was in need of a structured environment and appropriate help in order to develop in a positive way. B was still traumatised and communicated only by nodding or shaking her head. C was physically active, had become more independent and no longer feared daily sounds, such as the vacuum cleaner. The Council submitted a psychosocial investigation report from November 2009, a neuropsychological investigation report dated 26 October 2009 and a medical certificate dated 8 September 2009, all concerning A. 23.  The children\u2019s legal representative supported the Social Council\u2019s stance. During a meeting with the children, A had declared that he wanted to live with his parents and siblings and that there were too many rules where he now lived. He had stated that the second applicant had sometimes beaten him and had sometimes been kind. B had told her foster home parents that the second applicant had beaten her. The representative emphasised the children\u2019s need to see their parents but referred to the extensive material in the case-file which showed that the children had special needs. The investigations had also highlighted clear warning signals that the children had suffered at home. Moreover, the representative found it questionable whether the applicants would agree to voluntary care, since they had refused to cooperate with the Social Council on previous occasions. 24.  On 11 December 2009, after holding an oral hearing where several witnesses were heard at the applicants\u2019 request, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment in full. It found that the signs of lack of proper care which had appeared during the investigation in 2007 now appeared even more clearly. The investigations carried out after the decision on public care in June 2009 indicated that all of the children had special needs which had been neglected. Additionally, the court noted that both A and B had told various persons, in different situations, that they had been beaten by the second applicant. Although these accusations had not led to any charges against the second applicant, the court stressed that this information had to be taken seriously, since the main purpose of the 1990 Act was to protect the child. Moreover, the court observed that the Social Council had had difficulties carrying out the investigation correctly, mainly due to the applicants\u2019 unwillingness or inability to cooperate with the authorities. The applicants\u2019 unwillingness to cooperate had also manifested itself in their decision to move twice to another country, which had also jeopardised the security and stability of the children\u2019s environment. Making an overall assessment, the appellate court found that the investigations strongly indicated that the applicants had failed to care for their children properly and that they lacked understanding of the children\u2019s special needs and their own inability to care for them. Thus, there was a real risk of damage to the children\u2019s health and development. Lastly, the court noted that both of the applicants had declared that they were willing to receive help from the Social Council while, at the same time, they had refuted the accuracy of the investigation and claimed that the information was fabricated or much exaggerated. They also opposed the care plan developed for the children. Accordingly, there were valid grounds to take the children into public care. 25.  The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court which, on 15 April 2010, refused leave to appeal. 26.  On 22 September 2010, the Social Council decided that the children should remain in public care. 27.  The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court. They stated that they were settled in Norway, both of them holding full-time jobs, and that they were in contact with the Norwegian Social Council. They insisted that they had fully cooperated with the Swedish Social Council and had done all that had been required of them, including travelling to Link\u00f6ping for meetings with the Social Council and allowing the Norwegian authorities to visit them at home. Moreover, they were actively involved in an ADHD association and were attending courses to understand the condition better and be able to help A. With assistance from the Norwegian authorities and the school, they could take care of A and meet all of his needs. The applicants further questioned whether the Social Council really had a clear plan for how, in due time, to reunite them with their children and contested the Council\u2019s view that they opposed the plan for visits with the children. In fact, the first applicant\u2019s visit with the children had gone very well and the children had also reacted positively to photographs and letters from their parents. Taking into consideration the children\u2019s very young age, they emphasised the importance of not waiting too long before starting the reunion process, and including more frequent visits, in order to avoid a sudden removal from the foster homes which could cause the children emotional harm. Furthermore, the applicants categorically denied that any violence had occurred in their home and they alleged that if any of the children showed signs of trauma, it was most likely due to the traumatic separation from their parents. They submitted, inter alia, medical and other certificates to substantiate their good psychological health. 28.  The Social Council contested the appeal. It confirmed that the applicants had cooperated with the authorities and had come to planned meetings with the Council. It attached much importance to the fact that this cooperation needed to continue over time. However, it maintained its view that the applicants opposed the visiting plan since they had requested that the public care of their children be lifted and the children be returned home and since they opposed further care under the provisions of the Social Services Act. Although both of the applicants had demonstrated improvements in their capacity to assess the children\u2019s needs, they still lacked basic understanding of how to care properly for their children. The Council stressed that A had been taken into care due to lack of care at home, not because he had been diagnosed with ADHD. Moreover, A repeatedly spoke about how he had been beaten by the second applicant and he had had to be reassured before the meeting with the first applicant that he would return to the foster home after the meeting. Thus, the decision on public care was partly based on the need to protect him, as well as B and C. The Council further observed that, as concerned B, a psychologist had stated that there were reasons to believe that she had been neglected or traumatised at a preverbal stage of her life and that, consequently, her problems were not linked to being taken into care. Lastly, turning to C, it was asserted that she needed to be protected from neglect in order to develop positively and have her needs met. The Council repeated that there had been concern for the children for a long time and that its findings were based on an overall evaluation of the children\u2019s situation and their parents\u2019 ability to care for them. It submitted various investigation and evaluation reports about the children which it had used as a basis for its decision to keep them in public care. 29.  The children\u2019s legal representative supported the Social Council\u2019s stance. 30.  On 20 January 2011, after having held an oral hearing, the Administrative Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the public care order. It first noted that the applicants demonstrated great affection for their children and wanted them to be well and that they were engaged in activities and receiving assistance to understand the problems. The visit between the first applicant and her children had gone well. However, the court observed that the applicants still denied that they had failed in the care of their children and it found that they continued to lack understanding of the children\u2019s problems and their own ability to meet the children\u2019s special needs. Thus, it found no basis for lifting the care order. Moreover, since the applicants had not agreed to the care plan developed for each child, which included their living in a foster home over a longer period of time, there was no basis for voluntary care. 31.  The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining their claims and adding that they had never tried to intervene in the public care of their children but fully cooperated with the authorities in every way possible. They had fully understood that reunion with their children would have to be a gradual process, but it was important that their parent-child links did not disappear. In their view, there was no evidence of any risk that they would flee abroad with their children. Moreover, they considered that the Social Council had based its assessment on old investigations which were no longer relevant. They also questioned for how long the public care would continue, since that might jeopardise the connection between them and their children. They submitted, inter alia, medical certificates and a written observation dated 12 October 2009 and issued by an associate professor concerning the investigations carried out by the Social Council. 32.  Both the Social Council and the children\u2019s legal representative contested the appeal. They stressed that all three children had developed positively but that they were still in need of a stable environment. They were undergoing treatment at the BUP due to their special needs. The commitment shown by the applicants was positive for the future, but the deficiencies in care which had been evident when the children were taken into public care still existed. 33.  On 15 April 2011, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment in full. It first found that the material in the case indicated that the children still had special needs but that they had developed well since being taken into public care. The court further considered that, although the applicants had participated in activities and improved their understanding of A\u2019s special needs relating to his ADHD, they still lacked a more profound understanding of their daughters\u2019 special needs and of their own shortcomings in caring properly for their children. Thus, it concluded that the applicants were not currently in a position to meet their children\u2019s special needs and provide the care they required, for which reason the children had to remain in the foster homes. Since the applicants opposed such care, it was necessary to maintain the public care. 34.  Upon further appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on 15 June 2011. 35.  On 25 May 2009, when the Social Council decided to take A, B and C into immediate public care, it also decided to keep secret the address of the children\u2019s foster homes and not to grant the applicants contact rights to visit their children. These decisions were confirmed on 10 June 2009 by the Administrative Court. Upon appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court of Appeal decided, on 6 August 2009, to strike the case out of its list of cases (see paragraph 15 above). 36.  On 26 August 2009, the Social Council decided to continue to keep secret the address of the children\u2019s foster homes and to limit the applicants\u2019 contact rights by not allowing any visits. The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court, which quashed the Social Council\u2019s decision and, as concerned the contact rights, referred the case back. Consequently, on 16 October 2009, the Social Council issued a new decision denying the applicants any contact rights. In accordance with Section 14, paragraph 3, of the 1990 Act, this decision was reassessed by the Social Council on 23 November 2009 but it found no reason to change the previous decision since it considered that there was still a risk that the applicants would intervene in the care of the children if granted contact rights. 37.  The applicants appealed against the decision, demanding that it be reversed. They also requested that at least the first applicant be allowed to visit the children. The applicants pointed to the fact that the children had said that they missed them and they stressed that all allegations concerning any sort of abuse were groundless. They denied that they had previously tried to evade the social authorities and emphasised that, even if the authorities believed that there was such a risk, this should not prevent them from being granted contact rights in the presence of representatives of the Social Council. They were also willing to hand over their passports to the authorities. 38.  The Social Council contested the appeal. It stated that there were strong reasons to believe that the applicants would intervene in the care of the children and stressed that it was necessary to decide on total restrictions in order to keep the children\u2019s residences secret. If the children\u2019s location was revealed, they would have to be moved to new foster homes. It submitted a document issued by the director of the treatment centre where A had been observed which, among other things, stated that A had said that he missed his mother but had also expressed a wish to be like other children and live in a family where he could feel safe. To the staff at the treatment centre, he had described occasions when he had felt unsafe, such as when he and his siblings had lived alone with the first applicant and when he had been beaten by the second applicant. Since A had been placed at the treatment centre, he had developed and his ability to follow routines had greatly improved. It was of utmost importance that this positive development continue. If A were to meet the applicants, the negative consequences would significantly outweigh the positive. A would suffer from a conflict of loyalty which would seriously impede his positive development. 39.  On 10 December 2009, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court upheld the Social Council\u2019s decision. It noted that the applicants had been prohibited from visiting their children for six months and stressed that such extensive restrictions required exceptionally strong grounds. In the court\u2019s view, the applicants were not willing to cooperate with the authorities and had repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to evade the Social Council\u2019s investigations into their family situation. It further noted that all of the children were in need of special care and stability in order for their development to progress positively. On the basis of the investigation the court found that if the applicants were granted contact rights to visit the children, there was a real risk that the second applicant, in particular, would intervene in the public care of the children. Moreover, the court considered that since there was a risk that the children\u2019s residence addresses would be disclosed even if the first applicant were to visit the children alone, she could not be allowed any contact rights alone either. In reaching this conclusion, the court had regard to the best interests of the children and Article 8 of the Convention. 40.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining their claims. They stressed that the allegation of violence at home was completely unsubstantiated and that the Social Council\u2019s investigation was insufficient and could not form the basis for the complete prohibition of any contact between them and their children. All three children had said that they missed their parents, in particular their mother, for which reason a supervised visit of the first applicant with her children should be authorised. They had not seen their children for ten months and not even been allowed to talk to them on the telephone or write to them. Moreover, they were ready to hand in their passports and meet the children in a neutral location to eliminate any concerns that the authorities had about them \u201cfleeing\u201d with their children. In the applicants\u2019 view, the prohibition on seeing their children violated Article 8 of the Convention. 41.  The Social Council maintained that its decision was justified under the Convention and should be upheld. It was true that A and B had expressed the wish to meet their parents. C had not done so, but this was probably because of her late language development. Still, due to the risk that the applicants might escape with the children or obstruct their current care, and since the children had extensive care needs into which the applicants lacked insight, there was a need to prohibit contact rights. Moreover, currently there was no dialogue between the Social Council and the applicants and this would have to be re-established before contact rights could be granted. 42.  On 8 April 2010, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It first noted that, despite the applicants\u2019 submissions, it did not appear that the second applicant had altered his negative attitude towards the Social Council and was prepared to cooperate. The appellate court further observed that Article 8 of the Convention did not contain a general prohibition on complete contact restrictions. Still, it shared the applicants\u2019 concern that the complete contact restriction could harm the children and noted that the Social Council had a great responsibility to ensure that the children\u2019s need for contact with their parents was met. However, for this to be possible, the parents had to cooperate. Moreover, the court had to evaluate whether the combined risks that contact rights would entail for the children\u2019s health and development outweighed the corresponding risks if there were no contact. In the present case, the court considered that the only way to find suitable solutions to avoid the risks involved in contact rights between the applicants and the children was for the Social Council to plan the visits carefully together with the applicants and for the applicants to be willing to receive the help and support that they needed. As long as these conditions were not fulfilled, it would not be possible to arrange the contact. Furthermore, the appellate court had carefully considered the possibility of granting only the first applicant contact rights with the children. However, in view of its findings, and the first applicant\u2019s passive attitude, it did not consider this a viable option. Thus, a complete prohibition on contact remained the sole solution in the current situation. 43.  Upon further appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on 4 June 2010. 44.  On 22 September 2010 the Social Council decided that the first applicant should be allowed to meet the children on one occasion during the autumn of 2010 while the second applicant should not be allowed to meet them. Following an appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision in judgments delivered on 20 January 2011 and 15 May 2011 respectively. On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. 45.  On 22 December 2010 the Social Council decided that the first applicant should be allowed contact rights with the children on two occasions between January and June 2011 and that, during the same period, the second applicant should be allowed to meet the children on one occasion. 46.  On 29 June 2011 the Social Council decided that the applicants should be allowed contact rights with their children according to a contact plan. The plan specified that the applicants should meet with their children once every third month, for two hours each time, in a place decided by the Social Council and where staff from the Social Council would be present, as well as a counsellor and interpreter (to translate if the second applicant spoke Persian with the children). Moreover, telephone contact was allowed twice a year, for no more than 20 minutes, in a controlled setting. 47.  The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court, requesting that the contact restrictions be lifted. They stressed that their meetings with their children had gone very well and that they had followed carefully all of the Social Council\u2019s instructions. The children had been happy to see them and hugged them. The fact that they had later had a reaction in their foster home was normal since the meetings had been short and had taken place in an unnatural environment. Moreover, the children had been given negative information about their parents which had affected them and they probably felt a conflict of loyalty between their parents and their foster home. The applicants questioned how a reunion of the family would be possible if they were only allowed to meet their children so rarely and for a short time. They also repeated that they had never escaped with their children to Iran but that they had travelled there once every year to visit relatives. In fact, they had never tried to intervene or obstruct the public care of their children. Instead, they had cooperated and done all they had been asked to do. Both applicants had sessions with psychologists and the second applicant attended a programme called \u201calternatives to violence\u201d. In this respect, he underlined that he had never been aggressive or violent toward his children. 48.  The Social Council maintained its decision. It noted that reunion could only take place once the children\u2019s need for care had ceased. So far the meetings between the parents and children had gone well. B and C had had no negative reactions to the last meeting with the applicants but A had had nightmares. The next meeting would take place in an apartment, to give a more natural environment. The children would also meet with their older half-brother. Moreover, the children saw each other on a regular basis, at least every third week, to play and be together. The Social Council also submitted reports of its investigations into the children\u2019s current situation and development. 49.  On 27 September 2011, after an oral hearing, the Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It noted from the outset that only contact restrictions which were necessary for the purpose of the care order were allowed, and that the best interests of the children should be paramount when making this evaluation. The court then observed that all three children were receiving extra help and assistance to develop and function in their social settings. They were developing well in their foster homes. It further noted that the applicants\u2019 meetings with their children had gone well and that their contact rights had been extended. However, in the court\u2019s view, the applicants had accepted various measures because the Social Council had told them to do so, not because they felt that they were necessary. Thus, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court found that the contact restrictions decided by the Social Council were necessary for the time being. It noted that the Council regularly had to re-evaluate the need for contact restrictions, which opened the way for fewer restrictions in time to come. 50.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal and requested that their contact restrictions be eased to allow them to meet their children once every other month. They maintained their submissions as presented before the lower court. Moreover, the second applicant stated that he had realised during his therapy sessions that he had been \u201chard\u201d towards the first applicant, which he realised must have affected the children negatively. However, he maintained that he had never been violent towards his children. 51.  The Social Council opposed any changes to the contact restrictions. In its view, the current restrictions were necessary to ensure the children\u2019s continued positive development. It acknowledged that the last two meetings between the applicants and their children had gone well, but stated that the telephone conversation had not been satisfactory since the second applicant had asked questions to try to find out where the children were living and A had felt pressured and sad afterwards. 52.  On 20 March 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal granted the appeal and ordered that the applicants should have contact rights with their children once every other month. In all other parts the contact plan was maintained. The court noted that the second applicant had begun to have better insight into his behaviour and could acknowledge that the way he had sometimes treated his wife could be considered as violence. This was a first step in a process of change with the goal of the children returning home. A part of this process was the contact between the parents and their children. The appellate court found that contact restrictions had been necessary in the instant case but considered that, having regard to the current situation, it should be possible to extend the contact rights as requested by the applicants. 53.  Neither the applicants nor the Social Council appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court. 54.  The decisions to keep the children in public care and to limit the applicants\u2019 contact rights have continued to be reconsidered on a regular basis as stipulated by domestic law (see the part on relevant domestic law, paragraph 68 below). Most of these decisions have not been submitted to the Court, but it appears from the parties\u2019 submissions that, on 27 March 2013, the Social Council decided to keep the children in public care and rejected a request by the applicants to extend their contact rights. The Administrative Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals against these decisions. 55.  However, on 4 September 2013, the Social Council granted the applicants extended contact rights, allowing them to meet with the children for three hours every two months and to have telephone contact with them twice a year. 56.  The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court which, on 20 January 2014, increased the applicants\u2019 contact rights by one hour, that is to four hours in total, every other month. It considered that this was in the best interests of the children. 57.  Upon further appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment on 23 April 2014. 58.  On 10 December 2014 the Social Council decided to maintain the public care order and not to alter the contact rights. 59.  The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court, demanding that the public care order be lifted or, at least, that they be granted increased contact rights. 60.  The children\u2019s legal representative supported the Social Council\u2019s decisions as she considered that it was in the best interests of the children. They had expressed the wish to stay in their foster homes and, while they said that the meetings with their parents went well, they did not wish them to be increased. 61.  On 24 February 2015, after having held an oral hearing, the court rejected the appeal. It noted that the second applicant had continued to show aggressive behaviour towards social workers and that he had been convicted, inter alia, of making unlawful threats (14 counts), threatening a public official (15 counts), slander and abusive conduct against a public official (5 counts) and sentenced to one year and six months in prison. Moreover, the first applicant had been unable to take an active part and be available to her children during their meetings. The applicants had also intervened in the public care of their children, in breach of the contact restrictions. They had, for example, waited outside B and C\u2019s school and followed them to their foster homes, and they had also gone to A\u2019s foster home, making the children afraid and anxious. They had also sent letters and cards directly to the foster homes, despite an agreement that such items should be sent via the social authorities, in order to avoid upsetting the children. The court found that there was therefore no possibility to terminate the public care or transform it into voluntary care. Furthermore, all the children wanted to stay in their foster homes and the current level of visits was working well for the children. Thus, there were no reasons, according to the court, to depart from the well-functioning scale of contact, which was also in line with the will of the children. 62.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 22 April 2015, after having held an oral hearing, the appellate court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment in so far as it concerned the continuation of the public care. It considered that the applicants still lacked insight into their inability to care of their children, which had led to the public care at the outset, since they continued to blame the social authorities. However, the court extended the contact rights to six hours every other month. It noted that there was nothing to indicate that the scale of contact could not be moderately extended without negatively affecting the children\u2019s care. It was important for the well-being of the children that the time spent with their parents provided rewarding moments and had potential to develop their relationship. They should therefore be given enough time during each meeting to share activities and be together. 63.  The Court has not been informed of further developments in the case at the domestic level.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "9", "6", "3", "5", "0", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Steiermark in Austria. 6.  At the relevant period the applicant lived in Syktyvkar in the Komi Republic of Russia and had a blog hosted by livejournal.com, a popular blog platform. 7.  In February 2007 an election campaign for election of members of the regional legislature was under way in the Komi Republic. 8.  On 14 February 2007 the police arrived with an \u201cunplanned inspection\u201d (\u0432\u043d\u0435\u043f\u043b\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430) at the office of a local newspaper in Syktyvkar. The police searched the office, stated that the software installed on the computers was counterfeit, and seized the hard disks. 9.  Later that day, a regional non-governmental organisation \u2013 the Memorial Human Rights Commission in Komi (\u201cMemorial\u201d) \u2013 issued a press release which linked the search to the election campaign. The press release mentioned, in particular, that the newspaper in question had published a large amount of material in the context of the election campaign, and that it was in opposition to the current authorities of the Komi Republic, as it actively supported a well-known local politician who had a long-standing conflict with those authorities. The press release also stated that the police officers who had carried out the search had not clearly explained what the legal basis for their actions had been, and that one of them had acted rudely and had thrown out some of the journalist\u2019s belongings to get access to the latter\u2019s computer during that search. 10.  On the same day, the President of Memorial, Mr I.S., published the text of that press release on his blog at livejournal.com. Three comments were left under that publication on that day. One of the comments was left by a certain Mr T. and read as follows:\n\u201cThe police, once again, confirm their reputation as \u2018the regime\u2019s faithful dogs\u2019. Unfortunately, police officers still have the mentality of a repressive hard stick in the hands of those who have the power. It feels like they are an instrument of punishment of the recalcitrant rather than being a service to society. What can be done to carry out a rotation of meanings (\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0441\u043c\u044b\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432) in the law-enforcement agencies?\u201d 11.  On the same date Mr B.S., a journalist, blogger and the applicant\u2019s acquaintance, made a short post on his blog at livejournal.com about the search, stating that the police \u201c[were] seconded for a fight with the political opposition\u201d. The post contained a hyperlink to the press release published on Mr I.S.\u2019s blog. 12.  On 15 February 2007 the applicant, who was a subscriber to Mr B.S.\u2019s blog, read his above-mentioned post and then accessed Mr I.S.\u2019s blog using the hyperlink. The applicant read the text of the press release and the comments, including the one left by Mr T. In the applicant\u2019s words, this latter comment made a particularly strong impression on him. 13.  He then returned to Mr B.S.\u2019s blog and posted a comment which was entitled \u201cI hate the cops, for fuck\u2019s sake\u201d (\u201c\u041d\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0436\u0443 \u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043e\u0432, \u0441\u0446\u0443\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0445\u201d) and read as follows:\n\u201cI disagree with the idea that \u2018police officers still have the mentality of a repressive hard stick in the hands of those who have the power\u2019. Firstly, they are not police officers but cops; secondly, their mentality is incurable. A pig always remains a pig. Who becomes a cop? Only lowbrows and hoodlums \u2013 the dumbest and least educated representatives of the animal world. It would be great if in the centre of every Russian city, on the main square ... there was an oven, like at Auschwitz, in which ceremonially every day, and better yet, twice a day (say, at noon and midnight) infidel cops would be burnt. The people would be burning them. This would be the first step to cleansing society of this cop-hoodlum filth.\u201d 14.  On 14 March 2007 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant under Article 282 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code in connection with his comment on the Internet. 15.  On 16 March 2007 the police searched the applicant\u2019s home in the context of those proceedings. On the same day the applicant, who had found out the reasons for the criminal case against him, removed his comment. 16.  A report of 30 April 2007, reflecting the results of an examination carried out during the preliminary investigation, provided a detailed analysis of the language of the applicant\u2019s comment. It stated, in particular, that in the text its author had expressed a distinctly negative opinion about all police officers, their personal and professional qualities, in a gross, indecent, aggressive and insulting form, widely using slang and, indirectly, obscene vocabulary typical of young users of the Internet. 17.  In the proceedings before the Syktyvkar Town Court of the Komi Republic (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d), the applicant pleaded not guilty. He conceded that he had been the author of the impugned statement, and argued that it had represented his emotional and spontaneous reaction to the press release of Memorial regarding the police search at the office of an opposition newspaper and to Mr B.S.\u2019s relevant post and Mr T.\u2019s comment. In the applicant\u2019s words, for him there was a distinction between a \u201cpolice officer\u201d, that is to say an honest and respectable law-enforcement officer, and a \u201ccop\u201d, that is to say someone who acted unlawfully and abusively when performing professional duties. In his comment the applicant had expressed his disagreement with Mr T., who, in the applicant\u2019s view, had confused those two notions. The applicant also insisted that his comments had been exclusively addressed to Mr B.S. with whom he had shared his thoughts regarding the police operation of 14 February 2007, and that he had had no intention of making it public, let alone calling for any actions against the police. The applicant further conceded that his comment had been quite provocative, but insisted that he had used exaggeration, in particular, referred to \u201can oven, like at Auschwitz\u201d, only to express an idea that \u201cinfidel\u201d police officers should be severely punished. Lastly, he apologised to former prisoners of Nazi concentration camps and to \u201chonest\u201d police officers, who may have felt offended by his comment. 18.  The Town Court called and examined a large number of witnesses. In particular, three police officers, who had conducted a pre-investigation inquiry in connection with the applicant\u2019s comment on the Internet, stated that they had not seen it as directed against only \u201cinfidel\u201d police officers; in their view, it had related to all police officers, had ascribed negative characteristics to them and had proposed to incinerate them in public. Mr B.S. stated that, in his view, the applicant\u2019s comment had drawn a distinction between honest police officers and \u201cinfidel cops\u201d and had only related to the latter category. Some of the witnesses stated that they had seen the applicant\u2019s comment in Mr B.S.\u2019s blog, whereas others stated that they had only become aware of the comment or read it after the criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and his case had attracted the attention of the mass media. Some of the witnesses stated that they considered the applicant\u2019s comment and the expressions used therein to be too harsh, and the word \u201clowbrows\u201d to be immoral or unethical. Mr I.S. pointed out that \u201cthe bloggers\u2019 community\u201d, including his own acquaintances, had been indignant at the applicant\u2019s comment which they had considered to be too strongly-worded; however, in that witness\u2019s view, the applicant had merely expressed his opinion and had started a public discussion on an important issue. Another witness stated that he had not taken the applicant\u2019s comment seriously, let alone seen it as calling for any violent action. 19.  At the request of the parties, the first-instance court ordered that a comprehensive socio-humanities forensic expert examination of the impugned text be carried out by a commission of experts. 20.  The expert report of 19 June 2008, reflecting the results of that examination, stated, in particular, that the applicant had targeted police officers as a \u201csocial group\u201d and that his comment had \u201caimed at inciting hatred and enmity\u201d towards this group and had \u201ccalled for their physical extermination\u201d.\n(b)  Judgment of 7 July 2008 21.  On 7 July 2008 the Town Court found the applicant guilty under Article 282 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code for \u201chaving publicly committed actions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity and humiliating the dignity of a group of persons on the grounds of their membership of a social group\u201d. The court based its findings on, among other evidence, the expert reports of 30 April 2007 and 19 June 2008, stating that it had no reasons to doubt the experts\u2019 conclusions as those were consistent with the circumstances of the case as established by the court. 22.  The court stated, in particular, that the applicant, acting out of his personal aversion towards police officers, \u201c[had] decided to influence the public with the aims of inciting them to commit violent actions against police officers, of instilling the public with the resolve and aspiration to commit unlawful actions in respect of [the police officers]\u201d. According to the court, \u201cthe police officers of Russia [were] a large social group \u2013 people united by their common activity in protecting the life, health, rights and liberties of people, property, public and State interests from crimes and offences\u201d. It also noted that the applicant \u201c[had been] aware of the illegal nature of his actions when he [had] published his text aimed at inciting enmity and hatred, imbued with hostility, hatred and humiliation of the dignity of the police officers of Russia... on a more popular Internet blog than his own ... and thus [he had] made it accessible to a larger readership\u201d and that \u201c... access to the text [had been] unrestricted and it [had] remained accessible ... for approximately one month ...\u201d 23.  The Town Court went on to note that the impugned text had been generalised and impersonal and had drawn no distinctions on any grounds; the word \u201ccop\u201d had been used with a negative and insulting meaning. According to the Town Court, the applicant had \u201cargued that the police officers\u2019 [had been] inferior on account of their professional grouping\u201d, had humiliated their dignity by comparing them with \u201cpigs\u201d and ascribing to them the humiliating characteristics of \u201clowbrows and hoodlums \u2013 the dumbest and most uneducated representatives of the animal world ...\u201d and \u201ccop-hoodlum filth\u201d. 24.  In the court\u2019s view, the applicant \u201cnegatively [influenced] public opinion with the aim of inciting social hatred and enmity, escalating social conflict and controversy in society and awakening base instincts in people\u201d and \u201c[set] the community against police officers in calling for [their] physical extermination by ordinary people\u201d. According to the trial court, \u201cthe text [did] not allow for any ambiguous interpretation of [its] content and meaning, because it [was] understandable to any average native speaker of Russian who [had] basic oral and written language skills\u201d. 25.  The Town Court also found that the impugned text could not be viewed as a criticism, as it had not been intended as a discussion of any shortcomings or as an analysis or assessment of something specific. 26.  Lastly, the court considered that \u201cthe crime committed by [the applicant was] particularly blatant and dangerous for national security [as] it [ran] against the fundamentals of the constitutional system and State security\u201d, with the result that a sentence involving the deprivation of liberty should be imposed on the applicant. Given the applicant\u2019s positive references at the place of residence and work and the absence of a criminal record, the court considered it appropriate to give the applicant a suspended sentence of one year\u2019s imprisonment.\n(c)  Appeal proceedings 27.  The applicant appealed against the conviction. He pleaded, in particular, that the trial court had deliberately extended the scope of the term \u201csocial group\u201d to encompass police officers and that it had not been shown that his statement had, indeed, posed a danger to society. 28.  On 19 August 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and endorsed the Town Court\u2019s conclusions. It also found that the experts had acted within the scope of their competence, and that the applicant\u2019s allegation of a loose interpretation of the term \u201csocial group\u201d had not affected the objectivity of the first-instance court\u2019s findings. The appellate court added that the applicant\u2019s statement had not been concerned with any criticism of the law-enforcement bodies but had publicly called for violence against police officers.", "references": ["1", "2", "7", "4", "3", "9", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Rotterdam. 6.  The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 7.  V. made statements to the police admitting his own participation in the supermarket robberies and implicating the applicant in all four crimes. 8.  The applicant was tried before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank). V. was summoned as a witness by the defence. 9.  Not being suspected of having taken part in the street mugging, V. could not refuse to give evidence about it; he made a statement to the effect that he had not personally witnessed the robbery but had heard from bystanders that it had been committed by a group that did not include the applicant. 10.  V.\u2019s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 11.  On 30 August 2006 the Regional Court gave judgment convicting the applicant of all four crimes. It sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the execution of a suspended two-week sentence of juvenile detention (jeugddetentie) imposed on a previous occasion when the applicant was still a minor. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep) with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 13.  V. was again summoned as a witness by the defence. As relevant to the case before the Court, he kept silence on all four charges, including the street mugging in relation to which he was by this time being prosecuted for perjury. 14.  The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 4 March 2008 convicting the applicant of all four charges. It sentenced the applicant to six years\u2019 imprisonment and, as the Regional Court had done, ordered the execution of the two-week suspended sentence of juvenile detention. 15.  The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows:\n(a) The supermarket manager\u2019s report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed;\n(b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods;\n(c) V.\u2019s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention of the use made by the Court of Appeal of V.\u2019s statements to the police to ground his convictions even though V. had refused to answer the questions of the defence under cross-examination. 17.  The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.\u2019s evidence was \u201csole and decisive\u201d in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available. 18.  On 5 January 2010 the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. Referring to its own case-law (its judgment of 6 June 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV1633, Netherlands Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, \u201cNJ\u201d) 2006, no. 332, its judgment in the Vidgen case; see Vidgen v. the Netherlands, no. 29353/06, \u00a7 23, 10 July 2012), it found that the applicant had had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine V. or have him cross-examined. The mere fact that V. had refused to give evidence under cross-examination did not mean that use in evidence of his statement to the police was excluded by Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention.", "references": ["1", "0", "8", "7", "6", "5", "4", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Liski, Voronezh Region. 6.  In 2009 the applicant started to run a business as an \u201cindividual entrepreneur\u201d (\u0438\u043d\u0434\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c). 7.  In February 2013 he lodged a notification with the Liski unit of the south-eastern branch of the Consumer Protection Agency (\u201cthe Liski Unit\u201d) about his intention to extend his business to the sale of foods. In this notification he specified, inter alia, three different addresses as follows: the address at which he was actually residing (that he called \u201c\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u0436\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430\u201d), his \u201cregistration address\u201d (\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) which corresponded to his registered residence address and the address of the place of this new business (\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0438\u0434\u0430 \u0434\u0435\u044f\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438) for stands selling food. 8.  The applicant\u2019s business was subject to an inspection in July 2014. It appears that the applicant was aware that this inspection took place. The inspection was recorded in an inspection document dated 23 July 2014. 9.  On 28 July 2014 an official of the Liski Unit contacted the applicant on his mobile number and, it appears, informed the applicant of the intention to institute administrative offence proceedings against him and that a hearing in this regard would be held on 6 August 2014 (see, however, paragraph 10 below). On the basis of the inspection document the Liski Unit compiled on 6 August 2014 a record of the alleged administrative offence, accusing the applicant of non\u2011compliance with the technical regulations (Article 14.43 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences \u2013 \u201cthe CAO\u201d). Specifically, the applicant was accused of several counts relating to (i) the absence of equipment and/or proper storage arrangements respecting temperature requirements for food products, in particular for perishable foods; (ii) the fact that certain stored goods had not been accompanied by documents certifying their origin, quality and safety. The offence record contained the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone number; his registered residence address and the business address (the location of the stalls); his actual residence address was not specified in the offence record. 10.  The offence record states that the applicant came to the Liski Unit on 6 August 2014 but then left the building before any offence record could be compiled, having stated that he had not been properly informed of the actual purpose of the meeting. Thus, the applicant was not present during the compiling of the record. 11.  It is unclear whether the applicant received a copy of it at the time. 12.  The Liski Unit instituted proceedings before the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region (see paragraph 36 below). 13.  On 12 August 2014 the court adopted a decision to initiate a case and to examine it by way of a summary procedure. According to the Government, on 13 August 2014 this decision was dispatched, by registered mail, \u201cto the applicant\u2019s two addresses\u201d; both letters were subsequently returned following expiry of the retention period. Unlike for subsequent proceedings (see paragraphs 15 and 21 below), the Court has not been provided with any relevant evidence such as postal slips or dispatch cards. However, it appears that one letter was dispatched to the applicant\u2019s registered residence address and was then returned to the court for lack/absence of the addressee at that address (see paragraph 31 below). 14.  On 10 October 2014 the court decided to examine the case by way of an ordinary procedure because it was necessary to hear the defendant (that is to say the applicant). A preliminary hearing was scheduled for 11 November 2014 and the applicant\u2019s or his representative\u2019s presence was required. It was indicated in the relevant court order that information on the progress of the case (including the time and place of hearings) was available on the court\u2019s Internet site and at the information stand at the entrance to the court. 15.  According to the Government, the notification was dispatched on 13 October 2014 but then was returned to the court following expiry of the retention period. The Government has provided the Court with a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched on 14 October 2014 to the applicant\u2019s registered residence address and then returned to the court on 24 October 2014 with a note listing reasons for return with \u201cexpiry of the retention period\u201d being checked. 16.  On 11 November 2014 the court adjourned to 9 December 2014 and it required the parties to be present. On 12 November 2014 letters were sent by registered mail to the applicant\u2019s registered residence address and the location of the business (the stalls). Those letters were subsequently returned to the court as undelivered. The dispatch card listed reasons for re\u2011dispatch, with \u201cexpiry of the retention period\u201d being checked. 17.  The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was delivered to the Liski Unit on 19 November 2014. 18.  On 10 December 2014 the court heard the case and acquitted the applicant. Neither the applicant nor his representative was present, and they lodged no submissions. It was indicated in the judgment that the applicant had been \u201cduly informed\u201d of the hearing. 19.  The Government has submitted no specific information or documents relating to the dispatch of the trial judgment. 20.  The Liski Unit appealed to the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal. According to the Government, on 19 December 2014 a copy of their statement of appeal was dispatched to the applicant. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 21.  By a decision of 26 December 2014 the appeal court scheduled a hearing for 28 January 2015. According to the Government, this decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. 22.  The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched to the Liski Unit on 30 December 2014 and was handed over to it on 12 January 2015 as confirmed by a signature (of its official). 23.  On 4 February 2015 the appeal court adjourned the hearing to 4 March 2015. According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing this decision was dispatched to the applicant by registered mail but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch cards or postal slips. 24.  On 12 March 2015 the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal held an appeal hearing and heard the Liski Unit\u2019s representative. The appellate court admitted as evidence new documents submitted by the Unit, one of which was meant to demonstrate that the applicant had indeed been aware of the administrative hearing on 6 August 2014 (see paragraph 9 above). 25.  By a decision of the same date the appeal court then quashed that judgment, found the applicant guilty, and imposed a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 equivalent to 298 euros (EUR) at the time). This decision became final and enforceable on the same date. The appeal decision reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] is absent from the appeal hearing; he has been duly informed about the time and place of the hearing. Pursuant to Articles 123, 156 and 266 of the CComP [Code of Commercial Procedure] the case is being examined in his absence ...\nThis decision ... may be challenged by way of a cassation appeal before the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit within two months ...\u201d 26.  According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing the appeal decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court undelivered. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 27.  According to the applicant, he first learnt about the trial and appeal decisions on 3 June 2015 during a conversation with an official of the Liski transport prosecutor\u2019s office. The applicant then accessed the website of the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Regional Court. At his request, on 29 June 2015 he was given access to the case file at the registry of that court and was provided with the court decisions of 10 December 2014 and 12 March 2015. The applicant then lodged an application for a cassation\u2011appeal review in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 and requested the restoration of the time-limit for a valid reason. 28.  In his statement of appeal the applicant argued, as to the matter of notification in the appeal proceedings, that he had not been provided with the Liski Unit\u2019s statement of appeal and had not been informed of the start of the appeal proceedings. It should have been clear to the appeal court from the case file that the notifications to the registered residence address had been returned. However, the appeal court persisted in sending notifications to that address while failing to use alternative means such as a telephone communication on his mobile number that was mentioned in the case file. Moreover, the appeal court could have asked the Liski Unit\u2019s representative whether she had the applicant\u2019s actual residence address or his telephone contacts. The appeal court could have required the representative to hand over a notification to the applicant in person. The appeal court had been aware of a business notification and, specifically, could have sought submission of the 2013 notification document (see paragraph 7 above) indicating the applicant\u2019s actual residence address while the Liski Unit\u2019s representative had omitted to disclose it. The applicant insisted that he had not received any notifications; no correspondence, including by registered mail, had been handed over to him by any official of the postal service; he had never refused any such correspondence. In particular, despite the requirements of the law, when returning correspondence, the postal service had not specified that the addressee had not been present/residing at the address and had not indicated the source of their information about that. 29.  On 22 July 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit examined the applicant\u2019s application for the restoration of the time-limit for cassation review. The court held as follows:\n\u201cUnder Article 276 of the CComP an application for cassation review may be lodged within two months of the date on which an impugned judicial decision acquired legal force, unless otherwise provided by the CComP.\nIt is noted, however, that the statement of cassation appeal in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 was dispatched to the first-instance court on 8 July 2015 \u2013 that is to say after the expiry of the relevant period ...\nThe case file contains no indisputable proof that the impugned court decision was in a timely manner dispatched to and received by [the applicant]. It is also noted that he was actually served with the court decisions in respect of the present case on 29 June 2015 in the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region. Thus, the court finds it acceptable to grant the application for restoration of the time-limit ...\u201d 30.  On 6 October 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit held a public hearing while noting the absence of the parties and that they had been duly notified of the cassation hearing but had chosen not to attend. The cassation court then proceeded with the examination of the case on the basis of the case file and the parties\u2019 arguments concerning the charge and procedural matters. The cassation court then upheld the appeal decision. In particular as regards the matter of notification, it considered that the decision to start proceedings had been dispatched to the applicant but that he had avoided being served with judicial notifications; however, he had been able to continue to keep himself informed, via the court\u2019s website, of the appeal proceedings after the first-instance judgment against him (see the \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d section below). The decision of 6 October 2015 reads, in the relevant parts, as follows:\n\u201cIn his cassation appeal [the applicant] asks this court to set aside the appeal decision of 12 March 2015, referring to the wrong application of the substantive and procedural laws. In their observations in reply the administrative authority objects ... The parties were duly notified of the time and place of the [cassation] hearing but their representatives have not appeared before this court. Thus, the cassation appeal has been examined in their absence ... Having examined the case file and having examined the arguments raised in the cassation appeal and observations in reply, the cassation court finds no grounds for granting the cassation appeal ...\nThis court dismissed the cassation appeal in the part concerning the alleged non\u2011notification of the appeal hearing.\nPursuant to Article 121 \u00a7 1 of the CComP, a commercial court informs parties to a case of the initiation of that case, the time and place of a hearing, or a procedural act, by way of dispatching a court decision. When applying the above provision it is relevant that it follows from Article 121 \u00a7 6 and Article 123 \u00a7 1 that before a hearing or before taking a procedural act a court must have information that the participants have received a copy of the first judicial act in a given case or must have information relating to Article 123 \u00a7 4.\nA first judicial act means a decision to initiate a case. ...\nWhere a case file contains a document concerning the handing over (\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) of the first judicial act to the person or information relating to Article 123 \u00a7 4, this person is deemed to have been duly notified of appeal, cassation or supervisory review proceedings ... , provided that the relevant court fulfils its obligations relating to the posting of information regarding dates and places of hearings on the official Internet site ...\nPursuant to Article 9 \u00a7 1 and Article 41 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the CComP, participants in commercial-court proceedings bear the risk of adverse consequences that may arise from their taking a certain procedural action or from omitting to take it; they use their procedural rights in good faith and fulfil their procedural obligations ... failure to comply with such obligations entail the consequences prescribed by the CComP ...\nThe decisions to initiate a case and to start the examination of the case were dispatched to [the applicant], as required by the law, but he evaded (\u0443\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f) receipt of the court notifications.\nGiven the above-mentioned legal provisions and the presumption of good-faith conduct on the part of the participants in a commercial case, this court concludes that [the applicant] should have been aware of the time and place of the appeal hearing and could have accessed the relevant information on the processing of the case via accessible official sources ...\nThis decision may be challenged before the Supreme Court of Russia within two months of the adoption of this decision, as prescribed by Article 291.1 of the CComP.\u201d 31.  In his cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Russia the applicant mentioned, inter alia, the following information:\n\u201cAs can be seen from a certificate on registered mail postal dispatches (I have received this certificate on 25 July 2015; see its original enclosed herewith) the decision of 12 August 2014 ... was dispatched on 13 August to the following address [the applicant\u2019s registered residence address]. It was then sent back to the court on 21 August 2014, as indicated \u201cbecause there was no addressee\u201d, and was handed over to the court on 1 September 2014. This confirms that I did not evade the receipt of this notification or any subsequent notification ...\u201d 32.  Referring to Article 30.12 of the CAO, on 30 December 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the appeal decision and the first cassation-appeal decision.", "references": ["8", "0", "5", "2", "7", "1", "9", "6", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant is one of the founders and the chief executive officer of the second applicant, a non-profit organisation. 6.  The second applicant is the publisher of the Risale-I Nur Collection, an exegesis on the Qur\u2019an written by Muslim Turkish scholar Said Nursi in the first half of the 20th century. The books from that collection were used for religious and educational purposes in Russian mosques and medreses. 7.  On 28 March 2005 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic instituted criminal proceedings against members of the religious movement Nurculuk (\u041d\u0443\u0440\u0436\u0443\u043b\u0430\u0440) based on the writings of Said Nursi. They were charged with incitement of hatred or discord, as well as abasement of human dignity, an offence under Article 282 of the Criminal Code, for having distributed Said Nursi\u2019s books from the Risale-I Nur Collection. 8.  On 24 April 2006 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic applied to the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow, asking that the following books from the Risale-I Nur Collection published by the second applicant be declared extremist and banned (see sections 1 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act cited in paragraphs 41 and 42 below):\n-  \u201cFaith and Man\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M.G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cThe Foundations of Sincerity\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;\n-  \u201cThe Truths of an Eternal Soul\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev;\n-  \u201cThe Truths of Faith\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;\n-  \u201cThe Guide for Women\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev;\n-  \u201cThe Fruits of Faith\u201d, 2000, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cRamadan. Care. Thankfulness\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;\n-  \u201cMunajat (Prayer). The Third Ray\u201d, 2002 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cThirty-three Windows\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M. Irsala;\n-  \u201cThe Foundations of Brotherhood\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cThe Path of Truth\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev and M. G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cThe Staff of Moses\u201d, year of publication not specified, translated by T. N. Galimov and M. G. Tamimdarov;\n-  \u201cThe Short Words\u201d, year of publication not specified, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov; and\n-  \u201cBook for the Sick\u201d, 2003 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov. 9.  The prosecutor enclosed expert opinions prepared in the framework of the criminal cases against the members of Nurculuk by four psychologists and a psychiatrist. The experts found that the above-mentioned texts attempted to subconsciously influence the reader to form irrational values and opinions. The reader was thus deprived of the ability to think critically and independently and to choose his religion freely. The texts led the reader to form a negative opinion about adherents of other faiths and thus encouraged hatred and enmity towards them. They also advocated the idea of people\u2019s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. In particular, the texts by Said Nursi incited the reader to look at non-believers with disdain and aversion, and therefore promoted discord between believers and non-believers. Muslims guilty of apostasy from Islam were even denied the right to life. The experts concluded that Said Nursi\u2019s texts formed in the reader feelings of aversion, anger, hatred and enmity towards non-believers. 10.  The second applicant and the Council of Mufti of Russia were invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties. 11.  On 4 August 2006 the Council of Mufti of Russia submitted an alternative expert opinion by a panel of experts consisting of a doctor of theology and a doctor of religious philosophy. The experts found that in his books, Said Nursi explained the foundations of the Islamic doctrine, and provided a commentary on the Qur\u2019an. His commentary was in conformity with the classical version of Islam. The books did not contain any extremist statements and did not call for violence or ethnic or religious enmity. Although some texts indeed morally condemned sinners and non-believers, blaming them for the immorality of modern society, such discourse was characteristic of all religious texts. A perusal of the texts also revealed that their author promoted the peaceful coexistence of religions and dialogue between them. The experts criticised the conclusions made by the prosecutor\u2019s experts who, in their opinion, were incompetent in religious matters and did not have even a basic knowledge of Islam. The reproaches made by them against Said Nursi\u2019s books could have been made against any theological treatise, be it Muslim, Christian or Judaic, or any other religious text. 12.  In his letter of 4 August 2006 the Chief Mufti of Russia endorsed the above-mentioned expert opinion. He said that the prosecutor\u2019s experts had interpreted faith in the righteousness of any religion and the preaching of that faith as propaganda about people\u2019s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. The experts\u2019 findings had therefore been based on anti\u2011religion concepts and could be applied to any religious text. Said Nursi\u2019s books did not contain any calls to do harm to non-believers or adherents to other religions, to infringe their rights or to otherwise violate Russian laws. 13.  Counsel for the second applicant submitted the following documents to the Koptevskiy District Court:\n-  a letter from the president of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts could not be qualified as extremist or fanatical. They did not contain any calls for violence, ethnic or religious hatred or for overthrowing governments. Rather, they promoted Islamic values of goodness, love and belief in God;\n-  a letter from the president of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Tatarstan Republic affirming that Said Nursi was a respected commentator of the Qur\u2019an. He called for love towards all people irrespective of their ethnic origin, race or religion and advocated clemency, compassion, peace, brotherhood and mutual understanding. He encouraged interreligious dialogue and opposed all radical actions and attitudes;\n-  a letter from the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation arguing against declaring Said Nursi\u2019s texts extremist literature as this would violate the rights of Muslims to freedom of religion;\n-  a letter by Professor J. from the International Islamic University in Malaysia, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts called for reconciliation, peaceful co-existence and cooperation between different religions and cultures, as well as for justice, tolerance, freedom and love;\n-  a specialist opinion by the Department of Islamic Studies of the Tatarstan Republic Institute of History, according to which the books by Said Nursi called for self-development and moral perfection, and spoke against violence. For that reason his books were an important tool in the fight against religious extremism. Although he indeed stated that Islam was superior to other religions and to atheism, such statements were inherent in all religious texts;\n-  a letter from Mr M., a Catholic priest and the Secretary for Interreligious Dialogue of the Society of Jesus, affirming that the texts written by Said Nursi belonged to mainstream Islam and were rooted in the centuries-old Islamic tradition. They did not contain any elements of extremism. On the contrary, they were a moderating force in Islam, proposing to Muslims a way of life that was tolerant and open to others. They explicitly endorsed Muslim-Christian cooperation and unity, and stimulated friendship and positive relations between Muslims and followers of Christianity;\n-  a copy of the decision of 1984 of the prosecutor\u2019s office of Istanbul not to initiate criminal proceedings against the publisher of the Risale-I Nur Collection in Turkey. The prosecutor\u2019s office referred to an expert opinion which did not find any indications of a criminal offence in Said Nursi\u2019s texts;\n-  copies of expert opinions delivered in 1960 by a group of Turkish experts at the request of several Turkish prosecutors. The experts had found that the books by Said Nursi did not contain any harmful or unlawful statements;\n-  a letter from the Council on Religious Matters of the Committee of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s books contained directions on moral and religious issues inspired by the Qur\u2019an and did not touch on politics. Said Nursi had been a respected theologian who had always distanced himself from political, ideological and extremist activities, as well as from radical Islam. He had proclaimed that the truth was to be found through dialogue and had spoken against hatred and all forms of compulsion;\n-  a letter from the Ministry of Justice of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Mufti of Egypt, submitting that Said Nursi\u2019s texts were beneficial to the reader as they taught love of God and high moral values, and condemned envy, hatred, anger and resentment;\n-  a letter from the director general of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts promoted love of God, the importance of prayer and high moral values. His books did not contain any insulting or hostile statements against adherents of other religions or persons belonging to other races;\n-  a letter from Dr T., a professor of the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Durham, submitting that Said Nursi\u2019s books did not contain any statements aimed at stirring up religious hatred. Said Nursi had been extremely careful throughout his life to foster a sense of solidarity between followers of different religions and that was reflected in his texts. Nor did his books contain statements promoting the idea of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority of people based on their religious affiliation or ethnic origin or justifying extremist activities. Said Nursi was one of the few modern Muslim scholars who unequivocally opposed the ideas of extremism, political activism or offensive jihad. His texts provided a welcome antidote to the militancy of the contemporary Islamic discourse as they proscribed military jihad altogether, be it offensive or defensive, and said that Islam was not to be defended by the sword but by the force of reason, progress and civilisation. 14.  On 9 November 2006 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of a philologist, a linguist psychologist, a social psychologist and a psychologist from the Linguistics and Psychology Departments of the Russian Academy of Science. 15.  Counsel for the second applicant appealed, submitting that the appointed experts were incompetent in religious matters. He asked the court to appoint persons with expertise in religious issues. On 26 December 2006 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of 9 November 2006. 16.  On 15 February 2007 the experts delivered their joint report, finding that Said Nursi\u2019s texts encouraged religious discord between believers and non-believers, contained negative and humiliating statements about non\u2011believers and promoted the notion that believers had superiority over non-believers. Accordingly, they made the following findings:\n\u201c1.  The printed texts submitted for expert review contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds of attitude to religion) and also statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating the above statements and declarations. 2.  The printed texts submitted for expert review contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion. 3.  The printed texts submitted for expert review contain propaganda about the superiority or inferiority of citizens based on their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers) and contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views.\nThey do not advocate ideas concerning people\u2019s superiority or inferiority based on their ethnic origin.\u201d 17.  Counsel for the second applicant submitted to the Koptevskiy District Court the following specialist opinions, criticising the report of 15 February 2007:\n-  a specialist opinion by Mr Mu., president of the Russian Islamic University, who found that the court-appointed experts were not competent in religious matters and that they had quoted and analysed Said Nursi\u2019s statements out of context. Although in his books Said Nursi indeed criticised the Western way of life and condemned non-believers, he did not promote hatred or enmity towards those who did not share his opinion. Moreover, similar statements were present in all religious texts;\n-  a specialist opinion by Mr S., a doctor of law specialising in Muslim law, who expressed similar criticisms of the report of 15 February 2007 and found that Said Nursi\u2019s texts did not contain any propaganda in favour of discrimination, hatred or religious superiority. On the contrary, they were permeated with ideas of brotherhood, friendship and goodness, while anger and hatred were clearly condemned;\n-  a specialist opinion by Mr Me., a doctor of philosophy specialising in religious matters, who came to the same conclusions. He found, in particular, that Said Nursi\u2019s texts were no different from other religious texts in terms of assuming that their religion was superior to the others and condemning non-believers. 18.  Counsel for the second applicant again asked the court to appoint experts in religious matters. On 9 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court rejected his request, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics could analyse the meaning of the texts. 19.  On 28 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an additional expert opinion by the same experts. 20.  On 15 May 2007 the experts delivered an additional expert report, confirming their previous findings. 21.  During a closed hearing before the Koptevskiy District Court, two of the experts who had prepared the expert reports submitted by the prosecutor confirmed their previous findings. They said that the texts had been analysed from the perspective of social psychology. One of them, however, added that the analysed texts did not contain any explicit calls for social, racial, ethnic or religious discord. 22.  Two of the court-appointed experts were also questioned and confirmed their findings. 23.  A co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia stated that Said Nursi was a world-renowned Muslim scholar whose texts formed an integral part of the official teachings of Islam. They did not contain any extremist statements. Any religious text would be found irrational and extremist by an atheist. The ban on Said Nursi\u2019s books would hinder the religious life of Russian Muslims and unjustifiably restrict their freedom of religion. 24.  A specialist called by the applicants, a doctor of philosophy, criticised the experts appointed by the prosecution for taking fragments of text out of context and thereby distorting their meaning. Said Nursi\u2019s texts indeed proclaimed the superiority of Islam over other religions, but all religions did that. 25.  On 21 May 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court declared the books written by Said Nursi extremist material. After summarising the applicable domestic law, the submissions by the parties and the documents produced by them in support of their positions, it referred to the expert opinions commissioned by it. It held:\n\u201cIt follows from [the court-appointed expert reports of 15 February and 15 May 2007] that Said Nursi\u2019s books from the Risale-I Nur Collection [list of books] contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds of attitude to religion) and also statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating the above-mentioned statements and declarations.\nThe books contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion.\nThe books contain propaganda about the superiority or deficiency of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers). They also contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views.\nThe court does not have any reason to doubt these expert reports ...\u201d\nThe court then rejected the specialist opinions submitted by the applicants, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics were competent to establish the meaning of the contested texts. It held that the specialists cited by the applicants did not have such expertise. It also rejected the oral submissions by the co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia on the grounds that he was an interested party. It continued:\n\u201cIn view of the above, the court concludes that the books from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Said Nursi are extremist literature. Their content aims to incite religious discord and advocate the idea of the superiority or inferiority of citizens, depending on their religion. They also advocate and justify the necessity of such actions.\u201d 26.  On 18 September 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 21 May 2007 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. It stressed that the subject matter of the case was the specific editions of the books, rather than Said Nursi\u2019s teaching as such. 27.  In May 2008, the applicant, a religious association, commissioned the Klass publishing house to print the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d (\u00ab\u0414\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0435 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e \u043e \u0432\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0438\u0437 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0432\u044b\u0445\u00bb) from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Said Nursi. 28.  The prosecutor of the Krasnoyarsk Region applied to the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk for protection of the interests of the Russian Federation, asking that the book be declared extremist material and all printed copies be confiscated. He relied on previous decisions by the Russian courts, which had declared other works from the Risale-I Nur Collection extremist, and on a report of 24 December 2008 by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University. 29.  The report of 24 December 2008 had been prepared by a panel of \u201cspecialists\u201d consisting of a philologist, a psychologist and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies. They had made the following finding:\n\u201cThe book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 by Said Nursi submitted for expert review is ideological literature addressed to a wide audience. The gist of the book is propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion.\nThe text under review aims to arouse feelings of aversion, anger, enmity and discord against non-believers.\nThe book substantiates and justifies extremist activity.\u201d\nThat finding was based, among other things, on the fact that the book contained military metaphors which, according to the specialists, could incline the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The specialists also noted that the value of such a world-view was stressed by positive epithets. The specialist report cited the following expressions:\n\u201cListen, this state is a military ground; an exhibition of wonderful royal art;\n The military camp becomes like a lavish colourful blossoming garden on the Earth\u2019s surface. The armies of the Eternal King are plentiful, consisting of angels, jinn, people and ignorant animals and plants in a battle for the preservation of their lives. Having received God\u2019s order: \u2018Prepare your weapons and equipment for the defence!\u2019, all thorny trees and plants on the Earth link up their little bayonets, resembling a majestic military camp ready for battle ...\nThe One Wise and Almighty creates anew, from nothing, by a simple order \u2018Be and it comes true\u2019, and places in perfect order, wisely and in balance all parts and minute details of unit-like bodies of all animals and other living creatures who are like an army; every century, every spring He creates on the Earth\u2019s surface hundreds of thousands of species and tribes of living creatures who are like an army. How can you doubt that He can ... He says \u2018He who will resurrect you on the Resurrection Day is He for whom the entire universe is like an obedient soldier. It obeys with perfect submissiveness the order \u2018Be and it comes true\u2019. It is as easy for Him to create spring as it is to create a single flower\u2019.\u201d 30.  The applicant organisation was invited to participate in the proceedings as a third party. It submitted, in particular, that the opinion of 24 December 2008 had been made by specialists who had no knowledge of Islam and who had therefore incorrectly interpreted the text. 31.  The Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court ordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of two psychologists and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies from the Lomonosov Moscow State University. 32.  On 28 April 2010 the court-appointed experts delivered their joint report, finding as follows:\n\u201cThe book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi, 2005 edition, is a popular exposition of the Qur\u2019an. Its aim is to acquaint the reader with Said Nursi\u2019s point of view. The main part of the text is devoted to lauding and glorifying God and his wisdom, as is customary for any monotheistic religious tradition. Said Nursi\u2019s ideology, or his world-view, is quite traditional for Islam, as well as for any monotheistic religion. The author\u2019s objective is to \u2018show that the truths of Islam are reasonable, solid and interrelated\u2019, which is a typical objective of any theologian ...\nThe verbal means used in the book do not go beyond value judgments used in any religious literature ...\nUnder a normal perception of the text the book does not contain anything that could have a possible incentive influence on the human consciousness, will, socio\u2011psychological characteristics or conduct. Possible aberrant perceptions of the textual material by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people cannot be evaluated in the framework of the present review, as they would require an evaluation of the readers rather than of the text itself ...\nThe book does not contain any statements, appeals or declarations which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence ...\nThe book does not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation ...\nThe book does not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis ...\nFrom a scientific point of view, the book is not different from any other religious text; it does not substantiate, justify or advocate the idea that people have an exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency on the basis of their religious affiliation or attitude to religion ...\nIslam, like any other religion as well as atheism, is characterised by a psychologically based belief in the superiority of its world-view over all other world\u2011views, which made it necessary to substantiate the choice of that world-view ...\u201d 33.  At the hearing the applicant organisation requested the District Court to secure the attendance and in-court examination of the Moscow State University experts to clarify several of their findings which could be considered ambiguous. The District Court rejected that request, finding that the applicant organisation had not made it at the preliminary hearing and that it was not possible to clarify an expert report by questioning the experts; it would have been necessary to order an additional expert report, which the applicant organisation had not requested. The request to question the experts had therefore been \u201cformal, unjustified\u201d and an attempt \u201cto prevent the court from examining the case and deciding on the matter\u201d. 34.  The District Court also rejected as irrelevant a request for the examination of additional material about Said Nursi\u2019s life and teachings. It also refused to read the text of the book, noting that the book was sufficiently quoted in the report by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University. 35.  On 21 September 2010 the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk granted the prosecutor\u2019s application, declared the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d by Said Nursi extremist and ordered the destruction of the printed copies. After summarising the applicable domestic law and the submissions by the parties, it held as follows:\n\u201cAccording to the specialists\u2019 report of 24 December 2008 by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University, [the specialists] read the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi ...\nHaving analysed the textual content of the book, its syntax structures, the genre characteristics and the methods of structuring the text and expressions, the panel of specialists came to an unanimous finding that, as a whole, the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi is ideological, and at the same time religious, literature inciting religious discord and containing propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. In particular, it incites discord between Muslims and non-believers, which term is understood to include adherents of other religions as well as those who do not belong to any religion. The gist of the book is a breach of religious equality consisting in forming in the reader a negative and aggressive attitude towards non-believers and adherents to other religions, which amounts to inciting hatred and discord against them (see [specialist report of 24 December 2008]).\nAccording to the specialists\u2019 report mentioned above, the values inspired in the reader by the text are the exceptional nature of the Islamic faith, which is presented to the reader as the ultimate truth. People are divided into two groups: those who do not follow the Islamic faith are described by the author as \u2018the dissolute\u2019, \u2018the philosophers\u2019 and \u2018the idle talkers\u2019; and those who belong to that religion are described by the author as \u2018the faithful\u2019 and \u2018the just\u2019. It follows that believers and non-believers are rated differently on the basis of their adherence to the Islamic religion: the unfaithful are rated negatively, while the faithful to Islam are rated positively. The author uses in his text disparaging words and expressions to belittle the European culture, which is understood, in the light of the religious contents of the book, as religious confessions other than Islam. The author uses military metaphors in the text, which inevitably inclines the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The value of such a world-view is stressed by positive epithets. Simultaneously, through the use of verbal means and expressions, the author implicitly (that is covertly rather than openly, by influencing the subconscious) forms in the reader\u2019s mind the idea of an enemy, the notion of a potential aggressor. Taken together, it creates in the reader\u2019s mind an idea that it is necessary to be ready for a fight. The structure of the book is such that in the subsequent text the idea of the necessity to fight, of being ready for a fight, is, on the one hand, attenuated as it is not expressed directly; on the other hand, having been already stated earlier, it may be reinforced in the readers\u2019 minds because the text inspires the idea that non-believers commit a crime consisting in the very fact of not believing and which, according to the text under review, does not merit forgiveness. Thereby the author of the book attempts to influence the reader\u2019s psyche on a subconscious level and to influence the mechanisms of his faith, that is to form on an irrational basis conscious values and attitudes. It may deprive the reader of the capacity to think critically about changes happening in real life, may undermine his ability to make independent decisions and thereby breach the right to freedom of religion. According to the book, anyone who does not accept Islam, a non-believer, is the most inferior person who is deprived of his rights, is a criminal not deserving forgiveness. The book suggests to the reader corporate norms and a model of society where all people follow the same rules; the actions of all members of such a society are tightly regulated, they are encouraged to comply like obedient soldiers, military officers or civil servants who must unquestioningly carry out orders and commands (see [expert report of 24 December 2008]).\nAccording to the specialists\u2019 report mentioned above (see [specialists\u2019 report of 24 December 2008]), the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi is potentially addressed to different people.\nOn the one hand, the text is addressed to non-believers who do not have a developed ability to think critically. If the reader does not have a certain ideology of life, the text may influence him ideologically and form in his mind the ideas described above by methods of emotional induction and on the least rational level.\nOn the other hand, the text is addressed to readers who have a religious world-view other than Islam, as it calls on them to accept the only true God \u2013 Allah. The author suggests to the reader that it is normal to change one\u2019s world-view and that the author desires it.\nThe text is also addressed to people who accept the Islamic religious worldview, revere Allah and are ready to carry out his will and his commandments, which follows from a reconstruction of such an addressee\u2019s characteristics: readiness to fight for \u2018eternal life\u2019 and the constant service of Allah and his messengers in such forms as may transpire from respective orders.\nThe text is also addressed to readers who \u2018delay\u2019 religious activity ... until an undetermined future point, which may however come at the will of someone who has the right to command and give orders.\nThe text uses the expression \u2018little man\u2019, which may be understood as \u2018the most common\u2019 man who perceives himself as a \u2018little man\u2019. The author suggests that the essence of such a person, if he is not a follower of Islam, is an \u2018infinitely big crime\u2019.\nIn addition, the reader is encouraged to take responsibility for his parents; to save them he must accept the advocated Islamic religious creed. It means that any person who identifies with his parents, who has the slightest feeling of existential guilt for them, may be moved to adopt the view of the world suggested by the author.\nTo sum up, in the opinion of the panel of specialists, the psychological characteristics of the potential addressees (readers) mentioned above are not essential for understanding the text of the book because the text itself, by its specific structure and its [psychological] methods of holding attention and suggestion, is capable, after a long reading, to transmit the advocated religious ideology to any person who is in search of ideological support for his life, who is inclined to reflection and is in the process of self-development.\u201d 36.  The court considered the findings of the report by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University to be credible because they had been made by specialists with professional expertise in the spheres of social psychology, psycholinguistics, philosophy and religious studies who had used scientific methods of analysis. The specialists had confirmed their findings when questioned at the hearing. 37.  By contrast, the court rejected the expert report of 28 April 2010 by the Lomonosov Moscow State University, prepared at its own request, as \u201cnot credible\u201d. It held that the report of 28 April 2010 was insufficiently reasoned and was based on assumptions. In particular, the experts had not explained what they understood by \u201ca normal perception\u201d and \u201cpossible aberrant perceptions by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people\u201d. It was not clear what the experts meant when saying that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence\u201d, that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation\u201d, or that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis\u201d. The court considered that the experts\u2019 wording gave reason to believe that such interpretations could not be excluded, but that interpretations could in fact differ depending on the reader\u2019s individual perceptions. The experts had not cited the statements which, in their opinion, could be subject to different interpretations and had not explained why they had come to that conclusion. The court further found that the comparison of the book with other monotheistic religious texts had been misconceived because it had not asked for a comparative study. If the book contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation, it was irrelevant that other religious texts also contained such statements. Lastly, the District Court noted the absence of a linguist or a philologist in the panel of experts. In the court\u2019s view, that omission undermined the comprehensive nature of the study. 38.  The District Court concluded that the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d by Said Nursi was extremist literature because it was aimed at inciting religious discord and contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. Its contents substantiated and justified the necessity of carrying out such activity. It therefore had to be seized wherever it was found and on whatever information medium it was reproduced. 39.  On 29 November 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant organisation, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court in a summary fashion. 40.  According to the Government, only the editor\u2019s copy of the book was seized. It proved impossible to seize the other copies as they had already been distributed.", "references": ["8", "7", "4", "0", "3", "1", "2", "9", "No Label", "6", "5"], "gold": ["6", "5"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in B\u00edlovice nad Svitavou (the Czech Republic). 6.  On 30 December 1992 the applicant\u2019s legal predecessor and two others applied to the Bratislava Land Office for the restitution of some plots of land under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The date on which the applicant subsequently became a party to the proceedings is not specified. 7.  On 23 June 1997 the Land Office issued a decision approving an agreement whereby the proceedings would end in relation to part of the property but continue in relation to the remainder. 8.  By a decision of the Land Office of 17 May 1999, the proceedings in respect of another part of the property ended. However, on 23 May 2003 the relevant part of the proceedings was reopened. 9.  On 12 July 2013 the Land Office stayed the restitution proceedings on the grounds that the parties had failed to furnish it with their consent to process, in the course of the proceedings, their personal data. 10.  On 11 September 2015 the Land Office dismissed part of what was left of the applicant\u2019s claim. 11.  On 19 October 2015 the Land Office stayed the examination of the remainder of the claim, inviting a number of institutions to submit relevant documentation, which they did by the end of 2015. 12.  The remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim is still pending. 13.  Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 14.  On 20 December 2011 the applicant brought an action in the Bratislava Regional Court for acceleration of the proceedings under Article 250t \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d). 15.  On 19 April 2012 the Regional Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Land Office was short of staff and overburdened with complex and time-consuming restitution claims. It also noted that the Land Office had maintained active correspondence with the applicant and had therefore not caused any undue delays. 16.  The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant\u2019s claim within sixty days. 17.  On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (\u201cthe PPS\u201d) informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 18.  On 21 August 2014 the applicant lodged a fresh action with the Regional Court under Article 250t \u00a7 1 of the CCP, arguing that the Land Office had failed to abide by the order of 11 April 2013. 19.  On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 20.  On 4 July 2012 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints. 21.  The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it.\nOn 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it.\nThe Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t \u00a7 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22.  The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above).\nIn a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant\u2019s complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant\u2019s action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "references": ["7", "5", "1", "2", "9", "4", "8", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  On 23 December 2004 the applicants and 126 others lodged a claim with the Kom\u00e1rno Land Office, an authority that is now part of the Kom\u00e1rno District Office (\u201cthe Land Office\u201d), for restitution of land under the Restoration of Land Ownership Act (Law no. 503/2003 Coll., as amended). 6.  On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the grounds that all the claimants lacked standing to bring it. 7.  On 21 November 2011 the Nitra Regional Court upheld that decision following an administrative-law appeal by the claimants, lodged on their behalf by four individuals. 8.  However, following an appeal lodged by the claimants with the Supreme Court, on 29 January 2014 that court quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case to it on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish the representatives\u2019 authority to act on behalf of all the claimants. The proceedings before the Regional Court had been conducted merely in the presence of the designated representatives and the court had failed to summon the claimants in person and to have its judgment served on them. It had thereby breached the claimants\u2019 right of access to a court. 9.  Accordingly, it became incumbent on the Regional Court to determine anew the claimants\u2019 administrative-law appeal against the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010. In those proceedings, the court invited the claimants to clarify issues concerning their legal representation with a view to ensuring that they would be represented by a common representative. 10.  In a decision of 4 December 2014 the Regional Court issued several rulings. In so far as relevant for the present application, it ruled that the claimants would all be jointly represented by a lawyer who had up until then represented only some of them. 11.  On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 4 December 2014 following an appeal lodged by the claimants. 12.  The proceedings are still pending before the Regional Court. 13.  Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial\u2011review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together.\nHaving split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d below).\nAs regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.", "references": ["7", "5", "2", "4", "8", "9", "1", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Ploie\u0219ti. 6.  At the relevant time, he was married to I.M.U. and they had a son together, born in 2006. Following a series of conflicts between the parents concerning their son\u2019s education, on 13 September 2012 I.M.U. filed for divorce and custody of the child. On 19 October 2012 she left the family home and took the child with her. They moved in with her parents and grandmother. 7.  On 2 November 2012 the applicant lodged an application for an interim injunction (ordonan\u0163\u0103 pre\u015feden\u0163ial\u0103), seeking to be granted sole or shared custody of the child during the divorce proceedings, or alternatively the right to visit the child during those proceedings according to a detailed schedule that he submitted to the court. 8.  The Ploie\u0219ti District Court gave its ruling on 8 January 2013. It ruled that it would not be in the child\u2019s interests to change his residence temporarily during the divorce proceedings. It also observed that the applicant had not been prevented from visiting his child in the mother\u2019s new home, as he himself had confirmed in his statements before the court. The court noted that in any case the law did not provide for the possibility to have visiting rights established during divorce proceedings. It relied on Article 6132 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 18 below). 9.  Following an appeal by the applicant, that ruling was upheld by the Prahova County Court, which rejected all the arguments raised by the applicant concerning his right to visit his child. The court reiterated that the law did not allow for the granting of that right during divorce and custody proceedings. The court also ordered the applicant to pay 1,000 Romanian lei (RON \u2013 approximately 230 euros (EUR)) to I.M.U., representing the costs that I.M.U. had incurred. The court delivered the final decision in the case on 27 May 2013. 10.  In June 2013 the applicant, who was in the habit of visiting his son at school in the mornings, was removed from the school premises by the school guard, who informed him that from then on, he would need the school principal\u2019s permission if he wanted to see his son at the school. 11.  According to the applicant, after the final decision of 27 May 2013 (see paragraph 9 above), I.M.U. and her family denied him any further contact with his son. It appears from the parties\u2019 submissions that the applicant was able to see his son on 27 December 2012, between 31 December 2012 and 2 January 2013, on 20 January, between 2 and 3 March, on 14 and 17 March, on 28 April, on 2, 6 and 12 May 2013, and one last time, on 9 June 2013, after the court had given its ruling in respect of the interim injunction. 12.  On 30 October 2013 the applicant added a copy of the District Court\u2019s ruling of 8 January 2013 (see paragraph 8 above) to the case file. 13.  After several postponements that were due mainly to the parties\u2019 requests to be allowed to submit additional evidence, on 22 January 2014 the Ploie\u015fti District Court gave its judgment on the divorce proceedings, ruling that the child\u2019s sole residence would be with his mother. The applicant was granted the right to have the child stay at his home every other weekend and for two weeks during the summer holidays. On 21 February 2014 the applicant asked the District Court to finish the drafting of its written judgment faster, and reiterated that he had been unable to see his child for the past ten months. 14.  On 4 March 2014 the judgment was served on the applicant at his address; on 28 March 2014 he lodged an appeal. On 2 April 2014 I.M.U. also lodged an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. Despite requests from the applicant to expedite the proceedings in order to allow him to re-establish contact with his son, the case file could not be sent to the Prahova County Court before 7 May 2014 owing to administrative problems within the District Court. 15.  The start of the proceedings before the Prahova County Court was postponed on several occasions in order to allow the parties to get acquainted with the submissions in the file, to hear evidence and to obtain an expert evaluation of the relations between the parents and between each parent and the child. The County Court delivered its ruling on 22 October 2015. It upheld the previous decision adopted by the District Court. 16.  Both parties lodged appeals against the County Court\u2019s decision. At the applicant\u2019s request, the case was sent to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. After several postponements to the proceedings, on 2 November 2016 the Bucharest Court of Appeal delivered the final decision in the case. It upheld the ruling of the District Court, but made some amendments to the applicant\u2019s visiting schedule. 17.  On 19 February 2018 the child moved in with the applicant, at the boy\u2019s own express request and in accordance with an agreement signed before a notary by both parents, following the mother\u2019s decision to move permanently to another town.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "2", "9", "3", "1", "8", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and was detained at the Tekirda\u011f F\u2011type prison when the application was lodged. 5.  On 9 April 2003 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On 13 April 2003 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, and the state of evidence. 7.  On 23 July 2003 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation, and attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey by force. The criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced. 8.  On 10 November 2008 the court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 9.  On 10 November 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an objection against this decision. On 27 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 10.  On 4 May 2011 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 11.  On 25 September 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["6", "3", "4", "5", "9", "1", "8", "0", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, Tiramavia S.R.L., Valan International Cargo Charter S.R.L. and Grixona S.R.L. are companies specialising in air transportation. 6.  Each of the companies had a valid air operator certificate (an \u201cAOC\u201d)[1] issued by the Moldovan Civil Aviation State Authority (the \u201cCASA\u201d). 7.  On 1 June 2007 the CASA issued an order banning all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. 8.  Between 4 and 8 June 2007, all Moldovan aviation companies were subjected to a check by the European Union Safety Committee. As a result, some irregularities concerning compliance with the European norms in the field of aviation safety were detected. The European Union Safety Committee also found that some aviation companies did not comply with the rule according to which the companies have to have their principal place of business in the state of registration. One of the conclusions set down in the visit report drawn up by the European Union Safety Committee was that the CASA failed to demonstrate the ability adequately to enforce and implement the relevant safety standards. According to the report, the CASA had undertaken to remedy the situation within three months. 9.  In a letter addressed to the CASA by the European Commission on 8 June 2007, the former was asked to require all the companies concerned to present their response to the findings in the report by 22 June 2007 at the latest. The CASA was also informed that the companies concerned would have the possibility of presenting their views orally during the Air Safety Committee meeting of 25 June 2007 in Brussels, at which a decision was to be taken on whether or not to ban those companies from entering European Union airspace. 10.  On 14 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies the EU Safety Committee\u2019s report and informed them that they had until 22 June 2007 to present their comments. 11.  On 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies aviation instruction no. 2584 and asked them to present by 21 June 2007 a plan for remedying the irregularities found by the EU Safety Committee. The corresponding plan was sent by the applicant companies to the CASA on 21 June 2007. 12.  Also on 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies aviation instruction no. 2585 requesting them to undertake measures with a view to remedying some of the irregularities before 20 July 2007 and other irregularities before 20 September 2007. 13.  On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant companies\u2019 AOCs, and thereby terminating their activity. 14.  In respect of the first applicant company and three other companies which are not applicants in the present case, the reason relied upon by the CASA was that the airport authorities of several European countries had discovered irregularities with their aircraft, some of which had a recurring nature, and that those irregularities had a negative impact on flight security. The CASA did not specify which irregularities it referred to. 15.  As to the second and third companies, the CASA relied on the fact that they flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 16.  On 22 June 2007 the applicant companies wrote to the CASA and asked it to reverse its decision on the grounds that it had not explained exactly what irregularities formed the basis for the withdrawal of the AOCs and that the CASA had not afforded them enough time to remedy the alleged irregularities. 17.  The CASA refused to reverse its decision, and on 28 June 2007 the applicant companies challenged it in the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal. The applicants submitted, inter alia, that according to section 23 of the Law on Civil Aviation, the CASA was entitled to suspend or withdraw the AOCs only if the companies failed to remedy the irregularities found by the CASA within the prescribed time-limit. They also made reference to section RAC\u2011AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation according to which an AOC could be revoked only after being initially suspended. Since the CASA had not observed those legal provisions, its actions were unlawful. 18.  On 3 December 2008 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal rejected the applicant companies\u2019 action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw the applicant companies\u2019 AOCs because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found in respect of the first applicant company and three other companies, which are not applicants in the present case, and because those companies had failed to remedy those irregularities. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the other companies had failed to comply with the CASA\u2019s order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The court did not give an answer to the applicants\u2019 argument concerning the CASA\u2019s failure to observe the provisions of section 23 the Law on Civil Aviation and those of the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation. It only stated that the legal basis for the CASA\u2019s decision was section 5 of the Law on Civil Aviation and paragraph (c) of RAC-AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice, reiterating inter alia their position concerning the unlawfulness of the challenged decision. 19.  On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant companies\u2019 appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOCs since the second and third applicant companies had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. As to the first applicant company, the Supreme Court confirmed the finding of the inferior court that serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found in respect of it and other companies which are not applicants in the present case and that they had failed to remedy those irregularities. The Supreme Court did not specify which irregularities it referred to and did not address the issue of the unlawfulness of the CASA\u2019s decision.", "references": ["6", "7", "2", "0", "3", "4", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Ayd\u0131n. 8.  At the material time, the applicant was the manager of a hotel in Ku\u015fadas\u0131. 9.  On 10 July 2002 at 4.50 a.m. the applicant was arrested by police officers from the counter-terrorism unit of the \u0130zmir Security Directorate in connection with an operation conducted against an illegal organisation, namely the Bol\u015fevik Parti \u2013 Kuzey K\u00fcrdistan / Turkiye (Bolshevik Party \u2013North Kurdistan/Turkey). According to the arrest report, which was signed by the applicant, the police found eighty-eight left-wing books and periodicals in his room. Those books were seized by the police with a view to ascertaining whether they were illegal. 10.  On 11 July 2002 at approximately 2.15 a.m. the applicant took part in an identity parade in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant identified another co-accused, a certain M.B., and stated that he had allowed him to stay in his hotel free of charge without registering him in the hotel\u2019s guestbook. 11.  On the same day at 1.10 p.m. the applicant was interviewed by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant was asked, inter alia, what his ideology was, for how long he had been reading the periodical \u00c7a\u011fr\u0131 that had been found and seized in his place of work, and which other meetings or demonstrations \u2013 held within a democratic platform \u2013 he had participated in. The applicant explained that he regularly bought the periodical \u00c7a\u011fr\u0131 from a newspaper kiosk and enjoyed reading it. This periodical, which was sold legally, was supportive of leftist ideas. He also stated that he was friends with Mehmet Desde (who was the applicant in Desde v. Turkey, no. 23909/03, 1 February 2011) and E.Y., whom he had met when he had been in Germany. The applicant had allowed them to stay in his hotel and use his car when they had needed a vehicle. The applicant admitted that he had expressed his wish to be involved in the activities of the Bolshevik Party, but Mehmet Desde, who had connections in the organisation, had never replied to him. 12.  On 13 July 2002 the applicant was questioned by the public prosecutor again in the absence of a lawyer. He admitted to having lent his car to Mehmet Desde and to having provided him with accommodation in his hotel. However, he denied any affiliation with the illegal organisation. Following his questioning, the applicant was released. 13.  Although Mehmet Desde used his right to remain silent before the police, he made statements before the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer, where he stated that he had stayed in the applicant\u2019s hotel for two days and had borrowed the applicant\u2019s car. 14.  On 6 September 2002 the public prosecutor at the \u0130zmir State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant together with nine other co-accused. The prosecutor charged the applicant with aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, Bol\u015fevik Parti \u2013 Kuzey K\u00fcrdistan/T\u00fcrkiye \u2013, under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act as in force at the material time. 15.  On 24 October 2002, at the first hearing in the case, the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, denied the charges against him. He maintained that he had not been involved in any illegal activity. He further stated that Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B. had come to his hotel as guests and that they had not gathered with an ulterior motive. The applicant also stated that he had lent his car to Mehmet Desde and M.B. when they had told him that they wanted to drive to another coastal town. When asked about his statements before the police, the applicant denied them, alleging that they had been obtained through coercion and torture by the police as a result of which he had been pressured to sign his statement. At the end of that hearing, the trial court asked the applicant to make additional defence submissions given that his actions might be reclassified as assisting members of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (1) and (2) of Law no. 3713. He reiterated his previous defence submissions. 16.  At the hearing held on 24 July 2003, the applicant made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case and denied the allegations against him. He further stated that his only mistake had been not registering Mehmet Desde and M.B. in his hotel\u2019s guestbook. At the same hearing the \u0130zmir State Security Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. Having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused, the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d and the content of the case file as a whole, the trial court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel\u2019s guestbook and by lending his car to those people. Furthermore, the trial court listed the periodicals found in the applicant\u2019s possession as evidence in the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d part of its judgment. 17.  On 8 April 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that in rendering its judgment the first-instance court should have taken into account the recent amendments made to section 7 of Law no. 3713. 18.  In the meantime, pursuant to Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the \u0130zmir Assize Court. 19.  On 12 October 2004 the \u0130zmir Assize Court convicted the applicant once again under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. Having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused, the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d and the content of the case file as a whole, it held that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel\u2019s guestbook and by lending his car to those people. It listed the periodicals found in the applicant\u2019s possession as evidence in the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d part of its judgment. 20.  On 13 December 2004 the applicant appealed. 21.  While the appeal proceedings were pending before the Court of Cassation, in 2005 the new Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. By a decision dated 10 November 2005, the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation sent the case file back to the first\u2011instance court and requested that the latter reconsider the case in the light of the amendments made to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The case was accordingly transferred back to the \u0130zmir Assize Court. 22.  The public prosecutor before the \u0130zmir Assize Court submitted his opinion on the merits of the case and requested the acquittal of the applicant and his co-accused on the grounds that the organisation which they had allegedly founded did not correspond to the definition of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (1) of Law no. 3713. Consequently, he considered that the applicant\u2019s acts could not be characterised as aiding and abetting an illegal organisation under section 7 (2) of the same Law. 23.  On 16 March 2006 the \u0130zmir Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force. Having considered the structure, methods, purpose and activities of the said organisation, the court concluded that it could be categorised as a terrorist organisation, contrary to the submissions of the accused and the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation. It noted that even though the members of the organisation had not resorted to physical violence, they had used \u201cpsychological duress\u201d (manevi cebir), such as issuing threats, in order to achieve their aims. The trial court considered that the aim of the organisation was to start an uprising with a view to replacing the democratic regime with a totalitarian Marxist and Leninist regime. Thus, the fact that the organisation in question had not resorted to violence was not considered problematic with regard to categorising it as a terrorist organisation. It went on to state that the periodicals \u00c7a\u011fr\u0131 and G\u00fcney had been the legal media outlets of the organisation.\nThe trial court further held that the applicant had admitted to the allegations in his statements to the police. Moreover, having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused persons, the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d and the content of the case file as a whole, it held that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused persons, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel\u2019s guestbook. Again, it listed the periodicals found in the applicant\u2019s possession as evidence in the \u201cwritten evidence\u201d part of its judgment. 24.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant appealed against the judgment. 25.  On 5 October 2006 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodged a written opinion with the Ninth Division of the Court of Cassation in which he submitted, inter alia, that the objections of the lawyers concerning the use of police statements to convict the co-defendants should be rejected as irrelevant and unsubstantiated. However, the Principal Public Prosecutor also submitted that the Division should quash the judgment of the \u0130zmir State Security Court on account of the legislative amendments to Law no. 3713. 26.  On 25 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 16 March 2006 stating that the lawyers\u2019 objections in respect of the applicant and two other co-defendants were irrelevant and unsubstantiated. The applicant maintains that he only became aware of the judgment in April 2007. There is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant became aware of the judgment on the date of delivery.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "6", "9", "5", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 5.  On 24 August 2011 the applicant was taken into police custody on charges of murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was remanded in custody by the Centru District Court on 28 August 2011 and his detention was subsequently extended every thirty days until 21 January 2012 on the grounds that given the seriousness of the charges against him, he might abscond, re-offend and interfere with the investigation. The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 6.  On 17 January 2012 the applicant\u2019s case was committed for trial and his detention was extended by the court every three months, finding that the grounds which justified his initial detention had remained valid. 7.  In his appeals against the decisions of 12 April, 10 June and 10 July 2013 the applicant complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention which, in his view, was no longer justified. He argued that his detention pending trial had already exceeded the twelve-month time-limit set under Article 186 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the courts had not put forward any exceptional circumstance justifying such a long detention period, while the seriousness of charges could not by themselves constitute sufficient ground for his extended deprivation of liberty. 8.  By decisions of 23 April, 20 June and 25 July 2013 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. 9.  By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 17 September 2014 the applicant was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to twenty\u2011three years of imprisonment. 10.  On 28 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chi\u0219in\u0103u where he was detained until 4 December 2014. 11.  According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes. 12.  On 18 April 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office about the applicant\u2019s detention conditions in prison no. 13. By a letter of 15 May 2014 the Department of Penitentiary Institutions denied the complaints on overcrowding, TB infected inmates, insufficient food and medical assistance.", "references": ["6", "4", "8", "9", "5", "3", "0", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1983 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in Bolu F-type prison. 5.  On 10 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to a member of parliament, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah \u00d6calan by using \u201cK\u00fcrt Halk \u00d6nderi\u201d, meaning the leader of Kurdish people. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Kocaeli F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as \u201cthe Board\u201d) and on 24 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 13 days\u2019 solitary confinement, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 7.  On 17 January 2008 the Kocaeli Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant\u2019s objection. 8.  On 14 February 2008 the Kocaeli Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008.", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "5", "8", "9", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Glodeni. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to the present application he was a pensioner who received an amount equivalent to some fifty-eight euros (EUR) per month. On 5 May 2014 the Minister of Social Protection organised a meeting with the inhabitants of the applicant\u2019s town. The applicant was also present and after the meeting he asked the Minister a question about the method of calculation of his pension. He contended that the coefficient employed for the calculation had been wrong and that his pension was too small. The Minister replied that his pension was high enough and questioned in an ironic manner whether the applicant even understood the meaning of the words used in his question. The answer infuriated the applicant and he cursed and slapped the Minister in the face. 6.  On the same day, following the Minister\u2019s complaint, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on charges of hooliganism. 7.  On 12 May 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case ordered the applicant\u2019s psychiatric examination in order to determine whether he was fit to plead in the criminal proceedings. 8.  On 29 May 2014 a commission of psychiatrists speculated that the applicant might suffer from either dementia or amnesia. However, they did not reach a final conclusion and recommended the conduct of an in-patient psychiatric examination. 9.  On 2 July 2014, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, the Glodeni District Court ordered an in-patient psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant. The applicant challenged the above decision but without success. His appeal and appeal on points of law were rejected by the B\u0103l\u021bi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice on 28 August and 15 October 2014, respectively. 10.  On 18 September 2014 the applicant was arrested by a group of five police officers and taken to the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Psychiatric Hospital. Upon arrival, the applicant was asked to sign several pre-printed documents, the meaning of which was that he was giving his formal consent to hospitalisation and treatment. He signed them, but wrote on one of them that he did not consent to being subjected to a psychiatric examination (nu sunt de acord cu expertiza). 11.  On 20 September 2014 the applicant was visited by his son in hospital. After the visit the son employed a lawyer who started to take measures in order to have the applicant released. 12.  On 24 September 2014, at the lawyer\u2019s advice, the applicant wrote to the hospital administration a letter stating that he had been hospitalised against his will on 18 September 2014 and that if he had signed anything, he wished to withdraw his signature. 13.  On 25 September 2014 the applicant was released from hospital. It appears from a video submitted by the applicant\u2019s representative, that the door of the hospital ward where the applicant was detained was locked and that one could enter or exit only with the approval of the medical staff. 14.  On 30 September 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Glodeni District Court to have the applicant remanded in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days. 15.  On 4 November 2014 the Glodeni District Court rejected the prosecutor\u2019s request and found that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of his forceful hospitalisation. 16.  By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 26 December 2017 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a criminal fine of 4,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), the equivalent of some EUR 180.", "references": ["6", "7", "1", "8", "0", "4", "5", "3", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Karlovac. 5.  At about 5.50 p.m. on 2 November 2012 the police spotted the applicant with another man, V.P., in a vehicle parked in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. The applicant was already known to the police as a convicted drug dealer. While he was inside the supermarket the police approached V.P., who tried to throw away a plastic bag containing heroin. The police arrested him. When the applicant left the supermarket, he started to run away, but the police officers caught him and arrested him at about 6 p.m. 6.  According to the Government, since the applicant resisted arrest, the police officers had to apply force (a so-called \u201cleg sweep\u201d technique). 7.  According to the applicant, he was beaten by the police officers while lying on the ground. 8.  The applicant was then taken by the officers to the premises of the Zadar police. 9.  A criminal complaint was lodged against the applicant on charges of substance abuse. 10.  Medical documentation shows that on 3 November 2012 the applicant was seen by a doctor in the Zadar General Hospital and that he had sustained injuries the day before \u201din a fight\u201d. The injuries recorded were a haematoma below both eyes and a perforated left eardrum. A further medical record of 29 August 2013 shows that the applicant had a broken crown on one of his teeth. 11.  On 2 November 2012 officers B.R. and B.M. compiled a report for the Criminal Police Department of the Zadar police (\u201cthe Zadar criminal police\u201d) on the force they had used against the applicant. The report stated that at about 5.50 p.m. that day several officers from the Drug Crimes Division of the Zadar police had followed a lead that the applicant had been procuring large amounts of heroin from an unknown person in \u0160ibenik and selling it on in Zadar and Biograd na Moru with another person, V.P. The officers had arrived in a van in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. Several officers had stayed in the van while officers B.R. and B.M. had attempted to carry out an identity check on the applicant and V.P., who had both been known to the police as convicted drug dealers. V.P. had tried to throw away a plastic bag containing about 5 grams of heroin. The applicant had attempted to run away to avoid being arrested. Officers B.R. and B.M. had grabbed him by his hands but he had continued to resist them. Officer B.M. had then applied a leg sweep technique which had made the applicant fall to the ground and hit the left side of his face. The officers had then applied an arm lock technique to handcuff the applicant. He had refused the medical assistance offered to him and had said that he had had no objections to the conduct of the police officers. 12.  A report on the use of force against the applicant compiled on 3 November 2012 by the Zadar criminal police and signed by the applicant indicates that he had \u201cno objections\u201d.\nA record of the applicant\u2019s detention of the same date states that he had a visible injury, a haematoma above his right eye, and that he said that he had fallen down. 13.  On 5 November 2012 the chief of the Zadar criminal police sent a report on the use of force against the applicant to the chief of the Zadar police, describing the events at issue in the same manner as officers B.R. and B.M. He expressed the opinion that the police officers had lawfully used forced against the applicant. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ministry of Interior about the force used against him by the police officers. 15.  On 28 December 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Zadar Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u201cthe State Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d), alleging that police officers B.R., B.M. and S.K. had hit and kicked him all over during his arrest on 2 November 2012, even though he had not put up any resistance. He also alleged that later on, on the police premises, an officer wearing the badge no. 4373 had pushed him down the stairs. He enclosed a medical report dated 3 November 2012 showing that he had suffered a haematoma under both eyes and a perforated eardrum, the latter of which was considered a serious bodily injury. 16.  On 8 January 2013 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the Zadar police to interview officers S.K. and B.R. as well as other officers involved in the incident, including the officer whose badge number the applicant had remembered. The police were also instructed to obtain medical records concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries and to proceed with the case urgently and submit their report within thirty days. 17.  On 14 January 2013 officer A.V., the chief of the Drug Crimes Division of the Zadar police, interviewed B.R. and F.Z. The record of the interview with B.R. describes the applicant\u2019s arrest in the same terms as the report compiled by officers B.R. and B.M. (see paragraph 11 above). F.Z. was one of the officers who had stayed in the van when the two other officers had attempted to carry out identity check on the applicant and V.P. F.Z. did not describe the use of force against the applicant by the two other officers, but did state that the allegations in the applicant\u2019s criminal complaints were false. 18.  On 16 January 2013 the Zadar police asked the Prison Service for the identity of the officer with badge no. 4374 but it turned out that none of the officers had had that particular badge number. 19.  On 17 January 2013 officer A.\u0160., the chief of the Forensics Division of the Zadar police interviewed officer S.K. He said that on the critical occasion he had been on duty in Zadar and had had no knowledge of the events at issue. 20.  On 28 March 2013 the chief of the National Police asked the chief of the Zadar police to check the applicant\u2019s allegations from the standpoint of the police and to cooperate with the State Attorney\u2019s Office. 21.  On 9 April 2013 the State Attorney\u2019s Office informed the applicant that the police had been asked to carry out an enquiry into his allegations. The report it had received on 23 January 2013 indicated that the applicant had resisted the police officers in their attempt to carry out an identity check and put him in a police vehicle, in response to which the officers had used force against him which had resulted in him being forced to the ground and \u201creceiving a blow to the head\u201d. It was concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations were unfounded and he was informed of his right to complain to the Zadar County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 22.  On 12 April 2013 I.M., an officer from the Professional Conduct Department of the Zadar police interviewed officer M.K., a guard from the police\u2019s detention facility. He said that in November 2012 the applicant and V.P. had been brought into the facility by police officers on suspicion of substance abuse. He had noticed some injuries on the applicant, namely a bruise above his eye. The applicant had said that he had fallen. At about 6 p.m. both the applicant and V.P. had sought medical assistance because of withdrawal symptoms. An ambulance had arrived and taken the applicant to the Zadar General Hospital. M.K. had made an official note about these events and had also informed the Deputy State Attorney. 23.  On 25 April 2013 officer I.M. (see paragraph 16 above) wrote a report on the force used against the applicant. She stated that the State Attorney\u2019s Office had forwarded the applicant\u2019s complaint to the General Crime Department of the Zadar police, against officers S.K. and B.R. as well as one unidentified officer, alleging that they had ill-treated and hit him which had caused him bodily injuries. The State Attorney\u2019s Office had asked that several officers be interviewed and that the applicant\u2019s medical documentation be made available. The complaint had been assigned to the chief of the Zadar criminal police.\nOfficer I.M. stated that the chief of the Drug Crimes Division had interviewed officers B.R., B.M. and F.Z, while the chief of the Forensics Division had interviewed officer S.K. The related report had been sent to the State Attorney\u2019s Office on 21 January 2013.\nOfficer I.M. then described the incident in question as reported by the police officers implicated. She concluded that the applicant\u2019s complaints were unfounded and that it had been aimed at securing him a better position in the criminal proceedings against him. 24.  On the same day the chief of the Zadar police sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the police officers had lawfully used force against him and that no case of ill-treatment could be established on the basis of the medical reports or statements of the police officers concerned. Furthermore, his own statements had been contradictory. 25.  On 26 April 2013 the chief of the Zadar police sent a report to the chief of the Supervisory Service of the National Police (Slu\u017eba za nadzor, unapre\u0111enja rada i razvoj policije), repeating the findings of officer I.M. 26.  On 8 May 2013 the applicant replied to the State Attorney\u2019s Office, stressing that his submission was a criminal complaint rather than a petition and asked that a decision concerning the merits of his allegations be adopted. 27.  On 14 May 2013 the State Attorney\u2019s Office ordered the police to identify the fourth police officer mentioned in the criminal complaint who had allegedly pushed the applicant down the stairs and had the badge no. 4743 (not 4374) and whose last name was A. 28.  On 12 November 2013 the Deputy State Attorney interviewed officers B.M. and B.R. B.M. said that on 2 November 2012 the police had received information that the applicant had been procuring heroin and selling it on in the Biograd na Moru and Zadar area. B.M. had been working that day with officers B.R., J.P. and F.Z. They had noticed the applicant with V.P. in a vehicle which had been parked in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. The applicant had left the vehicle and entered the supermarket while V.P. had stayed inside it. B.M. and B.R. had approached the vehicle, identified themselves to V.P. who had then left the vehicle and thrown away a plastic bag which had contained about fifty grams of heroin. V.P. had not put up any resistance and had been handed over to officers J.P. and F.Z. who had placed him in the police vehicle. B.M. and B.R. had approached the applicant inside the supermarket and identified themselves. Since there had been some customers in the supermarket the officers had not resorted to handcuffing the applicant but had instead taken the applicant by the arm and escorted him towards the exit. The applicant had verbally expressed his discontent but when inside the supermarket had not physically resisted the officers. B.M. had held the applicant by one of his wrists. When they had left the supermarket the applicant had made a sudden movement to free himself and had attempted to flee. Officer B.M. had caught up with him and applied a leg sweep technique. Officer B.R. had also then caught up with the applicant who had then fallen to the ground, together with officers B.M. and B.R. While on the ground the applicant had fiercely and aggressively resisted the officers, attempting to get up and flee. That had lasted for about three to four minutes. It had been difficult for the officers to hold the applicant down, as he had weighed about 90 kilograms. B.M. admitted that in responding to the applicant\u2019s fierce resistance he might have hit him once or twice in order to prevent him from fleeing. His intention however had not been to hurt him. After the applicant had been overcome, he had been restrained and there had been no further hitting or ill-treatment. B.M. also stated that the officers\u2019 conduct in respect of the applicant had been completely professional and that the use of force against the applicant had been \u201cunavoidable\u201d. The officers had been cautious since they had known the applicant as a drug dealer and had had to ensure that he did not flee and destroy the evidence. B.M. also said that officer S.K. had never worked with them. B.R. described the incident in the same terms as officer B.M. As regards the specific moment when the applicant and two officers had fallen to the ground he said that the situation had become really messy because the applicant had put very strong resistance to fight them off. Officer B.R. admitted that in the commotion he or officer B.M. had hit the applicant on the head but neither of them had had any intention to hurt the applicant. The commotion on the ground had lasted for about three to four minutes after which the officers had managed to overcome and handcuff the applicant. He also stressed that there had been a risk of the applicant fleeing and destroying the evidence. 29.  On 26 November 2013 the State Attorney\u2019s Office dismissed the complaint on the basis of statements taken from the police officers involved as well as from officers, the applicant\u2019s allegations and the medical documentation enclosed. It found that officers B.M. and B.R. had had no intention of causing serious injuries to the applicant. The decision relied on the officers\u2019 assertion that during his arrest the applicant had put up strong resistance and that the force used against him had been necessary. The applicant was informed of his right to take over the prosecution by lodging an indictment against the accused within eight days. 30.  The applicant then took over the prosecution. 31.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant asked for an investigation into the matter. He lodged an indictment with the Zadar Municipal Court the following day, against officers B.R., B.M. and S.K. He repeated his allegations and requested that the accused, V.P. and the security guards of a supermarket on duty at the critical time be questioned, and that a forensic report be ordered in order to establish how his injuries had been caused. 32.  The applicant\u2019s request for an investigation was dismissed on 11 June 2014 by a Zadar County Court investigating judge on the grounds that the officers involved had had no intention of causing serious bodily injuries to him. No further witnesses were questioned and no reasons were given in that regard. 33.  The applicant appealed on 16 June 2014. He argued that the relevant facts surrounding his arrest had not been assessed, that no evidence had been collected and that it was for the State authorities to prove that the injuries he had sustained during his arrest had not been caused by the police. The appeal was dismissed on 30 June 2014 by a three-judge panel of the Zadar County Court on the grounds that the perforated eardrum the applicant had suffered during his arrest did not amount to a serious bodily injury. 34.  A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible on 21 October 2014 by the Constitutional Court for lack of competence on the grounds that it did not concern his civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him. 35.  On 11 December 2013 the applicant lodged an indictment with the Zadar Municipal Court against B.R., B.M. and S.K. on charges of causing serious bodily injury. 36.  It was declared inadmissible on 30 April 2014 on the grounds that it did not contain all the relevant information, namely that the accused had not given any oral evidence beforehand, as required by law. 37.  On 9 May 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that when his criminal complaint had been dismissed by the State Attorney\u2019s Office on 26 November 2013 he had been instructed to take over the prosecution by lodging an indictment within eight days. He had complied with that time\u2011limit and had also on 11 December 2014 asked the Zadar County Court to take oral evidence from the accused. The appeal was dismissed on 4 February 2015 on the grounds that the accused had not given any evidence beforehand.", "references": ["4", "6", "9", "7", "3", "5", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  On 11 March 2010 two individuals, S.T. and H.O., were arrested by the Georgian law-enforcement authorities in Tbilisi when they tried to sell 15 g of enriched uranium which they had transported from Armenia by train on the same day. 7.  In April 2010 the National Security Service of Armenia received information from the Georgian authorities that S.T. and H.O. had received the radioactive substance from the applicant. On 22 April 2010 the National Security Service instituted criminal proceedings in relation to the matter. 8.  On the same date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having aided and abetted S.T. and H.O. in the offence. He was believed to have acquired the enriched uranium which he had then sold to H.O. in Yerevan. Thereafter, S.T. and H.O. had smuggled the radioactive substance to Tbilisi, where they had been arrested. 9.  On 23 April 2010 the applicant was charged with aiding and abetting S.T. and H.O. in the offence. 10.  The applicant denied the charges. His case was that H.O., whom he had known for about ten years, had owed him money for a long time. In February 2010 he had been robbed in Ukraine, and afterwards he had somehow reached Moscow to find a job but had then been obliged to return to Yerevan. However, since his money had been stolen, he had decided to ask H.O. (as the person who owed him money) to send him some money for his journey. After his return he had met H.O. in Yerevan several times in order to discuss financial matters relating to the payment of the rest of the debt. 11.  On 28 April 2010 H.O. was questioned as a witness at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. He stated that, inter alia, the applicant had given him 1 g of a radioactive substance in either 2002 or 2003. At the beginning of March 2010 he and S.T. had asked the applicant, who had been in Russia at the time, whether he would be able to obtain radioactive substances. During the conversation the applicant had enquired about the price per gram that had been offered for such a substance. The next day he had called H.O. and offered to bring the requested radioactive substance to Armenia. Since the applicant had had no means to travel, they had transferred money to him. The applicant had arrived in Armenia several days later and given the radioactive substance to H.O. They had agreed that H.O. would pay the applicant after the deal. When asked whether he owed any money to the applicant, H.O. denied ever having borrowed from him. 12.  On 29 April 2010 S.T. was also questioned as a witness at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. He stated, inter alia, that when he had been in Georgia, some people had offered to buy uranium from him. He had then gone to Armenia and asked H.O. to find the applicant so that he could provide them with uranium. S.T. further stated that H.O. had been in contact with the applicant, who had agreed to come to Armenia and give him uranium. Thereafter they had sent travel money to the applicant by bank transfer. He had then met H.O. at the railway station. H.O. had brought the radioactive substance back to Georgia and stated that he had taken it from the applicant. 13.  On 8 December 2010 the bill of indictment was finalised and the case was transferred to the Tavush Regional Court for trial. The following evidence was relied on in the bill of indictment: the witness statements made by S.T. and H.O. in Georgia; other witness statements, in particular those of K.O. and V.G., made in Armenia; the conclusion of a forensic examination conducted in Georgia, according to which the substance seized from S.T. contained enriched uranium; regular telephone correspondence between the applicant and H.O. in the period between 1 September 2009 and 30 March 2010, and in particular two telephone calls made on 10 March 2010; and the relevant exit and entry stamps in the applicant\u2019s passport proving that he had arrived in Yerevan from Moscow on 10 March 2010. 14.  At one of the hearings before the Regional Court, relying, inter alia, on the Strasbourg Convention of 1959 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the applicant requested the temporary transfer of S.T. and H.O. from the prison in Georgia so that they could be examined at the trial. 15.  His request was granted. Thus, on 27 January 2011 the presiding judge ordered S.T.\u2019s and H.O\u2019s temporary transfer to Armenia. 16.  By a letter of 29 April 2011, the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, refused to grant the request by referring to Article 11 \u00a7 1(b) of the Strasbourg Convention, which states that a request for assistance may be refused if \u201chis or her presence is necessary at criminal proceedings pending in the territory of the requested Party\u201d. The Ministry of Justice added that S.T.\u2019s and H.O.\u2019s had been convicted by a judgment of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal of 30 March 2011, but that the judgment was still open to an appeal on points of law. 17.  On 6 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s representative allowed the Regional Court to continue with the examination of the case even if S.T. and H.O. could not be transferred to Armenia, since the applicant was ill. However, he asked the court not to rely in its judgment on the testimony given in Georgia by those absent witnesses. 18.  At a hearing of 24 May 2011 the presiding judge informed the parties of the reply received from the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. 19.  At the same hearing the applicant asked to summon S.G. \u2013 the conductor of the train who had been questioned during the investigation \u2013 as a witness, on the grounds that some of his statements were in contradiction with the statements of S.T. and H.O. The trial court rejected that application, considering it unfounded. 20.  On 25 May 2011 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, and ordered the confiscation of his property. In doing so, the Regional Court relied on the statements of S.T. and H.O. made during the questioning in Georgia; the statements of the witnesses V.D. and K.O. \u2013 the applicant\u2019s friend and H.O.\u2019s daughter respectively; the results of forensic examinations carried out in Georgia and Armenia confirming that the substance discovered contained enriched uranium; the evidence of telephone correspondence between the applicant and H.O.; and the existence of exit and entry stamps in the applicant\u2019s passport proving that he had arrived in Yerevan from Moscow on 10 March 2010. 21.  The applicant lodged an appeal, complaining, inter alia, about the lack of opportunity to cross-examine S.T. and H.O. at trial and about the trial court\u2019s refusal to summon S.G. 22.  On 13 July 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. The judgment did not address the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the fact that S.T. and H.O. could not be examined and the refusal to examine witness S.G. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those put forward in the previous appeal. 24.  By a decision of 17 September 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "2", "9", "4", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  A was born in 2011 and is the daughter of the applicant and Y. Both the mother and father had just turned 19 when the child was born. They had been engaged to be married, but the relationship had ended, and the applicant did not name Y as the child\u2019s father. At the father\u2019s initiative, paternity was established by a court on 18 April 2012. The applicant and the child\u2019s father later agreed on joint parental responsibility. 6.  When the child was born, the applicant was living at home with her parents, who are Norwegian Roma. Shortly afterwards, she and A were thrown out by the applicant\u2019s father \u2013 the child\u2019s maternal grandfather \u2013 and the applicant, assisted by the social security authorities, decided that she and the child would stay at R. family centre \u2013 a parent-child institution. They moved back home after just under three weeks, but returned to the family centre three weeks later because the maternal grandfather had been violent to the applicant. 7.  While the applicant was staying at R. family centre, on 1 December 2011 the grandfather stabbed a neighbouring married couple who were the parents of one of the applicant\u2019s friends. The background to this was that he believed that they had helped the applicant to move to the family centre. The applicant was equipped with a panic alarm (voldsalarm). 8.  The applicant and A stayed at R. family centre for three and a half months, until 16 February 2012. They then moved back in with the applicant\u2019s family. Shortly thereafter, the Child Welfare Service applied for a care order pursuant to section 4-12(a) of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). 9.  On 14 June 2012 the Child Welfare Service issued an emergency care order to place A in an emergency foster home at a secret address, in accordance with the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). The decision stated that the Child Welfare Service had known the family network for many years and that the family, including the applicant, evaded measures of assistance. The County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker \u2013 \u201cthe Board\u201d) approved the emergency placement the following day. On 18 June 2012 A was moved to the emergency foster home, and on 21 June 2012 it was decided that the applicant would have one hour of supervised contact per week. The reason given for the supervision was the risk that the child might be abducted. 10.  On 25 June 2012 the Board reviewed the emergency care order. It noted that the Child Welfare Service had been informed by the staff at R. family centre that there were considerable deficiencies in the applicant\u2019s ability to care for herself and the child, but that she would not accept assistance. Moreover, the Board observed, inter alia, that the applicant had repeatedly moved back from the family centre to her parent\u2019s home, where she herself had been the victim of violence numerous times as well as witness to violence against other family members and neighbours, even after A had been born. A witness from R. family centre had testified that the mother would not take advice, had herself had a troubled childhood and was under the dominance of her father. The witness mentioned that the applicant\u2019s father took decisions for the applicant and controlled her finances. He had also taken her to the social security authorities and presented her as having intellectual disability (psykisk utviklingshemmet) in order to obtain an apartment for himself. The Board added that even when the applicant had lived in a secure environment at R. family centre, she had followed her father\u2019s order to return home. 11.  On 23 August 2012 Oslo City Court (tingrett) reviewed and upheld the emergency care order. It noted, inter alia, that there was an obvious (n\u00e6rliggende) risk that the applicant\u2019s father would influence her to prevent the Child Welfare Service from involving itself any further. It took account of how her father had prevented her from going to school, which meant that she still could not read or write and did not have the necessary knowledge for day-to-day life. Further, the City Court found that the applicant was obviously still under strong influence of her father, as had been lately illustrated by how she had two times left the family centre (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above) without notice, because her father had asked her to do so. For this reason, the City Court did not attach weight to the applicant\u2019s statements before that court to the effect that she was now willing to accept assistance measures. Moreover, the applicant had stated that she was now living with a friend, but had been unable to give the address. A\u2019s father, Y, supported the emergency care order before the City Court. 12.  After three months, on 26 September 2012, A was moved from the emergency foster home to her current foster home. The background to this move was that the emergency foster mother had discovered a car following her after a contact session at the child welfare centre two days before, on 24 September. She had reported this to the centre\u2019s emergency foster care department, which had found out that the car belonged to the applicant\u2019s maternal grandfather. The car had been driven by a young man who was alone in the car. Because of the abduction risk, the Child Welfare Service made an emergency order that the applicant would have supervised contact with A one hour per month in suitable premises and with police assistance. A similar decision was made in relation to Y the next day, on 27 September. 13.  On 5 October 2012 Y initiated custody proceedings against the applicant and requested an order that A live in his care. The appointed expert in that case, A.G.H., concluded that neither parent should have care and control of or contact with A. 14.  On 18 October 2012 the Board reviewed the orders on contact rights of 26 and 27 September 2012 (see paragraph 12 above). It found, inter alia, that the incident on 24 September, viewed in conjunction with the other information about the behaviour of the mother\u2019s family and network, showed that the applicant and Y could both be subject to threats or pressure, which again implied a risk that A might be kidnapped. The Board noted that it would be demanding to carry out any contact sessions without A\u2019s identity being revealed to the applicant\u2019s family and network, but the risk would be reduced with fewer visits. The Board also attached weight to A being a vulnerable child who had experienced considerable instability and disorder in her first year. She had recently been moved again and had a particular need for calm and stability. 15.  On 19 December 2012 the Board, composed of a chairperson qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a layperson, in accordance with the first paragraphs of sections 7-2 and 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act, issued a care order pursuant to section 4-12(a) of that act (see paragraph 67 below). Before the Board, A\u2019s father, Y, supported the care order and requested visiting rights. 16.  On the issue of daily care, the Board considered that A was a vulnerable girl who had already experienced several broken relationships. Referring to case documents and testimony, it assessed A as insecure in her attachment to care persons. The Board further noted that A scored as \u201cdelayed\u201d and otherwise obtained low scores on tests relating to motor skills, communication and social functioning. It appeared clear that she had been under-stimulated until she was placed in the emergency foster home. She had therefore, in the Board\u2019s view, a particular need for stable and predictable surroundings and a care that could further her development (utviklingsfremmende omsorg). The Board found it clearly proved that there were serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security needed by A in light of her age and development. This could be related to the applicant\u2019s own growing up not having been secure and adequate (trygg og god), including that she had been kept away from, or had chosen not to avail herself of, assistance measures from child welfare and health authorities. 17.  The Board remarked that the child welfare authorities should consider offering the applicant treatment of her mental health, and further assessed that she would not be able to benefit from child welfare assistance measures without her first obtaining help with her mental health. In addition, the Board noted that the material conditions had considerable deficiencies: the applicant had been assisted to get her own apartment, but had not paid rent or managed to obtain documents in order to have the rent covered by the social security authorities. She had stated that her father had received all the money she had been granted as financial support, to which she had only had limited access. The Board considered that she, in short time, could end up in a situation where she could not offer the child a place to live and food. The Board examined the issue of A\u2019s Roma heritage in light of the United Nation\u2019s 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below) and the Council of Europe\u2019s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below) and concluded that these did not prevent that a care order be issued. 18.  As to the question of contact, the Board stated that this had to be determined in light of the proportionality requirement set out in Article 8 of the Convention as well as the United Nation\u2019s 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below). According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the clear starting point was that a care order should be a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit. Reference was also made to Johansen v. Norway, 7 August 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 78 and 83, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011III, according to which the authorities had a \u201cnormal obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to take measures with a view to reuniting them if the mother were to become able to provide the daughter with a satisfactory upbringing\u201d. At the same time, contact which did not further the child\u2019s development could be limited, and even denied. The Board further noted that according to case-law of the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, special and compelling reasons were required in order to justify contact to such limited extent that it had to be considered as a breaking off of contact. 19.  The Board went on to examine the instant case in view of the fact that, in its opinion, it would be a long-term placement. This meant that the purpose of contact was for A to get to know her biological origins with a view to potential future attachment. Before the Board, the child welfare authorities had submitted that contact should be denied altogether, because of the risk that A would otherwise be abducted. The Board found it substantiated that it was a member of the applicant\u2019s family who had followed the emergency foster mother on 24 September 2012 (see paragraph 12 above) to find out where A had been placed. However, the Board agreed with the parents that there was quite a leap between following someone in order to find out an address and carrying out an abduction. The Board was therefore of the opinion that there was a \u201ccertain risk\u201d of A being kidnapped and kept hidden, but that there was not, at the time it made its decision, a sufficiently present and obvious (aktuell og n\u00e6rliggende) risk. Two contact sessions had taken place since A had been moved from the emergency foster home into her ordinary foster home following the \u201ccar incident\u201d, without anyone attempting to find out her address. Nor had any information about where A had been placed emerged during contact sessions, since she was too young to communicate that information. She would probably be unable to do so for another year. 20.  The Board had not found any other circumstances relating to the contact between the parents and A to indicate that special and compelling reasons for denying contact existed, and gave both parents supervised contact of one hour, four times a year. Neither of them was entitled to know A\u2019s whereabouts. 21.  Both the applicant and Y accepted the care order, but the applicant applied to the City Court for contact to be increased, with the frequency to be decided by the court. The father became a party to the case. He first applied for the Board\u2019s decision to be upheld. He subsequently applied for unsupervised contact. The municipality asked the court to deny both parents contact because of the risk of abduction. 22.  The City Court heard the case from 18 to 19 June 2013. The court\u2019s bench was comprised of one professional judge, one lay judge and one psychologist (see paragraph 68 below). The parties attended with counsel and gave evidence. Eight witnesses were heard. 23.  On 5 July 2013 the City Court gave judgment and ordered that the applicant and Y were not entitled to have contact with A. 24.  The City Court found that the applicant\u2019s father had not altered his need to control the applicant and her child. The court referred to statements the applicant had made to the police, to the extent that her father wanted to take over the care of the child and planned to take the applicant and her daughter abroad, kill the applicant and then take over the care of A. He had allegedly said this only a few hours before he had stabbed the parents of the applicant\u2019s friend (see paragraph 7 above). It was also, to the City Court, unlikely that the applicant had cut off contact with her father. In addition, it was likely to have been the applicant\u2019s family who had followed the emergency foster mother (see paragraph 12 above). There was thus a present and obvious (aktuell og n\u00e6rliggende) risk of kidnapping. At the age of two, A had already had to change care persons several times, and it could be considerably harmful if she lost her foster parents because of kidnapping or a risk of such. In addition, the applicant\u2019s father could not in any way be expected to be a serious care person for A. Viewed in connection with the contact sessions that had taken place, which had led to the child having negative reactions and challenged the calm and stability in the foster home, this supported the conclusion that the court should not allow any contact. Weighing the different interests, the City Court concluded that a decision to the effect that the applicant would not be entitled to have contact with A, pertained to her best interests. 25.  As to A\u2019s cultural background on her mother\u2019s \u2013 the applicant\u2019s \u2013 side, the City Court concluded that the Council of Europe\u2019s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below) could not lead it to reach a different conclusion as to what was in A\u2019s best interests. It added that it would be limited how much the applicant could teach A about the Roma during four contact sessions yearly, and that A would be given information about her background by the foster parents. 26.  The applicant and Y both appealed to the High Court (lagmannsrett) which heard the case, including testimony from the applicant and the child\u2019s father \u2013 who both attended with counsel \u2013 and eight witnesses, three of which were experts. It gave judgment on 5 May 2014, dismissing the appeals. 27.  The High Court noted that it was circumstances relating to the applicant\u2019s family that had led it to decide not to allow any contact. It mentioned that the applicant\u2019s father had, over the years, been convicted of possession and use of drugs, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (promillekj\u00f8ring, kj\u00f8ring i p\u00e5virket tilstand), thefts and a stabbing. He had been suspected of violent crimes and charged with attempted murder with the use of a firearm, but the charges had been dropped. The applicant\u2019s mother had been fined and sentenced to imprisonment for violent crimes. Moreover, the High Court noted, the applicant\u2019s father had thrown the applicant out of her home when she had had care of the child, then only newborn. The applicant had explained that she had been subject to violence from her father and abuse from her mother and brother. The High Court noted that the applicant\u2019s father was violent and appeared unpredictable. In addition, there had been the incident with the emergency foster mother being followed (see paragraph 12 above). There was, in conclusion, a risk that the child would be abducted and hidden from the Child Welfare Service. The child had already been a victim of neglect when living with the applicant and the applicant\u2019s parents and there were reasons to fear that she would again be subject to neglect if someone in the applicant\u2019s extended family (storfamilie) kidnapped her. Breaking off A\u2019s relationship to her foster parents, to whom she was developing attachment, at that time, would also in itself be serious. 28.  The High Court also referred to the fact that a psychologist at an outpatient clinic, K.G.F., had reported that A was marked by neglect in her early life. The psychologist recommended that A, because of her socio-emotional difficulties, be referred to the Children\u2019s and Young People\u2019s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic (Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinkk). Furthermore, the psychologist recommended that A, because of her somewhat scarce use of language, attention difficulties and early development delay, in time be examined by educational and psychological services (praktisk-pedagogisk tjeneste) for at least one year prior to starting school. The psychologist had reported that A needed that her needs to develop in a completely secure and predictable environment be given priority, which also implied a need for a continued arrangement in which she did not have contact with the applicant. The High Court noted, in addition, that another psychologist, A.G.H., who had been appointed as expert in the proceedings between the parents concerning custody and parental authority (see paragraph 13 above) had already in 2012 recommended that none of the parents should have contact with A, primarily because of the abduction risk. 29.  The High Court disagreed with the Board\u2019s consideration to the effect that, while there was a certain risk of abduction, it could not qualify as present and obvious (aktuell og n\u00e6rliggende), and special and compelling reasons could therefore not be present. In the High Court\u2019s view, an overall assessment had to be made, in which not only the probability of an abduction would weigh in, but also factors such as the consequences of a possible abduction, the child\u2019s robustness and other consequences that contact would entail for the child. Although the main reason for refusing contact lay in the abduction risk, that risk was not the only argument for denying contact. One unfortunate consequence of the abduction risk was that contact sessions would necessarily have to take place without the foster parents \u2013 A\u2019s primary caregivers and those she felt most secure with \u2013 present. This could also harm the child\u2019s confidence in the foster parents. In addition, A had had negative reactions to the sessions that had taken place. The foster parents had stated that she, following the sessions, could cry for a week, be sad, wake up during nights as if she had bad dreams and had developed a rash that looked like eczema which the health visitor had said had been stress-related. The problems associated with the contact sessions had to be seen in view of the fact that A was a vulnerable child. 30.  In the view of the High Court, it was not possible for A\u2019s father, Y, to have contact with A either. He had repeatedly been threatened by the applicant\u2019s father, brother and cousin. The court was of the opinion that he could be pressured into disclosing information about A\u2019s whereabouts should it come to his knowledge. 31.  The applicant and Y appealed to the Supreme Court, regarding the application of the law and assessment of the evidence. Written declarations were presented to the court by A.N., a secondary education teacher at a municipal Roma Initiative (Romtiltaket) \u2013 an advice centre that gave help and guidance; H., a case officer with the Child Welfare Service, and the psychologist K.G.F. (see paragraph 28 above). They had also given evidence before the City Court and the High Court (see paragraphs 22 and 26 above). Since the High Court had given judgment, the maternal grandfather had started serving a four and a half year sentence in connection with the stabbing in December 2011 (see paragraph 7 above). The Supreme Court had also been informed that the applicant was pregnant and living with the father-to-be (see paragraph 38 below). 32.  In its judgment of 23 October 2014 (Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2014 page 976) the Supreme Court first set out the general principles with respect to contact rights, based on the Child Welfare Act, its preparatory works and related Supreme Court case-law, Article 9(3) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below) and Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect for family life as this provision had been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as Johansen v. Norway, cited above; R. and H. v. the United Kingdom (no. 35348/06, \u00a7 73, 31 May 2011); and Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC] (no. 41615/07, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2010). The Supreme Court additionally observed that the relevant legal standard that could be inferred from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights \u2013 that a child\u2019s ties with its family can only be broken \u201cin very special circumstances\u201d \u2013 was also in line with Article 102 and Article 104 viewed in conjunction with Article 92 of the Norwegian Constitution (see paragraph 66 below). 33.  On the topic of A\u2019s Roma identity, the Supreme Court examined, inter alia, Article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below), Article 27 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see paragraph 71 below), General Comment No. 11 from 2009, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 70 below), and Article 5 of the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below). 34.  The Supreme Court considered it somewhat unclear whether the High Court had been of the opinion that the risk of abduction alone was sufficiently high to justify denial of contact. Studying the High Court\u2019s reasons, it found that these could be understood to mean that, in the overall assessment, even a small (\u201ccertain\u201d) risk of abduction would be a sufficient basis for denying contact if an abduction would have a strong harmful effect on the child, if the child was vulnerable, and if the child reacted negatively to contact sessions. If this had been the High Court\u2019s point of departure for its assessment, it had not been pertinent. If the risk of abduction could not be said to be real and present (reell og aktuell), contact could not be denied because an abduction would have a severely harmful effect. This also had to apply if the child showed such negative reactions to contact sessions as in the present case, since contact was considered to be in the child\u2019s best interests from a long-term perspective. The Supreme Court also interpreted the municipality to mean that the negative reactions were not in themselves a sufficient basis for denying contact. 35.  When turning to the facts of the instant case, the Supreme Court took into account that there had been no direct presentation of evidence before it, nor had any expert witnesses been appointed, which would normally imply that it would be reluctant to depart from the High Court\u2019s assessment of the facts. In the instant case there were, however, some unclear or new aspects of the case that needed further examination by the High Court. This included A\u2019s maternal grandfather having started serving a four and a half year sentence (see paragraphs 7 and 31 above); two years had passed since the incident in which the emergency foster mother had been followed (see paragraph 12 above) and nothing had happened since to indicate that the applicant\u2019s family was trying to locate A or planning to abduct her; the applicant had grown older and was anew pregnant, now with a father to-be from a different environment; the applicant had gone to school and undergone a work placement. The Supreme Court wanted an assessment of what the foregoing meant in relation to the possibility of the applicant resisting any pressure exerted by her family and also a more thorough assessment concerning Y. 36.  The Supreme Court assumed, as had the High Court, that an abduction would be traumatic for A. She would be torn away from her care situation, and it was unlikely that she would receive satisfactory care if she were hidden from the authorities by someone acting on behalf of her maternal grandfather. The case had still not been sufficiently elucidated before it for it to be satisfied that a real and present (reell og aktuell) risk of abduction existed. 37.  The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the High Court\u2019s judgment be set aside so that the case could be reheard by the High Court. 38.  On 15 October 2014 the applicant had given birth to a son, B, whose father is of half Chilean and half Peruvian descent. 39.  On 3 November 2014, after the case was returned to the High Court from the Supreme Court, the applicant requested that an expert witness be appointed in order to assess her caring skills in respect of B. On 13 January 2015 the court turned the request down. It stated that the key issue was whether a real risk of abduction existed and that an expert assessment of the applicant\u2019s competence to care for her newborn child was not particularly relevant. As to the applicant\u2019s relationship to her own family, and the significance of this with respect to her ability and will to protect A from persons in the family who might pose an abduction risk, it considered that an expert witness would not be particularly qualified to draw a conclusion regarding these circumstances. Insights into these issues could rather be obtained through conversations between the Child Welfare Service and the applicant, and by the applicant\u2019s appearance before the High Court. 40.  The applicant and Y also requested an interim measure to the effect that contact be reestablished in line with the Board\u2019s decision. On 12 December 2014 the High Court turned the request down. It noted that while the Supreme Court under the relevant procedural law had been formally competent to decide on the merits of the case, it had chosen to quash the High Court\u2019s former judgment because the case had been insufficiently elucidated. A meeting with the parties had since been held on 8 December 2014, and the court had then been informed of the child welfare authorities having requested the police to make a report on the abduction risk. The report would be finalised by January-February 2015 and the appeal hearing had been scheduled at 12 March. A new, full hearing, would thus take place in three months\u2019 time and in examining the request for interim measure, the High Court had no further basis on which to assess the abduction risk than that which the Supreme Court had had some one and a half months earlier. 41.  During the appeal hearing from 12 to 13 March 2015 in the contact proceedings, the High Court\u2019s bench was comprised of three professional judges, a lay judge and a psychologist (see paragraph 68 below). The applicant and Y attended with their counsel and gave statements. An officer with the Child Welfare Service attended together with the municipality\u2019s counsel. Seven witnesses were heard, including the child welfare officer. 43.  In its reasoning, the court commenced by noting that it would review all aspects of the case as far as it was elucidated at the time judgment was given. 44.  As a rule, children and parents were entitled to have contact with each other after a child had been taken into care under the first paragraph of section 4-19 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). When applying this provision, decisive importance had to be attached to finding measures that were in the child\u2019s best interests. This included attaching importance to giving the child stable and good contact with adults and continuity of care. Reference was made to section 4-1 of the Child Welfare Act (ibid.). 45.  Moreover, the Child Welfare Act had to be interpreted and applied in accordance with Norway\u2019s obligations under various conventions. In the present case, the relevant provisions were found in Article 9(3) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child on the child\u2019s right to regular and direct contact with both parents (see paragraph 69 below) and Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect for family life. Since the child belonged to a national minority, Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the right of minority children to live in keeping with their own culture and use their own language also applied (ibid.). In addition, it followed from Articles 5(1), 10(1) and 14(1) of the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1 February 1995 (see paragraph 72 below) that the State had a duty to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, allow the minority to learn their minority language and use it freely and without interference. The Supreme Court had based several decisions on the understanding that the provisions had to be interpreted in such a way that special and compelling reasons were required to deny contact. The High Court assumed that the same requirement applied to the provision in the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention. 46.  The special and compelling reasons relevant to this case were whether there was a real risk of abduction if contact sessions took place and whether there were concrete circumstances that substantiated this fear. The risk also had to be present, but no \u201cpreponderance of probability\u201d could be required. The latter had been clarified by the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in the instant case (see paragraphs 32-37 above). 47.  In the High Court\u2019s opinion, the risk of abduction was still real and present (reell og aktuell). This risk was related to the applicant\u2019s father in particular, but also generally to other people in the community to which he and his family belonged. In this respect, the High Court agreed with the parents\u2019 counsels that the parents had to be assessed as individuals and not on the basis of what group they belonged to. Knowledge about the mother\u2019s environment could nevertheless have a bearing as background information. According to information provided by the police, the Roma community was statistically overrepresented in child abduction cases. This was also consistent with the impression of a psychologist, F. This overrepresentation could be due to the fact that many members of the community did not adhere to the Norwegian model for law enforcement and conflict resolution, and the possibility of keeping children away from the Norwegian authorities provided by family ties abroad. 48.  The applicant had previously found it difficult to break contact with her family and the community. When she had been given a place at R. family centre in September 2011, she had moved back in with her parents a few weeks later (see paragraph 6 above). On 1 November of the same year, she had been placed in the same institution again, but had moved back in with her family again in February 2012, despite the fact that her father had previously been violent to her (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). 49.  One of the witnesses \u2013 A.N., the teacher from the municipal Roma Initiative (see paragraph 31 above) \u2013 had given a positive assessment of the applicant\u2019s recent development. She was now described as resourceful and eager to learn, she had her own flat, and she had recently had her second child. According to the witness, she could serve as a role model for other Roma women. 50.  The High Court did not disagree that there were positive elements in the applicant\u2019s development, but there was also information to indicate that the development had not been as stable as the applicant and A.N. claimed. In May 2013 the applicant had been evicted from her flat after several complaints from neighbours of domestic disputes. She was in receipt of social security benefits because she had no other income with which to support herself and her second child, B. It had also been reported that her work training and school attendance had been somewhat unstable. In the summer of 2013 the police had been called because of an argument between the applicant and her father. Shortly after B\u2019s birth in October 2014 (see paragraph 38 above) social services had raised concerns because the applicant had been at risk of losing her home for being behind on her rent. B\u2019s father had previous convictions for drug crime, among other things, and, according to the applicant, he had been violent to her during her pregnancy. Considering the circumstances, the High Court considered it natural to assume that the applicant might feel the need for her family\u2019s help and protection. 51.  If the applicant were to come under her father\u2019s influence again, it was unlikely that she would cooperate with the Child Welfare Service to prevent A from being abducted in connection with a contact session. During the investigation of her father in connection with the stabbing (see paragraph 7 above), she had stated that her father wanted to take over the care of A. The applicant had been told that her father planned to take her to another country, kill her and take her child. She had then asked for a domestic abuse alarm device. 52.  It was the High Court\u2019s opinion that, if the applicant\u2019s father wanted to take over the care of A, there was little doubt that he would threaten or persuade the applicant to use contact sessions for these purposes if he considered it expedient. He had previously displayed controlling and threatening behaviour in relation to his daughter. He had taken her out of school when she was eight years old. She had been physically abused by him and he had been against her moving out. The High Court\u2019s judgment of 11 October 2013, in the criminal case against him, showed that he did not hesitate to carry out aggravated acts of violence when he thought the family\u2019s interests were being threatened. According to the judgment, he had visited a neighbouring married couple who had allegedly been involved in the applicant\u2019s moving out of her parents\u2019 flat into the family centre (see paragraph 6 above). The father\u2019s message had been that the couple was not to interfere in what was an internal family matter. The confrontation had ended with him stabbing the couple and inflicting life-threatening injuries on them both (see paragraph 7 above). He had been sentenced to four and a half years\u2019 imprisonment for this offence (see paragraph 35 above). His criminal record also contained many other serious offences (see, inter alia, paragraph 27 above). 53.  After a contact session on 24 September 2012, the emergency foster mother had noticed a car following her (see paragraph 12 above). She had stated that she had decided not to drive straight home, and instead had driven around for a while until her pursuer had lost her by a set of traffic lights. The car had been driven by a young man, and had later been found to be registered to the applicant\u2019s maternal grandfather. The episode had been reported to the police, but had not been investigated further. However, the fact that the emergency foster mother had been followed after a contact session by a car belonging to a member of the applicant\u2019s family could not be a coincidence. In the court\u2019s opinion, this episode confirmed the risk of abduction, although nothing more specific could be said about it. 54.  The fact that there had been no subsequent episodes to indicate that anyone was trying to locate the child or plan to abduct her did not, in the High Court\u2019s opinion, reduce the risk of abduction to any significant extent. It could just as well be due to a lack of opportunity as a change in attitude. The applicant\u2019s father had been serving a prison sentence during this entire period, and the foster parents\u2019 identity and address were not known to the applicant\u2019s family. 55.  The High Court considered that there would also be a real and present (reell og aktuell) danger of abduction in relation to Y if he were to have contact sessions. It was unlikely that he himself would abduct the child, but he might be pressured or tricked into aiding an abduction, for example by being threatened or tricked into disclosing information about A that could help to identify the foster home and foster parents. Y had previously stated that he had received such threats. He had told the police that the applicant\u2019s cousin and younger brother had threatened to kill him, and that this had allegedly taken place on 15 December 2010. His lawyer had written in a letter to the Child Welfare Service dated 8 November 2011 that Y had repeatedly received death threats from the applicant\u2019s father, brother and cousin when he had asked for a paternity test. In the summer of 2012 Y had told the Child Welfare Service that he had reported the applicant\u2019s family to the police twice. One of the official complaints concerned the applicant\u2019s brother and cousin, who he had reported for threatening to shoot him. The second concerned threats from the applicant\u2019s father and uncle. The complaints had been withdrawn because the parties had reached an agreement. He had raised concerns before the Board that the child might be kidnapped. The High Court did not attach decisive weight to the fact that Y, according to his testimony, no longer had any contact with the applicant or her family, and that he no longer shared the Child Welfare Service\u2019s concerns about an abduction. 56.  An abduction would clearly be harmful to A, who would in such a case be torn away from the care of her foster parents. A psychologist, F., had testified before the City Court that the child showed signs of having suffered neglect at an early age. She was still a vulnerable child with attachment problems. She needed a calm life, extra security and therapy. She would probably be subjected to more neglect if she were abducted. 57.  Other than the general assumption that it was a good thing for a child to get to know its culture and background, there was little to indicate that contact sessions would be beneficial if they were to take place. Contact would be quite limited and the possibility for the child to get to know her background and Roma culture would thus in any case be significantly reduced. In addition, the foster parents had stated that A had shown strong reactions to the contact sessions that had actually taken place. She was a child with special needs. According to the foster parents, the contact sessions had caused her sleep and digestive problems. If contact were to be resumed, psychologist F. feared that it could cause a significant feeling of insecurity and a reaction against the foster parents for allowing this insecurity, particularly as A had suffered significant neglect in her biological family. Both the foster parents and the Child Welfare Service still considered A to be suffering from separation anxiety, which could be exacerbated by contact. The contact sessions could also be stressful for her. The Child Welfare Service had stated that it had to consider the risk of abduction and make the contact sessions supervised and subject to police protection, regardless of the High Court\u2019s conclusion. The High Court had to assume that this would further impair the quality of the contact sessions. 58.  The effects that contact would have on the foster parents also had to be taken into consideration. Contact with the biological parents could create insecurity that could in turn have a negative impact on the conditions in the foster home. The incident in which a car had followed the emergency foster mother could be taken into account in this context. The episode had not been investigated, and not much was known for certain about it. In any case, it had to have been an unpleasant experience, and was likely to have created a sense of fear in the foster parents. 59.  Neither the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention nor the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention could lead to any other conclusion. The High Court did not interpret any of these conventions to mean that parents had an unconditional right to contact if it was contrary to the child\u2019s best interest. Under Article 9(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the right of contact could be exercised except if it was contrary to the child\u2019s best interests (see paragraph 69 below). The right to family life was also not unconditional, in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Convention. These exceptions had to be considered as expressions of a general principle in family law (barneretten) to consider the best interests of the child, a principle that had also to be applied when interpreting Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid.) and the relevant provisions in the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention (see paragraph 72 below). These provisions also had to allow for contact to be denied in cases, such as this one, where special and compelling reasons so indicated. 60.  The State\u2019s obligation to protect its citizens could not lead to any other conclusion either. The risk of abduction not only applied in connection with contact sessions. It was also related to the possibility of the applicant\u2019s family discovering the foster family\u2019s identity and address. If that were to happen, the measures required to protect the child from abduction would be so extensive as to be unrealistic. In the High Court\u2019s view, denial of contact was sufficient to fulfil the State\u2019s obligation to protect A from being abducted. 62.  Both parents appealed to the Supreme Court. The applicant maintained, among other things, that security measures in connection with contact sessions were not unusual, and that contact sessions had taken place also after the \u201ccar incident\u201d (see paragraph 12 above) without abductions having been attempted. In its response at this point, the child welfare authorities submitted, inter alia, that the fact that some contact sessions had been carried out subsequent to the County Social Welfare Board\u2019s decision (see paragraphs 15-19 above) without abduction having been attempted, could not be decisive. It argued that these sessions, which had taken place with police assistance, had occurred at a time when A had not yet started to talk and did not understand much of the situation. 63.  On 7 July 2015 the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeals Leave Committee (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg) \u2013 composed of three Supreme Court Justices \u2013 refused leave to appeal. 64.  The Committee remarked that during the High Court proceedings, the child\u2019s foster mother had testified by telephone without her identity being revealed to the appellants. This was a procedural error. However, it was clear to the Committee that it could not have had a bearing on the substance of the decision, and there was therefore no reason to refer the appeal on this matter for consideration by the Supreme Court. 65.  The High Court\u2019s reasons had clearly been sufficient. As to the appellants\u2019 attack on the substance of the High Court\u2019s judgment, the Committee found that neither the decision\u2019s significance beyond the scope of the current case nor any other circumstances indicated that the case should be heard by the Supreme Court. The decision to refuse leave to appeal was unanimous.", "references": ["3", "0", "9", "5", "1", "8", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5.  The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6.  On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants\u2019 plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7.  The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8.  In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9.  On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10.  On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants\u2019 plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11.  On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12.  On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13.  On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14.  In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants\u2019 claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (\u201cthe 2006 Code\u201d). 15.  The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the \u201cSMRDA\u201d), and challenging the lower court\u2019s decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.", "references": ["1", "5", "0", "8", "4", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant owns one half of a plot of land in the village of Golyamo Buchino, close to the city of Pernik. He also owned one half of a house standing on the plot, in which he lived until 1997, and one half of two smaller buildings, a barn and a pen. Those buildings no longer exist. 7.  On an unspecified date towards the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s the State took a decision to create an opencast coalmine near the village. In a decision of 8 May 1990 the local mayor expropriated about ninety properties in the area for that purpose, including the applicant\u2019s land and buildings. 8.  The expropriation decision stated that the applicant should receive in compensation another plot of land in the village. The applicant received additionally a sum of money (the parties have not presented the decision of the mayor on the additional compensation). The majority of the remaining owners received either monetary compensation or flats in the city of Pernik. As another plot was not provided to the applicant within the statutory time\u2011limit of one year, on 21 August 1992 he requested that the expropriation be cancelled, as he was entitled to under section 102 of the Property Act (see paragraph 24 below). Another person who was due a plot of land in compensation also applied to have the expropriation of her property cancelled. In a decision of 2 October 1992 the Pernik regional governor cancelled the two expropriations, noting that the plots of land due in compensation had not been provided \u201cowing to the impossibility for the municipality to ensure such plots\u201d. The decision stated furthermore that the owners had to pay back the monetary compensation they had additionally received. On 22 December 1993 the applicant paid back that compensation. 9.  The applicant remained in his house. In the years which followed the mine approached the house, due to its gradual enlargement. Coal was extracted from it by means of detonations, which, according to the applicant, shook the house on a daily basis. On unspecified dates cracks appeared on the walls of the house, and the barn and the pen collapsed. Towards the beginning of 1997 the applicant\u2019s family moved out of the house, judging it too dangerous to stay. 10.  Subsequently, the applicant contacted the mine, seeking to obtain compensation, but the negotiations failed. At the time, the mine was managed by a company which was wholly State-owned. In 2005 it was privatised. 11.  In 2001 the applicant brought a tort action against the company operating the mine, seeking compensation for the damage caused to his property. 12.  The Pernik Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), which examined the case at first instance, heard a witness, a neighbour of the applicant, who stated during a court hearing of 13 December 2001 that the walls of the applicant\u2019s house were cracked, that its state continued to deteriorate, and that the barn had collapsed three or four years earlier. He thought that the house had been well constructed, and explained that after the initial damage the applicant had attempted to repair it. On 7 March 2002 the Regional Court heard another witness, who stated that most of the damage to the applicant\u2019s house had been caused three or four years earlier. 13.  The Regional Court appointed an expert, who established that the house had been constructed between 1948 and 1950, when there had been no requirements as to seismic resistance. At the time of drawing up the expert report the house was uninhabitable, as its walls were bent and cracked, with the cracks sometimes reaching 20-35 cm in width. The distance between the house and the mine\u2019s periphery was about 160\u2011180 metres. This meant that the house was situated well inside the so\u2011called \u201csanitation zone\u201d consisting of land within 500 metres of the mine\u2019s edge, inside which the law prohibited any dwellings. The \u201csecurity zone\u201d for the mine, within which no unauthorised person was to be present during detonation works, had a radius of 600 metres. The expert confirmed his conclusions at a court meeting on 24 January 2002. 14.  In a judgment of 27 June 2003 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It considered it established that the applicant\u2019s property had been seriously damaged and that the damage had coincided in time with the beginning of detonation works in the mine. Still, it concluded that the applicant had not proven that a causal link existed between the damage and the detonations. He had relied in that regard on the witness testimony provided by two neighbours, but according to the Regional Court it was impossible to establish what had caused the damage to the property by way of witness testimony. The burden of proof to establish such a circumstance lay on the applicant and the other party had argued that the damage had been due to the manner of construction of his house. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal. Before the Sofia Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) he called an additional witness, who stated during a hearing on 2 February 2004 that many houses in the area had already collapsed, and that all the other houses in the applicant\u2019s neighbourhood had cracks. 16.  On 25 June 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, confirming its reasoning. It held that while witness testimony could establish the extent and the timing of the damage to the applicant\u2019s property, it could not prove the causal link between that damage and the detonation works at the mine. 17.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a judgment of 5 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It was of the view that the lower courts had not duly accounted for the fact that the mine operated in a prohibited area close to the applicant\u2019s house, the house being situated within both the \u201csanitation zone\u201d and the \u201csecurity zone\u201d around the mine. The lower courts had had to examine this fact in light of the statements of the witnesses, which had \u201cestablished the circumstance\u201d that the damage to the applicant\u2019s property had been the result of the detonation works. It was also necessary to assess compliance by the company operating the mine with other statutory requirements, such as those concerning environmental protection. 18.  After the case was remitted, the Court of Appeal commissioned a new expert report. The expert noted that, owing to the passage of time and the destruction of some documents, it was impossible to determine the exact distance between the applicant\u2019s house and the area where the detonations had been carried out in 1997. Nevertheless, it was clear that the house had been well inside the \u201csanitation zone\u201d around the mine. The expert additionally noted that the detonations had been carried out by qualified workers, in accordance with the mine\u2019s internal rules. 19.  The Court of Appeal heard an additional witness for the applicant, who stated during a court hearing of 23 November 2006 that many houses in the village had collapsed, and that he thought that this was due to the detonations at the mine. He added that the detonations took place on a daily basis, that they caused \u201cearthquakes\u201d, and that the houses shattered as a result. The first cracks on the applicant\u2019s house had appeared even before the time when the mine had operated closest to it. The witness was not aware of any landslides in the area. 20.  In a judgment of 2 April 2007 the Court of Appeal once again upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 27 June 2003, dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim. It found it \u201cindisputable\u201d that employees of the mine had acted in breach of law, by carrying out detonations in a prohibited area close to residential buildings, including at the time when, according to the applicant, the damage to his property had started. Nevertheless, on the basis of the material submitted, the applicant had not proved the causal link between the mine\u2019s work and the damage to his property. The Court of Appeal reasoned in that regard:\n\u201cThe causal link ... cannot be assumed \u2013 it is to be fully proven by the claimant. It has not been shown in the case that the claimant\u2019s building, constructed in the 1950s, has been damaged precisely because of the detonation works at the mine. The claimant has not shown that the residential building and the auxiliary buildings, given [their] manner of construction, the materials [used] and the time of [their] construction, would not have been damaged, or would not have been damaged to such an extent, had it not been for the detonation works at the mine. It has not been shown whether and to what degree the buildings\u2019 state described by the expert [heard by the Regional Court] was due to normal wear and tear, taking into account the year [they were built] and the manner of [their] construction, and any lack of maintenance by the owner after the 1990 expropriation.\u201d 21.  Upon a further appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 3 July 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment, affirming its conclusions. It pointed out in particular that the expert report presented to the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 18 above) had only established that the applicant\u2019s property had been situated within the \u201csanitation zone\u201d around the mine, but \u201cwas insufficient to prove the existence of a causal link between the damage ... and the unlawful behaviour of employees of the respondent company\u201d. 22.  In the meantime, the applicant\u2019s house has collapsed and no longer exists. The property has been abandoned.", "references": ["1", "8", "0", "5", "7", "4", "2", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first and third applicants were born in 1941, the second applicant was born in 1974, and the fourth applicant was born in 1967. The first, second and third applicants live in Kazanlak and the fourth applicant lives in Sofia. 6.  Ms Maria Kopankova and her grandson, the fourth applicant (son of the first applicant) co-owned a house with a garden in Kazanlak. At the time Ms Maria Kopankova lived in the house with her two sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov, and their families, which included the remaining applicants (the second and third applicants are Mr Kancho Kopankov\u2019s wife and son). 7.  By a decision of the town mayor of 18 July 1988 the property was expropriated under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision stated that each of the two owners (Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant) were to be compensated with a flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 8.  After the expropriation the municipal authorities opened a blocked housing savings account with the State Savings Bank in the name of Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant and transferred to it 13,420 old Bulgarian levs (BGL) \u2013 the equivalent of the expropriated property\u2019s value as assessed at the time. 9.  In 1989 Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants were moved out of the expropriated property and the house was pulled down. Construction work started on the plot of land and the foundations of a future building were laid. However, the site was soon after that abandoned. 10.  Throughout the years that followed Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants petitioned on many occasions the municipal authorities to provide them with the compensation due, but to no avail. The mayor never took a decision specifying the exact future flats to be offered in compensation (see paragraph 20 below). 11.  In 1998 Ms Maria Kopankova passed away and was succeeded by her sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov. The latter passed away in 2011 and was succeeded by the second and third applicants. 12.  On 16 February 2009 the applicants and Mr Kancho Kopankov made a request to the mayor under section 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (hereinafter \u201csection 9(2)\u201d) for the revocation of the expropriation order of 18 July 1988. As no response followed, they applied for judicial review of the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal. 13.  The Stara Zagora Administrative Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Administrative Court\u201d) gave a judgment on 27 May 2010. It found, firstly, that the fourth applicant and Ms Maria Kopankova, and subsequently her heirs, had not received the compensation due to them, namely two flats. It pointed out in this connection that the transfer of money to a blocked housing savings account in their name (see paragraph 8 above) was not equivalent to the provision of compensation. The Administrative Court found further that the authorities had not \u201ctaken possession\u201d of the applicants\u2019 property, within the meaning of section 9(2), because there had been no formal decision to take possession (as had been required at the time), and because in any event the construction work which had started on the plot had eventually been abandoned. Thus, the preconditions for the revocation of the 1988 expropriation under section 9(2) had been fulfilled. On that basis the Administrative Court quashed the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal and revoked the expropriation order. 14.  The judgment above was not appealed against and became final. 15.  In 2011 the applicants brought a tort action against the Kazanlak municipality under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 23 below). They claimed the value of the house and of other objects (such as trees, the pavement and outbuildings) which had stood on the plot of land and had been destroyed, but for which they had never received any compensation. The applicants also made claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 16.  In the context of the ensuing proceedings the Administrative Court, examining the case, appointed experts, who estimated the value of the house and the remaining objects at 37,868 new Bulgarian levs (BGN \u2013 the equivalent of approximately 19,370 euros (EUR)). 17.  In a decision of 26 January 2012 the Administrative Court found the applicants\u2019 claims inadmissible and refused to examine them on the merits. It reasoned that the applicants\u2019 situation had been regulated by sections 9(1) and 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (see paragraph 22 below, hereinafter \u201csection 9(1)\u201d and \u201csection 9(2)\u201d), and that the existence of such a special avenue of redress meant that the general tort provisions of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act did not apply. 18.  These conclusions were upheld in a final decision of 20 April 2012 of the Supreme Administrative Court, which added that since the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 property had been quashed and the expropriation proceedings completed, the municipality could not be liable for any damage stemming from these proceedings. It pointed out in addition that the applicants\u2019 claims did not fall to be examined by the civil courts, under the general rules of tort, and that the administrative courts remained competent to examine them, even though the claims were inadmissible. It thus refused to apply Article 135 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 below) and transfer the case to the civil courts, as the applicants had requested.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "7", "8", "2", "3", "0", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Silistra. 5.  In 2003 an individual installed a printing company in a building situated in close proximity to the building where the applicant was living with his family. Shortly after the printing company began operating, the applicant and his family started resenting the nuisance it was causing. In particular, they found the constant smell of ink and solvents intolerable; also, they were continuously disturbed by the vibrations caused by the printing machines, which reverberated through the walls of their dwelling. Moreover, as time went by, the applicant\u2019s young daughter developed an allergy, which the applicant believed was due to the chemicals used in the printing process and had to take daily medication to keep it under control. 6.  Between July 2006 and August 2007, the applicant turned to several State institutions, including regional branches of the hygiene and epidemiological inspectorate, the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health, the regional building inspectorate, the mayor of Silistra and the prosecution service. He complained to them in writing about the nuisance caused by the printing company. He claimed that the latter was operating contrary to a number of legal requirements found in different ministerial regulations. He also asked the authorities for help in forcing the printing company to cease its operations. 7.  More specifically, the chronology of his correspondence with the authorities can be traced as follows. 8.  On 15 August 2006, the director of the regional agency for public health (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0437\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435 \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe public health agency\u201d) informed the applicant that on 10 August 2006 two junior inspectors from the agency had visited the printing company in question. He did so in a brief one-paragraph letter in reply to a complaint made by the applicant on 31 July 2006. The inspectors had established during that visit that two printing machines (without specifying their type, power or capacity) were operating at that time in the printing company and that this number was in line with the requirements set out in Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health. The letter invited the applicant to propose a day and time for the measuring of the noise generated by the printing company. 9.  Two days later, on 17 August 2006, the applicant together with three of his neighbours complained in writing to the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health that the printing company was operating in contravention of relevant legal requirements. On 22 August 2006, the applicant and the same three neighbours wrote again to the same directorate expressing concern about and dissatisfaction with the manner in which the measurements in respect of noise and air pollution had been taken on 18 August 2006. In particular, two individuals who had not shown any credentials had turned up and measured the noise with a machine which had not reacted to sudden high-pitched noises but was set up to measure only background noise. Furthermore, when the applicant had invited the inspectors to also measure the purity of the air, one of them had opened the window, sniffed the air and stated that it was not that bad and that, in all likelihood, it would turn out to be within the relevant norms when measured. The applicant further stressed in the letter that the printing company was operating in close proximity to inhabited dwellings, whereas according to the relevant regulations this was prohibited within less than 50 metres of such buildings. 10.  The applicant and his three neighbours also wrote to the building inspectorate on 23 August 2006, complaining that the printing company\u2019 premises had been built in contravention of the relevant construction norms. 11.  On 25 August 2006 the Ministry for Health wrote to the public health agency, asking that a check be carried out and the applicant informed of the results accordingly. On 29 August 2006 the Ministry for Health issued an instruction to the owner of the printing company, inviting him to bring the noise levels generated by his business within the limits stipulated in the relevant regulations. 12.  On 30 August 2006, apparently in reply to the applicant\u2019s letter of complaint of 31 July 2006, the head of the public health agency informed the applicant that: the chemical agents identified at the work stations at the printing company in question were within the limits listed in Regulation No. 13 of 2003 for the protection of individuals exposed to chemical agents at their work station; the noise reaching the applicant\u2019s home when the windows were open, as well as the dwelling of one of his neighbours, was not in conformity with the requirements of Regulation No. 6 of 2006; and that instructions had been issued to the owner of the printing company to ensure that the noise levels produced by his business were brought within the legal limits. 13.  On 5 October 2006 a representative of the Ministry for Health wrote to the applicant informing him that staff from the public health agency had carried out two checks at the printing company; neither the dates of those checks, nor any further details about them were mentioned. The letter then read that on 18 August 2006 officials had measured the reverberating noise and the chemical agents produced at the printing company. As the noise levels had been found to be beyond the legal limits, the owner had been instructed to lower them by 29 October 2006. 14.  On 27 October 2006 the applicant and his three neighbours wrote to the Ministry for Health, expressing their dissatisfaction with the reply they had received on 5 October 2006. They reiterated that the printing company was surrounded on three sides by inhabited dwellings, in which a number of small children lived. They referred to point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992, which prohibited the installation of printing houses less than 50 metres from inhabited buildings and to the fact that the owner of the printing company had not obtained an agreement from any of his neighbours for installing his business at that location. They pointed out too that the noise levels had not been lowered, contrary to the authorities\u2019 instructions, and stressed that the record which they had signed on the day when the noise measurements had been taken had indicated 58 decibels (dB) and not 38 as stated in the record included in the file. They asked once again that the authorities order the printing company to cease its operations on the ground that they were in breach of point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992. 15.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant and four of his neighbours wrote to the regional inspectorate for the environment and water in Ruse (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430 \u0438 \u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435). They stated that, although the printing company had been apparently functioning on the basis of a lawful permit since 2003, given that it was located in a densely populated area, in their opinion, this was inappropriate. The letter then listed the exact name of the machines operating at the printing company and the type of ink used. The applicant and his neighbours further pointed out that, according to Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health, printing houses had to be located at least 50 metres from inhabited dwellings and that the printing company in question was joined on three sides to the complainants\u2019 dwellings. The printing business in question had been formally registered as \u201ca workshop for printing services with up to two work stations\u201d and not as a \u201cprinting house\u201d; in this way it had successfully circumvented the legal requirements applicable to printing houses, despite the fact that the notice exhibited at its entrance read \u201cprinting house\u201d (\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430). 16.  The letter further stated that in reality, for a number of consecutive years, more than two people had been working at the printing house at any given time. The applicant and his neighbours had learned from the staff that no antidote was being given to them; this was obligatory as protection against carcinogens present in printing inks and solvents used to clean the machines (up to ten times a day on a busy day). The authors of the letter then wondered whether they as well as the people living in the immediate vicinity of the printing house should also have been taking such antidotes. The applicant\u2019s daughter had developed an allergy towards some of the chemicals used by the printing house and was taking daily medication called Zertec. Whenever the door of the printing house was opened a pungent smell entered directly into the bedroom of the applicant\u2019s children, the window of which was situated directly opposite it at about seven metres\u2019 distance. 17.  Like the staff at the printing company, the applicant and his neighbours suffered frequently from headaches, their washing turned grey whenever it was hung to dry and the noise produced by the machines when operating was unbearable. In particular, at the house of one of the applicant\u2019s neighbours the noise was so loud it was as though an earthquake had started every time the guillotine was operating. The applicant and his neighbours had sought a copy of the original record signed at the time the noise had been measured but had not received one. The letter concluded that the residents whose dwellings adjoined the printing company were doomed to bringing up their children for the foreseeable future in an environment of noise and chemicals, without any guarantee for their health and normal development. One of the staff working for several years at the printing company had developed a brain tumour, which was a source of serious worry for everyone in the vicinity. The applicant and his neighbours were also worried that the owner did not wish to hear any suggestion of moving his printing business away, but insisted that it was harmless as he preferred to profit from the commercial advantages a central location offered. The letter\u2019s authors then invited the authorities to carry out an unannounced nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry in order for the community to learn about the poisons they were being exposed to, as well as to proceed with closing down the business. They enclosed a copy of the 810 signatures collected in support of their cause. 18.  On 10 September 2007 the head of the Ruse regional inspectorate for the environment and water wrote to the applicant in reply to the letter of 20 August 2007. The reply stated that two experts sent by the inspectorate had carried out a check on 30 August 2007 at the printing company in the presence of its owner. The conclusions of that check were that the printing company was operating on the basis of a permit issued by the building authorities on 25 July 2003. The type of operation \u2013 offset printing on sheets of paper \u2013 was not among the operations listed in Annex I of Regulation No. 7 of 2003 on limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds released into the environment as a result of the use of solvents in certain installations. Lastly, the noise emissions had been measured at 49.7 dB, which was lower than the legal limit of 60 dB to be found in Annex II \u2013 Table 2, point 2 of Regulation No. 6 of 26 June 2006. 19.  In addition to his appeals to the above-mentioned institutions, the applicant decided to attract public attention to his dispute with the printing company. He produced some posters for that purpose, calling on the community in the town of Silistra to express support for the termination of the printing company\u2019s operations. The text on the posters claimed that the printing company had been licensed in breach of the relevant legal requirements and that the pollution it was causing was harmful to the people living in the vicinity. The posters also listed parts of three regulations issued by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Regional Development and concerning sanitary requirements and, protection of public health in an urban environment. 20.  The applicant exhibited the posters described above on the windows of his own shop, which was situated close to both his home and the printing company. The posters were exhibited between 12 December 2006 and 22 February 2007, and within a little over a month the applicant had collected more than 800 signatures from individuals in support of his cause. 21.  On an unspecified date the owner of the printing company, V.V., brought defamation proceedings against the applicant under Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968. V.V. complained in particular that the applicant\u2019s actions had damaged his printing business and his personal reputation. 22.  The applicant\u2019s three neighbours, who together with the applicant had been continuously complaining to the authorities, submitted a signed declaration in support of the applicant. They stated that, irrespective of all the different permits which the printing company might have obtained from the authorities, this did not change the fact that it was causing a chemical and noise-related nuisance to the community on a daily basis. 23.  On 5 June 2007 the Silistra District Court found the applicant guilty of libel. It held that he had defamed V.V. by complaining in writing to various institutions about the latter\u2019s printing operations and by printing and publicly disseminating material which claimed that the business was operating unlawfully. Contrary to the requirements of Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968, the applicant had not submitted proof showing that his complaints to the authorities and the claims he had made in the posters were true. While officials from the Ministry of Health had indeed established that the noise emitted by the printing business had been beyond the authorised limits, the authorities had instructed its owner to bring it within the relevant norms and had given him a deadline, with which he had complied. The court then stated that, as seen from a chemical agents inspection report of August 2006 and from the subsequent explanations of the person who had carried out the check, it was clear that measurements had been taken throughout the working process at the printing premises and that the level of the chemical agents measured was not above the norms. 24.  As to the claim that the printing business had been set up in breach of Regulation No. 7 of 2003, that was impossible as the said regulation had become applicable as of 13 January 2004, whereas the printing business had been lawfully operating since 25 July 2003. In respect of the claim that Regulation No. 7 of 1992 had also been breached, the court found that while point 393 of that regulation indeed provided that printing houses had to be at least fifty metres away from inhabited dwellings, this only concerned \u201cprinting houses\u201d, while the business in question had been registered as a \u201cworkshop for printing services and a shop with an office\u201d, and the printing-house regulations did not apply to workshops. 25.  The allegation that the applicant\u2019s daughter had developed an allergy had also remained entirely unproven, given that the applicant had presented as evidence only a medical document stating that she was suffering from \u201cbronchitis\u201d. The court went on to say that \u201cevery biological parent of average intelligence whose child was frequently ill had to know that respiratory ailments were the most frequent ones in early childhood\u201d. 26.  The court concluded that, given that the applicant\u2019s claims were factually wrong, they had inevitably damaged the printing business owner\u2019s reputation. That amounted to defamation, which was in breach of the law and had to be sanctioned. The court then waived the applicant\u2019s criminal liability and imposed on him an administrative penalty in the form of a fine in the amount equivalent to 250 euros (EUR). It further partially upheld the claimant\u2019s civil claim submitted in the criminal proceedings and ordered the applicant to pay EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damages to V.V. and EUR 20 in court fees. 27.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the Silistra Regional Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s findings in a final judgment of 30 October 2007. It observed that the relevant authorities had carried out a number of inspections at the printing business in question in response to the applicant\u2019s complaints. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s allegations, none of those checks had established either a breach of the relevant legislation or the existence of pollution caused by the printing company. Despite this, the applicant had continued to disseminate false and discrediting information about V.V. by exhibiting posters on the windows of his own shop. 28.  The court agreed with the finding at first instance that the applicant could not be absolved from responsibility as he had been unable to prove the veracity of his allegations. It further found that the punishment had been neither excessive nor unfair and, if anything, it had been too lenient.", "references": ["0", "3", "5", "9", "1", "2", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Zagreb. 5.  On 28 April 2008 the daily newspaper B. published an article under the headline \u201cMob Lawyer joins the Supervisory Board\u201d, describing the applicant as an extortionist. 6.  On 27 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 7.  On 9 July 2008, after the expiry of the deadline envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Media Act (Zakon o medijima) to publish a correction, the applicant brought a civil action against the publisher in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu), claiming non-pecuniary damage. 8.  On 10 July 2009 the publisher replied stating in particular that the applicant had failed to submit a power of attorney with his request. 9.  At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-\u00e0-vis the publisher. 10.  On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant\u2019s claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request.\nThe relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIn his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ...\n...\nThis court does not accept the [applicant]\u2019s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant\u2019s] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ...\n...\nGiven that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ...\u201d 11.  On 19 November 2012 the \u0160ibenik County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u \u0160ibeniku) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision. 12.  On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant inadmissible on the grounds that there was \u201cno constitutional issue\u201d to be examined.", "references": ["5", "9", "4", "8", "6", "7", "1", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant company, B. Tagliaferro & Sons Limited, is a company registered in Malta in 1966 and is situated in Valletta. The second applicant company, Coleiro Brothers Limited, is also a company registered in Malta in 1966 and it is situated in Marsa. 6.  In 1993 each applicant company was the owner of a one third undivided share of three corner properties, namely nos. 124 and 125 in Strait Street and no. 109 Archbishop Street, Valletta (hereinafter \u201cthe properties\u201d). 7.  According to a court-appointed expert the properties nos. 124 and 125 were valued at the equivalent of 35,000 euros (EUR) each in 1993 and EUR 58,000 and EUR 60,000 respectively in 2012, while property no. 109 was valued at the equivalent of EUR 93,000 in 1993 and EUR 140,000 in 2012. The same architect estimated that the rental value from 1993 to 1998 would be the equivalent of EUR 233, EUR 250 and EUR 600 respectively, to be augmented by 10 % every five years thereafter. 8.  By a President\u2019s declaration of 23 February 1993 the Government declared its intention of acquiring by title of absolute purchase the three properties for public purposes. No Notice to Treat (offering an amount of compensation) was issued by the Commissioner of Lands (\u2018CoL\u2019) at the time (see below). The public purpose later transpired to be that of using the properties, together with other properties also expropriated (together referred to as \u201cthe premises\u201d hereinafter), as government offices \u2011 in particular, as the Office of the Attorney General. 9.  On 2 June 1993 and 12 October 1993 the Government had lodged planning applications, which were later withdrawn. Another development application was submitted in 1996 and approved in the same year. However, since parts of the premises expropriated (including other adjacent property not owned by the applicant companies) were occupied by squatters and by other persons having legal title (of lease or similar \u2011 inkwilini \u2011 hereinafter referred to as \u201clessees\u201d), the Government was unable to take over the premises. The applicant companies insisted that at the time of the declaration, the properties owned by them were vacant. 10.  Between 1996 and 2007 the Attorney General repeatedly requested the Lands Department to take steps to vacate the premises. In turn the latter department wrote to the Housing Authority requesting it to provide alternative accommodation to the lessees and the squatters. Given that not all the occupiers had applied for alternative accommodation, as expected by the authorities, the relocation process was delayed. Thus, the construction permit in relation to the planned project issued in 1996 expired. On 18 September 2000 another application was submitted to the Malta Environment and Planning Authority for approval. By the end of 2015 no approval had yet been issued due to various obstacles from the various committees of the Planning Authority. 11.  In the meantime in April 2000 the issue was brought to the attention of the Justice Minister and in January 2001 eviction orders were issued to evict the occupiers of the premises. 12.  In 2003 the applicant companies wrote to the CoL requesting him to pay compensation for the taking. The latter did not reply. 13.  In 2007 the premises were vacated and the Government took over their possession. 14.  By means of a judicial protest of 20 July 2008 the applicant companies requested the return of the properties owned by them as well as compensation for the taking until its effective release. The CoL did not reply to the protest. 15.  On 24 June 2009 the Government issued a new declaration for the expropriation of the properties. They offered the following amount of compensation which was deposited via the courts in an interest bearing account: EUR 8,968 for property no. 124 (for a plot of land measuring 23.10 sq.m.); EUR 8,316 for property no. 125 (no measurement provided); and EUR 21,733 for property no. 109 (for a plot of land measuring 87.08 sq.m), in line with estimates made by architect FHV. 16.  The Government thus became the owner of the properties in accordance with the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta, hereinafter \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d, as amended. The applicant companies were not served with this declaration as required by law (see paragraph 37 below). 17.  On unspecified dates the two applicant companies instituted separate constitutional redress proceedings complaining that the taking had not been in the public interest, that there had been a delay in the payment of compensation and that they had had no access to an impartial and independent tribunal in the meantime. 18.  The two applications were heard and determined concurrently by the domestic courts. 19.  By two separate judgments of 12 October 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, upheld the applicant companies\u2019 claims in part. 20.  It rejected their claim concerning the lack of public interest of the expropriation, having considered that the purpose of the taking was one in the general interest of citizens, given the role of the Attorney General who performed constitutional duties in the interest of the State. The Attorney General\u2019s Office was to be moved to a more appropriate location, allowing it to expand. Whether the Government had other alternative property for this project was not a matter to be examined by the court, such choices falling within the Government\u2019s discretion, which in the present case had not been applied unreasonably, and the decision had been intra vires. While it was true that a certain delay had occurred in the development of the initial plan, the court considered that the public interest still existed as the plan was still in force and had recently started progressing more rapidly. Moreover, the property was still earmarked for the same purpose, which purpose had never been abandoned by the authorities. 21.  The court, however, found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in connection with the delay resulting from the expropriation proceedings, highlighting the slowness of the authorities in taking steps to vacate the premises and in offering the applicant companies compensation. 22.  It further found a violation of Article 6 in so far as the applicant companies had not had access to court between 1993 and 2009, given that access to the Land Arbitration Board (LAB) was limited solely to the CoL. 23.  Moreover, until 2009 the LAB did not fulfil the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal given its composition according to the law as it stood before the 2009 amendments. The constitutional jurisdictions had already held (in previous domestic\u2011case law) that the LAB did not fulfil the requirement of independence and impartiality because of the method of appointment of its technical members before the 2009 amendments. Nevertheless, the latter amendments provided that the technical members, who assisted the chairperson in his decision, would now be appointed by the chairperson. Moreover, the latter\u2019s decision was subject to appeal before the Court of Appeal. It followed that the same issues did not arise post 2009, thus the applicant companies had suffered a violation of their right to have their claims determined by an independent and impartial tribunal solely until 2009. 24.  Furthermore, in the court\u2019s view, the applicant companies were also still suffering a violation of their right to a fair trial within a reasonable time in connection with the proceedings which were at the time in their preliminary phase, in so far as the CoL had not yet officially notified the owners (or curators on their behalf) allowing them to challenge the compensation. 25.  The court further noted that while according to the law the obligation to act was upon the CoL and owners should not be required to take judicial steps to impose a term for him to act, the fact that the applicant companies had not undertaken such judicial steps could affect the compensation awarded. 26.  The court rejected the applicant companies\u2019 claims for material damage without prejudice to proceedings which they could bring before the LAB which could now be considered independent and impartial \u2013 it being chaired by a judge or magistrate who fulfilled the relevant guarantee - and whose decisions could also be appealed. It awarded each applicant company EUR 10,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damage (known in the domestic system as moral damage) bearing in mind that they each were owners of a third undivided share of the properties. The court also ordered the applicant companies to pay half the costs of the proceedings, that is to say EUR 3,546.97. 27.  Both parties appealed. 28.  By two separate judgments of 31 May 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the defendants\u2019 appeal and upheld the applicant companies\u2019 appeal in part. It confirmed the first\u2011instance judgment, extending the scope of certain violations and increasing the amount of compensation awarded. 29.  The Constitutional Court confirmed the violations of Article 6 (access to court and length of proceedings) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as in the absence of a Notice to Treat issued by the CoL the applicant companies had had no access to court from 1993 to 2009. However, these violations persisted further, in so far as even after the declaration of 2009 and the CoL\u2019s deposit in court of the offer made to the applicant companies, he had failed to notify the owners as required by law [Article 9 (2) of the Ordinance] with the consequence that proceedings had stagnated and no access to court by the applicant companies was possible as a result of his inaction. Indeed, the authorities had slacked all throughout the process. Similarly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the applicant companies\u2019 failure to bring judicial proceedings to oblige the CoL to act could only have a bearing on the award of compensation but not on the substance of the claim. 30.  It further confirmed the public interest of the taking, which persisted to date since, despite the delay, the Government was still pursuing the aim it had originally intended for the property. 31.  The Constitutional Court also confirmed the lack of independence and impartiality of the LAB, however not only until 2009. The Constitutional Court considered that, even following those amendments the law remained deficient given the lack of security of tenure of the technical members of the board, on whose technical advice the chairperson had to base his or her decision. While it confirmed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s findings concerning the role of the chairperson, it observed that the technical members were still subject to reappointment (by the President of Malta, on the advice of the executive, which was always a party to the proceedings before such board). Although the role of the technical members was subordinate to that of the chairperson (who following the amendments was not bound to follow the experts\u2019 unanimous report), in practice it was decisive in so far as the chairperson (a legal person without the necessary technical knowledge) was undoubtedly influenced by the decision of the technical members when considering technical matters. As stated in previous domestic case-law, at least in the mind of an objective observer, the possibility of the technical experts being reappointed could be an incentive for such members to determine low values for expropriated property in order to remain in the good books of the executive who had the power to keep them in office. Thus, such a body did not fulfil the guarantees of independence and impartiality. In the specific circumstances, those failings could not be cured by the Court of Appeal, which was not in a position to interfere with the conclusions of the technical members of the board. 32.  However, the Constitutional Court considered that material damage had to be awarded by the LAB in separate proceedings; it thus only awarded non-pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 15,000 to each applicant company. It ordered the applicant companies to pay a third of the costs of the appeal proceedings (that is, EUR 1,109.41) and confirmed the costs as ordered at first-instance for those proceedings. It further directed that the judgment be served upon the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 33.  In 2018 the applicant companies submitted that no use had yet been made of their property, the value of which was increasing in line with the value of property in general in Malta. They also noted that the Government had done restoration works in the area, particularly to a part of Palazzo Verdelin, which was a historic building described in newspapers as an early example of baroque architecture in Malta, but not to the part owned by the applicant companies which was left to deteriorate in the absence of maintenance works. 34.  At the same time, the Government informed the Court that due to the urgency of vacating and transferring the Office of the Attorney General, another building in Valletta which was previously a museum was identified for use as the Office of the Attorney General. It was now being refurbished and modified for such purpose. However, the applicant companies\u2019 property remained designated for public use. They noted that the applicant companies\u2019 property could not be refurbished as it needed extensive structural works unlike Palazzo Verdelin which required only restoring the facade.", "references": ["8", "3", "2", "4", "6", "1", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Albania. He was a Member of Parliament from 2013 until 20 October 2015. 6.  On 20 March 2015 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe GPO\u201d) initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for making a false report of a crime and false statements before a prosecutor and for threatening people in order to obtain false statements in breach of Articles 305, 305/a and 312/a of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d). 7.  Having regard to his parliamentary immunity, on 26 March 2015 Parliament authorised the applicant\u2019s arrest. As a result, on the same day the GPO ordered his arrest, which was carried out with immediate effect. 8.  On 27 March 2015 the GPO asked the Supreme Court to validate the applicant\u2019s arrest. 9.  On 28 March 2015 the Supreme Court found that the GPO had complied with domestic law in ordering the applicant\u2019s arrest, since it had obtained Parliament\u2019s prior authorisation in accordance with Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution. The applicant had been charged with a number of offences. Given his public office, his financial situation, the possibility that he could tamper with evidence, and information obtained from the Belgian authorities about his alleged involvement in the commission of a crime in Belgium, there was reasonable suspicion that he might flee. The Supreme Court thus considered that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty was lawful. As to the security measure to be imposed on the applicant, the Supreme Court ordered his placement under house arrest. 10.  On 27 March 2015 the Interpol office in Tirana (\u201cInterpol Tirana\u201d) informed the GPO of the existence of an international arrest warrant against the applicant. The warrant, no. B1/07 OPC, had been issued on 3 December 2014 by the Belgian prosecutor\u2019s office at the Brussels Court of Appeal, in connection with the criminal offence of premeditated murder committed in collusion with others. It appears from the case file that, according to a Red Notice issued by Interpol in respect of the applicant, he was wanted for prosecution purposes. 11.  On 28 March 2015, relying on Article 6 of the CC, Article 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) and Article 38 \u00a7 7 of the Jurisdictional Relations Act, the GPO initiated fresh criminal proceedings against the applicant for committing premeditated murder in collusion with others under Article 78/1 and 25 of the CC. On the same day the prosecutor\u2019s office requested authorisation from Parliament with a view to ordering the applicant\u2019s arrest. 12.  On 2 April 2015 Parliament authorised the applicant\u2019s arrest, in line with the GPO\u2019s request of 28 March 2015. 13.  On 1 April 2015, relying on a criminal report filed by the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest, the prosecutor\u2019s office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for laundering the proceeds from a criminal offence or activity and refusing to state or falsely stating what his possessions were in breach of Articles 287 and 257/a of the CC. On the same date the prosecutor\u2019s office decided to join that set of proceedings to the second set of proceedings. 14.  On 2 April 2015, following Parliament\u2019s authorisation on the same day (see above), the applicant was detained in connection with the second and third set of criminal proceedings. The arrest warrant referred to a letter from the Tirana Police Directorate stating \u201cthe enforcement of the security measure of house arrest cannot be entirely guaranteed, on account of the geographical position of the applicant\u2019s house, the large surface area of the house, the existence of more than two entry and exit gates, and the existence of numerous buildings constructed adjacent to and around the house\u201d. 15.  On 2 April 2015 the prosecutor asked the Supreme Court to validate the applicant\u2019s detention. 16.  On 3 April 2015 the Supreme Court decided that the applicant\u2019s detention was lawful. Since he had been charged with offences punishable by no less than two years\u2019 imprisonment, his detention was in compliance with Article 253 of the CCP. There were reasonable grounds to believe that there was a risk of flight on account of the offences with which he was charged. The applicant was a member of parliament, he had financial means, and there was a risk that he might tamper with the collection of evidence or abscond from justice. 17.  The Supreme Court further stated that the security measure of detention (arrest) should be imposed in accordance with Articles 228-230 of the CCP, and this entailed the fulfilment of three conditions: firstly, that there was a reasonable suspicion, based on evidence, that the accused had committed a crime; secondly, that the facts attributed to the accused constituted a criminal offence which had not become time-barred, as provided for by the criminal law; and thirdly, that the accused was criminally responsible for the alleged criminal offence. In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, all three conditions had been cumulatively fulfilled in the applicant\u2019s case. Further, the applicant\u2019s detention complied with the criteria laid down in Article 229 of the CCP, and would also be justified by the need to prevent any interference by the applicant in the administration of justice because of his public office, and the need to prevent further consequences resulting from the offence. 18.  In his dissenting opinion, Judge A.B. stated that a risk of flight should not rest on assumptions, hypotheses, suppositions or second guesses. The fact that the police could not secure the applicant\u2019s house arrest should not have been held against him. The prosecutor had not discharged the burden of proof in relation to the assertion that the applicant intended or would attempt to flee. The case file did not contain evidence of any risk of flight. 19.  On 26 May 2015 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. He complained that the prosecutor should firstly have sought Parliament\u2019s authorisation to institute a criminal investigation against him before seeking authorisation for his arrest. Further, no authorisation for his arrest had been given by Parliament in relation to the charges under Articles 287 and 257/a of the CC. The criminal proceedings initiated against him in relation to the alleged crime in Belgium had been in breach of the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, because the Belgian authorities had not asked the Albanian authorities to initiate any proceedings against him. 20.  On 6 July 2015 the Constitutional Court, composed of a bench of three judges, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It reasoned that Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution, as amended in 2012, required Parliament\u2019s authorisation for, amongst other things, the arrest of a member of parliament, Parliament\u2019s authorisation for the institution of a criminal investigation having been repealed. The security measures imposed on the applicant by the Supreme Court had been in response to all the criminal proceedings initiated against him, including the charges under Articles 257/a and 287 of the CC. 21.  On 19 February 2015 the Belgian Assize Court of Brabant Wallon decided to reopen the criminal proceedings against the applicant, and scheduled a hearing for 19 October 2015. 22.  On 15 July 2015 the Albanian GPO decided that it did not have the authority to examine a request by the applicant to attend the hearing of 19 October 2015 in Belgium. 23.  On 4 September 2015 the Assize Court of Brabant Wallon adjourned the proceedings sine die. 24.  On 25 September 2015 the GPO decided to extend the period of investigation for three more months, on account of the voluminous files received from Belgium in the framework of mutual legal assistance, the complexity of the case, the need to question more people, and so on. On 29 September 2015 the applicant challenged the GPO\u2019s decision of 25 September 2015 before the Supreme Court. 25.  On 2 October 2015 the applicant asked for the \u201cpersonal security measure\u201d of detention to be changed to house arrest. On 12 October 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request. It reasoned that there was still a risk of flight and a risk of the applicant tampering with the collection of evidence. 26.  It appears from the case file that the applicant lost his mandate as a Member of Parliament on 20 October 2015. Therefore, on 17 December 2015 the Supreme Court, at the GPO\u2019s request, decided to dismiss the case, noting that the competence to review the personal security measure lay with the court examining the merits of the case. 27.  On 26 April 2016 the Tirana District Court decided that the applicant should remain in detention. On 3 May 2016 the applicant challenged the Tirana District Court\u2019s decision of 26 April 2016. The Court has not been informed of any outcome in those proceedings.", "references": ["8", "1", "5", "9", "4", "7", "6", "3", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  The applicant is a psychiatrist and a founder and director of the Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture \u201cEmpathy\u201d, a non\u2011governmental organisation (\u201cthe NGO\u201d). 7.  On 4 October 2003 the applicant\u2019s NGO concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) and undertook, among other tasks, to create a psychosocial rehabilitation office in Tbilisi Prison no. 1. The agreement specified that, depending on the availability of resources, the NGO was to involve specialists, use clinical laboratory and diagnostic methods, and provide medication to inmates if treatment was prescribed. It was to provide quarterly progress reports to the Ministry and make suggestions on how to solve the social problems it identified through its activities. The Ministry undertook to support the proper functioning of the rehabilitation office and to designate a coordinator from the Ministry\u2019s Medical Department in order to ensure the implementation of the contract. 8.  On 3 August 2004 the applicant became member of the Public Monitoring Commission overseeing the implementation of the inmates\u2019 rights and competent to issue recommendations if any irregularities were observed. Presidential order no. 309 issued to that end specified that the members of the Commission could enter all prisons during the working hours without prior authorisation. The persons concerned had the right to meet inmates in private and access any documentation except that which was classified as confidential. 9.  On 29 November 2004 the then Minister of Justice created the Inmates\u2019 Mental Health Research and Monitoring Commission. It included seven State and non-State mental health experts, including the applicant. The document did not elaborate on the specific functions of the Commission or its members. 10.  On 10 September 2005 Mr L.Ts. \u2013 an inmate placed in the prison hospital in view of his mental health issues \u2013 physically assaulted the Director and the head doctor of the prison hospital (\u201cthe incident of 10 September 2005\u201d). He had been transferred to the prison hospital by the director of the Medical Department of the Ministry (\u201cthe Medical Department\u201d), based on the applicant\u2019s medical opinion to that end. In an unrelated incident that happened at around the same time, an inmate died of a complication in his health problems and it was reported that numerous others were waiting in vain to be admitted to the hospital. Both incidents attracted wide media coverage in view of the allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the medical management of the penal system. Some members of the civil society contended that the transfers to the prison hospital were not implemented adequately and objectively but were based on suspicious arrangements within the Ministry. 11.  On 11 September 2005 an investigation was opened into the incident of 10 September 2005 on account of an alleged abuse of official power. On an unspecified date the applicant was questioned as a witness. 12.  On 13 September 2005 the then Minister of Justice, Mr K.K. (\u201cthe Minister\u201d) commissioned an internal investigation concerning the activities of the Medical Department of the Ministry carried out between the period of 1 January 2005 and 13 September 2005. The General Inspectorate of the Ministry was to deliver its findings on 13 October 2005. 13.  On 16 September 2005, while speaking live on a private television channel, Rustavi 2, about allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the Ministry and its Medical Department, the Minister, Mr K.K., stated:\n\u201cI am impelled to specify surnames and specific facts... Mariam Jishkariani, the president of non-governmental organisation [Empathy] and a member of the [public] monitoring council [for penal institutions] has been ... grossly exceeding her powers and writing medical conclusions concerning specific persons, bypassing the commission [set up for that purpose]. I have those conclusions on my desk. The investigation has them already and practically speaking a full assessment will be carried out which will reveal whether this was done for the sake of pretty eyes or whether it was precisely the type of business that this shameless person \u2013 I cannot call her anything else \u2013 has found for herself. Because it was owing precisely to Jishkariani\u2019s scribbles on a piece of paper that [two allegedly healthy inmates who later assaulted doctors] found themselves in the prison hospital without any legal grounds for that ...\u201d 14.  The Minister further noted that the director of the Medical Department was \u201cthe one who... [relied on] Jishkariani\u2019s illegal notes ... not signed by the members of the [medical] commission... to transfer the inmates [to the prison hospital].\u201d He noted that \u201ctherefore he [was] the suspect in these illegal arrangements and \u201c[would] become an object of the investigation along with Jishkariani.\u201d The Minister continued to note that \u201cthere are not only these two facts and the investigation is pending because it was Mariam Jishkariani who was the most important figure and [whose opinions were guiding the director\u2019s actions]...\u201d 15.  The Minister also criticised the Public Defender and accused his representatives of having a vested interest in transferring certain inmates to the prison hospital. 16.  The Rustavi 2 TV channel also transmitted brief comments made by representatives of the civil society, including the Public Defender, who were involved in the public monitoring of the prisons (see paragraph 8 above). They noted that the accusations levelled by the Minister had been groundless in view of the fact that the transfers of inmates to and from the prison hospital had been within the exclusive competency of the Ministry. 17.  The programme also featured the applicant\u2019s brief comment, as recorded by a journalist, that the Minister wanted to have \u201ca monitoring council that [would] not take a peek inside a prison]\u201d and \u201cthe prisons [were] in the same conditions ... as those under Saddam Hussein\u2019s regime.\u201d 18.  On 20 September 2005 the daily newspaper Rezonansi published an interview with the Minister. He discussed allegations of corruption in the management of medical facilities in the penal system. The relevant excerpts of the interview read as follows:\n\u201cJournalist: You give two names \u2013 Jishkariani and [the director of the Medical Department] that were involved in corruption. What concrete facts do you have when making such statements?\nThe Minister: [The director of the Medical Department] was completely under the influence of Mariam Jishkariani. Jishkariani is a psychiatric doctor of non\u2011governmental organisation [Empathy]. That field is very tainted with respect to prisons. Even during Soviet times a lot of money was made on psychiatric reports. Certificates of declarations of insanity were granted to those who were not entitled to them.\nIt was precisely in her own interests that this lady [referring to the applicant] made a nest in this monitoring council. ...\nThe confrontation started immediately after we uncovered materials where Mariam Jishkariani had signed documents on the transfer of inmates to the prison hospital. It was revealed that there had been healthy people amongst those inmates. ...\nJournalist: Are you saying that money taken from the inmates was circulating among those people?\nThe Minister: Only among them. Doctors at the medical department are responsible for the medical reports. Their boss was [the director of the Medical Department]. Jishkariani and others were accomplices. The money they took should either have been brought to me or taken by them. Nothing was brought to me. [The inmates] who assaulted the personnel had been transferred to the prison hospital based on Jishkariani\u2019s medical report even though they are healthy. She had no authority to do that. Is that not a crime? Naturally, Jishkariani could not have committed it alone. She only wrote a report, or to be precise, scribbled something on a piece of paper that was not signed by any of the commission members. Despite this [the director of the Medical Department] ordered the transfer [of the two inmates] to the Republican Hospital.\u201d 19.  On 13 October 2005 the General Inspectorate delivered its report. It principally concerned the actions and omissions of the director of the Medical Department in the management of the transfers of inmates to the prison hospital. The report mentioned the applicant, in brief, and only with respect to one transfer. In particular, it noted that an inmate L.Ts. (see paragraph 10 above) was assessed by the medical commission of the Ministry on 12 January 2005. He was diagnosed with organic personal disorder with periodic episodes of decline. The commission noted that the inmate had been receiving treatment for a mental illness since 2002 and had a second-degree disability status. He had further suffered a head trauma on 8 January 2005. However the commission did not recommend his transfer to the prison hospital. According to the report, the same inmate was reassessed on 21 January 2005 by the applicant who, noting his medical history described above, wrote in the commission\u2019s journal that the inmate needed to be supervised in a psychiatric ward, and prescribed him certain medication. Subsequently, despite the fact that the members of the medical commission did not agree with the applicant\u2019s assessment, \u201cthe director of the Medical Department bypassed the commission and decided \u2013 unilaterally \u2013 to transfer L.Ts. to the prison hospital based on [the applicant\u2019s] medical conclusion [in the journal] ... and in doing so he violated ... all the relevant rules concerning the prisoners\u2019 transfers to the medical establishment.\u201d 20.  On 27 December 2007 the investigation into the incident of 10 September 2005 was discontinued on the grounds of the absence of a crime, as provided under Article 28 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 32 below). 21.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant instituted civil-law defamation proceedings against the Minister. She claimed non-pecuniary damages and requested a retraction of the false accusations by the same means as they had been disseminated. According to the applicant, the drafting of recommendations on inmates\u2019 mental health had been part of the agreement of 4 October 2003 (see paragraph 7 above) and that all of her conclusions had been based on verifiable medical documents readily available in inmates\u2019 medical files. The explicit and public allegations of corruption and fraudulent behaviour against her circulated by the Minister through the media outlets were false and devoid of any factual grounds, especially considering that no investigative actions had ever been taken against her. The Minister\u2019s false allegations had had all the more of a negative impact on the applicant\u2019s reputation as a mental health professional because of the Minister\u2019s position as a high-level public official and the public confidence that it invited. 22.  On 13 April 2006 the Tbilisi City Court dismissed Mr K.K.\u2019s application to discontinue the consideration of the case based on Section 5 of the Freedom of Expression and Speech Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) (see paragraph 30 below). It reasoned that while a public debate existed on the matter, it was not of a political character for the purposes of that provision as the applicant was not a politician. Yet, according to the court, she could have been considered as a public figure in view of the public attention that her activities had attracted. 23.  On 22 June 2006 the Tbilisi City Court found against the applicant. In spite of the applicant\u2019s reliance on Article 18 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 31 below), it applied the standards established by the Freedom of Expression and Speech Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) as lex specialis. The court concluded that the applicant was a public figure for the purposes of the Act (see paragraph 30 below) in view of her activities in prison (see paragraph 7 above), and that the burden of proving the existence of the three cumulative conditions set out in Section 14 of the Act (see paragraph 30 below) to classify the Minister\u2019s statements as defamation had rested with her. 24.  The court agreed that the applicant had presented evidence that she was not and had not been a suspect, or otherwise officially accused of violating the law, and concluded that the Minister\u2019s accusations \u201cmay have contained erroneous facts.\u201d However it continued to note that in any event, the other two requirements of Section 14 of the Act had not been met. Namely, according to the court, the applicant had failed to show what harm she had suffered from the false information being disseminated by the Minister in the media, as required by the second condition set by Section 14. 25.  With respect to the third criterion of whether the Minister had known that the impugned statements were false or had acted with apparent and gross negligence, the court noted the following:\n\u201cThe court agrees with the respondent\u2019s argument that Mr K.K. took measures to verify the information before communicating it. The respondent presented Order no. 1640 of the Minister of Justice of Georgia of 13 September 2005 instructing the General Inspectorate of the Ministry to carry out an inspection of the Medical Department. Thus [the Minister] issued an order aimed at verification three days prior to making the public statement. Accordingly, it is possible that he was in possession of preliminary information about the existence of irregularities. However, the possession of [such information] is not confirmed in the case file. According to the case file, the existence of violations in the medical department is confirmed by the General Inspectorate\u2019s conclusion dated 13 October 2005. Therefore it has not been confirmed that the Minister was aware that the information was false by 16 September 2005. It has also not been proven that he acted with gross negligence when making the statement. [The Minister] scheduled the inspection of a department within the scope of his competence and thus he took measures to verify the information.\u201d 26.  The Tbilisi City Court concluded that the statements in question had been made as part of an important public discussion surrounding the management of medical facilities in the penal system. It noted that the Minister had enjoyed freedom of expression to voice his opinion about the state of affairs within his Ministry and that his statements had fallen within the limits of acceptable criticism, which it found to be wider in respect of the applicant because of her status as a public figure. 27.  On 2 July 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal fully upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. Regarding the third criterion of whether the Minister had known that the impugned statements were false or had acted with apparent and gross negligence, the court noted the following:\n\u201cThe Appellate Chamber shares the reasoning of the [lower court\u2019s] judgment that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that [the Minister] was either aware of the falsehood of the disseminated facts, or that [he] acted with apparent and gross negligence which led to the dissemination of a statement containing a substantially false fact.\nCivil procedure is based on the principle of adversarial procedure which, in addition to conferring certain rights to the parties, also imposes procedural obligations in their own interest. The failure of a party to abide by [those obligations] will lead to an unfavourable result. This rule stems from Article 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure according to which the parties have an equal possibility to define facts in support of their [position] and they themselves decide which evidence shall confirm those facts. Article 102 of the same Code provides that each party shall prove the circumstances on which it bases its [requests]. \u201d 28.  The appellate court concluded that \u201cK.K. had a right to voice his opinion about the state of affairs within his Ministry and the applicant, in view of her status as a public figure, was obliged to tolerate it as acceptable criticism.\u201d 29.  On 16 May 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "9", "6", "8", "3", "0", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website on which he campaigns, occasionally in a very graphic way, against abortion. 7.  By a decision of 1 March 2007 the Federal Review Board for Publications Harmful to Minors (Bundespr\u00fcfstelle f\u00fcr jugendgef\u00e4hrdende Schriften) included the applicant\u2019s website, www.babycaust.de (\u201cthe German website\u201d), on the list of publications considered to be harmful to minors. The applicant subsequently redesigned his online presence. His new website included a link in bold type to the website www.babycaust.at, (\u201cthe Austrian website\u201d) which was operated by M.H. \u2013 since deceased, described by the applicant on his current website as a \u201cdear friend and fellow campaigner\u201d. Attached to the link to the Austrian website was the following comment:\n\u201cIf you want to know more about the modern-day, democratic crime of \u2018abortion\u2019, make your enquiries in Austria.\u201d (Wenn Sie mehr \u00fcber das modern demokratische Verbrechen der \u2018Abtreibung\u2019 wissen wollen, dann fragen sie in \u00d6sterreich nach). 8.  At the material time, the content of the Austrian website was essentially consistent with that of the German website prior to the objection from the Federal Review Board. In addition, the Austrian website contained a link to a version of the applicant\u2019s complete German website as it had originally existed prior to the Federal Review Board\u2019s objection. Only the website credits had been deleted. The applicant had provided M.H. with a CD containing all the data required for the running of \u201cthe Austrian website\u201d. 9.  The version of the German website which could be reached via the link on the Austrian website included the following statement:\n\u201cEquating the Babycaust to the Holocaust would mean relativising today\u2019s abortion murders\u201d (Den Babycaust mit dem Holocaust gleichzusetzen w\u00fcrde bedeuten die heutigen Abtreibungsmorde zu relativieren.) 10.  Moreover, on the home page of the Austrian website the following statement was shown between two photos of babies, one of which was obviously covered in blood:\n\u201cThere is no other word for it: Abortion is \u2018AGGRAVATED MURDER\u2019!\u201d (Abtreibung ist \u201cMORD\u201d, es gibt kein anderes WORT!)\nThe photo underneath showed a pile of corpses in an unspecified Third Reich concentration camp. The caption below read:\n\u201cAbortion and euthanasia are crimes that no human law can presume to declare lawful\u201d (Abtreibung und Euthanasie sind Verbrechen, die f\u00fcr rechtm\u00e4\u00dfig zu erkl\u00e4ren sich menschliches Gesetz anma\u00dfen kann)\nFurthermore, under a link \u201cabortions\u201d on the Austrian website a caricature-like drawing of a wolf as an executioner guillotining embryos was shown. The text above this image read:\n\u201cAbortionists: They can kill, but woe betide those who remind them of the killing.\u201d (Abtreiber: T\u00f6ten k\u00f6nnen sie, aber wehe wenn man sie ans t\u00f6ten erinnert)\nUnderneath, the text read:\n\u201c\u2018Fascists\u2019/\u2019Anti-Fascists\u2019: Whether concentration-camp commanders or murderers of unborn children, both are manifestations of criminals! These \u2018low lifes\u2019 have the same genetic makeup\u201d (\u201cFaschisten\u201d / \u201cAntifaschisten\u201d: KZ-Kommandanten oder M\u00f6rder von Ungeborenen, sind zwei Erscheinungsformen von kriminellen Menschen! Diese \u201eSumpfbl\u00fcten\u201d haben denselben genetischen Code)\nAccessible via the link \u201cnot for the fainthearted\u201d were images purporting to show aborted foetuses and the words:\n\u201cSixty years post-Auschwitz: After \u2018termination\u2019, it\u2019s off to the incinerator or the rubbish heap!\u201d (60 Jahre nach Auschwitz: nach der \u201cUnterbrechung\u201d geht\u2019s in den Verbrennungsofen oder auf den M\u00fcll!) 11.  Following the link \u201cGermany\u201d and a further link on that page to \u201cPrayer requests\u201d, reference was made to a decision by the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal (judgment of 28 February 2007 \u2013 6 U 98/06) prohibiting the applicant from labelling abortions as performed by the doctors named on his website as \u201caggravated murder\u201d. The reference was glossed with the following statement:\n\u201cWe have not labelled and do not label abortion doctors as aggravated murderers. HOWEVER, we will stand firm in our conviction that the wilful \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being is AGGRAVATED MURDER. Can anyone seriously argue that an innocent, unborn human being is not wilfully killed in an \u2018ABORTION\u2019?\u201d (Abtreibungs\u00e4rzte sind von uns nicht als M\u00f6rder bezeichnet worden und werden von uns nicht als M\u00f6rder bezeichnet. ABER: Wir werden zu unserer Meinung stehen: Das vors\u00e4tzliche \u201ezu Tode bringen\u201c eines unschuldigen Menschen ist MORD. Und wer kann ernstlich behaupten, dass bei einer \u201eABTREIBUNG\u201c kein unschuldiger, ungeborener Mensch vors\u00e4tzlich get\u00f6tet wird?)\nAt the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text \u201cGerman contemporary history in brief\u201d, a sentence read:\n\u201cPerverted doctors murdered unborn children at the behest of their mothers\u201d (Pervertierte \u00c4rzte ermordeten im Auftrag der M\u00fctter die ungeborenen Kinder)\nFrom that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of many doctors across Germany who performed abortions. The list was accompanied by an invitation to pray for these doctors. 12.  Dr F., the plaintiff in the main proceedings, was mentioned on the list. He was of Jewish faith and his family had suffered from the atrocities carried out during the National Socialist era. 13.  Dr F. applied to the courts for an injunction against the applicant and M.H. as well as for damages for the violation of his personality rights. He argued that the websites in question had generated a direct association between the named doctors and the Third Reich, equated abortions with the crimes of the Third Reich and stigmatised him as a murderer. 14.  On 9 February 2010, the Karlsruhe Regional Court ordered the applicant to desist from using and/or allowing the use of the term \u201caggravated murder\u201d on the German website or the Austrian website to describe abortions performed by Dr F., who was named on those websites. It also ordered the applicant, as joint and several debtor (Gesamtschuldner) with M.H., to pay Dr F. compensation of 10,000 euros (EUR). A similar order against M.H. was issued in a separate judgment. 15.  The Karlsruhe Regional Court gave the following grounds for its decision. Firstly it established that the statements at issue could be attributed to the applicant. The fact that the said content was accessible only via the indirect route of the Austrian website operated by M.H. was irrelevant. The applicant had made the content his own by having referred and created a link on the German website expressly to M.H.\u2019s website. He had also not disputed during the proceedings that the statements had originated from him. Moreover, throughout the proceedings, he had continuously, and with conviction, described abortion as aggravated murder and considered the comparison of abortions and the Holocaust, reflected even in the \u201cbabycaust\u201d domain name, to be appropriate. 16.  In a next step the court analysed screenshots of the website, which had been submitted by the plaintiff. It concluded that the website at issue contained the general statement that abortions, as performed by Dr F., were acts of aggravated murder comparable with the utterly unjustifiable atrocities inflicted on Jews in the Third Reich. By mentioning Dr F.\u2019s name and his practice address directly in this context, the applicant had reproached the doctor specifically for performing abortions and had created a \u201cpillory effect\u201d. Even though the applicant had made his statements in the context of a public debate of fundamental importance and freedom of expression protected polemical and sharp criticism, the applicant\u2019s comments on the German website and the Austrian website had not been posted as broad criticism but specifically against the doctors mentioned on those sites. The applicant had purposefully undermined the plaintiff\u2019s right of personality by labelling abortion as aggravated murder, equating it to the crimes of the Holocaust and reproaching Dr F. specifically for his involvement. This was also true on the assumption that the statements constituted an expression of opinion and not a factual claim. Consequently, the weighing of all those considerations turned out in favour of Dr F.\u2019s general right of personality, which in these circumstances prevailed over the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. 17.  As regards damages the Karlsruhe Regional Court reasoned that the violation of the right of personality and the associated stigmatising effect were particularly serious, given that Dr F. himself was Jewish and his family had suffered directly the Nazi atrocities in the Third Reich. Moreover, the court took into account that the applicant had persistently made these or similar statements and had not been dissuaded by orders to desist issued against him, such as the decision of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal of 28 February 2007 (6 U 98/06) to which the website referred (see paragraph 11 above), or the inclusion of the website on the list of publications harmful to minors by the Federal Review Board. 18.  By indicative order of 21 September 2010 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal notified the applicant of its intention to dismiss his appeal owing to insufficient prospects of success. The court elaborated that the Regional Court\u2019s conclusion that the Austrian website had levelled the serious and personal allegation against Dr F. that he had performed acts of aggravated murder. The allegation had further involved comparing abortions to the extermination of Jews under Nazi rule. This had constituted a serious attack on Dr F.\u2019s reputation and personality rights. The Court of Appeal also confirmed that the applicant had to assume responsibility for the content of the Austrian website. He had given the relevant content from his own website over to M.H. and had given his consent, by means of a link, for it to be posted on the Austrian website. Moreover, the award of monetary compensation was appropriate in the light of the severity of the interference with the general right of personality. The Regional Court had correctly taken into account, to the detriment of the applicant, that he had failed to observe the legally binding decision of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal of 28 February 2007. The court further clarified that \u2013 for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be awarded \u2013 it was irrelevant whether Dr F. was Jewish and that his family had been persecuted under the Nazi regime. In support of that view, the court adjudged that there were no apparent indications that the applicant had had or should have had any such knowledge. 19.  The applicant was provided with the opportunity to submit his position on the above reasoning, which he made use of to no avail. On 2 February 2011 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant without an oral hearing. It referred to its reasoning in the indicative order of 21 September 2010 and emphasised that the awarded damages had been justified irrespective of whether Dr F. was Jewish. 20.  On 18 April 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible (1 BvR 798/11), without providing reasons.", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "7", "3", "5", "9", "8", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6.  On 25 November 2004 and 7 December 2004 the applicant distributed leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice of Dr S. The leaflets contained, inter alia, the following text on the front page:\n\u201cDid you know that Dr S. [full name and address] performs abortions that are unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court?\u201d (Wussten Sie schon, dass Dr S. ... Abtreibungen durchf\u00fchrt, die nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts rechtswidrig sind?)\nUnderneath, the following was in smaller type:\n\u201cAccording to international criminal law: aggravated murder is the intentional \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being.\u201d (Sinngem\u04d3\u03b2 aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vors\u04d3tzliche \u201cZu-Tode-Bringen\u201d eines unschuldigen Menschen!)\nThe back side of the folded leaflet contained the following text:\n\u201cThe aggravated murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the aggravated murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability.\u201d (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.)\nThe applicant further quoted parts of the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s leading judgment of 28 May 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 203) (see paragraph 17 below) with regard to abortion and a statement by Christoph-Wilhelm Hufeland, the personal physician of Goethe and Schiller. He also cited section 12(1) of the Conflicts in Pregnancy Act (see paragraph 17 below) and asked readers to make use of their influence on those performing and assisting in abortions. 7.  By a letter of 23 December 2004 Dr S. requested that the applicant sign a declaration to cease and desist. The applicant refused and published the following statement on his website:\n\u201cIf Dr S. [full name], by carrying out abortions, publicly shows that he agrees with abortions, then he should stand by his opinion. Instead Dr S. considers the leaflet campaign to be slander, threatens an interim injunction and has already given his lawyer a mandate to lodge a criminal complaint for defamation/slander. We ask ourselves: Is Dr S. unprincipled and characterless?\u201d (Wenn Dr S. mit der Durchf\u00fchrung von Abtreibungen \u00f6ffentlich bekundet, dass er f\u00fcr Abtreibungen ist, dann sollte er auch dazu stehen. Stattdessen sieht Dr S. in der Flugblatt-Verteilaktion eine Rufmordkampagne, droht mit einer einstweiligen Verf\u00fcgung und hat bereits seinem Rechtsanwalt die Vollmacht gegeben, eine Strafanzeige wegen Beleidigung/Verleumdung zu erwirken. Wir fragen uns: Ist Dr S. stand- und charakterlos?) 8.  Subsequently Dr S. applied to the Karlsruhe Regional Court for a civil injunction ordering the applicant not to claim on the Internet that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions and not to disseminate leaflets containing his name and the assertion that unlawful abortions were performed in his medical practice. He also lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 20,000 euros (EUR) and for pre-trial legal fees. 9.  On 30 September 2005, the date of the oral hearing before the Karlsruhe Regional Court, the applicant distributed a second leaflet directly in front of Dr S.\u2019s practice. Among other places, the applicant deposited this second leaflet, in which Dr S. was not mentioned by name, into letterboxes in the immediate vicinity of the latter\u2019s practice. The following sentence was on the front side of the leaflet:\n\u201cNear you: unlawful ABORTIONS ... and YOU are silent about the AGGRAVATED MURDER of our CHILDREN?\u201d (In Ihrer N\u00e4he: rechtswidrige ABTREIBUNGEN ... und SIE schweigen zum MORD an unseren KINDERN?) [Emphases in original]\nThe back of the folded leaflet contained the following text:\n\u201cThese pre-natal infanticides have meanwhile taken on proportions that bring to mind a new HOLOCAUST!\u201d (Diese vorgeburtlichen Kindst\u00f6tungen haben mittlerweile Ausma\u00dfe angenommen, welche an einen \u201eneuen HOLOCAUST\u201c erinnern!) [Emphases in original]\nFarther down the leaflet read:\n\u201cI\u2019m simply unable to understand that medical personnel and doctors, who are supposed to help and save lives, stoop to take part in aggravated murder.\u201d (Noch weniger kann ich verstehen, dass Mediziner und \u00c4rzte, welche helfen und Leben retten sollen, sich f\u00fcr\u2019s Morden hergeben) 10.  On 4 November 2005 the Karlsruhe Regional Court granted the requested injunction and ordered the applicant to desist from asserting publicly, both in writing and orally, on the Internet as well as on leaflets, that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice. In addition, the Regional Court awarded compensation for the pecuniary damage requested by the plaintiff (EUR 811.88) and dismissed the claim in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 11.  The court held that the applicant\u2019s statements were protected by freedom of expression and contributed to a public debate. Moreover, they had to be classified as statements of fact and, as such, the information that abortions were unlawful was in line with the judgment of the Constitutional Court and not incorrect. However, when read in conjunction with the whole leaflet, the statements had a \u201cpillory effect\u201d and amounted to a serious interference with Dr S.\u2019s personality rights, which was not justified by the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. The court came to this conclusion based on the facts that the applicant had singled out Dr S. by mentioning him by name and distributing the leaflets in the vicinity of his practice, that he had quoted the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment only in parts and had omitted the parts that stated that doctors had not been subject to criminal liability, that he had implied by defining aggravated murder that Dr S. had committed this criminal offence and that he had associated Dr S. with the Holocaust. Nonetheless, in regard to non-pecuniary damage the court concluded that even though the attacks on Dr S.\u2019s reputation had been grave enough to justify the injunction, they had not been sufficiently serious to justify non-pecuniary damage. 12.  The applicant and Dr S. appealed against the Regional Court\u2019s decision. Additionally Dr S. expanded his action to include the second leaflet (see paragraph 9 above), which subsequently became the subject matter of the judgment of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. 13.  On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal confirmed the reasoning of the Regional Court and in essence dismissed both appeals. However, it partly modified the Regional Court\u2019s judgment concerning the precise wording of the requested injunction. It ordered the applicant to desist from asserting in public that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice and asserting in direct connection to this that \u201caggravated murder is the intentional \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being\u201d. The Court of Appeal further ordered the applicant to desist from asserting that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions causing \u201cinfanticide\u201d. At the outset, it emphasised that the applicant\u2019s view that abortions should be subject to criminal liability and were not compatible with higher-ranking law fell within the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. However, the court also noted that the very wording of the applicant\u2019s statements showed that he labelled abortions, as performed by the plaintiff, aggravated murder, which could not be tolerated, neither if the statements were considered statements of fact nor if considered value judgments. In the court\u2019s view the applicant had created an unacceptable \u201cpillory effect\u201d by singling out the plaintiff, who had not given the applicant any reason to do so. In that regard the court noted that Dr S. had not been involved in the public debate about abortions in any way. 14.  In regard to the second leaflet the Court of Appeal held that even though Dr S. had not been mentioned by name, it had referred to him as it had been distributed in front of his medical practice and deposited in letterboxes in the vicinity. Similarly to the first leaflet, a not negligible part of the readers would have understood from the leaflet that Dr S.\u2019s professional activities had constituted aggravated murder. However, even if understood in a non-legal sense, the leaflet had made it understood that the applicant had conducted illegal and punishable abortions. Since the applicant had not clarified that he had only been criticising abortions, which were according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 17 below) unlawful but not subject to criminal liability, he had exceeded the limits of justifiable criticism. As to the claim for damages the Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment. It also did not grant leave to appeal on points of law. 15.  On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid for his complaint against the denial of leave to appeal on points of law on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 16.  On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint lodged by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1659/07).", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "3", "9", "8", "1", "7", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Sopot. The second applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Gda\u0144sk. 6.  On 10 April 2010 an aircraft of the Polish Air Force was carrying a Polish State delegation from Warsaw to Smolensk, Russia, to attend a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the Katy\u0144 massacre. The delegation was led by the President of Poland and included many high\u2011ranking officials. The aircraft crashed during the approach to Smolensk aerodrome, killing all ninety-six people on board (eighty\u2011eight passengers and eight crew members). 7.  The applicants are the widows of two victims of the crash, Mr Leszek Solski, an activist of the Katy\u0144 Families Association, and Mr Arkadiusz Rybicki, a member of parliament. 8.  On 29 July 2011 the Polish Committee for the Investigation of State Aviation Accidents (Komisja Badania Wypadk\u00f3w Lotniczych Lotnictwa Pa\u0144stwowego) published its report on the causes of the crash. It concluded:\n\u201cthe immediate cause of the accident was the descent below the minimum descent altitude at an excessive rate of descent in weather conditions which prevented visual contact with the ground, as well as the delayed execution of the go-around procedure. Those circumstances led to impact with an obstacle on the ground, resulting in the separation of part of the left wing with the aileron, and consequently to the loss of aircraft control and eventual ground impact.\u201d\nThe committee excluded the possibility that an explosion had taken place on board. An earlier report by the Russian Inter\u2011State Aviation Committee contained similar findings. The Parliamentary Group on the Examination of the Smolensk Crash reached different conclusions, however, and suggested that an explosion on board might have been one of the causes of the accident. According to the applicants, the Parliamentary Group was not an official investigative authority. 9.  The Warsaw Regional Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened an investigation into the crash on 10 April 2010. 10.  Both applicants were granted victim status in the investigation. 11.  On 4 April 2016 the investigation was assigned to an investigative team of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Prokuratura Krajowa). 12.  On 21 June 2016 the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office organised a meeting with the victims\u2019 families. The purpose of the meeting was to explain the need to carry out exhumations and autopsies, as well as to hear opinions from all the families concerned. 13.  The first applicant attended that meeting. She submitted that the prosecutor had focused on criticising the report of the Polish Committee for the Investigation of State Aviation Accidents. Only those families who supported the prosecutor\u2019s decision on the exhumations had been allowed to speak. The second applicant did not attend the meeting. She did not trust the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office because she felt that it favoured those families who supported the exhumations and the conspiracy theories around the crash. 14.  On 7 October 2016, pursuant to Article 209 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 and Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), a prosecutor of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to appoint a team of international and national forensic experts with a view to carrying out autopsies on the bodies of eighty-three victims of the crash (the bodies of nine victims had already been exhumed and four victims had been cremated). The prosecutor asked the experts to:\n\u201c(1) carry out the medical imaging, examination and autopsy of the victims\u2019 remains;\n(2) determine the cause of death, and the manner and circumstances in which the victims sustained their injuries, including whether the injuries were sustained before or after their death, as well as to ascertain whether the injuries occurred at the place and time of the crash;\n(3) ascertain whether the established injuries indicate that they came about as a result of the aircraft\u2019s impact with the ground and the disintegration of the aircraft parts ...;\n(4) ascertain whether the victims\u2019 bodies have injuries typical of an explosion of explosive or flammable material, or of some other sudden release of energy;\n(5) ascertain whether the method used by the Russian experts to examine the corpses and carry out the autopsies was consistent with the current standards, and whether the conclusions of their forensic report with regard to the injuries, the circumstances in which they had occurred and the cause of death correspond to the conclusions of the report established by the [current] team of experts;\n(6) determine the identity of the victims by comparing the results of the genetic testing with their genetic profiles, established at an earlier stage of the proceedings ...;\n(7) take samples from the victims\u2019 remains for further toxicological, histopathological, physicochemical and genetic examination.\u201d\nThe prosecutor further ordered (point IV of the decision) that for the purpose of carrying out the above-mentioned measures, the bodies of eighty-three victims be exhumed on dates to be determined in separate orders. 15.  In his decision, the prosecutor noted that directly after the crash, the Russian authorities had carried out autopsies and identification procedures on the victims\u2019 bodies. The victims\u2019 remains had subsequently been repatriated to Poland and buried. In the course of its investigation, the Warsaw Regional Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office had started to have doubts about the diligence of the Russian experts in identifying the victims and the injuries sustained by them. From August 2011 the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office had carried out exhumations and autopsies on nine victims of the crash. The results of those examinations had confirmed that the Russian experts had not properly recorded the injuries sustained by the victims and, in the case of six out of the nine bodies exhumed, had wrongly identified the victims. The prosecutor stated that, in the circumstances, doubts also remained in respect of the other victims of the crash. He further intended to resolve doubts concerning the alleged explosion on board. 16.  On 12 October 2016 the second applicant wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice \u2013 Prosecutor General, objecting to the exhumation of her husband\u2019s body. On 14 October 2016 the first applicant wrote a similar letter to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office, stating that she was convinced that her late husband had been properly identified. She had been present at the Moscow Forensic Institute where the identification of the victims had been carried out and had seen the body of her husband herself. The State Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied in the negative to both letters. The second applicant was also informed that a meeting with the relatives of the victims and the prosecutors would be scheduled prior to each exhumation in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to carry out the exhumations. 17.  The prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 October 2016 was served on the applicants\u2019 lawyer on 20 October 2016. 18.  On 27 October 2016 the applicants personally and through their lawyers lodged interlocutory appeals (za\u017calenie) against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 October 2016. They objected to the exhumation of their husbands\u2019 remains and asked that that part of the decision be reversed. 19.  The applicants argued that the prosecutor had applied Article 209 \u00a7 1 and Article 210 of the CCP without any consideration for the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, the prosecutor\u2019s decision had breached Article 2 \u00a7 1 (3) of the CCP, which provided that criminal proceedings had to respect the legal interests of a victim. The applicants further alleged that the reasons for the decision had been vague and sparse. The prosecutor had failed to properly establish that the exhumation of their husbands\u2019 remains was necessary, since such a measure should be one of last resort. 20.  In the applicants\u2019 view, the decision on exhumation violated the respect due to the remains of their late husbands, as well as their personal right to respect for the memory of a late relative (kult osoby zmar\u0142ej). Furthermore, in issuing a general order to exhume all the victims, without taking into account their individual circumstances, the prosecutor had demonstrated a lack of respect for the victims and had violated the families\u2019 right to dignity. 21.  The applicants invoked Articles 2, 30, 45 and 47 of the Constitution, alleging, inter alia, that the prosecutor had applied the provisions of the CCP in breach of a person\u2019s inherent right to dignity. They further relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The applicants also claimed that the prosecutor had failed to inform them of their right to lodge an interlocutory appeal against his decision. 22.  Lastly, the applicants relied on a letter dated 25 October 2016 from the Ombudsman to the Prosecutor General presenting arguments in favour of a judicial review of the prosecutor\u2019s decision on exhumation. The Ombudsman considered that exhumation of human remains carried out following a prosecutor\u2019s decision constituted an interference with the right to respect for the memory of a late relative, one of the personal rights protected by the Civil Code. Those personal rights constituted part of an individual\u2019s private life. Under Article 47 of the Constitution, everyone had the right to legal protection of his or her private life. In the light of that provision, everyone who considered that his or her private life had been violated by an act of the authorities had to have the opportunity to seek legal protection. Relatives therefore had to be provided with legal remedies with a view to determining whether the prosecutor\u2019s decision on exhumation was disproportionate. 23.  On 23 and 24 November and 6 December 2016 the prosecutor refused to entertain the applicants\u2019 interlocutory appeals, finding them inadmissible in law. He stated that the applicants had wrongly interpreted his decision of 7 October 2016 in considering that it constituted a basis for the exhumation of their husbands\u2019 remains. A decision on that matter would be issued in a separate order, specifying the time and place of exhumation. Nonetheless, he stated that a decision on exhumation under Article 210 of the CCP was not amenable to appeal. His decisions refusing to proceed with the interlocutory appeals did not contain any reference to the constitutional and Convention arguments raised by the applicants. 24.  On 6, 7 and 21 December 2016 the applicants lodged interlocutory appeals against the prosecutor\u2019s decision with the Warsaw Regional Court. They alleged that the prosecutor\u2019s decisions refusing to entertain their interlocutory appeals had violated the provisions of the Constitution (Articles 45, 47 and 77 \u00a7 2), the Convention (Articles 3, 8 and 13) and the CCP. In their view, a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CCP, in the light of the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights, should have resulted in the availability of an interlocutory appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 October 2016. 25.  The applicants invoked their right to dignity, the obligation to respect human remains and their right to respect for the memory of a late relative. They submitted that the decision of 7 October 2016 concerned not only the appointment of a team of forensic experts but also the exhumation of their husbands\u2019 remains. In their view, that decision predetermined a decision to exhume the remains of their husbands; at a later date the prosecutor would only set the exact date of the exhumation. The decision on exhumation constituted interference with the applicants\u2019 legal interests and therefore it was constitutionally required that they be provided with a legal remedy aimed at reviewing the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The applicants also stated that the prosecutor had failed to respond to their arguments based on the Constitution and the Convention. 26.  The applicants also reiterated the arguments raised by the Ombudsman in his letter of 25 October, and in his subsequent letters of 2 and 18 November 2016 to the Deputy Prosecutor General. 27.  On 3 April 2017 the Warsaw Regional Court (case no. VIII Kp 17/17) decided to refer a legal question to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of Article 210 of the CCP in so far as that provision did not provide for the opportunity to lodge an interlocutory appeal against a prosecutor\u2019s decision to exhume a body. The court alleged that the impugned provision was incompatible with Article 45 (the right to a court), Article 47 (the right to private and family life) and Article 78 (the right to appeal) of the Constitution and Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. The court considered that the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 October 2016 had predetermined the issue of exhumation.\nHaving analysed the provisions of the CCP, the Regional Court found that prosecutors\u2019 decisions ordering an autopsy (Article 209 of the CCP) or exhumation (Article 210 of the CCP) were not susceptible to judicial review. It noted, inter alia, that the right to grieve and the respect for that right owed to close relatives of a deceased person fell within the constitutional notion of \u201cprivate and family life\u201d. In the event of the authorities interfering with that right, the individual concerned should be provided with a remedy. Article 210 of the CCP was deficient in that respect from a constitutional and Convention perspective, since it did not provide for judicial review of a prosecutor\u2019s decision ordering exhumation. 28.  As a result of the decision to refer a legal question, the proceedings before the Warsaw Regional Court have been suspended until the Constitutional Court issues a decision on the matter. The proceedings before the Constitutional Court are currently pending (case no. P 18/17). 29.  On 24 May 2017 the applicants again urged the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office to revoke its decision on exhumation. The prosecutor replied in the negative on 7 June 2017. 30.  The Government informed the Court that the exhumation of the applicants\u2019 husbands had initially been planned for 24 and 26 April 2018. The exhumations had been planned in line with the wishes of the families and the bodies of those victims whose families had not complained had been exhumed first. The bodies of those victims whose families had complained against the prosecutor\u2019s decision would be exhumed at a later stage. 31.  On 13 April 2018 the prosecutor issued two orders setting the dates of the exhumation of the bodies of the applicants\u2019 husbands for 14 and 16 May 2018. The prosecutor stated that those orders were being issued in execution of the decision of 7 October 2016. The reasoning was limited to a brief reference to the ongoing investigation and the decision of 7 October 2016. 32.  The applicants lodged interlocutory appeals against the orders of 13 April 2018. On 27 April and 7 May 2018 the prosecutor refused to examine the applicants\u2019 interlocutory appeals on the grounds that they were inadmissible in law. 33.  On 7, 8 and 9 May 2018 the applicants lodged interlocutory appeals with the Warsaw Regional Court against the prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing to examine their appeals. They argued that the prosecutor\u2019s decision violated various provisions of the CCP and the Constitution, as well as Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. 34.  The Government submitted that in accordance with the code of conduct adopted by the investigative team of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the prosecutors in charge of the investigation had taken steps to arrange a meeting with the applicants and their lawyers in order to explain the reasons for the intended investigative actions, to clarify the aim of the autopsies and to elucidate other important issues, such as the families\u2019 participation in the investigative actions and the issue of reburial. 35.  On 19 April 2018 the second applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office that his client would not take part in the proposed meeting with the prosecutors because she opposed the exhumation. The lawyer communicated with the prosecutors on all aspects of the planned exhumation. 36.  On 24 April 2018 the first applicant and her lawyer participated in a meeting with the prosecutors responsible for the investigation. The participants discussed the organisational aspects of the exhumation. 37.  The exhumation of the remains of Mr Arkadiusz Rybicki, the husband of the second applicant, was carried out on 14 May 2018. According to reports in the media, a few hundred people protested peacefully against the exhumation at the cemetery in Gda\u0144sk. The exhumation exercise was secured by a large group of police officers. 38.  The exhumation of the remains of Mr Leszek Solski, the husband of the first applicant, took place on 16 May 2018. 39.  The investigation is pending. 40.  On 3 November 2016 the applicants sought an injunction in the civil courts to prevent the prosecutor from carrying out the exhumation of their husbands\u2019 remains. They argued that it would interfere with their personal right to respect for the memory of their late relatives. 41.  On 10 November 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to grant an injunction. It held that the applicants had demonstrated that the planned exhumations would interfere with their personal rights, namely their right to respect for the memory of their deceased close relatives. The exhumation, the examination of the corpses and a second burial would interfere with that right. However, the Regional Court found that the applicants had failed to demonstrate that the intended interference with their personal rights would be unlawful and therefore dismissed their application. Pursuant to Article 209 \u00a7 1 and Article 210 of the CCP, a prosecutor was competent to order the exhumation of bodies in the context of an investigation in which the deaths were being treated as suspicious. The legislature had decided that irrespective of the will and consent of the family, the prosecutor had a duty to order that an autopsy be carried out in every case of suspicious death and, if the corpse had been buried, also to order its exhumation. The legislature had given priority in this context to the investigation of serious crimes and punishment of the perpetrators over the protection of the right to respect for the memory of deceased family members. 42.  On 5 December 2016 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed an interlocutory appeal lodged by the applicants and upheld the Regional Court\u2019s findings. The Court of Appeal noted that its decision could not have been altered by the applicants\u2019 argument about the unconstitutionality of Article 209 \u00a7 1 and Article 210 of the CCP because the prosecutor\u2019s decision ordering exhumation was not amenable to appeal. It found that even if those provisions were eventually found to be unconstitutional, that would not render the prosecutor\u2019s decision unlawful.", "references": ["6", "7", "1", "8", "3", "5", "2", "9", "No Label", "0", "4"], "gold": ["0", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and at the time of the events lived in Saray, Absheron region. 6.  The facts of the case are similar to the application Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan (no. 69981/14, 17 March 2016) in that the applicant in the present case was arrested in the context of the same events and on the basis of similar charges. 7.  The applicant is a well-known human-rights lawyer and civil-society activist. He represents applicants before the Court in a large number of pending cases. 8.  He is also the chairman of the Legal Education Society (\u201cthe Association\u201d), a non-governmental organisation specialising in legal education. The Association was registered by the Ministry of Justice on 2 June 1999 and acquired the status of a legal entity. Its main functions consisted of raising legal awareness, organisation of training programmes for lawyers, human-rights defenders and journalists and preparation of reports relating to various human-rights issues in Azerbaijan. The Association was also involved in the preparation of applications to the Court and the submission of communications to the Committee of Ministers in the context of the execution of the Court\u2019s judgments. 9.  The applicant has collaborated with various international organisations on human-rights-related projects, including the European Programme for Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) of the Council of Europe. 10.  The applicant was involved, together with other human-rights defenders, in the preparation of a consolidated list of political prisoners in Azerbaijan. 11.  On 24 June 2014, during the June session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE), the applicant, along with other local human-rights defenders, including Mr Rasul Jafarov, participated as one of the speakers at a side event organised in the Council of Europe. During this meeting the applicant delivered a report on human-rights abuses in Azerbaijan. 12.  According to the applicant, following his participation at the above event, a smear campaign was launched against him and other human-rights defenders by the pro-government media. For instance, on 4 July 2014 an online news portal affiliated with the authorities described the applicant, together with other human-rights defenders, as \u201cAmerican agents who receive millions of dollars in grants for painting an anti-Azerbaijani picture\u201d. 13.  On 14 August 2014, following the applicant\u2019s arrest on 8 August 2014 (see paragraphs 22-24 below), A.H., the Chairman of the Legal Policy and State Building Committee of the National Assembly, gave an interview to APA, a news agency, where he commented on the reactions to the arrests of the applicant and other human-rights defenders and stated:\n\u201c... it is those [international organisations] which made them \u2018well-known\u2019. The[se] organisations have had grants allocated to them in non-transparent ways, directing them into various activities, including those against Azerbaijan. These people, some of whom are traitors and some weak-minded, will at last answer before the law.\u201d 14.  On 15 August 2014 A.H., the head of the Department of Social and Political Issues of the Presidential Administration, stated the following in an interview with Trend news agency:\n\u201cThe most deplorable thing is that such NGOs and individuals and some journalists, relying on foreign circles funding them, placed themselves above national law, evaded registration of their grant projects, filing financial statements, taxes and other legal requirements.\u201d 15.  In an interview published on 2 September 2014 Y.M., a member of parliament from the ruling party, who was also the director of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences, stated the following in respect of the recently arrested NGO activists and human-rights defenders:\n\u201cPeople who betray their motherland cannot be forgiven. ... The death penalty should be imposed on such people. Capital punishment must be the gravest punishment for them. Why should traitors be forgiven? ... Therefore, the activities of a number of non-governmental organisations must be investigated very seriously, and if any illegality is discovered, such organisations must be immediately banned and their leaders punished.\u201d 16.  On 3 September 2014 an online news portal Vestnik Kavkaza published an interview with R.M., the head of the Presidential Administration who stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cSuch NGOs as the Institute for Peace and Democracy, Institute for Reporters\u2019 Freedom and Safety, Legal Education Society, Monitoring and Teaching Democracy Center and others use big grants from foreign organisations under the guise of human\u2011rights protection to send reports to different quarters and organise anti\u2011Azerbaijani campaigns in international structures where Azerbaijan is represented.\u201d 17.  On 3 December 2014 State-owned news agencies published a sixty\u2011page manifesto written by R.M., the head of the Presidential Administration, entitled \u201cThe World Order of Double Standards and Modern Azerbaijan\u201d. The article accused human-rights NGOs operating in the country of being the \u201cfifth column of imperialism\u201d. It postulated that various, mostly US-sponsored, donor organisations such as the United States of America\u2019s National Endowment for Democracy (NED), as well as other foreign organisations, supported political opposition movements in various countries against national governments. For local human-rights NGOs, the purpose of such funding schemes was the formation of a \u201cfifth column\u201d inside a country. US taxpayers\u2019 money was being spent on pushing for regime change or forcing existing governments to comply with US political demands. 18.  On 13 May 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Articles 308.1 (abuse of power) and 313 (forgery by an official) of the Criminal Code in connection with alleged irregularities in the financial activities of a number of non-governmental organisations, including the Association. 19.  On 7 July 2014 the Sabail District Court ordered freezing of the applicant\u2019s and the Association\u2019s bank accounts. 20.  On 8 August 2014 the applicant was invited to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for questioning as a witness in connection with the above\u2011mentioned criminal proceedings. The interview lasted about thirty minutes during which the applicant was questioned about his background, his family and activities of the Association. 21.  Following the interview, the investigator issued a decision charging the applicant under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large\u2011scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (aggravated abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. The description of charges consisted of a single sentence which was one page long and was similar to that used in the case of Rasul Jafarov (cited above, \u00a7 16). The acts with which the applicant was charged appear as follows:\n\u2013 the applicant, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Association, had failed to inform the relevant executive authority of his appointment as head and representative of a legal entity in accordance with Article 9.3 of the Law on State Registration of Legal Entities and the State Register;\n\u2013 he had failed to register with the relevant executive authority various grant agreements which had been concluded since August 2012 with NED, Norway\u2019s Human Rights House Foundation and other donor organisations and which had allocated to the Association for various projects certain sums in the total amount of 74,911.29 new Azerbaijani manats (AZN \u2013 approximately 71,343 euros (EUR) at the material time);\n\u2013 he had signed the said agreements on behalf of the Association without having legal authority to do so and had placed the above allocated sums in the bank accounts of the Association and then, by withdrawing cash, had made payments to himself and other people involved in the projects in the guise of salaries and service fees;\n\u2013 by failing to register the above grant agreements with the relevant executive authority, the applicant had been conducting illegal entrepreneurial activity and had thus profited in the amount of AZN 66,204.58 (approximately EUR 63,051 at the material time) and had avoided in this context payment of taxes in the amount of AZN 8,706.71 (approximately EUR 8,291 at the material time) which were due in accordance with Articles 124, 150.1.6, 218, 219 and 220 of the Tax Code. 22.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The court justified the application of remand in custody by the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood that if released he might abscond and influence other participants in the criminal proceedings. 23.  On 11 August 2014 the applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that his detention was unlawful. He stated, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. He pointed out in this connection that the court had failed to justify his detention on remand and to take into account his personal circumstances, such as his social and family status, his state of health and his age, when it ordered his remand in custody. The applicant further complained, relying on Article 18 of the Convention, that the charges brought against him were politically motivated and that he had been deprived of his liberty because of his work as a human-rights activist. He submitted in this connection that the actual reason for his arrest had been the fact that he had represented numerous applicants before the Strasbourg Court in cases relating to election irregularities and that he had publicly accused the Government of human-rights abuses at a PACE event in June 2014. He argued that his arrest had been part of a general policy aimed at silencing and shutting down independent NGOs and human-rights defenders in the country. 24.  On 13 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and found the first-instance court\u2019s decision lawful. It referred to the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood that if released the applicant might abscond from the investigation, obstruct the proceedings and interfere with the course of justice. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaints that the charges were politically motivated owing to his human\u2011rights activity, the court held that these allegations were unfounded as the applicant had been accused of committing financial crimes which could not be associated with any political motives. 25.  On 3 September 2014 the applicant applied to the Nasimi District Court, requesting the substitution of remand with either house arrest or release on bail. In his application the applicant, among other things, reiterated his complaints to the effect that the acts attributed to him did not constitute a criminal offence and there was accordingly no reasonable suspicion of his having committed such an offence. 26.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the application, finding that the risks that the applicant might abscond or otherwise upset the course of the proceedings or reoffend continued to pertain. 27.  On 15 September 2014 the applicant appealed, reiterating his arguments. 28.  On 22 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 29.  On 23 October 2014 the applicant applied again to the Nasimi District Court, requesting the substitution of remand with either house arrest or release on bail. 30.  On 24 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed his application based on similar findings. 31.  On the same date the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention by three months, finding that the grounds justifying his continued detention \u201chad not ceased to pertain\u201d. 32.  On 27 October 2014 the applicant appealed against both decisions concerning his application for the substitution of remand with other alternative measures and the extension of his pre-trial detention. 33.  On 29 October 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s above decisions. 34.  On 12 December 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office charged the applicant de novo. In addition to the original charges, the applicant was further charged under Articles 179.3.2 (high-level embezzlement) and 313 (forgery by an official) of the Criminal Code. The acts imputed to the applicant under Article 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) of the Criminal Code were re-qualified under Article 213.2.2 (tax evasion on a very large scale) of the Criminal Code. In particular, the period of time during which the applicant allegedly committed crimes was expanded from 2012 back to 2009 onwards. As regards the charges of embezzlement, the applicant was accused of transferring various amounts from the bank accounts of the Association to the bank account of one of the Association\u2019s employees with a view to their subsequent withdrawing the cash. With respect to the charges concerning forgery, the applicant was accused of inserting false information into the cashbook concerning payments to various employees of the Association in the guise of salaries and services fees. As regards the re\u2011qualification of the crime of tax evasion, the total amount of alleged illegal profit obtained by the applicant was raised to AZN 496,729.25 (approximately EUR 473,075 at the material time) and the amount of alleged unpaid taxes to AZN 65,636.85 (approximately EUR 62,510 at the material time). 35.  On 29 December 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office drew up a bill of indictment and the case went to trial. 36.  On 7 August 2014 the prosecutor in charge applied to the Nasimi District Court to have a search of the office of the Association (see paragraph 8 above) and \u201cother places of storage\u201d authorised. The prosecutor justified the search by referring to the criminal investigation under Articles 308.1 (abuse of power) and 313 (forgery by an official) of the Criminal Code \u201cinto breaches of legislation discovered in the activities of a number of non-governmental organisations and branches and representatives offices of foreign non-governmental organisations in Azerbaijan\u201d. 37.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court authorised a search of the Association\u2019s office and \u201cother places of storage\u201d. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c[The prosecutor in charge of the case] applied to the court with a request to conduct a search and seizure in the framework of the criminal case no. 142006023.\n[The prosecutor in charge] justified his request by [the following:] ... this criminal case concerns an investigation under Articles 308.1 [abuse of power] and 313 [forgery by an official] of the Criminal Code into breaches of legislation discovered in the activities of a number of non-governmental organisations and branches and representatives offices of foreign non-governmental organisations in Azerbaijan. Given that the evidence gathered gives grounds [to conduct a search], it is necessary for the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive, thorough and objective investigation to conduct a search [of the Association\u2019s] office located at [office address] ... and other places of storage ...\nHaving regard to the above, for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive, thorough and objective investigation, a search and seizure is requested of [the Association\u2019s] office located at [office address] ... and other places of storage.\nThe court considers that for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive, thorough and objective investigation it is necessary to conduct a search and seizure [of the Association\u2019s] office located at [office address] ... and other places of storage.\u201d 38.  On 8 August 2014 the investigator carried out a search of the applicant\u2019s home on the basis of the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 7 August 2014. According to the search record of 8 August 2014, the search was carried out in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, members of his family and two attesting witnesses (hal \u015fahidl\u0259ri). The investigator seized all the documents, computers, USB flash drives and other electronic data storage devices. On the same day the investigator also carried out a search of the home of the applicant\u2019s brother where the applicant was officially registered as a resident. 39.  On 9 August 2014 the investigator carried out a search of the Association\u2019s office. It appears from the search record of 9 August 2014 that the investigator seized all the documents found in the office, including documents related to the Association\u2019s activities and case files concerning over a hundred applications pending before the Court and documents related to the proceedings before the domestic courts. 40.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court, claiming that the searches had been unlawful. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, he complained that there had been no legal basis for carrying out the searches. He also complained that the investigator had failed to record each seized document as required by the relevant law and had taken the documents without making an inventory. He further complained of the seizure of numerous documents and files relating to the ongoing court proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts. 41.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The first-instance court held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law. As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic court, it found that they could not be returned to the applicant at this stage of the proceedings. 42.  On 15 September 2014 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He asked, in particular, the appellate court to declare the searches unlawful, to order the return of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic courts, and to provide him with a copy of all the seized documents in order to prepare his defence. 43.  On 23 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 44.  Following his arrest, the applicant was placed in the Baku pre-trial detention facility in Kurdakhani. 45.  From 9 to 12 August 2014 the applicant was held in a so-called \u201cquarantine\u201d cell designed for the admission of newcomers. He was detained in this cell, which according to him measured approximately 10 sq. m, together with eight other detainees. The applicant did not have his own bed and had to share beds with others. The cell was not adequately ventilated and, although all the detainees were smokers except the applicant, there was no special place for smoking. The temperature inside the cell was very high. The applicant had no access to outdoor exercise and was confined to his cell for the whole day. There was no bathroom and the sanitary conditions were very bad. Water supply was available only two hours per day. The light was always on. 46.  As from 12 August 2014, following a visit of a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the applicant was transferred to another cell. He was then detained in a cell measuring 12-14 sq. m together with three other detainees. The applicant had his own bed and bedding. There was a small window in the cell. However, the cell was not adequately ventilated and the temperature inside the cell was very high in August and September and very low in winter because the central-heating system was turned on only after 15 November. There was no fresh air in the cell and while there was a yard of 10 sq. m adjacent to the cell, it was closed after 4 p.m. every day. The light in the cell was never switched off, contributing further to the lack of sleep. Cold water was provided every few hours, but hot water was available only twice per week. 47.  The food served in the detention facility was meagre and of poor quality and had to be supplemented with food sent by the applicant\u2019s family. However, the applicant was entitled to receive only one parcel of food per week and there was no possibility to keep food fresh because of the absence of a refrigerator. 48.  The applicant was confined to his cell for most of the day. There was an exercise room in the detention facility, but detainees were not allowed to use it.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 49.  Without specifying the relevant periods of the applicant\u2019s detention, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained with three other detainees in the cell measuring 17.82 sq. m., which was designed to accommodate four persons. The cell had been adequately lit and ventilated. There had been one window in the cell measuring 120 by 140 cm. Sanitary facilities had been separated by a plastic door and consisted of a toilet, a sink and a shower. The applicant had been provided with a separate bed and bedding, water, food and other necessities. In support of their account the Government submitted a copy of a certificate issued by the Prison Service which provided a general overview of the Baku pre-trial detention facility. 50.  The applicant suffered from a number of conditions before his arrest. In particular, he suffered from osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, abnormal blood pressure, thrombophlebitis, prostatic hyperplasia, insomnia and headaches and had neurological and urological problems. 51.  According to the applicant, his state of health significantly deteriorated following his arrest because of the interruption and postponement of medical treatment that he had been undergoing before his arrest. 52.  On 24 October 2014 during a hearing at the Nasimi District Court the applicant felt unwell and fainted in the courtroom. The applicant\u2019s lawyer immediately lodged an application with the judge, asking for the applicant\u2019s examination by a medical expert in order to establish whether his state of health was compatible with his detention. The judge decided to forward the request to the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, without taking further action. 53.  On 24 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer also lodged an application with the head of the detention facility, asking for the applicant to receive adequate medical treatment. 54.  On 25 and 27 October 2014 the applicant underwent medical examinations, including a MRI scan of his brain and vertebral column in the National Oncology Centre in Baku. According to the results of the scan, there was no pathology in the brain or the vertebral column. The results of the scan revealed the presence of osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, a hernia in the vertebral column and disc protrusions in the following areas of the vertebral column: C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 2-3, L 4-5. The doctors, however, concluded that none of these hernias or disc protrusions required surgery or inpatient treatment and prescribed outpatient treatment. The ultrasound examination of the abdominal zones showed enhanced parenchymal echogenicity of the left kidney, and some hydronephrosis and some kidney stones in the renal collecting system. Small masses were detected in the prostate. In order to determine whether there was pathological process in the prostate, the applicant was subjected to a specific prostate blood test, PSA (Prostate-Specific Antigen), and the result of the test was satisfactory. 55.  On 28 October 2014 the applicant asked the head of the detention facility to inform him of the results of the medical examinations. 56.  On 31 October 2014 the applicant was officially informed of the results of the medical examinations. However, according to the applicant, he was not provided with copies of these results. 57.  On 11 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the head of the detention facility to provide him with copies of the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations. It is not clear from the case-file whether the applicant was provided with those documents. 58.  By a decision of 14 November 2014, the investigator in charge of the case dismissed a request by the applicant for examination by a forensic expert, finding that the applicant had undergone the relevant medical examinations and there was no need for his examination by a forensic expert. 59.  On 20 November 2014 the applicant lodged a request with the prosecution authorities and the administration of the detention facility, asking them to allow his medical examination by two independent doctors, I.H. and A.G. 60.  By a decision of 28 November 2014, the investigator in charge of the case dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, finding that he had failed to substantiate his request. 61.  By a letter of 2 December 2014, the medical department of the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that he had undergone the relevant medical examinations and a conservative treatment had been prescribed for him. 62.  In December 2014 the applicant was examined by the neurologist, who prescribed anti-anxiety drugs. The applicant was also seen by an ophthalmologist and a psychiatrist, and underwent an ultrasound examination. 63.  On 26 December 2014 the applicant stopped taking the anti-anxiety drugs prescribed. According to the applicant, he decided not to take the drugs owing to the serious side effects, such as appearance of suicidal behaviour. 64.  According to the Government, on 19 February 2015 the applicant was examined in the Neurosurgery Hospital by the country\u2019s leading doctors. The laboratory and ultrasound examination did not reveal any cancer-related anomalies. 65.  According to the applicant, he was transported several times to and from the Baku pre\u2011trial detention facility. The distance between the detention facility and the court-house was about 15-20 km. 66.  The applicant and other detainees were transported in special vans and the journey usually lasted about one hour. According to the applicant, the vehicles were in poor condition and there was no appropriate place to sit or stand inside. Allegedly, no ventilation or air conditioning was available. 67.  On 24 October 2014 the applicant was transported to the Nasimi District Court together with nine other detainees, in a van allegedly designed for eight people. 68.  He was detained in a room situated in the basement of the court-house. According to the applicant, the room was not ventilated and did not allow access to daylight. There was only one little window which had metal bars and was not open. The room was small and measured 4-5 sq. m. The applicant shared this room with four detainees all day waiting for his hearing. He was allegedly not provided with food and water. 69.  On 28 January 2015 the applicant lodged under the Code of Criminal Procedure a complaint with the Sabunchu District Court against the Baku pre-trial detention facility, complaining about his conditions of detention and of the lack of adequate medical treatment. 70.  On 8 February 2015 the court left the applicant\u2019s complaint without examination for lack of jurisdiction as the investigation had been already completed and his criminal case had gone to trial. 71.  On 25 February 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the above decision. 72.  On 22 April 2015 the Baku Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged under Articles 179.3.2, 192.2.2, 213.2.2, 308.2 and 313 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 21 and 34 above) and sentenced him to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 73.  On 21 July 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence. 74.  On 24 February 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 21 July 2015. 75.  On an unspecified date the Prosecutor General lodged an application for supervisory review with the Plenum of the Supreme Court on the ground of the severity of the sentence imposed on the applicant. 76.  On 28 March 2016 the Plenum of the Supreme Court granted the application and reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to five years\u2019 imprisonment suspended on probation. The applicant was released from detention. 77.  The applicant\u2019s criminal trial is the subject of a separate application which is pending before the Court (application no. 51324/16).", "references": ["9", "8", "0", "3", "6", "5", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Yerevan. 7.  On 9 May 2007 at around 10.30 p.m. a certain S.V. was shot dead following an argument in front of a restaurant owned by the applicant\u2019s son, Levon Gulyan, aged 30. Later that evening a team of law-enforcement officers arrived at the crime scene, which included several police officers of the local Shengavit district police station (\u201cthe police station\u201d), investigators of the Shengavit district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) and two officers of the Principal Department for Criminal Intelligence (\u201cthe PDCI\u201d) of the Armenian police: the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., and the head of the Homicide Unit, G.T. 8.  On 10 May 2007 at around 3-4 a.m. Levon Gulyan was taken by police officers to the police station in connection with the incident. PDCI Officers H.T. and G.T. had a talk with him for several hours, after which he was taken to the prosecutor\u2019s office, where between 11.40 a.m. and 12.55 p.m. he was questioned as a witness by the prosecutor. He was kept at the police station until around 10 p.m. Levon Gulyan stated during questioning that he had gone out of his restaurant to smoke that evening when he had noticed a group of young people having an argument. He had unsuccessfully tried to calm them down and then had gone back into the restaurant. Later, when leaving the restaurant, he had seen police cars and other vehicles and found out that someone had been fatally shot. He had not seen the murder or heard gun shots. Two employees of his restaurant, barman H.M. and waitress M.G., were also questioned. M.G. stated that Levon Gulyan had been outside the restaurant when gunshots had been heard. 9.  On 11 May 2007 Levon Gulyan appeared again at the police station. The applicant alleged that Levon Gulyan had been kept there for the whole day and night and had been released in the morning of 12 May 2007 in order to be able to participate in a parliamentary election taking place on that day, on the condition that he return to the police station a few hours later. The Government alleged that Levon Gulyan had not been kept at the police station on 11 May 2007 and that he had gone home. 10.  On 12 May 2007, at around noon, Levon Gulyan appeared again at the police station. 11.  At around 2 p.m. he was taken from there by car to the PDCI which was situated at the Armenian police headquarters, by two PDCI officers, V.G. and S.M., on the order of the head of the PDCI, H.M. 12.  At 2.30 p.m. Levon Gulyan\u2019s entry into the police headquarters was recorded. 13.  At around 3.20 p.m. Levon Gulyan was found dead in the courtyard of the police headquarters with multiple injuries. It appears that he had fallen from the window of the office of the head of the Homicide Unit, G.T., which was situated on the second floor of the building. 14.  At an unspecified time an examination of the scene of the incident and an external examination of the body were carried out. The relevant records stated that Levon Gulyan was lying 2 m from the building with his head towards the building and his legs towards the opposite building. He was leaning on the left frontal part of his body. His shoe laces were missing and were found in his trouser pockets, while a lock of hair was found lying about 1 m away from his body. The frame of the window from which he had apparently fallen was 40 cm wide. 15.  On the same day, that is 12 May 2007, a prosecutor of the Yerevan prosecutor\u2019s office took a statement from PDCI Officer G.T., who submitted that Levon Gulyan had been brought to his office at around 2.30 p.m. and he had had a talk with him for about thirty minutes about the circumstances of the murder. In order to report to the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., the results of the talk, he had then left the office but had not wanted to leave Levon Gulyan alone, so he had taken him to Officer S.M.\u2019s office. On his way to H.T.\u2019s office he had bumped into Officer A.M. and told him to stay with Levon Gulyan in S.M.\u2019s office and to send S.M. for lunch. At around 3.30 p.m., when he had been in H.T.\u2019s office, he had heard noises in the corridor. He had gone out and learned that somebody had fallen from the window. He had run to the courtyard and seen Levon Gulyan lying on the ground. He had immediately called an ambulance and tried to provide first aid, but Levon Gulyan had already died. Later he had learned from A.M. that the latter had moved Levon Gulyan to his (that is to say G.T.\u2019s) office so that S.M. had been able to go for lunch. Levon Gulyan had jumped out of the window of the office when A.M. had gone out to fetch some water. 16.  The prosecutor also took a statement from PDCI Officer A.M. who submitted that at around 3 p.m. Levon Gulyan had been taken by Officer S.M. to G.T.\u2019s office. Then Officer S.M. had said that he had had to go for lunch, while G.T. had been at that moment reporting to the deputy head of PDCI, H.T., so he had stayed with Levon Gulyan. He had seen Levon Gulyan earlier in Officer S.M.\u2019s office and had been aware that he had been summoned in connection with the murder. Since he had been dealing with that case, he had decided to ask him some questions. Levon Gulyan had been tired and irritated, so he had decided to change the subject and had asked some unrelated questions concerning his restaurant. Levon Gulyan had then asked for permission to smoke and later for some water. There had been no water or bottle in the office. He had gone to a nearby office to fetch water but had then heard the sound of a window opening and a \u201cboom\u201d. He had run back to the office but there had been no one. The window had been open so he had immediately understood that Levon Gulyan had escaped. He had quickly run to the courtyard and had seen Levon Gulyan lying on his back, with blood around his head. There had been no one there, but later the members of his unit had arrived. A.M. submitted that he could not give their names as he had been in a state of shock. 17.  The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings under Article 110 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (provoking a person to suicide), relying on G.T.\u2019s and A.M.\u2019s above statements, including their allegation that Levon Gulyan had fallen and died while trying to escape through the window. 18.  Following the institution of proceedings, on the same day the prosecutor questioned PDCI Officers G.T. and A.M. as witnesses. They made submissions similar to those made earlier that day (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). Officer G.T. explained that he had left his office to report to the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., because Levon Gulyan, during their conversation, had provided the name of a previously unknown person who had been involved in the argument with S.V. 19.  The prosecutor furthermore ordered a forensic medical examination, asking the medical examiner to clarify, inter alia, the injuries to Levon Gulyan\u2019s body, whether they could have been sustained as a result of the fall and hitting obstacles on the way down, and his position when sustaining those injuries. 20.  On 13 May 2007 the requested medical examination was performed, resulting in medical report no. 402, according to which Levon Gulyan had suffered open injuries to his skull and closed and blunt-force-trauma injuries to his thorax and spine, with multiple fractures and bruises, which had been sustained by colliding with obstacles and the ground as a result of the fall and had caused his death. When sustaining the injuries to the skull and the area of the left shoulder girdle, Levon Gulyan had been facing, with the left part of his head and the area of his left shoulder girdle, towards the object that had caused the injuries, whereas when sustaining the injuries to his thorax and the shoulder and lower spine, Levon Gulyan had been facing with the back surface of his thorax towards the object that had caused the injuries. Apart from the above\u2011mentioned injuries there were also bruises on the left side of his abdomen, the left elbow joint, the dorsal surface of the left wrist and the outer surface of the right ankle joint, as well as scratches in the areas of the right elbow joint, the dorsal surface of the wrist joint and the palm, the anterior surface of the left elbow joint, the outer surface of the right ankle joint and the frontal surface of the left knee joint, which had been caused by blunt objects while still alive and could be qualified as minor injuries. 21.  On 14 May 2007 the applicant was recognised as a victim and informed of his rights. He was questioned on the same day. 22.  On the same date the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of marks, specifically fingerprints found on the window. 23.  On 15 May 2007 an additional examination of the scene of the incident and the building was performed. It was noted that there was a yellow gas pipe passing horizontally along the wall at some distance from the building about two metres below the window. There was also an entresol floor below the ground floor, covered by a shed that stretched from the building into the courtyard. It appears that there was no open exit from the courtyard to the street. 24.  On the same date the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of fibres on Levon Gulyan\u2019s clothes and under his fingernails, and of some smears found on the windowsill. 25.  On 17 May 2007 the prosecutor questioned the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., as a witness. 26.  On 18 May 2007 a medical examination was performed, which found that it could not be ruled out that the lock of hair found at the scene had belonged to Levon Gulyan. 27.  On 19 May 2007 the prosecutor, following a request by the applicant, decided to order another medical examination of Levon Gulyan\u2019s body to be performed by two foreign experts from Germany and Denmark. That decision stated that on 12 May 2007 Levon Gulyan had been invited to the PDCI for an \u201coperative talk\u201d. The experts were asked to clarify the injuries on Levon Gulyan\u2019s body and their origin, including whether there had been any injuries which could suggest that he had been ill-treated prior to his fall. 28.  On the same date the experts conducted the requested medical examination, producing report no. 418, which concluded that the cause of death had been a massive blunt-force trauma to the head and chest. The experts found multiple lesions on the head and body, but no typical defence lesions. The lesions were fresh and had been sustained while still alive. They had been caused by severe blunt force trauma and could, as stated, have been caused by a fall from a height. The distribution of the lesions and the position of the body at the scene suggested that the deceased had hit the ground with the head and the upper part of the body first, and that he might have hit an object on the way down, possibly the pipe seen on the outside of the building under the window. There were no lesions that could not be explained by a fall from a height. On the other hand, it could not be ruled out that a few of the smaller bruises and abrasions could have been caused by another impact (such as a punch or blow) prior to the fall. The experts, having examined the scene of the incident, found no indentations or other indications of a person having hit the shed. They did not examine the gas pipe. 29.  On 21 May 2007 the results of the forensic examination of the marks were produced in report no. 16080702, which stated that the fingerprints found on the internal side of the middle part of the window frame and on the left window pane belonged to Levon Gulyan. There was also a palm print and one fingerprint on the window which did not belong to him. 30.  On 4 June 2007 the prosecutor ordered an additional forensic examination of the marks. The forensic expert was asked whether the palm print and the fingerprint, which did not belong to Levon Gulyan, belonged to PDCI Officers G.T. or A.M., or to a third person, H.M., the cleaning lady who had apparently cleaned G.T.\u2019s office on 13 May 2007. 31.  On 12 June 2007 the results of the forensic examination of the fibres and smears were produced in report no. 16170705, which stated, inter alia, that foreign natural and chemical fibres had been found on Levon Gulyan\u2019s clothes and under his fingernails, which were fit for a further comparative examination. The fibres found on his clothes did not have the same generic origin as those taken from the pipe and the entresol shed. The smears found on the windowsill had the same generic origin as the samples taken from the soles of Levon Gulyan\u2019s shoes. 32.  On 18 June 2007 the results of the additional forensic examination of the marks were produced in a report, which stated that the palm print and the fingerprint found on the window did not belong to PDCI Officers G.T. or A.M. or to the cleaning lady. 33.  By letter of 12 July 2007 the prosecutor, in reply to an enquiry made by the Yerevan prosecutor\u2019s office, stated, inter alia, that the officers of the police station, having received an assignment to find and bring eyewitnesses, had brought Levon Gulyan to the prosecutor\u2019s office for questioning, which had happened only once on 10 May 2007. He had been accompanied by police officers but not handcuffed. No other investigative measures with his participation had been planned for the period of 10 to 12 May 2007 and the question of his appearance on 12 May 2007 at the PDCI was to be clarified with that authority. 34.  At some point during the investigation, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office ordered that an investigative experiment be conducted in order to clarify the mechanics of Levon Gulyan\u2019s fall, but there was no follow-up to that decision because of the absence of a suitable dummy. 35.  On 6 August 2007 the head of Armenian police issued a conclusion on the results of an official inquiry into Levon Gulyan\u2019s death, finding that PDCI Officer A.M. had shown a low level of professionalism by leaving Levon Gulyan alone in the office as a result of which Levon Gulyan had attempted to escape and died, while PDCI Officer G.T., as Officer A.M.\u2019s superior, had not properly supervised his subordinate. Both of them were to be subjected to a disciplinary sanction. 2.  Investigation by the Special Investigative Service (SIS) and the applicant\u2019s appeals to the courts\n(a)  Investigation by the SIS, termination of the criminal proceedings and the applicant\u2019s challenge before the courts 36.  On 12 December 2007 the investigation was taken over by the SIS and assigned to investigator G.P. 37.  On 19 December 2007 the investigator questioned PDCI Officer G.T. as a witness. Officer G.T. stated that Levon Gulyan had been invited to the PDCI in order to clarify the discrepancies between his statement and that of waitress M.G., who had also been invited to the PDCI. In his opinion, Levon Gulyan, having found out that M.G. had also been invited, had decided to escape in order not to take part in a confrontation alongside her, as this would have revealed the fact that he had made a false statement. G.T. alleged that Levon Gulyan had found out about the imminent confrontation by overhearing his telephone conversation with another police officer. 38.  On 12 March 2008 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings. This decision, which, following an appeal by the applicant, was approved by the supervising prosecutor, stated that on 12 May 2007 Levon Gulyan and M.G. had been separately invited to the PDCI to clarify the discrepancies between their statements. At the PDCI he had been taken to the office of the head of the Homicide Unit G.T., who had had a talk with him for about thirty minutes, during which Levon Gulyan had provided the nickname of one of the persons who had been involved in the argument with S.V. G.T. had then left the office in order to report this new piece of information, while Levon Gulyan had remained with the deputy head of the Homicide Unit A.M., with whom he had had a talk of a general nature. During their conversation Levon Gulyan had found out that M.G. had also been invited to the PDCI. Realising the imminence of a face-to-face confrontation with her, during which he would not have been able to conceal the identity of those involved in the argument, including that of the murderer, he had decided to escape. For that purpose he had asked Officer A.M. for some water. After A.M. had gone out to fetch some water, Levon Gulyan had tried to escape through the window but had fallen from a height of about 7 m and had died on the spot. Taking into account that Levon Gulyan had not been subjected to violence, threats, or inhuman or degrading treatment during his stay at the PDCI, and the fact that his escape had been motivated by his intention to conceal the identity of the offenders and his death had been the result of a fall, there was no corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. Nor was there a criminal element in A.M.\u2019s actions, specifically the fact that he had left Levon Gulyan alone in the office, because Levon Gulyan had had only the status of a witness as opposed to that of a suspect or accused. 39.  On 7 April 2008 the applicant contested that decision before the courts, complaining in detail that the investigation had not been impartial, transparent and effective. He relied on, inter alia, Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention. 40.  On 6 June 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan allowed the appeal and ordered that the case be resumed. The District Court held that the investigator\u2019s decision had been unfounded and violated individual rights and that no proper investigation had been carried out and a number of important circumstances had not been established. In its decision, reasoned in detail, the District Court found, inter alia, that: (a) the investigating authority had failed to determine the lawfulness of taking Levon Gulyan and others between 10 and 12 May 2007 to the law-enforcement agencies and keeping them there for extended periods of time; (b) the allegations raised in the press and by some of the witnesses, including barman H.M., that Levon Gulyan had been ill-treated with the purpose of coercing a confession during his stays at the law-enforcement agencies had not been investigated, including the allegation that such acts had been committed in G.T.\u2019s office and had led to his being thrown out of the window; (c) not all reasonable steps had been taken to secure evidence, including questioning police officers, to prevent their possible collusion and preserve the scene of the incident; (d) no proper assessment had been made of the fact that Levon Gulyan had neither been summoned nor gone voluntarily to the PDCI; (e) the events preceding the incident had not been properly clarified, in view of the multiple discrepancies in the statements made by the police officers, which also cast doubt on their credibility and the validity of the conclusions reached by the investigating authority on the basis of those statements; (f) no proper assessment had been made of the alleged behaviour of the deputy head of the Homicide Unit, A.M., upon his return to G.T.\u2019s office, specifically his reaction to the open window; (g) it had not been clarified whether Levon Gulyan had been able to move about freely while at the PDCI; (h) no investigation had been carried out into the fact that his shoe laces had been missing at the time of the incident and had been found in his trouser pockets; (i) no convincing evidence had been obtained concerning Levon Gulyan\u2019s fall and the preceding events; the investigating authority from the very outset had carried out the investigation on the premise that Levon Gulyan had attempted to escape and had died as a result of a fall, but had failed to carry out a complete and objective investigation into his motives, including the fact that he had only been a witness and that the window had been more than 7 m high and there had been numerous obstacles in the police building; (j) while, according to the official version, Levon Gulyan had hit an obstacle or obstacles during the fall, which could have been the gas pipe, no explanation had been provided for the absence of any particles on his clothes and under his fingernails of the pipe in question or any other possible obstacle, such as the entresol shed, or vice versa; nor had it been clarified whose fibres had been discovered on Levon Gulyan\u2019s clothes and no samples had been taken in that connection from police officers; (k) no explanation had been provided or samples taken from police officers in relation to the palm print found on the window, which had not belonged to Levon Gulyan; (l) the investigation had not clarified the mechanics of Levon Gulyan\u2019s fall and had not carried out in that connection an investigative experiment because of the absence of a suitable dummy, despite the fact that such an experiment had been ordered by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office; no measures had been taken to obtain such a dummy from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia within the framework of inter-State legal assistance; (m) no investigation had been carried out in connection with the findings of foreign experts concerning the other injuries found on Levon Gulyan\u2019s body, such as small bruises and scratches; (n) it had not been clarified how a lock of hair belonging to Levon Gulyan had been found lying at a distance from his body; (o) the applicant and other victims in the criminal case had not been involved in any investigative or other procedural measures and had had no possibility to pose questions to the police officers or the experts; and (p) the remains of a cigarette found in the ashtray in G.T.\u2019s office had not been seized and examined to determine whether it had been Levon Gulyan who had smoked it. 41.  On 16 June 2008 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision. 42.  On 21 July 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and upheld the findings of the District Court. It further added that the investigation had been flawed and based on only one premise, that of Levon Gulyan\u2019s attempted escape. Furthermore, the explanation provided for that sole premise was farfetched and the investigating authority, having showed a one-sided approach to the assessment of the collected evidence, had failed to carry out an impartial, objective and full investigation in that connection, thereby reaching inaccurate conclusions. The investigating authority had failed to explain and assess why Levon Gulyan, who had already been questioned, had been \u201cinvited\u201d and then, having been de facto deprived of his liberty, transferred to the PDCI in order to carry out \u201cinvestigative measures, including a cross-examination\u201d by officials who had had no authority to do so, which had violated his right to liberty and resulted in his demise. There had been no instruction from the investigator to carry out a face-to-face confrontation and, moreover, by taking Levon Gulyan to an alleged confrontation, the PDCI officers had violated Article 206 \u00a7 2 of the CCP, pursuant to which a witness had had to be questioned at the location where the investigation had been in train or, if necessary, where he or she had been located, whereas the PDCI could not be considered to have been either of those. The assessment of evidence had not been objective since the investigating authority had given preference to the statements of the police officers without a proper evaluation of other evidence in the case. The resulting decision, which had been taken in violation of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Convention, had amounted to a two-page document which had failed to make even a single reference to any evidence.\n(b)  Resumption of the criminal proceedings, their subsequent termination and the applicant\u2019s challenge before the courts 43.  On 16 August 2008 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 44.  On 18 August 2008 the SIS investigator sent a letter to the PDCI, requesting that an investigation be carried out in order to find out whether Levon Gulyan\u2019s fall had been witnessed by any police officers, and to report back. 45.  Between September 2008 and April 2009 the investigator conducted a number of interviews, including with Officers A.M., G.T., V.G. and S.M., the head of PDCI, H.M., as well as two other PDCI officers, H.S. and E.V. The applicant and his representatives were present at these interviews and were apparently able to pose questions. Levon Gulyan\u2019s wife and the cleaning lady were also questioned as witnesses during the same period. 46.  On 13 September 2008 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Armenia sent a letter to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia, enquiring about the availability of a 178-cm-tall dummy weighing 95 kg for the purpose of carrying out an investigative experiment. 47.  By letter of 1 December 2008 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia replied that they did not have at their disposal a dummy matching the specified characteristics. However, they had purchased dummies 170 cm tall and weighing 40 kg, one of which could be provided to the Armenian authorities. It appears that there was no follow-up to this offer. 48.  On 16 April 2009 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings. This decision, which, following an appeal by the applicant, was approved by the supervising prosecutor, provided a similar account of events to the decision of 12 March 2008, with the exception that it stated that Levon Gulyan had found out about the imminent confrontation with waitress M.G. from a telephone conversation he had overheard between PDCI Officer G.T. and his colleagues, and that Levon Gulyan had hit a pipe during the fall. The decision similarly concluded that there was no corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. It referred, inter alia, to the statements of a number of police officers, medical reports nos. 402 and 418 and reports nos. 16080702 and 16170705. Relying on the latter two documents, the decision stated that the fact that Levon Gulyan had climbed onto the windowsill without any external assistance was substantiated by his fingerprints found on the window and the smears found on the windowsill, left by his shoes. 49.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant contested that decision before the courts, complaining, inter alia, that the investigating authority, lacking from the very outset the intention of establishing the truth, following the resumption of the criminal proceedings had carried out an investigation which had been a pure formality and had ignored the issues raised in the court decisions. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention. 50.  On 2 December 2009 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments and upheld the investigator\u2019s decision of 16 April 2009. 51.  On 11 December 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 52.  On 5 February 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court. 53.  On 25 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 54.  On 27 August 2010 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, quashing the decisions of the lower courts and obliging the investigating authority to remedy the violations of individual rights which had taken place in the course of the investigation. The Court of Cassation stated at the outset that the authorities were required under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation with the aim of providing a convincing explanation for the death of Levon Gulyan who, at the material time, had been under the supervision of the PDCI officers. It further held that not all measures had been taken yet for the authorities to be considered to have fulfilled this requirement. In particular, no investigative experiment had been performed to determine the mechanics of Levon Gulyan\u2019s fall, whereas the necessity of such an experiment had been confirmed by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, the investigating authority and the supervising prosecutor. The investigating authority was still reasonably capable of taking measures to obtain the necessary dummy, since it could be ordered from the same company which provided dummies to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia. However, the investigating authority had not taken any measures in that connection in the four months following the letter of 1 December 2008. It was therefore necessary to obtain the dummy in question, carry out the experiment, compare its results with the other evidence and, if necessary, carry out other investigative measures. The Court of Cassation held that a conclusive finding on the fulfilment of the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention would be possible only following the implementation of the experiment in question and, if necessary, of the resulting other measures. A global assessment of the effectiveness of the investigation would be possible after taking into account all such evidence. Therefore, the questions raised by the applicant in his appeal could be answered only after the investigation had been completed.\n(c)  Resumption of the criminal proceedings, their subsequent termination and the applicant\u2019s challenge before the courts 55.  On 18 January 2011 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 56.  On 24 January 2011 the investigator applied to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, requesting assistance in obtaining an appropriate dummy from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia. 57.  By letter of 18 March 2011 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office replied that the fact of Levon Gulyan\u2019s death as a result of an attempted escape through a window had been established and it was impossible to guarantee the objective legitimacy of results by carrying out the investigative experiment, since Levon Gulyan, from the moment he had climbed onto the windowsill and until his collision with the ground, had performed conscious and intentional actions characteristic exclusively of his physical fitness and mentality, which were impossible to replicate with the help of a dummy or through any other experiment and research, and it was objectively impossible to approximate the circumstances of an investigative experiment to the actual event and to establish through such investigative experiment any circumstances having evidentiary value. 58.  On 21 March 2011 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as previously, reiterating, inter alia, the position set out by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 59.  On 2 May 2011 the applicant contested that decision before the courts. 60.  On 25 May 2011 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and to oblige the investigator to restore his violated rights. It found that the investigating authority had failed to carry out a full and comprehensive investigation, to show due diligence and to comply with the requirements of the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 27 August 2010. Instead of obtaining the necessary dummy for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the investigation and giving a global assessment to the incident through comparison of evidence, the investigating authority had decided once again to terminate the proceedings by relying \u2013 without any proper reasoning \u2013 on the prosecutor\u2019s unfounded letter of 18 March 2011, which had had no evidentiary value. 61.  On 3 July 2011 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision. 62.  On 30 June 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court 63.  On 18 July 2011 the prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law. 64.  On 26 August 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible.\n(d)  Resumption of the criminal proceedings and their subsequent termination 65.  On 8 September 2011 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 66.  On 6 December 2011 the SIS investigator sent enquiries to the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Armenian police and the National Security Service, inquiring whether they had a dummy weighing 95 kg and with a height of 178 cm. It appears that none of those authorities had at their disposal a dummy of the required size. 67.  On 8 February 2012 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as previously. This decision stated, inter alia, that it had been impossible to carry out an investigative experiment because of the absence of a dummy and, even if such an experiment were to be carried out, this would not lead to the establishment of any circumstances having evidentiary value. 68.  The applicant alleges that he had never been informed about this decision and a copy of it was served on him only in April 2015 after he had applied to the authorities for additional information and copies of documents in order to submit them to the Court.", "references": ["6", "2", "3", "7", "1", "9", "8", "4", "5", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 7.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main contenders were the then Prime Minister, Mr Sargsyan, representing the ruling party, and the main opposition candidate, Mr Ter-Petrosyan, who had also served as President of Armenia between 1991 and 1998. 8.  The applicant, who had occupied the post of Head of the Penitentiary Department at the Ministry of the Interior during Mr Ter-Petrosyan\u2019s presidency, was an active supporter of his candidacy. 9.  Immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results of the election, Mr Ter-Petrosyan called on his supporters to gather at Freedom Square in central Yerevan (also known as Opera Square) in order to protest against the irregularities which had allegedly occurred in the election process, announcing that the election had not been free and fair. From 20 February 2008 onwards, nationwide daily protest rallies were held by Mr Ter-Petrosyan\u2019s supporters, their main meeting place being Freedom Square and the surrounding park. It appears that the rallies at Freedom Square, held during the daytime and late into the night, attracted at times tens of thousands of people, while several hundred demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up a camp. It further appears that the applicant was an active participant in the rallies and was often on the podium, and had made a speech on the first day of the rallies. 10.  On 24 February 2008 the Central Election Commission announced that Mr Sargsyan had won the election with around 52% of all votes cast, while Mr Ter-Petrosyan received around 21% of votes. 11.  On 29 February 2008 the rallies were still in full swing. That night the applicant camped at Freedom Square. 12.  The applicant alleged that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. the police had arrived at Freedom Square. The several hundred demonstrators who were camping there were mostly still asleep, although some of them were awake, having been informed in advance about the arrival of a large number of police officers. In total about 800 heavily armed police officers appeared. The police cordon started approaching the tents and panic broke out among the demonstrators who started waking the others up. Some of the demonstrators managed to switch on the microphones and the lights on the square. Mr Ter-Petrosyan, who was also at the square, addressed the demonstrators: \u201cWe see that police forces have arrived at the square. Please, do not have any contact with them and do not touch them in any way. Please keep your distance from them. Let us wait and see what they want from us. If they have something to tell us, we are ready to listen. Please, be patient and peaceful\u201d. Then there was silence for about a minute. By then the police forces had already encircled the square with a triple cordon. Suddenly, without any prior warning or orders to disperse, the police forces, shouting loudly, attacked the demonstrators, most of whom were still asleep in their tents, violently beating them with rubber batons and destroying the camp. Mr Ter-Petrosyan was immediately arrested and taken away. Within a few minutes no demonstrator remained at the square, since everybody, including the applicant, had tried to save themselves by fleeing. He and other activists were then pursued by the police through the streets and arrested (see paragraph 25 below). 13.  The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations and claimed that the reason for the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square had been information obtained on 29 February 2008 by the Armenian Police and National Security Service, according to which a large number of weapons, including metal rods, wooden clubs, firearms, grenades and explosives, were to be distributed to the protesters to incite provocative actions and mass disorder in Yerevan on 1 March 2008. The police operation had aimed to verify that information. For that purpose, members of the relevant police force, without being equipped with any protective gear, had arrived at Freedom Square where about 800 to 900 demonstrators armed with metal rods and wooden clubs had gathered waiting for the police. The demonstrators had attacked the police officers, hitting them and throwing stones, pointed metal objects and Molotov cocktails at them, as a result of which numerous police officers had been injured. 14.  The Government, in support of their allegations, submitted a number of official documents, including six records of inspection of the scene drawn up by investigators of the Principal Department for Investigations of the Armenian Police. According to those records, the inspections were carried out on 1 March 2008 at several locations in Freedom Square and the surrounding park at various times between 8.30 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. and a number of different objects were found including pistols, cartridges, grenades and other explosives, wooden and rubber clubs, metal rods and other metal objects having a spiky, hedgehog-like shape. The Government also submitted a number of expert conclusions produced following the forensic examination of the objects in question. 15.  On the same date the Special Investigative Service instituted criminal case no. 62202508 under Article 225.1 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2, Article 235 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 and Article 316 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (CC) (see paragraphs 97, 91, 98 and 94 below) in connection with the events at Freedom Square. This decision stated:\n\u201cAfter the announcement of the preliminary results of the presidential election of 19 February 2008, the presidential candidate, Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, members of parliament, [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper, [N.P.], and others organised and held mass public events at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and incited disobedience to the decisions ordering an end to the events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, while a number of participants in the mass events illegally possessed and carried illegally obtained arms and ammunition.\nOn 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m., when the police took measures aimed at forcibly ending the public events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, in compliance with the requirements of section 14 of the Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act, the organisers and participants of the events, disobeying the lawful orders of the [police officers], who were performing their official duties, committed a life- and health-threatening assault on them with clubs, metal rods and other adapted objects, which had been in their possession for that purpose, causing the police officers injuries of varied severity.\u201d 16.  It appears that, after Freedom Square was cleared of demonstrators, some of them relocated to the area near the French Embassy, the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office and the Yerevan Press Building, situated at Grigor Lusavorich and Arshakunyats Streets about 1.7-2 km from Freedom Square, where they were later joined by thousands of others who apparently poured into the streets of Yerevan in response to the events of the early morning in order to voice their discontent. It further appears that the rallies continued throughout the city until late at night, involving clashes between protesters and law enforcement officers and resulting in ten deaths, including eight civilians, numerous injured and a state of emergency being declared by the incumbent President Kocharyan. The state of emergency, inter alia, prohibited the holding of any further rallies and other mass public events for a period of twenty days. 17.  On 2 March 2008 another criminal case was instituted, no. 62202608, under Article 225 \u00a7 3 and Article 235 \u00a7 2 of the CC (see paragraphs 96 and 98 below), in connection with the above-mentioned events. The decision stated:\n\u201c[Mr Ter-Petrosyan], the candidate running for president at the presidential election of 19 February 2008, and his followers and supporters, members of parliament [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper, [N.P.], and others, not willing to concede defeat at the election, with the aim of casting doubt on the election, instilling distrust towards the results among large segments of the population, creating illusions of public discontent and revolt and discrediting the election and the authorities, from 1 March 2008 in the area of the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office and central streets organised mass disorder involving murders, violence, pogroms, arson, destruction of property and armed resistance to public officials, with the use of firearms, explosives and other adapted objects.\u201d 18.  It appears that on the same date a number of police officers who had been involved in the events of 1-2 March 2008, including officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., were granted victim status within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508 and later gave testimony. It further appears that police officer A.Arsh. underwent a forensic medical examination and, according to the relevant medical conclusion, was found to have suffered a bruise to the left side of his forehead, which had been inflicted by a blunt object and caused light damage to health. 19.  According to the testimony of police officer A.Arsh., dated 2 March 2008, on 1 March 2008 he had been on duty at Freedom Square as a member of the Patrol Guard Service (PGS) deployed there for the purpose of preserving public order and assisting the police units which were entrusted with the task of verifying intelligence information concerning the possession of arms by the demonstrators. The demonstrators started assaulting the police officers. The PGS officers tried to calm the demonstrators but one of them, who was a slim man of around 55 with greying hair, a wide forehead and a sharp nose, hit him twice on the head with a stick and fled in the direction of Northern Avenue. Another PGS officer, A.Aru., tried to assist him, after which A.Aru. left in the same direction. 20.  According to the testimony of police officer A.Aru., dated 11 March 2008, after the demonstrators started assaulting and resisting the police officers, while standing behind the Hovhannes Tumanyan statue, he had seen one demonstrator assault police officer A.Arsh. by hitting him twice on the head with a stick. Later he had continued to perform his duties in the area of Arshakunyats Street where, near the Yerevan Press Building, he had noticed the same person, who was a slim man of around 50 with a wide forehead, of medium height and with short black hair. He had approached the man and asked him to follow him to a police station but the man had refused to comply with his order and punched him a few times in the chest, kicked his shield and fled. 21.  By a letter of 10 March 2008 the Chief of the Special Investigative Service requested detailed information from the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police concerning the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square, including its aim, planning, the number of police officers involved and the weapons and other means of personal protection used. 22.  By a letter of 27 March 2008 the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police replied to the above request as follows. The organisers and the participants in the unauthorised rallies that had been held between 20 and 29 February 2008 had, on numerous occasions, been informed about the unlawful nature of those events. The police operation of 1 March 2008 was based on intelligence information received the previous day by the police and the national security service, according to which a large quantity of metal rods, wooden clubs, firearms, grenades and explosives was to be distributed to the demonstrators in order to instigate mass disorder. The aim of the operation was to verify that information and to inspect the area. A number of unarmed police officers had entered Opera Square where they were attacked by 800-900 demonstrators armed with metal rods and wooden clubs, who were expecting the arrival of the police. The police officers were beaten and stones, pointed metal objects and Molotov cocktails were thrown at them. In order to prevent the disorder, an on-the-spot decision had been taken to engage the auxiliary police forces, which had been deployed earlier on the approaches to the square to prevent a possible deterioration of the situation and had been equipped with helmets, shields and rubber batons. The engagement of the said forces resulted in the demonstrators fleeing Freedom Square. The operation was carried out between 7 and 7.30 a.m. and was followed by a search, as a result of which numerous specially adapted metal objects, arms, ammunition and Molotov cocktails were found. Dozens of the most active and aggressive participants in the mass disorder were taken to various police stations. 23.  It appears that many participants in the post-election rallies, including a number of opposition leaders, were charged and stood trial within the scope of the instituted criminal cases. The outcome of criminal cases nos. 62202508 and 62202608, however, is unclear. 24.  According to a handwritten document entitled \u201cthe record of bringing-in\u201d (\u0561\u0580\u0571\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0563\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576 \u0562\u0565\u0580\u0574\u0561\u0576 \u0565\u0576\u0569\u0561\u0580\u056f\u0565\u056c\u0578\u0582 \u0574\u0561\u057d\u056b\u0576), the applicant was \u201cbrought in\u201d (\u0562\u0565\u0580\u0574\u0561\u0576 \u0567 \u0565\u0576\u0569\u0561\u0580\u056f\u057e\u0565\u056c) to Kentron Police Station on 1 March 2008 at around 6.30 a.m. by three police officers, E.R., H.S. and A.A., from 1 Grigor Lusavorich Street \u201cfor organising unauthorised demonstrations at Freedom Square in support of Mr Ter\u2011Petrosyan, resisting police officers and disobeying their lawful orders\u201d. The record was signed by the three police officers and an officer of Kentron Police Station who had drafted it. At the bottom of the record it was noted that the applicant had refused to sign it. 25.  The applicant alleged that the above-mentioned record had never been presented to him. In reality he had been taken into custody by about 10-15 persons who did not introduce themselves as police officers and were masked. Those persons had been pursuing him all the way from Freedom Square. He had managed to catch a taxi, but the taxi had been blocked after about 1-2 km by a police car at the intersection of Arshakunyats and Grigor Lusavorich Streets near the Yerevan Press Building. The above-mentioned persons had forced him out of the taxi and started kicking, punching and hitting him with rubber batons. He had then lost consciousness and been transported to Kentron Police Station. 26.  The applicant further alleged that upon his arrival at Kentron Police Station the same persons had continued to beat and humiliate him. Different parts of his body had been hit, including his head and legs, as a result of which he had fallen on the floor, bleeding and unable to get up. He had then been hit on the head again, which had resulted in concussion and loss of consciousness. Twice an ambulance had been called to provide medical assistance. His ill-treatment had been inflicted upon the instructions of the police chief. 27.  One of the above-mentioned three officers, E.R., reported to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station that:\n\u201c...today at around 7.30 a.m. I, together with [police officers H.S. and A.A.] brought [the applicant] in to Kentron Police Station from near Yerevan circus for having resisted police officers. While showing resistance, [the applicant] dropped a knife, two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys...\u201d 28.  Another report addressed by police officer E.R. to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station and signed by all three officers stated that:\n\u201c...following an alert received on 1 March [2008, I, together with police officers H.S. and A.A.] was in the area of the unauthorised demonstration held at Freedom Square where the demonstrators were ordered to terminate the unauthorised demonstration and to clear the square. However, they disobeyed our lawful orders and, while showing resistance, swore at the authorities. The crowd, which showed resistance to the police, started running towards the adjacent streets, while continuing to show resistance to the police. During this mass disorder we continued to pursue the most active demonstrators who ran towards the [Yerevan] Press Building through Northern Avenue and Abovyan Street. While pursuing them I noticed one person near Yerevan circus who was showing overly active resistance to the police and who climbed into a random taxi... Being nearby, I approached the car and removed that person, who dropped a knife at that moment. I took the knife and together with the above-mentioned police officers brought that person in to Kentron Police Station, where he was identified as [the applicant].\u201d 29.  Police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A. further addressed several other reports to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station, all of which had practically identical content, stating as follows:\n\u201c...following an alert received on 1 March [2008, we] were in the area of the unauthorised demonstration held at Freedom Square where the demonstrators were ordered to terminate the unauthorised demonstration and to clear the square. However, they disobeyed our lawful orders and [showed] resistance to the police officers, while hitting and swearing at them and the authorities. The most active of these citizens were brought in to the police station from the streets adjacent to the square.\u201d 30.  A memorandum signed by the Chief of Kentron Police Station in Yerevan and the Chief of the Yerevan Police, entitled \u201cAssaults and insults of a public official; organisation of public events in violation of the procedure prescribed by law; mass disorder within the territory of Kentron Police Station\u201d, stated:\n\u201cAs a result of mass events organised and held at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. officers of the Armenian police, having received an order, demanded the persons gathered at the square to vacate the square and to terminate the mass event that they had been holding for days[. H]owever, they did not obey the lawful orders of the police officers and, by committing health- and life-threatening assault, subjected [them] to mass beatings and did not obey their lawful orders, for which the activists of the above-mentioned rally were brought in to Kentron Police Station in Yerevan, among them: [A.M., the applicant, D.A., M.A., V.H. and H.B.].\nA clasp knife was discovered in [the applicant\u2019s] possession during his personal inspection conducted at the police station...\u201d 31.  The knife in question was at a later date examined by a forensic expert who classified it as a \u201cbladed weapon\u201d. The applicant alleged that he had never carried a knife, therefore no such object had ever been found in his possession. 32.  From 7.20 to 7.40 p.m. the investigator questioned the applicant as a witness. According to the relevant record, the applicant stated that he had been informed in connection with which criminal case he had been summoned to testify as a witness and that it had been explained to him that as a witness he was obliged to testify or risk criminal sanctions. He, nevertheless, did not wish to testify because he had not committed any offence. 33.  The applicant was kept in a cell at Kentron Police Station until around 10 p.m., when the investigator came to question him again. The applicant alleged that he had been unable to testify because of the ill\u2011treatment he had endured earlier. 34.  At around 10.30 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest (\u0561\u0580\u0571\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0563\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576 \u0561\u0576\u0571\u056b \u0571\u0565\u0580\u0562\u0561\u056f\u0561\u056c\u0574\u0561\u0576 \u0574\u0561\u057d\u056b\u0576) by filling in the relevant template, indicating \u201c10.30 p.m.\u201d as the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest and \u201cArticles 225.1 \u00a7 2 and 316 \u00a7 2 of the CC\u201d (see paragraphs 91 and 94 below) as the provisions under which the applicant was suspected of having committed offences. The arrest record was signed by the applicant. 35.  On 2 March 2008, in the early morning, the applicant was transferred to police holding cells where, following a medical examination, a number of injuries were noted, including an open wound on the left side of his head and a bluish-red left eye. The applicant complained of pain in his legs. 36.  The applicant alleged that the medical examination had not been carried out properly and only the obvious injuries had been recorded for purely formal reasons. 37.  At 3.10 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a suspect by the investigator within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508 in the presence of his lawyer. Asked to provide his account of events, the applicant submitted that he had not committed any offence and had been participating in a peaceful demonstration at Freedom Square when, at around 6.30 a.m., thousands of police officers had started beating peaceful demonstrators with rubber batons without prior warning or orders to disperse. He and others had fled, but the police officers had pursued them armed with rubber batons. He had been followed for about 2 km. Being of an advanced age, he had not been able to continue running so he had sat in a random taxi. The police officers had blocked the taxi with a police car, taken him out and brutally beaten him, constantly repeating his name and swearing at the same time. He had then been taken to Kentron Police Station where he had again been beaten by the same police officers, after which they had left. The injuries on his body had been sustained in those circumstances. He had not, however, been ill-treated by any of the officers at the police station. He did not know the identity of those who had ill-treated him but would be able to identify them. The investigator then posed three questions: (a) whether the applicant had participated in any demonstrations held after the presidential election of 19 February 2008 and what his role had been in those demonstrations; (b) which of the demonstrators had had weapons and ammunition, the types of such weapons and the place where they had been hidden; and (c) who were the persons who had ordered the demonstrators, on 1 March 2008 at 7 a.m., to resist the police. The applicant admitted his participation in the demonstrations and marches, but added that he had stayed at Freedom Square around the clock only on 29 February. He had been up on the podium on multiple occasions, but the podium had been accessible to anyone. He had never seen the demonstrators with any weapons or ammunition. The demonstrations had been peaceful and accompanied with song and dance. Nobody had given any orders to resist the police. That would have been pointless anyway, since the police had entered the square covertly and started assaulting the demonstrators with rubber batons. 38.  On the same day, the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508. The investigator\u2019s decision stated that, during the events of 1 March 2008, a number of persons had been injured, including the applicant. It was therefore necessary to clarify the location, nature, sequence of infliction, age and severity of any injuries on the applicant\u2019s body and the method of their infliction. The decision was transmitted to a forensic medical expert on 6 March 2008. 39.  Between 7.30 and 9.30 p.m. the investigator questioned in turn police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A. in connection with the early morning events of 1 March 2008. Their statements, including the questions and answers, were verbatim reproductions with the following content:\n\u201cCertain police officers, over a loudspeaker, ordered those who had gathered at Freedom Square to terminate the unlawful and unauthorised demonstration and to leave. However, not only did they not leave but some of them incited disobedience to the orders of the police officers and to continue the demonstration. Since the event in question was unlawful and the police officers\u2019 orders to end it were not obeyed, the demonstrators, who were disobeying the police officers, assaulting them and making calls, were being brought in to police stations by [various police officers]. A number of demonstrators were assaulting us, police officers, with stones. In that crowd we were trying to calm the demonstrators who were showing overly active resistance and, besides assaulting [the police officers], were also inciting the crowd to continue their struggle against the police. While trying to restore order in the crowd, some of the police officers, including me, reached the area of Pushkin Street, because part of the aggressive crowd continued the above-mentioned violent actions against the police while running away. At that time, around 7 a.m., in the area of the intersection of Pushkin [Street] and Northern Avenue we noticed several persons who were demonstrating overly violent behaviour. I noticed that these persons were pulling, punching and kicking a group of outnumbered and, to me, unfamiliar police officers in police uniforms, as well as disobeying their lawful orders. Naturally we intervened and managed to transport three of the attackers to the police car, while the unfamiliar police officers continued to pursue other public-order offenders. When seated in the police car these three persons tried to free themselves again but ... eventually we managed ... to bring them in to Kentron Police Station, where they were identified as [D.A., M.A. and V.H.]. We filed relevant reports about what had happened, after which [the investigator] drew up records of bringing them in and subjecting them to personal search.\nI would like to add that, after the above-mentioned persons had been brought in, the street disorder was still continuing, so I went again to Freedom Square [together with my two colleagues] where we continued our lawful actions. Mass disorder was still continuing at Freedom Square and we were again pursuing the overly active demonstrators, who were running through Northern Avenue towards the [Yerevan] Press Building. While pursuing them, having reached Yerevan circus, I noticed one person who was showing resistance to police officers, punching and kicking them, after which he tried to sit in a random taxi car... However, we managed to capture him, during which a knife, two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys fell from his pockets. We picked up those objects and, together with the above-mentioned police officers, brought that person in to Kentron Police Station, where he was identified as [the applicant].\nQuestion: Did you sustain any injuries and, if yes, in which circumstances?\nAnswer: I did not sustain any injuries. While being brought in to the police station, they just pulled on [our uniforms], trying to free themselves.\nQuestion: Are you familiar with the police officers who were assaulted by the persons whom you brought in to the police station?\nAnswer: I was not familiar with them. They were wearing police uniforms. I cannot provide further information about them.\nQuestion: Did you notice any weapons or other objects on the persons whom you brought in to the police station when they assaulted you and other police officers?\nAnswer: I did not notice them having any such objects.\u201d 40.  On an unspecified date two more police officers, A.P. and M.G., were questioned. Police officer A.P. submitted that on 1 March 2008 he had been at Kentron Police Station when the applicant was brought in and a clasp knife found in his possession was presented. The applicant had not claimed that the knife did not belong to him. Police officer M.G., who was the driver of the police car that took the applicant to the police station, submitted that a knife had been discovered in the applicant\u2019s possession when he was being brought in. 41.  On 3 March 2008 the applicant was formally charged under Articles 225.1 \u00a7 2 and 316 \u00a7 2, as well as Articles 301 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 91, 94, 93 and 95 below), within the scope of criminal case no. 62202608, as follows:\n\u201c...from 20 February 2008 onwards [the applicant], together with Mr Ter\u2011Petrosyan and others, organised and conducted unlawful public events, mass demonstrations, 24-hour long rallies, assemblies, pickets and sit-ins disrupting the normal life, traffic, functioning of public and private institutions and peace and quiet of the population in Yerevan and involving calls for a violent overthrow of the government and public insults addressed at public officials connected with the performance of their official duties.\nThereafter, on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m., when [the police officers] demanded the participants in the demonstration at Freedom Square to give a possibility to verify the veracity of the information that they possessed arms and ammunition, and once again warned them to end the unlawful event, he and other demonstrators, disobeying the police officers\u2019 lawful orders, committed life- and health-threatening assault on [them].\u201d 42.  On 4 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed a complaint with the Chief of the Special Investigative Service, alleging that the applicant had been unjustifiably taken to Kentron Police Station under the so-called procedure of \u201cbringing-in\u201d, subjected to ill-treatment and then unlawfully kept there the whole day on 1 March 2008. The record of his \u201cbringing-in\u201d had never been presented to him. His 72-hour arrest permitted by law had already expired, in violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention, and it was still unclear on what evidence the charge against him was based. The lawyer also relied on Articles 3, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 43.  On the same day at 7 p.m. the applicant was brought before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan which examined the investigator\u2019s application seeking to have him detained. 44.  The applicant submitted before the court that he had been brutally beaten and humiliated in the street and had sustained numerous injuries. No police officer had approached him to ask about weapons or to say that the demonstration was unlawful and that the demonstrators were to disperse. The applicant submitted that he was not a member of any political party and had not organised any demonstrations, and the charges against him were politically motivated and lacked corpus delicti. As regards the charge of assault under Article 316 \u00a7 2 of the CC, a group of 20-25 persons, without presenting themselves as police officers or asking him to follow them to a police station, preemptively attacked him and beat him up in the street and, by doing so, created an appearance of resistance. Moreover, no actual police officer to whom he had put up the alleged resistance had been identified. Furthermore, his rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention had been violated because he was prosecuted for simply being one of the demonstrators. As regards the charge under Article 301 of the CC, this was not based on any evidence and it was not even stated what calls for a violent overthrow of the government he had allegedly made. 45.  The District Court decided to allow the investigator\u2019s application and order the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months. It first recapitulated the circumstances of the case as outlined in the charge against the applicant (see paragraph 41 above) and concluded that the application was substantiated, taking into account that there was sufficient evidence in the case to impose a preventive measure, and in view of the nature and dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that, if he remained at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, continue his criminal activities and evade criminal responsibility. 46.  On 5 March 2008 the applicant was transferred to Vardashen Remand Prison. At the time of admission a \u201crecord of physical injuries\u201d was drawn up, signed by the applicant, which indicated the following injuries on his body:\n\u201c...a bruise on the lower left eye socket, scratch wounds on the shins, a bruise measuring 10 x 12 cm on the external surface of the right shoulder blade and a scabbed wound measuring 2 x 3 cm on the rear part of the left temple. The indicated injuries, according to [the applicant], are four days old.\u201d 47.  The applicant alleged that this medical examination had not been carried out properly and not all the injuries had been recorded. 48.  On 10 March 2008 the forensic medical expert examined the applicant at the remand prison as ordered by the investigator\u2019s decision of 2 March 2008. The applicant reiterated before the expert the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 37 above). The relevant expert conclusion, which was produced on 3 April 2008, contained the following findings:\n\u201cA wound measuring 0.9 x 0.2 cm, covered with a grey crust and mobile when palpated, is detected on the left part of the back of the head; the surrounding skin, in the area measuring 2.3 x 1.7 cm, has changed colour to pale pink. There is a bruise on the left side of the outer part of the upper and lower eyelids and the cheek area of a non-dense nature and pale yellow-greenish colour. Both parts of the chest are symmetrical and are equally involved in the respiration process. There is a bruise measuring 6.3 x 2.8 cm of unclear contour, non-dense nature and pale greenish\u2011yellow colour on the right part of the chest on the same line as the rear of the armpit and at the level of the third and fourth ribs, which has also partly spread to the rear area of the shoulder line. It is not painful when palpated. There is a bruise measuring 1.8 x 1.5 cm on the front surface of the upper third part of the right leg of a pale greenish-blue colour. There are small scratches covered with grey scabs on the inner surface of the joint between the leg and the foot, which are raised compared to the surrounding unharmed skin.\n...\nConclusions. The injuries sustained by [the applicant, as described above,] were caused by blunt objects, possibly within the period indicated in the circumstances of the case, which both jointly and separately do not qualify as mild bodily injuries. Since the injuries were inflicted within a short period, it is impossible to determine the sequence of [their] infliction.\u201d 49.  The applicant alleged that the expert had not been impartial and independent and had not fully recorded all of his injuries. 50.  On the same date the applicant lodged an appeal against his detention order. He argued, inter alia, that the charge against him was unsubstantiated, lacked certainty and clarity, and was not based on sufficient evidence or any witness testimony. In violation of the guarantees of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention, an artificial ground had been created to justify his detention, that is resisting a public official, which had never happened. Furthermore, there were not sufficient grounds justifying his detention: he was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence, did not try to hide from the investigation or refuse to appear before the investigating authority. No real evidence of any attempt to obstruct the proceedings had been presented. If he were to remain at large, he could not engage in similar activities, given the state of emergency declared in the country. 51.  On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant\u2019s detention was based on a reasonable suspicion and the grounds relied on by the District Court in justification of detention were sufficient. 52.  On 28 March 2008 confrontations were held between the applicant and police officers E.R., H.S. and A.P. who reiterated their earlier statements (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above). The applicant refused to have a confrontation with police officer A.A., alleging that E.R., H.S. and A.A. were not the police officers who had apprehended him. 53.  On 25 April and 26 June 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant\u2019s detention, each time by two months, finding that it was still necessary to carry out a number of investigative measures and that, if he remained at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence and evade criminal responsibility. The applicant\u2019s request for bail was refused. 54.  In the meantime, on 2 May 2008, the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the Chief of Kentron Police Station, enquiring about the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained his injuries; whether they had been inflicted at the police station or prior to his arrival there and, if it was the latter, whether any record had been made in the police registers. 55.  On 3 June 2008 the applicant applied to the General Prosecutor requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted and an investigation be carried out into the fact of his ill-treatment. He submitted that the circumstances of his arrest involved an offence against him since he had been beaten and tortured. No assessment, however, had been given to that circumstance in the context of the criminal case against him. 56.  It appears that no reply was provided to the lawyer\u2019s above\u2011mentioned enquiry and no decision taken on the applicant\u2019s above\u2011mentioned application. 57.  On 18 June 2008 seven members of the Armenian parliament filed a request with the General Prosecutor, seeking to have the applicant\u2019s detention replaced with another preventive measure, namely their personal guarantee. They submitted at the outset that the detention of several hundred persons, including the applicant, following the presidential election was a disproportionate measure and was not based on reasonable suspicions. They further submitted that they personally knew the applicant and guaranteed that, if he remained at large, he would not abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence or evade his penalty, if any. The outcome of this request is unclear. 58.  On 28 June 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order of 26 June 2008, arguing that his continued detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion and that he was being persecuted for his political views. The courts provided no evidential or factual basis in support of the charges against him. The case against him was trumped up, with police officers being the only witnesses and with the identities of the allegedly injured police officers not being known, and the courts had extended his detention in order for the investigating authority to have sufficient time to fabricate charges. Moreover, the courts provided abstract and stereotyped reasons when extending his detention. 59.  On 15 July 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the same grounds as previously. 60.  On 12 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan under Article 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d). He sought to have the relevant police order, which served as a basis for the police operation of 1 March 2008, declared unlawful and unfounded and the ensuing police actions declared unlawful. He submitted that he had participated in the demonstrations held from 20 February 2008 onwards. The demonstrations had been held in compliance with the Constitution and Article 11 of the Convention and involved no criminal behaviour. In the morning of 1 March 2008 armed police forces had suddenly invaded Freedom Square and started beating peaceful demonstrators. The police attack had been unjustified and failed to meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Convention. The true purpose of the police operation, which was justified as an attempt to restore public order, was to launch political persecution of the supporters of Mr Ter\u2011Petrosyan, including himself, by provoking the demonstrators to engage in clashes, creating artificial charges of resistance to police and punishing them for exercising their right to freedom of assembly and for their political opinion. Thus, the exercise of his right to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly had been criminalised and he was facing unfounded and trumped-up charges as a result of unlawful police actions. Such interference was unlawful, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The applicant requested that the decisions to institute criminal proceedings and to bring charges against him be quashed and the proceedings be discontinued. 61.  On 8 July 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the complaint, finding that the relevant police order was not a decision or action prescribed by the CCP and therefore could not be contested under Article 290. As regards the applicant\u2019s request to quash the decisions in question and to discontinue the criminal proceedings, the District Court found that such requests could be lodged with a court only after they had been raised before a prosecutor, which the applicant had failed to do. 62.  On 21 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal in which he argued, inter alia, that the District Court had incorrectly interpreted Article 290 of the CCP. It had failed to make any assessment of the police actions and its conclusion that the police order did not fall within the scope of criminal procedure law had not been based on the circumstances of the case. The police actions had been unlawful and disproportionate and the force used against peaceful demonstrators had been excessive, while the decision to institute criminal proceedings was artificial by its nature. Thus, the police actions and the decision in question should have been found incompatible with the requirements of the CCP. 63.  On 19 August 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal found, relying on Article 290 of the CCP, that the contested police order, the decision to institute criminal proceedings, as well as ordering the investigating authority to discontinue the criminal proceedings, were beyond the scope of judicial control over the investigation. Besides, Article 290 presupposed judicial control over pre-trial proceedings and therefore applied only to the period after a decision to institute such proceedings was taken. 64.  On 3 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 65.  On 21 November 2008 the Court of Cassation refused to examine the appeal on the grounds that it had been lodged out of time and that no proof was attached to the appeal certifying that its copy had been served on the respondent party. 66.  On 28 July 2008 about twenty-five police officers, including police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., who had allegedly been assaulted during the events of 1-2 March 2008 and had provided a description of the alleged perpetrators, were invited to Vardashen Remand Prison to identify the applicant. It appears that the applicant refused to take part in the identification parade, stating that that investigative measure had no probative value. As a result, the parade did not take place and instead a photo identification of the applicant was carried out. It further appears that police officer A.Arsh. identified the applicant, from among the photographs shown to him, as the person who had assaulted him at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. by hitting him twice with a stick. Police officer A.Arsh. stated that he recognised the applicant by the general structure of his face, his wide forehead and his haircut and style. Police officer A.Aru. identified the applicant, through the same procedure, as the person who had assaulted police officer A.Arsh. at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. with a stick and later assaulted him on Arshakunyats Street. Police officer A.Aru. stated that he recognised the applicant by his facial features, the structure of his forehead and his hair. 67.  On 5 August 2008 the investigator decided to drop the charges against the applicant under Article 225.1 \u00a7 2, Article 301 and Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 91, 93 and 95 below). The investigator found that the charge under Article 225.1 \u00a7 2 of the CC had to be dropped since it had been established by the investigation that the order issued by the police officers to the demonstrators on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. at Freedom Square was not to disperse but to allow them to inspect the area. Thus, the applicant\u2019s actions did not contain elements of a crime prescribed by that Article. As regards the charge under Article 301 of the CC, it had to be dropped on the ground of insufficient evidence since the applicant\u2019s involvement in an attempt to seize State power could not be established. As regards the charge under Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the CC, it had to be dropped since that Article had been repealed in the meantime. 68.  The investigator further decided to supplement the charge under Article 316 \u00a7 2 of the CC with new charges under Article 235 \u00a7 4 and Article 316 \u00a7 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 92 and 94 below). It was stated that the applicant, having regularly participated in the unauthorised demonstrations held following the presidential election, had been present at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m., when some of the demonstrators, using makeshift clubs, rods and other dangerous objects, had assaulted the police officers after the latter had demanded to be allowed to verify the information concerning the possession of arms and ammunition by the demonstrators. The applicant had refused to comply with the lawful orders of the police officers, assaulted police officer A.Arsh., twice hitting him on the head with a stick and causing light damage to his health, after which he had disappeared in the crowd. Police officer A.Aru. had witnessed the act committed by the applicant but failed to bring him in. Thereafter, police officer A.Aru. had continued to perform his duties near the Yerevan Press Building situated on Arshakunyats Street, where he had once again noticed the applicant. He had tried to bring the applicant in but the applicant had resisted, pushed, pulled and kicked police officer A.Aru., thereby assaulting him in a way which did not pose a threat to his health, and tried to escape in a random taxi. Police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A., who were on duty in the same area, had witnessed all this and brought the applicant in to Kentron Police Station, at which time a weapon, namely a knife, was found in his possession. 69.  On the same date the investigator invited the applicant for questioning and a confrontation with police officer A.Arsh. The applicant refused to testify or to take part in the confrontation, stating that he did not trust the investigator and the investigative measures in question. His lawyer further stated that a confrontation with a police officer so many months after the event did not appear credible and was simply another attempt to create evidence against the applicant. 70.  On 6 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s case was disjoined from criminal case no. 62202608 into a separate criminal case, no. 62215008. 71.  On the same date the knife in question was examined by the investigator and its description was recorded. 72.  On 13 August 2008 the General Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment under Articles 235 \u00a7 4 and 316 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CC. It contained an identical statement of facts to that in the charge against the applicant (see paragraph 68 above) and relied on the following evidence:\n(a)  the statements of police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. made in their capacity as victims (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above);\n(b)  the records of the applicant\u2019s photo identification by police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. (see paragraph 66 above);\n(c)  the statements of police officers H.S., E.R., A.A., A.P. and M.G. made in their capacity as witnesses (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above);\n(d)  the submissions of the police officers made during the confrontations with the applicant (see paragraph 52 above);\n(e)  two expert conclusions: one regarding the injury sustained by police officer A.Arsh. and the other classifying the knife in question as a \u201cbladed weapon\u201d; as well as the record of inspection of the knife (see paragraphs 18, 31 and 71 above);\n(f)  the letter of 27 March 2008 of the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police (see paragraph 22 above);\n(g)  the records of inspection of the scene and the relevant expert conclusions (see paragraph 14 above). 73.  It was lastly stated in the indictment that injuries had been discovered on the applicant, which did not qualify even as light injuries and which had been caused during the clash between the police officers and \u201cthe persons assaulting them\u201d. It was stated that the investigation in that respect was still pending. 74.  On 13 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s case was sent to the Yerevan Criminal Court for trial. In the course of the proceedings, the Criminal Court summoned and heard police officers A.Arsh., A.Aru., H.S., E.R., A.A., A.P. and M.G. 75.  Police officer A.Arsh. submitted that on 1 March 2008, when the police asked the demonstrators gathered at Freedom Square to allow them to carry out an inspection for weapons, the demonstrators had reacted violently. They had tried to calm them down but the applicant had attacked him and hit him twice on the head with a stick, after which he had fled. 76.  Police officer A.Aru. submitted that he had seen one of the demonstrators, namely the applicant, attack police officer A.Arsh. and hit him on the head with a stick. He had thereafter continued to perform his duty in the area of Arshakunyats Street, where he had noticed the applicant. He had asked the applicant to go with him to a police station, but the applicant had hit him several times on the chest, kicked his shield and fled. 77.  Police officer H.S. submitted that in the morning of 1 March 2008 the applicant had assaulted police officers on Arshakunyats Street near the Yerevan Press Building, by hitting and pulling them. He and police officers E.R. and A.A. had brought the applicant in in a patrol car, and a knife, mobile telephones and a bunch of keys had fallen from his pockets. 78.  Police officer E.R. submitted that, when performing his duty on Arshakunyats street in the morning of 1 March 2008, he had seen an individual punching and kicking police officers. That person had tried to flee but he and police officers H.S. and A.A. had brought him in, whereupon he had been identified as the applicant. A knife, a mobile telephone and a bunch of keys had been found in his possession. 79.  Police officer A.A. made similar submissions but stated that two mobile telephones had fallen from the applicant\u2019s pockets. He also specified that this had happened at 7.30 a.m. 80.  Police officers A.P. and M.G. reiterated their earlier statements (see paragraph 40 above). 81.  The applicant denied his guilt and submitted, inter alia, that, even if he had participated in the demonstrations held from 20 February 2008, he had done nothing illegal. He and his co-thinkers who were at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 had found out about the forthcoming arrival of the police several hours in advance. After the police had arrived, he had not hit anyone and had tried to escape. Having reached Arshakunyats Street, he had been brutally beaten by police officers and transported to Kentron Police Station where he had also been beaten. He had never carried a knife, therefore, no such object had ever been found in his possession. The applicant further contested the allegation that he had assaulted police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. He claimed that this could not have happened at around 7.15 a.m. and 7.30 a.m. as alleged by the prosecution, because the police operation had happened at around 6 a.m. as opposed to 7 a.m.. At 6.30 a.m. he had been at the police station already and by 6.45 a.m. there had been nobody at Freedom Square apart from the police. Besides, according to the relevant medical expert conclusion, police officer A.Arsh. had sustained his injury at some point between 1 and 3 March 2008. This cast doubts on the claim that the injury in question had been sustained specifically on the morning of 1 March 2008, especially in view of the fact that police officer A.Arsh. had participated in clashes on both 1 and 2 March 2008. 82.  To clarify the above circumstances, the applicant lodged requests with the court, seeking to have a number of persons called and examined as witnesses, including A.M., D.A., M.A., V.H., H.B., N.T., S.M., S.A. and H.T. He argued that the testimony of A.M., D.A., M.A., V.H. and H.B., who were also active demonstrators, would support his allegation that the actions of the police had been unlawful from the very outset, that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. he and they had been attacked by the police and other forces without prior warning and had been forcibly brought in, and that at 7 a.m. he had already been at the police station and could therefore not have been at Freedom Square. These demonstrators had similarly been brought to Kentron Police Station at around 6.30-7.00 a.m. and they were also able to confirm that he had continued to be ill-treated there upon his arrival. The applicant further argued that N.T. and S.M., who were also opposition activists, had been by his side at Freedom Square when the demonstrators had been attacked by the police and their testimony would clarify a number of circumstances related to the charge against him, including his allegation that as early as at 6.45 a.m. there had been nobody at Freedom Square apart from the police, and that the imputed offence could not have happened in the alleged circumstances. The applicant lastly argued that testimony from S.A. and H.T., who were high-ranking police officials and had apparently given orders for the police operation, was important in order to assess the police actions of the morning of 1 March 2008. The prosecuting authority had failed to investigate the lawfulness of the police actions, including the excessive force used by the police that morning. However, only if these circumstances were investigated would it be possible to assess the charge against him. In this connection, it was also necessary to call and examine other PGS officers who had taken part in the police operation of the morning of 1 March 2008. They would also be able to clarify whether police officer A.Arsh., whose involvement in that operation was debatable, had actually participated in it. 83.  The Yerevan Criminal Court decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s requests. It found that N.T. had already been questioned by the investigator during the investigation and it was sufficient to read out his statement in court. S.M., who was separately also standing trial, had in general refused to give testimony during the investigation. As regards V.H., D.A. and M.A., the argument that they were able to confirm the fact that at 6.30 a.m. the applicant had already been at the police station, was not a sufficient reason to call and examine them in court. Lastly, as regards S.A., H.T. and the unnamed PGS officers, it had been explained to the defence that the police actions could be contested before the courts through a different procedure. In such circumstances, the necessity of calling and examining those police officers was not well-founded. 84.  On 23 October 2008 the Yerevan Criminal Court found the applicant guilty under Article 235 \u00a7 4 and Article 316 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CC. The court sentenced him under Article 235 \u00a7 4 to a fine in the amount of 400,000 Armenian drams (AMD), under Article 316 \u00a7 1 to a fine in the amount of AMD 500,000 and under Article 316 \u00a7 2 to five years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so, the Criminal Court found it to be established that:\n\u201cIn the period preceding 1 March 2008 intelligence information was received by the Armenian Police and the National Security Service that the demonstrators gathered at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square had in their possession firearms, ammunition, clubs, rods and other objects for the purpose of causing physical injuries and violence. On 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. police officers demanded the persons gathered at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square to allow them to verify the above information by inspecting the area. The mentioned lawful demand of the police was announced out loud several times. Some of the people gathered at Freedom Square, including [the applicant], had already been informed several hours in advance about the planned police operation. The police officers of the Patrol Guard Service brigade of the Armenian Police, with the aim of preserving public order in that area, approached Freedom Square where [the applicant], in front of the statue of Hovhannes Tumanyan, hit the victim, [police officer A.Arsh.], twice on the head with a stick, causing light damage to his health accompanied by a brief deterioration of health, after which he disappeared in the crowd. [Police officer A.Aru., the second victim,] saw the act committed by [the applicant]. [Police officer A.Aru.] continued his duty in the area near the [Yerevan Press Building] situated at Arshakunyats Street, where he once again noticed [the applicant] and tried to bring him in. [The applicant], disobeying [police officer A.Aru.\u2019s] lawful order to appear at the police station, assaulted [him] in a non-health-threatening way by pushing, pulling and kicking [him], and tried to escape in a random taxi. [Police officers A.A., E.R. and H.S.], who were on duty at that time in the same area, noticed the incident and brought [the applicant] in to Kentron Police Station, during which a bladed weapon \u2013 a knife \u2013 fell from [the applicant\u2019s] pocket, as well as two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys.\nOn 1 March 2008 at 9 p.m. [the applicant] was arrested and on 4 March 2008 he was detained.\u201d 85.  In establishing the above findings, the Yerevan Criminal Court relied on the same evidence on which the indictment was based, plus the statements of the police officers made in court (see paragraphs 72 and 75-80 above). It found the applicant\u2019s submissions to be unreliable and an attempt to avoid criminal responsibility. 86.  On 10 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal in which he argued, inter alia, that the charge against him was trumped-up and politically motivated; that he had been ill-treated both at the time of his apprehension and at the police station and that no investigation had been carried out into his allegations of ill-treatment; that the interference with his freedom of peaceful assembly had been unlawful, unjustified and accompanied with use of excessive force by the police; that the only witnesses in the case were police officers who, being interested in the outcome of the case because of the brutal and unlawful force used against the demonstrators, including his ill-treatment, were not impartial and trustworthy witnesses and had made contradictory statements which were then coordinated towards the end of the investigation and which constituted the sole basis for his conviction; and that the principle of equality of arms had not been respected since his request to call and examine witnesses on his behalf had been groundlessly dismissed. Thus, the entire case was based on police testimony, while he was not allowed to defend himself effectively and to summon any impartial witnesses, including those who were by his side on the morning of 1 March 2008. The applicant contested the reliability of the evidence provided by police officers H.S., E.R. and A.A., pointing, inter alia, to the fact that their statements made in court differed, while those made during the investigation had been identical in wording. Moreover, it appeared from their statements that they had been arresting different demonstrators from different locations, all at the same time, which cast doubt on the veracity of their statements. As regards the statements of police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., they concerned events which had taken place in a chaotic situation early in the morning when it was still dark, which cast doubt on the reliability of that evidence. The police officers had effectively refused to answer any questions in court, limiting their answers to either \u201cI do not remember\u201d or \u201cI do not know\u201d. The trial court had failed to make any assessment of the police actions at Freedom Square, including their lawfulness and proportionality, without which the charge against him could not receive a fair determination. What had happened in reality was that the police officers had initiated an unlawful clash with the demonstrators and then rounded up all the activists, many of whom had also been subjected to ill-treatment. The alleged inspection of the scene had been simply a pretext to conceal the police officers\u2019 real intention, which had been to disperse the peaceful demonstration. The applicant alleged that he had been known to the authorities and was persecuted for being a supporter of Mr Ter-Petrosyan and because of a critical speech he had made on the first day of the demonstrations. He had initially been charged with resisting unidentified police officers, until about five months later when a new charge had emerged of him assaulting another police officer in a different location, namely at Freedom Square. Moreover, there were multiple contradictions regarding the time of his apprehension, which in later police statements was alleged to have happened at around 7.30-8 a.m. This was, however, an attempt by the prosecution to link him to the assault on police officer A.Arsh. which, according to the final official version, had taken place at around 7.15 a.m. However, it was a well-established fact that the police operation of 1 March 2008 had taken place at around 6 a.m. and, moreover, according to the relevant record, at around 6.30 a.m. he had already been at Kentron Police Station. The applicant also argued that, if he was suspected of assaulting police officer A.Arsh. on 1 March 2008, he should have been presented for identification as early as on 2 March 2008. Instead, photo identification was performed only about five months later. The evidence regarding the knife was not credible and he had never even been questioned in that connection. The applicant relied on, inter alia, Articles 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 87.  On 10 December 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s appeal through an expedited procedure and decided on the same day to dismiss it, relying on the same evidence as the Yerevan Criminal Court. In doing so, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that his conviction was based solely on the statements of police officers who were not impartial witnesses, finding that the fact that the victims and witnesses in the case were police officers did not diminish the probative value of their statements and it was unacceptable to view this as a predetermining or prejudicial circumstance. Furthermore, the criminal case was based also on a number of expert conclusions, the records of inspection of the scene and the records of the applicant\u2019s photo identification. As regards the applicant\u2019s claim that his allegations of ill-treatment had not been investigated, the Court of Appeal stated that, according to a decision of the investigating authority, it was still necessary to carry out a comprehensive investigation \u2013 within the scope of criminal case no. 62202608 \u2013 into the circumstances under which injuries had been sustained by persons, including the applicant, who had participated in the mass disorder of 1-2 March 2008. Since the investigation into the applicant\u2019s criminal case had been completed, his case was disjoined from criminal case no. 62202608, while the latter was still pending. 88.  On 27 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those in his appeal of 10 November 2008 and relying on, inter alia, Articles 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 89.  On 10 March 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. 90.  At the end of November 2010 the applicant was released from prison after having served more than half of his sentence.", "references": ["6", "8", "5", "0", "9", "4", "No Label", "7", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yerevan. 7.  The applicant is an ethnic Armenian who was born and raised in Iran and who subsequently went to live in Armenia. 8.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The subsequent protest rallies were eventually terminated on 1 March 2008 following intervention by the police, which resulted in clashes between protesters and law-enforcement officers and numerous arrests. 9.  On 1 March 2008 the applicant, who was apparently near the main rally location around the time of the police intervention, was taken to a police station on suspicion of assaulting a police officer. It appears that when asked for his identity at the police station, the applicant introduced himself as Vardges Gasparyan. 10.  In the applicant\u2019s arrest record drawn up on 2 March 2008 his name was indicated as both Vartgez Gaspari and Vardges Gasparyan. 11.  In a note dated 3 March 2008 the investigator stated that the applicant\u2019s wife had presented his passport and that the information provided by the applicant about his identity did not correspond to the information contained in his passport. 12.  On 5 March 2008 the applicant was formally charged and brought before the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan. The court examined an application lodged by the investigator for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months on the grounds that, if he remained at large, he could abscond, obstruct the course of justice, commit another offence and evade criminal responsibility. 13.  The applicant submitted before the District Court that the application was unsubstantiated. He had a higher education, was married, was head of a company, had a minor child dependent on him and had no previous convictions. The imputed acts fell into the category of offences of medium gravity and it had not been substantiated that if he remained at large, he would evade criminal responsibility. 14.  The District Court decided to allow the investigator\u2019s application, taking into account the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence and influence witnesses. 15.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence suggesting that if he remained at large, he would abscond, obstruct the course of justice, unlawfully influence witnesses, commit another offence or evade criminal responsibility. He was a respected and trusted person in the society, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and a minor child dependent on him, and had always respected the law. 16.  On 20 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The Court of Appeal stated that it followed from the case file that after having been brought to the police station, the applicant had introduced himself as Vardges Gasparyan instead of Vartgez Gaspari, thereby providing false information about his identity. His real name was discovered only after his passport had been presented. This provided sufficient grounds to believe that if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond, falsify or conceal evidence and obstruct the investigation by failing to appear when summoned by the authority conducting the criminal proceedings. 17.  On 23 April 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to set the case down for trial and to keep the applicant in detention. 18.  On 14 May, 17 June, 17 July and 5 August 2008 the applicant applied to the District Court for his release. 19.  The District Court dismissed the applications of 14 May and 17 June, finding that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention still persisted. It adjourned the examination of the applications of 17 July and 5 August until circumstances necessary for a decision to be taken had been clarified. 20.  At the hearing of 23 September 2008, the applicant once again urged the court to release him and asked it to reason its decision. The presiding judge refused to take a decision, stating that it had already been decided on 17 July to adjourn that question. It appears that an argument erupted between, on the one hand, the applicant and his lawyer, who insisted that the judge take a decision on the applicant\u2019s request or otherwise withdraw from the case, and on the other hand, the judge and the prosecutor, who objected to the demand that the judge withdraw. The applicant then wanted to leave the courtroom in protest against the allegedly unlawful actions of the judge. The judge decided to penalise the applicant by removing him from the courtroom on the grounds that he was obstructing the normal course of the hearing, abusing his procedural rights and disrespectfully refusing to follow the judge\u2019s orders. The hearing was adjourned until 29 September 2008. 21.  At the hearing of 29 September 2008, the presiding judge refused to grant the applicant\u2019s lawyer permission to lodge an application for release. Thereafter the applicant declared that he wished to lodge a challenge to the judge. In response, the judge decided once again to penalise the applicant on the same grounds as previously, by removing him from the courtroom and adjourning the hearing until 3 October 2008. 22.  On 22 October 2008 the applicant lodged another application, seeking to be released on bail. It appears that no decision was taken on that application. 23.  On 10 November 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment. The beginning of his sentence was to be calculated from 2 March 2008. The periods from 23 to 29 September and from 29 September to 3 October 2008, during which the court hearings were adjourned because of the applicant\u2019s removal from the courtroom, were not to be calculated as part of his sentence, pursuant to Article 314.1 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 24.  On 27 February 2009 the Criminal Court of Appeal, taking into account that Article 314.1 \u00a7 6 of the CCP had been amended in the meantime (see paragraph 35 below) and as a consequence the periods during which the trial court hearings had been adjourned were to be calculated as part of the applicant\u2019s sentence, decided to release him on the grounds that he had already served his one-year sentence. 25.  Between 6 March and 23 December 2008 the applicant was kept at Nubarashen Remand Prison. 26.  From 6 to 7 March 2008 the applicant was held in cell no. 9, which measured about 20 by 25 sq. m and accommodated seven to eight inmates. The cell was located in a semi-basement and was very damp and unsanitary. The air was stale, as the only source of ventilation was a window measuring one square metre and facing a pit filled with several centimetres of rubbish and frequented by rats. In the evening the toilet situated in the corner of the cell became clogged and sewage from the upper floors flooded the entire cell floor. The inmates\u2019 appeals to the prison guards produced no results and they were allowed only to direct the flood towards the corridor. The applicant addressed a letter to the head of the remand prison, complaining about the unsanitary conditions in the cell and, in particular, the flooding, and requested that measures be taken. 27.  At noon on 7 March the applicant was transferred to cell no. 29, which measured about 20 by 25 sq. m and accommodated about ten inmates. While in that cell, the applicant declared a hunger strike in protest against alleged human-rights violations in Armenia. 28.  At around 2 p.m. on the same date the applicant was transferred to cell no. 4, where he was kept until 14 March 2008. He shared the cell with another hunger striker. The cell measured about 20 sq. m and was again situated in the detention facility\u2019s semi-basement. The conditions were allegedly unsanitary, the air was damp and it stank of sewage. The only window to the basement cell, measuring 1 sq. m, had a pit in front of it which prevented natural light from entering the cell. No out-of-cell activities were allowed. 29.  From 14 to 20 March 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 79, which measured 20 sq. m. The cell was relatively calm and ventilated. 30.  From 20 March to 15 April 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 20, which measured about 20 sq. m and accommodated ten to twelve inmates. Almost all of his cell-mates smoked. Being a non-smoker, he felt asphyxiated and his eyes watered continuously. The television was switched on twenty-four hours a day, which disrupted his sleep. On 15 April 2008 the toilet became clogged and the cell floor flooded with sewage from the upper floors. The applicant complained and was transferred to cell no. 42 on the next floor. 31.  From 15 April to 4 September 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 42, which measured about 25 sq. m and accommodated up to fourteen inmates. The cell had only eight beds, so the inmates had to sleep in turns. There was a serious lack of fresh air, since almost all of his cell-mates smoked. The sanitary conditions were relatively satisfactory. 32.  From 4 September to 23 December 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 10, which measured about 12 sq. m and accommodated three to four inmates.", "references": ["9", "5", "4", "7", "8", "0", "6", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and is detained in Gorodyshche in the Rivne region. 6.  In the late hours of 11 July 2010 the applicant broke a window in the home of Mr and Mrs Ma. (\u201cthe victims\u201d) and threw a jar of petrol with a burning fuse into the room where Mrs Ma. was sleeping. As a result, she was seriously burned. 7.  On 19 July 2010 the applicant was arrested. 8.  According to the applicant, following his arrest, from 19 to 22 July 2010 police officers ill-treated him in order to force him to confess to attempted murder of the victims. In particular, he alleged that the police officers hit him, put a plastic bag over his head cutting off his air supply, and subjected him to electric shocks. He also alleged that during that period he had been kept without food and water, tightly handcuffed and had not been allowed to use the toilet. 9.  On 21 July 2010 the applicant gave a statement to the police confessing that he had thrown a firebomb into the window of the victims\u2019 house because he believed that a person with whom he had had a conflict, Mr Ma., lived there. 10.  On 22 July 2010 an arrest report was drawn up documenting the applicant\u2019s arrest on suspicion of attempted murder. O., a legal aid lawyer, was appointed for the applicant. The applicant signed a document that explained his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before his first questioning. 11.  Later on the same day the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of lawyer O. He repeated his confession in essentially the same terms. The investigator asked him how he had chosen the window into which to throw his firebomb. He responded that he had chosen the window which had been lit up by light from a computer, indicating that people were living there. At the close of the interview the lawyer asked the applicant whether he was making his statements of his own free will and the applicant responded in the affirmative. 12.  On 24 July 2010 the applicant refused the services of lawyer O. and asked that S. be admitted as his lawyer instead. The investigator admitted S. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer on the same day. 13.  On 26 July 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked that the applicant be directed to a forensic medical expert to determine whether he had any injuries and, if so, how they had been inflicted. 14.  A report drawn up by a forensic medical expert dated 29 July 2010 stated that, other than bruises on the wrists, which could be explained by handcuffing, the applicant had a hematoma on his back, and red spots on the back of his thighs. The applicant explained the injuries by saying that he had been ill-treated at the police station after his arrest on 19 July 2010: officers had hit him on the torso and back, twisted his arms, put a plastic bag over his head cutting off his air supply, and, using an electroshock device, subjected him to electric shocks on the back and legs. The expert believed that the spots were the result of the healing of bruises which could have been inflicted either by blunt objects or by electric shocks and that all the documented injuries could have been inflicted at the time indicated by the applicant. 15.  On 29 July 2010 the applicant was charged with attempted murder and the investigator attempted to question him. He refused to give evidence. 16.  On 3 September 2010 the applicant stated, in an interview, that he had intended to set fire to what he thought to be an empty summer cottage, without endangering anyone\u2019s life. 17.  On 19 October 2010 the investigator attempted to question the applicant in the presence of his lawyer concerning the origin of his injuries revealed by the forensic medical investigation. He refused to give evidence and stated that he would testify on that point in the course of the trial. 18.  Also on 19 October 2010 the investigator, having noted the results of the forensic medical examination, stated that if the applicant\u2019s statements to the expert were confirmed, they would indicate that official misconduct had been committed. Accordingly, he forwarded the results of the examination to the Slovyansk prosecutor, requesting that he conduct an investigation. The prosecutor questioned several police officers, who denied any ill\u2011treatment. Two officers stated that the applicant had been arrested on 19 July 2010 but had refused to follow the arresting officers to the police station, so he had been handcuffed. He had then been released and had come back to the station voluntarily when summoned on 22 July 2010. 19.  On 3 November 2010 an investigator of the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in connection with the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. He referred to the officers\u2019 statements and the applicant\u2019s refusal to give evidence on that point, and stated that the applicant had been handcuffed lawfully and there was no proof that his injuries had been inflicted by the police. 20.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation against the applicant witness Mi. was questioned. He testified that on the night of the crime he had taken the applicant to the vicinity of the victims\u2019 house in his car. The applicant had had in his bag a jar of petrol, which he had equipped with a fuse in Mi.\u2019s presence. He had then gone in the direction of the victims\u2019 house and had quickly returned. 21.  On 21 October 2010, on completion of the investigation, the applicant and his lawyer studied the file and stated that they had no statements or requests to make. 22.  The bill of indictment submitted to the trial court stated, in particular, that although the applicant had pleaded not guilty to the charges, his guilt was corroborated by the evidence, including his own statement made at the early stages of the investigation. 23.  At his trial, the applicant testified that he had intended to set on fire what he thought to be an empty summer cottage, without endangering the victims\u2019 lives. Witness Mi. testified that on the night of the crime he had taken the applicant to the victims\u2019 house in his car and that the applicant had had a bag with him. However, contrary to his statement made during the pre-trial investigation, Mi. testified at trial that he had not seen the bag\u2019s contents. He stated that the applicant had gone in the direction of the victims\u2019 house and had quickly returned. When asked about the contradiction in his statements made during the pre-trial investigation and during the trial, Mi. said that he had been subjected to \u201cpsychological and physical influence\u201d by the police during the pre-trial investigation. 24.  On 23 February 2012 the Slovyansk Court convicted the applicant of attempted murder, intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm and arson which had had grievous consequences. It sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In convicting the applicant the court relied, in particular, on the applicant\u2019s statements made during the pre-trial investigation, which the trial court interpreted to mean that the applicant had realised that the house he had set on fire had been the victims\u2019 home and that they might have been inside at the time, in particular the applicant\u2019s statement to the effect that he had seen lights on in the house. The trial court also relied on Mi.\u2019s statements made during the pre-trial investigation, finding them more credible than his testimony during the trial, in particular because they had been repeated in the course of confrontations with the applicant. His allegations of pressure had been verified by the prosecutor\u2019s office but no proof had been found to corroborate them. 25.  The applicant appealed, arguing, primarily, that he had not intended to murder the victims and had set their house on fire only after attempting to verify that there had been nobody inside. He insisted that he had been ill\u2011treated in order to extract his confession. 26.  On 29 May 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) requested the Slovyansk prosecutor to investigate the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations. 27.  On 5 June 2012 the Slovyansk prosecutor quashed the investigator\u2019s decision of 3 November 2010 and conducted a new round of pre\u2011investigation enquiries. In the course of the enquiries the prosecutor\u2019s office took statements from the applicant, the police officers, lawyer O. and the medical expert who had issued the report of 29 July 2010, and examined the premises of the police station where the alleged ill-treatment had taken place and its entry records. 28.  Police officers stated that the applicant had been arrested and handcuffed on 19 July 2012 but had then been released and invited back for a new interview on either 21 or 22 July 2010. Officer F. stated that he could not explain the discrepancy between the date of the applicant\u2019s initial confession, 21 July 2010, and the date of his official arrest, 22 July 2010, insisting that the applicant had been handed over to the investigator, who had put him under arrest immediately following his confession. 29.  The record of the interview with the medical expert is one page long. Two questions were put to the expert. First, he was asked on what grounds he had concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused by electric shocks. The expert responded that his conclusion had been based on the applicant\u2019s statements and the results of the examination. Secondly, he was asked whether the injuries noted in the report could have been inflicted by different blunt objects and under different circumstances. The expert responded that they could. 30.  Lawyer O. stated that the applicant had not complained to him of any ill-treatment. 31.  On 15 July 2012 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. By way of reasoning, the prosecutor stated, in particular, that the records of the police station where the applicant had allegedly been ill\u2011treated did not show that he had entered the station during the relevant period. The prosecutor referred to the police officers\u2019, lawyer O.\u2019s and the expert\u2019s statements. The prosecutor considered that the applicant\u2019s account of ill-treatment was not consistent with his injuries. 32.  On 12 July 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It also noted that according to the findings of the prosecutor\u2019s office, the applicant had been handcuffed on 19 July 2010 and there was no evidence that he had been released afterwards. In view of those findings, the Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been kept in detention from 19 to 22 July 2010 were credible and that that period of detention was to be deducted from his sentence. However, the Court of Appeal did not establish any causal link between that irregular detention and his confession. The Court of Appeal also held that the trial court had not erred in admitting the applicant\u2019s statement given during the pre-trial investigation, since the applicant\u2019s rights had been explained to him prior to questioning, a lawyer had been present and the applicant had not told him of any ill-treatment. 33.  The applicant appealed on points of law, raising the same arguments as those raised before the Court of Appeal and also arguing that the discrepancies between his statements made during the pre-trial investigation and the testimony given during the trial were due to the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected. 34.  On 19 March 2013 the High Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the judgment of the trial court and the ruling of the Court of Appeal.", "references": ["0", "5", "6", "2", "7", "8", "4", "9", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 12 and 13 April 2005 the applicant distributed leaflets in the vicinity of the medical practice of Dr St., who performed abortions there. The leaflets stated, inter alia, that the abortions performed by Dr St. in his practice, for which he gave the address, were unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition the leaflet contained the following statements:\n\u201cAccording to international criminal law: Aggravated murder is the intentional \u2018bringing-to-death\u2019 of an innocent human being!\u201d (Sinngem\u04d3\u03b2 aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vors\u04d3tzliche \u201cZu-Tode-Bringen\u201d eines unschuldigen Menschen!)\n\u201cThe murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability.\u201d (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) 7.  The applicant also addressed passers-by and the physician\u2019s presumed patients and attempted to engage with them in conversations about abortion. 8.  Dr St. lodged an application for a civil injunction against the applicant and on 25 October 2005 the Mannheim Regional Court granted the requested injunction. The court ordered the applicant to desist from speaking to passers-by in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice and labelling the abortions performed by the plaintiff unlawful with the objective of irritating female patients and preventing them from visiting Dr St.\u2019s practice. 9.  On 24 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the decision and slightly modified the wording specifying the geographical area concerned by the injunction. It also refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 10.  The Regional Court as well as the Court of Appeal both referred to a previous decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which it had confirmed a civil injunction against similar conduct by the applicant (see paragraph 13 below). The courts held that in the case at issue there were no factual or legal differences justifying deviating from the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. In so far that the doctor in the present case was slightly more well-known than the doctor in the original case, the Court of Appeal held that this was of minor relevance. The fact that Dr St. had appeared as an expert before the German Parliament many years previously did not have any substantial effects on Dr St\u2019s public profile at that time. Moreover, the involvement of Dr St. in different legal disputes was irrelevant, as trying to enforce his rights in the appropriate legal procedure could not redound to Dr St.\u2019s disadvantage. In sum, the applicant had vilified the non\u2011criminal professional activities of Dr St. by implying that he committed criminal acts and interfered with the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, which deserved special protection against the interventions of others. The applicant had therefore severely interfered with Dr St.\u2019s personality rights. This interference was not justified by the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression in view of the massive \u201cpillory effect\u201d the applicant had created by singling out the plaintiff and criticising him in a harsh way in the immediate vicinity of his practice. 11.  On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. On 20 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant\u2019s complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1670/07).", "references": ["2", "8", "5", "0", "3", "1", "9", "7", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6.  On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read \u201cthen: Holocaust\u201d. Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: \u201cAbortion \u2013 the new Holocaust?\u201d on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called \u201cLife or death?\u201d. Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline \u201cPrayer requests for Germany\u201d. From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors.\nAt the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text \u201cGerman contemporary history in brief\u201d, a sentence read:\n\u201cPerverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers\u201d (Pervertierte \u00c4rzte ermorden im Auftrag der M\u00fctter die ungeborenen Kinder)\nOn the same page, clicking on the button \u201cclose page\u201d forwarded the user to a page where it was stated:\n\u201cPray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing\u201d (Beten Sie \u2013 wenn m\u00f6glich regelm\u00e4\u00dfig \u2013 f\u00fcr die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungst\u00f6tung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original).\nSomewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications:\n\u201c... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother\u2019s womb.\u201d (... erm\u00f6glichen und beg\u00fcnstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterscho\u03b2.) 7.  One of the doctors listed on the applicant\u2019s website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8.  On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.\u2019s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website\u2019s content was covered by the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor\u2019s name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable \u201cpillory effect\u201d. 9.  Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and \u2013 during the appeal proceedings \u2013\nmodified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., \u201caggravated murder\u201d. 10.  On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant\u2019s website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted \u201caggravated murder\u201d. While the term \u201caggravated murder\u201d did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term \u201caggravated murder\u201d in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11.  On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12.  On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "3", "9", "0", "No Label", "6", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["6", "1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born on 6 July 1948 and lives in Kyiv. 11.  The applicant\u2019s judicial career started in 1976, when he was first elected to the post of judge of a district court. During his judicial career the applicant held the position of president in several courts. 12.  On 22 December 2005 the applicant was elected to the post of judge of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal by the Ukrainian Parliament. 13.  On 10 November 2006 the applicant was appointed, by the President of Ukraine, as acting president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. On 6 February 2009 he was appointed president of that court by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (a body of judicial self-governance). He was appointed for a five-year term, it being understood that he would reach the retirement age in July 2013, before the end of that term. 14.  In February 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges (another body of judicial self-governance) decided, among other issues, to review the functioning of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. The review was carried out in February and March 2011 and concerned the years 2009 and 2010, as well as the period between January and February 2011. 15.  On 24 May 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges, chaired by Judge K., made a submission to the High Council of Justice (\u201cthe HCJ\u201d) proposing the applicant\u2019s dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal for failure to perform his administrative duties properly. The proposal was based on the results of the aforementioned review. 16.  The HCJ scheduled hearings on 30 and 31 May 2011 and the applicant was invited to attend them. However, in view of information received from the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal on 27 May 2011 that the applicant was on annual leave until 8 July 2011, the HCJ adjourned the examination of the case. It sent the applicant a summons for the next hearing, which was scheduled on 14 June 2011. In reply, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal informed the HCJ once again that the applicant was on holiday until 8 July 2011. 17.  On 14 June 2011 the HCJ examined the case in the applicant\u2019s absence and decided to dismiss him from the post of president of the court, relying on section 20 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and section 32-1 of the High Council of Justice Act. The HCJ noted that \u201csignificant shortcomings, omissions and errors, and grave violations of the foundations of the organisation and administration of justice set forth by law [had] been found in the organisation of the work of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal\u201d. It stated that \u201cthe improper organisation of the court\u2019s work was the result of the failure by the president of the court, Mr A. Denisov, to comply with the provisions of the applicable laws concerning the fulfilment of his administrative duties\u201d. It also found that \u201cadministrative documents issued by Mr A. Denisov regarding the distribution of duties between the vice-presidents of the court, the setting-up of court chambers and panels and the distribution of cases among judges, as well as personnel-related and other documents in certain cases, [violated] the provisions of [the domestic legislation]\u201d. It lastly stated that the applicant\u2019s failures as president of the court involved a \u201clack of proper planning, control and effective use of human resources\u201d. 18.  The decision was voted on by the HCJ, whose members present on that occasion included Judge K., the Prosecutor General and other judicial and non-judicial members. Out of the eighteen members present, eight were judges. Fourteen votes were cast in favour of the applicant\u2019s dismissal. 19.  According to the applicant, the composition of the HCJ in his case included two members who on earlier occasions had initiated proceedings for his dismissal from the post of judge for an alleged \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the President of the HCJ and another member of the HCJ had previously communicated with him, attempting \u2013 albeit without success \u2013 to influence him in the course of his professional activities. 20.  On 17 June 2011 the President of the HCJ asked the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal to ensure that the HCJ\u2019s decision on the applicant\u2019s dismissal was executed and that information about its execution was provided to the HCJ immediately. On 23 June 2011 the applicant was dismissed from his administrative position, remaining in office as a judge of the same court. 21.  The applicant challenged the decision of the HCJ before the Higher Administrative Court (\u201cthe HAC\u201d), arguing that the decision on his dismissal was unlawful and unfounded. In his claim the applicant submitted that the HCJ had failed to comply with the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal. He emphasised that those requirements were part of the procedural safeguards provided for by Article 6 of the Convention, which was applicable to his case in its civil limb because the impugned decision had substantially affected his right to work and his professional dignity. The applicant further argued that his right to participate in the hearings had not been secured. He alleged that the decision of the HCJ was worded in general terms and that it did not refer to any specific facts or indicate a specific time when those facts had taken place. The applicant then asked the HAC to take into account the fact that his judicial career had exceeded thirty-five years, that he had held positions of president at several courts for twenty-five years, that he had been given awards for his judicial service and that during the initial period of his presidency of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal that court had moved from a demolished military barracks to premises in the city centre with proper equipment and a sufficient number of hearing rooms. 22.  The applicant also claimed compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the ensuing reduction in his remuneration, which, at the date of the claim, had amounted to 4,034.33 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) [1] in relation to the period which had elapsed in July and August 2011. 23.  On 25 August 2011 the HAC held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and decided to dismiss his claim in respect of pecuniary damage without considering it. The HAC adopted a decision to that effect, stating that it had no jurisdiction to determine that issue. 24.  On 11 October 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim concerning his dismissal from the administrative position as unsubstantiated. In its decision the HAC specified, in particular, that it had competence to review whether the impugned decision had been taken lawfully, reasonably, proportionately and, among other requirements, impartially. The HAC stated that the applicant had not contested the facts forming the grounds for his dismissal and therefore those facts had been taken as established. The HAC then reiterated the failings attributed to the applicant and concluded that the HCJ\u2019s decision had been lawful and that the applicant\u2019s right to participate in the proceedings in person had not been violated because the HCJ had taken all the necessary measures to inform him about the hearings and the applicant had not had any valid reason for being absent from the hearings. The HAC found that the HCJ had acted in accordance with the Constitution, the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and the High Council of Justice Act. It had also complied with the Rules of the HCJ, which provided that one of the grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position was a \u201cbreach of official duties\u201d. In conclusion, the HAC stated that the HCJ had not violated the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine. 25.  Following his dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, the applicant continued to work as a regular judge in the same court until 20 June 2013, when Parliament dismissed him from the post of judge after he had tendered a statement of resignation.", "references": ["2", "0", "6", "7", "1", "9", "8", "5", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1976 respectively and live in Switzerland. At the relevant time, they were members of a research cooperative called the East Scientific Research Cooperative (Do\u011fu Bilimsel Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar Kooperatifi \u2013 \u201cthe Cooperative\u201d). 7.  Between 30 May and 1 June 2005 the Cooperative organised an exhibition in Diyarbak\u0131r as part of the fifth Diyarbak\u0131r Culture and Art Festival, entitled \u201cWitnesses of War Talk\u201d. Within the context of the exhibition, photographs of deceased members of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), deceased members of the security forces who had been killed in security operations, persons who had lost their lives in prison, victims of enforced disappearances and victims of assassinations by unknown assailants in south-east Turkey were publicly displayed. The exhibition also included statements from family members of deceased and disappeared individuals, presenting their relatives and containing their personal views on the disturbances going on in south-east Turkey, and their wish for an enduring peace. 8.  On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was launched against the applicants and five other people in relation to a charge of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 31 May 2005 the applicants gave a statement to the investigating judge. Both of the applicants maintained that the exhibition in question had been organised for purely sociological reasons, and that they had conducted interviews with the families of the deceased which had also been included in the exhibition. They asserted that there had been no intention to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK. The investigating judge dismissed an application by the public prosecutor to remand the accused in custody. 9.  On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, charging the applicants and five other suspects with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 10.  Throughout the proceedings before the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court the applicants repeated their previous statements and contended that photographs of deceased members of the security forces had also been displayed in the exhibition alongside those of members of the PKK. 11.  On 18 May 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted both applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicants were sentenced to two years and a year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. In its judgment, the court observed that the invitations to the exhibition had referred to the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK as a \u201cwar\u201d, and the PKK members as \u201cguerrillas\u201d, thus glorifying the deceased terrorists and inciting young people to become members of the PKK. The court also noted that a \u201cwar\u201d was an armed conflict between two States and a \u201cguerrilla\u201d was an armed person who fought against unjust occupation. The court further observed that a couple of photographs of deceased soldiers had also been displayed in order to conceal the accused\u2019s intention to incite young people to join the PKK. 12.  On 9 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the second applicant, holding that the case should be reviewed in the light of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271), which regulates the suspension of a judgment\u2019s pronouncement. However, the trial court\u2019s judgment of 18 May 2006 became final in respect of the first applicant. On 3 August 2009 the decision of the Court of Cassation was filed with the registry of the first-instance court. 13.  On 22 October 2009, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court decided to suspend the pronouncement of its judgment in respect of the second applicant on the condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years. 14.  The first applicant served the sentence arising from the judgment of 18 May 2006.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "8", "3", "9", "4", "7", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tunceli. 6.  On 5 April 2007 the applicant attended a concert performed by a band called \u201cGrup Yorum\u201d in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 7.  On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People\u2019s Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7 (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the applicant had chanted the following slogans during the concert: \u201cMahir, H\u00fcseyin, Ula\u015f; Fight until emancipation\u201d[1] (\u201cMahir, H\u00fcseyin, Ula\u015f; Kurtulu\u015fa kadar sava\u015f\u201d); \u201cMartyrs of the revolution are immortal\u201d (\u201cDevrim \u015fehitleri \u00f6l\u00fcms\u00fczd\u00fcr\u201d); \u201cRevolutionary prisoners are our honour\u201d (\u201cDevrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur\u201d); and \u201cVictory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance\u201d (\u201cDa\u011flarda zafer, cephede kurtulu\u015f; ya\u015fas\u0131n zafer, ya\u015fas\u0131n direni\u015f\u201d). 8.  During the investigation and the proceedings against him, the applicant stated that he had attended the concert in question and chanted the slogans \u201cMusic shall not stop, dance shall continue\u201d (\u201cT\u00fcrk\u00fcler susmaz , halaylar s\u00fcrer\u201d) and \u201cWe will not be defeated by oppression\u201d (\u201cBask\u0131lar bizi y\u0131ld\u0131ramaz\u201d). He also noted that he had been on the concert\u2019s organising committee. 9.  On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. In its judgment, on the basis of a police report on a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, the indictment, the applicant\u2019s defence submissions, and the public prosecutor\u2019s observations on the merits of the case, the court considered it established that the applicant had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert, for which legal and administrative authorisation had been obtained, had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C, and that the applicant had chanted slogans used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 10.  The applicant appealed. 11.  On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 12.  Between 6 October 2011 and 1 August 2012 the applicant duly served his prison sentence.", "references": ["4", "8", "2", "1", "0", "7", "5", "9", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and serves his life sentence in a correctional colony in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region of Russia. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 27 March 2003 the applicant was arrested on charges of illegal possession of firearms, two armed robberies of local post offices, murder of three Russian Post Service cash messengers and attempted murder of the fourth one. On 14 October 2003 the case was sent to the Supreme Court of the Buryatia Republic (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) for trial. 7.  Twice, on 20 April 2004 and 22 May 2007, the applicant was convicted as charged. Both convictions were set aside by the Supreme Court of Russia. On 12 September 2008, in the course of the third round of jury trial, the Regional Court decided, upon a request by a representative of the Russian Post, to close proceedings to the public. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s objections made with reference to Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In doing so the Presiding judge referred to the case-file documents containing information about security measures and equipment in post offices, weaponry, schedules and routes of cash messengers, etc. Under the relevant Russian Post regulations that information was classified as \u201cfor internal use only\u201d. The Regional Court found that that information was a trade secret protected by the Commercial Secrets Act (Federal Law no. 98-FZ of 29 July 2004) and that its disclosure could have harmed public interests. Every hearing after 12 September 2008 was held in camera. 8.  On 14 December 2008 the jury convicted the applicant as charged. In the last days of December the trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. On 4 June 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction on one count and upheld the remainder of the verdict and sentence. The hearing was public. The court of appeal held, in particular, that the decision to dispense with a public hearing had been lawful and rejected, in a summary fashion, the relevant arguments by the applicant.", "references": ["9", "8", "6", "2", "4", "1", "7", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 17 April 1999 the Fier District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), following proceedings in which the applicant did not take part, convicted the applicant and his two co-accused of a number of serious criminal offences. It sentenced the applicant to death in absentia. 7.  On 1 June 1999 the Vlora Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), following appeals lodged by the two other co-accused, upheld the District Court\u2019s decision of 17 April 1999. 8.  On 8 May 2001, following appeals lodged by the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. However, it sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 9.  On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania from Italy. He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day. 10.  On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the District Court for leave to appeal out of time. 11.  On 25 January 2007 the District Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 8 May 2001 had become res judicata and that, consequently, the applicant could not be tried a second time for the same offence. 12.  On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant\u2019s appeals, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision. 13.  On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 2 July 2010. He also complained about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia. 14.  On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, rejected the appeal by a majority. It found that the applicant\u2019s complaint against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 2 July 2010 was manifestly ill-founded. As regards his complaint about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia, and the domestic courts\u2019 dismissal of his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not complained about the domestic courts\u2019 decisions taken in absentia (see paragraphs 6-8 above). It further found that that complaint was in any event time-barred. It also reasoned that in the present case the Supreme Court\u2019s unifying decision no. 1 of 20 January 2011 was applicable (see Izet Haxhia v. Albania, no. 34783/06, \u00a7\u00a7 28-31, 5 November 2013). In addition, it noted that although the appeals before the Supreme Court against the lower courts\u2019 decision were lodged by the co\u2011accused and not the applicant, the Supreme Court had examined and amended the lower courts\u2019 decisions of 17 April and 1 June 1999 also in respect of the applicant. 15.  On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the District Court\u2019s decision of 17 April 1999, the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 1 June 1999 and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 8 May 2001 complaining about his conviction in absentia. 16.  On 21 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, considering that the two-year time-limit had started to run as from 8 May 2001. The decision was communicated to the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 25 September 2007.", "references": ["6", "4", "2", "0", "9", "5", "1", "8", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 6.  On 30 September 2007 a reading out of a press statement and a march were held in Diyarbak\u0131r in order to protest about the conditions of detention and alleged poisoning of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Diyarbak\u0131r branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP) where a press statement was read out. They then marched. The applicant, as a member of the DTP, participated in the gathering and the ensuing march. According to a police report dated 9 October 2007, the applicant was seen while carrying a banner which read \u201c\u0130nsanl\u0131k zehirleniyor\u201d (\u201cThe humanity is being poisoned\u201d) and applauding together with other demonstrators in the police video footage. 7.  On 9 October 2007 the applicant was taken into police custody. On the same day she was detained on remand. 8.  On 17 October 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor charged the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the content of the banner she had carried during the demonstration of 30 September 2007. 9.  On 4 December 2007 the applicant was released pending trial. 10.  On 18 March 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. The court found it established, on the basis of an expert report on the police video footage, that the applicant had been together with other persons who had chanted the slogan \u201cBe Serok Jiyan Nabe\u201d (\u201cThere is no life without the leader\u201d) and that she had carried a banner which read \u201cThe humanity is being poisoned\u201d. The applicant was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  On 9 January 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 18 March 2008. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant started serving her prison sentence. On 17 July 2012, upon the applicant\u2019s request, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court ordered her release from prison, in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713.", "references": ["3", "7", "9", "5", "2", "4", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s. 6.  The first applicant has been detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 7.  On 27 July 2012 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 74,690 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 21,630 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8.  On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant\u2019s claim. It firstly held that the time\u2011limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant\u2019s claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time\u2011barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9.  The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant\u2019s allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10.  The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 20 May 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision in its entirety. 12.  The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 13.  On 4 October 2013 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded dormitory\u2011type rooms. He claimed LTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 3,200) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 14.  On 12 March 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant\u2019s claim. The court found that for seventy\u2011nine days the applicant had had 2.9 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m applicable to dormitory\u2011type rooms. It also found that for eighteen days, when the applicant had been kept under stricter disciplinary regime, he had had 3.34 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.6 sq. m applicable to such cells. 15.  However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for non\u2011pecuniary damages. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant\u2019s submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130.", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "4", "9", "3", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Ad\u0131yaman. 5.  On 17 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a public servant. She was successful in the examination and on 27 June 2000 she was notified by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister\u2019s office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e, the state-run Electricity Company. 6.  On 4 September 2000 the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e informed the applicant that she would not be appointed to a post in that office as she did not fulfil the requirements of \u201cbeing a man\u201d and \u201chaving completed military service\u201d. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an action against TEDA\u015e with the Ankara Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e. In her deposition, the applicant noted that being a man was not a requirement for appointment to the post in question and that she fulfilled all the requirements for that post. 8.  On an unspecified date the general directorate of TEDA\u015e submitted to the administrative court that one of the requirements for the post in question had been declared by the State Personnel Department as \u201chaving completed military service\u201d and that therefore only men could be appointed to the post. The applicant, being a woman, could therefore not be recruited as a security officer. 9.  On 28 November 2001 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDA\u015e. The court held that the requirement of \u201chaving completed military service\u201d should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDA\u015e. 10.  On 30 January 2002 TEDA\u015e lodged an appeal against the judgment of 28 November 2001. 11.  On 1 April 2003 the applicant was recruited by TEDA\u015e. 12.  On 21 October 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court, holding that the requirement regarding military service demonstrated that the post in question was reserved for male candidates. The high court therefore found that the administration\u2019s decision had been in accordance with the law. 13.  On 19 March 2004 the applicant was dismissed from her post. 14.  On 30 December 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case, taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. 15.  On 7 May 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of 30 December 2004. 16.  On 12 July 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment was notified to the applicant.", "references": ["5", "2", "9", "7", "0", "3", "6", "1", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Assemini (Italy). 6.  By a decision of 4 December 2006 of the Cantonal Prosecutor of the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegova\u010dko-neretvanski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant was granted the reimbursement of costs which she had incurred as a witness in the amount of 519 convertible marks (BAM)[1]. 7.  On 29 February 2008 the Mostar Municipal Court (\u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) rejected the applicant\u2019s request for the enforcement of this decision, deeming it unenforceable. 8.  On 18 September 2008 the Mostar Cantonal Court (\u201cthe Cantonal Court\u201d) quashed this decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 9.  On 19 November 2008 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o izvr\u0161enju). 10.  On 19 June 2009 the Municipal Court upheld the objection lodged against this decision. 11.  On 1 April 2010 the Cantonal Court quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 12.  On 18 February 2011 the Municipal Court partly accepted the objection against the writ of execution specifically as regards the interest on the main debt calculated from 4 January 2007, and the interest on the total costs of the enforcement proceedings. 13.  On 2 December 2011 the Cantonal Court upheld this decision. 14.  On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for revision as inadmissible. 15.  On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted the applicant\u2019s appeal and thereby found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the non-enforcement of the decision of the Municipal Court of 18 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). It also ordered the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton to undertake measures in order to enforce the decision within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 16.  On 21 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the final decision in question had not yet been enforced. 17.  On 18 December 2014 the said final decision was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash. 18.  By a judgment of the Municipal Court of 3 April 2009, which became final on 16 December 2009, a certain P.M. was ordered to pay the applicant the costs of civil proceedings in the amount of BAM 1,959. 19.  On 31 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Municipal Court a request for the enforcement of this judgment. 20.  On 14 September 2011, 4 November 2011 and 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted requests for the acceleration of the enforcement proceedings. 21.  On 5 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 22.  On 13 June 2013 the Municipal Court dismissed the objection lodged against its decision of 5 December 2012, and P.M. subsequently appealed this decision to the Cantonal Court. 23.  On 17 September 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the duration of the enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court. It further ordered the Cantonal Court to urgently rule on the appeal lodged by P.M. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 24.  On 16 October 2013 the Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal lodged by P.M. 25.  On 11 June 2015 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 26.  On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.", "references": ["7", "2", "6", "1", "4", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in the K\u0131z\u0131ltepe district of Mardin. 6.  On 30 March 2006 the applicant participated in a march and the reading out of a press statement held by the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi \u2013\u201cthe DTP\u201d) in K\u0131z\u0131ltepe. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the K\u0131z\u0131ltepe branch of the DTP and walked to the building of the district branch of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk\u0131nma Partisi), where a press statement was read out. The press statement concerned the clashes that had occurred between demonstrators and the police in Diyarbak\u0131r on 29 and 30 March 2006. The protestors then returned to the DTP building. During the march the protesters chanted slogans. The applicant participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement as a member of the DTP. 7.  On 8 March 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and eleven other individuals with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had attended the demonstration of 30 March 2006 and chanted the slogan \u201cTooth for tooth, blood for blood, we are with you \u00d6calan\u201d (\u201cDi\u015fe di\u015f, kana kan, seninleyiz \u00d6calan\u201d). 8.  Within the context of the criminal proceedings initiated following the indictment dated 8 March 2007, an expert who had examined the police video recordings of the public gathering of 30 March 2006 observed that the applicant had acted together with the crowd, but that it could not be established whether he had chanted the above-mentioned slogan since he had covered his mouth and nose. 9.  On 22 April 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had accepted that he had participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement, but denied the veracity of the allegation that he had chanted any slogan. The Assize Court found it established that the march and the gathering at which a press statement had been read out on 30 March 2006 had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and an illegal demonstration, and that the accused, including the applicant, had actively participated in that event. The Assize Court further observed that although, according to the expert report, it could not be established that the applicant had chanted the slogan, on the basis of the photographs in the case file, it was established that he had acted together with the demonstrators. Noting that there were other demonstrators who had covered their mouths and that the police documents showed that the applicant had actively taken part in the demonstration and instructed others to chant slogans, the Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The applicant was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  On 2 July 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 22 April 2008. 11.  On 4 February 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 21 June 2011 he was conditionally released.", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "8", "3", "7", "1", "5", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in \u0130zmir. 7.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended celebrations for the festival of Newroz in Buca, a district of the city of \u0130zmir, as one of the moderators. While she was hosting the event, the applicant addressed the crowd in Kurdish and invited them to observe a minute\u2019s silence in memory of \u201cNewroz martyrs\u201d and martyrs for freedom and democracy. 8.  On 10 April 2007 the \u0130zmir Assize Court issued a warrant for the applicant\u2019s arrest and a search of her residence. 9.  On 11 April 2007 she was arrested at her house. 10.  On 12 April 2007 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge. In her statements to the public prosecutor and the judge, she maintained that she had attended the Newroz celebrations as a moderator and that she had not shouted any illegal slogans. She stated that she had called for a minute\u2019s silence in memory of revolutionary martyrs. The investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody following her questioning. 11.  On 24 April 2007 the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings before the \u0130zmir Assize Court against the applicant and seven other individuals, charging them under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) with disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and, under Article 215 of the Criminal Code, praising a crime or a criminal. Subsequently the criminal proceedings commenced before the \u0130zmir Assize Court. 12.  On 13 August 2007, at the end of the first hearing in the trial, the first\u2011instance court ordered the applicant\u2019s release. 13.  On 10 September 2008 the \u0130zmir Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and sentenced her to one year\u2019s imprisonment. The court observed that the applicant had made a speech in Kurdish, that a man had translated her words into Turkish at the end of her speech, and that according to the translation she had uttered the following sentences:\n\u201cWelcome. I wish you a happy Newroz. We thank those who enabled us to be where we are today. I invite you to stand to observe a moment of silence in memory of Newroz martyrs, martyrs for freedom and democracy, and those who enabled us to be where we are today.\u201d 14.  The Assize Court further noted that following the applicant\u2019s speech the crowd had made a \u201cV\u201d sign and that during the speeches made by the other speakers, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. According to the court, the Newroz celebrations had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and the speakers had chanted slogans and had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court also observed that during the celebrations, symbols and banners of the PKK had been carried by the crowd. The court found that the speakers had provoked the crowd and had as a result committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court considered that in view of the applicant\u2019s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 it was unnecessary to deliver a decision in respect of the charges under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. 15.  On 21 September 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the \u0130zmir Assize Court. 16.  Between 13 January and 22 June 2012 the applicant served her prison sentence. On 22 June 2012 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court ordered her conditional release.", "references": ["1", "7", "8", "4", "9", "2", "5", "0", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Novi Sad. 5.  The proceedings began on 19 November 1999 when a third private party brought a lawsuit concerning his tenancy rights in respect of a flat owned by a respondent. The applicant acted as an intervener in these proceedings on the side of the respondent since she had previously signed a tenancy agreement with him. 6.  On 8 April 2003 the first instance court suspended the proceedings (mirovanje postupka). 7.  On 20 August 2003, 20 October 2005 and 13 May 2009 the first instance court terminated the proceedings having deemed the lawsuit as withdrawn due to the fact that the parties had failed to appear at the scheduled hearings. All three of these decisions were subsequently quashed on appeal. 8.  On 29 March 2012 the first instance court rendered a judgment in favour of the respondent and the applicant. 9.  On 22 August 2012 this judgment was upheld on appeal. 10.  On 28 September 2012 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Constitutional Court alleging a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. 11.  On 10 February 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time, but rejected her claim for non-pecuniary damages stating that the finding of a violation alone constituted sufficient redress for the said breach. In so doing it noted, inter alia, that the applicant had significantly contributed to the length of proceedings in question.", "references": ["9", "6", "0", "1", "5", "7", "4", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sanski Most. 6.  By a judgment of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 23 May 2005, which became final on 11 September 2007, the Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicant 42,767 convertible marks (BAM)[1] on account of pecuniary damage together with default interest calculated from 23 May 2005 until final payment. 7.  On 1 February 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the issuance of the writ of execution in his case, which request he amended on 30 August 2010. 8.  On 18 October 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 9.  On 15 November 2010 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued the writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o izvr\u0161enju). 10.  On 18 March 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance rejected the objections against its decision of 15 November 2010, as well as the applicant\u2019s request for the payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 11.  On 31 May 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance made certain corrections to its decision of 18 March 2011. 12.  On 15 December 2011 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance quashed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 18 March 2011 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 13.  On 26 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 14.  On 12 April 2012 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance partially granted the objection of the Republika Srpska against the writ of execution. 15.  On 23 April 2012 the applicant appealed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 12 April 2012. On 11 June, 13 July, and 21 November 2012, and on 15 January 2013 the applicant submitted further requests for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance. 16.  On 21 January 2013 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 12 April 2012. 17.  On 7 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in favour of the applicant that the enforcement proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance had not been finalised within a reasonable time. It further ordered the Banja Luka Court of First Instance to urgently expedite the enforcement proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damage. 18.  On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "4", "0", "8", "1", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Kybartai. 5.  On 22 December 2011 the applicant was arrested and taken to Klaip\u0117da police station, where he was detained for various periods until 5 March 2013, for 130 days in total. For twenty-two days the applicant had between 3.25 and 4 square metres of personal space at his disposal; for the remaining period he had more than 4 square metres of personal space, sometimes even up to 9.36 square metres. 6.  On 4 January 2012 the applicant was taken to \u0160iauliai Remand Prison, where he was detained for various periods until 13 March 2013. No information concerning separate cells, their sizes and the number of inmates has been provided to the Court. 7.  On 4 March 2013 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. On 11 October 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by the applicant and the judgment became final. 8.  On 13 March 2013 the applicant was taken to Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison to serve his sentence, and was detained there until 23 December 2015, when he was transferred to Kybartai Correctional Facility. 9.  According to the documents in the Court\u2019s possession, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were as follows. Between 13 March 2013 and 5 May 2014 the applicant was held in five different cells: nos. 88A, 93, 111, 223 and 228 and he was detained there for 419 days in total. For 316.5 days the applicant was alone in the cells, the plot of which varied between 6.83 and 7.94 square metres. For the remaining period he had between 3.82 and 3.87 square metres of personal space, except for one evening, when he had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. 10.  The applicant submitted two schemes of different cells in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. It is indicated in the schemes that the toilets were separated from the rest of the cells by partitions but that they were visible from the entrance of the cell. The Government have not provided any information regarding this matter. 11.  On 3 June 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He asked the court to oblige Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison to immediately terminate his inhuman and degrading treatment, transfer him to a cell where he would have no less than 4 square metres of personal space (not including space for the toilet and the furniture), and award him 86,886 euros (EUR) in compensation. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures, damp, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the fact that he was held with convicted inmates who were serving sentences for grave crimes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that he could only shower once a week for fifteen minutes, and the lack of time spent in the open air. He also complained about the lack of long-term visits in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison from 23 November 2011 until October 2013, and claimed that consequently he had separated from his partner.\nThe applicant further complained regarding his conditions of detention in Klaip\u0117da police station between 23 December 2011 and 5 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, the lack of ventilation, damp, low temperatures, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the lack of time spent in the open air, the fact that the shower had only been available once a week for fifteen minutes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that there had been no long-term or short-term visits, and the fact that there were no separate cells for non-smokers and inmates who had tuberculosis or HIV.\nHe also complained regarding his conditions of detention in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison between 4 January 2012 and 13 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures during the winter and high temperatures during the summer, insufficient ventilation, the fact that he could only shower once a week, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, and the fact that there had been no long-term visits. 12.  On 26 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. The court held that he had spent 419 days in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, and had had more than 3.6 square metres of personal space at his disposal for 418 days. On one evening the applicant had had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. The court further held that the partition between the toilet and the cell of 1.5 < metres in height did not constitute sufficient implementation of national hygiene norms and the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The other complaints by the applicant (regarding high temperatures in the summer, damp, a lack of proper ventilation, mould, a lack of cleaning materials, not having enough time to shower, the low energy value of the food, and having insufficient time outside) were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant could not receive them, as he was a remand prisoner and not a convicted inmate.\nAs regards \u0160iauliai Remand Prison, the court held that the applicant had spent 296 days there. The court further held that he had had insufficient personal space in the cells for 283 days (insufficient cell space had been unquestionably proved in respect of forty-eight days, and for the remaining 235 days the applicant had had a varying amount of personal space at his disposal) and found that the lack of proper partition walls between toilets and cells had breached both domestic requirements and the standards of the CPT. The court also found that the air temperature in cell no. 9 had been 0.19\u02daC lower than the standard. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant had not been entitled to them, in accordance with domestic law.\nWith regard to Klaip\u0117da police station, the court found that the applicant had had insufficient personal space (less than 5 square metres) for fifty\u2011seven days, and that the partition wall between the toilet and the cell, which was 1.2 and 1.3 metres in height in different cells, had been too low and had not satisfied the standards of the domestic law or the CPT. In relation to visits, the court held that people did not have a right to receive any visits from their relatives when they were transferred to police stations temporarily.\nAs a result, the court awarded the applicant compensation of EUR 1,200 from \u0160iauliai Remand Prison and EUR 200 from Klaip\u0117da police station. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court only noted that with regard to Klaip\u0117da police station, the first-instance court had miscalculated the time that the applicant had spent in overcrowded cells and stated that he had had less than 5 square metres of personal space for eighty-three days. However, the higher court found that for twenty-six days he had had between 4.77 and 4.84 square metres of personal space, which was less than the domestic requirement at the time (see paragraph 18 below). However, the court held that for those twenty-six days the deviation from the domestic norms had not been significant and thus it agreed with the first-instance decision. 14.  From the information available to the Court, it appears that the applicant never asked the prison administration if he could receive long\u2011term conjugal visits from his partner, and although short-term visits were available to him, he only used his right to receive them once, on 26 June 2013. Two other short-term visits were changed into phone calls (the visits of 12 June 2015 and 29 October 2015).", "references": ["0", "8", "7", "2", "9", "3", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Ad\u0131yaman. 5.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant participated in the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations held in Malatya. 6.  On an unspecified date the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and twenty other people with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had waved a green, yellow and red flag symbolising the PKK. 7.  On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted all of the accused as charged, including the applicant. On the basis of evidence in the case file, the court found it established that one of the accused, Ms N.K., had made a press statement, and the other accused, including the applicant, had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. The court also noted that the accused had waved the so-called flag of the PKK. The applicant was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  On 31 May 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 6 March 2008. 9.  On 21 December 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. 10.  On 12 July 2012 the Malatya Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release from prison in accordance with Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. 11.  On 12 December 2012 the Malatya Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicant\u2019s prison sentence in accordance with provisional section 1 of Law no. 6352. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit a terrorism-related offence during that period.", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "7", "5", "1", "2", "8", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 12 May 2009 the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file relating to an investigation against the applicant and others pursuant to Section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 6.  On 31 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7.  On 1 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s police statement was taken at the Anti-Terror Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of his lawyer. He was questioned at length about his telephone conversations that had been intercepted. The police read out the transcripts of the said telephone conversations and asked the applicant to comment on them. He was further questioned in relation to allegations about aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation as well as his participation in several illegal demonstrations on behalf of this terrorist organisation and several incidents of assault and battery. He was further asked questions about a co\u2011accused\u2019s incriminating statements. 8.  On 2 November 2009 the public prosecutor questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicant. The applicant did not deny that he had had these conversations but claimed that they were not made with the intention to plan a terrorist action. 9.  On the same day the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court ordered his pre-trial detention. 10.  On 2 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the court to lift the restriction of access to the investigation file. On 10 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court rejected this objection. 11.  On 4 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an objection against the decision on the applicant\u2019s detention, and requested his release. On 12 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor\u2019s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 12.  On 25 November 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with aiding and abetting of a terrorist organisation, and looting. 13.  On 4 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. On the same date the restriction on the file was lifted. 14.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant was released. 15.  According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.", "references": ["5", "9", "6", "8", "1", "3", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tuzla. 6.  By judgment of the Mostar Municipal Court of 18 June 2009, which became final on 16 December 2010, company R. was ordered to reinstate the applicant in his previous employment, as well as to pay him a total amount of 16,314 convertible marks (BAM)[1], together with default interest calculated from 20 March 2007 until final payment. The respondent company was further ordered to pay the applicant BAM 2,641 in respect of legal costs, together with default interest calculated from 18 June 2009 until final payment. Lastly, the respondent company was ordered to cover all pension-related contributions in respect of the applicant between 1 January 2003 and 17 January 2007. 7.  On 17 October 2011 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o izvr\u0161enju) in this regard. 8.  On 23 February 2012, upon the applicant\u2019s request, the Municipal Court amended its decision of 17 October 2011 by changing the object of enforcement. 9.  On 16 January 2012 the Municipal Court requested the respondent to indicate why it had not reinstated the applicant. On 23 January 2012 it fined the respondent in this connection. 10.  On 1 February 2013 the Municipal Court joined the enforcement proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case with an earlier enforcement procedure against the respondent. 11.  On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12.  On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent\u2019s property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent\u2019s real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13.   On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14.  According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case were still pending.", "references": ["8", "0", "4", "5", "6", "2", "1", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 7.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was the head of the district branch of the Democratic People\u2019s Party (Demokratik Halklar Partisi \u2013 DEHAP) in the Ergani district of Diyarbak\u0131r. 8.  On 15 February 2005, on the anniversary of the arrest and transfer of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK[1], to Turkey, the Ergani district branch of DEHAP organised a gathering in front of the district branch office in order to read out a press statement. The applicant read the statement in question. 9.  On 31 May 2005 the Ergani public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ergani Criminal Court against twenty-six persons, including the applicant, charging them with breach of the Marches and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911) on account of their participation in the above-mentioned event. They were accused of participating in the gathering and carrying banners with slogans such as \u201cThe solution is in \u0130mral\u0131[2]\u201d (\u201c\u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u0130mral\u0131\u2019da\u201d), \u201cSolitary confinement is a crime against humanity\u201d (\u201cTecrit insanl\u0131k su\u00e7udur\u201d), \u201cNot EU, not US, \u00d6calan has the solution\u201d (\u201cNe AB ne ABD, \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00d6calan\u2019da\u201d) , \u201cThe youth is \u00d6calan\u2019s fedai\u201d[3] (\u201cGen\u00e7lik Apo\u2019nun Fedaisidir\u201d), and \u201cFreedom to \u00d6calan\u201d (\u201c\u00d6calan\u2019a \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck\u201d), as well as posters of Abdullah \u00d6calan. They were also accused of chanting slogans such as \u201cTo the sun, to freedom\u201d (G\u00fcne\u015fe g\u00fcne\u015fe, \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015fmeye\u201d), \u201cLong live the brotherhood of peoples\u201d (\u201cYa\u015fas\u0131n halklar\u0131n karde\u015fli\u011fi\u201d), \u201cMay those hands which aim to damage peace be broken\u201d (\u201cBar\u0131\u015fa uzanan eller k\u0131r\u0131ls\u0131n\u201d), \u201cA tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, we are with you\u201d (\u201cDi\u015fe di\u015f kana kan, seninleyiz\u201d) and \u201cAKP, be careful, do not abuse our patience\u201d (\u201cAKP \u015fa\u015f\u0131rma, sabr\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131rma\u201d). 10.  On 5 October 2006 the Ergani Criminal Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the case. It held that the impugned acts constituted the offence proscribed by section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 and that the accused should therefore be tried by the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 11.  On an unspecified date the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court remitted the case file to the Ergani Criminal Court. 12.  On 19 March 2007 the Ergani Criminal Court once again decided that the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court had jurisdiction over the case. 13.  On 10 August 2007 the Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court began the trial in the case. 14.  On 15 April 2010 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor submitted to the first-instance court his observations on the merits of the case. According to those submissions, the public prosecutor considered that the applicant should be convicted under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, as the press statement read out by him had referred to Abdullah \u00d6calan as the \u201chonourable Kurdish people\u2019s leader\u201d. 15.  On the same day the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713. The court based its judgment, among others, on a police report regarding the reading out of the press statement dated 15 February 2005 and a police report dated 23 February 2005 on the examination of a police video recording of the event of 15 February 2005. The court judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... it has been decided that Ahmet K\u0131n\u0131k and R.A. committed the offence proscribed by section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, as they participated in the reading out of a press statement organised by the DEHAP in Ergani on 15 February 2005 on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah \u00d6calan, and chanted slogans such as \u2018The solution is in \u0130mral\u0131\u2019, \u2018Solitary confinement is a crime against humanity\u2019, \u2018Not EU, not US, \u00d6calan has the solution\u2019, and \u2018The youth is \u00d6calan\u2019s fedai\u2019. They marched and chanted these slogans without obtaining prior permission.\u201d 16.  The Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court sentenced the applicant to ten months\u2019 imprisonment but decided to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment (h\u00fckm\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n geri b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131) for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17.  On 5 July 2010 the applicant objected to the decision of the Assize Court to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment. 18.  On 22 November 2010 the Fourth Chamber of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection.", "references": ["5", "3", "1", "8", "2", "7", "9", "4", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Suponevo, the Bryansk Region. 6.  The applicant has been editor of a weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni (\u0411\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438), since he founded it in 1999. 7.  On 9 August 2012 the applicant published an article in Bryanskiye Budni no. 658/31 headlined \u201cPity the birds\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043a \u0436\u0430\u043b\u043a\u043e\u201d)[1], which he wrote under a pen name. In the article he discussed criminal proceedings which were pending against two men called Maksim Kosenkov and Ruslan Pogulyayev on charges of obtaining land by fraud. He also referred to witness statements in criminal proceedings against Anna Stregeleva, the former head of the regional department of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043c\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e), which had concerned the misappropriation of other plots of land and ended with Ms Stregeleva\u2019s conviction. According to those statements, several regional officials, including a deputy governor of the Bryansk Region, Nikolay Simonenko, had been involved to a certain extent in the events which had constituted the basis of the conviction. Criminal proceedings had been instituted against Mr Simonenko as well, but they had been discontinued and on 23 April 2012 the Bryanskiy District Court had awarded him compensation for non-pecuniary damage for wrongful prosecution. The article had a photograph next to it of Mr Simonenko and Mr Denin, the governor of Bryansk Region, in a room with other people. 8.  The article read as follows, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cMaksim Kosenkov and Ruslan Pogulyayev will be on trial in Bryansk. The lads wanted to replicate the deed of the Bryansk thieves from the local administration, but they lacked the power, although they had skills in abundance.\nThey concocted fake decrees from the Bezhitskiy District Administration on the parcelling of land for the construction of individual houses. They \u2018certified\u2019 the papers with makeshift stamps and took them to the Bryansk Region Department of the State Register (\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440). Here they were issued with [extracts from the State registry of real estate] in respect of nine plots of land. Try to register your property at that department. They will wear you down with requests for piles of papers. However, in this case the credulous clerks easily signed the documents after accepting the fakes. Isn\u2019t that strange?\nAs established by the prosecutor\u2019s office, the swindlers acquired property rights in this way in respect of plots of lands which belonged to the category of indivisible State property. Their market value exceeded 6,400,000 roubles. The lads face up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment for this. Pity the birds. They could be doing good deeds, raising their kids. However, they got carried away by the example of the big Bryansk thieves and failed to take into account that the latter were protected from all sides \u2013 by the powers that be, the party, relations, and so on.\nAt least we know now what sentence Bryansk Region residents Denin and Simonenko could be serving. This newspaper has several times dealt with the material of the criminal case which led to Simonenko spending a year detained at Matrosskaya Tishina [the SIZO no. 1 remand prison in Moscow] and who happily got out with a million in compensation. It looks like very few people understood that material. We shall have to shake the dust off those volumes once more.\nIf you go from Bryansk to the village of Michurinskoe, before the village to the left you will see a field and an orchard which caught the fancy of the Bryansk thieves from the authorities (\u0432\u043e\u0440\u044b \u043e\u0442 \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438). There are almost 66 hectares of land there. Having become skilled at the misappropriation of land, the thief-officials and a deputy decided to pocket that billion. And to multiply it. The thing is, they were going to build cottages there and sell them at triple the price. It is easy to turn a billion into three or five in that way.\u201d 9.  The article further referred to witness statements in the criminal proceedings against Ms Stregeleva, which concerned the misappropriation of plots of land from orchards that constituted federal land. According to the article, it could be seen from the material in the criminal case that Deputy Governor Simonenko had said at a meeting that \u201cthe issue with the orchards was agreed upon with the governor\u201d. The last paragraph of the article contained the following passages:\n\u201cStrangely enough, citizens Denin and Simonenko are still at large. Although we are talking about 66 hectares of expensive land. However, the Bezhitskiy lads may face up to ten years of prison time for a lesser crime. Can this be?...\u201d 10.  Mr Simonenko brought an action for defamation against the applicant and sought damages of 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB). He stated, in particular, that the following passages were untrue and damaging to his honour and reputation: 1.  \u201cHowever, they got carried away by the example of the big Bryansk thieves and failed to take into account that the latter were protected from all sides \u2013 by the powers that be, the party, relations, and so on\u201d; 4.  \u201c... Having become skilled at the misappropriation of land, the thief-officials and a deputy decided to pocket that billion. And to multiply it.\u201d 11.  On 26 September 2012 the Bryanskiy District Court of the Bryansk Region dismissed the claim (\u201cthe Bryanskiy District Court\u201d). The court noted that in the article the author had expressed an opinion and made suppositions with regard to procedural documents in the criminal case against Ms Stregeleva and the actions of certain participants in the proceedings. It further found that the first, third and fourth sentences quoted above could not be considered as damaging to the claimant\u2019s honour and reputation as he was not the only official in the Bryansk administration and it was not clear from the article that the author had meant him exactly. The court also noted that the fourth sentence did not constitute an assertion and had neither a legal nor a literal meaning. As regards the second sentence, the court found that the claimant had failed to prove that he was the one referred to in the passage as many people with the surname Simonenko lived in the Bryansk region. There had also been other people apart from the claimant in the photograph published next to the article. Furthermore, the sentence in question had not contained information about any facts but had merely expressed the author\u2019s opinion and his suppositions. 12.  Mr Simonenko appealed. 13.  On 27 November 2012 the Bryansk Regional Court set aside the judgment, allowed the claim against the applicant, ordered him to publish a retraction within fifteen days of the judgment\u2019s entry into force, and awarded the claimant damages of RUB 5,000 (approximately 125 euros). It also ordered the applicant to pay fees of RUB 200. 14.  The appellate court found that the passages in question had definitely referred to Mr Simonenko as his photograph had been published next to the article. It also cited the use of the expressions \u201cthieves from the local administration\u201d, \u201cthieves from the authorities\u201d and \u201cthief-officials\u201d in connection with the criminal proceedings against Mr Simonenko. It further found that in the light of the introduction to the article, \u201cMaksim Kosenkov and Ruslan Pogulyayev will be on trial in Bryansk. The lads wanted to replicate the deed of the Bryansk thieves from the local administration, but they lacked the power, although they had skills in abundance\u201d, it was clear that the first, third and fourth sentences constituted assertions to the effect that the claimant had committed offences and had abused his official position for personal gain. The appellate court found that the second sentence, read together with the sentence \u201cStrangely enough, citizens Denin and Simonenko are still at large\u201d, constituted an assertion that Mr Simonenko should be punished for the offences he had committed. The information had thus been presented by the author as a statement of fact. 15.  The appellate court also noted that according to the dictionary, \u201cthief\u201d meant a person who stole or a criminal who practised theft. It went on to conclude that the above passages, which contained negative judgments, were insulting and discrediting to the moral character of the claimant. They had also diminished his business reputation, portrayed him negatively as a person engaged in criminal activity, as a State official who abused his powers for mercenary ends, and created a wrong perception about the claimant in the eyes of society, both as a citizen and as a deputy governor of the Bryansk Region. The appellate court therefore found that all four sentences in question had damaged the honour and reputation of Mr Simonenko. 16.  On 27 December 2012 the Bryansk Regional Court refused the applicant leave to lodge a cassation appeal. 17.  On an unspecified date Mr Denin also instituted defamation proceedings against the applicant on account of the following two passages from the article: 1.  \u201cHowever, they got carried away by the example of the big Bryansk thieves and failed to take into account that the latter were protected from all sides \u2013 by the powers that be, the party, relations, and so on\u201d; 18.  On 23 April 2013 the Bryanskiy District Court granted the claim. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 22 October 2013 the Bryansk Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and dismissed the claim. The court found that the first passage could not be considered as constituting a statement of fact but was rather a value judgment. Furthermore, the court considered that the passage could not be regarded as concerning the claimant specifically, since neither his name nor the position he held had been mentioned. The applicant had referred to \u201cbig Bryansk thieves\u201d, and, given that the article contained comments on criminal proceeding instituted against other people from the Bryansk administration, it was impossible to regard the passage as relating specifically to Mr Denin. In the court\u2019s view, that conclusion was not altered by the publication of Mr Denin\u2019s photograph next to the article, since other people had appeared in the photograph as well. Accordingly, the passage in question could not be considered as defamatory in respect of the claimant. As regards the second passage, the court held that it could not be considered as defamatory either since it had not constituted a statement of fact but had rather been a supposition, which was reflected in the use of the word \u201ccould\u201d.", "references": ["2", "5", "9", "7", "3", "8", "4", "1", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Suponevo, the Bryansk Region. 6.  The applicant has been editor of a weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni (\u0411\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438), since he founded it in 1999. 7.  On 21 February 2008 the applicant published an article in Bryanskiye Budni no. 429/7 headlined \u201cFedorov always takes the lead\u201d (\u201c\u0424\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0432\u0441\u0435\u0433\u0434\u0430 \u0432\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u201d) about Viktor Fedorovich Fedorov, a member of the Bryansk Region Duma and the head of the regional Committee on Legislation, Law and Order and State Service. It discussed Mr Fedorov\u2019s having switched political parties and his wealth. The article read as follows, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cHe got into the regional Duma on the party lists of the Social Democrats. I remember that in a big beautiful poster Fedorov was seen showing off in the company of Anatoliy Bugayev and Nikolay Rudenok. Now Viktor Fedorovich is a member of the Duma faction of United Russia, as is Mr Bugayev. A very convenient and interesting position which, most importantly, is based on principle. In fact, they both \u2018dumped\u2019 the Social Democrat Nikolay Rudenok. Some say that is pure betrayal. Others contend that that is just politics ...\nNow the \u2018sweet couple\u2019 of former Social Democrats are united in their dislike of the speaker of the regional Duma Vladimir Gaydukov. Considering that the deputy speaker Bugayev is eager to get the post of speaker, it is very likely that he could have promised his current post to the head of the Committee on Legislation ... And why not?\nAt present Mr Fedorov is at a political crossroads. If they include him on the United Russia list for the elections to the regional Duma, he will only be at the very end of the list. To be a candidate in a single-member constituency entails expenses, and that would go against his principles.\nHowever, according to rumour, the head of the Committee on Legislation, Law and Order and State Service is a well-to-do man and has a \u2018small wholesale business\u2019 in neighbouring Orel. Sources note that he all too often takes a \u2018promenade\u2019 there in his official cars.\nAt first they thought Mr Fedorov was going there for the rich legislative experience of Orel\u2019s parliamentarians. However, it became clear later that the \u2018experience\u2019 he wanted was of a somewhat different nature ...\nDuring the three years of his \u2018parliamentary career\u2019 the head of the Committee on Legislation, Law and Order and State Service bought three cars for himself. And each one was a foreign car that was cooler than the one before ...\u201d 8.  The following is the original Russian text:\n\u201c\u0412 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0436\u0435 \u0414\u0443\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043d \u043f\u043e\u043f\u0430\u043b \u043f\u043e \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0439\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043c \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b-\u0434\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0432. \u041f\u043e\u043c\u043d\u044e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u043e\u043c \u043a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043f\u043b\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0435 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u043a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0440\u044f\u0434\u043e\u043c \u0441 \u0410\u043d\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0411\u0443\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0432\u044b\u043c \u0438 \u041d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0435\u043c \u0420\u0443\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\u043c. \u0421\u0435\u0439\u0447\u0430\u0441 \u0412\u0438\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0447 \u0443\u0436\u0435 \u044f\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0447\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0434\u0443\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0444\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u00ab\u0415\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f\u00bb, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d \u0411\u0443\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0432. \u041e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0443\u0434\u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0438 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f, \u0430 \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0446\u0438\u044f. \u0424\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0438 \u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d, \u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0439 \u00ab\u043a\u0438\u043d\u0443\u043b\u0438\u00bb \u043b\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b-\u0434\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u041d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0443\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430. \u041e\u0434\u043d\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440\u044f\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0447\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439\u0448\u0435\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0434\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e. \u0414\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0430\u044e\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u044d\u0442\u043e \u2013 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0430 ...\n\u0422\u0435\u043f\u0435\u0440\u044c \u00ab\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0430\u00bb \u0431\u044b\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b-\u0434\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u00ab\u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0430\u0442\u00bb \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0414\u0443\u043c\u044b \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0430 \u0413\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0443\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0432\u0438\u0446\u0435-\u0441\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0440 \u0411\u0443\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0432 \u0440\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f, \u0442\u043e \u0432\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435 \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e, \u043e\u043d \u043c\u043e\u0433 \u043f\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0449\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u043d\u044b\u043d\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u0444\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443 ... \u0410 \u043f\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0431\u044b \u0438 \u043d\u0435\u0442?\n\u0412 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u0449\u0435\u0435 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d \u0424\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0442\u044c\u0435. \u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0445 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0414\u0443\u043c\u0443 \u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u0442 \u0432 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u00ab\u0415\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438\u00bb, \u0442\u043e \u0442\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u0432 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e\u043c \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0446\u0435. \u0411\u0430\u043b\u043b\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u043f\u043e \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0438\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443 \u2013 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f, \u0430 \u044d\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0435 \u0432 \u0435\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0445.\n\u0425\u043e\u0442\u044f \u043f\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0445\u0430\u043c, \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443, \u0432\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0430\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043f\u043e\u0440\u044f\u0434\u043a\u0430 \u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043a, \u0438 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u00ab\u043c\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u043f\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0435\u0441\u00bb \u0432 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u043c \u041e\u0440\u043b\u0435. \u0418\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043c\u0435\u0447\u0430\u044e\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0438\u0448\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e \u043e\u043d \u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0442\u0443\u0434\u0430 \u00ab\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0436\u00bb \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043b\u044f\u0445.\n\u0421\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0434\u0443\u043c\u0430\u043b\u0438, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d \u0424\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0435\u0437\u0434\u0438\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0431\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u044b\u043c \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043e\u043f\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043c \u043e\u0440\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0435\u0432. \u041d\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e \u044f\u0441\u043d\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u044d\u0442\u043e \u00ab\u043e\u043f\u044b\u0442\u00bb \u043d\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430 ...\n\u0417\u0430 \u0442\u0440\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0435\u0433\u043e \u00ab\u0434\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430\u00bb \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443, \u0432\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0430\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043f\u043e\u0440\u044f\u0434\u043a\u0430 \u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0441\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043b \u0442\u0440\u0438 \u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043b\u044f. \u0418 \u0441 \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u044b\u043c \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043b \u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0443 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u0443 \u043a\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0439 ...\u201d 9.  Mr Fedorov brought an action for defamation against the applicant and sought damages in the amount of 40,000 Russian roubles (RUB). He claimed, in particular, that the following passages were untrue and damaging to his honour and reputation: 5.  \u201cDuring the three years of his \u2018parliamentary career\u2019 the head of the Committee ... bought three cars for himself. And each one was a foreign car that was cooler than the one before\u201d. 10.  On 25 March 2008 the Bryanskiy District Court of the Bryansk Region (\u201cthe Bryanskiy District Court\u201d) ordered an examination of the impugned passages by a psychological and linguistic expert. 11.  On 16 September 2008 Bryansk State University issued a report on the psychological and linguistic expert examination (\u201cthe expert report\u201d). In the report the expert specifically noted that the veracity of the statements at issue was not the subject of the examination. 12.  On 17 November 2008 the Bryanskiy District Court allowed the claim in part. In its decision the court relied heavily on the expert report. 13.  With regard to the first quote, the court referred to the conclusion of the expert report that the expression \u201cdumped\u201d contained a negative assessment of the claimant as an immoral person and found that, therefore, the passage contained information damaging to his honour and reputation. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s submission to the effect that the word \u201cdumped\u201d had been used in quotes specifically to emphasise its figurative sense. 14.  At the same time, the court found that the second quote did not contain any information damaging to the claimant\u2019s honour and reputation. 15.  With regard to the third and fourth quotes, the applicant argued that under Articles 34 and 35 of the Constitution (see paragraph 24 below) everyone had the right to exercise an entrepreneurial activity and dispose of his or her property and that the quotes in question therefore contained no allegations of unlawful activities and could not be considered as defamatory. He also stated that the third quote had specified that it was based on rumours and therefore amounted to a supposition. 16.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments and referred to the conclusions of the expert report, which stated that the third and fourth quotes contained information which showed the claimant in a negative light. In particular, they had portrayed him as a person who had committed the immoral and antisocial deed of using his official car for private purposes, and who had possibly even exercised an unlawful activity because members of the regional Duma were prohibited from other paid duties. In that regard the court referred to section 6 of the Law on the State of a Deputy of the Bryansk Region Duma (see paragraph 26 below) and noted that the claimant had provided it with a certificate from the tax authorities showing that he had not been an individual entrepreneur since 2005. It also took into account certificates from his employer about four business trips in official cars to Orel between 2005 and 2007 and concluded that the passages in question contained information damaging to the claimant\u2019s honour and reputation. 17.  Lastly, with regard to the fifth quote, the court again relied on the findings of the expert report, which stated that the impugned passage contained information damaging to the claimant\u2019s honour and reputation as it implied antisocial conduct on his part by suggesting that he had pursued his own enrichment instead of defending the interests of the public. The court also took into account a registration certificate for a Mitsubishi Pajero Sport presented by the claimant and found that the quote was damaging to his honour and business reputation. 18.  The court found the editorial board of Bryanskiye Budni and the applicant jointly liable for RUB 40,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the claimant. It also ordered the newspaper to publish a retraction within ten days of the judgment\u2019s entry into force. 19.  The applicant appealed. 20.  On 25 December 2008 the Bryansk Regional Court upheld the judgment.", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "7", "3", "9", "5", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kramatorsk. 6.  In July 2001 a journalist, Mr Igor Aleksandrov, was beaten to death by unknown persons in the premises of the local television company in Slovyansk, which he headed. He was the author of a number of television programmes on corruption and organised crime in the region. 7.  The above tragic event sparked a broad public outcry. 8.  In August 2001 the police arrested a certain V. on suspicion of Mr Aleksandrov\u2019s murder. V. was homeless and had no means of subsistence, being newly released from prison, where he had served a sentence for theft. Although he confessed to the crime in question many times, his statements lacked coherence. Eventually, he mentioned that he had entered into an agreement with a certain B., also a former convict, who had promised him a car and an apartment in exchange for his confessing to the journalist\u2019s murder. B. himself had been acting upon the instructions of certain law\u2011enforcement officials. He had assured V. that the latter would be taken care of in prison and that his term of imprisonment would be minimal. 9.  It appears that B. went missing in October 2001. 10.  In May 2002 the first-instance court acquitted and released V. In July 2002 he died, supposedly of heart failure. Subsequently, a criminal investigation was launched into V.\u2019s suspected poisoning. Its outcome is not clear from the case-file materials. 11.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were initiated in respect of the assumed murder of B., even though his body had not been found. 12.  At the time of the events the applicant held the post of deputy head of the Kramatorsk City Police Department. 13.  On 28 January 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in respect of a suspected abuse of office having led to grave consequences. Namely, he was suspected of having falsified the criminal case against V. According to the prosecution, the applicant, aiming to avoid responsibility for the failure to uncover the journalist\u2019s murder, had instructed B. to find a vulnerable person who would agree to confess to the crime in question in exchange for remuneration. Accordingly, B. had convinced V. to play that role. The applicant was also suspected of having instructed his subordinates to either bribe or coerce a taxi driver into committing perjury with a view to his acting as a witness against V. 14.  On 10 February 2004 the applicant was arrested as a suspect. 15.  On 13 February 2004 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (\u201cthe Pecherskyy Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. His pre-trial detention was subsequently extended on many occasions. 16.  On various dates in 2004 further criminal cases were opened against the applicant and other persons in respect of: several counts of suspected kidnapping and aggravated murder and a further episode of abuse of office (selling a car which had been impounded as material evidence). Furthermore, a criminal case was opened against the applicant in respect of B.\u2019s murder. All the cases in question were joined to the one initiated earlier. 17.  During his questioning on 8 November 2004 the applicant confessed to having falsified, together with another police officer, the criminal case against V., as well as to having been involved in V.\u2019s poisoning and to having murdered B. 18.  On 28 November 2004 the applicant retracted his statements of 8 November 2004 and lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, submitting that he had been coerced into self-incrimination under psychological pressure. 19.  On 5 April 2005 the Supreme Court extended the term of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to eighteen months (until 10 August 2005) in the light of the particular complexity of the proceedings. 20.  On 8 July 2005 the pre-trial investigation was declared completed. The investigator also made a formal declaration that the case file was available for inspection by the accused and their lawyers. 21.  On 14 July 2005 the applicant was given access to the case file. 22.  On 5 August 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Kyiv Court\u201d) extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to twenty months (until 10 October 2005) on the grounds that the applicant and his lawyers had not finished studying the case file, which consisted of over a hundred volumes. The applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted that the extension was not justified as, in any event, they had not received access to all the case-file materials. His argument was dismissed. The court based its ruling on Articles 156 and 165\u20113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 below). 23.  On 6 October and 8 December 2005, and on 6 March and 7 April 2006, the Kyiv Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, respectively, to twenty-two, twenty-five, twenty-six and twenty-seven months (until 10 May 2006) on the same grounds as before. 24.  On 28 April 2006 the case file was sent to the Supreme Court for it to determine the court which would conduct the trial. 25.  On 23 May 2006 the Supreme Court referred the case to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Zaporizhzhya Court\u201d). 26.  On 12 September 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Court held a preparatory hearing. It decided to keep the earlier chosen preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 27.  On 18 June 2008 the trial court allowed a request by the prosecutor for the charge regarding B.\u2019s murder to be severed into a separate set of proceedings. That part of the case was sent to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for additional investigation. There is no information on any further developments in those proceedings or their outcome. 28.  On 17 December 2008 the trial court severed into a separate set of proceedings another charge against the applicant \u2013 concerning suspected abuse of office leading to grave consequences (the falsification of the criminal case against V.) \u2013 and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation. 29.  The remaining charges against the applicant, in respect of which the Zaporizhzhya Court continued his trial, concerned several counts of kidnapping and murder, as well as abuse of office on account of his having sold the evidence. 30.  On 19 February 2009 the Zaporizhzhya Court delivered a judgment by which it acquitted the applicant of kidnapping and murder for lack of evidence of his guilt. The applicant was, however, found guilty of abuse of office in respect of his having sold evidence. He was sentenced to five years and nine days\u2019 imprisonment. Given that the applicant had already served that term, he was released in the court room. As a preventive measure until the verdict became final, he was placed under an undertaking not to leave the town. 31.  On the same date the trial court issued a separate ruling (see paragraph 59 below) with a view to bringing to the attention of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office certain shortcomings in the pre-trial investigation, which it considered to have been superficial and inadequate. The court also noted that throughout 2005-2008 the investigator in charge had given numerous interviews to various television and print media depicting the applicant and the other co\u2011accused as guilty, without changing their names (see paragraphs 41-43 below). The Zaporizhzhya Court held that such behaviour had been in breach of the accused\u2019s right to presumption of innocence and had amounted to exerting pressure on the court. 32.  On 29 October 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision of 17 December 2008 (see paragraph 28 above), as well as both the judgment and the separate ruling of 19 February 2009 (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above). It criticised the Zaporizhzhya Court, in particular for not having made any specific recommendations as to how the investigation could be improved. As regards the separate ruling, the Supreme Court noted that it had wrongly been issued in respect of the part of the proceedings remitted for additional investigation. The criminal case was remitted for fresh examination by a first-instance court. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the part of the trial court\u2019s decision placing the applicant under an undertaking not to leave town as a preventive measure. 33.  Pursuant to a decision of the President of the Supreme Court, the case was referred to the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Lugansk Court\u201d) as a first-instance court, which started the trial on 22 February 2010. 34.  On 25 January 2012 the Lugansk Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention following a request made by the prosecutor. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that order. 35.  On 6 February 2012 the trial court severed the charge of abuse of office (concerning the illegal sale of evidence) into a separate set of proceedings and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation. 36.  On 20 March 2012 the Lugansk Court found the applicant guilty of abuse of office leading to grave consequences (concerning the falsification of the case file in respect of V.) and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, with no right to hold public posts for three years. It also found the applicant guilty of perjury and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment on that count. As regards the last-mentioned charge, the court held that the prosecution had become time-barred and that the applicant was not therefore to serve that part of the sentence. By the same judgment, the trial court acquitted the applicant of the other charges (creating a criminal gang, as well as several counts of kidnapping and aggravated murder) for want of evidence. It decided to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure until the verdict became final. 37.  On 17 August 2012 the Rubizhne Town Court (\u201cthe Rubizhne Court\u201d) held a preparatory hearing for the applicant\u2019s trial in respect of the abuse-of-office charge regarding the illegal sale of evidence, which had been remitted for additional investigation on 6 February 2012 (see paragraph 35 above). It observed that, while the issue of a preventive measure had not been dealt with within that set of proceedings, the applicant was already detained in a different context under the judgment of 20 March 2012. Accordingly, the Rubizhne Court ordered his pre-trial detention as the most appropriate preventive measure pending trial in respect of the severed charge also. 38.  On 12 December 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe Higher Specialised Court\u201d) modified the Lugansk Court\u2019s judgment of 20 March 2012. It held that the applicant was to be absolved from serving the sentence altogether, given that the only charge which had entailed the imposition of that sentence (abuse of office on account of the falsification of the case file in respect of V. \u2013 see paragraph 36 above) had become time-barred as well. The Higher Specialised Court therefore ordered that the applicant be released. 39.  The applicant, however, continued to be detained as a preventive measure in the context of his trial on the charge of abuse of office concerning the illegal sale of material evidence, which remained pending (see paragraph 37 above). 40.  On 24 January 2013 the Rubizhne Court allowed a request lodged by the applicant for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued because the only remaining charge against him (abuse of office on account of the illegal sale of evidence) had become time-barred. The applicant was released in the court room. 41.  In 2005 a thirty-minute documentary \u201cThe Deadly Agreement\u201d (\u0421\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430) was broadcast on one of the national television channels, STB. As indicated during the programme, it was created with the support of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Interior (specifically, its Main Department for the Organised Crime Combatting). The documentary was about the agreement between V. and the law-enforcement officials, and the subsequent murder of V. and B. The applicant was named as the person who had proposed the agreement and as B.\u2019s murderer. The programme comprised, in particular, short films, in which the roles of the applicant and the other persons concerned were played by professional actors. One of those short films depicted the applicant murdering B. Furthermore, there were numerous interviews given by the investigator in charge, as well as by several officials of the Security Service. They shared their version of the events of the case in the form of what appeared to be factual statements, without specifying at what stage the proceedings had reached at the times of the various interviews. The fate of V. was described with a lot of emotion. The programme also contained extracts from the applicant\u2019s questioning of 8 November 2004, during which he confessed to having falsified the criminal case against V. and to having murdered B. (see paragraph 17 above). 42.  The above-mentioned programme was transmitted on STB at least twelve times between 2005 and 2008, and possibly later. 43.  In addition, the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case gave numerous interviews (making the same assertions as those made in the aforementioned programme) to various printed media. 44.  In 2012 the applicant was detained, with brief interruptions, in the Lugansk SIZO. According to the applicant, he was detained there from 20 March until 28 December 2012; however, according to the Government\u2019s submissions and the documents in the case file, the period of his detention in that facility was from 25 January until 20 December 2012. 45.  According to the applicant, the cells were extremely small and lacked proper ventilation; the sanitary conditions were very poor; the toilet was not separated from the living area and the applicant was obliged to take meals in its close vicinity; and the bed was infested with bedbugs. Furthermore, the applicant was allegedly often deprived of the daily hour\u2011long outdoor walk provided for by law. 46.  The Government submitted that they were not in a position to provide a description of the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Lugansk SIZO given that, following the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Lugansk was on non-Government controlled territory. 47.  On 25 January 2012, upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at the Lugansk SIZO, he underwent a medical examination, chest X-ray and blood analysis, with no particular health concerns being reported. At the same time, the doctors documented his medical history \u2013 namely, that he had suffered from hepatitis and had had surgery on account, in particular, of an inguinal hernia and an umbilical hernia. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he did not raise any health-related complaints at that stage. 48.  On 30 January 2012 a dermatologist and a psychiatrist examined the applicant in the Lugansk SIZO and reported the absence of any acute health concerns. At the same time, he was registered for medical monitoring on account of hypertension, chronic pancreatitis and chronic cholecystitis. 49.  Following complaints made by the applicant of headaches, dizziness and numbness of the tongue, on 28 November 2012 he was examined by a doctor of the Lugansk SIZO, who diagnosed a hypertensive crisis and administered him some medications. It was recommended that the applicant be examined by a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO and that he undergo an electrocardiogram. 50.  On 29 November 2012 the applicant underwent an electrocardiogram, which showed that he had a rotated heart and indications of left ventricular hypertrophy. 51.  On 6 December 2012 a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO examined the applicant and diagnosed him with: ischemic heart disease, stable effort angina, diffuse cardiosclerosis, cardiac insufficiency and high-risk hypertensive heart disease. Certain medications were prescribed to the applicant and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient medical treatment in the SIZO\u2019s medical unit and that his blood pressure be monitored. 52.  The Government were not able to provide further factual details as to whether the applicant had undergone the recommended medical treatment because they did not have access to the Lugansk SIZO\u2019s documentation (see also paragraph 46 above). 53.  According to the applicant, he was not hospitalised. 54.  On 24 January 2013 the applicant was released (see paragraph 40 above). 55.  The case file contains an extract from the applicant\u2019s clinical record from the cardiological department of the town hospital, in which he underwent inpatient medical treatment from 10 until 22 April 2013 on account of headaches and chest pain, accompanied by shortness of breath. According to the applicant\u2019s explanation summarised in that record, he had been suffering from headaches and hypertension since 2000 and his health had been deteriorating because of stressful circumstances in his life since September 2004. A limited improvement in the applicant\u2019s health condition was reported at the time of his discharge. 56.  The case file also contains a report of the ultrasound scan of the knee joints that the applicant underwent on 5 July 2013. He was diagnosed with a \u201cBaker\u2019s cyst\u201d (a pocket of fluid forming a lump behind the knee) in respect of both knees. 57.  The applicant lodged a civil claim against the State Treasury seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of his unlawful criminal prosecution and detention under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 62 below). 58.  Courts at three levels of jurisdiction (the Kramatorsk City Court on 10 December 2013, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal on 17 January 2014 and the Higher Specialised Court on 17 February 2014) rejected his claim as being without basis. They held that the Compensation Act did not provide for compensation in the applicant\u2019s situation because he had been acquitted only in part.", "references": ["8", "4", "7", "0", "6", "9", "5", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Klaip\u0117da. 6.  On 19 February 2012 V.M. complained to the Klaip\u0117da police that on that day he had been beaten up in the stairwell of his residential building by two teenagers, fifteen-year-old A.K. (the applicant\u2019s son) and seventeen\u2011year-old V.O. He was examined by a court medical expert, who found bruises and swelling on his face, concussion, contusions in the chest area and a resulting inflammation of the right lung, and a compression fracture of the spine. The injuries were categorised as a minor health impairment (nesunkus sveikatos sutrikdymas). The police opened a pre-trial investigation. 7.  When interviewed by the police, V.M. stated that at about 5 p.m. on 19 February 2012 he had heard a noise in the stairwell of his residential building and had gone out of his apartment to check. He had seen four teenagers smoking cigarettes and listening to loud music on a mobile phone, and there had been cans of beer at the window. V.M. had asked the teenagers to leave the building and two of them had done so. However, A.K. had refused to leave, so V.M. had threatened to call the police. Then A.K. had approached V.M. and punched him in the face. That had angered V.M., so he had blocked the exit of the stairwell and had tried to grab A.K. He had managed to grab A.K. by the coat, shaken him and told him to leave the building. Then V.O. had approached V.M. and tried to hit him but V.M. had managed to dodge the punches. At that moment A.K. had hit V.M. in the head and kicked him in the back, as a result of which V.M. had fallen down a flight of stairs. While he had been lying down, A.K. and V.O. had kicked him several times in the back and the face. V.M. had screamed for his wife to call the police and had eventually lost consciousness. He had come to in his apartment and the police had soon arrived. 8.  The applicant\u2019s son, A.K., was interviewed as a witness, with the applicant present during the interview. A.K. stated that on the day in question he and his three friends, including V.O., had entered the stairwell of a residential building in their neighbourhood to get warm. They had stayed in the stairwell for a while, talking and listening to music on a mobile phone, but they had not been smoking or drinking alcohol. After some time, V.M., whom they had not known, had come out of his apartment and had begun yelling at the teenagers. A.K. had asked him to stop yelling, after which V.M. had grabbed A.K. by the neck and kicked him in the legs. A.K. had stood up and tried to leave but had been unable to do so because V.M. had been standing in the way. V.M. had tried to grab A.K. and punch him, so A.K. had punched V.M. twice in self-defence. Then V.M. had grabbed A.K.\u2019s leg and A.K. had fallen down. When he had stood up, he had seen V.M. holding V.O. by the neck and trying to drag him inside the apartment. V.O. had asked A.K. to push V.M. and A.K. had done so. V.O. had managed to free himself and had pushed V.M. as well, and V.M. had fallen on the ground. Then A.K. and V.O. had run away. A.K. stated that V.M. had been the first to hit him and that he had hit V.M. only in self-defence. As a result, A.K. had broken his right hand, although he was not sure at which exact moment that had happened. He also stated that he had not seen V.O. hit V.M. 9.  V.O.\u2019s mother joined the proceedings as her son\u2019s representative and was questioned as a witness. She stated that after finding out about the allegations against her son, she had spoken to V.M. and the latter had told her that the conflict had broken out between him and A.K., whereas V.O. had only intervened later to help A.K. V.M. had also told her that A.K. had punched him first. She further stated that her son had likewise told her that he had not hit V.M. but had only held him. 10.  The police held a confrontation between V.M. and A.K., with the applicant present, during which they both essentially repeated their previous statements (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). The police also accompanied them both to the location of the incident (the stairwell) and they each showed how their claimed version of events had unfolded. 11.  On an unspecified date V.O. was charged with causing a minor health impairment and a breach of public order under Articles 138 \u00a7 1 and 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 12.  On 19 November 2012 the Klaip\u0117da District Court held an oral hearing in which A.K. was questioned as a witness and the applicant did not participate. A.K. essentially repeated his previous testimony (see paragraph 8 above). 13.  On 27 November 2012 the Klaip\u0117da District Court convicted V.O. of the charges against him. The court considered that even though V.O. had denied his guilt, it had been proved by other evidence: V.O. had admitted that he had participated in the altercation with V.M. and that he had instructed A.K. to push V.M., and credible witness testimony had shown that \u201cthe victim had been assaulted not only by [A.K.] but by [V.O.] as well\u201d. The court held that V.O. had committed the criminal offence while acting together with a minor below the age of criminal responsibility (A.K.), that he had encouraged A.K. to assault V.M., and that he had not stopped A.K. from doing so; accordingly he had to assume all the consequences of the criminal activity in question. V.O. was sentenced to one year of restriction of liberty and ordered to study or work during that period. The court allowed in part a civil claim lodged by V.M. for damages in respect of the assault, and ordered V.O. to pay him 240 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 70 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage and LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 580) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 14.  V.M. appealed against that judgment, asking that the award be increased in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 21 March 2013 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court partly allowed his appeal. It upheld V.O.\u2019s conviction and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage to LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,450). 15.  In May 2013 V.M. lodged a civil claim against the applicant and her son. V.M. submitted that A.K.\u2019s violent actions had impaired his health and had caused him physical and psychological suffering. He claimed LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage jointly from the applicant and A.K. 16.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court instructed V.M. to amend his claim and to indicate the specific actions of A.K. which had allegedly caused him harm. In June 2013 V.M. lodged an amended claim in which he submitted that A.K. had punched him in the face, arms and head, had kicked him in the back, as a result of which he had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that while he had been lying down, A.K. had kicked him again several times. 17.  The applicant and her son contested the claim. They argued that V.M. could not have relied on the courts\u2019 findings in the criminal proceedings against V.O. because A.K. had not been convicted in those proceedings and had only had the status of a witness. They also argued that V.M. should have submitted his claim not only against A.K.\u2019s mother (the applicant) but also against A.K.\u2019s father, who they argued was equally responsible for the actions of his minor son. Lastly they submitted that the amount of the claim was excessive because A.K. was a student and did not have any income, and the applicant was unemployed. 18.  At an oral hearing held on 8 November 2013, V.M. stated that A.K. had been the one who had started the assault. V.M. submitted that the courts in the criminal proceedings had ruled that V.O. and A.K. had committed the assault together (see paragraph 13 above); thus, even though A.K. could not have been held criminally liable because of his age, his actions had been established by a final court judgment. Meanwhile the applicant and her son\u2019s lawyer argued that the judgments given in the criminal proceedings against V.O. did not have a res judicata effect (neturi prejudicin\u0117s galios) in the present civil proceedings because the criminal and the civil proceedings had concerned different parties and the courts in the criminal proceedings had not made any findings as to A.K.\u2019s guilt in the operative part of their judgments. The lawyer also submitted that in the criminal proceedings it had not been identified which injuries had been caused by V.O. and which by A.K. 19.  On 28 November 2013 the Klaip\u0117da District Court partly allowed V.M.\u2019s claim. Referring to the material in the criminal case file, the court considered it established that A.K. had punched V.M. in the face, arms and head and had kicked him in the back, as a result of which V.M. had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that while he had been lying down, A.K. had kicked him again several times (see paragraphs 7 and 13 above). It also referred to the findings of the court medical expert who had examined V.M. and determined the injuries caused to him during the assault (see paragraph 6 above). The court further stated:\n\u201cWhen questioned during the pre-trial investigation, [A.K.] confessed that he had hit the victim and had pushed him down the stairs, stating that he had done so in self\u2011defence ... As a result of [A.K.\u2019s] actions, the victim had suffered harm. These facts were established in the course of criminal proceedings, during the pre-trial investigation (Article 182 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure); the defendants have not provided any facts that could disprove [A.K.\u2019s] guilt, so there is no need to prove these established facts with regard to [A.K.\u2019s] unlawful actions and guilt (\u0161i\u0173 nustatyt\u0173 fakt\u0173 d\u0117l atsakovo [A.K.] neteis\u0117t\u0173 veiksm\u0173 ir kalt\u0117s nereikia \u012frodin\u0117ti).\u201d 20.  The court further held that there had been a causal link between A.K.\u2019s actions and the harm suffered by V.M., so there were sufficient grounds for awarding V.M. damages. It dismissed the defendants\u2019 argument that A.K.\u2019s father should have been one of the defendants, taking note of V.M.\u2019s argument that A.K.\u2019s father lived separately from his family and that V.M. did not have any information about him, and stating that the civil claimant had had the freedom to choose the defendants against whom he wished to submit his claim. 21.  The court, having regard to A.K.\u2019s young age and the applicant\u2019s difficult financial situation, allowed V.M.\u2019s civil claim in part and awarded him LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 580) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 435) in legal costs. The court ordered that the above amounts were to be paid by A.K., and that if he did not have sufficient assets they were to be paid by the applicant. The applicant\u2019s obligation to pay those amounts would end when A.K. turned eighteen years old or when he obtained sufficient assets (see paragraph 32 below). 22.  The applicant and her son appealed against that decision, raising essentially the same arguments as those presented in their initial reply to the civil claim (see paragraph 17 above). V.M. also submitted an appeal in which he asked for his claim to be allowed in full and to be awarded LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 23.  On 28 April 2014 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant and her son. It stated:\n\u201cThe defendants in their appeal submitted that the judgment [in the criminal proceedings against V.O.] had not assessed [A.K.\u2019s] guilt in respect of the criminal offence and that the court could thus not have relied on the circumstances established in the judgment of 27 November 2012. This argument cannot be accepted. The Klaip\u0117da District Court\u2019s judgment of 27 November 2012 and the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 21 March 2013 established that unlawful actions had been committed by the defendant [A.K.] as well. The first-instance court correctly stated that the circumstances which had been established in the course of the criminal proceedings could be relied on and that there was no need to prove them (baud\u017eiamojoje byloje nustatytomis aplinkyb\u0117mis galima vadovautis ir j\u0173 nebereikia \u012frodin\u0117ti) (Article 182 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The [court] notes that the fact that the defendant has not been prosecuted in criminal proceedings does not preclude his civil liability ... The first-instance court drew the well-founded conclusion that the conditions for the civil liability of the defendants were present: unlawful actions, fault, a causal link determining civil liability, and the damage caused to [V.M.].\u201d 24.  The court partly upheld the appeal submitted by V.M. and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damages to LTL 8,000 (approximately EUR 2,320). The applicant and A.K. were also ordered to pay the legal expenses incurred by V.M. at the appellate stage, amounting to LTL 300 (approximately EUR 87). 25.  Subsequently the applicant and her son lodged two appeals on points of law in which they argued that the decisions of the first-instance and the appellate courts had been contrary to the law and the principles of fairness, reasonableness and good faith. In particular, they submitted that awarding a higher amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage against them (EUR 2,320) than had been awarded against V.O. (EUR 1,450), who had been convicted in criminal proceedings had been contrary to the law and unjustified. However, on 29 May 2014 and 31 July 2014 the Supreme Court declined to examine the appeals as raising no important legal issues.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "2", "4", "0", "5", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Suponevo, the Bryansk Region. 6.  The applicant has been editor of a weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni (\u0411\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438), since he founded it in 1999. 7.  In June 2010 the prosecuting authorities conducted a check into compliance with fire safety rules at the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre (\u0422\u0420\u0426 \u0422\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445). The report stated that fifteen breaches of the rules had been found. 8.  On 21 June 2010 the prosecutor applied to a court with a request, inter alia, to order N.K. Timoshkov, the owner of the shopping centre, to rectify the breaches. 9.  By a final decision of 2 August 2010 the application was allowed in that part. 10.  Enforcement proceedings were instituted and subsequently discontinued. 11.  In September 2011 the prosecuting authorities conducted another check. They found that the breaches had not been rectified and, moreover, found new ones. Overall, fifty violations of fire safety regulations were found, of which fifteen were considered to pose a threat to the life and health of people inside the centre. 12.  The bailiffs\u2019 decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings was set aside. 13.  At the same time the prosecutor instituted new court proceedings against the shopping centre, seeking to have the fire safety breaches rectified. The prosecutor also asked the court to close the shopping centre temporarily as a provisional measure until fire safety regulations had been complied with fully. 14.  On an unspecified date the Bryansk Regional Court ordered the shopping centre to close temporarily. The proceedings on the merits remained pending, and a further hearing was scheduled for 27 March 2012. 15.  On 23 March 2012 the Regnum Centre news portal published an article on its website about the temporary closure of the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre due to breaches of fire safety rules. 16.  On 26 March 2012 the iBryansk.ru news portal published an article on its website about a meeting between Mr Timoshkov and representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Bryansk prosecutor, the head of the Bryansk Administration and Mikhail Klimov, a deputy governor of the Bryansk Region. 17.  On 27 March 2012 the bnews32.ru news portal published an article about a court order to close the shopping centre. The article also stated that the owner of the shopping centre considered the measure to be too severe, and that Nikolay Denin, governor of the Bryansk Region, had instructed Mr Klimov to personally take charge of the matter. 18.  On the same date Regnum Centre published an article that at the 27 March 2012 hearing the Bezhitskiy District Curt of Bryansk had dismissed an application to lift the provisional measure. The article also stated that Mr Timoshkov had been very active in connection with the closure of the shopping centre and had already met representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Bryansk prosecutor, the head of the Bryansk Administration and Mr Klimov. The news portal reported that as the court hearing had taken place after the meeting, Mr Timoshkov had been outraged by the decision and had said as follows: \u201cIn my opinion, which is shared by officials at the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Deputy Governor Klimov, there is no threat to people\u2019s safety. I do not know why [the court delivered] such a decision. We shall appeal against it.\u201d 19.  On 29 March 2012 the province.ru news portal published an article on its website saying that the Bryansk prosecutor\u2019s office had applied to the court to lift the suspension of the shopping centre\u2019s activities, as announced by the deputy prosecutor, A. Stupak, at a meeting of the regional Duma. The article said that he had stated that the breaches that had been found were not considered by the Ministry of Emergency Situations as posing a threat to the life of employees and customers at the centre and that the owner had rectified some of them. 20.  On 30 March 2012 the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre reopened. 21.  On 11 April 2012 province.ru published an article on its website which read as follows:\n\u201cOn 27 March the building was closed due to breaches of fire safety rules. By a court decision provisional measures were applied for one month pending rectification of the breaches.\nThose events caused a stir. Businessmen talked to the regional prosecutor. Town and regional officials pleaded on behalf of the business. As a result, on 30 March the prosecutor\u2019s office withdrew its complaint and the shopping centre opened again.\nHowever, yesterday the regional court refused to lift the provisional measures. That means that before 27 April the building may be closed again. Today the shopping centre is open as usual. However, tenants say that bailiffs might visit them again on 13 April. In the meantime, the businessmen are going to again ask the prosecutor\u2019s office for clarification.\u201d 22.  On 29 March 2012 the applicant published an article in Bryanskiye Budni no. 639/12 headlined \u201c... and were Timoshkov\u2019s errand boys\u201d (\u201c... \u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0443 \u0422\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0430\u0445\u201d)[1], where he criticised the officials who had taken the side of the shopping centre in the above events. The relevant part of the article reads as follows:\n\u201cThe finest forces were mustered in support of Timoshkov. The most notorious sages gathered at the table \u2013 deputy governor Mikhail Klimov, the head of the town administration Sergey Smirnov and other officials. They were ordered to rescue their patron Timoshkov, and they did so. Quite a few establishments have been closed on account of a breach of fire safety rules, yet no such cavalry ever came to their rescue. The highest officials rushed to defend the interests of businessman Timoshkov ...\nThe corrupt Bryansk officials gave themselves away and did not even understand what had happened. Actually, they would not have been very embarrassed even if they had realised that they had revealed their connections. \u2018Who are you with, masters of culture?\u2019 they used to say in the times of Stalin. Another question needs to be asked in Bryansk: \u2018Who are you with, masters of thievery? Who are you defending?\u2019\u201d 23.  The original Russian version is given below:\n\u201c\u041d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443 \u0422\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0443 \u0431\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043b\u0443\u0447\u0448\u0438\u0435 \u0441\u0438\u043b\u044b. \u0417\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043c \u0441\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0441\u0430\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u043e\u0442\u044a\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0443\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0446\u044b \u2013 \u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0433\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0438\u043b \u041a\u043b\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0432, \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0435\u0439 \u0421\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438. \u0418\u043c \u0434\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0443 \u0441\u043f\u0430\u0441\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u043b\u044c\u0446\u0430 \u0422\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u0438 \u043e\u043d\u0438 \u0441\u043f\u0430\u0441\u0430\u043b\u0438. \u041c\u0430\u043b\u043e \u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e \u0438\u0437-\u0437\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043f\u043e\u0436\u0430\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043d\u043e\u0440\u043c, \u043d\u043e \u043d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043d\u0435 \u0431\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u0440\u0443\u0447\u043a\u0443 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0442. \u0418\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u044b \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0437\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0422\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043a\u0438\u043d\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432\u044b\u0441\u0448\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 ...\n\u0411\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0440\u044b \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0438 \u0434\u0430\u0436\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043d\u044f\u043b\u0438, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c. \u0412\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043c, \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0438\u0448\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0431\u044b \u0438 \u0441\u043c\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c, \u0435\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u044b \u0432\u0441\u0435-\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u043b\u0438, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438. \u00ab\u0421 \u043a\u0435\u043c \u0432\u044b, \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u043a\u0443\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0443\u0440\u044b?\u00bb - \u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0421\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0435. \u0414\u043b\u044f \u0411\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0448\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441: \u00ab\u0421 \u043a\u0435\u043c \u0432\u044b, \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u0441\u043b\u0430? \u041a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0435?\u201d 24.  On 23 April 2012 Mr Klimov brought an action for defamation against the applicant and sought damages of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB). He asserted, in particular, that the following passages were untrue and damaging to his honour and reputation: 1.  \u201cThe finest forces were mustered in support of Timoshkov. The most notorious sages gathered at the table \u2013 deputy governor Mikhail Klimov, the head of the town administration Sergey Smirnov and other officials. They were ordered to rescue their patron Timoshkov, and they did so ... The highest officials rushed to defend the interests of businessman Timoshkov.\u201d 25.  On 27 September 2012 the Bryansk District Court of the Bryansk Region allowed the claim. In its decision it relied on a linguistic expert\u2019s examination of 1 August 2012. According to the expert\u2019s report, the passages in question were susceptible of being looked at in terms of their factual accuracy. In the first and second passages the information had been presented in the form of assertions. The third passage had contained rhetorical questions which had expressed the author\u2019s opinion. However, there was also an implied assertion that those concerned, including the claimant, were \u201cmasters of the thieves\u2019 trade\u201d, that is they had been engaged in unlawful activities. 26.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that all the facts described in the article were true, whereas in the passages concerned he had expressed his opinion. Relying on the above report, the court found that the claimant had been referred to in the passages concerned, which constituted negative statements that had discredited his moral character and damaged his honour, dignity and business reputation. 27.  The court ordered the applicant to publish a retraction within ten days of the judgment\u2019s entry into force and awarded the claimant damages of RUB 5,000 (approximately 125 euros (EUR)). 28.  The applicant appealed. 29.  On 27 November 2012 the Bryansk Regional Court upheld the judgment. 30.  On 19 February 2013 the Bryansk Regional Court refused leave to the applicant to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["5", "8", "0", "4", "1", "3", "9", "7", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1940 and 1950 respectively and live in the village of Khasanya situated on the outskirts of Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, a region in the North Caucasus. They are the parents of Mr Rasul Tsakoyev, who was born in 1978. At the material time, he lived with them and worked in a shop selling mobile phones. 6.  According to the applicants, their son Mr Rasul Tsakoyev was suspected of membership of the illegal armed group, \u201cYarmuk\u201d, and was under the surveillance of the Department for Combating Organised Crime of the Ministry of Interior for Kabardino-Balkaria (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0411\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u041e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0430\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e-\u0411\u0430\u043b\u043a\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u2013 \u201cthe UBOP\u201d). On several occasions \u2212 in particular, on 4 May and 8 September 2003 and again on 18 August 2004 \u2212 he had been unlawfully detained for a number of hours, had been beaten and questioned by State agents, but had then been released without charge. 7.  On 27 and 28 September 2004, a special antiterrorist operation against Yarmuk members was carried out in the town of Nalchik, in the nearby village of Khasanya, and in other settlements in the Elbrusskiy district in Kabardino-Balkaria (see paragraph 15 below).\n(b)  Mr Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s disappearance on 27 September 2004 8.  On the morning of 27 September 2004 Mr Tsakoyev went to the shop where he worked. In the afternoon he told his colleague, Mr M.T., that he needed to go out for a short while. Later he called the colleague from his mobile phone and said: \u201cThey are following me again, I will be back soon\u201d. Mr M.T. understood that Rasul Tsakoyev was talking about the police. Since Mr Tsakoyev did not return to work, between 4 and 5 p.m. Mr M.T. called him, but his mobile phone was switched off. Later in the evening, he again tried calling Mr Tsakoyev, but his telephone was still off. Rasul Tsakoyev did not return home that night. 9.  At about 6 a.m. on 28 September 2004 the police conducted a search at Mr M.T.\u2019s home. The applicants learned about the search from his wife, who called them to warn that their house might be searched too. After the search, Mr M.T. was taken to the premises of the UBOP. He was held there for about twenty hours and then released. 10.  Also on the morning of 28 September 2004, the applicants learned that another friend of Rasul Tsakoyev, Mr R.M., had also been taken to the premises of the UBOP. They went to the building to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev was likewise detained there and asked the duty officer about their son. The officer told them that he had been brought there and would soon be released. No information regarding the grounds for their son\u2019s detention, the possible charges against him, or the exact time of his release was given. They waited at the entrance to the UBOP for a while and then returned home. Sometime later Mr R.M. and Mr M.T. were released, but Rasul Tsakoyev did not return home. 11.  On 29 September 2004 the applicants again went to the UBOP and requested information as to their son\u2019s whereabouts. They told Mr A.Z., the head of Khasanya village administration, that their son had been detained by UBOP officers and asked him to speak to the police and establish their son\u2019s whereabouts. After spending about an hour at the UBOP premises, Mr A.Z. told the applicants that he had spoken with the head of the UBOP, superior officer K., who had told him that their son had not been detained on those premises but had been taken to Khankala in the Chechen Republic. 12.  That afternoon the applicants again went to the UBOP and requested information about their son. However, they were given no information and the head of the UBOP, officer K., refused to see them. 13.  On the same date, the applicant\u2019s daughter complained in writing to the Nalchik prosecutor about the abduction of her brother Rasul Tsakoyev, it was to be presumed by representatives of the law-enforcement agencies. 14.  Later on 29 September 2004 Mr M.T. received a phone call in which he was told that two men from the village of Khasanya had found Rasul Tsakoyev next to a local gas station. He had been severely beaten. 15.  On 30 September 2004 the local newspaper \u201c\u0413\u0430\u0437\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u042e\u0433\u0430\u201d (Gazeta Yuga) in its issue no. 40 (553) published an official statement by the Ministry of the Interior of Kabardino-Balkaria, stating that as a result of the special operation a resident of Khasanya had been arrested, along with two residents of Nalchik. According to the applicants, nobody from Khasanya except their son had been arrested during the special operation.\n(c)  Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s return, his account of the detention and ill-treatment and his subsequent death 16.  Between 8 and 8.30 p.m. on 29 September 2004 two residents of Khasanya, Mr A. A. and Mr R.A., brought Rasul Tsakoyev home. He was severely beaten and groggy. His body was covered with bruises and abrasions, there were cigarette burns on his neck, punctures under his nails, lacerated wounds on his shoulders, marks left by handcuffs and wires on his wrists, and traces of injections on his left forearm and fingers. His heels were smashed and he smelled of medicines. 17.  Mr Tsakoyev told the applicants that on the evening of 27 September 2004, while walking not far from his shop, police officers in masks and camouflage uniforms bearing the stripes of the SOBR (\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u043e\u0442\u0440\u044f\u0434 \u0431\u044b\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u2013 quick response unit) had stopped him. They had put a bag over his head and forced him into a car. They took him to a building where they had taken the bag off. He had immediately recognised the UBOP premises since he had already been questioned there many times. During the three days of his detention there he had been tortured by UBOP officers who, under the orders of the superior officer K., pressurised him into confessing in writing to participation in an illegal armed group. Specifically, he had been given no food or water, the UBOP officers had beaten him with rubber truncheons, had burned cigarettes against his face, head, neck and shoulders, put needles under his nails, and tied his hands and feet with steel wire which had left marks. Once he had been given a liquid to drink which made him sick and he had thrown up. Then he had been given some pills that he had spat out. The officers had also tortured him with electric shocks. After lengthy beatings, a doctor in white overalls had entered the room, examined him, checked his pupils and made some injections that left marks on his shoulders. On the afternoon of 29 September 2004, he had been taken out of the UBOP premises, driven by car to a rubbish dump some two kilometres from the village of Khasanya and left there. He had walked to the gas station on the outskirts of Khasanya, where two local residents Khasanya had found him and taken him home. 18.  On 29 September 2004 after Mr Tsakoyev had been brought home, his relatives called an ambulance. The ambulance doctors diagnosed Mr Tsakoyev with closed craniocerebral injury, brain concussion, multiple contusions, closed fracture of the ribs and contusion of the kidneys. They said he needed to be urgently hospitalised and took him to the Republican Clinical Hospital. 19.  On 4 October 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev died in hospital. According to the medical report of the same date, his death was caused by renal failure, myoglobinemia, right-side pneumonia and severe multi-trauma. 20.  According to the forensic report of 13 October 2004 (see paragraph 61 below), Rasul Tsakoyev had the following injuries: massive blunt trauma with crushing of body muscles complicated by myoglobinemia, renal failure, respiratory failure and encephalopathy; contusion of the heart, lungs, kidneys and bowels; fracture of the sixth and seventh ribs on the left side; posttraumatic pneumonitis on the right side; closed craniocerebral injury and brain concussion; large bruises of the chest and extremities; abrasions of the head and extremities. The above injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects. Abrasions on the wrists had most likely been caused by handcuffs. 21.  On 8 October 2004 residents of the Khasanya village organised a protest meeting demanding prosecution of the police officers responsible for the ill-treatment and death of Rasul Tsakoyev. The head of the Kabardino\u2011Balkaria Government, Mr Gubin, and the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, Mr Ketov, had promised the crowd that the perpetrators would be prosecuted. 22.  On 19 October 2004 two hundred and forty residents of the Khasanya village submitted a joint petition to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor asking him to ensure the prosecution of the police officers who had abducted Rasul Tsakoyev on 27 September 2004 next to the prosecutor\u2019s office and then tortured him until 29 September 2004, causing his death from the ill-treatment they had inflicted. 23.  On 20 December 2004 the residents of Khasanya sent their joint petition to the Russian Prosecutor General and demanded an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Rasul Tsakoyev. 24.  The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the case, as presented by the applicants. They agreed that Mr Tsakoyev had been subjected to ill-treatment as a result of which he had died. However, the alleged involvement of the police in the incident was not confirmed by the criminal investigation. 25.  The Government submitted that between May and June 2005 the Kabardino-Balkaria police had obtained information indicating that Rasul Tsakoyev had actively aided members of the illegal armed group Yarmuk and those leaders had given him and Mr M.A. a large amount for money for the preparation of terrorist attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria. After the failure of the attacks, members of Yarmuk group had been displeased with Rasul Tsakoyev and had claimed their money back. Members of the Yarmuk group used camouflage uniforms and balaclavas and might have impersonated representatives of law-enforcement agencies. 26.  The Government also submitted the following information concerning Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friends and/or colleagues Mr M.A., Mr A.Z., Mr M.T., Mr R.M. and Mr Z.S. as well as the UBOP superior officer K. According to their submission, between January 2005 and April 2009 these five friends of Mr Tsakoyev had all been put on the wanted list and then eventually killed as results of various special operations carried out by law\u2011enforcement agencies. As for officer K., on 12 January 2008 he had been shot dead by unidentified culprits. 27.  In response to the Court\u2019s request for a copy of the entire contents of the criminal investigation file, the Government furnished a copy of some of its contents. The Government stated that the parts of the file recording the steps taken against members of illegal armed groups could not be submitted to the Court. The partial contents as submitted ran to 560 pages and could be summarised as follows. 28.  On 30 September 2004 the first applicant had complained to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, stating that his son had been unlawfully detained and severely beaten by UBOP officers and that he was being treated in the intensive care unit at the Republican Clinical Hospital. The first applicant also stated that his son had been unlawfully detained by the police on several occasions, namely on 4 May and 8 September 2003 and on 18 March and, finally, on 27 September 2004, and requested that the perpetrators of his son\u2019s abduction and ill-treatment be prosecuted. 29.  On 7 October 2004 the Nalchik prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 21/175-04 under Article 111 of the Criminal Code (infliction of grave injuries leading to death). 30.  On 9 October 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. The applicant stressed that his son had told him that he had been abducted and tortured by UBOP officers on the premises of the police unit and that he had been subjected to severe beatings on the direct orders of the head of the UBOP, officer K. 31.  On 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s sister, Ms Kh. Ts., who gave a statement similar to that given to the investigation by the first applicant and to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. In addition, she stated that, while he had been at home on 29 September 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev had told her that at least six police officers had participated in his abduction and two police officers of Kabardian ethnic origin had subjected him to the severe beatings. 32.  On 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s aunt, Ms Z. E., who gave a statement similar to that given by the first applicant and to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. 33.  On the same date, 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who gave a statement similar to that given to the investigation by the first applicant. In addition, she stated that whilst her son had been at home after the ill-treatment he had told her that he had been abducted by six policemen, taken to the UBOP premises and beaten there by two policemen who had spoken Kabardian between themselves and Russian to him. They had tortured him, pressurising him to admit to assisting members of illegal armed groups. They had demanded that he identify a bearded man in a photograph. The applicant also stated that on 8 September 2003 the police had searched their family home with a warrant. During the search the police officers had told her that her family was suspected of aiding members of illegal armed groups in Chechnya and illegally storing firearms in the house. However, the police had found nothing and had merely taken Rasul for questioning. Rasul had been under surveillance by the police on suspicion of participation in a radical movement. 34.  On 11 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr A.A., who stated that on 29 September 2004 he and Mr R.A. had seen Rasul Tsakoyev next to the gas station. The latter had been severely beaten and could barely walk. He had told them that he had been subjected to beatings on the premises of the UBOP and that the police officers who had carried out the beatings had spoken Kabardian and Russian. The witness and Mr R.A. had taken Mr Tsakoyev home, where they had helped his relatives to call for an ambulance. 35.  On the same date, 11 October 2004, the investigators questioned Mr R.A., who gave a statement similar to that of Mr A.A. He also stated that Rasul Tsakayev had alleged that he had been severely beaten by the police officers on the premises of the UBOP. 36.  On 11 October 2004 the investigators also questioned the head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr A.Z., who gave a statement similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. In addition, he stated that when he had asked the head of the UBOP, officer K., whether Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained on their premises, the latter had replied in the negative but told him that he was suspected of aiding an illegal armed group run by a certain Mr M. Atabayev by supplying it with money and telephones. The witness further stated that on 29 September 2004 he had seen the Imam of the Khasanya mosque, Mr Kh.M., who had told him that Rasul Tsakoyev and two of his friends were being held in detention on the police premises in Nalchik. 37.  On 11 October 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr R.F., who stated that at the end of September 2004 he had learnt from the Imam of the Khasanya mosque Mr Kh.M. that Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained and taken to the UBOP unit and that he had died at the beginning of October 2004 as a result of the beatings to which he had been subjected by the police. 38.  On 12 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.B., who stated that they had found Rasul Tsakoyev in a severely beaten condition next to the gas station on 29 September 2004. Mr Tsakoyev had told them that he had been subjected to ill-treatment at the UBOP premises. 39.  On 12 October 2004 the investigators also questioned Mr Z.S., who stated that he had visited Rasul Tsakoyev at home before he had been taken to the hospital. Mr Tsakoyev had told him that he had been beaten by officers from the UBOP. The witness further stated that on 3 October 2004 he had spoken with police officer Kh.G., who had told him that he had not personally participated in Mr Tsakoyev\u2019s ill-treatment but that it had been the UBOP the superior officers who had issued the orders to beat him. 40.  On 13 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s colleague Mr M.T., who stated that early in the morning of 28 September 2004 several police officers had searched his house after showing him their warrant. After that he had been taken to the first floor of the UBOP building, where he had been questioned first by by officer E. and then, about three or four hours later, by another policeman on the second floor. The police officers had told him that his telephone had been tapped due to the suspicion that he had been aiding members of illegal armed groups. On the evening of 28 September 2004 he had been released and at the entrance to the UBOP building he had met the applicants, who had been searching for their son. The following day he had learnt that Rasul Tsakoyev had been abducted and ill-treated by UBOP officers, who had lied about it to the applicants on 28 September 2004 when they went to the police station searching for their son. 41.  On 13 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friend Mr R.M., who stated that on 28 September 2004 police officers and the officers from the Federal Security Service (the FSB) had searched his house with a search warrant. After that he had been taken to the second floor of the UBOP building and had been questioned about Rasul Tsakoyev by an officer named Anzor and had been told that his detention had been ordered by the head of the UBOP, officer K. He had then been handcuffed to the radiator for the whole night. The following day, 29 September 2004, he had been allowed to go home at about 10 a.m. At the entrance to the building, he had seen the applicants, who had been searching for Rasul Tsakoyev. Later on, when he visited Mr Tsakoyev at the hospital, the latter had told him that he had been beaten on the UBOP premises. 42.  On 14 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Kh. M., the Imam of the Khasanya mosque, who stated that he had assisted the applicants and Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friends in their search after his abduction by masked policemen. On 27 or 28 September 2004 he and Mr R.N. had arrived at the UBOP premises, where they had spoken with a police officer whose office was on the second floor in the same building as the UBOP. In their presence, the officer had telephoned someone in the UBOP and had told them that Rasul Tsakoyev and his two friends had been detained by the UBOP but would be released after questioning (see also paragraph 49 below). The following day, when the witness returned to the building, he had not been allowed to enter, but had been given permission to leave food for the three men. The following day he had seen Rasul Tsakoyev at home, beaten to a pulp. 43.  On 14 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr R.N., who gave a statement similar to that given by the Imam Kh.M. In particular, he stated that Rasul Tsakoyev and two other men had been detained in the UBOP building and that he and the Iman had been allowed to leave some food and drink for them. 44.  On 18 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friend Mr Z. G., who stated that he had visited him in hospital at the beginning of October 2004 and that the latter had told him and the others that he had been abducted and beaten by UBOP officers on the direct orders of the head of the UBOP. 45.  On 3 and 5 November 2004 the investigators questioned medical doctors Mr A.M., Mr K.M. and Mr A. Ch., who stated that they had treated Mr Tsakoyev in the hospital until his death on 4 October 2004. According to the doctors, his condition had been very serious, he could barely talk and had been put on a ventilator, but to no avail. Mr Tsakoyev had not informed them about the origin of his injuries. 46.  On 9 November 2004 the investigators questioned the police investigator Ms Kh. K., who stated that she had questioned Rasul Tsakoyev on 30 September 2004 at the hospital. He had been very weak and had told her that on 27 September 2004 he had been abducted in Nalchik, next to the prosecutor\u2019s office, by four unidentified police officers who had arrived in a red VAZ-model vehicle. He said that they had taken him somewhere for two nights and had severely beaten him, and that he would not be able to identify the policemen, who had spoken Russian, as they had had balaclavas over their faces. Even though Mr Tsakoyev had told her that he had been beaten by police officers, he had not said that they had been from the UBOP. 47.  Between 9 and 22 November 2004 the investigators questioned several residents of Nalchik: Ms M.Ch. ,Ms Z.Ch., Mr Al. Kh. and Mr An.K., whose mobile telephone numbers had been used to call Rasul Tsakoyev or receive calls from his number on the afternoon of 27 September 2004. All of them stated that they had not used those SIM cards with their respective phone numbers and denied knowing anything about either Mr Tsakoyev or his abduction. 48.  On 11 November 2004 the investigators questioned police officers A.Ch. and R.K., both of whom stated that on 29 September 2004 they had been on duty at the entrance of the UBOP building and that they did not recall any visitors wanting to speak with officer K. 49.  On 16 November 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the Dolinskiy Department of the Interior in Nalchik, officer A.K., who stated that at the end of September 2004 the Imam of Khasanya village had arrived at his office with another man and had asked him whether three or four acquaintances of his had been arrested by the police and held in detention. The witness had made several phone calls to various police stations and had been told that several men had been detained by the UBOP. He, the Imam and the other man had gone to the UBOP, where he had seen officer Z.Sh., who confirmed that several men from Khasanya had been taken there for questioning. 50.  On 17 November 2004 the investigators questioned police officers M.M., I.S., A.K. and V.L., who gave similar statements to the effect that on 29 September 2004 they had been the duty officers at the UBOP premises and that they did not recall anyone visiting their office and asking about Rasul Tsakoyev. All of them also stated that at the time officer K. was travelling a lot for work and had frequently been out of the office. 51.  On 23 November 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Dzh.G., who stated that at the end of September 2004 her father had witnessed the abduction of a young man by several men in balaclavas who had pulled over in a car and quickly forced him inside. After the car had driven off, her father had found a mobile telephone, which had fallen out the young man\u2019s pocket, and had given it to her as a gift. She had received several calls from young men who had asked her in the Balkar language who she was and why she had the phone. After that she had turned the telephone off and had used it only when needed. At the end of October 2004 she had thrown away the young man\u2019s SIM card and put a new one in. She did not know Rasul Tsakoyev and had no information about his abduction or ill-treatment. The investigators seized the telephone from Ms Dzh.G. on the same day, 23 November 2004. 52.  On 23 November 2004 the investigators questioned the father of Ms Dzh.G., Mr A.G., who gave a statement similar to that of his daughter (see the paragraph above). 53.  Between 10 and 14 December 2004 the investigators questioned the UBOP officers M.G. and Z.Sh., both of whom gave similar statements to the effect that at the end of September 2004 they had been asked by relatives and friends of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s about his possible whereabouts on their unit\u2019s premises. They had checked some offices, but had not found him. In addition, they stated that at the material time officer K., like a number of other officers, had work in the Elbrusskiy district. 54.  On 16 December 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head UBOP officer, A.E., who stated that at the end of September 2004 he had seen Mr M.T., who had been detained on the premises of their building. He was unaware of the reasons for his detention and did not know whether Rasul Tsakoyev had been taken there. 55.  On 1 February 2005 the investigators conducted a face-to-face confrontation between Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friend Mr Z.S. and officer Kh.G., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.S., the UBOP police officers had tortured Mr Tsakoyev, whereas Mr Kh.G. denied seeing him on the UBOP premises. 56.  On 1 February 2005 the investigators carried out another face\u2011to\u2011face confrontation, this time between Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friend Mr Z.G. and officer Kh.G., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.G., officer Kh.G. had told him that the police officers had tortured Mr Tsakoyev on the direct orders of officer K., whereas Mr Kh.G. denied giving such information. 57.  On 3 February 2005 the investigators carried out a third face-to-face confrontation, this time between Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friend Mr Z.G. and officer E.B., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.G., officer E.B. had been present at the hospital where Rasul Tsakoyev had been hospitalised at the end of September 2004 and in his presence officer Kh.G. had admitted that Rasul had been detained in the UBOP and tortured on the direct orders of the superior officer. Mr E.B. admitted being at the hospital at that time but denied hearing any such conversation. 58.  On 8 November 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.D. and Mr M.B. The copies of their statements submitted to the Court were illegible. 59.  On 4 October 2004 the investigators carried out an examination of the crime scene in room no. 3 of the intensive care unit of the Republican Clinical Hospital, where Rasul Tsakoyev was treated between 29 September and 4 October 2004. 60.  On 11 October 2004 the investigators seized Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s clothing from the first applicant for forensic examination. On 19 October 2004 the forensic report was received. It stated that no biological material had been found on the outer items of the clothing and that the traces of blood on Mr Tsakoyev\u2019s underwear had not belonged to his blood group. 61.  On 12 October 2004 the investigators ordered a report on Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s body based on his medical records. On 13 October 2004 the experts issued their report, according to which the injuries had been inflicted about seven days prior to his death, that is to say on 27 or 28 September 2004, and that those injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects (see paragraph 20 above). 62.  On 18 October 2004 counsel G. hired by the applicants requested that the investigators question witnesses Mr Z. S., Mr Yu. S., Mr Z. G. and officers G. and B. On the same date, the request was granted in the part relating to the questioning of Mr Yu. S., Mr Z. G. and officers G. and B. It was dismissed in the part relating to Mr Z. S. since he had already been questioned. 63.  On 19 October, 20 and 22 November 2004 the applicants complained to various State authorities, including the Russian Prosecutor General, about the inefficiency of the investigation. In their complaints they stated that their son had been abducted by UBOP police officers, had been tortured on the direct orders of officer K., and that he had died as a result. They argued that the head of the Kabardino-Balkaria Government, Mr Gubin, and the Prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, Mr Ketov, had failed to keep their promise to bring the perpetrators to justice (see paragraph 21 above). 64.  On 21 October 2004 the first applicant requested that the investigators provide him with the following documents: a statement of calls made from and received on Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone between September and October 2004; excerpt from the UBOP detention register for the period from 27 to 28 September 2004; transcript of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s questioning on 18 September 2004. The first applicant also requested that a search be conducted for the persons who now had Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone and that it be tapped. He said that he suspected that his son\u2019s telephone was in the hands of the UBOP officers who had abducted him. 65.  On the same date, 21 October 2004, the investigators granted the above request in full. The text of their decision included the following:\n\u201c... On 21 October 2004 the victim D. Tsakoyev requested that the investigators obtain a court authorisation for the tapping of mobile telephone number 8\u2011928\u2011637\u201161-27 \u2012 which had belonged to Rasul Tsakoyev and had been lost after [his] arrest by the officers of the UBOP of the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior \u2012 obtain a detailed list of the phone calls, and take operational search steps to establish the whereabouts of Mr Tsakoyev\u2019s telephone.\nThis request should be granted in full for the following reasons.\nThe circumstances referred to by [the first applicant] D. Tsakoyev, are considered to be substantiated by the investigation and necessary for a full, objective investigation into the circumstances of the incident ...\u201d\nFrom the documents submitted it appears that, although the request was formally granted, the steps it specified therein were not taken. 66.  On 22 October 2004 the investigators received a list of the ten police officers who had participated in the search of Mr R.M.\u2019s and Mr M.T.\u2019s households on 28 September 2004. 67.  On 25 November 2004 the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor received the first applicant\u2019s complaint, which had been forwarded by the Representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal Circuit on 20 November 2004. According to the first applicant, his son Rasul Tsakoyev had been tortured on the premises of the UBOP on the direct orders of the superior officer K., and his son had told him about it prior to his death in hospital. The applicant stressed that his son had been detained on several occasions prior to the last detention and that he had been a person of interest for the local police. According to the applicant, the following evidence proved that his son had been abducted and tortured specifically by UBOP officers and not by any other policemen:\n\u201c1.  On 4 May and 8 September 2003 and then on 18 August 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev was detained by the officers from that particular unit; 2.  A search was conducted on 28 September 2004 in the households of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s friends Mr M.T. and Mr R.M. and they, in particular Mr R.M., had subsequently been questioned only about Rasul Tsakoyev; 3.  On 28 September 2004 the Imam of the Khasanya village Kh.M. asked officers from the UBOP whether they were detaining Rasul Tsakoyev, Mr R.M. and Mr M.T.; the officers replied that all three of them had been detained on the premises of that unit and that at that time there were no superiors in the station to order their release; 4.  On 29 September 2004, I, as the father of Rasul Tsakoyev, went to that police unit with the head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr A.Z., ... but only Mr A.Z. was allowed to enter the premises. After a 30-40 minute conversation there, Mr A.Z. came out and told me that, according to officer K., Rasul had been transferred to Khankala. After that we went home. However, sometime later Rasul\u2019s friends told us that he had not been taken anywhere but had been detained in the UBOP building. This information was confirmed by one of the duty officers at the entrance to the UBOP premises.\nIn addition, the local press stated that on 28 September 2004 several residents of Khasanya, Kendelen and Nalchik had been detained as a result of a special operation. Nobody from Khasanya village except for Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained on 27 or 28 September 2004. ... 5.  Prior to his death Rasul told us that he had been beaten and tortured by two police officers in balaclavas who had demanded that he confessed to aiding terrorists and supplying them with telephones and food. During those inhumane procedures, officer K. had entered and asked the officers: \u201cSo, anything?\u201d and they had replied: \u201cHe would not confess\u201d. Officer K. had ordered them to continue. As a result of those actions by the police officers from the UBOP unit, my son Rasul Tsakoyev died. 6.  During Rasul\u2019s stay at the hospital, police officers Kh.G. and E.B. visited him and confirmed [to us] that Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained in the UBOP building at the material time [27-29 September 2004].\nGiven the above, I have reasons not to trust the law-enforcement bodies in Kabardino-Balkaria and request that you take the investigation of the criminal case under your personal control and transfer it to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Southern Federal Circuit for a full and complete investigation ...\nI request that you take those steps as the investigative authorities are not taking sufficient measures and not interested in solving the crime and prosecuting the perpetrators in court.\u201d\nNo reply was given to this request. 68.  On 7 February 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 69.  On 2 March 2005 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the investigation and take the following investigative steps: question the person who had Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone; arrange a face-to-face confrontation between the applicants, their daughter and the head of the UBOP, officer K.; arrange a face-to-face confrontation between officer K. and another witness. 70.  On 7 March 2005 the first applicant\u2019s request was refused. The applicant appealed against the refusal to the investigators\u2019 superiors. 71.  On 1 April 2005 the investigators\u2019 superior, the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, dismissed the complaint. The decision stated, inter alia, that the statements made by officer K. and by Mr Z. contained no conflicting information and there was therefore no need for a face-to-face confrontation. Officer K. had provided information on his whereabouts between 27 and 29 September 2004. He had neither met with the applicants nor talked to them. Accordingly, there was no need for a face-to-face confrontation either. As regards Ms Dzh. G., who was using Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone, it had been found by her father. Neither of them had been involved in the infliction of injuries on Rasul Tsakoyev and no face-to-face confrontation was therefore required. 72.  On 13 May 2005 the investigation was resumed. The decision stated that it was necessary to verify the possible involvement of an illegal armed group headed by Mr M.A. in the offence and to take other steps. 73.  On the same date, 13 May 2005, unidentified persons broke into the house of the applicants\u2019 counsel, G., while he was absent. They opened his safe but did not steal anything. Later somebody called him on the phone and said that he had been warned. Since at the time counsel G. was working solely on Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s case, he concluded that the trespassing and the phone call must have been related to it. At the end of May the applicants had to accept the withdrawal of his assistance. 74.  On 27 and 30 May 2005 the first applicant complained to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor about the attempt to put pressure on his counsel. In his complaints, he also mentioned the murder of Mr A. Z. on 14 May 2005. 75.  On 1 June 2005, the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor\u2019s office replied that his complaint of 30 May 2005 had been enclosed in the case file. 76.  On 16 June 2005 the investigation was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 77.  On 23 August 2005 the applicants\u2019 new legal counsel, D., requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents from the case file. 78.  On 24 August 2005 the investigators provided the counsel with copies of the decisions to institute and suspend the investigation but refused to provide copies of other documents. 79.  On 29 August 2005 counsel D. again requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents in the case file, including records of witness questioning and the expert reports. 80.  On 30 August 2005 the investigators allowed the request in part only concerning provision of copies of the procedural decisions and of other documents in the case file. 81.  On 16 September 2005 the first applicant applied to the Minister of the Interior asking the latter to take steps to ensure an effective investigation in the case and to resume the proceedings. His request was forwarded to the investigators. 82.  On 15 December 2005 the investigators replied to the first applicant that all possible investigative steps had been taken and that there were no grounds for resuming the proceedings. 83.  On 9 March 2006 the first applicant requested that the investigators take the following steps: grant victim status to the second applicant; join the medical evidence of 29 October 2004 to the case file; give him Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone; question him again; arrange face-to-face confrontations between the applicants, officer K. and Ms Dzh. G.; request from the UBOP a copy of the transcript of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s questioning on 18 September 2004. 84.  On 19 March 2006, following the decision of the Kabardino\u2011Balkaria Supreme Court of 28 February 2006 (see paragraph 102 below), the decision to suspend the investigation was overruled and the proceedings were resumed. 85.  In April 2006 the applicants applied in person to the deputy prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, who promised to supervise the investigation personally. 86.  On 19 April 2006 the investigators examined Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s telephone and included it as evidence in the case file. 87.  On 20 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s legal counsel D. asked the deputy prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria for assistance in obtaining a copy of the decision to resume the investigation. She stated that her previous request had been refused by the investigator. Her request was not granted. 88.  On 21 April 2006 the first applicant visited the investigators to collect Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone but was unsuccessful. 89.  On 25 April 2006 the investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings against officer K. and other UBOP officers for lack of corpus delicti. In particular, according to the decision, relatives of Rasul Tsakoyev stated that he had told them that he had been ill-treated in the UBOP. However, officer K. stated that between 26 and 29 September 2004 he had been participating in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy district and had only returned to Nalchik on a few occasions. On 29 September 2004 he had come to the UBOP to fetch certain documents from his office. Mr Z. had come to see him and had asked whether Rasul Tsakoyev was being detained at the UBOP. Officer K. had then called the duty officers, who had replied that he was not being held there. Officer Ger. stated that in September 2004 he had participated in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy District together with officer K. and other UBOP officers. On one of those days he had come to the UBOP in Nalchik. There had been a lot of people outside the UBOP building. Some men in the crowd had asked him to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev was being detained at the UBOP. He had searched for Mr Tsakoyev in the UBOP and, not having found him, had told the men so. Doctor K., who had examined Rasul Tsakoyev upon his admittance to the emergency ward of the Republican Clinical Hospital, stated that during the examination Mr Tsakoyev had only said that he ached all over but had given no details of what had happened to him. The Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior confirmed that between 27 and 29 September 2004 UBOP officers had participated in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy District. The decision concluded that there was no evidence corroborating the suggestion that officer K. or other UBOP officers had been responsible for the injuries caused to Rasul Tsakoyev. 90.  On 26 April 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The suspension decision stated, inter alia, that the question had been raised whether Rasul Tsakoyev might have been abducted due to possible disputes relating to his business. However, it was impossible to question his business partner, Mr M.T., who had absconded and had been put on a wanted list (see paragraph 26 above). 91.  On 2 June 2006 the first applicant asked the investigators to return Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone to him and to provide him with copies of the procedural decisions taken in the case. 92.  On 6 June 2006 the investigators replied that the mobile phone had been returned to the first applicant. On the same date, he was provided with copies of the five procedural decisions taken in the case. 93.  On 17 July 2006 the first applicant wrote to the Russian Prosecutor General, the prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, and the director of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) in Kabardino-Balkaria, asking them to resume the investigation and to hand it over to different investigative officers (see also paragraph 67 above). 94.  On 21 July 2006 the investigators rejected the request and informed the applicant of their decision on 23 March 2007. 95.  On 2 September 2009 the investigators\u2019 superiors ordered that the investigation be resumed and that a number of steps be taken:\n\u201cThe [last] decision to suspend the investigation was premature and unsubstantiated as not all of the steps it is possible to take in the absence of those to be charged with a crime have been taken. It must therefore be overruled. It is necessary that the investigators take the following steps:\n- question the medical nurses Ms N.S. and Ms A.A. to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev informed them about the circumstances in which he had received the bodily injuries;\n- questioning of the UBOP officer B.M. ... concerning the circumstances of the transfer of Rasul Tsakoyev and others to the UBOP; establish whether Mr Tsakoyev was taken to the UBOP premises on 27-29 September 2004 and if so, who questioned him and whether physical force was used against him;\n- examine the crime scene with the participation of Mr A.G.;\n- establish eye-witnesses to Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s abduction;\n- establish which officers were on duty at the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor\u2019s office on 27 September 2004 and find out the circumstances of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s abduction;\n- obtain information from the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of Health as to whether any calls were made on 27-29 September 2004 for an ambulance to go to the UBOP premises;\n- examine the circumstances of the seizure by the UBOP officers of Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s car and its return [to the applicants] a month later;\n- ask the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior to provide information concerning the participation of officer K. in the special operation in the Elbrusskiy district; ...\u201d 96.  From the documents submitted it appears that the orders were not complied with and none of the above steps was taken by the investigators. 97.  From the documents submitted it appears that the criminal proceedings are still pending. 98.  On 16 September 2005 the applicants\u2019 counsel lodged an appeal before the Nalchik Town Court against the decision of 16 June 2005 to suspend the investigation and the decision of 30 August 2005 partially granting her request for documents. 99.  On 26 September 2005 the Nalchik Town Court dismissed the complaint. The applicants appealed. 100.  On 8 November 2005 the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Court set aside the decision and remitted the complaint for a fresh examination. As regards the suspension of the investigation, the court noted that, although the first applicant indicated to the investigators the particular persons whom he believed to be involved in the offence, there was no indication that his version of events had been investigated. 101.  On 23 December 2005 the Nalchik Town Court allowed the complaint. The court found, inter alia, that in the course of the investigation it had not been verified whether the red VAZ-2107 car Mr Rasul Tsakoyev had been forced into belonged to the UBOP. Likewise, although officer K. had claimed that he had been elsewhere during the events, no evidence had been obtained to corroborate his statement. Furthermore, Mr A.G., who had found Mr Rasul Tsakoyev\u2019s mobile phone and had claimed to have witnessed his abduction, had not been questioned at the crime scene. No measures had been taken to identify other possible witnesses to the abduction and the crime scene had not been examined at all. Moreover, the source of the newspaper article referred to by the first applicant (see paragraph 15 above), which stated that several residents of Khasanya had been detained in the course of a counter-terrorist operation, had not been established. 102.  On 28 February 2006 the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal.", "references": ["8", "7", "3", "4", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Balashikha, a town in the Moscow Region. 7.  From 2008 the applicant lived together with A.D. in an extramarital relationship. 8.  They separated shortly after A.D. became pregnant in autumn 2009, but continued to maintain regular contact. 9.  On 6 July 2010 A.D. gave birth to a baby girl, P. The applicant had regular contact with the child. 10.  In January 2011 A.D. started avoiding communication with the applicant and preventing him from visiting the child. 11.  On 6 June 2011 the applicant brought a claim seeking the establishment of his paternity of the child and the determination of the terms of his contact with the latter. 12.  On 25 June 2012 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) discontinued the examination of the applicant\u2019s claim in so far as it concerned the determination of his contact rights. The District Court reasoned that such claims could only be brought by one of the child\u2019s parents, whereas on the date of its examination of the claim in question the applicant\u2019s paternity of the child had not been established. 13.  On the same day the District Court established the applicant\u2019s paternity of P. 14.  On 20 December 2012, following an appeal by A.D., the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) quashed the judgment of 25 June 2012 establishing the applicant\u2019s paternity of the child and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 15.  On 4 October 2013, following an appeal by the applicant, the Presidium of the City Court, under the cassation procedure, quashed the judgment of 25 June 2012 and the appeal decision of 20 December 2012 and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. 16.  On 13 November 2013 the District Court left unexamined the applicant\u2019s claims in view of new proceedings instituted by the applicant (see below). 17.  On 29 October 2013 A.D.\u2019s partner, A.K., was registered as the child\u2019s father. 18.  On 11 November 2013 the applicant challenged the registration of A.K. as the child\u2019s father, seeking that his own paternity of the child be established and that his contact rights with the latter be determined. 19.  On 24 January 2014 the District Court ordered that A.K.\u2019s registration as the child\u2019s father be annulled, established the applicant\u2019s paternity of the child, and held that contact between the applicant and his daughter should take place at A.D.\u2019s place of residence on the first Saturday and second Sunday of every month from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m. 20.  On 28 July 2014 the City Court upheld the judgment of 24 January 2014 following an appeal by A.D. and A.K. 21.  On 5 December 2014, after failed attempts to persuade A.D. to comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 \u2012 as upheld on appeal on 28 July 2014 \u2012 the applicant applied to the Tsaritsynskiy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service in Moscow (\u201cthe district bailiffs\u2019 service\u201d) for the institution of enforcement proceedings. 22.  On 12 December 2014 a bailiff from the district bailiffs\u2019 service declined to institute such enforcement proceedings, because the operative part of the judgment did not oblige A.D. to carry out or to abstain from certain actions. 23.  On 4 February 2015 the applicant lodged a claim challenging the lawfulness of the above-mentioned decision. 24.  On 18 March 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 25.  On 6 July 2015 the City Court quashed the above-mentioned judgment, holding that the decision of 12 December 2014 declining to institute enforcement proceedings had been unlawful. 26.  On 10 August 2015 a bailiff from the district bailiffs\u2019 service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 24 January 2014. 27.  On 17 August and 24 August 2015 the bailiff telephoned A.D. On the former date A.D. answered the phone. She was informed of the institution of the enforcement proceedings and summoned to appear before the bailiff on 20 August 2015. On the latter date the bailiff telephoned the same number, only to be answered by a woman who told the bailiff that the telephone number did not belong to A.D., after which she hung up. 28.  On 6 October 2015 the enforcement proceedings were transferred from the district bailiffs\u2019 service to the newly created Inter-district Department of Bailiffs for the Recovery of Child Maintenance Payments of the Federal Bailiffs\u2019 Service of Russia for Moscow (\u041c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0432 \u043f\u043e \u0432\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0430\u043b\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439 \u2116 1 \u0423\u0424\u0421\u0421\u041f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0433. \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u0435, \u201cthe Inter-district Department of Bailiffs\u201d). 29.  On 30 October 2015 a bailiff of the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs decided to accept the proceedings for enforcement. 30.  On 30 October and 10 December 2015, and on 12 February and 25 July 2016 the bailiff sent A.D. notices of enforcement of the judgment of 24 January 2014. 31.  On 4 December 2015 the bailiff several times called A.D.\u2019s telephone number, but nobody answered. 32.  On 7 December 2015 the bailiff again made calls to A.D.\u2019s telephone numbers. One call was answered by a woman who introduced herself as A.D.\u2019s mother and refused to answer any questions. 33.  Over the course of 2015 the applicant lodged multiple complaints concerning the inactivity of the the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs to various authorities, including the Inter-district Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the head of the Federal Department of Bailiffs\u2019 Service for Moscow, and the Ombudsman for Children. 34.  On 14 February 2016 a bailiff visited A.D.\u2019s presumed place of residence. The door was opened by A.D.\u2019s mother, to whom the bailiff handed a notice of enforcement of the judgment of 24 January 2014. She told the bailiff that she was unaware of her daughter\u2019s whereabouts and that A.D. would not give the child to the applicant. 35.  On 17 February 2016 the bailiff received a declaration by A.D., in which she stated that she was not going to let the applicant contact the child as the child did not wish to have such contact. 36.  On 2 March 2016 the bailiff sent enquiries to kindergarten no. 1457 in Moscow, the Moscow City Children\u2019s Polyclinic no. 23, the Public Services Centre of the Biryulyovo Vostochnoye District, and the Social Protection Administration for the Biryulyovo Vostochnoye District in order to establish, respectively, whether the child attended the kindergarten, was receiving medical services, and lived with A.D. at the address visited by the bailiff. 37.  On 2 March, 17 March and 11 April 2016 the bailiff took decisions to involve a psychologist in the enforcement proceedings. 38.  According to the Government, on an unspecified date the bailiff imposed an execution fee on A.D. for her failure to comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 and warned her of her administrative liability[1] for not complying with that judgment. 39.  On 29 April 2016 the bailiff obtained A.D.\u2019s written declaration. A.D. submitted, in particular, that on 14 March 2016 she brought a claim before the District Court to challenge the applicant\u2019s paternity, to withdraw his parental rights and restore A.K.\u2019s parental authority (see 49 below). She furthermore submitted that she could not comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 since the child strongly objected to having any contact with the applicant. 40.  Meanwhile, at the applicant\u2019s request, in June 2016 the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs appointed another bailiff to oversee the enforcement proceedings. 41.  In accordance with requests lodged by A.D. on 28 April and 28 July 2016, on the latter date the District Court suspended the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 24 January 2014, pending the outcome of the proceedings initiated by A.D. on 14 March 2016. 42.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 30 September 2016 the Moscow City Court found the decision of 28 July 2016 to suspend the enforcement proceedings unlawful and unsubstantiated and quashed it. 43.  According to the Government, on 3 November 2016 the bailiff imposed an administrative fine on A.D. under Article 5.35 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation for her non\u2011compliance with the judgment of 24 January 2014[2]. 44.  On 12 December 2016 the bailiff adopted a decision temporarily restricting A.D.\u2019s travel outside the Russian Federation. 45.  On 4 February 2017 in the course of the enforcement proceedings the applicant met his daughter for the first time since January 2011. According to the applicant, despite the difficult environment of the meeting, the child was willing to communicate. 46.  Subsequently, the applicant tried to see his daughter on 12 February and 4 March 2017 (the second Sunday and the first Saturday of the month respectively); he was unaccompanied by the bailiff. On the first occasion A.D. prevented the applicant from seeing the child; on the second occasion neither she nor the child were present at their place of residence at the scheduled time. Reports of these events were submitted by the applicant to the police and the bailiff. 47.  On 12 March 2017 the applicant again came to see his daughter; this time he was accompanied by a bailiff. A.D. brought the child into the applicant\u2019s presence to talk with him; however, she turned the child against the applicant and asked her to decide whether she needed to have any relations with the applicant. The child replied that she refused to communicate with the applicant. A report of this was drawn up by the bailiff. 48.  The case file contains no information about the further course of the enforcement proceedings. 49.  On 14 March 2016 A.D. brought an action before the District Court seeking to recover child maintenance from the applicant, to terminate his parental rights and to restore the parental rights of A.K. 50.  The case file contains no further information on the outcome of those proceedings.", "references": ["9", "6", "1", "5", "7", "2", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  In 2004 the applicant occupied a flat in Zagreb situated in a decayed building in the wider city centre of Zagreb. 7.  In 2005, in the context of the denationalisation process, a certain V.W-M. became the owner of the building. 8.  Soon afterwards the area in which the building was located attracted the interest of real-estate investors, and many residential and commercial buildings were built there. V.W-M. took certain measures with a view to selling her property. 9.  In the early hours of 22 December 2005 the applicant informed the police that a bullet had been shot into her flat. The police immediately responded at the scene and found that a bullet had entered the applicant\u2019s flat though a window. The scene was secured and the applicant spent the night with a friend. 10.  A further onsite inspection was carried out by the police, but the bullet was not found. The applicant was interviewed about the circumstances of the shooting but she could not provide any further details, as she had been sleeping at the time when the bullet had entered the flat. 11.  On 18 January 2006 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe State Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d) against an unknown perpetrator in relation to charges of endangering life and property through dangerous acts or means (shooting). 12.  There is no information to indicate that any further investigative steps have been taken. The perpetrator remains unknown. 13.  On 10 November 2010 the applicant called the police to report that she had recently heard noise from the neighbouring building, where nobody was supposed to be living. She feared that something suspicious was happening. The police carried out an inspection of the scene but only found in the vicinity a homeless person, who argued that he had never been in the building in question. 14.  On 22 November 2010 the applicant and her neighbour, T.O., reported to the police that a certain M.B. had often visited the applicant\u2019s building, explaining that he represented an investor. He had offered to the applicant 1,000 euros (EUR) to leave her flat. After she had refused that offer, he had threatened to move into her flat when she was absent. 15.  In connection with the applicant\u2019s allegations, on 21 December 2010 the police interviewed M.B. He explained that he had been interested in buying the building containing the applicant\u2019s flat, and that for that reason he had entered into negotiations with the tenants. However, he denied threatening or otherwise harassing them. M.B. also explained that he had abandoned the idea of buying the building as it would have entailed many legal disputes with the tenants. 16.  On 22 December 2010 a fire broke out in the building where the applicant lived. The police attended at the scene and found that the fire had started in the premises of an abandoned retail store. The police recorded that there was no threat to people or particular damage to property. The fire was extinguished and no further action taken. 17.  The next day, the tenants found a Zippo cigarette lighter at the scene which, according to the applicant, they immediately wanted to hand over to the police, but the police refused to accept it (see also paragraphs 20-21 below). 18.  On 25 December 2010 the applicant informed the police that somebody was trying to break into the premises in which the fire had broken out few days earlier. The police attended at the scene but found nobody. 19.  On 4 January 2011 a fire broke out in one of the flats (occupied by G.K.) in the applicant\u2019s building. 20.  Firefighters and the police immediately responded at the scene. They found traces of forced entry into the flat and a lighter of the same model as that found by the tenants following the fire of 22 December 2010 (see paragraphs 16-17 above). They also found that a pile of old clothes had burned in the living room. In the first interviews conducted with the tenants, one of them stated that G.K.\u2019s former husband had threatened to move by force into the flat in question and had also harassed neighbours. 21.  The next day, the police carried out an onsite inspection and seized a plastic bucket and clothes which they found in the flat. The police furthermore seized a lighter found at the scene and the lighter found by the tenants following the incident of 22 December 2010. The police also took samples from various objects in the flat. The seized material and samples were sent to the police forensic centre for further analysis. 22.  On the same day, the police interviewed the applicant and her neighbours. They reported the following:\n-  the applicant argued that M.B. had often visited the building accompanied by several men and had exerted pressure on the tenants to move out of the building. He had offered to the applicant different amounts of money, and at one point one of his men had said that they would easily get rid of the tenants. The applicant knew that some of the tenants had accepted M.B.\u2019s offers. She also heard that some other investors had been interested in the building but that they had changed their mind when they had realised that M.B. had decided to invest there;\n-  G.K. stated that she had had problems with M.B., who had threatened her since she had refused to move out of the building. She suspected that M.B. was behind the fire;\n-  T.\u0110. explained how the tenants had big problems with the investor to whom the owner wanted to sell the house and who wanted to throw them out of the building. She furthermore stated that G.K.\u2019s former husband had said that he would move into the above-mentioned flat (see paragraph 19). She also explained how, following the fire of 22 December 2010, she and her husband had found a lighter of the same type as the one found after the fire of 4 January 2011. This was confirmed by T.\u0110.\u2019s husband;\n-  LJ.O., who is T.\u0110.\u2019s mother, stated that at the time of the incident she had been in her flat when she had heard an explosion and smelled petrol, after which she had seen fire in G.K.\u2019s flat. LJ.O. also stated that the tenants had been often visited by M.B., who had introduced himself as the representative of the owner and who had offered them money to leave the building;\n-  M.D. stated that around Christmas two men had knocked on her window but as she had not opened the door to them they had gone to see the applicant and said something to the effect that they had done what she (the applicant) had asked for and that the building was now on fire. 23.  On 5 January 2011 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney\u2019s Office against an unknown perpetrator in relation to charges of endangering life and property through dangerous acts or means (arson). 24.  On 11 January 2011 the applicant went to the police station as she wanted to add to her previous statement. The applicant stated that at the time of the 2005 incident she had had problems with her former husband. Moreover, in April or May 2010, M.B. had started coming to the building and talking to the tenants with a view to removing them from the building. He had offered to the applicant different amounts of money to move, but as she had refused he had threatened to move into her flat when she was absent. In December 2010 more men had come in a car to inspect the building. They had said that they represented a certain Ma.Be., who had become the owner of the building. Previously, the applicant had managed to get in touch with Ma.Be. and on that occasion he had stated that he would sell the building and that he did not care about the tenants. Then on 22 December 2010 several men had come with the same car that had been used by those who had come earlier to inspect the building. They had asked about a certain person and left. That evening the fire had broken out in the abandoned retail store. 25.  According to the note of her interview, the applicant also stated that she had heard that a certain person, who at the time of the fire in G.K.\u2019s flat had been carrying out some work there, had been dangerous and had participated in an incident of arson. She also stated that she had heard that a certain L.\u010c. had become the owner of the building and that a certain O.\u010c. was also associated with her[1]. 26.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant went to the State Attorney\u2019s Office and alleged that L.\u010c. (who according to the applicant had become the owner of the building on 21 December 2010) and Ma.Be.[2] had been behind the fires on 22 December 2010 and 4 January 2011. 27.  On 18 January 2011 the applicant informed the police that people, whom she considered to be behind the arson, were trying to break into the building. The police responded at the scene, where they found O.\u010c., his lawyer and a business associate. 28.  In his interview with the police, O.\u010c. explained that a few months earlier (on 14 December 2010) his wife, L.\u010c., had bought the building from V.W-M. He also stated that he had started negotiating with the tenants through a lawyer about the possibility of their removal from the building. He denied threatening them or otherwise being associated with the arson. He refused to participate in a polygraph test, arguing that he had certain psychological problems and was under medication. Moreover, he could not prove his alibi for 4 January 2011. 29.  The police also interviewed O.\u010c.\u2019s lawyer and his business associate, who explained the circumstances of their business engagement with O.\u010c. They had no information concerning the arson. The applicant was also interviewed, and she repeated her earlier statement to the police and the State Attorney\u2019s Office. 30.  On 20 January 2011 a fire inspector produced a report according to which the fire on 4 January had been caused by an inflammatory liquid being first spread over the flat and then set on fire using an open flame. 31.  In the period between September and November 2011 the police forensic centre produced reports which found that the material seized from the flat had contained traces of gasoline and that no fingerprint traces had been identified. However, a sample of male DNA had been identified on one of the objects. The DNA sample did not correspond to any of the samples stored in the centre\u2019s database. 32.  In September 2012 the police informed the State Attorney\u2019s Office of the results of the investigation. 33.  In the meantime, on 28 February 2011 the applicant signed a contract with L.\u010c., represented by her husband O.\u010c., under which she would move out of the house in exchange for EUR 6,000. She also accepted that she had received the amount in question and that she had no other claims towards L.\u010c. The applicant argued before the Court that she had signed the contract as a result of threats made by O.\u010c. According to the applicant, he had promised to pay her an additional EUR 40,000, which he had never done. 34.  On an unspecified date in March 2011 the applicant and the other tenants moved out of the building, following which the building was demolished and a hotel was built on that location. 35.  On 10 July 2011 O.\u010c. informed the police of a message which he had received from the applicant in which she suggested that O.\u010c. still owned her money and that she would ensure that he ended up in prison for trying to kill her. Two days later, the applicant called the police and asked them to be present while she took some of her belongings from the flat. 36.  On 9 April 2013 the applicant reported to the police that during 2012, and again between March and April 2013, O.\u010c. had several times threatened her with violence. 37.  On 20 April 2013 the applicant reported to the police that she had learned that a certain B.N. and D.V. had started the fire in the building where she lived. She also stated that she had talked to D.V., who had on that occasion said that they should have also spilled gasoline on the applicant and set her on fire and that it was not excluded that they would do so. 38.  On 3 June 2013 the police interviewed O.\u010c., who argued that the applicant was harassing and threatening him in connection with an amount of money that she expected to receive for the flat. However, O.\u010c. considered that the payment had been settled and that he did not owe anything to her. 39.  Meanwhile, in May, and then in October 2013, the applicant lodged further complaints against O.\u010c., alleging that he had threatened her in connection with the above-mentioned debt in respect of the flat. 40.  On 9 November 2013 the police informed the State Attorney\u2019s Office of the applicant\u2019s complaints, and the State Attorney\u2019s Office requested that a further interview be conducted with O.\u010c. 41.  The police interviewed O.\u010c. on 15 January 2014. He denied making any threats against the applicant but argued that she had harassed and threatened him over the debt, which he considered did not exist. 42.  After making a number of enquiries into the status of her case, on 6 October 2014 the applicant received a letter from the State Attorney\u2019s Office indicating that O.\u010c. had been questioned and that he had denied all of the applicant\u2019s allegations and that there was no evidence to refute his statement. The State Attorney\u2019s Office also stressed that an investigation into the arson was still pending. 43.  On 6 November 2014 the applicant received a letter from the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) reiterating the information provided by the State Attorney\u2019s Office. 44.  On 17 December 2014 the applicant was questioned by the police concerning her numerous complaints regarding the ineffectiveness of the investigation into her allegations of harassment and threats made by O.\u010c. On that occasion, she alleged that a number of other individuals were associated with O.\u010c. and the events leading to her forceful removal from her flat. 45.  On 12 May 2015 the State Attorney\u2019s Office rejected the applicant\u2019s criminal complaints against O.\u010c. in relation to charges of threats on the grounds that there was no evidence to suggest that he had committed the offence in question. The applicant was instructed that she could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. 46.  The investigation into the two instances of arson is still pending.", "references": ["0", "5", "3", "7", "2", "8", "9", "1", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are owners of residential buildings or apartments which were subject to the rent control system. However, as found by the Constitutional Court, the Czech rent control system was unconstitutional and violated the right of property of owners protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This situation, described as a \u201clegal vacuum\u201d, existed between 1 January 2002 and 30 March 2006 and no legal basis existed for rent control measures either in the period between 31 March and 31 December 2006. The interference was considered by the Court to be unlawful in this period of time (see R & L, s.r.o., and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 37926/05 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7 123-127, 3 July 2014). 5.  The applicant is a co-owner of a tenement building in Prague. One flat in the building was rented under the rent control system. 6.  On 16 March 2004 the applicant and three other co-owners lodged a claim against J.M., who occupied the flat, seeking to be paid 3,338 Czech korunas (CZK \u2013 131 euros (EUR)) in respect of the outstanding rent for October and November 2003, CZK 5,118 (EUR 201) in respect of services for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, and CZK 50 (EUR 2) in respect of the use of equipment in the flat for the period of October and November 2003. 7.  On 29 March 2005 the Prague 3 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud) decided, inter alia, to split the co-owners\u2019 claim into separate proceedings and to suspend these proceedings pending a final decision on J.M.\u2019s right to the tenancy of the flat. On 30 May 2005 the court decided that J.M. was the tenant of the flat because the tenancy had transferred to her upon the death of her grandfather. Following an appeal by the applicant and the co-owners, on 21 September 2005 the Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) upheld this judgment. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law (dovol\u00e1n\u00ed) lodged by the co-owners. 8.  In the meantime, on 28 November 2005, the District Court ordered J.M. to pay CZK 30 (EUR 1.2) to the co-owners of the tenement building. It dismissed the remainder of their action. Following an appeal by the applicant and the co-owners, on 1 March 2006 the Municipal Court upheld this judgment. 9.  Following a complaint by the applicant and the co-owners, in a judgment (n\u00e1lez) of 26 July 2007 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) quashed this judgment, referring to its case-law in this matter. 10.  By a judgment of 27 November 2007 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal the judgment of the District Court of 28 November 2005. However, after a further appeal, on 19 February 2009 the Constitutional Court quashed it. 11.  On 29 May 2009 the Municipal Court quashed the judgment of the District Court of 28 November 2005 on appeal in respect of the co-owners\u2019 claim for payment of CZK 3,388 (EUR 133). On 20 August 2009 the District Court, after refusing a request by the co-owners\u2019 for the amount of CZK 3,388 to be modified, dismissed their action. 12.  On 15 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s last judgment. 13.  On 4 May 2007 the applicant and other co-owners brought an action for damages against the tenant, seeking CZK 172,210 (EUR 6,780). They claimed that during the earlier set of proceedings, J.M. had concealed the fact that her then-husband owned another flat. They therefore claimed damages corresponding to the difference between the market rent and the rent actually paid for the period from 1 May 2004 until 30 November 2006. 14.  On an unspecified date, the District Court allowed the State to join the proceedings upon the landlords\u2019 request. 15.  In a judgment of 5 May 2011 the District Court dismissed the co-owners\u2019 action, stating that the tenant had not been obliged to disclose her then husband\u2019s ownership in the earlier proceedings and that the landlords could therefore not claim damages in this respect. Neither could they claim unjust enrichment, since the judgment of 30 May 2005 too constituted the legal entitlement under which J.M. had acquired the right to tenancy. In respect of the claimed damages relating to the rent control system, the District Court referred to Constitutional Court\u2019s opinion no. Pl. \u00daS-st. 27/09 (hereinafter \u201cthe plenary opinion\u201d) of 28 April 2009, according to which ordinary courts could set a new level of rent only pro futuro (that is to say from the date of the bringing of an action by tenants) until 1 January 2007, when Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents had entered into force. The courts could not, therefore, determine the rent retroactively. Finally, it dismissed the claim for damages against the State as statute-barred. 16.  In a separate judgment given on the same date, the District Court, after the co-owners had brought an action for payment of CZK 75,292 (EUR 2,964) against the tenant (and subsequently also against the State), ordered the tenant to pay CZK 60 (EUR 2.36) to the landlords. It dismissed the action in respect of the State as statute-barred. On 21 September 2011 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal this judgment in respect of the tenant but quashed it in respect of the State on the grounds that the publication of the plenary opinion in 2009[1] should have been taken into account for the calculation of the beginning of the three-year statutory limitation period under section 32(1) of the State Liability Act. 17.  On 27 October 2011 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment of the District Court of 5 May 2011 concerning the damages claimed by the co-owners in the amount of CZK 172,210 (EUR 6,780). It endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, dismissing the claimants\u2019 objection that the three-year statutory limitation period under the State Liability Act should have started to run on the date of the adoption of the plenary opinion \u2013 that is to say on 28 April 2009. 18.  In a judgment of 6 February 2012 the District Court ordered the State to pay CZK 4,846 (EUR 191) to the co-owners in respect of the damage they had sustained. 19.  On 20 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment of 27 October 2011. 20.  The applicant owns a flat in a tenement building in Pardubice, which was rented under the rent control system. 21.  On 31 March 2006 he lodged an action against the tenant seeking the determination of the rent in the locality in question. 22.  Following the adoption of the plenary opinion, the applicant applied for the State to be admitted to the proceedings. The Pardubice District Court (okresn\u00ed soud) dismissed the application motion on 24 June 2009, stating that the admittance of the State would be against the principle of procedural economy. On 19 August 2009 the Hradec Kr\u00e1lov\u00e9 Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) upheld this decision on appeal. It specified that as the original issue of the proceedings had been the determination of the rent in the locality in question, the admittance of the State would lead to a claim for damages. It therefore advised the applicant to bring a separate action for damages. 23.  In a judgment of 11 January 2010 the District Court decided that the tenant should pay rent of CZK 3,500 (EUR 138) per month during the period from 31 March until 31 December 2006. The court found that both parties agreed that the sum of CZK 3,500 (EUR 138) was the market rent for a flat in the locality in question. At the same time, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of the period from 1 January 2002 until 30 March 2006 and from 1 January 2007 onwards. 24.  On 9 December 2010 the applicant brought an action for damages against the State seeking CZK 133,248 (EUR 5,246) with the Prague 1 District Court. The relevant period was defined as being from 1 January 2002 until 31 March 2006 and the sum was calculated as the difference between collected rent and the market rent (CZK (3,500 minus 792) multiplied by six months (the period from 1 January 2002 until 30 June 2002), and CZK (3,500 minus 900) multiplied by forty-five months (the period from 1 July 2002 until 31 March 2006). In a judgment of 9 September 2011 the District Court dismissed this action, accepting the State\u2019s argument that it had become statute-barred. On 22 February 2012 the Municipal Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 25.  On 20 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded. 26.  The applicants own a tenement building in Prague. One of the flats is rented under the rent control system. In July 2002 the rent and payment for maintenance services were CZK 2,653.95 (EUR 104) and CZK 424 (EUR 17) respectively, as fixed by the Prague 8 District Court. 27.  On 14 September 2003 the applicants informed the tenant that the monthly rent would be increased to CZK 10,000 (EUR 394), but he refused to pay the new rent. The tenancy agreement was terminated on 31 December 2004. 28.  On 5 May 2005 the applicants brought an action with the Prague 8 District Court against the former tenant for payment of CZK 117,846 (EUR 4,640) in outstanding rent for the period between November 2003 and December 2004. 29.  In a judgment of 17 June 2010 the District Court ordered the tenant to pay CZK 17,223.30 (EUR 678), which corresponded to the difference between the payments that the tenant had actually made during the relevant period and the amount which was supposed to be paid according to the previous judgment of the Prague 8 District Court (see paragraph 26 above). The court referred, inter alia, to the plenary opinion, which banned the general courts from imposing a retrospective increase in rent. 30.  On 17 March 2011 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal this judgment in respect of the former tenant\u2019s refusal of the rent increase, ordering the tenant to pay to the applicants CZK 12,028 (EUR 474) in respect of default charges. 31.  On 19 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law, reiterating the plenary opinion. It further added that the repeal of the price regulation could not be considered as constituting a change in law which would allow the applicants to increase the rent. 32.  On 30 October 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants as manifestly ill-founded. 33.  The applicant is the co-owner of a tenement building in Prague in which nine out of eleven flats were rented under the rent control system. 34.  On 7 October 2004 he brought an action against the State, represented by the Ministry of Finance, for damages in the amount of CZK 772,524 (EUR 30,414), corresponding to the difference between the regulated rent and the market rent in the locality in question for the period from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2003. He submitted that the State was responsible for his loss of profit owing to its inactivity and continuing unlawful interference with his proprietary rights. 35.  On 9 February 2005 the Prague 1 District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It held that the failure of Parliament to enact deregulating legislation did not constitute an \u201cincorrect official procedure\u201d within the meaning of the State Liability Act (Act no. 82/1998). It also stated that Article 420 of the Civil Code was not applicable, as the relation between a citizen and the State could not be considered a civil relationship within the meaning of the Civil Code. 36.  On 29 August 2005 the Prague Municipal Court upheld this judgment. It endorsed the assessment of the first-instance court as to the inapplicability of the State Liability Act. It further noted that as for the period preceding the adoption of judgment no. Pl. \u00daS 2/03 of the Constitutional Court of 19 March 2003 (published in the Official Gazette on 20 March 2003 under the number 84/2003), by which the Constitutional Court had abolished Regulation No. 567/2002 on 20 March 2003, the applicant could not claim the non-existence of legal regulation as this had indeed existed until the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment. Thus, there had indeed been a decree regulating the matter, and the said judgment did not have retroactive effect. The appellate court also stated that the applicant should have first brought an action against the tenants for the rent to be determined according to the local and material conditions before initiating proceedings against the State. 37.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 29 October 2007. The Supreme Court considered, in particular, that the judgment of the appellate court had been in compliance with its previous case-law. 38.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, claiming that he had pursued his action on the basis of the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court, especially judgments no. Pl. \u00daS 20/05 and no. I. \u00daS 717/05. He submitted that the inactivity of the legislative body had amounted to a violation of his rights \u2013 specifically his right to enjoy his possessions. 39.  On 30 July 2009 the Constitutional Court quashed the judgment of the Supreme Court and those of the lower courts. It referred to its plenary opinion (see paragraph 15 above). 40.  In four following submissions, the applicant supplemented the original wording of his action, specifying that he sought only damages in respect of five out of the nine flats rented under the rent control system and limiting the amount claimed to CZK 501,228 (EUR 19,733) for the period of 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2003 (see paragraph 34 above). 41.  In a judgment of 29 November 2011, the District Court ordered the State to pay compensation in the amount of CZK 95,934 (EUR 3,777), dismissing the rest of the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that the applicant\u2019s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had been restricted and found it reasonable to award the applicant the aforesaid sum. As to the method of calculation, it stated:\n\u201c...the court considers it appropriate to establish the amount of the damage ... as an average of regulated and deregulated rent ...\u201d 42.  On 27 June 2012 the Municipal Court reduced on appeal the damages awarded to the applicant to CZK 40,980 (EUR 1,613). It found that the first-instance court had erroneously calculated those damages. It stated that the amount of damages should not exceed the rent that could have been collected in 2007 after Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents had entered into force. The damages awarded should correspond to the difference between the possible unilaterally increased rent in 2007 and the rent under the rent control system in 2003. In 2003, the applicant had been able to collect CZK 109,956 (EUR 4,329) and in 2007 he had been able to collect CZK 150,936 (EUR 5,942) by renting out the five flats. The difference, therefore, amounted to CZK 40,980 (EUR 1,613). 43.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law which was, however, dismissed by the Supreme Court on 29 April 2015. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous case-law, in particular judgment no. 22 Cdo 3188/2012, in which it had held that an owner of flats should be compensated if rent under the rent control system, taking into account local circumstances and other concrete circumstances, did not cover the justifiable costs of maintenance and repair within a reasonable time and make an adequate profit. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, compensation for the restriction of the right to property could not be considered as constituting compensation for damage and did not cover loss of profit. Nevertheless, the amount awarded must have been .proportional. In this regard, the appellate court correctly applied the amount of rent by using the method of calculation specified in Act no. 107/2006. 44.  On 12 April 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It relied on its previous case-law in which it had approved the above-described methods of calculating compensation and had stated that the compensation for unconstitutional restriction of property rights did not constitute a claim for damages and, therefore, did not constitute compensation for loss of profit. 45.  The applicant is the owner of a tenement flat in Prague which was rented under the rent control system. 46.  On 31 May 2007 he brought an action against the State ( represented by the Ministry of Finance) and his tenant for damages in the amount of CZK 129,448 (EUR 5,096), corresponding to the difference between the regulated rent and the market rent in the locality in question for the period from 1 June 2004 until 31 March 2006. On 20 August 2009 he withdrew the action against the tenant but maintained his claim against the State. He argued that the State was responsible for his loss of profit due to its inactivity and continuing unlawful interference with his proprietary rights. 47.  Following a request by the Prague 1 District Court, on 25 June 2009 an expert opinion on the standard level of rent was produced. 48.  On 29 November 2010 the Prague 1 District Court awarded the applicant damages in the amount of CZK 98,208 (EUR 3,866) and dismissed the rest of the applicant\u2019s claim in the amount of CZK 31,240 (EUR 1,230), representing the legal interest on the awarded amount from 1 June 2006 until 30 April 2008. 49.  On 23 August 2011 the Prague Municipal Court upheld on appeal the first-instance judgment and revoked it in respect of the part concerning legal costs. 50.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial and his right to enjoyment of his possessions. He specifically complained that he had not been compensated for his legal costs. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on 10 January 2012 as manifestly ill-founded, asserting that the applicant\u2019s fundamental rights were not at stake. 51.  The State lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which quashed the decisions of the lower courts in respect of the award of damages and legal costs on 23 April 2013. The rest of the decision of the District Court, namely the part concerning unawarded interest in the amount of CZK 31,240 (EUR 1,230), became final, as no appeal was lodged against it. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that the lower courts had not assessed correctly the amount of compensation which should have been awarded. It held in this regard that the severity of the restriction of the applicant\u2019s right to property should have been duly examined. 52.  The applicant lodged a new constitutional complaint, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court on 26 August 2013 as premature and therefore inadmissible. 53.  Following the judgment of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 51 above), in the ensuing proceedings, on 3 February 2014 the District Court reduced damages awarded to the applicant to the amount of CZK 6,439 (EUR 254) and determined the legal costs. The court stated that the compensation should not exceed the rent that could have been collected in 2007 after Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents entered into force. The damages awarded should correspond to the difference between the possible unilaterally increased rent in 2007 and the rent under the rent control system in the period from 2004 until 2006. During these years, the applicant had been able to collect CZK 5,850 (EUR 230) per month. However, under the rent control system, the rent had been CZK 1,386 (EUR 55), and since 1 January 2007 the amount had been CZK 1,678 (EUR 66) per month. The District Court concluded that the monthly difference corresponded to CZK 292.69 (EUR 12), and in the further period of twenty-two months (1 June 2004-31 March 2006), the monthly difference amounted to CZK 6,439 (EUR 254). 54.  On 3 June 2014 the Municipal Court upheld the first-instance judgment but quashed it in respect of the legal costs awarded. 55.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible on 14 July 2015. 56.  The applicant lodged a third constitutional complaint, which on 19 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. Relying on its previous case-law, it concluded that the courts could not have disproportionally interfered with the applicant\u2019s property rights, even though they had calculated the compensation as the difference between the market rent and the deregulated rent under Act no. 107/2006.", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3", "5", "6", "8", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in \u017dupanja. 6.  On 5 July 2011 the applicant was indicted before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Op\u0107inski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of causing a road accident under Article 272 of the Criminal Code. 7.  The applicant was tried in summary proceedings (skra\u0107eni postupak). On 4 May 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court convicted the applicant as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of four months\u2019 imprisonment with two years\u2019 probation. 8.  On 23 May 2012 the applicant appealed against his conviction and asked to be allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 9.  On 15 January 2013 the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu), without informing the applicant or his lawyer, examined the case without holding a hearing. It dismissed the appeal and upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence. 10.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining, inter alia, that he had not been allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 11.  On 18 September 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. That decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 4 October 2013.", "references": ["8", "2", "0", "5", "4", "1", "6", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1970 respectively, and live in Odessa. They are a married couple. 7.  At the time of the events the first applicant was an accountant in a private food-processing company (\u201ccompany Y.\u201d). Her mother, N., was its director and owner. The second applicant was a private entrepreneur supplying company Y. with raw materials in exchange for processed foodstuffs. 8.  On 23 July 2001 the Odessa Prymorskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Prymorskyy prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) opened a criminal case against the officials of company Y. on suspicion of forgery of quality certificates for the company\u2019s goods. 9.  On the following day the police conducted a search on the company\u2019s premises, as a result of which they seized a considerable volume of foodstuffs belonging to the second applicant. 10.  There was an altercation between the first applicant and the police: she attempted to leave, but several officers stopped her when she was already in her car, dragged her out and handcuffed her (see paragraphs 16, 31, 35 and 38 below for additional factual details). As the first applicant lost control of her vehicle, it collided with a car parked nearby, which belonged to a private person, G. 11.  On 24 May 2002 the Odessa Prymorskyy District Court (\u201cthe Prymorskyy Court\u201d) quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 23 July 2001 (see paragraph 8 above) as unlawful. 12.  On 24 July 2001 N. (the first applicant\u2019s mother and the director of company Y. \u2013 see paragraph 7 above) complained to the Prymorskyy prosecutor\u2019s office about the events of 24 July 2001. She submitted in particular that the first applicant had been beaten by the police. 13.  On the following day N. sent a similar complaint to the city and regional prosecuting authorities, as well as the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 14.  On 30 July 2001 the first applicant complained to the Prymorskyy Court about her alleged ill-treatment on 24 July 2001 at the time of her arrest. She asked the court to declare the officers\u2019 actions unlawful and to oblige them to make a public apology to her. 15.  On 6 December 2001 the Prymorskyy Court forwarded the above complaint to the Odessa Suvorivskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) for investigation. 16.  On 20 December 2001 the Suvorivskyy prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the constituent elements of a criminal offence in their actions. The prosecutor gave the following reasons for that decision. The first applicant had arrived at company Y. during the police search and had tried to leave the premises before the search had been completed. She had \u201cdeliberately inflicted minor bodily injuries on [two police officers] who had tried to stop her illegal actions\u201d. Furthermore, a medical examination of the first applicant of 25 July 2001 had documented in particular an abrasion below her right eye, a bruise on her chest and a bruise on her left thigh. However, \u201cshe had sustained those injuries in circumstances which [she was] concealing\u201d. The first applicant had also had bruises on her wrists and arms. Those had resulted from her forceful removal from the car and her subsequent handcuffing, both of which were deemed to be legitimate restraint measures. The prosecutor observed that the first applicant\u2019s arrest by the police and the events thereafter had been video recorded, and that the videotape confirmed the police officers\u2019 account. 17.  On 26 December 2001 the first applicant received a copy of the above ruling. 18.  She challenged the ruling before the Odessa Suvorivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Suvorivskyy Court\u201d). As confirmed by a postal receipt, the first applicant sent the above complaint on 3 January 2002 and the court received it on 4 January 2002. 19.  On 10 January 2002 the Suvorivskyy Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint without examining it on the grounds that it had been introduced out of time. According to the court\u2019s ruling, she had lodged it on 9 January 2002[1], whereas she had had to do so within seven days of 26 December 2001. 20.  On 21 January 2002 the first applicant appealed against the above ruling to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal. She submitted that the correct date on which she had lodged her complaint was 3 January 2002[2] and she had not missed the seven-day time-limit, given that there had been official holidays during which neither the post office nor the court had been open. 21.  On 27 February 2004 the first applicant enquired with the Suvorivskyy Court about the progress of her appeal. In accordance with the relevant procedure, she had submitted the appeal via the court\u2019s registry and the registry had been responsible for forwarding it to the appellate court. 22.  On 1 April 2004 the President of the Suvorivskyy Court replied to the first applicant that her appeal had indeed been received on 21 January 2002. However, the clerk who had registered it had been dismissed in February 2003. At the time of writing, there were no records of the first applicant\u2019s appeal in the court\u2019s information system. 23.  On 7 July 2004 the first applicant asked the Suvorivskyy Court to restore the proceedings concerning her appeal of 21 January 2002 which had apparently been mislaid. She received the reply that such an action was impossible, given that there was no appeal before the court. 24.  On 26 April 2005 the first applicant again challenged the prosecutor\u2019s ruling of 20 December 2001 before the Suvorivskyy Court. 25.  The case file does not contain any further information in that regard. 26.  On 19 September 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the first applicant on suspicion of having inflicted minor bodily injuries on the police officers. 27.  On 3 December 2001 an obligation not to leave her town of residence was imposed on the first applicant as a preventive measure pending her trial. 28.  On 7 March 2002 the investigator rejected a request by the first applicant for a forensic medical examination to establish the seriousness of her injuries sustained on 24 July 2001. The reason for the rejection was that on 20 December 2001 the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings regarding the matter (see paragraph 16 above). 29.  On 11 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was referred to court for trial. 30.  The Suvorivskyy Court adjourned hearings on several occasions owing to the absence of the first applicant and the absence of the victims and witnesses. One of the adjournments, which lasted almost eight months, was at the first applicant\u2019s request, because she was pregnant. 31.  On 17 September 2004 the Suvorivskyy Court found the first applicant guilty of deliberately inflicting minor bodily injuries on law\u2011enforcement officials and sentenced her to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended for one year. The court relied in particular on the videotape of the events of 24 July 2001, as well as reports on the officers\u2019 medical examination of 25 July 2001 which documented the injuries which they had possibly sustained a day earlier. One of them had a bite wound on his right wrist possibly originating from a human bite, and an abrasion on his right hand that might have resulted from scratching by handcuffs. Another officer had abrasions on his face and right arm possibly resulting from being scratched with fingernails. The preventive measure in respect of the first applicant \u2013 the obligation not to leave town \u2013 remained the same. 32.  The first applicant appealed. She submitted in particular that the trial court had failed to examine her own allegation of ill-treatment by the police. She noted in that regard that, as shown on the videotape, at 2.30 p.m. she had had no visible injuries, whereas at 4.10 p.m. on that day there had been a bruise below her eye. 33.  On 23 September 2004 the President of the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal acknowledged the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant in a letter sent to her following her complaints in that regard. The letter stated that the judge of the first-instance court who was dealing with her case had been disciplined in that regard. 34.  On 25 November 2004 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 31 above) and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 35.  On 28 July 2005 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant. It held that, as indicated by the case-file material, the search conducted on company Y.\u2019s premises on 24 July 2001 had been unlawful (see paragraph 11 above). Furthermore, the police officers involved had been wearing plain clothes. Accordingly, the first applicant\u2019s actions had been legitimate and had aimed to protect her property and reputation. The court also lifted the preventive measure in respect of the first applicant. 36.  On 13 December 2005 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 28 July 2005, remitting the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 37.  On 18 January 2006 the Suvorivskyy Court started a retrial. 38.  On 10 October 2008 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant once again and lifted her obligation not to leave town. The Suvorivskyy Court\u2019s reasoning was similar to that in its decision of 28 July 2005. It further stated that the police officers had had no order to prevent anybody from leaving the company\u2019s premises and that their violence towards the first applicant had been unlawful and arbitrary. 39.  On the same day the Suvorivskyy Court also delivered a separate ruling stating that there had been a number of violations of the domestic legislation and the Convention in the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that ruling. 40.  On 10 February 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 10 October 2008 and the separate ruling. 41.  On 19 January 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions in the retrial proceedings. 42.  On 4 September 2001 G., with whose car the first applicant\u2019s car had collided on 24 July 2001 (see paragraph 10 above), lodged a civil claim for damages against the first applicant. 43.  On three occasions the appellate court remitted the case to the first\u2011instance court for fresh examination. In the fourth round of the proceedings, on 2 December 2008, the Suvorivskyy Court allowed G.\u2019s claim in part, awarding her an amount corresponding to 420 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and about EUR 50 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by the first applicant. 44.  On 24 February and 7 May 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld that judgment. 45.  After the seizure of the foodstuffs on 24 July 2001, the prosecuting authorities transferred them to a private company, D. (\u201ccompany D.\u201d), for storage purposes. 46.  Following several unsuccessful complaints to the prosecuting authorities in respect of the search and seizure, on an unspecified date the second applicant brought a commercial claim against company D., seeking the return of his property, as well as compensation for lost profit. 47.  On 18 January 2002 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court allowed his claim in part and ordered company D., which did not dispute having received the foodstuffs, to return the second applicant\u2019s property to him. However, as the bailiff was unable to find any such property at the premises of company D., on 14 February 2002 the same court changed the mode of enforcement in respect of its judgment and ordered the company to pay the second applicant 102,535 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH \u2013 about EUR 22,000 at the time). 48.  On 15 April 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the defendant in part and deleted certain foodstuffs from a list referred to in the judgment of 18 January 2002. Apparently, the appellate court was not aware of the ruling of 14 February 2002. 49.  On 29 May 2002 the Higher Commercial Court quashed the lower courts\u2019 decisions and rejected the second applicant\u2019s claim. 50.  On 18 June 2002 the second applicant applied to the Higher Commercial Court for a review of its ruling of 29 May 2002 on the basis of newly discovered circumstances, namely the Prymorskyy Court\u2019s decision of 24 May 2002 recognising that the criminal investigation against the company Y. officials had been unlawful (see paragraph 11 above). The Higher Commercial Court referred that application to the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal for examination. 51.  On 25 November 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the Higher Commercial Court\u2019s ruling of 29 May 2002. It held that the impugned seizure had taken place within the criminal proceedings, whose institution had been recognised as unlawful. Furthermore, the police had had no procedural documents authorising them to seize the goods in question. It had also been established that the withheld property had never been used as material evidence in criminal proceedings; nor had the assets been frozen or transferred to company D. to secure a civil claim. Lastly, the court stated that company D. had had no legal basis to sell those goods. 52.  On 3 April 2003 the bailiff\u2019s service transferred to the second applicant UAH 4,404 which it had recovered from company D. in relation to the enforcement of the ruling of 14 February 2002. 53.  On 23 March 2004 the bailiff\u2019s service returned the writ of enforcement to the court, as it was impossible to implement it, owing to the absence of any funds or property at company D. 54.  On 2 April 2002 the second applicant complained to the Odessa Regional Commercial Court of the bailiff\u2019s inactivity as regards enforcing the ruling of 14 February 2002 (see paragraph 47 above). 55.  On 9 June 2003 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court found that there had indeed been an unlawful omission on the part of the bailiff\u2019s service: the service had not taken any steps to ensure the enforcement. 56.  On 13 December 2004 the applicants brought a claim against the bailiff\u2019s service, seeking compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 57.  On 26 December 2005 the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court ordered the bailiff\u2019s service to pay the second applicant UAH 98,131 in respect of pecuniary damage (the unenforced part of the ruling of 14 February 2002 \u2013 see paragraphs 47 and 52 above). The court also ordered the defendant to pay both applicants UAH 30,000 (about EUR 5,000) jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim for pecuniary damages. 58.  On 21 June 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court\u2019s decision of 26 December 2005. It rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim and discontinued the proceedings brought by the second applicant, holding that his claim fell to be examined by commercial courts. 59.  The applicants appealed on points of law to the Higher Administrative Court, which started the proceedings on 24 March 2008. 60.  According to the applicants\u2019 submissions of 7 September 2017, they did not receive any information from the Higher Administrative Court about further developments in those proceedings.", "references": ["8", "6", "2", "5", "7", "4", "0", "No Label", "1", "3", "9"], "gold": ["1", "3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  She gave birth to her first three children in hospital. In 2011 she became pregnant with her fourth child and had a due date in February 2012. 7.  In November 2011 she sent a letter to the Croatian Chamber of Midwives (Hrvatska Komora Primalja), enquiring about the possibility of having professional assistance with a home birth. She explained that her first three hospital deliveries had gone normally, without the need for much medical intervention, but that she had not felt fulfilled afterwards. She therefore wanted to give birth to her fourth child at home. 8.  On 1 December 2011 she received a reply that according to the relevant domestic legislation health professionals, including midwives, were unable to assist with home births. In particular, although the Act on Midwifery allowed the setting up of private practices by midwives, the Healthcare Act, as the general Act in the sector, still did not expressly provide for such a possibility. Therefore, since the matter was not clearly regulated, no midwife had set up a private practice or officially assisted with home births. The letter also cited a statement from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi Republike Hrvatske - hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry of Health\u201d) issued in August 2011 and published on the Croatian Chamber of Midwives\u2019 website:\n\u201cHaving regard to the current circumstances, where the requirements for organising a system of professionally conducted home births do not exist (education and training of personnel) and where the other accompanying elements (availability of emergency transport and proper admission [to a medical facility] in the case of complications) which would enable safe delivery at home are lacking, we are of the opinion that in this area of healthcare the lawmaker has ensured, as far as possible, all the conditions for the care of mothers and the right of children to life and health. Considering the above, we are of the opinion that the protection of children, who do not choose the circumstances of their coming into this world, takes precedence over respect for a woman\u2019s right to freely choose to give birth outside a medical facility.\u201d\nThe Croatian Chamber of Midwives thus declined to assist with the applicant\u2019s planned home birth. It noted that home births nevertheless occurred in Croatia, and for that reason it had urged the Ministry of Health to clearly regulate the matter as soon as possible. 9.  On 15 February 2012 the applicant gave birth to her child at home, assisted by a midwife from abroad. 10.  After the birth a paediatrician and a gynaecologist allegedly declined to examine the applicant and her baby but she eventually managed to find doctors who examined them both. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant registered the birth and obtained a birth certificate. 12.  On 11 May 2011 the Ministry of Health sent a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Ombudswoman for Children (Pravobraniteljica za djecu), which stated that the relevant domestic law provided that babies were to be delivered in medical facilities. The question of home births had not been regulated by law and medical assistance in such procedures was considered as quackery. It further stated that home births were the personal responsibility of the mother and the person assisting with the delivery. In the event of a delivery outside a medical facility and where a woman claiming to be the mother did not have any medical documentation, the doctor carrying out the first examination of the child was obliged to make note of the absence of such documents. The doctor was not allowed to register data which he or she was not able to verify. 13.  On 25 August 2011 the Ministry of Administration (Ministarstvo uprave Republike Hrvatske) sent a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Parents in Action - Roda NGO (Roditelji u Akciji \u2013 Roda) stating that the law provided for the possibility to register the civil status of a child born outside a medical facility. It further stated that officials were obliged to verify data reported to them before putting anything down in the State register. Consequently, a person reporting the birth of a child born outside a medical facility was required to submit proof that the woman reported as the child\u2019s mother had indeed given birth to the child. The medical documentation required for proving such circumstances was a matter for the health administration authorities. 14.  On 31 May 2012 the Ministry of Health replied to an enquiry from Parents in Action \u2013 Roda NGO by saying that it had never instructed doctors not to examine children born at home. On the contrary, having regard to the increased frequency of situations in which doctors were faced with having to examine children born at home without any medical documentation, it had consistently held that doctors were obliged to examine such children but were not allowed to register any data that they were not able to verify. It added that home birth was still not regulated by law and that therefore there was no mechanism for registering requests for home birth or regulations on the duty to report them. 15.  On 24 January 2012 the Croatian Chamber of Midwives reported on a case in which, according to the media coverage, a woman who had given birth at home had been separated from her child for two days. In particular, the hospital had called the police and social workers in order to establish that she was indeed the child\u2019s mother after she had refused to be examined by a gynaecologist in a hospital. In addition, several midwives suspected of having taken part in the birth had been questioned by the police. 16.  According to information submitted by the Government, no health professional has ever been prosecuted in criminal proceedings or sanctioned for assisting with a home birth. 17.  In the Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports on Croatia issued on 24 July 2015, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed concern regarding the lack of oversight procedures and mechanisms for ensuring adequate standards of care, the protection of women\u2019s rights and their autonomy during deliveries and the lack of options for giving birth outside hospitals. 18.  A survey on maternity practices in Croatia undertaken by the Parents in Action - Roda NGO in March 2015 noted situations of women\u2019s wishes being disregarded by medical staff during childbirth, of a lack of consent for procedures conducted during labour, and limits on the presence of an accompanying person during childbirth. 19.  The Gender Equality Ombudsperson (Pravobraniteljica za ravnopravnost spolova) issued a research report in 2013 which noted inconsistencies in hospital practices regarding the presence of an accompanying person during childbirth.", "references": ["3", "1", "7", "6", "9", "2", "0", "5", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  On 21 November 2016 the Civil and Criminal Court (Tribunale Civile e Penale) of Rome decided to issue a warrant for the applicant\u2019s arrest, as he was suspected of tax evasion, money laundering, embezzlement and membership of a transnational criminal organisation. On 13 December 2016, via a \u201cRed Notice\u201d issued through Interpol, the Italian judicial authorities requested the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest (voorlopige aanhouding) for the purpose of extradition. On the same day the applicant was arrested in Sint Maarten, brought before the Procurator General (procureur-generaal) and detained in Philipsburg Police Station. 7.  On 15 December 2016 the applicant was brought before the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris), who found the continuance of the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest lawful. 8.  In the days following his arrest the applicant was visited several times by a doctor, who found that the applicant had received treatment for a malignancy on his tongue in 2015, and that this should be monitored regularly. In addition, the applicant\u2019s blood pressure was too high. He was prescribed medication, and after a few days the applicant\u2019s blood pressure had sufficiently decreased. According to a letter from the doctor to the public prosecutor, dated 23 December 2016, the applicant was in good health, was not experiencing any exacerbations of past ailments at that time, and his blood pressure was responding well to medical treatment. The doctor concluded that there were no medical impediments to the applicant\u2019s detention. 9.  On 19 December 2016 the applicant lodged an application with the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Cura\u00e7ao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van Aruba, Cura\u00e7ao, Sint Maarten en van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba, hereinafter \u201cthe Joint Court\u201d), requesting the suspension of his detention. The applicant argued under Article 5 \u00a7 1(f) of the Convention that deprivation of liberty should be the ultimum remedium, in that a person should only be deprived of his liberty when this was strictly necessary and the aim pursued could not be achieved in a less restrictive manner. In his opinion, his fragile state of health and considerable business interests in Sint Maarten opposed (a continuation of) his detention. The Procurator General opposed suspension of the applicant\u2019s detention, arguing that there was a high risk of absconding, given that the applicant was a wealthy businessman in whose home two identity cards from Columbia and the Dominican Republic had been found during a search, and that he had use of a private jet in the United States of America. Against this background, only deprivation of liberty could prevent the applicant from finding ways to evade extradition. 10.  On 20 December 2016 the Sint Maarten prosecution authorities apparently decided to transfer the applicant from Sint Maarten to Cura\u00e7ao, another country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The applicant filed an appeal against that decision with the Joint Court. 11.  On 4 January 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for suspension of his detention. It found that, under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, it was competent to examine the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention. It noted that the applicant had not established that he was unable to receive adequate medical care in detention or that his business interests were at risk. It further took into account that the Italian authorities had not yet filed a formal extradition request, whereas the forty-day time-limit for doing so under Article 16 \u00a7 4 of the European Convention on Extradition had not yet expired. The Joint Court, taking all interests at stake into consideration \u2013 including the Procurator General\u2019s substantiated claim that there was a high risk of absconding \u2013 decided to reject the applicant\u2019s request for suspension of his detention. No further appeal lay against that decision. 12.  On 12 January 2017 the formal request for the applicant\u2019s extradition to Italy, dated 30 December 2016, was received by the Minister Plenipotentiary of Sint Maarten (Gevolmachtigd Minister van Sint Maarten). 13.  On 3 February 2017 the Procurator General filed a request for the applicant\u2019s extradition with the Joint Court. A hearing was initially fixed for 21 March 2017 but, at the applicant\u2019s request, was rescheduled for 16 May 2017. 14.  On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a fresh application with the Joint Court, requesting that his detention be either terminated or suspended. He argued, inter alia, that the prospects of his extradition being found permissible were at best highly doubtful, in the absence of guarantees by the Italian authorities that he would be allowed to serve a possible prison sentence in Sint Maarten or elsewhere in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and that a sentence imposed in Italy would be converted into a penal sanction prescribed by Dutch law for the same offence. He further argued that his serious health condition \u2013 considered in the light of the inadequate medical care and hygiene in the detention centres of Sint Maarten, as found by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in various reports \u2013 and his considerable business interests necessitated suspension of his detention pending extradition. He lastly argued that the police cells in which he had been held since 13 December 2016 were neither intended nor suitable for longer periods of detention. 15.  On 22 February 2017 the Joint Court accepted the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 20 December 2016 to transfer him to Cura\u00e7ao. It found that the Procurator General of Sint Maarten was not competent under the applicable statutory provisions to have free use of the detention facilities in other countries within the Kingdom. It therefore quashed the decision of 20 December 2016 and prohibited the Sint Maarten Public Prosecution Department or the Procurator General from transferring the applicant from his place of detention in Sint Maarten to another place of detention in another country within the Kingdom. 16.  On 8 March 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request of 7 February 2017. As regards the permissibility of the extradition request, it considered that it could not act in anticipation of the actual extradition procedure. The question before it at that time concerned the lawfulness of the detention pending extradition. On this point, it found that all formalities for the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition had been satisfied. It noted that the Procurator General was opposed to terminating or suspending the detention, arguing that there was still a high risk of absconding. It further noted that the personal situation of the applicant relating to his medical situation and business interests \u2013 the grounds he relied on in his request \u2013 had already been taken into account in its decision of 4 January 2017, and it did not appear that, two months later, there were facts or circumstances which should lead to another conclusion. Lastly, the Joint Court saw no reason to grant the applicant bail. 17.  On 13 March 2017 the applicant was visited by a dentist, who diagnosed a gum/periodontal infection around a tooth which had to be extracted. In addition, the dentist prescribed antibiotics and a disinfectant for irritated gums. The dentist recommended that the applicant be provided with vitamin B and iron to cope with vitamin and mineral deficiencies. He further recommended that the applicant be seen by a dentist every three to four months to avoid similar infections. On 3 April 2017 the dentist reported that the infection had subsided but the build-up of plaque was already visible again, and this was probably due to the lack of possibilities for adequate oral hygiene. 18.  Meanwhile, on 21 March 2017 the applicant had lodged a new petition with the Joint Court, requesting either termination or suspension of his detention, or a transfer to the sickbay at Point Blanche Prison in Sint Maarten. Relying on a CPT report of 25 August 2015 (see paragraph 29 below) and the Court\u2019s considerations in the case of Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, \u00a7\u00a7 138-41, ECHR 2016), the applicant argued that there was at least a strong presumption that the conditions of his detention should be regarded as contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. On this point, he submitted that for three months he had been staying in a cell measuring 16 square metres which he often had to share with five or sometimes even six other persons. Furthermore, the cells were dark and unhygienic and there was a foul smell. He further submitted that the unhygienic circumstances had caused the infection diagnosed by the dentist on 13 March 2017. 19.  On 12 April 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request of 21 March 2017. It noted that the Procurator General opposed the request, submitting that it was a fact of common knowledge that the prison infrastructure of Sint Maarten offered room for improvement, but that this was the responsibility of the Minister of Justice of Sint Maarten. The applicant could be transferred to Cura\u00e7ao, where the conditions of detention were better, but the applicant had opposed such a transfer. If he consented to a transfer, he could find himself a spacious single-occupancy cell in Cura\u00e7ao within a matter of days. The Joint Court further noted that on two previous occasions it had considered and rejected requests filed by the applicant to suspend or terminate his detention, and it found no substantial change of (personal) circumstances warranting a different finding as regards the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty. In this respect the Joint Court took into account that during the hearing on 4 April 2017, on which his request was examined, it was confirmed that the applicant by that time was no longer detained in a multi-occupancy cell, but in a single-occupancy cell, that he daily received vitamins and that, if he wished so, he could see a doctor or dentist. It also took into account that, in reply to an explicit question it had put to him about a possible voluntary transfer to Cura\u00e7ao, the applicant had indicated that this was not an option for him. Lastly, it found no medical reason for the applicant to be transferred to the sickbay of Point Blanche Prison. 20.  On 20 April 2017 the applicant was visited by his general practitioner, who, in a written statement dated 23 April 2017, expressed surprise at the fact that the applicant had only been seen by a doctor once whilst in detention. The general practitioner found that the applicant\u2019s blood pressure was too high. In addition, he found that the scar caused by the surgical removal of the malignancy on the applicant\u2019s tongue could give cause for concern, and recommended that the applicant be seen by a specialist as soon as possible. 21.  On 20 June 2017, following a hearing held on 16 May 2017, the Joint Court declared the applicant\u2019s extradition permissible on the basis of the facts as set out in the decision of 21 November 2016 of the Civil and Criminal Court of Rome, facts which also constituted criminal offences under the laws of Sint Maarten. Having found that the extradition request complied with the applicable formal and material requirements, the Joint Court advised the Governor (Gouverneur) of Sint Maarten to proceed with the applicant\u2019s extradition to Italy. The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 22.  On 23 June 2017 the Joint Court rejected a fourth request by the applicant for suspension of his detention pending extradition. The applicant had filed that request during the hearing of 16 May 2017, arguing, inter alia, that his detention was not or was no longer compatible with his rights under Article 3, Article 5 and Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention because of the deplorable conditions and duration of his detention, and the lack of justification for his detention. The Joint Court noted, amongst other things, that the applicant was a very wealthy man who had travelled extensively in the past and who apparently had close ties with the Dominican Republic, from where extradition would not be possible. It further noted that the applicant had been detained at Philipsburg Police Station since his arrest because, being a wealthy man, he could not be held in the remand centre of Point Blanche Prison for safety reasons, which, in the circumstances, justified his detention at the Philipsburg Police Station. In respect of the duration of his detention at that facility, the Joint Court noted that, although on legal grounds it had prohibited the Sint Maarten Prosecution Department from transferring the applicant \u2013 who had fiercely opposed such a transfer \u2013 to a place of detention in another country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it remained open to the applicant to consent voluntarily to such a transfer. It further held that, despite the critical submissions of the defence about the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention, and taking all circumstances of the case at hand into account, the detention situation was not unlawful. 23.  On 4 August 2017, after the applicant had withdrawn his appeal in cassation on 21 July 2017 without indicating any specific reason, the Governor of Sint Maarten approved the applicant\u2019s extradition. On 16 August 2017 the applicant was extradited to Italy.", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "7", "6", "0", "9", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kazan. 5.  In 1969 the Shumelka river in Tveretinovka, Republic of Tatarstan, was dammed and an artificial lake was created. 6.  The original owner of the plot of land that contained the lake was a State fur farm. 7.  In 2003 the fur farm sold the plot of land and the lake to a private limited liability company through a public sale by tender. The new owner\u2019s title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register. 8.  On 5 May 2008 the company sold the land to the applicant through a public sale by tender. The applicant\u2019s title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register and on 28 June 2008 the applicant was issued with the relevant certificate. 9.  On 18 October 2011, following bankruptcy proceedings, the limited liability company was de-registered as a legal entity. 10.  On 29 March 2012 the regional agency for management of State property brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to reclaim the plot of land and the lake. 11.  On 5 May 2012 the Pestrechinskiy District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan granted the claims in full. The Court noted that, pursuant to the applicable legislation, the lake could not be owned by a private entity or a person and should be returned to the State. The court further noted that the public sale by tender in 2008 had been conducted in contravention of certain regulations (in particular, the announcement concerning the sale had not been published in the newspapers indicated in the State-approved list) and refused to apply the three-year statute of limitations to the agency\u2019s claims. 12.  On 5 July 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan quashed the judgment of 5 May 2012 on appeal and rejected the claims in full. The court considered that the District Court had erred in the interpretation of the applicable legislation and that the plot of land with the lake could be owned by a private party. It further noted that, in any event, the agency\u2019s claim should be dismissed for its failure to bring its action within the three-year time-limit. In this connection the court referred to the fact that (1) the State had been aware that the contested property had left its possession back in 2003 when the plot of land had been sold by the State farm to a private company and the new owner\u2019s title to the property had been registered in the State land register and (2) the State had been aware that the applicant had owned the plot of land since 2008 when the applicant\u2019s title to the property had been registered in the State land register. The agency appealed. 13.  On 14 September 2012 the Supreme Court referred the matter for a review of points of law. 14.  On 10 October 2012 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgement of 5 July 2012 and upheld the judgment of 5 May 2008, by way of a points-of-law review. It rejected the applicant\u2019s request to apply the statute of limitations, considering that the agency had learnt about the infringement of the State\u2019s rights in respect of the plot of land only in 2012 after receiving a letter from the Federal Water Resources Agency (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438). 15.  On 22 February 2013 the plot of land was registered as federal property in the State land register. 16.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the imposition of a fine on her in 2011 as the owner of the plot of land. She claimed that she had not been the owner of the plot of land. 17.  On 19 April 2013 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. It noted that the applicant had been the owner of the plot of land in 2011 and that the parties had not furnished any evidence to the contrary.", "references": ["7", "0", "3", "8", "4", "1", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  On 17 April 1936 the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (\u201cthe USSR\u201d) entrusted the management of the network of recreational facilities for workers in the USSR to the Union-wide Central Council of Trade Unions (\u201cthe Union-wide Council\u201d), the central authority for the USSR\u2019s official State-controlled trade unions. 7.  By a resolution of 17 April 1956 the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic (\u201cthe Ukrainian SSR\u201d) obliged the Ministry of Healthcare of the Ukrainian SSR to \u201ctake\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0439\u043d\u044f\u0442\u0438) from the trade unions and other ministries and State agencies various assets (including the Sanatorium). 8.  By a resolution of 23 April 1960 on transferring to trade unions sanatoria and recreational resorts of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic, the Council of Ministers obliged the above-mentioned Ministry to transfer \u201cfor free use\u201d (\u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0438 \u0443 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f) to the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions (a Ukrainian entity functioning under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union and under the auspices of the Union-wide Council; \u201cthe Republican Council\u201d) all functioning self-supporting sanatoria, recreational resorts and health centres (including the Sanatorium). 9.  On 6 October 1990 the XV Congress of Trade Unions of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a decision whereby it transformed itself into the First Founding Congress of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine. That congress founded the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine (which subsequently became the Federation) and declared its independence from the State and from commercial bodies of the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union. It also declared its refusal to function under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union. The Federation was also declared the Republican Council\u2019s legal successor. 10.  On 18 November 1990 the Council of the General Conference of Trade Unions of the Soviet Union approved an agreement of 18 November 1990 between the General Conference of Trade Unions of the Soviet Union and the Federation, whereby various assets (including the Sanatorium) were \u201creserved\u201d (\u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u0456\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0456) for the Federation. 11.  By a resolution of 29 November 1990 on the protection of sovereign property rights of the Ukrainian SSR, the Parliament of the Ukrainian SSR ordered that until a law on privatisation (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f) of property was enacted, a moratorium on the State authorities making any change to the title to State property and owners thereof was to be introduced. 12.  On 24 August 1991 Ukraine declared its independence. 13.  On 10 September 1991 the Law on Enterprises, Establishments and Organisations of the Soviet Union located on the Territory of Ukraine was enacted. The assets and financial resources of enterprises, establishments, organisations and other entities subordinated to the former Soviet Union and located on the territory of Ukraine were declared State property of Ukraine. All contracts concluded in breach of the 1990 moratorium were declared null and void. 14.  On 22 November 1991 the Federation decided to create UPO, a joint-stock company (currently, a private joint-stock company). Pursuant to that decision, the Federation transferred to UPO various assets (including the Sanatorium). On 4 December 1991 the Federation and the Social Insurance Fund of Ukraine (\u201cthe SIFU\u201d) ratified UPO\u2019s articles of association and statute. 15.  On 23 December 1991 the local authorities registered UPO. 16.  By a resolution of 4 March 1992 on the implementation of the Law of Ukraine on Privatisation of Property of State Enterprises, the Parliament of Ukraine repealed the resolution of 29 November 1990 and instructed the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to draw up, by 15 March 1992, a list of enterprises which had concluded contracts whereby title to State property had been transferred, in breach of the 1990 moratorium. 17.  By a resolution of 10 April 1992 on property complexes and financial resources of civic organisations of the former Soviet Union located on the territory of Ukraine, Parliament ordered that, until a list of legal successors of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union had been drawn up, the assets and financial resources of enterprises, establishments and entities, which were located on the territory of Ukraine and which were under their central bodies\u2019 authority, were to be temporarily transferred to the State Property Fund of Ukraine (\u201cthe SPFU\u201d), an authority managing State property. 18.  By a resolution of 4 February 1994 on the property of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union, Parliament further ordered that, until the owners of the above-mentioned assets had been determined in legislation, those assets were to be regarded as State property. No such legislation has been adopted to date (see paragraph 40 below). 19.  On an unspecified date the SPFU brought a claim against the Federation, the SIFU and UPO, arguing that the assets the Federation had transferred to UPO had not belonged to it, but had belonged to the Union-wide Council, and the SPFU had therefore been their managing authority. 20.  By a judgment of 20 January 1997 (case no. 137/7), the Higher Arbitration Court of Ukraine (\u201cthe HACU\u201d; in 2001 renamed \u201cthe Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine\u201d, \u201cthe HCCU\u201d) rejected the claim. Referring to the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994, it stated that the SPFU had not established what had constituted assets under those legal acts. The assets on the basis of which UPO had been created had been transferred to the Republican Council, succeeded by the Federation, as was evident from the latter\u2019s founding documents. Since the assets had not been transferred to the Union-wide Council, they were not covered by those resolutions. Moreover, since their transfer to trade unions, the assets had not been \u201crecalled\u201d (\u043d\u0435 \u0432\u0438\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044f) by the State in accordance with the established procedure. The trade unions\u2019 title to those assets had not been challenged and had therefore been lawful. Under Article 92 \u00a7 7 of the 1994 Constitution of Ukraine, the legal regime applicable to property was to be determined by the laws of Ukraine only. Since a special law governing the legal regime of assets belonging to Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union had not been adopted when the case was examined, there had been no legal restrictions on the creation of UPO on the basis of sanatoria\u2019s assets. Accordingly, UPO had been founded lawfully, there was no basis for annulling its founding documents and the SPFU\u2019s allegation that it was the managing authority of UPO\u2019s assets was at odds with the law and the circumstances of the case. 21.  On 17 June 1997 the HACU review panel upheld the above judgment. It held that assets which had formed the basis for the creation of UPO had been transferred to the Republican Council pursuant to the resolution of 23 April 1960. They had not been in the Union-wide Council\u2019s use and were not, therefore, covered by the resolution of 10 April 1992. 22.  On 27 June 2000, at UPO\u2019s request, the local authorities registered its title to assets transferred to it in accordance with its founding documents. 23.  By a decision of 22 November 2007, which is available to the public, the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to allow a request submitted by the Prosecutor General for a review of the decision of 17 June 1997. The Supreme Court did not provide the details of its decision. 24.  In 2000 the applicant founded the \u201cKovcheg\u201d Social Rehabilitation Centre (\u201cthe Centre\u201d). According to the latter\u2019s Statute, its activities include \u201csocial protection, social-pedagogical and psychological rehabilitation of children between the ages of six and eighteen, who are in difficult life circumstances[, and] assistance with the provision of complex social, psychological, pedagogical, medical, legal and other types of individual and family assistance.\u201d 25.  On 30 August 2002 the applicant and the Centre purchased from UPO certain premises of the Sanatorium (dormitory blocks, cafeteria, library, medical block, laboratory and some other premises). Their price under the contract was 1,915,200 Ukrainian hryvnias[1] (UAH). According to the contract, the premises were owned by UPO on the basis of the title certificate of 27 June 2000. 26.  The applicant subsequently registered its title to the above-mentioned premises with the local authorities, and the Centre has been using the premises for its activities and is based there. In particular, the premises have been used as accommodation for children from \u201cdifficult\u201d families and from families of internally displaced persons (\u201cIDPs\u201d). 27.  In August 2011 a prosecutor acting on behalf of the State lodged a claim with the Kyiv City Commercial Court against UPO, the applicant and the Centre, seeking the annulment of the 2002 contract. He argued, in particular, that the premises that had been sold were State property and had never been transferred from the State to UPO\u2019s ownership. The 2002 contract had thus breached State interests. The prosecutor also stated that he had only learned about the 2002 contract in July 2011. 28.  On 19 September 2011 the court allowed the claim. It held that in 1960, the State had transferred sanatoria and recreational facilities, including the disputed property to trade unions for their free use but not their ownership. Therefore, when UPO had been created, the disputed premises had belonged to the State. The 2002 contract had thus been invalid. The court dismissed UPO\u2019s reference to the judgment of 20 January 1997, stating that the parties in that case and in the present one were not the same, and that judgment contained value judgments rather than facts as regards the owner of the disputed property. Furthermore, that judgment had not been in accordance with the Supreme Court\u2019s findings in its decisions of 25 September 2007 and 16 September 2008, in which it had held that property transferred for free use under the resolution of 23 April 1960 had been State property (the parties did not provide copies of those decisions). Lastly, the court rejected the prosecutor\u2019s argument that the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 had been breached, holding that they were inapplicable in the present case, as they concerned property owned by civic organisations of the former Soviet Union (including trade unions), whereas the disputed property had not been transferred from the State (that is to say, trade unions had never gained title to the property). 29.  The applicant appealed, stating that UPO had a title certificate to the disputed property. Even assuming that UPO had had no right to sell that property, the applicant was a bona fide purchaser. Moreover, it had spent around UAH 5 million on renovation of the purchased premises. 30.  On 1 April 2014 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 19 September 2011 and found for the applicant, stating that there were no legal grounds to conclude that the disputed premises belonged to the State. In particular, the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 had not concerned the Federation\u2019s trade unions, because the latter had left the Union-wide Council as early as 1990. Moreover, those legal acts had been in breach of Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, pursuant to which the property regime could be regulated by laws of Ukraine only. UPO had therefore become the owner of property transferred to it. The court also referred to the judgment of 20 January 1997 and decisions adopted in case no. 48/202-20/191 (see a summary of the latter decisions in paragraph 42 below), holding that facts established by a decision of a commercial court were not to be proved again when deciding other disputes with the same parties. The applicant had been a bona fide purchaser as it could not have known about the existence of any obstacles for concluding the 2002 contract, and such obstacles had not been present when it had been concluded. 31.  On 24 July 2014, following an appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor, the HCCU quashed the judgment of 1 April 2014 and upheld the judgment of 19 September 2011. It held that following a systematic analysis of various legal acts, including the law of 10 September 1991 and the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994, there were no grounds to conclude that under the resolution of 23 April 1960 the State had transferred title to the disputed property to the trade unions. The latter resolution contained no indication that the disputed property would be transferred to the ownership of the Republican Council, nor any intention on the part of its owner (the Ukrainian SSR) to alienate it to the Republican Council. The resolution of 29 November 1990 had set a moratorium on any change of title to, and owners of, State property until the enactment of a law on privatisation of property. Accordingly, the disputed property which had been transferred to the Republican Council and used by it had been State property. The HCCU also held that its position was confirmed by its own decisions and those of the Supreme Court given in 2007-2014 (the parties did not provide copies thereof). 32.  In October 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for a review of the decision of 24 July 2014.  On 4 February 2015 the Supreme Court rejected its request. It referred, inter alia, to the resolution of 23 April 1960, the resolution of 29 November 1990 and the law of 10 September 1991, and stated that it did not follow from them that the transfer of property to the Republican Council had entailed a change in the State\u2019s title to it. Trade unions had been operating under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union and had been Union-wide civic organisations. Therefore, the Sanatorium had been the property of a civic organisation of the former Soviet Union located on the territory of Ukraine and, when UPO had been created, the Sanatorium had belonged to the State and could be alienated only with the State\u2019s consent. The Supreme Court also referred to the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 in support of its findings. In particular, it held that the question of holders of title to property of Union-wide civic organisations had not yet been regulated by domestic law and the property of such organisations was at present regarded as State property. Accordingly, there had been no legal grounds for the Federation to dispose of the property of Union-wide civic organisations. 33.  On 2 April 2018 relevant changes were entered in the register of ownership rights to real estate. The State, as represented by the SPFU, was indicated as the new owner of the disputed property. 34.  Despite the judgment of 19 September 2011, the applicant is still able to use the disputed property and children from \u201cdifficult\u201d families and IDP families still live on those premises. The applicant also informed the Court that on 1 February 2018, at its request, the Kyiv City Commercial Court decided to postpone the execution of the judgment until 31 May 2018. As it appears from the decision of 1 February 2018, the representatives of the State did not object to that postponement.", "references": ["8", "7", "5", "0", "4", "2", "1", "6", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are a family comprising the husband and wife (the first and second applicants) and their child (the third applicant). They were born in 1976, 1978 and 2001 respectively and live in Kayseri. 5.  On 9 August 2001, the second applicant was admitted to a State Hospital in Ni\u011fde. She gave birth to the third applicant who has irreversible injuries caused by an intervention performed by that hospital\u2019s medical staff during labor. 6.  In their report of 12 May 2004, the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the two members of the medical staff who tended to the labor were equally and solely at fault for the third applicant\u2019s injuries. 7.  On 1 December 2004, the first and second applicants on their own and on behalf of the third applicant, submitted a claim to the Ministry of Health for compensation arising from the third applicant\u2019s injuries. 8.  Following the tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicants brought an action for damages before the Konya Administrative Court on 2 February 2005. They claimed 30,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 100,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 9.  In the course of the proceedings, the domestic court decided proprio motu to seek an expert report to determine the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. In his report submitted on 14 June 2006 to the court, the expert assessed the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants to have been TRY 194,916. 10.  On 27 June 2006, the applicants requested to increase the amount of their claim for pecuniary damage in the light of the expert report. 11.  On 6 July 2006 the court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded them the full amount of their initial claims in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 30,000 plus interest running from the date of lodging their claims with the Ministry of Health. It further awarded them a total of TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and interest running from the date of the lawsuit. The applicants\u2019 request to increase their claim for pecuniary damage were dismissed by the court which considered itself bound by the initial claim indicated by the applicants when they lodged their case. 12.  The applicants\u2019 ensuing appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 June 2009 and 28 December 2010 respectively. 13.  On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "1", "5", "8", "4", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was a member of the Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi). 6.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations in Adana, where he made a speech on behalf of his political party. According to a report prepared on the same day by the police, in his speech the applicant stated that the military forces should comply with the ceasefire declared by the PKK and that a general amnesty should be declared. He contended that people were being detained for referring to Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK, as \u201cSay\u0131n (Esteemed) \u00d6calan\u201d whereas the Prime Minister also referred to him as \u201cSay\u0131n \u00d6calan\u201d. The applicant further stated that Abdullah \u00d6calan should not be kept in isolation in prison and that independent doctors should visit him. He lastly made the following statement:\n\u201cDo not fire but talk for resolving the Kurdish issue\u201d. 7.  The police report of 21 March 2007 further stated that subsequent to the applicant\u2019s speech, songs with Kurdish lyrics were played and some demonstrators waved PKK flags. 8.  On 6 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor asked two experts to prepare a report on the police video recordings of the celebrations of 21 March 2007. According to the report dated 16 April 2007 prepared by two persons, the demonstrators chanted certain slogans and waved flags and posters of Abdullah \u00d6calan from time to time during the celebrations. 9.  On 18 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Adana Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of the PKK[1] under Articles 220 \u00a7 7 and 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code on account of his participation in the demonstration of 21 March 2007 and of the content of his speech. He relied on the police report of 21 March 2007, the police video recordings of the Newroz celebrations and the expert report dated 16 April 2007. 10.  On an unspecified date the Adana public prosecutor amended the charges against the applicant and asked the Adana Assize Court to convict him of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). 11.  On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under the aforementioned provision and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. The court considered, on the basis of the police report of 21 March 2007 and the expert report of 16 April 2007, that the applicant\u2019s statements had constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK and that the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK after having listened the applicant\u2019s speech. 12.  On 19 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. 13.  On 11 January 2012 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 29 May 2012 the Adana Assize Court granted the applicant early conditional release starting from 3 June 2012.", "references": ["7", "8", "2", "4", "3", "9", "1", "0", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1949 and 1950, respectively, and lived in Podgorica, where the second applicant still lives. 6.  On 25 July 2000 the applicants\u2019 mother instituted civil proceedings against Podgori\u010dka banka Societe Generale Group ad Podgorica (hereinafter \u201crespondent\u201d) seeking the payment of her savings, which she had deposited with the respondent\u2019s legal predecessor Titogradska osnovna banka Titograd. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicants continued the above-mentioned proceedings in their mother\u2019s stead as she had passed away in the meantime. 8.  On 25 July 2008 the First Instance Court in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicants. 9.  On 19 January 2010 the High Court in Podgorica reversed the first\u2011instance judgment by dismissing the applicants\u2019 claims in their entirety. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19 October 2010. 10.  On 5 December 2010 the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicants. 11.  On 3 February 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 12.  On 12 April 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeal, which decision was served on the applicants on 29 May 2012.", "references": ["1", "8", "5", "2", "0", "6", "9", "4", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  Under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention the applicants complained of the excessive length of enforcement proceedings. 7.  The circumstances of the cases as presented by the parties may be summarized as follows. 8.  Between 18 December 2000 and 16 April 2003, the first, second, third and fourth applicants lodged separate civil complaints with the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court (Op\u0161tinski sud u \u010ca\u010dku) against the same socially owned\u2011company, Akcionarsko dru\u0161tvo Fabrika reznog alata \u010ca\u010dak, requesting the payment of salary related damages. 9.  On 26 December 2007, the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. 10.  On 30 July 2008 \u010ca\u010dak District Court (Okru\u017eni sud u \u010ca\u010dku) upheld this judgment on appeal. 11.  On 31 March 2009 the applicants lodged a joined enforcement request which was accepted by \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court on 2 April 2009. 12.  On 22 June 2005 the fifth applicant lodged her civil complaint with the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko dru\u0161tvo Fabrika reznog alata \u010ca\u010dak requesting the payment of an allowance. 13.  On 21 April 2008 the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the fifth applicant. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment subsequently became final. 14.  On 27 October 2009 the fifth applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court on 28 October 2009. 15.  On 27 August 2003 the sixth applicant lodged her civil complaint with the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko dru\u0161tvo Fabrika reznog alata \u010ca\u010dak requesting the payment of salary related damages. 16.  On 24 April 2008 the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the sixth applicant. 17.  On 29 October 2008 the \u010ca\u010dak District Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 18.  On 31 December 2008 the sixth applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court on 08 January 2009. 19.  On 22 April 2003 the seventh applicant lodged his civil complaint with the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko dru\u0161tvo Fabrika reznog alata \u010ca\u010dak requesting the payment of salary related damages. 20.  On 11 November 2008 the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the seventh applicant. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment subsequently became final. 21.  On 9 April 2009 the seventh applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court on 4 February 2010. 22.  Since the judgment rendered in favour of the applicants remained unenforced, on 24 February 2014, the sixth and the seventh applicants and on 19 May 2014, the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, lodged their appeals with the Constitutional Court. 23.  In so doing, the applicants complained about the length of enforcement proceedings in question and the ultimate non-enforcement. 24.  Pursuant to the Amendments to Court Organization Act (Zakon o izmenama i dopunama Zakona o ure\u0111enju sudova; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 101/13) the complaint concerning the length of proceedings was transmitted to the Kragujevac Court of Appeal which then itself forwarded the matter to the \u010ca\u010dak High Court (Vi\u0161i sud u \u010ca\u010dku), i.e. the former \u010ca\u010dak District Court. 25.  On 27 January 2015 the \u010ca\u010dak High Court found that the first, second, third and fourth applicants\u2019 right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded them 200 euros (EUR) each in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings.\nIt, further, ordered the \u010ca\u010dak Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud u \u010ca\u010dku), i.e. the former \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court, to speed up the enforcement proceedings and enforce the judgment rendered in the applicants\u2019 favour. 26.  On 11 February 2015 the applicants complained to the Supreme Court of Cassation claiming that the compensation awarded was too low and, accordingly, inadequate for the violation found. On 26 March 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals. 27.  On 14 January 2015 the \u010ca\u010dak High Court found that the fifth applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded her EUR 100 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. It also ordered to the \u010ca\u010dak Court of First Instance to speed up the proceedings and enforce the judgment. 28.  On 2 February 2015 the fifth applicant complained to the Supreme Court of Cassation of the insufficient redress. Her appeal, however, was rejected on 22 April 2015. 29.  On 2 December 2014 the \u010ca\u010dak High Court found that the sixth applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded her EUR 300 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. Her appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the amount of the compensation awarded was rejected on 6 May 2015. 30.  On 20 February 2015 the \u010ca\u010dak High Court found that the seventh applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded him EUR 80 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. His appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the amount of the compensation awarded was rejected on 19 May 2015. 31.  Between 3 August 2015 and 30 December 2015 all applicants lodged new appeals with the Constitutional Court. 32.  They complained, inter alia, about the failure of domestic authorities to enforce the final judgments rendered in their favour, and that the amount of compensation awarded by the competent courts in respect of the breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been too low. 33.  Between 12 May 2016 and 9 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found that due to the failure of domestic authorities to enforce the judgments rendered in the applicants\u2019 favour their right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions had, indeed, also been violated. The Constitutional Court, accordingly, awarded the applicants with pecuniary damages in the amounts granted by the judgments that had remained unenforced. 34.  However, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the insufficient redress as regards the violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time since it considered the awards given by the domestic courts as reasonable compensation for the violations found. 35.  The Constitutional Court lastly emphasized that, in any event and due to the changes in legislation, it could not have assessed the specific reasons for the amounts awarded by other courts in this respect.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "4", "5", "9", "1", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1957 and 1981 and live in Diyarbak\u0131r and Adana respectively. 6.  On 17 August 2006 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with Adana Magistrate\u2019s Court charging the applicants and five other persons with praising an offence and an offender under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. The public prosecutor alleged that the applicants had signed a petition in September 2005 which had been drafted in order to be sent to several institutions. The petition read as follows:\n\u201cAs a person from Kurdistan, I consider and accept Mr/Esteemed Abdullah \u00d6calan of Kurdistan as a political actor.\u201d[1] 7.  On 19 January 2007 the Adana Magistrate\u2019s Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction in the case due to the possibility of application of section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) proscribing disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court then sent the file to Adana Assize Court. 8.  On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of Law No. 3713 and sentenced them each to two years\u2019 imprisonment. In its judgment, the first-instance court found it established that the above-mentioned petition had been prepared for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader and that by signing that petition the applicants had committed the offence proscribed in section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 9.  On 13 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. On 24 August 2011 the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment was deposited with the first instance court\u2019s registry. 10.  On an unspecified date the second applicant started serving his prison sentence. 11.  On 19 October 2012 the Adana Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicants\u2019 prison sentence in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. The suspension was for a period of three years, on condition that they did not commit an offence through the press, media or other methods of expressing ideas and opinions.", "references": ["8", "2", "3", "5", "9", "0", "7", "4", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Mr Aristov) was born in 1986 and lives in Moscow. The second applicant (Mr Gromov) was born in 1983 and lives in Moscow Region. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present cases are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  The applicants took part in the demonstration on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. They were arrested at the venue of the event and brought to the police stations where they were charged with administrative offences. After an overnight detention the applicants were brought before the justices of the peace and convicted as charged. 9.  According to the first applicant, during the demonstration he stood at the intersection of Malyy Kamennyy Bridge and Bolotnaya Embankment and filmed the event. At 6 p.m. he was picked out of the crowd and apprehended by the police, though he did not cause any disorder. The applicant did not resist the police officers, who gave no orders during his arrest. 10.  According to the Government, the first applicant was arrested at 6 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because he had participated in breaking the police cordon and disregarded the police orders to cease his actions. 11.  At 7.20 p.m. the first applicant was brought to Basmannyy district police station in Moscow. At the police station an on-duty officer drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s administrative escort for the purpose of compiling an administrative file. The record of administrative arrest indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 7.20 p.m. at the police station and released on 7 May 2012 at 9.20 a.m. 12.  After that an on-duty officer drew up an administrative-offence record, on the basis of the reports and explanatory notes by police officers P. and Ch., who had arrested the applicant. These reports and notes were drawn up using an identical template and contained no individualised information except the police officers\u2019 personal information and the applicant\u2019s name. The latter was accused of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police, an offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The administrative-offence record reiterated the police reports, stating as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant], acting as part of a group of 15,000 citizens, took part in an authorised meeting ... chanted slogans \u2018Russia without Putin\u2019, \u2018Putin is a thief\u2019, and \u2018United Russia is a party of crooks and thieves\u2019. During the event [the participants] broke the police cordon and tried to enter Red Square; [the applicant] did not react to the multiple lawful demands of Officers P. and Ch. to stop breaking the police cordon and continued his unlawful acts, in breach of Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 13.  On 7 May 2012 the first applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District of Moscow. The applicant insisted that he had not broken the police cordon and had been arrested by the police with no warnings or orders. He applied to have the two police officers who had arrested him examined as witnesses. This application was rejected in order to expedite the proceedings. The court questioned two witnesses for the defence and examined the video recording submitted by the applicant\u2019s representative. 14.  On the basis of the police officers\u2019 reports and explanations and the records of the administrative escorting and arrest, the court established that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as described in the administrative-offence record. The court dismissed as unreliable the testimony of defence witnesses, who stated that he had not chanted any slogans in their presence and had not participated in breaking the cordon. As for the video recording, it was dismissed on the grounds that it showed the background of the events in question rather than the applicant\u2019s arrest. Moreover, it did not contain any sound and could not therefore prove whether the applicant had chanted any slogans or not. The court sentenced the applicant to twenty-four hours\u2019 administrative detention. 15.  On 22 May 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of 7 May 2012. The applicant repeated his application to summon and question the two police officers who had arrested him on 6 May 2012 but the court rejected it owing to the applicant\u2019s failure to name those officers. At the trial the applicant insisted that he had not chanted any slogans and had not participated in breaking the police cordon. The court questioned two defence witnesses, who confirmed the applicant\u2019s account of events but stated that they had not observed his arrest. Their testimony was dismissed as unreliable because both witnesses were the applicant\u2019s friends. Relying on the reports and written statements of the police officers, the District Court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment. 16.  According to the second applicant, on 6 May 2012 at 4 p.m. he came to Bolotnaya Square to participate in the authorised demonstration. He could not leave the venue of the event because all the ways out of the square had been cordoned off by the police. The applicant stood in the crowd waiting for further information about the demonstration from its organisers. Around 7.30 p.m. he saw State Duma Deputy Ponomarev with a megaphone and came closer to listen to him together with ten other participants. At that moment a few police officers ran out of the cordon and arrested the deputy and everyone around him, including the applicant. 17.  According to the Government, the second applicant was arrested at 8.10 p.m. at the Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012 because he was participating in breaking the police cordon and he had disregarded the police order to cease these acts and disperse. 18.  At 9 p.m. the second applicant was brought to Veshnyaki district police station in Moscow. At the police station an on-duty officer drew up a record of his administrative escort at 9.10 p.m. for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 9.20 p.m. the applicant was administratively arrested; according to the record of his administrative arrest he was released on 7 May 2012 at 10.50 a.m. 19.  The second applicant was accused of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police, an offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The administrative-offence record contained a printed template which stated as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] disobeyed a lawful order of the police who were fulfilling their service duty of maintaining public order and ensuring safety. In particular, [the police] repeatedly announced through the loudhailer lawful demands to stop the march but [the applicant], acting as part of a group of citizens, broke the [police] cordon. [He] did not react to the multiple demands [of the police] to cease these actions and disperse, and continued his unlawful acts, thereby attracting the attention of the public and mass media. [The applicant] tried to cause confusion among the public (\u0441\u043e\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441\u0443\u043c\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0445\u0443 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d), thereby demonstrating his refusal to obey the lawful orders of the police officers and precluding them from fulfilling their service duties, in breach of Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 20.  The administrative case file contained two hand-written reports by police officers D. and S., who had arrested the second applicant on 6 May 2012. The reports repeated the description of the applicant\u2019s acts contained in the administrative-offence record. 21.  On 7 May 2012 the second applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka district of Moscow, who adjourned the case to 17 May 2012. On 15 May 2012 the court decided to transfer the case owing to the lack of jurisdiction. 22.  On 14 August 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 114 of the Luberetskiy Court District of Moscow Region examined the charges against the second applicant. Upon his application, the court questioned the applicant\u2019s sister who was an eyewitness to his arrest. She confirmed his account of events (see paragraph 16 above) but the court dismissed her statements as unreliable evidence. The court also questioned Officers D. and S., who stated that after the end of the demonstration, at around 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the applicant, acting as part of a group of citizens, had broken the police cordon and begun the march towards Red Square. As he had not reacted to multiple demands to stop, he had been arrested together with other participants following the radio communication order. 23.  On the basis of the police officers\u2019 statements and reports the court found the second applicant guilty under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 700 Russian roubles ((RUB) \u2013 about 18 euros (EUR) at the time). 24.  The second applicant appealed against the judgment, pointing out that he had been arrested by riot squad officers rather than by D. and S. On 24 September 2012 the Lyuberetskiy Town Court of the Moscow Region examined the appeal and upheld the judgment of 14 August 2012. The Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations and considered that the statements of D. and S. about the applicant\u2019s failure to obey their lawful demands to stop marching after the end of the event had been trustworthy.", "references": ["8", "4", "1", "5", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 1978 respectively and live in Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar region. 6.  On 3 January 2005 a young woman (S.) was found near a block of flats in Tikhoretsk with serious head injuries from which she died in a hospital on the following day. Criminal proceedings were initiated and an investigation was conducted firstly by Sh. and later, from 23 January 2005, O. \u2013 both investigators with the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d). Operational and search activities in the case were conducted by the criminal investigation unit of the Tikhoretsk Town and District Police Department (\u041e\u0423\u0420 \u0423\u0412\u0414 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0422\u0438\u0445\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u0430 \u0438 \u0422\u0438\u0445\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430, \u201cthe Tikhoretsk Police Department\u201d) \u2013 in particular by three police officers, Ch., K. and R. Those officers established that B. could have been involved in the crime. On 20 January 2005 B. was arrested and gave a statement incriminating the first applicant. 7.  On 21 January 2005 Ch., K. and R. arrested the first applicant in the presence of witnesses and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where they interviewed him. The applicant denied his involvement in the crime. 8.  The applicant\u2019s account of events at the police station is as follows. Officers Ch., K. and R. demanded that he confess to the crime. He refused. They knocked him down, punched and kicked him, beat him with a rubber truncheon, and put a gas mask over his head, blocking his access to air. 9.  At 9 p.m. on 21 January 2005 Sh., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. 10.  The applicant was taken to the temporary detention facility (IVS) at the Tikhoretsk Police Department. At 10.30 p.m. the IVS officer called an ambulance. 11.  The ambulance doctor examined the applicant and recorded multiple haematomas on his chest and back, sharp pain upon palpation in the area of sternum, and the applicant\u2019s complaints about pain in the chest and stomach, weakness and difficulty breathing. The applicant was diagnosed with a fracture of the ribs, multiple contusions and traumatic shock. The doctor noted the applicant\u2019s explanation that he had been beaten up and assessed his condition as grave. 12.  At 11.30 p.m. the applicant was brought to Tikhoretsk town hospital for an X\u2011ray examination. He was examined by a surgeon and by a traumatologist, who diagnosed him with a fracture of the ribs on the left\u2011hand side. The applicant was taken back to the IVS. 13.  On 22 January 2005 the applicant was examined by Sh. \u2013 in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer \u2013 as a suspect. He denied having been involved in the crime. According to the applicant, he complained to the investigator that the police officers had subjected him to violence in order to coerce him into giving a confession but that he had received no response. 14.  On 23 January 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 15.  On 31 January 2005 the applicant was charged with causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death. During his examination as an accused on that day and on 20 May 2005 the applicant denied his involvement in the crime and refused to give a statement, citing his right not to incriminate himself. 16.  On 25 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office submitting that the applicant had been subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against those officers. On 18 April 2005 O., the investigator, replied that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In May 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Krasnodar regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe regional prosecutor\u2019s office) that O. had used unlawful investigation methods. 17.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer in a record dated 25 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file, stated, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the crime had not been proven as the prosecution case had been based, inter alia, on the second applicant\u2019s confession, which he had subsequently retracted as having been given under coercion. 18.  According to an expert opinion of 5 May 2010 (ordered in the course of an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police and prepared by a commission of forensic medical experts from the Krasnodar regional forensic medical examination bureau and a traumatologist), multiple haematomas on the applicant\u2019s chest and back recorded by the ambulance doctor on 21 January 2005 had been caused by multiple blows from a blunt object. Due to the brevity of the description of the haematomas in the medical records it was impossible to establish the time of their infliction. The experts further concluded that the applicant had sustained fractures to two ribs on the left-hand side, which could have been caused by a blunt object on 21 January 2005 in the circumstances described by the applicant \u2013 for example as a result of the applicant being punched, kicked or hit with a rubber truncheon. Those fractures, complicated by traumatic shock, gave rise to a long-term health disorder for a period exceeding 21 days and were classified as harm to health of medium gravity. 19.  According to the second applicant, at around 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 police officers K. and R. arrested him at his place of work in his colleagues\u2019 presence and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department. 20.  The applicant\u2019s account of events at the police station is as follows. K., R. and another police officer demanded that he confess to having inflicted bodily injuries on S. He refused and was then beaten with a rubber truncheon. A gas mask was put over his head and his access to air was blocked. Thereafter the police officers handcuffed him to a ladder at the police station. The applicant spent the night at the police station. The following morning K. and R. started beating him again, demanding that he give a statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) and telling him that V. ( another suspect in the case) had already given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating the first applicant and the second applicant, together with B., and himself (that is to say V.) in inflicting head injuries on S. The applicant could not stand the violence any longer and so wrote a statement of surrender and confession that was dictated by the police officers, stating that he and the first applicant, as well as B. and V., had inflicted head injuries on S. 21.  His statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) was recorded by K. at 1 p.m. on 27 January 2005. 22.  At 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005 O., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. O. stated in the record that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. that day. 23.  According to the records of the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS, in which the applicant was placed on the same day, the applicant did not complain about his health. According to the applicant, at the IVS he was not asked about his state of health and did not undergo any medical examination. 24.  On 28 January 2005 the applicant was taken to O. According to the applicant, O. threatened him with further violence by police officers if he refused to repeat his confession. The applicant was examined as a suspect by O. in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer, D. The applicant reiterated his confession incriminating himself, the first applicant, B. and V. in the infliction of head injuries on S. On the same day the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 25.  On 1 February 2005 from 2.30 p.m. to 4.05 p.m. O. carried out an on-site verification of the applicant\u2019s statements in the presence of D. and the applicant. According to the applicant, he had been told by the police officers \u201cwhat to show [them] and where\u201d. The applicant again reiterated his confession. These investigative steps were recorded on video. 26.  According to the applicant\u2019s mother, who was present during the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on 1 February 2005, there was a bruise on the applicant\u2019s face and he was limping. His limp was also visible on the video recording, which was shown on a local television channel. 27.  On 2 February 2005 the applicant was taken by Kl., a police officer, to his grandparents from whom the applicant requested a sum of money. According to the applicant and his grandmother, when left alone with her, he explained that he had been beaten up by the police officers, that he had confessed to committing a crime out of fear for his life, and that he needed money in order to evade prosecution. His grandmother saw that he was limping and had a bruise on his face. His grandparents gave him the money. 28.  On 3 February 2005 the applicant was informed that his mother had retained D., a lawyer, to defend him during the criminal proceedings against him. During their meeting on the same day the applicant told D. that he had given the confession as a result of his having been beaten up by the police officers. During his examination as an accused on the same day he pleaded not guilty and refused to testify, citing his right not to incriminate himself. 29.  On 7 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that over a twenty-four hour period the applicant had been held in police custody and beaten by police officers until he had given a confession. 30.  On 15 February 2005 lawyer D. lodged a complaint with the inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers and that, as a result, he had given a confession (recorded as a statement of surrender and confession), which was repeated during his examination as a suspect and during the on-site verification of his statements, and that money (given to him by his grandparents) had been extorted from him by the police officers. 31.  On 17 March 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with a prosecutor at the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that he had been unlawfully detained and subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and had thus been coerced into giving a confession. On the same day he lodged a similar complaint with the investigator in charge of his criminal case, asking to be further examined as an accused. 32.  On 25 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged another complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department. 33.  On 30 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother once again lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that after his arrest on 26 January 2005 the applicant had been threatened and beaten during the night until he had confessed to a crime that he had not committed. 34.  On 18 April 2005 D., the lawyer, complained to the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office that his and the applicant\u2019s complaints had remained unanswered. 35.  In a letter of the same date O., the investigator, replied to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint dated 25 March 2005 that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused in the presence of a lawyer the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. O. concluded that he had given his statements voluntarily. 36.  On 26 April 2005 the applicant repeated his request to the investigator in charge of his criminal case that he be further examined as an accused, stating that he had not received any reply to his complaint of 17 March 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). 37.  On 3 May 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, expressing her disagreement with the statement in investigator O.\u2019s letter of 18 April 2005 that the applicant had not complained about his alleged ill-treatment by police officers. She noted that her complaints about the applicant\u2019s alleged beating by the police \u2013 as well as similar complaints lodged by the applicant and his lawyer, D. \u2013 had remained unanswered, and that O. had failed to examine (in accordance with the law) the applicant\u2019s complaints. 38.  During his examination as an accused on 16 May 2005 the applicant retracted his confession statements, asserting that they had been made under coercion exerted by police officers, and pleaded not guilty. 39.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer, D., stated in a record dated 23 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file that in the course of the preliminary investigation the applicant and D. had repeatedly complained that the applicant had been beaten on 26 and 27 January 2005 by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department, as a result of which he had given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating himself and his co\u2011accused. They had not received any reply to their complaints and to requests lodged by them for an inquiry and confrontations to be held. 40.  On 2 June 2005 an investigator from the regional prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against O. for lack of evidence of a criminal event in his actions. The decision referred to the official records of the investigative activities undertaken and statements made by O., K. and R., which denied any ill-treatment of the applicants. In particular, O. stated that neither he nor the officers of the Tikhoretsk Police Department had used any unlawful physical or psychological measures in relation to the applicants, and that accordingly, no pre-investigation inquiry had been carried out. The decision of 2 June 2005 concluded that the applicants had been arrested, examined as suspects, detained on remand in custody and charged, in accordance with the law. 41.  On 29 June 2005 at the preliminary hearing in the applicants\u2019 criminal case the second applicant requested that his statement of surrender and confession of 27 January 2005, the record of his examination as a suspect of 28 January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 be excluded from evidence on the grounds that his confession had been obtained through the use of physical violence by police officers who had unlawfully kept him in custody for twenty-four hours before his official arrest. The Tikhoretsk Town Court dismissed his request as premature and unfounded, stating that no such request had been lodged during the preliminary investigation in the case. 42.  On 30 June 2005 the second applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Town Court, submitting that the applicant had been unlawfully detained by the police officers for about twenty-four hours between his actual arrest at his place of work at about 7.45 a.m. on 26 January 2005 and his formal arrest on 27 January 2005. During that time Ch., K. and R. had subjected him to physical and psychological pressure, as a result of which he had made a confession in relation to a crime that he had not in fact committed. She requested that the police officers be prosecuted and that evidence be examined in support of her complaints. 43.  On 6 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the complaint of 30 June 2005 lodged by the second applicant\u2019s mother on the grounds that she had not been authorised to represent the applicant, who was not a minor, and that it was no longer possible to complain under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) about the police officers\u2019 actions in respect of the preliminary investigation since the preliminary investigation in the case had been completed and the trial had started. On 11 July 2005 the second applicant lodged a complaint (similar to that lodged by his mother on 30 June 2005) with the Town Court. 44.  On 14 July 2005 the Town Court heard a certain St., who had allegedly shared a cell with the second applicant in March 2005 at the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS. St. stated that he had been told by the second applicant that he (that is to say the second applicant) had committed a crime [against S.] together with other people but had decided to deny it and to argue that his statements had been obtained under coercion. St. stated that he knew that no pressure had actually been exerted on the applicant. St. did not remember whether there had been other people present when the applicant had told him this. 45.  On the same day the Town Court heard the applicants and their co\u2011accused. All four defendants complained that they had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by police officers. The first applicant argued, inter alia, that the second applicant\u2019s confession incriminating him of having murdered S. had been obtained as a result of the second applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police officers and therefore constituted inadmissible evidence. The second applicant reiterated the arguments that he had advanced at the preliminary hearing \u2013 namely, that he had actually been arrested on 26 January 2005 and held continuously in police custody, where he had been subjected to violence until he had given a confession. He also stated that when he had been brought to O., the investigator, for questioning on 28 January 2005, he had complained about the above-mentioned ill-treatment; O. had replied that if he did not reiterate his statements he would spend another night with the police officers. The applicant furthermore stated that the police officers had visited him every day and had threatened him; his family had been unaware of his whereabouts; he had given confession statements out of fear for his life; and he had not in fact committed the crime in question. The Town Court ordered that the hearing be adjourned and an inquiry into the applicants\u2019 and their co-defendants\u2019 allegations be carried out by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office before the next hearing on 26 July 2005. 46.  On 22 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint of 11 July 2005 (see paragraph 43 above) on the grounds that it was no longer open to him to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the police officers\u2019 actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of his case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed and the trial had started. 47.  On 23 July 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a refusal (pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCrP) to open a criminal case for absence of a criminal event under Articles 286 (abuse of powers) and 302 (forced extraction of confession) of the Criminal Code. The investigator relied on statements given by the investigators, O. and Sh., and the police officers, K. and R., all of whom had denied the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment. O. also stated that no forensic medical expert examination had been carried out in relation to the applicants since no complaints concerning their state of health or the police officers\u2019 actions had been lodged by them. K. and R. stated that on 21 January 2005 they had established the first applicant\u2019s whereabouts, taken him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and interviewed him. He had denied his involvement in the crime. He had later been arrested by Sh. The investigator also relied on statements given by K., R. and V.V., a police officer who had been on duty at the IVS, according to which during the first applicant\u2019s arrest and at his arrival at the IVS, respectively, they had heard him saying that he was suffering from a pain in the chest sustained during a fight with someone two days previously. 48.  On 28 July 2005 at a hearing in the trial concerning the applicants\u2019 criminal case, M.S., a senior assistant to the prosecutor of the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office who was representing the prosecution at the hearing, reported the results of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, stating that the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police officers had not been confirmed. The applicants and their co-defendants objected, considering the inquiry to have been superficial and to have constituted a pure formality. The second applicant requested that an additional inquiry be carried out, since his complaints about extortion by the police officers who had taken him to his grandparents on 2 February 2005, had remained unaddressed. The court ordered that an additional inquiry be carried out before the next hearing on 2 August 2005. 49.  On 1 August 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision not to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence of a criminal event. He relied on the statements given by Kl., the police officer, that he had taken the second applicant out of the IVS on 2 February 2005 in order to verify his suspected involvement in some thefts; and by taking the applicant to his grandparents he had done him a favour (see paragraph 27 above). The investigator concluded that Kl.\u2019s actions had had no connection with the second applicant\u2019s alleged coercion into making a confession concerning S.\u2019s death. 50.  On 2 August 2005 the Town Court examined the results of the additional inquiry, which had been communicated to it by M.S. The applicants considered that inquiry to have been superficial and formalistic. At their request the Town Court examined witnesses. Two witnesses, in whose company the first applicant had spent time immediately before his arrest, stated that the first applicant\u2019s state of health before his arrest had been normal. It also examined G., the second applicant\u2019s colleague, who stated that at about 7.50 a.m. on 26 January 2005 the applicant had left his place of work at the request of two persons who, as he had learned later during the day, had been from the police. 51.  In a decision of 2 August 2005 the Town Court dismissed the request for the exclusion from the evidence of the record of the second applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect of 28 January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 (see paragraph 41 above). Relying on the refusals of 23 July and 1 August 2005 by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office to institute criminal proceedings and the official record dated 27 January 2005 of the second applicant\u2019s arrest (which indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005), the Town Court found that his allegations of police ill\u2011treatment and unlawful detention had not been based on real facts. As regards the record of the second applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession of 27 January 2005, the Town Court excluded it from evidence on the grounds that it had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. 52.  On 5 August 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court convicted the applicants, who had pleaded not guilty, of causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death and sentenced the first applicant to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment and the second applicant to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. Relying on the refusals to institute criminal proceedings issued by the inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, the Town Court dismissed their allegations of ill-treatment by the police as unfounded. The evidence presented in the case included the record dated 28 January 2005 of the second applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 (see paragraph 51 above), as well as the confession statements given by B. and V. during the preliminary investigation and subsequently retracted by them as having been given under coercion exerted by Tikhoretsk Police Department officers. The applicants appealed against that judgment, reiterating their arguments that they had been subjected to violence by the police officers and that the second applicant\u2019s confession incriminating them should have been excluded from evidence as having been given under duress. 53.  On 29 March 2006 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss the applicants\u2019 arguments concerning their alleged ill-treatment and the request for the exclusion of the second applicant\u2019s incriminating statements allegedly obtained under coercion exercised by the police officers. It referred to the refusals issued by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 allegations. 54.  The applicants lodged applications for supervisory review in respect of their case, which were dismissed on 9 June 2006 by the Krasnodar Regional Court and on 17 September 2007 by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 55.  On 31 May 2011 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Stavropol reduced the first applicant\u2019s sentence of imprisonment by two months, in accordance with the amendments to the Criminal Code. The applicants\u2019 sentences of imprisonment ended and the applicants were released in 2014 (the second applicant) and 2016 (the first applicant). 56.  On 6 February 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the regional prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 2 June 2005 refusing to open a criminal case against O., the investigator. A new refusal was issued on 8 February 2007 and was declared unlawful on 20 November 2007 by the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar. A further refusal dated 9 January 2008 pointed out that the allegations of the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment by the police had been the subject of a different inquiry, which was pending. On 6 August 2008 the Krasnodar Regional Court terminated proceedings initiated by the applicants\u2019 mothers to appeal against the refusal of 9 January 2008 on the grounds that it was no longer open to them to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the investigator\u2019s actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of the applicants\u2019 case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed. The Regional Court noted that should the unlawfulness of actions on the part of O. or the police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department be established during the investigation in the criminal case opened on 5 March 2008 (see paragraph 60 below), the decisions not to open criminal cases against them would be annulled and the proceedings in the criminal case against the applicants would be reopened owing to newly discovered circumstances. 57.  Following the numerous complaints lodged by the applicants, on 22 March 2007 a deputy prosecutor from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry the refusals of 23 July 2005 and 1 August 2005 to institute criminal proceedings, and ordered an additional inquiry. Eight further decisions taken by investigators refusing to open a criminal case between 27 March 2007 and 6 January 2008 were annulled on the grounds that they were unlawful and had been based on an incomplete inquiry. Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded (namely, the Town Court\u2019s decisions of 15 October 2007, 27 December 2007 and 29 January 2008) \u2013 particularly in view of the investigating authority\u2019s failure to correct certain deficiencies (highlighted by courts and the supervising authorities) in the inquiry in question. 58.  One of those eight decisions not to institute criminal proceedings, dated 23 May 2007, referred to the following statements collected by an investigator during the inquiry:\n-  According to V.Yu., the second applicant\u2019s colleague, shortly after 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 the second applicant had left his place of work at the request of two men. They had all left by car. Before leaving, the applicant had had no visible injuries and had not complained about his health. Those men had enquired about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts the day before.\n-  The second applicant\u2019s mother stated that she had seen the second applicant during the verification of his statements at the crime scene on 1 February 2005. He had had a bruise on his face and had been limping.\n-  According to the second applicant\u2019s grandmother, on 2 February 2005 two police officers had brought the applicant to her place. He had been handcuffed. He had said that he needed money. When left alone with her, he had explained that he had been beaten unconscious and threatened by the police officers as a result of which he had signed a document at their request. He had had a bruise on the face and had been limping. His grandfather had given him the money he asked for.\n-  According to D., he \u2013 as one of the lawyers on duty \u2013 had been officially assigned to defend the second applicant during the applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect and during the verification of his statements at the crime scene. D. had not noticed any injuries on the applicant. After those investigative activities he had concluded an agreement with the applicant\u2019s mother to defend the applicant during the criminal proceedings against him. At their next meeting he had informed the applicant about the agreement concluded with his mother, and the applicant had told him that he had not committed the crime and had given statements incriminating himself and the first applicant as a result of coercion exercised by the police officers, who had threatened him and beaten him up. At the applicant\u2019s request D. had lodged complaints concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police. The applicant had not shown D. any injuries. 59.  The following statements were also received during the inquiry:\n-  According to the second applicant\u2019s mother, the second applicant had been arrested by K. and R., the police officers, at his place of work at 7.45 a.m. on 26 January 2005 in the presence of a team of co-workers, including V.Yu., G. and three others. K. and R. had visited her the day before, when the applicant had not been at home, asking about his whereabouts. They had again come at 7.30 a.m. on 26 January 2005, shown their service identity cards and asked about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. She had told them that the applicant had gone to work and they had left. When she had gone to the applicant\u2019s place of work she had been told that the applicant had been taken away by two men matching the description of K. and R. From 26 until 28 January 2005 she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department many times but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28 January 2005 D. had informed her that the applicant was suspected of having committed a grave crime and had offered his services as a lawyer.\n-  According to S.A. (the second applicant\u2019s girlfriend), after the second applicant\u2019s arrest she had seen the video recording of the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on a local television channel. She had noticed that the applicant was limping and that his face was bruised and swollen. After the applicant had been taken away by police officers on 26 January 2005, she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS on 27 January 2005 but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28 January 2005 she had gone to the Tikhoretsk Police Department to enquire about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts, and had been informed by O., the investigator, that the applicant was suspected of having committed a murder. 60.  On 5 March 2008 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee at the regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Tikhoretsk investigative committee\u201d) opened a criminal case under Article 112 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (harm to health of medium gravity) in relation to the injuries inflicted on the first applicant by an unknown person at an unknown place at an unknown time in January 2005. By decisions of 5 June, 2 August, 13 September and 22 October 2008 the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence. Those decisions were annulled by the head of the Tikhoretsk investigative committee. 61.  The Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged repeatedly that the Tikhoretsk investigative committee\u2019s inaction had been unlawful and that it had failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the law (namely, the Town Court\u2019s decisions of 30 May, 1 July, 21 August and 26 September 2008). The Tikhoretsk inter\u2011district prosecutor repeatedly called upon the Tikhoretsk investigative committee to put an end to violations of the CCrP being committed in the course of the criminal proceedings. Thereafter the proceedings were repeatedly terminated for lack of evidence of a criminal event or suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence, and the relevant decisions were annulled as unlawful and unfounded. 62.  In 2010 the criminal case was transferred to the Tikhoretsk Police Department for further investigation for the reason that the police officers\u2019 involvement in the first applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment had not been established. On several occasions the investigation was suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence and then resumed again. 63.  According to the investigating authority, in 2012 a certain N.K. turned himself in to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and confessed that in 2005 he had inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant two days before the applicant\u2019s arrest. The proceedings against N.K. were terminated as time\u2011barred. 64.  In April 2013 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk Police Department was disciplined for violations of criminal procedure in the course of the investigation. On 4 April 2013 the Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged numerous shortcomings in the investigation, such as the failure to question the applicant about allegations raised by N.K. in his testimony or to obtain a medical expert opinion as to whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by N.K. 65.  On 7 October 2008 the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor allowed an application lodged by the applicants for the reopening of the criminal proceedings against the applicants (in the light of newly discovered circumstances) on the grounds that the refusals to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment (on which the trial court had relied) had later been annulled. 66.  On 15 July 2010 the prosecutor terminated the proceedings, holding that the applicants had been lawfully convicted by final judicial decisions, while their allegations of police ill-treatment were being examined in the course of the separate proceedings (concerning the applicants\u2019 complaints about their alleged ill-treatment by the police). On 28 July 2011 the Tikhoretsk Town Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 July 2010. 67.  In parallel with the proceedings described above, a joint pre\u2011investigation inquiry into both applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill\u2011treatment was carried out by the Tikhoretsk investigative committee, starting from November 2010 (after a number of refusals to open a criminal case into the second applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had been issued and annulled between 26 November 2009 and 19 November 2010). 68.  Between 29 November 2010 and 15 July 2015 seven more decisions not to institute criminal proceedings were taken and subsequently annulled as based on incomplete inquiries. Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded, namely, the Tikhoretsk Town Court\u2019s decisions of 5 March 2011 (which was upheld by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 13 April 2011), 1 April 2013 and 23 April 2013. 69.  The most recent decision not to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment in police custody \u2013 for lack of the constituent elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 (abuse of powers) of the Criminal Code in the actions of Ch., K., R. and other police officers, as provided by Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP \u2013 was taken on 24 February 2016 by an investigator from the Tikhoretsk district investigation unit of the Krasnodar regional investigative committee. Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements denying that they had ill-treated the applicants, the investigator concluded that no material showing that the police officers could have committed crimes against the applicants had been established. The decision also mentioned other statements, in particular the following:\n-  statements by Sh. and O., the investigators, denying the applicants\u2019 ill\u2011treatment;\n-  statements by several persons that the first applicant had not had any visible injuries before his arrest;\n-  statements by the police officers K., R. and V.V. (see paragraph 47 above);\n-  statements by D. (see paragraph 58 above);\n-  statements by the police officers K. and R. that the second applicant had been arrested on 27 January 2005 on suspicion of having committed the above-mentioned crime against S. and taken to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where he had written a statement of surrender and confession, after which he had been arrested by O.; and\n-  statements by S.A. that after the second applicant\u2019s arrest she had seen him being filmed in detention on a programme on a local television channel; she had noticed that his face was an unnatural colour; and she had later seen on the same television channel another programme that had shown the video recording of the verification (with the applicant\u2019s participation) of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene.", "references": ["9", "8", "0", "5", "7", "6", "4", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were owners of plots of land. The municipal authorities reclaimed the plots of land, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled. The details pertaining to each application are provided below. 6.  The applicant in this case is Oleg Dmitriyevich Sergunin, who was born on 10 December 1967 and lives in Kazan. 7.  On 5 September 2009 the local council transferred the title to a plot of land in Privolzhskiy district, Kazan, to G. The relevant documents confirming that the plot of land had been earlier assigned to G. had been prepared by Gib. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered G.\u2019s title to the plot of land. 8.  On 10 December 2009 G. sold the plot of land to M. On 8 February 2010 M. sold the plot of land to N. On 16 March 2012 N. sold the plot of land to the applicant. Each time the transfer of the title to a new owner was verified and registered by the State authorities with the issuance of the relevant certificate. 9.  On 13 March 2013 the Privolzhskiy District Court of Kazan found Gib. guilty of having committed fraud in respect of the transfer of the plot of land to G. 10.  On 5 July 2013 a prosecutor acting on behalf of the local council brought an action seeking invalidation of the decision of the local council of 5 September 2009, invalidation of the applicant\u2019s title to the plot of land and return of the plot of land to the municipality. 11.  On 17 October 2013 the District Court granted the claims in full. 12.  On 23 January 2014 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment of 17 October 2013 on appeal. 13.  On 14 April 2014 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant. 14.  On 30 May 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected a second appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 15.  The applicant in this case is Dmitriy Gennadyevich Isupov who was born on 7 May 1978 and lives in Kirov. 16.  On 3 December 2009 the applicant bought a plot of land and a share in another plot of land in Sloboda Solomintsy, Kirov, from S. and T. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered the applicant\u2019s title to the plots of land. 17.  On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 18.  On 14 May 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered two judgments, allowing the prosecutor\u2019s claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the local council assigning the plots of land to T. and S. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the town\u2019s title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the town administration. 19.  On 15 and 23 July 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 14 May 2014 on appeal. 20.  On 22 August the Regional Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments. 21.  On 11 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed a second appeal on points law lodged by the applicant against the judgments of 14 May and 15 June 2015. 22.  The applicant in this case is Sergey Vasilyevich Prokudin who was born on 19 October 1958 and lives in Kirov. 23.  The applicant bought six plots of land in Sloboda Lyangasy, Kirov, from S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transactions and registered the applicant\u2019s title to the plots of land. 24.  On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 25.  On 9 and 10 June 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered six judgments, granting the prosecutor\u2019s claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the district administration assigning the plots of land to S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the city\u2019s title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the council. 26.  On 21 and 28 August and 2 September 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 9 and 10 June 2014 on appeal. 27.  On 19 January 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments.", "references": ["5", "2", "1", "8", "0", "6", "3", "4", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and now lives in Odessa, Ukraine. 6.  On 31 January 2014 the applicant sold a plot of land and a summer cottage in the Moscow Region for 4,600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). On 20 February 2014 he exchanged RUB 3,605,000 for 100,000 United States dollars (USD). 7.  On 19 March 2014 the applicant travelled to Odessa from Domodedovo Airport in Moscow. He was carrying the entire USD 100,000 in his handbag. At the security check, his hand luggage was X-rayed. An officer asked him whether he was carrying any cash. The applicant acknowledged that he had money in his handbag and showed it to the officer. 8.  The applicant was subsequently interviewed by a police officer and an investigator on suspicion of smuggling foreign currency. He insisted on the lawful origin of the money and claimed that he had erroneously believed that the customs control would take place after the security check. 9.  On 18 April 2014 the investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings because it could not be established that the applicant had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations. 10.  On 6 June 2014 the Federal Customs Service prepared a report on a regulatory customs offence under Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was charged for his failure to make a written declaration in respect of the USD 100,000 he had been carrying on him. 11.  A hearing was held on 18 December 2014 before a justice of the peace in the Domodedovo District of the Moscow Region. The court held that the customs report and statements the applicant had given to the police were sufficient evidence of the offence. It was legally irrelevant whether he had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations or negligently failed to abide by the applicable declaration requirements. The court issued a confiscation order for USD 90,000, reasoning as follows:\n\u201cWhen deciding on the punishment, the court takes into account the nature and gravity of the offence which is connected to the operation of a hazardous device, the information on the character of Mr Gyrlyan, who has no previous record of similar offences, and considers it appropriate to order confiscation of the object of the administrative offence.\u201d 12.  In his grounds of appeal, the applicant relied in particular on the case-law of the Constitutional Court, which emphasised that any punishment had to be fair and proportionate to the nature of the offence, the gravity of the consequences, the extent of the damage and other relevant factors. He pointed out that the money had been lawfully obtained and that his actions had not caused any damage to the State. 13.  On 14 January 2015 the Domodedovo Town Court dismissed the appeal in a summary fashion, noting that the punishment had been determined \u201cwithin the range of penalties [provided for in Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences] and with regard to the character of the offender\u201d. 14.  An appeal on points of law was dismissed by the deputy president of the Moscow Regional Court on 30 April 2015. He wrote that \u201cthe defence\u2019s allegation of a formalistic approach on the part of the [lower] courts [was their] subjective opinion that [did not] shield Mr Gyrlyan from liability.\u201d", "references": ["0", "6", "2", "1", "3", "5", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, Suren Osmanyan, Serob Osmanyan, Bakur Osmanyan, Mane Osmanyan and Donara Amiraghyan were born in 1935, 1961, 1988, 1990 and 1966 respectively and live in Teghout village. 6.  The applicants are a family of five, making their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.383 ha. 7.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u201cTeghout\u201d) was discovered about 4 and 6 km from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 8.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 9.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the expropriation zones of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region to be taken for State needs, and changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 10.  On 25 March 2008 Oliver Group LLC, a licensed evaluation company hired by Teghout CJSC, delivered an evaluation report of the applicants\u2019 plot of land. According to the report, the cadastral value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land was AMD 250,865 (approximately EUR 545). By means of calculations based on comparative and income capitalisation methods, the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land was estimated at AMD 188,000 (approximately EUR 409). 11.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for AMD 188,000 plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 216,200 (approximately EUR 470). 12.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. They claimed that they were unable to obtain an evaluation of their property by another company since no other evaluation company was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of their land. 13.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim with the Lori Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) against the applicants and L., the first applicant\u2019s late wife, seeking to oblige them to sign the agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group LLC. 14.  In the course of the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted a corrected version of the evaluation report on the applicants\u2019 property stating that Oliver Group LLC had made certain corrections as a result of which the market value of the land was estimated at AMD 194,000 (approximately EUR 422). The final amount of compensation, together with the additional 15% required by the law, would thus be equal to AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485). The remainder of the data contained in the original report had not been changed. 15.  The applicants argued before the Regional Court that the market value of their land had been underestimated and that the court should order a forensic expert examination to determine the real market value of their property. 16.  On 6 October 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding L. and the applicants a total of AMD 223,100 in compensation. 17.  The applicants lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the third applicant had not been duly notified about the proceedings and that L. had died before the proceedings before the Regional Court had started. They further argued that they had not been duly notified about the dates and times of the rescheduled hearings. 18.  On 27 February 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 19.  On 2 June 2009 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim finding, inter alia, that the evaluation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC should be considered lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 property to be taken for State needs and that the applicants\u2019 request to order a forensic expert examination was groundless. The Regional Court stated that the first applicant, as L.\u2019s successor, should be awarded her share in the amount of compensation and awarded the applicants a total of AMD 223,100 in equal shares as compensation. 20.  The applicants lodged an appeal claiming, inter alia, that the amount of compensation was not adequate and that no account had been taken of their fruit trees and their profitability. They argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by their opponent as established proof of the market value of their property. Also, they argued that the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination since such a necessity had arisen in the course of the proceedings and they had no possibility to provide an alternative evaluation themselves. 21.  On 31 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, stating that it should have granted the applicants\u2019 request by ordering a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the property. The case was remitted to the Regional Court. 22.  On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court ordered a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land, including that of immovable property or other improvements, if there were any. 23.  On 12 August 2010 expert G. of the \u201cExpertise Centre\u201d, a State nonprofit organisation, delivered a report according to which the market value of the property was estimated to be AMD 230,000 (approximately EUR 500). It was stated in the report that the applicants\u2019 plot of land was entirely covered with grass, did not have any water supply and was used to provide fodder. There were four peach trees on the land in question. Relevant photographs of the applicants\u2019 plot of land were attached to the report. 24.  On 1 November 2010 the Regional Court ordered an additional forensic expert examination. The expert was requested to determine whether there were any improvements on the applicants\u2019 plot of land and, if so, to describe them and to establish the market value of the land together with the value of the improvements, if there were any. 25.  On 17 December 2010 expert A. of \u201cNational Bureau of Expertise\u201d, a State nonprofit organisation, delivered his report which estimated the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land at AMD 209,100 (approximately EUR 450). The report confirmed the description of the applicants\u2019 plot of land contained in the previous expert report. In addition, it was stated that in the expert\u2019s opinion that the four fruit trees on the land could not have any bearing on the determination of its market value. The report also stated that the first expert report and the evaluation report by Oliver Group CJSC had produced quite realistic results. 26.  On 21 April 2011 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim. It relied on the corrected evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group CJSC and two forensic expert reports. The Regional Court granted the applicants AMD 264,500 (approximately EUR 575) by taking the highest market value of the three evaluations at its disposal and adding to that amount the additional 15% as required by law. 27.  The applicants lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that the second forensic examination report was not credible since the expert had failed to specify the sources of information he had used to reach his conclusions and moreover no account had been taken of the number of the applicants\u2019 trees and their value. They further argued that they had filed an application with the Regional Court seeking to exclude this piece of evidence and assign an additional forensic examination, but their application was dismissed. 28.  On 7 July 2011 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment finding that the amount of compensation had been correctly determined based on the existing evidence. As regards the applicants\u2019 arguments concerning the fruit trees, the Civil Court of Appeal stated that both experts appointed by the Regional Court had recorded that there were only four fruit trees on the plot of land while expert A. had stated in his report that the trees in question could not have a significant bearing on the market value of the land. 29.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They raised similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. 30.  On 31 August 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "6", "5", "7", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ostia Lido. 6.  At birth, the applicant was entered in the civil-status registers as male and was given the forename L. However, the applicant stated that she had always identified as female and lived in society as a woman under the forename S. For instance, her work colleagues (the applicant has worked as a civil servant since 1999) had always called her S., and in the photograph on her identity card issued in August 2000 her appearance was that of a woman. 7.  In 1999 S.V. began treatment with feminising hormones as part of the gender transition process. 8.  On 9 November 2000 she applied to the Rome District Court on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982, stating that she wished to complete the transition process by permanently changing her primary sexual characteristics, and sought authorisation to undergo gender reassignment surgery. 9.  In a judgment of 10 May 2001 the District Court found that the applicant had embarked on the gender transition process after careful consideration. Having taken note of her determination the court authorised her to undergo surgery in order to adapt her primary sexual characteristics to match her female gender identity. 10.  On 30 May 2001 the applicant, while awaiting the surgery authorised by the District Court, applied to the prefect of Rome for a change of forename under Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000. She argued that, given that she had been undergoing a gender transition process for several years, and in view of her physical appearance, the fact that her identity papers indicated a male forename was a constant source of humiliation and embarrassment. She also asserted that the waiting period for surgery was approximately four years. 11.  In a decision of 4 July 2001 the prefect refused the applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that, under Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000, a person\u2019s forename had to correspond to his or her gender. In the prefect\u2019s view, in the absence of a final court ruling ordering the change to her legal gender status for the purposes of Law no. 164 of 1982, the applicant\u2019s forename could not be changed. 12.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court and also requested a stay of execution of the prefect\u2019s decision. 13.  On 23 July 2001 the applicant underwent mammoplasty. On 6 September 2001 she was placed on a waiting list at Trieste University Hospital for surgery to alter her primary sexual characteristics. 14.  On 21 February 2002 the Regional Administrative Court refused to grant a stay of execution of the prefect\u2019s decision. 15.  On 3 February 2003, while the proceedings before the Regional Administrative Court were still pending on the merits, the applicant underwent an operation to change her sexual characteristics from male to female. She subsequently applied to the Rome District Court, on an unspecified date, for legal recognition of her gender reassignment under section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982. 16.  In a judgment of 10 October 2003 the Rome District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and ordered the Savona municipal authorities to alter the indication of the applicant\u2019s gender from male to female and to change the forename L. to S. 17.  By a judgment of 6 March 2008, deposited with the registry on 17 May 2008, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the prefect\u2019s decision of 4 July 2001. The court held that Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000 concerning changes of forename was not applicable in the present case, which actually came within the scope of Law no. 164 of 1982 concerning changes to legal gender status. The court stressed in that regard that, under the terms of the latter, the amendment of the civil-status records of a transgender person had to be ordered by the court ruling on his or her gender reassignment. It therefore considered that the prefect had correctly refused the applicant\u2019s request.\nThe applicant did not appeal against that judgment.", "references": ["5", "6", "7", "3", "0", "2", "9", "1", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, listed in the appendix, were all professors who at the material time were working at Tbilisi State University (\u201cthe University\u201d). They opposed reforms initiated by the new University administration as a part of the nation-wide higher education reform in 2004-2005 and had initiated several court proceedings against the University in that regard. As part of their activities, they also held numerous public meetings at the University, made public statements and wrote to various public officials, denouncing what they called the \u201cdestruction\u201d of the University. The applicants, with the exception of Mr Tuskia, Ms Sikharulidze, and Mr D. Bakhtadze (the first, sixth and ninth applicants respectively), were at the material time members of the Grand Academic Council, the highest representative body of the University (composed of seventy-eight members), which operated under the University charter (approved by the President of Georgia on 13 July 2001) and which led the protests against the changes at the University. 6.  On 8 June 2005 the President of Georgia issued Presidential Decree no. 473, which, among other measures, repealed the University charter, thus abolishing the Grand Academic Council. The representatives of the Council challenged before the Constitutional Court of Georgia the constitutionality and legality of Presidential Decree no. 473 and several newly amended provisions of the Law on Higher Education. On 25 July 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the above-mentioned challenge as inadmissible. 7.  On 5 April 2006 the President of Georgia appointed Mr G.Kh. as acting Rector (\u201e\u10e0\u10d4\u10e5\u10e2\u10dd\u10e0\u10d8\u201c) of the University. 8.  On 19 June 2006 the already-dissolved Grand Academic Council organised a meeting of University staff. After the meeting, several former members of the Council met the new acting Rector of the University, Mr G.Kh., for the purpose of expressing their concerns to him regarding the changes at the University. The meeting ended without any results and the University employees \u2013 among them all of the applicants \u2013 decided to stay at the University in one of the lecture halls and to hold a further meeting themselves. 9.  According to the applicants, at around 1 a.m. the police arrived at the University. Without giving any explanations or any prior warning, they forced everyone out of the University building. Despite the applicants\u2019 repeated requests, the police officers did not show them any order authorising the removal of the people gathered. 10.  The next day, the applicants, along with other employees of the University, gathered again in one of the lecture halls of the University. Towards the evening the police allegedly again dispersed their meeting. 11.  On 3 July 2006, in response to the request of Mr Sanadze (the fourth applicant), the acting Rector of the University authorised a meeting of University employees in the Grand Hall of the main University building between 3.30 p.m. and 7 p.m. of the same day. In the letter authorising the gathering G.Kh. stressed that the participants of the planned gathering were asked to maintain order and to conclude the meeting before 7 p.m. 12.  At the meeting, which started as planned, the already-dissolved Grand Academic Council \u201celected\u201d the second applicant as the new Rector of the University. Thereafter, a group of about twenty people, including all of the applicants, headed to the office of the acting Rector in order to inform the latter of the Council\u2019s decision and to demand his resignation. 13.  According to the applicants, they entered the acting Rector\u2019s office without using any force and informed him of the Grand Council\u2019s decision. They asked G.Kh. to leave the office; the latter, however, refused to do so. While the meeting at the Rector\u2019s office continued, the police entered the University grounds. The police officers went straight to the office of the acting Rector, who upon their entrance immediately left the room. Afterwards, the police asked the applicants, along with the other people present, to leave. They left the Rector\u2019s office without any resistance and moved to a lecture hall. 14.  The Government disputed the applicants\u2019 version of events. According to the official version of events, at least twenty people forced their way into G.Kh.\u2019s office, while dozens of others stayed in the reception area and the corridor chanting slogans against G.Kh. The second applicant informed the acting Rector of the former Grand Academic Council\u2019s decision and demanded that he leave his office within ten minutes. The University security service was no longer in control of the situation and the functioning of the University administration was disrupted. Given that the applicants and other protesters were refusing to leave, the police were called to restore order. G.Kh. left his office as soon as the police arrived. Then it took more than one hour for the police to negotiate the applicants\u2019 removal from the Rector\u2019s office. 15.  According to the case file, after their removal from the Rector\u2019s office, the applicants \u2013 together with other protesters (in total, some 400 people) \u2013 gathered in one of the lecture halls of the main University building, where they continued their protest. The applicants alleged that at around 11 p.m. the police had closed the doors of the lecture hall and prevented the people inside from leaving it. They had been locked in the lecture hall without access to water, food or toilet facilities until approximately 8-10 a.m. the next day. 16.  On 3 July 2006 criminal proceedings were initiated under Article 226 of the Criminal Code of Georgia against unidentified perpetrators in respect of the organisation and participation in group actions violating public order. 17.  According to the applicants on 4 July 2006 the Minister of Education held a press briefing denouncing the events that had taken place at the University on the preceding day. He referred to those involved in the 3 July 2006 events as \u201chooligans\u201d and gave an assurance that they would all bear responsibility for their actions. 18.  Over the following several days, twenty witnesses were questioned in connection with the events of 3 July 2006 \u2013 among them six police patrol officers, three members of the University security service, and eleven administrative staff members (including the acting Rector, G.Kh., and his deputy). The staff members (eyewitnesses to the events) all identified the applicants as being among those who had forced their way into the Rector\u2019s office, insulted him and demanded his resignation. They noted that while there had been no physical confrontation, the group of so-called \u201cprotesting professors\u201d had been acting in a highly disrespectful manner, chanting insulting expressions against Mr G.Kh. They also claimed that the University had remained paralysed during the incident with several meetings being disrupted and the Rector and several members of the University administration being prevented from carrying out their duties. 19.  The acting Rector testified that around twenty people, among them all the applicants, in disregard of the orders of the security staff, had burst into his office. The second applicant had informed him of the former Grand Academic Council\u2019s decision and had \u201ccategorically\u201d (\u10d9\u10d0\u10e2\u10d4\u10d2\u10dd\u10e0\u10d8\u10e3\u10da\u10d0\u10d3) demanded that he leave his office, \u201cbag and baggage\u201d, (\u10d1\u10d0\u10e0\u10d2\u10d8-\u10d1\u10d0\u10e0\u10ee\u10d0\u10dc\u10d0) within ten minutes. G.Kh. explained that their meeting had continued against a background of noise and chanting, with the protestors chanting \u201cleave, leave\u201d. He had not been personally insulted, although his colleagues had told him that protesters in the corridor adjacent to his office had been chanting insulting slogans. In reply to a direct question, he explained that no foul language had been used by protesters in his office, either in respect of him or of his colleagues. He remembered, however, Mr Dolidze inciting via cell phone other protesters to join them in the acting Rector\u2019s office. Lastly, G.Kh. noted that the incident in his office had lasted for about an hour and a half, paralysing not only his work but the functioning of the whole administration of the University. 20.  The security service members, who were also questioned during the pre-trial investigation, claimed that they had been unable to identify the professors involved in the events by name. They confirmed, however, that a large group of about fifty people \u2013 in disobedience of the orders given by the security service \u2013 had entered the reception area of the office of the Rector by force. Then around fifteen or twenty people had forced their way into the Rector\u2019s office, where they had stayed for about two hours and until the police secured their removal from the office. 21.  On 5 July 2006 the second, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth applicants were also questioned as witnesses in the course of the above\u2011mentioned criminal proceedings. 22.  On 24 July 2006 several members of the former Grand Academic Council, among them the second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh applicants, sent a letter to the President of Georgia complaining about the events of 19\u201120 June and 3-4 July 2006. With reference to the events of 3-4 July 2006, they made a particular complaint that they, along with several hundred other people, had been locked in the University lecture hall for the whole night. They alleged that this had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, as they had been denied access to drinking water and a toilet and had been left without fresh air. They requested the initiation of criminal proceedings in this regard. 23.  A copy of the above-mentioned letter was sent to the Prosecutor General of Georgia. In support of their request, the applicants submitted statements given by fifteen people accounting in detail for the events of 19\u201120 June and 3-4 July 2006. 24.  On 29 July 2006 the relevant prosecutor issued a ruling terminating the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged organisation and participation in group actions violating public order. The prosecutor concluded that the actions of the applicants had not comprised elements of a crime. The ruling read further as follows:\n\u201cThey committed offences \u2013 namely arbitrary behaviour, a minor violation of public order, and disobeying the lawful instructions of law-enforcement personnel \u2013 which constitute administrative offences under Articles 174, 166 and 173 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 25.  In the operative part of the prosecutor\u2019s ruling, the prosecutor stated that the ruling, along with the case file, was to be sent to the Tbilisi City Court in order for administrative proceedings to be conducted against the applicants. 26.  In the same ruling the prosecutor also decided on the termination of the proceedings that apparently had been opened against the police officers in respect of their alleged unlawful use of force on 3-4 July 2006, finding the complaint lodged by the applicants in that connection unsubstantiated. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings provided in its operative part a fifteen-day time-limit for an appeal. The prosecutor\u2019s ruling did not mention the applicants\u2019 complaint concerning the events of 19\u201120 June 2006. 27.  The applicants were served with a copy of the above-mentioned ruling late in the evening of 29 July 2006. They were told at the same time that a hearing in the administrative proceedings initiated against them had been scheduled for the next day. 28.  On 30 July 2006 a hearing took place at the Tbilisi City Court. The applicants objected that owing to the initiation of the administrative proceedings they could not avail themselves of the opportunity to challenge the prosecutorial ruling of 29 July 2006. They furthermore complained that they had not had sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the relevant material in the case file and to hire a lawyer. The applicants also requested that the acting Rector of the University and the security staff of the University be questioned. The prosecutor, for his part, requested the questioning of three of the police officers involved in the events that had developed in the Rector\u2019s office on 3 July 2006. The judge allowed a request lodged by the prosecutor for the three police officers to be examined in court and postponed the hearing until 3 August 2006. 29.  At the hearing on 3 August 2006 the applicants reiterated their request for the acting Rector to be examined in court. They furthermore requested that the court hear the deputy Rector of the University and four other eyewitnesses to the events of 3 July 2006, including two journalists who had not been questioned at the pre-trial stage of the discontinued criminal proceedings. The judge granted the applicants leave to question the four new witnesses, while refusing their request for the questioning of the acting Rector and his deputy. In that connection, the court reasoned that those two individuals had already been questioned at the pre-trial stage and observed that their statements had been included in the case file. 30.  According to the minutes of the 3 August 2006 hearing, the applicants challenged the factual circumstances of the events of 3 July 2006, as presented by the prosecutor. They maintained that they had not broken into the Rector\u2019s office, but rather that they had entered the office and had sat there calmly without using any force; that they had not insulted or threatened the acting Rector, but had simply presented him with the decision of the Grand Academic Council; and that they had not disobeyed the instructions of the police, but had left the Rector\u2019s office within ten or fifteen minutes of being ordered to do so by the police. The second applicant stated that he had been taken out of the office sitting on a chair because he had apparently looked very tired. The applicants\u2019 lawyers also argued that the Rector\u2019s office did not constitute a public space for the purposes of Article 166 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cCAO\u201d) (see paragraph 47 below) and that in any event the applicants had simply been exercising their right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, as provided for in the Constitution of Georgia. Lastly, they alleged that the prosecutor had presented the case in a manner suggesting the collective administrative liability of the applicants, as the individual role of each applicant in the events of 3 July 2006 had not been identified. 31.  The applicants also reiterated their complaint that they had been locked in the University lecture hall for the night of 3-4 July 2006 without their having access to water or toilets. They tried to put to the prosecutor several questions in this regard but the presiding judge dismissed the questions as irrelevant, having no bearing on the case. 32.  During the hearing of 3 August 2006 the following witnesses were questioned. V.J., a member of the University security service, claimed that about fifty people \u2013 disregarding his orders and pushing him away \u2013 had forced their way to the reception area of the Rector\u2019s office. In reply to the judge\u2019s question, he said that he could not recall exactly who had pushed him. He furthermore stated that various protesters had been making insulting statements and noise and that as a result the work in the main building of the University had been disrupted. 33.  According to the statement given in court by G.Ch., a police patrol officer, at the moment of his arrival at the University there had been around 200 people protesting outside. He had entered the building and had tried to enter the Rector\u2019s office, which had been blocked by protestors. After making his way through protesters and entering the office of G.Kh, he had seen around twenty people inside. It had taken him and the other officers about one hour to persuade the protesters to leave the office. In reply to a question he clarified that no one had physically resisted the police, but that the protesters had simply refused to leave the office. He also specified that insulting statements had been made by protestors in the corridor and not in the acting Rector\u2019s office. 34.  Z.S., another police officer, confirmed that while no force had been used, they had spent an hour persuading a group of about twenty people to leave the Rector\u2019s office. He said that Mr Mebonia (the second applicant) had been taken out of the office still sitting on a chair as he had refused to stand up and leave by himself. He added that he recalled all of the applicants, except for Ms Sikharulidze (the sixth applicant), being inside the Rector\u2019s office. The third police officer, K.B., who was also questioned in court, similarly maintained that there had been no physical confrontation inside the office, but that it had taken a while before those inside had agreed to leave. 35.  On the same date the Court examined two members of the University staff, who gave evidence similar to their pre-trial statements (see paragraph 18 above). In addition, the court questioned two journalists and two professors, all of whom had been among the group of protesters on 3 July 2006. All four claimed that there had been no confrontation (either physical or verbal) in the office of the Rector, that the group had been simply demanding the resignation of G.Kh., and that they had left the office at the request of the police. 36.  By a decision of 4 August 2006 the Tbilisi City Court found the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eight applicants guilty of the above\u2011mentioned administrative offences under Articles 166, 173 and 174 of the CAO and imposed a fine of 100 Georgian laris (GEL \u2013 approximately 45 euros) on each of them. The court terminated the proceedings concerning the alleged disobeying of a lawful order given by the police (Article 173) with respect to the sixth and ninth applicants, finding that they had left the office of the Rector before the arrival of the police and held them guilty of the administrative offences under Articles 166 and 174 of the CAO only, imposing a fine of GEL 100 on each of them (see paragraph 39 below). 37.  In reaching its decision, the Tbilisi City Court concluded that the Grand Academic Council had begun acting unlawfully starting from 8 June 2005, when the old University charter had been repealed by Presidential Decree no. 473. Consequently, the court found that the restoration of the dissolved body, the impugned election of the new University Rector on 3 July 2006, and the subsequent demand for the resignation of G.Kh. in view of the election had been unlawful and constituted the administrative offence arbitrary behaviour within the meaning of Article 174 of the CAO (see paragraph 47 below). 38.  In connection with the charge of a minor breach of public order (minor hooliganism), the court established that the applicants had burst into the office of G.Kh., calling for his resignation. They had demanded, in an insulting manner, that he immediately leave his office and take all his belongings with him. The court concluded that given that the applicants had occupied the office of the acting Rector against his will for about two hours and had disregarded his repeated requests for them to leave it in order to allow everyone to resume their work, their behaviour had amounted to insulting harassment (\u10e8\u10d4\u10e3\u10e0\u10d0\u10ea\u10ee\u10db\u10e7\u10dd\u10e4\u10d4\u10da\u10d8 \u10d2\u10d0\u10d3\u10d0\u10d9\u10d8\u10d3\u10d4\u10d1\u10d0) with respect to G.Kh. as well as the other staff present, and to \u201cother similar action\u201d that had violated public order and peace. The Tbilisi City Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 argument that the Rector\u2019s office was merely a private working space, reasoning that the presence of the public rendered it a public space for the purposes of the CAO. As to the submission by the defence that the applicants had simply been exercising their right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, as provided in the Constitution of Georgia, the court concluded as follows:\n\u201cThe court notes that although a person is entitled to exercise the rights and freedoms enshrined in Articles 19, 24 and 25 of the Constitution, he or she is at the same time obliged, in the process of exercising his or her rights, to abstain from violating others\u2019 rights and interests, from encroaching upon [others\u2019] honour and dignity, [and] from violating ... public order ... . [He or she] should not, in exercising his or her constitutional rights, commit acts prohibited by law, which, in the court\u2019s view, in fact happened on 3 July 2006 in the office of the Rector ...\u201d 39.  As for the charge of disobeying a lawful order given by the police, the court concluded that the sixth and ninth applicants had left the office of G.Kh. before the arrival of the police. They were thus acquitted of the above-mentioned charge. As for the remainder of the applicants, the court established that despite the repeated requests of the police, they had refused to leave the office of the acting Rector. In the court\u2019s view, notwithstanding the fact that no physical force had been used, the applicants\u2019 refusal for more than an hour to obey the orders of the police had amounted to a breach of Article 173 of the CAO (see paragraph 47 below). 40.  The applicants appealed against the first-instance court\u2019s decision to the chairwoman of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. They complained that there had been no record of an administrative offence having been made individually in respect of each of them, that their individual roles in the commission of the impugned administrative offences had not been established, and that the proceedings had been brought in a manner suggesting their collective liability. In that connection, they referred to the statements of witnesses who had noted that there had been two hundred people outside and twenty people inside the acting Rector\u2019s office during the events of 3 July 2006 and that it was impossible to identify the individuals who had allegedly insulted the acting Rector and forced their way into his office. The applicants also complained of the failure of the Tbilisi City Court to examine the acting Rector and his deputy in the course of the trial. Lastly, they challenged the categorisation of their actions as administrative offences by the first-instance court, submitting that they had simply been exercising their freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. 41.  On 4 September 2006, the chairwoman of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, sitting privately in her office and without holding an oral hearing, dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal as unsubstantiated. She concluded that the decision of the first-instance court had been lawful and properly reasoned. The operative part of the decision of 4 September 2006 indicated that no further appeal was possible. 42.  The case file contains a copy of a television report by the Imedi broadcasting company about the events of 3 July 2006. As was shown in Imedi\u2019s recording of the events of 3 July 2006, at least twenty people had entered the reception area of the acting Rector\u2019s office by force, in disregard of the protests of the security staff and reception staff. Then some of them had walked into the office itself, notifying G.Kh. of the decision of the Grand Academic Council and demanding his resignation. According to the video, dozens of protesters had simultaneously gathered in the corridor adjacent to the acting Rector\u2019s office and had chanted \u201cstep down!\u201d 43.  Imedi also ran an extract from the press briefing held by the Minister of Education on 4 July 2006. While commenting on the events in the University the preceding day, the Minister said the following:\n\u201cThose people, who went beyond all the limits of academia and ethics yesterday, will of course, face responsibility for that.\u201d", "references": ["8", "1", "2", "0", "9", "5", "4", "No Label", "6", "7", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation. 7.  The most important procedural steps were described in the case Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011), and also in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15 and 38 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are referred to below. 8.  On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaint regarding the offence of attempted homicide committed against the applicant was statute-barred. This decision was annulled by a Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation under file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 9.  On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken to gather information from domestic authorities: the prosecutor\u2019s office contacted 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of the events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, and verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 10.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (see Sidea and Others, cited above, \u00a7 11), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "6", "2", "9", "4", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Vilnius. 5.  On 17 April 2009 the applicant was officially notified that she was suspected of having organised the embezzlement of property of high value. On 7 May 2009 the applicant was charged with the relevant offences. She denied her guilt. 6.  On 22 July 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the legal classification of the charges against the applicant was incorrect, because the total value of the allegedly embezzled property was not high. The court reclassified the charges on the basis of a less serious offence, held that the prosecution had become time-barred and discontinued the proceedings. 7.  The prosecutor appealed. On 27 October 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Vilnius Regional Court. 8.  After re-examining the case, on 10 June 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court found the applicant guilty of the charges against her. She was given a fine of 12,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 3,475 euros (EUR)). She was also ordered to pay some of the damages claimed by a company, amounting to LTL 2,800 (approximately EUR 810). 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal, but on 18 October 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed it and upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment in its entirety. 10.  On 7 January 2014 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. On 17 February 2014 a selection panel of three judges refused to examine the appeal, on the basis that it did not comply with Article 368 \u00a7 2 and Article 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d) (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). The chair of the selection panel, Judge V.G., was the father of M.G., who had been the prosecutor in the case against the applicant before the first-instance and the appellate courts. 11.  The Supreme Court consists of two divisions: Civil and Criminal. The Criminal Division has sixteen judges in it.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "9", "6", "0", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant company, K\u00f6nyv-T\u00e1r Kft, is a limited liability company with its registered office in Budapest. The second applicant company, Suli-K\u00f6nyv Kft, is a limited liability company with its registered office in Tata. The third applicant company, Tank\u00f6nyv-Ker Bt, is a limited partnership company with its registered office in Budapest. 5.  The applicant companies are schoolbook distributors. 6.  The Hungarian school system was entirely reorganised by a series of measures adopted in 2011 and 2012. The schools, formerly decentralised, became subject to centralised State management. On 9 December 2011 and 24 July 2012 respectively, Acts nos. CLXVI of 2011 and CXXV of 2012 (collectively referred to as \u201cthe New Regulations\u201d) were published in the Official Gazette; they contained, inter alia, provisions amending Act no. XXXVII of 2001 on the Schoolbook Market. The amendments came into force on 1 October 2012 and were effective from the school year starting in September 2013. The essence of the new legislation was already contained in the first amendment, published in December 2011. 7.  The applicant companies submitted that the Hungarian schoolbook distribution market, as a whole, had previously involved three groups of market participants: the publishers, the distributors and the schools. Prior to the New Regulations\u2019 entry into force, it could be considered a semi-regulated market; in respect of the publishers this meant that the legislature had established the requirements for a book to qualify as a schoolbook, and it often applied certain measures in this context, such as maximum prices or State subsidies based on indigence. However, the schoolbook distribution sector in itself was an unregulated market. The schoolbook distributors\u2019 clients were the schools, which, in an often highly competitive market, were able to select the publishers and schoolbook distributors, the former for the products they offered and the latter mainly for their reliability and accessibility and for the discounts promoted. 8.  The task of distributors included not only the provision of logistical services but the processing of orders, the management of customised billing and the handling of returns. Most of the companies dealing with the distribution of schoolbooks leased warehouses and delivery vehicles for a two-to-four-month period when performing their activities, which were predominantly seasonal in nature. Besides their regular staff, ranging from three to fifty-seven employees, they employed an additional ten to thirty seasonal workers, normally students, for the compilation of schoolbook packages. Larger market participants generally had their own vehicles and storage bases where they performed both retail and wholesale activities. These companies bought the books from the publishers and made them available to the smaller distributors. There were well over thirty market-dominant schoolbook distributors operating in the country (six large and about thirty medium-sized distributors). 9.  Participants in the market strove to acquire as many schools as possible as clients, in particular those which were located in the area close to the distributors\u2019 warehouses, in order to be able to optimise delivery costs. They made continuous efforts to keep hold of their clients, the schools, by providing flexible and prompt services. The wholesale price margin was generally about 3% to 5%, and the operating profit about 1% to 5%. 10.  The first applicant, K\u00f6nyv-T\u00e1r Kft, distributed educational materials for elementary and secondary schools. In this activity, it had business relationships with some 200 publishers, sixty of them being schoolbook publishers. In 2012 it supplied 126 schools. 11.  The second applicant, Suli-K\u00f6nyv Kft, served directly (i) 90% to 95% of schools in Kom\u00e1rom-Esztergom County; (ii) 100% of schools in the western part of Pest County; (iii) 65% to 70%) of schools in the northern part of Pest County; (iv) 95% to 100% of schools in Gy\u0151r-Moson-Sopron County; (v) 95% to 100% of schools in Vas County; (vi) 85% to 90% of schools in Veszpr\u00e9m County; and (vii) 25% to 30% of schools in Budapest. Moreover, it supplied more than 1,200 schools indirectly via subcontractors dealing exclusively in schoolbook retail, competing with another five large distributors. 12.  The third applicant, Tank\u00f6nyv-ker Bt, supplied about thirty-five schools in two counties. 13.  The New Regulations introduced a new system of schoolbook distribution in Hungary, laying down that \u201cschoolbook supply\u201d \u00ad\u2013 comprising the order and purchase of school textbooks and their delivery to schools, and the collection of the purchase price from schools \u2013 was a public-interest responsibility of the State. 14.  According to the reasoning of the relevant bill, the legislature\u2019s intention was to discharge these duties through a single, State-owned non-profit book distribution company, K\u00f6nyvt\u00e1rell\u00e1t\u00f3 Kiemelten K\u00f6zhaszn\u00fa Nonprofit Kft (Non-profit Library Supplier Limited Liability Company; hereinafter \u201cK\u00f6nyvt\u00e1rell\u00e1t\u00f3\u201d). A description of the objectives pursued gave the following reasons for the decision:\n\u201cto strengthen the schoolbook procurer\u2019s position through the uniform and centralised procurement of schoolbooks ... and ... to make schoolbook distribution more transparent by generating competition in a stronger position, that of the procurer.\u201d 15.  The applicant companies submitted that the New Regulations had centralised and monopolised the schoolbook distribution market with a guaranteed margin of 20% for the State-owned schoolbook distributor, without providing any compensation for former market participants, including themselves. As a consequence, the applicant companies and other schoolbook distributors had effectively been barred from the market (which was either their exclusive or major field of activity), where they had been operating freely prior to the entry into force of the New Regulations. 16.  The applicant companies filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, requesting that the New Regulations be repealed. However, in their submissions to the Court, they stated that this was not an effective remedy because even if the Constitutional Court had repealed the New Regulations, they would have needed to reinvest a significant amount of money in order to re-establish their business, and would have been unable to repair the damage they had already sustained. 17.  On 14 April 2014 the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings without an examination of the merits of the applicant companies\u2019 complaint. The Constitutional Court noted that subsequent legislation, Act no. CCXXXII of 2013 on Schoolbook Supply in the National Public Education System, had been enacted, and had entered into force on 1 January 2014. This legislation repealed Act no. XXXVII of 2001 on the Schoolbook Market entirely, including the impugned New Regulations. The Constitutional Court found that the examination of the provisions\u2019 alleged unconstitutionality had thus become redundant.\nAs of 1 January 2014, Act no. CCXXXII of 2013 had completely removed any schoolbook distribution based on the free market, and had introduced an entirely State-organised form of schoolbook supply to the Hungarian public education system.\nThe applicant companies did not file a constitutional complaint against Act no. CCXXXII of 2013.", "references": ["3", "2", "5", "4", "8", "1", "0", "6", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant, Mr Tama\u0161auskas, was born in 1971. The second applicant, Mr Radzevi\u010dius, was born in 1977. They are both detained in Vilnius. 5.  The first applicant was detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison from 28 September 2012 until 4 September 2014. 6.  On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 48,493 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 9 January 2015 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant\u2019s claim. It found that during the period under consideration the applicant had spent 629 days in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison and that during the remaining periods he had been transported outside of that prison. During those 629 days, he had between 1.72 and 16.96 sq. m of personal space. The court noted that the documents provided to it by the administration of the prison did not indicate the exact amount of personal space available to the applicant in each cell. It therefore gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and held that during the entire period of 629 days his right to adequate personal space (3.6 sq. m, under the domestic law applicable to prison cells) might have been breached. The court also noted that parts of the cells had been occupied by furniture and that the space in which the applicant had been able to move had thus been even smaller. 8.  However, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations that the conditions in the cells had been unsanitary on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities. It also held that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. 9.  The applicant was awarded EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 6 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision in its entirety. 11.  The second applicant was detained in Alytus Correctional Facility from 22 November 2012 until 17 September 2014. 12.  On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary dormitory-type rooms. He claimed EUR 16,611 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 13.  On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant\u2019s claim. It found that from 22 November 2012 until 11 April 2013 the applicant had had 2.96 sq. m of personal space, and that from 11 April 2013 to 13 August 2014 he had had 3.03 sq. m of personal space, in violation of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m, applicable to dormitory-type rooms. During the remainder of his detention the personal space available to the applicant had complied with the domestic requirements. 14.  On the basis of reports submitted by the domestic public healthcare authorities, the court held that the temperature, ventilation and humidity in the rooms had complied with the relevant domestic requirements, and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints in that regard. However, it observed that the administration of the correctional facility had not submitted any documents refuting the applicant\u2019s allegation that the natural light in the rooms had been insufficient, and found in the applicant\u2019s favour. The court also noted that during the relevant period the applicant had sought medical help for back pain, headaches, mood swings and insomnia; the court considered that those ailments might have been related to the unsuitable conditions of his detention. 15.  However, the court considered that the reduction in the minimum personal space available to the applicant had been minor and that it had been compensated for by his ability to move freely around the correctional facility and by the various leisure activities available there. It therefore held that the finding of a violation was sufficient, and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 14 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision in its entirety.", "references": ["0", "9", "7", "5", "2", "3", "6", "4", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1968, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1959, 1955 and 1954, respectively, and live in Novi Travnik and Bugojno, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6.  By seven judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court and the Bugojno Municipal Court, of 19 January 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2011, 2 February 2009, 1 September 2009 and 9 April 2004, respectively, the applicants\u2019 employers, two companies manufacturing weapons and military technology, were ordered to pay them various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. The judgments became final on 24 August 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 26 November 2011, 20 August 2009, 13 October 2009 and 13 April 2005, respectively. 7.  The applicants\u2019 winding-up petitions were rejected on 27 May 2010 and 14 February 2011, respectively, because the Federal Ministry of Energy had refused authorisation (see paragraph 14 below). Consequently, in accordance with the 2003 Insolvency Act, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became liable for the debts of the applicants\u2019 employers (see paragraph 14 below). 8.  The Sarajevo Municipal Court issued enforcement orders on 9 November 2011, 21 February 2012, 17 April 2012, 25 April 2012, 5 July 2012, 27 March 2012 and 9 August 2012, respectively, in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a debtor. They were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges in the federal budget. 9.  On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 10.  The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d). 11.  On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants\u2019 cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation. 12.  On the following dates in 2017 the final judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour were fully enforced:\n(i) on 10 January 2017 in respect of Mr Mujo Zahirovi\u0107;\n(ii) on 9 January 2017 in respect of Ms Ned\u017evija Mandara;\n(iii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Miralem Mustajbegovi\u0107;\n(iv) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Mr Nihad Hrnjica;\n(v) on 11 January 2017 in respect of Mr Zijad D\u017eugum;\n(vi) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Ms \u0110evada Hod\u017ei\u0107; and\n(vii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Fadil Pand\u017eo.\nThe payments made in the applicants\u2019 favour included the reimbursement of the costs sustained for the enforcement procedure.", "references": ["8", "1", "4", "7", "6", "2", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lived in Kalvarija. She died on 8 April 2017. 7.  In December 1993 a large sum of money disappeared from A.G.\u2019s mother\u2019s home in the town of Kalvarija. A.G. suspected the applicant\u2019s son R.A., and R.A.\u2019s friend, Z.V., of having stolen the money. 8.  As later established by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 40 below), on 19 April 1994 A.G., acting with accomplices, forced R.A. and Z.V. into a car and drove them to a forest in Kalvarija. R.A. and Z.V. were tied to a tree, interrogated, beaten, put in a hole in the ground and, when they tried to escape, shot, stabbed and thus killed. Both victims were then buried in the forest in an attempt to hide the evidence. Their bodies were never found. 9.  On 8 July 1994 the applicant\u2019s daughter reported to the police that her brother R.A. had disappeared.  Having examined the material indicating that on 19 April 1994 R.A. had been placed in a car and had not returned, on 29 August 1994 the police opened a criminal investigation into charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty. 10.  In autumn 1994 the authorities started connecting A.G. to the disappearance of the applicant\u2019s son and Z.V. On 25 October 1994 A.G. was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. However, as later established by court decisions, when in October 1994 two witnesses gave false testimony that they had seen the two missing persons \u2013 R.A. and Z.V. \u2013 alive in Klaip\u0117da, on 4 November 1994 A.G. was released from pre\u2011trial detention. 11.  The criminal investigation into the charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty continued. The authorities questioned a number of witnesses, including A.G., who had also been questioned as a suspect earlier. In order to eliminate contradictions between the witnesses\u2019 testimony, the authorities conducted several formal confrontations (akistata). As noted by the Government, several forensic expert examinations were performed with regard to the seized vehicle allegedly used in the kidnapping, but no traces of blood were found in that vehicle. 12.  On 29 November 1994 the pre-trial investigator took the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, because R.A. and Z.V. could not be located and there were no objective grounds for establishing who was responsible for their disappearance. The police were instructed to continue searching for R.A. and Z.V., as well as for those who were responsible for their disappearance.\nAccording to the Government, the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 13.  The Government also stated that afterwards R.A. had been considered a missing person (ding\u0119s be \u017einios). In order to find him, the authorities had entered information into the relevant registers and databases. Various police records had been inspected. R.A. had been sought in medical establishments. Information with regard to unidentified corpses had been checked in order to look for similarities. The media had also been employed to ask the general public for assistance. The search had been closed on 26 May 2004 because of the expiry of the statutory limitation period. Before closing the search, R.A.\u2019s relatives had been questioned once again, and the matter of whether R.A. had crossed the Lithuanian border had been verified. 14.  According to the Government, within the context of another criminal case instituted in April 2004 regarding an attempt to murder A.G., information was received that A.G. could have been involved in R.A.\u2019s and Z.V.\u2019s disappearance. According to the documents before the Court, in June 2004 the Prosecutor General office asked the Criminal Police Bureau to continue investigating the disappearance. 15.  On 24 January 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau found that A.G., acting together with G.S. and G.M., had killed R.A. and Z.V. (see paragraph 8 above). The Criminal Police Bureau thus opened a criminal investigation into the murder of two persons. It appears that the evidence against A.G. consisted of witness testimony, including the testimony of two witnesses who agreed to testify on the condition that they could do so anonymously, as well as the secret surveillance of another witness who had misled the investigators in 1994 (see paragraph 10 above). 16.  On 13 June 2005 the police wished to question A.G., but he could not be found either at his home or at his place of work. Two days later, on 15 June 2005 the authorities issued a decision to charge A.G. with the murder of two persons. The following day an operative search (operatyvin\u0117 paie\u0161ka) in respect of A.G. was announced. By 24 June 2005 the authorities obtained information that A.G. was already abroad, possibly in Latvia, and planned to travel to either the United States of America or Kazakhstan. On 30 June 2005 a court authorised A.G.\u2019s detention, in the event that he was found. 17.  On 18 July 2005 a prosecutor specified (patikslino) charges against A.G. and charged him with the aggravated murder of two persons (compare paragraph 11 above). Noting that the operative search which had been announced earlier had not brought about any results, the prosecutor announced a national and international search in respect of A.G. (vietin\u0117 ir tarptautin\u0117 paie\u0161ka). On 16 August 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. 18.  In December 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau obtained information that A.G. could be in Kazakhstan, and it noted that it intended to contact the Kazakhstan authorities in order to establish A.G.\u2019s exact whereabouts and to seek his arrest and extradition to Lithuania. 19.  A.G was arrested on 17 March 2006, when he came to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office in Vilnius. He was questioned as a suspect in R.A.\u2019s and Z.V.\u2019s murder. He denied any involvement. By that time, the authorities had questioned a number of witnesses, performed searches, sent a legal aid request to Latvia, asked for information from the Lithuanian embassy in the United States of America, and also had agents travel to Ukraine, where one of A.G.\u2019s accomplices had been apprehended. The documents before the Court also show that between June 2005 and March 2007 the Criminal Police Bureau investigator repeatedly questioned the suspects and organised formal confrontations between them, so that any inconsistent testimony would be clarified. 20.  In response to a request by the applicant of 12 June 2006, on 19 September 2006 a prosecutor granted her civil claimant (civilinis ie\u0161kovas) status in the case regarding her son\u2019s murder. 21.  The applicant\u2019s daughter had been granted the status of a victim (nukent\u0117jusioji) on 12 June 2006. For her part, on 19 September 2006 the applicant was recognised as a victim in the criminal case regarding her son\u2019s murder. 22.  In September 2006 the prosecutor also imposed a restriction on A.G.\u2019s real property. 23.  From 17 March to 22 November 2006 A.G. was again detained pending trial, including by a ruling of the Vilnius Regional Court of 20 October 2006. The applicant appealed against that ruling. 24.  As later established by a court decision (see paragraph 40 below), whilst being detained, on 22 March 2006 A.G. had attempted to offer a bribe of 20,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 5,800 euros (EUR)) to the Criminal Police Bureau investigator, in an attempt to persuade the latter not to actively pursue leads in the criminal murder case, so that the remand measure which had been imposed on him \u2013 pre-trial detention \u2013 could be replaced with a less stringent one. 25.  On 22 November 2006 the Court of Appeal ordered A.G.\u2019s release from pre-trial detention. Whilst acknowledging that, at that stage, it was not pronouncing judgment on the question of A.G.\u2019s guilt, the appellate court nevertheless noted that the evidence corroborating his guilt on the charges of murder was very scarce to support his detention pending trial. In particular, although the victims had allegedly been killed as early as 1994, their bodies had still not been found, and A.G. had been charged with their murder only in 2005. The Court of Appeal also pointed out that there was no evidence that A.G. could hide from the investigation, although these had been the grounds relied on by the prosecutor in support of A.G.\u2019s detention. On the contrary, the case material showed that, when summoned in March 2006, A.G. had attended the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. His wife had also later taken his passport to the prosecutor, which, according to the Court of Appeal, showed that he had not been hiding that document. Moreover, between June 2005 and February 2006 \u2013 the period which the prosecutor referred to as the period when A.G. had been hiding from the authorities \u2013 in reality, A.G. had been working in Lithuania and receiving a salary. Similarly, although the prosecutor claimed that in the summer of 2005 A.G. had been recognised as a suspect and a national and international search in respect of him had been announced, in reality, the police had not been actively searching for A.G. This was because, during the relevant time, A.G. had taken part in an unrelated court hearing in Lithuania and had also crossed the Lithuanian State border a number of times. It was very plausible that A.G. had not even known that he was being sought by the authorities. For the Court of Appeal, there were also no grounds to hold that A.G. could hide from the authorities abroad, because he had not done so, in spite of his numerous trips to foreign countries. 26.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the case was particularly complex and the case file was voluminous, given that the case involved more than one suspect, numerous witnesses had been questioned, and many forensic examinations, including DNA, had had to be performed. Even so, the appellate court pointed to the inconsistency in relation to the arguments for A.G.\u2019s detention. In particular, in October 2006 and in a co-accused\u2019s case, the prosecutor had asserted that all necessary actions in the criminal investigation had already been performed, and that therefore it was unlikely that that co-accused would hide from the authorities and there were no grounds for his pre-trial detention. However, in A.G.\u2019s case, in October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court had extended A.G.\u2019s detention, considering that many investigative actions had yet to be performed. For the Court of Appeal, this meant that, with regard to the collection of evidence, double standards had been applied to the two co-accused in the case, which raised doubts as to the objectivity of the criminal investigation. The Court of Appeal also considered that such actions could be seen as discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, as was apparent from the material presented by A.G.\u2019s lawyer, a DNA examination had already been performed in the case. This fact had also been acknowledged by the prosecutor, who had also confirmed that all the main investigative actions had already been completed. The Court of Appeal thus considered that continuing A.G.\u2019s detention would be unnecessary, and would risk breaching Article 5 of the Convention. 27.  The Court of Appeal lastly observed that A.G. had no prior convictions, and had a family, two minor daughters, a permanent place of residence, and a job. Accordingly, a less stringent remand measure could be imposed on him, and it was for the prosecutor to choose what that measure would be, given that the court could not choose another remand measure by itself. 28.  On 22 November 2006 the prosecutor thus varied the remand measure in respect of A.G. and imposed on him an obligation not to leave his place of residence. A.G. was also ordered to periodically register with the police (\u012fpareigojimas periodi\u0161kai registruotis policijos \u012fstaigoje) every other day, and he had his personal documents \u2013 identity card and passport \u2013 taken off him. 29.  On 1 February 2007 the prosecutor discontinued the criminal investigation into the murder charges in respect of A.G.\u2019s co-accused. The prosecutor established that the co-accused had not wanted R.A. and Z.V. to die, and that it had been only A.G. who had exceeded their initial plan (vykdytojo ekscesas) to kidnap R.A. and Z.V. and had murdered them. 30.  In August 2007 A.G. asked that the criminal proceedings against him be discontinued on the grounds that pre-trial investigation had been going on too long. However, by a ruling of 28 August 2007 the Vilnius City Second District Court dismissed his complaint, noting that even after 22 November 2006 the investigators had continued to question suspects and witnesses, performing expert examinations on handwriting and documents, as well as other investigative actions. The court pointed out that the case file was voluminous, that the crime in question had been committed a long time ago, and that certain actions could not be performed because of A.G.\u2019s illness in 2007. 31.  In January 2008 the applicant asked the Kaunas Regional Court to hear the criminal case without her being present. She submitted that her health was frail and that she could not face seeing her son\u2019s murderer at the court hearing. She asked the court to rely on her earlier testimony given at the stage of the pre-trial investigation. The Government specified that the applicant had later taken part in one hearing before the trial court. 32.  The prosecutor drew up the bill of indictment on 11 October 2007 and transferred the case to the trial court. According to the chronology provided by the Government, afterwards the trial court held eighteen hearings, when witnesses were questioned and evidence was examined. 33.  By a judgment of 2 February 2009 the Kaunas Regional Court acquitted A.G. of R.A.\u2019s and Z.V.\u2019s murder and of the attempted bribery of a police investigator. The applicant and her daughter had participated in some of the hearings before the trial court.\nThe trial court ordered that the remand measures imposed on A.G. \u2013 the obligation not to leave his place of residence, the taking away his identity documents (passport and ID card), and the order to periodically register with the police \u2013 should be lifted and his identity documents returned. The trial court also rejected civil claims by the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other person who had been killed).\nLastly, the trial court lifted the restrictions on A.G.\u2019s real property (see paragraph 22 above). 34.  It transpires from the documents before the Court that A.G.\u2019s identity documents were returned to him on 17 February 2009, after he requested this. 35.  Both the prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s daughter appealed against the trial court\u2019s judgment acquitting A.G. 36.  On 15 December 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld A.G.\u2019s acquittal in relation to the charges of murder and attempted bribery of a police investigator, and left the civil claims by the applicant and I.V. unexamined. 37.  The prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, and by a ruling of 5 July 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal decision of 15 December 2010 and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh examination. The Supreme Court took note of the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that the case was a complex one because it involved criminal charges for a serious crime that had been committed many years previously. It also found that, although the appellate court had examined the evidence by questioning not only some of those witnesses who had already been questioned before the first-instance court, but also some newly summoned witnesses, it had nevertheless failed to rule on some other evidence and had not questioned an anonymous witness, even though earlier the appellate court had considered that witness\u2019s testimony pertinent to the case. Furthermore, the appellate court had not answered all the questions regarding the evaluation of evidence which had been raised in the appeal against the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 38.  Once the case was returned to the Court of Appeal, the latter completed the examination of the merits of the case during the hearing of 12 October 2012, announcing that the judgment be pronounced on 27 November 2012 (see paragraph 40 below). 39.  It transpires that no remand measure was imposed on A.G. during the examination of the case by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 27 November 2012 the Court of Appeal reversed the Kaunas Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 2 February 2009, and on the basis of all the evidence found A.G. guilty of the aggravated murder of two persons \u2013 R.A. and Z.V. \u2013 under Article 105 \u00a7 2 (2 and 5) of the old Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). The Court of Appeal established that that crime had been committed against persons in a particularly vulnerable situation (bej\u0117gi\u0161kos b\u016bkl\u0117s), since both R.A. and Z.V. had been shot after they had been beaten and placed in a hole in the ground with their hands tied, which was an aggravating circumstance. The Court of Appeal also found A.G. guilty of the attempted bribery of a pre-trial investigation officer, under Article 227 \u00a7 2 of the new Criminal Code (see paragraphs 24 above and 50 below). A.G. was sentenced to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment, to be served in a correctional home (pataisos namuose). The time which he had already spent in pre-trial detention \u2013 from 25 October 1994 to 4 November 1994 and from 17 March 2006 to 22 November 2006 \u2013 was to count as time served in relation to that sentence. The Court of Appeal noted that A.G. had no prior convictions; he worked, was married and had four children. Moreover, the criminal proceedings had lasted rather a long time, which was a reason to impose a less severe punishment than the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 41.  By the same judgment, the Court of Appeal also awarded the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other murdered person), LTL 150,000 (approximately EUR 43,500) each, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the loss of their sons. 42.  According to the Government, on 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court sent the judgment convicting A.G. to the Marijampol\u0117 police, so that it could be executed. 43.  As the documents before the Court show, on 11 December 2012 the police established that A.G. had absconded to avoid serving his sentence. The same day, the police announced a national and international search in respect of him. The Government provided the Court with a copy of an authorisation, confirmed by a notary, which A.G. had signed on 28 November 2012 in the Smolensk Region in the Russian Federation, empowering his wife to represent his interests before the Lithuanian institutions. The Government specified that in November 2013 A.G.\u2019s wife had presented that authorisation to a court in Lithuania when she had asked to familiarise herself with the applicant\u2019s criminal file. 44.  On 26 February 2013 the Lithuanian authorities issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. The authorities noted, inter alia, that A.G. had been physically present when the Kaunas Regional Court had acquitted him on 2 February 2009, when the Court of Appeal had delivered a ruling on 15 December 2010, when the Supreme Court had issued a ruling on 5 July 2011, and when the Court of Appeal had heard his case afterwards. He had also been physically present on 12 October 2012, when the hearing on the merits had been completed and the appellate court had adjourned pronouncement of the judgment. It had been A.G.\u2019s lawyer who had been physically present when the Court of Appeal had pronounced the judgment of 27 November 2012. 45.  On 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court issued a writ of execution, pursuant to which the applicant and I.V. were to get LTL 150,000 each from A.G. On 11 December 2012 the applicant took the writ of execution to the bailiff, who on the following day accepted the execution request and on that same day took a decision to seize A.G.\u2019s property. It transpires from the documents before the Court that in the period April-July 2013 amounts totalling about EUR 400 were recovered to compensate for the execution costs of roughly the same value already paid by the applicant\u2019s daughter. In July 2013 the bailiff decided to suspend the enforcement proceedings until A.G. was found. The applicant was informed about the decision to suspend the enforcement proceedings. 46.  The applicant\u2019s daughter appealed against the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment convicting A.G. (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above), asking for A.G. to be ordered to serve his sentence not in a correctional home, which was an institution with a less stringent regime, but in a prison. She pointed out that A.G. had killed her brother in a particularly cruel way when he had been particularly vulnerable. A.G., for his part, in his appeal on points of law, asked to be acquitted and for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued. 47.  By a final ruling of 25 June 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on points of law by the applicant\u2019s daughter and by A.G. The Supreme Court considered that the punishment imposed on A.G. had been just. At the Supreme Court hearing, A.G.\u2019s wife admitted that her husband was abroad, but refused to disclose his whereabouts.\nAccording to the information provided by the Government in 2017, A.G. had been granted refugee status in the Russian Federation (see also paragraph 80 below).", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "9", "5", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in the case Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6.  During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime, on the night of 21/22 December 1989 the applicant\u2019s son was killed by gunfire in Bucharest. 7.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was registered with the highest prosecutor\u2019s office \u2013 the military prosecutors section \u2212 under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). In the main criminal investigation the applicant raised civil claims and asked that the perpetrators of the offence of homicide committed against her son be identified and punished. 8.  At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of complicity in seriously aggravated homicide and complicity in attempted seriously aggravated homicide, committed against a large number of persons, including the applicant\u2019s son, culminated in the committal for trial of public officials, members of the ruling political party, and their subsequent conviction by a final decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 April 1992. 9.   The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in the cases Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41) and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, \u00a7\u00a7 8-11, 5 June 2018). 10.  On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main criminal investigation, finding that the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the offence of homicide committed against her son was statute-barred and that a complaint concerning instigation of homicide was a matter of res judicata following the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s decision of 20 April 1992 (see paragraph 8 above). 11.  The decision of 14 October 2015 was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 12.  According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see B\u0103nu\u021boiu and \u0218tefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, \u00a7 12, 3 July 2018).", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "2", "7", "6", "1", "4", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in the case of Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5.  All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21\u204422 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened, of its own motion, investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 7.  At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation against a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the committal for trial of senior military and public officials and their subsequent conviction by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. It cannot be seen from the court\u2019s decision whether the injured persons, including the applicants, participated in those proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, B\u0103nu\u021boiu and \u0218tefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, \u00a7 7, 3 July 2018). 8.  As regards the offence of improper conduct, the military prosecutor\u2019s office decided on 27 October 1993 (Ms Nicoleta-Lorena Giurcanu \u2011 applicant in application no. 30365/15, hereinafter \u201cthe first applicant\u201d), 9 March 1994 (Mr Traian Vasu \u2013 applicant in application no. 30392/15, hereinafter \u201cthe second applicant\u201d) and 27 August 1993 (Ms Lumini\u021ba Zeleniuc \u2013 applicant in application no. 30410/15, hereinafter \u201cthe third applicant\u201d) not to open a separate investigation of its own motion on the grounds that the offence of improper conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the third applicant on 25 September 2008. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants\u2019 injury. 9.  Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants\u2019 respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor\u2019s office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial. 10.  The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41), and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, \u00a7\u00a7 8-11, 5 June 2018). 11.  On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision in respect of the offence of instigating illegal deprivation of liberty, concerning all the applicants, by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s decision of 10 May 1991 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, the military prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main investigation in respect of the offence of instigating improper conduct regarding the second applicant, as it fell under an amnesty law (see paragraph 8 above). No decision was adopted with respect to the injury and assault and battery complained of by the applicants. 12.  The decision of 14 October 2015 (see paragraph 11 above) was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 13.  According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see B\u0103nu\u021boiu and \u0218tefoglu, cited above, \u00a7 12).", "references": ["6", "4", "9", "5", "8", "2", "0", "7", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vienna (Austria). 6.  The applicant is a businessman associated with a major Austrian financial and industrial group. Under a complex corporate and contractual arrangement, he had an office in Bratislava (Slovakia). It was situated at the same address as premises of other entities belonging to the group. 7.  Although no formal charges were brought against him, an investigation into various transactions involving the applicant was carried out in Austria on suspicion of, inter alia, investment fraud, breach of confidence and insider trading. In the context of this investigation, the Austrian prosecution service asked their Slovakian counterparts to search the above-mentioned premises and to seize documents relevant to the investigation. 8.  The search took place in 2009 and business documents and electronic storage media were seized, including from the applicant\u2019s office, and later handed over to the Austrian authorities. 9.  In a judgment of 7 December 2010 the Constitutional Court found that the warrant issued in Slovakia for the search and seizure did not extend to the applicant and his office and that the terms of the warrant had therefore been exceeded, in violation of the applicant\u2019s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, respect for his private life, and judicial and other legal protection. Accordingly, the Public Prosecution Service of Slovakia (\u201cthe PPS\u201d) was ordered to stop violating the applicant\u2019s rights and to ask the Austrian authorities for the return of the unlawfully seized items with a view to their restitution to the applicant. 10.  On 6 September 2011 the PPS asked the law firm representing the applicant in Slovakia to specify whether they were entitled to receive on his behalf the items that had meanwhile been returned by the Austrian authorities. A power of attorney to that effect was submitted on 12 September 2011. 11.  On 1 February 2012 the Bratislava I District Police Directorate issued a decision restoring those items to the applicant, identifying them as six specific units of electronic storage media. 12.  The applicant claims, and this has not been disputed by the Government, that the media to be returned to the applicant contained, inter alia, legal advice protected by lawyer-client privilege. 13.  On 27 February 2012 the PPS summoned the applicant\u2019s lawyer to its premises on 7 March 2012 with a view to restoring the above-mentioned possessions to the applicant. 14.  On 7 March 2012 at 9.10 a.m. those items were restored to the applicant\u2019s lawyer and, at 9.15 a.m., they were all seized from him again with reference to a letter rogatory from the Vienna office of the Prosecution Service of Austria of 14 April 2011. That letter sought specifically the seizure of the same items as were to be restored to the applicant and referred to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Schengen Implementing Convention, and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union. 15.  The record of this operation indicates that the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that under Article 89 \u00a7 1 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) he was under a duty to surrender the objects in question and that he had been warned that if he did not do so, they could be taken from him under Article 91 of the CCP and he could face a fine under Article 70 of the CCP and a referral for disciplinary proceedings by a competent body, in response to which he surrendered the items voluntarily. However, he added that he protested on the grounds that he considered the re-seizure to be an obstruction of implementation of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 7 December 2010 and stated that further reasons would be added to the protest later. 16.  The applicant lodged a series of requests, complaints and repeated complaints with all levels of the PPS raising two groups of arguments.\nFirst, he complained as regards execution of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 2010. In particular, he argued that the PPS had failed to execute that judgment properly in that (i) not all of his documents unlawfully seized in 2009 had been restored to him and (ii) the PPS had failed to ensure that the Austrian authorities returned or destroyed all the copies they had made of the material unlawfully seized and transmitted to them.\nSecond, the applicant challenged the re-seizure of 7 March 2012, arguing that he had only learned of the decision to dismiss his complaint against the decision of 1 February 2012 restoring the items in question the day before their scheduled restoration and re-seizure. Accordingly, he had had no possibility of being present in person. As the items had been seized again immediately after having been returned to his lawyer, the applicant had not had time to verify their condition and to confer with his lawyer on how to respond. In that regard, his lawyer could not, even in theory, have checked the condition of some of the material concerned because it was encrypted. Moreover, it was protected from seizure by lawyer-client privilege. Lastly, the applicant argued that the Austrian authorities knew about the items they had asked to be seized again exclusively from the results of their unlawful initial seizure. Therefore, the re-seizure had served the sole purpose of rectifying the initial seizure, which was against the object and purpose of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 2010, and for which his lawyer had been arbitrarily exploited. 17.  All the complaints were dismissed, of which the applicant and his lawyer were ultimately informed by letters of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 10 August and 31 December 2012. The reasons given were as follows:\nAll the seized items, of which the applicant was unquestionably the owner, had been returned to him. There was no duty to return all of the items at once. Should he demonstrate his ownership in respect of other items, these could still be restored to him at a later stage. As regards the restoration or destruction of any copies made by the Austrian authorities, the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 2010 did not specify any duties on the part of the PPS. In any event, it was open to the applicant to assert his rights in that respect before the relevant Austrian authorities.\nAs the items in question had been returned to the applicant on 7 March 2012, the previous unlawfulness of their seizure had been rectified and there had been no obstacle to seizing them again. The re-seizure complied with all the requirements under the applicable statute and the relevant international rules and as such was lawful and justified. As the applicant had authorised a lawyer to receive on his behalf the items to be returned to him, it had been apparent that he had had no intention of participating personally in the dealings with the PPS. Had he manifested any wish to do so, this would have been taken into account. Accordingly, he could not complain of being unable to defend his rights and interests adequately in relation to the re\u2011seizure. 18.  On 11 March 2013 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, arguing that by failing to ensure full compliance with the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 7 December 2010 and seizing the restored items again, the Slovakian authorities had been responsible for a violation of a number of his rights, including respect for his private life and correspondence and the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and of failing to provide an effective remedy. In substance, he advanced similar arguments to those mentioned above, including, in particular, that the items that had been seized again contained legal advice protected from seizure by lawyer-client privilege. 19.  On 16 May 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. In the pertinent part of its decision, it quoted extensively from the letter of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 31 December 2012, pointed out that its task was to review the constitutionality but not the legality as such of the challenged decisions, and found no constitutionally relevant arbitrariness or other shortcoming in the position the PPS had taken in his case.\nA written version of the decision was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 15 July 2013 and no appeal lay against it. 20.  On 18 April 2012 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible a complaint by which the applicant\u2019s then lawyer had challenged in his own name the re-seizure of 7 March 2012. 21.  The complaint had been lodged on 9 March 2012 and included, inter alia, claims of a violation of the lawyer\u2019s own rights under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.\nIn particular, he complained that he, as the applicant\u2019s representative, had not been given access to the letter rogatory underlying the seizure and that he had been granted no time to confer with the applicant. He had thereby been prevented from exercising his profession as a lawyer in relation to his instructions from the applicant. Moreover, he was bound by the duty of confidentiality as regards the affairs of the applicant as his client and this duty had not been lifted. Forcing him, on pain of sanctions, to surrender the applicant\u2019s documents had therefore interfered not only with his own personal integrity but also with his constitutional function as an advocate.\nBeing aware that the re-seizure was reviewable by the PPS and that a constitutional complaint was admissible only upon exhaustion of ordinary remedies, he asked to be exempted from the obligation to exhaust such remedies on account of special circumstances. These, in his view, lay in particular in the attitude of the PPS until then regarding execution of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 2010 and the imminent risk of the re\u2011seized items being handed over to the Austrian authorities. 22.  The Constitutional Court found no merit, however, in the lawyer\u2019s plea for an exemption from the requirement of exhaustion of available ordinary remedies and, accordingly, rejected his complaint for his failure to do so.", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "9", "0", "6", "3", "7", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Moscow. 5.  S. was the owner of a one-room flat located at 6-60, Smolenskaya Street, Moscow. On 7 February 2008 S. died. 6.  An unidentified person presenting a passport in the name of M. and claiming that she was S.\u2019s sister and heir applied to G., a notary, seeking the recognition of her rights in respect of the flat. In support of her claim she submitted a copy of her birth certificate. 7.  On 18 March 2009 G. issued a certificate confirming, inter alia, M.\u2019s title to the flat. The city authorities registered M.\u2019s title to the flat in the State land register. 8.  On 19 May 2009 an unidentified person posing as M. sold the flat to the applicant. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the purchase price was 6,499,999 Russian roubles (RUB). The city authorities registered the sale of the flat and the applicant\u2019s title to it in the State land register. 9.  On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat. It was established that the document presented to the notary as M.\u2019s birth certificate had been forged. 10.  On 23 September 2009 the police informed the Department of Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) of the pending criminal investigation. 11.  On 1 December 2009 the Housing Department brought an action seeking the transfer of the applicant\u2019s flat to the City of Moscow (\u201cthe City\u201d). 12.  On 11 March 2010 the criminal investigation was suspended. 13.  On 27 December 2010 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow allowed the Housing Department\u2019s action. It reasoned that M. had died intestate with no surviving kin and that her flat should have been considered bona vacantia. It annulled the applicant\u2019s title to the flat and ordered its transfer to the City of Moscow. 14.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 14 July 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2010. 15.  On an unspecified date the judgments of 27 December 2010 and 14 July 2011 were enforced. Subsequently the City of Moscow sold the flat to a private party under a social assistance scheme that permitted the buyer to pay the purchase price in instalments. 16.  On 12 October 2017 the criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat was reopened.", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "8", "1", "6", "0", "7", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Sunzha, Ingushetia. The applicant is the father of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev, born in 1982. 6.  At the time of the events in question the applicant, his wife and their children, including Mr Maskhud Makhloyev, resided at 55 Pavlov Street (a family house comprising two buildings and a shared courtyard), in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. At the relevant time, two police checkpoints were located in the vicinity of the village. 7.  On 26 December 2006 Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was arrested and detained on suspicion of involvement in an attack on local policemen. On the same date the Sunzhenskiy District prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a search of the applicant\u2019s family house. During the search Mr Maskhud Makhloyev\u2019s passport was seized, together with several other items. 8.  The applicant submitted that he had had no news about his son following the arrest. It was only after four days that he had found out that his son had been kept in the Sunzhenskiy District\u2019s temporary detention facility. 9.  On 27 December 2006 the Sunzhenskiy District Court declared that the search of 26 December 2006 had been lawful (see paragraph 7 above). 10.  On 26 April 2007 the criminal proceedings against Mr Maskhud Makhloyev were terminated for lack of evidence of his guilt and he was released from custody. 11.  The applicant submitted that law-enforcement agents had searched his house again on 31 October 2008 and 5 January 2009. On the first occasion they had looked for weapons but had not found anything. On the second occasion, the search had been conducted at 3 a.m. and the applicant and his family had been requested to present their passports. Mr Maskhud Makhloyev had not been at home at the time. 12.  On 14 August 2009 Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was wounded by an unidentified person on the street. The applicant submitted that police officers had visited his son in hospital and had threatened to kill him and his family members. 13.  On the night of 29 October 2009 the applicant and his wife were sleeping in their family home with their children, including Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. They were awoken at about 3.30 a.m. when seven to eight armed men in camouflage uniforms, wearing masks and carrying machine guns (Kalashnikov) and bullet-proof shields, broke into the applicant\u2019s courtyard. 14.  Having heard the noise, the applicant and his wife ran out of their house to the courtyard. The armed men pointed the guns at them and ordered them to stand up against a wall. They did not identify themselves; according to the applicant, they spoke Russian with no accent. The applicant asked what they wanted from them, but the men did not reply. They used portable radios to communicate with each other. 15.  The armed men then broke into the house in which the applicant\u2019s daughters were sleeping. They took his two daughters into the courtyard and put them next to their parents. They then forced them all into one room of their house and ordered them to stay there. 16.  In the meantime the men went upstairs to the room shared by the applicant\u2019s sons, Ibragim and Maskhud. During all that time his third son, A.M., remained in his room. After approximately ten minutes the men left. The applicant, his wife and daughters went up the stairs and found their son Ibragim on the floor, tied up with adhesive tape, his shirt pulled over his head and his mouth covered with adhesive tape. He told them that around seven to eight men had broken into the room, beaten up him and Maskhud, and then taken Maskhud away. 17.  The applicant\u2019s neighbour, L.S.M., later told the applicant that she had seen four vehicles driving away from his home: a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car. She had been unable to see the model of the fourth vehicle. 18.  On 29 October 2009 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev underwent a medical examination which confirmed that he had sustained bodily injuries. 19.  The applicant has had no news of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev since his abduction. 20.  The Government were invited to provide an entire copy of the case file opened into the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. The relevant information from the criminal case file and that provided by the applicant can be summarised as follows. 21.  On 29 October 2009 the applicant complained of his son\u2019s abduction by unidentified persons to the Ingushetia prosecutor\u2019s office. 22.  An on-site investigation was conducted on the same day. Photographs were taken of the applicant\u2019s house and various objects therein, including the adhesive tape which had been used on Mr Ibragim Makhloyev. 23.  On 2 November 2009 an investigator of the Sunzhenskiy District investigations department of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Ingushetia (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) sent numerous requests concerning the disappearance of the applicant\u2019s son to various State bodies, such as local police departments of different districts of Ingushetia and the Department of the Federal Security Service in Ingushetia (\u201cthe FSS\u201d). 24.  On 10 November 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings into the disappearance of the applicant\u2019s son under Articles 126 \u00a7 2 (aggravated kidnapping) and 222 \u00a7 2 (illegal possession of firearms) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case file was assigned number 09600131. 25.  The investigation established that at around 3.30 a.m. on 29 October 2009 about ten to twelve unidentified armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms had broken into the applicant\u2019s house, inflicted bodily injuries on Mr Ibragim Makhloyev and kidnapped Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. The latter\u2019s whereabouts were unknown. 26.  On 11 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s neighbour, L.S.M., was questioned as a witness. She said that at around 3.30 a.m. on 29 October 2009 she had heard the noise of vehicle engines. Looking from her window she had seen four cars \u2013 a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car (she had been unable to discern the model of the fourth vehicle) \u2013 driving in the direction of Rabochaya street in the village. She had been unable to see the colour of the vehicles or their registration plates. 27.  On 12 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife was questioned as a witness. Her account of the events of 29 October 2009 was the same as the applicant\u2019s (see paragraphs 13-16 above). 28.  On 13 November 2009 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. His account of the events of the night in question was the same as the one presented to the Court (see paragraphs 13-16 above). He further stated that their family had not been in a blood feud with anyone and that to his knowledge his son had not had any enemies. In response to the investigator\u2019s question whether he had suspected why his son had been abducted, the applicant answered in the negative. 29.  On the same date Mr Ibragim Maskhudov was questioned as a witness. His account of the events of 29 October 2009 was the same as the one presented to the Court by the applicant (see paragraphs 13-16 above). 30.  On 13 and 14 November 2009 the registration logs of the police checkpoints \u201cAngara \u2013 120\u201d and \u201cKerch-Kavkaz 1\u201d, located in the vicinity of the applicant\u2019s village, were examined. 31.  On 14 November 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office asked the Ministries of the Interior of the Chechen Republic, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Alania to check whether Mr Maskhud Makhloyev had been detained on their respective territories or whether his dead body had been found there. They also asked for information concerning any compromising material about the applicant\u2019s son which might have been found. It transpires that those requests yielded no relevant information. 32.  On the same date an analogous request was sent to the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. It was also asked to identify the police officers who had been on duty at the \u201cAngara \u2013 120\u201d and \u201cKerch-Kavkaz 1\u201d checkpoints on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 and to request that they report to the prosecutor\u2019s office for questioning. The same request was sent again on 5 April 2010. 33.  On 15 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s third son, A.M., and a daughter, R.M., were questioned as witnesses. They both said that they did not know why their brother had been kidnapped; they were not aware of any conflict he might have had with anyone. A.M. stated that during the events in question he had stayed in his room (see paragraph 16 above). 34.  On 16 November 2009 the applicant was questioned again. He said that after the abduction his family had noticed that his son\u2019s mobile phone was missing. Other than that, the applicant confirmed his previous statement. 35.  On the same day the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the military prosecutor\u2019s office of military unit no. 68799 to examine the vehicle registration logs kept at the FSS\u2019s checkpoints in order to check whether UAZ vehicles and a Gazel vehicle had left or entered the FSS on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009. If so, the military prosecutor\u2019s office was to ask the FSS servicemen who had been on duty at the checkpoints at the relevant time and the servicemen who had travelled in those vehicles where they had been driving to and whether they had detained Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 36.  On 17 November 2009 a medical examination of Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was ordered. A forensic expert\u2019s opinion produced on an unspecified date concluded that he had sustained moderate damage to his health. 37.  On the same day the investigator in charge of the case applied for judicial authorisation of access to all call logs for the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 kept by mobile-phone providers operating in the area. On 18 November 2009 he also applied for access to the logs of all incoming and outgoing calls to and from Mr Maskhud Makhloyev\u2019s mobile phone as from 29 October 2009. 38.  On 18 and 19 November 2009 the investigator in charge of the case requested Mr Maskhud Makhloyev\u2019s medical information and his criminal record from the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. 39.  On 19 November 2009 the FSS informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that they had not arrested Mr Maskhud Makhloyev and had not carried out any special operations at the applicant\u2019s family house (see paragraph 23 above). 40.  On the same day the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was known to the police as a follower of Wahhabism, an extremist religious movement. He had not been known for alcohol or substance abuse. 41.  On 20 November 2009 the Sunzhenskiy District Court granted the investigators\u2019 requests and ordered the mobile-phone providers to submit the information sought (see paragraph 37 above). It would appear that no relevant information was gathered from the inspection of the call logs. 42.  On 23 November 2009 two FSS officers, Y.I.G. and P.Y.I., were questioned as witnesses. On the night in question they had been on duty at the single checkpoint controlling vehicular access to the FSS. They both stated that from 11 p.m. on 28 October to 4 a.m. on 29 October 2009 no vehicles had passed through the checkpoint. Their statements were confirmed by copies of the entries in the car registration logs. 43.  On the same day two other FSS officers who served in the Sunzhenskiy Unit, T.R.E. and L.Y.Dz., were questioned. They testified that at the material time no special operation had been carried out in respect of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 44.  On 24 November 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that the investigation was ongoing and that the measures taken thus far had not been able to establish the whereabouts of his son or the identity of the alleged perpetrators. 45.  On 8 December 2009 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Chechnya informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that according to their information, Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was a member of an illegal armed group led by a certain A.M.B.Y., which was operating in Sunzhenskiy District in Ingushetia. 46.  On the same day the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that they had not carried out any special operation at the material time at the applicant\u2019s family house. 47.  On 10 December 2009 the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that according to their information, Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was a member of a criminal group called \u201cCaliphate\u201d led by A.M.B.Y. 48.  Between 3 March and 15 June 2010 several of the applicant\u2019s neighbours were questioned as witnesses. They all stated that they had heard about the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev from his family, but had no direct knowledge of the event themselves. 49.  On 5 April 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office requested a copy of the case file and medical documentation concerning the incident of 14 August 2009 (see paragraph 12 above) from the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. On 6 April 2010 they were informed that the case file had been destroyed in a terrorist attack on 17 August 2009. 50.  On 6 April 2010 the police officers who had been on duty at checkpoint \u201cAngara 120\u201d at the material time, M.A.L., Z.M.M. and M.I.M., were questioned as witnesses (see paragraph 32 above). They all stated that on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 a convoy consisting of a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car had not passed their post. 51.  On 7 April 2010 the same statements were given by the police officers who had been on duty at checkpoint \u201cKerch-Kavkaz 1\u201d at the material time, A.R.O. and Kh.A.Kh. 52.  On 19 April 2010 the head of the prosecutor\u2019s office instructed a special investigator, M.A.K., to establish the whereabouts of the adhesive tape which had been shown in the photograph included in the minutes of the inspection of the crime scene (see paragraph 22 above), to remove it and, if necessary, to order its expert analysis. It would appear that those instructions were not carried out. 53.  On 5 June 2010 the applicant was questioned again by the prosecutor\u2019s office. The questions concerned the charges brought against Mr Maskhud Makhloyev in 2006 and the incident of 14 August 2009 (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). The applicant reiterated his previous statements and added that he did not know who had shot at his son on 14 August 2009 and for what reason. 54.  On 2 July 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office requested all regional ministries of the interior to perform operational search activities to establish the whereabouts of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. It would appear that no response was received to those requests. 55.  On 27 July 2010 the applicant submitted a request to the prosecutor\u2019s office to inform him about the results of the preliminary investigation. On 9 August 2010 he was informed that he could consult the case file on any day except at weekends. 56.  On 10 August 2010 the investigator in charge of the case suspended the preliminary investigation for failure to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. It was stressed that the investigation had followed two possible versions of the incident in question: that the reason for abduction could had been a blood feud or hostility towards Maskhud Makhloyev; or that he had been detained by the law-enforcement agencies and kept in a military or other detention facility. Despite the investigative measures taken, the investigation had been unable to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. 57.  On 8 October 2010 the applicant submitted another request to the prosecutor\u2019s office, asking for permission to make photocopies of the documents in the case file. The applicant claimed that it was on this occasion that he had found out that the investigation had been suspended. 58.  On 13 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Magasskiy District Court of Ingushetia (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the decision of 10 August 2010 to suspend the investigation. 59.  On 26 October 2010 the District Court rejected his appeal. 60.  On 3 November 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court of Ingushetia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). On 28 December 2010 the Supreme Court rejected his appeal and upheld the decision of 26 October 2010. 61.  According to the latest information available to the Court (dated 28 June 2018), there have been no new developments in the case and Mr Maskhud Makhloyev\u2019s whereabouts remain unknown. 62.  On 25 February 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings concerning the bodily injuries caused to Mr Ibragim Makhloyev. On the same day those proceedings were joined to the proceedings concerning the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 63.  On 1 March 2010 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was granted victim status. 64.  On 3 March 2010 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was questioned again. He reiterated his previous statements.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "9", "5", "4", "3", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Moscow. The second applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Irkutsk. 5.  On 20 February 2009, the first applicant, a lawyer at the time, was elected to be a member of the council of the Irkutsk Regional Bar (\u201cthe Bar\u201d). 6.  On 24 October 2010 the members of the council conducted elections for the presidency of the Bar. Five members of the Council voted for S. and the other five voted for the second applicant. 7.  On 25 November 2010 the second applicant issued an order appointing herself acting President of the Bar. 8.  On an unspecified date a group of lawyers applied to the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region challenging the second applicant\u2019s appointment. The court granted their request to enjoin the second applicant from fulfilling the functions of acting president pending the outcome of the proceedings. 9.  On 19 January 2012 the Commercial Court discontinued the proceedings. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Commercial Court on 26 September 2012. 10.  On 11 February, 2 March and 5 April 2011 several members of the Bar, including the applicants, lodged complaints with the President of the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region, to the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation and to the Supreme Judicial Qualifications Board, alleging that Judge R. had acted in contravention of the applicable laws on jurisdiction when she had accepted the claims concerning the second applicant\u2019s appointment to the office of President of the Bar for consideration. They further claimed that (1)  S. had announced in public that his opponents in the council of the Bar would be disbarred and that he would organise a \u201cred terror\u201d in response to the \u201corange revolution\u201d; (2)  S.\u2019s ultimate goal had been to get rid of his opponents in the Council of the Bar through rotation and disbarment; (3)  S. had had an extra\u2011professional relationship with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, who had been instrumental in ensuring a favourable outcome in the proceedings against the second applicant\u2019s appointment; (4)  through his personal connections with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, S. had obtained an injunction against the second applicant and ensured that a group of bailiffs had been present at the Bar\u2019s conference in order to put pressure on the participants and his opponents. 11.  On an unspecified date in July 2011 the lawyers posted their complaints on the website of the President of the Russian Federation. They sent a copy of their complaint to the President of the Supreme Commercial Court and to the Public Anticorruption Committee. 12.  On 18 July 2011 the First Deputy of the President of the Regional Commercial Court informed the plaintiffs that their allegations had not been confirmed by the conducted investigation. 13.  On 27 July 2011 the President of the Regional Commercial Court forwarded a copy of the lawyers\u2019 complaint to the Bar and the First Vice\u2011President of the Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicants. 14.  On 31 October 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the first applicant. The council considered that (1)  the letters sent by the group of the lawyers to the Judicial Qualifications Board and the President of the Commercial Court had not been a correct or permissible conduct in response to the actions of the judges of the Commercial Court; (2)  the complaints had contained untrue allegations damaging to the reputation and goodwill of Judges B. and R., and S., a lawyer; (3)  the first applicant had been disrespectful towards them. The Council concluded that (1)  the first applicant had violated the relevant legislation and the Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers (\u041a\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043a\u0441 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0444\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0430\u0434\u0432\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430); (2)  the dissemination of information damaging the reputation and goodwill of judges and lawyers was incompatible with membership of the Bar; (3)  the first applicant\u2019s conduct had disparaged the Bar and its members. 15.  On 8 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the first applicant against the decision of 31 October 2011. 16.  On 11 March 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 8 December 2011 on appeal. 17.  On 16 December 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the second applicant. The reasons underlying the council\u2019s decision were identical to the one used in the first applicant\u2019s case. 18.  On 27 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the second applicant against the decision of 16 December 2011. 19.  On 19 April 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2011 on appeal.", "references": ["1", "9", "2", "4", "5", "8", "0", "7", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate, Mr Ter-Petrosyan. The applicant was the head of Mr Ter\u2011Petrosyan\u2019s election headquarters in the town of Abovyan and regularly attended the rallies. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police, causing mass protests throughout Yerevan. 6.  On 8 March 2008 the applicant was summoned to a local police station in Abovyan where he was questioned about the leaflets that he had prepared and distributed among the demonstrators during the rallies. 7.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant was charged with organising mass disorder and an attempt to usurp State power. 8.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (the District Court) ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 8 May 2008, taking into account the nature and the gravity of the imputed offence and the severity of the punishment prescribed for it. By the same decision the District Court refused the applicant\u2019s request to be released on bail. 9.  On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the investigating authority had not presented any evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. 10.  On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that the fact that the applicant had been accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal punishment. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to release the applicant on bail in view of the fact that, if at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence, evade responsibility and punishment, and continue to breach public order. As to the applicant\u2019s good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient to justify lifting the detention order. 11.  On 4 May, 2 July, 3 September and 30 October 2008 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on the same grounds, on each occasion by two months. 12.  On 19 May, 18 July, 19 September and 16 November 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals against those decisions. 13.  On 10 December 2008 the trial court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant\u2019s detention was to remain unchanged. 14.  On 22 June 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of making public calls inciting a violent overthrow of the government, and imposed a two-year sentence. It further decided to absolve the applicant from serving his sentence under a general amnesty declared by the Armenian parliament on 19 June 2009. The applicant was immediately released from detention.", "references": ["5", "9", "4", "6", "7", "8", "3", "1", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jrvezh. 5.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan\u2019s Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police. The applicant, who was present at Freedom Square at that time, was arrested and later charged under Article 316 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (CC) with assaulting police officers. 6.  On 4 March 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 1 May 2008, on the ground that the applicant, if at large, might abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the criminal proceedings. 7.  On 10 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. He was a former high-ranking police officer and a law-abiding citizen who enjoyed trust and respect in society. 8.  On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fact that the applicant was accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal liability and punishment and was sufficient to conclude that the applicant, if at large, might commit a new offence. As to the applicant\u2019s good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient for lifting the detention order. 9.  On 29 April 2008 the indictment was finalised and the applicant\u2019s case was sent to court for trial. The applicant remained in detention by virtue of Article 138 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 10.  On 13 May 2008 the District Court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant\u2019s detention was to remain unchanged. That decision was not subject to appeal. 11.  On 11 June 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 316 \u00a7 1 of the CC of assaulting police officers and sentenced him to a suspended term of one and a half years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["3", "1", "8", "7", "5", "9", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in \u0141atanice. 6.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was detained in Kielce Remand Centre from 6 September to 4 October 2012 (28 days). 8.  The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Kielce Remand Centre, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2. 9.  In their observations, the Government admitted that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell. However, they emphasised that the space in each cell had exceeded 2 m\u00b2 per person and that the hardship caused by staying in an overcrowded cell had been compensated by adding 30 minutes to his daily walk as well as additional cultural and educational classes or sports activities. 10.  In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant, the domestic courts established that for twenty-eight days the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell (see also paragraph 13 below). 11.  Regarding the conditions of detention, the domestic courts established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. Cells were equipped in compliance with the relevant law; they were properly ventilated and the toilet area had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells. 12.  On 12 August 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in various penitentiary facilities. He claimed 35,000 Polish zlotys (approximately 8,750 euros) in just satisfaction. 13.  On 28 May 2014 the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It confirmed, however, that temporarily (from 6 September to 4 October 2012) the applicant had been detained in cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2, but not below 2 m\u00b2. 14.  On 1 April 2015 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["4", "8", "6", "0", "3", "5", "9", "7", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently detained in Warsaw S\u0142u\u017cewiec Remand Centre. 7.  On 26 November 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police. 8.  On 27 November 2010 the Warsaw Wola District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) charged the applicant with possession of a significant amount of drugs and requested that the Warsaw Wola District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) detain him on remand. 9.  On 28 November 2010 the court decided to detain the applicant on remand for a period of three months, in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had been in possession of a significant amount of drugs (III Kp 2159/10). The court applied this measure due to the high probability that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, the severity of the maximum sentence provided by law for such offence (up to at least eight years\u2019 imprisonment) and the fact that the likelihood of such a penalty might induce the applicant to obstruct the proceedings, as well as the fear that the applicant might influence other persons to present a version of events favourable to him. 10.  On 21 February 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court noted that the applicant had also been charged with being a member of an organised, armed criminal gang and pointed out the actions that needed to be taken to conclude the investigation. 11.  Between 18 March and 12 April 2011 the applicant partially served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 203/09). 12.  On 23 May the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. The court again relied on the severity of the anticipated sentence and possibly adverse consequences that the applicant\u2019s release could have for the ongoing investigation. 13.  On 22 August 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. It listed the charges against the applicant, which included, apart from those mentioned above, battery, making a profit from prostitution of others and destroying property. The court expressly stated that it was not obliged to specify actions aiming to obstruct the investigation, because the sole gravity of charges allowed for the presumption that such actions might be undertaken. It also pointed out that, while at large, the applicant might hinder the investigation concerning other members of the same gang. 14.  On 16 September 2011 a bill of indictment against the applicant and fourteen other persons was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court (XVIII K 297/11). 15.  The applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 26 September 2011 until 30 March 2012. 16.  Between 24 October 2011 and 24 October 2012 the applicant served the remaining part of the prison sentence ordered in case III K 203/09, and from 24 October 2012 to 23 October 2013 he served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 1027/07). 17.  In the meantime, the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on 13 March, 4 July and 20 September 2012. The two latter decisions were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) on 31 July and 4 October 2012 respectively. 18.  The Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention on 4 October 2012, 15 January, 13 June and 28 October 2013, 13 March, 29 July and 30 December 2014, 25 June and 22 October 2015 and on 26 January 2016. The court relied on a high probability that the applicant and other accused had committed the offences with which they had been charged and on the complexity of the case. The court also considered that the persons accused might take actions aiming at obstructing the proper course of the proceedings, because they had known other accused, and the charges against them included being members of an armed and organised criminal gang. The Court of Appeal also considered that there was a high likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed. The relevant decisions were often phrased in general terms and no particular instances of the applicant\u2019s conduct during the investigation or at the judicial stage was provided to substantiate the extension of detention on remand. 19.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against those decisions were unsuccessful. His numerous requests for release, including on bail, were dismissed. 20.  On 4 March 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted of multiple offences and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment and to a fine of 8,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 1,850 euros (EUR)). On the same date the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was lifted. 21.  On 12 May 2017 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld that judgment in respect of the applicant.", "references": ["6", "1", "7", "0", "9", "4", "3", "8", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 7.  In December 2007 there was an on-going public debate on developments in human embryonic stem-cell research. As part of the debate the Catholic Bishop F. voiced criticism of human embryonic stem-cell research and a group of scientists at the University of Bonn responded to that criticism. On 13 December 2007 Bishop F. issued a press release repudiating allegations that his earlier comments had implied a degree of similarity between the scientists carrying out embryonic stem-cell research and the Nazis who had performed experiments on humans. He emphasised that he had had absolutely no intention of casting such defamatory aspersions upon the scientists, but reasserted his belief that there was an urgent need for such vitally important ethical issues to be debated critically. He claimed that he had never wished to imply that there had been any link between stem-cell research and the ideological and historical context of the crimes committed by the dehumanising Nazi system, which should not be relativised through comparison. 8.  On 18 December 2007, the applicant issued a press release for his initiative Never Again! (Nie Wieder! e.V) with the title:\n\u201cDogs which have been hit bark! Stem-cell research in Germany\u201d (Getroffene Hunde bellen! Stammzellenforschung in Deutschland)\nThe press release was published on the Internet and handed out as leaflets. It read:\n\u201cThe initiative Never Again! [Nie Wieder! e.V.] and the Austrian Christian Social Working Group [Christlich Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft \u00d6sterreichs] wish to make known their opposition to the press release issued by the University of Bonn on 13 December 2007, which bears the signatures of eighteen well-known professors and in which the professors express their outrage at the comments made by Bishop F. [name abbreviated by the Court] comparing modern-day stem-cell research to the experiments on human beings carried out by the Nazis.\nThe professors appear to have forgotten that these experiments were performed in Nazi times by willing doctors and scientists. These doctors and scientists, who were clearly in bondage to the rogue State and subservient to it, also carried out their research solely \u2018for the good of the people\u2019.\nThe research performed during the Nazi regime took place at a later stage of human life.\nThe present-day research takes place at an earlier stage of human life.\nDo the professors want to determine humans\u2019 right to life on the basis of how useful they are? The principle of human dignity does not apply only after a particular phase of growth has been completed, and people should not be allowed to experiment at will during this phase.\nThe professors can spin it any way they want. Aggravated murder [Mord] will always be aggravated murder, regardless of the stage of life at which the human being is destroyed. The fact that others were responsible for performing these contract killings does not provide moral justification for working with this \u2018human material\u2019.\nThe comments made by Bishop F. [name abbreviated by the Court], which were presumably addressed directly to Prof. Dr B. [name abbreviated by the Court], were absolutely accurate.\nProf. Dr B uses embryos \u2013 people \u2013 for research purposes at the University of Bonn that were murdered in Israel and then sold to Germany for significant sums of money.\nDuring Nazi times, German scientists performed research experiments on Jews and then murdered them.\nNowadays, the unborn children of people who follow the religion of Moses \u2013 the Jews \u2013 are murdered and sold to the \u2018Christian\u2019 country of Germany for research purposes, all with the blessing of both Israel and Germany!\nThe comparison drawn by Bishop F. was entirely justified!\nThe crimes against democracy being committed in the here and now must be denounced in the strongest possible terms and brought to people\u2019s attention.\nThe time has finally arrived to overcome the spirit of Auschwitz!!\u201d 9.  On 12 November 2008 the Weinheim District Court convicted the applicant of insult and sentenced him to a penalty of thirty daily fines of 15 euros (EUR) each. In its judgment the court acknowledged the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression and to impart to others his beliefs that the fusion of an egg and a sperm represented the beginning of human life and that research using imported stem cells from terminated embryos involved the destruction of human life. It also emphasised that the applicant had the fundamental liberty to exercise his freedom of expression by imparting his opinion strikingly and pointedly, including in the form of abusive criticism addressed at well-known researchers referred to by name. However, the court found that, when viewed in its entirety, the press release had exceeded the permissible bounds of abusive criticism. The court based this decision on the fact that the implication that the scientists had been guilty not just of committing murder but of doing so for deeply despicable motives had been a central theme running through the press release and had escalated in the phrase \u201cThe time has finally arrived to overcome the spirit of Auschwitz\u201d. It concluded that the applicant had intended to imply that the scientists carrying out stem-cell research had been prompted by the same criminal, sadistic and dehumanising motives as those responsible for performing unimaginably cruel mass experiments on humans, such as Mengele in Auschwitz. Given Prof. Dr B.\u2019s position as a doctor and scientist, this implication had been severely insulting. 10.  On 26 March 2009 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. Similarly to the District Court, the Regional Court acknowledged the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression and that his press release had contributed to a debate of great public interest. It further held that the majority of the statements in the press release had been value judgments and that therefore the press release had to be classified as a value judgment and not as a statement of fact. Nonetheless, the court stated that freedom of expression was not granted unconditionally and could be subject to restrictions with a view to protecting, inter alia, the right to personal honour. When examining contributions to a debate of public interest, however, there had to be a presumption in favour of freedom of speech. The Regional Court further found that the criterion for abusive criticism had not been met. Criticism which was excessive or even aggressive in nature was not necessarily abusive. The relevant criterion was whether the main purpose of the criticism had been to defame an individual rather than to debate the relevant issue. The court concluded that this was not applicable in the case at hand, since the applicant\u2019s past behaviour and the content of the press release showed that the focus had been on \u201cthe issue\u201d rather than the individual doctor against whom allegations had been made. The court therefore found that the right to freedom of expression had to be balanced with the legally protected personality rights of Prof. Dr B. and emphasised that freedom of expression granted equal protection to all statements of opinion, regardless of whether they were useful, useless, correct, incorrect, emotional, rational or even polemical or insulting. The Regional Court took into account that the press release had represented the applicant\u2019s contribution to the formation of public opinion, but believed that referring to Prof. Dr B. by name had been equivalent to linking his professional conduct to the atrocities committed by the Nazis. It concluded that this had represented a serious infringement of his personality rights, which had also been unnecessary since the applicant could have contributed to the debate without referring to the professor by name. 11.  On 15 February 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant as unfounded and on 6 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant without providing reasons (1 BvR 827/10).", "references": ["9", "4", "0", "8", "2", "7", "5", "No Label", "6", "1", "3"], "gold": ["6", "1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Limay. 6.  On 24 September 2008 the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale bank lodged a criminal complaint against a person or persons unknown for forgery, uttering forged documents, and fraud, following complaints by Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, the then President of France, about four fraudulent payments to mobile telephone companies from his bank account for a total amount of 176 euros (EUR). 7.  On 25 September 2008 the preliminary investigation was entrusted jointly to the fraud squad and the serious crime squad. On the same day Mr Sarkozy himself filed a criminal complaint, which was joined to the investigation. On 23 October 2008 the public prosecutor of Nanterre opened a judicial investigation in respect of fraud committed as a premeditated joint enterprise, to the detriment of the companies concerned, Mr Sarkozy and eight other individuals including relatives of his. During the judicial investigation Mr Sarkozy applied to join the proceedings as a civil party. 8.  On 11 June 2009 the investigating judge committed the applicant and six other individuals to stand trial before the Nanterre Criminal Court on a charge of fraud committed as a premeditated joint enterprise. They were accused of having obtained 148 telephone lines, mobile telephones and the payment of subscriptions using the references of payment cards and bank accounts belonging to a third party. 9.  Before the trial court, the applicant claimed that Mr Sarkozy\u2019s application to join the proceedings as a civil party was inadmissible. He argued, first, that the possibility for the serving President to intervene as a civil party, when it was impossible to bring proceedings against him or to have him summoned as a witness during his term of office (see Article 67 of the Constitution, paragraph 17 below), would create an imbalance in the proceedings. Secondly, he contended that the President\u2019s power to appoint judges and prosecutors under Articles 64 and 65 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 17, 22 and 25 below) cast doubt on the impartiality of the judicial proceedings to which he was a party. 10.  In a judgment of 7 July 2009 the court found the applicant guilty of the charges against him and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment, after establishing his participation in the preparatory acts and his role in the organisation of the fraud. It held that Mr Sarkozy\u2019s application to join the proceedings as a civil party was admissible on the basis of his right of access to a court, but deferred its decision on his claim for damages until the expiry of a one-month period after the end of his term as President (see Article 67 of the Constitution, paragraph 17 below). The court took the view, with reference to Article 6 of the Convention, that the President\u2019s status before the court would entail a breach of the equality of arms principle because, as a civil party, he could not, for the duration of his term of office, be the subject of any sanction for bringing unjustified proceedings or be prosecuted for malicious or rash accusations, or be questioned or confronted with the defendant (ibid., see also, paragraph 31 below). It further emphasised that the President\u2019s power to appoint judges and prosecutors was capable of creating the appearance, for the defendant, that he was not being tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. 11.  In a judgment of 8 January 2010 the Versailles Court of Appeal varied the judgment and sentenced the applicant to eight months\u2019 imprisonment. It found the applicant guilty, based on his own confessions and the statements of other defendants, together with the material discovered during searches. In respect of the civil claim, it ordered the applicant to pay EUR 1 to Mr Sarkozy in respect of non-pecuniary damage and, jointly with the other defendants, EUR 2,500 for costs at first instance and on appeal:\n\u201c... L.S., [the applicant] and F.T. contend that the special status of the Head of State rules out, in the present proceedings, any summons, interview, confrontation, investigative act or adversarial debate concerning Mr Sarkozy. It is not so much the securing of equality in the factual or legal arguments which matters, but the equal opportunity, for each of the parties, to submit its own \u2018arms\u2019 and to discuss those of the other party. In the present case, it is clear that this submission and discussion were effective throughout the proceedings, both during the judicial investigation and first-instance proceedings and before this court. A fair hearing has thus been guaranteed, not only in the balance between the parties but also through the effectiveness of the adversarial debate.\nAs regards the second aspect, concerning the impartiality of the tribunal which has allegedly been undermined by the supposed partiality of the public prosecutor and the President\u2019s intervention in the proceedings when he is the guarantor of judicial independence and authority, a distinction must be made. On that first point, the submissions by the public prosecutor of Nanterre rightly observe that the criminal proceedings were brought by the public prosecutor\u2019s office, which is not subject to any application for withdrawal, and the proceedings did not therefore depend on a civil-party intervention. On the second point, many civil or criminal courts, in particular in press-related matters, have, on many occasions, admitted proceedings brought by the serving President of the Republic, who in that capacity is also chair of the National Legal Service Commission, without at any time considering that he was in any way contravening his constitutional duties.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeal further sought to ascertain whether the impartiality of the tribunal could also be called into question in the light of the theory of appearances. It pointed out the ambiguity of the Head of State\u2019s status, which \u201c[came] from the fact that it [was] wholly intended to protect him from attacks before the courts, but [did] not prevent him from acting as an ordinary litigant when he decide[d] to have recourse to judicial proceedings\u201d. It emphasised, however, that the public prosecutor\u2019s office was not affected by the guarantee of the right to an impartial tribunal and that the President\u2019s powers of appointment had not infringed the right to a fair trial:\n\u201c... the fact that, in the present case, the public prosecutor\u2019s offices both of Nanterre and of Versailles had endeavoured to ensure that the case was examined as quickly as possible, and exceptional means of investigation were deployed (serious crime squad and fraud squad), could no doubt be attributed to the identity of the victim, but also to the fact that members of his family were affected by the same offences, those factors suggesting that a large-scale action targeting the Head of State and his family was likely to have been organised on account of their identity.\nThus, without there being any evidence that the President intervened directly in the proceedings, it is certain that the local public prosecutor\u2019s office, of its own initiative, showed a manifest zeal, which could not, however, have undermined the legitimate interests and fundamental rights of those concerned. The defendants have not demonstrated that they have suffered as a result of any breach by the French institutions of the principles which must govern a fair trial.\nMoreover, ... Article 64 of the Constitution states ... that the President is the guarantor of the judicial authority, and this provision legitimises, at the highest level of the hierarchy of legal norms \u2013 and even when the President of the Republic is a party to the proceedings \u2013 his powers over the public prosecutor\u2019s office, while also ruling out any doubt as to the independence of the judiciary ... [The applicant] cannot dispute the President\u2019s capacity to act as an ordinary citizen.\nIn addition, even supposing that French judicial organisation and the Convention are incompatible, only a reform of the Constitution would be capable of resolving that contradiction.\nIn those conditions, as there is nothing to show that the public prosecutor\u2019s office or the power to appoint judges and prosecutors caused any concrete impairment of the independence or impartiality of the judges, the objection is unfounded.\u201d 12.  The applicant appealed on points of law and, in addition to complaining of a breach of his right to a fair trial, argued that Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below) was unconstitutional as it did not preclude the President of the Republic from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party. In the meantime, in pleadings of 16 August 2010, the applicant asked the Court of Cassation to refer a question to the Constitutional Council for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality (question prioritaire de constitutionnalit\u00e9 \u2013 \u201cQPC\u201d) relating to the compatibility of the above-mentioned Article 2 with the principle of the separation of powers and the rights of the defence, and with the right to a fair trial. 13.  In a judgment of 10 November 2010 (Bull crim., no. 180) the Court of Cassation decided not to seek a preliminary ruling on constitutionality on the following grounds:\n\u201cThe question, which does not pertain to the interpretation of a constitutional provision that the Constitutional Court has not yet had occasion to apply, is not a new one.\nThe question raised does not have any serious merit in so far as it seeks, in reality, to clarify the scope of Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the light of Article 67 of the Constitution, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.\u201d 14.  In his opinion before the Court of Cassation, the Advocate-General called for the partial quashing of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in so far as it had not stayed its ruling on Mr Sarkozy\u2019s civil action until the end of his term of office. The Advocate-General took the view that the fact that no proceedings could be brought against the President (for malicious, improper or de facto fanciful accusation), or that he could not be summoned to testify, had not created, in the circumstances of the case, any inequality between the parties, while acknowledging that this inability could cause serious difficulties in other proceedings if mainly based on accusations or evidence emanating from the President. However, in the Advocate-General\u2019s view, the President\u2019s power to appoint judges and prosecutors was such as to cast doubt on the objective impartiality of any private disputes to which the President might be a party during his term of office. He nevertheless indicated that the fact of declaring inadmissible the President\u2019s application to join the proceedings as a civil party would have the effect of depriving him of his right of access to a court and concluded that it was necessary to opt for a compromise solution in the form of suspending any civil action brought by the President for the defence of his personal interests until the end of his term of office. 15.  In a judgment of 15 June 2012 the Plenary Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment in so far as it had not given sufficient reasons for the prison sentence handed down against the applicant. For the remainder, it found as follows:\n\u201cFirst, the President of the Republic who, in his status as victim, is entitled, under Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to exercise his rights as a civil party during his term of office, joined proceedings that had already been initiated by the public prosecutor, and the appellant has not been granted a discontinuance or an acquittal.\nSecondly, the judgment observes that the appellant was found guilty on the basis of both his own confessions and the statements of other defendants, together with the evidence gathered during searches.\nThirdly, the Court of Appeal, in assessing, without contradiction, the particulars of the case, found that the public prosecutor\u2019s action had not breached either the legitimate interests or the fundamental rights of the accused persons.\nFourthly, the judgment finds in precise terms that the guarantee of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, applies only to judges and not to the prosecution.\nLastly, the mere fact that judges are appointed by the President does not render them subordinate to him, since once they have been appointed, they enjoy tenure and are not subjected to any pressure or instructions in the exercise of their judicial duties. After finding that each party was able to present its arguments and discuss those of the opposite party throughout the judicial pre-trial investigation and the hearings both at first instance and before the Court of Appeal, the judgment indicates that the defendant had not demonstrated that he had sustained a breach of his right to a fair trial on the part of the French institutions. The Court of Appeal thus rightly concluded that the principle of the equality of arms had not been infringed. ...\u201d 16.  In a judgment of 24 January 2014 the Versailles Court of Appeal set aside the applicant\u2019s sentence, replacing it with a suspended term of ten months\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["0", "2", "7", "8", "9", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "9.  The first applicant, Mr S., was born in 1989. The second applicant, Mr V., and the third applicant, Mr A., were both born in 1982. 10.  On Saturday 10 October 2009 from 8 to 10 p.m. a football match between Denmark and Sweden was held in Copenhagen. The stadium had a capacity of 38,000 spectators. Beforehand the police had received intelligence reports of intentions among various club factions from Denmark and Sweden to instigate hooligan brawls. Consequently, in addition to the Copenhagen Police, which was in operation as usual, an extra 186 police officers were called on duty. Most of them wore uniforms throughout the day. They were familiar with members of local football factions. 11.  The three applicants went to Copenhagen to watch the match. They were detained during the day by virtue of section 5(3) of the Police Act (Politiloven) (see paragraph 29 below). 12.  Altogether 138 spectators/hooligans were detained, approximately half of them under section 755 of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) (see paragraph 35 below), being charged with various criminal offences, while the other half were detained under section 5(3) of the Police Act outside the context of criminal proceedings. 13.  The first applicant was detained from 4.45 p.m. to 12.06 a.m., a total of seven hours and twenty-one minutes. 14.  The second applicant was detained from 3.50 p.m. to 11.27 p.m., a total of seven hours and thirty-seven minutes. 15.  The third applicant was detained from 3.50 p.m. to 11.34 p.m., a total of seven hours and forty-four minutes. 16.  The last disturbances in the city centre of Copenhagen resulting in detentions took place at 10.51 p.m. and 11.21 p.m., at which time it was recorded that a police transport wagon was holding thirty-five detainees (those detained at 10.51 p.m.). 17.  On 15 October 2009, on behalf of the applicants, their representative requested that the police bring the cases before the courts in order to examine the lawfulness of the detention under chapter 43a of the Administration of Justice Act. She also sought compensation under section 469, subsection 6, of the same Act. 18.  On 4 November 2009, the parties having agreed on a common venue, the cases were brought before the Aarhus City Court (Retten i Aarhus). The applicants, three witnesses on their behalf, the leader of the police operation and four other representatives of the police were heard. The case was tried over three days, on 11 March, 6 September and 28 October 2010. 19.  The applicants explained that they had been part of a group of approximately twenty-five people from Aarhus, who had arrived in Copenhagen well before the match was due to begin. They had met between five and ten friends from Copenhagen and entered a pub. A group of forty or fifty people had afterwards left the pub to find a bigger pub on the Str\u00f8get pedestrian shopping street but the police had led them down a side street and detained the second and third applicants and four others. Subsequently, the first applicant had gone with some friends to another pub. Later on he had gone to a square opposite Tivoli Gardens to meet a friend from Aarhus. While standing outside with this friend, and talking on the phone with another friend from Copenhagen, he had been detained. The applicants argued that they had not been involved in any altercations; nor had they had any such intention. They confirmed that on a couple of previous occasions, they had been held in police custody in connection with other football matches. 20.  A \u201cMemorandum on detentions in connection with the international match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009\u201d, prepared by Chief Inspector B.O., the strategic commander for the event, was submitted to the City Court. It stated that the police had received intelligence reports that hooligan groups from both countries were set on fighting each other on the match day. The risk of fighting was increased by the fact that the match would not start until 8 p.m., leaving considerable time for each group to consume alcoholic beverages beforehand. In order to prevent such clashes, the plan was to start engaging in proactive dialogue from 12 noon, when the first fans/spectators appeared, and in the event of clashes, first to arrest the instigators under section 755 of the Administration of Justice Act and charge them or, if that was not possible, to detain the instigators by virtue of section 5(3) of the Police Act. Since detention under the latter provision, as far as possible, should not exceed six hours, the memorandum specifically stated that it was preferable to avoid detaining anyone too early during the day, since they would then have to be released during or after the game, with the possibility that they would head for the city centre again and resume their involvement in brawls. At 3.41 p.m. the first big fight started between Danish and Swedish supporters at Amagertorv Square, on Str\u00f8get in the centre of Copenhagen, resulting in five or six individuals being detained, including the second and third applicants. Subsequently, elsewhere, other supporters were detained, including the first applicant. Up until the start of the match, further individuals who instigated and directed fights were detained, but the manoeuvre tactics continued to be a dialogue to ensure that the large number of supporters behaved and made their way to the stadium to watch the match. After the match, another large brawl started in the city centre, resulting in further detentions of a large group of Swedish and Danish supporters/hooligans. 21.  Before the City Court, Chief Inspector B.O. stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... that he was the strategic commander for the event and located in the control room in connection with the international football match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009. The police had received intelligence reports of intentions among various club factions from Denmark and Sweden to initiate hooligan brawls in connection with the match. The police were therefore prepared for it not to be the usual audience of festive Danish and Swedish supporters. This information had come from police \u2018spotters\u2019 in different networks of football fans. They had received information that Danish and Swedish groups had planned to collaborate ... Police preparations had targeted different locations in Copenhagen. It was the intention to locate the various groups, talk to them to calm them down and accordingly dampen tempers before they reached the national stadium. The police had already deployed forces and divided them into groups at around 2 p.m. on the basis of intelligence that the spectators would arrive early to go partying. They had managed to locate the groups of fans by means of their spotters, and it had turned out that the fans were divided into a Swedish and a Danish group. They had seen the first large fight between Danish and Swedish hooligans at around 3.40 p.m. The fight had occurred in the central part of Str\u00f8get, the pedestrian shopping street, outside bar D, where the Swedish group had settled down. Prior to the fight, they had located the Danish groups in the central courtyard of Boltens G\u00e5rd. According to the intelligence, the Danish people involved were supporters of the football clubs of Br\u00f8ndby, Lyngby [Copenhagen] and AGF [Aarhus]. This intelligence had been collected by police officers in the home towns of these clubs. Those police officers had come to Copenhagen to assist, and they had recognised supporters.\nThe fight had taken the police somewhat by surprise, but they had managed to segregate the Swedish supporters at the bar D, and guide the Danish participants down Valkendorffsgade, a small side street off the pedestrian shopping street. It was a group of about fifty to sixty Danish fans altogether. He did not know the number of persons involved directly in the fight, but had understood from local reports that there were about fifty or sixty persons on either side. A fight of this kind causes a lot of uncertainty.\nHe himself had been in the control room, but had had regular contact with people at the scene of the incident. He was the one who had made the decision to detain persons who could not be charged with an offence, that is, detention pursuant to the Police Act. It had been planned that only the instigators should be detained. To the extent possible, they had also intended to avoid detaining many people early in the day because those people would then have to be released during or right after the match and would then be able to head for the city centre again and resume fighting. He had made use of local [police] spotters to identify six leading members, who had then been detained. They had been identified on the basis of police officers\u2019 prior knowledge of them, combined with their ongoing observations. The crucial factor had naturally been the individuals\u2019 actual behaviour. They would not have been detained if they had not been acting as instigators ...\nThe detainees had been released following an assessment of the situation in central Copenhagen. The police had started releasing the detainees after midnight, when the situation in central Copenhagen had calmed down and it had been assessed that there was no one with whom the newly released persons could start a fight. He was, of course, aware of the six-hour rule laid down in the Police Act, but it might be necessary to exceed this maximum period. They had done so deliberately that particular evening. Had there been no violence after the expiry of the six-hour period, there would have been no justification for not releasing the detainees. The purpose had definitely been to avoid confrontations and fights and situations causing uncertainty. They had made a continuous assessment during the period of detention.\nNormally there were no problems in relation to the six-hour rule in connection with matches played earlier in the day/on weekdays when people did not arrive so early. The control room team had included an investigator who had had regular contact with the Bellah\u00f8j police station regarding the detentions. The detainees who had been charged with an offence had been released after the match. As regards the persons detained under the Police Act, a comprehensive, general assessment had been made and then those persons had been released one by one when the danger had passed. He had been involved in the general assessment of the length of the detention periods, but not in the assessment of the individual cases. The control room had been closed down shortly after midnight, when the observers around the city had reported that things were quiet and that people were on their way home/back to their hotels. As already mentioned, it had been decided to release detainees on the basis of a general assessment made in the control room, but the actual releases had been effected at the Bellah\u00f8j police station. The police\u2019s assessment had been that the detainees would meet up again and start new fights if released before the streets of the city centre had become quiet ...\u201d 22.  Police Constable P.W. stated:\n\u201c... that he had participated as a member of a special patrol in the police action in Copenhagen on 10 October 2009 in connection with the international match. They had received intelligence that hooligans from Aarhus would meet with other hooligans from Denmark to fight Swedish football fans. The Copenhagen Police had asked for help from the police of other districts in Denmark who were familiar with members of local factions. He and his colleagues had met at around 11 a.m. for a briefing. He and a colleague of his from the Police of Eastern Jutland had then moved around the city to look for any hooligans from Aarhus whom they might recognise. They had been told that people from Br\u00f8ndby had gathered at a particular bar, and they had gone there. Among the people they had seen were [the first and second applicants]. [The second applicant] had been sitting together with A, the leader of South Side United (SSU), which is a local faction from Br\u00f8ndby. There had been a good atmosphere, and no violence. The witness had remained standing outside for a short while and had talked to people from Aarhus. It had probably been around 1 p.m. He and his colleague and some other officers had then posted themselves opposite the bar to keep an eye on what was going on. They had received reports that Swedes and Danes were to meet and fight. At some point the Danish hooligans had started leaving the bar, walking down the pedestrian shopping street towards Amagertorv Square [around 700 metres from the bar].\n[The witness] had worked in the special patrol for four years and had met [the first and second applicants] several times at previous fights in connection with football matches. He had seen them take part in fights and heard them shout \u2018White Pride Hooligan\u2019. He and his colleagues had followed the group and reported back to the control room. When they had come closer to Amagertorv Square, police personnel carriers had been parked crosswise to prevent the group from colliding with the Swedish football fans. The Danish hooligans had then been turned around and taken down a side street, where they had been registered and searched.\nThey had been told by the control room to select two leading hooligans from Aarhus. He and his colleague had agreed on selecting [the second and third applicants]. It had happened in a calm manner. The reason why [the second applicant] had been taken to the police station was that they had indeed seen him talking to A, combined with their prior knowledge of him. [The third applicant] had also been taken to the police station because of their knowledge of him. [The witness] had written a report on the detentions a couple of hours later.\nWhen questioned about Exhibit 46 at the bottom and its continuation on Exhibit 47 at the top [the police reports written by him], according to which both [the second and third applicants] had issued several orders to the other hooligans from Aarhus, the witness stated that he could no longer recall the details, but if this was what he had written, then that was how it had been. The purpose of detaining those two persons had been to create calm and prevent clashes. This had apparently succeeded because he had been present during the international match himself, and it had been obvious that the hooligans from Aarhus had been missing someone to take control. When the group from the bar was being guided into the side street, a couple of people might have tried to disappear into the crowd, but the group had followed directions from the police.\nWhite Pride supporters were characterised by being highly structured. It was very clear that someone was in control. Directions were issued by the leaders, and the directions were obeyed. The three factions present at the bar had come from Aarhus, Br\u00f8ndby and Lyngby and were not usually friends. They had come out together and walked in a group towards Amagertorv Square, where the Swedish hooligans were supposed to be.\u201d 23.  Police Constable M.W. stated:\n\u201c... that he had participated in the police action in Copenhagen on 10 October 2009 as a dog handler. He had been involved in the administrative detention of a person [the first applicant] at Axeltorv Square. He did not recall the name of this person, but it was the only person whom he had been involved in detaining. He and a colleague of his had been sitting observing in a car at Axeltorv Square, when a citizen, a man aged 40 to 45, holding his son of about five by the hand, had contacted them saying that three people, whom he had pointed out from a very short distance, were planning a fight as they had been calling various mates, telling them to meet up at the entrance to Tivoli Gardens and try to start a fight with some Swedish supporters. This citizen had overheard the calls just before he had contacted the police, and he had pointed out one of the three persons in particular. The person in question was still talking on his mobile phone at that time. The witness and his colleague considered the person making the report to be highly credible. The person making the report did not look like a typical football supporter.\nThe witness had continued to keep an eye on the person standing with his telephone to his ear. When the three men noticed that the witness and his colleague had caught sight of them, they had started to walk in different directions. The witness had then detained the person who had the telephone to his ear. Some colleagues driving in the police personnel carrier which had arrived in the meantime had detained the other two people ...\u201d 24.  Chief Inspector P.J. stated:\n\u201c... that he had been involved in placing detainees in cells, upholding the detentions and releasing the detainees. When the Copenhagen Police planned comprehensive police actions and expected to detain many people, he was usually selected as the person responsible for verifying that standard procedures were observed when the detainees were placed in a cell at Bellah\u00f8j police station.\nOn the relevant evening he had been assisted by two leaders, each of whom had assistance from two colleagues in carrying out body searches, and making photo recordings, of the detainees. Ten additional police officers were there to help. One of his tasks had been to make sure that the six-hour rule was observed. They had been faced with the issue that the six-hour period applicable to two of the persons detained under the Police Act expired at 9.50 p.m. He had contacted the control-room supervisor before the expiry of this period. Concurrently, clashes had been starting in the streets, and the control-room supervisor had decided not to let the relevant persons out. They had not wanted to add fuel to the fire. This decision had been made by the supervisors because he himself did not have the power to make such a decision. He had talked to the control room many times during that evening from 9.30 p.m. onwards. Very many detainees had been brought to the police station up until around 11 p.m., reaching a total of 136 detainees. Half of them had been detained under the Police Act. He had regularly asked when they should start releasing the detainees. He had not called and asked about specific names, but a general assessment had been made on an ongoing basis for all detainees from the time when the statutory six-hour periods started to expire. The radio communication had made it possible for him to keep updated about when things started calming down after the arrests of people in the Boltens G\u00e5rd courtyard, and finally it had been confirmed that he could start releasing the persons detained under the Police Act. He did not keep a log of all telephone calls and was therefore unable to give the exact time. As far as he recalled, there had probably been one detainee under 18 years old who had been fetched by his parents before the end of the six-hour period, but otherwise no one else had been let out before the two initial detainees. It could very well have happened that some of his colleagues had started taking people out of the cells before the end of the six-hour period when they had received the information from the control room, because everybody was highly aware of the six-hour rule. If the persons concerned had subsequently been returned to their cells, the reason was an order from the control room saying that they should continue to be detained.\u201d 25.  By a judgment of 25 November 2010 the City Court found against the applicants for the following reasons:\n\u201cThe Copenhagen Police ought to have brought the matters before the court within five days of receipt, as set out in section 469(2) of the Administration of Justice Act. The court finds, however, that the non\u2011submission does not as such give rise to liability making the plaintiffs eligible for compensation.\nBased on the evidence, the court accepts as fact that the Copenhagen Police had received intelligence prior to the international football match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009 that Danish and Swedish hooligan groups had arranged to meet in connection with the match and that the police had seen the first large fight between Danish and Swedish football fans at Amagertorv Square at 3.41 p.m. This implied a concrete and imminent risk of disturbance of public order, and the police were under a duty to attempt to prevent such disturbance; see section 5(1) of the Police Act.\nAccording to the evidence given by Police Constable P.W., compared with the police report prepared by the same witness on 11 October 2009 (Exhibits 47 and 48), the court accepts as fact that [the second and third applicants] were detained after the witness had specifically seen the persons concerned talking with an activist from the local Br\u00f8ndby faction of South Side United on 10 October 2009 and issuing orders to others, in combination with the fact that the persons concerned were known to the police for having been detained several times previously in connection with similar football events.\nThe court also accepts as fact, based on the evidence given by Police Constable M.W., compared with the evidence given by Chief Inspector B.O., that [the first applicant], who had also been detained several times previously in connection with similar events, was detained because a person, whom M.W. and his colleague had deemed to be highly credible, had spontaneously contacted him stating that he had just overheard a person, whom he had simultaneously pointed out as being [the first applicant], calling other people by phone and inciting them to start a fight with Swedish football fans at Tivoli Gardens together with him.\nLess radical measures could not be deemed sufficient to avert the risk of additional unrest in those circumstances, and the court finds that the Copenhagen Police did not exceed their powers by detaining [the applicants] under section 5(3) of the Police Act on that basis.\nBased on the evidence, the court accepts as fact that during the afternoon and evening, about 138 persons were detained, half of them being detained pursuant to the Police Act; that the unrest continued for the rest of the afternoon and all evening; and that the detention of the plaintiffs was ended as soon as the city centre had become quiet, in the assessment of the police, after a group comprising thirty-five Danes was arrested towards midnight. The court finds, in the circumstances of the present case, that there is no basis for invalidating the assessment made by the police, according to which the release of the detainees before the city centre had become quiet would have entailed a concrete and imminent risk of further unrest, including clashes with spectators who had been let out of the national stadium after the end of the match and who were still in the streets in large numbers.\nIt is stated in the second sentence of section 5(3) of the Police Act that detention must be as brief as possible and should not extend beyond six hours where possible. According to the preparatory notes on this provision, as described in the second column on page 32 of Bill no. 159 of 2 April 2004, the purpose of the detention must be taken into account in this assessment and any person so detained must be released when the circumstances giving rise to the detention no longer exist. It also appears from the preparatory notes on the same provision that normally the six-hour period can only be exceeded in connection with actions involving the detention of a considerable number of people, in which situations the time spent on transfer to the police station and registration and identification of detainees would render it impossible, in practice, to observe the six-hour rule.\nWhilst the legislative intent of the provision is to extend detention to more than six hours only in exceptional situations, if an extension is not justified by practical issues related to the detention of a large number of people that render it impossible to observe the maximum period, the court finds on the above grounds, in view of the purpose of the detentions compared with the organised nature, scope and duration of the unrest, as well as the length of the specific periods by which the maximum periods had been exceeded, that the conditions for detaining [the applicants] pursuant to section 5(3) of the Police Act for more than six hours were met. Accordingly, there is no basis for awarding compensation to [the applicants].\u201d 26.  On appeal, for the reasons stated by the City Court, on 6 September 2011 the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) upheld the judgment. 27.  On 12 December 2011, finding that the case raised no issue of principle, the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsn\u00e6vnet) refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret). 28.  It appears that forty-nine persons (not including the applicants) were charged with criminal offences on the day of the match, notably for breaching the Executive Order on Police Measures to Maintain Public Order and Protect the Safety of Individuals and the Public, etc., and the Right of the Police to Launch Temporary Measures (bekendtg\u00f8relse om politiets sikring af den offentlige orden og beskyttelse af enkeltpersoners og den offentlige sikkerhed mv., samt politiets adgang til at iv\u00e6rks\u00e6tte midlertidige foranstaltninger) (see paragraph 33 below). However, those charges were later withdrawn because it was deemed impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to prove that every single one of the persons charged had committed one or more criminal offences. One person was convicted under section 119 of the Penal Code for having thrown a glass item at a police officer\u2019s head, and another person was convicted under section 121 for having verbally insulted a police officer on duty.", "references": ["0", "5", "6", "7", "8", "3", "1", "9", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1987 in the Netherlands and arrived in Denmark when he was approximately 9 months old. He remained in Denmark, together with his parents and three brothers. 8.  The applicant has a criminal record. Before he turned 18 years old, he had been convicted four times by a City Court: on 8 May 2003 of, inter alia, drug offences, with a sentence of four months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended; on 1 October 2003 of armed robbery, with a sentence of one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment, of which one year was suspended; on 24 June 2004 of, inter alia, theft and possession of weapons, with a sentence of one year and four months\u2019 imprisonment; and on 12 May 2005 of, inter alia, robbery, and sentenced to nine months\u2019 imprisonment. He was released on 10 July 2006 with two hundred and fifty-five days remaining, suspended for two years. 9.  After having reached the age of majority the applicant was convicted a number of times. 10.  By a City Court judgment of 7 September 2006 he was convicted of handling stolen property and sentenced to eight months\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  By a City Court judgment of 11 June 2008, he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment. Moreover, the City Court ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion, suspended with two years\u2019 probation. He was released on 28 January 2010. 12.  By a City Court judgment of 25 March 2010, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to thirty days\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  By a judgment of the High Court, acting as an appeal instance, on 9 November 2010 he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to one year and three months\u2019 imprisonment. In addition, his expulsion was again ordered, suspended with two years\u2019 probation. 14.  By a City Court judgment of 27 February 2012 the applicant was convicted of attempting to escape from prison. No additional sentence was imposed. 15.  In the meantime, on 12 November 2011 the applicant was arrested and charged with offences under the Penal Code, inter alia two counts of robbery, the first committed in a private home on 4 October 2011, and the second in a bank on 24 October 2011. The applicant was also charged with possession of arms, threatening a witness, drug offences and handling stolen property. 16.  The case was heard by the City Court of Copenhagen (K\u00f8benhavns Byret). Two co-accused from the applicant\u2019s family were also on trial. The applicant was heard and pleaded not guilty to the robberies. He explained that he was 25 years old. Except for eight months spent, as a baby, in the Netherlands, he had lived all his life in Denmark, where all his family lived, including his parents, three brothers and 80 other family members. He had never been to Croatia or the former Yugoslavia. He had no family there and did not speak the language. He had been diagnosed with ADHD and took medication for that. He had had a girlfriend for 2 years and 3 months. They wanted to marry and have children. 17.  For the purpose of the court proceedings, the Aliens Authority (Udl\u00e6ndingestyrelsen) issued a report on the applicant. It noted that since the applicant had turned 15, he had been convicted of similar criminal offences and served sentences totalling 1,755 days, equal to four years and ten months.\nThe applicant\u2019s mother had been granted a residence permit in 1987 on the grounds of her marriage with the applicant\u2019s father. She had left in June 1988, but returned in November 1988 with the applicant, who was 9 months old at the time, and who was granted a residence permit until March 2005, later extended to April 2012. The length of his legal stay in Denmark was therefore calculated at approximately sixteen years and two months. The conditions for ordering an expulsion were set out in the Aliens Act (Udl\u00e6ndingeloven), section 22 no. 6 or section 24 no. 1, read in conjunction with the former.\nThe applicant had been to school for seven years, but had no other education, and at the relevant times had received social welfare. He had stated that, for the past two years, he had had a girlfriend, and that his father, three brothers and about 80 family members lived in Denmark. He had also stated that he had been diagnosed with ADHD, that he suffered from emotional stress and that he heard voices when smoking cannabis, to which he had been addicted for ten years. He had suffered three cannabis psychoses during the past four years, and been treated once in hospital for such psychosis.\nIn conclusion, the Aliens Authority endorsed the prosecution\u2019s recommendation of expulsion. 18.  By a judgment of 12 December 2012, the City Court convicted the applicant inter alia of the two counts of robbery, and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. It attached special weight to the fact that he was convicted of two robberies and had previously been convicted of similar crimes. 19.  In addition, by virtue of section 22 no. 6 in conjunction with section 26, subsection 2, of the Aliens Act, the City Court ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion, with a permanent ban on his return. In this respect the City Court stated:\n\u201cAs regards the issue of expulsion, the Court observes that it depends on an assessment of proportionality as established by the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret) in a judgment reproduced on page 225 of the Danish Weekly Law Reports for 2012 ((UfR) 2012.225H), whether an offender is to be expelled. The Supreme Court said with reference, inter alia, to \u00a7 71 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 23 June 2008 in Maslov v. Austria ([GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 application no. 1638/03) that, where the person to be expelled is a young adult who has not yet founded a family of his or her own, the relevant criteria for the assessment of proportionately, see Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, are as follows:\n(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by that person,\n(b) the length of the person\u2019s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled,\n(c) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the person\u2019s conduct during that period, and\n(d) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.\nAccording to \u00a7\u00a7 72 and 73 of the judgment, the age of the relevant person can play a role when applying the said criteria. For instance, when an assessment is made of the nature and seriousness of an offence committed, it has to be taken into account whether the relevant person committed it as a juvenile or as an adult. When an assessment is made of the length of the person\u2019s stay in the host country and the solidity of the ties with the host country, it evidently makes a difference whether the person concerned had already come to the country during his or her childhood or youth, or was even born there, or whether he or she only came to the host country as an adult. Regard is to be had to the special situation of a person who has spent most, if not all of his or her childhood in the host country, was brought up there and received his or her education there (\u00a7 74). According to \u00a7 75 of the judgment, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion of a settled migrant who has lawfully spent all or the major part of his or her childhood and youth in the host country.\nIn the case at hand, the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years for two robberies: a robbery committed at a private home and a bank robbery. Both robberies were committed in October 2011.\n[The applicant] is a national of Croatia and entered Denmark a few months after his birth. Accordingly, the defendant has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark. All his family, including his parents and his three siblings, are Danish residents. He has no ties with Croatia, has no family or friends there and does not speak Croatian according to the information provided, but only Roma in addition to Danish. He has a Croatian passport.\n[The applicant] has not yet founded a family of his own as he is neither married nor the father of any children. No significance should be attributed to the circumstance that the defendant has had a Danish girlfriend for about two years as this relationship was started at a time when his girlfriend, who is domiciled in Denmark, was or ought to have been aware of his criminal activities.\n[The applicant] dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He has not started any vocational training or education, and he has never had a job, but has lived on social security benefits. He has been addicted to cannabis, and he has suffered a number of cannabis psychoses according to the information provided. Even though he has lived in Denmark all his life, he must be considered very poorly integrated into Danish society.\nConsidering the fact that he has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark and has received all his schooling in this country, and since he has no ties with Croatia, strict requirements must be met for the crime to result in expulsion.\n[The applicant] has been convicted of robbery on several previous occasions. Two of those sentences were imposed for robberies committed before he attained the age of 18: a sentence for robbery at a post office in 2003 when the defendant was almost 16 years old and a sentence for two street robberies and other offences in 2004/2005 when the defendant was 17 years old. The proceeds of both robberies were of minor value.\n[The applicant] has furthermore been convicted of robbery twice after he has attained the age of 18. The first of those sentences was imposed on 11 June 2008 when he was found guilty of a street robbery and a robbery at a shop contrary to section 288, subsection 1 (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years and suspended expulsion from Denmark. The second sentence was imposed on 9 November 2010 in appeal proceedings when he was found guilty of a street robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year and three months and suspended expulsion from Denmark subject to a probation period of two years.\nMoreover, several sentences have been imposed for other offences against property. Altogether, the defendant, who is 25 years old today, has been sentenced to and has served 1,755 days in prison, corresponding to four years and ten months, since his 15th birthday.\nThe offences for adjudication in connection with the case at hand were committed during the probation period of the most recent suspended expulsion order. The offence for adjudication in connection with the judgment of 9 November 2010 delivered in appeal proceedings was committed in the probation period of the first suspended expulsion order. The nature and seriousness of the offences in combination with the previous sentences for similar offences and the fact that the defendant has now failed to observe the conditions of two suspended expulsion orders is deemed by the Court to provide weighty reasons why the defendant should now be expelled. The fact that a number of the judgments relate to offences committed after the defendant has come of age also makes expulsion appropriate. Against this background, the Court finds that altogether such very serious reasons exist that the defendant must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entry as set out in section 22, subsection 1(vi), section 26, subsection 2) and section 32, subsection 2 (v) of the Aliens Act, in which connection it is observed that the expulsion order is deemed not to be contrary to Denmark\u2019s international obligations.\u201d 20.  On appeal, by a judgment of 26 August 2013 the High Court of Eastern Denmark (\u00d8stre Landsret - henceforth \u201cthe High Court\u201d) upheld the conviction, the sentence and the expulsion order. A majority of five judges out of six stated:\n\u201cOn the grounds given by the City Court, we concur that altogether such very serious reasons exist that [the applicant] must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entering despite his lack of ties with Croatia. We concur that an expulsion order is found not to be contrary to Denmark\u2019s international obligations, including section 38 and 39 of Executive Order no. 474 of 12 May 2011 on Residence in Denmark for Aliens Falling Within the Rules of the European Union (bekendtg\u00f8relse om ophold i Danmark for udl\u00e6ndinge, der er omfattet af Dem Europ\u00e6iske Unions regler) [implementing EU Council Directive 2004/38/EC].\u201d\nOne judge stated:\n\u201cSince [the applicant] has lived his whole life in Denmark and has no ties to Croatia, I find it contrary to Denmark\u2019s international obligations to issue an expulsion order despite the serious crime committed.\u201d 21.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret), was refused by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsn\u00e6vnet) on 12 December 2013. 22.  In December 2013, pursuant to Council Framework Decision 2008-909-JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended by Council Framework decision 2009-299-JHA of 26 February 2009, the Ministry of Justice requested the Croatian authorities to take over the enforcement of the sentences imposed on the applicant by the High Court judgment of 9 November 2010 and the High Court judgment of 26 August 2013. 23.  By a City Court judgment of 6 September 2016 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for three months and expulsion for violence against a fellow inmate. He appealed against the judgment to the High Court. It is unknown whether the appeal proceeding have ended. 24.  It appears that the applicant was expelled from Denmark in December 2017, after having served his sentence, and that he re-entered Denmark shortly after, in breach of the ban.", "references": ["9", "2", "7", "8", "5", "3", "0", "6", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Tallinn. 6.  On 27 May 2010 the Harju County Court determined that the applicant\u2019s son, O.T. (born in 1984), had restricted active legal capacity (piiratud teov\u00f5ime). It appointed the applicant as O.T.\u2019s guardian to protect his interests in social and legal matters and in matters concerning property. The court relied on a forensic psychiatric expert opinion of 14 March 2010 according to which the applicant\u2019s son suffered from permanent paranoid schizophrenia and was incapable of understanding or controlling his actions. 7.  On 25 October 2010 O.T. committed acts of a sexual nature in respect of a ten-year old girl and threatened to kill the victim. 8.  Criminal proceedings were initiated and O.T. was examined by a forensic psychiatric expert who confirmed, in an expert report dated 8 November 2010, the earlier expert findings (see paragraph 6 above). The expert furthermore added that O.T. posed a danger to society and needed coercive psychiatric treatment (ps\u00fchhiaatriline sundravi). On 6 May 2011 the Harju County Court terminated the criminal proceedings and ordered that O.T. undergo coercive psychiatric treatment, which commenced on 6 June 2011. 9.  On 14 December 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the Tartu County Court for O.T.\u2019s coercive psychiatric treatment to be discontinued or for his inpatient treatment to be replaced by outpatient treatment. In her request, she referred to an opinion given by a medical committee \u2013 comprised of O.T.\u2019s attending doctor and the acting head of the coercive treatment department (Dr E.K.) of the hospital where O.T. was being detained \u2013 dated 14 June 2012, which stated: \u201csubstantial contact [sisuline kontakt] with O.T. deficient [puudulik], his answers to questions are sparse, poses counter-questions. Denies the committed offence, does not consider himself mentally ill. In need of continued treatment as he poses danger to society.\u201d The applicant considered that the opinion was not impartial and asked for a new independent expert assessment to be carried out with respect to O.T. 10.  On 6 February 2013 the Tartu County Court dismissed the application. It relied on an opinion dated 11 December 2012 drawn up by a medical committee comprised of O.T.\u2019s attending doctor and the head of the coercive treatment department (Dr S.K.), according to which O.T.\u2019s mental condition had not changed. According to the opinion, substantial contact with him had been deficient, his answers to questions had been sparse, he had posed counter-questions and had made incoherent statements. During the course of the interview his facial expression had become angry from time to time, he had laughed inappropriately, and he had faked psychotic experiences. On the basis of the above, the medical committee concluded that O.T. was in need of continued psychiatric treatment. The court decided that no additional expert opinion was necessary, as under Article 403 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik \u2013 \u201cthe CCrP\u201d) (see paragraph 21 below) the opinion of the medical committee sufficed as evidence. 11.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 5 March 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision because, contrary to the CCrP, the first-instance court had not examined the case in oral proceedings. The Court of Appeal noted that under Article 402-1 \u00a7 3 and Article 403 \u00a7 5 of the CCrP (see paragraph 21 below), the ordering of a new expert report had not been compulsory and the first-instance court had been entitled to rely solely on the written opinion of the medical committee or to question the attending doctor at a hearing. 12.  On 30 April 2013 the Tartu County Court granted State-funded legal aid to O.T., and a lawyer (advokaat) was appointed to assist him. 13.  The Tartu County Court re-examined the case at a hearing on 8 May 2013. It had at its disposal the medical committee opinion of 11 December 2012 (see paragraph 10 above). The head of the coercive treatment department, Dr S.K., who had participated in the drawing up of the medical opinion in question, was also heard by the court. He submitted that O.T. had not recovered: he did not have an understanding of what was going on, did not adhere to his treatment, and had accused his mother of poisoning him. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, outpatient treatment was out of the question. The applicant and O.T\u2019s legal aid lawyer expressed a wish for O.T. to be released. O.T. himself stated that he did not understand anything and did not wish to make statements. 14.  By a decision of 8 May 2013 the County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, considering that O.T. had not recovered to such an extent that it would be possible to discontinue the coercive treatment or change from inpatient to outpatient treatment. It observed that there was no reason to doubt the conclusions of the medical committee\u2019s opinion of 11 December 2012 or the reliability of the head of the coercive treatment department. 15.  The applicant appealed to the Tartu Court of Appeal on 29 May 2013. She argued that it had not been established that O.T. posed a danger to himself or to society and that no independent expert assessment had been carried out. She considered the opinions given by the hospital\u2019s own medical committee (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above and paragraph 22 below) to be superficial and repetitive in their wording. She also invoked Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, claiming that the patient himself should have been entitled at reasonable intervals to initiate proceedings during which the continued need for treatment would be assessed. She made reference to Article 402-1 \u00a7 1 of the CCrP (see paragraph 21 below) and the explanatory annex to the relevant draft legislation (see paragraph 23 below), according to which persons subjected to coercive psychiatric treatment had no such right (see paragraph 23 below). 16.  On 4 July 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the applicant\u2019s complaint about the lack of impartiality of the doctors treating O.T. was unfounded and that the County Court had rightly relied on the opinions of the medical committee and the head of the coercive treatment department. The Court of Appeal noted that an independent expert examination was mandatory in proceedings related to the initial ordering of coercive treatment. The danger to society posed by O.T. and the preconditions for applying coercive treatment had already been independently established by a court on 6 May 2011. In the proceedings at issue \u2013 which concerned the proposed discontinuation of inpatient coercive treatment or its replacement with outpatient treatment \u2013 it was not mandatory to obtain an alternative expert opinion (see paragraph 21 below). The Court of Appeal held that in a situation where the state of O.T.\u2019s health and adherence to the treatment had not improved and the discontinuation of his inpatient treatment or its replacement with outpatient treatment was in the doctors\u2019 opinion excluded, ordering another expert examination would have been irrelevant. 17.  On 19 July 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating the complaints made in her first appeal. She also requested legal aid, since an appeal before the Supreme Court could be lodged only by a lawyer, for the hiring of whom she had no financial means. 18.  By a decision of 16 September 2013 the Supreme Court refused the applicant\u2019s request for legal aid. The Supreme Court noted that although the applicant had asked for legal aid for herself and not for O.T., she had justified her request by arguing that there was a need to protect O.T.\u2019s rights \u2013 primarily his right to liberty. The Supreme Court went on to add that the applicant did not herself have rights in the proceedings in question that she could protect by means of securing legal aid and that there was therefore no need to recognise her right of appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the legal aid lawyer appointed for O.T. by a decision of the Tartu County Court of 30 April 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) could have lodged an appeal in his client\u2019s interests. 19.  On 18 September 2017 the Government notified the Court that the psychiatric treatment of the applicant\u2019s son had been terminated, at the request of the applicant, by a decision of the Tartu County Court of 21 September 2016.", "references": ["0", "6", "1", "8", "7", "5", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1980 and 1986, respectively, and were detained at the Tekirda\u011f F-Type prison when the application was lodged. 6.  On 28 and 29 October 2005 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7.  On 31 October 2005 the applicants were brought before a judge at the Istanbul Assize Court which ordered their detention on remand. 8.  On 23 December 2005 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation and illegal possession of explosives. 9.  On 26 December 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicants\u2019 detention. 10.  Throughout the proceedings the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants\u2019 detention on remand. Between the hearings, with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicants\u2019 detentions on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend. 11.  At the end of the hearing held on 13 October 2008, the trial court decided once again to prolong the applicants\u2019 detention. Although the applicants\u2019 lawyer was present at this hearing, the applicants were not brought from prison to the court. Subsequently, their lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 13 October 2008. On 11 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or to their representative. 12.  On 23 December 2009 the court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The court also ordered the continuation of the first applicant\u2019s detention and the release of the second applicant. 13.  On 24 March 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.", "references": ["5", "0", "9", "3", "4", "1", "6", "8", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Kragujevac. 6.  On 14 December 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Kragujevac Clinical Centre requesting damages. In the course of the proceedings eleven hearings were held, whereas five hearings were scheduled, but were not held. 7.  On 20 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s claim was rejected as unfounded by the Kragujevac Court of First Instance. 8.  On 26 December 2011 the Kragujevac Appellate Court (\u201cthe Appellate Court\u201d) quashed the decision of 20 May 2011 and remitted the case to the first instance court. 9.  In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought recusal of the acting judge twice, but both of his motions were rejected. 10.  On 4 October 2012, after three held hearings and two hearings which were not held, expert examination and the increase of the applicants claim, the case was transferred to the Kragujevac High Court (\u201cthe High Court\u201d). 11.  On 20 March 2013, following the applicant\u2019s two other recusal requests, one of which was adopted, the High Court rejected the applicant\u2019s damages claim as unfounded. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 21 August 2014 the Appellate Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 20 March 2013. Thereafter, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law, which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Cassation only on 21 December 2016. 13.  In the meantime, on 7 February 2013, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court complaining about the length of the pending civil proceedings, seeking non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 3,000 euros and publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court transferred the case-file to the Appellate Court, as a competent court to deal with the length complaints of the pending cases, pursuant to Article 8a of the Law on the Organization of the Courts. However, on 23 September 2014 the Appellate Court established that it no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint since it found that the civil proceedings had been finished. The applicant\u2019s case-file was thus returned to the Constitutional Court. 14.  On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court returned the case-file to the Appellate Court, which on 28 November 2014 again found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. The Appellate Court then transferred the case-file further to the Supreme Court of Cassation, as the competent court. The applicant appealed. 15.  On 22 January 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 28 November 2014. It also partially adopted the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the length of the proceedings and awarded him 200 euros for non-pecuniary damage, whereas the rest of claim rejected. 16.  On 21 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal in regards to the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court established that even though the impugned proceedings had lasted seven years and eight months, they were very complex and the applicant largely contributed to its length, whereas the competent courts acted efficiently.", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "5", "7", "8", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Be\u010dej, where he was employed as a police officer. 6.  On 24 January 2003 the Be\u010dej Municipal Court (\u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) started judicial investigation proceedings against the applicant for the alleged commission of a number of criminal offences concerning the performance of his duties. 7.  On 26 May 2003 the competent directorate of the Ministry of Interior dismissed the applicant from the police force (effective as of 30 May 2003). The decision noted that the criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and that Article 45, in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, which was in force at the time of the dismissal, should be applied. According to this provision a police officer could be dismissed, at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, if he no longer met the requirements for being a police officer, which included the requirement that criminal proceedings of a particular type should not be pending against him. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, but on 30 June 2003 his appeal was rejected and the dismissal thus confirmed. 8.  On 23 July 2003 the applicant lodged a claim with the Municipal Court seeking his reinstatement. 9.  On 31 October 2003 the Municipal Court partly discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant based on the applicable procedural prescription period. 10.  On 12 November 2003 the remainder of the criminal proceedings were discontinued because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the charges. 11.  On 30 December 2003 the Municipal Court annulled the decision on the applicant\u2019s dismissal of 26 May 2003 by partial judgment, establishing that everyone charged with a criminal offence should be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law, and that a broad interpretation of Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 in regards to the persons who were not found guilty could be only to their detriment. 12.  On 17 June 2004 the Novi Sad District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) upheld this judgment. The applicant\u2019s former employer thereafter submitted an appeal on points of law. 13.  In the meantime, the applicant was reinstated to his previous post by decision of the Ministry of Interior of 13 January 2005. The decisions of 26 May and 30 June 2003 were also repealed. 14.  On 9 March 2005, however, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal on points of law, reversed the judgments of 30 December 2003 and 17 June 2004 and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for reinstatement. It found that the dismissal of 26 May 2006 had been in accordance with the Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2) of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, and that the mere fact that the criminal proceedings had been pending against the applicant was sufficient reason for the applicant\u2019s dismissal. 15.  On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16.  On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 17.  On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court concerning the outcome, fairness and the length of the civil proceedings concerning his dismissal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the \u201cright to work\u201d. 18.  On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant\u2019s second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant\u2019s favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his \u201cdismissal as such\u201d. 19.  Before this on 19 January 2011, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision in the case of Stefanovi\u0107 v. Serbia (U\u017d 753/2008), concerning the same legal issue in which it ruled in favour of the appelant in that case (see Milojevi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia, nos. 43519/07 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 36-37, 12 January 2016).", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "7", "9", "8", "4", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1993, 1992, 1992, 1994, 1993, 1993, 1995, 1993, 1996, 1994 and 1951 respectively and live in Tighina (Bender). 6.  The applicants are ten pupils of the Romanian (Moldovan) language boarding school in Tighina (Bender) for orphans and other children taken into public care, and their head teacher and also legal guardian, at the time of lodging the application. Not all the applicants are orphans and some of them had sporadic contacts with their parents. The children studied and lived at the school. During the summer holidays, they either went to summer camps or stayed with the families of the school staff. In 2004 the children spent their summer holidays together with the families of school staff. The applicants\u2019 school was registered with the Moldovan Ministry of Education and was therefore using the Latin script and a curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Moldova. 7.  According to Article 12 of the Constitution of the \u201cMoldovan Republic of Trandniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d), the official languages within the \u201cMRT\u201d are \u201cMoldavian\u201d, Russian and Ukrainian. Article 6 of the \u201cMRT\u201d Law on languages, which was adopted on 8 September 1992, states that, for all purposes, \u201cMoldavian\u201d must be written with the Cyrillic alphabet. The \u201claw\u201d provides further that use of the Latin alphabet may amount to an offence. In particular Article 200-3 (currently Article 5.28) of the \u201cMRT\u201d Code of Administrative Offences states that:\n\u201cFailure by persons holding public office and other persons in the executive and State administration, in public associations, as well as in other organisations, regardless of their legal status and form of ownership, and in other entities, situated on the territory of the MRT, to observe MRT\u2019s legislation on the functioning of languages on the territory of MRT ... entails liability in the form of a fine which may amount to 50 (fifty) minimal salaries.\u201d 8.  On 18 August 1994 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities forbade the use of the Latin script in schools. By a decision of 21 May 1999, the \u201cMRT\u201d ordered that all schools belonging to \u201cforeign States\u201d and functioning on \u201cits\u201d territory had to register with the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, failing which they would not be recognised and would be deprived of their rights. The registration meant that the schools had to follow the \u201cMRT\u201d school curriculum, use the Cyrillic alphabet and learn history in the interpretation of the MRT authorities. 9.  More details about the general background of the facts of the case are described in the Court\u2019s judgment in Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, \u00a7\u00a7 13\u201142, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 10.  On 4 June 2004 the school administration was informed that the Bender city administration rescinded the utilities contracts because the school had failed to register with \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. However, the school was given a new time-limit, until 27 June 2004, to provide \u201cMRT\u201d authorities with documents in order to obtain such registration. 11.  The school administration did not comply with the request and on 27 June 2004 the water supply to the school was disconnected. 12.  On 30 June 2004 the Bender city administration requested the school to provide, by 1 July 2004, documents certifying its legal status, its entitlement to use the building and utilities as well as its bank account. 13.  On 5 July 2004 the school was disconnected from the electricity supply. 14.  On 15 July 2004 the Bender city administration issued a decision formally closing the school, because it operated without registration and license. 15.  In the evening of 26 July 2004, unidentified persons and around thirty \u201cMRT\u201d militia officers, acting on behalf of the Bender city administration, sealed the school buildings and restricted access to the school area. Russian peacekeeping forces were present but did not intervene. The following day, the children and teachers forcefully re-entered the school dormitory. They were still occupying it when the application was submitted. 16.  On 27 July 2004 the school administration sent a fax to the President of the Russian Federation complaining about the acts of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities which affected 300 children, and about the inaction of Russian peacekeepers on 26 July 2004. 17.  On 4 August 2004 the school was given a new time-limit, until 15 August 2004, to register with the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, otherwise the children risked being transferred by force to a Transdniestrian boarding school for children with disabilities. On 11 August 2004 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities suggested to the school administration that children would have been safer if they were transferred to kindergarten no. 10 in Bender where appropriate living conditions would be available. 18.  The school was disconnected from all utilities and its administration was denied access to the school kitchen or storehouses. From 27 July to 10 August 2004 the Moldovan authorities provided the children with food and water, which was brought to the entrance of the city of Bender, the OSCE mission securing its transportation from there to the school. From 11 August 2004 OSCE employees were not allowed to deliver food and water more than once per day. 19.  On 21 August 2004 the school administration asked the Russian Embassy in Chi\u0219in\u0103u to intervene in order to remedy the situation of the children deprived of water, electricity and food.", "references": ["1", "3", "9", "5", "2", "6", "7", "0", "8", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Moscow. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 14 April 2006 the applicant was charged with verbal insult of traffic police officers, an offence punishable with a fine or with up to one year\u2019s correctional work (\u201cthe first criminal case\u201d). On 2 July 2009 a justice of the peace of the Tsentralnyy Circuit in Novosibirsk found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine. The applicant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Tsentralnyy District Court in Novosibirsk on 27 September 2010. On 6 December 2010 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed his cassation appeal. 7.  On 8 October 2010 the applicant was charged with contempt of court and criminal libel of the judge who presided over the appeal proceedings in the first criminal case (\u201cthe second criminal case\u201d). In his speech to the trial court and a blog post, he had accused her of misusing her office for political means. On 11 October 2012 the applicant was found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to a fine. On 5 February 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed, in final instance, an appeal against the conviction. 8.  On 29 August 2007 the investigator made the applicant sign an undertaking to stay in Novosibirsk for the duration of the proceedings in the first criminal case. He referred to the applicant\u2019s alleged failures to appear for interviews. 9.  In August 2008 the first criminal case was submitted for trial. As the sole guardian of his bed-ridden elderly mother, the applicant asked the trial judge to let him travel to Moscow to arrange her financial affairs. On 13 November 2008 his request was refused; the judge held that the application of the travel restriction was justified on account of the applicant\u2019s previous failures to appear. Her decision was upheld on appeal by the District Court on 27 January 2009 and by the Regional Court on 16 March 2009. The Regional Court justified its decision in the following manner:\n\u201cMr Manannikov stated at the hearing that, should the travel restriction be lifted, he would move freely in the Russian territory and also go abroad. Mr Manannikov also stated that he had always appeared at interviews with the investigator and court hearings and would continue to do so in the future.\nHis submissions confirm the fact that, if the travel restriction is lifted, Mr Manannikov could leave Novosibirsk which would hinder examination of the criminal case within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal judgment ... is lawful, justified and well-reasoned; there are no grounds to set it aside.\u201d 10.  In February 2009 the applicant reiterated his request to be allowed to leave Novosibirsk. It was rejected by first the trial judge on 16 February 2009 and later by the District Court on 8 May 2009. 11.  On 26 May 2011 an identical travel restriction was imposed on the applicant in the second criminal case, on the ground that he had allegedly missed an interview with the investigator earlier that month. 12.  The travel restriction expired in 2013 after the proceedings in the second criminal case were terminated (see paragraph 7 above). 13.  On 12 October 2010 the applicant\u2019s flat was searched in the framework of the second criminal case, allegedly to uncover evidence showing that he had written the blog post. The investigator located and removed his desktop and laptop computers, a memory stick, two CDs and a DVD. He examined the devices, copied the relevant contents onto a disk and put them sealed in the storage. 14.  On 18 November 2010 the investigator refused the applicant\u2019s request to make a copy of his application to this Court and supporting documents which were stored on his computer. He stated that \u201cthe investigation had no grounds to unseal physical evidence\u201d. 15.  The applicant applied for judicial review. On 23 December 2010 the Tsentralnyi District Court dismissed his application, holding that he would be able to make copies of any materials, including physical evidence, after the investigation had been completed. 16.  On 21 February 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on appeal. 17.  The electronics were returned to the applicant in 2013 after the conviction in the second criminal case had become final (see paragraph 7 above). 18.  The applicant retained counsel M. to represent him in the first and second criminal cases. 19.  On 22 October 2010 the investigator decided to interview M. as an eye-witness to the offence of contempt of court that the applicant was charged with. M. refused to testify on the ground that she was the applicant\u2019s lawyer. The investigator issued the decision to remove M. as the applicant\u2019s counsel, relying on the legal provision that prevented witnesses from representing defendants in the same criminal case. 20.  The applicant\u2019s request for a judicial review of the investigator\u2019s decision was unsuccessful. His complaint was rejected by the District Court on 11 February 2011 at first instance and on appeal by the Regional Court on 6 April 2011. 21.  Legal-aid lawyer S. was appointed to represent the applicant. The applicant objected to his participation and insisted that M. should be allowed to represent him. 22.  After the case was submitted for trial, the applicant complained to the trial court about a breach of his right to be defended by a lawyer of his own choosing. At the preliminary hearing on 1 July 2011, the Novosibirsk Regional Court accepted that the rights of the defence had been undermined by reason of the investigator\u2019s failure to address the applicant\u2019s objections to the participation of the legal-aid lawyer. The Regional Court returned the case to the prosecutor with the instruction to remedy the violation. 23.  The prosecutor appealed. On 22 August 2011 the Criminal Panel of the Regional Court rejected the appeal. The Criminal Panel established that the investigator\u2019s order had not been lawful or justified. As counsel M. had refused to testify, no conflict between the interests of the defendant and those of his representative could have arisen, and the investigator had not had any legal grounds to exclude her from the proceedings. 24.  On 23 December 2010 the applicant showed up at the District Court to hear the decision on his complaint about the retention of electronic devices (see paragraph 15 above). Towards the end of the pronouncement hearing, the investigator entered the room, accompanied by two bailiffs. They told the applicant that he would be taken to another judge of the same court who would decide on the investigator\u2019s application for his placement for an in-patient psychiatric assessment in the framework of the second criminal case. 25.  The applicant insisted that his lawyer M. should be present. Instead, legal-aid lawyer S. was called in to represent him (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant refused the services of the lawyer S. but the court did not rule on his challenge. Moreover, the applicant objected to the prosecutor\u2019s request, in particular, on the ground that he was the sole guardian of his ailing mother who would be left to her own devices in his absence. 26.  One hour later the District Court granted the application. It noted that the applicant did not have any known mental issues and had submitted himself to an outpatient psychiatric assessment. The experts observed that the applicant was \u201cegocentric\u201d, had an \u201cexceedingly positive self-image\u201d and \u201ca passion for reform\u201d. However, they were unable to determine the extent to which those character traits were pronounced or to provide responses to the investigator\u2019s questions. Accordingly, the court considered necessary to commit the applicant for an in-patient assessment lasting no longer than thirty days with a view to determining what his mental state had been at the time the imputed offence of libel had been committed. The court further ordered that the custody of the applicant\u2019s mother be transferred to the guardianship authority in the Oktyabrskiy District in Novosibirsk. 27.  The applicant was taken to the hospital where he went on a hunger strike in protest against his involuntary placement. He also filed grounds of appeals, complaining in particular about a breach of his right to defend himself through legal assistance of his choosing. On 30 December 2010 the applicant was released, the medical experts were satisfied as to his sanity. 28.  On 9 February 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed his appeal in a summary fashion.", "references": ["7", "0", "8", "5", "1", "4", "6", "No Label", "2", "3", "9"], "gold": ["2", "3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in \u0160titare. 5.  On 30 May 2000 the Belgrade Third Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company KMG Trudbenik (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d), based in Belgrade, to pay to the applicant a specified amount on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings (judgment no. P1 863/99). This judgment became enforceable on 19 June 2000. 6.  On 13 March 2002, upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Fourth Belgrade Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant\u2019s enforcement costs (enforcement order no. I-VIII 101/2002). 7.  On 7 October 2003 the enforcement proceedings were suspended due to the institution of compulsory settlement proceedings before the Belgrade Commercial Court (\u201cthe Commercial Court\u201d). 8.  On 9 December 2011 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company. 9.  On 6 March 2012 the applicant submitted his request for enforcement of the 30 May 2000 judgment (\u201cenforcement request\u201d) to the insolvency manager. The insolvency manager neither rejected the applicant\u2019s claim nor forwarded it to the Commercial Court. 10.  On 24 February 2014 the applicant thus submitted his enforcement request with the Commercial Court, and on 1 October 2014 he supplemented it. 11.  On 6 August and 27 October 2014 the applicant complained about the inactivity of the acting judge in the insolvency proceedings. 12.  On 13 October 2014 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant\u2019s enforcement request as having been lodged out of time. 13.  On 28 January 2015 the Commercial Appellate Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, and upheld the Commercial Court\u2019s decision of 13 October 2014. 14.  On 24 March 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of the decision of 28 January 2015. 15.  However, on 19 May 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded.", "references": ["6", "5", "4", "7", "8", "9", "1", "2", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Bratislava. 6.  On 20 December 2014 the Bratislava IV District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in the context of criminal proceedings in which he was prosecuted for committing the criminal offence of manslaughter. The reason for his detention was the risk of reoffending. 7.  On 3 March 2015 the applicant submitted a request to the District Prosecution Office for release from pre-trial detention. In it, he asked for his detention to be replaced with supervision by a probation officer. The request was received by the latter on 4 March 2015 and dismissed on 5 March 2015, following which it was transferred to the District Court for a judicial determination. 8.  On 26 March 2015 the District Court held a hearing and dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for release. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant on 14 April 2015 and, after several unsuccessful attempts at delivery, was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 21 April 2015. 9.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a written interlocutory appeal with the District Court within the statutory three-day period, namely on 24 April 2015. The case file was transferred to the Bratislava Regional Court on 29 April 2015 and the applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed in chambers on 7 May 2015. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 18 May 2015. 10.  On 1 June 2015 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint, relying inter alia on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. He alleged that the authorities had not proceeded speedily with his request for release. He formally challenged the proceedings held before the District Curt, the decision of the Regional Court of 7 May 2015 and the proceedings preceding this decision. He also requested compensation of 2,000 euros (EUR) in addition to his legal costs and expenses. 11.  On 30 March 2016 the Constitutional Court declared the part of his complaint in respect of the proceedings held before the District Court admissible and the remainder inadmissible. The Constitutional Court held that it had found no irregularities in the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 7 May 2015. 12.  On 21 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right guaranteed under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It did not award him any compensation or legal costs and expenses. The Constitutional Court scrutinised only the District Court\u2019s proceedings and concluded that they had lasted 44 days. The District Court had therefore failed to deal with the applicant\u2019s request speedily and to serve the written decision on him promptly. With respect to the financial compensation, the Constitutional Court referred to \u201cthe principle of fairness\u201d, \u201cthe particular circumstances of the case\u201d, the duration of the delays and the intensity of the interference, and concluded that the finding of a violation of the applicant\u2019s right constituted a sufficient redress.", "references": ["4", "7", "9", "3", "1", "5", "6", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 29 December 2007 N., the owner of two rooms in flat 10 located at 3\u20113, ulitsa Anny Severyanovoy, Moscow, signed a deed of gift in respect of the rooms for Ya. The Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the \u201cRegistration Service\u201d) registered the deed and Ya.\u2019s title to the rooms. 7.  On an unspecified date the investigative committee opened criminal investigation into M.\u2019s actions who was suspected of having tricked N. into signing the deed of gift for Ya.\u2019s benefit. 8.  On 2 June 2008 Ya. sold the rooms to the applicant. According to the sale contract, the applicant paid 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the rooms. 9.  On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M. 10.  On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant\u2019s title to the rooms. 11.  On 28 September 2009 the District Court found M. guilty of multiple offences, including a fraud in respect of the room later purchased by the applicant, and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The Court established that M. had tricked N. into signing the deed of gift in respect of the two rooms whilst M. had actually sold the rooms to Ya. 12.  On 16 March 2010 N. died. 13.  On 7 February 2014 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) brought a civil action seeking restitution of the title to the two rooms to the City of Moscow and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 14.  On 29 December 2014 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims. The court found the deed of gift null and void. It further established that N., the lawful owner of the rooms, had died intestate and without heirs. Accordingly the rooms should be considered a bona vacantia and should be transferred to the City of Moscow, even though the applicant had bought the rooms in good faith. The court transferred the title to the rooms to the City of Moscow and ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. 15.  On 18 June 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 29 December 2014 on appeal. 16.  On 26 October 2015 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to a cassation appeal against the judgments of 29 December 2014 and 18 June 2015. 17.  On 9 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision. 18.  The parties did not provide any information as regards the enforcement of the judgments in the City\u2019s favour.", "references": ["0", "8", "3", "6", "4", "5", "1", "7", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a private media company whose registered office is in Ljubljana. 6.  On 10 August 2011 the Competition Protection Office (\u201cthe Office\u201d) initiated proceedings against the applicant company under section 23 of the Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Competition Act\u201d, see paragraph 25 below), following a complaint from two television stations that the applicant company had abused its dominant position. 7.  On 10 August 2011 the Office issued an order to inspect the premises, which contained a warning that if the inspection was obstructed an order imposing a fine amounting to 1% of the applicant company\u2019s annual turnover in the preceding business year could be issued. 8.  On 21 September 2011 the Office issued an inspection report which indicated that on 11 August 2011 officers of the Office had arrived at the applicant company\u2019s premises at 9.05 a.m. Mr V., the applicant company\u2019s director, had not been present and none of the applicant company\u2019s employees had allowed the inspection to be carried out. According to the report, Mr S., the direct marketing executive, explained to the officers that he was not authorised to accept and sign the inspection order or the order to initiate proceedings against the applicant company. The officers asked him to direct them to someone authorised or to the mailroom, so that they could serve the orders and start the inspection. Mr S. took the officers to the mailroom but nobody was there. An employee who arrived at the mailroom at 9.25 a.m. refused to sign anything and said that she would call her superior. A moment later Mr P., the deputy finance executive, arrived at the mailroom. It is stated in the report that in a loud voice he then asked the officers to leave, pointing with his hand in the direction of the exit and showing no intention to cooperate with the officers, despite being warned by them that refusal to cooperate would be regarded as an obstruction of the inspection, resulting in a fine. Since none of the employees wanted to accept the orders, the officers eventually left them in the mailroom and the orders were thus deemed to be served. According to the report, at 9.31 a.m. the officers left the building because they believed that the inspection would not be possible without police assistance. At 9.57 a.m., after the arrival of the police, the officers again entered the applicant company\u2019s premises. At 10 a.m. Mr V. arrived. He apologised for the inconvenience and was willing to cooperate. At 10.45 a.m. the officers started the inspection, which was then carried out without any obstructive behaviour on the part of the applicant company. 9.  On 6 October 2011 the applicant company commented on the inspection report, maintaining that nobody had raised their voices at the officers or had asked them to leave the company\u2019s premises. According to their comments, Mr P. had only asked the officers to wait in the reception area for the person on whom they could serve the orders. Nothing had prevented them from carrying out the inspection. The officers had decided to leave and call the police of their own motion. The police intervention had been unnecessary. 10.  By an order of 21 February 2012 the Office fined the applicant company 105,000 euros (EUR), 0.2 % of the company\u2019s annual net turnover in the preceding year, for obstructing the inspection on 11 August 2011. The obstruction had been Mr P.\u2019s unwillingness to cooperate with officers and to immediately facilitate access to evidence and its preservation. It concluded that the applicant company had obstructed the inspection by not making the inspection physically possible (preiskava ni bila fizi\u010dno omogo\u010dena) after being requested and warned to do so by the officers. Waiting in the reception area for the applicant company to prepare for the inspection or for the authorised person of the company to arrive ran contrary to the purpose of an unannounced inspection, which was to secure evidence. The Office also held that it was a company\u2019s duty to cooperate even when its legal representative was absent. In setting the fine, the Office considered that the inspection had been delayed for one hour and thirty minutes, and for twenty-six minutes the applicant company\u2019s conduct had been outside the officers\u2019 control and could have resulted in the destruction of incriminating evidence. Referring to the EU Commission\u2019s practice, it held that the punishment had to be stringent enough to deter the offenders. It also had regard to the subsequent exemplary cooperation of the applicant company and the fact that this had been the first time a fine had been imposed under the Competition Act. 11.  On 22 March 2012 the applicant company brought an action and an application for an interim measure against the above order (see paragraph 10 above), reiterating the complaints it had raised before the Office (see paragraph 9 above). It requested an oral hearing, maintaining that a direct examination of the evidence was required to properly establish the facts of the case. In particular, the four witnesses, who had been present at the premises on the day of the alleged obstruction, would prove that the applicant company had not obstructed the inspection or refused to cooperate with the officers. They would also show that the officers had not properly introduced themselves and had tried to enter the premises in an aggressive manner. The applicant company also argued that the officers could not be prevented from doing something which they had not specifically requested, namely access to specific places or persons under the inspection. At the time the obstruction had allegedly been committed, the officers had only asked for someone on whom they could serve the orders and had been subsequently politely asked to wait in the reception area. The applicant company\u2019s employees had complied with the duty to cooperate by trying to find that person. The applicant company argued that the officers could have freely continued with the inspection. Furthermore, had there been an obstruction of the inspection, the Office would have sanctioned the company on the spot and not six months later. As to Mr P., it held that he had not been an employee of the applicant company and had not been authorised to collect any mail. Since he was only in a contractual relationship with the applicant company, his allegedly illegal actions could not be attributed to it. Lastly, given the amount of the fine imposed, which was excessive, immediately enforceable and of a punitive nature, the proceedings at issue had been criminal in nature and required adequate fair trial guarantees. 12.  Meanwhile, in 2013 the Competition Protection Agency (\u201cthe Agency\u201d) took over the Office\u2019s tasks and assumed full control of all its pending matters. 13.  On 26 November 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s action (see paragraph 11 above). It noted at the outset that the applicant company was not allowed to introduce new facts and evidence in the judicial review proceedings and that they would not be taken into consideration. The court emphasised that although the applicant company had contested the facts as established by the Office (see paragraph 10 above), it had not challenged the fact that the officers could not immediately after their arrival at the company\u2019s premises secure the evidence. In particular, the majority of the management had been absent, while Mr P. had refused to cooperate and had asked the officers to leave the premises until the arrival of his superiors. According to the Supreme Court, the applicant company had merely argued that the above-described acts had not constituted an obstruction of the inspection. In the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion this was not a question of fact but purely of law. In this connection, the court held that making the officers wait in the reception area while the company prepared for the inspection ran contrary to the purpose of an inspection. It was irrelevant whether the company\u2019s employees had raised their voices at the officers or had asked them to leave. The only important fact was that the authorised persons could not immediately start securing the evidence. The applicant company had not acted in accordance with the minimum duty to cooperate, which had been necessary for the inspection, and had thus obstructed it. The court also rejected the argument that Mr P. could not obstruct the inspection, finding that he was a contractual worker working in the name of the applicant company in accordance with section 31(5) of the Competition Act (see paragraph 25 below). Lastly, the court deemed the imposed fine adequate, considering the seriousness of the violation and the relevant circumstances of the case. 14.  On 6 May 2015 the Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights which would have serious consequences for the company. 15.  On 15 September 2015 the tax authorities enforced the collection of the imposed fine from the applicant company. 16.  Meanwhile, on 7 August 2012 the Office issued a summary of the relevant facts (povzetek relevantnih dejstev), expressing the opinion that the applicant company had abused its dominant position in the television advertising market. 17.  On 24 September 2012 the applicant company commented on the summary of the relevant facts, requesting an oral hearing and for the examination of several witnesses to prove that it had not restricted competition. 18.  On 24 April 2013 the Agency decided that the applicant company had been abusing its dominant position in the television advertising market. It found that by requesting exclusivity in advertising from customers and offering them conditional loyalty discounts the applicant company had restricted competition. The Agency also ordered the applicant company to end the above infringement of competition rules, notably section 9 of the Competition Act and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It refused to hold a hearing on the grounds that it was not necessary to hear the witnesses proposed by the applicant company and that the applicant company had had adequate opportunity to present its case in writing. The Agency also noted that the minor-offence proceedings that generally followed were separate from the administrative proceedings. The latter ended with a decision establishing a violation of competition rules, whereas the first also involved a consideration of responsibility for the minor offence at issue and the imposition of a fine. 19.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant company brought an action against the Agency\u2019s infringement decision (see paragraph 18 above). It reiterated the complaints made before the Agency (see paragraph 17 above), adding that the Agency had violated its right to adversary proceedings and to defend itself. It also requested that the Supreme Court examine the proposed witnesses at an oral hearing. 20.  On 3 December 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the action (see paragraph 19 above). It held that the examination of the witnesses proposed by the applicant was unnecessary because the facts of the case had already been fully established by the Agency, which had provided logical and convincing reasons for each of the central issues in dispute. Consequently, it refused to hold a hearing. 21.  On 30 June 2015 the Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights which would have serious consequences for the company. 22.  On 7 May 2014 the Agency initiated minor-offence proceedings, alleging a violation of competition rules by the applicant company and three responsible individuals of the company. In accordance with the Minor Offences Act, the Agency informed those involved in the proceedings in writing of the alleged minor offence and invited them to submit their written statements within five days of service of the document. On 21 July 2014 it found that they had committed a minor offence under section 73(1) of the Competition Act (see paragraph 25 below), imposing a fine of EUR 4,994,491 on the applicant company and several thousand euros on each of the responsible individuals. 23.  On 3 November 2014 the Ljubljana Local Court granted their application for judicial review and stayed the minor-offence proceedings, finding that the act, as it had been described in the operative part of the impugned decision, did not constitute a minor offence. 24.  On 18 September 2015 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed an appeal by the Agency and upheld the first-instance judgment.", "references": ["2", "5", "1", "9", "4", "8", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  On 15 June 2014 the applicant had an altercation with two persons, one of whom was in an advanced state of intoxication. During the altercation, the applicant pushed the intoxicated person and punched the other one. As a result, the intoxicated person fell to the ground and received a serious head trauma. The scene was witnessed by the wife of the intoxicated person and a neighbour. 7. On the same day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. On 18 June 2014 the Ialoveni District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days. The court considered that the detention was necessary because the applicant was accused of a serious offence and there appeared to be a risk of his interfering with the investigation, absconding and re-offending. 8.  The applicant appealed against the detention order and argued, inter alia, that he had a permanent abode, an employment and no history of violent behaviour. He also submitted that he could not influence any witnesses because they were in another village and that a restraining order to quit his town of residence would be sufficient to eliminate that risk. He also submitted that he had cooperated with the investigators from the beginning of the investigation and that he could not leave the country because his travel documents had been seized. 9.  On 1 July 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 10.  On 11 July 2014 the Ialoveni District Court examined the Prosecutor\u2019s request for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention and a habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant. It found no reasons to detain the applicant in custody and ordered his immediate release under judicial control. The applicant had no right to leave the town without approval by the court and to communicate with the persons involved in the criminal investigation. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office appealed. 11.  On 22 July 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the Prosecutor\u2019s appeal, quashed the above decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The reasons given by the Court of Appeal were that the applicant could abscond, interfere with the investigation and re-offend. The applicant was not arrested and, according to him, was told to go home. 12.  On 25 August 2014 the applicant was arrested at home and placed in detention. 13.  On 1 September 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request with the Ialoveni District Court. He argued, inter alia, that the case was not complex and that all witnesses had been heard in the beginning of the investigation. 14.  On 17 September 2014 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an application for the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention arguing, inter alia, that between 22 July 2014 and 25 August 2014 the applicant had absconded from the investigating authority. 15.  On 23 September 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the Prosecutor\u2019s request and prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of thirty days. The reasons for detention were the same as before: risk of absconding, risk of interfering with the investigation and re-offending. 16.  The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued, inter alia, that there was no risk of absconding or interfering with the investigation. He submitted that, on 22 July 2014, when the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal had quashed the Ialoveni District Court\u2019s decision of 11 July 2014 and had ordered the prolongation of his detention, he had not been arrested but advised to go home. He went home and nobody came after him until 25 August 2014. Between 11 July and 25 August 2014 he had not attempted to abscond or interfere with the investigation. 17.  On 7 October 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court found that the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding was real because he had absconded from investigating authorities between 22 July and 25 August 2014. 18.  On 17 October 2014 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office applied to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention for another thirty days. One of the reasons relied upon by the Prosecutor was that the applicant had absconded from investigating authorities between 22 July and 25 August 2014. 19.   On 22 October 2014 the applicant requested access to the casefile with a view to obtaining a copy of the materials filed by the public prosecutor together with his application of 7 October 2014. He argued that the public prosecutor\u2019s application was accompanied by a set of documents, while he had only received a copy of the application. The applicant lodged on the same date a habeas corpus request. 20.  On 22 October 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the public prosecutor\u2019s application and ordered the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention for thirty days on the ground that there was a risk of absconding and interfering with the investigation. The applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request was rejected while his request for access to the materials of the file was not examined. The applicant appealed and complained about the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for detention. He did not complain in his appeal about the lack of access to the materials in the casefile. 21.  On 4 November 2014 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 22.  On 14 November 2014 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office applied again to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 23.  On 20 November 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request. 24.  On 20 November 2014 the Ialoveni District Court dismissed the public prosecutor\u2019s request and upheld the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus request. The applicant was released from detention and ordered not to leave his town and not to interfere with the investigation. 25.  Throughout his detention the applicant was held in Prison no. 13. 26.  According to the applicant, he was detained in overcrowded cells which lacked ventilation. His co-detainees smoked in the cells. The cells were equipped with squat toilets which were not properly separated. There was a sink with a rusted tap and the quality of water was very bad. The food was insufficient. 27.  On 9 March 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice convicted the applicant for hooliganism and unintentional infliction of severe bodily harm and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["3", "9", "4", "5", "8", "6", "0", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in St Petersburg. X, the second applicant, was born in 2012 and lives in the Moscow region. 6.  The applicants are father and son. The first applicant lodged the application on his own behalf and on behalf of his son, who is a minor. 7.  Until April 2013 the first applicant, his wife M. and their son X lived together in St Petersburg, where X had his residence registration and his continuing paediatric and specialist care for his chronic illness, and where he was on the waiting list for a local nursery school. 8.  On 28 April 2013 M. left the first applicant and took X with her. According to M., she left the first applicant because of frequent disputes between them during which the first applicant had shouted at her. She left a note promising to contact him shortly. She went directly to her flat in Nizhny Novgorod. She sent him an email on 30 April 2013, indicating her whereabouts. According to the first applicant, she did not leave an address and did not answer her mobile phone. The first applicant unsuccessfully searched for her in Nizhniy Novgorod, where she possessed a flat jointly with her parents, and in Moscow, where her parents lived at that time. 9.  On 30 April 2013 the first applicant contacted the St Petersburg childcare authorities and asked for assistance in finding his son and returning him to his registered place of residence in that city. 10.  Later on the same day the first applicant learned that M. and the second applicant were in Nizhniy Novgorod and on 17 May 2013 M. allowed him to visit them there. 11.  Since that date M. has allowed the applicant to see his son on average six days per month for two hours each time. However, sometimes she has not allowed the first applicant to see his son for weeks at a time or has taken him out of town for long periods without informing the first applicant about his son\u2019s whereabouts. For example, on 29 December 2013 the first applicant complained to the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities that M. had taken X away to an unknown location and had cancelled a meeting that had been scheduled by mutual agreement for 27 December 2013. 12.  On 30 August 2013 M. instituted divorce proceedings before the Nizhegorodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod, and asked for a residence order in respect of X. She submitted, in particular, that she was on parental leave and was still breastfeeding her son. She was a part\u2011owner of her parents\u2019 flat where she and her son occupied a room. She also argued that she could create better conditions for the development of the child because she had a university diploma and good references from her previous place of work and also because she was calm and loving. 13.  M. submitted an opinion by a psychologist, L., whom she and the first applicant had consulted once before their separation regarding their marital problems. L. noted that the first applicant\u2019s supressed aggression towards M. and his wish to dominate her had been the cause of their marital issues. L. considered that in the event of divorce, it would be in X\u2019s best interest to live with his mother. 14.  The first applicant asked that M.\u2019s request for a residence order be rejected and that X be returned from Nizhniy Novgorod to St Petersburg. He submitted that it would be better for the child if he and both his parents lived in St Petersburg for the following reasons. Firstly, considerable amounts of money would be spent by the first applicant travelling to Nizhniy Novgorod to visit his son. If the entire family lived in St Petersburg, that money could be better spent on the child\u2019s needs. Secondly, living conditions in St Petersburg were better than in Nizhniy Novgorod. The first applicant had three spacious flats in St Petersburg and a dacha in the surrounding region, while in Nizhniy Novgorod M.\u2019s family possessed only a small one-bedroom flat. St Petersburg provided better development and educational opportunities having more sports centres, better schools and universities, and world-famous cultural heritage. It also had better medical services, less air pollution and a lower crime rate than Nizhniy Novgorod. Thirdly, the second applicant had been born in St Petersburg and had lived there until taken away by M. He had his residence registration and his continuing paediatric and specialist care there and was on the waiting list for a local nursery school. Moreover, X\u2019s paternal grandparents and other relatives lived in St Petersburg. If M. agreed to move back to St Petersburg, the first applicant proposed donating one of his three flats to her. He proposed an arrangement according to which X would live one third of every month with him and two thirds of every month with M. until the age of three, and half of every month with each of the parents after that. He argued that that arrangement would ensure that the second applicant maintained family ties with both parents. 15.  Subsequently, the first applicant lodged a counterclaim, applying for a residence order in respect of the second applicant. He submitted that X\u2019s young age alone could not justify his residence with his mother. He was older than one and a half years and there was no longer any need to breastfeed him. He submitted a copy of X\u2019s medical records from which it was apparent that the breastfeeding had stopped in May 2013. The first applicant further submitted that he had a stable income from bank\u2011deposit interest while M. had no income and lived on the child maintenance that he paid her. He worked as a volunteer in a number of social NGOs and had flexible working hours and could therefore devote a lot of time to his son. Indeed, while they had lived together, he had spent as much time with the child and had been responsible for his everyday care as much as M. They had a very strong mutual attachment. Given his education and background, the first applicant could provide the child with a better upbringing. For example, he had teaching experience \u2013 in particular he had worked as a teacher in children\u2019s summer camps. The first applicant further submitted that M. had abducted the child. She had restricted the first applicant\u2019s contact with his son and had sometimes taken him away for long periods of time without informing the first applicant of his whereabouts. He vowed that if the child were to reside with him, he would not in any way hinder his contact with his mother. 16.  The Nizhegorodskiy District Court refused to accept the first applicant\u2019s application for a residence order, finding that he should have submitted it at the beginning of the proceedings. It also refused to accept X\u2019s medical records in the file, finding that they were irrelevant and that M. was the only one who could tell whether she was still breastfeeding. 17.  Lastly, the first applicant asked that the court appoint a psychological expert to examine him, M. and the second applicant to assess each parent\u2019s suitability for raising the child and each parent\u2019s relationships with him. The Nizhegorodskiy District Court rejected that application. It however asked the Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg childcare authorities to assess the first applicant\u2019s and M.\u2019s living conditions and to express an opinion on the issue of the second applicant\u2019s residence. 18.  The first applicant\u2019s parents applied to intervene as third parties and that the second applicant\u2019s residence be set as St Petersburg. They submitted, in particular, that they had not seen their grandson since March 2013 because M. had refused to bring him to St Petersburg for a visit. They could not visit him in Nizhniy Novgorod because the first applicant\u2019s mother was disabled and could not travel there, a distance of more than 1,000 km. The first applicant\u2019s father could not leave his wife alone and unassisted and could not therefore go to Nizhniy Novgorod either. The decision to set the second applicant\u2019s residence as Nizhniy Novgorod with his mother would therefore most likely mean that they would never be able to see him again. The Nizhegorodskiy District Court dismissed their application to intervene as third parties, finding that they could lodge a separate suit. 19.  On 20 November 2013 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court adjourned the examination of the case until 20 February 2014, enjoining the first applicant and M. to attempt marriage reconciliation. 20.  On 18 February 2014 the St Petersburg childcare authorities issued their opinion on the case, finding that it was in the second applicant\u2019s best interest to live with his father. It noted that M. had taken the child away and had for some time concealed his whereabouts from the first applicant. She had restricted the first applicant\u2019s contact with the child. She was unemployed and had no income except the child maintenance paid by the first applicant. Her only pecuniary asset was a share in her parents\u2019 one\u2011bedroom flat in Nizhniy Novgorod. M.\u2019s parents lived in Moscow. By contrast, the first applicant had a stable and sufficient income from bank\u2011deposit interest and did not need to work. He could therefore spend most of his time with the child. He owned a one-bedroom flat in St Petersburg and part-owned two other flats. The first applicant\u2019s parents lived in St Petersburg. His mother was confined to a wheelchair, which restricted her ability to travel to Nizhniy Novgorod to see her grandson. 21.  On 31 March 2014 the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities also issued their opinion on the case, finding that it was in the second applicant\u2019s best interest to live with his mother. It found that M. had good living conditions and received child maintenance from the first applicant and financial help from her parents. According to M., she was breastfeeding and was on parental leave devoting all her time to the child. She did not wish to return to St Petersburg. It was true that the first applicant also had good living conditions and had actively participated in the child\u2019s upbringing and care. However, taking into account X\u2019s young age, it was better for him to live with his mother for the time being. In reply to the applicant\u2019s question, the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities explained, in a letter of 12 May 2014, that a child was considered to be of \u201cyoung age\u201d until 18 years old and that \u201cfor the time being\u201d meant until a change of circumstances, for example the child\u2019s reaching the age of ten or fourteen. 22.  On 4 April 2014 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court granted the divorce and M.\u2019s application for a residence order in respect of the second applicant. The court firstly cited the opinion of 31 March 2014 of the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities. It then noted that the family had lived in St Petersburg until M. had left her husband and moved to Nizhniy Novgorod taking the child with her. M. co-owned the flat in Nizhniy Novgorod where she currently lived with X; that flat had everything necessary for a small child. The District Court continued:\n\u201cIt is apparent from [M.\u2019s] submissions that she is still breastfeeding the child. [M.] is on parental leave and devotes all her time to the child. [M.]\u2019s parents help her take care of and [financially] support the child. The [first applicant] pays [M.] 15,000 roubles [RUB] every month of his own accord. The child is on a waiting list for a nursery school.\nThe [first applicant] ... takes an active part in his son\u2019s life. He wants the child to live in St Petersburg, where he has created all necessary conditions for him. [M.] however categorically refuses to move to St Petersburg.\nBoth parents have positive character references and wish to live together with the child and participate directly in his upbringing.\nIn such circumstances, and based exclusively on the interests of the child and on the situation in which he is now, taking into account the child\u2019s age, the court considers it opportune [\u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u043e] to grant the residence order in respect of [X] to his mother [M.] for the time being.\nThe court reminds the parties that in accordance with Article 66 of the Family Code the parent residing separately from the child is entitled to maintain contact with the child and to participate in his or her upbringing and education. The parent with whom the child resides may not hinder the child\u2019s contact with the other parent, unless such contact undermines the child\u2019s physical or psychological health or moral development.\n[The first applicant]\u2019s ... financial situation allows him to visit the child in Nizhniy Novgorod (according to [the first applicant\u2019s] submissions his monthly income is about RUB 60,000).\nThe [first applicant]\u2019s arguments that St Petersburg has less air pollution, a lower crime rate and better local infrastructure for children than Nizhniy Novgorod are legally irrelevant because the child\u2019s place of residence is with his parents. In the present case the court grants the residence order to the mother [M.]; [M.\u2019s] place of residence is currently in Nizhniy Novgorod.\u201d 23.  The first applicant appealed, repeating his previous arguments. He further complained that the District Court had not conducted an in-depth examination of the case. In particular, the District Court had not taken into account the opinion of 18 February 2014 of the St Petersburg childcare authority. It had not even cited the opinion, let alone explained why it disagreed with it. The only reason advanced by the District Court for its decision to grant the residence order to the child\u2019s mother had been the child\u2019s age. The child\u2019s age was only one of the criteria mentioned in Article 65 of the Family Code (see paragraph 58 below) that the domestic courts were to take into account when deciding on a child\u2019s residence arrangements. The District Court had not taken into account the other criteria mentioned in Article 65. Nor had it ordered a psychological expert examination to establish the child\u2019s relationship with each parent and his best interests. Moreover, given that the second applicant had been more than one and a half years old at the time of the District Court\u2019s decision, there had been no justification for automatically preferring residence with his mother over residence with his father. Such automatic preference of the mother over the father in a case where the father could provide better living and development conditions for the child had amounted to discrimination on grounds of sex. The first applicant also disputed some of the facts established by the District Court. In particular, the second applicant\u2019s medical documents indicated that breastfeeding had stopped at the age of one. In any event, the official medical guidance recommended that breastfeeding be stopped at the age of one and a half years old at the latest. Moreover, M. was unemployed rather than on parental leave because she had not been in employment since 2009. In any event, M. had returned to work in December 2014 and since then the second applicant had been taken care of during the day by his maternal grandmother. By contrast, the first applicant had sufficient non-work income and a flexible schedule for his social-volunteer activities and could therefore take care of the child himself. Lastly, the first applicant argued that inherent in the concept of the child\u2019s \u201cbest interests\u201d was the right for a child not to be removed from one of his or her parents and retained by the other (he referred to Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, 6 December 2007). M. had abducted the second applicant and had restricted the number and the length of the first applicant\u2019s visits, including during the period after the District Court\u2019s judgment. In total, during the previous nineteen months he had been allowed to see his son 122 times only. Lastly, the first applicant complained that the refusal to examine his counterclaim \u2013 that is his application for a residence order in his favour \u2013 had been unlawful. 24.  On 2 October 2014 the first applicant complained to the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities that M. had continued to restrict his contact with his son. In particular, on several occasions she had agreed to a visit but after he had travelled from St Petersburg to Nizhniy Novgorod she had changed her mind and refused to let him see his son. 25.  On 10 March 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 April 2014 on appeal. It held:\n\u201cHaving analysed the entirety of the evidence in the case file, including the child authorities\u2019 opinions on the merits of the case, [the District Court] made a reasoned finding that granting a residence order in respect of [X] to the father was not in the interests of the child who, after the parents\u2019 separation, had been brought up by his mother.\nThe court rejects [the first applicant\u2019s] appeal submissions ... which in essence convey a disagreement with [the District Court\u2019s] assessment of evidence. It notes that a parent\u2019s better financial or social situation or professional position are not decisive factors in deciding the question of the child\u2019s residence ...\nIn the present case [the District Court] made a thorough assessment of the evidence presented by the parties in support of their claims and objections. The court\u2019s findings were based on the evidence in the case file. There is no reason to doubt the impartiality of the examination and assessment of evidence ...\u201d\nThe court also added that the issue of the child\u2019s contact with his grandparents was to be examined in separate proceedings. Furthermore, the refusal to examine the first applicant\u2019s counterclaim had not breached his rights as the domestic courts had to give a residence order to the parent who could better meet the needs of the child, irrespective of which of the parents had been the first to apply for a residence order in his or her favour and of whether the other parent had lodged a counterclaim or not. 26.  On 13 March 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities informed the first applicant that they had had a meeting with M. during which she had been told that she had to keep the child\u2019s father informed about the child\u2019s whereabouts and that the child was entitled to maintain contact with his grandparents and other relatives. 27.  On 12 June 2015 the first applicant\u2019s mother died. She had not seen her grandson since April 2013. 28.  On 6 October 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the residence order to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. It noted, in particular, that the main reason for granting the residence order to M. had been the second applicant\u2019s young age. In such circumstances, the first applicant\u2019s argument that it was in the child\u2019s best interest to live with his father had been unconvincing. M.\u2019s actions in taking the child away from St Petersburg had not amounted to abduction, a criminal offence under Article 126 of the Criminal Code. M. had not committed any criminal offence by moving to Nizhniy Novgorod with her son. Lastly, the judge found no evidence of discrimination. 29.  On 27 October 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the case to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for consideration, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 30.  On 9 September 2015 M. moved to Moscow where she had found a job. X remained in Nizhniy Novgorod with his maternal grandmother. 31.  On an unspecified date the first applicant applied to the Nizhegorodskiy District Court for contact rights, claiming that M. decided whimsically on the days when she would allow him to see his son without taking into account that he lived in another town, and that she occasionally prohibited any contact between them for long periods of time. 32.  On 29 September 2015 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court allowed the first applicant\u2019s application for an interim contact order. It determined the contact schedule as follows. While the main contact proceedings were pending, the applicants should be able to have contact for no more than ten consecutive days starting on the first Wednesday of each month, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 5 to 8 p.m., unless otherwise agreed between the parents. The contact should take place at X\u2019s place of residence, in the mother\u2019s presence, or in her absence if she agreed, and with the right to attend outdoor activities for children if X was in good health. The court also ordered that M. should inform the first applicant immediately by telephone if X were suffering from illness, and inform him two days in advance about any temporary change of residence. If the applicants had not seen each other for more than ten days, M. should ensure their communication through IP telephony for no less than five minutes every two days. M. should not hinder the first applicant\u2019s attendance of X\u2019s medical procedures or educational and recreational activities in which X participated. She should also consult the first applicant in writing before taking any decisions concerning X\u2019s medical treatment or education. 33.  On 8 December 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the interim contact order on appeal. 34.  On an unspecified date the Nizhegorodskiy District Court ordered an expert report to determine X\u2019s relationship with each of the parents. 35.  On 19 January 2016 a panel of psychology and psychiatry experts examined the applicants and M. and found that X was attached to both parents and was emotionally close to both of them. They were both involved in X\u2019s education, although their educational methods were different: M. was milder, more permissive and more supportive, while the first applicant was more domineering and controlling and was not always capable of taking into account X\u2019s age and stage of development. X was more excitable and capricious in his father\u2019s presence, while his mother\u2019s presence had a soothing effect on him. According to X, his family included his mother and his maternal grandparents. The experts found that it was important that X should have stable residence arrangements; shared residence was not advisable at his age. At the same time, regular contact with the father was necessary for a balanced psychological development. Irregular contact with any of the parents would be detrimental to his relationship with that parent. 36.  On 1 February 2016 M. and X moved to Moscow Region. 37.  On 29 March 2016 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court found that the bailiffs service had not taken any actions to enforce the interim contact order of 29 September 2015 and ordered that the bailiffs service should redress the consequent breach of the first applicant\u2019s rights. 38.  It therefore ordered that M. consult the first applicant before taking any decisions concerning X\u2019s medical treatment or education. It further determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicants should be able to have contact (i) on Saturdays and Sundays of even weeks, from 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. at X\u2019s place of residence with the right to attend outdoor activities for children; (ii) for two weeks during the summer at the first applicant\u2019s place of residence with the right to travel to other places within Russia. The schedule was valid until X\u2019s seventh birthday and was to be revised afterwards. 39.  On 8 July 2016 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s request for immediate enforcement of the contact order of 27 April 2016, finding that it did not belong to the category of cases where immediate enforcement was prescribed by law. There were no special circumstances justifying immediate enforcement, such as circumstances in which a delay in enforcement could lead to serious damage or make future enforcement impossible. 40.  On 31 August 2016 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg allowed an application for a contact order lodged by X\u2019s paternal grandfather and grandaunt. It found that M. had been preventing them from seeing X. It held that they should have contact with X for five consecutive days every two months. In view of their advanced age and consequent inability to travel, contact should take place in St Petersburg where X should be brought either by M. or by the first applicant. 41.  On 13 September 2016 M. was fined for hindering contact between the applicants in breach of the interim contact order of 29 September 2015. 42.  On 14 September 2016 the Nizhegorodskyy District Court found that, despite its decision of 29 March 2016, the bailiffs service had still not taken any actions to enforce the interim contact order of 29 September 2015 and again ordered that the bailiffs should redress the first applicant\u2019s rights. 43.  On 25 October 2016 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the contact order of 27 April 2016 on appeal. It amended the contact schedule, holding that in addition to the contact time determined by the District Court, the applicants should also have contact (i) from 3 to 7 p.m. on X\u2019s birthday each year at X\u2019s place of residence; (ii) on the first Wednesday and third Friday of each month from 3 to 7 p.m. at X\u2019s place of residence; and (iii) for half an hour every day by means of Internet communications. 44.  On 13 March 2017 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the contact order of 27 April 2016, as upheld on appeal on 25 October 2016, to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 45.  On 4 April 2017 the St Petersburg City Court amended the contact order of 31 August 2016 on appeal, finding that the contact schedule was too onerous for X and M. It held that X\u2019s paternal grandfather and grandaunt should be able to have contact with him for seven days every six months at the grandfather\u2019s place of residence. 46.  On 18 April 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the contact order of 27 April 2016, as upheld on appeal on 25 October 2016, to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 47.  On 1 March 2018 the Zheleznodorozhniy Town Court of Moscow Region granted the first applicant the right to bring X to St Petersburg for ten additional days during the summer holidays. It also increased the time the applicants were to spend together on X\u2019s birthdays. On 11 July 2018 the Moscow Regional Court quashed that judgment on appeal and rejected the first applicant\u2019s request to amend the contact schedule, finding that the contact schedule established by the judgment of 27 April 2016 was valid until X\u2019s seventh\u2019s birthday and that there was no reason to change it before that date. 48.  According to the Government, X now lives in Moscow Region with his mother. The first applicant is renting a flat in the vicinity of X\u2019s new place of residence and regularly comes from St Petersburg to visit him. M. does not hinder the contact between the applicants. The first applicant pays child maintenance but does not give any other financial help. 49.  On 27 April 2015 the first applicant, acting on his own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant, lodged a claim with the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court seeking compensation for the non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the excessively long examination of the child residence dispute, and costs and expenses. He submitted, in particular, that the nature of the dispute had called for particular expedition on the part of the domestic courts. Indeed, the case had concerned a residence dispute in respect of a very young child who, owing to the delay in examining the case, had unlawfully resided with his mother for almost two years. 50.  On 8 May 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court declared the claim lodged on behalf of the second applicant inadmissible. The court found that the second applicant had not been a party to the residence proceedings and could not therefore claim compensation for their allegedly excessive length. 51.  The first applicant appealed, submitting that the residence proceedings had directly affected the second applicant by determining his residence arrangements. The length of the residence proceedings had therefore breached the second applicant\u2019s rights. 52.  On 8 July 2015 the Administrative Chamber of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the decision of 8 May 2015 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 53.  On 9 July 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court awarded the first applicant 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 about 475 euros (EUR)) for non\u2011pecuniary damage and RUB 12,886.40 for costs and expenses against the Ministry of Finance. The court noted that the proceedings had lasted one year, six months and seven days before two instances. It found that the first applicant had not contributed to the length of proceedings. It further held that the case had been simple, no expert opinions had been ordered nor witnesses questioned. There had been important delays in the proceedings attributable to the District Court, in particular excessively long intervals between hearings, adjournments caused by repeated failures to inform the parties of the dates of scheduled hearings and substantial delays in serving the reasoned judgment of 4 April 2014 and the hearing record on the parties and in forwarding the parties\u2019 statements of appeal to the Regional Court. Accordingly, the first applicant\u2019s case had not been heard within a \u201creasonable time\u201d. When deciding on the amount of compensation, the Regional Court noted that the case had concerned a child residence dispute and that the delay in its examination had created legal uncertainty as to the child\u2019s residence and had hindered the exercise by the first applicant of his contact rights. 54.  On 19 August 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the decision of 8 May 2015, as upheld on appeal on 8 July 2015, to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 55.  On 30 September 2015 the Administrative Chamber of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment of 9 July 2015 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 56.  On 27 November 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the first applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the decision of 8 May 2015, as upheld on appeal on 8 July 2015, to the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 57.  On 5 July 2017 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court awarded the applicants RUB 30,000 (about EUR 475) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage and RUB 11,398.34 for costs and expenses against the Ministry of Finance for the excessive length of the contact proceedings. The court found, in particular, that the delay in determining a definite contact schedule between the applicants had resulted in insufficient contact and had undermined their personal bond.", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "6", "5", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 5.  The applicant was born on 7 February 1977. In July 1997, when the applicant was 20 years old, he requested a residence permit for Denmark, via the Danish Embassy in Amman, on the grounds of his marriage in 1997 to a stateless Palestinian woman, X, from Lebanon, who lived in Denmark and had obtained Danish nationality. His request was granted and he was registered as a person legally residing in Denmark in November 1997. 6.  Between 1997 and 2001, the couple had three children together. After they divorced, the applicant maintained contact with the children and his ex\u2011wife. 7.  In 2002, under Islamic law, the applicant married Y, an Iraqi woman of Kurdish origin. Between 2003 and 2009, the couple had three children together. 8.  The applicant has a criminal record which includes, inter alia, a conviction in June 2006 for assault, threats and drug offences, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for one year.\nCriminal proceedings leading to the expulsion order 9.  On 16 April 2008 the applicant was detained and charged with drug offences. 10.  By a judgment of 11 March 2009 the District Court in Aarhus (Retten i Aarhus) found him guilty, jointly with others, of trafficking approximately 1 kg of cocaine from Holland to Denmark in the period from around 28 February 2008 to 4 March 2008, for the purpose of distribution, contrary to Article 191 of the Criminal Code. The applicant was sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  In addition, the District Court had to determine whether, as claimed by the prosecution, the applicant should be expelled. 12.  In this decision, it took into account a statement of August 2008 by the Immigration Service (Udl\u00e6ndingeservice) about the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances. It set out, inter alia, that the applicant had resided in Denmark for more than nine years. He spoke Arabic and only a little Danish. An interpreter had been used during his interview with the Immigration Service. He had never had a job in Denmark. The applicant\u2019s parents and siblings remained in Jordan, where the applicant had visited them a couple of years before. The applicant saw his children from his first marriage. 13.  The District Court also noted the applicant\u2019s statement before it, that before being detained he had seen his three children from his first marriage, who were aged six to ten, about every two days. In addition, he had three children under the age of six from his second marriage. He was still married. He had refused to receive visits from his children in the local prison because he feared that it would have a negative emotional impact on them. His wife had a Danish alien\u2019s passport. She originated from Iraq. He believed that she would not accompany him if he were deported. 14.  Having regard thereto and to the seriousness of the crime, the District Court did not find that the circumstances mentioned in section 26, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act made expulsion inappropriate, or that this would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. It therefore ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion with a permanent ban on his return. 15.  On appeal to the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret), henceforth the High Court, supplementary information was provided that the applicant had been fined on 10 December 2008 for a traffic offence, and on 3 April 2009 for a violation of the Executive Order on Controlled Substances (Bekendtg\u00f8relse om euforiserende stoffer). By judgment of 25 November 2009 the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, although the latter was to include 22 days remaining from his conviction in 2006. It also found that expulsion would not be contrary to the principle of proportionality and upheld that order. 16.  The applicant did not request leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret).\nAsylum proceedings 17.  While serving his sentence, the applicant requested asylum. During those proceedings he stated that he would lose contact with his three children from his first marriage, since they would not be able to afford to visit him more than once a year. Moreover, his oldest son, I, was mentally disabled and would need special assistance to travel. 18.  The applicant\u2019s request for asylum was refused by the Immigration Service on 28 June 2011 and, on appeal, by the Refugee Appeal Board (Flygtningen\u00e6vnet) on 31 October 2011.\nRevocation proceedings 19.  On 15 August 2012 the applicant had served two-thirds of his sentence and was due to be released on parole. Since he did not consent to the release on parole, he was brought before the District Court which, on 23 August 2012, by virtue of section 50, subsection 2, of the Aliens Act (Udl\u00e6ndingeloven) maintained his detention until a decision was taken on whether to revoke the deportation order. To this effect, relying on section 50, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act, the applicant claimed that material changes had occurred in his circumstances. He stated, among other things, that he had strong links to his six children, his wife and his ex\u2011wife, that they had all visited him in prison, and that he would lose contact with them upon return. His wife and her family had stayed illegally as refugees in Jordan and had been fined therefor, so she would not be allowed entry. After his mother had died, he had not had much contact with his family in Jordan. 20.  For the purpose of the case, the Immigration Service issued a statement of 24 October 2012, which read as follows.\n\u201cThe Immigration Service finds that no such changes have occurred in [the applicant\u2019s] circumstances as set out in section 26 [of the Aliens Act] that could justify the revocation of the expulsion order. Accordingly, we find that it cannot lead to a revocation of the expulsion order that [the applicant] and his spouse living in Denmark, whom he married in a Muslim ceremony, have three minor children from their marriage, that he has received visits from his spouse and children about once a week since his arrest and that his spouse cannot enter Jordan because of her debt to the former authorities. We have emphasised in this respect that the above information was known already at the time of the judgment delivered by the High Court on 25 November 2009 and that he could not subsequently have had a justified expectation that he would be able to exercise his right to a family life in Denmark. In our opinion, it cannot lead to a revocation of the expulsion order either that [the applicant\u2019s] former spouse and the three minor children from their marriage live in Denmark and that his eldest child is in respite care due to a disease. In this respect we have emphasised that the information about the children, including the disease of the eldest child, was known at the time of the judgment delivered by the High Court on 25 November 2009. The Immigration Service also finds that the unsubstantiated information provided by [the applicant\u2019s] counsel, that several of [the applicant\u2019s] children suffer from mental problems as a result of the separation from [the applicant] cannot lead to a revocation of the expulsion order either...\u201d 21.  In connection with the case, the applicant\u2019s ex-wife, X, gave statements to the police on 7 and 12 September 2012. Her statements, reproduced in two police reports, were read out in the District Court and stated, inter alia:\n\u201cX stated that she and the applicant had been married from 1997 to 2001. X was now a Danish national, but was originally a stateless Palestinian from Lebanon. She and [the applicant] had three children from their marriage: a 14-year-old boy, a 12\u2011year-old girl and an 11-year-old boy. The 14-year-old boy had a mental disability, but no physical disability. He wore a nappy and his speech and language were undeveloped. He attended a special school. Their two other children were normal and attended ordinary elementary school. X had sole custody of the three children. She and the three children visited [the applicant] about twice a month in prison \u2013 although sometimes only once a month. They had done so for the entire period that [the applicant] had been in prison. X was on a disability pension. [The applicant\u2019s] only contribution to her living costs was child support. She and her three children would not accompany [the applicant] to Jordan if he were returned to Jordan.\u201d\n\u201c.... Her 14-year-old son had been in respite care with a family until two years before. Now he was in respite care in an institution ... For example, he would live with X from Monday to Wednesday and go to the special school from X\u2019s home. From Thursday to Sunday of the same week, he would live in the institution and go to the special school from there....\u201d 22.  Before the District Court, X confirmed the statements that she had given to the police. The children were then 14, 12 and 11 years old. Their eldest son had not been diagnosed, as such. He was still in respite care, as she had described to the police. The children and [the applicant] had a very close relationship. The children were very excited to spend time with him. Their daughter was probably the one who was most strongly attached to [the applicant], but their two sons were also very attached to him. Their daughter was going through puberty and had a strong need for a father, whom she could present to her friends. However, the children found it difficult to understand why they always had to visit [the applicant] and not the other way around. The two youngest children had not been offered consultations with a school psychologist. She had not forced the issue either, as she had always believed that things would work themselves out. It would be a disaster if her children were separated permanently from their father. They had lived in a strong hope that they would be reunited with their father upon his release. She feared that her children would break down in case of [the applicant\u2019s] deportation. It would become very difficult to integrate them into Danish society. For the sake of her children, she really hoped that [the applicant] could be allowed another chance. In the case of [the applicant\u2019s] deportation, she and the children would remain in Denmark as the children and she had no chance of managing elsewhere. 23.  Y also gave statements to the police on 7 and 12 September 2012. Her statements, reproduced in two police reports, were read out in the District Court and stated, inter alia:\n\u201cY stated that she was an Iraqi national, but a Kurd ... She stated that she spoke Arabic. She understood some Danish but found it difficult to speak Danish. She stated that she had been granted residence based on an application for asylum. She had entered Denmark in 2000. She was still married to [the applicant], although they had only married in a Muslim ceremony. They had never married under the Danish rules. They had three children together: a 9-year-old boy, an 8-year-old girl and a 7-year-old boy. All of them were healthy and attended school here in Denmark. Y and [the applicant] had joint custody of the three children, who were all Iraqi nationals. Before [the applicant\u2019s] arrest in the drug case, which resulted in him being sent to prison, Y and [the applicant], had lived together at Y\u2019s current home. After his arrest and during his imprisonment, Y had visited [the applicant] in prison once a week on average. Their three children had also accompanied her on the visits. If [the applicant] were released, the plan was for him to move in with Y again and live with her and their three children. Y indicated that she could not go to Jordan with him if he were deported to Jordan. She stated in that respect that she had lived in Jordan for five years with her parents. When leaving Jordan in 2000, she had been told at the airport in Jordan that she must pay some money for having lived in Jordan, and if she failed to pay she could not return to Jordan. Y could not pay the money; she did not recall the amount. When asked whether she was in possession of Jordanian documents in that respect, she replied that she was not. This was the reason why she could not return to Jordan. Furthermore, she did not want her children to grow up in Jordan. Accordingly she and her three children would not accompany [the applicant] if he were returned to Jordan. ... Her father was dead ... She subsisted on welfare benefits. [The applicant\u2019s] only contribution to Y\u2019s living costs was child support ...\u201d\n\u201c.... Her father had been granted asylum in Denmark. In Jordan, she and the rest of her family had had to pay to live there. When asked how and to whom her family had had to pay money, she replied that she had been very young at the time and had never learned the details about that. She had lived in Jordan for about three years and had not left the country during those three years. She had left Jordan in 2000 with her mother and her three siblings as they had been granted family reunion in Denmark. Y and her family had therefore travelled to Denmark. She had not been to Jordan since. When Y and her family had left the airport in Amman, the airport authorities/police had demanded that the family pay money for the time that they had lived in Jordan. The applicant did not know how much money her family had been asked to pay. She stated that she had heard that the amount was ten Jordanian dinars, probably for each day\u2019s stay on each passport, but there may also have been a monthly payment. Their family had had three passports altogether. Her family had been unable to pay the amount demanded at the airport of Amman, and they had then been told that it would subsequently be impossible for them to enter Jordan in future. She did not know whether her family could enter if the amount due was paid in connection with a future journey to Jordan. When asked about her three children, Y replied that they were all in good health and attended school here in Denmark. In connection with parent consultations at the school, Y had been informed that her children were doing well at school. However, her eldest son isolated himself a little when in after-school care. None of the children suffered from diseases of any kind, whether physical or mental. When asked, Y replied that none of her children saw a doctor or a psychologist. However, her eldest son was often sad because he thought about his father.\u201d 24.  Before the District Court, Y confirmed the statements that she had made to the police. The children were then 9, 8 and 7 years old. The eldest son\u2019s relationship with [the applicant] remained unchanged. He was still waiting and looking very much forward to [the applicant\u2019s] release. Her eldest son had a support person. The reason was that he isolated himself. The reason why he isolated himself was that he missed being part of a whole family. It would help if he could be with [the applicant]. No support had been granted to the two younger children. They were doing well. Her siblings also lived in Aarhus. However, she did have one sister living in the Netherlands. A few years before, this sister had tried to return to Jordan after she was expelled from the Netherlands. However, Jordan had refused to accept her sister because there was an unpaid bill or fine linked to the family\u2019s stay in Jordan. If [the applicant] were deported to Jordan, she would have to remain in Denmark with the children, primarily for the sake of the children. She did not want them to grow up elsewhere. It would also have a very negative impact on the children if their father were deported. 25.  By decision of 3 June 2013 the District Court refused to revoke the expulsion order, finding as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] was sentenced to expulsion when found guilty of trafficking approximately 1 kg of cocaine into Denmark and sentenced to imprisonment for five years. His involvement in the case was neither random nor insignificant. On the contrary, the crime was categorised as organised and consequently also characterised by professionalism. Due to its nature, the crime accordingly constitutes a major problem for Danish society. Against this background, it is a strict requirement that [the applicant\u2019s] personal circumstances change to such extent that the changes can be considered material so as to justify the revocation of the expulsion order, see section 50(1) of the Aliens Act. As material changes in his circumstances, [the applicant] has referred to the circumstances that the health of his children has deteriorated, that his wife\u2019s possibility of accompanying him to Jordan following his deportation has been reduced, and that during the period since the High Court judgment of 25 November 2009 the risk has increased that he will also be punished in Jordan for the drug offence for which he has served a sentence in Denmark.\nSince the High Court delivered its judgment, [the applicant] has maintained contact with his wife and his children. However, that circumstance cannot independently lead to the conclusion that there have been material changes in circumstances. In the assessment of the Court, the information available does not provide any basis on which to conclude that there have been material changes in the health of his children. His wife has stated that she left Jordan in 2000, and there is nothing to suggest that her possibilities of returning to Jordan have changed since then.\nWith reference to that, and based on the information on the risk of double punishment, the Court finds that there have been no such material changes in the applicant\u2019s] personal circumstances as to satisfy the conditions for revoking the expulsion order. As Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has accordingly not been violated either, the Court cannot allow his claim that the expulsion order be revoked.\u201d 26.  The applicant filed an appeal against the decision with the High Court, before which the applicant and X were heard, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consulted anew. The latter had consulted a new legal source, which had confirmed the information obtained during the asylum procedure. 27.  Supplementary information was provided that the applicant and his ex-wife, X, now had joint custody of their three children and planned to re\u2011marry. Moreover, the eldest son, who was now 15 years old, lived in a residential institution. He had been diagnosed with von Recklinghausen\u2019s disease, type 1, and his stage of development corresponded to that of a four to six-year-old child. 28.  The applicant submitted that in May 2013, thus before the District Court\u2019s decision of 3 June 2013 to refuse to revoke the expulsion order, he had divorced his wife, Y, according to Islamic law. He and his ex-wife, X, had talked about marrying again but they would await the outcome of the case at issue. It had not been decided whether she would follow him to Jordan in case of expulsion. There would be no help in Jordan for his disabled son. He had broken off contact with his father and his eight siblings in Jordan in 2005. He maintained contact with all his children. 29.  The applicant\u2019s ex-wife, X, stated that it would not be possible for her to follow the applicant to Jordan due to the son\u2019s disability. 30.  On 27 January 2014, the High Court upheld the decision not to revoke the expulsion order. It concluded as follows:\n\u201cfor the reasons given by the District Court, it is found on the basis of the evidence produced before the High Court, that there have been no such material changes in the applicant\u2019s circumstances as set out in section 50, subsection 1, cf. section 26 of the Aliens Act that would justify the revocation of his expulsion order. The information presented to the High Court on the risk of double punishment upon return to Jordan and on the intention of the applicant and his ex-wife to remarry cannot lead to a different outcome\u201d. 31.  The applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on 20 March 2014 by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsn\u00e6vnet). 32.  The applicant was deported from Denmark on 8 April 2014.\nII.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "1", "5", "3", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are joint owners of the property at number 274, Republic Street, Valletta. The property, known as the \u201cKing\u2019s Own Band Club\u201d (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe KOBC\u201d), is a four\u2011storey building of 864 square metres, and is located in a prime site in Malta\u2019s capital city. 6.  Initially, the property belonged to the applicants\u2019 ascendants. In 1946, the applicants\u2019 ascendants entered into a rent agreement with the KOBC, whereby they willingly rented the said property for 500 pounds sterling (GBP) annually (around 1,164.69 euros (EUR)). In 1955 legislation specifically regulating the lease of property to band clubs (Act V of 1955, hereinafter \u201cthe 1955 amendments\u201d) was introduced. 7.  By law (The Civil Code read in conjunction with the Re\u2011letting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance \u2013 see relevant domestic law below), the applicants are obliged to renew, on an annual basis, the lease entered into by their ascendants, and may not demand an increase in rent. According to the applicants\u2019, the property\u2019s market rental value (in 2014) was EUR 269,100 annually. 8.  Part of the property is utilised as a band club, and part of the property is operated as a restaurant and bar. The applicants claim that the operation of the restaurant and bar is a profitable economic activity that generates an income to the caterer of around EUR 150,000 or more annually. 9.  In 2009, amendments were introduced to allow for increases in certain rents and to establish a cut-off date for existing protected leases relating to commercial properties, which are thus to come to an end in 2028. These amendments did not affect the applicants\u2019 property which is rented out as a band club. The amendments however also gave the relevant Minister the power to regulate conditions relating to clubs, thus allowing for the possibility of future amendments (see paragraph 19 below). 10.  In 2011, the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. The proceedings were brought against the Attorney General (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe AG\u201d), the Prime Minister (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe PM\u201d) and the King\u2019s Own Band Club (the lessee). The applicants claimed that their right to peaceful enjoyment of the property as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was being breached. They claimed that they were being denied the use of their property without being provided with adequate compensation. The applicants further submitted that, in 2009, the law had been amended, allowing for an increase in rent and the establishment of a cut\u2011off date for existing \u201cprotected rents\u201d, but the amendments in the law did not cover properties rented out as clubs. Therefore, in contrast with other commercial rents, the annual rent for the club could not be raised, and the rent contract could not be terminated. The applicants claimed that the law was discriminatory and was therefore in violation of Article 14 of the Convention. 11.  On 8 October 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found that the applicants had suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as the interference with the applicants\u2019 property rights had not been proportionate. The applicants had submitted that the property had a rental value of EUR 269,100 a year, while the AG and the PM had submitted that the property had a rental value of EUR 93,000 a year. Irrespective of which value one was to consider, the court concluded that the rent being received by the applicants was disproportionate. Keeping in mind the estimated rental values presented before the court, and the income that the KOBC was generating from its bar, the court awarded EUR 300,000 in damages to the applicants (to be paid half by the AG and the PM jointly, and half by the KOBC). The costs of the proceedings were to be paid, half by the AG and PM, and the other half by the KOBC. 12.  The court further concluded that the applicants had not suffered any discrimination as no satisfactory proof had been presented showing that they were discriminated against when compared to other owners leasing their property as a club. 13.  The AG, PM and KOBC filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court. 14.  On 6 February 2015 the Constitutional Court overturned in part the judgment of the first\u2011instance court, and concluded that there had been no violation of the applicants\u2019 rights. The Constitutional Court ordered that the costs of proceedings at both instances be paid by the applicants. 15.  The Constitutional Court found that contrary to that pleaded by the Government, the applicants did have title of ownership over the property at issue. However, in line with domestic case-law the Constitutional Court concluded that, because the agreement had been entered into voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to (that is, that the rent due could not be raised and the rent agreement could not be terminated), then the applicants could not allege a violation of their rights. This was so, even if due to the rate of inflation throughout the years, the rent due was now to be considered low. The Constitutional Court further held that the amendments to the law of 2009, mentioned by the applicants, did not affect their position which remained the same as that when the rent agreement had been entered into [in 1946], and therefore there was no reason for the principle of pacta sunt servanda (\u201cagreements must be complied with\u201d) not to be given full effect. 16.  On 6 May 2015, the applicants filed an application for retrial. They claimed that the Constitutional Court had committed an error of fact and applied a wrong interpretation of the law. They noted that the protection given in law to clubs was introduced in 1955 while their predecessors in title had entered into a lease agreement in 1946. 17.  Nevertheless, the applicants also instituted proceedings before this Court on 20 July 2015. 18.  On 3 February 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 request for a re\u2011trial. The Constitutional Court held that, as the law stood, retrial could not be applied in regard to a case of a constitutional nature. The costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the applicants. 19.  Pending the constitutional redress proceedings (on appeal), on 1 January 2014, the Conditions Regulating the Leases of Clubs Regulations (hereinafter \u2018the Regulations\u2019), Subsidiary Legislation Chapter 16.13 of the Laws of Malta came into force (see relevant domestic law). 20.  The Regulations provided that the rent payable to the owners by the band clubs holding the property under title of lease was to be increased by 10% (from the previous year) every year until 2016 and as from 1 January 2016 the rent was to be increased by 5% (from the previous year) every year until 2023, following which it would increase every year according to the index of inflation. As from 2015 the tenant also had to pay an additional rent calculated at the rate of 5% on the annual income derived by the club. As a result in 2015 the total annual rent paid to the applicants by the KOBC was EUR 2,876. 26 and in 2016 EUR 3,017.20,", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "7", "6", "5", "1", "3", "No Label", "8", "9"], "gold": ["8", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Vait Askhabov, who was born in 1976. 8.  At about 3 p.m. on 12 March 2001 a convoy of military vehicles, supported by four helicopters, arrived in the village of Chiri-Yurt. Mr Vait Askhabov at that time was working in his garden. As the main part of the convoy was passing along the main street, two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and four military lorries stopped next to his garden and their crew started to repair one of the APCs. Shortly thereafter something exploded next to the APC. The servicemen immediately cordoned off the area, including the applicant\u2019s house. They went to the garden fence and ordered Mr Vait Askhabov to climb over the fence and come to them. They then forced him into a military Ural lorry and did not let anyone come close to that lorry. About thirty minutes later they drove away with Mr Vait Askhabov. Several people, including Mr Vait Askhabov\u2019s sister (Ms L.A.) and his neighbours (Ms Z.Kh., and Ms A.U.) witnessed the incident. The applicant submitted to the Court their written statements, which confirmed the applicant\u2019s account of the events. Mr Vait Askhabov has been missing ever since. 9.  On 13 March 2001 the applicant complained to the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office of Mr Vait Askhabov\u2019s abduction. 10.  On 12 July 2001 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 23132 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Russia (\u201cCC\u201d) (abduction). Four days later Mr Vait Askhabov\u2019s father was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 11.  In September 2001 (the exact date is illegible) the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 12.  On 31 July 2002 the Shali District Court declared Mr Vait Askhabov a missing person. 13.  On 24 February 2004 the applicant asked the Ombudsman of Chechnya to request the investigators to conduct an effective investigation. 14.  On 19 March 2004 the investigation was resumed. The investigator sent several requests for the persons involved in the operation of 12 March 2001 to be identified, but to no avail. A month later the investigation was suspended. 15.  On 23 December 2004 the investigation was resumed in order for the crime scene to be examined and several persons to be questioned concerning Mr Vait Askhabov\u2019s possible membership in illegal armed groups. The persons questioned denied that possibility. A month later the investigation was suspended. 16.  On 28 May 2007 the applicant complained to the President of the Chechen Republic that the investigation had been ineffective. That complaint was forwarded to the investigators. 17.  On an unspecified date in June 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and that the investigators had failed to take basic steps. 18.  On 29 June 2007 the Shali District Court allowed the claim. It noted that the investigation had not achieved any positive results, that it had been deliberately protracted, and that the applicant had been denied access to the criminal case file. The court ordered the investigator to take all necessary investigative steps and to provide the applicant with access to the case-file documents. 19.  Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 11 December 2007 and 7 March 2008, and suspended on 12 January and 7 April 2008, respectively, without attaining tangible results. 20.  On 31 January 2011, following strong criticism from the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office, the proceedings were resumed. 21.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 22.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Murdalov, who was born in 1977. The second applicant is his mother. The third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 23.  Mr Shamkhan Murdalov was a member of illegal armed groups during Russia\u2019s first military campaign in Chechnya between 1994 and 1996. 24.  On the morning of 21 May 2004 Mr Shamkhan Murdalov \u2013 with his relative, Mr R.B., and acquaintance, Mr Kh.Z. \u2013 left his home in the village of Valerik and went to Grozny to buy building supplies. On their way, at the entrance to Grozny, at the Chernorechensky traffic police station, they were stopped by a group of about ten armed police officers in uniforms. Some of the police officers were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic and Chechen appearance. They forced Mr Shamkhan Murdalov, Mr R.B. and Mr Kh.Z. out of the car, pulled black plastic bags over their heads, put them into a Gazel vehicle parked nearby and drove off in the direction of Grozny. The arrest was witnessed by several persons. 25.  The applicants submitted to the Court written statements by Ms M.D. (Mr Shamkhan Murdalov\u2019s aunt) and Ms P.M. (a resident of Valerik), who witnessed the events. According to the submitted statements, on 21 May 2004 the women were traveling from Valerik to Grozny in a bus. When the bus was stopped at the traffic police station they witnessed the arrest of three men, one of whom they recognised as Mr Shamkhan Murdalov. 26.  On 24 May 2004 Mr R.B. and Mr Kh.Z. were released. They stated that following their arrest they had been taken to the Russian military base in Khankala and questioned. 27.  On the same date, 24 May 2004, the police arrived to search the applicants\u2019 house. Instead of searching the entire house, the police officers went straight to the rooftop, where they found hidden machine guns and bullets. 28.  The whereabouts of Mr Shamkhan Murdalov have been unknown since 21 May 2004. 29.  After the abduction, the applicants requested a number of law enforcement agencies to provide assistance in the search for their relative. In particular, in December 2004 they complained to the military prosecutor\u2019s office, the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office and the Ministry of the Interior. 30.  On 5 April 2005 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 41035 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). Six days later the second applicant was granted victim status. 31.  Over the following days the investigator questioned the second applicant, witnesses to the search of 24 May 2004, and a police officer from the Chernorechensky traffic police station. He confirmed that on 21 May 2004 a car with several passengers had been stopped by a special unit responsible for combatting unlawful armed groups. The passengers had been forced out of the car and taken in the direction of Grozny. 32.  On 5 June 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 33.  On 19 January 2006 the proceedings were resumed. The investigators asked various authorities to provide information relevant to the proceedings, but no pertinent information was received. On 19 February 2006 the investigation was again suspended. 34.  On 10 October 2007 the investigators\u2019 superiors overruled the suspension owing to the need to question the traffic police officers who had witnessed the arrest. 35.  In November 2007 the investigators obtained statements from the police officers on duty at the time of the arrest, Mr Kh.V, and Mr A.D. They stated that on 21 May 2004 officers from the North-Caucasus Regional Operative Military Headquarters and/or the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) had arrived at their traffic police station and arrested three persons on suspicion of their being members of an illegal armed group. 36.  On 19 November 2007 the proceedings were suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 37.  Between June and December 2008 the proceedings were resumed and suspended on several occasions, but no tangible results were achieved. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 38.  The first, second and third applicants are respectively the wife, daughter and son of Mr Rustam Makayev, who was born in 1973. 39.  At about 2.20 a.m. on 1 December 2001 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in the town of Urus\u2011Martan in an UAZ minivan, Ural lorries and an APC. Three or four servicemen entered the applicants\u2019 house for an identity check, while the others entered the other house located in the same courtyard. The servicemen searched the applicants\u2019 house, asked Mr Rustam Makayev a number of questions and took him to the courtyard, where another ten or eleven servicemen were waiting. One of them was filming the events on video camera. They then put Mr Rustam Makayev in the UAZ and drove off towards the centre of Urus-Martan. 40.  In the morning the applicants went to the Urus\u2011Martan district military commander\u2019s office, where the FSB officer, Mr. S.G., told them that Mr Rustam Makayev would be questioned and released in two hours. On the same day the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus\u2011Martan prosecutor\u2019s office. 41.  According to the applicants, in January 2002 a person working at the Urus-Martan military commander\u2019s office promised them that Mr Rustam Makayev would be released in return for their handing him over a gun. However, the next day the same person said that Mr Rustam Makayev had been transferred from FSB custody to the Main Intelligence Service and that he would not be able to release him. 42.  According to the applicants, several days later a man at the Urus\u2011Martan military commander\u2019s office asked them to provide him with a list of persons who had been abducted in the area. Sometime later he told the applicants that all of the abducted men on the list had been killed. 43.  In October 2002 someone left a note in the applicants\u2019 courtyard stating that Mr Rustam Makayev was allegedly detained in the Zverevo detention facility in the Rostov region. However, the applicants were unable to obtain any information from that facility. 44.  Following complaints lodged by the applicant on 4 December 2001 and on 22 December 2001 the Urus-Martan prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 25169 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 45.  Having questioned Mr Rustam Makayev\u2019s father and wife, who confirmed the account of the events, as described above, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 22 February 2002 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 46.  Between May and June 2002 the applicants requested various authorities to assist them in establishing their relative\u2019s whereabouts. In reply, the applicants were each time informed that their request had been forwarded to another law enforcement authority for examination. 47.  On 29 November 2002 the criminal proceedings were resumed. 48.  On 29 January 2003 the applicants requested the investigators to expedite the investigation into the abduction. Two days later Mr Rustam Makayev\u2019s father was granted victim status in the proceedings. 49.  On 28 February 2003 the investigation was suspended again. 50.  On 1 August 2003 the applicants requested that the proceedings be resumed. 51.  On 5 September 2003 and 19 February 2004 the criminal proceedings were resumed and on 5 October 2003 and 8 April 2004 they were again suspended. In the meantime, in September and November 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene and questioned the applicants\u2019 neighbour, Ms R.A, who had witnessed the events of 1 December 2001. Her statements were similar to those of the applicants before the Court. On 24 March 2004 the investigators inspected a logbook from the Urus-Martan police station. No records with Mr Rustam Makayev\u2019s name were found. 52.  On 17 August 2004 the applicants requested to be allowed to access to the investigation file. 53.  On 27 October 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office informed them that their request for assistance in the search for their relative had been forwarded to the investigators. 54.  On 27 May 2005 the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment in the North Caucasus Region (\u0412\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u041e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0432\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a (\u0441\u0438\u043b) \u043f\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u2011\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430) informed the applicants that their relative\u2019s abduction was being investigated by the Urus-Martan prosecutor\u2019s office. 55.  Between January 2007 and August 2008 the applicants lodged a number of requests with various law-enforcement agencies. In reply, they were informed that their requests had been forwarded to another law\u2011enforcement body. 56.  The proceedings in the criminal case were resumed on 29 May and 1 September 2008, and suspended on 29 June and 1 October 2008 respectively. No tangible results were achieved. 57.  On 1 January 2009, at the first applicant\u2019s request, the investigators produced a progress report, stating that the perpetrators had not been identified. 58.  On an unspecified date in early 2010, Mr Rustam Makayev\u2019s mother contacted the head of the Chechen Parliament asking for assistance in the search for her son. The request was forwarded to the investigators, who on 2 June 2010 informed her that the undertaken investigative measures had not brought any results. It appears that the criminal proceedings are still pending. 59.  The applicant is the sister of Mr Adam Sadgayev, who was born in 1967. 60.  At the material time Mr Adam Sadgayev, his common-law partner, Ms M.Shch., and his mother, Ms A.S., lived in the town of Shali. 61.  At about 5 a.m. on 17 February 2005 a group of about twenty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at Mr Adam Sadgayev\u2019s house in a Gazel vehicle and an UAZ minivan. Some of the servicemen were in balaclavas and military helmets. Those without were of Slavic appearance; they spoke unaccented Russian and used portable radio sets. The servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. Thereafter, they took Mr Adam Sadgayev away to an unknown destination. 62.  Mr Adam Sadgayev\u2019s abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including his partner, mother and neighbours. The applicant submitted written statements by Ms M.Shch., Ms A.S., and one of the neighbours, Mr D.V., who confirmed the account of the events, as described above. Mr Adam Sadgayev\u2019s whereabouts remain unknown. 63.  Immediately after the abduction the applicant and her relatives informed the authorities thereof and requested that a criminal investigation be initiated. According to the applicant, the investigators had lost their initial complaint of the abduction, which led to a delay in the opening of the criminal case. 64.  On 5 April 2005 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 46036 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 65.  A week later Ms M.Shch. was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. 66.  On 5 July 2005 the investigators informed her that the proceedings in the case had been suspended. 67.  In 2006 the proceedings were resumed on 26 January, then suspended on 7 March, again resumed on 28 March and suspended on 28 April. During the active part of the investigation several relatives and neighbours of Mr Adam Sadgayev were questioned. 68.  On 14 February 2007 the suspended proceedings were resumed. The authorities added several of Mr Adam Sadgayev\u2019s character references to the case file, questioned several witnesses, and then, on 5 April 2007, suspended the investigation again. 69.  On 1 December 2008 Ms M.Shch. asked to be allowed to access the criminal case file. Her request was allowed three days later. 70.  On 21 August 2009 the deputy Shali district prosecutor stated that Ms M.Shch had been granted victim status wrongly, as her marriage to Mr Adam Sadgayev had never been officially registered. As a result, her witness statements were excluded from the case file. 71.  On 16 September 2009 the suspended proceedings were resumed and lasted until a new suspension on 26 September 2009. 72.  On 24 December 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings again. Four days later the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 73.  On 30 December 2010 the proceedings were suspended yet again. It appears that they are still pending. 74.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov, who was born in 1980. The second applicant is his wife and the third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 75.  At about 6.30 a.m. on 13 April 2003 a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in two grey UAZ vehicles and one armoured personnel carrier (APC) without a registration plate at the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Cheri-Yurt. The men spoke unaccented Russian, most of them were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic appearance. 76.  Having checked the identity documents, the men ordered Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov to get into one of the UAZ vehicles and then drove off with him in the direction of the village of Stariye Atagi. Then they passed through the premises of a military unit stationed in the village of Chechen\u2011Aul and went in the direction of the town of Argun. 77.  In the search for their relative the applicants went to the office of the FSB in Stariye Atagi. One of the FSB officers confirmed that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had been brought to their premises but said that he had then been transferred to the town of Shali. 78.  At the Shali prosecutor\u2019s office the applicants were informed that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had been detained there for a short time and then transferred to Khankala, the main military base of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya. 79.  Sometime later the applicants received information from unidentified sources that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had allegedly been detained in a remand prison in Vladikavkaz. During one of the applicants\u2019 visits to that prison, a senior officer, who introduced himself as \u201cYuriy Borisovich\u201d, confirmed that the applicants\u2019 relative had indeed been detained on their premises for some time but said that he had then been transferred elsewhere in the town of Pyatigorsk. The applicant provided that information to the investigators. 80.  The whereabouts of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov remain unknown. 81.  On 13 April 2003 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case be opened into the incident. 82.  On 12 May 2003 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 22080 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of her son\u2019s abduction, as described above. Several days later the investigator questioned the second applicant and other relatives of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov. 83.  On 12 July 2003 the investigation in the case was suspended. 84.  From the material in the case file it appears that between 2003 and 2005 the investigative authorities took some steps, the nature of which is unknown, as the copies of the relevant documents submitted by the Government are illegible. 85.  On 19 April 2006 the investigation was resumed. The investigators examined the crime scene, questioned several relatives and neighbours of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov, and then decided to suspend the proceedings on 21 May 2006. 86.  On 22 July 2006 and 30 January and 6 March 2009 the first applicant herself, and Memorial, a non-governmental organisation, acting on her behalf, enquired about the progress in the case. By letters dated 20 November 2006, 24 March 2007, and 12 March 2009, respectively, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended. 87.  On 7 May 2009 the proceedings were resumed and the first applicant was granted access to the case file. The next day the proceedings were again suspended. 88.  On 21 December 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, complaining of the investigator\u2019s failure to take basic steps. 89.  On 14 January 2011 the deputy Shali district prosecutor ruled the suspension unsubstantiated and resumed the proceedings. The investigators were instructed to question the first applicant, request the remand prison in Vladikavkaz to provide information about Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov\u2019s detention between 2003 and 2004, and to obtain blood samples from his relatives. 90.  In view of the above-mentioned developments, on 17 January 2011 the Shali Town Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint. 91.  On 10 February 2011 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated the statement that she had given previously, and obtained blood samples from her. A week later the investigation was suspended again. 92.  On 30 April 2012 the first applicant enquired about progress in the proceedings. By a letter of 27 May 2012 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 93.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Salakh Yakhyaev, who was born in 1975, and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev, who was born in 1982. 94.  At about 6.30 a.m. on 17 March 2003 a group of about thirty armed servicemen in camouflage and black uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicant\u2019s house in the village of Avtury, where she lived with her and her sons\u2019 families. The servicemen took three of the applicant\u2019s sons to the courtyard and ordered the applicant in unaccented Russian to show their passports. Having received and examined the documents, the servicemen left the applicant\u2019s youngest son in the courtyard and took the other two, Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev, away with them. When the applicant went outside she saw that the servicemen had arrived in two grey UAZ minivans, a white VAZ-2106 vehicle and a white VAZ-21099 vehicle. The vehicles had no registration plates. The abductors drove off in the direction of the village of Geldegen. Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev have not been seen since. 95.  The applicant submitted written statements by eyewitnesses to the events, including the grandmother of Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev (Ms Sh.G.) and their aunt (Ms Z.A), who both confirmed the account of the events described above. She also submitted written statements by their neighbour, Ms Kh.M., who had witnessed the abduction from her window. 96.  On 25 March 2003 the applicant complained of the abduction to the Chechnya Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 97.  On 15 May 2003 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 22081 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 98.  On 20 May 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 99.  On 15 July 2003 the investigation was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 100.  On 8 April 2004 the Shali District Court declared Mr Salakh Yakhyaev a missing person. 101.  On 26 October and 19 November 2004 the applicant requested the investigators to resume the proceedings. 102.  On 27 May 2005 she asked the Government of Chechnya to assist in the search for Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev. Her request was forwarded to the investigators. 103.  By a letter of 31 August 2005 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that operational search measures had been taken to find her missing sons. 104.  On 17 July 2006 the criminal proceedings were resumed. Having questioned the applicant on 10 August 2007 the investigator suspended the proceedings on 17 August 2006. 105.  On 22 December 2006 the Chechnya Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 5 December 2006. 106.  On 24 December 2006 the investigator questioned Mr Salakh Yakhyaev\u2019s wife, who had witnessed the events of 17 March 2003 and who gave a statement similar to that of the applicant. On 6 January 2007 the investigation was suspended again. It was resumed on 5 April and 3 August 2007, and 21 April and 6 October 2008, and suspended on 6 May 2007, and 3 January, 21 May and 7 November 2008 respectively. 107.  On 21 May 2009 the applicant requested permission to access the criminal case file. On 3 July 2009 the investigators allowed the request in part and she was granted access to some of the documents in the file. A request lodged by the applicant for the proceedings to be resumed was refused. 108.  On 17 August 2010 the applicant appealed to the Shali District Court against the investigators\u2019 decision of 21 May 2008 to suspend the proceedings. 109.  In the meantime, the investigators resumed the investigation on 4 September 2010. Taking that into account the Shali District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint on 7 September 2010. 110.  The applicant appealed against the above-mentioned decision before the Chechnya Supreme Court. She stated that the investigation had been pending for seven years and had not yet attained any tangible results. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on 22 December 2010. 111.  Meanwhile on 3 October 2010 the proceedings were suspended yet again. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 112.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev, who was born in 1974, the third applicant is his wife and the fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are his children. 113.  At around 11 p.m. on 1 April 2005 a group of armed servicemen in a green Gazel minivan, a grey VAZ-21099 car, a VAZ-2109 vehicle and a VAZ\u20112106 vehicle arrived at the applicants\u2019 family house in the village of Stariye Atagi. The men were in camouflage uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. Most of them were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic appearance. Having broken into the house, they searched the premises and checked Mr Rizvan Oybuyev\u2019s identity documents. Then they forced him into one of the vehicles and drove off. 114.  Mr Rizvan Oybuyev\u2019s brother, Mr I.O., ran after the convoy of military vehicles and saw them heading in the direction of an abandoned mill at the outskirts of the village, where a Russian military unit was stationed. Mr Rizvan Oybuyev\u2019s whereabouts have been unknown since. 115.  The abduction of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted to the Court written statements by Mr Rizvan Oybuyev\u2019s brothers and their neighbours. They confirmed the account of the events described above. 116.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities of the incident and requested, both orally and in writing, that criminal proceedings be opened. 117.  On 6 May 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 44037 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 118.  On 17 May 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned by the investigators. 119.  Having questioned several relatives of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev the investigator suspended the proceedings on 6 August 2005. 120.  After the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Government of the Chechen Republic the investigation was resumed on 20 January 2006. On the same day the authorities carried out an examination of the crime scene. 121.  Between 21 and 27 January 2006 several neighbours and Mr Rizvan Oybuyev\u2019s close relatives were questioned. 122.  On 22 February 2006 the investigation was suspended owing to a failure to identify the perpetrators. 123.  On 20 November 2007 the Stariye Atagi administration \u2013 apparently at the applicants\u2019 request \u2013 issued a certificate stating that on 1 April 2005 Mr Rizvan Oybuyev had been detained and taken away from his home by Russian servicemen. 124.  On 14 March 2008 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic declared Mr Rizvan Oybuyev a missing person. 125.  On 27 June 2008 the sixth applicant asked the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office about progress in the investigation. By a letter of 2 July 2008 he was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 126.  On 21 July 2009, apparently after the resumption of the proceedings, the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 127.  On 10 March 2011 the third applicant enquired about recent developments in the investigation and requested access to the investigation file. By a letter of 1 April 2011 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended on 22 February 2006. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 128.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein (also spelled as Suliman Said-Khusin) Elmurzayev, who was born in 1978. The first applicant is his late mother, who died on 17 October 2013. The second applicant is his sister. 129.  At about 4 a.m. on 2 April 2005 the applicants\u2019 family was at home in the village of Duba-Yurt when a large group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at their house in two UAZ minivans and a white Niva car. Having ordered all male members of the family to go outside, the servicemen searched the premises, speaking Russian among themselves. Then they forced Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev and his father, Mr S.E., into the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Khankala, passing unrestrictedly through a military checkpoint located at the outskirts of the village. 130.  On 8 May 2005 the body of Mr S.E. was found on the bank of the Sunzha River, Chechnya. 131.  The whereabouts of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev have remained unknown since his abduction. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants, their family members and neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev\u2019s wife and one of his sisters. 132.  Shortly after the incident the applicants complained about the abduction to the authorities. 133.  On 5 April 2005 the police officers from the Shali district department of the interior (\u041e\u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0428\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438) questioned three neighbours and two relatives of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev. The witnesses confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described by the applicants in their submission to the Court. 134.  On 14 June 2005 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 46060 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 135.  On 2 August 2004 the uncle of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was granted victim status in the criminal case. 136.  On 14 August 2005 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 137.  On 19 January 2006 the proceedings were resumed. Following the interrogation of several witnesses, the investigator suspended the proceedings on 20 February 2006. 138.  The investigation was again resumed on 1 March 2006. Fifteen days later the investigators joined the criminal proceedings with those opened into the murder of Mr M.S. on 2 August 2005. 139.  On 1 April 2006 the legal classification of the crime against Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was changed to that of aggravated murder committed by a group of persons (Article 105 \u00a7 2 of the CC). 140.  On 2 June 2006 the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 21 July 2006 but then suspended again on 21 August 2006. 141.  In the meantime, on 19 August 2006 the uncle of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was deprived of victim status for lack of close blood ties with the abducted persons. 142.  On 11 February 2008 the investigation questioned several witnesses. 143.  On 20 February 2009 the investigators requested the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny to grant them access to classified documents relating to the special operation in the village of Duba\u2011Yurt. The request was granted on 4 March 2009. No pertinent information on the abduction was found during an examination of the classified files on 7 April 2009. On the next day the proceedings were suspended again. 144.  On an unspecified date between 2009 and 2010 the first applicant asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for Mr Suleiman Said\u2011Khusein. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that the operational search activity was ongoing. 145.  On 19 August 2011 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. From the response of the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office dated 25 August 2011 she learned that the proceedings had been resumed on 24 August 2011. It appears that they are still pending. 146.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev, who was born in 1982. The third applicant is his sister. 147.  At about 4 a.m. on 3 August 2004 the applicants\u2019 family was at home in Grozny when a group of approximately thirty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in a VAZ-21010, a UAZ minivan and a Zhiguli car. Most of the servicemen were in balaclavas and only one of them, apparently a commander, was unmasked; they spoke Chechen and Russian. A group of about fifteen of them broke into the applicants\u2019 house and searched the premises. Having checked their identity papers, they seized the service identity card of the brother of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev, Mr R.E., who was a police officer. Then the servicemen forced Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev outside, put him into one of the vehicles and drove off, passing unhindered through checkpoints on their way. 148.  On the same morning an acquaintance of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev was arrested by the North Caucasus Regional Department for the Fight Against Organised Crime (\u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e) (\u201cthe RUBOP\u201d). He was detained in a detention facility for five days and then released. He stated that he had been held in the same facility with Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev and that he had been able to hear the latter\u2019s voice. The applicants provided this information to the investigators. 149.  The whereabouts of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev have remained unknown ever since. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by three neighbours, who confirmed the applicants\u2019 account of the events. 150.  About a month after the abduction, the RUBOP arrested Mr A.I., a friend of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev. Mr A.I. was questioned about his relations with Elzhurkayev\u2019s family, shown Mr R.E.\u2019s service identity card seized from the applicants\u2019 house on 3 August 2004, and subsequently released. 151.  On an unspecified date in 2008 the first applicant went to the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny in connection with the investigation into the abduction. At the office she saw a RUBOP officer called \u201cMuslim\u201d. She recognised him as the unmasked serviceman who had been in charge of her son\u2019s abduction on 3 August 2004. The applicant immediately informed the investigators about it. 152.  On 3 August 2004 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 153.  On 13 August 2004 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 33066 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154.  On 3 and 18 August 2004 the second and third applicants, respectively, were granted victim status in the case. They were questioned, and confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 155.  On 4 August 2004 the investigators requested a number of State authorities to inform them whether they had arrested or detained Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev. No replies in the positive were received. 156.  On 20 October 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 157.  On 13 October 2004 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators and then resumed on 24 May 2005. The applicants were informed of that resumption on 14 June 2005. 158.  On 24 June 2005 the investigation in the case was suspended. Subsequently, it was resumed on 28 June 2005, 1 November 2005 and 12 December 2005, 22 May 2006, 2 February, 24 March, 7 July, 3 September and 24 November 2008 and 19 July 2009 and 7 July 2010 (following criticism by the investigating authority supervisors, who each time ordered it to be resumed), and again suspended on 28 July and 1 December 2005, 12 January and 22 June 2006, 4 March, 25 April, 8 August, 3 October and 25 December 2008, 29 July 2009 and 12 July 2010. 159.  On 9 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. She reiterated the statements that she had previously given. 160.  On 27 August 2011 the first applicant requested the investigators to inform her about the progress in the proceedings and to grant her access to the case file. The outcome of this request is unknown. 161.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 162.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev (in the documents submitted also spelled as Dudurkayev), who was born in 1954. The second applicant is his brother. The other five applicants are his children. 163.  At about 3 a.m. on 4 November 2002 a group of ten to twelve armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Goyskoye. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen searched the premises, checked Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev\u2019s passport and took him away to an unknown destination. At the time of the events the applicants\u2019 neighbours saw heavy military vehicles parked on the road near their house. 164.  Two days after the abduction, on 6 November 2002, the same military servicemen again arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in an Ural lorry. They thoroughly searched the premises and left. 165.  The whereabouts of Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev have remained unknown since the date of his abduction. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants. 166.  On 5 November 2002 the first applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. 167.  On 8 November 2002 the first applicant was questioned by the investigators. Her statement to the authorities was similar to the account submitted by the applicants before the Court. 168.  On 23 December 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 61164 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 169.  On the same date, 23 December 2002, the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 170.  It appears that on 1 February 2003 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned the first applicant, who was also granted victim status in the criminal case. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as specified above. It appears that shortly thereafter the investigation was suspended again. 171.  On 1 April 2004 the first applicant submitted requests to several law enforcement agencies for assistance in the search for her husband. It is unclear whether any reply was given to these requests. 172.  On 6 April 2005 the investigator in charge of the case issued an information note describing the course of the proceedings and the main versions of the events, according to which Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev had been variously abducted by servicemen, members of an illegal armed group, or private persons aiming to extract information/obtain a ransom or to pursue a blood feud. It was noted that the operative search measures conducted in the case had been inefficient. 173.  On 18 June 2007 the supervising prosecutor requested that operational search activities be undertaken in order to establish Mr Dudarkayev\u2019s whereabouts. 174.  On 23 June and 5 July 2007 the investigators informed their superiors that the operational search activities had not produced any positive results. 175.  On 14 February 2008 the supervising prosecutor ruled that the decision of 23 December 2002 to suspend the investigation had been premature and unlawful and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. Subsequently, the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions in response to criticism from the supervising prosecutors: it was suspended on 26 March 2008 and 16 May 2008 and 14 January 2012, and then resumed on 16 April 2008 and 7 December 2011 respectively. 176.  Between February and April 2008 the investigators asked a number of law-enforcement authorities and detention facilities whether they had arrested or detained Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev or whether any special operation had been conducted on the date of his abduction in Goyskoye. No information in the affirmative was received. 177.  On 13 March 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. She reiterated the statements that she had previously given. 178.  Between 15 and 20 March 2008 the applicants\u2019 neighbours were questioned. All of them confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described by the applicants. 179.  On 18 February 2011 the first applicant lodged a request to be granted full access to the investigation file. Her request was refused. 180.  On 18 March 2011 the first applicant appeared before the Urus\u2011Martan Town Court to complain about her lack of access to the criminal case file. On 28 March 2011 the court allowed the complaint and ordered the investigators to grant her access to the contents of the investigation file. 181.  On 2 December 2011 the first applicant lodged another complaint challenging the decision of 16 May 2008 to suspend the investigation. On 7 December 2011 the court dismissed her complaint, having learned that the investigators had resumed the proceedings on the same date (7 December 2011). 182.  Later in December 2011 the investigators questioned the first applicant and seven fellow residents of her village. Two of them had witnessed the incident of 4 November 2002, and five of them had heard about it from their relatives. 183.  On 23 January 2012 the investigation was suspended. It was again resumed on 19 August 2013. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["4", "3", "9", "7", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Nicoreni. 6.  In January 2012 the applicant had an agreement with a person (\u201cX\u201d) according to which he promised to help him apply for a Spanish visa at the Spanish consulate in Moscow. They were to travel to Moscow by train, however, X did not show up at the train station at the time of leaving and the applicant left for Moscow alone with the money he had previously obtained from X in the amount of 520 euros. He did not return to Moldova until October 2015. 7.  In the meantime X lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of fraud. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in March 2012 on the basis of that complaint. 8.  Since the prosecutor in charge of the case could not locate the applicant, he applied to an investigating judge for a detention warrant in respect of the applicant for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor argued in support of the remand that the applicant had been hiding from the investigating authorities. 9.  On 8 February 2013 the R\u00e2\u0219cani District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. In support of its decision, the court argued that the applicant had been absconding from the investigating authorities and that he could hinder the investigation and influence witnesses. 10.  On 9 October 2015 the applicant returned to Moldova from the Russian Federation. At the border he was informed that he was being wanted by the police and that he had to present himself at the R\u00e2\u0219cani Police Station. The applicant telephoned the police station and agreed to come on 13 October 2015. 11.  On 13 October 2015 the applicant went to the R\u00e2\u0219cani Police Station where he was immediately arrested and placed in detention. 12.  On 15 October 2015 the applicant appealed against the order of 8 February 2013. He argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against himself and that he had learned about it upon his return to Moldova. Moreover, after learning about the investigation he had immediately contacted the Police Station and presented himself there. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or interfere with the investigation. 13.  On 2 November 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It did not give an answer to the applicant\u2019s argument that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against him. 14.  The applicant\u2019s detention was prolonged on several other occasions until 16 March 2016 on identical grounds and all his appeals were dismissed. 15.  In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week. 16.  By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2017 the applicant was convicted of fraud and given a suspended sentence of four years imprisonment.", "references": ["7", "4", "0", "9", "5", "6", "8", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, were living in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives alive since the alleged arrests. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but questioned the allegation that servicemen had been involved in the events. 7.  The first applicant is the mother, and other applicants are brothers of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, who was born in 1980. 8.  Between 13 and 20 May 2002 a military unit of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya under the command of General Bronivitskiy conducted a special operation in the village of Avtury. The military servicemen cordoned off the area and ran identity checks on all the residents. Detained residents were taken to a special filtration camp set up on the outskirts of the settlement. 9.  On the morning of 15 May 2002 Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov was at home with the first and second applicants. Another relative, Mr M., and a neighbour, were also present. At around 10 a.m. two armoured personnel carriers (\u201cAPCs\u201d) arrived at the applicants\u2019 house located in the centre of the village. A group of about twenty armed and masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into the courtyard and threatened all those present with firearms. Having checked the identity documents, the servicemen forced Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov into one of the APCs and drove off in the direction of the filtration camp. According to the applicants, the arrest was filmed by journalists. 10.  The applicants submitted written statements from Mr B.Dzh., a village resident arrested on 15 May 2002. He had seen Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov in the filtration camp. The latter had been exhausted and had complained of ill-treatment by the servicemen. 11.  In 2010 Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov\u2019s skeletal remains with a bullet hole in the skull were found in a forest near Avtury (see paragraph 17 below). According to the applicants, along with the remains, Mr Magomed\u2011Emin Mezhidov\u2019s t-shirt, which he had been wearing on 15 May 2002, was found. It had two gunshot holes and a further hole that had been caused by stabbing with a knife. 12.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities about it and requested that a criminal investigation be opened into the incident. 13.  On 28 November 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59266 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Russia (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status. 14.  On 28 January 2003 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the first applicant was informed of that decision on 11 April 2006. 15.  On 13 May 2003, in response to an enquiry from the applicants, the investigator informed them that the investigation had been suspended but that operational search activities were under way. 16.  On 24 December 2003 and 26 February 2006 the first applicant asked various authorities for assistance in the investigation. It appears that her requests were forwarded to the Chechnya Prosecutor\u2019s Office. By letters of 23 January 2004 and 11 April 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed her that the operational search for the perpetrators was ongoing. 17.  On 22 April 2010 the investigating authority found the skeletal remains of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, and resumed the investigation. On 22 May 2010 the investigation was again suspended. 18.  On 21 January 2011 the investigation was resumed again. Three days later the investigating authority obtained a thirty-second video, allegedly made on 15 May 2002. It depicted armed men forcing a person, possibly Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, into an APC. The footage was included in the criminal case file. 19.  On 27 January 2011 a new criminal case was opened into the circumstances of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov\u2019s death under Article 105 of the CC (murder). On the same day the investigation in the case was joined to the investigation into the abduction, and suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the joint investigation is still pending. 20.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Akhyad Shakhidov, who was born in 1964, and of his brother, Mr Khamzat Shakhidov, born in 1968. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Akhyad Sakharov; the second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant is the wife of Mr Khamzat Shakhidov; the sixth applicant is his son. 21.  On the morning of 14 May 2002 a group of about thirty armed military men in camouflage uniforms arrived in APCs and military lorries in the village of Makhkety to carry out an identity check on residents. The men were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. 22.  At about 10.30 a.m. the servicemen entered the applicants\u2019 house. Mr Akhyad Shakhidov, Mr Khamzat Shakhidov, the applicants and other family members were at home. The men checked the brothers\u2019 identity documents and searched the premises. Then they forced Mr Khamzat Shakhidov into an APC and took him in the direction of the village of Khattuni, in the Vedeno district. Shortly thereafter, several armed men remaining in the house forced Mr Akhyad Shakhidov into their military lorry and took him in the same direction. 23.  On their way out of the village, the military convoy passed a broken\u2011down UAZ vehicle. The car\u2019s driver, Mr M.K., the head of the Khattuni police department, asked the servicemen for their help with the vehicle, but to no avail. The first applicant, who was following the convoy, asked Mr M.K. where the servicemen were from. The officer replied that they were from Grozny. 24.  Another village resident, Mr Zh., was abducted on the same day under similar circumstances. He was released several days later and stated that on the day of the abduction the perpetrators had put him in the same APC as Mr Akhyad Shakhidov and Mr Khamzat Shakhidov. After the ride the men had been separated and he had not seen them again. 25.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. 26.  On 16 June 2002 the Vedeno district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 73038 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 27.  On 22 July 2002 the case file was transferred to the Shali military prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. 28.  On 17 December 2002 the case file was destroyed by fire. It was reassembled about two years later, in October 2004. 29.  On 18 November 2004 the investigation in the case was suspended. 30.  On 8 September 2005 the supervising prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed. On the same day an examination of the crime scene was conducted. 31.  Two days later, on 10 or 11 September 2005, the first and fifth applicants were granted victim status in the case. 32.  On 16 September 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office replied to a request from the applicants for information, stating that operational search activities were in progress. 33.  On 8 October 2005 it was decided to suspend the investigation. The fifth applicant was informed thereof two days later. 34.  On 21 January 2009 the first applicant asked the investigating authorities to provide her with information about the progress of the investigation. On 28 February 2009 the investigators replied that the proceedings were pending. 35.  Five years later, on 28 February 2014, the investigation was resumed, particularly, due to the need to examine the applicants\u2019 consistent allegation of the involvement of State servicemen in the abduction, which had not been duly examined since the beginning of the criminal proceedings. On 5 April 2014, the investigators again suspended the proceedings, without having taken any meaningful steps. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 36.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Magomed Israilov, who was born in 1980. The first and second applicants are his late father and mother, who died on 11 June 2013 and 26 March 2014 respectively. The third applicant is Mr Magomed Israilov\u2019s brother. 37.  At the material time Mr Magomed Israilov lived with the applicants in the town of Shali, Chechnya. Mr Magomed Israilov\u2019s sister, Ms G.A., was also staying in the house with her son, who was a minor. 38.  At around 3 a.m. on 16 August 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 17 August 2002) the family was at home when two APCs and a Ural lorry with a group of about forty to fifty armed servicemen arrived at their house. The servicemen, all of whom were in balaclavas, broke into the house. Having threatened the family members with firearms, they checked their identity documents and searched the premises. They then forced Mr Magomed Israilov and the third applicant out of the house, blindfolded them, tied their hands behind their backs and put them into different APCs. Thereafter, the convoy of military vehicles drove off in the direction of Avtury. 39.  The second applicant followed the abductors\u2019 vehicles up to a military checkpoint at the entrance to the military compound of Special Investigative Group-1 (\u201cthe military compound\u201d) (\u041f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0413\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0430), located about five hundred metres from their house in the direction of Avtury. He saw the convoy enter the military compound. 40.  Mr Magomed Israilov has not been seen since. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 41.  At around 11 p.m. on 17 August 2002 the third applicant was released by the abductors. He was dropped off by the servicemen in front of his aunt\u2019s house in the town of Shali. 42.  According to the third applicant, after his abduction he was taken to the military compound. The drive was short, but it was unclear in what direction the vehicle was going. While in detention, he did not see his brother, but heard him screaming. He also heard the guards conversing in unaccented Russian. 43.  Searching for their son, the first and second applicants spoke to Colonel T.K., who confirmed to them that Mr Magomed Israilov was detained at the military compound and promised to release him in exchange for money. 44.  On 29 August 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59221 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). On the same day the second applicant was granted victim status in the case. 45.  On 29 October 2002 the investigation in the case was suspended. 46.  On 6 June 2003 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings and ordered that the investigation be resumed. Subsequently, it was suspended and resumed on several occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 6 June 2003, then resumed on 17 April 2006 and then suspended again on 19 May 2006. 47.  On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2006, in particular on 17 March 2003 and 13 March 2006, the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in their search for Mr Magomed Israilov. In reply they received letters stating that their complaints had been examined or forwarded to other authorities for examination and that the law\u2011enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their relative\u2019s whereabouts. 48.  In 2007 the criminal proceedings were resumed and suspended several times, without any tangible results having been achieved. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 49.  The first, second and third applicants are respectively the mother, sister and daughter of Mr Razambek Isiyev, who was born in 1983. 50.  On 22 July 2002 Mr Razambek Isiyev was driving his car on the Argun-Shali highway. At about 3 or 4 p.m. a group of servicemen in APCs stopped him on the highway and took him to the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) office in the town of Argun. 51.  Later the same day the first applicant contacted Mr M.Kh., the head of a unit at the FSB office, where Mr Razambek Isiyev had been hired the previous day. According to Mr M.Kh., the FSB officer, D.Ts., had told him that Mr Razambek Isiyev had been detained for questioning. 52.  At 5 p.m. on 23 July 2002 an APC, a UAZ vehicle and a Ural lorry parked near garages situated next to the applicants\u2019 house. The first applicant saw her son, Mr Razambek Isiyev, inside the UAZ vehicle through its open door. He was pointing in the direction of the garages and explaining something. He saw his mother but before he could say anything the servicemen shut the vehicle door and drove off. 53.  At 10 a.m. on 24 July 2002 the servicemen returned to the same place with Mr Razambek Isiyev. This time they used an excavator to dig the ground. They did not find anything and left. 54.  On 25 July 2002 the applicants and their relatives gathered in front of the military commander\u2019s office in Argun. Mr M.Kh., the head of the FSB unit, assured the first applicant that he would bring Mr Razambek Isiyev home. For the next several days the first applicant visited the office of the military commander and each time Mr M.Kh. assured her that her son would be released soon. However, Mr Razambek Isiyev has not been seen since. 55.  On 3 August 2002 the first applicant complained of the disappearance of her son to the Argun district prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same date the prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 78081 under Article 126 of the CC and granted the applicant victim status in the proceedings. 56.  On 3 October 2002 the investigation was suspended, on 27 January 2004 it was resumed, and on 28 January 2004 it was suspended again. 57.  On 13 July and 5 August 2004 the North Caucasus military prosecutor\u2019s office forwarded the first applicant\u2019s requests for assistance in establishing her son\u2019s whereabouts to the military prosecutor\u2019s office of military unit no. 20102. On 16 August 2004 the latter informed the first applicant that the involvement of their servicemen in her son\u2019s abduction had not been confirmed. 58.  On 26 August 2004 the Argun district prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicants that the investigation of the abduction had been suspended but that search activities were under way. 59.  On 12 September 2006 the first applicant asked the investigating authorities to provide her with access to case-file documents. It is unclear whether the request was granted. 60.  On 22 February 2007 the first applicant requested the authorities to expedite the search for her missing son. As a result, on 27 March 2007 the investigation was resumed. It was again suspended a month later, on 27 April 2007. 61.  On 20 February 2009, 5 August 2010 and 14 February 2011 the applicants asked the investigators to provide them with an update on the progress of the investigation. In reply to the first letter the authorities informed the first applicant that the investigation had been suspended, but that search activities were being undertaken. No reply was given to either the second or the third enquiry. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 62.  The first applicant is the mother, and the second applicant the brother of Mr Movsar Limayev, who was born in 1978. 63.  At 3.30 a.m. on 28 October 2002 three APCs with smeared registration numbers stopped at the first applicant\u2019s house in the village of Mesket-Yurt. Six armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas jumped over the fence into the courtyard. Two servicemen broke into the house and demanded that the lights be turned on. Then they handcuffed Mr Movsar Limayev, who was in his underwear and barefoot, and took him outside. The intruders ordered the applicants and their relatives to remain in the house. However, the first applicant went outside and saw Mr Movsar Limayev being forced into one of the APCs, which then drove off in the direction of Shali. 64.  The applicants have had no news of Mr Movsar Limayev since. 65.  On the same day, 28 October 2002, the applicants complained of the abduction to the Shali district police and subsequently to a number of other law\u2011enforcement agencies. 66.  On 31 March 2003 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 22053 under Article 126 of the CC. On the same day the first applicant was questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case. 67.  On 31 May 2003 the investigation was suspended. 68.  On a number of occasions between 2003 and 2005 the applicants complained to various law\u2011enforcement agencies about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received formal letters, stating either that the investigation was in progress, or that their requests had been forwarded elsewhere. 69.  Between November 2005 and August 2006 the criminal case was suspended and resumed several times. The last decision to suspend the investigation of which the applicants were informed was taken on 3 August 2006. 70.  On 26 March 2008 the Materi Chechni (Mothers of Chechnya), an NGO with offices in Moscow and the Republic of Ingushetia, complained on behalf of the first applicant to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the investigation into her son\u2019s death had been ineffective. The complaint was forwarded to the investigating authority and included in the criminal case file, but no reply followed. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 71.  The first applicant is the wife, and the second applicant the son of Mr Musa Mintsaligov, who was born in 1968. 72.  At about 3 a.m. on 10 October 2004 the applicants were at home when a large group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in the village of Valerik, in two APCs and two Ural lorries without registration numbers. A group of about six servicemen broke into the house, forced Mr Musa Mintsaligov outside and took him away to an unknown destination. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian, most of them were in balaclavas and helmets; those without were of Slavic and Asian appearance. 73.  The whereabouts of Mr Musa Mintsaligov remain unknown. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 74.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that a criminal investigation be initiated. 75.  On 15 October 2004 investigators examined the crime scene. 76.  On 16 October 2004 an officer of the Valerik traffic police informed the head of the Achkhoy-Martan district police that on the night of the abduction a convoy of military vehicles, consisting of two APCs and two Ural lorries without registration numbers, had left Valerik, passed through a checkpoint, and driven off in the direction of Urus-Martan. 77.  On 1 November 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutors\u2019 office opened criminal case no. 38052 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 78.  Between 26 November and 24 December 2004 the investigators questioned numerous witnesses to the events, most of whom were the applicants\u2019 neighbours and members of their family. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 79.  On 25 December 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned by the authorities. 80.  On 1 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently resumed on 10 June 2008 and 21 July 2011 following criticism by the supervisors, and then again suspended on 10 July 2008 and 31 July 2011 respectively. 81.  In the meantime, on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2006 the applicants complained to various military and law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish Musa Mintsaligov\u2019s whereabouts. 82.  On 2 July 2010 the first applicant asked the authorities to inform her about the progress in the investigation and to resume the proceedings in the criminal case. Three days later the investigator informed her that the proceedings had been suspended on 10 July 2008 but that operational search activities were in progress. 83.  On 2 February 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her full access to the contents of the investigation file. On 8 February 2011 her request was rejected. 84.  On 21 February 2011 the first applicant challenged her lack of access to the criminal case file before the Achkhoy-Martan District Court. 85.  On 24 March 2011 the court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint, having ordered the investigators to grant her full access to the file. 86.  On 23 June 2011 the first applicant lodged another complaint with the court, challenging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic investigative steps. The complaint was rejected on 25 July 2011, because on 21 July 2011 the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. Then, ten days later, the investigation was suspended again. It appears that it is still pending. 87.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev, who was born in 1956. The first applicant is his wife, and the second and third applicants are his sons. 88.  On 22 April 2002 seven or eight armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms entered the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Goyty. The three applicants, Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev\u2019s father, mother, minor daughter and his daughter-in-law were at home and witnessed the events that followed. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen, who were of Slavic appearance, checked the family\u2019s identity documents. They then said that they would take Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev to the Urus-Martan military commander\u2019s office. After the servicemen had left, the first applicant ran outside and saw an APC and a UAZ- minivan driving away from the house. Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev has been missing ever since. 89.  On 22 April 2002 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor\u2019s office. On the same day the latter opened criminal case no. 61077 under Article 126 of CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in the case. 90.  On 22 June 2002 the investigation was suspended and on 21 October 2003 it was resumed. A month later it was suspended again. 91.  In October-November 2003 the investigators questioned the three applicants, Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev\u2019s father, mother, minor daughter and his daughter-in-law. All of them confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 92.  On 12 April 2004 the applicants requested that the Urus-Martan district police assist them in their search for Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev. On 2 June 2005 the applicants forwarded a similar request to the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office. 93.  On 22 February 2006 the applicants requested that the investigation be resumed. It was resumed on 17 July 2006, and then on 28 April 2006 it was suspended again. 94.  On 7 August 2006 the applicants requested information on the progress in the investigation and on 28 April 2010 they requested permission to access the investigation file. Their requests were refused, but the applicants successfully challenged the refusal before the Achkhoy\u2011Martan District Court. Their complaint was granted on 5 October 2010. 95.  On 22 June 2011 the applicants asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and inform them of their progress. The next day they received a letter saying that the proceedings had been suspended, but that operational search activities were in progress. 96.  On 5 July 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint against the investigators with the Urus-Martan Town Court, seeking the resumption of the investigation. 97.  On 21 July 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings, so the court rejected the applicants\u2019 complaint as groundless. An appeal lodged by the applicants against that decision was upheld by the Chechnya Supreme Court on 24 August 2011. 98.  On 31 July 2011 the proceedings were suspended again. 99.  In April 2012 the investigators resumed and then again suspended the criminal proceedings. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 100.  The first and second applicants are respectively the sister and the wife of Mr Musa Zaurbekov, who was born in 1964. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are his children, and the seventh applicant is his mother. 101.  At about 3 a.m. on 6 May 2003 the applicants and Mr Zaurbekov were at home in Grozny when a group of about ten armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into their house. Most of the servicemen were in balaclavas and those without were of Slavic appearance. They forced Mr Zaurbekov outside and took him away on foot in the direction of a nearby school, where two APCs and two UAZ vehicles were waiting. The servicemen put Mr Zaurbekov into one of the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Grozny city centre. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and their neighbours. 102.  The written statements of four neighbours, submitted by the applicants to the Court, confirm the account of the events as described above. 103.  The whereabouts of Mr Musa Zaurbekov remain unknown. 104.  On 6 May 2003 the first applicant informed the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office of the abduction and requested that a criminal investigation be opened. 105.  On 16 May 2003 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 50052 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 106.  On 5 June 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status. 107.  On 16 July 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 108.  On 20 July 2004 the above-mentioned decision was overruled and the proceedings were resumed. A month later, having not achieved any tangible results, the investigation was suspended. 109.  The investigation was subsequently resumed on 30 April 2006, suspended on 30 May 2006, resumed on 2 March 2007, and then suspended again on 3 April 2007. The applicants were not informed of those decisions. 110.  On 6 October 2010 the first applicant asked the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative, an NGO based in Moscow, to assist in the search for her brother and lodge information requests with various authorities in an attempt to establish his whereabouts. The second applicant submitted a similar request to the NGO in April 2011. 111.  From the documents submitted it transpires that between 2010 and 2011 the applicants contacted the authorities with requests for information, but to no avail. In the autumn of 2011 the first applicant requested that she be allowed to access the investigation file. On 3 November 2011 the investigators granted the request. In 2012 their close relatives and those of Mr Musa Zaurbekov contacted a local human rights NGO, which on their behalf requested various authorities to resume the investigation. 112.  On 26 March 2014 the investigation was resumed. The second applicant was granted victim status and questioned by the investigators. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 113.  The first applicant is the sister of Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov, who was born in 1976. The second applicant is his mother and the third and fourth applicants are his children. 114.  At the material time, Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov was living with his family in the village of Duba-Yurt, Chechnya. 115.  At about 4 a.m. on 20 July 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 15 May 2002) the family was at home when a large group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in an APC and a grey military UAZ minivan. A group of about ten servicemen broke into the house, searched the premises, forced Aslambek Abdurzakov outside, then put him in one of the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 116.  The same morning, at some point before the abduction, the same servicemen had broken into the house of Aslambek Abdurzakov\u2019s neighbour, Ms Z.U., and had shot her in the leg. 117.  Sometime after the abduction the second applicant received a note, allegedly handwritten by Aslambek Abdurzakov, saying that he was detained in the Urus-Martan remand prison. 118.  The whereabouts of Aslambek Abdurzakov remain unknown. 119.  On 25 July 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59168 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 120.  On 26 July 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. She and several other witnesses to the abduction were questioned. The applicant\u2019s submissions before the investigators were similar to her account before the Court. 121.  On the same date, 26 July 2002, the investigators collected two machine-gun shells found in the house of Ms Z.U., who had been shot in the leg by the abductors. The shells were sent for a ballistics expert examination. 122.  On 27 July 2002 the first applicant was questioned again. She confirmed the statement she had given previously and submitted additional information on the registration numbers of the abductors\u2019 APC and the UAZ vehicle. 123.  On the same date, 27 July 2002, the investigators questioned the second applicant, who stated, in particular, that a few days after the abduction she had seen the abductors\u2019 UAZ vehicle entering the premises of the Shatoy district police station. 124.  On 25 September 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 125.  In 2003 the applicants complained to various authorities about the abduction and requested that an effective investigation be carried out. 126.  Between 2006 and 2007 the investigation was suspended and resumed several times. The applicants were not informed of those decisions. 127.  On 16 February 2008 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her about the progress in the proceedings, and sought information from the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences on the possible detention of Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov in Russian detention facilities. 128.  On 20 June 2009 the request was granted in part. The investigators asked the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences to inform them whether Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov had been detained in a detention facility after his abduction. The outcome of that enquiry is unknown. 129.  On 5 March and 20 October 2011 the first applicant was allowed to access the investigation file. 130.  On 1 March 2012 the investigation was resumed. The first applicant gave the investigators a blood sample for inclusion in the database for identification of bodies found in the Chechen Republic. A month later, in April 2012, the investigation was suspended again. 131.  On an unspecified date in 2012 the first applicant complained to the Shali Town Court of the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic investigative steps. The outcome of those proceedings is unknown. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 132.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Saykhan Isayev, who was born in 1984. 133.  During the night between 17 and 18 January 2005 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the applicant\u2019s village of Chechen-Aul in an APC, two UAZ- vehicles and a Niva car. The servicemen were armed with machine guns and spoke unaccented Russian. At about 3 a.m. that night a group of about seventeen of them broke into the applicant\u2019s house, searched the premises, violently beat up the applicant\u2019s husband, her three sons and the pregnant wife of one of them. Then the intruders took Mr Isayev away to an unknown destination. 134.  The applicant submitted to the Court written statements of several neighbours who saw armed men entering her house and then leaving it with a man on their shoulders. As soon as they left, the neighbours entered the house, saw the injured members of the applicant\u2019s family and learned that Saykhan Isayev had been taken away. His whereabouts remain unknown. 135.  On 18 January 2005 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. 136.  On an unspecified date a decision not to open a criminal case was taken. 137.  According to the applicant, shortly after the abduction several agents from the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office arrived at her house in Chechen-Aul. They advised the applicant and her family not to lodge any official complaints concerning the events. Therefore, for some time after the abduction, fearing for her life and the lives of her family members, she refrained from asking the authorities to open a criminal case. 138.  In May 2005 one of the witnesses to the abduction, Mr R.I., was questioned. Her statement was similar to the applicant\u2019s account before the Court. 139.  On 8 June 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 44048 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 140.  On 20 June 2005 the applicant was granted victim status. 141.  On 18 August 2005, 25 and 27 March 2007, and 23 October 2008 several other witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s family members present during the incident, were questioned. Their statements were similar to the applicant\u2019s account before the Court. 142.  On 8 October 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 2 March 2007 that decision was overruled as premature and the investigation was resumed. The proceedings were subsequently resumed and suspended several times, including at least four suspensions and resumptions between June 2007 and October 2010. 143.  In the meantime, on 28 March 2007 two officials from the Chechen-Aul village administration were questioned. They stated, in particular, that prior to the abduction, law-enforcement agencies had made enquiries about Mr Isayev\u2019s home address. 144.  On 2 August 2010 and 24 October 2010 two of the applicant\u2019s sons, who had witnessed the abduction, were questioned again. They confirmed the statements they had previously given to the investigators. 145.  On 20 October 2010 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 146.  On 4 November 2010 the investigation was suspended again. 147. On 6 April 2016 the investigators resumed the proceedings in order to question the applicant and take a sample of her saliva for inclusion in a database for identification of corpses found in the Chechen Republic. It appears that the investigation is still pending.", "references": ["5", "7", "6", "8", "9", "4", "3", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a sentence in Diyarbak\u0131r prison. 7.  On 12 September 1994 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. He was allegedly subjected to torture while held in police custody, which lasted twenty-two days. 8.  The applicant was questioned by the police at the Diyarbak\u0131r Security Directorate. Subsequently, the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor took statements from him in the absence of a lawyer, concerning his involvement in the activities of Hizbullah. In his statements, the applicant admitted his membership of the illegal organisation and mentioned certain activities in which he had participated. 9.  On 20 September 1994 the applicant participated in an on-site inspection (ke\u015fif) and a reconstruction of events (yer g\u00f6sterme), in the course of which he confessed, in the absence of a lawyer, to committing some offences. 10.  On 25 September 1994 the applicant participated in another on-site inspection and reconstruction of events, in the course of which he confessed, again in the absence a lawyer, to other offences. 11.  Twenty-two days after his arrest, namely on 4 October 1994, a doctor at Diyarbak\u0131r Public Hospital drew up a collective medical report in respect of the applicant and twenty-seven other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant\u2019s body. 12.  On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He retracted the statements he had made to the police and the prosecutor, alleging that he had given them under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody. 13.  Owing to a lack of prison places, the applicant was not put in prison but was kept at the anti-terrorism branch of the Diyarbak\u0131r Security Directorate for three more days, during which time he was allegedly subjected to torture again. 14.  On 24 October 1994 the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor issued an indictment charging the applicant and twenty-one others under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State\u2019s control by killing and injuring numerous individuals. Seven other individuals were charged under Articles 168 and 169 of the same Code. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 15.  On 4 November 1994 the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 18 November 1994. 16.  At the second hearing held on 23 January 1995 the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and retracted the statements he had made to the police and the public prosecutor, alleging that they had been obtained through torture. He further stated that he had no relationship with the illegal organisation and that all the acts attributed to him had been a sham orchestrated by the police. 17.  At the hearings of 28 April, 8 December and 28 December 1995, the State Security Court heard evidence from F.E., C.D., H.Y., C.\u00d6., \u0130.A. and M.A. as witnesses and from \u0130.\u00c7. as a complainant. 18.  At the hearing held on 26 January 1996 the State Security Court informed the applicant that he was entitled to lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor concerning his allegations of torture against the police officers. 19.  At the hearings of 22 August, 4 October and 15 November 1996, the State Security Court heard evidence from H.O., \u015e.D. and M.H.B. as witnesses, and from S.\u00d6. as a complainant. 20.  On 22 August 1996 the applicant maintained his allegation that he had been tortured while in police custody and applied to the court for his release and acquittal. 21.  At the hearings of 5 August and 30 December 1997, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and M.E. as witnesses. 22.  On 6 November 1997 the applicant stated that he had been coerced by the police into admitting to the acts attributed to him. 23.  At the hearings of 5 March and 3 December 1998, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and A.\u00d6. as witnesses. 24.  While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. 25.  In the first thirty-four hearings that were held until the hearing of 20 July 1999, the composition of the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court changed seventeen times. Each time the previous reports were read out as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 26.  At the hearing of 20 July 1999, the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, read out the previous reports as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 27.  On 15 January 2002, 23 October 2003 and 12 May 2005 the public prosecutor filed additional indictments against the applicant, charging him under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code. In total, the applicant was accused of taking part in the killing of nineteen people and of injuring eight others on behalf of Hizbullah. The Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court joined all the cases owing to the link between them. 28.  By virtue of Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 29.  At a hearing held on 2 February 2007, the applicant applied to the court for his acquittal. 30.  On 26 February 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court relied on, inter alia, the statements the applicant had given to the police and the public prosecutor, the reports of the reconstruction of events and the on-site inspection, as well as the statements of some of the co-accused and the witness F.E. It rejected the applicant\u2019s contention that he had been tortured while in police custody on the grounds that according to the medical report dated 4 October 1994, no traces of ill-treatment had been found on him. According to the reasoned judgment, thirty other co-defendants who had given incriminating statements to the police denied the accusations against themselves when giving evidence in person before the trial court. In particular, twenty-eight of them had fully retracted their police statements before the trial court while two of them had partially done so. 31.  The applicant appealed and on 16 April 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. It appears from the decision of the Court of Cassation that the applicant\u2019s request for a correction of his age had been dismissed by the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 32.  In 2010 the applicant requested a copy of the medical report prepared on 4 October 1994 from the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office. On 5 February 2010 he was informed that all the documents prepared in 1994 had been destroyed in 2004.", "references": ["9", "5", "6", "7", "0", "8", "4", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "3.  The applicant, who is now deceased, was born in 1937 and lived in Paris. 4.  On 23 June 2009 the guardianship judge of the District Court of the 15th Administrative District of Paris placed the applicant, who was then seventy-two years of age, under enhanced protective supervision (curatelle renforc\u00e9e) for five years, on an initial request from his adoptive daughter. In order to reach her decision, the judge first of all requested the opinions of Dr M.F. and Dr J\u2011P.B., two specialists, who each drew up a medical certificate, on 25 November 2008 and 14 March 2009 respectively. She appointed M.-C.M as supervisor (see paragraphs 24 to 34 below for further details on the protective supervision system). 5.  The applicant applied to the Paris Regional Court for the lifting of the measure, in the alternative for his placement under ordinary supervision, and in the further alternative for the reduction of the period of supervision to twenty-four months. On 18 December 2009 the Paris Regional Court dismissed those requests. It noted that the report drawn up by Dr R., a neuropsychiatrist whom the applicant had consulted, had ruled out any form of dementia but had confirmed a slight cognitive impairment and some psychological fragility and vulnerability, rendering a protective measure necessary in view of the extent of the applicant\u2019s personal assets. The court agreed with Dr B. that the applicant had previously considered the management of his real property as a hobby, that he no longer had the physical and mental capacities for performing that task, that it was important that he be relieved of the said task of managing his business interests and tax returns, and that, similarly, he should no longer be allowed to dispose of his property. However, the court considered that the measure could be adjusted on the basis of the cognitive impairment noted, allowing him to hold a bank account and a cash withdrawal card. 6.  The applicant requested his supervisor\u2019s authorisation to marry M.S., a friend whom he had known since 1996 and who had become his partner in 2008. The supervisor interviewed M.S. and the applicant, at first separately and then together. They informed her of the importance which they attached to the religious dimension of marriage. On 17 December 2009 the supervisor refused to authorise the marriage on the grounds that she had only known the applicant for a few months and that she therefore lacked the necessary background to authorise a wedding. 7.  By order of 21 December 2009, the guardianship judge ordered a social inquiry, and commissioned the D\u00e9partement Union of Family Associations (the \u201cUDAF\u201d) to gather information on the applicant\u2019s living conditions, lifestyle, social status and circle of friends. The applicant appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal against that order. 8.  On 21 December 2009 the guardianship judge commissioned a medical opinion, on her own initiative, in order to consolidate her knowledge of the case file with an eye to determining the applicant\u2019s capacity to enter into wedlock. 9.  On 18 January 2010 the psychiatrist appointed by the judge drew up a detailed medical certificate concluding that the applicant suffered from intellectual disorders. While noting the applicant\u2019s capacity to consent to marriage, the psychiatrist considered him incapable of dealing with the consequences of his consent in terms of his property and finances. In his report, quoting passages from his interview with the applicant, the psychiatrist gave his personal opinion on the facts of the case, including works carried out by the applicant on his apartment. He also considered that some of the arguments put forward by the applicant in favour of his marriage \u201cbordered on the absurd\u201d, including the fact that his grandmothers had also remarried at an advanced age and that he wanted help in looking after himself and carrying out everyday chores. 10.  On 1 March 2010 the Paris Court of Appeal declared inadmissible the applicant\u2019s appeal against the order of 21 December 2009. It held that it was in the interests of a vulnerable adult for the guardianship judge to take all the necessary action to ensure his protection, bearing in mind that a person under a supervision order can only get married with the authorisation of the supervisor, or failing that, of the judge, who could order a social inquiry or an inspection by a person of his or her choosing. The court noted that that was precisely the option which had been taken by the guardianship judge in issuing two separate orders for a medical examination and a social inquiry. 11.  On 1 June 2010 the UDAF submitted its report. It emphasised that there was a financial stake at the heart of a major family conflict, in which the applicant\u2019s interest and well-being did not seem to be given much consideration. It noted that the applicant\u2019s daughter and M.S. accused each other of being primarily interested in the applicant\u2019s fortune, and that it was unclear whether the latter was being influenced by anyone. The UDAF added that the applicant was deeply affected by the conflict and that he seemed to consider marriage as a way of ensuring that he had someone at his side to assist him and to organise his daily life, and to avoid having to end his life on his own. 12.  On 24 June 2010, after hearing the applicant and his daughter, the guardianship judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. While noting that no one disputed the latter\u2019s attachment to M.S., it ruled that that was insufficient to justify authorising the planned wedding. Having pointed out that the applicant and M.S. were former alcoholics and that the applicant was apparently still drinking, the judge stated that he \u201cwas therefore only seeking greater safety in  marriage in order to prevent a possible break-up and therefore the risk of ending his life alone\u201d. Furthermore, she considered that the lack of clarity as to the financial implications of the marriage was particularly worrying as the applicant was torn between his daughter and M.S., and financial considerations had manifestly led to a serious conflict between the two, quoting the UDAF\u2019s findings on that point. Without pronouncing on the religious dimension mentioned by the applicant, she concluded that the planned marriage as it stood was not in the applicant\u2019s interests. The applicant appealed. 13.  By judgment of 6 September 2011 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the guardianship judge\u2019s decision of 24 June 2010. It noted that although the applicant had on several occasions expressed the wish to marry M.S., the serious disorders from which he had been suffering for several years had severely affected his judgment, as noted in the medical certificates of 14 March 2009 and 18 January 2010. Moreover, his anosognosia had prevented him from planning his joint life with his partner, taking account of the financial and legal implications of marriage. Furthermore, while the applicant seemed emotionally attached to his partner, the court noted that since they had been living together the applicant had been managing his affairs in an increasingly unreasonable manner, and his supervisor had not always been able to protect his interests. In particular, the applicant had had work carried out in the family apartment to the tune of 250,000 euros a few months after his wife\u2019s death, and had placed her furniture in storage under somewhat questionable conditions. The court of appeal also noted that a draft handwritten will had been prepared on 14 August 2009 in M.S.\u2019s favour, observing that according to his lawyer\u2019s submissions, the applicant held assets of some 6,000,000 euros and had concluded with his deceased wife a universal community of assets contract. The court of appeal further noted that the applicant\u2019s relations with his daughter, M.D., had seriously deteriorated. The court of appeal concluded that although the inquiries ordered by the guardianship judge had mentioned the applicant\u2019s and M.S.\u2019s mutual affection, the psychopathological turn in his disorders and his failing perception of the realities of his finances were such that he could not give his informed consent to marriage. 14.  The applicant appealed on points of law. In that appeal he also put a request for a preliminary ruling (a \u201cQPC\u201d) on the constitutionality of Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code. He submitted that that provision contravened, in particular, the principle of freedom of marriage by making the marriage of a supervisee subject to the supervisor\u2019s authorisation, or failing that, to that of the guardianship judge. 15.  By decision of 29 June 2012 (no. 2012-260 QPC), the Constitutional Council, noting that the right to marriage was based on Articles 2 and 4 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, declared Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code to be in conformity with the Constitution, given that it did not prohibit marriage but rather permitted it with the supervisor\u2019s authorisation, the withholding of which could be brought before a court, which was required to organise adversarial proceedings followed by a reasoned decision, against which an appeal also lay. The court also considered that, having regard to the personal and pecuniary obligations stemming from marriage, the latter was an important civil act with which the said restrictions on freedom of marriage did not interfere disproportionately. 16.  On 5 December 2012 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. On the one hand, it noted that the Constitutional Council had declared Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code constitutional, and on the other, held that the Paris Court of Appeal had lawfully reasoned its decision by analysing not only the relevant medical certificates but also the other documents on file, thus enabling it to deduce that the applicant was incapable of providing informed consent to his marriage owing both to the psychopathological evolution of his disorders and to his loss of control over the realities of his financial situation. 17.  On 15 February 2016 counsel for the applicant informed the Court of his client\u2019s death on 4 February 2016. 18.  On 6 September 2016 he informed the Court of M.S.\u2019s intention to pursue the application. The Registry of the Court invited the Government to present their comments on that development.", "references": ["7", "0", "6", "4", "1", "8", "5", "2", "3", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1933 and was detained in Milan up to the time of his death in 2016. 6.  The applicant, who had been a fugitive on the run from the authorities (latitante) for over forty years, was arrested on 11 April 2006. 7.  Several sets of criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant, as a result of which he was sentenced to several terms of life imprisonment for, amongst other offences, membership of a mafia-type criminal organisation, mass murder (strage), multiple homicide, aggravated attempted homicide, drug trafficking, kidnapping, criminal coercion, aggravated theft, and the illegal possession of firearms. 8.  Other criminal proceedings against the applicant were ongoing at the time the application was lodged before the Court. In the context of one such set of proceedings, on 7 December 2012 the preliminary hearing judge (giudice dell\u2019udienza preliminare, hereafter \u201cthe GUP\u201d) of the Palermo District Court ordered an expert evaluation of the applicant\u2019s health in order to assess his ability to understand and participate rationally in the preliminary hearing. 9.  On 12 December 2012 the court-appointed experts carried out a first examination. However, they were unable to undertake further assessments, because on 17 December 2012 the applicant underwent surgery to remove a subdural haematoma, and was then in recovery (see paragraph 25 below). Based on their first examination conducted before the surgery and the applicant\u2019s past medical records, the experts nonetheless reported that the applicant had displayed reduced consciousness and responsiveness to his surroundings, as well as a limited ability to express himself. 10.  By an order of 8 January 2013 the GUP adjourned the proceedings against the applicant until such time as he had recovered from the surgery. 11.  Following a documented improvement in his condition, the GUP ordered a new expert evaluation, which was carried out on 1 March 2013. The experts found that the applicant\u2019s cognitive situation impaired his ability to interact with the outside world and communicate in a coherent and meaningful manner. They thus concluded that the applicant was not in a condition to consciously participate in the preliminary hearing. 12.  By an order of 5 March 2013 the GUP suspended the proceedings against the applicant. 13.  On 21 May 2014 the Guardianship Judge at the Milan District Court issued a guardianship order appointing the applicant\u2019s son, Angelo Provenzano, as his limited guardian (amministratore di sostegno). The court observed that the applicant\u2019s son had previously been appointed as the applicant\u2019s legal guardian following the applicant\u2019s being sentenced to life imprisonment and the consequent legal incapacitation such a sentence entailed under domestic law. For the purposes of the proceedings before it, the court gave the applicant\u2019s son authority over decisions that concerned his health-care and personal assistance needs. The court also authorised the applicant\u2019s son to be served with the applicant\u2019s legal correspondence, and conferred upon him the power to appoint counsel in criminal and civil proceedings. On 27 May 2014 Angelo Provenzano was sworn in as the applicant\u2019s guardian. 14.  The applicant was detained in several Italian correctional facilities. According to the material in the case file, he was detained in the Novara Correctional Facility from an unspecified date until 27 April 2011, when he was transferred to the Parma Correctional Facility. On 7 June 2013 he was admitted to the correctional wing (reparto protetto) of Parma General Hospital, where he remained until his transfer to the Treatment and Diagnostic Centre (centro diagnostico terapeutico) of the Milan Opera Correctional Facility on 5 April 2014. On 9 April 2014 he was admitted to the correctional wing of San Paolo Hospital in Milan, where he was hospitalised until his death. 15.  The applicant suffered from a number of chronic medical conditions, including vascular encephalopathy, hepatopathy linked to HCV (the hepatitis C virus), Parkinson\u2019s disease, and arterial hypertension. It is apparent from his medical history that he underwent a radical prostatectomy in 2003 and a partial thyroidectomy on an unspecified date. The applicant\u2019s clinical condition was also characterised by a decline in his cognitive functioning. 16.  The prison medical records from May 2011 to April 2013 show that the applicant\u2019s health was regularly monitored by medical and nursing staff at the Parma Correctional Facility\u2019s health unit. In addition to such monitoring, there is a record of physicians being called to examine the applicant when he complained about specific ailments, or when they were requested by the nursing staff. 17.  During the same period, the prison medical records show that a large number of specialist consultations were arranged and carried out. The applicant was examined by cardiologists, infectious disease specialists, urologists, endocrinologists, otolaryngologists, pulmonologists, orthopaedists, physiatrists, and nutrition specialists, and most of the examinations occurred on a regular basis. He also had several surgical consultations. 18.  A large number of diagnostic tests were performed on him, ranging from routine blood tests and echocardiograms to various ultrasounds (renal, thyroidal, and abdominal), CAT (computerised axial tomography) scans, PET (positron emission tomography) scans, PSA (prostate-specific antigen) tests, X-rays, and colonoscopies. 19.  With specific regard to the applicant\u2019s neurological situation, the medical register shows that he was examined several times by a neurologist, a psychiatrist and a psychologist, and that tests were performed. 20.  Each entry in the medical register by prison medical staff includes a section on the therapeutic plan for the management of the applicant\u2019s chronic illnesses, health issues deriving from his prostatectomy and thyroidectomy, and other emerging health issues, with relevant drug dosages and a record of the medication administered. 21.  On 17 October 2012 a doctor at the correctional facility\u2019s medical centre reported an increase in the applicant\u2019s blood pressure and transferred him to the emergency department of the civilian hospital in Parma, where he was diagnosed with a hypertensive crisis. A CAT scan and other diagnostic tests were performed, and the applicant was examined by specialists. The neurologist who examined the applicant described him as a subject with cognitive deterioration on a vascular basis. Following an improvement in his overall condition, he was discharged on 19 October 2012. 22.  On 3 December 2012 the duty doctor transferred the applicant to the civilian hospital in Parma, as he appeared disorientated and was refusing to eat or take his prescribed medication. The duty doctor also reported that the applicant had fallen, with no consequences, but noted that this was among more than four accidental falls that had occurred.\nAccording to the civilian hospital record, an ultrasound was performed and the applicant was examined by a neurologist, a psychiatrist and a nutrition specialist. The neurologist who examined him on 3 December detected signs of initial cerebral deterioration which could be attributed to degenerative and vascular causes, and the neurologist who visited him the next day found probable cognitive deterioration on a vascular basis. The applicant was declared fit to be discharged on 7 December 2012. 23.  On 12 December 2012 the duty doctor was called by a prison officer, who reported that the applicant had slipped in his cell and fallen. He described the patient as alert and somewhat cooperative, although his verbal expression not readily comprehensible. He examined the applicant. He checked for signs of trauma and found none, and examined his pupils, which were isocoric, isocyclic and reactive to light. He concluded that no neurological deficits could be detected. He also examined, amongst other things, the applicant\u2019s heart rate, blood pressure, and blood sugar levels. While no repercussions worthy of note were registered, amongst other things, the doctor suggested that the applicant be placed with a cellmate so as to ensure, amongst other things, the timely signalling of any worsening of his conditions. The doctor further recommended that his cell be equipped with a bed with safety rails. 24.  On 15 December 2012 the duty nurse reported that the applicant had fallen out of bed while sleeping. The duty doctor examined him and found him to be alert, cooperative and oriented. The doctor noted what he described as minimal bruising above the applicant\u2019s right eye, and reported normal vital signs. He examined the applicant on another occasion on the same day, reported normal cardiorespiratory values, and instructed the nurse to monitor his vital signs. 25.  On 17 December 2012 the duty nurse called the doctor, as the applicant was not responding to verbal or painful stimuli. He was transferred to the emergency room of the civilian hospital in Parma, where he underwent urgent surgery for the removal of a subdural haematoma. He was then placed in the hospital\u2019s long-term care unit, and later in its correctional wing. 26.  In the application form it is stated that the applicant\u2019s counsel lodged a criminal complaint with the Parma public prosecutor alleging, amongst other things, that the prison administration had failed to properly care for the applicant, and that the he had been left without medical assistance following the fall on 15 December 2012. However, there are no specific details about when that complaint was lodged, and no information was provided as to its outcome. 27.  On 18 February 2013 the hospital doctors decided that the applicant could be discharged. 28.  On 26 February 2013 an inspection was carried out by two doctors from the correctional facility\u2019s medical unit to assess whether the premises where the applicant was to be accommodated on his return were compatible with his health and care needs. 29.  On the same day the prison management issued a report summarising the structural changes that had already been carried out in view of the applicant\u2019s return \u2013 such as the installation of a new bed with safety rails \u2013 and changes which were scheduled. Those scheduled changes included, amongst other things, an intervention in respect of the electrical system, planned for the same day, in order to plug in a special mattress to prevent bedsores and install an oxygen tank for medical emergencies. 30.  On 1 March 2013 a personalised care plan had been drawn up by the correctional facility\u2019s medical unit in view of the applicant\u2019s return. The plan outlined the applicant\u2019s general and specific needs, and included a schedule of regular medical examinations, a nutrition and hydration plan, and a plan to avoid bedsores and other consequences of long-term bed rest. Specialist consultations to follow up on the applicant\u2019s medical conditions were requested and scheduled. The care plan also concerned assistance which the applicant required with daily tasks he could no longer perform, such as taking care of his personal hygiene on a daily basis. It also provided for the management of his incontinence and scheduled times at which his incontinence pads should be changed, with provision for additional changes according to his needs. 31.  On 5 March 2013 the applicant was transferred back to the Parma Correctional Facility. The medical register from that date to the date of his transfer to the civilian hospital in Parma shows that, in addition to the treatment of his chronic conditions, the applicant underwent physiotherapy sessions to improve his mobility, coupled with passive mobilisation, also during the night, in order to avoid bedsores. 32.  On 7 June 2013 the applicant was admitted to the civilian hospital in Parma. He was diagnosed with a bacterial infection and a yeast infection. Following a consultation with an infectious disease specialist, he was prescribed treatment. He remained hospitalised in the civilian hospital until his transfer on 5 April 2014. The material on file indicates that, during this period of hospitalisation, the applicant had daily medical examinations, periodic visits from specialists, and diagnostic tests. 33.  On 29 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s son lodged a criminal complaint with the Parma public prosecutor, alleging that his father was not being properly cared for, in that his underwear, which had been collected from the correctional facility on 22 June 2013, had been stained with bodily fluids. No information was provided by the parties as to the outcome of those proceedings. 34.  On 10 October 2013 the Parma Prison administration submitted a report on the applicant to the General Directorate for the Treatment of \u201cSection 41 bis\u201d Detainees. The report attested that an inspection had been carried out by the local health authority on 26 February 2013 (see paragraph 28 above). It also certified and provided documentation to the effect that health-care assistants and nurses had taken care of the applicant\u2019s personal hygiene on a daily basis as of 5 March 2013, in accordance with the instructions set out in the personalised care plan (see paragraph 30 above). 35.  On 23 December 2013 the hospital in Parma submitted a report updating the Parma Prison administration on the applicant\u2019s clinical situation. He was diagnosed by the reporting doctor as suffering from serious cognitive deterioration. He was described as being necessarily bedridden due to a hypokinetic syndrome, and completely dependent on others.\nThe applicant\u2019s neurological situation was described as stable yet having deteriorated. His verbal expression, when present, was characterised by the production of a few incomprehensible syllables, which meant that the reporting doctor had had difficulties in assessing his degree of comprehension.\nThe applicant was receiving artificial nutrition and hydration via a nasointestinal feeding tube which had been put in place on 6 September 2013 due to his confirmed inability to feed himself. 36.  On 29 January 2014 the Emergency Department of Parma General Hospital submitted a report updating the Director of Parma Prison on the applicant\u2019s clinical situation. The first part of the report mainly repeated the findings of the report of 23 December 2013. Another part focused on the applicant\u2019s cognitive status. In this respect, the reporting doctor stated that, during medical examinations, the applicant sometimes answered simple questions when he was verbally stimulated, but his expression was mostly incomprehensible. 37.  On 19 March 2014 Parma General Hospital submitted another report updating the Parma Prison administration on the applicant\u2019s clinical situation. Amongst other things, the reporting doctors had identified progressive atrophy of his muscular apparatus and the presence of small lesions caused by bedsores. His neuro-cognitive situation remained unchanged. If asleep, he woke up when stimulated. He rarely uttered intelligible words or carried out elementary tasks when stimulated. His verbal expression, when present, was described as incomprehensible. The reporting doctor confirmed the previous report\u2019s finding to the effect that the applicant was completely dependent on others for everything. Since the insertion of the nasointestinal feeding tube, his necessary daily calorie intake had been ensured, with a consequent improvement in his nutritional status and weight. 38.  On 5 April 2014 the applicant was released from Parma General Hospital. On the same day he was transferred to the Treatment and Diagnostic Centre of the Milan Opera Correctional Facility and was scheduled to be transferred to San Paolo Hospital for, amongst other things, an examination by a neurologist and an oncologist, a re-evaluation of his artificial nutritional support strategy, and a general re-evaluation of his treatment. 39.  On 9 April 2014 the applicant was transferred to San Paolo Hospital in Milan, where he remained until the time of his death. 40.  It is apparent from the material on file that, during his period of hospitalisation at San Paolo Hospital, the applicant had daily medical examinations, periodic visits from specialists and a wide range of tests (routine blood tests, regular monitoring of glycaemia, renal, hepatic and thyroid function, blood pressure, cardiac frequency, and daily hydration monitoring, as well as diagnostic tests such as CAT scans). There is evidence of treatment of the applicant\u2019s bedsores and treatment to prevent the problem being aggravated, treatment of urinary infections linked to long-term catheterisation, treatment of intestinal problems and adjustments to the applicant\u2019s hydration and nutritional support. 41.  On 11 April 2014 the applicant underwent a neuropsychological examination by a specialist in San Paolo Hospital. He was described as being alert but not complying with instructions, aside from very simple ones. The reporting doctor stated, inter alia, that if the applicant was left on his own he voiced scarcely comprehensible sentences lacking a framework or grammatical structure. One of the conclusions the doctor reached was that the applicant\u2019s lack of cooperation made it impossible to evaluate and quantify his cognitive status. 42.  On 11 June 2014 the head of the ward where the applicant was hospitalised submitted a report updating the court in Rome responsible for the execution of sentences (\u201cthe Rome Court\u201d) on the applicant\u2019s clinical situation. The reporting doctor confirmed the findings of the report by the Parma General Hospital authorities of 19 March 2014 in terms of the applicant\u2019s neuro-cognitive situation, which he described as seriously compromised, as well as his progressive muscular atrophy, lack of mobility, and complete dependence on others. The reporting doctor concluded that there had been a serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s clinical state, and his condition was worsening. As to nutrition, in addition to the nasointestinal tube, artificial nutritional support had to be provided by central venous access. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, in the light of his current state of health, the applicant could only receive adequate medical treatment in a long-term care unit within a hospital. The doctors certified that the facility in which he was hospitalised had the necessary medical staff and equipment to provide adequate care and treatment, and recommended that he remain in the hospital. 43.  On 8 August 2014 a report was submitted by two independent medical experts appointed by the Milan Court. The experts had been asked to provide an assessment of the applicant\u2019s overall state of health and to specify, inter alia, whether he could receive adequate treatment in the hospital ward where he was currently detained.\nFollowing consideration of a summary of his medical history, clinical chart and other health documentation, the experts provided an account of their examination of the applicant, whom they recorded as being hospitalised in the Internal Medicine Division, in the \u201c[section] 41 bis area\u201d of the hospital\u2019s correctional wing. He was described as bedridden and was noted as being physically restrained because of his attempts to remove his feeding tube. His language and elocution could not be assessed; when greeted, he uttered things which were incomprehensible, to the experts and also to the health staff he had contact with on a daily basis. His state of consciousness was only examinable in terms of his being awake or asleep, and neither his space-time orientation nor his thought function could be conclusively assessed. His degree of collaboration was hard to gauge, owing to his incomprehensible verbal expression.\nThe experts described the applicant\u2019s clinical situation as complex and characterised by multiple pathologies, although none of those pathologies were at an acute stage. The pathologies with the greatest functional impact were identified as being extrapyramidal syndrome and serious cognitive decline. The applicant\u2019s being permanently bedridden, and the need for artificial nutrition and a permanent urinary catheter were permanent conditions not likely to improve. The experts reiterated his complete lack of autonomy in terms of performing basic everyday functions, and highlighted the need to provide him with constant assistance for his nutrition, hydration, personal hygiene, and to prevent complications linked to long-term bed rest. His cognitive situation was described as having worsened since the previous neuropsychological examination (see paragraph 41 above).\nAs to the applicant\u2019s continued hospitalisation \u2013 albeit in the context of detention \u2013 and the adequacy of the care he received, the experts considered that San Paolo Hospital guaranteed an excellent level of treatment and the presence of clinical specialists who could ensure timely interventions in the event of complications. The absence of the kind of treatment which the applicant was receiving at that point would lead to his death in a very short time. 44.  In a medical report of 11 August 2014 submitted by San Paolo Hospital to the Milan Opera Prison administration, the reporting doctor described the applicant\u2019s condition as stable and reiterated the presence of a serious cognitive decline that made the applicant unable to maintain interactions with people and take care of himself. 45.  The latter findings were confirmed in a subsequent report issued on 17 September 2014. 46.  Various other reports were issued by doctors of San Paolo Hospital in Milan between April 2015 and March 2016. The applicant\u2019s clinical situation was generally described as stable, although his neurological functions were characterised as being in progressive decline (report of 12 June 2015) and his cognitive functioning was described as having seriously deteriorated (report of 17 March 2016). Throughout the entire period the applicant was bedridden and received all his hydration and nutritional support via a nasointestinal feeding tube. 47.  According to the most recent medical reports on file, issued by San Paolo Hospital in Milan on 9 and 13 July 2016, the applicant\u2019s clinical condition deteriorated severely and he entered a preterminal phase. The report of 13 July 2016 states that the applicant\u2019s relatives were granted access to his room and he died on the same day. 48.  It is apparent from the material in the case file that, during the applicant\u2019s detention in Parma and Milan, his lawyers lodged applications with different courts responsible for the execution of sentences, seeking the suspension of his prison sentence for medical reasons under Articles 146 and 147 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 81 and 82 below for the relevant domestic law provisions) and the replacement of his detention with more lenient custodial measures. 49.  By a decision of 3 May 2013 the Bologna court responsible for the execution of sentences (\u201cthe Bologna Court\u201d) held that there were no grounds for modifying the applicant\u2019s sentence on health grounds. The court found that the applicant\u2019s medical conditions were not in such an advanced state that he was no longer responding to treatment, a necessary condition for the application of Article 146 of the Criminal Code.\nThe court also found that discretionary suspension of the sentence under Article 147 was not warranted. It considered that it could not be stated that the applicant\u2019s medical conditions required treatment which could not be provided in custody, albeit custody coupled with admission to a civilian hospital whenever necessary. The Bologna Court considered that he had received and was receiving medical treatment, frequent medical examinations, and diagnostic tests. It underlined that the applicant had been admitted to a civilian hospital when the necessary treatment could not be administered in the correctional facility, even for extended periods of time. It also noted that the proximity of the civilian hospital to the correctional facility made it possible for the applicant to be admitted to the emergency department in a timely fashion and whenever necessary.\nThe court reiterated that a court deciding on discretionary suspension of a sentence on health grounds must also take into account, as a relevant factor, the possibility that the individual applying for the suspension might engage in criminal behaviour (see paragraph 82 below). In this regard, the court considered that the applicant was a \u201csocially dangerous\u201d person who had been arrested after many years as a fugitive, and who was being tried for and had already been convicted of extremely serious crimes. 50.  By a decision of 27 August 2013 the Bologna Court held that there were no grounds for modifying the applicant\u2019s sentence on health grounds. The court found that the applicant\u2019s medical conditions were not in such an advanced state that he was no longer responding to treatment. Moreover, the court considered that he would not benefit from additional or alternative medical treatment if his sentence were suspended.\nThe court was also not persuaded that the conditions for discretionary suspension under Article 147 obtained. It noted that the medical documentation it had considered showed that the applicant\u2019s medical conditions were being adequately monitored and treated in the correctional facility, with external hospitalisation being sought when required. Referring to the medical reports in its possession, the court noted that the applicant was responding positively to treatment and in the manner expected, given his advanced age and the nature of his medical conditions.\nAs in its decision of 3 May 2013, the court further considered the danger that the applicant, a socially dangerous individual, could commit criminal offences in the event of his sentence being suspended. In this connection, the court considered that, notwithstanding the applicant\u2019s proven cognitive deficit, the documentation available to it did not allow it to exclude his \u2013 albeit fluctuating and diminished \u2013 ability to comprehend and communicate. 51.  The applicant appealed against the decision before the Court of Cassation.  On 4 April 2014 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. It reiterated the Bologna Court\u2019s findings to the effect that the applicant\u2019s health conditions were being adequately monitored, and the necessary medical treatment was being administered in the correctional facility, with external hospitalisation when required. The court was satisfied that the Bologna Court had relied on the most recent medical reports in its possession in concluding that the conditions required for a stay of execution of the applicant\u2019s sentence under Articles 146 and 147 of the Criminal Code had not been met. 52.  By a decision of 3 October 2014 the Milan Court held that there were no grounds for modifying the applicant\u2019s sentence on health grounds. In making its assessment, the court relied on the content of the report by the two independent experts it had appointed (see paragraph 43 above). The court reiterated that, in cases such as the one under examination, the primary consideration had to be the best interests of the detainee in terms of safeguarding his health. The court considered that the applicant was not being detained in a correctional facility, but rather he had been placed in a highly specialist civilian hospital which could provide him with the most appropriate and effective care and treatment for his medical conditions. Moreover, in the court\u2019s view, his placement in the correctional unit and not within the general hospital population guaranteed an even higher level of attention and vigilance with respect to his critical health conditions. The court concluded that the applicant\u2019s situation at the time of the decision was the one that best secured his right to health. The applicant appealed against that decision before the Court of Cassation. 53.  By a decision of 11 November 2014 the Bologna Court held that there were no grounds for modifying the applicant\u2019s sentence on health grounds. It first of all reiterated and expressed its agreement with the conclusions of the Milan Court in its decision of 3 October 2014. It referred to the reports prepared by the medical staff at San Paolo Hospital and the independent medical experts appointed by the Milan Court in concluding that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s medical conditions, he was not being detained in a correctional facility, but rather in a civilian hospital, and was responding to the treatment administered in that setting. 54.  By a decision of 9 June 2015 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged against the Milan Court\u2019s decision of 3 October 2014. It considered that the reasoning of the Milan Court hinged on the need to safeguard the detainee\u2019s right to health to the fullest extent possible, and could not be deemed to be at odds with the provisions of the Criminal Code regulating stays of execution of prison sentences for health reasons. 55.  By a decision of 11 July 2016 the Milan judge responsible for the execution of sentences (magistrato di sorveglianza) decided, on a provisional basis and pending a decision of the court responsible for the execution of sentences, that no urgent interim measure entailing a stay of execution of the applicant\u2019s sentence was warranted. The judge found, inter alia, that the applicant was being treated in a facility that guaranteed excellent levels of care and which had medical and nursing staff of an extremely high quality, and that his detention in the hospital did not conflict with the common understanding of humanity. 56.  On 13 April 2006 the Minister of Justice issued a decree ordering that the applicant should be made subject to the special prison regime provided for in the second subsection of section 41 bis of the Prison Administration Act (see paragraphs 83 - 86 below for the domestic law provisions). 57.  The 2006 decree imposed the following restrictions:\n\u2013  restrictions on visits by family members (a maximum of a single one\u2011hour visit per month);\n\u2013  no visits with non-family members;\n\u2013  a prohibition on using the telephone;\n\u2013  no sums of money above a fixed amount to be received or sent out;\n\u2013  no more than two parcels to be received per month, not exceeding a certain weight, but permission to receive two special parcels per year containing clothing and bed linen;\n\u2013  no right to participate in elections for prisoners\u2019 representatives or to be elected as a representative;\n\u2013  no handicrafts;\n\u2013  no food requiring cooking to be purchased;\n\u2013  no more than two hours\u2019 outdoor exercise per day, of which one could be spent in the library facilities, gym, and so on, and in groups of no more than four persons. 58.  In addition, incoming and outgoing correspondence was to be monitored, subject to prior authorisation by the judicial authority. 59.  The application of the special regime was subsequently extended for periods of one or two years, via extension orders issued on 5 April 2007, 3 April 2008, 2 April 2009, 1 April 2010, 28 March 2012, 26 March 2014 and 23 March 2016. 60.  On 8 March 2013, in an application addressed to three different courts for the execution of sentences (Bologna, Rome and Parma) as well as to the Minister of Justice, the applicant\u2019s counsel sought revocation of the special prison regime provided for by section 41 bis of the Prison Administration Act, a key argument being that, in the light of the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s cognitive functioning, the reasons as to why the regime had been applied originally were no longer relevant. 61.  On 22 July 2013 the District Anti-Mafia Prosecution Office (Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, hereafter \u201cthe DDA\u201d) of Caltanissetta expressed a favourable opinion on revocation of the special prison regime. The office acknowledged that there had been a deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health, noting his compromised cognitive functioning, as evidenced by the medical documentation available to it. It noted in particular the conclusions of the report by the experts appointed by the Palermo GUP (see paragraph 11 above) to the effect that the applicant\u2019s cognitive functioning had deteriorated and his ability to communicate had been impaired. In the light of such findings, the office expressed the opinion that the reasons which had initially justified the imposition of the special prison regime no longer obtained. 62.  By a decision of 27 August 2013 the Rome Court declared the applicant\u2019s application of 8 March 2013 inadmissible. It considered that the power to revoke the imposition of the section 41 bis special prison regime per se rested with the Minister of Justice. The court only had jurisdiction in relation to applications lodged against decisions issued by the Minister of Justice, such as orders to renew the application of the special regime or refusals by the Minister to revoke orders for the regime. The court was therefore precluded from examining the merits of the application. 63.  On 21 November 2013 the applicant\u2019s counsel lodged an application with the Minister of Justice seeking revocation of the section 41 bis special prison regime. On an unspecified date the Minister of Justice dismissed the application. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s son on 11 February 2014. 64.  On 13 February 2014 the applicant\u2019s counsel lodged an application against the latter decision with the Rome Court. He reiterated the arguments advanced in the application of 8 March 2013. 65.  On 26 March 2014 the Minister of Justice issued an order renewing the application of the special prison regime for two years. It was found that the applicant\u2019s ability to maintain contact with members of the criminal organisation had not ceased, and regard was also had to his \u201cparticular and concrete dangerousness\u201d. 66.  The order reiterated the rationale underlying the special prison regime, and restated in particular that its imposition constituted a preventive measure in the interests of ensuring public safety and order, and did not serve any punitive purpose. 67.  The order also reviewed some of the applicant\u2019s convictions for extremely serious crimes, including multiple aggravated homicides, aiding and abetting mass murder (stragi), and criminal association, which indicated his high level of responsibility in the criminal organisation. 68.  The order further gave an overview of information provided by different police bodies, prosecution offices, the Anti-Mafia Investigations Directorate, and the Minister of the Interior, which had been requested with a view to ascertaining the persistence of the conditions justifying the extension of the regime (istruttorie relative alla preesistente attualit\u00e0 ed alla permanente gravit\u00e0 delle esigenze di prevenzione ai fini della proroga). It also summarised opinions issued by the DDAs of Florence and Caltanissetta in February 2014 and by the National Anti-Mafia and Counterterrorism Prosecution Office (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo, hereafter \u201cthe DNA\u201d) and the Palermo DDA in March 2014. 69.  The order stated that the Palermo, Caltanissetta and Florence DDAs had expressed an unfavourable opinion as to the renewal of the restrictions, in the light of the applicant\u2019s health conditions. However, it stated that the Palermo DDA had found that the applicant was still socially dangerous. 70.  The order focused in particular on the findings of the DNA, which outlined the applicant\u2019s criminal profile as well as Cosa Nostra\u2019s (the Sicilian Mafia) ongoing criminal activities, and called attention to the fact that one of the most prominent members of the applicant\u2019s criminal organisation was still on the loose. As per the text of the order, the DNA further found that, on the basis of the expert medical evidence in its possession, it could not be concluded that there had been a complete annihilation of the applicant\u2019s attention, comprehension and orientation abilities at that time, but rather only a \u2013 non-quantifiable \u2013 deterioration. This, in turn, could not exclude the possibility that the applicant could communicate orders to the criminal organisation if detained in the context of a normal prison regime. The applicant\u2019s health was also addressed in terms of whether the imposition of the special prison regime was hindering the medical treatment that he needed in view of his health problems, which, in the office\u2019s opinion, it was not. The DNA concluded that the renewal of the restrictions was still considered necessary. 71.  The order also focused on the Minister of the Interior\u2019s opinion summarising the findings of recently concluded investigations confirming the applicant\u2019s prominent role in the criminal organisation. The outcome of such investigations had also shed light on the means by which the applicant\u2019s support network had enabled him to remain in hiding, the communication system between himself and prominent fugitives during their time in hiding, and his use of coded messages to convey the organisation\u2019s strategies. 72.  On 31 March 2014 the applicant lodged an application against the Minister of Justice\u2019s renewal order of 26 March 2014. The applicant\u2019s counsel argued that the special prison regime ought to be suspended due to the applicant\u2019s psychophysical condition, and provided medical documentation in support of that argument. 73.  By a decision of 5 December 2014 the Rome Court dealt with the applications of 13 February 2014 and 31 March 2014 jointly and dismissed them both. Some salient points of the decision may be summarised as follows.\nThe court reviewed the applicant\u2019s arguments and the medical documentation available to it and focused on the applicant\u2019s neurological condition. It quoted extracts from a report of a neuropsychological examination performed on the applicant on 25 November 2014 indicating that he was bedridden, that he alternated between being asleep and being awake, and that, if appropriately stimulated, he sometimes formulated words that made sense or carried out elementary tasks. The applicant was described as alert and occasionally \u201creachable\u201d, but the report noted that he did not comply with instructions. The court noted that a conclusive assessment of his cognitive skills had not been possible due to his severely compromised motor function, coupled with his inability to concentrate and general lack of cooperation.\nThe court thus acknowledged the existence of a serious decline in the applicant\u2019s cognitive functioning. However, notwithstanding that decline, on the basis of the medical documentation available to it, the court concluded that it could not with absolute certainty rule out the possibility of the applicant being able to convey criminally relevant messages pertaining to the organisation\u2019s criminal activities via family members or other individuals if he were allowed unregulated contact with the outside world. The court also relied on reports from health-care staff in the hospital ward which indicated that the applicant had transient moments of lucidity alternating with moments of confusion, and that at times he replied to their questions in a comprehensible manner. In conclusion, in the court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s clinical status could not be considered such as to preclude the communication of messages or criminal instructions.\nThe court reiterated that the applicant, the leader of Cosa Nostra for decades, was considered to be an individual who posed a great threat to national security and society at large. It further reiterated that during his time in hiding he had relied on a solid support network and managed to run the criminal organisation through so-called pizzini, apparently simple messages which concealed orders for the criminal network. Thus, in the court\u2019s view, the criminal organisation could obtain instructions for carrying out criminal activities by receiving even simple messages from the applicant, given his position within the organisation. It also noted that one of the key and most dangerous individuals belonging to the applicant\u2019s organisation was still a fugitive at the time.\nBased on the foregoing considerations, the court concluded that the extension of the section 41 bis prison regime was still fully justified, in the interests of public order and safety. 74.  On 23 March 2016 the Minister of Justice issued an order renewing the application of the special prison regime for another two years. As with the 2014 order, he held that the applicant was still able to maintain contact with members of the criminal organisation who were still at large, and also had regard to his \u201cparticular and concrete dangerousness\u201d. The minister confirmed the renewal of all the restrictions in place (see paragraph 57 above). Some salient points of the order may be summarised as follows. 75.  As with the 2014 order, the Minister of Justice reiterated the regime\u2019s rationale and purpose and provided an overview of information provided by different police bodies, prosecution offices, and the Minister of the Interior \u2013 information which had been requested with a view to ascertaining the persistence of the conditions justifying the extension of the regime. The order summarised opinions issued by the DDAs of Florence, Caltanissetta and Palermo in February 2016 and the DNA in March 2016. 76.  The order acknowledged that the Caltanissetta and Florence DDAs had confirmed their previous negative opinion as to the renewal of the regime with regard to the applicant, and that the Caltanissetta DDA had relied on the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health to reach its conclusions, while the Florence DDA\u2019s opinion had hinged on the finding that there were no longer any ongoing criminal investigations involving the applicant. On the other hand, the Palermo DDA and the DNA confirmed that there was a need for the renewal of the special prison regime. 77.  As reported in the order, the Palermo DDA had concluded that the application of the section 41 bis regime was still absolutely necessary to prevent and interrupt the applicant\u2019s lasting and dangerous relations with the outside world and with other detainees which would allow him to pursue the illegal activities that he had headed for decades. The DDA focused on, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s criminal history and his leadership role in Cosa Nostra, reviewing his decisive participation in a large number of criminal acts, from mass murder to extortions, and noting the control he had exercised over economic activities which had allowed him to acquire considerable assets. The DDA provided details on the support network which the applicant had had within the organisation \u2013 the network had allowed him to stay in hiding for over forty years and manage multiple aspects of the criminal enterprise ranging from resolving disputes to commissioning murders. It highlighted that a prominent member of the criminal organisation was still on the run from the authorities.\nWith regard to the applicant\u2019s health, the Palermo DDA stated that, on the basis of the clinical information in its possession, it agreed with the Rome Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 73 above), and it quoted an extract from the decision in which the court had stated that it could not rule out with absolute certainty the applicant\u2019s being able to convey criminally relevant messages pertaining to the organisation\u2019s criminal activities. 78.  As reported in the order, the DNA concluded that the combination of elements that had warranted the initial application of the special prison regime remained unchanged in its view. It relied primarily on the applicant\u2019s \u201ccriminal profile\u201d, his multiple convictions for heinous crimes, and the ongoing activities of Cosa Nostra and its continuous reorganisation, in addition to the fact that a prominent member of the criminal organisation who had had a documented relationship with the applicant in the past was still on the run.\nWith regard to the applicant\u2019s health, the DNA reiterated the content of its 2014 opinion on the extension of the special prison regime and quoted extracts from it to the effect that the imposition of such a regime in no way interfered with the applicant\u2019s medical care, and modifying the regime would not have an impact on his health. The DNA also quoted an extract from its 2014 opinion where it had found that, based on the documentation available to it, it did not appear that the applicant\u2019s attention, comprehension and orientation in space and time had completely ceased, but had only deteriorated. 79.  On 8 April 2016 the applicant\u2019s counsel lodged an application against the Minister of Justice\u2019s renewal order with the Rome Court. 80.  On 16 September 2016 the Rome Court discontinued the proceedings due to the applicant\u2019s death.", "references": ["8", "0", "5", "4", "9", "3", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Vienna. 7.  From January 2008 she held several seminars entitled \u201cBasic Information on Islam\u201d (Grundlagen des Islams) at the right-wing Freedom Party Education Institute (Bildungsinstitut der Freiheitlichen Partei \u00d6sterreichs). The seminars were not only open to members of the Freedom Party or invited guests, but were also publicly advertised on its website. In addition, the head of the Freedom Party, H.-C.S., had distributed a leaflet specifically aimed at young voters, advertising them as \u201ctop seminars\u201d in the framework of a \u201cfree education package\u201d. The applicant had not been involved in the selection of participants. 8.  Two of the seminars were held on 15 October and 12 November 2009 respectively, with around thirty participants at each. One of the participants was an undercover journalist working for a weekly journal, N. 9.  At the journal\u2019s request, a preliminary investigation was instituted against the applicant, and on 11 February 2010 she was questioned by the police concerning certain statements she had made during the seminars which had been directed against the doctrines of Islam. 10.  On 12 August 2010 the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien \u2013 \u201cthe public prosecutor\u201d) brought charges against the applicant, pursuant to Article 283 of the Criminal Code, for inciting to hatred (Verhetzung). Hearings were held on 23 November 2010 and on 18 January and 15 February 2011. 11.  At the hearing on 18 January 2011 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Strafsachen Wien \uf02d \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) informed the applicant that the court might adopt a different legal classification in the matter from the one contained in the charge. The hearing was therefore postponed to give her time to properly prepare a defence. 12.  At the end of the hearing on 15 February 2011 the Regional Court acquitted the applicant in relation to several of the statements originally included in the indictment under Article 283 of the Criminal Code. This was partly because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the indictment concerning certain statements and partly because it could not be established that the applicant had made some of the other statements exactly \u2013 or at least approximately \u2013 as they were worded in the indictment. She was however convicted of disparaging religious doctrines (Herabw\u00fcrdigung religi\u00f6ser Lehren), pursuant to Article 188 of the Criminal Code, concerning the three remaining statements. She was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings and a day\u2011fine of 4 euros (EUR) for a period of 120 days (amounting to EUR 480 in total), which would result in sixty days\u2019 imprisonment in the event of default. The court considered the applicant\u2019s repeated infringements to be an aggravating factor and the fact that she did not have a previous criminal record to be a mitigating factor. The court found her guilty of publicly disparaging an object of veneration of a domestic church or religious society \u2013 namely Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam \u2013 in a manner capable of arousing justified indignation (geeignet, berechtigtes \u00c4rgernis zu erregen). 13.  The statements which the court found incriminating were the following:\nEnglish translation:\n\u201cI./ 1. One of the biggest problems we are facing today is that Muhammad is seen as the ideal man, the perfect human, the perfect Muslim. That means that the highest commandment for a male Muslim is to imitate Muhammad, to live his life. This does not happen according to our social standards and laws. Because he was a warlord, he had many women, to put it like this, and liked to do it with children. And according to our standards he was not a perfect human. We have huge problems with that today, that Muslims get into conflict with democracy and our value system ... 2. The most important of all Hadith collections recognised by all legal schools: The most important is the Sahih Al-Bukhari. If a Hadith was quoted after Bukhari, one can be sure that all Muslims would recognise it. And, unfortunately, in Al-Bukhari the thing with Aisha and child sex is written...\nII./ I remember my sister, I have said this several times already, when [S.W.] made her famous statement in Graz, my sister called me and asked: \u201cFor God\u2019s sake. Did you tell [S.W.] that?\u201d To which I answered: \u201cNo, it wasn\u2019t me, but you can look it up, it\u2019s not really a secret.\u201d And her: \u201cYou can\u2019t say it like that!\u201d And me: \u201cA 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?\u201d Her: \u201cWell, one has to paraphrase it, say it in a more diplomatic way.\u201d My sister is symptomatic. We have heard that so many times. \u201cThose were different times\u201d \u2013 it wasn\u2019t okay back then, and it\u2019s not okay today. Full stop. And it is still happening today. One can never approve of something like that. They all create their own reality, because the truth is so cruel ...\u201d\nGerman original:\n\u201cI./1. Eines der gro\u00dfen Probleme, die wir heute haben, ist dass Mohammed als der ideale Mann, der perfekte Mensch, der perfekte Muslim gesehen wird. Das hei\u00dft, das oberste Gebot f\u00fcr einen m\u00e4nnlichen Moslem ist es, Mohammed nachzumachen, sein Leben zu leben. Das l\u00e4uft nicht nach unseren sozialen Standards und Gesetzen ab. Weil er war ein Kriegsherr, hatte einen relativ gro\u00dfen Frauenverschlei\u00df, um das jetzt einmal so auszudr\u00fccken, hatte nun mal gerne mit Kindern ein bisschen was. Und er war nach unseren Begriffen kein perfekter Mensch. Damit haben wir heute riesige Probleme, weil Muslime mit der Demokratie und unserem Wertesystem in Konflikt geraten... 2. Die wichtigsten von allen Rechtsschulen anerkannten Hadith-Sammlungen: Die allerwichtigste ist die Sahih Al-Bukhari. Wenn eine Hadith nach Bukhari zitiert wurde, dann k\u00f6nnen Sie sicher sein, dass es alle Muslime anerkennen. Und in der Al-Bukhari ist auch bl\u00f6derweise das geschrieben mit der Aisha und dem Kindersex...\nII./ Ich erinnere mich an meine Schwester, das hab ich schon ein paar Mal erz\u00e4hlt, als [S.W.] in Graz ihren ber\u00fchmten Sager gemacht hat, ruft mich meine Schwester an und sagt: \"Um Gottes willen. Hast du ihr das gesagt?\" Worauf ich gesagt habe: \"Nein, ich war\u2019s nicht, aber es ist nachzulesen, es ist nicht wirklich ein Geheimnis. \" Und sie: \"Das kann man doch so nicht sagen.\" Und ich : \"Ein 56-J\u00e4hriger und eine 6-J\u00e4hrige ? Wie nennst du das? Gib mir ein Beispiel? Wie nennen wir das, wenn\u2019s nicht P\u00e4dophilie ist?\" Sie: \"Na ja, das muss man ein bisschen umschreiben, diplomatischer sagen.\" Meine Schwester ist symptomatisch. Das haben wir schon so oft geh\u00f6rt. \"Das waren doch andere Zeiten\" \u2013 das war damals nicht o.k., und es ist heute nicht o.k. Punkt. Und es passiert heute auch noch. So was ist nie gutzuhei\u00dfen. Sie legen sich alle eine Wirklichkeit zurecht, weil die Wahrheit so grausam ist...\u201c 14.  The Regional Court found that the above statements essentially conveyed the message that Muhammad had had paedophilic tendencies. It stated that the applicant was referring to a marriage which Muhammad had concluded with Aisha, a six-year-old, and consummated when she had been nine. The court found that by making those statements the applicant had suggested that Muhammad was not a worthy subject of worship. However, it also found that it could not be established that the applicant had intended to decry all Muslims. She was not suggesting that all Muslims were paedophiles, but was criticising the unreflecting imitation of a role model. According to the court, the common definition of paedophilia was a primary sexual interest in children who had not yet reached puberty. Because paedophilia was behaviour which was ostracised by society and outlawed, it was evident that the applicant\u2019s statements were capable of causing indignation. The court concluded that the applicant had intended to wrongfully accuse Muhammad of having paedophilic tendencies. Even though criticising child marriages was justifiable, she had accused a subject of religious worship of having a primary sexual interest in children\u2019s bodies, which she had deduced from his marriage with a child, disregarding the point that the marriage had continued until the Prophet\u2019s death, when Aisha had already turned eighteen and had therefore passed the age of puberty. In addition, the court found that because of the public nature of the seminars, which had not been limited to members of the Freedom Party, it was conceivable that at least some of the participants might have been disturbed by the statements. 15.  The Regional Court further stated that anyone who wished to exercise their rights under Article 10 of the Convention was subject to duties and responsibilities, such as refraining from making statements which hurt others without reason and therefore did not contribute to a debate of public interest. A balancing exercise between the rights under Article 9 on the one hand and those under Article 10 on the other needed to be carried out. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s statements were not statements of fact, but derogatory value judgments which exceeded the permissible limits. It held that the applicant had not intended to approach the topic in an objective manner, but had directly aimed to degrade Muhammad. The court stated that child marriages were not the same as paedophilia, and were not only a phenomenon of Islam but also used to be widespread among the European ruling dynasties. Furthermore, the court reasoned that freedom of religion as protected by Article 9 of the Convention was one of the foundations of a democratic society. Those who invoked their freedom of religion could not expect to be exempt from criticism, and even had to accept the negation of their beliefs. However, the manner in which religious views were attacked could engage the State\u2019s responsibility in order to guarantee the peaceful exercise of the rights under Article 9. Presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative way capable of hurting the feelings of the followers of that religion could be conceived as a malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which was one of the bases of a democratic society. The court concluded that the interference with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression in the form of a criminal conviction had been justified as it had been based in law and had been necessary in a democratic society, namely in order to protect religious peace in Austria. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the impugned statements were statements of fact, not value judgments. She referred to several of the documents which she had submitted as evidence which, in her view, clearly confirmed that when Muhammad had been fifty-six years old, he had had sexual intercourse with the nine-year-old Aisha. She stated that it was no more than reasonable to present those facts in the light of the values of today\u2019s society. It had not been her intention to disparage Muhammad. She had merely criticised the notion that an adult had had sexual intercourse with a nine-year-old child and raised the question whether this amounted to paedophilia. If one were to follow the arguments of the Regional Court, it would mean that someone who had married a child and managed to maintain the marriage until the child had come of age could not be described as a paedophile. She further contended that she had not used the term \u201cpaedophile\u201d in the strict scientific sense, but in the way it was used in everyday language, referring to men who had sex with minors. She stated that she had never said that Muhammad had been a paedophile because he had married a child, but because he had had sexual intercourse with one. In any event, her statements were covered by her rights under Article 10 of the Convention, which included the right to impart opinions and ideas that offended, shocked or disturbed. 17.  On 20 December 2011 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, confirming in essence the legal and factual findings of the lower court. The Regional Court had based its findings on the facts as submitted by the applicant, namely that Muhammad had married Aisha when she had been six years old and consummated the marriage when she had been nine. It had rightly made a distinction between child marriages and paedophilia. It had not based its findings on an unpredictable definition of the term \u201cpaedophilia\u201d but on a common definition which was comparable to that used by the World Health Organisation. As regards the alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal, referring to the Court\u2019s case-law (\u0130.A. v. Turkey, no. 42571/98, ECHR 2005\u2011VIII, and Ayd\u0131n Tatlav v. Turkey, no. 50692/99, 2 May 2006), found that it had to examine whether the comments at issue were merely provocative or had been intended as an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. It concluded that the latter was the case as Muslims would find the applicant\u2019s statements \u2013 \u201che liked to do it with children\u201d, \u201cthe thing with Aisha and child sex\u201d and \u201ca 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?\u201d \u2013 wrong and offensive, even if Muhammad had married a six-year-old and had had intercourse with her when she had been nine. 18.  The Court of Appeal stated that the reason for the applicant\u2019s conviction had not been that the events had purportedly taken place more than a thousand years ago and similar conduct would no longer be tolerable under today\u2019s criminal law and contemporary moral and value concepts, but because the applicant had accused Muhammad of paedophilia by using the plural form \u201cchildren\u201d, \u201cchild sex\u201d, \u201cwhat do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?\u201d without providing evidence that his primary sexual interest in Aisha had been her not yet having reached puberty. Moreover, there were no reliable sources for that allegation, as no documentary evidence existed to suggest that his other wives or concubines had been similarly young. On the contrary, his first wife had been fifteen years older than him, as could be seen from the documents submitted by the applicant herself. Even if the applicant had had the right to criticise others\u2019 attempts to imitate Muhammad, her statements showed her intention to unnecessarily disparage and deride Muslims. Harsh criticism of churches or religious societies (Religionsgesellschaften) and religious traditions and practices was lawful. However, the permissible limits were exceeded where criticism ended and insults or mockery of a religious belief or person of worship (Beschimpfung oder Verspottung einer Religion oder von ihr verehrten Personen) began. The interference with the applicant\u2019s freedoms under Article 10 of the Convention had therefore been justified. As to the applicant\u2019s argument that those who had participated in the seminar knew of her critical approach and could not be offended, the Court of Appeal found that the public seminar had been offered for free to young voters by the Austrian Freedom Party Education Institute, and at least one participant had been offended, as her complaints had led to the applicant being charged. 19.  On 16 April 2012 the applicant lodged a request for a renewal of the proceedings (Antrag auf Erneuerung des Strafverfahrens) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), pursuant to Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), and relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1, Article 7 \u00a7 1 and Article 10 of the Convention. 20.  On 6 June 2012 the applicant lodged her application with the Court. 21.  On 11 December 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the request for a renewal of the proceedings. As regards the alleged violation of Article 10, it found that the applicant\u2019s conviction under Article 188 of the Criminal Code constituted an interference with the right to freedom of expression, which had however been justified under Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295\u2011A; \u0130.A., cited above; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; Ayd\u0131n Tatlav, cited above; and Giniewski v. France, no. 64016/00, ECHR 2006\u2011I), it held that the aim of the interference had been to protect religious peace and the religious feelings of others and was therefore legitimate. The Court had stated many times that in the context of religion member States had a duty to suppress certain forms of conduct or expression that were gratuitously offensive to others and profane. In cases where the impugned statements not only offended or shocked, or expressed a \u201cprovocative\u201d opinion, but had also been considered an abusive attack on a religious group \u2013 for example an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam, as in the applicant\u2019s case \u2013 a criminal conviction might be necessary to protect the freedom of religion of others. Where a conviction was based on Article 188 of the Criminal Code, the principles developed under Article 9 and 10 of the Convention had to be considered when examining whether a statement was capable of \u201carousing justified indignation\u201d. A statement could not be considered as arousing indignation if it was compatible with Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. The courts therefore had to examine the meaning of the impugned statement, as well as the context in which it had been made and whether the statement was based on fact or was a value judgment. Only by considering all of those points could the question of the ability to arouse justified indignation be examined. 22.  Applying the above considerations to the applicant\u2019s case, the Supreme Court held that she had not aimed to contribute to a serious debate about Islam or the phenomenon of child marriage, but merely to defame Muhammad by accusing him of a specific sexual preference, based on the assumption that he had had sexual intercourse with a prepubescent child, in order to show that he was not a worthy subject of worship. The court, whilst not misjudging the importance of the debate about sexual contact between adults and children, found that the applicant had not contributed to a debate of general interest because she had made her allegation primarily in order to defame Muhammad. On the basis of the Regional Court\u2019s findings that the applicant\u2019s statements qualified as value judgments, the Supreme Court held that they had not been a contribution to a serious debate. The case had to be distinguished from the case of Ayd\u0131n Tatlav (cited above), in which a scientific book, published in its fifth edition, had contained a passage of harsh criticism of religion, which had not been offensive. In the present case the criminal conviction constituted a measure necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the measure taken by the Criminal Court had also been proportionate, as the applicant had only been ordered to pay a fine of EUR 480. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a renewal of the proceedings. 23.  The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 8 January 2014.", "references": ["3", "8", "0", "7", "4", "9", "1", "No Label", "6", "2", "5"], "gold": ["6", "2", "5"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5.  The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Slobozia, T\u00e2rgovi\u0219te and Re\u0219i\u021ba, which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor\u2019s offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants\u2019 injury and their close relatives\u2019 deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7.  The most important procedural steps were mentioned in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41) and in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, \u00a7\u00a7 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant developments of the criminal investigation are as follows. 8.  On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor\u2019s office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the taking of evidence from military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 9.  From March 2017 the military prosecutor examined military and civilian archives, including the vast archives of the Romanian Senate. They also viewed and transcribed more than 400 hours of audio/video recordings. They proceeded with the re-examination of several witnesses. They questioned military personnel involved in the December 1989 military operations and fifty-one members of the political party which ruled at the time and of other authorities. They verified the documents indicating the military units\u2019 actions from that period. 10.  At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.", "references": ["9", "1", "2", "5", "8", "7", "6", "4", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. The second applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. Both applicants are attorneys practising in Reykjav\u00edk. 6.  On 16 February 2012 Y and Z were indicted for participating in fraud and market manipulation along with two other individuals. On 7 March 2012, in accordance with Article 31 of the Criminal Procedures Act No. 88/2008 (hereinafter \u201cthe CPA\u201d), the first applicant was appointed as Y\u2019s defence counsel and the second applicant was appointed as Z\u2019s defence counsel. 7.  On 7 March 2012, the indictment of the prosecution against, inter alios, Y and Z was registered before the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk. At a preliminary hearing they pleaded not guilty to the charges laid against them. From March to December 2012 the prosecutor and the applicants, along with the other defence counsel in the proceedings, repeatedly submitted arguments in further preliminary hearings about various issues, such as the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the deadline for the defence to file pleadings and the defence\u2019s request to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court issued three rulings on procedural matters in the case. 8.  On 19 December 2012, after consulting the prosecution, the applicants and the other defence counsel, the District Court judge decided that the trial would take place from 11 to 23 April 2013. The same day, the second applicant replied to the judge\u2019s email stating that, although it was reasonable to decide dates for the trial, he wanted to remind the judge that the case was not ready for trial at that time because the prosecution had not submitted the requested evidence and issued a witness list. Shortly afterwards the judge replied with \u201cMerry Christmas!\u201d. 9.  On 24 January and 7 March 2013 the prosecution submitted further evidence in the case. During the second of these preliminary hearings, the applicants and the other defence counsel requested more time to study the evidence and the postponement of the trial, inter alia, because the submission of evidence had not been concluded. By a decision of the same day the District Court rejected the request. 10.  In a preliminary hearing on 21 March 2013, the prosecution and one defence counsel submitted further evidence. The applicants and the other defence counsel requested that the prosecution provide them with certain documentary evidence. In a preliminary hearing on 25 March 2013 the applicants and the other defence counsel requested again that the trial be postponed for 6-8 weeks to allow them to study new evidence presented by the prosecution. By decisions of 26 March 2013, the District Court rejected both requests. By a decision of 4 April 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 11.  On 8 April 2013 each applicant wrote a letter to the District Court judge in the case, arguing that they could not, for reasons of conscience, continue to perform their duties as defence counsel for their clients. The applicants stated, inter alia, that they had not been informed about the deadline to submit their pleadings to the Supreme Court before its ruling of 4 April 2013, the prosecution had neglected to send them a copy of its pleadings, the defence had not had adequate access to important documents, the prosecution had tapped telephone conversations between them and their clients and the whole procedure had in general violated their applicants\u2019 rights under the Constitution, the CPA and the Convention. Lastly, the applicants stated that their clients\u2019 rights had been so grossly violated that they were forced to resign from further participation in the case. They noted that they had discussed this with their clients and made clear that the latter approved of their decision. The applicants requested that their appointment as defence counsel for their clients be revoked in accordance with Section 21 (6) of the Attorneys\u2019 Act No. 77/1998. 12.  On the same day, the District Court judge replied to the applicants\u2019 letters and rejected their requests. The judge referred to the CPA and the Attorneys\u2019 Act. He reiterated that the trial would start on 11 April 2013 as previously decided. The applicants replied to the letter immediately, referred to their previous arguments and stated that they would not attend the trial on 11 April 2013. 13.  On 11 April 2013, Y and Z attended the trial accompanied by new defence counsel. The applicants did not attend the hearing and were not summoned to appear by the court. The presiding judge recorded the aforementioned communications between him and the applicants and declared that it was unavoidable to relieve the applicants of their duties as defence counsel. New defence counsel were appointed for Y and Z and the trial was postponed for an unspecified period. The prosecution requested that the applicants be fined for contempt of court under Section 223 of the CPA (see paragraph 32 below). 14.  Before this Court the applicants submitted that, according to news reports, the presiding judge had explicitly rejected the prosecution\u2019s request, stating that the conditions to impose fines were not fulfilled at that time. However, the Government stated that the court records (which were not submitted to the Court) did not reflect that the presiding judge had taken a position on this point. In any event, the Government argued that the statement had not been a formal one, it had not been noted in the court records and there was great uncertainty as to whether it had been made and, if so, what had actually been said. 15.  A new trial was held before the District Court from 4 to 14 November 2013. In the meantime, the presiding judge had withdrawn from the case and a new judge had been appointed. 16.  By a judgment of 12 December 2013, Y and Z, along with the other two accused, were convicted. Furthermore, the applicants were each fined 1,000,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately 6,200 euros (EUR) at the material time) under Section 223(1) (a) and (d) of the CPA for offending the court and causing unnecessary delay in the case by not attending the trial on 11 April 2013 and thereby damaging their clients\u2019 and the other defendants\u2019 interests. The judgment was delivered in the absence of the applicants. 17.  On 13 December 2013 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court judgment as regards the imposition of fines, by way of an appeal lodged by the prosecutor at their request. Before the Supreme Court, the applicants primarily requested that the District Court judgment be annulled as to the imposition of their fines and, as a subsidiary request, that the fines be reduced, were the Supreme Court to reject their request for annulment. 18.  In their submissions to the Supreme Court the applicants claimed firstly that they had been penalised without having been given the opportunity to defend themselves against the prosecution\u2019s claims or being made aware of the court\u2019s intention to impose fines on them. This had been a violation of their right to a fair trial under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 to 3 of the Convention and Article 70 of the Constitution. Secondly, the applicants maintained that they had had valid reasons to resign from the case and that the legal conditions to fine them had not been fulfilled. 19.  As regards their first claim, the applicants argued that they had at no point been informed that the court was considering imposing fines on them and they had not been invited to defend themselves before the District Court, which was a fundamental part of the right to a fair trial. 20.  As regards the second complaint, the applicants argued, inter alia, that imposing fines on them as defence counsel had not been in accordance with the CPA as they had not been defence counsel at the time the District Court judgment was delivered. They argued that, according to Section 224 of the CPA, they should have been fined immediately as \u201cothers\u201d. Furthermore, the applicants maintained that their conduct in question had not occurred during the proceedings as the CPA required. In any event, their behaviour could not be considered as offending the court since they had not attended any hearings with the judges who had imposed the fines and decided on the merits of the case. The applicants further stated that their actions had been in their clients\u2019 interests, and their clients had approved of their decisions. 21.  The applicants submitted documentary evidence along with their submissions to the Supreme Court. They did not ask to examine witnesses or to give statements themselves before the court. 22.  The Supreme Court held an oral hearing in the case where the applicants were represented by legal counsel. No witnesses were heard and the applicants did not give statements before the court. 23.  The applicants were represented by two separate defence counsel before the Supreme Court. However, the applicants claimed before this Court that, due to the limited time given to present the case before the Supreme Court, each defence counsel put forth arguments on behalf of both applicants. 24.  According to the second applicant\u2019s summary of the oral pleadings before the Supreme Court the applicants argued, inter alia, that a decision to impose court fines was an ex proprio motu decision of the court, without the parties\u2019 involvement, and could therefore not be quashed and referred back to the first instance court. Furthermore, the applicants argued that referring the case back to the District Court for a new trial due to a violation of the CPA and Article 6 of the Convention could never be legitimate at this point as the time-limits for imposing fines on them had expired. According to Section 223 and 224 of the CPA the applicants could only be fined as \u201cdefence counsel\u201d in a substantive judgment in the criminal case against their clients or as \u201cothers\u201d, during the main trial in the criminal case against their clients. Additionally, the applicants argued that the amount of the fine was tenfold compared to fines imposed in previous cases and that no maximum amount for fines was stipulated in the CPA. Furthermore, the applicants referred to the principle of legality in criminal cases (Article 69 of the Constitution) and the principle of lex certa. 25.  By a judgment of 28 May 2014, a majority of the Supreme Court (three out of five judges) confirmed the District Court judgment as regards the fines imposed on the applicants. 26.  In its judgment the Supreme Court described the facts in detail. It referred to the obligation incumbent on attorneys under Article 20 of the Attorneys\u2019 Act to accept the appointment or nomination as defence counsel in criminal proceedings if they fulfilled statutory requirements. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the applicants could not resign as defence counsel in a criminal case with reference to Section 21 (6) of the Attorneys\u2019 Act as it only applied to civil cases. Their decision not to attend the trial in spite of the District Court rejecting their request to relieve them of their duties as defence counsel was not in accordance with the law or in the interest of their clients or the other defendants. Their statements about resigning from their positions as defence counsel had furthermore been a gross violation of their obligations as defence counsel under Section 34 (1) and 35 (1) of the CPA. The applicants had completely disregarded the legitimate decisions of the District Court judge, who had had no other option than to revoke their appointment as defence counsel and to appoint others to secure legal representation for the accused. 27.  The Supreme Court subsequently set out in detail the applicable legal provisions on the imposition of court fines, namely Sections 222 to 224 of the CPA, and noted that the provisions did not stipulate any maximum fine. The court considered, moreover, that the fines imposed on the applicants were substantial and therefore categorised them as criminal punishment. 28.  Furthermore, the judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201cAs previously stated, the second sentence of Section 222 (1) of [the CPA] permits the prosecution to instigate proceedings for offences subject to fines pursuant to this chapter [Chapter XXXV]. According to general rules the defendants in question must then be provided with the opportunity to defend themselves. Such a case was not instigated. On the other hand it was, as previously stated, also possible for the judge in the criminal case, of his own accord, to impose fines in accordance with the first sentence of [Section 222 (1)]. Under those circumstances a special claim on behalf of the prosecution was not required. There are no grounds to hold that [the applicants] should have enjoyed lesser protection under the law, depending on which of the above-mentioned options were chosen when assessing whether they should be subject to the imposition of fines, which amounted to penalties, cf. Article 70 of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6 (1) and (3) of [the Convention], cf. Act No. 62/1994.\nWhen it became clear that [the applicants] would not fulfil their duty of attending the trial and the court was considering imposing fines on them, they should have been summoned to a special hearing and given an opportunity to present their case and submit further arguments to that end, beyond what they had already clearly raised in their correspondence with the District Court. However, this was not done. Instead [the applicants] were relieved of their duties at the hearing on 11 April 2013 and a decision to impose fines on them was taken in the judgment delivered on 12 December 2013.\nAs stated in Chapter V of the judgment the prosecutor lodged an appeal regarding this part of the case. That was done at the request of [the applicants] who, according to law, had the right to have the fines imposed on them by the District Court reviewed by a higher court following an oral hearing. [The applicants\u2019] right to defend themselves on appeal is therefore not subject to any limitations by law and they were provided with the opportunity to raise any views in the oral hearing of the case, and as appropriate by giving statements themselves and presenting witnesses, cf. Article 205 (3) of [the CPA], or by instigating special witness proceedings, cf. Article 141 (1) of the same Act. In the light of this, the applicants\u2019 rights have not been impaired due to the lack of an oral hearing by the District Court before the decision was taken to impose fines on them. Accordingly, the procedure which has taken place is in accordance with the law and does not violate their rights to a fair trial under Article 70 (1) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6 (1) and (3) of [the Convention], cf. Act No. 62/1994. For reference see the judgment of [the Court] in the case of Weber v. Switzerland from 22 May 1990 and the judgment in the case of T v. Austria from 14 November 2000. Accordingly, with reference to the reasoning of the appealed judgment, the decision on the fines imposed on [the applicants] must be upheld.\u201d 29.  The minority shared the majority\u2019s opinion that the applicants\u2019 conduct in not attending the trial in the criminal case against their clients had not been in accordance with the law and had been a violation of their duty as defence counsel. The minority also agreed that their conduct had caused a delay in the proceedings and the imposed fines had constituted criminal punishment. 30.  However, the minority held as follows:\n\u201cWhen it became clear that [the applicants] would not attend the hearing, a hearing should have been convened immediately, according to provisions of [Chapter XXXV of the CPA], and [the applicants] given notice of the charges and the opportunity to object to the decision to impose the fines. However, that was not done. Instead [the applicants] were relieved of their duties at the trial on 11 April 2013 and new defence counsel were appointed in their stead. However, the decision to impose fines on [the applicants] was made in the judgment of 12 December 2013, without notifying them, who were not defence counsel any more, of those intentions and without allowing them to defend themselves, both as regards the decision to impose the fines and the amount.\nIn accordance with the aforementioned, the processing of the case before the District Court was flawed, but no legal provision allows this part of the criminal case to be referred back to the District Court to be heard again. Given these circumstances in the processing of the case, the appealed provision of the District Court\u2019s judgment on the court fines should be annulled.\u201d", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "5", "4", "1", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  On 22 January 2007 the first-instance court found the applicant guilty of inflicting bodily injuries on another individual and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On 28 March 2007 and 23 October 2007 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 8.  From 13 April 2007 to 17 June 2011 the applicant had been serving his sentence in Boryspil Correctional Colony (\u201cthe prison\u201d). 9.  On 17 June 2011 he was released on probation. 10.  In his initial submissions, the applicant stated that he had been detained in dirty cells with poor ventilation and insufficient heating in winter. Inmates suffering from HIV and tuberculosis were kept together with healthy prisoners. The food and water provided to him and other prisoners were unsatisfactory and hazardous to their health. 11.  In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant also submitted that the cells had been overcrowded. Without specifying the periods of his detention in particular cells, he stated that he had been held in four cells, with the following characteristics:\n - cell 1, measuring about 70 square metres and accommodating 50 prisoners;\n- cell 2, measuring about 100-120 square metres and accommodating 85 prisoners;\n - cell 3, measuring about 120-130 square metres and accommodating 110 prisoners;\n - cell 4, measuring about 45 square metres and accommodating 35 prisoners. 12.  Prisoners were often subjected to ill-treatment by guards, which included arbitrary solitary confinement in disciplinary cells, verbal and physical abuse and threats. On many occasions during the daytime, while the prisoners were absent, searches were carried out in the applicant\u2019s cell, as a result of which the cell was left in a mess and some personal belongings and documents from the applicant\u2019s case file went missing. Some searches had been carried out at night. As a result, the applicant experienced fear and stress. 13.  No adequate medical assistance was provided to the applicant during his imprisonment. In particular, he did not undergo a thorough medical examination and no long-term strategy for his medical treatment was drawn up. He only received occasional and symptomatic treatment. 14.  Under the threat of disciplinary punishment, the applicant was forced to work overtime, often for twelve to fourteen hours per day and seven days per week. He did not receive adequate remuneration for the work done. 15.  The prison authorities screened all the applicant\u2019s correspondence, including letters to and from the Court, and selectively failed to send letters, or delayed sending or delivering them. For example, his letter of 23 February 2009 to the Court (which the Court, in fact, received in due time) was not sent by the prison administration and the Court\u2019s letter of 21 January 2011 was received by him a month after being dispatched by the Court. He therefore had to send some letters to the Court via friends who were at liberty. The applicant also submitted copies to the Court of letters he had received from it while in prison, one of which bore the prison stamp. 16.  According to the applicant, he brought the aforementioned matters to the attention of different authorities, including the prosecutor\u2019s office. However, those complaints were either not dispatched or were ignored. 17.  The Government challenged the trustworthiness of part of the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning the conditions of his detention, specifically his allegations that he had been detained in cells with poor sanitary and hygiene conditions together with inmates suffering from tuberculosis. They contended in this respect that the applicant had failed to support the allegations with any evidence. 18.  The Government submitted that in accordance with domestic legislation, inmates suffering from tuberculosis were detained separately from other prisoners. The relevant medical tests were performed once a year to reveal those affected by this disease. 19.  The food and water were regularly checked and were of adequate quality. The heating functioned adequately and the temperature in the cell in winter was between 18oC and 20oC. The sanitary conditions were appropriate. In support of their account of the facts, the Government submitted: information notes concerning living conditions in the prison, issued by the prison governor in reply to a request from the Government; an extract from the applicant\u2019s detention card concerning the provision of bedding; and records of completed disinfection operations carried out in the prison in July and October 2011.\n(b)  Medical assistance 20.  The Government submitted that throughout the period of his detention in the prison the applicant had been provided with adequate treatment for different medical issues he had complained of and his health had generally remained stable. 21.  According to the summary of the applicant\u2019s medical record submitted by the Government, upon arrival at the prison in April 2007 the applicant underwent a medical examination and was found to be healthy; he did not request medical assistance until March 2009. 22.  On 2 March 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis and was provided with appropriate treatment. 23.  On 5 March and 5 April 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with lumbar radiculoneuritis and prescribed appropriate treatment (diclofenac and menovazin). 24.  On 23 September 2008 and 29 April 2009 the applicant was found to be suffering from dermatitis and prescribed appropriate treatment. 25.  On 12 May 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with possible hypertension and prescribed treatment.\n(c)  Other issues relating to the applicant\u2019s detention 26.  The Government could not provide any factual information about whether any force had been applied to the applicant by prison guards, or about the searches conducted in his cell, because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. They further stated that the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint was couched in very general terms and not supported by evidence. 27.  The Government challenged the trustworthiness of the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning his forced labour. They submitted that he had performed work that prisoners were normally required to perform under the relevant domestic legislation and had received remuneration accordingly. He had normally performed the tasks of a service worker (\u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0447\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0433\u0430). When he had refused job offers, he had assisted unpaid with different kinds of prison maintenance work, for no more than two hours a day. 28.  The Government provided no information as regards the applicant\u2019s allegation that his correspondence had been monitored by the prison administration. As regards the applicant\u2019s communication with the Court, they denied that all the letters sent to him had been opened. According to a certificate issued by the prison governor, to which the Government referred, the applicant had sent only one letter to the Court, on 3 December 2008, and had received no reply. 29.  Lastly, the Government contended that the applicant had made no complaints to the domestic authorities concerning the material conditions of his detention, his alleged ill-treatment and the poor medical assistance provided to him. 30.  On 7 May 2008 the applicant lodged the present application with the Court. 31.  On a number of occasions before and after his application to the Court the applicant, at his request, was provided with copies of different documents from his case file, including judgments of 22 January 2007 and 28 March 2007 in his criminal case, his indictment and appeals against his conviction. 32.  By letters of 8 and 15 September 2008 the Brovary Town Court, at which his case file was kept, informed the applicant, inter alia, that the case file did not contain his cassation appeals or any replies from or judgments of the Supreme Court. The applicant\u2019s request for a copy of his entire criminal case file was refused by the Brovary Town Court as having no basis in law. 33.  By a letter dated 14 January 2009, the Court invited the applicant to submit a copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 October 2007. Further to this letter, on 7 February 2009 the applicant submitted requests to the Brovary Town Court and the Supreme Court, asking for a copy of their refusals to provide him with the judgment requested or a copy of his request with an acknowledgment of receipt. 34.  On 17 February 2009 the Brovary Town Court informed the applicant that the case file did not contain any letters or judgments of the Supreme Court. 35.  On 9 April 2009 the applicant was provided with a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in his criminal case and on 13 April 2009 he submitted it to the Court. 36.  On 12 September 2009, at his request, the applicant was familiarised with records relating to his detention in the prison. 37.  After his release from the prison on 17 June 2011, the applicant was given full access to his criminal case file.", "references": ["6", "3", "4", "0", "5", "7", "8", "2", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  Ms Bazanova (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born on 4 December 1964 and lives in Serpukhov. 5.  On 6 October 2009 the first applicant, deputy head of the municipal administration at the time, was arrested on the charges of abuse of power and bribery. Ts. and K. alleged that they had bribed the first applicant in order to facilitate the purchase of plots of land. 6.  On 19 November 2010 the Moscow Regional Court opened the trial in the first applicant\u2019s case. 7.  On 23 March 2011 K. complained to the court that certain publications about the trial had an adverse effect on his private life. The information disclosed had been damaging to his reputation. His statements had been taken out of context and misconstrued. He also alleged that unknown persons had followed and threatened him in the courthouse. 8.  On the same date Ts. lodged a similar complaint with the court. He alleged that the publications in the local newspaper about the trial and his role in it had been damaging to his reputation. 9.  On 24 March 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to hold the trial in camera. He relied on the complaints lodged by K. and Ts. The court granted the prosecutor\u2019s request and decided to hold the trial in camera in order to protect the interests of the witnesses. 10.  On 11 August 2011 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty on two counts of abuse of power and two counts of bribery and sentenced her to 7.5 years\u2019 imprisonment and a monetary fine. The first applicant appealed. 11.  On 12 October 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the first applicant and her counsel, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of Ts.\u2019s attempt to purchase a plot of land) and quashed it in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of K.\u2019s attempt to purchase a plot of land) remitting the matter for fresh consideration. The court also reduced the first applicant\u2019s sentence and the amount of the fine. 12.  On 8 October 2013 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty as charged, as regards charges of abuse of power and bribery in respect of the bribe paid by K., and sentenced her cumulatively to 7 years and 3 months\u2019 imprisonment and a monetary fine. The court held a public hearing. It appears that the first applicant did not appeal against the judgment of 8 October 2013. 13.  Mr Mukhachev (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), was born on 29 December 1976 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Zheleznodorozhniy, Moscow Region. 14.  On 4 August 2009 the second applicant was arrested on the charges of extremism and fraud. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 15.  On 31 March 2011 the Savelovskiy District Court of Moscow fixed the trial for 14 April 2011. The court decided to hold the trial in camera in order to ensure security for the parties to the proceedings and their family members. 16.  On 30 September 2011 the District Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to 9 years\u2019 imprisonment. The second applicant appealed. 17.  On 14 December 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the second applicant and his counsel and the counsel for the civil party, the Moscow City Court upheld, in substance, the second applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal.", "references": ["1", "5", "2", "7", "9", "6", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1950 and 1945 and live in \u0130stanbul and Ankara respectively. They are university professors specialising, inter alia, in human rights protection. 6.  On 5 February 2002 the applicants were appointed as members of the Consultative Council on Human Rights (\u201cthe Consultative Council\u201d), a public body answerable to the Prime Minister which was set up under Law No. 4643 of 12 April 2001 and is responsible for providing the Government with opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on the whole range of issues relating to the promotion and protection of human rights. 7.  At its first meeting on 26 February 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Kabo\u011flu as its chairman. At its second meeting on 9 May 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Oran chairman of the Working Group on issues relating to minority and cultural rights. 8.  On 1 October 2004 the General Assembly of the Consultative Council discussed and adopted a report on minority and cultural rights (\u201cthe report\u201d), presented by the above-mentioned working group. On 22 October 2004 the report, as amended by Mr Oran in line with the comments put forward by members of the Consultative Council at the meeting on 1 October 2004, was submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Human Rights Affairs. The report first of all dealt with the concept and definition of and the historical background to the protection of minority and cultural rights in worldwide and in Turkey. It then went on to consider issues relating to the protection of minorities in Turkey, relying on the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, national legislation and practice and the case-law of the higher courts. According to the report, there were two primary reasons for the problematical situation of minorities in Turkey: a theoretical reason tending to define the supra-identity in terms of \u201crace\u201d (\u0131rk) and religion as Turkish (T\u00fcrk) and not as T\u00fcrkiyeli (\u201ccoming from Turkey\u201d, \u201ccitizen of Turkey\u201d), which resulted in alienating the infra-identities of citizens who do not belong to the Turkish \u201crace\u201d or the Muslim religion; and an historical/political reason stemming from the paranoia (paranoya) inherited from the dismantling of the country in the recent past, a syndrome referred to in the report as \u201cthe S\u00e8vres syndrome\u201d[1]. 9.  Having explained that the Governments in the 1920s and 1930s had attempted to create a homogeneous and monocultural nation, the report stated that, having regard to the presence in the country of a patchwork of different cultures and identities, and in the light of global developments as regards the organisation of society up until the 2000s, now was the time to revise the citizenship concept and to adopt, like all the European nations, a multi-identity, multicultural, democratic, liberal and pluralist societal model. It consequently proposed rewriting the Constitution and the relevant legislation from a liberal, pluralist and democratic angle, including the participation of the organised fringes of society; guaranteeing the rights of persons laying claim to different identities and cultures to preserve and develop those identities on the basis of equal citizenship; making central and local administrations more transparent and democratic such as to ensure participation and oversight by the citizens; signing and unreservedly ratifying the international treaties laying down the universal standards of human rights, and in particular the Council of Europe\u2019s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; and, as regards international treaties, discontinuing the practice of entering reservations or interpretative declarations tending to negate infra-identities in Turkey. 10.  Following the publication of the report, several articles were published in broadly ultranationalist newspapers disparaging the text and criticising the applicants. Furthermore, a number of political leaders and senior officials criticised the report and its authors. On 26 October 2004, for example, an MP speaking in the National Assembly used, with regard to the authors of the report in question, expressions such as \u201chired boffins\u201d (entel dev\u015firme), \u201cindividuals spitting their venomous saliva\u201d, \u201cpeople in the pay of foreigners\u201d, \u201cpersons who hate the words \u2018Turkish nation\u2019\u201d, \u201ctraitors\u201d, \u201cthose who want to split up the Republic of Turkey\u201d, and \u201cenemy of the Turks\u201d. The Deputy Prime Minister spoke of a \u201cmarginal report by marginal people\u201d, claiming that the authors had drawn it up without informing the Government of its content. The Minister of Justice described the report as \u201csowing intellectual discord\u201d. The Deputy Chief-of-Staff also criticised the report, declaring that the unitary structure of the State was beyond question. Moreover, the Director of Human Rights at the Prime Minister\u2019s Office questioned the validity of the report by alleging that there had been no quorum when it had been adopted by the Assembly of the Consultative Council. 11.  On 1 November 2004 Mr Kabo\u011flu, in his capacity as Chairman of the Consultative Council, organised a press conference in order to reply to the criticisms of the report in question. At the beginning of the conference, which was shown on television, an ultranationalist trade unionist, F.Y., who was also a member of the Consultative Council, interrupted the meeting by ripping up a copy of the report in front of Mr Kabo\u011flu and saying \u201cthis report is fake and unlawful, we will not allow it to be read.\u201d 12.  In February 2005 the Prime Minister\u2019s Office informed the applicants and twelve other members of the Consultative Council that their term of office would end on 5 February 2005. The Consultative Council has not been reconvened by the Government since that date. 13.  On 14 November 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor brought proceedings against the applicants on charges of incitement to hatred and hostility and denigration of the State judicial organs on account of the content of the report. After criminal proceedings lasting some four years and seven months, the applicants were acquitted on the charge of incitement to hatred and hostility; as regards the charge of denigration of the State judicial organs, since the Justice Minister had not consented to the opening of criminal proceedings \u2013 a legal precondition for that particular offence \u2013 the case was struck off the list. 14.  In that context, the applicants received death threats from ultranationalist groups and individuals by mail and email. In view of the threats and at the request of counsel for Mr Kabo\u011flu, the Istanbul Police Department granted him personal protection as from 2007, which protection has been renewed every year since that date. In January 2007 the Ankara police department decided ex officio to task a police officer with protecting Mr Oran. In January 2013 the measure was converted into one of on-call protection. 15.  On 28 October 2004 the daily newspaper Halka ve Olaylara Terc\u00fcman published an article by N.K.Z. on the subject of the report on minority and cultural rights. In the article, the author stated the following:\n\u201cThese people should not be considered as liberal intellectuals. Some of them may be bona fide liberals. But their ringleaders are nothing less than traitors ...; there are no two ways about it: the Turkish nation, the Turkishness of Turkey and the Republic of Turkey are facing all-out treason ...; if [the country\u2019s Turkish majority] begins to growl, shout and roar, the traitors will find no hiding or breathing place ...; you obscurantists (karanl\u0131k\u00e7\u0131lar) who present yourselves as liberal intellectuals ..., you can stick your phoney minorities up your Europe (siz o uydurma az\u0131nl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131z\u0131 al\u0131n da gidin Avrupa\u2019n\u0131za sokun)! ... I would warn some of [those who are going too far] not to play with fire.\u201d 16.  On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the author of the article and the newspaper publishers. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they had sustained on account of the insulting and threatening language used by the author of the article against them. 17.  By judgment of 25 January 2005 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim. The court ruled that the impugned article had not directly targeted the claimants since their names had not been cited, and that it was only to be expected that opinions which had been set out in a scientific report designed to guide government policies, but which had prompted concern about the preservation of Turkey\u2019s unitary structure, should be severely criticised. 18.  On 20 April 2006 the applicants appealed on points of law. They submitted that since the author of the article had referred to their report he had obviously been directing his insults and threats at them and not at any unnamed persons. They further argued that the court\u2019s refusal to condemn the impugned article, which, they submitted, had comprised insults and incited to violence against them, had amounted to an infringement of their right to freedom of expression. 19.  On 14 June 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 10 July 2008. 20.  On 27 October 2004 the daily newspaper Yeni\u00e7a\u011f published an article relaying statements made by B.A., the Chairman of the Public Employers\u2019 Union Confederation, Kamu-Sen, concerning the applicants\u2019 report. B.A. had said:\n\u201cThis report is a real piece of treachery, and those who wrote it should have it ripped to shreds over their heads. Those who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with.\u201d 21.  On 8 November 2004 the daily newspaper Ortado\u011fu also published B.A.\u2019s statements, including the following:\n\u201cThis  report is the result of a line of thought that has been put about for years with a view to dividing and separating us ... I would appeal to those responsible, and I swear that the price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed.\u201d 22.  On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought civil proceedings against B.A. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they considered they had sustained on account of the insults and threats against them contained in those two statements. 23.  By judgment of 25 July 2006 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim on the grounds that their report was the subject of public debate, that in view of their social status they should tolerate criticism, including virulent critiques, and that B.A.\u2019s statements had remained within the bounds of acceptable criticism. The court also considered that the expression \u201cthe price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed\u201d was a popular saying which meant that people could lay down their lives for their country, rather than being a threat to the applicants. Furthermore, the statement \u201cthose who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with\u201d was only a criticism of the opinions expressed in the report. 24.  The applicants appealed on points of law. They argued that the impugned statements by B.A. had amounted to a clear and concrete call to violence, and had been intended to intimidate them and single them out as targets. 25.  On 22 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 26 November 2007. 26.  On 26 October 2004 A.T. published an article in the daily newspaper Yeni\u00e7a\u011f including the following passages:\n\u201cThe rapporteur for the second set of S\u00e8vres negotiations, Prof. Dr Bask\u0131n Oran ...\u201d, \u201cthe treasonous report (ihanet raporu) penned by Bask\u0131n Oran\u201d, \u201cwhen the time is ripe, they will be held to account for having prepared a treasonous report ...\u201d 27.  Another article by A.T., published on 31 October 2004 in the same newspaper, contained the following passage:\n\u201c... The report, concerning minority and cultural rights, [was drafted by] twenty-four leftist, separatist, subversive [persons] unhappy about the unity of the country [who deserve] the death penalty ...\u201d 28.  On 4 November 2004 the Yeni\u00e7a\u011f newspaper published another article signed by A.T. which included the following sentences:\n\u201cF.Y. vehemently protested against \u0130brahim Kabo\u011flu and Bask\u0131n Oran, who had prepared and defended a report which might as well be called the \u2018report on the second set of S\u00e8vres negotiations\u2019\u201d; \u201cthe leaders of the traitor networks say that there are millions of \u00fclk\u00fcc\u00fc [\u2018idealists\u2019, extreme right-wing activists] ...: so all these people are idiots and you are intelligent, is that it? Kabo\u011flu\u2019s and Oran\u2019s bad faith has been revealed on many occasions. Irregularities in the operation of the Consultative Council have been exposed. Why do these gentlemen ignore the protests against the irregularities committed during the preparation of this report, [and why] do they prefer to attack those who exercise their right to tear up this bumph dubbed as a \u2018report\u2019?\u201d 29.  In another article published on 5 November 2004 in the same paper, A.T. stated the following:\n\u201c... The lickspittles with their report on minorities and cultural rights are threatening the country\u2019s integrity ... \u0130brahim Kabo\u011flu says \u2018Atat\u00fcrk did not say T\u00fcrk, he said T\u00fcrkiyeli\u2019 ... Anyone who goes so far as to hijack the words of Mustafa Kemal shows his bad faith, separatist aims and treachery...\u201d 30.  Another article by A.T., published on 6 November 2004 in Yeni\u00e7a\u011f, contained the following statements and expressions:\n\u201cWithin the Prime Minister\u2019s office people are working on dismantling Turkey, and when we intervene we are accused of using brute force ...; be careful, twenty-four persons did vote for this report, but they did not sign it. The traitors are emerging when Turkey is weakened. ... The main pro-S\u00e8vres cheerleader, Kabo\u011flu, ... was going to present the report to the public ... No one sees the unlawfulness, the deviousness, the betrayal underlying this case. They condemn as brutal F.Y.\u2019s act of snatching the report from the hands of the pro-S\u00e8vres cheerleader and ripping it up. If someone had kicked and punched the pro-S\u00e8vres leader and his treacherous assistants, that would have been brutality. In my view, if those individuals had been beaten up, people would have been relieved. The S\u00e8vres apologists deserved a good thrashing... No punches were thrown, and yet they consider the ripping up of the bumph as a brutal act ...\u201d 31.  On 7 November 2004, A.T. wrote the following in his article published in the same newspaper:\n\u201c... No one mentions the fact that the intention had been to publish the treasonous document [clandestinely]. They pay scant attention to the treachery, but on the other hand they consider that in tearing up the report F.Y. had committed a brutal act ... just because they sup from the same dog-bowl as \u0130brahim Kabo\u011flu and Bask\u0131n Oran.\u201d 32.  On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought an action for damages against A.T. and the company owning the newspaper having published the impugned articles. 33.  By judgment of 25 July 2006, the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim on the grounds that the statements in the impugned articles fell within the ambit of the provisions protecting their author\u2019s freedom of expression. The court held that insofar as the report in issue contained virulent criticism of the governments of the Republic and dismissed those who objected to their ideas as paranoiacs, the applicants should also tolerate the same kind of criticism, or indeed even more virulent criticism, short of actual violence. 34.  The applicants appealed on points of law. They complained that the Regional Court had failed to protect them in the exercise of their freedom of expression and had considered that the insults against them had fallen within the ambit of the legal provisions protecting freedom of expression. 35.  By judgment of 12 November 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the impugned judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. In a dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation considered that A.T.\u2019s articles had overstepped the bounds of the right to criticism as protected under the right to freedom of expression, on the grounds that those articles had comprised insulting expressions explicitly targeting the applicants. The judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 2 January 2008. 36.  In an article published in the daily newspaper Ak\u015fam on 27 October 2004, S.K. wrote the following on the subject of the applicants\u2019 report:\n\u201c... After the European Union\u2019s \u2018never make any progress\u2019 report of 6 October 2004, it was expected, as a \u2018conditioned reflex\u2019, that those in the pay of the wild west (vah\u015fi bat\u0131n\u0131n beslemeleri), almost all of whom are former ... communists, would follow their masters, and even surpass them. The comparison is perfectly apt. Like little dogs rolling over and wagging their tails when their food is served in their dog-bowls or when [they are promised] a bone, they begin their subtle attacks ... Those who pose as the eyes, ears and spleen of the Trojan horse infiltrating our country, the fools and idiots posing as smart alecs ...; in this report on minorities prepared by this insolent, perfidious and pathetic minority, the losers, who would never have dared commit this type of treason before, are clearly targeting the indivisible integrity of the State and the nation ...; some losers who, their whole lives long, have never got rid of their paranoia about Turks ... designate as \u2018S\u00e8vres paranoia\u2019 the watchful and persevering attitude of those who represent the heart, head and intelligence of our nation against the new S\u00e8vres dictates and are attempting to insult them, driven on by their wilfulness; their shared characteristic is apostasy ...; someone has said \u2018he who is not a communist at the age of twenty is an ass, and he who is not a capitalist at the age of thirty is the ass\u2019s son\u2019. Being a libo\u015f [a derogatory word for liberals in Turkey] under the auspices of the [European Union] suits these ex-communist apostates perfectly.\nJust look at this assailant (bask\u0131nc\u0131[2] eleman) who drew up this scandalous report on minorities on behalf of the Consultative Council on Human Rights ... This is the treacherous dagger which this man, ... disguised as a scientist, and the minority which he is using, has perfidiously stabbed into the heart of the Republic of Turkey and into the unity and peace of our nation...!\nAnd there is another man whose life depends on the fact of eating and swallowing; the more dogfood he eats, the more applause he attracts ... A miserable spy and apostate. Are his windows flung open not to the world, but to his stomach? Alongside a Statesman, the miniature poodle aspires to the status of a large poodle. Now he constantly growls. Perhaps he thinks [that if he continues to] bark ever more loudly, his western masters will one day make a man of him. Oh the poor little chap! God has made him a dogfood gobbler. Calm down a little, [you might scratch] the Rolex on your front paw. Carry on anyway with your bird-brain dividing, dismantling and growling. In any case we are not forced to listen to you. The most you will manage to do is tug at the backs of a few trouser legs. We have seen lots of crawlers like you, you know, and how many have we stoned? If someone like you, rootless and without a pedigree, can [bark] at people, how unfortunate for you! Oh crack-voiced, short-breathed bootlicker! Go on then! Waste your saliva! What a pity [you are allowed to] talk, what a shame [you are listened to and people are allowed] to listen to you ...\u201d 37.  On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought an action for damages for insult and defamation against the author of that article and the company owning the newspaper which had published it. 38.  By judgment of 8 June 2006 the Ankara Regional Court upheld the applicants\u2019 claim. Considering that the impugned article overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism and infringed the dignity of the applicants, the court ordered the defendants to pay the latter damages in respect of the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 39.  By judgment of 31 January 2008 the Court of Cassation (4th Civil Chamber) quashed the first-instance judgment. It found that the first section of the impugned article had consisted of severe criticism of the attitude of Turkish intellectuals to national issues, that the second section on Bask\u0131n Oran had amounted to a statement of a critical opinion on the report in question, and that the expressions used in the last section had not concerned the applicants. The Court of Cassation consequently considered that the article in question had comprised not any gratuitous attacks on the applicants but a series of acerbic and virulent critiques of their report, and that it had not overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism. In a separate dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation expressed the view that the first-instance judgment should be confirmed. 40.  On 20 November 2008 the Ankara Regional Court decided not to follow the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment and to uphold the judgment which it had delivered on 8 June 2006. 41.  On 3 June 2009 the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, upholding the arguments put forward in the cassation judgment of 31 January 2008, set aside the Ankara Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 42.  By judgment of 3 December 2009 the Ankara Regional Court, bound by the judgment of the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers, dismissed the action brought by the applicants. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 28 January 2010.", "references": ["5", "7", "8", "9", "3", "0", "2", "1", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Belgium. At the time of the events, he was studying at a university in Constan\u0163a, where he had been since October 2006. 5.  On 3 April 2008 the Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) attached to the Tulcea County prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation against O.D.A., a student at the same university as the applicant, on suspicion of drug trafficking. 6.  At around 1.30 p.m. on 18 April 2008 O.D.A. was caught trying to send by bus a package containing twelve LSD tabs in an undercover operation set up by DIICOT. The drugs were destined to reach an undercover agent who had previously contacted O.D.A. asking to buy drugs from him. O.D.A. was immediately taken to the Tulcea County police station, where he gave a written statement saying that he had \u201chad\u201d the drugs from the applicant. He also said in his statement that he had been informed that he was entitled to a lawyer but had waived this right. 7.  On the same date the case prosecutor submitted to the Tulcea County Court a request to search the residences of O.D.A. and the applicant. In the request the prosecutor stated that, by a decision issued on 18 April 2008, the criminal investigation opened against O.D.A. had been extended to the applicant on suspicion of drug trafficking. The search was authorized by a judge. 8.  During the search, which took place on the evening of 18 April 2008, 4.12 grams of cannabis and fifty-one LSD tabs were found in the applicant\u2019s room. After the search, at around 10 p.m., the applicant was first taken to hospital for a toxicology test and then to the Tulcea County police station (in the city of Tulcea, 125 km from Constan\u0163a), where a police officer asked him to give a statement. 9.  The applicant handwrote a statement (in English) in which he explained as follows:\n\u201c... my brother and I travel frequently ... to Belgium.... While in [Belgium], my brother and I travelled to the Netherlands numerous times to smoke THC ... The first and only time that I brought drugs into Romania was 2 months ago. I bought these drugs from a friend of a friend of mine ... He offered me a deal from someone he knew. I gave my friend the money, 450 euros, and he returned a day later with 200 grams of hashish and 60 LSD which was meant as a gift... After smoking about 40 grams of it, my brother and I wrapped the hashish and LSD in a black plastic bag and put it in a pocket of some trousers and packed it in a suitcase amongst other clothes. ...\u201d\nHe further stated that since he did not use LSD and had needed money he had decided to sell nine LSD tabs to O.D.A. Lastly, he said that he had never sold any drugs before, that he was not a drug trafficker and that he was sorry for his actions, which he would never repeat. At the upper bottom of the front page the statement was signed and dated 18 April 2008 by a police officer. Besides the applicant\u2019s signature, the statement bore an additional signature which resembled that of the lawyer appointed on his behalf and, at the foot of the page, the date of 19 April 2008. 10.  The applicant was then taken to the headquarters of DIICOT where, at 2.15 p.m. on 19 April 2008, the prosecutor informed him of the accusations against him, namely unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs. At the same time the applicant was informed of his right to an interpreter and a lawyer of his own choosing and to remain silent. Then the accusations were read to him in the presence of a lawyer and an English language interpreter \u2013 both appointed on his behalf by the authorities \u2013 who also assisted him during his subsequent questioning by the prosecutor. All the above information were included in a minutes drafted on 19 April 2008 at 14:15 p.m. and signed by the prosecutor, the applicant as well as by his appointed lawyer and interpreter. After the applicant\u2019s initial statement given to the police had been translated into Romanian by the interpreter, the prosecutor took a new statement from him. In this statement, which was in Romanian and signed by the applicant, the lawyer, the interpreter and the prosecutor, the applicant reiterated the previous statement given to the police (see paragraph 9 above) but this time stated that he had not known about the LSD in his luggage until he had unpacked at the dormitory. The applicant also said: \u201cI have no complaints against the police authorities or the prosecutor\u201d. After the charges were formally brought against him, at 3.45 p.m. in the presence of the lawyer and the interpreter, the applicant said that he \u201cmaintained his previous statements\u201d. 11.  The same day a request by the prosecutor to remand the applicant and O.D.A. in custody was rejected by the Tulcea County Court because the two men did not have a criminal record, were students and had been willingly cooperating with the investigative authorities. Later that evening the applicant was allowed to leave the prosecutor\u2019s office. 12.  On 3 June 2008 the applicant and O.D.A were sent to trial for unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs. 13.  The Tulcea County Court considered the criminal case between September and October 2008. 14.  The applicant, who was assisted by two lawyers of his choice and did not contest the charges brought against him, raised numerous complaints before the court regarding procedural irregularities during the investigation. He stated, among other things, that after the search on the evening of 18 April 2008, he had been detained by the police from 10 p.m. until the next day, when the prosecutor\u2019s request to remand him in custody had been rejected by the court. He argued that his initial statement given to the police during his detention (see paragraph 9 above) should not be taken into consideration because it had been taken in the absence of a lawyer and an interpreter and, as a result, he had not understood his rights. 15.  On 24 October 2008 the Tulcea County Court convicted the applicant of unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. He was fined 1,000 Romanian Lei ((ROL) \u2013 approximately 270 euros (EUR)). 16.  Drawing on the evidence gathered during the investigation and at the trial, the court established the facts as follows. In February 2008 the applicant and his brother had travelled to Belgium to visit their father and from there to Amsterdam, in order to smoke THC. On their return, the applicant had hidden in his luggage and brought into Romania 200 grams of hashish and 60 tabs of LSD, drugs that he had obtained from a friend studying in Belgium. The applicant alleged that he had not known at the time about the LSD, which had been a present from his friend, and that he had only discovered it when he had unpacked at the dormitory. The court however held that the applicant could not claim that he had not been aware of the contents of his luggage since in his first statement (see paragraph 9 above) he had declared that he had personally packed the LSD in a black bag in his suitcase. The court further held that O.D.A., who had used to smoke together with the applicant, had responded to a request for drugs from other students because he had needed money. According to his statements, he had bought approximately 40 grams of cannabis from the applicant on several occasions, and twelve LSD tabs that he had sold at a higher price. On 18 April 2008 O.D.A. had been caught trying to sell the twelve LSD tabs. 17.  The court stated that it had based its decision on the following: a technical report on the drugs, toxicology reports, the statements given by the defendants and witness statements. As regards the applicant\u2019s request to disregard his initial statement it stated:\n\u201cAs regards the defendant [K.C.], not only did he refuse to testify before this court, but he tried \u2013 personally and through his lawyers \u2013 to exclude from the case the statements he gave before the prosecutor, claiming that he had not been made aware of his rights and that he had not been satisfied with the services of the interpreter.\nAfter verification of these allegations, the court finds that the defendants were informed of the charges and of their right to remain silent and to be represented by a lawyer of their choice.\nThe defendant K.C. was informed of his rights on 19 April 2008, at [2.15 p.m.], in the presence of his interpreter and lawyer, [and was] questioned afterwards.\nAs regards the services of the interpreter, the defendant could have complained to the prosecutor if he was not satisfied, which he failed to do.\u201d 18.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, reiterating his previous arguments. 19.  On 3 April 2009 the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. In reply to his arguments, it noted that he had been represented by a lawyer and had benefited from the services of an interpreter throughout the entire criminal proceedings, in compliance with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. The court further held that:\n\u201cThe nature of the case and the people involved, in a special location \u2013 a university campus \u2013 required urgent investigative measures, therefore it cannot be claimed that the presumption of innocence had been breached or that the defendants had been deprived of their right to defence.\u201d 20.  The applicant filed an appeal on points of law (recurs). He argued, among other things, that he had been held at the police station and at the prosecutor\u2019s office without legal justification for an unreasonable length of time (twenty-two hours); he also stressed that his initial confession had been taken while he had been detained at the police station without an interpreter, in the absence of a lawyer and following threats by the police officer guarding him. He further submitted that the most serious charges against him had been based only on this initial confession and on O.D.A.\u2019s statement \u2013 also taken in the absence of a lawyer \u2013 as well as on the findings of the search that, in his opinion, had not been carried out in compliance with the legal procedural requirements. The applicant added that his right to be informed promptly in a language which he understood and in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as provided for by Article 6 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, had been breached. 21.  On 21 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law with final effect. 22.  The court undertook a fresh analysis of the evidence in the file and decided that the guarantees of a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention had been respected as regards both defendants since they had been provided with legal assistance and had benefited from adversarial proceedings in which all their arguments had been examined and replied to. In conclusion, the court considered that the proceedings, taken as a whole, had been fair. 23.  As regards the applicant\u2019s specific complaint about his initial statement given to the police, the court held as follows:\n\u201c ... the statements given by the applicant and O.D.A. ... were in compliance with the legal requirements ... for the respective stages of the investigation, they reflected their wishes at the relevant time, both defendants having the capacity to understand the rights presented to them, being students and even in the absence of legal studies, they could have understood the extent of their rights and obligations.\u201d 24.  The court further observed that O.D.A. had specifically waived his right to legal assistance (see paragraph 6 above) while the applicant, who had also been informed of his right to an interpreter, had expressed a wish to be assigned one. It also noted that the file included the prosecutor\u2019s decision appointing an English language interpreter in the case and minutes signed by the applicant and the interpreter attesting that the applicant had been informed of his right to be represented by a lawyer of his choice and of the right to remain silent (see paragraph 10 above). The court concluded that, in any event, the applicant had not at any point been detained and therefore legal assistance had not been mandatory in his situation. 25.  The remaining arguments raised by the applicant were dismissed by the court as not proved. 26.  Throughout the entire trial the applicant was represented by two lawyers of his choice and assisted by a court provided English language interpreter.", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "6", "5", "9", "8", "1", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1979. 8.  The applicant is the biological mother of four children. Together with her husband, G., a French citizen, she has a son, P., who was born on 13 November 2001. In December 2005 he was placed in foster care in Slovenia and has remained there ever since, having only occasional contact with the applicant. The applicant does not attend meetings with the welfare workers and foster parents and does not pay maintenance for him. On 19 November 2007 the applicant gave birth to her second child, M. In April 2008 the competent French authorities placed M. in foster care in France and referred the applicant for psychological counselling. M. was later adopted in France and has no contact with the applicant. 9.  On 5 January 2010 the applicant gave birth to her third child, A., in the Postojna Maternity Hospital. The hospital informed the Ljubljana Social Work Centre of A.\u2019s birth. The Ljubljana Social Work Centre arranged for the applicant to be transported to and accommodated at her mother\u2019s home. The Cerknica Social Work Centre (\u201cthe Cerknica Centre\u201d) provided the applicant with a nursing service and housekeeping assistance three times a week. The T. Association also helped the applicant care for A. Nonetheless, it was noted that the applicant was unable to take care of A. and often travelled and left A. at home, and that the applicant\u2019s mother could not cope with this. Since December 2010 A. has been living with his father, G., in France. 10.  The present application concerns the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s parental rights in respect of her fourth child, E., who was born on 31 December 2010. 11.  On 29 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother phoned the Cerknica Centre to inform them that the applicant was returning from France by train and was heading directly to Postojna Maternity Hospital, where she would shortly give birth. On 4 January 2011, after the applicant had given birth to E., the Cerknica Centre\u2019s social workers visited her in the hospital, where the medical staff brought to their attention that the applicant was unable to take care of E. and needed constant supervision and help. Consequently, on 7 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s stay in the hospital was extended until 10 January 2011. Following her discharge from the hospital, she went to live with her mother temporarily \u2013 an arrangement which the applicant and her mother agreed upon following an intervention by the Cerknica Centre. The Cerknica Centre provided the applicant with family help at home, a social service which included the participation of the T. Association and the community nursing service, domestic help with household tasks three times a week, and the assistance of a peripatetic worker from the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital. 12.  On 19 January 2011, via email, the Cerknica Centre asked the Slovenian Consulate in Paris to enquire of G. whether he was willing to take care of E. On 7 February 2011 the consulate replied to the Cerknica Centre that the French social services had talked with G., who had doubts as to whether E. was his daughter and whether he could take care of her. The Cerknica Centre\u2019s records of the phone call show that on 11 February 2011 it tried to telephone G. but was unsuccessful. On 15 February 2011, via email, the Cerknica Centre asked the consulate to enquire of G. whether he was willing to give his consent to E.\u2019s adoption. 13.  On 20 January 2011 the peripatetic worker who monitored the applicant at home (see paragraph 11 above) informed the Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic of his concerns about the applicant\u2019s mental state. The applicant was referred for an emergency examination by a clinical psychologist, which she refused to undertake. In addition, the community nursing centre and the worker helping the applicant with household tasks informed the Cerknica Centre of problems they had noticed in the applicant\u2019s care of the newborn. 14.  On 28 January 2011 the social workers talked to the applicant, who, considering E. old enough to travel, explained to them that she was planning to travel to France before 31 January. Subsequently, the team of professionals met at the Cerknica Centre and concluded that E.\u2019s well-being was at serious risk. 15.  On 30 January 2011 the applicant travelled to France to see her husband. She left E. with her mother, E.\u2019s grandmother. As the applicant\u2019s mother was not willing to take care of E., on 1 February 2011 the Cerknica Centre issued an interim removal order with immediate effect whereby E. was removed from her parents and placed in the Crisis Centre for Children. The Cerknica Centre also filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for abandoning a child, but the criminal proceedings were later discontinued. 16.  On 16 February 2011 E. was placed in the care of the Cerknica Centre on the basis of section 201 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Family Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 60 below). On 18 February 2011, by way of an interim care order, the Cerknica Centre placed E. in the care of foster parents, who later adopted her (see paragraph 50 below). On 23 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre issued a final removal and care order removing E. from her parents and placing her in foster care. It based its decision on sections 119, 120, 157 and 158(2) of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). It does not appear that the applicant attempted to challenge the removal and/or care order in any way. 17.  Following E.\u2019s birth the applicant often changed places and travelled back and forth to France. Her location was not always known to her family or the Cerknica Centre, which tried to reach her, unsuccessfully. 18.  The applicant has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In October 2009 she was placed in a psychiatric hospital for the first time, in Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic. Since giving birth to E. she has been placed in a psychiatric hospital several times, including against her will on at least one occasion. 19.  In her statement of 10 January 2011 a doctor from the Postojna Maternity Hospital noted that the applicant had been refusing to take medication, and the peripatetic worker from the Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic said the same in his statement of 20 January 2011 (see paragraph 13 above). 20.  The case file indicates that as of 7 January 2011 the applicant was regularly examined by a psychiatrist from the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital, often on a monthly basis. 21.  The Cerknica Centre\u2019s records of 9 April 2014 show that the Cerknica Centre offered services including counselling to the applicant, who refused this, arguing that she had already joined a self-help group and had monthly sessions with a psychologist and psychiatric examinations every three months. 22.  Dr M., who examined the applicant, stated in his report of 31 March 2014 and at a hearing (see paragraph 41 below) that the applicant\u2019s illness, paranoid schizophrenia, had been in remission for some time and she had been taking her medication regularly. In 2015 the applicant\u2019s condition worsened and she had to be hospitalised twice in that year. 23.  On 15 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre held the first meeting of the Individual Project Team (hereinafter \u201cthe IPT\u201d), which was set up under the Foster Care Execution Act (see paragraph 61 below) to monitor E.\u2019s foster care. Although, as E.\u2019s parent, the applicant was invited to the meeting, she did not attend it because she was travelling. The IPT was composed of social workers, the foster parents and the applicant. 24.  The Cerknica Centre\u2019s records of the IPT\u2019s meeting, prepared by a social worker, show that on 6 June 2011 the applicant visited the Cerknica Centre, enquiring about E. for the first time. On 5 July 2011 the first contact session with E. took place. The social worker who was supervising the contact session noted in the report that the applicant\u2019s behaviour during the contact session had been inappropriate for E.\u2019s age, because she had tried to put E., then six months old, on her feet. 25.  The Cerknica Centre\u2019s records of the IPT\u2019s meeting show that on 12 January 2012 the applicant again asked the Cerknica Centre if she could see E. The second contact session took place on 31 January 2012. The applicant cancelled the next scheduled contact session which was to take place on 28 March 2012 because of her alleged departure to France. On 15 May 2012 the third contact session took place. The Cerknica Centre\u2019s records of a phone call with the applicant indicate that on 19 June 2012 the Cerknica Centre contacted her with a view to arranging another contact session, but no agreement was reached as she ended the conversation saying that she was busy. On 2 July 2012 the Cerknica Centre enquired with the applicant as to whether she wanted another contact session to be arranged, but she declined, referring to her poor \u201cstate\u201d. As further noted in the Cerknica Centre\u2019s records, the applicant confirmed that she was aware that the Cerknica Centre would organise another session as soon as possible if she so wished. Following a request by the applicant of 4 July 2012, the fourth contact session took place on 11 July 2012. A social worker from the Kranj Social Work Centre who was supervising the contact session noted in her report that the applicant was tired during the contact session and stopped playing with E. after a couple of minutes. The contact session scheduled for 26 September 2012 was cancelled due to the applicant\u2019s illness. 26.  Another thirteen contact sessions between the applicant and E. took place before the end of 2014. They all took place in the presence of the foster parents and the Cerknica Centre\u2019s social worker. According to the records of the IPT meetings, the presence of the foster parents was necessary because of E.\u2019s age and the need to ensure her sense of security, given that she and the applicant did not have a close relationship. 27.  The reports of the contact sessions prepared by the social worker supervising them indicate that during most of the sessions the applicant appeared distant and remained largely passive, observing E. without having any interaction with her. Numerous reports of the contact sessions further indicate that during the sessions E. did not approach the applicant on her own initiative. On several occasions she wanted to leave before the end of the contact session and stayed only because the foster parents entertained her. Furthermore, in her reports of the sessions, the social worker noted that the foster parents encouraged E. to establish contact with the applicant and the relatives present at the sessions, and that they were accessible and communicative with respect to the applicant and her questions about E. Following a request made by the applicant at the IPT meeting in February 2014 for help in establishing her relationship with E., the social worker and the foster parents offered her help with regard to future contact sessions and encouraged her to engage more actively in establishing the relationship. It was noted in the reports of the contact sessions of 2 July 2014 and 10 September 2014 that the applicant had made efforts to establish a connection with E., which had led to some interaction between them. However, no such interaction had occurred at the last contact session, which had taken place on 26 November 2014. 28.  The records of the IPT meetings, which took place every couple of months, show that the contact sessions took place on the dates agreed at the meetings based on the applicant\u2019s requests. The Cerknica Centre, the foster parents and the applicant agreed that the contact sessions would take place gradually because E. did not know the applicant. 29.  On 8 January 2014 the applicant asked the Cerknica Centre for contact sessions on a more regular basis. The Cerknica Centre advised her to institute proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court, which was competent to decide on her contact with E. in the absence of the agreement. 30.  As requested by the applicant in May 2016, the inspection authorities of the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities carried out an inspection with a view to determining whether the Cerknica Centre had impeded contact between the applicant and E. Their report and the documents in the file show that on at least on five further occasions the Cerknica Centre informed the applicant that she should institute proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court if she was not satisfied with the existing arrangements. The IPT records also show that at that time the applicant was in contact with her lawyer, with whom she had discussed the possibility of taking the matter to court. 31.  According to the report issued by the inspection authorities, the Cerknica Centre had acted in a professional way in arranging the contact sessions, and had good reasons to put the interests of the child first. The inspection report also noted that the Cerknica Centre had insisted on that contact pending a decision by the Constitutional Court, and had on numerous occasions informed the applicant of the judicial remedy she should use if she found the existing contact arrangements unsatisfactory. The report further found that after the Constitutional Court had confirmed the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s parental rights (see paragraph 48 below), the Cerknica Centre had properly considered that the contact had been forced upon E. and thus was not in her best interests. 32.  It would appear that the Cerknica Centre also asked the Human Rights Ombudsman to provide a general opinion on what would be in the child\u2019s best interests in the situation in question \u2013 the withdrawal of parental rights or permanent foster care. On 29 July 2015 the Human Rights Ombudsman replied to the Cerknica Centre, noting that if the child could not be reunited with her family, the next best solution was adoption. They confirmed that foster care should be understood to be a temporary measure and that, as regards a change in contact arrangements, advising the mother to institute court proceedings was the only available option. 33.  The records of the Cerknica Centre indicate that on 23 September 2015 the Cerknica Centre enquired of the applicant whether she had taken any steps to change the arrangements by means of court proceedings. According to those records, she answered that she had been too busy with other things. 34.  On 15 February 2016 the Cerknica Centre sent the applicant some photos of E. 35.  On 7 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre lodged an application with the Ljubljana District Court seeking that the applicant and G. be divested of their parental rights, on the grounds that they had neglected and abandoned E., had not taken care of her basic needs, had repeated the problematic behaviour, and had jeopardised the well-being of the child. In the Cerknica Centre\u2019s opinion, protecting the interests of the child required the withdrawal of the parental rights of both parents. 36.  The applicant received legal aid and was represented by legal counsel in the proceedings. She disputed the Cerknica Centre\u2019s arguments in the application of 7 March 2011, and argued that she, as a result of mental illness, was not able to understand the proceedings. She submitted that since E. was safe in foster care there was no urgency to divest her of her parental rights. In her view, the court should wait for her mental health \u2013 which at that point was poor \u2013 to improve before deciding the application. Provided that she received appropriate therapy, she would be capable of taking care of the child, so the withdrawal of her parental rights was not necessary. In addition, the applicant argued that the aim of the proceedings was to give E. up for adoption and preclude her from later seeking to have her parental rights restored. 37.  The court appointed an expert psychiatrist, Dr K., who met the applicant for an interview. In his opinion of 16 May 2012 he submitted to the court that the applicant suffered from a disease on the schizophrenia spectrum, but had the capacity to be a party in the proceedings. He noted that the applicant was in remission (the period when a patient does not have positive psychotic symptoms); however, that was a recent development and the remission was still unstable. He further noted that the disease could rapidly turn into its active form. Dr K. also stated that provided the applicant took the prescribed medication regularly, her health condition would not deteriorate; however, if she failed to do so, the deterioration would be inevitable. He attached the opinion of an expert in clinical psychology, J., who had also examined the applicant and found that her attitude toward her health condition was not sufficiently serious and that her sense of reality was deficient. The applicant showed indications of extensive and persecutory delusions, while her emotional state was elated and inappropriate for the situation. Dr K. further explained that, in his opinion, the applicant was not able to take care of the child at that time. Her health condition had not improved to such a degree that she could assume the care and upbringing of a child who was a minor. 38.  On 29 November 2012 the Ljubljana District Court issued a decision whereby it divested the applicant and G. of their parental rights in relation to E. on the basis of section 116(1) of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). With regard to the applicant\u2019s understanding of the proceedings, the Ljubljana District Court concluded, on the basis of Dr K.\u2019s expert opinion as well as the applicant\u2019s own statements, that she was regularly taking the medication and that she did not lack the capacity to be a party to the proceedings at issue. With respect to G., who had not responded to the Cerknica Centre\u2019s application for the withdrawal of his parental rights and had remained inactive in the court proceedings, the court noted that he had not shown any interest in E. and had clearly demonstrated that he was not going to take care of her. With respect to the applicant, it found that the applicant had abandoned E. and had seriously neglected her parental responsibilities. The court pointed out that the same pattern could be observed as regards the applicant\u2019s attitude towards the other three children. 39.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 16 April 2013 the Koper Higher Court quashed the first-instance court\u2019s decision in the part relating to the applicant and remitted the case for re-examination. It stressed that the lower court had failed to clarify whether the applicant\u2019s behaviour in question and her attitude towards her illness and treatment was due to the mental illness itself, or was a result of her voluntary actions. 40.  In the new proceedings, the Ljubljana District Court appointed a new expert psychiatrist, Dr M., and obtained the opinion of an expert psychologist, Dr P. The court held a hearing and, inter alia, examined the applicant and the two experts. 41.  After personally examining the applicant on 23 September 2013, Dr M. submitted to the court a written expert opinion confirming that she had a mental disorder on the schizophrenia spectrum and noting that her character appeared to have been affected by the illness. According to Dr M., the applicant\u2019s lack of a realistic understanding of her illness, her negative attitude towards treatment, and her abandonment of E. were all the results of her mental illness. Acknowledging that the illness could be controlled and the symptoms managed by medication, as well as noting that the course of the condition depended on each individual, Dr M. stressed that the prognosis for the applicant\u2019s illness was not good, and therefore it was not possible to expect her to be able to take care of E. In particular, it was noted that, notwithstanding the episodes of remission, schizophrenia, like some other mental illnesses, led gradually to a permanent deterioration in a person\u2019s capacities, and such a process would occur despite the applicant\u2019s medical treatment. Dr M. also noted that, in the interview, the applicant herself had openly expressed doubts as to whether she could take care of her daughter on her own. 42.  After conducting an interview with the applicant and clinically examining her, Dr P. submitted a written report in which he noted that the applicant suffered from a chronic mental disorder on the schizophrenia spectrum which was incurable but treatable (manageable). In his opinion, deterioration causing the applicant\u2019s unpredictable behaviour was inevitable, and the old behaviour pattern was likely to repeat. According to him, the applicant\u2019s understanding and awareness of the child\u2019s needs had been reduced to an understanding and awareness of her primarily physiological needs. The applicant did not understand the parental role and was unable to see the child as an individual with her own needs and desires. He found that the applicant was properly equipped intellectually, but had emotional problems such as diminished empathy. In his opinion, at that time the applicant was not able to care for or bring up E., and was not a suitable person to do so because she could not be expected to provide a stable environment for the child. He also noted that she had not expressed a wish to have custody of E., but had expressed her desire to have more frequent contact with her. Dr P. found E. lively, communicative and cordial, but restrained in relation to the applicant. The expert concluded that contact with the mother was burdensome and forced upon E. The expert also noted that, when observing the contact session, he had not noticed any emotional connection between the applicant and E. 43.  On 3 April 2014 the Ljubljana District Court issued a new decision divesting the applicant of her parental rights in relation to E. on the basis of section 116 of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). The court found, on the basis of the new expert opinions (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above), that the applicant had suffered from paranoid schizophrenia for many years before its critical manifestation. It further reasoned that the consequences of the disease in the applicant were a non-critical attitude to the illness, and as a result the applicant was not able to understand her health problems, their seriousness, or the importance of treatment. Equally, her neglectful conduct in relation to E. when she had left her did not reflect the true will and conscious action of the applicant. The court weighed the interests of the child against those of the applicant. It noted that, in the absence of any realistic possibility of the applicant resuming care of the child, it was more appropriate to withdraw her parental rights and provide the child with a substitute family for permanent care and emotional stability. Having regard in particular to the above\u2011mentioned expert opinions, the court concluded that the applicant should be divested of her parental rights. It based the conclusion on the fact that she suffered from paranoid schizophrenia which, though controllable, was incurable, could possibly worsen, and would in any event lead to negative personality changes. The court also had regard to fact that the applicant had four children but all the children were cared for by other foster or adoptive parents, and she had spent only a month with E., whereas E. had spent most of her life with the foster family, in an environment where she could be provided with permanent care and emotional stability, something which could not be provided by her mother. 44.  The applicant appealed, arguing that it was unacceptable to divest her of her parental rights solely because of her mental illness, and that the legislation provided no basis for such an extreme and disproportionate measure. In her opinion, E.\u2019s interests would be sufficiently safeguarded by foster care, which would be a less intrusive measure. Moreover, she argued that her illness was in remission, she was regularly taking medication, and did not present any danger to E. She further argued that the conclusion that contact was not in E.\u2019s interests was unfair. In her view, the first-instance court had not taken into account that she had been doing her best, including by trying to find a job in order to improve her situation. 45.  On 21 October 2014 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that the fact that her actions had not been deliberate could not be a crucial factor in a decision under section 116 of the Family Act. The main criterion for a decision was the child\u2019s best interests. The court further found that the reason behind the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s parental rights was the fact that there was no prospect that the family would ever be reunited. During the remission stage of her illness, the applicant could function in her daily life, but she could not take care of her daughter either at that time or in the future. In this connection, the court found that the applicant lacked empathy, did not understand her parental responsibilities, and had been mostly passive during the contact sessions with E. The court noted that the applicant had not abused her contact rights, but had failed to establish proper communication with E., and consequently a basic parent-child relationship. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that E. should remain in foster care, finding that this was only a temporary measure intended to enable parents to exercise their parental responsibilities pending their children being returned to them. Since reunification of the applicant\u2019s family was not likely to happen, protection of the child\u2019s best interests required a more lasting measure aimed at ensuring permanent care and emotional stability for the child. The court concluded that \u201cwhen balancing the child\u2019s interests against the mother\u2019s rights, it was not possible to give priority to the mother\u2019s interest in maintaining her parental rights\u201d. 46.  The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme State Prosecutor to lodge a request for the protection of legality. On 19 February 2015 the Supreme State Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for his intervention in the case. 47.  On 30 January 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Koper Higher Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 45 above). She invoked several provisions of the Constitution, as well as Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. She disputed the lower court\u2019s findings concerning the poor quality of the contact she had had with E., and argued that depriving her of her parental rights was unjustified because she had not posed any danger to E., and the court\u2019s preference for adoption over fostering in cases such as hers violated the biological parents\u2019 rights. In her opinion, the lower court\u2019s position implied that people with incurable mental illnesses who presented no danger to their children could not have parental rights just because they were unable to take proper care of their children. She also argued that the concept of proper care had not been defined by any of the lower courts. Furthermore, she pointed out that she wished to maintain contact with E., but had been unable to do so since the Koper Higher Court\u2019s judgment of 21 October 2014. 48.  On 10 December 2015, by five votes to three, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It found that the lower court\u2019s arguments relating to the applicant\u2019s permanent inability to take care of E., the absence of a family bond between her and E., her inability to establish a relationship with E. during the contact sessions, and the benefits of providing E. with a substitute family for permanent care and emotional stability, justified the withdrawal of her parental rights in the child\u2019s best interests. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s opinion, when weighing the child\u2019s interests against the mother\u2019s rights, the interests which should prevail were E.\u2019s interests in her permanent and stable care and upbringing. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument concerning discrimination against mentally ill people, the Constitutional Court found that the withdrawal of her parental rights had not been based on the fact that she suffered from mental illness, but on the fact that she had been permanently incapable of taking care of E. and the finding that there was no prospect that the family would ever be reunited. It was for domestic courts to protect the child\u2019s interests in the most appropriate way. In E.\u2019s case, they had decided that this was possible only by ensuring a permanent and stable substitute family environment. Moreover, the Constitutional Court upheld the Koper Higher Court\u2019s finding that section 116 of the Family Act could be applied to the present case despite the applicant lacking intent as regards her actions threatening E. (see paragraph 45 above). It considered that the Koper Higher Court\u2019s interpretation of the scope of the application of section 116 complied with Article 54 (1) of the Constitution, which provided that parents could be divested of their parental responsibility or have that responsibility limited only on the grounds provided for by law in order to protect a child\u2019s interests. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, that provision did not imply that the State was to protect the child\u2019s interests only when he or she was threatened by the deliberate actions or omissions of his or her parents. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 12 January 2016. 49.  Judge D. Jadek Pensa of the Constitutional Court, who voted against the above decision, wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by the other two dissenting judges. She pointed out that the interference in the applicant\u2019s case had been particularly serious, and noted that the right to know one\u2019s parents and have contact with them was an internationally recognised right of a child. In her view, the lower court should explain why E. would be at risk of harm by knowing her mother and having contact with her. She also found it questionable whether the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to form a bond with E., and argued that the positive obligations imposed on the authorities, including the Cerknica Centre, had been disregarded. 50.  On 16 May 2016 the Cerknica Centre issued a decision on E.\u2019s adoption by her foster parents. On 2 June 2016 the decision became final and the foster care in respect of E. was terminated and in effect replaced by the adoption. The applicant was not a party to those proceedings. 51.  In its decision, the Cerknica Centre relied on Article 20 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and section 141 of the Family Act (see paragraphs 60 and 63 below). It emphasised that foster care was a temporary measure and that a child needed a long-term placement which provided him or her with permanent loving care and intimacy from the same person. The Cerknica Centre found that it had exhausted all possibilities for reunification with the biological family. Furthermore, the Cerknica Centre held that the relationship between E. and her foster parents was strong and safe, indicating that the foster parents would take care of her in a responsible and appropriate manner. 52.  On 19 May 2016 the applicant initiated court proceedings against two social work centres which had been involved in the contact arrangements in the past and E.\u2019s adoptive parents, seeking the regulation of her contact with E. and an interim decision setting out temporary contact arrangements pending the court proceedings. She requested that contact sessions take place every fortnight for three hours. In her opinion, it was in the child\u2019s interests for her to know her mother. She maintained that contact sessions with E. in the past had been rare, and that she had expressed her wish to have them more often; however, the Cerknica Centre had limited them even further and had suspended them after the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision (see paragraphs 31 and 48 above). The applicant received legal aid and was represented by legal counsel in the proceedings. 53.  The Koper District Court appointed an expert in psychiatry and paediatric psychiatry, Dr Z., who, inter alia, carried out a psychiatric examination and an interview with the applicant, and held a paediatric psychiatric interview with E. In her expert opinion, Dr Z. emphasised the applicant\u2019s inability to establish an adequate relation with E. Notably, her findings showed that the applicant was emotionally unresponsive, lacked empathy, had a distorted view of reality, and was not capable of either perceiving the child as an individual or reacting to her needs. In Dr Z.\u2019s opinion, E.\u2019s contact with someone like the applicant, who did not understand and was not able to react to the child, would be unpleasant, painful and burdensome. Since, in the present case, it was the child\u2019s biological mother who did not know how to respond or touch the child, the contact experience could be traumatic for E. Dr Z. also emphasised the relevance of the applicant\u2019s negative attitude towards E.\u2019s adoptive parents, which could be harmful to E. She observed that, in the past, E.\u2019s adoptive parents had encouraged E.\u2019s contact with the applicant and had not acted as her competition. The expert refused to arrange a contact session between the applicant and E., as she believed that that would be contrary to the professional rules of medicine and harmful for E. 54.  On 9 August 2016, after holding a hearing, the Koper District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the regulation of contact (predlog za ureditev stikov) and an interim decision. It firstly observed that E. had been adopted after the contact proceedings had been initiated (see paragraph 50 above). Consequently, the social work centres had stopped playing a role in arranging the contact, and the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application in so far as it was directed against them, without any further examination. Furthermore, the adoption had resulted in a different legal basis which the court had to apply in determining contact between the applicant and E. In particular, since the applicant was no longer considered to be E.\u2019s parent, the relevant provision for the regulation of contact became section 106.a of the Family Act, which regulated a child\u2019s contact with people who were not his or her parents (see paragraph 60 below). The court held that it would allow contact between E. and the applicant if it established on a cumulative basis that E. was personally attached to the applicant, had a family-type relationship with her, and that the contact was in E.\u2019s interests. Therefore, it found the question of responsibility for the quality of contact sessions in the past irrelevant for the purposes of determining the case at hand. 55.  In its assessment, the court relied on Dr Z.\u2019s expert opinion (see paragraph 53 above) and the statements of the social worker who had supervised the contact sessions in the past and observed that, during the sessions, the applicant had been largely passive and there had been no proper interaction between her and E. It concluded that there was no personal connection between the applicant and E. Having regard to the nature of the actual relationship between the applicant and E., the applicant\u2019s health situation at that time, her inability to form a relationship that would be beneficial to E., her negative attitude towards the adoptive parents, and the consequences the contact would have for E., the court found that the contact would not be in her interests. As the child\u2019s interests constituted the first and paramount consideration in the case, it dismissed both the application for contact and the application for an interim decision. 56.  The applicant appealed, maintaining that the decision not to grant her any contact was disproportionate and based on flawed findings and an erroneous application of the law. She argued that Dr Z.\u2019s expert opinion was incomplete and focused on the observations of contact sessions in 2014. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, Dr Z. had failed to examine the possibility that progress in establishing a relationship with E. could have been made had the Cerknica Centre not arbitrarily suspended the contact more than a year and a half earlier. Furthermore, invoking Article 8 of the Convention, she argued that the first-instance court had not carried out a proportionality test when weighing up the rights of the child and the applicant. It had also failed to assess whether the authorities had done everything to maintain her relationship with E., especially after her parental rights had been withdrawn. 57.  On 4 April 2017 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the appeal. It found that the first-instance court had convincingly established in a well-reasoned decision that contact with the applicant was not in E.\u2019s interests because of the applicant\u2019s lack of emotional capacity to establish a relationship with E. and her negative attitude towards the adoptive parents. The Koper Higher Court emphasised that in cases like the one at hand, where the interests of the biological mother, the child and the adoptive family had to be balanced against each other, the interests of the child constituted the main guidance. Since the reintroduction of contact with the applicant would be harmful, even traumatic, for E.\u2019s health and development, the mother\u2019s right to family life had to give way to the child\u2019s right. 58.  The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law, which was rejected as inadmissible by a decision of the Supreme Court of 8 August 2017. The court held that the decision against which the applicant had lodged an application for leave to appeal had been issued in non-contentious civil proceedings in which an appeal on points of law was inadmissible unless otherwise provided for by law. 59.  A request by the applicant for free legal aid for the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had been rejected on the basis that the proceedings had no prospect of success owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. She did not appeal against that decision, nor did she lodge a constitutional complaint.", "references": ["9", "0", "1", "3", "7", "6", "2", "5", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 1987 respectively. 6.  On 5 April 2009 general elections took place in Moldova. On 6 and 7 April 2009 a large crowd protested in the streets against alleged electoral fraud. Hundreds of young persons were arrested on 7 April 2009 and later dates; many of them were ill-treated during arrest (for more details, see Taraburca v. Moldova, no. 18919/10, \u00a7\u00a7 7-10 and 33-37, 6 December 2011, Buhaniuc v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 56074/10, \u00a7 7, 28 January 2014 and Iurcu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 33759/10, \u00a7\u00a7 7-9, 9 April 2013). 7.  On 7 April 2009 the applicants were returning from Chi\u015fin\u0103u to their home village when the minibus in which they were travelling was stopped by masked armed men at 11.10 p.m. The men ordered the bus driver to drive to the police headquarters in Chi\u015fin\u0103u (\u201cthe police headquarters\u201d), where the applicants, together with other passengers, were ordered to stand with their hands behind their heads. 8.  Upon entering the detention centre in the police headquarters, the applicants were taken to a room where five police officers registered their arrest. The applicants and other female detainees were ordered to stand with their faces to the wall and not to look to the sides. When one of them (N.) looked to the side, Officer A.C. hit her head against the wall. 9.  The first applicant was asked to identify her bag. According to her, A.C. threatened to throw away the bag instead of registering all of the items inside. She then proposed to register only the documents, the mobile phone and the contents of her wallet. The first applicant noticed that her arrest had been wrongly mentioned as having taken place at 2.20 p.m. and told that to the officer. A.C. allegedly threatened her with death if she did not sign, after which she signed the arrest record. In the meantime, several young men were lined up against the wall and were periodically hit if they tried to look around. The applicants heard sounds of people being beaten from the adjacent room, following which A.C. escorted one young man out of there. 10.  After signing the arrest record, A.C. took the applicants one by one to another adjacent room. Two officers were there (V.D., a male officer, and M.T., a female officer). V.D. ordered each of the applicants to undress. After they initially removed only a part of their clothes, V.D. shouted at them to fully undress. Each of the applicants was also ordered to do sit-ups while naked, while both officers smiled. The door remained partly open throughout the procedure. M.T. allegedly called the first applicant a prostitute. 11.  The applicants were placed, together with five other female detainees, in a cell, where they were held until 9 April 2009. No food was provided for them and they were not allowed to contact anyone outside the detention centre. During 7 and 8 April 2009 the officers would come every three hours to the cell where the applicants were being detained, officially in order to verify their presence. All those inside had to stand up, their hands behind the back. During one of such visits on 8 April 2009, A.C. told everyone in the applicants\u2019 cell to be thankful to President Voronin, who had not ordered shots to be fired into the crowd during the unrest of 7 April 2009. 12.  On the morning of 9 April 2009 a prosecutor visited their cell and asked whether anyone had been ill-treated or had any other complaints. Several police officers from the police headquarters were standing just behind the prosecutor, which, according to the applicants, prevented them from complaining. The first applicant asked for permission to call home to see how her child was doing, but the prosecutor replied that he could not help and that she needed to negotiate that with the head of the detention facility. 13.  On the same day at 3.30 p.m. the applicants were taken, one by one, to a room in the police headquarters where a judge asked each of them their names. After finding their files and reading them for several seconds, the judge declared that five days of detention for each of the applicants would suffice. The entire \u201ctrial\u201d took not more than five minutes. 14.  On the same day at around 11 p.m. the applicants and five other female detainees were ordered to enter the back section of a police minivan measuring 2.5 square metres and were taken to an unknown destination, without any explanation of the reasons for the move. Four hours later they arrived at Drochia police station. They spent the remainder of their detention at that police station and were released on 13 April 2009. After their release the applicants were so afraid that they did not leave their houses for a week. 15.  On 16 April 2009 a Moldovan news agency reported the allegation that three young women had been ordered to fully undress in front of male police officers. Following that the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted, in April-May 2009, an internal investigation into the matter in order to verify the allegations. The applicants and N., another person detained together with the applicants, made statements to the investigator on 23 and 22 April 2009 respectively and recounted the facts as summarised in the preceding paragraphs. N. noted that she had been taken by Officer A.C. to the room in which she had been verbally abused and forced to fully undress by V.D., in the presence of a uniformed woman. 16.  On 18 May 2009 a prosecutor interviewed the applicants, who repeated their statements made to the police. These statements were then forwarded to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. On 20 May 2009 the results of the internal investigation (see paragraph 15 above) were also submitted to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. It would appear that the latter did not take any decision in respect of the material submitted to it. 17.  On 23 July 2009 the applicants made a complaint to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, referring to the verbal abuse to which they had been subjected, as well as to the order to undress in front of male officers. 18.  On 18 and 20 August 2009 a prosecutor interviewed A.C. and V.D., who declared that they had not been at work on the relevant night. 19.  On 10 September 2009 the military prosecutor\u2019s office, which had been tasked with examining all complaints of ill-treatment during the events of April 2009, decided not to launch a criminal investigation in response to the applicants\u2019 complaint of 23 July 2009 to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, in the absence of any evidence that an offence had been committed. He noted that M.T. had declared that she alone had conducted body searches of the applicants and that A.C. and V.D. had not been at work that day. The applicants found out about that decision on 14 October 2009. On 15 October 2009 their lawyer challenged the decision, noting that the investigation had not been prompt or thorough; that they had not undergone any expert psychological examination to verify whether it could be concluded that they had suffered psychological trauma; that the decision had been based solely on the declaration by the officers involved that they had not been at work on the relevant day, without verifying whether they had been urgently called in to work to deal with the emergency situation on 7 April 2009; and that no criminal investigation had been launched by that date. This complaint was rejected by a more senior prosecutor on 9 November 2009. 20.  On 16 November 2009 the applicants\u2019 lawyer received a letter from the prosecution informing her of the decision of 9 November 2009. On 20 November 2009 the applicants challenged the decisions of 10 September and 9 November 2009 before the R\u00ee\u015fcani District Court. On 19 January 2010 the court allowed their application and annulled both those decisions. The court found that the investigation had been superficial and listed a series of actions which had not been carried out, such as interviewing the arresting officers and those responsible for escorting them and registering their arrest; verifying the reasons for their transfer to Drochia police section, the person who had ordered the transfer and the reason why the prosecutor had not established a breach of applicable legislation as a result of that transfer; determining the reason for the prosecutor\u2019s failure to examine the applicants\u2019 complaint within the statutory seventy-two hours.\n(b)  Criminal proceedings against the police officers 21.  On 2 February 2010 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u prosecutor\u2019s office launched a criminal investigation on suspicion that Officers A.C., V.D. and M.T. had ill-treated the applicants by means of psychological intimidation and forcing them to undress in front of persons of the opposite sex.\n(i)  Proceedings against Officers V.D. and M.T. 22.  On 15 March 2010 the prosecution charged V.D. and M.T. with ill-treating the applicants. 23.  On 23 April 2010 the case against V.D. and M.T. was submitted to the Centru District Court for trial. 24.  The Centru District Court scheduled hearings in the case approximately once a month. From the beginning of the trial, that court had held four hearings and postponed five others for various reasons such as the absence of the prosecutor, of one of the applicants or of their lawyers, as well as annual leave taken by the prosecutor and the judge. 25.  On 15 July 2011 the Centru District Court of Chi\u0219in\u0103u found the two police officers guilty of ill-treating the applicants. It sentenced V.D. to six years\u2019 imprisonment and M.T. to five years\u2019 imprisonment, conditionally suspending the execution of both sentences for a probation period of five years. The officers were also prohibited from holding positions in the police for five years. Although the operative part of the judgment was read out on 15 July 2011, the applicants were sent the fully reasoned decision by post on 7 December 2011. 26.  On 3 May 2012 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld that judgment, reducing V.D.\u2019s imprisonment term to five years and maintaining all the other sanctions. The court found that the law did not allow suspension of a sentence for which the punishment exceeded five years\u2019 imprisonment and that the lower court had made an error. It corrected the error by reducing V.D.\u2019s sentence to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 27.  On 23 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 3 May 2012 and ordered a rehearing by the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal. 28.  On 13 March 2013 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal adopted a judgment, convicting V.D. and M.T. and sentencing both to five years\u2019 imprisonment, conditionally suspending the execution of both sentences for a probation period of five years. The officers were also prohibited from holding positions in the police for five years and were sentenced to 240 hours\u2019 community service. In reply to the applicants\u2019 arguments in respect of the leniency of the lower court\u2019s judgment and about impunity, with reference to the Court\u2019s judgments in Valeriu and Nicolae Ro\u015fca v. Moldova (no. 41704/02, 20 October 2009) and P\u0103dure\u0163 v. Moldova (no. 33134/03, 5 January 2010), the court found that those cases were not applicable to the present case since in both of them serious physical ill-treatment had been caused, while the applicants in the present case had only been psychologically ill-treated. Moreover, one witness who had been subjected to the same treatment as the applicants during the relevant events had refused to completely undress and had not been ill-treated as a result. The court also noted that the accused had committed the offence \u201cowing to the situation obtaining on 7-8 April 2009 in Chi\u0219in\u0103u, [when] peaceful protests [had] escaped the control of law-enforcement authorities ... result[ing] in mass disorder, with the destruction of sites of national importance\u201d. 29.  In their appeal the applicants argued, inter alia, that suspending the sentence imposed on V.D. and M.T. was unlawful since it was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which was effectively part of domestic law. They relied on the judgments in Ro\u015fca and P\u0103dure\u0163 (cited above) and referred to G\u00e4fgen v. Germany ([GC] no. 22978/05, ECHR 2010) as evidence that even threats of torture were sufficient to constitute ill-treatment. They added that following the Moldovan judgments mentioned above the Criminal Code had been amended so as to exclude the possibility of suspending the serving of sentences imposed for torture. Sentencing the officers to the minimum allowed by law, with the effect of shielding them from serving any prison time and in view of their persistent denial of having committed the crime, had not ensured the required preventive effect. 30.  On 13 September 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice found \u201cno grounds for doubting the [victims\u2019] statements\u201d. However, it upheld the judgment adopted since the applicants had not indicated any specific errors in the application of the law by the lower court, which had taken a lawful and reasoned decision and had properly individualised the sentences in view of the nature and seriousness of the offence. 31.  During the criminal investigation and the trial V.D. and M.T. were not suspended from their duties.\n(ii)  Proceedings against Officer A.C. 32.  On 16 April 2010 the criminal investigation that had started on 2 February 2010 against the three police officers (see paragraph 21 above) was discontinued in respect of A.C. The prosecutor summarised the applicants\u2019 statements and referred to the results of the identity parades during which each of the applicants had identified A.C. as the person who had taken them to the room in which they had been ordered to undress and do sit-ups. The first applicant stated that A.C. had ordered everyone to face the wall and not to look back. When one young woman (N.) had looked away, he had hit the back of her head, as a result of which her forehead had struck the wall. The first applicant added that when another officer had been describing the personal items in her purse, A.C. had threatened to throw it away. Subsequently she had been ordered to sign a document. When she had pointed out that the time of arrest had been noted incorrectly, A.C. had told her \u201cI\u2019ll give you one [that is to say \u2018hit you\u2019] so that you\u2019ll join your grandmother in the grave\u201d. The second applicant had given a similar description, noting that when she had entered the detention facility she had seen many persons against the wall, many of whom had been beaten by the police, while not offering any resistance. The prosecutor found that A.C. had clearly exceeded his powers as a police officer, but that the applicants had not sustained such serious damage as to qualify as torture. Accordingly, his actions were qualified as excess of powers under the Contravention Code (Codul contraven\u0163ional). Since the three-month prescription period for this administrative offence had already expired, the case against A.C. could not be pursued. He continued to work as a police officer throughout the proceedings. 33.  On 22 April 2010 the applicants\u2019 application to have the decision of 16 April 2016 annulled was rejected by the prosecutor who had adopted it. On 4 June 2010 the lawyer asked a more senior prosecutor to annul the decisions taken on 16 and 22 April 2010. She argued, inter alia, that A.C. should not have been relieved of criminal responsibility since he had acted at least as an accomplice of V.D. and M.T., in respect of whom the prosecution had continued to press criminal charges. In particular, A.C. had been fully aware of V.D.\u2019s presence in the room to which he had escorted the applicants and three other female detainees and had known that they would be subjected to a strip search. Moreover, he had acted brutally towards the applicants, humiliating them and hitting one of the female detainees (N.) and other persons in their presence. This treatment had had a considerable effect on the applicants, taking into consideration their gender and age (the second applicant was 21 at the relevant time) and the dominant position held by the police officer. Moreover, having witnessed A.C.\u2019s openly hitting N. in front of the applicants had caused them to fear being subjected to similar treatment. In addition, the applicants\u2019 will to resist police intimidation had been completely broken since the reason for their detention had not been explained to them, nor had they been informed of the rights which they had had, in the absence of a guarantee of being able to defend those rights. They had thus been forced to sign documents which had subsequently led to their detention. It had been also unclear why the prosecutor had not charged A.C. with the criminal offence of excess of powers (Article 328 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 37 below), but had preferred to examine the case under the Contravention Code, with the effect of letting A.C. go unpunished. 34.  On 10 June 2010 her lawyer was informed that her complaint had been rejected and that the decision could be appealed against to the investigating judge. 35.  On 26 July 2010 the applicants challenged in court the decisions of 16 and 22 April 2010, as well as that of 10 June 2010. The lawyer formulated essentially the same arguments which she had made in her complaint to the prosecutor (see paragraph 33 above). 36.  On 15 October 2010 the investigating judge of the R\u00ee\u015fcani District Court rejected the applicants\u2019 complaint as unfounded. The court found that under Article 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a criminal investigation lawfully discontinued by a prosecutor could be reopened only if new circumstances had been discovered or where the decision had been affected by a fundamental defect in the proceedings. Since the prosecution had decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against A.C. and in the absence of any new circumstances warranting the reopening of the investigation, it was contrary to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the court to order the reopening of the criminal proceedings against him. The judge also found that the prosecutor had fully and objectively examined the case, taking into account all the evidence available. That decision was final.", "references": ["9", "7", "0", "4", "8", "5", "2", "3", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Viljandi. 6.  At the time of the events at issue, the applicant was serving a prison sentence for robbery and violence against a prison official. According to the risk assessment contained in his individual management plan drawn up by Tartu Prison on 16 January 2013 (kinnipeetava individuaalne t\u00e4itmiskava), the applicant had been punished five times for criminal acts and was assessed to be a danger to the public, prone to risks and impulsive. 7.  On 13 May 2013 the applicant requested prison leave to attend his grandmother\u2019s funeral in Tarvastu, Viljandi County, which is located approximately 80 km from Tartu Prison. The applicant stated in his request that he was aware that the leave would entail him wearing handcuffs and that he would be accompanied by guards. 8.  Permission for prison leave under supervision (l\u00fchiajaline v\u00e4ljaviimine) was granted on 14 May 2013. The decision (k\u00e4skkiri) made reference to the fact that the applicant was considered highly dangerous and had received several disciplinary punishments which were still in effect. The decision was accompanied by an order (korraldus) of the same date which detailed how the prison leave would be organised, specifying that the applicant had to be escorted by at least three prison officers and that, as a preventive measure, he had to wear both hand and ankle cuffs. 9.  On 15 May 2013 the applicant and his brother (also a prisoner in the same prison), were to be transported to the funeral service in the same prison van. The applicant signed a document about the prison escort regime (kinnipeetavale isikule l\u00fchiajalise v\u00e4ljaviimise raames kohaldatav saatmisre\u017eiim) which explained the rules about being escorted, including the obligation to wear hand and ankle cuffs. At 9.30 a.m. he was placed in a single occupancy compartment of a prisoner transport van. It was a Volkswagen Crafter van used by the prison since October 2010, which had one four-person compartment and four single occupancy compartments. Each single occupancy compartment was at least 60 cm wide, 149 cm high and 85 cm long, with a floor area of 0.51 square metres. The compartment in which the applicant was placed was furnished with a plastic seat attached to the floor. There were no handles or seat belt. 10.  The prison van reached the vehicle access gate of the prison premises. The applicant then decided not to go to the funeral and was taken back to the prison approximately twenty minutes later. His brother was thereafter transported to the funeral at 10.02 a.m. and reached the cemetery at 10.57 a.m. 11.  On 9 September 2013 the applicant lodged a request with Tartu Prison, asking for compensation in the sum of 7,500 euros (EUR), claiming that the use of hand and ankle cuffs had been unjustified and that the prison authorities had wished to expose him to the public and to his family in such degrading circumstances. He added that the van compartment had been too small and without safety equipment, making him fear for his life. The applicant also alleged he had suffered psychological trauma because he had been forced to forego attending his grandmother\u2019s funeral owing to the above-mentioned conditions. The prison dismissed his complaint. 12.  On 4 December 2013, repeating the same complaints as those detailed above, the applicant lodged a complaint against Tartu Prison with the Tartu Administrative Court. 13.  On 11 March 2014 the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court referred to the legal basis for using hand and ankle cuffs and considered it justified. With regard to the conditions in the transport van, the court noted that the applicant had refused to be transferred and therefore had never been subjected to the conditions described. As the applicant had refused to go on prison leave of his own free will, no unlawful action could be attributed to Tartu Prison. The court considered it plausible that the applicant had decided not to attend the funeral because he had not wanted his relatives to have a bad impression of him. However, there was no sign that the prison authorities had particularly wanted to degrade him in front of his family by resorting to the use of hand and ankle cuffs. 14.  On 9 September 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He claimed, inter alia, that there had been no reason to conclude that he would have been embarrassed to be in shackles in front of his family, and that the main reason he had decided not to go to the funeral had been the transport conditions. 15.  On 7 October 2014 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. Since the applicant had foregone being transferred to his grandmother\u2019s funeral, there had been no unlawful act on the part of the prison authorities. As the transfer van had never left the precincts of the prison, he could not claim compensation for something that might have happened or for any trauma that might have occurred had he taken the prison leave. 16.  On 10 November 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, stating that he stood by the same submissions he had made to the lower courts. On 11 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal on points of law.", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "2", "9", "6", "4", "7", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Batman. 7.  The applicant is the owner of a property in the Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi area of Batman, which has mainly been used as an industrial park since 2002. Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi is located in close proximity to the T\u00fcpra\u015f Batman Oil Refinery (\u201cT\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery\u201d or \u201cT\u00fcpra\u015f\u201d), which was a State-owned enterprise until its privatisation in 2005, and to an oil storage and supply facility run by the Ministry of Defence (Milli Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Akaryak\u0131t \u0130kmal ve NATO POL Tesisleri \u2013 hereinafter \u201cANT\u201d). It appears that there are also a number of private petrol stations in the vicinity. 8.  On 3 May 2004 a large underground explosion took place in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi, which resulted in three deaths and many injuries. The explosion and ensuing fire also damaged many properties in the vicinity, including that of the applicant. 9.  A number of administrative commissions were established in the aftermath of the incident in order to determine the cause of the explosion and the damage caused by it, as well as to secure the area of the explosion. Further information regarding the work undertaken by those commissions, and other entities, is outlined below. 10.  The fact-finding commission established by the Batman governor\u2019s office consisted of, among others, the governor, deputy governor and mayor of Batman, the director of the Batman Security Directorate, the director of the local office of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the directors of the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (T\u00fcrkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cTPAO\u201d) and the presidents of the local chambers of architects, mechanical engineers and geological engineers. It appears that the preliminary investigations led by the fact\u2011finding commission, with the assistance of experts, established that the explosion had been caused by an underground oil leak, although the source of the leak could not be identified. 11.  On 27 May 2004 the fact-finding commission decided that some of the businesses in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi should be evacuated in view of the risk of further explosions. It is not clear from the information in the case file whether the applicant\u2019s property was amongst those evacuated at the relevant time. 12.  There is no further information in the case file as to any other action taken by the fact-finding commission. 13.  The Batman governor\u2019s office established a damage assessment commission, with a view to ascertaining the damage sustained in the area as a result of the explosion. Following the inspections performed, the commission established six heavily damaged, ten moderately damaged and thirty-one slightly damaged businesses, and two slightly damaged residences in the area. The owners of those properties were declared \u201cdisaster victims\u201d. The applicant\u2019s property was not amongst those identified as damaged by the commission. The owners of the damaged properties were provided with some rent allowance and other assistance. 14.  The Commission for the Discharge of Chemicals of an Unknown Origin measured the levels of underground gas in the area and, where high levels of gas were detected, arranged for it to be discharged through pipes. 15.  A technical commission was set up on an unspecified date to determine the source and extent of the oil leak, and to make proposals for cleaning up the area affected. The commission consisted of representatives from the Batman municipality, the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and academia, as well as from the local chambers of architects and engineers of various disciplines. In its report dated 14 June 2004 the commission stated that the explosion had occurred as a result of the compression of petroleum products that had leaked into the underground water. 16.  Under the supervision of the commission, a number of shafts were drilled to extract the leaked oil. However, the commission stated in the aforementioned report that despite its continuous efforts, it had not made any progress in cleaning up the leak, given the magnitude of the problem, and its lack of sufficient means and expertise. It had however discovered that the contamination was concentrated outside the walls surrounding the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and that no leakage had been observed around the ANT pipeline. 17.  The members of the technical commission, with the exception of the T\u00fcpra\u015f representative, also stated in the same report that while they had not been able to establish the source of the leak conclusively, their investigation suggested that the leak may have originated from the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 18.  Upon the instruction of the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, which had deemed the aforementioned report of the technical commission to be insufficient, another commission was established under the coordination of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources for the purposes of ascertaining the cause of the explosion. The commission was made up of, among others, academics, engineers and representatives from various ministries, the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and TPAO. 19.  According to its interim report dated 11 October 2004, the studies it had carried out in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi showed that the explosion of 3 May 2004 had been the result of an environmental pollution phenomenon that was much more complex than initially estimated. The management of this unprecedented environmental crisis required the utmost care, expertise, information and interpretational skills. The pollutant at issue was a mixture of crude oil and various petroleum products and, according to its estimations, there were between 500 and 2,000 tonnes of such material above groundwater. Technical limitations prevented the determination of the source of the leak with absolute certainty. However, the interpretation of the available data suggested that pollution of such great magnitude could only have been caused over a long period by a facility with a high capacity of petroleum refining and storage in the vicinity, which pointed to the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery (a conclusion which was challenged by T\u00fcpra\u015f and TPAO representatives). The report also stressed, however, the absence of conclusive evidence to back up this assumption. It added that once responsibility for the leak was determined with certainty by the national courts, all claims for damages could be directed against the party responsible. 20.  In the same report, the commission recommended the involvement of the State Water Board (Devlet Su \u0130\u015fleri \u2013 \u201cDS\u0130\u201d) in the operation carried out in the area to establish the source of the leak. It also recommended the closure of the Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi area to housing and commercial activity until the underground oil leak was cleaned by professional experts, given the risk of further explosions and fire posed by the leak. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 21.  In accordance with the proposal in the above interim report, on 17 August 2005 the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor\u2019s office decided that no business or occupation permits should be granted in the area designated as the \u201cred zone\u201d, which consisted of an area of 200 x 300 metres where the contamination was at its highest, until the underground clean-up operation in the area was completed. 22.  Following receipt of the interim report mentioned above, the Prime Minister\u2019s Office instructed the establishment of a high-level commission to take, or recommend, more concrete steps to tackle the environmental disaster at issue and determine its causes. There is no information in the case file as regards its composition. 23.  In January 2005 the commission invited the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and ANT to carry out tests on their pipelines to determine whether the oil leak at issue had originated from them and, if so, to take the necessary precautions. It appears from the information in the case file that neither T\u00fcpra\u015f nor ANT assumed responsibility for the leak. 24.  In January 2005 the high-level commission also took some decisions regarding the underground clean-up operation that had to be undertaken in the contaminated area. Accordingly, it invited the Batman governor\u2019s office, which was tasked with coordinating the decontamination operation, to issue a call for tenders for the clean-up operation. There is, however, no further information in the case file as to whether the Batman governor\u2019s office initiated the tender process or took any other steps to get the clean-up operation underway. 25.  According to a report dated 12 May 2004 prepared by experts from T\u00fcpra\u015f, pressure tests conducted on the ANT pipeline suggested the possibility of a leak in that pipeline. They referred in this connection to some reports which indicated that the ANT pipeline had been damaged during excavation work carried out in September 2002. The experts further noted that water wells drilled along the ANT pipeline in previous years had revealed the presence of petrol in the underground water. Wells drilled in the vicinity of T\u00fcpra\u015f petrol tanks after the explosion to disclose any leaks originating from those tanks on the other hand had not yielded any results. 26.  It was also noted in the same report that before its reconstruction as an industrial park, the Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi area had been used for the trade and storage of petroleum products, as well as for the repair of tankers, which may have played a role in the contamination of the area. 27.  On 17 May 2004 T\u00fcpra\u015f issued a press release mainly recapitulating the claims made in the above report. It was indicated in the press release that although no leaks had been detected around its petrol tanks, a couple of wells drilled elsewhere on the refinery grounds had revealed the existence of a mixture of water and oil flowing towards the refinery from an outside source. It was also stressed that the levels of oil in the tanks were monitored electronically and that, therefore, any leaks of such substantial amounts would not have gone unnoticed. 28.  In February 2005 DS\u0130 submitted to the Batman governor\u2019s office a report which found that the oil leak had heavily contaminated an area of 1 sq. km around the Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi area. It was estimated that the leak had been ongoing for a very long time and that it involved some four to six thousand tonnes of phenol. 29.  According to a report prepared by the petrol analysis laboratory of the Middle East Technical University (Ortado\u011fu Teknik \u00dcniversitesi \u2013 hereinafter \u201cODT\u00dc\u201d) on 15 October 2004, the product that had caused the explosion was a refined petroleum product that did not exist in nature as such and, therefore, it must have originated from another source. It was not, however, possible to speculate that the petroleum had leaked from the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery. 30.  In a report issued on 16 June 2005, experts from the Dokuz Eyl\u00fcl University in \u0130zmir stated, inter alia, that the oil leak at issue had, in all likelihood, emanated from T\u00fcpra\u015f. They added that the difficulties faced in identifying the source or sources of the leak probably resulted from technical limitations. 31.  According to information obtained from the Municipality of Batman on 13 September 2017, the restrictions on business and occupation permits imposed by the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor\u2019s office on 17 August 2005 in the so-called \u201cred zone\u201d (see paragraph 21 above) were still in force, as no progress had been made in cleaning up the underground oil leak. 32.  Soon after the explosion, the Batman public prosecutor\u2019s office initiated an investigation into the incident. 33.  On 31 December 2004 it filed a bill of indictment with the Batman Assize Court against a number of serving T\u00fcpra\u015f executives in connection with the explosion, accusing them under Article 383 \u00a7 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code (Law no. 765) of causing unintentionally (by carelessness, negligence or inexperience) an explosion that resulted in death, injury and damage. The public prosecutor relied as evidence on the commission reports mentioned in paragraphs 10 to 24 above. 34.  Sixty-four people, including the relatives of the victims who had lost their lives as a result of the explosion, as well as others who had sustained bodily or financial harm, joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties (m\u00fcdahil). The applicant was not amongst them. 35.  At the first hearing held on 28 January 2005, a representative of the victims claimed that even if the oil leak which had caused the explosion had originated from the ANT pipeline, T\u00fcpra\u015f, as the supplier of the oil into that pipeline, remained responsible for the explosion. They nevertheless requested the judicial authorities also to prosecute the relevant officials from the ANT who were in charge of the oil pipeline. The Batman Assize Court decided that the lawyer\u2019s request concerning the ANT officials would be taken into consideration on receipt of expert reports on the source of the leak. 36.  The T\u00fcpra\u015f executives mainly made the following arguments in their defence statements.\n(i)  There were several oil pipelines, oil storage facilities and petrol stations in the area apart from the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery, the largest being the ANT facilities. The oil pipeline between ANT and T\u00fcpra\u015f, which had been used since 1972 to transfer F-46 military oil, had been inoperative since 1992, and a report prepared in 2002 attested that the pipeline had been empty at the time. However, the studies conducted on the pipeline after the explosion showed not only that there had been F-57 military oil in the pipeline, which had not been supplied by T\u00fcpra\u015f, but also that the pipeline had been damaged.\n(ii)  According to its modus operandi, the ownership of both oil pipelines and the product supplied by T\u00fcpra\u015f belonged to the purchaser, and T\u00fcpra\u015f was not accountable for any damage or loss arising from a damaged pipeline.\n(iii)  The wells drilled around the T\u00fcpra\u015f storage tanks had not revealed any oil leaks, which ruled out the possibility that the leak had originated from the refinery.\n(iv)  The petroleum extracted from the various wells drilled in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi had been analysed in the ODT\u00dc laboratory, and the results of the analysis showed that the sample product was not amongst those produced at the T\u00fcpra\u015f Batman Refinery.\n(v)  Petroleum production consisted of only 5.95 % of the total production of the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery, and the remaining capacity was mainly devoted to the production of diesel fuel, asphalt, fuel-oil, solvents, residual oil and naphtha. In these circumstances, it was illogical to claim that the leak allegedly originating from the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery consisted only of the 5.95 % of its production, and that none of the remaining products, which made up the bulk of its production, had leaked.\n(vi)  All product lines at the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery were above ground and consistently monitored. 37.  The victims contested the defendants\u2019 claim that the 2002 report concerning the ANT pipeline indicated that the pipeline had been empty. They also claimed that the analysis conducted at the ODT\u00dc laboratory was not decisive, as the laboratory had checked the samples obtained from the wells only against the current products of the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery. That analysis did not necessarily take into account the changes over time in the refinery\u2019s production or the changes sustained by the products underground, considering that the leak had been ongoing for a long time. 38.  On 31 July 2006, at the request of the Batman Assize Court, three professors from ODT\u00dc submitted an expert report on the source of the leak. Relying on all the information in the case file, including the commission reports noted in paragraphs 10 to 24 above, the experts made the following findings.\n(i)  The studies carried out so far were inadequate to determine the source of the leak. For instance, although wells had been drilled outside the surrounding walls of the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery, which had revealed a significant amount of petroleum above groundwater, no drilling had been carried out on the other side of the walls. Without drilling wells in the appropriate key locations, it would not be possible to determine whether the leak had originated from a damaged pipeline or from the refinery.\n(ii)  Various construction works and excavations carried out in the Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi area over the years had revealed the presence of petroleum under the ground long before the explosion. Therefore, the fact that there was an oil leak had been known for many years, including, most probably, by the State authorities, although it was not possible to pinpoint when the leak had started.\n(iii)  The suspected corporations should normally have the technical means and manpower to detect any leaks originating from their facilities and take the necessary precautions. However, where leaks arose from breaches of pipelines or other equipment by malicious individuals for the purposes of theft, then these institutions could not be expected to uncover such incidents by their own efforts alone. Since the leak in question involved a highly valuable economic commodity, it seemed highly improbable that the institutions would not take any action to stop such a leak after taking notice of it. 39.  On 7 November 2006 three other experts, all of whom were engineers who worked as work safety inspectors, issued a second report. They noted in the report that the studies undertaken thus far had not been able to reveal the source or sources of the leak. The view that the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery was responsible for the incident had not been based on sufficient evidence. Hard evidence would be required to impute responsibility to persons or corporations and no conclusions could be reached on the basis of mere presumptions. 40.  On 1 May 2008 the Batman Assize Court delivered its judgment on the case. It held that while its proximity to the site of the explosion suggested that T\u00fcpra\u015f was responsible for the explosion, it was not possible to determine whether any of the individual suspects should bear liability for it, particularly given that the leak had been ongoing for a considerable amount of time and that the suspects would surely have taken action had they been aware of the leak. The Assize Court accordingly acquitted the T\u00fcpra\u015f executives. 41.  On 17 January 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court and discontinued the proceedings as prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 42.  On different dates in 2004 a number of property owners in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi brought compensation proceedings against both the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery and ANT before the Batman Civil Court of First Instance (\u201cthe Batman Civil Court\u201d) in respect of the damage they had sustained as a result of the explosion in question. In the course of one of those sets of proceedings (case no. 2004/963 E.), the Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report from three university professors to determine the source of the leak. 43.  On 3 March 2006 the experts submitted their report to the Batman Civil Court. The following findings were made in the report:\n(i)  the product that had leaked underground was gasoline;\n(ii)  it was highly likely that the contamination had been caused by an underground accumulation of gasoline that had leaked from one or more sources over a long period;\n(iii)  given the location and movement of the underground contamination slick and the ground water flow direction, the source of the leak must have been in the south, where the T\u00fcpra\u015f facilities were located; they stated that any leak originating from the ANT pipeline would have generated a contamination slick in a northwesterly/northerly direction alongside the pipeline, which had not been the case; this left the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery as the only plausible source of the leak.\n(iv) In addition to their legal responsibility arising from the failure to detect and prevent the leak in a timely manner, the State authorities were responsible on account of their negligence in authorising the establishment of residences and businesses in such close proximity to the refinery despite the apparent dangers it posed. 44.  The Batman Civil Court admitted that report into another case file concerning the same incident (case no. 2004/966 E.) and, relying on the findings in that report, on 21 July 2006 it decided that the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery was solely responsible for the leak. It dismissed the claims against ANT. 45.  The judgment of the Batman Civil Court, which was the first occasion on which the T\u00fcpra\u015f Refinery was publicly confirmed as the source of the leak by a court of law, was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 30 January 2007. A request made by T\u00fcpra\u015f for rectification of that decision was rejected on 18 June 2007. 46.  On 16 November 2006 the applicant brought an action for compensation against T\u00fcpra\u015f before the Batman Civil Court. He requested a total of 10,000 Turkish liras (TRY) for the depreciation of the value of his property after the explosion and for his loss of rental income for the following eighteen months, reserving his right to increase those claims. The applicant argued in his petition that following the explosion, Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi had been declared a hazardous area by the Batman governor\u2019s office and had accordingly been evacuated, which had significantly reduced the value of his property. He had also been deprived of his rental income for the next year and a half. Moreover, since the necessary steps had not been taken to clean the oil leak, the area was still at risk of further explosions. The applicant also stated that the responsibility of T\u00fcpra\u015f for the explosion had been established by the expert reports submitted to the Batman Civil Court in another case (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). 47.  In its response dated 19 December 2006, T\u00fcpra\u015f claimed firstly that the applicant\u2019s claims had become time-barred, as he had failed to lodge his action within one year of the date of the explosion. It also claimed, inter alia, that:\n(i)  given the proximity of the site of the explosion to the T\u00fcpra\u015f facilities, many wells had been dug around the T\u00fcpra\u015f oil tanks to locate the source of the leak; however, none of those wells had revealed any oil leaks; on the other hand, wells dug around the perimeter of the Refinery had revealed the presence of oil that had leaked from elsewhere towards the Refinery;\n(ii)  the scientific analysis of the samples obtained from the site of the explosion showed that the leaked material had not been produced by T\u00fcpra\u015f;\n(iii)  the expert reports submitted to the criminal case file found that T\u00fcpra\u015f could not be held liable for the explosion;\n(iv)  although the pipeline between T\u00fcpra\u015f and ANT had officially been out of use since 1992, it had been noted after the explosion that the pipeline in question had actually been full of oil; moreover, the pressure tests carried out subsequently showed that the pipeline had been punctured and was leaking oil;\n(v)  the complaints arising from the security measures taken in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi after the explosion, such as the ceasing of commercial activity and the denial of occupation licences, were outside the competence of T\u00fcpra\u015f. 48.  On 28 February 2007 the applicant brought another action against T\u00fcpra\u015f in respect of the structural damage that his property had sustained as a result of the explosion, and requested TRY 6,000 as compensation. He reserved his right to subsequently increase his claim. The applicant stressed in his petition that the sole responsibility of T\u00fcpra\u015f for the explosion had now been definitively established, as the judgment delivered by the Batman Civil Court against T\u00fcpra\u015f in case no. 2004/966 E. had been upheld by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). The Batman Civil Court joined the case to the one that the applicant had previously brought in November 2006. 49.  The Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report to determine the extent of the applicant\u2019s damage. The experts carried out an on-site inspection at the applicant\u2019s property on 7 March 2007, and reported their findings on 12 March 2007. They mainly noted the following:\n(i)  the impact of the explosion had been equivalent to that of an earthquake with a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale;\n(ii)  the applicant\u2019s property, which was used as business premises, had been mostly repaired by the time of the on-site inspection and commercial activity had resumed; some cracks were nevertheless visible on the walls;\n(iii)  the infrastructure of the building, including water, electricity and telephone connections and the sewer system, had had to be repaired as a result of the damage sustained in the basement;\n(iv)  leaving aside the estimated wear and tear of the property since its construction, the structural damage was noted to be TRY 13,278.36;\n(v)  given the magnitude of the explosion, it was inevitable that the walls and structural joists of the property would sustain cracks; moreover, the explosion had considerably slowed down real estate sales in the area; having regard to these factors, it was estimated that the applicant\u2019s property had lost 50 % of its value, corresponding to TRY 66,483.25;\n(vi)  a drop of 60 to 70 % had been noted in the rental income of property owners in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi subsequent to the explosion; in these circumstances, the applicant\u2019s loss of rental income for the eighteen months following the explosion was calculated to be TRY 5,400. 50.  In the light of the findings in the expert report, on 22 March 2007 the applicant applied to the Batman Civil Court to increase his original claims in line with the amounts calculated by the experts. 51.  On 18 April 2007 the Batman Civil Court allowed the applicant\u2019s compensation claim in so far as it concerned the depreciation of the value of his property and the structural damage it had sustained as a result of the explosion, but rejected the claims concerning a loss of rental income for lack of sufficient evidence. The Civil Court held in its decision that both the original claims and the subsequent request to increase those original claims had been brought within the one-year time-limit set out in Article 60 \u00a7 1 of the former Code of Obligations, bearing in mind that the relevant time-limit would only start running when both the damage and the tortfeasor responsible for that damage became known to the victim. It stressed in this regard that the identity of the tortfeasor at issue had only been \u201cknown\u201d once the judgment in case no. 2004/966 E., which had established T\u00fcpra\u015f as solely responsible for the explosion, had been upheld by the Court of Cassation, and the request for rectification of that Court of Cassation decision was still pending. 52.  On 26 October 2007 T\u00fcpra\u015f appealed against that judgment. In its appeal, it mainly repeated its time-limit objections and contested the findings in the expert report of 12 March 2007 that had formed the basis of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. The company also stressed that it had been held responsible for the explosion without any objective and tangible proof. Bearing in mind that 132 similar civil actions had been brought against its refinery in connection with the explosion of May 2004, it now risked paying damages of over TRY 10 to 12 million, plus interest and court fees. 53.  On 18 February 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court, holding that the time-limit for bringing an action under Article 60 \u00a7 1 of the former Code of Obligations, which had started running on the date of the explosion, had expired by the time that the applicant had brought his claims. The Court of Cassation held in this connection that the explosion at issue had taken place on 3 May 2004 and that, soon after that date, some of the property owners in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi had brought compensation claims against T\u00fcpra\u015f. Since the applicant was also a property owner in Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi, he should have formed an opinion regarding the responsibility of T\u00fcpra\u015f for the explosion on the date of its occurrence. The Court of Cassation stated that venturing a guess as to the identity of the tortfeasor, within the bounds of possibility, was sufficient to bring an action; it was not necessary to have the tortfeasor established with certainty. The applicant\u2019s claim that he had brought the action subsequent to the establishment of the tortfeasor as T\u00fcpra\u015f in a case brought earlier by other property owners could not stop the running of the time-limit from the date of the explosion. The Court of Cassation further stated that although criminal proceedings had also been brought against T\u00fcpra\u015f executives in connection with the explosion in question, the longer prescription period applicable to the criminal offence at issue could not apply to the civil compensation claim brought against T\u00fcpra\u015f within the meaning of Article 60 \u00a7 2 of the former Code of Obligations. That was because, where a civil claim brought against a company for offences committed by its employees was concerned, the longer time-limit provided in the Criminal Code applied in the civil proceedings only for offences under Article 465 of the Criminal Code. Since the charges brought against the T\u00fcpra\u015f executives did not concern one of the offences under Article 465, the civil claim against T\u00fcpra\u015f should have been brought within the aforementioned one-year time-limit. 54.  On 12 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative requested rectification of the decision of the Court of Cassation. He mainly made the following arguments:\n(i)  the Court of Cassation\u2019s ruling that merely guessing, or being in a position to guess, the tortfeasor was sufficient to trigger the Article 60 \u00a7 1 time\u2011limit ran counter to the doctrine and settled practice of the Court of Cassation on the issue, which unambiguously required certain and exact knowledge of the tortfeasor before the time-limit could start running; the applicant relied in this connection on a judgment of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 22 November 1974, as well as to some articles drafted by legal scholars and practitioners dating as far back as 1992;\n(ii)  the studies conducted in the aftermath of the explosion showed that the explosion had not been a simple accident, but had involved very complex elements; bearing in mind that it had taken even the experts in the field almost one year of scientific studies to establish the exact cause of the explosion, and another year after that to identify its source, a simple layman such as him could not be expected to have known the tortfeasor on the very day that the explosion took place;\n(iii)  in these circumstances, he had only acquired the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor upon the finalisation of case no. 2004/966 E;\n(iv)  it was well established in the legal doctrine, as well as in the Court of Cassation judgments, that where \u201ccontinuing damage\u201d was concerned, the time-limit would only start running when the damage at issue came to an end; bearing in mind the risk of further explosions at Toptanc\u0131lar Sitesi on account of the leak, his damage had not come to an end. 55.  On 25 September 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed that request without providing any reasoning. 56.  On 19 December 2008 the Batman Civil Court delivered a judgment in line with the quashing decision of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims for having become time\u2011barred. 57.  On 10 March 2009 the applicant appealed against that judgment. In his appeal, he mainly reiterated the arguments noted in paragraph 54 above. He also stated that the 7th Chamber of the Court of Cassation had ruled in many cases concerning the same explosion that for the purposes of the time\u2011limit rule set out in Article 60 \u00a7 1, the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor could not be considered to have been acquired before the respective actions had been brought (see the cases noted in paragraph 68 below). The 7th and 4th Chambers of the Court of Cassation had, therefore, delivered contradictory judgments on the same legal issue concerning identical facts. 58.  On 28 May 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court without responding to any of the applicant\u2019s claims. 59.  On an unspecified date the applicant requested rectification of the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision. He highlighted, inter alia, the absence of any evidence in the case file to suggest that he had learned the identity of the tortfeasor prior to its establishment by the Batman Civil Court in case no. 2004/966 E. 60.  On 22 October 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s rectification request.", "references": ["1", "2", "7", "5", "0", "6", "8", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Barcelos. 11.  The High Council of the Judiciary (Conselho Superior da Magistratura, hereafter \u201cthe CSM\u201d) decided to open three sets of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, who at the time was a judge at the Vila Nova de Famalic\u00e3o Court of First Instance. 12.  On 8 October 2009 Judge H.G. was instructed by the CSM, in his capacity as a judicial inspector (inspetor judicial), to conduct the applicant\u2019s performance appraisal. As the applicant was due to start maternity leave at the end of June 2010, she asked him to carry out the appraisal before her departure so that she would be in a position to apply for vacant posts in 2010 (movimento judicial).\nOn 13 September 2010, while she was on maternity leave, the applicant telephoned H.G. to ask him again to conduct her performance appraisal, which had still not been carried out. The following day she sent a request to the same effect to the CSM. The same day, H.G. asked to be relieved of responsibility for the applicant\u2019s appraisal, stating that she had made disrespectful remarks about him during the telephone conversation. 13.  On 16 November 2010 the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (disciplinary case no. 333/10) for insulting a judicial inspector. 14.  On 12 January 2011 the judicial investigator (juiz instrutor) Judge F.M.J. was placed in charge of the investigation. The applicant was represented by a lawyer. 15.  On 27 January 2011 the judicial investigator informed the CSM that he was about to begin the investigation in accordance with section 114(3) of the Status of Judges Act (Law no. 21/85 of 30 July 1985 \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe Act\u201d). The applicant was also informed. 16.  On 8 February 2011, on the basis of the evidence heard from H.G., Judge F.M.J. drew up an indictment against the applicant, of which she was notified on 9 February 2011. The indictment stated, in particular, that in a letter to the CSM dated 9 June 2010 the applicant had accused the judicial inspector H.G. of \u201cinertia and lack of diligence\u201d and that she had called H.G. a \u201cliar\u201d during the telephone conversation of 13 September 2010. 17.  On 11 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the indictment, arguing that it was null and void because she had not given evidence before the judicial investigator. In an order of 19 February 2011 the judicial investigator allowed the appeal. He set aside all the steps that had been taken in the investigation and summoned Judge H.G. and the applicant to appear before him to give evidence. They gave evidence on 22 and 23 February 2011 respectively. 18.  During the investigation various documents were examined and witnesses were questioned. One witness called by the applicant stated that he had been present during the telephone conversation in question and had not heard the applicant make the alleged remarks. However, he retracted his statement on 21 March 2011. 19.  On 13 March 2011 the judicial investigator drew up a fresh indictment against the applicant, again finding the facts set out in the previous indictment to be established. Taking the view that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety, he proposed a penalty of twenty day-fines.\nIn accordance with section 118 of the Act, the applicant was given notice of the indictment and had fifteen days to present her defence. As required by section 120 of the Act, the indictment specified where the applicant or her lawyer could consult her disciplinary file. 20.  On 29 March 2011 the applicant submitted a request to the CSM for Judge F.M.J. to be withdrawn from her case on the grounds that he had breached her right to be presumed innocent and had close ties to the judicial inspector whom the applicant was accused of insulting. 21.  On 30 March 2011 the applicant filed her defence pleadings, contesting the facts and submitting that the disciplinary proceedings were null and void as there had been a breach of the principles of equality and impartiality and of her right to be heard.\nWith regard to the breach of the principle of equality she observed that she had lodged a complaint with the CSM against the judicial inspector H.G. for making false accusations and that, in an order of 15 February 2011, it had been decided not to institute proceedings in that regard, despite the fact that the complaint concerned the same facts giving rise to the current disciplinary proceedings against her.\nAs to the facts, the applicant stated as follows:\n(a)  that she had indeed telephoned the judicial inspector H.G. on 13 September 2010 to ask him to carry out her appraisal while she was on maternity leave. She had explained that she wished to be able to apply for the vacancies arising in 2011 since she had been unable to apply the previous year because her appraisal had not been carried out before she left on maternity leave;\n(b)  that the inspector had expressed surprise, claiming that she had previously told him that she did not wish her appraisal to be carried out while she was on maternity leave;\n(c)  that he had then asked her to submit her request in writing given that they were unable to agree;\n(d)  that she had replied that it was he who had failed to keep his word hitherto; and\n(e)  that she had at no point accused him of being a liar.\nShe attached some items of evidence and requested that a further witness be examined. 22.  On 10 April 2011 Judge F.M.J. requested leave from the CSM to stand down from the case, saying that he was the applicant\u2019s \u201csworn enemy\u201d following the accusations she had made against him in the context of her request for him to be withdrawn. 23.  In an order dated 3 May 2011 the Permanent Council of the CSM granted Judge F.M.J.\u2019s request to stand down and replaced him with another judicial investigator, Judge A.V.N. 24.  In his final report dated 23 September 2011 Judge A.V.N. proposed that the applicant be ordered to pay fifteen day-fines for acting in breach of her duty of propriety. 25.  In a decision of 10 January 2012 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, found the truth of H.G.\u2019s allegations to be established. It found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety and that, given the seriousness of her remarks, a heavy penalty should be imposed. Accordingly, it ordered her to pay twenty day-fines, corresponding to twenty days without pay. 26.  The decision of 10 January 2012 was adopted by a majority of the fifteen-member formation, comprising six judges and nine non-judicial members. Four of the non-judicial members issued a joint dissenting opinion expressing the view that it was not possible to establish, solely on the basis of H.G.\u2019s statement, that the applicant had called him a \u201cliar\u201d, and finding that the remarks referring to his \u201cinertia\u201d and \u201clack of diligence\u201d came within the scope of the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the CSM\u2019s decision with the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court (Sec\u00e7\u00e3o do Contencioso administrativo do Supremo Tribunal de Justi\u00e7a). She submitted in particular:\n(a)  that the CSM had not taken into consideration a number of facts on which she had relied in her defence and which were corroborated by various items of evidence;\n(b)  that in its establishment of the facts the CSM had made no reference to the intentional element of the disciplinary offence;\n(c)  that the disciplinary penalty was based on insufficient or irrelevant evidence;\n(d)  that the conduct complained of had not amounted to a disciplinary offence, that she had simply been exercising a legitimate right and that the authorities had disregarded the principle of administration in good faith;\n(e)  that the CSM had failed to give reasons for its decision not to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and\n(f)  that the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the acts of which she had been accused. 28.  In a final judgment of 21 March 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. 29.  The Supreme Court began by emphasising that appeals against disciplinary decisions of the CSM were not full appeals on fact and law but concerned only the lawfulness of the decisions in question. It went on to find as follows:\n\u201cEffective protection by the courts of citizens\u2019 legally protected rights and interests, which is guaranteed by Article 268 \u00a7 4 of the Constitution, affords them, in the specific context of the decisions of the CSM in disciplinary proceedings, the right to a review of lawfulness rather than a review by a body with full jurisdiction. Hence, any appeal will be aimed at obtaining a declaration that the impugned act is null and void or non-existent, rather than a fresh assessment of the criteria employed by the administrative body or of the question whether those criteria were applied correctly, with particular regard to the establishment of the key facts ... The position taken by the Judicial Division is that, although the Supreme Court has the power to assess and sanction a failure to take necessary and relevant steps in disciplinary proceedings, it cannot take the place of the competent administrative body \u2013 the CSM \u2013 in gathering the evidence (aquisi\u00e7\u00e3o da mat\u00e9ria instrut\u00f3ria) or establishing the key facts. Its task is solely to set aside the impugned decision, if appropriate, in order for that body to carry out or order a particular investigative measure in the proceedings and re\u2011examine the case accordingly ...\nAccording to the case-law of the Supreme Court regarding administrative cases, it may not reassess the evidence examined by the authority [whose decision is contested]. Its sole task is to ascertain, on the basis of the available evidence, whether the establishment of the facts was reasonable, and hence to verify whether the authority [whose decision is contested] examined (or re-examined) the facts set forth in the indictment and those submitted by the defence, [and whether it] gave adequate reasons for the establishment [of the facts], which the Supreme Court has no option but to uphold ...\nAccording to the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law, an appeal may relate to the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence and facts on which the decision to impose a disciplinary penalty was based. However, ascertaining whether these were sufficient does not entail reassessing the factual evidence or drawing a new and different conclusion from the available evidence. The Supreme Court may only assess the reasonable and coherent nature of the relationship between the facts as established by the authority [whose decision is contested] and the evidence on which its decision was based ...\nThe extent of the Supreme Court\u2019s review of the facts is confined to ascertaining that the assessment [made by the authority whose decision is contested] was not defective; it cannot re-examine the evidence relied on and deliver a fresh judgment on the basis of that evidence. In other words, it is not the task of the Supreme Court to deliver a fresh judgment after assessing the evidence, but solely to verify whether the evidence was valid and lawful and whether the facts were reasonably and coherently established. It must therefore, against this background, examine any contradictions, inconsistencies and insufficiency in the evidence and any manifest errors in the assessment thereof, in so far as these defects are apparent ...\u201d 30.  In the case at hand the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the establishment of the facts, finding as follows:\n\u201cThere were no errors in the assessment of the facts on which the decision [by the CSM] was based, or in the interpretation of those facts. It is clear from the reasoning that the evidence was examined in a coherent and logical manner. The reasoning was based on facts which, once established in accordance with the principle of the free assessment of evidence, do not preclude the assessment made in the present case ... [the assessment of the facts] was not arbitrary, haphazard, obscure or incoherent.\u201d 31.  The Supreme Court also dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s arguments, to the effect that the conduct complained of did not amount to a disciplinary offence, that she had simply been exercising a legitimate right and that the authorities had disregarded the principle of administration in good faith. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the reasoning leading to the CSM\u2019s finding that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety. 32.  With regard to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court found:\n(a)  that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and\n(b)  that the penalty had not been disproportionate.\nThe Supreme Court ruled as follows:\n\u201cIn the context of disciplinary proceedings, it is for the CSM to decide on the severity of the penalty to be imposed, where it is variable in the abstract.\nIt is not the task of the Supreme Court to reconsider this decision, but merely to verify whether it was appropriate to the offence committed and whether the penalty imposed was proportionate to that offence ...\nThe determination of the penalty falls within what is known as the technical and administrative [margin of] discretion, which is not subject to judicial scrutiny except in cases of gross and manifest errors and particularly of failure to comply with the principle of proportionality as regards the appropriateness of the penalty ...\nHaving regard to the foregoing, and since it has been established that a fine, set at twenty days, should be imposed by way of a penalty, there is no basis for finding that the sanction imposed is disproportionate to the disciplinary offence or to the relevant legislative framework.\u201d 33.  On 29 March 2011, following information received from the judicial investigator F.M.J., the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open a second set of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (case no. 179/11) for the use of false testimony in the first set of disciplinary proceedings. The investigation also concerned the witness in question. 34.  On an unspecified date Judge R. was placed in charge of the investigation as judicial investigator. 35.  During the investigation evidence was heard from the applicant, F.M.J., the applicant\u2019s co-accused and one witness. 36.  On 26 May 2011 the judicial investigator drew up the indictment against the applicant. He found that she had acted in breach of her duty of loyalty, but did not specify in what manner she had been involved in committing the offence. Likewise, he did not propose any penalty, taking the view that the applicant\u2019s defence arguments should first be examined. He noted in that regard that section 117(1) of the Act, concerning the indictment, did not require a penalty to be proposed at this stage. 37.  The applicant was given notice of the indictment and filed defence pleadings. She contested the allegations, submitted documents in support of her arguments and called two witnesses in accordance with section 121 of the Act. She also submitted that she could not be prosecuted as an accomplice to the offence as the law made no provision for that possibility. 38.  On 14 July 2011 the judicial investigator submitted his final report under section 122 of the Act. He found that the facts in question had been established and that the applicant had therefore acted in breach of her duty of loyalty. He specified in that connection that she should be regarded as the co-perpetrator of the offence, given that in disciplinary case no. 333/10 she had knowingly called a witness who had not been present during the conversation in question. Accordingly, he proposed by way of a penalty that the applicant be suspended from duty for sixty days. 39.  On 19 July 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint against this report with the judicial investigator. She argued, in particular, that the indictment had not proposed this heavy penalty and that her defence rights had therefore been infringed. She requested that the indictment be set aside and that she be given additional time to prepare her defence. 40.  In an order of 31 August 2011 the judicial investigator dismissed the complaint on the grounds, in particular, that the applicant had not raised a plea of nullity in respect of the indictment in her defence pleadings (see paragraph 37 above). 41.  On 11 October 2011 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, gave its decision, which was adopted unanimously by a twelve-member formation comprising seven judges, including the President of the CSM, and five non\u2011judicial members. It found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of honesty, which it regarded as \u201ca more practical manifestation of the wider duty of loyalty referred to in the indictment\u201d and which should govern judges\u2019 personal and professional conduct not just in the strict performance of their duties but also in their relations with society. The CSM noted that in disciplinary case no. 333/10 the applicant had knowingly agreed to use testimony containing false statements concerning the acts of which she had been accused. It observed that those acts had been established on the basis of calls made by the applicant on her mobile phone, the records of which had been obtained with her consent at the request of the judicial investigator F.M.J. In view of the scope of the duty of honesty, which it considered to be a personal duty, the CSM found that the applicant had been the perpetrator of the acts in question, rather than the co-perpetrator as indicated in the judicial investigator\u2019s final report, and imposed a disciplinary penalty of 100 days\u2019 suspension from duty. Noting that the indictment had conformed to the requirements of section 117(1) of the Act, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that it was null and void. The CSM also held that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had not been infringed given that, after examining the evidence, the judicial investigator had set out in his final report the facts he considered established and their legal classification, and had proposed a specific penalty under section 122 of the Act. 42.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed to the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court against the decision of 11 October 2011. She submitted that:\n(a)  there had been errors in the establishment of the facts. In particular, she had not been acting in the performance of her duties, and a new witness questioned during the investigation had confirmed that she had not made the alleged remarks in the course of the conversation in question, during which that witness had indeed been present;\n(b)  her conduct had not amounted to a disciplinary offence. In the alternative, she submitted that it had been driven by \u201cnecessity\u201d, in view of the avowed hostility of the judicial investigator F.M.J. towards her;\n(c)  she had not been questioned about the planned disciplinary penalty, which had not been proposed in the indictment;\n(d)  the CSM had altered the legal classification of the facts and the manner of her involvement in the disciplinary offence, in breach of her defence rights, including her right to be heard;\n(e)  the CSM had failed to give reasons for its decision not to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and\n(f)  the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the facts. 43.  On 23 January 2012 the CSM submitted its memorial in reply, which was notified to the applicant on 27 January 2012. 44.  In a final judgment of 26 June 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 45.  The Supreme Court began by defining its jurisdiction in the following terms:\n\u201cThe longest-established guarantee is the right to appeal or to challenge administrative acts; [this guarantee] is aimed at ... individuals\u2019 legally protected rights and interests, and generally encompasses the possibility of applying to have an administrative act set aside or declared null and void or non-existent, on grounds of unlawfulness.\nHence, Article 50 \u00a7 1 of the Administrative Courts Code concerning appeals against administrative acts provides that \u2018an appeal against an administrative act is aimed at obtaining the setting-aside of the act in question or a declaration that it is null and void or non\u2011existent\u2019.\n Even though, since 1997, the Constitution no longer refers to \u2018unlawfulness\u2019 as a ground for appealing against an administrative act, this should not be construed to mean that the courts now have powers to examine the \u2018well-foundedness\u2019 of the administrative action: the unlawful nature of the act stems from the infringement of the individual\u2019s legally protected rights and legitimate interests[1].\nUnder the Constitution, the administrative courts have jurisdiction to determine disputes arising in legal relationships in the administrative sphere. Article 212 \u00a7 3 provides that \u2018the administrative and fiscal courts shall rule on actions and appeals aimed at determining disputes arising out of legal relationships in the administrative and fiscal spheres\u2019.\nHowever, Article 3 \u00a7 1 of the Administrative Courts Code provides for one limitation[2], according to which \u2018within the limits imposed by the principle of separation of powers, the administrative courts shall examine compliance with the legal rules and principles by which the administrative authorities are bound, but shall not examine the appropriateness or expediency (conveni\u00eancia ou opportunidade) of their actions\u2019.\nArticle 3 \u00a7 1 of the Administrative Courts Code makes very clear that a degree of discretion is left to the authorities, an administrative sphere of activity that is not governed by legal rules or principles and falls outside the scope of the administrative courts\u2019 scrutiny.\n...\nAccordingly, in view of this discretion on the part of the authorities, the courts\u2019 scrutiny of administrative activity must be confined to examining whether or not the authorities have complied with the legal principles by which they are bound. In principle, this will entail a negative review (proceedings to set aside rather than a full review), in which the court may not substitute its assessment for that of the administrative authorities with regard to elements falling within the scope of that discretion.\u201d 46.  With regard to the establishment of the facts by the CSM, the Supreme Court pointed to its case-law according to which judicial review could encompass only the insufficiency of the evidence and the facts in disciplinary proceedings; this did not entail conducting a fresh assessment of the available evidence or reaching a new and different conclusion on the basis of that evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court could not remedy possible omissions in the disciplinary proceedings. In the event of such an omission it was empowered solely to set aside the disciplinary body\u2019s decision and refer the case back to that body for any further steps in the investigation.\nIn the instant case the Supreme Court found that the CSM had indeed examined the factual evidence which, according to the applicant, it had disregarded. The Supreme Court pointed out in that connection that the issue whether the applicant had been acting in the performance of her duties was more in the nature of a legal issue and that, in any event, in assessing whether a judge had complied with his or her duty, it was necessary to take into account the judge\u2019s relations with society and with the CSM, which was the profession\u2019s management and disciplinary body. The Supreme Court found that the CSM had been right to dismiss the witness evidence presented by the applicant, in view of its content and the fact that the truth of the insult allegation had already been established in the earlier proceedings (see paragraphs 25 and 30 above). 47.  The Supreme Court also considered that the CSM had not committed any manifest error in its assessment of the applicant\u2019s conduct in finding her to have acted in breach of her duty of honesty. 48.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s remaining arguments, concerning the procedural safeguards in proceedings before the CSM, the Supreme Court found:\n(a)  that the fact that the judicial investigator had not proposed a penalty until the final report was in line with the statutory requirements and had been sufficient in view of the fact that the report had been duly notified to the applicant so that she could make whatever comments she deemed necessary;\n(b)  that the rights of the defence, and in particular the right to be heard, had not been infringed in the applicant\u2019s case, given that her defence had related to the facts of the case rather than to the proposed penalty and the fact that it had been open to the CSM to impose a heavier penalty than the one proposed; and\n(c)  that the legal reclassification of the facts had likewise not damaged the defence, given that it was in the context of the same facts that the applicant had breached her duty of honesty. 49.  As to the applicant\u2019s arguments in relation to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court found:\n(a) that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and\n(b)  that the penalty imposed had not been disproportionate. 50.  On 7 June 2011, following information received from the judicial investigator F.M.J., the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open a third set of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (case no. 269/11) on the grounds that she had asked that judicial investigator, in the course of a private conversation on 18 March 2011, not to institute disciplinary proceedings against the witness on her behalf whom she had called in the first set of disciplinary proceedings. 51.  On an unspecified date Judge R. was placed in charge of the investigation as judicial investigator. 52.  On an unspecified date the applicant received notice of the indictment, which proposed that she be removed from her post for acting in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety. 53.  The applicant filed defence pleadings in accordance with section 121 of the Act and attached evidence. She argued, in particular, that the proposed penalty was manifestly disproportionate to the acts of which she was accused. She admitted having had a private conversation with F.M.J., but denied having made the request in question. 54.  During the investigation evidence was heard from the applicant, F.M.J., and thirty-two witnesses. Written statements from witnesses were added to the file. The judicial investigator R. also organised a confrontation (acarea\u00e7\u00e3o) between the applicant and F.M.J. 55.  On 21 December 2011 the judicial investigator R. submitted his final report. Deeming Judge F.M.J.\u2019s testimony to be credible, he concluded on that basis that the facts were established and therefore proposed that the applicant be removed from office for acting in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety. 56.  On 17 January 2012 the applicant requested that a public hearing be held. As it emerges from the minutes of the plenary sitting of the CSM held on the same day, the applicant\u2019s request was refused on the ground that the statutory rights of the defence had been respected and that there was no legal basis for holding a public hearing before the CSM sitting in plenary. 57.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted that the final report was null and void, and requested that it be rectified. On 30 January 2012 the judicial investigator rectified various errors in the report. 58.  In a decision of 10 April 2012 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety.\nFirst of all, it rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the proceedings were null and void on account of a breach of the adversarial principle.\nThe CSM took the view that, despite the various items of evidence to the contrary adduced by the applicant, F.M.J.\u2019s statements remained credible.\nTaking into account the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances and her professional attributes, it found that a lesser penalty than that proposed in the final report was sufficient, and ordered that the applicant be suspended from duty for 180 days. 59.  The decision of 10 April 2012 was taken by fourteen of the seventeen members of the CSM (eight judges, including the President, and six non-judicial members). One of the judges issued a dissenting opinion to the effect that the facts as established, given their seriousness, warranted a penalty of compulsory early retirement or removal from office under section 95 of the Act (see paragraph 71 below). 60.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the CSM\u2019s decision with the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court. In her appeal, she submitted:\n(a)  that the relevant facts had not been taken into account, that the CSM had committed a manifest error in its assessment of the evidence, and that it had used factual evidence obtained by fraudulent means;\n(b)  that the CSM\u2019s decision had been unlawful, especially on account of the definition of the alleged disciplinary offence;\n(c)  that there had been a breach of her right to a fair trial, as the CSM had refused to provide her with information which, in her submission, would have made it possible (i) to clarify certain allegations made by the judicial inspector F.M.J. or cast doubt on their credibility, and (ii) to establish which member of the CSM formation had made public certain details of the deliberations in the case before the decision had been delivered;\n(d)  that no reasons had been given for the refusal to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and\n(e)  that the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the acts of which she had been accused. 61.  In her memorial the applicant requested that a public hearing be held in accordance with Article 91 \u00a7 2 of the Administrative Courts Code, so that she could present new evidence, namely a witness and some documents. 62.  On an unspecified date the CSM submitted its memorial in reply. 63.  In a judgment of 8 May 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. 64.  The Supreme Court found at the outset that the applicant\u2019s request for a public hearing should be refused on the ground that it was not that court\u2019s task to reassess the facts. Rather, its role was confined by law to verifying that the CSM had complied with the rules and principles governing the examination of evidence, and in particular that its decision regarding the establishment of the facts had been coherent and reasonable.\nThe Supreme Court held as follows:\n\u201cWhether or not the provisions governing a special administrative action [a\u00e7\u00e3o administrativa especial] to set aside an administrative act permit the holding of a public hearing at an appellant\u2019s request will naturally depend from the outset on the extent of the Supreme Court\u2019s powers of review, as fashioned and regulated specifically by the Status of Judges Act, with regard to the establishment of the facts and the taking of evidence in connection with the appeal. In reality, it is clear that such a hearing, devoted to the production of evidence and discussion of the facts, would be useful and meaningful only if the Supreme Court, in determining the appeal, had broad-ranging jurisdiction to review without restriction all the facts and evidence relied on in the impugned decision. If that were the case the Supreme Court would repeat and add to the examination of the evidence produced in the disciplinary proceedings in order to ... form ... its own opinion as to the conclusions to be drawn from it ...\nHowever, as it follows from the uniform, settled case-law of the Judicial Division, this is manifestly not the legal position that is continuing to emerge, primarily, from the reinforced law represented by the Status of Judges Act.\u201d\nWith regard to the evidence which the applicant proposed to produce during the hearing, the Supreme Court found that it was inadmissible and irrelevant, stressing in particular\n(a)  that the applicant\u2019s request for evidence to be heard from the witness had been aimed at establishing the content of the draft decision of the plenary CSM in the applicant\u2019s disciplinary case; this ran counter to the confidentiality of the proceedings leading to the final decision; and\n(b)  that the documents submitted by the applicant went beyond the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceedings.\nLastly, the Supreme Court observed that the applicant had produced a lengthy memorial. Under Article 91 of the Administrative Courts Code, this made it unnecessary to hear legal arguments in oral proceedings. 65.  On the merits, the Supreme Court noted\n(a)  that there had been no manifest error or inconsistency in the establishment of the facts, or any indication that the evidence had been obtained unlawfully;\n(b)  that the CSM had considerable discretion regarding the definition of the disciplinary offence, which was described in broad terms in the Act, and that the Supreme Court could alter that legal classification only in the event of a gross, manifest error, which was not the situation in the present case; and\n(c)  that the applicant\u2019s arguments that the proceedings before the CSM had been unfair were unfounded, as the refusal to provide certain items of information had been duly reasoned. 66.  As to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court observed\n(a)  that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and\n(b)  that the penalty imposed had not been disproportionate.\nOn this last point, the Supreme Court found as follows:\n\u201cNevertheless, as ruled uniformly and consistently in this Division\u2019s case-law, \u2018when it comes to fixing penalties in the context of disciplinary proceedings, a degree of [administrative] discretion exists which should be overridden only in cases of gross, manifest error ...\u2019\n...\nIn the light of the Supreme Court\u2019s powers with regard to the scale of the penalty \u2013 which falls wholly within the discretionary powers [of the administrative authorities] in accordance with the above-mentioned case-law \u2013 we do not consider that the CSM\u2019s value judgment regarding the specific factual circumstances and the accused\u2019s misconduct was apt to infringe the principles of proportionality and equality.\nFurthermore, there is nothing in the case file to indicate that the choice of the [type] of sanction or its severity was based on any criteria other than the need to protect the public interest and the requirements of judicial ethics; accordingly, [the complaint concerning the] alleged abuse of powers is manifestly ill-founded ...\u201d 67.  In a final decision of 30 September 2014 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, after deciding that the penalties incurred by the applicant in the three sets of disciplinary proceedings referred to above should be imposed cumulatively (c\u00famulo jur\u00eddico das penas disciplinares aplicadas), unanimously ordered a single penalty of 240 days\u2019 suspension from duty. 68.  The decision of 30 September 2014 was taken by a formation comprising twelve of the seventeen members of the CSM (seven judges, including the President of the CSM, and five non-judicial members). 69.  The applicant stated that she had actually been suspended from duty for only 100 days, as enforcement of the remainder of the penalty had become time-barred.", "references": ["7", "0", "8", "1", "6", "2", "9", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  On 29 or 30 January 2013 the applicant telephoned the police and reported X for threatening him. 7.  On 1 February 2013 X entered a coffee-bar owned by the applicant and asked him to come outside. Once outside, X started punching the applicant. Some passers-by separated X from the applicant, after which X left the scene saying \u201cI will bring a knife and a hammer to kill you\u201d. Shortly afterwards, X returned to the bar with a kitchen hammer and started hitting the applicant on his head and all over his body, saying \u201cI will kill you\u201d. One of the waiters and some of the customers separated X from the applicant and took the applicant for emergency treatment. The doctor in charge of the emergency ward noted that the applicant had suffered a head injury measuring 4 cm by 1 cm inflicted by a hammer. 8.  The same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint in written form against X, after which X was arrested. On 6 February 2013 X was charged with violent behaviour. In the processing of the indictment it transpired that there was another indictment pending against X, issued on 30 October 2012, in which he had been charged with stabbing V.J. and inflicting light bodily injuries on him. The proceedings on those two indictments were joined into a single set of proceedings. 9.  On 30 May 2013 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica found X guilty of inflicting light bodily injuries on V.J. on 9 October 2012, and of violent behaviour against the applicant on 1 February 2013. The court ordered the mandatory psychiatric treatment of X in a hospital (mjera bezbjednosti obavezno psihijatrijsko lije\u010denje i \u010duvanje u zdravstvenoj ustanovi), and the confiscation of two knives and a kitchen hammer. 10.  During the proceedings it transpired that X had been a long-term psychiatric patient, suffering from schizophrenia, and that he had been treated several times in a special psychiatric hospital. It also transpired that on several occasions he had attacked some of his neighbours, had set his flat on fire, and had caused a flood in the next-door flat. In the course of the proceedings X\u2019s aunt submitted that about three months before attacking the applicant, X had become more aggressive and that she had reduced contact with him to a minimum. The court also established that X had stabbed V.J. without any reason. It transpires from the case file that after that attack, X had been arrested and then released, but there is no information as to the exact dates. 11.  The court found that there was a direct causal link between X\u2019s mental state and the criminal offences he had committed, that there was a serious danger that he might commit a more serious offence (neko te\u017ee djelo), and that he required psychiatric treatment in order to prevent that from happening. 12.  That judgment became final on 20 June 2013. On 24 June 2013 the Court of First Instance requested the prison authorities to transfer X to a special hospital in Kotor. On 16 November 2015 the Court of First Instance discontinued (obustavio) the enforcement of mandatory inpatient psychiatric treatment and replaced it with mandatory psychiatric treatment on an outpatient basis, as long as there was a need for treatment but no longer than three years. On 12 April 2016 the Court of First Instance issued an order (nalog) directing X to undergo outpatient psychiatric treatment in a healthcare centre (Dom zdravlja). He was readmitted to hospital between 22 August and 21 October 2016, apparently at his own request. Between 18 April 2016 and October 2017 X had regular monthly check-ups by a specialist. 13.  On 27 May 2013 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State, seeking 1,700 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He submitted, in substance, that X had already attacked other people before attacking him, including V.J. four months earlier. Moreover, the applicant had reported X to the police for threatening him before the attack. Owing to the failure of the State to undertake any preventive measure in respect of X, the applicant had been attacked by him and had suffered injuries. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, on 20 December 2013 the court heard Z.\u0189., a police officer, who had been patrolling for more than ten years in the neighbourhood where X lived and where the applicant\u2019s bar was located. He stated that two to three days prior to the attack, the applicant had called the police to report X who had been \u201ccausing him problems\u201d (stvarao mu problem) and who had told the applicant that he \u201cwould see who the boss in the neighbourhood was\u201d. Following that complaint, Z.\u0189. had looked for X in order to talk to him but had been unable to find him for the next two days. After the applicant had been attacked, Z.\u0189. had gone to the scene and, \u201cknowing that X always carried a knife or some other cold weapon\u201d, asked him whether he had a knife. In response, X had taken a knife from behind his back and handed it in. Z.\u0189. further submitted that the police often received complaints of noise, disturbances (neredi) and attacks by X. The police would always have \u201can informative talk\u201d (informativni razgovor) with X, and would duly notify the State prosecutor (Osnovni dr\u017eavni tu\u017eilac) thereof. He did not know, however, whether those complaints had been further processed. 15.  On 19 February 2015 the Court of First Instance ruled against the applicant. The court held that the police had acted as required, notably by taking X\u2019s statements and forwarding them to the competent prosecutor for further processing. In addition, after the attack X had been criminally prosecuted and found guilty. Therefore, there had been no lack of action and thus the State was not liable for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. Relying on section 148(1) of the Obligations Act, the court held as follows:\n\u201cThe court dismisses as factually and legally unfounded the applicant\u2019s submissions that the State ought to have hospitalised X before the event here in issue, as the State bodies did order his hospitalisation as soon as the conditions for that had been met. The fact that it was only after the case at issue does not affect the court\u2019s conclusion. The court has concluded that the State bodies acted in accordance with the law and their powers both pursuant to this event and other preceding events, and therefore the conditions for an award of compensation have not been met.\u201d 16.  On 20 April 2015 the High Court upheld the first-instance judgment. It considered, in substance, that there was no causal link between the State\u2019s actions and the damage caused, given that the applicant\u2019s injury was a result of an attack by a third person. Therefore there was no liability on the part of the State to compensate him for the said damage. The court stated that it had examined other submissions but found that they did not influence its verdict. 17.  On 12 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. In substance he maintained that: (a) the State had failed to react appropriately after X had attacked V.J.; (b) four months thereafter, X had attacked and injured the applicant; and (c) three days before the attack the applicant had complained to the police that X had threatened him. The State was thus responsible, as it had had knowledge of the kind of person X was, but had failed to react. The applicant relied on Article 28 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below), and on the Court\u2019s findings in the case of Branko Toma\u0161i\u0107 and Others v. Croatia in respect of Article 2 of the Convention. 18.  On 14 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected (odbacuje se) the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal, holding, in particular:\n\u201c[the applicant] complains of a violation of his rights in substance by challenging the established facts.\nThe Constitutional Court reiterates that it is not competent to substitute the regular courts in assessing the facts and evidence, but that it is the task of the regular courts to [do so] (see the European Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Thomas v. the United Kingdom, 10 May 2005, no. 19354/02). The task of the Constitutional Court is to examine whether the proceedings as a whole were fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention and whether the decisions of the regular courts violate constitutional rights. Therefore, the Constitutional Court is not competent to replace the assessment of the regular courts by its own assessment, as it is up to those courts to assess the evidence and establish the facts relevant for the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, the constitutional appeal here at issue is manifestly (prima facie) unfounded.\u201d\nThat decision was served on the applicant on 13 January 2016 at the earliest. 19.  On 10 June 2003 X was found guilty of a serious traffic offence and was sentenced to six months in prison, suspended for two years. On 28 June 2006 he was found guilty of setting his flat on fire and was ordered to undergo mandatory outpatient psychiatric treatment. 20.  Before 24 June 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) X had been hospitalised on several other occasions: (a) for an unspecified period in 1997; (b) from 29 November to 19 December 2001; (c) from 25 July 2003 to 8 July 2004 (following a court decision of 21 July 2003 to that effect, after he had set his flat on fire; once it was considered that he had achieved a stable clinical condition, X was discharged from the hospital); (d) from 31 January to 21 February 2006; (e) from 23 July to 29 September 2006; (f) on 15 February and 13 March 2007 (on the recommendation of the healthcare centre in Podgorica following complaints from X\u2019s neighbours); (g) from 5 June to 25 July 2008; and (h) from 24 September 2012 to 3 October 2012. That period of hospitalisation would appear to have been prompted by an attempt by X to commit suicide by taking a large quantity of medication. The discharge note of 3 October 2012, however, noted that X \u201c[did] not want to remain in hospital in spite of the persistent insistence of the doctor in charge (ordinarijus) that he continue hospital treatment. He [was] prescribed a check-up in seven days\u2019 time with a competent psychiatrist in a health care centre\u201d. There is no information as to whether X had any treatment or a medical check-up thereafter. It is clear from the case file that between the periods of hospitalisation in 2008 and 2012, X had seen a psychiatrist on at least three occasions: on 1 November 2010, 22 September and 11 October 2011. Two of the three medical reports state that X had regularly been taking medication. 21.  On 13 December 2013 X was deprived of his legal capacity following a proposal to that effect by the local social work centre of 14 November 2013. On an unspecified date thereafter, the social work centre was appointed his legal guardian.", "references": ["5", "0", "3", "2", "7", "9", "8", "6", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  On 19 November 2007 the applicant\u2019s sons, Aykut and Aykan, born in 1991 and 1992 respectively, left home in their school uniforms with their rucksacks to go to their secondary school. When they did not return home at the usual time in the evening, their mother called the applicant, who in turn enquired about his sons\u2019 whereabouts from friends and family. When his enquiries did not yield any results, the applicant informed the police that his sons were missing. 7.  In his statement taken at the Samand\u0131ra police station on 20 November 2007 the applicant told the police that his sons had apparently not gone to school after leaving home the previous day, and that they had left their mobile telephones at home. He also informed the police that they had not had any disagreements or fights which could have prompted their disappearance. 8.  On the same day, the police informed the Kartal public prosecutor of the disappearance of the applicant\u2019s sons. The public prosecutor instructed the police to take the statements of those who could have information as to the two children\u2019s whereabouts, and to keep him informed of developments. 9.  On 22 November 2007 the police took the applicant\u2019s wife\u2019s statement. She told the police that on the morning in question her sons had left home on foot, whereas they had normally taken a minibus to go to school. She had noticed that Aykan had looked somewhat anxious before leaving home, and that he had forgotten to wear his school tie and socks. She had had no idea where Aykut and Aykan could have gone, and none of their friends, relatives or school teachers had had any information on the two childrens\u2019 whereabouts either. Although her son Aykut had had a mobile telephone, he had left the telephone at home that day. She added that she had no reason to suspect anyone with regard to her children\u2019s disappearance. 10.  Based on the information obtained from the applicant and his wife, the police registered Aykut and Aykan as missing persons. 11.  Still on 22 November 2007, the Kartal district gendarmerie asked the Kartal public prosecutor\u2019s office to authorise access to Aykut Aka\u2019s mobile phone records for the past six months. 12.  On 27 November 2007 the Kartal public prosecutor\u2019s office asked the Turkish Telecommunication Institution to provide a record of the individuals who had called Aykut Aka\u2019s mobile telephone in the past three months, together with their complete identity information and addresses. 13.  In the meantime, on 23 November 2007 three fishermen, T.G., K.S. and A.D., had contacted the coast guard as they had spotted a corpse at the bottom of the sea off the Emirgan coast. The male corpse recovered by the divers deployed to the incident site was fully dressed in a school uniform and wearing a rucksack. While removing the rucksack from the body, they noted that the rucksack was filled with heavy stones. The student identity card subsequently discovered in the victim\u2019s pocket suggested that the body was that of the applicant\u2019s son, Aykan Aka. The body was subsequently taken to the morgue of the \u0130stinye State Hospital, where the applicant confirmed the identity of his son. 14.  On the same day, a post mortem examination was conducted on the body in the presence of the Kartal public prosecutor. An initial examination revealed no sign of violence on the body. It was decided to transfer the body to the Forensic Medicine Institute for a full autopsy, without which the definite cause of death could not be established. 15.  On the same day, officers from the Sar\u0131yer Security Directorate prepared an incident scene report. After reiterating the aforementioned information, the report verified that stones weighing three to four kilograms had been found in the victim\u2019s rucksack. 16.  Still on the same day, the police took another statement from the applicant. After reiterating the statement he had made on 20 November 2007 (see paragraph 7 above), he provided the following additional information.\n-  On 21 November 2007, two days after their disappearance, his son Aykut\u2019s mobile telephone had rung. When he had picked up the telephone, a woman unknown to him had asked why he had answered that telephone, and then had hung up. When the applicant had called the number back, someone else had answered and hung up, after shouting at him for calling.\n-  His son Aykut had received a text message in Arabic on the occasion of the bayram[1], one month prior to his disappearance. Following his request, the Samand\u0131ra gendarmerie command had managed to locate the owner of the number from which the message had been sent (M.Y.), but M.Y. had denied any involvement with the message.\n-  After his sons\u2019 disappearance, the applicant had found a handwritten note by Aykan in their room, which read:\n\u201cI, Aykan Aka, will die and become a martyr on December 13th at 2.25 a.m. Place of [death]: Istanbul Samand\u0131ra/Kavakl\u0131k. I will be waiting for all of you. Words: Aykan Aka Written by: Aykan Aka [and signature]. I am giving my life to his holiness Azrael, this is wonderful\u201d. 17.  On 26 November 2007 the police questioned the principal of the secondary school which the applicants\u2019 sons had attended, along with Aykan\u2019s school friends, Y.D. and \u00d6.K. The principal said that Aykut had been talkative and a successful student. Aykan, on the other hand, had not had good marks, and, according to his schoolmates, had not been very sociable. Y.D. stated that he had met Aykan some three months before at the start of the school year. Aykan had been withdrawn, but he had not appeared to have any problems at school or home. He had always studied during the breaks, and had told him to study too so that they could get good marks. He had regularly scribbled notes such as \u201cdoomsday signs\u201d, \u201cdajjal[2]\u201d or \u201cChrist\u201d in his notebook. He had once made a calculation and said that the doomsday would arrive in fifty two years and two hours, and had then said that it would not matter whether they died then or fifty two years later. \u00d6.K.\u2019s statement corroborated Y.D.\u2019s. 18.  The applicant requested that an underwater search be carried out along the Emirgan coastline to find his other son Aykut\u2019s body. This was done on 30 November 2007. A body was located at the sea floor some fifty metres from the coast. Just like Aykan, Aykut was also wearing a rucksack filled with heavy stones. His rucksack was also attached to his body by a rope. 19.  The incident scene report prepared on the same day noted no signs of violence on Aykut\u2019s body. The post mortem examination conducted subsequently found that the cause of death appeared to be drowning. It was, however, decided to transfer the body to the Forensic Medicine Institute for a full autopsy, without which the definite cause of death could not be established. 20.  On 3 December 2007 the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor\u2019s office requested detailed information on incoming and outgoing calls pertaining to four telephone numbers which had been apparently used by the applicant and his sons in the period between 5 and 30 November 2007. 21.  The Turkish Telecommunication Institute informed the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor\u2019s office in a letter dated 13 December 2007, that the requested information had been compiled. The call records enclosed with that letter were not submitted to the Court. However, a handwritten note on the letter, by an unknown author, indicates that no significant calls were detected in the records. 22.  According to a report prepared by the police on 28 December 2007, the CCTV footage from 19 November 2007 of the place where the bodies were recovered did not reveal any information that could shed light on the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 sons\u2019 suspicious deaths. 23.  The autopsy reports issued by the Forensic Medicine Institute on 14 and 25 January 2008 in regard to Aykan and Aykut respectively noted their cause of death as drowning. The report also indicated that no toxic substances were found in their bodies, nor were any signs of trauma noted. 24.  On 1 February 2008 the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor rendered a decision not to prosecute in connection with the death of Aykan. The decision simply noted that the cause of death had been established as drowning by the Forensic Medicine Institute, and that no evidence of a crime had been found. 25.  In a similar decision not to prosecute taken on 15 February 2008 with respect to Aykut, the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor stated that there was no reason to hold anyone accountable for his death. 26.  On 1 April 2008 the applicant objected to the decisions delivered by the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor. He claimed in particular that the public prosecutor had failed to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the incident. He had not fully investigated his sons\u2019 telephone records or CCTV footage that could have revealed information regarding their deaths, nor had he questioned his sons\u2019 close friends. The lack of an effective investigation into the incident had impaired his trust in the justice system, which had compelled him to participate in a live TV show in the hope of gathering information that could shed light on the circumstances of his sons\u2019 deaths. A number of viewers had called the studio with possible information on the incident, yet the public prosecutor\u2019s office had not sought those individuals out with a view to getting official statements. He also made the following allegations.\n-  On 7 February 2008 five individuals had attempted to kidnap his younger son Volkan, an incident which had been reported to the police.\n-  On 22 February 2008 three photos of his son Aykan had been left on his doorstep, which had also been reported to the police.\nHe claimed that all of these factors, when viewed together, showed that his sons\u2019 deaths had not been a simple case of drowning, and that he suspected that they had been killed. He asked the authorities to extend the investigation into the deaths and to question his sons\u2019 friends H.B., Y.A., E.\u0130., F.\u00c7. and E.\u00c7., none of whom had yet been questioned. 27.  On 10 June 2008 the Bak\u0131rkoy Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection, holding that the Sar\u0131yer public prosecutor\u2019s decisions not to prosecute had complied with the procedure and law.", "references": ["2", "5", "1", "8", "9", "6", "7", "3", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Villavente (Le\u00f3n). 6.  He worked as a teacher, also acting as head of department, in a public school, the Le\u00f3n School of Arts and Crafts (Escuela de Artes y Oficios de Le\u00f3n). One of his colleagues \u2013 a teacher in the same department \u2013 filed a complaint against him with the education authorities for psychological harassment in the workplace. The complaint was dismissed on the basis that there had been no harassment but mere disputes at work. 7.  On 20 June 2006 the colleague filed an administrative claim with the Department of Education of the Regional Government of Castilla-Le\u00f3n aimed at seeking redress for the malfunctioning of the public administration. She requested that the administration be found liable for the alleged psychological harassment in the workplace. The competent authorities did not render a decision within the requisite time-limit. 8.  On 25 January 2007 the colleague instituted judicial proceedings (recurso contencioso-administrativo) against the implied rejection of her request of 20 June 2006. She claimed that the applicant had subjected her to workplace harassment, from the academic year 2000/01 onwards in particular, and that the competent authorities had failed to take any measures to prevent it. She described a series of events in which the applicant had allegedly made false accusations against her and subjected her to discriminatory and humiliating treatment, disrespect, insults and death threats at work in the presence of students, parents and other colleagues. The colleague further requested compensation from the Regional Administration of Castilla-Le\u00f3n in the amount of 74,434.12 euros (EUR), as well as reinstatement in her position as a teacher at the Le\u00f3n School of Arts and Crafts, requesting that all appropriate measures be taken to prevent any possible risks, particularly psychosocial, in the workplace. 9.  On 19 December 2007, after notice of the aforementioned application was given, the respondent \u2013 the Regional Administration of Castilla-Le\u00f3n \u2013 contested the claims and requested the dismissal of the application. 10.  By a judgment (no. 2491/2011) of 2 November 2011, the High Court of Justice of Castilla-Le\u00f3n (Administrative Chamber) ruled against the Regional Administration of Castilla-Le\u00f3n, ordering it to pay compensation to the plaintiff in the amount of EUR 14,500. It concluded that the situation suffered by her amounted to workplace harassment and that the education authorities, despite being aware of the situation, had not taken effective measures to bring it to an end. Although the court acknowledged that not all the acts or behaviour attributed to the applicant could be considered psychological harassment, it found that on the basis of the evidence collected a situation of psychological harassment in the workplace had been shown to exist.\nThe High Court of Justice included the following reasoning concerning the applicant, who was frequently identified by name:\n\u201c... from the documentary, witness and expert evidence [in the proceedings] [the court] can find that ... a situation of psychological harassment in the workplace has been shown [to exist] on the basis that the head of department\u2019s conduct towards the claimant met the material element \u2013 unjustified professional harassment \u2013 the temporal element \u2013 regular and repeated \u2013 and the element of intent \u2013 malicious and not by chance \u2013 of the so-called bullying (mobbing) ...\na) Not all the acts or behaviour that the plaintiff attributed to Mr Vicent ... constitute psychological harassment towards her ...\nb) ... although it should also be considered established that the behaviour ... of Mr Vicent ... was to a certain degree general or collective, ... in the particular case of the plaintiff ... this general behaviour of a lack of respect and manners was translated, more intensively and strongly, into repeated and conscious professional discredit, of underestimation and mockery of her teaching ability, that resulted not only from the documented complaints already described ..., but particularly from the expressive witness evidence ...\u201d 11.  On 15 December 2011 the applicant requested to have access to the file and to become a party to the proceedings. He claimed to have learned of the judgment some days earlier through the publication of information in a Le\u00f3n newspaper (Diario de Le\u00f3n). 12.  By a decision of 23 January 2012, the High Court of Justice of Castilla-Le\u00f3n granted the applicant access to the file but refused his request to be a party to the proceedings on the basis that he could not be considered to be an interested party in liability proceedings against the public administration. 13.  On 1 February 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision requesting the annulment of the proceedings. The High Court of Justice of Castilla-Le\u00f3n dismissed it by a decision of 2 March 2012. On the one hand, the court held that the request for annulment of the proceedings had been made outside the time-limit prescribed by law, since an \u201cappeal for annulment\u201d (incidente de nulidad) should have been submitted within twenty days of the date the applicant became aware of a possible breach of his rights. The court took into account that the applicant had claimed that he had learned of the judgment through the publication of information in a newspaper on 9 and 10 December 2011, and that in any case on 15 December 2011 (the date on which he had requested access to the file and to become a party to the proceedings) he had clearly known the decisive elements for his complaints.\nThe court nevertheless decided on the merits. It stressed that the proceedings were aimed at determining liability for the damage suffered by the claimant as a result of the acts of the authorities and staff working for the public administration. Therefore, in line with section 145 of Law 30/1992 and the relevant subordinate legislation, within such proceedings neither the authorities nor civil servants could be sued nor, accordingly, could they be a party to the proceedings. The national legislature had set up liability proceedings against the public administration excluding the possibility of its authorities or staff becoming interested parties to them even though in all cases the public officials concerned were identifiable; their professional conduct was being judged and hence their honour and moral integrity could eventually be affected; there was a possibility that the administration concerned would institute a \u201crecovery action\u201d against them; and the administrative or judicial decisions were subject to potential media coverage.\nDespite acknowledging that public officials\u2019 professional conduct was being judged and that their honour and moral integrity could be affected, the court held: (i) that the proceedings involved disputes exclusively between the public administration and alleged victims of the acts of its public officials; (ii) that the authorities and staff allegedly causing the damage could not be considered to be interested parties for the purposes of section 31 of Law 30/1992; and (iii) that both liability and compensation are sought from the public administration, as opposed to the public officials concerned. Lastly, the court stated that the public official concerned would only be considered to be an interested party in a recovery action (acci\u00f3n de repetici\u00f3n) under section 145(2) of Law 30/1992, in which each and every one of the elements constituting the liability for which recovery was sought could be contested, including the acts attributed to him or her.\nThe court thus concluded that the concept of an \u201cinterested party\u201d in liability proceedings brought against the public administration should be understood as referring to those allegedly injured by the acts of public officials. The restriction on public officials being a party to such (administrative or judicial) proceedings was however justified by the special nature, purpose and scope of liability proceedings brought against the public administration. According to the court, such proceedings were set up to facilitate redress and compensation for those affected by the acts of public officials. Otherwise, the proceedings would require each and every public official concerned (including, for example, the school management board and education inspectorate, or doctors, nurses, porters and so forth in cases related to healthcare) to be summoned to appear in proceedings in their own defence and with their own representatives, contrary to the regulatory developments, that essentially simplified the proceedings for the benefit of those injured or affected by the public administration. 14.  The applicant then lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, invoking a breach of Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution (right to a fair trial). He claimed that, despite his having a direct and personal interest in the proceedings on the basis that his rights and legitimate interests had been affected, he had not been summoned to appear and his request to become a party to the proceedings had been refused. The court declared the appeal inadmissible by a decision of 2 October 2012 (served on the applicant on 9 October 2012) on the grounds that it had not duly justified its special constitutional significance.", "references": ["9", "6", "3", "8", "7", "0", "5", "2", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1958, 1977, 1956, 1981 and 1979, respectively (see appendix). 5.  On 2 March 2010 the first applicant was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment by a panel of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional for encouragement of terrorism (enaltecimiento del terrorismo). He was also acquitted of the charges of unlawful assembly and association (reuni\u00f3n il\u00edcita y asociaci\u00f3n il\u00edtica). 6.  The first applicant brought a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging, inter alia, the impartiality of the President of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional and judge rapporteur of that judgment (hereinafter \u201cthe presiding judge\u201d), as she had displayed hostility towards him during those criminal proceedings. 7.  In particular, the first applicant argued that during the oral hearing, and once the applicant had finished his statement, the presiding judge had asked him whether he condemned ETA\u2019s (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the former armed Basque nationalist and separatist organisation) violence. The first applicant had refused to give an answer. The presiding judge had then replied that she \u201calready knew that he was not going to give an answer to that question\u201d. 8.  On 2 February 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the first applicant, finding that the presiding judge\u2019s declarations during the trial had cast doubts on the absence of prejudice or bias. The Supreme Court stressed the following:\n\u201cThe significance of the Judge\u2019s action...cannot be reduced to an isolated assessment of the question raised by her, yet it must be put in direct connection with the comment that she made after the appellant refused to give an answer, as well as the nature of the charges, their legal characterization and the moment the question and the answer take place...\nThe question put by the presiding judge and, very particularly, her reaction to the appellant\u2019s refusal to give an answer, can be interpreted, from an objective perspective, as an expression of a previously formed opinion...about the significance assigned to the words spoken by the appellant...The appellant had objectives reasons to think that the judge was precipitately voicing out a value judgment on the criminal nature of [his statements]\u201d 9.  The Supreme Court, assessing the proceedings as a whole, found that there were \u201cobjective reasons\u201d to consider that the presiding judge (and judge rapporteur of the case) was expressing a prejudice against the first applicant about the significance that should be given to the phrases and words expressed by him, which had also led to a preconceived idea as to his guilt. This had taken place before the oral phase had terminated, i.e, before the presiding judge (as well as the whole panel) had had an opportunity to assess all the pieces of evidence brought before her and prior to the applicant\u2019s right to have a last word. Thus, the applicant\u2019s doubts as to the impartiality of this judge were \u201cobjectively justified\u201d. Consequently, the Supreme Court declared that the judgment was void and ordered a re-trial by a new panel formed by three other judges different from the ones that were part of the composition of that panel. 10.  As a result, a new and different composition of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional tried the applicant on the charge of encouragement of terrorism. On 22 July 2011 the Audiencia Nacional acquitted the applicant. 11.  In 2009, criminal proceedings were brought against all the applicants before the Audiencia Nacional, on the grounds that a political party that the applicants intended to create was in fact under the control of the terrorist organisation ETA. The applicants were accused of being members of this terrorist organisation. The facts have been referred to as the \u201cBateragune Case\u201d. These proceedings were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional, whose composition consisted of the same judges that had taken part in the first set of criminal proceedings followed against the first applicant, which ended with the judgment of 2 March 2010, finally declared void by the Supreme Court on 2 February 2011. This time the presiding judge was not the judge rapporteur. 12.  The first applicant initiated proceedings to challenge the whole panel, arguing that the Section\u2019s composition did not offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality, for the presiding judge had already showed signs of partiality and bias in previous criminal proceedings against him. According to the first applicant, the bias previously shown by the presiding judge created an objective situation which contaminated the impartiality of the judges. This also created a subjective situation of mistrust on the Section\u2019s composition. 13.  On 26 April 2011 a special chamber of the Audiencia Nacional (a chamber that, according to Article 69 of the Judicature Act is ex professo formed to deal with challenge proceedings) ruled against the first applicant. According to the Audiencia Nacional, these new proceedings had a different object, i.e. his belonging to a terrorist organisation and the existence of strong and permanent links with ETA, which had nothing to do with his previous charge of encouragement of terrorism. Neither the question previously put by the presiding judge (see paragraph 7 above) nor her subsequent reaction showed any sign of prejudice against the first applicant. 14.  On 16 September 2011 the Audiencia Nacional delivered its judgment and sentenced the first and third applicants to ten years\u2019 imprisonment for being a member and leader of a terrorist organisation. The second, fourth and fifth applicants were sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist organisation. All applicants were further disqualified from taking part in elections for the same length of time as their respective prison sentences. 15.  All the applicants brought a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court. The first and fifth applicants contested in particular the impartiality of the panel of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional reiterating the same arguments that were brought during the challenging proceedings before the Audiencia Nacional. 16.  On 7 May 2012 the Supreme Court, in a 3 to 2 decision, partially upheld the applicants\u2019 appeals and reduced their sentence to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment in respect of the first and third applicants and six years in respect of the second, fourth and fifth applicants. The disqualification from taking part in elections was confirmed. However, the Supreme Court rejected the applicants\u2019 arguments concerning the alleged violation of the their right to an impartial tribunal by declaring that the bias displayed by the presiding judge against one of the applicants during previous and different proceedings did not reach the necessary threshold to believe that the judges (and, specifically, the presiding judge) had become again biased or prejudiced, not only against the first applicant but against all of them. According to the Supreme Court, there was no evidence apart from what happened in previous proceedings that supported the alleged partiality of the judges. The Supreme Court stressed the following:\n\u201cTo presume that every judge that has been declared biased in previous proceedings must be forcefully contaminated in any other further proceedings...implies to issue a universal judgment on bias that lacks a minimum objectives proofs ad causam...The question of subjective partiality or impartiality and even in many cases of objective impartiality is a very delicate one since it directly affect the composition of the Tribunals subject to the rule of law. Consequently, the appearances can only be relevant if they have a connection with the legal causes to challenge a judge as established by the lawmaker...in the sense that it is not possible to established different causes according to an analogic criterion or treating the appearance as an autonomous cause with its own procedural life...Therefore, the complaint must be rejected\u201d 17.  Two of the Supreme Court\u2019s judges issued two separate dissenting opinions. According to the first dissenting opinion (which was endorsed, in substance, by the second dissenting judge), the applicants\u2019 right to an impartial tribunal had indeed been violated, because the preconceived idea showed by the presiding judge in previous criminal proceedings against the first applicant also affected her judgment during subsequent proceedings. This lack of impartiality also had affected the other two judges of the panel. Consequently, a new trial before a different panel of judges should have been ordered. According to the second dissenting opinion, however, there was not enough evidence to support the applicants\u2019 conviction. Consequently, the fact that the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional lacked impartiality, although true, was irrelevant, for the applicants should have been acquitted by the Supreme Court. 18.  On 21 June 2012 the third applicant lodged a separate amparo appeal against the judgments of 16 September 2011 and of 7 May 2012, arguing, inter alia, that there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant\u2019s conviction. On 27 June 2012 the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court against these judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the panel composition of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional fell short of the requirements of an impartial tribunal. 19.  On 22 July 2014 the Constitutional Court, in a 7 to 5 decision, ruled against the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants. The majority of the Constitutional Court found that the doubts as to the presiding judge\u2019s impartiality were neither subjectively nor objectively justified. The Constitutional Court observed that the doubts on the presiding judge were in connection with previous proceedings dealing with a different subject, i.e. the determination on whether the first applicant had committed the crime of encouragement of terrorism, which differed from the charges they were all accused of in the framework of the second set of criminal proceedings. The two proceedings did not present enough similarities as to cast doubts on the judges\u2019 impartiality. 20.  The five dissenting judges were of the opinion that the applicants\u2019 right to an impartial tribunal had been violated. In particular, they considered that the presiding judge\u2019s conduct in previous proceedings was a clear sign of a preconceived idea regarding the first applicant\u2019s guilt, which made her impartiality during the proceedings against all applicants questionable. 21.  On 22 September 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled against the third applicant in a 4 to 2 decision.", "references": ["4", "6", "9", "1", "0", "8", "2", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants are Ukrainian nationals of Roma ethnicity. Before 10 September 2002 the applicants lived in the village of Petrivka, Ivanivskyy District, Odessa Region (hereinafter also \u201cthe village\u201d). They currently live in Berezivka District, Odessa Region. 7.  On 7 September 2002 a 17-year-old ethnic Ukrainian was murdered in the village, allegedly by a Romany man who was apparently convicted of the murder afterwards. It appears that this occurred in the course of an altercation between Romany men and other youngsters from the village at a local bar or dancehall. 8.  On 8 September 2002 a crowd of village residents gathered and demanded that the Roma be expelled from the village. According to the statement of the village mayor, Mr M.S., made in the course of a subsequent criminal investigation, the local officials attempted to defuse the situation and urged the villages not to do anything illegal. 9.  On the same day the village council met. Among those present were: a representative of the Ivanivskyy District State Administration (\u201cthe District Administration\u201d) and the head of the Ivanivskyy District Police Department (\u201cthe District Police Department\u201d). According to the minutes of the meeting submitted by the applicants, in his opening remarks the mayor said, inter alia:\n\u201c... today a cruel crime was committed [in the village] by a group of residents of Gypsy ethnicity. One student of [the village high school] was murdered and three others were injured and are now in hospital in a serious state. This crime was made possible by the fact that no appropriate measures are being taken against them in the event of their [engaging in crimes]. Everybody knows that the spread of drug addiction, which is taking place in our village, is their fault. Today a meeting of villagers took place at which a negative opinion was expressed about the banditry and other [forms of crime] on the part of this category of people ... I invite the council members to speak responsibly and to express their opinion about the crime committed and about the decision of the villagers. I would like this meeting not to turn into something which aggravates inter-ethnic relations.\u201d 10.  At the close of the meeting the council decided, in particular, to \u201csupport the decision of the meeting of the village residents to expel persons of Gypsy ethnicity from the village\u201d. 11.  On 9 September 2002 the village council met again. The heads of the District Administration and the District Police Department and the chairperson and members of the Ivanivskyy District Council were present. The village council examined the question of \u201cbringing the decision of the village council [of 8 September] concerning the expulsion of the persons of Gypsy ethnicity into compliance with legal norms\u201d. The head of the District Administration invited the village council members to carefully consider the wisdom of their decision, drawing a clear line between crime\u2011related problems and inter-ethnic relations. A council member, D., stated that whatever the wording of the decision it would have no legal consequences and that legal action against drug dealers would also be ineffective. In fact, it was not possible to keep the situation under control. D. furthermore stated that the neighbours of the Roma residents were saying that it was necessary to cut off their gas supply and to burn down the Roma\u2019s houses. At the close of the meeting the village council decided to ask law enforcement authorities \u201cto ensure the expulsion of socially dangerous individuals, regardless of ethnic origin, from the village\u201d. 12.  On the evening of the same day the mayor and the local police advised the applicants to leave the village, as a \u201cpogrom\u201d was about to start. Electricity and gas supplies to their houses were cut. Subsequently, in the course of the night of 9-10 September 2002 a crowd of several hundred people, allegedly led by a certain Mr O.M., ransacked the houses belonging to the Roma, destroying their belongings. A number of police officers were present but did not intervene to prevent the looting and apparently concentrated solely on preventing human casualties. The house where the first applicant lived had burned down. According to the Government, the results of the expert analysis of the causes of the fire were inconclusive (see paragraph 118 below). 13.  The applicants submitted a number of written statements from the applicants addressed to Ms Duducehava, the leader of a Roma association, and Mr Stoyanov, a lawyer who represented a number of applicants in the domestic criminal proceedings (see below). The statements bear various dates from 2004 and 2007, contain descriptions of the events of 7\u201110 September 2002, and ask for help in dealing with the authorities. According to the general tenor of the statements, the applicants\u2019 had been urged to leave by the police prior to the pogrom, and in their absence their houses had been ransacked by the mob \u2013 in particular, doors and windows had been smashed, and furniture and belongings destroyed or stolen. 14.  According to the fifth applicant\u2019s statement, dated 17 November 2007, she and the fourth applicant (her husband) had been away from the village at the time of the events and had only learned about them when they had returned on 20 September. She had had to sell her house \u201cat half the price\u201d (\u201c\u0437\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0446\u0435\u043d\u044b\u201d), as had other Roma victims of the pogrom. The seventh, eighth, thirteenth and sixteenth applicants\u2019 statements, as well as the statements of some other former Roma residents of Petrivka, were similarly worded, speaking of the houses having been sold for less than their normal price (for instance, Mrs M. Burlya, the second applicant\u2019s wife, characterised the price for which her house had been sold as \u201cvery cheap\u201d). 15.  The applicants submitted eight undated photographs showing the ruins of one or several houses, certain photographs showing signs of fire. The origin of these photographs is unclear. In her statement to Ms Duducehava in 2004 the sixth applicant referred to certain photographs showing damage to her and her relatives\u2019 houses. 16.  The seventh and eighth applicants stated that all the Roma had left the village before the attack started. 17.  Applicants identified in the Appendix asserted in their statements to Ms Duducehava, Mr Stoyanov or to the police in the course of the subsequent criminal investigation that they had been away from the village at the time of the events of 7-10 September 2002 and of the attack and had only learned about it later. 18.  In her statement to Mr Stoyanov dated 18 November 2007 the ninth applicant stated that she had been at home with her two granddaughters (aged ten and fifteen at the time) when the attack started. Stones had started flying through the windows, four attackers had broken down the door and started shouting, and the older granddaughter had pleaded with the attackers not to kill them. The attackers had not touched the applicant or her granddaughters; the applicant had then fled.\nHowever, in her statement to the police dated 26 September 2002 this applicant stated that she had fled the village prior to the attack and had returned the next day to find her home ransacked. In her statement (addressed to Ms Duducehava) and dated 13 June 2004 this applicant complained of having been expelled from her home but did not mention that she had personally witnessed any attack. 19.  According to a report published on 20 September 2002 in the regional newspaper Porto Franko and information given at a press conference held on 12 September 2002 by the Secretary of State (\u0414\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440) for the Ministry of the Interior and by the head of the Odessa Regional Police Department (\u201cthe Regional Police\u201d), police officers had been present in force and had observed the attack. However, they had not attempted to prevent or stop it, apparently concentrating solely on preventing casualties. 20.  The events were reported in a number of regional and national newspapers. 21.  The applicants alleged that after the attack they had had to move to another town and live with family and friends in overcrowded and inadequate conditions. 22.  On 10 September 2002 the Ivanivka district police initiated criminal proceedings against persons unknown on suspicion of disorderly conduct committed in a group (\u0445\u0443\u043b\u0456\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432\u0447\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u044e \u043e\u0441\u0456\u0431). 23.  On 10 September 2002 police investigators from Ivanivka, Berezivka, and several other districts conducted on-site examinations of the damaged houses in Petrivka (which included the taking of fingerprints). A regional police investigator conducted further on-site examinations in December 2002 and January 2003. 24.  On 12 September 2002 it was decided to constitute an investigative team composed of a senior investigator from the regional police department and investigators and other police officers from the Ivanivka district and three other districts. 25.  From 12 September to 9 October 2002 the regional police investigator obtained a number of expert opinions concerning the material found on the scene (notably assessing the damage there). 26.  On 20 September 2002 an officer of the Ivanivka police questioned neighbours of some of the applicants. Those neighbours stated that on the night of the attack they had seen around 150 and 300 people near the applicants\u2019 houses. 27.  From 23 September 2002 to 27 January 2003 at least sixty village residents, including O.\u041c. and P.M. (who were later accused by the applicants\u2019 representative Ms Duducehava of having a role in the attack \u2011 see paragraph 36 below), were questioned by the police \u2013 four of them by Ivanivka police officers and the rest by the regional police investigator. The villagers generally stated that there had long been tensions in the village between the Roma and non-Roma populations (many mentioning that this was connected with the alleged involvement of Roma residents in the drug trade), and that on the night of 9 September 2002 several hundred individuals had ransacked the houses of the Roma residents. This had been done to ensure that Roma would be expelled from the village. Some expressed approval of the attackers\u2019 actions (as having been triggered by the authorities\u2019 inaction against the drug trafficking), but denied that they had personally taken part in the attack. 28.  The police also questioned a number of applicants, who gave statements largely consistent with the account of events set out in paragraphs 7-17 above. 29.  On 14 November 2002 a certain Mr V. \u2013 apparently a Roma and a Petrivka resident at the time \u2013 was questioned. He stated that on 9 September he had been called in to Ivanivka district police station and told that residents of Petrivka would be attacking Roma houses. Upon learning this, he returned to the village and helped to evacuate his family, as well as other Roma residents, to another village. 30.  The police recognised the applicants listed in the Appendix as having the official status of aggrieved parties or of civil claimants (see paragraphs 53 and 54 below). 31.  In January 2003 (in the summary provided by the Government the relevant dates seem to be misstated as being in January 2002 and January 2007) the regional police investigator questioned three officers of the \u201cBerkut\u201d special police unit. They stated that about 2,000 persons had participated in the pogrom. They had asked the officers not to interfere in their actions. They had entered the houses and asked the individuals there not to resist and to leave. 32.  In February 2003 the police obtained an expert opinion in an attempt to identify the voices on a video cassette. It appears that the video cassette contained a recording of a meeting of village residents held before the pogrom. The expert concluded that no voice could be identified owing to the poor quality of the recording. 33.  On 4 February 2003 the police suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 17 February 2003 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered that it be resumed. 34.  On 20 February 2003 the Ivanivsky district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe DPO\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the village council\u2019s officials for lack of constituent elements of a crime in their actions. 35.  On 1 April 2003 the regional police investigator suspended it again. 36.  On 27 February 2005 Ms Duducehava, the chairperson of Romani Zbora, an NGO, wrote to the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office asking it to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had participated in the attack and the officials who had allowed it. Specifically, she named Mr O.M., Mr P.M. and Mr I.D., all of whom, she alleged, had incited the attack; she named M.S., the chairman of the village council, and O.V., the head of the district police department, as being among the officials who had allowed it. She named the first fifteen and the seventeenth to nineteenth applicants as persons whose property had been damaged, summarising their statements to her (see, in particular, paragraph 13 above). 37.  On 28 March 2005 the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed Ms Duducehava that an investigation into disorderly conduct had been initiated and suspended on 1 April 2003 but that operational measures were being taken to identify the perpetrators (see paragraph 58 below for a summary description of the legislative framework in respect of such measures). Twenty-three individuals, including those whose statements had been added to Ms Duducehava\u2019s complaint, had been recognised as aggrieved parties or civil claimants. Concerning the failure of the police to prevent the disorderly conduct in question, the head of the Regional Police had imposed disciplinary sanctions on the police officers at fault. 38.  On 21 November 2005 Mr I. Stoyanov, a lawyer representing a number of the applicants, complained to the President of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General that the crime committed had been incorrectly classified as merely disorderly conduct, even though it could be characterised as an act of discrimination and mass disorder. The identity of the guilty parties was well known. 39.  On 31 December 2005 the head of the regional police informed Mr Stoyanov that the investigation had been suspended on 1 April 2003 and that the regional prosecutor\u2019s office had examined the case and left the decision to suspend it in force. 40.  On 25 January 2006 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov of the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the village officials (see paragraph 34 above) and stated that Mr Stoyanov could obtain information about the situation in the hooliganism case from the regional police, who were in charge of it. 41.  On 27 January 2006 the Ivanivka district police took over the investigation in respect of the hooliganism case and decided to resume it. On 5 April 2006 they suspended it again. 42.  On 22 August 2008 Mr Stoyanov wrote to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office asking to be informed about the progress of the operational measures to identify the perpetrators and to be allowed to study the case file. 43.  On 25 September 2008 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov that the investigation had been lawfully suspended and that the aggrieved parties could only examine the case file once the investigation had been completed. 44.  The applicants submitted a copy of a letter from the district police dated 13 July 2009 addressed to Mr Stoyanov. The letter informed Mr Stoyanov, in response to his query, that on 10 February 2009 the investigation had been renewed and on 2 March 2009 suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. No reason for the alleged renewal was mentioned. The Government argued that the letter was not genuine (see paragraphs 88 to 91 below). 45.  On 21 March 2003 the Ivanivskyy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), having heard an appeal by the DPO, quashed the village council\u2019s decision of 9 September 2002 on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution and had been taken under the pressure exerted by a crowd of angry villagers in order to calm them down and prevent the lynching of the Roma. 46.  On 23 December 2005 the applicants (except the fourth and sixteenth) lodged with the District Court a civil claim for damages against the District Administration and the village council. 47.  On 23 November 2007 the District Court rejected the applicants\u2019 claim, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the Odessa District Administrative Court. No appeal was lodged. 48.  On 3 May 2007 the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants lodged a claim seeking to have the failure of the DPO and the district police to investigate the incident declared unlawful. 49.  On 9 February 2008 the Odessa Circuit Administrative Court rejected the claim without considering it on the merits, holding that it fell outside the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. On 17 March 2008 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal upheld this ruling. 50.  On 5 June 2008 the District Court initiated proceedings concerning the claim brought by the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants under the Code of Criminal Procedure in which they challenged the decision to suspend the investigation. On 19 August 2008 and 8 April 2009 Mr Stoyanov lodged additional complaints on behalf of the first to third, sixth to fifteenth and seventeenth to nineteenth applicants in these proceedings. In those complaints, they stated that they had never been questioned and had never been recognised as aggrieved parties (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043f\u0456\u043b\u0456). They asked the court to order the police to recognise them as such. According to the applicants, at the time of the application to the European Court of Human Rights the proceedings were still pending before the District Court and no decision had been made.", "references": ["2", "7", "3", "6", "5", "0", "No Label", "8", "1", "4", "9"], "gold": ["8", "1", "4", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company, Narodni List d.d., is a joint stock company incorporated under Croatian law which has its registered office in Zadar. It was the publisher of a weekly magazine, Narodni List. 6.  On the morning of 23 November 2006 Ms Z.S.-K., who was at the time a judge of the Zadar Municipal Court, reported to the police Mr A.M., a photojournalist at Narodni List, claiming that on that same morning he had secretly been taking photos of her in front of the Municipal Court building. He was immediately brought in for questioning by the police, after which he was released. He defended himself by saying that he had been photographing the court building and the court employees under the instructions of his editor-in-chief. On the same day Ms Z.S.-K. lodged a criminal complaint against the journalist in question, stating that he had committed the criminal offence of making an unauthorised recording, as defined in Article 131 of the Criminal Code. 7.  The day after, on 24 November 2006, the police again questioned A.M., after which they lodged a criminal complaint against him with the Zadar Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zadru). On the same day, at the request of the police, the investigating judge of the Zadar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zadru), Mr B.B., issued a warrant for police to search through the camera used by A.M. and through Narodni List\u2019s computers with a view to finding photographs of Ms Z.S.-K. During the search, which was carried out on the same day between 2.45 p.m. and 4.05 p.m. on the applicant company\u2019s premises, seven police officers in the presence of two witnesses inspected the camera in question and seven computers belonging to the company. They found no photos of Ms Z.S.-K. 8.  On the same day, 24 November 2006, a web portal, Index, reported on the search of Narodni List\u2019s premises. The short article implicitly criticised the search by noting that Judge Z.S.-K. had lodged a criminal complaint against the photojournalist, A.M., for the \u201calleged\u201d unauthorised recording, and ironically referring to that journalist as a \u201cdangerous suspect\u201d. On the same day that web portal also published a statement by the chairman of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, \u017d.P., who expressed his organisation\u2019s support for Narodni List and stated that the photojournalist had been taking photographs in a public place, which was not against the law. He added that what was going on was \u201ctotally crazy\u201d, that whoever went along with the criminal complaint against A.M. was \u201cnot in his right mind\u201d (nije pri sebi), and that the entire topic was \u201ctoo stupid\u201d to warrant any discussion. The next day Index published a commentary defending freedom of the press and criticising the conduct of the police and judicial authorities in the matter. The article was accompanied by two photographs of the building in which another municipal and county court were located. By publishing those photographs the portal satirically expressed its support for A.M. by joining him, as ironically stated in the article, in his seditious and \u201csubversive actions\u201d of photographing court buildings. 9.  In the absence of incriminating evidence, on 12 December 2006 the Zadar Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office dismissed the criminal complaint against A.M. 10.  Almost two years later, Judge B.B., who had issued the warrant to search the applicant company\u2019s premises, attended the opening of another newspaper in Zadar started by Mr S., a controversial local entrepreneur. The judge thereby again caught the attention of the journalists of Narodni List. 11.  On 31 October 2008 Narodni List published a small article on page three entitled \u201cJudge B. should be put in the pillory\u201d (Suca B. treba prikovati na stup sramote)\u201d[1]. The article, featuring a photo of Judge B., read as follows:\n\u201cJudge of the Zadar County Court B.B. came to congratulate S. on starting a daily newspaper. Even though that is not allowed under [...] the Code of Judicial Ethics because of the potential conflict of interest, B. nevertheless stopped by for a drink with his acquaintance from old times. B.\u2019s arrival would have gone unnoticed had this judge not become \u2018famous\u2019 [even] outside Croatia\u2019s borders by illegally signing a warrant to search [the premises of] Narodni List. On the basis of that authorisation a herd of policemen raided [the premises of] Narodni List looking for photos of his colleague, Judge S.-K. That [set] a precedent unknown in western democracies.\nWhat B. is doing in journalistic circles is known only to the crew around S. In the western world journalists put such judges in the pillory.\u201d 12.  Judge B.B. asked the newspaper to publish an apology but it refused to do so. 13.  On 26 November 2008 the judge brought a civil action for defamation against the applicant company before the Benkovac Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Benkovcu), seeking 50,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the article constituted an open invitation to lynch him and that it had harmed his reputation in that it called into question his moral and professional integrity by insinuating that he had broken the law while exercising his duties as a judge. Throughout the proceedings the applicant company was represented by Mr V.\u0160. (see paragraphs 25, 28-29 below). 14.  By a judgment of 10 March 2010 the Municipal Court ruled for the plaintiff and ordered the applicant company to pay him HRK 50,000[2] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the form of his tarnished reputation, as well as HRK 6,005[3] with respect to costs of proceedings. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIt is undisputed between the parties that the impugned text constitutes a value judgment ...\n...\nSection 21(1) of the Media Act prescribes that a publisher who causes damage to another person by [publishing] information in the media is obliged to compensate [that person], except in cases prescribed by the same Act (section 21(4)).\n...\n... this court finds that the defendant [company], as the publisher, ... by publishing the impugned text entitled \u2018Judge B. should be put in the pillory\u2019 and the [accompanying] photo of the plaintiff, exceeded the bounds of the freedom to publish information, to the prejudice of the plaintiff. [By publishing that information the defendant company], without [presenting] valid arguments, and contrary to journalistic ethics, harmed the plaintiff\u2019s reputation, honour and dignity as an individual and as a judge of the Zadar County Court. [This court also finds] that the impugned damaging information does not constitute any [of the types of] information listed in section 21(4) of the Media Act. For these reasons the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained by the breach of his rights of personality [prava osobnosti] within the meaning of section 22(1) of the Media Act and section 1100(1) and (2) of the Obligations Act \u2013 that is to say to just financial compensation in the amount claimed by the action. When determining the level of just financial compensation the court, guided by the principle of proportionality, took into account the consequences of the defendant [company]\u2019s statements, which exceeded the bounds of acceptable criticism ...\u201d 15.  By a judgment of 3 December 2010 the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) dismissed an appeal by the applicant company and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final. The relevant part of the second-instance judgment reads as follows:\n\u201c... in its appellate arguments the defendant [company] actually states the reasons whereby it justifies the publication of the impugned article.\nHowever, there is no justification for it. Beginning with its headline (\u2018Judge B. should be put in the pillory\u2019) the impugned article does not use acceptable and normal ways of expression. In that sense the following statements are worth noting: \u2018B\u2019s arrival would have gone unnoticed had this judge not become \u2018famous\u2019 [even] outside Croatia\u2019s borders by illegally signing the warrant to search [the premises of] Narodni List\u2019 and \u2018What B. is doing in journalistic circles is known only to the crew around S. In the western world journalists put such judges in the pillory\u2019. [Those statements] represent a grave personal media attack on the plaintiff [aimed at] settling scores with [him] in a very rude way, because of [the defendant company\u2019s] dissatisfaction with a decision that the plaintiff adopted in the exercise of his duty as a judge. The article depicts the plaintiff as a person unworthy of judicial office and calls into question his professional competence ... The plaintiff\u2019s honour, reputation and dignity, and also his professional dignity, were thereby violated, which justifies awarding non-pecuniary damages in respect of a breach of his rights of personality.\n...\n... when publishing information containing value judgments, journalists are obliged to respect the dignity, honour and reputation of the person they write about and to avoid using insulting and demeaning expressions, because the publisher cannot escape liability for damages where ... a value judgment is expressed in an insulting manner.\u201d 16.  The applicant company then, on 16 February 2011, lodged a constitutional complaint alleging violations of its freedom of expression and its right to fair procedure, both guaranteed by the Constitution. It also relied on Article 10 of the Convention. 17.  By a decision of 19 October 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant company\u2019s constitutional complaint. It held that freedom of expression was not absolute and could be restricted for the protection of the dignity, reputation and honour of others, which rights were also guaranteed by the Constitution. In particular, the Constitutional Court held that the ordinary courts had correctly applied the relevant substantive law and given sufficient reasons for their judgments.", "references": ["1", "5", "2", "7", "0", "8", "9", "4", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Palaio Faliro. 6.  She has worked as a kindergarten teacher for the Greek Ministry of Education since 1983. On 23 August 2005, following her participation in a selection procedure, she was appointed educational coordinator of the Hellenic Republic at the General Consulate of Greece in Chicago for a period of two years. On 14 August 2007 the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs issued a decision informing all educational coordinators abroad of the end of their term of service. On the same date, the Minister of Education issued a decision informing the educational coordinators that they were to remain in their posts until the completion of the next selection procedure. The applicant\u2019s name was omitted from the second ministerial decision and the post of educational coordinator in Chicago remained vacant. She applied to have the decision annulled, which the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal agreed to do as the applicant had been omitted from the decision without any specific reasoning (decision no. 1363/2008). The applicant was therefore allowed to occupy the position until the successful completion of the next selection procedure. 7.  In the meantime, a call for applications for educational coordinators for the next two-year period was published on 27 November 2007. The applicant submitted an application. On 23 July 2008 the coordinators selection committee published a ranking of candidates in which the applicant, having received 48.00 points, was placed 13th among those who had chosen French as their foreign language. On 22 August 2008 the Official Gazette (\u0395\u03c6\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u039a\u03c5\u03b2\u03b5\u03c1\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2) published a decision by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education to appoint the candidates who had been selected. The applicant was not included. That decision was revoked and replaced with a ministerial decision dated 29 August 2008 including the same content. 8.  On 24 September 2008 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the ministerial decisions of 22 and 29 August 2008 on appointing the selected educational coordinators with the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal in so far as she had been omitted. The applicant complained that the ranking had not been published in the Official Gazette, as required by law, and that she had been erroneously awarded fewer points than she should have had. 9.  On 16 July 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative requested that the court accelerate proceedings, arguing that an educational coordinator\u2019s term of appointment lasted two years and that the contested administrative act would soon expire. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 13 November 2009, but was adjourned to 5 March 2010. 10.  On 3 February 2010 the applicant submitted additional grounds of annulment. The 5 March 2010 hearing was adjourned to 4 June 2010 as the Ministry had not provided the court with its submissions regarding the additional grounds for annulment. On 27 May 2010 the applicant sent a memorandum to the Court, requesting that the case be heard speedily, adding that an eventual discontinuation of the trial would violate her rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the hearing was again adjourned owing to the Ministry\u2019s failure to provide submissions. Adjournments took place on 4 June, 17 September and on 8 October 2010. On 26 October 2010, the Ministry sent its observations to the court, and a hearing took place on 10 December 2010, when the two-year term for educational coordinators and the contested ministerial decision had already expired. 11.  On 13 December 2010 the applicant submitted a memorandum requesting that the examination of her application for annulment be continued despite the expiry of the administrative act, arguing that she had special locus standi to continue to pursue the annulment process. In particular, she argued that if the contested act was annulled she would be credited with two more years of experience, which would improve her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure. 12.  On 16 March 2011 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal published decision no. 508/2011 rejecting the applicant\u2019s arguments. As regards her first reason for continuing the proceedings, it held that she had already been awarded the maximum number of points allowed by law for experience abroad. As regards her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure, the domestic court held that that was not a lawful reason to continue the procedure in court, because it concerned an uncertain, future administrative procedure. Based on the above and on domestic law, the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal held that there was no need to adjudicate, on the grounds that the contested act was no longer in force (decision). As regards the applicant\u2019s arguments that the eventual rejection of her application would violate Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the domestic court held that the provision of Article 32 \u00a7 2 of Presidential decree no. 18/1989 served the legal aim of avoiding any unnecessary trials. The individual who had lodged the application was no longer in need of judicial protection as the contested act no longer had any unfavourable consequences. Having also regard to the possibility provided for by law to continue the trial if the individual could prove that he or she still suffered from unfavourable consequences that could be removed only by the annulment of the contested act, the right to judicial protection remained intact.", "references": ["9", "5", "2", "8", "1", "0", "4", "6", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in the village of Akhaldaba. 6.  On 16 August 2004 the applicant and two other men (\u201cthe brothers\u201d) were arrested on identical charges of aggravated murder and illegal manufacturing, possession, and carrying of firearms. 7.  The charges against the applicant and the brothers were based on a statement given by the victim\u2019s father, Mr V.N., who claimed to have witnessed the crime, and on other evidence, namely a hand grenade seized from the brothers\u2019 home, as well as several forensic reports. 8.  According to Mr V.N., there was a long-running dispute between his family and the respective families of the applicant and the brothers. On two occasions, one two years earlier and the second earlier that year, the three accused attempted to rob and threaten his family, but he chose not to notify the police. Early in the morning on 14 August 2004, Mr V.N. went to work on a farm near the village and was later joined by his son. At the time of the murder, at about 10 a.m., he was working in the farmhouse while his son was outside. As he heard a gunshot, he rushed to the window and saw his son lying on the ground, about forty to forty-five metres from the building. One of the accused was holding a gun, while his brother and the applicant were shouting at him to fire another shot, which he did. The three men then ran off. Mr V.N. first ran up to his son, whose body was shaking, and then ran home to bring his car back to help him. Once he got home, he took out a gun. At that moment he was visited by his neighbours, who told him the news about his son\u2019s death. Mr V.N. did not tell the visitors that he had been at the crime scene and witnessed his son\u2019s murder, or that he knew anything about the shooting. He drove them to the farmhouse to see his son\u2019s body and once there started claiming that the brothers and the applicant had killed him, without mentioning that he had witnessed the crime. It appears that he later told the police that he had witnessed the crime. 9.  Three witnesses, a father and son \u2013 Mr M.M. senior and Mr M.M. junior, and Mr S.P., testified that they lived in the same village, knew the victim\u2019s family, and on the morning of 14 August 2004 had also been working on the farm, around two hundred metres from the crime scene. None of them had seen the victim\u2019s father at the farm either before the murder or immediately after. According to them, however, the victim passed by their plot at around 9 a.m. and they heard shots after about fifteen to twenty minutes. They rushed to the crime scene and found the victim dead. Mr M.M. senior sent his son to notify Mr V.N. of the murder. Mr M.M. junior was joined by Mr D.M., Mr V.N.\u2019s neighbour, along the way. They found Mr V.N. at home. On hearing the news, Mr V.N. took his car and drove Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. to the crime scene, without mentioning that he had witnessed the murder, or that he knew anything about it. Once Mr V.N. arrived at the crime scene, he started blaming the brothers and the applicant, without mentioning that he had personally witnessed the crime. 10.  According to several witness statements, the applicant was seen in the village sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. Ms T.M. said that she had seen him in her yard at 9.10 a.m. Mr D.K. stated that he had seen him in Ms T.M.\u2019s yard on the morning of 14 August 2004, without specifying the exact time. Mr G.G. could recall seeing him in the village shop sometime between 10 and 11 a.m. He stated that the shop was located approximately two kilometres from the crime scene. The shopkeeper stated that the applicant had spent about two to three hours in the shop, without specifying the exact time. The applicant had allegedly heard the news about the murder while there. He was not with the brothers at the time. 11.  A forensic biological examination report (no. 140/162) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic Centre of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs between 2 September and 22 October 2004 provided an analysis of bloodstains found on the trousers of one of the brothers. The blood was of type AB (II), the same as that of the victim, while the owner of the trousers had blood type AB (IV). 12.  A forensic soil examination report (no. 1700/10) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic and Special Research Centre of the Ministry of Justice between 7 September and 6 October 2004 provided an analysis of soil found on the brothers\u2019 shoes in relation to soil at and around the crime scene. It found that the traces of soil on the brothers\u2019 shoes seized from their home had the same characteristics as the soil at the crime scene. 13.  On 8 May 2006 the Tbilisi Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The brothers were convicted of aggravated murder and illegal possession of firearms, and were sentenced to seventeen and sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. 14.  The first-instance court fully relied on Mr V.N.\u2019s statement (see paragraph 8 above). It accordingly found that the ongoing dispute between the three men and the victim and his family had been the underlying cause of the crime. It continued to note that at around 10 a.m., the applicant and the brothers had gone to the victim\u2019s farm and killed him with a gun. After one of the accused fired the first shot, his brother and the applicant shouted at him to shoot again, which he did. The gun was never recovered. In addition, the court relied on the forensic biological examination (see paragraph 11 above) and forensic soil examination (see paragraph 12 above), and other forensic evidence such as a forensic examination of the victim\u2019s body and of the hand grenade, without elaborating on their relevance to the applicant\u2019s conviction. 15.  The applicant\u2019s argument that he had an alibi for the presumed time of the crime in the light of the statements given by some of the defence witnesses (see paragraph 10 above) was dismissed by the court. It noted that the statements in question were inconsistent, contradictory and aimed at shielding the accused from criminal responsibility. 16.  On 13 June 2006 only the applicant appealed against the judgment of 8 May 2006. He emphasised that unlike his co-accused, no piece of forensic evidence available in the criminal case file implicated him personally in the crime. He argued that the only piece of evidence connecting him to the murder was the eyewitness statement given by the victim\u2019s father. However, it was doubtful whether the latter had even been at the crime scene, given the evident contradictions between his account and the statements given by witnesses M.M. junior and D.M., that they had found him at home shortly after the murder, and that he had not mentioned having witnessed the crime, despite having gone with them to the crime scene to verify the tragic news (see paragraph 9 above). He argued that Mr V.N.\u2019s version that he had gone home after having witnessed his son\u2019s murder without notifying anyone and without telling Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. that he had been at the crime scene, without any other evidence corroborating his account, created serious doubts as to the veracity of his claim to have witnessed the event. The applicant further claimed to have an alibi to the effect that he had been seen alone in the centre of the village around the time of the murder, and noted that Mr V.N. might have been implicating him out of revenge. He argued that given the lack of any response to his main arguments, the conviction rendered by the first-instance court had relied on a mere doubt devoid of any evidence, in violation of Article 503 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below). 17.  On 21 September 2006 the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of second and final instance, held a hearing and upheld the lower court\u2019s verdict. It reasoned that the lower court had acted in full compliance with Article 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below) and had assessed the factual circumstances of the case fully and objectively. In upholding the lower court\u2019s verdict, the Supreme Court fully relied on the statement of the victim\u2019s father, the statements of the other witnesses who were told by him that the applicant had killed his son, and the forensic evidence, without addressing any of the applicant\u2019s arguments, including that none of the cited evidence had implicated him, and that the lower court had failed to address his arguments in that regard. 18.  On an unspecified date in May 2016 the applicant was released from prison. 19.  On 19 September 2004 the applicant was remanded in custody and placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. He was allegedly held in an overcrowded cell, had to take turns with other prisoners to sleep, and was unable to shower for months. The toilet in the cell was not separated from the living area. He also alleged that there were rodents in his cell. 20.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi Prison no. 1. According to him, the conditions there were identical. 21.  On 31 March 2006 he was transferred from Tbilisi Prison no. 1 to the newly built Rustavi Prison no. 6. 22.  On 16 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 2. During his time there, he was allegedly exposed to harmful emissions from a nearby concrete factory. It does not appear that he complained to the prison authorities about any aspect of his detention conditions. 23.  On 6 April 2007 the applicant was returned to Rustavi Prison no. 6. He stayed at that prison until his transfer to the prison hospital on 11 January 2009 (see paragraph 27 below). 24.  It does not transpire from the case file that the applicant raised any concerns before the prison administration or any domestic authority about the conditions of his detention in any of the penal institutions referred to above. 25.  Upon the applicant\u2019s readmission to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 6 April 2007 (see paragraph 23 above), he underwent a standard medical examination upon entry and was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia but was not prescribed any treatment. It does not appear that the applicant lodged any complaints in that respect. 26.  On 23 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Department of Prisons, apparently for the first time, about headaches, and requested to have a medical examination administered in that regard. On 17 December 2008, in view of the applicant\u2019s complaint that the Government had allegedly left his medical complaints \u2013 including those concerning headaches \u2013 unaddressed, the President of the Section decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to implement all necessary measures to assess his state of health. It transpires from the information submitted by the Government that on 28 July 2008 the applicant was consulted by a neurologist concerning the headaches. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia, hypertensive hydrocephaly syndrome, and post-traumatic brain condition, and the relevant treatment was prescribed. The applicant complained again about headaches on 18 September and 11 November 2008. The applicant\u2019s submissions dated 29 January 2009 revealed that he had been seen by a neurologist on an unspecified date in October 2008. As regards the complaint of 11 November 2008, no immediate reaction followed from the authorities. On 14 January 2009, the applicant was consulted by a neurologist and a skull X-ray was carried out. The neurologist concluded that no pathological signs could be observed and prescribed treatment for the applicant\u2019s headache. No complaints regarding headaches appear to have been raised following that date. As regards the other health-related complaints, on 28 October 2008 the applicant was examined and diagnosed with a chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. On 19 November 2008 an ultrasound exam was performed which confirmed the diagnosis of the chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. The relevant treatment was prescribed. The interim measure was lifted on 8 February 2012. 27.  On 11 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital, where he underwent a series of examinations and tests. On 16 January 2009, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. On the same day, he was put on a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short course) programme, the strategy for the detection and treatment of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organisation. 28.  On 12 February 2009 the applicant was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. 29.  On 9 July 2009 he was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 1 and on 21 September 2009 successfully finished his treatment in the framework of the DOTS programme.", "references": ["7", "4", "0", "9", "8", "2", "5", "6", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1974. He is currently serving a life sentence in Marche-en-Famenne prison (Belgium). 9.  The applicant was arrested on 17 December 2007 by the French gendarmerie in a village situated in the French d\u00e9partement of Nord and taken into police custody under a European arrest warrant issued against him on 14 November 2007 by an investigating judge of the Charleroi (Belgium) Court of First Instance, on the basis of a request of 6 November 2007 from the Crown Prosecutor attached to that court. 10.  The warrant stated that the applicant was wanted for the premeditated murder of his former girlfriend, M.B., committed on 5 November 2007. The warrant stated that a witness who was a neighbour of M.B. had formally identified the applicant. It also referred to a risk of reoffending in view of his history of violence. 11.  The interview record drawn up by the French gendarmes at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest on 17 December 2007 indicated that he had waived his right under Article 63-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure to consult with a lawyer of his choosing or, failing that, officially assigned counsel. 12.  In a judgment of 21 December 2007, the Investigation Division of the Court of Appeal of Douai (France), after acknowledging that the applicant had not renounced his entitlement to the rule of speciality[1], ordered his surrender to the Belgian judicial authorities for the execution of the above\u2011mentioned arrest warrant. The applicant was assisted before the Investigation Division by a lawyer, Ms A., of the Douai Bar. 13.  Having been surrendered to the Belgian authorities at 10.40 a.m. on 31 December 2007, the applicant was interviewed by the criminal investigation police from 11.50 a.m. to 3.55 p.m. 14.  As shown by the police interview record, in accordance with Article 47bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (code d\u2019instruction criminelle) (see paragraphs 62-65 below), the applicant was notified that he was entitled to request the verbatim transcription of all the questions put to him and his answers, to request any investigative act or the conducting of any interview, and that his statements could be used in evidence. 15.  During that first interview, the applicant explained that he had met M.B. in early 2007 through C.L., his then girlfriend. He admitted that he had been present on 5 November 2007 at the scene of the crime but denied having committed the murder. He claimed that the victim, M.B., had been struck with a hammer by her thirteen-year-old son. He explained that he had intervened and grabbed the hammer from the child, but the latter had continued to hit his mother. The applicant stated that he had left with an axe \u2013 which the police had later found near the scene \u2013 because he was afraid of being accused on account of his criminal record. He explained that he had fled the scene and had been hiding in his car when the emergency services arrived. He stated that he was unaware that the victim was dead. 16.  During the interview the applicant was also questioned about a statement made to the police by M.B. on 25 October 2007 according to which the applicant had tried to kill her by running her over. The applicant explained that he had accidentally skidded while driving his car and had probably hit M.B., but denied that his intention had been to kill her as she had alleged. 17.  The investigators informed the applicant that they had intercepted a number of text messages that had been sent to relatives of M.B., following her death, from a mobile phone belonging to him. Those messages included one offering condolences for the death of M.B. The applicant denied having sent them himself. 18.  The applicant\u2019s detailed statements were taken down by the police in an eight-page record. The record indicated at the very end that following the interview the applicant had read over his statements and had not wished to correct them or add to them. 19.  All subsequent records of his statements contained the same indications and were signed by the applicant. Except for the first police interview record, of which a copy was given to him after his examination by the investigating judge later that day, the applicant received his copies immediately after being questioned. 20.  Following his interview by the criminal investigation police, the applicant was examined by the investigating judge at the Charleroi Court of First Instance at 4.45 p.m. that day. He confirmed his statements to the investigating judge. 21.  On being asked by the investigating judge at the beginning of the examination whether he had chosen a lawyer, the applicant answered in the negative. At the end of the interview record it was stated:\n\u201cI (the investigating judge) have notified him that I have informed the deputy to the Chair of the Bar Council, given that, at the current stage of the proceedings, he has not appointed counsel.\u201d 22.  Following the investigating judge\u2019s examination, which finished at 5.42 p.m., the judge observed that a psychiatrist needed to be called immediately. He formally charged the applicant with the premeditated murder of M.B. An arrest warrant was issued to the applicant on the same day and he was remanded in custody. 23.  It is not in dispute that the applicant was not allowed to communicate with a lawyer between the time of his surrender to the Belgian authorities and the end of his period in police custody on 31 December 2007. He was only allowed to consult with a lawyer, in accordance with the applicable law, once the decision had been taken by the investigating judge to remand him in custody (see paragraphs 21 above and 55-56 below). Moreover, even though he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer during the judicial pre-trial investigation, that lawyer did not attend the police interviews, examinations by the investigating judge or other investigative acts which took place throughout that phase of the proceedings (see paragraph 59 below). 24.  On 11 January 2008 the applicant was again interviewed by the criminal investigation police. He confirmed his previous statements about M.B.\u2019s death and provided further particulars about what had happened. The applicant stated that he had indeed seen a person passing by in the street who had witnessed the blows inflicted by the victim\u2019s son, and that this witness had been accompanied by a woman, and he admitted to having threatened the witness with a fake gun that had subsequently been found in his car after his arrest. When the officers pointed out the inconsistencies in his account, the applicant acknowledged that he had been carrying a real gun at the time but continued to deny that he was the murderer. 25.  There is no indication in the interview record of 11 January 2008, or elsewhere in the file, that the applicant had actually been assigned a lawyer following the notification to the Bar on 31 December 2007, or that he had been in contact with a lawyer prior to that interview. 26.  In parallel to the investigation into the murder of M.B., the applicant was interviewed by the police on four occasions between 6 and 7 March 2008 for \u201ccriminal association\u201d in respect of car thefts. 27.  When examined again by the investigating judge on 17 March 2008, the judge asked the applicant if he had chosen a lawyer. He replied in the affirmative and mentioned that he had been in contact with a lawyer at the Brussels Bar. The applicant was informed that the psychiatric assessment had been received and that it had identified an antisocial personality disorder. When questioned about the facts related to M.B.\u2019s murder, the applicant confessed to having stolen a document from the case file, although the authorities had been unaware of this. Subsequently, having repeated that the perpetrator of M.B.\u2019s murder was her son, the applicant changed his account of the events. He mentioned the presence of C.L. at the scene of the crime at the time when M.B. was attacked. He explained that he had witnessed an argument between the two women and that he had had to wrest a hammer from C.L.\u2019s hands. 28.  On 25 March 2008 the criminal investigation police interviewed the applicant for the purposes of a morality and personality assessment. A second police interview was held on the same day concerning bodily harm inflicted on C.L. on 17 September 2007. The applicant acknowledged that he had invited C.L., then pregnant, to get into his car. He stated that he had punched C.L. in the face to \u201cprotect\u201d her from a possible encounter with M.B. that had been planned with the aim of stealing the latter\u2019s mobile phone and bank card. He explained that M.B., with the help of an accomplice, had then pushed C.L. into the canal. 29.  A neuropsychological assessment of the applicant was carried out on 28 April 2008 and sent to the investigating judge. The expert psychologist concluded that the applicant had limited verbal skills but that his reasoning was not abnormal. The expert also highlighted his significant lack of empathy and sociability. 30.  On 6 June 2008 a reconstruction of the events of 5 November 2007 was held at the scene of the crime. The two eyewitnesses took part in the reconstruction (see paragraphs 10 and 24 above). The applicant\u2019s lawyer was absent, as the law did not provide for the attendance of a lawyer at any investigative act (see paragraph 59 below). In the context of the reconstruction, the applicant mentioned when interviewed that another person, A.N., had also been at the scene on the day in question. He changed his version of events again and stated that he had falsely accused the victim\u2019s son. He claimed that the fatal blows had in fact been struck by C.L. and that he had fired a gun to intimidate C.L. 31.  During the interview conducted on the same day by the criminal investigation police, the applicant challenged the account given by the two eyewitnesses at the reconstruction and confirmed his new version of the facts. There is no evidence in the file that the applicant sought to communicate with his lawyer before or after the reconstruction or the interview of the same day. 32.  An arrest warrant was issued on 8 August 2008 extending the investigating judge\u2019s remit, on the basis of the submissions of the Crown Prosecutor dated 23 May 2008 and 7 July 2008, to three additional offences: the attempted murder of M.B. on 25 October 2007, and two offences committed on 17 September 2007 against C.L., namely robbery with violence or threats, and fraud. 33.  The applicant was examined on that subject by the investigating judge on 18 August 2008. The information provided for by Article 47bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 65 below) was repeated to him; he was also notified of his right to refuse the extension of the charges and to consult with his lawyer on this matter beforehand. The record of the examination shows that he agreed to the extension, thereby renouncing his entitlement to the speciality rule that had been granted by the French authorities (see paragraph 12 above). He also expressed his wish that his lawyer should confirm his position. 34.  On 5 December 2008 the applicant was heard by the Crown Prosecutor as to whether he agreed to the extension of the charges. He replied that he wished to consult with his lawyer on this matter. 35.  Acknowledging that the applicant had not ultimately given his consent, in a judgment of 13 January 2009 the Investigation Division of the Douai Court of Appeal agreed to extend his surrender for the purposes of a criminal prosecution to the three above-mentioned additional charges. 36.  At the close of the judicial investigation stage, the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Assize Court of Hainaut Province by a judgment of 31 August 2009 of the Indictment Division (chambre des mises en accusation) of the Mons Court of Appeal. The Indictment Division found that there were serious indications of the applicant\u2019s guilt in the light, principally, of the witness statements, the investigators\u2019 findings, the real evidence gathered and the forensic medical and psychiatric assessments. 37.  At the start of the trial in the Assize Court, on 1 February 2010, the applicant, assisted by his Belgian counsel, filed a submission in which he requested that the records of the interviews conducted without legal assistance and the ensuing acts should be annulled and that the prosecution case should be declared inadmissible. He argued that his lack of access to a lawyer while in police custody, on 31 December 2007, and during the subsequent interviews and examinations had entailed a breach of an essential formal requirement directly affecting his defence rights and thus irretrievably vitiating the arrest warrant. The applicant complained that the absence of a lawyer had necessarily caused him damage. 38.  Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law and in particular the judgments in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008) and Dayanan v. Turkey (no. 7377/03, 13 October 2009), the applicant submitted that it laid down an absolute principle not allowing for any case-specific assessment, given that the restriction arising from Belgian law was one of a general and mandatory nature, and that Belgian law did not meet the requirements of the Convention in such matters. 39.  The Assize Court, in an interlocutory judgment of the same day, dismissed the applicant\u2019s plea to dismiss the prosecution case. It began by pointing out that the Court\u2019s case-law did not guarantee, in an absolute manner, the presence of a lawyer at all stages of the criminal proceedings from the first interview onwards and that the Court had emphasised the need to take account of the proceedings as a whole when assessing whether the right to a fair trial had been upheld. It explained that, in principle, defence rights would be irretrievably affected only where incriminating statements were made. The Assize Court further found that courts had no power to substitute their own solutions for those of the legislature in order to make good the shortcomings complained of by the applicant. 40.  As to the consequences of the Court\u2019s case-law for the proceedings in the present case, the Assize Court took the view that, in respect of the French part of the proceedings, the applicant had initially waived his right to legal assistance. Later, before the Investigation Division of the Douai Court of Appeal he had been assisted by a lawyer. The Assize Court dismissed his allegation of pressure by the French gendarmes on the grounds that in one of his interviews (namely in the context of the reconstruction of 6 June 2008 referred to in paragraph 30 above) the applicant had given a different explanation as to why he had falsely accused the victim\u2019s son, allegedly under duress, at the time of his arrest. 41.  As to the Belgian part of the proceedings, the Assize Court found that the applicant had not incriminated himself in respect of the charges, had not claimed that he had been put under any pressure by the investigators, had not been interviewed in a state of particular vulnerability, had expressed himself freely on the facts and had not in any way been compelled to incriminate himself, even being able to exercise his right to remain silent. The applicant had been able to confer with his lawyer after each police interview and examination by the investigating judge to discuss his defence and had been afforded every opportunity to consult with his lawyer throughout the investigation stage. He had also been able, for the two years of his pre-trial detention, to prepare his defence with his lawyer every time he had appeared before the pre-trial courts (juridictions d\u2019instruction), but he had failed, on those occasions, to mention the omission of which he later complained in the Assize Court. 42.  Furthermore, the Assize Court noted that the applicant had been committed to stand trial before it in the light of indications of guilt which stemmed primarily from material other than his own statements (see paragraph 36 above) and that he had availed himself of the right to request the performance of additional investigative acts. After pointing out that the jury\u2019s inner conviction was formed during the oral proceedings before it, the Assize Court concluded that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had been observed and that there was no reason to declare the interview/examination records or prosecution invalid. It therefore declared the prosecution case admissible and ordered that the proceedings be continued. 43.  The bill of indictment drawn up by the Principal Crown Prosecutor on 23 November 2009 was read out at the hearing in the Assize Court. Containing twenty-one pages, it set out the facts and how they had occurred, the investigative acts and their results, and the forensic medical assessments, together with the applicant\u2019s background and family life. The indictment referred to the particulars that had been acknowledged by the applicant (his presence at the scene of M.B.\u2019s murder, the threatening of a witness and the fact that he had been alone with C.L. and had struck her). It also reproduced the various versions of the events that he had given during his police interviews and examinations by the investigating judge, explaining that those accounts were inconsistent with the investigators\u2019 factual findings and were contradicted by the various witness statements. 44.  At the close of the trial, on 9 February 2010, the jury found the applicant guilty, principally of the premeditated murder of M.B. on 5 November 2007 and of the attempted premeditated murder of C.L. on 17 September 2007. 45.  The jury\u2019s reasons were set out in the Assize Court\u2019s \u201creasoning judgment\u201d (arr\u00eat de motivation) of the same day. The relevant parts read as follows:\n\u201c... the main reasons for the decision given by the jury are as follows:\n\u2013 The first and second questions [concerning the murder of M.B. on 5 November 2007]\nThe jury considered decisive the consistent and mutually corroborative testimony of the youngsters who had seen only the defendant and the victim at the scene of the crime, without any other person being present, the threats previously made by the defendant against his victim and the various steps taken by Philippe Beuze (in particular the fact of hiding the axe in a bush) in preparation for the crime.\n\u2013 The third and fourth questions [concerning the attempted murder of M.B. on 25 October 2007]\n[Finding of not guilty]\n\u2013 The fifth and sixth questions [concerning the attempted murder of C.L. on 17 September 2007]\nThe jury found that the following evidence proved both the actual occurrence of the acts and the homicidal intention which had driven the defendant:\n\u2013 the defendant had deliberately arranged to be alone with a pregnant woman, whom he knew was thus placed in a weakened position;\n\u2013 he violently struck C.L., as shown by the medical findings, and left her for dead;\n\u2013 he then fled the scene without calling for help, even though he had the means to do so;\n\u2013 he subsequently sent text messages clearly showing his intention to kill C.L.\nThe jury also took the view that the acts committed by the defendant before going off towards the canal at the end of a long walk (simulation of a flat tyre, deliberate car crash, etc.) all constituted evidence of premeditation.\u201d 46.  In a sentencing judgment dated 10 February 2010, the Assize Court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 47.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Assize Court judgments of 1, 9 and 10 February 2010. Alleging a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, as interpreted in the Court\u2019s case-law, he relied on the right to be assisted by a lawyer and submitted that the presence of a lawyer during questioning was mandatory under the Convention. 48.  In a judgment of 26 May 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed that ground of appeal as follows:\n\u201c3.  Sections 1, 2, 16(2) and (4), and 20(1) of the Law of 20 July 1990 on pre\u2011trial detention do not provide for the presence of a lawyer to assist the person in police custody during the twenty-four hour period laid down by Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Constitution.\nThe secrecy imposed by Article 28quinquies, \u00a7 1, first paragraph, and Article 57 \u00a7 1, first paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure precludes, as a rule, the lawyer\u2019s attendance at acts performed during the preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor and the judicial pre-trial investigation. 4.  These provisions cannot be said in themselves to violate the right to a fair trial. There are two reasons for this. First, the impugned restriction must be assessed in relation to the full set of legal safeguards made available to the defendant with a view to ensuring the effective protection of his defence rights from the time the prosecution is brought. Secondly, the appellant\u2019s interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention must be examined with reference to the constitutional principle of the legality of criminal proceedings. 5.  In the light of the following elements, there can be no automatic finding that it is irretrievably impossible for a person questioned by the police and the investigating judge without a lawyer to have a fair trial: the formal requirements laid down for the questioning of a suspect in Article 47bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the brevity of the police custody period, the immediate issuance to the person charged (upon notification of the arrest warrant) of all the documents referred to in sections 16(7) and 18(2) of the Law of 20 July 1990, the right of the person charged to communicate immediately with his lawyer in accordance with section 20(1) and (5) of that Law, access to the file as governed by section 21(3) of the Law, the lawyer\u2019s presence at the recapitulatory examination provided for in section 22(1), (2) and (3), and the rights set forth, in particular, in Articles 61ter, 61quater, 61quinquies, 136 and 235bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6.  As a rule, Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Constitution does not allow the court to amend the formalities of criminal proceedings as laid down by the law of a democratic State. The only exception is where a domestic rule, if declared incompatible, may be set aside without distortion by the court of the legal framework of which it is part.\nOn account of its lack of precision, the weight that the appellant attaches to a fair trial cannot trump the above-mentioned principle of legality, whereby the investigation, prosecution and trial can only proceed in accordance with pre-existing and accessible statutes. The submission does not determine the extent to which the court should set aside the domestic statute in order to render the trial fair for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention according to its proposed evolutive interpretation.\nTherefore, neither the appellant nor the case-law on which he relies indicate clearly whether the trial would have been fair on the sole condition that the lawyer had been present during the police custody period or whether it would have been necessary to extend that assistance to all investigative acts.\nThe right to a fair trial also implies that none of the parties should be placed in a more favourable or less advantageous situation than that of another party. It cannot therefore be regarded as established that the proceedings submitted to the court\u2019s review would have been fairer, within the meaning of the appellant\u2019s submission, simply if a lawyer had been present at all his interviews, without an equivalent advantage being secured to the other parties. 7.  The submission that the alleged right of the accused is absolute in nature must accordingly be rejected, and it is necessary to consider in concrete terms whether, in the light of the proceedings taken as a whole, the matter complained of by the appellant may have vitiated those proceedings.\nThis does not appear to have been the case. As can be seen from the following findings of the judgment appealed against [of 1 February 2010]:\n(i)  the appellant made no self-incriminating statements while in police custody;\n(ii)  prior to his first interview by the French gendarmerie, he expressly waived the legal assistance to which he was entitled under Article 63-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure;\n(iii)  the appellant was assisted by a lawyer from the time of his appearance before the Investigation Division of the Douai Court of Appeal and for the two years of his pre-trial detention;\n(iv)  the appellant was at no point compelled to incriminate himself, and at all times expressed himself freely.\nThe Assize Court therefore acted within the law in refusing to declare the prosecution case inadmissible.\u201d", "references": ["2", "8", "1", "7", "6", "9", "4", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1977 and 1964, respectively, and live in Voronezh. 5.  The applicants are lawyers practicing in Russia. 6.  Between 2008 and 2010 the applicants, within the group of lawyers, consulted several municipal organisations about various legal issues and provided other legal service. However municipal organisations did not pay for the service and the applicants instituted proceedings seeking to recover the debt. 7.  On 22 June 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh granted the applicants claim against the municipal transport company and awarded them 40,020,000 Russian roubles. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. It appears that the judgment was executed at the expense of the municipal budget. 8.  On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor of the Voronezh Region applied to the district court for the extension of the time-limits for an ordinary appeal against the judgment of 22 June 2010. 9.  On 13 June 2013 the district court refused to extend the time-limits. The prosecutor appealed. 10.  On 8 August 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court quashed the decision of the district court and extended the time limit for an ordinary appeal. The court found that the public interest had been concerned as far as the judgment had been executed by means of the municipal budget. Thus the prosecutor had the right to lodge an appeal. 11.  On 12 November 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court granted the appeal lodged by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 22 June 2010 and ordered the reversal of execution. The judgment became final and was partially executed.", "references": ["0", "2", "7", "4", "5", "1", "9", "6", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Mu\u011fla. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought an enforcement order through a bailiff\u2019s office against her former husband, G.F., to collect alimony in arrears and accrued interest. 7.  On 9 March 2006 G.F. objected to that order by bringing a case against the applicant before the Dat\u00e7a Enforcement Court. He requested that the court declare the enforcement order null and void on the grounds that he had made the payments in question in full. 8.  In the first hearing G.F.\u2019s representative requested the court to take out an expert report to determine whether the payments he had made corresponded to the alleged debt. The court adjourned its examination on the question whether an expert report would be sought to a hearing to be held on 10 May 2006. 9.  In that hearing, the applicant\u2019s representative left it to the court\u2019s discretion for an expert to be appointed concerning the determination of the amounts that were already paid. The court therefore ruled for an expert to be appointed and scheduled another hearing for 7 June 2006. 10.  In the meantime, but before the hearing of 7 June 2006, the applicant\u2019s representative requested that he be excused from that hearing since he had another scheduled court hearing elsewhere. 11.  The court held the hearing as scheduled but noted that the applicant\u2019s representative was excused. In that hearing, the court noted that the expert report had been submitted in the case-file and read its contents out in the presence of G.F.\u2019s legal representative. The latter asked the court to rule in accordance with the findings in the expert report, which had concluded that all the relevant alimony payments had been made. The court scheduled a hearing for 21 June 2006 holding that the absent party be notified. 12.  On 21 June 2006, in its final hearing, the court ruled against the applicant on the basis of the expert report in question. Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at that hearing. There is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that suggests that the court examined whether the applicant\u2019s representative had been notified in due time. 13.  On 31 July 2006 the applicant\u2019s representative lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation, arguing that the notice for the court hearing of 21 June 2006 had been served on him only on 26 June 2006, resulting in him and her client missing the opportunity to participate in the hearing and submit their observations on the findings of the expert report. He explained in that connection that the expert\u2019s calculations had been erroneous and did not correspond to the bank transfer receipts in the case-file. 14.  On 5 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 21 June 2006 without responding to the applicant\u2019s arguments. 15.  The applicant\u2019s rectification request against that decision was rejected on 13 March 2007.", "references": ["4", "5", "9", "7", "2", "6", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and is a life-sentenced prisoner. He has been detained in X Prison since 2008. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  Following a referral by the prison medical unit for the applicant to undergo a colonoscopy, the prison director issued an order on 9 November 2010 assigning a three-member escort team equipped with firearms, ammunition and bulletproof vests to take the applicant to Y Hospital. On the same date an escort plan (saateplaan) was drawn up, which included a section headed \u201cRelevant circumstances for the execution of an escort task\u201d. It gave an overview of the applicant\u2019s past criminal behaviour, noting that he had been sentenced to life imprisonment for aggravated murder, and, while in prison, had been convicted for handling narcotic substances and repeatedly punished for acts of violence against public officials. The escort plan also included a personal risk assessment. It was noted that the applicant reacted aggressively to lawful orders of the officials when he thought that they were being unreasonable and also in situations where he felt cornered. He did not respect the prison regime and was prone to self-harm. Moreover, he was considered to become more dangerous in situations where he interpreted information in a manner expecting a favourable outcome for himself which nevertheless did not follow. The risk of his absconding was considered to be higher when outside prison. Against that background, it was considered necessary for the applicant to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 9.  On the same day the applicant was transferred from the prison to a public hospital. The prison officers remained in the room with him during his examination and he was restrained by handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 10.  According to the applicant, he was not allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. The members of the escort team could overhear the conversation between him and the doctor and were able to follow the examination of his internal organs on a monitor. 11.  According to the Government, the applicant had not requested to wear his own clothes during the visit. They submitted an explanation given on 11 August 2016 by a doctor at Y Hospital, who noted that he did not remember the particular visit, but asserted that although members of the escort team would normally stay in the examination room, a screen would be placed between them and the patient. The quality management specialist of the hospital confirmed that screens were commonly used, as they prevented prison officers from directly observing the examination, but allowed them to intervene if needed. The Government also submitted detailed information about the hospital\u2019s floor plan and noted that the relevant examination room measured 40 square metres, so the prison officers had not been in the immediate vicinity of the applicant. 12.  Following a referral by the prison medical unit for the applicant to be taken to hospital for an examination by an ear, nose and throat specialist, the prison director issued an order on 27 October 2011 assigning a four-member escort team equipped with firearms and ammunition to take the applicant to Y Hospital. The information about the applicant\u2019s criminal behaviour and personal risk assessment was repeated (see paragraph 8 above) and it was considered necessary for him to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs during the visit. 13.  On the same day the applicant was transferred from prison to Y Hospital. 14.  According to the applicant, he was not allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. In his application, he stated that the prison officers had remained in the room during the examination and could overhear the conversation between him and the doctor. In his observations he submitted that he had, very shortly after being taken to the hospital, asked to be returned to prison and had refused to go in to see the doctor as he had been embarrassed to be seen in handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 15.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not requested to wear his own clothes. They stated that although it appeared from the note in the applicant\u2019s escort plan that he had refused to see a doctor at the hospital because of his handcuffs and ankle cuffs, his medical file nonetheless revealed that a short meeting between the applicant and the doctor might have taken place. According to information obtained from the hospital, the relevant doctor\u2019s room had measured 33.5 square metres. 16.  On 30 January 2012 the deputy director of the prison granted the applicant\u2019s request to visit his newborn daughter (who had undergone surgery and was in a serious condition) in hospital. The applicant had submitted a request to be allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. A six-member team (four of whom were required to stay in the immediate vicinity of the applicant and two of whom had the task of \u201csecuring the convoy\u201d) equipped with firearms and ammunition was assigned to escort the applicant. According to the escort plan, which contained information about the applicant\u2019s criminal behaviour and personal risk assessment (see paragraph 8 above), it was considered necessary for him to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs. The visit took place on 31 January 2012. 17.  According to the applicant, the prison officers had been aware that the visiting hours at the hospital were from 12 noon to 7 p.m., but he had been transferred to the hospital at around 11 a.m. His visit with his daughter had lasted only ten minutes because he had been there during the time that medical procedures were being performed on the patients. Furthermore, he had wanted to touch his child and the doctors had given their permission, but the prison officers had stopped him from doing so. The prison officers had remained with him at all times and could overhear the conversation between the applicant and the doctor regarding his daughter\u2019s health. 18.  Relying on information provided by X Prison, the Government stated that in the relevant intensive care unit of the hospital the visiting hours were twenty-four hours a day. However, the time of the visit outside the hospital\u2019s general visiting hours (from 12 noon to 7 p.m.) had been specifically agreed with the hospital so as to minimise contact between the applicant and other people. According to the escort plan, the applicant had arrived at the hospital at 10.50 a.m. and the visit had ended at 11.15 a.m. 19.  The Government submitted an explanation drafted on 2 April 2012 by the head of the escort team on duty on the day of the visit. It stated that no medical procedures had been performed on the applicant\u2019s daughter during the visit and that the visit had not been terminated \u2013 the applicant had wished to leave the hospital himself. 20.  The Government also submitted an explanation given on 18 August 2016 by the head of the hospital board, who admitted not remembering the actual visit but stated that according to the hospital rules and code of good conduct, the intensive care unit was very quiet and any information was passed on quietly, so as not to disturb anyone. Staff had to be careful that the information was not heard by anyone other than the person concerned. Given the medical condition of the applicant\u2019s daughter, it was unlikely that permission had been granted to touch or hold her as this could have worsened her condition. 21.  Following the dismissal of his claims by X Prison, the applicant lodged a claim with the Tartu Administrative Court on 5 February 2012, alleging that the conditions and circumstances of the above-described visits had been unlawful. 22.  On 16 April 2012 he lodged a claim with the Tartu Administrative Court requesting compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 30,000 euros (EUR), based on the same complaints. In this claim he argued, inter alia, that the limitations on the visit to see his daughter and the inability for him to touch her had been unlawful. The court joined the two sets of proceedings. 23.  By a judgment of 29 January 2013, the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint in full. It held that the use of handcuffs and ankle cuffs had been permitted by law, based on preventive security considerations and, as such, had been proportionate. In the \u201cfacts and proceedings\u201d (asjaolud ja menetluse k\u00e4ik) part of the judgment the court noted that the applicant had complained about the prison officers remaining in the examination room during the medical procedures and about his visit to see his daughter having taken place at the wrong time and being of limited duration. The court did not address these complaints in its reasoning part of the judgment. 24.  On 28 February 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal, asking it to overturn the first-instance judgment and uphold his complaint in full. In the appeal he noted, inter alia, that the Tartu Administrative Court had failed to respond to the reasoning supporting his claims and had failed to address the breach of doctor-patient confidentiality in its judgment. 25.  By a judgment of 26 August 2014, the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint in full, but amended some of the reasoning provided by the first-instance court. It confirmed the Administrative Court\u2019s conclusion about the use of handcuffs and ankle cuffs during the medical examination. It noted that in his appeal the applicant had claimed that the Administrative Court had failed to address the obligation to wear prison clothing, the manner in which the prison officers had carried their weapons and special equipment and the breach of doctor-patient confidentiality. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint about the prison officers\u2019 presence during his hospital visits, as the prison officers had had a duty under the Regulation of the Minister of Justice \u201cPrisoner Escort Duties and Procedures\u201d (see paragraph 36 below) to escort and guard him. The regulation also required that at least one member of the escort team maintain visual contact with the prisoner at all times. Even if they had overheard a conversation between the applicant and the doctor, they had had an official duty to maintain the confidentiality of that information. The court also addressed and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints about the obligation to wear prison clothing and about the prison officers carrying firearms. In the \u201cfacts and proceedings\u201d part of the judgment, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had, inter alia, complained that the visit to see his daughter had taken place at the wrong time, limiting his visit. The court did not address this complaint in its reasoning part of the judgment. 26.  On 26 September 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. He reiterated his complaints about the handcuffs and ankle cuffs and the presence of the prison officers during the visits. The applicant also stated that the Court of Appeal had failed to address his complaint regarding the prison officers having taken him to see his child at the wrong time (thereby restricting the duration of the visit) and having stopped him from touching his daughter. 27.  On 15 January 2015 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law.", "references": ["3", "7", "8", "2", "6", "9", "0", "5", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Sivas. 7.  According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant, on 19 November 2002 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Hizbullah following an hour long armed conflict with the police officers during which he had resisted, had thrown a grenade and had fired back at the police officers. 8.  On the same day at 1.50 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Silvan State Hospital, in Diyarbak\u0131r, by a doctor who observed the following on the applicant\u2019s body: 2 cm-long scrape on his lower left chest, handcuff marks on his wrists, a traumatic scrape on the front side of his right leg. The doctor observed no unfitness for work. Also on the same day at 5.45 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Hospital by another doctor who made similar findings as those mentioned in the first medical report. 9.  On 22 November 2002 the applicant was interviewed by police in the absence of a lawyer in the course of which he had allegedly sustained both physical and psychological ill-treatment. According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, he was allegedly forced to sign some documents, as well as a declaration to waive his right to legal assistance. He further maintained that when he had wished to read the documents that he had been made to sign he had been threatened with further ill-treatment. 10.  On 23 November 2002 at the end of his police custody, the applicant was examined at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Hospital by a doctor who noted that there were no new signs of ill-treatment on the applicant\u2019s body. According to the applicant, during the examination the police officers intervened and ordered the doctor to write that the applicant had some grazes on his wrists and ankles. 11.  On 23 November 2002 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he accepted the accusations against him. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, who took his statements in the absence of a lawyer in which he had accepted most of the statements he had given to the police. According to his submissions before the Court, the applicant claimed that he had admitted being a member of the Hizbullah before the public prosecutor and the judge on account of the duress and the intimidation exerted on him by the police. He further claimed that the police officers had threatened him with excessive length of proceedings and had told him that if he had accepted the charges they would help him and release him from detention. 12.  On 27 November 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 13.  On 19 March 2003 the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant gave evidence without a lawyer in which he denied his previous statements and the accusations. He further stated, without providing any details, that he had been subjected to pressure while in police custody and that he had pressurised to sign his police statements without reading them.\nWhen asked about his statements before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of the pressure from the police officers. 14.  At a hearing held on 18 September 2003 the applicant submitted, without providing any details, that he had been tortured during the preliminary investigation. 15.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 16.  On 22 June 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Relying on the medical report dated 23 November 2002, it also rejected the applicant\u2019s contention that he had been tortured while in police custody. 17.  On 10 April 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["8", "7", "5", "0", "1", "2", "9", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tianchang, the People\u2019s Republic of China. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was an undergraduate economics student at Kharkiv National University, Ukraine. 7.  On 1 May 2009 a group of about fifteen Chinese students, including the applicant, were having a picnic. When they were about to finish, four Ukrainian men (D., Sa., Su. and M.), who were picnicking nearby, approached them to get some beer. The Ukrainians were clearly drunk. D. took a knife from the Chinese students\u2019 table and threw it in the river on the pretext that it was a weapon and there was no place for it there. M., who appeared less drunk than his friends, was friendlier and the applicant gave him a bottle of beer. All four drank the beer and returned for more. Apparently, they offered the Chinese students a small folding knife instead of the one that had been thrown away, but their offer was declined. D.\u2019s behaviour was particularly insulting and indecent: he undid his trousers and showed his genitals to everyone around him, including girls. The applicant gave the Ukrainians another bottle of beer and the group of Chinese students started packing up. M. filmed the events on his smartphone. The last thing recorded was one of the Chinese students, subsequently identified as W., taking two metal skewers out of a plastic bag. 8.  At some point a fight started between the two groups. They later blamed each other for beginning it. In the course of the fight M. was stabbed in the back with a metal skewer. 9.  Sa. took hold of one of the Chinese students, Ch. When the police arrived, Sa. stated that he had seen Ch. stabbing M. in the back with a folding knife and confirmed his statement in writing the same day. According to the report of the police officer on duty, Su. and D. were so drunk that it was impossible to question them. As for the victim, he was unconscious. 10.  The applicant had been waiting for the police together with the four Ukrainians and some of his companions (several others had run away). None of the Ukrainians expressed any suspicions about the applicant and he eventually left with his friends. 11.  On 2 May 2009 M. was questioned in hospital. He submitted that he had been stabbed unexpectedly in the back and that he had not seen who had done it. When he had fallen down, he had seen three Chinese men stepping over him, including the applicant. M. remembered the applicant because he appeared bigger than the other Chinese men and had spoken some Russian. M. considered that, most probably, it had been the applicant who had injured him. 12.  On the same day Sa. changed his initial statement and submitted that he had seen \u201cone of the Chinese [men], who [had] appeared bigger than the others and called himself Yura [the applicant], jump on [M.\u2019s] back and stab him with a metal skewer\u201d. 13.  On 4 May 2009 M. died of his injury in hospital. 14.  On the same day Su. told the police he had seen one of the Chinese men, who had appeared bigger than the others, stab M. with a metal skewer. 15.  During an identification parade conducted that day Sa. and Su. pointed at the applicant as the one who had injured M. 16.  The applicant was arrested that day on suspicion of M.\u2019s murder. 17.  On 6 May 2009 one of the Chinese students, W., speaking in the presence of a lawyer and with the aid of an interpreter, made a statement of surrender to the police. He stated that he had accidentally injured one of the Ukrainians with a skewer and had run away because he had been scared. He was sorry for what had happened. 18.  On 8 May 2009 W. repeated his confession, adding that the applicant had done everything possible to prevent the conflict. 19.  On an unspecified later date W. retracted his confession and submitted that he had only slightly injured D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but not M. 20.  The investigation established that the Chinese students had initially had six metal skewers. Only four of them, packed in a plastic bag, were discovered. The two skewers taken by W. from the bag shortly before the fight were never found. 21.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation twelve Chinese citizens made witness statements describing the events prior to, during and after the fight. None of them had seen who had injured M. or how it had happened. Nor had anybody seen the applicant holding a metal skewer at any point. To the contrary, some witnesses among the Chinese students submitted that they had been next to the applicant during the fight and that he had not been the one who had injured M. 22.  Furthermore, several of the Chinese witnesses told the police that W. had been particularly nervous after the incident, had destroyed the clothes he had been wearing on 1 May 2009 and had asked his parents for a considerable amount of money. 23.  On an unspecified date the investigation was declared completed and the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Kyivskyy Court\u201d) started the trial. 24.  On 15 January 2010 the Kyivskyy Court ordered an additional pre\u2011trial investigation. As stated in its ruling, several people had seen metal skewers in W.\u2019s hands, but nobody had seen the applicant holding a skewer, let alone stabbing M. Sa. had eventually retracted his statement of 2 May 2009 about seeing the applicant stab M. and specified that in fact he had not seen the injury being inflicted on M. He explained that when pointing out the applicant he had been \u201cdriven by [his] emotions\u201d. Furthermore, while D. and Su. considered the applicant guilty of injuring M., it was established in the court hearing that none of them had seen how that had actually happened. The trial court further found unconvincing the conclusion reached by the pre-trial investigation that W. had inflicted light injuries on D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but that it had been unlikely that he might have also injured M. Next, the court referred to the statement of the police officer who had been on duty on 1 May 2009, that the applicant had been there all the time after the arrival of the police and that he had been calm, clean and without any injuries. The officer further submitted that the Ukrainians had indicated that it was Ch. who had wounded M. and they had handed him over to the police. Ch. did not speak Russian well. After being provided with an interpreter, he had maintained his innocence. The investigator could not explain how suspicion had fallen on the applicant. He submitted that somebody from the criminal investigation department had told him that the applicant was the perpetrator, but he could not remember exactly who. Lastly, it was observed in the court ruling that although some of the Ukrainians\u2019 witness statements had identified the applicant as appearing bigger than his companions, it was clear that there had been several other Chinese students who had appeared bigger and heavier than him. The investigation had failed to make any assessment of that point. 25.  On 25 March 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the above-mentioned ruling, concluding that all the issues it raised could be clarified in the course of the trial and that an additional pre-trial investigation was not necessary. 26.  On 26 September 2011 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. It relied on the statements of Sa. and Su., who claimed to have seen the applicant \u201changing on [M.\u2019s] back\u201d shortly before the latter had shouted that he had been stabbed. The court also relied on the statements of D., who stated that he had seen the applicant running away from the victim with Ch. The court concluded that two metal skewers had been used in the fight. Given that W. had injured D. and Su. with one of them, he could not also have stabbed M. W. could not be examined in court as he had left Ukraine. The Chinese students gave their account of the fight. However, the court did not consider it credible and expressed the opinion that they had been trying to help the applicant. 27.  The applicant appealed, submitting, in particular, that his conviction lacked any evidential basis apart from the controversial and speculative statements of M.\u2019s friends. The prosecutor also lodged an appeal, considering the sentence to be too lenient. 28.  On 26 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for additional pre-trial investigation owing to numerous flaws and omissions. It observed in particular that no effort had been made to establish the motive for the murder. It was clear from the evidence in the case file that both the applicant and M. had been friendly and that both of them had tried to avoid the conflict. Furthermore, the appellate court pointed out that the statements of D., Sa. and Su., on which the first\u2011instance court had based the applicant\u2019s conviction, had been contradictory, inconsistent and speculative. They could not therefore be interpreted as conclusive evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. The appellate court also considered the accusation against the applicant to be too vague as it had never been established where exactly M. and the applicant were situated prior to the incident. Nor had the exact mechanism of M.\u2019s injury been established. 29.  Following an additional round of pre-trial investigation measures, the case was sent to the Kyivskyy Court. 30.  On 2 July 2012 the Kyivskyy Court held that the deficiencies pointed out by the Court of Appeal in its ruling of 26 March 2012 had not been rectified and that the additional investigation, like the one carried out earlier, had been incomplete and superficial. The case was therefore remitted once again for further pre-trial investigation. 31.  On 20 September 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the above\u2011mentioned ruling. 32.  On 19 November 2012 the new Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP 2012\u201d) came into effect, introducing many major changes in criminal procedure (see paragraph 45 below). 33.  On 19 December 2012 the investigator announced to the applicant a \u201cnotice of suspicion\u201d, that being the new procedure of opening criminal proceedings under the CCP 2012. 34.  On the same date the pre-trial investigation was declared completed, and on 24 December 2012 the case was referred to the Kyivskyy Court. 35.  On 24 July 2013 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. It relied in particular on the statements made by Sa., Su. and D. at the court hearing, which were identical to those summarised in the judgment of 26 September 2011 (see paragraph 26 above). The court observed that it was impossible to establish with precision the mechanism of the fatal injury to M. on the basis of the evidence of those witnesses. It held, however, that their statements had not been refuted by any forensic medical findings. The court also relied on M.\u2019s testimony during the pre-trial investigation (see paragraph 11 above). At the same time, in spite of requests by the applicant, it refused to admit in evidence any of the statements of the other Chinese students, who had meanwhile left Ukraine and could therefore not be questioned in court. Only one Chinese student had not left the country and was questioned. However, his statement was of little evidential value, given that he had left the scene prior to the beginning of the fight and had not seen any of it. The Kyivskyy Court held as follows:\n\u201c... [Pursuant to Articles 85 and 86] and Article 95 \u00a7 4 of the CCP [2012], the court may only base its conclusions on statements received directly at the court hearing or in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of this Code, and is not entitled to base judicial decisions on statements made to the investigator or prosecutor, or to refer to such statements. The court therefore holds that the reference by the applicant and his lawyer to the witness statements documented in the investigation\u2019s reports and made either to the investigator or to the prosecutor outside of court hearings and not in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of the CCP [2012], cannot be regarded as proper and admissible defence evidence.\u201d 36.  The trial court further held:\n\u201c..The court has no doubts regarding the circumstances of the case which it considers established ... The statements of the witnesses [Sa., Su. and D.] are consistent and corroborated by other evidence in these criminal proceedings.\u201d 37.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the only evidence leading to his conviction had been the victim\u2019s friends\u2019 inconsistent and contradictory statements, which they had drastically changed on at least three occasions. The applicant emphasised that the trial court had not analysed either any of those contradictions or the reasons why the witnesses had changed their statements. Likewise, he complained, no assessment had been given to the contradictions between the above-mentioned witness evidence and the version of events given by the victim himself shortly before his death (see paragraph 11 above). He observed in particular that M. had been clear in his statement that the stabbing in his back had been a complete surprise for him and that he had never submitted that somebody had been \u201changing on [his] back\u201d as alleged by the witnesses. 38.  The applicant also complained that the statements of twelve other Chinese people during the pre-trial investigation had been disregarded. He observed that, under Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the CCP 2012, the admissibility of evidence was to be assessed in the light of the CCP provisions in force at the time when that evidence was obtained. Furthermore, the applicant referred to Article 8 of Chapter 11 of the Transitional Provisions of the CCP 2012, which stipulated that the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained prior to the entry into force of the new CCP was to be decided in accordance with the procedure applicable prior to its entry into force (see paragraph 45 below). In his case, he emphasised, all the evidence had been obtained while the old CCP 1960 had still been in force. Accordingly, he considered that the trial court should have been guided by provisions of the CCP 1960 when deciding on the admissibility of the evidence including the witness statements given by the Chinese students. Given that under the CCP 1960 evidence obtained in the course of a pre-trial investigation was admissible in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 44 below), the applicant complained that it had been unlawful and unfair to exclude the witness evidence for the defence and that by doing so the trial court had substantially aggravated his situation and had deprived him of the opportunity to defend himself. 39.  On 27 November 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the findings and the reasoning of the Kyivskyy Court\u2019s judgment. It held in particular as follows:\n\u201cThe [first-instance] court\u2019s findings regarding [the applicant\u2019s guilt] are concordant with the factual circumstances of the case. [They] are based on the evidence, which was explored in the court hearing and which is set forth in detail in the judgment. The trial court thoroughly verified [that evidence] and assessed it in an objective manner.\u201d 40.  The Court of Appeal did not comment on the applicant\u2019s argument about the applicability of the CCP 1960 on the assessment of the admissibility of evidence. 41.  The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law. 42.  On 22 July 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters found against him and upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. It found no reasons to consider the investigation at the trial superficial or otherwise flawed. The Higher Specialised Court was silent on the applicant\u2019s argument on the admissibility of the defence evidence in the light of the CCP 1960. 43.  According to the information provided by the applicant, on 31 March 2016 he was released and he returned to China. The case file before the Court does not contain any further details in that regard.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "6", "2", "1", "4", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Strasbourg, France. The second applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Grozny, Chechnya, Russia. 6.  At the relevant time the applicants were residents of Grozny, Chechnya. Their property was damaged in the course of a counterterrorist operation in 1999-2000. The applicants did not pursue criminal remedies in order to determine the exact circumstances or identify the perpetrators of the damage. Instead, they sought to obtain no-fault compensation provided for by Government Decree no. 404 (see below). The applicants complied with the requirements for applying for the compensation and submitted the relevant documents. However, for administrative reasons their claims were not processed until September 2013. Their individual situations can be summarised as follows. 7.  The first applicant\u2019s flat was damaged during the hostilities in 1994\u20111995, and then destroyed in 1999-2000. It was situated in a 70-flat apartment block at 21 Tereshkova Street in Grozny, Chechnya. 8.  In March 2005 the first applicant submitted an application for administrative compensation to the Commission for compensation for lost property (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d \u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0445 \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0436\u0438\u043b\u044c\u0435 \u0438 \u0438\u043c\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e, hereafter \u201cthe Commission\u201d). She received an acknowledgment of receipt of documents (no. 22/9777). 9.  In April 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny confirmed the first applicant\u2019s title to property of flat no. 25 in the destroyed apartment block at 21 Tereshkova Street. 10.  In 2007 the first applicant was registered as a person eligible for social housing because her flat had been destroyed during the hostilities. She was assigned number 742 in the waiting list; in February 2016 her number was 727. 11.  In June 2010 the applicant was informed that her application had not been examined by the Commission since the building in question had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. The register was to be updated by the technical unit of the Federal authority on construction and municipal services (\u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0430 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443 \u0438 \u0416\u041a\u0425 \u043f\u043e \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0436\u0438\u043b\u044c\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438, hereafter \u201cthe technical unit\u201d). However, in August 2005 the work of the technical unit had been put on hold and the list of destroyed housing has not been updated since that time. Hence, the first applicant\u2019s application has not been processed and no decision has been taken. 12.  The first applicant complained to a district court about the Commission\u2019s failure to act. On 12 August 2010 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim, pointing out that the Commission was unable to proceed in the absence of the corresponding entry in the register. On 7 September 2010 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that judgment on appeal. The first applicant\u2019s subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review were unsuccessful. 13.  In 2011 she was informed by the Commission\u2019s secretariat that the technical unit had not been operational since 2005 and that the Commission did not know whether or when it would restart its work. 14.  The first applicant instituted civil proceedings, seeking damages for the destroyed property directly from the Government of Chechnya. On 21 March 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim, referring to the expiry of the time-limit and the lack of legal grounds for such claims. On 28 May 2013 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision, except the part referring to expiry of the limitation period. The Supreme Court stressed that compensation could not be paid because a new procedure for the payment of compensation was currently being devised. 15.  The second applicant owned flat no. 12 in an apartment block at 53 Kavkazskaya Street, Grozny. The building was destroyed during the hostilities in 1999-2000. 16.  In November 2004 the second applicant applied to the Commission and his file was assigned number 02/13975. 17.  In 2008 the applicant was registered as a person eligible for social housing because his flat had been destroyed during the hostilities. He was assigned number 1599 in the waiting list; in 2016 his number was 1579. 18.  In April 2010 he was informed that his application had not been examined by the Commission since the address in question had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. 19.  The second applicant complained to a court. On 5 July 2010 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny rejected his complaint since the Commission was unable to proceed in the absence of the technical unit\u2019s register. On 10 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld the decision on appeal. 20.  The second applicant sought to obtain damages from the Government of Chechnya for the damaged property and for failure to compensate the damage by alternative means. His claim was dismissed for failure to comply with the limitation period in a judgment of the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny of 27 June 2013, upheld on appeal on 7 November 2013 by the Supreme Court of Chechnya. 21.  The Government submitted a letter issued by the Chechen Government on 13 January 2016, in response to a request for information in relation to the applicants\u2019 situation. The letter stated that the Commission had ceased to exist in January 2014. It had held a final meeting on 16 September 2013 and, according to the minutes of the meeting (no. 61), had rejected all claims lodged by the owners of property which had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. Both applicants were in that category. In respect of the first applicant, the letter stated that her house had been inspected by the technical unit, which had confirmed its destruction (without specifying the date or any reference to the inspection record); however, for unknown reasons the building had not been entered in the register. The second applicant\u2019s house had been inspected by the technical unit, which had found that it had not been destroyed (without specifying the date or any reference to the inspection record). The letter concluded by saying that all documents relevant to the individuals\u2019 claims for compensation had been transferred to the Chechnya Government Archives Service for storage. No additional documents were submitted by the Government, and it is unclear whether the applicants were informed of the Commission\u2019s decision. 22.  The second applicant also submitted additional documents dating back to 2008 and 2010, confirming destruction of the apartment block where he had owned a flat. In February 2008 the local district administration examined flat no. 12 at 53 Kavkazskaya Street, Grozny, and concluded that it had been 100% destroyed. The applicant was issued with a certificate to that effect. On 24 May 2010 the local administration examined the building at 53 Kavkazskaya Street and found that it had been demolished.", "references": ["7", "3", "8", "0", "4", "1", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was the owner of a company, incorporated in Moldova, which ran an erotic video-chat business in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. It employed young female models who provided erotic shows via webcam to customers outside Moldova in exchange for payment. 7.  On 3 March 2015 the applicant was arrested and accused of pimping (proxenetism). 8.  On 7 March 2015, at the request of a public prosecutor, the Centru District Court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of thirty days. The applicant appealed against the order and argued that his detention had not been based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. He submitted that he could not be accused of pimping, in that the female models employed by him had not been engaged in prostitution. He argued that the prosecutor and the court which had ordered his detention had applied an extensive interpretation of the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the offence of pimping. He also argued that the existing case-law of the domestic courts did not contain anything which would enable erotic video-chat activity to be assimilated with prostitution and pimping. The applicant also contended that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons for remanding him in custody. 9.  On 16 March 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and held that there had been grounds to believe that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. The court did not respond to the applicant\u2019s argument about a lack of reasonable suspicion and the allegation of extensive interpretation of the criminal law. 10.  On 31 March 2015 the Centru District Court upheld a request by the Public Prosecutor and prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention for another thirty days. The applicant appealed on the same grounds as on the first occasion. However, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 April 2015. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request, which was upheld by the Centru District Court on 27 April 2015; the applicant was released from detention. 12.  During the proceedings the applicant explained that, prior to starting the video-chat business, he had consulted a lawyer to make sure that the activity was legal in Moldova, and he had been assured that it was not illegal. He also submitted that he had seen numerous similar businesses in Chi\u0219in\u0103u, which had strengthened his belief that the activity was not unlawful. 13.  On 30 December 2016 the Centru District Court found the applicant guilty as charged but ordered that the criminal proceedings against him be terminated on the basis of an amnesty law. One of the conditions for applying the amnesty law was for the applicant to admit his guilt and express remorse. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 14.  In deciding the case, the court sought an opinion from the State Agency for the Protection of Morality as to whether the acts committed by the female models employed by the applicant could be qualified as prostitution and, thus, whether the applicant\u2019s activity could be qualified as pimping. The opinion of 21 October 2015, which was the key element in convicting the applicant and was subsequently used in other similar cases, stated that the actions of the female models employed by the applicant could be considered acts of prostitution, in that their clients could obtain sexual gratification as a result of the models\u2019 performance and because the models were paid for those acts. Thus, the fact that the applicant obtained revenue from the above activity could be considered pimping.", "references": ["7", "3", "1", "5", "6", "9", "8", "4", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and is a life-sentenced prisoner. He has been detained in X Prison since 2008. During the relevant period he was detained in the increased surveillance wing of the prison. 7.  In January 2012 the applicant had been relocated from one section of the increased surveillance wing to another. 8.  On 11 February 2012 the applicant entered the cell of a fellow prisoner and stabbed him multiple times in the stomach, back and arms with a scissor blade. The attacked prisoner was taken to hospital following the incident. According to the applicant\u2019s explanation to the prison he had considered it necessary to punish his fellow inmate, as he had allegedly behaved arrogantly towards him. 9.  On 13 February 2012 the prison administration decided to impose additional security measures (t\u00e4iendavad julgeolekumeetmed) on the applicant. It took into account the stabbing incident of 11 February 2012, the applicant\u2019s history of aggressive behaviour and emotional characteristics (see paragraphs 12\u201313 below), and the need to ensure the health and safety of all those employed and detained in the prison. The measures entailed placing the applicant in a locked isolation cell (eraldatud lukustatud kamber); restricting his freedom of movement and communication inside the prison; banning him from using the prison\u2019s sports facilities; and handcuffing him whenever he was taken outside of his cell. The decision stated that the measures were to be applied until the grounds for them ceased to exist, but for no longer than six months. It also indicated that the decision had to be served on the applicant. 10.  The applicant lodged a complaint against the decision with the Tartu Administrative Court, but as he had failed to pay the State fee, the court refused to examine it. 11.  On 10 August 2012 the prison administration took two decisions by which it decided to prolong the application of additional security measures. On 9 August 2012 the applicant had been given the possibility to express his opinion about the planned prolongation. The decisions indicated that they had to be served on the applicant. 12.  In the first decision the authorities listed the applicant\u2019s five previous convictions (for, inter alia, theft, hooliganism, acts of violence, fraud, and extortion causing damage to life or health) before he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. They then noted that the applicant had been convicted and given a life sentence in 2001 for the murder of two people and the attempted manslaughter of another person. The authorities also provided a detailed summary of incidents, altogether seventeen, which had occurred in prison between February 2002 and the incident of 11 February 2012 and which involved unlawful activity, disruptive behaviour and insubordination, and repeated violence or the threat of violence on the part of the applicant against the prison officers. They further listed a total of twenty-five prior decisions, taken since 2003, to apply additional security measures to the applicant. 13.  The decisions also referred to a personal risk assessment dated 20 September 2011, which stated that the applicant had a low tolerance to stress and low self-criticism, which was supported by the fact that expressing anger had previously helped him get his way. He blamed others for his problems, and was found to resort to self-harm and injuring others to get what he wanted. 14.  Taking this into account, as well as the fact that on 30 May 2012 the applicant had, in a telephone call to the Ministry of Justice, said that he would be left with no option but to assault a prison officer, the prison authorities held that it would not be possible to discontinue the additional security measures. The fact that the applicant did not have any valid disciplinary punishment at the time the decision was taken was not considered decisive. 15.  By the first decision of 10 August 2012 the following additional security measures were imposed on the applicant:\n(i)  placement in a locked isolation cell to better monitor him and prevent contact with other prisoners, towards whom he might become violent;\n(ii)  restriction on his freedom of movement and communication inside the prison to prevent contact with other prisoners, whose health he might endanger;\n(iii)  a ban on using the prison\u2019s sports facilities, as it was not possible to ensure the restrictions on his freedom of movement and communication while escorting him to these facilities. 16.  The use of handcuffs on the applicant outside of his prison cell was at first not prolonged, but the decision was amended by another decision of the same date which required him to be handcuffed via the hatch on his cell door even before anyone entered. It was considered that he might pose a danger to the prison officers, particularly at the moment when the door was being opened, regardless of whether or not he was to be escorted outside of his cell. 17.  The measures were subject to review within no more than six months after being served on the applicant. 18.  On 30 September 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court, seeking to have the decisions of 10 August 2012 annulled. On 31 January 2013 the court found that the prison authorities had duly considered the applicant\u2019s most recent actions, as well as his overall prior behaviour and personal risk assessment. It found that the application of additional security measures to the applicant had been justified in the interests of other prisoners and the prison officers, and dismissed his complaint. 19.  On 2 March 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal, requesting that the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court be quashed and that the decisions of 10 August 2012 be declared unlawful, as it was no longer necessary to annul them as they had ceased to have effect six months after they had been adopted. 20.  On 8 April 2013 the Court of Appeal allowed an application by the applicant to have the annulment proceedings reclassified as proceedings for the determination of unlawfulness. 21.  On 9 January 2014 the Tartu Court of Appeal adopted a decision to join the cases in the second and third sets of court proceedings (see paragraph 29 below). 22.  On 28 February 2014 it dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court in the second set of court proceedings. The court noted that the prison had discretion in deciding whether to apply additional security measures and thus the judicial review of such decisions was limited. It found that in the present case the additional security measures had not been applied as a punitive measure, but to prevent possible harm to the life and health of the prison officers and other prisoners. The unpredictable, aggressive and violent behaviour of the applicant had given grounds for a reasonable fear that he might pose such a danger. The Court of Appeal also took a decision regarding the judgment of the Administrative Court of 4 October 2013 in the third set of court proceedings (see paragraph 30 below). 23.  On 1 April 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the joined cases. On 5 June 2014 it refused to examine the appeal. 24.  On 15 February 2013 the prison administration prolonged the application of additional security measures after giving the applicant the opportunity to express his opinion about the planned prolongation. The decision stated that it had to be served on the applicant. 25.  The decision relied on the already mentioned information (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above) and a new personal risk assessment dated 26 September 2012 (which considered the applicant to be dangerous; it noted that he had a low tolerance to stress and that aggressive behaviour was one of the coping strategies which helped him get his way). In addition, the prison authorities relied on information from the security department that the applicant had attempted to obtain prohibited items through other prisoners so that he could \u201csettle scores\u201d, once the additional security measures were discontinued, with those he had had disagreements with. Based on the above, the security measures were considered necessary to prevent the likely harm the applicant might cause. The same security measures as applied by the decisions of 10 August 2012 were imposed (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above) and were again subject to review within no more than six months after being served on the applicant. 26.  On 7 April 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court, seeking to have the decision of 15 February 2013 annulled. 27.  On 4 October 2013 the court dismissed the complaint. It found that the prison authorities had correctly assessed that the applicant could still be considered unpredictable and dangerous to other prisoners and the prison officers and that the application of security measures \u2013 as a preventive step \u2013 had been justified. 28.  On 5 November 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal. 29.  As noted above, on 9 January 2014 it adopted a decision to join the administrative cases in the second and third sets of proceedings (see paragraph 21 above). 30.  On 28 February 2014 it adopted a judgment reversing the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court of 4 October 2013 in part. The court held that the first-instance court should have found the decision of X Prison of 15 February 2013 unlawful with regard to the period 10 to 14 February 2013, since X Prison had been obliged to review its decisions of 10 August 2012 within no more than six months. It upheld the remainder of the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court of 4 October 2013. In doing so, the court relied, inter alia, on the information gathered by the prison security department (see paragraph 25 above), which the court examined in closed proceedings as the material was confidential. The court found that the aforementioned information gave X Prison sufficient grounds to believe that, upon the lifting of the additional security measures, the applicant would pose a danger to other prisoners and the prison officers. 31.  On 1 April 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but on 5 June 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine it. 32.  The applicant was kept in different cells over the relevant period, all measuring approximately 9.9 square metres. The Government provided photographs of the relevant cells and a list of the personal items the applicant had in his cells. According to the list, the applicant had had a television set in his cell since 26 July 2012. The applicant was authorised to wear his own clothes. 33.  The applicant was able to have long-term and short-term visits from his next-of-kin. Between 10 August 2012 and 15 August 2013 he was authorised to have thirteen long-term visits (of up to twenty-four hours) to meet his wife and daughters and two short-term visits. On some occasions the visits were cancelled, as the visitors did not attend. During the period concerned he had one meeting with his lawyer. 34.  The applicant had the right to make telephone calls and send letters. He could use the Internet to access legislation and could borrow books from the library. 35.  He had an opportunity to spend one hour daily in the open air and do physical exercises alone in the prison exercise yard, which measured 22.7 square metres. 36.  Between 5 September 2012 and 13 March 2013 the applicant participated in a social reintegration programme entitled \u201cThe Right Moment\u201d (focusing on issues such as the mapping of problems, emotions and thoughts; expression and verbalisation of feelings; coping with conflict and tolerating different viewpoints) and between 27 March and 31 July 2013 in the \u201cAnger Management\u201d programme. Both programmes entailed discussions with a psychologist to analyse the covered topics. 37.  Between 28 October 2012 and 4 August 2013 the applicant participated, on an individual basis, in musical activity under the guidance of a recreation leader (huvijuht). According to the information provided by the Government, the activity took place between seven and ten times a month. 38.  The applicant was under constant medical supervision. During the period from November 2006 to August 2016, he turned to the prison medical services with different health issues a total of 1102 times. On 23 August 2016 a psychiatrist issued a certificate stating that, based on a psychological assessment, the applicant did not have an irrational fear of forests (see paragraphs 41 and 58 below). 39.  According to a statement (\u00f5iend) issued by the prison on 1 January 2017, between 11 February 2010 and 11 August 2013 the applicant\u2019s cell did not overlook a forest. He was placed in a cell with a forest view on 12 August 2013. 40.  The applicant submitted that he had not been allowed to take part in any social events or recreational activities, and had been totally prevented from associating with other inmates. He added that \u201cduring the first few years\u201d (which includes the relevant period in the present case) in a locked isolation cell, he had not been able to use a television set or a radio and that these had been provided only \u201csome two years\u201d after his initial placement in the locked isolation cell. He submitted, however, a reply from X prison dated 10 October 2013, in which the authorities refused to grant him permission to have a radio (as every prison cell already had a built-in radio), but noted that he had been authorised to have a television and thus had been guaranteed sufficient access to information. 41.  In a certificate (t\u00f5end) dated 16 August 2013 a psychiatrist asked for the applicant to be relocated to a cell without a forest view. In an opinion dated 23 August 2013 a clinical psychologist discouraged his placement in such cells as they might increase his feeling of loneliness and isolation, particularly at night. 42.  With reference to his musical activity, the applicant submitted a document dated 1 December 2014 in which the X prison authorities explained that in relation to the incident of 11 February 2012, the applicant had not been allowed to take part in musical or art activity, but added that such a right had been granted as of October 2014.", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "5", "8", "7", "9", "6", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Zagreb. 7.  On 21 July 2000 the police temporarily seized the applicant\u2019s vehicle, which had Canadian number plates, suspecting that it had been stolen by an unknown perpetrator. 8.  On 24 July and 1 September 2000 police experts examined the car and established that its vehicle identification number (VIN) was genuine. 9.  In the meantime, on 21 July 2000 the police asked the Canadian Interpol office to check whether the applicant\u2019s car and two other vehicles were being sought by the police in Canada, under whose name they had been registered, whether they had been registered for export, and whether the car documents were genuine. 10.  On 29 December 2000 the police asked the Zagreb State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) to decide on the status of the vehicle. 11.  On 23 March 2001 the Zagreb State Attorney\u2019s Office instructed the police to ask for the relevant information from the Canadian Interpol office. 12.  On 18 March 2002 the police asked the Canadian Interpol office to expedite the handling of their request for information. 13.  According to the available data, the Canadian Interpol office did not respond to the request of the police. 14.  By a decision of 2 May 2002 the Zagreb State Attorney\u2019s Office ordered that the car be returned to the applicant, whereupon, on 7 May 2002, the police did so. 15.  On 22 July 2003 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Zagrebu). He argued that the car had been returned to him in a state of disrepair because it had not been stored properly and, in any event, it had fallen in value during the two years it had been kept by the police, which had been an unreasonably long period. He sought 55,275.95 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 7,126 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in compensation. 16.  The opinion of an expert obtained by the court during the proceedings suggested that the cost of repairing the applicant\u2019s car amounted to HRK 35,275.95 and that its value had dropped by HRK 22,000. 17.  By a judgment of 16 December 2008 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil action. Its decision was upheld on 30 June 2009 by the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu). 18.  The courts held that the temporary seizure of the applicant\u2019s car had been lawful as it had been based on Articles 177, 184 and 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that therefore the State could not be held liable for damages. 19.  The applicant then concurrently lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). 20.  In his appeal on points of law the applicant asked the Supreme Court to pronounce itself on a legal question which he considered important for the uniform application of the law, namely, whether the owners of objects temporarily seized for the purposes of criminal proceedings were entitled to compensation for the inability to use those objects, in a situation where, eventually, no criminal or minor-offence proceedings had been instituted. 21.  In his constitutional complaint the applicant argued that the judgments of the first and second-instance courts had been in breach of his right of ownership, guaranteed by Article 48 of the Croatian Constitution. 22.  By a decision of 21 February 2012 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible, finding that the legal question he had raised was not important for the uniform application of the law. 23.  On 23 January 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint and served its decision on his representative on 7 February 2014. The court examined the case primarily under Article 29 \u00a7 1 of the Croatian Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair procedure, and held that the contested judgments had not been arbitrary. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that his right of ownership guaranteed by Article 48 of the Constitution had been violated, the Constitutional Court held as follows:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court protects the right of ownership at the constitutional level in a manner that prevents any restriction or taking of [property] by the State authorities, unless the restriction or taking is provided for by law ...\n... interferences with ownership by other legal subjects (natural or legal persons) are property disputes of a private-law nature. The Constitutional Court also examines such decisions by judicial and other authorities if it finds that the contested decision, having regard to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, is based on an unacceptable legal view or is so wrong and lacking in sound legal reasoning that it can be described as arbitrary.\nThe Constitutional Court did not find any such circumstances in the complainant\u2019s case.\nTherefore, the complainant\u2019s right of ownership guaranteed by Article 48 of the Constitution was not breached by the contested judgments.\u201d", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "1", "3", "6", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960. 6.  On 11 August 2006 the applicant, who suffered from schizophrenia, was arrested in his parents\u2019 flat following an argument with his relatives. 7.  The Court, in connection with that incident, in its judgment of V.D. v. Croatia (no. 15526/10, 8 November 2011) found that the investigation into the applicant\u2019s arguable claim of ill-treatment by the police during the arrest had not been effective, contrary to the requirements of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. It also found that the Government had not furnished any convincing or credible arguments which would provide a basis to explain the manner in which the applicant had sustained his injuries during the arrest. The Court thus concluded that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, in breach of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention. 8.  On 16 August 2012, in the context of the procedure for the execution of the Court\u2019s judgment, the Government submitted an action plan indicating that the applicant had sought the reopening of the case against the police officers implicated in the incident (S.P., V.B., D.K. and T.S.) before the relevant criminal courts. To date, the Committee of Ministers has not concluded its supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. 9.  On 8 March 2013 the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) ordered the reopening of the proceedings against the police officers, S.P. and V.B. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 16 January 2014. 10.  On 4 October 2013 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Op\u0107inski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) ordered that the proceedings against D.K. and T.S., the other two police officers involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest, be reopened. That decision became final on 5 November 2013. 11.  Following the court orders for the reopening of the proceedings against the police officers, the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu; hereinafter: \u201cthe State Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d) assumed responsibility for conducting the investigation. 12.  On 13 June 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office informed the applicant that it had opened an investigation in respect of the police officers concerning his allegations of ill-treatment during his arrest on 11 August 2006. The applicant was also served with the decision on the opening of the investigation, which indicated that in the further course of the proceedings it would be necessary to question him, his parents and his common-law wife, Ms T.V., as well as the relevant police officers, and that a forensic expert report concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained in the incident would be ordered. In addition, the applicant was served with a list of his rights as a victim in the proceedings, which included, in particular, the right to be represented by a lawyer, to lodge a civil claim, to propose that certain facts be established and evidence obtained in the proceedings, and to have access to the file. 13.  On the same day, the State Attorney\u2019s Office received a letter from the applicant\u2019s lawyer (dated 12 June 2014) asking whether further proceedings would be conducted and whether the applicant would be able to propose that certain evidence be obtained in the proceedings. 14.  In the meantime, the suspect police officers challenged the decision to reopen the investigation. On 10 July 2014 the Zagreb County Court dismissed their appeals. The decision thereby became final. 15.  On 24 September 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office summoned the applicant for questioning. The applicant was again provided with a list of his rights as a victim in the proceedings. A summons was served on the applicant\u2019s father, who informed the State Attorney\u2019s Office that the applicant was living abroad and that he was unable to appear for questioning. The applicant also sent a letter to the State Attorney\u2019s Office providing the same justification for his absence. The applicant was then summoned to appear on 30 October 2014. 16.  During his questioning on 30 October 2014, the applicant stated that on the day of the incident he had been at his parent\u2019s flat in Zagreb together with his common-law wife, Ms T.V., and their son. As they had had a dispute, somebody had called the police, who had intervened at the scene. He had first spoken to the police officers but when they had asked him to accompany them to the police station, he had refused. They had then thrown him to the ground face down and had started beating him. At one point they had also handcuffed him and tied his legs. He had managed to bite one of the police officers and as he had been in agony from the beating, he had also bitten his own tongue. The applicant also stated that there had been two paramedics present at the scene. 17.  On 5 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the State Attorney\u2019s Office to send her a copy of the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning. On 28 November 2014 a copy of the record was sent to her. 18.  In the further course of the investigation, the State Attorney\u2019s Office questioned the applicant\u2019s parents and two other relatives (D.D. and M.D.) who had witnessed the incident, as well as the relevant police officers. 19.  During the questioning, D.D. stated that she had only seen the applicant being taken out of the flat by the police officers. M.D. stated that he had seen the applicant and the police officers talking in the flat and that at one point the applicant had tried to punch one of the police officers, after which the police officers had engaged in suppressing his resistance. However, at that point M.D. had left the room where that had been happening. The applicant\u2019s mother stated that she had left the room after the police officers had handcuffed the applicant and tied his legs. She had then heard screams, and on re-entering the room she had seen a lot of blood and the police officers standing around the applicant. Oral evidence to the same effect was given by the applicant\u2019s father. 20.  The police officers denied ill-treating the applicant. They all provided evidence to the extent that when they had intervened at the scene they had immediately realised that they were facing an individual with a mental disorder. He had threatened to kill them, although he had said that he would spare one of them because he had blue eyes. When they had approached him, the applicant had started to resist so they had decided to handcuff him. At that point, he had bitten the hand of police officer S.P. A commotion had then ensued, in the course of which the applicant had fallen on the ground. He had also started kicking, so the police officers had tied his legs. The applicant had also bitten his tongue and had hit his head against the floor, so the police officers had decided to hold his head and to put him on his side. Afterwards, a medical team had intervened at the scene and the applicant had been taken to hospital. 21.  On 24 November 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office ordered a report from a forensic expert, D.M., concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained following his arrest. 22.  On 27 November 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the Zagreb emergency service to provide the names of the members of the medical team who had intervened at the scene during the applicant\u2019s arrest. The next day, the emergency service replied that they could not find the requested information in their records. 23.  However, on the basis of a statement given by one of the suspects, V.B., the State Attorney\u2019s Office established the identity of one of the paramedics who had intervened at the scene. As that person had in the meantime moved out of Zagreb, on 28 November 2014 he was interviewed by telephone. In his interview with the prosecutor he denied having seen any ill-treatment of the applicant during the arrest. However, he stated that the applicant had been very agitated and that he had seen him attacking and biting a police officer. 24.  Meanwhile, on 27 November 2014 the expert, D.M., issued his report.  The expert report indicated that the injuries which the applicant had sustained to his face had been caused by two blows, probably by a fist. The further injuries on his arms, legs and body had been caused either by several blows or possibly also by a fall, as well as by handcuffing. Some of the injuries appeared to have been caused by the body being scratched with an object or dragged across the floor while lying face down. There was also damage to the applicant\u2019s tongue as a result of a bite, but it had been impossible to establish exactly how that injury had been caused. 25.  The State Attorney\u2019s Office found that the forensic expert, D.M., needed to be questioned concerning his report and that he should be presented with some further evidence obtained during the investigation, namely photographs of the crime scene and the individuals concerned taken immediately after the incident, the statements of the relevant police officers and the statement given by the paramedic. 26.  On 28 November 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office questioned D.M. The latter stated that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s face could not have been caused when the police officers had attempted to prevent the applicant from self-harming by holding his face, but that it was possible that he had banged his head against the stretcher while being transported by the paramedics. D.M. stressed that, likewise, the tongue laceration which the applicant had sustained could have been caused by his fall and by him banging his head against the stretcher. D.M. also explained that, having seen the photographs of the applicant taken after the incident, he did not believe that the injuries he had sustained had been caused by beating, but were likely to have been caused by the commotion during the arrest. 27.  On 9 December 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office, by a reasoned decision analysing all the evidence obtained and the facts established during the investigation, terminated the investigation on grounds of lack of evidence of any ill-treatment or any other excessive use of force by the police during the applicant\u2019s arrest. 28.  The decision to discontinue the investigation was served on the applicant on 15 December 2014. It was served on his lawyer the next day. The applicant was informed that he could take over the proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor. 29.  The applicant challenged the decision of the State Attorney\u2019s Office before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). On 19 February 2015 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s complaints inadmissible on the grounds that the impugned decision did not concern any of his civil rights or obligations, or any criminal charge against him. 30.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 5 March 2015. 31.  On 6 December 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu), seeking damages for the injuries sustained during his arrest. 32.  In the course of the proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court obtained evidence from several expert witnesses concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained. One of the experts, V.P., concluded that the injuries on the applicant\u2019s body could have been caused by blows or by the body being dragged across the floor, and that the injuries to his hands and legs could have been caused by impact against a hard surface. The injuries on his face had not been properly documented but such injuries were usually caused by punches delivered with lesser intensity. She also found that there had been an injury to the applicant\u2019s tongue. Another expert, S.D., found that it was impossible to draw any firm conclusion as to how the tongue injury had been caused. 33.  On 31 March 2014 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour. On appeal, the Zagreb County Court increased the amount of compensation for damage, awarding the applicant 17,400 Croatian kunas (HRK). On 20 April 2016 the State paid the applicant in total HRK 66,716.88 (approximately 8,850 euros (EUR)) in compensation for damage, costs and expenses incurred for the proceedings, and interest. 34.  Following intervention by the police and the medical service, the applicant was placed in a psychiatric hospital, where he died on 16 November 2017. An autopsy report indicated that the cause of death was heart failure. An investigation into the event is pending before the relevant State Attorney\u2019s Office.", "references": ["5", "3", "8", "6", "0", "4", "2", "7", "No Label", "1", "9"], "gold": ["1", "9"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 11.  The applicant is a political activist, opposition leader, anti\u2011corruption campaigner and popular blogger. These five applications concern his arrests on seven occasions at different public events. 12.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 13.  On 5 March 2012 the applicant took part in a meeting at Pushkinskaya Square, Moscow, which began at 7 p.m. It had been called to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections in Russia and had been approved by the municipal authorities. 14.  At the end of the meeting, at 9 p.m., State Duma deputy Mr P. addressed the participants, inviting the public to stay after the meeting for informal consultations, which began at about 9.30 p.m. and were attended by some 500 people. According to the applicant, he stayed among others at Pushkinskaya Square for a meeting with the deputy; they remained peacefully within the pedestrian area of the square and did not obstruct the traffic or access. According to the Government, the applicant was holding an irregular gathering without prior notification and was shouting political slogans. 15.  At 10.45 p.m. the police arrived and arrested the applicant, among many others. He was taken to the Tverskoy District police station. 16.  On the same evening two policemen drew up a report on the administrative offence, stating that the applicant had been arrested at 10.45 p.m. \u201cin a fountain\u201d at Pushkinskaya Square; that he had taken part in an irregular public gathering and that he had ignored police orders to disperse. The applicant was charged with a breach of the established procedure for conducting public events, an offence under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was released at 12.15 a.m. on 6 March 2012. 17.  On 15 March 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District examined the administrative charges against the applicant. The applicant challenged the authenticity of the police reports and the witness statement of the two police officers on the grounds that he had been arrested by different police officers, but his objection was dismissed. On the basis of the written statements and testimony of two police officers the Justice of the Peace found the applicant guilty of taking part in an irregular public gathering conducted without prior notification and fined the applicant 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB), equivalent at the material time to about 25 euros (EUR), under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 18.  On 10 April 2012 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant\u2019s appeal. The applicant was absent, but he was represented by a lawyer. The court questioned one further eyewitness, a journalist, who testified that before being arrested the applicant was standing \u201cin a fountain, holding hands with others\u201d and chanting political slogans. He also testified that the police officers who had placed the applicant in the police bus were the same officers who had signed the report and who had appeared at the first-instance hearing. The court examined two video recordings submitted by the applicant. It found that the State Duma deputy had indeed called a public meeting, but concluded that at the time of his arrest the applicant was not meeting the deputy but was participating in a protest assembly. It upheld the judgment of 15 March 2012. 19.  On 8 May 2012 the applicant took part in an overnight \u201cwalkabout\u201d, an informal gathering whereby activists peacefully met at a public venue to discuss current affairs. On this occasion, several dozen activists met up to discuss the inauguration of Mr Putin as President of Russia on the previous day. On 8 May 2012 some areas of central Moscow were restricted for traffic, and partly also to pedestrians, due to the presidential inauguration and the Victory Day celebrations. 20.  At 4.30 a.m., according to the applicant, or at 4 a.m., according to the Government, the applicant was walking down Lubyanskiy Proyezd, accompanied by about 170 people. The group stopped on the stairs of a public building for a group photograph. While the applicant was taking the photograph he was arrested by riot police. At 8 a.m. he was taken to a police station where an administrative offence report was drawn up. The applicant was charged with a breach of the established procedure for conducting public events, an offence under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was released at 10.50 a.m. on that day. 21.  On the same day, at 11.55 p.m., according to the Government, or at 11 p.m., according to the applicant, the applicant was walking down Bolshaya Nikitskaya Street in a cluster of about fifty people. According to the applicant, they stayed on the pavement, had no banners or sound equipment, and were causing no nuisance. They were surrounded by riot police and the applicant was arrested without any order or warning. 22.  At 11.58 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to a police station where an administrative offence report was drawn up. He was charged with a breach of the established procedure for conducting public events, an offence under Articles 20 \u00a7 2 (2) of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was released at 2.50 a.m. on 9 May 2012. 23.  On 30 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges concerning the applicant\u2019s administrative offence at Lubyanskiy Proyezd. The applicant was absent from the proceedings, but he was represented by his lawyer, who disputed the applicant\u2019s participation in an irregular assembly and claimed that his client had not chanted any slogans. He asked the Justice of the Peace to admit video evidence and to examine certain eyewitnesses, but she refused to do so. On the basis of written statements by two police officers the Justice of the Peace found the applicant guilty of taking part in a meeting conducted before 7 a.m., in breach of regulations, and fined him RUB 1,000 under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. This judgment was delivered in full on 1 June 2012. It was upheld on 6 July 2012 by the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. 24.  On 1 June 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 380 of the Presnenskiy District of Moscow examined the administrative charges concerning the applicant\u2019s administrative offence at Bolshaya Nikitskaya Street. The applicant was absent from the proceedings, but he was represented by his lawyer, who disputed the applicant\u2019s participation in an irregular assembly and claimed that his client had not chanted any slogans. The Justice of the Peace questioned three eyewitnesses and the police officer who had arrested the applicant. The police officer testified that he had arrested the applicant because he was walking in a big group of people, obstructing traffic and chanting political slogans. The eyewitnesses testified that the applicant had been walking down the street with about fifty or sixty people, and that the police had blocked their way and had begun to arrest them without any warning; they denied hearing any slogans or amplified sound. The Justice of the Peace refused to admit video evidence and dismissed the eyewitness statements on the grounds that the eyewitnesses were likely to be the applicant\u2019s supporters and were therefore biased. The applicant was found guilty of taking part in a meeting conducted in breach of regulations and was fined RUB 1,000 under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. This judgment was upheld on 25 June 2012 by the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow. 25.  On 9 May 2012 the applicant arrived at 5 a.m. at Kudrinskaya Square in Moscow to take part in an informal meeting with a State Duma deputy and to attend the Victory Day celebrations. He was among 50 to 100 people peacefully \u201cwalking about\u201d and discussing current affairs. According to the applicant, this gathering was not a demonstration: there had been no banners and no noise, and no one was chanting slogans or giving speeches. 26.  At 6 a.m. riot police arrived at the site of the meeting and arrested the applicant without issuing any orders or warning. The applicant submitted a video recording of his arrest. 27.  At 8.50 a.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to the Strogino District police station. At 11.50 a.m. the applicant was searched and an administrative offence report was then drawn up. According to the applicant, he was detained at the police station for more than three hours before being brought before a Justice of the Peace. The Government confirmed that the applicant had been detained pending trial, but did not specify the duration. 28.  At an unidentified time on the same day the applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 375 of the Presnenskiy District of Moscow. The Justice of the Peace refused the applicant\u2019s requests that the police officers who had arrested him be called and examined, and that video evidence be admitted, but granted his request for examination of three eyewitnesses. The witnesses testified that there had been a public meeting with a State Duma deputy to discuss current political developments; that no one had chanted slogans or made noise or obstructed traffic; and that the police had not issued any orders or warnings before arresting the applicant. On the basis of the written statements of two police officers the court established that the applicant had taken part in an irregular public meeting and had disobeyed a lawful order from the police to disperse. It also found that the applicant had chanted the slogans \u201cRussia without Putin!\u201d and \u201cPutin is a thief!\u201d and had refused to leave the square, which needed to be cleared for the Victory Day celebrations. The Justice of the Peace rejected the statements of the three eyewitnesses, on the grounds that they had given different estimates of the number of people present at the venue, the number of police officers who arrested the applicant, and the time of his arrival at the meeting. The applicant was found guilty of disobeying the lawful order of the police, in breach of Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and was sentenced to fifteen days\u2019 administrative imprisonment. 29.  On 10 May 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal. 30.  On 12 December 2012 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow examined the appeal. The applicant asked for the police officers on whose reports and statements the Justice of the Peace had based the judgment to be cross-examined, as well as eight eyewitnesses, and for the video recording of the arrest to be admitted as evidence. The court dismissed these requests and upheld the judgment of 9 May 2012. 31.  On 27 October 2012 the applicant held a static demonstration (\u201cpicket\u201d, \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) at Lubyanskaya Square, which was a part of series of peaceful pickets held in Moscow in front of the buildings housing the Federal Security Service and the Russian Investigation Committee to protest \u201cagainst repressions and torture\u201d. According to the applicant, his demonstration was a solo picket (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) which was not subject to a prior notification to the competent public authority. In total, about thirty people consecutively took part in this event. 32.  At 3.30 p.m. the police arrested the applicant at 9 Maroseyka Street when he was walking down the street accompanied by a group of people. According to the applicant, at the moment of arrest he had finished picketing and was peacefully walking along the pavement; he was not chanting or carrying any banners, but he was being followed by a group of people, including journalists, whose number he estimated as \u201ctwo dozen\u201d. According to the Government, the applicant had organised an irregular march without prior notification. The applicant was taken to the police station at 4.10 p.m. He was charged with a breach of the established procedure for conducting public events, an offence under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was released at 7.17 p.m. the same day. 33.  On 30 October 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges. She examined three eyewitnesses called at the applicant\u2019s request, but refused his request that the police officers who had arrested him be called and examined. The applicant\u2019s request that a video recording of the relevant events be admitted as evidence was also refused, as was the request that a written report from an NGO which had observed the pickets be admitted in evidence. The three eyewitnesses examined at the applicant\u2019s request testified that the applicant, after ending his picket, had walked down the street while speaking with a fellow activist, surrounded by journalists; he remained on the pavement, did not chant slogans, and carried no banners; several other participants in the picket remained standing with their banners, at a certain distance from each other; the police arrested the applicant without any warning or explanation. On the basis of written reports by two police officers the Justice of the Peace established that the applicant had organised and led a group of thirty people, thus holding a march without the approval of the local authorities; that they were heading from Lubyanskaya Square to Lefortovo detention facility, and that at 9 Maroseyka Street the group had obstructed the road, thus halting traffic. She dismissed the witness statements in the applicant\u2019s favour on the grounds that they contradicted the evidence in the case file and found the applicant guilty of taking part in a march which had not been duly notified to the authorities. She fined him RUB 30,000 (equivalent at the material time to about EUR 740) under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 34.  On 7 December 2012 the Basmannyy District Court upheld the judgment of 30 October 2012. 35.  On 24 February 2014 at 12 noon the applicant went to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow to attend a hearing involving activists who were on trial for participation in mass disorders at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 6 May 2012. The judgment was to be delivered at a public hearing on that date. The court-house was cordoned off and obstructed by police vans, and the applicant was unable to enter. He therefore remained outside among other members of the public wishing to attend the hearing. According to the applicant he was standing there silently when the police suddenly rushed into the crowd and arrested him, without any order, warning or pretext. According to the official version, he was holding an irregular gathering and chanting political slogans. 36.  At 12.50 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to a police station. He was charged with a breach of the established procedure for conducting public events, an offence under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was released at 3 p.m. the same day. 37.  Later that day, at about 7.45 p.m., the applicant took part in a peaceful public gathering following the delivery of the judgment in respect of mass disorders at Bolotnaya Square, as a result of which several activists had been sentenced to prison terms. The gathering of about 150 participants took place at Tverskaya Street. The applicant was arrested while he was standing on the pavement talking to a journalist. According to the applicant he had received no order or warning, and he did not resist the police. According to the police report, when the applicant was being seated in the police vehicle he was waving at the crowd and trying to attract media attention, thus demonstrating a refusal to comply with the police order and resisting the officers in the performance of their duties. 38.  At 8.20 p.m. the applicant was taken to the Tverskoy District police station, where an administrative offence report was drawn up. The applicant was charged with disobeying a lawful order of the police, an offence under Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was detained on remand. 39.  On the following day, 25 February 2014, at an unidentified time, the applicant was brought before the judge of the Tverskoy District Court, who examined the charges under Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant\u2019s request for two eyewitnesses to be examined was granted. They testified that the police had not given the applicant any orders or warnings before proceeding to arrest him. The court admitted and examined the video recording of the contested events and questioned the two police officers on whose reports the charges were based. The court established that the applicant had taken part in an irregular meeting and had disobeyed the lawful order of the police to disperse. The applicant was found guilty of disobeying a lawful order of the police, in breach of Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and was sentenced to seven days\u2019 administrative imprisonment. 40.  On 7 March 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court examined the charges relating to the applicant\u2019s alleged participation on 24 February 2014 in an unauthorised public gathering in front of the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court. The applicant requested that two eyewitnesses present at the court\u2011house and the two policemen on whose reports the charges were based be examined. These requests were dismissed. The court admitted a video recording of the contested events, but decided not to take cognisance of its contents because it was undated and because it had not reproduced the full sequence of events. On the basis of the written reports by the two police officers, the judge found the applicant guilty of taking part in a meeting which had not been notified to the competent authority in accordance with the procedure provided by law, and fined him RUB 10,000 (equivalent to about EUR 200) under Article 20 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 41.  On 24 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 25 February 2014. 42.  On 22 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 7 March 2014.", "references": ["9", "6", "5", "4", "0", "1", "No Label", "7", "8", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "8", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1955 and at the time of the events lived in Baku. The second applicant was born in 1986 and resides in Baku. 7.  The medical documentation in the case file shows that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses before his arrest. In particular, he suffered from end-stage kidney failure and from 28 January 2006 underwent dialysis in a specialist centre three times per week. He also suffered from a number of cardiovascular diseases and twice underwent surgery on his heart. 8.  The first applicant further suffered from a severe form of type 2 diabetes and, as a result of the chronic diabetes, had severe problems with his eyesight for which he underwent surgery in 2005. As a result of the above-mentioned illnesses, he had very limited physical mobility. In particular, he could hardly move and was incapable of changing his clothes or taking a bath without assistance. 9.  On 20 June 2007 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d) on suspicion of planning to murder Z.F., at that time the head of the Absheron District Executive Authority, because of a professional dispute between them. 10.  On 21 June 2007 the first applicant was charged with the attempted murder of a public official under Articles 29 and 277 of the Criminal Code. On the same day the prosecutor requested that the judge apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri). 11.  On 21 June 2007 the Sabail District Court, referring to the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request, remanded the first applicant in custody for three months. The judge substantiated the necessity of the measure by the seriousness of the first applicant\u2019s alleged criminal acts and the possibility of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the material in the criminal case and having agreed with the submissions of the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan that the accused, A. Aslanov, attempted to commit a particularly serious crime, that it was needed to prevent his unlawful actions, that there were sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation and disrupt the establishment of the truth about the case and relying on Articles ... decided ...\u201d 12.  On 22 June 2007 the first applicant appealed against that order, claiming that his detention was unlawful. He submitted, in particular, that there was no justification for remanding him in custody. He also complained that the court had failed to take into account his personal situation, such as his state of health and age, when it had ordered his pre\u2011trial detention. 13.  On 11 July 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court made no mention of the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe court bench considers that the first-instance court, having taken into account that A. Aslanov could obstruct the investigation, the nature of the criminal act, and the fact that the punishment for committing such an act is over two years\u2019 imprisonment, was correct in considering it necessary to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him.\nTherefore, the court bench does not consider that the representative\u2019s appeal should be allowed at this stage of the investigation.\u201d 14.  On 20 June 2007 the first applicant was taken to the pre-trial detention facility of the MNS and detained in a cell alone. 15.  On 22 June 2007 the first applicant\u2019s state of health significantly deteriorated and he was urgently transferred to the medical facility of the Penitentiary Service (\u201cthe medical facility\u201d). However, as it was impossible to undergo dialysis there, the first applicant was taken to the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital, where he had regularly undergone dialysis before his arrest. 16.  It appears from the medical documentation in the case file that, following the first applicant\u2019s dialysis at the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital, he was taken directly to the medical facility, where he remained until his death. 17.  On 22 January 2008 the first applicant\u2019s situation worsened during his dialysis at the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital. He died the same day. 18.  His death certificate dated 24 January 2008 indicates that the cause of death was acute heart failure. 19.  A post mortem report dated 25 January 2008 also concluded that the death had resulted from acute heart failure. 20.  A criminal inquiry into the first applicant\u2019s death was launched by the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office. By a decision of 1 February 2008 it refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there had been no criminal aspect to his death. 21.  On 28 February 2008 the first applicant\u2019s family was provided with a copy of that decision. It does not appear from the case file that that decision was appealed. 22.  On 25 June 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the investigating authorities to order a forensic medical examination in order to establish whether the first applicant\u2019s detention was compatible with his state of health. In that connection, he submitted that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses which could not be treated in detention. 23.  On 9 July 2007 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic medical examination. The investigator asked the experts to establish whether the first applicant suffered from coronary heart disease, postinfarction cardiosclerosis, end-stage kidney failure, diabetes and poor eyesight and if so, to determine the level of seriousness of the conditions and establish whether he could continue his medical treatment in the medical facility where he was being detained. 24.  The two experts issued forensic medical report no. 124/TM, which indicated that the examination had begun on 9 July and ended on 23 July 2007. The report confirmed that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses. However, the experts concluded that he could be treated in the medical facility if he was under the full control of an endocrinologist, ophthalmologist, cardiologist and nephrologist and continued his dialysis. 25.  On 30 July 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the investigator to order a new forensic examination with the participation of foreign experts. In particular, he noted that the first applicant could not be provided with dialysis or adequate medical assistance in respect of other conditions in the medical facility and that his detention in these circumstances amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 26.  By a decision of 6 August 2007 the investigator dismissed the request. The part of the decision regarding the first applicant\u2019s medical care in detention reads as follows:\n\u201cIn accordance with the forensic report\u2019s findings, in the medical facility where he was detained the accused A. Aslanov was placed under the full control of the doctors specialising in the medical fields indicated in the report and the continuity of his [dialysis] has, until now, been ensured.\u201d 27.  On 27 September and 11 October 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the Ministry of Justice to provide him with a copy of the document listing the serious illnesses precluding the detention of prisoners. By a letter of 7 November 2007 the Ministry of Justice refused to provide it, finding that the document in question was irrelevant to the first applicant\u2019s case as it concerned prisoners who had already been convicted as a result of a final court decision. 28.  On 23 November 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a civil action with the Sabail District Court, complaining of incompatibility of the first applicant\u2019s detention with his state of health and inadequate medical treatment. In particular, the lawyer asked the court to acknowledge a violation of the first applicant\u2019s right to medical assistance in detention and declare unlawful the Ministry of Justice\u2019s decision not to provide him with the document listing the serious illnesses precluding the detention of prisoners. On 27 November 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the President of the Sabail District Court to examine the case as soon as possible in view of the real risk to the first applicant\u2019s life. 29.  On 26 January 2008 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer received a copy of a decision dated 3 December 2007 by the Sabail District Court refusing to examine on the merits the complaint lodged on 23 November 2007. The Sabail District Court refused to admit the action on the grounds that the first applicant had failed to specify the rights that he considered had been breached. 30.  On 4 February 2008 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer on behalf of his family lodged an appeal against the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 3 December 2007, claiming that it was unlawful. 31.  By a decision of 7 February 2008 the Sabail District Court quashed its decision of 3 December 2007 and decided to examine the complaint on the merits. 32.  According to the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 4 March 2008, the first-instance court decided to leave without examination the action due to failure of the parties to attend the hearing. The court relied on Article 259.0.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that the action was left without examination if the parties failed to attend the hearing without asking in advance the court to examine the action in their absence. 33.  On an unspecified date the criminal investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Assize Court for trial. 34.  On 5 October 2007 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. The first applicant requested that the court discontinue his pre-trial detention. In that regard, he submitted that his continued detention violated his rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention as it was incompatible with his state of health and he was not being provided with adequate medical assistance. 35.  On the same day the Assize Court dismissed the request, finding that the preventive measure of remand in custody should be left unchanged. The Assize Court made no mention of the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints and did not provide any reasons for his continued detention. The decision was not amenable to appeal. 36.  On 16 November 2007 the Assize Court found the first applicant guilty under Articles 29 and 277 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to eleven years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The court held that he had attempted to murder Z.F., but that the planned murder had not been completed for reasons beyond his own control. 37.  Following the first applicant\u2019s death on 22 January 2008 (see paragraph 17 above), on 21 February 2008 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal decided to continue the appeal proceedings in respect of the first applicant at the request of the second applicant. 38.  On 29 May 2008 it dismissed the appeal and upheld the Assize Court\u2019s judgment. 39.  On 28 October 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction.", "references": ["6", "4", "3", "7", "5", "8", "9", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Region. 6.  The applicant was a locomotive driver with Russian Railways in the Moscow Region. He was a member of one of the railway workers\u2019 trade unions, Rosprofzhel (\u201cthe trade union\u201d). 7.  On 7 April 2008 the trade union entered into negotiations with Russian Railways, seeking a general pay raise and the introduction of long\u2011service bonuses for the relevant staff. As the negotiations failed, the trade union decided to organise a strike. On 25 April 2008 the trade union committee decided that the staff of Russian Railways in two suburban Moscow sectors should participate in the strike as from 4 a.m. on 28 April 2008. The trade union committee\u2019s decision referred to minimum services which would be provided during the strike, although the parties have not made any submissions in this regard. 8.  Russian Railways did not apply to the courts for the strike to be declared unlawful. On 28 April 2008 the applicant took part in the strike. He came to work but refused to take up his duties. The strike caused delays in circulation of the trains in the sector where the applicant worked. 9.  On 9 July 2008 the applicant was dismissed for two breaches of disciplinary rules. The first breach ascribed to him had had no relation to his trade union activities. (A year previously, on 8 June 2007, the applicant had been officially reprimanded for having stopped the train 50 metres after the platform). The second breach was the applicant\u2019s refusal to take up his duties during the strike on 28 April 2008. 10.  The applicant complained to a court that he should not have been dismissed for having participated in the strike organised by his trade union. 11.  On 19 August 2008 the case was heard by the Meschanskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). The court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s dismissal for a repeated failure to properly perform his professional duties. Regarding the applicant\u2019s participation in the strike, the court relied on the Railway Acts of 1995 and 2003 (Articles 17 and 26 (2) respectively \u2013 see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). The Acts prohibited strikes of railway workers responsible, inter alia, for the circulation of trains, shunting, and services to passengers. The court stressed that those limitations were aimed at securing safety on the railway and that railway workers were subjected to stricter disciplinary rules than workers in other sectors of industry. The applicant was a locomotive driver; therefore, his work was directly linked to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers. The District Court concluded that the applicant had been precluded from participating in the strike. Relying on a report dated 29 April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the District Court furthermore noted that the strike had caused a number of cancelled and delayed trains which had resulted in \u201cmassive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights\u201d. The strike had also \u201ccontributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety\u201d. Given the above and the applicant\u2019s earlier transgression, his dismissal had been justified. The District Court did not discuss the question of whether advance notice of the strike had been given or other issues related to the lawfulness of the strike of 28 April 2008. 12.  On 29 January 2009, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court confirmed the judgment of 19 August 2008.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "9", "3", "4", "1", "2", "8", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, Ms Violeta Pulfer, is an Albanian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Tirana. 6.  On an unspecified date in 2011 the applicant and her husband moved to Vlora. The applicant agreed to buy a house which had been unlawfully built by S.N. In the meantime, S.N. had lodged an application for the regularisation of the house\u2019s unlawful status. 7.  On 19 October 2011 the applicant and S.N. concluded a down\u2011payment agreement (kontrat\u00eb kapari) according to which the applicant deposited just under half of the sale price as a down-payment (kapar), the remainder to be paid upon the regularisation of the house\u2019s status and the conclusion of the sale agreement. 8.  On 8 December 2011 the applicant moved into the house on the basis of the down-payment agreement. 9.  On 12 January 2012 S.N. asked the applicant to vacate the house. The applicant opposed the eviction and reminded S.N. of the obligations arising from the down-payment agreement. It appears that on the same day S.N. also destroyed some of the applicant\u2019s movable property. 10.  On 1 February 2012 S.N. lodged a civil action, requesting that the down-payment agreement be declared null and that he be allowed to retake possession of the house. 11.  On 3 May 2012 the Vlora District Court dismissed the action and found that the down-payment agreement was valid and lawful. It also found that the request for the repossession of the house was not based on law. As no appeal had been lodged against it, the decision became final on 18 May 2012. 12.  It would appear that on 10 July 2012 the status of the house was regularised and, consequently, S.N. obtained the ownership deeds. No subsequent sale agreement seems to have been concluded between S.N. and the applicant. 13.  In the morning of 8 September 2012 S.N. forced his way into the house. According to the applicant, he put a rope around her neck and she was dragged to the ground and knocked against the surrounding walls for around ten minutes. 14.  On the same day the applicant sent text messages to the chief of police and the district prosecutor, seeking the authorities\u2019 protection against further violence. She submitted screenshots from her mobile telephone of the said text messages to the Registry of the Court as evidence. According to the applicant, the police intervened after one and a half hour. 15.  On 9 September 2012 the applicant\u2019s husband saw E.N., S.N.\u2019s wife, removing tools and objects from the house\u2019s garage. On the same day the applicant went to the police station to lodge a criminal complaint against S.N. for theft. 16.  It would appear that on 10 September 2012 the applicant went to live in her mother\u2019s home in Tirana. 17.  On 30 October 2012, with police assistance, the applicant entered the house and found that it had been emptied. 18.  On an unspecified date, in January 2012, the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against S.N. for the offence of \u201cself-administered justice\u201d (vet\u00ebgjyq\u00ebsia) under Article 277 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d). 19.  On 12 January 2012 the prosecutor took statements from S.N. and E.N. about their efforts to evict the applicant from the house. 20.  On 14 May 2012 S.N. was charged with the offence of self\u2011 administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. 21.  On 20 June 2012 the prosecutor committed S.N. for trial. The case file was forwarded to the Vlora District Court in order for it to conduct the proceedings. 22.  On 12 December 2012 the Vlora District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings on the basis of Article 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) as an amnesty had been granted in respect of that offence pursuant to the General Amnesty Act (Law no. 107 of 8 November 2012 on Amnesty). 23.  On 8 September 2012 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against S.N. for the offence of self-administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. On the same day the prosecutor questioned S.N as a person against whom an investigation was opened. 24.  On 9 September 2012 the applicant made a statement before the prosecutor complaining about the events of 8 and 9 September 2012 (see paragraphs 13-15 above). She also complained about E.N. On the same day E.N. was questioned in that connection as a person against whom an investigation was opened. 25.  Following the alleged assault of 8 September 2012, on 9 September 2012 the prosecutor ordered that the applicant undergo a medical examination. 26.  On 10 September 2012 a police officer referred the offence of self\u2011administered justice against S.N. and E.N. to the prosecutor. 27.  On 10 September 2012 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. The medical report found visible marks on the applicant\u2019s neck resulting from strangulation, and haematomata on the head resulting from impact with a hard object. The above injuries had made the applicant temporarily unfit for work for a period of nine days. 28.  It appears from the case file that the applicant\u2019s health started to deteriorate as a result of the assault on 8 September 2012. Afterwards, she sought expert medical advice in Greece. 29.  On 14 September 2012 the prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 1473 against S.N. for alleged infliction of bodily harm (plagosje e leht\u00eb me dashje) and self-administered justice under Articles 89 and 277 of the CC. An investigation was also opened against E.N. for alleged self\u2011administered justice. 30.  On 4 October 2012 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against S.N. for, inter alia, the offences of threat, breaking and entering, insult, theft, destruction of property and malicious use of telephone calls under Articles 84, 112, 119, 134, 150 and 275 of the CC. 31.  On 4 October 2012 the prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 1588 against S.N. for the offence of malicious use of telephone calls under Article 275 of the CC. 32.  On 8 October 2012 the prosecutor decided to join the two investigations, nos. 1473 and 1588. 33.  On 12 October 2012 S.N. made a statement before the prosecutor. 34.  According to a hospital certificate of 27 November 2012 drawn up in Greece, the applicant underwent a serious anterior cervical discectomy (an operation to remove a herniated or degenerative disc in the neck area of the spine) in Greece. She subsequently had to wear a cervical collar for two months. 35.  On 6 December 2012, following the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s statement that her health had deteriorated, and that she had undergone surgery and a magnetic resonance imaging scan of her cervical spine, the prosecutor ordered a new medical examination. The lawyer also submitted a detailed list of the applicant\u2019s belongings which had been inside the house in September 2012. 36.  On 17 January 2013 the forensic experts confirmed that strangulation marks and haematomata on the head as a result of the events of 8 September 2012 and a suture (as a result of surgery) had been found on the applicant\u2019s body. The above injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for a period of over nine days. They further stated that on the basis of the documents in the case file, namely the hospital certificate of 27 November 2012, the magnetic resonance images, and the report of a consultation with a particular neuropsychiatrist, the damage found on the magnetic resonance images was unrelated to the events of 8 September 2012; they had been caused as a result of conditions that had existed before the trauma. 37.  On 15 February 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office found that S.N. was suspected of having committed the offences provided for in Articles 89, 275 and 277 of the CC. E.N. was suspected of having committed the offence provided for in Article 277 of the CC. However, it decided to discontinue the investigation, since an amnesty had been granted in respect of the alleged offences pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. The decision also made reference to two forensic examinations of 10 September 2012 and 17 January 2013. The decision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\n\u201c... on the basis of the forensic examination of 10 September 2012 it was found that the bodily injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for over nine days.\n...\n[The applicant] alleges that on the day of the accident she suffered serious bodily injuries, as a result of which she had to undergo surgery. On 6 December 2012 she was subjected to a forensic re-examination, which was concluded on 17 January 2013 ..., it was found that the bodily injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for over nine days. The injuries fall to be examined under the offence of bodily harm prescribed in Article 89 of the Criminal Code.\n...\nOn the basis of information obtained during the investigation ..., it appears that from 24 to 27 September 2012, S.N. harassed (e ka shqet\u00ebsuar) Violeta Pulfer by way of telephone calls, and threatened not to allow her to return to the house she had purchased. In these circumstances, it is suspected that S.N. and E.N. have committed the offence laid down in Article 277 of the Criminal Code, whereas S.N. [is] also [suspected of] the offences laid down in Articles 89 and 275 of the Criminal Code ....\nOn 28 November 2012 [the General Amnesty Act] entered into force. Section 5 provides for the discontinuation of the criminal prosecution of all offences committed until 30 September 2012 in respect of which the Criminal Code prescribed a sentence of up to two years\u2019 imprisonment or a lighter punishment.\n...\nThe offences set out in Articles 89, 277 and 275 of the Criminal Code, in respect of which investigations have been opened, have a maximum term of imprisonment of two years, and were committed prior to 30 September 2012. Under these circumstances, there are grounds which mean that the investigation (procedimi penal) cannot continue.\u201d 38.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 February 2013 with the General Prosecutor of Albania. She requested that the investigation be continued by the district prosecutor on account of theft in collusion with others, destruction of property, torture and constraint through threat or violence for the acquisition of property under Articles 134, 150, 86, 109/b of the CC respectively. She also complained of a lack of impartiality of the prosecutor. 39.  On 25 April 2013 the applicant was awarded full disability status and was recognised as permanently unfit for work. 40.  On 11 July 2014 the General Prosecutor sent the file to the Fier district prosecutor\u2019s office to proceed with the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the impartiality of the Vlora district prosecutor. 41.  On 2 and 3 November 2017, the Government and the applicant, respectively, informed the Court that the applicant had lodged a complaint with the Vlora District Court against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 February 2013 under Article 329 of the CCP. 42.  On 18 May 2015 the Vlora District Court had dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. It found that the prosecutor had carried out all the necessary investigative steps and that the proceedings had been duly discontinued pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. 43.  On 15 September 2015 the Vlora Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant for the same reasons as given by the Vlora District Court. It also noted that the applicant had not claimed before the domestic courts that any investigative actions had been omitted by the prosecutor\u2019s office. 44.  On 14 July 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 15 September 2015. 45.  On an unspecified date the applicant made another criminal complaint against S.N. and E.N. for the offence of theft under Article 134 of the CC. 46.  On 3 November 2017 the applicant informed the Court of the outcome of the third investigation. 47.  On 2 November 2012 the prosecutor opened investigation no. 1762 against S.N. and E.N. for the offence of theft under Article 134 of the CC in relation to the event of 30 October 2012. 48.  On 6 December 2012 the applicant made another statement before the prosecutor, complaining of, amongst other things, the theft of her belongings that had occurred on 30 October 2012. 49.  On 13 March 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office classified the offence as self-administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. 50.  On 10 April 2014 the Vlora District Court discontinued the proceedings on the basis of Article 387 of the CCP since an amnesty had been granted in respect of the offence pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. 51.  On 3 November 2017 the applicant also informed the Court that, on an unspecified date in 2014 she had lodged with the Tirana prosecutor another complaint against S.N. for the offences of threat, grievous bodily harm (plagosje e r\u00ebnd\u00eb me dashje) and insult under Articles 84, 88 and 119 of the Criminal Code. The applicant had also complained that the forensic medical report of 17 January 2013 had been based on forged documents and that the offence of grievous bodily harm had in fact been committed. 52.  On 30 June 2014 the Tirana prosecutor, after having carried out some investigative actions, decided not to send the case for trial on the grounds that there were no elements of a crime. He reasoned that the magnetic resonance images and the neuropsychiatrist consultation, which the forensic medical report had relied on, were not related to the events of 8 September 2012. 53.  On 3 December 2014 the Tirana District Court, following an application by the applicant, decided to quash the prosecutor\u2019s decision and ordered him to continue the investigation. It decided that the prosecutor should examine the evidence as submitted by the applicant and any other evidence or claim related thereto, carrying out a thorough investigation. 54.  On 6 October 2015 the Tirana Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, upheld the District Court\u2019s decision of 3 December 2014. 55.  In February 2018 the Government informed the Court about the following development. On 6 December 2017, the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office registered the criminal proceedings on account of falsification of documents. On 11 December 2017 the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office declared its lack of competence and transferred the case to the Vlora prosecutor\u2019s office, which registered the case no. 9854 on 14 December 2017. It appears that the investigation is still ongoing. However, the Government stated that this set of proceedings had no bearing on the applicant\u2019s complaints.", "references": ["4", "7", "9", "0", "3", "6", "2", "5", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Labytnangi, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 5.  On 22 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the IK-8 correctional colony, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 6.  On 31 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s wife instituted divorce proceedings. 7.  On 9 April 2008 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Krasnosulinskiy District of the Rostov Region (\u201cJustice of the Peace\u201d) sent a letter rogatory to the courts of Tyumen Region, asking them to interview the applicant and to establish whether he wished to attend the hearing in person. 8.  On 22 April 2008 the Tyumen Regional Division of the Judicial Department received the letter. 9.  On 4 July 2008 a Justice of the Peace in Labytnangi fixed an interview with the applicant for 18 July 2008 and sent two summonses to his home address, which his wife had listed in her statement of claim. Both summonses were returned undelivered. 10.  On 10 September 2009 the Tyumen courts informed the Justice of the Peace that it had been impossible to reach the applicant. On the same day the Justice of the Peace decided to hold a hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence, noting that although the applicant had his registered residence at the address mentioned by the plaintiff, he had not appeared for an interview before the Justice of the Peace. 11.  On 18 September 2008 the Justice of the Peace granted the divorce. On the same day a copy of the decision was sent to the applicant\u2019s home address. 12.  On 20 November 2013, the applicant learnt of the judgment of 18 September 2008. He asked for an extension of the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. He argued that he had never received the judgment of 18 September 2008 and that he had been previously unaware of the divorce proceedings. 13.  On 26 December 2013 the Justice of the Peace heard evidence from the applicant\u2019s former wife who claimed that the applicant should have been aware of the divorce proceedings in 2008 because his mother had received the final judgment of 18 September 2008. The Justice of the Peace held that an excerpt of the judgment had been served on the applicant in person on 31 October 2008 and refused the applicant\u2019s application to extend the time limit for lodging an appeal. The hearing was held in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. 14.  On 15 May 2014 the Krasnosulinskiy District Court of Rostov Region upheld the decision of 26 December 2013, again in his absence.", "references": ["9", "7", "1", "6", "0", "2", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Republic of Dagestan. 6.  On 26 June 2012 Mr N. reported to the inter-district investigative committee that, since 2010, his minor daughter, the applicant in the present case, had been repeatedly forced to have oral and anal sex with eleven men over a period of almost two years from October or September 2010 to June 2012. The men had filmed the events and had threatened to disclose this information to the public should the applicant refuse to comply with their demands. 7.  In response to a complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s father, the authorities instituted a preliminary inquiry during which P., an investigator, questioned the applicant (who provided a detailed account of the above-mentioned events), subjected the applicant to a gynaecological examination (which did not detect any traces of sexual assault on the applicant\u2019s body), conducted an inspection of the locations where the alleged rapes had taken place and collected wet towel wipes found at the location of the \u201cT.L.\u201d area (the applicant having explained that one of the rapists had wiped himself with a towel wipe). The wipes were sent for forensic examination. The investigator also questioned six of the men accused by the applicant of having raped her. They all denied her allegations. The investigator examined the mobile telephones belonging to those men and found none of the video recordings mentioned by the applicant. 8.  On 18 July 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a DVD with a video recording of one of the alleged occasions. 9.  On 20 July 2012 the investigator examined the video recording. Having discerned no visible traces of injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, he concluded that the applicant had been engaging in oral sex voluntarily. 10.  Having examined the material obtained in the course of the inquiry, P., the investigator, discerned no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape and on 26 July 2012 issued a decision declining to open a criminal investigation against the alleged perpetrators. 11.  On 2 August 2012 the head of the inter-district investigative committee quashed the decision of 26 July 2012, noting that the investigator had not questioned all the alleged perpetrators and had failed to obtain the results of the forensic examination. 12.  On 12 August 2012 P. declined to open a criminal investigation. The relevant decision reiterated verbatim the wording of the decision of 26 July 2012. 13.  On 17 August 2012 the deputy head of the investigative committee quashed the decision of 12 August 2012, noting that the investigator had failed to comply with the decision of 2 August 2012. 14.  On 27 August 2012 P. issued a decision declining to open a criminal investigation. The wording of that decision reiterated that of his earlier decisions and added that the forensic examination of biological material obtained from one of the perpetrators had not been completed. The said decision was quashed by the deputy head of the investigative committee on 4 October 2012. 15.  On 3 November 2012 P., the investigator, declined to open a criminal investigation. He based his findings on the material collected in the course of the first inquiry. In addition, he relied on the statements made by the other three alleged perpetrators and the results of the forensic analysis, according to which the sperm found on the towel wipes could belong to Dzh.N. or K.G. 16.  On 28 November 2012 the head of the investigative committee opened a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape. 17.  On 15 January 2013 the applicant was granted the status of victim of a crime and advised of her procedural rights. 18.  On several occasions the investigator questioned the alleged perpetrators. The submissions that they made during that questioning are summarised in Annex I below. 19.  On 10 and 11 March 2013 M.G., Dzh.A., K.G., Dzh.N., Sh.D., M.M., N.A., and M.Kh. were arrested and remanded in custody on the charges of rape. 20.  On 13 and 19 March 2013 they were released. 21.  On 17 June 2013 the forensic expert prepared a report concerning the examination of the flash memory drives of six mobile telephones which the investigator had earlier obtained from the alleged perpetrators. The expert indicated that it was impossible to restore the flash memory drives of the phones because the laboratory did not have the necessary equipment. 22.  On 9 August 2013 the forensic expert concluded that the genetic material collected at the location indicated by the applicant could not have originated from Dzh.A., K.G. or Dzh.N. 23.  On 4 October 2013 an investigator, Z., ordered that the applicant undergo a polygraph test. On 7 October 2013 the applicant underwent the test. According to the polygraph specialist\u2019s report, the applicant had been telling the truth when she had said that M.G. had sexually assaulted her at the B. Hotel, that he had blackmailed her and that he had slapped her. 24.  On 9 October M.G. underwent a polygraph testing. The polygraph specialist concluded, on the basis of the answers provided by M.G., that it was probable that he had blackmailed or threatened the applicant and had coerced her into performing oral sex on him at the B. Hotel. 25.  On 6 December 2013 D., an investigator, suspended the investigation. 26.  On 13 January 2014 the first deputy head of the republican investigative committee determined that the criminal investigation had been incomplete and perfunctory and quashed the decision of 6 December 2013, ordering a further investigation. 27.  On 25 February 2014 D. discontinued the criminal investigation, noting that there was no evidence, except for the applicant\u2019s statements, implicating seven of the alleged perpetrators. 28.  On 16 May 2014 D. discontinued, on similar grounds, the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P. 29.  On 20 June 2014 the Sovetskiy District Court dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of 25 February 2014. On 20 August 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the said decision on appeal. 30.  On 28 January 2015 the deputy head of the second division of the republican investigative committee quashed the decision of 16 May 2015 and reopened the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P. On the same date he discontinued the criminal investigation. 31.  On 29 January 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of 16 May 2014. On 1 April 2015 the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld the decision of 29 January 2015 on appeal. 32.  On 1 September 2015 the District Court quashed the decision of 29 January 2015. 33.  On 30 September 2015 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 20 June 2014 and 20 August 2014. 34.  On 2 October 2015 the investigative committee reopened the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P. 35.  On the same date the investigative committee discontinued the criminal investigation. 36.  On 27 October 2015 the District Court accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that the investigation had been incomplete and found the decision of 25 February 2014 to have been unlawful. 37.  After the reopening of the case, the investigator questioned Dzh.A., K.G., Dzh.N. and Sh.D. 38.  On 30 January 2016 the criminal investigation was discontinued. The investigator relied on the statements made by the applicant, her parents and the alleged perpetrators, and forensic evidence. He also indicated in the decision to discontinue the investigation that he had received a response from the relevant mobile-telephone service providers that they had not been able to obtain and submit information concerning mobile communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators. The investigator concluded as follows:\n\u201c... the allegations that [the applicant was raped] are confirmed only by [the applicant] and her parents ... who learned about them from [the applicant]. The [applicant\u2019s] allegations contradict the statements of many witnesses and the forensic evidence. [The alleged perpetrators] denied the [applicant\u2019s] accusations. They maintained their innocence in [the applicant\u2019s] presence.\nThe investigation has not produced any additional evidence that would support the [applicant\u2019s] allegations. The [sexual] crimes were committed in the absence of witnesses, and obtaining proof of those crimes has become problematic. It should be also taken into consideration ... that a significant amount of time has passed since the crimes were committed.\u201d 39.  On 18 November 2016 the Government were requested to submit a complete investigation file in the applicant\u2019s case. 40.  On 29 March 2017 the Government submitted an incomplete copy of the material from the case file (comprising 898 pages, including seventeen pages containing nine tables of contents). According to the tables of contents, the complete case file comprised nine volumes totalling 1,882 pages. No explanation was given for the failure to submit the complete case file, as had been requested. 41.  In particular, the Government did not submit any of the material referred to by the investigator in his decision of 30 January 2016 as regards mobile communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators.", "references": ["9", "3", "6", "5", "0", "7", "2", "8", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in St Petersburg before his arrest. 6.  On 27 June 2013 D., an investigator at the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee in St Petersburg (\u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0433. \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u2013 \u201cSt Petersburg Investigative Committee\u201d), instituted criminal proceedings into fraud against Ms R. allegedly committed by the applicant. 7.  At 4.30 p.m. on 4 July 2013 the applicant was arrested near his car on a street in St Petersburg by masked police officers of the special rapid response unit of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region (\u0421\u041e\u0411\u0420 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u0438 \u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u00ad), and operational police officers of unit no. 7 of the operative\u2011search division of criminal investigation department no. 3 of the GUVD (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 7 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u041e\u0420\u0427 (\u0423\u0420) \u21163 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u0438 \u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe criminal investigation department\u201d). The applicant was dressed in a polo shirt and shorts. He lay on the ground until D.\u2019s arrival at the scene. 8.  The following investigative measures were carried out that day:\n(i)  from 5.25 to 6.30 p.m. the applicant\u2019s car was searched;\n(ii)  at 7 p.m. he was arrested as a suspect and searched by D. at police station no. 59 in St Petersburg (a record of the arrest was drawn up at 8.50 p.m.);\n(iii)  from 10 to 11.58 p.m. his apartment (which he rented from S.) was searched by D.;\n(iv)  shortly after midnight his wife\u2019s garage was searched, after which he was taken to D.\u2019s office at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee. 9.  According to the applicant, he did not resist his arrest. From the time he was taken to police station no. 59 on 4 July 2013 until about 6 a.m. on 5 July 2013 operational police officers Ch., K. and P. of the criminal investigation department, in D.\u2019s presence, allegedly subjected him to ill\u2011treatment in order to force him to confess to crimes. In particular, he was allegedly punched and kicked in the head and abdomen (by Ch. and K. at police station no. 59); struck with a book to the head, ears and back of the head and made to kneel on small objects spread out on the floor (by Ch., K. and P. during the search in his apartment); punched, kicked and dragged to the ground and spat upon in the face (during the search in the garage); punched in the head, abdomen and chest, nearly suffocated with a plastic bag placed over his head, struck several times in the torso and kicked in the left kidney (by Ch., K. and P. from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. in D.\u2019s office at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee), and threatened with a gun by Ch. D. allegedly refused to contact the applicant\u2019s family and lawyer. 10.  From 7 to 8.30 a.m. on 5 July 2013 at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee D. questioned the applicant as a suspect in the presence of A.D., a State\u2011appointed lawyer invited by D. According to the applicant, he asked A.D. to inform the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of his alleged ill\u2011treatment, but he did not do so. 11.  At around midday on 5 July 2013 police officers took the applicant to Aleksandrovskaya Hospital in St Petersburg, where the injuries on him were recorded. The applicant denied being physically assaulted. According to the applicant, he denied the assault because he had been threatened with violence by those who had ill-treated him if he \u201copen[ed] [his] mouth\u201d. 12.  From 5.10 to 6.05 p.m. that day the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. It granted a request by D. for the applicant\u2019s detention and remanded him in custody. 13.  After the court hearing, the applicant was taken to a different police station (no. 57) in St Petersburg, where his injuries were also recorded. The police records contain an explanation by the applicant stating that his injuries were caused from 4 to 5 July 2013 during his questioning at the Investigative Committee. 14.  At around 9 a.m. on 6 July 2013 the applicant was taken to hospital for a second time, where he remained until 9 July 2013. 15.  On 9 July 2013 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ 47/4 in St Petersburg. 16.  According to medical records from Aleksandrovskaya Hospital in St Petersburg, the applicant was admitted as an emergency and underwent inpatient treatment in the urology unit from 5 to 9 July 2013. He complained, in particular, of pain in the left side of his lumbar region and in his abdomen and knee joints. He was diagnosed with a contusion of the left kidney. He also had a superficial abrasion on his upper abdomen, abrasions on both his knee joints (measuring from 0.5 x 1 cm to 1 x 1.5 cm) and bruising on his abdomen, chest and arms. After his hospitalisation the applicant was discharged for further supervision and outpatient treatment by a urologist. 17.  According to records from police station no. 57 in St Petersburg of 5 July 2013, where the applicant was examined by an on\u2011duty officer, the applicant had: (i) a bruise on his forehead; (ii) abrasions on his right elbow; (iii) bruising on his chest and abdomen and (iv) abrasions on both his knees. 18.  On 9 July 2013 the applicant was examined by a doctor at pre-trial detention facility IZ 47/4. He complained of pain in the left side of his lumbar region. The doctor recorded abrasions on the applicant\u2019s knee joints and bruising on his abdomen and noted that the injuries had been received on or around 5 July 2013. 19.  On 2 September 2013 Sh., an investigator at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee in charge of a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police, ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, stating that he was in custody and could not therefore appear for the examination in person. The investigator summarised the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment as follows. After his arrest in the course of his questioning he had been repeatedly punched and kicked to the ears, back of the head and abdomen. 20.  According to forensic medical report no. 3575 P, which was carried out in the absence of the applicant from 13 to 18 September 2013 on the basis of the investigator\u2019s order of 2 September 2013, and which comprised an analysis of the applicant\u2019s medical records, the applicant had the following injuries: (i) bruising on his forehead; (ii) bruising on his chest and abdomen; (iii) an abrasion on his abdomen; (iv) abrasions on his right elbow joint and both knee joints, recorded on 5 July 2013; and (v) bruising on his arms, recorded on 8 July 2013. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries, as recorded on 5 and 8 July 2013, had been caused within the last fourteen to fifteen days. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused on 4 July 2013 and concluded that the injuries had originated from impact with a hard, blunt object or objects as a result of a blow or pressure (bruising), friction or a blow with friction (abrasions), and had not caused any \u201chealth damage\u201d to the applicant. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries to his abdomen could have been caused by being kicked in that area, as was alleged by the applicant. The expert further defined no less than seven areas on the applicant\u2019s body where there was evidence that force had been used. The expert considered that in view of the available medical data it was impossible to confirm for certain a contusion of the applicant\u2019s left kidney, therefore it was not subject to expert assessment. 21.  On 15 October 2013 Sh. ordered an additional forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, stating again that the applicant was in custody and could not therefore appear for the examination in person. The investigator stated that it had been established based on the video recording of the applicant\u2019s arrest that in the course of his arrest the applicant had been \u201cknocked down\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d) to the ground, where had remained lying for some time, face down and motionless. The investigator further stated that, according to explanations gathered during the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, upon the arrival of the officers of the special rapid response unit the applicant had attempted to flee by spinning his car around (\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0431\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f). However, the officers had surrounded the vehicle from both sides. Since the applicant had further resisted arrest, the officers had used sambo techniques, as a result of which the applicant had been \u201cknocked down\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d) from behind, face down on the ground and handcuffed. According to eyewitnesses, there had been light fresh abrasions on the applicant\u2019s elbows and knees, which must have been caused by his falling to the ground. There had been no other injuries on him. The investigator ordered the expert to determine whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused as a result of his falling down onto hard asphalt ground. 22.  On 15 November 2013 an additional forensic medical report (no. 4414 P) was issued by the same expert. It was carried out in the absence of the applicant on the basis of the investigator\u2019s order of 15 October 2013, and comprised an analysis of the applicant\u2019s medical documents and photographs in which he could be seen lying on the ground face down after his arrest in the presence of several police officers of the special rapid response unit. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question, the expert stated that the bruising on the applicant\u2019s forehead and abdomen and abrasions on his abdomen, elbow and knees could possibly have been caused as a result of a fall (\u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043f\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) onto hard asphalt. The expert further reiterated the conclusions made in the previous report about the other possible causes of the injuries such as being struck and, in particular, that he did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries to his abdomen, taking into account their nature and localisation, could have equally been caused by being kicked in that area one or more times, as was alleged by the applicant. 23.  On 7 August 2013 the applicant lodged a formal criminal complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 9 above) with the St Petersburg Investigative Committee. 24.  Sh. at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d). 25.  On the dates specified below, and pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, Sh. refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers and D. owing to the absence of the elements of an offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) in their actions. Four of those refusals were overruled by a higher authority within the Investigative Committee as unsubstantiated and/or unlawful, and the investigating authorities were ordered to carry out additional pre\u2011investigation inquiries:\n(i)  10 September 2013 (overruled on 16 September 2013);\n(ii)  15 October 2013 (overruled on 8 November 2013);\n(iii)  9 December 2013 (overruled on 7 October 2014);\n(iv)  18 December 2014 (overruled on 7 August 2015);\n(v)  5 September 2015. 26.  Sh. based his refusals to initiate criminal proceedings on the following explanations and other material collected during the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, as well as the forensic medical reports. 27.  A. and S.B., police officers of the special rapid response unit, assisted Ch., K. and P. during the applicant\u2019s arrest. They stated that the applicant had attempted to abscond by spinning his car around; they had surrounded the vehicle and used the following techniques on the applicant: they had held him in a hammerlock (\u0437\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0431 \u0440\u0443\u043a\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u043d\u0443) and \u201cstruck him with their feet\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430). Afterwards, they had laid (\u0443\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438) him on the ground face down. He had then been handcuffed. They did not state that they had knocked the applicant down to the ground. Nor did they state that the applicant had fallen to the ground. L., a driver of the special rapid response unit, filmed the arrest. His account of the way the arrest had been carried out was identical to that of A. and S.B. 28.  Ch., K. and P., the police officers of the criminal investigation department who participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest, stated that they had not seen the precise moment of his arrest, that is to say when he had been apprehended and laid face down on the ground by A. and B.S. According to Ch. and D. (who arrived after the arrest), the applicant had had fresh abrasions on his elbows and knees, which had probably been caused as a result of a fall to the ground. K. and P. had not noticed any visible injuries on him after his arrest. They stated that the applicant had \u201cpossibly\u201d had abrasions on his arms and forehead. He had not had any other injuries. No threats or physical force had been used against him after his arrest on the street, during the search of his car, at police station no. 59 in St Petersburg, during the searches of his home and his wife\u2019s garage, or at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee. The police officers denied subjecting the applicant to any form of threats or ill-treatment to extract a confession of fraud. 29.  A.B. participated in the search of the applicant\u2019s car after his arrest as an attesting witness, together with M. According to A.B., the applicant had behaved calmly and not made any complaints. The police officers had not insulted or threatened him. A.B. had not noticed any injuries on the applicant. According to A.B., the neighbours from the building nearby (whose names are not indicated in the investigators\u2019 decisions) had allegedly seen the applicant attempting to run away from the police officers in the direction of his car; however, he had then been apprehended by the police officers of the special rapid response unit. 30.  O. participated in the search of the applicant\u2019s apartment and the garage as an attesting witness, together with Sch. According to O., the applicant had behaved quietly and not made any complaints. The police officers had neither threatened nor physically assaulted him. O. had not seen any visible injuries on him. 31.  S., the owner of the apartment rented by the applicant, stated that she had seen the applicant during the search of the apartment. She had not noticed any visible injuries on him. According to S., the applicant had been calm and had not complained of being assaulted by the police. S. further stated that the police officers had behaved politely. After the search of the apartment, the applicant had gone downstairs without protest. He had been in handcuffs. 32.  The applicant\u2019s case file contained an undated internal memorandum by Ch. notifying D. of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 4.30 p.m. on 4 July 2013 on suspicion of fraud. The report indicates that \u201cduring the arrest, A.V. Samesov failed to obey and attempted to abscond. Sambo combat techniques and special devices \u2013 handcuffs \u2013 were therefore used on him\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0440\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0421\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u0410.\u0412. \u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b \u043d\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u043f\u044b\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f, \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0443\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441\u0430\u043c\u0431\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446. \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u2013 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438\u201d). 33.  The video recording made by the special response unit showed the applicant after his arrest lying face down on the ground. According to Sh.\u2019s observations, injuries resembling abrasions were visible on the applicant\u2019s forehead and right elbow. 34.  In the most recent refusal (5 September 2015) to open a criminal case \u2013 owing to the absence of the elements of offences under Articles 286 (abuse of powers) and 302 (forced extraction of confession) of the Criminal Code in the actions of Ch., K., P. and D. \u2013 Sh. considered that the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment contained unresolved contradictions, evidencing his attempts to avoid criminal liability and provide false information to the investigating authorities. In particular, the applicant indicated that he had been physically assaulted many times, receiving injuries to his head, abdomen and extremities. However, according to his medical records, he had not had any head injuries, and the alleged contusion of his left kidney had not been confirmed. As to the abrasions on his limbs, head and abdomen, the investigator concluded that they had most probably been caused during the arrest as a result of the use of combat techniques on the applicant by the officers of the special rapid response unit and the applicant\u2019s position (\u043d\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) on the ground. The investigator further indicated seven areas where force could have been used against the applicant on the forehead, chest, abdomen, arms and knees. The investigator noted that the applicant\u2019s injuries, as recorded on 5 and 8 July 2013, had been caused within the last fourteen to fifteen days. Accordingly, they could have been caused on a day other than 4 July 2013. 35.  The applicant challenged the refusals (of 9 December 2013, 18 December 2014 and 5 September 2015) to open a criminal case against the police officers under Article 125 of the CCrP. 36.  On 25 June 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 9 December 2013. On 7 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal and found the refusal in question unlawful and unsubstantiated; it ordered the investigating authorities to rectify the deficiencies. In particular, the appellate court noted that the investigator had taken the decision to refuse to open a criminal case without identifying all the officers responsible, in breach of the criminal procedural law requirements. Moreover, the appellate court found that the pre\u2011investigation inquiry was incomplete, as not all of the applicant\u2019s arguments had been addressed. 37.  On 26 June 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the refusal of 18 December 2014 unlawful and unsubstantiated, and the investigating authorities were ordered to rectify the deficiencies. In particular, the court found that the investigator had not addressed the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the alleged threats and incidents of physical assault by the police during the search of the garage, and had not substantiated its refusal to open a criminal case. 38.  On 6 May 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 5 September 2015 which it considered lawful and well founded. On 2 August 2016 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["0", "2", "9", "4", "7", "8", "6", "5", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently detained in Edirne. 11.  At the material time, the applicant was one of the co-chairs of the Peoples\u2019 Democratic Party (HDP), a left-wing pro-Kurdish political party. From 2007 onwards he was a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (\u201cthe National Assembly\u201d). Following the parliamentary elections on 1 November 2015, he was re-elected as a member of the National Assembly for the HDP, and his term of office ended at the time of the parliamentary elections on 24 June 2018. 12.  In the presidential election of 10 August 2014 the applicant received 9.76% of the vote. He also stood in the presidential election on 24 June 2018 and received 8.32% of the vote. 13.  In September and October 2014, members of the illegal armed organisation Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) launched an offensive on the Syrian town of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab in Arabic), some 15 km from the Turkish border town of Suru\u00e7. Armed clashes took place between Daesh forces and the People\u2019s Protection Units (YPG), an organisation founded in Syria and regarded as a terrorist organisation by Turkey on account of its links with the PKK (Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan, an illegal armed organisation). 14.  From 2 October 2014 onwards, a large number of demonstrations were held in Turkey and several non-governmental organisations at local and international level published statements calling for international solidarity with Kobani against the siege by Daesh. 15.  On 5 October 2014 a tweet was published from a Twitter account allegedly controlled by one of the PKK leaders, reading as follows:\n\u201cWe call upon all the young people, women and everyone from 7 to 70 to stand up for Kobani, to protect our honour and dignity and to occupy the metropolitan areas.\u201d (\u201cGen\u00e7leri kad\u0131nlar\u0131 7\u2019den 70\u2019e herkesi Kobane\u2019ye sahip \u00e7\u0131kmaya onurumuzu namusumuzu korumaya metropolleri i\u015fgal etmeye \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz.\u201d) 16.  On 6 October 2014 the following three tweets were published from the official HDP Twitter account, @HDPgenelmerkezi:\n\u2013 \u201cUrgent call to our people! Urgent call to our people from the HDP central executive board, currently in session! The situation in Kobani is extremely dangerous. We urge our people to take to the streets and to support those protesting in the streets against Daesh attacks and the AKP [Justice and Development Party] government\u2019s embargo over Kobani\u201d (\u201cHalklar\u0131m\u0131za acil \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131! \u015euanda toplant\u0131 halinde olan HDP MYK\u2019dan halklar\u0131m\u0131za acil \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131! Koban\u00e9\u2019de duru\u015f son derece kritiktir. I\u015e\u0130D sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 ve AKP iktidar\u0131n\u0131n Koban\u00e9\u2019ye ambargo tutumunu protesto etmek \u00fczere halklar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 soka\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kmaya ve soka\u011fa \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f olanlara destek vermeye \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz\u201d);\n\u2013 \u201cWe call upon all our people, from 7 to 70, to [go out into] the streets, to [occupy] the streets and to take action against the attempted massacre in Kobani\u201d (\u201cKoban\u00e9\u2019de ya\u015fanan katliam giri\u015fimine kar\u015f\u0131 7 den 70 e b\u00fct\u00fcn halklar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 soka\u011fa, alan tutmaya ve harekete ge\u00e7meye \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz\u201d);\n\u2013 \u201cFrom now on, everywhere is Kobani. We call for permanent resistance until the end of the siege and brutal aggression in Kobani\u201d (\u201cBundan b\u00f6yle her yer Kobane\u2019dir. Kobane\u2019deki ku\u015fatma ve vah\u015fi sald\u0131rganl\u0131k son bulana kadar s\u00fcresiz direni\u015fe \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz\u201d). 17.  On the same day, the following statement from an organisation known as the KCK (Koma Civak\u00ean Kurdistan \u2013 \u201cKurdistan Communities Union\u201d, identified as the \u201curban wing\u201d of the PKK by the Court of Cassation, was published on the website www.firatnews.com. The statement read as follows:\n\u201cThe wave of revolution that started in Kobani must spread throughout Kurdistan, and on that basis, we call for an uprising by the Kurdish youth ... All those among our people who can make it to Suru\u00e7 must go there immediately without wasting a second, and every inch of Kurdistan must rise up for Kobani ... We call upon all our people, from 7 to 70, to make life unbearable for Daesh and their collaborators the AKP wherever they are, and to take a stand against these gangs [responsible for] massacres by fostering rebellion [Serhildan in Kurdish] up to the highest level.\u201d (\u201cKobani ile ba\u015flayan devrim dalgas\u0131 t\u00fcm K\u00fcrdistan\u2019a yay\u0131lmal\u0131 ve Bu temelde K\u00fcrt gen\u00e7li\u011finin ayaklanmas\u0131 \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131nda bulunuyoruz... B\u00fct\u00fcn halk\u0131m\u0131z Suru\u00e7\u2019a gidebilecekler hemen bir saniye zaman kaybetmeden gitmeli ve K\u00fcrdistan\u2019\u0131n her kar\u0131\u015f topra\u011f\u0131 Koban\u00ea i\u00e7in aya\u011fa kalkmal\u0131d\u0131r... T\u00fcm halk\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 yediden yetmi\u015fe bulundu\u011fu her yerde ya\u015fam\u0131 I\u015e\u0130D ve i\u015fbirlik\u00e7isi AKP\u2019ye dar etmeye ve serh\u0131ldan\u0131 en \u00fcst d\u00fczeyde geli\u015ftirerek bu katliamc\u0131 \u00e7etelere kar\u015f\u0131 durmaya \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz.\u201d) 18.  On 7 October 2014 the following statement by the KCK Executive Council was published on the same website:\n\u201cOur people must carry on the resistance they have started against this terrible and insidious massacre, by spreading it everywhere and at all times. Our people in the North [in the region of south-eastern Turkey] must give the Daesh gangs and their supporters no chance of survival. All the streets must be turned into the streets of Kobani and the strength and organisation of this historic and unique resistance must be developed further. From now on, millions of people must take to the streets and the border must turn into a flood of people. All Kurds and all honourable people, friends and groups who are sympathetic [to our cause] must take action. Now is the time to develop and amplify the act of resistance. On this basis, we call upon our people, all groups that are sympathetic [to our cause] and our friends to embrace and amplify the Kobani resistance and we call upon all young people, particularly the Kurdish youth, to join the ranks of freedom in Kobani and to intensify the resistance.\u201d (\u201cHalk\u0131m\u0131z bu \u00e7irkin ve sinsi katliam kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyi her yere, her zamana ta\u015f\u0131yarak s\u00fcreklile\u015ftirmelidir. Kuzey halk\u0131m\u0131z \u0130\u015e\u0130D \u00e7etelerine, uzant\u0131lar\u0131na ve destek\u00e7ilerine hi\u00e7bir yerde ya\u015fam \u015fans\u0131 tan\u0131mamal\u0131d\u0131r. T\u00fcm sokaklar Kobani sokaklar\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fclmeli, tarihin bu e\u015fsiz direni\u015fine denk bir direni\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc ve \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc geli\u015ftirilmelidir. Bu saatten itibaren milyonlar sokaklara akmal\u0131, s\u0131n\u0131r insan seline d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmelidir. Her K\u00fcrt ve onurlu her insan, dostlar, duyarl\u0131 kesimler bu andan itibaren eyleme ge\u00e7melidir. An direni\u015f eylemini geli\u015ftirme ve b\u00fcy\u00fctme an\u0131d\u0131r. Bu temelde t\u00fcm halk\u0131m\u0131z\u0131, duyarl\u0131 kesimleri, dostlar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 Kobani direni\u015fini sahiplenerek b\u00fcy\u00fcmeye, ba\u015fta K\u00fcrt gen\u00e7leri olmak \u00fczere t\u00fcm gen\u00e7leri Kobani de \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck saflar\u0131na kat\u0131larak direni\u015fi y\u00fckseltmeye \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131yoruz.\u201d) 19.  From 6 October 2014 onwards, the demonstrations became violent. Clashes took place between different groups, and the security forces intervened forcibly. On unspecified dates, the local governors of a number of towns imposed curfews. 20.  In two statements on 7 and 9 October 2014 the applicant emphasised that he was opposed to the use of violence during the demonstrations. He stated that his political party was prepared to cooperate with the government but that the latter first needed to identify those who had provoked the violence. 21.  According to the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 21 December 2017 (no. 2016/25189) on the applicant\u2019s subsequent individual application, fifty people died during the violence on 6 and 8 October 2014 and 772 were injured, including 331 members of the security forces. 1,881 vehicles and 2,558 buildings, including hospitals and schools, suffered damage. In the course of the subsequent criminal investigations conducted by the appropriate prosecuting authorities, 4,291 people were arrested and 1,105 were placed in pre-trial detention (see paragraph 30 of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment). 22.  On 9 October 2014 the applicant gave a speech at the HDP offices in Diyarbak\u0131r. The relevant parts of the speech read as follows:\n\u201cWe issued the calls in question [the tweets published from the HDP Twitter account] because we had found out that Daesh had reached the border at M\u00fcr\u015fitp\u0131nar. People went out into the streets and there was no violence anywhere. We did not tell anyone to resort to violence. We appealed for political struggle. What aggravated the violence was not the call issued by the HDP, or the demonstrations by the people. It is the government\u2019s task to find those who provoked [the demonstrations]. There should be no acts of violence. There is no need for intervention in demonstrations [held] in support of Kobani ...\u201d (\u201cDAE\u015e \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fcn M\u00fcr\u015fitp\u0131nar s\u0131n\u0131r kap\u0131s\u0131na dayand\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6\u011frendi\u011fimiz i\u00e7in bahsi ge\u00e7en \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lar\u0131 yapt\u0131k, insanlar soka\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 hi\u00e7bir yerde \u015fiddet kullan\u0131lmad\u0131. \u015eiddet kullan\u0131ls\u0131n demedik. Siyasi m\u00fccadele ama\u00e7l\u0131 bir \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131 yapt\u0131k. \u015eiddeti b\u00fcy\u00fcten HDP\u2019nin \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 de\u011fil, halk\u0131n g\u00f6sterileri de\u011fil. Tahrik edenleri bulmak h\u00fck\u00fcmetin g\u00f6revidir. \u015eiddet eylemleri olmamal\u0131. Kobane\u2019yi sahiplenme eylemlerine m\u00fcdahale edilmemeli ...\u201d) 23.  In an interview published on 13 October 2014 in the daily newspaper Evrensel, the applicant was quoted as follows:\n\u201cIt is directly linked to Kobani. It is not for us to calm down the anger. We do not have so much influence over the people, nor is it necessary. We believe that practical measures that the government could take to drive Daesh out of Kobani will end this anger. Of course, I am not talking about acts of violence. We have not encouraged acts of violence like the use of weapons, arson, destruction [and] dispossession. We have not incited or organised [such acts]. But we have called for the people\u2019s anger to turn into an ongoing protest, day and night, everywhere, on the squares, in homes, in the streets, in cars. We still stand behind that call.\u201d (\u201cDo\u011frudan Kobaniyle ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131d\u0131r. \u00d6fkeyi yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131rabilecek olan biz de\u011filiz. Bizim halk \u00fczerinde ne b\u00f6yle bir g\u00fcc\u00fcm\u00fcz vard\u0131r ne de buna gerek vard\u0131r. Yani halk I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 durmas\u0131n sempati duysun diye u\u011fra\u015facak de\u011filiz. Biz h\u00fck\u00fcmetin ataca\u011f\u0131 pratik ad\u0131mlar\u0131n I\u015e\u0130D\u2019in Kobani\u2019den p\u00fcsk\u00fcrt\u00fclmesiyle sonu\u00e7lanmas\u0131n\u0131n bu \u00f6fkeyi durduraca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyoruz. Elbette ki bundan kastetti\u011fim \u015fiddet olaylar\u0131 de\u011fil. Biz silah kullanma, yak\u0131p y\u0131kma, yapmalama gibi \u015fiddet eylemlerini te\u015fvik etmedik, tahrik etmedik, \u00f6rg\u00fctlemedik ama halk\u0131n \u00f6fkesinin alanlarda, meydanlarda, gece g\u00fcnd\u00fcz evinde, sokakta, arabas\u0131nda elindeki b\u00fct\u00fcn imkanlarla bir protestoya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesinin \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 yapt\u0131k. O \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131n\u0131n da halen arkas\u0131nday\u0131z.\u201d) 24.  During late 2012 and January 2013, a peace process known as the \u201csolution process\u201d had been initiated with a view to finding a lasting, peaceful solution to the \u201cKurdish question\u201d. A series of reforms aimed at improving human rights protection were implemented. A delegation of members of parliament, including the applicant, went to \u0130mral\u0131 island, where Abdullah \u00d6calan \u2013 the leader of the PKK, who in 2013 called for an end to the armed struggle within his organisation \u2013 is imprisoned. On 28 February 2015 the delegation, together with the then Deputy Prime Minister, presented the \u201cDolmabah\u00e7e consensus\u201d, a ten-point reconciliation declaration. The then Prime Minister, Mr Ahmet Davuto\u011flu, stated that the consensus meant that significant steps were being taken towards halting terrorist activities in Turkey. However, shortly after the announcement, the President of Turkey, Mr Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, said that it was out of the question that the government would reach an agreement with a terrorist organisation. 25.  On 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections were held. The HDP achieved 13% of the vote and passed the threshold for representation in the National Assembly. The AKP lost its majority in Parliament for the first time since 2002. 26.  On 20 July 2015 a terrorist attack apparently carried out by Daesh took place in Suru\u00e7, leaving thirty-four people dead and more than 100 injured. 27.  On 22 July 2015, in another terrorist attack, two police officers were killed in their homes in Ceylanp\u0131nar. The murders, allegedly committed by members of the PKK, resulted de facto in the end of the \u201csolution process\u201d. 28.  The day after that attack, the PKK\u2019s leaders urged the people to arm themselves and to build underground systems and tunnels that could be used during armed clashes. They also called for the proclamation of a political system of self-governance. In addition, they announced that all civil servants in the region would now be considered accomplices of the AKP and as a result would risk being targeted. 29.  On 28 July 2015 the President of Turkey issued a press statement, the relevant parts of which read:\n\u201cI do not approve of dissolving political parties. But I say that the deputies of that party [the HDP] must pay the price. Personally and individually.\u201d (\u201cBen parti kapat\u0131lmas\u0131 olay\u0131n\u0131 do\u011fru bulmuyorum. Fakat bu partinin y\u00f6neticilerinin bu i\u015fin bedelini \u00f6demeleri gerekir diyorum. Fert fert, birey birey.\u201d) 30.  Between 10 and 19 August 2015 self-governance was proclaimed in nineteen different towns in Turkey, the vast majority of them in the south-eastern region. 31.  Members of the YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement), regarded as the PKK\u2019s youth wing, dug trenches and put up barricades in several towns in eastern and south-eastern Turkey, including Cizre, Silopi, Sur, \u0130dil and Nusaybin, to prevent the security forces from entering. According to the security forces, members of the YDG-H had brought a large number of weapons and explosives into the region. 32.  In August 2015 several curfews were imposed in various towns of south-eastern Turkey by the local governors. The stated aim of the curfews was to clear the trenches that had been dug by members of terrorist organisations, to remove any explosives planted there, and to protect civilians from violence. The security forces carried out operations in the areas where the curfew was in place, using heavy weapons. 33.  Following the declaration of a curfew in Sur, the applicant gave a statement to the press in Lice on 13 September 2015, stating as follows:\n\u201cOur people want self-governance, their own assemblies and municipalities where responsibility lies with elected officials rather than appointees. Our people have the power to resist against pressure and massacre policies everywhere. We have the power to protect ourselves against any attack. We will show that we are not despairing; we will resist together; we will achieve salvation without forgetting our motherland and history and by defending our rights.\u201d (\u201cHalk\u0131m\u0131z atananlar\u0131n de\u011fil se\u00e7ilmi\u015flerin yetkili oldu\u011fu kendi meclisleri ile belediye ile kendini y\u00f6netmek istiyor. Halk\u0131m\u0131z her yerde bask\u0131 politikalar\u0131na katliam politikalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 direnebilecek g\u00fc\u00e7tedir. B\u00fct\u00fcn sald\u0131r\u0131lara kar\u015f\u0131 kendimizi koruyacak g\u00fcc\u00fcm\u00fcz var. \u00c7aresiz olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 g\u00f6steriyoruz, birlikte direnece\u011fiz, kendi ana vatan\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 da tarihimizi de unutmadan haklar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 da savunarak hep birlikte kurtulu\u015fa gidece\u011fiz.\u201d) 34.  Following the failure of negotiations to form a coalition government, early elections were held on 1 November 2015, in which the HDP polled 10% of the vote. The AKP won the elections and regained its majority in the National Assembly. 35.  In a press statement on 18 December 2015 the applicant stated:\n\u201cEverywhere you carry out [security] operations is filled with an atmosphere of enthusiasm rather than fear and panic. Do you know why? [Because] these people are so sure that they will triumph from the very first day. They are the defenders of an honourable, proud and dignified cause. We will not let cruelty and fascism win any more; this resistance will triumph. Those who try to downplay it by calling it [resistance of] ditches and holes should look back at history. There are tens of millions of heroes and brave people resisting against this coup. You are waging a war against the people. The people are resisting and will resist everywhere. Next week, on 26 and 27 December, we will attend the extraordinary meeting of the Democratic Society Congress in Diyarbak\u0131r. We will have intensive discussions and take important decisions concerning the processes of self-governance and autonomy and their operation in the political arena. We will implement them all.\u201d (\u201cBug\u00fcn operasyon yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z her yerde korku ve panik havas\u0131 de\u011fil co\u015fku havas\u0131 hakim. Neden biliyor musunuz ? O insanlar daha ilk g\u00fcnden kazand\u0131klar\u0131ndan o kadar eminler ki. Onurlu, \u015ferefli, haysiyetki bir davan\u0131n savunucular\u0131d\u0131r. Bir kez daha zulm\u00fcn, fa\u015fizmin kazanmas\u0131na izin vermeyece\u011fiz, bu direni\u015f kazanacakt\u0131r. \u00d6yle hendek, \u00e7ukur diye k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fanlar da d\u00f6n\u00fcp tarihe baks\u0131nlar. On milyonlarca kahraman, yi\u011fit bu darbeye kar\u015f\u0131 direnen insan var. Sen halka kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015f a\u00e7m\u0131\u015fs\u0131n. Halk her yerde direnir, direnecektir. \u00d6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki haftasonu 26-27 Aral\u0131k\u2019ta Diyarbak\u0131r\u2019da Demokratik Toplum Kongresi\u2019nin ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc kongresine bizler de kat\u0131laca\u011f\u0131z. \u00d6z y\u00f6netimin, \u00f6zerkli\u011fin in\u015fas\u0131 ve i\u00e7inin doldurulmas\u0131 s\u00fcrecinn siyasi zeminde daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc y\u00f6netilmesi i\u00e7in \u00e7ok yo\u011fun tart\u0131\u015fmalar yapaca\u011f\u0131z, \u00f6nemli kararlar alaca\u011f\u0131z. Bunlar\u0131n hepsini hayata ge\u00e7irece\u011fiz.\u201d) 36.  On 26 December 2015 the applicant attended the extraordinary meeting of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK). He gave a speech in which he defended self-governance and the resistance. He also stated that barricades and trenches had been set up to thwart the Ankara authorities\u2019 plans for a massacre. The DTK\u2019s closing declaration included a call for the creation of autonomous regions. 37.  On 29 December 2015 the President of Turkey stated to the press that the applicant\u2019s speeches amounted to \u201cclear provocation and treason\u201d. 38.  In a speech on 26 March 2016 the applicant drew a distinction between war, which he described as illegitimate, and resistance, which he said was a legitimate response to the fascist policies of the political authorities in accusing millions of people of being terrorists. 39.  On 16 March 2016 the President of Turkey gave a speech to village and neighbourhood mayors (muhtars) at the presidential complex. The relevant parts of the speech read as follows:\n\u201cWe must immediately settle the issue of immunity. Parliament must move forward quickly. [We cannot discuss whether to lift the immunity of just] one or two people. We need to adopt a principle. What is this principle? Those who cause the death of fifty-two people by getting my Kurdish brothers to pour into the streets will show up in Parliament, those who say that the PKK, the PYD [Democratic Union Party] and the YPG are behind them will have clean hands, is that it? If Parliament does not take the necessary action, this nation and history will hold it accountable.\u201d (\u201cDokunulmazl\u0131klar meselesini s\u00fcratle neticelendirmeliyiz. Parlamento ad\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcratle atmal\u0131d\u0131r. Bir ki\u015fi mi olsun, iki ki\u015fi mi ? Biz ortaya ilkeyi koymal\u0131y\u0131z. Nedir bu ilke? Benim K\u00fcrt karde\u015flerimi soka\u011fa d\u00f6kerek 52 ki\u015finin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcne yol a\u00e7an ki\u015filer yarg\u0131lanmayacak da parlamentoda boy g\u00f6sterecek, arkas\u0131nda PKK\u2019nin, PYD\u2019nin, YPG\u2019nin oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yleyenler temiz olacak \u00f6yle mi? Parlamento gere\u011fini yapmazsa, bu millet, tarih bu parlamentodan hesab\u0131n\u0131 sorar.\u201d 40.  On 20 May 2016 the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment by inserting a provisional Article in the 1982 Constitution. Pursuant to the amendment, parliamentary immunity was lifted in all cases where requests for the lifting of immunity had been transmitted to the National Assembly prior to the date of adoption of the amendment in question. The relevant parts of the explanatory memorandum on the constitutional amendment read as follows:\n\u201cAt a time when Turkey is waging the largest and most intensive campaign against terrorism in its history, certain members of parliament, whether before or after their election, have made speeches amounting to moral support for terrorism, have provided de facto support and assistance to terrorism and terrorists [and] have called for violence; [these actions] have aroused public indignation. The Turkish public is of the view that members of parliament who support terrorism and the terrorist[s] and call for violence are abusing their [parliamentary] immunity, and has urged the Turkish Grand National Assembly to allow the prosecution of anyone carrying out such activities. In the face of such a demand, it is inconceivable that the Assembly should remain silent.\u201d (\u201cT\u00fcrkiye, tarihinin en b\u00fcy\u00fck ve en kapsaml\u0131, ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadelesini y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fcrken, baz\u0131 milletvekillerinin se\u00e7ilmeden \u00f6nce ya da se\u00e7ildikten sonra yapm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131 ter\u00f6re manevi ve moral destek manas\u0131ndaki a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131, baz\u0131 milletvekillerinin ter\u00f6re ve ter\u00f6ristlere fiili manada destek ve yard\u0131mlar\u0131, baz\u0131 milletvekillerinin ise \u015fiddet \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lar\u0131 kamuoyunda b\u00fcy\u00fck infial meydana getirmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye kamuoyu milletvekillerinden, her \u015feyden \u00f6nce, ter\u00f6r\u00fc ve ter\u00f6risti destekleyen, \u015fiddete \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131 yapan milletvekillerinin dokunulmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131 istismar etti\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmekte, bu t\u00fcr fiilleri olanlar\u0131n yarg\u0131lanmas\u0131na Meclis taraf\u0131ndan izin verilmesini talep etmektedir. B\u00f6yle bir talep kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda, Meclis\u2019in sessiz kalmas\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclemez.\u201d) 41.  The constitutional amendment affected a total of 154 members of the National Assembly, including fifty-nine from the CHP (Republican People\u2019s Party), fifty-five from the HDP, twenty-nine from the AKP and ten from the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). It also concerned one independent member of parliament.\nOn various dates, fourteen members of parliament from the HDP, including the applicant, and one from the CHP were placed in pre-trial detention as the subject of criminal investigations. 42.  On an unknown date, seventy members of parliament applied to the Constitutional Court for a review of the constitutional amendment. Their main contention was that the amendment should be treated as a \u201cparliamentary decision\u201d under Article 83 of the Constitution entailing the lifting of the immunity attaching to their status as members of parliament. They argued that the Constitutional Court should review the constitutionality of that \u201cdecision\u201d in accordance with Article 85 of the Constitution. 43.  In judgment no. 2016/117 delivered on 3 June 2016, the Constitutional Court unanimously rejected the application for a review of the constitutional amendment as a parliamentary decision on the lifting of the immunity of the members concerned. It observed that the case before it concerned a constitutional amendment in the formal sense of the term, which could not be treated as a parliamentary decision to lift the parliamentarians\u2019 immunity. It further noted that the amendment in question could be reviewed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 148 of the Constitution. However, under that procedure, only the President of Turkey or one-fifth of the 550 members of the National Assembly could apply for a review. Finding that this condition was not satisfied in the case before it, the Constitutional Court rejected the application by the members of parliament concerned. 44.  The constitutional amendment was published in the Official Gazette on 8 June 2016 and came into force the same day. 45.  On unspecified dates while the applicant was serving as a member of parliament, thirty-one investigation reports (fezleke) were drawn up in respect of him by the competent public prosecutors. The prosecutors applied to the National Assembly to have the applicant\u2019s parliamentary immunity lifted in connection with the criminal investigations concerning him. A large majority of the reports concerned terrorism-related offences. 46.  Following the entry into force of the constitutional amendment concerning the lifting of parliamentary immunity, the Diyarbak\u0131r public prosecutor (\u201cthe public prosecutor\u201d) decided to join all the criminal investigations in respect of the applicant under file number 2016/24950. 47.  On 12 July, 15 July, 28 July, 12 August, 6 September and 11 October 2016 the competent public prosecutors issued summonses for the applicant to give evidence. However, the applicant did not appear before the investigating authorities. In a speech at a meeting of his party\u2019s parliamentary group in April 2016, the applicant had stated that no HDP member of parliament would give evidence voluntarily. 48.  On 9 September 2016 the Diyarbak\u0131r Magistrate\u2019s Court ordered restrictions on the right of the applicant\u2019s lawyers to inspect the contents of the investigation file or to obtain copies of documents in the file. On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged an objection against that decision, but the objection was dismissed on 19 November 2016. 49.  On 3 November 2016, at the public prosecutor\u2019s request, the Diyarbak\u0131r Magistrate\u2019s Court ordered a search of the applicant\u2019s home. 50.  On 4 November 2016 the applicant was arrested at his home and taken into police custody. Officers of the Diyarbak\u0131r police carried out a search at his home. 51.  On the same day, the applicant, assisted by three lawyers, appeared before the public prosecutor. Arguing that he had been arrested and taken into police custody on account of his political activities and on the orders of the President of Turkey, the applicant stated on that occasion that he would not answer any questions relating to the accusations against him. 52.  Afterwards, the public prosecutor asked the Diyarbak\u0131r 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court to place the applicant in pre-trial detention for membership of an armed terrorist organisation (Article 314 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d)) and for incitement to commit an offence (Article 214 \u00a7 1 of the CC). 53.  Later on 4 November 2016, the applicant appeared before the Diyarbak\u0131r 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court and was questioned about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. The applicant repeated the comments he had made to the public prosecutor and stated that he would not answer any questions. In the reasons for its decision, the Diyarbak\u0131r 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court noted firstly that the constitutional amendment had lifted the applicant\u2019s parliamentary immunity in relation to the offences concerned. It then observed that, during the escalation of clashes between Daesh and the PYD in Syria in October 2014, the PKK had issued several calls for people to take to the streets. Almost simultaneously, three tweets had been published on behalf of the HDP central executive board, of which the applicant was a member and co-chair, likewise urging people to go out into the streets. The magistrate noted that during the events of 6 to 8 October 2014, PKK supporters had committed a number of offences, and in particular had caused the death of fifty people, injuries to 678 others and damage to 1,113 buildings. In his view, the tweets sent by the HDP gave rise to a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence of incitement to commit an offence, in view of his position within the HDP. Next, he observed that the applicant had given several speeches in which he had described certain acts by PKK members, such as digging trenches and putting up barricades in towns, as \u201cresistance\u201d, and had participated in activities of the Democratic Society Congress, an organisation which, according to the magistrate, operated in accordance with the KCK Agreement. He added that the applicant was the subject of several ongoing criminal investigations by the public prosecutor\u2019s office concerning terrorism-related offences such as:\n\u2013  committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being a member of it;\n\u2013  disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation;\n\u2013  assisting an illegal organisation;\n\u2013  public incitement to hatred and hostility;\n\u2013  condoning crime and criminals;\n\u2013  participating in unlawful meetings and demonstrations.\nIn the magistrate\u2019s view, those facts were a sufficient basis for a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation. The magistrate added that the offences in question were among those listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) \u2013 the so-called \u201ccatalogue offences\u201d, for which a suspect\u2019s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion. Subsequently, taking into account the severity of the sentences prescribed by law for the offences in question, he held that the measure of pre-trial detention was necessary and proportionate and that alternative measures to detention appeared insufficient. 54.  On 8 November 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In a decision of 11 November 2016 the Diyarbak\u0131r 3rd Magistrate\u2019s Court dismissed the objection. 55.  On 1 December 2016 the Diyarbak\u0131r Magistrate\u2019s Court examined of its own motion the question of the applicant\u2019s continued pre-trial detention, on the basis of the case file alone. The magistrate ordered his continued detention, having regard to the existence of grounds justifying it; the nature of the alleged offences and the fact that they were among those listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the CCP; the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed a criminal offence within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention; the strong suspicion against the applicant for the purposes of Article 19 of the Constitution; and the factual evidence grounding a strong suspicion that he had committed an offence for the purposes of Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Taking into account the severity of the sentences prescribed by law for the offences in question, the magistrate held that the applicant\u2019s continued pre-trial detention was proportionate and that alternative measures to detention appeared insufficient. 56.  On 11 January 2017 the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court in respect of the applicant, running to 501 pages (not including the appendices). He charged the applicant with forming or leading an armed terrorist organisation (Article 314 \u00a7 1 of the CC), disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation (fifteen counts \u2013 section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713)), incitement to commit an offence (Article 214 \u00a7 1 of the CC), condoning crime and criminals (four counts \u2013 Article 215 \u00a7 1 of the CC), public incitement to hatred and hostility (two counts \u2013 Article 216 \u00a7 1 of the CC), incitement to disobey the law (Article 217 \u00a7 1 of the CC), organising and participating in unlawful meetings and demonstrations (three counts \u2013 section 28(1) of the Meetings and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911)), and not complying with orders by the security forces for the dispersal of an unlawful demonstration (section 32(1) of Law no. 2911). He sought a sentence of between forty-three and 142 years\u2019 imprisonment for the applicant. 57.  The charges brought against the applicant by the public prosecutor may be summarised as follows.\n(i) In a speech he had given in Batman on 27 October 2012 in the offices of the Peace and Democracy Party (\u201cthe BDP\u201d, a left-wing pro-Kurdish political party), the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK terrorist organisation by urging people to close their shops and not to send their children to school as a protest aimed at securing the release of the PKK leader.\n(ii) On 13 November 2012 two demonstrations had been held in Nusaybin and K\u0131z\u0131ltepe in protest against the conditions of the PKK leader\u2019s detention, and the applicant had made the following comments in K\u0131z\u0131ltepe:\n\u201cThey said you couldn\u2019t put up the poster of \u00d6calan. Those who said it ... Let me speak clearly. We are going to put up a sculpture of President Apo. The Kurdish people have now risen up. With their leader, their party, their elected representatives, their children, their young and old, they are one of the greatest peoples of the Middle East.\u201d (\u201cDemi\u015fler ki \u00d6calan posteri asamazs\u0131n\u0131z. Onu diyenlere a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a sesleniyorum... Biz ba\u015fkan Apo\u2019nun heykelini dikece\u011fiz heykelini. K\u00fcrt halk\u0131 art\u0131k aya\u011fa kalkm\u0131\u015f bir halkt\u0131r. \u00d6nderiyle, partisiyle, se\u00e7ilmi\u015fiyle, \u00e7ocu\u011fuyla, genciyle, ya\u015fl\u0131s\u0131yla Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun en b\u00fcy\u00fck halklar\u0131ndan biridir.\u201d)\nAccording to the bill of indictment, these comments amounted to propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation.\n(iii) In a speech he had given in the BDP offices in Diyarbak\u0131r on 21 April 2013, the applicant had made the following statements:\n\u201cThe Kurdish movement used to see the war as a war of self-defence. Nowadays, if you have enough experience to resist [and] prevail using non-violent methods, it is not morally [and] politically right to use weapons. Today, those who criticise us also say that the Kurdish people would not exist, at least in Turkish Kurdistan, without the PKK movement. You could not speak of the existence of Kurds in Turkish Kurdistan. Without the coup in 1984 [the year of the first PKK attacks], without the guerrillas, no one today could speak of the existence of the Kurdish people; the Kurds would have no other choice. ... At the time of the initial resistance in \u015eemdinli [and] Eruh [the first terrorist attacks by the PKK, carried out in the \u015eemdinli district in Hakkari and the Eruh district in Siirt on 15 August 1984], no one was aware of what was happening but the resistance has today created [the] reality of the [Kurdish] people. We have gained our identity.\u201d (\u201cK\u00fcrt hareketi sava\u015f\u0131 me\u015fru m\u00fcdafaa sava\u015f\u0131 olarak ele ald\u0131. \u015eimdi e\u011fer elinizde silah d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda y\u00f6ntemlerle g\u00fc\u00e7le, mekanizmayla direnebilecek, ba\u015farabilecek yeteri kadar birikim varsa siz buna ra\u011fmen silah\u0131 kullan\u0131rs\u0131n\u0131z birincisi bu ahlaki olmaz ikincisi de siyasi olarak da do\u011fru bir tercih olmaz. K\u00fcrt halk\u0131 evet bug\u00fcn biz sadece s\u00f6ylemiyoruz, bizi ele\u015ftirenler de s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu, PKK hareketi olmasayd\u0131 bug\u00fcn K\u00fcrt halk\u0131 diye bir \u015fey T\u00fcrkiye K\u00fcrdistan\u2019\u0131 i\u00e7in en az\u0131ndan olmayacakt\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye K\u00fcrdistan\u0131\u2019nda K\u00fcrtlerin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan s\u00f6z edilmeyecekti. 1984 hamlesi olmasayd\u0131, gerilla sava\u015f\u0131 olmas\u0131yd\u0131, kimse bug\u00fcn K\u00fcrt halk\u0131n\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan s\u00f6z edemezdi, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc K\u00fcrtlerin ba\u015fka \u00e7aresi yoktu. ... \u015eemdinli\u2019de Eruh\u2019ta ilk direni\u015f sergilendi\u011finde kimse ne oldu\u011funun fark\u0131nda de\u011fildi ama o direni\u015f bug\u00fcn b\u00fcy\u00fck bir halk ger\u00e7e\u011fi yaratt\u0131. Kimli\u011fimizi kazand\u0131k.\u201d)\n(iv) Following the proclamations of self-governance and the operations conducted by the security forces, the applicant had stated on several occasions that the operations in question were massacres carried out by the national authorities and had described certain acts attributed to members of the PKK as acts of resistance.\n(v) The applicant had actively worked for the DTK organisation, founded according to the public prosecutor in order to raise public awareness of the PKK\u2019s views, and had given speeches at meetings organised by the DTK.\n(vi) The applicant was in charge of the political wing of the KCK illegal organisation; the public prosecutor presented evidence against him including the following:\n\u2013  two documents, entitled \u201cdocumento\u201d and \u201cikram ark\u201d, discovered on a hard drive seized from the home of a certain A.D., who had been sentenced to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment for leading a terrorist organisation; according to those documents, the KCK leader in Turkey, S.O., had given instructions to several people, including the applicant, to visit the relatives of \u0130.E., who had been mistakenly assassinated by the PKK;\n\u2013  the records of intercepted telephone conversations between S.O. and K.Y., a person who had been sentenced to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment for leading a terrorist organisation, and between K.Y. and the applicant; according to those records, S.O. had given instructions to several people, including the applicant, to take part in certain meetings abroad, including in Strasbourg.\n(vii) The applicant had incited the acts of violence that had taken place between 6 and 8 October 2014 through his speeches and statements, the relevant parts of which are summarised in paragraphs 22-23 above. 58.  On 2 February 2017 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court accepted the bill of indictment filed by the public prosecutor. On the same day, it contacted the Ministry of Justice, asking it to take the necessary steps to transfer the venue of the applicant\u2019s trial on public safety grounds. Also on the same day, it ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 59.  On 1 March 2017 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court examined of its own motion the question of the applicant\u2019s continued detention. Having regard to the number and nature of the charges against the applicant and the concrete evidence grounding a strong suspicion that he had committed an offence, and bearing in mind that he had yet to provide his defence submissions, that he had refused to appear before the investigating authorities, that the alleged offences were among those listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the CCP and that the grounds for keeping him in detention remained unchanged, it ordered his continued pre-trial detention. In view of the severity of the sentences provided for by law for the offences in question, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held that the application of alternative measures to detention would be insufficient. 60.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a further objection against the decision to continue his pre-trial detention. In a decision of 14 March 2017 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court dismissed the objection on the basis of the nature of the alleged offences, the state of the evidence, the period that the applicant had spent in detention, the strong suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and his refusal to appear before the investigating authorities during the investigation. 61.  On 22 March 2017, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, the Court of Cassation, finding that a change of venue for the applicant\u2019s trial was appropriate in order to avoid threats to public safety, transferred the case to the Ankara Assize Court. 62.  On 6 April 2017, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court forwarded the file to the Ankara Assize Court. 63.  On 22 June 2017 the Ankara 19th Assize Court, examining the question of its own motion, ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention. In so doing, it took account firstly of the existence of concrete evidence grounding a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the alleged offences and of the upper and lower limits of the sentences prescribed for those offences. Next, it found that the prevention of disorder and of further offences constituted valid grounds for pre-trial detention in the light of Article 5 of the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law. Having regard to the period that the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention, it also held that there was a risk of his absconding and tampering with evidence. For the same reasons, it concluded that the application of alternative measures to pre-trial detention would have been insufficient. 64.  On 3 October 2017, 103 days after its previous decision, the Ankara 19th Assize Court again examined the question of the applicant\u2019s continued pre-trial detention. Having regard to the number and nature of the charges against him, the existence of concrete evidence grounding a strong suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and the upper and lower limits of the sentences prescribed for those offences, and bearing in mind that he had yet to provide his defence submissions, that he had refused to appear before the investigating authorities and that the grounds for keeping him in detention remained unchanged, it ordered his continued pre-trial detention. It also noted that in view of the prospect of the applicant\u2019s conviction for the alleged offences, the application of alternative measures to pre-trial detention would be insufficient. 65.  On 7 December 2017 the Ankara 19th Assize Court held its first hearing in the case. 66.  During the trial, the applicant argued that he had been detained for expressing his political opinions, and denied having committed any criminal offence. He maintained that his initial and continued pre-trial detention were unlawful. In particular, he asserted that the aim of depriving him of his liberty had been to silence members of the opposition. 67.  During the investigation and the trial, the applicant lodged more than fifteen objections against his continued pre-trial detention. The national courts, in particular the Ankara 19th Assize Court, continued to extend his pre-trial detention, mainly on the same grounds as referred to in paragraphs 53, 55, 59, 60, 63 and 64 above. 68.  The criminal proceedings are currently pending before the Ankara 19th Assize Court. 69.  On 17 November 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained firstly of a violation of his right to liberty and security and his right to engage in political activities. In that connection he submitted that he had been arrested, taken into police custody and placed in pre-trial detention on account of political speeches he had made as a member of parliament and co-chair of a political party. He argued that the statements he had made should be examined from the standpoint of his right to freedom of expression. He also contended that the reasons given by the domestic courts to justify his continued detention had been insufficient. In addition, he complained that he had no access to the investigation file in order to challenge his pre-trial detention. Lastly, he maintained that in view of his status as a member of parliament, his continued pre-trial detention amounted to a violation of the right to free elections. 70.  In a decision of 21 December 2017 the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible (decision no. 2016/25189). 71.  With regard to the complaint concerning the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention in police custody, it held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 \u00a7 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. Furthermore, it noted that he had not lodged an objection under Article 91 \u00a7 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 72.  As regards the complaint about the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the applicant had argued that his initial and continued detention were in breach of the Constitution as he enjoyed parliamentary immunity. The Constitutional Court noted in that connection that there was no constitutional rule preventing the pre-trial detention of a member of parliament whose parliamentary immunity had been lifted. It observed that the constitutional amendment of 20 May 2016 had made it possible to grant the requests for the lifting of the applicant\u2019s parliamentary immunity that had been referred to the National Assembly before the adoption of the amendment. Referring to its judgment no. 2016/117 of 3 June 2016, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that his initial and continued pre-trial detention had no basis in law. 73.  Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a strong presumption that the applicant had committed an offence. It noted that, at a time when the internal conflict in Syria had posed a threat to national security in Turkey, following armed clashes in Kobani and alongside appeals from the PKK, the HDP had called on the people to take to the streets. Following those calls, serious violent incidents had started to take place on 6 October 2014. Tens of thousands of people had taken part in the incidents, and many people had lost their lives, while many others had suffered injuries. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not argued that the calls in question had been issued against his will; on the contrary, he had stated that he stood behind them. Having regard to the number of deaths and injuries, it found that a causal link could be established between the calls issued by the HDP central executive board, which was co-chaired by the applicant, and the acts of violence in question. Furthermore, with regard to the \u201ctrench events\u201d, it held that, bearing in mind the statements made by the applicant, the places where he had made them and his position as co-chair of the HDP, his pre-trial detention in connection with a terrorism-related offence was not unfounded. Thus, referring to the content of the speeches given by the applicant on 13 November 2012 and 21 April 2013 (see paragraph 57 (ii) and (iii) above), it observed that a finding that the speeches amounted to evidence of the commission of an offence could not be viewed as manifestly ill-founded. Lastly, having regard to the contents of the conversations between senior officials of the PKK and the applicant, it found that it had been legitimate to consider that the applicant might have acted in accordance with the instructions of the leaders of a terrorist organisation. It therefore held that these factors were sufficient grounds for a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence. 74.  The Constitutional Court then went on to consider whether the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention had been based on justifiable grounds. First of all, it examined whether the detention had pursued a legitimate aim. It noted in that connection that, having established that there was a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the alleged offences, the Diyarbak\u0131r 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court had ordered his pre-trial detention on the grounds that the offences in question were among those listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the CCP and were punishable by heavy sentences. The Constitutional Court noted that the severity of the potential sentence was a factor to consider when assessing the risk of absconding. It added that the applicant had refused to appear before the investigating authorities and had stated that no member of parliament from his party would give evidence voluntarily. Those aspects were sufficient in the court\u2019s view to conclude that there was a flight risk. 75.  The Constitutional Court then considered whether the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention were proportionate to the aim pursued. In that context, the applicant had alleged that his detention had prevented him from carrying out his political activities. Referring to several Constitutional Court judgments concerning the pre-trial detention of members of parliament, he had argued that his detention was disproportionate to the aim pursued, in view of his status as a member of parliament. In relation to that point, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that, contrary to what the applicant had maintained, it had never given a judgment in which it had found that the pre-trial detention of a member of parliament whose immunity had been lifted amounted in itself to a breach of the Constitution. It noted that in the cases of Kemal Akta\u015f and Selma Irmak (no. 2014/85), Faysal Sar\u0131y\u0131ld\u0131z (no. 2014/9), \u0130brahim Ayhan (no. 2013/9895) and G\u00fclser Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m (no. 2013/9894), no review of the lawfulness of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention had been carried out since they had not raised a complaint on that account. In the cases of Mehmet Haberal (no. 2012/849) and Mustafa Ali Balbay (no. 2012/1272) it had declared the complaints as to the lawfulness of the applicants\u2019 detention inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. In those judgments it had examined the complaints concerning the right to be elected and to carry out political activities in conjunction with the complaints about the length of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention. In finding a violation of the right to liberty and security of the members of parliament concerned, it had weighed the public interest inherent in the exercise of the right to be elected and to carry out political activities against the length of the applicants\u2019 detention (four years, three months and twenty-two days in the Mehmet Haberal judgment (no. 2012/849); four years and five months in Mustafa Ali Balbay (no. 2012/1272); four years, eight months and sixteen days in Kemal Akta\u015f and Selma Irmak (no. 2014/85); four years, six months and fifteen days in Faysal Sar\u0131y\u0131ld\u0131z (no. 2014/9); three years, two months and twenty-six days in \u0130brahim Ayhan (no. 2013/9895); and three years, ten months and five days in G\u00fclser Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m (no. 2013/9894)). The Constitutional Court further noted that as the applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention a long time after the alleged offences had been committed, it had to examine whether or not his initial and continued pre-trial detention could have been regarded as necessary in the circumstances. In that context, it pointed out that, in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitution, the applicant could not have been placed in pre-trial detention while he enjoyed parliamentary immunity. It observed that the investigation reports concerning him had been sent to the competent public prosecutors after the entry into force of the constitutional amendment introducing an exception to parliamentary immunity in his case, and that he had been placed in pre-trial detention some five months afterwards. It was therefore clear from the evidence in the case file that the investigating authorities had not remained inactive during that period. The Constitutional Court further held that it was unable to conclude that the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention had been disproportionate and arbitrary, notably in view of the severity of the sentences prescribed for the offences in question. For those reasons, it declared this part of the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 76.  The applicant had also argued, relying on Article 18 of the Convention, that he had been placed in pre-trial detention for a purpose other than those provided for in Article 5 of the Convention. Having regard to its conclusion concerning the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court found that it was unnecessary to examine that complaint. 77.  Concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had had no access to the investigation file, the Constitutional Court held that he had had sufficient means available to prepare his defence to the charges against him and to challenge his pre-trial detention, in view of the contents of the investigation reports submitted to the National Assembly by the public prosecutors. It observed that the applicant and his representatives had had unrestricted access to those reports. Next, it examined the public prosecutor\u2019s application of 4 November 2016 for the applicant to be placed in pre-trial detention for membership of an armed terrorist organisation and incitement to commit an offence, and the order of the same day for his pre-trial detention. It found that although the applicant had not had an unlimited right of access to the evidence in the file between 9 September 2016 and 2 February 2017, he had had sufficient knowledge of the substance of the evidence forming the basis for his pre-trial detention and had thus had the opportunity to properly contest the reasons given to justify the detention. Accordingly, it declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 78.  Lastly, regarding the complaints relating to the right to freedom of expression and the right to be elected and to carry out political activities, the Constitutional Court, having regard to its conclusion in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint as to the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, declared them inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 79.  In his dissenting opinion, the judge in the minority likewise considered, on the basis of the evidence in the case file, that there was a strong suspicion that an offence had been committed by the applicant. However, referring to the principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law, particularly in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, 5 July 2016), he expressed the view that the applicant\u2019s detention was not proportionate in so far as it had not been shown that there were relevant and sufficient reasons to justify it. In his opinion, the judicial authorities had not explained why the application of an alternative measure to detention would have been insufficient. Turning to the risk of absconding, he observed firstly that the orders for the applicant\u2019s initial and continued pre-trial detention had given two main reasons to substantiate that risk, namely the severity of the sentences prescribed by law for the offences in question and the fact that the applicant had refused to appear before the investigating authorities. In the dissenting judge\u2019s view, however, the severity of a sentence could not per se justify a person\u2019s pre-trial detention. Similarly, he considered that it could not be concluded that the applicant\u2019s refusal to appear was an indication of a flight risk, since he had continued to carry out his political activities without demonstrating any intention of absconding. Furthermore, the dissenting judge noted that between the entry into force of the amendment to the Constitution lifting the applicant\u2019s parliamentary immunity and the date of his initial pre-trial detention, the applicant had travelled abroad more than ten times and had never attempted to flee. For these reasons, he was of the view that there had been a violation of Article 19 of the Constitution in the applicant\u2019s case. Noting in addition that the applicant was a member of parliament and co-chair of a political party that had obtained more than five million votes, the dissenting judge considered that his pre-trial detention without relevant and sufficient reasons also amounted to a breach of the right to be elected and to carry out political activities as safeguarded by Article 67 of the Constitution. 80.  On 20 April 2018 the National Assembly decided to bring forward to 24 June 2018 the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2019. The applicant stood as a candidate in the presidential election. 81.  On 15 May 2018 the applicant lodged an objection seeking his release, on the grounds that he was a candidate in the presidential election. 82.  On 21 May 2018 the Ankara 19th Assize Court, by a majority, dismissed the objection, on the following grounds:\n\u2013  the existence of evidence grounding a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences of which he was accused;\n\u2013  the fact that the offences in question were among those listed in Article 100 \u00a7 3 of the CCP;\n\u2013  the severity of the sentences prescribed by law for the offences concerned;\n\u2013  the finding that alternative measures to detention appeared insufficient;\n\u2013  the applicant\u2019s refusal to appear before the investigating authorities;\n\u2013  the fact that the applicant\u2019s defence submissions had not yet been obtained.\nIn a dissenting opinion, the judge in the minority expressed the view that, since the applicant was a candidate in the presidential election, he should be released pending trial in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 83.  On 22 May 2018 the applicant lodged an objection against that decision. On 23 May 2018 the objection was dismissed by the Ankara 20th Assize Court. 84.  On 29 May 2018 the applicant lodged another individual application with the Constitutional Court. He alleged a violation of Articles 5 and 10 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 85.  It appears from the case file that the proceedings concerning this application are still pending before the Constitutional Court. 86.  On 7 September 2018, in the context of separate criminal proceedings, the Ankara Assize Court, on the basis of section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), sentenced the applicant to four years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment on account of a speech he had given at a rally in Istanbul on 17 March 2013. This case is still pending in the domestic courts.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "3", "7", "4", "9", "8", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Istanbul. He is the president of the second applicant, a company with its registered office in Istanbul. 6.  In 1984 the second applicant, Em Export D\u0131\u015f Ticaret A.\u015e. (hereinafter \u201cthe applicant company\u201d), entered into a business contract with a State-owned company, namely the Iron and Steel Company of Turkey (T\u00fcrkiye Demir \u00c7elik \u0130\u015fletmeleri), for transactions in substantial amounts of coal and iron between the two companies over a certain period of time. 7.  In 1988 and 1990 respectively, the applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Ankara Commercial Court, claiming that the Iron and Steel Company had failed to respect its contractual obligations. The court joined the two sets of proceedings and accepted the applicant company\u2019s case. It ruled that the Iron and Steel Company was to give the applicant company a certain amount of iron and pay it compensation. The Iron and Steel Company appealed against the judgment. In the meantime, the applicants initiated enforcement proceedings while the case was still pending before the Court of Cassation. 8.  As a result of the enforcement proceedings, in 2000 the Iron and Steel Company paid a total of approximately 1,600,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL)[1] to the applicant company. 9.  By a letter dated 23 June 2000, the then under-secretary to the Treasury wrote to the Ministry of Finance requesting a tax audit of the applicant company. In their letter, the authorities indicated that the enforcement proceedings had caused such substantial damage to the Iron and Steel Company that some of its factories had stopped production. They claimed that the applicant company\u2019s initiation of enforcement proceedings without having waited for the final decision had aimed at obstructing the Iron and Steel Company\u2019s business and benefiting from its financial difficulties. 10.  On 27 July 2000 the Directorate General of Tax Inspectors (Vergi Denetmenleri B\u00fcrosu Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Tax Inspectorate\u201d) decided that an audit would be carried out in respect of the applicant company. 11.  On 23 August 2000, having established that the applicant company could not be found at its registered addresses, two tax inspectors went to another address in Mecidiyek\u00f6y, Istanbul, which appeared to be its business premises, in order to examine its account books. The records subsequently prepared by the inspectors stated that the first applicant, who had introduced himself with a false name, had requested a period of fifteen days to submit the relevant documents and had refused to sign the records. The inspectors also noted that following the first applicant\u2019s refusal to sign the records, they had summoned a police officer and prepared an official letter in his presence. That official letter invited the applicant company to submit all documents related to its income and expenditure within fifteen days. The applicant company was informed that it should make a specific request in order to have the audit conducted at its premises, provided that the premises were available for such a procedure. The letter also stated that the representatives of the applicant company would be charged with tax evasion if they failed to declare the company\u2019s income and present its account books. 12.  By a letter dated 5 September 2000, the applicant company informed the inspectors that the documents were ready for examination at its office. It said that a separate room at its premises would be allocated to the inspectors during the audit and asked to be given two days\u2019 notice in order to prepare the room and the staff who would present the documents. 13.  On 13 September 2000 one of the inspectors, S.K., sent an official letter to the applicant company, stating that it was not possible to carry out the audit at its business premises as the address was not registered. She invited the first applicant to provide her with the documents requested previously within fifteen days. 14.  On 29 September 2000 the first applicant responded, arguing that S.K. had not complied with the relevant legislation and that she had acted in bad faith. He pointed out that the documents were at the disposal of the authorities for examination at the applicant company\u2019s premises on condition that they gave it five days\u2019 notice. 15.  On 10 October 2000 the tax inspectors went to the address in Mecidiyek\u00f6y together with two police officers. According to the records, the applicant company\u2019s staff refused to present the required documents and requested five days\u2019 notice to do so. Subsequent records stated that following a discussion during the drafting of the first record, the staff had decided to present the books for 1998 but not those relating to the tax year 2000. The inspectors stated that seven books and a total of 396 receipts had been submitted. They pointed out that all of the documents had been signed, stamped and given back to the company\u2019s representatives. Lastly, they noted that although the office was physically available to them to carry out an audit, it would not be possible to do so in view of the tension caused by the company\u2019s staff. The records were signed by those present, namely two inspectors, two police officers and the applicant company\u2019s lawyer. 16.  On 26 October 2000 S.K. applied to the \u015ei\u015fli public prosecutor\u2019s office in the name of the Tax Inspectorate, requesting a warrant to search three addresses related to the applicant company. She submitted that an examination of its tax files had revealed that the applicant company appeared to be hiding the money it had received from the Iron and Steel Company in order to evade the payment of taxes. Summarising the content of the records drawn up until that point and referring to all the correspondence between her and the applicant company, she maintained that the company\u2019s representatives had acted in a hostile manner and tried to obstruct the work of the inspectors by hiding information such as their names and the official address of the company, as well as by unjustly accusing her. She pointed out that under section 138 of the Tax Procedure Act, the authorities were not required to inform taxpayers in advance of an audit and that in view of that provision, the applicant company\u2019s request to have several days\u2019 notice, despite having already been informed of the audit, was unacceptable. She concluded that a search was required under those circumstances. 17.  On the same day the \u015ei\u015fli Magistrates\u2019 Court issued a warrant authorising a search of the applicant company\u2019s premises. The relevant parts of the search warrant read as follows:\n\u201cPursuant to the \u015ei\u015fli public prosecutor\u2019s request dated 26 October 2000, it is decided that: 1.  A search will be carried out at the business premises of Em Export D\u0131\u015f Ticaret A.\u015e., located at ... Mecidiyek\u00f6y, Istanbul, taking into account that the account books and other documents to be examined are [being] presented to the authorities at that address. The search will be conducted during the daytime and only once. 18.  Later the same day, two tax inspectors, including S.K., searched the applicant company\u2019s premises and seized a number of documents. According to the records, the search was carried out in the presence of the first applicant, staff members of the applicant company and two police officers. It was noted that the documents that were considered relevant for the audit had been placed in a bag and sealed, and that a detailed inventory would be made at a later stage. The records were signed by the two inspectors, the two police officers and a staff member of the applicant company. The first applicant refused to sign them. 19.  On 1 November 2000 the applicant company was informed that the seized documents would be \u201cunsealed\u201d (m\u00fchr\u00fcn fekki) on 28 November 2000 and was invited to be present during the procedure. 20.  On 27 November 2000 the first applicant sent a letter, stating that he had not understood the meaning of \u201cunsealing\u201d. He reiterated his argument that the audit should be carried out at the applicant company\u2019s premises. 21.  On 28 November 2000 S.K. and two other inspectors opened the two bags containing the documents that had been seized during the search and drew up an inventory. The inspectors recorded the fact that the seals had been broken in the absence of the taxpayer as it had not attended the procedure despite having been invited to do so. The inventory listed the names of all the books and tax declarations seized. A note was made that the receipts concerning various years had been classified and sealed separately. 22.  On 11 December 2000 the head of the Tax Inspectorate informed the first applicant of the address where the seized documents were being kept. He also explained what \u201cunsealing\u201d meant. 23.  By two letters dated 4 November and 6 December 2000 the Tax Inspectorate requested that the applicant company submit the account books for the years 1996, 1997 and 2000, as they were not among the seized documents. 24.  On 23 December 2000 the applicants submitted certain documents. 25.  On 23 January 2001 the Tax Inspectorate requested an extension of the audit period, on account of the substantial number of documents seized during the search and the fact that the applicant company had not submitted the missing documents until 23 December 2000. It also stated that the applicant company had not yet presented some of the documents requested. In line with the request, the \u015ei\u015fli Magistrates\u2019 Court extended the audit period by six months. 26.  The applicants objected to that decision. On 31 May 2001 the \u015ei\u015fli Criminal Court of General Jurisdiction decided to annul the remainder of the extended period, holding that the four months that had passed since the Magistrates\u2019 Court\u2019s decision must have been sufficient to conclude the audit. 27.  During the course of the audit, tax inspector S.K. compiled three records, listing in detail the information obtained from the seized documents and putting certain questions to the applicants in respect of those. One of the records was read by the applicants\u2019 lawyer, who objected to its findings by means of a handwritten note. The other two records stated that the applicants had submitted a letter, according to which they refused to sign them. Consequently, the seized documents had been kept by the authorities. 28.  In the meantime, S.K. had several exchanges of correspondence with the enforcement authorities, whereby she requested certain information about the amount that had been paid to the applicant company and how much of that amount corresponded to interest. 29.  By a letter dated 1 May 2002 the applicant company was informed that the audit had been completed. 30.  On 25 May 2002 S.K. drew up a tax-assessment report, noting several irregularities in the applicant company\u2019s financial records and payment of taxes, in particular with regard to the amount it had obtained as a result of the payment made to it by the Iron and Steel Company. In that connection, among many documents examined, the report also referred to the information provided by the enforcement authorities, which specified the total amount paid to the applicant company by the Iron and Steel Company and the interest rate applied in the calculation of that amount. It pointed out that the applicant company, which had not been active for a long time, appeared to have made a substantial number of transactions with some of its partners, without any documents justifying them. Moreover, it found that the company had profited from its investments in foreign currencies, which had not been declared to the authorities. Concluding that the applicant company had acted fraudulently in its bookkeeping, the report requested that corporate income tax and provisional tax be imposed on it, together with a penalty for potential lost revenue.\nAs regards the procedure that had been followed, the report pointed out that the authorities had been unable to locate the applicant company at its registered addresses. It also stressed the difficulties caused to them by the company\u2019s staff at another address which the company was using temporarily as its business premises. Reiterating the content of the records drawn up during the visits to that latter address, the report noted that after having obtained a search warrant from the Magistrates\u2019 Court, the inspectors had had to seize the relevant documents and take them to the Tax Inspectorate, as the audit could not be carried out there due to the staff\u2019s behaviour and as it was not the applicant company\u2019s registered business address within the meaning of section 139 of the Tax Procedure Act (Law no. 213). 31.  On 11 July 2002 the Tax Office issued several tax notices to the applicant company under sections 341 and 344 of the Tax Procedure Act. It ordered it to pay TRL 123,205,000,000 in income tax and TRL 587,688,150,000[2] as a penalty (cezal\u0131 gelir stopaj vergisi ve fon pay\u0131 tarhiyat\u0131) in respect of different periods of year 2001. For the year 2000, the Tax Office ordered the applicant company to pay provisional income tax of TRL 111,059,520,000 and a penalty of TRL 563,071,740,000[3] (ge\u00e7ici kurumlar gelir vergisi ve vergi ziya\u0131 cezas\u0131). 32.  The applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Istanbul Tax Court, requesting the annulment of the income tax and the penalty imposed in respect of different periods of year 2001. It stated that both the tax and the penalty had resulted from the payment made to it by the Iron and Steel Company following the judgment of the Commercial Court to that effect, and that the amount was not yet subject to any tax as proceedings were still pending before the Court of Cassation. It also challenged the findings of the tax-assessment report, arguing that the transactions between partners did not justify the imposition of the tax and the penalty.\nWith regard to the procedure, the applicant company claimed that both the search and the audit had been conducted unlawfully. Despite the allegations of tax inspector S.K., its address was registered and the documents should have been examined at its premises. Although the Tax Procedure Act provided that a search could only be conducted on suspicion of tax evasion, S.K. had obtained a search warrant without there being any such indication. The applicant company further alleged that S.K. had refused to make an inventory of the documents seized during the search, had prevented it from sealing the documents with its own seal and had distorted the facts in the search records as well as in the tax-assessment report she had drafted. Lastly, the audit had been carried out unlawfully after the expiry of the period indicated in the warrant issued by the domestic court. 33.  On an unspecified date the Tax Court held a hearing attended by the applicants and S.K. 34.  On 11 June 2003 the Tax Court delivered two judgments regarding the two sets of proceedings brought by the applicant company. The court allowed the applicants\u2019 claims in part, and reduced the tax penalty to one-third of the amount originally imposed. It dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claims as regards the unlawfulness of the search and seizure, finding that the procedure had been in compliance with the relevant legislation. Referring to section 139 of the Tax Procedure Act, the court held that the applicants\u2019 behaviour before the search, as well as their failure to submit the required documents and to respond to the tax inspectors\u2019 letters, had made it clear that the audit could not be conducted at the applicant company\u2019s premises. It also held that the documents in the case file did not substantiate the company\u2019s allegations against the tax inspector.\nAs for the tax and the penalty imposed, the court held that despite certain flaws in the tax inspector\u2019s methods, the findings of the tax-assessment report were reliable. In that connection, it held that the amount paid to the applicant company by the Iron and Steel Company was subject to taxation and that the former had failed to clarify the source of substantial transactions with some of its partners. 35.  The applicant company appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Tax Court had relied on the tax-assessment report, which, according to it, had been drawn up unlawfully. S.K. had distorted the content of certain documents she had seized during the search and had not notified it of the records she had drawn up during the course of the audit, in breach of the relevant legislation. Lastly, the applicant company requested that a criminal investigation be opened against S.K. 36.  On 27 April 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgments. 37. The applicant company applied for rectification of the judgment, arguing that although the tax-assessment report pointed to the absence of certain receipts as one of the reasons for the penalty, those receipts and other important documents had unlawfully been taken from its premises during the search and had not been made accessible to the applicants later on. It submitted that despite its requests to that effect, the Tax Court had failed to obtain those documents and to request that criminal proceedings be instituted against the officials who were responsible for their unlawful seizure.\nThe Supreme Administrative Court rejected the rectification requests on 25 November 2004. Final decisions were served on the applicant company on 10 January 2005. 38.  On 14 November 2000 and 29 June 2001 respectively, the Governorship of Istanbul imposed two provisional seizure measures on the applicant company in line with S.K.\u2019s reports. 39.  Both seizure measures were found to be unlawful and were annulled by the Istanbul Tax Court. 40.  Subsequently, on 19 December 2001 the applicant company requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against S.K., claiming that she had abused her powers by presenting false information to the authorities. On 14 October 2002 the Governorship of Istanbul delivered a decision. Finding that S.K. had acted in compliance with the law, it refused to give permission for the opening of an investigation against her. 41.  On 20 February 2003 the District Administrative Court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant company to that decision. 42.  The applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Istanbul Tax Court, this time requesting the annulment of both the provisional income tax and the penalty imposed in respect of tax year 2000. It argued that the tax assessment report had been drafted in vague terms and had failed to clearly indicate the reasons for its conclusions. In its petition, the applicant company repeated once again its claims as regards the unlawfulness of the search and the audit. 43.  On 11 June 2003 the Tax Court accepted the cases and held that both the provisional income tax and the penalty related to it had been imposed unlawfully. The domestic court noted that due to the applicant company\u2019s failure to declare its yearly income in full, its income for year 2000 had been calculated ex proprio motu by the authorities. It found that an income calculated in that manner was not subject to provisional taxation and that no penalty could be imposed on the company as a result. The court did not mention the search and seizure. 44.  On 27 April 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court partially quashed the judgments, finding that although the annulment of the provisional taxation was in line with the relevant legislation, as the set-off period had elapsed, under the relevant provisions a penalty could still be imposed for failure on the part of the taxpayer to declare the correct amount. 45.  On 10 March 2005 the Tax Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claim for annulment of the penalty, holding that it was in line with the legislation as the company had failed to declare a certain part of its income. The court held that it was not necessary to rule on the provisional tax, as that part of the judgment had already been upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. 46.  The applicant company appealed. After raising several arguments concerning the imposition of the tax penalty and its calculation, it pointed out that the search had been conducted unlawfully in that all the documents had been seized by the inspectors without making an inventory. It further argued that the Tax Court had failed to address its arguments and to deliver a reasoned judgment. 47.  On 5 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgments. The decisions were served on the applicant company on 2 December 2005. 48.  In 2004 and 2005 the applicant company made several payments to the Tax Office as regards the years 2000 and 2001.", "references": ["5", "2", "9", "1", "6", "8", "7", "0", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Seville. 6.  The applicant was a member of an activist group which occupied the Casas Viejas Social Centre in Seville. 7.  The owners of the building initiated judicial proceedings before the Seville First Instance Court no. 24 (hereinafter the \u201cFirst-Instance Court\u201d) to recover possession of their property. The First-Instance Court ultimately ordered the eviction of all the occupants and set 29 November 2007 as the date for their removal. 8.  On that date, the applicant, along with other occupiers, participated in a protest against their eviction from the building. 9.  Once the Judicial Committee of the Notices and Seizures Department (Comisi\u00f3n Judicial del Servicio Com\u00fan de Notificaciones y Embargos), together with the legal representative of the building owners and the police, entered into the building, they discovered that the occupants had dug an underground tunnel of about 4.5 m deep which ended in a small space. They had placed some rudimentary reinforcing in order to prevent the collapse of the structure. Furthermore the occupants had positioned several \u201cPVC\u201d and iron tubes in the walls and the floor of the small room. 10.  As part of the protest against the eviction, the applicant and another protester, R.D.P., claimed that they had attached themselves to the floor of the room in such a way that they were not able to release themselves. Indeed they had introduced one of their arms inside one of the tubes and enchained their wrist to an iron stick which was fixed inside the tube. Since the fixation system was not visible it was impossible for the authorities to know whether this was true or not. 11.  Negotiations were held throughout the whole day, yet they were unsuccessful. The police, together with the fire service, considered digging them out. This idea was dismissed as there was risk of collapse. 12.  In order to verify whether the applicant and R.D.P. were attached to the floor, the police officers fixed a rope to their waist and wrist, respectively, and tried to pull them out of the tube to which they were fixed, to no avail. The fire service informed the applicant and R.D.P. that the building might collapse if heavy machinery were used to release them. 13.  On 30 November 2007, in view of the time which had elapsed and the applicant\u2019s threat to kick down some unstable wooden posts that had been installed by the fire fighters as a preventive measure, two police officers immobilised them with ropes. 14.  At around 7 p.m. on 30 November 2007, owing to the severe suffering caused by the fixation technique, R.D.P. informed the police officers and fire fighters of his intention to voluntarily release himself and asked them to untie him. At around 8.30 p.m. the applicant also decided to end his protest. 15.  The applicant and R.D.P. were immediately arrested and brought before a judge. They were also taken to a public health centre where they underwent a forensic examination. As regards the applicant, the forensic report stated the following:\n\u201cPatient history and examination\nHe refers to having had his right hand tied, reporting local pain, local redness. Joint movement. No vascular disorders.\nX rays: 0[1]\nPresumptive diagnosis:\nContusion of the right wrist.\nTreatment:\nAvoid strain.\n[illegible drug name] 1/d if pain\u201d 16.  That same report also stated the following:\n\u201cVisual inspection, palpation and manipulation of limbs and other body areas rule out the possibility of physical injuries compatible with trauma or exogenous violence.\nNo haematomata, abrasions or injuries on different explored areas. He reports discomfort in both wrists but no visible haematological signs are at present detectable.\nInterview and patient history rule out any decrease of his cognitive or volitional abilities, [patient thus] fit to give statement at this very moment.\u201d 17.  On 1 December 2007 the applicant participated in a press conference during which he commented on the eviction and the techniques the police and fire fighters had used during the confinement. He referred to the events in the following terms:\n\u201cThe torture was physical and psychological. The physical torture was undertaken only by national police officers and was insanely observed by the fire fighters. That is to say, fire fighters, whose specific names I am going to give because they treated us very badly \u2013 the most senior fireman was L., and [there was also] firemen M. and J \u2013 were taking photographs while we were tortured, taking photographs next to us as if we were their prizes, mocking. The physical torture that I am going to describe ... was very subtle so that it did not leave marks, but it caused intense pain ... and the other torture, well, it left marks ... above all the first one on my colleague ...\nThe first act of torture was carried out by national police officers, as I say, as soon as they came ... they grabbed my colleague\u2019s arm, the free one, and they fixed a rope to his wrist quite tightly and they took the rope out of the tunnel and three national police officers ... pulled him to try to get him out ... with the purpose of causing him pain, frightening him, you know. The wrist inside the tube started to swell ... he was not able to open the padlock for a full day ...\n[T]o me, instead of fixing the rope to my free wrist, they fixed it to my waist and they repeated what they had done to R.D.P.: they took the rope out of the tunnel and three national police officers ... pulled me with the same purpose ... the second act of torture was already physical and was perpetrated by national police officers. It was conducted at the end of the protest action, that is to say, the physical torture forced us to [release ourselves] from the tubes ... [T]he blood supply was cut off at the top, we could not move our fingers since the pain was very intense, we were like this for an hour, that is when fire fighters took the photograph because they did nothing else to us.\nThis act of torture was also undertaken by two national police officers who appeared in some press pictures in \u2018Emasesa\u2019 white overalls: I am not sure that if [people] have realised that both police officers with the \u2018Emasesa\u2019 overalls appear [in the press pictures], well, these are the ones who carried out the torture[;] then they finished tying us up and left the place and right away some fire fighters arrived and then the firemen J., M. and L. took photographs as a prize ... at this point, and owing to suffering and the pain in his wrist, R.D.P. ... decided to leave the protest action and release himself ... I said to them as a proposal: \u2018Look, I am not going to release myself, but I will cooperate with everything that is necessary to allow the underpinning of the structure ... [T]hey then tied me in the same position and, well, that is then when I decided to put an end to the protest action. Well this was physical torture ...\nPsychological torture was repeated eh, well it was continuous ... psychological torture was repeated several times and it was mainly perpetrated by fire fighters and consisted of brief psychological mistreatment ... they told us that it was impossible to take us out alive ..., that we would be killed by rubble because there was a bulldozer working right above us, [and] we were listening to the bulldozer ... [T]hey used the famous \u2018oxygen measuring device\u2019 which indicated that we were about to pass out ... They told us that the police were going to inject us with a sleep serum ... [T]hey told us that the police were going to introduce gas through the ventilation system, they did not specify which type of gas ... [T]hey also told us that they would release rats inside the tunnel ...\u201d 18.  A female journalist asked the applicant whether the medical report had revealed any kind of physical or psychological damage, to which the applicant answered \u201cnot psychological\u201d yet \u201cphysical\u201d. The applicant further stated that he had already said that \u201cphysical torture [was] very subtle and undertaken by elite police officers, that hardly left marks but ... caused intense pain\u201d. 19.  As a result of the statements, on 21 December 2007 the delegation of the Government of Andalusia lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor, requesting the initiation of a criminal investigation before the Seville investigating judge no. 17. This judge ordered the opening of an investigation, as a result of which the applicant was charged with slander and defamation. 20.  On 6 July 2011 Seville criminal judge no. 13 (hereinafter \u201cthe criminal judge\u201d) convicted the applicant of slander, sentencing him to twenty month fine with a daily amount of 10 euros (EUR). In addition, he was ordered to pay compensation to the two police officers for damage in a total amount of EUR 1,200, with one day\u2019s imprisonment for every two day fines unpaid in default. Furthermore, the applicant was ordered to publish the judgment in the media which had participated in the press conference at his own expense. 21.  The criminal judge stated that authorities had acted in a proportionate manner. The criminal judge considered that the first action carried out by the police (that is to say fixing a rope to their waist and wrist, respectively, and using force in an attempt to pull them out) had been a proportionate technique with the purpose of verifying whether the applicant and R.D.P. were in fact attached to the concrete floor. He further observed that the methods used by the police, such as threatening them with the use of gas or with prosecution for committing a crime against a person in authority, had just been measures aimed at pressuring the applicant and R.D.P. to release themselves. According to the criminal judge the fire fighters also intimidated the applicant and R.D.P. by telling them that the walls could collapse if the authorities opted to use machinery to release them. The purpose behind this was to make them release themselves voluntarily. Additionally, the criminal judge observed that the authorities had then taken the decision to tie the applicant\u2019s right hand to his ankle in order to immobilise him, in view of the risk of the walls collapsing and the applicant\u2019s threat to kick down the unstable wooden posts that had been installed by the fire fighters as a preventive measure. 22.  In view of the statement of facts as determined by the judge, it was considered that the applicant\u2019s remarks constituted a direct accusation of the commission of a crime \u2013 namely torture \u2013 which was untrue. 23.  The criminal judge then considered that the right to freedom of speech was \u201ca fundamental right but it [was] not unlimited either in its abstract concept or in its practical execution\u201d since it had to be \u201crespectful of other people and one [could not] avail oneself of it in order to use abusive or offensive words\u201d. In this case \u201cthe applicant [had] exceeded the bounds of his right to freedom of speech ... by violating other people\u2019s rights.\u201d 24.  The criminal judge noted that the behaviour of the police officers did not disclose all the elements under the legal classification of torture within the meaning of Article 174 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which clearly defined torture as follows:\n\u201cTorture is committed by a public authority or official who, in abuse of office, and in order to obtain a confession or information from a person, or to punish him or her for any act he or she may have committed, or is suspected of having committed, or for any reason based on any kind of discrimination, subjects that person to conditions or procedures that, owing to their nature, duration or other circumstances, cause him or her physical or mental suffering, suppression of or decrease in his or her powers of cognisance, discernment or decision-making, or that in any other way attack his or her honour\u201d. 25.  The criminal judge thus considered that the applicant\u2019s declaration included a specific accusation of torture, which meant that a police officer or official had specific intent to obtain a confession or information from a person, or to punish them for an act they may have committed, or were suspected of having committed. 26.  The judge additionally found that the descriptions given by the applicant, in combination with the pictures that had been published by the press, could lead to the identification of the police officers in question. They would then be linked to accusations of torture, which, according to the criminal judge, had not taken place. 27.  In reply to the argument that the word \u201ctorture\u201d had been used colloquially, the judge considered the following:\n\u201c[T]he applicant\u2019s repetition of the word torture reveals that it was not an occasional and exceptional use of such word in place, but it was exposed and expressed in full awareness and repeatedly in order to get the message across to listeners, i.e., that the applicant had been subject to torture by police officers and fire fighters.\u201d 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Seville Audiencia Provincial, which on 28 June 2013 partially ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the fine to be reduced to twelve month fine with a daily amount of EUR 10. The Audiencia Provincial upheld the remaining elements of the first-instance judgment. In particular, the Seville Audiencia Provincial indicated that the remarks made by the applicant had constituted a direct accusation of the crime of torture and that the applicant\u2019s statements were a \u201cdeliberate way to personally and professionally discredit the police officers\u201d. According to the Audiencia Provincial, the applicant was aware of the fact that what he was publicly saying was false. Additionally, it stated that the applicant\u2019s statement could not be described as an act of public criticism of the intervention carried out by the police, nor had the applicant\u2019s intent been to provide the public with information. On the contrary, the applicant had \u201csimply claimed that he [had been] tortured by two police officers ..., something that [had been] false ... with the sole intent of attacking the honour of the police officers by maintaining that they had committed a crime\u201d. The applicant\u2019s statements had been a \u201cconscious, disproportionate, unnecessary and unjustified act of accusing someone of having committed a crime which [had gone] beyond the legitimate criticism of a police action ...\u201d. 29.  On 29 July 2013 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. In particular, the applicant relied on paragraphs a) and d) of Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. The applicant stated that the narrated facts at the press conference had been true, as had been recognised by the domestic courts in the framework of the criminal proceedings, yet the only thing that had differed had been the intention attributable to the police officers. The applicant had used the term \u201ctorture\u201d in a colloquial manner. This type of expression could not be limited by strict criminal-legal definitions. The applicant further stated that the term \u201ctorture\u201d contained several meanings apart from the strictly criminal one. According to the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (Real Academia Espa\u00f1ola \u2011 hereinafter \u201cthe Academy\u201d), the word torture meant \u201cserious physical or psychological pain inflicted on somebody, with various methods and tools, with the purpose of obtaining a confession or as a means to punish\u201d. However, according to this same institution, the word torture also meant \u201cserious pain or suffering, or the thing that produces it\u201d. The applicant further stressed that the word \u201ctorture\u201d was in daily used to refer to any kind of mistreatment. Ultimately, the applicant argued that restricting the use of the word \u201ctorture\u201d to those scenarios where all the criminal elements of the crime were present was an excessive restriction on the right to freedom of expression and, in particular, on a social debate which concerns the methods used by public powers in order to pursue a legitimate aim. 30.  On 21 October 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the amparo appeal inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had not complied with the obligation to prove that his appeal was one of \u201cspecial constitutional relevance\u201d.", "references": ["9", "7", "5", "8", "0", "2", "3", "No Label", "6", "1", "4"], "gold": ["6", "1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Berlin. 6.  On 13 March 2010 there was a fight in the applicant\u2019s apartment between the applicant, S. (the applicant\u2019s flatmate at the time) and S.\u2019s guests. By letter from the police of 18 March 2010, the applicant was notified that preliminary proceedings against him had been initiated and that he was accused of having insulted S. and of having pushed and punched him in the face, resulting in bruising to S.\u2019s skull and jaw problems. The letter also stated that he was given the opportunity to submit written or oral comments and that he was free, at any time, even before being questioned, to consult defence counsel to be chosen by him. 7.  On 7 March 2011 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued a penal order (Strafbefehl) against the applicant, finding him guilty of libel and two counts of assault against S. and B., a guest at the event in question, and sentencing him to 80 day-fines of EUR 30 each. The applicant, who had applied for access to, and been given copies of the file prior to the issuance of the penal order, lodged a timely objection against that order and asked to be given access to the file again, which was granted. 8.  On 9 May 2011 the District Court admitted S. as private accessory prosecutor (see paragraph 18 below), represented by counsel paid for by S. himself. 9.  On 12 May 2011 S.\u2019s lawyer, in the context of the criminal proceedings, lodged civil claims for compensation under Articles 403 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below) and applied for legal aid to be granted to S. for the pursuit of those claims. The applicant was given the opportunity to submit written comments on this and made use of that opportunity. 10.  On 24 May 2011 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court granted legal aid to S. and appointed his lawyer to represent him in the pursuit of the civil claims in the context of the criminal proceedings. 11.  The following day the main hearing took place, lasting for some 75 minutes. The District Court orally heard S. as well as B. and M., the latter two having been present at the event in question, as witnesses and also evaluated a medical certificate concerning the injuries sustained by S. It convicted the applicant of libel and two counts of assault and sentenced him to a fine of 90 day-fines of EUR 15 each. In respect of the civil claims, it also ordered him to pay EUR 430 in damages (EUR 400 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage and EUR 30 in respect of pecuniary damage) plus interest to S. S.\u2019s lawyer had been given leave to address only the civil compensation claim. The applicant had made written submissions setting out his position prior to the hearing and was orally heard by the District Court. 12.  On 26 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on facts and law. 13.  On 4 July 2011 the judge presiding over the competent appeals chamber of the Berlin Regional Court informed the public prosecutor\u2019s office of his intention to appoint defence counsel for the applicant. That same day, Mr F\u00f6rster, the applicant\u2019s lawyer in the Convention proceedings, gave notice that he now represented the applicant. In a written submission of 11 July 2011, he stated that he wished to pursue the appeal lodged by the applicant as an appeal on points of law (resulting in the competency of the Berlin Court of Appeal, rather than of the Regional Court). In addition to complaining of a wrongful application of law to the merits of the case, he alleged a procedural error because no defence counsel had been present for the applicant throughout the trial before the District Court. He claimed that representation by defence counsel had been necessary, given that the private accessory prosecutor S. had been represented by counsel who had been present at the main hearing. 14.  On 14 March 2012 the Berlin Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on points of law, save for allowing the applicant to pay the fine in instalments. It found that the conditions for mandatory appointment of defence counsel under Article 140 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 20 below) were not met. The legislature had deliberately chosen to limit the presumption that an accused cannot defend himself to cases where the competent court had appointed counsel for the victim for the private accessory prosecution in accordance with Articles 397a and 406g \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Code (see paragraph 20 below). There were legitimate reasons for that distinction, given that counsel was appointed for the private accessory prosecutor for victims of certain grave offences or where the victim was not able to safeguard his interests sufficiently, or could not be expected to do so, including in scenarios which gave rise to particular factual or legal difficulties. In the present case, counsel for S. had been appointed by the court only in respect of the civil claims (see paragraph 10 above), but not for the private accessory prosecution, in respect of which counsel had been hired by S. at his own expense (see paragraph 8 above). 15.  Where counsel acted for the (victim and) private accessory prosecutor, without having been appointed by the court, the presumption contained in Article 140 \u00a7 2 of the Code did not apply. In such a scenario, the individual circumstances of the case had to be assessed in order to determine whether defence counsel had to be appointed. Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant was capable of effectively defending himself without counsel and had indeed done so. It considered that the applicant had knowledge of the parts of the file relevant for the decision, which did not give rise to factual or legal difficulties, that the nature of the offences and the potential sentence at stake were not significant, and that the factual background and the taking of evidence were easily understandable. Counsel for S. had only acted in respect of the civil claims. The applicant\u2019s written submissions, including his timely appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment, showed that he was capable of safeguarding his legal interests on his own. 16.  On 30 April 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s request to be heard. 17.  On 18 September 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 1377/12), finding that it was inadmissible because he had not applied for the appointment of defence counsel before the District Court.", "references": ["2", "4", "7", "8", "5", "1", "6", "9", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  On 2 January 2007 M.G. and V.G., two elderly sisters, were found dead in V.G.\u2019s apartment, where they lived together following which the prosecution started an investigation into their death. It appears that the applicant had known V.G., who had drawn up a will on 5 April 2006 according to which she had bequeathed her apartment to the applicant. 7.  On the same day forensic medical examinations, including autopsies, were ordered to determine, inter alia, the cause of death of the two sisters. 8.  On 2 February 2007 the expert A.D. issued two opinions (nos. 22 and 23). According to the first one, M.G. had died as a result of acute heart failure brought about by low body temperature while opinion no. 23 stated that V.G. had died as a result of hypothermia. 9.  On 9 February 2007 the prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation. Relying on forensic medical opinions nos. 22 and 23, the prosecutor found that the sisters\u2019 death had not been intentional or caused by negligence. 10.  On 14 February 2007 the applicant submitted V.G.\u2019s will to the notary and gave his acceptance to inherit her apartment. 11.  On 1 June 2007 M.G. and V.G.\u2019s niece applied to the prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that although V.G. had bequeathed the apartment to her by the will certified by a public notary back in 1991, she had been informed that the applicant had submitted another will in respect of the same apartment according to which the apartment was to pass down to him. She alleged that her aunt\u2019s signature had been forged on that will. 12.  It appears that on 11 July 2007 additional post-mortem forensic medical examinations following the exhumation of the bodies of M.G. and V.G. were ordered to determine, inter alia, whether forensic opinions nos. 22 and 23 had correctly determined the causes of their death and, if not, whether it was possible that they had died as a result of having been poisoned. 13.  On 7 August 2007 the investigator decided to start an investigation on account of forgery. 14.  It appears that at some point during the investigation the applicant stated that he had never visited the apartment where M.G. and V.G. had lived and did not know its location. Sometime in 2006 V.G., whom he knew, had visited him in his home to hand over some documents to him, namely a will and other documents from the notary informing him that she had bequeathed her apartment to him. 15.  On 25 September 2007 G.H and A.B. delivered expert opinions nos. 13/631/K and 14/630/K according to which both sisters had died as a result of poisoning by compounds containing phosphorous. 16.  On 26 September 2007 the applicant was charged with fraud and two counts of murder committed for gain. The following day he was detained. 17.  On 21 December 2007 a forensic technical and toxicological examination was completed. The results of the applicant\u2019s psychiatric and psychological forensic inpatient examinations were received on 8 February 2008. Three experts G.H., A.D. and M.A. gave expert statements on 6 December 2007, 25 January and 5 February 2008 respectively. 18.  On 26 May 2008 further post-mortem forensic medical examinations on additional exhumation of the bodies of M.G. and V.G. were ordered, and they were completed on 27 June 2008. Expert opinions nos. 12/525/K and 13/526/K delivered by S.H. and S.S. confirmed the presence of phosphorous compounds in the bodies of the two victims. 19.  On 8 July 2008 the applicant\u2019s case was transferred to the Yerevan Criminal Court for trial. 20.  At the hearing of 26 August 2008, the opinions of all expert witnesses were read out aloud. The applicant then orally requested for a possibility to have examined, in court, the expert witnesses A.D., S.H. and S.S., who had delivered the conflicting opinions, in order to clarify a number of issues that required specialist knowledge. The court decided to adjourn the case. 21.  At the hearing of 25 September 2008, the applicant\u2019s representative requested again the examination of the expert witnesses but his request was orally rejected by the trial court judge. The judge reasoned this decision by stating that as the subsequent expert opinions already explained the content of the first opinion issued by A.D., it was not necessary to call the expert witnesses. 22.  On 21 October 2008 the Yerevan Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated murder committed for gain and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In doing so, it mostly relied on the trial statements of the victims\u2019 relatives and neighbours, who confirmed that the applicant had visited the sisters in their apartment several times; on the expert opinions; and on material evidence seized from the applicant\u2019s apartment, namely the originals of the ownership certificate in respect of V.G.\u2019s apartment, V.G.\u2019s will drawn up on 5 April 2006 and a duplicate of V.G.\u2019s death certificate. In finding the applicant guilty, the trial court also took into account the fact that he had previously been convicted of murder carried out for financial gain for killing an elderly woman to obtain possession of her apartment. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that he had been deprived of the opportunity to examine the experts with regard to their contradictory opinions. 24.  On 12 February 2009 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal without addressing the complaint about his inability to have the experts examined during his trial. 25.  On 2 July 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar complaints as before. 26.  On 28 July 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["2", "8", "6", "1", "9", "4", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  In 2005 to 2006 the applicant was prosecuted for various crimes. He was eventually found guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, the final decision having been adopted on 19 September 2006. 5.  From 27 May 2005 to 3 October 2006 the applicant was detained at a pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) in Kropyvnytskyi (then named Kirovograd). 6.  From 4 October 2006 to 20 March 2008 the applicant was detained at correctional colony no. 6 in Kropyvnytskyi (hereinafter \u201cthe first colony\u201d). 7.  According to the applicant, he was held in a dormitory measuring 6 by 8 sq. m and containing twelve double bunk beds. The Government submitted that the dormitory concerned measured 41.68 sq. m and contained ten single beds. They submitted photographs supposedly corroborating their submissions in that regard. 8.  The applicant alleged that electricity in the colony had been regularly switched off. The Government submitted that electricity was supplied round the clock but, to reduce power consumption as part of a nationwide energy\u2011saving strategy, the voltage of the general lighting in the institution had been reduced from 220 to 110 V. The applicant submitted that that meant that, even when the lighting had been on, the cell had been dimly lit and the light insufficient for activities such as reading and sewing. 9.  The applicant also alleged that he had not been given the essential items and that he had been \u201cbeaten, humiliated, tortured [and] placed in a disciplinary cell\u201d. In particular, he alleged that he had been beaten on arrival at the colony on 4 October 2006 and that the guards had tried to place him into a psychiatric clinic in March 2007. The Government denied those allegations. 10.  On 23 May 2008 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 78 in the village of Raikivtsi, Khmelnytsk Region (hereinafter \u201cthe second colony\u201d), where he stayed until his release on 25 May 2012. 11.  The applicant alleged that the food in the correctional colonies had been inadequate and of a poor quality. He alleged that at both correctional colonies the sanitary conditions had been inadequate in that there had been cockroaches and sometimes mice and rats. The Government denied those allegations. They submitted that the food supply had been in accordance with the relevant regulations and regularly checked. In support of their submissions they submitted a number of logs and reports from the prison authorities showing that portions compliant with the regulations in force had been distributed to the prisoners, and that the sanitary conditions had been checked and found to be appropriate. They also submitted several statements from inmates who alleged that they had served time with the applicant and stated that the conditions of their detention, particularly in terms of the provision of food, clothes and sanitary conditions, had been appropriate. 12.  The applicant alleged that he had been repeatedly ill-treated by prison guards, that the prison authorities had intercepted, reviewed, blocked and delayed his correspondence, particularly that with the Court and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights, and had persecuted and threatened him for having applied to the Court. The Government denied those allegations. 13.  It appears from the documents submitted by the parties that the applicant complained many times to various domestic authorities, notably the prosecutor\u2019s office, alleging, in general, ill-treatment and persecution by the prison authorities. In May and August 2010 he withdrew two of his complaints, stating that they had been lodged in a state of heightened emotions. 14.  Registers of incoming and outgoing mail from the correctional colonies submitted by the Government show that, in the period from 17 June 2008 to 1 December 2011 \u2013 the only period of the applicant\u2019s detention for which specific information in this regard is available \u2013 the applicant sent and received more than sixty letters to and from various public entities, most notably various domestic courts, disciplinary commissions of judges, members of Parliament and the Presidential Administration. Under domestic law (see paragraph 21 below) this correspondence was subject to monitoring by the prison authorities. The prison registers show that the applicant also corresponded extensively with other entities, namely prosecutors, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the Court. This correspondence was, under domestic law, exempted from monitoring. 15.  The Government also submitted a number of cover letters prepared by the prison authorities relating to the letters sent out by the applicant. For instance, in a cover letter of November 2011 to the Judges Qualifications Commission of Ukraine the governor of the second colony stated that he was forwarding a letter by the applicant concerning the initiation of criminal proceedings against the judges of the trial court that had convicted him. 16.  The applicant alleged that the domestic authorities had denied him access to his criminal case file, thus preventing him from obtaining copies of documents related to his application to the Court. The Government denied those allegations. They submitted documents from the domestic courts showing that the applicant had examined his criminal case file on 23 December 2011[1] and 11 January 2012 and that, by a letter of 25 January 2012, the trial court had sent him a number of copies of documents from that file. 17.  After sending the Court an authority form empowering Mr Markov to represent him, the applicant sent the Court two letters, in April 2014 and April 2015, informing it that he wished to revoke the lawyer\u2019s authority. He said that the lawyer, by seeking to derive financial benefit from the case, had demonstrated conduct unworthy of his status. 18.  In subsequent correspondence between the Registry, the applicant and the lawyer it transpired that the applicant was apparently upset about the lawyer\u2019s inability to help him with matters unrelated to the proceedings before the Court, such as sending him various goods and representation in unrelated domestic judicial and pardon proceedings. 19.  When invited to comment on the first revocation, in May 2014 the applicant informed the Court that he wished to cancel that revocation and maintain the lawyer\u2019s authority. Following this cancellation of the first revocation and before the second revocation the lawyer submitted observations in reply to those of the Government on behalf of the applicant. 20.  After the second revocation, the lawyer\u2019s comments questioning the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s wish to revoke his authority were forwarded directly to the applicant with an invitation to comment. He did not respond.", "references": ["9", "2", "3", "7", "0", "8", "5", "6", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Novosibirsk. 5.  The applicant was charged with and subsequently found guilty of murdering his father and uncle. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 31 October 2002. 6.  On 18 April 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court in which he complained of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that he had not been provided with legal assistance in the appeal proceedings (application no. 21272/03). 7.  On 26 March 2007 the Court gave notification of the application to the Russian Government. 8.  On 4 July 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgment of 31 October 2002 by way of a supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 9.  On 29 November 2007 the Supreme Court held a new appeal hearing in which the applicant took part by means of a video link and was represented by State-appointed counsel, A. The court upheld, in substance, the applicant\u2019s conviction. The applicant had been allowed fifteen minutes to confer with his counsel by means of video link prior to the hearing. 10.  On 15 January 2009 the Court examined the admissibility and merits of the case and held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in that the applicant had not received effective legal assistance during the appeal proceedings in his criminal case. 11.  On 14 September 2009 a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted the Government\u2019s request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. 12.  On 22 September 2010 the Grand Chamber delivered a new judgment in the applicant\u2019s case. Noting that the applicant had been unable to enjoy effective legal assistance before the appellate court, it found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) thereof. In particular, the Grand Chamber concluded that the time allotted to the applicant for communication with his counsel had been insufficient and that the means of such communication had not ensured the requisite privacy. 13.  On 13 October 2011 the President of the Supreme Court, referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the applicant\u2019s case, asked the Presidium of the Supreme Court to reopen the proceedings. 14.  On 23 November 2011 the Presidium of the Supreme Court granted the President\u2019s request, quashed the judgment of 29 November 2007 and remitted the matter to the appellate court for fresh consideration. 15.  On an unspecified date the Supreme Court appointed Ms K., a lawyer practising in Moscow, to represent the applicant. On 15 February and 1 March 2012 lawyer K. studied the applicant\u2019s case file. 16.  On 15 March 2012 the Supreme Court held a hearing in the applicant\u2019s case. The applicant complained that he had not been provided with an opportunity to discuss his case with State-appointed counsel without running a risk of being overheard by a third party. The court adjourned the hearing in order to arrange for communication between the applicant and his lawyer. 17.  On 22 March 2012 the applicant communicated with his lawyer by means of a video link. According to the Government, only counsel K. was present in the room during the video conference. The court\u2019s employee responsible for the functioning of the video link was located outside the room in which counsel K. was present. The applicant was also alone in the video conference room. A guard was stationed outside. 18.  On 5 April 2012 the Supreme Court upheld, in substance, the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. Counsel K. attended the hearing. She did not submit fresh grounds for appeal and made submissions to the court that appeared to be based on the grounds for appeal originally filed by the applicant and counsel A. The applicant, who was detained in Novosibirsk, took part in the hearing by means of a video link. He had agreed to be represented by counsel K. and confirmed that he had been provided with sufficient time to communicate with her to discuss his case. He also agreed to pay her a legal fee. 19.  From 7 February to 29 May 2012 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-1 in Novosibirsk. According to excerpts from the remand prison population records submitted by the Government, he was held in the following cells:\nCell no.\nPeriod of detention\nCell size (square metres)\nNumber of sleeping places\nNumber of inmates\n322\nFrom 7 to 8 February 20.  According to the Government, the cells in which the applicant was detained were furnished with a sink, a table, a bench, a cupboard for storing food products, a coat stand, a mirror, a drinking water tank, a rubbish bin, wash basins, a heater, an electric plug and an alarm button. There was a toilet cabin which ensured complete privacy for the person using it. The windows in the cells had small vents, which could be kept open to ensure access to fresh air. There were no grilles or shutters on the windows preventing access to daylight. During the daytime the cells were lit with a 95-watt electric bulb. During the night the cells were lit with a 60-watt electric bulb. The central heating system was always in a good working order. The temperature in the cells was maintained at +22 to +25oC in the summer and +19 to +21oC in the winter. The cells were cleaned once a week. The bed sheets were changed each time the inmates took a shower. Once a month the cells were disinfected, which ensured that they were free of insects or rodents. 21.  According to the applicant, cells nos. 48 and 18 were overcrowded throughout the time he was detained there. During his detention in cell no. 48 he was not always provided with an individual bed. He did not have bed sheets, cutlery or toiletries. The cell was infested with bedbugs. The lighting was insufficient. The dining table was too small to accommodate all inmates. The applicant had to eat sitting on the floor. The table was located 1 metre away from the toilet. The toilet was separated from the living area of the cell by a brick wall that was 35 centimetres high. The flush was broken and the toilet caused a constant unpleasant smell in the cell. The ventilation system did not function. The food was of low quality. The inmates had to do their laundry in the cell. Some of the inmates had lice. The daily outdoor exercise lasted no more than 35 to 45 minutes. The exercise area was too small and often overcrowded. 22.  On 15 March 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the remand prison, alleging that he had been detained in inhuman and degrading conditions there. 23.  On 14 March 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Novosibirsk dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. The applicant appealed, challenging the District Court\u2019s findings as regards the conditions of his detention in cell no. 48. 24.  On 10 September 2013 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 14 March 2013 and granted the applicant\u2019s claims in part. The court acknowledged that the applicant had been detained in cramped conditions in cell no. 48 and awarded him compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB). In particular, the court held as follows:\n\u201cRegard being had to the evidence submitted, [it follows] that during the period under consideration the personal space afforded to each inmate in the cell where the applicant was detained ... was 2.6 sq. m. From 7 February to 16 March 2012 ... the cell was overpopulated and the personal space afforded to the inmates was 2.2 sq. m, 1.95 sq. m and 1.7 sq. m. ...\nIn view of the above, [the court] considers that it has been established that during the period under consideration the personal space afforded to the applicant in cell no. 48 in remand prison no. 1 in Novosibirsk was below the standards set forth in the national legislation and in the case-law of the ECHR.\u201d 25.  According to the applicant, he received the compensation awarded to him by the judgment of 10 September 2013 in July 2016.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "7", "9", "5", "8", "0", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Martin. In 2006 she was recognised as \u201cseverely disabled\u201d with 60% \u201cfunctional impairment\u201d pursuant to the relevant national laws. Her monthly disabled person\u2019s allowance payments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 325.40 euros (EUR), EUR 336.20 and EUR 346.30, respectively. 5.  Prior to the above, in 2004, the applicant had lodged a claim with the Martin District Land Office (Obvodn\u00fd pozemkov\u00fd \u00farad) for restitution of a suite of real property consisting of several plots which came under special legislation provisions on restitution. 6.  On 20 December 2011 she lodged an action against the Land Office with the \u017dilina Regional Court, sitting as an administrative tribunal, seeking an order for acceleration of the restitution proceedings. 7.  This type of action required mandatory legal representation. Accordingly, the action was submitted through a lawyer. The applicant also sought an order for costs. The latter claim was calculated under the applicable national rules as pertaining to two \u201cacts of legal assistance\u201d (\u00fakon pr\u00e1vnej slu\u017eby), in particular a first consultation with a lawyer, and the formulation of the action. EUR 130 was claimed in respect of one such act along with an associated lump sum for overheads; the whole claim came to some EUR 260. 8.  On 2 January, 29 February and 23 March 2012 the applicant made further submissions. In the former two, she proactively informed the court that the Land Office had taken decisions in respect of her restitution claim on 23 December 2011 and 12 January 2012 and contended that these decisions did not determine her claim in relation to all the plots concerned and that they had been taken with the aim of creating a false impression that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The latter submission was made in response to a request by the court to specify the plots in respect of which the applicant\u2019s restitution claim was still outstanding. 9.  In the submission of 23 March 2012 the applicant reiterated her claim in respect of legal costs, amending its scope as pertaining to five acts of legal assistance, including the three submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 10.  On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant\u2019s claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance.\nThere is no reference in the Regional Court\u2019s decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant\u2019s claim, in the courts\u2019 reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision.\nThe Regional Court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal. 11.  On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12.  On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant\u2019s action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants\u2019 case was \u201cchallengeable under the criteria of lawfulness\u201d. However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant\u2019s case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded.\nThe decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.", "references": ["8", "6", "9", "7", "5", "4", "0", "2", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in \u00c7orum. 6.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody along with another person, on suspicion of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, the TDP (Turkish Revolutionary Party). 7.  On 18 March 2004, before his police statement was taken, the applicant asked for the assistance of a lawyer. In accordance with Article 138 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, in force at the relevant time, a defence lawyer, A.E.D., was appointed by the Bar Association to represent him. He arrived at the police station where the applicant was being held. The applicant and A.E.D. had a private meeting to discuss the case that lasted for eight minutes. The applicant agreed to A.E.D. representing him. 8.  On 18 March 2004 the applicant\u2019s police interview took place in the presence of A.E.D. at the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul Security Headquarters. According to the written interview record, the applicant replied to certain questions concerning his background and his alleged affiliation to the TDP. He did not admit to any affiliation to the organisation. Following the last question, the applicant stated that M.K., one of the alleged members of the TDP at the time, had asked him to provide him with a fake identity card in order to escape abroad and he had provided him with the identity information of his brother. The police officers terminated the interview at that point as they believed that the lawyer was interfering with the applicant\u2019s free will by saying \u201cremain silent, do not make such statements, do not answer this question\u201d. The lawyer, alleging that the police officers were recording phrases that had not been said by the applicant, also requested that the police officers remove that part of the applicant\u2019s statement. 9.  Following the lawyer\u2019s intervention the police officers took him out of the interview room allegedly under threat and would not allow him to represent the applicant any more. As a result, the lawyer did not sign the interview record. According to the applicant\u2019s submissions to the Court, after his lawyer was forced to leave, the police officers coerced him into signing self-incriminating statements which he had made while his lawyer was present, by indicating to him that they would involve his brother in the case if he refused to sign the statements. The applicant signed his statements. 10.  On 20 March 2004 at the request of the police officers, a new lawyer was appointed for the applicant. On the same day, the police resumed the interview and took additional statements from the applicant in the presence of his new lawyer. The applicant once again denied his affiliation to an illegal organisation. He stated that M.K. had stayed at his house on several occasions. On 16 March 2004, when at his house, M.K. had wanted to visit a friend. Having explained that the police were looking for him, he had asked if the applicant\u2019s wife could accompany him so he would not be noticed by the police. Subsequently, the applicant had allowed them to visit the friend together. 11.  On 21 March 2004 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and investigating judge respectively. He exercised his right to remain silent before the public prosecutor. He then gave statements to the investigating judge in the presence of a lawyer and retracted his police statements, alleging that he had been compelled by police officers to make self-incriminating statements. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s release. 12.  On 22 March 2004 the applicant\u2019s detention was ordered in absentia. 13.  On 29 March 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with aiding and abetting an illegal organisation under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 20 April 2004 the applicant was remanded in custody. 15.  At a hearing held on 24 November 2004 the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and denied the charges against him, arguing that he had not aided any member of an armed organisation. He accepted the statements he had given to the investigating judge and the fact that he had exercised his right to remain silent before the public prosecutor. However, he denied his statements to the police, stating that they had frequently recorded things he had not said, as a result of which his lawyer had confronted them and had then been removed from the interview. According to the applicant, after his lawyer\u2019s removal, the police had added to his statements the fact that he had passed the identity information of his brother to his co-defendant M.K. At the same hearing, the court noted that the investigation file relating to the allegations that the police officers had ill-treated the accused and had not allowed them to see their lawyers had been sent to the Fatih public prosecutor\u2019s office. It accordingly decided to request a copy of that investigation file. 16.  At a hearing held on 6 July 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the case pending before it to proceedings before the Erzurum Assize Court, to which it sent the case file. 17.  On 4 March 2005 the applicant was released pending trial. 18.  On 16 March 2006 the Erzurum Assize Court acquitted the applicant, finding that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. 19.  On 20 November 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, concluding that the elements of the crime had been established. The case was accordingly remitted to the Erzurum Assize Court. 20.  A document provided by the PTT (the postal, telegraph and telephone service) to the Erzurum Assize Court shows that on 26 January 2007 the forthcoming hearing date was served on the secretary of the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 21.  At a hearing held on 24 December 2007 the applicant, at his request, made his final submissions to the Erzurum Assize Court about the decision of the Court of Cassation. At the end of the hearing the court notified him that the next hearing would take place on 27 December 2007. 22.  On 27 December 2007 the first-instance court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment in the absence of both him and his lawyer. In delivering its judgment, the court relied on his partial confession, the false identity card drawn up in his brother\u2019s name, the arrest and identification reports. The court held that the applicant had harboured a member of an illegal organisation, M.K., and had provided him with the identity information of his brother, E.S. It further noted that on 27 February 2004 police officers had arrested M.K. at Adana Airport in possession of a false identity card, drawn up in the applicant\u2019s brother\u2019s name, while he had been trying to escape to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 23.  In his appeal, the applicant alleged that he had not been notified of the hearing date and argued that he had been convicted on the basis of abstract police statements obtained under coercion. 24.  On 2 March 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction. 25.  On 8 April 2009 the judgment was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court.\nCriminal proceedings against the police officers 26.  On an unspecified date the applicant, along with the lawyer concerned, lodged a complaint alleging that the police officers who had participated in his interview had unlawfully interfered with the questioning and had therefore breached his defence rights. 27.  On 22 October 2004 the Fatih public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the relevant police officers, accusing them of ill\u2011treatment and misconduct in office. The prosecutor stated that they had ill-treated the applicant and other suspects in police custody between 17 and 21 March 2004. It further held that they had not allowed the lawyers to examine certain documents, had not given them copies of those documents and had terminated the interviews on the grounds that the lawyers had interfered with the free will of the suspects and reminded them of their right to remain silent in the course of the interviews. 28.  At a hearing held on 2 March 2005 before the Fatih Criminal Court of General Jurisdiction, the applicant\u2019s officially appointed lawyer A.E.D. was heard as a complainant. He stated that on the day in question he had been representing another suspect and the police had told him that he could not look that suspect in the face. Subsequently, during the course of the applicant\u2019s interview when he had informed him that he had the right to remain silent, one of the officers had shouted at him saying that he was \u201cill-mannered\u201d (terbiyesizlik). Another police officer had allegedly told him that he had \u201coverstepped the mark\u201d (\u00e7izmeyi a\u015fmak) and had taken him out of the interview room. Two other lawyers also testified as complainants and stated that the police had either not allowed them to see the suspects or had prevented them from examining certain documents in the investigation file. 29.  On 29 September 2010 the Fatih Criminal Court of General Jurisdiction discontinued the case, finding that it was time-barred pursuant to Article 102 of the former Criminal Code (Law no. 765) and Article 223 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271). The parties did not appeal and the judgment became final on 14 December 2010.", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "8", "6", "5", "4", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, who are brothers, were born in 1964 and 1962 respectively and live in Mardin. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicants held teaching posts with the Ministry of Education and were employed as primary school teachers. 8.  On 22 January 2000 the first applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, Hizbullah, following the discovery of his profile in the format of a CV (\u00f6zge\u00e7mi\u015f) amongst documents confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house in Beykoz, Istanbul. On 26 January 2000 he was questioned by the police. In his statement, which he refrained from signing, he denied the allegations that he was a member of Hizbullah but submitted that he had given some of the same personal information about himself reflected in the CV to an individual named F.\u015e. in 1983. He further submitted that he had adopted a religious lifestyle and had been in contact with religious communities since 1983; however, his activities had never gone beyond reading the Quran to children in mosques. In a statement given on 29 January 2000 to the public prosecutor, the applicant stated that he had refrained from signing his statements before the police since they had contained expressions which had not been used by him. He further submitted that the fact that his profile had been discovered in the safe house meant nothing, since anyone could have given that information to Hizbullah. He stated that, in any event, he had not given information about himself to the organisation. 9.  On 22 January 2000 the second applicant was taken into police custody in similar circumstances to the first applicant, that is, following the discovery of his profile in the format of a CV amongst documents confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house in Istanbul. On 28 and 29 January 2000 he was questioned by the police and the Mardin public prosecutor respectively, and denied all allegations against him on both occasions. Claiming that he had never been in contact with Hizbullah, he stressed that the CV shown to him as evidence by the police during questioning differed from the one he had seen at the time of his detention a week earlier, and that they both contained inaccurate information about his background. 10.  On 29 February 2000 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, accusing the applicants of membership of an illegal armed organisation. He further accused the second applicant of complicity in the murder of two individuals and the wounding of a third. 11.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The cases against the applicants were therefore transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 12.  On 13 September 2004 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court held that the first applicant\u2019s involvement with the terrorist organisation had been limited to handing in his CV and attending its indoctrination sessions, which therefore fell within the scope of aiding and abetting rather than membership. Having regard to the fact that the alleged crime had been committed before 23 April 1999, the court held that Law no. 4616 \u2013 which provided for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before that date (see paragraph 38 below) \u2013 was applicable. It thus suspended the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. On 28 September 2007 the proceedings against him were discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. The decision became final on 31 October 2007. 13.  On 7 December 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court reclassified the charge against the second applicant as aiding and abetting an illegal organisation and discontinued the proceedings in respect of that charge on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. It further acquitted him of the remaining charges for lack of sufficient evidence. 14.  Owing to the fact that they were being prosecuted on charges of membership of an illegal organisation, the applicants were suspended from their positions. Furthermore, on 27 January 2000, following the initiation of the criminal investigation against the applicants, the Mardin Directorate of Education (\u201cthe Directorate\u201d) initiated a disciplinary investigation against the applicants and a number of other civil servants into their political and ideological activities. Among those questioned within the context of that investigation were the applicants, about six to nine of their colleagues, as well as the principal and vice-principal of the primary school. In respect of the first applicant, three teachers briefly stated that they had been aware that the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter or had heard such rumours. One teacher colleague stated that he believed the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter as he had seen his wife wearing a \u00e7ar\u015faf (chador). In respect of the second applicant, the teachers said that they knew him to be religious but that they had not witnessed him engaging in any ideological propaganda at school. One teacher submitted that the second applicant was rumoured to be a Hizbullah supporter. In respect of both applicants, most of the teachers submitted that their suspension from the school had disrupted the working order of the institution in so far as the applicants\u2019 students had had to be transferred to the rest of the teachers, resulting in merged classes of sixty to seventy pupils. The principal and vice-principal stated that they had not witnessed or been made aware of anything to suggest that the applicants had connections with the illegal organisation. The applicants denied the allegations and stated that they wanted to return to their duties as soon as possible. 15.  In an investigation report dated 30 June 2000, investigators took into account the evidence in the criminal proceedings, in particular the fact that the applicants\u2019 CVs had been discovered on a computer confiscated from the organisation\u2019s safe house, and concluded that the applicants were members of Hizbullah. They also went on to add that this conclusion was corroborated by the statements of the applicants\u2019 teacher colleagues. They then decided that the nature of the criminal proceedings against the applicants on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation fell within the ambit of section 125 (E) (a) of the Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657), which provides for the dismissal of a civil servant for disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of an institution for ideological and political purposes. The investigators therefore recommended the applicants\u2019 dismissal on those grounds. 16.  On 24 October 2000 the applicants were invited by the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Education (\u201cthe Supreme Disciplinary Council\u201d) to submit defence statements in response to the allegations concerning their active membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and their alleged disruption of the peace, tranquillity and order at the workplace for ideological and political purposes. 17.  In separate submissions the applicants denied all the allegations against them. They denied having given Hizbullah their CVs and highlighted obvious spelling mistakes, discrepancies and inaccurate information in the copies contained in the case file to demonstrate that they had been prepared by someone else without their knowledge. The first applicant further argued that the disciplinary investigation file contained no objective assessment of whether he had engaged in ideologically or politically motivated behaviour at the workplace so as to disrupt the peace, tranquillity and the working order of the school. In that respect he submitted that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authorities was not grounded on facts but solely on accusations and rumours. 18.  By a decision of the Supreme Disciplinary Council dated 18 April 2001, the applicants were dismissed from the civil service pursuant to section 125 (E) (a) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c...The acts attributed to the applicant[s]: Membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and carrying out activities for the organisation, disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes.\n...\nBased on the examination of the information and documents in the case file, the veracity of the acts attributed to the applicant[s] and their continuous nature has been established. Having regard to the importance of the teaching post and the characteristics and seriousness of the offence, it has not been deemed appropriate to impose a lighter penalty. Based on the following considerations, the recommendation for the applicant[s]\u2019 dismissal was accepted unanimously ...\u201d\nb.  Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the first applicant 19.  On 4 August 2001 the first applicant brought a claim against the Ministry of Education in the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal. He requested a stay of execution of the dismissal order because criminal proceedings were still pending against him. 20.  On 10 January 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court rejected his request for a stay of the dismissal order. 21.  Relying on his right to be presumed innocent, on 18 February 2002 the first applicant challenged that decision before the Regional Administrative Court. 22.  On 4 March 2002, having regard to the fact that the first applicant had been dismissed on account of his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation, the Regional Administrative Court granted his request for a stay of the dismissal decision and held that he had been charged with a criminal, not a disciplinary, offence, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. It therefore held that he could not be dismissed from public service for membership of a terrorist organisation without a final conviction. If he were to be convicted, however, he could be dismissed on the grounds that he no longer qualified for civil service. The case was remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court. 23.  On 3 December 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court adjourned its examination of the merits of the case pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 24.  On 14 April 2005, shortly after the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u2019s decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s request for the dismissal decision to be quashed. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n \u201cThe applicant and other civil servants holding various posts in the district have been the subject of a disciplinary investigation in connection with their alleged acts of \u2018disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes; participating, provoking, encouraging or otherwise assisting in acts such as boycotts, occupations, obstructions, slowdowns and strikes or being collectively absent from work.\u2019 The Ministry of Education\u2019s investigation report dated 30 June 2000 recommended the applicant\u2019s dismissal from public service because [he] was a member of the Hizbullah terrorist organisation.\nDespite the fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant [on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation] have been suspended, it is an established principle of case-law that exoneration from criminal liability does not preclude the finding of a disciplinary offence. Hence, following an examination of the case file and investigation report, the court finds it established that the applicant committed the disciplinary offence in so far as he gave the organisation his profile and attended its lessons and meetings.\u201d 25.  On 21 June 2005 the first applicant appealed against the judgment of the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting a stay of the decision ordering for his dismissal from service. He challenged the grounds on which he had been dismissed, arguing that membership of a terrorist organisation was not one of the disciplinary offences listed in the Law on Civil Servants which warranted dismissal from public service. Moreover, he relied on his right to be presumed innocent since the criminal proceedings against him had been suspended and there had been no definitive finding of guilt. He also argued that the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court\u2019s failure to give reasons in its decision implied that it had not established the facts giving rise to the disciplinary action independently. 26.  In a decision dated 27 September 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request for a stay of the dismissal order without providing any further reasons. On 6 June 2006 it also dismissed his appeal. 27.  On an unspecified date the first applicant requested a stay of his dismissal order and rectification of the decision in the Supreme Administrative Court, maintaining the same grounds of appeal as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 25 above). 28.  The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s requests on 13 February 2008 and 14 April 2009 respectively, without responding to his arguments.\nc.  Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the second applicant 29.  On an unspecified date the second applicant brought a case before the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal and requesting a stay of execution of the dismissal order. On 10 January 2002 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for a stay of execution. 30.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court. He complained, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings on charges of membership of an illegal organisation were still pending before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court and that, therefore, his dismissal without a conviction on the basis of abstract accusations infringed the presumption of innocence; that the allegations that he had disturbed the peace and order at the workplace remained completely unproven and unsubstantiated; and that in delivering its decision, the Supreme Disciplinary Council had failed to comply with the six-month time\u2011limit set out in Law no. 657. 31.  On 4 March 2002 the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the dismissal decision. It reiterated at the outset the three principal conditions for an act to be considered a disciplinary offence: (i) that it be carried out by the employees of an institution within that institution; (ii) that it disrupt the established order of the institution; and (iii) that the act constituting the disciplinary offence, as well as the related penalty, be set out in the relevant laws and regulations. The Regional Administrative Court then went on to examine the different types of offences that may be committed by civil servants, differentiating between acts amounting to disciplinary offences exclusively, acts considered to be offences under both disciplinary and criminal laws and, lastly, acts defined as offences only under the Criminal Code. In the light of this classification, the Diyarbak\u0131r Regional Administrative Court decided that the act attributed to the second applicant, that is, membership of a terrorist organisation, fell under the third category of acts punishable only under the Criminal Code, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. Bearing in mind that the relevant criminal proceedings were still pending before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court, the Regional Administrative Court concluded that the second applicant could not, for the time being, be lawfully dismissed from the civil service on account of membership of a terrorist organisation. The case was remitted to the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court. 32.  On 8 September 2006 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court annulled the Supreme Disciplinary Council\u2019s dismissal decision as unlawful. Noting the discrepancy in the latter\u2019s decision, the court stated that while the second applicant was being accused by the administration of membership of a terrorist organisation, the legal basis put forward for his dismissal was the disruption of peace and order at the workplace through ideological and political propaganda under section 125 (E) (a) of Law no. 657. Considering that none of the people questioned at the school had witnessed such propaganda by the second applicant there, and bearing further in mind that \u201cmembership of a terrorist organisation\u201d was not one of the exhaustive grounds for dismissal from the civil service listed in the relevant section, the second applicant\u2019s dismissal had had no legal basis. 33.  The Ministry of Education appealed against the decision. On 20 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the decision of the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court and amended the legal grounds for the second applicant\u2019s dismissal. The Supreme Administrative Court firstly acknowledged that the charges against the second applicant of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation had been discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prescription period laid down for that offence, and that he had been acquitted of the remaining charges. Referring to the second applicant\u2019s statements given to the police, his CV obtained from the Hizbullah safe house in Istanbul and the bill of indictment filed against him by the Mardin public prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court then found it established that the second applicant was a member of a terrorist organisation who in addition had recruited members to the organisation and pursued the ideology of the terrorist organisation in the classroom. It continued that even if his colleagues had not witnessed such action on the part of the second applicant at the school, his dismissal had still been justified under a different subsection of section 125 (E), namely subsection (g), which authorised the dismissal of civil servants who were found to engage in \u201cdisgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant\u201d. 34.  On 27 May 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Administrative Court transferred the case to the Mardin Administrative Court, which was deemed to be the court with jurisdiction in the instant case. 35.  On 24 November 2009, complying with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Mardin Administrative Court upheld the disciplinary decision ordering the second applicant\u2019s dismissal from the civil service under section 125 (E) (g) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the judgment read:\n\u201cNotwithstanding the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of membership of an armed organisation and his acquittal on charges of murder and battery, the investigation and [criminal] case file reveal that the applicant\u2019s profile was discovered in the organisation\u2019s [safe] house in Istanbul and that his statements to the police and the bill of indictment demonstrate the fact that he was a member of the organisation, recruiting new members and lecturing on its ideologies, facts which were corroborated by his statements and [CV]. These acts fall within the scope of disgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant ... which therefore justify his dismissal from public service.\u201d 36.  On 17 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request for leave to appeal lodged by the second applicant.", "references": ["0", "8", "6", "9", "5", "1", "7", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants are from four families. 7.  On various dates in the 1990s the employer of the adult male applicants (applicants 1, 3, 5 and 10), the security service of the Ministry of Finance, provided them with accommodation in its dormitory building in Moscow. They were registered as living in the building on a temporary basis. 8.  In 2001 the right of operational management in respect of the dormitory building was transferred to the Federal Treasury (\u201cthe Treasury\u201d). 9.  The adult female applicants (applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13) submitted that they had been residing in the dormitory building with their husbands since their marriages in 2002, 2004, 2003 and 2005 respectively. 10.  Between 2003 and 2009 applicants 2, 6, 7, 9 and 12 were born and started living in the dormitory building with their parents. 11.  The third and fifth applicants resigned from the security service in 2004 and 2009 respectively, but continued to live in the dormitory building. According to the Government, the first applicant was dismissed from the security service in 2014. The tenth applicant is still employed by the security service. 12.  The adult male applicants are registered as living in the dormitory building on a permanent basis. Each family occupies a room in the building. 13.  The Government submitted that they had not disposed of any information as regards the exact dates when the applicants had moved into the dormitory building. 14.  In 2007 the Treasury brought court proceedings against the adult female applicants, seeking their eviction from the particular rooms which they occupied in the dormitory building. The Treasury submitted that the respondents had moved in unlawfully, without its permission. 15.  On 14 September 2007 the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the eviction of applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 without providing them with any alternative accommodation. In particular, the District Court established the following:\n(i) the building in question was federal property; it was used as a dormitory building under the operative management of the Treasury;\n(ii) the dormitories had been designed for the temporary accommodation of persons during the period of their work, service or studies;\n(iii) the adult female applicants had been moved into the dormitory building by their husbands when the old Housing Code had been in force, prior to 1 March 2005;\n(iv) the Ministry of Finance had never issued any decision providing the adult female applicants with accommodation in that dormitory building;\n(v) no tenancy agreements had been concluded with the adult female applicants\u2019 husbands in respect of the premises which they occupied;\n(vi) social tenancy agreements could be concluded with people living in dormitory buildings only in the event that the property was liquidated, however such a decision had not been taken in respect of the dormitory building in question.\nHaving regard to the above, the District Court concluded that Articles 53 and 54 of the old Housing Code and Articles 69 and 70 of the new Housing Code, which allowed tenants under a social tenancy agreement to move members of their families into a property, were not applicable to the adult female applicants, and therefore they had to be evicted from the occupied housing without any alternative accommodation being provided. The District Court noted that it had also taken into account that the adult female applicants had been registered as living in various regions of Russia and the Republic of Moldova, where they retained a right of occupation in respect of living premises. 16.  On 22 November 2007 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the eviction order. 17.  In January 2008 bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. In March 2008 those proceedings were terminated, as the creditor recalled the writ of execution. 18.  On 5 February 2009 new enforcement proceedings were instituted. However, on 28 August 2009 they were terminated, on the grounds that it was impossible to enforce the writ of execution. 19.  In 2009 the Treasury brought new eviction proceedings against the adult female applicants. This time, the Treasury sought to evict them from the dormitory building, regardless of which rooms they were occupying. The Treasury claimed that those applicants had started living on the premises without its permission. 20.  The applicants concerned lodged a counterclaim, seeking to have their right to occupy the dormitory building premises recognised. They submitted that they had been residing in the building lawfully as spouses of the persons to whom the housing had been provided, and in any event, under domestic law (Article 20 of the Civil Code, and Articles 31 and 54 of the Family Code (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below), they had a right to live together with their husbands and children. 21.  Local authorities \u2013 which had been invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties \u2013 were against the eviction of the adult female applicants. They claimed that the applicants who were minors were registered as living in the dormitory building and lived there with their families. The Family Code provided that parents had equal rights, obligations and responsibilities in raising their child, and therefore eviction of the mothers would make it difficult for them to comply with their parental duties. The local authorities asked the District Court to take the interests of the minor applicants into account when making its decision and to dismiss the eviction claims. 22.  On 14 April 2010 the District Court ordered the eviction of applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 from the dormitory building and dismissed their counterclaim. In particular, the District Court referred to its findings in the judgment of 14 September 2007, with reference to Articles 301 and 305 of the Civil Code (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below), and found that:\n (i) irrespective of their status as family members of their husbands, the adult female applicants had no right to reside in the dormitory building, since it had been designed as temporary accommodation for persons working for the security service; and\n(ii) no tenancy agreement on occupying the dormitory building premises had been concluded with their husbands, and therefore the provisions of Article 100 \u00a7 5 of the Housing Code, which allowed tenants to be joined by family members, were not applicable to them.\nThe District Court further stated that it had taken into account that the adult female applicants could decide themselves with which parent their minor children should live, especially as they (the adult female applicants) had been registered as living in various regions of Russia and the Republic of Moldova, where they retained a right of occupation in respect of living premises. 23.  The adult female applicants appealed against the eviction order. They submitted in particular that the courts had not indicated which rights, freedoms and interests of the claimant (the Treasury) had been breached when their husbands had moved them into the dormitory building, or which rights would be breached if they were allowed to stay living together with their children in the building. They also submitted that, by taking the decision to evict them, the District Court had breached their right to respect for their family life. In particular, they drew the attention of the appeal court to the position of the District Court as regards their minor children\u2019s place of residence, a position which, in their opinion, was in breach of Article 54 of the Family Code (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). 24.  On 24 November 2010 the City Court upheld the eviction order. The City Court referred to the findings of the District Court in the judgments of 14 September 2007 and 14 April 2010. The City Court found that the District Court had duly assessed the adult female applicants\u2019 arguments and dismissed them on the basis of the applicable domestic law. The City Court further held that the adult female applicants\u2019 argument that the eviction order had de facto prohibited their families from living together had aimed to reassess the conclusions of the judgment of the District Court and, given the fresh conclusion that the District Court had duly assessed the arguments before it, could not serve as a basis for quashing the judgment. 25.  It appears that the eviction order has not yet been enforced, and applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 continue to live in the dormitory building. 26.  On an unspecified date the applicants were put on the municipal housing list. 27.  On an unspecified date the adult male applicants brought court proceedings against various authorities, including the Government of Moscow and the Government of the Russian Federation, seeking to have their right to occupy the dormitory building indefinitely under a social tenancy agreement recognised. Those applicants brought proceedings on their own behalf, but also in the name of and on behalf of the minor applicants. 28.  On 17 August 2011 the District Court granted the claims of the adult male applicants and the minor applicants in part. In particular, the court established that the adult male applicants had been moved into the dormitory building by their employer, the security service of the Ministry of Finance, between 1990 and 1995. Therefore, on the date the new Housing Code had entered into force, they had already worked for the security service for more than ten years. In accordance with the applicable law, the adult male applicants could not be evicted from the residential accommodation which they occupied without being provided with alternative accommodation, and therefore their right to reside there was not limited by the duration of their work contracts and was therefore unlimited in terms of duration. However, the District Court held that the claimants were not entitled to have social tenancy agreements in this respect. 29.  On 16 February 2012 the City Court upheld that judgment. 30.  On 15 August 2017 the applicants informed the Court of changes in their family situations. In particular, on 28 June 2012 the youngest son of the Popov family, Grigory, was born, and the Ozerov family had twin daughters, Valeria and Maria, on 15 June 2012, and a son, Maxim, on 7 October 2015.", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "2", "5", "3", "0", "1", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Istanbul. 7.  On 11 December 1995 the applicant, a traffic control officer, was hit by a car while on duty. He suffered bodily injuries as a result of the accident. An official disability report indicated that he had a reduced working capacity of 60%. 8.  On the basis of this report the applicant, while reserving the right to increase his claims in due course, made an initial request for compensation to the Ministry of Interior, claiming 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in pecuniary damages and TRY 5,000 in non-pecuniary damages. 9.  Following tacit dismissal of the claim by the Ministry, the applicant brought a case for compensation before the Istanbul Administrative Court for the amounts he had specified in his request to the Ministry. 10.  During the course of the proceedings, the court decided of its own motion to order an expert report to determine the exact amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. The report, which was submitted to the court on 26 September 2005, indicated the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damages as 157,077 TRY. The applicant did not submit a request to the court to increase his initial claims in the light of that report. The Istanbul Administrative Court in its decision delivered on 15 February 2006 only awarded him the amounts initially requested by him.", "references": ["5", "2", "9", "7", "4", "0", "6", "1", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The second applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Prilep. 5.  On 8 November 2008 seven persons, including the second applicant, founded the applicant association. The founding members adopted several documents concerning the applicant association, including its Charter, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\nArticle 1\n\u201cThe Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia [hereinafter \u201cthe Church\u201d] is a voluntary association of individuals, who exercise, through their religious beliefs and doctrinal sources, the freedom of religion ... through preaching; prayer; religious rituals; and other forms of expression.\u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201cThe seat of the [applicant association] is [the street name].\u201d\nArticle 8\n\u201cThe aims of the Church are the following:\n...\n-  to promote, stimulate and educate the members about the spiritual life and development;\n-  to hold and organise religious education; educative religious discussions and lectures; public religious debates; visits to monasteries ... to hold preaching sessions; prayer meetings ... and other orthodox rituals;\n-  to organise humanitarian funds and actions for the well-being and support of people;\n-  to take care and support all who are in a need of help ...;\n...\n-  to inform the orthodox followers about religious holidays and culture;\n-  to publish bulletins, material, publications, books and advertising material with orthodox content;\n-  to organise and hold joint meetings, rituals and other religious activities with other orthodox churches in the State and abroad with whom the Church is in union.\u201d\n...\u201d\nArticle 9\n\u201cAs part of its activity, the Church will publish literature with orthodox content and establish funds, in particular, for:\n-  publication of bulletins and periodicals ...;\n-  publication of chronicles concerning the work of the members;\n-  publication of books;\n-  creation of funds for financial aid.\u201d\nArticle 11\n\u201cThe publication and humanitarian activity of the Church, as well as the funds that it will establish, shall be financed by:\n-  sponsors;\n-  donations;\n-  contributions;\n-  funds gained by its own economic activities.\u201d\nArticle 27\n\u201cThe Church will be financed by:\n-  economic activities;\n-  sponsorship;\n-  donations;\n-  voluntary contributions and funds, and so forth.\u201d 6.  On 26 November 2008 the Ministry of Justice granted permission to the applicant association to use the word \u201cMacedonia\u201d in the name. 7.  On 3 December 2008 the second applicant, acting as an authorised representative of the applicant association, submitted an application for its registration as a religious association. As stated in the application, it appended, inter alia, evidence that its founding members were Macedonian nationals. By a letter of 19 December 2008, the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe Registration Court\u201d) acknowledged receipt of all appended documents and requested that the applicants complete the application by specifying the organisational form under which the applicant association sought registration. On 5 January 2009 the applicants replied that the applicant association sought registration as a church. 8.  On 6 March 2009 the Registration Court rejected the application as incomplete. Whereas it confirmed that nationality documentation was in the file, the court held that it was unable to establish whether the application for registration had been submitted in good time. That decision was quashed on appeal by the Skopje Court of Appeal, which found no reasons why the Registration Court had not sought that the applicants complete the application in that respect by its request of 19 December 2008. 9.  On 10 May 2010 the Registration Court dismissed \u201cthe application of the applicant association\u201d for registration, finding that it had requested registration as a religious entity under the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act (\u201cthe 2007 Act\u201d) only for formal reasons, while in practice it would operate as an association of citizens to which the Association of Citizens and Foundations Act applied. In this connection, the court held that: (a) the text of Article 1 of the Charter was not identical to the text of section 2 of the 2007 Act; (b) Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter specified that the applicant association would publish literature with religious content and would create funds, which, according to the court, was contrary to the aims specified in section 2 of the 2007 Act. In this connection it was noted that Articles 11 and 27 of the Charter specified that the applicant association would be financed, inter alia, by economic activities (\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0434\u0435\u0458\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442), which was contrary to sections 30-33 of the 2007 Act; (c) there was no evidence that the founding members and the second applicant were Macedonian nationals; and (d) despite the fact that the founding members had adopted the required documents for registration of the applicant association, they had not discussed the issues specified in section 13(1)(2-6) of the 2007 Act. 10.  Referring to sections 7 and 8 of the 2007 Act, the court also found that:\n\u201cThe registration of the voluntary association of physical persons under the name \u2018Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia\u2019 ... would violate the freedom of religion ... of all physical persons-believers who exercise the[ir] freedom of religion through already registered religious communities and, in particular, the lawful legal status of other registered voluntary associations of physical persons ... and their managing bodies; hierarchy; their competence; titles; religious activity and everything that is regulated by their rules ...\n... the free manifestation of religion cannot endanger ... human rights and freedoms of others ...\u201d 11.  The second applicant lodged an appeal with the Skopje Court of Appeal in which he complained on behalf of the applicant association that the reasons given by the Registration Court were unclear and contradictory. In this connection he argued, inter alia, that he had submitted copies of nationality documentation for the founding members; that section 31 of the 2007 Act provided that religious entities could publish relevant literature; that the sources of income provided for in the Charter corresponded to those set forth in the 2007 Act; and that the Registration Court had not explained how and why the registration of the applicant association would affect the religious beliefs and managing bodies of other registered religious communities. 12.  On 16 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, finding that the reasoning contained therein was clear and consistent. It held that Article 11 of the Charter provided that the applicant association would be financed from funds obtained from economic activities, which implied that it would be for-profit, contrary to section 33(2) of the 2007 Act. Furthermore, the permission granted by the Ministry of Justice of 26 November 2008 (see paragraph 6 above) concerned \u201cthe Church of Real Orthodox Christians\u201d and not \u201cthe Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia\u201d. Lastly, it established that there was no evidence in the case file regarding the nationality of the founding members and the second applicant. The court did not address the remaining complaints.", "references": ["3", "1", "9", "2", "0", "8", "6", "4", "No Label", "7", "5"], "gold": ["7", "5"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Verona, Italy, in connection with criminal charges unrelated to the present case. 7.  In the early morning of 22 July 2005 a sales clerk, G., was attacked in a shop in Kharkiv where she worked. She suffered multiple cuts, including a penetrating chest wound, which led to pneumothorax. She was hospitalised in an intensive-care unit. 8.  According to the subsequent findings of the domestic court which convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery (see paragraph 18 below), the applicant had attacked G., whom he had known previously, and seized a certain amount of cash belonging to her employer, the company that ran the shop. 9.  According the applicant\u2019s account, which he maintained throughout the proceedings before the domestic courts and before this Court, G. owed him money and he had gone to the shop to collect the debt. However, G. had attacked him with scissors and, trying to defend himself, he had hit her back, seized the scissors from her and stabbed her with them. When the shop\u2019s alarm had gone off, he had taken the money and run away. 10.  According to the applicant, late on 22 July 2005 he was arrested by the police and taken to a police station where he was questioned about the incident. Allegedly, his request for a lawyer was ignored. 11.  In a statement (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) dated 22 July 2005 taken by a police officer, the applicant gave the account of events as set out in paragraph 9 above. 12.  On 23 July 2005 a number of reports were drawn up: (i) an arrest report according to which the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery; (ii) a record stating that the applicant\u2019s procedural rights as a suspect had been explained to him, including the right to remain silent, to have a legal aid lawyer appointed and to consult him prior to the first questioning; (iii) a record stating that the applicant, having been informed of the right to legal assistance, had decided to waive it; (iv) a transcript of the applicant\u2019s questioning as a suspect: the applicant\u2019s account of events was as set out in paragraph 9 above. 13.  On 25 July 2005 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. He repeated his account of the fight with the victim (see paragraph 9 above), adding that in the course of the fight the victim had hit him in the jaw with a mug. He stated that he had not been ill-treated by the police. The expert noted that the applicant had a hematoma on his jaw and a number of cuts on his right hand, and concluded that the injuries were consistent with the applicant\u2019s account. 14.  According to the applicant, at the close of the pre-trial investigation and then, subsequently, in preparation for his appeal, he had not been given sufficient time to study the case file. 15.  On 17 October 2005, at the opening of the trial before the Kharkiv Kyivsky District Court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) the applicant stated that he wished to defend himself and waived his right to legal assistance. He subsequently alleged that he had been forced to do so by the police guards present in the courtroom. 16.  In the course of the trial the applicant repeated the account of events set out in paragraph 9 above. 17.  Also in the course of the trial the applicant asked the trial court to call certain witnesses, without clearly identifying them. He claimed that they could have testified to the existence of the victim\u2019s debt to him and to his good character. The trial court refused his applications in that respect (see paragraph 19 below). 18.  On 18 October 2005 the trial court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. The court relied on, inter alia: (i) the applicant\u2019s admissions in the course of the trial; (ii) the victim\u2019s court testimony, denying, in particular, having borrowed any money from the applicant, as well as her statements incriminating the applicant given in the course of a reconstruction of the crime scene and confrontation with the applicant; (iii) money and clothes with brown spots seized from the applicant on 22 July 2005;[1] (iv) testimony given by D., the applicant\u2019s girlfriend, who denied any knowledge of the applicant having lent any money and stated, on the contrary, that he himself had been borrowing money from her; (v) the testimony of the victim\u2019s sister and son, equally denying knowledge of any debt. The sister stated that at 7 p.m. on 22 July 2005 in the hospital, the victim had told her that she knew the attacker; (vi) the pre-trial statement of M., a sales clerk in a neighbouring shop, who had stated in the course of the pre-trial investigation that he had seen someone looking like the applicant enter the victim\u2019s shop and then run away from it after the alarm had gone off; he had then discovered the victim injured. 19.  As far as the applicant\u2019s requests to call additional witnesses were concerned, the trial court stated that he had failed to indicate the names and addresses of those individuals, whom he had supposedly informed about the debt and who could have overheard a telephone call he had had with the victim\u2019s son in that connection. The trial court considered those allegations to be an obfuscation tactic on the part of the applicant and pointed out that his girlfriend, with whom he had lived for two years, did not know of any debt. On the contrary, she had testified that he had had no money to lend. 20.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant appealed to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). He raised, notably, various matters concerning the assessment of the evidence. He asked the Court of Appeal to provide him with a lawyer. 21.  On 6 January 2006 the applicant reiterated the latter request. 22.  On 2 February 2006 the Vice-President of the Court of Appeal asked the regional Bar association to assign a lawyer for the applicant. There is no indication of any follow-up. 23.  On 20 July 2006 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and the prosecutor, and upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 24.  On 21 July 2006 the applicant asked the trial court to appoint a lawyer for him, for the preparation of an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. On 28 August 2006 the trial court replied that, as his conviction had been upheld on appeal, there were no lawful grounds for appointment of a legal aid lawyer. The applicant was free to hire such a lawyer himself. 25.  On 4 December 2006 the applicant lodged a handwritten appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. He raised various matters of fact, disagreeing with the lower courts\u2019 assessment of the evidence. He also complained that he had not been provided with a lawyer before the first police interview on 22 July 2005, had been forced to waive his right to legal assistance on 17 October 2005 under duress from the police (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above), and that the Court of Appeal had failed to appoint a lawyer for him. 26.  On 28 February 2007 a Supreme Court judge, sitting in private, rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law. The judge considered that the applicant\u2019s appeal concerned only matters of fact and assessment of the evidence, which were not grounds for the opening of proceedings. 27.  Following his arrest, in July and August 2005 the applicant was allegedly held in a police station, a hospital and a police temporary detention facility. 28.  On 17 August 2005 the applicant was transferred to the Kharkiv pre\u2011trial detention centre (\u201cSIZO\u201d). According to him, he was held in a cell that had twenty-four sleeping places, with more than fifty other inmates. 29.  According to the Government, at the SIZO the applicant was held in the following cells:\nCell no.\nDates \nCell area, in square metres\nNumber of sleeping places\nSquare metres per sleeping place\n657\n17/08/05-18/08/05 1.34\n250\n07/06/06-16/07/06\nno information as that cell no longer existed at the time when the Government submitted their observations\n276\n \n17/07/06-28/08/06\n05/10/06-14/12/06 30.  On 28 August 2006 the applicant was transferred from the SIZO to Kharkiv correctional colony no. 18, where he served the rest of his sentence until being released on 3 October 2012. From 5 October to 14 December 2006 he was returned to the SIZO to enable him to study the case file in preparation for his appeal on points of law. 31.  On arrival at the SIZO, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that he had no health problems at the time. The doctor noted, however, that in 1999 the applicant had been treated for tuberculosis, which was currently inactive. The applicant was recommended periodic courses of prophylactic treatment to prevent the reactivation of his tuberculosis, which he subsequently underwent in the course of his detention. In September 2011 he was diagnosed with the first signs of a cataract in the left eye. Glasses were prescribed and issued to him. On one occasion in October 2011 he was diagnosed with high blood pressure and was given the relevant medication. No other complaints in this respect were recorded. On several occasions in the course of his detention the applicant was treated for seasonal influenza, back pain and headaches. 32.  On 28 January 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative engaged a lawyer practising in Kharkiv to visit him in prison and advise him on legal matters. From 6 to 18 February 2008 the lawyer examined the applicant\u2019s criminal case file. 33.  In a letter to the Court of 12 December 2008, the applicant submitted that the domestic authorities were refusing to provide him with certain documents, which could prove his innocence, for his application to the Court, namely:\n(i)  the statement by M. and documents concerning the court\u2019s efforts to summon that witness (see paragraph 18 (vi) above);\n(ii)  the statement of the victim;\n(iii)  documents concerning a civil claim for damages made by the shop that had been robbed;\n(iv)  the transcript of a particular hearing before the trial court;\n(v)  statements made by the applicant in the course of the investigation on 22 and 23 July 2005;\n(vi)  search and seizure records of 22 July 2005.\nThe applicant added that he did have copies of the documents from the criminal case file but they were of poor quality, preventing him from sending them to the Court. 34.  On 23 August 2010 the Registry pointed out to the applicant that his application was incomplete and asked him to provide copies of:\n(i)  his first appeal;\n(ii)  his requests for the appointment of a legal aid lawyer;\n(iii)  his appeal on points of law. 35.  On 4 September 2010 the applicant responded by providing copies of his first appeal and his request of 6 January 2006 to the Court of Appeal that a lawyer be appointed for him (see paragraph 22 above). He added that the trial court and the Supreme Court had not provided him with the remaining documents he had requested.", "references": ["5", "7", "6", "9", "0", "8", "4", "2", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  On 29 October 2008 O.M., M.I. and B.T., former nuns in the Macedonian Orthodox Church (\u201cMOC\u201d), founded the applicant association. The minutes of the constituent assembly (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) included the following statement:\n\u201c... nuns gathered at the assembly do not accept the teaching of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, (which) they consider wrong and unorthodox. (Consequently) they do not want to have any canonical communication with episcopes and priests of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Not only is (that) church in dispute (\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b) with all other orthodox churches, it is not recognised by anyone. This is so because all other churches consider its teaching heretical and wrong. We ... do not want to waste our life in religious doubt ... to be led by immature and non-religious people ... we would be offended on religious grounds if we are associated with another religious community ...\u201d 5.  On the same date, the founding members created the following official documents: (a) a founding decision; (b) decisions authorising O.M. to represent the applicant association and submit an application for its registration; and (c) the Charter (\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0442) of the applicant association. 6.  The relevant parts of the founding decision read as follows:\nArticle 1\n\u201cThis decision serves (the purpose of) the registration of Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom in the register of churches, religious communities (\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438) and groups (\u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0433\u0438\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0438 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0438) in the Republic of Macedonia, as a voluntary, non-profit association of Christians who do not belong to any religious community and, in particular, have nothing in common with the Macedonian Orthodox Church. \u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201cBecause it is a Christian religious community ...\u201d 7.  The relevant parts of the Charter read as follows:\nArticle 1\n\u201cThe Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom is a voluntary association of individuals who exercise, through their religious beliefs and doctrinal sources, freedom of religion ... through preaching, prayer, religious rituals, and other forms of expression.\u201d\nArticle 2\n\u201cThe Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom is a religious community founded by nuns (completely devoted to God) and private citizens (\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0438 \u043b\u0438\u0446\u0430), whose religious beliefs correspond to the Old and New Testament (the Bible). \u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201cThe name of the religious community is: Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom, with its registered office in v. Nizopole-Bitola.\u201d 8.  On 5 November 2008 O.M. submitted an application for registration of the applicant association \u201cas one of the religious communities\u201d to the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe registration court\u201d). The above\u2011mentioned documents were appended to the application. On 10 December 2008 the registration court requested that the applicant association submit evidence concerning the nationality of its founding members, a requirement with which the applicant association complied. 9.  On 18 February 2009 the registration court refused to register \u201cthe voluntary association of physical persons named in the application as Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom\u201d. It found that the application for registration did not meet the requirements laid down in sections 1 and 2 of the 2007 Act on the legal status of a church, religious community and association (\u201cthe 2007 Act\u201d, see paragraphs 14 and 15 below) in that (a) it referred to a form of voluntary association of physical persons which was not covered by the Act and (b) the registration of the applicant association \u201cwould violate the freedom of religion \u2011 provided for in the Convention and the Constitution \u2012 of other lawfully registered voluntary associations of physical persons\u201d. As to the former, the court held that the 2007 Act provided for the registration of churches, religious communities and groups but not of other religious entities, in this case a \u201cmonastery\u201d (\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0440), as specified in Article 1 of the applicant association\u2019s Charter. The court did not elaborate further on the second ground on which it based its decision. 10.  The applicant association complained about that decision, arguing that it had sought to be registered as a religious community under the name specified in the founding documents, which was evident from the application for registration. It also submitted that non-registration was a very drastic measure (in this connection it argued that the court should have indicated any shortcomings that were to be rectified). The court had failed to explain whose religious beliefs would be affected by its registration. Assuming that it referred to the followers of the MOC, the court had not explained how its registration would violate their rights. The applicant association pointed out that in 2002 the registration court had refused to register it as a non-governmental organisation and had ruled that an association with such a name should seek registration under the legislation regulating religious communities and associations that was in force at the time. 11.  On 29 April 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant association\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 12.  On an unspecified date, O.M. lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining of a violation of freedom of thought and discrimination on religious grounds owing to the refusal by the registration court to register the religious community with which she was associated. 13.  By a decision of 9 September 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional appeal, finding that O.M. had not sought protection of her rights and freedoms but \u201chad complained on behalf of the religious community with which she was associated\u201d. It also held that the complainant \u201chad sought protection of freedoms and rights only formally... without submitting any arguments, evidence or facts ...\u201d. Lastly, the court stated that the complainant had requested that it review the application of the law by the registration court in the proceedings for the registration of the religious community, which, according to the Constitutional Court, was beyond its jurisdiction (U.br.189/09).", "references": ["3", "1", "9", "8", "4", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "7", "5"], "gold": ["7", "5"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chevelcha. 6.  Between October 2003 and November 2004 a number of thefts of cattle from different farms were committed and criminal proceedings were instituted on that account. 7.  In the early morning of 2 November 2004 a cow and a bull were stolen from a farm in a village next to the one in which the applicant lived. 8.  On 12 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of the theft of 2 November 2004. 9.  On 14 November 2004 \u2013 at 8.30 a.m. according to the applicant \u2013 the applicant was taken by the police from her home to the Orzhytsya police station (\u201cthe police station\u201d) to verify her possible involvement in the above-mentioned criminal offences. 10.  According to the applicant, at the police station she was subjected to beatings and psychological pressure with a view to extracting her confession to the cattle thefts. The police officers hit her in her face, laid her on the floor with her face dawn, stamped on her legs and twisted her arms back. She was also made to spread her legs as widely as possible while standing and threatened with a beating if she fell down. Her requests for legal assistance were allegedly rejected. 11.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to any ill-treatment. 12.  On the same day, in police custody, the applicant drafted \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u044e) in which she confessed to several counts of cattle theft and gave \u201cexplanations\u201d in which, according to the Government, she submitted that she had committed the criminal offences as a member of a group of persons. No copies of those statements and \u201cexplanations\u201d have been made available to the Court. As can be seen from the available complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer with the domestic authorities, the applicant drafted a separate document for each of her confessions. 13.  At 6.10 p.m. on the same date the investigator of the Orzhytsya police unit dealing with the criminal proceedings concerning the cattle thefts (\u201cthe investigator\u201d) drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s detention as a suspect. The applicant signed a record of the explanation of procedural rights to her; in that record she stated that she did not wish to be legally represented at that stage. The investigator therefore issued a decision to conduct the pre-trial investigation into the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004 without the involvement of a defence lawyer. 14.  Thereafter, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the absence of a lawyer. The verbatim record of the questioning suggests that her right to a lawyer and to a meeting with him before the first round of questioning (as well as her right not to incriminate herself) had been explained to the applicant before the start of the questioning. According to the record, the applicant confessed to a number of cattle thefts in 2003 and 2004, committed as a part of a group, and provided some details in this respect. No questions were put or remarks made by the investigator. 15.  On 16 November 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother signed a contract for her legal representation with a lawyer, V. On three occasions on the same day and twice on 17 November 2004 (in the morning and afternoon) he attempted to hold a meeting with the applicant but for different reasons was denied access to the police station by duty officers. After each attempt on 17 November 2004, he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office that the police had unlawfully obstructed him from meeting with the applicant, and submitted that all investigative steps taken with the applicant\u2019s participation but in his absence should be considered as having been conducted in breach of her defence rights. 16.  On 17 November 2004, apparently during the lunch break, V. managed to see the investigator and requested to be admitted to the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s lawyer on the basis of the agreement concluded with the applicant\u2019s mother. The case-file suggests that on the same date the investigator admitted V. to the proceedings concerning the theft committed on 2 November 2004 and granted him permission to meet with the applicant. 17.  On the same date \u2013 between 8.15 and 11.30 a.m. according to the official records, and in the afternoon according to the applicant \u2013 a reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant record, which was signed by the applicant without any observations, suggests that before the reconstruction commenced, the applicant had been apprised of her constitutional right not to make self-incriminating statements and her right to refuse to participate in the reconstruction or to insist that it be carried out in the presence of a lawyer. The applicant declined (\u201cin the lawyer\u2019s presence\u201d, according to the record) to exercise those rights and expressed her wish for the reconstruction to be carried out without the assistance of a lawyer. 18.  During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to the theft committed during the early morning of 2 November 2004 and pointed out the place where the stolen animals had been slaughtered by her. The immediate inspection of the place revealed two detached cattle heads and two respective identification tags. 19.  From 5 p.m. until 6.15 p.m. on the same date, a court hearing on the application of the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was held, following which the applicant\u2019s detention was extended to ten days. As suggested by the records of the hearing, at the beginning of the hearing the applicant submitted that she wished to be represented by V. and her request was granted by the court. Upon his arrival, the applicant requested a meeting in private with V. Having heard V., who submitted that he was entitled to represent the applicant as of 9 a.m. of 16 November 2004 but since then had been unlawfully obstructed from meeting her, the court announced a break until 6.10 p.m. in order to allow the applicant to meet the lawyer in private. 20.  According to the applicant, no such meeting was ever ensured and V. was, in fact, excluded from the hearing. The verbatim record of the hearing refers to no intervention on V.\u2019s part after the break had finished. 21.  On 17 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Lubny temporary detention facility (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u2013 \u201cthe ITT\u201d). The admissions register of the facility suggests that upon her admission the applicant was found to be suffering from abrasions on her chin, left elbow and hip, a bruise on her right hip and a scratch mark on her left knee. It is furthermore stated in the register that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained three days before her admission to the facility and that she raised no complaints before the ITT staff. 22.  On 18 November 2004 V. unsuccessfully tried to meet the applicant in the Orzhytsya ITT as he had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT. On the same date he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that he had been unable to meet the applicant and had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT. 23.  On 19 November 2004 the deputy head of the Lubny ITT declined to allow V. to meet with the applicant as the investigator\u2019s room was allegedly occupied and there was no other way to allow his request. On the same date V. complained to the prosecutor about this fact. He noted, in particular, that he had waited at the Lubny ITT until the end of the working day and had seen nobody coming out of the premises but the police officers from the Orzhytsya police unit; this, in his opinion, constituted evidence that they had been \u201cworking with the applicant\u201d in the lawyer\u2019s absence. 24.  On 23 November 2004 V. again complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office that he was still not able to see the applicant and that no response had been given by the prosecutor to his four earlier complaints about violations of the applicant\u2019s defence rights and his rights as her lawyer. 25.  On the same date, from 12.29 until 4.14 p.m., another reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant verbatim record, which was signed by the applicant without observations, suggests that, on being informed of her procedural rights, the applicant declined to be assisted by a lawyer during this investigative step. 26.  During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to nine episodes of cattle thefts that she had allegedly committed as part of a group in 2003 and 2004 and showed the directions from which her accomplices had brought the stolen animals to her and the places where the cattle had been slaughtered by her. The record of the reconstruction furthermore suggests that once the reconstruction was terminated, the applicant attested that she had given that evidence of her own free will, without any physical and psychological influence being exerted by the police. 27.  On 24 November 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights as a suspect, the applicant expressed her wish to be represented by V. On the same date the latter was admitted to the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004. 28.  On the same day, in V.\u2019s presence, the applicant was charged with having committed, as a member of a group, the theft on 2 November 2004. She was then questioned as an accused in this respect. The applicant denied her guilt for the theft and submitted that she had given her earlier statements after being told that other persons had incriminated her in the theft and that there was thus no point in her denying her guilt. When asked how it had then happened that she had known and shown the place where the slaughtered animals\u2019 heads had been hidden, she stated that she had been told about the place by the attesting witnesses. 29.  On 3 December 2004 a new investigator was appointed to the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant. 30.  On 9 December 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor ordered the head of the Orzhytsya police unit to cease the violations of the applicant\u2019s defence rights and to ensure that she could meet with her lawyer, V., without any limitations as to the number and duration of such meetings. 31.  On 17 December 2004 V. was denied a meeting with the applicant as he had not received any authorisation to do so from the newly appointed investigator to the case. On the same day V. complained about this fact to the prosecutor, referring to the police\u2019s failure to comply with the prosecutor\u2019s order of 9 December 2004 (see paragraph 30 above). 32.  On 22 December 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights in the case concerning the theft committed during the early morning of 2 November 2004, the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by V. On the same date, the investigator admitted V. to these proceedings. 33.  On 23 December 2004 V. was again denied a meeting with the applicant as \u201cthere had been no information proving his admission to the proceedings\u201d. On the following day the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office regarding this refusal to allow her to meet her lawyer. The latter furthermore submitted that on 22 December 2004 his meeting with the applicant had been interrupted and she had been taken out of the meeting room. 34.  On the same date, on 23 December 2004, during a court hearing regarding the application of the preventive measure, which was held in the presence of V., from 10 until 12 a.m., the applicant submitted, inter alia, that on the morning of 14 November 2004, at the police station, she had denied having participated in the thefts and had unsuccessfully requested the assistance of a lawyer. She furthermore complained that the police officers had ill-treated her and forced her to draft confessions to a number of thefts, as dictated by them. She provided details of her ill\u2011treatment on 14 November 2004, as summarised above (see paragraph 10 above), and submitted that she had been afraid of raising any complaint during her examination by a forensic expert on 22 November 2004. 35.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings concerning all instances of theft were joined into a single case. 36.  On 19 February 2005, being apprised of her procedural rights as an accused, the applicant stated that she wished to be represented by V. In his presence, she was charged with having organised in 2003 a criminal group and having committed in 2003 and 2004 a number of cattle thefts. 37.  On 2 March 2005, when signing a record stating that she had been acquainted with the contents of the case file, the applicant denied her guilt and stated, without giving any details, that all investigative actions had been carried out in breach of her defence rights. V. submitted that there had been no evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt and requested, accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against the applicant be terminated. On the same day the investigator refused the lawyer\u2019s request as unsubstantiated and having been raised in only general terms. 38.  On 22 March 2005 the case against the applicant and her alleged accomplices was sent for trial to the Chornukhinskiy District Court, Poltava Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 39.  On 19 April 2005 the District Court held a preparatory hearing in the presence of all the defendants and of V. No complaints were raised by them during that hearing. 40.  During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed, inter alia, that her self-incriminating statements had been obtained by the police by means of ill-treatment and in the absence of a lawyer. Similar statements were made by the applicant\u2019s co-defendants. 41.  On 15 September 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty on a number of counts of theft and sentenced her to five years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so, it referred mainly to the self-incriminatory statements made by the applicant on 14, 17 and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above) and the confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation. When dismissing the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment by the police, the District Court referred to the statements of attesting witnesses present at the crime reconstructions of 17 and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 17 and 25 above); according to those witnesses, the applicant and other defendants had given evidence at those crime reconstructions of their own free will. It furthermore referred to evidence given by the police officers concerned (all of whom had denied all allegations of ill-treatment) and to the fact that no injuries had been found on the applicant\u2019s body during her medical examinations on 22 and 25 November 2004 (see paragraphs 52 and 55 below). The court also stated that during the whole pre-trial investigation the defendants had acknowledged their guilt and had never complained about any ill-treatment, but had retracted their statements only during the trial (which the court considered they had done simply as part of their defence strategy). 42.  On appeal of the applicant, on 15 March 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the above-mentioned judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It noted, inter alia, the selective approach taken by the trial court to the assessment of evidence in the case, including the evidence concerning the alleged ill-treatment, and a breach of the applicant\u2019s defence rights. 43.  On 20 March 2007 the prosecutor withdrew charges against the applicant on four counts of theft for lack of evidence. 44.  On 18 April 2007 the District Court found the applicant and her co\u2011defendants guilty as charged and sentenced them to different terms of imprisonment. The applicant was given a four-year suspended sentence. The court based the applicant\u2019s conviction on: her voluntary surrender to the police and the self-incriminatory statements that she had made on 14, 17 and on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above); confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation; the records of the crime scene examinations; and statements by the victims (that is to say farm owners) and witnesses confirming the fact that animals had been stolen from the farms. 45.  The District Court dismissed the defendants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police as ill-founded. It noted in this respect that the police officers concerned had denied all allegations of ill-treatment; a surgeon, N., who examined the applicant on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below) had submitted that he had found no bodily injuries when he had examined her; the forensic expert who had examined the applicant on 22 November 2004 had also attested that no injuries had been found by him on the applicant\u2019s body (see paragraph 52 below); and attesting witnesses who had been present at the crime reconstructions (in which the defendants had participated) had submitted that the applicant and other defendants had given evidence of their own free will. 46.  The applicant appealed, submitting that the District Court had failed to comply with the instructions of the Court of Appeal and to duly examine the allegations made by her and her co-defendants of ill-treatment by the police. She stated, inter alia, that the District Court had deliberately ignored evidence proving her bodily injuries. She relied, inter alia, on the relevant data from the admissions register of the Lubny ITT (see paragraph 21 above) and the testimony of a prosecutor who had seen the applicant\u2019s injuries. The applicant furthermore contested the credibility of the statements given by the police officers in the light of the fact that they were direct perpetrators. She also stated that two of the attesting witnesses could not be objective as at the time of the events in question one of them had been undergoing prosecution by the police and the other one was himself a former police officer who had close ties with the police. She furthermore submitted that the District Court had falsified the statement made by N., the surgeon, during the trial regarding the results of the applicant\u2019s examination on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below). She noted in this respect that N. had in fact confirmed that there had indeed been bodily injuries, which he had recorded in the applicant\u2019s medical file. Lastly, the applicant stated that she had been unlawfully deprived of legal assistance between 14 and 24 November 2004 and that all the evidence on which her conviction had been based, in particular her confessions, had been obtained during that period. She also referred in this regard to the unsuccessful attempts made by her lawyer to hold a meeting with her within the above-mentioned period and to the complaints that he had unsuccessfully lodged with the prosecutor\u2019s office in this respect. 47.  On 2 July 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court. In doing so the court referred to (i) the applicant\u2019s voluntary surrender to the police and to the further self-incriminatory statements that she had made during her questioning, which had been corroborated by those made by her alleged accomplices, and (ii) the fact that remains of animals had been found at the place pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime. It furthermore stated that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been correctly dismissed by the first-instance court as unsubstantiated, given that the police officers had denied any ill\u2011treatment and no injuries had been uncovered in the course of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations of 22 and 25 November 2004 or during her further medical examinations in detention in view of the worsening of her chronic health conditions. 48.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, maintaining, inter alia, her complaints concerning her alleged psychological and physical ill-treatment in police custody and the lack of access to a lawyer between 14 and 24 November 2004. She submitted in this respect that the courts had deliberately ignored evidence proving the fact that she had had bodily injuries shortly after her arrest. 49.  On 26 March 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It noted that her guilt had been proved by her own statements as a suspect in which she had confessed to the thefts and which she had later confirmed during the reconstructions of crimes. The Supreme Court furthermore found that the applicant\u2019s statements had been corroborated by the confessions of her co-defendants. It noted that her complaint of ill\u2011treatment had been thoroughly examined by the lower courts and had been lawfully rejected as unsubstantiated. It also noted that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been disproved by the testimony of the surgeon, N., and the forensic expert, as well as by that given by the police officers. As regards the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s defence rights, the Supreme Court noted that during the pre-trial investigation, the applicant had been informed of her right to a lawyer and that the lawyer of her choice had been admitted to the proceedings. The judgment of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicant on 8 April 2009. 50.  On a number of occasions between 16 and 21 November 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody and requested that she be given a medical examination, in his presence, in order to secure evidence of that ill\u2011treatment. 51.  On 18 and 19 November 2004 similar complaints were made by the applicant\u2019s mother. 52.  On 22 November 2004 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. The relevant record suggests that the applicant had had no bodily injuries and had raised no complaints. According to the applicant, she had done so because she had been afraid of further beatings by the police. 53.  On 23 November 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office declined to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the complaints of the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant had been ill-treated and her defence rights violated. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court. According to the Government, the decision was based on the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examination of 22 November 2004 (see paragraph 52 above), the police officers denial of ill\u2011treatment and on the fact that the applicant had not raised any complaint about her ill-treatment during a court hearing on the application of a preventive measure. As regards the defence rights, it was also noted that under the decision of the Orzhytsya District Court of 17 November 2004 lawyer V. had been granted permission to have a meeting with the applicant (see paragraph 19 above). 54.  On 25 November 2004 the applicant, through her lawyer, requested a meeting with the prosecutor with a view to making statements regarding \u201cwhat [had been] done to her at the police station\u201d and \u201chow her voluntarily surrenders [had] appeared\u201d. She also denied her guilt of any criminal offence and asked for a medical examination of her to be conducted in order to identify and treat the injuries that she had been suffering from as a result of her ill-treatment by the police and to protect her from fresh beatings. 55.  According to the extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical file, which was provided by the latter to the Court, on the same date, on 25 November 2004, the applicant complained about her poor state of health, including pain in her left elbow. She was examined by N., a surgeon from the local civil hospital who discovered \u201cactive yellow marks\u201d (\u043a\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0443\u0447\u0456 \u043f\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0436\u043e\u0432\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0440\u0443) from 0.5 to 1 cm in diameter on the applicant\u2019s forearms, hips and right breast. Following the examination, N. found that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not require any medical intervention. 56.  On 26 November 2004, after having a meeting with the applicant and being given the results of the aforesaid medical examination, lawyer V. again complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police and requested, inter alia, that she be given another forensic medical examination in his presence. 57.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Poltava Temporary Detention centre (\u201cthe Poltava SIZO\u201d). As can be seen from a certificate issued by the SIZO governor, upon her arrival the applicant underwent a medical examination which uncovered a bruise on her left hip measuring 5 cm by 3 cm and an inflammation on her left forearm. 58.  On 17 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office that no response had been made to the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment. 59.  On the same date the applicant refused to undergo a medical examination unless her lawyer was present. 60.  On 21 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Poltava prosecutor\u2019s office about the lack of any response to the complaints lodged regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment; the failure to conduct a medical examination of her in the absence of police officers and in the presence of her lawyer; and violations of her defence rights. He furthermore drew the prosecutor\u2019s attention to the allegations of ill-treatment made by the applicant\u2019s alleged accomplices, one of whom had been allegedly hospitalised after being beaten by the police. 61.  On 10 January 2005 the Poltava prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 23 November 2004 (see paragraph 53 above) as unsubstantiated and ordered an additional investigation in respect of V.\u2019s allegations. It noted, inter alia, that the case file contained no explanations by the officers from the Orzhytsya and the Lubny ITTs and no information regarding whether the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when in the Poltava SIZO and whether she had undergone a medical examination with a view to establishing whether she had bodily injuries. It was furthermore noted that M.M., the applicant\u2019s alleged accomplice, had also lodged a complaint about his physical and psychological ill-treatment by police officers of the Orzhytsya police unit. 62.  According to the Government, on 20 January 2005 the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office had declined to institute criminal proceedings and the applicant had not appealed against that decision. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court. 63.  The applicant furthermore unsuccessfully raised a complaint in respect of her ill-treatment by the police before the domestic courts (see paragraphs 40-49 above).", "references": ["5", "6", "2", "7", "4", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently detained in the centre for persons in preventive detention on the premises of Straubing Prison (hereinafter \u201cthe Straubing preventive detention centre\u201d). 11.  On 29 October 1999 the Regensburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and, applying the criminal law relating to young offenders, sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. It found that in June 1997 the applicant, then aged nineteen, had strangled a woman who had been jogging on a forest path by use of considerable force with a cable, a tree branch and his hands, had partly undressed the dead or dying victim and had then masturbated. The court, having consulted two medical experts, found that the applicant had acted with full criminal responsibility when killing the woman for sexual gratification and in order to cover up his intended rape. The court noted that, despite indications to that effect, both experts had not wished to draw the conclusion that the applicant suffered from a sexual deviancy as the young applicant had made few statements on the motives for his offence. 12.  On 12 July 2008 a new legislative provision, section 7(2) of the Juvenile Courts Act, entered into force. It authorised the ordering of subsequent preventive detention (see for the terminology also paragraphs 104-106 and 157 below) of persons convicted under the criminal law relating to young offenders (see paragraphs 54-57 below). 13.  From 17 July 2008 onwards, after he had served his full prison sentence, the applicant was remanded in provisional preventive detention under Article 275a \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 below). 14.  On 22 June 2009 the Regensburg Regional Court, with Judge P. sitting on the bench, ordered the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention under section 7(2)(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with section 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act (see paragraphs 56 and 59 below). The court, having regard to the reports made by a criminological expert (Bo.) and a psychiatric expert (Ba.), found that the applicant continued to harbour violent sexual fantasies and that there was a high risk that he would again commit serious sexual offences, including murder for sexual gratification, if released. On 9 March 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 15.  On 4 May 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court, in a leading judgment, allowed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 22 June 2009 and the Federal Court of Justice\u2019s judgment of 9 March 2010 and remitted the case to the Regional Court. It further found the order for the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention \u2013 which had become devoid of purpose once the order for the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention in the main proceedings had become final \u2013 to be unconstitutional (file no. 2 BvR 2333/08 and no.  2 BvR 1152/10). The Federal Constitutional Court found that the impugned judgments and decisions had violated the applicant\u2019s right to liberty and the constitutional protection of legitimate expectations guaranteed in a State governed by the rule of law (see in more detail paragraphs 68-75 below). 16.  On 5 May 2011 the applicant requested that the Regensburg Regional Court order his immediate release. He claimed that following the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 4 May 2011, which had quashed the judgment ordering his subsequent preventive detention, there was no longer any legal basis for his detention. 17.  On 6 May 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court, allowing the Public Prosecutor\u2019s request of 5 May 2011, again ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention under sections 7(4) and 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with Article 275a \u00a7 5, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 59 and 61 below). The court found that the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention was necessary because there were weighty grounds for expecting that his subsequent preventive detention would be ordered under section  7(2)(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in the light of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 4 May 2011. 18.  By submissions dated 27 June 2011, received by the Regional Court on 29 June 2011, the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court\u2019s decision, for which he submitted further statements of grounds on 15, 19, 22, 25 and 26 July 2011. He claimed, in particular, that his provisional preventive detention was unlawful. 19.  On 4 July 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court refused to amend its decision of 6 May 2011. 20.  On 16 August 2011 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. It had regard to: (i) a request lodged by the Nuremberg General Public Prosecutor on 20 July 2011 requesting the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s appeal; (ii) the findings of fact made by the Regensburg Regional Court in its judgment of 22 June 2009; (iii) the findings of two medical experts in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 22 June 2009; (iv) the findings of two other experts in previous proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s mental condition and the level of danger that he posed; and (v) the new restrictive standards set by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 May 2011. 21.  On 29 August 2011 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding a breach of his right to be heard and his objection to the decision of 16 August 2011. The decision was served on counsel for the applicant on 6 September 2011. 22.  On 7 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Regensburg Regional Court dated 6 May 2011, as confirmed by the Nuremberg Court of Appeal. He further requested that the execution of those decisions be stayed by way of an interim measure until the Federal Constitutional Court delivered its decision. The applicant claimed, in particular, that his right to a speedy decision, enshrined in his constitutional right to liberty, had not been respected in the proceedings concerning the review of his provisional preventive detention. 23.  On 18 October 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court communicated the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint to the regional Government of Bavaria, to the President of the Federal Court of Justice and to the General Public Prosecutor at the latter court. 24.  On 25 October 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court, in a reasoned decision, refused to stay the order for the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention by way of an interim measure. 25.  By submissions dated 1 January 2012 the applicant replied to the submissions of the regional Government of Bavaria, of the President of the Federal Court of Justice and of the General Public Prosecutor at the latter court dated 28, 24 and 25 November 2011 respectively. 26.  On 22 May 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 1952/11). The decision was served on counsel for the applicant on 30 May 2012. 27.  On 17 November 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh request for judicial review of his provisional preventive detention. By a decision of 28 November 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention as ordered on 6 May 2011. On 2 January 2012 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against that decision. 28.  In the resumed proceedings before the Regensburg Regional Court following the remittal of the case to it (see paragraph 15 above), the applicant lodged a motion against Judge P. for bias. The latter had been a member of the bench of the Regensburg Regional Court which had ordered the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention on 22 June 2009 (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant alleged that Judge P. had remarked to the applicant\u2019s female defence counsel on 22 June 2009, immediately after the delivery of the Regional Court\u2019s judgment ordering the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention, in reference to the applicant: \u201cBe careful that after he is released, you don\u2019t find him standing in front of your door waiting to thank you.\u201d He claimed that the remark had been made in the course of a discussion in camera between the judges of the Regional Court and the applicant\u2019s two lawyers concerning the applicant\u2019s possible transfer to a psychiatric hospital following the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 29.  In a comment of 13 December 2011 on the applicant\u2019s motion for bias, Judge P. explained that he remembered having had a discussion about the applicant\u2019s possible transfer to a psychiatric hospital at a later stage, after the delivery of the judgment. However, given the length of time that had elapsed, he neither recalled the precise contents of the discussion nor the exact context in which he had allegedly made the impugned remark. 30.  On 2 January 2012 the Regensburg Regional Court dismissed the motion for bias lodged by the applicant. The court considered in particular that, even assuming that the applicant had established to the satisfaction of the court that Judge P. had made the remark in question, there were no objectively justified doubts as to P.\u2019s impartiality as a result thereof. Even assuming that the applicant could reasonably consider the sense of the words \u201cthank you\u201d in the above context as meaning that the applicant could commit a violent offence, it had to be noted that the Regional Court, including Judge P., had just established that the applicant still suffered from fantasies of sexual violence and that there was at that time a high risk that he would again commit serious offences against the life and sexual self\u2011determination of others. Assuming that Judge P. had indeed made the remark in question, his \u201cadvice\u201d had therefore constituted in substance nothing more than the application of the Regional Court\u2019s said findings to a particular case. The remark had further been made in the context of a confidential exchange between the participants in the proceedings in the absence of the applicant. Judge P. could have expected that the applicant\u2019s female counsel would interpret his remark in the above-mentioned manner within that context. 31.  Furthermore, Judge P.\u2019s remark had reflected his view as it had been on the day of the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 22 June 2009. It did not suggest in any way that Judge P. had not been ready to take an impartial decision in the present proceedings, more than two years after the impugned remark and following the conclusion of a new main hearing. The fact that Judge P. had previously dealt with the applicant\u2019s case did not in itself render him biased.\n(b)  The new order for the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention 32.  On 3 August 2012 the Regensburg Regional Court, having held hearings over twenty-four days, again ordered the applicant\u2019s subsequent preventive detention. 33.  The Regional Court based its 164-page judgment on sections 7(2)(1) and 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 4 May 2011. It considered, firstly, that a comprehensive assessment of the applicant, his offence and, in addition, his development during the execution of the sentence relating to young offenders revealed that there was a high risk that the applicant, owing to specific circumstances relating to his person or his conduct, could commit the most serious types of violent crimes and sexual offences, similar to the one he had been found guilty of, if released. 34.  The Regional Court found, secondly, that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 85 below), namely sexual sadism. Having regard to the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court, it considered that, whereas a mere \u201caccentuation of the personality\u201d was not sufficient to constitute a mental disorder within the meaning of the said Act, such disorder did not have to be so serious as to exclude or diminish the criminal responsibility of the person concerned for the purposes of Articles 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 82-83 and 88-89 below). Given that the sexual sadism from which the applicant suffered was of a serious nature and had substantially affected his development since adolescence, it amounted to a mental disorder within the meaning of the Therapy Detention Act. 35.  The Regional Court based its view on the reports of two experienced external medical experts whom it had consulted, K. and F., who were professors and doctors for psychiatry and psychotherapy at two different university hospitals. One of the experts consulted, K., was firmly convinced that the applicant continued to suffer from sexual sadism while the other expert, F., formulated his findings more cautiously, stating that it was certain that the applicant had suffered from sexual sadism in 2005 and that this disorder could not be expected to have disappeared. 36.  Having regard to the findings of these experts, as well as to those of several medical experts who had previously examined the applicant since his arrest following his offence, the Regional Court was satisfied that the applicant has had violent sexual fantasies involving the strangulation of women since the age of seventeen. He was suffering from a sexual preference disorder, namely sexual sadism, as described by the relevant tool for the classification of diseases, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems in its current version (ICD-10);[1] this disorder had caused, and been manifested in, his brutal offence, and still persisted. The court, having regard to the experts\u2019 findings, observed that the applicant had hidden the sadistic motives behind his offence in the proceedings before the trial court in 1999, which, despite some indications of sexual deviance, had then interpreted the offence as an intended rape which had failed. The applicant, who had given diverging versions of the motive for his offence, had only admitted in 2005/2006, during his examination by a psychological and a psychiatric expert, that in his murder he had put into practice intensifying fantasies of exercising power over women by attacking their neck and by masturbating on their inanimate bodies. The applicant\u2019s new statements concerning his fantasies were more reconcilable with the trial court\u2019s findings as to the manner in which the offence had been carried out. 37.  The court further observed that the therapy followed by the applicant up until 2007, in particular social therapy, which both experts K. and F. had considered as appropriate treatment for his condition, had been unsuccessful. Even though the applicant appeared not to refuse further therapy as a matter of principle, he was not currently undergoing any treatment. He had, in particular, opposed the prosecution\u2019s request to the Regensburg Regional Court in 2010/2011 to transfer him to a psychiatric hospital under Article 67a \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 67 below) in order to treat his condition in a different setting. He had further refused meetings aimed at establishing a new individualised therapeutic programme with reference to the pending court proceedings. 38.  In an appeal on points of law against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 3 August 2012, the applicant complained of the unlawfulness of his \u201cretrospective\u201d preventive detention and of the fact that the judgment had been delivered with the participation of a biased judge, P. 39.  On 5 March 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as ill-founded. 40.  On 11 April 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained, in particular, that the \u201cretrospective\u201d order for his preventive detention had infringed the prohibition on retrospective penalties under the Constitution and Article 7  \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, that order had failed to comply with his constitutional right to liberty, with the protection of legitimate expectations in a State governed by the rule of law and with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. He further argued that his constitutional right to a tribunal established by law had been violated because Judge P. had been biased against him. 41.  On 5 December 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 813/13). 42.  The Regensburg Regional Court subsequently reviewed the necessity of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention at regular intervals. It decided on 18 September 2014, 2 March 2016 and 6 April 2017 that the detention had to continue because the applicant\u2019s mental disorder and consequent dangerousness persisted. Each of the court\u2019s review decisions was based on a fresh report by a different psychiatric expert, all the experts consulted having diagnosed the applicant with sexual sadism. The applicant is currently still in preventive detention. 43.  During the execution of his ten-year prison term (up until July 2008) the applicant was, in particular, detained in the social-therapeutic department for sexual offenders of Bayreuth Prison from 2001 to 2007, where he underwent social therapy. As the applicant failed to pursue the therapy with the requisite sincerity and motivation, the core issue of his deviant sexual fantasies could not be sufficiently addressed and the therapy was not completed successfully. In 2007 he was transferred to the social therapy for sexual offenders department of Straubing Prison, where a fresh attempt to treat him also failed owing to the applicant\u2019s lack of motivation vis-\u00e0-vis the different therapies provided. 44.  During the execution of his first preventive detention order, issued on 22 June 2009, the applicant had objected to the prosecution\u2019s request to transfer him to a psychiatric hospital under Article 67a \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 67 below) in order to consolidate further his rehabilitation by undergoing treatment in that hospital. Moreover, he had turned down proposals for a further therapeutic programme in Straubing Prison. 45.  On 7 May 2011, following the quashing of the first preventive detention order and the new order for the applicant\u2019s provisional preventive detention, he was transferred from the wing for persons in preventive detention in Straubing Prison to a wing for persons in detention on remand. As a consequence, the applicant lost the privileges reserved for persons in preventive detention. In particular, he was no longer able to undergo any kind of therapy. On 13 September 2011 he was transferred back to, and once again detained in, the preventive detention wing of Straubing Prison until 20 June 2013, where he was offered social therapy. He rejected the proposal. 46.  Since 20 June 2013 the applicant has been detained in the newly built Straubing preventive detention centre. That institution, which is situated in a separated fenced-off compound on the premises of Straubing Prison and can house up to 84 detainees, has more staff than Straubing Prison, namely one psychiatrist, seven psychologists, one general practitioner, four nurses, seven social workers, one lawyer, one teacher, one prison inspector, forty-four general prison staff members and four administrative staff members, providing for the detainees. Inmates can stay outside their cells, which nowadays measure 15 m\u00b2 (compared to some 10 m\u00b2 previously) and now include a kitchen unit and a separate bathroom, between 6 a.m. and 10.30 p.m. 47.  In the Straubing preventive detention centre, inmates are provided with individualised medical and therapeutic treatment by specialised staff in accordance with an individual treatment plan. The treatment options have been considerably increased as compared to those proposed under the previous preventive detention regime in Straubing Prison. The applicant initially refused all types of therapeutic provision at that centre, including one-to-one or group social therapy, participation in an intensive treatment programme for sexual offenders, and therapy administered by an external psychiatrist. He took up one-to-one psychotherapy only after the period covered by the proceedings here at issue, from 10 June 2015 until 30 June 2017, with a psychologist from the preventive detention centre.", "references": ["4", "7", "6", "9", "5", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, were living in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives alive since the alleged arrests. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in their search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the allegation that servicemen had been involved in the events. 7.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Turpal-Ali Yandayev, who was born in 1982. The second applicant is the father of Mr Said-Ali Khamayev, who was born in 1984. 8.  On the afternoon of 19 June 2003 Mr Turpal-Ali Yandayev, Mr Said\u2011Ali Khamayev and Mr Z.I. were on their way from the village of Tsa-Vedeno to the village of Serzhen-Yurt, Chechnya, when military servicemen stopped their Gazel vehicle at a checkpoint known as \u201cSSG-4\u201d, which was situated at the crossroads on the outskirts of the village of Elistanzhi. The servicemen ordered the men to get out of their car and then searched the vehicle. The search took place in the presence of numerous witnesses, who were passing through the checkpoint at the time. It is unclear what happened after the search. The whereabouts of Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. have remained unknown ever since. 9.  On the next day, 20 June 2003, the burnt-out wreck of the car of Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. was found about 200 metres from the Benoy checkpoint, on the outskirts of Serzhen-Yurt. The checkpoint logbook had an entry which recorded the passage of the car through the checkpoint at 8 p.m. on 19 June 2003. Subsequently, the time was changed to 7 p.m. Servicemen manning the checkpoint told the applicants that at about 9 p.m. on 19 June 2003 they had seen something burning not far from the checkpoint. 10.  On an unspecified date after the abduction, the second applicant learned from Colonel B., an officer at the Grozny remand prison, that Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. had allegedly been detained at the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala, Chechnya for about six months, and then transferred to the Mozdok district of Chechnya. It is unclear whether the applicants submitted this information to the investigators. 11.  On 23 June 2003 the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 22096 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction) into the events of 19 June 2003. 12.  It appears that on the same day the investigators found and examined the burned-out remains of the Gazel vehicle. A plastic bottle containing a combustible mixture was found nearby. That evidence was not collected or added to the case-file. 13.  On 24 June 2003 the investigators questioned Mr U.I., who stated that between 5 and 6 p.m. on 19 June 2003, as he had been passing a checkpoint on the Serzhen-Yurt road, he had seen a Gazel vehicle parked nearby. One man had been in the car and another had been speaking with a serviceman. 14.  On various dates at the end of June 2003 the investigators questioned several traffic police officers who had been on duty at the Benoy checkpoint on the day of the incident. The copies of the records of their questioning submitted to the Court are illegible. 15.  On 10 July 2003 the applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. 16.  On 23 August 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Shortly thereafter the applicants lodged a request for the proceedings to be resumed, but on 28 August 2003 their request was refused. 17.  On 1 September 2003 the investigators asked the Federal Security Service (\u201cFSB\u201d) whether the abducted persons had been detained by FSB officers. On 4 September 2003 the FSB replied in the negative. 18.  On 7 June 2004 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision of 23 August 2003 to suspend the investigation, noting various shortcomings in the investigation. He pointed out that the bottle containing a combustible mixture found near the burned car had not been collected and that the investigators had not identified a military unit stationed in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt that might have had information about the abducted persons. 19.  On 10 July 2004 the investigators established that military unit no. 62372 had been stationed near Serzhen-Yurt at the relevant time. However, since 2003 the personnel making up that unit had been changed four times. Therefore, according to the investigators, it was impossible to find persons who could shed light on the circumstances of the abduction. 20.  On 22 July 2004 the investigation was suspended. 21.  On 5 May 2005 the first applicant asked the Shali district prosecutor to resume the proceedings. 22.  On 16 December 2005 the prosecutor informed the first applicant that the investigation would be resumed \u201cin the nearest future\u201d. 23.  On 28 March 2006 the Russian Justice Initiative, an NGO based in Moscow, on behalf of the first applicant, enquired about the progress of the investigation. The reply from the investigators of 21 April 2006 stated that operational-search activity was ongoing. 24.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 25.  The first applicant is the son of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev, who was born in 1925. The second applicant was the wife of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev. According to a letter addressed to the Court dated 4 July 2018 from the first applicant, the second applicant has died. 26.  At the material time, Mr Sultan Saynaroyev lived in the village of Galashki, Ingushetia. 27.  He was engaged in bee keeping and ran an apiary in a small area, known as \u201cBerezhki\u201d, located between the two neighbouring villages of Arshty and Galashki. 28.  On the afternoon of 22 October 2002 Mr Sultan Saynaroyev left the apiary and was heading home to Galashki on foot when a group of forty-five to fifty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in four armoured infantry carriers (\u201cAICs\u201d) without registration numbers. One of the vehicles carried a large label reading \u201cRossiya\u201d (\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f). Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen stopped Mr Suleyman Saynaroyev and ordered him to go with them to a neighbouring apiary belonging to Mr M.O. The latter and his family members were in that apiary. The servicemen checked the identity documents of all those present and searched the premises. One of the servicemen, who was apparently in charge of the group, introduced himself as Sergey and said that he was from a military unit stationed in Arshty. After the search, the servicemen ordered Mr Sultan Saynaroyev to proceed with them to their headquarters for a further check, having assured him that the decision to apprehend him had been approved by the Arshty municipal administration. They put Mr Sultan Saynaroyev into one of the AICs and drove off in the direction of Chechnya. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 29.  In the evening the first applicant spoke to the head of the Arshty police department, Mr A.Ts., who told him that a special sweeping-up operation was in progress in the village and that for that reason a large number of military servicemen were present in the village. 30.  On 24 October 2002 the first applicant spoke to Mr A.M, deputy head of the Ingushetia Government. The latter said that he had had a telephone conversation with the military commander of the headquarters of the federal forces at the military base in Khankala, Chechnya, who had informed him that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been brought to the Khankala military base on 23 October 2002 and that he would soon be released. 31.  The whereabouts of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev have remained unknown ever since. 32.  On 23 October 2002 the applicants lodged a complaint about the abduction with the authorities and asked that a criminal case be opened. 33.  On 14 November 2002 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 22600057 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34.  The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicant\u2019s submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 35.  On 20 November 2002 the Ingushetia Minister of the Interior informed the deputy head of the Ingushetia Government that the operational search activities conducted into the disappearance of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev showed that the latter had been abducted by unidentified military servicemen, who had taken him in a military vehicle in the direction of the Chechen Republic. 36.  On an unspecified date the criminal case was forwarded to the military prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. 37.  On 29 November 2002 Colonel S.I., the commander of military unit no. 74814, reported, in particular, that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been detained on 22 October 2002 by servicemen of the Regional Operative Headquarters of the FSB in the North Caucasus (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0428\u0442\u0430\u0431 \u0424\u0421\u0411 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u2011\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0443). 38.  On 25 December 2002 the military prosecutor\u2019s office, referring to its lack of jurisdiction over the investigation, forwarded the criminal case to the Ingushetia prosecutor. 39.  On 29 December 2002 the Ingushetia FSB informed the investigators that it had no information concerning Mr Sultan Saynaroyev\u2019s whereabouts. 40.  On 10 January 2003 the acting head of the criminal investigation department of the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior reported to the investigators that on 29 November 2002 the United Group Alignment had confirmed that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been detained by servicemen of the FSB, but that the FSB in a letter of 3 January 2003 had denied any involvement in the incident. 41.  On 14 March 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 42.  On 23 April 2003 the Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the applicants that operational search activities had indicated that FSB servicemen had been involved in the abduction of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev. 43.  On 4 September 2003 and again on 21 November 2003 the investigators informed the applicants that the proceedings in the criminal case had been resumed. 44.  On 18 January 2006 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform him about the progress of the proceedings. A week later the investigators replied that the investigation had been suspended. 45.  On 21 April 2006 and again on 27 September 2006 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the proceedings again. Apparently no reply was given to these two enquiries. 46.  On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicants complained to various State authorities and law-enforcement agencies about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that their requests had been forwarded to yet another State agency or that the law-enforcement authorities had no information concerning their relative\u2019s whereabouts. 47.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 48.  On 27 February 2006 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia challenging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. On 13 March 2006 the court allowed the complaint and ordered that the investigation be resumed and a number of procedural steps taken. 49.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Usman Magomadov, who was born in 1957. The first and the third applicants are his brothers, the fourth applicant is his wife, and the fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are his children. 50.  The second applicant was Mr Usman Magomadov\u2019s brother. He died on 2 December 2010. His widow, Ms Zakhra Magomadova, subsequently expressed her wish to pursue the application. 51.  On 28 March 2002 Mr Usman Magomadov left his home in the village of Mesker-Yurt and was driving to work in the town of Argun in his white Zhiguli car when a group of about four armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas stopped him at checkpoint no. 136 on outskirts of Argun. They pulled Mr Usman Magomadov out of his car, forced him into one of the two APCs waiting nearby and drove off in the direction of the town. 52.  The abduction was witnessed by several bystanders, including the fourth applicant and her relative, Ms E.D. 53.  Ms E.D. asked one of the servicemen at the checkpoint where Mr Usman Magomadov was being taken. The serviceman replied that he was being taken to the Argun military commander\u2019s office. She immediately took a taxi and followed the APCs until they reached the premises of the military commander\u2019s office. Then the military vehicles turned in the direction of Khankala, where the main base of the Russian forces in Chechnya was located. Somewhere on the road the vehicles stopped. Ms E.D. got out of the taxi and was approaching them on foot when a Niva car pulled over. A serviceman, who appeared to be a military colonel, got out of the car and asked her what was happening. She explained the situation and he promised to help. Then he approached the APCs and spoke to the servicemen. After finishing the conversation, the colonel and the servicemen drove off to Khankala. 54.  Several days later the driver of the Niva car informed Ms E.D. that Mr Usman Magomadov was detained in the Grozny department of the FSB. 55.  The whereabouts of Mr Usman Magomadov remain unknown. 56.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and asked that a criminal case be opened. 57.  On 30 April 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78051 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 58.  The Government did not submit copies of the documents from the relevant criminal case file. Instead they submitted copies of documents from an unrelated case file. 59.  According to the documents submitted by the applicants, the investigation proceeded as follows. 60.  On 5 May 2002 the fourth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 61.  On 14 June 2002 Mr V.S., a police officer who had been manning the checkpoint on the day of the abduction, was questioned. He stated, in particular, that during the morning on that date thirty-five to forty military servicemen had arrived at the checkpoint in four APCs. From their conversation with each other he had understood that they had been looking for certain men in a white Zhiguli vehicle who had allegedly committed an armed attack on federal forces the day before. 62.  On 20 June 2002 the crime scene was examined. The investigators did not find or collect any evidence. 63.  On the same day they questioned Mr V.B., another police officer who had been manning the checkpoint on the day of the abduction. He had not witnessed the moment of the abduction; however, he confirmed the presence of armed military servicemen and four APCs at the checkpoint at the time of the events in question. 64.  On 19 June 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed several times \u2013 each time on the orders of (and following criticism by) the supervisors, and then suspended again. Specifically, the investigation was resumed on 25 December 2003, on unspecified dates in April and September 2004, and on 6 February and 5 June 2007. It was suspended on 5 February, 9 May and 9 October 2004 and 6 March and 10 July 2007. 65.  In the meantime, on 19 May 2004, the fourth applicant requested the Chechen Governmental Committee for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Russian Citizens Living in the Chechen Republic (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438) to assist in the search for Mr Usman Magomadov. His request was forwarded to the investigators. 66.  On 10 April 2006 the first applicant asked the Argun prosecutor to expedite the investigation into Usman Magomadov\u2019s abduction. It appears that the requests were forwarded to the investigators and that the proceedings are still ongoing. 67.  On 1 December 2006 and 7 May and 22 November 2007 the fourth applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court regarding her lack of access to the case file and the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. 68.  On 8 February 2007 and 8 June and 14 December 2007 respectively the court allowed the complaint in part, ordering that access to the case file be granted. 69.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Alash Mugadiyev, who was born in 1956. 70.  On 1 February 2003 the Vostok special battalion conducted a special military operation in the village of Ersenoy, Chechnya. The servicemen cordoned off the settlement and ran identity checks in respect of all of its residents. 71.  At about 8 a.m. on that date the applicant, Mr Alash Mugadiyev, their daughter, and their son-in-law were in their house in Ersenoy when a group of ten armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms entered their household. The servicemen were unmasked, were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. They checked the identity papers of all the family members and informed them that they were going to detain Mr Alash Mugadiyev for three hours. The servicemen then took him to the outskirts of the village, where a convoy of military vehicles was waiting. 72.  The applicant and her relative, Ms S.M, followed the servicemen and saw Mr Alash Mugadiyev being put into an UAZ (tabletka) minivan. The vehicle\u2019s registration plate contained the figures 386 \u043a\u0445. On the same day two other residents of the village, Mr S.A. and Mr A.B., were detained by servicemen. Mr S.A. was put into the same vehicle as Mr Alash Mugadiyev. 73.  At about midnight the special operation was completed and the servicemen left Ersenoy and drove to the settlement of Vedeno; they travelled in a large group of military vehicles, including several APCs, Ural military lorries and the UAZ minivan containing Mr Alash Mugadiyev and Mr S.A. 74.  The applicant followed the servicemen to the settlement, where she met the commander of the Vostok special battalion, Mr Y.D., who confirmed that her husband and several other residents of Ersenoy had been detained by his battalion\u2019s servicemen. 75.  Mr S.A. and Mr A.B. were released later. Mr S.A. stated that following their detention on 1 February 2003, he and Mr Alash Mugadiyev had been taken to the Vedeno district military commander\u2019s headquarters and had there been separated. 76.  The whereabouts of Mr Alash Mugadiyev remain unknown. 77.  Immediately after the above-described events the applicant asked the authorities to open a criminal investigation into the abduction of her husband. 78.  On 3 March 2003 the Vedeno district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 24018 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). The applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. 79.  On 3 July 2003 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended, and then, on 18 November 2003, resumed again. 80.  A week later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 81.  On 2 December 2003 the investigators asked the head of the Khankala military base whether a special operation had been carried out in the region between 29 January and 3 February 2003. It appears that no reply was given. 82.  On 29 December 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 83.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant asked the head of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her husband and to expedite the investigation. On 1 March 2007 the request was forwarded to the investigators, who resumed the proceedings on 31 March 2007. 84.  On 10 April 2007 the investigators reported that one of the witnesses, Mr Y.D., had died in March 2003, and that he therefore could not be questioned. 85.  On 14 April 2007 the applicant was questioned again. Her statements were similar to those submitted to the Court. 86.  On 22 and 23 April 2007 the investigators questioned two relatives of Mr A.B. They submitted that he had been detained separately from Mr Alash Mugadiyev and had not met him. 87.  On 30 April 2007 the investigation was suspended. 88.  On 5 May 2007 the investigators questioned Mr V.T., who had been the military commander of the Vedeno District at the time of the abduction. He stated that owing to the amount of time that had elapsed he could not recall the events of early 2003. 89.  On the same day the investigators established that the Vedeno district department of the interior had not had a vehicle with a registration plate containing the figures 386 \u043a\u0445. 90.  On 25 February 2009 the applicant requested the investigators to transfer the criminal case for further investigation to a military investigations department. The request was refused on 20 March 2009. 91.  It appears that the criminal proceedings are currently pending. 92.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Rasul Tutayev, who was born in 1981. 93.  At about 8.40 p.m. on 22 October 2004 the applicant, Mr Rasul Tutayev, his wife (Ms R.A.), and three other family members were at home when two Gazel minivans arrived at their block of flats in Grozny. A group of about fifteen armed men in military uniforms broke into the applicant\u2019s flat. All of the men, except two, were in balaclavas. The two men not wearing balaclavas were of Asian appearance. All of the men spoke unaccented Russian and had special military equipment, such as aiming lasers, blast shields and helmets. 94.  After threatening the applicant and her family members with firearms, the men forced Mr Rasul Tatuyev outside, put him into one of the two minivans with the registration number 798ax95rus, and drove off. 95.  The applicant, Ms R.A. and two of their neighbours, Ms Z.Ts. and Ms R.M., witnessed the men forcing Mr Rasul Tatuyev into the minivan and driving away. Ms R.A. ran after them and saw the vehicles enter the premises of one of the State authorities\u2019 buildings in Grozny. 96.  Mr Rasul Tutayev has not been seen since. 97.  On 23 October 2004 the applicant went to the Leninskiy district commander\u2019s office in Grozny. The military commander, D., confirmed that Mr Rasul Tutayev was detained on those premises. 98.  Immediately after the abduction the applicant complained to the authorities about her son\u2019s detention and requested assistance in the search for her son. 99.  Shortly thereafter the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny asked the FSB and the police task force unit (OMON) about Mr Rasul Tutayev\u2019s arrest. In late October 2004 the FSB and OMON replied that they had not detained him. 100.  On 19 November 2004 the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 30136 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 101.  Three days later the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 102.  On 19 February 2005 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 103.  On 30 March 2005 the investigation was resumed and joined with criminal case no. 40025, which had been opened in respect of the abduction on 26 January 2005 of Mr A.A. and which had allegedly been perpetrated by the same persons. A month later the investigators suspended the proceedings. 104.  On 18 August 2006 the supervising prosecutor ordered that that the investigation be resumed. 105.  On an unspecified date in September 2006, the investigators questioned Mr Rasul Tutayev\u2019s wife. Her statements were similar to those submitted by the applicant to the Court. 106.  On 7 September 2006 Mr Rasul Tutayev\u2019s brother was granted victim status in the criminal case. 107.  On 18 September 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 108.  On 11 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the Chechen President, asking him to ensure that there would be an effective investigation into the abduction of her son. 109.  On various dates in 2010 the applicant contacted the Investigative Committee of Russia and the FSB, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. On 9 July 2010 the Russia Investigative Committee forwarded her complaint to the Chechnya Investigative Committee. On 2 September 2010 the FSB informed her that the whereabouts of Mr Rasul Tutayev were unknown to it. 110.  On 3 December 2012 the applicant wrote to the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny enquiring about the recent developments in the investigation. 111.  On 22 May 2013, following the applicant\u2019s repeated requests, the proceedings were resumed. Having sent several requests to various State bodies for information, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 24 June 2013. On 13 November 2013 that decision was declared unlawful by a higher investigating authority and ill-founded on account of the investigators\u2019 failure to establish the identity of the owner of the vehicle with the registration number 798ax95rus. Six days later the investigation was resumed. It was again suspended on 19 December 2013, then resumed on 19 August 2014, and again suspended on 19 September 2014. 112.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 113.  The first applicant is the sister of Mr Askhab Konchiyev, who was born in 1973. The third applicant is his brother. 114.  The second applicant was also a brother of Mr Askhab Konchiyev. He died on 16 January 2016, after lodging the application with the Court. 115.  On 18 July 2002 Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweeping-up operation in the village of Serzhen-Yurt. The servicemen cordoned off the settlement and ran identity checks on all the residents. 116.  At around 12 a.m. on that day (in the documents submitted the time was also given as 9 a.m.) a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in Serzhen-Yurt in four APCs and one UAZ vehicle with no registration numbers. The servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. They then forced Mr Askhab Konchiyev into one of the APCs and took him to an unknown destination. 117.  The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 118.  On various dates between July 2002 and February 2003 the first applicant lodged a complaint regarding the abduction with the South Federal Circuit prosecutor. On 6 February 2003 her complaint was forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office, and then to the Shali district prosecutor. On 27 February 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 22042 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in that case. 119.  On 27 April 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It is not clear whether the applicants were informed of the suspension. 120.  On 15 June 2006 the first applicant asked the deputy head of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her brother. 121.  On 26 July 2006 the investigators resumed the proceedings and sent a number of requests to various authorities, including the federal military forces, for it to be established whether Mr Askhab Konchiyev had been arrested and placed in custody. The replies were all in the negative, none of the authorities had any information about his detention. 122.  On 10 August 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who confirmed the account of the events described above, and who also stated that an acquaintance of hers had seen footage of Mr Askhab Konchiyev\u2019s arrest broadcast on a federal television channel in November 2005. 123.  On 26 August 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 124.  On 5 May 2010 the first applicant requested the investigators to provide her with access to the investigation file. Her request was refused on 14 May 2010. 125.  On 9 June 2010 the first applicant requested the investigators to resume the proceedings and to ensure that there would be a thorough investigation into the abduction. Her request was refused on 21 June 2010; nevertheless, on 2 September 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 126.  On 29 September 2010 the investigators questioned a person from the village, who stated that in summer 2003 the federal forces had conducted a special sweeping-up operation in Serzhen-Yurt. The servicemen had not had any distinctive features on their uniforms, and some of them had been in balaclavas. He had not seen the arrest of Mr Askhab Konchiyev, but had heard about it from other residents of the village. 127.  On 2 October 2010 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 128.  On 18 July 2011 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. In September 2011 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 129.  On 28 September 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings. In October 2011 they questioned Mr Askhab Konchiyev\u2019s nephew, who had witnessed the abduction and who gave statements similar to those given by the applicants. 130.  On 28 October 2011 the investigators ordered that a DNA test be performed in order to verify whether Mr Askhab Konchiyev\u2019s body was among unidentified remains found in the region. The outcome of the expert examination is unknown. 131.  It appears that the proceedings in the case are still pending. 132.  On 20 August 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic investigative steps. 133.  On 7 September 2010 the court rejected her complaint, having found that on 2 September 2010 the investigation had been resumed. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision on appeal. 134.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is his son and the third applicant is his brother. 135.  On the morning of 23 June 2002 Mr Yusup Mezhiyev and his acquaintances, Mr K.A., Mr B.A., Ms B.A. and Ms A.A., left their homes in the village of Staryye Atagi and went to work in Grozny. At about 8.30 a.m. a group of military servicemen stopped their car at checkpoint no. 33 in the Oktyabrskiy district in Grozny. Having checked their identity documents, the servicemen handcuffed and blindfolded Mr Yusup Mezhiyev. Then they forced him into an UAZ minivan parked nearby and drove off in the direction of the Oktyabrskiy district temporary police department in Grozny (\u0412\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u041e\u043a\u0442\u044f\u0431\u0440\u044c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0433. \u0413\u0440\u043e\u0437\u043d\u044b\u0439). The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 136.  The whereabouts of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev remain unknown. 137.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be initiated. 138.  On the same day investigators from the Grozny town prosecutor\u2019s office arrived at checkpoint no. 33. There they met FSB officers, who declined to provide any information concerning Mr Yusup Mezhiyev\u2019s detention. The FSB officers noted that they were involved in a special operation, and that they were not subordinates of the prosecutor\u2019s office. 139.  On 5 July 2002 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 52075 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 140.  On 20 July, and again on 7 and 9 August 2002 the investigators questioned several police officers who had been manning checkpoint no. 33 at the time of the events in question. They stated that on 22 June 2002 the FSB officers had arrived at the checkpoint in order to undertake a special operation. On the morning of 23 June 2002 they searched cars passing through the checkpoint. None of the officers questioned had information about the abduction. The checkpoint had also been manned by OMON officers. Several of them were also questioned by the investigators, but none of them had witnessed the arrest of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev. 141.  On 24 July 2002 the third applicant was granted victim status. 142.  On 20 August 2002 the investigators questioned Ms A.A. Her account of the events was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. 143.  On 5 September 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Following criticism by the supervisors it was subsequently resumed on 22 May 2003. 144.  On 14 August 2003 Mr B.A was questioned. His statement was similar to those of the applicants and Ms A.A. He also stated that immediately after Mr Yusup Mezhiyev\u2019s detention he had asked a police officer at the checkpoint about the people who had carried out the arrest. He had been told that Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had been arrested by the FSB officers. 145.  On 25 August 2003 the FSB replied to an enquiry lodged by the investigators, stating that Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had never been detained by its agents. 146.  Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 30 August and 28 November 2003, 21 November 2004, 7 August 2005, and 7 February and 28 May 2011, and resumed on 28 October 2003, 21 October 2004, 7 July 2005, and 26 January and 18 May 2011 respectively. 147.  In the meantime, in November 2003 the investigators questioned the officers who had visited the checkpoint on the date of the abduction. They stated that the FSB officers at the checkpoint had refused to answer any questions. All of them, except one, had been in balaclavas. They had arrived at the checkpoint in an UAZ minivan. 148.  A year later, in November 2004, several other police officers from the checkpoint were questioned. All of them confirmed the presence of the FSB officers at the crime scene, but none of them could say whether Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had been detained. Their duty station had been located too far from the FSB officers for them to be able to make out the details of what had happened. 149.  On various dates between 2006 and 2010 the applicants lodged several requests for information with the investigators, asking them to expedite the proceedings. On 20 April 2010 the first applicant requested that she be granted victim status in the criminal case in order for her to be able to access the case file. 150.  On 25 May 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned by the investigators. It is not clear whether she obtained permission to access the case file. 151.  On 11 July 2005 the investigators asked the head of the OMON forces to provide them with a list of the officers who had been manning checkpoint no. 33 at the time of the incident, but to no avail \u2013 the OMON head refused the request on 27 July 2005, citing the confidentiality of the information sought. 152.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 153.  On 28 December 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny challenging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. 154.  On an unspecified day in late January 2011 (the date is illegible) the court rejected the complaint on the grounds that on 26 January 2011 the criminal investigation had been resumed. 155.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov, who was born in 1986. 156.  At the material time the \u201cZapad\u201d unit of the United Military Alignment (\u201cthe UGA\u201d) was stationed in the town of Urus-Martan, about one kilometre from the applicants\u2019 house, situated in the vicinity of a bridge. The area was under curfew; checkpoints had been erected on all roads leading to and from the town. 157.  On 8 January 2003 the applicants and their sons, Lom-Ali and Magomed, were at home. At about 3 a.m. a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in the neighbourhood in several vehicles, including an APC, an Ural lorry and an UAZ minivan. Some of them were in balaclavas. The soldiers, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the applicants\u2019 house, pointed their guns at the first applicant and took Mr Lom\u2011Ali outside. They told the second applicant that she would find her son on the following day at the Zavodskoy district department of the interior in Grozny (\u201cthe Zavodskoy ROVD\u201d). Then they walked out onto the street with the applicant\u2019s son and headed in the direction of the UGA headquarters; they dragged him over the bridge and then put him in the UAZ minivan. According to the applicants\u2019 neighbours, another group of soldiers, numbering about twenty, was waiting for the first group at a point about 300 metres from the applicants\u2019 house. 158.  The whereabouts of Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov remain unknown. 159.  On the morning of 8 January 2003 the applicants went to the Zavodskoy ROVD, looking for their son. The police denied that he had been arrested or detained on their premises. On 10 January 2003 the applicants complained about the abduction to the Urus\u2011Martan district prosecutor. 160.  On 13 January 2012 investigators from the prosecutor\u2019s office questioned Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov\u2019s brother, an eyewitness to the abduction, who confirmed the account of the events given by the applicants. 161.  On 30 January 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34009 (in the documents submitted also referred as no. 63044) under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 162.  On 30 March 2003 the investigation in respect of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the applicants were not informed thereof. Between 2005 and 2006 they requested information about the progress of the proceedings, but to no avail. 163.  On 12 June 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants. They gave statements similar to those that they had submitted to the Court. 164.  On 9 July 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, alleging that the investigation of his son\u2019s abduction by federal servicemen had been ineffective and requesting that the authorities grant him victim status in the criminal case and inform him about progress in the proceedings. On 20 July 2009 the investigators replied that the investigation had been resumed for failure to take basic steps, such as questioning the witnesses to the abduction and undertaking an examination of the crime scene. 165.  On 28 July 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 166.  On 7 August 2009 the investigators questioned Mr S.A., the applicants\u2019 neighbour. He had seen the abduction from his house. According to him, the abduction had followed the scenario typically followed by the federal forces, who usually left their military vehicles at some distance, detained a person and then returned to their vehicles. 167.  Several days later the investigators sent requests to various authorities for them to establish Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov\u2019s whereabouts. It appears that no positive answers were received. 168.  On 20 August 2009 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 169.  On 3 September 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the head of the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district investigations department, stating that the investigation had been ineffective and asking to be allowed to review the case file. 170.  On 15 September 2009 the investigators replied to the applicant, stating that he had the right to access only those documents which related to the investigative steps taken with his participation. 171.  Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 19 May and 29 June 2011, and then suspended on 29 May and 29 July 2011 respectively. 172.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 173.  On 18 November 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and requesting the court to order the investigators to resume the proceedings and allow him to review the case file. On 11 December 2009 the court allowed the complaint, stating that for more than six years the investigation had been unlawfully suspended and that the applicant was entitled to review the entire contents of the case file. 174.  On 11 November 2010 the first applicant again lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court stating that the investigation had been ineffective. On 20 May 2011 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, stating that the investigation had been resumed on 19 May 2011. On 15 June 2011 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Chechnya Supreme Court. 175.  The first and fourth applicants are the adoptive parents of Mr Isa Zilbukharov, who was born in 1975. 176.  The second and third applicants are, respectively, the grandmother and the mother of Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, who was born in 1979. 177.  The fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are, respectively, the daughter, the son and the wife of Mr Aslan Tsurayev, who was born in 1972 (in the documents submitted the year of birth was also referred to as 1970). On 10 July 2018 the applicants informed the Court that the fifth applicant, Ms Amina Tsurayeva, changed her surname to Bogatyreva on 22 August 2016. 178.  The eighth, ninth and tenth applicants are the children of Mr Cha\u2011Borz (also spelled as Chaborz) Ibragimov, who was born in 1975. The thirteenth applicant is his brother. 179.  The eleventh and twelfth applicants are, respectively, the son and the wife of Mr Sharpuddi Altamirov, who was born in 1964. 180.  On 3 November 2003 a temporary military checkpoint was set up at a crossroads on the highway between the villages of Shalazhi and Gekhi\u2011Chu. Military servicemen conducted checks of passing vehicles and passengers. 181.  At about 6 p.m. (in the documents submitted the time was also given as 8 p.m.) on 3 November 2003 Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov, Mr Aslan Tsurayev and Mr A.D. were driving in a car through the checkpoint, when a group of twenty to twenty-five armed military servicemen stopped them for an identity check. The servicemen were wearing camouflage uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. Having checked the documents, the servicemen forced Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov and Mr Aslan Tsurayev into a GAZ-66 vehicle parked nearby. 182.  Mr A.D., who witnessed the events, asked one of the servicemen where the three men were being taken. The serviceman replied that they were taken to a police station. 183.  Meanwhile, Mr Sharpuddi Altamirov and Mr Cha-Borz Ibragimov were passing through the same checkpoint. The servicemen also stopped them for an identity check. They forced them into the GAZ-66 vehicle into which Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov and Mr Aslan Tsurayev had already been put, and drove off in the direction of Gekhi-Chu. 184.  The whereabouts of the applicants\u2019 relatives remain unknown. 185.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and asked that a criminal case be opened. 186.  On 20 November 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34118 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 187.  The Government provided the Court with a copy of criminal case file no. 34118, which was opened on 21 December 2004 in respect of the finding of three corpses on a road leading to the village of Zebir-Yurt, Chechnya. Apparently that case is unrelated to the investigation into the abduction of the applicants\u2019 relatives. 188.  On 5 December and 19 December 2003, 9 January 2004, 25 July 2005 and 15 June 2010 the seventh, eighth, twelfth, fourth and third applicants, respectively, were granted victim status and questioned. 189.  The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, including 23 May 2008, 2 March 2009 and 16 June 2010, when it was each time suspended. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 190.  On 27 October 2008 the twelfth applicant asked the investigators to grant her permission to access the contents of the investigation file and to resume the investigation. Her request was refused. 191.  On an unspecified date in April 2011 (the exact date is illegible) the investigators informed the fourth applicant that proceedings in the case had been suspended and that operational search activities were underway in order to establish the whereabouts of his missing relative. 192.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 193.  On 12 November 2008 the twelfth applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court challenging her lack of access to the investigation file and the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. 194.  On 13 January 2009 the court allowed her complaint in part and ordered that the investigation in respect of the case be resumed. However, it ruled lawful her lack of access to the investigation file. 195.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Abdul-Malik Dishnayev, who was born in 1970, and his brother, Mr Abdul Dishnayev, who was born in 1974. The second and third applicants are their sisters. The fourth applicant is the father of Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, who was born in 1980. 196.  On 9 March 2003 Mr Abdul-Malik Dishnayev, Mr Abdul Dishnayev and their acquaintance, Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, arrived in Grozny and stayed at the second and third applicants\u2019 house. 197.  At about 2 a.m. on 10 March 2003 a large group of 120 to 130 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in an APC, Ural lorries and UAZ-452 vehicles. A group of ten servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. They spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance; some of them were equipped with portable radio devices. The servicemen forced the Dishnayev brothers and Mr Timerlan Akhmadov outside, put them into the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 198.  The whereabouts of the applicants\u2019 relatives remain unknown. 199.  On 10 March 2003 the second applicant complained to the authorities about the abduction. 200.  Three days later the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 20050 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 201.  On 30 April 2003 the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. On the same date she and the second applicant were questioned as witnesses; they confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 202.  On 17 and 27 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.G., the applicants\u2019 neighbour, and Mr B.Kh., a police officer who worked at a checkpoint in the vicinity of the applicants\u2019 village. Mr Kh.G. stated that on the night of the abduction he had heard military vehicles passing by and the next morning had learned of the abduction of village residents. Mr B.Kh. confirmed that at that time a motorcade of military vehicles had passed through the checkpoint. The next morning three women from the village had come to the checkpoint, asking for assistance in the search for three abducted relatives. Mr B.Kh. had advised them to contact the police. 203.  On 13 June 2003 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 204.  In 2004 the investigators sent a number of requests to the domestic authorities, including military units and detention facilities, in an effort to establish the whereabouts of the Dishnayev brothers and Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, but to no avail \u2013 no replies in the positive were received. 205.  On 5 May 2005 the first applicant lodged an application with the Chechen Governmental Committee for the Protection of Constitutional rights of Russian Citizens Residing in the Chechen Republic, asking it to provide her with assistance in her search for her sons. On 20 May 2005 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 206.  In early 2006 the first and the fourth applicants wrote to the head of the Chechnya Parliament, asking him to assist in the search for their abducted relatives. Their letters were forwarded to the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior. On 21 June 2006 the applicants were informed that criminal proceedings were pending. 207.  On 25 July 2006 the investigation was resumed and the applicants\u2019 were informed thereof. 208.  On 1 September 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings again, but on 7 December 2006 that decision was overruled as unfounded. The supervising authorities instructed the investigators to question witnesses to the abduction. 209.  On 19 and 20 December 2006 the investigators questioned several relatives of the abducted persons. Their statements were similar to the account submitted by the applicants to the Court. 210.  On 30 December 2006 the proceedings were suspended. 211.  On an unspecified date, apparently in 2008, the first, second and third applicants complained to Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. On 10 October 2008 the proceedings were resumed. 212.  On 10 November 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. Two days later the proceedings were suspended again. 213.  On 19 March and 16 April 2010 the applicants were informed that the criminal case had been transferred to the special cases department of the investigations committee at the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office (\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e \u0432\u0430\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435) for further investigation and that operational search activities were in progress. 214.  It appears that the investigation is still pending.", "references": ["8", "4", "3", "5", "7", "9", "6", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant, Ms R.I., was born in 1975 and lives in Bucharest. She was in a stable relationship with R. She had two children with him: the second applicant, M.I., born in 2006, and the third applicant, I.I., born in 2009. In 2010, the relationship broke down and R. moved out of the family home. The parents agreed that the children would remain with the first applicant, in their family home. The parents also decided that R. would have unrestricted access to the children and would play an active role in their education. 5.  On 28 October 2013 the children and their maternal grandmother were involved in a traffic accident, as a result of which only the grandmother needed medical care and attention. In November R. took the children from the first applicant\u2019s home without her consent. According to the first applicant, from that time until May 2014, she managed to see the children only occasionally and always in their father\u2019s presence. After 5 May 2014 (see paragraph 9 below) contact between them became even more scarce, and after 6 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 below) all contact stopped. 6.  On 25 November 2013, the first applicant instituted custody proceedings against R. before the Bucharest District Court (see paragraph 26 below). At the same time she applied for an interim injunction (ordonan\u0163\u0103 pre\u015feden\u0163ial\u0103), seeking to have the children\u2019s residence set at her place during the custody proceedings (see paragraph 9 below). 7.  On 20 December 2013 the first applicant also brought the situation of the second and third applicants to the attention of the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (\u201cthe Bucharest child protection authority\u201d). She feared that they were showing signs of emotional abuse caused by their father. 8.  In two official reports of 21 January and 5 February 2014, the Bucharest child protection authority observed that the children were well taken care of, were enjoying optimal conditions at their father\u2019s home, and manifested affection towards their father and his new partner. The reports concluded that no signs of abuse had been identified. The experts noted, however, that the children experienced a considerable degree of anxiety and distress because of the conflicts between their biological parents. They recommended counselling. 9.  Deciding in the interim proceedings (see paragraph 6 above), in a final decision of 5 May 2014 the Bucharest County Court ordered that the children should reside with their mother and that R. should pay monthly child support of 1,000 euros (EUR) for each child until the end of the custody proceedings. 10.  On 4 June 2014 the first applicant applied to the bailiff\u2019s office for enforcement of the decision of 5 May 2014. Her request was approved by the bailiff on 6 June 2014 and by the Bucharest District Court on 16 June 2014. 11.  On 6 June 2014 the first applicant went to the children\u2019s school to pick them up and take them home. R. showed up as well and became abusive towards the first applicant. The police had to intervene. The first applicant was unable to take the children home. Advised by the school administration, she returned on 9 June to pick them up, but on that day the children were absent. 12.  On 13 June 2014 the first applicant wrote to the Bucharest child protection authority to ask for help, but the authority could not intervene as the father was not found at home. 13.  In a letter of 26 June 2014 the bailiff asked R. to comply with the court order and to return the children to their mother within ten days. As he failed to comply, the bailiff summoned him to bring the children on 17 July 2014 to the bailiff\u2019s office, where the first applicant, two police officers and representatives of the Bucharest child protection authority would be present. R. and the children did not attend. 14.  On 4 August 2014 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and complained that R. was manipulating the children into fearing and rejecting her, and was forbidding any contact between her and her children. She also informed the authority about the incident of 6 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The authority could not verify her allegations as R. was not at home and did not contact the authority, despite being invited to do so. 15.  The bailiff scheduled a second meeting for 14 August 2014. This time, R. went with the children. As noted by the bailiff in his report drafted on the same day, the children refused in absolute terms to return to their mother. They alleged that she used to shout at them and had occasionally beaten them when they had lived together. The enforcement could not take place. 16.  Following the meeting of 14 August 2014, on 9 September 2014 the Bucharest child protection authority asked the Bucharest District Court to order a two-month psychological counselling programme for the children, under the provisions of Article 912 of the Code of Civil Procedure (psychological counselling for children who refuse contact with the estranged parent). The first applicant contacted the child protection authority with a similar request on 16 and 19 September 2014. On 2 October 2014 the District Court allowed the request made by the Bucharest child protection authority. 17.  Between 7 November 2014 and 2 January 2015, a psychologist met the children and their parents ten times. On 22 January 2015, she drafted a final report, recommending as follows:\n\u201cBearing in mind the numerous relationship problems identified, I consider it opportune to recommend an immediate[1] clinical psychological evaluation of the children and the parents, of the current relations between them, as well as their continued psychological counselling.\u201d 18.  On 28 January 2015 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and explained that the behaviour exhibited by the children during their recent encounter made her fear that they were suffering from parent alienation syndrome because of their father\u2019s influence over them. 19.  Acting upon the first applicant\u2019s request, a social assistant from the Bucharest child protection authority interviewed the children. On 17 February 2015 he drafted his report, finding that the children refused to see their mother because allegedly she used to beat them and be mean to them. The social assistant asked the father to take the children for a psychological evaluation. He also sent his report to the Bucharest child protection authority\u2019s service for violence against children. 20.  On 14 May 2015 the Bucharest child protection authority drafted a two-month plan for the rehabilitation of the two children \u201cwith the aim of ensuring their harmonious physical and psychological development and protecting their dignity and their best interests\u201d. The plan required cooperation between the social assistant responsible for their case, a psychologist, the school administration and the two parents. 21.  On 30 June 2015 R. complained to the Bucharest child protection authority that the psychologist had put pressure on the children and induced a state of stress which had required the children\u2019s hospitalisation after one of their meetings. He demanded to know on what grounds the children continued to be subjected to psychological counselling. 22.  Acting upon an application made by the first applicant (asigurarea probelor), on 7 July 2015 the Bucharest District Court requested a psychological evaluation of the children and their parents. After meeting with them on several occasions between 13 August and 30 October 2015, the psychologist rendered a report on 17 November 2015. She found that there was no indication of physical abuse from the mother but that there was an indication of psychological abuse in the form of parental alienation exercised by the father. The relevant parts of the report read as follows:\n\u201c(1)  During the expert evaluation there was no relevant information from the children that would confirm the existence of physical abuse by their mother. The evaluation only highlighted the children\u2019s and their father\u2019s statements as well as the resistance of both children in relation to their mother.\n(2)  Because they are involved in the parental conflict, the children exhibit emotional and behavioural indicators frequently associated ... with psychological abuse. ...\n(3)  There are ... several symptoms of parent alienation syndrome, in particular in respect of [the second applicant]. ...\nIn particular concerning underage children, the father\u2019s behaviour corresponds to the profile of the \u2018alienator parent\u2019 who behaves in this manner out of a genuine conviction that he can protect and care for the children better than their mother. His behaviour may also be connected to a profound aversion to, and hostility towards, the children\u2019s mother, which has more to do with the relations between the adults than with their parenting abilities.\nAccording to the specialised literature, the alienated parent also plays a role in losing his or her ties with the child. It appears from the information offered during the interview by Mrs [R.I.] that she has experienced occasional doubts and insecurities concerning her maternal role which might have undermined her relationship of secure attachment with her children in their early childhood.\nRecommendations 1.  It is recommended that the parents undertake psychological counselling, in order to receive assistance in finding methods of cooperation for the present and future well-being of their children. ...\nParents must be aware that parental alienation has negative consequences for the children\u2019s development; without specialised intervention and the conscious participation of both parents, children can develop emotional or behavioural problems. 2.  It is recommended that the two children be no longer involved in the conflict between the parents. Their exposure to the parental conflicts has had a traumatising effect on them and left painful marks in their emotional development.\u201d 23.  On 23 November 2015, the first applicant asked the bailiff to resume the enforcement proceedings. New meetings were convened for 7 and 23 March 2016 in the bailiff\u2019s office. R. and the children did not appear. 24.  On 18 December 2015 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and reiterated her fears that the children\u2019s father was alienating the children from her. 25.  R. contested the enforcement proceedings, but on 9 November 2016 the Bucharest District Court dismissed his complaint. An appeal lodged by him was also dismissed in a final decision of the Bucharest County Court on 18 September 2017. 26.  On 24 September 2014 the Bucharest District Court decided on the application for custody (see paragraph 6 above). It granted the mother physical custody of the children and ordered R. to pay child support of 5,000 Romanian lei (RON \u2013 approximately EUR 1,100 at the relevant time) per month until the children reached the age of majority. R. appealed, but on 18 January 2016 he informed the Bucharest County Court that he did not wish to maintain his appeal. The first applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the County Court had unlawfully reduced the award for costs. In a final decision of 2 June 2016 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected her appeal as inadmissible. 27.  On 27 July 2016 the first applicant applied for enforcement of the decision of 24 September 2014 on the payment of child support and legal costs. On 19 August 2016 the first applicant asked the bailiff to extend the enforcement order to the return of the children. Her request was granted by the bailiff\u2019s office on 8 September 2016 and by the Constan\u0163a District Court on 20 September 2016. 28.  In March 2017 R. informed the authorities that he had moved with the children to N\u0103vodari, Constan\u0163a County, where they would be spending weekends and school holidays. The Constan\u0163a Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (\u201cthe Constan\u0163a child protection authority\u201d) visited R. and the children in the new location and kept in touch with the Bucharest child protection authority. R. informed the Constan\u0163a child protection authority that he was willing to pursue counselling for his children in N\u0103vodari and reiterated that he had not prohibited the first applicant from seeing the children. 29.  On 7 March 2017, the Constanta District Court partially allowed R.\u2019s opposition to the enforcement, finding that he had complied in full with the obligation to provide for the children since they lived with him and that he could not be asked, in addition, to pay child support in their favour. 30.  In August 2017 the first applicant reinitiated the enforcement proceedings in respect of the return of the children, but on 12 September 2017 R. appealed against the enforcement order. On 19 September 2017 R. sought a stay of the enforcement, pending the outcome of his appeal; his request was granted by the Constan\u0163a District Court on 25 September 2017. On 8 May 2018 his appeal was dismissed by a final decision rendered by the Constan\u0163a County Court and the decision was notified to the first applicant on 31 May 2018. 31.  On 18 July 2018 the applicants\u2019 representative informed the Court that on 16 July 2018 the applicants and R. had met in the bailiff\u2019s office. The children had refused in absolute terms to move in with their mother. 32.  Meanwhile, the first applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against R., accusing him of disobeying the court order concerning the custody arrangements. On 17 June 2014 the police started investigating the case under the supervision of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court. 33.  On 16 August 2016 the first applicant asked the prosecutor to extend the investigation to also cover allegations of ill-treatment of minors, arguing that R. was subjecting the children to psychological abuse. In a decision of 28 June 2016 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused her request on the grounds that no evidence of ill-treatment had been found. On 10 October 2016 an objection lodged by the first applicant was dismissed by the prosecutor\u2011in\u2011chief and on 13 October 2016 the Bucharest District Court\u2019s preliminary chamber rejected as inadmissible a complaint lodged by the first applicant against the prosecutor\u2019s decisions. 34.  On 17 August 2016 R. had applied for physical custody of the children. On 20 March 2017 the Bucharest District Court decided that the children should live with their father. It based its judgment on the fact that the children had been living with him for the past three years and that he represented the only parental figure in their life. A sudden change in their life would cause them more distress. Based on the conclusions of the expert report of 17 November 2015 (see paragraph 22 above), the court noted that the children felt uncomfortable in their mother\u2019s presence and refused to move in with her, preferring their father\u2019s presence. The court also noted that the first applicant had never been prevented from visiting them, but had chosen not to and had instead demanded that the children be returned to Bucharest. The court further observed that the first applicant had not sought enforcement of the custody order, limiting her request to the enforcement of the child-support allowance and costs. It concluded that it would be in the children\u2019s best interests to remain with their father. It advised the parents to put an end to their conflict for their children\u2019s sake and to allow the mother\u2011children relationship to be rebuilt. 35.  The first applicant became aware of the content of that decision on receiving the Government\u2019s observations in the case (sent to her by the Registry of the Court on 28 July 2017). At her request, she was notified of the decision on 1 September 2017. On 7 September 2017 she lodged an appeal against it. 36.  In a final decision of 24 April 2018 the Bucharest County Court allowed the appeal, quashed the previous decision and dismissed R.\u2019s request to be granted physical custody of the children. It found as follows:\n\u201c... the [first applicant] is not at fault in the non-enforcement of decision no. 590A/5 May 2014, in so far as the Romanian State had a positive obligation to urgently take all necessary legal measures in order to protect the [first applicant]\u2019s right to family life, by immediately returning the children to their mother\u2019s home, in order to avoid the parental alienation exhibited by the children towards the [first applicant].\nTherefore, by penalising [the first applicant] with losing the possibility of having her children live with her, for circumstances for which she is not responsible, ... would affect the substance of her right of access to a court and [the right] to respect for her family life. ...\nThe court notes that the first-instance court\u2019s decision to set the children\u2019s home with their father on the grounds that they were attached to him by strong affection and that they refused to communicate with [the first applicant], is the direct consequence of the non-enforcement of decision no. 590A/5 May 2014. [R.] had a real possibility to influence the children to see their mother as a stranger, as a danger to the father\u2011children family relationship, and as a danger to their health. ...\nThe break of the family ties between the mother and her children will without any doubt become permanent if the children are to live with their father, and therefore any visiting programme for the mother and the children will be illusory and formal in so far as the mother was unable to obtain the enforcement of a final decision for more than four years and as during that time she practically could not even speak with the children.\u201d", "references": ["9", "1", "7", "8", "2", "3", "6", "0", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Znamensk. 7.  The applicant is a former military officer. He performed his military service and lived with his family in Znamensk, a closed administrative unit (\u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) of the Astrakhan Region. Since 1975 he was registered at the place of residence at 71 the 9th May avenue, apartment 18, in Znamensk. In 1998 he was dismissed from military service and registered as a person in need of housing in the city of his choosing, Moscow. 8.  In 2002 the applicant\u2019s family of two was included in the list of persons entitled to the receipt of a housing certificate. In 2004 a domestic court declared the applicant\u2019s son, his wife and their son (the applicant\u2019s grand-son) the applicant\u2019s family members. The applicant requested the housing authority to modify its earlier decision to include the above persons into the list of family members entitled to the Housing certificate. In 2006 the City Inter-Departmental Commission Responsible for the State Housing Certificates Program of the Department of the Housing Policy and Housing Fund of Moscow (the Moscow housing commission) rejected his request and annulled its decision of 2002, referring to a change of legislation concerning the financing of the resettlement from closed administrative units. The applicant challenged the refusal in court. 9.  On 9 April 2007 the Znamensk Town Court of the Astrakhan Region granted his claim, having found the reference to the legislative changes inapplicable to the applicant\u2019s case. The court confirmed the applicant\u2019s and his four family members\u2019 right to housing provision in the form of the housing certificate, to be performed at the expense of the federal budget and at the place of the claimants\u2019 registration as persons in need of housing. The court ordered the Moscow housing commission to include the applicant\u2019s family of five in an \u201corder list\u201d (\u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a-\u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430) for receipt of a State housing certificate. The judgment became final on 20 April 2007. It appears that the debtor authority\u2019s representatives were not present at the hearing and asked to examine the case in their absence, on the basis of their written submissions. 10.  According to the letter of 4 July 2017 by the Znamensk Town Court, on 6 June 2007 the court sent a copy of the judgment to the respondent authority by fax and mail. The court registry kept the transmission record stating that the fax passed \u201cnormally\u201d. The court file contained no further documents evidencing the receipt of the judgment by the respondent. 11.  On 10 February 2011 the Department of the Housing Policy and the Housing Fund of Moscow conducted a campaign for re-registration of persons in need of housing and sent the applicant a letter setting out a list of eleven documents to be provided, including, among others, a duly certified copy the decision to dismiss the applicant stating the reasons for the dismissal, as well as documents confirming his title to the flat in Znamensk. 12.  According to the applicant, on 26 March 2011 he sent the requisite documents to the authority by mail. He submitted a copy of the request of 10 February 2011 and the postal receipt dated 26 March 2011 and containing the requesting authority\u2019s address in the \u201cdestination\u201d part, in support of his submissions. 13.  On 5 May 2015 the City Property Department of the Government of Moscow informed the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Court that at some point they had examined the applicant\u2019s unspecified application concerning the housing issue. The authority established that a number of documents were missing from the applicant\u2019s, namely, a duly certified copy of the decision to dismiss the applicant stating the reasons for the dismissal, as well as documents confirming his title to the flat in Znamensk, and invited the applicant to provide the documents. The applicant\u2019s address specified in the letter read as follows: 71 the 9th May avenue, apartment 118. Despite several reminders, the applicant had failed to provide the requisite documents. Accordingly, on 3 July 2012 the Department of Housing Policy and Housing Fund of Moscow had decided to strike the applicant\u2019s family off the lists of persons in need of housing. There had been no grounds to provide them with housing. The authority had not received a copy of the judgment of 9 April 2007 for execution. 14.  According to the letter of 22 August 2016 by the Department of the Housing Policy and the Housing Fund of Moscow to the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Court, the authority has not received a copy of the judgment of 9 April 2007, and the applicant had not applied \u201cwith documents\u201d for a housing certificate. The authority further stated that, pursuant to a Decree of the Moscow Government of 14 February 2012 No. 43-\u041f\u041f On Housing Provision to Some Categories of Citizens, as of that date the provision of housing certificates had been ensured by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defence. 15.  On 1 November 2011 the administration of the closed administrative unit Znamensk of the Astrakhan Region concluded a social tenancy agreement with the applicant in respect of the three-room flat in Znamensk (see paragraph 7 above). The agreement stipulated that five applicant\u2019s family members, namely, his son, his daughter, his son\u2019s wife and their two children moved into the flat together with the applicant. 16.  In 2016 the applicant\u2019s son divorced from his wife. The two children remained with her. On 6 February 2017 a domestic court granted the applicant\u2019s request to discontinue the son\u2019s ex-wife and their children\u2019s use of the flat. On 20 June 2017 the social-tenancy agreement of 1 November 2011 was amended to specify that the three family members (the applicant\u2019s wife, son and daughter) moved into the flat together with the applicant.", "references": ["4", "8", "6", "1", "0", "7", "2", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Malyn, Zhytomyr Region. 5.  On 17 November 1993 M. gave birth to a baby girl, K. Given that the applicant had had relations with M. at the relevant time, on 2 December 1993 he accepted paternity of K. by submitting the relevant declaration to the authorities. 6.  On 23 March 2000 the applicant married M. They divorced in 2006. 7.  In July 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Malyn District Court against M., challenging the paternity of K. The applicant claimed that, even though he had been married to another woman at the relevant time, he had had relations with M. and he had been sure that he was the father of the child and so accepted the paternity. However, in 2005 he had reason to doubt his paternity. 8.  On 24 March 2008 the District Court found for the applicant, relying on a genetic expert\u2019s opinion which excluded the possibility of the applicant being K.\u2019s biological father. The court noted that the applicant had a right to challenge his paternity given that there was no evidence in the file to suggest that he had known that he was not the father of the child when accepting paternity of K. 9.  M. appealed, stating that from January 1993 she and the applicant had lived together without being married and that she had never had any doubts about the applicant\u2019s paternity of K. She argued, inter alia, that the genetic expert\u2019s opinion was not reliable. 10.  On 29 May 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court\u2019s decision and held that, under Article 56 of the Family and Marriage Code, the applicant had not had a right to challenge his paternity because at the time that he accepted paternity of K., he was aware that he was not K.\u2019s father. In support of that finding the Court of Appeal noted that before K.\u2019s birth, the applicant and M. had not been married, they had not lived together (noting, in particular, that between February and April 1993 the applicant lived in another town), and the applicant had been married to another woman at the relevant time. 11.  The applicant appealed on a point of law, contending that there were no grounds for the Court of Appeal to find that at the material time he was aware that he was not the biological father of the child. No such evidence was available in the file and the Regional Court of Appeal had exceeded its powers in drawing such a conclusion. 12.  On 9 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal by the applicant as unfounded.", "references": ["6", "7", "3", "0", "1", "9", "5", "2", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1968 and is detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison; the second applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility. 6.  In February 2014 the first applicant lodged a petition with the Parliamentary Commission on Petitions (\u201cthe Commission\u201d), requesting a change to the wording of the provision of the Code for the Execution of Sentences in order that it would read that electronic items could be given to inmates by their friends and acquaintances as well as by their spouses, partners and close relatives. In March 2014 the Commission decided not to examine the first applicant\u2019s petition as it was not clear enough. In March 2014 the first applicant lodged a new petition with the Commission. In April 2014 the Commission informed the first applicant that his petition would be examined. In June 2014 the Commission examined the first applicant\u2019s petition and decided to dismiss it. Addressing the first applicant\u2019s proposal that Article 96 \u00a7 1 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences be amended so that it would permit inmates to receive electronic items from their acquaintances or friends, as well as from their spouses, partners or close relatives, the Commission held that the existing regulation was aimed at preventing inmates from receiving items acquired by criminal means \u2013 for example, by their accomplices in crime. In June 2014 the Lithuanian Parliament dismissed the first applicant\u2019s proposal that Article 96 \u00a7 1 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences be amended. 7.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that from 2007 onwards the first applicant had a computer game player, a computer game, and a television set; moreover, in November 2014 he purchased a laptop with his own money. It also appears from the information submitted by the Government that the applicant has a sister, a brother, an aunt, an uncle and a cousin (that is to say close relatives). 8.  On 17 September 2013 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court alleging overcrowding and other inadequate sanitary conditions in the Prison Hospital. He alleged that he had been confined to the Prison Hospital from 22 March until 4 April 2010, from 25 February until 4 March 2011, from 21 until 27 September 2011, and from 17 until 24 January 2014. He subsequently provided a specified complaint (patikslintas skundas \u2013 that is to say a complaint in which he clarified certain issues). 9.  On 19 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court ascertained that the second applicant had been confined to the Prison Hospital from 22 March until 13 April 2010, from 25 February until 4 March 2011, from 21 until 27 September 2011 and from 17 until 24 January 2014. The court also applied the three-year statutory time\u2011limit to part of the second applicant\u2019s complaint. It held that the second applicant had been placed in overcrowded wards for fifteen days and awarded him 100 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 29 euros (EUR)) in compensation for the fifteen days that he had spent in overcrowded wards during the periods from 21 until 27 September 2011 and from 17 until 24 January 2014. The second applicant\u2019s other grievances were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 10.  The second applicant appealed, and on 9 December 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. However, it held that the first-instance court had erred in determining the relevant amount of personal space. The court held that under domestic regulations, a person confined to the Prison Hospital had to have at least 5.1 square metres of personal space. The court recalculated the number of days and held that between 25 February 2011 and 4 March 2011 the second applicant had had 4.05 square metres of personal space at his disposal, and that between 17 and 24 January 2014 he had had 2.83 square metres of personal space. The court held that it was impossible to determine how much personal space the second applicant had had between 21 and 27 September 2011; accordingly, it calculated in favour of the second applicant the number of days during which he had not had enough personal space (that is to say the court calculated the number of such days and, in the absence of specific data, stated that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for more days than he probably had been held there). It then ruled that he had not had enough personal space for twenty days in total. However, he had been able to move around the Prison Hospital from 6 a.m. until 10 p.m., and he had also been able spend time outside. 11.  On 15 July 2013 the second applicant lodged a request with the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to be allowed to receive a portable digital music (MP3) player from J.G., a person who was not his relative. On 17 July 2013 his request was refused. 12.  In July 2013, the second applicant lodged a complaint about the above\u2011mentioned refusal with the Prison Department, which replied in August 2013 that the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility had acted in accordance with domestic law. 13.  On 20 August 2013 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court regarding the refusal of the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to allow him to receive an MP3 player from someone to whom he was not related. He asked the court to oblige the Correctional Facility administration to issue him with permission to receive equipment and other items from acquaintances in view of the fact that his relatives were not visiting him, and to award him compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 10,137. 14.  On 13 January 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court ruled that the second applicant could receive an MP3 player from his spouse, partner or a close relative. However, as the person who had offered to bring him the player did not fall within the category of such persons, the refusal of the Vilnius Correctional Facility administration had been lawful. The court had no doubts about the relevant provisions of domestic law and observed that they were designed to motivate inmates to work, to communicate with their relatives and to enhance their social ties. The court furthermore observed that (among other items) MP3 players did not constitute essential items but rather entertainment items. It therefore dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint. 15.  The second applicant appealed, and on 30 October 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court held that the second applicant had not denied that he had close relatives, but had simply submitted that they were not visiting him. The second applicant found himself in the same position as that of other inmates. His right to have an MP3 player had not been denied, as he could have purchased one. It was not prohibited for persons other than close relatives to give money to convicted inmates; thus, the second applicant could have received money with which to buy an MP3 player. 16.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that the second applicant had been working in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 2 July 2012 until 31 March 2014 and had been receiving remuneration for his work. 17.  On 8 April 2014 the second applicant asked the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to allow him to receive an MP3 player by post from his mother, J.U. On 5 May 2014 his request was refused because domestic law did not provide the possibility to send items to inmates by post. 18.  On 24 March 2015 the second applicant lodged a request with the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to be allowed to receive certain electronic items (a television monitor and related parts, such as headphones) from his partner, K.J. His request was granted. 19.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that the second applicant received a personal computer in January 2011 (which he returned to his relatives in June 2011); another personal computer, a monitor and headphones in June 2011 (which he returned to his relatives in July 2016); and a USB key (which was destroyed at the second applicant\u2019s request in December 2016) and a laptop in August 2016. 20.  From the information provided by the Government it appears that the applicant was able to watch television as there were specially equipped rooms which the inmates could use at any time, given that they could freely move around the premises of Vilnius Correctional Facility.", "references": ["7", "2", "0", "5", "6", "3", "9", "8", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Luhansk. She has had a first-degree disability since childhood. 6.  On 2 April 1998, during her time at the Slavyanoserbskiy Psychoneurological Asylum run by the Luhansk Regional Council (\u0421\u043b\u0430\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438) (\u201cthe asylum\u201d), another patient, B., inflicted grievous bodily harm on the applicant. Her injuries included concussion, a fractured jaw and nose, and numerous cuts on her face. Later she also lost the sight in her right eye and the sight in her left eye deteriorated which, according to the forensic examination report of 25 June 2007, was also due to the trauma sustained by the applicant on 2 April 1998. 7.  On 16 September 1998 B. died. 8.  On 8 May 1998 the Slavyanoserbskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of the Luhansk Region (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456 \uf02d \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings against two asylum employees (orderlies), N. and L. When questioned about the incident, the orderlies testified that on the morning of 2 April 1998 they had been cleaning the rooms when they had heard someone crying. They had found the applicant on her bed with her face smashed. Other patients had told N. and L. that B. had beaten the applicant with a mop because she had hit B. The prosecutor noted that (i) B. was \u201cwithout legal capacity because of a mental disorder\u201d (\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0430\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0443) and thus could not be held criminally responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) even though it appeared that orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties (according to the asylum orderlies\u2019 list of duties submitted by the Government they were not allowed to leave patients unsupervised), which could possibly constitute a crime under Article 167 of the 1960 Criminal Code (see paragraph 27 below), they were not considered to be \u201cofficials\u201d who could be prosecuted under that provision. 9.  On 9 December 2004, within civil proceedings (see paragraphs 11\u201316 below), the applicant\u2019s representative requested that the first-instance court reopen a criminal investigation into the incident. On the same date the request was rejected. The court noted that the prosecutor\u2019s office had already issued a decision on 8 May 1998, which had not been appealed against. Moreover, B. had died and therefore, in accordance with the law in force, no criminal proceedings could be instituted against her. The ruling was upheld by the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine on 3 August 2005 and 31 March 2006 respectively. 10.  Following the entry into force of a new Criminal Procedure Code, on 26 December 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police, alleging negligence by the orderlies. The complaint was registered and two separate investigations launched into negligent performance of duties by members of the medical or pharmaceutical profession and negligence of duties by officials. On 19 February 2013 both investigations were merged. Several witnesses were questioned including the applicant, her mother and orderly L. The latter testified that she had not seen the incident take place but had later learned that for an unknown reason B. had hit the applicant with a mop left by L. in their room. On 30 June 2013 the proceedings were terminated by a police investigator of the Slyavyanoserbskyy District Police Department (\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443 \u0413\u0423\u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0432 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456). That decision was identical to the one of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and referred to the investigator\u2019s findings (i) that B. had been \u201cwithout legal capacity because of a mental disorder\u201d (\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0430\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0443) and thus could not be held responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) that even though it appeared that the orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties, which could constitute a crime under Article 167 (negligence of duties by officials) or Article 140 of the new 2001 Criminal Code (negligent performance of duties by members of the medical profession), they were not considered to be \u201cofficials\u201d or \u201cmembers of the medical profession\u201d who could be prosecuted under those provisions of the law. 11.  On 10 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the asylum in the Zhovtnevyy Local Court of Luhansk, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage (the cost of medications and food expenses incurred while staying in a hospital between 2 and 30 April 1998 and between 18 and 26 May 1998 and the costs of dental prosthesis care). The applicant claimed that following negligence on the part of the asylum employees L. and N. she had been beaten by B. The applicant also indicated that the asylum should not have placed B. in one room with the applicant since B. had been known for her violent behaviour. 12.  On 4 May 1999, at the request of a prosecutor, the court launched proceedings to establish the applicant\u2019s legal capacity. Eight days later the consideration of the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation was suspended pending the outcome of the legal capacity proceedings. 13.  On 9 October 2002 the legal capacity proceedings were terminated because the prosecutor failed to appear at the hearing. 14.  On 19 June 2003 the first-instance court ordered a medical examination of the applicant and the case was forwarded to the Luhansk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. On 19 October 2004 the case was returned to the first-instance court with an expert report confirming that the applicant had sustained grievous bodily harm. 15.  On 3 October 2006 the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk awarded the applicant 30,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage (approximately 4,500 euros (EUR) at the material time). In a court hearing the asylum\u2019s representative submitted that in his view the applicant had initiated the conflict with B. herself and thus there had been no negligence on the part of the asylum\u2019s employees. The court, having listened to the parties and witnesses and having examined the case material, concluded that on 2 April 1998 as a result of a fight between the applicant and B., \u201cwho at the material time was found to be without legal capacity\u201d (\u044f\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0431\u0443\u043b\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u044e), the applicant had received injuries. The court expressly noted that those conclusions were not disputed by the parties. The court further referred to the decision of the prosecutor\u2019s office of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and held that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees (orderlies). Lastly, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims for pecuniary damages (compensation for medication, food, loss of income and travel expenses) as not supported by relevant evidence. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal challenging the refusal of the court to award her pecuniary damages but later withdrew it. The decision of 3 October 2006 thus became final and enforceable. 17.  On 13 December 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office sent a demand to the asylum pointing out violations of work safety regulations which required remediation. According to the demand, the applicant\u2019s rights had been violated because there had been no internal investigation into the incident within the statutory time\u2011limit (of within ten days of the incident). 18.  There is no information to suggest that the asylum complied with the demand. 19.  On 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk, seeking an acknowledgement that bodily harm had been inflicted on her. The applicant asserted, in particular, that the asylum was avoiding delivering a report on the incident even though it was necessary to establish the facts surrounding the incident and to recover damages for the injuries sustained. 20.  On 22 November 2007 the complaint was allowed by the court. Referring to its decision of 3 October 2006, which had become final (see paragraph 16 above), the court established that the applicant had had a fight with B. and had received injuries while at the asylum. 21.  On 18 February 2008 the applicant instituted a new set of proceedings against the asylum, seeking compensation for loss of labour capacity and expenses for medications which the applicant permanently needed. 22.  On 15 June 2012 the Zhovtnevyy District Court allowed the claim. Referring to its judgment of 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above), the court established that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. The court also noted that even though B. had not been declared to be without legal capacity, at the time of the incident both she and the applicant had been under the supervision of the asylum, which should accordingly have been held responsible for the incident. On 23 October 2012 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 23.  On 30 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine, following an appeal by the defendant, quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that since B. \u201cha[d] not been declared to be without legal capacity\u201d (\u043d\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u043b\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u044e), she had been partially responsible for the incident and thus the lower courts should have considered the extent of her liability. 24.  On 27 September 2013 the first-instance court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and awarded her UAH 44,130 (around EUR 4,140 at the material time). The asylum was ordered to pay the applicant each month UAH 779.52 (approximately EUR 71), which was 64% of the monthly minimum wage. The court noted that, according to the court decision of 3 October 2006, harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. However, since B. had not been officially declared to be without legal capacity and thus had been partially liable for the incident, liability for the incident and damages were divided between the asylum and B. as to 80% and 20%, respectively. No particular grounds for that assessment were given. 25.  Both parties appealed against this judgment. The applicant argued that the asylum had been solely responsible for her injuries, referring to the court\u2019s findings on 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above) and 22 November 2007 (see paragraph 20 above). On 18 December 2013 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 27 September 2013, noting that \u201cthe first-instance court had correctly established the degree of guilt of those who had inflicted harm\u201d. On 17 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave for appeal as unsubstantiated.", "references": ["0", "9", "7", "6", "4", "2", "8", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Klaip\u0117da. 5.  On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to \u0160iauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaip\u0117da District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 6.  In April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court about his conditions of detention in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison. He complained of: overcrowding; of there being no partition wall between toilets and cells; of insufficient ventilation; of insufficient time in the open air; of insufficient time for showering; of the presence of cockroaches; of inmates smoking in the cells; of no long-stay or short visits; of the fact that he had not been allowed to go home; of the low energy value of the food provided; of the prohibition on receiving food from relatives and friends; and of the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player. 7.  On 27 June 2014 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant\u2019s cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant\u2019s other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8.  The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9.  In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long\u2011stay visit and that he had not been allowed to \u201ctake holidays\u201d. It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10.  On 5 December 2014 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 \u2013 for 176 days \u2013 the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with \u0160iauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the \u0160iauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11.  The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.", "references": ["9", "3", "5", "8", "2", "0", "6", "7", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant company operates a popular online news portal in Hungary called 444.hu, which averages approximately 250,000 unique users per day. The online news portal has a staff of twenty-four and publishes approximately seventy-five articles per day on a wide range of topics, including politics, technology, sport and popular culture. 7.  On 5 September 2013, a group of apparently intoxicated football supporters stopped at an elementary school in the village of Kony\u00e1r, Hungary, while travelling by bus to a football match. The students at the school were predominantly Roma. The supporters disembarked from the bus, and proceeded to sing, chant and shout racist remarks and make threats against the students who were outside in the playground. The supporters also waved flags and threw beer bottles, and one of them reportedly urinated in front of the school building. To protect the children, the teachers called the police, took the children inside and made them hide under tables and in the bathroom. The football supporters boarded the bus and left the area only after the police arrived. 8.  On 5 September 2013, J.Gy. the leader of the Roma minority local government in Kony\u00e1r gave an interview, in the company of a pupil of the elementary school and his mother, to Roma Produkci\u00f3s Iroda Alap\u00edtv\u00e1ny, a media outlet with a focus on Roma issues. While describing the events, and referring to the arrival of the football supporters in Kony\u00e1r, J.Gy. stated that \u201cJobbik came in[1]\u201d (Bej\u00f6tt a Jobbik). He added: \u201cThey attacked the school, Jobbik attacked it\u201d, and \u201cMembers of Jobbik, I add, they were members of Jobbik, they were members of Jobbik for sure.\u201d On the same day the media outlet uploaded the video of the interview to Youtube. 9.   On 6 September 2013 the applicant company published an article on the incident in Kony\u00e1r on the 444.hu website with the title \u201cFootball supporters heading to Romania stopped to threaten gypsy pupils\u201d, written by B.H., a journalist of the Internet news portal. The article contained the following passages:\n\u201cBy all indications, a bus full of Hungarian football supporters heading to a Romania-Hungary game left a highway in order to threaten mostly Gypsy pupils at a primary school in Kony\u00e1r, a village close to the Romanian border.\nAccording to our information and witnesses\u2019 statements, the bus arrived in the village Thursday morning. The supporters were inebriated and started insulting Gypsies and threatening the pupils. Teachers working in the building locked the doors and instructed the smallest children to hide under the tables. Mr J.Gy., president of the local gypsy [cig\u00e1ny] municipality, talked to us about the incident. A phone conversation with Mr Gy. and a parent has already been uploaded to Youtube.\u201d\nThe words \u201cuploaded to Youtube\u201d appeared in green, indicating that they served as anchor text to a hyperlink to the Youtube video. By clicking on the green text, readers could open a new web page leading to the video hosted on the website of Youtube.com. 10.  The article was subsequently updated three times \u2013 on 6 and 12 September and 1 October 2016 \u2013 to reflect newly available information, including an official response from the police. 11.  The hyperlink to the Youtube video was further reproduced on three other websites, operated by other media outlets. 12.  On 13 October 2013, the political party Jobbik brought defamation proceedings under Article 78 of the Civil Code before the Debrecen High Court against eight defendants, including J.Gy., Roma Produkci\u00f3s Iroda Alap\u00edtv\u00e1ny, the applicant company, and other media outlets who had provided links to the impugned video. It argued that by using the term Jobbik to describe the football supporters and by publishing a hyperlink to the Youtube video, the respondents had infringed its right to reputation. 13.  On 30 March 2014 the High Court upheld the plaintiff\u2019s claim, finding that J.Gy.\u2019s statements falsely conveyed the impression that Jobbik had been involved in the incident in Kony\u00e1r. It also found it established that the applicant company was objectively liable for disseminating defamatory statements and had infringed the political party\u2019s right to reputation, ordering it to publish excerpts of the judgment on the 444.hu website and to remove the hyperlink to the Youtube video from the online article. 14.  The judgment of the High Court contains the following relevant passages:\n\u201c...\nThe Court established that first defendant J.Gy. violated the plaintiff Jobbik Magyarorszag\u00e9rt Mozgalom\u2019s inherent right of protection against defamation by falsely claiming in his statements given to the second defendant on 5 September 2013 and uploaded to youtube.com, and to the sixth defendant on 7 September and uploaded to haon.hu that the events that had taken place on 5 September 2013 in front of the primary school of Kony\u00e1r, had been done by the plaintiff party, and that the people who had taken part in it were individuals associated with the plaintiff party. The Court established that the second defendant, Roma Produkcios Iroda Alapitvany; the fourth defendant, I.V., the fifth defendant, Magyar Jeti, the sixth defendant. Inform M\u00e9dia Kft; and the eighth defendant HVG Kiad\u00f3 Zrt. also violated the plaintiffs inherent right to be protected against defamation as the second defendant uploaded the first defendant\u2019s false statement to youtube.com, and the fourth defendant made it available and disseminated it on romaclub.hu, the fifth defendant on 444.hu, the sixth defendant on haon.hu. and the eighth defendant on hvg.hu.\n...\nThe Court obliges the first and second defendants to make the first and second paragraphs of this judgment publicly available within 15 days and for a period of 30 days on youtube.com at their own cost, and for the fourth defendant to make it publicly available on romaclub.hu, the fifth defendant on 444.hu, the sixth defendant on haon.hu, and the eighth defendant on hvg.hu.\nIt also obliges the fifth defendant to delete the link to the first defendant\u2019s statement uploaded to youtube.com in its article \"Supporters on their way to Romania stopped by to threaten gipsy students\" published on 6 September 2013, within 15 days.\nDefamation can be realised not only by the stating of a falsehood but also by the publication and dissemination of a falsehood that pertains to another person (see Article 78 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code). When establishing the occurrence of an infringement, it does not matter whether the persons concerned acted in good or bad faith, [but] whether the infringement can be imputable to them or not.\nWith regard to the above mentioned, the Court established that the second, fourth and fifth [the applicant company], sixth and eight defendants also violated the plaintiff\u2019s inherent right to be protected against defamation by publishing and publicly disseminating the first defendant\u2019s defamatory statement.\n...\nThe objective sanctions for the violation of inherent rights:\nPursuant to Paragraph 1 of Section 84 of the Civil Code, a person whose inherent rights have been violated shall have the following options under civil law, depending on the circumstances of the case:\na) demand a court declaration of the occurrence of the infringement;\nc) demand that the perpetrator make restitution in a statement or by some other suitable means and, if necessary, that the perpetrator, at his own expense, make an appropriate public disclosure for restitution;\nd) demand the termination of the injurious situation and the restoration of the previous state by and at the expense of the perpetrator and, furthermore, to have the effects of the infringement nullified or deprived of their injurious nature.\nThe above cited sanctions [Article 84 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code] for the violation of inherent rights are objective in nature, [and] therefore are independent from the imputability of the perpetrator or the lack of it. The violation itself forms the basis for the application of an adequate objective sanction. With regard to the above mentioned, the Court established that the defendants violated the plaintiff\u2019s Inherent rights, based on Paragraph 1 a) of Section 84 of the Civil Code.\nWith regard to the restitution in accordance with Paragraph 1 c) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, the Court ordered the defendants - pertaining to the infringement they have realized by their proceedings - to make public in the affected websites the first and second paragraphs of the judgment that contain the establishment of the infringement and at the same time affect the plaintiff and declare the falseness of the statement that was made publicly available. Just as they did so with the first defendant\u2019s declaration that contained untrue statements. Since the plaintiff\u2019s harm can be repaired in the objective sanctions\u2019 circle with the given provision, the Court rejected that part of the plaintiff\u2019s claim that referred to the public dissemination of a declaration with a different content.\nBased on Paragraph 1 d) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, the Court ordered the fifth defendant to deprive its related report of its injurious nature, but it rejected the same claim the plaintiff submitted against the eighth defendant, since it can be established by the facts of the case that the eighth defendant\u2019s report available on hvg.hu merely links to the report that appeared on the website 444.hu maintained by the fifth defendant, therefore the latter\u2019s deprivation of its injurious nature effectively results in the deprivation of the report on hvg.hu of its injurious nature.\nThe subjective sanctions of violation of inherent rights:\nBased on Paragraph 1 e) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, a person whose inherent rights have been violated shall file charges for punitive damages in accordance with the liability regulations under civil law.\nBased on Paragraph 1 of Section 339 of the Civil Code, a person who causes damage to another person in violation of the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of liability if he is able to prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be expected in the given situation. Based on Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Section 355 of the Civil Code, the person responsible for the damage shall indemnify the aggrieved party for non-material damages. The four conjunctive conditions of indemnification of non-material damages are; 1) the violation of law in the violation of inherent rights; 2) imputability; 3) non-material disadvantage; 4) causal link between the violation of inherent rights and the non-material disadvantage.\nWith regard to legal persons, the non-material damage is non-material disadvantage or loss manifested in the assessment of the legal person, and in the adverse changes in its business turnover, in its participation in other relations and in the situation and quality of its existence and operations.\nThe occurrence of the disadvantage can be established not just on the basis of evidence but by publicly known facts as well, based on Paragraph 3 of Section 163 of the Code of Civil Procedure (BH.2001.178.)\nIn the case in question, the Court established it as a publicly known fact that the first defendant\u2019s statement, which presented the plaintiff political party as such that committed an aggressive, threatening and racist event, and which was later on publicly disseminated by the other defendants, caused non-material damage in the assessment of the plaintiff political party. This circumstance is rejected and regarded with disdain by a wide layer of society, and it forces the legal person \"associated\" with such events to explain and clarify its role (or in this case, the lack of its role). In the case of a political party with parliamentary representation, this kind of non-material damage can especially be caused by such violation of inherent rights committed nearly six months prior to the parliamentary elections.\nWith regard to the first defendant, the Court established the fact of imputability out of the conditions of indemnification for non-material damages....\nIn the case of the other defendants, the Court did not establish their imputability with regard to the violation of law, and consequently, the Court rejected the plaintiff\u2019s claim for indemnification for non-material damages against the other defendants, as follows:\nIn their own online news websites maintained by the fifth [the applicant company], sixth and eight defendants, the defendants in question published reports that presented the events of 5 September in the most realistic way, and they used the available information channels and forms of control in the expected manner. They presented contradictory information and opinions in an objective manner, remained true to the information and the given opinions. The fact that the defendants also included [Mr J.Gy.\u2019s statements] does not violate the procedure expected from the staff of the press in such a situation [is] not regarded as a deliberately false publication, and therefore does not call for the establishment of whether the employees of the given defendants failed to examine the veracity of the facts, and in relation to this, failed to act with the precision necessary for the responsible practice of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. In contrast with this, it can explicitly be established based on the content of the testimonies and the submitted reports that the employees of the affected defendants acted with the precision necessary for the responsible practice of their work[:] they examined, exposed and presented the veracity of the facts[;] therefore they acted in a manner that would generally be expected from them in the given situation.\n...\u201d 15.  The applicant company appealed arguing that public opinion associated the notion of \u201cJobbik\u201d not so much with the political party but with anti-Roma ideology, and the name had become a collective noun for anti-Roma organisations. According to the applicant company, the statement had not had an offensive content regarding the political party, since it had been publicly known that Jobbik had been engaged in hatred-inciting activities. The applicant company also emphasised that by making the interview with the first defendant available in the form of a link but not associating the applicant company with the video\u2019s content, it had not repeated the statements and had not disseminated falsehoods. 16.  On 25 September 2014 the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision. It held that the statement of J.Gy. had qualified as a statement of facts because it had given the impression to the average audience that the football supporters had been organisationally linked to the political party. The court found that the statement had been injurious to the political party since it had associated the latter with socially reprehensible conduct. As regards the applicant company in particular, it held:\n\u201c... With regard to the fifth defendant\u2019s [the applicant company\u2019s] reference in its appeal, the court of first-instance correctly established that making a false statement available through a link, even without identifying with it, qualifies as the dissemination of facts.\nDissemination (or circulation) is the sharing of a piece of news as a content of thought and making it available for others. Contrary to the fifth defendant\u2019s viewpoint expressed in its appeal, the infringement of law by dissemination occurs even if the disseminator does not identify with the statement, and even if their trust in the veracity of the statement is ungrounded. Making lawful content available in any form qualifies as dissemination; and the disseminator bears objective responsibility for sharing another person\u2019s unlawful statement owing to the occurrence of the sharing.\nBased on the grammatical and taxonomical interpretation of dissemination defined in Article 78 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code, it occurs by the sharing of information, which makes the given content accessible to anyone. The essence of dissemination is the sharing of information, and owing to the objective legal consequence, it does not matter what the goal of the sharing was, whether the disseminator acted in good or bad faith, nor do the scope of publicity or the gravity of the infringement have any relevance.\n...\u201d 17.  The applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint under Act no. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (\u201cthe Constitutional Court Act\u201d) on 1 December 2014, arguing in essence that under the Civil Code, media outlets had objective liability for dissemination of false information, which according to judicial practice meant that media outlets were held liable for the veracity of statements that clearly emanated from third parties. Thus, even if a media organ prepared a balanced and unbiased article on a matter of public interest, it could still be found to be in violation of the law. This would result in an undue burden for publishers, since they could only publish information whose veracity they had established beyond any doubt, making reporting on controversial matters impossible. It argued that the judicial practice was unconstitutional since it did not examine whether a publisher\u2019s conduct had been in compliance with the ethical and professional rules of journalism, but only whether it had disseminated an untrue statement. In the area of the Internet where the news value of information was very short, there was simply no time to verify the truthfulness of every statement. 18.   Two of the defendants also lodged a petition for review with the K\u00faria. The applicant company argued that the second-instance judgment restricted the freedom of the press in a disproportionate manner, as it had only reported on an important issue of public concern, in compliance with its journalistic tasks. It emphasised that, as established by the lower-level courts, its report on the issue had been balanced. It further maintained that the statement of J.Gy. qualified as an opinion rather than a fact. In any event, it had not been engaged in the dissemination but had merely fulfilled its journalistic obligation of reporting. 19.  The K\u00faria upheld the second-instance judgment on 10 June 2015 (served on the applicant company on 4 September 2015), reiterating that J.Gy.\u2019s statements were statement of facts and that the defendants had failed to prove their veracity. Although the term jobbikos was used in colloquial language, in the case at issue J.Gy. had explicitly referred to the political party and its role in the incident. As regards the question of whether the applicant company\u2019s activity constituted dissemination of information the K\u00faria found:\n\u201cBoth in criminal law and other cases of civil law, the K\u00faria has taken the legal standpoint ... that dissemination is carried out by sharing or making public any information, as a result of which anyone can have access to the given content. The Internet is only one possible alternative for publishing, it is the forum of dissemination, meaning that information and facts are shared through a computer network. Internet link to one\u2019s own publication serves an appendix; it becomes accessible and readable with a single click. The Civil Code established objective responsibility for the dissemination, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the disseminator. In the K\u00faria\u2019s view, requiring media outlets not to make injurious statements accessible does not constitute a restriction of freedom of the press or freedom of expression, nor was it an obligation on them which cannot in practice be met.\u201d 20.  On 19 December 2017 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint. It emphasised the second-instance court\u2019s finding that providing a hyperlink to content qualified as dissemination of facts. Furthermore, dissemination was unlawful even if the disseminator had not identified itself with the content of the third-party\u2019s statement and even if it had wrongly trusted the truthfulness of the statement. 21.  The Constitutional Court also reiterated its previous case-law concerning reporting about public figures\u2019 press conferences, stating that such conduct did not qualify as dissemination if the report was unbiased and objective, the statement concerned a matter of public interest, the publisher provided the source of the statement and gave the opportunity to the person concerned by the potentially injurious statement a possibility to react. In such cases, according to the Constitutional Court, journalists neither made their own statements nor did they intend to influence public opinion with their own thoughts. Therefore, the liability of the press for falsehoods was to be distinguished from situations where the media content was merely defined by the own choices and decisions of the editors and journalists. Specifically, in these situations the aim of a publication was neither to enrich nor to influence public debate with the journalists\u2019 own arguments, but to provide an up-to-date and credible report on the statements of third\u2011parties participating in public debates. The interest of a public debate required accurate reporting about press conferences. 22.  Concerning the present case, the Constitutional Court found that the dissemination of a falsehood did not concern a statement expressed at a press conference. The statement in question had related to a media report about an event which the press had presented according to its own assessment. The press report had summarised information concerning an event of public interest. A press report fell outside the definition of dissemination only if the aim of the publication was to provide a credible and up-to-date presentation of statements of third parties of a public debate. However, in the present case the K\u00faria found that the aim of the publication had not been the presentation of J.Gy.\u2019s statements, but the presentation of the contradictory information concerning the event. Thus the press report qualified as dissemination.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "8", "7", "2", "1", "3", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Zmiyiv. 6.  On 7 April 2005 the Kyivskiy District Court of Kharkiv found the applicant guilty of theft and of two counts of deliberately causing bodily harm to his wife and G., and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment for the theft, one year\u2019s imprisonment for deliberately causing bodily harm to G. and seven years\u2019 imprisonment for deliberately causing bodily harm to his wife. Using the rule of absorption of more lenient punishment by a stricter one the applicant was given seven years\u2019 imprisonment as a final sentence. 7.  On 29 November 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) partly amended the first-instance judgment. Having considered that the theft was no longer classified as an offence, the appellate court terminated the proceedings with relation to the theft. In addition, as the applicant had continued to plead his innocence in relation the episode with G. and had objected to closing the proceedings in relation to that matter, and in view of the fact that meanwhile the offence had become time-barred, the Court of Appeal absolved the applicant from having to serve the sentence in respect of the episode with G. The remainder of the sentence, namely a term of seven years\u2019 imprisonment for deliberately causing harm to the applicant\u2019s wife, was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 8.  On 8 May 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on points of law as unsubstantiated and upheld the findings of the Court of Appeal. 9.  Between 4 April 2006 and 16 July 2010 the applicant served his sentence at the Romenska Correctional Colony (\u201cthe prison\u201d). 10.  According to the applicant, he was detained in overcrowded cells with poor sanitary and hygiene conditions. The unit no. 8 in which he served his sentence consisted of three rooms with a total living area of 75.5 sq. m., a dining room, a shower room and a toilet room. From April to December 2006 the applicant shared his room with fifty other prisoners. As from December 2006 onwards he was confined in another room of the same unit, measuring 48 sq. m and accommodating twenty-six prisoners. No adequate access to sanitary facilities had been ensured: every ten inmates had to share a water tap and a lavatory. Once a week, prisoners were allowed to take a bath. 11.  On twelve occasions the applicant was transported for medical reasons from the prison to an inter-regional hospital and on four occasions to Temnivska Correctional Colony no. 100 in Kharkiv Region. The prison vans used for transportation consisted of two compartments of about 2 to 3 sq. m each, had no windows, and accommodated twelve inmates in each compartment. Likewise, railway carriages used for transporting prisoners consisted of several compartments of 2 to 3 sq. m each, had no ventilation, and accommodated twelve inmates in each compartment. Trips lasted for more than twelve hours in one direction. The applicant referred in this respect to the relevant reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (hereinafter, \u201cthe CPT\u201d) in respect of their visits to Ukraine. 12.  According to the Government, the applicant was detained in unit no. 8, in which inmates suffering from tuberculosis were to serve their sentences. He was provided with an individual bunk and bedding. Having relied on certificates issued by the prison authorities in March 2014, attesting to the conditions of detention in the unit on that date, the Government submitted that the unit accommodated forty-two prisoners. The dormitory of the unit was of 75.5 sq. m. and consisted of three bedrooms measuring 10.1 sq. m, 34.8 sq. m, and 27.6 sq. m respectively, which were equipped with necessary furniture. The above-mentioned certificates further attested that apart from the sleeping rooms there was also a shower room, a toilet and a room for reheating food. The Government submitted that the unit also disposed other premises, such as rooms for educational work, storage rooms for food and personal belongings of prisoners and a drying room, which the applicant was free to use between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. each day in order to compensate the scare attribution of space in his bedroom. They relied in this respect on printed copies of various photographs, taken in 2014, allegedly showing some of the above-mentioned premises of the unit. According to them, all areas were in satisfactory condition, were equipped with furniture, stock and household goods. In the shower room there was one water tap per ten inmates and one toilet per twelve inmates. According to the prison\u2019s schedule, the inmates of the applicant\u2019s unit had a bath once per week, and bedding and underwear would also be changed. The Government thus concluded that the applicant was detained in appropriate conditions which afforded him in total no less than 3 sq. m of personal space which was in compliance with relevant minimum standard set in the domestic law. 13.  The Government acknowledged the fact that, on a number of occasions, the applicant had been transported from the prison to different medical institutions. He had been taken in a prison van to the Romny railway station and had then continued his journey in a railway carriage specially equipped for transporting prisoners. However, they could not provide any details relating to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transportation because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had subsequently been destroyed. The Government therefore referred to domestic statutory provisions governing prisoners\u2019 transportation. 14.  On 26 August 2008 the Court invited the applicant to submit copies of documents pertinent to his complaints, including his appeal and appeal on points of law. 15.  In his letter to the Court of 27 November 2008, the applicant stated that his request of 26 September 2008 for copies of the necessary documents had remained unanswered, even though there was evidence that the request had been received by the Kyivskiy District Court of Kharkiv. 16.  According to the Government, in 2004 and 2005, following the applicant\u2019s requests, he had studied the case file in detail and had been served with copies of procedural documents in his case, save for a copy of his appeal on points of law, which was not available in the case file at the time. They provided no factual information as regards the applicant\u2019s requests for documents submitted in 2008. 17.  On 16 July 2010 the applicant\u2019s sentence came to an end and he was released from the prison (see paragraph 9 above). According to domestic law, his access to the case file following his release was not limited. There is no evidence that, after his release, the applicant applied to the relevant authorities with a request to have access to his case file or to have copies of documents made. 18.  The applicant alleged that the prison administration had deliberately delayed sending certain of his letters to the Court, had monitored his correspondence and had withheld documents attached to some of the complaints, which he had asked them to send to the Court. According to the applicant, he had also been persecuted by the administration of the prison for communicating with the Court. In particular, on an unspecified date in 2009 he had been placed in disciplinary detention for fifteen days. 19.  The prosecutor\u2019s office examined the applicant\u2019s grievances and found them to be unsubstantiated. 20.  The Court received all the letters referred to by the applicant with all their enclosures. 21.  The relevant extracts from the reports of the CPT concerning conditions of transportation of detainees in Ukraine can be found in Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 15825/06, \u00a7\u00a7 59-61, 25 October 2007).", "references": ["7", "6", "2", "3", "5", "4", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Timi\u015foara. 5.  On 20 February 2003 the applicant, a bank manager at that time, was placed in pre-trial detention by the Bucharest Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, on a charge of taking a bribe in order to favourably influence the acceptance of a loan requested by M.G. 6.  By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe High Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7.  The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (\u201cLaw no. 51/1991\u201d) for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8.  The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "9", "1", "8", "5", "7", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Mr Asainov) was born in 1968 and lives in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Sibiryak) was born in 1975 and lives in Mashabei Sadeh, Israel. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present cases are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it transpired that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8.  The applicants took part in the demonstration on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. They were arrested at the venue of the event and taken to police stations, where they were charged with administrative offences and then convicted as charged by the justices of the peace. 9.  According to the first applicant, on 6 May 2012 he had arrived at Bolotnaya Square to take part in the peaceful demonstration. Around 8.55 p.m. he had been arrested outside the venue of the event. Before his arrest, he had not committed any breach of public order or other offences and had not received any orders from the police. 10.  According to the Government, the applicant, as a participant in the authorised demonstration, had broken through the police cordon and tried to pass to the Red Square. He had ignored the police orders to cease these actions and actively resisted the officers while being taken to the police van. 11.  At 8.30 p.m. the first applicant was brought to the Fili-Davydkovo district police station in Moscow. At the police station an on-duty officer drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s administrative escorting for the purpose of compiling an administrative file. The administrative arrest record indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 8.30 p.m. at the police station and released at 11.05 p.m. on the same day. 12.  After that a duty officer drew up an administrative offence record, stating as follows:\n\u201c... On 6 May 2012 at 8.30 p.m. at the Bolotnaya Square in Moscow [the applicant] took part in an authorised meeting... he broke through the police cordon and tried to enter Red Square, pushing police officers away. [The applicant] did not react to the multiple lawful demands of the police to cease these actions and actively resisted while being taken to the police van, thereby demonstrating his refusal to obey the lawful orders of the police officers and preventing them from fulfilling their service duties, in breach of Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 13.  On 29 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District of Moscow examined the administrative charges against the applicant in his presence. On the basis of the statements of two police officers the court established that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as described in the administrative offence record. The first applicant was sentenced to a fine of 500 Russian roubles ((RUB) \u2013 about 12 euros (EUR) at the time). 14.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. On 7 June 2012 his wife, who had been an eye-witness to the events of 6 May 2012, submitted written statements to the court. According to her, she had come to take part in the authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square with her husband. They passed Yakimanka Street together with other participants, but when they approached Malyy Kamennyy Bridge the march stopped. After standing there and waiting for some time they decided to cease their participation in the event, but could not leave the venue and remained at the pavement. Around 8.30 p.m. the police told them to proceed to the metro station, which they did. On the way to the station at 8.55 p.m. her husband was arrested by the police officers, who gave no orders, and was taken to the police van. Then she went to the Fili-Davydkovo police station to wait for his release. 15.  On 16 July 2012 the District Court examined and partly granted the applicant\u2019s request to exclude the written statements of the police officers as inadmissible evidence. The court summoned them to be examined at the hearing as witnesses. On 2 August the hearing was adjourned to 23 August 2012; the applicant\u2019s request to be represented by one more lawyer was granted. The applicant and his lawyer were duly summoned to that hearing. 16.  On 22 August 2012 the first applicant sent a telegram to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court asking to adjourn the hearing on the grounds that he was away from Moscow for family reasons. 17.  On 23 August 2012 the District Court held a hearing in the absence of the applicant and his lawyers, having mentioned that none of them had lodged a request to adjourn the hearing. The court questioned two police officers, who stated that the applicant, together with other participants of the demonstration, had pushed through the police cordon and tried to approach the Kremlin; had pushed the police officers away; had thrown stones, glass bottles and smoke bombs; had disregarded multiple demands by the police to cease his actions; and had resisted arrest. The appeal decision did not mention the eye-witness statement submitted by the applicant\u2019s wife. Relying on the testimony of the police officers, the District Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 18.  According to the second applicant, she arrived at Oktyabrskaya metro station at 4 p.m. on 6 May 2012 to take part in the peaceful demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. She passed Yakimanka Street with other participants, but on approaching the square found the entrance blocked. Around 6.30 p.m. the police started to break the crowd up into groups and push them. Two police officers grabbed her hands and pushed her towards the police van. She did not breach public order and had not taken part in any acts of violence prior to her arrest. At around 9.05 p.m. the second applicant was brought to Khoroshevskiy district police station. After the police drew up an administrative offence record, she was released at around 1.40 a.m. on 7 May 2012. 19.  According to the Government, the second applicant was arrested at 7.15 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because she had been participating in breaking through the police cordon and had disregarded the police order to cease these acts and disperse. She was taken to the police station at 8.10 p.m. and released at 10.35 p.m. on the same day. 20.  The logbook of persons brought to the Khoroshevskiy district police station indicated that the second applicant was taken there at 7.50 p.m. and released at 10.35 p.m. on 6 May 2012. The administrative file contained no record of the applicant being escorted to the police station. The record of administrative arrest compiled at 8.20 p.m. indicated that she had been taken to the police station at 8.10 p.m. and released later on the same day. 21.  The second applicant was accused of having disobeyed a lawful police order, which was an offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The administrative offence record stated as follows:\n\u201cOn 6 May 2012 at 7.15 p.m. [the applicant] took part in an authorised meeting at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, broke through the police cordon and tried to approach the Kremlin. [The applicant] did not react to the multiple lawful demands of the police officers to cease these actions, thereby preventing them from fulfilling their service duties ... in breach of Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 22.  The administrative case-file contained a police officer\u2019s report which was drawn up on a template. The report contained no individualised information except the police officer\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s personal data. It substantially repeated the description of the applicant\u2019s acts contained in the administrative offence record. The report added that the applicant had thrown stones at the police, lit fireworks and resisted arrest. 23.  On 30 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit Court no. 100 of the Yakimanka District of Moscow examined the administrative charges against the applicant. The applicant was not present at the hearing, even though she had been summoned to attend. On the basis of the police officer\u2019s report, the applicant was found guilty under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences and was sentenced to a fine of RUB 500 (about EUR 12 at the time). 24.  On 13 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant\u2019s appeal in her presence and upheld the first-instance judgment. The second applicant\u2019s request to have the police officers who had arrested her examined at the hearing was dismissed. However, at her request, the court examined a witness of defence who stated that the applicant had not participated in breaking through the police cordon and had not committed any unlawful acts. The witness\u2019s statements were dismissed by the court as unreliable evidence on the grounds that he was the applicant\u2019s friend. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had been duly summoned to the first-instance hearing by telephone but had failed to appear or to lodge a request for its adjournment. 25.  On 15 April 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court examined the applicant\u2019s administrative case in supervisory review proceedings and upheld the earlier judicial decisions.", "references": ["6", "2", "9", "1", "4", "0", "5", "8", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Vietnam. 6.  From 1 March 2012 until 25 July 2012 she was detained at Limassol Police Station pending her deportation. She was deported on the latter date. 7.  The applicant submitted that throughout her detention the women\u2019s wing at Limassol Police Station had been overcrowded. As result, most of the time she had shared cells with other detainees. When the applicant had been in a double occupancy cell with two bunks, she had shared the cell with up to four other detainees. They all had to share the two bunks. When the applicant had been in a single occupancy cell, which she had initially estimated to measure about 3 to 3.5 sq. m, she had had to share with another detainee and a mattress of about 1.90 m would be placed on the dirty floor alongside her bed. This left only about 30 cm of free space between the mattress and the bed. The mattresses placed in the cells to accommodate additional detainees were filthy and sleeping on the concrete floor with only one blanket was very uncomfortable. The detainees therefore shared the bunks as they could share two blankets this way, which made it warmer. 8.  The cells lacked fresh air. Furthermore, the air-conditioning/heating system did not function properly. In addition to a disruption that had lasted three days in March, there were electrical failures or system failures quite frequently, for up to four hours. During this period the cell temperature would drop to two or three degrees above zero and the detention authorities refused to provide more blankets. For this reason, the applicant had asked S.E. to bring her a blanket and a jumper. The disruption of the air-conditioning system also meant that there was no ventilation and the air became foul with so many women in the wing when the weather was warmer in May and June. 9.  The applicant was allowed to go to the courtyard for half an hour per day but only when a guard was available. As there was a shortage of police officers to supervise the detainees, in practice this happened every three days. When police officers were absent they were never replaced and as there was overcrowding at the station the detainees\u2019 exercise time was consequently reduced. The applicant was deprived of fresh air, light and exercise on most days of her detention. 10.  The detention authorities refused to provide basic hygiene products. From the very beginning of her detention, the applicant had contacted S.E. by telephone asking him to bring her soap, shampoo, toilet paper and toothpaste. He had continued to regularly provide her with basic hygiene products. 11.  Lastly, the applicant submitted that during her detention the food which was provided by an external restaurant was not compatible with her religious beliefs \u2013 she did not eat beef \u2013 or with her nutritional habits, which involved eating rice and fish on a daily basis. As the food provided often made her sick, S.E. would regularly bring her meals. 12.  The Government submitted that throughout her detention the applicant had been detained in the women\u2019s wing at the police station. The wing had eight cells, which could accommodate a total of ten detainees. It had two double occupancy cells which measured 9.99 sq. m (cell no. 27) and 6.48 sq. m (cell no. 28). The remaining eight cells (cells nos. 29-34) were single occupancy cells, each measuring 5.94 sq. m. When it was necessary to place a second detainee in a single occupancy cell or a third detainee in a double occupancy cell, another mattress was placed inside the cell and the additional detainee was provided with, inter alia, sheets and blankets. Additional blankets were provided upon request. 13.  The Government provided copies of the station\u2019s daily occupancy records (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7 \u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd-\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd) indicating the number of detainees (both men and women) held during the relevant period. However, they submitted that no consistent records were kept in relation to the occupancy of particular cells. There was therefore no record as to the precise cells or type of cells in which the applicant had been held. Notwithstanding this, in certain of the daily occupancy records where the cell was recorded, it was consistently noted that the applicant had been detained in cell no. 29. 14.  On the basis of the above records, the Government had put together a daily occupancy table for the purposes of the present case concerning the women\u2019s wing. According to the table, it was estimated that between 1 March 2012 and 25 July 2012 the wing had accommodated between eight and twenty detainees per day. That meant that when there were ten detainees, the applicant would have been alone in her cell and would thus have had 5.94 sq. m of personal space. When there were eleven to twenty detainees, it was likely that she had shared a cell with another detainee, and would therefore have had 2.97 sq. m of personal space. It was not, however, possible to estimate the length and frequency of the periods during which the applicant had shared a cell with another detainee. According to the table, during the relevant period there had been fifteen days when there were eight to ten detainees in the wing, three when there were eleven detainees in the wing, and at least sixty-three days where there were between twelve and twenty detainees. The remaining sixty-five days were unaccounted for. 15.  There were shared toilets and showers in the wing. There were two toilets, two showers, three washbasins and three mirrors. The detainees were provided with toilet paper and hygiene products (soap, sanitary towels and toothpaste) on a daily basis. There was a central air-conditioning system, which provided either heat or cold air. During the period of the applicant\u2019s detention, the air conditioning was permanently switched on, with the exception of three days in March 2012 when it was under maintenance. Furthermore, each cell had a ventilation system which also operated around the clock. All cells had glass block windows measuring 0.62 m by 0.95 m, which were properly insulated against draughts. The cells had lamps which provided artificial light. 16.  Female detainees were allowed to move freely in the open courtyard, which measured approximately 172 sq. m, for four hours per day between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. 17.  On 9 March 2012 and 4 May 2012 S.E. sent letters on behalf of the applicant to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (\u201cthe Ombudsman\u201d) complaining, inter alia, about the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention. By a letter dated 20 August 2012 the Ombudsman replied that she had carried out a visit to Limassol Police Station and had submitted a report to the competent authorities with her observations and recommendations. She assured the applicant that her office would continue to closely observe the conditions of detention in that station. 18.  On 10 April 2012 S.E. sent a letter on behalf of the applicant to the Independent Authority for Investigation of Allegations and Complaints against the Police (\u201cIAIACAP\u201d) complaining about the conditions of her detention and disputing the lawfulness of her arrest and detention. By a letter dated 6 July 2012 the IAIACAP informed the applicant that, following a preliminary investigation into her complaint, there was no basis for any further steps to be taken. In the actual report by the investigator dated 25 June 2012, in so far as the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention were concerned, it was stated that the heating at the station had been functioning in March 2012, apart from three days when the system had been under maintenance, and that blankets had been provided. 19.  In the meantime, S.E. sent a letter dated 4 April 2012 to the President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus informing him of the problems and violations of rights that the applicant had suffered during her detention. The President of the Supreme Court informed the applicant by a letter dated 5 April 2012 that this matter did not fall within his competence. 20.  On 8 June 2012 Mr L. Loucaides, a lawyer who had been hired by S.E., sent a letter of complaint to the General Director of the Ministry of Interior about the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention and the detention itself. As no response was received Mr L. Loucaides sent a follow-up letter on 9 January 2013. This also remained unanswered. 21.  On 6 December 2012 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) released its report on its visit to Cyprus from 12 to 19 May 2008. 22.  The relevant extracts of the report concerning Limassol Police Station read as follows:\n\u201c5. Conditions of detention 55. However, the delegation observed that some cells at Limassol Police Station had no windows, and, as a result, no access to natural light or ventilation. The CPT recommends that these deficiencies be remedied without delay.\n... 56. Once again, the delegation heard consistent complaints about the provision of food, especially as regards quantity, but also as regards quality. Persons remanded in police custody were not provided with food in the evening for the first eight days at Larnaca Central Police Station. For the first 15 days of custody at Pafos and Limassol Police Stations, only cold food was provided, once a day. The CPT recommends that all persons held on police premises are provided with appropriate food at regular intervals (including at least one full meal every day). 57. The CPT has reiterated in the report on each visit to Cyprus that all persons detained longer than 24 hours must be offered the opportunity of one hour of outdoor exercise every day. However, in 2008, outdoor exercise was provided only at Police Prison (Block 10) and Larnaca and Paralimni Police Stations. At Aradippou and Limassol Police Stations, detained persons were offered, at best, access for several hours to a courtyard covered by corrugated plastic sheeting. Thus, outdoor exercise was still not provided at most police establishments, including those which held primarily or exclusively long-term immigration detainees, such as the former Famagusta detention facility in Larnaca and Lakatamia Police Stations.\n...\nThe CPT calls upon the Cypriot authorities to ensure that all persons detained in police stations for longer than 24 hours are offered one hour of daily outdoor exercise. 58. Subject to remedying the shortcomings identified above, the existing police detention facilities visited in Cyprus were suitable for accommodating detained persons for short periods of time, i.e. for a few days. However, as the CPT has stressed in the past, police detention facilities will generally remain inappropriate for holding persons for prolonged periods. Indeed, none of the police establishments visited offered the material conditions or the opportunities for activities that persons detained for prolonged periods are entitled to expect. ...\nAt the end-of-visit talks with the Cypriot authorities, the visiting delegation made an immediate observation pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 5, of the European Convention for the prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, requesting that the Cypriot authorities take immediate steps to improve the conditions of detention of persons held in police custody for prolonged periods. The delegation requested to be informed, within three months, of action taken in response to the immediate observation. 59. By letter of 8 September 2008, the Cypriot authorities informed the CPT that remand police custody rarely lasts longer than 16 days, and that, as regards immigration detention, pursuant to a recent decision of the Minister of Interior, he personally examines, on a case-by-case basis, the files of non-EU nationals detained for longer than six months. Where there is no prospect of deportation and the individual has not committed any criminal act, he or she is set free and issued with a 12-month temporary residence/employment permit, after which the case is re-examined. The Cypriot authorities also informed the CPT that a new establishment for the detention of up to 300 aliens was planned for 2012.\n... 61. The CPT remains concerned by the persistence of the Cypriot authorities in using unsuitable premises for persons detained pursuant to the aliens legislation, and for prolonged periods.\nIt is certainly positive that the Cypriot authorities state that they intend not to keep aliens in detention for longer than 6 months. However, the fact remains that holding such persons in police stations for months on end is not acceptable. A solution to this problem cannot await the opening of the new aliens centre planned for 2012. The CPT has already described, in its previous report, the standards that accommodation provided to persons detained for prolonged periods under aliens an asylum legislation should meet.\nThe CPT once again recommends that the Cypriot authorities urgently review the conditions in the existing centres designed to hold persons deprived of their liberty under aliens/asylum legislation, in the light of the aforementioned standards, and that they ensure that any additional centres they establish comply with those standards.\n...\u201d 23.  On 31 July 2012 the Ombudsman released a report on the conditions of detention and the treatment of detainees at Limassol Police Station following a visit carried out on 23 May 2012 by her office. In the report the Ombudsman observed, in so far as relevant to the present case, the following. 24.  The station was overcrowded: it could house a maximum of thirty-seven men and ten women but on the day of the visit there had been forty-two men male detainees and nineteen women. It had thus substantially exceeded its capacity. 25.  The facilities were old and totally unsuitable for long-term detention and did not provide dignified conditions of detention. Taking into account the CPT\u2019s recommendations, none of the cells were of an adequate size. The hygiene and sanitation facilities, as well as nutrition, were inadequate and although the cell temperature was satisfactory there was no natural light or proper ventilation, contrary to both CPT and United Nations standards (referring to CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2010 and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957)). The cells had no windows but just glass blocks which did not allow natural ventilation and light. 26.  Furthermore, the Ombudsman observed that although the station\u2019s director had informed her that the detainees had access to hygiene products (for example, toilet paper, soap and shampoo), he had also informed her that in 2012 the budget for these products had been reduced from 3,000 euros (EUR) to EUR 400. This drastic cutback was not in line with the relevant CPT standards and the sum allocated was not enough to cover the needs of all the detainees. 27.  Although she had been informed that sheets were sent to the laundry once a week, there had been complaints by detainees that there were not enough sheets to go round and that they were often dirty. Similarly, complaints had been made to her about the cleanliness of mattresses, many of which were placed on the floor because of overcrowding. 28.  The centre had an internal courtyard with natural light and ventilation which female detainees could use from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. In the Ombudsman\u2019s view this was satisfactory as it secured, in line with CPT standards, the detainees\u2019 right to least one hour\u2019s daily exercise. 29.  The Ombudsman concluded that the infrastructure of the facilities had serious shortcomings and inadequacies and was not compatible with the fundamental principles for the treatment of prisoners and international standards for detention and imprisonment. In particular, in addition to overcrowding, the shortcomings that existed as to natural ventilation, minimum/basic hygiene conditions and the failure to separate pre-trial detainees from immigration detainees, rendered the centre completely unsuitable for detention, especially for a period exceeding six months. 30.  The Ombudsman made recommendations which included the immediate adoption of measures to add a window to each cell, to end overcrowding and the practice of detainees sleeping on mattresses on the floor, to provide personal hygiene products to detainees at any time and to review the budget that was allocated for this purpose.", "references": ["3", "4", "5", "2", "0", "9", "7", "6", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1975 respectively and are currently detained in Sevan Prison. They are brothers and used to live in and run their business activities from the town of Gavar before their conviction and imprisonment. 5.  On 5 November 2009 a resident of Gavar, H.H., reported to the police that at around 6.20 p.m. his car had been shot at by someone travelling inside a black sports utility vehicle (SUV) on a street in Gavar, as a result of which his son H. and his friend (who had been with him in the car) had received gunshot injuries and had been taken to hospital. 6.  On the same date the Gavar investigative department instituted criminal proceedings for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearms. 7.  In the course of the investigation, a number of people were questioned, including eyewitnesses and police officers. It was determined that at around 1 p.m. on 5 November 2009 the applicants and their friend H.P. had beaten up V.M., the son-in-law of H.H. Later that day the shooting in the street had taken place. The applicants had subsequently gone missing, and H.P. had left the country. 8.  During his interview H.H., who had been given the status of victim in the proceedings, stated, inter alia, that his car had been shot at by someone travelling inside a black SUV. He had seen the first applicant in the vehicle. As the car had driven away, he had recognised it as the second applicant\u2019s car. 9.  A.S., a person close to the applicants\u2019 family and employed by them in one of their businesses, stated in his interview that on the day of the events in question he had met the applicants and H.P. shortly after the shooting and had understood from their conversation that they had shot at H.H.\u2019s car. 10.  S.G., the applicants\u2019 relative, stated during his interview that on the day of the events in question the second applicant had called him to enquire about the incident. In particular, he had tried to find out who had been inside H.H.\u2019s car and what exactly had happened to them. He had later been informed by his son that the people gathered at the scene of the incident had told him that the applicants had shot at H.H.\u2019s car. He had then talked to the second applicant and tried to obtain more specific information from him. He had not denied anything, so it had become clear to him that it had been the applicants who had committed the offence. 11.  M.M., a friend of the mayor of Gavar who was the applicants\u2019 relative, stated in his interview that he had lent his car to the mayor (who had allegedly then helped the applicants to leave town). He had later heard from the people gathered in the street that the applicants had shot at H.H.\u2019s car and fled. He had found his car the next morning entirely covered in mud. 12.  At some point S.K., the first applicant\u2019s friend, was questioned. He stated, inter alia, that in November 2009 the first applicant had called him to ask if he would put up some guests in his empty apartment in Yerevan for a couple of days. On the same day he had met the first applicant and given him the key to the apartment. The next day he had gone to the apartment, where he had found the first applicant and two other men whom he did not know. Several days later he had decided to visit the first applicant and his guests once again, but they had already left. He submitted that he did not know exactly why the first applicant and his guests had been visiting Yerevan and staying in his apartment. 13.  On 10 November 2009 a new set of proceedings was instituted for hooliganism. The applicants and H.P. were charged with aggravated hooliganism and a warrant was issued for their arrest. 14.  On 9 December 2009 H.P. was arrested. He was also charged with illegally crossing the State border. 15.  It appears that H.P. admitted to the charges. During his interview he stated, inter alia, that after the incident with V.M. on 5 November 2009, the applicants had given him various types of firearms, which he had put in the second applicant\u2019s SUV. While driving together with the applicants, they had noticed H.H.\u2019s car in the street, which had turned in their direction and started to follow them. They had then seen that H.H. was armed. The first applicant had screamed to open fire, which H.P. had done from the back seat, where he had been sitting. The applicants had then also fired their guns. The shooting had lasted for about twenty seconds, after which the second applicant had driven towards the centre of Gavar. Several seconds later they had heard shooting behind them. 16.  On 9 April 2010 the proceedings in respect of H.P. were severed from the main proceedings. On 11 May 2010 the Gegharkunik Regional Court convicted H.P. as charged, and he received a custodial sentence. 17.  On 5 May 2010 the proceedings were stayed on the grounds that the identity of the perpetrator of the attempted murder was unknown and, as regards the incident of hooliganism, the accused had absconded. 18.  On 15 June 2010 the applicants gave themselves up to the police and the main proceedings were resumed. During their interviews that day, the applicants refused to answer most questions and pleaded not guilty. 19.  During their interviews on 18 June and 21 June 2010 respectively the applicants pleaded not guilty and denied participating in the crimes they were being questioned about. 20.  On 3 September 2010 the proceedings for hooliganism were severed from the main proceedings and sent to court. 21.  On 7 September 2010 the main proceedings for attempted murder were once again stayed on the grounds that the identity of the perpetrator was unknown. 22.  By a judgment of 26 October 2010 the Regional Court found the applicants guilty of hooliganism. They received custodial sentences and were released. 23.  On 4 March 2011 the proceedings were resumed and the case was assigned to the Special Investigative Service. 24.  On 14 March 2011 the applicants were detained and charged with the attempted murder of two or more persons committed by a group and illegal possession of firearms. The applicants\u2019 rights were explained to them and they exercised their right to be represented by a lawyer. 25.  On 16 March 2011 H.P. was charged with the same offences as the applicants. 26.  On 18 April and 3 May 2011 respectively the applicants were interviewed, but they refused to answer any questions. 27.  According to the Government, on 18 May 2011 a face-to-face confrontation was held between the first applicant and H.H., who maintained his previous statements. During the confrontation, the first applicant maintained his innocence and exercised his right to pose questions to H.H., who gave self-incriminating answers. On the same day a confrontation was held between the second applicant and H.H., who again maintained his previous statements. However, the second applicant refused to answer H.H.\u2019s questions and did not ask him any questions. 28.  On 19 May 2011 the applicants were again questioned in respect of the alleged attempted murder, but they refused to answer questions and maintained their innocence. 29.  According to the Government, at the end of the investigation the applicants and their representative acquainted themselves with the material in the criminal case file. On 16 June 2011 the applicants\u2019 representative lodged a request with the investigator, asking, inter alia, that a confrontation be held between the applicants, A.S. and H.P. This request was refused by the investigator as ill-founded. In particular, the investigator stated that the confrontations requested by the applicants could not be conducted at that stage of the proceedings because (a) a warrant had been issued for A.S.\u2019s arrest and his whereabouts remained unknown, and (b) H.P., exercising his rights as an accused, had refused to take part in a confrontation with the applicants. 30.  On 22 June 2011 the criminal case was sent to the Regional Court for trial. 31.  On an unspecified date H.P. was examined before the Regional Court, but he mainly contradicted his pre-trial statements. 32.  On 13 July 2011 H.H. wrote to the Regional Court to ask that his pre-trial statements be taken into account since he was in another city for health reasons and did not wish to attend the trial as the events had made him suffer psychologically. 33.  In the course of the trial, the Regional Court attempted to secure the attendance of H.H. and H., as well as the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. 34.  In particular, on 20 July 2011 the Regional Court issued decisions requiring H.H. to appear in court. In reply to those, on 28 July 2011 the Gavar police informed the Regional Court that H.H. was not in the city. According to the relevant police records, H.H.\u2019s wife had told the police that H.H. and H. were in the Nagorno Karabakh Republic for health reasons and had mentioned an address in Yerevan, indicating that H.H. and H. had been living there. However, on 28 July 2011 the Yerevan police informed the Regional Court that H.H. was not at the above-mentioned address. The owner of the apartment had told them that H.H. and H. had rented it for about eight months. However, they had left and she had no information about their whereabouts. 35.  On 4 August 2011 the Regional Court issued new decisions requiring the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. to appear in court. On 10 August 2011 the Gavar police informed the Regional Court that A.S., M.M., S.G. were not in the city and that they had no information about their place of residence. In particular, it appeared that A.S., M.M. and S.G. had left the country. On the same day, the Yerevan police informed the Regional Court that S.K. was absent from his place of permanent residence, as he had apparently been working in another city. 36.  On 17 August 2011 the Regional Court again issued decisions requiring H.H., M.M., S.G. and S.K, among others, to appear in court. On 24 August 2011 the Gavar police addressed a similar reply regarding the whereabouts of H.H., M.M. and S.G. Specifically, M.M. was apparently in Russia and S.G. had left for Egypt. Meanwhile, by means of a telegram addressed to the Regional Court on 9 August 2011, S.K. asked the court to take into account his pre-trial statements. On 26 August 2011 the Yerevan police informed the court that he was not in Yerevan. 37.  On 24 August 2011 the applicants asked the Regional Court to disregard the pre-trial witness statements of A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. but not to exclude them from the list of the witnesses to be heard at trial. 38.  On 14 September 2011 the Regional Court again decided to order H.H. to appear in court. On 22 September 2011 the Gavar police informed the court that daily visits by the police officers to H.H.\u2019s place of residence had not yielded any results and that he had apparently not been seen there for about a year. 39.  On 23 February 2012 the Regional Court convicted the applicants and H.P. as charged and sentenced them to thirteen years\u2019 and twelve years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. In doing so, the Regional Court referred, among other items of evidence, to the pre-trial statements of H.H. and the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K., all of whom had failed to attend the applicants\u2019 trial. The Regional Court also referred, inter alia, to the testimony of more than twenty witnesses obtained during the pre-trial and trial stages; the records of confrontations conducted as part of the investigation; a forensic medical examination report; a complex ballistic and fingerprint examination report; a complex ballistic and forensic chemical examination report; the record of an investigatory experiment; records of an operative-investigative measure; a vehicle inspection report concerning H.H.\u2019s and the second applicant\u2019s cars; a crime scene inspection report; a number plate recognition report concerning the second applicant\u2019s car; transcripts of calls to and from several telephone numbers; and a complex forensic fibre examination report. 40.  The applicants lodged appeals, complaining, inter alia, that the pre-trial statements of H.H. and the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. had been admitted in evidence against them even though they had failed to attend the proceedings. 41.  On 20 July 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment in full. 42.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those raised in their previous appeals. 43.  On 7 September 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["8", "2", "0", "9", "6", "4", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  The applicant was a journalist and an active member of the Popular Front Party, which is one of the opposition parties. At the time of the events he wrote for the newspaper Azadliq and participated in various media projects. In particular, he was the presenter of a satellite TV show \u201cAzerbaijani Hour\u201d which was critical of the government. In 2016 the applicant was awarded that year\u2019s \u201cFree Media Awards\u201d by the Fritt Ord Foundation and ZEIT-Stiftung for independent journalism in Eastern Europe. 7.  At around noon on 29 August 2014, when the applicant was on his way to work, a certain M.H. approached him near a bus stop, asking him why he had not replied to his messages sent via Facebook. The applicant, who did not know M.H., answered that he had not replied to him because he had probably not seen his messages. According to the applicant, immediately after that answer, M.H. physically assaulted him by punching him in the face. At that moment the applicant began defending himself and hit M.H. with a glass water bottle that he had just bought from the market. The applicant then left the scene of the incident and asked for help. At that moment he saw a police car and immediately asked the police officers for help. 8.  At around 12.30 p.m. on the same day the applicant and M.H. were taken to the Absheron District Police Office. 9.  At 2.40 p.m. on the same day an investigator issued a record of the applicant\u2019s detention as a suspect. The applicant was suspected of having committed the criminal offence of hooliganism under Article 221.3 of the Criminal Code. 10.  On 30 August 2014 the applicant was charged under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. In particular, he was accused of having caused minor bodily harm to M.H. by hitting the latter on the head with a glass water bottle and also punching and kicking him in the face. 11.  On the same day the Absheron District Court, relying on the official charge brought against the applicant and a request by the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of two months, calculating the period of detention from 29 August 2014. The court justified the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody by referring to the risk of the applicant reoffending and obstructing the investigation\u2019s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201c... having examined the preliminary material of the case file (witness statements and forensic expert reports), the court considers that there are sufficient grounds to believe that there is a likelihood that the accused Haziyev Seymur Mashgul oglu will obstruct the investigation\u2019s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings and reoffend.\u201d 12.  On 1 September 2014 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial, and that his pre-trial detention amounted to a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. In this respect, he submitted that there was no evidence in the case file proving the existence of any risk of his reoffending or obstructing the investigation\u2019s functioning. He also argued that he could not in any way obstruct the investigation\u2019s functioning, as all the protagonists involved in the incident had already been identified and examined by the forensic expert. He further pointed out that he was a journalist and had always collaborated with the law-enforcement authorities. The applicant also challenged the charge against him, claiming that he had only defended himself against the physical assault by M.H., whom he had not known before the incident. 13.  On 12 September 2014 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court\u2019s decision was justified. In particular, the appellate court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint relating to the legal classification of his action as hooliganism, but remained silent as to his above-mentioned specific complaints concerning the lack of justification for his pre-trial detention. 14.  On 30 September 2014 the applicant lodged an application with the Absheron District Court, asking to be released on bail or put under house arrest rather than being held in pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his pre-trial detention was not justified and that there was no reason for it to continue. In support of his application, he pointed out that he had a permanent place of residence, that he had no criminal record, and that there was no proof that he could obstruct the investigation and reoffend. 15.  On 2 October 2014 the Absheron District Court dismissed the application, finding it unfounded. 16.  On 13 October 2014 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 17.  On 27 October 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case filed the bill of indictment with the Absheron District Court for trial. 18.  On 11 November 2014 the applicant lodged an application with the Absheron District Court, asking to be placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention. He also complained that despite the fact that his pre-trial detention period had expired on 29 October 2014, he had not been released from detention. 19.  On 11 November 2014 the Absheron District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, finding that his detention was lawful. The first-instance court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal. 20.  On 20 November 2014 the Absheron District Court held a preliminary hearing in which it decided, inter alia, that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged, without citing any grounds. The first-instance court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal. 21.  On 29 January 2015 the Absheron District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 221.3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 22.  On 29 September 2015 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. It was further upheld on 15 April 2016 by the Supreme Court.", "references": ["6", "5", "3", "1", "9", "0", "8", "7", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Katowice. 6.  The applicant is a former activist of an anti-communist opposition group, who was interned in 1982. 7.  He observed the trial against three high-ranking members of the communist-era Military Council of National Salvation who had ordered the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. 8.  The trial in question, which lasted from 2007 until 2015, attracted a lot of public attention in Poland. 9.  On 12 January 2012 the main defendant, General C.K. was convicted and sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment. This penalty was reduced by half under the Amnesty Act and its execution was suspended for five years in view of the defendant\u2019s old age and poor health. Another defendant was acquitted and another had her case discontinued. On 15 June 2015 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 10.  The applicant was in the courtroom when on 12 January 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) was to deliver its judgment in the case described above. 11.  At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge\u2019s table and shouted: \u201cThis is a mockery of justice!\u201d (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwo\u015bci). 12.  The judges left the courtroom. 13.  Some other members of the audience shouted \u201cDisgrace!\u201d and \u201cCourt before the court!\u201d (Ha\u0144ba and S\u0105d pod s\u0105d). They were all holding up photos of victims of the communist regime. 14.  The applicant was forcibly removed from the courtroom. 15.  Shortly afterwards, he returned and continued shouting out similar statements joint by other members of the audience. In view of the audience\u2019s refusal to leave the courtroom, the judge who was presiding over the trial decided to announce the judgment from a different room. 16.  At 3 p.m. the trial was resumed in a new room, with the public comprising only journalists. Here, in the applicant\u2019s absence, the Warsaw Regional Court imposed on him a disciplinary custodial penalty of fourteen days for contempt of court (\u201cfor the breach of the solemn nature, serenity and the course of court proceedings, to the degree making the announcement of the judgment impossible\u201d). 17.  On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect. 18.  The applicant submitted that he had not been served with that decision or informed of it. 19.  On the day of the trial in question, that is 12 January 2012, a warrant was issued ordering the applicant\u2019s placement in a penal facility with a view to his serving the penalty. On 13 January 2012 a warrant to this effect was sent to Katowice police station together with a copy of the court\u2019s decision imposing the disciplinary punishment. 20.  On 19 January 2012 the applicant was served with a warrant and then arrested so that he could be committed to Warsaw Remand Centre to serve the penalty in a closed regime. 21.  On 22 January 2012 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the decision imposing the custodial penalty. He argued that his one-minute statement had not disturbed the court to such an extent as to make it impossible to announce the judgment. He also submitted that if the presiding judge had told him to return to his seat, he would have complied. Since only a copy of the first page of the applicant\u2019s appeal has been submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the applicant had also raised the argument of the lack of impartiality of the judges who had punished him for contempt of court. 22.  On 30 January 2012 this appeal was registered with the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny). 23.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant\u2019s appeal was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court for comment. 24.  On 1 February 2012 the appeal together with the Regional Court\u2019s comments was received by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The appellate hearing was scheduled for 23 February 2012. 25.  On 2 February 2012 \u2013 the fourteenth day of the applicant\u2019s detention \u2013 the Prison Board of the Warsaw Remand Centre decided that the applicant should be detained under a semi-open regime (with the possibility to leave his cell during the day). 26.  Following that decision, the applicant was transferred for several hours to a remand centre with a semi-open regime. 27.  He was released later that day. 28.  On an unspecified date, the appellate hearing was rescheduled because of the judge\u2019s illness for 22 March 2012. 29.  On 22 March 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s interlocutory appeal, finding that the applicant\u2019s disrespectful behaviour had interfered with the solemn nature of court proceedings and with the court\u2019s dignity, and had disrupted the proceedings. His action had provoked the audience to shout similar slogans. It had been premeditated as the applicant had known that the announcement of the judgment had been scheduled for live media broadcast. The court also considered that the applicant\u2019s behaviour could not be explained by an emotional disagreement with the court\u2019s ruling because at the time of the incident the applicant had been unaware of the outcome of the trial. The applicant had wished to disturb the order of the proceedings irrespective of their result. In the domestic court\u2019s view, imposing a more lenient penalty would have sanctioned unaccountability and would have lacked a deterrent effect.", "references": ["8", "9", "0", "7", "1", "4", "2", "5", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 5.  He had been employed by the National Security Service, at the Regional Office of Blagoevgrad, as an agent since 1998. On account of the nature of his duties, he had held a security clearance permitting him access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant\u2019s job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to him holding his post. 6.  On 20 November 2013, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision to revoke the applicant\u2019s security clearance allowing access to classified information. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of that revocation, apart from a reference to section 59, in relation with section 40 \u00a7 1 f) and h); section 41 c) and d), and section 42 a) and b) of the Classified Information Protection Act (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below). 7.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the revocation with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 9 January 2014, upheld the revocation. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 8.  On 6 March 2014, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of his employment was the revocation of his security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable precondition for him to be able to perform his duties. 9.  The applicant challenged his dismissal at two levels of jurisdiction. He contested the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that he was not able to challenge, in the course of the procedure before the State Commission for Information Security, the facts on which the revocation of the security clearance permit was based. The Director of the National Security Service abused his powers in dismissing the applicant, who was not allowed an opportunity to defend himself. 10.  By its judgment of 19 March 2015, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims, reasoning that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke the applicant\u2019s security clearance was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant\u2019s dismissal inevitable because he was no longer able to perform his duties. The court added that the applicant had exhausted the remedy provided by law by challenging the revocation decision, and that the latter had become final; in addition, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any questions related to its lawfulness. 11.  On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant\u2019s security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "5", "7", "4", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "3.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4.  The applicants sued different State and municipal unitary companies (the debtor companies) in several unrelated sets of court proceedings. 5.  On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in favour of the applicants to be paid by the debtor companies. In application no. 34145/11 the courts also ordered the debtor company to take certain action in favour of the applicant, as specified in the appended table. 6.  The companies were incorporated as State or municipal unitary enterprises. They provided services specified in the appended table. 7.  On various dates insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of some of the debtor companies. The companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency proceedings started and ended are tabulated below.", "references": ["4", "0", "6", "8", "7", "2", "5", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Mr Eugeniusz Bukowski, the second applicant, Ms Gra\u017cyna Zmys\u0142owska, and the third applicant, Ms Jolanta Barszcz, were born in 1931, in 1960 and 1959 respectively and live in Warsaw. 6.  The property in Warsaw which gives rise to the present application (two adjacent plots of land with a detached house situated on it) was originally co-owned by the applicants\u2019 predecessors, the D. family and the K. family. 7.  The land and the building in question fell under the Decree of 26 October 1945 on Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw by virtue of which the Warsaw Municipality (and after 1950, the State Treasury) became the owner of all plots of land located in Warsaw. Due to subsequent amendments of law, on 6 January 1992 (\u201cthe 1992 decision\u201d) the land in question was transferred ex lege to the Warsaw Municipality. 8.  According to a further donation contract, a sale contract and the rules on inheritance, since 1998 the rights and claims to the land and the building have belonged in 3/6 to the third applicant, in 2/6 to the second applicant and in 1/6 to the first applicant. 9.  On 22 June 1988 the third applicant filed with the Mayor of Warsaw an application for restitution of the right of ownership of the building and the land in question pursuant to the Land Administration and Expropriation Act of 29 April 1985 (Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wyw\u0142aszczaniu nieruchomo\u015bci). On 12 September 1996 the first applicant and on 25 February 1998 the second applicant joined the proceedings. 10.  In a decision of 3 January 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw noted that on 1 January 1998 the new Land Administration Act of 21 August 1997 had entered into force. Pursuant to section 214 of that act restitution of the right of ownership of the land was not possible. The former owners whose property had been taken over by the State and whose claims for restoration had expired were only entitled to apply for perpetual use of the land. Consequently, the Mayor granted the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land and declared that they retained the ownership of the building located thereon. 11.  On 17 January 2005 the applicants applied to have this decision amended and the ownership of the land restored. 12.  On 6 June 2005 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 13.  On 21 November 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a decision, granting the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land. The Mayor decided to return the ownership of the building to the applicants and decided on the annual amount of fees to be paid for the perpetual use of the land. 14.  On 8 December 2005 the applicants appealed against this decision objecting to the amount of fees. 15.  On 5 December 2007 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 (see paragraph 13 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. 16.  On 15 October 2008 the applicants lodged with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity on the part of the Mayor of Warsaw. 17.  By a judgment of 28 January 2009 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court obliged the Mayor of Warsaw to issue a decision within four weeks. 18.  On 18 June 2009 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a new decision, granting the applicants a right of perpetual use of the land and the ownership of the house. It further fixed the amount of annual fees to be paid for the perpetual use of land. 19.  On 30 June 2009 the applicants applied to the Warsaw Self\u2011Government Board of Appeal contesting the amount of fees for the perpetual use of land. 20.  On 5 November 2009 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. 21.  On 27 November 2009 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. On 1 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected their appeal as lodged out of time. However, subsequently, it granted them leave to appeal out of time. 22.  On 26 January 2011 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. 23.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, which was dismissed on 9 August 2012. 24.  On 24 May 2013 the applicants signed a notarial deed by virtue of which they acquired the ownership of the building and a right of perpetual use of the land. 25.  On 6 April 2010 the applicants filed an application to declare the 1992 decision (see paragraph 7 above) null and void. 26.  On 25 February 2011 the Minister of the Interior refused to declare the 1992 decision null and void. 27.  Subsequently, on various dates, the applicants applied to have the case re-examined. Following several remittals on 12 February 2013 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court refused the applicants\u2019 request. 28.  On 14 March 2013 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. However, they have failed to submit any information about the further course of the proceedings. 29.  On 20 June 2013 the applicants applied to the Mayor of Warsaw for transformation of their right of perpetual use of land into the right of ownership under the Act of 25 July 2005 on Transformation of a Right of Perpetual Use into a Right of Ownership. 30.  On 28 August 2013 the Board of the Mokot\u00f3w District (Zarz\u0105d Dzielnicy Mokot\u00f3w) refused to grant the application. The applicants appealed against this decision on 13 September 2013. 31.  On 3 October 2013 and 3 September 2014 the Warsaw Self\u2011Government Board of Appeal and the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court, respectively, upheld the first-instance decision. 32.  On 3 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both decisions. 33.  On 14 April 2016 the Board of the Mokot\u00f3w District issued a decision on the free of charge transformation of the right of perpetual use of the land into the right of ownership.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "7", "5", "1", "8", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are a married couple of Roma origin. They were born in 1986 and live in Hurbanovo. 6.  On 16 June 2012, around 9 a.m., Mr J., a municipal police officer who was off duty that day, took an illegally purchased gun with two full magazines and some extra ammunition and drove in his private car to the town of Hurbanovo, where around a thousand Roma people live. 7.  Around 10 a.m. he stopped in front of the applicants\u2019 family house, entered the property and, without saying a word, started firing bullets at the family members who happened to be in the yard. He stopped shooting when the cartridge of the gun was empty. Three members of the applicants\u2019 family, namely the second applicant\u2019s father, brother, and brother-in-law, were shot dead. The first applicant was seriously injured in the hips and thighs and the second applicant in the liver, lower appendix, stomach, and elbow. 8.  After the shooting, Mr J. returned to the car. On his way, he met two other Roma men, members of the applicants\u2019 family, and threatened to kill them. Then he got into his car and drove away. Eventually, he arrived at the house of the mayor of Hurbanovo, in front of which he was arrested. 9.   Mr J. was charged on 17 June 2012 with premeditated first-degree murder, partly accomplished and partly attempted (zlo\u010din \u00fakladnej vra\u017edy, s\u010dasti dokonan\u00fd a s\u010dasti v \u0161t\u00e1diu pokusu), in connection with the offences of prohibited acquisition and possession of a firearm and forcible entry into a dwelling.\n(a)  Questioning of Mr J. 10.  During his pre-trial questioning on 16 and 17 June and 12 July 2012 Mr J. provided several statements concerning his recollection of the above events, confessed to the charges on all counts, and expressed remorse. 11.  His first statement of 16 June 2012 reads as follows:\n\u201c... I woke up at around 8.30-9.00 a.m. and I don\u2019t know what came into my mind but I told myself that I must do something with those Roma people, it was nothing specific ... I put on my boiler suit and slippers, took a gun \u2013 a pistol which I had in my wardrobe ... this morning I loaded the gun, ... got into my car and went to deal with everything, including the Roma ... Afterwards, I wanted to shoot myself; somehow it weighed heavily [on my mind] ... I went down to Hurbanovo, where I arrived at around 9.20 a.m. ... I went across the city of Hurbanovo and I came to the houses at the end of the city, where Roma live. I slowed down nearby one house [and] looked into the yard, but there was only one girl, so I drove further to another house. ... By the next house ... I saw a gate opened and Roma in the yard, I pulled up, got out of the car and entered the yard ... I had the gun already in my hand as I was getting out of the car ... they were sitting and I started to fire shots at them ... I wanted to kill them. ...\u201d\nThe investigator further asked why Mr J. had entered that particular yard and started shooting. Mr J. answered:\n\u201c... I did not care which yard I entered, if there had been more Roma in that first yard where only one girl had been, I would have entered there and opened fire in that first yard.\u201d 12.  During a second interview on 17 June 2012, Mr J. stated, inter alia, that he was not able to explain the reasons for his actions, that he did not remember most of the events, and that he had wanted to commit suicide shortly after the shooting. He had just fired at some people \u2013 not at a specific person \u2013 and could not remember how many times he had fired. He also declared that he did not know the applicants\u2019 family personally, only by sight, having had dealings with them as a municipal police officer. He had often gone to Hurbanovo to deal with problems of public order and remembered meeting some members of the applicants\u2019 family \u2013 in particular, the late brother of the second applicant, since he had once slapped him because of his aggressive behaviour after he had been caught stealing.\nIn particular, his statement reads as follows:\n\u201cThe investigator: What brought you to the decision to go and shoot at those people?\nMr J.: This I don\u2019t know ... maybe because I have been working as a policeman for twenty years and there were always problems with Roma, but I have never been aggressive towards them.\n...\nInvestigator: Why did you enter that particular yard and start shooting?\nMr J.: Because there were people; if there had been people in the first yard, I would have maybe gone in there.\nThe investigator: Did you care about the nationality, age, ethnicity of those people in the yard?\nMr J.: I did not think about that. ...\u201d 13.  At a third interview conducted on 12 July 2012, Mr J. confirmed his previous statements and further stated:\n\u201c... these thoughts that I had about dealing with the Roma in Hurbanovo \u2013 that is to say to do something with them \u2013 had been crossing my mind. When I was loading the gun with bullets I might have been thinking also about a radical solution, as eventually happened ... I had been thinking about my work, how to resolve the public\u2011order issue in the town. I felt that I had been dealing with this for a long time without any success, that there had been some kind of a failure or ineffectiveness ... I could have been nervous because of all this; I could have been tense and all this resulted in my actions.\u201d\n(b)  Statements of witnesses 14.  On 16 June 2012 several witnesses were interviewed, including the applicants\u2019 relatives. In general, they did not know of any particular racially motivated behaviour on the part of Mr J. against Roma. However, one of the witnesses, Mr D.L., stated that Mr J. was harsher on Roma than on other people. Other witnesses \u2013 including Mr J\u2019s daughters, the mayor of Hurbanovo and Mr J.\u2019s direct supervisor \u2013 stated that he had not shown any anti-Roma sentiment. 15.  The police conducted further interviews on 19 June and 20 June 2012. The witnesses, including colleagues of Mr J., stated that he had not expressed any anti-Roma opinions or comments. 16.  On 3 July 2012 the police interviewed other witnesses; they also again interviewed Mr D.L., who stated that approximately a week or two before the incident Mr J. had had a conflict with his nephew, M. who had been shot dead during the attack. M. had been caught stealing in a scrap yard with two other Roma boys. Mr J. had allegedly tried to kick one of them, slapped M. and told them that they were lucky that it was not him who had caught them.\n(c)  Expert opinion 17.  On 16 July 2012 the investigator requested expert examinations of Mr J. by two experts in psychiatry and one expert in clinical psychology. They drafted a joint expert opinion. 18.  The experts were asked questions, inter alia, about Mr J.\u2019s mental state and possible illness or disorder, his ability to recognise the lawfulness of his actions, his ability to control his own behaviour, a possible motive for his actions from a psychological point of view, his ability to fully comprehend the course of events, and his credibility. 19.  The report concluded that Mr J. did not remember clearly what had happened. However, he was able to credibly reconstruct some events and acknowledge that he had fired at someone. During the examination, he had also mentioned some incidents that he and his colleagues had experienced involving people of Roma origin, his worries, his fear of them, and his despair at his inability to deal with them. In particular, he had also stated:\n\u201cThis family has paid for all of them ...\u201d 20.  The report further concluded that Mr J. had been suffering mounting emotional tension for a long time, which had been released by \u201cthe escalation effect\u201d and had possibly been affected by the alcohol he had consumed the night before. He was suffering from a temporary mental disorder, known as \u201cabnormal short-term reaction failure with the clinical result of the escalation effect\u201d (abnormn\u00e1 skratov\u00e1 reakcia s klinick\u00fdm priebehom vystup\u0148ovan\u00e9ho afektu), which had resulted in his becoming of unsound mind at the critical moment. Therefore, while he had been committing the crime in question he had had a significantly reduced ability to recognise the unlawfulness of his actions and to control them. 21.  Furthermore, the clinical psychologist concluded that Mr J. was not suffering from any mental illness such as psychosis, or from any dependency. Rather, he had been developing a paranoid personality connected to an intense fear of the aggressive behaviour of some \u201cRoma fellow citizens\u201d towards him or people close to him. This had triggered a perceived need to protect himself, born of paranoia. The psychologist considered that Mr J. had:\n\u201c... the paradoxically altruistic motive of [finding] a radical solution to public order issues in the town, in particular towards that part of it which contained the non\u2011adaptable and problematic Roma people. [Mr J.\u2019s] ambition to personally deal with the public order issues in the town, in particular as regards the Roma minority, is evidently overdesigned [predimenzovan\u00e1] [and] is beyond the actual capabilities of one person ... it can be stated that [Mr J.] had been developing burnout syndrome as another of the possible motivating factors.\u201d 22.  In his conclusion, the psychologist found that an important motive determining his behaviour before and during the crime could have been his continual frustration about his own work and the fact that he had been unable to resolve the public-order issues in the town \u2013 in particular, the problems concerning the Roma part of the population. He had been developing burnout syndrome as well. However, the immediate motive for his behaviour at the critical moment was unclear. 23.  On 23 November 2012 the investigator interviewed the psychologist, who further confirmed that Mr J.\u2019s aggression had manifested itself shortly before the attack against the Roma boys who had been caught stealing and that this aggression had been internally intensified by a growing feeling of helplessness and fear of danger from the Roma. Furthermore, the expert noted that Mr J. had believed that he could solve the \u201cRoma question\u201d and that his action was in the interest of society. He also stated that:\n\u201c... the anger, rage and hatred of the accused concerned those from the Roma ethnic minority, who had been repeatedly subject to his interventions ...\u201d 24.  The expert concluded that he could not confirm unequivocally a racial motive.\n(d)  The indictment 25.  On 11 December 2012 the special prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Specialised Criminal Court (\u0160pecializovan\u00fd trestn\u00fd s\u00fad) (hereinafter \u201cthe SCC\u201d), charging Mr J. with (i) premeditated first-degree murder under Article 144 \u00a7 1 and \u00a7 2 (c) of the Criminal Code, with reference to Article 138 (j) of the Criminal Code, partly accomplished and partly attempted (zlo\u010din \u00fakladnej vra\u017edy, s\u010dasti dokonan\u00fd a s\u010dasti v \u0161t\u00e1diu pokusu), and (ii) the offence of carrying a concealed weapon under Article 294 \u00a7 1 and \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, in concurrence with the offence of illegal entry into a dwelling under Article 194 \u00a7 1 and \u00a7 2 (a) of the Criminal Code, with reference to Article 138 (a) of the Criminal Code. 26.  The special prosecutor referred to, inter alia, the testimony of Mr J., of the applicants, and of other witnesses, as well as the expert reports and the statements given by the experts when they had been interviewed, including the psychologist\u2019s statements concerning the earlier violent confrontation between Mr J. and Roma children, and Mr J\u2019s growing feelings of helplessness, his fear of the Roma, and his belief that in acting as he had he had believed that he was solving an issue with the Roma. 27.  As regards the legal classification of the offence of murder, the bill of indictment reads, in the relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cit is necessary to classify ... the action of the accused, as far as it concerns the shooting [and killing] of the five members of the Lakato\u0161 family ... as ... the offence of first-degree murder within the meaning of Article 144 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 (c) of the Criminal Code ... In the present case, there was no accidental behaviour (murdering) caused by the arising of a situation (for example, an argument or ... outburst at the place in question); rather, the murder was premeditated (that is to say a motive had been considered in advance). ... [T]he term \u201cin advance\u201d is not confined to a particular time and ... the motive could have been formed ... over years, months, hours, or several minutes ... In the case of the accused, he had committed himself to the decision to kill ... when he ... decided to drag out a weapon from its hiding place ... and left the house. ... [M]oreover, the experts also identified a longer and continuing internal feeling of dissatisfaction with the state of affairs ... which resulted exactly in the decision to go and shoot with an intention to kill and which had also manifested itself for several moments externally; for example, by the earlier obtaining of an illegal weapon.\u201d\nThe special prosecutor furthermore argued that the intention to kill was obvious from the manner in which the accused had acted. The special prosecutor identified one aggravating factor in the offence under Article 144 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Criminal Code \u2013 namely, that Mr J.\u2019s attack had been directed simultaneously against five persons. The ethnicities of the victims or racial motives were not mentioned and addressed. 28.  Between 25 and 28 March 2013 a public hearing took place, during which Mr J. gave no evidence, stated that he did not deny the charges, and responded affirmatively to the presiding judge\u2019s questions as to whether he understood the facts of the crime, whether his defence rights had been properly granted, whether he comprehended the legal status of the offence, whether he had been informed of the penalties under the law for the criminal offences in question, and whether he had confessed to the crime voluntarily. 29.  The applicants, together with six other members of the family, joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties. Their lawyer claimed compensation for damage on their behalf. 30.  On 26 March 2013 two of the experts testified and referred to the conclusions of their report. To the applicants\u2019 representative\u2019s questions, the expert in psychiatry stated that it was not within their remit to assess the issue of racism. Later, the representative also attempted to question the clinical psychologist regarding Mr J.\u2019s aggression towards Roma. However, since a civil party could raise only issues concerning a claim for damages (see paragraph 53 below), the court did not allow him to ask those questions. In his final remarks, the applicants\u2019 representative expressed doubts about the objectivity and accuracy of the expert opinion, and in relation to the Mr J.\u2019s motive stated that:\n\u201c... the assessment of the motivational foreground is, in my opinion, inadequate. The experts ... underestimated or misjudged the racial motive of the offender\u2019s actions.\u201d\nThe applicants\u2019 representative proposed that a second expert opinion be ordered. This was rejected by the court. The court reasoned that the issue of the accused\u2019s motive for the purposes of the claim for damages was of a legal nature and could thus not be assessed by such experts. 31.  On 27 March 2013 the SCC delivered a simplified version of the judgment. Owing to the fact that Mr J., his lawyer, and the prosecutor had all waived their right to appeal, the judgment contained only a brief description of the criminal act in question and the sentencing part, pursuant to Article 172 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment did not contain any legal reasoning. 32.   The SCC found Mr J. guilty of a serious criminal offence as charged, killing three people and injuring two. The court established that:\n\u201c[The accused] ... after he woke up at around 9 a.m. ... with a view to definitively resolving the problem with the unintegrated [neprisp\u00f4sobiv\u00ed] citizens of Hurbanovo by causing their deaths, took a weapon [and] loaded it with two full magazines; in addition ... he took twelve pieces of single 7.62 x 25 mm ammunition and ... drove himself to the front of the family house ... in Hurbanovo, where at around 10.10 a.m. he left the vehicle, unlawfully entered the yard ... and without a word ... aimed and shot eight times at persons at the yard ...\u201d 33.  Mr J. was sentenced to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was exceptionally reduced owing to Mr J.\u2019s diminished soundness of mind, pursuant to Article 39 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Criminal Code. His gun was forfeited and protective psychological treatment in an institution was ordered for him, together with protective supervision amounting to three years. 34.  The applicants\u2019 claim for damages was referred to the civil courts. 35.  As can be seen from the file, on 19 April 2013 two appeals were lodged. The first appeal was lodged by Ms I.L. She argued, inter alia, that the court had failed to consider the possibility of a racial motive. The second appeal was lodged (through their representative) by all members of the family, including the applicants and Ms I.L. In their appeal, they cited procedural errors, including the lack of any reasoning for the impugned judgment. 36.  On 18 September 2013 the applicants\u2019 appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Najvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed s\u00fad). It concluded that the applicants, as civil parties, did not have the right to challenge the judgment in respect of the guilt of and sentence imposed on Mr J. and that their appeal could only have been directed against the ruling on compensation for damage. However, since the applicants had been referred to civil courts to claim such compensation, and having regard to the fact that those proceedings were ongoing at the material time, the Supreme Court considered their appeal premature in this part. 37.  On 26 June 2013 and 4 March 2014 the applicants, together with other injured parties, sought leave from the Minister of Justice to lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law. Such leave was refused by the Minister of Justice on 17 September 2013 and 3 April 2014, respectively. 38.  On 24 May 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00e1 s\u0165a\u017enos\u0165) against the judgment delivered by the SCC. They alleged a violation of Articles 2, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and the corresponding provisions under the Constitution. In sum, they claimed that the SCC had erroneously concluded that Mr J. had had diminished soundness of mind at the time that the crime had been committed, and that as a consequence the SCC had imposed an inappropriately low sentence, which could not serve to discourage the future occurrence of the behaviour in question. 39.  They furthermore complained of the ineffectiveness of the criminal prosecution owing to the questionable quality of the expert report and the alleged bias of its authors, the court\u2019s refusal to order a second expert opinion, the fact that it had been impossible for their lawyer to ask questions and cross-examine the expert witnesses, the absence of any reasoning in the final judgment, and the lack of any assessment of the racial overtones of the crime. They also alleged a lack of reasoning in the SCC\u2019s judgment and that they had had no opportunity to challenge the conviction in their position as civil parties in the criminal proceedings, apart from the part concerning compensation for damage. 40.  On 27 May 2015 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00fd s\u00fad) dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint. It held that the impugned judgment had been delivered in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. It furthermore held that even if it had found the lack of reasoning incorrect it could not have found any violation of the applicants\u2019 constitutional rights on the basis of that conclusion. The court noted that:\n\u201c... the sole fact that the impugned judgment ... is not reasoned complicates the assessment of its constitutionality. The Constitutional Court can assess other applicants\u2019 complaints only generally on the basis of other documents from the [respective] case file (in particular, the expert opinion and minutes from the main hearing).\u201d 41.  In so far as the applicants complained of the failure of the criminal justice authorities to address the racial motive of the attack, as well as their inability to challenge the conviction and the sentence, the Constitutional Court considered that these complaints were directed against provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the position of an injured party under Slovak criminal law. However, the court observed that the applicants could not challenge the compatibility of the law with the Constitution and the Constitutional Court had no competence to address their grievances. 42.  In addition, the court scrutinised the adequacy of the sentence and summarised that the accused had been diagnosed with diminished soundness of mind at the time of the commission of the crime. This was the conclusion reached by a lawfully obtained expert report, which had also examined the motive of the accused and provided a comprehensive explanation in that regard. The criminal court had had discretion to impose such a reduced sentence, as long as it was done in accordance with the law. As to the applicants\u2019 complaint about the lack of a decision on their claim for damages in the criminal proceedings and the lack of any reasoning given by the court in respect of their claim for damages, the Constitutional Court referred to the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning and rejected this part of the complaint. 43.  On 10 October 2012 the family of the applicants\u2019 late relatives lodged a civil claim for damages with the Kom\u00e1rno District Court (okresn\u00fd s\u00fad). After the SCC referred the applicants to the civil courts with their claim for damages, on 30 May 2013 they requested to be allowed to join the pending proceedings. 44.  By a decision of 22 October 2013, the District Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 request. Following an appeal by the applicants, the Nitra Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd s\u00fad) quashed that decision on 31 January 2014 and allowed the applicants to join the pending proceedings in respect of damages. 45.  On 22 November 2016, at the hearing before the District Court, the applicants withdrew their claims and the court discontinued the proceedings. 46.  On 18 June 2013 the Ministry of Justice awarded the first applicant the sum of 2,358 euros (EUR) and the second applicant EUR 7,545.60, in accordance with Act no. 215/2006 Coll. on compensation for victims of violent crimes. Furthermore, the second applicant received EUR 4,090 in respect of his father\u2019s death. 47.  On 9 March 2015 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed a criminal complaint lodged by the applicants against Mr J., which was based on the suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence by disposing of property in order to defraud creditors (po\u0161kodzovanie verite\u013ea) by transferring the title to his house to his daughter and giving EUR 5,000 to his wife as a gift.", "references": ["9", "2", "6", "7", "1", "4", "3", "5", "No Label", "8", "0"], "gold": ["8", "0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of child molestation and on the same day he was brought before a judge at the Gaziosmanpa\u015fa Juvenile Court, who placed him in detention on remand. 6.  On 3 September 2007 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on his detention. On 18 September 2007 the Beyo\u011flu Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 7.  On 23 October 2007 and 19 November 2007 the Gaziosmanpa\u015fa Magistrates\u2019 Court prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention ex officio. 8.  On 16 December 2007 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Juvenile Assize Court, charging the applicant with child molestation. 9.  On 31 December 2007 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Juvenile Assize Court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file, and decided that it had no jurisdiction ratione loci and that the case should be heard by the Beyo\u011flu Juvenile Assize Court and referred the case file to the latter. 10.  On 24 January 2008 the Beyo\u011flu Juvenile Assize Court declared itself incompetent ratione loci as well and sent the case file to the Court of Cassation to render its decision on the conflict of jurisdiction ratione loci. On the same date the court also ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file. 11.  On 30 January 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on the continuation of his pre-trial detention. On 14 February 2008 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 12.  On 23 June 2008 the Court of Cassation gave its decision authorising Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Juvenile Assize Court over the case. 13.  On 13 August 2008 the trial court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention on the basis of the case file. On 12 September 2008 and 9 October 2008, respectively, the court ex officio examined the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 14.  On 30 October 2008 the court held its first hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 15.  During the hearings held on 21 January 2009, 14 April 2009 and 21 July 2009, at which the applicant was present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. Between the hearings, which were held with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on the basis of the case\u2011file and decided to extend it 16.  On 3 November 2009, at the end of the fifth hearing before the court, the applicant was released pending trial. 17.  According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending.", "references": ["0", "9", "4", "7", "6", "3", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1985, 1988 and 1985, respectively. They live in Serbia. 7.  On 26 and 27 March 2008 a brandy still, a kettle, two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a wheel and 10 litres of motor oil were stolen from the home of L.M. near Subotica. On 27 March 2008 L.M. reported that crime to the police. During the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 L.M. was brutally beaten up. The following items were stolen from his home that night: a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose, a tamburitza (a string instrument popular in Southern Europe), a Cardan joint, 60 euros (EUR) and a small amount of Serbian dinars (RSD). 8.  On 28 March 2008 at about 1 a.m., following a tip-off from L.F., a patrol from Pali\u0107 police station found an abandoned car about 5 km from L.M.\u2019s home. Not far from the car, they found two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose and a tamburitza. They took those items to Pali\u0107 police station. L.F. told the police that his neighbours, J.M. and \u0160.K., had seen four or five Roma men leaving the car. No further steps were taken at that stage since they were not aware that those items had been stolen from L.M. the day before. 9.  On 28 March 2008 at about 2 p.m. the police found L.M. at his home. He was half-conscious. An investigating judge arrived at about 3 p.m. A police detective, at the request of the investigating judge, collected DNA evidence from a water jug on the kitchen table. Soon thereafter, he collected DNA evidence from the car mentioned above. He then went to Pali\u0107 police station to photograph the items found near that car the previous night. 10.  On 31 March 2008 the first applicant made a statement to the police. He stated that on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 the second and third applicants and R.K. had beaten up L.M. and stolen from him a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose, a tamburitza and EUR 60. He also stated that he had stayed in the car because he had refused to participate in the robbery. He added that the car had broken down shortly after that and that they had been obliged to leave it and continue on foot. 11.  On the same day, the police arrested R.K. In the presence of his counsel, V. Juhas \u0110uri\u0107, he denied any involvement in that robbery. 12.  On 2 April 2008 R.K was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he again denied any involvement in the crime in question. 13.  On 3 April 2008 the public prosecutor requested that an investigation be opened into the robbery of L.M. against R.K., and against the second and third applicants, whose whereabouts were unknown at that time. 14.  On 4 April 2008 R.K. was taken to the investigating judge again. In the presence of his counsel, he reiterated that he had not taken part in the robbery. This time, however, he incriminated the applicants. He stated that the three applicants in the present case had told him on 29 March 2008 that they had robbed L.M. They allegedly told him also that they had been obliged to abandon their car and some stolen items not far from L.M.\u2019s home because of an accident. His counsel, V. Juhas \u0110uri\u0107, then withdrew from legally representing him owing to a conflict of interest (he intended to defend the second and third applicants if and when they were arrested). 15.  Later that day, the investigating judge opened an investigation into the robbery of L.M. against R.K and against the second and third applicants. 16.  On 7 April 2008 the third applicant was arrested. The next day he was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he denied any involvement and added that R.K. had lied in his statement of 4 April 2008. 17.  On 18 April 2008 a number of witnesses, including the first applicant, were questioned by the investigating judge. The first applicant retracted his statement of 31 March 2008, maintaining that it had been extracted under threats of violence from police officers. He further stated that R.K. had lied in his statement of 4 April 2008. 18.  On 22 April 2008 the public prosecutor requested that the investigation into the robbery of L.M. be extended so as to include also the first applicant. 19.  On 12 May 2008 the second applicant was arrested. On 20 May 2008 he was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he denied the charges. Since he was not fluent in Serbian, he made his statement in Hungarian. 20.  On 20 May 2008 L.M. gave evidence to the investigating judge. He said, inter alia, that on 27 March 2008 he had seen a group of Roma men in front of his home running away with a wheel he owned; one of them had had black hair with blonde highlights, had been short and around 30 years old (it would appear from a subsequent statement of L.M. that this was in fact R.K. \u2013 see paragraph 27 below). 21.  On 26 May 2008 R.K. gave evidence to the investigating judge again. He retracted his statement of 4 April 2008, claiming that he had lied. 22.  On 11 June 2008 the investigating judge extended the investigation into the robbery of L.M. so as to also include the first applicant. 23.  On 8 July 2008 experts established that the DNA evidence collected from the water jug found in L.M.\u2019s kitchen matched the DNA profile of L.M. and that the DNA evidence collected from the car found in the vicinity of L.M.\u2019s home matched the DNA profile of the third applicant. 24.  On 10 July 2008 the public prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicants and R.K. for robbery allegedly committed on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 (count 1) and for burglary allegedly committed on 26 and 27 March 2008 (count 2). 25.  On 5 September 2008 R.K. was transferred to the Special Prison Hospital in Belgrade. On 15 October 2008 he was diagnosed with advanced stomach cancer. One week later he was operated on and put on morphine. In the meantime, the start of the trial had had to be adjourned. 26.  On 28 October 2008, in order to prevent further delays in the case against the other accused, the public prosecutor requested that R.K.\u2019s case be severed and that he be tried separately. She amended the indictment accordingly. 27.  The trial against the applicants started on 17 November 2008. They pleaded not guilty to both charges. The trial court then heard the victim, L.M., who said that on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 four Roma men had attacked him at his home. He could not remember their faces. Having been shown a photo of R.K., L.M. stated that this was most likely the man with blonde highlights who had stolen his wheel on 27 March 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). He added that the tamburitza, the combine-harvester radiator and the portable water hose, which had been found by the police on 28 March 2008 at about 1 a.m., had belonged to him. 28.  On 21 November 2008 the trial court held that R.K. was not able to effectively participate in the criminal proceedings due to his health. It therefore ordered his immediate release. 29.  On 2 December 2008 the first applicant applied to the trial court to present evidence as soon as possible because he had some important information concerning it. However, at the next hearing, held on 23 January 2009, he invoked his right to remain silent. 30.  On 23 January 2009 the trial court heard evidence from seven witnesses. 31.  D.R., the police detective in charge of this case, said that he had collected DNA evidence from a water jug on the kitchen table in L.M\u2019s home and from an abandoned car found not far from there. He had tried to take also fingerprints from the crime scene, but this had been impossible. 32.  U.\u0110. confirmed his earlier statement according to which in March 2008 he had heard two young men on a local bus plotting to steal a violin from the home of a musician that same night. They had spoken Serbian without an accent. One man had got off at Aurometal and the other on Dubrova\u010dka Street in Pali\u0107. The witness decided to follow the latter until an abandoned house in Marka Ore\u0161kovi\u0107a Street in Pali\u0107, which had been occupied by Roma people. He later went to the police and reported the incident. The witness stated at the hearing that he was 50-60% certain that the second applicant had been the one who had got off the bus at Aurometal (the witness had been able to observe him from the bus for about thirty seconds); the third applicant could have been the other one, but the witness was not sure because he had seen him only from behind. 33.  M.P., a police officer, stated that on 14 March 2008, following the tip-off from U.\u0110., he had gone to the house in Marka Ore\u0161kovi\u0107a Street and found the applicants, R.K. and some other Roma people there. On 28 March 2008 at about 1 p.m. he had decided to visit L.M. to inform him that some of the items stolen from him the day before had actually been found. L.M. had been injured, but had managed to tell the witness that three or four Roma men had attacked him during the night and had stolen from him a tamburitza, among other things. The witness had instantly remembered the incident of 14 March 2008 concerning a plot to steal a musical instrument. He had then gone to check the car found not far from there the previous night. He had established that the car had belonged to either the second or third applicant. Lastly, the witness added that all three accused had been known to the police. 34.  O.S., one of the experts who examined the DNA evidence collected from L.M.\u2019s home and from the car found in the vicinity of L.M.\u2019s home, explained his report of 8 July 2008 according to which the material matched the DNA profiles of L.M. and the third applicant (see paragraph 23 above). 35.  P.E. stated that he had helped Officer M.P. to find L.M.\u2019s home the day after L.M. had been beaten up and robbed. 36.  J.M. and \u0160.K. confirmed their earlier statements according to which they had seen four or five Roma men leaving a car beside the road during the night of 27 to 28 March 2008. J.M. and his neighbour, L.F., had then found two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a tamburitza, a combine-harvester radiator and a water hose about 50 m from the car. They had called the police. 37.  On 23 January 2009 the public prosecutor applied to the court to have the statements that R.K. had made to the investigating judge read out at the trial. The defence objected, arguing that R.K. could only be heard as a witness as his case had been severed. The trial court dismissed the application. On 26 January 2009 the defence applied to have two social workers give evidence so as to confirm that the second applicant did not speak Serbian without an accent (unlike the person whom U.\u0110. had heard plotting to steal a violin (see paragraph 32 above)). The trial court also dismissed that application. 38.  On 19 February 2009 R.K. died. 39.  On 30 March 2009 the following additional documents were read out at the trial: the criminal file no. 119/08 concerning the severed case of R.K.; judicial records according to which the first applicant had three prior convictions, the second applicant had no prior convictions, the third applicant had two prior convictions, and, lastly, R.K. had nine prior convictions; and a police report of 14 March 2008 (see, in this regard, the witness statements of U.\u0110. and M.P. in paragraphs 32 and 33 above) stating that the persons seen by U.\u0110. earlier that day had been probably the first and the third applicants (rather than the second and the third applicants, as stated by U.\u0110. on 23 January 2009). The trial court declared inadmissible the statements of the first applicant made before the opening of an investigation against him. In his closing argument, defence counsel argued that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 was not reliable as it had not been made under oath and had been retracted on 26 May 2008. 40.  On the same day, the trial court rendered a judgment. On the basis of the statement of R.K. made on 4 April 2008 and the other evidence set out above, it convicted the applicants of burglary and robbery. The first and third applicants were sentenced to eight and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. In view of the fact that he had no prior convictions, the second applicant was sentenced to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 41.  In their appeal, the applicants argued, inter alia, that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 ought not to have been admitted because they had not been able to test that evidence by means of cross-examination. 42.  On 9 March 2010 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) upheld the judgment of 30 March 2009. It acknowledged that the statement of R.K. made on 4 April 2008 had been the sole evidence against the first applicant and that the only corroborative evidence against the second and third applicants had been the statement of U.\u0110. made at the trial on 23 January 2009 and the DNA evidence belonging to the third applicant found in a car abandoned in the vicinity of the crime scene. The court held that its admission was still lawful. It relied, in this regard, on Article 337 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the fact that R.K. had made the statement in question in the presence of his counsel, V. Juhas \u0110uri\u0107, who had shortly thereafter become counsel for the applicants. 43.  In their constitutional appeal, the applicants invoked, inter alia, the right to a fair trial. In this connection, they submitted that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 ought not to have been admitted as they had not been able to test that evidence by means of a cross-examination. They added that it was irrelevant that V. Juhas \u0110uri\u0107, their then counsel, had been present when R.K. had made the impugned statement because he had become their counsel only after that date. In their opinion, it had been crucial that they had not been able to examine or have examined R.K. either on 4 April 2008 or later. They relied in this connection on Luc\u00e0 v. Italy (no. 33354/96, ECHR 2001\u2011II). 44.  On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the case. It relied, like the second-instance court, on the relevant domestic provision in accordance with which statements made by co-accused to an investigating judge could be admitted as evidence if they had died in the meantime. It concluded that the applicants\u2019 complaint about the fairness of their trial was, in substance, of a fourth-instance nature and therefore inadmissible. 45.  The applicants have served their prison sentences.", "references": ["6", "9", "8", "4", "5", "0", "2", "1", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1963, 1960 and 1959 respectively. The first applicant lives in Balzan, the second applicant in Naxxar and the third applicant in Sliema. 6.  The applicants are owners of apartment no. 3 situated at 94, Melita Street, Valletta. This apartment was inherited by the applicants from their father, who died in September 2006. 7.  Initially, the apartment belonged to the applicants\u2019 late father and his brothers. On 4 August 1981, the late father of the applicants and his brothers entered into a contract granting a temporary emphyteusis for seventeen years to couple S. The seventeen year temporary emphyteusis was to commence on 12 August 1981 and the ground rent to be paid was set at 120 Maltese liri (MTL) (around 280 euros (EUR)) annually. 8.  In 1988, one of the co\u2011owners had taken legal action to collect arrears of ground rent for eleven years and to evict couple S. By a judgment of the Court of Appeal (civil jurisdiction) of 27 May 1992, couple S. was ordered to pay the arrears; however, the court did not order their eviction. 9.  According to the applicants, in 1992, their late father had entered into negotiations with couple S., in order to reach a new lease agreement and increase the rent. Couple S. did not accept the terms of the new lease and did not pay outstanding arrears. 10.  On 17 October 1994, a deed of partition was signed by the siblings and the apartment in question was assigned in its entirety to the late father of the applicants. 11.  On 11 August 1998 the temporary emphyteusis came to an end. Nevertheless, couple S. continued to occupy the apartment by title of lease since the law (Article 12(2)(b)(i) of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance as amended by Act XXII of 1979 \u2013 see Relevant domestic law below) provided for the conversion of a temporary emphyteusis into a lease, irrespective of the owners\u2019 consent. As a result, couple S. could in practice reside indefinitely in the applicants\u2019 premises. 12.  The rent established at the time, calculated in accordance with the law, was MTL 170.70 (around EUR 397.62) annually and was to be revised every fifteen years (according to Articles 12 and 13 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance). The next revision of the rent was scheduled for 2013 and the rent then would be EUR 568.06. 13.  Neither the applicants, nor their late father ever accepted any rent paid by couple S. on the following grounds: the rent due as calculated according to the law was far less than the rental market value of the apartment; the law in question (Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance) was in breach of their rights as stipulated in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; the conditions imposed by Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance were disproportionate and did not pursue a legitimate aim; the owners were being denied enjoyment of their own property; and structural changes had been made to the premises without the applicants\u2019 late father\u2019s permission (or of any of his brothers). 14.  According to a report of an ex-parte architect drawn up on 25 January 2011, the market value of the apartment at the time was that of EUR 125,000.\nConstitutional Redress Proceedings\n(a)  First-instance 15.  On 18 October 2012, the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. They alleged that their predecessors had no alternative but to enter into a contract of temporary emphyteusis in order to prevent the apartment from being requisitioned, and once that contract of temporary emphyteusis had been converted into an indefinite lease, by imposition of the law and against their will, the applicants had lost the property for an indefinite period and had no means of recovering it. The applicants argued that had the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance not been amended by Act XXII of 1979, the temporary emphyteusis on their apartment would have simply come to an end and they would have recovered their property. However, due to the change in law (brought about by Act XXII of 1979), couple S. had remained therein rendering it impossible for the applicants to regain possession of their apartment. Furthermore the rent due to them, as established by the law, failed to strike a fair balance between the rights of the owners and the rights of couple S. They also argued that they needed the apartment for their own use. The applicants requested that the court provide them with the necessary compensation for the damage they had suffered. 16.  On 29 January 2014, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, found against the applicants, dismissed their claims and ordered them to pay the expenses of the proceedings. 17.  Relying on Zammit v. Malta (no. 16766/90, Commission decision of 12 January 1991, Decision and Reports 68) the court held that state intervention in socio economic matters such as housing is often necessary in securing social justice and public benefit. In this area the margin of appreciation available to a legislature in implementing social and economic policies was necessarily a wide one, both with regard to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting a measure of control and as to the choice of the rules for the implementation of such a measure. Recognizing that a balance between the right of owners, the state, and the person occupying the apartment needed to be struck, and that according to the European Court of Human Rights such balance had not been struck in the case of Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, 15 September 2009 in connection with the laws pertinent to this case), the court noted that neither the Convention nor the Constitution established an absolute right of property. 18.  The court held that Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance did not deprive the applicants of their property, but it impacted the ability of the applicants to use the apartment. Furthermore, the rent payable to the applicants did not reflect the value of the property in question \u2011 the court\u2011appointed expert had established that the rental value of the apartment in 2014 was EUR 3,000 annually, and that the rental value of the apartment in 1998 had been EUR 2,000 annually. However, in the court\u2019s view the applicants could not validly argue that Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, as amended by Act XXII of 1979, had infringed their rights since the temporary emphyteusis had been entered into in 1981, when the amendments to the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance by Act XXII had already been introduced. At the time, the consequences of the law as amended by Act XXII were clear and foreseeable; nevertheless, the applicants still chose to enter into such an agreement, and did so freely.\n(b)  Appeal 19.  On 31 January 2014, the applicants appealed the above decision. 20.  On 6 February 2015, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the decision of the first\u2011instance court. The Constitutional Court ordered the applicants to pay for the costs of the appeal proceedings.\nIt found that the inflation rate was established by the Principal Government Statistician, as required by Article 13(2) of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance. Having no proof to the contrary, it had to be assumed that the inflation rate established was correct and objective. The calculation of the rent due for the lease (upon conversion of the temporary emphyteusis to a lease), did not only depend on the inflation rate but also on the ground rent that had been payable at the time of the temporary emphyteusis. Thus, the rent was low not as a consequence of the inflation rate, but as a result of the ground rent, established voluntarily by the applicants\u2019 predecessors, which was lower than it should have been at the time. The Constitutional Court considered that the ground rent payable at the time of the temporary emphyteusis for the property at issue should have been EUR 1,476.27 a year (based on the inflation index for 1981 as being 408.16, and in the light of the fact that the inflation index for 1998 was 580.61 \u2011 time when the court expert had estimated the rental value of the apartment for that year at EUR 2,100) and not MTL 120 (around EUR 280) as the parties had agreed. The Constitutional Court observed that when the temporary emphyteusis agreement was entered into, two architects had been present alongside the applicants\u2019 predecessors (then owners of the apartment). Therefore, the applicants could not argue that their predecessors had not known the value of the apartment. 21.  The Constitutional Court therefore concluded that the owners of the apartment (which had now been inherited by the applicants) knew that: i) they were agreeing on a ground rent that was relatively low in amount; ii) when the temporary emphyteusis ended it would be converted into a lease that could be inherited and renewed (because Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance as amended by Act XXII was already in effect at the time the temporary emphyteusis agreement was entered into); and iii) that the value of the rent would be worked out on the basis of the ground rent that was being paid, in proportion to the rise in living standards. In consequence they were aware that the rent would remain relatively low, like the ground rent had been. 22.  The Constitutional Court also found that the applicants\u2019 need for the apartment, namely to place their mother who was herself living in a rented apartment paid for by the applicants (at EUR 400 a month), was not a good reason to have the property back. 23.  Lastly, the Constitutional Court did not deny that the applicants\u2019 predecessors were faced with a possibility that the apartment would be requisitioned, since the apartment was empty (and empty properties could be requisitioned). However, entering into a temporary emphyteusis agreement was not the only choice they had: the applicants\u2019 predecessors could have sold the apartment or rented it for commercial purposes. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court argued that the owners could have requested a higher ground rent. Nevertheless, they didn\u2019t and they had entered the contractual relationship voluntarily fully aware of the consequences that would ensue.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "2", "3", "8", "0", "4", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Palanga. 6.  On 22 November 2013 the director of company M. lodged a complaint with the Klaip\u0117da police, alleging that the applicant\u2019s wife, who had been providing accounting services to company M., had unlawfully transferred large amounts of money from that company\u2019s bank account to other companies. The director claimed that company M. had not obtained any services from those companies and that he had not pre-approved those transfers. 7.  On 25 November 2013 the Klaip\u0117da police opened a pre-trial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and falsification of documents, under Article 184 \u00a7 1 and Article 300 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The director of company M. was questioned as a witness and stated that in May 2012 he had entered into a contract for accounting services with company A., of which the applicant was the director. In accordance with that contract, the applicant\u2019s wife had begun providing accounting services to company M. In the beginning he had been happy with her work, but later he had noticed certain bank transfers which appeared suspicious to him. One such suspicious transfer had been a payment of 120,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 34,750 euros (EUR)) to company A. 8.  On 4 December 2013 the applicant\u2019s wife was granted the status of a \u201cspecial witness\u201d in the investigation; in line with the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d), she was questioned about her own possibly criminal activity and was exempted from liability for refusing to testify or giving false testimony (see paragraph 27 below). She stated that all the transfers from company M.\u2019s bank account which she had carried out had been pre-approved by its director. She also stated that the transfer to company A. had been made by mistake, and the entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week. 9.  On 9 April 2014 the applicant was called as a witness. He refused to give testimony in relation to his wife\u2019s actions and the payment of LTL 120,000 received by company A. from company M. 10.  On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaip\u0117da regional prosecutor\u2019s office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11.  The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a \u201cspecial witness\u201d was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12.  On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaip\u0117da regional prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a \u201cspecial witness\u201d (see paragraph 19 below). 13.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaip\u0117da District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a \u201cspecial witness\u201d, complied with the Constitution. 14.  On 9 July 2014 the Klaip\u0117da District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor\u2019s decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant\u2019s right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant\u2019s request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was \u201csubjective and legally unfounded\u201d. That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16.  On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife. 17.  On 22 September 2014 the Klaip\u0117da regional prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that no criminal offences had been committed. It appears that that decision was not appealed against and became final.", "references": ["2", "9", "0", "8", "7", "5", "1", "6", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are a family. The first applicant, Mr Omer Ak\u00e7ay (also spelt Emer and Emir Akchay), who was born in 1960, is a Turkish national. The second and third applicants are his wife, Ms Svetlana Akchay, who was born in 1975, and his son, Mr Deniz Akchay, who was born in 2000. Both of them are Russian nationals. The first applicant\u2019s surname is spelt as it would be in Turkish. The second and third applicants\u2019 surname is the same as that of the first applicant, but it has been transliterated into Russian and has a different spelling.\nBackground information 5.  The first applicant has been residing in Turkey since April 2016. Prior to that, from 1999 to 2016, he resided with his family in Syktyvkar, in the Komi Republic, Russia. The second and third applicants still reside there. 6.  At some point prior to December 1999 the first applicant moved from Turkey to Russia and started living with the second applicant in Syktyvkar. He resided in Russia on the basis of regularly extended residence permits. 7.  In January 2000 the third applicant was born and the first applicant was registered on his birth certificate as his father. The third applicant goes to school in Syktyvkar. 8.  In 2007 the first applicant was officially registered as a business owner; he had a cattle farm, where he employed five Russian nationals. 9.  On 27 January 2015 the Komi Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe Komi FMS\u201d) granted the first applicant yet another renewal of his five-year residence permit, valid until 3 February 2020. 10.  On 2 December 2015 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 27 November and 4 December 2015) the Komi Department of the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe Komi FSB\u201d) issued a letter requesting that the FMS annul (revoke) the first applicant\u2019s residence permit. The text of the document stated as follows:\n\u201c... on 13 October 2005 the Komi FMS issued Mr E. Akchay \u2013 a Turkish national who was born on 1 January 1960 in Malazgirt, Turkey \u2013 with residence permit 82 no. 0013753 (by FMS decision no. 015777 of 13 October 2005).\nAccording to the department\u2019s information, this person\u2019s actions mean that he poses a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, which, in accordance with section 9(1)(1) of the Foreign Nationals Act, provides grounds for annulling a foreigner\u2019s residence permit in the Russian Federation.\nGiven the above, we ask you to annul the residence permit of the Turkish national Mr Emer Akchay, in accordance with the Russian legislation.\u201d 11.  The above request by the Komi FSB specified neither the grounds for the measure nor the nature of the alleged threat. 12.  On 8 December 2015 the Komi FMS annulled the first applicant\u2019s residence permit with reference to section 9(1)(1) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which provided for the revocation of the residence permits of foreign nationals who posed a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation or its citizens. 13.  On 29 December 2015 the first applicant was invited to the Komi FMS, where he was made aware of the annulment decision and his residence permit was confiscated. He was warned that he was supposed to leave Russia within two weeks, or he would be deported. The first applicant was not informed of the grounds for the annulment. 14.  On 26 January 2016 the applicants\u2019 farm was inspected by the Russian Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, which fined the first applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for failing to comply with a number of relevant regulations \u2013 for example, for not having pet passports for three of the farm dogs and for piling up manure within less than sixty metres of the cattle barn. 15.  On 17 February 2016 the Komi FMS issued a decision ordering the first applicant to leave Russia within five days of receiving the decision, under the threat of deportation, and banning his re-entry into the Russian Federation until 19 September 2018. The first applicant was informed of that decision on 7 April 2016. 16.  On an unspecified date in April 2016 the first applicant was again invited to the Komi FSB and reminded to leave Russia on his own initiative, as otherwise he would be detained and then deported. He was given an exit visa valid until 20 April 2016. 17.  On 20 April 2016 the first applicant left Russia. The second and third applicants remained in Syktyvkar to take care of the farm and continue attending school. 18.  On 13 July 2016 (in the documents submitted, the date was also referred to as 21 June 2016) the first and second applicants officially registered their marriage in Turkey. 19.  On 31 December 2015 the first applicant appealed to the Syktyvkar Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) against the annulment of his residence permit, stating that the Komi FSB\u2019s request of 2 December 2015 to annul his residence permit had been made on national security grounds which were unknown to him, and that the subsequent decision of the Komi FMS complying with that request and annulling his residence permit was unlawful and disproportionate. He stated that he had a family in Russia, was a business owner, had no criminal record or record of administrative offences, and that the annulment of his residence permit would deprive him of grounds for staying in Russia and disrupt his family and private life. 20.  On 24 February 2016 the Town Court examined the first applicant\u2019s appeal. At the hearing, representatives of the Komi FSB informed the court that the first applicant had received eleven (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as twelve) administrative fines for speeding, for which six tickets had been issued in 2015, three tickets in 2014 and two tickets in 2013. In addition, in 2015 the first applicant had been fined for other traffic violations, such as driving a vehicle with a defect, on three occasions. He had also received two administrative fines for violating the terms of foreigners\u2019 residence in Russia (failing to register within the prescribed time-limit, in 2013 and then in 2015). In addition, on one occasion in January 2016 he had been fined for failing to comply with veterinary regulations at the cattle farm. 21.  The first applicant\u2019s representative stated at the hearing that the first applicant had a farm in Russia, diligently paid taxes, employed several Russian nationals, and had a wife and a fourteen-year-old son. After the Russian military aircraft had been brought down in Turkey, the traffic police had started stopping the first applicant \u201cat every turn\u201d. When the first applicant\u2019s representative asked the Komi FSB\u2019s representative why, despite all of the alleged administrative infractions, the first applicant\u2019s permanent residence permit had been extended yet again in February 2015 without any problems, the Komi FSB\u2019s representative replied as follows:\n\u201cthe international situation is complicated, therefore the attitude in Russia towards violations by foreign nationals has become stricter\u201d.\nThe first applicant\u2019s representative invited the applicants\u2019 neighbour, Ms Ch., to the hearing, who testified that she had known the first applicant for twenty years, that he was a well-respected man who helped local orphans, that he worked for the good of the local community, and that he had a wife and son and was the breadwinner of the family. 22.  At the hearing the first applicant also asserted that he had not been made aware of the detailed information concerning his administrative infractions which had been presented to the court by the Komi FSB prior to the hearing. He stressed that he was still unaware of the nature of the threat he allegedly posed to Russia\u2019s national security, and that he had family in Russia, including a son who was a minor. He also had a farm which required constant attention. He admitted that he had had speeding tickets, but stressed that such infractions were very common and were of a minor nature, and that throughout the time he had been living in Russia he had never had a traffic accident. In his opinion, the impugned decision to exclude him from Russia had been taken in view of the strained relations between Russia and Turkey after the incident with the Russian military aircraft. 23.  On the same date, 24 February 2016, the Town Court upheld the annulment of the first applicant\u2019s residence permit. In its decision, the court referred to his record of administrative violations as submitted by the Komi FSB at the hearing. The court did not make any references to the nature of the threat posed by the first applicant to national security, other than stating that his record of administrative offences for the last three years had provided the necessary basis for the Komi FSB\u2019s request to annul his residence permit. The Komi FSB did not provide any other documents substantiating its request for the first applicant to be excluded on national security grounds. The court did not examine the first applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the disruptive effect of the exclusion on his family life. 24.  On 17 March 2016 the first applicant appealed to the Komi Supreme Court against the judgment of 24 February 2016, stating, amongst other things, that he had been residing in Russia since 1999, and that since 2005 he had been living there on the basis of regularly extended five-year residence permits. The last extension had been granted in February 2015, which demonstrated that he was a long-term migrant of good standing who complied with the relevant regulations. The first applicant further stated that he had always paid the taxes relating to his farm business and that he provided jobs for five Russian nationals. Referring to Article 8 of the Convention, he submitted that the annulment violated his and his family members\u2019 right to respect for their family life, and that it was a disproportionate measure that did not pursue a legitimate aim. Lastly, the first applicant stressed that he was still unaware of the nature of the threat he allegedly posed to the national security of the Russian Federation. 25.  On 15 and 28 April 2016 the Komi FSB lodged its objections to the first applicant\u2019s appeal with the Komi Supreme Court, demanding that the court find against him. Amongst other things, its submissions of 15 April 2016 stated the following:\n\u201c... State security bodies, in particular the Federal Security Service, have the right to evaluate the activities of foreign citizens and stateless persons as [people] representing a threat to defence, the security of the State, public order or health, and the court has no right to interfere with that authority. The use of those preventive measures in respect of national security is left to the discretion of the Federal Security Service.\nIssues relating to national security are specific, and their evaluation is carried out by designated bodies on the basis of information obtained from sources, including those outside of judicial control.\nTherefore, the Federal Security Service is not supposed to provide the court with documents substantiating the grounds for its decisions concerning the undesirability of the residence of a foreign citizen in the Russian Federation, as such documents contain State secrets, and the court does not have authority to request those documents ...\u201d 26.  Amongst other things, the FSB\u2019s further submissions to the court of 15 April 2016 stated the following:\n\u201c... the information concerning the annulment of the residence permit was provided to the Federal Migration Service by the Federal Security Service on the basis of classified decision no. 18577c of 27 November 2015 concerning the applicant\u2019s actions posing a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and its citizens, [actions] which serve as the basis for the annulment of the residence permit, in accordance with section 9(1) of The Foreign Nationals Act ...\nThe [Komi] FSB provided the court of first instance with [only] information whose disclosure was not limited ...\u201d 27.  On 5 May 2016 the Komi Supreme Court examined the appeal and upheld the annulment. In its decision, the court referred to the first applicant\u2019s record of administrative violations committed between 2013 and 2016 and some undisclosed information provided by the FSB, without specifying what the nature of that information was. The court stated that the decision to annul the residence permit had been taken by the FSB within its executive authority, and that the information obtained from classified sources was not subject to judicial control, stating as follows:\n\u201c... the court takes into account that in accordance with Federal Law no. 40- \u0424\u0417 on the Federal Security Service of 3 April 1995, the right to assess the activities of foreign nationals as [people] representing a threat to the State\u2019s defence capacity or national security, or public order or health, is within the competence of the Russian FSB and lies within the discretion of the security service. Within administrative proceedings, the court does not have the right to assess the [information relating to] factors threatening national security which has been obtained in respect of a foreign national ...\u201d\nAs for the first applicant\u2019s allegations regarding the adverse effect of the measure on his right to respect for family life, the court stated as follows:\n\u201cthe annulment did not represent an inadmissible interference by the authorities with the right to respect for family life\u201d. 28.  On 28 October 2016 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Presidium of the Komi Supreme Court, and on 25 November 2016 the court rejected it without examining his allegations concerning the violation of his right to respect for family life. 29.  On 13 February 2017 the Administrative Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to examine a further cassation appeal lodged by the first applicant. 30.  On 17 February 2016 the Komi FMS issued a decision banning the first applicant from re-entering the Russian Federation until 19 September 2018 (the entry ban) and ordering him to leave Russia within five days of receiving the decision, under the threat of deportation. The first applicant was informed of that decision on 7 April 2016 (see paragraph 15 above). 31.  On 18 April 2016 the first applicant appealed to the Town Court against the above entry ban. He stated, in particular, that the decision referred to his record of administrative infractions for speeding and failing to comply with minor immigration regulations and sanitary rules at the farm, but the ban imposed had been issued on national security grounds which he still did not know about. The first applicant further stated the ban was a disproportionate punishment, as he was a law-abiding resident of good standing who paid all his taxes and employed Russian nationals. The first applicant stressed that when imposing the sanction, the authorities had failed to balance the public interests with his right to respect for his family life with his son and wife. 32.  On 19 July 2016 the Town Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s appeal, referring to his administrative infractions and stating that \u201cthe impugned decision had been taken in accordance with the law and within the authority of the Komi FMS\u201d. 33.  On 30 March 2017 the Komi Supreme Court upheld the above decision and on 22 August 2017 it rejected a cassation appeal by the first applicant.", "references": ["3", "5", "9", "2", "0", "6", "1", "8", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants, who were born in 1984, 1987 and 1988 respectively, live in \u0130stanbul. 5.  On 23 August 2007 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On the same day, the judge at the \u0130stanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file, under Article 153 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCP\u201d), Law no. 5271. The judge also decided to delay the second and third applicants\u2019 right of access to their lawyer for twenty-four hours pursuant to section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 7.  On 26 August 2007 the applicants were questioned by police officers from the Anti-Terror Branch of the \u0130stanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of their lawyer. They used their right to remain silent. 8.  On the same day, the applicants were also interrogated by the public prosecutor, in the presence of their lawyer. They were mainly questioned about certain records of telephone conversations and the incident of the arson of vehicles during an illegal demonstration. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicants. The applicants did not remember that they had had these conversations but claimed that these conversations did not prove that they had committed the offences with which they were charged with, or that they attended the illegal demonstration on behalf of a terrorist organisation. 9.  On 26 August 2007, after having taken the applicants\u2019 statements, the judge at the 10th Chamber of the \u0130stanbul Assize Court ordered their pre\u2011trial detention. 10.  On 31 August 2008 the applicants\u2019 lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 26 August 2007 ordering the applicants\u2019 detention, and requested their release. On the same day, the 10th Chamber of the \u0130stanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor\u2019s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 11.  On 3 December 2007 the \u0130stanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation, illegal possession of explosives and causing damage to public property. 12.  On 17 December 2007 the \u0130stanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. 13.  On 27 December 2007 the \u0130stanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and dismissed the applicants\u2019 requests for release. 14.  On 18 April 2008 and 22 July 2008 the court held further hearings, in which the applicants and their lawyer were present. At the end of those hearings, the court ordered the continuation of the applicants\u2019 detention. 15.  At the end of the third hearing, held on 20 November 2008, the court prolonged the applicants\u2019 detentions. The applicants were present at this hearing. Subsequently, they filed an objection against this decision. On 28 November 2008 the 11th Chamber of the \u0130stanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative. 16.  On 19 December 2008 the court ex officio examined the applicants\u2019 detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 17.  At the hearings held on 19 March 2009 and 16 July 2009, in which the applicants were present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants\u2019 detention on remand. 18.  On 24 November 2009, 30 March 2010 and 24 May 2012, respectively, the applicants were released from detention on remand. 19.  On 1 October 2013 the \u0130stanbul Assize Court acquitted the second applicant of the charges against him. The court convicted the first and the third applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The judgment in concerning the acquittal of the second applicant became final, as there was no appeal against it. 20.  On 1 July 2016 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court in so far as it concerned the convictions of the first and third applicants. Accordingly, the case file was remitted to the first instance court. 21.  According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the first and third applicants are still pending before the \u0130stanbul Assize Court.", "references": ["0", "4", "6", "5", "9", "8", "3", "7", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Baia Mare. 6.  At the relevant time, the applicant was the chief prosecutor in the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court. He was also the staff member in the prosecutor\u2019s office tasked with providing information to the media in relation to criminal proceedings. 7.  On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court had caught V.F. red-handed being given money by a relative of V.T.V., who was detained in Baia Mare Prison. 8.  According to statements given by the detainee, V.F. had promised to intervene and pass on the money to the prosecutors and judges who were to make the decision concerning his conditional release from prison. 9.  On 22 October 2008 the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department (\u201cthe NAP\u201d), which by law was competent to continue the investigation. 10.  On the same day, the applicant issued a press release, which received considerable public attention. 11.  The press release read as follows:\n\u201cAfter being informed by police that V.F. seeks and receives money from individuals in exchange for intervening in favour of the conditional release of detainees held in Baia Mare Prison, the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court organised a flagrante delicto operation on 21 October 2009. V.F. was caught red-handed while accepting the sum of 1,650 euros (EUR) from a detainee\u2019s relative...\nA criminal investigation into influence peddling was opened and, according to the initial findings in the case, it was found that the suspect had received EUR 9,850 of the EUR 11,000 she had sought for intervening to influence favourably the conditional release of that detainee or the allocation of his work placements.\nAccording to the detainee, the suspect claimed that the intended recipients of the money were prison employees with responsibility for the allocation of work to the detainees or members of the commission for conditional release. Moreover, the suspect told the detainee that part of the money was to go to the magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees.\nAs the object of the offence of influence peddling was a sum of money exceeding EUR 10,000, the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department.\u201d 12.  On the same day, at the request of a local television channel, AXA TV, the applicant gave a short statement providing mainly the same information as was contained in the press release. 13.  The newscaster added the following comments to the information provided by the applicant:\n\u201cThe commission for conditional release, which comprises nine members, is chaired by a delegated judge. We don\u2019t know whether it is purely coincidence that yesterday, the same day on which the flagrante delicto operation was organised and the detainee was conditionally released, that judge\u2019s assignment to the Baia Mare Prison came to an end...\u201d 14.  A few local newspapers wrote articles about the incident. Some of them contained images of the flagrante delicto operation, taken by journalists who had been present at the operation organised by the prosecutors and police. 15.  On 3 November 2008 judge G.E. lodged a complaint with the Superior Council of the Magistracy (\u201cthe SCM\u201d) seeking the commencement of a disciplinary investigation against the applicant in connection with the manner in which he had informed the media about the incident of 21 October 2008. She contended that at the time of the incident she had been the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison and because of the applicant\u2019s press release and interview with AXA TV it was suggested by the media that she might be the alleged recipient of the money. 16.  The disciplinary commission for the prosecutors of the SCM instituted an investigation against the applicant in connection with two disciplinary offences, namely failure to observe the secrecy of deliberations or the confidentiality of documents that are of a secret nature, and adopting a disrespectful attitude towards colleagues in the exercise of his duties under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors. The SCM also held that the applicant had breached the provisions of Article 12 \u00a7 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens\u2019 access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage. 17.  The applicant was questioned by the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission for prosecutors on 23 March 2009. According to his statement, he had prepared the press release after receiving additional information about the investigation from the chief prosecutor of the NAP. He had then submitted the press release to two colleagues at the NAP, namely the prosecutor in charge of the case and the chief prosecutor, and had asked for their opinion. The first had had no objections concerning the press release; the other had advised him that he should limit its content to aspects concerning the investigation carried out by his office. 18.  On 27 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer received a letter from the president of Baia Mare District Court. In that letter the president of the court had stated that he had not considered it necessary to open an investigation into corruption offences allegedly committed by judges from Baia Mare District Court because in his opinion \u201cthe press release did not make any reference to the identity of the magistrates involved\u201d. 19.  At a hearing held before the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission on 31 March 2009 the applicant was assisted by a lawyer of his choice. He proposed as evidence a video recording of the news programme presented by AXA TV concerning the incident of 21 October 2008 so that it could be compared to the press release drafted by the applicant. He also proposed that the news editor of AXA TV be questioned. As documentary evidence he requested copies of the articles published in the local newspapers concerning the incident and the letter addressed by the National Audiovisual Council to judge G.E. in reply to the complaint she had lodged in connection with the comments made by AXA TV about her alleged involvement in the influence peddling. 20.  At the same hearing the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission heard evidence from the prosecutor who had organised the flagrante delicto operation. He stated that it had taken place in a public space, namely a bar, in the presence of two journalists, one of whom had taken pictures. The pictures accompanied articles published by local newspapers in the days following the events. 21.  The applicant asked the SCM to question the two journalists. This request having been rejected, the journalist who had taken the pictures gave a written statement, which was joined to the case file by the applicant. The journalist maintained that he had been present at the flagrante delicto operation by chance: he had been attending a conference in the building in which it had been staged. Seeing masked police officers entering the bar, he had followed them and had seen suspect V.F. being caught red-handed. 22.  When questioned by the SCM at the hearing of 31 March 2009, the prosecutor in charge of the case at the NAP stated that the press release issued by the applicant had not jeopardised the outcome of the criminal investigation. Moreover, the press release had only referred to \u201cstatements at the initial stage of the investigation, while the case was still at the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court\u201d. 23.  The SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission heard evidence from judge G.E. She stated that before lodging her complaint with the SCM she had asked AXA TV to retract its remarks concerning any possible connection between the termination of her mandate as the delegated judge to Maramure\u015f prison and the case of influence peddling. As she had not received any reply she had referred the matter to the National Audiovisual Council but had not been satisfied with its response. 24.  The applicant joined to the case file copies of the complaints lodged with the television channel and the National Audiovisual Council by judge G.E. and the letters she had received in reply.\nThe relevant part of the letter sent by the National Audiovisual Council read as follows:\n\u201cOn 11 November 2008 the Council, convened in a public meeting, examined the report prepared by the Inspection Department and watched a recording of the broadcast mentioned in your complaint....\nIt was noted that the news item had been broadcast on 22 October 2008 at 9.30 p.m. As the information broadcast did not contain any specific reference to you, the item could not infringe your right to a protected public image.\nThe members of the Council considered that the requirements for granting the right of reply or remedy, as provided for under Articles 52 and 60 of Decision no. 187/2006 concerning the regulation of audio-visual content, were not met.\u201d 25.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the General Prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He attached a copy of the press release issued by him on 22 October 2008 and asked the opinion of the Prosecutor General about the way in which he had drafted it and especially whether it had been drafted in compliance with Order no. 116 issued by the General Prosecutor on 24 May 2007 regulating activities undertaken in relation to the mass media within the public prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph 63 below). 26.  On 10 April 2009 the applicant received a reply to his letter from a prosecutor working at the Office for Public Information and Relations with the Mass Media based in the General Prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 27.  In the prosecutor\u2019s view, the information provided by the applicant in the press release had been \u201cminimal and general, but necessary so that the public could understand the facts of the case\u201d. As regards the fact that the applicant had issued the press release after the case had been transferred to the NAP, the prosecutor concluded that the action had complied with the practice observed by the public prosecutor\u2019s office. Moreover, the press release had contained only information concerning the investigation carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court. 28.  This letter, accompanied by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Order no. 116/2006, was added by the applicant to the case file to be examined by the SCM on 13 April 2009. 29.  In his oral submissions before the disciplinary commission, the applicant\u2019s lawyer claimed that the applicant had acted in good faith in informing the press about the incident. His references had been general and impersonal and he had made no reference to any specific person. He also submitted that the applicant had merely fulfilled his obligation to inform the press and to protect the image of his institution and of the legal system by informing the public about a pending criminal investigation. The public had already been exposed to information about the incident as the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation had published articles about the incident. The lawyer also pointed out that the applicant had observed the confidentiality of the investigation and had referred only to the activity carried out by his office without making statements which could have led to the identification of the magistrate, judge or prosecutor who was the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. The applicant\u2019s reference to \u201cmagistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees\u201d was too general to have resulted in the identification of the magistrate concerned. The lawyer concluded by submitting that the information presented by AXA TV about the incident had been more comprehensive than the information provided by the applicant in the press release and in his interview with the AXA TV channel. 30.  On 5 May 2009 the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission found the applicant guilty of two disciplinary offences under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 and imposed a disciplinary sanction under Article 100 of Law no. 303/2004 in the form of a reprimand. The disciplinary commission noted that the applicant had issued a press release and given an interview to AXA TV revealing information about the investigation into the offence of influence peddling on 22 October 2008. 31.  It further noted that the applicant had provided information about the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. without checking the accuracy of the detainee\u2019s statements and had done so one day after the case file had been transferred to the NAP. Such information had led to the identification of judge G.E. as one of the alleged recipients of the money. The disciplinary commission concluded that the applicant had therefore breached the provisions of Article 12 \u00a7 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens\u2019 access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage when there was a risk that the result of the investigation would be undermined or confidential sources revealed. From the way in which the press release was drafted, \u201cthe circle of magistrates who could have been the recipients of the money was restricted and limited and made possible the identification of the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison in the person of judge G.E.\u201d As the six-month term of her delegation expired just at the time of the events in question, the mass media made speculative suggestions that the termination was connected with the influence\u2011peddling case. 32.  Two of the five prosecutors comprising the disciplinary commission were opposed to reprimanding the applicant for the offence of adopting a disrespectful attitude toward colleagues in the exercise of his duties. They expressed their position in a dissenting opinion. 33.  They noted, among other things, that:\n(i)  the names of the persons who were allegedly to receive money from the influence peddler were not mentioned in the press release or in the television interview; there was only a general, impersonal reference to the judges and the prosecutors who were involved with the conditional release of detainees;\n(ii)  individuals in this sphere included not only the judge delegated to the prison but also the judges who examine requests for conditional release at first instance and on appeal, as well as the prosecutors who attend the hearings concerning these requests. AXA TV\u2019s reference to the judge whose involvement with the prison had just ended was made in an additional comment that was not included in the press release;\n(iii)  the reference to the delegated judge made possible the identification of the magistrate, but since this statement was attributable exclusively to the television channel, the latter should bear responsibility for all subsequent comments and speculations;\n(iv)  only the additional information concerning the end of the delegated judge\u2019s mandate allowed the identification of judge G.E. Possible damage to her reputation could therefore not be imputed to the press release from the prosecutor\u2019s office;\n(v)  the press release from the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court and the interview with the defendant referred to the offence of influence peddling and not to the offence of active bribery. The defendant stated that the allegations concerning the alleged recipients of the money had been made by the detainee. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission. 35.  In his appeal the applicant complained about the unfairness of the proceedings before the disciplinary commission. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention the applicant also complained that the imposition of a disciplinary sanction had infringed his right to impart information to the press. 36.  He argued that questioning the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation would have proved that he had not supplied any confidential information. They had published articles, accompanied by pictures of the incident, stating that \u201caccording to unofficial sources, V.F had connections in prison employees\u2019 and magistrates\u2019 circles\u201d. 37.  Moreover, the main reason for issuing the press release had been to prevent possible speculation in the media about the operation \u2012 which was already known to the press \u2012 that could have been detrimental to the judiciary. 38.  As regards the accusation that he had shown a disrespectful attitude towards his colleague judge G.E., the applicant submitted that the latter had not contacted him to express any displeasure about the press release before lodging her complaint with the SCM. If he had known that she had felt that her reputation and public image had been damaged by his press release of 22 October 2009, he could have clarified the matter by issuing a new one. 39.  The High Court allowed a request lodged by the Association of Romanian Magistrates to intervene in the proceedings in support of the applicant\u2019s appeal. 40.  The association justified its intervention in the disciplinary proceedings by referring to its role as protector of the magistrates\u2019 status and their public image, pointing out that \u2012 in its opinion \u2012 the decision delivered by the SCM against the applicant had had a serious negative impact on his professional career. It further argued that in its opinion the press release issued by the applicant had complied with the provisions of Law no. 554/2001, with the guidelines issued by the SCM concerning cooperation between courts and prosecutor\u2019s offices and the media, and with guidelines issued by the General Prosecutor\u2019s office attached to High Court. It also pointed out that the applicant had observed Recommendation Rec(2003) 13 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in so far as he had not disclosed confidential information concerning the criminal investigation to the media and had not in any way undermined the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 41.  On 23 November 2009 a panel of nine judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It held that the applicant should have limited his press release to the minimum of information, which would not have allowed the identification of any magistrate as the alleged recipient of the money obtained by the influence peddler from the detainee\u2019s family. In the High Court\u2019s opinion the applicant should not have added to his press release the reference to \u201cmagistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees\u201d. 42.  One of the judges drafted a dissenting opinion, noting that the press release drafted by the applicant contained only general and impersonal information about the flagrante delicto operation and the pending criminal investigation. The judge noted that the applicant had not mentioned in his press release and interview any magistrates or prison employees involved in the conditional release of detainees in Baia Mare Prison. The applicant could not be held liable for the fact that, after presenting his press release, AXA TV had made express references to the judge delegated to the Baia Mare Prison. The evidence in the file proved that judge G.E. already had a strained relationship with the local media. 43.  On 5 May 2009, the day on which the disciplinary action against the applicant was approved, the SCM\u2019s disciplinary commission for prosecutors issued a decision to remove him from his position as chief prosecutor in the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court. 44.  The applicant challenged this decision before the plenary of the SCM\u2019s members on 8 May 2009. 45.  On 21 May 2009 in a plenary meeting, the SCM dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge. 46.  The applicant appealed against this decision before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 47.  By a decision of 8 December 2009 the High Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that the applicant\u2019s removal as chief prosecutor had been the direct consequence of imposing on the applicant a disciplinary sanction pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Article 51 \u00a7 2 let c) of Law no. 303/2004. The removal of a magistrate from a leading position following imposition of a disciplinary sanction is similarly mandatory according to the law (see paragraph 50 below). 48.  On 19 May 2009 the deputy chief prosecutor in the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Maramure\u015f County Court lodged a complaint against the applicant, claiming that the latter had continued to act as chief prosecutor in spite of the SCM\u2019s decision of 5 May 2009 by which he had been removed from that position (see paragraph 43 above). 49.  A fresh set of disciplinary proceedings was instituted against the applicant, who alleged that he had been threatened with exclusion from the profession if he continued to exercise his duties as chief prosecutor. He had therefore decided to give up his position even though the appeal on points of law against the SCM\u2019s decision to remove him from the position of chief prosecutor had had a suspensive effect according to the law.", "references": ["9", "5", "8", "2", "3", "0", "4", "7", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Ljubljana. 8.  On 8 October 1992 the applicant became a member of L.E., which was at that time a public limited company operating under Slovenian law. The share capital of L.E. stood at 2,995,250 Slovenian tolars (SIT)[1] and the applicant\u2019s capital contribution was SIT 332,805.55[2] (that is, 11.11% of the company\u2019s share capital). L.E. had nine members in total. 9.  On 2 February 1993 the applicant was employed by company L.E. as head of its IT department. In addition, he provided assistance to the finance director (bookkeeping). 10.  On 19 February 1993 two key members and directors of company L.E., Mr J. Za. and Mr M. D., died in a car accident. The first one, however, remained registered as a member of L.E. The shares of the second were taken over by Ms D. D. Two other members, Mr J. Zu. and Mr D. P., were seriously injured, but also remained registered as members of L.E. Following those events, the applicant assumed the role of acting director of L.E. on 29 April 1993, and then of managing director on 23 February 1995. In that capacity he acted as the company\u2019s representative. 11.  In 1993 the Slovenian Railways, a statutory company, initiated civil proceedings against L.E., claiming the payment of three sums arising from their business dealings, totalling approximately SIT 5,000,000. The applicant represented L.E. at all hearings held in that case except for the last hearing on 22 November 2000. 12.  On 9 August 1995 Mr M. K., another member of L.E., died, but nevertheless remained registered as a member. 13.  In November 1995 L.E. was aligned with the Companies Act 1993, as required (see paragraph 35 below), and at the same time converted from a public limited company into a limited liability company (see paragraph 33 below). At that time L.E. was already both illiquid and insolvent. 14.  On 6 May 1996 the general meeting of L.E. dismissed the applicant from the post of managing director. Since the members failed to appoint a new director, as required (see paragraph 37 below), the applicant\u2019s dismissal was not entered in the court register and he remained registered as managing director of L.E. 15.  On 19 June 1997, on the applicant\u2019s initiative, the general meeting of L.E. decided to start winding-up proceedings. The applicant made a winding-up petition on behalf of L.E. on 23 June 1997, declaring that the company had been insolvent for some time and that its total debt was SIT 22,393,952. On 16 July 1997 the competent court ordered L.E. to make, within 15 days, the required advance payment to cover the costs of the publication of the winding-up order in the Official Gazette in the amount of SIT 150,000[3]. The applicant alleged that some members of L.E. had refused to contribute to the advance payment and had preferred to wait for the competent court to wind up the company of its own motion, in accordance with the then applicable legislation (see paragraph 40 below). 16.  On 31 July 1997 the applicant stopped working for L.E. 17.  On 25 September 1997 another member of L.E., Mr J. Zu., died, but nevertheless remained registered as a member. 18.  On 15 October 1997 L.E.\u2019s winding-up petition was rejected for failure to make the required advance payment. 19.  By a judgment of 22 November 2000, the District Court of Ljubljana ordered L.E. to pay the Slovenian Railways the sums claimed plus interest (see paragraph 11 above). L.E. did not appeal; the judgment became final on 12 January 2001. 20.  On the basis of notification from the competent authority that L.E. had not performed any transactions through its bank account in a period of twelve consecutive months, on 19 January 2001 the Ljubljana District Court \u2013 acting in its capacity as the registry court \u2013 initiated proceedings to strike off the company from the court register pursuant to the Financial Operations of Companies Act 1999 (hereinafter \u201cthe FOCA\u201d; paragraphs 41-52 below). 21.  On the same day, the decision to initiate strike-off proceedings was entered in the court register. The decision was sent to the registered address of L.E., but since no representative of the company was there to receive it, a delivery slip was left in its mailbox, notifying the company that the relevant correspondence could be collected at the post office. On 12 February 2001 the decision was returned to the registry court with the information that the addressee had failed to collect it. The registry court then served it by posting it on its notice board, as provided for by domestic law. 22.  No objection was made to the decision of 19 January 2001, either by L.E. or by its members. Consequently, on 11 May 2001 the registry court issued a decision to strike off L.E. from the court register. The decision was published in the Official Gazette on 30 May 2001[4]. The registry court also attempted to serve the decision on L.E. by sending it to the company\u2019s address, but like the previous decision, it was returned on 4 June 2001 with the information that the addressee had failed to collect it. The decision was again posted on the registry court\u2019s notice board. Neither company L.E. nor any of its members, who were entitled to lodge an appeal against the strike-off decision, appealed against the decision, so on 17 August 2001 it became final. 23.  On 25 September 2001 L.E. was struck off from the court register and thus ceased to exist. Notification of the strike-off was published in the Official Gazette on 6 February 2002[5]. At the time of the strike-off, L.E. had nine registered members (including the applicant). The applicant stated that he had become aware that his company had been struck off on 22 December 2004, when a writ was served on him (see paragraph 24 below). 24.  On 5 April 2002 the above-mentioned creditor applied to the Ljubljana Local Court for the judgment mentioned in paragraph 19 above to be enforced. On 5 June 2002 the court issued a writ of execution, ordering the seizure and sale of all tangible movable property of the applicant and six other members of L.E. It later revoked the writ in respect of Mr J. Za., Mr M. K. and Mr J. Zu., as they had died (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 17 above). At the request of the creditor, on 30 November 2004 the court expanded the writ, ordering the payment of the judgment debt by direct deduction from the earnings of the applicant and of three other members of L.E. The writ was served on the applicant on 22 December 2004. 25.  On 29 December 2004 the applicant lodged an objection to the writ, arguing that the Local Court had failed to establish his actual role in company L.E. or to acknowledge his status as a passive member (see paragraph 51 below), which would have exonerated him from liability for the debts of the company. He maintained that the creditor\u2019s claim against the company had arisen before he had joined it. Moreover, the applicant was of the view that the onus was on the creditor to establish that he had been an active member of the company. Lastly, he applied for a stay of enforcement. 26.  In its judgment of 12 March 2005, the Ljubljana Local Court found that the onus of proving his status as passive member was on the applicant and that he had failed to prove that he had not been an active member of L.E. The court established that with his 11.11% share in the company, the applicant had enjoyed the rights of a minority member, and furthermore, he had been employed by the company and actively involved in its management since April 1993. In his capacity as acting director and later managing director, he had been authorised to act on behalf of the company. Moreover, even after he had resigned as managing director, he had still been active in the running of the company and had also signed the winding-up petition. Lastly, the court considered that, as a minority member, the applicant could have and should have proposed the appointment of a new director at a general meeting of the company, since pursuant to domestic law all companies had to have a director. For those reasons, the applicant\u2019s objection was rejected. The court also dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a stay of enforcement, as he had failed to demonstrate that the enforcement would have caused him irreparable or serious damage. 27.  On 9 February 2006 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant on essentially the same grounds as the first-instance court. It observed, inter alia, that the Constitutional Court had found the measure of lifting the corporate veil under the FOCA to be in line with the principle of the separation of a company\u2019s assets from those of its members and thus consistent with the Constitution. The court considered it irrelevant whether the applicant had become a member of L.E. before or after the creditor\u2019s claim had arisen. Having joined the company, he had assumed its assets as well as its liabilities. It further held that it was not decisive that the applicant had not remained a director of L.E. until the dissolution of that company. What was crucial was that the applicant had been actively involved in its management and that he had had the rights of a minority member pursuant to section 445 of the Companies Act 1993 (see paragraph 37 below). The court noted that, in contrast to section 6 of the Companies Act 1993 which required the creditors of a company to prove that a member of the company had abused the corporate form (see paragraph 34 below), the FOCA had introduced a \u201cnon-rebuttable\u201d presumption that the members of a struck-off company were deemed to have undertaken joint and several liability for any outstanding debts of the company. In accordance with the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling, they could be exonerated from their personal liability only if they demonstrated that they were \u201cpassive members\u201d of the company (see paragraphs 46 and 51 below). Lastly, the court took note of the fact that the applicant had indeed made a winding-up petition on behalf of L.E., but it considered this irrelevant because L.E. had at the time failed to make the required advance payment and the petition had therefore been rejected (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above). 28.  On 5 May 2006 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints. In one of them, he complained that the decisions rendered in the strike-off proceedings against L.E. had been served on that company alone and not on him personally. In the other one, he complained about the outcome of the enforcement proceedings against him. 29.  On 31 January 2007 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the strike-off proceedings. The decision was served on the applicant on 5 February 2007. It found that the applicant lacked legal interest in challenging those proceedings, since L.E. had already been struck off from the court register. Consequently, even a positive outcome of the constitutional complaint could not improve the applicant\u2019s position. 30.  On 9 July 2007 the Constitutional Court also rejected the complaint regarding the enforcement proceedings as manifestly ill-founded. It held that the lower courts had correctly applied the Constitutional Court\u2019s criteria for differentiating between active and passive members to the applicant\u2019s individual situation. 31.  In 2010 the judgment of 22 November 2000 was enforced in part by direct deduction from the applicant\u2019s salary. On 23 September 2011 the applicant reached an out-of-court settlement with the creditor and paid the agreed amount. The enforcement proceedings against the applicant were terminated on 28 September 2011. In total, the applicant paid EUR 32,795 to the Slovenian Railways. It is not clear how much other members of L.E. have paid to the Slovenian Railways in this connection.", "references": ["6", "0", "3", "7", "1", "5", "2", "4", "No Label", "8", "9"], "gold": ["8", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1988, the second applicant was born in 1994 and the remaining applicants were born in 2010-2016. According to the last letter sent by their representative to the Court on 20 May 2018, they currently reside in Poland, where their asylum applications are under consideration. 6.  The applicants used to live in the Chechen Republic. As submitted by them, the events leading to their departure were as follows. 7.  In 2005-2006 the first applicant started having problems with the Russian security services. He believed that that was happening because his relatives had participated in the Second Chechen War. Officers from the district police came to his home and questioned him at a police station, and his home was raided by armed people wearing masks. In 2009 he decided to leave Chechnya and applied for international protection in Poland, and later moved to Austria. However, in 2010 he had to return to Chechnya. There, he started working in the State security system, where he participated in counter-terrorism operations and provided security to the highest officials of Chechnya. He quit that job in October 2015, but before that he and his mother were asked if he was planning to join illegal armed groups in Syria. In February 2017 he was taken to the headquarters of the department at which he worked and asked to become an informer; he refused. In March 2017 two police officers came to his home and forcefully took him to a police station, where he was again asked to become an informer and again he refused. Afterwards he was tortured \u2013 he was given electric shocks and beaten on the kidneys, head and other parts of his body. After that he agreed to become an informer and was released after five days of detention. Following the beating, the first applicant started suffering from health problems, such as pain in the kidneys and problems with his memory. 8.  In April 2017 the applicants left Chechnya and went to Belarus with the aim of crossing into Poland. They submitted that they had attempted to lodge asylum applications several times on the Polish border, but each time the border guards had refused to accept their applications and returned them to Belarus (see M.A. and Others v. Poland, no. 42902/17, Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties; see also paragraphs 22-26 below for further events and the applicants\u2019 eventual acceptance into Poland). 9.  On 16 April 2017, around noon, the applicants arrived at the Medininkai checkpoint on the border between Lithuania and Belarus. They submitted to the Court that they had told the border guards in Russian that they were seeking asylum, but asylum proceedings had not been initiated. 10.  The State Border Guard Service (hereinafter \u201cthe SBGS\u201d) issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants. The decisions indicated that the applicants had been refused entry on the grounds that they did not have valid visas or residence permits. It was also indicated that the decisions could be appealed against before a regional administrative court within fourteen days. The decisions were written in Lithuanian and English. 11.  The applicants were asked to sign the decisions. In the space for a signature on each of the seven decisions, the first and second applicants wrote \u201cazul\u2019\u201d in Cyrillic (\u0430\u0437\u0443\u043b\u044c) \u2013 they submitted to the Court that that word was often used by Chechen asylum seekers to mean \u201casylum\u201d. 12.  The border officer who was on duty at the Medininkai checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer:\n\u201cI hereby inform you that on 16 April 2017, at 12.15 p.m., at the Medininkai border checkpoint ... a Russian national [M.A.] ... who had arrived on foot ... was refused entry into Lithuania.\nThe reason for refusal of entry \u2013 absence of a valid visa or residence permit.\nAt 12.45 p.m. the alien was returned to Belarus.\nHis documents were checked by a senior border officer [A.B.].\u201d\nReports with similar wording were drawn up with respect to each of the applicants. 13.  The applicants were returned to Belarus on that same day. They did not appeal against the decisions refusing them entry into Lithuania. 14.  On 11 May 2017, around noon, the applicants arrived at the Kena checkpoint on the border between Lithuania and Belarus. They submitted to the Court that they had told the border guards that they were seeking international protection and asylum and that the first applicant had been tortured in Chechnya. However, asylum proceedings were not initiated. 15.  The SBGS issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants, with the same content as before (see paragraph 10 above). The decisions were written in Lithuanian. The first and second applicants signed all seven decisions and wrote that the decisions had been translated into Russian. 16.  The border officer who was on duty at the Kena checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer:\n\u201cI hereby inform you that on 11 May 2017 ... when I was examining the train [from Moscow to Kaliningrad], at around 12:00 p.m., the following Russian nationals [the applicants] submitted their documents for inspection. None of them had valid visas or residence permits, and therefore they were refused entry into the Republic of Lithuania. Seven refusal of entry decisions were issued in respect of these individuals ...\nAt 3.10 p.m. the individuals were transferred to border officers of Belarus via the Medininkai border checkpoint.\u201d 17.  The applicants were detained at the border checkpoint for several hours and then they were returned to Belarus. They did not appeal against the decisions to refuse them entry into Lithuania. 18.  On 22 May 2017, at around 10.20 p.m., the applicants arrived at the railway border checkpoint in Vilnius. They submitted to the Court that they had had with them a written asylum application in Russian, prepared by a Belarussian human rights organisation, and they had given that application to the Lithuanian border guards. They provided the Court with a copy of that application and a photograph of the application, together with their train tickets, taken on what they claimed to be the premises of the border checkpoint. However, asylum proceedings were not initiated. 19.  The SBGS issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants, with the same content as before (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above). The first and second applicants signed the decisions concerning them, but those concerning the children (the remaining applicants) were not signed. The decisions were written in Lithuanian and it was not indicated on them whether they had been translated into Russian. 20.  The border officer who was on duty at the Vilnius railway checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer:\n\u201cI hereby inform you that on 22 May 2017 I was on duty at the Vilnius railway border checkpoint.\nAt around 10.50 p.m. ..., upon the arrival of a passenger train [from Minsk to Vilnius], it was detected that nationals of the Russian Federation did not have valid Schengen visas or residence permits ...\n...\nThe above-mentioned individuals were returned via the Medininkai border checkpoint on 23 May 2017, at 4.24 a.m.\u201d\nThe report mentioned the names of the second applicant and three of the children. The Court has not been informed if a similar report was drawn up with regard to the first applicant and the other two children. 21.  The applicants were detained at the border checkpoint overnight, and in the morning of 23 May 2017 they were returned to Belarus. They did not appeal against the decisions refusing them entry into Lithuania. 22.  Subsequently, the applicants again attempted to submit asylum applications in Poland, without success, and they lodged an application against Poland before this Court. On 16 June 2017 the Court decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Polish Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus. However, it appears that they were removed (see M.A. and Others v. Poland, Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties cited above). 23.  The applicants\u2019 stay in Belarus was legal until 10 July 2017. 24.  Between October and December 2017 the first applicant\u2019s relatives in Chechnya received several summonses, addressed to him, obliging him to appear before the police. In December 2017 a summons was delivered to the first applicant in Belarus. He went to a police station there and was told that all the applicants had to leave Belarus. They returned to Russia at the end of December 2017. Soon afterwards the first applicant was detained. The second applicant had not been informed about the exact location of the first applicant\u2019s detention. 25.  In January 2018 the second applicant and the remaining applicants went to Belarus again and managed to submit asylum applications on the Polish border. They were admitted to a refugee reception centre in Poland to await the decision on their asylum applications. 26.  In February 2018 the first applicant was released from detention in Russia. He submitted that he had not known where he had been held and that he had been beaten up by the staff at the detention facility. He provided the Court with photographs of bruises on his body which he claimed to have sustained in detention. In March 2018 the first applicant travelled to Belarus and managed to submit an asylum application on the Polish border. He joined the second applicant and the remaining applicants at a refugee reception centre in Poland to await the decision on his asylum application.", "references": ["2", "5", "8", "4", "6", "7", "3", "0", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 6.  On different dates between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix) the applicants learned that their right to leave the country had been restricted and that they were no longer allowed to leave Azerbaijan. 7.  It appears from the documents in the case files that in all the cases the restriction in question was imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of various criminal proceedings in which the applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons, but were only questioned as witnesses. 8.  The travel bans imposed in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 62775/16 and 43327/16 were lifted by the investigating authorities on 29 January and 21 April 2016 respectively. 9.  On various dates the applicants brought an action claiming that the restriction imposed on them was unlawful, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cjudicial review\u201d). Some of the applicants used both of the above-mentioned remedies. 10.  The applicants claimed, in particular, that the domestic law did not provide for the imposition of travel bans on witnesses in criminal proceedings and that the restriction on their right to leave the country was not justified. 11.  In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants\u2019 complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12.  As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed.\u201d 13.  On 5 April 2013 the applicant in application no. 66650/13 appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no legal basis for restricting his right to leave the country under domestic law. 14.  On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court\u2019s decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "9", "0", "5", "1", "7", "8", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  On 30 October 1991 the applicant\u2019s sister applied for the restoration of her property rights to her late father\u2019s land, which was located in Pylim\u0117liai village, city of Vilnius. She indicated that the applicant was also a successor to the same plot of land. 7.  It appears that the applicant\u2019s father had owned some land in Pylim\u0117liai village. According to the most recent information available to the Court, the exact plot of land he had owned was 6.0961 hectares. It appears that the applicant\u2019s restitution process took two directions: at first she agreed to receive part of the land in the Vilnius region and then she asked to receive another 0.32 hectares in the Vilnius region, and she wanted to receive some land in the city of Vilnius (see paragraphs 8-22 below). 8.  On 26 May 2000 the applicant asked the authorities to restore her property rights to her father\u2019s land by giving her plots of land of equivalent value in the Vilnius region. 9.  By a decision of 6 April 2001, the applicant\u2019s property rights were restored in respect of 0.2420 hectares of her father\u2019s land by attributing to the applicant a plot measuring 0.5124 hectares in the Vilnius region. 10.  On 19 May 2006 the authorities established that the applicant had a right to restore her title to 0.32 hectares of her father\u2019s land. It appears that they did so following an application lodged by the applicant to have her right to a plot of land of 0.32 hectares transferred from Vilnius to the Vilnius region. 11.  On 17 November 2014 the applicant was informed that she could have her property rights restored to her father\u2019s land by receiving a plot of forest in a rural area. She had to apply before 1 March 2015. On 27 February 2015 the applicant informed the authorities that she wanted her property rights restored by receiving a plot of forest in Did\u017eioji Rie\u0161\u0117. 12.  On 30 July 2015 the National Land Service (\u201cthe NLS\u201d) decided to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0315 hectares of her father\u2019s land by transferring her right to a plot of land of 0.1599 hectares. It was indicated in the decision that her rights to the remaining 0.2884 hectares would be restored later. 13.  On 30 August 2016 the NLS held a meeting to consider the location where the applicant had chosen two plots of land. 14.  On 26 February 2018 the NLS held a meeting to consider the location where the applicant had chosen four plots of land. It appears that no decision as to the restoration of the remaining land was adopted. 15.  It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (17 September 2018), the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.2884 hectares of her father\u2019s land had not yet been restored. 16.  On 27 December 2001 the applicant applied for the restoration of her property rights to her father\u2019s land by returning to her 0.2 hectares of land in Vilnius, either in the former Pylim\u0117liai village or in Antakalnis. It appears that this request was the change of her initial wish as regards the form of restitution (see paragraph 8 above). 17.  On 20 March 2003 the applicant asked the authorities to return to her in kind the remaining part of her father\u2019s land in Pylim\u0117liai, Vilnius. It appears that this request was another change of her wish as regards the form of restitution (see paragraph 16 above). 18.  On 27 June 2005 the Vilnius County Administration (\u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0973 hectares of her father\u2019s land by transferring to her a plot of land in Vilnius for the construction of an individual house. On 10 February 2006 the VCA restored the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0544 hectares of her father\u2019s land by transferring to her eleven plots of land in the former Pylim\u0117liai village. 19.  On 2 May 2012 the applicant informed the authorities that she would not accept monetary compensation as a form of restitution and that she wanted to restore her property rights to her father\u2019s land in natura. She also asked what actions she had to take in order to receive the land. 20.  On 23 April 2013 the NLS restored the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0005 hectares of her father\u2019s land. 21.  On 19 July 2016 the NLS restored the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0042 hectares of land by returning to her in natura four plots of land measuring 0.0042 hectares in total. 22.  On 5 January 2018 the NLS restored the applicant\u2019s rights to 0.0078 hectares of land by returning to her in natura two plots of land measuring 0.0078 hectares in total. It was indicated that the applicant\u2019s property rights to the remaining 0.2898 hectares would be restored later. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (17 September 2018), the applicant had not yet received those 0.2898 hectares of land. 23.  On 4 November 2004 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined a claim lodged by the applicant that the VCA had been protracting the adoption of a decision on the restoration of her property rights in Vilnius. The court found that the authorities had asked the applicant to provide a document which she had in fact already provided and held that the authorities had failed to act in due time in the process of restoring her property rights. The court ordered the authorities to act in accordance with domestic law and to proceed with the restitution process. 24.  On 3 June 2005 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined another claim lodged by the applicant that the VCA had been protracting the adoption of a decision on the restoration of her property rights. She asked the court to oblige the VCA to return to her 0.7730 hectares of land. The court held that the authorities had been inactive and ordered them to issue a decision restoring the applicant\u2019s property rights within three months of the date on which the aforementioned court decision had become final (see paragraph 36 below). 25.  The VCA appealed against that decision. On 11 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. 26.  On 10 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined a third complaint lodged by the applicant regarding the inactivity of the authorities in the process of restoration of her property rights. The applicant asked the court to oblige the VCA to restore her property rights to 0.3013 hectares of land in Vilnius and to 1.72 hectares in the Vilnius region, as well as to award her 10,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,896 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the applicant had submitted several requests in 2006 asking the VCA to proceed with the restoration of her property rights; however, the latter had refused to act. Moreover, the authorities\u2019 decision of 19 May 2006 (see paragraph 10 above) had remained unenforced. It was explained to the applicant that several measures had yet to be carried out in order to proceed. The court held that the applicant had to be included on the list of citizens wishing to receive land in Did\u017eioji Rie\u0161\u0117, but that due to the authorities\u2019 inactivity, she had not been included on the list. The court also found that she still had a right to the restoration of her title to 0.6223 hectares of land and that the restitution process in her case had been going on for more than eighteen years. The court ordered the VCA to issue a decision restoring the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.6223 hectares of land within three months of the date on which the aforementioned court decision became final. As regards compensation, the court awarded the applicant EUR 579 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 27.  The authorities appealed. On 14 June 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the first-instance court had made some mistakes in calculating the time-limits for submission of a claim, and remitted the case for fresh examination. 28.  On 8 December 2011 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court carried out a fresh examination of the applicant\u2019s complaint (see paragraph 26 above). The court stated that 5.44 ares of land had been returned to the applicant in natura in total and that the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.6223 hectares of her father\u2019s land had not been restored. The court held that it could not order the VCA to transfer her rights to a plot of land measuring 0.3013 hectares in Vilnius because the largest plot that could be transferred in Vilnius was 0.12 hectares. Nor could it order the VCA to transfer 1.72 hectares of land in the Vilnius region because the plot of land the applicant had indicated belonged to someone else. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The applicant and the NLS appealed. On 16 April 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeals. The court held that the decision regarding the applicant\u2019s right to the restitution of 0.32 hectares of land had not yet been adopted and that the applicant had been offered the option of monetary compensation. 30.  In 2014 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking compensation amounting to EUR 133,848 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 28,962 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. She claimed that the authorities had failed to issue decisions restoring her property rights in due time and that her property rights had not yet been restored. She also claimed that she had lost the right to the restoration of her title to 0.2 hectares of land in the city of Vilnius because \u2012 after a change in the domestic regulations \u2012 the maximum plot size that could be restored for the construction of an individual house was now fixed at 0.12 hectares (see paragraphs 28 above and 37 below). However, she had received a plot of land measuring 0.0973 hectares. 31.  On 26 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s compensation claim. It held that in 2000 she had applied to the authorities for the restitution of 2 hectares of her father\u2019s land in the Vilnius region instead of the original plot her father had owned in Vilnius County (see paragraph 8 above). She had received 0.5124 hectares in 2001 (see paragraph 9 above). In 2001 she had applied for the restoration of her property rights to 0.2 hectares of land in Vilnius (see paragraph 16 above), and in 2003 she had asked for the remaining land to be returned in kind (see paragraph 17 above). In 2005 and 2006 the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0973 and 0.0544 hectares of land had been restored (see paragraph 18 above). In 2012 the applicant had informed the authorities that she would not accept monetary compensation and still wanted to receive the remaining land in natura (see paragraph 19 above). In 2013 her property rights had been restored to 0.0005 hectares of land (see paragraph 20 above). The court also indicated that before 1 April 2003 the applicant had changed her mind as to the form of restitution and had claimed that she wanted to receive the land in natura. The court noted that the process of restoration of the applicant\u2019s property rights had been carried out in several stages: in 2005 she had received a plot of 0.0937 hectares in Pa\u0161ilai\u010diai, Vilnius (see paragraph 18 above); in 2006 a document confirming that she had a right to receive 0.32 hectares of State redeemable land had been drawn up; and in 2006 and 2013 her property rights had been restored to 0.0544 hectares and 0.0005 hectares respectively (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). As regards the plot for the construction of an individual house, the court held that a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.0937 hectares of land had been issued in 2005 and had not been challenged. The court also ruled that the restitution process was not over and would be continued. In the court\u2019s opinion, the authorities had not acted unlawfully and there were no grounds for awarding the applicant compensation. 32.  The applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and on 7 April 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to reopen the case for examination on the merits in order to receive some additional documents. 33.  On 19 June 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first\u2011instance decision. It held that although the applicant claimed that the authorities had failed to execute the decisions of the courts to restore her property rights, she had never challenged the authorities\u2019 decisions to restore her property rights to certain plots of land. The court also held that the restitution process had been carried out and suspended for objective reasons. The authorities had confirmed that the process would recommence as soon as the municipality had delineated the plots of land.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "1", "3", "8", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  According to a police report drawn up on 21 June 2005, the police division responsible for fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (\u201cthe police\u201d) received information from an undisclosed source that an individual called \u201cUrsu-Degweed\u201d was a member of a network of dealers that was trafficking drugs in Constan\u0163a. 7.  The police initiated an investigation of their own motion. On 21 June 2005 the prosecutor authorised the use of an undercover police agent, who was to be helped by a police informer, D., to follow a lead regarding the applicant\u2019s alleged criminal activities. At the time of the events, the applicant was a student; D. was an acquaintance of the applicant, studying at the same university. 8.  D. called the applicant and asked him to provide her with some drugs. She informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer, set the price for the drugs and sent the money by mail (postal order) on 23 June 2005. 9.  On 25 June 2005 the applicant called D. and set up a meeting at the Constan\u0163a railway station for the same day. The applicant was accompanied by three friends. At about 11.45 p.m., while he was waiting for D. at the railway station, police officers from Constan\u0163a Police, acting in league with the undercover agent and D., approached him. They searched the applicant and found eighteen ecstasy tablets and 0.46 grams of cannabis resin in his possession. 10.  In his first statement to the police, given on 26 June 2005, the applicant disclosed that the dealer who had sold him the drugs was called B. and helped the police to set up an operation to catch him in the act of committing a crime. 11.  The applicant also stated that D. had called and had asked him to buy twenty ecstasy tablets for her. She had sent the money for the drugs by post and had informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer. L. had given him the number of a dealer, B., who had sold him seventeen tablets. He had received two tablets as a gift; he had kept one for himself and had given the other one in exchange for the cannabis resin, found in his possession at the search. He intended to spend his holidays in Constan\u0163a with his friends at D.\u2019s invitation. D. had also promised to offer him accommodation. 12.  The applicant maintained his allegations in a statement given in the presence of two lawyers of his choice on 19 July 2005. He added that he had accepted to provide D. with the ecstasy tablets in the hope of having an intimate relationship with her during his stay in Constan\u0163a. 13.  On 25 July 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office committed the applicant for trial on charges of drug trafficking, in violation of Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (hereinafter \u201cLaw no. 143\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 22 below). 14.   Several hearings were held before the Constan\u0163a County Court. The applicant denied his involvement in drug trafficking and claimed that he had been entrapped by the police. His lawyers insisted on the importance of hearing evidence from D. 15.  On 5 June 2007 the Constan\u0163a County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to one and a half years\u2019 imprisonment suspended on probation. The court dismissed his allegations that he had been entrapped. It confined itself in noting that the activity of the informer, D., had been lawful, without referring to the question whether she had been authorised to act as an undercover agent. The relevant part of its reasoning read as follows:\n\u201cThe applicant\u2019s argument that the informer, D., had incited him to commit the offence could not be retained. The court notes the applicant\u2019s recruitment activity in bars in Constan\u0163a, the undercover informer being a simple client among other clients. The activity performed by the undercover informer was in line with Law no. 143/2000.\u201d 16.  The Constan\u0163a County Court did not provide any reasons justifying the fact that, in spite of the applicant\u2019s insistence, D. had not been heard. In convicting the applicant, it relied on his own statements, corroborated by the statements made by the friends who had accompanied him on his trip to Constan\u0163a on 25 June 2005, as well as on reports produced by the undercover agent and the police following the police operation organised on 25 June 2005 when the applicant had been caught in the act of committing a crime. 17.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of 5 June 2007. His lawyers reiterated that he had been entrapped by the police and that D. should be heard by the court. They also claimed that D. had not been authorised to be part of the undercover operation. 18.  On 22 October 2008 the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal noted that D. had never given evidence as a witness before the investigating authorities and that her name had only been mentioned in the reports drafted by them. Accordingly, her previous statements could not be read in open court pursuant to Article 327 \u00a7 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 23 below). 19.  On 24 October 2008 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the County Court\u2019s findings. Without providing any additional reasons, the court simply reiterated that the evidence obtained by using an undercover agent was in accordance with Law no. 143. It did not refer at all to the applicant\u2019s argument that D. had not been heard. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He claimed that he had been unduly incited by D. to commit the offence of which he had been found guilty and that throughout the proceedings he had not had an opportunity to have her questioned. 21.  In a final decision of 4 March 2009 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. It upheld the reasoning of the two lower courts.", "references": ["1", "2", "8", "6", "4", "9", "7", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1951 and 1948 respectively and live in Makiyivka. 6.  On 2 February 2002 B., the applicants\u2019 son, died in a road accident in the town of Makiyivka. B.\u2019s car collided with another car being driven by Br., who sustained serious bodily injuries and was taken to hospital. 7.  On the same day the Makiyivka town police inspected the scene of the accident and questioned M., who was Br.\u2019s passenger at the time of the accident. 8.  On 4 and 5 February 2002 forensic medical experts identified the injuries on the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s body and noted that there was ethyl alcohol in his blood and urine. 9.  Between 5 February and 8 April 2002 the police conducted technical vehicular examinations and questioned Br., the applicants, and several other witnesses. According to the results of the technical examinations, the applicants\u2019 son swerved into the oncoming traffic lane and collided with Br.\u2019s car, which was moving in the opposite direction. The expert therefore concluded that the applicants\u2019 son had contravened traffic rules and thus caused the road accident. 10.  On 18 April 2002, after the applicants had lodged their complaints, the Makiyivka District police opened a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s death. 11.  Between May 2002 and January 2005 the police ordered three forensic technical expert examinations, an additional technical examination, a vehicular trace examination, and three forensic expert examinations of the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s body. The police also conducted several on-site accident reconstructions, questioned witnesses, and took other investigative measures. The investigating authorities found that the surviving driver, Br., had previously been employed in a police security company, but that he had resigned before the accident happened. 12.  In the course of the above investigations, on 4 November 2003 the Chief Department of Investigations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued instructions as to the manner in which the case was to be investigated. It was emphasised that there had been contradictions in the evidence; the scene of the accident had not been inspected properly; Br.\u2019s car had not been seized; the circumstances of the accident had not been noted carefully; and the witnesses had not been identified. 13.  On 2 July, 4 September and 29 October 2004 the criminal case was terminated because the investigators considered that it had been the applicants\u2019 son who had contravened traffic rules and caused the accident resulting in his own death. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by supervising prosecutors, who found that further measures were required to ensure full and objective investigation. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 14.  Between 2005 and 2007 the investigators ordered two more technical expert examinations and a vehicular trace examination, three medical forensic expert examinations of the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s body, and a medical forensic examination of Br. 15.  On 5 November 2007 the investigator ordered a new technical expert examination, which was completed on 19 June 2008. According to the results of the examination, it had been the applicants\u2019 son who had contravened traffic rules and caused the accident in which he had died. 16.  On 23 June 2008 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings because of the death of the applicants\u2019 son. The applicants objected to the grounds on which the case had been terminated, because their son had not been exonerated. 17.  On 1 September 2009 the prosecutor quashed the decision of 23 June 2008, noting that the applicants had objected to the grounds for termination of the proceedings, and therefore it had been for the court to take a final decision in the case. 18.  On 29 September 2009 the investigator asked the Gornyanskyy District Court of Makiyivka (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) to close the criminal case concerning the traffic accident in which the applicants\u2019 son had died. 19.  On 23 June 2010 the District Court rejected the investigator\u2019s request and sent the case back to the prosecutor\u2019s office, finding that there had been procedural errors in referring the case to the court. In particular, the investigator was instructed to prepare a bill of indictment. 20.  On 3 September 2010 the investigator closed the criminal case by his own decision, on the grounds that the person responsible for the accident had died. That decision was quashed on 3 December 2010 by a supervising prosecutor for failure to follow the court\u2019s instruction of 23 June 2010. 21.  On 28 January 2011 the investigator referred the case to the District Court for a further decision on discontinuing the proceedings. 22.  On 31 January 2012 the District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings because of the death of the person responsible for the accident. The applicants appealed, arguing that the investigation had not been thorough and that the available evidence had been contradictory. 23.  On 24 April 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 31 January 2012 as unlawful, finding that the first-instance court should carry out a full examination of the case and give judgment, either finding the applicants\u2019 son guilty or acquitting him. 24.  On 26 December 2013 the District Court found the applicants\u2019 son guilty of causing a traffic accident, but the sentence was not imposed owing to his death. 25.  On 7 April 2014 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above judgment, finding that the first-instance court had violated the applicants\u2019 right to defence, and remitted the case for a fresh examination by the same court. 26.  From April 2014 illegal armed groups associated with two self\u2011proclaimed entities known as the \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d and the \u201cLuhansk People\u2019s Republic\u201d began operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, seizing control of certain parts of those regions by force, including Makiyivka. Ukrainian Government forces launched a military anti-terrorist operation against them. A ceasefire line was later put in place. 27.  According to information provided by the applicants, their case was going to be examined by the \u201cauthorities\u201d of the \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d.", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "7", "5", "9", "6", "2", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are siblings who were born in 1949, 1944, 1947, 1952, 1955 and 1954 respectively and live in Vilnius. The seventh applicant is the first applicant\u2019s daughter; she was born in 1968 and also lives in Vilnius. 6.  In 1991 the fifth applicant applied for restoration of his property rights to his late father\u2019s land, which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. In that application he indicated that the first, second, third, fourth and sixth applicants, as well as their mother, P.M., and brother, N.M., were also possible candidates to have their property rights to that land restored. 7.  On 8 March 2004 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored the property rights of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, as well as P.M. and N.M., by giving them all joint ownership of 5.80 hectares of agricultural land and 3.20 hectares of forest in Naujakiemis, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. As P.M. and N.M. had died by then, the applicants inherited their share of the land. 8.  On 31 March 2006 the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants signed two preliminary agreements (preliminariosios sutartys) with the seventh applicant by which they undertook to sell her the two plots and the seventh applicant paid them 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 290 euros (EUR)). However, final sale agreements were not concluded and the seventh applicant did not become the owner of the plots. 9.  On 29 August 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants\u2019 property rights to the nine hectares given to them annulled. The prosecutor submitted that the two plots given to the applicants were covered by forest which, being situated within a city, was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovi\u010d and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 12 June 2018). According to the information provided by the prosecutor, forests of national importance covered the entire plot of 3.20 hectares, as well as 1.37 hectares of the other plot (see paragraph 7 above). In view of the circumstances, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants\u2019 property rights to the two plots, their preliminary agreements with the seventh applicant (see paragraph 8 above) also be annulled. 10.  The applicants and the VCA disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. However, on 1 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the claim. It underlined that transferring forests of national importance to private ownership was contrary to the law (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 89-91) and therefore the VCA\u2019s decision had to be annulled. The court held that the applicants could not be considered as having acquired their property rights in good faith (s\u0105\u017einingi \u012fgij\u0117jai) because the information about the presence of forests on their land had been available in a public register and any diligent person should have known that, under the Constitution, forests of national importance could only be owned by the State. 11.  The court annulled the restoration of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants\u2019 property rights and ordered them to return the two plots to the State. It also annulled the preliminary agreements between them and the seventh applicant and ordered them to return to the seventh applicant the LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) which she had paid them pursuant to those agreements (see paragraph 8 above). 12.  The applicants and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision. However, on 22 April 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision in its entirety. The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 23 July 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination, holding that it raised no important legal issues. 13.  On 23 February 2012 the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d) confirming that, after the courts had annulled their property rights to nine hectares of land, they had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. 14.  On 8 and 30 May 2012 the first applicant sent letters to the NLS on behalf of all the aforementioned applicants, asking that land in the original location which was not covered by forest be returned to them. 15.  On 26 July 2012 the NLS sent a letter to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants which stated that it might be possible to give them two plots in Naujakiemis, measuring 4.44 and 0.07 hectares, so if they wished to receive those plots, their requests would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. As for the restoration of property rights to the remaining land, the applicants were asked to consider alternative forms of restitution (ibid., \u00a7 92) and to inform the authorities of their choice. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to that letter. 16.  On 19 August 2012 the second applicant died (see paragraph 4 above). The third applicant was issued with a certificate of inheritance with respect to the second applicant\u2019s estate on 12 December 2012. 17.  On 19 February 2015 the NLS approved a list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Naujakiemis. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive two plots measuring a total of 4.4115 hectares. 18.  On 6 May 2015 the NLS adopted decisions to restore the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants\u2019 property rights by giving them two plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 4.4115 hectares. The decisions stated that the rights to the remaining 4.5885 hectares would be restored at a later date. 19.  On 28 August 2017 the NLS adopted decisions to restore the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants\u2019 property rights to the remaining 4.5885 hectares by means of monetary compensation of EUR 5,307, corresponding to the indexed value of the land (that is to say, the value established by relevant public authorities).", "references": ["2", "8", "7", "6", "3", "4", "5", "0", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is serving a prison sentence in Khabarovsk. 5.  On 30 July 2004 the Samara Regional Court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. On 20 July 2007 the applicant was placed in Correctional Colony No. IK-56. 6.  The Government submitted the following information as regards the personal space afforded to the applicant during his detention in the colony: \nCell No.\nPeriod of detention\nCell measurements (sq. m)\nNumber of inmates\n7\nFrom 20 July to 2 August 2007\n18\n2\nNo information available. The relevant documents have been destroyed.\n10\nFrom 29 October to 26 November 2014\n18\n2\n6\nFrom 26 November 2014 to 2 April 2015\n18\n2\n010\nFrom 2 April 13 December 2015\n4\n1\n6\nFrom 13 to 23 December 2015\n18\n2\n010\nFrom 23 December 2015 to 9 August 2016\n4\n1\n10\nFrom 9 August to 7 September 2016\n18\n2\n010\nFrom 7 September to 26 December 2016\n4\n1\n7\nFrom 26 to 27 December 2016\n18\n2\n10\nFrom 27 December 2016 to 21 July 2017\n18\n2\n3\nFrom 21 July to 3 March 2017\n18\n2\n6\nFrom 3 March 2017 to date\n18\n2 7.  The Government further submitted that from 21 October to 11 November 2009, from 14 to 18 December 2013, and from 5 October to 26 December 2016 the applicant had been detained in Correctional Colony No. IK-55. 8.  According to the applicant, the inmates are housed in double or single cells. The double cells measure approximately 18 m\u00b2 and the single ones approximately 4 m\u00b2. Since 2007 the applicant has been assigned to different cells, his conditions of detention remaining unchanged. 9.  There is no water supply or sewage system on the colony premises. The inmates are given buckets, to compensate for the lack of a toilet, which they have to empty every morning in a cesspool located some two metres away from the recreation area. Each day the inmates receive 10 litres of river water for their personal needs. They are allowed to take a shower once a week. 10.  The windows in the cells are covered with three layers of metal bars or screens. The cells are not ventilated. The lighting is dim and inadequate. 11.  The food is not fresh, lacks variety and is of poor quality. The milk is often sour, and the fruit juices are diluted with water. 12.  The applicant has been housed in single cell no. 10 since 2010. The temperature in the cell does not exceed +120C during the winter. It is damp and stuffy during the summer. He is confined to his cell 22 hours a day and is entitled to one and a half hours\u2019 outdoor exercise per day. 13.  The recreation area is divided into exercise yards measuring 7 m\u00b2. The yards are covered with metal bars and screens. There is no exercise equipment. 14.  From July 2007 to December 2016 the applicant was not allowed to grow a beard or to have his hair longer than 0.5 cm. His hair was completely shaved off 2 to 4 times a month, and he had to shave his face 2 to 3 times a week. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecutor about the compulsory shaving. 16.  On 13 December 2013 the prosecutor replied that the compulsory shaving of the head and beard to which the applicant had been subjected had been unlawful, and that the prosecutor\u2019s office had informed the administration of the correctional colony where the applicant was serving his prison sentence. The prosecutor also informed the applicant of his right to appeal either to a higher-ranking prosecutor or a court. It appears that the applicant took no further action.", "references": ["9", "6", "2", "8", "3", "7", "4", "0", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "7.  The first applicant was born in 1937, the second applicant was born in 1930, the third applicant was born in 1934, the fourth applicant was born in 1945, the fifth applicant was born in 1930, the sixth applicant was born in 1954, the seventh applicant was born in 1926 and the eighth applicant was born in 1929. They all live in Vilnius. 8.  On various dates in 1991 the first, second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants applied for restoration of their property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. The fourth and fifth applicants did so in 2000. 9.  Between 1995 and 2001 the administrative authorities or courts acknowledged that the first, second and third applicants had the right to have their property rights restored in respect of plots of land in Gudeliai, and that the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants had the right to have their property rights restored in respect of plots of land in Kriau\u010di\u016bnai. Gudeliai and Kriau\u010di\u016bnai were former villages which had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996. 10.  In 2005 and 2006 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored the applicants\u2019 property rights by giving them the following plots:\n- the first, second and third applicants \u2013 a total of ten hectares in Gudeliai;\n- the fourth and fifth applicants \u2013 a total of two hectares in Kriau\u010di\u016bnai;\n- the sixth and seventh applicants \u2013 a total of 8.149 hectares in Kriau\u010di\u016bnai;\n- the eighth applicant \u2013 4.6663 hectares in Kriau\u010di\u016bnai. 11.  On various dates in 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged claims with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, seeking to have the applicants\u2019 property rights to some of the land given to them annulled. The prosecutor submitted that part of the applicants\u2019 land was covered by forests. Since those forests were situated in a city, they were considered forests of national importance (valstybin\u0117s reik\u0161m\u0117s mi\u0161kai) and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovi\u010d and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 12 June 2018). As a result, the prosecutor argued that the VCA\u2019s decisions restoring the applicants\u2019 property rights to such forests had to be declared unlawful and their effects annulled. 12.  In all of the applicants\u2019 cases, the courts upheld the prosecutor\u2019s claims. The final decisions were taken by the Supreme Administrative Court between January and March 2010. By virtue of those decisions, the applicants\u2019 property rights were annulled with respect to the following plots:\n- the first, second and third applicants \u2013 3.66 hectares;\n- the fourth and fifth applicants \u2013 0.52 hectares;\n- the sixth and seventh applicants \u2013 1.22 hectares;\n- the eighth applicant \u2013 1.2 hectares. 13.  In 2010 and 2011 the fourth and fifth applicants sent several letters to the VCA and subsequently to the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d), asking that their rights to 0.52 hectares be restored by new land in Kriau\u010di\u016bnai being given to them or, if that was not possible, land of equivalent value in a different area in Vilnius. It does not appear that they received any answers from those institutions. 14.  On 9 November 2011 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the seventh applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 0.251 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.78 hectares would be restored later. However, the seventh applicant submitted to the Court that that decision had not been related to her property rights annulled by the domestic courts (see paragraph 12 above), and the Government did not argue otherwise. 15.  In February 2012 all the applicants received letters from the NLS confirming that, after the courts had annulled their property rights, they had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. The applicants again received similar letters from the NLS in July 2012 stating that there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area, and thus the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider alternative forms of restitution, such as being given a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid.). 16.  On 25 May 2012 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the eighth applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 0.4419 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.7581 hectares would be restored later. 17.  In July 2012 the fourth applicant received a letter from the NLS informing her that a plot of land was being prepared for her in Medininkai, in the Vilnius Region. The fourth applicant replied to that letter by stating that she had never agreed to be given land in that area, and asked the NLS to stop any preparation in that regard. 18.  In August 2012 all the applicants sent letters to the NLS in which they asked, inter alia, to be allocated plots of land for the construction of individual homes in Vilnius in the order of priority, or to receive compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage which they had sustained as a result of the annulment of their property rights. 19.  On 26 May 2016 the NLS held a meeting for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriau\u010di\u016bnai. The eighth applicant\u2019s representative took part in that meeting and chose two plots. The fifth applicant took part in that meeting but did not choose any plots. 20.  On 3 June 2016 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the eighth applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 0.24 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.5181 hectares would be restored later. 21.  On 17 June 2016 the NLS informed the first, second and third applicants (or their heirs \u2013 see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) that their property rights to 3.66 hectares would be restored by monetary compensation of 2,646 euros (EUR). However, the applicants did not agree to this proposal, and it was not carried out. 22.  In February 2017 the NLS sent a letter to the seventh applicant, asking her to indicate the area in which she wished to receive a plot. The seventh applicant\u2019s heir (see paragraph 3 above) replied that same month, indicating her choice. 23.  On 29 November and 14 December 2017 the NLS held meetings for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriau\u010di\u016bnai. The fifth, sixth and eighth applicants took part in those meetings but did not choose any plots. During the latter meeting, the fifth applicant stated that she would not choose any plots because her complaint was being examined by the European Court of Human Rights. 24.  On 9 January 2018 the NLS held a meeting for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriau\u010di\u016bnai. The seventh applicant\u2019s heir (see paragraph 3 above) took part in that meeting but did not choose any plots. 25.  In January 2018 the first, second and third applicants (or their heirs \u2013 see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) sent a letter to the NLS stating that they had expressed their wish for their property rights to be restored in kind and not by monetary compensation. They informed the NLS that their complaint was being examined by the European Court of Human Rights, and that the NLS should refrain from any unilateral actions which might make the Court\u2019s decision impossible to implement. 26.  At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (12 October 2018), the applicants\u2019 property rights had still not been restored with respect to the following plots:\n- the first, second and third applicants \u2013 3.66 hectares;\n- the fourth and fifth applicants \u2013 0.52 hectares;\n- the sixth and seventh applicants \u2013 1.22 hectares;\n- the eighth applicant \u2013 0.5181 hectares.", "references": ["2", "5", "3", "8", "7", "6", "1", "4", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kharkiv. 6.  On 3 April 2008 the applicant shot a person, causing a serious injury. He was arrested at the scene of the crime. He remained in detention throughout the criminal proceedings against him, primarily at the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre (SIZO). 7.  On 14 April 2009 the Kharkiv Court of Appeal sentenced him to ten years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property. On 29 December 2009 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 8.  The applicant served his sentence in a number of correctional colonies, including, from 11 May 2010 until 7 April 2011, the Slovyanoserbsk Correctional Colony in the Luhansk Region (hereinafter, \u201cthe colony\u201d). 9.  On 27 May 2015 the applicant was transferred to a semi-open correctional institution. 10.  On 25 December 2015 the applicant was released. 11.  On 13 May 2010, the applicant was placed in a single-occupancy cell at his request, as he feared an attack on his life and health by other inmates. Decisions on his placement in isolation from the general prison population were taken in July and August 2010. 12.  According to a report by a prison guard dated 10 September 2010, the applicant refused to move from the single-occupancy cell to a dormitory, claiming that he feared violence from other inmates. Similar reports were filed monthly from October 2010 until February 2011. 13.  In his application form of 8 November 2010 the applicant described the conditions of his detention in the following fashion: since 13 May 2010 he had been held in an isolation cell, which measured 4.5 sq. m as a whole (including the toilet and the washbasin), with the living space proper measuring 1 sq. m. 14.  Following the communication of the application to the respondent Government, the applicant submitted that the average living space per inmate in the dormitory cells of the colony was 2.8 sq. m. He referred in this respect to the report (dated 23 November 2011) of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, \u201cthe CPT\u201d) on its visit to Ukraine from 9 until 21 September 2009 (CPT/Inf (2011) 29), which mentioned overcrowding in respect of most of the colony\u2019s dormitories. 15.  The applicant alleged that in the course of his detention all of his correspondence had been systematically monitored by the prison authorities. He submitted in particular that on 22 July and 9 September 2009 the prison administration had handed him two letters from the Court and on 18 December 2010 a letter from the parliamentary secretariat, all of which had been opened by the administration. 16.  The applicant submitted copies of registers compiled by prison authorities of his outgoing mail. They show that in the period from 22 July 2009 until December 2010 the applicant sent at least forty-seven letters to various public entities \u2013 correspondence which, under domestic law (see paragraph 40 below), was subject to monitoring by the prison authorities \u2013 most notably various domestic courts, the High Council of Justice, the Department for the Execution of Sentences (the executive agency in charge of prisons) and Parliament. However, the same register records that the applicant also addressed a number of letters to the Court and a letter to his lawyer, correspondence exempt from such monitoring. The letters to non-exempt addresses are accompanied by brief summaries of their content (for example, in respect of the letter of 18 February 2010 addressed to a domestic court it is noted that it concerned \u201cstudy of the file, presence at a hearing\u201d) or are marked in the register as \u201capplication\u201d, \u201cpetition\u201d or \u201ccomplaint\u201d (\u201c\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f\u201d, \u201c\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f\u201d or \u201ccomplaint\u201d, respectively), while letters to the Court and the lawyer are marked as \u201csealed letter\u201d. 17.  According to the applicant, in November 2009, while he was in the Kyiv SIZO, somebody poisoned him; as a result, he developed gastroduodentitis (inflammation of the stomach and duodenum), which became chronic. 18.  The applicant\u2019s prison records contain no information in respect of the period from his arrest until 26 January 2010 (see paragraph 46 below). 19.  On 26 January 2010 the Kharkiv SIZO medical officer noted that the applicant was suffering from chronic gastroduodentitis that was in unstable remission (\u0445\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0456\u0442 \u0443 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0434\u0456\u0457 \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f). He prescribed a number of medications. The applicant alleges that he was not actually given those medications. 20.  On 18 March 2010 the applicant underwent a radiological examination of his intestinal tract, as a result of which the SIZO general practitioner confirmed the diagnosis of chronic gastroduodentitis. 21.  From 6 until 19 April 2010 the applicant was hospitalised in the medical unit of the Kharkiv SIZO and treated for his gastroduodentitis. 22.  On 15 February 2011 he was examined by a general practitioner at the colony, who confirmed the diagnosis of chronic gastroduodentitis, which he noted was in a state of exacerbation (\u0445\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0456\u0442 \u0443 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0434\u0456\u0457 \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f). The general practitioner recommended the applicant\u2019s transfer to the hospital at Luhansk SIZO for examination and treatment. No transfer followed. 23.  On 4 October 2011 the applicant was examined at a civilian hospital in Kharkiv. He underwent an ultrasound examination and a biochemical blood test, which included aspartate aminotransferase (AST) and alanine aminotransferase (ALT) markers for liver function. He was diagnosed with acute pancreatitis, congestive duodenopathy, gastric stasis (reduced stomach functioning), inflammation of the oesophagus and chronic hepatitis (with diffuse changes in the liver). A number of medications and a special diet were prescribed. 24.  The next day a general practitioner at the correctional colony at which the applicant was being held at the time recommended hospitalisation in the prison hospital at Temnivka, a specialist prison hospital for the Kharkiv region. On 11 October 2011 the applicant was taken there. The applicant refused hospitalisation because he mistrusted the prison doctors and preferred to be treated in a civilian institution. 25.  On 17 October 2011 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, who diagnosed chronic pancreatitis in the acute stage and prescribed treatment. 26.  On 1 August 2012 a general practitioner diagnosed biliary dyskinesia (a disorder in which bile has difficulty in moving normally through the biliary tract) and prescribed medication. The applicant alleges that he was not given this medication. 27.  From 25 until 31 January 2013 the applicant was treated for hepatitis \u2013 specifically, he received antispasmodic and hepatoprotective medicine \u2013 as an inpatient in the prison\u2019s medical unit. Upon his discharge it was recommended that he abstain from spicy and fried foods. The applicant alleges that the prison authorities did not comply with this recommendation. 28.  Beginning on 15 February 2014 the applicant received medical care in civilian institutions. 29.  The applicant had been suffering from osteochondrosis of the lumbar spine since 1998. He was hospitalised and treated for that condition from 28 February until 5 March 2008, prior to his arrest. 30.  From 24 April until 4 May 2012 the applicant was treated in the medical unit of the colony in which he was detained at the time for his osteochondrosis and disk protrusion. 31.  On 17 May 2012 the applicant underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of the spine in a civilian hospital. 32.  On 31 May 2012 a surgeon examined the applicant and recommended that he undergo examination and treatment in a specialist neurology ward. The applicant alleges that the recommendation was not implemented. 33.  From 13 until 23 July 2012 the applicant was hospitalised in the colony\u2019s medical unit and treated for osteochondrosis and multiple Schmorl\u2019s nodes (protrusions of the intervertebral disc). 34.  On 20 March 2013 the applicant was examined by a traumatologist. The previous diagnoses were confirmed. The traumatologist prescribed painkillers and anti-inflammatory medication and the use of a back-support device. The applicant alleges that the recommendations were not implemented. 35.  From 13 August until 4 September 2015 he was hospitalised in a civilian institution specialising in spinal conditions. On 3 September 2015 the applicant underwent spinal surgery. The doctors explained that surgery was needed in view of the ineffectiveness of the conservative care that he had received and the increase in pain that he was suffering. 36.  On 11 November 2015, owing to his back condition, the applicant was recognised as a person suffering from Category 2 disability. The second category is the intermediary one, the first constituting the severest level of disability and the third the least severe. 37.  In the course of his detention the applicant also underwent several chest X-rays (which revealed no abnormality), and was diagnosed with bronchitis and a fungal infection of the nails; he was prescribed treatment for that infection. He was also examined by a dentist and an ophtalmologist. 38.  Beginning in October 2011 the applicant was also diagnosed with a number of heart-related conditions, notably coronary heart disease. This diagnosis was subsequently confirmed on a number of occasions. No specific treatment was indicated.", "references": ["3", "7", "8", "6", "5", "0", "2", "9", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962. Before his arrest he lived in Berezna, a village in Chernigiv Region. Mr. Y. (hereinafter also referred to as the \u201cvictim\u201d) lived in the same town, a short distance from the applicant\u2019s house. 6.  In the evening of 27 February 2007 Y., who was drunk, was involved in a fight with Do. Ty., O. and Sh. were present. After the fight, at about 9.25 p.m., Y. went to a local caf\u00e9 where he saw K., the caf\u00e9\u2019s employee. 7.  At about 11 p.m. the applicant walked into the caf\u00e9, saw Y., bought chocolates and left. 8.  At about 1 a.m. on 28 February 2007 Y. left the caf\u00e9. He was walking home along a dark street when suddenly a man approached him and shot him in the abdomen. Y. went home and told his girlfriend that he had been shot by a tall man. He then went to a hospital where doctors established that he was heavily drunk and had eight gunshot wounds in the abdomen. Y. was operated on, but the projectiles were not found (see the surgeon\u2019s evidence at paragraph 23 below). 9.  On 1 March 2007 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of having shot Y. On the same date they searched the applicant and found on him a black revolver with a white stripe on its grip. A subsequent expert examination revealed that that was a flare gun and that it would be impossible to injure someone by firing it. 10.  On 3 March 2007 the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat in the presence of the applicant and attesting witnesses. During the search the police found another gun, a gas pistol modified so as to be able to fire live ammunition, bullets and explosive material. 11.  On 6 March 2007 the police questioned Y., who was undergoing treatment in hospital. He stated that he had met Do., Sh., Ty. and O. between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. on 27 February 2007. After that he had gone to a caf\u00e9 where he had seen a small man about forty years of age wearing a light-coloured leather coat. Y. had seen the man several times before, because he lived near Y.\u2019s house. Y. left the caf\u00e9 at about 1 a.m. on 28 February 2007 and was heading home when that man shot him with a small revolver with a white stripe. Y. stated that he would be able to recognise the person who had shot him. 12.  On the same day the investigator carried out an identification parade. The applicant, who was forty-five years old and wearing a light-coloured leather coat, was invited to sit next to T., who was fifty-nine years old and wearing a dark-coloured leather coat, and G., thirty years old and wearing a black coat. The applicant sat between T. and G., and the investigator invited Y. into the room. The latter immediately approached the applicant and asked him \u201cWhy did you shoot me?\u201d This was recorded in a police report, which the applicant signed without raising any objections. 13.  On 13 March 2007 the police carried out a face-to-face confrontation between Y. and the applicant. The victim confirmed that the applicant had shot him. The parties have not submitted to the Court the record of that confrontation. In his subsequent appeal (see paragraph 28 below) the applicant\u2019s lawyer alleged that there was a discrepancy between the victim\u2019s original statement and his statements at the confrontation in that at the confrontation the victim claimed that he had seen the applicant only once before the attack. 14.  On 5 May 2007 Y. committed suicide for unknown reasons. 15.  On 1 June 2007 the applicant asked the investigator to question Sh. (see paragraph 6 above), to extract the bullets from Y.\u2019s body and to establish whether they had been fired from the pistol found in his flat (see paragraph 10 above). 16.  The investigator refused the applicant\u2019s request, stating that the police had made an attempt to question Sh., but he had refused to give evidence, relying on his privilege against self-incrimination, and that it was impossible to extract the bullets from the victim\u2019s body because the victim\u2019s mother had not permitted the exhumation of his body. 17.  The applicant\u2019s case was submitted to the Mena Court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) for trial. The indictment stated that the applicant had shot Y. with the pistol which had been found in his flat. 18.  At the first hearing the trial court granted the applicant\u2019s request to summon and question Sh. The court also decided of its own motion to summon and question O. (see paragraph 6 above). 19.  At the same hearing the court questioned Ty. (see paragraph 6 above) in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. Ty. stated that in the evening of 27 February 2007 he had been with O., Sh. and Do. Y. had turned up and had had a fight with Do. After the fight O. had been covered with blood and had repeated, \u201cI\u2019ll do it to him\u201d. At around 9.25 p.m. Y. had left. The applicant and his lawyer did not challenge the accuracy of Ty.\u2019s statements and did not ask him any questions. 20.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer subsequently lodged further requests, insisting on the questioning of O. and Sh. On 15 October 2007 the court ordered the police to bring those individuals to the next hearing. However, O. and Sh. did not appear, for unknown reasons. 21.  On an unspecified date the trial court questioned K., the caf\u00e9 employee (see paragraph 6 above). She stated that at around midnight on 27 February 2007 she saw the applicant standing near the caf\u00e9 and observing the victim. 22.  The forensic expert, Z., stated that the revolver found on the applicant (see paragraph 9 above) was a flare gun and that it was impossible to injure someone by firing it. The bullets found in the applicant\u2019s flat fitted into the pistol found in the same flat (see paragraph 10 above). The possibility that the gun and the bullets had been used to injure Y. could not be excluded. The revolver and the gun were of approximately the same size and colour; the revolver had a white stripe on the grip, whereas the pistol did not. Whether a person would be able to distinguish between them depended on the person\u2019s perceptiveness. The trial court also examined both weapons: it noted that both weapons were small, fully fitting into the hand, were the same colour (black) and that the only difference between them was that the revolver had a revolving cylinder while the pistol had a magazine. 23.  Dr N., the surgeon who had operated on the victim, stated that he had discovered no projectiles in the body in the course of the surgery, even though X-rays had shown small foreign objects in the victim\u2019s tissues. 24.  The investigator who had organised the identification parade, and T., who had been in the identification line-up with the applicant (see paragraph 12 above) stated that during the identification parade they had seen Y. confidently identify the applicant as the perpetrator, approach the applicant and ask \u201cWhy did you shoot me?\u201d. 25.  Y.\u2019s mother stated that her son had told her that he had been shot by a man in a brown coat and a hat. His girlfriend reported Y.\u2019s words after he had been shot (see paragraph 8 above). 26.  Before the trial court the applicant and his lawyer argued that the gun had been planted in the applicant\u2019s flat by the police. They said that Y.\u2019s statements concerning the gunman\u2019s appearance and crime weapon were inconsistent. As the victim had been heavily drunk at the time, he could not have seen the gunman clearly enough to identify him later. The applicant admitted that in the evening on 27 February 2007 he had visited the caf\u00e9. He had been wearing a leather coat and a hat. The applicant and his lawyer requested the court to order a psychiatric examination to assess whether Y.\u2019s state of mind would have allowed him to see and identify the person who had shot him. The court refused their request as irrelevant for the consideration of the case. 27.  On 16 November 2007 the trial court convicted the applicant of grievous bodily harm and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The conviction was based, in particular, on:\n(i)  the victim\u2019s statements given during the pre-trial investigation, including in the course of the face-to-face confrontation with the applicant (see paragraph 13 above);\n(ii   the results of the identification parade (see paragraph 12 above);\n(iii)  the results of the examination and forensic expert analysis of the pistol and the revolver (see paragraph 22 above);\n(iv)  the statements of Ty., K. (the caf\u00e9 employee), of the participants in the identification parade, and the victim\u2019s girlfriend and mother (see paragraphs 19, 21, 24 and 25 above).\nThe court held that the inconsistencies in the victim\u2019s statements could be explained by the fact that he had been drunk at the time, had been suffering from serious injuries, and by the fact that the shooting had taken place at night on a dark street. 28.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed. He stated that Y. had been heavily drunk, so he could not have seen the gunman; the pistol and the bullets found in the applicant\u2019s flat did not belong to him and had been planted by the police; the trial court had not given due consideration to the statements of Ty.; during the identification parade the applicant, T. and G. had been seated, therefore Y. had been unable to assess their height; during the same parade only the applicant had worn a light-coloured leather coat and had been in his forties, exactly like the gunman Y. had described. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also pointed out an inconsistency between the victim\u2019s original statement and his statement in the course of the confrontation with the applicant in respect of whether the victim had known the applicant before the attack (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). 29.  In a judgment of 17 January 2008 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal found that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been sufficiently established on the basis of the victim\u2019s statements and the forensic examinations. Just before the search, the applicant had opened the flat with his own keys and the search had been conducted in the presence of attesting witnesses, so the gun and the bullets could not have been planted. Before the trial court T. had confirmed that during the identification parade Y. had recognised the applicant as the gunman. The Court of Appeal pointed out that there were no reasons to doubt the truthfulness and reliability of the statements which Y. had given during the pre-trial investigation. 30.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed in cassation, raising the same arguments as those raised before the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 28 above). They also complained that neither Y. nor the witnesses proposed by the applicant (see paragraph 20 above) had been called and questioned by the trial court. 31.  On 4 June 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in cassation. 32.  In February 2009 the applicant\u2019s sister, who was representing the applicant before the Court at that time, asked the trial court to give her the police records of the questioning of Y. and his girlfriend, documents concerning the applicant\u2019s search after his arrest, the minutes of the court hearings, and the police report concerning the identification parade. On 6 March 2009 the trial court replied that it was not legally empowered to give copies of documents after the termination of criminal proceedings. 33.  On 13 May 2009 the Court asked the applicant\u2019s sister to provide copies of the applicant\u2019s appeals, stamped by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to prove that they had been received by both courts. 34.  On 16 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s sister requested the Mena Court, the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court to send her those documents. 35.  On 24 June 2009 the Supreme Court replied that it was not empowered to give copies of documents. 36.  The Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal suggested that the applicant\u2019s sister address the trial court with her request for the documents. 37.  The trial court replied that the applicant\u2019s sister had already received a copy of the appeal lodged with the Court of Appeal and the trial court was not empowered to send her another copy. The trial court did not give her any information about the cassation appeals lodged with the Supreme Court. 38.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant was taken to the trial court and allowed to study the case file. For unknown reasons, it did not contain the appeals in cassation lodged by the applicant and his lawyer or the decision of the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above). 39.  On 28 February 2012 Mr Tarakhkalo, the applicant\u2019s new representative (see paragraph 2 above) asked the Supreme Court for a copy of the appeals in cassation lodged by the applicant and his lawyer. He received those copies and submitted them to the Court on 27 March 2012.", "references": ["2", "7", "0", "6", "9", "4", "1", "5", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6.  The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7.  On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8.  According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant\u2019s house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9.  On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10.  On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the investigation into the applicant\u2019s criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11.  On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12.  On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13.  On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant\u2019s case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14.  On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15.  On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16.  On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17.  On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18.  On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor\u2019s office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19.  On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20.  On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21.  On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator\u2019s office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH \u2013 approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 22.  On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23.  The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24.  On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25.  On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant\u2019s appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.", "references": ["9", "0", "8", "6", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea. 6.  On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor County Court (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) discontinued the criminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking. 7.  On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 8.  On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor\u2019s office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking and opened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office. 9.  On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare \u2013 \u201cAVAB\u201d) joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)), the damage that it had allegedly incurred as a result of the applicant\u2019s abuse of office. 10. On 16 August 2002 the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the seizure of the applicant\u2019s movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes. 11.  On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor\u2019s office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial. 12.  Between 7 October 2002 and 6 February 2006 the Bihor County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant. 13.  On 13 February 2006 the County Court examined the applicant\u2019s case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damage as a result of his actions. Consequently, the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant\u2019s assets. It also convicted the applicant of bribe taking and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended. 14.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 15.  Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16.  Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant\u2019s request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court\u2019s determination of the case. 17.  On 8 April 2010 the County Court examined the applicant\u2019s case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB\u2019s civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however, of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  The applicant and AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 19.  Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate. On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 20.  The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe Court of Cassation\u201d). 21.  Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 the Court of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare his case. 22.  By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact and law in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, but his criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts. 23.  On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts\u2019 judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.", "references": ["8", "1", "7", "2", "4", "6", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and has been serving a prison sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison since 16 January 2002. 5.  On 16 May 2014 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He also complained that toilets were not properly partitioned from the rest of the cells and thus the prison staff could see him use the toilet. He submitted that his health had deteriorated as a result of the inappropriate conditions of his detention and claimed 450,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 130,300 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 6.  On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant\u2019s claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 7.  The court also quoted the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) on its visit to Lithuania in 2012. According to that report, nearly all the inmates in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison were confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day, with no out-of-cell activities other than outdoor exercise lasting one hour in small and dilapidated yards (see paragraph 13 below). The court noted that the prison administration had not provided any evidence that the situation in the prison had changed. 8.  Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9.  The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the \u201cscope, intensity and duration\u201d of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision in its entirety.", "references": ["2", "4", "8", "3", "5", "6", "7", "0", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Toretsk. 5.  In December 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Dzerzhynsk Court against the Social Insurance Fund (\u201cthe Fund\u201d), seeking damages for injuries caused by a work-related accident. 6.  By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7.  In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal (\u201cthe statement of intent\u201d; \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e \u0430\u043f\u0435\u043b\u044f\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0440\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court\u2019s stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court\u2019s stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8.  In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant\u2019s appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund\u2019s appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 9.  According to the transcript of the court hearing on 18 March 2008, the applicant\u2019s representative stated during the hearing that the applicant had lodged the statement of intent on 25 January 2008 and the appeal itself on 13 February 2008. She also stated that they were not challenging the judgment of 17 January 2008 as regards the application of the law but rather were merely seeking an award of the full amount of damages claimed by the applicant. The applicant\u2019s representative also asked the Court of Appeal to reject the Fund\u2019s appeal. The applicant submitted that at the hearing his representative had also produced a copy of his appeal and had asked the Court of Appeal to join it to the case file; however, the latter refused to do so. 10.  The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11.  On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation had been lodged in \u201cApril 2007\u201d.", "references": ["6", "1", "9", "8", "2", "0", "4", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Poltava. 6.  On 18 April 2003 the applicant\u2019s employer, Grebinkivska District State Administration (\u201cthe Administration\u201d), received a statement from the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor\u2019s office dated 17 April 2003 (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s statement\u201d). The document analysed the amount of preventive social work performed by the applicant in connection with minors in 2002 and concluded that the applicant, as the head of the juvenile service department of the Administration, had no knowledge of the relevant law and displayed an irresponsible attitude towards her professional duties. The document contained a demand that the applicant be disciplined. 7.  On 21 April 2003 the Administration examined the prosecutor\u2019s statement and decided to give the applicant a warning against the use of excessive formalism in her work. On 14 May 2003 the Administration informed the prosecutor\u2019s office of the actions taken in consequence of their consideration of the prosecutor\u2019s statement. 8.  On 10 April 2004 the applicant brought civil defamation proceedings against the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor\u2019s office, Prosecutor Mr B., the Poltava Region prosecutor\u2019s office and the State Treasury of Ukraine, alleging that the prosecutor\u2019s statement contained untrue information relating to her professional activity and that this negative evaluation of her attitude to work had damaged her honour, dignity and professional reputation. She asked the court to order the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor\u2019s office to retract the prosecutor\u2019s statement and to pay her compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9.  On 8 December 2005 the Pyryatynskyy District Court of Poltava Region applied defamation law as contained in the Civil Code of 2003, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office Act and the Information Act. It considered the case on its merits and allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. 10.  On 17 July 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal did not challenge the approach of the first-instance court in considering the case under civil law defamation provisions. However, it disagreed with the application of the Civil Code of 2003 and applied the old Civil Code of 1963. It partly allowed the claim and increased the level of compensation awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage. 11.  On 20 September 2006 the State Treasury of Ukraine appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court. 12.  On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision of 17 July 2006 and closed the proceedings, finding that the case should not have been examined in civil proceedings. The court indicated that the prosecutor\u2019s statement should have been contested either before a superior prosecutor (in accordance with section 22 of the Prosecutor\u2019s Act) or before \u201ca court\u201d. The Supreme Court also ruled that, according to paragraph 4 of Resolution no. 7 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dated 28 September 1990, entitled \u201con the application of legislation by the courts regulating defence of honour, dignity and reputation of citizens and organisations\u201d (\u201cthe Resolution\u201d), it was not possible to file a civil defamation claim in respect of statements contained in courts\u2019 decisions or decisions of various investigative bodies.", "references": ["1", "5", "7", "8", "0", "2", "9", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Sochi. 5.  The applicant obtained three judgments in her favour against various domestic authorities specified in the Appendix. 6.  The judgments were either enforced with a delay or remained unenforced until the date of receipt of the parties\u2019 latest submissions, as specified in the table below. 7.  According to the Government, to enforce the judgment of 23 June 2005 the authorities held a public auction to determine a company to perform the renovation of the applicant\u2019s flat in Yakutsk. On 3 October 2008 the applicant refused to let the employees of the winner private company in, and they were unable to start the renovation works in the flat. In November 2008 the bailiffs sent a notification to the applicant that the renovation works were scheduled for 19 November 2008, but the notification was never delivered to her, as in the meantime she had moved to a different town. In March 2009 the bailiffs and the local administration employees attempted to visit the flat in question and compiled an act on the applicant\u2019s absence from the flat. 8.  On 11 November 2004 the Justice of the Peace of the 41st Court Circuit of Yakutsk granted the applicant\u2019s complaint about the bailiffs\u2019 inaction in various rounds of the enforcement proceedings concerning other judgments in her favour and ordered the bailiffs\u2019 service of Yakutsk to pay the applicant 200,000.15 Russian roubles (RUB) of compensation. 9.  The applicant requested to amend the judgment, to replace the respondent authority by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Referring to the applicant\u2019s request, on 9 February 2005 the Justice of the Peace, of the 41st Court Circuit of Yakutsk annulled the judgment of 11 November 2004 and ordered that the proceedings be reopened. 10.  In May 2005 the case was forwarded for examination to the Yakutsk Town Court according to the jurisdiction rules, on the respondent\u2019s request. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the decision to transfer the case; the final decision was issued on 16 June 2005 by the Yakutsk Town Court. On 28 June 2005 the proceedings were suspended on the applicant\u2019s request. Since that date the applicant had not lodged any further applications with domestic courts. On 20 December 2005 the Yakutsk Town Court left the applicant\u2019s action against the bailiffs without examination, for the applicant\u2019s lack of interest in maintaining the case. The applicant did not appeal against the decision. 11.  On 19 November 2004 the Yakutsk Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s civil action against the municipal unitary enterprise \u201cPayment Processing Centre\u201d (\u041c\u0423\u041f \u00ab\u0415\u0420\u041a\u0426\u00bb) of Yakutsk. The court found that the respondent company, when calculating the communal charges, had failed to take account of the water provider\u2019s failure to supply water to the applicant\u2019s flat in summer, as well as of the applicant\u2019s absence from home for a specific period of time. The court ordered the enterprise (1) to count RUB 25,500 already paid by the applicant towards her debt in respect of communal charges; to recalculate the charges on account of (2) the applicant\u2019s long-term absence and (3) the lack of hot water supply; and (4) to provide information about communal services already paid by her. 12.  On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The court found, in particular, that the enterprise was a due respondent, as the Yakutsk administration had delegated to it the power to collect communal charges from the population. 13.  The debtor company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration. The company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. The parties did not provide information on its core activities. It appears that it was, inter alia, in charge of collection of communal charges from local population. It also provided programming, data processing and IT consultancy services. 14.  According to the Government, on 14 December 2004 the company\u2019s activity was discontinued as the company was re-structured in the form of transformation (\u0440\u0435\u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0432 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f) and incorporated as open joint-stock company OAO \u201cPayment Processing Centre\u201d (\u00ab\u041e\u0410\u041e \u0415\u0420\u041a\u0426\u00bb, \u201cthe OAO\u201d). On the same date a relevant record was made in the Register of Legal Entities. The parties did not provide information on the owners of the newly-created company\u2019s shares, did not submit a copy of the transfer and acceptance act and did not provide any details on the legal succession issue. 15.  On 21 January 2005 the writs of execution were issued in respect of the judgment of 19 November 2004, and on 1 February 2005 the enforcement proceedings were opened. 16.  Referring to a \u201cnotification\u201d dated 19 April 2005 by the municipal unitary enterprise \u201cPayment Processing Centre\u201d[1], the Government submitted that on an unspecified date the judgment had been enforced in part, in so far as the obligations to count the amount toward the applicant\u2019s debt and to recalculate the charges on account of the lack of hot water were concerned. They did not submit a copy of the notification. 17.  It appears that on 6 September 2007 the writs were returned to the bailiffs by an unspecified person or authority without execution. 18.  On 12 September 2007 the bailiffs\u2019 service discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the remaining part of the judgment on account of the impossibility to enforce it and returned the writs of execution to the Yakutsk Town Court. The parties did not provide copies of the relevant documents. 19.  According to the Government, on 23 August 2008 the OAO was liquidated.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "7", "8", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1960 and 1959 respectively and live in Vilnius. 5.  In 1991 the applicants\u2019 grandfather, P.S., applied for restoration of his property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. In 1994 the administrative authorities acknowledged that P.S. had the right to have his property rights restored. 6.  On 28 September 2004 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored P.S.\u2019s property rights by giving him 8.17 hectares of land, consisting of several plots in Kry\u017eiokai and Naujaneriai, areas in the Vilnius city municipality. 7.  On 25 May 2005 P.S. sold a plot of 0.50 hectares out of the 8.17 hectares given to him to S.M. On 30 June 2005 P.S. sold a plot of 1.27 hectares to \u017d.J. Both sale agreements were certified by a notary. 8.  On 26 July 2005 P.S. died. The applicants were issued with a certificate of inheritance in respect of his estate on 21 December 2005. 9.  On 28 July 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.\u2019s property rights to 2.50 of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled. The prosecutor submitted that 2.50 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovi\u010d and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.\u2019s property rights to that part of the land, the applicants\u2019 property rights to it also be annulled. 10.  The applicants and the VCA disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. However, on 21 October 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. On 24 May 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicants, and on 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on points of law, upholding the lower courts\u2019 decisions in their entirety. 11.  On 15 December 2008 the prosecutor lodged a further claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.\u2019s property rights to 0.15 hectares of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled, on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants\u2019 property rights to that part of the plot annulled. Since the 0.15 hectares had been sold to S.M. (see paragraph 7 above), the prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.\u2019s property rights, the sale agreement between him and S.M. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 12.  The applicants disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. However, on 10 December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. The court annulled P.S.\u2019s property rights to the 0.15 hectares, as well as the sale agreement between P.S. and S.M. with respect to that amount of land. It stated that the applicants, as P.S.\u2019s heirs, had to take over his legal obligations, and ordered them to return to S.M. what he had paid for the 0.15 hectares \u2013 49,500 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 14,340 euros (EUR)). 13.  On 23 September 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicants, and on 11 April 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on points of law, upholding the lower courts\u2019 decisions in their entirety. 14.  The Court has not been informed whether the applicants have paid the amount of LTL 49,500 (approximately EUR 14,340) to S.M. 15.  On 14 November 2008 the prosecutor lodged yet another claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.\u2019s property rights to 0.87 hectares of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled, on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants\u2019 property rights to that part of the plot annulled. Since the 0.87 hectares had been sold to \u017d.J. (see paragraph 7 above), the prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.\u2019s property rights, the sale agreement between him and \u017d.J. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 16.  The applicants disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim, but on 8 March 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. The court annulled the VCA\u2019s decision to restore P.S.\u2019s property rights in the part concerning the 0.87 hectares, as well as the sale agreement between P.S. and \u017d.J. in respect of that amount of land. It ordered the applicants, as P.S.\u2019s heirs, to return to \u017d.J. what she had paid for the 0.87 hectares \u2013 LTL 188,730 (approximately EUR 54,660). 17.  The applicants appealed against the first-instance court\u2019s decision, but on 12 July 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld it in its entirety. The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 19 September 2011 the Supreme Court refused to examine it on the basis that it raised no important legal issues. 18.  On 22 August 2013 the applicants paid to \u017d.J. the amount of LTL 188,730 (approximately EUR 54,660), as well as LTL 6,440 (approximately EUR 1,865) in bailiff\u2019s expenses. 19.  On 23 February 2012 the applicants received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d) confirming that, after the courts had annulled P.S.\u2019s property rights to 3.52 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to this letter. 20.  On 24 July 2012 the applicants received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for the applicants to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area, but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as being given a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid.). They were also informed that there remained about 0.10 hectares of vacant land in Kry\u017eiokai, so if they wished to receive a plot in that area, their request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 21.  On 21 August 2012 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS. They submitted that the annulment of their property rights to 3.52 hectares of land had caused them pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 627,630 (approximately EUR 181,770), consisting of the value of the 2.50 hectares of land which had been taken away from them (see paragraph 9 above), according to a private assessment, as well as the amounts which the applicants had been ordered to pay to S.M. and \u017d.J. (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above). In the applicants\u2019 view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicants asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when they might expect to receive one. They also stated that they would agree to receive a plot of land in Kry\u017eiokai but would first want to know its exact location. The applicants stated that they did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 22.  On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Kry\u017eiokai. The applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive 3.52 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting at which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The applicants took part in that meeting and chose four plots, measuring a total of 0.8035 hectares. As regards the remaining land, they stated that they would wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in their case.\nHowever, as it appears from the information at the Court\u2019s possession, those four plots were eventually not given to the applicants, for reasons not provided to the Court. 23.  On 21 August 2014 the NLS adopted a land plan of the aforementioned areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. The applicants were included in the list and were entitled to receive two plots of land, measuring a total of 0.203 hectares. The applicants later submitted to the Court that those two plots included installations and buildings belonging to third parties. 24.  On 21 April 2015 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS, asking it to temporarily suspend the planning of the two aforementioned plots \u201cwhile court proceedings [were] ongoing\u201d (kol vyksta teismai). The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 letter must have been referring to the proceedings before the Court, as no relevant domestic proceedings had been ongoing at that time. 25.  On 25 May 2016 the applicants took part in another candidates\u2019 meeting and chose three plots, measuring a total of 0.23 hectares. It does not appear that they were offered any more plots at that meeting. 26.  In another candidates\u2019 meeting held on 10 July 2018 the applicants were offered a plot of 0.1239 hectares in joint ownership with a third party, but they refused it on the grounds that such joint ownership would not be financially beneficial to them. 27.  On 11 October 2018 the NLS adopted a decision to restore P.S.\u2019s property rights by giving him 0.23 hectares of land. The decision stated that his rights to the remaining 3.29 hectares would be restored at a later date. 28.  At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (15 October 2018), the applicants\u2019 property rights to 3.29 hectares of land had still not been restored.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "3", "0", "4", "6", "8", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in \u0130zmir. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant and his brother sell building materials. The applicant claimed that on 8 January 2007, while he and his brother were driving in their van to their place of work in \u0130zmir, a number of plain-clothes police officers on two motorbikes indicated to him that he should pull over. The police officers then told him that he had been driving erratically and asked him to get out of the vehicle. The applicant and his brother had got out of the van and asked to see the police officers\u2019 identity cards. The police officers then became agitated and started hitting the applicant\u2019s brother. When the applicant asked them to stop, they sprayed him with tear gas and he fell to the ground. Then one of the police officers put his fingers in the applicant\u2019s nostrils and pulled him up and the applicant tried to push that police officer away. The applicant then heard one of the police officers cocking his pistol. Thinking that the plain-clothes police officers, who had refused to show him their identity cards, could in fact be robbers, the applicant got hold of a wooden stick from the back of his van to defend himself. At that moment, one of the police officers, C.U., fired three rounds towards the applicant. One of the bullets hit the applicant\u2019s abdomen and he fell to the ground. The police officers then handcuffed the applicant and his brother. One of them grabbed the wooden stick and started hitting the applicant\u2019s brother, while another officer hit and kicked the applicant. Although the applicant\u2019s brother asked the officers to take the applicant to a hospital, they did not listen to him. Instead, the applicant and his brother were taken to a police station, where they were placed in custody. The applicant\u2019s brother had shouted and asked the custody officers to take his brother to a hospital. 8.  The applicant was subsequently taken to the accident and emergency ward of a hospital, where he underwent surgery. The doctors observed a bullet entry hole, five centimetres above his navel, and a corresponding bullet exit hole on the lower lumbar, three centimetres above the sacrum. The doctors noted that, as it travelled through the applicant\u2019s body, the bullet had damaged the applicant\u2019s small and large intestines, and considered his injury to be life-threatening. It was also stated in a medical report that his injury would prevent him from working for a period of forty\u2011five days. A neurosurgeon who examined the applicant concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries amounted to a \u201cpermanent deterioration in the functioning of one of his organs or his nerves\u201d. It was also established in December 2008 that as a result of having been shot, the applicant had developed \u201cpost-traumatic stress disorder\u201d and \u201csevere depression\u201d. Three neurosurgeons who examined the applicant stated in their report of 11 December 2009 that they had observed atrophy (wasting away of the muscle) of the applicant\u2019s thigh muscles and sensory loss on the front of the thighs. Finally, according to a report issued by a hospital in \u0130zmir on 19 April 2010, as a result of the applicant\u2019s injury, his ability to work had been reduced by 27% (see also paragraph 53 below). 9.  On 22 May 2008 a prosecutor filed an indictment with the \u0130zmir Criminal Court of First Instance and charged Officer C.U. with the offence of intentionally causing a life-threatening injury. The same day the prosecutor also decided not to bring any proceedings against Officer C.U. and the remaining officers in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment and an objection lodged by the applicant against that decision was rejected on 31 October 2008. 10.  On 4 June 2008 the \u0130zmir Criminal Court of First Instance considered the possibility that the offence attributed to Officer C.U. could be reclassified as \u201cattempted murder\u201d, and forwarded the case file to the \u0130zmir Assize Court, which had jurisdiction to deal with such offences. 11.  In the course of the investigation and the trial, Officer C.U. maintained that he had not shot the applicant intentionally and that his pistol had accidentally fired when he and the applicant had had a scuffle. 12.  The Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the applicant had not been shot at close range. 13.  On 15 March 2010 the First Chamber of the \u0130zmir Assize Court found that Officer C.U. had fired in the air twice before firing in the direction of the applicant without aiming at a particular part of his body. Contrary to what was claimed by Officer C.U., there had been no scuffle between him and the applicant when Officer C.U. had fired his weapon. It also found that, although Officer C.U. had not attempted to kill the applicant, he had used disproportionate force and caused an injury which had threatened the applicant\u2019s life. The Assize Court sentenced Officer C.U. to five months\u2019 imprisonment but suspended the pronouncement of his conviction under Article 231 of the Criminal Code of Procedure (see \u201cRelevant Domestic Law\u201d below). 14.  The applicant lodged an objection against the Assize Court\u2019s decision and argued, in particular, that the decision to suspend the pronouncement of the conviction would encourage other police officers to carry out similar acts against members of the public. 15.  The objection was rejected by the Second Chamber of the \u0130zmir Assize Court on 7 June 2010. 16.  In the meantime, the applicant instituted proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior before the \u0130zmir Administrative Court and claimed 11,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In its decision of 17 June 2010 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court found the Ministry responsible for the damage suffered by the applicant and awarded him TRY 712 (approximately 370 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 50,000 (approximately EUR 26,000) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus statutory interest. The Ministry of the Interior appealed against the decision. 17.  On 21 April 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the \u0130zmir Administrative Court\u2019s decision insofar as it concerned the pecuniary damage but quashed the part of the decision concerning the non-pecuniary damage because it considered that the applicant had also been partly responsible for the incident. 18.  The case file was returned to the \u0130zmir Administrative Court which decided on 24 February 2016 to award the applicant TRY 20,000 (approximately EUR 6,200 at the time) plus statutory interest in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The appeal lodged by the applicant against this finding is currently pending.", "references": ["8", "5", "7", "9", "2", "6", "3", "4", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Pervomayskiy, the Krasnodar Region. 5.  In 1967-95 the applicant worked in the Far North of Russia. His family was entitled to assistance in resettlement from the Kamchatka Region pursuant to the Federal Target Program \u201cConstruction of housing for persons moving from the Far North Areas\u201d. 6.  The program was adopted on 10 July 1995 by the Government of Russia, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation no. 1122 of 23 September 1992. It provided, inter alia, for construction of housing for persons wishing to resettle from the Far North to various Russian regions. The program was financed by the federal and regional budgets. The client for the entire program was a state scientific and production company S.M. 7.  In 1994 S.M. and the State Unitary Enterprise \u201cUnited Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region\u201d (the GUP) concluded a co\u2011operation agreement. S.M. undertook to build an apartment block in Inzhavino of the Tambov Region, provide assistance with residence registration and compensate 30 per cent of the flats\u2019 price in case they were occupied. The GUP undertook to pay for the housing. 8.  At a later stage in 1994 the applicant and the GUP concluded a shared-construction agreement in respect of a flat in the apartment block in Inzhavino. The GUP undertook to provide the applicant with the flat and to transfer it to the applicant\u2019s ownership once it was accepted for exploitation, and the applicant was to pay the price of the flat. He paid the amount due. 9.  In 1995 S.M. built the flats and transferred them to the GUP, which was acting for the administration of the Kamchatka Region, to be registered as the administration\u2019s property. The GUP then transferred the flat to the applicant, whose title to the flat was registered. However, expert examinations in respect of the adjacent flats in the same apartment block revealed a number of serious breaches of the sanitary and construction which made the apartment block unsuitable for living. 10.  On 2 February 2001 the applicant brought a court action against the GUP for non-compliance with contractual obligations and provision of appropriate housing in accordance with the contract, instead of the flat initially provided to him. 11.  On 21 June 2001 he modified the claims asking to dissolve the shared-construction agreement, declare the apartment block to be not in compliance with the construction norms, and pay him damages. On 22 June 2001 the expert examination was ordered by the court, and in December 2001 the expert report was submitted to the court. In the meantime, the case was joined with a number of similar cases against the same defendant. 12.  On 13 February 2002 the Inzhavinskiy District Court of the Tambov Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) rejected the claim. On 25 March 2002, acting on the applicant\u2019s appeal, the Tambov Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for a new examination, for the court\u2019s failure to establish substantial facts of the case and to examine some items of evidence referred to in the judgment. 13.  On 15 July 2002 the District Court again rejected the claim. On 21 August 2002 the Regional Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and found that the lower court had incorrectly applied the domestic law provisions on statutory limitations. It quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for a new examination. 14.  On 11 September 2002 the District Court allowed the claim in part and ordered the defendant to pay the applicant an amount of money. On 23 October 2002 the Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal and found that the lower court had raised and examined issues falling outside the scope of the applicant\u2019s claims. It annulled the first-instance judgment and sent the case for a fresh consideration by the first-instance court. 15.  On 28 January 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant a sum of money which was larger than that pursuant to the judgment of 11 September 2002. On 26 March 2003, on the appeal of the applicant\u2019s counsel, the Regional Court quashed the judgment, in particular, for a failure to address the important circumstances of the case, and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 16.  On 20 June 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in part and declared the contract at issue null and void. On 22 July 2003 the District Court supplemented its judgment of 20 June 2003. Both parties appealed. On 20 August 2003 the Regional Court annulled the judgments, having found that the lower court had incorrectly applied the norms of substantive law, and ordered a new examination of the case by the first-instance court. 17.  On 1 December 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in full. On 10 March 2004, on the appeal of the defendant, the Regional Court set aside the judgment as it contained an incorrect interpretation of the substantive law, and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18.  The applicant modified his claim, requesting replacement of the flat by a new one of appropriate quality, in line with the consumer protection law. 19.  On 5 May 2005 the District Court rejected the claim. The applicant appealed. On 27 July 2005 the Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment. The applicant applied for supervisory review proceedings. 20.  On 20 April 2006 the Presidium of the Regional Court granted his request, quashed the judgments of 5 May and 27 July 2005 as issued in breach of procedural and substantive law, and ordered that the case be re\u2011examined by the first-instance court. 21.  The applicant modified the scope of the claims. He claimed the dissolution of the shared-construction agreement, as well as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and court expenses. 22.  By a judgment of 17 July 2006 the District Court allowed the claim in part. It established that the flat built for the applicant by the company did not comply with the sanitary and technical requirements. The court ordered the dissolution of the shared-construction agreement between the applicant and the State Unitary Enterprise \u201cUnited Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region\u201d concerning the construction of housing. The court further obliged the respondent enterprise to pay the applicant 644,570 Russian roubles (RUB)[1] in damages, RUB 300,000[2] in penalty and RUB 12,277[3] in costs and expenses. The court further ordered that the flat be transferred in the local administration\u2019s ownership. The applicant appealed. On 20 December 2006 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 July 2006. 23.  On 31 January 2007 the writs of execution were sent by the district court to the applicant. 24.  According to the Government, on 2 November 2007 the applicant applied to the bailiffs\u2019 service with a request to open the enforcement proceedings and enclosed a copy of the writ of execution. On the same date the enforcement proceedings were opened. 25.  Between 28 April and 25 September 2008, by several instalments, the debtor company transferred the amounts due under the writs to the applicant\u2019s known banking account. However, the money returned to the company as the account had been closed in the meantime. 26.  On 19 September and 7 November 2008 the bailiffs requested that the applicant updates his banking account information. On 31 October 2008 the bailiffs\u2019 service informed the applicant that the debtor had paid the amount due under the judgment, and re-invited him to submit his banking details. 27.  On 6 February 2009 the applicant provided the requested information. On the same date the amount awarded by the domestic court was paid to him in full. 28.  The State Unitary Enterprise \u201cUnited Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region\u201d (the GUP) was set up by a decision of the administration of the Kamchatka Region. The company, incorporated as a unitary enterprise at the material time, had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. The founder was the owner of the assets. 29.  It appears that at the material time the GUP was involved in the construction of socially-important objects in the Kamchatka Region. It used to be a client for construction, major overhaul and reconstruction, represented the regional administration in the respective transactions and was in receipt of the relevant budgetary funds. In particular, in 2002-2005 the company on several occasions became a client and managed funds in respect of construction projects under various Federal Targeted Programs related to housing provision, including resettlement from the Far North, housing for orphans and veterans, and received funds from the regional budget for that purpose. Since August 2004 the company was \u201ca regional State client\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0447\u0438\u043a) in respect of the housing subsidies\u2019 allocation for citizens leaving the Far North areas.", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "7", "9", "6", "8", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chernivtsi. 6.  In October 2002 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region issued a writ of enforcement in a case against a private company, U. The parties did not provide any documents related to the proceedings against company U. 7.  Under that writ in March 2005 the State Bailiffs\u2019 Service seized, among other property items which belonged to company U., an industrial construction (a 2,000 sq. meters metallic shed) of a declared worth of 98,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) equivalent at the material time to around 13,950 euros (EUR). 8.  In December 2005 the State Bailiffs\u2019 Service concluded an agreement with a private company M. to hold an auction in order to sell the seized shed. 9.  On 3 April 2006 the applicant participated in this auction and bought the above construction for UAH 26,000 (at the material time around EUR 4,200). The applicant submitted copies of the bills according to which he had paid the above amount in full. 10.  On 10 August 2006 the applicant sold the shed to a private person T. for UAH 50,000. 11.  On an unidentified date, a third person S. lodged an administrative claim against the bailiffs and the applicant seeking to declare the bailiff\u2019s seizure and sale of the shed unlawful as in fact it belonged to him. In view of this claim, in October 2006 the sales contract between the applicant and T. was annulled by the parties and the applicant returned the money to T. On 23 November 2006 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region found that the shed belonged to S. and thus the bailiffs had unlawfully seized and sold it. There is no information as to whether there was an appeal against this decision. 12.  In parallel, criminal proceedings for abuse of office were initiated against bailiff D. in charge of the respective enforcement proceedings. On 16 March 2007 the applicant was given victim status in these proceedings. In the relevant resolution it was noted that the applicant sustained pecuniary damage and had not been reimbursed the money he had paid at the auction. The amount of the damage aggravated the charges against the bailiff. 13.  On 2 August 2007 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court convicted the bailiff as charged. In the text of the sentence the applicant is referred to as a witness. Apparently, no civil claim was submitted by the applicant in the course of these criminal proceedings. There is no information whether there was an appeal against this sentence. 14.  In May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Bailiffs\u2019 Service and the local department of the State Treasury claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The applicant referred to provisions on compensation of damage of the Civil Code of Ukraine, in particular Article 1174, and to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine \u201cOn the State Bailiffs\u2019 Service\u201d according to which damage caused to an individual by actions or omissions of a state official, in particular, by a bailiff during enforcement proceedings, had to be compensated by the State (see paragraphs 19 and 21 below). 15.  On 1 December 2008 the Sadgirskyy District Court of Chernivtsi found for the applicant based on the above legislative provisions. It awarded the applicant UAH 60,262 (equivalent to around EUR 6,884) which comprised: i) cost of the shed (UAH 26,000); ii) bank commission (UAH 262); iii) lost income (UAH 24,000) and iv) non-pecuniary damages (UAH 10,000). 16.  Following the defendant\u2019s appeal, on 12 March 2009 the Chernivtsi Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. The court held that since the applicant was not a party to the enforcement proceedings in the case against company U. he could not claim damages from the bailiffs under Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine \u201cOn the State Bailiffs\u2019 Service\u201d (see paragraph 21 below). The court of appeal did not examine the applicability of the Civil Code provisions, relied upon by the applicant and the local court. The court further noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the shed had been in fact seized from him without any compensation, or that the sales contract with company M. in charge of the auction had been dissolved. 17.  The applicant appealed in cassation stating that he no longer owned or used the shed as its seizure and sale were found unlawful by the court decision of 23 November 2006 (see paragraph 11 above) and it had been returned to S. He noted that the money he paid at the auction had not been reimbursed. He thus sustained damages. To support his claim the applicant reiterated again the Civil Code provisions. 18.  On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to open cassation proceedings finding the cassation appeal ill-founded.", "references": ["0", "5", "7", "2", "1", "4", "8", "6", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in Poarta Alb\u0103 Prison. 6.  On 19 July 2007 the authorities initiated an investigation of their own motion in connection with a network of drug dealers coordinated by C.B.S. 7.  On the same day the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice authorised the police division responsible for combatting organised crime and drug trafficking to use an undercover agent in order to identify members of the network. The justification given for such an operation was that, on the basis of information gathered during a preliminary criminal investigation, there was a strong indication that the applicant belonged to a drug-dealing network which provided drugs such as cannabis, ecstasy and hashish to drug users known to him in Craiova. 8.  The authorisation for the operation was extended three times, on 18 August, 17 September and 16 October 2007 respectively. 9.  The interception and recording of the applicant\u2019s phone conversations was also authorised. The meetings between the applicant and the undercover agent were recorded. 10.  On 19 July 2007 the undercover agent approached the applicant, asking to buy cannabis or any other drug from him. According to the report drafted by the agent on the same day, the applicant confirmed that he had a small amount of cannabis and hashish in his possession and offered to sell it to the agent. He sold to the undercover agent on that occasion 1.59 grams of cannabis, 0.23 grams of hashish and a cigarette containing cannabis. 11.  At the undercover agent\u2019s request they met again on 25 July 2007. The undercover agent asked for more drugs. The applicant informed him that he had none, but promised to find a supplier. He subsequently bought two ecstasy pills from C.B.S. and on 27 July 2007 he met the undercover agent and sold him the pills. 12.  After the undercover agent telephoned him again requesting more drugs, the applicant bought three pills of ecstasy from N.F. and handed them over to the undercover agent on 2 August 2007. 13.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant supplied the undercover agent with 0.43 grams of cannabis. 14.  On 17 August 2007 the police officers, acting in league with the undercover agent, caught the applicant red-handed while he was selling 7.54 grams of cannabis to the undercover agent. 15.  The applicant also had in his possession five small packages of cannabis and a small envelope containing hashish. 16.  The applicant was immediately remanded in police custody. His home was searched on the same day and the police officers found 350 grams of cannabis. 17.  The applicant gave a statement in the presence of a lawyer appointed on his behalf. He pleaded guilty to the accusation of drug trafficking. The next day the applicant was questioned again in the presence of a lawyer of his own choosing. He stated that initially he had only been a user (but not a seller) of drugs. In 2003 he had decided to stop using drugs. In 2007 he had encountered some financial difficulties and had accordingly decided to sell cannabis that he had found growing wild on public spaces in Craiova and a village in the city\u2019s neighbourhood. On several occasions he had gathered the cannabis and sold it to different buyers. He also acknowledged selling hashish that he had procured from C.B.S., one of his friends. He had also sold ecstasy pills that he had obtained from N.F., a girl he had met in May 2007 in a holiday resort. She had told him that she had bought ecstasy pills while living in Spain and that before returning home she had sent a parcel containing ecstasy pills to her home address. They had met again several times after the holiday and she had informed him that she could obtain more ecstasy pills from her brother, who was living abroad. 18.  Five co-defendants (who were allegedly members of the same network of drug dealers) were taken into police custody on the same day. Arrest warrants were issued in their names and their pre-trial detention for thirty days was ordered on 18 October 2007 by the Dolj County Court. 19.  On 12 September 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice issued an indictment naming the applicant and five co-accused, and the case was registered with the Dolj County Court. 20.  On 17 October 2007 the prosecutor in charge decided to join the applicant\u2019s file to another criminal file concerning other offences involving drug-trafficking allegedly committed by one of the applicant\u2019s co\u2011defendants. In that file another undercover agent and his collaborator were authorised to operate. 21.  The applicant gave evidence again on 5 March 2008 before the Dolj County Court. He partly maintained the statement that he had given earlier, during the criminal investigation. He contended that the cannabis he had gathered from the public space located near Craiova\u2019s stadium had been for his own use and not for selling. He also stated that he had not sold drugs to anyone other than the undercover agent. 22.  On 14 May 2008 the county court heard evidence from the undercover agent, in the presence of the applicant who was assisted by his lawyer. The undercover agent stated that he had been introduced to the applicant by a drug user, who had informed him that the applicant had been trying to find buyers for hashish and cannabis. He also stated that it had been the applicant who had proposed that he obtain a large quantity of ecstasy pills for him. 23.  In his last oral and written submissions the applicant\u2019s lawyer contended that the use of an undercover agent had been illegal. 24.  By a judgment of 5 September 2008 the Dolj County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking under Article 2 of Law no. 143/2000 and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. When determining his sentence, the court \u2013 referring to Articles 74 (a) and (c) and 76 of the Romanian Criminal Code \u2013 took into account as mitigating circumstances the applicant\u2019s good behavior before and after committing the crime. 25.  The court based its findings on (i) the statements given by the co\u2011defendants, the undercover agent and witnesses, (ii) the transcripts of the recorded phone conversations, and (iii) technical and search reports. It held that the applicant\u2019s defence argument \u2013 according to which he had acted at the undercover agent\u2019s instigation \u2013 was not viable as the undercover agent had not forced the applicant to sell him drugs. He had merely called the applicant several times and asked him to sell him different drugs.\nMoreover, the defence argument was contradicted by the statements given by the applicant during the criminal investigation and by C.B.S., one of the co-accused. Accordingly, the court concluded that the use of the undercover agent in the case had been lawful. 26.  The court furthermore noted the extensive criminal activity engaged in by the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, including C.B.S. (who provided most of the drugs that the applicant sold to the undercover agent) and imposed on them prison sentences. It also noted that the investigating authorities had found out that the cannabis sold by the co-accused had been gathered from a park located in Craiova and that it had been cultivated by C.B.S. Moreover, C.B.S. had been caught red-handed with 102 ecstasy pills when taking delivery of a parcel received by post. 27.  The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the undercover agent had overstepped the legitimate limits of investigation by influencing him and inciting him to sell drugs. He also contended that he had merely been a drug user and not a drug dealer. 28.  On 19 November 2008 the Craiova Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and partly set aside the judgment of the first\u2011instance court. It reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to four years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended, and placed him on probation. The appeal court upheld the lower court\u2019s reasoning in dismissing the entrapment plea. 29.  The prosecutor\u2019s office and all the accused, including the applicant, lodged appeals on points of law. 30.  The applicant submitted that \u2013 as was clear from the transcripts of the recorded phone conversations \u2013 all the drug transactions had taken place at the initiative of the undercover agent. He argued that prior to 19 July 2007, when he had been approached by the latter (see paragraph 10 above), he had not been known as a drug dealer. He also claimed that even though he had been under police surveillance between July and November 2007, no buyer other than the undercover agent had been identified. 31.  The High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s appeal and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It quashed the decision of 19 November 2008 (see paragraph 28 above) and upheld the judgment of 5 September 2008 (see paragraph 24 above). The court of last resort addressed all the arguments submitted by the applicant and his lawyer, including the matter of his having been incited by an agent provocateur. It considered the applicant\u2019s plea of entrapment to be unfounded.", "references": ["2", "9", "1", "4", "7", "0", "8", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 in Khabarovsk and is serving a life sentence in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6.  From 25 May 2012 to 10 April 2014 the applicant was held in penal colony IK-56 in the Sverdlovsk Region. He was able to have five short visits in 2013 and one short visit in 2014. 7.  On 15 July 2013 the applicant asked the governor to allow him a short meeting with four adult relatives, his mother, sister and two cousins. He also asked for the meeting to be held without a glass partition between him and his visitors or the presence of a prison officer. The governor signed his decision on the petition: \u201cRejected. Not allowed under the Code of Execution of Sentences\u201d. 8.  From 15 May to 16 July 2014 the applicant was transferred to remand prison SIZO-1 in Khabarovsk \u2013 where his family still lived \u2013 to take part in another investigation. 9.  On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members \u2013 his sister, two cousins and aunt \u2013 without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre\u2011trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10.  On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11.  The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that \u201cthe authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences\u201d. 12.  The applicant challenged the restrictions on family visits before a court of general jurisdiction. According to the information from the Government, all of his challenges were dismissed as unfounded. 13.  According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.", "references": ["9", "0", "2", "7", "1", "6", "5", "3", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Washington DC, the United States of America (hereafter \u201cthe USA\u201d). X, the second applicant, was born in 1998 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The applicants are father and daughter. The first applicant lodged the application on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, who was underage at the material time. 7.  Until 2008 the first applicant had been living in Moscow together with his wife E. and their daughter, X. 8.  In June 2008 the family moved to the USA. X started to attend school there. 9.  On 2 December 2008 X moved to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to live with her maternal grandparents temporarily, as her mother had become seriously ill. 10.  On 26 December 2008 E. died of cancer in the USA. 11.  On 4 January 2009 the first applicant went to Tashkent for E.\u2019s funeral. He then returned to the USA to deal with the necessary formalities, temporarily leaving X in Tashkent with her maternal grandparents, B. and S., because her state of health after her mother\u2019s death prevented her from travelling. An agreement was concluded between the first applicant and his parents-in-law that they would take X to Moscow as soon as he returned there from the USA. 12.  The first applicant returned to Moscow in March 2009. However, B. and S. refused to take X to Moscow. 13.  During the following months the first applicant applied to the Russian Consulate in Uzbekistan, to the Russian Embassy in Uzbekistan and to the Russian Ministry of International Affairs for assistance in recovering his daughter. 14.  By letter of 29 September 2009, the Ministry of International Affairs informed the first applicant that on 18 September 2009 officials from the Russian Consulate in Uzbekistan had visited B., S. and X in their home in Tashkent. They had found that X\u2019s living conditions were excellent. She had a separate room with all necessary facilities, including a personal computer with access to the Internet. She attended a local school and numerous extracurricular activities and was an exemplary pupil. B. had told the officials that the first applicant had not visited his daughter. B. had been worried that if X returned to the first applicant, she would not be taken good care of. He had also considered that it would not be in X\u2019s best interests to move to the USA. She would be better off living in Tashkent where her mother was buried and where most of her family and friends lived. X had told the officials that she missed her father and could not understand why he had not visited her for so long. The officials had concluded that there were no obstacles preventing the first applicant from visiting his daughter in Tashkent and eventually taking her away with him. 15.  On 9 October 2009 the Uzbek childcare authority visited X. The officials found that X\u2019s living conditions were good. X told them that she missed her father but preferred to live with her grandparents. 16.  On 9 January 2010 the first applicant arrived in Tashkent. He went to X\u2019s school where he was able to talk to her. B. and S., however, prevented him from visiting X again or taking her away with him. 17.  On 19 July 2010 the Tashkent childcare authority visited X and found that her living conditions were comfortable and that she was taken good care of by her grandparents. She attended school and extracurricular activities. 18.  In July 2010 the first applicant complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Khamzinskiy District of Tashkent that B. and S. were unlawfully retaining his daughter. By letter of 20 July 2010, the prosecutor\u2019s office replied that he was free to take his daughter away at any time. If B. and S. prevented him, he should apply to an Uzbek court. 19.  On 1 September 2010 the first applicant applied to the Cheremushinskiy District Court of Moscow, seeking X\u2019s return to him. He submitted that his parents-in-law were unlawfully retaining his daughter against his will. They were preventing him from seeing X and from contacting her by telephone or via the Internet. He also submitted that there was a strong attachment between him and X and that X was suffering as a result of being separated from her father. 20.  The Cheremushinskiy District Court registered the case on 3 September 2010 and invited the parties for a talk on 27 September 2010. 21.  On 27 September 2010 the Cheremushinskiy District Court asked the childcare authority to prepare an opinion on the case and scheduled the first hearing for 19 October 2010. 22.  The hearing of 19 October 2010 was adjourned until 19 November 2010 at the first applicant\u2019s request. 23.  On 21 October 2010 the Moscow childcare authority visited the first applicant\u2019s flat in Moscow and found it comfortable. They also questioned his uncle, who stated that the first applicant lived and worked in the USA. He had a comfortable income and a spacious flat. He had bought medical insurance for X and had enrolled her in the best school in the area where he lived. He also stated that B. and S. had been preventing the first applicant from contacting X, in particular by cutting off her telephone and Internet access. 24.  On 13 November 2010 the Moscow childcare authority visited a flat belonging to B. in Moscow and found it comfortable. On the same day the Moscow childcare authority questioned B.\u2019s representative, who stated that the first applicant lived in the USA, often travelled for work and could not therefore take care of his daughter. He did not support her financially and did not visit her. B.\u2019s representative also conceded that B. was preventing the first applicant from contacting his daughter. 25.  Hearings were held on 19 November and 15 December 2010. The first applicant reiterated the arguments set out in his complaint of 1 September 2010. He also stated that he permanently lived and worked in the USA, had a stable income and could provide his daughter with everything she needed. He complained that S. and B. were not only preventing him from contacting X, but were also exercising influence on her in order to set her against him. He also submitted the following documents from the USA: X\u2019s school records; X\u2019s and his own character references from the neighbours, X\u2019s teachers and the parents of her school friends; certificates from his employer confirming his income and health insurance covering himself and his daughter, and stating that his post was based in Washington, DC, and did not require frequent travel; an opinion by the doctor who had treated X\u2019s mother that, in view of an increased hereditary risk of cancer, X needed regular medical supervision in a specialised clinic; and a description of the first applicant\u2019s flat in Washington, DC, by a real\u2011estate agent. 26.  B. and S. stated that they were worried that the first applicant would not have sufficient time to take care of X because he had to travel a lot for work. They were taking good care of their granddaughter and supported her financially because her father did not pay any child maintenance. X had been born in Tashkent, attended school there and had many friends. Neither her father nor her paternal grandparents, who also lived in Tashkent, visited X or showed any interest in her life. X\u2019s return to her father against her will would traumatise her. They submitted affidavits by X\u2019s teachers that when the first applicant had visited X at school in January 2010, the girl had been frightened and had asked them to call her grandparents. 27.  The next hearing was scheduled for 24 January 2011. The court ordered B. and S. to bring X to testify at that hearing. 28.  On 20 January 2011 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that, given that the parents had priority rights over anyone else in raising their children, X should be returned to her father. 29.  On 24 January 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court discontinued the civil proceedings, finding that civil proceedings between the same parties and concerning the same facts were pending before Uzbek courts. 30.  On 2 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision to discontinue the proceedings. On 8 April 2011 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 24 January 2011 on appeal as unlawful. 31.  On 19 April 2011 the mayor of the Mirzo-Ulugbek District of Tashkent appointed S. as X\u2019s guardian, finding that her mother had died, that her father\u2019s whereabouts were unknown and that she had been brought up by S. since 2008. 32.  On 28 April 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court resumed the proceedings and scheduled the next hearing for 27 May 2011. 33.  The hearing of 27 May 2011 was adjourned until 21 June 2011 because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear. 34.  At the end of the hearing of 21 June 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court decided to send a request for assistance to the Uzbek courts, asking that X be questioned about the following matters:\n\u2013  whether her grandparents were preventing her from seeing or contacting her father;\n\u2013  when she had seen her father for the last time;\n\u2013  whether she missed her father;\n\u2013  whether she wanted to live with her father; and\n\u2013  whether she talked to her father over the telephone and, if so, on whose initiative the telephone calls were made. 35.  On 20 July 2011 the Russian Ministry of Justice forwarded the request to their Uzbek colleagues. 36.  On 24 October 2011 the Ulugbekskiy District Court of Tashkent questioned X. Assisted by a specialist from the childcare authorities and by her guardian, S., X stated that her grandparents did not prevent her from contacting her father. She had access to the Internet and was present on social networks. She would like to contact her father, but she did not know his telephone number or email address, and had no social network account for him. She had seen her father for the last time about two years earlier. She missed him and would like to see him more often, but she would prefer to live with her grandparents. 37.  On an unspecified date the Cheremushinskiy District Court received the questioning record and scheduled the next hearing for 15 November 2011. 38.  The hearings of 15 November and 22 December 2011 were adjourned because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear. The next hearing was scheduled for 1 February 2012. 39.  On 31 January 2012 the first applicant asked that the hearing of 1 February 2012 be held in his absence. He submitted that he was prevented from travelling to Moscow and that his counsel was on maternity leave. They could not therefore attend the hearing. 40.  The hearing of 1 February 2012 was adjourned until 27 February 2012 because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear and because the childcare authority needed additional time to prepare a new opinion on the case, taking into account the child\u2019s wishes. 41.  On 27 February 2012 the childcare authority issued a new opinion on the case. It found that X should remain with her grandparents. 42.  On 27 February 2012 the Cheremushinskiy District Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s request for X to be returned to him. Taking into account X\u2019s wishes and the opinion of the childcare authority, the court held that it would be in X\u2019s best interests to remain with her grandparents. 43.  On 26 March 2012 the first applicant lodged appeal submissions. He complained, in particular, that the excessive length of the judicial proceedings had resulted in X\u2019s getting used to living with her grandparents. He also complained that X had not been questioned by the District Court. Her questioning by an Uzbek court should not be taken into account because she had been under the influence of her grandparents, who had been present during the questioning. Lastly, the first applicant argued that under Russian law he had a right to priority over any other person in raising his daughter. The District Court\u2019s judgment had legitimated X\u2019s unlawful retention by her grandparents, who hindered any contacts between him and his daughter. All telephone numbers had been changed and, despite his repeated requests, he had not been given his daughter\u2019s new telephone number. Her social network account had been inactive since January 2009. His relatives\u2019 numerous attempts to visit X had been unsuccessful, as B. and S. had refused to let them into the house. By contrast, he had had the same telephone number and email address for at least ten years and X knew them. If she had unlimited access to telephone and the Internet, as B. and S. claimed, she could have contacted him without any difficulty. The first applicant claimed that those facts could have been easily verified but the District Court had failed to do so. 44.  Meanwhile, on 29 February 2012, the Mirzo-Ulugbek District Court of Tashkent, Uzbekistan, deprived the first applicant of parental authority over X at S.\u2019s request. The District Court noted at the outset that it had been unable to obtain the first applicant\u2019s submissions on the case. It had sent two requests for assistance to a competent Russian court, asking it to collect the first applicant\u2019s submissions; the Russian court had however replied that it was impossible to obtain the first applicant\u2019s submissions because he did not live at his registered place of residence. The District Court then found that X had been living with her maternal grandparents since 2008. The first applicant had not taken part in her upbringing and had not supported her financially. He had visited her only once, in 2010. The District Court also took note of X\u2019s statement that she no longer remembered her father and wished to live with her grandparents. 45.  On 18 May 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 February 2012 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 46.  On 8 October 2012 a judge of the Moscow City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the first applicant to the Presidium of that Court for examination, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 47.  In June 2015 X moved to Moscow with her grandparents.", "references": ["0", "9", "2", "5", "3", "6", "8", "7", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and, at the time of the last communication from him to the Court, was detained in Torez Correctional Colony. 6.  The applicant, represented by a lawyer, stood trial before the Kerch Court on charges of engaging in sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, A. (born in 1999), over the period between March 2006 and April 2007. The applicant denied the charges, asserting that he may have broken A.\u2019s hymen by accident while bathing her. 7.  On 27 July 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  The judgment was based, in particular, on\n(i) the victim\u2019s statements made at the pre-trial stage;\n(ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant;\n(iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim\u2019s hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant\u2019s genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness.\nAccording to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his \u201cinternal sexual organs\u201d, he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time. 9.  On 11 September 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence of his guilt. The appeal contained the following statement:\n\u201cThe court\u2019s conclusion as to my guilt is based only on indirect evidence and on the statement of a minor [A.], made in the course of the pre-trial investigation and who, according to a psychiatric expert\u2019s analysis, was suffering from mental retardation\u201d (\u0412\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0434 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430 \u043e \u043c\u043e\u0435\u0439 \u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0441\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434\u043e\u043c \u0442\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u0441\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a \u0436\u0435 [sic] \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u043c\u0430\u043b\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0442\u043d\u0435\u0439 [A.], \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0438, \u0438 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430\u044f, \u0441\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e-\u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u044b, \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0443\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e). 11.  The applicant submitted that the breaking of A.\u2019s hymen was explained by the fact that he had accidentally penetrated her with his finger while bathing her. However, even if such a penetration had been intentional, it would not have constituted the offence of rape. 12.  The applicant further complained of the trial court\u2019s refusal to order an additional expert examination to determine whether he had any diseases of his \u201cinternal sexual organs\u201d which would have prevented him from sustaining an erection and engaging in sexual intercourse. 13.  The applicant asked the Supreme Court to reclassify his actions as \u201cabuse of a minor\u201d (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043d\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043b\u0456\u0442\u043d\u0456\u0445), a lesser offence than rape, and to impose a non-custodial sentence. 14.  On 9 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to consider the case in cassation and upheld the lower courts\u2019 findings. 15.  On 27 November 2008 the Court\u2019s Registry asked the applicant to provide copies of his appeal, his appeal in cassation and the decision of the Supreme Court in his case, to supplement his application. 16.  He accordingly requested those documents from the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 17.  On 19 January 2009 the Court of Appeal advised the applicant that he needed to address his request for the copies to the trial court. 18.  On 26 January 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that it was not empowered to send him the requested copies. 19.  On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that it was not the court\u2019s practice to issue copies of appeals in cassation or of its decisions.", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "7", "1", "5", "9", "6", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1983 and currently lives in Paris. 11.  In September 2003 she arrived in Moscow from Chechnya and started working at an insurance company. In October 2003 she went to a mosque where she met V. and Ku., two young Russian women who had converted to Islam. 12.  In December 2003 the applicant was stopped on the street by two policemen for an identity check. She was then taken to a police station to have her identity verified. According to the applicant, she was released from custody several days later following the intervention of a certain A., who was also an ethnic Chechen and was employed as a police officer attached to the organised crime division of the Moscow police department. In the meantime she was dismissed by her employer because of her unauthorised absence from work. 13.  In February 2004 A. helped the applicant to be reinstated at work. He also found a flat for her, where he visited her on several occasions. The applicant shared the flat with V. and Ku. The flat was located in a dormitory block which belonged to the police department. It was equipped with concealed videotaping and audiotaping devices. The police placed the applicant under surveillance because she was suspected of affiliation with a terrorist group related to the Chechen insurgency movement. The Moscow City Court authorised the use of secret surveillance devices in the flat from 5 February until 4 March 2004. 14.  On the evening of 4 March 2004 the applicant was stopped by a police patrol for an identity check as her physical appearance allegedly matched the profile of a suspect in a wanted persons notice. The applicant immediately telephoned A., who spoke briefly with the police officers who had stopped her. The applicant was then taken to a police station because the official registration of her stay in Moscow had expired, which constituted an administrative offence under Russian law. 15.  At the police station, the applicant was informed that she had been apprehended (\u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0430). Her bag was searched by a female police officer I. in the presence of two attesting witnesses, B. and K., and her fingerprints were taken. The record of the personal search showed that the search of the applicant lasted from 8.35 p.m. until 9.03 p.m. During the personal search, I. discovered two square packages of an unknown substance wrapped in aluminium foil inside the applicant\u2019s bag. The substance, together with the inner lining of the applicant\u2019s bag and the pockets of her jacket, was taken for forensic examination. The forensic examination report stated that the applicant\u2019s fingerprints were taken at 9.30 p.m. The police did not test the applicant\u2019s hands for residue from the substance; nor did they check for her fingerprints on the packages found in her bag. Later the same day the applicant was arrested on charges of terrorism and questioned by the police. A criminal investigation was opened. 16.  On 12 March 2004 an expert examination of the substance found in the applicant\u2019s bag was carried out. The examination report showed that the substance contained 196 grams of Plastit-4, an industrial explosive prepared using hexogen. In the course of the examination the explosives were destroyed. The examination of the applicant\u2019s bag and the lining of the pockets of her jacket revealed the presence of hexogen. 17.  The police searched the flat where the applicant lived with V. and Ku. and seized a note that had been handwritten by the applicant. The note criticised Russian policy in Chechnya, spoke harshly of Russia and Russians, glorified suicide bombers, preached the way of jihad, vindicated acts of terrorism in Russia and included a statement about \u201c...dreaming of falling [in a] martyr\u2019s death as a shahid on the path of Allah\u201d. The police also found several photographs of an escalator in the Okhotniy Ryad shopping centre in the centre of Moscow. 18.  A transcript of the conversations on the video tapes recorded at the flat showed that the applicant had been proselytising Islam to V. and Ku., discussing her hatred for Russians and the need for a \u201choly war\u201d against them, praising the leaders of the Chechen insurgency, and telling her flatmates about the insurgent camps in the Caucasus. 19.  In the course of the investigation the applicant, represented by her defence lawyer, had pre-trial confrontations with witnesses V. and Ku. as well as with police officers S. and I., who had taken part in her arrest and personal search. The applicant had the opportunity to present her account of the events and to put relevant questions. 20.  On 12 October 2004 the applicant submitted the following motion to the investigating authorities.\n\u201cToday, 12 October 2004, I was charged with [preparing an act of terrorism]. I completely disagree with the charges. I consider that in my case evidence of my innocence and my lack of connection with this case have not been gathered.\nI request you to [provide] subpoena records of [my mobile phone calls] on 3 and 4 March 2004, since on those dates the police officers who took me from work and brought me to [the police station] where plastic explosives were planted had talked with A.\nI request you to question him [A.], and put the following questions to him: 21.  The next day an investigator granted the motion in the part concerning the questioning of A., questioned him and informed the applicant about the decision on her motion. 22.  When questioned A. testified that at the end of December 2003, on the order of his superiors, he had established a relationship of trust with the applicant, who had also introduced him to V. and Ku. He further stated that with the support of the police department he had helped the applicant to find accommodation. She had moved into a flat in the dormitory block belonging to the police department with V. and Ku. On 4 March 2004 the applicant had called him because she had been stopped by a police patrol. He had advised her to obey the orders of the police officers and to follow them to the police station. 23.  The applicant and her defence lawyer, who had been duly informed about the contents of the record of A.\u2019s questioning, did not attempt to put any further questions to him, nor did they request the investigator to conduct a pre-trial confrontation. 24.  On 2 December 2004 the applicant received a copy of the case file for review. On 7 December 2004 the applicant was indicted with preparing an act of terrorism (an explosion) in the Okhotniy Ryad shopping centre and inciting V. and Ku. to commit an act of terrorism. The bill of indictment mentioned A. in the lists of both defence and prosecution witnesses to be summoned to the trial. However, A.\u2019s testimony was merely mentioned by both the prosecution and the defence. The bill of indictment did not contain any information going beyond the statements made during the above\u2011mentioned questioning, and which were neither cross-referenced with any other evidence nor used to substantiate any specific factual or legal point. 25.  On 17 December 2004 the Moscow City Court held a preliminary hearing. It granted the applicant\u2019s motion to consider her case in a single judge formation, scheduled the trial hearing and ordered that witnesses be called according to the lists presented by the parties and in the bill of indictment. 26.  On 22 December 2004 the applicant\u2019s trial began before the city court. The applicant was represented by two lawyers of her own choosing, U. and S. 27.  The trial proceeded in the following manner. 28.  V. testified at the trial that she and Ku. had first met the applicant at a mosque in October 2003. They had become friends and had started frequenting Islamist Internet chat-rooms and surfing pro-insurgency web\u2011sites together. After a while, they had decided to form a religious community (dzhamaat) to study Islam and live together. In their conversations the applicant had glorified terrorism and had approved of suicide bombings and the methods and targets of the Chechen insurgents. The applicant had told them about a camp near Baku in Azerbaijan where Muslims received training to become suicide bombers, and that she knew someone from there. She had mentioned that she herself had participated in the Chechen war on the side of the insurgents. Together they had often visited an Internet caf\u00e9 in the Okhotniy Ryad shopping centre. The applicant had also taken photos of an escalator in the shopping centre from different positions. 29.  On 3 March 2004 the applicant had told V. and Ku. that if something were to happen to her, they would have to remove all Islamic literature and her diary from the flat, and that they were to call her mother in Chechnya. She had also told them that she had just received a call from a friend who had arrived in Moscow to \u201cblow himself up\u201d, and that she (that is, the applicant) \u201cwas in danger\u201d and \u201cunder suspicion\u201d [by the authorities]. The applicant had not threatened them and had not incited them to commit a terrorist act but had asked them if they were capable of doing so. She had constantly preached \u201cthe way of jihad\u201d to them and had given them Islamist books and audiocassettes. Some of those books had been given to her by her acquaintance, A. 30.  V. denied having seen any explosives in the flat where they had lived. 31.  At the request of the prosecutor, the trial judge allowed V.\u2019s pre-trial testimony to be read out, as it partly contradicted statements she had made at the trial. In particular, during her pre-trial questioning V. had testified that the applicant had undergone terrorist training in a camp near Baku and that she had been indoctrinating V. and Ku. in order to prepare them to become suicide bombers. Asked by the prosecutor to explain her contradictory statements, V. stated that she was not sure whether the applicant had really attended a terrorist training camp. However, she stated that the applicant had been preparing her and Ku. to become suicide bombers. 32.  During her cross-examination at trial, Ku. partly retracted her pre\u2011trial statements, which were for the most part similar to the above statements by V. During the trial Ku. confirmed that she, V. and the applicant had taken photos in the Okhotniy Ryad shopping centre at the applicant\u2019s initiative, and that the applicant had \u201ctaken snapshots randomly\u201d. In particular, the applicant had taken photographs of the escalator and the people on it. Ku. submitted that the applicant had disapproved of the policy of the Russian federal forces in the Caucasus. However, she had not incited Ku. to become a suicide bomber. According to Ku., they had simply wanted to reside together to pray, read and live free from parental supervision. 33.  Ku. further stated that the applicant\u2019s acquaintance, A., was a policeman and that he had paid for the flat where the three of them had lived. He had also occasionally given them money. The applicant had once told her that she liked A. 34.  Ku. further stated that during the pre-trial questioning the investigator had misinterpreted her words concerning a suicide attack and that she had never planned to commit any such attack. She denied having given her pre-trial statements under pressure. In view of Ku.\u2019s change of testimony her pre-trial statements were read out during the trial.\n(b)  Statements by police officers 35.  Several police officers who had participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest and personal search (P., S., B., I. and Ke.) were questioned in court. They stated that the applicant\u2019s arrest had occurred during a regular patrol and they had not been aware that her bag contained explosives. 36.  P. testified that on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest he had decided to check the applicant\u2019s documents because \u201cshe had been walking idly in the direction of the Prospekt Vernadskogo metro station\u201d. She had shown them her passport and the registration stamp confirming her right to stay in Moscow, which had expired. The policemen took her to a police station. At the point of arrest she had been agitated and aggressive. They had decided to search her bag because such action \u201cwas compatible with the law\u201d. P. further explained that he had stopped the applicant \u201cbecause it had been unclear where she had been going to\u201d, because she had \u201cresembled a girl from a wanted persons notice\u201d, and because she was \u201ca person of Caucasian ethnicity [that is to say from the North Caucasus region]\u201d. P. also stated that the expiry of her registration had been sufficient reason to arrest the applicant. He further testified that they had been routinely searching all individuals whose registration had expired. 37.  S.\u2019s testimony was similar. He added that the applicant had been walking quickly and that she had started to threaten the police officers with disciplinary sanctions when they stopped her. 38.  B. testified that they had decided to stop the applicant because she had been wearing black clothing and was of \u201cCaucasian ethnic origin\u201d. He added that the applicant\u2019s appearance had matched the description of someone on their wanted persons notice. He also testified that the applicant had her bag with her up until the moment of her personal search at the police station. 39.  The court also questioned the police officers who had been on duty at the Prospekt Vernadskogo police station on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest. 40.  I. testified that she had searched the applicant in the presence of two attesting witnesses and had found in her bag two square yellow objects wrapped in aluminium foil, which had later been confirmed to be explosives. The applicant\u2019s fingerprints had been taken only once \u2013 after the objects had been discovered in her bag. 41.  Ke. testified that before the search the applicant had had all her personal belongings with her and that it had taken approximately twenty minutes before the start of the search to find attesting witnesses to observe the personal search. 42.  The prosecution extensively questioned all of the police officers about the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s search and fingerprinting. All of them had consistently testified that the applicant had been in possession of her belongings, i.e. her handbag, at all times prior to the search and that she had been fingerprinted only once after the search. The defence only asked police officer B. whether the applicant had been in possession of her handbag prior to the search and police officer Ke. about the manner in which the attesting witnesses were chosen. Both of the questions were put to the above witnesses only once, and there was no relevant follow-up to their answers. 43.  The prosecution finished presenting their evidence on 12 January 2005 without either attempting to call A. to testify at the trial or referring to his pre-trial statements. 44.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges against her. She testified that on 4 March 2004, after the police patrol had driven her to the police station, she had first been taken to a room where a police officer, S., had been filling in some papers. He had told her that she had been arrested and that her fingerprints would be taken. She had left her jacket and bag in that room. Another police officer, B., had then taken her to another room, where another police officer, L., had taken her fingerprints using ink. Afterwards, she had gone to a bathroom to wash the ink off her hands. When she returned to the first room, she was informed that she would be searched in the presence of two attesting witnesses B. and K. The police officer had searched the applicant\u2019s bag and discovered two packages wrapped in aluminium foil, which did not belong to her. The applicant stated that her fingerprints had been taken before and after the search, and that only the second episode had been recorded. 45.  The applicant further stated that the police had questioned her in the absence of a lawyer, and had then decided to detain her. Furthermore, the applicant testified that she had been told to sign a record of her questioning, on pain of ill-treatment. Over the following days she had been beaten by the policemen who were questioning her. However, she had continued to deny her involvement in any terrorist activity. 46.  The applicant stated that the packages found in her bag had not belonged to her, that the police had planted them in her bag and that she had never incited V. and Ku. to commit a terrorist attack. When the prosecutor asked whether she had noticed that her rather small bag had become heavier than it was before the personal search, the applicant stated that she had not noticed anything conspicuous. 47.  She further stated that the six photographs of the escalator that had been seized from her flat had been taken by her. However, she had been photographing people at random in the shopping centre, rather than the escalator, and she had done so for recreational purposes. 48.  The applicant admitted writing the note that had been seized from the flat but stated that she had copied its text from the internet because she had liked it and had simply wanted to have a copy. The applicant\u2019s lawyer argued that her words had been misinterpreted and that there had been nothing in them demonstrating a link to any terrorist activity. She stated that the applicant\u2019s bitter perception of the situation in Chechnya was absolutely natural for someone who had been living in a war zone since childhood and that her words should have been analysed more carefully. 49.  At certain points in her testimony the applicant mentioned A. in passing, stating that they had no personal relationship, that he had helped her with finding accommodation free of charge, that he had called her on the phone, given her two books by the American historian Paul Klebnikov, and that he had told her to follow the policemen\u2019s orders at the time of her arrest. 50.  On 13 January 2005, during the last day of the examination of evidence by the trial court, the applicant\u2019s lawyer U. submitted a motion to play videotapes during the hearing. The relevant part of the trial records reads as follows:\n\u201cLawyer U.: I request to start playing the videotape, since the accused claims that there are multiple discrepancies between the recording and the transcript. I also request to call an interpreter for the translation of the ethnic speech and to view one videotape 5-489c.\nAccused and lawyers: No objections.\nProsecutor: I do not think an interpreter is necessary, since there are transcripts of conversations on the videotapes. In the other part, I agree.\nThe court decided to grant the motion of the defence and to watch the videotape 5\u2011489c, in respect of calling an interpreter \u2013 to refuse [the motion].\n[The videotape recording is viewed for 30 minutes]\nLawyer U. asking the accused: Did these conversations take place?\nAccused: I see nothing illegal in them.\u201d 51.  According to the trial records the defence submitted no requests or complaints concerning the quality of the video-recording or the manner in which the tape was played. 52.  Immediately after viewing the videotape the applicant\u2019s lawyer S. submitted oral motions to summon attesting witnesses B. and K. and police officer A. The relevant part of the trial records reads as follows:\n\u201cLawyer S.: I request to summon the attesting witnesses who were present during the personal search of Murtazaliyeva, that is, B. and K., in order to determine the relevant circumstances [and] whether or not plastic explosives were planted.\nLawyer U.: I support [the motion].\nAccused: I do not dispute that plastic explosives were seized in the presence of these attesting witnesses, but I maintain that they were planted by police officers prior to the personal search. I do not insist on calling these attesting witnesses, but if [the lawyers] consider this necessary, then I agree with them.\nProsecutor: I object, because the accused was questioned and stated that the record [of the search] had been drawn up without any violation of the law...\nThe court decided that the motion for summoning the attesting witnesses would not be granted.\nLawyer S.: I request to summon witness A.\n[The presiding judge informs the parties that witness A. is on a work-related mission outside Moscow and cannot appear in court]\nProsecutor: I request to read out the statements made by witness A. during the pre\u2011trial proceedings.\nLawyer U.: I do not object to the reading out of A.\u2019s statements.\nLawyer S.: I agree to the reading out of his statements.\nAccused: No objections.\nThe court decided under Article 281 of the Criminal Procedure Code and with the agreement of the parties to read out the statements of witness A., made during the pre\u2011trial proceedings.\n[The record of witness A.\u2019s interrogation is read out]\nProsecutor asks the accused: Do you agree with the statements of witness A.\u2019s read out?\nAccused: I agree with these statements in part, but do not agree that he had no contacts with the girls without me and that we maintained contact only over the phone.\u201d 53.  Immediately afterwards the defence proceeded to submit evidence in the form of character references about the accused and lodged motions to subpoena the applicant\u2019s phone records and conduct a forensic psychiatric examination of witnesses V. and Ku.; both motions were refused by the court. Subsequently the defence rested its case. 54.  The presiding judge inquired as to whether the parties wished to continue with further examination of evidence. Using that opportunity, the prosecution motioned to read out the applicant\u2019s diary entries and the defence motioned to strike that evidence out. 55.  After consideration of the above motions the presiding judge repeatedly asked whether the parties were prepared to rest their cases in the absence of those witnesses who had not appeared. There were no objections from either the prosecution or the defence. The trial court closed the examination of evidence and, upon a motion of the defence, adjourned the proceedings until closing arguments on 17 January 2005. 56.  The State prosecutor in his closing argument gave an overview of the entire body of evidence, pointing out inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s allegations of her innocence and the absence of an act giving rise to a crime (both actus reus and mens rea). He asked the trial court to find the applicant guilty as charged and to sentence her to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. 57.  The applicant and her lawyers U. and S. in their closing arguments maintained that the applicant was innocent and that the prosecution had failed to prove her guilt. They provided their own account of the events, alleging that the substance of the accusation was based on misinterpretation of the applicant\u2019s conversations and actions and that the explosives had been planted by the police. The speech by the lawyer U. included the following statement made in passing while describing the applicant\u2019s attitude to the military conflict in Chechnya and religion: \u201cI think that this whole criminal case is a set-up against Murtazaliyeva by law-enforcement agents.\u201d For her part, the applicant\u2019s speech contained the following relevant part:\n\u201c... As to conversations in the apartment, many things do not match. I stated that during the hearing. I submitted a motion for confrontation with A. [He] did not appear in court. I do not admit my guilt on any of the charges ...\u201d\nThe defence\u2019s closing arguments contained one-off statements about the explosives having been planted by the police in the applicant\u2019s handbag, but did not refer to the alleged double fingerprinting or the applicant\u2019s lack of control over her possessions prior to the search, or to any matters concerning the choice and participation of the two attesting witnesses. 58.  On 17 January 2005 the court convicted the applicant of preparing an act of terrorism (an explosion), inciting others to commit an act of terrorism and carrying explosives, and sentenced her to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. The court considered the following evidence:\ni.  the trial and pre-trial statements by V. and Ku., as well as records of their pre-trial confrontations with the applicant;\nii.  the trial and pre-trial statements by police officers S., I., P., B., and Ke., as well as records of S.\u2019s and I.\u2019s pre-trial confrontations with the applicant;\niii.  the records of the search of the applicant\u2019s residence and her personal search;\niv.  a forensic explosives report;\nv.  six photographs depicting the escalator in the Okhotniy Ryad shopping centre, seized at the flat where the applicant lived, as well as a report on an inspection of the shopping centre premises;\nvi.  a note containing extremist statements written by the applicant and seized in the flat where she lived, and a forensic handwriting report on that note;\nvii.  the transcripts of the video tapes recorded in the apartment where the applicant lived;\nviii.  the pre-trial statement by A.;\nix.  the testimony of further prosecution witnesses heard at the trial;\nx.  the testimony of defence witnesses heard at the trial, and character references about the applicant from her places of residence, study and employment. 59.  The judgment referred to witness A.\u2019s testimony only in one part, which read as follows:\n\u201cWitness A. [a police officer] testified that at the end of December 2003 under instructions of his superiors he established relations of trust with Murtazaliyeva; [she] introduced him to her friends Ku. and V., who had voluntarily converted to Islam. In view of Murtazaliyeva\u2019s housing problems and with the assistance of [police authorities] she was provided with a room in a dormitory, where she moved with her friends at the beginning of February 2004; in the evening of 4 March 2004 Murtazaliyeva called [A.] and informed him that she had been stopped by a police patrol for an identity check and that she had been requested to go with them to the police station; he recommended that she follow the policemen\u2019s orders.\u201d\nIn contrast to its approach with regard to the testimony of other witnesses, the court did not cross-reference A.\u2019s statements with those of other witnesses and did not refer to his testimony in support of any conclusions. 60.  The judgment contained a detailed analysis of the trial and pre-trial testimony given by V. and Ku., the applicant\u2019s flatmates, as well as the records of their pre-trial confrontations with the applicant. The court accepted the pre\u2011trial statements by V. and Ku. and the trial statements by V. as valid and persuasive, since they were coherent as well as consistent with the remaining body of evidence. As to the change in Ku.\u2019s testimony at trial, the court considered this to be a strategy to assist the applicant and dismissed it. It noted in particular that Ku., assisted by a defence lawyer, had been repeatedly questioned during the pre-trial investigation and that she had never complained of being subjected to duress by the investigating authorities. When questioned at trial she did not dispute that her previous statements had been given voluntarily and without any psychological or physical influence. Ku. did not provide any reasons for making false pre-trial statements. Moreover, she stated in court that after a conversation with the applicant\u2019s lawyer she had formally complained about psychological duress during questioning, but had subsequently withdrawn that complaint as being untrue. 61.  The court examined and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim that the explosives had been planted in her bag. It referred to the testimony by the patrol officers and the officers at the police station, who had denied those allegations, and to the fact that, according to the official report, the personal search of the applicant had preceded the taking of her fingerprints, and there had been no evidence that the fingerprints had been taken twice, as the applicant had alleged. 62.  The court further found that the applicant must have drafted the text of the handwritten note herself and that she had not copied it from Islamist websites on the internet, as she had claimed, since the note had contained modifications and corrections. 63.  The applicant and her lawyers appealed against her conviction. The statements of appeal submitted by the defence lawyer S. indicated the following:\n\u201c... during the hearing 15 out of 16 videotapes containing records of the secret surveillance were not examined; they have significant evidentiary value, because their comparison with ... testimony of Murtazaliyeva and the key prosecution witnesses V. and Ku. could have had a considerable impact on [the conviction] ...\nMurtazaliyeva claimed and continues to claim in her appeal that there are discrepancies between these video recordings and the transcripts. During the selective viewing of one videotape she was deprived for \u2018technical reasons\u2019 of the possibility to point out the inconsistencies ...\nThe judge did not consider my motion to examine police officer A. as a witness and did not decide on that motion. He limited himself to saying that witness A. [was] on a work-related mission outside Moscow and [could] not appear in court. At the time this appeal is submitted [the case-file] has no documentary proof of that information.\nThe court\u2019s refusal to call and examine attesting witnesses B. and K., who were present during Murtazaliyeva\u2019s personal search, appears unreasonable. [Murtazaliyeva insists that the plastic explosives were planted in her bag by police officers]. No one can recall who invited the attesting witnesses and how, and when ...\nAccording to the testimony by witness A., read out during the hearing and relied upon by the court in the judgment, he talked on the phone not only with Murtazaliyeva, but also with arresting police officers; [these were not the police officers questioned during the hearing, since they did not mention talking to A. in their multiple statements at the pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings]. [Accordingly] the testimony of A. refutes the testimony [of these police officers] and confirms Murtazaliyeva\u2019s claim that she was arrested by other officers when she was leaving her workplace ...\u201d 64.  The lawyer U. in her statement of appeal stated in particular that the defence had requested witness A.\u2019s attendance as both a defence and a prosecution witness. However, that motion had been denied by the trial court with reference to his absence, which was not supported by any documentary evidence. 65.  On 17 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment, reducing the applicant\u2019s sentence to eight years and six months. 66.  The Supreme Court held that the videotape had been shown at the request of the defence and that no objections or complaints, including that not all of the videotapes had been shown, had been lodged with the court after the videotape had been played. 67.  The Supreme Court further considered that the questioning of A. had not been possible due to his absence on a work-related mission and that his pre-trial statement had been read out with the consent of the defence in accordance with Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As for the two attesting witnesses B. and K., their personal appearance had not been necessary since the applicant had claimed that the explosives had been planted in her bag before their arrival. In any event, the defence had agreed to proceed to the closing arguments and had not submitted any objections or additional requests about the examination of the applicant\u2019s case. 68.  In June 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer S. lodged a supervisory review complaint, referring, inter alia, to the trial court\u2019s failure to summon and question witness A. and attesting witnesses B. and K. The complaint in the relevant part labelled A. as \u201ca key witness\u201d, who, following the instructions of his superiors, had \u201ccovered\u201d the applicant for more than two months, provided her with a job and accommodation and controlled her actions and movements, including her arrest. In respect of the attesting witnesses the complaint stated that \u201cthe examination of the attesting witnesses could have resolved the significant contradictions in the statements [and] could have served as the basis to corroborate or disprove the circumstances immediately prior to the search.\u201d 69.  On 13 September 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the supervisory review complaint.", "references": ["2", "8", "0", "6", "1", "9", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Juod\u0161iliai in the Vilnius Region. 5.  In 1991 the applicant\u2019s mother applied for restoration of her property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 6.  On 27 September 2001 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s property rights by giving her a plot of six hectares in Pagiriai, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. As the applicant\u2019s mother had died in 1995, the applicant was issued with a certificate of inheritance in respect of the plot on 13 March 2003. 7.  On 4 December 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s property rights to the six hectares given to her annulled. The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, 5.59 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovi\u010d and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s property rights to the plot, the applicant\u2019s property rights to it also be annulled. 8.  The applicant and the VCA disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. However, on 15 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim and annulled the VCA\u2019s decision to restore the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s property rights to six hectares of land, as well as the applicant\u2019s property rights to that land. 9.  The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision, arguing that the restoration of the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s property rights had complied with the relevant legislation. The applicant also submitted that he was being deprived of his property without any compensation. However, on 1 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision in its entirety. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the lower courts had incorrectly found that the forest on his land constituted an urban forest, but on 25 January 2011 it was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d) confirming that his mother had retained the right to have her property rights to six hectares of land restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in Pagiriai and asked the applicant to inform the authorities of his choice as to one of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 92). It is unclear whether he replied to this letter. 12.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for the applicant to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid., \u00a7 92). He was also informed that there might be some vacant land in Pagiriai, so if he wished to receive a plot in that area, his request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 13.  On 21 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. He submitted that the annulment of his property rights to six hectares of land had caused him pecuniary damage in the amount of 251,217 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 72,760 euros (EUR)), according to an assessment of the value of the land carried out in May 2012. In the applicant\u2019s view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. He asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when he might expect to receive one. If he could not be given such a plot, he wished to receive compensation of LTL 251,217. The applicant also stated that he would only be able to decide whether he wished to receive a plot in Pagiriai after being presented with a plan of a specific plot. He stated that he did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 14.  On 7 October 2013 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant\u2019s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 22 October 2013 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS, he stated that the question of the restoration of his property rights was pending before the European Court of Human Rights, that he was dissatisfied with the available vacant land and that he refused to choose any plots (\u017eem\u0117s sklyp\u0173 nesirinko). 15.  On 22 April 2016 the NLS held another meeting in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he asked to be shown the plots which had been offered to him at their location and not just on a plan. He stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive its decision \uf02d only then would he \u201cdecide what to do with his land\u201d. The applicant examined the land plan but did not make any decisions with regard to the available plots (joki\u0173 sprendim\u0173 nepri\u0117m\u0117), stating that he would \u201cseek solutions from organisations of a higher instance\u201d. 16.  At a subsequent meeting held on 17 May 2016, the applicant stated that he had seen the plots offered to him but that they could not be used according to their purpose because of their uneven surface and the presence of electricity and other installations on them. He therefore \u201csaw no possibility of choosing any plots\u201d (\u017eem\u0117s sklyp\u0173 pasirinkimo galimybi\u0173 nemato). The applicant further stated that the plot which had been taken away from him had been large and of good quality, and that he preferred to \u201cwait for decisions of a higher instance\u201d. 17.  On 9 October 2017 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant\u2019s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 25 October 2017 the NLS held a meeting for candidates in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he was dissatisfied with the size and location of the plots which had been offered to him. He again stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive that Court\u2019s decision \uf02d only then would he decide \u201cwhat to do with the land which had not been returned to him\u201d. He refused to make any decisions during the meeting (susirinkimo metu joki\u0173 sprendim\u0173 nepri\u0117m\u0117) on the grounds that he was \u201cwaiting for a response from a competent institution\u201d. 18.  On 24 November 2017 the NLS held yet another meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in the aforementioned areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he again refused to make any decisions (susirinkimo metu joki\u0173 sprendim\u0173 nepri\u0117m\u0117) and repeated that he was waiting for a response from the European Court of Human Rights. 19.  At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (13 February 2018), the applicant\u2019s property rights to six hectares of land had still not been restored.", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "3", "4", "7", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Komotini. 9.  The applicant\u2019s husband, Moustafa Molla Sali, a member of the Muslim community of Thrace, died on 21 March 2008. On 7 February 2003 he had drawn up a notarised public will in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. He had bequeathed his whole estate to his wife, namely: one-third of a 2,000 sq. m plot of farmland near Komotini; one-half of a 127 sq. m apartment, a parking space and a basement in a block of flats in Komotini; one-quarter of a shop in Komotini with a surface area of 24 sq. m, and another shop measuring 31 sq. m in Komotini, which was subsequently expropriated in return for compensation that has already been paid to the applicant; and four properties in Istanbul. 10.  By decision no. 12.785/2003 of 10 June 2008 the Komotini Court of First Instance, on the basis of a next-of-kin certificate submitted by the applicant, approved the will presented before it. On 6 April 2010 the applicant accepted her husband\u2019s estate by notarised deed. The Treasury was notified and the applicant registered the property transferred to her with the Komotini Land Registry, paying the corresponding registration fees. It does not appear from the case file that the applicant had to pay any inheritance tax on the property transferred to her. 11.  On 12 December 2009, meanwhile, the deceased\u2019s two sisters had challenged the validity of the will before the Rodopi Court of First Instance. They asserted a claim to three-quarters of the property bequeathed. They submitted that they and the deceased belonged to the Thrace Muslim community and that therefore any questions relating to his estate were subject to Islamic religious law (Sharia law) and the jurisdiction of the mufti, rather than to the provisions of the Civil Code. They contended that the application of Muslim customs and Sharia law to Greek nationals of Muslim faith was laid down in the provisions of Article 14 \u00a7 1 of the 1920 Treaty of S\u00e8vres (ratified by decree of 29 September/ 30 October 1923) and Articles 42 and 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (ratified by decree of 25 August 1923) (see paragraphs 65-68 below). They argued that the law of succession applicable to Muslims was based on intestacy rather than testacy. Under Islamic law, where the deceased was survived by close relatives, the will only served to complement the intestate succession. Those provisions had continued to apply after the adoption of the Greek Civil Code, pursuant to section 6 of the Introductory Law to the Code, solely in respect of Greek nationals of Muslim faith living in Thrace. 12.  By judgment no. 50/2010 of 1 June 2010, the Rodopi Court of First Instance dismissed the challenge brought by the deceased\u2019s sisters. It held that applying the Islamic law of succession to Greek Muslims in such a way as to prevent them from disposing of their property in anticipation of their death gave rise to unacceptable discrimination on grounds of religious beliefs. It found that the consequent inability of such persons to draw up a public will was in breach of Article 4 (principle of equality), Article 5 \u00a7 1 (free development of personality), Article 5 \u00a7 2 (principle of non-discrimination) and Article 13 \u00a7 1 (freedom of religious conscience) of the Constitution, as well as Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The court emphasised that even if it should be inferred from section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 (ratifying the Legislative Act of 24 December 1990 on Muslim ministers of religion) that inheritance matters for Muslims were governed by Sharia law, such law should be applied in a manner compatible with the Constitution and the Convention. The incompatibility in the present case had stemmed from interpreting the Islamic law of succession in such a way as to deprive the persons concerned of some of their civil rights, against their wishes. The court added that although the application of Sharia law was based, inter alia, on international law, and in particular on the combined effect of Articles 42 and 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne, it should not result in the Islamic law of succession being applied in such a way as to curtail the civil rights of Greek Muslims, because the aim of the treaty had not been to deprive the members of that minority of such rights, but to strengthen their protection. 13.  The court pointed out that a Greek Muslim contacting a notary in order to draw up a public will was exercising his right to dispose of his property, in anticipation of his death, under the same conditions as other Greek citizens. It was consequently impossible to annul the will or to override any of its legal effects on the grounds that a will of that kind was prohibited by Sharia law. Upholding the claimants\u2019 arguments would thus amount to introducing an unacceptable difference in treatment among Greek nationals on the grounds of their religious beliefs. 14.  On 16 June 2010 the deceased\u2019s sisters appealed against the aforementioned judgment. 15.  On 28 September 2011 the Thrace Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal (judgment no. 392/2011). It emphasised, firstly, that the legislative provisions enacted pursuant to the Treaties of S\u00e8vres and Lausanne had been intended to protect Greek nationals of Muslim faith and were in conformity with the Constitution and the Convention. That applied both to Islamic wills and to intestate succession, and the mufti had no jurisdiction in relation to public wills. The court held that since the testator was free to choose the type of will he wished to draw up in the exercise of his rights and therefore to draw up a public will in accordance with Article 1724 of the Civil Code, he was not obliged to follow Islamic law, which did not cover matters relating to such wills. Furthermore, the mufti had no jurisdiction over the testator\u2019s wishes, which could not be circumscribed. Otherwise, there would be discrimination on grounds of religion, which was unlawful under the general rules on prohibition of discrimination. 16.  More specifically, the Court of Appeal noted that the decision taken by the deceased, a Greek citizen of Muslim faith belonging to the Thrace Muslim religious minority, to ask a notary to draw up a public will, choosing personally to decide how and to whom he would bequeath his property, fell within his legal right to dispose of his property in anticipation of his death, under the same conditions as other Greek nationals. 17.  On 23 January 2012 the deceased\u2019s sisters lodged an appeal on points of law. 18.  By judgment no. 1862/2013 of 7 October 2013 and on the basis of a provision of international law, namely Article 11 of the 1913 Treaty of Athens, and provisions of domestic law, namely section 4 of Law no. 147/1914, section 10 of Law no. 2345/1920 (enacted pursuant to the 1913 Treaty of Athens) and section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 the Court of Cassation allowed the appeal. It noted that section 10 of Law no. 2345/1920 (on the provisional Arch-Mufti and muftis serving Muslims residing in the territory) reproduced the contents of Article 11 \u00a7 8.1 of the Treaty of Athens, pursuant to which muftis exercised their jurisdiction over Muslims in the spheres of marriage, divorce, maintenance payments, guardianship, trusteeship, capacity of minors, Islamic wills and intestate succession. It emphasised that the law governing interpersonal relations among Greek nationals of Muslim faith, as laid down in the above-mentioned treaty ratified by Greece, was, pursuant to Article 28 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, an integral part of Greek domestic law and prevailed over any other legal provision to the contrary. Examining the reasoning of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment, it concluded that that court\u2019s determination of the case had breached the relevant legislative provisions, because the law applicable to the deceased person\u2019s estate had been the Islamic law of succession, which formed part of domestic law and applied specifically to Greek nationals of Muslim faith. It noted that the estate in question belonged to the category of property held \u201cin full ownership\u201d (mulkia) \u2013 public land which had belonged to the Ottoman administration, the full ownership of which had been transferred to private individuals and which had been governed by Sharia law during the Ottoman occupation \u2013 and that, consequently, the impugned public will had to be deemed invalid and devoid of legal effect on the grounds that Sharia law recognised no such institution. 19.  The Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Thrace Court of Appeal. 20.  By judgment no. 183/2015 of 15 December 2015 the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment delivered by the Rodopi Court of First Instance on 1 June 2010. In line with the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment, it held that the relevant legislative provisions had been intended to protect Greek nationals of Muslim faith, constituted a special body of law and did not breach the principle of equality secured under Article 4 of the Constitution or the right of access to a court as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. It pointed out that the law applicable to the deceased\u2019s estate had been Sharia law, because the property bequeathed belonged to the \u201cmulkia\u201d category, and that consequently the public will at issue was devoid of legal effect because Sharia law did not recognise any such institution. It emphasised that the judgments of the Court of Cassation were binding on the courts to which cases were remitted as regards the legal issues determined by those judgments. It therefore considered itself bound by the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment of 7 October 2013 and could not overrule it, thus being unable to allow a request by the applicant to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the interpretation of section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 and of Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Since an appeal on points of law was lodged against that judgment, it was not immediately enforceable. 21.  On 8 February 2016 the applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and the hearing in the Court of Cassation was scheduled for 11 January 2017. She put forward a number of grounds of appeal. 22.  In her first ground of appeal she submitted that the impugned judgment had been insufficiently reasoned as regards one specific point which she considered to have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceedings, namely that it had ignored the question whether her husband had been a \u201cpractising Muslim\u201d, which was a precondition for the application of the special body of law. 23.  The applicant\u2019s second ground of appeal was that section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 and certain Articles of the Civil Code had been incorrectly interpreted and applied. She submitted that the impugned judgment had extended the scope of the provisions creating a separate body of law for Greek nationals of Muslim faith to members of the Muslim community who did not faithfully adhere to Islamic doctrine. 24.  The applicant argued in conclusion that those grounds of appeal had not been encompassed in the legal issue determined by judgment no. 1862/2013 of the Court of Cassation. She pointed out that that judgment had concerned Greek nationals of Muslim faith in general and had not addressed the matter of the law applicable to non-practising members of the Muslim community. 25.  In her additional observations, the applicant contended that the case, which concerned the drawing up of a public will, a possibility afforded to all Greek citizens regardless of religious considerations, fell outside the mufti\u2019s jurisdiction. The specific provisions concerning the Muslim minority could not, in her submission, be applied without violating the individual rights of Muslims as guaranteed under the Greek Constitution, as well as by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 26.  By judgment no. 556/2017 of 6 April 2017 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. It did not refer to the Convention in its reasoning. 27.  As regards the applicant\u2019s first ground of appeal, it declared it inadmissible, finding that it was based on the extent of the deceased\u2019s religious sentiment as a Muslim, a criterion that had no legal effect. It added that the deceased\u2019s Greek nationality did not preclude the application of Sharia law. 28.  As regards the second ground of appeal, the Court of Cassation held that the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment had contained sound reasons, in line with the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment no. 1862/2013. It emphasised that the Court of Appeal had assessed the facts of the case in the light of substantive law and had given sufficient reasons for its determination of the fundamental issue of recognising the invalidity of the will. 29.  That judgment marked the end of the proceedings in respect of the property located in Greece. 30.  As a result of the whole proceedings, the applicant was deprived of three-quarters of the property bequeathed. 31.  In 2011, meanwhile, the testator\u2019s sisters had applied to the Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the will, in accordance with the principles of private international law enshrined in the Turkish Civil Code. They submitted that the will was contrary to Turkish public policy. Hearings were held on 9 February and 26 May 2016, but the court adjourned its consideration of the case on the grounds that the applicant still had to appeal on points of law against judgment no. 183/2015 of the Thrace Court of Appeal. The new hearing in the case was scheduled for 28 September 2017, and then adjourned until 18 January 2018. By the date of the present judgment the Court had yet to be informed of the progress of those proceedings.", "references": ["6", "9", "5", "1", "2", "4", "0", "3", "7", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, a Turkish national, was born in 1980 in Neustadt/Weinstra\u00dfe (Neustadt) and lives in Speyer. He has a daughter of German nationality, born in 2009, who lives with her mother. 6.  The applicant\u2019s parents had migrated to Germany. In 1982 the applicant witnessed the murder of his mother by his father. His father subsequently fled to Turkey, where he was sentenced to imprisonment, and where he continued to live after his release from prison. 7.  After the death of his mother, the applicant lived and grew up, together with his sister, with his grandparents in Neustadt. He was partly accommodated in a daytime clinic and attended a special needs school, from which he was expelled, without a school certificate, for physical violence against a teacher. 8.  On 25 January 1996, the competent authority of the city of Neustadt issued the applicant a permanent residence permit. 9.  Since 1996 the applicant has repeatedly been convicted of criminal offences. On 26 September 1996 the Neustadt District Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to a juvenile sentence of one year and four months, suspended on probation. On 20 July 2000 the same court convicted him on twenty counts of drug trafficking and sentenced him to a juvenile sentence of ten months, again suspended on probation. On 2 July 2001 it convicted him on twelve counts of commercial trafficking of drugs and, cumulating it with the judgment of 20 July 2000, sentenced him to juvenile custody for two years and three months. On 10 January 2002 it convicted him on two counts of attempted aggravated extortion by use of force and, cumulating it with the judgment of 2 July 2001, sentenced him to juvenile custody for four years. 10.  On 18 January 2005 the applicant was released from prison. The execution of the remainder of his sentence was suspended on probation, subject to the condition of long-term therapy for his drug addiction. The applicant subsequently participated in outpatient drug rehabilitation and a methadone programme. 11.  On an unspecified date in spring/summer 2005 a different District Court convicted the applicant of drug possession and fined him. It established that on 7 May 2005 the applicant had been found in possession of heroin. On 9 July 2007 the Neustadt District Court convicted him of several offences committed in 2005 and 2006, including violent and traffic offences, as well as drug trafficking, and sentenced him to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  In June 2008 the sentence was deferred when the applicant was admitted to a specialist clinic for the purpose of receiving drug therapy. The deferment was revoked two weeks later, after the applicant had been expelled from drug therapy for disciplinary reasons. In August 2008 the sentence was again deferred and the applicant was again admitted to a specialist clinic for the purpose of receiving drug therapy. He was diagnosed with polysubstance dependence, which is simultaneous addiction to different drugs, and a dissocial personality disorder. In February 2009 the execution of the remainder of the sentence of the judgment of 9 July 2007 was suspended on probation and the applicant was released from prison. He continued therapy. 13.  On 6 November 2009 the applicant was taken into pre-trial custody. On 9 December 2010 the Frankenthal Regional Court convicted him of drug trafficking and acquisition of drugs and sentenced him to four years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. It established that the applicant had been a heroin dealer since August 2009, in order to finance his own consumption and to earn a living. After serving the initial part of his sentence in prison, the applicant was moved to a psychiatric prison as of August 2011. He was again diagnosed with polysubstance dependence and a combined personality disorder characterised by narcissistic and dissocial symptoms. 14.  The subsequent therapy evolved slowly. In May 2014, the clinic still considered the applicant\u2019s risk of relapse to be significant. It was only in November 2014, after the applicant had graduated from secondary school, that the clinic\u2019s evaluation changed. On 2 December 2014 the applicant was released and the remainder of the sentence was suspended on probation. 15.  On 31 July 2002, after the conviction of 10 January 2002 (see paragraph 9 above), the competent authority of Neustadt ordered the expulsion of the applicant to Turkey. It referred, in particular, to the applicant\u2019s prior convictions. On 22 April 2003, the competent committee on legal affairs (hereafter - \u201cthe committee\u201d) rejected the application for administrative review of the expulsion order. On 18 October 2003 the Neustadt Administrative Court rejected the appeal. On 14 January 2005 the Rhineland-Palatinate Administrative Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Administrative Court and quashed the expulsion order. It established that the applicant could rely on a right of residence under Article 7 of the Decision No. 1/80 of the EEC/Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (see paragraph 30 below). He could hence only be expelled on the basis of a discretionary decision of the authority, requiring a current and concrete danger of further significant criminal offences. Against this background, the reasons provided for the justification of the expulsion order were not sufficient. In this context the Court of Appeal referred, in particular, to the fact that the applicant had at the time not yet undergone inpatient therapy, which he was willing to do. Moreover, the applicant could refer to exceptional life circumstances, in particular the violent death of his mother. 16.  In December 2007 the competent authority notified the applicant that it was willing to order expulsion to Turkey, anew. The applicant informed the authorities that he was now engaged to J., a German national, and that he was intending to undergo stationary treatment of his addiction. On 1 February 2008, the authority nevertheless ordered the expulsion of the applicant to Turkey. It referred to the numerous previous criminal offences, in particular those after 14 January 2005, and concluded that the applicant posed a sufficiently significant risk to the public. 17.  The applicant applied for administrative review of that decision. On 4 June 2009, shortly after the applicant had acknowledged paternity of the child J. expected at that time, the city committee suspended the proceedings. 18.  The applicant\u2019s daughter was born out of wedlock on 23 September 2009. As of that day, J. exercised sole custody rights. In the following weeks, the applicant lived with his daughter and J. in a common apartment, until he was taken into pre-trial custody in November 2009 (see paragraph 13 above). 19.  On 19 September 2013, the city committee resumed the suspended proceedings and orally heard the applicant as well as J. who had, in 2011, given birth to a second child by a different father. On 24 September 2013, the committee rejected the application, maintaining that the applicant posed a current and concrete danger for public safety, as he was likely to commit further significant criminal offences. He was a chronic offender with a high potential for aggressive behaviour. Having regard to the applicant\u2019s interests protected by Article 8 of the Convention, it found the expulsion order to be a proportionate interference. 20.  On 22 May 2014 the Neustadt Administrative Court ordered the reduction of the re-entry ban to five years and dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that the expulsion order did not contravene the binding force of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 14 January 2005 (see paragraph 15 above) since it was essentially based on events subsequent to that judgment, in particular the judgments of the District Court of 9 July 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) and the judgment of the Regional Court of 9 December 2010 (see paragraph 13 above). The expulsion order was based on sections 55 \u00a7 1 and 56 \u00a7 1 of the Residence Act in conjunction with section 14 of Decision No. 1/80 of the EEC/Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (see paragraph 30 below). The authority had correctly established that the applicant posed a current and concrete danger to the basic interests of Germany, and that his expulsion was indispensable to preserve these basic interests. 21.  The Administrative Court essentially based its conclusions on the seriousness, the frequency and the drug context of the criminal offences, as well as on the expectation that the applicant would be likely to commit such offences again. In this connection, the court referred to the numerous convictions based on drug-related offences, as well as the frequent failure of therapy for his drug addiction. Not even favourable conditions, such as the drug therapy as of August 2008, the suspension of the remaining sentence, further therapy, the expected paternity and finally the birth of his child brought about substantial changes in the applicant\u2019s life. Also, at the time, the treating clinic considered the applicant\u2019s risk of relapse to be significant. 22.  The applicant\u2019s relationship with his daughter was protected by Article 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. It had, however, been kept from developing more intensely, due to his arrest only months after his daughter\u2019s birth. The same was true for the relationship with his family of origin, in particular his sister. He had also failed to substantiate the actual status of the relationship with J. After initial, rather frequent visits by J. and their common daughter in prison, contact became rather infrequent after J. gave birth to a second child by a different father. The fact that the applicant was about to finish secondary school (see paragraph 14 above) did not justify a more positive prognosis. Since he lacked the necessary vocational training, his prospects of finding a job were still rather slim. The authorities had correctly taken account of the applicant\u2019s interests, of the fact that he had been born in Germany and that he had family in Germany, in particular his daughter and his sister. Making explicit reference to Article 8 of the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law, the Administrative Court established that the reasons at the heart of the expulsion were sufficient to justify it, even though the expulsion might cause hardship for the daughter, who did not live with the applicant. The applicant\u2019s interests were sufficiently taken into account by limiting the re\u2011entry ban and he could, moreover, apply for a further reduction of the re\u2011entry ban, if the relevant facts were to change. 23.  The applicant also lacked economic or social integration. He had never worked and essentially lived on social benefits. As for any difficulties the applicant might face in Turkey, those seemed surmountable. Regarding his allegation that he had no command of the Turkish language, criminal investigations into his offences had shown that he had been perfectly capable of switching between German and Turkish for drug dealing. Also, other oral communication in Turkish had been established, for example two telephone calls with his father from prison. At the oral hearing, he had also conceded that his fluency had improved since 2005. Moreover, the applicant was familiar with Turkish living conditions, since he had visited Turkey twice as a child. His grandfather had shown a rather traditional attitude and he had, in order to improve his Turkish skills, spent a lot of time with family since 2005. He would not be without support in Turkey, even though the relationship with his father might be tense and other contact in Turkey could only be established through his sister. 24. On 25 March 2015 the Rhineland-Palatine Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal, endorsing the Administrative Court\u2019s assessment, while also taking into account the developments that had taken place since. 25.  On 7 October 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court did not accept the complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 826/15). 26.  An attempt to deport the applicant on 9 October 2015 was unsuccessful, because the applicant did not possess a valid passport. 27.  On 17 December 2015, the applicant submitted an asylum application, invoking the danger of re-traumatisation as a bar to his deportation. He was granted a temporary permit to stay for the purposes of the asylum proceedings (Aufenthaltsgestattung). No information about the current state of these proceedings has been submitted to the Court. 28.  On 17 March 2016 the competent authority rejected an application by the applicant concerning a further reduction of the duration of the re\u2011entry ban. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Administrative Court. No information about the current state of those proceedings has been provided.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "9", "8", "6", "1", "No Label", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["0", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1987. 5.  On 13 June 2006 an investigation was opened into an alleged robbery committed against D.G., an offence under Article 178 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Criminal Code of Georgia. On the same date D.G. was formally granted victim status and questioned in connection with the incident. She claimed in her statement that, while walking in the street earlier the same day at around 3.30 p.m., she had been attacked by a young boy who had ripped her gold necklace off her. She described him as being around twenty years old with dark curly hair and around 177 cm in height, and claimed that she could identify him. A friend of hers who had witnessed the incident noted in her statement that she could not identify the alleged robber, as she had not seen his face. 6.  On 14 June 2006 a photo identification parade was organised. The victim identified the person on photo no. 4 as the robber. It appears that later an investigator made a note on the identification record that the victim had identified the person on photo no. 2. There was no explanation as to why there were contradictory notes. 7.  Immediately thereafter the applicant was named as the person on photo no. 2, and an order for his arrest was issued. 8.  On 15 June 2006, following the applicant\u2019s arrest, an identification parade was organised. Four persons were presented at the identification parade, and the victim identified the applicant as the robber. A personal search of the applicant and a subsequent search of his home did not reveal any unlawful items. 9.  On 17 June 2006 the investigator in charge of the case wrote a letter to the prosecutor, noting that the applicant had affiliations with the criminal world and had been following \u201c[a] thief\u2019s traditions\u201d, and that it should have been expected that he would commit various offences. On the same date the Tbilisi City Court, acting at the prosecutor\u2019s request, ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for two months. The decision was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 26 June 2006. 10.  On 8 August 2006 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case file was sent to the trial court for examination, along with the bill of indictment. 11.  The trial opened on 28 December 2006. The victim confirmed her pre-trial statement, noting that she remembered the face of the applicant very well. The investigator who had organised the photo identification parade was also questioned by the first-instance court. He claimed that the victim had mistakenly written down photo no. 4 instead of photo no. 2 on the photo identification record. Therefore, he had subsequently made an additional note only to rectify this purely technical mistake. The first-instance court also questioned N.K., a shop assistant who had witnessed the whole incident. She described the alleged robber and claimed that the applicant had a different appearance. 12.  On 2 February 2007 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant\u2019s conviction was based on the victim\u2019s statement in court, the results of the identification parades, and the statement which the victim\u2019s friend had made in court. The trial court dismissed the evidence of the shopkeeper as \u201csubjective\u201d and aimed at allowing the applicant to escape criminal responsibility. The price of the necklace, estimated by the victim to be 300 Georgian laris (GEL \u2013 approximately 150 euros (EUR) at the material time) constituted an aggravating circumstance. 13.  The applicant appealed against his conviction to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. He requested that the victim and the investigator be examined again before the second-instance court. On 23 May 2007 the victim wrote to the appeal court, informing the judges that she was pregnant and claiming, on the basis of a medical certificate, that she had been asked to stay in bed and could not appear in court. In the meantime, the appeal court had allowed the applicant\u2019s application for the investigator to be examined again. According to the relevant court transcript, in reply to a question concerning the report on photo identification, the investigator maintained that the victim had orally identified photo no. 2, whereas she had mistakenly written down photo no. 4 in the report. As he had noticed that mistake only after she had left the police station, he had made a note to that effect. In view of the investigator\u2019s explanations regarding the photo identification report, the defence once again requested that the appeal court summon the victim. The applicant\u2019s lawyer maintained that it was necessary to examine her in court in order to establish the circumstances surrounding the photo identification parade, and also to verify the value of the necklace that had been stolen. By a letter of 5 September 2007 the victim once again informed the court that, in view of her pregnancy, she could not appear in court. On the basis of that statement, the prosecutor asked the court to rely on the victim\u2019s statement given before the first-instance court. Having heard the parties\u2019 arguments, the appeal court concluded the following:\n\u201c... the examination of the case should continue, since as it appears from the victim\u2019s ... application submitted to the court, she cannot appear in court because of her pregnancy, which is also confirmed by an extract from her medical file; hence, the court cannot compel her to appear. ...\u201d 14.  By a decision of 21 September 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, whilst reclassifying the offence as a simple robbery, confirmed the applicant\u2019s conviction and reduced his sentence to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The appeal court concluded that the results of the photo identification had been marred by procedural irregularities and dismissed them as unreliable. However, the applicant\u2019s guilt had been proved by the victim\u2019s consistent statements during the pre-trial investigation stage and before the trial court, by the results of the identification parade, and by the evidence given by the victim\u2019s friend. The appeal court rejected the aggravating circumstance, concluding that the price of the necklace, as claimed by the victim, had not been proved. 15.  By a decision of 14 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law as inadmissible. 16.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant was released on probation, by virtue of a relevant court decision. 17.  According to the case file, prior to his detention the applicant was diagnosed with an acute cataract in his left eye and advised to have surgery. Following his detention, on 15 June 2006 he was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. On 21 October 2006, having complained of a loss of sight in his left eye and impaired vision in his right eye, he was transferred to the prison hospital, where the diagnosis of an acute cataract was confirmed. He was further diagnosed with chorioretinitis (inflammation of the uveal tract) in his right eye. The applicant was prescribed drug-based treatment and discharged on 4 November 2006 in a satisfactory condition. 18.  On 13 January 2007 the applicant was again transferred to the prison hospital, where he stayed until 12 February 2007. He underwent blood and urine tests there and was seen by various doctors, including an ophthalmologist. The ophthalmologist confirmed the applicant\u2019s diagnosis of an acute cataract in his left eye and prescribed drug-based treatment. The applicant was discharged from the prison hospital after his condition had improved, as noted in the relevant medical certificate. 19.  On 3 March 2007 the applicant was transferred back to the prison hospital, this time with an additional diagnosis that he had developed haziness of the vitreous body in his right eye. On 12 March 2007 he was moved back to prison for, as noted in his medical file, \u201cnon-medical reasons.\u201d On 20 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother wrote to the Prisons Department, requesting that her son be transferred back to the prison hospital. She claimed that he was suffering from a serious visual impairment of his left eye. Her request was forwarded to the Governor of Prison no. 5, where the applicant was detained at the material time, yet no reply followed. 20.  In the period April-May 2007, acting at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, a private eye clinic called Mzera Eye Clinic examined the applicant\u2019s medical file and confirmed the diagnosis of a uveal cataract in his left eye. The expert recommended drug-based treatment followed by surgery, namely the implantation of an artificial lens. No pathology in the right eye was established. 21.  On 2 June 2007 the applicant was again transferred to the prison hospital for treatment for his cataract. On 25 June 2007 his treating ophthalmologist requested that the prison hospital organise for an eye surgeon to see the applicant. On an unidentified date the head doctor of the prison hospital wrote to Mzera Eye Clinic. He requested that the clinic send a specialist to examine the applicant, given his diagnosis. It appears from the case file that, despite the above request, the applicant was not seen by an eye surgeon at that time. 22.  In the meantime, having undergone various tests, in mid-August 2007 the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from smear-negative tuberculosis of the right lung in the infiltration stage. On 31 August 2007 he was discharged from the prison hospital and transferred to a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. Following the diagnosis being confirmed, on 2 September 2007 he was enrolled in an anti-tuberculosis treatment programme under the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course \u2013 the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organization). 23.  On 24 January 2008 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital, where he stayed for almost two weeks. According to the entries made in his medical file, he regularly complained of a loss of vision in his left eye. He was not seen by an ophthalmologist at that time. 24.  On 2 May 2008 the applicant completed his treatment for tuberculosis. On 17 June 2008 his mother wrote a letter to the head of social services at the Prisons Department, requesting that her son be transferred to a medical establishment for prisoners with tuberculosis. On an unspecified date he was transferred back to Ksani prison, where another medical test revealed that he had had a relapse. He was diagnosed with smear-positive infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung in the disintegration stage. A decision was taken on 12 September 2008 to put him on the DOTS programme again. No entries were made in his file concerning his ophthalmological treatment at the material time. 25.  On 28 October 2008, relying on Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the applicant asked the Court to indicate to the Government that he should be transferred to a medical establishment where he could access appropriate medical examinations and treatment, and have an operation to prevent him from losing his eyesight. 26.  On 3 November 2008, under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, the President of the Chamber requested that the Government provide the Court with a specific treatment plan aimed at safeguarding the applicant\u2019s eyesight. 27.  On 18 November 2008 the Government submitted the applicant\u2019s medical file to the Court, and also gave an account of the treatment which he had been receiving in prison as of January 2007. According to the submitted information, On 14 November 2008 the applicant was seen by an ophthalmologist, who recommended that he receive treatment for conjunctivitis before a decision was made about surgery. On 18 November 2008 the applicant was advised that he could undergo the required eye operation at Mzera Eye Clinic. According to the relevant note signed by the applicant and his ophthalmologist, the applicant refused the operation offered by the prison authorities. 28.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant was released on probation.", "references": ["8", "2", "4", "7", "0", "6", "9", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Rustavi. 5.  On 6 May 2007 an investigation was opened into a murder. 6.  On 24 May 2007 an identification parade was carried out. The eyewitness to the crime identified the applicant\u2019s son, G.T., as the culprit. The latter was arrested and remanded in custody in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. 7.  On 18 February 2008 G.T. was convicted of murder and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  On 23 June 2008 an appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence in full. 9.  On 28 January 2009 an appeal on points of law by G.T. was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 10.  Between 24 May 2007 and 7 July 2008 G.T. was detained at Tbilisi Prison no. 5 and Gldani Prison no. 8. No medical complaints were raised by G.T. while he was at those facilities, nor has the applicant suggested otherwise. 11.  On 7 July 2008 G.T. was placed in Rustavi Prison no. 2. 12.  On 1 December 2008 G.T. complained of ill health. He was examined by a duty doctor, who suspected tuberculosis. 13.  On 8 December 2008 a sputum test was performed at the laboratory of the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease. 14.  On 17 December 2008 the sputum test revealed the presence of tuberculosis bacteria, and a susceptibility test regarding first-line drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis was ordered (\u201cthe first susceptibility test\u201d). On the same day a doctor from Rustavi Prison no. 2 diagnosed G.T. with tuberculosis, and recommended that he be transferred to a specialist facility. 15.  On 21 December 2008 G.T. was placed in the medical unit of Rustavi Prison no. 2 and enrolled in a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course) programme, the strategy for the detection and treatment of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organization. He started receiving conventional, first-line anti-tuberculosis drugs pending the outcome of the first susceptibility test. The programme in question operated at Rustavi Prison no. 2 between 21 December 2008 and 29 January 2009. 16.  On 21 January 2009 a doctor noted in G.T.\u2019s medical file that his state of health remained serious despite the treatment, and recommended that he be transferred to a specialist medical establishment. 17.  On 29 January 2009 G.T. was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. The medical note made on that date refers to his tuberculosis as being \u201cmultidrug-resistant\u201d, and describes his overall condition as \u201cserious.\u201d G.T. continued to have treatment under the DOTS programme. 18.  On 24 February 2009 the results of the first susceptibility test showed that G.T. was resistant to the first-line drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis. Therefore, a second susceptibility test was ordered in respect of the second-line drugs for the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (\u201cthe second susceptibility test\u201d). 19.  On 26 February 2009 G.T. was transferred to the prison hospital in view of a further deterioration in his health. The medical records relating to his time at that facility show that he was suffering from cachexia, and from early March 2009 onwards he complained that he was unable to walk. He continued to receive the previously prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment with the first-line drugs pending the results of the second susceptibility test. 20.  On 10 April 2009 the results of the second susceptibility test were received by the prison hospital, and they demonstrated that the disease was responding to all but one drug out of the second-line drugs. 21.  On 24 April 2009 it was decided that G.T. should be enrolled in the DOTS+ programme for the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. 22.  On 4 May 2009 G.T. started the prescribed treatment. 23.  On 19 May 2009 G.T. died of a massive pulmonary haemorrhage. 24.  On 19 May 2009 the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Prisons opened a preliminary investigation into premeditated murder. On the same day, a forensic medical examination was carried out to determine the exact cause of G.T.\u2019s death, which confirmed that he had died of a massive pulmonary haemorrhage, a fatal complication of the disease. 25.  The investigating authorities questioned the chief doctor of Rustavi Prison no. 2, a doctor from the Ksani facility for prisoners with tuberculosis, and a doctor from the prison hospital. They stated that G.T.\u2019s treatment under the DOTS programme had been adequate. 26.  On 13 October 2009 the investigator in charge of the case refused to grant the applicant victim status. He noted that no crime had been committed, as G.T. had died of a natural complication of his tuberculosis. The applicant appealed. 27.  On 19 November 2009 a prosecutor from the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office who was supervising the investigations carried out by the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Prisons forwarded the applicant\u2019s appeal against the investigator\u2019s refusal to grant her victim status to the director of that department, \u201cfor an appropriate response\u201d. 28.  On 22 February 2010 the applicant was granted victim status. 29.  An undated document signed by the prosecutor instructed the investigator to question experts from the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease and obtain records concerning G.T.\u2019s health. 30.  On 5 February 2010 two experts from the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease were also questioned. They confirmed that G.T.\u2019s treatment under the DOTS programme had been adequate. As regards his involvement in the DOTS+ programme, one of the experts noted that it was only in February and April 2009 that the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis had become possible in the Ksani facility and the prison hospital respectively. 31.  On an unspecified date the investigator sent G.T.\u2019s medical file to the State Regulation Agency for Medical Activities to be assessed. The report issued on 21 May 2010 concluded that a massive pulmonary haemorrhage was a possible lethal complication of tuberculosis. It noted that G.T.\u2019s enrolment in the DOTS programme and later in the DOTS+ programme had been in compliance with the national standards on the treatment of tuberculosis. 32.  On 4 June 2010 the preliminary investigation was terminated on account of the absence of a crime. The investigator relied on the forensic evidence to conclude that G.T. had died of a natural complication of tuberculosis, and also relied on witness statements confirming that his treatment had been adequate. 33.  On 22 July 2010 the Tbilisi City Court allowed an application by the applicant and ordered that the investigation should be reopened in order for G.T.\u2019s sister to be questioned. His sister had allegedly met a doctor at Rustavi Prison no. 2 before G.T.\u2019s official diagnosis and had given him some strong drugs intended for her brother on the basis of an unsigned and undated prescription. That doctor had not been identified or questioned. 34.  On an unspecified date the investigation was reopened. It was closed again on 15 October 2010 after G.T.\u2019s sister had been questioned and after a forensic examination of the unsigned and undated prescription had been carried out to identify whether its author was indeed one of the doctors from Rustavi Prison no. 2. As the handwriting examined in the forensic examination did not resemble the handwriting of any of the doctors at the prison in question, the investigator concluded that G.T.\u2019s sister\u2019s allegations were manifestly ill-founded. 35.  The relevant national and international materials concerning the problem of tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, and the World Health Organization Guidelines for the Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis are summarised by the Court in the case of Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia (no. 35254/07, \u00a7\u00a7 44\u201148, 22 November 2011). 36.  At the material time, the management of prisons, including the provision of medical care to prisoners was a responsibility of the Prison Department of the Ministry of Prisons (see Order no. 60 of the Minister of Prisons approving the Regulations of the Prison Department, 24 February 2009). The Prison Department and the Investigative Department were subordinated to the Minister of Prisons (see Order no. 60, cited above, and Order no. 152 of the Minister of Prisons approving the Regulations of the Investigative Department, 16 April 2009).", "references": ["6", "4", "1", "7", "5", "2", "9", "8", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Rubtsovsk, Altai Region. 5.  On 2 March 2011 the applicant was arrested. On an unspecified date he was charged with extortion and the murder of Vos. 6.  On an unspecified date a trial by jury was opened in the applicant\u2019s case in the Altai Regional Court. 7.  On an unspecified date the jury returned a guilty verdict against the applicant and three other defendants. By a judgment dated 17 May 2012 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  On 6 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the verdict on appeal, in view of contradictory conclusions contained in the jury\u2019s verdict, and remitted the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration. 9.  On 30 January 2013 the jury returned a guilty verdict in respect of the applicant and three other defendants. 10.  On 19 February 2013 juror V. made a statement addressed to the trial judge. She alleged that Ch., Vos\u2019s mother, had repeatedly talked to the jurors during the adjournments. Ch. had informed the jurors that it was the second trial and that the applicant and other defendants had already been found guilty of her son\u2019s murder. Ch. had also advised the jurors to check out the information concerning her son\u2019s murder on the Internet. V. had done so and, as a result, had been influenced by this information when finding the defendants guilty. It appears that the trial judge ordered an inquiry in response to V.\u2019s allegations. 11.  On 25 February 2013 Ch. submitted a written statement denying V.\u2019s allegations. 12.  On 26 February 2013 jury foreperson G. signed a statement in which she indicated that she \u201chad not been aware\u201d of any instances of undue influence on the jury by Ch. 13.  On 27 February 2013 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 28 February 2013 the trial judge asked the bailiffs\u2019 service to conduct an inquiry in response to the statement made by juror V. 15.  On 18 March 2013 the deputy head of the bailiffs\u2019 service responded to the trial judge as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the reports submitted by the bailiffs ... and the bailiffs\u2019 group supervisor that on the relevant dates the jurors were supervised by the bailiff ... while they were in the courtroom or in the jurors\u2019 room. None of the jurors contacted [the bailiffs\u2019 service] as regards the [jurors\u2019] security or interference with the fulfilment of the jury\u2019s duties.\u201d 16.  Following an appeal lodged by the applicant and two other defendants, on 8 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that Ch. had exerted undue influence on the jury, the court stated as follows:\n\u201c[The court] rejects as unsubstantiated the argument ... that the jury\u2019s verdict was ... a result of unlawful influence exerted by Ch.\nAccording to the trial record, the jury members were selected in compliance with the requirements set out in [the rules of criminal procedure].\nThe materials in the case file show that ... Ch. did not exert undue influence on the jurors.\n[The court] discerns no violations of the rules of criminal procedure, including those alleged by [the defendants], that would justify the quashing of the verdict.\u201d", "references": ["9", "8", "5", "0", "4", "2", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Moscow. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, \u00a7\u00a7 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the \u201cMarch of Millions\u201d was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it transpired that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protesters to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protesters from the square. 8.  The applicant took part in the demonstration on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. She was arrested at the venue of the event and taken to a police station, where she was charged with an administrative offence. After a night in detention the applicant was released; on 8 May 2012 she was convicted as charged but exempted from administrative liability. 9.  According to the applicant, on 6 May 2012 she participated in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. She conducted herself peacefully and did not take part in any acts of violence prior to her arrest. At 6 p.m. she was arrested by the police and at around 9 p.m. was taken to Taganskiy district police station of Moscow. 10.  According to the Government, the applicant was arrested at 6 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because she had been participating in breaking the police cordon. At 7.20 p.m. she was taken to Taganskiy district police station, which was also indicated in the record of her transfer to the police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative file. She was released on 7 May 2012. 11.  The record of administrative arrest indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 8.45 p.m. at the police station. It contained no mention of the date or time of her release. It indicated that the applicant had not asked to notify anyone of her arrest. She signed an undertaking that she would attend court if ordered by the judge to do so. 12.  After that an on-duty officer drew up an administrative-offence record on the basis of the reports and explanatory notes of G.S. and M.S., the police officers who had arrested the applicant. These reports and notes were drawn up using an identical template and contained no individualised information except the police officers\u2019 personal information and the applicant\u2019s name. The latter was accused of disobeying lawful orders of the police, an offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The administrative-offence record reiterated the reports and notes of the police officers, stating as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant], acting as part of a group of 1,500 citizens, took part in an authorised meeting ... during the event [the applicant] committed a breach of the rules on holding public events, [that is to say] she broke the police cordon ... thereby preventing police officers from carrying out their service duties, in breach of Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.\u201d 13.  According to the applicant, at the police station she was not allowed to make a phone call, despite making insistent requests. She told the police that she was the mother of a fifteen-month-old child left at home with a babysitter and requested that her family be notified of her arrest, but this was also refused. Her passport contained no information about her baby. At the police station she was detained in a small overcrowded cell with no sanitary facilities, sleeping place or bedding. She had no access to drinking water and was given no food. 14.  The administrative case file also contained an explanatory note by the applicant. She stated that during the demonstration she had happened to be in the middle of the crowd, which had pulled her towards the police officers. At some point she had been arrested and taken to the police station, even though she had not chanted any slogans. 15.  At around 6 p.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant appeared before a justice of the peace. However, her case could not be examined that day and she was taken back to the police station. According to the applicant, she was released at about 10 p.m. that day. She signed an undertaking that she would attend the court hearing of the administrative case. 16.  On 8 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District examined the charges against the applicant. On the basis of the police officers\u2019 reports and explanations and the records of administrative transfer and arrest, the court established that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as described in the administrative-offence record. The applicant repeated the statements she had given in the explanatory note, but they were dismissed. The court decided, however, to absolve her from administrative liability on the grounds that her offence had not entailed serious consequences and that she had a baby born in 2011. The Justice of the Peace issued her a warning. She did not appeal against the judgment. 17.  On 26 July 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow about her allegedly arbitrary arrest on 6 May 2012 and detention until 7 May 2012, the termination of the rally at Bolotnaya Square and the conditions of her detention at the police station. 18.  On 3 September 2012 the court refused to examine the complaint on the grounds that the contested acts of the police had been the matter of the administrative proceedings and could not be challenged separately. It did not examine the complaint about the conditions of detention. 19.  On 20 May 2013 the Moscow City Court quashed the part of the decision of 3 September 2012 concerning the refusal to examine the complaint about the conditions of detention, and upheld the remaining part. 20.  On 23 October 2013 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint about the conditions of her detention at the police station as unsubstantiated. On 28 February 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment.", "references": ["4", "8", "3", "1", "0", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "7", "2"], "gold": ["7", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Cluj-Napoca. He is a university professor and contributor to various magazines and newspapers, mainly of an economic and financial nature. At the time of the relevant events he had already published more than 180 articles in various local or national publications. 6.  Prior to parliamentary elections held at the end of November 2008, the applicant wrote an article about M.I.-I., who was standing as a candidate for one of the national parties. The article, headlined \u201cAttention! He also wants [to be] in Parliament\u201d, was published on the front page of F., a newspaper, on 6 November 2008. It read as follows:\n\u201cAfter five rounds of free parliamentary elections, ordinary people, who are politically active only when they vote, have come to an uncontroversial conclusion: there is something wrong with people who become candidates for various political functions. Without even knowing exactly what [is wrong], most people of good moral and professional character often choose not to vote any more. They make that choice especially when they learn that the person appearing on the electoral poster asking for votes has never done anything remarkable in his or her profession. ...\nIt is therefore no longer surprising that the Romanian Parliament is the institution that enjoys the least public confidence.\nTime has consolidated the public\u2019s belief that most candidates want to become parliamentarians so that they can for a couple of years take advantage of the privileges they grant themselves or of those informal benefits which come through the development of the system of relationships associated with their functions. There are candidates who do everything to become parliamentarians in order to shield their criminal record from the [criminal] acts they committed before becoming senators or deputies.\nAmong the many cases of that type, I today present you one. And if I do this it is not to help the voters, because imposture by an individual reveals itself without reserve to the perceptive masses, whereas one by a group or party does not, especially when one can use all the presidential and municipal logistical powers, impressive amounts of funds and an unsuspected power to persuade individuals with little training.\nOne such case is that of Mr M.I.-I. This gentleman is in good physical condition, especially after living a comfortable life as a manager at R. Cluj [a public company], and now wants to use his skills in Parliament. And he does not intend to reach such a position only based on his well-known lucidity, but also with the help of some financial support for the intellectual efforts he wishes to make for the benefit of the many. For that purpose, he borrowed 15 billion Romanian lei for a period of 12 months, namely until 31 October 2008 \u2013 to invest on the stock market and earn a bit more than the creditor would request as interest, based on perfectly legal documents.\nIt is just that at one point the moral profile of this representative of the Democratic Party of Cluj showed itself clearly. Not having made as much [profit] as he hoped, the candidate M.I.-I. decided not to repay the loan thus contracted, after imploring the creditor to have mercy, to postpone and not enforce the contract. Even though he knows that the contract weighs against him, he is relying on that defect of Romanian justice of postponing the adjudication of cases. In fact, Mr M.I.-I. brought a case before a court which had no jurisdiction to assess the case. But he hopes in the near future to be able to invoke his immunity as a member elected by the nation, just like his spiritual guardian, who left us without a maritime fleet.\nThat is why I say that we must be careful about what Mr M.I.-I. signs and promises! For the following day he might no longer admit to anything, he may switch to another political party, if he is given more, he may even sell part of the electoral district where he ran and if nobody wants it, he can go to Smirnov because it is warmer in Tiraspol than in Huedin.\u201d 7.  On 9 April 2009 M.I.-I. brought a civil action against the applicant: he sought 25,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage as the article had allegedly seriously affected his reputation and made him lose the election by approximately one hundred votes. M.I.-I. also complained about the publication by the applicant of another defamatory article on 21 January 2009, which was in a similar vein. He also complained about the distribution of leaflets before the election, which had reproduced the contents of the article of 6 November. He alleged that all the material had been meant to discredit him as a candidate. 8.  The applicant confirmed that he was the author of the article in question and that everything he had written had been true, as proved by documents from the Arbitration Tribunal of the Cluj Chamber of Commerce, which would become available to the court. He further denied contributing in any way to the publication or distribution of other articles and leaflets concerning M.I.-I. 9.  On 20 July 2009 the Cluj-Napoca Court of First Instance allowed the claims lodged by M.I.-I. and held that the article of 6 November 2008 had contained defamatory statements about him. It further held the applicant liable to pay EUR 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage and 3,291 Romanian lei (RON) in legal costs. 10.  The court held that the applicant had not proved that his statements were true. The procedure before the Arbitration Tribunal, invoked by the applicant in his defence, had concerned a commercial dispute between M.I.-I. and the applicant\u2019s brokerage company, in which the claims of M.I.-I. had been partially granted on 7 April 2009, as the repayment deadline had been set for 30 April 2010. The court considered that even if true, the applicant\u2019s statements had been defamatory and should not have been made public in the media, especially since they concerned matters of a private, commercial nature. 11.  The court further noted that the applicant\u2019s statements had been reproduced in electoral leaflets, which had been distributed in several public places, in bus stations and private mailboxes. The court held that even if it was not the applicant who had produced or distributed the leaflets, there was a causal link between the publication of the article and the harm caused to M.I.-I.\u2019s reputation because if he had not produced his article in the first place, there would have been no leaflets and no amplification of the negative effects on M.I.-I.\u2019s image. 12.  The court then focused on the terms used by the applicant in his article, in particular calling the defendant an impostor, which was found to be insulting and lacking factual justification as there existed no criminal complaints of fraud against M.I.-I. It concluded that the language used, conveying the idea that M.I.-I. would accept any compromise for money and would therefore betray the electorate, his party and his country, had exceeded the limits of admissible criticism and had disparaged him. 13.  The applicant appealed, arguing before the Cluj County Court that the publication of the article in question during a parliamentary election campaign had had the role of informing the public, in good faith, about a political figure. In such a situation, the limits of admissible criticism were wider. He argued that during election campaigns the press had the essential role of informing the public about future members of the Romanian Parliament. He argued that the amount of damages awarded by the first-instance court had been disproportionate and had had an obvious punitive purpose. 14.  In a final judgment of 21 January 2010 the County Court essentially upheld the reasoning of the lower court. It considered that the manner in which the applicant had acted proved that he had not complied with the duties and responsibilities inherent in the exercise of the freedom of expression:\n\u201cThe seriousness of his allegations and of the acts imputed to M.I.-I. hold him [the applicant] responsible for showing the highest rigour and a special caution, the lack of which would breach the rights of others.\u201d 15.  The County Court confirmed that the lower court had correctly estimated that it had been necessary to balance the right to private life on the one hand and freedom of expression which contributed to a debate of public interest on the other, holding that:\n\u201cTo insult, to defame a person cannot be justified and legitimate when one party aims to unilaterally expose in the press private litigation of a commercial nature involving two private parties.\nIn assessing the existing conflict between the exercise of freedom of expression in the press and the necessity to protect the reputation and the rights of others, the court estimates that even though the applicant\u2019s allegations made in a press article during an electoral campaign, concerned a potential member of the Romanian Parliament, thus were of public interest, there are limitations to freedom of expression, the applicant having been bound to act within the limits given by the public interest in protecting the reputation and the rights of another person, including his or her right to be presumed innocent.\nUndoubtedly, when the article was published in the newspaper F., the applicant did not comply with the minimum requirements of diligence prescribed by Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, in the sense of acting in good faith and in accordance with the journalistic ethics so as [to ensure that] the provided information be trustworthy, notwithstanding the dose of exaggeration or provocation allowed in such situations.\u201d 16.  Nevertheless, the County Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal in part and reduced the damages to EUR 5,000, considered to be more proportionate to the damage sustained by M.I.-I.", "references": ["8", "4", "2", "0", "1", "3", "5", "7", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1963 and the second applicant was born in 1965. They live in Dogana and Faetano, respectively. 6.  When the applicants lodged their applications they were serving their prison sentences in San Marino. At the time of the facts the first and the second applicant were officials responsible for the supervision of safety on construction sites (Sicurezza Antinfortunistica). 7.  By Law No. 107 of 22 July 2011, the parliament of San Marino (Consiglio Grande e Generale) established a commission of inquiry (\u201cthe commission\u201d) to investigate organised crime in the country (Commissione consigliare sul fenomeno delle infiltrazioni della criminalit\u00e0 organizzata). On 27 September 2011 Parliament gave the commission the specific task of investigating the existence of any collusion between politicians and company F., a fiduciary company which had been traced back to B. (a notary and lawyer by profession). 8.  The commission produced a report, chapter two of which was devoted entirely to criminal collusion between company F. and various officials. It highlighted the existence of a well\u2011established corrupt practice of representatives or employees of certain named construction companies which bribed public officials responsible for overseeing construction site safety (Sicurezza Antinfortunistica) to omit to carry out compulsory safety checks on companies allegedly connected with the above\u2011mentioned company F. 9.  Further details about the commission\u2019s work and the relevant investigation and trial are set out in Berardi and Others v. San Marino ((dec.), no. 24705/16, ECHR, 1 June 2017). 10.  On 12 December 2012 the applicants (and other persons) were charged with the continuing offence of bribery pursuant to Articles 50, 73 and 373 of the Criminal Code (see Relevant domestic law below). In particular, they were charged with periodically receiving sums of money in cash in order to omit to carry out their duties by failing to inspect the construction sites of the companies controlled by B. and abstaining from sanctioning violations and irregularities found in such companies. The first and second applicants were charged in respect of events up to 1 January 2010. 11.  On 19 September 2014 the first\u2011instance judge found all the accused, including the applicants, guilty of the continuing offence of bribery. The applicants were sentenced to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, a four\u2011year prohibition on holding public office and exercising political rights, and a fine of 25,000 euros (EUR). 12.  In particular, the judge considered B. as being the de facto dominus of the companies under investigation and found that he had been responsible for giving orders and instructions to the various formal directors of the companies to bribe the first and the second applicant in order to avoid safety checks at his companies\u2019 construction sites. The court found that witness statements had been corroborated by the bank accounts showing disbursements, the sums of money deposited by the applicants in their bank accounts in the relevant years (2005\u201112), and the testimony of another person, who had stated that she had often seen the officials come to the office to meet M. (the formal administrator of a company which was owned and actually controlled by B.) for very brief periods. 13.  The judge held that the offence had to be classified as direct bribery (corruzione propria) under Article 373 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code as the applicants had been exercising discretionary powers arising from their office while carrying out the criminal acts. In particular, the exercise of discretion while consciously violating the rules pertaining to its exercise had to be considered as acts that were contrary to the duties arising from the applicants\u2019 office. The fact therefore that the applicants had agreed to refrain from exercising their discretionary powers or to do so in an aberrant way in exchange for money constituted direct bribery. 14.  As to the penalty, the judge stated, in general terms, that he had calculated it on the basis of parameters such as the number of acts of bribery, the type of acts which had been the subject of the bribery, the role of each accused person and the time\u2011frame in which they had carried out the criminal act. 15.  On 13 February 2015, the applicants appealed. They complained, inter alia, that before the passing of Law No. 92 of 17 June 2008 there had been no provision for the crime of \u201cbribery inducing omission\u201d (corruzione per omissione), that is, a form of bribery where an official is paid to omit to carry out or to delay a legitimate act arising from his or her office (hereinafter referred to as \u201cbribery inducing omission\u201d). Thus, at most they should have been charged with indirect bribery (corruzione impropria), which carried a lighter penalty (by one degree/punishment bracket). However, they had been accused of bribery inducing omission in relation to facts which had arisen before the law had come into force. 16.  By a judgment filed in the registry on 12 January 2016 the Judge of Criminal Appeals (Giudice d\u2019Appello Penale) upheld the first\u2011instance judgment in the part relating to the applicants, but reduced the sentence to five years\u2019 imprisonment, a four\u2011and\u2011a\u2011half\u2011year prohibition on holding public office and exercising political rights, and a fine of EUR 20,000. The judge did not apply the increased penalty provided for by Article 50 of the Criminal Code (for a continuing offence), which had been applied by the first\u2011instance judge, because the first\u2011instance judge had not indicated the specific extent of the increased penalty he had applied, solely stating that the penalty had been determined with regard to the several acts of corrupt conduct. 17.  It was noted that the bank account deposits made by the first and second applicants indirectly indicated their guilt. The evidence adduced by the applicants, or that which they had asked to submit but which had not been allowed at first instance, was not sufficient to disprove any inferences based on the apparent situation. Indeed, there was no explanation as to why the applicants had regularly deposited money in their bank accounts when there had been a real\u2011estate and construction boom or why the deposits had then declined after a crisis in the sector in general, and more specifically after one that had affected the companies concerned. In the light of the clear evidence of payments having been made to the first and second applicants, there was no need to enter into a detailed analysis of their role on the construction sites. 18.  In connection with the applicants\u2019 complaint concerning the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Judge of Criminal Appeals noted that the case did not concern multiple crimes. The only crime at issue was bribery resulting from the pact struck (patto corruttivo) between B. and the applicants. That pact had involved, on the one hand, a promise not to create problems for the construction companies in question, that is, favourable treatment for friends, and, on the other hand, it had been done in exchange for the making and receiving of regular payments of money. Such favouritism had had specific corresponding rewards according to comparative tables adjusted for the purpose. Indeed, the duration of the pact had required various amendments to the applicable tariffs, which had also depended on the rotation of the people and companies involved. However, it had consisted of one crime (unicit\u00e0 di reato) perpetrated over time, as each payment resulting from the original pact meant the renewal of the pact. In connection with the date on which the punishable act had been committed (tempus commissi delicti), with all the elements of the offence being present, the court considered that the period in question was the whole time from the initial pact and lasting throughout the execution of each act constituting its renewal. The prolonged nature of the act in question had had various consequences: (i) third persons who had not been involved in the original pact had nevertheless become accomplices in the offence of bribery; (ii) limitation periods had to start running from the date of the last payment involving the accused and (iii) as in the case of continuing offences, an amendment to the relevant law during the period of the crime had to be applied also to the continuing offence of bribery of which the applicants had been accused. 19.  The court noted that if the acts ascribed to the applicants had amounted to bribery inducing omission (that is, a private \u201ccorruptor\u201d had paid the public officials to fail to do their duty), then it was true that such acts could have been considered as not constituting a crime at the time, or more precisely, that they had constituted the offence of indirect bribery, covered by paragraph 2 of the old law. However, that was not the case as the applicants had been paid also to carry out acts which were contrary to the duties of their office, which was covered by the \u201cold\u201d Article 373 [\u00a7 1]. According to the Judge of Criminal Appeals, the amended Article 373, which expressly provided for the crime of direct bribery to include the promise of an omission or payment for a past omission, did not create a new crime but amounted solely to a more serious legal classification of acts which already constituted a crime. The change in the law was therefore irrelevant in the applicants\u2019 case. 20.  In conclusion, the judge dismissed the idea that the acts for which the applicants had been found guilty should have been classified merely as bribery inducing omission (formerly indirect bribery, then qualified as direct bribery after the entry into force of the new law). That was because the applicants had not only been found guilty of omission of acts arising from their office, but also of having a general attitude of favouritism towards the companies de facto controlled by B. by sometimes not carrying out the necessary safety checks, doing fewer than necessary or ignoring possible irregularities. In doing so, they had been acting contrary to the duties related to their office in the interests of a private corruptor. It followed therefore that the more limited formulation of Article 373 before 2008 also covered the facts of the applicants\u2019 case.", "references": ["0", "6", "3", "4", "9", "8", "7", "5", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants, Petra Wunderlich, who was born in 1967, and Dirk Wunderlich, who was born in 1966, are married to each other. 7.  The applicants are the parents of four children: M. (born in July 1999), J. (born in September 2000), H. (born in April 2002) and S. (born in September 2005). 8.  The applicants reject the State school system and compulsory school attendance and wish to homeschool their children themselves. In 2005 their oldest daughter, M., reached school age. The applicants refused to register her in a school. Several regulatory fines and criminal proceedings were conducted against the applicants for failing to comply with rules on compulsory school attendance. The applicants accepted these decisions and paid the fines, but did not change their behaviour. 9.  Between 2008 and 2011 the applicants lived with their children abroad. In 2011 they returned to live permanently in Germany, but did not register their children with any school. 10.  By a letter of 13 July 2012 the State Education Authority (staatliches Schulamt \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Education Authority\u201d) informed the competent family court that the applicants were deliberately and persistently refusing to send their children to school and provided a chronological list of administrative fines and criminal investigations against the applicants \u2013 amongst others for hitting one of the daughters \u2013 as well as of other incidents since 2005. The Education Authority concluded that the children were growing up in a \u201cparallel world\u201d without any contact with their peers and that they received no attention of any kind which would enable them to have a part in communal life in Germany. It therefore suggested a court measure under Article 1666 of the German Civil Code (see paragraph 25 below), arguing the children\u2019s best interests were endangered owing to their being systematically deprived of the opportunity to participate in \u201cnormal\u201d life. The youth office (Jugendamt \u2013 hereinafter: \u201cthe youth office\u201d) supported the request of the Education Authority. It considered that the persistent refusal of the applicants endangered the best interests of the children. 11.  The Darmstadt Family Court initiated court proceedings and heard testimony from the applicants, their children and the youth office. It also appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. In the oral hearing, on 6 September 2012, the applicants stated that they had paid the administrative fines imposed on them for not sending the children to school and that, despite the State sanctions, they would continue to homeschool their children. Already in a previous written submission the applicants had confirmed their unwillingness to send their children to school and had stated that the authorities would have to remove their children from the family home and take them away from them entirely if the children were ever to go to a State school. The children explained during the hearing that it was primarily their mother who taught all four children and that school normally started at 10 a.m. and lasted until 3 p.m., with a break for lunch, which was prepared by their mother. 12.  On 6 September 2012 the Darmstadt Family Court withdrew the applicants\u2019 right to determine their children\u2019s place of residence, their right to take decisions on school matters and right to apply to the authorities on behalf of their children, and transferred these rights to the youth office. It also ordered the applicants to hand their children over to the youth office for enforcement of the rules on compulsory school attendance and authorised the youth office to use force if necessary. In its reasoning the court stated that the parents\u2019 persistent refusal to send their children to a State school or a recognised grant-aided independent school not only violated section 67 of the Hesse School Act (Hessisches Schulgesetz) (see paragraph 31 below) but also represented an abuse of parental authority which risked damaging the children\u2019s best interests in the long term. Independent from the question of whether it could be ensured that the children were acquiring sufficient knowledge through the applicants\u2019 homeschooling, the children\u2019s not attending school was preventing them from becoming part of the community and learning social skills such as tolerance, assertiveness and the ability to assert their own convictions against majority-held views. The court found that the children needed to be exposed to influences other than those of their parental home to acquire those skills. Lastly, the court concluded that no less severe measures were available. Owing to the persistent refusal of the applicants to send their children to school, only withdrawing parts of parental authority could ensure the children\u2019s continual attendance at school and would prevent them suffering harm on account of them being educated at home. 13.  The applicants appealed against that decision. 14.  In a letter dated 15 November 2012 the youth office informed the applicants that it intended to assess the children\u2019s knowledge on 22 November 2012 and asked the applicants to have their children ready to be collected on that day. On 22 November 2012 a member of staff of the youth office, acting as the children\u2019s guardian, attempted to take the children to the Education Authority\u2019s premises to conduct the learning assessment. The children refused to go with him. A second attempt to take the children to the learning assessment on the same day by two members of the public-order office and a police patrol also failed on account of the children\u2019s refusal to accompany them. In a letter dated 10 December 2012 the applicants were notified of two dates (19 December 2012 and 17 January 2013) on which the children were to be assessed at home. The applicants submitted statements to the Education Authority in which they informed the latter that the children did not wish to participate in the assessment. In a letter dated 20 December 2012 the Education Authority informed the applicants\u2019 lawyer that in order to ensure the children\u2019s school attendance the children would, among other things, firstly have to undergo a learning assessment. At the same time the parents were informed that the appointment of 19 December 2012 had been cancelled, but the appointment of 17 January 2013 still stood. However, staff of the Education Authority were not allowed to enter the family home when they arrived for the appointment in January 2013. The father spoke to the members of staff and explained that he believed that the Family Court\u2019s decision had been unlawful and that he alone was authorised to decide whether his children attended school or not. 15.  On 25 April 2013 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal rejected the parents\u2019 appeal, but clarified that the applicants retained the right to determine their children\u2019s place of residence during school holidays in Hesse. At the outset the court noted that up to that date the children had not attended school, even though the decision of the Darmstadt Family Court had not been suspended. It also observed that all attempts to conduct a learning assessment had failed on account of the children\u2019s and the parents\u2019 resistance. As to the law, the court outlined that the decision to withdraw parts of parental authority under Articles 1666 and 1666a of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below) presupposed a significant endangerment of the best interests of the children, which the parents were unable or unwilling to prevent. To establish such an endangerment, a process of balancing the various interests had to be undertaken, during which the rights and interests of the children and of the parents as well as the interests of society had to be considered. In particular, a withdrawal of parental authority could not be justified to enable children to receive the best possible education but only to prevent any endangerment of children. Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court concluded that the applicants\u2019 persistent refusal to ensure that their children attended school risked damaging the best interests of the children. According to the court, the children\u2019s best interests were in concrete danger on account of them being kept in a \u201csymbiotic\u201d family system and being denied an education which met standards which were both well recognised and fundamentally important for growing up in society. The education they were receiving from the applicants could not compensate for not attending school. Five hours of homeschooling \u2013 including a lunch break \u2013, which was conducted concurrently for all four children, could not suffice to offer each child a range of schooling appropriate to his or her age. In addition, the children were also not members of any sports club, music school or similar organisation where they could acquire other skills important for their education. The court also noted that the applicants\u2019 submissions as a whole showed that their main concern was creating a strong attachment between the children and their parents to the exclusion of others. Moreover, by their persistent refusal they were also teaching the children that they did not need to comply with the rules of community life if they found them disagreeable. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that there were no less severe measures available, since merely issuing instructions would have been ineffective, as shown by the applicants\u2019 previous conduct and submissions. Consequently, the withdrawal of parts of parental authority by the Family Court had been correct. 16.  On 9 October 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons. The decision was served upon the applicants on 16 October 2014. 17.  In later proceedings (see paragraph 23 below) the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal transferred the right to determine the children\u2019s place of residence back to the applicants on 15 August 2014. 18.  On 26 August 2013 the youth office arranged a meeting between the applicants, their lawyer, the youth office and the Education Authority. During the meeting the applicants declared that they refused \u2013 on principle \u2013\n to have their children schooled outside the family. In addition, Mr Wunderlich stated, amongst other things, that he considered children to be the \u2018property\u2019 of their parents. 19.  On 29 August 2013 the applicants\u2019 children were removed from the parental home and placed in a children\u2019s home. The children had to be carried out of the house individually with the help of police officers after they had refused to comply with the court bailiff\u2019s requests to come out voluntarily. 20.  On 12 September 2013 and on 16 September 2013 the knowledge of the applicants\u2019 children was assessed for ninety minutes each during two school appointments with a view to determining the children\u2019s appropriate class and schooling requirements. 21.  In written submissions dated 10 September 2013 concerning other ongoing proceedings before the Family Court the applicants agreed to the children\u2019s attending school. On 19 September 2013 the court heard testimony from the applicants, their children and a member of staff of the Education Authority. The children were subsequently handed back to the applicants that same day, since the applicants were now willing to allow their children to attend school. 22.  Following the return of the children on 19 September 2013, they attended school for the school year of 2013-14. On 16 May 2014 the Education Authority lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants for failing to comply with rules on compulsory school attendance. On 25 June 2014 the applicants again withdrew their children from school. 23.  On 15 August 2014, in parallel proceedings, the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal transferred the right to determine the children\u2019s place of residence back to the applicants. The court held that, as pointed out in its decision of 25 April 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), the applicants\u2019 persistent refusal to send their children to school constituted child endangerment and that neither their temporary schooling nor the learning assessment of the children had changed that conclusion. However, the court continued, the situation had changed in comparison to that of August 2013, at which point \u2013 according to the information provided by the youth office \u2013 several elements had led to the children\u2019s removal from the family home: a risk emanating from the children\u2019s father to their physical integrity could not be excluded; failed attempts to bring the children to school by the police had led to the risk of the children internalising the attitude that laws had had no bearing on them; attempts to carry out a learning assessment had failed owing to the resistance of the applicants; and according to the information available at the time, it had been possible to assume that the children had had no contact with anyone outside of the family whatsoever. According to the information gathered since the removal of the children by the youth office, any risk to their physical integrity emanating from the applicants could now be excluded. Moreover, the learning assessment had showed that the knowledge level of the children was not alarming and that the children were not being kept from school against their will. Since permanent removal of the children from their parents would be the only possible way to ensure the continued schooling of the children, this was no longer proportionate as it would have a greater impact on the children than being homeschooled by their parents. The Court of Appeal however emphasised that the present decision should not be understood as permission for the applicants to homeschool their children. In that regard it observed that the Education Authority had already lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants for failing to comply with the rules on compulsory school attendance, which carried a maximum sentence of six months\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["9", "7", "5", "8", "3", "6", "0", "1", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Sofia. 7.  The applicant\u2019s grandfather owned part of a real estate. He donated his part to the applicant\u2019s cousins in 1997. The applicant\u2019s grandfather died on 16 January 2003. 8.  On 13 February 2004 the applicant brought proceedings under section 30 of the Inheritance Act 1949 before the Sofia District Court. She claimed that, by donating his part in the immovable property in 1997, her grandfather had infringed her right to a \u201creserved share\u201d in his inheritance, given that the immovable property in question represented his entire estate. In a decision of 2 March 2005 the court upheld her claim by diminishing the part of the estate donated to the applicant\u2019s cousins and restoring the applicant\u2019s \u201creserved share\u201d in her grandfather\u2019s inheritance. 9.  Following an appeal by the other party, on 20 September 2007 the Sofia City Court quashed the first instance court\u2019s judgment and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for restoration of her \u201creserved share\u201d in her grandfather\u2019s estate. In particular, referring to Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 4 February 2005 by the Supreme Court of Cassation (\u201cSCC\u201d), the court found that the applicant had not complied with the statutory requirements for claiming her reserved share. The court held that, given that her cousins to whom the real estate had been donated could not be considered \u201cheirs-at-law\u201d, the applicant should have claimed the reserved share of the inheritance by means of an \u201cinventory\u201d. 10.  Following a cassation appeal brought by the applicant, on 24 March 2009 the SCC upheld the Sofia City Court\u2019s findings in full in a final decision.", "references": ["5", "8", "6", "7", "1", "9", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant worked as an investigative journalist since 2005. She worked as a staff reporter and director at the Azerbaijani service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (\u201cAzadliq Radio\u201d), whose broadcasts were often critical of the government, covering various topics, including corruption and violations of human rights. In addition, she worked as a regional coordinator for the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, where she trained journalists in investigation techniques and cross-border reporting. She has received a number of international awards for her journalistic activity. 7.  In August 2010 and June 2011, before the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant had published and contributed to articles concerning the alleged involvement of the President\u2019s daughters in various commercial ventures. In early 2012 the applicant claimed that her research had uncovered that the presidential family controlled a mining consortium which had just been awarded a lucrative extraction licence by the Azerbaijani government. 8.  During the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant continued to report on the above matters. In particular, on 3 May 2012 she published an article on the above-mentioned mining consortium. On 7 May 2012 she published an article entitled \u201cPresident\u2019s family benefits from Eurovision Hall\u201d. On 11 October 2012 she wrote about the alleged investments of the presidential family in an article entitled \u201cAzerbaijani enclave in the Czech Republic\u201d. On 3 April 2013 she published an investigative report entitled \u201cOffshore companies provide link between corporate mogul and Azerbaijan\u2019s president\u201d. 9.  According to the applicant, since she began reporting critically on the government she has been threatened and intimidated in various ways. 10.  On 7 March 2012 the applicant received a letter enclosing six still images from a video taken in her bedroom with a hidden camera. Those images showed her engaged in sexual intercourse with a man who, according to the applicant, was her then boyfriend. The message accompanying the images stated: \u201cWhore, refrain from what you are doing, otherwise you will be shamed! \uf04a\u201d (\u201cQ\u0259hb\u0259, \u00f6z\u00fcv\u00fc y\u0131\u011f\u0131\u015fd\u0131r. \u018fks halda r\u00fcsvay olacaqsan! \uf04a\u201d). The letter had been sent by post from an address in Moscow. The sender\u2019s name as noted on the envelope was \u201cValeriy Mardanov\u201d. 11.  The same images were also sent to two opposition newspapers, Yeni M\u00fcsavat and Azadliq, which did not publish them. 12.  On the same day the applicant made a statement, distributed through social media, that she would not cease her journalistic activity and would not be silenced. 13.  On 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the above-mentioned letter to the prosecution authorities and lodged a formal request for an investigation, arguing that the letter amounted to blackmail related to her recent journalistic activities. She also requested measures to protect her safety. The investigation was formally launched on 15 March 2012 (see section C below). 14.  In the meantime, on 13 March 2012 the newspaper Yeni Az\u0259rbaycan (the official newspaper of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party) published an article titled \u201cKhadija Ismayilova as she seems and as she is\u201d. The article began with a reference to the applicant\u2019s statement about receiving the threatening letter. It further criticised the applicant and those who had spoken in her support. In particular, it criticised both her and a colleague at Azadliq Radio for lack of professionalism and anti-government bias. Moreover, citing another former employee of Azadliq Radio, it also insinuated that the applicant was a person of immoral behaviour who spent a great deal of her time in bars and clubs and regularly held all-night parties and \u201corgies\u201d with her friends in her office. The same article was published in the newspaper \u0130ki Sahil on 15 March 2012. 15.  On 14 March 2012 a video was posted online on a website named \u201cmusavat.tv\u201d, featuring scenes of a sexual nature involving the applicant and her then boyfriend, taken with the same camera hidden in her bedroom. M\u00fcsavat is a political opposition party, which indicated that it had nothing to do with the website and condemned the posting of the video. According to the applicant, the domain name \u201cmusavat.tv\u201d was apparently chosen solely for the posting of the video, to create the suggestion of a link with the M\u00fcsavat party or its newspaper, Yeni M\u00fcsavat. 16.  On 16 March 2012 the newspaper S\u0259s published an article titled \u201cNot surprising\u201d. The article spoke about a number of scandals in which various opposition politicians had been involved. At the end, the article briefly alluded to the incident involving the applicant, without going into much detail about it, but stating that it was not surprising that many opposition-oriented individuals were involved in \u201csex scandals\u201d. 17.  On 5 April 2012 S\u0259s published another article titled \u201cWho should Khadija sue?\u201d attacking the applicant for \u201cimmoral behaviour\u201d and suggesting that the video scandal had been created by herself and her friends at \u201cmusavat.tv\u201d. 18.  Several more articles attacking the applicant were published later in S\u0259s. 19.  In April 2013 another video purporting to show the applicant engaged in sexual activities was posted on a website named \u201cictimaipalatka.com\u201d where, according to the applicant, similar videos of other activists and anti-government figures had been posted previously. This particular video did not in fact involve the applicant, but rather a woman meant to resemble her. 20.  While the investigation in connection with the threatening letter and the posting of the first video was under way (see below), in July 2013 another video of the applicant and her then boyfriend filmed in the applicant\u2019s bedroom was posted on \u201cictimaipalatka.com\u201d. This video actually featured the applicant, and had been taken with the same hidden camera used for the first video. According to the applicant, the webpage of the video was contained in a frame marked \u201cSesTV Player\u201d. 21.  As noted above, on 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the threatening letter received on 7 March 2012 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, complaining that it was blackmail in connection with her journalistic activity, and asking the prosecution authorities to ensure her safety, to investigate the matter, and to hold those responsible for the threat and the video accountable. 22.  On 15 March 2012, one week after the applicant\u2019s formal complaint and a day after the video was posted, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office launched criminal proceedings under Article 156 (breach of inviolability of private life) of the Criminal Code on the basis of the applicant\u2019s request, and assigned the case to the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 23.  On 17 March 2012 the applicant was questioned by Mr N.A., an investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 24.  On 17 March 2012 the applicant found out, with the help of friends, that as well as the camera in the bedroom there were multiple other hidden cameras installed in her flat. Moreover, they found a newly installed second telephone line and data wires which had evidently been used for transmitting the footage shot with the hidden cameras. 25.  According to the applicant, she and her friends returned to the flat the next day and discovered several signs indicating that someone had been in it overnight. 26.  On 19 March 2012 the applicant went to the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office to request an inspection of her flat. According to the applicant, the investigators visited her flat, but refused to comment on the purpose or implications of the wires, indicating that they did not possess the technical expertise to do so. They also refused to arrange for an inspection by an expert, but agreed that the applicant would herself contact the Automatic Telephone Station No. 538 (ATS), operated by Baktelekom, a State-owned communications company, which was responsible for the telephone box outside the flat to which the wires were connected. 27.  The applicant was told at the ATS that the designated service engineer for the applicant\u2019s building was Mr N.J., an employee of the ATS. The applicant managed to track down Mr N.J. and arranged to meet him in her flat the same day. She also arranged for two investigators from the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, Mr N.A. and his assistant, to be present during the meeting. 28.  According to the applicant, during the meeting in her flat on 19 March 2012, Mr N.J. admitted, in the presence of the investigators, the applicant, her lawyer and three of her friends, that in July 2011, on a day off work, Saturday (either 2 or 9 July 2011), on the instructions of his supervisor, he had installed a second telephone line and connected the wires from the ATS to the telephone box outside the applicant\u2019s flat. He had been asked by an unknown man he had met outside the flat to leave an extra fifteen metres of wire so that they could be connected inside the flat. He had also heard other people at work with the wires inside the flat. According to the applicant, during the conversation the investigator Mr N.A. appeared to be recording the engineer\u2019s statements. However, he later tore up his handwritten investigation record and made a new document that did not contain the engineer\u2019s account. He also asked the engineer to remove the second phone line, without documenting its removal. According to the applicant, despite her objections, he did not include Mr N.J.\u2019s statements in the investigation case file and did not mention in the investigation record that there had been a meeting with Mr N.J. at the applicant\u2019s flat. 29.  On 21 March 2012 the applicant asked the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office to question Mr N.J. Then, according to her, on 3 April and 12 April 2012 she visited the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office to get an update on the status of the investigation, but to no avail. 30.  According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 30 March 2012 Mr N.A., the investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, took a formal decision granting the applicant\u2019s request to have Mr N.J. questioned and to take investigative steps to determine who had instructed him to install wires leading to the applicant\u2019s flat. The Government did not submit any records of Mr N.J.\u2019s questioning or any further decisions by the prosecuting authorities taken in this regard. 31.  In the meantime, on 19 March 2012 the investigator ordered an expert examination of gloves, pieces of newspaper and a lock found in the applicant\u2019s flat. 32.  Between April 2012 and August 2013, the investigator issued a series of decisions ordering expert examinations of the following items: the still images sent to the applicant and the Yeni M\u00fcsavat newspaper; wires found in the applicant\u2019s flat; a disc containing the video recording published on \u201cmustavat.tv\u201d; the postal packaging in which the threatening letter and the still images had been sent to the applicant and the Yeni M\u00fcsavat newspaper; and a disc containing the video recording published on \u201cictimaipalatka.com\u201d. 33.  The Government did not submit any expert reports or other documents relating to the above-mentioned decisions. No further documents concerning the investigative steps taken have been made available to the Court by the parties. 34.  On 4 April 2012 the applicant published a press release in which she criticised the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office for failing to conduct an adequate investigation, and stated that her access to the investigation material was \u201cextremely limited\u201d. 35.  On 13 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office against the officials of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, complaining that the latter were refusing to take obvious and simple investigative steps. 36.  The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office did not act on the applicant\u2019s complaint. Instead, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office published a joint public statement on the status of the investigation (\u201cthe status report\u201d). The content of the status report and the proceedings relating to it are described in section D below. 37.  On 12 November 2012 the applicant requested from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office information on the status of the investigation, and copies of any decisions taken. According to the applicant, by letters of 14 and 21 November 2012 the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied that the investigation was being conducted and that decisions on the applicant\u2019s various requests had been taken on 31 March and 3 April 2012 (no copies of those letters or decisions are available in the case file). According to the applicant, she wrote a letter dated 28 November 2012 asking for copies of those decisions, since she had not received them. 38.  Having received no further replies, on 2 April 2013 the applicant again requested information from the prosecuting authorities on the status of the investigation. On 4 April 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied that decisions taken in respect of her requests had been sent to her on 30 March 2012 and 3 December 2012 (no copy of a decision taken on the latter date is available in the case file). The letter further stated that a number of investigative steps, including various expert examinations, had been taken, and that the investigation was under way. By a letter of 30 April 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office gave the applicant a similar reply. 39.  On 12 August 2013, after the publication of the second hidden video recording in July 2013 (see paragraph 20 above), the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, noting that there had been no effective investigation for over a year, and that the prosecuting authorities had limited themselves to vague indications to the effect that the investigation was ongoing. She asked the court to find the prosecuting authorities\u2019 inactivity unlawful, and sought monetary compensation. 40.  By a decision of 13 August 2013 the Sabail District Court refused to examine the complaint, finding that it had no competence to examine it under the judicial supervision procedure, because the matter complained of was not among the exclusive list of types of decisions and steps by the prosecuting authorities, established by Articles 449.3.1 to 449.3.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d), that could be challenged under the judicial supervision procedure. The court noted that a complaint concerning the alleged inactivity of the prosecuting authorities should be made under the rules of administrative procedure. 41.  On 16 August 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, ruling on a request by the applicant, refused to allow her access to the investigation case file until the investigation was complete, relying on Articles 87, 281.3 and 284-286 of the CCrP. On the same day, it refused her request for the criminal offence to be reclassified as falling under Article 163.1 (hindrance of a journalist\u2019s lawful professional activity) of the Criminal Code. 42.  On 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, with content similar to that of the previous complaint of 12 August 2013. On 30 August 2013 the Sabail District Court rejected the complaint, for the same reasons as in the decision of 13 August 2013. On 9 September 2013 the applicant appealed. On 18 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Sabail District Court\u2019s inadmissibility decision. 43.  On 18 September 2013 the applicant lodged a third complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, which was again rejected by that court on 30 September 2013, and by the Baku Court of Appeal on 17 October 2013. 44.  In the meantime, as recommended by the Sabail District Court, on 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 under the rules of administrative procedure. 45.  On 19 September 2013 the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 refused to hear the complaint, finding that under the Code of Administrative Procedure and the Law on Administrative Proceedings it had no competence to examine complaints concerning the activities of criminal prosecution authorities in criminal proceedings. 46.  On 14 October 2013 the applicant appealed, stating that she had been instructed to pursue the administrative procedure by the Sabail District Court. 47.  On 4 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1. 48.  On 20 December 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, which was rejected on 6 February 2014. 49.  As mentioned above, in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint of 13 April 2012, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office published a status report on the investigation (see paragraph 36 above). The status report noted that the applicant and her lawyer had been spreading false information in the media about the alleged inadequacy of the investigation and, as such, had attempted to \u201ccreate a negative opinion\u201d among the public concerning the investigation. It further noted that the investigating authorities had taken a number of investigative steps, in particular:\n \u201cAt the request of [the applicant], on 15 March 2012 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office opened a criminal case under Article 156.1 of the Criminal Code and assigned the investigation to the Investigation Department of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office. At the initial stages of the investigation [the applicant] was questioned in the presence of her representative A. Ismayilov; she was designated a victim of crime, and her rights and obligations were explained to her.\nThereafter, in order to discover the traces of crime and material evidence and to determine other circumstances important for the case, [the investigating authorities] conducted, with the participation of an expert, a criminalist, [the applicant], her representative and attesting witnesses, an inspection of the place of the incident, namely the flat located at ..., and owned by ..., where the applicant lived as a tenant, took relevant material evidence from the place of the incident, ordered and obtained expert reports, and made relevant inquiries and issued instructions relating to the case.\u201d 50.  The status report then provided information about the period during which the applicant had rented the flat, as well as the identities of individuals to whom she had subsequently sublet the flat, and the financial arrangements between them. 51.  The status report proceeded as follows:\n\u201cIn addition to this, the investigation also established that envelopes containing photographs of [the applicant] were mailed under the name of Valeriy Mardanov from Moscow to [the applicant\u2019s] registered address at ... and to the editorial office of the Yeni M\u00fcsavat newspaper. The envelopes were seized by the investigation and added to the case material.\n[The applicant\u2019s] request for additional persons to be questioned as witnesses, received by the investigation on 28 March 2012, was granted, and those persons were questioned.\u201d 52.  The status report then noted that in addition to the above steps being taken, a number of other persons were also questioned. The report disclosed the full names of those individuals, as well as their professional occupations or their relation to the applicant. They included reference to the man with whom, according to the report, the applicant was \u201cin a liaison\u201d, her sister, her brother, her friends and her colleagues who had visited her flat. In all, the report gave the full names of fifteen people, as well as the professional occupations of most of them. 53.  The status report concluded as follows:\n\u201cOn 13 and 17 April 2012 [the applicant] was invited to the investigation department in connection with the necessary investigative steps, but she did not appear; she only appeared for questioning on 26 April 2012.\nSince the beginning of the investigation, in addition to [the applicant] and her representative being summoned by the investigation, on 17 March, 3 April and 14 April 2012 the administration of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office received visits from her and her representative during which they heard her requests and gave specific instructions to the investigation team for full, impartial and comprehensive conduct of the investigation.\u201d 54.  As to the information mentioned in paragraphs 50 and 52 above, according to the applicant she herself had reluctantly provided much of the above information to the investigators at the request of a prosecutor, in order to assist the investigation, expecting that the information would be kept confidential. She had been promised by officials of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office that the information would remain confidential. 55.  On 27 April 2012 the spokesman of the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office indicated in an interview that the status report had been released in response to the applicant\u2019s public complaints about the lack of an effective investigation. He also stated that there was nothing unlawful in the contents of the status report. 56.  On 21 June 2012 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Sabail District Court against the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, Mr N.A. (an investigator at the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office) and Mr A.A. (the Baku City Deputy Prosecutor). She argued that the publication of detailed information concerning her private life in the status report of 26 April 2012 constituted an unlawful and unjustified interference with her right to respect for private life and freedom of expression, arguing that the status report was an integral part of the \u201cslander campaign\u201d against her, which also included the release of the \u201csex video\u201d and the newspaper articles. She argued that the publication of this information had been in breach of, inter alia, Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 8 of the Convention. She sought compensation for distress in the amount of 40,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) and a public apology by the defendants. 57.  By a judgment of 27 July 2012 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims, finding that the purpose of the status report had been to counter the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant\u2019s public complaints that the investigation was ineffective. The court found that the information in the status report was of a \u201cgeneral character\u201d, and had not breached the requirements of the domestic law concerning individuals\u2019 privacy. Specifically, it found as follows:\n\u201c[The status report] contained information of a general character in order to prevent creation of a negative opinion among the public; when the information was written, the requirements of the domestic legislation concerning the protection of Khadija Ismayilova\u2019s private and family confidentiality were not breached. Therefore, the information in [the status report] cannot be considered damaging to the plaintiff\u2019s reputation or her private and family life.\u201d 58.  The court also held that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate that she had suffered any non-pecuniary damage under the provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Plenum of the Supreme Court. 59.  On 24 September 2012 the applicant appealed, reiterating her arguments and complaining further that the first-instance court had ignored her legal and factual arguments and had failed to rely on any legal provisions in arriving at its decision. 60.  On 20 November 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, agreeing with its reasoning. 61.  On 29 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgments, finding that the publication of the status report had not interfered with the applicant\u2019s private or family life and had not been in breach of the relevant domestic legal provisions. 62.  In December 2014 the applicant was arrested and detained on the charge that she had incited a former colleague to commit suicide. In February 2015 she was additionally charged with the criminal offences of large-scale misappropriation, illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale tax evasion and abuse of power in connection with her activity as the director of Azadliq Radio during the period from 1 July 2008 to 1 October 2010. The events relating to her arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application (no. 30778/15), in which the applicant raised complaints under Articles 5, 6 \u00a7 2, 10 and 18 of the Convention. 63.  On 1 September 2015 the applicant was sentenced to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. After a series of appeals, on 25 May 2016 she was acquitted in part and her sentence was reduced to three and a half years\u2019 imprisonment, conditionally suspended for five years. She was released from prison on the same day.", "references": ["2", "9", "8", "1", "0", "5", "7", "No Label", "6", "3", "4"], "gold": ["6", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Vrbovec. 6.  On 16 July and 30 August 2013 the applicant was indicted in the Ivani\u0107-Grand Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Ivani\u0107-Gradu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) on charges of uttering serious threats to his neighbours. 7.  Following an expert report into the applicant\u2019s mental condition at the time of the commission of the alleged offences, on 2 January 2014 the relevant State Attorney\u2019s Office amended the indictments, arguing that he had committed the offences in a state of mental derangement caused by paranoid schizophrenia which he had been suffering from for a number of years. It also asked that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital in accordance with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. 8.  In the meantime, on 26 November 2013 the Municipal Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the grounds that he might reoffend. He was detained on 30 November 2013 and on 2 December 2013 he was placed in the Zagreb Prison hospital for treatment. During the proceedings, his pre\u2011trial detention was extended several times. 9.  The applicant challenged the orders for his detention before the Velika Gorica County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Velikoj Gorici), which on 12 December 2013 and 13 January 2014 dismissed his appeals as ill\u2011founded. Judge LJ.B. took part in these decisions as a member of the appeal panel of the Velika Gorica County Court. 10.  On 14 January 2014 the Municipal Court found that the applicant had committed the offence of uttering serious threats against his neighbours in a state of mental derangement and that he posed a threat to others. On this basis, the court ordered his internment in a psychiatric institution, in accordance with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. The court also decided that he would remain detained until the judgment became final. 11.  The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment by lodging an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. He also challenged the decision to detain him until the judgment became final. 12.  On 23 January 2014 the Velika Gorica County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision to detain him until the judgment became final. Judge LJ.B. took part in this decision as a member of a three\u2011judge panel. 13.  On 3 March 2014 a three-judge panel of the Velika Gorica County Court, on which Judge LJ.B. was sitting, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the first-instance judgment of the Municipal Court, which thereby became final. 14.  The applicant challenged the judgment of the Velika Gorica County Court by lodging a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He alleged in particular a lack of impartiality on the part of the Velika Gorica County Court, given Judge LJ.B.\u2019s previous involvement in his case. 15.  On 4 June 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for extraordinary review on the grounds that there was no reason to call the impartiality of Judge LJ.B into question. 16.  On 20 May 2015 the Constitutional Court upheld these findings and dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 17.  After the criminal court\u2019s judgment became final, on 19 March 2014 the file was forwarded to the Zagreb County Court (hereinafter \u201cthe County Court\u201d) as the court with competence to rule on the applicant\u2019s involuntary placement in a psychiatric hospital under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act (see paragraphs 34 and 36 below). The file also contained submissions made by F.\u017d., the applicant\u2019s lawyer in the criminal proceedings. At that time, the applicant was still being held in the prison hospital (see paragraph 8 above). 18.  On the same day the County Court opened the proceedings for the applicant\u2019s committal to a psychiatric hospital. In the decision opening the proceedings, it noted that the applicant was represented by a legal aid lawyer, R.T. 19.  On 21 March 2014 the County Court found that the applicant had not appointed a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings and, as legal representation was mandatory, it appointed him a legal aid lawyer, T.\u017d. 20.  On 10 April 2014 it committed the applicant to Vrap\u010de Psychiatric Hospital (hereinafter \u201cthe hospital\u201d) for a period of six months, starting from 3 May 2014. 21.  On 28 July 2014 the hospital asked the County Court to extend the applicant\u2019s involuntary psychiatric confinement on the grounds that the treatment had started to show positive results but had been short, so further treatment was needed. 22.  Upon receipt of the request, the County Court opened the proceedings for the applicant\u2019s further involuntary placement in the hospital and appointed the legal aid lawyer T.\u017d. to represent him in the proceedings. 23.  On 30 July 2014 the judge conducting the proceedings visited the applicant in the hospital. According to a note of the visit, it was possible to communicate with the applicant, he was engaged in therapeutic activities, his mother had been visiting him and he wanted to be given the possibility to take occasional therapeutic leave from the hospital. The note also indicated that T.\u017d. had attended the meeting. There is no indication that she asked any questions or otherwise addressed the applicant or the judge during the meeting. 24.  On 7 August 2014 the County Court ordered an expert report from S.H., a psychiatrist from a different psychiatric hospital to the one in which the applicant was placed, concerning the possibility of granting the applicant therapeutic leave. S.H. was of the opinion that short-term therapeutic leave from the hospital could be granted. 25.  On 20 August 2014 F.\u017d., the lawyer who had represented the applicant in the criminal proceedings before the Municipal Court, sent a request to the hospital for information concerning the applicant\u2019s treatment. He stressed that all his previous attempts to contact the hospital had been to no avail. He asked the hospital to consider the possibility of releasing the applicant, as his parents had been actively engaged in finding him employment. This letter appears to have only been received by the County Court on 18 December 2014. 26.  Meanwhile, on 27 August 2014 the County Court held a hearing, which was attended by representatives of the hospital and the State Attorney\u2019s Office, as well as the applicant\u2019s legal aid lawyer T.\u017d. Those present at the hearing agreed that the applicant should be granted short-term therapeutic leave. The representative of the hospital reiterated its request for the applicant\u2019s further psychiatric confinement (see paragraph 21 above) and the judge conducting the proceedings read out the note of her visit to the applicant (see paragraph 23 above). The representative of the State Attorney\u2019s Office agreed with the request. The legal aid lawyer T.\u017d. also agreed with the request, and made no other submissions at the hearing. 27.  On the same day the County Court ordered the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation for a further period of one year. It referred to the judge\u2019s meeting with the applicant (see paragraph 23 above) and noted that neither the representative of the State Attorney\u2019s Office nor the applicant\u2019s legal aid lawyer opposed the hospital\u2019s request. At the same time, the County Court granted the applicant therapeutic leave for the period between 28 and 31 August 2014. 28.  The applicant\u2019s father, on behalf of the applicant, challenged the decision on his son\u2019s further involuntary hospitalisation before a three-judge panel of the County Court. He contended that the applicant\u2019s family had never been informed that his psychiatric confinement would be extended, and had only accidentally learned of his further confinement after inspecting the case file in the County Court. The applicant\u2019s father also complained of ineffective legal representation in the proceedings. 29.  On 19 December 2014 a three-judge panel of Zagreb County Court dismissed the appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that a lawyer had been duly appointed to represent the applicant in the proceedings concerning his involuntary hospitalisation. 30.  The applicant\u2019s father then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the legal aid lawyer appointed for his son in the proceedings before the County Court had acted as an extended arm of the institutions rather than a lawyer protecting his interests. 31.  On 3 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the three-judge panel of the County Court. 32.  In the meantime, on 22 May 2015 the applicant, through his chosen representative F.\u017d., asked to be released from the hospital. 33.  On 24 August 2015, following a further examination of the applicant\u2019s situation, the County Court ordered the applicant\u2019s conditional release from the hospital.", "references": ["9", "7", "4", "8", "3", "6", "5", "1", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in the Ventspils district. 6.  On 6 December 2001 the applicant was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated murder and aggravated extortion and sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. This judgment was upheld at two levels of appeal and took effect in 2002. 7.  In accordance with section 504(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code (Latvijas Sodu izpildes kodekss), the applicant was placed at the maximum\u2011security level in a closed prison. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to the medium\u2011security level of that closed prison. 9.  According to the applicant, in 2008 he realised that there was a difference in the respective treatment of male and female inmates with regard to the execution of custodial sentences. Male inmates who had been convicted of serious crimes started serving their sentences in closed prisons, while female inmates who had been convicted of the same crimes started serving their sentence in partly-closed prisons. As the applicant considered that this had a notable impact on restrictions of various prisoners\u2019 rights, he lodged complaints about this issue with several State institutions. 10.  On 30 September 2008 the applicant was informed that his father had died. On 2 October 2008 he requested permission to leave prison in order to attend his father\u2019s funeral. On the same day the prison director replied that he had no authority to allow the request, as the applicant was serving his sentence at the medium-security level of a closed prison. Under the Sentence Enforcement Code only prisoners serving their sentence at the medium- or minimum- security level in partly-closed prisons were eligible for such leave. 11.  In the years 2012-2015 the applicant was granted one prison\u2011leave day per year. The case file contains no information as to the type of prison and security level in which the applicant served his sentence during this time. 12.  On 11 September 2015 the applicant was conditionally released. 13.  On 1 July 2008 the Ministry of Justice examined the applicant\u2019s complaint about the difference in treatment between convicted men and women. It referred to sections 504(1) and 505(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code and observed that the legislature had chosen to create different legal frameworks in respect of sentence execution for men and women. The Ministry of Justice concluded that there was no discrimination on the grounds of sex because the rights of both male and female inmates were restricted, and both sexes were deprived of their liberty. 14.  On 25 October 2010 the Ombudsperson concluded the examination of the applicant\u2019s complaint about the refusal to allow him to attend his father\u2019s funeral. He observed that closed prisons hosted male convicts who had been sentenced to deprivation of liberty for having committed serious or especially serious crimes, as well as convicts who had been moved from partly-closed prisons for grave or systematic breaches of the regime under which they had been held. In closed prisons convicts were subjected to tightened security and maximum surveillance. It followed that the persons placed in those prisons were particularly dangerous to the society. Hence, the restriction imposed on the applicant was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. 15.  On 9 July 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing that section 504(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code was discriminatory on the grounds of sex, in breach of Article 91 of the Constitution. As women convicted of the same crimes started serving their sentence in partly-closed prisons, they were entitled to more and longer visits, more phone calls and could progress to more lenient security levels more rapidly. In addition, women could be granted leave from prison for up to seven days per year, whereas no such right was provided for men. 16.  On 29 July 2008 the Constitutional Court, relying on section 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, declined to institute proceedings. It stated that the legal reasoning included in the complaint was evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed (ac\u012bmredzami nepietiekams pras\u012bjuma apmierin\u0101\u0161anai). In particular, the applicant had failed to specify why the difference in treatment between men and women should not be acceptable. 17.  On 7 August 2008 the applicant lodged a second constitutional complaint, adding that men and women who were convicted of serious and especially serious crimes were in the same circumstances in that they were both imprisoned. Yet, despite the prohibition of discrimination requiring men and women to be treated equally, their rights were restricted to a different extent. The applicant also pointed out that within the context of discrimination the burden of proof was shifted \u2013 namely, after a person had demonstrated a difference in treatment, it fell for the respondent to show that this difference had not amounted to discrimination. 18.  On 5 September 2008 the Constitutional Court again declined to institute proceedings. With respect to the first sentence of Article 91 of the Constitution, which addressed the principle of equality, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the following criteria had to be examined \u2013 the existence of comparable groups, a difference in treatment between those groups, and a lack of objective and reasonable justification for that difference in treatment. As the legal reasoning advanced by the applicant was based on the assumption that men and women who had committed similarly grave crimes were in comparable situations, the Constitutional Court considered this reasoning evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed. With respect to the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the second sentence of Article 91 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the applicant had failed to specify the human right in conjunction with which the discrimination complaint had been made. Thus, in relation to this part of the application, legal reasoning had not been provided (nav sniegts juridiskais pamatojums) and the formal requirements of a constitutional complaint had not been met. In so far as relevant, the Constitutional Court relied on sections 20(5)(3) and 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. 19.  In a third constitutional complaint of 20 October 2008, the applicant added that on 2 October 2008 he had been refused permission to leave prison to attend his father\u2019s funeral. He had thereby been discriminated against on the basis of sex, as women in his situation would have been able to attend the funeral. In support of his discrimination-related complaint the applicant referred to the right to private life, right to family life, and freedom of expression. 20.  On 21 November 2008 the Constitutional Court declined to institute proceedings, invoking section 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. It noted that the application contained no reasoning as to why men and women who had been convicted of serious and especially serious crimes and given prison sentences would need to be subjected to the same rules of sentence enforcement \u2013 namely, how men and women were in comparable situations. On those grounds, the legal reasoning included in the constitutional complaint was held to be evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed.", "references": ["9", "2", "1", "7", "6", "5", "0", "3", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant, Mr Fabian Gjini, a Croatian citizen of Albanian origin, was born in 1972 and lives in Crikvenica, Croatia. 7.  On 22 August 2008 the applicant was arrested by the Serbian police on suspicion of having attempted to pay a toll at Tovarnik border crossing (a border crossing between Serbia and Croatia) with a counterfeit ten\u2011euro (EUR) banknote. 8.  Upon his arrest, the applicant was taken before an investigating judge. The applicant was unable to provide the EUR 6,000 security for his bail, and the investigating judge ordered his detention. 9.  The applicant spent 31 days in custody in Sremska Mitrovica Prison and was released from detention on 22 September 2008. 10.  On 30 September 2008 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued by the prosecuting authorities, because the expert tests performed on the allegedly counterfeit banknote showed that it was actually genuine. 11.  The applicant alleges that in Sremska Mitrovica Prison he was placed in a four-bed cell which already housed four other inmates. Because of the lack of space, the applicant had no proper bed and had to sleep on the floor, on a sheet of foam material. 12.  According to the applicant, the ill-treatment and humiliation started immediately. His cellmates forced him to mop the cell floor. While he was mopping, they did not allow him to raise his head, and would kick him sporadically. After he had mopped up, the cellmates would slap and kick the applicant for his \u201cfailure\u201d to mop the floor properly. The applicant was compelled to clean the floor again and again. He could not remember how many times he had mopped the cell floor. He remembered, however, that his cellmates poured the water containing detergent over him to teach him how to get \u201cthings\u201d clean. 13.  According to the applicant, his cellmates thought that he was an informer. They did not believe that he had been put in their cell because of a counterfeit note. Rather, they thought that he had been placed there to spy on them and find out about their crimes. 14.  The cellmates threatened the applicant by saying that they would stage his suicide if he told anyone what was happening in the cell. At night, the applicant was put in the toilet. There, the cellmates forced him to keep his feet in cold water for the whole night. He was not allowed to move. The morning after, the skin on his feet tore off and open wounds appeared. 15.  The situation worsened after the applicant\u2019s cellmates found out about his origin. Upon learning that he lived on the Croatian coast, they said that they wanted to test him to see how well a person from the coast could \u201cdive\u201d. They filled a bucket with water and put the applicant\u2019s head in it. Afterwards, they would shower the applicant with cold water. This test was performed over and over again. 16.  On one occasion, the applicant\u2019s cellmates gave him a wet towel and forced him to fight with another prisoner. After the applicant had managed to hit his opponent, his four cellmates jumped on him, punched and kicked him, and abused him for daring to hit a Serb. 17.  They made him sing Serb nationalist songs (\u010detni\u010dke pesme). After he said that he did not know any, they taught him some and forced him to sing them for several nights. The applicant could not remember whether he had also been forced to sing Croat nationalist songs (usta\u0161ke pesme). 18.  According to the applicant, his cellmates raped him. Although he could not remember the rape itself, he assumed that it happened as follows. One day the cellmates gave him a glass of water. The water caused him to feel dizzy, and he felt unable to walk and quickly lost consciousness. The next morning, he had pain in his anus and saw blood in his faeces. On that day his cellmates shaved him and shaved his eyebrows. Later, he discovered that shaved eyebrows were a sign that he had become someone\u2019s \u201cgirl\u201d (curica). Being a \u201cgirl\u201d meant that he had been sodomised. 19.  According to the applicant, the prison guards were perfectly aware of what was happening to him. In particular, all the events happened while one guard \u2013 who appeared to be a school friend of one of the applicant\u2019s cellmates \u2013 was on duty. The applicant remembered that the prison guards laughed at him openly during his walks in the prison yard. He also had impression that everything that happened to him was because of his origin and nationality. 20.  Several days after the start of his detention, the applicant\u2019s lawyer noticed changes in the applicant\u2019s behaviour and sensed that something was wrong. The applicant was afraid to say anything to his lawyer. Nevertheless, the lawyer urged the prison authorities to move the applicant to another cell. 21.  After his relocation, the applicant was no longer ill-treated. 22.  The Government contended that the applicant\u2019s version of the events was not supported by evidence. They did not provide a separate description of the events from 22 August 2008 until 22 September 2008 when the applicant was detained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. 23.  On 29 October 2008 the applicant invited the Ministry of Justice to make a payment in respect of his allegedly unlawful detention. He received no reply. 24.  On 1 September 2009, the applicant amended his proposal, adding a request for compensation for the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention. Again, he received no reply. 25.  On 25 December 2009 the applicant lodged a civil complaint against the Republic of Serbia with the Second Municipal Court (subsequently renamed the Court of First Instance) in Belgrade. He requested compensation for his detention, and in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained in terms of fear, physical pain and mental anxiety owing to the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected during his time in detention. 26.  On 12 March 2010 the Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office (Republi\u010dko javno pravobranila\u0161tvo) contested the applicant\u2019s claims. The office underlined that the applicant had failed to submit any medical evidence in support of his claims concerning the alleged ill-treatment. 27.  On 15 June 2010 a hearing was held before the Court of First Instance. The Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office was not present. The applicant was represented by his lawyer. However, owing to the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the domestic court decided that the applicant had to be present at hearings. The applicant was summoned to attend the next hearing, scheduled for 21 October 2010, subsequently rescheduled for 2 February 2011. 28.  At the hearing of 2 February 2011, and the further hearing on 20 May 2011, the judge interviewed several witnesses: (i) P.S., who had been serving a sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison at the same time when the applicant had been there; (ii) D.\u017d., who had represented the applicant in the criminal proceedings and was familiar with the events in prison; and (iii) M.\u010c., the applicant\u2019s uncle. 29.  P.S. stated that he had met the applicant in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. The applicant was placed in a cell in the part of the prison where he was imprisoned. P.S. remembered hearing someone singing Serb and Croat nationalist songs at night. That was before the applicant was transferred to another part of the prison. P.S. and the applicant used to talk during the morning walks in the prison. One morning P.S. observed that the applicant\u2019s eyebrows had been shaved. On that occasion, he also noticed haematomas behind the applicant\u2019s ears and on the upper part of his arm. He could see the injuries because it was summer and they were all in T-shirts. The applicant had a strange look in his eyes and seemed very scared. The applicant avoided the company of other prisoners and complained to P.S. regarding the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by his cellmates. The applicant also complained that his anus was bleeding and that he had been given some medicine which had made him lose consciousness. P.S. could not remember whether someone had screamed at night. Their cells were 10-15 metres apart. P.S. confirmed that shaved eyebrows in prison meant that the person had been raped. He also saw the damaged skin on the applicant\u2019s feet. The guards in prison must have heard that somebody was singing songs, and they must also have noticed other signs of maltreatment. The guards knew what shaved eyebrows meant. Prison guards patrolled the prison corridors day and night. Through peepholes, they controlled what prisoners did in their cells. There were cameras placed in the corridors, but there were no cameras in the cells. The applicant was moved to another cell after his lawyer urged the prison authorities to relocate him. P.S. left Sremska Mitrovica Prison seven to eight days before the applicant. 30.  D.\u017d. met the applicant in 2008 when he represented him in the criminal proceedings concerning the use of an allegedly forged banknote. He visited the applicant in prison. On that occasion, D.\u017d. noticed that the applicant had been shaved and his eyebrows had also been shaved. The applicant looked disorientated and scared. D.\u017d. asked the applicant whether there was any problem, but the applicant could not give him a clear answer. The applicant seemed frightened and confused. D.\u017d. urged the prison authorities to transfer the applicant to another cell. Specifically, D.\u017d. called the prison authorities, expressed his concern about the applicant\u2019s treatment, and underlined that the authorities should respect the laws and regulations concerning the placement and status of detainees. D.\u017d. also talked to another client, V.D., who informed him what had happened to the applicant. 31.  M.\u010c. had known the applicant since birth. He was the applicant\u2019s uncle. He visited the applicant once during his time in prison. On that occasion, he could not recognise the applicant. The applicant was bald, with shaved eyebrows. M.\u010c. also noticed bruises on the applicant\u2019s right arm, as well as bruises on his head. M.\u010c. stated that he wanted to know what had happened to the applicant, yet the applicant was evasive and avoided eye contact. M.\u010c. had previously known the applicant to be a happy and cheerful person, but said that the applicant had never fully recovered from what had happened to him in prison. 32.  Between the two hearings, a statement was taken from another witness, V.D., who was still serving his sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. This witness remembered the applicant, but was not exactly sure what had happened to him during his time in the prison. V.D. recalled seeing him with shaved eyebrows and a strange haircut. He also recalled hearing the applicant singing or screaming at nights, but he could not remember what he had actually been singing. 33.  At the hearing of 9 November 2011 two expert witnesses \u2013 an expert on traumatology and a neuropsychiatrist \u2013 submitted their reports. They found that, due to his suffering in prison, the applicant had suffered certain physical pain and had sustained an overall loss of 10% in his \u201cvital activity\u201d (umanjenje op\u0161te \u017eivotne aktivnosti). 34.  The Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office denied the events in Sremska Mitrovica Prison as alleged by the applicant. It, in particular, referred to the absence of medical evidence. 35.  On 9 November 2011 the Court of First Instance in Belgrade accepted the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the request for compensation for his detention, but rejected his request in respect of compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by ill-treatment in a State-owned institution. The court found:\n\u201c[The applicant has] no medical certificate proving the injuries. Medical expert witnesses testified on the basis of the claimant\u2019s statement. The testimonies of other witnesses are based on what the claimant told them. The claimant, if injured at all, should have gone to see the doctor in the detention unit; he ought to have visited the doctor, who would have confirmed the injuries, or he should have said something in order to be transferred to another cell and protected. The claimant has no medical certificate concerning any injuries.\u201d 36.  On 17 October 2012 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the Court of First Instance\u2019s decision as regards the compensation for detention, but quashed the rejection of the claim for compensation in respect of the ill\u2011treatment. The case was remitted to the Court of First Instance for reconsideration. As regards the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal stated the following:\n\u201c[It] failed to properly evaluate the evidence in accordance with Article 8 of the Law on Civil Procedure, in accordance with which a court must decide on the facts established as proven, but on the basis of a conscientious and meticulous assessment of each particular piece [of evidence] and of all the evidence together, as well as in relation to the outcome of the whole proceedings. Given that such an evaluation was not carried out in this particular case, the findings of the first-instance court that it had not been proved that the claimant had been ill-treated and molested by other cellmates during his time in detention \u2013 causing him to sustain different types of non-pecuniary loss for which the [State] could be held responsible as defined in Article 172 of the Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima) \u2013 cannot be accepted with any certainty.\u201d 37.  In the reopened proceedings, the Court of First Instance re-examined the applicant\u2019s first lawyer, D.\u017d., as well as the two expert witnesses. The court also considered reports produced by a psychologist and a psychiatrist from Rijeka, Croatia concerning the applicant\u2019s current mental health and emotional distress. Those reports confirmed that, because of the ill-treatment he had sustained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison, the applicant was still in a state of mental anxiety. 38.  On 10 May 2013 the Court of First Instance awarded the applicant 200,000 Serbian dinars (RSD \u2013 approximately EUR 1,900) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the 10% loss in his general vital activity associated with the events in detention. However, the claim for the applicant\u2019s physical suffering was rejected because, in the court\u2019s view, his suffering had not constituted grievous but rather slight bodily harm, for which no compensation could be awarded, according to the law. Also, the court refused to award the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage for his fear. 39.  On 10 December 2013 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance in part and reaffirmed the findings of that court that the applicant had suffered from an acute stress disorder as a result of being detained and harassed by other inmates, which, in general, had led to his experiencing post-traumatic stress and a loss in his general vital activity. However, the Court of Appeal awarded the applicant an additional RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR 450) for the fear arising from the events during his detention, and explained its reasoning in the following manner:\n\u201cTaking into account the established factual situation and all the circumstances of the present case, as well as the findings of the neuropsychiatrists, according to which the claimant suffered post-traumatic stress during and after his detention, this being, in itself, a complex reaction when a person\u2019s physical and personal integrity is threatened, which [in this case] lasted for days and involved fear, emotional distress, a feeling of sadness, distraction and despair, and being a reaction which, by its nature, is more complex than a fear of strong intensity, the Court of Appeal finds that, in accordance with Article 200 of the Obligations Act, the claimant is entitled to a just award for non-pecuniary damage for the fear he experienced.\u201d 40.  On 18 January 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained under Articles 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 35 and 36 of the Constitution (articles corresponding to Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention). In particular, his complaint was as follows:\n\u201cThe domestic courts have unlawfully and unconstitutionally rejected the claimant\u2019s clearly justified claim for compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he suffered on account of the violation of his human dignity after being placed in illegal detention, where he was molested for days by a group of prisoners as a person of Croatian and Albanian origin, being beaten and kicked all over his body, drenched with water, beaten with wet towels, tortured, battered, raped and thereafter shaved all over his body, which was the symbol of a raped person, and being subjected to real and serious threats that he would \u2018commit suicide by hanging [himself] over the door handle\u02bc, or be cut with a razor blade and similar items. And all this was done with the silent approval of prison officers who knew which cell they had put the claimant in, and who knew or ought to have known about everything that happened to him.\u201d 41.  On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. It only considered his complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, and found it to be manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court did not address any other complaint raised by the applicant. 42.  About the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention, the applicant also complained to the President of the Republic and to the Minister of Justice herself. No one ever replied to those complaints. 43.  On 24 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative complained to the Provincial Ombudsperson (Pokrajinski ombudsman) regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in prison. On 16 March 2010 the Provincial Ombudsperson replied that he had no jurisdiction over the case, as the applicant was no longer in detention. 44.  On 1 March 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative also informed the State Ombudsperson (Za\u0161titnik gra\u0111ana Republike Srbije) about the detention and ill-treatment of the applicant. He particularly highlighted the fact that even if State authorities knew or ought to know about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in detention, none had ever launched an investigation into the case. The State Ombudsperson replied on 26 April 2010 that he had no jurisdiction over the work of the public prosecutor\u2019s office or the courts, and accordingly had no jurisdiction over the case.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "0", "5", "2", "4", "3", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and was detained in LPU-3, Chelyabinsk. 5.  On 14 November 2003 the Saint Petersburg City Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and possession of firearms, and sentenced him to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment. On 1 November 2004 the conviction was upheld on appeal. 6.  On 28 September 2007 the applicant arrived at medical detention facility no. LPU-3 in Chelyabinsk, where he stayed until 30 October 2007. 7.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant was ordered to leave his cell. He entered the corridor, turned to face the wall and took up a spread-eagle position leaning against the wall. Having refused to strip naked for a body search, he was immediately subjected to beatings. A warder hit him a number of times on the buttocks with a rubber truncheon. At the same time another warder started kicking and hitting the applicant on the back and head. Trying to protect himself from more serious harm, the applicant turned and faced his assailants. He raised his arm and inadvertently hit the warder\u2019s face. The beatings intensified and the applicant was pushed to the floor. The warders continued kicking and punching him and hitting him with truncheons. The applicant lost consciousness. A warder dragged him back to the cell and the applicant was left there on the floor. 8.  On the same date the applicant was examined by a prison doctor. The doctor found hematomas on his buttocks and documented them in the applicant\u2019s medical records as follows:\n\u201cSkin hyperaemia on both buttocks, traces of blunt injury, blue hematomas. Moderate pain on palpation.\u201d 9.  On 5 October 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of assault on a warder and disruption of order in the detention facility. The prosecution\u2019s case was that on 2 October 2007 the applicant had refused to be subjected to a body search and had waved his hands to prevent the search. Warder B. had warned the applicant about the intention to use force should he fail to comply with the order. In response, the applicant had punched another warder, Mr L., in the face, splitting his lip. 10.  On 2 September 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court, by a jury verdict, acquitted the applicant. Having established that he had hit warder L. once and had split his lip, the jury nevertheless concluded that the applicant had caused the injury in an attempt to protect himself. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe jury has established in a verdict that two injuries to Mr L.\u2019s lower lip were caused by [the applicant] with a single punch to Mr L.\u2019s face. [The applicant] had refused to strip naked and to submit his clothes to a check-up, and had asked for a copy of a decision by the head or deputy head of the facility authorising a full body search. [The applicant] who had stayed with his face to the wall, had been subsequently kicked and punched, and hit with rubber truncheons a number of times, at least ten, on various parts of his body, head [and] limbs. [The beating] had been accompanied by verbal assaults. In an attempt to prevent further beatings and to protect himself, [the applicant], while falling down, had turned and taken an aimless swing in the direction of the persons who had continued hitting him.\u201d 11.  On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal. 12.  After the acquittal had become final, the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, providing his version of the events of 2 October 2007 and complaining of ill\u2011treatment. 13.  On 28 January 2009 the investigative department of the Metallurgicheskiy District of Chelyabinsk opened a criminal investigation into the events of 2 October 2007 on charges of abuse of power committed with violence. The investigators questioned the applicant along with fourteen witnesses and conducted three cross-examinations. 14.  On 28 September 2009 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. 15.  On 18 November 2009 the investigation was reopened. 16.  On 22 December 2009 the criminal proceedings against the prison warders were discontinued and the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigators had questioned the warders B. and L. mentioned in the acquittal judgment of 2 September 2008, who had testified that they had indeed administered up to six truncheon blows to the applicant\u2019s buttocks because he had refused to go through a body search and had hit warder L. in the face. 17.  On 8 November 2012 the criminal proceedings against the warders were reopened. 18.  On 19 November 2012 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigator analysed the depositions of warders and other witnesses, and the findings of the medical examination of 2 October 2007, and concluded that the applicant had not obeyed the warders\u2019 lawful orders and had been aggressive. Therefore, the use of rubber truncheons had been justified. Moreover, the medical records contained a vague summary description of the applicant\u2019s injuries, which were not life-threatening. Lastly, the jurors\u2019 verdict did not contain any assessment of the warders\u2019 actions or any proof of the warders\u2019 guilt. 19.  On 14 November 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region quashed the decision of 19 November 2012 and reopened the investigation. 20.  On 28 February 2014 the criminal proceedings against the warders were terminated. The investigator found that the warders had not abused their powers and had acted in accordance with the law. 21.  The applicant\u2019s representative challenged the decision of 28 September 2009, arguing that the jury verdict of 2 September 2008 had already identified the assailants and that there had therefore been no reason to adjourn the proceedings. 22.  On 10 February 2011 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the complaint, having found as follows:\n\u201cAs follows from the case-file materials, on 28 September 2009 a senior investigator of the investigative department, Mr V., refused to open a criminal case against officers of [medical colony no. 3], Mr M., Mr B. and Mr L., who, as follows from that decision, had lawfully used force against [the applicant]. That decision remains in force.\nIn those circumstances, the decision by which the criminal proceedings were adjourned is lawful and well-founded; there are no grounds to consider it unlawful.\u201d 23.  On 9 April 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision on appeal and remitted the case for re-examination. 24.  On 1 June 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk held to discontinue the proceedings as the decision of 28 September 2008 had been quashed on 18 November 2009.\n(b)  Challenging of the investigator\u2019s decision of 22 December 2009 and other decisions 25.  On an unspecified date the applicant asked the court to declare unlawful the investigator\u2019s decisions of 28 September 2008, 11 November 2008, 22 December 2009 and an opinion of 12 October 2009 justifying suspension of the investigation. He argued that those decisions contradicted each other and sought to conceal the warders\u2019 crime. 26.  On 9 November 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk discontinued the proceedings on the applicant\u2019s claim. 27.  On 21 March 2013 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh examination. 28.  On 18 April 2013 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that the decisions of 28 September 2008 and 22 December 2009 lacked sufficient reasoning, did not contain any references to the jurors\u2019 verdict, and were based only on the testimony of warders. It ordered that the violations found be remedied. 29.  The applicant brought a civil action against the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful institution of criminal proceedings. He also sought apologies from the implicated officials. 30.  On 10 August 2011 the applicant and his lawyer asked the court to consider the case in their absence. 31.  On 11 August 2011 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chelyabinsk awarded the applicant 15,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (353 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and dismissed the remaining claims. The District Court held the hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 32.  On 6 February 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 11 August 2011 and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. The appellate court also noted that as an inmate, the applicant had been duly notified of the court hearing but had failed to attend it.", "references": ["2", "8", "0", "5", "9", "4", "6", "7", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is now serving his sentence in a detention facility at Nizhniy Tagil. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 7 November 2013 a group of nine detainees, including the applicant, was scheduled for a transfer from a police station to a remand prison. A Gazel prison van was available for transfer. It was designed to transport a maximum of seven prisoners, but Police Major V., who was in charge of the transfer, took the decision to take all nine prisoners at once to save fuel. 8.  The prison van was manned by four officers. Driver G. and Major V. were seated in the front, and Officers K. and D. were riding in the rear part of the cabin next to the prisoner cells. 9.  Five prisoners were placed in the large cell in the van, and three prisoners in individual cells. As the applicant was a former law-enforcement officer, the transfer regulations required that he should be separated from the other detainees. However, no other individual cells were available, so he was allowed to ride in the rear together with Officers K. and D. 10.  Approximately half way to the destination, prisoners Sa., Ma. and Mu. kicked out the door of the large cell and attacked the convoy officers. Prisoner Mu. overpowered Officer D. and seized his holster containing a handgun. A struggle for the gun ensued and Mu. fired a shot at the floor. Prisoner Sa. grabbed Officer D. from behind, and a second shot was fired. 11.  Meanwhile, Officer K. pushed prisoner Ma. aside, drew his gun and told everyone to freeze or he would shoot. Prisoners Sa. and Mu. were still struggling with Officer D. for the gun. Officer K. shot at Sa. and hit him. 12.  Major V. came running to the back of the van and opened the door. More shots followed. Eventually, prisoner Mu. released the gun and threw it out of the van. At some point, a bullet ricocheted, wounding the applicant in his left shin. 13.  The applicant was taken to a local military hospital where his wounded leg was put in a cast. On the following day he was discharged and transferred to a prison hospital. 14.  In December 2013 the applicant complained to a prosecutor that he had been injured as a consequence of the grossly negligent actions of convoy officers who had breached the transfer regulations. 15.  On 9 January 2014 an investigator with the Bashkortostan Regional Division of the Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal case. He found no indications of gross negligence arising from the decision to transport two prisoners in excess of the van\u2019s design capacity and that not putting the applicant in a cell had been motivated by \u201cconsiderations of budgetary austerity and saving money allocated for the purchase of fuel\u201d. 16.  On 4 December 2014 a deputy prosecutor of the Kirovskiy District in Ufa rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision. 17.  On 30 April 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa upheld the investigator\u2019s decision as lawful, noting that it had been within his competence to issue such a decision, and that the decision contained no defects of form. On 20 July 2015 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic rejected an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 18.  On 14 September 2015 the acting head of the regional division of the Investigations Committee ordered an additional \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d into whether an offence of negligence causing grievous bodily harm had been committed. Ten days later the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings:\n\u201c... it does not appear possible to establish with certainty that the bullet which hit [the applicant] was shot from the handgun of Officer V., rather than from [the handgun of] Officer D., while it was in the possession of prisoner Mu. Besides, under Article [41] of the Criminal Code, causing damage to interests protected by criminal law is not a criminal offence if the act causing such damage was based on a reasonable risk assessment and sought to achieve a socially useful objective, such as preventing an attempted escape in the instant case.\u201d 19.  On 8 February 2016 the deputy head of the regional division upheld the investigator\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 20.  On 5 May 2016 the supervising deputy prosecutor of the Bashkortostan Republic set the decision aside and ordered a forensic assessment of the applicant\u2019s injury. On 6 June 2016 the investigator with the Central Investigations Department in Ufa again refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that the applicant\u2019s medical record could not be located. It had been sent to the facility where he was serving his sentence and that facility had not responded to the investigator\u2019s request for a copy. 21.  In parallel criminal proceedings, on 22 December 2014 the Ordjonikidzevskiy District Court in Ufa convicted prisoners Mu. and Sa. of attempted escape from prison and sentenced them to five years\u2019 imprisonment each. Convoy Officers K., D. and V. had been given the status of injured parties in those proceedings. The applicant testified as a witness.", "references": ["4", "2", "9", "7", "0", "8", "3", "6", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  Details concerning the applicants can be found in the appendix. 5.  The applicants are part-owners of the property named \u201cAssunta\u201d in Nazzarenu Street, Paola, Malta, which is a twentieth century corner town house with three floors and a total area of approximately 135 square metres. The first applicant owns one seventh undivided share thereof. The second and third applicants each own one of twenty\u2011eight undivided shares thereof and the fourth applicant owns one of twenty\u2011one undivided shares thereof. 6.  The applicants\u2019 ancestor, L.M., as owner of the property, had granted it on temporary emphyteusis to J.S. on 31 March 1962 for a period of seventeen years at a yearly ground rent of 45 Maltese liras (MTL), approximately 105 euro (EUR). In 1971 a certain C.C. had obtained the sub\u2011utile dominium (by way of sub-emphyteusis) of the property from J.S. 7.  In March 1979 when the temporary emphyteusis came to an end C.C. continued to live in the property as a result of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta which provided for the conversion of temporary emphyteusis contracts into lease contracts. The rent under the new lease regime was MTL 86.54, approximately EUR 200 annually. 8.  On 9 April 1986 the property was requisitioned by the State and C.C. was given other accommodation. He handed in the keys to the Housing Department on 29 September 1986. 9.  On 30 October 1986 the Housing Department allocated the property to D.L. for residential use, at the annual rent of MTL 86. To the applicants\u2019 knowledge, at the time when the property was allocated to D.L., there was no pressing social need for such an allocation. D.L. and her husband (thereinafter \u201cthe occupants\u201d) had come to Malta from the United Kingdom three months before, and had been living in a house in Senglea. The husband had a job and the house they were previously residing in was not in danger of being requisitioned, nor had it been granted to them on account of old age. The Government noted that the applicants had not submitted any proof in this respect. The applicants also noted that the Government, in whose possession all the relevant documentation was, had failed to submit any evidence concerning D.L.\u2019s need for the premises in question. Nevertheless, from the order itself it transpired that this was a normal case, and not one founded on homelessness, old age, or a risk of danger. 10.  The owners refused the rent and did not recognise the occupants as tenants. 11.  The occupants thus started paying rent directly to the Housing Department. 12.  Eventually the owners became aware that the occupants were also occupying a portion of an adjacent property (a room previously used as an office), also owned by the applicants in the above\u2011mentioned shares, and which was not covered by the requisition order. 13.  The owners informed the authorities of this but no action was taken. 14.  On an unspecified date, following the death of D.L. (in whose name the requisition order had been issued) the owners asked for the property to be returned to them. They offered the occupants a smaller property in the vicinity as part of a settlement proposal. The deal did not go through. 15.  In 2001 D.L.\u2019s husband also died and on 30 January 2002 their son L.L. requested to be recognised as tenant of the requisitioned premises. On 16 September 2003 the authorities recognised L.L. as tenant despite the owners\u2019 objections of 27 March 2002. 16.  Rent continued to be paid on the terms mentioned above. 17.  The owners complained to the ombudsman who, on 29 October 2003, considered that the authorities had not given sufficient attention to the owners\u2019 complaints. 18.  On an unspecified date, L.L. applied for a grant to make alterations to the premises, including to the commercial room the occupants had been occupying without legal title. 19.  When the owners became aware that this application had been lodged, they filed, on 21 February 2007, an objection to the proposed development. 20.  The relevant permit to make structural alterations was issued by the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) on 16 April 2007. In the applicants\u2019 view these structural changes affected the character of the property as well as its value. 21.  On 28 May 2007 the owners (including the applicants or their predecessors in title) instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They complained of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and requested that the requisition order be annulled, that the property be returned to them and that compensation be awarded for any damage suffered as a result of the occupation of the premises and the breach of their right to property. 22.  Pending proceedings, on 11 February 2010, the property was derequisitioned; however the Government admitted that although the property had been abandoned by the occupants the Government had not recovered the keys. On 8 April 2010 the Government offered the owners EUR 4,507.30 as rent for the occupation of the premises from 9 April 1986 until 11 February 2010. The owners refused the offer which they considered was too low compared to the rental value of the property and the long number of years during which it had been occupied by third parties. 23.  On 28 April 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found in favour of the owners. It found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, being unable to annul the requisition order \u2011 it having come to an end pending the proceedings \u2011 it ordered the defendants to return the property, free and unencumbered, to the owners. It also awarded EUR 7,535 in compensation, with costs against the Government. 24.  The court considered that while the requisition order had been lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, it had failed to strike a fair balance for the purposes of the invoked provision. The owners had received a low amount of rent for twenty-four years which had remained unvaried. In establishing compensation, the court had regard to the rental value submitted by the owners\u2019 expert [in a report of 2007] of MTL 250 (approximately EUR 582) a month, in other words MTL 3,000 (approximately EUR 6,988) yearly, which however included a room which was not subject to the requisition order and thus its rental value had to be deducted. This estimate was however not binding on the court. It noted that had the property not been requisitioned, according to Chapter 158 of the laws of Malta, rent would have increased every fifteen years according to the index of inflation (but never amounting to double the original rent). Thus, the owners would have been due a yearly rent of MTL 86.45 (from 9 April 1986) until 31 March 1994, of MTL 141.09 (approximately EUR 329) until March 2009, and thereafter a rent of MTL 207.39 (approximately EUR 483) until date of judgment, amounting to a rounded up sum of EUR 7,535. 25.  The Government appealed in so far as they had been forced to return the premises (over which they no longer had control) and the owners cross\u2011appealed in connection with the award of compensation. The latter noted that although L.L. had vacated the premises and offered to return the keys, the Government had failed to recover the keys. 26.  By a judgment of 28 April 2014 the Constitutional Court considered that the first\u2011instance court could not have ordered the return of the property which had already been de-requisitioned. As to the compensation it found that the amount awarded by the first-instance court had been low. Indeed the award of EUR 7,535 reflected the sums that the owners would have been entitled to as rent for the premises according to the provisions of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, and thus it was not an award in compensation for the violation of their property rights, nor did it reflect an award for the occupation of the premises at undervalued rents. Bearing in mind the social aim pursued by the measure and the fact that the rent paid had been in accordance with the law, as well as the fact that the measure persisted for twenty-four years during which the owners received a low rent compared to its market value, it awarded non-pecuniary damage of EUR 5,000 to be added to the pecuniary damage already awarded. Thus, in total it awarded compensation of EUR 12,535 covering both pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage, without prejudice to any claims the owners may have for material damage caused to the property, and it ordered that the costs of the proceedings at both instances be split equally between the contending parties. 27.  Pending these proceedings, on 21 October 2013, L.M., predecessor of the second and third applicant, died. 28.  Eventually, in or around August 2014, the keys were also returned to the owners, and the property was returned to them in a poor state. The applicants claimed that the property was not habitable and the works started by L.L. were never completed. They considered that the Government\u2019s lack of regard towards the situation had contributed to the degeneration of the property and that a considerable expense would have to be incurred and relevant permits obtained to reinstate the building for habitation. 29.  According to an architect\u2019s valuation dated 19 August 2014, the property was abandoned halfway through a refurbishment project, leaving it in an uninhabitable and unfinished state, with visible damage, most pertinently as a result of severe water penetration. According to the same report the sale market value of the property with vacant possession, as it stood, was EUR 145,000 and the market value upon completion of works would be EUR 175,000. The estimated rental value of the property (in an unspecified state) in 2014 was EUR 665 a month (EUR 7,980 a year). On the basis of a process of interpolation, rental values for previous years were calculated to be as follows:\n \nYear\nMonthly rent (in EUR)\nAnnual rent (in EUR)\n1971", "references": ["5", "7", "1", "8", "4", "3", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were both born in 1968 and live in Marsalforn and Naxxar, respectively. 6.  The applicants are owners (each own a half undivided share) of the property at number 85, St. Francis Square, Alley No. 3, Qormi, Malta. 7.  On 18 November 1986 the applicants granted the property on emphyteusis for twenty\u2011one years to Mr and Ms E. at a rent of approximately 230 euros (EUR). 8.  On 31 December 1992, the property was requisitioned by the Director of Social Housing by virtue of requisition order no. RO53704 (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe requisition order\u201d). No reason for the requisition was set out in the order. The property was allocated to Mr and Ms A. At the request of the Housing Authority, on 26 March 1997, the emphyteutical grant in favour of Mr and Ms E. was transferred to Mr and Ms A. 9.  The contract of emphyteusis expired in 2007. However, given Article 12A, of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law), which provided for the automatic conversion of the emphyteusis into a lease, Mr and Ms A. continued to occupy the property by title of lease. 10.  Mr and Ms A. paid the applicants EUR 279.52 annually by way of rent pursuant to the rent control legislation. However, the applicants did not accept this rental amount on the ground that it was insignificant when compared to the rental value which the property would have fetched on the open market. Due to this refusal the rent was to be deposited with the court registry. The rental amount was never revised in the subsequent years, the 2010 amendments (see Relevant domestic law) not being applicable as the rent exceeded the EUR 185 stipulated by law. 11.  On 9 March 2009 the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. The applicants claimed that their rights, as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, were being violated because they had not received adequate compensation for the forced occupation of their property and because the authorities had failed to properly look after the property after taking possession of it. 12.  On 26 March 2013 the court decided in favour of the applicants. The court found a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It confirmed that the applicants were the legitimate owners of the property, it declared the requisition order null and void, and ordered the release of the premises with vacant possession in favour of the applicants, as well as the eviction of Mr and Ms A. from the property within one month. It awarded EUR 50,000 in compensation (kumpens dovut) to the applicants to be paid by the Housing Authority. The costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the Housing Authority and Mr and Mrs A. 13.  The court held that keeping the requisition order in place was unjustifiable since Mr and Ms A. had left the property in an abandoned state and left it to deteriorate without carrying out any acts of ordinary maintenance. Thus, the very scope of requisitioning a property for the purpose of \u201csupplying housing accommodation\u201d was not met in the present case given that Mr and Ms A. had abandoned the property. Furthermore, a disproportionate and excessive burden was being imposed on the applicants, since they had been required to bear most of the social and financial costs of supplying housing accommodation. A balance had not been struck between the interests of the applicants (as owners of the property) and the interests of the public especially since the property lay abandoned. 14.  The court\u2011appointed architect estimated that it would require 25,000 Maltese liri (MTL) (equivalent to EUR 58,234) to make the property habitable again and he estimated the property\u2019s sale value on the market (in 2010) to be EUR 139,800 and its rental value (for the same year) to be EUR 4,893 annually. Against that background, the court considered that the discrepancy between that amount and the rental sum offered by Mr and Ms A. rendered the situation devoid of any proportionality as required under the Convention. 15.  Mr and Ms A. did not file an appeal but the Attorney General and the Housing Authority both appealed against the decision of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. The applicants made submissions in reply to the appeal lodged by the defendants, and asked the Constitutional Court to confirm the first\u2011instance judgment. 16.  On 18 July 2014 the Constitutional Court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment in part. It confirmed that the requisition order constituted an interference with the applicants\u2019 property and amounted to a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, the Constitutional Court revoked the first\u2011intance court\u2019s order to evict Mr and Ms A. from the premises, and revoked the annulment of the requisition order. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court reduced the compensation due as non\u2011pecuniary damages from EUR 50,000 to EUR 12,000. One\u2011fifth of the costs of the appeal were to be borne by the applicants. 17.  The Constitutional Court confirmed that the applicants had proved ownership of the property and noted that as a result of the requisition order the applicants\u2019 father lost possession of the property and had no means of regaining possession as long as the requisition order remained in force. It further noted that the court\u2011appointed architect had described the property as having been neglected for a long time and left without ordinary maintenance; it was (at the time of the judgment) uninhabitable. It followed that the first\u2011instance court\u2019s conclusion, to the effect that the property was not being lived in, was correct. The deterioration of the property also caused damage to the owners as substantial costs would have to be incurred in order to carry out repairs. 18.  In the light of these circumstances, the Constitutional Court considered that the requisition order was putting a disproportionate and excessive burden on the applicants, who, moreover, were precluded from taking judicial action before the ordinary courts against Mr and Ms A., with the aim of protecting their interests. This was even more so given that the Housing Authority did nothing, and did not appear to have the will to do anything, to remedy the damage done to the property. Indeed it appeared that the requisition order was kept in place because the Housing Authority wanted to exclude the possibility of Mr and Ms A. being evicted from the property. Nevertheless the court considered that Mr and Ms A., could still be protected through the lease agreement. 19.  As to redress, the Constitutional Court observed that the first\u2011instance court had awarded compensation in the light of the court\u2011appointed architect\u2019s valuations of the property and the expenses required to rehabilitate the property. However, it considered that while the applicants deserved compensation for the violation of their rights, namely non\u2011pecuniary damages, the quantum established by the court of first\u2011instance was excessive. In its view, constitutional redress proceedings should not serve as a replacement to ordinary remedies available to the applicants. Once the requisition order was annulled (by means of a judicial review procedure), the applicants had other remedies to deal with both the eviction of Mr and Ms A. and the award of material damages before the ordinary courts. The Constitutional Court also observed that the applicants took a long time before taking action to protect their fundamental rights, namely, in 2009, around seventeen years after the violation of their rights first occurred. Therefore, as a result of this delay the Constitutional Court considered that the amount of EUR 12,000 was just and equitable as compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. In relation to practical measures, the Constitutional Court considered that since the applicants still had a remedy under Article 469A, by means of which they could attack the requisition order before the ordinary courts, it was not for it to annul the requisition order. 20.  On 5 August 2014 the Housing Authority derequisitioned the property of the applicants. However, up to the date of the lodging of the application, the property still had not been returned to the applicants. No keys were returned to them and they had no means of taking possession of the property unilaterally. 21.  On 31 October 2014, the applicants wrote to the Housing Authority requesting that a declaration be made on whether the premises were vacant and requesting the Housing Authority to prepare a condition report detailing the state of the premises at the end of the requisition period. According to the applicants, the Housing Authority failed to reply. 22.  During the observations stage of proceedings before the Court the parties submitted an update of the situation. On 31 August 2015 the Housing Authority wrote to the applicants informing them that they could collect the keys of the property. The applicants refused to withdraw the keys in the absence of the drawing up of a condition report in the presence of the authorities since \u2011 as had already transpired in the domestic proceedings \u2011 the property had suffered huge damage while subject to the requisition order. The applicants thus wanted a condition report to be drawn up, in the presence of the authority, to enable them to obtain compensation for the damage incurred which was the responsibility of the State in line with Article 5 of the Housing Act (see Relevant domestic law below). The authorities refused to co-operate and informed the applicants that if they wished they could draw up a report at their own expense. In the Government\u2019s view if the applicants wished to obtain compensation for damage it was for them to lodge the relevant domestic proceedings. The applicants having failed to withdraw the keys, on 7 September 2016 the Housing Authority deposited the keys in court.", "references": ["4", "6", "2", "3", "8", "1", "7", "5", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, who was born in 1972, lives in \u0130zmir. 5.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On 3 December 2004 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the risk of absconding. 7.  On 7 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation. 8.  On 14 March 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The court ordered the continuation of his detention. 9.  On 24 January 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds. The case was accordingly remitted to the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  On 19 July 2007 the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 11.  On 25 July 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 19 July 2007. On 7 August 2007 the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12.  On 6 November 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court once more convicted the applicant and sentenced him to six years and three months\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his release. 13.  On 30 January 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld this decision.", "references": ["9", "4", "0", "6", "5", "8", "1", "7", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant worked as a cashier in the main office of a bank. Her duty was to count cash money brought in bags from the bank\u2019s branches. 6.  On 18 September 2015 the applicant came to work at around 7.40 a.m. and started counting money in bags of cash. After having counted the money from four bags she went to the toilet and, upon her return, she heard one of her colleagues saying that one of the uncounted bags lacked its seal. She did not pay much attention to that, since that was not the first time when a seal was missing. The colleague who found the bag without a seal was instructed by her superior to count the money in the bag. It appeared that forty-seven thousand euros (EUR) was missing from that bag. 7.  Another superior was called in and a search of the premises was carried out. The branch from which the bag of money came was contacted; however, its employees stressed that the bag had been sealed upon its dispatch. Later, the applicant went again to the toilet and then left for lunch. 8.  On 2 October 2015 a search was carried out at the applicant\u2019s home but nothing of interest for the investigation was found. 9.  On the same day, the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 10.  On 5 October 2015 the applicant was charged with the offence of theft in the amount of EUR 47,000. It was alleged that, together with other employees of the bank, she had stolen the aforementioned amount of money from the bag in question. The indictment order did not point to any evidence capable of proving the applicant\u2019s involvement in the offence. It appears that one of the applicant\u2019s colleagues was also accused of the same offence. 11.  On the same date, namely on 5 October 2015, the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Buiucani District Court for the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor alleged that there was a risk that the applicant could tamper with evidence, influence witnesses and reoffend, which therefore warrant her detention on remand. 12.  On 5 October 2015 the Buiucani District Court found that the prosecutor in charge of the case did not specify in his application the reasons giving rise to the suspicion that the applicant might have committed an offence. Nevertheless, the court noted that during the hearing the prosecutor had indicated that the other co-accused had stated that the money could have been stolen by the applicant because she had taken bags from the stack of bags in which the unsealed bag had been found and she had had a suspicious behaviour. Moreover, the security camera in the room was turned away from the place where the applicant was sit. The court concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence. The court noted that some thirteen days had elapsed since the day of the theft. The applicant had a permanent abode, a job, family and no criminal record. There were no reasons to believe that she would hinder the investigation in circumstances in which her involvement in the offence was unclear. The court considered that the risk of reoffending had also not been proven by the prosecutor which would warrant placing the applicant in detention. Therefore, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s house arrest for a period of twenty days. 13.  The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued that the measure of house arrest was unnecessary because even the court of first instance had found that the reasons adduced by the prosecutor had not been convincing. The prosecutor also appealed. 14.  On 15 October 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. It quashed the decision of 5 October 2018 and ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The court considered that there was a risk of absconding, interference with the investigation and collusion with the other co-accused persons. The court observed that unjustified manifestations of clemency would encourage anti\u2011social behaviour of the sort and would affect the peoples\u2019 trust in the law enforcement organs and that the measure of pre-trial detention was called to punish and discourage anti-social behaviour. As to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence imputed to her, the court noted that the applicant had not contested its presence. 15.  The next day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 16.  On 26 October 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal examined the appeal lodged by the applicant, upheld it and ordered her release under judicial control. The court found that there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would abscond, hinder the investigation or reoffend. 17.  It appears that the criminal investigation into the circumstances of the alleged theft of 18 September 2015 is pending to date.", "references": ["4", "9", "1", "6", "3", "5", "0", "8", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Lipetsk. 6.  On 18 September 2007 the applicant signed a private contract for the purchase of a flat in Lipetsk. The seller was Ms E.M.T., acting on behalf of herself and her daughter Maria, a minor. The contract stipulated that the property was not \u201cmortgaged, encumbered by any claims of third parties, disputed or charged\u201d. 7.  The flat in question had been allocated as social housing to Ms E.M.T. and her husband, Mr V.A.V., in 1979. They had lived there with their four children: Yelena, Mikhail, Dmitriy and Maria. Mikhail and Dmitriy were given long prison sentences in 1998 and 2004 respectively and were still serving them at the material time. Yelena moved out in 1997 to continue her studies in Dagestan. In 2006, Ms E.M.T and Maria became the sole owners of the property by way of privatisation, while Mr V.A.V., Mikhail, Dmitry and Yelena declined in writing to exercise their right to obtain their shares of the privatised flat. 8.  As the seller Ms E.M.T. delayed submitting the contract for State registration, the applicant sought a court order upholding her full title to the property. The seller Ms E.M.T. brought a counterclaim. She submitted that she was unable to move out because the purchase of the new flat for herself and her daughter Maria had not yet been finalised. However, after Ms E.M.T. failed to appear in court, on 2 April 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Lipetsk struck out the counterclaim and granted the applicant relief in the form of an order compelling State registration of her full title to the property. On 12 November 2008 the title was registered. 9.  The applicant then sued the former owner Ms E.M.T. and members of her family, seeking termination of their right to use the flat, annulment of the registration of their residence at that address, and their eviction. 10.  On 7 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed her claim in part. It ordered the eviction of Ms E.M.T. and Maria, as they were no longer owners of the property, but dismissed the claim in respect of Yelena, Mikhail and Dmitriy on the following grounds:\n\u201cAccording to the parties, the contested property contains personal belongings and chattels of the defendants [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena]; it appears from their written statements that, in declining their shares of the contested property during its privatisation, they did not intend to stop using the flat. Since there was no arrangement between the owner of the contested property and the defendants regarding the discontinuation of the right to use the property, the court considers that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] had a right of use over the flat which was identical [in its scope] to that of the owner; accordingly, there are no legal grounds for allowing [the applicant\u2019s] claim to declare their right of use over the flat terminated.\nA change in ownership of the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right to use the flat ...\nThe plaintiff\u2019s argument to the effect that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] do not actually live in the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right of use over the flat ...\nSince the defendants\u2019 right of use over the flat is not terminated, there are no grounds for ordering their eviction ...\u201d 11.  On 27 May 2009 the Lipetsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the District Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["4", "5", "0", "6", "2", "8", "1", "3", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  The applicant has been involved in numerous protests against alleged acts of corruption and abuse committed by police officers, prosecutors and judges. He was himself the victim of police abuse, ill-treatment and prosecutorial inaction (see M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, 2 November 2010). Each year during the professional holiday of the prosecutors or the police he stages protests involving live animals, toilets, caricatures and masks. 7.  On 29 January 2013, the professional holiday of prosecutors in Moldova, the applicant conducted a one person demonstration in front of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. According to him, the aim of the protest was to draw public attention to the corruption and the control exercised by politicians over the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. At 10 a.m. he started his protest by installing two large wooden sculptures on the stairs of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The first sculpture represented an erect penis with a picture of the face of a high-ranking politician attached to its head. The sculpture had a white collar and a tie and measured two metres. The second sculpture represented a large vulva with pictures of several high\u2011ranking prosecutors between the labia. The applicant also inflated balloons in the form of male genitals and attached them to the nearby trees. 8.  The demonstration was observed from the beginning by several police officers and numerous journalists approached to interview the applicant. At 11 a.m. a police van approached, the sculptures were removed by police officers and the applicant was taken to a police station. 9.  Later the applicant was charged with the criminal offence of hooliganism. The criminal investigation was conducted by a department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office whose head\u2019s picture had been attached to the sculpture of the vulva. 10.  On 2 March 2015 the R\u00e2\u0219cani District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for a period of three years. In deciding on the sanction to be applied, the court took into consideration the fact that the applicant had previously been sanctioned with fines for similar deeds and that those sanctions had proved to be inefficient. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s deeds had been immoral because he had exposed obscene sculptures in a public place where they could be seen by anyone, including by children. The court based its findings on the statements of several prosecution witnesses who had stated that they had disliked the sculptures exposed by the applicant and had considered them to be indecent and obscene. The court also stated that assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism in a democratic society and was therefore not an act protected under Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the accusations meant to be made by the applicant by means of his protest against the officials concerned lacked a factual basis and had been contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. 11.  The applicant appealed against the above decision arguing, inter alia, that it ran contrary to his rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 12.  On 2 November 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he reiterated his position that his conviction had been contrary to the provisions of the Convention and stated that the sculptures had represented a form of artistic expression which was to be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. He reiterated that his protest had been against the corruption within the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and among high-ranking politicians, a phenomenon which was universally known and did not need to be proved. He also argued that the sculptures exposed by him could not be considered obscene. In any event, at the time of his protest, children were normally at schools and kindergartens. The fact that some of the prosecution witnesses disliked what they saw was not sufficient to hold him responsible for a criminal offence. The applicant admitted that the form of the protest chosen by him had been striking, however he considered this manner of protesting as the only way possible to make himself heard in a society which was oversaturated with subjects of discussion. The applicant finally submitted that the sanction applied to him had been disproportionately harsh and that it had had a chilling effect on him. He pointed to the fact that the first-instance court had admitted to having pursued the goal of discouraging his future involvement in protests. By the application of a suspended sentence, he had in fact been forced to abstain from organising further protests for a period of three years or risk being imprisoned. 14.  On 20 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The decision was notified to the applicant on 19 May 2016.", "references": ["1", "4", "8", "0", "2", "5", "3", "9", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Bogdany. 6.  On 26 January 2004 the applicant obtained from the State a deed of title to an agricultural plot of land (an official Land Registry title) based on a decree issued by the Varvynska local administration on 22 December 2003. This amounted to the official registration of her title to the land in accordance with the domestic procedures. At that point the applicant had not filed a request for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out and was not farming the land. 7.  On 26 July 2004 the local administration concluded a lease agreement with the private company B., according to which the company would rent the applicant\u2019s land and pay the rent to the local administration. The applicant was not informed about this agreement. She learnt of the lease agreement only in September 2004, after the private company B. had planted seeds on the land. 8.  On 4 October 2004 the applicant requested the local administration to allow her to establish the boundaries of her land. In this connection, on 19 October 2004, the local administration ordered the termination of the lease agreement with company B. and authorised the applicant to carry out work to mark out of the boundaries of her land. 9.  In July 2005 the company removed its crop from the applicant\u2019s land. On 25 July 2005 amendments were introduced to the lease agreement of 26 July 2004, excluding the applicant\u2019s plot of land from the list of leased lands. From then on the applicant\u2019s land ceased to be a leased property, and company B. has not used it since. In the same month the boundaries of the applicant\u2019s land were established. 10.  On 20 January 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the domestic courts against the local administration and company B. Claiming that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 infringed her property rights and should have been declared invalid, she sought compensation for the use of the land by company B. She argued that the amount of compensation to be paid to her should correspond to the value of the crop that had been harvested from her land. 11.  On 2 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. In particular, the court found that once the applicant had received a title to the plot of land in question, the local administration should not have concluded any agreement concerning the land with other parties. As to the boundaries, the court found that the local administration had unlawfully linked their establishment with the existence of the applicant\u2019s ownership rights. It also noted that despite the fact that the boundaries had not been marked out, the local administration should have learned about the applicant\u2019s title to the land in question from the land registry and local land plans. The court added that after lodging her request on 4 October 2004 for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out, the applicant had tried to accelerate the process by applying to the local administration and other authorities, to no avail. The court concluded that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 had violated the applicant\u2019s property rights and was to be declared invalid. The court also held that under domestic law the applicant was entitled to compensation for the use of her property equal to the value of the crops taken from her land (29,210 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH); 4,493 euros (EUR) at the material time). The compensation, in the court\u2019s view, should have been paid to the applicant both by the local administration and by company B., as they were jointly and severally liable for the unauthorised use of the applicant\u2019s land. 12.  The local administration appealed. On 12 September 2006 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned judgment. The court noted that the use of the applicant\u2019s land by company B. had been lawful since it had been based on the lease agreement. The court further stressed that under Article 125 of the Land Code of Ukraine, the right of the owner of a plot of land to use it arose only once its boundaries had been marked out and after receipt by the owner of the document certifying that right. The appellate court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to compensation as the boundaries of her land had been marked out only in July 2005; as she could not have used the land before that date, she could not claim an interest in the harvested crop. 13.  The applicant appealed on points of law. On 4 January 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to examine the merits of the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, finding that it was frivolous. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged another civil claim against company B., claiming the value of the land that had been used by B., as well as rental charges for the use of her land. On 7 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region left this claim unexamined because of the applicant\u2019s attitude, citing the fact that she had been absent from the court hearings in her case on numerous occasions without good reason.", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "7", "6", "5", "3", "4", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant, is a company specialising in air transportation. 5.  At the time of the events it had a valid air operator certificate (an \u201cAOC\u201d) issued by the Moldovan Civil Aviation State Authority (the \u201cCASA\u201d). 6.  On 1 June 2007 the CASA issued an order banning all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. 7.  Between 4 and 8 June 2007, all Moldovan aviation companies were subjected to a check by the European Union Safety Committee. As a result, some irregularities concerning compliance with the European norms in the field of aviation safety were detected. The European Union Safety Committee also found that some aviation companies did not comply with the rule according to which the companies have to have their principal place of business in the state of registration. One of the conclusions set down in the visit report drawn up by the European Union Safety Committee was that the CASA failed to demonstrate the ability adequately to enforce and implement the relevant safety standards. According to the report, the CASA had undertaken to remedy the situation within three months. 8.  On 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2584 and asked it to present by 21 June 2007 a plan for remedying the irregularities found by the EU Safety Committee. The corresponding plan was sent by the applicant company to the CASA on 21 June 2007. 9.  Also on 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2585 requesting it to undertake measures with a view to remedying some of the irregularities before 20 July 2007 and other irregularities before 20 September 2007. 10.  On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant company\u2019s AOC, and thereby terminating its activity. The CASA relied on the fact that the applicant company flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 11.  On 22 June 2007 the applicant company wrote to the CASA and asked it to reverse its decision on the grounds that it had not explained exactly what irregularities formed the basis for the withdrawal of the AOCs and that the CASA had not afforded it enough time to remedy the alleged irregularities. 12.  The CASA refused to reverse its decision, and on 28 June 2007 the applicant company challenged it in the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal. The applicant submitted, inter alia, that according to section 23 of the Law on Civil Aviation, the CASA was entitled to suspend or withdraw the AOCs only if the companies failed to remedy the irregularities found by the CASA within the prescribed time-limit. It also made reference to section RAC\u2011AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation according to which an AOC could be revoked only after being initially suspended. Since the CASA had not observed those legal provisions, its actions were unlawful. 13.  On 3 December 2008 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company\u2019s action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw its AOC because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found by European experts, and because those irregularities had not been remedied. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the applicant company had failed to comply with the CASA\u2019s order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice. 14.  On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOC since the applicant company had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007.", "references": ["1", "2", "6", "7", "0", "8", "4", "5", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  On 4 September 2000 the President of Russia appointed Ms G. to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court for a period of three years. 5.  On 21 May 2004 the State Council of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace of Lesozavodskiy Judicial District of Syktyvkar for three years. On 31 May 2007 the Council extended her appointment for another seven years. 6.  On 16 January 2008 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms G.\u2019s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status effective as of 1 April 2008. 7.  On 19 November 2009 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. as acting justice of the peace for Kutuzovskiy district in Syktyvkar as of 23 November 2009 pending the appointment of a permanent justice. According to the Government, Ms G. served as justice of the peace until 8 February 2010. 8.  On 8 April 2010 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace in Vylgort as of 16 April 2010 for a period of one year. 9.  On 5, 9 and 29 May and 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for (1) driving a vehicle without a registration plate, (2) driving without a driving licence, (3) refusal to take a breath test and (4) driving under the influence. 10.  On 4 and 22 June and 6 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty on seven counts of road traffic offences and sentenced him to administrative detention and a fine. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the five judgments of 4 June 2010, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 12.  On 24 and 30 June 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 13.  The applicant did not appeal against the judgments of 22 June and 6 July 2010 in view of the futility of his previous appeals. 14.  On 24 December 2009 Justice of the Peace G. dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims against the social-security authorities for interest payments and non-pecuniary damage. 15.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered her case had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 16.  On 23 April 2010 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment of 24 December 2009 on appeal. The Town Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 17.  On 9 May and 13 July 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for refusal to take a breath test and driving under the influence respectively. 18.  On 13 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to administrative detention. 19.   On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the two judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 20.  On 6 August 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court upheld the judgments on appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 21.  On 26 May 1990 Ms Ch. was elected to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court. 22.  On 22 December 1999 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms Ch.\u2019s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status. 23.  On 26 August 2010 the President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms Ch. as acting justice of the peace in Vylgort for a period of up to one year. 24.  On 11 January 2011 the President of the Supreme Court relieved Ms Ch. of her duties of office of acting justice of the peace. 25.  On 21 September 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for leaving the scene of a road traffic accident and refusal to take a breath test. 26.  On 15 October 2010 justice of the peace Ch. delivered two judgments, finding the applicant in violation of road traffic rules and sentenced him to administrative detention. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 27.  On 17 November the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic upheld both judgments of 15 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.\u2019s appointment to the office of justice of the peace. 28.  On 7 October 2010 Justice of the Peace Ch. allowed an action lodged by Yu. against the applicant and reduced the amount of monthly maintenance Yu. had to pay as child support for the parties\u2019 minor daughter. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to her office in contravention of the applicable laws. 29.  On 8 December 2010 the District Court upheld the judgment of 7 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.\u2019s appointment to the office of justice of the peace.", "references": ["6", "8", "1", "7", "4", "2", "9", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Batumi. 5.  On 2 September 2008 at 10.05 a.m. the applicant was arrested (together with his friend Z.B.) in Batumi on suspicion of possession of illegal drugs, by members of the Special Operations Unit (\u10e1\u10dd\u10d3\u10d8\u10e1 \u10e1\u10d0\u10db\u10db\u10d0\u10e0\u10d7\u10d5\u10d4\u10da\u10dd) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cthe MIA\u201d). According to the report of his detention and personal search, he physically resisted the arrest. As a result he sustained injuries to his face and both legs when being forced out of his car and on to the ground. The applicant signed this report without making any written comments. 6.  At 5:35 p.m. on the same day the applicant underwent an external visual examination at the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. A report drawn up thereafter recorded multiple injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, including bruises and abrasions on his face and head, both legs, and the waist area, and black and swollen eyes. A note was made to the effect that the applicant could not remember in what circumstances he had sustained those injuries and that he had no complaints about the arresting officers. 7.  Soon afterwards an ambulance was called for the applicant. He was pre-diagnosed as suffering from possible concussion and was recommended for a transfer to a medical establishment. An hour later an ambulance was called again. After the applicant had been examined, he was diagnosed with a closed head injury and concussion; bruises were noted on his chest and waist area and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient treatment in a hospital neurosurgery department. 8.  At 10.10 p.m. the applicant was taken to Batumi hospital. After a brain tomography examination and other medical check-ups the diagnosis of a head injury was not confirmed. He was diagnosed instead with a fracture of the maxillary sinus on the right side, multiple bruises, and excoriations on his face and body. He was then taken back to the temporary detention centre. 9.  On the same night the applicant\u2019s lawyer called the hotline of the office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated. On 4 September 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated under Article 118 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing less serious bodily injury). On the same date the investigator dealing with the case ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. Having visually examined the applicant, the medical expert concluded on 10 September 2008 that the applicant had multiple scratches and bruises all over his body and face, as well as black eyes and a fracture of the right maxillary sinus. He noted that the injuries could have been sustained on 2 September 2008 by the impact of a hard blunt object, and cumulatively belonged to the category of less serious bodily injuries causing long-lasting damage to health. 10.  On 4 September 2008 the applicant was questioned in connection with the circumstances of his arrest. He maintained his allegations of ill treatment, claiming that he had been beaten during the arrest as well as after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit at the MIA. He further dismissed the accusation that he had resisted arrest as untrue. On 6 September 2008 the investigator questioned two employees of the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. They both confirmed that the applicant had had multiple injuries when he had arrived at the detention centre, and that in reply to their question he had claimed that he had sustained those injuries during the arrest. He had not provided any additional details, and had not made any complaints against the arresting police officers. 11.  On 17 November 2008 the investigator decided to continue the investigation under Article 333 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (abuse of power). In the meantime, on 15 November 2008, the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office denouncing the investigation as ineffective. He complained about the fact that no identification parade had been carried out: this would have allowed the applicant to identify the police officers who had ill-treated him during the arrest. Nor was this done in respect of the time after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit, where he had stayed for about seven hours. He also noted that he had requested footage from the video surveillance cameras in the street where the arrest operation had taken place, but that his request had received no response. By a letter of 15 January 2009 the prosecutor dealing with the case informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the investigation was still pending, and that in view of the conflicting evidence it was impossible to establish whether the force used against the applicant during the arrest had been proportionate or not. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was also informed that the surveillance cameras in question had not been working on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, so no video recording could have been obtained. 12.  According to the Government, at the time they submitted their observations the investigation of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment was still pending. 13.  According to the bill of indictment, the applicant was charged with various drug offences under Article 260 \u00a7 3 (a) and Article 273 of the Criminal Code. On 18 March 2009 the Batumi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fourteen years and three months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. His conviction was confirmed by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Georgia on 23 September and 18 November 2009 respectively.", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "3", "8", "2", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Skopje. 7.  At birth the applicant was registered as a girl, with a clearly female name. The applicant submitted that from an early age he became aware that he was male rather than female. Not being able to obtain appropriate medical treatment in the respondent State, in 2010 the applicant went to a specialist clinic in Belgrade, where a psychologist and sexologist diagnosed him with \u201ctranssexuality\u201d. A medical certificate dated 20 September 2010 included a recommendation that the applicant pursue hormone treatment with a view to eventual genital reassignment surgery. The applicant started taking hormones to increase his testosterone levels. 8.  On 1 June 2011 the applicant applied for a change of his first and family name. In a decision of 7 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior allowed that application, registering the applicant under a clearly male forename (the applicant also changed his surname). Soon after, it issued the applicant with a new identity card bearing his new name. However, the sex/gender marker and numerical personal code (composed of ten digits, some of which indicate the person\u2019s sex) remained the same, identifying the applicant as a female. 9.  On 5 July 2011 the applicant lodged an application to have the sex/gender marker and the numerical personal code on his birth certificate corrected (\u043a\u043e\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) to indicate that he was male. In support of his application he submitted copies of a medical report by a surgeon at the specialist clinic in Belgrade (see paragraph 7 above) and referred to the paper entitled \u201cHuman rights and gender identity\u201d of October 2009 issued by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 34 below) and the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 10.  In a decision of the same date, the Civil Status Registry (\u201cthe Registry\u201d) \u2013 a body within the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) \u2011 dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, stating that \u201cno certificate [has been] issued by a competent authority [attesting to the fact] that [the applicant\u2019s] sex [had] been changed, the application having been corroborated only with a certificate that gender reassignment surgery [was] in preparation, which cannot be regarded as proof that it [would] take place.\u201d 11.  The applicant appealed to the Ministry, alleging that there was no statutory provision that regulated the matter in hand. Sex reassignment surgery was unavailable in the respondent State and unjustified in his case. Furthermore, such a requirement would subject him to unwanted medical treatment and sterilisation, in breach of his rights. He argued that he had already been diagnosed as transsexual, which was sufficient to obtain legal gender recognition. In a decision of 17 October 2011 the Ministry dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned decision had been based on section 23 of the Civil Status Registration Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0435\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430) (\u201cthe Act\u201d; under the 2016 amendment this provision became section 22(2) \u2013 see paragraph 25 below) and that the evidence produced had not been \u201csufficient and relevant\u201d in respect of the alteration (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430) sought. 12.  In November 2011 the applicant challenged the refusal of the lower administrative authorities to modify his sex/gender marker on the birth certificate before the Administrative Court. He argued that there was no statutory provision proscribing or specifying any conditions for the alteration of a person\u2019s sex/gender marker and personal code. 13.  On 28 February 2013 the Administrative Court quashed the Ministry\u2019s decision. Since the applicant\u2019s request had not been in the case file, the court could not ascertain whether the applicant had sought the rectification or alteration of the sex/gender marker only or also of the personal code, the latter having not been addressed in the impugned decision. It also held that the Ministry should have specified the appropriate evidence required and set a time-limit for the applicant to provide it. Lastly, the court found that the Ministry had neither established the relevant facts nor provided adequate reasons for its decision. In this connection it held that section 23 of the Civil Status Registration Act did not specify any requirement to have the sex/gender marker changed; it only contained an instruction to administrative authorities regarding the evidence to be adduced and assessed in such proceedings. 14.  On 11 June 2013 the applicant underwent a double mastectomy (breast removal) in Belgrade and continued his hormonal therapy. 15.  In the resumed proceedings, the Registry instructed the Forensic Institute (\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0430) to examine the applicant. As reported in the Registry\u2019s decision (see paragraph 17 below), on 20 June 2014 the Forensic Institute drew up a report, which stated: \u201c[O]wing to his mastectomy and on-going hormonal therapy, [the applicant] displays male sexual characteristics which affect his everyday life. Although there is no statutory regulation ... and the second genital surgery has not been carried out, [the experts] consider that [the applicant] should be provided with a document attesting to his new sex ...\u201d 16.  The Registry also requested that the Ministry of Health specify the nature of the certificate and the authority competent to attest to the change of the applicant\u2019s sex. In reply, the Ministry of Health stated that the sex alteration procedure was not specified in health-related regulations and suggested that evidence regarding prior medical intervention in respect of the applicant should be taken into consideration. 17.  On 29 December 2014 the Registry, referring to section 23 of the Act, dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for the alteration of the sex/gender marker on the birth register, holding that despite its requests to competent authorities it had not obtained \u201cevidence of an actual change of sex (\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0431\u0430\u0432\u0438 \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0441\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0458 \u045c\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0438 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0458\u0431\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u0458\u0430 \u0443\u043a\u0430\u0436\u0443\u0432\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0442)\u201d. 18.  The applicant appealed against that decision. On 16 October 2015 the Ministry dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Registry. 19.  On 11 November 2015 the applicant challenged the latter decision before the Administrative Court, arguing that section 23 of the Act did not specify any requirement for an alteration of the sex/gender marker in civil \u2011 status documents. He furthermore submitted that the Registry had authority to administer civil-status records and accordingly to decide on the matter. The applicant also referred to the Court\u2019s case-law on the matter. 20.  On 28 April 2017 the Administrative Court set aside the Ministry\u2019s decision since it had failed to forward the case file. 21.  On 28 February 2018 the Registry rejected (\u043e\u0442\u0444\u0440\u043b\u0430) the applicant\u2019s application for lack of jurisdiction (\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043b\u0435\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442), holding that it did not concern the rectification of an error in an entry, but the alteration of the sex/gender marker in the civil status register. On 13 July 2018 the State Commission, which had become competent to decide such issues in second instance, upheld that decision. The proceedings before the Administrative Court are underway. 22.  The applicant submitted several reports from 2012 and 2016 in which psychologists had found that the protracted procedure in respect of seeking legal recognition of the applicant\u2019s gender identity was having negative consequences on his psychosocial and mental health and everyday life.", "references": ["3", "7", "2", "8", "5", "6", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1987 and was detained in prison in Rustavi at the material time. 5.  On 3 December 2007 a taxi driver reported to the police that he had been robbed of a mobile phone and twenty-six Georgian laris by two young men at knife-point. He claimed that he could identify both of them. On the next day, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the armed robbery of the taxi driver. Neither a body search of the applicant nor a search of his apartment revealed any unlawful items. On the same date an identity parade was held, during which the taxi driver identified the applicant as one of his assailants. 6.  During his initial questioning as an accused, the applicant gave a detailed statement providing an alibi and naming all the people with whom he had spent the evening of the crime, or who had seen him on that evening. In particular, he claimed that he had spent that evening with his girlfriend and her friend out walking the streets and that he had been seen by several people in the area. 7.  On 7 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the investigator in charge of the case requesting that he question twelve persons who could confirm the applicant\u2019s alibi. By a decision of 9 December 2007 the investigator rejected the request as unsubstantiated. In his reasoning he noted that the applicant\u2019s girlfriend and her friend had an interest in the outcome of the case. As for the remaining potential witnesses, according to the investigator, they had not been with the applicant at the time of commission of the offence in question. The rejection of the applicant\u2019s request was confirmed on appeal by a supervising prosecutor. 8.  The trial opened on 22 April 2008. In the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, who had failed to appear for the hearing, the trial judge decided to adjourn it. The trial resumed on 30 April 2008, when the applicant was represented by a new lawyer. The latter requested an adjournment of the hearing, claiming that she had not had sufficient time to prepare the defence. Her request was granted and the hearing was re-scheduled for 6 May 2008. 9.  On 5 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed a written request with the trial judge complaining that the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of the armed robbery of the taxi driver had been incomplete and one-sided. She noted that the applicant\u2019s alibi should have been verified and she requested, in that connection, on the basis of Article 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), that seven witnesses be questioned. In support of her request she submitted written statements for those witnesses. 10.  The next day, at the hearing of 6 May 2008, the prosecutor asked the trial judge to dismiss the defence\u2019s application as out of time. He claimed that the request for the examination of defence witnesses should have been submitted five days before the opening of the trial. In reply, the lawyer noted that she had only been instructed in the case on 29 April 2008 and accordingly could not have filed any requests beforehand. Having heard the parties, the trial judge rejected the request of the defence on the basis that it did not comply with Article 475 of the CCP. He accepted the prosecutor\u2019s argument that any such request should have been lodged five days before the opening of the trial. 11.  On 22 May 2008 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant\u2019s conviction was based on the evidence given in court by the taxi driver, the investigator in charge of the case, the results of the identity parade and the results of two forensic examinations. The first forensic examination established a similarity in fibres of black cotton removed from the front and back seats of the taxi and micro-particles removed from the applicant\u2019s coat. The report stated that both fibres had a similar nature, colour, colour tonality, fibre structure and type of dye. The second expert examination was an odour recognition examination which established that the samples of the odour trace taken from the taxi corresponded with the odour sample taken from the applicant. The court also relied on the report on the examination of the crime scene, and the reports on the arrest and the searches of the applicant\u2019s person and his apartment. 12.  The applicant appealed against his conviction. He alleged that the pre-trial investigation and the first-instance court proceedings had been unfair, in violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention; and specifically that his defence rights had been violated as he had been prevented from showing his innocence by proving his alibi before the court, and in that connection had not been allowed to examine witnesses on his behalf. He reiterated his request for the examination of the witnesses. 13.  On 15 July 2008 the appeal proceedings started. The appeal court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for the examination of defence witnesses, concluding that it had not been submitted as required by Articles 231 and 475 \u00a7 4 of the CCP (as cited in paragraph 17 below). 14.  On 18 July 2008 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. The court concluded that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been proven on the grounds of the statement of the taxi driver, the statement of the investigator, the report on the identification parade, the report on the applicant\u2019s arrest and the search of his person, the report on the search of the applicant\u2019s apartment, and the forensic conclusions, among other grounds. None of the defence witnesses was questioned during the appeal proceedings. As for the applicant\u2019s version of the events, the court concluded that it had been fabricated with the sole purpose of evading criminal liability. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He maintained that his defence rights as envisaged in Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention had been violated on account of the lower courts\u2019 refusal to hear the defence witnesses. He claimed in that connection that he had been put in a disadvantageous position vis-\u00e0-vis the prosecution and had been prevented from proving his innocence. 16.  By a decision of 13 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as inadmissible.", "references": ["1", "6", "9", "5", "2", "7", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Alik Tazuyev (in the documents submitted also spelled as Tuzayev), who was born in 1985. 8.  At the material time Mr Alik Tazuyev was staying at his grandmother\u2019s house in the village of Sernovodsk (also spelled as Sernovodskoye or Sernovodskaya). 9.  At about 2 a.m. on 15 July 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in three military UAZ vehicles, two Niva cars and one VAZ car, all without registration plates. Most of the men were unmasked and spoke unaccented Russian; those of them who were in balaclavas were apparently of Chechen origin. The men broke into the house of Mr Alik Tazuyev\u2019s grandmother, forced Mr Tazuyev into one of their vehicles and drove off. Having passed unhindered through several checkpoints on the way, they drove to the Nadterechniy district department of the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) located in the neighbouring village of Znamenskoye. Relatives of the abducted persons followed the abductors and found special pass no. 168 for an UAZ-3962 vehicle with the registration number C688XX95RUS (in some documents B688XX95RUS), which had been issued on 1 May 2002 by the commander of the United Group Alignment in the North Caucasus Region . 10.  According to the applicant, that night several other residents of Sernovodsk were abducted under similar circumstances. 11.  On 17 July 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63049 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction) into the abduction of Mr Alik Tazuyev and the other abducted residents of Sernovodsk. 12.  On 20 July 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 13.  Over the following months the investigators sent requests to law\u2011enforcement authorities in Chechnya, including the FSB, for them to check if the abducted persons had been taken into their custody. The replies were all in the negative. 14.  On 17 September 2002 the investigation in the case was suspended. 15.  On 25 June 2003 in reply to the applicant\u2019s request the investigators informed her that the criminal proceedings had been suspended but that operational search activities continued. 16.  On 22 January 2004 a lawyer, who represented relatives of one of the abducted persons, lodged a complaint to the prosecutor of Chechnya, alleging the ineffectiveness of the investigation. He also submitted that the relatives of the abducted persons had followed the abductors and had found the special pass issued by the commander of the United Group Alignment forces. A copy of that pass was attached to the complaint. 17.  On 11 March 2004 the investigators resumed the proceedings and several days later added the special pass to the evidence in the case file. 18.  Between 30 March and 10 April 2004 the investigators questioned several relatives of the abducted persons and their fellow village residents, who confirmed the relatives\u2019 account of the events. 19.  On 11 April 2004 the investigation was suspended. 20.  A copy of the criminal file submitted by the Government lacked one volume, the one covering the investigation between mid-2004 and early 2012. 21.  According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the investigation was resumed on 21 June 2007, and then suspended on 31 July 2007. 22.  According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 23 January 2012 the investigators resumed the proceedings again. By February 2012 they had established that the UAZ vehicle with a special pass had belonged to a private person, Mr A.E., who denied any involvement in the abduction. 23.  On 16 February 2012 the investigators obtained the applicant\u2019s DNA sample for comparison with samples obtained from unidentified bodies, but to no avail. 24.  Subsequently, the investigation was suspended on 23 February and 25 September 2012, 22 August and 12 September 2013, and 16 January and 14 February 2014; it was resumed on 20 September 2012, 5 August, 11 September and 23 December 2013, and 13 February 2014 respectively. 25.  In the meantime, on 23 January 2014 the investigators established that the military forces based in Khankala had been provided with vehicle registration plate K688XX95RUS. 26.  On 13 February 2014 the investigators found that they had wrongly identified Mr A.E. as the owner of the UAZ vehicle, and that his car was of a different series. 27.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 28.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained of the investigators\u2019 inaction to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court, which on 26 June 2007 dismissed her complaint as unsubstantiated. 29.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Dmitry Kulishov, who was born in 1980. 30.  At about 11 p.m. on 14 March 2005 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two grey VAZ vehicles and broke into Mr M.Ts.\u2019s flat in Grozny, where Mr Dmitry Kulishov was temporarily residing. They took him away to an unknown destination. 31.  On 15 March 2005 Mr M.Ts. lodged a complaint with the local police about Mr Dmitry Kulishov\u2019s abduction. The applicant joined that complaint. 32.  On 26 March 206 the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny declined to open a criminal case. 33.  On 9 April 2005 the above decision was overruled by a supervising authority. Two days later the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 40071 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34.  On 15 March 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.Ts., who submitted that in the evening of 14 March 2005 his neighbours, Mr S. and Mr V., had visited his flat, where he lived with Mr Dmitry Kulishov. At about 10.55 p.m. he had left the flat to buy some bread in a nearby shop. On his way back he saw five men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas. Armed with machine guns, they stood at the entrance to his block of flats. Mr M.Ts. tried to enter the block of flats, but the men did not let him in. They spoke Russian with a Chechen accent. Sometime later the armed men left the flat with Mr Dmitry Kulishov. They put him in a grey VAZ vehicle without registration plates and drove him away. 35.  On 16 April 2005 the applicant was granted victim status. 36.  On 14 June 2005 the investigators questioned Mr V. and Mr S. They confirmed the account of the events given by Mr M.Ts. Mr V. also submitted that he had heard that Mr Dmitry Kulishov had been taken to the Chechen Ministry of the Interior and then transported to an unknown destination. 37.  On 11 July 2005 the investigation was suspended after it had failed establish the identity of the perpetrators. On 13 February 2006 that decision was overruled by the supervising prosecutor and the investigation was resumed. One month later it was suspended again. 38.  Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 21 August 2006, 12 February 2007, 6 May 2009, 9 July and 21 September 2009, 20 December 2011, 4 June 2012, and 9 October and 12 December 2013; they were suspended on 25 August 2006, 16 March 2007, 5 June and 21 October 2009, 19 January and 4 July 2012, and 11 November 2013, respectively. 39.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 40.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny, alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and that the investigators had failed to take basic steps. She also complained about the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the proceedings. 41.  On 6 December 2008 the court ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour. It ordered the investigating authorities to resume the proceedings and take necessary investigative measures. 42.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Askhab Soltagirayev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is his wife. The third, fourth, and fifth applicants are his children. 43.  In 2001 Mr Askhab Soltagirayev was pardoned under a Government amnesty aimed at former members of illegal armed groups. In 2000 his brother, Mr Alikhan Soltagirayev, had allegedly been killed by Russian servicemen. 44.  At the material time the applicants, save for the first applicant, resided together in the town of Gudermes. On 12 April 2002 Russian servicemen conducted a special operation in the area, as a result of which many men were arrested. 45.  At around 3 a.m. on that date a group of ten to fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms (some in balaclavas), armed with grenades and machine guns broke into the applicants\u2019 house. The unmasked intruders were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian, while the masked ones spoke Chechen. Some of them searched the house, while the others seized Mr Askhab Soltagirayev and his passport, took him outside and put him in a grey UAZ minivan. Then the servicemen departed in the direction of the town centre, accompanied by another grey UAZ car and an Ural lorry. 46.  Later in the morning the applicants and their relatives went to the Gudermes District Department of the Interior (\u201cthe ROVD\u201d), where many people were waiting for the release of relatives who had been detained on the same day under similar circumstances. At around 10 a.m. one of the arrested men, Mr Askhab from the village of Belorechye (also referred to as Ilaskhan\u2011Yurt), was released and told the applicants that their relative had been detained in the ROVD along with other men. On the same day two ROVD officers, Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev, confirmed that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had been detained there until at least 2 p.m. and then taken to the premises of a department of the Federal Security Service. The head of the ROVD later informed Mr Askhab Soltagirayev\u2019s uncle that his nephew had not been detained on their premises. 47.  The applicants have not seen Mr Askhab Soltagirayev since his abduction. 48.  According to the applicants, despite attempts made by them to persuade the authorities to initiate a criminal investigation into the abduction of 12 April 2002, the Gudermes district prosecutor dissuaded them from lodging an official request. For that reason, their request for an investigation was officially registered only on 14 May 2004. 49.  Between 27 and 29 May 2004 the police questioned the second applicant and her relatives and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 50.  On an unspecified date in May or June 2004 one of the police officers reported to his superior that according to the applicants\u2019 neighbours, a special operation had been conducted on the day of the abduction. 51.  On 3 June 2004 the Gudermes district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 35035 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 52.  Five days later the second applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 53.  In June 2004 the investigators contacted law-enforcement authorities in Chechnya to check whether Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had been arrested. The replies were all in the negative. 54.  In June and July 2004 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants and their six relatives, including Mr Said\u2011Magomed. They submitted that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev\u2019s detention at the ROVD had been acknowledged by Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev. 55.  On 21 June and 16 July 2004 the investigators questioned officers Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev. Both stated that they did not know Mr Askhab Soltagirayev and had neither arrested him nor informed anyone of his arrest. 56.  On 6 August 2004 the deputy head of the ROVD stated that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had never been detained on their premises. 57.  On 3 August 2004 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The second applicant was informed of that decision. 58.  On 13 February 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the case. 59.  On 6 March 2008 the proceedings were resumed and the first applicant\u2019s request was granted. The proceedings were suspended one month later. 60.  On 21 April 2008 the investigation was resumed. In May 2008 the investigators questioned several of Mr Askhab Soltagirayev\u2019s relatives, who reiterated their previous submissions. 61.  Subsequently the proceedings were suspended on 21 May and 11 July 2008, 29 June, and 13 September and 23 December 2009; they were resumed on 11 June 2008, 5 May, 11 August and 13 November 2009 respectively. 62.  In the meantime, on 20 June 2008 the deputy district prosecutor criticised the investigators for their failure to take basic steps such as confronting the applicants with Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev, or establishing whether other persons had been detained in the ROVD on 12 April 2002. 63.  In August 2008 the investigators replied to the above-mentioned criticism. They submitted that, under the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, they were under no obligation to conduct a confrontation. As regards persons detained in the ROVD at the time of the abduction, the investigation had not obtained any relevant information. Operational search measures to establish them would be taken. 64.  On 18 March 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to allow her to study the case file. On 21 March 2009 her request was refused. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Gudermes District Court in Chechnya against the investigators\u2019 refusal (see paragraph 67 below). Before the appeal court delivered its judgment she was allowed to access the investigation file. 65.  On 30 October 2009 the deputy district prosecutor again criticised the investigators, noting that their failure to carry out confrontations between witnesses, to establish the persons allegedly detained with Mr Askhab Soltagirayev in the ROVD, or to check whether former servicemen from the \u201cVostok\u201d battalion of the Russian Ministry of Defence had been involved in the abduction. 66.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 67.  On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Gudermes District Court in Chechnya regarding the investigators\u2019 refusal to allow her to access the case file. 68.  On 12 May 2009 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, stating that on 6 May 2009 she had already been granted access to the case file. 69.  The applicant is the brother of Mr Anzor Tangiyev, who was born in 1978. 70.  On 24 May 2000 Mr Anzor Tangiyev stayed overnight in the flat of his neighbour, Mr A.D., in a block of flats in Grozny. 71.  At about 4 a.m. on 25 May 2000 about twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the flat, took both Mr Anzor Tangiyev and Mr A.D. to the courtyard, tied their hands behind their backs, pulled their T-shirts over their heads and laid them on the ground. They then forced Mr A.D. in one of the UAZ vehicles, drove him to an unknown destination and placed him in a basement. Mr A.D. was ill-treated by the abductors for four days to make him confess to membership in illegal armed groups. On the fourth day of his detention Mr A.D. was taken to a different room, where he saw Mr Anzor Tangiyev, who bore signs of ill-treatment, including a broken finger on his right hand. Mr Anzor Tangiyev told the servicemen that Mr A.D. did not participate in illegal armed groups. Then Mr A.D. was taken back to the basement. From a conversation he had overheard between the servicemen and from the noise of nearby helicopters Mr A.D. understood that he was being detained at the Khankala military base, the headquarters of the federal military forces located in the suburbs of Grozny. 72.  On 17 June 2000 Mr A.D. was blindfolded and taken in an APC to the centre of Grozny, where he was released in front of the publishing house building. 73.  According to the applicant, immediately after the incident Mr Anzor Tangiyev\u2019s mother complained to the military and civilian authorities about the abduction, but the criminal proceedings were not opened. The Government did not dispute that submission. 74.  Between 2003 and 2009 the applicant complained of his brother\u2019s abduction to various authorities. He complained to the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office, the President of Chechnya, the Russian Prosecutor General, the Russian Ministry of the Interior, and the Russian President on 21 June, 15 July, 4 and 9 August 2003 and 15 January 2004 respectively. It appears that no replies followed. 75.  On 9 March 2010 the Shali district investigative committee opened criminal case no. 38001 under Articles 126 (abduction) and 286 (abuse of authority) of the CC. 76.  The Government did not submit a copy of the criminal case file requested by the Court. From the documents submitted by the applicant, it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 77.  On 10 March 2010 Mr Anzor Tangiyev\u2019s mother was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. She stated that immediately after the abduction she had contacted the mother of Mr A.D., who had already searched for him. The mother of Mr A.D. had told her that Mr Anzor Tangiyev and Mr A.D. had been detained together. On an unspecified date Mr Anzor Tangiyev\u2019s mother had met Mr S., who had promised her that she would arrange the release of her son in return for her handing over to Mr Ser. 1,000 United States dollars (USD). Mr Anzor Tangiyev\u2019s mother had collected the money, but before she had been able to transfer it Mr S. had died. According to Mr Anzor Tangiyev\u2019s mother, after the abduction she had lodged complaints about it with various civilian and military authorities (including prosecutors) but no proper investigation had followed. 78.  On 16 and 27 March 2010 the investigators questioned Mr A.D. His statements were similar to the account of the events given by the applicant in his submissions to the Court. Among other details he noted that some of the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian and that from his neighbors, who had witnessed the abduction, he had learned that the abductors had arrived in UAZ minivans. Mr A.D. alleged that the culprits had belonged to the federal forces and had apprehended him together with Mr Anzor Tangiyev on suspicion of membership in illegal armed groups. Mr A.D. stated that after his release he had been questioned about the circumstances of the abduction by police officers from the Staropromislovskiy district temporary department of the interior. 79.  On 9 June 2010 the investigators suspended the proceedings after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. On an unspecified date that decision was overruled, and the investigation was resumed. 80.  On 11 January 2011 the proceedings were suspended again. The applicant was not informed thereof. 81.  On an unspecified date between January and April 2013 the applicant lodged a request with the investigators for them to resume the investigation and grant him victim status in the criminal case. On 15 April 2013 the request was refused as ill-founded. 82.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 83.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Timur Tsakayev, who was born in 1976. The second applicant is his grandmother, and the third applicant is his brother. 84.  Mr Timur Tsakayev was a relative of Mr Ramzan Tsakayev, a well\u2011known Chechen fighter against the Russian federal forces who lived in the village of Alkhan-Yurt. Fearing persecution on that account, Mr Timur Tsakayev and his family moved to Ingushetia in 1999. In order to visit his relatives in Chechnya, he used, again, for fear of persecution, a passport in the name of Mr Islam Khalidov. 85.  In October 2001 Mr Timur Tsakayev went to Alkhan-Yurt to visit his grandmother. At about 3 a.m. on 2 November 2001 the family members were woken up by the noise of two APCs and an Ural lorry, which pulled up at their gate. A group of forty to fifty armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms cordoned off the house and searched its premises. Mr Timur Tsakayev showed them his passport, which was in the name of Islam Khalidov. The servicemen took him and his uncle Musa to the back yard and questioned them in unaccented Russian. 86.  Meanwhile, the other servicemen locked Mr Timur Tsakayev\u2019s relatives in the house. An hour later, they let Musa go and put Timur Tsakayev in the Ural lorry, which, according to local residents, already contained other apprehended men with sacks over their heads. The Ural and one of the APCs drove away shortly thereafter. The other APC left later in the morning. 87.  The whereabouts of Mr Timur Tsakayev remain unknown. 88.  For several months after Mr Timur Tsakayev\u2019s abduction his relatives complained to various authorities, referring to him by the name of Islam Khalidov. In February 2002 the first applicant disclosed her son\u2019s true identity to the authorities. 89.  On 3 August 2003 Mr Timur Tsakayev\u2019s aunt asked the Urus\u2011Martan district prosecutor to open a criminal case into his abduction. On the same day the investigators questioned her and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 90.  On 5 October 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34095 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 91.  After the opening of the criminal proceedings the investigators requested various law-enforcement authorities to inform them of whether they had arrested or detained Timur Tsakayev. The replies received were in the negative. 92.  On 5 December 2003 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 93.  On 1 January 2004 the investigation was resumed, and one month later suspended again. 94.  The Government did not submit a copy of the case-file documents concerning the subsequent developments in the proceedings. According to the applicants, the proceedings were resumed on 25 March 2006, 12 April 2007, and 10 February 2010 and suspended on 25 April 2006 and 16 May 2007 respectively. 95.  In the meantime, on 9 June 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status, but to no avail. 96.  On 26 March and 19 May 2009 the applicant repeated her request for victim status. She also asked the investigators to grant her access to the case\u2011file documents. 97.  On 10 February 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status, and on 27 May 2010 she was provided with copies of documents from the investigation file. 98.  In 2012 the Government submitted to the Court an update on the criminal proceedings; according that update the investigation had been resumed on 12 December 2011. 99.  On 30 December 2011 the investigators questioned a former head of the Alkhan-Yurt municipal administration, who stated that Mr Timur Tsakayev had been involved in an illegal armed group. At that time (the year 2001), several authorities \u2013 including the FSB, the Main Intelligence Directorate (\u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0420\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435), the federal military forces and the police \u2013 conducted arrests of the members of that group. He also stated that illegal armed groups also moved around in the vicinity of the village. 100.  On 31 January 2012 the investigators asked the FSB, the Federal Armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior whether special operations had been conducted in Alkhan-Yurt in 2002. No relevant information was provided. 101.  On 3 February 2012 the first applicant\u2019s DNA was compared with DNA samples taken from unidentified corpses, but no match was found. 102.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 103.  The applicants are three sisters of Mr Aslan Bachakov, who was born in 1974. 104.  On 9 October 2001 Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special operation in the town of Argun. It was cordoned off and surrounded by military vehicles. 105.  At about 8 a.m. a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in an APC bearing the identification number 023, two UAZ vehicles and one VAZ vehicles. Prior to the incident, the APC had been seen on the premises of the Argun military commander\u2019s office. 106.  The servicemen threatened the applicants with firearms, searched the premises and detained Mr Aslan Bachakov. One of them, having introduced himself as an officer from the military commander\u2019s office, assured the applicants that their brother would be questioned and then released. Thereafter, the men forced Mr Bachakov into one of the UAZ vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 107.  The whereabouts of Mr Aslan Bachakov remain unknown. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 108.  Immediately after the events, the applicants went to the Argun military commander\u2019s office, where an unidentified officer confirmed Mr Bachakov\u2019s detention on their premises. However, in the course of the applicants\u2019 subsequent visits to the office, the serviceman denied it and refused to disclose information about his whereabouts. 109.  On the same date, 9 October 2001, the applicants formally informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case into the incident be opened. 110.  On 1 March 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78026 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 111.  On 7 March 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 112.  On 10 March 2002 the Argun Department of the Ministry of the Interior (the Argun town police) provided the investigators with a statement that between 7 and 10 October 2001 a special sweeping-up operation had been conducted in the town. Several military vehicles, including two APCs, had been involved in that operation. Shortly after the end of the operation, another town resident, Mr Kh. U., complained that on 9 October 2001 armed men in camouflage uniform had abducted Mr A.B. and driven him off to an unknown destination. The Argun town police had no information about Mr Aslan Bachakov\u2019s apprehension. 113.  On 1 May 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 114.  On 10 April 2003 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings. Nine days later the proceedings were resumed. 115.  On 16 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr L.S., who was the neighbour of Mr Bachakov. He confirmed that on the morning of 9 October 2001 a sweeping-up operation had been carried out by servicemen and police officers in APCs. Immediately after the APCs\u2019 departure at the end of the operation, several UAZ vehicles and a Zhiguli car had arrived at Mr Bachakov\u2019s house. Armed men in camouflage uniform had forced him into a vehicle and taken him away to an unknown destination. Later that day Mr L.S., Mr Aslan Bachakov\u2019s wife and the applicants had gone to the Argun military commander\u2019s office. They had been told that the military authorities had not arrested Mr Aslan Bachakov. 116.  On 19 May 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings. The first applicant was informed of that decision. 117.  On 22 March 2005 the Argun town prosecutor examined the investigation file and concluded that Mr Aslan Bachakov had most probably been abducted by an illegal armed group. He also noted several shortcomings on the part of the investigators, including the fact that they had sent no information requests to the law-enforcement authorities. 118.  On 20 April 2009 the first applicant asked a member of the Chechen Parliament for help in the search for her brother. That request was forwarded to the investigators. By a letter dated 18 May 2009 the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures were ongoing. 119.  On 7 October 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 120.  On 28 October 2010 the investigators obtained a sample of the first applicant\u2019s DNA for comparison with DNA taken from unidentified remains; the results of that comparison remain unknown. 121.  In November 2010 the investigators questioned several witnesses to the events, who mainly confirmed the account of the events submitted by the applicants, and examined the crime scene. No evidence from Mr Aslan Bachakov\u2019s house was collected. 122.  On 26 November 2010 the proceedings were suspended. Subsequently, they were resumed on 21 June and 5 October 2011, 27 January and 8 May 2014; and then suspended again on 21 July and 6 October 2011 and 27 February and 8 June 2014 respectively. 123.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 124.  On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court in Chechnya, alleging that the investigators had failed to take basic steps and had prematurely suspended the proceedings. 125.  On 18 October 2010 the court dismissed the complaint, having found that on 7 October 2010 the proceedings had been resumed. On 8 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld that decision on appeal. 126.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Olkhazur Osmayev, who was born in 1971. The first applicant was his father, who died on 12 June 2017. The second applicant is his mother. The third and fourth applicants are his brothers. 127.  At about 1 a.m. on 20 April 2002 about fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas armed with machine guns broke into the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Mesker, ordered the men to go out to the courtyard and locked the women and children in the house. After searching the premises, the servicemen handcuffed Mr Olkhazur Osmayev and his two brothers (the third and fourth applicants) pulled their jackets over their heads and put them in a car waiting in the street. Then they took the three men first to the Shali district military commander\u2019s office and then the Shali ROVD, where they were questioned by a Russian-speaking investigator. A few days later the third and fourth applicants were released. As for Mr Olkhazur Osmayev, the applicants have had no news of him since the above-mentioned events. 128.  On 20 April 2002 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Shali district prosecutor. 129.  On 24 April 2002 the third and fourth applicants were questioned by the police. Their statements were similar to those submitted by them to the Court. 130.  On 26 April 2002 the Shali district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 59097 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 131.  In May 2002 the investigators sent requests concerning Mr Osmayev\u2019s whereabouts to various authorities, including the Shali military commander, the FSB and the police stations in the Shali district. 132.  On 26 June 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 133.  On 29 May 2003 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered the proceedings be resumed. 134.  On 5 June 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 135.  On 29 June 2003 the investigation was suspended again. 136.  On 19 July 2003 the Department of the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic (\u201cthe Chechen FSB\u201d) in the Shali district of Chechnya confirmed at the investigators\u2019 request that the third and fourth applicants had been arrested between 10.20 p.m. and 11.05 p.m. on 20 April 2002. The arrest had been carried out by Major K., who had left the Chechen Republic and could therefore not be questioned. 137.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the second applicant contacted the Chechen Parliament, seeking its assistance in the search for her son. On 18 July 2005 her letter was forwarded to the Chechnya Prosecutor; on 20 June 2005 it was forwarded onwards to the Shali district prosecutor. It is not clear whether a reply followed. 138.  On 27 February 2006 the second applicant asked the Shali district prosecutor to expedite the investigation into Mr Osmayev\u2019s abduction. On 14 March 2006 the prosecutor informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that the search was still in progress. 139.  On 3 March 2008 the NGO Materi Chechni on the applicants\u2019 behalf asked the head of the Chechen Parliament by letter to assist in the search for Mr Osmayev. The letter was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 17 April 2008 that operational search activities in respect of the case were ongoing. 140.  On 18 May 2009 the second applicant repeated the request to the head of the Chechen Parliament. On 21 June 2009 she received a reply similar to that of 17 April 2008. 141.  On 22 March 2010 the applicants requested that the investigation be resumed and that they be allowed to access the investigation file. 142.  On 18 May 2010 the investigators replied that the criminal case had been transferred to the Main Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in the South Federal Circuit and that the applicants would be able to access the file once it had been returned. 143.  On 23 June 2010 the deputy Shali prosecutor noted numerous shortcomings in the investigation; two days later he gave instructions to the investigators comprising a list of thirty nine measures to be taken. 144.  On 28 June 2010 the investigation was resumed. On 7 June 2010 the investigators asked the Chechen FSB to send them a copy of the criminal case file related to the arrest of the third and fourth applicants on 20 April 2002. On 24 July 2010 the FSB replied that the case file had been sent to the Chechnya Prosecutor in 2003. The investigators searched for that file in the archives, but to no avail. 145.  In July 2010 the investigators questioned two brothers, Mr R.S. and Mr Sh.R. Both of them had been apprehended in Mesker on the night of 19\u201120 April 2002 and had been put in an UAZ vehicle, together with three other detainees. On the morning of 20 April 2002 the brothers had been taken to the Shali police station, questioned and subsequently released. 146.  On 28 July 2010 the proceeding were suspended. It appears that they are still pending. 147.  On 15 June 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court regarding the investigators\u2019 failure to resume the investigation and to take all measures possible to solve the crime. 148.  On 28 June 2010 the Shali District Court dismissed the complaint, referring to the recent decision to resume the proceedings (see paragraph 144 above), which had been taken earlier. 149.  The applicants appealed against that decision to the Chechnya Supreme Court, which dismissed their appeal on 22 December 2010. 150.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ilyas Movsarov, who was born in 1975. The second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his wife. 151.  At the material time Mr Ilyas Movsarov lived with his wife, the third applicant, and their two minor children in Grozny. 152.  On the night of 29-30 April 2002 a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in three UAZ vehicles at Mr Movsarov\u2019s house. Having broken in, they searched the premises and checked Mr Movsarov\u2019s identity documents. Then they forced him outside, put him in one of the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 153.  The next day the applicants went to the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD in Grozny. The head of the department, Mr B., informed them that their relative had been detained by officers from the Regional Department of the Fight against Organised Crime of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe RUBOP\u201d). 154.  According to the applicants, Mr Ilyas Movsarov was subsequently seen while being held in detention on the premises of the RUBOP. His whereabouts remain unknown. 155.  On 30 April 2002 the third applicant complained to the Grozny prosecutor about Mr Movsarov\u2019s abduction. 156.  On the same day the third applicant and three neighbours of Ilyas Movsarov were questioned by investigators. Their statements were consistent with the applicants\u2019 submissions to the Court, as described above. The third applicant noted that the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian. 157.  On 4 June 2002 the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 54031 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 158.  On 21 August 2002 the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned by the investigators. During the interrogation she stated that her husband\u2019s abductors had taken their television set. 159.  On 4 September 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 160.  On 11 April 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 161.  On 14 May 2003, having questioned several witnesses, who made statements similar to those of the applicants\u2019, the investigators suspended the proceedings. 162.  On an unspecified date between 2007 and 2008 a relative of Mr Movsarov (apparently his daughter) asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for her father. By a letter dated 30 January 2008 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but that operational search activities were still ongoing. 163.  On 6 June 2009 the investigators resumed the proceedings and sent a number of requests to various authorities, including law-enforcement bodies, concerning Mr Movsarov\u2019s whereabouts, but no positive replies were received. 164.  On 4 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case. Two days later the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 8 September and 23 December 2010, 8 October and 6 December 2011, and 3 July 2012 and suspended on 8 October 2010, 23 January and 9 October 2011, and 6 January and 3 August 2012, respectively. 165.  In the meantime, on 28 December 2010 the investigators opened criminal case no. 23083 under Article 162 of the CC (robbery) into the misappropriation of the applicants\u2019 television set. The third applicant was granted victim status in that case. Shortly thereafter it was joined with case no. 54031. 166.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 167.  On 30 July 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court in Grozny, challenging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic investigative steps. 168.  On 27 September 2010 the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the decision to suspend the proceedings had already been overruled. The Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal on 15 December 2010. 169.  The application was lodged by the parents of Mr Adlan Moltayev (also spelled as Maltayev), who was born in 1979. 170.  On 25 September 2018 the Court was informed that the father and the mother of Mr Adlan Moltayev had died on 16 January 2017 and 1 April 2018 respectively, and that their daughter, Ms Larisa Khatsiyeva, wished to pursue the application in their stead. 171.  At about 4 a.m. on 11 March 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in an APC and an UAZ vehicle at the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Achkhoy-Martan. Speaking unaccented Russian, the men searched the premises, forced Mr Adlan Moltayev outside, put him in the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. 172.  The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 173.  The whereabouts of Mr Adlan Moltayev have remained unknown ever since. 174.  On 11 April 2002 Mr Adlan Moltayev\u2019s relatives informed the authorities of his abduction. On the same day the crime scene was examined by investigators from the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutors\u2019 office. No evidence was collected. 175.  The next day the Achkhoy-Martan prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63027 under Article 127 of the CC (unlawful deprivation of liberty). Several requests were sent to law-enforcement authorities in order to establish whether Mr Adlan Moltayev had been arrested and placed in custody. The replies received were all in the negative. 176.  In April 2002 the investigators questioned several witnesses; the copies of their statements furnished by the Government to the Court were illegible. 177.  On 14 April 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned by the investigators. Her account of the events was similar to those submitted by the applicants to the Court. 178.  On 12 June 2002 the investigators suspended the proceedings after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 179.  Between 2003 and 2007 the second applicant lodged a number of requests with various authorities for them to assist in the investigation and in the search for her son: on 16 July 2003 she contacted the Chechnya Prosecutor; on 16 February 2004 she contacted the Russian President; on 24 January 2005 she contacted the Chechen President; on 29 June 2005 she contacted the Russian State Duma; on 3 February 2006 she contacted the Chechen President and the Chechen Government; and on 3 August 2007 she contacted the Achkhoy-Martan prosecutor. Each request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures were being undertaken. 180.  On 17 June 2008, the proceedings were after the supervisors voiced their criticism. Having sent dozens of requests for information concerning the possible participation of Mr Moltayev in illegal armed groups, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 17 July 2008. 181.  On 27 March 2009 the proceedings were resumed again. Three days later the investigators questioned (i) Mr Moltayev\u2019s neighbour, who had witnessed the abduction and who confirmed the account of the events submitted by the applicants, and (ii) the second applicant, who repeated the statements that she had previously given. 182.  On 17 April 2009, at his own request, the first applicant was granted the status of civil claimant in the criminal case. 183.  On 30 April 2009 the investigators suspended the proceedings and on 3 March 2010 resumed them. On the same date the second applicant was granted victim status. The next day the proceedings were suspended again. 184.  On 18 January 2011 the first applicant lodged a request to be allowed to access the case file. His request was dismissed on 20 January 2011. Subsequently he lodged a complaint with the Urus\u2011Martan Town Court in Chechnya against the investigators on that account (see paragraph 188 below). 185.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 186.  On 15 March 2010 the applicants complained to the Achkhoy\u2011Martan District Court in Chechnya. They alleged that the instigators had not taken all necessary measures to investigate the incident. The court allowed the complaint in part on 12 April 2010. 187.  On 29 September 2010 the applicants again lodged a complaint regarding the investigators\u2019 inaction. The outcome of that complaint remains unknown. 188.  On 1 February 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Urus\u2011Martan Town Court in Chechnya concerning their lack of access to the case file. On 5 April 2011 their complaint was allowed and the investigators were ordered to grant the applicants full access to the investigation file. 189.  The applicants are the mothers of Mr Bayali (also spelled as Bay\u2011Ali) Bashkuyev and Mr Umar Arsayev, who were born in 1987 and 1986 respectively. 190.  In the early hours of 31 March 2004 a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the village of Elistanzhi, Chechnya, in APCs that bore no registration plates. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. Between midnight and 1.15 a.m. on that date they made a forced entry into the applicants\u2019 houses, arrested Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev, put them into the military vehicles, and drove off to an unknown destination. 191.  The whereabouts of Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev have remained unknown ever since. Their abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and several neighbours. 192.  On 31 March 2004 an officer from the Vedeno police department, after the applicants had lodged a complaint with it, reported to the deputy Vedenskiy district prosecutor the abduction of Mr Bayali Bashkuyev and Mr Umar Arsayev. On the same date the crime scene was examined. No evidence was collected. 193.  On 1 April 2004 the Vedeno district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 43017 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 194.  On 8 April 2004 the investigators questioned police officers stationed at road checkpoints along the way to the applicants\u2019 village. According to the copies of their statements furnished by the Government, the road police officers confirmed the passage of two APCs on the night of the abduction. 195.  On 16 July 2004 the applicants were granted victim status in the case and questioned. Their statements were similar to those submitted by them to the Court. 196.  On 1 June 2004 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 197.  On 24 July 2007 the investigators\u2019 supervisors overruled as unlawful the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered the investigation to be resumed. Between July and August 2007 the investigators sent a number of requests to law-enforcement authorities asking whether Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev had been suspected of criminal activities and arrested on that account. Replies in the negative were given. 198.  On 24 August 2007 the proceedings were suspended; on 21 December 2010 they were resumed. 199.  On 11 and 12 January 2011 the second and then the first applicant were questioned by the investigators. Both applicants submitted that neither Mr Bashkuyev nor Mr Arsayev had participated in or supported illegal armed groups. 200.  On 12 January 2011 the investigators obtained DNA samples from both applicants for comparison with those held in a database of unidentified remains. 201.  Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 27 January 2011, 10 September 2012 and 28 November 2013, and resumed on 30 August 2012 and 28 October 2013. 202.  By a letter of 6 March 2017 the investigators informed the applicants that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures to establish the identity of the perpetrators continued. 203.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 204.  On an unspecified date in September 2013 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Vedeno District Court alleging the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps to solve the crime and asking that the proceedings be resumed. 205.  On 18 September 2013 the court dismissed the complaint, having found that the investigators had already resumed the criminal investigation. In a separate ruling given on the same date the court pointed to certain procedural flaws in the investigation. 206.  On unspecified dates in 2015 the applicants lodged claims against the Ministry of Finance of Russia seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the abduction. 207.  On 12 May 2015 the court, in decisions adopted separately in respect of each applicant, dismissed the claims as unfounded. On 7 and 16 July 2015 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decisions on appeal. 208.  According to the applicants, in 2017 the domestic courts declared Mr Umar Arsayev dead.", "references": ["4", "8", "5", "9", "7", "3", "6", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Horn\u00e1 Kr\u00e1\u013eov\u00e1. The second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Nitra. 5.  On 14 March 2014 a judge of the Nitra District Court remanded the applicants in detention pending trial on the charge of continuous criminal offence of insurance fraud. This followed their arrest on 11 March 2014. 6.  With respect to the first applicant, the District Court decided that there were reasons to suspect that he would influence witnesses, reoffend and continue to make illegal financial gains. With respect to the second applicant, the District Court concluded that there was a reason to suspect that he would interfere with witnesses and his co-accused to influence the evidence they would give. 7.  On 21 March 2014 both applicants lodged an interlocutory appeal, arguing that no specific factual elements had been relied on in the District Court\u2019s decision to justify their pre-trial detention. 8.  On 1 April 2014 the Nitra Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 interlocutory appeals, referring to the findings of the District Court. 9.  On 24 April 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the decisions on their detention lacked specific reasons justifying their pre-trial detention. They each requested just satisfaction of 5,000 euros (EUR). 10.  The Constitutional Court joined their complaints and on 24 September 2014 found a violation of their rights under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention. It quashed the relevant part of the decision of the Regional Court and awarded each of the applicants EUR 1,000 as just satisfaction in addition to their legal costs and expenses in the amount of EUR 284.\nThe Constitutional Court noted that where the ordinary courts used only formal and standard phrases in their decisions on detention (as was the case with the applicants), suspicion arose as to whether they had looked properly at the specific circumstances at hand. It concluded that even though the ordinary courts had referred to some specific facts, which allegedly justified the applicants\u2019 detention, they had failed to explain them in their decisions. Furthermore, the Regional Court had not dealt with some of the applicants\u2019 core arguments and thus had not remedied the shortcomings of the District Court\u2019s decision.\nIn view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention had been based on an arbitrary decision lacking proper and sufficient reasoning. 11.  In the meantime, on 30 May 2014 the applicants had been released and placed under supervised probation.", "references": ["7", "6", "1", "5", "4", "9", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Costesti. 6.  On 16 July 2008 the Ialoveni District Court found the applicant guilty of disrespectful conduct towards a police officer and sentenced him to five days\u2019 administrative arrest. The applicant appealed. 7.  On 12 August 2008 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal quashed the above\u2011mentioned judgment and returned the case for a re\u2011examination on the merits. 8.  On 11 February 2009 the Ialoveni District Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant as a result of the expiry of the time-limit for applying an administrative sanction. Meanwhile, the applicant had already served his sentence. The applicant appealed. 9.  On 13 March 2009 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the district court and discontinued the administrative proceedings in respect of the applicant for lack of corpus delicti. 10.  The applicant brought an action under Law no. 1545 seeking 300,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 18,750 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 11 May 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice concluded that the applicant\u2019s administrative arrest had been unlawful and thus awarded him MDL 8,000 (equivalent to EUR 500) as compensation for the damage caused.", "references": ["6", "9", "8", "7", "0", "5", "4", "1", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants are fifty Russian nationals. Their dates of birth and places of residence are listed in Appendixes I, II, III and IV. 8.  The applicants are former military servicemen. They all obtained final court decisions in their favour ordering military units to provide them with housing before their dismissal from military service. The respective court orders\u2019 details, such as dates of the judgments and their entry into force and the respective court\u2019s names, are summarised in the Appendixes. 9.  In some cases the defendants were subsequently replaced by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defense. 10.  The judgment in case of Mr Nazarov has remained unenforced to date. The judgments in favour of other applicants were enforced on the dates listed in the Appendixes below. 11.  Pursuant to the judgment in favour of Mr Medinskiy (Appendix III) the authorities decided to allocate a flat to the applicant on 6 November 2015. According to the transfer and acceptance act, the applicant accepted the flat on 20 November 2015. On 21 January 2016 he registered his title to the flat. 12.  Pursuant to the judgment in favour of Mr Vedernikov (Appendix III) the authorities decided to allocate a flat to the applicant on 27 October 2015. According to the transfer and acceptance act, the applicant accepted the flat on 13 November 2015. On 11 January 2016 he registered his title to the flat. 13.  Since 1999 Mr Nazarov owned a \u00bc share in a flat (15 sq.m.) in Pushkino, the Moscow Region. In 2007 the housing commission of the military unit considered his housing situation, noted his title to a share in the flat and decided to put the applicant on the list of persons in need of housing. 14.  On 13 January 2009 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison ordered the housing commission of the military unit to provide him with housing in Moscow, as indicated in the appended table. On 27 January 2011 the same court replaced the defendant by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defense. 15.  Between 18 August 2009 and 24 June 2011 the applicant had a \u00bd share in tenancy of a flat in the Smolensk Region. 16.  On 25 April 2013 the Hosing Department of the Ministry of Defense found that overall size of the applicant\u2019s living premises (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above) exceeded the housing norms for the respective region. Accordingly, the debtor authority decided to strike his name off the list of persons in need of housing. 17.  On 24 February 2014 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison and on 26 June 2014 the appeal court upheld lawfulness of the above decision. 18.  In the meantime, the defendant twice applied to the domestic courts with a request for termination of the enforcement proceedings, as the applicant\u2019s name had been removed from the list of persons in need of housing, and there had \u201cno longer been a possibility to enforce the judgment\u201d. 19.  On 29 November 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court allowed the request. On 14 April 2014 the Moscow City Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision on appeal and issued a new ruling dismissing the request in full. The court found that the first-instance court had incorrectly interpreted the applicable law. There was no evidence that the judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour could no longer be enforced. It was not quashed or amended. A \u201closs of a possibility to enforce\u201d should have been \u201cof an objective nature\u201d and could not be conditional on the circumstances depending on the debtor itself. The defendant\u2019s arguments were rather indicative of its disagreement with the court\u2019s findings in the judgment of 13 January 2009, but did not constitute a ground for termination of the enforcement proceedings. 20.  On 23 December 2014 the first-instance court and on 4 September 2015 the Moscow City Court acting as an appeal instance rejected the defendant\u2019s new request to terminate the enforcement, based this time, inter alia, on the judgment of 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 17 above). The courts gave the same reasons for the refusal as in the previous round of the similar proceedings. 21.  In 2016 the defendant again requested the court to terminate the enforcement proceedings, the application being lodged this time with a military court. The registry of the military court sent to the applicant notifications of the hearing by registered mail and by telegram to his known address. The notifications had not been delivered as the flat was closed. On 20 December 2016 the registry of the court informed the applicant of the date and place of the hearing by phone, as confirmed by a \u201ctelephonogram\u201d (a telephone conversation record). The applicant stated in the telephone conversation that he had no longer lived at the address he had provided to the court and had refused to give his new address. 22.  On 21 December 2016 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison granted the request. With reference to the judgment of 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 17 above) it found established that as of 25 April 2013 the applicant had no longer been in need of the housing, which meant that the defendant had no longer had a possibility to enforce the judgment of 2 February 2009. 23.  The applicant was not present at the hearing. The decision specified that he had been duly notified of the date and time of the examination of the case. 24.  On 23 December 2016 he collected the telegram (see paragraph 21 above) from the post office. 25.  The applicant appealed, referring, inter alia, to the two earlier decisions on the same matter rejecting the defendant\u2019s similar requests, and argued that he had not been duly notified of the hearing in his case. 26.  On 16 February 2017 the Civil Division of the Military Court of the Moscow Command upheld the decision on appeal. It found, inter alia, that the defendant\u2019s prolonged failure to take actions to enforce the judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour did not have any bearing on the lawfulness of the decision to discontinue the enforcement, as since 2013 the applicant had no longer been entitled to State housing. The proceedings were held in written form. 27.  As regards the absence from the first-instance hearing, the appeal court noted that the notifications of the hearing had been sent to the applicant by registered mail and by telegram to his known address, but had not been delivered as the flat had been closed and the applicant had failed to collect the telegram pursuant to a notification thereof. Further, on 20 December 2016 he was informed of the date and the place of the hearing by phone. The court also noted his reply in the telephone conversation that he had no longer lived at the address he had provided to the court, as well as his refusal to provide his new address, and rejected the complaint. 28.  On 3 May 2017 a judge of the Military Court of the Moscow Command rejected the applicant\u2019s first leave for cassation appeal. The judge found, in particular, that the decisions of the Presnenskiy District court referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20 had not had a res judicata effect on the proceedings as the domestic law did not prohibit the debtor from lodging a repeated request for termination of the enforcement proceedings. 29.  On 20 July 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to grant leave for the second cassation appeal against the decision of 21 December 2016. 30.  On 15 March 2015 the applicant Mr Bazhenov (Appendix II) died. On 23 May 2015 his widow, Ms Leyla Khalilyevna Bazhenova, born on 13 July 1973, expressed a wish to maintain the application in his stead, and submitted a copy of the certificate confirming that she was her late husband\u2019s legal heir. 31.  Two applicants, Mr Balyas and Mr Golovachev, withdrew their complaints on the dates specified in Appendix IV.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "0", "5", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic or in the Republic of Ingushetia. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by service personnel during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to various law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and decisions have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formulaic responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of service personnel in the events. 7.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev, who was born in 1967. 8.  On 11 July 2004 Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev was visiting his relative in the village of Muzhichi, Ingushetia, when a group of service personnel from the Bamut military command under Major General Starkov arrested him at the outskirts of the village on suspicion of having committed a murder. They handed him over to officers from the Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe FSB\u201d), who took him away to an unknown destination. 9.  On the evening of the same date police officers from the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (\u201cthe Sunzhenskiy ROVD\u201d) arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. Having informed the applicant that earlier that day FSB officers had arrested Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev on suspicion of murder, they searched the premises and left. 10.  On 12 July 2004 Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev\u2019s brother, Mr U.Ts., went to the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in search of the abducted relative. His acquaintance, Mr G.M., who worked in the prosecutor\u2019s office, told him that Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev had been detained by the FSB. 11.  The next day the prosecutor summoned Mr U.Ts. for questioning. In the course of the questioning a representative of the prosecutor\u2019s office, Mr Kh., and the head of the criminal investigation department of the Sunzhenskiy ROVD confirmed that Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev had been detained by the FSB and was being held on the latter\u2019s premises in Ingushetia. 12.  On 13 July 2004 the applicant asked the authorities to investigate the abduction of her husband. 13.  On 27 August 2004 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 04600057 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction). 14.  The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the criminal case file. From the documents submitted by the applicant it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 15.  On 10 September 2004 the investigators granted the applicant victim status in the case. 16.  On 27 October 2004 they suspended the investigation for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 11 January 2005, 27 October 2006, 4 May 2007, and an unspecified date in 2008. It was suspended on 28 February 2005, 27 November 2006 and 4 June 2007 respectively. 17.  In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 and then on 16 January 2008 the applicant enquired about developments in the proceedings. In reply, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended. 18.  On 10 June 2006 and on 9 October 2008 the applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and to allow her access to the case file. Both of her requests were dismissed. There is no information about further developments. 19.  On 13 July 2006 and on an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia alleging the investigators\u2019 failure to investigate the abduction effectively. On 13 October 2006 and 27 April 2007 the court allowed the complaints and ordered that the investigation be resumed. 20.  On 18 February 2008 the applicant complained to the court of the investigators\u2019 inaction and their decision to suspend the investigation on 4 June 2007. On 24 March 2008 the court dismissed her complaint referring to the fact that the decision to suspend the investigation had already been overruled by a higher investigating authority. 21.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant complained to the court about the lack of access to the investigation file. The outcome of the proceedings is unknown. 22.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev, who was born in 1980 (in certain documents the year of birth also indicated as 1981), and the wife of Mr Sharip Shavkhayev, who was born in 1941. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Umar Bekayev, who was born in 1941. 23.  At the material time, the first applicant, Mr Sharip Shavkhayev and their children, Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev, Ms S.Me. and Ms S.Ma., lived in the village of Avtury, Chechnya. 24.  At about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001 the family was at home when a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in military camouflage uniforms broke into their house. Some of the men were in balaclavas. Those who did not have them were of Slavic appearance. All of the intruders spoke unaccented Russian. 25.  Having threatened the family members with firearms, the men forced the father and the son out of the house and took them away to an unknown destination. Meanwhile, some of the men searched the premises, seized the identity documents of Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev and Mr Sharip Shavkhayev and left the house. The abduction was witnessed by several people. 26.  The same night, three residents of Avtury, Mr Umar Bekayev, Mr I.Kh. and his brother Mr M.Kh., were abducted by presumably the same group of men under similar circumstances. Eight days later the abductors released Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. from detention. 27.  At about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001, a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage military uniforms broke into the second applicant\u2019s house in Avtury, where she was living with her daughter and husband, Mr Umar Bekayev. Speaking unaccented Russian, the men threatened those present with firearms, tied Mr Umar Bekayev\u2019s hands behind his back, put a bag on his head and took him away on foot to an unknown destination. 28.  In the morning of 9 June 2001 the applicants went to the Shali district command in search of their relatives. The commanding officer told them that their relatives had been detained by military service personnel. 29.  On 9 June 2001 the applicants asked the investigating authorities to open a criminal case into the abductions of their relatives. 30.  Three days later the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 23170 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 31.  On 19 August 2001 the investigators questioned Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. They submitted that at about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001 they had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms. The abductors had taken them to an unknown destination and placed them in a pit. They had been kept there for about one week, and had been regularly beaten up by the perpetrators. A week later the abductors had blindfolded them, put them in an armored personal carrier (\u201cAPC\u201d), transported them into the fields in the Shali district and thrown them out of the vehicle. They had been found by Chechens, who had taken them home. 32.  In September 2001 the investigators questioned the relatives of the abducted persons, those who had been eyewitnesses to the abductions, and their neighbours, who gave hearsay evidence. They confirmed the account of the events as described by the applicants in their submissions to the Court. 33.  On 12 October 2001 the proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of perpetrators. 34.  On 23 January 2002 the investigators opened criminal case no. 59039 into the abduction of Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. 35.  On 12 July 2002 the investigation into the abduction of the applicants\u2019 relatives was resumed, joined to the investigation into the abduction of Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. and then suspended. 36.  On 21 December 2004 the proceedings were resumed again. 37.  In January 2005 the investigators sent requests to various military authorities and detention facilitates to investigate the applicant\u2019s version of the abduction by State agents. The bodies that responded, stating that they did not have information about the alleged arrest of the applicant\u2019s relatives on 9 June 2001 and their subsequent detention. 38.  On 21 January 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. On the same day the proceedings were suspended. 39.  On 29 January and 9 February 2007 the first and second applicants respectively asked the investigators to allow them access to the criminal case file. Their requests were dismissed on 1 and 18 February 2007 respectively. 40.  Subsequently the investigation was resumed on 27 December 2007, suspended on 28 December 2007, and then resumed on 12 August 2008 again. In the meantime, in December 2007 the first applicant was given access to the criminal case file. There is no information about further developments. 41.  On unspecified dates the applicants complained to the Shali Town Court of the investigators refusals to allow them access to the criminal case file of 1 and 18 February 2007. 42.  On 10 October and 22 November 2007, respectively, the court allowed the first and the second applicants\u2019 complaints and ordered the investigators to provide them with partial access to the case file. 43.  The applicants appealed against the above decisions seeking full access to the case file.  On 20 February 2008 the Chechnya Supreme Court allowed their appeals. 44.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Murad Zakriyev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is the mother of Mr Rustam Muradov, who was born in 1977. 45.  At the material time the applicants and their sons were temporarily residing in Ingushetia as refugees. Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov were working at a private construction site located on the premises of Mr B.G.\u2019s house in the town of Nazran. 46.  At about 12.30 a.m. on 14 July 2003 Mr Rustam Muradov, his colleague Mr V.S. and Mr B.G.\u2019s family members, including his son Mr R.G., were at the site, when a group of ten to fifteen armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a GAZelle minivan and a VAZ vehicle. Speaking unaccented Russian, the service personnel broke into Mr B.G.\u2019s home, handcuffed and blindfolded Mr Rustam Muradov, Mr V.S. and Mr R.G., forced them into the minivan and drove off. 47.  Several minutes later, allegedly the same group of service personnel arrested Mr Murad Zakriyev on a street on his way to the construction site. They forced him into the minivan and drove off in the direction of the town of Mozdok, passing unrestricted through military checkpoints on their way. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 48.  Later on the same day Mr V.S. and Mr R.G. were released and returned home. 49.  About a month after the abduction, a man visited the second applicant and told her that Mr Murad Zakriyev was detained at the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala, Chechnya. 50.  At some point later the first applicant learnt from Mr D.M., a police officer from the Ministry of the Interior in Ingushetia, that Mr Rustam Muradov was allegedly detained at a detention facility in Krasnoarmeysk in the Volgograd Region of Russia. 51.  The applicants\u2019 attempts to find their sons were to no avail. 52.  On 14 July 2003 Mr B.G. contacted the Nazran town prosecutor, complaining of the abductions of Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov. He stated that the culprits\u2019 GAZelle minivan\u2019s number plate had been C293CE95RUS and the VAZ vehicle had had a number plate containing 441 95RUS. 53.  Ten days later the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 03560058 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 54.  On 25 July 2003 the investigators questioned Mr V.S. and Mr R.G. Their statements were consistent with the applicants\u2019 account of the events before the Court. Among other details Mr V.S. noted that during the two\u2011hour trip in the GAZelle minivan after the abduction, the perpetrators had used portable radio sets. From the content of their conversations, he had understood that they had been State agents. He also submitted that their car had passed through security checkpoints without any obstacles. 55.  In the meantime, the investigators asked various authorities, including the FSB in Ingushetia and the Ministry of the Interior to provide them with information about the special operation in Nazran, the alleged detention of Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov on the premises of local law-enforcement agencies and about the owners of the vehicles with the registration plates noted by Mr B.G. The authorities that responded replied that they had no relevant information. 56.  In August 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned about the incident on 15 August 2003. 57.  On 17 September 2003 the investigators questioned Mr M.T., a witness to Mr Murad Zakriyev\u2019s abduction. His statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. 58.  On 24 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 59.  The Government did not submit any documents concerning the further progress of the investigation. 60.  According to the applicants, they were not regularly informed of the developments in the proceedings. Several times they asked the investigators about the progress of the investigation, but each time the latter replied in general terms that all possible measures to establish the whereabouts of the abducted persons were being taken. 61.  On 17 July 2008 the second applicant applied for access to the investigation file. Her request was granted on 13 November 2008. There is no information about further developments. 62.  The first applicant was the mother of Mr Akhdan (also known as Chingiz) Akhmetkhanov, who was born in 1977. She passed away on 16 August 2014, after the Russian Government had been informed of the case. 63.  The second applicant is the wife of Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov. The third and fourth applicants are his children. 64.  In 2002 the applicants\u2019 family lived in the village of Gekhi, Chechnya. They owned three separate houses with a common garden. The second, third and fourth applicants and Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov lived in the first house, the first applicant resided in the second house and Mr B.A., Akhdan Akhmetkhanov\u2019s nephew, lived in the third house. 65.  Late at night on 3 July 2002 a group of fifteen to twenty men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas, armed with automatic weapons and speaking unaccented Russian, broke into the houses. 66.  Four intruders entered the first house. They forced Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov to the ground and took his documents and his shirt. Then they took him into the garden. 67.  At the same time the first applicant was awakened by two men who walked into her room. They asked her how many sons she had. She replied that she had four sons and confirmed that Akhdan was the youngest. Then she heard the second applicant screaming that Chingiz (Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov) was being taken away. The first applicant attempted to run into the garden, but the men ordered her to stay in the house. 68.  At some point the four applicants were able to walk out of their houses into the garden. They saw the service personnel taking Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov away. Two service personnel remained at the entrance gate. The first applicant attempted to follow the soldiers, but one of the men shot at the ground under her feet, and she had to return to the yard. Then the two remaining serivcemen left the gate and joined the group. 69.  From the yard the applicants saw the service personnel walking away with Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov towards the road to the town of Urus\u2011Martan. Twenty minutes later the applicants heard the noise of a vehicle which they believed to be an APC. On their way the abductors drove freely through the military checkpoint which blocked the road from Gekhi to Urus-Martan. 70.  The applicants submitted a statement by their neighbours Mr M.T and Mr V.I., who confirmed the account of the events as described above. 71.  It appears that on the same night another village resident, Mr M.I., was abducted under similar circumstances. 72.  On 4 July 2002 the applicants learned that the night before a group of armed soldiers had rushed into the house of the Malsagov family, their neighbours. The service personnel had asked one of the family members, Ramzan Malsagov, if his name had been Chingiz. He had answered in the negative and stated that Chingiz had lived nearby. Then the military had left. Malsagov\u2019s had dog started barking, and a serviceman had shot it. Ramzan Malsagov collected a cartridge case left by the service personnel after the shooting and gave it to the first applicant. 73.  On 4 July 2002 the applicants applied to various domestic authorities, including the Urus-Martan District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the Chechen Republic (\u201cthe Urus\u2011Martan ROVD\u201d) asking for assistance in the search for Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov. The applicants\u2019 requests remained unanswered for about one week. 74.  A week after Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov\u2019s abduction, local police officers questioned the first and the second applicants. The first applicant showed the cartridge case to them, but they did not take it. Owing to her illiteracy she was unable to write an application to accept the cartridge case as evidence. At some point later she lost it. 75.  On 22 July 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 61103 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in the proceedings. 76.  On the same day the investigators questioned her. She described the circumstances of the abductions as she did in her submission to the Court. 77.  On 24 July 2002 the three applicants\u2019 neighbours, who had witnessed the abduction, were questioned by the investigators. Their statements were consistent with those of the applicants. 78.  On 14 August 2002 the investigation into Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov\u2019s abduction was joined with the investigation into the abduction of Mr M.I. 79.  In the meantime, the investigators unsuccessfully contacted various law-enforcement authorities to establish Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov\u2019s whereabouts. 80.  On 4 September 2002 the proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 81.  On 19 December 2002 the first applicant asked a deputy of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her son. On 4 January 2003 her request was forwarded to the investigators. It is not clear if any reply followed. 82.  On 2 February and 5 July 2004 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Ministry of the Interior and the President of Chechnya seeking their assistance in the investigation. Her requests were also forwarded to the investigators. By a letter of 20 August 2004 the Ministry and the President informed the first applicant in general terms that despite the suspension of the proceedings in 2002, they were continuing the search for her son. 83.  On 10 January 2007 the investigation was resumed. 84.  In late January 2007 the investigators questioned the second applicant and her neighbours. All of them stated that Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov had not been a member of an illegal armed group. 85.  Owing to the lack of any tangible results the investigators suspended the proceedings on 10 February 2007. 86.  On 21 April 2008 the above decision was overruled as ill-founded and the proceedings were resumed. Having questioned some of the applicants and their relatives about the events of 3 July 2002, the investigators suspended the proceedings once again on 22 May 2008. 87.  On 10 March 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Four days later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 88.  On 10 April 2010 the proceedings were suspended again. There is no information about further developments. 89.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Magomed Mestoyev, who was born in 1964. The second and third applicants are his sons. 90.  At about 2 p.m. on 6 August 2002 a white GAZelle minivan without registration plates pulled over at the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Khambi-Irzi, Chechnya. Four armed service personnel waited near the vehicle while the other three entered into the house. Speaking unaccented Russian they asked Mr Magomed Mestoyev to show his identity documents. He could not produce the documents, as his passport had been submitted for renewal. Then the service personnel took him away for an identity check. 91.  On 13 August 2002 Mr Magomed Mestoyev was taken by the same service personnel to the outskirts of the village of Khamby-Irzi and then released. 92.  Having returned home, Mr Magomed Mestoyev told the applicants that he had been held in an unacknowledged detention facility on suspicion of illegal activities. He had been detained alone and handcuffed in a damp cage in a dark basement, given only bread and water and had had to sleep on the floor. He had been repeatedly taken to another room for questioning. 93.  On 29 September 2003 a group of forty to fifty service personnel in camouflage uniforms with semi-automatic weapons arrived at the applicants\u2019 house in five or six UAZ vehicles with registration plates covered with dirt. Some of the service personnel were in helmets without balaclavas and of Slavic appearance. The service personnel surrounded the house; several of them broke inside and searched the premises. They checked the residents\u2019 identity documents and then took Mr Magomed Mestoyev away on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed group. The abductors told the head of the local council, Ms N.A., whose office was located across from the applicants\u2019 house, that they were from the Urus\u2011Martan Department for the Fight against Organised Crime (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0411\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u041e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u2013 \u201cthe RUBOP\u201d). 94.  Immediately after the abduction, Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s brother, sister and a neighbour followed the abductors\u2019 vehicles to the premises of the Urus-Martan ROVD. However, the ROVD police officers denied any involvement in Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s arrest. 95.  On the way back home Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s relatives spoke with traffic police officers manning a checkpoint on the motorway to Grozny. Some of them admitted that the UAZ vehicles had gone through their checkpoint on the way to Grozny. 96.  Later Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s relatives went to the FSB office in Grozny and enquired about Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s detention, but to no avail. 97.  Shortly after the incident the applicants and their fellow villagers organised a protest, blocking the Rostov-Baku motorway for three days to protest against Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s abduction. The protest was stopped after the authorities promised that Mr Magomed Mestoyev would be released. 98.  On 12 August 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63058 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) into the events of August 2002. On 30 September 2002 it was closed for lack of evidence of a crime. 99.  On 13 October 2003 the applicants complained to the prosecutor in respect of Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s abduction on 29 September 2003. 100.  On 29 October 2003 the decision to close the criminal case was annulled and the proceedings were resumed. 101.  Several days later (the exact date is illegible), in November 2003, the investigators questioned the head of the local council, Ms N.A., who had witnessed the abduction from her office. She stated that as soon as she had seen the arrest of Mr Magomed Mestoyev, she had left the office and approached the abductors. Having introduced herself she had asked the perpetrators to explain what had been happening. The perpetrators had told her that they \u2013 FSB officers \u2013 had just arrested a leader of an illegal armed group. Ms N.A. had assured them that Mr Magomed Mestoyev had not been a member of an illegal armed group, but they had not believed her. Later she had learned that the abductors had been RUBOP officers and that their commander\u2019s surname had been of a Chechen origin and had started with \u201cA\u201d. 102.  In November 2003 the investigators questioned several neighbours, who confirmed the applicants\u2019 account of the events. The investigators also contacted various law-enforcement bodies to establish Mr Magomed Mestoyev\u2019s whereabouts, but to no avail. 103.  On 10 January 2004 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 104.  Following a request by the first applicant, on 19 October 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court of Chechnya declared Mr Magomed Mestoyev a missing person. 105.  On 17 June 2008 the criminal proceedings were resumed and on 18 July 2008 suspended again. 106.  On 11 August 2009 the applicants complained of an ineffective investigation to the Chechen President and a number of local authorities. On 20 August 2009 the first applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 107.  On 7 September 2009 the first applicant applied for victim status in the criminal proceedings. Three days later the proceedings were resumed and her application was granted. 108.  Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 12 September 2009, 25 January 2010, 12 July 2012, 17 June 2013 and 25 April 2014, and then resumed on 25 December 2009, 29 June 2012, 17 May 2013 and 10 April 2014 respectively. No tangible results had been achieved in the meantime. There is no information about further developments. 109.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Magomed Umarov, who was born in 1984. The first applicant, his father, passed away on 13 December 2015. The fourth applicant, his stepmother, wished to withdraw her application on 24 January 2016. The second and third applicants are Mr Magomed Umarov\u2019s siblings. They maintain their applications. 110.  At about 4 a.m. on 25 May 2005 the first applicant noticed several armed men in camouflage uniforms, helmets and balaclavas climbing over the fence into the courtyard of his house in the village of Duba-Yurt, Chechnya. When he went out the armed men ordered him to put his hands up and searched him. Then the armed men broke into the house, took Mr Magomed Umarov outside and drove him to an unknown destination in a grey UAZ vehicle. 111.  As the first applicant later found out, the abductors had driven from Duba\u2011Yurt through the Uzhniy checkpoint, which had been manned by the Special Police Force, and had arrived at the Russian military base located in the northern outskirts of the village Stariye Atagi. 112.  About one year later, in 2006, the head of a correctional colony in the Kemerovo Region told the applicants that Mr Magomed Umarov had allegedly been detained in his detention facility, but then transported to Chechnya. The applicants have not had any news about their relative since. 113.  On an unspecified date the first applicant contacted the NGO Memorial in Chechnya asking for assistance in the search for her son. 114.  On 17 June 2005 Memorial asked the Chechnya prosecutor to open a criminal case into the events of 25 May 2005. The request was forwarded to the Shali district prosecutor. On 4 August 2005 the latter opened criminal case no. 46092 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 115.  In July 2005, within the framework of pre-investigation inquiry, the investigators questioned Mr Magomed Umarov\u2019s relatives, who had been in the house during the abduction. Their statements were similar to those submitted by the applicants to the Court. They also mentioned that the abductors had taken from their house two mobile phones and a video camera. 116.  On 9 August and 6 September 2005 the first and second applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 117.  In the meantime the investigators contacted military authorities, law-enforcement bodies and detention facilitates to check whether Mr Magomed Umarov had been arrested during a special operation in Duba-Yurt and taken into custody. No positive replies followed. 118.  On 4 October 2005 the proceedings were suspended and then on 15 January 2007 they were resumed. 119.  On 26 February 2007 the Shali District prosecutor opened a separate criminal case under Article 161 of the CC (robbery) into the theft of the applicants\u2019 belongings by the abductors. On the same day it was joined with case no. 46092 and then suspended. 120.  On 14 March 2007 the investigators resumed the proceedings. Having questioned the applicants\u2019 neighbours, who gave hearsay evidence about the abduction, they suspended the proceedings on 15 April 2007. 121.  Five days later, in April 2007, the proceedings were resumed again. On 20 May 2007 the investigation was suspended. 122.  On 17 March 2008 the investigators informed the applicants that criminal case no. 46092 had been transferred to the Chechnya investigations committee for further investigation. 123.  On 8 February 2010 the applicants asked the investigating authority to resume the criminal proceedings and grant them access to the investigation file. 124.  On 13 February 2010 the applicants were allowed access to the documents concerning their participation in the proceedings. The request to resume the investigation was dismissed. 125.  On 24 June 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Several weeks later the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the first applicant. They compared it with a database of DNA from unidentified corpses, but no matches were found. 126.  On 23 July 2010 the first applicant was granted civil-claimant status in the criminal proceedings. The next day the investigation was suspended. There is no information about further developments. 127.  On 8 June 2010 the applicants challenged the investigators\u2019 refusal of 13 February 2010 to resume criminal proceedings before the Shali District Court in Chechnya. 128.  On 25 June 2010 the court left the complaint without consideration because the investigation had been resumed. 129.  On 5 July 2010 the applicants appealed against the decision of 25 June 2010 to the Chechnya Supreme Court, which upheld it on appeal on 1 September 2010. 130.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Umar Ozdamirov, who was born in 1962. The second applicant is his sister. 131.  On 30 July 2002 Russian federal forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweep operation in Grozny. Certain city districts were cordoned off with military vehicles. 132.  At about 2 p.m. on that day (in the documents submitted the date was also stated as 29 July 2002) Mr Umar Ozdamirov was at a bus stop at a crossroads in the centre of Grozny when a group of armed military service personnel in two GAZelle minivans without registration plates forced him into one of the minivans and took him to the premises of a State agency in Grozny. The service personnel were in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms; they spoke unaccented Russian. The abduction was witnessed by several passers\u2011by. 133.  On the same day around eleven people were abducted under similar circumstances in Grozny. 134.  On 12 August 2002 military commanders showed journalists passports of several Chechens who were thought to have been members of illegally armed groups and who had recently been killed. One of those passports belonged to Mr Ozdamirov. 135.   The second applicant denied the possibility of her brother being killed in August 2002 as a member of an illegal armed group (see paragraph 144 below). 136.  On 1 August 2002 the applicants complained to the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case be opened. 137.  On 8 August 2002 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 50116 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 138.  On 3 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 139.  On 8 October 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 140.  On 1 September 2004 the proceedings were resumed. The investigators contacted a number of law-enforcement authorities to establish the whereabouts of Mr Umar Ozdamirov, but to no avail. 141.  On 29 September 2004 the investigators questioned Mr B.V., an eyewitness to the abduction. He said that the abductors had been armed with automatic firearms and had been wearing camouflage uniforms. They had arrived in one white GAZelle minivan, one beige VAZ 2106 car and three camouflaged UAZ vehicles. They had seized Mr Umar Ozdamirov and his acquaintances who had been standing nearby. 142.  On 1 October 2004 the investigation was suspended. Three days later the Second Operative-Search Bureau of the Main Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the South Region (ORB-2) (\u0412\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u042e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443) informed the investigators that on 11 August 2002 at the outskirts of Malye Varandy village the federal military forces had discovered an illegal armed group consisting of five persons. In a skirmish that followed three members of that group, including Mr Umar Ozdamirov had been killed. It appears that the investigators did not make any assessment of that information. 143.  On 30 August 2007 the investigators resumed the proceedings, and a month later suspended them again. 144.  On 27 May 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings and four days later questioned the second applicant. She stated that before the events of 30 July 2002 her brother had submitted his passport to the Ministry of the Interior for renewal and had not received it back. Accordingly, he could not have been the person with the passport shot by military service personnel in August 2002. 145.  On 6 June 2011 the investigators suspended the proceedings once again. There is no information about further developments. 146.  On 6 May 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny regarding the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the proceedings on 30 September 2007 and their failure to take basic investigative steps. 147.  On 27 May 2011 the court dismissed the claim, having found that the investigation had already been resumed. 148.  On 29 June 2011 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 149.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov, who was born in 1970. 150.  At about 5.30 p.m. on 2 October 2004 Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov and an acquaintance of his, Mr Kh.G., were driving on the motorway between the village of Novyye Atagi and the town of Shali, Chechnya, when a group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas stopped their car. Speaking unaccented Russian, the service personnel forced Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov and Mr Kh.G into a UAZ minivan parked nearby and drove off in the direction of Novyye Atagi, where a Russian military base was stationed. Later that day Mr Kh.G. was released and returned home. 151.  It appears that immediately after the abduction of Mr Mayr\u2011Khadzhi Gerikhanov his relatives contacted the commanding officer of the Shali district in Chechnya and asked for his assistance in the search for their missing relative. In late October 2004 they brought a formal complaint of abduction. 152.  In early December 2004 the investigators of the Shali ROVD questioned Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov\u2019s relatives and Mr Kh.G. The latter stated that on 2 October 2004 he had offered Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov a lift home. They had followed a motorway which had been blocked by a UAZ minivan. As soon as they had stopped, a group of five to six armed individuals in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas approached. Speaking unaccented Russian, they had forced Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov into their car and driven off in the direction of Novyye Atagi. 153.  The above witness statement was forwarded to the Shali district prosecutor, which on 24 December 2004 opened criminal case no. 36149 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154.  On 26 December 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 155.  On 11 January 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov\u2019s sister, who stated that the commanding officer of the Shali district had established that Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov\u2019s abductors\u2019 car had had the registration plate A452AX and that it had been seen entering the premises of military regiment no. 70. 156.  Between 22 January and 1 February 2004 the investigators sent a number of requests to various law-enforcement authorities and detention facilities to obtain information about Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov\u2019s alleged arrest and detention. The respondent authorities replied that they did not have any relevant information. 157.  Subsequently the proceedings were suspended on 24 March and 2 July 2005, 15 March 2006, and 17 November 2008; and then resumed on 26 May 2005, 15 February 2006 and 16 October 2008 respectively. 158.  In the meantime, the investigators repeatedly questioned the applicant and Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov\u2019s other relatives and submitted new requests to various civil and military authorities, but no tangible results were achieved. 159.  On 14 April 2009 the applicant asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for her husband. Her request was forwarded to the investigators. There is no information about further developments. 160.  On 14 October 2008 the applicant lodged a claim with the Shali Town Court, seeking to have the decision to suspend the investigation on 15 March 2006 quashed, and an order for the investigation\u2019s resumption. She alleged that the investigating authorities had not conducted the proceeding with the required promptness. 161.  On 17 October 2008 the court dismissed her claim, finding that on 16 October 2008 the investigators had already resumed the criminal proceedings. 162.  The first applicant is the sister of Mr Rizvan Isayev, who was born in 1981, and the aunt of Mr Anzor Isayev, who was born in 1983. The second and third applicants are the brothers of Mr Rizvan Isayev and the uncles of Mr Anzor Isayev. 163.  On 16 March 2003 Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev were taking a bus from Ingushetia to the village of Samashki, Chechnya. At about 2.20 p.m. the bus was stopped at the Kavkaz checkpoint at the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya to check the passengers\u2019 identity. A group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms asked the passengers to show their identity documents. The service personnel spoke unaccented Russian; some of them were wearing balaclavas. Having checked the passports, they forced Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev outside, put them into an UAZ minivan and took them away to an unknown destination. The abduction was seen by numerous witnesses. 164.  The applicants submitted that immediately after the abduction they attempted to search for their relatives on their own. They went in person to various law-enforcement and military agencies asking about their relatives\u2019 whereabouts, but to no avail. On an unspecified date they lodged an official complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, asking him to open an investigation into the abduction. 165.  On 12 June 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 44046 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 166.  Despite a request by the Court, the Government did not submit a copy of the file of the investigation into the Isayevs\u2019 abduction. Instead, they submitted a copy of the case file concerning the abduction of Mr M.Kh., which is irrelevant to the present application. 167.  According to the applicants, the investigation proceeded as follows. 168.  On 2 November 2003 the investigators suspended it for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 169.  On 27 May 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor criticised the above decision and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. 170.  On an unspecified date after the resumption of the proceedings the investigators questioned Ms Kh.Yu. and Ms R.S, two eyewitnesses to the abduction, who had been travelling on the same bus as Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev on 16 March 2003. Their submissions to the investigators were similar to those of the applicants before the Court. Several days later the bus driver, Mr A.E. was also questioned. His statement was consistent with those of Ms Kh.Yu. and Ms R.S. 171.  On 1 November 2004 the proceedings were suspended again. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of that decision. 172.  On 31 January 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings, to grant her civil-claimant status and to allow her access to the investigation file. 173.  The above request was granted in part. The investigators resumed the proceedings on 2 February 2011, on the same day they granted the first applicant victim status and civil-claimant status in the criminal case. Access to the case file was, however, refused. 174.  On 2 February 2011 the first applicant was also questioned about the circumstances of her brother\u2019s and nephew\u2019s abduction. Among other things, she stated that immediately after the abduction she had gone to the Kavkaz checkpoint and spoken with the commanding officer there. The latter said that her relatives had been abducted by officers from the Main Intelligence Directorate (\u0413\u043b\u0430\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0413\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0448\u0442\u0430\u0431\u0430 \u0412\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0451\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0301\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438). After that she had searched in various different ways in Chechnya, but to no avail. 175.  It appears that shortly after that, in February 2011, the proceedings were suspended. 176.  On 23 June 2011 the first applicant again contacted the investigators seeking resumption of the proceedings and access to the case file. Her requests were dismissed. There is no information about further developments. 177.  On 1 April 2011 the first applicant lodged a civil claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction. 178.  On 3 May 2011 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow provisionally deferred the examination of the claim in view of a number of procedural defects. The applicant was given time to remedy the defects. The outcome of the proceedings is unknown. 179.  On 27 June 2011 the first applicant challenged her lack of access to the investigation file before the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia. Her claim was dismissed on 5 July 2011. 180.  On 16 August 2011 the Supreme Court of Ingushetia upheld the above decision on appeal. 181.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Abdula (also spelled as Abdul) Demelkhanov, who was born in 1970. 182.  In the afternoon of 28 March 2004 Mr Abdula Demelkhanov was at the junction of Musorova Street and 8 Marta Street in Grozny, Chechnya, when a group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms arrived in APCs, grabbed him and took him away to an unknown destination. The arrest took place in the presence of several witnesses. 183.  On 28 March 2004 the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov, Ms S.D., informed the authorities \u2013 apparently the Urus-Martan ROVD \u2013 of the disappearance of her brother. She stated that he had left the town of Urus\u2011Martan in his car, but had never arrived at his sister-in-law\u2019s house in Grozny. 184.  The next day the traffic police found a car belonging to Mr Abdula Demelkhanov in Grozny. It was parked in the vicinity of the Department of the Interior offices in Oktyabrskiy district in Grozny (\u201cthe Oktyabrskiy ROVD\u201d). 185.  On 8 April 2004 the investigators from the Urus-Martan ROVD questioned the first applicant and the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov, who confirmed that the latter had been missing since 28 March 2004. Later that day the investigation was transferred to the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, which had to take the decision on the merits of the case. 186.  The next day the applicant complained of the abduction to the Oktyabrskiy District prosecutor in Grozny. It appears that on an unspecified date she and the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov were questioned. 187.  On 17 April and 25 December 2004 the Oktyabrskiy ROVD and the Oktyabrskiy District prosecutor respectively refused to open a criminal case into the abduction. 188.  In the meantime, on 22 April and 9 June 2004 the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, apparently following the applicant\u2019s allegation that her husband had been abducted by State agents, contacted the FSB in Chechnya and the commanding officer of the army in Chechnya to check if Mr Abdula Demelkhanov had been arrested in the course of a special operation. The replies received were in the negative. 189.  On 9 August 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor annulled the decision of 17 April 2004 and opened criminal case no. 42104 under Article 105 of the CC (murder). On the same day the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 42094 into the same events under the same Article of the CC. Eight days later the two cases were joined under no. 42094. 190.  On 16 August 2005 the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 191.  On 9 November 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 192.  On 22 March 2006 the applicant contacted the Chechen President asking him to assist in the search for her husband. Her letter was forwarded to the investigators. 193.  It appears that on 4 May 2006 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned the applicant. She repeated her previous statements and added that her husband had not been a member of any illegal armed groups. Shortly after that the proceedings were suspended again. 194.  Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 17 May 2011, 6 February and 25 May 2012, 9 December 2013, 28 December 2015 and 1 July 2016. It was then suspended on 6 June 2011, 10 February and 22 July 2012, 19 December 2013 and 30 December 2015 respectively. 195.  In the meantime, on 4 June 2011 and 7 February 2012, the investigators questioned two eyewitnesses to the abduction, Ms R.K. and Ms T.D. They submitted that at about 5 p.m. on 28 March 2004 they had been in front of 8 Marta Street in Grozny when an APC had stopped beside Mr Abdula Demelkhanov\u2019s car. A group of five to six service personnel in camouflage uniforms armed with automatic weapons had emerged from the vehicle. Some of them had been wearing balaclavas and had spoken unaccented Russian. The men asked Mr Abdula Demelkhanov to show his identity documents. Then they had pulled him out of the car and forced him into the APC, which had driven off in the direction of Chernorechye village. 196.  On 29 December 2015 the investigators granted victim status to Mr Abdula Demelkhanov\u2019s mother. There is no information about further developments. 197.  On 28 January 2013 the applicant lodged a court claim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the alleged abduction of her husband. 198.  On 12 March 2013 the Urus-Martan Town Court granted the claim and awarded the applicant 1,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 13,200 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 199.  On 28 May 2013 the Chechnya Supreme Court quashed the above decision on appeal and dismissed the claim as unfounded.\n(b)  Proceedings against the investigators 200.  On 22 June 2016 the applicant complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into her husband\u2019s abduction. In particular, she requested that the decision of 30 December 2015 to suspend the investigation be annulled as ill-founded. 201.  On 1 July 2016 the court rejected her claim, finding that the decision to suspend the investigation had already been annulled by the investigating authority.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "6", "9", "8", "3", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants claim to be the owners of the land at issue in the present case. It appears from the documents in the case\u2011file that the applicants along with two other persons own one third undivided shares of part of that property. 6.  By a judicial letter of 15 February 1969 the applicants\u2019 father (PC) was notified with a copy of a declaration by the Governor General whereby it was being declared that six plots of land in Kalafrana and Beng\u0127ajsa, limits of Bir\u017cebbu\u0121a, Malta, were required for a public purpose and thus the Governor General was acquiring the said property by title of full ownership. 7.  A similar letter dated 26 February 1969 was notified to the applicants\u2019 father sometime later. The latter concerned another piece of land consisting of around 22,480 square metres close to the sea (Plot 60 \u2011 hereinafter referred to as Land B). 8.  Sometime later PC was notified with an offer of compensation in the amount of 4,492 Maltese Liras (MTL), approximately 10,464 Euros (EUR) in respect of the six plots of land mentioned above. He refused to accept the amount of compensation. 9.  Subsequently the Commissioner of Land (CoL) started the procedure before the Land Arbitration Board (LAB), in order to transfer the land and establish the amount of compensation to be paid. 10.  A part of the six plots of land were used for the purposes of the Malta Freeport (hereinafter Land A). However, parts of the same six plots were not used for this purpose and Land B remains unused to date. According to the Government they were not left unused but simply not built, as they were used as a buffer zone for security purposes. 11.  In 1997 PC instituted constitutional redress proceedings concerning part of those six plots of land which had been taken but remained unused (Land C). By a final judgment of 28 December 2001, the Constitutional Court found in favour of the applicants and declared the Government\u2019s declaration in respect of that land (which was outside the Freeport zone) as without effect from the date of the first\u2011instance judgment, 9 April 1999. 12.  As a result of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment, the proceedings before the LAB were ceded by the CoL on 8 April 2003. As a result of the CoL\u2019s action, no compensation was ever determined for the taking of the applicants\u2019 remaining land (A and B). 13.  In 2006 PC and his wife instituted constitutional redress proceedings in connection with the part of the six plots of land which was actually used for the purposes of the Freeport (Land A), as well as Land B which had remained unutilised. Invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 6 of the Convention, they asked the court to declare the declaration of the Governor General null, to return the unused parts of the land, to award compensation in respect of the land which had been used, and to redress the violations found. In particular they argued that the land had not been expropriated for a public purpose, but for a commercial purpose given that the CoL had transferred the land to the Malta Freeport Corporation and in 1989 with the introduction of the Freeport Act, the land became part of the Freeport. The Freeport was eventually privatised in 2001 and sold to an international company in 2004. 14.  During these proceedings, on 4 November 2008, a doubt was raised by the Government and the technical expert as to the exact size of Land B, in so far as the site plans (attached to the applicants\u2019 application to the domestic courts) drafted by the architect included an extra area which appeared to be owned by the Government. The Government thus requested the court to determine the confines of the expropriated land, and thereafter the title of the applicants to the land in question. The Government noted that both elements were necessary to define the juridical interest of the applicants. 15.  The parties agreed that they would attempt to find relevant documentation to this effect. Various documentation was subsequently submitted to the court, including purchase contracts in the name of PC, although these were often not accompanied by the relevant plans of the land. According to the conclusions of a technical report drawn up on the matter by a court\u2011appointed architect in June 2009, Land B as shown on the plans which were submitted by the applicants with the application to the Civil Court (First Hall), included a piece of land which PC had already sold to a third party, the remaining parts which were expropriated were the property of the applicants. 16.  By a decree of 30 September 2010 the applicants as heirs of their parents who passed away intervened in the proceedings in their stead. 17.  By a judgment of 2 October 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the Government\u2019s objection as to non\u2011exhaustion of ordinary remedies and found in favour of the applicants in part. It found that there had been a violation of the Convention provisions invoked in connection with Land B which had remained unused in so far as the taking lacked any public interest. It thus declared the Governor declaration in that respect to be null and void. It further ordered the release of that land and the payment of EUR 30,000 in compensation for the years during which the applicants had been denied the use of their land. It however rejected the applicants\u2019 claims in connection with Land A, which it considered had been taken from the applicants in the public interest. 18.  Both the applicants and the defendants appealed. 19.  By a judgment of 30 May 2014 the Constitutional Court upheld the Government\u2019s appeal and rejected that lodged by the applicants. 20.  The Constitutional Court considered that there was no doubt that the Freeport was established in the public interest namely the economic development of the country and therefore the taking of Land A was Convention compatible. As to compensation in respect of Land A, it considered that the applicants had not raised, before the first\u2011instance court, a complaint about a lack of proportionality, and thus they could not raise this matter on appeal. It followed that no compensation was due in that respect. 21.  As to Land B, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the Government had not made any objection in the sense that the applicants were not the owners of the property, nor that proof was required as to ownership of that land. There also appeared to be no doubt that this property formed part of the property referred to in the Governor\u2019s declaration notified to the applicants\u2019 father. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court considered that during the first\u2011instance proceedings, on 4 November 2008, a doubt was raised as to the matter by the Government and the technical expert, which was eventually never resolved before the first\u2011instance court. The latter court had, nevertheless, proceeded to give judgment, instead of allowing the applicants some time to institute a relevant procedure to determine their ownership of the property. However, in such a circumstance the Constitutional Court considered that it could not give a remedy to the applicants in the absence of proof of their ownership. It thus revoked that part of the first\u2011instance judgment which had found a violation and had awarded compensation in respect of Land B.", "references": ["2", "0", "5", "7", "6", "3", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant company has its registered office in Essingen, Germany. 5.  From the 1990s onwards the applicant company regularly purchased scrap metal from A. Safaryan and Associates LLC, a limited liability company registered in Armenia (\u201cthe LLC\u201d). 6.  On 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 the applicant company and KBKS (another German company owned by the applicant company) concluded three contracts with the LLC, under which KBKS and the applicant company were to make advance payments to the LLC in return for scrap metal. The contract of 2 April 2003 contained the following dispute resolution clause:\n\u201c... 7.  Arbitration 7.1  The parties agree that any disputes and differences arising out of the performance of this contract shall be resolved through negotiations in order to reach a mutually beneficial resolution. 7.2  If it is not possible to settle such disputes amicably, these matters shall, with the exception of those falling within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, be referred to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent.\n...\u201d 8.  On 8 April 2002 KBKS and the applicant company concluded an assignment agreement whereby KBKS transferred all its contractual rights, including those towards the LLC, to the applicant company. 9.  On 8 November 2002 the applicant company provided the LLC with a loan in the amount of 100,000 euros (EUR), which was due to be repaid by 31 January 2003. The purpose of the loan was to assist the LLC in paying off a bank loan. It appears that it was not paid back to the applicant company. 10.  It further appears that the LLC failed to meet its contractual obligations vis-\u00e0-vis the applicant company, in that it supplied less scrap metal than the advance payments that it had already received. 11.  On 28 October 2005 representatives of the applicant company and the LLC made a calculation of their liabilities as at that date and it was revealed that the LLC owed 1,213,824 US dollars (USD) to the applicant company. As a result of negotiations, the applicant company agreed to provide debt relief in the amount of USD 613,824 on the condition that the LLC paid off the rest of the debt, namely USD 600,000, in accordance with a debt repayment schedule which was set up in a separate agreement signed on the same day by the directors of both companies. According to this agreement, the LLC undertook to repay the debt in five instalments, with the first payment due by 15 December 2005. If the LLC failed to meet its obligations as set out in the repayment schedule, it would be immediately liable to repay the entire debt, and any disputes with regard to repayment would be resolved through litigation. 12.  On the same day the parties concluded another agreement, setting out a repayment schedule in respect of the loan of EUR 100,000 and arrears in the amount of EUR 10,000. It also stated that an additional 6% would be payable in the event of failure to respect the repayment schedule. 13.  It appears that the LLC missed the required payments. In subsequent correspondence, the director of the LLC acknowledged the debt but deferred its repayment, each time providing different reasons. 14.  On 15 January 2007 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Commercial Court against the LLC, seeking to recover USD 10,000 from the initial debt of USD 1,213,824. 15.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant company amended its initial claim, seeking to recover a total of USD 1,516,442 and EUR 116,600 from the LLC, including the principal debt, the loan and interest on both. It also requested a waiver of the court fees. 16.  On 4 October 2007 the LLC filed a counterclaim, contesting the applicant company\u2019s claims. The director of the LLC requested the annulment of the two documents dated 28 October 2005, arguing that, having no command of German, he had been unaware of their content and had signed them as a result of fraud. 17.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant filed a response to the counterclaim, arguing, inter alia, that the director of the LLC had been personally present during the negotiations in Germany when a recalculation of liabilities between the companies had been carried out. Since the director of the LLC was fluent in Russian, the negotiations had been conducted in Russian and there had also been a copy in Russian of the documents signed. Moreover, the fact that the director of the LLC had been fully aware of the content of the documents he had signed of his own free will was confirmed by his numerous letters, where he had provided justification for having failed to transfer the amounts due in a timely manner. 18.  On 7 November 2007 the LLC requested the Commercial Court to leave the applicant company\u2019s claim unexamined on the grounds that the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 contained a dispute resolution clause whereby disputes concerning their performance would be resolved by the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent. The LLC therefore claimed that, it being the respondent, resolution of the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia (\u201cthe Arbitration Tribunal\u201d). 19.  On 16 November 2007 the Commercial Court granted the request and decided to leave the applicant company\u2019s claim and the counterclaim lodged by the LLC unexamined. In doing so, it referred to Article 103 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and found that the resolution of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal. It found that, as the contract of 2 April 2003 contained an arbitration clause, the agreement of 28 October 2005 was also subject to arbitration. The decision was amenable to appeal before a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court within three days of receipt by the party. 20.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant company lodged a complaint concerning the decision to leave the claim and counterclaim unexamined. It argued, inter alia, that the agreements signed on 28 October 2005, which had succeeded the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003, provided that disputes concerning the failure of the LLC to respect the repayment schedules set out in them would be determined by the courts. It further argued that, subsequent to the agreements of 28 October 2005, no other arrangements concerning dispute resolution had been concluded between the parties. Relying on section 8(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act, the applicant company also argued that, contrary to its requirements, the court had decided to leave the claim unexamined, even though the LLC had submitted the relevant request several months after the litigation had started and had already made its submissions on the merits of the claim. Lastly, the applicant company argued that its claim in the part relating to the recovery of the amount of the loan of EUR 100,000 was not connected in any way to the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003. However, the court had decided that the entirety of its claims were to be determined through arbitration. 21.  On 10 December 2007 a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court rejected the complaint submitted by the applicant company. The decision stated that, inter alia, the claims concerning the debt and the loan were interconnected and stemmed from the commercial relationships between the parties based on the contract for the supply of scrap metal. 22.  On 23 July 2008 the applicant company\u2019s representative sent a request for information to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal, asking whether the arbitration clause contained in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for the tribunal to accept the claim for examination, and whether the decisions of the Commercial Court to leave the claim unexamined on the grounds that the determination of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of a commercial arbitration court provided sufficient grounds for accepting the claim. Translations into Armenian of extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause and copies of the two decisions of the Commercial Court were enclosed with the letter. 23.  On 1 August 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal replied that the question of whether the arbitration clause stipulated in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for it to accept the claim for examination could only be determined once the claim had been lodged. 24.  At the same time, the registrar of the Arbitration Tribunal submitted to the representative of the applicant company a draft arbitration agreement to be concluded with the LLC. According to the applicant company, its representative told the registrar that the conclusion with the LLC of this type of new agreement was at that point impossible and unreasonable, since the Commercial Court had already found that the arbitration clause contained in the contracts was sufficient to start arbitration proceedings. 25.  On 17 September 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Arbitration Tribunal, seeking to recover EUR 116,600, the amount of the loan and interest. A copy of the promissory note signed on 8 November 2002 on providing a loan to the LLC in the amount of EUR 100,000, together with other documents, was attached to the claim. In addition, it was stated in the claim that the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause had already been submitted to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal with the letter of 23 July 2008. 26.  On 7 October 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal informed the applicant company that its request to start arbitration proceedings would not be granted. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n\u201c... The promissory note of 8 November 2002 and the agreement of 28 October 2005, on which your claim was based, do not contain an arbitration clause and, moreover, the parties have not concluded any agreement to submit the disputes arising out of the performance of the above-mentioned promissory note and the agreement to the permanent arbitration institution of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia for determination. Consequently, in the absence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, the [Arbitration Tribunal] cannot start arbitration proceedings.\u201d 27.  In view of the fact that the Commercial Court had been abolished by that time, on 17 October 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Yerevan Civil Court, seeking to recover EUR 116,600 from the LLC, representing the amount of the loan and interest. It submitted that the Arbitration Tribunal had refused to accept the claim for examination even though the Commercial Court had already found that the determination of the dispute fell within the tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the applicant company\u2019s right of access to a court had been violated. The applicant company also applied for a freezing injunction in respect of the respondent\u2019s assets in the amount of the claim. 28.  On 12 November 2008 the Yerevan Civil Court accepted the applicant company\u2019s claim for examination and scheduled a preparatory hearing. On the same day it allowed the applicant company\u2019s interlocutory application for a freezing injunction in respect of the property of the LLC in the amount of the claim. 29.  On 27 February 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court transferred the case to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) based on territorial jurisdiction, in view of the fact that on 1 March 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court would be abolished. 30.  On 13 March 2009 the District Court accepted the case for examination. 31.  On 12 June 2009 the LLC, relying on the decision of the Commercial Court of 16 November 2007, requested the District Court to leave the applicant company\u2019s claim unexamined. It submitted, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to substantiate that the grounds for leaving its claim unexamined no longer existed. 32.  The applicant company contested the arguments put forward by the LLC, arguing that the possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal no longer existed since, by a letter of 7 October 2008, examination of the claim had been refused. 33.  On 16 June 2009 the District Court decided to leave the claim lodged by the applicant company unexamined, finding that the refusal to start arbitration proceedings stated in the letter of 7 October 2008 did not substantiate the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The District Court further referred to the previous findings of the Commercial Court to conclude that the claim should be left unexamined. 34.  On 25 June 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal. It argued, in particular, that the Arbitration Tribunal had been provided with the decisions of the Commercial Court and the contracts concluded between the parties. Having examined them, it had concluded that it had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute. In such circumstances, the rationale for considering that the dispute should be determined by the tribunal was incomprehensible. 35.  In its reply to the applicant company\u2019s appeal, the LLC submitted, inter alia, that the applicant company had failed to provide the Arbitration Tribunal with copies of the relevant extracts of the contracts that contained the arbitration clause and the relevant decisions of the Commercial Court. Therefore, the tribunal had refused to accept the claim. 36.  On 21 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 16 June 2009. In doing so, it stated, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause, as a result of which its claim had not been accepted. 37.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It argued, in particular, that the Civil Court of Appeal had upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, despite the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The applicant company further pointed out that the argument that it had failed to submit the relevant extracts of the contracts to the tribunal was groundless since, in its claim lodged with that institution, it had expressly mentioned that copies of the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts in question had already been submitted with the letter of 23 July 2008. 38.  On 23 September 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible. In doing so, it stated the following:\n\u201c... As for the letter of the President of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of 7 October 2008 concerning non-acceptance of the claim lodged by [the applicant company], it was based on the grounds that [the applicant company] had not submitted the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy, as required by the Commercial Arbitration Act and [the provisions contained therein], in the absence of which arbitration proceedings could not be started.\nThe Court of Cassation finds that, taking into account the failure to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy ... and non-examination of [the applicant company\u2019s] claim, [the applicant company] is not deprived of judicial protection in accordance with the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ...\u201d", "references": ["0", "5", "7", "4", "6", "2", "8", "1", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Brighton. 6.  The applicant has been active in the peace movement since 1948 and has been a regular attender at public demonstrations since then. 7.  In 2005 the applicant began participating in demonstrations organised by Smash EDO. The object of Smash EDO was to close down the activities in the United Kingdom of EDO MBM Technology Ltd, a United States-owned company which manufactured weapons and weapon components and had a factory in Brighton. Serious disorder and criminality were features of a number of Smash EDO protests. Smash EDO protests therefore attracted a substantial policing presence. 8.  The applicant was twice arrested at Smash EDO demonstrations for obstructing the public highway but has never been convicted of any offence. 9.  In March 2010 the applicant made a subject access request to the police under section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d, below) for information relating to him. Sixty\u2011six entries from nominal records for other individuals and information reports which incidentally mentioned him, concerning incidents between March 2005 and October 2009, were disclosed to him. Those records were held on a police database known as the \u201cExtremism database\u201d, which at the relevant time was under the responsibility of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit of the police (NPOIU). 10.  Most of the records related to demonstrations at the office of EDO MBM Technology Ltd but thirteen entries related to other demonstrations. They included, for example, the recording of his attendance at the Trades Union Congress (\u201cTUC\u201d) Conference in Brighton in September 2006; at a demonstration at the Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth in September 2007; at a pro-Gaza demonstration in Brighton in January 2009 and at a demonstration against \u201cNew Labour\u201d organised by a number of trade unions in September 2009. In the great majority of cases, the information recorded about Mr Catt was his name, presence, date of birth and address. In some cases his appearance was also described. A photograph of the applicant taken at a demonstration in September 2007 was also disclosed to him in response to his subject access request. 11.  In August 2010 the applicant asked the Association of Chief Police Officers (\u201cACPO\u201d) to delete entries from nominal records and information reports which mentioned him. In September 2010 ACPO declined to do so. They did not give reasons. 12.  On 17 November 2010 the applicant issued proceedings against ACPO for judicial review of the refusal to delete the data. He contended that the retention of his data was not \u201cnecessary\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. Permission to seek judicial review was granted in March 2011 (see section B, below). 13.  In January 2012, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary published a report on undercover police operations designed to obtain intelligence about protest movements (see paragraphs 50 to 53 below). The report concluded that information was being unnecessarily retained in police records. Although the report was concerned with covertly obtained intelligence, it also led to an extensive review of the database covering overtly obtained intelligence and resulted in the deletion of a large number of nominal records and information reports. After that deletion process, the number of reports which mentioned the applicant was apparently reduced to two. 14.  Following the judicial review proceedings, the applicant wrote to the police to make a further subject access request. The police replied on 12 November 2015 stating:\n\u201c... the records are held to help UK policing manage a future risk of crime \u2013 of which [you] could be the victim. The records themselves should not and will not be disclosed [to you] for what are obvious reasons. An intelligence database loses all efficacy if it is not kept confidential.\u201d 15.  In answer to a question asked by the Court when communicating the case the Government indicated that they had discovered four additional records mentioning the applicant in the database. They clarified that as a result, at the time the case was determined by the domestic courts there had in fact been six rather than two records in the database mentioning the applicant. 16.  Of the four additional records, two concerned references to the domestic legal proceedings by third parties. The Government indicated in their submissions that one of those has since been deleted. The other two referred to the applicant. One was dated 15 April 2011 and detailed the applicant\u2019s presence at five separate events, not organised by Smash EDO, where there was a significant police operation and arrests occurred. The other was dated 19 July 2011 and related primarily to a third party but mentions the applicant\u2019s attendance at an event which was not organised by Smash EDO. There is no indication of whether there was any police presence or arrests at that event. 17.  The Government stated that the police could not provide any explanation of why the reports were not disclosed previously. However, they were investigating the matter. They indicated that they had informed the Supreme Court and the applicant of the additional reports. 18.  In a witness statement dated 6 June 2011 prepared in the context of the proceedings introduced by the applicant before the High Court, the then National Coordinator explained the functions of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the position as regards retention of data relating to the applicant. In his witness statement, the National Coordinator clarified that the material which had been disclosed to the applicant following his subject access request of March 2010 was not all the material held in respect of the applicant: a considerable amount of further information had not been disclosed on the grounds that disclosure would prejudice the investigation or detection of crime and that the material was thus exempt from disclosure under section 29 of the Data Protection Act (see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d, below). 19.  After explaining the nature of his activities and the various units supervised by him, the National Coordinator continued:\n\u201c16.  The term \u2018domestic extremism\u2019 is not prescribed by law. It is a descriptor generally used by the police service and partners to describe the activity of individuals or groups who carry out criminal acts of direct action to further their protest campaigns, outside the democratic process.\u201d 20.  He then provided examples of how intelligence reports had assisted in policing a Smash EDO protest in 2010 and confirmed that, in his view, the applicant\u2019s data were being processed lawfully and fairly. 21.  A hearing in the judicial review proceedings took place on 9 February 2012. With the agreement of the parties, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was joined as a defendant. The High Court handed down its judgment on 30 May 2012. The court considered that Article 8 was not engaged in the case and that, even if it were, the interference was justified under Article 8 \u00a7 2. The applicant was granted permission to appeal by the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2012. 22.  Following a two day hearing during which legal representatives for the applicant, an NGO, the NHRI for England and Wales, ACPO and the Secretary of State presented their arguments, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal in a judgment of 14 March 2014. It found that the inclusion of the applicant\u2019s personal data in the database constituted an interference with his Article 8 rights which was not justified. The court said that it did not doubt the importance to modern policing of detailed intelligence gathering and that it accepted the need for caution before overriding the judgment of the police about what information was likely to assist them in their task. It noted that, for present purposes, that task was to obtain a better understanding of how Smash EDO was organised in order to be able to forecast the place and nature of its next protest and to anticipate the number of people likely to attend and the tactics they were likely to adopt. 23.  The court said that it was \u201cnot easy to understand how the information currently held on Mr Catt can provide any assistance in relation to any of those matters\u201d. It referred to the comment in the statement of the National Coordinator that it was valuable to have information about the applicant\u2019s attendance at protests because he associated with those who had a propensity to violence and crime. However, it considered that the statement did not explain why that was so, given that the applicant had been attending similar protests for many years without it being suggested that he had indulged in criminal activity or actively encouraged those that did. The court continued:\n\u201c44. ... The systematic collection, processing and retention on a searchable database of personal information, even of a relatively routine kind, involves a significant interference with the right to respect for private life. It can be justified by showing that it serves the public interest in a sufficiently important way, but in this case the respondent has not in our view shown that the value of the information is sufficient to justify its continued retention. It is striking that [the National Coordinator] does not say that the information held on Mr Catt over many years has in fact been of any assistance to the police at all. The Divisional Court considered that it was not practically possible to weed out from time to time information held on particular individuals. There is, however, no evidence to support this conclusion and we are not satisfied that it is correct. It should not be overlooked that the burden of proving that the interference with Mr Catt\u2019s article 8 rights is justified rests on the respondent. 45.  That leaves the question whether the interference with Mr Catt\u2019s rights is in accordance with the law. This is very much a live issue given the relatively vague nature of some aspects of the regime contained in the MoPI Code and Guidance and the criticisms voiced by the Divisional Court in C (paragraph [54]) [see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d, below] and by the Strasbourg court in M.M. v. the United Kingdom (2012) (Application no. 24029/07). However, in the light of the conclusion to which we have come on the question of proportionality it is unnecessary for us to reach a final decision on the point.\u201d 24.  The Supreme Court granted the Commissioner and ACPO leave to appeal. Following a three day hearing during which legal representatives for the applicant, an NGO, the NHRI for England and Wales, ACPO and the Secretary of State submitted arguments, it upheld the appeal in a judgment of 4 March 2015 by a majority of four justices to one. All five justices agreed that Article 8 was applicable and that retention of the data amounted to an interference with the applicant\u2019s rights under that article. 25.  Lord Sumption delivered the leading opinion for the majority. He set out the applicable legal framework for collection and retention of data. After reviewing the requirements for \u201clawfulness\u201d under Article 8 of the Convention, by reference to S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2008, he concluded that the interference was in accordance with the law. He noted that the Data Protection Act laid down principles that were germane and directly applicable to police information and contained a framework for their enforcement. These principles were supplemented by a statutory Code of Practice and administrative Guidance (see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d, below), compliance with which was mandatory. While, inevitably, there were discretionary elements in the scheme, their ambit was limited. Lord Sumption considered the applicant\u2019s argument that the Code of Practice and the Guidance did not enable him to know precisely what data would be obtained and stored or for how long to be unrealistic. He explained that the infinite variety of situations in which issues of compliance might arise and the inevitable element of judgment involved in assessing them made complete codification impossible. However, he noted, any person who thought that the police held personal information about him could seek access to it under section 7 of the Data Protection Act and, if he objected to its retention or use, could bring the matter before the Information Commissioner. 26.  Lord Sumption then turned to consider the proportionality of the interference. He observed that political protest was a basic right recognised by the common law and protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. He summarised the facts of the applicant\u2019s case, including the nature of Smash EDO\u2019s activities and the applicant\u2019s attendance at public demonstrations, and the framework for police collection and retention of data in this context. He concluded that the retention of information, including some which related to persons such as the applicant against whom no criminality was alleged, was justified. The starting point, in his view, was the nature and extent of the invasion of privacy involved in the retention of information of this kind, which he described as minor. While the information stored was personal information because it related to individuals, it was in no sense intimate or sensitive information. Rather, it was information about the overt activities in public places of individuals whose main object in attending the events in question was to draw public attention to their support for a cause. Although the collation of the information in the form in which it appeared in police records was not publicly available, the primary facts recorded were and always had been in the public domain; no intrusive procedures had been used to discover and record them. 27.  He then addressed the justification for retaining the personal data for someone who has a clean record and for whom violent criminality must be a very remote prospect indeed. Referring back to the National Coordinator\u2019s statement (see paragraphs 18 to 20), he identified three reasons for the need to retain such data: (1) to enable the police to make a more informed assessment of the risks and threats to public order; (2) to investigate criminal offences where there have been any, and to identify potential witnesses and victims; (3) to study the leadership, organisation, tactics and methods of protest groups which have been persistently associated with violence. He also underlined some basic facts about intelligence-gathering commenting:\n\u201c31 ... Most intelligence is necessarily acquired in the first instance indiscriminately. Its value can only be judged in hindsight, as subsequent analysis for particular purposes discloses a relevant pattern ... The most that can be done is to assess whether the value of the material is proportionate to the gravity of the threat to the public ...\u201d 28.  Lord Sumption further considered that the retention in a nominal record or information report of information about third persons such as the applicant did not carry any stigma of suspicion or guilt. It did not imply that all those mentioned as participating in events such as Smash EDO protests were being characterised as extremists. It was further noteworthy that the material was not usable or disclosable for any purpose other than police purposes, except as a result of an access request by the subject under the Data Protection Act. It was not used for political purposes or for any kind of victimisation of dissidents and was not available to potential employers. The material was also periodically reviewed for retention or deletion according to rational and proportionate criteria based on an assessment of danger to the public and value for policing purposes. 29.  In conclusion, Lord Sumption was of the view that sufficient safeguards existed to ensure that personal information was not retained for longer than required for the purpose of maintaining public order and preventing or detecting crime, and that disclosure to third parties was properly restricted. 30.  Lady Hale concurred with Lord Sumption but indicated:\n\u201c51. ... it would be more objectionable if the police were to retain a nominal record collecting together all the information that they currently hold about him. Such dossiers require particular justification, not least because of their potentially chilling effect upon the right to engage in peaceful public protest. Mr Catt may be a regular attender at demonstrations, some of which are organised by a group which resorts to extreme tactics, but he himself has not been involved in criminal activity at those or any other demonstrations, nor is he likely to be in the future. Had the police kept a nominal record about him, therefore, I would have been inclined to agree with Lord Toulson that it could not be justified.\u201d 31.  Lord Toulson, dissenting, agreed that the collection and retention of the data by the police was in accordance with the law. However, he considered that retention of the data was disproportionate. He explained that he had no difficulty in accepting in general terms the explanation given in the National Coordinator\u2019s statement, but that there had to be limits, particularly in the case of a person who had never been accused of violence and had been assessed not to be a threat. The statement did not explain why it was thought necessary to maintain for many years after the event information on someone whom the police had concluded, as they had in July 2010, was not known to have acted violently and did not appear to be involved in the coordination of the relevant events. Nor did it explain why it was thought necessary and proportionate to keep details of the applicant\u2019s attendance at other political protest events such as the Labour Party conference and the TUC conference. 32.  He agreed with the Court of Appeal that the Commissioner had not shown that the value of the information relating to the applicant was sufficient to justify its continued retention. As to the suggestion that it would place too great a burden on the police to undertake frequent reviews, Lord Toulson pointed out that there was no evidence from the police that this would be over-burdensome. On the contrary, he said, the thrust of the evidence was that they did carry out regular reviews so there was nothing to indicate that deleting their historic records of the applicant\u2019s attendances at protest events would create any real burden. 33.  Lord Toulson accepted that, when investigating serious organised crime, it was necessary for the police to be able to collate and keep records of the details of their investigations. However, he did not agree that there was any risk of that being hampered by upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal in the applicant\u2019s case. While the court should be slow to disagree with the evaluation of the potential usefulness of evidence by the police if a clear reason for it had been advanced, on the facts of this case Lord Toulson could not see what value they had identified by keeping indefinitely a record of the applicant\u2019s attendances at events where he had done no more than exercise his democratic right of peaceful protest. He concluded:\n\u201c69.  One might question why it really matters, if there is no risk of the police making inappropriate disclosure of the information to others. It matters because in modern society the state has very extensive powers of keeping records on its citizens. If a citizen\u2019s activities are lawful, they should be free from the state keeping a record of them unless, and then only for as long as, such a record really needs to be kept in the public interest.\u201d", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "0", "3", "5", "1", "8", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Buseck. 6.  In 2003, the applicant purchased one of four residential property units in a shared complex, into which she moved with her family. 7.  In January 2005, the applicant and the owners of the other three properties instigated independent evidentiary proceedings before the Regional Court against the property developers on the basis of alleged defects in the residential property units, in particular the water drainage system. On 25 February 2005 the court ordered an expert report from H.K., an expert in residential buildings; H.K. wrote a report dated 16 July 2005 and presented his findings to the court, most recently in a hearing held on 30 March 2007. 8.  On 23 June 2007 the applicant instigated proceedings against the property developer seeking compensation for alleged defects in her residential unit \u2013 namely, defects in the drainage system, together with defects in other parts of the building which had led to damp and mold on the walls. She sought compensation of roughly 17,000 Euros (EUR). 9.  Over the following months, after the applicant had made an advance payment on the court fees, the Regional Court forwarded to the other parties to the proceedings the applicant\u2019s statement of claim and the defendants\u2019 statement of defence; extended the deadline for the applicant to make further submissions; forwarded the submissions of the applicant\u2019s neighbours (in which they (i) declared their wish to join the proceedings by way of intervention and (ii) sought EUR 8,000 in damages); held an oral hearing, in which it discussed the factual and legal situation and suggested a friendly settlement; waited for the applicant to propose the basis for a friendly settlement agreement; and forwarded further submissions made by the parties. 10.  On 17 March 2008 after the applicant\u2019s final rejection of a friendly\u2011settlement proposal, the Regional Court ordered an expert opinion from H.K., who had already been involved in the independent evidentiary proceedings. In the following weeks, the applicant complained about the ordering of the expert opinion and challenged H.K.\u2019s impartiality. On 26 June 2008 after obtaining further submissions from the parties and the interveners, the Regional Court once again suggested a friendly settlement. On the following day, it sent the case file to H.K. The parties several times exchanged submissions and suggestions regarding the basis for a friendly settlement. On 14 July 2008 H.K. invited the parties to participate in an onsite visit, which took place on 28 August 2008. Subsequently, H.K. informed the parties that another onsite visit was necessary; this finally took place on 22 October 2008. 11.  On 5 January 2009 the Regional Court requested H.K. for a progress report; H.K. replied to that request by stating that he needed to undergo urgent medical surgery, which he assumed would result in a delay of at least eight weeks. On 11 February 2009 the wife of H.K. informed the Regional Court that there would be a further delay of at least six months, due to the illness of her husband. The Regional Court informed the parties of this and invited them to submit comments. The applicant requested a replacement for H.K. 12.  On 23 February 2009 the Regional Court dismissed H.K. and ordered the return of the case file. On 31 March 2009, H.K. returned the file. On 12 May 2009 the Regional Court asked the Chamber of Commerce to suggest potential replacement experts. On 26 May 2009 the Chamber of Commerce suggested two experts, one of whom was G.K. On the same day, the Regional Court forwarded those suggestions to the parties. On 15 June 2009 the defendants rejected both suggestions. On 17 June 2009 the applicant made further submissions and applied for permission to inspect the case file. On 2 July 2009 the applicant\u2019s representative returned the file to the court. On 7 July 2009 the Regional Court asked for further advance payments on the court fees, which the applicant paid on 3 August 2009. On 7 August 2009 the Regional Court made a suggestion regarding how to proceed with regard to the expert. On 20 August 2009 the applicant agreed. On the same day, the Regional Court forwarded to the defendant the applicant\u2019s statement that he agreed to the proposed expert. 13.  On 25 September 2009 the Regional Court amended the decision to order an expert opinion (see paragraph 10 above) and ordered an expert opinion from G.K. (instead of H.K.). The following four months were dominated by a dispute between G.K., the Regional Court and the applicant about the amount due in further advance payments of court fees; during that dispute various submissions and objections were made. The dispute lasted until the middle of January 2010. 14.  On 28 May 2010 the Regional Court asked G.K. for a progress report. On 26 June 2010 G.K.\u2019s office informed the Regional Court that the progress report would only be submitted in the twenty-eighth calendar week (12-18 July 2010). On 10 August 2010 the Regional Court again asked G.K. for a progress report. On 31 August 2010 G.K. informed the Regional Court that he was overloaded with work and suggested that the court order the opinion from H.K. (the original expert), to which the parties to the proceedings agreed. 15.  On 21 September 2010 the Regional Court ordered the opinion from H.K. 16.  On 30 September 2010, H.K. invited the parties to participate in another onsite visit, which was scheduled for 28 October 2010. However, the visit had to be rescheduled several times \u2013 once because the defendants were unable to attend and three times because the applicant was unable to attend; eventually the visit took place on 17 January 2011. On 4 May 2011, the applicant complained about the length of time it was taking for the expert to prepare his opinion. 17.  On 9 May 2011, the Regional Court asked H.K. for a progress report. On 18 May 2011, H.K. informed the Court that the opinion would be provided in the twenty-second calendar week (30 May-5 June 2011). On 5 August 2011, H.K. provided his opinion in written form. 18.  On 8 August 2011 the Regional Court forwarded the expert opinion to the parties and asked them to submit comments within five weeks. On 30 August 2011 the applicant lodged an objection to the method of calculating the fee for the expert opinion and applied for an extension of the deadline in order to be able to prepare substantial submissions in the light of the content of the expert opinion. On 10 October 2010 the applicant submitted substantial reasoning for her objection and made substantial submissions in the light of the expert opinion. The Regional Court also invited H.K. to submit comments. 19.  On 5 December 2011 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection regarding the method of calculating the fee for the expert opinion. On 20 December 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision and, on 24 January 2012, submitted arguments supporting her appeal. On 12 March 2012 the Court of Appeal ruled that the fee for the expert opinion had been calculated wrongly and annulled the decision setting out that fee. 20.  On 11 May 2012 the Regional Court asked H.K. for his views on the comments of the parties regarding his expert opinion. On 24 May 2012 H.K.\u2019s wife informed the Regional Court that he had fallen ill, again, and that it was unclear when he would recover. On 29 May 2012 the Regional Court forwarded that information to the parties and invited them to submit comments. On 22 June 2012 the applicant applied for an extension of the deadline for the submission of comments. On 3 July 2012 the applicant applied to be allowed to inspect the case file. 21.  On 24 July 2012 the Regional Court scheduled an oral hearing for 12 October 2012. 22.  On 12 October 2012 the oral hearing took place and the parties agreed on a friendly settlement. 23.  On 23 July 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Court of Appeal in which she sought compensation, alleging that the civil proceedings had been excessively lengthy. 24.  On 30 January 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the complaint as unfounded. It ruled \u2013 explicitly referring to section 198 of the Courts Constitution Act (see \u00a7 18 below), as well as Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and judgments of the Court \u2013 that the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been unreasonably long. 25.  The Court of Appeal ruled that any assessment of the reasonableness of the length of proceedings had to start with the principle that a court must conduct proceedings expeditiously. That court had to make use of all available options in order to expedite the proceedings in question. A lengthening of the proceedings by the court would not give rise to a compensation claim if it had been based on a reasonable legal position and had taken place in accordance with the rules of procedure. It had to be established whether or not there had been a delay which, at least in principle, constituted grounds for a claim for compensation; different delays at different stages of the proceedings had to be added together and calculated as one single figure. Lastly, an overall assessment of whether the length of proceedings had been reasonable had to be carried out, with regard being paid to the circumstances of the case \u2013 in particular the complexity and difficulty of the proceedings. 26.  In application of these principles, the Court of Appeal assessed all phases of the proceedings and reasoned that the Regional Court had generally expedited the proceedings sufficiently and that it had caused a delay only in the summer of 2010 because it had failed to sufficiently instruct the expert at the time in question and had failed to undertake the measures necessary to ensure that the expert submitted his opinion in good time. Had the court done so, the expert\u2019s excessive workload would have become apparent and a different expert could have been appointed earlier. Furthermore, it had to be taken into account that the proceedings had been complex; this had in particular been due to the complexity of the relevant facts and the difficulty in gathering evidence. Moreover, there had been three intervening parties on the side of the applicant, which had contributed substantially to the length of the proceedings. In addition, the applicant had repeatedly lodged applications, objections and appeals throughout the proceedings, and this had also substantially contributed to the length of the proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeal took into account that the applicant herself attributed substantial importance to the proceedings, for both financial and health reasons. Nevertheless, viewed overall, the length of the proceedings did not appear unreasonably long. 27.  On 5 December 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant on points of law. It found the judgment of 30 January 2013 to be in line with section 198 of the Courts Constitution Act, as well as with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 28.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint; on 3 February 2016, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the constitutional complaint for adjudication, without giving any reasons for its decision (2 BvR 157/14).", "references": ["8", "0", "2", "9", "6", "4", "7", "5", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant is the widow and the second applicant is the son of the late John Demjanjuk. They were born in 1925 and 1965, respectively, and live in Ohio, the United States of America. 6.  On 12 May 2011 the Munich Regional Court II, after 91 days of trial, convicted John Demjanjuk on 16 counts as an accessory to the murder of at least 28,060 persons. It found it established that he had, in his capacity as a guard in the Sobib\u00f3r extermination camp, aided and abetted the systematic murder of persons who had been deported to the said camp in 16 convoys between 27 March 1943 and September 1943. It sentenced him to a total of five years\u2019 imprisonment for these crimes. The judgment ran to 220 pages plus appendices. 7.  Both the accused and the public prosecutor filed appeals on points of law against that judgment. Defence counsel submitted a brief containing the grounds for the appeal on points of law in November 2011 and subsequently submitted four additional briefs, the last of which was received by the Regional Court on 12 January 2012. On 24 February 2012, the public prosecutor\u2019s office instructed that the file, along with the submissions by the public prosecutor\u2019s office in response to the defence counsel\u2019s submissions, be transferred to the Federal Court of Justice, which was competent to examine the appeal on points of law. 8.  John Demjanjuk died on 17 March 2012. At that time, the Federal Court of Justice had not yet received the case file. 9.  By decision of 5 April 2012 the Munich Regional Court II discontinued the proceedings in accordance with Article 206a \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to the death of the accused (see paragraph 14 below). In that same decision, relying on Article 467 \u00a7 3, second sentence, number 2 of the Code (see paragraph 15 below), it ruled that the accused\u2019s necessary expenses were not to be borne by the treasury. The Regional Court reasoned as follows:\n\u201c... The accused had been convicted on 16 counts as an accessory to murder after 91 days of trial with a comprehensive taking of evidence. The conviction was based on a thorough examination of the evidence as to the facts and an assessment of all relevant legal aspects. Even though the conviction could not become final in the absence of a decision on the appeal on points of law, Article 467 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply.\nThe procedural impediment occurred after the judgment convicting the applicant had been handed down. The duration of the trial, which had lasted for almost one and a half years, was attributable, to a significant degree, to the time-consuming strategy pursued by the defence. The defence had made excessive use of their right to make statements under Article 257 \u00a7 2 of the Code, often repeating arguments already made several times, and had filed around 500 applications for the taking of evidence, a large number of which had been directed at evidence that had either already been taken or that was impossible to obtain, such as the examination of deceased persons. Likewise, the defence had filed more than twenty complaints alleging bias with regard to each of the professional judges sitting on the case, again often repeating arguments and considerations that had already been ruled on. It would have been possible to conclude the trial within a few months, while fully respecting defence rights, if the defence had exercised its procedural rights in a targeted, structured and technical manner.\nIt would thus have been possible to conclude the proceedings, with a final verdict, during the lifetime of the accused. Against this backdrop, it is not equitable, even in the absence of a conclusive finding of guilt, in the context of the discretionary decision to be made, to order that the accused\u2019s necessary expenses be reimbursed by the treasury. ...\u201d 10.  Counsel for the late accused filed an immediate appeal against the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 5 April 2012. He submitted, inter alia, that the decision not to reimburse the accused\u2019s necessary expenses, and its reasoning, breached the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. On 17 April 2012 counsel submitted powers of attorney from the applicants in the present case. 11.  On 4 October 2012 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the immediate appeal as inadmissible due to a lack of standing. The procedural status as an accused in criminal proceedings was personal in nature and could not be transferred, including by way of inheritance. In respect of the late accused, it had ceased because of his death. The Court of Appeal went on to state that the immediate appeal was, in addition, ill-founded. Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention had not been breached. Having regard to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of N\u00f6lkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, Series A no. 123, it considered that the decision not to reimburse the late accused\u2019s necessary expenses did not breach that provision, as it did not contain a finding of guilt, which the decision itself explicitly stated. It was permissible, in view of the establishment of the late accused\u2019s guilt by the trial court, to find that there continued to be, at the time the proceedings were discontinued, a state of suspicion against the late accused, and to apply Article 467 \u00a7 3, second sentence, number 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure on that basis. 12.  On 12 October 2012 counsel filed a complaint to be heard, which the Court of Appeal dismissed as ill-founded on 15 November 2012. 13.  On 18 December 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 2397/12), without providing reasons.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "8", "6", "4", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Glendale, California, the United States of America. 5.  The applicant worked in the British Council\u2019s Armenia office (hereinafter \u201cthe British Council\u201d) as a project manager on a full-time, permanent contract starting from 25 November 2002. 6.  In the course of her employment the applicant had two children, born on 27 March 2008 and 7 May 2010. The applicant spent her maternity leave in the United States and regularly sent requests to extend that leave every six months for the duration of her absence. In particular, she sent such requests in March and September 2009 as regards her first child and then in April and September 2010 as regards her second child. It appears that the applicant\u2019s maternity leave was extended, based on those requests. In March 2011 her leave was further extended until 1 September 2011. 7.  According to the applicant, on 19 August 2011 she requested another extension of her maternity leave. She handed an envelope with her written request to that effect to her friend H.K., who was to return to Armenia on 17 August 2011 after a visit to the United States. Upon arrival, H.K. gave the envelope to R.O., a driver, who then handed it to A.K., a security guard at the British Council. 8.  On 30 September 2011 the applicant received notice of termination of her employment contract prior to its term. The notice referred to the change in volume and conditions of work at the British Council, as well as the need to reduce the number of staff. In addition, the notice stated the following:\n\u201c... [your] employment contract shall be terminated based on [the relevant provisions] of the Labour Code of the Republic of Armenia.\nWe also inform you that your employment contract shall be terminated ... considering the fact that you did not return to work after the completion of your unpaid maternity leave, which was to end on 1 September 2011, as indicated in your letter sent to us by fax on 17 March 2011.\nThe employment contract shall be considered terminated as of 1 December 2011.\u201d 9.  It appears that the applicant sent emails to the management of the British Council in relation to the early termination of her employment. 10.  On 30 November 2011 Ar.M., a lawyer and a representative of Prudence, a law firm which provided legal services to the British Council, replied to the applicant on behalf of that body. In particular, the email stated that the termination of the applicant\u2019s employment had been in full compliance with domestic law and the terms and conditions of the British Council. 11.  By an order of 1 December 2011, issued by the director of the British Council, the applicant\u2019s employment contract was terminated. 12.  On 30 December 2011 the applicant brought a claim against the British Council before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, contesting the order of 1 December 2011 and seeking reinstatement. 13.  By a decision of 11 January 2012, Judge A.M. of the District Court took over the examination of the applicant\u2019s case and scheduled the preparatory hearing. 14.  According to a power of attorney executed by a notary public in London on 12 January 2012, the British Council authorised, inter alia, Ar.M. and K.B., another lawyer with Prudence, to represent jointly or separately its interests before courts of all instances in Armenia. 15.  On 16 January 2012 the British Council was notified by the District Court of its taking over of the examination of the case and the judge appointed. 16.  On 31 January 2012 K.B. applied to the District Court to represent the British Council before the said court, also asking the court to postpone the hearings. On 1 February 2012 Ar.M. informed the District Court that he would not be representing the interests of the British Council in the instant case. It appears that during the whole trial before the District Court, K.B. alone represented the British Council. 17.  On 14 February 2012, in its reply to the applicant\u2019s claim signed by K.B., the British Council denied that the applicant had submitted a request to extend her maternity leave for another six months as of 1 September 2011. 18.  On 9 July 2012 Judge A.M. rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding that her dismissal had been lawful. 19.  After the proceedings before the District Court, it was discovered that Judge A.M. and the lawyer Ar.M. were twin brothers. Furthermore, the law firm Prudence, of which Ar.M. and K.P. were senior associates, had been founded by D.M., A.M.\u2019s and Ar.M.\u2019s elder sister, and was managed by her husband, E.M. 20.  On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that Judge A.M. had lacked impartiality when deciding her case owing to his close family ties to the legal representatives of her opponent in the proceedings. The Government claimed that no such issue had been raised, nor had any evidence to support such a claim been provided. 21.  On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in her previous appeal. 23.  On 28 November 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["2", "8", "0", "9", "6", "4", "5", "1", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The first applicant, Mr Aleksandr Viktorovich Ivanov, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1956. He is currently serving a life sentence in Zhytomyr prison no. 8 (\u201cZhytomyr prison\u201d). 8.  On 17 March 1996 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and other crimes. On 23 March 1996 he was placed in the Odessa pre-trial detention centre (\u201cSIZO\u201d). 9.  On 19 February 1997 the Odessa Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and other crimes, and sentenced him to the death penalty. On 10 July 1997 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld that judgment and it became final. 10.  Following a declaration that the death penalty was unconstitutional by a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in December 1999 and amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2000, on 4 October 2000 the Odessa Regional Court commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment. 11.  On 29 May 1999 the applicant was transferred to Zhytomyr prison. 12.  On 27 March 1996 while detained in the Odessa SIZO, the applicant was found to have HIV antibodies. According to his medical file, that result was confirmed following further tests on 29 March and 1 April 1996. The applicant was recommended to undergo a clinical immunology examination. 13.  According to the applicant, no further examination or medical treatment was carried out following the above-mentioned test. 14.  The applicant\u2019s medical file contains a note by a dermato-venereologist on 19 April 1996 with indication that he was HIV-infected. Another note was made on 31 August 1998 indicating that he received medical advice \u201con the issues of HIV infection\u201d. Later on, in October 2008 a note was made in his medical file indicating that the applicant had been suffering from HIV for ten years and had had hepatitis B. 15.  According to the Government, on 20 February, 27 March, 17 April, 3 June, 11 June, 9 September and 5 November 1997, and on 23 January, 5 March, 17 March, 4 June, 7 July, 19 September and 10 December 1998, the applicant underwent regular medical examinations at the SIZO. In the course of those examinations he did not raise any health complaints. An HIV test of 11 January 1999 did not indicate HIV infection in the applicant\u2019s blood. The case file contains a medical certificate of 14 January 1999 indicating that following the HIV test, the applicant was found to have HIV antibodies. He was recommended to undergo an in-depth clinical immunology examination. There is no information in the case file as to whether that recommendation was followed up. 16.  On 31 May 1999, following the applicant\u2019s transfer to Zhytomyr prison, he underwent a medical examination by a panel of doctors at the prison medical unit. The examination revealed that he was apparently in good health. 17.  On 25 December 2007 following a blood test, the applicant was revealed viral hepatitis C antibodies. 18.  On 6 May 2008 the applicant underwent a CD-4 (white blood-cell) test, the result of which was 175 cells per mm3. 19.  On 25 June 2008, following a regular medical examination by a specialist in infectious diseases, the applicant was diagnosed with stage 2 HIV infection (the CD-4 count was 176 cells). He was prescribed a course of antiretroviral therapy(\u201cthe ART\u201d). 20.  On 13 July 2008 the applicant underwent another CD-4 test, the result of which was 296 cells per mm3. 21.  According to the applicant\u2019s medical file provided by the Government, in November 2008 he was examined by a doctor from the Zhytomyr regional centre for Aids prevention and control (\u201cthe anti-Aids centre\u201d). The applicant was diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage) and hepatitis C in the remission stage. 22.  According to the Government, on 1 March 2009 the prison received the relevant medication from the penal authorities, and the applicant started the ART course. 23.  On 7 October 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical commission and diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage), chronic hepatitis (the type of disease was not indicated), chronic gastritis, cholecystitis, ischemic heart disease and second-degree hypertension. 24.  On 27 August 2010 the applicant underwent a regular examination by a specialist in infectious diseases, who diagnosed him with HIV infection (second clinical stage) and chronic hepatitis C with minimal activity. 25.  On 19 December 2011 the applicant underwent a regular quarterly examination by doctors from the anti-Aids centre. He was diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage with a CD-4 count of 437 cells) and chronic hepatitis C with minimal activity. It was recommended that he continue receiving the ART by hepatoprotectors twice a year for twenty days. 26.  The parties did not inform the Court about the treatment the applicant was provided with after December 2011. 27.  The second applicant, Mr Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kashuba, was a Ukrainian national who was born in 1958. At the time of his death (8 January 2018 \u2013 see paragraph 6 above), he was serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynka Colony no. 39 (\u201cthe Ladyzhynka Colony\u201d). 28.  On 7 September 2000 the second applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated robbery and murder. On 14 September 2000 he was placed in the Lutsk SIZO. 29.  On 4 January 2001 the Volyn Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery and murder and convicted him to life imprisonment. By the same judgment he was found to be exceptionally dangerous to society. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 24 May 2002. 30.  On 8 September 2001 the applicant was transferred to the Vinnytsya SIZO. 31.  On 22 February 2007 he was transferred to the Ladyzhynka Colony. 32.  Upon arrival at the Lutsk SIZO in September 2000, the second applicant was examined by the SIZO medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person who had suffered tuberculosis (TB). 33.  Upon arrival at the Vinnytsya SIZO in September 2001, the applicant was examined by the SIZO medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person who had suffered TB. 34.  According to the applicant, in March 2003 he underwent a medical check and was diagnosed with TB. 35.  The applicant submitted that, in May 2003 he had received some medication for his TB. From June to August 2003 he did not receive any treatment. In September 2003 his treatment was resumed and a special diet was prescribed for him. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 36.  On 18 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and was diagnosed with clinically cured TB (\u043a\u043b\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0438\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0442\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0437). On 30 March 2004 he was examined by another tuberculosis specialist and was diagnosed with spontaneously cured TB (\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0438\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0442\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0437), and tuberculoma of the upper part of the left lung. The parties did not specify whether the applicant had been prescribed and had received any treatment during the above-mentioned period of time. 37.  According to the applicant, between March 2004 and November 2006 he was examined eight times by the tuberculotherapist. During that period he was diagnosed with tuberculoma of the upper part of the left lung and later with post-TB residual changes in the upper part of the left lung (category 5.1). He was prescribed some treatment, the nature of which was not specified by the parties. 38.  Upon arrival at the Ladyzhynka Colony on 22 February 2007, the applicant was examined by the colony\u2019s medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person with residual changes in the upper part of the left lung in the form of dense focal lung lesions (\u0449\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0456 \u0432\u043e\u0433\u043d\u0438\u0449\u0435\u0432\u0456 \u0442\u0456\u043d\u0456), category 5.1. 39.  According to the applicant, since 27 February 2007 he has been provided with medical treatment and a special diet for his TB. The parties did not specify the nature and duration of that treatment. 40.  On 3 September 2007, 29 February and 1 September 2008, 1 March and 1 September 2009, and 26 February 2010 the applicant was prescribed a season\u2019s course of anti-relapse treatment and a special diet. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 41.  According to the Government, between April 2008 and April 2014 the applicant was examined by a prison doctor more than fifty times regarding his TB. He was diagnosed with TB residual changes in the upper part of the left lung in the form of dense focal lung lesions (category 5.1), and chronic bronchitis in the unstable remission stage. Medical treatment was prescribed. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 42.  The second applicant submitted that he was forced to remain in a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back during regular searches of his cell, for outside walks, and on the way to take showers. He provided the following description of the above-mentioned events. 43.  Before the cell doors were opened, the applicant was asked to bend down, put his arms behind his back and insert them through a small window in the cell door to have them handcuffed. The guards then opened the cell door, took the prisoners out of the cell and performed a search of the inmates and the cell. During the search, the applicant and the rest of the inmates were kept in a bent position. Upon completion of the search, the applicant was taken back to the cell, the handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to stand up straight once the cell door had been closed. 44.  In order to take outside walks, the applicant was taken out of the cell in a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back. He and the other inmates were forced to assume that position on the way to the exercise yard and back. The inmates were escorted by a group of prison guards and dogs. Sometimes that procedure was followed with beatings with rubber truncheons. 45.  According to the prison schedule, the applicant was allowed a shower once a week. On the way to the shower facilities and back, he was forced to assume a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back. The water in the shower was sometimes cold and the shower itself lasted five minutes. The shower room was dark; it was equipped only with a small window, and there was no electric light inside. There was no heating in the shower room and in winter the temperature there was approximately 7-8oC. 46.  The applicant was provided with 100 grams of soap per month for his hygiene needs. He received the rest of the hygiene products he needed from his mother. 47.  The applicant had to wash and dry his clothes in the cell which, as a result, was damp. It was not possible to open the window and ventilate the cell in winter as the heating was too low and the cell got cold at once.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "4", "3", "0", "9", "2", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978. According to the most recently available information, at the time of the events in June 2016 the applicant was detained in Kirovograd pre-trial detention facility no. 14 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 5.  In January 2013 the applicant started serving a sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for murder. In February 2013 he was placed in Kirovograd prison no. 6 (\u201cthe Prison\u201d). 6.  In April 2014 the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 7.  On 11 April 2014 the applicant complained of feeling unwell to the Prison medical unit. He was examined immediately and diagnosed with acute gastroduodenitis and chronic calculous cholecystitis. According to the case-file material, he was not prescribed medical treatment. 8.  On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9.  On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10.  Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant had undergone the recommended examination. 11.  From 2 to 29 May and from 3 to 11 June 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for acute chronic gastroduodenitis in the Prison medical unit. According to the Government, he was administered the prescribed medication and his state of health improved. 12.  On 10 July 2015 he was examined by a general practitioner of Kirovograd City Hospital, who confirmed the earlier diagnoses and recommended inpatient treatment and dietary treatment. 13.  From 28 July to 10 September 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for calculus cholecystitis in unstable remission at the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. The applicant alleged that the treatment which he had received there had been inadequate and had led to an aggravation of his condition. He also alleged that surgery for his calculus cholecystitis had been scheduled but had not been performed owing to lack of funds. 14.  On 21 September 2015 he was transferred back to the Prison. In the meantime he had been detained in the Kyiv SIZO and the Odessa SIZO. During his detention from 14 to 21 September 2015, he complained to the SIZOs\u2019 administration of abdominal pain and vomiting, but allegedly to no avail. 15.  On 8 October 2015 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell in the Prison for three months as a penalty for consumption of alcohol. According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention there were very poor: he suffered from lack of fresh air, low temperatures, unsanitary conditions and high humidity. Furthermore, he allegedly had no mattress to sleep on. 16.  According to the Government, on 8 October 2015 the Prison governor issued a decision on the applicant\u2019 placement in a disciplinary cell for consumption of alcohol. On 30 December 2015 he was early released from the disciplinary cell. 17.  On 12 October 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18.  On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19.  On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant\u2019s placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 20.  On 11 December 2015 and 16 January 2016 the prison service again requested the applicant\u2019s placement in the hospital at correctional colony no. 4 of Dnipropetrovsk Region. On 27 January 2016 the prison service took a decision on the applicant\u2019s transfer to the hospital for the required surgery. 21.  On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22.  On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and \u201cdiffusive changes\u201d of the liver (\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0443\u0437\u043d\u0456 \u0437\u043c\u0456\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0447\u0456\u043d\u043a\u0438). 23.  According to the Government, as of November 2016 the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory. The Government did not provide documentary evidence in respect of that statement.", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "4", "9", "6", "5", "3", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1976, 1981, 1995 and 1989 respectively and live in Karcsa. They belong to the Roma minority. 8.  On 3 September 2013 the applicants, riding in a car driven by the first applicant, arrived at a petrol station in S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely, at about midnight. 9.  At the petrol station two police officers called on the applicants to identify themselves, for no apparent reason. When the first applicant produced his ID, the officers made derogatory remarks about the applicants\u2019 Roma origin. Although the applicants offered no resistance, the first applicant was hit in the chest, pressed violently against the car and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. Two additional police cars arrived and the applicants were transported to the S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely police station. 10.  While in the car, the first applicant was hit in the spine and, once at the police station, was dragged, with his bottom against the ground, into the building while being kicked repeatedly. Inside the police station he was hit repeatedly while held in a detention room. 11.  At the police station, the second applicant\u2019s trousers were pulled off and his testicles squeezed; he was repeatedly hit and kicked and his back was injured with a sharp object. While being assaulted by four or five officers, he was also insulted and told that he, a Roma, should die, or else move away from S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely. 12.  The third applicant was repeatedly hit and kicked at the petrol station and in the patrol vehicle, but not at the police station. 13.  The fourth applicant was handcuffed, led to a round table inside the police station, his handcuffs were attached to a leg of the table and his leg was then kicked so that he fell under the table, where he was repeatedly kicked or hit in the head. As a result of the beating, his wrist broke. 14.  When the first applicant asked for a doctor, this was refused by the officers who said that he could have a doctor once he was dead. On release, the officers wanted him to sign a waiver stating he had not been assaulted; since he refused to do so, an officer signed the waiver for him. Intimidated, the other applicants signed the waiver. 15.  Prior to their arrival at the petrol station, the applicants had had an altercation with the staff of a local night club where they had not been served for apparently being intoxicated. Police Officers Gy.R. and M.P., passing by the petrol station in a patrol vehicle, recognised the car described by the staff of the night club, stopped and proceeded to check the applicants\u2019 identities at about 12.45 a.m. The applicants did not co-operate and behaved aggressively towards the officers, calling them names. The officers called in reinforcements. They isolated the first and second applicants from the others, handcuffed them with their hands behind their backs by applying physical restraint, and then placed them in the patrol car. The applicants were yelling gross insults at them. 16.  As backup, Police Officers K.L.J., H.Z., M.D., B.R. and D.P.Cs. arrived at the petrol station. They applied physical restraint and handcuffed the third and fourth applicants, and placed them in the police vehicle. All applicants were then transferred to the police station where they were held until after 3 a.m. 17.  In the ensuing proceedings, the first applicant stated that he had handed over his wallet containing his ID card to the officers immediately upon being requested to do so. However, two employees of the petrol station testified that the first and second applicants had refused to prove their identities and had addressed the officers in an unacceptable manner, whereas the latter had instructed the applicants in a business-like, official manner. 18.  The first applicant also stated in his testimony that he must have been hit on the jaw after he had been seated in the patrol car, for he could not remember anything afterwards until he had been pulled out of the car outside the police station. However, in the original criminal complaint filed by the applicants, no mention had been made of any such blow; and no corresponding injury had been recorded in the ensuing medical report \u2013 in which it had, on the other hand, been recorded that the first applicant had not become unconscious and had been able to remember the events clearly. Similarly, the criminal complaint filed by the applicants had not contained any reference to what the first applicant stated in his subsequent testimony, namely that he had been kicked in the head \u2013 his left temple \u2013 on the flight of steps leading to the entrance of the police station. According to the first applicant, his son, the third applicant, had also seen this. However, the latter had not been able to corroborate this in his testimony. 19.  The fourth applicant stated that he had been handcuffed to the leg of a round table. The on-site inspection was unable to confirm this allegation since there had been no round table in the corridor in question at the police station. Furthermore, the fourth applicant alleged that he had suffered a fracture of his left scaphoid bone after he had fallen under the table following being handcuffed to the table leg, where one of the police officers had kept kicking him every ten to fifteen minutes for four to five hours, from the beginning of his detention until his release. He alleged that most of the kicks had hit his head and that there had even been a footprint on his head. His wrist had allegedly been fractured when a kick had hit the handcuff on a hand that he had raised to protect his head. Although the medical examination revealed abrasions of different sizes on various parts of his head, none of those had exceeded 2.5 cm in length and there had been no lesions that had matched a shoe print. In the forensic expert\u2019s opinion, the medically documented injuries of the fourth applicant \u2013 epithelial abrasions of the forehead, the left eyebrow, the area anterior to the left ear and both knees (see paragraph 24 below) \u2013 could have been caused when he had been handcuffed, a measure that he had resisted; the injuries had not been typical of a beating and had only indicated a weak impact. Redness of the wrist had also been observed but had likely been caused by the handcuffing; whereas the left scaphoid bone fracture had been a residual condition of a former fracture that could have occurred years earlier (see paragraph 28 below). 20.  The third applicant stated initially that he had been hit by one of the officers at the petrol station, and that his arm had then been tightly squeezed while he had been escorted to the patrol car. Later however, he alleged that he had been hit on the back of the head and his arm while inside the patrol car but had not otherwise been assaulted. He could not give an acceptable explanation for this contradiction. 21.  In their testimonies, both the first and the second applicants said that they had been placed in two adjacent detention rooms and repeatedly assaulted every ten to fifteen minutes by several officers for hours on end, involving many blows. However, the medical findings recorded in both cases had indicated only smaller abrasions and bruises. In relation to the first applicant, the fourth applicant mentioned assaults that the first applicant himself had not mentioned during his questioning and which were not described in the criminal report filed by the first applicant either: namely that upon arrival at the police building he had been pulled out of the car and kicked in the spine. 22.  The applicants stated that at the petrol station, one of the officers had said over the radio that \u201cwe are taking in gypsies\u201d or \u201cgypsy kids\u201d. However, the audio recordings of the radio traffic did not contain such a statement. One officer had said at one point only that \u201cfour young Roma men kicked up a fuss at the petrol station\u201d. 23.  Neither the police officers, nor the security guard on duty at the police station, nor the petrol station staff had provided any support for the allegation that the applicants, who had been under the influence of alcohol and talking to the officers in an extremely rude way, had been assaulted either at the petrol station or in the police building. 24.  The applicants were examined at S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely Hospital at about 6 p.m. on 4 September 2013. The first applicant was found to have suffusions in his left ear, on his face and chest, on his left arm and elbow, and on his right arm, abrasions on his buttocks, and erythema on both wrists. The second applicant sustained suffusions on his neck and right upper arm, abrasions on his back and lower right arm, and erythema on both wrists. The third applicant was found to have suffusions on his neck and around his right collar bone as well as suffusions and abrasions on both upper arms. The fourth applicant had abrasions on the forehead, above the left eye, next to his ears and on both knees, erythema on both wrists and a fracture of the left scaphoid bone; it was uncertain whether the latter was a recent or an inveterate injury. 25.  The applicants lodged a criminal complaint on 18 September 2013, accusing the officers of ill-treatment. The case was investigated by the Miskolc Investigation Office and, subsequently, by the Debrecen Bureau of the Central Prosecutorial Investigation Office. The public prosecutors in charge of the case obtained video footage, a recording of the police radio traffic, medical reports, police documents, opinions of medical and graphology experts, and testimonies of witnesses, suspects and victims. 26.  On 16 April 2014 the Independent Police Complaints Board, which had been approached by the applicants\u2019 lawyer in parallel to the proceedings outlined above, issued a report on the first applicant\u2019s case. It found that handcuffing him had not been justified in the circumstances and had been contrary to human dignity, especially since his hands had been handcuffed behind his back. It also found that his prolonged detention at the police station had breached his right to liberty. However, in terms of the entire incident, the Board was not convinced that excessive force had been applied.\nWith regard to the remainder of the issues, namely the first applicant\u2019s rights to health, human dignity, equal treatment and non-discrimination, the Board identified no breach of his fundamental rights, essentially for want of conclusive evidence and because there had been differing versions of events that could not be reconciled. 27.  On 15 May 2014 the Board issued a report on the fourth applicant\u2019s case. Its conclusions were similar to those in the first applicant\u2019s case. 28.  On 22 and 29 May 2014 the opinions of two forensic experts were obtained in the fourth applicant\u2019s criminal case. One expert was of the view that the abrasions and erythema he had sustained could be explained by the melee that had occurred when he had resisted being handcuffed or by his immobilisation. As regards the broken scaphoid bone, the expert found that it was an inveterate lesion that had occurred at least six to eight months prior to the incident. In sum, the expert stated that the fourth applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been assaulted for hours on end was not supported by the medical findings. In the other expert opinion, a radiologist stated that the broken scaphoid bone could not have been related to the incident and had occurred years earlier. 29.  On 10 July 2014 the Board issued reports on the second and third applicants\u2019 cases. Its conclusions were again similar to those in the first applicant\u2019s case. 30.  On 21 August 2014 the Investigation Office discontinued the prosecution against the police officers. It held that the testimonies of the applicants had been exaggerated, contradictory and modified several times, and that the findings of fact could not enable it to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the injuries had been deliberately caused by the officers exceeding the use of force necessitated by the applicants\u2019 own conduct. 31.  On 14 October 2014 the Attorney General\u2019s Office rejected a complaint by the applicants against the discontinuation order. It pointed out that the witness testimonies and the audio recordings refuted the applicants\u2019 allegations of racist motivation and utterances. It further underlined that the applicants\u2019 injuries had not provided evidence of any use of force exceeding that which had been prompted by the applicants\u2019 own conduct; it also observed that in the forensic medical expert\u2019s opinion (see paragraph 28 above), the fourth applicant\u2019s scaphoid bone fracture had been a pre-existing condition. As regards the lawfulness and proportionality of the use of force, the Attorney General\u2019s Office held that the information available on the case was insufficient to reconcile the opposing versions. 32.  The applicants\u2019 attention was drawn to the possibility of pursuing their complaint as substitute private prosecutors, but they did not avail themselves of this legal avenue.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "4", "2", "0", "5", "3", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1997 and 1999 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5.  On 20 July 2010 X, the applicants\u2019 sister, nine-year-old at the time, was grievously injured in a car accident. She was immediately admitted to hospital where, after four days of intense suffering, she died. 6.  A criminal investigation for involuntary manslaughter was initiated against the driver of the car. It was established that while driving at about ninety\u2011two kilometres per hour (when the speed limit was fifty kilometres per hour) she lost control of her car and mounted the pavement where the applicants\u2019 sister was situated. 7.  On 26 September 2010, during the pre-trial investigation stage, the applicants, their mother and their older brothers brought a claim for damages in the criminal proceedings. 8.  On 24 October 2011 the Bucharest District Court severed the civil claims from the criminal proceedings. 9.  On 6 December 2011 the Bucharest District court awarded each civil party (including the applicants) 100,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. It ordered the driver\u2019s insurance company to pay the damages. 10.  The court held that between the civil parties and the nine\u2011year\u2011old girl there had been a strong emotional relationship and the girl\u2019s violent death had caused intense pain to her family.\nThe wording of the court judgment read as follows:\n\u201c...the brothers of the deceased suffered non-pecuniary damage, consisting of the pain caused by the loss of their nine-year-old sister in violent circumstances and by their sister\u2019s suffering in the hospital until her death; from the evidence adduced before the court (the statements of the civil parties were corroborated by the statements of three witnesses) it can be determined that between the civil parties and the nine-year-old girl there was a strong emotional relationship. Therefore, having regard to the negative consequences, the importance of the infringed moral values, the way in which they were perceived by the civil parties, and the impact of their loss on the stability of their family, the court will grant to each civil party the equivalent of 100,000 euros\u201d. 11.  All the parties appealed against the judgment. 12.  No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 13.  On 9 April 2012 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the insurance company. It ordered the driver of the car to pay the damages, holding that the insurance company\u2019s liability was only contractual and therefore subsidiary. The court further dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim for non-pecuniary damages on the ground that at the time of their sister\u2019s accident they had been younger than fourteen and had therefore been unaware of the negative consequences of her death. In relation to the claims lodged by their older siblings, the court decreased the awards to EUR 25,000 each.\nThe wording of the court judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe court will dismiss the civil claims lodged by Cosmin Mihai Deaconu and Alexandru Bogdan Deaconu on grounds other than those invoked by the insurance company.\nIn the present case, the applicants\u2019 situation should be assessed in a different way, having regard to the fact that at the time of their minor sister\u2019s accident they were younger than fourteen and therefore they were not aware of the negative consequences of her death. This aspect was apparent to persons who had a close relationship with the deceased\u2019s family; thus, witness N.G.G. contended in her statement before the court that the younger brothers were less aware than their older brothers, who suffered...\u201d 14.  The court also decreased the award for their mother in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage to EUR 50,000.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "9", "7", "2", "6", "3", "1", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963. 6.  From 22 July 2016 the applicant was held in the Chernigiv pre-trial detention centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d) as a suspect in respect of a crime. 7.  On 8 September 2016, while being held at the SIZO, the applicant suffered acute myocardial infarction. He was treated at Kozeletsk Town Hospital from 8 until 19 September 2016. 8.  On 27 September and 6 October 2016 the applicant underwent examinations at the Chernigiv Regional Cardiological Centre. He was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease; acute myocardial infarction; third\u2011stage hypertonic disease; a hypertensive heart; and second-degree heart failure. The applicant was prescribed outpatient medical treatment and a further heart examination. On the last mentioned date he was recommended to undergo a cardiac ventriculography test. 9.  On 7 February 2017, in response to a request for information lodged by the Chernigiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office, Chernihiv City Hospital (\u201cthe Hospital\u201d) noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health posed a high risk to his life. 10.  On 15 March 2017, the Hospital informed the SIZO authorities that the cost of a cardiac ventriculography test was 4,000 hryvnias (UAH \u2013 approximately 140 euros (EUR)). There is no information regarding whether that test was undertaken. 11.  Following a deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment \u2013 including surgery, if appropriate. 12.  On 23 May 2017 the applicant was transported to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis was confirmed (see paragraph 8 above). On the same day he was returned to the SIZO and provided with outpatient treatment. 13.  On 25 May 2017 the Hospital informed the SIZO that in order for the applicant to be provided with qualified medical advice, he needed a cardiac ventriculography test. In view of the complexity of the applicant\u2019s state of health, before the cardiac ventriculography test the Hospital requested that the applicant have an additional consultation at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. 14.  According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 15.  Following a further deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health, on 22 June 2017 the ambulance took him to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis (see paragraph 8 above) was confirmed, electrocardiography and cardiac ventriculography tests were recommended, and he was prescribed some medication. 16.  The case file contains an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical file bearing no date and signed by the head of the SIZO medical unit; according to the extract, the SIZO had no cardiologist on its staff and high-quality medical treatment was not possible at the SIZO. The applicant did not receive the prescribed medication in full owing to a lack of funds. The extract furthermore stated that he remained under the supervision of the SIZO medical staff and did not require inpatient medical treatment. 17.  On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). 18.  According to the available information, from August 2016 until September 2017 the applicant underwent more than fifteen examinations, both within the SIZO and at civilian hospitals, and an ambulance was called twelve times to provide him with urgent treatment. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant was released from custody. On 7 November 2017 he underwent an examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. According to the results of the examination, he was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, exertional angina (class III), postinfarction cardiosclerosis, and atherosclerosis of the aorta and of the coronary arteries. It was recommended that he undergo surgery for his ischemic heart disease, together with further inpatient treatment. There is no information regarding whether the applicant has undergone the recommended surgery and treatment.", "references": ["0", "3", "9", "6", "4", "5", "2", "8", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a legal entity registered in Ma\u017eeikiai. 6.  In 2004 the Competition Council (Konkurencijos taryba) opened an investigation into the applicant company\u2019s alleged abuse of its dominant position on the fuel market. The investigation covered the applicant company\u2019s activities between 2002 and 2004. According to the applicant company, the last action that fell within the scope of the investigation was undertaken on 31 December 2004. 7.  On 7 March 2005 the Competition Council decided to broaden the scope of the investigation and to find out whether the applicant company\u2019s activities had affected trade between the European Union member States, as defined in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (\u201cthe TEC\u201d) \u2013 now Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (\u201cthe TFEU\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 43 below). 8.  On 22 December 2005 the Competition Council found that the applicant company had abused its dominant position on the fuel market, and fined it 32,000,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 9,267,841 euros (EUR)). 9.  The applicant company appealed against the decision of the Competition Council of 22 December 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). It argued that the Competition Council had committed procedural violations and that it had also made mistakes in defining the scope of the market and the scope of the geographical market, and that its ruling that the applicant company had abused its dominant position on the fuel market had thus been unjustified. The applicant company also described as unjustified the Competition Council\u2019s ruling that its pricing had been discriminatory and that the applicant company had obliged other economic entities to sign loyalty and non-competition agreements (see paragraph 16 below), and that it had discriminated against other economic entities. The applicant company also described as unfounded the Competition Council\u2019s ruling that it had sold diesel fuel for differing prices to different economic entities and had thus discriminated against them and that it had sold arctic diesel fuel to one economic entity for a better price than that which it had offered to others. The applicant company was also dissatisfied with the level of the fine and was of the view that that it had been disproportionate. 10.  On 28 June 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court stated the following. The court held that the Competition Council had a right to investigate whether actions of economic entities had been in accordance with Article 82 of the TEC. The court emphasised that the Law on Competition enabled the Competition Council to initiate an investigation upon its own initiative if it gave sufficient reasons for doing so. In the present case, the Competition Council had given sufficient reasons for broadening the investigation to cover Article 82 of the TEC. The court found that the Competition Council had committed some procedural violations and decided to annul parts of its decision. The court also examined the case on the merits. It held that the Competition Council had defined the scope of the market and the geographical market incorrectly, and that that had had a major impact on its decision. It followed that further conclusions reached by the Competition Council regarding the applicant company\u2019s dominant position, its abuse of that dominant position and compliance with Article 82 of the TEC could not have been just because they had been based on incorrect data. 11.  The Competition Council appealed. On 8 December 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court delivered its decision, stating that it disagreed with the first-instance court regarding a number of procedural violations but holding that the Competition Council had not extensively explained why it had ignored the applicant company\u2019s arguments regarding the scope of the market. In order to establish the scope of the market, it was necessary to investigate further. The court thus decided to return the case to the Competition Council for additional investigation (gr\u0105\u017einti byl\u0105 Konkurencijos tarybai atlikti papildom\u0105 tyrim\u0105). 12.  On 15 January 2009 the Competition Council decided that the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 11 above) obliged it to undertake additional investigative measures into the applicant company\u2019s activities and decided to reopen the investigation (atnaujinti tyrim\u0105) with regard to the applicant company. 13.  On an unspecified date, the applicant company appealed against the decision of the Competition Council to recommence the investigation. It submitted that the investigation of the applicant company\u2019s activities had covered the period between 2002 and 2004. Although the initial investigation had not mentioned the end date of the actions examined, it could be presumed that the last investigated action had been undertaken on 31 December 2004. Domestic law provided that economic entities could only be held liable for breaches of the Law on Competition up to three years after the date of the violation in question or, if the violation was continuous, three years after the date of the last action that had been contrary to the Law on Competition (see paragraph 27 below). The applicant company stated that the last such action had been undertaken by it on 31 December 2004 and that the limitation period had ended on 31 December 2007; it could thus not be held responsible for breaches of the Law on Competition. 14.  On 25 May 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s complaint. The court held that final court decisions had to be executed, and that in view of the fact that the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 December 2008 had become final (see paragraph 11 above), the Competition Council had an obligation to reopen the investigation into the applicant company\u2019s activities. 15.  The applicant company lodged an appeal, which was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 May 2010. The court provided its reasoning in five short paragraphs, holding that by its impugned decision the Competition Council had merely restarted the previous investigation (rather than opening a new one) (skund\u017eiamu nutarimu yra tik atnaujinamas anks\u010diau vykdytas tyrimas vykdant Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo \u012fpareigojim\u0105, o ne pradedamas naujas tyrimas), and that the provision of the domestic law regarding the limitation period was only applicable in respect of new investigations. 16.  In order to comply with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 December 2008 (see paragraph 11 above), on 16 December 2010 the Competition Council carried out an additional investigation into the applicant company\u2019s activities. The Competition Council clarified the definition of the geographical scope of the market, narrowing it to the territory of Lithuania. The Competition Council found that the applicant company had undertaken actions that had restricted competition \u2013 namely, it had abused its dominant position by applying discriminatory pricing, by imposing yearly loyalty requirements on other economic entities (that is to say by requiring them to agree to purchase a certain amount of fuel per year from the applicant company) and by restricting parallel imports and the onward sale by its clients of cheap fuel. The applicant company raised an issue regarding the limitation period, claiming that it had expired and that the Competition Council therefore had to terminate the investigation. The Competition Council was of the view that a limitation period had to be calculated from the time at which the economic entity in question had ceased engaging in unlawful activity. One of the breaches committed by the applicant company had started in 2002; one had started in 2003; and the rest had started in 2004. There was no information that the applicant company had ended its unlawful activities (except for one of them). Thus, the three\u2011year limitation period had not even started to run. Moreover, there was no information that the applicant company had changed its behaviour on the relevant markets in such a way that it no longer undertook actions contrary to the Law on Competition and the TFEU; therefore, the violation had been continuous, and it could not be held that the limitation period had expired. Even if the limitation period had started running before the Competition Council\u2019s issuance of its decision of 22 December 2005, the calculation of it would nevertheless have ceased to run on the day that the Competition Council adopted its decision. The time\u2011limit for holding the applicant company liable should have started running on 8 December 2008 \u2013 the date of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s partial annulment of the decision of the Competition Council. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for the Competition Council to rectify the shortcomings in its decision owing to the length of the court proceedings. Such a situation would have been contrary to the principles of justice and reasonableness because the harmful actions in question could have continued and there would have been no opportunities to require the applicant company to terminate them. Moreover, it would have been impossible to enforce the execution of the court\u2019s decisions. The calculation of the limitation period provided by the applicant company was favourable to other economic entities that had breached the Law on Competition. Such economic entities would only have to behave in such a manner as to ensure that the court proceedings in respect of their own behaviour lasted for a long time.\nThe Competition Council also drew attention to the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences, wherein it was stated that if a court annulled a decision to impose a sanction on an economic entity or to terminate the procedure regarding the imposition of a sanction (or if that first\u2011instance decision was annulled by an appellate court), the time-limits would start to run again from the date on which the court\u2019s or appellate court\u2019s decision became final (see paragraph 31 below). The Supreme Administrative Court held that responsibility for violations of the Law on Competition was an administrative responsibility in the broad sense and that the principles of administrative responsibility could also be applied to violations of the Law on Competition (see paragraph 38 below). The Competition Council decided that the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences had to be applied in the applicant company\u2019s case and that \u2013 irrespective of the rules of the Law on Competition \u2013 the time-limit had to be calculated from the day on which the Supreme Administrative Court had adopted its decision. The provisions of European Union law also provided that the limitation period for imposing fines had to be suspended when the European Commission\u2019s decision was reviewed by the European Union Court of Justice (see paragraph 47 below). The Competition Council was of the view that the national competition authority could not be more limited than the European Commission in its ability to suspend the limitation period.\nThe Competition Council also relied on the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 May 2010, whereby the court held that the Competition Council had been obliged to reopen the investigation and not to start a new one (see paragraph 15 above). The Competition Council found that the applicant company had breached the Law on Competition and the TFEU and fined it LTL 8,231,000 (approximately EUR 2,383,862). 17.  The applicant company lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and asked it to annul the order of the Competition Council of 16 December 2010 (see paragraph 16 above). The applicant company\u2019s arguments were based, inter alia, on the fact that the limitation period for imposing the fine had been missed and that the applicant company could not be held responsible for violations of the Law on Competition and of the TFEU. The applicant company argued, inter alia, that the Law on Competition set the most serious economic sanctions of all those provided under the Lithuanian legal system and that such high fines threatened the continuity of the activities of economic entities and that because of that it was logical that the law provided that the limitation period could not be suspended or renewed. 18.  On 15 April 2011 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s complaint. As regards the limitation period and its calculation, the court held that the investigation into the applicant company\u2019s activities had been started on 15 July 2004. The Competition Council was of the view that the limitation period had not started running before 22 December 2005 and that even if it had, it must have stopped when the Competition Council had adopted its decision (see paragraph 8 above). When the Supreme Administrative Court had annulled part of the Competition Council\u2019s decision (see paragraph 11 above), the time-limit for responsibility for violations of competition law had had to be reset. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court decided that the investigation had merely been reopened and that no new investigation had been initiated (nagrin\u0117jamu atveju tyrimas tiesiog buvo atnaujintas, o ne prad\u0117tas naujas) and that the applicant company\u2019s arguments regarding the limitation period had been unfounded. 19.  The applicant company appealed, raising the issue of the limitation period. On 21 January 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the arguments of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph 18 above). It added that there was disagreement between the parties about the dates on which the applicant company had committed violations. Because the Competition Council had investigated the applicant company\u2019s activities between 2002 and 2004, the court held that the last violation had been committed by the applicant company on 31 December 2004. The court also observed that the Competition Council had not proved that the violation had continued after 31 December 2004, and did not accept its arguments that the applicant company\u2019s violation had been continuous or that the limitation period had not started running at all. The court then emphasised the importance of the principle of res judicata \u2013 that is to say the factual and legal aspects had been examined in another decision of the court and had to be accepted, and that a party to the proceedings or another person who had participated in the case (where the parties to the proceedings were the same) could rely on that court\u2019s decision without having to prove the same circumstances again. In addition, one of the most important elements of the principle of the rule of law was the principle of legal certainty, which required that the principle of res judicata be respected. Accordingly, when the courts resolved a case, their decisions should not be questioned or left unexecuted, because courts\u2019 decisions (together with legal norms) were a guarantee of the stability of public life and the certainty of social relations. Having regard to that, the Supreme Administrative Court was of the view that on 13 May 2010 it had already examined the Competition Council\u2019s right to reopen the investigation into the applicant company\u2019s activities (see paragraph 15 above). As a result, the legality of the reopening of the investigation had the power of res judicata and could not be questioned again.\nThe Supreme Administrative Court also referred to another one of its cases, decided by different composition with an exception of one judge, on 21 June 2012, which had concerned the sale of dairy products (\u201cthe dairy products case\u201d). In that case it had examined the relevant provisions of the Law on Competition \u2013 namely their application when a case concerning a violation of competition law was transferred for examination to a court, which then annulled the decision of the Competition Council and returned the case to it for further investigation (see paragraph 40 below). However, the court held:\n\u201cIn the opinion of the extended composition of the court, the reasoning provided in the dairy products case is not applicable to the present case firstly, because of the abovementioned arguments regarding the influence of the decision of 13 May 2010 and the principle of res judicata. Moreover, the circumstances of the instant case and the one in which the decision of 21 June 2012 has been adopted, are not the same or so similar that they could be examined similarly. In the administrative case no. A520\u20112136/2012 the court has examined the legality of the decision of the Competition Council whereby the economic entity was suspected of a breach of the provisions of the Law on Competition and in the instant case the applicant company is suspected of breaching both the Law on Competition and the TFEU. In the opinion of the extended composition of the court, this circumstance also determined the conclusion that the two cases are substantively different and the decision, taken in one of them, cannot be a precedent in determining the other one.\u201d\nThe court thus decided that the Competition Council\u2019s ruling that (i) the limitation period had not expired and (ii) the applicant company could be held liable for the breaches of the Law on Competition had been lawful.\nThe court did however lower the fine to LTL 7,819,450 (approximately EUR 2,264,669).", "references": ["8", "0", "6", "5", "4", "9", "2", "7", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants are shareholders of two savings banks, namely Kinizsi Bank Zrt. (\u201cKinizsi Bank\u201d) and Moh\u00e1csi Takar\u00e9k Bank Zrt. (\u201cMoh\u00e1csi Bank\u201d), and of one savings cooperative, P\u00e1tria Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezet (\u201cP\u00e1tria Cooperative\u201d). A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix, which also indicates the financial institution in which they hold shares and any changes to their situation following the lodging of the application. 8.  At the time the application was lodged, the applicants held shares with an aggregate par value of 2,043,342,000 Hungarian forints (HUF), approximately 6,310,000 euros (EUR), representing 98.28% of the total registered capital of Kinizsi Bank and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 1,833,300,000, approximately EUR 5,662,000, representing 87.65% of the total registered capital of Moh\u00e1csi Bank, and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 8,100,000, approximately EUR 25,000, representing 5.61% of the total share capital of P\u00e1tria Cooperative. 9.  On 18 December 2014 and 15 April 2015 respectively two of the applicants, Ms L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 Boris (no. 18) and Ms. Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 Csoltk\u00f3 (no. 28), the only shareholders of P\u00e1tria Cooperative amongst the applicants, withdrew their complaints before the Court. Therefore, the facts of the case below do not contain any further information relating specifically to P\u00e1tria Cooperative. 10.  Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank were established in 1958 and used to operate as savings cooperatives. Their clientele was mostly from the local community. 11.  In 1993 a voluntary and restricted integration took place involving 235 savings cooperatives, including the predecessors of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank. The purpose of the integration was to enhance the cooperatives\u2019 market position and financial security. With the active support of the Hungarian State and the PHARE Program of the European Union, they entered into an integration agreement. The key institutions of the integration were the National Association of Savings Cooperatives (Orsz\u00e1gos Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezeti Sz\u00f6vets\u00e9g \u2013 \u201cOTSZ\u201d), the Savings Bank (Takar\u00e9kbank Zrt.) and the National Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings Cooperatives (Orsz\u00e1gos Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezeti Int\u00e9zm\u00e9nyv\u00e9delmi Alap \u2013 \u201cOTIVA\u201d), which was created as part of the integration. OTIVA, on the one hand, improved the security of deposits placed with the savings cooperatives by supplementing the National Deposit Insurance Fund (Orsz\u00e1gos Bet\u00e9tbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si Alap \u2013 \u201cOBA\u201d), and, on the other hand, served to prevent crisis situations and improved the stability of savings cooperatives. Until changes were introduced by the Integration Act, the shareholding of the savings cooperatives and certain saving banks (together referred to as \u201ccooperative credit institutions\u201d) in the Savings Bank exceeded 60%. 12.  In 2006 and 2008 respectively Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank transformed into the companies limited by shares and received their licences for banking operations. They however remained members of OTIVA and part of the above-mentioned integration. 13.  According to Risk Report 2013/I issued by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (hereafter \u201cthe Supervisory Authority\u201d) in June 2013, the cooperative credit institution sector remained profitable throughout the economic crisis. However, in 2011 and 2012 respectively the operating licences of two saving cooperatives were revoked by the Supervisory Authority, which resulted in the deposit holders obtaining indemnification from OBA. 14.  Following an audit carried out with respect to 121 cooperative credit institutions, further to the entry into force of the Integration Act (see paragraph 16 below), a certain number of them had their operating licences withdrawn. Furthermore, ninety-one cooperative credit institutions were obliged to commit reserves, in eight cases a serious crisis situation was established and some required a capital injection from the Integration Organisation (see paragraph 18 below). 15.  According to the Government, basing its findings on the data collected after the Integration Act came into force, considering the capital/loan ratio, thirty-nine cooperative credit institutions would not have been in a position to ensure profitable operations without the new measures. The above-mentioned audit also revealed that thirteen cooperative credit institutions had a capital adequacy ratio below 8%, five of which had a negative ratio value. 16.  On 13 July 2013 Act no. CXXXV of 2013 on the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions and the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding Economic Matters (\u201cthe Integration Act\u201d) entered into force. It was then amended in several aspects, including by Act no. CXCVI of 2013 on the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions (\u201cthe Integration (Amendment) Act\u201d) with effect from 30 November 2013. 17.  The Integration Act concerned cooperative credit institutions, that is most savings cooperatives operating as a cooperative and the banks operating as companies limited by shares who on 1 January 2013 had been members of OTIVA. Its scope therefore extended to Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank. It made the cooperative credit institutions ipso jure members of the Integration Organisation and shareholders of the Savings Bank. 18.  The Integration Act abolished the integration of cooperatives organised on a voluntary basis, with voluntary membership, and terminated OTIVA. Instead, it introduced a mandatory integration headed by, inter alia, the Integration Organisation of Cooperative Credit Institutions (Sz\u00f6vetkezeti Hitelint\u00e9zetek Integr\u00e1ci\u00f3s Szervezete \uf02d \u201cthe Integration Organisation\u201d), which had been newly created as a legal successor of OTIVA and other voluntary institutional protection funds, and the Savings Bank, which continued to be the central bank of the integration, now having more extensive powers. The Integration Act also created a financial risk pool, encompassing the whole of the cooperative credit institutions sector. 19.  The Savings Bank supervises the operations of the cooperative credit institutions and is authorised to issue instructions in order to ensure compliance with the law and the regulations issued by the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank. Apart from the cooperative credit institutions, the Savings Bank and the Hungarian Development Bank (Magyar Fejleszt\u00e9si Bank Zrt. \u2013 \u201cthe MFB\u201d) became members of the Integration Organisation by virtue of law. Due to the changes in the ownership of the Savings Bank pursuant to the Integration Act (see in particular, sections 13 and 20, cited in paragraph 39 below) the shareholding of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank in the Savings Bank changed. While the two banks previously possessed 0.15% and 2.27% respectively in the Savings Bank, they had a 0.12% and 1.83% stake respectively following the implementation of the Integration Act. 20.  The Integration Organisation\u2019s assets are included in the consolidated own funds of the Savings Bank and the cooperative credit institutions. The solvency capital of the cooperative credit institutions is determined collectively, including the property of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation. 21.  Under section 17 of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions which did not comply with the relevant requirements of the Integration Act were excluded from integration and their operating licences withdrawn. In such cases, and if they decided to exit, their shares in the Savings Bank could be bought by the MFB, who had a call option (section 20(10) of the Integration Act). 22.  In July 2013 banks could leave the integration if they were each able to provide an additional HUF 2 billion, approximately EUR 6 million, as for the creation of a new bank. Moreover, following the amendment of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to deposit an amount equivalent to the value of the share capital they had had at the time of the establishment of their membership in the Integration Organisation to a separate account at the Savings Bank for 730 days (sections 11(7) and (8), and 20/A(12) and (13) of the Integration Act; see also paragraph 43 below). At least one bank, to which the Integration Act applied, decided to exit the system and this decision was accepted by the Supervisory Authority. 23.  In 2012 the Hungarian State emerged as an indirect owner of the Savings Bank, when the MFB (see paragraph 19 above), which is owned by the State, purchased a stake in Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, representing 38.5% of the Savings Bank\u2019s shares. Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the Savings Bank\u2019s capital was increased by HUF 654,986,000 to HUF 3,389,704,000 (approximately EUR 10 million) from the previous amount of HUF 2,735,038,000. Out of this capital increase, the State-owned Hungary Post (Magyar Posta) exercised its statutory subscription rights and acquired ordinary shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 654,666,000 (approximately EUR 2 million), almost 20% of the Savings Bank\u2019s shares (see section 20 of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 below). 24.  Apart from the capital increase, the State has directly paid HUF 136 billion, approximately EUR 420 million, to the Integration Organisation through the Joint Capital Coverage Fund of Cooperative Credit Institutions (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Fund\u201d). 25.  It was envisaged that the State\u2019s ownership in the integration would only be of a temporary nature. In 2014 its stake in the Savings Bank was sold, through a bidding process, to one company. According to the Government, the majority of the buyer company is owned by savings cooperatives and private individuals and, as a result of this transaction, the direct and indirect shareholding of cooperative credit institutions in the Savings Bank increased to 76.96%. 26.  Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to approve a new memorandum of association conforming to the model established by the Integration Organisation. They continue to be bound by any amendments to the model introduced by the Integration Organisation (sections 17/H and 19(3) of the Integration Act, see also paragraph 46 below). 27.  For a resolution by the board of directors and supervisory board of the cooperative credit institutions to be valid, an invitation to the relevant meeting of the board of directors or supervisory board, together with all related material, must be simultaneously sent to the Savings Bank (section 15/A of the Integration Act). Minutes of the general meetings and meetings of the board of directors of the cooperative credit institutions must always be submitted to the Savings Bank, and minutes of the supervisory board meetings must be sent to the Savings Bank in certain cases. The cooperative credit institutions are also required to inform, inter alia, the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank of any legal proceedings in which they are involved (section 15/C of the Integration Act). 28.  The shareholders of the cooperative credit institutions may take, inter alia, the following resolutions subject to consent/approval of the Savings Bank:\n- the adoption of the annual financial report of the company (section 15(11) and 17/J(2) of the Integration Act);\n- the issuing of bonds (section 17/K(1) of the Integration Act);\n- decreases or increases of capital (ibid.);\n- any payment to the shareholders under any legal title (e.g. dividends, reduction of capital) in connection with their status as shareholders (see section 17/Q(3) and (4) of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 below);\n- the conversion, merger or demerger of the company (section 17/S(3) of the Integration Act); and\n- acquisition of own shares (section 17/Q(6) of the Integration Act). 29.  The consent of the Savings Bank is required for the appointment of executive officers of the cooperative credit institutions (section 15(12) of the Integration Act). The Savings Bank is authorised to suspend their mandate; it may appoint a managing official for an interim period if the cooperative credit institutions do not comply with the instructions or their operations are not in compliance with the law or regulations, or if they are in a so-called crisis situation (section 15(4), (7) and (12) of the Integration Act). 30.  The Integration Organisation is entitled to suspend the voting rights of the shareholders of the cooperative credit institution for one year if they threaten the reliable and secure operation of the cooperative credit institutions (see section 17/C(5), cited in paragraph 39 below). 31.  The Integration Organisation is authorised to define the level of the cooperative credit institutions\u2019 solvency capital on an individual case\u2011by\u2011case (not consolidated) basis (section 17/C(1); if they do not reach the level defined, the Integration Organisation is authorised to increase the capital of the cooperative credit institutions, or take certain other measures (see section 17/C(2), cited in paragraph 39 below). 32.  As to the actual application of the measures provided for by the Integration Act, the Government submitted the following information:\n(i)  There have been altogether 151 cases in which cooperative credit institutions sought the consent of the Integration Organisation for the appointment of board members; in ten cases the consent was refused, affecting seven cooperative credit institutions. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank.\n(ii)  Executive officers of cooperative credit institutions were removed in nine cases; four of these affected cooperative credit institutions where the capital adequacy ratio was largely insufficient, which led to a capital injection by the Integration Organisation in three cases and a merger with another cooperative credit institution in the fourth case; in the remaining five cases, executive officers were removed for breaches of the relevant legislation. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank.\n(iii)  In eight cases the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of dividends; the reasons were: (a) non-compliance with the relevant legislation (two cases, including Kinizsi Bank (see paragraph 35 below)), (b) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan (four cases), (c) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan but allowing for the payment of a limited amount of dividends (two cases, including Moh\u00e1csi Bank (see paragraph 35 below)).\n(iv)  In three cases the increase in capital was provided by the Integration Organisation in order to achieve the 8% capital adequacy ratio; none of them concerned Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank.\n(v)  The voting rights of shareholders of cooperative credit institutions have never been suspended by the Integration Organisation.\n(vi)  In two cases, not concerning Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of the shares\u2019 value in a cooperative credit institution for members who had exited the institution, finding that the payment would have jeopardised the fulfillment of the capital adequacy ratio requirements. 33.  Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank had to adopt a memorandum of association in line with the model provided by the Integration Organisation following the entry into force of the Integration Act. However, the shareholders of the two banks who disagreed with the resolution adopting the aforementioned memorandum challenged it in court. On 12 March 2015 the P\u00e9cs High Court found for the plaintiffs in the case brought by the Mohacsi Bank\u2019s shareholders. The court held that the model memorandum of association issued by the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation could not in any way deviate from the mandatory provisions of the Companies Act. On 30 March 2015 a similar judgment was given by the Veszpr\u00e9m High Court in a case brought by the shareholders of Kinizsi Bank. In both cases, the decision adopting the impugned memorandum at the general meetings of the bank was annulled. 34.  It would appear that the required solvency capital of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank was at some point raised. However, both banks were able to comply with the new requirement. 35.  In the case of Kinizsi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to approve the annual report for 2014 as the bank had not provided data to the auditor to complete the financial audit. The applicants submitted that the required data had been submitted in due time. In the case of Moh\u00e1csi Bank, the Savings Bank approved the annual financial report for 2014 but prohibited the actual payment of dividends amounting to 25% (see paragraph 32 above). 36.  The Government averred that several further sets of proceedings were pending before Hungarian courts in which Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank or their shareholders had sought a remedy against certain decisions of the Savings Bank or the Integration Organisation.", "references": ["5", "6", "1", "0", "4", "7", "8", "2", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  The applicant was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1992 and came to Russia in 2003, together with his mother and grandmother. He graduated from a secondary school and a vocational training college in St Petersburg. He has no identity documents. 6.  On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a \u201cnative\u201d (\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0446) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (\u0421\u0423\u0412\u0421\u0418\u0413 \u0423\u0424\u041c\u0421 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u041f\u0431 \u0438 \u041b\u041e) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7.  On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant\u2019s nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. 8.  On 19 May 2014 a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. 9.  By a judgment of 17 July 2014, as upheld on appeal on 30 October 2014, the St Petersburg courts refused to discontinue the proceedings, finding that the bailiff had not shown that she had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant\u2019s removal. 10.  On 7 August 2014 counsel for the applicant asked the St Petersburg City Court to review the Kirovskiy District Court\u2019s judgment by way of supervisory review, to annul the sanction of administrative removal and to release the applicant. Counsel pleaded in particular that the applicant\u2019s removal was not a realistic prospect and that his continued detention could only be justified if deportation proceedings were genuinely in progress. On 25 November 2014 a deputy president of the City Court acceded to her request. Noting that the applicant was not an Azerbaijani national, the judge found that his removal was not feasible and that his detention was likely to become indefinite. He amended the judgment, replacing the removal with the requirement to leave Russia voluntarily under control. 11.  On 27 November 2014 the applicant was released. 12.  The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows. From 7 to 20 February 2014 he shared Cell 307 measuring 17 square metres with ten other detainees. It was not furnished, inmates unrolled mattresses for the night. From 20 February to 5 May 2014 he was held in a smaller, seven\u2011square-metre cell (Cell 310), together with five or six persons. Two-tier bunk beds were brought in only in late April 2014. From 5 May to 27 November 2014 he was in Cell 309 measuring seventeen square metres. Initially it had accommodated twelve persons but their number rose to seventeen in November when they started renovating the cells on the seventh and eighth floors of the facility. Detainees had to remain within the floor on which their cell was located; they could not go outside or to other floors. Outdoor exercise was limited to a fifteen-minute walk once a week because there was not enough staff to supervise the detainees. The facility did not have a library, board games, radio or workshop, or offer any other meaningful activities.", "references": ["8", "7", "3", "0", "4", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bir\u017eai. 5.  On 11 April 2008 the applicant\u2019s son, M.P., was arrested on suspicion that he had committed a burglary and stolen a laptop computer. He was taken to a police station in Bir\u017eai, where he was held until his death (see below). On 12 April 2008 the police searched M.P.\u2019s home and found an amount of drugs (cannabis). On 13 April 2008 the authorities informed M.P. that he was suspected having committed crimes of theft and possession of drugs. 6.  By a ruling of 13 April 2008, a court sanctioned M.P.\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of eighteen days, on the grounds that he could flee from justice, for previously he had worked in Norway and had connections in that country. M.P. confessed to possession of drugs, but denied the theft. M.P. was present at the court hearing; he also had a lawyer, J.P., representing his interests in the courtroom. The court indicated that M.P. had no criminal record. 7.  While detained at Bir\u017eai police station, M.P. was kept in cell no. 1 alone for the entire time, given that the other detainees at that station had prior convictions, and, pursuant to the relevant domestic law, persons with no criminal record had to be held separately from those with prior convictions (see paragraph 53 in fine below). 8.  As later established by the prosecutor, whilst detained at Bir\u017eai police station between 12 and 14 April 2008 M.P. was taken out of his cell four times so that he could meet his lawyer and the investigator. During the pre-trial investigation M.P.\u2019s lawyer, J.P., would later also testify that he had met M.P. at around 2-3 p.m. on 14 April at Bir\u017eai police station to discuss whether to appeal against the court ruling imposing detention, but M.P. had stated that there had been no need because he had been ready to confess of the theft. Later that day the lawyer had taken part in M.P.\u2019s questioning by the pre-trial investigator, when M.P. had made a statement about the theft. According to the lawyer, M.P. had communicated in a calm manner, he had not been agitated and had had no complaints. 9.  On the morning of 15 April 2008 M.P. was found dead in his cell at Bir\u017eai police station. As was later established during the pre-trial investigation, at around 8 a.m. that morning the guards\u2019 shift was changing, and, in accordance with the applicable rules, the doors of all the cells were being opened. M.P. was found standing with his feet on the ground leaning forward; a blanket was looped tightly around his neck while the other end of the blanket was attached to the metal bar at the side of the top bunk of his bunk bed. The body bore the marks of strangulation, without marks of any other injuries. Police Officer D.M. immediately took M.P. out of the noose and laid him on the floor of the cell. 10.  As transpires from the medical records and the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2014 (also see paragraph 44 below), at 8.08 a.m. on 15 April 2008 officers at Bir\u017eai police station called an ambulance, which arrived at the scene within a couple of minutes, at 8.12 a.m. The paramedics indicated in the medical report and also later testified during the pre-trial investigation that they had examined M.P.\u2019s body at 8.12 a.m.: the body had been found lying on the floor, had shown no signs of breathing or a pulse, the pupils had been dilated and had not reacted to light, the neck had shown signs of strangulation, post-mortem discoloration had set in, as had rigor mortis. The paramedics also stated that they had not attempted to resuscitate M.P. because according to what they had seen he had died one or two hours before. The paramedics further asserted that apart from strangulation marks on M.P.\u2019s neck there had been no injuries on M.P.\u2019s face or hands. They also attested that there had been no signs on M.P.\u2019s hands which would have indicated that he had been handcuffed or tied with a rope. The paramedics also noted that, if any other injuries had have been visible on M.P.\u2019s body, they would have been noted in the medical report. 11. There was a suicide note found in the cell. It was addressed \u201cTo Mother\u201d. An empty box of matches was found in M.P.\u2019s cell, and the authorities later established that the suicide note had been written with charcoal from used matches (also see paragraphs 21 and 44 below). 12. On 15 April 2008, the incident scene was inspected, photographs were taken, one of them showing a white sheet on the bunk bed, and police officers who worked at Bir\u017eai police station had been questioned. The same day the prosecutor also questioned the applicant, who stated that \u201crecently her son [had] not complain[ed] about any problems or troubles, everything [had been] good\u201d. She also stated that previously \u201cM.P. ha[d] never attempted to hang himself or to commit suicide, there [had been] no similar accidents in the past, and he [had] not mention[ed] such things either\u201d. The prosecutor continued questioning the police officers on 17 April 2008. 13.  On 15 April 2008 an autopsy was ordered. The prosecutor provided the expert with a plastic bag containing M.P.\u2019s clothes and a blanket which had been found in M.P.\u2019s cell. The expert examination was performed the following day, 16 April 2008. The expert, who was from the Panev\u0117\u017eys branch of the Mykolas Romeris University Forensic-Medicine Institute (Mykolo Romerio Universiteto Teismo medicinos instituto Panev\u0117\u017eio skyrius), concluded that the cause of M.P.\u2019s death had been mechanical asphyxiation as a result of his neck being squeezed by a noose. Whilst noting that there were light scratches on M.P.\u2019s forehead and nose, the expert observed that this could have resulted from scratching of acne and concluded that it was not related to M.P.\u2019s death (report no. M 224/008(05)). 14.  The applicant requested that an additional autopsy be performed and the prosecutor granted her request. The additional autopsy was performed on 18 April 2008 (report no. M 759/08(01)). The forensic expert at the Vilnius branch of the Mykolas Romeris University Forensic-Medicine Institute concluded that there were strangulation marks on the neck and bruising on the back. The neck injuries could have been inflicted several minutes prior to death as a result of the neck being squeezed by the bed sheet. As to the bruising on the back, this could have been caused when the body hanging in the noose went into convulsion hitting off hard blunt surfaces. The expert concluded that there were no objective indications which could have denied M.P.\u2019s cause of death as having been asphyxiation when the neck had been squeezed in a noose. The expert noted that there were no signs of strangulation by hands; he also indicated that it had been a one-time constriction on the neck.\nThe findings of this additional autopsy were later confirmed when, following the last reopening of the criminal proceedings, the pre-trial investigation judge ordered another forensic examination (report no. EKM 52/14(01)) to be performed to answer certain questions, including those submitted by the applicant. 15.  According to the Government \u2013 who have not been contested on this point by the applicant \u2013 upon the applicant\u2019s request, after the second autopsy the bailiff examined the corpse and took photographs in order to establish factual circumstances. The bailiff noted injuries on the back and the neck of the corpse. 16.  On 7 May 2008 the applicant was granted victim status. She was represented by a lawyer. 17.  On 25 November 2008 the prosecutor summarised the findings made as a result of the criminal investigation and decided to discontinue it, citing the lack of any indication of a crime. The prosecutor considered that M.P. had died through suicide, which was corroborated by his suicide note. 18.  However, by a ruling of 5 February 2009 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court, on appeal by the applicant, found that the pre-trial investigation had not been thorough and annulled the prosecutor\u2019s decision to discontinue it. For the court, it had been necessary to investigate whether M.P. had been harmed by other persons, taking into account the injuries on M.P.\u2019s wrists, as alleged by the applicant, as well as to examine the suicide note and to establish whether it had been written by M.P. and with what writing instruments. The video recordings from Bir\u017eai police station had not been properly inspected, and the statements of some of the police officers had been contradictory, even false. Moreover, an internal investigation had established gross breaches of duty by the police officers at the police station (see paragraphs 47-50 below), which in turn could attract criminal liability under Article 229 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 52 below). Nevertheless, the prosecutor had failed to assess that internal-investigation report. 19.  In March and April 2009 another prosecutor continued the investigation and questioned witnesses. 20.  In May 2009, and in order to establish whether the suicide note had been written by M.P., the prosecutor ordered a handwriting expert examination of the note, which then was compared to several other documents handwritten by M.P. One of those other documents was a note which M.P. had handwritten to the applicant on 14 April 2008, whilst detained at Bir\u017eai police station. It transpires from the material before the Court that that document had been in the possession of the applicant who had refused to give it to the authorities. A copy of that note had eventually been obtained by the authorities under a court order. 21.  In June 2009 the handwriting experts produced a report concluding that the suicide note had been undoubtedly been written by M.P. In December 2009 the forensic experts concluded that there was high probability that the suicide note had been written with burned matches, which could have come from one of the two match boxes that had been found in M.P.\u2019s cell or from another box of matches (expert report no. 11\u20131457(09)). 22.  On 29 January 2010 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation, holding that M.P.\u2019s death had been suicide. In reaching that decision he relied on an abundant body of evidence, including analyses of the video recordings from the police station cameras, which showed that no\u2013one had entered M.P.\u2019s cell at the relevant time. Between 5 p.m. on 14 April 2008, when M.P. had already been in the cell, until 8.04 a.m. on 15 April 2008, when M.P.\u2019s body had been found, the doors of his cell had been opened only once, at 8.00 p.m. on 14 April 2008, when the guards D.M. and D.A. had changed shift. Furthermore, the recordings showed that the guards D.A. and D.M. had checked on M.P. several times though the peep hole, and during the night the guard D.M. had patrolled his area several times. 23.  As to the possible criminal liability under Article 229 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 52 below) on the part of the police, the prosecutor took into account the conclusions of the internal investigation to the effect that the Officers D.M. and R.S. had not followed the internal instructions regarding the obligation to constantly observe detainees. That being so, the prosecutor also noted that the two officers could not have foreseen the consequences of such behaviour \u2013 M.P.\u2019s suicide \u2013 and prevent it, because M.P. had been a quiet and introverted person, he had been calm, had caused no problems in the police station and had not complained. There had been no indication that M.P. had had suicidal tendencies or a tendency to self-harm, and therefore no signs that special supervision had been needed. Accordingly, since there had been no causal link between the actions of the officers and the consequences, there were no grounds to start a pre-trial investigation for failure to perform official duties. 24.  On the basis of an appeal by the applicant, who had argued that during such a flawed pre-trial investigation her suspicions that her son had been murdered had only become stronger, by a ruling of 13 May 2010 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court in a public hearing again annulled the prosecutor\u2019s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. This time the court considered that there were certain contradictions with regard to the bed sheet as the object used for strangulation. 25.  Having performed an additional examination of the bed sheet in the light of all available evidence, such as the witnesses\u2019 statements, the photographs from the scene and expert reports, by a decision of 6 September 2010 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.\u2019s death. 26.  The applicant appealed, and on 25 October 2010 the Roki\u0161kis County District Court quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court considered that, in order to eliminate all doubts as to how M.P. could have killed himself, it was possible to conduct a reconstruction which would also verify the applicant\u2019s version that her son could not have killed himself in the way suggested (see paragraph 9 above). The court also stated that it was necessary to establish why burned matches with which M.P. had written the suicide note had not been found in the cell. Lastly, the specific instrument which had been used as a noose around M.P.\u2019s neck had to be established. That decision was upheld by a higher court. 27.  On 14 December 2010 two reconstructions were performed at Bir\u017eai police station, with the participation of the applicant, the prosecutor, Police Officer D.M., who had found M.P.\u2019s body, and others. It was examined whether M.P. could have hanged himself in the manner stated by the police officers on 15 April 2008 (see paragraph 9 above). After the first reconstruction the applicant maintained that her son could not have hanged himself in the manner described. She had no remarks as to the results of the second reconstruction. The results of those reconstructions were written down in two reports. 28.  In order to find the instrument which had caused M.P.\u2019s strangulation, the prosecutor sent requests to the Bir\u017eai county prosecutor\u2019s office and to the forensic experts in Panev\u0117\u017eys, and questioned certain witnesses. Even so, the blanket could not be found. 29.  In the meantime, the applicant lodged an application to have a pre-trial investigation on the charges of failure to perform official duties (Article 229 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 52 below) opened in respect of the prosecutors who had earlier discontinued the pre-trial investigation. By a final ruling of 10 January 2011 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court refused her application, noting that it was within the prosecutors\u2019 competence which actions to take when handling a criminal case. More importantly, in this case, once the courts had annulled the prosecutors\u2019 decisions to discontinue criminal investigation, the prosecutors had continued the pre-trial investigation and the actions which the court had ordered had been carried out. 30.  On 10 February 2011 the Roki\u0161kis County District Court allowed an application by the applicant\u2019s lawyer to have a medical expert evaluate the results of the second reconstruction (see paragraph 27 above) in order to answer the question as to whether in hanging himself in the manner shown during the second reconstruction M.P.\u2019s neck bones should have broken. According to the applicant, one needed \u201cacrobatic\u201d skills to commit suicide in such a manner. Having performed the examination of the second reconstruction report and the additional autopsy report (see, respectively, paragraphs 14 and 27 above), on 27 November 2011 the expert concluded that he could not answer the question posed by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, because the question was speculative. 31.  On 13 January 2012 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.\u2019s death and also, for the reasons set out earlier (see paragraph 22 above) refused to open one in respect of Officers D.M. and R.S. for failure to perform official duties.\nHis decision was upheld by the first-instance court, which dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 32.  By a final ruling of 6 April 2012 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and upheld the part of the prosecutor\u2019s decision regarding the refusal to open a criminal investigation in respect of the actions of Officers D.M. and R.S., on the grounds that they had failed to perform their duties. The court reached this decision in a public hearing in which the applicant and her lawyer took part and could present their arguments. The court concurred with the prosecutor\u2019s view that the authorities had not been aware that M.P. had been a suicide risk, so as to confer liability on the officer. Pursuant to domestic law as applied in this case, persons detained in several cells at Bir\u017eai police station had to be constantly monitored through spy holes. Even so, on the basis of the medical report the court nevertheless underlined that M.P. had died within a couple of minutes of the moment when the noose had closed around his neck, that is to say within a very short time. It would have been physically impossible for D.M. and R.S. to constantly monitor, through the holes in the cell doors, all the persons detained at the police station, including M.P. This was one more reason why the court could not hold that D.M.\u2019s and R.S.\u2019s failure to perform their duties had caused M.P.\u2019s death. 33.  On 27 April 2012 the Roki\u0161kis County District Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal and quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 13 January 2012 in the part discontinuing the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.\u2019s death (see paragraph 31 above). The court held that in order to eliminate any contradictions about alleged violence against M.P., a confrontation had to be performed between the applicant and one of the police interrogators who had questioned her son on 14 April 2008 (see paragraph 8 above). In addition, the applicant requested that other persons who were detained at Bir\u017eai police station between 14 and 15 April 2008 be questioned, and the court granted that request. 34.  As requested by the court, the prosecutor then performed a confrontation between the applicant and the police interrogator and questioned eight individuals who had been detained at Bir\u017eai police station at the time of M.P.\u2019s death. They all stated that they had heard no suspicious sounds during that night. In particular, D.\u017d., M.P.\u2019s co-accused in the case of theft, who had also been detained in the same Bir\u017eai police station but in another cell, averred that the two of them had talked through the slots intended for passing food at about 9 p.m. on 14 April 2008. M.P. did not state that any violence had been used against him or that he had been threatened. Neither had D.\u017d. heard any suspicious sounds from M.P.\u2019s cell. 35.  On 22 October 2012 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.\u2019s death, holding that it had been the result of suicide. 36.  As she was dissatisfied with the way in which the pre-trial investigation had been conducted, on 14 November 2012 the applicant applied to have the entire office of the Panev\u0117\u017eys regional prosecutor\u2019s office removed from the investigation. By a final ruling of 7 March 2013 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court held that her complaints were without substance, and that there was no reason to believe that any prosecutors from that office would not be able to effectively carry out the pre-trial investigation. 37.  By a ruling of 31 January 2013 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court however allowed an appeal by the applicant against the prosecutor\u2019s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 35 above). The applicant was present at the court hearing. She asked that an expert report be prepared in order to establish whether the video recordings from Bir\u017eai police station had not been tampered with. The court granted her request. 38.  The prosecutor then proceeded with the pre-trial investigation. On 20 June 2013 the forensic experts produced report no. 11\u2013745(13), wherein they concluded that even if there were small gaps between the clips, each of the clips in those video recordings was complete, and that none of the clips had any signs of having been altered by deletion or addition. 39.  By a decision of 8 July 2013 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He relied on the entirety of the evidence in the criminal file, including the expert conclusions regarding the video\u2013recordings (see the above paragraph). 40.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the pre-trial investigation had been flawed, and that a number of pieces of evidence, such as, among other things, the marks on her son\u2019s wrists and the video recordings, had been improperly evaluated. 41.  By a decision of 1 October 2013 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court again quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court considered that there still remained certain contradictions, in particular, whether the short gaps within the video recording had occurred owing to a technical problem or because of another cause. It was also necessary to ascertain whether the video files had been provided in sequence. Moreover, no clear answer had been obtained from the medical expert as regards the possible reasons for M.P.\u2019s injuries in the light of the results of the second reconstruction (see paragraphs 27 and 30 above). A supplementary medical evaluation had to be performed in which the specialists would be provided with all the existing information about M.P.\u2019s injuries so that the mechanism of his death could be determined and the question of whether there had been signs of violence against M.P. answered. The applicant and her lawyer were given the opportunity to pose questions to the experts. Lastly, the court underlined that a person\u2019s death, and even more so a death in a police station, was \u201ca particular situation (yra ypatingas atvejis)\u201d, which had to be thoroughly examined. 42.  In accordance with the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court\u2019s instructions (see the paragraph above), the prosecutor then asked the forensic experts to examine the video recordings at issue. On 1 April 2014 an expert at the Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (Lietuvos Teismo ekspertiz\u0117s centras) then concluded (report no. 11\u20133422(13)) that it was most likely that the gaps between the clips had appeared when transferring the video files to DVD. The video files were in chronological order. The expert also noted that one of the cameras had recorded two paramedics at the police station at 8.12 a.m. on 15 April 2008. 43.  As instructed by the Roki\u0161kis County District Court on 25 November 2013, the experts at the State Forensic-Medicine Service (Valstybin\u0117s teismo medicinos tarnyba) had been given the material of the pre-trial-investigation file, which had amounted to four volumes, to perform an expert examination of the cause of M.P.\u2019s death. They conducted the examination from 26 May to 28 November 2014 and produced report no. EKM 52/14(01). The experts firstly concluded that M.P. could have died as had been demonstrated during the second reconstruction, which had been performed on 14 December 2010 (see paragraph 27 above). They also noted that M.P.\u2019s neck organs could have been placed under pressure because of his own weight, and also underlined the fact that, when a person\u2019s body is in a certain position, his or her weight is sufficient to bring about suffocation. The experts also explained that the death of M.P. should have occurred while he was in a vertical or similar position, as proven by the location of the post-mortem discolouration, and that the bruises on M.P.\u2019s back could have been caused when he was in the noose and his back came into contact with the frame of the bunk bed during his convulsions. As to the injuries to M.P.\u2019s wrists, which the applicant alleged had been inflicted during handcuffing, the experts had explained that those had appeared after the first autopsy when M.P.\u2019s hands had been bound during preparation of his body for burial, which was the usual practice. On the basis of the documentary evidence \u2013 photographs of M.P.\u2019s corpse from the scene, the bailiff\u2019s statements of 16 April 2008 (see paragraph 15 above) and the additional autopsy report (see paragraph 14 above) \u2013 the experts also categorically and officially stated that there had been no bruising around M.P.\u2019s eyes, unlike what had been claimed by the applicant. 44.  By a decision of 19 December 2014 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He relied on the entirety of the evidence which he cross-referenced \u2013 including that obtained after the last resumption of the criminal investigation \u2013 and held that no crime had been committed, holding that M.P. had died as a result of suicide. For the prosecutor, suicide as the cause of death was also corroborated by the statements of M.P.\u2019s lawyer, who stated that on 14 April 2008 M.P. had been acting calmly, had been responsive, had not complained about anything and had not been agitated (see paragraph 8 in fine above). Among other things, the prosecutor also noted that an empty box of matches had been found in M.P.\u2019s cell, and that the cell had had a toilet and burned matches could have been disposed of there (see paragraphs 11, 21 and 26 above). Although the blanket which had been given to the forensic expert on 15 April 2008 (see paragraph 13 above) had not been found during the later stages of the pre-trial investigation, there was sufficient data to confirm that M.P. had put his neck into a noose made from a blanket, and there was no evidence that someone had forced him to do that or that someone had hanged him. 45.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision, asserting that the criminal investigation had not proven that her son had committed suicide. She still insisted that the evidence which had been gathered during the pre-trial investigation had been contradictory and had raised doubts. The applicant still considered that her son could have been a victim of police violence. 46.  The criminal proceedings in respect of M.P.\u2019s death were ultimately terminated by a ruling of the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court on 27 April 2015, dismissing an appeal by the applicant. The court noted that numerous pieces of evidence had been collected and examined. It also emphasised that two of the applicant\u2019s main criticisms had been answered. Firstly, after the last re-opening of the pre-trial investigation an examination of the video recordings was performed by a forensic expert, who had disproved the applicant\u2019s allegation that the video recordings from Bir\u017eai police station had been tampered with (see paragraph 42 above). Secondly, report no. EKM 52/14(01) (see paragraph 43 above), as well as earlier medical reports (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above), had reached the same conclusions \u2013 that M.P. had died as a result of being strangled in a noose. The court noted that those medical reports had explained that M.P. could have died in the manner which had been demonstrated in the second reconstruction, and also noted that there had been no signs of injuries on M.P.\u2019s body which he could not have inflicted himself. The applicant\u2019s allegation that M.P.\u2019s death could have been caused by someone else had been examined throughout the criminal investigation but no evidence of that had been found. The court also noted that the prosecutor had reached reasoned conclusions after having performed a comprehensive analysis of the gathered evidence. Although the applicant had expressed doubts in respect of the evidence gathered, in her appeal she had not presented any new arguments regarding what particular pre-trial investigation actions had not been performed, what data had not been evaluated, or what investigative actions, had they been performed, would have clarified any important circumstances in this case. Lastly, the court concluded that during the pre-trial investigation all actions provided by law had been used to obtain evidence. Even so, there was \u201cno unquestionable data (neabejotini duomenys)\u201d that a crime had been committed. 47.  After M.P.\u2019s death, the police also conducted an internal investigation. It was led by a senior investigator at the Panev\u0117\u017eys city police. On 30 May 2008 the internal investigator produced report no. 50-1-IS-42, which was approved by the chief of the Panev\u0117\u017eys city police. 48.  Having examined the available material, which included both the criminal case-file regarding the theft and the material of the criminal case-file concerning the circumstances of M.P.\u2019s death, the internal investigator concluded that there was no information which could lead to a conclusion of any kind of abuse of M.P. by the police officers. 49. Within the course of the internal investigation, the safeguarding of M.P. while in police custody was also examined. On the basis of video recordings from the police station the internal investigation established that during his shift the guard D.M. had patrolled his area only a few times and had stopped only briefly at the doors of the cells. He had also only twice slowly walked the corridor along his post and only once, while patrolling his area, had he looked inside cell no. 1, where M.P. had been held. The investigator concluded that D.M. had thus failed to perform his duties in accordance with the internal instruction on ensuring constant supervision of detainees, and had thus committed a disciplinary offence. Lastly, the investigator noted that by making a statement during the internal investigation that he had ensured constant supervision of the detainees, D.M. had given false testimony. Afterwards D.M. was given a reprimand. 50.  As to the other guard \u2013 R.S. \u2013 the internal investigation established that he had monitored the situation at his post via video cameras, which he considered a possible way of carrying out his duties. The internal investigator admitted that such a method of carrying out his duties could not be seen as unreasonable, even if there had been certain technical errors in how his functions had been assigned. As a result, no disciplinary sanctions were imposed on R.S.", "references": ["6", "3", "7", "5", "9", "8", "2", "4", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  The applicant was born in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in 1971 and came to Russia in 1993. He graduated from a vocational training college in the Arkhangelsk Region. He has no identity documents. 6.  On 14 August 2014 the Directorate of the Federal Migration Service for the Arkhangelsk Region declared applicant\u2019s stay in the Russia undesirable (\u201cthe exclusion order\u201d). This order was based on his multiple convictions in the administrative and criminal proceedings. The applicant was required to leave Russia voluntarily by 14 September 2014. He was informed of this decision on 27 August 2014. 7.  Since the applicant failed to depart voluntarily, on 2 October 2014 the Plesetskiy District Court in the Arkhangelsk Region found him guilty of failing to leave Russia within the specified time-limit, which was an offence Article 18.8 \u00a7 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in a special facility for the detention of aliens. The removal and detention order indicated that the applicant was an apatride. 8.  The applicant was initially placed in one such facility in Arkhangelsk. A few days later the building was damaged by fire. On 7 October the applicant was transferred to the Krasnoye Selo facility in the Leningrad Region (\u0421\u0423\u0412\u0421\u0418\u0413 \u0423\u0424\u041c\u0421 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u041f\u0431 \u0438 \u041b\u041e). 9.  Replying to an inquiry from the Federal Migration Service, on 12 November 2014 the Embassy of Tajikistan confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. Subsequently, a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court refused her application, finding that it had not been shown that the bailiff had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant\u2019s removal. 10.  On 8 May 2015 counsel for the applicant asked the Plesetskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the removal and detention order. He submitted that the applicant was an apatride, that no State was willing to accept him, and that he had already spent seven months in custody in poor conditions. 11.  On 4 June 2015 the District Court rejected the application. It considered that even an apatride could be removed from Russia and that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention had not been unreasonable. 12.  On appeal from counsel, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court set aside the District Court\u2019s decision. Referring to the case-law of the Russian Constitutional Court prohibiting indefinite detention of individuals (judgment no. 6-P of 17 February 1998), it held that the removal and detention order should have set the maximum period of the applicant\u2019s detention. 13.  On 31 July 2015 the District Court carried out a fresh determination of the application. It found that enforcement was no longer feasible because the applicant was not a national of Tajikistan and that he had already spent a long time in the detention centre. The District Court discontinued the execution of the removal and detention order and ordered the applicant\u2019s release. He was released on the same day. 14.  In so far as the parties\u2019 descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention coincided or were undisputed, they may be summarised as follows. The applicant shared the cell with three other detainees. Its floor surface was given as fifteen square metres by the applicant and as twenty-seven square metres by the Government. Each detainee had his own bed and bed linen. A squat toilet and a sink were placed inside the cell and separated with a one-metre-high wall. Detainees were allowed to spend up to fifteen minutes outside per week, in the courtyard of the facility. Food was brought in pre-cooked, the ration did not include fish, dairy products or fresh fruit.", "references": ["7", "5", "4", "9", "6", "0", "3", "1", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are former employees and heirs of former employees of company F. - C.M.E. S.A. (hereinafter \u201ccompany F.\u201d), which owned a factory making engines and electric alternators in Aveiro. The company experienced a series of financial problems in 1985, leading to it being unable to continue paying salaries to its staff. 6.  On 4 October 1994 the Coimbra Court of Appeal declared company F. insolvent. On 8 May 1995 the case was remitted to the Aveiro Court. 7.  By a decision that was made public on 3 July 1995 the Aveiro Court ordered that creditors wishing to declare their claims (reclama\u00e7\u00e3o de cr\u00e9ditos) should be summoned. 8.  Having learnt that a site division and urban development plan (plano de pormenor) encompassing the land of company F. had been drawn up by the municipality of Aveiro, former employees of the company, including some of the applicants, applied to the Aveiro Court on 12 December 1997, requesting that it wait for the plan to be approved before ordering the sale of company F.\u2019s assets. They hoped that the plan would lead to a rise in the land\u2019s value and thus increase the prospects of their recovering what they were owed. 9.  On 24 March 2000 the Aveiro Court issued a decision on the classification of the various claims (senten\u00e7a de gradua\u00e7\u00e3o de cr\u00e9ditos). Some of the creditors appealed against that decision to the Coimbra Court of Appeal. 10.  In a decision of 7 November 2000 the Aveiro Court authorised the suspension of the sale (see paragraph 8 above) until the approval of the site division and urban development plan. 11.  In a judgment of 23 January 2001 the Coimbra Court of Appeal delivered a judgment on the classification of the former employees\u2019 claims. On 9 February 2001 the first applicant appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court of Justice. 12.  On 19 February 2001 the applicant Rosa Rodrigues Casal (applicant no. 199 in the appended table) lodged an application with the Aveiro Court, seeking to register a claim against the insolvent company. 13.  On 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Justice delivered a judgment confirming the classification of claims by the Coimbra Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). 14.  On 27 November 2002 the judicial liquidator informed the Aveiro Court that he had suspended his activities following another court\u2019s decision. In a decision of 29 January 2003 the court appointed a new liquidator. 15.  On 15 April 2009, as part of a redraft of the court-distribution map (setting out the geographical areas over which courts had jurisdiction), the proceedings were transferred to the Aveiro Commercial Court. 16.  On 29 July 2009 the municipality of Aveiro, the body of creditors and company G. entered into an agreement for the exchange of land between company F., company G., a neighbouring company, and the Aveiro municipality. 17.  On an unspecified date a part of the land measuring 17,629.10 sq. m and a separate plot were put up for sale. 18.  On 14 July 2011 a session at which offers to purchase could be made took place, and no offers were received. The court ordered the judicial liquidator to submit the documentation concerning that session and the proposal for sale within ten days. 19.  On 6 December 2011 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings. 20.  Since the judicial liquidator had not replied to the previous request, on 6 March 2012 the court ordered him to urgently provide information on the state of the proceedings, giving him a ten-day time-limit. 21.  In the absence of any reply to the two previous requests, on 17 April 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings, and also ordered that he would be fined if he did not provide such a reply. 22.  On 23 April 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that no offers to purchase had been received, and he proposed to initiate contact with companies which specialised in the real-estate sector. 23.  On 2 May 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to establish contact with real-estate companies, and gave him a ten-day time-limit. 24.  On 29 May 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that he had contacted some real-estate companies, but he requested ten more days in order to finalise the task. On 4 June 2012 he was informed that his request had been granted. 25.  On 12 June 2012 the judge ordered the judicial liquidator to draw up a report indicating the detailed amounts to be allocated to each creditor in the light of the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 13 above). 26.  Following the Aveiro Commercial Court insisting that the judicial liquidator provide information on the progress regarding contact with real-estate companies by way of three notifications (sent to him on 27 September, 19 October and 19 November 2012), on 16 January 2013 he informed the court that only one real-estate company had expressed interest in mediating the sale of the property. 27.  On 6 March 2013 the court invited the judicial liquidator to initiate new contact with real-estate companies by email, since until then contact with the real-estate companies had been established in person. 28.  On 18 December 2013 the judicial liquidator informed the court that contact by email had been made with 119 real-estate companies, and offers to acquire the property were to be received until 15 January 2014. In the meantime, the court had sent him three notifications in that regard \u2013 on 21 May, 10 July and 11 November 2013. 29.  On 17 June 2014 the judicial liquidator replied to the 12 June 2012 court order (see paragraph 25 above). He informed the court that most former employees had not detailed the origin of their claims, and therefore it was not possible for him to provide a detailed plan on payment. On the same date the judicial liquidator informed the court that only three real-estate companies had replied and that those replies were negative. He then suggested that a new procedure for a sale by private agreement should be initiated, this time for 50% of the previously requested amount. 30.  In reply to the judicial liquidator\u2019s information, on 11 July 2014 the judge ordered him to provide information on the amount already obtained as proceeds of the liquidation (produto da liquida\u00e7\u00e3o), by reference to real estate or movable property, in order to assess the practical effects of distributing those amounts among the creditors. As the judicial liquidator did not reply to that request, on 1 July 2015, 21 April 2016 and 13 June 2016 the court insisted that he do so. 31.  Meanwhile, on 30 September and 9 October 2015 the judicial liquidator was summoned in two sets of tax enforcement proceedings against company F. 32.  On 23 November 2016 the judicial liquidator informed the court of the two sets of tax enforcement proceedings which were ongoing. 33.  On 6 July 2017 the court notified the judicial liquidator that he should provide information on the state of the proceedings within ten days. 34.  On 1 September 2017 the court insisted that the judicial liquidator provide information on the state of the proceedings. 35.  On 20 September 2017 the judicial liquidator informed the court that a new tax issue was an obstacle in the insolvency proceedings. 36.  According to the latest information received by the Court on 21 May 2018, the insolvency proceedings were, on that date, still ongoing. 37.  On 11 September 1996 the applicants and other individuals (represented in the present case by their heirs) identified by numbers 1 to 131 in the Annex lodged an application with the Court to complain about the duration of the proceedings at issue before the Aveiro Court. 38.  In a judgment of 8 June 2000, the Court found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings, awarding each applicant the sum of 900,000 Portuguese escudos (PTE \u2013 about EUR 4,489) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and PTE 313,840 (about EUR 1,565) to the first applicant for costs and expenses. 39.  The just satisfaction was paid to the applicants on 11 and 12 December 2000. 40.  By Resolution CM/ResDH(2016)149 adopted on 8 June 2016 at the 1259th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, the Committee of Ministers declared that it had exercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2 of the Convention in respect of application no. 34422/97, and decided to close the examination of its enforcement.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "0", "8", "1", "6", "2", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the town of Snizhne, Donetsk region. 5.  On 14 January 2004 the applicant\u2019s son, born in 1967, was found dead in the applicant\u2019s barn. On the same day police officers inspected the scene and reported that the man had committed suicide by hanging. 6.  On 24 January 2004 the investigator of the Snizhne Prosecutor\u2019s Office, following the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established in relation to the death of the applicant\u2019s son. 7.  On 11 February 2004, following a forensic medical examination, an expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death had been caused by strangulation by a loop of rope, possibly as a result of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s body weight pulling against the rope. The body displayed no other injuries. 8.  On 5 April 2005 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the decision of 24 January 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) as premature and unfounded, finding that further pre-investigation inquiries were necessary given that the possible reasons for suicide had not been examined, and other relatives as well as acquaintances of the deceased had not been questioned either. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 9.  In the course of further pre-investigation inquiries, between 2005 and 2012, the investigators took measures to establish the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death. They questioned various persons, and ordered numerous additional medical examinations of the corpse of the deceased. At a certain point medical experts noted that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s body had numerous fractures. The experts opined that all those fractures had been inflicted after the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death, possibly during the exhumation of the body. The applicant\u2019s husband informed the authorities that when he had seen his dead son in the barn, the corpse of his son had been in a sitting position and the rope loop had not been tightened. The applicant argued that it had not been suicide but a violent murder. She advanced different theories, suspecting notably: police security guards who had allegedly taken the applicant\u2019s son from a local bar, following which he had been found dead; a local police officer who had engaged in a dispute with the applicant\u2019s son; a woman who had been employed by the applicant\u2019s son in his textile business and her husband; the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s brothers-in-law; a business partner of the applicant\u2019s son; and people from a local gambling club (the applicant\u2019s son had been engaged in transporting money from the club to another town). 10.  On 25 April 2005, 26 March 2006, 20 August 2008, 17 February and 12 December 2011, 15 February 2012 and 17 September 2012, following the pre-investigation inquiries, the investigators refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising authorities, which found that further investigative measures were necessary. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 11.  On 7 December 2012 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened in respect of the alleged murder of her son. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted. 12.  On 24 December 2012, 22 July and 30 September 2013 the criminal proceedings were terminated because no elements of a crime could be established. Those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. In particular, on 5 December 2013 the Snizhne Town Court quashed the decision of 30 September 2013 after finding that the investigation had not been thorough and comprehensive. The court noted the theory of the possible involvement of the local police had not been properly examined, the role of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s brother-in-law had not been clarified even though he might have been the first to find the dead body, the applicant had not been questioned on all the issues which were relevant to the case, and the evidence relating to the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s suicidal tendencies had not been assessed. 13.  On 1 April 2014 the criminal proceedings were closed one more time on the ground that no elements of a crime could be established.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "8", "3", "4", "2", "5", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1925 and at the time of the introduction of the application lived in Dublin. 8.  On 20 December 2012 X. (around 55 years old) instituted an action before the Civil Court (Family Section) requesting the court to declare the applicant to be her biological father and to order this to be reflected on her birth certificate. 9.  On 11 February 2013 the Director of the Public Registry (also defendant in the proceedings) requested the court to order that the parties submit themselves to the genetic tests as provided by Article 100A of the Civil Code, and for the applicant to submit his details, which would be required to make the relevant changes to X.\u2019s birth certificate, if the court had to find in X.\u2019s favour. 10.  On 11 February 2013 the applicant filed written submissions in reply, denying that he had been involved in the applicant\u2019s conception and raising the plea of execeptio plurium concubentium (defence of several lovers) on the basis that X.\u2019s mother had had various partners. 11.  On 7 May 2013 X. filed her written statement confirmed on oath (affidavit), as well as that of her mother. In her affidavit X. claimed that she had been born in London of a relationship between her mother (Y.) and the applicant, and that as of her young age she had always been told that the applicant was her father. After her sixteenth birthday she had sent a letter to him, which remained unanswered. She claimed that in 1978 on having knowledge that the applicant was going to be in Malta she went to meet him at the airport \u2013 on that day she had seen him arrive with his family, and noted the resemblance between herself and one of the applicant\u2019s daughters. On that occasion she had not approached him, but they met some time later before a lawyer. She stated that the applicant greeted her warmly and that, after that, they met various times. She also met the applicant\u2019s wife. According to X. the applicant had told her that he would not inform his children about her in order not to disrupt their schooling and she agreed. X. stated that the applicant started visiting Malta regularly on his own and when she had become pregnant he had offered her one of his properties to live in, and in this way they lived there together on his visits to the island. On the birth of X.\u2019s daughter in 1979, the applicant had been the latter\u2019s god parent as shown by relevant certification. She claimed that upon the applicant\u2019s suggestion she moved to the U.K. only to return sixteen months later because she missed Malta. At that stage the applicant had given her the keys to another property for her to reside in. She remained in close contact with him until 1985. In 1998 she was evicted from the property and thereafter their relationship deteriorated. X. explained that during the eviction proceedings the applicant had promised her a sum of money to leave the premises peacefully, she accepted the deal but he never paid up. Subsequently, she successfully issued proceedings against him to recover the mentioned sum (the relevant court judgments were also submitted). 12.  According to Y.\u2019s affidavit, Y. had had a relationship with the applicant, for whom she worked, and had become pregnant. She claimed that the applicant had wanted to interrupt the pregnancy and brought a person home to give her an injection. She later miscarried. The applicant had bought her a place where to stay and they used to meet there, since he was married. Y. claimed that she had always been faithful to him as she feared him, given that he was a powerful man involved in criminal activities. Y. stated that she later gave birth to a child she had with him (X.) and thereafter their relationship had deteriorated, to the extent that he had also wanted her to prostitute herself. She finally plucked up courage, left him, and returned to Malta with X. 13.  On 13 May 2013, relying on Article 100A of the Civil Code (see Relevant Domestic Law), X. requested the court to order that genetic tests be undertaken by her and the applicant. Save for her own affidavit and that of her mother she declared to have no further evidence to adduce. On 4 June 2013 the applicant cross-examined Y. The cross\u2011examination was to continue on a later date. It is unclear whether this occurred. 14.  On 22 May 2013 the applicant objected to the tests on the basis that such an order would breach his human rights. In particular, he argued that Article 100A of the Civil Code (which referred back to Article 70A of the same code) breached his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, and requested the court to refer the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions. He further questioned why the request had been lodged fifty\u2011three years after X.\u2019s birth and noted his advanced age, arguing that any intervention could have negative medical implications for him. 15.  After hearing submissions from the parties on the matter, on 23 October 2013 the court referred the applicant\u2019s claim to the constitutional jurisdictions. 16.  In his submissions before the constitutional jurisdictions the applicant claimed that none of the aims mentioned in sub\u2011paragraph two of Article 8 applied in his case, and the law in force did not allow for a fair balance of the competing interests at play. It also imposed an excessive burden in so far as it impeded his possibility of contesting a claim. Moreover, everyone was entitled to institute such proceedings without a shred of evidence, and an alleged father would be bound to submit to the test, with all its consequences, even if he were sure that he was not the father. He claimed that a positive result of the test would disrupt and create havoc in his life after so many years of silence [he was 88 years old]. He requested the court to balance X.\u2019s right (if any) to know who was her father, and his right to respect for his private and family life. 17.  By a judgment of 30 October 2014 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found that there would be no violation of Article 8 if the Civil Court (in its ordinary competence) were to order the applicant to undergo a genetic test, for the specific purposes of that suit. 18.  The court considered that the enactment of the impugned provisions reflected the State\u2019s action in accordance with its positive obligations in respect of a person\u2019s right to know one\u2019s parentage in the context of a judicial procedure. Citing Pascaud v. France (no. 19535/08, \u00a7 64, 16 June 2011) the court reiterated that \u201cthe interest of a presumed father was not, alone, a sufficient argument to deprive the applicant [a person seeking to establish paternity] of her Article 8 rights\u201d. According to the court, disproportionality would result had the person seeking paternity acted negligently, by not requesting the test, or not availing him or herself of an available remedy, or had renounced such right, but this was not the case at hand. Referring to the ECtHR case\u2011law the court noted that while it was true that the absence of an obligatory test did not necessarily entail a violation, it could not be said that making it obligatory was in violation of Article 8 because it was not proportionate. 19.  Furthermore, the age of X. was irrelevant to her quest to discover her genetic parent. This was even more so given that she had been trying to establish paternity over the years and that the applicant had been part of her life for a period of time. In that light the applicant could not claim that his family life would now be in havoc. 20.  Lastly, referring to J\u00e4ggi v. Switzerland (no. 58757/00, ECHR 2006\u2011X) which concerned the same circumstances save that the putative father in that case was deceased \u2013 the court confirmed that a particularly rigorous scrutiny was necessary in weighing competing interests in cases of ascertaining parentage, and that a person\u2019s right to ascertain parentage was a vital interest protected by the Convention. 21.  On 10 November 2014 the applicant appealed. He argued, in particular, that by assessing the case under positive obligations, the first\u2011instance court had failed to assess proportionality. Neither had it looked at the lawfulness of the measure and the legitimate aim \u2013 in this connection he contended that since the requirement to order the test was mandatory (unless it concerned a minor), it deprived the judge making such order of any possibility to balance out the interests at play and to decide according to his or her discretion. Further, the impugned law impinged on the equality of arms principle and was contrary to procedural rules (specifically Article 562 of the Civil Code \u2013 see Relevant Domestic Law). 22.  By a judgment of 26 June 2015, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal and confirmed the first\u2011instance judgment. 23.  The Constitutional Court considered that, as was clear from the first\u2011instance judgment, that court had looked into the proportionality of the measure. While it had focused mostly on the legal aspects of the case, it did not mean that it had not considered the factual elements pertinent to the case, and indeed its conclusions had specifically referred to the case at issue and were not general. 24.  As had been noted by the first-instance court, the Constitutional Court referred to the fact that X. wished for a number of years to find the truth about an important aspect of her personal identity; she also wished to amend her birth certificate which read \u201cunknown father\u201d (and was thus, in her view, incorrect) to avoid further humiliation every time she had to present such certification. She also wanted to establish a claim over the applicant\u2019s property after his death, according to law. Thus, her impelling interest in determining paternity was clear. On the other hand, save for his old age, the humiliation of undergoing the test [a buccal swab], and the havoc the confirmation of such paternity would cause, the applicant had not referred to any further negative effects. 25.  The Constitutional Court recognised the right of X. to have her paternity established for the reasons adduced by her, namely moral and patrimonial interests. On the other hand the applicant had not put forward reasons which were sufficiently valid to find that the application in his case of Article 100A would breach his rights under Article 8. Reiterating the findings in Pascaud (cited above), the Constitutional Court emphasized that the interest of a presumed father was not, alone, a sufficient argument to deprive the applicant [a person seeking to establish paternity] of her Article 8 rights. Indeed, Article 8 paragraph 2 expressly allowed for a legitimate interference with a person\u2019s private life in the case that such interference was \u201cfor the protection and rights of others\u201d. This was precisely the case at hand. Thus, the application of the relevant law to the applicant\u2019s case would be justified given that the aim was precisely to establish the identity of the X. and safeguard her patrimonial interest, if it were to be found that she was the applicant\u2019s daughter. 26.  In that light and bearing in mind the applicant\u2019s submissions that Article 70A(2) of the Civil Code excluded any exercise of discretion by the court ordering the test, the Constitutional Court considered that while it was not excluded that there might be cases where the necessary application (applikazzjoni tassativa) of Article 70A(2) of the Civil Code may result in a breach of Article 8, namely where a fair balance has not been reached between the interests at play, in the present case it was not so, given the factual circumstances of the present case. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the applicant would not have suffered any humiliation in having to undergo a buccal swab which was not an invasive action, and any turbulence which could be caused to his private and family life did not outweigh X.\u2019s interests. 27.  Lastly, the complaint about equality of arms was frivolous in so far as the test was available to both parties, and also because the fact that a piece of evidence was conclusive evidence in favour of one party did not mean that it should be discarded. 28.  Following the above\u2011mentioned Constitutional Court judgment, on 18 October 2015 the Civil Court (Family Section) ordered that the proceedings be continued and that the applicant undergo the genetic test. It appointed an expert to conduct such an examination and requested her to submit a report by 28 January 2016. 29.  On 24 May 2016 counsel for the applicant informed the court that inquiries were to be made with the applicant concerning the possibility of him tendering evidence by video conferencing given that he was residing abroad. On 6 October 2016 counsel informed the court that it was likely that the applicant would file an affidavit with his own evidence. However, no such written testimony was submitted. 30.  The applicant submitted to the test and according to a report of the expert issued on 21 February 2017 (submitted to the ECtHR) the probability of paternity, namely of the applicant being X.\u2019s father, was 99.9998%. 31.  From the minutes of the hearing of 6 April 2017, it appears that the expert could not attend that hearing, so the court authorised her to submit the report, and confirm it on oath, at the court\u2019s registry; the court also solicited the applicant\u2019s details. The case was adjourned for judgment. On the same day a note was filed by the applicant indicating his personal details. 32.  On 21 June 2017 Civil Court (Family Section) declared that X. was the biological child of the applicant and ordered the Director for Public Registry to make the necessary changes in the act of birth of X. so to include the details of the applicant. The court judgment referred to the sworn statements of X. and Y. as well as to the DNA report, and the failure of the applicant to make submissions, opting to limit himself to submitting his personal details. The court noted that X. and Y.\u2019s testimony had not been rebutted as the applicant failed to submit his testimony, and the applicant\u2019s initial objection had been contradicted by the result of the DNA test, which corroborated the witness testimony, particularly that of Y.", "references": ["5", "3", "0", "2", "1", "6", "8", "9", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant, who belongs to the German-speaking minority in Belgium, was born in 1957. He is detained in the Paifve social-protection facility (\u00e9tablissement de d\u00e9fense sociale, or \u201cEDS\u201d). 9.  In 1997 the applicant was convicted of indecent assault of a minor aged under 16, rape of a minor aged under ten, theft, destruction and damage, and possession of prohibited firearms by the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court. The prison terms were due to expire on 20 February 2004. 10.  While in prison the applicant committed other offences, in respect of which fresh proceedings were brought, in particular for threats, harassment and making false accusations against members of the judiciary. In consequence, on 16 June 2003 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric institution, pursuant to section 7 of the Law of 9 April 1930 on Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Perpetrators of certain Sexual Offences (the \u201cSocial Protection Act\u201d), applicable at the material time, and on the basis, inter alia, of a neuropsychiatric report by Dr L., dated 15 December 2001, and a report by psychologist H., dated 20 August 2002. 11.  On 1 August 2003 the Indictment Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The applicant did not appeal on points of law. 12.  On 15 January 2004, based on, among other information, a psychiatric report by Dr V. dated 23 September 2003, the Minister of Justice also ruled that the applicant was to be placed in compulsory confinement, pursuant to section 21 of the Social Protection Act, in continuation of the sentences imposed in 1997. 13.  On 21 January 2004, further to a decision of 16 October 2003 by the Social Protection Board for the Lantin Prison psychiatric wing (commission de d\u00e9fense sociale, or \u201cCDS\u201d), the applicant entered the Paifve EDS, located in the French-speaking region of Belgium. 14.  An expert psychiatric report drawn up by Dr Ri. on 5 September 2005 stated, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... there is no doubt that Mr Rooman requires treatment which focuses initially on his paranoiac psychosis. Here, therapy must be undertaken simultaneously at psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic level. ... Long-term therapy over several years is required. The psychotherapy must be carried out by therapists specialising in the treatment of chronic psychosis, with, in the present case, support meetings and psycho-educational and pedagogical aspects. It is essential in this context that the therapies are administered in parallel; that is, that the psychotropic drugs help to prepare the patient for the psychotherapy and that, in turn, the psychological sessions enable the patient to respond to the psychotropic drugs.\n... The therapy should therefore begin in a secure institution; treatment might then be possible in the closed unit of a long-stay institution, before envisaging treatment in an open unit. Confirmation that [the applicant] has achieved the required level in order to vary the [place of] therapy must be given by a psychiatric expert.\n... With regard to practical implementation of the therapy, the language raises a significant problem. The psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment must take place in German. ...\u201d 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant made an initial application for conditional discharge. 16.  On 27 January 2006 the CDS postponed its examination of the request for conditional discharge until March 2006, holding that it was necessary to identify an institution that could admit the applicant and provide him with therapy in German, the only language that he understood and spoke. 17.  On 9 June 2006 the CDS examined the application. At the hearing, the director of the Paifve EDS acknowledged that the institution was unable to provide the therapeutic care recommended by the experts who had already been consulted, given that no German-speaking doctor, therapist, psychologist, welfare officer or custodial staff member was employed in the institution. 18.  In consequence, the CDS issued the following conclusions:\n\u201cIt is undisputed that the detainee speaks only German, and that the medical, welfare and prison staff in the institution in which he is detained are unable to provide him with any therapeutic or welfare assistance; that he has been abandoned to his fate without any treatment since his arrival in Paifve (on 21 January 2004), although some individuals have, on a voluntary basis, made considerable efforts to explain to him his situation, which he experiences as an injustice;\nIn the present case, the two-fold legal aim of the compulsory confinement, namely protection of society and of the patient\u2019s health, can only be achieved if the deprivation of liberty is accompanied by the treatment necessitated by the detainee\u2019s mental health; since this dual condition is not fulfilled, [Mr] Rooman\u2019s detention is unlawful; ...\u201d 19.  The CDS postponed its examination of the application for conditional discharge until a hearing to be held in September 2006, pending the appointment of German-speaking employees to the Paifve EDS. 20.  In accordance with an order by the chairperson of the CDS of 24 September 2006, the applicant was transferred to Verviers Prison so that its German-language psychosocial team could assess his mental health and ascertain whether he posed a danger to the public. On 30 October 2006 the CDS confirmed this order and postponed the case to a later date. 21.  On 26 January 2007 the CDS dismissed the application for conditional discharge. A report of 24 January 2007, drawn up by the German-language psychosocial team in Verviers Prison, indicated that the applicant had a psychotic personality and paranoid character traits (high self-esteem; lack of respect for others, whom he used only for his own purposes; a feeling of omnipotence; lack of self-criticism; use of threatening remarks), and that he was refusing any treatment. Furthermore, the CDS noted that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the security and language requirements arising from the applicant\u2019s specific profile, and that the only German-language hospital which could be considered was an open hospital, and had thus to be ruled out in view of the applicant\u2019s mental health. 22.  On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied for day release. On 5 June 2008 the CDS noted that it had proved impossible to provide any treatment and that the search for a German-language institution had proved fruitless. Accordingly, it ordered the Eupen remand prison to prepare a plan for conditional discharge, and ordered a new expert report to assess the level of danger posed by the applicant. It adjourned examination of the request sine die. 23.  Having received a new application from the applicant for conditional discharge, the CDS issued a decision on 5 May 2009, finding as follows:\n\u201cThere has been no progress in Mr Rooman\u2019s situation; progress cannot occur until he is in a setting where he can be understood in his own language, like any citizen of this country. A single member of the prison staff, a nurse [A.W.], is temporarily providing him with social contact, whereas a psychiatrist and/or a psychologist should be made available to him.\nFor years, the prison authorities have failed to put forward any kind of solution to this problem, of which its services are fully aware. Worse, as those authorities are unable to provide him with the necessary treatment, they seem to have resigned themselves to a role that extends no further than an unfair repressive detention.\nThe medical reports and [Dr Ro.\u2019s] expert report [of 21 January 2009] indicate that Rooman, who continues to present a danger to society, cannot be discharged without support and preparation in an institutional setting, something that cannot currently be provided in Belgium, but is available abroad.\u201d 24.  In view of those findings, the CDS invited the Eupen remand prison to prepare, together with the applicant, a plan for conditional discharge, and requested that the authorities rapidly take the necessary measures to improve the applicant\u2019s situation. 25.  On 13 October 2009 the CDS found as follows:\n\u201cIn the years since this file was opened (October 2003), the persons involved in this case have been thwarted by the fact that the individual in compulsory confinement speaks and understands only one language, and that the authorities have no German\u2011speaking staff available for him, with the exception of one nurse [A.W.] (who is apparently due to retire in the near future);\nIn September 2005 Doctor [Ri.], expert, wrote that changes to the detainee\u2019s regime \u2018are possible only in parallel with successful treatment, assessed by predefined steps. The treatment must begin in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution...\u2019 Given that treatment in Germany is impossible, it was to begin in Paifve with German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists;\nSince that time the detainee\u2019s situation has not changed: he converses and leaves the building only with the sole German-speaking member of staff, and a treatment programme has not even been put in place. No satisfactory follow-up has been given to the requests by the [Social Protection] Board for an end to be put to this unlawful situation for Mr Rooman, who is deprived of his freedom in order, on the one hand, to protect society from possible dangerous conduct by him, and on the other, to provide him with the treatment necessary for his reinsertion; ...\nIn the light of the authorities\u2019 failure, the question now before the Board is whether there exists, outside the social-protection facility, a unit or persons who could provide home-based therapy for Mr Rooman; ...\u201d 26.  In consequence, and pointing out that German was one of the national languages of Belgium and that the applicant was thus entitled to speak, be understood and receive treatment in that language, the CDS asked the Eupen remand prison to search in and around Verviers and Eupen for either a mental health unit, or a doctor or clinic, which could provide home\u2011based therapy for the applicant in his mother tongue. It reserved its decision on the application for conditional discharge. 27.  On 12 January 2010 the applicant submitted pleadings in support of his application for discharge. He criticised the failure to provide him with therapeutic care and complained about the effect on his health of the absence of any prospect of improvement in his situation. As his main submission, he requested his immediate discharge on the grounds of the illegality of his deprivation of liberty. Alternatively, he asked that the CDS impose an obligation on the relevant authorities to take all necessary measures so that he would receive, in his mother tongue, the treatment required by his mental-health condition. 28.  In an interlocutory decision of 13 January 2010, the CDS noted that the applicant\u2019s situation had not changed and that the reply from the Eupen judicial assistance unit gave no grounds for hoping that he could receive appropriate treatment, in a secure establishment or elsewhere, in the foreseeable future. It considered that it was necessary to attempt one last plea to the Minister of Justice, whose intervention had previously yielded some fruit, even if this had been insufficient to resolve the problem. The CDS accordingly ordered that an \u201cofficial report\u201d on the applicant\u2019s situation be sent to the Minister of Justice. 29.  On 29 April 2010 the CDS noted that the Minister of Justice had not responded to its submission and that the applicant\u2019s situation had worsened, since he was no longer assisted by the German-speaking nurse A.W., who had left the Paifve EDS. It found as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the report [from the psychosocial department] of 30 March 2010 that, except for occasional meetings with a welfare officer \u201cwho speaks German\u201d, the detainee has no social contact in his language and that he has had no opportunity for several months to converse and to gain a fresh perspective in the outside world; the doctor and psychologist who signed this report do not seem particularly convinced of progress in the \u2018ongoing measures (taken) by the department to enable a German\u2011psychologist to intervene occasionally to provide care for the German\u2011speaking patients in the EDS\u2019;\nMr Rooman\u2019s situation is deadlocked: an ill individual, he is detained in a prison medical institution where no one is able to provide the treatment to which he is entitled; the Minister and his departments are turning a deaf ear, with no concern for the despair to which this manifestly unjust attitude may lead;\nIn spite of the unlawfulness of Mr Rooman\u2019s detention, his health condition means that discharge cannot be envisaged unless it is accompanied by therapy and practical support;\nThe [Social Protection] Board has no powers, firstly, to restore the detainee\u2019s basic rights, namely, the rights to liberty, health care and respect for his humanity; and secondly, to compel the Minister to put an end to this situation, which his administration has been fully aware of for more than six years.\u201d 30.  The CDS decided, while \u201cremaining open to any proposals\u201d, to leave the applicant\u2019s situation unchanged; in other words, it rejected his application for discharge. 31.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Higher Social Protection Board (Commission sup\u00e9rieure de d\u00e9fense sociale or \u201cthe CSDS\u201d). 32.  In parallel, he made an urgent application to the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, asking that his detention be declared unlawful and requesting his immediate discharge, or, in the alternative, that a decision be issued ordering the Belgian State to provide him with the medical care required by his situation. 33.  By an order of 12 May 2010, the president of the court held that he did not have jurisdiction to hear this application, on the grounds that the CDS was the legally competent body to decide on the applicant\u2019s discharge or his continued compulsory confinement. 34.  On 27 May 2010 the CSDS upheld the decision of 29 April 2010 by which the CDS had held that the applicant was to remain in compulsory confinement. Unlike the CDS, it held that the applicant\u2019s detention was perfectly legal, given that he had been lawfully placed in compulsory confinement and that he did not meet the necessary conditions for definitive or conditional discharge. It noted that, under section 18 of the Social Protection Act, discharge could only be ordered if the detainee\u2019s mental condition had improved sufficiently and if the conditions for his reintegration into society were satisfied. It considered, however, that this was not the situation here. It also found that the mere fact that the applicant spoke only German did not mean that the authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment required by his condition. 35.  The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 36.  On 8 September 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the argument alleging a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it held that legal reasons had been given for the CSDS\u2019s decision and that it had been justified in law. It argued as follows:\n\u201cAs compulsory confinement is primarily a security measure, the therapeutic action necessitated by such detention is not legally required in order for the deprivation of liberty to be lawful, even if a secondary aim, after that of protecting society, is to provide the detained person with the necessary treatment.\nUnder section 14(2) of the Act, the social protection boards have the power, rather than the duty, to order, in a decision giving specific reasons, placement in an appropriate institution, corresponding to the relevant security measures and treatment required. It follows that execution of the compulsory confinement measure does not become unlawful solely because it is implemented in one of the institutions created by the government for that purpose, rather than in another institution specifically designated for the treatment it may provide.\u201d 37.  The Court of Cassation declared inadmissible the argument alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, on the grounds that examining it would require a factual verification of the conditions in which the applicant was detained and such an examination fell outside the scope of its jurisdiction. For the remainder, it considered that the CSDS had replied to the applicant\u2019s complaint in stating that the fact that he spoke only German did not mean that the relevant authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the required treatment. 38.  On 13 November 2013 the applicant again applied for discharge. 39.  A report by the psychosocial department of the Paifve EDS, dated 13 January 2014, reiterated that the applicant had a poor command of the French language, speaking only a few words of French which were insufficient to enable him to conduct a conversation; in consequence, he had very little contact with the other patients and members of staff. The report also indicated that the applicant had met a German-speaking psychologist on a single occasion, in June 2010; his behaviour had improved, he was less aggressive and intolerant than before, and he had recently been moved from the cell wing to the community wing; in addition, he had never expressed a wish to meet members of the psychosocial team on a regular basis. The report concluded that the applicant should remain in the Paifve EDS, citing among other reasons his \u201cuntreated mental health problems\u201d. 40.  On 24 January 2014 the CDS issued its decision. It noted, firstly, the content of the reports by Dr Ri., dated 5 September 2005, and Dr Ro., dated 21 January 2009, finding that it was necessary for the applicant to receive psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution, before his admission to an open facility could be envisaged. It noted that, since those reports were drawn up, the various attempts to resolve the language problem had not succeeded in securing a significant improvement in the applicant\u2019s health: his rare outings accompanied by a German-speaking member of the prison staff had been abandoned, since this employee was no longer available and had not been replaced; attempts to find a German-language institution, doctor or therapist had met with failure; no follow-up seemed to have been given to the commitment that a minimum number of German-speaking staff were to be recruited, and the applicant had, of his own accord, declined the assistance of the German-speaking welfare officer with whom he had occasionally met. Nonetheless, the CDS rejected the application for conditional discharge, finding that the conditions for discharge, namely an improvement in the applicant\u2019s mental state and guarantees for his social rehabilitation, were not met. With regard to the absence of treatment in German, complained of by the applicant, it held:\n\u201cThe detainee claims that he is not receiving the appropriate treatment for his mental health condition in German, his mother tongue, without however describing or even referring to the treatment allegedly denied to him, and that he would agree to accept or participate in. The mere fact that he only speaks German does not mean that the Paifve social-protection facility has not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment his condition requires.\nWhile, as [the applicant] points out in his submissions, it is for the relevant authorities to take all the necessary measures for his health, it is not, however, within the [Social Protection] Board\u2019s powers to discharge a detainee who claims to be the victim of shortcomings on the part of the authorities...\nNor does the Board have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to third parties, [or] to reprimand them for their actions or shortcomings ...\u201d 41.  On 3 April 2014 the CSDS upheld the CDS\u2019s decision. It held, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cContrary to what he alleges in his pleadings, the detainee receives all the treatment required by his condition from competent and qualified staff in the Paifve EDS, and his specific medical needs are fully taken into account. In spite of the treatment given, the detainee\u2019s mental condition has not yet improved sufficiently, on account of his paranoid and psychopathic character traits, his lack of self-criticism and his constant demands. The detainee is thus clearly wrong in attributing the lack of improvement in his mental condition to the language issue alone.\nThe continued compulsory confinement in an EDS suited to his medical condition of an individual who would represent a danger to the public in the event of discharge, when his mental condition has not sufficiently improved and the conditions for his social rehabilitation are not met, is not unlawful and does not amount to a violation of the provisions of the [Convention].\u201d 42.  On 25 June 2014 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision by the CSDS on the grounds that it had not addressed the applicant\u2019s argument that he was not receiving care appropriate to his situation, in view of the fact that he spoke and understood only German and that no German-speaking staff members were available in the facility where he was being held. The case was sent back to the CSDS with a differently constituted panel. 43.  On 22 July 2014 the CSDS issued an interlocutory order, requesting the CDS to appoint a group of German-speaking experts to update the psychiatric report of 21 January 2009. It invited the director of the Paifve EDS institution to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the requisite care was made available to the applicant, by at least providing the services of a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist. It ordered that the case be reopened and scheduled a hearing for 17 October 2014. 44.  In a decision of that date, the CSDS took note of the fact that the applicant had been treated by a German-speaking psychologist since 11 July 2014 and by a German-speaking psychiatrist since 16 September 2014. It ordered that a panel of experts be appointed; assisted by a German interpreter, it was to update Dr Ro.\u2019s report of 21 January 2009. 45.  The updated report, prepared by three experts who had each examined the applicant separately, was submitted on 27 March 2015. The experts concluded that the paranoia-like delusional disorder persisted, that the psychotic aspect of the applicant\u2019s personality was also still present, and that his neuropsychological condition was practically identical to what it had been in 2009 when Dr Ro. had drawn up his report. 46.  By a decision of 20 May 2015, the CSDS dismissed the request for final or conditional discharge, considering that the applicant\u2019s state of health had not improved sufficiently and that the conditions for his reintegration into society were not met. It also specified that it had not been established that this lack of improvement in the applicant\u2019s situation was due solely to the fact that he had not had an opportunity to be in contact with German\u2011speaking individuals, particularly in view of the treatment provided by medical staff since 11 July 2014. 47.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision, which the Court of Cassation dismissed in a judgment of 28 October 2015. The Court of Cassation restated the CSDS\u2019s conclusions and specified that, having regard to the reasons given by it, it was not necessary to examine the applicant\u2019s submissions alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 48.  In the meantime, on 28 March 2014 the applicant had brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the President of the French\u2011language Brussels Court of First Instance, as the judge responsible for hearing urgent applications in accordance with Article 584 of the Judicial Code. He requested his discharge or, in the alternative, that the authorities be ordered to take the measures required by his state of health. 49.  By an interlocutory order of 4 July 2014, the president of the court asked the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. from that EDS\u2019s psychosocial unit to inform him, firstly, about the treatment available in that EDS and, secondly, about the treatment that had in fact been provided to the applicant. 50.  In their respective replies, dated 28 August 2014, the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. indicated that the applicant now had access to consultations with a German-speaking psychologist and that the authorities had made contact with a German-speaking psychiatrist who had agreed to meet the applicant. Dr B. stated, in particular:\n\u201cPsychiatry is a branch of medicine which deals with mental disorders, and its modus operandi entails, first and foremost, a specific dialogue between a patient and his or her therapist, the doctor. This implies the use of language; it also implies, of course, that there is mutual understanding; it implies that the two sides have access to a common language, enabling them to communicate and allowing the psychiatrist to assess accurately all the nuances of the patient\u2019s condition and its development.\nFrom this perspective, however, we have constantly emphasised that [the applicant] is essentially German-speaking. Admittedly, he occasionally comes out with a few simple words in French, but, clearly, the years spent in Paifve have not persuaded him to learn to use French more fluently so as to communicate more meaningfully with those caring for him. Alternatively, as certain examinations seem to indicate, he is so cognitively disadvantaged that he cannot achieve this.\n... One can of course always hope that in [the applicant\u2019s] case, permanent support and appropriate treatment in the German language could improve his personality disorder somewhat, but, to repeat, I am more of the opinion that with this type of paranoid personality disorder, paranoia with anti-social traits, positive progress is unlikely.\u201d 51.  In an order of 10 October 2014, the president of the court noted that, until September 2014, the applicant had had no access to a psychiatrist who could communicate with him in German. He had had access to an external German-speaking psychologist between May and November 2010. The president noted that the consultations with that psychologist had ended, not because the applicant no longer wished to attend them, as alleged by the State in its pleadings, but because of the Belgian State\u2019s late payment of the psychologist\u2019s fees and expenses, and that the consultations had resumed in July 2014. He noted that, until April 2010, the applicant had benefitted from the presence and care of a German-speaking nurse, who had in the meantime left the Paifve EDS, but that since August 2014 the same nurse had been authorised to accompany the applicant on outings. Lastly, he noted that the applicant had met a German-speaking welfare officer, but had declined the latter\u2019s services in February 2014. 52.  With regard to the main request, the president held that he did not have jurisdiction to order the applicant\u2019s discharge, holding that only the social protection bodies had power to do so. Ruling on the subsidiary request, the president noted that the applicant had not had access to the mental-health treatment required by his condition, and considered that, prima facie, there had been a breach of his right of access to health care and that he had sustained inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. In consequence, he ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary to treat the applicant, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to initiate the treatment routinely provided to French-speaking persons in compulsory confinement who suffered from a similar mental illness to the applicant. 53.  No appeal was lodged against that order. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, the Belgian State appointed a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist, who visited the applicant several times. However, those visits appear to have stopped towards the end of 2015. 54.  In the meantime, on 2 May 2014 the applicant had filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. 55.  By a judgment of 9 September 2016, the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held that the failure to provide the applicant with psychological treatment in his mother tongue between 2010 and 2014 had been negligent. It held, in particular:\n\u201cIt is undeniable that the psychiatric and psychological treatment which must be provided to [the applicant] must be provided to him in German, the only language in which he is fluent and, moreover, one of the three national languages in Belgium.\nHowever, between 2010 and 2014 [the applicant] received no medico-psychological treatment in his own language.\nWhatever the quality \u2013 which is, indeed, undisputed \u2013 of the care provided to detainees in the Paifve [EDS], it is totally inappropriate for [the applicant\u2019s] mental\u2011health condition purely and simply on account of the fact that it is not given in German.\nIn spite of the official and repeated denunciations of this situation by the Social Protection Board to the Belgian State since 2010, the latter has taken no measures to correct it. In addition, it has produced no evidence of the slightest step taken by it to that end.\nThis failure to act amounts to negligence within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.\n...\nMoreover, and as [the applicant] also submits, Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention] require the Belgian State to take the necessary measures to provide him with access to the basic care necessitated by his mental health.\n...\nIn the present case, the applicant\u2019s vulnerability on account of the very nature of his psychological disorder and the absence of any real possibility of contact in his language have necessarily exacerbated his feelings of distress and anxiety.\nIt is immaterial that, in any event, the [applicant\u2019s] state of mental health does not permit his discharge. The mere fact of having been detained for an indefinite period without appropriate treatment amounts in the present case to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention].\nContrary to the submissions of the Belgian State, the fact that [the applicant] is not always receptive to psychological, medical and social therapy does not permit minimisation of the Belgian State\u2019s negligent attitude towards an individual suffering from a mental disorder, and whose discernment is, by assumption, uncertain.\nEqually, at the risk of disregarding the lived experience of the person suffering from a mental disorder, [the applicant\u2019s] stable conduct within the institution does not suffice to establish that he received appropriate treatment for his condition.\u201d 56.  Finding that this absence of treatment had caused the applicant mental suffering, the court ordered the State to pay him 75,000 euros (EUR), an amount assessed ex aequo et bono, in compensation for the period from January 2010 to October 2014. It is unclear from the case file on what date this judgment was served on the parties. 57.  On 24 January 2018 the applicant lodged an application with the Brussels Court of Appeal requesting legal aid in order to appeal against the judgment of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance. By an order of 26 January 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal granted that request. 58.  For its part, the Belgian State appealed against the same judgment on 19 February 2018, arguing that the applicant\u2019s complaints were inadmissible and/or ill-founded. A preliminary hearing was held before the Brussels Court of Appeal on 22 March 2018. 59.  At the date of adoption of the present judgment those proceedings were still pending. 60.  In their observations to the Grand Chamber, the parties produced documents showing that fresh proceedings had been brought for the applicant\u2019s discharge, under the new Law of 5 May 2014 on compulsory confinement (\u201cthe Compulsory Confinement Act\u201d, see paragraphs 91\u201197 below). In this context, on 12 January 2017 a team from the psychological and welfare service of the Paifve EDS, which included a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a welfare officer, drew up a multi-disciplinary psychiatric and psycho-social report on the applicant\u2019s situation. It stated that the information set out in its report had been drawn from various psychiatric examinations conducted during the applicant\u2019s period in compulsory confinement, and that in view of the language barrier, it had been impossible to obtain other information or compare the information from previous expert reports with the applicant\u2019s statements at the time the report was being prepared. It then confirmed that the patient spoke only German and that he knew only a few words of French, which were not sufficient to enable him to hold a conversation, with the result that he had limited contact with the other patients and with members of staff. The team which produced the report added that this language barrier had restricted and complicated the clinical observation, and that, in view of this shortcoming in the assessment, it was unable to provide a sufficiently informed psychiatric opinion on the application for discharge. Nonetheless, in spite of this difficulty in providing an objective assessment of the applicant\u2019s dangerousness, the likelihood of his reoffending, and his capacity for autonomy, it considered it possible to state that grey areas still remained. It indicated, in particular, that the applicant continued to display an obsession with vengeance, as highlighted in the 2015 expert report, and that the risk of his harassing the victims could not be ruled out. It therefore gave an unfavourable opinion in respect of the applicant\u2019s application for discharge. 61.  On 5 May 2017 the director of the Paifve EDS prepared a separate report in which she indicated that the applicant continued to require an institutional setting, given his pathology and the fact that he remained dangerous in that he was still likely to commit offences or harass the victims. She considered that, in order for \u201cthe conditions for conditional discharge to be satisfied, and given Mr Rooman\u2019s personality, the only safe option was [conditional] discharge to an institution [a structured facility]\u201d. She also expressed the view, in light of the existing situation, that the applicant should not be discharged. 62.  Basing its decision on the arguments contained in these two reports, on 29 May 2017 the public prosecutor at the Li\u00e8ge Post-Sentencing Court (TAP) issued an opinion in favour of maintaining the applicant in compulsory confinement and opposing the request for conditional discharge. 63.  On 28 July 2017 the Social Protection Division (CPS) at the Li\u00e8ge TAP, sitting in a different composition, which now had jurisdiction under the new 2014 Compulsory Confinement Act (see paragraph 97 below) to rule on whether to extend compulsory confinement and, if appropriate, to order the applicant\u2019s discharge, issued an interlocutory decision. It ordered that the proceedings be reopened, so that the parties could submit relevant information on whether the situation which had led the European Court of Human Rights to find a violation of Article 3 in the Chamber judgment of 18 July 2017 persisted. Pending receipt of that information, the CPS adjourned its examination of the case. It also summoned the Director General of Prisons to a hearing fixed for November 2017. 64.  On 16 November 2017 the CPS held a hearing, in private, at the Paifve EDS, at which the applicant was present; he was assisted by his lawyers and an interpreter.\nIn its judgment, delivered on 27 December 2017, the CPS found as follows:\n\u201c... According to the information submitted to the Division, [the applicant] can now contact a German-speaking psychologist (3 visits since August 2017). If he so wishes, he can also request a visit from a German-speaking psychiatrist. He has one outing a month, accompanied by a German-speaking nurse. Contact with German-speaking psychological and welfare assistants has been organised. A German interpreter will be called upon whenever necessary (CAP, disciplinary hearings, expert reports). Clinical consultations have been scheduled in order to assess the treatment plan and to adapt it as necessary (one meeting has already taken place, another is scheduled).\n... It is established that [the applicant\u2019s] detention, during those periods when he was not being treated by German-speaking medical staff, was in breach of Article 3 of the [Convention].\nIt was demonstrated in the hearings on 16 November 2017 that that violation has now ceased, as the Paifve EDS and the prison authorities have done what was necessary to ensure that German-speaking care providers are available, both in terms of his psychological and psychiatric treatment and with regard to welfare assistance and supervised outings. An interpreter is also called upon whenever required. ...\n... while accepting [the applicant\u2019s] argument that the failure to provide treatment in his mother tongue broke the link between the compulsory confinement and the illness at its origin, so that the detention became unlawful ..., it should again be noted that the unlawful nature of the detention ended following the measures currently put in place.\n[The applicant\u2019s] current detention is justified by his mental health, and the conditions of his detention make it possible to provide him with treatment while at the same time ensuring his safety and that of others.\n... there remain obstacles to [the applicant\u2019s] discharge, namely:\n- the lack of prospects for social reintegration, given his mental disorder ...\n- the risk that offences will be committed ...\n- the risk that he will harass the victims, and his attitude towards the victims of the offences which resulted in his compulsory confinement ...\u201d 65.  On those grounds, the CPS dismissed the main request for final discharge and held that it was also inappropriate to grant conditional discharge. With regard to the subsidiary request for treatment in German, it added that this had become devoid of purpose. It ordered an eight-month observation period, at the close of which the director of the Paifve EDS would be required to provide a fresh opinion on the applicant\u2019s situation. 66.  By a judgment of 28 February 2018 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the CPS\u2019s judgment of 27 December 2017. 67.  In support of the observations submitted in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the Government attached a chronological summary of the treatment administered to the applicant since he was placed in compulsory confinement in the Paifve EDS in 2004. They also provided factual clarifications at the public hearing on 6 June 2018. 68.  With regard to psychiatric treatment, the document submitted by the Government indicates that the applicant was treated by various French\u2011speaking psychiatrists. The frequency of the consultations is not specified. From 2004 to 1 February 2014, a German-speaking nurse assisted the psychiatrists during those meetings by providing interpretation. Between March 2008 and August 2009 the applicant was monitored by a psychiatrist who spoke elementary German. On 20 May 2015 the applicant met with Dr V., a German-speaking psychiatrist. This meeting did not give rise to regular meetings. The psychiatrist noted that the applicant had expressed no particular requests or asked for psychiatric assistance. She had nonetheless agreed to return if necessary. She had reiterated her availability on 23 March 2016, then at the end of 2017, in a telephone conversation with the in-house psychiatrist at the Paifve EDS. At the public hearing before the Court, the Government stated that the applicant, who was deemed to be capable of forming his own views, did not wish to enter into regular contact with the psychiatrist. 69.  With regard to psychological treatment in German, the applicant had attended nine meetings with a psychologist in 2010, and nine other meetings in 2014-2015. Between 18 August 2017 and 12 March 2018, the date on which the Government\u2019s observations were submitted, the applicant had had monthly meetings with this psychologist, the most recent, according to the information provided to the Court at the public hearing on 6 June 2018, being on 20 March and 27 April 2018. For his part, the applicant stated that he had had no further meetings since March, and submitted that the last meeting had taken place in February 2018. 70.  With regard to welfare assistance, the Government stated that since 1 October 2006 the applicant had received welfare assistance from a German-speaker, except for the periods from May to September 2014 (on account of maternity leave), and from 1 April to 1 November 2017 (on account of a change in post). Since November 2017, the German-speaking welfare assistant had returned to her post in the Paifve EDS and continued to meet the applicant several times a month. She had essentially dealt with the applicant\u2019s requests for administrative help, or for practical help in his contacts with the outside world, especially with his lawyer. 71.  With regard to psychiatric nursing care, the document submitted by the Government indicated that, from his arrival at the Paifve EDS, the applicant had been assisted regularly by a German-speaking male nurse. In addition to his somatic nursing skills, this nurse had specialised psychiatric care skills and had been able to spend time with the applicant, mainly to support him and help him deal with his stress. According to the Government, this nurse\u2019s listening skills had enabled him to assess the applicant\u2019s state of mind and report his observations to the psychiatrist. The nurse had been transferred to the prison on 1 February 2014 and retired on 1 December 2016. After that date, he had continued to meet the applicant in order to maintain contact with him and accompany him on outings, the last of these having taken place on 24 April 2017. 72.  Moreover, the applicant was able to see a general practitioner once a month. Since 30 November 2017, an interpreter had been called in to translate at these meetings. 73.  On 25 November 2017 a multidisciplinary meeting of the care team had taken place, in the presence of the applicant and an interpreter. At the public hearing, the Government stated, without submitting any document in support of this assertion, that a coordination meeting of the various actors involved in the applicant\u2019s treatment both inside and outside the Paifve EDS had been held, in the applicant\u2019s presence. At that meeting, the team had, in particular, sought the applicant\u2019s permission for the external German\u2011speaking psychologist to transmit to the in-house psychosocial team information obtained in her monthly meetings with him, as well as her conclusions regarding developments in his state of health, given that the psychosocial team was responsible for preparing an assessment of the degree of danger posed by him and of the prospects for his rehabilitation. The applicant had refused to consent to this transmission of information. 74.  Lastly, the applicant had been authorised to leave the institution on day-release, accompanied by the nurse. The number of these daytrips had progressively increased from one in 2007 to six in 2017. Since 2015 the applicant had made regular visits to Germany. In 2016 he had resumed contact with his family. It appears from other information in the file that the applicant has a brother with whom he has renewed contact in the past few years.", "references": ["3", "0", "8", "7", "6", "9", "5", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Ceira (Portugal). 9.  The facts of the case, as established by the domestic courts and submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  The applicant\u2019s son, A.J., was born on 29 May 1964. 11.  A.J. suffered from several mental illnesses, with a number of possible diagnoses being considered over the years such as schizophrenia and major depression. He also had a pathological addiction to alcohol and prescription drugs (medicamentos) and was sometimes violent towards his mother and sister. According to the expert medical opinion obtained after his death and during the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 33 below), A.J. may also have suffered from borderline personality disorder. 12.  A.J. was hospitalised in the Sobral Cid Psychiatric Hospital (Hospital Psiqui\u00e1trico Sobral Cid, hereinafter \u201cthe HSC\u201d) in Coimbra on eight occasions on a voluntary basis from: 4.  10 to 18 January 1993, after being accompanied to the HSC by the police who had been called to his home following a family dispute. He was released at his request, having filled out a release form; 6.  1 to 3 September 1999, when he was urgently admitted to hospital on 1 September (diagnosed with chronic alcoholism), and signed his own release form on 3 September 1999 against medical advice; 7.  12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000, when he was hospitalised after a delirious episode, and referred to the HSC by the emergency department. At the beginning of his stay he was forbidden to leave the pavilion building where he was confined; 13.  The medical files show that his degree of dependence on medical assistance (grau de depend\u00eancia) varied during these stays between being a patient in need of partial assistance and a patient requiring intensive or full assistance. At other times the degree of dependence was not noted, as was the case for his last stay in 2000. Between some of these stays he saw a doctor at the HSC as an outpatient but on an infrequent basis. 14.  According to the Government, these stays followed emergencies or bouts of alcoholic intoxication, and only the last stay followed a suicide attempt. 15.  During some of the periods he spent in hospital, A.J. was authorised to spend weekends at home with his family \u2013 three weekends during the period from 12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000, and two weekends during the period from 2 to 27 April 2000. 16.  In March 2000 A.J. went to Lisbon to try to renew his driving licence for heavy vehicles. However, he was unsuccessful. On 1 April 2000 he attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of prescription drugs. He was taken to the emergency department of Coimbra University Hospital. 17.  On 2 April 2000 A.J. was voluntarily admitted to the HSC from the emergency department (this was the last of his stays at the HSC (see paragraph 12 above). He was treated by Dr A.A., who had been his psychiatric doctor since December 1999. According to the clinical records dated 2 April 2000 and the witness statement of Dr A.A., the suicide attempt may have been the result of his failure to renew his driving licence. According to her, he had become depressed and thought his life no longer had any value, he felt marginalised and also powerless to achieve any aim in life. 18.  For the first week of his stay at the HSC, he was placed under a restrictive regime, even though he was a voluntary inpatient (see paragraph 54 below). He was confined - in his pyjamas - to pavilion 8, where the Male General Psychiatric Clinic (Hospitalisation of Acute Cases) was located, and was not allowed to leave the pavilion. However, the clinical records show that on 3 April 2000 he left the pavilion after lunch and went home. He was brought back to the HSC by his brother-in-law at around 1.30 p.m. In the second and third week of that stay at the HSC, given an improvement in A.J.\u2019s condition, the restrictive regime was lifted and he was allowed to circulate outside the pavilion and within the HSC grounds. This regime remained unchanged up until his death on 27 April 2000 (see paragraph 28 below). During that period he was allowed to spend two weekends at home. 19.  During the second weekend A.J. was allowed to go home to spend Easter with the applicant and other members of his family. He left the HSC at 10 a.m. on Friday 21 April 2000 after his breakfast, and was due to return on Wednesday 26 April 2000 after breakfast. Dr A.A. was on holiday over that period (she had left on 19 April 2000) and was replaced by Dr E.R. Dr E.R. saw A.J. twice before the latter spent the Easter weekend at home. 20.  At around 10.30 p.m. on Tuesday 25 April 2000, the applicant took A.J. to the emergency department of the Coimbra University Hospital because he had drunk a large amount of alcohol. The observation record completed by the emergency department at around midnight on 25 April 2000 read as follows:\n\u201cpatient hospitalised in HSC, being seen by doctor A.A; he spent the weekend outside and must have behaved recklessly because he got drunk. History of mental weakness, depressive episodes and recurrent suicide attempts, those characteristics were not observed during the weekend. Sent back to the HSC where he is hospitalised.\u201d\nHe was prescribed medication in case of emergency, and it appears from his clinical records that he was given emergency medication at around 2 a.m. on 26 April 2000 at the HSC. 21.  The clinical record from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. on 26 April 2000 shows that A.J. stayed in bed and only got up to eat. He received phone calls and a visit from his sister. There is no clinical record for the shift from 4 p.m. to midnight and for the shift from midnight to 8 a.m. the next day. The domestic courts accepted that the applicant\u2019s son had been medicated for the whole day, whereas the applicant contested that fact on the basis of the lack of any clinical record. 22.  The clinical record resumes at 8 a.m. on 27 April 2000. The nurse noted that between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. A.J.\u2019s behaviour had been calm and he had been walking around outside pavilion 8. According to the oral statement of one nurse and the clinical record, he had eaten well, including his afternoon snack at around 4.45 p.m. 23.  The clinical records do not mention that A.J. was seen by the doctor on call on returning to the HSC. Dr E.R. stated in his oral evidence that he had assumed that A.J. was fine since the nurses had not requested any assessment (see paragraph 35 below). 24.  At around 4 p.m. the applicant called the hospital. She was told to call back later, during the afternoon snack, as her son was not inside the building at that time. She was assured that some minutes earlier he had been standing at the door and he looked fine. 25.  At around 7 p.m. it was noticed that A.J. had not appeared for dinner. The coordinating nurse was informed of his absence. The hospital staff then started searching the areas where patients were allowed to walk about freely, such as the cafeteria and the park. 26.  At some time between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. the coordinating nurse reported the disappearance to Dr M.J.P., who was on call that day (but not at the HSC at that time), and contacted the National Republican Guard. 27.  At around 8 p.m. the coordinating nurse spoke on the telephone to the applicant and told her that A.J. had not appeared for dinner. 28.  It is not known at what precise time A.J. left the pavilion and the hospital grounds after he had taken his afternoon snack and thereafter followed a footpath towards the applicant\u2019s house. At 5.37 p.m., dressed in his pyjamas, A.J. jumped in front of a train running between Lous\u00e3 and Coimbra. 29.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Coimbra Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do C\u00edrculo de Coimbra) against the HSC under the State Liability Act (Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967) seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages of 100,403 euros (EUR). 30.  The applicant claimed that her son had been treated at the HSC for mental disorders on several occasions. He had been admitted to the hospital as a voluntary inpatient on 2 April 2000 because he had attempted to commit suicide. She alleged that he had made another attempt over the Easter weekend when he was at home with her. The fact that her son had been able to leave the hospital grounds on 27 April 2000 had led the applicant to conclude that the hospital staff had acted negligently in the performance of their duties. Because of his suicide attempts and mental condition, her son should have been under medical supervision and the hospital staff should have prevented him from leaving the hospital grounds. She maintained that her son\u2019s suicide had been caused by the poor organisation of the hospital services. The poor organisation was reflected in three aspects: a) the lack of fencing around the boundaries of the hospital, which allowed inpatients to leave the hospital easily without any supervision, b) the lack of a mechanism for checking the presence of inpatients which would allow the hospital staff to notice an absence immediately, and c) the lack of an emergency procedure capable of detecting an inpatient\u2019s absence, which would allow the hospital staff to adopt the effective measures required to ensure that the inpatient was returned safely without endangering the lives of others or his own life. The applicant relied on the specific background leading to A.J.\u2019s hospitalisation since the beginning of April as well as details from his clinical record, notably his repeated excessive consumption of alcohol, his mental illness, and his earlier suicide attempt. She maintained that on account of all those circumstances, the monitoring measures should have been enhanced in order to prevent him from leaving. 31.  On 29 October 2003 the court gave a preliminary decision (despacho saneador) specifying the facts considered to be established and those which remained to be established. 32.  On 5 July 2005 the court ordered that an expert report be drawn up on A.J.\u2019s clinical condition and the supervision measures required as a result of that condition. 33.  On 27 September 2006 a psychiatrist appointed by the Medical Association (Ordem dos M\u00e9dicos) submitted his report, which was based on an analysis of photocopies from the clinical files of the HSC. The relevant parts of the report read as follows:\n\u201c...\nAlthough alcohol dependence was the predominant diagnosis, several other diagnoses were considered. In particular, dependent personality (personalidade dependente); delirious outbreaks (surto delirante); schizophrenia; manic-depressive psychosis (psicose man\u00edaco-depressiva)... A.J.\u2019s clinical history enables us to consider him an ill person with recurring relapses into excessive alcohol consumption ... but also another kind of symptomatology...\nHe was an individual who was \u201cvery violent and aggressive when he was drunk, and even in those moments when he had not been drinking he was a conflictual young man, easily irritable\u201d...\n...\nThere is no detailed reference in his clinical records to his psychopathological condition on 26 April 2000 (after the alcohol intoxication episode which led him to the emergency services on 25 April 2000), 27 or 28? April 2000...\n...\nThe [plaintiff\u2019s] son suffered from disturbances which caused depressive behaviour with a significant inclination to suicide.\nTaking into account the clinical documents, his clinical condition may have led to another attempt to commit suicide, which turned out to be fatal.\nIn addition, the polymorphism of the patient\u2019s psychiatric condition should be emphasised. A psychopathological condition such as the patient\u2019s has a bad prognosis and suicide is frequently preceded by an attempt (or attempts) to commit suicide. ... Indeed, it must be clarified that ... he may have been suffering from a borderline personality disorder [perturba\u00e7\u00e3o de personalidade borderline]...\n...\nThere is reference to a multiplicity of diagnoses, all of them capable of enhancing the risk of the patient\u2019s suicide (and also of suicidal behaviour).\n...\nThe clinical history and psychopathological framework [quadro psicopatol\u00f3gico], for the reasons already mentioned, would predict future suicidal behaviour; thus the occurrence of suicide is not surprising.\nWith regard to prevention, containment and surveillance measures must without a doubt be adopted. But with a patient like this one, these measures are difficult to adopt (see for example his requests to be discharged despite the doctor\u2019s opinion, which is substantiated) and never sufficient because of the high potential for suicide.\n...\nWe can assume or assert the increased suicide potential of an individual when he is suffering from a psychopathological framework such as schizophrenia, major depression, chronic alcoholism; all these pathologies are mentioned in the patient\u2019s clinical records. This potential is also increased if the patient is suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder, as we mentioned; an illness which cannot be excluded with regard to this patient. The prevalence of suicide is significant among patients suffering from these pathologies. Therefore, what happened is not unusual.\nThe fact that the patient had been on antidepressant treatment for more than two weeks, had wandered around the hospital without ever endangering his life, and the fact that there is nothing in the medical records on suicidal thoughts, does not mean that the probability of that event (suicide) was negligible. However, it was hardly avoidable.\n[Fully effective] Prevention of suicide in these patients is an impossible task.\nIn a patient who wanders around the hospital and whose symptomatology is not suggestive of imminent suicide, where that probability (of suicide) is higher but is not so increased at that moment (considering the background and the characteristics of the patient), prevention is much more difficult.\u201d 34.  The first hearing took place on 8 October 2008. The applicant and the psychiatrist who had issued the above medical opinion gave evidence at the hearing. 35.  At five hearings (namely on 8 and 9 October 2008, on 14 January 2009, and on 9 and 13 February 2009) the court heard evidence from different witnesses, including: the applicant\u2019s daughter (A.J.\u2019s sister); nurses, doctors and medical auxiliaries who had worked for or were still working for the HSC, some of whom had started their shift at 4 p.m. on 27 April 2000; a social worker employed by the HSC since 1995, who had had contact with A.J.; and the train driver. Dr A.A., who had been A.J\u2019s psychiatric doctor at the HSC, gave evidence that his treatment consisted of taking the prescribed medication, ensuring that he received the treatment voluntarily, and establishing a relationship of trust with him in order for him to receive therapy. She confirmed that voluntary inpatients could have their freedom of movement restricted if it was thought necessary. In these circumstances inpatients would be forbidden from leaving the pavilion and would remain in their pyjamas. Dr E.R. (who had been replacing Dr A.A. at the relevant time) confirmed that on 27 April 2000 there had been no mention on the information board in pavilion 8 of any restrictive measures in respect of A.J. In other words, he had been free to leave the pavilion, although to leave the grounds of the HSC he would have needed medical permission. Dr M.J.P., who had been the emergency doctor on call on 27 April 2000, explained that had the nurses in the pavilion seen a problem with A.J.\u2019s behaviour on that day they would have called her, which they had not done. The court also analysed several documents attached to A.J.\u2019s clinical file from the HSC. 36.  On 9 March 2009 the court conducted an on-site inspection (see paragraph 48 below). 37.  On 7 January 2010 the court held a hearing at which it adopted a decision concerning the facts. The court considered, inter alia, that it should not explicitly define A.J.\u2019s pathology. Regarding the episode on 25 April 2000, the court decided to view it simply as an abuse of alcohol, taking into account his underlying chronic alcoholism and the fact that the drinking had taken place in the afternoon and mainly at a caf\u00e9. 38.  On 25 April 2011 the Coimbra Administrative Court delivered a judgment in which it ruled against the applicant. With regard to the applicant\u2019s argument that the hospital should have erected fences or other barriers around the hospital grounds, the court pointed out that the current approach in the treatment of mentally ill patients was to encourage social interaction. The existence of fencing would lead to the stigmatisation and isolation of mentally disabled inpatients. In this regard it held that the lack of security fences or walls was:\n\u201cin line with modern theories of psychiatric science according to which the treatment of patients suffering from mental disorders must take place in an atmosphere of trust and mobility of movements, in physical conditions which promote the freedom and autonomy of movements, and which favours the interaction and the conviviality between patients and the staff in order to encourage [the patient\u2019s] reintegration; monitoring of these patients must be conducted in a discreet way\u201d. 39.  As to the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the lack of a mechanism capable of checking the presence of inpatients, the court found that the HSC had a surveillance procedure in place which consisted of verifying the inpatients\u2019 presence at meal and medication times; this was in compliance with recent psychiatric science and respected the inpatients\u2019 right to privacy and dignity. Additionally, the court found that the inpatients in respect of whom a specific restrictive regime of hospitalisation was adopted were given more attention by the nursing team and the medical assistants, who verified their presence inside the building where they were hospitalised or in the areas surrounding the building\u2019s entrance, as the case may be. With regard to the applicant\u2019s argument that no emergency procedure existed, the Coimbra Administrative Court noted that it consisted of alerting the police and the inpatient\u2019s family in the event of absence. It found this procedure to be appropriate. 40.  As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint that her son had committed suicide as a result of the absence of permanent monitoring, the court held that his suicide had not been foreseeable. It was true that her son had been suffering from a mental illness which had never been properly diagnosed, either because the symptoms were complex or because he had been addicted to alcohol and prescription drugs. In this regard, the court pointed out that over the years the applicant\u2019s son had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and major depression. However, it was only after his death and as a consequence of an expert opinion requested from the Medical Association during the proceedings (see paragraph 33 above) that a probable diagnosis of borderline personality disorder had been made. The court established that A.J. had last been admitted as an inpatient after a suicide attempt. However, it considered that despite the possibility that inpatients diagnosed with mental diseases such as those of the applicant\u2019s son might commit suicide, during the last days before his death he had not shown any behaviour or mood which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that 27 April 2000 would be different to the preceding days.\nAccording to the Coimbra Administrative Court, the fact that he had been admitted to the emergency department of the Coimbra University Hospital because he had consumed a large amount of alcohol had not been the result of a suicide attempt but of reckless behaviour. The Coimbra Administrative Court found that, having returned to the HSC, he had been kept under medical supervision the whole day, was medicated and accompanied by the medical staff, and that his health had improved. The court thus concluded that there were no circumstances that would have made it possible to predict the tragic outcome that had occurred. It was not possible to affirm that his suicide had been predictable, nor was there anything in the case file that could have justified the adoption of the involuntary treatment procedure in the days preceding the tragedy, since it was not foreseeable that he would commit suicide. According to the court, A.J.\u2019s behaviour had been \u201cabsolutely unexpected and unforeseeable\u201d, given the concrete circumstances of the case. 41.  On 12 May 2011 the applicant appealed to the Administrative Supreme Court, claiming that the first-instance court had wrongly assessed the evidence, that its findings of fact had been incorrect, and that it had wrongly interpreted the law. 42.  On 26 September 2012 the Deputy Attorney-General attached to the Administrative Supreme Court was asked to provide an opinion on the appeal. He recommended that the first-instance judgment should be reversed. The opinion focused on the failure to put in place a surveillance framework specifically adapted to A.J.\u2019s mental health problems and risk of suicide, as well as the alleged failure of the HSC to comply with its obligation to prevent suicide. It stated that:\n\u201c....\nwith regard to patients with a tendency to commit suicide only the prescription and application of enhanced monitoring (vigil\u00e2ncia acrescida) could be considered adequate.\nIn A.J.\u2019s medical report there are references to suicide attempts; the last one occurred on 1 April 2000, some days before 26 April 2000 when he went back to HSC after being treated at [Coimbra University Hospital] due to the consumption of a large amount of alcohol; the possibility of a suicide attempt was thus a \u201cprobable risk\u201d or, among the possible risks, one which could be anticipated in so far as it could be expected by a prudent assessor (avaliador prudente).\nTherefore, in our opinion, the impugned judgment has erred in considering for the purpose of assessing the level of monitoring required from the defendant, that A.J.\u2019s suicide was an absolutely unexpected and unforeseen fact and by holding that there were no grounds to increase the monitoring in the particular case.\nThe [HSC] never prescribed or put in place a regime to reinforce the monitoring of A.J. \u2013 a regime which could be suited to preventing any possible exit from the hospital, ...\nThis enhanced surveillance, which aims at protecting the patient, is part of the therapeutic obligation of the hospital and it does not conflict with the open-door regime as a treatment method applied to patients in the circumstances in which it is considered suitable.\u201d 43.  Regarding the facts which the applicant had relied on concerning several HSC inpatients who had left without permission and the resulting tragic consequences, the opinion noted that those elements should not be taken into consideration.\nAccording to the opinion:\n\u201cthe degree of surveillance that ought to be established must take into consideration \u201call the probable risks\u201d and all those \u201cwhich can fall within the expectations of a prudent assessor\u201d. A.J.\u2019s medical report, alone, already had references to suicide attempts, one of which had occurred twenty-five days earlier. Thus it was possible to predict a repetition of those.\nIt is therefore possible to conclude that the defendant did not establish or put in place any monitoring measure which could be considered adequate to the status of a psychiatric hospital and to A.J.\u2019s characteristics as a patient \u2013 it could and should have done so.\u201d 44.  On 29 May 2014 the Administrative Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal by two votes to one, upholding the legal and factual findings of the Coimbra Administrative Court. The Administrative Supreme Court found that the facts relied on by the applicant before the lower court concerning similar cases of inpatients who had left the HSC without permission were irrelevant to the decision in the instant case. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that A.J. had exhibited depressive behaviour with a \u201cstrong\u201d tendency towards suicide, which he had attempted on different occasions. It upheld the finding of the lower court which had established only one suicide attempt on 1 April 2000. 45.  The Administrative Supreme Court considered that the practice of counting of inpatients at meal and medication times was sufficient and had allowed the hospital staff to verify A.J.\u2019s attendance during lunch and the afternoon snack on 27 April 2000. It rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that counting the inpatients when they were given their meal trays with their meals was \u201cdeeply amateurish\u201d. As to the foreseeability of the suicide, the Administrative Supreme Court held that the HSC had not breached any duty of care, as there had been no indication which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that the applicant\u2019s son would try to commit suicide that day, namely by leaving the hospital grounds. The Administrative Supreme Court took into account that during previous periods of hospitalisation the applicant\u2019s son had also left the hospital grounds, and that no link had been established between that behaviour and a particular risk of suicide in so far as they had only been able to establish the existence of a single suicide attempt, namely on 1 April 2000. 46.  In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges stated that the hospital should have secured the grounds in some way in order to fulfil its duties of care and supervision. By not doing so, it had allowed inpatients to leave easily without being discharged, thus breaching those duties. That omission had been the cause of the \u201cescape\u201d and suicide of the applicant\u2019s son. 47.  The HSC is a psychiatric hospital located outside Coimbra on seventeen hectares of land. It is part of the Coimbra University Hospital and is State-run. 48.  According to an on-site inspection made by the Coimbra Administrative Court on 9 March 2009 in the course of the proceedings against the hospital, the HSC had eighteen buildings (one for each hospital department). On the basis of information before the Court it appears that different types of patients were hospitalised in these different buildings depending on their gender and the type and extent of their illness. The grounds of the HSC were not bordered by security fences or walls of any other kind. The buildings were surrounded by green areas with trees and other vegetation, and the different buildings were accessed by means of roadways and paths, which were also surrounded by trees and other vegetation. The main entrance to the HSC had a barrier and a security guard. One of the possible exits from the hospital grounds led to a shortcut towards a railway station platform. This shortcut was accessed by taking the road behind building no. 9. The station platform was around a fifteen to twenty-minute walk from that part of the HSC\u2019s grounds. 49.  In accordance with the guidelines prepared by the HSC, meals were taken in the hospital cafeteria and inpatients had to remain there until the end of the meal. There was a User\u2019s Guide intended for inpatients which set out the rules governing their hospitalisation. Inpatients were not allowed to leave the pavilion without informing the relevant nurse in advance. Inpatients were also forbidden to leave the hospital grounds without the authorisation of a specialist. If an inpatient wished to leave the hospital before authorisation had been given, a discharge form had to be signed. 50.  The following schedule was in place during A.J.\u2019s stay in April 2000:\ni.  Wake-up time: between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m.;\nii.  Bedtime: flexible, from 10 p.m. the inpatient must remain silent and with the lights out;\niii.  Meals: 51.  A mechanism was in place, as recognised by the domestic courts, for checking an inpatient\u2019s presence, by counting the inpatients at each meal time (five times a day) and at medication time. In addition to this, an inpatient\u2019s presence was checked at bedtime. Inpatients under a restrictive hospitalisation regime were monitored more closely by the nursing team. 52.  An emergency procedure was triggered when the absence of a patient was noticed. This procedure consisted of alerting the police, the doctor on call and the inpatient\u2019s closest relatives. 53.  During hospitalisation an inpatient was accompanied by a therapeutic team made up of a doctor, a nurse, a social worker, and a medical auxiliary. 54.  A distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary hospitalisation (see paragraph 58 below). Under voluntary hospitalisation, an inpatient could abandon treatment at any moment. However, according to the doctors who testified in the domestic proceedings and the Government\u2019s observations, there were two types of regime for voluntary inpatients: a restrictive regime, according to which inpatients were not allowed to leave the pavilion, and a general regime, allowing inpatients to leave the building after informing the duty nurse, although they were still not allowed to leave the grounds of the HSC without permission. Inpatients under the restrictive regime were generally dressed in pyjamas and a dressing gown, while inpatients under the general regime seem to have had a free choice as to what they wore. It appeared that inpatients were often kept on the restrictive regime at the beginning of a hospital stay, even if they were admitted on a voluntary basis. There was an isolation room for inpatients who were very agitated and aggressive and this room could also be used for voluntary inpatients. 55.  The applicant submitted news articles to the Court referring to inpatients who had apparently managed to leave the HSC\u2019s grounds. The first five articles below had already been submitted to the domestic authorities (see paragraph 44 above where the Administrative Supreme Court found the information contained therein to be irrelevant to the decision in the instant case):\n(i)  on 9 March 2008 the body of an inpatient who had escaped two weeks earlier was found close to the hospital grounds (in Di\u00e1rio de Coimbra);\n(ii)  on 29 October 2008 a man escaped from the HSC and was hit by a car after jumping in front of it (in Di\u00e1rio das Beiras);\n(iii)  on 31 July 2008 the body of an inpatient who had escaped from the hospital the previous month was found in a river (in Di\u00e1rio de Coimbra);\n(iv)  on 14 August 2008 a patient who had been involuntarily hospitalised in the HSC escaped (in Di\u00e1rio de Coimbra);\n(v)  in early March 2010 three different inpatients escaped from the hospital; one of them was located by the police after stealing a car and another was found dead in a nearby river (in Bombeirospontopt);\n(vi)  on 16 October 2011 an inpatient escaped from the HSC\u2019s grounds and attacked two police officers with a hoe (in Correio da Manh\u00e3);\n(vii)  on 1 March 2015 two inpatients escaped from the HSC and stole a car (in Tvi24).", "references": ["2", "1", "6", "4", "7", "5", "3", "9", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a private company that was set up in 2007 and has its registered office in Yerevan. 6.  On 7 May 2007 the applicant company and company S. concluded a contract, under which the applicant company had to carry out construction work on the premises of company H. 7.  On 18 January 2008 the applicant company initiated compensation proceedings against company S. in the Yerevan Civil Court (\u201cthe Civil Court\u201d), arguing that it had completed the construction work as required by the contract of 7 May 2007, but company S. had failed to make full payment for the work. 8.  On 21 January 2008 the Civil Court admitted the applicant company\u2019s claim. 9.  On 20 February 2008 the Civil Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work which the applicant company had carried out on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. The examination was assigned to the Bureau of Forensic Examinations under the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Bureau\u201d). In particular, the court ordered the experts to measure the surface area of the construction work and assess the quality of the construction work carried out. 10.  On 11 March 2008 the expert in charge of conducting the forensic examination filed a letter with the Civil Court, stating that it was necessary for the Civil Court to ensure his access to the premises of company H. for the purposes of the examination, as that company was not a party to the civil proceedings. 11.  On 4 April 2008 the Civil Court resumed the proceedings and summoned company H. to the proceedings as a third party. 12.  On 15 May 2008 the Civil Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and again stayed the proceedings. 13.  On 28 October 2008 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of opportunity to access the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the Civil Court on 15 May 2008. 14.  On 19 November 2008 the Civil Court resumed the proceedings. 15.  On 19 February 2009 the Civil Court granted the applicant company\u2019s claim. 16.  On 27 February 2009, due to reorganisation of the judiciary, the Civil Court decided to transfer the case to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan. 17.  On 4 March 2009 company S. appealed against the judgment of 19 February 2009. 18.  On 23 April 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case, reasoning, inter alia, that in the absence of an expert opinion on the questions posed by the Civil Court as regards the disputed construction work, that judgment was unfounded. 19.  On 29 July 2009 the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) took over the applicant company\u2019s case. 20.  On 26 August 2009 the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. 21.  On 31 May 2010 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of opportunity to access the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the District Court on 26 August 2009. 22.  On 7 June 2010 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 23.  On 16 July 2010 the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. The court ordered that the forensic examination be carried out with the help of the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (\u201cthe DEJA\u201d). It is unclear what the outcome of that order was. 24.  On 21 June 2012 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of access to the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the District Court on 16 July 2010. 25.  On 27 June 2012 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 26.  On 3 October 2012 the applicant company filed additional submissions with the District Court. 27.  On the same date the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. 28.  On 25 November and 24 December 2014 the applicant company submitted a letter to the Bureau, enquiring about the progress of the examination ordered by the District Court. 29.  On 27 December 2014 the Bureau responded by stating that the examination which had been ordered had not been carried out due to the lack of an expert in the relevant field. The Bureau also noted that it had already recruited and trained relevant experts, and the examination was expected to be carried out in January 2015. 30.  On 28 February 2015 the applicant company submitted another letter to the Bureau, reminding it that the examination had not yet been carried out and informing it about the delay that the lack of an expert examination had caused in the civil proceedings. 31.  On 5 May 2015 the applicant company submitted a letter to the Ministry of Justice, complaining about the delay in the civil proceedings and requesting that it take measures to expedite them. 32.  On 20 May 2015 the Minister of Justice responded by stating that even though it would take one day to carry out the expert examination and approximately five days to complete the report, the examination had not been carried out for reasons such as the lack of an expert in the Bureau, the expert\u2019s inability to access the premises of company H., the excessive workload in the Bureau, and so on. The Minister concluded by stating that the examination could be carried out by the Bureau, provided that the expert was granted access to the premises concerned. 33.  On 30 June 2015, apparently after performing the technical examination, the Bureau sent the relevant expert opinion to the District Court. 34.  On 9 July 2015 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 35.  The District Court held a number of hearings in 2015 and 2016, and on 9 June and 2 August 2016 it also decided to conduct a new examination of the case. 36.  On 10 October 2016 the District Court granted the applicant company\u2019s claim in part. 37.  On 15 December 2016 company S. appealed against that judgment. 38.  On 23 March 2017 the Civil Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and upheld the contested judgment. 39.  No appeal on points of law was lodged against the decision of 23 March 2017, which became final.", "references": ["5", "9", "4", "1", "7", "0", "6", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  In the early morning of 27 December 2001 a group of approximately twenty federal servicemen who had arrived in two armoured personnel carriers (\u201cAPCs\u201d) and UAZ vehicles surrounded the house where the applicant lived with her son (Mr Alvi Bugayev), his wife (Ms Z.S.), and their four children. They forcibly entered the house, dragged the applicant\u2019s son out of bed and, without allowing him to put clothes or shoes on, took him away. The servicemen also took a car (used for transportation by Mr Alvi Bugayev and owned by his uncle, Mr I.A.) and all the identification documents they found in the house. 7.  Mr Alvi Bugayev was then detained for fifteen days in the Urus\u2011Martan temporary district \u201cthe VOVD\u201d). 8.  On 12 January 2002 a prosecutor of the Urus-Martan district, Mr K., informed the applicant that Mr Alvi Bugayev was to be released on the same day. The applicant, Mr Alvi Bugayev\u2019s wife and their children spent the entire day at the entrance to the VOVD awaiting his release. In the evening, Mr Alvi Bugayev drove his car out of the police station. Several military cars followed him. 9.  Mr Bugayev\u2019s wife managed to get into his car. During a short conversation with her he expressed fear for his life, describing to her the servicemen\u2019s intention to kill him. Being troubled by the pursuit of the military vehicles, Mr Bugayev decided to drive to his sister\u2019s house, which was located a mere 200 metres away from the VOVD. 10.  After Mr Bugayev had got out of the car near his sister\u2019s house, a vehicle stopped near him, four servicemen with automatic guns got out and shot Mr Bugayev dead in front of his wife and children. The applicant did not witness the killing, as she was still walking away from the police station. 11.  The incident of 12 January 2002 took place during the daily curfew period that had been placed on the area. 12.  On 12 January 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe investigators\u201d) opened criminal case no. 61000 into the killing of the applicant\u2019s son. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n\u201cOn 12 January 2002, at approximately 6 p.m., a number of unidentified criminals murdered, using firearms, Mr Alvi Bugayev near [the building at the address] 5 Sovetskaya Street in the town of Urus-Martan in the Chechen Republic; [after the murder] they left the crime scene in a white VAZ car (model 2106).\u201d 13.  On the same date (12 January 2002) the investigators questioned Mr Bugayev\u2019s wife, Ms Z.S., who stated that the perpetrators of her husband\u2019s killing had been those servicemen who had threatened to kill him. 14.  On 13 January 2002 the investigators questioned Mr I.A. and Mr Ya.A., whose statements were not furnished to the Court. 15.  On 13 January 2002 the investigators examined the crime scene and collected several bullets and spent cartridges. On the same date, they ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence. According to the resulting expert report, dated 6 February 2002, the cartridges had been fired from a Kalashnikov machinegun. 16.  On 13 January 2002 the operational search officer, M., reported to his superiors that according to the information that he had obtained, Mr Bugayev had been killed by servicemen and that one of the perpetrators had told Ms Z.S. that her husband had been killed for being a \u201ctraitor\u201d. 17.  On 13 January 2002 the investigators questioned Ms R.Ya. who stated that she had witnessed the killing. Her statement was similar to the applicant\u2019s submission before the Court. 18.  On 19 January 2002 the investigators requested that the VOVD provide them with a list of the people who had been detained with Alvi Bugayev and of the police officers who had questioned him while he had been in detention. In response, on 5 February 2002, the VOVD provided a list of five men who had been detained with Mr Bugayev. As for the police officers, no information on their identities was given. 19.  On 22 January 2002 the investigators granted Ms Z.S. victim status in the criminal case. 20.  Between 13 and 16 February 2002 the investigators questioned two of the applicant\u2019s relatives and a neighbour; their statements did not provide any pertinent information. 21.  On 12 March 2002 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. Neither the applicant nor her relatives were informed thereof. 22.  On 4 April 2002 the local forensic bureau issued a report, according to which Mr Bugayev had died of multiple gunshot wounds. The applicant was not informed of the report. 23.  On 26 April 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the investigators\u2019 superiors, stating that they had not provided her with information on the progress of the investigation. 24.  On 11 May 2004, in reply to the above-mentioned request, the Urus\u2011Martan prosecutor informed the applicant that she had the right to familiarise herself with those contents of the case file that referred to steps taken with her participation but that the full contents of the case file would be accessible to her only after the completion of the investigation. 25.  On 24 May 2005 Ms Z.S. and the applicant lodged a complaint with the Urus-Martan prosecutor, stating that she had received no information on the progress of the criminal investigation. 26.  On 1 June 2005, in reply to the above-mentioned complaint, the investigators informed Ms Z.S. and the applicant that \u201cat present, operational search measures are being taken to identify the culprits\u201d. 27.  On 21 December 2006 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan prosecutor requesting that the investigation be resumed and that she be granted victim status. 28.  On 17 January 2007, following the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned complaint, the investigators\u2019 superiors overruled the suspension of the investigation as unlawful and premature and ordered that it be resumed, citing the need to take investigative steps, such as questioning the applicant and other witnesses. The applicant was informed of that decision. 29.  On 17 January 2007 the deputy Urus-Martan district prosecutor ordered that the investigators take a number of steps in the criminal case, including the detailed questioning of the eyewitnesses to the killing and other witnesses. 30.  On 19 January 2007 the investigators requested that the VOVD inform them of the identities of the police officers who had worked there at the time of the killing of Mr Bugayev so that they could be questioned. In their reply of 23 January 2007, the police stated that in January 2002 their staff had consisted of police officers on a mission from the Republic of Bashkortostan (Bashkiria). 31.  On 20 January 2007 the investigators again questioned Ms R.Ya., who had witnessed the killing and whose statement was similar to the applicant\u2019s submission before the Court. 32.  On 23 January 2007 the investigators questioned the applicant, whose statement was similar to her submission before the Court. In addition, she stated that her daughter-in-law, Ms Z.S., had left the region. 33.  On 26 January 2007 the investigators questioned Mr S.Sh., who had been detained with Mt Bugayev in January 2002 and whose statement did not provide any new information. 34.  On 30 January 2007 the investigators questioned Mr A.M., who stated that in January 2002 he had participated in the examination of the scene of Mr Bugayev\u2019s killing and that he had no information concerning the perpetrators\u2019 identities. 35.  On 6 February 2007 the applicant again wrote to the Urus-Martan prosecutor requesting that the investigators take all possible steps to identify the perpetrators of her son\u2019s killing. 36.  On 13 February 2007 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 37.  On 17 February 2007 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identity the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof in July 2007. 38.  On 6 August 2007 the applicant requested that the investigators provide her with a copy of the decisions to open the criminal case and to grant her victim status and with the latest decision to suspend the investigation. On 8 August 2007 the requested documents were forwarded to the applicant. 39.  Upon receipt of the above-mentioned documents, in September or October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Urus-Martan Town Court stating that the investigators\u2019 had failed to investigate her son\u2019s murder effectively and requesting that the proceedings be resumed. 40.  On 26 November 2007 the Town Court dismissed the complaint as groundless. 41.  There is no further information on any progress in the proceedings. 42.  At the material time, the applicant\u2019s relative, Colonel Ruslan Yunusov, who was born in 1964, was the Deputy Minister for Emergency Situations of the Chechen Republic. 43.  on the night of 29-30 December 2001 an armoured reconnaissance patrol vehicle (BRDM) of the Russian federal forces opened unprovoked fire on a vehicle of the Ministry for Emergency Situations (\u201cthe MES\u201d) and wounded one of Mr Yunusov\u2019s colleagues. After the incident the BRDM, which belonged to the Leninskiy district military prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny, drove off. The incident was reported to the Minister for Emergency Situations of the Chechen Republic. 44.  On 4 January 2002 the BRDM arrived at the premises of the MES in Grozny for some repair work, where it was recognised as the vehicle that had been involved in the above-mentioned incident. Officers of the MES requested that the vehicle remain on their premises to await the arrival of the Grozny military commander, who had been informed of the incident. 45.  The BRDM crew refused to obey the order, shut their vehicle\u2019s hatches and tried to drive off the MES premises through the exit gates (checkpoint no. 4). Colonel Yunusov jumped onto the military vehicle and covered its eye slits with his jacket trying to stop it from moving. The BRDM turned the turret and, having opened fire, drove through the gates with Mr Yunusov on its hull. The vehicle drove at high speed in the direction of the Leninskiy district military commander\u2019s office, which was located in the vicinity. 46.  Shortly thereafter, servicemen of the Leninskiy district military commander\u2019s office opened fire on Mr Yunusov on the BRDM and shot him. The vehicle stopped at the gates of the office and Mr Yunusov was taken to Grozny Town Hospital no. 9, where he shortly thereafter died of his wounds. 47.  The Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office (in the documents submitted also referred to as the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office) opened criminal case no. 54001 in connection with the killing of Colonel Yunusov on 4 January 2002. 48.  On 4 January 2002 the investigators examined the crime scene and collected several pieces of evidence. 49.  On 7 January 2002 they ordered an expert examination of the bullet taken out of the body of Mr Yunusov and on 18 January 2002 the Forensics Bureau of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior reported that it had been fired from a Kalashnikov machinegun. 50.  On 16 January 2002 the investigators decided to forward the criminal case for further investigation to the military prosecutor\u2019s office, as the killing had been perpetrated by federal servicemen. On 5 February 2002 that decision was overruled by the investigators\u2019 superiors as premature. 51.  On 28 February 2002 the investigators asked their superiors for an extension of the time-limit for the investigation. Their request contained, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... According to the information collected by the investigation ... at about 12 p.m. on 4 January 2002 Corporal Yu.M. and Sergeant M.B. from the military commander\u2019s office were carrying out welding work on BRDM no. 140 on the premises of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, when an order was given by the Grozny military commander to the officers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations to detain the vehicle [and its team] on suspicion of their involvement in gunfire opened from that vehicle on 29 December 2001. However, Corporal Yu.M. and Sergeant M.B. quickly got into the BRDM and started driving off the premises. The Deputy Minister for Emergency Situations, Colonel Yunusov, and ... Mr R.A. tried to stop the vehicle ... Yunusov threw his jacket over its slits and got onto the hull. Then the BRDM increased its speed and opened fire, broke down the gates ... and drove to checkpoint no. 106 on Garazhnaya Street with Mr Yunusov on its hull. Mr R.A. ran after the BRDM and loosed two gun shots at its wheels. At that time policemen from the Leninskiy VOVD (K., B., S., E., who were at checkpoint no. 106, and G., Kh. and L. who were at checkpoint no. 101) fired warning shots into the air. However, the BRDM broke down the barriers and started moving in the direction of the gates of the Leninskiy temporary department of the interior [the VOVD]. In connection with this, the above-mentioned police officers from both checkpoints, as well as the officers who were on the roof of the VOVD (I., B., G. and Ba.), opened fire on the BRDM\u2019s wheels. As a result of that gunfire, Colonel Yunusov, who was on the hull, was wounded in the chest and died in hospital from his wounds ...\u201d 52.  On 1 March 2002 the investigators ordered a ballistic examination of the bullet taken from Mr Yunusov\u2019s body and of the handguns and machineguns of eleven police officers and ten servicemen from the military commander\u2019s office implicated in the shooting. On 22 March 2002 the experts concluded that the bullet that had killed Mr Yunusov had been shot from a Kalashnikov machinegun belonging to a police officer, A.L. 53.  Between January and October 2002 the investigation questioned a number of witnesses to the incident, including military officers, and confirmed that Colonel Yunusov had been shot by the machinegun belonging to officer A.L., who at the time in question had been deployed on a temporary military mission to the Chechen Republic from the Vologda Region of the Russian Federation. 54.  On 20 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. As can be seen from the documents submitted, the applicants and their representatives regularly contacted the authorities with requests for information concerning progress in the criminal proceedings. Between 2002 and 2006, the applicants also lodged several complaints at various levels of the prosecutor\u2019s office for it to expedite the investigation in the criminal case and to prosecute the servicemen responsible for Mr Yunusov\u2019s killing. 55.  For instance, on 21 July 2005 the applicants\u2019 representatives complained to the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor of the lack of information concerning the investigation and the investigators\u2019 failure to inform the applicants of the most important steps taken, such as the results of the expert examination of evidence and the questioning of key witnesses. They requested to be informed of progress in the proceedings and asked for the investigation to be resumed in the event that it had been suspended. 56.  Between October 2002 and 17 January 2006 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on at least seven occasions. From the documents submitted by the parties, it can be seen that the applicants were not informed of the majority of those procedural decisions. 57.  On 17 January 2007 the investigators\u2019 supervisor overruled the decision of 17 January 2006 to suspend the investigation and ordered that it be resumed in order that a number of steps might be undertaken. The decision stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cIt is necessary to take the following measures:\n- make a coherent plan regarding investigative steps and operational search measures to be taken;\n- according to expert report no. 265 of 22 March 2002, the spent bullet casing found in the clothing of Mr Yunusov had been shot from a machinegun belonging to Mr A.L. It is necessary to take sufficient steps to establish his whereabouts and to question him. A decision concerning his procedural status must be taken ...\u201d\nFrom the documents submitted it can be seen that no tangible steps, other than that of sending formal requests for information, were taken in order to comply with those orders. 58.  On 14 June 2007 the investigators\u2019 superior issued orders to the investigators instructing them to comply with the orders issued on 14 October and 13 December 2005 and 17 January 2007. In particular, the investigators were to take steps to establish the whereabouts of officer A.L. From the documents submitted it can be seen that those orders were not complied with. 59.  On 31 July 2007 the above-mentioned orders were reiterated. From the documents submitted it can be seen that the orders were again not complied with. 60.  On 20 November 2007 the applicants\u2019 lawyer, Mr M.A., lodged a complaint with the investigators\u2019 superiors, stating that he had been denied access to the investigation file, despite the court\u2019s ruling in this respect (see paragraph 72 below). He stated that the lack of information about the proceedings precluded the applicants from appealing before a court regarding any possible omissions on the part of the investigators. He also requested that the applicants be informed of steps taken to establish the whereabouts of officer A.L., to whom had belonged machinegun no. 2094, with which Mr Yunusov had been shot. 61.  On 3 December 2007 the deputy prosecutor of the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny allowed the complaint in part, stating that before the completion of the investigation, the applicants were entitled to access only that part of the contents of the investigation file concerning steps taken with their participation. On the same date the applicants were informed of the deputy prosecutor\u2019s decision. 62.  On the same date (3 December 2007) the deputy prosecutor also ordered the investigators to remedy the procedural violations (\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430, \u0434\u043e\u043f\u0443\u0449\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u0445\u043e\u0434\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f) that had occurred during the investigation of Mr Yunusov\u2019s murder. He stated, in particular, that the proceedings had been suspended prematurely and unlawfully, given that a number of necessary steps had not been taken despite previously issued orders, and that the applicants had not been informed of progress in the proceedings. 63.  On 19 December 2007, at the above-mentioned order of the supervising prosecutor, the investigators allowed the applicants to access part of the contents of the investigation file. 64.  On 22 January 2008 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishment of the whereabouts of Mr A.L. 65.  On 29 January 2008 the investigators\u2019 superior issued orders to the investigators instructing them to take a number of steps, including obtaining information from the Vologda Region police in order to establish the addresses and full details of a number of the police officers (including Mr A.L.), who had been deployed in Grozny at the time of the incident. The documents submitted show that no such steps were taken, other than the sending of requests for information. 66.  On 21 February 2008 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were informed thereof. 67.  There is no further information on progress in the proceedings. 68.  On a number of occasions between November 2002 and August 2006 the applicants requested the investigators\u2019 permission to access the investigation file, but to no avail. 69.  On an unspecified date between September and November 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) in Grozny, stating that the investigators had refused to grant them access to the investigation file and that the proceedings had been suspended. 70.  On 23 January 2007 the District Court dismissed their complaint. The applicants appealed, and on 4 April 2007 the Chechen Supreme Court overruled the dismissal and remitted the complaint for fresh examination. 71.  On 16 April 2007 the District Court again dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint. The applicants appealed and on 20 June 2007 the Chechnya Supreme Court overruled the dismissal and again remitted the complaint for fresh examination. 72.  On 2 August 2007 the District Court allowed the applicants\u2019 complaint, ordering that a thorough and comprehensive investigation be carried out into the murder and that the applicants be allowed to access part of the investigation file. 73.  On an unspecified date in 2015 the second applicant lodged a claim for compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by the killing of Colonel Yunusov. On 29 June 2015 the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny dismissed the claim on procedural grounds. 74.  On 26 January 2005 the third applicant and the applicants\u2019 relatives \u2013 Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev (in the documents submitted also referred to as Zhabrail Atabayev), who was born in 1989, and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev, who was born in 1989 \u2013 were driving in the fourth applicant\u2019s VAZ 2110 car after visiting a relative in a Grozny hospital. 75.  As the vehicle was travelling at a distance of about 250 metres from a federal forces checkpoint, which was situated next to the Transmash (\u0422\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043c\u0430\u0448) factory and manned by police officers from the \u201cWest\u201d (\u0417\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0434) battalion of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior their car came under unprovoked fire from machineguns and a grenade launcher wielded by armed men in three UAZ vehicles without registration numbers who had just passed through the checkpoint. 76.  After the shooting had stopped, several servicemen from the checkpoint approached the perpetrators. The latter got into their cars and drove away, passing without hindrance through the checkpoint. 77.  As a result of the firearms assault, Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev were killed on the spot and the third applicant, Mr Adam Atabayev, received several gunshot wounds to the legs; he was taken to a Grozny hospital. 78.  Later on the same date, some of the federal television channels broadcast news of the \u201cliquidation\u201d by federal forces of the applicants\u2019 two relatives, who were described as members of illegal armed groups. 79.  On 26 January 2005 the applicants complained about the killing to the authorities, and on the same date the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 43015. 80.  On 26 January 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene, where they collected more than fifty spent cartridges and six bullets, two hand grenades and two flare-shells cases. On the following day, 27 January 2005, they ordered an expert examination of the evidence. On 24 and 25 February 2005 the experts concluded that the grenades had been industrially made and that fourteen cartridges were of the type used with TIS (\u0422\u0418\u0421) machineguns and sniper rifles equipped with devices for noiseless and flameless shooting. Fifty-nine cartridges were of the type used with Kalashnikov machineguns and six were of the type used with the TT pistol. 81.  On 28 January 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the bodies of Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev. According to the experts\u2019 conclusions, dated 15 February 2005, they died of multiple gunshot wounds. 82.  On various dates between 27 January and 1 April 2005 each of the applicants was granted victim status in the criminal case. 83.  On 27 January 2005 the investigators questioned the third applicant, whose statement concerning the incident was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. 84.  On 1 February 2005 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who added information to his previous statement to the effect that he had been driving the car during the accident and that Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev had been in the back seat. When the shooting had started, he had been shot in the left leg, had managed to get out of the car and had found that both Mr Abiyev and Mr Atabayev were dead. He had hidden behind the right side of the vehicle and had shouted out in Russian and Chechen, asking for the shooting to stop, but to no avail. Then the shooters had launched two flares and had continued shooting while he tried to crawl away. After moving about 20 or 25 metres he had come across several servicemen from the nearby checkpoint, who had taken him to hospital. 85.  On 4 February 2005 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. She also stated that to her knowledge, the men who had taken the third applicant to the hospital had been present by the place of the shooting and worked in law-enforcement agencies (\u0432 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043e\u0445\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0445). 86.  On 20 February 2005 the investigators ordered a trace examination of the bullets, cartridges and shells collected from the crime scene. On 28 March 2005 the experts reported that the victims\u2019 car had been shot at from its front and left side. 87.  On 25 February 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the third applicant. On 20 March 2005 the experts reported that the third applicant had suffered injuries of medium-level gravity \u2013 namely, multiple gunshot wounds to the muscles and tendons of the left thigh and right shin. 88.  On 16 February 2005 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. 89.  On 18 March 2005 the investigators requested that Operational Search Bureau no. 2 (ORB-2) in Grozny inform them of whether Mr Vakha T. was one of officers of the Anti-Organised Crime Department (\u0420\u0423\u0411\u041e\u041f) as, according to the witness statements, he had been one of the persons who had been present next to the place of the shooting at the time of the incident. On the same date the ORB-2 replied that no such person worked there. 90.  On 18 March 2005 the investigators requested that the commander of the West battalion of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior provide (for the purposes of their being questioned) a list of the servicemen of that unit who had been manning the checkpoint at the time of the shooting. 91.  On 28 March 2005 the Memorial Human Rights Centre lodged a complaint on the applicants\u2019 behalf with the Russian Prosecutor General. Their letter stated, in particular, that Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev, who had been teenagers at the time in question, and the third applicant had been driving when they had been attacked by unidentified persons in the vicinity of the West battalion and that according to local residents, gunfire had been opened on them from that direction. The letter requested that the applicants be informed of whether a criminal case had been opened into the incident and whether the perpetrators had been identified. 92.  On 1 April 2005 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. In addition, he stated that State servicemen had been responsible for the gunfire opened on the car containing his relatives. 93.  On 1 April 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants\u2019 relatives, Mr R.A. and Mr A. Kh., who had arrived at the crime scene shortly after the shooting. Their statements were similar to the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court. In addition, they stated that the gunfire directed towards their relatives had been opened by servicemen riding in armoured UAZ vehicles without registration numbers and that one of the servicemen had been Mr Adlan G. 94.  On 5 April 2005 the investigators requested that the commander of the West battalion provide them with information regarding whether officers Vakha T. and Adlan G. were serving in their unit. The investigators pointed out that it was the second such request that they had made and that the previous one had gone unanswered. 95.  On 11 April 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.S., who stated that on 26 January 2005 Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant had met with him and his friend Khasan in the courtyard of Grozny Town Hospital no. 3, where they had gone to visit a mutual friend. After that the third applicant, Mr Abiyev and Mr Atabayev had driven away. A few minutes later he had heard the sounds of automatic gunfire coming from the direction in which they had left. He had run out of the hospital courtyard but had been stopped and thrown to the ground by several men, and a beanie hat had been pulled over his face. Then one of those men had heard on his portable radio that \u201cEverything is in order\u201d (\u041d\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430); he had then been allowed to leave. 96.  On 25 April 2005 the applicants lodged a complaint with the investigators\u2019 superiors, stating that the investigators were aware of the perpetrators\u2019 identities but had failed to take active steps to prosecute them. In particular, they requested that Mr Adlan G., Mr Vakha T. and Mr Akhmed G. be questioned concerning their whereabouts at the time of the incident on 26 January 2005. 97.  On 26 April 2005 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 98.  Between April and May 2005 various law-enforcement bodies replied in the negative to queries made by the investigators regarding whether special operations had been conducted by their units on the date of the incident. In addition, the replies indicated that no criminal proceedings were pending against Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant, and that neither were they suspected of illegal activities. 99.  On 11 May 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor overruled as premature and unlawful the decision of 26 April 2005 to suspend the investigation and ordered that it be resumed so that a number of steps could be taken, including the questioning of the persons indicated by the second applicant in his request of 25 April 2005 (see paragraph 96 above). 100.  On an unspecified date between 1 and 12 May 2005 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor, stating that the investigators had failed to take the following steps:\n\u201c ... [They have failed] 1.  To clarify the reasons for which on 27 or 28 January 2005 the television news broadcast stated that two illegal fighters had been killed and one had managed to abscond and to find out who provided the television channel with this information; 101.  On 12 May 2005 the investigators issued a plan of steps to be taken within the criminal investigation. The plan stated, in particular, that there were two main theories concerning the attack on the applicants\u2019 relatives and the third applicant: (i) it had been perpetrated in connection with a blood feud, and (ii) it had been committed by law-enforcement agencies during a special operation. The investigators were, inter alia, to question the persons indicated by the applicants in their request of 25 April 2005 and to identify other witnesses to the incident. The documents submitted show that no tangible steps were taken to verify the blood-feud theory. 102.  On 15 May 2005 the investigators questioned Mr A.M., who stated that on 26 January 2005 he and three of his friends had been present next to the premises of the plant, when at about 7 p.m. three grey UAZ vehicles without registration numbers had pulled over and armed men in camouflage uniforms had got out of the vehicles. He and his friends had immediately left for home. On the way, a few minutes later, he had heard gunfire and two explosions. Half hour later he had learned of the attack on the car. 103.  On 20 May 2005 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statement and added that shortly after the incident at the crime scene his sister (the first applicant) had seen a group of about twelve military servicemen in dark uniforms and balaclavas getting into grey UAZ vehicles. She had run up to their vehicles, but two of the men had stopped her. As he had found out later, one of these two men had been Mr Vakha T. 104.  On various dates between 26 May and 10 June 2005 the investigators questioned several people who resided in the vicinity of the site of the incident. All of them gave similar statements confirming the applicants\u2019 submission before the Court but denied having any information concerning the perpetrators\u2019 identities. 105.  On 11 June 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 106.  On 29 July 2005 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including an examination of the evidence collected at the crime scene. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 107.  On 8 August 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 108.  On 20 October 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishment of the identities and questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders, other than the sending of formal requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies regarding whether they had conducted special operations on the date of the incident, were not complied with by the investigators. 109.  On 20 November 2005 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements and added that the two grenades and bullets from the TT model pistol had been planted in the car of Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant during the crime scene examination. 110.  On 20 November 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 111.  On 4 December 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishing of the identities and the questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 112.  On the same date, 4 December 2005, the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 113.  On 15 May 2006 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishing of the identities and the questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 114.  On 15 June 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 115.  On 11 August 2006 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order that the previously ordered steps could be taken. 116.  On 29 August 2006 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. He also stated that the persons who had participated in the attack on the car had been Mr Vakha (also known as Bekhan) T. and Mr Adlan G.; he knew this because the first applicant had recognised them when they had stopped her from approaching the culprits in the UAZ vehicles, as Mr Vakha T. had removed his balaclava when talking to her. He furthermore stressed that the bullets and grenades found in the car had not belonged to his nephews (who had at the material time been studying at school) and that this evidence had been planted after the shooting by the perpetrators. 117.  On 4 September 2006 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who stated that the grenades and bullets found in the car had belonged to neither him nor to Dzhabrail Abiyev or Alkhazur Atabayev. In his opinion, this evidence had been planted by the perpetrators of the shooting. 118.  On 4 September 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants\u2019 relative, Mr R.A., whose statement did not provide any new information. 119.  On 11 September 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 120.  On 6 October 2006 the investigators\u2019 supervisor overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order that a number of steps could be taken. None of those steps were taken. 121.  On 6 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 122.  On 18 January 2007 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for the previously ordered steps to be taken. 123.  On 26 January 2007 the investigators questioned a local resident, Ms L.M., whose statements did not provide any new information. 124.  Between 26 January and 2 February 2007, the investigators familiarised the first, third and fourth applicants with the decision to order a forensic examination of the bodies of Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev and with the resultant expert reports. 125.  On 18 February 2007 the investigation was suspended again. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 126.  On 26 March 2007 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for the previously ordered steps to be taken. The applicants were informed of that decision on 30 March 2007. 127.  On various dates in April 2007 the investigators questioned several local residents, who made statements to the effect that they had heard about the incident from their relatives or neighbours. 128.  On 11 April 2007 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements and insisted that Mr Vakha T. and Mr Adlan G. had been involved in his relatives\u2019 killing. In addition, he stated that at the crime scene there had been three armoured UAZ vehicles and one regular UAZ vehicle. 129.  On 16 April 2007 the investigators questioned Mr S.Kh., whose statement was similar to that given by Mr A.M. (see paragraph 66 above). 130.  On 30 April 2007 the investigators suspended the criminal investigation. The applicants were informed thereof shortly afterwards. 131.  On 19 September 2008 the investigators\u2019 supervisor overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken. None of those steps were in fact taken. 132.  On 20 October 2008 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 133.  On 17 November 2008 the deputy Leninskiy district prosecutor criticised the investigators\u2019 failure to comply with the previously given orders and ordered that the investigation be resumed and the ordered steps taken. 134.  On 19 November 2008, following the district prosecutor\u2019s criticism, the investigation was resumed in order for the requested steps to be taken. 135.  On 4 December 2008 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. 136.  Between 13 and 17 December 2008 the investigators questioned several local residents, who gave statements to the effect that they had heard about the incident from their relatives or neighbours. 137.  On 19 December 2008 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 138.  On 19 January 2009 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed so that the previously ordered steps could be taken. 139.  On 9 February 2009, following the district prosecutor\u2019s criticism, the investigation was resumed. The requested steps were not taken. 140.  On 13 March 2009 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 141.  On 5 April 2009 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed and the previously ordered steps taken. 142.  On 12 April 2009, following the district prosecutor\u2019s criticism, the investigation was resumed. The ordered steps were not taken and on 12 May 2009 the investigation was suspended again. 143.  From the copies of the contents of the investigation file it can be seen that the applicants regularly gave statements to the investigators and contacted them and their superiors, asking for information on the progress of the criminal proceedings. For instance, on 16 January 2010 the fourth applicant lodged a complaint with the Russian Prosecutor General, stating that the local law-enforcement agencies were stalling the investigation and trying to cover up the incident and their involvement in the killing of the local law\u2011enforcement officers. 144.  Following the above-mentioned complaint, on 30 May 2010 the investigation was resumed. In addition, on the same date the investigators opened a criminal case against the unidentified persons who had killed the applicants\u2019 relatives on 26 January 2005. That criminal case was joined with criminal case no. 43015 under the joint number 43015. 145.  On various dates in June 2010 the investigators questioned several local residents, who gave statements to the effect that they had heard about the killing of the applicants\u2019 relatives from their relatives or neighbours. 146.  On 30 June 2010 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 147.  On 2 August 2011 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. 148.  On 4 August 2011 the investigators again suspended the investigation. 149.  On 23 August 2011 the investigation was resumed and then again suspended on 23 September 2011 without any steps having been taken. 150.  On 17 November 2011, after the applicants complained to the investigators\u2019 superiors, the proceedings were resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken. None of those steps were taken and on 18 November 2011 the investigation was suspended again. 151.  On 7 October 2011 the investigators\u2019 superiors again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed and the previously ordered steps taken. 152.  On 22 October 2011, following the superiors\u2019 criticism, the investigation was resumed. The requested steps were not taken, except for the sending of formal requests for information, and on 22 November 2011 the investigation was again suspended. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 153.  On 4 April 2014 the investigation was resumed. There is no further information on any progress in the proceedings.", "references": ["1", "3", "7", "5", "8", "6", "4", "9", "No Label", "0", "2"], "gold": ["0", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants are five Russian nationals. Their personal details are set out in the Appendix. They are members of one family. 7.  Since 1981 the applicants have lived in a flat in an apartment block provided to them under a social tenancy agreement by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. The landlord was under obligation to perform a major overhaul of the apartment block, and the applicants had to make regular payments for the major overhaul. They paid the amounts due. The overhaul had never been performed, allegedly since 1935. 8.  On the dates listed in the Appendix the Orenburgskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region granted their claims, having noted from expert reports that the apartment block was \u201c64%\u2012dilapidated\u201d and its state was \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d, and that the flat was 64%\u2012dilapidated. The court found that the applicants\u2019 living premises, as well as the common property of the apartment block required a major overhaul. The court ordered the Federal State Institution of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit to perform the major overhaul of the applicants\u2019 flat, as well as of the common property of the apartment block and of the \u201cdevices situated in the living premises and serving for provision of communal services\u201d in the apartment block, and to pay each applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 9.  According to the applicants\u2019 observations, on 9 November 2011 the Orenburgskiy District Court awarded the claimants RUB 490,155.43 (approximately 11.681 euros) of compensation of losses. They did not enclose a copy of the judgment or further details as to either the defendant, or the exact list of claimants, the scope of the judgment or its subsequent challenge on appeal by any of the parties. 10.  In 2012 Federal State Treasury Department (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit became a legal successor of the debtor institution. 11.  In 2012 the applicants sued various authorities for penalties for several years of the non-enforcement. By the final judgment of 5 February 2013 the Orenburg Regional Court rejected their claims in full, having found that they were based on an incorrect interpretation of the domestic law and that the applicants had failed to submit a calculation of the penalty. 12.  According to the Government, in December 2013 the applicant\u2019s house was included in a regional housing overhaul assistance program. The authorities prepared a project and the budget documentation, which were approved by the experts. 13.  On 13 April 2015 Ms Konstantinova privatized the flat and acquired a title to it. 14.  According to the Government\u2019s latest observations of 31 May 2017, the judgments had remained unenforced at the material time.", "references": ["2", "5", "7", "1", "6", "0", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Qormi. The second applicant is a limited liability company incorporated in 1996 and registered in Marsa, Malta. The second applicant is owned by the first applicant. 5.  On 27 July 2011, the Court of Magistrates as a court of criminal judicature found M. (the first applicant\u2019s son, who lives under the same roof as the first applicant) guilty of involuntary grievous bodily harm of two minors, and of driving a Peugeot van with registration number HBD096 (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Peugeot\u201d) without a licence. The Peugeot was registered in the name of Maxkim Limited (the second applicant). M. was not an employee of the company. The Court of Magistrates sentenced M. to a term of imprisonment and disqualified him from obtaining a driving licence for a period of time. Furthermore, it ordered the confiscation of the Peugeot, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 (2) (c) (i) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (hereinafter \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d) (see Relevant Domestic Law), since this was more than the third time in which M. was being found guilty of a crime under Article 3 of the Ordinance. 6.  M. appealed the decision. 7.  On 24 October 2011, the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed the first\u2011instance court judgment in part, namely lowering the disqualification period to six months. The rest of the judgment was confirmed. As to the confiscation of the Peugeot, the Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the confiscation was a result of the above\u2011mentioned provision of law which provided that both the person as well as the vehicle must be insured. 8.  The authorities eventually took physical possession of the Peugeot. However, by this time, the Peugeot had been returned to the importer following an agreement between him and the second applicant which provided that the latter would not pay any further instalments in connection with the hire purchase agreement with which the car had been acquired. The Government submitted that since this had never happened the vehicle remained owned by the importer, who was in 2018 pursuing proceedings before the domestic courts, and it therefore followed that the second applicant could not be considered to have had a possession. 9.  On 6 January 2012 the Court of Magistrates as a court of criminal judicature found M. guilty under Article 61(1) of the Traffic Regulations Ordinance of driving away, with the intention to use, a vehicle of the make Toyota (Vitz) with registration number KIM324 (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Toyota\u201d). The Toyota was registered in the name of the first applicant. It is not disputed that the Toyota was owned by him. The Court of Magistrates did not order the confiscation of the Toyota (which had already been seized by the police since 9 November 2011) on the ground that M. had used it without the consent of the owner, and thus ordered its release. 10.  Despite the above finding, the car was not released by the authorities. 11.  The Attorney General (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe AG\u201d) appealed against part of the decision of the Court of Magistrates, requesting the Court of Criminal Appeal to order the confiscation of the Toyota; he also appealed with respect to the punishment imposed. 12.  It appears that during these appeal proceedings the first applicant requested the court to release the Toyota. He argued that there was no reason for the Toyota not to be returned to him, since the first\u2011instance court had not ordered its confiscation and, according to law, the AG\u2019s appeal did not suspend the execution of the judgment of the first\u2011instance court (Article 416(4) of the Criminal Code) (See Relevant Domestic Law). The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected this request. 13.  On 26 March 2014 the Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the AG\u2019s appeal in toto. 14.  On 27 March 2014 the Toyota was returned to the first applicant. 15.  In the meantime, on 28 November 2012, the applicants (Mr Ciantar in his name and on behalf of Maxkim Limited) filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. They claimed, inter alia, that both the above-mentioned criminal proceedings against M. violated their rights under Articles 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 16.  It was argued, in connection with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the confiscation of the Peugeot in the first set of criminal proceedings and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings rejecting the request to release the Toyota, pending the appeal proceedings, had been \u2018unlawful\u2019. 17.  Under Article 6 the applicants argued that they had never been accused of a crime and had not had the opportunity to defend themselves before a court; however, they had nonetheless suffered the imposition of a penal punishment upon them. Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeal had refused to grant back to the first applicant possession of the Toyota in violation of the law. 18.  The applicants requested that the two vehicles be released, and that they be awarded just satisfaction for the violations suffered and the lost use of the two vehicles. 19.  On 23 October 2013 the court rejected the applicants\u2019 claims except for that concerning the release of the Toyota. It ordered the Toyota to be released immediately (since the Court of Magistrates had not ordered its confiscation), at least until the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal on the AG\u2019s appeal, which was still pending at the time. 20.  In regard to the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the court held that the confiscation of the Peugeot had been ordered by a final judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the first set of criminal proceedings and therefore there could be no doubt that the confiscation was in compliance with the law (Article 3 of the Ordinance). It noted that Article 3 was aimed at protecting innocent citizens from abuse by people who broke the law by driving vehicles without a licence or without insurance. The fact that the provision ordered the confiscation of a vehicle used by a person caught driving without a licence or without insurance, even if the vehicle belonged to a company the perpetrator worked for, or the vehicle belonged to a family member with whom that perpetrator lived, struck the necessary balance and was an appropriate deterrent to the commission of crime. It followed that it was not in violation of the invoked provisions. 21.  Regarding the claim for damages, the court concluded that the applicants must demand them from M., since M. was the one who had violated the law leading to the institution of the criminal proceedings with the ensuing consequences. 22.  On 7 November 2013 the applicants filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court. It was argued that in both sets of criminal proceedings the applicants had been unlawfully deprived of their property. According to the applicants, Article 3 was inapplicable to the confiscation of the Peugeot, which could only be possible if, differently from M., the accused had been an employee of Maxkim Limited. The applicants further contended that the withholding of the Toyota by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings lacked a legal basis, which had not been remedied by the temporary order of the first\u2011instance constitutional jurisdiction. Further, the latter court had failed to effectively consider their complaints under Article 6 of the Convention. 23.  The AG also filed an appeal. 24.  On 11 August 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the AG\u2019s appeal and declared that the applicants had suffered a violation of their rights as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In connection with both vehicles, the court found that Article 3 of the Ordinance violated the same right in so far it permitted the confiscation of a vehicle, without the owner of the vehicle being given the opportunity to effectively contest the confiscation. Article 3 of the Ordinance was therefore declared null and void in regard to such consequences. The Constitutional Court ordered the release of both vehicles, and the payment of non\u2011pecuniary damages in the sum of 300 euros (EUR) to each of the applicants. The rest of the applicants\u2019 claims were rejected. The cost of the appeal proceedings before the Constitutional Court filed by the applicants were to be borne in the proportion of one fifth by the applicants and four fifths by the AG, and the costs of the appeal proceedings before the Constitutional Court filed by the AG were to be borne by him. The applicants\u2019 share of costs amounted to EUR 1,129.46 (of which 425.79 were registry fees). 25.  The Constitutional Court noted that, simply because the courts in the first set of criminal proceedings had applied the law did not necessarily mean that there had not been a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. While the confiscation of the Peugeot had been lawful, it had however placed a disproportionate and excessive burden upon the applicant [company] thereby leading to a violation of its rights (especially since the applicants had no possibility of defending themselves in order to prevent the confiscation of the vehicle which was mandatory). Furthermore, there existed no adequate or effective remedy to prevent the confiscation of the Peugeot, and third parties were not protected by any procedural safeguards. 26.  As for the Toyota, the same last\u2011mentioned considerations applied. Furthermore, as a result of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings, the Constitutional Court concluded that the seizure of that vehicle had been unnecessary and could not be justified as having been done in the interests of justice since no third party had suffered any damage. 27.  The confiscation/seizure of both vehicles amounted to, according to the Constitutional Court, a lack of balance between the interests of the general community and the rights of the applicants. Therefore a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had occurred. 28.  In regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the court noted that the fact that measures resulting from an act for which a third party (in this case M.) was prosecuted, affecting in an adverse manner the property rights of the applicants, could not in themselves lead to the conclusion that, during the course of the criminal proceedings complained of, any \u201ccriminal charge\u201d, for the purpose of Article 6, was brought against the applicants. Therefore, the court concluded that Article 6 in its criminal head was inapplicable and the applicants had not invoked this provision under its civil head. Thus, the claim of a lack of access to court had been unfounded. Furthermore, the court concluded that Article 3 of the Ordinance did not create any presumption of guilt and the applicants had not been found guilty of a crime. 29.  In the meantime on 15 October 2012 the importer of the Peugeot started civil proceedings against the applicants for fraudulent behaviour and bad faith when they agreed to return the Peugeot which was potentially subject to a confiscation order. The importer also started proceedings against the Commissioner of Police, as a result of which the above\u2011mentioned civil proceedings were adjourned sine die. 30.  On an unspecified date following the constitutional redress proceedings, the Peugeot was released but remained under the authority of the court due to the above-mentioned issues, and payment of the award of EUR 300 was made to each applicant. On 9 January 2017 the Government paid their share of expenses of the constitutional redress proceedings.", "references": ["2", "6", "1", "5", "8", "3", "4", "0", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. 5.  On 21 October 2010 the Directorate of Tax Investigation (Skattranns\u00f3knarstj\u00f3ri r\u00edkisins) initiated an audit of the applicant\u2019s tax return for the income year 2006. On 5 November 2010, the applicant was interviewed by the Directorate. 6.  The investigation was concluded with a report issued on 13 January 2011. By a letter of 14 January 2011 the Directorate informed the applicant that the case would be referred to the Directorate of Internal Revenue (R\u00edkisskattstj\u00f3ri) for reassessment of his taxes. It also informed the applicant about the Directorate of Tax Investigation\u2019s upcoming decision on possible criminal proceedings, listed possible ways of finalising the criminal procedure in the case and gave the applicant 30 days to comment. By letter of 18 February 2011, 5 days after the deadline, the applicant replied and requested the finalisation of the case with a decision by the Directorate, ordering him to pay a fine, or for the case to be sent to the State Internal Revenue Board (Yfirskattanefnd). 7.  On the basis of the Directorate of Tax Investigation\u2019s report, the Directorate of Internal Revenue, ruling on 23 November 2011, found in particular that the applicant had failed to declare significant capital gains received in 2006. Therefore, it revised upward the amount declared as capital gains in his tax return for the income year 2006 and, consequently, re-assessed his taxes and imposed a 25% surcharge. The applicant paid the additional tax and tax surcharges. 8.  The applicant did not appeal to the State Internal Revenue Board against the decision, which thus acquired legal force three months later, in February 2012, when the time-limit for an appeal had expired. 9.  On 28 March 2012 the Directorate of Tax Investigation reported the matter to the Special Prosecutor. By a letter of the same day, the applicant was informed about it. On 14 September 2012 the applicant was interviewed by the police for the first time. 10.  On 10 October 2012 the Special Prosecutor indicted the applicant for aggravated tax offences. In particular, the applicant was charged with having under declared his income in his tax return of 2007. This included failure to declare significant capital gains received in 2006. 11.  By judgment of 16 May 2013, the District Court found that the applicant had acted with gross negligence, which was sufficient for criminal liability under the relevant provisions of the tax law, and therefore convicted the applicant of the charges against him. The court sentenced him to three months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years, and the payment of 24,006,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately 152,000 euros (EUR) at the material time). Furthermore, the applicant was ordered to pay legal costs of ISK 878,500 plus value added tax for his defence counsel. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 13.  By a judgment of 22 May 2014, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to dismiss the case on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. The court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and confirmed his prison sentence. However, the Supreme Court sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of ISK 21,000,000 (approximately EUR 136,000 at the material time). In fixing the fine, the court had regard to the tax surcharge imposed. The applicant was ordered to pay legal costs of ISK 1,286,614, ISK 1,255,000 of that amount for his defence counsel.", "references": ["5", "2", "6", "4", "3", "9", "0", "7", "1", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6.  On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor\u2019s office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority\u2019s reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor\u2019s office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7.  On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8.  According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9.  At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10.  According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans \u201cFreedom to political prisoners\u201d, \u201cDeath to fascists\u201d and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all \u201cBolotnaya participants\u201d were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11.  According to the records of transfer to the police station (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044b \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12.  According to the Government, the term of the applicants\u2019 retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13.  At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14.  On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days\u2019 detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a \u201cmeeting\u201d with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was \u201cundated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant\u2019s] arrest\u201d. 15.  On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days\u2019 detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained \u201cinformation about the address\u201d. 16.  Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a \u201cmeeting\u201d (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "8", "9", "1", "2", "No Label", "6", "7", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. 6.  In early 2012 Ms B., headmistress of School no. 118 of Rostov\u2011on\u2011Don and chairwoman of the local electoral committee, removed the applicant from his position as an electoral committee member. 7.  On 1 September 2012 festive events were taking place at School no. 118 to celebrate \u201cThe Day of Knowledge\u201d (\u0414\u0435\u043d\u044c \u0437\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439). Around 8.15 a.m. on that day the applicant staged a solo demonstration (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442) in front of the school. He distributed leaflets to the parents of the pupils expressing his negative opinion about the professional and personal qualities of the headmistress, Ms. B. The leaflets read as follows:\n\u201cDear parents, you have entrusted your children to the staff of School no. 118, with Ms B. as its headmistress. I, Eduard Nikolayev, have reasons to believe that your child will be taught from Hottentot and Old Testament ethics. See for yourself: on 10 March 2012 I held a demonstration and was handled by the police. I was then sentenced to two days in detention by a justice of the peace, on a fabricated charge of hooliganism. This is now a widespread practice in respect of political matters in Russia. As the judicial reprisals were manifestly unlawful (since I had immunity as a member of an electoral committee), they needed to invent some justification. Such a justification was deliberately faked by Ms B., chairwoman of the local electoral committee ...\u201d 8.  The school staff called police officer O., who was present at the school premises owing to enhanced security measures taken on that day. 9.  According to the applicant, within thirty minutes two additional police officers, T. and M., had arrived. He complied with their order to show his identity documents. At some point, while the police officers were carrying out an identity check through the police database, he decided to leave. However, when the applicant saw police officer T. following him, he changed his mind and returned. Officer T. then took him in a painful armlock and handcuffed him, without giving any valid reason; the applicant was then taken to the police van. 10.  According to the Government, Ms B. had informed police officer O. that the applicant was distributing leaflets. The applicant refused to familiarise officer O. with the contents of the leaflet or to leave the school premises upon her request. At 8.30 a.m. a special group of police officers arrived. They asked the applicant to present his identity documents and to proceed to the police van for an identity check. The applicant tried to escape; the police used force and handcuffs to stop him. Then the applicant was taken to the police station. 11.  At the police station the officer on duty drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s administrative arrest for the purpose of bringing him to court. The record indicated that the applicant had been escorted to the police station at 9.55 a.m. and released at 12.20 p.m. on 1 September 2012. After that the on-duty officer compiled an administrative-offence record, according to which the applicant had used foul language at the premises of School no. 118 and disturbed passers-by in an insulting manner. Moreover, he had resisted arrest by pushing the police officers away and had tried to escape from them. The applicant was accused of minor hooliganism, an offence punishable under Article 20.1 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, \u201cthe CAO\u201d) (see paragraph 25 below). 12.  The administrative case file contained a report by police officer M., which stated that at 8.50 a.m. on 1 September 2012 he and officer T. had arrested the applicant at the premises of School no. 118. The applicant had used foul language and had behaved inappropriately; in particular, he had disturbed passers-by. He had not reacted to their multiple requests to calm down and to cease this behaviour, had refused to present his identity documents and had tried to escape. Officer M. also recorded that the police had used physical force and handcuffs. 13.  On 1 September 2012 the administrative case was transferred to the Justice of the Peace of the Voroshilovskiy District of Rostov-on-Don. 14.  Upon his release from the police station on 1 September 2012, the applicant went to Rostov-on-Don City Emergency Hospital. At 4.25 p.m. he was examined by a doctor, who diagnosed him with a sprain to the right shoulder and bruises on both wrists. After being provided with the necessary treatment, at 5.20 p.m. the applicant was released from the hospital. The applicant stayed on sick leave in connection with these injuries from 1 until 24 September 2012. 15.  On 3 September 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Investigative Committee of Rostov-on-Don alleging breaches of his rights to liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly by the police. It appears that the Rostov regional department of the Ministry of the Interior conducted an internal inquiry into this complaint. As a result, it was determined that police officers T. and M. had acted in accordance with the law and internal requirements and had not breached the applicant\u2019s rights. 16.  On 12 September 2012 police station no. 1 of Rostov-on-Don informed the applicant in a letter that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued as his actions lacked the constituent elements of the crime. 17.  In November 2012 the applicant brought civil proceedings (in accordance with Article 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure) challenging the following actions on the part of the public authorities and officials: the police order to stop the demonstration and distribution of leaflets, in breach of his right to impart information; their recourse to physical force and use of handcuffs; taking him to the police station; and his prosecution under the CAO. 18.  By a judgment of 5 April 2013 the Voroshilovskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed his claims. The court accepted the applicant\u2019s submission that he had staged a static demonstration (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435), which consisted of distribution of leaflets. It considered that the applicant had attempted to escape during the identity check and had been arrested, and that the use of force and handcuffs had complied with the relevant regulations. Further, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued, on the grounds that no formal decision had been issued. The court also relied on the statements of a representative of the regional department of the Ministry of the Interior in that regard, who had testified that the administrative-offence file against the applicant had been lost. However, the police had been reassembling the file at the time of the trial. 19.  On the basis of several testimonies, the District Court concluded as follows:\n\u201cIn the present case the police officers intended to put an end to the breach of public order, consisting of [showing] disrespect to society accompanied by the use of foul language in a public place [by the applicant], disturbing citizens in an insulting manner and refusing to obey an order by a public official ... The police officers ... acted within their powers and did not violate the applicant\u2019s rights. Nor did they cause any impediment to the exercise of any such rights ...\u201d 20.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He contended that the finding of the first-instance court had been based on the pending charge against him and the wording of Article 20.1 of the CAO, and had thus violated his right to be presumed innocent. Furthermore, in the applicant\u2019s view, the court had failed to specify the factual details concerning his showing of \u201cdisrespect to society\u201d, the content and the alleged victims of the foul language allegedly used by him, the details of his \u201cdisturbing others\u201d and \u201cthe order by a public official\u201d and the lawfulness of any such order. 21.  On 17 June 2013 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. The court pointed out that the circumstances concerning the applicant\u2019s guilt in the commission of an administrative offence should be discussed in the context of the administrative offence proceedings.", "references": ["9", "2", "0", "8", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "6", "1", "3"], "gold": ["6", "1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Mr Grigoryev) was born in 1984 and lives in Svetlogorsk. The second applicant (Ms Igamberdiyeva) was born in 1989 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6.  On an unknown date the second applicant notified the Kaliningrad authorities of her intention to hold a group public event on 12 December 2010 in Pobeda Square. The authorities replied that preparations for the New Year celebrations were planned on that day; they did not suggest an alternative venue. The second applicant did not challenge the authority\u2019s reply before the domestic courts. Both applicants decided to stage solo demonstrations near the monument to \u201cMother Russia\u201d instead; this did not require prior notification. 7.  According to the applicants, on 12 December 2010 the first applicant staged a solo demonstration holding a banner saying \u201cFreedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev! We plead for a lawful judgment\u201d. After he had completed his demonstration and placed himself at a distance of some twenty metres, the second applicant held her own solo demonstration. She was wearing a T-shirt saying \u201cFreedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev!\u201d She completed her demonstration in five minutes. Then the first applicant returned to the venue with his banner and remained there for about two minutes, until police officers took him to a police van. He was then taken to a police station and held there for over three hours. 8.  According to the Government, at 4 p.m. on 12 December 2010 the applicants participated in a group public event in the form of a \u201cpicket\u201d (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) using visual props, namely a banner and a T-shirt. At 4 p.m. the first applicant was taken to the Leninskiy district police station. Between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. a duty officer drew up an administrative offence record in respect of the first applicant. He was accused of taking part in a group public event held without authorisation, an offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d). On 14 December 2012 the second applicant was called to the Leninskiy district police station, where she was accused of a similar offence, although it was classified under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. 9.  The cases against the applicants were submitted to a justice of the peace of court circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Kaliningrad. The court ordered the police to submit a video recording showing the events of 12 December 2010. By two judgments of 3 March 2011 the justice of the peace found that the applicants had held solo demonstrations and had not breached the Public Events Act (hereinafter \u201cthe PEA\u201d), including its prior notification requirement applicable to group events. The court relied, inter alia, on the video recording submitted by the police. The administrative cases against the applicants were discontinued for lack of the elements of the offences under Article 20.2 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CAO. 10.  The police lodged an appeal. On 16 May 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Kaliningrad upheld the judgments. The appellate court also considered that it had not been confirmed that the applicants had in fact taken part in a group \u201cpicket\u201d. 11.  The applicants sought compensation of 100,000 roubles (RUB)[1] each for unlawful deprivation of liberty and violation of their right to freedom of expression by way of solo demonstration. By a judgment of 15 July 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad found that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful, and awarded him RUB 10,000 (equivalent to 250 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 25 July 2011 the same court also granted the claims by the second applicant, having found that preventing her from staging a solo demonstration and consequently prosecuting her had been unlawful. The court also awarded the second applicant RUB 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. 12.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 15 July 2011, complaining, inter alia, about the amount of the compensation and the first\u2011instance court\u2019s failure to make specific findings in relation to the violation of his freedom of expression on account of the police intervention in his solo demonstration. On 7 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment. Relying on Article 27.1 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and Article 1070 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code, it ruled that it followed from the discontinuation of the CAO case that placing the first applicant under administrative escort and arrest had been unlawful under Russian law as well as \u201cunjustified\u201d (\u043d\u0435\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435). The appellate court also considered that the interference with freedom of expression had been acknowledged by the declaration that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful. 13.  The second applicant also appealed. On 21 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment of 25 July 2011.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "4", "1", "8", "3", "7", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5.  In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6.  On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7.  On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8.  On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9.  On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company\u2019s insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10.  On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11.  On 28 September 2010 the B\u0103l\u0163i Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant\u2019s action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12.  On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant\u2019s objection concerning the late appeal.", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "1", "2", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Ms Muchnik) was born in 1968 and lives in Tomsk. The second applicant (Mr Mordovin) was born in 1956 and lives in Seversk, in the Tomsk Region. 6.  At the end of 2014 the Russian Television and Radio Network informed the private regional television company TV-2 that its contract for broadcast services would be cancelled as of 1 January 2015. At the same time, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (\u0420\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440) did not renew the company\u2019s broadcast licence, which was due to expire on 8 February 2015. As a result, TV-2, one of the leading channels in the Tomsk Region which had been reporting on everyday life in the region since 1990, stopped broadcasting at the beginning of 2015. 7.  According to the first applicant, between 4 and 14 January 2015 she staged nine solo demonstrations to protest against the authorities\u2019 decision to deprive TV-2 of its ability to broadcast. Some other people also staged solo demonstrations on the same dates and at the same time, keeping a 30\u2011metre distance from each other. 8.  According to the Government, the first applicant, acting together with other persons, held nine \u201cpickets\u201d (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u044b) near two shopping centres in Tomsk between 4 and 14 January 2015, expressing support for TV-2. These \u201cpickets\u201d were held without prior notification being given to local authorities. 9.  On 27 February 2015 an administrative-offence record was compiled in respect of the first applicant. She was accused of organising and participating in group public events held without prior notification being given to the local authority, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, \u201cthe CAO\u201d). It was considered that, while the applicant and other solo demonstrators had complied with the local requirement to keep a 30-metre distance from each other, there had still been a single event amounting to an \u201cassembly\u201d of several people. 10.  The administrative case file contained a report and an explanatory note from a high-ranking police officer from Tomsk police department. It was stated, in particular, that F. had initiated a number of public assemblies in support of TV-2 from 4 January 2015 onwards, by posting calls for support via social networks. The first applicant had picked up those involved in the solo demonstrations and transported them to the event venues; she had also handed out leaflets to them for distribution. It was stated that she had organised \u201cpicketing\u201d over the course of ten days and had enlisted the help of around eighty people. The report comprised several screenshots of Facebook pages showing calls for people to support TV-2 through protests, including a personal page of the applicant. The administrative case file also contained several reports by police officers who had been present on 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 January 2015 at the location where the solo demonstrations had taken place. The police officers pointed out that no breaches of the Public Events Act (hereinafter, \u201cthe PEA\u201d) had been detected; the demonstrators had kept the minimum 30-metre distance from each other and had not breached public order. 11.  On 3 March 2015 the case against the first applicant was submitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of Tomsk. On the same day, it was assigned to a judge, who set up a hearing for 4.30 p.m. At 1.45 p.m. the judge\u2019s assistant informed the applicant of this by telephone. The judge dismissed an application for the hearing to be adjourned for two days, because such a case had to be examined on the same day it was received by a court. However, the judge gave the applicant an hour to study the file, and when her lawyer appeared some time later he requested only fifteen minutes to study the file. The judge\u2019s assistant later reported that the applicant had not studied the file for the hour which she had been given; instead, she had talked on the phone and chatted with the other people present in the courtroom. The hearing went from 6.09 p.m. to 11.28 p.m., including breaks. 12.  By a judgment of 3 March 2015 the first applicant was convicted under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 about 287 euros (EUR) at the time). The court relied on the administrative-offence record, reports and an explanatory note by police officers, screenshots of Facebook pages, and written statements by different people outlining the applicant\u2019s role in organising the public events. The court dismissed as unreliable the testimony of F. and the applicant\u2019s husband, who had been questioned at her request. 13.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the Tomsk Regional Court. By a decision of 13 April 2015 the appellate court excluded the reference to the applicant being the organiser of the events, but upheld the remainder of the trial judgment. 14.  On 7 September 2015 and 10 February 2016 the Tomsk Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia respectively dismissed applications for review lodged by the first applicant. 15.  According to the second applicant, on 6 August 2014 from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. he staged a solo demonstration protesting against the persecution of political activists. The officials present at the venue in question did not make any claims during his solo demonstration or after it (see, however, paragraph 17 below). The applicant was not hindered in any way and completed his demonstration. 16.  According to the national authorities and according to the Government\u2019s submissions before the Court, on 6 August 2014 from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. the second applicant, acting together with (seven) other persons, organised and held a public event in the form of \u201cpicket\u201d near Big City, a shopping centre in Tomsk. Using visual aids, the applicant and other protestors expressed their opinion about the participants in the events of 6 May 2012 in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, without giving prior notification to the authorities. 17.  On 15 May 2015 the head of the division for the execution of administrative legislation of the Tomsk police department (\u041e\u0418\u0410\u0417 \u0423\u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443 \u0422\u043e\u043c\u0441\u043a\u0443) compiled an administrative-offence record in respect of the second applicant and notified him of that record. The latter was accused of an offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO for organising and holding a public event without giving prior notification to the competent authority. It was stated that the participants had had posters and T-shirts with slogans expressing their demand that the political activists be released. 18.  The administrative case file contained notes written by the police which described a video-recording of the \u201cpicket\u201d and comprised screenshots of several social media webpages calling for people to participate in the event of 6 August 2014. It also contained two explanatory notes by police officers from the Tomsk police department\u2019s Centre for Combatting Extremism. The notes described monitoring activities carried out in respect of the applicant and other activists, and three public assemblies held by them on 6 June, 6 July and 6 August 2014. 19.  On 15 May 2015 the case file against the applicant was submitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of Tomsk. The applicant, who had not been deprived of his liberty, attended the trial and pleaded not guilty. The trial court heard several witnesses on behalf of the defence. On the same day the district court convicted the second applicant under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 306 at the time). The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the trial. The court considered that the applicant had conspired with others to hold a static demonstration on 6 August 2014; the applicant had been the event organiser, and he had failed to give the authorities prior notification of the event. The court relied on the administrative-offence record drawn up by the police and on various notes and video-recordings produced by the police. In particular, the court noted that the videos showed the applicant and other participants in the event gathering at the venue; it also showed that during the event they had been standing less than 30 metres from each other and talking. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, an argument which was supported by the testimony of defence witnesses who had also been participants in the event. 20.  The second applicant lodged an appeal against the above judgment. On 19 June 2015 the Tomsk Regional Court held an appeal hearing and heard the applicant and his lawyer. The appellate court noted that the available evidence did not confirm that the applicant had been the event organiser; however, he had still been a participant in the public assembly, an assembly of which the authorities had not been given notice. The court therefore reclassified his actions, found him guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 5 of the CAO and reduced the fine to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 165 at the time). 21.  On 30 November 2015 the acting President of the Tomsk Regional Court rejected a further appeal on points of law by the second applicant.", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "5", "9", "8", "No Label", "6", "7", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Ms Belan) was born in 1961. The second applicant (Ms Sviderskaya) was born in 1949. They both live in Rostov-on-Don. 6.  On 3 September 2012 the second applicant and Ms T. notified the local authority of their intention to hold a public assembly from 4 to 5 p.m. on 15 September 2012 in Sovetov Square in Rostov-on-Don. They indicated that the assembly would otherwise be held in front of the Lenin monument at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. The first applicant intended to take part in the public event. 7.  On 5 September 2012 the authority suggested that the event should instead be held from 9.30 to 10.30 a.m. in the square in front of the City Library. On 6 September 2012 the event organisers dismissed the suggestion as unsuitable for the purposes of their assembly. On 12 September 2012 the authority insisted on their suggestion and refused to make another one because large-scale festive events were due to take place in the town on the proposed date. Ms T. withdrew her request to hold the planned event. 8.  According to the first applicant, she decided to stage on 15 September 2012 a solo \u201cpicket\u201d (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442) from 2 to 3 p.m. at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. She chose the format of a solo \u201cpicket\u201d because it did not require her to give prior notification to the authorities. At around 2.10 p.m., shortly after she had started, she was approached by police officers who ordered her to stop the \u201cpicket\u201d and issued her with a formal warning for a violation of public order. One of the officers asked a passer-by, Mr Z., to hold her banner so that she could sign the warning. The events were recorded on video. At around 2.20 p.m. the applicant and Mr Z. were arrested and taken to a police station. The applicant remained there from 2.30 to 6 p.m. She was then allowed to leave. 9.  According to the second applicant, from 1.30 to 2.45 p.m. on 15 September 2012 she staged a solo demonstration on a street corner opposite Gorkiy Park to protest against construction laws. On her way back home she walked through the park and at around 3 p.m. saw a man holding a banner. She approached him to read the banner, which read \u201cI will not give up my freedom of choice, which is granted by God and the Constitution!\u201d. She was immediately approached by a police officer, who ordered her to show her own banner but she refused. At 3.05 p.m. she was taken to a police station, where she saw the first applicant. According to the second applicant, she spent five hours at the police station (including two hours waiting outside for a copy of the record). 10.  According to the relevant records, the first and second applicants were taken to the police station at 5.20 p.m. and 4.45 p.m. respectively for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. The police station logbook indicated that the first applicant had been brought there at 4.20 p.m. and released at 6.30 p.m., and that the second applicant had been brought there at 4.45 p.m. and released at 6.45 p.m. 11.  At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a public event without giving prior notification to the authorities, in breach of Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d). The administrative-offence records indicated that the first applicant had held a public event at 3.45 p.m. and the second applicant at 3.10 p.m., and that both offences had been committed near the Lenin monument at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. The administrative case files contained handwritten reports by the two police officers who had arrested the applicants. Both reports contained descriptions of the applicants\u2019 acts substantially similar to those contained in the administrative-offence records. 12.  On an unspecified date the case was transferred to a justice of the peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don. The trial court held several hearings. The applicant attended and was assisted by a representative, though it is unclear whether that person was a lawyer. 13.  On 25 September 2012 the trial court held a hearing and heard various witnesses. Ms O. stated that she had seen the applicant standing in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park with a banner and that a man and a woman had also been \u201cstanding on that square\u201d with banners. Mr P. testified that he had wanted \u201cto join the picket\u201d at Gorkiy Park. Mr Z. stated that he had happened to be standing close to the first applicant and had taken her banner at the request of the police so that she could sign some papers. 14.  At the same hearing the trial court dismissed an application by the defence seeking to admit two photographs and a video-recording (apparently showing the events of 15 September 2012) into evidence. The judge stated that it was unclear who had captured the footage and that they contained no indication of when and where they had been taken. However, at the defence\u2019s request, the judge ordered the city police department to release the footage of two street cameras. 15.  On 4 October 2012 the deputy chief of the city police department replied that the footage from one camera had been \u201csaved\u201d and invited the judge to provide an electronic storage device onto which it could be copied. However, on 18 October 2012 the acting head of the duty unit of the city police department informed the judge that the street camera footage could not be released because it had not been archived owing to a failure of the archiving system and \u201cbecause those city cameras had not been working\u201d. 16.  The trial court summoned police officer A., who had arrested the first applicant, for questioning. At a hearing on 7 November 2012 A. stated that after receiving information from Sh., the chief of police station no. 4 (see paragraph 28 below), he had arrived at Gorkiy Park where he had seen a group of people, including Z., in possession of banners, without having given any prior notification of their public event, and that he also remembered arresting Ms Belan, though he could not remember her face. A. also stated that on 15 September 2012 officers from the regional bureau of forensic examinations (\u201cforensic bureau\u201d) within the regional police department had taken photographs of what appeared to be a public assembly. 17.  On 7 November 2012 the trial court also allowed the examination of videos submitted by officers of police station no. 4 containing two clips relating to the events on 15 September 2012. One showed the applicant with a banner, while the other showed her reading a piece of paper and Mr Z. standing close to her and holding a banner above his head. The trial court later declared those clips inadmissible evidence. The trial court also granted a request by the defence for the forensic bureau to provide the photographs taken on 15 September 2012. The hearing was then adjourned. 18.  On 12 November 2012 the chief of the city police department replied to that request, indicating that no photographs or video recordings had been taken on 15 September 2012 in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park. It is unclear whether the forensic bureau was within that official\u2019s purview. 19.  In the meantime, on 9 November 2012 the same justice of the peace convicted the second applicant in separate proceedings dealing with the same events (see paragraph 28 below). 20.  On 13 November 2012 the trial court convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and issued him with a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 about 497 euros (EUR) at the time). The court based its findings on the statements of the witnesses O., P. and Z. and officer A.\u2019s testimony. The court found it established that on 15 September 2012 a group of people with banners had held a public event in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park, without having given prior notification to the authorities, and that the applicant had participated in that event. 21.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don, arguing that the Public Events Act (hereinafter \u201cthe PEA\u201d) conferred on the regional authorities the power to determine the minimum distance between solo demonstrations. As no such specification had been made in the Rostov region, there was no legal justification for not treating people standing at even a short distance from each other as solo demonstrators or, by implication, for treating them as a public assembly. 22.  It appears that the appellate court heard further evidence from the witness O., who stated that around 3 p.m. on 15 September 2012 she had approached the Lenin monument with the intention of expressing her views on the situation in the country; she had seen the applicant standing alone with a banner close to the monument. O. had positioned herself at a distance, closer to the city administration building. The applicant had then been approached by two police officers and had handed over her banner to a passer-by while signing a document, before being taken away. O. had also seen two other people standing with banners at a distance. 23.  It also appears that the appellate court watched a video-recording at the applicant\u2019s request, although its origin is unclear. It is also unclear whether this was one of the videos sought to be admitted into evidence at the trial. 24.  On 3 December 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It dismissed O.\u2019s testimony as unconvincing and complicit, noting that she had participated in the same event and was an acquaintance of the applicant. With regard to the above-mentioned video-recording, the court observed as follows:\n\u201cAs regards the video examined at the hearing ... it shows [the applicant] holding a banner. It also shows different people. The video-recording was done without zoom so it is not possible to conclude whether [the applicant] was holding a demonstration alone or whether there were other participants. In any event, earlier other people were convicted of the same offence at the same time and place. This refutes [the applicant\u2019s] argument about her solo demonstration.\u201d 25.  On 4 December 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Rostov regional prosecutor\u2019s office, seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers under Articles 149 and 286 of the Criminal Code (unlawful impediment to a public assembly and abuse of powers). She alleged that the termination of her solo demonstration and her arrest by the police had been unlawful. By a letter of 9 January 2013 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office replied that the decisions of 13 November and 3 December 2012 were not amenable to appeal. 26.  On 28 December 2012 the justice of the peace granted permission to the applicant to pay the administrative fine of RUB 20,000 in three instalments. 27.  On 6 March and 20 May 2013 the deputy president of the Rostov Regional Court upheld the decisions of 13 November and 3 December 2012. The applicant did not apply for a further review of those court decisions before the Supreme Court of Russia. 28.  On 9 November 2012 the same justice of the peace convicted the second applicant under Article 20.2 of the CAO for holding a public assembly without giving prior notice to the authorities. The court heard several witnesses, including two defence witnesses and the two police officers who had arrested her. Officer Sh. stated (see paragraph 16 above) that there had initially been four solo demonstrators but they had later started to gather together. The applicant had been walking amongst them and had put down her banner when she had been told by the police that she was conducting herself in an unlawful manner; subsequently, the four demonstrators had positioned themselves in pairs. 29.  The justice of the peace found that the applicant had held a group public event together with three other participants and concluded that in the circumstances of the case it was appropriate to issue her with the minimum statutory fine of RUB 20,000. 30.  The applicant appealed. On 6 December 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don examined her appeal and upheld the earlier judgment. 31.  On 10 December 2012 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Rostov regional prosecutor\u2019s office, similar to that lodged by the first applicant (see paragraph 25 above). The second applicant alleged that she had been placed under administrative arrest, which had been unlawful because no written record of it had been made by the police. On 9 January 2013 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office replied that the decisions of 9 November and 6 December 2012 were not amenable to appeal. 32.  By a decision of 26 December 2012 the justice of the peace allowed the applicant to pay the administrative fine in three monthly instalments (two instalments of RUB 7,000 and one of RUB 6,000). This was the best possible solution under Article 31.5 of the CAO. The court took note of the fact that the applicant received an old-age pension of RUB 5,561 (EUR 138 at the time) per month. It was not specified whether she had any other income. 33.  In the meantime, the second applicant applied for a supervisory review of the decisions of 9 November and 6 December 2012, arguing, inter alia, that she was in a precarious financial situation. She asked for the fine to be reduced to below the statutory minimum, in accordance with a ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court made on 14 February 2013. On 6 March and 29 May 2013 the deputy president of the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgments, stating, in particular, that the amount of fine was \u201cwithin the scope of the statutory requirement\u201d. On 10 January 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia also upheld the judgments.", "references": ["6", "9", "8", "4", "5", "0", "No Label", "7", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and, at the time of his latest communication with the Court, was detained in Kirovograd. 6.  The applicant, who had a number of prior drugs-related convictions, was targeted in an undercover operation in the form of a test purchase of drugs. 7.  According to the decisions of the domestic courts, P., apparently a private individual recruited by the police as an undercover agent, was supplied with cash in front of attesting witnesses and, subsequently, out of their sight, made three purchases from the applicant and returned with syringes filled with opium, which he handed over to the police in the presence of the witnesses. The first purchase was video-recorded, apparently with a hidden camera (see paragraph 15 below). 8.  The applicant was subsequently convicted of selling P. small quantities of an opioid substance on three occasions, namely on 26 February and 6 and 9 March 2007 (see paragraph 21 below). 9.  On 9 March 2007 the applicant was arrested. At the opening of his subsequent trial the applicant admitted that at the time of his arrest he had had a drug-filled syringe in his sleeve and, in trying to get rid of the drug, had ejected the liquid over his sweater and had thrown it on the ground near him. At some point in the proceedings he started denying that he had a syringe on him at the moment of arrest, even though he continued to admit that that day he had purchased drugs for his own consumption (see paragraph 19 below). 10.  The police had pushed the applicant to the ground and handcuffed him. According to the applicant, after he had been immobilised on the ground the police had continued to drag him around, causing him pain and humiliation. 11.  On the day of the arrest the two arresting officers filed reports with their superiors, stating that because the applicant had attempted to destroy evidence during the arrest they had deployed force (\u201c\u0431\u0443\u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0456 \u0437\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438 \u0432\u043f\u043b\u0438\u0432\u0443\u201d) to prevent him from doing so, and had handcuffed him. 12.  On 15 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the investigator to order a medical examination for the applicant. The lawyer stated that the applicant had been beaten up by the police while being arrested, and also subsequently at a police station. On the same day the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who noted that the applicant had abrasions on his right hand and shin and on both knees, which could have been sustained on 9 March 2007. Abrasions on his legs could have been caused by a fall. 13.  On 8 May 2007 the prosecutors refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had taken part in the applicant\u2019s arrest. The applicant did not appeal against that decision but continued to allege, before the courts which were dealing with his criminal case, that he had been ill-treated by the police at the time of his arrest. The text of his submissions in that respect has not been submitted to the Court. Those courts (see paragraphs 21, 24 and 26 below) rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, finding that the police had used force against the applicant during his arrest lawfully, and that the prosecutors had examined the applicant\u2019s complaints in proper fashion. 14.  On the day of the arrest and on several other occasions in the course of the investigation the applicant\u2019s rights as a criminal suspect were explained to him and the investigator attempted to question him. However, the applicant stated that he wished to remain silent. 15.  On 20 April 2007 the police investigator, in the presence of two attesting witnesses, watched a videotape and noted in a report that the tape showed the applicant selling drugs to P. as part of the test purchase. The applicant\u2019s lawyer asked to watch the tape. On 27 April 2007 the investigator refused this request on the grounds that P.\u2019s real identity was being protected and the showing of the tape would lead to the disclosure of P.\u2019s identity and put his life and health in danger. 16.  The applicant submitted to the investigating authority that a certain B. had been with the applicant on the day of his arrest and could confirm that he had bought drugs for his own consumption. The applicant asked for B. to be found and examined as a witness. The applicant identified him by his first and last name and stated that B. lived in \u201cone of the neighbouring streets\u201d but that he did not know the exact address. The investigator ordered the police to search for B. The police reported that their search had been unsuccessful. 17.  P. was questioned by the investigator. He described how he had purchased drugs from the applicant on three occasions as part of a test purchase operation. 18.  The bill of indictment against the applicant, sent to the Kirovograd Kirov District Court as the trial court, identified P. as one of the witnesses to be summoned in the course of the trial. It also identified the police report summarising the video recording of the first test purchase (see paragraph 15 above) as one of the elements of proof against the applicant. 19.  The applicant admitted that he had bought and kept drugs for himself, but not for sale, on 9 March 2007, and that on that occasion he had been accompanied by B. The applicant denied buying or selling drugs on two other occasions. At the opening of the trial the applicant admitted that at the time of his arrest he had had a drug-filled syringe on him and, in trying to get rid of the drug, had ejected the liquid over his clothes. At a later point in the proceedings he started denying that he had had a syringe on him at the time of his arrest. 20.  It appears that during the trial the applicant asked the trial court to disclose to the defence the video recording of the first test purchase and to call and examine P. (the undercover agent), B. (see paragraph 16 above), and the forensic expert who had compiled a report stating that the applicant\u2019s clothes and a syringe found on him on the day of the arrest contained traces of an illegal drug. Those requests were refused, for unknown reasons. 21.  On 26 June 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. The court found that the applicant had sold drugs to P. on three occasions in February and March 2007. The court relied on:\n(i) the in-court statements by the police officer who had arranged the test purchase and one of the attesting witnesses who had certified the records of that operation (see paragraph 7 above). The witness had described the operation in detail, to the effect that, on three occasions, banknotes with certain numbers had been handed over to P. to buy drugs from the applicant; P. had then returned with filled syringes stating that he had purchased them from the applicant. The police officer gave largely similar evidence;\n(ii) written statements by P. and another police officer involved in the organisation of the test purchase, obtained at the pre-trial stage;\n(iii) the fact, documented in a police report, that a banknote used by the police for use in the test purchase had been found on the applicant at the time of arrest. It is not clear from the trial court\u2019s judgment on which of the three dates the banknote had been used;\n(iv) results of a forensic expert analysis showing that the applicant\u2019s sweater contained traces of drugs, as did the syringes the undercover agent had bought from the applicant. 22.  According to the decisions of the domestic courts, between September 2007 and January 2008, in preparation for his appeal the applicant examined the case file on at least twenty-one occasions. 23.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed, challenging the trial court\u2019s factual and legal findings. They also complained about the court\u2019s refusal to summon P., to order an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment by the police, and to examine the video recording of the test purchase. They questioned whether the video actually existed and adequately reflected the events, given that neither P.\u2019s pre-trial evidence nor records connected to the test purchase indicated that it was video-recorded. 24.  On 25 March 2008 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, finding that no serious procedural violations had been committed in the proceedings and that the conviction had been based on sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal went on to note that, in addition to the evidence cited by the trial court, the applicant\u2019s guilt was also evidenced by the investigator\u2019s report on the examination of the video recording of the test purchase (see paragraph 15 above). 25.  The applicant appealed in cassation. The parties have not provided a copy of that appeal. The text of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision on the appeal indicates that the applicant raised arguments largely similar to those raised in his first appeal. 26.  On 4 September 2008 a judge of the Supreme Court found that the applicant\u2019s appeal was unsubstantiated, and refused to order a cassation review of the case. In particular, the judge noted that the witnesses on whose statements the conviction had been based had been duly questioned, and that the Court of Appeal had lawfully rejected the applicant\u2019s complaints of lack of access to the case file. 27.  In order to substantiate his application, in particular as regards the complaints of an unfair trial, the applicant submitted a number of requests to the trial court, which had kept the case file, for copies of various procedural documents, including records of court hearings, and his cassation appeal. 28.  On 10 October 2008 the trial court rejected the applicant\u2019s request, stating that the domestic law did not provide for any procedure for a convict to examine a case file after completion of criminal proceedings, when the convict was already serving his sentence. The trial court gave similar responses to the applicant\u2019s new requests on 30 March 2009 and 27 May 2013. On 28 October 2008 the Court of Appeal also gave a similar response.", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "4", "2", "6", "9", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the expropriation zones of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region to be taken for State needs and changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plot of land belonging to the applicant was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture. He owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.186 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding the livestock and beekeeping. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his plot of land. The amount of compensation offered was 134,000 Armenian Drams (AMD, approximately 290 euros (EUR)), plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11.  The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that the applicant tried to obtain an alternative evaluation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other evaluation company was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of his land. 12.  On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the evaluation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed evaluation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicant\u2019s plot of land was estimated at AMD 134,000 (approximately EUR 290). 13.  In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had been underestimated. He further submitted that the evaluation of his property had not been carried out correctly since no account had been taken of the number of fruit trees, their profitability and the existence of a fence and a water pipeline on the territory in question. He also claimed to be unable to submit an alternative evaluation of the real market value of his land since other companies refused to perform an evaluation. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted another evaluation report of the applicant\u2019s property stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the applicant\u2019s plot of land was estimated at AMD 137,000 (approximately EUR 298). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be AMD 157,550 (approximately EUR 343). 15.  On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicant a total of AMD 157,550 in compensation. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17.  On 19 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property based on the corrected evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["7", "4", "1", "3", "0", "2", "5", "6", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the land use category. According to the decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 1.622 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for 818,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 1,780 euros (EUR)) plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 940,700 (approximately EUR 2,045). 11.  The applicants did not reply to the letter, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered. 12.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement for their property to be taken for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land was estimated at AMD 818,000 (approximately EUR 1,780). 13.  In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the fourth applicant represented the other applicants and argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. He requested additional time to be able to submit an alternative valuation report. 14.  It appears that the applicants were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 15.  During the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation of the applicants\u2019 property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,960). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,035,000 (approximately EUR 2,250). 16.  On 26 September 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 1,035,000 in compensation. 17.  The applicants lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the market value of their land had been seriously underestimated and that the amount of compensation offered to them was inadequate. They further argued that the fact that Oliver Group LLC had submitted two different valuation reports during the proceedings raised doubts as to the credibility of its reports, and that the court should have initiated an independent valuation of their property. 18.  On 29 January 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, finding, inter alia, that the market value of the property to be taken for State needs had been correctly estimated, on the basis of the valuation report contained in the case file. 19.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They argued, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to order an independent valuation of the property, despite having the power to do so under the law. They submitted that they had disagreed with the valuation report submitted by the other party to the proceedings, which was moreover not an expert opinion and therefore could not be admitted as evidence. 20.  On 24 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["4", "0", "7", "6", "5", "2", "3", "8", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1933, 1940 and 1975 respectively and live in Teghout village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 8.  The applicants, a family of three, live in Teghout village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.430 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening and feeding their livestock. 9.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for 231,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 500 euros (EUR)) plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 265,650 (approximately EUR 578). 10.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuer was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of their land. 11.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land was estimated at AMD 231,000 (approximately EUR 500). 12.  In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated, since the lowest market prices had been considered during the valuation, while several plots of land had been acquired for much higher prices. They also argued that no account had been taken of the presence of fruit trees and that the valuation report erroneously stated that their plot of land did not have a water supply whereas it did have such a supply, which had actually been cut off because of the plaintiff\u2019s activities on the property. 13.  On 3 July 2008 the first hearing at the Lori Regional Court was held. According to the Government, the applicants were duly notified of the date of the proceedings, but they did not appear. 14.  In the course of the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation report on the applicants\u2019 property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the land was AMD 262,000 (approximately EUR 570). The final amount of compensation with the additional 15% would thus be equal to AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655). 15.  On 6 October 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655) in compensation. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal, complaining that they had not been duly notified about the dates and times of the rescheduled hearings. 17.  On 29 January 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18.  On 27 February 2009 the case was set for trial in Lori Regional Court. The court hearing was scheduled for 2 April 2009. The Government argued that the applicants had been duly notified of the hearing and that the notification letter, as always, had been sent to their addresses. 19.  On 2 April 2009 the applicants\u2019 representative requested adjournment of the examination of the case. The court examination was adjourned and rescheduled for 22 April 2009. 20.  On 21 April 2009 the applicants\u2019 representative lodged an application with the Lori Regional Court, asking for the examination of the case to be adjourned. Accordingly, on 22 April 2009 the court examination was adjourned and rescheduled for 29 April 2009. 21.  On 27 April 2009 the applicants\u2019 counsel requested the Regional Court to order a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land, and to order that this examination was to be performed by experts of the State non-profit organisation \u201cExpertise Center of the Republic of Armenia\u201d (\u201c\u0540\u0561\u0575\u0561\u057d\u057f\u0561\u0576\u056b \u0540\u0561\u0576\u0580\u0561\u057a\u0565\u057f\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u0583\u0578\u0580\u0571\u0561\u0563\u056b\u057f\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u056f\u0565\u0576\u057f\u0580\u0578\u0576\u201d \u057a\u0565\u057f\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0578\u0579 \u0561\u057c\u0587\u057f\u0580\u0561\u0575\u056b\u0576 \u056f\u0561\u0566\u0574\u0561\u056f\u0565\u0580\u057a\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576). 22.  On 29 April 2009 the Lori Regional Court held a court hearing. During the hearing it became clear that there was no information concerning whether the applicants had been notified. In these circumstances, the Lori Regional Court decided to adjourn the examination, taking into consideration the fact that the applicants were not duly notified about the court hearing. The next hearing was scheduled for 20 May 2009, a notification to that effect was sent both to the applicants\u2019 representative and the applicants. 23.  On 20 May 2009 both the applicants\u2019 representative and the applicants were present at the hearing. The applicants\u2019 representative requested that the court ordered that a forensic expert examination be made to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 plot of land. Furthermore, the Lori Regional Court refused the applicants\u2019 representative\u2019s request, which was based on the domestic legislation, according to which each party to the proceedings must itself present evidence on the facts. 24.  On 2 June 2009 the Lori Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim finding, inter alia, that the valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC were lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 property to be taken for State needs. The Regional Court dismissed counsel\u2019s request and awarded the applicants AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655) in equal shares as compensation. 25.  On 22 June 2009 the applicants\u2019 counsel lodged an appeal, claiming, inter alia, that the amount of compensation was not adequate. He argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by the applicants\u2019 opponent as established proof of the market value of their property, and that it had refused to order a forensic examination without any grounds. He further argued that the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination, since the necessity for it had arisen in the course of the proceedings and the applicants had no opportunity to provide an alternative valuation themselves. 26.  According to the case file, on 10 July 2009 the notifications of the hearing of the Court of Appeal scheduled for 24 July 2009 were sent to the applicants, but they did not appear at that hearing. 27.  On 24 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal hearing was held; the applicants and their representative were not present. 28.  On 7 August 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the latter\u2019s decision not to order a forensic examination was well grounded, since there was no necessity for it. The Court of Appeal further found that the amount of compensation had been correctly determined, on the basis of the corrected valuation report prepared by Oliver Group LLC, given that that report was the only lawful and acceptable piece of evidence produced during the proceedings. 29.  According to the applicants, the decision of the Court of Appeal was not served on their counsel. 30.  On 1 October 2009 the applicants\u2019 counsel requested permission from the Regional Court to consult the case file. After the counsel\u2019s request was granted, he made a copy of the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision in order to lodge a cassation appeal. 31.  On 9 October 2009 the counsel lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. The counsel also submitted that the Court of Appeal had not duly notified him of the proceedings and had examined the appeal in his absence. Additionally, he requested to have the missed time-limits for lodging an appeal on points of law restored, explaining that the reason for late submission was the failure of the Court of Appeal to serve on him a copy of the decision of 7 August 2009, despite the fact that he was the applicants\u2019 authorised representative in the proceedings. 32.  On 28 October 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the cassation appeal inadmissible as lodged out of time. In doing so, it found that the reasons for late submission advanced by counsel were not justified in view of the fact that the applicants had been served with a copy of the decision in due time.", "references": ["3", "6", "7", "4", "2", "8", "0", "5", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Cork. 5.  He suffers from severe brain damage. It was asserted on his behalf that his condition was caused by the measles vaccination administered to him in 1988 when he was 15 months old. 6.  In November 2002, 14 years after receiving the vaccine, the applicant\u2019s mother instituted proceedings on his behalf against four defendants; the local health authority, the State, the Attorney General (collectively described in the domestic proceedings as the State defendants) and the doctor who had administered the vaccination, H. 7.  On 5 August 2003, the High Court issued a limited order of discovery addressed to the local health authority seeking all relevant records about the applicant in its possession, as well as information about the vaccine used, about any adverse effects noted at the time with this vaccine, about the manner in which the mother\u2019s consent was obtained, and about the health of the other members of the applicant\u2019s family. Although the High Court set a time-limit of 8 weeks for discovery, the local health authority only complied with the order in June 2008, that is to say with a delay of over four and a half years. 8.  The applicant appealed the scope of the order of discovery of 5 August 2003, leading to the grant of a further limited order of discovery by the High Court on 30 January 2004, addressed to all four defendants. The applicant brought another appeal against the order of discovery of 30 January 2004, but in July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, making only a minor amendment to the order granted by the High Court. 9.  The applicant\u2019s mother died in December 2007. 10.  In June 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the local health authority to complain that the long delays in litigating the case had caused grave prejudice to the case. The applicant\u2019s mother had been a vital witness, and with her death essential evidence had been lost. Settlement of the substantive dispute was proposed but not agreed. 11.  In May 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sought to have the defence of the State defendants set aside. The High Court refused this application on 12 March 2010. 12.  The trial involved ten days of hearings. No factual evidence was called on behalf of the applicant, but independent medical witnesses gave evidence, having read the applicant\u2019s medical records, and documentary evidence provided by way of discovery was before the court. On the eleventh day of the trial, 19 July 2011, the judge accepted an application by the defendants to strike the case out for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. 13.  Regarding the doctor, he noted that the applicant accepted there was insufficient evidence to establish any negligence in the administration of the vaccine. The claim against the doctor H was dismissed. In relation to the State defendants, the judge held that no evidence had been produced that could support the various grounds relied on by the applicant. 14.  The proceedings in the High Court terminated on 19 December 2011. The applicant filed a notice of appeal presenting 30 grounds of appeal. Following the establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the applicant\u2019s case was transferred to it. Outline written submissions were submitted by H in February 2015 and by the State defendants in September 2015. 15.  The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on 10 February 2016, dismissing the appeal. In its conclusions, the Court of Appeal stated that, by taking the case at its highest, the trial judge had adopted the correct approach on the question of striking the case out. The Court of Appeal concluded by remarking on the many legal hurdles the applicant would have had to overcome in order to succeed. It found no basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. 16.  The proceedings ended on 10 May 2016 when the Supreme Court declined the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal.", "references": ["2", "5", "1", "4", "8", "7", "6", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Baku. 5.  The applicant\u2019s son, Urkhan Mammadov (U.M.), was born in 1989. On 7 July 2010 he was drafted into the army for his compulsory military service. 6.  At the request of the military authorities, before joining the army, on 21 May 2010 U.M. underwent a medical examination in Narimanov District Polyclinic no. 8, where it was established that he was suffering from rheumatism. In May and June 2010 U.M. underwent further medical examinations at the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital and the Research Institute of Cardiology. During these examinations, no heart disease or any other disease was revealed which might prevent him from performing his military service. 7.  On 6 July 2010 U.M. underwent a medical examination at the Narimanov District Military Commissariat (the army recruitment office) which declared him partially fit for military service (m\u0259hdudiyy\u0259tl\u0259 h\u0259rbi xidm\u0259t\u0259 yararl\u0131) in accordance with Articles 49 (\u00e7) (nasal cavity illness) and 66 (\u00e7) (spine illness) of the \u201cTable of Diseases\u201d (\u201cX\u0259st\u0259likl\u0259r c\u0259dv\u0259li\u201d). 8.  On 7 July 2010 U.M. joined a military unit in Barda region and on an unspecified date he was transferred to a military unit located in Shaki region. 9.  On 13 July 2010 U.M. called his family by telephone, asking them to provide him with some belongings. During the conversation he did not complain about his state of health. 10.  At around 10 a.m. on 14 July 2010 the applicant was invited to the Narimanov District Military Commissariat, where he was informed of the death of his son. 11.  It appears from the case file that at around 5 a.m. on 14 July 2010 at reveille in the dormitory of the military barracks U.M. did not wake up. At that moment the soldiers realised that U.M. was wheezing. They took U.M. out of the military barracks and tried to give him artificial respiration. However, as U.M. did not respond, he was immediately taken to the Shaki Central Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 12.  On 14 July 2010 a record of an inspection of the scene of the incident (hadis\u0259 yerin\u0259 bax\u0131\u015f protokolu) was drawn up and signed by an investigator at the Zagatala Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. It was further signed by two attesting witnesses (hal \u015fahidi), S.R. and A.F., who were serving in the same military unit, as well as, by a participant (i\u015ftirak\u00e7\u0131), M.M., who was also serving in the same military unit. The record states that the inspection began at 9 a.m. and ended at noon. According to the record, no object relevant to the investigation was identified. The investigator also noted that U.M.\u2019s bed had been made by other soldiers after U.M.\u2019s transfer to the hospital and the floor of the dormitory had been cleaned with chlorine and kerosene in the morning before the beginning of the inspection. 13.  On 14 July 2010 the Zagatala Military Deputy Prosecutor examined U.M.\u2019s body and drew up a record of this inspection (meyit\u0259 bax\u0131\u015f ke\u00e7irilm\u0259si haqq\u0131nda protokol) in the presence of two experts. It appears from the record that various injuries were found on U.M.\u2019s body. In particular, the following injuries were mentioned in the record: a blue-violet bruise (qan\u00e7\u0131r) of an elongated shape, measuring 8 x 3 cm, on the right side of his lower back; a scratch (c\u0131z\u0131q), measuring 0.8 x 0.1 cm, on the left side of his back; a subcutaneous haemorrhage (d\u0259ridaxili qans\u0131zma), measuring 5.5 x 1 cm, on his upper right hip; and two abrasions (s\u0131yr\u0131q), measuring 0.3 x 0.1 cm and 0.5 x 0.2 cm on the fingers of his left hand. Blood and cell samples were taken from the body and sent for biological and histological forensic examinations. Eighteen photographs of the body were taken during the inspection and were added to the record. The Government provided the Court with a copy of that record, together with black and white versions of these photographs, in which no sign of injury to the body can be seen. The applicant provided the Court with a copy of a colour version of photograph no. 5 added to the record. It appears from this photograph that there was a bruise on the left side of his neck between the ear and the shoulder and a bruise around the left eye. However, there was no mention of such injuries in the record of 14 July 2010. 14.  On 12 August 2010 the two experts who had examined U.M.\u2019s body on 14 July 2010 issued report (akt) no. 21 on the forensic medical examination (meyitin m\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259-tibbi m\u00fcayin\u0259si) of the body, which was considered as an annex to the record of 14 July 2010. The report was based on the examination of the body on 14 July 2014, as well as on the results of the biological and histological forensic examinations of the samples taken from the body and the opinions of two other specialists. The experts concluded that, taking into consideration that there was no injury which might have caused the death, U.M.\u2019s death had probably resulted from a severe dysfunction of the respiratory system (k\u0259skin t\u0259n\u0259ff\u00fcs \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131) caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour. As for the injuries found on the body, the experts concluded that they were not related to U.M.\u2019s death. They further found that those injuries had been caused by a hard blunt object, that the abrasions, bruise and haemorrhage were likely to have been inflicted one to three days before the death, and the scratch not more than one week before the death. 15.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on various dates the investigator in charge of the case questioned a number of soldiers of the military unit in which U.M. had served. The soldiers stated that they had never witnessed any case of ill-treatment during their military service. 16.  On 25 August 2010 the investigator ordered a forensic examination. The investigator asked the experts conducting that examination to answer various questions concerning the cause of U.M.\u2019s death and the existence of any relationship between U.M.\u2019s previous health problems and his death. The investigator also asked the experts to establish whether the injuries on U.M.\u2019s body could have been sustained when he had performed physical exercises during his military service or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 17.  On 24 September 2010 the experts issued forensic report no. k/82, which mainly reiterated the findings of the report of 12 August 2010. The experts concluded that U.M.\u2019s death had probably resulted from severe dysfunction of the respiratory system caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour, because there was no potentially lethal injury on his body. They further noted that U.M. had probably been suffering from this disease before joining the army, but it had not been possible to reveal it during the medical examinations. As regards the investigator\u2019s question concerning the origin of the injuries, the experts noted that as they had not examined the body they could not give a clear answer to that question. However, they pointed out that, taking into consideration the morphological characteristics of the injuries, it was possible from the medical forensic point of view that they could have been sustained when U.M. had been performing physical exercises during his military service or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 18.  On 16 October 2010 an investigator from the Zagatala Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with U.M.\u2019s death. Relying on the forensic medical reports, the investigator concluded that the death had probably resulted from severe dysfunction of the respiratory system caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour. He further held that, as U.M. had not complained about his state of health and had had no clear symptoms, it had not been possible to establish the existence of this health problem during the medical examinations that U.M. had undergone before joining the army. As regards the injuries on U.M.\u2019s body, the investigator noted that U.M. had never been ill-treated during his military service and that these injuries could have been sustained when U.M. had been performing physical exercises or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 19.  On 12 November 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ganja Military Court against the investigator\u2019s decision of 16 October 2010, complaining of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation. He disputed the investigator\u2019s conclusions relating to the cause of his son\u2019s death, arguing that U.M. had not been suffering from any disease. In particular, he argued that, if U.M. had really died of the swelling of the thymus gland and a brain tumour, there would have been prior medical symptoms. The applicant further disputed the investigator\u2019s explanation as regards the origin of the injuries found on U.M.\u2019s body. In that connection, he submitted that, although the experts concluded that the injuries were likely to have been inflicted one to three days before the death, the investigator held that the injuries could have been sustained when the soldiers tried to resuscitate U.M. on 14 July 2010. 20.  On 24 November 2010 the Ganja Military Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court reiterated the investigator\u2019s findings as regards the cause of the death and the origin of the injuries found on U.M.\u2019s body. 21.  On 7 December 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He complained, in particular, that the criminal investigation had failed to establish clearly the cause of his son\u2019s death and the origin of the injuries found on U.M.\u2019s body. 22.  On 24 December 2010 the Shaki Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "5", "4", "9", "8", "7", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicant were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture and bakery production. He owned eight plots of agricultural land in the village measuring 0.420 ha, 0.890 ha, 0.904 ha, 1.206 ha, 0.780 ha, 0.900, 0.974 and 0.354 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening, beekeeping and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his eight plots of land for 194,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 422 euros (EUR)), AMD 422,000 (approximately EUR 917), AMD 417,000 (approximately EUR 907), AMD 555,000 (approximately EUR 1,207), AMD 328,000 (approximately EUR 713), AMD 426,000 (approximately EUR 990), AMD 409,000 (approximately EUR 890), and AMD 240,000 (approximately EUR 522) respectively, plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 11.  The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that he tried to obtain an alternative valuation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of his land. 12.  On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant, seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on the taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicant\u2019s plots of land was estimated at 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 13.  In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had apparently been underestimated. He further submitted that the valuation of his property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the amounts he had actually paid for the plots of land in question and of the significant investments he had made. He also claimed that the deprivation of his property was not in the public interest since it was aimed at securing high profits for several individuals. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicant\u2019s property, stating that after the institution of the proceedings Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicant\u2019s eight plots of land was estimated at respectively AMD 187,000 (approximately EUR 407), AMD 456,000 (approximately EUR 991), AMD 437,000 (approximately EUR 950), AMD 535,000 (approximately EUR 1,163), AMD 343,000 (approximately EUR 746), AMD 411,000 (approximately EUR 893), AMD 427,000 (approximately EUR 928), and AMD 268,000 (approximately EUR 583). The representative of Teghout CJSC asked the court to take into account the relatively higher amounts of the initial valuations in respect of those plots of land that were valued lower as a result of the new valuation. The final amounts of compensation would therefore be equal to the amounts mentioned in the corrected reports for those plots of land valued higher than previously, and would stay the same as in the initial offer for the rest, together with the additional 15% required by law. 15.  On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicant AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485), AMD 524,400 (approximately EUR 1,140), AMD 502,550 (approximately EUR 1,093), AMD 638,250 (approximately EUR 1,388), AMD 394,450 (approximately EUR 858), AMD 489,900 (approximately EUR 1,065), AMD 491,050 (approximately EUR 1,068). and AMD 308,200 (approximately EUR 670) respectively in compensation for his eight plots of land. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17.  On 18 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 18 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["8", "4", "6", "2", "5", "0", "7", "3", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village. The first plot of land measured 0.334 ha and the second one consisted of two distinct parts measuring 0.932 ha and 0.723 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 163,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 355 euros (EUR)) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12.  On 14 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants\u2019 plots of land was estimated at AMD 163,000 (approximately EUR 355) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) respectively. 13.  In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees and their profitability and they were unable to submit an alternative valuation of the market value of their land, since other companies had refused to carry out a valuation. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports of the applicants\u2019 property, stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicants\u2019 two plots of land was estimated at AMD 173,000 (approximately EUR 376) and AMD 986,000 (approximately EUR 2,143). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 198,950 (approximately EUR 433) for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 (approximately EUR 2,465) for the second. 15.  On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicants compensation of a total of AMD 198,950 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 for the second plot. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17.  On 25 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["4", "6", "2", "1", "3", "5", "7", "0", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1939 and 1976 respectively and live in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the land use category. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicants, father and son, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned six plots of arable land in the village measuring 0.053 ha, 0.448 ha, 0.075 ha, 0.254 ha, 0.212 ha and 0.799 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their six plots of land for 19,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 41 euros (EUR)), AMD 213,000 (approximately EUR 463), AMD 26,000 (approximately EUR 57), AMD 87,000 (approximately EUR 190), AMD 73,000 (approximately EUR 160), and AMD 339,000 (approximately EUR 737) respectively plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 870,550 (approximately EUR 1,893) in total. 11.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants and their late mother, H., seeking to oblige them to sign the agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants\u2019 six plots of land was estimated at AMD 757,000 (approximately EUR 1,645) in total. 13.  In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the second applicant argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicants\u2019 property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the entire property was AMD 1,038,000 (approximately EUR 2,257). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595). 15.  On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding H. and the applicants a total of AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595) in compensation. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal, complaining, inter alia, that the first applicant had not been duly notified about the proceedings. They further argued that the Regional Court, although aware that H. had died in 2007, had delivered a judgment that concerned her rights. 17.  On 3 April 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18.  On 7 October 2009 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim finding, inter alia, that the valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC should be considered lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants\u2019 property to be taken for State needs. The Regional Court stated that the first applicant, as H.\u2019s successor, should be awarded her share in the compensation, and awarded the applicants a total of AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595) in equal shares as compensation. 19.  The applicants lodged an appeal, claiming, inter alia, that the market value of their land had been seriously underestimated and that the amount of compensation offered to them was not adequate. They argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by their opponent as established proof of the market value of their property. They argued in particular that, in order to provide them with a reasonable opportunity to present their case, the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination, since such a necessity had arisen in the course of the proceedings and they had had no opportunity to provide an alternative valuation themselves. 20.  On 3 February 2010 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, stating that the applicants had failed to raise their complaints concerning the alleged inadmissibility of evidence at the first level of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal did not address the issue of whether the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination to determine the real market value of the applicants\u2019 property, given that there was a dispute on this issue. 21.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They raised similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. 22.  On 24 March 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["8", "5", "4", "0", "3", "1", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant company has its seat in Rovaniemi. 8.  The applicant company is a limited liability company which was carrying out business in the asphalt sector until February 2000. In 2002 the Finnish Competition Authority (kilpailuvirasto, konkurrensverket) started to investigate whether the applicant company, among others, had been involved in nationwide or regional cartels in this sector. 9.  On 31 March 2004 the Competition Authority lodged an application before the Market Court (markkinaoikeus, marknadsdomstolen), requesting that the court impose a penalty payment on the applicant company, among others, on the grounds that it had participated in a cartel from 1995 to 2000. 10.  Between 14 November and 18 December 2006 the Market Court held an oral hearing in the course of which forty-eight witnesses were heard. Documentary evidence, including telephone recordings were also presented to the court. 11.  On 19 December 2007 the Market Court found, inter alia, that the applicant company had taken part in a cartel in respect of asphalt contracts commissioned by the central government authorities, by participating in territorial allocation of markets, by participating to a minor degree in price-fixing activities and by participating in restrictions on the supply of asphalt mass. A penalty payment (seuraamusmaksu, p\u00e5f\u00f6ljdsavgift) of 75,000 euros (EUR) was imposed on the applicant company. With regard to the allegation of territorial allocation and price-fixing in the markets for local government and private sector asphalt contracts, the Market Court found that the applicant company had not participated in a cartel. 12.  The Market Court found that the territorial allocation of the markets and the bid-rigging between the companies involved in the cartel had amounted to a single continuous infringement of competition law rules, and that they were not to be regarded as individual unconnected infringements. According to the court, the infringements of competition law rules had lasted for more than seven years. Although some companies had participated in the infringements for a longer time than others, all the companies had infringed the competition law rules for three years at least. In addition, geographically, the infringements covered the entire country in respect of central government asphalt contracts, and several regions of the country in respect of local government and private sector contracts. 13.  The Market Court found it established that between 1996 and 2000 the applicant company had agreed with three other asphalt companies about the allocation of central government asphalt contracts, and had done the same with three more asphalt companies between 1999 and 2000. Moreover, from 1996 until the end of 2000, the applicant company had agreed with another cartel company in advance the prices to be offered in competitive bidding, and had tendered accordingly. Between 1996 and 2000, as far as central government asphalt contracts were concerned, it had also agreed with the other cartel companies that none of them would supply asphalt mass to companies outside the cartel. The court held that the applicant company had infringed the prohibition on the division of markets by its above-mentioned conduct regarding central government asphalt contracts. 14.  When considering the amount of the penalty payment the Market Court took into account, for each company, its turnover from the asphalt business in Finland during the last year of its participation in the infringement of competition law rules. In addition, considering the relatively low turnover of the applicant company, its market position, and the regionally limited scope of the related restriction of competition, the Market Court held that it was not justifiable to penalise the applicant company with a penalty payment exceeding the normal scale. 15.  Concerning the evidence, the Market Court noted that evidence in competition law cases could be either direct or indirect, such as economic evidence. As direct evidence was not always available, an assessment was to be made of whether indirect evidence was sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel. The court found that, in the present case, the economic evidence alone was not sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel. The court also found that the existence of a cartel could not be proved on the basis of hearsay evidence. In the present case, the Market Court reached its conclusion in respect of the central government asphalt contracts by relying, inter alia, on the testimonies of eight witnesses. However, to the extent that those testimonies contained hearsay evidence, such evidence was not taken into account. As far as local government and private sector contracts were concerned, the Market Court analysed the evidence for restrictions of competition region by region and found it sufficient in respect of certain regions while insufficient in respect of others. As regards the regions where the applicant company was doing business (Northern Finland and North Karelia), the Market Court found that the evidence in support of a cartel was not sufficient. In this context, the Market Court stated, inter alia, that the testimonies of two witnesses who had been heard on this matter had been based solely on what the witnesses had heard from other people, whereas other witnesses had not given evidence that was capable of substantiating the existence of a cartel for local government and private sector contracts in this particular region. 16.  In January 2008, the Competition Authority and the defendant companies, including the applicant company, lodged appeals at the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, h\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltnings\u00addomstolen). In its appeal, the Competition Authority contested the interpretation adopted by the Market Court as regards the scope of the cartel, arguing that there was nothing to suggest that the territorial allocation of markets did not encompass contracts in all the above mentioned categories of works and pointing out that the exclusion of supplies of asphalt mass outside the cartel companies affected competition in the entire sector. The Competition Authority maintained that there had been a single, nationwide cartel encompassing the entire market for state, local authority and private sector asphalt contracts. In so far as evidence was concerned, the Competition Authority argued, inter alia, that even hearsay evidence should have been taken into account by the Market Court. The company which had been found to play a leading role in the cartel lodged a partial appeal. In its appeal, the applicant company claimed that the Market Court had drawn the wrong conclusions from the evidence, as the Competition Authority had not been able to show that the company had participated in a cartel. In its response to the appeal brought by the Competition Authority, the applicant company reiterated its submissions already made before the Market Court and argued, inter alia, that reliance on any elements of hearsay in the evidence should remain excluded. 17.  On 25 February 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court held a preparatory meeting with the parties for the oral hearing of the case. The oral hearing itself was held between 20 and 23 April 2009, at which the court again heard six key witnesses. Four of them had been called by the Competition Authority, and two by one of the asphalt companies. The parties, including the applicant company, did not ask the court to hear any other persons. 18.  On 29 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the Market Court\u2019s decision. In its judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Competition Authority\u2019s application was well-founded in respect of all but one of the defendants. Inter alia, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the applicant company had participated in a nationwide cartel between May 1995 and 15 February 2000, and the applicant company was ordered to pay a penalty payment of EUR 500,000. 19.  In regard to matters of procedure, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the concept of \u201ccriminal charge\u201d had an autonomous meaning in the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and that therefore certain sanctions imposed in administrative-law proceedings fell within the scope of Article 6. The court stated that in the light of that case-law, the procedure for imposing a penalty payment under the Restriction of Competition Act had to be considered to fall within the scope of Article 6 (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2006\u2011XIV). The court further noted that the Court of Justice of the European Communities, when applying Article 6 as a part of the general principles of Community law, had held that the proceedings under Community competition law had to comply with the requirements of Article 6. The Supreme Administrative Court, citing the case of Jussila, considered that while Article 6 of the Convention under its criminal limb thus applied to proceedings imposing a penalty payment, in such cases the Article 6 requirements were not necessarily identical to the requirements which were applicable in the core areas of criminal procedure. 20.  In its judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court made a number of general statements about the assessment of evidence in competition proceedings. It emphasised at the outset that the domestic legislation in this regard was based on the principle of free assessment of evidence. This meant, inter alia, that the court was to take into account all evidence adduced before the Market Court, in addition to the evidence adduced in its own proceedings, while also bearing in mind the finality of the Market Court\u2019s findings to the extent that it had not been challenged by a party on appeal. 21.  The court also referred to the particular difficulties in obtaining evidence of practices aimed at restricting competition. In this context, it cited the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The court thus recalled that as the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and the penalties which offenders may incur are well known, it is normal for the activities relating to restrictive practices and agreements to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. Evidence of unlawful contact between economic operators will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together and in the absence of another plausible explanation, may constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules (see Aalborg Portland and Others v. the Commission, Joined cases C\u2011204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C\u2011219/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, \u00a7\u00a7 55-57). Accordingly, the competent court was not precluded from taking into account circumstantial evidence, or from drawing inferences from various elements of proof, including testimony containing references to what the witness has heard from others. Various factual elements attesting to similar events or patterns occurring in a given market, alongside other kinds of circumstantial evidence may, in the absence of any other reasonable explanation, demonstrate the existence of restrictive practices. Furthermore, the court cited case-law of the General Court of the EU emphasising that while the competition authority must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement of competition rules took place, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see JFE Engineering Corp. and Others v. the Commission, Joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, \u00a7\u00a7 179-180). 22.  The court stated that the evidence provided in a competition law case could not be subject to the same requirements as evidence in criminal cases, inter alia, because Finnish competition law was a part of EU competition law. In this regard, the court also cited case-law of the General Court of European Union (see BPB plc v. the Commission, Case T-53/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:254, \u00a7 64), according to which a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be required in competition cases. It further cited case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union according to which it is incumbent on the Commission as competition authority to prove the infringements of competition rules and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement, and where such evidence had been presented the court was entitled to consider that it was for the defendant to provide another explanation for the incriminating circumstances. This did not unduly reverse the burden of proof or set aside the presumption of innocence (see Montecatini Spa v. the Commission, Case C-235/92 P, ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, \u00a7\u00a7 179-181). 23.  According to the Supreme Administrative Court, circumstantial evidence as well as inferences could also be relied on for establishing prohibited cooperation in the absence of any alternative reasonable explanation. When drawing such inferences, the court was not precluded from taking into account hearsay evidence alongside other scattered evidence. It was essential to take a holistic approach to the evidence presented. When it came to the duration of the infringement of competition law rules, it was sufficient that the presented evidence related to facts sufficiently close in terms of time, in order that it could be established with reasonable certainty that the suspected infringement had continued without interruption between the dates when the alleged cartel had started and ended. 24.  In this case, the Supreme Administrative Court had at its disposal all written evidence, including economic and financial evidence, as well as the records of statements made by all of the witnesses heard by the Market Court. The court also heard six witnesses in person. The gist of testimonies relied on is cited in the judgment. The court\u2019s findings indicate, inter alia, that independently of each other, a number of witnesses mentioned examples from different geographical regions in different parts of Finland where the companies had agreed about the allocation of markets either by geographical regions or by the volumes of contracts. The witnesses expressed a common understanding that a cartel had dominated the Finnish asphalt markets throughout the country in respect of both local government and private sector contracts and central government contracts. Several witnesses also reported consistently on the practices by which the cartel companies had agreed the price to be offered by each of them in competitive bidding. The witnesses reported that the practices followed in competitive bidding had been intended to ensure that the markets were divided as agreed. The reported tendering practices were confirmed by the recordings of telephone calls presented as evidence, and by the written evidence relating to certain competitive biddings. Furthermore, the witnesses reported consistently on how the cartel had supervised the geographical division of the markets. In addition, three witnesses testified before the court about their experience regarding the alleged division of the markets, the related false invoices and the supply of cost-free asphalt mass, as well as some consistent hearsay. They testified that if the contracted works had not corresponded to the amounts agreed in advance, the company which had been awarded too many contracts would pay compensation to those which had received too few contracts, for example by means of false invoices. These witnesses also testified about the pressure exerted by cartel members on smaller companies to join the cartel and about measures taken to conceal the infringements. 25.  On the basis of the evidence before it, the Supreme Administrative Court found that a single nationwide cartel had existed between 1994 and 2002 in respect of central and local government as well as private sector asphalt contracts. It found that the Competition Authority had presented extensive evidence of the existence of the cartel, by means of witness statements, documents, telephone recordings and other evidence. Although the evidence provided by the Competition Authority had not covered all incidents in the asphalt markets during the period covered by its application, either geographically or in terms of time, it had nevertheless permitted the court to get an overall picture of the functioning of the asphalt markets during the period in question. The evidence had excluded the possibility that the established facts were a matter of similar practices which had coincided accidentally. Taking into account what is generally known about the functioning of cartels on the basis of earlier experience and research, the most credible explanation for the similarity between the events which had occurred in different regions and the observations made by the witnesses was that the asphalt companies had agreed about the territorial allocation of the asphalt markets in the whole of Finland, as well as about the measures for implementing the agreed allocation in practice. In its final conclusion, the court stated that the Competition Authority had adduced extensive evidence of the existence of a cartel, while the defendants had not been able to refute the credibility or reliability of that evidence, nor the conclusions which the Competition Authority had drawn from it. 26.  As to the applicant company\u2019s participation in the cartel, the Supreme Administrative Court held that:\n\u201c(1274)  [o]n the basis of [the three witness] statements adduced before the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court and the written evidence consisting of the [chart on the geographical division of the markets], it has been shown that [the applicant company] took part in the cartel, in particular in Lapland and the North Karelia region. It had been agreed that the area of Northern Finland was allocated to [the applicant company], and in general the other cartel companies had no right to do business there.\n(1275)  In addition, it has been shown that there were restrictions in respect of works on central government contracts as well as the supply of asphalt mass. When taking into account that works commissioned by the State were executed throughout the country, the restrictions relating to such contracts necessarily affected the whole State territory.\n(1276)  On the above-mentioned grounds, [the applicant company] has participated in the nationwide cartel the existence of which the Supreme Administrative Court has found established in Part 9 of the present judgment.\u201d 27.  It further held that the applicant company had taken part in this cartel for almost five years. It had been established that the applicant company through its representatives had been an active operator in the cartel, taken initiatives for agreements regarding bidding for contracts, hampered the business of new and smaller companies in the market and exerted pressure on other companies to join the cartel. 28.  The Supreme Administrative Court based its above mentioned findings concerning the applicant company on one witness statement given directly before it, which was corroborated by several witness statements given before the Market Court. The court noted that witnesses heard before it and the Market Court had given evidence about matters based on what they had experienced, heard or inferred concerning the applicant company\u2019s conduct. Those statements could not be excluded when assessing the nature and extent of the restrictions of competition in which the applicant company had been involved. The court specifically stated that the economic evidence of the applicant company\u2019s unusual financial performance was not taken into account as evidence of the existence of the cartel. Moreover, the court found that the applicant company had not been able to present any credible alternative explanations for its behaviour on the markets, or to refute the Competition Authority\u2019s conclusions. 29.  The applicant company had thus participated in a very serious and extensive cartel, which had aimed to eliminate all functioning competition in the Finnish asphalt markets and which had been particularly harmful for this sector. However, in determining the penalty payment, account was taken of the relatively small market share of the applicant company and the regional and temporal dimensions of the applicant company\u2019s infringements, which were smaller than those of the prime participants in the cartel. 30.  After the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s decision of 29 September 2009, and on the basis of that decision, the Finnish State and several municipalities brought compensation claims in the civil courts against the participants in the cartel, including the applicant company. Those claims amounted to several million euros in total. 31.  On 28 November 2013 the Helsinki District Court (k\u00e4r\u00e4j\u00e4oikeus, tingsr\u00e4tten) rejected the Finnish State\u2019s claims against all asphalt companies, including the applicant company. The Finnish State was ordered to pay the asphalt companies\u2019 litigation costs, some EUR 2.6 million. On the other hand, most of the municipalities won their cases against the asphalt companies. The applicant company lost two out of the four cases brought against it, but it was not ordered to pay any compensation to either of those two municipalities, since another asphalt company had already been ordered to do so. 32.  The Finnish State appealed against the District Court judgment. Also, in three of the four cases which the municipalities had brought against the applicant company appeals were lodged with the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovr\u00e4tten). 33.  On 20 October 2016 the Helsinki Court of Appeal accepted the claims of the Finnish State against the asphalt companies in four cases out of seven. The applicant company was among those asphalt companies which lost their case against the State, and it was ordered to pay some EUR 1.7 million in compensation to the State. Moreover, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeals of most of the municipalities. The applicant company thus won all of its three cases against the municipalities before the Court of Appeal. 34.  The applicant company appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in respect of the claim by the Finnish State which it had lost. Two of the three cases brought by the municipalities against the applicant company were also appealed against to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, h\u00f6gsta domstolen). 35.  On 6 September 2017 the Supreme Court refused the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal. The judgment of 20 October 2016 by the Court of Appeal thus became final in respect of the applicant company. 36.  On 25 September 2014 the applicant company requested the Supreme Administrative Court to annul its decision of 29 September 2009. 37.  On 3 January 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to suspend the proceedings until the Strasbourg Court renders a decision in the present case.", "references": ["2", "4", "7", "6", "5", "0", "1", "8", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Tekirda\u011f. 6.  On 13 November 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of the PKK/KADEK (Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress), an illegal organisation. He was in possession of a fake identity card at the time of his arrest. Subsequently, following the applicant\u2019s directions to the police, the latter conducted a house search in the presence of the applicant on the premises where he and another co-accused had been staying. The police found and seized 40 grams of cyanide, a description and diagrams for the construction of a bomb mechanism handwritten by the applicant, and a fake passport bearing the applicant\u2019s photograph that had been used by him to go to Iran twice. 7.  On 14 November 2003 the applicant was taken for questioning to the Istanbul police headquarters. The applicant\u2019s statements to the police were transcribed on pre-printed forms, the first page of which was filled in to indicate, inter alia, that the applicant was suspected of the killing of a certain M.Y. in 1999 on behalf of the PKK/KADEK, of undergoing military and political training at the organisation\u2019s camps abroad and of carrying out other activities for the organisation. The same page also included a pre-printed message which stated, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. It appears from the form that the applicant had refused legal assistance, since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating \u201cNo lawyer sought\u201d and a box next to it that is marked with a pre-printed \u201cX\u201d. Moreover, according to the record, he also stated that he did not want a lawyer or to remain silent. In his statement, which was fifteen pages long, the applicant admitted that he had become a member of the PKK/KADEK in 1996 and gave a detailed account of all the activities he had carried out for that organisation since then, including the killing of M.Y., opening fire on a police armoured vehicle during a demonstration organised in the aftermath of Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s arrest, and receiving training at the organisation\u2019s camp in Iraq. Moreover, when he was asked whether he wished to benefit from Law no. 3419 on Repentance (Pi\u015fmanl\u0131k Yasas\u0131), the applicant turned the offer down, explaining that he found the relevant Law to be \u201cdegrading\u201d and \u201cdishonourable\u201d. Every page of the statement form was signed by the applicant. 8.  According to an undated form explaining arrested people\u2019s rights, which the applicant duly signed, he was reminded of his right to remain silent and to have access to a lawyer. According to another document dated 14 November 2003, the applicant had been informed of his rights under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the material time and stated that he would like to give his statements without a lawyer present. This was also a pre-printed form that bore the applicant\u2019s signature and the indication that a copy of a form explaining his rights had been given to him. 9.  On 15 November 2003 at 11.10 p.m. two police officers and the applicant signed an incident report according to which the applicant had suddenly moved towards a window while in custody, pushing the officers, and had tried to harm himself by punching the window and hitting his head off it. 10.  On 16 November 2003 at midnight the applicant was examined at Haseki Hospital in Istanbul by a doctor who noted the presence of an abrasion on the applicant\u2019s third and fifth fingers of his left hand. 11.  According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant and his lawyer, T.D., on 16 November 2003, the applicant had seen his lawyer the same day. 12.  On 17 November 2003, the applicant underwent a further medical examination at the branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute responsible for the Istanbul State Security Court at 10.30 a.m. The doctor who examined the applicant also observed the same abrasion, adding that the applicant had told him that it had happened when he had hit the window. That report also bore the applicant\u2019s handwritten complaints according to which he had been subjected to external stress, deprived of sleep and subjected to psychological pressure and had not been informed of his rights. However, the doctor concluded that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant\u2019s body. 13.  On the same day the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court, where he was once again informed of his right, inter alia, to have access to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. He stated that he did not wish to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer and that he wanted to remain silent. He complained to the prosecutor that he had been subjected to psychological duress at the Istanbul police headquarters, that he had not been informed of his rights and that he had been denied legal assistance. He alleged that when he had asked to see a lawyer, the police had told him that the lawyer had not wished to come to the interview session. 14.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court without a lawyer present, where he expressed his wish to see a lawyer before giving any statement. Thus, the applicant remained silent and refused to make a statement. At the end of the interview, the judge ordered his pre\u2011trial detention. 15.  On 4 December 2003 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with that court against the applicant and four other persons, charging the applicant with the offence of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State\u2019s control, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The acts attributed to the applicant were as follows: involvement in opening fire on a police vehicle during a demonstration on 16 February 1999; involvement in a demonstration of 20 February 1999 where six police officers had been wounded by gunfire; membership of a terrorist organisation; killing M.Y. on 1 June 1999; and collecting money on behalf of a terrorist organisation through coercion. 16.  On 17 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court held its first hearing (case no. 2003/332), where the applicant denied all the charges against him, as well as his police statement. He maintained that at the Istanbul police headquarters he had been forced to sign a self-incriminating statement prepared by the police officers and that his request for legal assistance had been disregarded. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also stated that the applicant had not been provided with a lawyer during his pre\u2011trial detention despite his requests, and repeated this allegation throughout the proceedings. He further stated that the witness testimony given by a certain S.N. during a different set of proceedings before the same court (case no. 1999/285), which also concerned the killing of M.Y., included a description of the suspected killer which bore no resemblance to the applicant. The lawyer, therefore, pleaded the applicant\u2019s innocence and applied for his release. At the end of the hearing, the court held, inter alia, that there was no need to summon S.N. as a witness as he had already testified in case no. 1999/285 and he had not had much information about the killing of M.Y. in any event. It also ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention. It further decided to request the investigation file concerning the torture allegations of the applicant from the Fatih public prosecutor\u2019s office. 17.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, the State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 18.  At a hearing held on 25 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the trial court that the Fatih public prosecutor had delivered a decision not to prosecute the police officers and that he had lodged an objection (itiraz) against that decision. 19.  At a hearing held on 22 November 2004 case no. 2003/332 was joined with case no. 1999/285, which was also pending before the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 20.  At a hearing held on 6 April 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the trial court that the objection against the decision of the Fatih public prosecutor had been dismissed by the Beyo\u011flu Assize Court. 21.  At a hearing held on 20 July 2005, the applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that in accordance with Article 148 \u00a7 4 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, in force as of 1 June 2005, statements taken by the police without a lawyer present should not be used unless confirmed by the individual before a judge or a court. Thus, he asked the court to exclude the applicant\u2019s statements to the police. The trial court did not respond to his application. 22.  At a hearing held on 9 November 2005 the trial court received a copy of the Fatih public prosecutor\u2019s decision not to prosecute the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. At the same hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyer, while referring to his previous defence submissions, stated that the applicant\u2019s police statement had no probative value in line with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court did not give a ruling on that issue. 23.  At a hearing held on 6 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted once again that the evidence had been collected in respect of the applicant had been in breach of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that such evidence should not be used in the trial. The trial court did not respond to this application. 24.  At a hearing held on 5 June 2006 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits of the case, stating that the applicant should be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyer and some of the lawyers of the other co-defendants applied for time to prepare their defence submissions in reply to the public prosecutor\u2019s observations on the merits of the case. The trial court adjourned and granted them further time until the next hearing on 26 July 2006. 25.  At a hearing held on 26 July 2006, the trial court noted that two different lawyers of the other co-defendants had informed the court that they would be unable to attend the hearing as one of them had another hearing outside Istanbul and the other one had a hearing in another court in Istanbul. Referring to the absence of those lawyers and the fact that they had not been able to prepare their defence submissions, the applicant\u2019s lawyer also asked the trial court to give them a short period of time to prepare their written observations in reply to the public prosecutor\u2019s observations on the merits. The trial court accepted the excuses of the two lawyers, adjourned and granted all three lawyers further time to prepare their submissions. 26.  At the next hearing, held on 13 November 2006, the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits and reiterated his previous observations. The applicant\u2019s lawyer did not attend that hearing. The lawyer of co-defendant M.A. and the applicant applied for more time to prepare their submissions. The trial court adjourned and granted that application, stating that it would give them time until the next hearing but that it would be for the last time. 27.  At the hearing of 12 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a seven-page-long defence submission where he reiterated, inter alia, that the applicant had been subjected to torture while in police custody and had been forced by the police to sign his statements. In that respect, he referred to Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursuant to which statements that had been obtained through such methods could not be used in evidence. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s lawyer reiterated that Article 148 \u00a7 4 of the Code provided for a specific proscription of the use of police statements taken without a lawyer present unless they had been confirmed by the individual before a judge or a court. Thus, he asked the trial court not to use the applicant\u2019s police statements taken without his lawyer present, given that he had never accepted the content of those statements. According to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, it would be a breach of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention were the trial court to rely on the applicant\u2019s statements to the police to convict him. At the same hearing, M.A.\u2019s lawyer once again applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions, citing his inability to meet his client and the voluminous nature of the case file. The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that in the event of another adjournment of the trial, he would like to make his oral submissions at the next hearing. The trial court noted the reasons put forward by M.A.\u2019s lawyer, adjourned and granted them further time until the next hearing. 28.  At the next hearing, held on 2 July 2007, it was noted that M.A.\u2019s lawyer had sent a fax to the trial court in which he had provided an excuse and asked for an adjournment. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and reiterated his defence submissions that the evidence against the applicant was unlawful and that it could not be used by the trial court. The trial court did not respond to this application. However, the trial court accepted the excuse of M.A.\u2019s lawyer, adjourned and granted further time to that lawyer for the preparation of his defence submissions on the merits. 29.  At the next hearing, held on 8 October 2007, the trial court noted the application lodged by M.A.\u2019s lawyer asking for M.A. to be represented by new counsel. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and reiterated his previous defence submissions. The trial court adjourned the hearing with a view to appointing a new lawyer for M.A. and granting that lawyer time to prepare defence submissions. 30.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. M.A.\u2019s new lawyer applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions and was granted this by the trial court. 31.  At a hearing held on 2 June 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a fax to the trial court in which he provided an excuse for his inability to attend the trial. The trial court heard evidence from a defence witness in respect of M.A. in relation to his ill-treatment allegations. M.A.\u2019s lawyer further raised a plea of unconstitutionality in relation to the maximum permissible period of detention. The trial court decided to examine the plea of unconstitutionality raised by M.A.\u2019s lawyer, accepted the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s excuse and granted him additional time to prepare his oral submissions. 32.  At a hearing held on 19 November 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. M.A.\u2019s lawyer asked the trial court to conduct an additional investigation and hear S.N. as a witness with a view to shedding light on M.Y.\u2019s killing. That lawyer once again asked for additional time to prepare his defence submissions. The trial court dismissed the plea of unconstitutionality, granted M.A.\u2019s lawyer further time to prepare his defence submissions and adjourned. 33.  At the hearing held on 19 December 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. However, another lawyer for M.A. was present and she applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions. The trial court adjourned and granted her further time. 34.  On 13 February 2009 the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged, convicted him under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State\u2019s control, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court listed, among other pieces of evidence, \u201cthe statements of the accused throughout the proceedings\u201d in the \u201cevidence\u201d part of its judgment. In the part entitled \u201cassessment of evidence and reasons\u201d, the trial court noted that one of the accused, namely M.Z.\u00c7., had sent a letter to the court on 12 May 2004 in which he had stated that M.Y. had been abducted and killed by Ma.Y., F.A. and M.H. The trial court concluded that that statement had been corroborated by the autopsy report, a sketch of the scene and a police report establishing that the gun that had been used to kill M.Y. had been the same one that had been used in the demonstration of 20 February 1999. It went on to hold that the defendants\u2019 denial during the trial of their guilt should be dismissed in the light of that evidence. 35.  The trial court also noted that documents of an organisational nature and documents containing descriptions for the construction of bomb mechanisms handwritten by the applicant as well as the invoices of the illegal organisation had been found. In view of that evidence and the statements of the witnesses and the victims, it found it established that co-defendants M.Z.\u00c7. and Ma.Y. had both on their own and on the applicant\u2019s orders attempted to or collected money on behalf of the illegal organisation through coercion. Taking into account the participation of the applicant, M.Z.\u00c7. and Ma.Y. in the demonstration of 20 February 1999, and their positions within the illegal organisation, the trial court considered that the killing of M.Y. and the completed acts of extortion should be accepted as being \u201cserious enough\u201d, the material element of the offence set out in Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 36.  Lastly, in the \u201cconviction\u201d part of its judgment, the trial court held that the applicant had been a member of an illegal organisation, had taken military training in its mountain camps, had participated in the demonstration on 16 February 1999 on behalf of that illegal organisation and had opened fire on a police vehicle, had been involved in the injury of five policemen on 20 February 1999, and that the three bullet casings found in the scene of that incident had been fired from the pistol that the applicant had used to kill M.Y. on 1 June 1999. The trial court did not assess any evidence in that part of its judgment. 37.  The material submitted by the parties to the Court does not contain a copy of the evidence listed either in the \u201cevidence\u201d or in the \u201cassessment of evidence and reasons\u201d parts of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Furthermore, the trial court did not mention any of the defence submissions made by the applicant\u2019s lawyer and merely stated that the applicant had denied the accusations in his defence before the court. Similarly, while twelve out of the fifteen accused that had made incriminatory statements to the police had denied those statements before the trial court, the latter did not conduct any assessment in that regard. 38.  At the end of each hearing, the Istanbul State Security Court, and subsequently the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court, considered the applicant\u2019s detention either of their own motion or following an application by the applicant. Each time, they ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention pending trial, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence with which he was charged, the existence of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offence and the state of the evidence. On two occasions the applicant objected to the assize court\u2019s decisions dated 12 March 2007 and 8 October 2007 regarding his continued detention, specifically on 14 March and 15 October 2007. Both of those objections were rejected by the Thirteenth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court on 21 March 2007 and 24 October 2007 respectively on stereotypical grounds by way of a non-adversarial procedure. More specifically, the examination was conducted on the basis of the case file alone without hearing the applicant or his lawyer although the public prosecutor was consulted on the matter. Moreover, the opinion obtained from the public prosecutor regarding the applicant\u2019s detention was not transmitted to the applicant. 39.  On 27 April 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["5", "4", "1", "9", "6", "8", "7", "0", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Mankivka. 6.  On 2 April 2007 the applicant underwent surgery in connection with an umbilical hernia (exomphalos). 7.  According to the applicant, on 9 February 2008 the police arrested him in Vinnytsya on suspicion of abduction and murder. On the same day he was transferred to Kyiv and placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 8.  According to the Government, the applicant was arrested in Kyiv on 10 February 2008 on suspicion of abduction and murder, and on the same day he was placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 9.  According to the applicant, between 10 and 16 February 2008 he was beaten by police officers who tried to force him to confess to the abduction and the murder. In particular, Officer G., the first deputy head of Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station, kicked the applicant in the face and abdomen, injuring the area where he had had the operation for his umbilical hernia (see paragraph 6 above). After the beating, the applicant started suffering from constant pain in his abdomen. 10.  On 16 February 2008 the applicant confessed to the murder and the abduction and signed several documents which were undated. On the same day the police transferred him to the Kyiv Temporary Detention Facility (hereinafter, \u201cthe ITT\u201d). The ITT medical staff examined the applicant on the same day and noted that he had a bruise under his right eye. 11.  According to the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Kyiv Pre-trial Detention Centre (hereinafter, \u201cthe SIZO\u201d) administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. This was the second time that the SIZO administration refused to admit him (see paragraph 39 below). The applicant was sent back to the ITT and the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Kyiv Medical Emergency Hospital (\u201cthe Emergency Hospital\u201d). According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed there from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for \u201ccontusion to the abdomen and facial tissue\u201d. 12.  On 26 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the SIZO. He was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a \u201cpost-operative condition\u201d following the operation on his umbilical hernia in 2007. 13.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police officers of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station between 10 and 16 February 2008. 14.  On 24 June 2008 the investigator dealing with the criminal case against the applicant ordered a forensic medical expert to establish the injuries the applicant had sustained between 9 and 16 February 2008. The forensic medical expert examined the applicant on 4 July 2008 and did not find any injuries on him which could have been inflicted during that period. The expert noted that a liquid was leaking from the applicant\u2019s navel, and recommended that he be examined by a surgeon. 15.  On 11 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a petition to the prosecutor\u2019s office in which he stated that the applicant had been beaten by Officer G., the first deputy head of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 16.  On 16 September 2008 the investigating officer of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer based his decision on statements of the investigator and the police officers dealing with the initial investigative activities concerning the applicant. Those questioned denied that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated. 17.  On 29 September 2008 the applicant\u2019s defence counsel lodged a complaint with the Kyiv City public prosecutor against the decision of 16 September 2008. 18.  On 16 October 2008 the Kyiv City public prosecutor\u2019s office considered that there were no legal grounds for quashing the decision of 16 September 2008 (see paragraph 16 above). 19.  On 18 November 2008 the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (hereinafter, \u201cthe local court\u201d) quashed the decision of 16 September 2008. It held that, in the course of the inquiry, the investigating officer had failed to question the applicant and Officer G., the police officer whom the applicant had pointed out. The local court also found that the investigator had failed to append to the case file the results of the forensic examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries which his lawyer had referred to in the application of 11 August 2008 (see paragraph 15 above). 20.  On 19 December 2008, following an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officer G. was questioned. He said that he had not taken part in the applicant\u2019s arrest or in any other investigative activities relating to him. 21.  On 1 December 2009 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The local court noted that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions it had given in the decision of 18 November 2008 (see paragraph 19 above). In particular, the investigating officer had not questioned the applicant and had failed to provide any substantiation for his decision of 19 December 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). 22.  On 30 January 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officers \u041e., L., Psh., and S., were additionally questioned and they denied physically or psychologically coercing the applicant into making a confession. 23.  On 18 May 2010 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court noted that the instructions it had given in the decisions of 18 November 2008 and 1 December 2009 (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above) had not been followed by the investigating officer. 24.  On 23 August 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G., the person who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant (see paragraph 9 above), because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of that additional inquiry, the applicant was questioned and he reiterated his account of the events relating to the ill\u2011treatment. The investigating officer concluded that there was no evidence proving Officer G.\u2019s involvement in those events. 25.  On 5 December 2010 and 30 March 2011 the applicant lodged petitions with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in which he reiterated, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by Officer G. and that the investigation into his complaints in that respect had been ineffective. 26.  On 17 January 2011 a superior prosecutor quashed the decision of 23 August 2010 (see paragraph 24 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 27.  On 12 April 2011, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, the investigating officer questioned Officer Ovs., who had been on duty at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The officer denied that there had been blood on the applicant\u2019s body in the stomach area. The investigating officer also noted that the applicant had not raised any complaints either during his time at the police station or after his transfer to the Kyiv SIZO. On 30 March 2012 the local court quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 28.  On 28 June 2012, following an additional inquiry, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer came to the conclusion that it was impossible to question the people who had been at the police station with the applicant in February 2008. On an unspecified date that decision was quashed and the case file was remitted for an additional inquiry. 29.  On 7 September 2012, following an additional inquiry, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 17 September 2012 a superior prosecutor quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 30.  On 27 September 2012, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding ill-treatment, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the inquiry, the inspector on duty at the material time, Inspector Ag., was questioned and stated that he didn\u2019t remember whether he had seen the applicant. 31.  On 7 May 2013 the local court quashed the decision of 27 September 2012 (see paragraph 30 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to interrogate and/or properly analyse the statements of:\n- the people who had been detained with the applicant in the cell at the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station in February 2008;\n- the ITT and SIZO staff, in relation to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment and the SIZO\u2019s alleged refusal to admit him after the court had ordered his arrest;\n- the medical personnel from the emergency service who had provided the applicant with medical assistance in February 2008;\n- the surgeon from Buchanska Prison Hospital who had performed an operation on the applicant on 20 January 2010;\n- the police officers who had arrested the applicant in Vinnytsya on 9 February 2008. 32.  On 21 May 2013 the information about the physical injuries inflicted on the applicant was entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations and the respective pre-trial investigation started, in accordance with the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. 33.  On 27 June 2013, following the results of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence. 34.  On 4 July 2013 a superior prosecutor quashed the above decision, holding that the investigating officer had failed to follow the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7 May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above). 35.  On 5 July 2013 the investigating officer questioned S., who had been detained with the applicant in the ITT cell. The witness stated that he did not remember the applicant being beaten. 36.  On 29 August 2013, following the results of the investigation, the prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 18 February 2014 the local court upheld that decision. 37.  On 15 April 2014 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the investigating officer of 29 August 2013 and the decision of the local court of 18 February 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) and remitted the case file for a pre-trial investigation. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7 May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above), and in particular had failed to establish the origin of the injuries sustained by the applicant in February 2008. 38.  The parties did not submit information about further developments in the case. 39.  Meanwhile, on 13 February 2008 the local court had ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and ordered that he be transferred to the SIZO. As indicated before (paragraph 11 above), according to the applicant, the SIZO administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. The police then transported the applicant back to the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 40.  On 16 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the \u0406\u0422\u0422 (see paragraph 10 above). As a result of a medical examination, a bruise was found under his right eye. It was classified as a minor physical injury. 41.  Following a deterioration in the applicant\u2019s state of health, the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Emergency Hospital. According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed in that facility from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for \u201ccontusion to the abdomen and facial tissue\u201d (see paragraph 11 above). 42.  On 26 February 2008 the applicant was transferred from the ITT to the SIZO. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, upon his arrival he was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a post-operative condition following his umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above). 43.  According to the applicant, on 29 February, 5, 10, and 16 March 2008 he complained to the SIZO staff of constant pain in his abdomen. The SIZO doctors examined him and established that the pain was due to a post-operative navel fistula. On 21 March 2008 he was examined by a SIZO general practitioner who gave him an anaesthetic. Between 13 May and 2 July 2008 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit and was treated with the following: lactulose, aloe, fluconazole, ascorbic acid, and Captopril. His navel injury was treated with hydrogen peroxide, vitamins \u04121 and \u04126, Thiotriazolin, Levomekol (an ointment), Riboxin, and angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE). After being treated, he was discharged and placed in a cell. 44.  On 13 June 2008 the applicant was examined by a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital, who diagnosed a suture sinus (a type of wound complication) following the umbilical hernia operation. He recommended that a bandage be applied to the applicant\u2019s navel area, and also recommended that he be treated with antiseptics, antibiotics and have elective surgery. The surgeon noted that the applicant did not need urgent inpatient treatment, and the applicant was returned to the SIZO on the same day. 45.  On 22 October 2008 the applicant was examined in the SIZO by another surgeon, who noted that he did not need inpatient treatment or an urgent operation in connection with his navel fistula. 46.  From 26 November to 15 December 2008 the applicant had examinations at the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. He was diagnosed with omphalitis (inflammation of the navel and the surrounding area) and a suture sinus following the umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above). He was also diagnosed with: ischemic heart disease, myocardial cardiosclerosis, category II hypertension, hypertonic crises of 27 November, 1 and 4 December 2008, category I cardiac failure with cephalgia phenomena, asthenoneurotic syndrome, discirculatory encephalopathy, and chronic acute cholecystopancreatitis. The applicant received the following treatment: antispasmodic drugs, hepatoprotectors, antibiotics, biocatalysts, antihypertensive drugs (inhibitors, angiotensin-converting enzyme, beta-blockers, diuretics), and bandages on his umbilical area. On 5 December 2008 and 30 January 2009 the surgeon from the Emergency Hospital recommended that the applicant have elective surgery on the fistula and continue with the care and treatment of his symptoms under the surgeon, neuropathologist and cardiologist at the SIZO medical unit. 47.  Between 9 February and 10 April 2009 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit. He was diagnosed with and received treatment for: omphalitis, a urachal cyst, a navel fistula and suture sinus, ischemic heart disease, encephalopathy and an exacerbation of his chronic pancreatitis. The treatment consisted of oral medication and the application of antiseptic to the applicant\u2019s navel area. 48.  On 6 and 7 May 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO cardiologist, neuropathologist and surgeon. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula and category II hypertension. He was prescribed outpatient treatment for his symptoms. 49.  On 31 July 2009 the SIZO surgeon recommended that the applicant have an operation on the fistula, to be performed in a public hospital. 50.  On 4 August 2009 the SIZO informed the applicant\u2019s wife that the operation to remove his navel fistula would be arranged as soon as the court dealing with the criminal case against him allowed him to be transferred to an outside medical facility. 51.  On 15 August 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO therapist. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula, and category II hypertension. It was recommended that he continue with the prescribed outpatient treatment. 52.  On 24 September 2009, during hearings at the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, an ambulance was called for the applicant. The ambulance team suggested that the applicant had peritonitis, and recommended that he be hospitalised urgently. According to the ambulance team report, the person in charge of the prison escort refused to allow him to be hospitalised. After the hearing, the applicant was taken back to the SIZO medical unit. He remained in that unit until 8 October 2009 and was treated for his navel fistula and inflammation of the navel. He received oral medication and antiseptic was applied to his navel area. 53.  On 29 September 2009 the applicant was transported to the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. A duty surgeon and a supervising surgeon diagnosed him with omphalitis with a small amount of purulent discharge. The doctors did not prescribe any emergency operation, but recommended that bandages be applied, with Levomekol and Ceftriakson. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO. 54.  Between 24 September and 8 October 2009 the applicant remained in the SIZO medical unit, where he received the necessary treatment. He was discharged with a recommendation that his health be further monitored by the therapist and the surgeon of the SIZO medical unit. 55.  On 30 October 2009 the Court granted the applicant\u2019s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court and indicated to the Government that he should be placed in a medical facility where he could receive appropriate medical treatment. 56.  On 4 November 2009 the SIZO administration proposed to place the applicant in the Emergency Hospital. The applicant refused that proposal, explaining that he did not trust the Emergency Hospital\u2019s doctors. An ambulance team which had been called for the applicant did not transfer him to the Emergency Hospital, but recommended that he see a surgeon. 57.  On the same day V., one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, asked the SIZO administration to transfer the applicant to Public Hospital no. 6 for inpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. Another of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, A., asked the SIZO to place the applicant in a private hospital. The applicant agreed to be placed in that hospital. Eventually, he was not placed in either of those hospitals. 58.  On the same day the SIZO staff called an ambulance for the applicant. The ambulance team noted that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation, and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. The applicant was then placed in the SIZO medical unit. 59.  On 9 November and 16 November 2009, in reply to the requests of the applicant\u2019s lawyers concerning his hospitalisation, the SIZO administration advised that it was not competent to decide on the applicant\u2019s placement in an outside medical facility, and suggested that the lawyers should address the requests to the court dealing with the applicant\u2019s case. 60.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant was taken to Public Hospital no. 9 for an examination. The doctors recommended that he have an operation on his navel fistula. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO. 61.  On 24 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the hearing room of the Kyiv City Court of Appeal in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. The applicant was given treatment for his symptoms. 62.  On 26 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the SIZO in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen, and found that he did not require urgent hospitalisation. 63.  On 27 November 2009 a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital examined the applicant and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment for his navel fistula. 64.  On 4 December 2009, in the light of additional information from the respondent Government on the applicant\u2019s state of health and the treatment provided to him in the SIZO, the Court decided to lift the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 55 above). 65.  In December 2009 the applicant lodged several requests with the SIZO administration, asking to be transferred to any medical facility in view of the serious deterioration in his state of health. 66.  On 25 December 2009 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation in an outside medical facility and was receiving adequate medical treatment for his fistula in the SIZO. 67.  On 18 January 2010 the applicant was placed in the surgery department of Buchanska Prison Hospital, diagnosed with a ligature fistula of the umbilical area. 68.  On 20 January 2010 the applicant underwent an operation to remove the navel fistula. On 26 February 2010 he was discharged and sent back to the SIZO. 69.  The Government did not provide information or supporting documents as to the treatment provided to the applicant after his discharge from the hospital. They submitted that the medical documentation for the period of time from 26 February 2010 onwards had been lost. 70.  According to the applicant, the cells in which he was kept in the SIZO lacked natural light, and the electric light was dim and constantly on. The inmates slept on beds without mattresses or bed linen. 71.  He added that the food was unsatisfactory in terms of quality and quantity, and the prisoners were given tea and bread in the morning, porridge in the afternoon and boiled water in the evening. 72.  According to the applicant, he was not provided with food and water on hearing days, since Ukrainian legislation did not make provision for this. It was not possible to have meals or drinks at the courts dealing with his case.", "references": ["4", "8", "9", "3", "6", "0", "5", "7", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska colony no. 39 (\u201cthe colony\u201d). 6.  On 25 November 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered confiscation of all his property. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment with certain changes. 7.  Since 26 August 2003 the applicant has been detained in various detention facilities, initially pending the criminal investigation against him and his trial, and subsequently after sentencing. 8.  On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007 he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 9.  Upon completion of the criminal proceedings, on 16 March 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ladyzhynska colony. 10.  On 20 March 2007 a preliminary examination of the applicant was conducted, together with laboratory tests and an X-ray. He was put under medical supervision owing to the residual effects of his tuberculosis. 11.  According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant\u2019s regular examination and treatment during that time. 12.  In December 2011 a blood test revealed that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C. According to the applicant, he was denied access to copies of the test results. 13.  According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 14.  On 16 May 2012 doctors from the Vinnytsya Regional Centre of Control and Prevention of HIV-Aids diagnosed the applicant with hepatitis C in remission without hepatic impairment. According to the Government, the applicant was prescribed with symptomatic treatment and as a result of the treatment his health improved. The Government did not specify the nature of that treatment. 15.  According to the Government, the applicant was supervised by the colony doctors and was prescribed with all necessary medicine and a special diet. The Government did not specify the frequency of the treatment or the nature of the diet provided to the applicant. 16.  The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17.  They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory. 18.  According to the applicant, during his detention he submitted numerous applications to the domestic authorities, including the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), seeking to obtain copies of various documents to be submitted to the Court in substantiation of his application. 19.  He added that between August and November 2006 he requested that the Court of Appeal provide him with a copy of his indictment. His requests were refused on 8 August and 6 September 2006 on the grounds that he had already been provided with a copy of that document in the course of the criminal proceedings against him and that there was no legal requirement to meet his requests. Eventually, on 21 July 2008 a copy of that document was sent to the applicant. 20.  Between April and August 2009 the applicant requested that the Court of Appeal send him copies of several court records from his criminal case file as well as from that of his accomplice. Those requests were initially refused as not having a basis in law. According to the Government, on 10 September 2009 the applicant lodged another application with the Court of Appeal in which he requested copies of court hearing records, the cassation appeal and other documents from his criminal proceedings case file. On 2 October 2009 the Court of Appeal sent the requested copies to the applicant, but excluded copies of the court hearing records, on the ground that their transmission was not covered by the legislation that was applicable at that time. On 21 April 2011 the Office of the Government Agent before the European Court of Human Rights sent copies of the court hearing records to the applicant. 21.  By letters dated 12 and 17 January 2017, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant\u2019s applications for a copy of his request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against his conviction of 25 November 2004 and a copy of a court ruling of 26 October 2016 dismissing that request. The Court of Appeal specified that the applicant\u2019s criminal case file had been sent to the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Matters upon the latter court\u2019s request. The applicant has not been provided with a copy of the requested documents.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "0", "4", "3", "9", "6", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1952 and died in 2013. 7.  On 21 February 2002 P., a businessman, contacted the police complaining that the applicant, who was then the director of a municipal housing management agency, was demanding money from him in exchange for permission to use some premises managed by his agency. The applicant had allegedly assured P. that some of the money would be used to bribe representatives of any supervising authorities who might enquire into the use of the premises. 8.  On the same day the police, in the presence of two attesting witnesses, gave P. several banknotes marked with a luminescent substance only visible in special lighting to be given to the applicant as the bribe, and an audio recorder. 9.  Later that day P. went into the applicant\u2019s office and then came out saying that he had delivered the money. 10.  The police went in to arrest the applicant. The same attesting witnesses followed. In their presence, the luminescent substance was discovered on the applicant\u2019s hand and pocket. The marked banknotes were discovered in one of the rooms adjoining his office. These investigative steps were video recorded. 11.  On the same day the applicant wrote and signed a statement confessing to having accepted the money from P. He subsequently retracted the confession, claiming that it had been extracted under \u201cphysical and psychological pressure\u201d from the police. 12.  The applicant was charged with fraud, apparently because he actually had no statutory authority to let the premises in question. 13.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation a certain T.V.S., who was apparently an employee of the applicant\u2019s agency, stated that, on an unspecified date, apparently prior to P.\u2019s complaint to the police, the applicant had asked her to show the premises in question to P. 14.  The attesting witnesses made formal statements to the investigating authority describing the events of 21 February 2002 which they had observed. They stated, in particular, that they had entered the applicant\u2019s office after the police and, when they entered, two police officers were already holding the applicant. 15.  In the bill of indictment the victim, the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. were identified as witnesses to be summoned in the course of the trial. 16.  In the course of the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and argued that the banknotes had been planted on the agency premises by the police, who had also smeared his hand and pocket with the luminescent substance to frame him. The traces of the substance on his hand could come from shaking P.\u2019s hand. 17.  According to the Government, P. testified in the course of the trial on two occasions in April 2004. It appears that he repeated the substance of his statements to the police (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 18.  The attesting witnesses were repeatedly summoned to testify at the trial but failed to appear as they could not be found at the home addresses they had given to the authorities. The court records submitted to the Court show that the hearings were adjourned and rescheduled on at least thirty-three occasions due to the \u201cwitnesses\u2019 failure to appear\u201d (\u0441\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u043e\u0437\u0433\u043b\u044f\u0434 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043e \u0443 \u0437\u0432\u2019\u044f\u0437\u043a\u0443 \u0437 \u043d\u0435\u044f\u0432\u043a\u043e\u044e \u0441\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043a\u0456\u0432) and that the trial court repeatedly requested the help of police and of the prosecutor\u2019s office in locating and escorting the witnesses to the hearings. It appears that those measures concerned both the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. However, despite those efforts, those witnesses failed to appear and their pre-trial statements were read out at the trial. 19.  On 5 October 2009 the Kharkiv Kominternivsky District Court convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to two years\u2019 detention in a semi-open penal institution, but waived enforcement of the sentence as it had become time-barred (see paragraph 24 below). In convicting the applicant, the court relied on: the statements of P., the attesting witnesses and T.V.S.; audio and video evidence; police reports documenting the delivery of the marked banknotes to P. and their subsequent discovery, as well as the discovery of the luminescent substance on the applicant\u2019s hand and pocket; statements of the police officers who had organised the investigative actions in question; the results of expert analysis confirming the discovery of the luminescent substance from the same source on the banknotes, on the applicant\u2019s hand and in his pocket; and the applicant\u2019s confession. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation that his confession had been extracted under duress as unsubstantiated. 20.  The applicant appealed, arguing in particular that P., the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. had not been examined in the course of the trial as they failed to appear at the trial (\u201c\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u043e\u0442 \u044f\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0432 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0438\u201d). 21.  On 4 February 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating that there was sufficient evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. There was no reason to distrust the statements of the victim and the witnesses which were corroborated by the other evidence in the file, including audio and video evidence. The court perceived no reason for the witnesses to falsely testify against the applicant. 22.  In his appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court the applicant stated that the witnesses had ignored summons to appear at the trial and the trial court had failed to ensure their presence. The attesting witnesses had stated that, when they entered the office, the police officers already held the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). This showed that the police were behaving in a violent way towards the applicant and it was comprehensible why he could be intimidated and falsely confess under such pressure. 23.  On 9 June 2010 a Supreme Court judge denied the applicant leave to appeal on points of law. The judge noted that matters of fact were not subject to review by the Supreme Court, that the judicial decisions were based on properly assessed evidence and the conclusions were reasoned and gave no reason to doubt them. The criminal-law characterisation of the applicant\u2019s actions was correct and the punishment lawful. There were no grounds to open review proceedings.", "references": ["9", "2", "5", "1", "7", "4", "0", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first, second and third applicants were born in 1971, 1947 and 1954 respectively, and live in Budapest. 5.  The second and third applicants, as well as the legal predecessors of the first and third applicant (Ms R\u00f3bertn\u00e9 Hidas and Ms Mikl\u00f3sn\u00e9 Kecsk\u00e9s) and other persons were co-owners of a plot of land of 4,847 sq. m (land registry title no. 223591) in District XXII of Budapest. They also co\u2011owned a neighbouring plot of land of 423 sq. m (land registry title no. 223592). 6.  On 19 January 1998 the Budapest District XXII Mayor\u2019s Office (hereafter \u201cthe local authority\u201d) ordered the partition of plot no. 223591 into two plots measuring 1,519 sq. m and 3,328 sq. m. In the same decision, it requisitioned (lejegyz\u00e9s) the plot of 1,519 sq. m for the purpose of constructing a local public road and awarded compensation of 5,511,000 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately 25,000 European Currency Units (ECU) (the predecessor to the euro) at the material time), to be distributed among the owners in proportion to their ownership shares. 7.  At the same time, the local authority also partitioned plot no. 223592 and requisitioned a part of that land with an area of 123 sq. m in exchange for compensation of HUF 376,200 (approximately ECU 1,700). 8.  The decisions were served on the first applicant\u2019s legal predecessor, the second applicant, the third applicant and the third applicant\u2019s legal predecessor, among other persons. They appealed against it. 9.  On 6 March 1998 the Budapest Public Administration Office (Budapest F\u0151v\u00e1ros K\u00f6zigazgat\u00e1si Hivatala) upheld the first-instance decisions, which thus became final. 10.  On 25 March 1998 the local authority entered into possession of the requisitioned plots of land and paid the compensation to the applicants, who only provisionally accepted the sum, while reserving their right to bring court proceedings against the requisition orders. 11.  On 13 April 1998 some of the above-mentioned owners challenged the administrative decisions in court. The legal predecessor of the first applicant and the second applicant himself were parties to the proceedings, but not the third applicant or his legal predecessor. 12.  On 16 March 2005, following two remittals ordered by the Budapest Court of Appeal, the Budapest High Court delivered a first-instance judgment and dismissed the claim. 13.  On 30 November 2005 the Budapest Court of Appeal overturned the first-instance judgment and ordered new administrative proceedings. It held that the local authority\u2019s decision had been tainted by a procedural irregularity, in that the local authority\u2019s notary (who had adopted the decision of 19 January 1998) should have abstained from taking a decision in a case in which the local authority employing him had been one of the interested parties. 14.  Accordingly, the Budapest District XI Mayor\u2019s Office was appointed to conduct new first-instance administrative proceedings. On 7 February 2008 it adopted a decision identical to that of 19 January 1998 (see paragraph 7 above). 15.  On 2 July 2008 the decision was upheld on appeal by the Public Administration Office of Budapest, with an amendment that the compensation figures should be increased by accrued interest. 16.  On 27 August 2008 the first applicant challenged the new administrative decision in court. The second and third applicants intervened (beavatkoz\u00f3) in the proceedings in support of the first applicant. 17.  On 11 March 2010 the Budapest High Court found for the applicants, quashed the administrative decision because it had been adopted on the basis of a legal provision previously annulled by the Constitutional Court, and ordered new proceedings. 18.  On 10 January 2015 the Budapest Government Office (Budapest F\u0151v\u00e1ros Korm\u00e1nyhivatala) adopted a new administrative decision, with the same content as before, but on different legal grounds. 19.  On 9 February 2015 the applicants brought court proceedings against that decision. 20.  On 19 April 2016 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court delivered its judgment. It dismissed the applicants\u2019 action as far as the requisition\u2019s lawfulness was concerned but quashed the administrative decision as regards the compensation amount. It held that the compensation amount should be set at such sum as reflected by an assessment of the value of the properties as at 2015 and that the assessment should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Government Decree no. 58/2015 (III.24). The government decree in question contained a table for the purposes of calculating social security pensions. In that table, different multiplication factors were associated with different years (from 1950 onwards), making it thus possible to calculate the current value of salaries and incomes received during previous employment. 21.  On 14 June 2017 the K\u00faria quashed the final judgment and remitted the case to the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court for the recalculation of the compensation amount. It held that the method of assessing the valuations applied in the first-instance judgment could not be used in the context of the case; instead, the amount to be paid should be calculated by an expert on the basis of the properties\u2019 market values on 10 January 2015, from which the compensation already received in 1998 (see paragraph 10 above) should be deducted. 22.  Throughout the court proceedings, the Land Registry has retained a record of the dispute (perfeljegyz\u00e9s). 23.  The public road contemplated by the local authority\u2019s requisition order of 1998 (see paragraph 7 above) has yet to be constructed. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (2 October 2018), the proceedings concerning the amount of compensation due to the applicants were still pending before the domestic courts.", "references": ["1", "4", "5", "0", "7", "8", "2", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Ljubljana. 6.  For the relevant background to the case, see Riba\u0107 v. Slovenia (no. 57101/10, \u00a7\u00a7 6-11, 5 December 2017). 7.  The applicant was a citizen of the Republic of Serbia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (\u201cthe SFRY\u201d). Following the dissolution of the SFRY, he retained citizenship of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He has had permanent resident status in Slovenia since 1977, where he also married and had two children. He was a member of the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army (hereinafter \u201cthe YPA\u201d). 8.  On 23 September 1991 he applied to the Vrhnika Military Post Office for early retirement as of 30 April 1992, and was then \u201cavailable\u201d (na razpolago) and on leave until his retirement. On 29 November 1991 the Office granted his request. 9.  On 25 October 1991 he left Slovenia with the YPA and went to Kraljevo. The applicant maintained that he had left with the YPA so he could fulfil the retirement conditions. On 21 December 1991 he returned to Slovenia, but left again in January 1992, which he maintained was for the purpose of arranging documents for his retirement. On 27 April 1992 the applicant returned to Slovenia, holding that it had not been possible for him to return earlier because of the war. 10.  On 16 July 1992 the military pension fund for the armed forces of the SFRY (hereinafter \u201cthe YPA Fund\u201d) found the applicant to be entitled to an early retirement pension under SFRY military rules as from 1 May 1992. The applicant maintained that he had never received any pension from the YPA Fund. 11.  On 27 December 1991 the applicant applied for Slovenian citizenship under section 40 of the Citizenship Act (see paragraph 22 below). By a decision of 7 July 1992 the Ministry of the Interior refused his application, holding that the applicant had not lived in Slovenia between 25 October 1991 and 27 April 1992. The Supreme Court dismissed his subsequent appeal. 12.  On 29 July 1992 the applicant applied for an advance payment of his military pension under the Advance Payment of Military Pensions Ordinance (hereinafter \u201cthe Ordinance\u201d; see paragraph 22 below). By a decision of 18 February 1993 the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter \u201cthe Institute\u201d) refused the applicant\u2019s application, finding that he had not fulfilled the conditions for pension entitlement under SFRY military rules, namely the age requirement, by 18 October 1991 (section 2(1)(2) of the Ordinance). The Institute also noted that the Ministry of Defence had opined that there had been no indication of the applicant having participated in aggression against Slovenia (section 2(2) of the Ordinance; see paragraph 22 below). His subsequent appeal was dismissed and the applicant initiated court proceedings. 13.  On 4 February 1994 the Court of Associated Labour of the Republic of Slovenia dismissed his claim, holding that the applicant had not fulfilled the conditions under section 2(1)(2) of the Ordinance (see paragraph 22 below) because he had not reached the required retirement age by 18 October 1991. The court emphasised that there had been nothing to suggest that the applicant had participated in aggression against Slovenia as a member of the YPA (section 2(2) of the Ordinance). An appeal, an appeal on points of law and a constitutional complaint all lodged by the applicant were dismissed. 14.  On 4 November 1998 the applicant applied for an old-age pension under the Act on the Rights Stemming from the Pension and Disability Insurance of Former Military Personnel (hereinafter \u201cthe 1998 Act\u201d, see paragraph 22 below). On 25 February 1999 the Institute refused his application, holding that he had not continuously had permanent resident status in Slovenia between 25 June 1991 and October 1998 (section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act). The applicant appealed. 15.  On 12 August 1999 the Institute dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant had not fulfilled the statutory requirements under the 1998 Act because he had not continuously had permanent resident status in Slovenia for the relevant period and had failed to claim his pension rights by 25 June 1991 (section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act). 16.  On 10 January 2003 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court dismissed an application for judicial review lodged by the applicant. It pointed out that the applicant had fulfilled the permanent resident status requirement, but had nevertheless not claimed his pension rights by 25 June 1991. 17.  Meanwhile, in October 1999 the applicant reapplied for Slovenian citizenship. On 15 May 2002 the Ministry of Interior issued an assurance to the applicant that he would be granted citizenship if he could prove that he had been released from his current citizenship. On 2 December 2002 the applicant asked the Ministry to grant him citizenship on the basis of the amended Citizenship Act without prior release from his current citizenship. On 4 February 2003 the applicant acquired citizenship by naturalisation under section 19 of the amended Citizenship Act (see paragraph 22 below). 18.  On 19 May 2003, after lodging a new request with the Institute, the applicant was granted an old-age pension as from 4 February 2003 under the Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter \u201cthe general rules\u201d). 19.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he should have been granted the pension as from 1 May 1992. On 3 November 2003 the Institute dismissed his appeal, holding that the applicant had been entitled to an old-age pension under the general rules and section 2(4) of the 1998 Act as from 4 February 2003 \u2013 when he had acquired Slovenian citizenship. An application that he lodged for judicial review and a subsequent appeal were also dismissed by the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court and the Higher Labour and Social Court respectively, reiterating the Institute\u2019s arguments. 20.  On 23 March 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The court reiterated that under new section 15 of the 1998 Act (see paragraph 23 below), the applicant would be entitled to a pension retroactively only if he had acquired citizenship under section 40 of the Citizenship Act. 21.  On 30 March 2010 the Constitutional Court refused to accept for consideration a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional issue or entail a violation of human rights which had serious consequences for him.", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "5", "0", "6", "4", "7", "9", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1988, 1982, 1984 and 1987 respectively. At the material time all four of them were serving their respective prison sentences in Rustavi Prison no. 1. 6.  At about 1 p.m. on 30 March 2009 the applicants were arrested in a yard behind the prison during an alleged attempt to flee. The applicants and the Government have submitted different accounts of the circumstances surrounding their arrest. 7.  According to the applicants, they left the confinement area through an open door. Then they climbed up a two-metre high wall with the assistance of scaffolding attached to it at the time and jumped down into the back yard. There, they were attacked by prison officers who severely beat them with wooden sticks and iron pipes. The second and third applicants, together with another prisoner, R.G., hid in a truck parked nearby to avoid the beatings, while the first and fourth applicants surrendered immediately. After the arrest the applicants were placed in a punishment cell where their beating continued. 8.  The Government admitted that the applicants had been injured on the day of the incident, but submitted that they had sustained all the injuries either as a result of falling from a prison wall that was under construction at the time or as a result of the necessary physical force to which the prison officers had had to have recourse in order to effect their arrest. The Government further submitted that whereas the second and third applicants had resisted the prison officers during their arrest, the first and fourth applicants had immediately surrendered. 9.  On the day of the incident the Investigation Department of the then Ministry of Corrections and Legal Aid (\u201cthe Ministry of Prisons\u201d) opened a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 attempted escape. The investigator in charge of the case questioned the applicants, who blamed all their injuries on a fall from a prison wall. On the same date, the investigator commissioned an expert from the National Forensic Bureau who visually examined all those injured and issued reports in respect of the first, second and third applicants as well as the prison officers on 7 April 2009 and in respect of the fourth applicant on 16 April 2009. The examinations of the applicants were conducted in the presence of the investigator. 10.  The medical expert concluded, in respect of all the applicants, that the injuries could have been caused by blows with a hard blunt object(s) inflicted at the time of the escape attempt. He further concluded that the injuries concerned were of minor severity and had not caused the third and fourth applicants long-lasting effects on their health. The extent and nature of the injuries sustained by each of the applicants, as recorded by the expert, were as follows: 11.  It was observed that the first applicant had multiple abrasions on his chest, nose, forehead, cheeks, right ear, upper left arm, right shoulder and on both knees. His nose was bleeding and swollen. His lower left eyelid was bruised and swollen and he had a cut which was slightly bleeding on his tibia. The forensic expert further noted that during the examination, the applicant had complained of pain in the chest. 12.  It was observed that the second applicant had multiple haematomas from his shoulders to his back and on his right cheek; abrasions on the right shoulder and on the back of his right hand; multiple scratches on the right side of his neck; and a deep scratch on the left thigh, covered with scabbing. 13.  It was observed that the third applicant had multiple abrasions on the right forearm; an abrasion on the back of the fifth finger of his left hand; and cuts which were slightly bleeding on his head, on the left temple and crown. 14.  It was observed that the fourth applicant had multiple haematomas on the chest, right elbow, and below the left eye; abrasions on the forehead and knee; a scratch on the right thigh; and a laceration which was slightly bleeding on the crown of the head. 15.  According to the forensic expert reports issued on 7 April 2009 (as cited in the Court of Appeal judgment of 25 March 2010 against the applicants), it was observed that prison officer Z.Ch. had an abrasion on his forehead; V.M. had a haematoma on his face; and O.T. had multiple abrasions on his feet and hands. 16.  In October and November 2009 when the applicants were allowed to testify before the court in the criminal proceedings against them, they stated that they had been ill-treated during their arrest. All of them withdrew the statements they had given during the pre-trial investigation. The first and second applicants claimed in that connection that pre-typed texts of statements had been given to them by the investigator and that they had been forced to sign those statements without reading them. 17.  On 29 December 2009 the Rustavi City Court convicted all the applicants of attempted escape from prison (an offence under Article 379 of the Criminal Code of Georgia). The second and third applicants were also found guilty of resisting prison officers in the exercise of their duties (an offence under Article 378 of the Criminal Code of Georgia). Their conviction was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 25 March 2010. Before the courts of first and second instances, the applicants maintained their ill-treatment allegations, which were not, however, addressed by the courts. By a decision of 26 July 2010 the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected as inadmissible an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. 18.  On 10 November 2009 all the applicants, except for the fourth one, complained to the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia of ill-treatment on 30 March 2009 and requested the initiation of criminal proceedings in line with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. On 11 November 2009, the prosecutor forwarded the applicants\u2019 complaint to the judge examining the case against the applicants, considering it relevant for the on-going trial proceedings. 19.  On 1 February 2010 the applicants enquired about the progress of the investigation, complaining that none of them had been questioned in connection with their allegations of ill-treatment. 20.  On 19 February 2010 a panel of independent forensic experts called by the second and third applicants issued forensic reports concluding that the two applicants suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which could have been derived from the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment. Based on the forensic reports issued by the National Bureau of Forensics on 7 April 2009 (see paragraph 9 above), the panel further concluded that the applicants concerned could have sustained the injuries described in those documents as a result of ill-treatment. The two applicants provided the Office of the Chief Prosecutor with the forensic reports in relation to their complaints. 21.  On 3 March 2010 the fourth applicant also lodged a criminal complaint of ill-treatment with the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. 22.  On 8 July 2010 the applicants, acting through the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia (\u201cthe PDO\u201d), lodged yet another complaint. By a letter of 30 July 2010 they were informed that a preliminary enquiry had been opened on 22 July 2010 under Article 123 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing severe or minor injuries by use of excessive force). 23.  On 15 December 2010 and 13 January 2011 all four applicants, acting through their lawyer, wrote again to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor enquiring about the progress of their case. In their letter of 13 January 2011, they also denounced the fact that their ill-treatment allegations against the prison authorities were being investigated by the very same authorities \u2013 the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons. On 31 March 2011 the applicants\u2019 letter was forwarded to the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons, but was left unanswered. 24.  In April 2011 the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons conducted the first investigative interviews in connection with the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment. Throughout the subsequent months an investigator from the Ministry of Prisons interviewed the prison governor and four prison officers who had been involved in the incident, including those who had arrested the applicants. They all denied having beaten the applicants. Two of them claimed that all of the applicants had sustained their injuries by falling from the wall while they had been fleeing from the prison. One of the officers (O.G.) stated that the first and fourth applicants had surrendered without resistance or complications. The three prison officers who had been injured during the incident (V.M., O.T. and Z.Ch.) admitted that they had had recourse to physical force in order to arrest the second and third applicants, but they denied that the applicants had sustained any injury therefrom. Rather, they attributed all the applicants\u2019 injuries to their alleged fall from the wall. 25.  As regards the details of the arrest of the second and third applicants, Z.Ch., V.M. and O.T. stated that the two, together with another prisoner, R.G., had attempted to escape in a truck that had been parked in the back yard of the prison. After driving a short distance, the truck had stopped all of a sudden. The prison officers had then approached them and ordered them to surrender. The three prisoners had resisted arrest while they had been in the truck cabin. According to O.T., R.G. had been trying to restart the vehicle. The officers had managed to capture the applicants only after receiving help from additional prison staff. 26.  The investigator also interviewed the four applicants, who confirmed the allegations of ill-treatment they had made in their criminal complaints. In particular, they stated that they had been severely beaten with wooden sticks and iron pipes immediately after their arrest and as a result, the first, second and fourth applicants had passed out several times. When they had regained consciousness, the beatings had resumed. The applicants also named those prison officers who had been involved in the beating. They denied that they had sustained their injuries as a result of falling from the wall. Only the fourth applicant admitted that he had slightly injured his leg when he had jumped from the wall, but said that he had received the remaining injuries from the beating. 27.  The second and third applicants further claimed that on the day of the incident pre-typed texts of statements had been given to them by the investigator and that they had been forced to sign these statements without reading them. The fourth applicant stated that he had felt sick after the ill\u2011treatment, so he had been unable to adequately judge reality and had signed the interview record without scrutinising it. He further stated that the next day after the incident he had been transferred to Ksani Prison no. 15, where, upon his arrival, he had been beaten by the Governor of the prison. Subsequently, he had been regularly threatened and warned not to lodge a complaint about his ill-treatment. The second and third applicants also claimed that D.Ch., head of the Prison Service of the Ministry of Prisons and other senior officials of the agency had promised them leniency in respect of their escape attempt in return for remaining silent about their ill\u2011treatment. 28.  The investigator also interviewed R.G., who was arrested together with the applicants while fleeing. He essentially confirmed the applicants\u2019 account of the events and further claimed that the prison governor, D.S., while physically and verbally abusing the applicants, had called a guard to shoot them, but the latter had not complied with the order. 29.  The forensic medical examination reports of April 2009 obtained as part of the investigation conducted against the applicants in the prison escape case were included in the investigation file concerning the applicants\u2019 alleged ill\u2011treatment. 30.  On 17 September 2011 in response to a complaint lodged by the applicants about the ineffectiveness of the investigation, the prosecutor informed them that they were just witnesses in the matter and had no standing to lodge a complaint. 31.  On 13 March 2012, the PDO, acting on behalf of the applicants, requested the Office of the Chief Prosecutor information about the status of the investigation. The PDO was notified that several witnesses had been interviewed and that the investigation was on-going. 32.  On 20 August 2012 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the proceedings for lack of evidence of a crime. The prosecutor fully accepted the version of events put forward by the prison officers, concluding that the applicants could have been injured when they had jumped down from a wall whilst fleeing from the prison. The prosecutor also noted that the prison officers had been forced to use physical force against the applicants to effect their arrest, but made no conclusion as to whether the applicants had sustained their injuries therefrom. The applicants were not informed about the decision. 33.  On 21 October 2013 the applicants wrote yet another letter to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor enquiring about the status of the investigation, but received no reply. Hence, on 19 June 2014 the applicants\u2019 lawyer sent an additional complaint. 34.  By a letter of 21 July 2014, the applicants were informed that a decision had been taken on 20 August 2012 to discontinue the relevant proceedings.", "references": ["0", "4", "8", "9", "6", "7", "2", "5", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6.  On 25 September 2000 the Neam\u021b County Court ordered a state\u2011owned company to pay the applicant due salary rights. 7.  On 9 October 2001 the Roman District Court ordered a private person to reimburse a loan to the applicant. 8.  On 14 November 2008 the Bra\u0219ov County Court ordered the municipality of Bra\u0219ov to leave a plot of land in the applicant\u2019s full property and possession. 9.  On 3 April 2009 the applicant signed a report, drafted on the occasion of the compulsory enforcement of the above judgment, which attested to the restoration of his possession over the land in dispute by placement of metal bars on the free area and by tracing a line with white paint over the area occupied by roads and bridge pillars belonging to the municipality. 10.  On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11.  On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.", "references": ["8", "0", "5", "7", "2", "1", "6", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "9.  The first applicant was born in 1942 and at the time of the events he lived in Baku. 10.  He was a linguist and worked at the Linguistic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He was of Talysh ethnicity and carried out research on the Talysh language. He also worked as editor-in-chief of the Tolishi Sado, a bilingual Azerbaijani-Talysh newspaper, and regularly published articles therein. 11.  At around 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the MNS in Javid Park in Baku. He was taken to the premises of the MNS where he was questioned for twenty-three hours about his alleged collaboration with the Iranian intelligence service. 12.  He was deprived of water and food and was kept awake. He was also subjected to physical violence. In particular, the fingers of his right hand were several times squashed with a door and he got injuries on his left shoulder. His ill-treatment was stopped owing to his high blood pressure. 13.  At around 4 p.m. on 3 February 2007 the MNS\u2019s agents took the first applicant by car to the area near the Elmler Akademiyasi metro station in Baku and released him there. The applicant was not provided with any document concerning his arrest and detention. 14.  Immediately after his release while the first applicant crossed the road, a police officer approached and arrested him because of his alleged failure to comply with the police officer\u2019s request to identify himself. He was taken to Yasamal District Police Station no. 28, where an administrative-offence record was drawn up by police officers. The first applicant refused to sign the record. 15.  On the same day the first applicant was taken to the Yasamal District Court and appeared before a judge. The judge found him guilty under Article 310 \u00a7 1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention. 16.  On 5 February 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against that decision. He claimed that the first applicant\u2019s administrative conviction had been totally unjustified and that the first-instance court had not examined any evidence proving his guilt. His lawyer further noted that the first applicant had been ill-treated on the premises of the MNS, where he had been unlawfully detained from 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 to 4 p.m. on 3 February 2007. In that connection, the lawyer submitted that there were bruises on his hand and asked the court to order his forensic examination. The relevant part of the complaint reads as follows:\n\u201cIt appeared at the court hearing [before the first-instance court] that N. Mammadov [the first applicant] had also been subjected to physical violence. In fact, the existence of bruises on his left hand was clearly seen.\u201d 17.  On 9 February 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. The appellate court\u2019s decision made no mention of the lawyer\u2019s particular requests and complaints. The hearing was held in the absence of the first applicant. 18.  Following his administrative conviction on 3 February 2007 by the Yasamal District Court, he was returned to the premises of the MNS where he was kept until 17 February 2007. He was again ill-treated by MNS agents during that period. In particular, although he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism, he was not provided with the relevant medical care and medication. He was questioned in general at night and no record was drawn up in respect of those interviews. He was given false information about his family according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and that his wife had been hospitalised and was suffering from a serious disease. He was not provided with clean clothing during this period. His family was not informed of his place of detention. 19.  It appears from the documents in the case file that an investigator at the MNS, N.Z., compiled on 9 February 2007 a record on the first applicant\u2019s questioning as a witness on the premises of the MNS. The investigator questioned him about his travels to and relations with Iran. 20.  The Government submitted that they had been unable to obtain the files of the case concerning the first applicant\u2019s administrative detention as they had been destroyed owing to the expiration of their term of storage. For this reason, the Government were not able to clarify the conditions of the first applicant\u2019s detention and treatment to which he had been subjected during this period. 21.  As the first applicant\u2019s family had no information about his place of detention following his administrative conviction, his lawyer sent numerous letters and telegrams to the MNS, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Court of Appeal asking for information about the first applicant\u2019s place of detention. The lawyer also indicated in his submissions that there were bruises on the first applicant\u2019s hand, and that the first applicant had to follow a special diet and be provided with the relevant medication because of his state of health. 22.  In reply to the above-mentioned requests, by a letter of 9 February 2007 the MNS informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been arrested or detained on their premises. By a letter of 16 February 2007 the Ministry of Internal Affairs also informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been taken to or detained in the detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 23.  On 15 February 2007 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General asking for the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination in the presence of his lawyer. In that connection, she noted that at the hearing of 3 February 2007 before the Yasamal District Court the first applicant\u2019s family members had noticed injuries to the index finger of his right hand. She further noted that she had not been informed of his place of detention and that the first applicant could not live without his medication because of his state of health. 24.  By a letter dated 20 February 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the second applicant that her request concerning the allegedly unlawful actions taken against her husband had been transferred to the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office and that she would be informed of the outcome. 25.  It appears from the case file that on 7 April 2007 the investigator in charge of the case ordered the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination. According to forensic report no. 32/TM, during his examination by the expert on 12 April 2007, the first applicant complained of having been ill\u2011treated on the premises of the MNS on 2 February 2007. In particular, he stated that the index finger of his right hand had been squashed with a chair and that he had been struck on his left rib cage. The expert concluded that there was not at that time any objective sign of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body. The first applicant was not provided with a copy of the report. Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the domestic proceedings, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the above-mentioned forensic report. 26.  On 8 October 2007 the first applicant lodged an action with the Sabail District Court, asking the court to find violations of his rights protected under Articles 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention. He alleged, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007, that his arrest and detention on the premises of the MNS from 2 to 3 February 2007 had been unlawful, and that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of his ethnicity. The part of the complaint concerning the first applicant\u2019s ill-treatment reads as follows:\n\u201cIt appeared from the submissions that he [the first applicant] made to his representative in the presence of the investigator on 17 February 2007 that, although he had not officially asked for medical aid, he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and poor eyesight. During the period when he had been administratively detained on the premises of the MNS, he had been subjected to unrecorded interviews with 200/220 mm Hg blood pressure, he had not been provided with the relevant medication, and on several occasions, he had not been allowed to go to the toilet with the intention of breaking his will.\n... N. Mammadov had been threatened on several occasions and had been given false information according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and his wife had been hospitalised on account of a serious heart disease ...\nAlthough the application and request of his wife and representative concerning the violence against N. Mammadov had been addressed to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, those complaints had been sent first to the Yasamal District Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and then again to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The latter sent the complaints made on 9 March for a legal assessment two months later to the Investigation Department of the MNS. They were dealt with with delay on purpose so that the visible trace of injuries to the index finger of his right hand would disappear and recover; and the forensic examination had been ordered only in April 2007.\u201d 27.  On 18 October 2007 the Sabail District Court, which examined the action under the procedure established by Articles 449-51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against the prosecuting authorities\u2019 actions and decisions, dismissed it without addressing any of the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints. 28.  On 24 October 2007 the first applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 29.  On 16 November 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 18 October 2007. 30.  On 17 February 2007 the first applicant was charged with the criminal offence of high treason under Article 274 of the Criminal Code. 31.  On the same day the Sabail District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request for the preventive measure of remand in custody to be applied, ordered the first applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The judge substantiated the necessity of this measure by the seriousness of the first applicant\u2019s alleged criminal acts, and the possibility of his absconding and obstructing the investigation. 32.  On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 17 February 2007. He claimed, in particular, that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. He also complained that the court had failed to take into account his personal situation, such as his age and his having a permanent place of residence, when it had ordered his detention pending trial. 33.  On 1 March 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention order was justified. 34.  On 12 May 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 3 August 2007. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the seriousness of the charges and by the necessity of additional time to carry out further investigative steps. 35.  On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that he had not committed any crime and that there was no reason for his continued detention. 36.  On 31 May 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 37.  On 28 July 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 3 December 2007. The court substantiated the necessity of this extension on the grounds that a number of investigative steps needed to be carried out and thus more time was needed to complete the investigation. 38.  On 3 August 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 39.  On 15 November 2007 the first applicant\u2019s case was sent to the Assize Court for trial. 40.  On 7 December 2007 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. The first applicant complained at the hearing that he had been ill-treated and had been unlawfully detained on the premises of the MNS and asked the court to return the case to the investigators for a new examination. On the same day the Assize Court dismissed his applications. The court further decided that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the first applicant should remain \u201cunchanged\u201d, as there were no grounds for his release. 41.  In the course of the proceedings before the Assize Court, the first applicant reiterated his previous complaints relating to the alleged violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. In this regard, he claimed that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007 and that he had been unlawfully arrested and detained by them. 42.  It appears from the case file that on 5 March 2008 a judge of the Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination, asking the expert to clarify the conclusions of forensic report no. 32/TM (see paragraph 25 above). Following the first applicant\u2019s examination on 3 April 2008, the expert concluded in his report, no. 54/TM, that there was no objective sign of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body. The expert also concluded that the first applicant\u2019s pain in his left shoulder had not been noted in the conclusions of forensic report no. 32/TM as it had not constituted an objective sign of injury. It further appears from report no. 54/TM that the first applicant complained of pains in his left shoulder and these pains were having an effect on the fourth finger of his left hand. However, there was no sign of injury to his finger or left shoulder. 43.  On 5 March 2008, following a request from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, a judge at the Assize Court asked the MNS to inform the court, inter alia, whether the first applicant had been on the premises of the MNS on 2, 3 and 9 February 2007, whether he had been questioned on the premises of the MNS on 9 February 2007, and whether he had been subjected to a medical examination and what his diagnosis had been. 44.  In reply to the judge\u2019s letter of 5 March 2008, by a letter dated 16 April 2008 the MNS informed the judge that the first applicant, who was at that time detained in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, had been diagnosed with hypertension and was being provided with the relevant treatment. However, the MNS\u2019s letter was silent as to the judge\u2019s requests for information concerning the first applicant\u2019s presence on the premises of the MNS on 2, 3 and 9 February 2007. 45.  On 24 June 2008 the Assize Court convicted the first applicant of high treason and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The Assize Court also held, relying on the conclusions of forensic report no. 54/TM, that there had been no objective sign of injury to the first applicant\u2019s body. 46.  On 26 December 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Assize Court\u2019s judgment of 24 June 2008. 47.  On 27 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 26 December 2008. 48.  According to the first applicant, he suffered from various medical conditions, including hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism and poor eyesight before his arrest. He regularly received medical treatment in connection with the above-mentioned conditions. 49.  It appears from the documents in the case file that the first applicant was detained from 17 February 2007 to 25 June 2008 in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, from 25 June 2008 to 14 January 2009 in pre\u2011trial detention facility no. 1, from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, and from 28 July 2009 until his death on 17 August 2009 in the medical facility of the Prison Service (\u201cthe medical facility\u201d). 50.  It appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention-facility medical record (tibbi kitab\u00e7a) no. 353, as well as from the documents in the case file, that in 2007 and 2008 the first applicant was examined on numerous occasions by doctors. During this period the first applicant\u2019s state of health was stable and he mainly complained of high blood pressure and headaches. According to medical record no. 353, which covered the first applicant\u2019s detention from 17 February 2007, the first applicant was subjected to initial examination (ilk bax\u0131\u015f) upon his arrival at the detention facility. The initial examination did not contain references to any injury on his body. The date of the initial examination was not indicated in the medical record, but there was a stamp dated 20 February 2007 on that page of the medical record indicating the result of the first applicant\u2019s blood test. 51.  It appears from two letters dated 1 and 12 September 2007 sent from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer to the head of the MNS pre-trial detention facility that the lawyer asked for information about the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment. The lawyer also expressed his gratitude for the conditions created for the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment in detention. 52.  It also appears from a request from the first applicant dated 30 June 2008 that he asked the head of pre-trial detention facility no. 1 to allow his lawyer to provide him with the medication. 53.  As regards the period of his detention from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, on 14 January 2009, upon his transfer to that facility, the head of that prison decided to place the first applicant in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days. It appears from the case file that following the intervention of the Azerbaijani Committee against Torture, a local non-governmental organisation, on 21 January 2009 the first applicant was transferred to a normal cell. 54.  On 26 January and 19 February 2009 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the head of prison no. 15, complaining about the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention. The lawyer noted that the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days without any reason and asked for a copy of the decision in this regard. The lawyer further submitted that although the first applicant suffered from various medical conditions, he had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance. 55.  On 23 February 2009 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an action with the Nizami District Court, complaining of the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he pointed out that the first applicant had been unlawfully placed in a punishment cell and had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance. 56.  On 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court partially allowed the action, holding that the first applicant\u2019s placement in a punishment cell had been unlawful. The court also found that the first applicant had not been subjected to a medical examination upon his arrival at the prison and ordered the latter to carry out a medical examination of the first applicant and to provide him with adequate medical care. It further appears from the judgment that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated at the court hearing that he had been on leave when the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell and that he had requested to be transferred to a normal cell immediately after his return to work. He further stated that the first applicant suffered from hypertension and that he had informed the first applicant of the necessity of his transfer to a specialised medical establishment, but the first applicant had rejected that suggestion. 57.  On 29 March 2009 the first applicant appealed against that judgment, noting that the first-instance court had failed to acknowledge the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he noted that he had been detained from 14 to 21 January 2009 in a punishment cell which had been windy, wet and not heated. He also pointed out that the cell had not received natural light and that he had not been provided with the relevant clothing. During this period, he had been obliged to remain standing from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day as there had been no chair in the cell. In his appeal the first applicant confirmed that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 had proposed his transfer to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had refused that proposal because of his financial situation as he had not considered that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance free of charge. 58.  On 16 April 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal. 59.  It appears from the documents in the case file that in the meantime, as evidenced by a document dated 30 March 2009 and signed by the first applicant, the latter refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. He substantiated his refusal by the poor quality of medical treatment in that particular medical establishment. 60.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on 7 July 2009 the first applicant again refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had not had any financial means and that he had not thought that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance there. 61.  It further appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s medical records that he refused on several occasions to be examined by the doctors. Various medical records were compiled by the doctors in this connection. 62.  On 28 July 2009 the first applicant was transferred upon his consent to the medical facility with the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae (boyun f\u0259q\u0259r\u0259l\u0259rinin osteoxondrozu) and right shoulder plexus (sa\u011f t\u0259r\u0259fli \u00e7iyin pleksiti). 63.  It appears from a letter dated 14 August 2009 and signed by the head of the medical facility, sent in reply to an information request from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, that upon his arrival at the medical facility the first applicant mainly complained of neck pains, general weakness and dyspnea. On various dates indicated in the letter the first applicant was examined by a number of specialists, including a neurosurgeon, an endocrinologist, a urologist and an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae and right shoulder plexus. The doctors also confirmed that the first applicant suffered from various other medical conditions such as hypertension, prostatitis, acute cholecystitis, bronchitis, hyperthyroidism and cataracts. 64.  On 17 August 2009 the first applicant died. According to the death certificate, the death resulted from an ischemic cerebral infarction (ba\u015f beyinin i\u015femik infarkt\u0131). 65.  Following the death of the first applicant, the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office launched a criminal inquiry into the circumstances of his death. 66.  On 18 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of the body, which was carried out on the same day, for the purposes of determining the cause of death. Report no. 105 dated 29 August 2009 showed that death had resulted from an acute ischemic cerebral infarction (ba\u015f beyinin k\u0259skin i\u015femik infarkt\u0131). 67.  On 24 August 2009 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General, claiming that the first applicant had died in detention because he had not been provided with the adequate medical treatment after January 2009. In that connection, she submitted that the first applicant\u2019s state of health had worsened following his placement in a punishment cell between 14 and 21 January 2009 in prison no. 15 and that his medical treatment following that had not been adequate. 68.  By a letter dated 27 August 2009, the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office returned the documents of the criminal inquiry to the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office, finding that the inquiry into the first applicant\u2019s death had not been conducted thoroughly. In particular, the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office held that the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office had failed to determine the medical conditions from which the first applicant had suffered and whether he had been provided with adequate medical assistance. It further found that the first applicant\u2019s cellmates and the doctors examining him in prison had not been questioned by the prosecuting authorities. 69.  On 31 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic examination by a panel of experts. The prosecutor asked the experts to establish whether the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance, whether his medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and whether his death had resulted from a lack of adequate medical treatment in detention. 70.  Report no. 177/KES dated 1 September 2009, which examined only the period of the first applicant\u2019s treatment following his transfer to the medical facility on 28 July 2009, showed that the first applicant\u2019s medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and treated in the medical facility. The three experts furthermore found that, although the first applicant had been suffering from numerous conditions (such as osteochondrosis, hypertension, prostatitis, cataracts), the latter could not have developed during a short period of time and could only have appeared following long pathological processes in his body. The report further found that the death had resulted from a cerebral infarction as a result of thrombosis inside cerebral blood vessels and was not related to his medical treatment. 71.  On 28 September 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the first applicant\u2019s death because of the lack of evidence of a crime in his death. He relied in this connection on the findings of the above-mentioned two forensic expert reports, concluding that the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment had been adequate and that there had been no causal link between his medical treatment and death. The decision also referred to the statements from various doctors and the first applicant\u2019s cellmates according to which the medical treatment had been adequate and that the first applicant had not made any complaint in this connection during his treatment. In particular, the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated that although the first applicant\u2019s transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions, he had refused that proposal. 72.  On 21 October 2009 the second and third applicants lodged a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 28 September 2009 with the Nizami District Court, asking the court to overrule it. They claimed that the first applicant had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detention and that his unlawful placement in a punishment cell on 14 January 2009 had resulted in the development of numerous diseases. In that connection, they complained that the first applicant had been transferred to the medical facility only on 28 July 2009, despite the fact that on 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court ordered prison no. 15 to provide the first applicant with adequate medical care. They further submitted that they had not been provided with a copy of the first applicant\u2019s medical records and the forensic reports relating to his death and that they had been provided with a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 28 September 2009 only on 19 October 2009. 73.  On 2 November 2009 the Nizami District Court dismissed the complaint. The court found that the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical care. It further noted that although his transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions before 28 July 2009, he had rejected these proposals. 74.  On 5 November 2009 the second and third applicants appealed against that decision, reiterating their previous complaints. 75.  On 17 November 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. As to the argument that the Nizami District Court\u2019s decision of 6 March 2009 had not been executed, the appellate court found that the first applicant had refused to be transferred to the medical facility. That decision was not amenable to appeal.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "9", "3", "8", "4", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Drogobych. 6.  On 6 September 2007 the B. family\u2019s house in the village of Side was burgled by a masked gang. On unspecified dates, a number of other robberies were committed in a similar way in the region. 7.  At the end of October 2007 M., a relative of the B. family, confessed to them that he had participated in the burglary, having been forced to do so by K. and Ya., who had also taken part in the crime. He submitted that the other participants had not been known to him. 8.  On 4 December 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of the burglary. 9.  On unspecified dates K. and Ya. \u2013 and, subsequently, three other persons \u2013 were arrested as suspects in the case. Before being arrested on criminal charges, all of them had been placed in administrative detention for alleged resistance to the police, in the course of which they confessed to the burglary. One of the detainees, Sh., allegedly named the applicant as an accomplice. 10.  On 6 February 2008, in order to verify the applicant\u2019s possible involvement in the aforementioned crime, police officers approached him when he was in the backyard of his house and ordered him to accompany them to a police station. The applicant refused and, according to the police record, attempted to flee. Accompanied by his father, he was taken to the Sambir police station and spent the following night in detention. His father was sent home. 11.  At about 10 a.m. on 7 February 2008, the applicant was taken to Drogobych police station where the police drew up a report stating that he had committed an administrative offence, having manifested wilful disobedience to a lawful order given by police officers. They also drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s administrative arrest, which suggested that no physical injuries had been found on him during his apprehension. The applicant refused to sign both reports. Thereafter, he was brought before the Drogobych District Court, which sentenced him to twelve days\u2019 administrative detention for manifest disobedience to the lawful demands of the police. 12.  On the same day at the Sambir police station, according to the relevant record the applicant made a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043aa \u0437 \u043a\u0430\u044f\u0442\u0442\u044f\u043c) in which he confessed to two counts of burglary, including that of the B. family. According to this statement, the applicant had participated in the crime because he had been under constant threats from K., the alleged organiser of the burglary, to whom he had owed money, and from K.\u2019s friend, P., who had also participated in the burglary. He also stated that he had no complaints against the police and that no physical or psychological coercion had been applied to him. On the same date, according to the relevant record, \u201cexplanations\u201d were obtained from the applicant in which he confirmed his participation in the burglary and provided further details as to the circumstances of the crime. 13.  According to the applicant, the police ill-treated him with a view to extracting confessions from him. In particular, after the hearing at the Drogobych District Court on 7 February 2008 (see paragraph 11 above), he was taken back to Drogobych police station. At about 3 p.m., police officers of that station, in the presence of their colleagues from Sambir police station, handcuffed his hands behind his back, kicked him and hit him with the back of a chair; when he requested a lawyer, police officer Y. came in holding a white stool leg. He placed the applicant face down on a table, stuffed a knitted hat in his mouth and beat him with the stool leg on his bare heels, causing him a fractured foot. To stop the beating the applicant agreed to confess and signed the statement of surrender to the police. Thereafter, he was taken to the investigator in charge of the investigation of the burglary for questioning. He once again confirmed his confessions, being afraid of further ill-treatment by the police. Prior to being taken to the investigator, the applicant was transferred back to Sambir police station in the late evening on 7 February 2008. There he was taken to the Sambir Temporary Detention Centre (\u201cthe Sambir ITT\u201d) where he drafted a statement that he had not been beaten by the police and that his foot pain had been caused by accidently twisting his foot on the stairs. According to the applicant, he was forced to make such a statement by the head of the police station. He further submitted that no medical assistance had been administered to him for the following five days, despite his complaints of severe pain in the foot. 14.  According to the Government, the applicant had not suffered any ill\u2011treatment and had confessed to the burglary of the B. family\u2019s home of his own free will. 15.  In the early morning of 8 February 2008, according to the applicant, he was made to write another document, referred to as \u201cexplanations\u201d, as dictated by police officers. In this document he confirmed his confession to the burglary. 16.  On 12 February 2008 the applicant was taken to Sambir Town Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a fractured right foot and received the necessary medical assistance. 17.  On the same date, once he had been discharged from the Sambir ITT, the applicant submitted in writing that he had no complaints against the police officers of Sambir police station in connection with his detention in that facility. 18.  On a number of occasions during the applicant\u2019s administrative detention, namely on 9, 11 and 12 February 2008, a lawyer, Ms I., appointed by the applicant\u2019s family on 7 February 2008, unsuccessfully attempted to hold a meeting with the applicant. She managed to \u201cbriefly meet\u201d him for the first time in the late evening of 12 February 2008. 19.  On 18 February 2008, when the term of the applicant\u2019s administrative detention expired, criminal proceedings were instituted against him in connection with the burglary of the B. family\u2019s home and, without leaving the police premises, he was re-arrested as a suspect in the case. According to the arrest report, the applicant was arrested on the grounds that he had been identified by an eyewitness. The relevant entry in the arrest record suggests that the applicant expressed his wish to be assisted by a lawyer before the first questioning. 20.  According to the Government\u2019s submissions, on the same date the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He admitted his guilt in respect of the burglary and provided the relevant details. Before the questioning, he had been apprised of his procedural rights and waived his right to legal assistance. Copies of the interview record, as well as of the waiver and the note on acquaintance with procedural rights, submitted to the Court by the Government, bear a visible handwritten correction of their dates: from an illegible pre-typed to a handwritten \u201c18\u201d February 2008. 21.  The applicant submitted that he had not been questioned on 18 February 2008 and had never waived his right to legal assistance. He alleged that the authorities had forged the documents and that the recorded interview they referred to had in fact taken place in the investigator\u2019s room on 7 February 2018, during his administrative detention (see paragraph 13 above). 22.  On 19 February 2008, at the applicant\u2019s request, Ms I. was admitted to the proceedings as his defence counsel. Thereafter, the applicant was assisted throughout the proceedings either by her or by another lawyer, Mr M., appointed by the applicant\u2019s father. 23.  On 20 and 25 February 2008 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He denied his guilt in respect of the burglary and refused to make any further statement in that respect. 24.  On 21 February 2008 the Sambir Town Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. 25.  On the same day an expert from the Sambir Town Forensic Examination Bureau examined the applicant on the investigator\u2019s instruction with a view to establishing whether he had any injuries and, if so, their location and nature, and whether they could have been caused by a free fall from one\u2019s height or by falling onto some objects. The applicant told the expert that he had been beaten at Drogobych police station on 7 February 2008, including with a stool leg. The examination report was completed on 4 March 2008. It documented inflammation at the base of the first finger on both hands (\u043e\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0448\u043a\u0456\u0440\u0438 \u0432 \u0434\u0456\u043b\u044f\u043d\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0446\u0456\u0432 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0445 \u0440\u0443\u043a\u0430\u0445), which could have been caused by blunt hard objects, possibly on the date and in the circumstances as described by the applicant. The injury was assessed as a minor one and not typical of a free fall from a man\u2019s height. In addition, the expert noted that the applicant\u2019s right foot was in a plaster cast during the examination and that on 4 March 2008 a radiologist from the Lviv Regional Diagnostic Centre had examined an X-ray image of 12 February 2008 and found \u201cno signs of traumatic injuries\u201d on the bones of the right foot. 26.  On 31 March 2008 the applicant retracted his earlier confessions and submitted that he had incriminated himself as a result of ill-treatment by the police and that he had not committed the crime in question. 27.  On 24 April 2008, during an identification parade, the victim B. pointed to the applicant as having participated in the burglary of her home. She alleged that she recognised him by his hands and provided the relevant details. 28.  On 4 June 2008 the applicant again denied his participation in the burglary. 29.  On 6 June 2008 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case against the applicant and his five alleged accomplices was sent to the Sambir District Court of Lviv Region (\u201cthe Sambir District Court\u201d) for trial. During the trial, the applicant and his alleged accomplices pleaded not guilty and submitted that their confessions to the burglary had been extracted from them by the police by means of ill-treatment. They relied on the bodily injuries which had been discovered on them shortly after their arrest and on the pending criminal proceedings against the police officers. 30.  On 28 December 2010 the Sambir District Court found the applicant, along with his five co-defendants, guilty of aggravated burglary and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment, with confiscation of all his personal property. The court relied on, among other things, the confessions the applicant had made during the pre-trial investigation \u2013 in particular, on 7 February 2008 and \u201cduring his questioning as a suspect\u201d \u2013 even though he had retracted them at the investigation stage and during the trial. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that his statement of voluntary surrender and confession to the police had been extracted from him by means of ill\u2011treatment. It noted that in accordance with the applicant\u2019s submissions, after his arrest on 6 February 2008 he had been taken first to Sambir police station and then, on 7 February 2008, to Drogobych police station where his alleged ill-treatment had taken place. The court thus concluded that \u201cthe applicant had made his confessions to the police on 7 February 2008 at Sambir police station before the physical injuries had been inflicted on him.\u201d The allegations of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants as to their ill\u2011treatment by the police were also dismissed by the trial court. The term of the applicant\u2019s sentence was to be calculated from 6 February 2008. 31.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of Lviv Region (\u201cthe Lviv Regional Court\u201d). He submitted, among other things, that his conviction had been based mainly on confessions obtained from him by coercion, as well as on the statements made in a similar way by his co\u2011defendants. 32.  On 23 November 2011 the Lviv Regional Court upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s judgment. As regards the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment and his objection to the use of his self-incriminating statements obtained under duress, the court found that the first-instance court had established that the applicant had made his confession at Sambir police station before being taken to Drogobych police station where the alleged ill\u2011treatment had taken place. It further relied on the Sambir prosecutor\u2019s findings set out in his decision of 7 March 2008, which had not been appealed against by the applicant, according to which on 7 and 12 February 2008 the applicant himself submitted that he had had twisted his foot on the stairs and that he had had no complaints against the officers of Sambir police station (see paragraph 37 below). 33.  The applicant, both in person and through his lawyer, M., appealed on points of law. In his appeal, the applicant mainly maintained the arguments advanced in his earlier appeal. He emphasised in this connection that the Lviv Regional Court had relied on the results of the investigation of his ill\u2011treatment allegations conducted by the Sambir prosecutor\u2019s office as the final and conclusive ones, whereas the criminal proceedings in respect of his ill-treatment complaint had been still pending. Lawyer M. mainly challenged the allegedly selective approach to the assessment of evidence and the establishment of the facts. 34.  On 22 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe HSC\u201d) upheld the judgments of the lower courts. It concluded that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been sufficiently proved by the evidence, including his own confessions. In so far as his allegation of ill\u2011treatment was concerned, the HSC relied on the reasoning given by the Lviv Regional Court and found that it had correctly dismissed the allegation as unsubstantiated. The complaints of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants about their ill-treatment in police custody with a view to extracting their confessions to the burglary of the B. family were likewise dismissed by the HSC. 35.  On 14 February 2008 lawyer I., acting upon the instructions of the applicant\u2019s relatives, lodged a criminal complaint with the Sambir district prosecutor\u2019s office about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and requested that he be given a forensic medical examination. She also complained that the head of Sambir police station had unlawfully obstructed her from meeting with the applicant on 9, 11 and 12 February 2008 and had provided false information as to the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. 36.  On 27 February and 20 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s mother and father respectively complained to the Sambir district prosecutor\u2019s office and the Prosecutor General of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody and the police\u2019s failure to provide the applicant with timely medical assistance for his foot injury. The father requested that the applicant be given a forensic medical examination. 37.  On 7 March 2008, in response to the complaints of lawyer I. and the applicant\u2019s mother, the deputy prosecutor of Sambir refused to institute criminal proceedings against the heads of Sambir police station and of the Sambir ITT and a police officer, K., on the grounds that there was no evidence that they had committed any crime. He relied on the applicant\u2019s statements made on 7 and 12 February 2008, according to which nobody had ill-treated him and his foot injury had been caused by accidentally twisting it on the stairs (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). He noted that the applicant had not complained to him of any ill-treatment shortly after his arrest. The prosecutor forwarded the ill-treatment allegations to the Drogobych prosecutor\u2019s office for further examination. By the same decision, the prosecutor rejected as unsubstantiated the complaints concerning the lack of medical assistance in respect of the applicant\u2019s foot injury and the allegations that his relatives and lawyer had not been allowed to see him. 38.  On 26 March, 9 April and 4 June 2008 the prosecutors refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the complaints of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. They questioned the applicant, who maintained that he had been ill-treated by the police and submitted a detailed account of the events of 7 February 2008 as outlined in paragraph 13 above, and the police officers, all of whom denied any use of physical force or psychological pressure against the applicant. The prosecutors then relied on the testimony of the officers and on the statements the applicant had made on 7 and 12 February 2008. They also noted the fact that the applicant had remained silent during a court hearing on the application of a preventive measure in respect of him. 39.  On 1 April 2008, 10 May and 10 July 2008 the above-mentioned prosecutors\u2019 decisions of 26 March, 9 April and 4 June 2008 respectively were annulled by supervising prosecutors as unfounded and premature. The prosecutors found the inquiries that had been conducted incomprehensive and of a low professional level and ordered additional investigative steps to be taken. 40.  On 7 and 23 April 2008 at the request of the applicant\u2019s father the applicant underwent another X-ray examination of his right foot. It confirmed that the applicant had a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot. 41.  Between July 2008 and August 2010, in the context of unspecified criminal proceedings against officers of Sambir police station, a number of investigative steps were taken to verify the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment. In particular, the applicant and the police officers identified by him were questioned on a number of occasions; reconstructions of the crime scene were conducted (on 29 July and 16 August 2008) and identification parades were carried out (on 16 August and 17 September 2008). The applicant repeated in detail his account of the events and pointed out the persons who had allegedly ill-treated him. On 17, 18 and 30 September 2008 confrontation interviews between the applicant and the police officers were carried out. The officers denied any ill-treatment. 42.  On 12 August 2008, a traumatologist who had examined the applicant on 12 February 2008 was questioned. He confirmed that the applicant had had a fractured foot when he had been admitted to the hospital, and submitted that the applicant had not replied when asked about the origin of his trauma. 43.  On an unspecified date another witness submitted that he had seen police officers holding the applicant under his arms because he had a foot injury. When the witness had asked the applicant what had happened to his foot, the applicant had allegedly replied: \u201cI don\u2019t know\u201d. 44.  On 17 September 2008, following an order given by the prosecutor, comparative X-ray images of the applicant\u2019s feet were made. 45.  On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor ordered a forensic medical examination by a panel of experts from Lviv Regional Forensic Examination Bureau aimed at answering the following questions. Did the applicant sustain traumatic injuries to his right foot and, if so, how serious were the injuries and could they have been inflicted in the circumstances indicated by the applicant during his questioning as a witness and during the reconstruction of the crime scene with his participation? Could the injuries have been sustained in the circumstances indicated in the applicant\u2019s written statement of 7 February 2008, namely that he had twisted his foot on the stairs? Could the injuries have been self-inflicted (intentionally or accidently), without the application of external force, for example by twisting the foot while walking or running? What were the features of the object which could have been used to cause the injuries and could this have been a wooden stool leg, as suggested by the applicant? Could those injuries have been inflicted on 7 February 2008 (between 6 and 12 February 2008) and, if so, what was the precise date of their infliction? Lastly, was it possible to establish how many blows had been inflicted on the applicant and in which order? 46.  On 28 October 2008 the experts\u2019 report answered those questions as follows: the applicant did sustain a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot; the injury could have been caused at the beginning of February 2008, as suggested by the applicant, but it was not possible to state with precision the particular date of infliction; the injury originated from a blunt object and could be classified as \u201clight\u201d in terms of severity; such a fracture would normally be caused by a direct impact on the bone either by inflicting a blow with a blunt object or by falling on the foot from a height, but in the applicant\u2019s case it most likely originated from a blow to his foot with a blunt object such as a wooden stool leg or a wooden bar; the particularities of the applicant\u2019s injury which could be observed on the X\u2011ray images were not typical of an accidental twisting of the foot; and the last question could not be answered. 47.  On 3 August 2010 the Drogobych interdistrict prosecutor\u2019s office instituted separate criminal proceedings against the officers of Drogobych police station identified by the applicant for abuse of powers in connection with the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. On 24 December 2010, following questioning of the applicant and the police officers, the criminal investigation was discontinued for lack of evidence of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions. 48.  On 19 January 2011 the Lviv regional prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 24 December 2010, having noted that there remained a number of investigative steps yet to be taken in order to establish the truth in the case. 49.  On 21 March 2011 the investigator ordered another medical examination by a panel of experts to answer the same questions as those which had been answered by the forensic experts on 28 October 2008 (see paragraph 45 above). In the prosecutor\u2019s opinion, the experts\u2019 conclusions of 4 March 2008 and 28 October 2008 raised doubts as to their correctness and contradicted the material in the case file. 50.  On 23 January 2012 an additional forensic medical report was delivered by a panel of experts from the Main Forensic Examination Bureau of the Ministry of Health. According to the report, the applicant had a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot which, given the absence of external injuries in the area of the fracture, could have been sustained without the application of external force to the applicant, for example by twisting the foot while walking or running. The experts found that the injury could not have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant or by falling from a height. They further noted that the abrasions on both his hands had been caused by a blunt object, but that there was insufficient information in the file to identify the object. The experts concluded that both injuries could have been sustained between 6 and 12 February 2008 and stated that it was not possible to establish the date more precisely. Likewise, it was impossible to establish \u201cthe number of blows and ... in which order\u201d they had been administered. 51.  On 20 March 2012 the Drogobych interdistrict prosecutor closed the criminal proceedings against the police officers of Drogobych police station. He relied on the police officers\u2019 denial of any ill-treatment, supported by statements by their colleagues, the applicant\u2019s statement made on 7 February 2008 that he had accidently twisted his foot on the stairs and the results of the forensic medical examination of 23 January 2012, which the prosecutor regarded as the only reliable one. That decision was not appealed against by the applicant. Instead, he complained of ill-treatment in the course of the trial in the criminal case against him (see paragraph 29 above).", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "4", "2", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (\u201cTACT\u201d) empowers police, immigration officers and designated customs officers to stop, examine and search passengers at ports, airports and international rail terminals. No prior authorisation is required for the use of Schedule 7 and the power to stop and question may be exercised without suspicion of involvement in terrorism. However, questioning must be for the purpose of determining whether the person appears to be concerned or to have been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. If someone fails to co-operate he or she is deemed to have committed a criminal offence and could face up to three months in prison, a fine or both. 6.  The applicant, a French national, is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. Her husband, who is also a French national, is in custody in France in relation to terrorist offences. 7.  On 4 January 2011, following a visit to her husband in France, the applicant and her three children returned to the United Kingdom on a flight from Paris. The flight landed at East Midlands Airport at approximately 8.05 p.m. 8.  At the United Kingdom Borders\u2019 Agency (\u201cUKBA\u201d) desk the applicant and her children were stopped but she was not formally detained or arrested. She was told that she was not under arrest and that the police did not suspect her of being a terrorist, but that they needed to speak to her to establish if she might be \u201ca person concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism\u201d. She was therefore taken to an examination room with her youngest child. As the applicant had arranged for someone to meet her at the airport, her two older children were permitted to proceed to Arrivals. The applicant\u2019s luggage was taken to another room and searched. 9.  The applicant asked to consult a lawyer and for an opportunity to pray. At approximately 9.00 p.m., while she was praying, one of the officers spoke with her lawyer and indicated that she would be free to speak to him in fifteen minutes. When she finished praying, she was told that she could telephone her lawyer after she had been searched. 10.  At approximately 9.23 p.m., after the applicant had been searched, she spoke with her lawyer by telephone. However, the officers made it clear that they would not delay the examination pending his arrival. 11.  In or around 9.30 p.m. the applicant was taken to an examination room and served with a form TACT 1 (see paragraph 42 below). The contents of the form were also read to her. In response, she informed the officers that she would only answer questions after her lawyer arrived. Thereafter, she was asked a number of questions about her family, her financial circumstances and her recent visit to France. She refused to answer most of those questions. 12.  At around 10.00 p.m., following the conclusion of the examination, the applicant was cautioned and reported for the offence of failing to comply with her duties under Schedule 7 by refusing to answer questions. She was also told that she was \u201cfree to go\u201d. 13.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer arrived at approximately 10.40 p.m. 14.  The applicant was subsequently charged with three offences: wilfully obstructing a search under Schedule 7; assaulting a police officer contrary to section 89 of the Police Act 1996; and wilfully failing to comply with a duty under Schedule 7. The first and second charges were eventually dismissed. 15.  On 12 December 2011 the applicant appeared before Leicester Magistrates\u2019 Court, where she pleaded guilty to the third charge and was sentenced to be conditionally discharged. That plea followed a ruling by the District Judge that he had no power to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process on the grounds advanced by the applicant; namely, that the powers given to the police under Schedule 7 had infringed her rights under Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention and her right to freedom of movement between Member States of the European Union under Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 16.  The applicant appealed to the High Court against the District Judge\u2019s ruling. 17.  On appeal, the applicant alleged that there had been an abuse of process based on a violation of her rights under Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention and her freedom-of-movement rights. She also sought a declaration of incompatibility; or, if no declaration were to be granted, she contended that her rights under the above-mentioned Convention Articles had been infringed. 18.  With respect to her Convention rights, she argued that the powers under Schedule 7 were in breach of Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention because they were neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate safeguards to be \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d; or, in the alternative, that the interference with her Article 8 rights was not proportionate. She further argued that her rights under Article 6 had been engaged at the latest when she was obliged to answer questions exposing her to the risk of self\u2011incrimination without her lawyer in attendance. 19.  The High Court delivered its judgment on 28 August 2013. In respect of the Article 8 complaint, the court considered that the present case was distinguishable from that of Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, ECHR 2010 (extracts). Unlike the Code of Practice relating to the powers exercised under section 44 of TACT (the provisions under consideration in Gillan and Quinton), in the present case the relevant Home Office Code of Practice and accompanying Practical Advice (see paragraphs 42 and 43 below) afforded a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by the Executive. Moreover, port and border control was very different from the power to stop and search, exercisable anywhere in the jurisdiction, and conclusions as to the arbitrariness of the latter did not readily translate to conclusions as to the former. The United Kingdom, as an \u201cisland nation\u201d, concentrated controls at its national frontiers and the court was therefore of the view that it was to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in carrying out these controls. 20.  Not being constrained by the authority of Gillan and Quinton, the court went on to find that the Schedule 7 powers were sufficiently circumscribed and were therefore \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d. First, it noted that many exercises of Schedule 7 powers were unlikely even to engage Article 8 as the intrusions would fall below the threshold of a minimum level of seriousness. Secondly, it considered that the arguments which served to distinguish Gillan and Quinton likewise served to emphasise the important and particular position of port and border controls and the need for such powers. Thirdly, the Schedule 7 powers were applicable only to a limited category of people: namely, travellers in confined geographical areas. Furthermore, while there was no room for complacency, the statistics collated by the Independent Reviewer (see paragraphs 48-49 and 56-61 below) did not suggest arbitrary overuse or misuse in respect of members of ethnic-minority communities. Fourthly, the Schedule 7 powers could only be exercised in respect of that limited category for the purpose of determining whether the person questioned appeared to be a person who was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, and these limitations told against the powers being arbitrary. Fifthly, the Schedule 7 powers were principally an aspect of port and border control rather than of a criminal investigation and it was therefore not surprising that there was no requirement of \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d for the powers to be exercised. Sixthly, the court noted that the underlying purpose of the Schedule 7 powers was to protect the public from terrorism. 21.  In this regard, the court observed:\n\u201cThe manifest importance of that purpose and the utility of the powers do not, of course and of themselves, entail the conclusion that these powers are not arbitrary and thus compatible with Art. 8. However, the exercise of Schedule 7 powers is subject to cumulative statutory limitations. Their exercise is governed by the Code. Over and above the possibility of legal challenge if misused in an individual case, they are subject to continuing review by the Independent Reviewer. The absence of a requirement of reasonable suspicion is both explicable and justifiable. For the reasons already given, we are not at all persuaded that these powers render the public vulnerable \u2018...to interference by public officials acting on any personal whim, caprice, malice, predilection or purpose other than for which the power was conferred\u2019 \u2013 Lord Bingham\u2019s test for arbitrariness, in Gillan (HL), at [34], set out above. Equally, we are not persuaded that these are unfettered powers, falling foul of the test applied in Gillan (Strasbourg), at [76] \u2013 [77], also set out above; for our part, the \u2018level of precision\u2019 of these powers (ibid) falls and falls comfortably on the right side of the line.\u201d 22.  The court also found that the exercise of Schedule 7 powers was proportionate. For the reasons already given, it did not accept that they were too broad. Furthermore, it noted that there was an objective justification for the focus on ports, airports and border areas, which, in the United Kingdom, provided a particularly appropriate venue for detecting, deterring and disrupting potential terrorist activity. With regard to the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case, the court found that the interference with her Article 8 rights had been justified. As she had been returning to the United Kingdom after visiting her husband, who was imprisoned in France for terrorism offences, she was not stopped and examined on a random basis. Moreover, the questions asked of her were rationally connected to the statutory purpose and were in no way disproportionate. 23.  In view of the court\u2019s conclusions in respect of Article 8, it found that the applicant\u2019s Article 5 argument could be dealt with summarily. As the respondent accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant\u2019s rights, and the applicant accepted that the interference was \u201cin order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law\u201d, the only issue to be determined was whether the interference was \u201clawful\u201d, and the conclusions in respect of Article 8 had determined that it was. 24.  Finally, the court considered the applicant\u2019s argument under Article 6 of the Convention. However, it found that on the facts of her case, Article 6 was not engaged as her examination under Schedule 7 was not an inquiry preparatory to criminal proceedings but rather an inquiry related to border control with the specific public interest of safeguarding society from the risk of terrorism. Furthermore, the examination was not carried out for the purpose of obtaining admissions or evidence for use in such proceedings, and the fact that the applicant\u2019s answers might have yielded information potentially of evidential value did not of itself suffice to engage Article 6. Even if the applicant\u2019s rights had been engaged, the court found that there would have been no violation since it was fanciful to suppose that permission would be granted in criminal proceedings for any admissions obtained pursuant to a Schedule 7 examination to be adduced in evidence. 25.  The applicant was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, which gave judgment on 22 July 2015. 26.  Prior to the judgment, Schedule 7 was amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which required examining officers to take a person into detention if they wished to examine him or her for longer than one hour; reduced the maximum period of detention from nine hours to six hours; required the periodic review of detention by a review officer; provided that the questioning of an examinee should not commence until after the arrival of a requested solicitor; and stipulated that examining officers should be designated and trained for this purpose (see paragraphs 52-53 below). The Code of Practice was amended to reflect these changes (see paragraphs 54-55 below). In considering the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Supreme Court had regard to the amended Schedule 7 power. 27.  With regard to the Article 8 complaint, Lord Hughes (with whom Lord Hodge agreed) also considered that Gillan and Quinton (cited above) was distinguishable on its facts since the Schedule 7 power was confined to those passing through ports of entry/exit, while the section 44 power was exercisable in relation to any person anywhere in the street. Furthermore, while there was evidence that the safeguards provided in the case of section 44 were ineffective, none of these applied to the powers under Schedule 7. Having regard to the safeguards which applied in respect of Schedule 7, their Lordships were satisfied that the principle of legality was met. In particular, they had regard to the restriction of the power to those passing in and out of the country; the restriction to the statutory purpose; the restriction to specially trained and accredited police officers; the restrictions on the duration of questioning; the restrictions on the type of search; the requirement to give explanatory notice to those questioned, including a procedure for complaint; the requirement to permit consultation with a solicitor and the notification of a third party; the requirement for records to be kept; the availability of judicial review; and the continuous supervision of the Independent Reviewer. 28.  Lords Neuberger and Dyson agreed that there were important differences between the statutory provisions and modus operandi of the Schedule 7 system and section 44 system, and that those differences established that the powers in the case at hand were more foreseeable and less arbitrary than those considered in Gillan and Quinton. 29.  Lords Hughes and Hodge further accepted that the interference with the applicant\u2019s private life had been proportionate: the intrusion itself had been comparatively light, as it was not beyond the reasonable expectations of those who travel across the United Kingdom\u2019s international borders, and, in view of the relevant safeguards, a fair balance could be said to have been struck between the rights of the individual and the rights of the public at large. Lords Neuberger and Dyson agreed that the appeal, insofar as it was based on proportionality, should fail, given that the interference was slight, the independent justification was convincing, the supervision impressive, the safeguards and potential benefits substantial, and no equally effective but less intrusive proposal had been forthcoming. 30.  Lords Neuberger and Dyson added that:\n\u201cLegality is said to give rise to a problem for the powers granted under paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 because those powers can be exercised randomly. However, it is important to the effectiveness of these powers that they can be exercised in this way. Furthermore, if the power to stop and question under Schedule 7 infringes the Convention because it is exercisable randomly, the logical conclusion must be either that the valuable power must be abandoned or the power must be exercised in a far more invasive and extensive way, namely by stopping and questioning everyone passing through ports and borders. The former alternative would be unfortunate in terms of deterring and hindering terrorism, whereas the latter alternative would seem to put proportionality and legality in irreconcilable tension.\u201d\n(b)  Article 5 31.  Although Lords Hughes, Hodge, Neuberger and Dyson agreed with the Divisional Court that the comments made in relation to safeguards in the context of Article 8 also applied in respect of Article 5, in their view it did not follow that the power of detention was automatically justified. The level of intrusion occasioned by detention for up to six hours was of a different order to the intrusion occasioned by compulsory question and search, and safeguards which were adequate for one would not necessarily be sufficient for the other. Furthermore, it did not follow that the fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interest of the public would fall in the same place. However, although their Lordships expressed doubts about whether detention for as long as six hours could ever be justified, on the facts of the present case they found that, to the extent that there was any deprivation of liberty, it was clear that it was for no longer than necessary to complete the process and therefore there had been no breach of Article 5.\n(c)  Article 6 \u00a7 1 32.  In respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6, Lords Hughes, Hodge, Neuberger and Dyson accepted that the privilege against self\u2011incrimination did not apply where a person was being questioned pursuant to Schedule 7. However, their Lordships considered port questioning and search under Schedule 7 to be separate from a criminal investigation and, since the applicant had been at no time a defendant to a criminal charge, no question of a breach of her right to a fair trial could arise. In reaching this conclusion, they noted that any use in a criminal prosecution of answers obtained under compulsion would breach Article 6 of the Convention; consequently, Schedule 7 material could never be adduced in a subsequent criminal trial (unless the prosecution concerned the failure to comply with the Schedule 7 duty). 33.  Lord Kerr disagreed with the majority that the Schedule 7 powers were \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d. In fact, he considered that comparison with the section 44 powers illustrated the greater ambit of the Schedule 7 powers. In particular, he observed that no authorisation was required for an examining officer to have resort to the Schedule 7 powers; the examining officer did not have to consider the use of those powers expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism; there was no geographical or temporal limitation on the use of those powers, other than that they were to be used at a port of entry into or exit from the United Kingdom; and there was no provision for their automatic lapse, nor was there any question of their renewed authorisation being subject to confirmation. Furthermore, Lord Kerr noted that certain features were common to both sets of powers: the width of the powers was similar (in both instances there was no requirement of either reasonable or even subjective suspicion) and challenges to their use on conventional judicial review grounds faced the same difficulties identified in Gillan and Quinton (namely, if an examining officer was not required to have a reasonable suspicion, how was the proportionality of the exercise of his powers to be reviewed?). 34.  In response to the majority\u2019s reliance on the fact that Schedule 7 powers could only be used in respect of persons passing through ports of entry or exit, Lord Kerr made two points. First, being subjected to border controls, such as the requirement to provide proof of identity and entitlement to enter, was entirely different from being required to answer questions about one\u2019s movements and activities and facing criminal sanction for refusing. Secondly, and more importantly, the fact that people were accustomed to intrusion moving through ports of entry or exit did not bear on the question of whether the circumstances in which the Schedule 7 powers could be exercised were too widely drawn to satisfy the test of \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d. In other words, an unfettered power which might be arbitrarily or capriciously used did not become legal just because people generally did not take exception to its use. 35.  Furthermore, given that there were 245 million passenger movements through United Kingdom ports every year, the fact that the Schedule 7 power was used sparingly could have no bearing on its legality. A power on which there are insufficient legal constraints does not become legal simply because those who may have resort to it exercise self-restraint. It was the potential reach of the power \u2013 and not its actual use \u2013 which had to be judged. In any case, although the percentage of travellers subjected to the use of the power was small, in absolute terms the number was not inconsequential, since on average five to seven people each day were examined for more than an hour. 36.  Finally, Lord Kerr expressed concern about the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the power since there was no clearly obvious means of policing the requirement that persons should not be stopped and questioned just because of their ethnic background or religion. In any case, the Code of Practice contemplated that ethnic origin or religious adherence could be at least one of the reasons for exercising the power, just so long as it was not the sole ground. Lord Kerr considered that the fact that the legislation authorised the use of a coercive power, at least partly, on grounds of race and religion should be starkly confronted since it permitted direct discrimination, which was entirely at odds with the notion of an enlightened, pluralistic society all of whose members were treated equally.\n(b)  Proportionality 37.  Lord Kerr was not persuaded that the interference with the applicant\u2019s rights under Articles 5 and 8 was \u201cnecessary\u201d. In this regard, he noted that there was no evidence that a suspicion-less power to stop, detain, search and question was the only way to achieve the goal of combatting terrorism.\n(c)  Privilege against self-incrimination 38.  Lord Kerr considered the requirement that a person questioned under Schedule 7 must answer on pain of prosecution for failing to do so to be in breach of that person\u2019s common law privilege against self-incrimination and therefore incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention. In Lord Kerr\u2019s opinion, it was inescapable that there was a real and appreciable risk of prosecution if the answers to the questions asked proved to be self\u2011incriminating, and the fact that the applicant in the present case was not suspected of being a terrorist was nothing to the point. If she was asked questions designed to establish whether she appeared to be a terrorist, the potential of her answers to incriminate her if they were of an inculpatory character was indisputable. This remained the case even if those self\u2011incriminating answers could not be adduced in evidence, as they might prompt enquiry which could lead to the obtaining of independent evidence.", "references": ["5", "7", "6", "9", "0", "8", "1", "No Label", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are entrepreneurs who obtained from the local authorities in Leova licences (patenta) to offer services such as selling various types of goods at the local marketplace. All the applicants offered their services on the territory of a private marketplace (L.) situated in the centre of Leova and which had received its licence in 1996. The local authorities authorised the offering of services on the territory of L. from Monday to Saturday. Another marketplace, owned by the State (U.), was open on Sundays, but was situated far from the centre and was inconvenient to many sellers and the population. 5.  The applicants and L.\u2019s owners asked the local authorities for a change in work schedule, allowing them to work on Sundays and to have their free day on Monday, as was the case of many similar marketplaces in other towns. However, the local authorities rejected on a number of occasions such a change, invoking various sanitary, public order and other reasons. According to the applicants, the real reason for the refusal was the protection of U.\u2019s interests, since Sunday was the most lucrative day of the week. Accordingly, many private entrepreneurs felt obliged to offer their services also at the State-owned marketplace, thus having to incur additional costs and suffering from the rudimentary conditions of work on the territory of U. 6.  On 31 January 2005 the general meeting of entrepreneurs (which included the applicants) decided to ask the local authorities to allow them to work on Sundays and to rest on Mondays. They submitted their request to L.\u2019s owners, who on 8 February 2005 complained to the mayor of Leova, referring to the decision of 31 January 2005 and requesting an authorisation of a change in the work schedule of the marketplace. 7.  On 2 March 2005 the Leova city council adopted its decision no. 2.2, rejecting \u201cthe requests of citizens of Leova who work on the territory of [L.] and have business licences\u201d. The reasons were that work on Sunday would cause traffic problems and would disturb the nearby population, including a school and a hospital. The decision was printed a stationery with the heading of the mayor\u2019s office. The stamp on the decision was applied by the Leova mayor\u2019s office and bears the date 29 March 2005. 8.  On 4 April 2005 the general meeting of entrepreneurs (including the applicants) expressed its disagreement with the decision of 2 March 2005. On the same day the 191 entrepreneurs working on the territory of L., including the applicants, declared a strike and decided to submit an official request for a change in their work schedule. 9.  Accordingly, on 4 April 2005 the entrepreneurs submitted their request to the \u201cLeova regional council\u201d. They asked, inter alia, for the annulment of the decision 2.2 adopted by the city council on 2 March 2005 and explained that they had not been offered proper working conditions on the territory of U. 10.  On the same date the applicants sent a preliminary request to the Mayoralty of Leova. In it, the applicants made a similar description to that in their complaint made mentioned in paragraph above. They asked for the annulment of decision no. 2.2 adopted by the city council of the Leova Mayoralty. 11.  On 6 April 2005 the Leova city council discussed at its meeting the demands of the entrepreneurs and of L.\u2019s administration, made in their request of 4 April 2005. According to the applicants, L.\u2019s director was allowed to address the councillors and spoke about the applicants\u2019 demands. After discussing the issue, the city council adopted its decision no. 3.1 in which it took note of the applicants\u2019 demands and decided that L. was to work in accordance with the decision of the Leova city council no. 2.2 of 2 March 2005. 12.  On 12 May 2005 the mayor of Leova replied to the complaint of 4 April 2005. The mayor informed the entrepreneurs that an answer to their demands had already been given by the Leova city council in its decision no. 3.1. of 6 April 2005, \u201cnamely that [L.] shall work in accordance with the decision of the Leova city council no. 2.2 of 2 March 2005\u201d. 13.  On 28 May 2005 the 191 entrepreneurs, including the applicants, lodged administrative court proceedings, asking for the annulment of the decision of 2 March 2005. They argued that their rights had been affected by that decision and that its aim was the protection of U.\u2019s interests. They annexed copies of the preliminary request addressed to the mayoralty, of their complaint made on 4 April 2005 to the Leova city council, and of the reply of the mayor\u2019s office of 12 May 2005 (see the preceding paragraph). 14.  On 5 July 2005 the Leova District Court found in favour of the entrepreneurs. The court established that L.\u2019s activity on Sundays did not cause any kind of sanitary, traffic or other problems and that the decision of 2 March 2005 was contrary to anti-monopoly legislation. It also accepted in full the applicants\u2019 request for compensation for their legal costs of 15,000 Moldovan lei, a sum which they had paid to the lawyer for representing them in this case. The Leova city council appealed. 15.  By its final decision of 20 October 2005 the Cahul Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and decided to strike out the court action lodged by the entrepreneurs. It explained that the entrepreneurs had submitted their preliminary complaint to the mayor, while the decision which they sought to annul had been adopted by the city council of the Leova mayoralty. Therefore, Article 14 of the Law on administrative proceedings (see paragraph 17 below) had not been observed since the complaint had to be submitted first to the authority which had adopted the impugned decision. The court added that the applicants no longer had the right to complain against the decision of 2 March 2005.", "references": ["5", "8", "7", "0", "6", "9", "1", "2", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lived in Budva. 6.  On 8 October 2009 the applicant\u2019s brother was murdered in Belgrade, Serbia. Shortly afterwards the applicant publicly offered a reward for any relevant information. 7.  On 29 April 2013 X was murdered in an ambush in Belgrade by 15 shots. X\u2019s brother had been identified in 2010 by the Organised Crime Prosecution Service in Serbia as the leader of a criminal organisation responsible for, inter alia, the murder in 2003 of the then Prime Minister of Serbia. 8.  On 18 July 2013 the Organised Crime Prosecution in Serbia opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and several other persons in relation to the murder of X. The investigation order implied that the applicant had arranged the murder of X as he had considered X\u2019s brother responsible for the murder of his own brother. On an unspecified date between 18 and 26 July 2013 the applicant was arrested in Montenegro. 9.  On 26 July 2013 the Ministry of Justice of Serbia sought the applicant\u2019s extradition to Serbia on suspicion that he had committed an aggravated murder. On 29 January 2014 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica refused the request, which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud). On an unspecified date in February 2014 the applicant was released from detention. On 4 April 2014 the Supreme State Prosecution of Montenegro authorised the applicant\u2019s prosecution in Montenegro. 10.  On 8 April 2014 the applicant was arrested in Montenegro. The decision was based on the assessment that he could influence the witnesses and that his release could seriously disturb public peace and order. It also took into account the gravity of the offence he was suspected of and the severity of the penalty potentially faced. 11.  On 9 April 2014 the High State Prosecutor ordered an investigation (naredba o sprovo\u0111enju istrage) in respect of the applicant on reasonable suspicion that he had committed aggravated murder through incitement (te\u0161ko ubistvo putem podstrekavanja). 12.  On 10 April 2014 the applicant was heard by an investigating judge of the High Court in Podgorica. He submitted, inter alia, that he had neither any reason nor any possibility to influence the other suspects given that they were in detention under a special regime in Belgrade. He also submitted that he had been in extradition detention for seven months and that the public had not been disturbed after he had been released. He also maintained that he had not fled, nor did he have any reason to do so, and that his wife and a minor child lived in Montenegro, too. He offered to hand in his passport and to put up bail (jemstvo) in lieu of detention. 13.  The same day the investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s detention as of 8 April 2014, for one month at most, on reasonable suspicion (osnovana sumnja) that he had committed an aggravated murder through incitement, the penalty for which was ten years of imprisonment or more. The detention was ordered on the basis of Article 175 \u00a7 1(2) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter \u201cCPC\u201d; see paragraph 44 below). The decision specified that the applicant could influence witnesses. It also took into account the manner in which the offence had been committed, that the motive for it had been revenge and that the applicant\u2019s release could provoke an outcry among the people and could threaten public peace and order. In view of all that it was considered unacceptable that the applicant remain free during the proceedings. 14.  On 15 and 24 April 2014 the High Court, in a three-judge panel, dismissed the appeals against the detention order lodged by the applicant and his representatives respectively. The court relied on the same reasons and found that there was no violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 15.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended on 7 May, 6 June, 7 July, 4 August and 5 September 2014, each time for a month, relying on Article 175 \u00a7 1(2) and (4). The reasoning was the same as before: there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the said criminal offence; if released he could influence the witnesses, given that the investigation was ongoing and several witnesses were yet to be heard; the statutory penalty for the said criminal offence was ten years\u2019 imprisonment or more, which offence was particularly grave in view of its motive \u2013 revenge \u2013 and its consequence \u2013 X\u2019s death; and there were exceptional circumstances indicating that his release would seriously threaten public peace and order given that the media had extensively reported on the murder of X. 16.  By a decision of 20 June 2014 the Court of Appeals upheld the decisions of 7 May and 6 June 2014. The court also examined the applicant\u2019s health-related and family circumstances and considered them to be \u201cof no impact\u201d (nijesu od uticaja). No appeal was allowed against the decisions of 7 July, 4 August and 5 September 2014. 17.  On 7 October 2014 the High State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. The same day the High Court extended his detention \u201cuntil a further decision of the court\u201d. On 16 October 2014 the High Court\u2019s decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal. 18.  On 17 October 2014 the High Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention \u201cuntil a further decision of the court\u201d, on the basis of Article 175 \u00a7 1(4) of the CPC. It relied on the same reasons as before, and added that, if released, the applicant could abscond. It considered that detention was proportionate to the gravity of the criminal offence at issue, taking into account \u201call the circumstances of the case\u201d, and that the purpose of detention from Article 175 \u00a7 1(4) could not be achieved by any other, less restrictive measure. 19.  On 22 October 2014 the High Court returned the indictment, requiring further investigation in respect of the offence of criminal association. 20.  On 31 October 2014 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals submitted by the applicant and his representatives against the decision of 17 October 2014 extending his detention. It considered that the High Court\u2019s reasoning was clear and detailed, the only exception being the finding that the applicant could abscond, which was an obvious error (oma\u0161ka), but it considered it of no importance for the lawfulness of his detention. It also held that what was relevant for the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s further detention was that the indictment should be issued within six months, which had been complied with given that the investigation had begun on 9 April 2014 and the indictment had been issued on 7 October 2014. It was of no relevance that the indictment had been returned, or that it had been issued for two criminal offences whereas the applicant\u2019s detention had been extended relying on only one of the two. The court \u201calso considered ... [the applicant\u2019s] personal and family circumstances ... and ... other submissions, but found them ... of no influence\u201d. 21.  On 13 November 2014 the High State Prosecutor ordered further investigation (naredba o pro\u0161irenju istrage), in particular in respect of criminal association. 22.  On 15 December 2014 the applicant approached the prison authorities and sought that he be released. He submitted that his detention had not been reviewed after a 30-day period and that therefore it had been unlawful as of 15 November 2014. He relied on Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the CPC (see paragraph 47 below). 23.  The same day, 15 December 2014, the High Court extended his detention \u201cuntil a further decision was taken by a court\u201d relying on Article 175 \u00a7 1(4) of the CPC. The decision specified that the investigation had not been terminated yet, and given that the applicant was in detention the court of its own motion, pursuant to Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the CPC, reviewed his further detention. Invoking the same reasons as before, in particular that releasing the applicant would seriously threaten public peace and order, the court considered that there were sufficient reasons justifying the extension of detention. The court also considered that detention could not be replaced by any other, less restrictive measure. 24.  Between 19 and 22 December 2014 the applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted, in particular, that the court had failed to review within 30 days whether the reasons for his detention persisted, and when it had done so, it had merely copied the earlier reasoning without really examining what exactly would disturb public peace and order, as nothing had happened when he had been released after the seven-month extradition detention. He submitted that this was contrary to both national legislation and Article 5 of the Convention. 25.  On 25 December 2014 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals. It held that pursuant to Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the CPC the court had a duty to review whether the reasons for detention persisted and to issue a new decision extending or revoking it every 30 days before the indictment entered into force, and every two months after the indictment had come into force. However, the court\u2019s failure to do so within the said time-limits by no means meant that the detention had ceased. It also held that the applicant\u2019s detention had been lawful, as the indictment had been issued within six months. It was irrelevant that it had been returned and further investigation requested. 26.  On an unspecified date, apparently between 25 December 2014 and 8 January 2015, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He relied on Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, Article 177 of the CPC (see paragraphs 38-39 and 46 below) and Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted, inter alia, that: (a) the courts had failed to review his detention and issue a relevant decision within 30 days; (b) his detention had already lasted for more than eight months without the indictment having entered into force even though it was statutorily limited to six months; (c) the decisions extending his detention had been insufficiently reasoned, the reasoning having been identical, merely copied from one decision to another, and the reasons set out in the first detention order could no longer suffice. In particular, the court had not taken into account the overall length of his detention or his personal circumstances \u2013 he was 77 years old at the time, had a minor daughter, had severe health problems, had never been convicted before, and had been a respectable citizen. Also, the decisions had not specified how long the detention would last, which made them arbitrary and his deprivation of liberty unlawful. The applicant referred to, inter alia, Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207; Clooth v. Belgium, 12 December 1991, Series A no. 225; and Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, 21 December 2000. 27.  On 29 May 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal, which decision was served on 9 January 2016. The court considered unfounded (neutemeljeni) the applicant\u2019s allegations relating to his detention not having been reviewed within the statutory time\u2011limits and the indictment not having entered into force. It acknowledged that reasonable suspicion was a conditio sine qua non, but that after a certain time it was no longer sufficient. It held, however, that the High Court and the Court of Appeals had examined the existence of reasonable suspicion, assessed the existing evidence and other circumstances justifying the extension of detention, indicated which evidence had been taken into account and given clear and precise explanations in accepting them. Therefore, the disputed decisions were reasoned, there was no arbitrariness in them and hence no violation of Article 5. 28.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended on 15 January, 30 January, 2 March, 2 April, 4 May, 4 June, 6 July, 6 August, 10 September, 9 October, 9 November and 9 December 2015, 11 January, 11 February, 11 March, 11 April, 11 May, 13 June, 15 July, 25 July, 1 September, 4 October and 4 November 2016. The decisions of 11 March, 11 April and 15 July 2016 have not been included in the case-file. All the other decisions extended detention \u201cuntil a further decision of the court\u201d and gave the same reasons for detention as before. All these decisions were upheld by the Court of Appeals. The court explicitly held that once the indictment had been issued and then returned the detention was extended or revoked pursuant to Article 179 \u00a7 2 of CPC. 29.  On 29 January 2015 the High State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. On 13 February 2015 the High Court returned the indictment, seeking further investigation. 30.  Between 26 February 2015 and 23 September 2016 the applicant was hospitalised in Cetinje. He was hospitalised again on 28 November 2016. There is no information in the case file as to when he was released from hospital. 31.  Between 17 April 2015 and 10 August 2016 the time limit for finalising the investigation was extended 17 times, each time for one month, pursuant to the High State Prosecutor\u2019s request to that effect. 32.  On 8 June 2016 an indictment was issued in Serbia against the applicant and several other persons for criminal association. On 15 July 2016 the indictment was approved by the High Court in Belgrade. 33.  On 22 July 2016 the High State Prosecutor in Podgorica issued a third indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. On 19 October 2016 the indictment was returned for further investigation. 34.  On 25 July 2016 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the High Court decision of 11 May 2016 extending his detention, and the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision of 30 May 2016 upholding it. He invoked, inter alia, Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted that the Court had found a violation of Article 5 in a case identical to his, and referred to Mugo\u0161a v. Montenegro, no. 76522/12, 21 June 2016. He complained again about the unlawful detention, in particular between 15 November and 15 December 2014, and about all 25 decisions extending his detention being insufficiently reasoned, the reasoning having been copied from one decision to another. It would appear that this constitutional appeal is still pending. 35.  On 9 December 2016 the applicant\u2019s detention was revoked and he was released. The High Court found that the reasons for his detention no longer persisted. The court took into account the length of detention thus far, the fact that the indictment had been returned for the third time, and that it was uncertain when and if at all it would come into force, and held that the applicant should not bear the consequences of that. It also took into account that the detention could last three years at most, as well as Article 6 of the Convention. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals on 14 December 2016. 36.  On 11 March 2017 the applicant was murdered in front of his house by at least 15 shots fired from a moving vehicle. 37.  On 13 April 2017 the High Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio postupak) due to the applicant\u2019s death. The indictment against the applicant in Montenegro had never entered into force.", "references": ["8", "7", "3", "0", "1", "6", "4", "9", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1948 respectively. The first applicant died on 29 August 2018. The second applicant lives in St Petersburg. 7.  The applicants were former spouses. They divorced in 1988, but continued to live together in the same apartment. 8.  The applicants\u2019 daughter, O., married K.O.V.-S., a national of Finland. The couple settled in Finland. 9.  On 28 September 2006 O. gave birth to a daughter, M. 10.  In May 2008 O. and M. moved in with the applicants in Russia. 11.  On 3 April 2011 O. died of a serious illness. M. remained living with the applicants. 12.  According to the Government, during O.\u2019s illness the applicants\u2019 relatives Mr and Ms Z. started to help the applicants with the upbringing of M.: they took the girl to their place of residence on weekends and holidays, and attended events in her kindergarten. 13.  On 16 May 2011 the second applicant was appointed M.\u2019s guardian with the written consent of the first applicant. 14.  On 24 October 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court of St Petersburg granted the second applicant\u2019s application and deprived K.O.V.-S. of his parental rights over M. 15.  According to the Government, after the death of O., a protracted family dispute arose between the applicants. The first applicant was dissatisfied with the way the second applicant fulfilled his duties as M.\u2019s guardian and insisted that their son, N.B., should take on those obligations. Furthermore, there was a disagreement as to whether M. should start school in September 2013. 16.  When the question of M.\u2019s schooling arose Mr and Ms Z. decided to apply to adopt the girl. The applicants at that stage supported their decision. 17.  From February to April 2013 Mr and Ms Z. underwent training courses for individuals wishing to adopt a child left without parental care. 18.  On 29 May and 13 June 2013 respectively the Kronverkskoye municipal entity issued positive decisions on Mr and Ms Z.\u2019s suitability to become adoptive parents. 19.  On 19 June 2013 the head of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity received a written statement from the second applicant to the effect that he did not object to the adoption of M. by Mr and Ms Z. 20.  According to the Government, when the first applicant found out that the second applicant had agreed to the adoption of their granddaughter, she started to set the child against Mr and Ms Z. and to interfere with their communication. She further tried, in vain, to deprive the second applicant of his guardianship of M. and have N.B. appointed as the child\u2019s guardian. 21.  In connection with this situation, in the beginning of July 2013 Ms Z., with the consent of the second applicant, lodged an application seeking to be appointed as M.\u2019s second guardian. 22.  On 2 July 2013 the head of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity took a decision to appoint Ms Z. as M.\u2019s second guardian. The child\u2019s place of residence was determined as being with Ms Z. 23.  On 4 July 2013 M. moved in with Mr and Ms Z. 24.  From that moment on the first applicant began to lodge applications with the childcare authorities alleging that Ms Z. prevented her communicating with the child. 25.  On 26 September 2013 a meeting was held between the parties on the subject of the first applicant\u2019s and N.B.\u2019s communication with the child with the participation of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity, the childcare authorities, the Children\u2019s Rights Commissioner in St Petersburg, the prosecutor\u2019s assistant of the district prosecutor\u2019s office, an expert specialising in conflict resolution and a psychologist of the District Centre for Social Assistance to the Family and Children. An oral agreement was reached between Ms Z. and the first applicant to the effect that the latter\u2019s meetings with the child were to take place on 5 October and 12 October 2013 for two hours in the presence of Ms Z. On 1 November 2013 Ms Z. and the first applicant were to come to the office of the Children\u2019s Rights Commissioner for a debriefing on the meetings. 26.  On 9 December 2013 the first applicant informed the childcare authorities that none of the meetings had taken place. 27.  While the first applicant did not have any contact with the child after that, the second applicant continued communicating with M. until November 2014. Subsequently Mr and Ms Z. prevented the second applicant from staying in touch with M. 28.  Meanwhile, on 13 November 2013 Mr and Ms Z. lodged an adoption application with the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 29.  On 25 November 2013 the second applicant submitted to the deputy head of the local administration of the municipal entity Krasnenkaya Rechka his agreement to M.\u2019s adoption by Mr and Ms Z. He expressed his wish for the adoption case to be heard in his absence. 30.  On 26 November 2013 the District Court granted the application by Mr and Ms Z. to adopt M. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 7 December 2013. 31.  In 2015 the applicants, acting separately, applied for restoration of the procedural time-limit for appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 seeking to challenge it on account of, inter alia, their loss of post-adoption contact with their granddaughter, which ran contrary to the child\u2019s interests. 32.  On 11 February 2015 the second applicant applied to the District Court to have the procedural time-limit for lodging his appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 restored. 33.  On 16 March 2015 the District Court granted the second applicant\u2019s application. 34.  On 13 May 2015 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the judgment of 26 November 2013 on the second applicant\u2019s appeal. The City Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that the child\u2019s close relatives had been unaware of the adoption proceedings. It noted that the second applicant had known about the proceedings, had not raised any objections to the adoption and had asked to have the case examined in his absence. The City Court further held that notification, let alone involvement in the proceedings, of the child\u2019s other relatives (grandmother and uncle), was not required by law. As regards the second applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that the child\u2019s adoption had led to the termination of all contact between her and the grandparents, the City Court stated, relying on Article 67 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Family Code, that the grandfather, grandmother, brothers, sisters and other relatives have a right to contact with the child and that in the event of a refusal by the child\u2019s parents to afford them such contact, they are entitled to apply to a court to have the obstacles to their contact with the child eliminated. 35.  On 21 August 2015 the City Court and on 22 December 2015 the Supreme Court of Russia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d), following a prior application for review of the final judgment, decided not to refer the case for review in the cassation procedure. 36.  Meanwhile, on 28 May 2015 the first applicant applied to the District Court to have the procedural time-limit for lodging her appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 restored. Relying on Article 137 of the Family Code she argued that by failing to involve her in the adoption proceedings the domestic court had ruptured her family ties with her granddaughter. 37.  However, on 14 July 2015 the District Court dismissed her application. The District Court held that the first applicant had not been a party to the proceedings resulting in the judgment of 26 November 2013, that the above judgment had had no bearing on her rights and obligations, and therefore she had had no standing to appeal against it. The District Court further held that the first applicant misinterpreted Article 137 of the Family Code. It did not follow from the provisions of Article 137 that the first applicant\u2019s family ties with her granddaughter would be ruptured. Relying of Article 67 of the Family Code, the District Court considered that it was open to the first applicant to apply to a court for the determination of her contact with the child. 38.  On 10 September 2015 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 39.  On 11 December 2015 the City Court and on 29 January 2016 the Supreme Court decided not to refer the above decisions for review in the cassation procedure. 40.  On 3 March 2014 the first applicant instituted court proceedings against Mr and Ms Z. seeking to oblige them not to thwart her contact with her granddaughter M. and to have determined the contact schedule with the latter. 41.  On 18 April 2014 the administration of the municipal entity Krasnenkaya Rechka submitted that the girl needed a calm psychological atmosphere; that she perceived the situation around her as tense and anxious; and that she did not understand the conflict between the applicants themselves and between the first applicant and the girl\u2019s adoptive parents. 42.  On 16 October 2014 in her conversation with a psychologist M. submitted that the applicants \u201chad never been friends\u201d, that they often swore, even in her presence; and that she was not frightened when they swore because she was used to it. 43.  On 21 January 2015 an expert of the Istina Independent Expert Organisation gave her opinion that the child considered and called Mr and Ms Z. her parents. She had close emotional bonds with them. Despite the absence of contact, the girl remembered and loved her grandmother. This was explained by the fact that the adoptive parents, although preventing their communication, were not exercising psychological pressure on the girl and were not denigrating the grandmother. The expert considered, however, that communication between the child and the grandmother could have a negative impact on the psychological state of the child, as there was an unsettled conflict between the applicants and the Z.s: the grandmother disapproved of the child\u2019s adoption and was challenging its lawfulness. The expert further considered that the child\u2019s residence with the grandparents would not be ideal, because, given the instability of interfamilial relations and the protracted conflict in the applicants\u2019 family, there existed a risk of the child\u2019s being involved in the adults\u2019 conflict. However, since the girl retained the positive image of her grandmother and expressed her wish to communicate with her, it was possible to establish a contact arrangement, which would provide for an obligatory preparatory stage, including reconciliation between the relatives. 44.  On 10 February 2015 the Pushkinskiy District Court of St Petersburg established, on the basis of the relevant reports and expert examinations, that M. still had a positive image of the first applicant and had expressed a wish to have contact with her, and that it was therefore possible to establish a contact schedule between them. The Pushkinskiy District Court therefore ordered Mr and Ms Z. not to place obstacles in the way of the first applicant\u2019s communication with M. and held that contact between the first applicant and M. should take place as follows: during the first six months after the finalisation of the judgment \u2013 each second and fourth Sunday of the month from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. outside the parents\u2019 and the grandparents\u2019 places of residence in the presence of the parents, and thereafter on the same conditions without the parents present. A year after the finalisation of the judgment the first applicant was able, in addition to the above arrangements, to spend two weeks with M. during the summer holidays with sixty days\u2019 prior notice to the parents of the place of the planned holiday. Mr and Ms Z. appealed. 45.  Following an appeal by Mr and Ms Z., on 17 September 2015 the City Court quashed the above judgment on appeal and discontinued the proceedings. The City Court held that the District Court had committed substantial violations of material and procedural law which resulted in wrongful conclusions. Relying on Articles 137 \u00a7\u00a7 4 and 5 of the Family Code and clause 18 of the ruling of the Plenary of the Supreme Court no. 8 of 20 April 2006 (see paragraphs 54, 55 and 68 below), the City Court held that the first applicant had not applied for continued post-adoption contact with her granddaughter within the adoption proceedings, for which reason this issue had remained unexamined by [the District Court examining the adoption case] and no reference had been made in the adoption judgment regarding continuation of family ties between the first applicant and her granddaughter after her adoption. In such circumstances, the City Court considered that civil and family law did not enable the first applicant to claim the elimination of obstacles to her contact with the child and determination of the terms of such contact with the latter. 46.  On 7 December 2015 the City Court and on 29 February 2016 the Supreme Court, following a prior application for review of the final judgment, decided not to refer the decision of 17 September 2015 for review in the cassation procedure. 47.  On an unspecified date in 2015 the second applicant instituted court proceedings against Mr and Ms Z., seeking to oblige them not to thwart his contact with his granddaughter M. and to have the contact schedule with the latter determined pursuant to Article 67 of the Family Code. 48.  On 1 December 2015 the District Court held that since the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 did not contain an indication as to the continuation of family ties between the second applicant and his granddaughter after the adoption, the former did not have a right to claim the elimination of obstacles to contact with the child and determination of the terms of his contact with his granddaughter. Consequently, the District Court discontinued the proceedings. 49.  On 2 March 2016 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal.", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "8", "3", "6", "7", "0", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a journalist. 6.  On 18 July 2006 a local daily newspaper, the Kostroma Chronometer (\u0425\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0440-\u041a\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0430) published in issue no. 29 an article by the applicant entitled \u201cAn Unfunny Film\u201d (\u041d\u0435\u0441\u043c\u0435\u0448\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043a\u0438\u043d\u043e). The article read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cIn the midst of the corruption scandals rocking the region, \u2018The Red House\u2019 is trying to save face at all costs.\nFor the sake of the \u2018honour of the regiment\u2019.\nFor several years residents of the Kostroma Region have been forced to watch endless \u2018soap operas\u2019 featuring major corruption scandals involving the region\u2019s authorities.\nThe first episode of the series, \u2018There is no corruption in the regional administration\u2019 was released in 2002, when a criminal investigation was initiated against D.S., the Deputy Governor of the Region. The investigation was opened on suspicion of his having inflicted moderately grave bodily injuries, as well as \u2013 under Article 201 of the Criminal Code a corruption-related provision \u2013 suspected embezzlement constituting abuse of public office.\nIn spite of the serious nature of the criminal charges brought against his deputy, Governor V.Sh. tried to shield his subordinate at all costs, attempting to uphold \u2018the honour of the regiment\u2019 (\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043c\u0443\u043d\u0434\u0438\u0440\u0430). But whilst the scandal-ridden deputy languished in his remand prison cell and sat in the court room during the trial, a comfortable chair was quietly awaiting its owner back at \u2018The Red House\u2019 (\u2018\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u043c\u2019).\nIn February 2003 the Governor sent to judge M. petition no. 134/gl on a piece of stationery carrying the coat of arms of the Kostroma Region, in which he made a remarkably simple demand: \u2018If the court finds that the actions with which D.S. has been charged are of a criminal nature, I ask you to examine the possibility of terminating the criminal proceedings against him.\u2019 It is curious that even after the delivery of the verdict finding D.S. guilty, Governor V.Sh. persisted and for a long time refused to dismiss from office the civil servant who had tainted his reputation. He was able to part with such a \u2018promising\u2019 employee only after the prosecutor of the region had made an official request to this end...\u201d 7.  On 28 July 2006 the Administration of the Kostroma Region and V.Sh., Governor of the Kostroma Region, lodged defamation claims with the Leninskiy District Court of Kostroma (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) against the publisher of the Kostroma Chronometer and the applicant, seeking retraction of certain statements and claiming compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The claimants challenged, in particular, the following statements: \u201cIn the midst of the corruption scandals rocking the region, \u2018The Red House\u2019 is trying to save face at all costs\u201d and \u201c[i]n spite of the serious nature of the criminal charges brought against his deputy, the Governor tried to shield his subordinate at all costs, attempting to uphold the honour of the regiment\u201d. 8.  On 5 October 2006 the District Court partially allowed the defamation claims, finding that one of the impugned statements was untruthful and ordering that a retraction be published and that the applicant and the newspaper pay 500 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 15 euros (EUR) at the exchange rate applicable at the time) and RUB 1,000 (approximately EUR 30), respectively, in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. The judgment read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cAnalysing the article\u2019s contents as a whole and the information therein disputed by the claimants, the court concludes that ... the expression \u2018to save face\u2019 referring to the corruption scandals in the region and endeavours of the administration of the Kostroma Region is not defamatory for the reason that the criminal prosecution of the heads of the region\u2019s executive bodies and unitary enterprises was a known fact. All these events attracted public attention and drew wide public response in the region, regardless of articles in the press.\nThe claim of the article\u2019s author that the Administration of the Kostroma Region was trying to \u2018save face\u2019 in the midst of corruption scandals does not imply a statement that this State agency is trying to justify, especially by any unlawful means, any of its actions or those of its employees.\nIn view of the foregoing, the court finds no grounds to allow the claims brought by the Administration of the Kostroma Region.\nThe statements published in the newspaper concerning Governor V.Sh.\u2019s attempts to shield, at all costs, the actions of his subordinate D.S., who was facing criminal charges, have not been confirmed [as truthful] in the course of the court hearing.\nThe court has established that on 9 February 2003 Governor V.Sh. sent to federal judge M. a petition seeking termination of the criminal proceedings against D.S. ... The Governor requested that the court examine the possible termination of criminal proceedings against D.S., taking into account legal norms in force.\n\u2018Shielding\u2019 [\u0432\u044b\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435] is defined in the dictionary ... as proving that someone is not involved in something, with a view to escaping responsibility.\n\u2018At all costs\u2019 [\u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0438\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0438] means [according to the dictionary] by all means and in every manner.\nThe Governor\u2019s petition does not contain any indications that Governor V.Sh. was trying to prove to the court that [his deputy] D.S. had not been involved in the crimes he had been accused of and that he was trying to help him escape criminal responsibility at all costs. The Governor\u2019s request meant that, taking into account the legal norms in force, that is to say in accordance with the law, the court [be invited to] examine the possibility of terminating the criminal case, taking into account the time that had elapsed since the commission of the offences by D.S. and the information concerning the latter\u2019s personal character.\nConsequently, the information contained in the article in the part impugned by the claimant does not reflect the truth.\nIn the court\u2019s opinion, the statements disseminated concerning the Governor are of a damaging nature because they lead a reader to the opinion that he has broken moral and ethical norms, behaved improperly towards society, [and] ignored the requirements of the criminal procedure laws.\nMoreover, according to the dictionary ..., \u2018the honour of the regiment\u2019 implies an ironical attitude to apparent decency and a falsely impeccable reputation. This expression describes a person who, for the sake of personal or narrowly interpreted institutional interests, does not want to wash his dirty linen in public [and] wishes to maintain decency and a good reputation by any means possible.\nThe defendants failed to provide evidence that would objectively demonstrate that, when sending the petition concerning the termination of the criminal case against D.S., the Governor was pursuing his private interests or those of the Administration of the Kostroma Region.\nAccordingly, the [defamation] claims of the Governor of the Kostroma Region regarding the protection of his honour, dignity and business reputation are well\u2011founded in law and should be granted.\u201d 9.  The applicant and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper appealed against the judgment to the Kostroma Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) referring, inter alia, to the fact that the impugned statements represented value judgments which had a strong factual basis in the form of the Governor\u2019s petition to judge M. The Administration of the Kostroma Region also appealed. 10.  On 11 December 2006 the Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of 5 October 2006 in full. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201cWhen deciding on the claims brought by the Governor of the Kostroma Region, the [District] court reasonably concluded that the defendants had not proven in the course of the hearing that the Governor had tried to shield his subordinate by all means and in every manner, that is, at all costs, in order to uphold \u2018the honour of the regiment\u2019. The [District] court therefore reached the correct conclusion that the statement in question was untruthful and damaging for the Governor. This finding by the [District] court is well-reasoned, corresponds to the requirements of law and to the case materials, [and] there are no grounds for declaring it erroneous.\nMs Skudayeva\u2019s argument that an author has the right to express her own opinion \u2212 value judgments which are not susceptible of proof \u2212 cannot serve as grounds for quashing the judgment [of 5 October 2006]. Indeed, Ms Skudayeva, just like any other individual, has a right to express her personal opinion, judgment and appraisement (\u0441\u0443\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435). However, if personal opinions, judgments or appraisements contain statements which tarnish a person\u2019s honour, dignity and reputation, they must be truthful. Under Article 17 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution of Russia, the realisation of human rights and freedoms cannot breach the rights and freedoms of others.\nFurthermore, the statements in question include the statement of fact that \u2018[i]n spite of the serious nature of the criminal charges brought against his deputy, Governor V.Sh. tried to shield his subordinate at all costs, attempting to uphold \u2018the honour of the regiment\u2019, and proof of that [statement] is given later\u2019.\u201d 11.  According to the applicant, the bailiffs\u2019 service received RUB 500 from her in V.Sh.\u2019s favour on 17 January 2007.", "references": ["1", "8", "0", "5", "2", "4", "3", "9", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ulyanovsk. 5.  At around 8.10 p.m. on 16 June 2007 the applicant and K. were arrested on suspicion of robbery. They were taken to the criminal investigation unit of the Kotlovka district police department for the South\u2011West Administrative Circuit of Moscow (\u041e\u0423\u0420 \u041e\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u041a\u043e\u0442\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u042e\u0417\u0410\u041e \u0433. \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u044b). 6.  The applicant\u2019s account of subsequent events at the police station is the following. During the night of 16 June 2007 the applicant was insulted and beaten up by police officers A.A. and M., who requested that he confess to the robbery. He lost consciousness several times. The applicant continued to be physically assaulted in the presence of investigator A.I. from the South\u2011West Administrative Circuit police, who threatened him with imprisonment. The applicant refused to sign any confession statements. The police officers coerced K. to confess to the robbery, physically assaulting him and making him see the applicant\u2019s beatings. The applicant was threatened with physical retaliation if he complained about their conduct. 7.  At 7.20 a.m. on 17 June 2007 investigator A.I. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest for robbery, which was signed by the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The record indicates that the applicant was arrested at 7.20 a.m. that day. 8.  At 11.05 a.m. the applicant was placed in a South\u2011West Administrative Circuit temporary detention facility (IVS). 9.  On 18 June 2007 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow remanded the applicant in custody. 10.  On 21 June 2007 the applicant was placed in a Moscow pre\u2011trial detention facility (IZ-77/2). 11.  On 17 June 2007 the applicant was examined by a doctor of Moscow Town Hospital no. 33 at the request of the on-duty officer of the Kotlovka district police station. According to the hospital records, the applicant had (i) bluish bruises on his face, chest, back and both legs measuring between 6 x 6 cm and 3 x 6 cm; and (ii) an abrasion on his back measuring 1.5 x 6 cm. He was diagnosed with multiple contusions and abrasions on his head, chest and upper limbs. 12.  According to records from the IVS and IZ-77/2, of 17 and 21 June 2007, respectively, the applicant had multiple contusions and abrasions on his head, chest and upper limbs. 13.  On 13 August 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the internal security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, allegedly as soon as he had stopped fearing for his life. 14.  During the two years which followed, investigators of the Zyuzinskiy district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Moscow carried out a pre-investigation inquiry and issued refusals to open a criminal case (dated 14 September 2007, 24 February 2008 and 2 May 2009) pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) or (2) of the CCrP, either because there was no evidence that a crime had been committed or because none of the elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers with use of violence) were present in respect of the actions of police officers A.A. and M. In doing so they relied on the police officers\u2019 and investigator A.I.\u2019s explanations denying any wrongdoing. They did not interview the applicant. 15.  According to explanations by the police officers received during the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, on 16 June 2007 they took the applicant \u2013 who according to operative information had committed a robbery \u2013 to the police station, where an \u201cexplanation\u201d was received from him concerning the crime, without any physical or psychological pressure being exerted on him. 16.  The investigators\u2019 decisions refusing to open a criminal case, except for the most recent decision of 2 May 2009, were overruled by the investigators\u2019 superiors and an additional inquiry was carried out. On 15 January 2008 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 14 September 2007 was overruled on the grounds that it had been premature and based on an incomplete inquiry, as it did not contain an explanation of the applicant\u2019s injuries. On 23 April 2009 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 24 February 2008 was overruled as premature. 17.  The investigator\u2019s conclusions in the most recent refusal to open a criminal case dated 2 May 2009 were generally similar to the previous decisions. It also stated that the applicant had been convicted of several crimes and had been sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment, and that the police officers had acted in accordance with their duties. 18.  The applicant appealed against the investigator\u2019s decisions of 24 February 2008 and 2 May 2009. His appeal against the former decision was not examined by domestic courts, which terminated the proceedings in view of the annulment of the decision by the investigating authority (decision of 24 April 2009 of the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow, as upheld on 28 October 2009 by the Moscow City Court). On 24 November 2010 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s second appeal, holding that the decision of 2 May 2009 was lawful and well\u2011grounded. In particular, the court noted that the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning his alleged ill-treatment by police officers A.A. and M. had been examined during his criminal trial and dismissed as unconfirmed. On 6 June 2011 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and fully endorsed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. 19.  On 11 December 2007 the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow convicted the applicant of robbery and banditry, and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. 20.  At trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. He stated that on 16 June 2007 he had been arrested, driven to a police station and physically assaulted by police officers. The trial court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police. It relied mainly on the investigator\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers of 14 September 2007 (subsequently overruled), noting there was no objective information showing that physical violence had been used against the applicant. 21.  The applicant\u2019s co-accused, K., did not confirm his confession statements at the preliminary investigation, explaining that he had given them because police officers had physically assaulted him and had made him see the applicant\u2019s beatings. The trial court dismissed his arguments and based its judgment on K.\u2019s confession statements given at the preliminary investigation and other evidence. 22.  On 27 February 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal, holding that the applicant\u2019s allegations that unlawful investigative techniques had been used had not been confirmed. 23.  The Government submitted statements collected by lieutenant colonel S. from the internal security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow on 17 November 2016 from police officer M. and investigator A.I., in which both M., presently a senior operational police officer of the Criminal Search Department for the South-West Administrative Circuit of Moscow, and A.I., presently an investigator of the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime for the South-West Administrative Circuit of Moscow, denied any unlawful conduct and ill\u2011treatment in respect of the applicant after the applicant\u2019s arrest in 2007.", "references": ["0", "7", "9", "8", "3", "2", "6", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5.  On 14 August 2008 the applicant was arrested in Orel on suspicion of assault and rape. According to the applicant, during his time in police custody police officers from the Severnyy district police department in Orel and the operational search division of the Orel regional police department (\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u041e\u0440\u043b\u0430 \u0438 \u041e\u0420\u0427 \u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u041e\u0440\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) subjected him to ill-treatment to force him to confess to the crimes. The police officers allegedly handcuffed the applicant and physically assaulted him, punching and kicking him multiple times in the face, legs and body. 6.  On 15 August 2008 the Orel inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for the Orel region (\u201cthe investigative committee\u201d) ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. It began on 15 August 2008 and was completed on 29 August 2008. According to the report (no. 2378/5a), the applicant had the following injuries: (i) three scratches on his right cheek; (ii) two bruises on his neck; (iii) two bruises on his chest; (iv) two bruises on his back; (v) eleven bruises and an abrasion on his right upper limb; (vi) nine bruises and an abrasion on his left upper limb; (vii) an abrasion on his right lower leg; (viii) an abrasion on his left hip; and (ix) an abrasion on his left buttock. 7.  According to the expert, the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by blunt objects with a limited surface area one to three days before the examination and had not caused any actual bodily harm to the applicant. 8.  The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s bruises on his wrists could have been caused by handcuffs, and also concluded that the applicant had had thirty-four points on his body where force had been used, and had sustained no less than twenty-three blows. 9.  In reply to an investigator\u2019s question whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted, the expert stated that the injuries were within the reach of the applicant\u2019s hands, except for the injuries on the back, which could have been received as a result of the applicant being struck by or striking himself against a blunt object with a limited striking surface (the expert\u2019s \u201cexplanations\u201d of 26 June 2009). 10.  According to the IVS (temporary detention centre) medical records, the applicant complained about headache and pain in the back when he was placed in the IVS on 16 August 2008, after being examined at the traumatology centre of the Orel town hospital and diagnosed with contusion to the soft tissues of the head and closed craniocerebral injury (with a question mark). When he was taken out of the IVS at 12.45 p.m. on 18 August 2009 he complained about pain in the area of the wrists and dumb fingers, dizziness and nausea. When he was brought back at 9 p.m. that day (after being examined at the Orel regional hospital where he was diagnosed with contusions to the soft tissues of the head and abrasions to the face) he complained about headache and had abrasions on the forehead and on the back, explaining that he had received them at the Severnyy district police station. On 19 August 2008 he complained about headache and dizziness, and had abrasions on the face, forehead, wrists and left elbow, which \u2013 according to him \u2013 he had received at the Severnyy district police station the day before. 11.  According to pre-trial detention facility IZ-57/1, on 20 August 2008 the applicant had abrasions above the left eyebrow, on the left cheek, the wrists and the right elbow. 12.  On 18 August 2008 the applicant lodged complaints with the Severnyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orel and the investigative committee against the police officers, requesting that they be prosecuted. 13.  On 19 August 2008 the investigative committee received material in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. 14.  On the dates specified below, and in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) or (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, officials at the investigative committee issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers under Article 286 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) for no case to answer. Those refusals were systematically overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee as premature, unsubstantiated and based on incomplete inquiries, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The refusals were issued and overruled on the following dates:\n \nRefusal No.\nIssued on:\nOverruled on:\n(i)\n19 December 2008\n18 February 2009\n(ii)\n27 February 2009\n12 May 2009\n(iii)\n26 June 2009\ndate unknown\n(iv)\n21 August 2009\n6 May 2010\n(v)\n16 May 2010\n19 October 2010\n(vi)\n29 October 2010 15.  The investigative committee based its decision on the police officers\u2019 explanations denying the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. They stated that they had arrested the applicant in the night time on suspicion of having committed the crimes, that in the course of the arrest they had tripped the applicant up, twisted his hand behind his back and handcuffed him since he had tried to escape, and that they had interviewed him at the Severnyy district police department before the arrival of an investigator next morning to draw up an official record of his arrest. They also interviewed the applicant on 18 August 2008 about his complaint of ill-treatment at the Severnyy district police, which had been communicated to the police on 16 August 2008 by the traumatology centre of the town hospital. According to the police officers, the applicant had fallen before his arrest (being drunk) and at the IVS detention centre, and had inflicted injuries on himself at the police station. According to the applicant\u2019s explanations, he had not resisted his arrest, he had been beaten up at the time of his arrest and also during the night at the Severnyy district police station and when brought there for investigative activities thereafter. As a reaction to his ill\u2011treatment and false accusations of crimes he had tried to bang his head against the desk and, on 18 August 2008, to jump out of the window of the Severnyy district police station, but had been stopped. Police officer R.D. had thrown him to the floor and stepped on his face. The applicant denied the police officers\u2019 allegations of self-inflicted injuries and stated that he had signed the explanation about allegedly falling before the arrest under the threats of continued ill\u2011treatment from police officers S.D. and I.B., who had beaten him up before. According to statements by the applicant\u2019s girlfriend, she heard the applicant screaming from being allegedly beaten up during his arrest and at the police station; several days later at the police station he had complained to her that police officers had beaten him up; he had had abrasions on the face; and he had lost consciousness during a confrontation between them and the ambulance had been called. 16.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers of 29 October 2010 maintained the findings made in the previous refusals (for example, the refusal of 26 June 2009) that the police had lawfully applied force during the applicant\u2019s arrest, that the applicant had attempted to inflict injuries on himself, which was coherent with the forensic medical expert\u2019s conclusion that the injuries, except for the injuries on the back, had been within the reach of his hands. By alleging the police ill\u2011treatment the applicant had tried to escape prosecution and to blacken the police officers\u2019 honour and dignity. 17.  On 16 April 2009 the Zavodskiy District Court of Orel convicted the applicant of physical assaults and rapes involving three women victims, and sentenced him to thirteen years and five months\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  At trial, the applicant denied his guilt and complained about the police ill-treatment. The trial court acknowledged the appearance of injuries on him as they had been recorded by the expert, but noted that that could not serve as evidence of his innocence in relation to the crimes which had been committed. The trial court also noted that the pre-investigation inquiry had been pending with respect to his alleged ill-treatment, and that an examination of that issue fell outside the scope of the applicant\u2019s criminal case. 19.  On 9 June 2009 the Orel Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the trial court\u2019s conclusions.", "references": ["2", "3", "9", "5", "6", "7", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in Tavda, Sverdlovsk Region. 8.  On 22 September 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with a murder and a robbery committed in March 1999. 9.  On 2 October 2000 investigator B. of the Dzerzhinskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Nizhniy Tagil (\u201cthe District Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) took a decision to summon the applicant to the proceedings as a defendant and to remand him in custody. Regard was had to the gravity of the charges and the risk that the applicant might obstruct the establishment of the truth. The detention order, approved by the prosecutor, did not indicate a specific time-limit, but contained a reference to Article 97 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided that the initial period of detention during a criminal investigation was not to exceed two months (see paragraph 73 below). 10.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s name was put on the list of wanted persons, as his whereabouts could not be established. 11.  During the night of 18-19 March 2006 the applicant was arrested. 12.  On 19 March 2006 he was taken to a police station, where he was informed that he was on the wanted list as a suspect in connection with a murder committed in Nizhniy Tagil. 13.  On 27 April 2006 the investigator informed the applicant of the decision of 2 October 2000 and appointed legal-aid counsel N. to secure his defence. Under questioning the same day the applicant confirmed that he understood the charges against him. 14.  Meanwhile, on 25 April 2006 the applicant brought a complaint against the investigator under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (which provides for judicial review of decisions of investigators that might infringe the constitutional rights of participants in the proceedings or prevent a person\u2019s access to court) challenging the lawfulness of his arrest, which had not been based on a judicial decision, and the investigator\u2019s failure to bring charges against him within the required time-limit. 15.  On 23 May 2006 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court found that the applicant had been arrested in accordance with the law and had been informed of the charges against him as soon as he had been brought before the investigator on 27 April 2006. 16.  On 7 July 2006 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) discontinued the appeal proceedings in respect of the decision of 23 May 2006. The Regional Court held that Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation did not allow for judicial review of issues related to arrest or detention. 17.  In the meantime, on 18 May 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 18 July 2006. The District Court found that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention persisted and that there existed a risk that the applicant might abscond during the investigation or trial, as he had been on the wanted list for several years prior to his arrest. 18.  On 16 June 2006 the Regional Court upheld the order on an appeal by the applicant. 19.  On 17 July 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 August 2006 on the same grounds. 20.  On 16 August 2006 the Regional Court upheld the above extension order, noting that it was of no importance that the initial detention order had been issued by the investigator in 2000. It referred to the fact that before the entry into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation in July 2002, it had been lawful for a prosecutor to issue detention orders in a criminal case. 21.  On 24 August 2006 the District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 18 September 2006. The District Court considered that the grounds for detention were still valid. 22.  Meanwhile, on 4 August 2006 the revised charges were brought against the applicant. Under questioning on the same day the applicant confirmed that the substance of the charges was clear to him. 23.  On 31 August 2006 the applicant studied the case file, which comprised three volumes. 24.  On 5 September 2006 the applicant was served with a bill of indictment and the case was submitted to the Regional Court for trial. 25.  On 2 November 2006 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and murder and sentenced him to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. 26.  On 16 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 27.  On 18 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s partner T. told the police that the applicant had been on the wanted list since 2000, and informed them of the latter\u2019s whereabouts. She gave them the keys to the applicant\u2019s flat and warned that he usually carried a knife and a razor blade on him. 28.  On the same day officers of the special police force of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia for Perm Region (\u201cthe OMON\u201d) and investigators from the Department of the Interior of the Sverdlovskiy District of Perm planned the applicant\u2019s arrest. 29.  At 11.30 p.m. officers and investigators (nine officers in total) entered the applicant\u2019s flat in order to arrest him. According to them, when they shouted that they were the police the applicant tried to reach for a bag containing a razor blade. The officers forced him to the floor and handcuffed him. According to the applicant, when the officers entered the room where he was sleeping they immediately dragged him on to the floor and started kicking and beating him with their gun stocks. 30.  On 19 March 2006 the applicant was taken to the police station and from there to Perm remand prison no. 59/1 (\u201cPerm SIZO-1\u201d). The record of the applicant\u2019s medical examination in the remand prison indicates that the applicant complained of severe pain in the left side of his chest area. He was observed to have small abrasions and haematomas up to four cm in diameter in the area of his face, on his head, chest, back, and hips, and morbidity on palpation of the left ribs. A preliminary diagnosis of broken ribs was given. 31.  At 4.25 a.m. on the same day the applicant was examined by doctors at the first-aid station of the Perm City Hospital No. 1 and was found to have an injured chest and a broken rib on his left side. The first-aid station report sent to the police on the same date read that the applicant had sustained the injuries at the hands of the police during his arrest. The applicant was referred to the Perm Regional Hospital. 32.  At 5.10 a.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to the Perm Regional Hospital, where an X-ray was carried out which revealed fractures to his eighth and ninth ribs on the left side. The applicant explained at the hospital that he had received those injuries on 18 March 2006 when he fell on the street. The fractures were bound and the applicant was found fit for detention. 33.  On 20 March 2006 the applicant was transferred to SIZO-3 in Nizhniy Tagil via Yekaterinburg remand prison no. 66/1 (\u201cYekaterinburg SIZO-1\u201d). 34.  Between 19 March and 4 April 2006 the OMON conducted an internal check in respect of the incident. The use of force and special means (handcuffs) on the applicant was found lawful. 35.  On 21 March 2006, during his medical examination at Yekaterinburg SIZO-1, the applicant was diagnosed with fractures to the eighth and ninth ribs on his left side. He made a written submission to the head of SIZO-1 to the effect that those injuries had been inflicted by police officers during his arrest in Perm. 36.  On 29 March 2006 the applicant complained to a prosecutor in Nizhniy Tagil that he had been ill-treated during his arrest. On 31 March 2006 his complaint was forwarded to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sverdlovskiy District of Perm (\u201cthe District Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d). 37.  On 17 April 2006 an investigator of the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open a criminal case against the officers who had participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest, stating that the existence of constituent elements of a crime in their actions had not been made out. The investigator relied mainly on the statements made by those officers. He concluded that the officers\u2019 conduct during the arrest had been lawful. The investigator referred in this respect to sections 13 and 14 of the Federal Law on the Militia, which provided that police officers could apply physical force when arresting a person who had committed an offence and resisted the lawful demands of the police. The text of this decision contained the applicant\u2019s submission to the effect that after his arrest he had been taken to the police station on 19 March 2006, where he had been informed that he was on the wanted list on suspicion of a murder committed in Nizhniy Tagil. 38.  Following the communication of the complaint of ill-treatment to the Government (see paragraph 4 above), on 5 December 2012 the acting prosecutor of the Perm Region quashed the decision of 17 April 2006, finding that the pre-investigation inquiry had been incomplete. 39.  On 12 December 2012 an investigator of the Sverdlovskiy District Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee in Perm instituted criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment during his arrest. 40.  On 12 February 2013 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. He was questioned the following day. 41.  The investigators identified and questioned witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s neighbours in Perm and the doctors involved in his medical examination on 19 March 2006 at the Perm Regional Hospital. The police officers insisted that they had not beaten the applicant. They suggested that he could have hurt himself when he tried to get hold of a razor blade during the arrest. Two doctors of the Perm Regional Hospital submitted that during the applicant\u2019s examination he explained that his injuries had been the result of a fall the day before the arrest. A forensic medical examination was ordered. 42.  In their report of 15 February 2013 the medical experts concluded that on the basis of the available documents they could not determine the time when the applicant\u2019s ribs had been broken. 43.  Witness T. (one of the police officers) further submitted that during the arrest the applicant did not obey the lawful demands of the police and tried instead to get hold of the razor blade in his bag. T. then had used a foot sweep to put the applicant on to the floor. As he fell, the applicant hit his left side on a chair. When the applicant fell on to the floor he landed on his left side and started using foul language. At that moment the officers pressed him on to the floor and rolled him on to his abdomen. 44.  The additional expert report dated 30 April 2013 also stated that the time when the injuries had been inflicted could not be established. The applicant\u2019s ribs could have been fractured either as a result of the impact of a hard blunt object or objects or in the circumstances indicated by T. 45.  On 12 June 2013 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of constituent elements of a crime in the actions of police officers. The investigator concluded that the applicant could have been injured either by the police during his arrest or under other circumstances prior to the arrest. He noted, in particular, that at the regional hospital the applicant had explained that he had received his injuries when he had fallen in the street on 18 March 2006. The investigator relied on the findings of the medical experts that the time of the injuries could not be established. The investigator further found that the use of force and special means against the applicant had been lawful and justified: the applicant was known to have a knife and a razor blade on him and, when told to surrender, had tried to reach for the bag containing them. Therefore, if the applicant had received his injuries at the moment of his arrest, there would have been no constituent elements of the crime in the actions of the police officers. 46.  On 26 June 2013 a senior supervisor at the Department for Investigation of High-Priority Cases at the Investigation Committee for Perm Region found the decision of 12 June 2013 lawful and justified. He concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had most probably been inflicted on the applicant by the police officers during the arrest. However, as the applicant had shown resistance to the officers and they had had information that he had a knife and a razor blade on him, the use of force (a foot-sweep wrestling move) and handcuffs by the police had been lawful, and there were no constituent elements of a crime in the acts of the officers. 47.  According to the applicant, he found out about the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings from the Government\u2019s observations. On 6 July 2016 he wrote to the Perm Region Prosecutor asking for the criminal investigation to be resumed. In August 2016 his request was dismissed. 48.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant was taken by train from Perm SIZO-1 to Yekaterinburg SIZO-1. 49.  According to the applicant, while he was later being transferred, from Yekaterinburg SIZO-1 to Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3 on 27 March 2006, he was beaten up by two convoy officers, which led him to attempt suicide by cutting his right wrist with a razor blade. 50.  After his arrival in Nizhniy Tagil on 28 March 2006, the applicant was taken to medical facility LIU-51. A medical certificate issued by LIU\u201151 on the same day indicates that the applicant had a cut on the right forearm, haematomas on the chest and left hip, and fractures of the eighth and ninth ribs, all received on 19 March 2006. 51.  On 31 March 2006 an investigator in Nizhniy Tagil issued a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings. During the pre-investigation inquiry the applicant explained that he had attempted to cut the veins on his right wrist to protest against his brutal arrest, and that he had no complaints against the officers accompanying him on the train. On the basis of that statement and the explanation by the officers and other arrested persons, the investigator concluded that there was no indication of ill-treatment. 52.  On 5 April 2006 the applicant was transferred to Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3. 53.  According to the applicant, on numerous occasions between 14 April and 6 September 2006 he was taken from SIZO-3 to the Dzerzhinskiy police station in Nizhniy Tagil, where he was threatened in order to make him cooperate with the investigating authority. 54.  On 5 June 2006 the applicant was transferred to the medical unit of SIZO-3 because of chronic bronchitis. He was discharged from the medical unit on 25 September 2006. 55.  According to the applicant, while he was in the medical unit of SIZO-3, on 11 July, 15 and 23 August 2006 he was exposed to some kind of nerve gas, which was intended to extract a confession. The applicant alleges that as a result of gas exposure, his bronchial asthma had been aggravated to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 56.  From 2007 to 2012 the applicant received regular treatment in detention for chronic bronchitis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 57.  On 25 February 2009 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that he had been ill-treated between 14 April and 6 September 2006. 58.  On 18 April 2009 an investigator from the Dzerzhinskiy District investigative division of Nizhniy Tagil of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region (\u201cthe Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of investigator B. in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case. It had not been established that investigator B. intimidated the applicant or used any other illegal means to extract his confession. 59.  On 29 November 2012, following the communication of the complaint to the Government, the Head of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region quashed the decision of 18 April 2009 as premature. An additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered. 60.  On 9 January 2013 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division took a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. On the basis of the available documents and testimonies, the investigator concluded that throughout his stay at Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3 the applicant had had access to medical assistance and had received treatment for his bronchial asthma. Apart from complaints of a cough and shortness of breath no other complaints were raised by the applicant. 61.  On 4 February 2013 the Head of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region set aside the above decision and ordered an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 62.  On 6 March 2013 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division again took a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings. The investigator noted that there had been no evidence of ill\u2011treatment, and that the applicant had never mentioned the alleged ill\u2011treatment during the criminal proceedings against him. 63.  On 15 April 2015 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division rejected another request for a criminal investigation in respect of B., on account of alleged ill-treatment of the applicant during detention. 64.  On 10 March 2016 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint in connection with the above decision not to open a criminal case. The court found that the decision of 15 April 2015 was well reasoned. 65.  On 24 June 2016 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 66.  On 17 June 2013 the Court sent the applicant a letter containing the Government\u2019s comments on the applicant\u2019s claims for just satisfaction and their further observations on the case. It was sent to the applicant for information purposes, and he was asked not to reply. 67.  According to the applicant he received that letter only on 30 August 2013, despite the fact that it was delivered to the local post office on 17 August 2013. The envelope was already open and certain pages were missing.", "references": ["4", "6", "7", "5", "3", "0", "9", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Carate Urio (Como). 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant is a well-known Italian journalist. At the material time, specifically from January 2007 until 15 July 2008, he was the editor-in-chief of Libero, a national daily newspaper that sold around 125,000 copies per day. 8.  On 17 February 2007 one of the main Italian newspapers, La Stampa, published an article covering the story of a thirteen-year old girl who had undergone an abortion. The article suggested that the girl had been forced to undergo the abortion by her parents and G.C., the guardianship judge (giudice tutelare) who had authorised the procedure. Later that day it was reported that there had been no pressure placed on the teenager, and that she had decided alone to terminate the pregnancy. This clarification was widely disseminated by different sources: in particular, the National Press Agency (ANSA) issued a number of press releases on 17 February 2007 clarifying the events; the television news bulletins broadcast by Rai2 and Rai3 (Italy\u2019s public national television channels) reported that the news concerning the alleged pressure on the teenager was false; the newspapers Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica reported the facts of the case in the same vein. 9.  On 18 February 2007 two articles were published in Libero concerning the events involving the teenager. Despite the clarification disseminated the previous day by other media, both articles reported that the girl had been forced to undergo an abortion by her parents and G.C. 10.  The first article, written by an unknown person under the pseudonym \u201cDreyfus\u201d, was entitled \u201cJudge orders abortion. The law is stronger than life\u201d (Il giudice ordina l\u2019aborto. La legge pi\u00f9 forte della vita). 11.  It was worded as follows:\n\u201cA teenager from Turin has been forced by her parents to [have an abortion] ... the magistrate has heard the parties and has applied the law \u2013 the law! \u2013 ordering the compulsory abortion ... she did not want. She struggled ... [N]ow the young mother (you are still considered as a mother even if your son died) is hospitalised as mentally ill. She had screamed in vain \u2018if you kill my son, I will commit suicide\u2019 ... if there were the death penalty, and if [it were ever] applicable, this would have been the case, [f]or the parents, the gynaecologist and [G.C.] ... the medicine and the judiciary are accomplices in the [coercive abortion]\u201d. 12.  The second article, written by the journalist A.M., was entitled \u201cForced to abort by her parents and the judge\u201d (Costretta ad abortire dai genitori e dal giudice). The relevant parts read as follows:\n\u201cPregnant [girl] at the early age of thirteen undergoes abortion and is hospitalised in a psychiatric centre ...) After the abortion [the thirteen-year old girl] accused her family of forcing her to [have an abortion]...\u201d 13.  On 27 April 2007 G.C. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant and A.M. with the Milan District Court. The applicant was charged with defamation, aggravated by the fact that the offence consisted of imputing a specific fact (Article 595 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code), and failure of newspaper\u2019s editor-in-chief to control what had been published \u2013 omesso controllo (Article 57 of the Criminal Code). 14.  In a judgment of 26 January 2009, filed in the relevant registry on 20 March 2009, the District Court found the applicant guilty of omesso controllo, as far as the article drafted by A. M. was concerned, and of aggravated defamation since, as head of the newspaper, he was responsible for the article published under the pseudonym \u201cDreyfus\u201d. The applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 5,000 euros (EUR), damages in the sum of EUR 10.000 and costs in the sum of EUR 2,500 (to be paid jointly with A.M.), with publication of the judgment in Libero. 15.  It concluded: (i) that both articles contained false information, and (ii) that the content of both articles had severely damaged the reputation of the victim, clearly overstepping the boundaries of the applicant\u2019s right to freely impart information. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal. 17.  In its judgment of 17 June 2011, filed in the relevant registry on 24 June 2011, the Milan Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment in part. It pointed out that the articles at issue had reported false information, since the thirteen-year old girl had decided alone to terminate the pregnancy. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that the penalty imposed was too lenient, particularly in the light of the seriousness of the offence committed, and a finding that the applicant was a recidivist. The Court of Appeal thus increased the penalty to one year and two months\u2019 imprisonment, and upheld the fine of EUR 5,000. The Court of Appeal did not suspend the enforcement of the penalty and decided to record the conviction on the applicant\u2019s criminal record. In addition, the damages were also increased from EUR 10,000 to EUR 30,000. 18.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 19.  In a judgment of 26 September 2012, deposited in the relevant registry on 23 October 2012, the Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s findings, assessing, inter alia, the compatibility of the conviction and the sentence imposed in the light of the case-law of the Court. In particular, the Court of Cassation sought to justify the imposition of a custodial sentence by arguing that there were exceptional circumstances in the case. In particular, the imposition of the detention measure had been justified by a set of concurrent factors, such as the existence of the aggravating circumstance of \u201cimputing a specific fact\u201d; the applicant\u2019s personality, his criminal record (the applicant being a recidivist) and the fact that the publication of false information had undermined the reputation of G.C., a member of the judiciary. 20.  By a decision of 30 November 2012, filed in the relevant registry on the same date, the Milan Court responsible for the execution of sentences (Tribunale di Sorveglianza di Milano) ordered the applicant to serve his sentence under house arrest (pericolo di fuga), on the grounds that there was no risk that he might abscond. 21.  On an unspecified date, relying on Article 87 \u00a7 11 of the Constitution, the applicant filed a request with the President of the Italian Republic to convert the remainder of the detention period into a fine. 22.  By a decree of 21 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s request was granted and his sentence was commuted into the payment of a EUR 15,532 fine. 23.  In his decision to commute the applicant\u2019s penalty, the President relied on the criticism expressed by the European Court of Human Rights with respect to the imposition of custodial sentences on journalists. He also expressed his concerns about the ongoing review of the legislation on defamation, which was on hold owing to difficulties in striking a balance between the need to set out more lenient sanctions while at the same time ensuring more effective redress measures. 24.  The applicant spent twenty-one days under house arrest, starting 30 November 2012 until 21 December 2012, when he was released (see paragraphs 20-22).", "references": ["1", "4", "7", "9", "2", "8", "3", "0", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  The applicant was a student at the Azerbaijan State University of Economics at the time of the events. He was also a civil society activist and was one of the founders of Free Youth, a non\u2011governmental organisation established in 2011. 7.  Following a number of deaths of soldiers in the Azerbaijani army in non-combat situations, from January until March 2013 a number of demonstrations were held in Baku in protest against the deaths of soldiers in the army. The demonstrations received wide media coverage and drew the public\u2019s attention to the deaths of soldiers in the army for which the government were harshly criticised. The demonstrations were organised through social media and the information about them was disseminated through social media and the press. The applicant actively participated in those demonstrations and in their organisation. The NIDA civic movement, a non-governmental organisation established by a group of young people, played a key role in the organisation and conduct of the above-mentioned demonstrations. Although the demonstrations were peaceful, the police dispersed those who had gathered and a number of demonstrators were arrested (see, for example among many other cases, Mehtiyev and others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 20589/13 and 7 others, 6 April 2017; Bayramov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 19150/13 and 52022/13, 6 April 2017; and Hajili and others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 44699/13 and 2 others, 29 June 2017). 8.  At the time of the events the \u201cHarlem Shake\u201d dance became popular in Azerbaijan. A number of video performances of a \u201cHarlem Shake\u201d dance by different groups of people were prepared in Azerbaijan and uploaded to the YouTube video-hosting website. On 1 March 2013 the applicant together with a group of his acquaintances, went to the seaside park in the city centre of Baku, where his acquaintances performed a \u201cHarlem Shake\u201d dance; a video recording of their dance was made. The applicant did not dance and just observed those who were dancing. On an unspecified date the video recording of the dance was uploaded to YouTube. There is no document in the case file indicating that the video recording in question was uploaded to YouTube by the applicant. The video which is still available at the time of the judgment on YouTube lasts around one minute. It represents seven individuals dancing together in a park. In the back of the scene, one person is dancing in a close proximity to a bronze statue, making sexually suggestive movements. On an unspecified date, after the uploading of the video recording to YouTube, a television programme concerning that video was broadcast on a private television channel. The narrated section of the broadcast referred to the people dancing in the video as drug addicts and anarchist members of NIDA, criticising the demonstrations organised in protest against the deaths of soldiers in the army. 9.  In March 2013 criminal proceedings were instituted against some members of NIDA who had actively participated in the organisation of the above-mentioned demonstrations, for illegal possession of explosive substances and devices and illegal possession of narcotic substances (see Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 48653/13 and 3 others, \u00a7\u00a7 5-16, 7 June 2018). The applicant was questioned twice as a witness within the framework of those criminal proceedings prior to his arrest. 10.  Since 2013 various criminal proceedings have been instituted against members of NIDA who have been arrested and detained within the framework of those criminal proceedings. The domestic proceedings concerning the arrest and pre-trial detention of various members of NIDA are the subject of other applications pending before the Court (see for example applications nos. 65583/13, 70106/13, 41105/14, 54846/14, 63571/16, 74143/16 and 14307/17). 11.  On 30 April 2013 the applicant was arrested by the police because of his participation in a gathering in front of the Azerbaijani State Oil Academy. On the same day the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 298.2 (violation of the rule regulating the organisation and holding of gatherings) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days\u2019 administrative arrest. The domestic proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s arrest on 30 April 2013 and subsequent administrative conviction have already been the subject of the judgment in the case of Mirzayev and others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 12854/13, 28750/13 and 76329/13, 20 July 2017). In that case, the Court found violations of Articles 11 and 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention in relation to the applicant. 12.  Following his release, on 17 May 2013 the applicant was again arrested and charged under Articles 221.2.1 (hooliganism committed by a group of individuals) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism committed by resisting a public official) of the Criminal Code. The description of the charges consisted of a single sentence half a page long. The relevant part of the decision stated:\n\u201c... Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade has been charged on the basis of sufficient ... evidence that he engaged in hooliganism by expressing manifest disrespect towards society because on 1 March 2013 in Baku, with a group of individuals, including B.G. and others, with whom he had close ties, at around 3 p.m. in the seaside park, [he] blatantly breached public order by making a video recording of continued and repetitive immoral actions ... in respect of a bronze statue of an old man ... and of intentionally chaotic hand and foot movements (q\u0259r\u0259zli xaotik \u0259l-qol h\u0259r\u0259k\u0259tl\u0259ri) carried out after having stripped to the waist, and [he] manifestly failed to comply with lawful requests [made by] public officials, ... [namely] the security officers of the seaside park department and police officers [and others] that he desist from the above\u2011mentioned actions, [which breached public order; [he] resisted by [insolently refusing] to cease his actions (m\u00fcst\u0259sna h\u0259yas\u0131zl\u0131qla \u00f6z h\u0259r\u0259k\u0259tl\u0259rini dayand\u0131rmamas\u0131 il\u0259 m\u00fcqavim\u0259t g\u00f6st\u0259r\u0259r\u0259k); [he] prepared video footage amounting to 6.16 megabytes from a video recording depicting actions against the ethical principles of the society in which he lives and on 1 March 2013 widely disseminated it by uploading it to the YouTube website under the title of \u201cHarlem Shake \u2013 Park Bulvar\u201d ...\nThrough these actions, Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade committed criminal offences under Articles 221.2.1 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.\n...\u201d\nIt appears from the documents in the case file that apart from the applicant only one other person (B.G.) dancing in the impugned video was charged with the criminal offence of hooliganism under Article 221 of the Criminal Code. No criminal proceedings were instituted against other individuals performing in the impugned \u201cHarlem Shake\u201d dance video. 13.  On the same day the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court seeking the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial. The prosecutor justified his request by citing the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the fact that there was a risk of his absconding and obstructing the investigation\u2019s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings. 14.  On 17 May 2013 the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court cited the risk of his absconding and reoffending, together with the nature of the criminal act, and justified its decision as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the request with the [aid of the] material in the case file and having heard the submissions of those who have been present at this court hearing, and taking into account the fact that there is a likelihood that the accused, Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade, will abscond from the investigation and reoffend, as well as the nature of the criminal act attributed to him, the court considers that he should be remanded in custody.\u201d 15.  On 20 May 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, submitting that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial. In particular, he submitted that he had already complied twice with the investigation\u2019s requests within the framework of other criminal proceedings and that there was no evidence that he would abscond or reoffend. He also submitted that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence. In that regard, he noted that the court had ordered his detention pending trial without examining any evidence, as even the video recording of the dance had not been available in the case file. 16.  On 24 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court\u2019s decision had been justified. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned specific complaints. 17.  On 27 June 2013 the applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court, asking to be put under house arrest instead of being held in pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his pre-trial detention was not justified and that there was no reason for it to continue. 18.  On 28 June 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding it unfounded. 19.  On 4 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 20.  On 12 July 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, submitting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 21.  On 15 July 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial until 17 September 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by citing the likelihood that, if released, the applicant might abscond or obstruct the investigation by influencing those participating in the criminal proceedings. 22.  On 18 July 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first-instance court had failed to justify the extension of his detention pending trial. He also reiterated that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence and that the court, in deciding to extend his pre-trial detention, had not examined any evidence proving that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence. 23.  On 22 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 15 July 2013. The appellate court\u2019s reasoning reiterated that provided by the first-instance court. 24.  Following a request dated 10 September 2013 by the prosecutor in charge of the case for an extension of the period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, on 11 September 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by two months, until 17 November 2013. The court justified its decision by citing the need for additional time in which to carry out further investigative measures and the fact that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention had not changed. 25.  On 16 September 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 26.  On 19 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 16 September 2013. The appellate court reiterated the reasoning provided by the first\u2011instance court. 27.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 28.  It appears from the documents before the Court that on an unspecified date in September 2013 the applicant was additionally charged with new criminal offences under Articles 28 (preparation of a crime), 220.1 (mass disorder) and 228.3 (illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation and carrying of arm, its accessories, supplies, explosive substances and devices by an organised group) of the Criminal Code. The investigator\u2019s decision in this respect was not made available to the Court. 29.  On 6 May 2014 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. 30.  On 16 December 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal and on 15 October 2015 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment in respect of the applicant. 31.  A separate application (see application no. 22323/16) concerning the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, in which various complaints under Articles 6, 7, 10 and 18 of the Convention were raised, is pending before the Court.", "references": ["9", "5", "3", "8", "4", "0", "7", "1", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967. He was a member of the National Assembly (Milli Majlis), elected in 2005. 6.  The applicant provided the following account of the impugned events. 7.  On 16 March 2007 the National Assembly was hearing a 2006 Cabinet of Ministers report presented by the Prime Minister. The presentation of the report was to be followed by questions and subsequently by a debate. 8.  According to the applicant, when he was given an opportunity to ask a question, he began to deliver a speech criticising the Cabinet of Ministers. After a few sentences his microphone was cut and he was not allowed to finish his speech. This prompted the applicant to engage in a verbal argument with the Speaker. 9.  The applicant claimed that while he and the Speaker were arguing, F.A., a member of parliament who was seated behind him, shouted an insult directed at the latter. In reply, the applicant, also using insulting language, demanded that F.A. mind his own business. F.A. allegedly responded by continuing to shout curses directed at the applicant and his close family members, and a heated argument between the applicant and F.A. ensued. 10.  The applicant, using gestures, invited F.A. to follow him so that they could settle their differences outside the assembly room and began heading towards the exit. However, according to the applicant, at that point F.A. approached him from behind and punched him in the face. The applicant pushed F.A. away, as a result of which F.A. fell onto a desk. However, he allegedly continued to throw punches at the applicant. The applicant also attempted to punch F.A., but was stopped by several other members who had quickly intervened to stop the fight. He was led out of the assembly room and left the parliament building. 11.  The Government neither disputed the applicant\u2019s above account of the events nor provided a separate description thereof (see paragraph 56 below). 12.  The above incident in the National Assembly was video recorded and broadcast later by various public television channels. 13.  On the same day F.A. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the latter instituted criminal proceedings under Articles 132 (battery) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism accompanied by resistance to a State official or other person carrying out duties in protection of public order or prevention of breaches of public order) of the Criminal Code. 14.  According to the applicant, at around 10.30 a.m. on 19 March 2007 he was arrested by masked police officers in the street. The police allegedly applied force during his arrest. 15.  Several hours after the arrest the National Assembly lifted the applicant\u2019s parliamentary immunity, following a request by the Prosecutor General. 16.  By a decision of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of 19 March 2007, the applicant was formally charged with criminal offences under Articles 132 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code. The decision stated that the applicant\u2019s actions had caused F.A. to experience symptoms of a closed craniocerebral trauma. 17.  On the same day, based on a request by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s remand in custody for a period of two months. 18.  On 16 March 2007 the investigator in charge ordered F.A.\u2019s medical expert examination. The forensic report, finalised on 17 April 2007, found that F.A. had a closed craniocerebral trauma, concussion, a haematoma on his forehead and other less serious injuries. According to the expert, the injuries had been caused by several punches to the head and the time of the infliction of injuries corresponded to 16 March 2007 as claimed by F.A. 19.  On 27 March 2007 the investigator carried out the inspection of the videotapes (videokaset\u0259 bax\u0131\u015f ke\u015firilm\u0259si bar\u0259d\u0259 protokol), which were submitted by various television channels and contained footage of the incident. 20.  On 3 May 2007 the charges against the applicant were reclassified under Articles 127.2.1 ((deliberate infliction of less serious harm (az a\u011f\u0131r z\u0259r\u0259r) to health, in connection with the victim\u2019s performance of his professional or public duties)), 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious harm to health, in a publicly dangerous way and with hooligan intent) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism accompanied by resistance to a State official or other person carrying out duties in protection of public order or prevention of breaches of public order) of the Criminal Code. 21.  After the completion of the pre-trial investigation, on 8 May 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office issued an indictment in respect of the applicant under Articles 127.2.1, 127.2.3 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code and the case went to trial. 22.  During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed that he had not been the instigator of the fight and it had been F.A. who had punched him first. 23.  On 18 May 2007 the Sabail District Court convicted the applicant on all counts, revoked his mandate as a member of parliament and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment suspended for two years. The applicant was released, but was forbidden to change his place of residence during the period that the suspended sentence was in force, without notifying in advance the relevant authority for the execution of court judgments. The description of the acts for which the applicant was found guilty read as follows:\n \u201cAt 12.30 p.m. on 16 March 2007 at [the National Assembly\u2019s address] [the applicant], while making a speech during a plenary session [of the National Assembly], in breach of parliamentary ethics used rude and insulting expressions violating human dignity and honour despite a warning and a call to order [by the Speaker of the National Assembly] in accordance with Articles 45 and 46 [of the National Assembly\u2019s internal regulations. [The applicant], by committing deliberate actions aimed at manifestly displaying, without any reason, disrespect towards the members of parliament, parliamentary officials and members of the public watching the parliamentary session, insulted and offended [the latter] with indecent expressions. [The applicant] used violence to offer resistance to [F.A.] who, by carrying out his civic obligation, called [the applicant] to order and prevented a breach of order in a parliamentary session as defined by law. [The applicant], by punching [F.A.] in the head and various other parts of his body with hooligan intent, inflicted less serious harm (az a\u011f\u0131r z\u0259r\u0259r) to [F.A.]\u2019s health and disrupted the conduct of the plenary session [of the National Assembly] for twenty minutes.\u201d 24.  It is evident from the judgment that, in finding the applicant guilty, the court relied on the following evidence: the testimony of F.A.; the testimonies of a number of members of parliament and parliamentary officials who had witnessed the incident; and the medical forensic report of 17 April 2007. The court\u2019s judgment was silent as regards the video evidence. According to the applicant, his request to play the videotape during the trial hearing was refused by the first-instance court. 25.  On 22 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, in which he complained, inter alia, of an erroneous assessment of the factual circumstances, procedural irregularities in obtaining forensic and other evidence, and misapplication of the substantive criminal law. In particular, he argued that the classification under Article 221.2.2 presupposed the existence of other victims against whom the act of hooliganism had been directed, apart from a person to whom the resistance was offered, whereas in his case F.A. had been the only victim involved. The applicant also complained that, having regard to the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on the judicial practice concerning cases related to hooliganism, F.A. could not be considered as a person carrying out a duty in protection of public order. In addition, the applicant argued that the trial court had relied on the prosecution\u2019s distorted version of the events rather than examining the video footage of the incident which showed that he had not been the instigator of the fight. 26.  On 24 July 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing. It appears from the transcript of the hearing that the applicant applied to have the court ensure F.A.\u2019s presence at the appeal hearing and examine the videotape of the incident. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application with regard to the latter as follows:\n\u201cThe Court\u2019s Panel, after having briefly deliberated on the bench,\nDecides\nTo ensure the participation of [F.A.] at the court hearing and to reject the remaining part of the application as being unfounded ...\u201d 27.  On 6 August 2007 the appellate court upheld the Sabail District Court\u2019s judgment. The court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was confirmed by the witness testimonies and the medical forensic report. The court\u2019s judgment was silent in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning incorrect classification of the crime and the failure to examine the video evidence. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal reiterating his complaints. 28.  On 4 December 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgments. In its decision the court did not address the applicant\u2019s above complaints. 29.  The applicant suffered from spinal disc herniation before his arrest. According to the applicant, the conditions of his pre-trial detention were harsh and unsuitable for his health condition as he experienced chronic pain. His state of health significantly deteriorated during the two months\u2019 pre-trial detention owing to the delays in providing him with the requisite medical assistance. Although he continuously complained about this to various domestic authorities, no measures were taken to adequately address his medical problems. His request to be transferred to a specialised medical institution was granted only after he had gone on hunger strike. 30.  On 19 March 2007 following his arrest the applicant underwent a medical examination, which concluded that he was \u201cpractically healthy\u201d. 31.  On 27 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a neurologist, who found that he was \u201cneurologically healthy\u201d and did not need inpatient treatment. 32.  On 28 March 2007 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination, which did not reveal any pathology in his thorax. 33.  After this, the applicant refused to undergo medical examinations on several occasions. 34.  On 13 April 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ministry of Justice\u2019s Medical Facility and diagnosed with \u201clumbosacral radiculitis\u201d. He received inpatient medical treatment in the neurology department of the facility for thirty-five days until his release from custody on 18 May 2007. During his treatment in the facility, he underwent various medical examinations, which did not reveal any need for surgery, and a \u201cconservative treatment\u201d was recommended. 35.  On 13 August 2007 the applicant applied to the Department of Execution of Court Judgments of the Ministry of Justice for permission to travel to Germany for medical treatment. 36.  On 16 August 2007 the Department refused the applicant\u2019s request. The applicant appealed to the courts. 37.  On 17 September 2007 the Sabail District Court issued a decision permitting the applicant to travel abroad for medical reasons. 38.  The ban on the applicant\u2019s departure from the country was de facto lifted on 22 September 2007.", "references": ["6", "0", "8", "1", "4", "2", "7", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have been ongoing for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formalistic responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still ongoing. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ismail Makhmudov, who was born in 1976. The first applicant is his mother, the third applicant is his wife, the fourth applicant is his daughter, and the fifth and sixth applicants are his brothers. The second applicant was Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s father. He died on 12 July 2010. 8.  At about 7 p.m. on 4 January 2003 a grey UAZ minivan (tabletka) allegedly belonging to the Gudermes district department of the interior (\u201cthe Gudermes ROVD\u201d) parked near the applicants\u2019 house in Oiyskhar settlement, Chechnya. At 8 p.m. Mr Ismail Makhmudov left his house and when he was passing the minivan ten armed men in camouflage uniforms, some of them in balaclavas, jumped out of the minivan, surrounded him, forced him into the vehicle, and drove off to an unknown destination. 9.  The applicants submitted written statements by three witnesses to the incident. Ms L.Ya saw a UAZ minivan parking some 300 metres from her house, and a group of men in camouflage uniforms speaking unaccented Russian nearby; Ms T.A. saw the abduction of Mr Ismail Makhmudov from her window; and Mr A.T. witnessed the UAZ minivan with the men in camouflage uniforms driving by in the direction of the highway. 10.  On 5 January 2003 day the first applicant went to the Gudermes ROVD, where she met a police officer, Officer L.Kh., who told her that they had already taken Mr Ismail Makhmudov home. 11.  On 6 January 2003 the second applicant, Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s father, complained of the abduction to the Gudermes ROVD. Three days later the Gudermes ROVD refused to open a criminal case into the incident, stating that \u201cthere were no grounds to believe that [Mr Ismail Makhmudov] had been the victim of a criminal offence\u201d. 12.  On 21 January 2003 the Gudermes district prosecutor in Chechnya overruled the above refusal and opened criminal case no. 32004 under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction). 13.  On 20 March 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 14.  Having questioned several witnesses who did not have any information about Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s whereabouts, on 21 March 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 15.  On 1 March 2004 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her access to the case file documents. On 18 March 2004 her request was refused. 16.  On unspecified dates between April and June 2004 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Ministry of the Interior, the Chechen President and other authorities, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. She was informed in reply that the criminal proceedings were ongoing. 17.  In early 2005 the first applicant sent similar requests to the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) in Chechnya, the Chechnya prosecutor and the Chechen Ministry of the Interior. Her enquiries were forwarded to the investigators in charge of the case. 18.  On 28 April 2005 the deputy Gudermes district prosecutor overruled the decision of 21 March 2003 and resumed the proceedings to question Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s neighbours and check if he had been apprehended during a special operation. 19.  It appears that in May 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s neighbours. The copies of their interview records submitted by the Government were illegible. 20.  On 28 May 2005 the proceedings were suspended. The applicants were not informed about that. 21.  On 16 November 2005 the first applicant asked the Gudermes district prosecutor to inform her about the progress of the case and to investigate the abduction more thoroughly, alleging that it had been perpetrated by State agents. No response followed. 22.  On 15 February 2006 the NGO Russian Justice Initiative contacted the investigators on behalf of the first applicant, seeking an update on the progress of the investigation. Again, no response followed. 23.  On 7 April 2008 the proceedings were resumed. Several days later the investigators contacted various law-enforcement bodies and detention facilities to establish whether Mr Ismail Makhmudov had been placed in custody. The respondent authorities had no information about his arrest or detention. 24.  On 15 May 2008 the first applicant was questioned. She provided the investigators with the names of several fellow villagers who had seen a grey UAZ minivan parked near her son\u2019s house at the time of the abduction. 25.  On 19 May 2008 the investigation was suspended again. Later, it was resumed on 15 December 2008, 30 January 2009 and 21 August 2012, and then suspended on 19 January and 12 March 2009 and 21 September 2012 respectively. 26.  On 15 January 2009 the investigators granted victim status to the second applicant and questioned him. He made statements similar to those of his wife, the second applicant. He also mentioned that the former head of the local police, Mr U., had told him that at about 8 p.m. on 4 January 2003 he had seen a UAZ minivan and several persons in military uniforms and balaclavas near the applicants\u2019 house. The men had stated that they had problems with electricity, but had refused to accept his help. 27.  On 10 March 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.B., who submitted that he had seen a grey UAZ minivan in the vicinity of Mr Ismail Makhmudov\u2019s house. 28.  On 4 February 2015 the first applicant enquired about the course of the proceedings. On 13 February 2015 she was informed that they were still ongoing. There is no information about further developments in the case. 29.  On 20 March 2010 the first applicant lodged a court claim with the Gudermes Town Court in Chechnya, seeking that the proceedings suspended on 19 May 2008 be resumed. She also alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. 30.  On 8 June 2010 the court dismissed her claim on the grounds that the proceedings had already been resumed on 2 June 2010. 31.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ismail Dashtayev, who was born in 1975. The second applicant is his sister. 32.  On 30 January 2002 Mr Ismail Dashtayev and his fellow villager Mr L.\u2011A.Ch. were going by taxi from the town of Nazran, Ingushetiya, to the village of Novyye Atagi, Chechnya. Just before the entrance to Novyye Atagi, they were stopped by servicemen who had blocked the road with two armoured personnel carriers (\u201cAPCs\u201d). The servicemen were in camouflage uniforms without identifying insignia, except for one, who had the shoulder straps of a colonel. Speaking unaccented Russian, they asked Mr Ismail Dashtayev and Mr L.\u2011A.Ch. for their identity documents. A few minutes later, two grey UAZ minivans without registration plates arrived. Suddenly, one of the servicemen pointed his gun at Mr Ismail Dashtayev\u2019s head, while another searched his pockets. They then put Mr Ismail Dashtayev in one of the UAZ minivans and drove off towards the town of Shali. When Mr L.\u2011A.Ch. asked the servicemen where Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been taken, the servicemen shouted at him, asking whether he wanted to join him. Thereafter, the servicemen searched Mr L.-A.Ch., put a black plastic bag over his head, forced him into the other UAZ minivan, drove him to Shali, and then released him in front of the central district hospital. 33.  On 7 February 2002 the first applicant complained of the abduction of her son to the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya. 34.  On 31 May 2002 the district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 59116 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 35.  On 1 July 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant. She described her attempts to find her missing son. Firstly, she had contacted Mr L.-A.Ch.\u2019s mother, who had told her that Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been apprehended together with Mr L.-A.Ch. Then she had spoken with the head of Novyye Atagi\u2019s local authorities, who had stated that Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been detained on the premises of the Shali district department of the interior (\u201cthe Shali ROVD\u201d). 36.  The next day the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 37.  On 31 July 2002, having sent requests concerning Mr Ismail Dashtayev\u2019s whereabouts to various authorities, including the Shali ROVD, the investigators suspended the criminal proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 38.  At some point later the authorities replied that they did not have any information about Mr Ismail Dashtayev\u2019s whereabouts. 39.  On 21 January 2003 the proceedings were resumed and then on 28 February 2003 suspended again. 40.  On 5 March 2004 and 22 February 2008 the first applicant asked the head of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences and the Chechnya Ombudsman to assist her in her search for her son. 41.  On 14 March 2008 the investigators resumed the proceedings. 42.  On 28 March 2008 the investigators questioned Mr L.-A.Ch for the first time. His statement was similar to those submitted to the Court by the applicants. 43.  On 19 April 2008 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed of that. 44.  On 10 February 2010 the applicants\u2019 representative contacted a number of domestic authorities, asking for their assistance in establishing the whereabouts of the applicants\u2019 missing relative. In reply, he was informed that the criminal investigation into Mr Ismail Dashtayev\u2019s abduction was ongoing. 45.  On 20 January 2011 the investigation was resumed. Several days later the investigators questioned various officials who had assisted the investigation in establishing the circumstances of the abduction. All of them explained that they had failed to find out which authority had blocked the road and apprehended Mr Ismail Dashtayev. 46.  On 14 February the investigators ordered a DNA test to be performed, to compare the DNA of the first applicant to that stored in a database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 47.  On 21 February the investigation was suspended again. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 48.  On 27 December 2010 the applicants complained to the Shali Town Court of the decision of 19 April 2008 to suspend the proceedings and of the investigators\u2019 failure to take all necessary investigative steps. 49.  On 24 January 2011 the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the investigation had already been resumed on 20 January 2011. 50.  On 28 January 2011 the applicants appealed. They complained that the investigators\u2019 failure to act in a timely manner had not been examined by the district court, and that the court hearing had been held in their absence. 51.  On 6 April 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the decision of 24 January 2011 for technical reasons and then terminated the examination of the appeal. 52.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Vakha Nauzov, who was born in 1974. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his wife, and the third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 53.  On 6 June 2003 the Russian Parliament announced amnesty for illegal combatants involved in the armed conflict in Chechnya who voluntarily stopped their activities and surrendered their weapons. 54.  At the beginning of June 2003 Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. surrendered their weapons to the Gudermes department of the FSB and were pardoned. A few days later both men were hired by the security service of the Head of Administration of the Chechen President. They worked in the village of Novoe Gordali, Chechnya. 55.  On 20 June 2003 Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. drove to work in a silver-blue VAZ-2106 car with registration plate no. 173-05. At 11 a.m. they were stopped at checkpoint no. 75 on a highway near the village of Druzhba. Fellow villagers who were passing the checkpoint in a minibus at the time, including Ms A.E. and Ms D.Kh., saw that several servicemen had surrounded Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M., while others were searching their car. Some of the witnesses, whose identities the applicants did not disclose before the Court, heard Mr Vakha Nauzov shouting that his boss should be informed that they were being taken away. 56.  On 22 June and then again on 6 August 2003 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Gudermes prosecutor and the Gudermes ROVD in Chechnya. In the complaint to the prosecutor, the applicants alleged that Mr Vakha Nauzov had been apprehended at a checkpoint in the eastern part of Gudermes. 57.  On an unspecified date police officers from the Gudermes ROVD questioned the servicemen who had been manning checkpoint no. 75. They denied arresting Mr Vakha Nauzov. 58.  On 6 August 2003 the Gudermes ROVD refused to institute an investigation into the abduction, for lack of evidence of a criminal offence. 59.  On 19 July 2004 the Gudermes prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicants that the Gudermes ROVD had opened search case no. 063043 to establish their relative\u2019s whereabouts. 60.  On 15 July 2005 the Gudermes prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the refusal to open a criminal case of 6 August 2003 and ordered the Gudermes ROVD to carry out further examination of the abduction complaint. 61.  On 4 August 2005 the Gudermes ROVD again refused to open a criminal case. On 31 October the Gudermes prosecutor overruled the refusal and ordered the ROVD to examine the complaint once again. 62.  On 31 November 2005 the Gudermes prosecutor opened criminal case no. 45129 under Article 105 of the CC (murder) in respect of the abduction of Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. 63.  On 31 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 64.  On 18 September 2007 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide her with a copy of their decision to grant her victim status. It appears that no response followed. 65.  On 24 October 2007 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the proceedings and grant her victim status. 66.  On 19 November 2007 the proceedings were resumed and on 13 December 2007 the first applicant was granted victim status. Six days later the proceedings were suspended again. 67.  On 2 July 2008 and 13 April 2009 the applicants contacted the Chechen President and the head of the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons respectively, asking for their assistance in the search for their missing relative. Their requests were forwarded to the investigating authorities, which informed the applicants that the criminal proceedings were still ongoing. 68.  On 21 April 2010 the second applicant requested that the investigators grant her victim status. The next day her request was granted. It appears that the investigation was not formally resumed at that time. 69.  On 12 January 2011 the first applicant asked the Chechen prosecutor to establish her son\u2019s whereabouts and find the culprits. On 31 January 2011 she was informed that her request had been forwarded to the Gudermes prosecutor. 70.  On 14 February 2011 the first applicant asked to be updated on the progress of the investigation and to be allowed to access the criminal case file. Four days later she was given access to a few documents from the file. 71.  On 11 June 2011 the first applicant again requested access to the case file. On 30 June 2011 the investigators dismissed the request on the grounds that the same request had already been granted. 72.  Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 31 October 2011 and on 6 July 2012, and then suspended on 30 November 2011 and 6 August 2012 respectively. No tangible results have been achieved in the meantime. There is no information about further developments in the case. 73.  The first applicant was the mother of Mr Supyan (also spelled as Supiyan) Mukayev, who was born in 1982. She died on 30 November 2013. The second applicant is the father of Mr Supyan Mukayev. The third applicant is the latter\u2019s brother. 74.  At about 3 p.m. on 15 March 2005 Mr Supyan Mukayev and his acquaintance Mr M.Kh. were standing on Groznenskaya Street, across from the Bass petrol station in the village of Shali, when a group of about ten armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms approached them and ordered them to put their hands up. They then forced Mr Supyan Mukayevwas and Mr M.Kh into two separate vehicles, a VAZ-2199 car and a UAZ minivan, parked nearby and drove them off in the direction of Grozny, passing freely through military checkpoints on their way. The abduction was witnessed by several persons. 75.  Shortly thereafter the street was cordoned off by the Vostok-2 battalion of the Russian Defence Ministry. Military vehicles such as APCs and UAZs patrolled the town, while servicemen searched the premises of the local telecommunication agency. 76.  The first applicant, together with other town residents, approached the Shali military commander and asked him for an explanation as to what had happened to Mr Supyan Mukayev and Mr M.Kh. In reply, the officer told her that her son was an informant for illegal armed groups operating in Chechnya. 77.  On the next day, 16 March 2005, the servicemen took Mr M.Kh. to the town of Gudermes and released him there. 78.  At some point after the abduction, the first applicant went to the Shali local administration and spoke to its deputy head, who told her that her son had been arrested by servicemen from the Vostok-2 battalion and had then been detained in Gudermes. 79.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities of what had happened and requested that a criminal case be opened. 80.  On 7 July 2005 the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 46073 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 81.  On the same day the prosecutor contacted various law-enforcement authorities in order to check if Mr Supyan Mukayev had been arrested and placed in custody. The respondent authorities stated that they had no information in that regard. 82.  The next day, 8 July 2005, the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Subsequently, the second applicant was granted victim status on 27 April 2011. 83.  On an unspecified date in September 2005 the investigators obtained a copy of a report of 16 March 2005 prepared by the Shali district military commander and addressed to the Chechnya military commander. According to that document, there had been activity aimed at cordoning off the local telecommunication agency in Shali on 15 March 2005. During that operation two village residents, Mr Supyan Mukayev and Mr M.Kh had been arrested. Mr Supyan Mukayev had been arrested on suspicion of having been a messenger for Mr P.Ch. After that, servicemen of the Vostok battalion had taken him in the direction of Mesker-Yurt village. Another village resident, Mr M.Kh., had been released following an inquiry. 84.  On 13 September 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.Kh. He explained that he had been apprehended in Shali and released a day later in Gudermes. He had been blindfolded and therefore unable to see the abductors or the place where he had been detained. During subsequent questioning, on 2 February 2007 he stated that the perpetrators had been State agents. 85.  On 7 October 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 15 March and 17 July 2006, 16 January and 14 March 2007, 25 April 2011, and 9 July 2012, and then suspended on 15 April and 27 August 2006, 27 February and 15 April 2007, and 9 August 2012 respectively. 86.  In the meantime, on 10 April 2006 the investigators had questioned the deputy head of the Shali local administration. He confirmed that he had spoken with the first applicant about Mr Supyan Mukayev\u2019s abduction, but denied making any references to the Vostok-2 battalion. According to him, at that time he had had only some unverified information that Mr Supyan Mukayev had been apprehended by servicemen. 87.  In February 2007 the investigators questioned several persons who worked at the Bass petrol station and had witnessed the abduction. Their statements were similar to the applicants\u2019 account of the events. 88.  On 14 January 2009 the first applicant asked the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons to assist in the search for her son. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 1 June 2009 that the proceedings had been suspended, but the search was still under way. 89.  In May or June 2011 the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the second applicant and then compared it to those stored in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 90.  There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 91.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Rustam Gaysumov, who was born in 1980. The third applicant is his wife and the fourth and fifth applicants are his children. The sixth and seventh applicants are the parents of Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov, who was born in 1980. 92.  On 8 November 2006 the police conducted a special operation in Druzhby Narodov Square in Grozny. The area was intensively patrolled by a large number of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms. 93.  On the same date, in the morning, Mr Rustam Gaysumov and Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov, both of whom were former members of illegal armed groups in Chechnya, went to Grozny on business. At about 1 p.m. the police stopped their car for an identity check in Druzhby Narodov Square, then arrested them and took them away to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 94.  The applicants submitted written statements from Ms M.E., who worked at a kiosk located in Druzhby Narodov Square, and Ms Sh.N. Both were eyewitnesses to the abduction. Ms M.E. submitted that on 8 November 2006 she had seen servicemen in uniforms and balaclavas armed with automatic weapons. They had conducted a special operation. At around 2 p.m. they had stopped a car with two persons, allegedly Mr Rustam Gaysumov and Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov. Shortly thereafter, one of them had gone to Ms M.E.\u2019s kiosk to buy a blank authorisation form for driving a car and had told her that he was from the Achkhoy-Martan District. Then he had returned to his car. Immediately after that the servicemen had forced Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov into a Niva car and driven off. Ms Sh.N. gave a similar statement. She added that there had been forty to fifty servicemen in the square and the Niva car had been followed by two to three UAZ vehicles. 95.  On 10 November 2006 some of the applicants informed the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. Between November and January 2007 the applicants forwarded similar requests to a number of other law-enforcement agencies. 96.  The Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny carried out a preliminary inquiry into the incident. In particular, he obtained \u201coperative information\u201d that Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov had been apprehended by \u201cunidentified staff members of the Chechen law\u2011enforcement agencies\u201d and had been released later. Apparently, keeping this in mind, on 28 December 2006 the prosecutor refused to open a criminal case. 97.  It appears that at some point later that decision was overruled and on 27 January 2007 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 11006 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 98.  On 31 January and 3 March 2007 the first and seventh applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 99.  On 13 March 2007 the investigators questioned Ms M.E., the lady who worked at the kiosk in Druzhby Narodov Square. She stated that on 8 November 2006 when servicemen had been conducting a special operation in the square, one of them had come to her kiosk to buy a blank authorisation form for driving a car. She had had a limited view from the kiosk\u2019s window, and therefore could not see what had happened thereafter. According to the applicants, Ms M.E. was afraid to tell the investigators about the abduction she had witnessed. 100.  On 27 March 2007 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 101.  On 26 June 2007 the proceedings were resumed and on 17 August 2007 suspended again. 102.  In 2008 the applicants contacted various authorities, including the Chechen Government and the Chechen President, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relatives. Their enquiries were forwarded to the investigators, who informed them that the proceedings had been suspended. 103.  On 22 November 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned relatives of Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov. 104.  On 2 December 2010 the first applicant asked the investigators about progress and applied for victim status in the proceedings. Ten days later he was informed that on 12 December 2010 the proceedings had been suspended. 105.  On 3 March 2011 the seventh applicant also requested information about the investigation\u2019s progress and access to the case file. The outcome of that request is unknown. 106.  Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 17 May and 16 November 2011 and 28 February 2014, and were then suspended on 6 June and 21 December 2011 and 19 March 2014 respectively. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 107.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, who was born in 1975. The first, third and fourth applicants are his siblings and the second applicant is his mother. 108.  At 4 a.m. on 14 June 2003 twelve to fifteen armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived in a white Niva car and armoured UAZ vehicles without registration plates at Mr Alikhan Satuyev\u2019s flat in Grozny. Some of them surrounded the block of flats, while others broke into the flat, handcuffed Mr Satuyev and took him away to an unknown location. 109.  Mr S. Kham., the uncle of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, who was working as a judge at the time, found out that Alikhan Satuyev had been taken to the Oktyabrskiy temporary district department of the interior (\u201cthe Oktyabrskiy VOVD\u201d) by the head of its criminal search department. In a private conversation with the latter, he was told that Alikhan Stauyev had been released on the same day, shortly after his arrest. 110.  On 14 June 2003 the wife of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, Ms L.U., complained of the abduction to the Zavodskoy district department of the interior in Grozny (\u201cthe ROVD\u201d). On the same day the investigators questioned Mr A.D., Mr Satuyev\u2019s neighbour. His submission was similar to those made by the applicants before the Court. Two days later, Ms L.U.\u2019s abduction complaint was forwarded to the Zavodskoy district prosecutor. On 24 June 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 30097 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 111.  On 2 July 2003 the investigators questioned Mr M.B., who stated that on the night of 12-13 June 2003 police officers from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD had apprehended him and taken him to the police station, where they had asked him about Mr Alikhan Satuyev. The police officers had then taken him to the centre of Grozny, where he had shown them where Mr Satuyev\u2019s flat was located. 112.  Later in July 2003 the investigators questioned several officials from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD. The copies of their statements as submitted by the Government were illegible. As far as could be seen from one of them, Mr A.T., the head of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD, spoke with Mr Satuyev\u2019s uncle, Judge S. Kham., and then with Officer N.S. following the judge\u2019s enquiry into the fate of his nephew. The officer informed him that Mr Satuyev had been arrested and apparently released afterwards. 113.  In the period August-September 2003 the investigators attempted to question Officer N.S., but failed to locate him. 114.  On 24 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 115.  On 22 January 2004 the proceedings were resumed. By 20 February 2004 the investigators had obtained the names or nicknames of five officers from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD who had allegedly been involved in the events of 14 June 2003. They asked the Oktyabrskiy VOVD to inform them about the officers\u2019 whereabouts. 116.  On 28 February 2004 the investigators initiated the search for Officer N.S. and suspended the criminal proceedings into the abduction. 117.  On 26 March 2004 the proceedings were resumed. 118.  On 28 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy VOVD informed the investigators that certain persons from the list of alleged perpetrators had left the police owing to the expiration of their employment contracts. The Oktyabrskiy VOVD did not have information about the identity of the officers whose nicknames had been specified by the investigators in their request. 119.  On 14 April 2004 the investigators questioned Officer M.A., who confirmed that on 14 June 2003 he had participated in a special operation under Officer N.S.\u2019s command. In particular, he had cordoned off the area near a block of flats where the arrested person had lived. Officer M.A. did not know that person\u2019s name. 120.  On 26 May 2004 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 121.  On 26 January 2005 the above decision was overruled by the Chechnya deputy prosecutor, who ordered that the proceedings be resumed. 122.  On 16 February 2005 Ms L.U. was granted victim status in the proceedings. 123.  On 8 March 2005 the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 10 January 2006, 20 April 2007, 20 September 2011, and then suspended on 14 January and 23 May 2007 and 20 October 2011 respectively. In the meantime, the applicants contacted various authorities, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relative. 124.  On 15 May 2009 the second applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. On 15 May 2009 the investigators replied to her, stating that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were ongoing. 125.  On 5 October 2011 the second applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. There is no information about further progress in the case. 126.  On 12 August 2011 the second applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny about the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the criminal proceedings. On 20 September 2011 the court dismissed the complaint, as the investigation had already been resumed. 127.  On 8 January 2013 the second applicant lodged a civil claim with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny, seeking compensation in the amount of 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 75,100 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction of her son. 128.  On 21 March 2013 the Leninskiy District Court granted the claim in part, awarding the second applicant RUB 500,000 (approximately EUR 12,500). 129.  On 2 July 2003 the Chechen Supreme Court quashed the above judgment on appeal and dismissed the second applicant\u2019s claim in full, on the grounds of lack of evidence of State agents\u2019 involvement in the abduction. 130.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Vakhab Abubakarov, who was born in 1957. The second and third applicants are his children. 131.  At about 4 a.m. on 26 November 2002 several servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into the applicants\u2019 house in Argun, Chechnya. Speaking unaccented Russian, they asked the members of the applicants\u2019 family to show their identity documents. They then searched the house, took Mr Vakhab Abubakarov outside, and locked the applicants in the house. The applicants\u2019 neighbours heard an APC moving around in the vicinity of their house. 132.  On 26 November 2002 the first applicant complained to the local police of Vakhab Abubakarov\u2019s abduction. 133.  On 28 November 2002 the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78101 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 134.  In November 2002 the investigators contacted various civilian and military authorities to check if Mr Vakhab Abubakarov had been apprehended in the course of a special operation and placed in custody. The respondent authorities had no information about his arrest or detention. 135.  On 4 December 2002 the investigators questioned the members of Mr Abubakarov\u2019s family who had been in the house at the time of his abduction. Their statements were similar to those which they made before the Court. On the same date the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 136.  On 28 January 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 137.  On 4 September 2004 the proceedings were resumed. Two days later the investigators examined the crime scene. 138.  On 4 October 2004 they suspended the proceedings again. 139.  On 22 November 2004 the Shali Town Court declared Mr Vakhab Abubakarov a missing person. 140.  On 4 May 2006 the NGO Memorial enquired about progress in the proceedings on the first applicant\u2019s behalf. By a letter dated 2 June 2006, they were informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 141.  On an unspecified date in early 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to allow her to access the case file. On 6 March 2009 the request was granted. 142.  On 25 May 2009 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons, seeking its assistance in the search for her husband. Her request was then forwarded to the investigators, who informed her on 21 June 2009 that the criminal proceedings into the events of 26 November 2002 had been suspended. 143.  On 5 March 2010 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be granted access to the investigation file. On an unspecified date the investigators replied that the case file had been sent to the Investigative Committee for examination. 144.  On 28 June 2010 the investigation was resumed. It was subsequently suspended on 28 July 2010, then resumed again on 18 August 2010, and suspended one more time on 18 September 2010. 145.  On various dates in July 2010 the investigators questioned several neighbours of the applicants who had heard about the abduction, but had not witnessed it. On 23 July 2010 the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the first applicant. They compared it to the ones in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies, but did not find any matches. 146.  In late 2010 the NGO Materi Chechni asked a member of the Russian Parliament to assist in search for Mr Abubakarov. The first applicant\u2019s inquiry was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 3 November 2010 that the proceedings had been suspended on 18 September 2010. 147.  There is no information about further progress in the investigation. 148.  On 10 June 2010 the applicants complained to the Shali District Court of the investigators\u2019 failure to investigate the case thoroughly and about their decision to suspend the proceedings on 4 October 2004. 149.  On 29 June 2010 the applicants\u2019 complaint was dismissed on account of the investigation being resumed on 28 June 2010. 150.  The applicants appealed, but to no avail. The Chechen Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on 15 September 2010. 151.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Lema (also known as Lom-Ali and also spelled as Lyoma in the documents submitted) Magomadov, who was born in 1981. 152.  On the night of 13-14 November 2002 the applicant and her son, Mr Magomadov, were at home in Grozny when about a hundred armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the entrance of their house. They had automatic weapons, helmets and portable radio sets. Shortly thereafter a group of the intruders forced the door and broke into the house. Having searched its premises, they beat Mr Magomadov and then dragged him away, barefoot and undressed. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the neighbours. 153.  On the morning of 14 November 2002 the applicant\u2019s neighbours examined the area. Along with numerous shoeprints left on the ground, they found prints left by bare feet, presumably those of Mr Magomadov, who had been taken away on foot. Having followed the trail, the neighbours arrived at a checkpoint, where they discovered tyre tracks left by an APC. The neighbours learnt from officers who had been manning the checkpoint on the night of the abduction that an APC had indeed parked at the checkpoint during the night, and at some point a group of military servicemen had arrived with a young man, barefoot and undressed, had put him into the APC and had driven off. 154.  On 14 November 2002 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested their assistance in the search for her son. 155.  The next day the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 48212 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 156.  On the same day, 15 November 2002, the investigators examined the crime scene at the applicant\u2019s house. No evidence was collected. 157.  On 7 January 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. Her statement was similar to the account of the events submitted to the Court. 158.  On 15 January 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 26 May 2004 to question the applicant\u2019s neighbours and \u201cintensify operative search measures\u201d. 159.  In early June 2004 the investigators questioned several neighbours who had not seen the abduction, but had heard about it from the applicant and other village residents. 160.  On 25 June 2004 the investigation was suspended. 161.  On 16 and 25 June 2005, 15 September 2008 and 20 April 2009 the applicant contacted the Grozny town prosecutor, the Chechen Parliament, the Russian Investigative Committee and the head of the Chechen Parliament, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. The authorities forwarded her letters to the investigators, who informed her by letters of 18 August 2005, 14 October 2008 and 23 May 2009 that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 162.  Between May and June 2004 and again in July 2007 the investigators asked a number of authorities to provide them with any information about Mr Magomadov\u2019s whereabouts. They also enquired whether a special operation had been conducted in Grozny on the night of his abduction. No reply in the affirmative followed. 163.  On 4 June 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings. Several days later they questioned the applicant again. She confirmed her previous statement. A month later, on 4 July 2010 the proceedings were suspended. 164.  On 27 August 2011 the applicant asked the investigators about developments in the case and asked them to allow her to access the case file documents. On 15 September 2011 her application was granted. She was also informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 165.  There is no information about further developments in the case. 166.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny of the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps to find her son. 167.  On 11 February 2010 the court dismissed her complaint as ill\u2011founded. 168.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev, who was born in 1980. 169.  At the material time, Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev was staying in Grozny on business. He was residing in a flat belonging to his acquaintances, Ilyas and Isa Yansuyev. 170.  At about 4 or 5 a.m. on 13 February 2003 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the Yansuyevs\u2019 block of flats in two APCs, apprehended Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev, Mr Ilyas Yansuyev and Mr Isa Yansuyev, and drove them off to an unknown destination. 171.  The circumstances of the abduction are described in detail in the application lodged by relatives of the Yansuyev brothers: Sasita Israilova and Others v. Russia, no. 35079/04, \u00a7\u00a7 9-15, 28 October 2010. 172.  On 13 February 2003 the applicant complained of the abduction to the Leninskiy District military commander. The family of Mr Ilyas Yansuyev and Mr Isa Yansuyev joined the complaint. 173.  The next day investigators from the Leninskiy district department of the interior examined the crime scene. They found a bloodstain and collected a sample from it. 174.  On 17 May 2003 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 20039 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 175.  The course of the investigation, from its beginning until 14 April 2009, is described in Sasita Israilova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 20-78. 176.  On 14 April 2009 the criminal proceedings were resumed. On various dates in April and May the investigators questioned relatives of the abducted persons and their neighbours, all of whom repeated their statements which they had given to the investigators before. On 18 May 2009 an expert examined the blood sample collected on 14 February 2003 and concluded that it had rotted owing to the wrong packaging being used and was not usable. Three days later the proceedings were suspended. 177.  On 22 February 2012 the NGO Materi Chechni contacted the head of the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons on the applicant\u2019s behalf, seeking assistance in the search for Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev. The head of the committee asked the investigators to inform him about the course of the proceedings. On 14 April 2012 the investigators replied that the proceedings had been stayed, but operative search activity was under way. 178.  On 5 April 2012 the applicant asked the investigators to inform her of the progress made and to allow her to access the case file. On 17 April 2012 the request was granted. 179.  On 17 July 2014 the investigators resumed the proceedings and five days later obtained the applicant\u2019s DNA sample to compare it to the ones in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 180.  On 6 August 2014 the proceedings were suspended again. There is no information about further developments. 181.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Islam Asukhanov, who was born in 1968. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. 182.  At about 3 a.m. on 30 May 2003 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants\u2019 house in the village of Goyty, Chechnya, searched it, and took Mr Islam Asukhanov to an unknown destination. 183.  On 30 May 2003 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus\u2011Martan district department of the interior (\u201cthe Urus\u2011Martan ROVD\u201d). On the same day the investigators examined the crime scene and collected some fingerprints. 184.  The next day the first applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Chechnya prosecutor. She stated that Mr Islam Asukhanov had been abducted by a group of fifteen persons in camouflage uniforms. Some of them had cordoned off the house, while others had climbed over the fence and entered the premises. They had forced her husband into a white VAZ car and driven off to an unknown destination. After the abduction she had contacted servicemen who were manning the checkpoint at the entrance of Goyty. The servicemen had told her that two APCs and two cars had driven into Goyty at around 2 a.m. and had left the village thirty minutes later. They had headed to the village of Atagy. 185.  On an unspecified date the first applicant\u2019s complaints were forwarded to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. On 6 June 2003 the latter sent several requests to law-enforcement authorities, military authorities and the FSB in the Urus-Martan district to check if Mr Islam Asukhanov had been apprehended during a special operation. The replies received were all in the negative. 186.  On 14 June 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34064 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 187.  On 14 August 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 188.  On 13 June 2006 the above decision was overruled as premature and the proceedings were resumed. 189.  On 10 July 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbour, Ms R.U. She stated that on the night of 30 May 2003 she had seen a white VAZ vehicle on the street. The next morning the first applicant had told her that her husband, Mr Islam Asukhanov, had been abducted. 190.  On 12 July 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She stated, among other things, that the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian and had been armed with automatic weapons. 191.  The next day the investigation was suspended. 192.  On 5 August 2009 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be allowed to access the case file. Six days later she was allowed to access some of the case file documents. The remainder of her request was dismissed. 193.  On 23 June 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and question several witnesses to the abduction. 194.  On 27 June 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings to question the witnesses mentioned by the first applicant. However, the investigators questioned none of them and on 1 July 2011 they suspended the proceedings again. 195.  On 13 April 2012 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide an update about new developments in the proceedings. On 24 April 2012 she was informed that the proceedings in the case had been suspended. 196.  Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 12 June and 18 September 2012, 30 May and 1 August 2014, and then suspended on 22 June and 28 September 2012, 6 July 2014 and 7 August 2014 respectively. 197.  On 20 June 2014 the investigators questioned several neighbours of the applicants, none of whom had seen the abduction, but had heard about it from the applicant. 198.  There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 199.  On 16 September 2010 the first applicant complained to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court, challenging the investigators\u2019 refusal of 5 August 2009 to provide her with access to the entire case file and resume the proceedings. The complaint was allowed on 27 September 2010. 200.  In June 2012, in two separate sets of proceedings, the first applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decisions of 1 July 2011 and 22 June 2012 to suspend the investigation before the Urus\u2011Martan Town Court. 201.  On 15 June and 21 September 2012 respectively the court dismissed the challenges on the grounds that the proceedings had already been resumed. 202.  On 28 September 2012 the first applicant appealed to the Chechnya Supreme Court against the second decision, and on 17 October 2012 the court upheld it.", "references": ["9", "7", "6", "8", "3", "4", "5", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Utena. 6.  The historical background is summarised in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, \u00a7\u00a7 11-14, ECHR 2015. 7.  Adolfas Ramanauskas, code name \u201cVanagas\u201d (hereinafter \u2013 also A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d), was born in 1918 in the United States of America. In 1921 his family returned to Lithuania. He was a teacher. 8.  As established by the domestic courts, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d became a participant in the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation, a Lithuanian partisan, on 25 June 1945. Initially, he led a partisan squad, later he became a commander of a partisan battalion, then commander of a brigade, and from October 1948 he was the commander of the south Lithuania region. In 1949 an all-partisan organisation, the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania (Lietuvos laisv\u0117s kovos saj\u016bdis (\u201cLLKS\u201d)) was formed. On 16 February 1949 the organisation adopted a declaration stating that the LLKS Council was \u201cthe highest political authority of the nation, leading the nation\u2019s political and military struggle for freedom\u201d. That year, in the assembly of partisan commanders of the whole of Lithuania, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d was appointed first deputy of the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS (Lietuvos laisv\u0117s kovos saj\u016bd\u017eio tarybos prezidiumo pirmininko pavaduotojas). Later that year he was also elected commander in chief of the defence forces of the LLKS. In 1951 A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d became chairman of the LLKS Council. 9.  In 1956 he was captured and tortured, and in 1957 sentenced to death and shot (see also paragraphs 20-31 below). 10.  After restoration of Lithuania\u2019s independence in 1990, by a ruling of 19 March 1991 A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court. 11.  In 1997 \u201cVanagas\u201d was posthumously recognised as a participant in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation and granted volunteer serviceman status. 12.  In 1998 and 1999 he posthumously received the military rank of brigadier general, and was granted the State decorations. 13.  On 16 October 2003 the Seimas granted to A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d, as a person who had signed the declaration of the LLKS of 16 February 1949, the status of signatory to the act of independence of Lithuania. 14.  The Seimas, inter alia, having regard to the fact that on 6 March 2018 it was 100 years since the birth of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d, emphasising the importance of the partisan movement fighting against the Soviet occupation, seeking to give due respect to that historic personality for the Lithuanian nation, proclaimed the year 2018 as the year of Adolfas Ramanauskas \u201cVanagas\u201d. 15.  On 20 November 2018 the Seimas also declared the leader of the partisans A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d the head of the Lithuanian State which had fought the Soviet occupation. His remains were discovered the same year and he received State funeral. 16.  Birut\u0117 Ma\u017eeikait\u0117, code name \u201cVanda\u201d (hereinafter \u2013 also B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d), was born in 1924. From 1945 she was a liaison person (ry\u0161inink\u0117) of the partisans of the Dainava Region, and was later a partisan in that region. She was A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d wife. 17.  In 1956 she was captured, and in 1957 sentenced to deportation (see also paragraphs 20-32 below). 18.  She was rehabilitated on 18 September 1989 by the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR. 19.  In 1998 B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d was recognised as a participant in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation. 20. As established by the domestic courts, for two years from March 1950 the applicant had studied at the Lithuanian SSR (hereinafter \u2013 the LSSR) Ministry of State Security (MGB) School in Vilnius. Upon graduation from that establishment in 1952, he was granted the military rank of officer-lieutenant, and joined the 2-N Board of the LSSR MGB, the main function of which was the fight against the national resistance movement. In particular, the division where the applicant worked was tasked with carrying out surveillance of the members and leadership of the Lithuanian underground movement. From 1952 the applicant was also a member of the USSR Communist Party. 21.  At the time of arrest of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.B. \u201cVanda\u201d in 1956, the applicant was a senior operative officer at the KGB (successor to the MGB; see paragraph 24 of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in paragraph 51 below and paragraph 54 below), and had the rank of senior lieutenant. 22.  According to a report of 18 October 1956 by the Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR to the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, which was relied on during the criminal proceedings against the applicant, from 1945 A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had been an active participant in the \u201cbourgeois\u201d \u201cnational underground\u201d. The report also noted the role of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d in the LLKS, where he had eventually been declared the chief commander of the defence forces and had been granted the military rank of general (also see paragraph 8 above). Notwithstanding the fact that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had been in hiding with his wife B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d, he retained that rank until the day of his capture. 23.  The report also stated that following the plan for \u201cliquidating the remaining banditry in the Republic (banditizmo liku\u010di\u0173 Respublikoje likvidavimas)\u201d set by the KGB of the USSR, \u201cparticular attention\u201d and \u201cparamount importance\u201d had been given to the search for and capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d. The report noted that in 1950-53 some of the \u201cbandit gangs\u201d had been liquidated. Nonetheless, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his wife had succeeded in avoiding capture by moving within Lithuanian territory. A special operative group from among the qualified Chekists of the KGB was therefore established to work continuously in the search for A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d. In 1956 alone, a total of thirty agents were recruited to pursue A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his family. Places where it was possible A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his wife would show up in the towns of Kaunas and Merkin\u0117 were covered by reliable and qualified agents; in other places where he might also appear active measures, including cooperation with the armed forces of the Ministry of the Interior, were employed so that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d could not set up a new hideout. 24.  The report also stated that on 11 October 1956 one of the agents, \u201c\u017d\u201d, alerted the security services that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his wife B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d would be staying at his home in Kaunas overnight. The same day operation was then planned for their capture. 25.  The plan specified that two detention groups were composed to effect the seizure: the first group, consisting of six operative agents and led by mayor J.O., was to be in a car approximately 200 metres from \u201c\u017d\u201d\u2018s house in Kampo Street; the second group, consisting of six operative agents and led by mayor N.D., was to be in another car in Algirdo Street, approximately 300 metres from that house. As later established by the trial court, the applicant was included in the second detention group (see paragraph 38 below). Radio contact between the two detention groups and surveillance of the house as well as surrounding objects (railway tracks, bridges, and so on) was to be assured. The plan also stipulated that either group could arrest A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d; it only depended which street they chose to walk into. The plan also stipulated that further instructions to the agents who were to take part in that operation would be given by the deputies to the LSSR KGB Chairman. 26.  According to the KGB documents, on 12 October 1956 at about 8.30 a.m., A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d left \u201c\u017d\u201d\u2018s house in Kaunas. They walked on to Kampas Street, where they were seized by the KGB officers. They were carrying two pistols and two seals inscribed \u201cLLKS Presidium\u201d and \u201cLLKS Military Headquarters (LLKS ginkluot\u0173j\u0173 paj\u0117g\u0173 \u0161tabas)\u201d, forged passports, and other documents. After the arrest, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d were transported to Vilnius, where at about 2 p.m. they were detained in the prison of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR in Vilnius. 27.  On 15 October 1956 the head of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR wrote a special report to the Chairman of the LSSR Communist Party to the effect that now that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had been captured \u201cthe liquidation of the commanders of Lithuania\u2019s bourgeois nationalist banditry formations was complete\u201d. 28.  The report of 18 October 1956 (see paragraph 22 above) also concluded that \u201chaving arrested the last leader of the Lithuanian nationalist underground [A.]R., the liquidation of the former heads of the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalist banditry formations was totally completed\u201d. 29.  As detailed in a medical report of 15 October 1956 by the doctors at the KGB hospital in Vilnius, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d was taken to that hospital at 4:30 p.m. on 12 October 1956 in a particularly grave condition. He was unconscious, his blood pressure was barely felt; he had muscle tremors. Upon medical examination it was established that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had six stab wounds to his right eye socket, wounds in his stomach, a wide wound from a tearing on his scrotum; both his testicles were gone. He was given a blood transfusion and thus stabilised, and he was operated on. The doctors noted that if his health allowed A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d could be interrogated after two or three weeks. 30.  In the KGB decision of 13 October 1956 on the detention of \u201cVanagas\u201d it was, inter alia, stated that by nationality he was Lithuanian, and he also belonged to \u201cLithuanian bourgeois nationalists\u201d. The decision underlined the specific, active and leading role of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d in the partisan movement. The decision also noted that in 1946-47 A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d took an active part in the publication of the anti-Soviet newspapers Bell of Freedom (Laisv\u0117s varpas) and Voice of Freedom (Laisv\u0117s balsas). 31.  On 24-25 September 1957 the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR found A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d guilty of counter-revolutionary crime and treason against the \u201cMotherland\u201d and sentenced to death. He was shot on 29 November 1957 in Vilnius. 32.  By a decision of the Supreme Court of the LSSR of 8 May 1957, B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d was sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. She was deported to the Soviet Gulags in Kemerovo region, in Siberia, in what is now the Russian Federation. 33.  After Lithuania regained its independence, on 13 June 2014 the applicant was charged with being an accessory to genocide, in accordance with Articles 24 \u00a7 6 and 99 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below), for having taken part in the operation of 11-12 October 1956 during which A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d was captured, and subsequently tortured, sentenced to death and executed, and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d was captured and afterwards sentenced to deportation. The prosecutor noted that both partisans were members of the \u201cLithuanian armed resistance to the Soviet occupation\u201d and members of a \u201cseparate national-ethnic-political group\u201d.\n(b)  The trial court\u2019s judgment 34.  By a judgment of 12 March 2015 the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of being an accessory to genocide under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. It held that on 11 and 12 October 1956 the applicant had taken part in an operation during which one of the most prominent leaders of the Lithuanian partisans, who was also the chairman of the all-partisan organisation, the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d, was captured together with his wife, B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d, who was also a partisan. Afterwards, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d was detained in a KGB prison, tortured nearly to death, sentenced, and executed (see paragraphs 29 and 31 above); B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d was sentenced to deportation (see paragraph 32 above). 35.  Referring at length to the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling of 18 March 2014 (see paragraph 59 below; other relevant extracts from that ruling are reproduced in Vasiliauskas, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 56-63), the trial court pointed out that, in cases where the intention was to exterminate part of a protected group, that part should be sufficiently significant to have an impact on the survival of the entire protected group (see paragraph 59 below). The trial court underlined that Lithuanian partisans were also representatives of the Lithuanian nation (lietuvi\u0173 tauta), and therefore representatives of a national group. It noted that Soviet genocide had been perpetrated precisely in accordance with the inhabitants\u2019 \u201cnational\u201d criterion. In the case at hand, given their background, to which the court also gave particular consideration (see paragraphs 8 and 16 above), A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d, as active participants in the resistance to the Soviet occupation, \u201chad been important for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation), defined by ethnic characteristics, given that armed resistance to the occupation obstructed the Soviet occupation authorities in carrying out deportations or taking other repressive measures against Lithuanian civilians\u201d. Relying on the aforementioned Constitutional Court ruling, the trial court also noted that the applicant \u201chad served in the MGB/KGB unit, the main task of which was the elimination of part of Lithuania\u2019s population \u2013 members of the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation, belonging to a separate national-ethnic-political group, and which had an impact on the survival of the national-ethnic group\u201d. 36.  The trial court held that by having taken part in the aforesaid operation the applicant had committed genocide of Lithuanian partisans, who constituted a \u201cnational\u2011ethnic\u2011political group\u201d. Article 99 of the Criminal Code could thus be applied retroactively. The court also noted that four of the protected groups listed in that Article (national, ethnic, racial and religious) coincided with those protected under international law norms. 37.  On the facts of the case the trial court also rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments that he could not be held liable for the fate of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d since he had not personally arrested them, nor had he been involved in the sentencing of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d or the deportation of B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d. The court noted that from 1952 the applicant had worked as an operational agent of the MGB. Furthermore, on 12 October 1956 he had been not a simple member of that repressive organisation, but an officer of senior rank. Accordingly, \u201che perfectly well understood one of the core goals of that repressive structure of that period in occupied Lithuania \u2013 to finally physically eliminate the members of the organised Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet occupation \u2013 Lithuanian partisans, their contacts and supporters\u201d. Moreover, the applicant had served in the MGB/KGB voluntarily, and had not been forced by anyone. From his earlier experience in that service \u201che had clearly known that such a high-ranking participant in the Lithuanian national resistance to the occupational regime as A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his spouse B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d without doubt would be physically eliminated or deported, since this was the practice of the repressive structures in Lithuania at that time, and was applied not only to those representing resistance to the occupying Soviet regime, but even to those individuals who had nothing to do with the resistance\u201d. 38.  The trial court also noted that the applicant had taken part in the impugned \u201cparticularly professionally organised and very much clandestine\u201d operation for the capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and his spouse B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d of his own free will. Although the applicant did not apprehend them personally, he took actions which assisted in their arrest. It was also clear that apart from the members of the group that personally arrested A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d, other individuals, including the applicant, also took actions which aided the arrest. Without those other persons\u2019 participation in the operation \u2013 such as those who had betrayed the two partisans, and those who had followed them and blocked neighbouring streets, yards or bridges so that they could not escape, the arrest would not have been successful. Furthermore, according to the archive materials, the applicant was a member of the reserve group for the arrest, whose role according to the plan was analogous to the role of those who actually had arrested A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d. It was only because A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d chose to walk on to the street where the applicant\u2019s arrest group was not positioned that meant it was the first arrest group which captured the two partisans (see paragraph 25 above). Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s role in that operation had still been an important one. 39.  In that context the trial court also rejected the applicant\u2019s line of defence that he had not even been present in the operation in Kaunas, because he had already arrived at the KGB headquarters in Vilnius, where all the participants in that operation had gathered in its wake, in service uniform instead of plain clothes, and that he had therefore been excluded from taking part in that operation. The trial court pointed out that every action in a repressive organisation such as the KGB was painstakingly regulated and documented. Had the applicant in reality arrived in service uniform, this would have been evaluated as a gross breach of his duties and, without a doubt, would have been recorded in the KGB documents. On the contrary, after the operation the KGB placed even more confidence in him, and he was entrusted with the guard of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d at the KGB hospital and visiting him in prison, a right which was not vouchsafed to other participants in that operation. 40.  Having taken into account the applicant\u2019s advanced age and the fact that the crime had been committed more than fifty years previously, the trial court considered that the minimum sanction \u2013 deprivation of liberty in a correctional home for a period of five years \u2013 was appropriate. The court noted that although the applicant\u2019s health was weak, it was not so fragile that he could not serve a sentence involving deprivation of liberty. He began serving the sentence.\n(c)  The Court of Appeal 41.  On 10 July 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld his conviction for genocide under Article 99 of the Criminal Code. Relying on the Constitutional Court ruling of 18 March 2014, the Court of Appeal emphasised the Lithuanian partisans\u2019 role during the Lithuanian inhabitants\u2019 resistance to the Soviet occupation. It underscored that the Lithuanian partisans had been significant for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation) defined by ethnic characteristics, given that the partisans obstructed the Soviet repressive structures designed to facilitate deportation and other forms of persecution of civilians in Lithuania. The partisans accordingly fell within a \u201cseparate national-ethnic-political group\u201d. 42.  The Court of Appeal also underlined that both A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d had been active participants in the resistance to the Soviet occupation. In fact, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had been one of its leaders (the court referred to his service history, see paragraphs 8\u201315 above, and Lithuanian legislation as to the status of volunteer soldiers). Accordingly, the repressive structures\u2019 actions against them could be considered as targeted against a \u201csignificant part of a national-ethnic-political group\u201d. This was also proved by the fact that their capture had been declared by the KGB as the end of the \u201cliquidation of former bourgeois nationalist banditry formations\u201d (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). Although the active resistance ended in 1953, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d were searched for by the Soviet authorities even after this. The domestic court paid attention to documents from the relevant time which showed that a particular commitment was made to ensuring the capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d in pursuance of the plan for liquidation of the Lithuanian partisans. In his testimony the applicant confessed that at the time he was aware of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d, that the latter was leader of the partisan movement, and that he was in hiding. Accordingly, the mere fact that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d had succeeded in hiding from repression, not only during the partisan war but until their capture in 1956, was not an impediment to qualifying the applicant\u2019s actions as genocide. 43.  As to the applicant\u2019s guilt, the appellate court also found that he, having studied at the MGB school and joined that service of his own free will, understood at the time the special goal of the Soviet totalitarian policy, which was to physically exterminate those participating in the Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet occupation regime \u2013 the Lithuanian partisans \u2212 \u201cso that the basis of the Lithuanian civil nation (pilietin\u0117 tauta) would be destroyed\u201d. Accordingly, when briefed on 11 October 1956 about the operation for the arrest of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d, the applicant must have understood the danger of his actions, comprehended what was the intended result of that operation, and sought that outcome (the death and deportation of those arrested). In that context, the fact that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d were not killed during the operation in which they were captured did not refute the special aim of exterminating the \u201cnational-ethnic-political group\u201d, namely the Lithuanian partisans. Nor had that aim been negated by the fact that afterwards the applicant was not responsible for deciding the means, namely issuing a death sentence or a sentence of deprivation of liberty, by which that goal would be achieved. 44.  The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicant\u2019s claim that during the impugned operation he had been at the KGB headquarters in Kaunas and had not been in the street where the operation took place, and thus had not taken part in the operation for the capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d. This was proved by the archive documents, a witness statement, and the applicant\u2019s own testimony given during the pre-trial investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that, when arrested on 12 October 1956, A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had attempted to commit suicide. The injuries, such as those noted in the medical expert report (see paragraph 29 above), could not have been self-inflicted.\n(d)  The Supreme Court 45.  At the applicant\u2019s request, on 18 January 2016 the Supreme Court suspended the execution of his sentence and ordered that he be released from the correctional home until the merits of his appeal on points of law had been examined by the Supreme Court. 46.  By a final ruling of 12 April 2016, the Supreme Court, sitting in a plenary session formation (plenarin\u0117 sesija) of seventeen judges, upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions as regards the applicant being guilty of genocide. However, it amended the lower courts\u2019 decisions by reducing the applicant\u2019s sentence to five months\u2019 deprivation of liberty, which meant that by that time he had already served his sentence. 47.  Relying, among other sources, on the Court\u2019s judgment in Vasiliauskas (cited above), the Supreme Court firstly established that in 1956, at the time of commission of the act by the applicant, genocide was recognised as a crime under international law. Given the applicant\u2019s background in MGB/KGB, the international legal instruments prohibiting genocide (as well as complicity in committing genocide) and providing for criminal liability for genocide must have been known to him.\n(i)  Regarding the elements of the crime of genocide and the application of Article 99 of the Criminal Code 48.  As to the definition of genocide in Lithuanian law and its compatibility with the principle of rule of law, the Supreme Court recapitulated:\n\u201c11. When defining the crime of genocide in Article 99 of the Criminal Code, in addition to national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, social and political groups, that is, the two groups which were not provided for when defining the crime of genocide under the universally recognised norms of international law have been included. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has pointed out in the Ruling of 18 March 2014 that \u2018<...> the inclusion of social and political groups into the definition of genocide in Article 99 of the Criminal Code <...> was determined by a concrete legal and historical context \u2013 the international crimes committed by the occupation regimes in the Republic of Lithuania\u2019. The Constitutional Court, inter alia, concluded that the legal regulation established in Article 99 of the Criminal Code and a broader interpretation of the crime of genocide does not conflict with the Constitution. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has held that paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Criminal Code ..., in so far as this paragraph establishes the legal regulation under which a person may be brought to trial under Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the actions aimed at physically destroying, in whole or in part, the persons belonging to any social or political group, where such actions had been committed prior to the time when liability was established in the Criminal Code for the genocide of persons belonging to any social or political group (thus, the establishment of the retroactive effect of Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the actions which are classified as genocide only under the norms of national law) was in conflict with Article 31 \u00a74 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law.\u201d 49.  The Supreme Court also gave particular consideration to the Court\u2019s judgment in Vasiliauskas (cited above), and held:\n\u201c12. In the context of the cassation case at issue, the judgment rendered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 20 October 2015, after the decisions disputed in the given proceedings, in the case Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania (application no. 35343/05) is relevant. The Court held that there has been a violation of Article 7 (nullum crimen sine lege) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the conviction of the applicant under Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the genocide of a political group of the Lithuanian population \u2013 participation in the killing of two Lithuanian partisans in 1953. The Court, inter alia, found that in 1953 international treaty law did not include a \u2018political group\u2019 in the definition of genocide, nor could it be established with sufficient clarity that customary international law provided for a broader definition of genocide than that set out in Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention (Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, \u00a7 178). In examining whether the interpretation of the actions of V. Vasiliauskas provided by the Lithuanian courts in the case of the applicant V. Vasiliauskas conformed to the concept of the notion of genocide as it stood in 1953, the Court, inter alia, noted that authorities have discretion to interpret the definition of genocide more broadly than that contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention. However, such discretion does not permit domestic tribunals to convict persons accused under that broader definition retrospectively. Considering the fact that in 1953 political groups were excluded from the definition of genocide under international law, the [Court] held that the prosecutors were precluded from retroactively charging, and the domestic courts from retroactively convicting, the applicant of genocide of Lithuanian partisans, as members of a political group.\nIt also follows from the judgment of the [Court] in the case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania that the Grand Chamber held that the Lithuanian courts had failed to adequately substantiate their conclusions in the judgments rendered in the criminal case of V. Vasiliauskas that the Lithuanian partisans constituted a significant part of the national group, that is, a group protected under Article II of the Genocide Convention.\u201d 50.  On the question of attribution of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d to a significant part of a \u201cseparate national-ethnic-political group\u201d, and the twofold concept of the nation, the Supreme Court held:\n\u201c13. It has been mentioned that in the criminal case at issue S.D. has been convicted of aiding representatives of the Soviet occupational power to commit genocidal acts against A.R. and B.M. as \u2018members of a distinct national-ethnic-political group, namely one engaging in armed resistance to the Soviet occupation\u2019. The appellate court noted that Lithuanian partisans \u2013 members of the armed resistance to the occupational power \u2013 are attributed to a \u2018separate national-ethnic-political group\u2019 and assessed the unlawful actions directed against A.R. and B.M. by the repressive structures of the occupational power as directed towards a significant \u2018part of the national-ethnic-political group\u2019. Thus, the courts described partisans as a national- ethnic-political group. According to the law, where at least one element of a national or ethnic or political group (or a part thereof) under extermination is identified, that is a sufficient basis (also in the presence of other constitutive elements of genocide) to apply Article 99 of the Criminal Code. The above-referred characteristics of a group (or a part thereof) exterminated by genocide have an autonomous alternative meaning of a constitutive element of corpus delicti.\nThus, S.D. has been convicted of aiding in the commission of genocide against the persons belonging to the national, ethnic and political group. A political group is not on the list of groups protected by the Genocide Convention. However, that does not make the application of criminal liability to S.D. for genocide unjustified. Criminal actions directed at the extermination of persons belonging to any group protected under the Convention are deemed to be genocide. The courts have held that A.R. and B.M., as members of the resistance to the Soviet occupation who belonged to a political group, were also members of the groups of individuals protected under the Genocide Convention \u2013 a national and an ethnic group \u2013 therefore, where genocide against any of these groups is discovered, this constitutes a basis for the application of criminal liability. It should be noted that the factual circumstance identified by the courts, namely the affiliation of A.R. and B.M. to a political group, Lithuanian partisans, is relevant in disclosing the essence of the criminal offence and historically may not be assessed separately from the assessment of a national and ethnic group as a characteristic.\u201d\n\u201c18. It should be noted in the context of the case at issue that the definition of a national and an ethnic group should be linked with the concept of a nation, the understanding whereof is twofold ... The first meaning is related to the notion of ethnicity or an ethnic group, and means a historically developed community \u2013 an ethnic nation with common ethnic, cultural characteristics (origin, language, self-awareness, territory, ethnopsychology, traditions, and so on). Thus, an ethnic group is a community of persons with a common origin, language, culture, and self-identity. The other meaning of a nation pertains to the notion of nation (Latin natio) or a modern nation to which, as a formation, the attributes of statehood, nationalism and citizenship are characteristic. Therefore, a nation may be defined as a community of people historically formed on the basis of a common language, territory, socioeconomic life, culture and national self-identity, with a common national, political and economic perspective. Thus, a national group means a historically developed community of people belonging to a certain nation, formed on the basis of language, territory, socioeconomic life, culture, national self-identity and other common characteristics. Individuals belonging to both a national and an ethnic group may be interrelated, and a complete delimitation of such groups as a separate formation in the crime of genocide is not always possible.\u201d 51.  As to the international legal and historical context in 1940-56 and the national resistance to the Soviet repression the Supreme Court expounded:\n\u201c20. In the context of the proceedings at issue, it is highly important to consider the international legal and historical circumstances of the period between 1940 and 1956, as well as the scope (massive scale) of the national resistance to the occupying power and the scale of repression of the Soviet occupying power against the Lithuanian population. 21. As is generally known, on 15 June 1940 an act of aggression was carried out by the USSR against the Republic of Lithuania, namely the invasion of the Soviet armed forces into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and the occupation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. Continuing its aggression, the USSR carried out the annexation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania on 3 August 1940. In June 1941 the Republic of Lithuania was occupied by the German Reich: the latter occupation began on 22 June 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union and ended in 1944\u201345 after the USSR had reoccupied the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. The second Soviet occupation continued until 11 March 1990, when the independence of the Republic of Lithuania was restored. 22. After the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania, its residents suffered mass acts of repression that violated fundamental human rights to life, health, freedom and dignity...\n[The Supreme Court then cited passages from the ruling of 18 March 2014 of the Constitutional Court about the scale of repressions, see Vasiliauskas, cited above, \u00a7 62]. 23. The occupants used the most brutal methods of fighting: they destroyed the farmsteads of partisan families and their supporters with mortar fire, publicly disfigured dead bodies in public squares of towns and villages, and arranged provocations by hitmen agents ... Repression was also applied against the families of participants in the resistance and their supporters: their property (farms) was confiscated, and their families were exiled en masse. On the basis of resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the largest deportations of Lithuanians were carried out in 1948-51. The first two deportations (in May 1948 and March-April 1949) were officially directed against the families of known partisans and persons in hiding, partisans who had been killed, and convicted persons, also against the participants in the resistance: in May 1948 more than 40,000 residents (around 11,000 families) were deported from Lithuania, and in March\u2013April 1949 more than 32,000 people (around 10,000 families)... 24. The main bodies of the Soviet occupational power that carried out repressive acts in the suppression of the Lithuanian national resistance against occupants from 1944 were the relevant structures of the People\u2019s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People\u2019s Commissariat for State Security (NKVD and NKGB) of the LSSR; from 1946, the people\u2019s commissariats were renamed ministries (the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security (MGB)), which became from 1954 the State Security Department of the LSSR (KGB), there were also internal security units of the USSR NKVD-MVD-MGB, special \u201cextermination\u201d squads (stribai) and other repressive bodies. By the Law of 16 July 1998 \u201cOn the Assessment of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Current Activities of the Staff Members of this Organisation\u201d, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania recognised the NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB as a criminal organisation which had committed war crimes, genocide, acts of repression, terror and political persecution in the Republic of Lithuania occupied by the USSR. 25. The annihilation of the participants in the armed national resistance, namely Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, by the occupying power and its repressive bodies, was systematic, consistent, based on a clear methodology and instructions. It has been mentioned that the acts of repression were directed against the most active and advanced part of the Lithuanian nation as a national, ethnic group. Such extermination had the clear aim of influencing the demographic changes of the Lithuanian nation and its very survival, as well as at facilitating the sovietisation of the occupied Lithuania. The extermination of the resistance participants not only meant the elimination of obstacles to the objectives of the occupying regime; it also had another purpose, namely to intimidate the residents of Lithuania by showing what destiny awaited those who refused to obey the occupying power.\nIt should be noted that Resolution No 1481 of 25 January 2006 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe \u2018On the Need for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes\u2019 stated that the communist regimes justified massive violations of human rights and crimes against them in the name of the class struggle theory and the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat; they legitimised the elimination of people who were considered harmful to the construction of a new society and as such enemies of the regime, and a vast number of victims in every country concerned were its ethnic residents.\u201d 52.  As to the partisans\u2019 role specifically, the Supreme Court stated:\n\u201c26. When the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania for the second time, tens of thousands of Lithuanian residents joined the struggle against the occupants. In 1944-45, about 30,000 armed men joined forces in the forests. ... The majority chose armed struggle consciously and were committed to fighting until the restoration of an independent Lithuanian State... Partisan groups regulated their activities with statutes and rules. Those who joined the partisans took an oath. Partisans wore military uniforms with distinctive signs. The ten years of resistance, also known as the Lithuanian War or the resistance or partisan war, is exceptional in the history of Lithuania from several aspects: its duration (almost ten years), universality (during the entire period there were at least 50,000 active members of the armed resistance and about 100,000 others who participated in the resistance as members of underground organisations and supporters), and the unequal balance of power which was unfavourable to the Lithuanian partisans .... On 10-20 February 1949 an assembly of Lithuania\u2019s partisan commanders took place; this brought together the units of the anti-Soviet resistance into one organisation, namely the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania (LLKS). This organisation, under the leadership of General Jonas \u017demaitis\u2013Vytautas, adopted military-political documents proclaiming the LLKS as the organisation which was leading the political and military liberation struggle of the nation and represented the ideals of independent Lithuania in the occupied country. During the assembly, on 16 February 1949, a political declaration was adopted, whereby the restoration of the independent parliamentary Republic of Lithuania was declared the final goal of the partisan movement\u2019s struggle. 27. According to the laws of the Republic of Lithuania ... \u2018[d]uring the occupation period, the LLKS Council [was] the supreme political body of the nation, in charge of the political and military fight for the liberation of the nation\u2019)... 29. People of different status participated in the national armed resistance, mostly Lithuanians by nationality; they were united by a common goal, namely to restore the independence of Lithuania. The resistance was supported and the occupation was also resisted in other ways by a large part of the Lithuanian nation. As mentioned, according to the data available not less than 50,000 people participated actively in the armed resistance that lasted for a decade, and the whole resistance movement involved around 100,000 residents of Lithuania, as members of underground organisations and supporters; around 20,000 Lithuanian partisans and their supporters were killed in total during the resistance. It should be noted that according to the data of the Department of Statistics of Lithuania, in 1945 the population of Lithuania was 2.5 million ..., and there were approximately 2.3 million residents in 1951 .... Although the numbers who participated in the resistance and suffered from the repression are undoubtedly high, they should be considered not only by \u201cquantitative\u201d criterion but also in the context of the overall scale of the repression, including massive deportations of civilians. It has been mentioned that the acts of repression by the Soviet power were also directed against the family members of partisans and their connections and supporters, who were also incarcerated, deported or killed: [in this way,] it was also aimed at the extermination of a large part of the Lithuanian nation, a national, ethnic group. Thus, the total number of victim participants in the resistance \u2013 Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, who were killed or suffered repression of other kinds, is significant both in absolute terms and considering the size of the total population of Lithuania at that time. 30. It has been mentioned that armed participants in the resistance, Lithuanian partisans, who had the support of Lithuanian residents, were putting into practice the right of the nation to self-defence against occupation and aggression. The armed resistance obstructed the Soviet occupational structures in carrying out their deportations, exiles, and other repressive measures against Lithuanian civilians. In this way the participants in the resistance not only really sought to ensure the survival of the nation (by defending it) but also embodied that survival. The leadership of Lithuanian partisans was the supreme political and military power, represented abroad by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (Preamble of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Status of Participants in Resistance against the Occupations of 1940-90 ....\u201d 53.  Regarding the role of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d in the national resistance movement, the Supreme Court reiterated the lower courts\u2019 findings of fact (see paragraph 8 above). It also held:\n\u201c31. ... The courts established in the proceedings that A.R. and B.M. were active participants in the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation, and A.R. was also one of the leaders of this resistance. Lithuanian partisans, as a separate political group, were significant for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation), which is defined by ethnic features.\nAttention should be drawn to the fact that A.R. was persecuted, and his destruction was sought, not only because of his membership of the partisan movement but also as the chairman of the political power of the occupied State: the Presidium of the LLKS Council. The evidence in the case file confirms that large forces of the LSSR MGB (KGB) were allocated for that purpose: a permanent operational group for the search for A.R. was formed, more than forty agents were deployed, much organisational work was undertaken, and the search continued for several years.\nIt should also be noted that after the detention of A.R. and his wife B.M. it was reported to the leadership of the LSSR MGB (KGB) that the detention of A.R. had completed the \u2018liquidation of Lithuanian \u2018bourgeois nationalist\u2019 (bandit) leaders\u2019. 32. In the light of the circumstances described, it should be held that the participants in the resistance to occupation, namely Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, \u2013 were a significant part of the Lithuanian nation, as a national, ethnic group. This part of the national and ethnic group had an essential impact on the survival of the Lithuanian nation, and was highly important for the protection and defence of Lithuanian national identity, culture and national self-awareness. This [description] conforms to the characteristics of the above-described group protected under Article II of the Genocide Convention: extermination of members of this group should be assessed as genocide under both international law and the Criminal Code. Therefore, the conclusions of the courts, that A.R. and B.M., as Lithuanian partisans, were members of the national and ethnic group protected under the Genocide Convention and targeted by the actions of the institutions of the occupational power that sought to exterminate part of this group, should be upheld.\u201d\n(ii)  As to the applicant being guilty of genocide 54.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s conviction for genocide, the Supreme Court found it established that by 1956, when the crime was committed, the applicant had already been working for the MGB, which he had joined \u201cconsciously and voluntarily\u201d, for four years. Before that, he had completed the Vilnius School of MGB Operational Staff Training, where he studied for two years. It was noteworthy that the applicant had studied at the security service school and started his service in the security structure during the period when the national resistance movement against the occupying power was active. He was not an ordinary officer: from 1952 he was a member of the USSR Communist party, and after graduating from the MGB school he was granted the rank of officer-lieutenant. The applicant worked at the Lithuanian MGB/KGB 2-N board, the main function of which was the fight against the national resistance movement. It was also noteworthy that the division where the applicant had worked carried out surveillance of the members and leadership of the Lithuanian national underground movement. Furthermore, at the time of the arrest of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d in 1956 the applicant was already a senior operative officer in the KGB. He had the rank of senior lieutenant. As could be seen from his service record, he was directly \u201cinvolved in combat operations with regard to national underground (banditry)\u201d. It had also been established that the applicant was aware of the actions of a repressive nature being conducted against the partisans; he knew about A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d as the leader of the partisans and about his being in hiding from the Soviet authorities. He was also briefed about the purpose of the operation aimed at the capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d. 55.  In the light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that the applicant understood one of the essential operational goals of the LSSR MGB, namely to destroy physically the members of the organised movement of the Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet regime, that is Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, as a part of the Lithuanian national-ethnic group; he approved of those goals and took part in their implementation during the secret operation in which the Lithuanian partisans A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d were captured. He was also aware of the torture, killing or deportation threatening them after the detention. Thus, the participation of the applicant in the detention operation was inseparable from the goal of the LSSR MGB/KGB to destroy Lithuanian partisans as part of a national-ethnic group. Attention should be drawn to the fact that, in fact, it was officers of the board of the LSSR KGB, where the applicant had served, who took of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d and B.M. \u201cVanda\u201d into detention, which only confirmed the fact that the applicant was not a person who was in the detention group accidentally. 56.  Lastly, the Supreme Court noted that the fact that the applicant had taken part in an operation in 1956, after active armed resistance to the Soviet occupation had ended [as noted by the Constitutional Court, such active armed resistance took place between 1944 and 1953], had no bearing on the classification of his actions as genocide. Actions could qualify as genocide even if they had not been committed during one single period. In the applicant\u2019s case, it was paramount that his and the KGB\u2019s actions had been prompted by one single goal, namely to physically exterminate all or part of the members of a protected group. The case-file documents showed that the Soviet authorities\u2019 goal of completely eliminating the leadership and members of the national resistance had remained in place even after the period of their active resistance was over. In this connection it was also pertinent that A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d had been one of the leaders of the national resistance, that more than forty KGB agents had been involved in the efforts to capture him, and that it was only after several years of searching that the KGB had succeeded in apprehending him. After that operation the KGB had declared that with the capture of A.R. \u201cVanagas\u201d \u201cthe liquidation of the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists\u2019 leaders\u201d had been terminated. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s actions also conformed to the subjective elements of corpus delicti of genocide.", "references": ["7", "8", "9", "4", "5", "1", "3", "2", "0", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Noviy Engenoy. 6.  On 1 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s husband, Mr Vakhid Magamedov (in the documents submitted also spelt as Magomadov), went fishing with his fellow villagers, Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu., near the village of Sary-Su in the Shelkovskiy district of Chechnya. The four men arrived at the fishing spot in the VAZ-2107 car of Mr Z. Three of them then went to the other side of the pond (in the documents submitted also referred to as a \u201clake\u201d), while the applicant\u2019s husband fished near the car. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. fished about 40 to 60 metres from each other and about two hundred metres or so from Mr Magamedov. 7.  At about 9 p.m. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. heard gunfire coming from the direction of the car. They went in that direction and saw six or seven men in military camouflage uniforms next to their car and heard them speaking Russian. Those men had arrived in armoured personnel carriers (\u201cAPCs\u201d) and were using flashlights. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. hid in the bulrushes. Then they saw the servicemen trying to push the car into the pond and, when their attempt failed, set it on fire. Then the perpetrators noticed the three men hiding in the bulrushes and opened gunfire in their direction. 8.  Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. ran to the village of Sary-Su to warn the police. On the way they got lost in the dark and only arrived at the village at about 4 a.m. on 2 April 2006. They knocked at the door of the house of a local resident, Mr Kh.V., and told him about the incident. Mr Kh.V. took them by car to the local police station. Then Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. returned to the pond, accompanied by the police. They found Vakhid Magamedov\u2019s burnt body in the car. At about the same time three cars and two APCs belonging to the federal military forces arrived at the scene. The servicemen told the police that they were carrying out a special operation in the area. Mr Yu. told to the policemen that he would be able to identify the servicemen who had killed Vakhid Magomedov. 9.  In response to the Court\u2019s request for a copy of the entire contents of the file of the criminal investigation into the killing of Mr Vakhid Magomedov, the Government furnished a copy of its contents, amounting to 378 pages, which could be summarised as follows. 10.  On 2 April 2006 Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. were taken by the police to the prosecutors\u2019 office and questioned about the incident. Each of them provided a statement similar to the applicant\u2019s submission to the Court and stressed that the perpetrators had been in military camouflage uniforms and that they had opened fire on them without any warning. 11.  On 2 April 2006 the Shelkovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe investigators\u201d) opened criminal case no. 61010 into the murder of Mr Vakhid Magomedov. Mr D., Mr Yu and Mr Z. were granted victim status in the proceedings and questioned. They reiterated the statements that they had previously given. 12.  On 2 April 2006 the investigators also granted Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magomedov, victim status in the criminal case. 13.  On the same date, 2 April 2006, two other local residents, Mr A.A. and Mr S.A., were questioned by the police. Their submissions were similar: both of them stated that on the morning of 1 April 2006 they had gone to the lake to fish. On the way there they had stopped to change a flat tyre when two APCs with Russian-speaking servicemen had pulled over. The servicemen checked their identity documents. About five minutes later, another military-type vehicle, a light-coloured UAZ car, had also pulled over. The military servicemen who had arrived in it, requested identity documents and then ordered that both Mr A.A. and Mr S.A. go with them to Sury-Su for a further identity check. 14.  On 2 April 2006 the investigators also questioned a local resident, Mr Z.Kh., who stated that at about 8 p.m. on 1 April 2006 he had been driving to the pond to go fishing when he had seen three APCs driving in the same direction and that about two hours later he had seen those APCs driving back. 15.  On 2 April 2006 the investigators also questioned a resident of Sary\u2011Su, Mr Kh.V., and his neighbour, Mr Sh.K., whose statements were similar to the applicant\u2019s submission before the Court. Both witnesses also confirmed that the night before they had taken the three men, who had arrived at their village in a shaken state, to the local police station. They had also gone with the three men and the police officers to the pond, where they had seen a burnt-out car with a human body in it. 16.  On 2 April 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene at the lake. They found the car, which had been completely burnt out, with traces of gunshots in the boot and a burnt corpse on the front seat. As a result, a number of spent cartridges and one bullet were collected, among other things, as evidence. 17.  On 2 April 2006 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 12 April 2006) the investigators ordered a forensic examination of Vakhid Magamedov\u2019s body (to be conducted as part of the crime-scene examination report). On 25 May 2006 the experts concluded that it was impossible to establish the exact cause of death owing to the forensic examination\u2019s shortcomings in the description of the state of the corpse. 18.  On 12 April 2006 the investigators ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence collected at the crime scene. On 28 April 2006 the experts concluded that the bullets and cartridges had most probably been shot from Kalashnikov machineguns and that that those guns \u2013 were they ever to be found \u2013 could be identified as those that had fired and contained, respective, those bullets and cartridges. 19.  On 2 June 2006 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. Those granted victim status in the criminal case were informed thereof. 20.  From the documents submitted it transpires that following the applicant\u2019s complaint, on 22 January 2007 a prosecutor from the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office requested that the investigators inform him of the reasons for the suspension of the criminal proceedings and the theories they had examined in order to identify the perpetrators; he also requested the entire contents of the relevant criminal case file. On 20 February 2007 the investigators forwarded the case file relating to criminal case no. 61010 to the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office. Neither the applicant, nor her relatives were informed thereof. 21.  Between February 2007 and September 2009, the criminal case file remained with the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office to be checked by the prosecutor\u2019s superiors. 22.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the investigators requesting information on the developments in the criminal proceedings. She complained that neither she nor her relatives had been kept informed about progress in the investigation and that she had not been granted victim status or questioned.  On 9 July 2009 she sent a similar letter to the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office. 23.  On 25 September 2009, following the applicant\u2019s request of 9 July 2009 to the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office, the latter returned the file regarding criminal case no. 61010 to the investigators, together with a list of steps to be taken in the criminal case. Inter alia, the list stipulated that: amongst other things, for the followings steps:\n\u201c... it is necessary to: 7.  Send requests to the law-enforcement agencies asking for their assistance in identifying the perpetrators of or witnesses to the crime; 24.  On 5 October 2009 the investigators informed the applicant that the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended on 2 June 2006 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 25.  On 7 October 2009 the investigators\u2019 supervisor allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint of 3 July 2009, after finding that the investigation had been ineffective and ordering that it be resumed. The applicant\u2019s complaint to the investigators of 3 July 2009 concerning her victim status remained unanswered until 2015 (see paragraph 54 below). 26.  On 8 and 9 October 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.K. and Mr Kh.V., who reiterated their previous statements (see paragraph 15 above). 27.  On 2 November 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Z., who reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 10 above) and added that the perpetrators had completely burnt out his car. 28.  On 3 November 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who stated that he had not witnessed the incident and had only learnt of his brother\u2019s murder on 2 April 2006. 29.  On 7 November 2009 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators (see paragraph 32 below). 30.  On 10 and 13 December 2009 the applicant again wrote to the investigators and the Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office asking for information about the progress in the investigation and the outcome of the examination of her previous request, and complaining that she had not been kept informed about progress in the proceedings. 31.  On 21 December 2009 the investigators informed the applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 2 October 2009. 32.  On 15 January 2010, in reply to the applicant\u2019s request for information, the investigators informed her that they had suspended the proceedings on 7 November 2009. 33.  On 1 and 6 March 2010 the applicant complained to the investigators and the Russian Prosecutor General that the investigation had been ineffective and that she had not been kept informed of progress in the proceedings. 34.  On 26 March 2010 the investigators informed the applicant that her complaint had been rejected as the criminal case file had been transferred to the Southern Federal Circuit Investigative Committee. 35.  On 7 June 2010 the applicant again complained to the investigators of the lack of information in respect of the proceedings. On 30 June 2010 they replied that the suspension of the investigation on 7 November 2009 has been overruled as unlawful and that she would be informed of any further decision taken. 36.  On 30 June 2010 following the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned complaint, the investigators\u2019 supervisor (the deputy prosecutor of the Shelkovskiy district) criticised the investigators and ordered that a number of shortcomings in the criminal proceedings be remedied. In particular, he requested that the previously-given orders should be carried out (see paragraph 23 above). 37.  On 5 July 2010, following the above instructions, the investigators resumed the investigation. 38.  Between 13 and 26 July 2010 the police questioned several neighbours of Vakhid Magamedov, all of whom stated that they had either no information about the incident or had heard about it from others. 39.  On 16 July 2010 the investigators questioned two police officers, G. and T., who stated that they had been on duty at the police station when they had been informed about the incident at the pond. They had not gone to the crime scene and therefore had no information concerning \u201ceither the spent cartridges found at the scene or the three APCs there\u201d. 40.  On 7 July 2010 Mr Z. and Mr Yu. sent to the investigators written affidavits describing the events of 1 April 2006. Copies of those documents were not furnished to the Court with the copy of the criminal case file. 41.  On 5 August 2010 the investigators again questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who reaffirmed his previous statement. 42.  On 7 August 2010 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 7 August 2013) the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 43.  On 3 July 2013 the applicant requested information on the progress of the investigation in respect of case no. 61010. No reply was forthcoming. 44.  On 27 November 2013, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, the deputy prosecutor of the Shelkovskiy district again criticised the investigators and ordered that a number of shortcomings in the proceedings be remedied. In particular, he instructed that the previously-given orders should be carried out (see paragraphs 23 and 36 above). 45.  On 25 December 2013 the investigators resumed the investigation. 46.  On 31 December 2013 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 47.  On 20 October 2014 the investigators\u2019 supervisor ordered that the investigation be resumed, having found that it had been suspended unlawfully, without the prescribed steps having been taken. 48.  On 31 October 2014 the investigators resumed the investigation. 49.  On 1 November 2014 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who reaffirmed his previous statement and added that his relatives had refused to allow the exhumation of his body as it had been burnt and it had been clear that he had died from gunshot wounds. 50.  On 8 November 2014 the investigators questioned several residents of Sary-Su who stated that between 1999 and 2008 the federal military forces and law enforcement agencies had been based in their village. 51.  On 15 November 2014 the investigators again questioned Mr Z. and Mr Yu. and Mr D., who reiterated their previous statements (see paragraph 10 above). 52.  On 23 November 2014 the investigators questioned the head of the Shelkovskiy district police, who stated that he had participated in the crime\u2011scene examination in 2006 but could not recall the details, owing to the passage of time. 53.  On 31 November 2014 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 54.  On 20 April 2015 the investigators resumed the investigation in order to take a number of steps, including granting the applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioning her. 55.  On 17 April 2015 the investigators\u2019 supervisor ordered that a number of steps be taken, including the questioning again of the witness who had seen the APCs in the vicinity of the crime scene on the day of the incident. 56.  On 20 May 2015, in reply to a request lodged by the applicant for information, the investigators informed her that on 20 May 2015 the proceedings had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 57.  There is no further information on the criminal proceedings. They appear to be still pending.", "references": ["2", "9", "7", "1", "4", "5", "6", "3", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment in Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 13 (\u201cthe Kyiv SIZO\u201d). 6.  The applicant had already lodged an application before the Court, no. 43374/02, on 12 November 2002, complaining, in particular, of the inadequacy of his medical treatment in detention. He had also raised several complaints regarding his pre-trial detention and the length of the criminal proceedings against him. 7.  On 21 October 2010 the Court delivered a judgment on the above\u2011mentioned application, in which it found violations of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention (see Petukhov v. Ukraine, no. 43374/02, 21 October 2010). 8.  On 3 December 2004 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of a number of serious crimes committed by an organised criminal gang, namely several counts of aggravated murder, armed robbery, illegal arms possession and carjacking, as well as an attempt on the lives of law-enforcement officials. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment. 9.  On 24 May 2005 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 10.  The applicant was detained in Kherson Prison no. 61, which had the status of a prison tuberculosis (\u201cTB\u201d) hospital, during the following periods: from 3 July 2010 to 22 January 2014, from 24 March to 19 October 2014 and from 2 December 2014 to 19 January 2015.\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s account 11.  All the cells in which the applicant had been detained (he mentioned, in particular, cells nos. 3, 4 and 5) lacked sufficient daylight and fresh air. The windows were covered by an opaque film impeding access to natural light and could be opened only partially. The artificial ventilation system drew in air from the prison corridor only. 12.  To substantiate the above submissions, the applicant referred to a letter sent to him from the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights on 16 October 2013. As stated therein, a representative of that authority had visited the prison following the applicant\u2019s complaints of poor conditions of detention. The letter read:\n\u201c... in order to rectify the deficiencies identified, it has been recommended that the management of the Kherson Regional Office of the State Department for the Enforcement of Sentences ensure that there is adequate natural light and artificial ventilation in the premises in which you are detained, and ensure that the outdoor walks, medical care and nutrition arrangements, as well as the choice of foodstuffs and articles of daily necessity [available] in the prison shop, comply with the legal requirements.\u201d 13.  In 2010-14 major repairs were carried out in the prison, causing inmates inconvenience such as noise, dust and the smell of paint. 14.  The yards for outdoor walks, which were located on the roof and measured between 16 and 60 square metres, were dusty and littered with construction material, and provided no shelter from the sun or rain. While theoretically prisoners suffering from TB had the right to two-hour daily outdoor walks, in practice only a one-hour walk was possible. 15.  The applicant\u2019s cell was under constant video surveillance, including in the toilet. In support of that statement, the applicant submitted two images printed from the video records, which had been provided to him by the prison administration at his request. As explained by the applicant, those images had been recorded when he had been using the toilet in a sitting and in a standing position. In the first image, the applicant could not be seen; in the second image his head was visible. The applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the prison authorities about his permanent video surveillance. In May and July 2014 the Kherson Regional Office (\u201cthe regional office\u201d) of the State Department for the Enforcement of Sentences (\u201cthe Prison Department\u201d) replied to her that it was a statutory security measure, of which life prisoners were aware, and that the applicant\u2019s intimacy had not been violated given that the video camera, which was indeed placed above the toilet area, did not cover the toilet itself. 16.  The prison premises were not adequately disinfected, and the frequent transfer of life prisoners from one cell to another was dangerous for their health. 17.  When the central heating was turned off, the temperature inside the cells was extremely low. For example, on 30 April 2014 the applicant had complained to the prison administration that it was too cold in his cell (the central heating had been switched off on 31 March 2014) and that his requests for permission to buy a portable heater at his own expense had been arbitrarily rejected. On 19 May 2014 the acting governor of the prison had replied to him that the use of portable heaters by prisoners was not envisaged by law. 18.  The drinking water was of extremely poor quality, which the applicant thought was partly due to the dilapidated state of the pipelines. 19.  The food provided to prisoners was inadequate and insufficient, and did not correspond to the needs of those suffering from TB. Meat, dairy products, fruit and vegetables could only be received from relatives or bought at the prison shop.\n(ii)  The Government\u2019s account 20.  The conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were satisfactory. They had been further improved by refurbishment of the building. Each cell had windows measuring 130cm by 110cm, with a ventilation pane. The windows were covered with an opaque film (\u201cfrost-type\u201d) permitting light to pass through. 21.  Although sufficient financing was not available for modernising the ventilation system, air conduits had been added in the internal walls to enhance the artificial ventilation. 22.  The cells were divided into those designated for inmates with active Mycobacterium TB (\u201cMBT+\u201d) and those with inactive MBT (\u201cMBT-\u201d). Transfers took place between either \u201cMBT+\u201d cells or \u201cMBT-\u201d cells, but not from one category to another. Cells were disinfected on a daily basis by means of a special liquid disinfectant. In addition, a routine disinfection of cells was carried out with portable ultraviolet germicidal irradiation lamps, the application of which was registered in a special logbook. Mattresses, pillows and blankets were disinfected regularly. 23.  As Kherson Prison no. 61 had the status of a TB hospital, its inmates received five meals per day. Specifically, prisoners were served daily: 450 g of bread, 85 g of cereals, 540 g of potatoes, 550 g of vegetables, 300 g of fruit, 21 g of oil, 200 g of fruit juice, 50 g of butter, 500 g of milk, 100 g of cottage cheese, 15 g of cheese, 1 egg, 30 g of sour cream, 310 g of chicken meat, 110 g of fish, 60 g of sugar, 5 g of honey, 40 g of sweets, 4 g of chicory, 3 g of coffee, and 1 g of tea. The first breakfast usually consisted of porridge or pasta, fried or stewed meat with gravy, coffee, milk, bread and butter. The second breakfast consisted of cocoa with milk or compote, nuts, a biscuit, cottage cheese and sour cream. For lunch, prisoners had \u201cborsch\u201d or soup with cereals or pasta, or pickle soup made with meat stock, porridge or stewed cabbage, fried or stewed meat with gravy, vegetable salad, and bread. In the afternoon, fruit juice and fruit were served. For dinner, prisoners received stewed vegetables or mashed potatoes, fried or stewed fish, tea and bread and butter. The total energy value of a daily portion of food was 3,198 calories. 24.  All foodstuffs supplied to the prison had quality certificates, as well as certificates of compliance with sanitary, veterinary and other standards. Meat and fish were stored in freezers. The prison had its own bakery and made its own bread from good-quality wheat. 25.  The quality of water supplied to the prison was regularly checked. Thirteen reports on the tap-water chemical analyses carried out on various dates from 2010 to 2014 showed that the water was fully suitable for drinking.\n(b)  In the Kherson Pre-Trial Detention Facility (\u201cthe Kherson SIZO\u201d) 26.  The applicant was detained in cells nos. 392 and 394 of the Kherson SIZO from 22 January to 24 March 2014.\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s account 27.  The Kherson SIZO was located in an old building in a dilapidated state. The cells were cold and damp, and the cell walls were covered with mould and fungus. The window panes were broken and partially missing. 28.  In substantiation of his allegations, the applicant submitted eight colour photographs of some of the premises, which he claimed to be his cells in the Kherson SIZO. The photographs showed, in particular, large dark stains on the ceiling and walls, and a window with metal grids partially covered with plastic or cloth. 29.  The applicant stated that on 3 March 2014 his lawyer had complained about the appalling conditions of his detention to the Kherson regional prosecutor\u2019s office. She had stated in her complaint that cell no. 394, in which the applicant had been placed on 22 January 2014, had been found unsuitable for use by the SIZO administration, owing to a leaking ceiling, high humidity and low temperature. Although the applicant had been transferred, for a short period, to cell no. 392, he had subsequently been placed again in cell no. 394, where the conditions were manifestly incompatible with his poor health. The prosecutor\u2019s reply was that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were satisfactory.\n(ii)  The Government\u2019s account 30.  Both of the cells complained of were in satisfactory condition. Cell no. 392 measured 22.8 square metres and was equipped with ten beds. Cell no. 394 measured 10.7 square metres and had four beds. 31.  There was one window in each cell. As of 20 March 2014 the inside temperature was +21oC in cell no. 392 and +22oC in cell no. 394. 32.  There was a permanent water supply in the cells and the sanitary facilities functioned properly. 33.  The SIZO administration had accepted that cell no. 394 required repairs and had carried them out at the SIZO\u2019s expense. While those repairs were being carried out, the applicant had been transferred to cell no. 392. Thereafter, the walls in cell no. 394 had been dry and whitewashed, and the ceiling no longer leaked. 34.  The applicant has been suffering from the residual effects of a multiple fracture of his left thigh as a result of a gunshot wound in 1999. He also has a medical history of pulmonary TB since 2002. The facts pertaining to his state of health and his medical treatment prior to his transfer to Kherson Prison no. 61 were analysed by the Court in its judgment on his previous application to the Court (see Petukhov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 33-66 and 73-101) and are not referred to in the present judgment. 35.  Having been diagnosed with a relapse of TB on 2 February 2010 while detained in Sokal Prison no. 47, on 3 July 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kherson Prison no. 61, which had the status of a prison TB hospital. 36.  On 13 July 2010 prison doctors reported a failure of the applicant\u2019s TB treatment. Sputum culture and bacterial sensitivity tests showed that he had developed resistance not only to first-line anti-TB drugs (isoniazid, streptomycin and ethambutol) but also to second-line ones (kanamycin, ethionamide and para-aminosalicylic acid). His right lung exhibited indications of damage aggravated by limited pleural empyema with bronchopulmonary fistula. He was also suffering from respiratory difficulties. 37.  According to the records in the applicant\u2019s medical file, from July 2010 to December 2014 he underwent forty-four bacteriological sputum tests; thirty general blood analyses (he reportedly refused to undergo tests on fourteen occasions); fifty-six general urine analyses (with two reported refusals); as well as X-ray examinations approximately once every three months. He also underwent regular medical examinations. 38.  On 23 November 2010 the applicant was certified as having a third\u2011degree disability (the mildest) on account of his tuberculosis and his thigh injury. 39.  According to the information provided by the administration of Kherson Prison no. 61, the applicant refused to take anti-TB medication during the following periods: from 30 December 2010 to 9 February 2011, from 1 to 18 July 2011, and from 3 to 15 November 2011. According to the applicant, that information was inaccurate. He alleged that often, when certain medication had been unavailable, an entry had been made in his medical file that he had refused to take it. 40.  On 1 December 2010 the regional office of the Prison Department wrote to the applicant\u2019s lawyer stating that the supply of second-line anti\u2011TB drugs in Kherson Prison no. 61 was \u201cextremely insufficient\u201d. It was specified that, as of 26 November 2010, only three second-line drugs were available (amikacin, kanamycin and ciprofloxacin). The standard practice was that the prison ordered the required first and second-line drugs from the central procurement service of the Prison Department at the end of each year for the entire year to follow. Sometimes those amounts turned out to be insufficient, but could not be replenished. For example, by the end March 2010 the prison hospital had already used the 700 bottles of capreomycin it had received for the year. 41.  On 10 May 2011 the applicant was diagnosed for the first time with genito-urinary TB and was prescribed antibacterial treatment. As reported in his medical file, he underwent the prescribed treatment \u201cin short cycles depending on the availability of the prescribed drugs in the prison\u2019s pharmacy\u201d. 42.  On 1 September 2011 the Kherson City tuberculosis clinic stated in an information note that Kherson Prison no. 61 had no second-line or substitute anti-TB drugs at its disposal. It was also stated that the applicant required further inpatient treatment with the following anti-TB drugs: rifampicin, pyrazinamide, capreomycin, levofloxacin, clofazimine and cycloserine. 43.  On 12 September 2011 the Kherson City prosecutor in charge of supervising lawfulness in prisons, to whom the applicant had complained of inadequate medical treatment, wrote to him stating that there were no reasons for prosecutorial intervention. 44.  On 2 November 2011 the regional office of the Prison Department wrote to the applicant\u2019s lawyer stating that the supply of anti-TB drugs in Kherson Prison no. 61 remained \u201cextremely insufficient\u201d. As of 24 October 2011, there were only two first-line drugs, isoniazid and pyrazinamide, whereas ethambutol, streptomycin and rifampicin were not available. Of the second-line anti-TB drugs, only kanamycin, ofloxacin and protionamide were available in sufficient quantities. The prison also had an insignificant quantity of gatifloxacin, rifapentine, para-aminosalicylic acid and sodium para-aminosalicylate. It was noted in the letter that the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory. The following medication had been prescribed for him: rifampicin, pyrazinamide, ethambutol, ofloxacin and capreomycin. It was noted in the letter that de  facto the applicant was receiving only rifampicin (at his own expense) and pyrazinamide. Lastly, the official observed that the applicant had refused to be treated with ofloxacin on account of the poor state of his blood vessels. 45.  On 25 November 2011 a disability evaluation board reassessed the applicant\u2019s medical condition and certified him as having a second-degree disability (medium level). 46.  On 20 January 2012 the regional office of the Prison Department wrote to the applicant\u2019s lawyer stating that the applicant was receiving treatment in accordance with the prescribed regimen in its entirety, but that he was demonstrating a negative attitude to his treatment and often refused to follow it. The regional office also stated that the applicant was being provided with adequate nutrition and that the conditions of his detention were satisfactory. 47.  In reply to an enquiry sent by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 6 July 2012 the deputy governor of Kherson Prison no. 61 stated that the applicant was being treated with anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course). Given a shortage of terizidone in the prison pharmacy, the applicant had not been receiving it since 6 March 2012. All the other drugs prescribed for him were available \u201cin relatively sufficient quantities\u201d. 48.  On 30 August 2012 the applicant sent a written statement to the head of the medical unit of Kherson Prison no. 61, claiming that he was obliged to stop his treatment because of the permanent shortage of medication. As only two out the required list of at least four drugs were available, he considered it pointless to continue the treatment. 49.  On 30 November 2012 a thoracic surgeon examined the applicant and decided that surgical treatment for TB was not feasible. 50.  According to an information note issued by the prison administration on 11 April 2013, all the drugs prescribed for the applicant were available. Before 21 February 2013 the only medication that had not been available in the prison pharmacy was cycloserine. 51.  On 2 July 2013 the applicant underwent an examination by a panel of medical experts, which established that his medical treatment for TB had failed and had no prospects of success. The experts also confirmed the applicant\u2019s second-degree disability (see paragraph 45 above). He was prescribed palliative treatment, having attained an incurable stage of TB. 52.  On 23 July 2013 the prison administration wrote to the applicant\u2019s lawyer stating that the decision to provide the applicant with palliative care was based on Order no. 1091 of the Public Health Ministry (see paragraph 72 below). The palliative care would consist of regular administration of isoniazid and symptomatic treatment. At the time of writing, isoniazid was available from the prison pharmacy. Furthermore, the applicant was receiving \u201cdisintoxication and strengthening therapy\u201d. 53.  On 25 October 2013 the regional office of the Prison Department issued an internal inquiry report regarding the applicant\u2019s complaints of inadequate medical treatment for TB. It stated that the applicant was receiving the prescribed palliative treatment in its entirety and that there was no shortage of the required drugs. His health was stable and he remained under constant medical supervision. It was also observed that the disease with which the applicant had been diagnosed did not fall within the list of diseases constituting grounds for releasing a convict on health grounds. 54.  On 21 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the director of the National Institute of TB Studies and Pulmonology named after F.G. Yanovskyy (\u041d\u0430\u0446\u0456\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0444\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0456\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0457 \u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043c\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0457 \u0456\u043c. \u0424.\u0413. \u042f\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0410\u041c\u041d \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438). She stated that the palliative care prescribed for the applicant included the administration of isoniazid on a permanent basis, as well as symptomatic treatment. However, the applicant had developed a steady resistance to isoniazid and his treatment therefore had to be adjusted. The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested recommendations as to how such an adjustment could be made. 55.  On 2 April 2014 the above-mentioned institute replied that, in the circumstances of the case, resorting to palliative care was indeed justified. It had been observed that the applicant\u2019s medical treatment had not been able to stop the emission of tubercle bacilli for about two years, that the applicant had developed a resistance to most anti-TB drugs, and that there remained no room for any further adjustment of his treatment. Furthermore, surgery was not possible in his case. It was stated in the letter that the palliative care consisted of the administration of medication enhancing the functioning of the heart (depending on the symptoms manifested), vitamins, pyretic and analgesic therapy, as well as wholesome nutrition. The applicant also required a regular thoracotomy (drainage) of the right pleural cavity and its rinsing with antiseptics. Anti-TB drugs should not be administered to him given his resistance to them and their ineffectiveness, as well as their toxic effect on all the body organs. 56.  Following a chest X-ray examination on 15 July 2014, \u201cstabilisation of the TB process\u201d was reported. Subsequent regular X-ray examinations showed no changes in the applicant\u2019s lungs. 57.  On 9 December 2014 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors and underwent another X-ray examination. He was diagnosed with the following residual symptoms of tuberculosis: dense lesions, pneumono\u2011cirrhosis and massive pleural thickening from the right side. It was concluded that he could be monitored in a prison for healthy inmates. The doctors prescribed a vitamin-based treatment and immunological prophylaxis, and recommended that he avoid hypothermia. 58.  On 7 August 2015 the applicant was transferred to the Kyiv SIZO to continue serving his life sentence. 59.  On 11 August 2015 he underwent an X-ray examination, which confirmed the previous diagnoses. 60.  On 23 February 2016 the applicant underwent another X-ray examination, which revealed significant post-TB residual changes in the form of multiple calcifications in the right lung with calcified costal pleura in the right side, and reduced volume of the right lung. 61.  On 24 February 2016 the Kyiv SIZO issued a medical certificate stating, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s medical condition did not fall under the list of diseases warranting his release for health reasons. His state of health was considered compatible with imprisonment. 62.  On 15 March 2016 the applicant was examined by a senior doctor from the Kyiv City Medical Association for TB Studies (\u0422\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u0434\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u00ab\u0424\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0456\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0456\u044f\u00bb \u0432 \u043c. \u041a\u0438\u0454\u0432\u0456) at the request of the Government Agent, following notification of the application to the Government. The diagnosis was as follows: post-TB residual changes in the form of pulmonary fibrosis, dense foci with calcified costal pleura. The absence of any indication of re-activation of TB was noted. The applicant was not considered to require any specialised medical treatment. Lastly, it was observed that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention and the medical care arrangements afforded to him were in compliance with the applicable legal provisions. 63.  On 23 December 2013 the applicant applied for release on health grounds under Article 84 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (see paragraph 73 below). He submitted that his TB disease had become incurable because of failures by the authorities. He also argued that his irreducible life sentence ran contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 64.  On 17 June 2014 the Kherson Suvorovskyy District Court refused the applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that his medical condition did not fall under the list of diseases warranting early release (see paragraph 74 below). The court considered that the applicant\u2019s health had improved since 2010. In particular, the development of his TB had been stabilised and the emission of tubercle bacilli had stopped. Lastly, the court noted that the applicant had been convicted for a number of particularly serious crimes and that in the course of his detention, disciplinary measures had been applied to him twenty-eight times, whereas he had never been commended for good behaviour. 65.  On 21 August 2014 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision by a final ruling. Like the first-instance court, it concluded that the preconditions for release on health grounds had not been met and that the applicant\u2019s illnesses did not prevent him from serving his sentence. 66.  In 2009 the applicant married his lawyer, Ms Boykova (see paragraph 2 above). On that occasion they were allowed an extraordinary short-term meeting, during which they were separated from each other by a glass partition and communicated by telephone. 67.  During his post-conviction detention until 16 February 2010 the applicant was allowed to see his wife (he had no other relatives in Ukraine) at short-term meetings lasting up to four hours once every six months. Subsequently, he was granted the right to have short-term visits once every three months (see paragraphs 95-97 below). 68.  Following the entry into force on 6 May 2014 of legislative amendments entitling life prisoners to long-term family visits (for three days) every three months (see paragraph 98 below), the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the penal authorities that requests made by the applicant to that effect had not been allowed. 69.  On 25 June 2014 the Kherson Regional Office of the State Prisons Service (previously named \u201cthe Prison Department\u201d) replied to her that, indeed, life prisoners were entitled to a long-term family visit every three months. The prison administration was carrying out the necessary refurbishment with a view to creating adequate premises. 70.  According to information provided by the prison administration, the applicant had sixteen short-term meetings with his wife (not taking into account his meetings with her in her capacity as his lawyer) during the period from April 2014 to January 2015. He also had long-term visits from her on 1 August and 31 December 2014, each of which lasted for three days.", "references": ["3", "9", "2", "5", "8", "0", "7", "6", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  A new court within the Icelandic judicial system, the Court of Appeal (Landsr\u00e9ttur), was established on 1 January 2018 and became operational on the same day. Specific temporary provisions on the appointment of judges to the court, including temporary provision IV of the new Judiciary Act No. 50/2016, entered into force on 14 June 2016. These provisions stipulated that the appointment of the fifteen judges of the Court of Appeal should be completed no later than 1 July 2017 and their appointment take effect as from 1 January 2018. 6.  Temporary provision IV of the new Judiciary Act regulated the selection procedure and the appointment of the initial fifteen judges to the court (see paragraph 57 below). In accordance with paragraph 1 of temporary provision IV of the Act, a committee of experts, the Evaluation Committee (\u201cthe Committee\u201d), already set up on the basis of Section 4 (a) of the prior Judiciary Act No. 15/1998, was statutorily mandated to assess the candidates for the vacant posts and deliver its assessment report on their competences to the Minister of Justice. The Committee was composed in total of five experts: one nominated by the Judicial Council (D\u00f3mst\u00f3lar\u00e1\u00f0), one nominated by the Icelandic Bar Association, one elected by Althingi (\u201cParliament\u201d) and two nominated by the Supreme Court, one of whom acted as Chairman. According to temporary provision IV of the new Judiciary Act, as amended by Act No. 10/2017, which entered into force on 28 February 2017, the Minister could not appoint a candidate as a judge who had not been considered the most qualified by the Committee, either alone or among others. However, an exception to this rule was made if Parliament accepted the Minister\u2019s proposal to appoint such a candidate on the condition that he or she fulfilled the minimum requirements under domestic law for the appointment to a judicial post. The second paragraph of temporary provision IV then stated that when the \u201cMinister [proposed] for the first time appointments to the office of judge of the Court of Appeal, she [should] submit her proposal regarding every appointment to Althingi for its acceptance. If Althingi [accepted] the Minister\u2019s proposals, she [should] send them to the President of Iceland, who [would] formally [appoint] the judges\u201d. 7.  On 10 February 2017 a call for applications for the posts of fifteen judges in the Court of Appeal was published. The application deadline was 28 February 2017. In total, 37 persons applied for the posts, including A.E. Later, in April and May 2017, three persons withdrew their applications and one candidate did not fulfil the legal requirements for the post. Thus, 33 candidates were assessed by the Committee. 8.  At a meeting on 2 March 2017, the Chairman of the Committee delivered the applications to the Minister of Justice (then the Minister of the Interior, hereinafter the \u201cMinister\u201d or the \u201cMinister of Justice\u201d). At the meeting, the Minister suggested to the Chairman that the Committee give her a list of, for example, 20 qualified candidates for her to choose from and appoint as judges to the Court of Appeal. At a meeting on 11 May 2017, the Chairman delivered to the Minister the Committee\u2019s draft assessment report with a list of fifteen named candidates who were considered the most qualified. During the meeting, the Minister again inquired whether the Committee could deliver an assessment of more than fifteen qualified candidates. The Chairman then presented the Minister with an evaluation table (see paragraph 12 below) upon which the Committee had relied in its assessment of the candidates for the vacant judicial posts. On the same day, the Committee sent the draft assessment report to the candidates for their comment. 9.  By email of 12 May 2017, the Secretary-General of the Parliament sent a memorandum on the appointment of judges to the Court of Appeal and the role of Parliament in the process, to the Minister of Justice and the Speaker. The memorandum stated that the procedure before Parliament would be in accordance with Section 45 (5) of the Parliamentary Procedures Act No. 55/1991 (see paragraph 61 below) and a proposed procedure was set out in more detail. It was noted inter alia that the Minister had to submit one proposal for each appointment, that the matter would be sent to the Constitutional and Supervisory Committee of Parliament (hereinafter \u201cthe CSC\u201d) and that the CSC would give its opinion on the Minister\u2019s proposals and set it out in such a way that Parliament could decide on each proposed candidate. Furthermore, it stated that no changes could be made to the proposals by Parliament and if it did not accept one of the Minister\u2019s proposals, and thus the required number of judges was not approved, the procedure had to be repeated. 10.  By email of 16 May 2017, the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister\u2019s Office informed lawyers in the Prime Minister\u2019s office, and the Ministry of Justice working on the matter, that the Minister of Justice had approved the proposed procedure set out in the memorandum of the Secretary-General of the Parliament. 11.  On 19 May 2017 the Committee submitted to the Minister of Justice its assessment report on its evaluation of the candidates. It covered 117 pages and was divided into 6 chapters, including, inter alia, biographical information on the candidates, the assessment criteria, the procedure adopted by the Committee and the Committee\u2019s conclusions on the competences of the candidates. The Committee found that all 33 candidates qualified to serve as court of appeal judges. However, in the Committee\u2019s operative part, only the fifteen most qualified candidates were named. The assessment report did not contain an internal formal ranking of the fifteen candidates, but the Committee stated explicitly that the fifteen named candidates were all more qualified than the remaining applicants. 12.  In judicial proceedings instigated later by two candidates for the vacant posts (see paragraphs 27-35 below), it transpired that the Committee had worked in accordance with an evaluation table, in which each candidate had been given points on the basis of twelve specific assessment criteria. The overall points of each candidate then determined their ranking. The Minister received the detailed information of the points of each candidate. A.E. was ranked number 18 of the 33 candidates and was therefore not included by the Committee in the top fifteen of the most qualified candidates in its final assessment report to the Minister. 13.  By email of 26 May 2017, the Minister asked two lawyers working for the administration to provide her with feedback on possible reasoning in her letter to Parliament. By email of the same day, the lawyers informed the Minister that they had inserted comments and suggestions in the letter. Furthermore, they stated, inter alia, that the main comment was that if the Minister intended to change the Committee\u2019s list of proposed candidates, such a change had to be specifically reasoned on the basis of their qualifications. Furthermore, it was noted that perhaps the candidates should be informed about the changes, at the latest before it was sent to Parliament or processed by it. On 28 May 2017 these views were reiterated by one of the lawyers in an email to the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister\u2019s Office. He stated inter alia that if the Minister of Justice considered that there were flaws in the Committee\u2019s procedure or in its opinion, the Minister had two options. Firstly, the matter could be referred back to the Committee. Secondly, the Minister could herself remedy the flaws, which meant that the Minister had to evaluate all the candidates in the light of the Minister\u2019s objective and on the basis of lawful criteria. However, the lawyer suggested that the standard thing to do was to request the Committee to conduct a new evaluation. Furthermore, the lawyer noted that the Minister\u2019s decision to appoint judges was an administrative act and therefore it had to be performed in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act No. 37/1993 (see paragraph 62 below). Lastly, he proposed that it might be wise to inform the candidates about the changed emphasis and give them an opportunity to present new information that could be relevant for the evaluation. 14.  By letter of 27 May 2017 to the Chairman of the Committee, the Minister of Justice requested further information and documents on the Committee\u2019s evaluation and the fact that the Committee only made reference to the fifteen most qualified candidates and not others who had applied for the positions in the Court of Appeal, inter alia, with regard to the Equality Act No. 10/2008. 15.  By a letter of 28 May 2017, the Chairman of the Committee informed the Minister on the manner in which the Committee had given weight to each evaluation criterion, which had been part of its overall assessment, and explained that the same approach had been followed during his four years as Chairman of the Committee. Every candidate\u2019s points for each criterion had been registered in an evaluation table and the candidates had been ranked in accordance with their overall score. The Committee\u2019s conclusion had been to apply the same weight as had previously been applied for each criterion. As regards the second question, the Chairman explained that the Committee had not found that there had been numerous equally qualified candidates or that it had been impossible to name one more qualified than another. In this instance, fifteen positions had been advertised and the Committee had concluded that fifteen specific candidates had been more qualified than others for the positions. Therefore it had not been necessary to list more candidates. The Committee\u2019s evaluation table had clearly showed the ranking of the candidates. However, the Minister\u2019s idea had been that she be able to choose from among, for example, 20 candidates for the fifteen vacant posts. According to this idea, the candidate ranked 20th in the Committee\u2019s assessment could thus be chosen over candidates ranked 5th, 10th or in any position whatsoever. The Chairman stated that this idea would not have been in conformity with the purpose behind the prior Judiciary Act as it had been described in the preparatory works to the Act. The Chairman furthermore stated that the intention behind the legislative framework requiring a separate expert committee to assess candidates for judicial posts, and not the Minister himself or herself, was to safeguard judicial independence in the light of the developments in other European countries. 16.  By letter of 29 May 2017, the Minister of Justice presented her proposal of the fifteen candidates to be appointed judges of the Court of Appeal by the President of Iceland to the Speaker of Parliament. The proposal contained only 11 names of candidates whom the Committee had found the most qualified. The remaining four, ranked numbers 7, 11, 12 and 14 in the Committee\u2019s evaluation table, were not included on the Minister\u2019s list. Instead the Minister proposed that four other candidates, ranked numbers 17, 18, 23 and 30 on the Committee\u2019s evaluation table, including A.E., who had been ranked number 18, be appointed. In a separate letter, the Minister presented arguments for her proposals and the changes she had decided to make from the Committee\u2019s findings. The Minister stated, inter alia, that the Committee had not given adequate weight to judicial experience in accordance with the applicable regulations. After reviewing the assessment report, the candidates\u2019 objections to it and the working documents presented to her, the Minister had concluded that a higher number of candidates should have been considered than those listed in the Committee\u2019s report, all fifteen candidates named by the Committee as well as others having many years of judicial experience, in total 24 candidates. 17.  On the same day, the Minister\u2019s proposals were referred to the CSC. The CSC invited the Minister to its meeting, as well as the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, a number of experts, a representative of the Icelandic Bar Association and the Icelandic Judges\u2019 Association, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, and the Chairman of the Committee. 18.  On 30 May 2017, the Minister presented a memorandum to the CSC, further substantiating her proposal. She reiterated her view that more weight should be given to judicial experience in the assessment of the candidates. The Minister referred also to the Equality Act No. 10/2008 in support of her proposal to include the four candidates and remove the four considered more qualified by the Committee. The Minister\u2019s conclusion was the following:\n\u201cIn this instance, the Minister is of the opinion that the aforementioned four candidates are moreover the most qualified for the post of judge of the Court of Appeal. This opinion by the Minister is based on a thorough examination of the documents of the case, including the applications, the comments by the Evaluation Committee, the candidates\u2019 objections, the working documents of the Committee, and with these objective views in mind, as stated before.\nThe Minister has not raised any objections regarding the preparation of this case by the Evaluation Committee. The Minister believes that the Evaluation Committee has shed sufficient light on the matter and that a satisfactory investigation has been performed for the assessment of the factors that constitute the grounds for the conclusion. The Minister considers it appropriate that more weight be given to judicial experience than assessed by the Evaluation Committee. The Committee has already considered this factor and all information about the judicial experience of the candidates is found in the file. No new information or data form the basis of the Minister\u2019s proposal.\u201d 19.  On 31 May 2017 the majority of the CSC, divided along party lines, found that the Minister had presented arguments for her proposals and agreed with those arguments. It further found that if the Minister wanted to depart from the Committee\u2019s list of candidates she had to present arguments for the change, and the choice had to be objective and the most qualified person had to be selected for the position. 20.  The CSC proposed a parliamentary resolution, recommending that Parliament approve the Minister\u2019s proposals. The candidates were listed in alphabetical order and numbered from 1-15. The minority recommended that the proposal be dismissed as it considered the Minister\u2019s reasoning to be insufficient, especially as regarded the departure from the Committee\u2019s proposal. Moreover, the minority expressed serious reservations regarding the Minister\u2019s compliance with principles of administrative law, including the requirement of sufficient investigation and the rule of national law that only the most qualified candidates should be selected. 21.  Before the vote in Parliament, the Speaker stated that a proposal from the CSC had been tabled in Parliament to approve the Minister\u2019s fifteen candidates for the office of judge of the Court of Appeal. He further noted that the proposal in 15 numbered items would be voted up or down in a single vote, if no one opposed. No Member of Parliament objected to that arrangement. 22.  On 1 June 2017, Parliament voted on and rejected the CSC minority\u2019s proposal of dismissal by 31 votes to 30, strictly along party\u2011political lines. This was followed by a vote on the majority\u2019s proposal, which was also passed along party-political lines with 31 votes of MPs in favour, who all were members of the political parties composing the majority in the coalition Government, and 22 MPs voting against, composed of members of parties in opposition. A total of 8 MPs abstained, none of whom were members of Government parties. 23.  By letter of 2 June 2017, the Minister of Justice was informed that at its meeting on 1 June 2017, Parliament had approved the Minister\u2019s proposal to nominate fifteen named individuals as judges of the Court of Appeal. The letter was signed by the Speaker and the Secretary-General of Parliament. The same day, the Minister of Justice sent a letter to the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, who holds the position of Secretary to the Council of State. In the letter the Minister requested that letters of appointment be issued for fifteen named individuals for the office of judges of the Court of Appeal in a specific order. The appointees were then listed in order based on how long they had been qualified to hold the office of a judge in the court. 24.  By letter of 6 June 2017, the Secretary to the President of Iceland asked for information on the procedures adopted in Parliament in the matter. By letter of 7 June 2017, the Secretary-General of Parliament gave an account of the procedure in Parliament and concluded that the voting had been lawful and in conformity with Parliament\u2019s statutory and traditional procedures. The letter also stated the following:\n\u201cIt has to be emphasised that the provision [temporary provision IV] does not contain further instructions on the procedures before Parliament. Therefore, the Parliamentary Procedures Act applies and the normal application of those provisions. However, it is clear from the temporary provision that Parliament shall, or can, take a stand on each proposed candidate for the position of judge if it so wishes.\n...\nIt is a normal practice and an old one that many issues are taken together during a vote if it is clear that everyone will vote in the same manner or when there is no proposal for amendments on individual matters, e.g. during the second discussions about a bill of law or on parliamentary resolutions. This is referred to as the sections being \u201ctaken together\u201d and the voting applies, or its conclusion, to each section. 25.  On 8 June 2017, in accordance with the Minister of Justice\u2019s proposal and Parliament\u2019s acceptance of the list presented by the Minister, the President of Iceland signed the appointment letters for the fifteen nominated candidates, including A.E. A.E.\u2019s letter of appointment stated the following:\n\u201cThe President of Iceland makes known: that in accordance with the Judiciary Act, I hereby appoint [A.E.] to the position of judge of the Court of Appeal, effective as of 1 January 2018. She shall respect the State\u2019s constitutional law and Icelandic laws in general, all in accordance with a solemn declaration by her.\n[...]\u201d 26.  On the same day, the President of Iceland issued a statement addressing the correspondence between Parliament and the Secretary to the President. The President concluded that no mistakes had been made in the preparation and arrangement of the voting on 1 June 2017 and that the procedure had been in conformity with the law, parliamentary conventions and procedures. 27.  In June 2017, two candidates, J.R.J. and \u00c1.H., who were among the fifteen candidates that the Committee considered most qualified, but had been removed from the final list of nominees proposed to Parliament by the Minister of Justice, brought judicial proceedings in the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk against the Icelandic State. Their primary claim was that the Minister\u2019s decision of 29 May 2017, by which she had not included them among the fifteen candidates proposed to Parliament to be judges of the Court of Appeal, should be annulled. Furthermore, the plaintiffs requested the annulment of the decision not to include them on the list of fifteen candidates proposed to the President of Iceland for appointment after the vote in Parliament. In addition they claimed compensation for pecuniary damage and 1,000,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK, approximately 9,000 euros (EUR) at the time) for personal injury (non-pecuniary damage). 28.  In both cases, the Icelandic State requested the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk to reject their claims as inadmissible. By decisions on 7 July 2017, the District Court in both cases upheld the inadmissibility requests of the State as regards the plaintiffs\u2019 annulment claims and their claims for pecuniary damage. 29.  The plaintiffs both appealed the decisions of the District Court to the Supreme Court on 10 July 2017. By two judgments of 31 July 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court decisions in dismissing their claims for annulment of the Minister\u2019s decision not to include them in her proposal to Parliament and in her list of judges to be appointed by the President after the vote in Parliament. Its reasoning stated that a judgment to that effect could have no effect on the appointment of the 15 judges already appointed to the Court of Appeal. However, the Supreme Court annulled the District Court decisions to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for pecuniary damage and remitted their claims to that effect for further proceedings on the merits in the District Court. 30.  By judgments on the merits of 15 September 2017, the District Court found in favour of the Icelandic State and dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 31.  The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court on 19 September 2017. By judgments of 19 December 2017, the Supreme Court rejected, with identical reasoning in both judgments, their claims for compensation for pecuniary damage. However, the applicants were each granted ISK 700,000 (approximately EUR 5,700 at the time) as compensation for personal injury (non-pecuniary damage). 32.  In its judgments, the Supreme Court recalled the general principle of Icelandic administrative law that the executive, in appointing persons to office, was bound by the rule that only the most qualified candidates should be selected. The court then stated that when the Minister decided to propose to Parliament to depart from the Committee\u2019s opinion, as the law permits, the Minister\u2019s proposal had to be based on an independent investigation of all the elements necessary to substantiate her proposal in accordance with Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act (see paragraph 62 below). Thus, the Minister had to ensure that her own investigation and assessment were based on similar expertise as members of the Evaluation Committee had in their work and that the Minister followed the Rules No. 620/2010, set by the Ministry itself (see paragraph 58 below) on the elements to be taken into account in such an assessment. The Supreme Court then emphasised that this was even more important when the law stipulates that the assessment report of the Committee limits the powers of the Minister and prohibits him or her from appointing a candidate to the post of judge that the Committee has considered not to be the most qualified, unless the Minister receives the consent of Parliament. The court stressed that in appointing judges, the Minister was not appointing persons to offices that are accountable to the Minister, but rather members of another branch of government which has a monitoring role vis-\u00e0-vis the other branches and is guaranteed independence by Article 61 of the Constitution and Section 24 of the prior Judiciary Act. 33.  On this basis, the Supreme Court held that in the light of her obligation to independently investigate the facts under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Minister should, at a minimum, have compared the competences of the four candidates she decided to include in her proposal to Parliament and the fifteen candidates considered most qualified by the Committee. On the basis of such a comparison, the Minister should then have reasoned her decision to seek the approval of Parliament for her proposal to depart from the Committee\u2019s conclusions. Only in this manner could Parliament have sufficiently served its role in the process and taken a position on the Minister\u2019s assessment which departed from the assessment of the Committee. On this basis, and in accordance with temporary provision IV of the Judiciary Act No. 50/2016, the Minister had been bound to present an independent proposal for each of the four candidates she proposed and who had not been in the group of fifteen candidates considered most qualified by the Committee. 34.  The Supreme Court thus found, on the basis of the file and the facts before it, that the Minister of Justice had violated Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act for failing to substantiate her proposal to Parliament with an independent investigation shedding light on elements necessary to assess the merits of the four candidates she had proposed, in comparison to the fifteen candidates considered by the Committee as the most qualified. Her proposal to include the four candidates had not been based on any new documents or an independent investigation of the facts on her part. The procedure adopted by the Minister had thus also resulted in a flaw in the procedure in Parliament when it assessed the Minister\u2019s proposal as the Minister had not rectified the procedural breach when the issue came to a vote in Parliament. 35.  As to the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for damages for personal injury (non\u2011pecuniary damage), under Section 26 of the Tort Act No. 50/1993 (see paragraph 63), the Supreme Court stated that although nothing suggested that the Minister had acted specifically with the intention of causing injury to their reputation and personal honour, her actions had nevertheless had the consequence of serving the interests of some of the four candidates that the Committee had ranked less qualified than the plaintiffs. Although the Minister had not expressed herself in a manner directed at the reputation or personal honour of the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not be disregarded that she should have been aware of the fact that her actions had unjustifiably been to the detriment of the reputation of the plaintiffs and thus caused them injury. Nevertheless, the court found that the Minister had acted \u201cin complete disregard of this obvious danger\u201d (\u201c\u00der\u00e1tt fyrir \u00feetta gekk r\u00e1\u00f0herrann fram \u00e1n \u00feess a\u00f0 skeyta nokku\u00f0 um \u00feessa auglj\u00f3su h\u00e6ttu\u201d). 36.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in K\u00f3pavogur. 37.  On 31 January 2017 the applicant was indicted for a violation of the Traffic Act No. 50/1987, for driving without holding a valid driver\u2019s licence and under the influence of narcotics. 38.  By a judgment of 23 March 2017, the District Court of Reykjaness convicted the applicant of the charges against him. The case was processed summarily as the applicant pleaded guilty and thus accepted the charges. The applicant was sentenced to 17 months\u2019 imprisonment and his driver\u2019s licence was revoked for life. 39.  On 6 April 2017, the applicant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court and requested that his sentence be reduced. As the case was not heard by the Supreme Court before the end of 2017, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeal in accordance with Section 78 (1) of Act No. 49/2016 on Amendments to the Criminal Procedures Act and Civil Procedures Act, as it had been amended by Section 4 of Act No. 53/2017. 40.  By letter of 29 January 2018, the Court of Appeal notified the applicant and the prosecution that the trial would take place on 6 February 2018 and also of the names of the three judges who would sit in the panel for the case. The panel of judges included A.E., who was one of the four judges appointed by the President of Iceland on the basis of the proposal of the Minister of Justice, departing from the assessment report of the Committee, and the vote in Parliament (see paragraphs 5-26 above). 41.  By letter of 2 February 2018, the applicant\u2019s defence counsel requested that A.E. withdraw from the case due to the irregularities in the procedure when she and the other three candidates had been appointed as judges to the Court of Appeal and because they had not been appointed in accordance with the law. 42.  On 6 February 2018, at a preliminary hearing before the Court of Appeal, the applicant formally lodged a procedural motion to the effect that A.E. withdraw from the case. The applicant claimed that according to Article 59 and 70 (1) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, he would not enjoy a fair trial before an impartial and independent tribunal established by law if she were to participate, due to the irregularities in the procedure leading up to her appointment as a judge of the court. The applicant referred in support of his claim to the decision of the EFTA Court (Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)) of 14 February 2017 in case E-21/16 and the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 23 January 2018 in case no. T\u2011639/16 P (see paragraphs 64-69 below). He argued that according to these rulings, when an appointment of a judge is not in accordance with the law, the judge is not fully vested with judicial powers and his or her judgments will be invalid. In accordance with the Supreme Court judgments of 19 December 2017 and of 31 July 2017 (see paragraphs 27-35 above) the same would apply in the applicant\u2019s case if his request were rejected. 43.  By a decision of 22 February 2018, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s motion for A.E. to withdraw from the case. 44.  On 24 February 2018 the applicant appealed the decision to reject the motion to the Supreme Court. By a judgment of 8 March 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the conditions for appeal had not been fulfilled. The court held that as the applicant\u2019s motion for A.E. to withdraw was in fact based on A.E.\u2019s judicial position not being established in accordance with the law, such a motion could not be appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis of a procedural decision by the Court of Appeal, but had to be examined on the basis of an appeal on the merits of a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal in the applicant\u2019s criminal case. 45.  Following the Supreme Court\u2019s dismissal of the applicant\u2019s appeal as to the motion for A.E. to withdraw, the trial continued with A.E as one of the three judges on the bench. 46.  By letter of 13 March 2018, the applicant changed his pleadings before the Court of Appeal. His primary claim was that he be acquitted. His secondary claim was for his sentence to be reduced on the ground that the appointment of judges to the Court of Appeal had been in violation of Article 59 and 70 of the Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 47.  By a judgment of 23 March 2018, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment on the merits. 48.  On 17 April 2018 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and on 20 April 2018 the applicant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court by way of an appeal lodged by the prosecutor at his request. 49.  The applicant\u2019s main claim before the Supreme Court was that the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment be quashed and the case be remitted for retrial. His secondary claims were for the court to acquit him or to reduce his sentence. His claims were based on the ground that the procedure leading up to the appointment of A.E., one of the judges in his case before the Court of Appeal, had violated the new Judiciary Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. Furthermore, he argued that the Minister of Justice\u2019s proposal to Parliament, for the appointment of A.E., had violated the general principle of domestic law that authorities should appoint the most qualified candidate for office. Therefore, A.E.\u2019s appointment had not been in accordance with the law as required by Article 59 of the Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. This had also resulted in him not enjoying a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal as stipulated in Article 70 (1) of the Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In his observations before the Supreme Court, the applicant alleged, inter alia, that A.E.\u2019s husband, B.N., a Member of Parliament and of the same political party as the Minister of Justice, had given up the first place on the party\u2019s constituency list in Reykjav\u00edk in the parliamentary elections held in October 2017 in favour of the Minister after her decision to include his wife in her proposal to Parliament. B.N.\u2019s decision had effectively excluded him from serving as a Minister after the parliamentary election when the party had formed a new coalition Government. 50.  By a judgment of 24 May 2018, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. As to the complaint concerning the appointment of A.E., the Supreme Court set out the procedure leading up to the appointment of judges in the Court of Appeal and referred principally in this respect to its judgments of 19 December 2017 in the related judicial proceedings (see paragraphs 27-35 above). The judgment then contained the following reasoning:\n\u201c[The applicant\u2019s] arguments for his primary and secondary claims before the Supreme Court are inter alia that according to Article 59 of the Constitution and Article 6 of [the Convention] an appointment of a judge has in all respects to be in accordance with the law. In case that fails and the appointment is thus unlawful \u201cthe judge in question is not a lawful holder of judicial power and a court\u2019s judicial rulings in which he has participated constitute a dead letter\u201d, as is argued in [the applicant\u2019s] observations before the Supreme Court. The conclusion drawn from the cited words cannot be sustained unless it would be considered that a person\u2019s appointment as a judge under these circumstances would be a nullity (\u201cmarkleysa\u201d), thus not only that flaws in the appointment process would result in its annulment. It must be taken into account that in the aforementioned assessment report of the Evaluation Committee of 19 May 2017 it was concluded that all the 33 candidates fulfilled all the requirements provided for by law to hold the office of a judge in the Court of Appeal, a fact that has not been challenged. The appointment of the judges was conducted in accordance with the formal procedural rules of Chapter III of Act No. 50/2016, as well as temporary provision IV of the same Act, however with the exception that during the Parliamentary procedure on the Minister of Justice\u2019s proposals on the appointment of the judges, the requirements of the second paragraph of the temporary provision were not followed in that the Parliament should have voted on each and every judge separately, but not all the judges at the same time, as was in fact done. This issue, however, has already been addressed in the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court [of 19 December 2017], where it was concluded that this was a defect which did not have significance. Taking this into account, as well as the fact that all the fifteen judges were appointed to office by letters signed by the President of Iceland on 8 June 2017, co-signed by the Minister of Justice, it cannot be concluded that the appointment of [A.E.] was a nullity nor is it accepted that judicial rulings of the Court of Appeal, which she delivers along with others, are for that reason a \u201cdead letter\u201d.\nWhen it is assessed whether the accused, due to [A.E.\u2019s] participation, did not enjoy the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 70 of the Constitution, cf. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it must be recalled that in the aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court [of 19 December 2017] it was concluded that such flaws were in the procedure of the Minister of Justice preceding the appointment of the fifteen Court of Appeal judges that the State was liable in damages. In this case, this finding has in no way been challenged and these judgments have, therefore, evidentiary value in this respect in accordance with Section 116 (4) of the Civil Procedure Act. In this regard, it must also, in particular, be emphasised that it cannot be accepted, as was argued in the aforementioned memorandum of the Minister of Justice of 30 May 2017, that by only increasing the weight ascribed to judicial experience from that which such experience was ascribed by the Evaluation Committee in its internal table, relied upon in its assessment report of the 19th of the same month, but relying in other respects on the \u2018sufficient investigation\u2019 of the Committee as to each assessment factor, the finding could be made that four named candidates for the post of judge in the Court of Appeal, but not others, would be removed from the group of the fifteen most qualified, and four specific named candidates would be moved up into that group rather than others. When assessing the consequences of the said flaws in the Minister of Justice\u2019s procedure, account must be taken of the fact that the appointment of all the fifteen judges of the Court of Appeal for an indefinite term, which in no way has been annulled by a court, became a reality upon the signing of their letters of appointment, dated 8 June 2017. As stated above, all of them fulfilled the requirements of Section 21 (2) of Act No. 50/2016, for being appointed to the office of judge, including the requirement of item 8 of the said paragraph, that is being considered to be qualified to hold these offices in the light of their professional experience and legal knowledge. From that time, the judges have held positions, cf. Article 61 of the Constitution, which preclude them from being discharged from office except by a judicial decision. From the time the appointment of these judges took effect, they have, according to the same provision of the Constitution, cf. Section 43 (1) of Act No. 50/2016, been under the main obligation in the performance of their official duty to follow only the law. They have also been afforded, in accordance with the last mentioned provision of law, independence in their judicial work but also the duty to perform it under their own responsibility and never follow instructions from others in their work. With reference to all of the above, there is not a sufficient reason to justifiably doubt that [the applicant] enjoyed a fair trial before independent and impartial judges, in spite of the flaws in the procedure by the Minister of Justice.\u201d 51.  On 5 March 2018 a motion of no-confidence was lodged in Parliament against the Minister of Justice by several members of two parties in the opposition. The reason for the motion was the Minister\u2019s violations of domestic law in the process of appointing judges to the Court of Appeal. On 6 March 2018 Parliament rejected the motion by a vote of 33 MPs voting against the motion with 29 in favour, with one MP abstaining. The 33 MPs rejecting the motion were all members of parties composing the majority in the coalition Government. However, two other members of those parties voted in favour of the proposal. 52.  In February and March 2017, the two other candidates, E.J. and J.H., who were among the fifteen candidates that the Committee considered most qualified, but had been removed from the final list of nominees proposed to Parliament by the Minister of Justice, brought judicial proceedings in the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk against the Icelandic State. E.J. requested a declaratory judgment to the effect that the State was obliged to pay him pecuniary damage for not being appointed one of the judges to the Court of Appeal due to an unlawful decision by the Minister of Justice. J.H. claimed compensation for pecuniary damage and non-pecuniary damage for not being appointed one of the judges to the Court of Appeal by an unlawful decision of the Minister of Justice. 53.  By two separate judgments of 25 October 2018, the District Court of Reykjav\u00edk found for the plaintiffs. In the first judgment the District Court acknowledged E.J.\u2019s right to compensation for pecuniary damage due to him not being appointed a judge of the Court of Appeal. The District Court concluded, inter alia, that the candidate had sufficiently established that had the procedure been conducted in a lawful manner with a reasonable assessment being made of his application and a comparison performed of his merits in relation to other candidates, the result would have been that he would have been appointed a judge of the Court of Appeal. In the latter judgment the District Court referred to the Supreme Court judgments of 19 December 2017 (see paragraphs 32-34 above) and awarded the plaintiff, J.H., ISK 1,100,000 (approximately EUR 7,300 at the material time) as compensation for personal injury (non-pecuniary damage). As for the right to compensation for pecuniary damage the District Court awarded him ISK 4,000,000  (approximately EUR 29,200 at the material time). The District Court concluded that the candidate had also sufficiently established that had the procedure been conducted in a lawful manner with a reasonable assessment being made of his application and a comparison performed of his merits in relation to other candidates, the result would have been that he would have been appointed a judge of the Court of Appeal. 54.  The Icelandic State has appealed both judgments. They are currently pending before the Court of Appeal after leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court was refused on 13 December 2018.", "references": ["8", "4", "2", "6", "5", "9", "7", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in J\u016brmala. 6.  On 20 November 2008 the police drew up an administrative offence report (administrat\u012bv\u0101 p\u0101rk\u0101puma protokols) stating that the applicant had violated Article 14915(4) of the Code of Administrative Offences (Latvijas Administrat\u012bvo p\u0101rk\u0101pumu kodekss) by driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 1.5 permilles (0.15%). The applicant lodged an appeal. 7.  On 1 December 2008 the J\u016brmala City Court (J\u016brmalas pils\u0113tas tiesa) terminated the administrative offence proceedings, as it had failed to establish corpus delicti. This decision took effect on 5 January 2009, and the applicant\u2019s driving licence card was returned to him. 8.  On 10 February 2009 a prosecutor lodged an appeal (apel\u0101cijas protests) against the decision of 1 December 2008. The Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa) instituted appeal proceedings. On 23 February 2009 the applicant received notice of the hearing, which was set to take place in four days. He asked for the hearing to be postponed so that he could prepare his defence. The Riga Regional Court dismissed that request and heard the case in the applicant\u2019s absence. 9.  By a judgment of 27 February 2009 the Riga Regional Court quashed the decision of 1 December 2008. It found that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 14915(4) of the Code of Administrative Offences and imposed the following penalties: fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention; a fine of 500 lats (LVL \u2013 approximately 685 euros (EUR)); a two-year driving ban; and a ban on obtaining a licence to operate recreational crafts for two years. The decision was not amenable to appeal and took effect on 6 March 2009 when its text was finalised. 10.  The applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice that a final court decision had been quashed. On 26 March 2009 the Ministry responded that under the Code of Administrative Offences the prosecutor had the right to appeal against decisions taken in administrative offence proceedings and that there were no time-limits for doing so. 11.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant requested that the execution of the judgment of 27 February 2009 be suspended. By a final decision of 28 April 2009 the Riga Regional Court dismissed that request. 12.  On 31 July 2009 the police drew up an administrative offence report stating, inter alia, that the applicant had driven a car while disqualified, in violation of Article 1494(6) of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe initial offence\u201d). On 1 September 2009 a fine of LVL 250 (approximately EUR 343) was imposed on him. On 7 October 2009 that decision was upheld by the State Police. 13.  On 19 October 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with the administrative courts. He argued that on 1 December 2008 the first set of administrative offence proceedings had been terminated and that the relevant decision had taken effect. His driving licence card had been returned to him. Under domestic law, decisions that had become final could not be quashed on appeal. 14.  On 20 December 2010 the Administrative District Court (Administrat\u012bv\u0101 rajona tiesa) dismissed the appeal, noting that the decision of 1 December 2008 had been set aside by the Riga Regional Court, whereas the judgment of 27 February 2009 revoking his right to drive vehicles had taken effect and was binding. Thus, on 31 July 2009 the applicant had driven a car even though his licence had been revoked. 15.  The applicant appealed before the Administrative Regional Court (Administrat\u012bv\u0101 apgabaltiesa), which by a final judgment of 24 April 2012 upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It added that the twenty-day time-limit for lodging an appeal only applied to persons against whom administrative offence proceedings had been instituted. It did not apply to prosecutors in the exercise of their right to lodge an appeal. Hence, in the applicant\u2019s case the prosecutor had been entitled to appeal against the decision of 1 December 2008 even after it had taken effect. Furthermore, the judgment of 27 February 2009 had become final and was legally binding. Its legality could not be reassessed in the present set of proceedings. Lastly, there was no indication that the applicant had been unaware of the fact that his driving licence had been revoked. 16.  On 23 September 2009 the police drew up an administrative offence report stating that the applicant had driven a car while disqualified and that the offence had been committed repeatedly within a year, in violation of Article 1494(7) of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter \u201cthe repeat offence\u201d). The applicant lodged an appeal. 17.  On 6 November 2009 the Riga City Zemgale District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Zemgales priek\u0161pils\u0113tas tiesa) found the applicant administratively liable under Article 1494(7) of the Code of Administrative Offences for driving while disqualified repeatedly within a year. In establishing the facts the court referred to the judgment of 27 February 2009 (see paragraph 9 above) and the administrative offence report of 31 July 2009 (see paragraph 12 above). The court imposed a penalty of five days\u2019 administrative detention and a fine of LVL 400 (approximately EUR 549). 18.  The applicant appealed against this judgment arguing (i) that the judgment of 27 February 2009 was unlawful and (ii) that the repeated nature of the offence could not be established, as his appeal concerning the administrative offence report of 31 July 2009 (relating to the initial offence) was still pending. The applicant requested that the court either terminate the proceedings or suspend them until the conclusion of the administrative offence proceedings concerning the initial offence. 19.  On 26 February 2010 the Riga Regional Court by a final judgment upheld the finding that the applicant had committed a repeat offence. It noted that there was no reason to conclude that a person could not be found guilty of a repeat offence while the decision concerning the initial offence was being appealed against. The fact that the appeal proceedings were still pending could not be used as a criterion to determine whether the person had already been administratively punished. The only criterion for determining the repeated nature of the offence was whether or not the decision on the initial offence had been set aside or its legal effect suspended at the time the decision on the repeat offence was being taken. In the absence of such circumstances, the findings of the decision on the initial offence were legally binding and had to be taken into account when classifying the second offence as a repeat offence. Referring to Article 283 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the court noted that an appeal against a decision revoking a person\u2019s driving licence did not suspend enforcement of that decision. Accordingly, the appeal lodged against the decision concerning the offence of 31 July 2009 (the initial offence) did not preclude the offence under consideration being classified as a repeat offence and the proceedings being concluded while that appeal was still pending. 20.  On 2 June 2010, when the applicant lodged his application with the Court, he submitted that he had already served the sentence of five day\u2019s administrative detention and had already paid the fine imposed in the third set of administrative offence proceedings. The Government did not contest this allegation.", "references": ["9", "1", "5", "8", "6", "4", "2", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Tbilisi. 7.  On 7 November 2002 the applicant was sentenced to a suspended term of five years\u2019 imprisonment for breaching public order and resisting a police officer. 8.  On 4 July 2004 a police officer, the head of the criminal investigation unit at the Gldani-Nadzaladevi district police department in Tbilisi (\u201cthe district police department\u201d), ordered a personal search of the applicant to be carried out in urgent circumstances. The relevant decision stated that having examined the inquiry file (\u10db\u10dd\u10d9\u10d5\u10da\u10d4\u10d5\u10d8\u10e1 \u10db\u10d0\u10e1\u10d0\u10da\u10d4\u10d1\u10d8) in respect of the applicant, who was suspected of possession and use of narcotic substances, the police officer had decided, under, inter alia, Articles 290, 321, and 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Georgia (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) (as cited in paragraph 37 below), that a personal search of the applicant should be conducted for the purpose of seizing any unlawful substances. The decision consisted mainly of pre-typed standard phrases with the applicant\u2019s first and last names added by hand, noting that he was suspected of unlawful drug possession. It was signed by the police officer himself and the head of the relevant district police department. 9.  According to the official version of events, at around 5.20 p.m. on the same date, as the applicant was entering a billiards hall with two friends, two police officers waiting in a vehicle parked opposite the hall called to him. The applicant approached them. He was then searched, without the police having a judicial warrant for that purpose. The police report on the personal search, which was drawn up subsequently at the police department, stated:\n\u201c... given that there were sufficient grounds to suspect that the arrested person would try to destroy evidence (narcotic substance heroin) showing that he or she had committed a crime, a personal search of [Archil Jugheli Kobiashvili born in 1973 and living at ...] was conducted.\u201d\nThe report further noted that before being searched the applicant had been asked to \u201cindicate where he was keeping the heroin\u201d. The applicant had pointed to \u201cthe trouser pocket in which he was carrying heroin wrapped in white paper\u201d. A yellow powder had been discovered there as a result. Two attesting witnesses, Mr U.K. and Mr L.Ts., who had attended the search, as well as a police officer, Sh.Sh., signed the report on the personal search. The applicant refused to countersign it. The search lasted from 5.20 to 5.45 p.m. 10.  The applicant was formally arrested at 6 p.m. on suspicion of unlawful use and possession of the narcotic substance heroin. He again refused to sign the arrest record. 11.  On what appears to be the same date (the document is not dated) the head of the relevant district police department wrote a report to the Tbilisi Gldani-Nadzaladevi district prosecutor, informing him of the personal search of the applicant that had taken place at 5.45 p.m. on 4 July 2004. According to that note, the relevant investigative measure had been conducted in urgent circumstances in the absence of a judicial warrant and before the initiation of criminal proceedings. The police officer asked the prosecutor to apply to the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court with a request for legalising the search post-factum. 12.  According to the investigation file, on the same date, that is on 4 July 2004, on the basis of the above-mentioned request, the Tbilisi Gldani-Nadzaladevi district prosecutor lodged an application with the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court in Tbilisi to have the search of 4 July 2004, which it claimed had been urgent, legalised. The request simply provided the place the applicant had been arrested, the substance that had been revealed as a result of the search, and the offence the applicant had been suspected of. In accordance with Article 290 of the CCP and with reference to section 7(4) and sections 8 and 9 of the Law on the Conduct of Undercover Investigations, the prosecutor asked the court to legalise the search. In support of the request the prosecutor submitted three documents. The first was a handwritten note by Officer Sh.Sh., according to which the search had been conducted, on the basis of \u201coperational information\u201d (\u10dd\u10de\u10d4\u10e0\u10d0\u10e2\u10d8\u10e3\u10da\u10d8 \u10d8\u10dc\u10e4\u10dd\u10e0\u10db\u10d0\u10ea\u10d8\u10d0), by him, by another police officer N.O., and by the driver, police officer M.Ts., and that as a result of the search attended by witnesses, heroin had been found on the applicant. The above note, in contrast to the police report on personal search of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above) stated that at the time of the arrest, the applicant had been under the influence of drugs. 13.  The second document was a handwritten note from L.Ts., one of the witnesses who had attended the search. He stated that while walking along the street, he had been approached by police officers with a request to attend a personal search. He confirmed that the substance had been found in the back right pocket of the applicant\u2019s jeans and that the applicant had stated that it belonged to him. The third document submitted to the court was a handwritten note from the other attesting witness to the search, U.K., who provided a short description of the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s personal search in terms identical to those used by L.Ts. 14.  According to the case-file, the prosecutor\u2019s request to have the personal search of the applicant legalised, as submitted to the court, included neither a copy of the decision ordering the search in urgent circumstances nor the inquiry file in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). It also appears that a copy of the police report on personal search of the applicant was likewise missing from the case-file available to the court (see paragraph 9 above). 15.  On 5 July 2004 the court examined the request and the documents produced by the public prosecutor\u2019s office in accordance with Articles 290 and 293 of the CCP and declared the search lawful. It concluded:\n\u201cHaving reviewed the reasoning of the request, [the court] consider[s] that the personal search of Archil Kobiashvili was conducted because of an exigent need, in compliance with the rules of criminal procedural legislation and that there is a legal basis for granting [the request].\u201d\nThe procedure was conducted in writing and the applicant was not allowed to submit his observations regarding the circumstances of the search. The decision stated that no appeal lay against it. 16.  On an unspecified date the applicant was formally charged with buying and possessing a large quantity of drugs, an offence under Article 260 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Criminal Code. 17.  On 5 August the two attesting witnesses were questioned again. They maintained their initial statements, describing in more detail the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s search. On 7 August 2004 Officer Sh.Sh., who was also questioned in the capacity of a witness, again confirmed that he had acted with two other police officers, N.O. and M.Ts., on the basis of operational information. According to that information, a certain person on land adjacent to a billiards hall was under the influence of drugs. 18.  On 26 August 2004 a forensic examination by the investigating authorities established that the substance discovered during the search was 0.059 grams of heroin. In addition, on 27 August 2004 a narcotics test revealed that the applicant was not a drug addict, although he did require \u201cpreventive treatment.\u201d 19.  The applicant remained silent during the investigation. 20.  On 10 December 2004 the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court opened the applicant\u2019s trial. The applicant, describing the events that had taken place in front of the billiards hall, pleaded not guilty. He claimed that he had not been searched either before or after his arrest and that the substance allegedly discovered on him had belonged to the police. He explained that the police had taken him to the police station, where they had \u201cheated up\u201d an injection of drugs (opium) and administered it to him by force. He had then been taken to a toxicology clinic to be tested. 21.  On 21 December 2004 U.K., one of the attesting witnesses, was questioned in court. He claimed that he had not attended the applicant\u2019s search on 4 July 2004 but had been approached at around 10 p.m. at the construction site where he had been working by police officers who had taken him directly to the police station. There, they had dictated to him a text which he had signed. In addition, he had signed a hand-written report without reading it. In reply to a question as to whether the police had insulted him, U.K. replied that they had been swearing at the police station and that he had been scared. He also alleged that the police had threatened to arrest him. 22.  On 27 December 2004 Officer Sh.Sh was questioned in court. He confirmed that the applicant had been arrested and searched on the basis of operational information. He maintained that the search had been attended by two witnesses who had been approached in the street. The second police officer, N.O., when questioned in court on 9 March 2005, explained that he had acted on the basis of operational information according to which \u201cthere [had been] a person in Mukhiani IV district, who could have been under the influence of drugs\u201d. He further stated that he was not sure whether visually it had been evident that the applicant had been under the influence of drugs. Arguing that U.K.\u2019s testimony before the trial court was untrue, he confirmed the official version of the search of the applicant and maintained that the latter\u2019s personal search had been conducted immediately at the scene of his arrest. 23.  In the meantime, L.Ts., the second witness to the search, refused to appear before the court. After being served with a summons, on 18 February 2005 he wrote a brief note to the judge informing her of his inability to attend the hearing on 22 February 2005 because of a planned trip to the United States. 24.  The court also heard evidence from two friends of the applicant who had been with him at the time of his arrest. They stated that all three of them had been standing in front of a billiards hall when the police had called to the applicant and the latter had approached their vehicle. They both claimed that the applicant had been immediately taken away by the police without any search having been conducted on the spot. 25.  In his final statement, the applicant\u2019s defence counsel asked the court to dismiss the report on the applicant\u2019s personal search as null and void, on account of various procedural irregularities. He also claimed that the second alleged witness to the search, L.Ts., was a police agent, a former police officer who had acted in many similar criminal cases as an attesting witness. 26.  On 18 April 2005 the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment, to which was added six months from a previous sentence. The court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was proven by the statements given by the two police officers who had arrested and searched him, and by the results of the personal search. As regards U.K.\u2019s contradictory claims, the court concluded that it \u201chad not been unequivocally established that he had not been a witness to the personal search and had only signed the papers at the police station\u201d. Consequently, the court decided not to take account of the part of U.K.\u2019s testimony where he had denied being present during the search. The court further held that it could not take into account the statements of the applicant\u2019s friends, given that the two men were friends of the accused and therefore wanted to get him out of trouble. 27.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, arguing again that he had not been searched at the time of his arrest and that his conviction had been based on planted evidence. He claimed that the first-instance court had not drawn objective conclusions from his friends\u2019 statements and the testimony of U.K. in which the latter had claimed not to have witnessed the search. The applicant also criticised the fact that no evidence had been heard from L.Ts. He provided the witness\u2019s address and requested that he be questioned in court. At the same time, he asked the court to re-examine all the witnesses, namely the two police officers, U.K., and his friends. 28.  On 3 June 2005 the appeal proceedings started. The appeal court heard evidence from the two arresting officers, who confirmed the official version of events. They both stated that as far as they could recall, the operational information had simply stated that there had been a person at a certain address under the influence of drugs. None of them could recall exactly who had received that information at the police station and whether it had been provided by telephone or by some other means. 29.  The appeal court further examined L.Ts., the second attesting witness to the search, who confirmed that he had been present during the search in question at the request of the police, and had seen that a yellowish substance had been discovered in the applicant\u2019s trouser pocket. He contested the allegations of the defence that he was a former police officer or had otherwise cooperated with the police in the past. The first attesting witness, U.K., confirmed the evidence he had given before the first-instance court. He refuted the allegation that he had attended the applicant\u2019s personal search and claimed that he had been forced to sign several documents at the police station. He alleged that he had been subjected to psychological as well as physical pressure by the police. At the same time, in reply to a question put by the prosecutor, U.K. said that having learnt that the documents he had signed concerned the applicant, he had gone to see the latter\u2019s brother and had told him everything. He had then gone with one of the applicant\u2019s cousins to the Public Defender\u2019s Office and had given them a detailed statement concerning the circumstances of the case. 30.  The two friends of the applicant were also questioned in the appeal court. They confirmed the evidence given to the first-instance court. 31.  At the hearing of 18 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s defence counsel applied to the appeal court to exclude as inadmissible evidence, among other things, the police report on the applicant\u2019s personal search. Defence counsel argued, firstly, that the search had been conducted without a judicial warrant or the authorisation of a senior investigator, in violation of the relevant provisions of the CCP. In support of his argument he referred to the fact that the decision to conduct a personal search had not been duly signed by a senior investigator, had not indicated the exact time at which it had been issued, and had included detailed information about the identity of the applicant, including his name and address, and the type of narcotic substance, heroin, that he allegedly had on his person, facts which had become known to the police only after the arrest and search of the applicant. Moreover, he alleged that the decision had not been read out to the applicant before the search. Secondly, in his evidence before the first and second\u2011instance courts, U.K. had unequivocally claimed that he had not witnessed the personal search of the applicant and had been forced to sign certain documents at the police station. As for the second witness, L.Ts. had lied about his prior working experience with the police and was thus unreliable. In support of his arguments, the defence submitted a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, according to which L.Ts. had been working for the Ministry in 1996. Thirdly, the defence emphasised that the friends of the applicant had consistently maintained that the latter had not been searched at the place of his arrest. The defence thus requested that the search report be excluded as an inadmissible piece of evidence, in accordance with Article 111 of the CCP. 32.  On 6 December 2005 the appeal court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request in its entirety. In connection with the search decision, they concluded that it had been taken by an authorised police officer in line with the requirements of Article 67 of the CCP. They further considered that it was unclear as to whether the decision had indeed been read out to the applicant prior to the personal search being carried out; therefore they were not in a position at that stage of the proceedings to assess that alleged breach of procedure. 33.  On 21 February 2006 the appeal court upheld the first-instance judgment. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s guilt was confirmed by the reports of his arrest and the personal search, the statements of the arresting officers, and other evidence in the case file. In connection with the evidence of U.K., the appeal court found the testimony he had given in court not credible as it contradicted the case materials. Furthermore, it was \u201cillogical\u201d and had apparently been given under the influence of the applicant\u2019s family. The appeal court also relied on the statement of L.Ts., disregarding the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning his being a former police officer. It dismissed the evidence of the two friends of the applicant as unreliable. 34.  On 6 March 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He maintained that serious procedural irregularities that had taken place during the pre-trial investigation had undermined his ability properly to defend his case, and that his conviction was based on unlawful evidence, notably on a falsified decision to carry out a personal search in urgent circumstances, which had served as a basis for the unlawful search and untrue witness statements. He also denounced as unsubstantiated the appeal court\u2019s decision refusing his request concerning the inadmissibility of evidence. 35.  On 12 June 2006 the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible on the grounds that it did not satisfy the requirements of Article 547 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 36.  On 3 January 2011 the applicant was released from prison upon the expiry of his prison sentence.", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "7", "8", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and currently lives in Vienna, Austria. 6.  In 2002 the applicant purchased a flat in Baku at a location near the Tezepir Mosque, with a living space of 17.6 sq. m. 7.  In 2004 the applicant carried out some renovation and construction works at the flat, as a result of which the total area of the flat became 84 sq. m, while the living space increased to 33.6 sq. m. 8.  On 7 March 2005 the head of Yasamal District Executive Authority issued an order recognising the fact that by building additional rooms (living rooms, hall, kitchen, mansard, and so on), the applicant had increased the total area of her flat to 84 sq. m. 9.  On 3 June 2005 the Baku City Department of Technical Inventory and Registration of Property Rights issued a certificate of title to the applicant certifying that her flat comprised a total area of 84 sq. m, 33.6 sq. m of which was living space and the remainder of which was auxiliary space. 10.  In July 2006 the Tezepir Mosque lodged a claim against the applicant with the Yasamal District Court, asking that the applicant be dispossessed of her title to the flat in exchange for monetary compensation, and be evicted from the flat. The Tezepir Mosque argued that the area where the applicant\u2019s flat was located was within the area of works required for the renovation and development of the mosque complex, and that the applicant and her family were the only residents who had refused to relinquish their flat in exchange for the compensation offered to them. The Tezepir Mosque was ready to pay 100,000 United States dollars (USD) in compensation. 11.  During the court hearing, the representative of the Tezepir Mosque argued that the market price of comparable flats was USD 500 per sq. m, and that the applicant was only entitled to be paid for the living space of her flat (33.6 sq. m). It appears that, in support of this claim, he submitted copies of some sale announcements published in unidentified issues of the local newspaper. The applicant argued that the total area of her flat was 84 sq. m, that the market value of comparable flats was USD 3,000 per sq. m, and that she would sell her flat only if she was paid USD 252,000. 12.  The Yasamal District Court noted that, under Article 157.9 of the Civil Code, private owners could be dispossessed of their title to property for State and public needs, in exchange for compensation. It also referred to an order by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (\u201cthe Azerbaijan SSR\u201d) dated 22 May 1986 (hereinafter \u201cthe order of 22 May 1986\u201d), concerning renovation work on the land of the Tezepir Mosque and the relocation of people residing in that area to other accommodation. It also noted, without referring to any specific decisions, that subsequently the Baku City Executive Committee and its successor, the Baku City Executive Authority, had issued several other decisions on the continuation of the renovation work on that land and the \u201cgradual relocation\u201d of the area\u2019s residents. 13.  In deciding the amount of compensation payable, the court found that the area of the applicant\u2019s flat was 33.6 sq. m. It also took note of the Tezepir Mosque\u2019s submissions that, despite the fact that the applicant had purchased a flat which was located on land already allocated to the Mosque and that she had subsequently carried out renovation and construction work in the flat \u201cwithout obtaining rights to the land\u201d and \u201cwithout authorisation\u201d, the Mosque had offered to pay her USD 100,000, an amount which exceeded the flat\u2019s market value. The court considered that the proposed amount of compensation was reasonable. 14.  By a judgment of 2 August 2006, the Yasamal District Court revoked the applicant\u2019s title to the flat, ordered the Tezepir Mosque to pay her the equivalent of USD 100,000 in Azerbaijani manats, and ordered the eviction of the applicant and her family from the flat. By a separate decision delivered on the same day, the Yasamal District Court also ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. 15.  On 27 September and 27 December 2006 the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively.", "references": ["7", "8", "2", "5", "4", "6", "1", "0", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (\u2018Teghout\u2019) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper\u2011molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicants, a family of four, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture and apiculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village measuring 0.373 ha and 0.448 ha. They also owned a beekeeper\u2019s house measuring 69.4 square metres situated on the second plot of land. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding their livestock and beekeeping. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 183,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 398 euros (EUR)) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company, but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the valuations prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants\u2019 plots of land was estimated at AMD 183,000 (approximately EUR 398) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) respectively. 13.  In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees, the beekeeper\u2019s house situated on the second plot of land, and a number of other factors that should have affected the calculation of the amount of compensation. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted new valuations of the applicants\u2019 property, also prepared by Oliver Group LLC. The representative of Teghout CJSC stated that a new valuation of the applicant\u2019s second plot of land had been conducted in order to include the building situated on it. According to the new valuations, the market value of the applicants\u2019 second plot of land including the building was estimated to be AMD 1,728,000 (approximately EUR 3,760). As to the first plot of land, it was stated that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 189,000 (approximately EUR 410). The final amounts of compensation for the two plots of land, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 217,350 (approximately EUR 473) and AMD 1,987,200 (approximately EUR 4,320) respectively. 15.  On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC\u2019s claim, awarding the applicants compensation of AMD 217,350 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,987,200 for the second plot of land. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17.  On 18 June 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment finding, inter alia, that the latter had struck a fair balance between the applicants\u2019 interests and the legitimate aim pursued, and that the market value of the property had been properly determined, on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 12 August 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["8", "3", "7", "6", "0", "1", "5", "2", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and currently lives in Berlin, Germany. 6.  In 2005 he was an English teacher in a school in Kyiv, Ukraine. At that time he entered into private relations with a married woman living in Kyiv. In 2006 the woman gave birth to a child. Her husband was indicated as the father in the child\u2019s birth certificate. In 2007 a DNA test was performed proving that the applicant was in fact the father of the child. The applicant was not prevented from having access to the child by her mother, who accepted financial support from him on a monthly basis. The applicant bought a car for the child\u2019s mother. In 2011 he wrote a will bequeathing all his property to the child. 7.  The applicant had regular contact with the child until 2015 when the mother informed the applicant that she had divorced her husband and that she had decided to marry a German national and move with the child to Germany. As the applicant opposed the decision to emigrate to Germany, the mother denied him access to the child and prevented him from communicating with the child. 8.  In June 2015 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) seeking recognition of his paternity and to have the child\u2019s birth certificate amended accordingly. 9.  During the hearing the mother of the child admitted that the applicant had provided regular financial support and had taken part in the upbringing and education of the child. However, she submitted that the applicant\u2019s claims were time-barred under Article 129 \u00a7 2 of the Family Code, which provided a one-year time-limit for such claims (see paragraph 15 below). The applicant contended that he had delayed his lawsuit because he had not wished to disturb the child\u2019s family situation and he had not been prevented from communicating with the child on a regular basis until 2015. Only when the child\u2019s mother had decided to emigrate to another country with the child had he decided to seek formal recognition of his paternity. 10.  On 17 November 2015 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claims, declaring him the father of the child and ordering the amendment of the child\u2019s birth certificate. The District Court considered that the applicant had missed the time-limit for valid reasons. It took into account the applicant\u2019s argument that he had not wished to disturb the family and cause any harm to the child with a lawsuit during the long period when the mother had in fact assisted him in having regular access to the child. 11.  On 3 February 2016 the Kyiv Court of Appeal overturned the District Court\u2019s decision and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as time-barred. The appellate court stated that Article 129 \u00a7 2 of the Family Code provided a one-year time-limit, which had started to run from the moment the applicant had found out or should have found out about his paternity. The applicant had become aware of his paternity in 2007 when the DNA test had been performed (see paragraph 6 above); however he had applied to the court in 2015 (see paragraph 8 above), which had been too late. 12.  The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had applied the statute of limitations without duly taking into account the reasons for which he had delayed his action and without examining the child\u2019s interests. 13.  On 13 July 2016 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, without examining whether the applicant had provided valid reasons which could justify his non-compliance with the time-limit set out in Article 129 \u00a7 2 of the Family Code.", "references": ["8", "2", "6", "5", "7", "0", "1", "9", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Milcov\u0103\u021bu. In 2008 he was convicted of burglary and served a sentence of imprisonment until 30 August 2011, when he was conditionally released. 6.  Between 2007 and 2009 the applicant completed the last two years of his primary education (grades III and IV) in Rahova Prison, within the framework of the \u201cSecond Chance\u201d educational programme for prisoners. 7.  Following a transfer to Jilava Prison, between May and August 2010 the applicant lodged three requests with the prison administration, asking to be enrolled in secondary education (the educational stage corresponding to grades V-VIII) as a fifth grade student. 8.  On 29 July 2010 the Jilava prison governor wrote to the Ilfov County Schools Inspectorate (\u201cthe schools inspectorate\u201d) pointing out that, under legislation enacted earlier that year (see paragraph 16 below), prisoners were required to receive compulsory education. He included information on the number and educational levels of the prisoners concerned and asked the schools inspectorate to consider the possibilities available to them to complete their compulsory education. In a reply of 24 August 2010 the schools inspectorate notified the prison governor that a class had been set up at School No. 1 in Jilava (\u201cthe school\u201d) for primary education and that, as regards secondary education, it was necessary to submit, to the same school, the documents necessary for the prisoners\u2019 enrolment, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 on part-time secondary education (see paragraph 18 below). 9.  In the meantime, the prison administration informed the applicant that his request to be enrolled had been considered and that he was required to provide his academic record from his previous school. On 2 September 2010 the applicant gave his written consent for the prison administration to request his academic record. 10.  On 21 September 2010 Jilava Prison and the school signed a collaboration protocol concerning the education of prisoners at primary and secondary level in the academic year 2010/2011. Following this, on 28 October 2010 the prison governor wrote to the school asking to be informed of the starting date of the secondary education courses. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had given its approval for the courses to be organised on the prison premises, that the conditions for organising them had been met, and that additional documents concerning the prisoners\u2019 previous education were to be sent to the school once they became available. 11.  On the same day the applicant lodged a complaint with the judge delegated to supervise the observance of prisoners\u2019 rights (\u201cthe post\u2011sentencing judge\u201d), alleging that the prison administration had violated his right to education. At a hearing of 29 October 2010 he stated that the prison administration had approved his request to be allowed to study, but had informed him that no teacher wished to teach in the prison. 12.  While the proceedings before the post-sentencing judge were ongoing, in a letter of 4 November 2010 the school informed the prison administration that the prisoners\u2019 enrolment applications did not contain the necessary documents, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 (see paragraph 18 below). The letter also pointed out, without reference to any individual situation, that academic records had been submitted in respect of only five of the sixteen prisoners who had requested to be enrolled. It then listed the number of prisoners who could potentially be enrolled in grades VI to VIII and concluded that it was not possible to arrange for teachers to teach each subject to a class containing only one student, as was the case in respect of grade VII. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had been notified accordingly. 13.  In a decision of 16 November 2010 the post-sentencing judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as ill-founded. The decision stated that the Education Act and the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraphs 15\u201116 below) imposed a positive obligation on prison administrations, together with the educational authorities, to ensure prisoners\u2019 access to compulsory education. The prison administration had taken all the necessary steps to ensure that the applicant and other prisoners had access to secondary education in prison, in accordance with the law. In particular, it had duly approached the competent institutions, and on 29 October 2010 it had sent the school the applicant\u2019s and other prisoners\u2019 study documents and academic records. Therefore, the applicant\u2019s inability to pursue his studies was not imputable to the prison administration, but to the insufficient number of students, which constituted an impediment to the establishment of a class for secondary education. 14.  The applicant appealed against that decision. He argued that prison administrations were under a clear legal obligation to ensure prisoners\u2019 access to secondary education, irrespective of their number. On 12 January 2011 the Bucharest County Court gave a final judgment which upheld the ruling made by the post-sentencing judge. It concluded that the applicant\u2019s inability to continue his studies had been due to a situation outside of everyone\u2019s control, namely an insufficient number of students to set up a class in accordance with the law.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "9", "3", "7", "8", "2", "4", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Beiu\u015f. 5.  The applicant was married to I.T. and had a daughter with him, born in 2011. In May 2013 the applicant left the marital home and the child remained with I.T. On 21 May and 5 June 2013 respectively I.T. and the applicant filed for divorce and each sought sole custody of the child. 6.  On 10 December 2013 the Beiu\u015f District Court granted the couple\u2019s divorce and joint custody of the child, and decided that the child should remain with her father. In a final decision of 17 June 2014 the Bihor County Court quashed the above decision in part and decided that the child should live with the applicant. I.T. refused to hand over the child. 7.  On 4 July 2014 the applicant applied to the bailiff\u2019s office for enforcement of the decision of 17 June 2014. On 5 August and 25 September 2014 I.T. went to the bailiff\u2019s office alone and told the bailiff that the child refused to live with her mother. A representative of the Bihor Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (\u201cthe child\u2011protection authority\u201d) was also present at these meetings. 8.  On 3 October 2014 the bailiff and the applicant lodged an action with the Oradea District Court, seeking an order that I.T. pay her 1,000 Romanian lei (RON \u2013 approximately 225 euros (EUR)) for each day of non-enforcement of the custody order. On 11 May 2015 the court dismissed the action on the grounds that I.T. had not opposed the enforcement and that it had been the child who had refused to go with her mother. It appears that neither the applicant nor the bailiff appealed against this decision. 9.  On 6 October 2014 the bailiff lodged a criminal complaint against I.T. for non-compliance with a court order, but on 23 January 2015 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Oradea District Court decided not to charge I.T. It considered that the reports drafted by the bailiff after each encounter with I.T. showed that it had not been I.T., but the child who had opposed the enforcement. 10.  On 4 November 2014 the bailiff, accompanied by a social worker from the child protection authority and the police, went to I.T.\u2019s home. They asked to see the child to verify if she wanted to go with her mother. Initially I.T. refused, but eventually he brought the child out. The bailiff noted as follows:\n\u201cAfter [the mother] talked with the minor, I asked the minor if she wanted to leave with her mother, and she gave me a non-committal answer. However, I should note that, although the minor did not show an aversion towards her mother, she did not wish to leave with her mother. The social worker reached the same conclusion.\u201d 11.  The social worker who was also present at the meeting noted as follows:\n\u201cThe father refused to bring out the child, became uncooperative but eventually agreed that [the child] sit near her mother. The atmosphere was tense, the parents made reproaches to each other in front of the child and they spoke to each other in a raised voice.\nWhen the mother tried to hold the child in her arms, the child started crying and held the hand of her father\u2019s current wife tightly.\nAfter the child sat for a while with the mother, [the bailiff] asked the child if she wished to leave with her mother. Although the child did not show an aversion towards her mother, she refused to leave with her.\u201d 12.  On 13 November 2014 the applicant complained to the child protection authority that the social worker who had accompanied her and the bailiff on 4 November 2014 had been unfamiliar with the case, had questioned her motives in front of the child and had not known how to facilitate their reunion. It appears that she received no reply to her complaint. 13.  On 8 December 2014, at the bailiff\u2019s request and based on the report of the visit of 4 November 2014, the child protection authority applied for mandatory counselling under Article 912 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with a view to re-establishing a relationship between the applicant and the child. On 20 January 2015 the Beiu\u015f District Court allowed the request and ordered that the child should follow a three-month psychological counselling programme. 14.  The objectives of the counselling programme were to assist both parents in establishing positive contact with the child, and to help rebuild the mother-child relationship. 15.  Several meetings were organised between 4 February and 4 May 2015. The psychologist met the parents separately and together and met the child. I.T. refused to allow the applicant to participate in the counselling sessions together with the child. He also asked the applicant to agree to postpone the enforcement of the custody decision for a year if she wanted to see her daughter during counselling. As the applicant did not accede to his request, he refused any contact between the mother and daughter during that period. 16.  On 16 June 2015 the psychologist submitted her report to the court and to the child protection authority. She noted that the child was well\u2011integrated into her father\u2019s family, was emotionally attached to her father, stepmother and stepbrother, and was afraid that the applicant would come and take her away during the counselling meetings. She also noted that the father was not facilitating the relationship between the applicant and their child. 17.  At the end of the counselling programme I.T. agreed to allow the applicant to speak with the child on the telephone. The psychologist observed that the counselling had failed to diminish the child\u2019s high levels of separation anxiety and ambivalent attitude towards her biological mother and had failed to reach the objectives set at the beginning. 18.  On 21 May and 22 October 2015 and 16 April 2016 the applicant asked the bailiff to continue the enforcement proceedings. There is no indication that he did so. On 22 October 2015 and 25 May 2016 the bailiff sought payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings from I.T. 19.  On 8 July 2015 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against I.T. for refusing to comply with a court order and for alleged acts of violence against the child when the applicant had wanted to take her home. On 30 September 2016 the prosecutor decided not to charge I.T. The applicant did not complain about that decision. 20.  Meanwhile, on 2 June 2015 I.T. had lodged an application with the Beiu\u015f District Court, seeking an order that the child live with him. At the same time he lodged an interim request with the same objective. On 30 June 2015 the District Court dismissed the interim request on the grounds that the child was already living with him. The court noted that the applicant had already suffered harm because she could not take her child home despite the court decision of 17 June 2014 (see paragraph 6 above). I.T. appealed, but on 27 August 2015 the Bihor County Court upheld the previous decision. 21.  On 17 February 2016 the Beiu\u015f District Court also dismissed the main action lodged by I.T. concerning the child\u2019s residence. The parents, I.T.\u2019s new wife and the child were interviewed by a court-appointed psychologist who was tasked with assessing the family relations between the parties. She concluded that the child needed time to rebuild her relationship with her mother and recommended that a contact schedule be drawn up between them. She also recommended parental counselling. The court considered that there were no serious reasons to prompt a change in the child\u2019s legal residence and that it was in the child\u2019s interests to remain with her mother. 22.  I.T. appealed, but in a final decision of 29 September 2016 the Bihor County Court upheld the previous decision. The relevant parts read as follows:\n\u201cThe minor must have a normal relationship with both parents, which presupposes that the current situation, where she is distanced from her mother, is overcome, because otherwise it will be almost impossible for her to re-establish a normal relationship with her mother, and this does not serve the child\u2019s best interests.\nThe court does not deny the importance of a stable environment for the minor, including her home and the people who are part of her daily life; it considers, however, that at the present time preserving continuity does not serve the child\u2019s interests to develop a normal relationship with both parents. The parties must understand ... that the minor must be supported in order to adapt to her new environment...\nThe court is not bound by the wish expressed by the minor to remain with her father, because she is of a young age and because the father has persuaded the minor not to go to her mother\u2019s home. ... To hold that the child\u2019s opinion is binding without exception would mean that the proceedings, including the hearing of evidence, are useless and that the court\u2019s sole role is to take note of the child\u2019s preference and decide accordingly.\u201d 23.  According to the applicant, on 21 March 2018, the date of her latest communication to the Court, she had still not been reunited with her daughter.", "references": ["7", "1", "8", "9", "5", "0", "6", "3", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mica. She has been diagnosed with a slight intellectual disability. 8.  On 20 May 2008 around 7 p.m. the applicant was walking home from the village of C\u0103p\u00e2lna, where she had been helping her husband all day in the fields. Near the village of Mica, she was approached by an unknown individual, identified later as T.F.S., who started walking alongside her and who tried unsuccessfully to engage her in conversation. 9.  At some point, they met two men. One of them, whom the applicant knew by sight as I.L., stopped T.F.S. and asked him if he wanted to accompany him in order to finalise a transaction over a horse. T.F.S. replied that he would join him later. 10.  In her statement to the police made later (see paragraph 17 below), the applicant described the subsequent events as follows:\nAfter the two men went away, T.F.S. continued walking along with her. He eventually offered her money and a mobile phone if she agreed to have oral sex with him. She refused saying that she was not \u201cthat kind of person\u201d and added that she had a husband at home. T.F.S. continued following her and, as the applicant was telling him that he was wasting his time because she would not accept the proposal, he grabbed her by the right arm and the neck and dragged her close to a nearby cemetery. The applicant alleged that she was threatened by T.F.S. to obey, otherwise he would use the knife he had in his possession. He told her to undress and lie on the ground. In a state of shock, the applicant obeyed. Then T.F.S. raped her. After he finished, he told her that they would meet again and warned her not to tell anyone about the incident. He then left. 11.  The applicant went straight to the police station in Mica. Nearby, she met I.S., who had previously been the landlady of a local police officer. The applicant told I.S. that she had been raped by a man wearing black clothes. I.S. advised the applicant not to tell anyone about what had happened, as she would make a fool of herself in front of the whole village because she had no witnesses. The applicant nevertheless knocked on the window and then on the door of the police station. As no one answered, she went home and showered. Later that evening she talked to her mother and to a friend, explaining to them what had happened. Next day, when her husband came home from the field where he had spent the night, she told him that she had been raped. 12.  In the morning of 21 May 2008 the applicant went to the local police in Mica accompanied by her husband and lodged a criminal complaint. She complained that she had been threatened with a knife by an unknown man and forced to have sexual intercourse with him. 13.  The same day the police interrogated I.L., who confirmed he had seen the applicant the previous day walking with T.F.S. He stated that he had not noticed anything special in her behaviour. 14.  Later that day T.F.S. gave a statement to the police. He admitted having suggested sexual intercourse to the applicant, but claimed that the applicant\u2019s reply was that she was afraid that her husband would find out. He confirmed that the act had taken place on the side of the road but claimed that it had been consensual. He was then allowed to leave. 15.  When they checked T.F.S.\u2019s criminal record the police found out that he had a previous conviction for rape. 16.  On 22 May 2008 the applicant went to the T\u00e2rgu-Mure\u015f Institute of Forensic Medicine for examination. The report drafted on that occasion concluded that the applicant had two bruises on her right arm consistent with a compression between two hard surfaces, resulting in temporary disability of two to three days. It also stated that the applicant did not have any \u201crape-specific injuries\u201d in her genital area. 17.  On 3 June 2008 the applicant gave a second statement to the police. She gave a detailed description of the events of 20 May, and mentioned that after T.F.S. had grabbed her violently and dragged her along the ground, she had entered into a state of shock, was afraid for her life and could neither react nor resist. She further mentioned that she feared that the aggressor might have given her a venereal infection. She concluded that ever since the attack she had been in a constant state of distress and was afraid to leave the house, fearing that the attacker would come and find her because she had dared to complain to the police. For these reasons, she requested protection for herself and her family. 18.  On 9 July 2008 the police interrogated I.S., who confirmed that she had seen the applicant arriving at the police station on 20 May 2008 to lodge a complaint of rape and that she had seen the applicant leaving, as the police station was closed. 19.  On several occasions in June, July and August, T.F.S. was searched for by the police for further statements, but was not found at his house. 20.  On 21 January 2009 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court decided not to open criminal proceedings, as the acts committed by T.F.S. did not constitute a crime. The prosecutor relied on the following elements: I.L. had testified that he had not noticed anything unusual when he had met the applicant and T.F.S. on 20 May, prior to the alleged rape; the applicant had failed to ask for help although, prior to the sexual intercourse, she and T.F.S. must have passed in front of a petrol station on their way to the village; the forensic medical examination had revealed no injury in the genital area; as regards the bruises on the applicant\u2019s right arm, the forensic report provided no indication as to when they had been caused; no other injuries had been found on the applicant\u2019s body. 21.  On 22 February 2009 the applicant made a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision to the chief prosecutor of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court. She reiterated that T.F.S. had threatened her that he would use a knife, and had violently grabbed her by the arm and throat, and that that was why she had complied with his orders. Furthermore, she mentioned that she had been advised by the police to withdraw her complaint, because there were no witnesses. She complained that after the police took her initial statement they had failed to provide her with information about her procedural rights as a victim. Subsequently, she had to call the 112 emergency services in order to find out that she needed to go to the forensic medicine institute for a medical examination. She also mentioned that when her husband went to the prosecutor\u2019s office in order to submit the results of her medical exams, the case prosecutor had told him that the complaint had been withdrawn. She requested the prosecutor to ask for clarification of the forensic medical certificate as regards the possible date of the bruises found on her arm. She also requested that a psychiatric expert report be made in the case, in view of the fact that she was suffering from oligophrenia and depressive syndrome. The applicant also requested that witnesses, and in particular I.L., be reheard in more detail, and that the alleged perpetrator be subjected to a polygraph test. Lastly, she stated again that she was afraid for her life, and requested protection from the police for her and her family. A medical certificate dated 30 May 2008 indicating that she was suffering from first-degree oligophrenia with an IQ of 57 and depressive syndrome was attached to her complaint. 22.  On 24 February 2009 the chief prosecutor rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the evidence available did not suggest that physical force had been used by T.F.S. to have sexual intercourse with the applicant. The prosecutor relied firstly on the fact that I.L. had not noticed anything unusual about the applicant or T.F.S. when he had met them, and secondly on the absence of injury to the applicant\u2019s genital area. 23.  On 20 March 2009 the applicant, represented by her husband, complained about the prosecutors\u2019 decisions before the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court. In her submissions, she stressed that T.F.S. had admitted having used force on her. She also claimed that during the reconstruction of the scene conducted by the Mica police, when she was showing the police officer how T.F.S. had grabbed her by the neck, the latter had \u201cjumped at her\u201d and stated furiously that he had not \u201cgrabbed her that hard\u201d. The applicant stated that during the events of 20 May T.F.S. had constantly threatened that he would use the knife he had with him. She further complained about the attitude of the authorities who had investigated her complaint, mentioning that she had been advised by the police to withdraw her complaint because there were no witnesses and because \u201cshe was asking for it\u201d and in any event \u201cit did her good\u201d. She requested the court to order a clarification of the forensic certificate in order to specify the possible date of the injuries on her arm. 24.  On 6 May 2009 the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and decided to refer the case back to the prosecution with a view to opening criminal proceedings against T.F.S. The court found that the prosecutor\u2019s conclusion to the effect that the sexual act had been consensual was unsupported by evidence. It further found that the lack of reference in the forensic certificate to the date of the applicant\u2019s injuries should have led the prosecutor to investigate further in order to redress this omission. The court also stated that the absence of injury to the applicant\u2019s genital area was consistent with the allegation of threat. Finally, the court criticised the prosecutor\u2019s failure to consider the fact that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s arm were consistent with being grabbed forcefully. 25.  The court ordered the prosecutor to proceed to the following acts: a psychiatric examination in order to determine whether, having regard to the applicant\u2019s diagnosis of oligophrenia, she was able to react or to fight back or whether she may have not been able to express her will; the re\u2011interrogation of I.S. in order to clarify the applicant\u2019s state of mind when she had met and talked to this witness; a confrontation between the applicant and T.F.S. with a view to clarifying the contradictions in their statements with reference to the psychological and physical coercion; and a socio-moral assessment of the applicant to ascertain her behaviour in society and her level of credibility in the community. Finally, the court advised the prosecution to take into account the fact that T.F.S. had previously been convicted of rape and therefore may have been aware of the legal requirements for the existence of the crime of rape. 26.  On 15 October 2009 the prosecutor attached to the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court appealed on points of law (recurs) against the decision of 6 May 2009, on the grounds that the evidence the District Court had requested was irrelevant. A psychiatric evaluation of the victim, when more than seventeen months had passed since the incident, would no longer be conclusive. Similarly, neither the re-interrogation of I.S. nor a confrontation between the applicant and T.F.S. were necessary. Finally, the prosecutor stressed that, in the present case, the refusal to open criminal proceedings had been done on the ground that the act committed by T.F.S. lacked the elements defining the crime of rape. More specifically, in the absence of a connection between the injuries to the applicant\u2019s arm and the alleged physical coercion, and in the absence of any injuries specific to the crime of rape in the genital area, the alleged physical coercion had not been proved. 27.  The applicant was represented before the appeal court by an ex officio lawyer, appointed upon a request made by her husband. The lawyer stressed that the evidence ordered by the T\u00e2rn\u0103veni District Court in the decision of 6 May 2009 was extremely important to the case, and that failure to collect this evidence at the relevant time was the prosecution\u2019s fault. She also pointed out that the applicant should have been given legal assistance ex officio during the investigation in order to adequately protect her procedural rights. 28. T.F.S. stated before the court that he agreed with the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and \u201cif the injured party thinks he is guilty, she should bring witnesses to prove it\u201d. 29.  On 11 February 2010 Mure\u015f County Court allowed the prosecution\u2019s appeal and rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint with final effect. The court stated in particular that it was unnecessary to re-interrogate S.I., since in her first statement she had not mentioned having seen the applicant in a state of discomfort whilst confessing to her that she had been raped. The court further found that the forensic report did not support the applicant\u2019s allegations, since, on the one hand, it did not reveal injuries specific to rape in the genital area, and, on the other, the injuries to the applicant\u2019s arm were undated. It finally found both the conduct of a psychiatric assessment and the confrontation between the applicant and T.F.S to be unnecessary, and deemed a socio-moral assessment to be irrelevant. 30.  As a result, the applicant was ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings initiated by her before the first-instance court.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "5", "8", "2", "0", "3", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Oslo. She is a well-known lawyer who mainly deals with criminal and child custody cases. She is married to a businessman and was formerly a talk show host and active participant in public debate. 6.  In August and September 2010 the applicant lodged two complaints with the Press Complaints Commission (Pressens Faglige Utvalg) against two publications owned and controlled by Mr Trygve Hegnar: the weekly and daily business newspapers Kapital and Finansavisen. Mr Hegnar also owned and controlled the internet portal Hegnar Online, which focused mainly on business and financial news. 7.  All three publications had, from late summer 2010, published articles concerning the applicant\u2019s role and relationship with a wealthy, elderly widow from whom she would inherit. The publications contained direct or indirect suggestions that the applicant had exploited her emotionally or financially. After the widow passed away in 2011, her relatives instituted proceedings against the applicant, challenging the validity of her will. The inheritance case, which the applicant won both at first and second instance (in 2012 and 2014 respectively), was covered extensively in the above publications. 8.  The Hegnar Online website featured a forum \u2013 at a separate web address, but to which access was given via the online newspaper \u2013 where readers could start debates and submit comments. There was no editorial content in the forum; all content was user-generated. It was possible for users to comment anonymously and there was no requirement to register. More than 200,000 comments were posted every month and the debate forum was among the biggest of its kind in Norway. The forum was divided into many subforums, with topic headings such as \u201cShipping\u201d, \u201cIT\u201d, \u201cFinance\u201d, \u201cProperty\u201d, \u201cMedia\u201d and \u201cTheme of the day\u201d (\u201cDagens tema\u201d). 9.  On 5 November 2010 a forum thread was started in the subforum \u201cTheme of the day\u201d under the heading \u201cMona H\u00f8iness \u2013 the case is growing, according to Kapital\u201d (\u201cMona H\u00f8iness \u2013 saken vokser, sier Kapital\u201d), where the original poster wrote only \u201cWhat is the status?\u201d (\u201cHva er status?\u201d). The next comment, posted the same day, read \u201cSexy lady. What is the case about ???\u201d (\u201cSexy dame. Hva gjelder saken ???\u201d), to which another commenter responded \u201cMoney.\u201d At 12.32 p.m. the following day another comment was made, in which the poster claimed to \u201cknow someone who knows someone\u201d who had been \u201clucky to have shagged\u201d the applicant (\u201cSexy hun da! Kjenner en som kjenner en som knulla henne. Heldiggris\u201d \u2013 hereinafter \u201ccomment 1\u201d).\nThe thread continued the same day with a commenter writing: \u201cstatus quo\u201d and \u201cab absurdo\u201d. The following comment was made the next day: \u201cI read about this case briefly several weeks ago. I now see that Kapital gives it the front page. The conflict relates to an apartment at Frogner + wealthy old lady with whom H\u00f8iness has developed a mother-daughter relationship over many years.\u201d (\u201cLeste om denne saken s\u00e5vidt, for flere uker siden. Ser n\u00e5 at Kapital gir den forsiden. Striden gjelder en leilighet p\u00e5 Frogner + velst\u00e5ende eldre dame som H\u00f8iness har utviklet et mor/datter-forhold til over mange \u00e5r.\u201d)\nThe next comment read: \u201cIs it Kapital\u2019s Case [(\u201cSaken til Kapital\u201d)] which is growing?\u201d, to which another commenter responded with the wordplay: \u201cIt is Hegnar\u2019s thing [(\u201csaken til Hegnar\u201d)] which is growing.\u201d This was followed by the comment \u201cIf you are looking for pretty ladies, look at the thread \u2018Pride of the nation\u2019\u201d, to which another poster added: \u201cAnd that about the Marilyn-revelation\u201d.\nThe next day, on 8 November 2010, a new comment was made: \u201cWith 100 million at stake it is clear that one would bend the ethical rules a little\u201d (\u201cMed 100 mill i potten er det klart du t\u00f8yer de etiske reglene litt\u201d), before another poster asked: \u201cHas she become pregnant, or is she only gaining weight?\u201d, and yet another poster followed with the above wordplay: \u201cIs Hegnar\u2019s stake [(\u201cstaken til Hegnar\u201d)] still growing?\u201d. At 5.55 p.m. another commenter wrote: \u201cIf I were to s\u2013\u2013 her, it would have to be blindfolded. The woman is dirt-ugly \u2013 looks like a wh\u2013\u2013\u201c (\u201cSkulle jeg k\u2013\u2013 henne m\u00e5tte det bli med bind for \u00f8ya. Synes dama er dritstygg \u2013 ser ut som en h\u2013\u2013\u201d \u2013 hereinafter \u201ccomment 2\u201d). Thereafter a poster asked: \u201cHow old is she now?\u201d, to which the last commenter responded: \u201cShe\u2019s 83 by now [(\u201cetter hvert\u201d)]. Time flies!\u201d\nAll the comments were made anonymously and thus the number of possible different posters was unknown. According to a printout made at 7.26 p.m. on 8 November 2010, comment 1 had by then been read 176 times, while comment 2 had been read twelve times. 10.  The same day, 8 November 2010, the applicant\u2019s counsel wrote a letter to the Press Complaints Commission, in the course of the proceedings concerning one of the above-mentioned complaints in respect of the coverage of the inheritance case (see paragraph 7 above). The counsel stated, inter alia, that a new report had been published in Kapital and that the case had been chosen as the \u201cTheme of the day\u201d on Hegnar Online. In particular, Hegnar \u201callowed the posters to present serious and degrading sexual harassment\u201d of the applicant. In the letter, it was expressly stated that this was not to be made part of the existing complaint against Kapital, so as not to further delay the handling of that complaint by the publisher. A copy of the printout of the forum thread in question was attached (see paragraph 9 above). 11.  Mr Hegnar received a copy of the letter and in an email to the Press Complaints Commission on 9 November 2010 stated, inter alia, that Hegnar Online was a separate newspaper with its own editor, unrelated to Kapital. He submitted that it could not therefore be taken into account in a complaint against the latter. The Commission wrote an email to both parties the following day stating that it \u2013 having spoken with the applicant\u2019s counsel \u2013 noted that the letter of 8 November 2010 did not amount to a new complaint, but was an appendix to the documents in the pending case against Kapital and did not relate to Hegnar Online. 12.  Comments nos. 1 and 2 were not deleted. The applicant\u2019s counsel sent an email at 12.32 p.m. on 17 November 2010 to Mr B. and Mr H., an editor working for Hegnar Online, requesting written confirmation that the comments would be deleted immediately and arguing that Mr Hegnar himself had \u201cdeclined all responsibility for the matter\u201d (\u201cfraskrev seg alt ansvar for saken\u201d). 13.  Mr B. from Hegnar Online responded at 12.45 p.m. the same day, saying that he was sorry that comments in breach of their guidelines had not been deleted, and that he had now deleted the comments he had found. 14.  On 19 November 2010 Mr Hegnar wrote an editorial in Kapital commenting on the applicant\u2019s remarks on the forum comments in the context of the complaint against Kapital (see paragraph 10 above). In the editorial, he stated that Hegnar Online was unrelated to Kapital and, furthermore, that Kapital would not take responsibility for what eager commenters wrote on Hegnar Online, which he described as \u201can open forum\u201d. The editorial read, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201c... Many strange, annoying and plainly wrong things are written on such open websites, where there is subsequent control and no editorial treatment prior to publishing.\nAlso we ourselves must, at times, endure harsh comments (\u201ct\u00e5le r\u00f8ff omtale\u201d) on such websites, but we cannot rush off to the Press Complaints Commission with it.\u201d 15.  On 23 November 2010 the Press Complaints Commission examined the applicant\u2019s complaints against Kapital and Finansavisen (see paragraph 6 above), and found that both publications had breached the code of conduct for journalists (V\u00e6r varsom-plakaten): Kapital for their use of a misleading headline (case no. 187/10) and Finansavisen for not giving the applicant the opportunity to reply simultaneously (case no. 192/10). 16.  On 28 November 2010 a forum thread was started on the subforum \u201cMedia\u201d. The thread starter, under the headline \u201cMona H\u00f8iness vs Trygve Hegnar\u201d, commented on the inheritance case and the applicant\u2019s allegation that she was being sexually harassed (see paragraphs 7 and 10 above). The next posting in the thread, made the same day, said only: \u201cAsk if Mona knows tr\u00f8nderbj\u00f8rn? :))\u201d (\u201cSp\u00f8r om Mona kjenner tr\u00f8nderbj\u00f8rn? :))\u201d)\nOn 30 November 2010 the next poster commented: \u201csome have a passion for popstars and football players, while others like to hang around centres for the elderly and old people\u2019s homes\u201d, before another wrote: \u201care you old, ill and confused? The law firm MH takes the case. NB! Pre-payment only\u201d. At 11.02 a.m. the same day a comment raising the question whether the applicant was \u201cstill shagging\u201d someone referred to by the nickname \u201ctr\u00f8nderbj\u00f8rn\u201d (see paragraph 27 below) (\u201cDriver hun fortsatt \u00e5 knuller p\u00e5 denne tr\u00f8nderbj\u00f8rn?\u201d \uf02d hereinafter \u201ccomment 3\u201d) was posted.\nOn 1 December 2010 a poster wrote: \u201csaw a woman sneak out of borgen kremat. [(a crematorium in Oslo)] with two handbags filled with golden jewellery and wallets. She smiled knowingly ... [(\u201csmilte lurt\u201d)]\u201d.\nAll the comments in the thread were made anonymously. 17.  On 3 December 2010 an editor at a radio station (Radio Norge) drew the applicant\u2019s counsel\u2019s attention to the debate that had been started on the Hegnar Online forum on 28 November 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) and enclosed a copy of the relevant thread in an email. From that it emerged that comment 3 had by then been read 115 times. 18.  On 6 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s legal counsel wrote to Mr H., attaching the email from the editor at the radio station and demanding confirmation that harassing comments in the \u201cMedia\u201d subforum would be deleted immediately. In an email the same day Mr H. replied that he had also been contacted by the radio editor directly on 3 December 2010 and, on checking, had seen that the comments had by then already been deleted. 19.  On 7 January 2011 a complaint concerning the two forum threads as a whole (see paragraphs 9 and 16 above) was lodged with the Press Complaints Commission. On 22 February 2011 it concluded in general terms that neither comments with sexual content nor comments that accused the applicant of unethical or unlawful behaviour in the inheritance case were in compliance with the code of conduct for journalists, and that the editors should accordingly have removed them immediately, pursuant to a provision in that code (case no. 002/11). 20.  On 7 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s counsel sent a letter to Hegnar Online stating the applicant\u2019s intention to instigate civil proceedings against Hegnar Online and the editor, Mr H., because comments 1 to 3 had been defamatory and contrary to Article 246 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below). For the defamation she would claim redress under section 3-6 of the Compensation Act (see paragraph 44 below), of amounts limited to 250,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK - today approximately 25,000 euros (EUR)) from the company Hegnar Online and NOK 25,000 (approximately EUR 2,500) from Mr H. personally.\nThe applicant\u2019s counsel argued that comments 1 to 3 had constituted sexual harassment beyond what a publicly known person had to endure and that it was settled law that such derogatory comments, discriminatory to women, were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention under any circumstances. Reference was made to the case of Tammer v. Estonia (no. 41205/98, ECHR 2001\u2011I). 21.  Hegnar Online and Mr H.\u2019s counsel responded in a letter of 28 April 2011. The counsel stated that the company Hegnar Media AS, into which Hegnar Online had by then been incorporated, had a procedure that made it simple to complain about forum comments that anyone might consider inappropriate. Next to each post was a link which could be clicked on in order to warn the company (\u201cwarning button\u201d). When the company received such complaints, this usually led to deletion of the comment. Between 1,800 and 2,000 comments per month were deleted on the basis of such complaints. In addition, the company had moderators who on their own initiative removed comments in breach of the forum guidelines. Comments 1 and 2 had been removed immediately \u2013 within eight minutes of the applicant\u2019s complaint \u2013 and comment 3 had been removed on the initiative of a moderator.\nIn the letter it was further stated that Hegnar Media AS apologised for three of its users having made comments with sexual content, directed at the applicant, but that it did not consider itself liable to pay compensation. The three comments had had nothing to do with the company\u2019s journalistic work or editorial responsibility; they had not been uttered or produced by the company, nor had it authorised them for publication. Furthermore, the comments in question had not been defamatory and had been removed as soon as the company had become aware of them. Although the company did not consider itself legally liable, it offered the applicant NOK 10,000 (today approximately EUR 1,000) for the inconvenience she had suffered because of the comments. 22.  On 4 May 2011 the applicant instigated civil proceedings before the Oslo City Court (tingrett) against Hegnar Media AS and the editor, Mr H., for defamation. As previously stated in the letter to Hegnar Online (see paragraph 20 above), she claimed that her honour had been infringed because of comments 1 to 3 and that she was therefore entitled to redress. She maintained, inter alia, that the conclusion of the Press Complaints Commission (see paragraph 19 above) supported her argument that the defendants had exactly the same editorial responsibility for the comments as if they had been letters from readers printed in a newspaper. 23.  The City Court heard the case from 19 to 20 December 2011. The parties attended with their counsel and one witness was heard. During the proceedings the applicant invoked Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below), in conjunction with section 3-6 of the Compensation Act (see paragraph 44 below). The defendants argued principally that the situation at hand was governed by section 18 of the E-Commerce Act (see paragraph 45 below). They also maintained that Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code were inapplicable since they required intent (forsett) on the part of the wrongdoer. In the case at hand the defendants had not even been aware of the comments in question, and the principles relating to editorial responsibility were in any event irrelevant. In any case, editorial responsibility could not apply to the situation before the editor had become aware of the comments, and in the instant case they had been removed as soon as Mr H. had become aware of them. 24.  On 4 January 2012 the Oslo City Court ruled in favour of the defendants. It considered that the three comments had not amounted to unlawful defamation as they had been incapable of offending either the applicant\u2019s honour or reputation. 25.  As to comment 1, the City Court noted that the comment had been tasteless and vulgar, but had not in itself been an accusation (beskyldning) of promiscuity or some sort of immoral behaviour. In the City Court\u2019s view, it could not harm the applicant\u2019s reputation (omd\u00f8mme) under Article 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below). Furthermore, it had not expressed disdain or disapproval of her, so could not harm her honour (\u00e6resf\u00f8lelse) under Article 246 of the Penal Code (ibid.). 26.  With respect to comment 2, the City Court again found that it had been tasteless and \u201cunserious\u201d. An anonymous comment of this sort could not, however, harm the applicant\u2019s reputation or honour. It might be considered to be ridicule, but had not exceeded the threshold over which ridicule would be unlawful. The City Court also had regard to the fact that \u201cTheme of the day\u201d was a marginal forum frequented mostly by anonymous people. It was generally unserious and, according to the City Court, most readers would find that the comments said more about those posting them than about the people mentioned in the comments. The City Court expressed that it completely understood that the applicant found it unpleasant that anonymous persons had posted \u201csleazy\u201d remarks about her on the Internet. However, based on an overall assessment, the City Court concluded that comment 2, either alone or in conjunction with comment 1, had not been capable of harming the applicant\u2019s honour. 27.  Turning to comment 3, the City Court said that this was again a comment that most people would consider inappropriate, tasteless and vulgar. It had to be interpreted as an allegation that the applicant had had a sexual relationship with a person nicknamed tr\u00f8nderbj\u00f8rn. No further information about who or what kind of person that might be had been given either in the forum or during the civil case. The court found that an anonymous comment indicating that the applicant had had a sexual relationship with an unidentified person could not harm the applicant\u2019s reputation or honour. There had been nothing expressly negative in the comment. Moreover, since the writer had been anonymous there had been no reason to take him or her seriously. 28.  The City Court also made an overall assessment of the three comments viewed as a whole, but found that they still had not amounted to unlawful defamation. It remarked that several of the other comments in the forum threads in question, that the applicant had not complained about, could possibly be defamatory, as had also been indicated by the defendants briefly during the hearing, but since the applicant had not complained about any other comments, the City Court could not decide on their lawfulness. 29.  The applicant was ordered to pay the defendants\u2019 litigation costs of 225,480 Norwegian kroner (NOK - approximately 24,650 euros (EUR)). The City Court stated that it was in no doubt as to the result of the case and noted that the applicant had turned down the defendant\u2019s offer of settlement (see paragraph 21 above). The defendants had claimed NOK 290,880 (approximately EUR 30,615), an amount which the City Court considered exceeded what was reasonable and necessary under the relevant provisions of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 47 below). 30.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant appealed against the City Court\u2019s judgment to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett). Apart from maintaining that the three statements (comments 1 to 3) had amounted to unlawful defamation, she submitted that her right to privacy (privatlivets fred) as enshrined in Article 390a of the Penal Code, and her rights under the general principles concerning the protection of personality (det ulovfestede alminnelige rettsvern for personligheten) had been breached. Moreover, she argued that the comments had been in breach of section 8a of the Gender Equality Act and that under section 17 of that Act compensation was payable (see paragraph 46 below). Lastly, she submitted that the defendants had been awarded an amount of litigation costs exceeding what had been necessary. 31.  The High Court heard the case on 10 and 11 September 2013. The parties attended and gave evidence, and one witness was heard. The judgment was delivered on 24 October 2013. 32.  The High Court stated at the outset of the judgment that there had been an extensive coverage of the inheritance case both by the Hegnar Group and other media. The coverage had undoubtedly been a strain on the applicant, but was not the topic of the proceedings. It did however form a background to the case and explained why the applicant had come into the spotlight and subsequently been the topic of anonymous statements on the debate forum related to Hegnar Online. 33.  The High Court went on to state that it was of the view that the applicant had had good reason to react to the statements on the Hegnar Online forum. The statements had been unserious and sexually loaded. Accordingly, she had by way of a complaint to the Press Complaints Commission achieved a declaration that Hegnar Online had breached the code of conduct for journalists because the content of the forum threads had exceeded what she had had to accept and that Hegnar Online should on its own initiative have discovered and removed the comments more quickly than had happened. 34.  Turning to the question of liability to pay compensation, the High Court stated that this was a different question to that considered by the Press Complaints Commission. At this point the High Court had reached the same conclusion as the City Court had, but on different grounds. The City Court had considered each of the three comments in detail and concluded that, although inappropriate, unserious and tasteless (\u201cusaklige, useri\u00f8se og smakl\u00f8se\u201d), they did not fall within the scope of Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraphs 24-28 above and 43 below). The High Court stated that it shared the City Court\u2019s view with regard to the lack of seriousness, but deemed it unnecessary to assess the three comments against the provisions on defamation. 35.  Instead, the High Court proceeded on the basis that the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation could in any event not succeed unless the defendants had acted with sufficient culpability. It would be decisive whether such culpability had been demonstrated by Hegnar Online and Mr H. not having done enough to discover and thereafter remove the impugned comments. 36.  The High Court further stated that one characteristic of posts on the type of debate forum in question, and also of comments on editorial content posted online, was that they were posted in real time without any prior censorship being possible. This meant that controls needed to be carried out subsequently, regardless of whether it concerned content subject to editorial responsibility or a website with only user-generated content. 37.  With regard to the general system for monitoring content, the High Court noted that there were \u201cwarning buttons\u201d on the website, which readers could click on in order to react to comments. Furthermore, the editorial staff had the task of monitoring content and removing comments on their own initiative. However, there were a very large number of posts on the forum as a whole, and the High Court presumed that only a few discoveries of content to be removed had been made at the relevant time. 38.  Turning to the three specific comments in question, the High Court noted that comments 1 and 2 had been posted on 6 and 8 November 2010 respectively. The applicant had been notified by others of the comments, and had not read them herself on the website. The editorial staff had been notified of the two comments by email on 17 November 2010, and had responded thirteen minutes later that they had been removed. This had clearly been an adequate reaction. However, the High Court discussed whether the letter from the applicant\u2019s counsel to the Press Complaints Commission on 8 November 2010 (see paragraph 10 above) implied that Mr Hegnar should have initiated a deletion process at that time. Having regard to the fact that the letter was formally made in a different context, namely the pending complaint against Kapital (see paragraph 6 above), and did not contain any request that the comments be removed, the High Court found it appropriate that Mr Hegnar had only considered the letter as a document in the Kapital case. 39.  With respect to comment 3, this had been posted on 30 November 2010. On 3 December 2010 staff at Radio Norge had informed the applicant\u2019s counsel, who had contacted Hegnar Online on 6 December 2010. Hegnar Online had by then already looked into the matter, as it had received a similar notification from Radio Norge on 3 December 2010, and had on that date noticed that the comment had already been deleted, presumably by a moderator at Hegnar Online. As this comment had, thus, rapidly been deleted of the staff\u2019s own motion, there was nothing to suggest liability on the part of Hegnar Online. 40.  The High Court upheld the City Court\u2019s decision on litigation costs before the City Court and awarded the defendants NOK 183,380 (approximately EUR 20,050) for their costs before the High Court. It remarked that the case had been clear and that neither considerations on the parties\u2019 welfare nor relative strength (see paragraph 47 below) could justify not awarding the winning party costs. The defendants had claimed NOK 231,980 (approximately EUR 24,416), but the High Court found that as their counsel charged a high hourly rate, appropriate for a specialist lawyer, this should have been reflected in a lower amount of hours. 41.  On 22 November 2013 the applicant appealed against the High Court\u2019s judgment to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett). She contested the High Court\u2019s assessment that the defendants had acted with sufficient care and alleged that the High Court had erred in law as its reasoning had not been clear with respect to the standard of care required, notably whether it had proceeded on the basis that negligence would suffice for liability, or whether the establishment of gross negligence had been necessary. She also contested the High Court\u2019s assessment of evidence concerning Mr Hegnar\u2019s dealing with the letter of 8 November 2010 addressed to the Press Complaints Commission. The applicant pointed out that Mr Hegnar had written an editorial in Kapital on 19 November 2010, making remarks about how the applicant had complained about comments on the forum (see paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, the applicant argued that the High Court had wrongfully proceeded on the basis that the standards for the moderation of websites with user-generated content had been more lenient in 2010 than at the time of the High Court\u2019s judgment. Lastly, she appealed against the High Court\u2019s decision on litigation costs. The defendant\u2019s counsel charged an hourly rate of up to NOK 3,900 (approximately EUR 410), which was so high that there would be a chilling effect on individuals\u2019 willingness to challenge violations of Article 8 of the Convention. 42.  On 7 February 2014 the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeals Leave Committee (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg) refused the applicant leave to appeal against either the High Court\u2019s judgment as a whole or against its decision on legal costs.", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "2", "1", "7", "9", "0", "No Label", "6", "4"], "gold": ["6", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Ljubljana. 6.  The applicant was a member of the supervisory board of company A from 11 November 2013, with a four-year term. 7.  On 12 March 2014, the chairman of the supervisory board of company A resigned: following this the supervisory board had only three members (of the required statutory six members). 8.  On 20 March 2014, the Ljubljana District Court in Ljubljana adopted a decision on the initiation of \u201cpreventive restructuring\u201d of company A (see paragraph 24 below). 9.  On 13 May 2014 a session of the supervisory board of company A was held. One of the members, T. H., proposed to extend the agenda with a point on the dismissal of the chair of the management board. Allegedly, physical violence occurred between the members of the supervisory board, as some of them did not allow one member to leave the premises, to maintain the required quorum. It would appear that a resolution was passed dismissing the chair of the management board. 10.  On 15 May 2014, a claim was brought before the Ljubljana District Court seeking to establish nullity of the supervisory board\u2019s resolution of 13 May 2014. Company A agreed to the claim and the court consequently issued a decision annulling the impugned resolution. 11.  In the meantime, on 29 May 2014, company P, who held a 91.42% share in company A, filed a motion to deprive the applicant and another supervisory board member, T.H., of their membership, and appoint provisional members. The motion was lodged against the applicant and T.H., who acted as opposing parties (nasprotna udele\u017eenca). Company P relied on, inter alia, section 276 (2) of the Companies Act (see paragraph 24 below) and grounded the motion on the allegedly unacceptable personal qualities of the applicant and T.H., referring in particular to the incident that had occurred during a supervisory board meeting on 13 May 2014 (see paragraph 9 above). It requested the court to proceed to a decision without delay, without notifying the opposing parties of the proceedings and without holding a hearing. In particular, company P argued as follows: the applicant\u2019s and T.H.\u2019s conduct was unacceptable and therefore they should have not continued with their four-year mandate; there were well-founded reasons for depriving them of their membership; their membership should be terminated immediately and they should be replaced by provisional members so as to ensure lawful functioning of the supervisory board and company A; though company P had enough shares to request the management board to convene a general meeting of shareholders this was impossible due to the uncertainty as to who was the company manager; company A was undergoing reconstruction and there were deadlines to be met in this connection; calling a general meeting would thus not ensure a sufficiently prompt response to the situation; and so the court\u2019s intervention was necessary. 12.  On 4 June 2014 the Ljubljana District Court upheld company P\u2019s motion. Referring to company P\u2019s submissions and the case file in the proceedings concerning nullity of the resolution of 13 May 2014 (see paragraph 10 above) the court established that one member of the supervisory board had not been voluntarily present at the session of the supervisory board on 13 May 2014 (see paragraph 9 above) because of the conduct of the two remaining members of the supervisory board. In particular, it established that the applicant had clearly allowed T.H.\u2019s conduct, had agreed with it, and had fully cooperated with her. The court explained that the law required that the supervisory board\u2019s members act diligently and responsibly, and that this was particularly important in the present case, where company A was undergoing a process of \u201cpreventive restructuring\u201d. It found that the conduct of two of the supervisory board members was harmful to company A\u2019s functioning and that they should therefore not continue in their function until the end of their four-year term. It considered the case to be of an urgent nature, because company A was at risk, and the supervisory board with the applicant and T.H. as members was not in a position to perform its function until the first general meeting of company A. The decision also contained notice that an appeal was allowed against it within eight days of the notice of the decision. The court noted that the decision was effective immediately, and that any appeal would not stay its execution. 13.  On 5 June 2014 a journalist asked the applicant to comment on the aforementioned decision. According to the applicant, he received a copy of it only a few days later. 14.  On 24 June 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that he had been unlawfully denied the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. He referred to, inter alia, section 4 of the Non-Litigious Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 25 below). He also disputed company P\u2019s allegations concerning his conduct during the incident of 13 May 2014 (see paragraph 9 above), and gave his own version of events. He argued that the court\u2019s intervention was not called for and that no grounds had been given for his dismissal. He also emphasised that the protection of his reputation required that he be involved in the proceedings and able to submit evidence. 15.  On 3 July 2014 company P replied to the appeal, arguing that the case had been of an urgent character because it could have incurred losses had company A gone into insolvency. In its view, the impugned decision was a kind of interim injunction, and the adversarial principle could be ensured through appeal proceedings. 16.  On 5 August 2014 company P informed the court that, on 4 August 2014, company A had held an assembly and appointed two new members to replace the applicant and T.H. It invited the court to reject the appeal, because the applicant could not be considered to have any legal interest in its outcome. 17.  The applicant replied to the above pleadings on 25 August 2014. He argued that the supervisory board\u2019s member\u2019s dismissal at a general meeting of the shareholders could not be equated with the judicial termination of his term of office, because for the latter there had to be well-founded reasons, which had not been established in his case. 18.  On 3 November 2014 the applicant submitted examples of the domestic jurisprudence, with a view to demonstrating that the domestic law had required that he be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. 19.  On 21 January 2015 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that he could not have had any legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings because in the meantime company A had at its general meeting appointed new members to replace him and T.H. It noted that the appointment and dismissal of the members of the supervisory board, whose role it was to represent the interests of the shareholders, fell within the discretion of the assembly. The latter could dismiss supervisory board members any time during their term of office without having to provide any reason for doing so. Therefore, in the court\u2019s view, even had the applicant succeeded in the appeal proceedings he could not have obtained reinstatement in his previous position. 20.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. Relying on, inter alia, Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, he complained about being unable to participate in the proceedings. He argued that had he had an opportunity to reply to company P\u2019s allegations the court would have reached a different conclusion. 21.  On 10 November 2015 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for consideration pursuant to section 55b (2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 27 below). This decision was served on the applicant on 13 November 2015. 22.  A major Slovenian financial newspaper, Finance, reported the court\u2019s dismissal of the applicant from its membership in company A\u2019s supervisory board and the issues on which it had been based.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "6", "0", "9", "5", "1", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Galgiai in the Vilnius Region. 5.  In 1991 the applicant applied for restoration of her property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 6.  On 23 December 2002 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) restored the applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her two plots of 2.44 hectares and 0.16 hectares in Galgiai, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. It appears that, even though the decision referred to 2.44 hectares, the applicant was in fact given a plot measuring 2.2859 hectares. 7.  On 22 May 2007 the applicant sold the plot of 2.2859 hectares to company S. for 2,500,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \uf02d approximately 724,000 euros (EUR)). The sale agreement indicated that company S. was purchasing the plot with the aim of transferring it to company V. The agreement was certified by a notary. Company S. had previously concluded a lease agreement (i\u0161perkamosios nuomos sutartis) with company V., by which company S. undertook to buy a plot of land selected by company V. and to transfer it to the latter. 8.  On 1 December 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant\u2019s property rights to 0.38 hectares of the land given to her annulled. The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, 0.38 hectares of the plot of 2.2859 hectares was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see Beinarovi\u010d and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA\u2019s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant\u2019s property rights, the sale agreement between her and company S. (see paragraph 7 above) be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 9.  The applicant, the VCA and company S. disputed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. However, on 14 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the claim. It observed that even though the area covered by forest was only 0.38 hectares, it formed part of a plot measuring 2.2859 hectares and had not been demarcated. The court stated that it had no way of determining the exact location of the forest and it therefore annulled the applicant\u2019s property rights to the entire plot. Since the VCA\u2019s decision had referred to 2.44 hectares, the court annulled the applicant\u2019s property rights to 2.44 hectares. 10.  The court also considered that the sale agreement between the applicant and company S. and the lease agreement between companies S. and V. (see paragraph 7 above) had been simulated (apsimestiniai sandoriai). In the court\u2019s view, it was evident that company V. did not plan to use the land for agricultural activity but intended to change the purpose of the land and to develop a construction project, and that company S. had purchased the land not seeking to become its owner but with the aim of gaining profit from financing company V.\u2019s acquisition of it. These and other related circumstances led the court to conclude that the applicant, company S. and company V. had in fact entered not into two separate agreements but into a single finance lease agreement (finansin\u0117s nuomos sutartis). The court emphasised that, under domestic law, land and natural resources could not be the object of a finance lease agreement. Accordingly, the agreements between the applicant, company S. and company V. were null and void ab initio. 11.  In accordance with the Civil Code, company S. was ordered to return the plot of land to the State, and the applicant was ordered to return LTL 2,500,000 (approximately EUR 724,000) to company S. (see Beinarovi\u010d and Others, cited above, \u00a7 94). 12.  Following the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision, company S. asked it to order interim measures and to seize property belonging to the applicant to the value of LTL 2,500,000. The court allowed the request for interim measures. On 24 April 2009 four plots of land and two apartments owned by the applicant were seized. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision of 14 April 2009 (see paragraphs 9-11 above). She paid LTL 14,983 (approximately EUR 4,340) in court fees for the lodging of the appeal. The VCA and company S. appealed against that decision as well. However, on 8 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision in its entirety. The court held that the applicant and company S. \u201ccould not be considered bona fide acquirers merely because the land in question had become private property as a result of a decision adopted by a public authority\u201d. It stated that, in accordance with the law, any transaction which was contrary to mandatory statutory provisions had to be annulled and the parties had to return to each other everything which they had received, and that in the present case there were no exceptional circumstances which would justify applying a different rule. 14.  The court stated that, having found that the VCA\u2019s decision had to be annulled, it was not necessary to examine the agreements concluded between the applicant, company S. and company V. However, since the first-instance court had examined them (see paragraph 10 above), the Court of Appeal did so as well and upheld the findings made by the lower court. It considered that companies S. and V. had deliberately concluded a simulated agreement in order to hide their actual intentions. Furthermore, the applicant had to have been aware of company S.\u2019s intention to transfer the land to company V. because that had been explicitly included in the sale agreement which she had signed. The court stated that the applicant should have acted more diligently and should have carefully analysed the contents of the agreement before signing it, seeking professional advice if necessary. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which she argued that as her land was located in a rural area and the forest on that land was not a forest of national importance, there were no grounds to annul her property rights. However, on 24 August 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 16.  On 5 October 2010 company S. was issued a writ of execution against the applicant in the amount of LTL 2,500,000 (approximately EUR 724,000). 17.  On 21 November 2011 the applicant sent a letter to the Vilnius land management authorities asking for her property rights to be restored in kind. On 28 December 2011 the authorities informed her that it might be possible to return to her some of the land which had previously been given to her and that there were two other vacant plots in Galgiai, measuring 0.18 hectares in total, which could be given to her as well. 18.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d) confirming that, after the courts had annulled her property rights to 2.44 hectares of land, she had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It stated that a plot of 0.14 hectares in Galgiai had already been assigned to her, which she would receive when the land plan for that area had been prepared. It also stated that there were two other vacant plots in Galgiai, measuring 0.18 hectares in total, which could be given to her. As for the remaining land, the applicant was informed of the forms of restitution provided for by domestic law (see Beinarovi\u010d and Others, cited above, \u00a7 92) and was asked to inform the authorities of her preferred form of restitution. 19.  On 7 March 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she wished to receive a plot of 0.08 hectares in Galgiai and that she would inform them of her choice concerning the remaining plots later. 20.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for her to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider alternative forms of restitution provided for by domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 92). 21.  On 9 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. She stated that a forest of national importance had only occupied 0.38 hectares of the land which had been given to her (see paragraph 8 above) and thus there should have been no obstacles to returning the remaining 2.06 hectares to her in natura. The applicant emphasised that she had financial obligations vis-\u00e0-vis company S. and therefore asked that her property rights be restored without undue delay. She also stated that she had been informed by the Vilnius land management authorities that two plots of 0.08 and 0.10 hectares would be allocated to her in Galgiai (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). As for the remaining land, the applicant asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius as a matter of priority, taking into account the fact that she had applied for the restoration of her property rights in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above) and that they had already been restored to her in 2002 (see paragraph 6 above). She stated that she was under an obligation to transfer the land to company S. and to inform it of any steps taken in the restitution proceedings. She therefore asked the NLS to reply to her as soon as possible. It is unclear if the applicant received any response to that letter. 22.  On 23 December 2013 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her two plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 2.0441 hectares. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 0.3959 hectares would be restored later. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicant asked the NLS to allocate to her the 0.18 hectares of land in Galgiai (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above) but the NLS refused. The applicant lodged a complaint with a court but on 10 February 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed it. The court stated that there were several candidates waiting to have their property rights restored in that area and that the applicant could not claim to have priority over them. She therefore had to take part in the restitution process, during which her property rights would be restored in accordance with the applicable regulations. 24.  On 17 May 2017 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 0.08 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 0.3159 hectares would be restored later. 25.  On 30 June 2017 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights by giving her 0.3159 hectares of land for the construction of an individual home. 26.  In October 2011 the applicant signed an agreement with company S. by which she undertook, in lieu of the monetary payment of LTL 2,500,000 (see paragraph 11 above), to transfer to the company any land which would be given to her during the subsequent restitution process. However, pursuant to that agreement, company S. retained the right to claim a monetary payment of LTL 2,500,000 from the applicant without prior notice. 27.  After the applicant\u2019s property rights were restored in December 2013 and May and June 2017 (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above), she transferred those plots to company S. On 23 July 2018 company S. confirmed to the applicant that it did not have any outstanding claims against her and that it had asked domestic courts to lift the seizure previously imposed on her property (see paragraph 12 above). 28.  In her last letter to the Court (8 November 2018), the applicant stated that the seizure of her property had not yet been lifted and that the relevant court proceedings were ongoing. The Government did not comment on that point.", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "8", "4", "7", "2", "1", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1948 and 1963 and live in Istanbul and Ankara respectively. 6.  They held a certain amount of shares in T\u00fcrkiye T\u00fct\u00fcnc\u00fcler Bankas\u0131 Ya\u015farbank A.\u015e. (hereinafter \u201cYa\u015farbank\u201d) - a private bank established in 1924 - which they had bought on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 7.  By a decision dated 21 December 1999 (no. 99/13765), the Council of Ministers decided to transfer the management and control of Ya\u015farbank as well as all of its shareholder rights (except for dividends) to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d), pursuant to section 14(3) and (5) of the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389) as amended by Law no. 4491. With the same decision, the Council of Ministers also decided to transfer the ownership of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s shares to the Fund under section 14(5) of the same Act. 8.  At the time of the transfer, 48.48% of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s shares were owned by Ya\u015far Holding A.\u015e., 32.85% by companies belonging to the Ya\u015far Group, 2.08% by foundations belonging to the Ya\u015far Group, and 0.12% by the Ya\u015far family. Lastly, the remaining 16.47% of capital was held by the public, including the applicants. 9.  On 21 December 1999 Ya\u015farbank\u2019s shares, which were open to the public, sold on the Istanbul Stock Exchange at a price of 1,950 former Turkish liras (TRL) each. 10.  A financial report prepared by a private audit company on 22 December 1999 noted that Ya\u015farbank\u2019s assets and liabilities amounted to TRL 385.46 trillion and TRL 947.16 trillion respectively. 11.  On 26 January and 18 February 2001 respectively the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar D\u00fczenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu - hereinafter \u201cthe Agency\u201d) decided that Ya\u015farbank would be consolidated under S\u00fcmerbank and that the former\u2019s banking licence would be revoked. 12.  On 4 February 2000 the main shareholders of Ya\u015farbank, including Ya\u015far Holding A.\u015e., brought an administrative case against the Agency, seeking the annulment of the decision of 21 December 1999 regarding the bank\u2019s transfer to the Fund. They argued, inter alia, that the conditions set forth by section 14(3) of Law no. 4389 as regards the transfer of a bank to the Fund had not been satisfied and that accordingly the Council of Ministers\u2019 decision had been unlawful. In that connection, they argued that following its amendment by Law no. 4491, section 14(3) provided for more detailed measures which would be implemented gradually. However, the bank had not been invited to take those measures and the authorities had failed to take account of the recovery plan it had submitted which, according to them, could have strengthened the bank\u2019s financial situation had it been implemented. They also claimed that the transfer of the bank had been disproportionate in view of the other measures provided for by section 14 of Law no. 4389. Lastly, they raised a plea of unconstitutionality. 13.  On an unspecified date the main shareholders initiated administrative proceedings, challenging the revocation of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s banking licence. 14.  On 27 February 2002, after examining a number of expert reports, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the main shareholders\u2019 action for the annulment of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s transfer to the Fund.\nFirstly, the court rejected the main shareholders\u2019 request to refer the case to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling, finding that section 14 of Law no. 4389 did not contravene Article 35 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to property.\nAs to the merits, it found that in line with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section 14 of Law No. 4389 the administration had discretion to choose the measures to be adopted according to the severity of the financial problems involved and that the measures provided for by the different paragraphs of section 14 need not be implemented in order. Moreover, in view of its deteriorating financial situation, Ya\u015farbank had been placed under the close supervision of the authorities pursuant to the former Banking Activities Act (Law no. 3182). However, it had failed to apply the measures pointed out in the relevant audit reports issued during that period of supervision. Nor had the recovery plan prepared by the bank been sufficient to improve its financial situation. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the continuation of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s activities would have jeopardised the rights of its creditors and undermined the reliability and stability of the banking system. 15.  On 27 October 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court also dismissed the action regarding the annulment of the revocation of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s banking licence. 16.  By two separate decisions delivered on 29 April 2004, the General Assembly of the Administrative Proceedings Divisions of the Supreme Administrative Court (Dan\u0131\u015ftay \u0130dari Dava Daireleri Genel Kurulu - hereinafter \u201cthe General Assembly\u201d) upheld both judgments. On 8 February 2007 the General Assembly rejected an application for rectification by the main shareholders. 17.  A detailed description of the facts surrounding the State\u2019s takeover of Ya\u015farbank and the proceedings initiated by the main shareholders may be found in the case of Ya\u015far Holding A.\u015e. v. Turkey ((merits), no. 48642/07, 4 April 2017). 18.  On an unspecified date the first applicant bought a number of shares in Ya\u015farbank on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 19.  Following the transfer of Ya\u015farbank to the Fund, the first applicant initiated proceedings, requesting the annulment of the transfer and claiming compensation of TRL 2 trillion, the approximate value of his shares at the time, together with interest. He maintained that he had bought the shares on the stock market, relying on the financial statements of the bank, which had been supervised by the Capital Markets Board (Sermaye Piyasas\u0131 Kurulu) and approved by independent auditing agencies. He argued accordingly that no fault could be attributed to him for Ya\u015farbank\u2019s transfer to the Fund and that he should have received the same protection as that granted to the creditors of the bank.\nThe first applicant pointed out that the main shares of banks and shares bought on the stock market were subject to different legal provisions and thus should have been dealt with separately during the State\u2019s takeover of the bank. In that connection, he argued that the relevant legislation, in particular section 14(5) of Law no. 4389, was unclear in that it referred to the transfer of the shares of the main shareholders and the transfer of all shares of the bank in the same sentence, making it difficult to understand the scope of the transfer covered by that provision. He concluded therefore that the transfer of his shares to the Fund, without any compensation in return, had violated his right to property.\nThe first applicant also raised a plea of unconstitutionality as regards section 14 of Law no. 4389. 20.  On 18 June 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s case. Referring to its judgment of 27 February 2002 regarding the main shareholders\u2019 action for the annulment of the impugned transfer, the court found that the Council of Ministers\u2019 decision to transfer the bank to the Fund had been lawful. In that connection, it reiterated that taking account of reports drawn up following inspections of Ya\u015farbank over a five-year period, instructions given to the bank by the State authorities, and the failure of the bank to improve its financial situation following these instructions, it had become clear that further activity of the bank, whose assets had been insufficient to cover its liabilities, would disrupt the stability of the financial system and make it impossible for the authorities to protect its creditors\u2019 rights.\nWith regard to the first applicant\u2019s compensation claim, the court noted that the administration was not liable to pay compensation for any loss resulting from the transfer of Ya\u015farbank. It noted that the applicant should be considered a partner of the bank as he had owned shares in it, and that although the aim of commercial activity was to make profit, one could not remove the risk of loss from such activity.\nThe court also rejected the first applicant\u2019s request to refer the case to the Constitutional Court. 21.  The first applicant appealed, stating that the Supreme Administrative Court had violated his right to a fair trial as it had not addressed his main argument, that is, the transfer of his shares as a minority shareholder. In that connection, he maintained again that the State authorities had failed in their duty of supervision, in that they had not informed the public of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s deteriorating financial situation and had caused the deprivation of his shares by their wrongful actions. 22.  On 29 April 2004 the General Assembly upheld the judgment. The final decision was served on the applicant on 20 July 2004. 23.  On various occasions between 3 and 20 December 1999 the second applicant bought a certain amount of shares in Ya\u015farbank on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 24.  Following the Council of Ministers\u2019 decision to transfer Ya\u015farbank to the Fund, on 18 February 2000 he brought a case against the Fund, requesting the annulment of that decision. He maintained that he reserved the right to request compensation at a later stage.\nHe argued, inter alia, that section 14(5) of Law no. 4389 as amended by Law no. 4491 did not cover the shares of minority shareholders and its application in Ya\u015farbank\u2019s case had been unlawful as it had resulted in the transfer of all of the bank\u2019s shares, including those of minority shareholders such as himself, who had bought their shares on the stock market, relying on information provided by the authorities. In that connection, he maintained that the deprivation of his property had resulted from the authorities\u2019 failure to comply with their duty of supervision, and in particular the failure of the Capital Markets Board to inform the public of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s deteriorating financial situation, as required by the Capital Markets Act (Law no. 2499).\nThe second applicant also raised a plea of unconstitutionality regarding section 14(3) to (5) of Law no. 4389. 25.  On 8 October 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the second applicant\u2019s request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. The court also dismissed the action for the annulment of Ya\u015farbank\u2019s takeover by the State, finding that the Council of Ministers\u2019 decision to transfer the bank to the Fund had been lawful. In doing so it repeated the reasoning it had provided in the first applicant\u2019s case. 26.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment had merely pointed out that the transfer of the bank had been lawful, without addressing his main argument, namely the unlawfulness of the application of section 14(5) and the resulting transfer of the shares obtained on the stock market together with those of the main shareholders. 27.  On 7 October 2004 the General Assembly upheld the judgment. 28.  On 3 May 2007 the appellate court rejected a rectification application lodged by the applicant. That final decision was served on the applicant on 3 July 2007.", "references": ["8", "5", "4", "2", "0", "1", "6", "7", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Institution for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions (Zavod za izvr\u0161enje krivi\u010dnih sankcija; hereinafter \u201cthe IECS\u201d) in Spu\u017e. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On several occasions in July and August 2005 explosives were used on the construction site of a hotel on the Montenegrin coast, apparently with the aim of forcing the investors to buy the adjacent plot of land. A high\u2011ranking police officer, S.\u0160., was in charge of the police investigation. 8.  Shortly after midnight on 30 August 2005, S.\u0160. was ambushed in front of his house and killed by nineteen shots from an automatic gun. 9.  On 16 February 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of criminal enterprise (zlo\u010dina\u010dko udru\u017eivanje), attempted extortion (iznuda u poku\u0161aju) and aiding and abetting aggravated murder (te\u0161ko ubistvo putem pomaganja). The case was entrusted to the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime. 10.  On 19 February 2006 the investigating judge of the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica issued a detention order against the applicant and several other persons for fear that they might abscond, taking into account the gravity of the offences and the severity of the prison sentence prescribed. The decision specified that detention would last for a month starting as of 16 February 2006. It relied on Article 148 \u00a7 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) in force at the time (see paragraph 94 below). 11.  The detention of the applicant and one other person was extended on 16 March, 15 April, 16 May, 15 June and 12 July 2006, each time for another month, in substance for fear that they might abscond and taking into account the gravity of the criminal offences of which they were suspected. Relying on Article 148 \u00a7 1(1) of the CCP, the court specified, inter alia, that there was an ongoing investigation against them and that a number of witnesses remained to be interviewed. Those decisions specified that as well as criminal enterprise and attempted extortion, the applicant was also suspected of aiding and abetting aggravated murder. 12.  On 14 August 2006 the Supreme State Prosecutor (Special Prosecutor) filed an indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was indicted for criminal enterprise, attempted extortion, aiding and abetting aggravated murder, helping a perpetrator after the commission of a criminal offence, incitement to forge an official document (isprava), and incitement to endanger the public (izazivanje op\u0161te opasnosti). 13.  The defendants\u2019 detention, including the applicant\u2019s, was further extended by the High Court on 15 August 2006, 21 October 2008 and 11 March 2009, in substance for fear that they might abscond taking into account the gravity and number of criminal offences that they had been accused of and the sentences prescribed for them. The latter two decisions also took into account that the defendants were relatively young, that three of them were unemployed, two were single, and one was a foreign citizen. All three decisions relied on Article 148 \u00a71(1) and none of them specified for how long the detention was extended. 14.  In addition, on 23 May 2007, during the main hearing (glavni pretres), the applicant requested that his detention be lifted, submitting that he had nowhere to abscond to and that he would duly appear before the court (uredno odazvati na pozive suda). The court dismissed the request the same day, considering that \u201cthe grounds for [the applicant\u2019s] detention still persisted\u201d. 15.  On 7 August 2009 the High Court found the applicant guilty of several criminal offences and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. 16.  On 17 February 2010 the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica quashed the High Court judgment. The same day it extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, without specifying for how long, considering that \u201cthe reasons for detention still persisted\u201d. The court relied on Article 148 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the CCP in force at the time (see paragraph 94 below). 17.  On 4 March 2011 four defendants, including the applicant, applied for release (predlog za ukidanje pritvora). On 10 March 2011 the High Court dismissed their application, considering that \u201cthe circumstances on the basis of which [their] detention had been extended still persisted\u201d. It relied on Article 148 \u00a71 (1) and (4). 18.  On 9 May 2011 the High Court again found the applicant guilty of several criminal offences and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The same day the court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, for fear that they might abscond in view of the sanction imposed, and that their release could seriously jeopardise public order and peace. The court relied on Article 175 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP (see paragraphs 100-101 below). 19.  On 30 December 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the High Court\u2019s judgment. The same day the court extended the detention of five defendants, including the applicant, without specifying for how long, considering that \u201cthe reasons for detention still persisted\u201d. It relied on Article 175 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 20.  On 1 February 2012, relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, five defendants, including the applicant, applied for release, maintaining that the reasons for their detention no longer persisted. On 8 February 2012 the High Court dismissed their application, considering that \u201cthe circumstances had not changed since the previous decision\u201d and that \u201cthe reasons for their detention persisted\u201d. It relied on Article 175 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 21.  On 11 April, 13 June and 10 August 2012 the High Court, acting pursuant to Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the 2009 CCP (see paragraphs 96 and 100 below), further extended the detention of five defendants, including the applicant, \u201cuntil further notice\u201d (ima trajati do dalje odluke suda), for fear that they might abscond and that their release would seriously breach public order and peace. In doing so the court relied on Article 175 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the CCP. The court took into account the gravity and the number of offences at issue, the sentence provided for the offences, the circumstances in which they had been committed, as well as the fact that the defendants were relatively young and that one of the accused had absconded. 22.  On 18 April 2012, during the main hearing, five defendants, including the applicant, applied to the court to lift their detention. The court dismissed their application the same day, considering that \u201cthe reasons for extending their detention persisted\u201d. 23.  On 9 October 2012 the High Court, inter alia, found the applicant guilty of attempted extortion, public endangerment and aggravated murder, all through incitement (sve putem podstrekavanja), and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The same day the court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant. It considered that the risk of their absconding persisted, and that there were particular circumstances indicating that releasing them would seriously breach public order and peace. The court relied on Article 175 \u00a7 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 24.  On 2 April 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 25.  On 2 April 2014 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment. The same day the Supreme Court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, considering that the reasons for detention persisted. Notably, the defendants at issue had been found guilty of aggravated murder by the first-instance judgment, which had not been quashed. The offence contained two qualifying circumstances: (a) the victim was a police officer, and (b) he had been murdered for profit (koristoljublje). Referring to Article 175 \u00a7 1(4), the court considered that releasing the defendants could seriously breach public order and peace. 26.  On 1 August 2014 the applicant applied for release to the High Court. Relying on Article 5 of the Convention and the relevant case-law, he complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention, alleging insufficient reasoning of the relevant decisions, the lack of regular review of his detention pursuant to Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the CCP, a lack of medical care and poor conditions in detention. He also submitted that in October 2013 he had been diagnosed with ulcerative colitis (an inflammatory bowel disease that causes long-lasting inflammation and ulcers in the digestive tract; it affects the innermost lining of the large intestine (colon) and the rectum) and enclosed the relevant medical reports. On 3 September 2014 the applicant urged the High Court to rule on his application. 27.  On 4 September 2014 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal. On 12 September 2014, during the main hearing before the Court of Appeal, the applicant applied for release, primarily for health-related reasons. He submitted additional medical reports. Between 5 November 2014 and 16 January 2015 he urged the Court of Appeal on six occasions to rule thereon. 28.  On 23 January 2015 the Court of Appeal heard a medical expert witness and obtained information from the IECS in this regard. The expert medical witness submitted that the applicant\u2019s illness (ulcerative colitis) was serious, requiring a special diet and specific medical treatment, the absence of which, or even small deviations, could make it worse. He also explained that the illness caused a lot of psychological changes. The IECS submitted that it provided both medical care, including in public health institutions where needed, and various diets. In particular, the applicant had been taken to various hospitals and specialists, and was allowed to provide for his own food. On 13 February 2015 the court dismissed his application. 29.  On 20 February 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court\u2019s judgment on the merits of 9 October 2012. The same day, relying on Article 175 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, the court extended the four defendants\u2019 detention, including the applicant\u2019s, finding that the reasons for it persisted. 30.  On 12 March 2015 the Supreme Court, acting upon an appeal lodged by the applicant, quashed the order of 20 February 2015 extending the applicant\u2019s detention, finding that Article 175 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, on which the Court of Appeal had relied, did not exist, as the relevant provision contained only two paragraphs. The court also acknowledged that there was no reasoning as to whether the applicant\u2019s health affected his further detention. 31.  On 16 March 2015 the Court of Appeal extended four defendants\u2019 detention, including the applicant\u2019s, relying on Article 175 \u00a7 1(4). It found the applicant\u2019s health of no relevance to his further detention, given that it transpired from the IECS\u2019s submission that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical care and nutrition. 32.  On 20 March 2015 the applicant appealed, relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. He submitted that the order to extend the detention had been issued for all defendants together, and that the court had failed to provide specific reasons for extending his detention. He also complained about the conditions in detention and of a lack of adequate medical care there, including a lack of the medically prescribed diet (see paragraph 45 below). 33.  On 27 March 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. While acknowledging that the relevant judgment was not yet final, the court took into account that the defendants had been found guilty of aiding and abetting aggravated murder, for which a prison sentence of ten years or more was prescribed. It also held that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently examined the applicant\u2019s health and its relevance to detention. 34.  On 7 May 2015, invoking Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained, in particular, that (a) the conditions of detention in prison, in particular the medical care, were inadequate; (b) his detention was unlawful given that it was not regularly reviewed; (c) his detention was lengthy and the relevant decisions had been insufficiently reasoned; and (d) his application for release submitted on 1 August 2014 had not been ruled upon. 35.  On 16 June 2015 the applicant again applied for release. He invoked the principle of proportionality and submitted that whenever possible the courts were obliged to order a less severe measure instead of detention. He referred to his state of health and relied on Bulatovi\u0107 v. Montenegro, no. 67320/10, 22 July 2014. He attached a medical report of 10 June 2015 (see paragraph 77 below). 36.  On 9 July 2015 the High Court dismissed his application, relying on Article 175 \u00a7 1(4) of the CCP. It considered that the applicant had been found guilty of aggravated murder by a judgment which was not yet final, and that the criminal offence at issue was particularly grave owing both to the manner in which it had been committed, and to its consequences \u2013 the death of a high-ranking police officer, who had been murdered for profit. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s health was of no consequence as he was being, and had to be, provided with an adequate diet and medical care in the IECS. Even if this had not been the case, it would not affect the existence of a reason for detention, but could only indicate that he should be detained in more adequate conditions, such as in the Clinical Centre of Montenegro. 37.  On 20 October 2015 the Supreme Court, in substance, upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 February 2015 and the applicant\u2019s sentence of thirty years in prison. 38.  On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. The court found, in particular, that the impugned decisions had been rendered by competent courts, in a procedure prescribed by law, on the basis of the CCP, and that the reasons contained therein were not arbitrary. As regards the length of detention, the court held that Article 5 distinguished between detention before and after conviction. It held that the lawfulness of detention could be assessed only until the first\u2011instance judgment, which did not have to be final. Given that the first\u2011instance judgment had been issued on 7 August 2009, the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal in that regard was belated. As regards medical care, the court considered that the applicant\u2019s health had been continuously monitored by a number of specialists in various institutions, and that he had been provided in a timely manner with reasonable available medical care (pravovremeno su pru\u017eili razumnu dostupnu medicinsku njegu). The decision did not address the conditions of detention, whether the applicant\u2019s detention had been regularly reviewed or the alleged failure to rule on his application for release. That decision was served on the applicant on 25 March 2016. 39.  The parties\u2019 submissions in this regard differed. 40.  The applicant maintained that the cell in which he had been detained had been overcrowded, the number of inmates varying, and that he had lacked water and daily exercise. The cell had contained a sanitary facility and a dining table. Due to a frequent lack of water, the applicant had had to collect it in a container (u buretu). Also, the daily walks had lasted for one hour \u2013 except for Thursdays and Fridays, when they had lasted for half an hour \u2013 and had been cancelled altogether on rainy days. 41.  The Government, for their part, submitted that there were no records for the period prior to 5 August 2009. Between 5 August 2009 and 26 March 2010 the applicant had been held in room D4, measuring 30 sq. m, which, at times, he had shared with five other persons at most. Between 27 March 2010 and 8 February 2016 he had been in room L9, measuring 20 sq. m, which he had shared with three other persons at most, and during some periods he had been there alone. Both D4 and L9 had their own toilets, separated from the rest of the room, which the inmates were in charge of cleaning. 42.  In the remand section of the prison the applicant had had at his disposal four outdoor walking areas, measuring in the range of 506 sq. m to 900 sq. m. He had also been allowed out of his room during family visits (thirty minutes per week) and during the visits of his representatives, which were not time-limited. 43.  On 8 February 2016 the applicant had been transferred to the post\u2011conviction section of the prison, where he had been placed in a single room on the ground floor in newly-built pavilion F. The room measured 15.09 sq. m, of which the main area measured 5.7 sq. m, the dining area 7.84 sq. m, and the toilet with wash basin 1.55 sq. m, separated from the rest of the room by a dividing wall. In the room there was a bed, a table and a chair, a wardrobe, a television set and receiver, a DVD player, a refrigerator, air-conditioning, a hot plate and an oven. In the immediate vicinity of the room there was a common bathroom with several showers. There were several outdoor yards at his disposal: one of concrete measuring 289 sq. m, and two grass ones measuring 210 sq. m and 2,393 sq. m respectively. There was also a covered gym (natkrivena teretana) of a metal construction. 44.  The Government also submitted that the conditions in the prison, for both remand prisoners and convicted prisoners, had been significantly improved after a visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) in 2013 (see paragraph 139 below). 45.  In September 2013 the applicant was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis and was prescribed a special diet (crijevna dijeta) by a specialist in the Clinical Centre of Montenegro (a State-run hospital). The relevant medical report did not contain any details as regards the exact content of the diet. With the consent of the High Court judge of 9 December 2013, special food products were provided by the applicant\u2019s family, at first once a day and then once a week. 46.  It transpires from medical reports issued in June, July and November 2014 that the treatment the applicant was receiving for ulcerative colitis was not effective. In 2014 he was, inter alia, admitted twice to the Clinical Centre as his condition had worsened. As he did not wish to undergo surgery, he was prescribed medication called Vedolizumab (\u201cVDZ\u201d) instead. It is unclear from the case file when exactly VDZ was prescribed, but it would appear that it was between September and November 2014. The reports of November 2014 also noted that the applicant did not wish to be hospitalised either. As VDZ was not available in Montenegro, the applicant had four doses bought for him in Germany, the cost of which was 17,222.40 euros (EUR). Those doses were administered in December 2014, January, February and March 2015. After the dose in March 2015 the doctors noted \u201cevident improvement\u201d and considered it of utmost importance that the applicant be given the next dose, as \u201cevery delay thereof increased the risk of the illness worsening\u201d. The next dose was planned for May 2015. 47.  Twice in May 2015 the IECS informed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of its attempts to provide VDZ for the applicant. Given that it was not registered in Montenegro, it could be obtained only with the exceptional approval of a request made by a company licensed to distribute medication. The IECS had asked that such a request be made by a pharmaceutical company. 48.  On 20 May 2015 the main distributor of VDZ informed the pharmaceutical company that VDZ was under special monitoring (pod posebnim pra\u0107enjem). Every administration of it had to be authorised by its medical sector, and each and every individual case examined separately. 49.  On 22 July 2015 the applicant had two more doses bought for him in Germany, the cost of which was EUR 5,975.94. They were administered in August and September 2015. 50.  On 2 September 2015 the IECS provided for two doses of VDZ, the cost of which was covered by the High Court (one being EUR 4,457.85). They were administered in November 2015 and January 2016. 51.  In the course of 2015 the applicant was hospitalised once because his ulcerative colitis had worsened. 52.  In 2016 the applicant received five doses of VDZ in total (the one in January 2016 mentioned in paragraph 50 above, and in February, October, November and December 2016). The dose planned for March 2016 was not administered until October 2016. 53.  In 2017 the applicant received nine doses of VDZ (January, February, March, April, May, June, July and two in September). There is no information in the case file as to who covered the costs of the doses as of February 2016 onwards. 54.  In at least nine medical reports in 2017 the doctor in charge noted that the treatment with VDZ had been prescribed because the applicant had kept refusing surgery. He considered, however, that in spite of the VDZ treatment, the applicant\u2019s health was not satisfactory and that even though he kept refusing to undergo an operation, there was no other option, and the applicant was advised to consider it again. The doctor also considered that it was practically impossible for the applicant to recover (ostvari remisiju), given that the conditions in which he was detained increased the risk of complications and could be life-threatening. 55.  Between 15 November and 4 December 2017 the applicant was hospitalised again because his ulcerative colitis had worsened. As he had been recommended surgery, further VDZ treatment was discontinued. 56.  On 13 June 2018 the doctor from the Clinical Centre noted that the applicant was feeling well. On 23 July 2018 the applicant underwent an endoscopic examination in the Clinical Centre, in which it was found that the ulcerative colitis was in remission. On 25 July 2018 the prison doctor noted that the applicant was feeling well, that he was in a state of remission and that his ulcerative colitis was in a \u201ctranquil\u201d phase. Between 3 August and 20 December 2018 the applicant had three more specialists\u2019 examinations indicating an inflammatory pseudopolyp and that the ulcerative colitis had reactivated after six months of remission. 57.  On 17 October 2013 a discharge note from the hospital stated that the applicant had been, inter alia, recommended an ophthalmological examination in order to determine his dioptres. A discharge note of 25 December 2013 stated that the applicant had diminished vision (oslabljen vid). 58.  On 13 January 2014 (during an endoscopic examination at the Clinical Centre), the applicant was told he must undergo an ophthalmological examination on account of his sudden eyesight problems (zbog naglo nastalih smetnji s vidom). 59.  On 4 February 2014, with the High Court\u2019s consent of 30 January and 4 February 2014, the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist in Meljine hospital as well as in a privately-run ophthalmology clinic in Podgorica. The report of the ophthalmologist in Meljine is partly illegible. It transpires from the legible part that the applicant was diagnosed with complicated cataracts (cataracta complicate) in his left eye. The next check\u2011up was recommended in three to four months. 60.  On an unspecified date, apparently in March 2014, the applicant was diagnosed with proliferative retinopathy (Retinopathia proliferativa alia), myopia (OD Myopia), and optic atrophy (OS Atrophia n. optici). A panel of ophthalmologists (konzilijum oftalmologa) recommended eye surgery in a privately-run clinic, which would include a cataract operation. 61.  On 26 March 2014 the applicant was examined in a privately-run ophthalmological clinic. He underwent surgery on 27 March 2014, for which he paid EUR 2,600. 62.  It transpires from the case file that the applicant had been suffering pain in the knee, spine and feet since 2000. He had undergone surgery to his left leg in 2001, had broken a thighbone in 2003, and both legs were \u201cextremely deformed\u201d (izrazito deformisana) owing to shotgun injuries (prostrelne rane) and a car accident, which would appear to have taken place in 2005. After gangrene had appeared, the applicant had undergone surgery to his right leg and skin grafts. 63.  In the course of 2015 the applicant was examined by a number of specialists from the Clinical Centre and the Special Hospital for Orthopaedics, Neurosurgery and Neurology in Risan (\u201cthe Risan hospital\u201d), and received various medication. 64.  In particular, during his hospitalisation between 28 March and 3 April 2015 (for ulcerative colitis) the applicant was also examined by an orthopaedist who recommended surgery. He had another check-up on 22 April 2015. 65.  On 24 April 2015 the applicant was hospitalised again because his surgery wounds were oozing (secernacije) under the left knee and he required further surgery. On 30 April 2015, on his discharge from hospital, he was recommended rehabilitation treatment in the Rehabilitation Institute in Igalo (Institut za fizikalnu medicinu, rehabilitaciju i reumatologiju \u2013 \u201cthe Igalo Institute\u201d) and, if the results were not satisfactory, an endoprosthesis. 66.  On 27 July 2015 the applicant requested that he be allowed the said rehabilitation treatment. The High Court approved the request on 30 July 2015, noting that the exact dates of the treatment would be agreed directly between the IECS and the applicant. 67.  On 21 August 2015 the applicant asked the prison authorities to provide him with transportation to the Igalo Institute the first week of September. He submitted that the costs of his treatment and stay there would be entirely covered by his family. On 2 September 2015 he informed the IECS that his treatment was scheduled to begin on 7 September 2015. He repeated that the costs of it would be covered by him. On 7 September 2015 the applicant was taken to Igalo. 68.  Following the recommendation of doctors in Risan hospital, the applicant\u2019s request to that effect and the High Court\u2019s consent, his treatment in the Igalo Institute was extended twice. In one of those requests the applicant submitted that the costs thereof would be covered by him. He stayed there between 7 September and 7 December 2015, for which he paid EUR 10,673.60. The discharge note from the Igalo Institute stated that he had received treatment for strengthening his muscles with the aim of preparing him for a possible endoprosthesis. 69.  Between 4 September 2015 and 9 February 2016 the High Court informed the IECS on several occasions that the costs of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment, including for VDZ, and the costs of security guards at the Igalo Institute, would be covered by the High Court upon presentation of the relevant reimbursement requests (po podno\u0161enju zahtjeva za naknadu tro\u0161kova), pursuant to Article 226 \u00a7\u00a7 2(5) and 4 of the CCP. Between 14 October 2015 and 12 February 2016 the Judicial Council paid EUR 15,748.80 to the Igalo Institute for the accommodation of the IECS security guards who had accompanied the applicant during his treatment there. 70.  On 3 December 2015 a specialist in Risan hospital noted that the applicant was still suffering strong pain in his left knee and that the treatment in the Igalo Institute had not improved it. The specialist recommended inter-ligament corrective osteotomy with external fixing (interligamentarna korektivna osteotomija uz spolja\u0161nju fiksaciju). He diagnosed the applicant with advanced knee arthrosis. 71.  Between 2 June 2016 and March 2017 the applicant\u2019s left knee was further examined by a number of specialists: once by an orthopaedist, a vascular surgeon and a neurologist, and three times by a neuro-surgeon. He also had an X-ray of the knee and an MRI scan of the lumbar spine. He was diagnosed with serious osteoarthritis of the left knee (gonarthrosis lateralis sinistri gradus gravis), atherosclerosis, lumbalgia (lumboischialgia), and peroneal nerve dysfunction (leasio nervi peronaei), and further treatment in the Igalo Institute was recommended. 72.  During his hospitalisation between 28 March and 3 April 2015 (for ulcerative colitis) the applicant had also been examined by a psychiatrist and prescribed treatment. The report did not specify which treatment, but stated that the next check-up should take place \u201cif needed\u201d (po potrebi). 73.  On 25 March 2016 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who recommended an examination by a psychiatrist in the specialist hospital in Kotor. On 29 March 2016 the applicant was examined in Kotor, where he submitted that in the previous two months he had felt fear for his physical health and certain aspects of everyday functioning. The doctor prescribed treatment. The next appointment scheduled for 19 April 2016 took place on 18 April 2016. The doctor found that he was suffering from \u201cprominent anxious-depressive psychopathology with vegetative expression\u201d (prominentna anksiozno-depresivna psihopatologija, sa vegetativnom ekspresijom) and prescribed treatment. The next check-up recommended for 4 May 2016 took place on 8 July 2016. The applicant submitted that he had stopped taking the medication \u201cdue to changes in the work of the health service\u201d (zbog izmijenjenih okolnosti rada zdravstvene slu\u017ebe). The doctor found that he was suffering from depression, a high level of anxiety and severe somatic symptom disorder. He prescribed treatment and recommended another check-up in a month. The next check\u2011up took place on 23 August 2016, when severe anxiety was noted. It was recommended that the next check-up be done by telephone in two weeks, and a further one in Kotor hospital in one to two months. It would appear from the case file that there have been no further check-ups. 74.  Between March 2013 and 4 December 2017 the applicant was hospitalised eight times (for 128 days in total) and had in addition twenty\u2011two outpatient hospital treatments. Between September 2013 and January 2018 he was examined outside the IECS 151 times. 75.  Between 17 September 2013 and 18 August 2015 the IECS informed the High Court on several occasions that following the referral (uput) of the prison doctor, the applicant had been taken to various medical institutions outside the IECS. 76.  Medical examinations had been conducted in the presence of prison guards, including a colonoscopy and psychiatric examinations. The colonoscopy had been performed without anaesthesia. 77.  On 10 June 2015 three medical experts (one in forensic medicine, one in internal medicine \u2013 a gastroentero-hepatologist and a psychiatrist) issued an opinion on the applicant\u2019s health, after having examined him and his medical file. They stated that ulcerative colitis was incurable and that apart from genetic factors, it was generated by stressful circumstances. They recommended that the applicant be treated in the least stressful environment possible, that is that he be \u201cisolated from the IECS\u201d. They observed that his health had constantly deteriorated until he had started treatment with VDZ, and that \u201ceven though the medication was not registered in Montenegro, it was absolutely medically indicated and necessary to try to administer it, as the only other alterative was surgical removal of the colon, which needed to be avoided as long as there was any other option\u201d. 78.  The doctors further observed that the applicant suffered from myopia, that he could not see in the left eye and he had an artificial lens implanted in the right eye, that he had a dislocation of the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae and ossification of the lumbar part of his spine, ossification of his left knee, an injury to a nerve in his left calf, he walked with crutches, and had two skin infections following the administration of injections as a result of the lack of disinfectant alcohol in the prison. The prison doctor later confirmed that there had indeed been no such disinfectant in the IECS for a considerable time and that it could not provide for the applicant\u2019s special diet, which was why his family was allowed to bring him food. 79.  The doctors described the applicant\u2019s cell as a \u201cclassic prison cell\u201d, where only the applicant was held at the time, although he sometimes had a cell-mate. There was a toilet, apparently not separated from the rest of the room, and a separate tank of water. The doctors considered that the lack of running water and absence of a shower in the room could additionally cause a deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health because of an increased risk of infection. 80.  On 3 July 2015 the IECS informed the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the applicant that three types of medication (not VDZ), also unavailable in Montenegro, had been provided for the applicant. 81.  On 18 September 2017 a medical expert submitted an expert opinion at the request of the applicant\u2019s representatives. He maintained that there was a threat of malign alteration, which would inevitably result in the applicant\u2019s death, and that it was absolutely necessary to find a solution allowing for adequate nutrition, the permanent administration of complex treatment, moderate daily physical exercise and the elimination of stressful situations. The conditions in which the applicant was detained were described as unfavourable for recuperation. 82.  It would appear that on 26 September 2017 the applicant applied for an extraordinary reduction of his sentence for health-related reasons. The court requested an expert opinion in this regard, which was produced in October 2017. The expert submitted that stressful conditions in the IECS and the limited possibility of an adequate diet were such that the applicant would never achieve remission as long as he was in the IECS. Such course of illness was harmful and threatened to cause serious complications, some of which could undoubtedly be life-threatening. 83.  On 18 January 2018 the applicant was diagnosed with bronchial asthma and prescribed treatment. 84.  On five occasions between 1996 and 2010 the applicant was found guilty of various criminal offences. He received penalties ranging from a six-month suspended sentence to three years of imprisonment. 85.  Before the first first-instance judgment was rendered, sixty hearings had taken place (twenty-one in 2007, twenty-two in 2008 and seventeen in 2009), during which more than seventy witnesses and ten expert witnesses had been heard, tens of expert witnesses\u2019 opinions read out, and more than 100 pieces of material evidence examined. In the same period nine hearings were adjourned because of the absence of or various requests by the applicant and/or other defendants and/or their representatives. 86.  Between 14 September 2010 and 9 May 2011 eighteen hearings were held. Between 5 April and 9 October 2012 eleven hearings were held. 87.  Between 27 June 2014 and 20 February 2015 the Court of Appeal held ten hearings. 88.  The ombudsman\u2019s report of December 2017 indicates that half of all prisoners have some sort of mental illness or disorder and that the prison health service is not operating at full capacity. There is a waiting list for psychiatric evaluation and examination. Recommendations were made to the Ministry of Justice and the IECS to urgently consider the need to establish a prison psychiatric unit and to undertake steps to help patients suffering from depression, as well as to ensure that that kind of examination was conducted without the presence of prison guards (unless the psychiatrist explicitly requested their presence).", "references": ["6", "4", "0", "9", "7", "5", "3", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Novi Sad. 5.  On 1 June 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking reimbursement for income she had lost because of a car accident. 6.  On 25 February 2008 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance delivered a judgment partly in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay her a certain amount in that respect. 7.  On 30 October 2008 the Novi Sad District Court partly quashed the judgment of 25 February 2008 and remitted the case, upholding the remainder of the judgment. 8.  On 2 July 2010 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance rejected the applicant\u2019s claim in the remitted part. 9.  On 30 January 2012 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal partly upheld the judgment of 2 July 2010 and partly reversed it granting certain applicant\u2019s claims. 10.  On 5 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint about the length of those proceedings, taking into consideration that the civil courts had rendered four judgments at two instances and that the proceedings had been complex.", "references": ["4", "5", "0", "2", "6", "1", "9", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964. 6.  On 29 May 2007 he arrived to serve a life sentence at correctional colony no. 39 in Ladyzhyn, Vinnytsia Region (\u201cprison no. 39\u201d), where (with an interruption between 13 June and 3 November 2010 related to medical treatment that he received in correctional colony no. 61 in Kherson (\u201cprison no. 61\u201d) he has since been detained. 7.  The present application covers the period of the applicant\u2019s detention from May 2007 until September 2013. 8.  In his initial submissions before the Court, the applicant complained of a poor diet (which usually consisted of water with cabbage, boiled maize, or porridge); a lack of cleaning products and utilities in the cells; and delays in the supply of goods to the prison store and in his being provided with cigarettes. He had unsuccessfully complained about those issues to the prison governor and to the public prosecution office. 9.  The Government submitted that from May 2007 until October 2008 the applicant had been held in cell no. 9 (which had measured 6.8 sq. m and had been designed to accommodate one prisoner), and that from October 2008 he had shared cell no. 10 (measuring 8.9 sq. m) with another prisoner. Certificates \u2013 issued on 14 February 2013 by the governor of prison no. 39 following inspections of the above-mentioned cells (which the Government submitted to the Court) \u2013 suggested that: both cells had been equipped with the necessary furniture and the applicant had been provided with his own sleeping place; the lavatory had been separated from the living area; the walls and floor in cell no. 9 had been repaired; the ventilation and heating systems had been operating properly; and the food and soap supply had been in compliance with domestic standards. 10.  In his reply of 3 July 2013 to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant contested the relevance and accuracy of the evidence provided by them. He submitted, inter alia, that he had also been held in cell no. 6 together with another prisoner. He provided no information as regards the period of his detention there and the conditions in which he had been detained. He also claimed that for a year he had shared cell no. 9 with another prisoner, and for a month (from January until February 2013) he had shared cell no. 10 with two prisoners. The wall plaster had been falling off in cell no. 10, the floor surface had needed to be repaired, and there had been rats everywhere. Lastly, the applicant noted that the Government had failed to provide detailed information on all aspects of the detention regime of life prisoners; however he did not give a personal account of how he had been affected by those aspects. 11.  On 17 September 2013 the Government submitted that, following a complaint lodged in May 2013 by the applicant about the poor conditions of his detention, a prosecutor from the Ladyzhyn public prosecution office had visited prison no. 39 and had found that the wall plaster and the floor surface in cell no. 10 were in a bad condition and that there had been a delay in conducting rodent-control measures in the facility. In accordance with the prosecutor\u2019s instructions, the walls and the floor in cell no. 10 had been repaired and rodent-control measures had been carried out. The Government submitted in this respect a written statement, allegedly given by the applicant on 9 September 2013, in which he affirmed that until that date he had had no complaints as regards the provision of cigarettes or the quality of his food and that his cell (no. 10) had been recently repaired. 12.  From 13 June until 3 November 2010 the applicant was detained in prison no. 61 in order for him to undergo anti-tuberculosis treatment at that prison\u2019s hospital (see paragraph 19 below). 13.  On 20 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Court a handwritten attestation, signed by him and his alleged cellmates, in which he stated that \u201c[On] 19 October 2010 at 6 p.m., in cell no. 10 of prison no. 61, the ceiling plaster began to fall off. [All four of us were taken out of the cell], which measured 2.5 by 1.5 sq. m, for the period during which the hospital staff removed from the cell pieces of concrete and garbage. We were then returned to the cell ...\u201d The applicant\u2019s attestation furthermore alleged that he and his cellmates had had to keep watch all night long in order to avoid injury and that the general conditions in the facility were inappropriate: cells were dirty, damp and cold, and the heating system was not operating. 14.  The Government contested the applicant\u2019s submissions. They provided the Court with a certificate issued by the governor of prison no. 61 according to which between 13 June and 3 November 2010 the applicant had been detained in cells nos. 6, 7 and 8, which measured 28, 20 and 21 sq. m respectively and had been shared by four prisoners. All the cells had been situated on the ground floor, had had a lavatory that had been separated from the living area, and had been equipped with the necessary furniture. The cells had had natural ventilation and it had been possible to open the window of each cell from the inside. During the period from 2008 until 2009 the prison cells had undergone major repairs and in 2010 repair works had been conducted in the corridors and utility rooms. The heating system had been operating properly, with the exception of a five-day period at the beginning of November 2010, when it had been cut off owing to repair works. 15.  In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant submitted written statements by two prisoners who had been held in prison no. 61 during the same period as the applicant. The statements provided a description of the general conditions of detention in the relevant section of the facility. According to the statements, some of the cells lacked access to fresh air and natural lights as the windows were always closed; ventilation and heating system did not work properly, so it was too cold in winter and too hot in summer; the artificial light was too weak; some cells were located in the basement and were humid and damp; the nutrition was inappropriate and did not comply with the relevant domestic norms; the facility was infested with rats; the prisoners were often subjected to ill-treatment by the prison staff and regularly transferred from one cell to another. The applicant furthermore contested the objectiveness of the information provided by the prison governor and stated that the Government\u2019s submissions did not exclude the possibility that, before the repair works had been completed at the end of 2010, there had been smaller rooms in the facility in which he could have been held (and which following the reconstruction had been merged to create a bigger room). 16.  Upon his arrival at prison no. 39 in May 2007 the applicant underwent a medical examination and was found to be healthy. 17.  On 7 October 2008, following a routine check for tuberculosis (\u201cTB\u201d) infection, the applicant was diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis on the upper part of the left lung (category 3). On the same date he was placed in the medical unit of prison no. 39. According to the synopsis of the applicant\u2019s treatment history provided to the Court by the Government, the applicant was seen by a TB-specialist (only once, according to the applicant) and prescribed standard treatment in the form of a combination of \u201cfirst-line\u201d anti-TB antibiotics (Streptomycin, Isoniazid, Rifampicin and Ethambutol), vitamins, hepatoprotectors, and an appropriate diet. Monitoring tests (sputum, urine and blood tests and X-rays) were performed on a number of occasions. According to the above-mentioned synopsis, an improvement (\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043c\u0456\u043a\u0430) was noted following the administration of the treatment in that there had been no destruction of the lung tissue and the infiltration and induration in the primary sites (\u0443\u0449\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u043e\u0433\u043d\u0438\u0449) had dispersed. 18.  On four occasions (on 9 October 2008, 24 April and 22 December 2009 and 14 April 2010) the administration of prison no. 39 lodged a request with the State Department for the Enforcement of Sentences, asking it to allow the applicant\u2019s transfer to a specialised medical facility (as required by domestic law) in order for his TB to be cured. On an unspecified date in 2010 permission was given and on 16 May 2010 the applicant was sent to prison no. 61 for further treatment. 19.  From 13 June until 3 November[1] 2010 the applicant underwent anti\u2011TB treatment at the hospital in prison no. 61. After undergoing a medical examination upon his arrival he was diagnosed with focal tuberculosis of the upper part of the left lung (category 5.1), \u201cwith equivocal activity\u201d (\u0456\u0437 \u0441\u0443\u043c\u043d\u0456\u0432\u043d\u043e\u044e \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u044e), accompanied by toxic vestibulopathy. It was recommended that he continue treatment with Isoniazid, Rifampicin, Pyrazinamide, Ethambutolm and Streptomycin and vitamins \u04121, \u04126, \u041212 for three more months. During his treatment he was under the regular supervision of a TB-specialist and underwent various tests to monitor the status of his TB (blood, sputum and urine tests and X\u2011rays). After the applicant had lodged various complaints about different health issues that he had experienced during his anti TB-treatment (including vertigo, weakness and diarrhoea), he was examined by a general practitioner and a neuropathologist, who diagnosed him with intestinal indigestion and toxic vestibulopathy and prescribed the appropriate treatment (Loperamid and Laevomycetin for the indigestion problems; Piracetam, ascorbic acid and Cinnarizine for the vestibuloparthy). A dentist recommended that the applicant undergo a mouth debridement. 20.  On 27 September 2010 a medical panel examined the applicant, finding small post-TB residual changes in the upper part of the left lung and fibrosis (\u043c\u0430\u043b\u0456 \u0437\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0448\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0456 \u0437\u043c\u0456\u043d\u0438 \u0442\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0437 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043d\u044c\u043e\u0457 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043a\u0438 \u043b\u0456\u0432\u043e\u0457 \u043b\u0435\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0456 \u0443 \u0432\u0438\u0433\u043b\u044f\u0434\u0456 \u0449\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u043e\u0433\u043d\u0438\u0449 \u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043d\u0435\u0432\u043c\u043e\u0444\u0456\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0437\u0443). The applicant was assigned the status of category 5.1 for three years. The applicant was discharged from the hospital with the relevant recommendations for further treatment and in early December 2010 was transferred back to prison no. 39. According to the applicant, his anti-TB treatment was \u201cstopped\u201d at prison no. 39. The medical records submitted by the Government suggest that every spring and autumn until 2012 the applicant was provided with preventive anti-TB treatment (in the form of Isoniazid, Pirazinamid and vitamins). His special diet, like that of other prisoners of the same category, was discontinued in March 2012 following a general order issued by the Department for the Execution of Sentences. 21.  On 11 February 2013 a general practitioner and a psychiatrist from Ladyzhyn Town Hospital examined the applicant and studied his medical file, in particular the part relating to his anti-TB treatment. The relevant record in the applicant\u2019s medical file suggests that the doctors found that the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory following the treatment provided and that they recommended that he stop smoking and undergo an X-ray examination of his chest once a year by way of preventive measures. 22.  In his initial submissions to the Court the applicant complained of a delay in his transferral to a specialised medical institution. He alleged, without providing details, that the medical unit of prison no.39 could not offer the appropriate treatment for tuberculosis. He submitted the same complaints (with the same level of detail) to the domestic authorities. In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, he furthermore submitted that his treatment in prison no. 61 had caused him suffering because of its side-effects, such as weakness, dizziness and nausea, and that his treatment both at the prison no. 61 hospital and in general had been terminated too early. 23.  Referring to the medical evidence submitted by them, the Government maintained that the applicant had received adequate medical treatment for his TB infection. 24.  The applicant alleged that in the course of his imprisonment all of his correspondence, including that with the Court, had been systematically monitored by the prison authorities. He submitted in particular that (i) on 15 May 2008 a prison officer had requested him to submit a letter written by him to the public prosecution office in an unsealed envelope, as it had been necessary to insert a cover letter from the prison authorities, and (ii) on 8 December 2011 a prison officer had opened a letter from the Court in the applicant\u2019s presence and handed it to him. 25.  The applicant furthermore suggested that the authorities had withheld some of the complaints that he had addressed to different bodies, as he had received no reply to them. He referred, by way of an example, to his letters of 26 March 2008 (to an NGO) and of 27 and 31 March and 2 and 8 July 2008 and 26 March 2010 (to the public prosecution office). He also stated that letters from him to the Court dated 29 May 2008, 14 December 2009 and 14 June 2011 had likewise not been dispatched by the prison authorities and that on several occasions the prison staff had warned him that his letters would not leave the prison if he continued to complain about the conditions of his detention and had threatened him for having lodged an application with the Court. 26.  The Government denied the applicant\u2019s allegations and submitted that no monitoring had been conducted as regards letters addressed to the public prosecution office, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (\u201cthe Ombudsperson\u201d) and the Court, as such monitoring was prohibited by law. They furthermore submitted that the letters sent out and received via the prison postal service had been duly dispatched and delivered. They provided evidence that the letter to the public prosecution office of 26 March 2010 had reached the addressee and stated that other letters referred to by the applicant had not been registered in the register of outgoing correspondence (and had therefore not been sent by the applicant via the prison\u2019s mail office). 27.  In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant submitted that the authorities had interfered with his communication with his representative before the Court (lawyer B.). In particular, he had sent a letter to B. containing, inter alia, his claim for just satisfaction. However, the latter document had been missing from the envelope received by his representative. Instead, it had contained blank sheets of paper of a different type to those on which the remaining parts of the applicant\u2019s submission had been made. The envelope had had no postal stamp on it. He had also on one occasion been denied the possibility of speaking by telephone with his representative before the Court. On that occasion he had gone on hunger strike. The Government did not specifically comment on these allegations. 28.  The Court notes that extracts from the prison no. 39 registers of incoming and outgoing mail submitted by the Government show that in the period from June 2007 until March 2013 the applicant sent and received more than three hundred letters, including to and from various public entities \u2013 most notably the public prosecution office, the Ombudsperson and the Court. This correspondence was, under domestic law, exempt from monitoring (see paragraph 31 below). He also corresponded with other entities, notably the Department for the Execution of Sentences, the office of the President of Ukraine and human rights lawyers. Under domestic law this correspondence was subject to monitoring by the prison authorities. A copy of a page from the prison no. 39 register of incoming mail for January 2013, which was submitted to the Court by the applicant, summarises the content of letters from those entities with which correspondence was subject to monitoring under the law. By contrast, a letter from the Court is marked as \u201cregistered letter\u201d. 29.  It appears from the Government\u2019s submissions that on many occasions the public prosecution office, having conducted relevant enquiries, declared unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s complaints about alleged interferences with his correspondence. The one exception pertained to one instance of interference in August 2008 (of which the applicant did not complain to the Court), when it was established that the applicant\u2019s letter to the Prosecutor General had not been sent out by a prison officer. Disciplinary proceedings against the officer in question were instituted by the prison administration and he was reprimanded. Nothing in the case file or the applicant\u2019s submissions suggests that he took any steps following the acknowledgement of that violation of his rights. The case file also contains an exchange of correspondence between different bodies (including the Ombudsperson, human rights lawyers and prosecutors) in respect of complaints raised before them by the applicant. 30.  The application form dated 29 May 2008 sent by the applicant to the Court, together with letters of 14 December 2009 and 14 June 2011 that the applicant allegedly sent to the Court via the prison no. 39 postal service, never arrived at the Court. No letters from the applicant that have reached the Court have borne the stamp of the detention facility on their respective front pages, and nor were they accompanied by brief summaries by the prison authorities of their contents. Some letters were sent by the applicant via other prisoners whose cases were also pending before the Court. These letters have been received by the Court.", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "8", "7", "9", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv. 6.  On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married. 7.  On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 8.  The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners. 9.  In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10.  According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11.  The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened \u201cshortly after the introduction of the application\u201d. According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12.  As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison\u2019s logbook as his fianc\u00e9e. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "6", "0", "8", "2", "1", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 5.  On 25 July 2002 the applicant\u2019s 51-year-old brother Aleksandr Alekseyvich Anoshin was murdered by a policeman in the alcohol recovery centre of the Sovietsky District Police Department of Nizhniy Novgorod (\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0432\u044b\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0420\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u041d\u0438\u0436\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u041d\u043e\u0432\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430). 6.  Earlier that day, at about 7 p.m., he was stopped in the street by a police patrol as he was staggering home after having drinks with workmates. He was driven to the centre and left alone on a bed in a recovery room, as centre staff sat down to a game of cards nearby. One hour later Mr Anoshin started banging on the door and asking to be let out. Officer M., who together with his partner K. had just returned from patrol duty, got annoyed at the disruption, pushed Mr Anoshin away from the door and demanded that he calm down. Mr Anoshin fell on the bed and his head slammed against the wall. He then got to his feet and stepped towards the officer. Officer M. punched the applicant\u2019s brother in the head and chest five times, and strangled him until he was unconscious using a squared piece of a broken wooden chair. M. laid Mr Anoshin down on the bed, and walked out. Officer An. watched this scene from the doorway. 7.  At 10 p.m. the applicant\u2019s brother died of asphyxia. 8.  On 3 August 2002 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sovietsky District opened a criminal investigation into the death. The investigation lasted four years and was handled in turn by at least six different investigators. They inspected the scene, conducted witness interviews, commissioned forensic reports, and staged reconstructions. 9.  The centre staff initially testified that they had found the applicant\u2019s brother unwell in his bed, but then changed their story, saying that they had seen him hang himself using a bed sheet tied to the bars of his cell window. The forensic reports (on the cause of death, the nature of the injuries, the origin of blood on the wall and the presence of metallic traces on the sheet) refuted the hanging hypothesis, pointed to a violent death and incriminated the centre staff. However, the investigation was put on hold thirteen times because no credible suspect had been identified. 10.  In March 2006 M. was interviewed for the first time. 11.  By August 2006 the case against him had gone to trial. 12.  On 1 August 2008 the Sovietsky District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod convicted M. of murder and violent abuse of official power and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment and a three-year ban from police service. Neglect-of-duty charges brought against his two co\u2011defendants (Officers An. and Ag.) were dropped as time-barred. 13.  At the trial, M. was directly incriminated by An., Ag., and K. Officers An. and Ag. confessed that the suicide story had been a cover-up condoned by commanders of Sovietsky Police Department. 14.  On 14 November 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the sentence. 15.  The applicant and three of her brother\u2019s four children each claimed from the State 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 69,000 euros (EUR)) for emotional distress caused by the crime. On 25 May 2009 the Sovietsky District Court awarded RUB 150,000 (approximately EUR 3,400) to each claimant. 16.  On 14 August 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld that decision.", "references": ["6", "4", "8", "9", "2", "3", "1", "5", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5.  At around 5 a.m. on 13 May 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robberies by officers of the police unit for combating organised crime in the Ryazan region (\u0423\u0411\u041e\u041f \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u0420\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe organised crime unit\u201d), assisted by officers of the special rapid response unit of the Ryazan region (\u0421\u041e\u0411\u0420 (\u041e\u041c\u0421\u041d) \u0423\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe rapid response unit\u201d). 6.  The applicant\u2019s account of subsequent events is the following. He was taken to the Moskovskiy district police station of Ryazan, where the (unnamed) police officers beat him for an hour, forcing him to confess to carrying weapons. He was then taken to the organised crime unit, located at a different address, where police officers N.A. and I.O. physically assaulted him and subjected him to electric shocks in a gym. Two other (unnamed) police officers of the rapid response unit then continued physically assaulting him, chained his handcuffs to some exercise equipment, pinched his nose and sprayed tear gas into his mouth to force him to confess to robberies and assaults. On the evening of 13 May 2006 the applicant was taken to the Zheleznodorozhnyy district police station of Ryazan. 7.  At 7.40 p.m. on 13 May 2006 investigator A.A. from the investigation unit of the Zheleznodorozhnyy district police department drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The record indicates that the applicant was arrested at 7 p.m. that day. 8.  According to the applicant, during his time at the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station, he was allegedly driven to the organised crime unit several more times and subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. This allegedly included beatings, electric shocks and having a plastic bag placed over his head so that he lost consciousness. 9.  At 2 p.m. on 15 May 2006 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan extended the applicant\u2019s arrest until 6 p.m. on 16 May 2006. 10.  According to the applicant, on the evening of 15 May 2006 he was physically assaulted again at the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station by an unknown police officer, who tried to force him to confess to different unsolved crimes concerning weapons, thefts and drugs. 11.  On 16 May 2006 the District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He was placed in a Ryazan pre-trial detention facility (IZ 62/1). 12.  According to records from IZ 62/1 dated 16 May 2006, on his arrival at 4.20 p.m. that day the applicant was examined by a medical assistant (feldsher). He had the following injuries: (i) multiple abrasions covered in brown scabs on his forehead and the back and top of his head; (ii) swelling on the inner surface of the lips; (iii) multiple large purple and blue bruises on his chest, abdomen, left side, forearms and shoulders; (iv) purple and yellow bruises on his knee joints; and (v) abrasions covered in brown scabs on the back of the toes of his left foot. 13.  On 18 May 2006 the material concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries was forwarded from the pre-trial detention facility to the Zheleznodorozhnyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Ryazan. It was registered on 25 May 2006. 14.  On 25 May 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zheleznodorozhnyy district prosecutor against the police officers, requesting that they be prosecuted. His complaint was registered that day. 15.  On 30 May 2006 the material in both files concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment were joined. 16.  On 5 June 2006, 20 December 2006 and 10 June 2008 officials at the prosecutor\u2019s office, and later the Zheleznodorozhnyy inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Ryazan (\u201cthe investigative committee\u201d) issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. 17.  The two earlier refusals were overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee on 25 September 2006 and 9 June 2008 respectively, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The most recent refusal of 10 June 2008 was issued in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) on the grounds that none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of the police officers\u2019 actions. 18.  Police officer A.S. from the organised crime unit stated in an explanation of 8 June 2006 that on 13 May 2006 eight officers from the rapid response unit had carried out the applicant\u2019s arrest. As the applicant and three other individuals were armed and refused to get out of their car, physical force (unspecified \u201csambo\u201d wrestling techniques) and special devices (handcuffs) were used on them. A.S. could not remember whether those arrested had received any injuries. According to him, they were then taken to the Moskovskiy police station. A.S. referred to a report on the arrest. 19.  According to the report on the arrest, signed by the head of division no. 1 of the rapid response unit on 13 May 2006, the arrest operation had been carried out between 5.00 a.m. and 5.30 a.m. on 13 May 2006 by eight officers from the rapid response unit. The applicant and four other suspects had been in a car. Two guns had been found during the search. It was stated in the report that the police officers had used \u201cphysical force\u201d and handcuffs, and that \u201cno incidents had happened\u201d. 20.  Police officers of the rapid response unit (T.D., M.A., O.S., K.D., K.A. and Ch.D.) stated that they had carried out the applicant\u2019s arrest at around 6 a.m. on 13 May 2006. They arrested four individuals (including the applicant), who all resisted arrest. They used physical force and special devices (handcuffs). 21.  Police officer P.V. from the organised crime unit stated that, after the applicant\u2019s arrest in the early hours of 13 May 2006, he had searched him in the presence of attesting witnesses. He denied subjecting him to any physical or verbal abuse. 22.  Police officers R.A. and B.A. of the Moskovskiy police denied subjecting the applicant to any ill-treatment. 23.  Investigator A.A. stated in an (undated) explanation that the applicant had been arrested in the early hours of 13 May 2006 by police officers of the organised crime unit. During his arrest the applicant resisted, and physical force was used on him. A.A. did not know whether the applicant had been subjected to any ill\u2011treatment by the police officers of the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station. At 7 p.m. on 13 May 2006 the applicant was taken to his room. A.A. arrested him on suspicion of organised robbery pursuant to Article 91 of the CCrP. A.A. denied subjecting the applicant to any physical or psychological pressure. 24.  In its most recent refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers dated 10 June 2008, the investigative committee briefly concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had resulted from the use of force and special devices (handcuffs) by police officers of the rapid response unit during the applicant\u2019s arrest, as the applicant had resisted arrest.\n(b)  Judicial review of the investigators\u2019 decisions 25.  Relying on Article 125 of the CCrP, the applicant appealed against two of the refusals to open a criminal case against the police officers to the courts, namely those of 20 December 2006 and 10 June 2008. 26.  On 10 June 2008 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan ruled that the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 20 December 2006 should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 9 June 2008 the investigative committee had already revoked the refusal. 27.  On 16 December 2008 the same court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 10 June 2008, holding that it was lawful and well-grounded. In particular, the court noted that the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning his alleged ill-treatment in police custody from 13 to 15 May 2006 had been examined during his criminal trial and on appeal and dismissed as unconfirmed. On 5 February 2009 the Ryazan Regional Court fully endorsed that decision on appeal. 28.  On 26 May 2006 a copy of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment was forwarded to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Ryazan for a separate inquiry in relation to the police officers of the organised crime unit. 29.  On 2 June 2006 and 24 February 2009 respectively, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCrP, officials at the Sovetskiy prosecutor\u2019s office and Moskovskiy inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Ryazan issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers as none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of their actions. On 25 December 2008 the first refusal was overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee as unsubstantiated, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out an additional inquiry. 30.  In its most recent refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers dated 24 February 2009, the investigative committee briefly noted the outcome of the applicant\u2019s criminal case and concluded that there was no objective information showing that any crimes had been committed against the applicant by the police officers. 31.  In December 2006 and May 2008 respectively the applicant lodged two more complaints with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the investigative committee against the police officers, investigators and other State officials, requesting that they be prosecuted for unlawful arrest, detention and abuse of power in connection with the events of 13 to 16 May 2006 and his criminal case. 32.  On 16 January 2007, 12 April 2007 and 26 May 2008, officials at the Zheleznodorozhnyy prosecutor\u2019s office and the Zheleznodorozhnyy inter\u2011district investigative committee issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. 33.  The two earlier refusals were overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee on an unspecified date and 14 May 2008 respectively, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The most recent refusal of 26 May 2008 was issued in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, because none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285, 286 and 301 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers and unlawful arrest and detention respectively) were present in respect of the police officers\u2019 actions, as the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed in the course of the inquiry.\n(b)  Judicial review of the investigators\u2019 decisions 34.  Under Article 125 of the CCrP, the applicant appealed against all three of the refusals mentioned above. 35.  On 2 April 2007 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan examined the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 16 January 2007 and concluded that it had been unlawful and unsubstantiated because not all of the applicant\u2019s arguments had been examined concerning, in particular, his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention. The investigation authority was ordered to rectify those deficiencies. It appears that the refusal was subsequently overruled by the investigative committee, and an additional inquiry was ordered. 36.  On 14 May 2008 the same court ruled that the applicant\u2019s appeal against the investigator\u2019s refusal of 12 April 2007 should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 14 May 2008 the investigative committee had already overruled it. 37.  On 10 December 2008 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that the refusal of 26 May 2008 was lawful and well-grounded. It also endorsed the findings of the trial and appellate courts in the applicant\u2019s criminal case. On 22 January 2009 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. 38.  On 28 April 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court convicted the applicant of organised banditry, illegal possession of firearms and armed robbery, and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 39.  At trial, the applicant complained that the investigative measures carried out during the preliminary investigation of his criminal case had been unlawful, and that he had been coerced into making a confession. 40.  The trial court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations as unconfirmed. It referred mainly to the results of the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment, which had resulted in the (subsequently overruled) refusal of 20 December 2006 to open a criminal case against the police officers. 41.  On 7 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that judgment on appeal, finding the conclusions of the trial court duly reasoned.", "references": ["0", "9", "3", "8", "6", "7", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in St Petersburg. 6.  He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing. 7.  On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial. 8.  On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October 2011. 9.  On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock. The applicant\u2019s lawyer could only approach him with the court\u2019s permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the presence of the guards. 11.  On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the judges via a video link.", "references": ["0", "5", "7", "8", "2", "9", "6", "4", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1971, 1975, 1974 and 1981 respectively and are detained in Marijampol\u0117 and Kybartai Correctional Facilities. 5.  It was suspected that the first applicant, together with the other applicants, had previously agreed to carry out criminal activities, using firearms, as members of a criminal organisation. In May 2011 the pre-trial investigation opened. It was suspected that criminal activities had been planned in Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain. 6.  In the context of that investigation, the applicants were arrested on 22 January 2013. 7.  The first applicant was questioned and officially notified that he was suspected of being a member of and the leader of a criminal organisation that possessed and distributed large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances. He was also suspected of having property with a value of more than 500 times the amount of the minimum standard of living (\u201cMSL\u201d \u2011 didesn\u012f negu 500 MGL vert\u0117s turt\u0105) (approximately 18,825 euros (EUR)) registered in the names of other individuals, which could not have been acquired lawfully. The other applicants were questioned and officially notified that they were suspected of creating and participating in a criminal organisation that possessed and distributed large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances. The applicants were also suspected of having property with a value of more than 500 MSL registered in the names of other individuals, which could not have been acquired lawfully. 8.  On 23 January 2013 the Vilnius City District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for three months. The court considered that the testimony of witnesses in the case, identification reports, expert conclusions, and other data such as information from the authorities of Poland and Russia, were sufficient to hold that the applicant might have committed the criminal offences of which he was suspected. The court noted that it could only impose arrest if it was impossible to achieve the objectives of Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely to ensure that the suspect, the accused or the convicted person participated in the proceedings, to prevent interference with the pre-trial investigation or with the examination of the case before the court, or with the execution of the sentence, and to prevent the commission of further criminal acts by other, less restrictive measures. The court considered that the applicant was suspected of having committed deliberate criminal offences categorised as serious and very serious, and one crime of medium severity, which could lead to imprisonment of more than one year, which was enough to justify measures being taken against the risk of absconding. Also, some of the offences the applicant was suspected of could lead to life imprisonment. The risk of absconding was strengthened by the fact that the applicant had connections in European Union countries, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, and had planned and committed crimes outside the territory of Lithuania. Moreover, he had already been found guilty of criminal offences in Lithuania and Germany, and it was possible that he would commit new ones. Lastly, the court noted that the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing, was very complex, and the applicant\u2019s detention was necessary to ensure his attendance during the proceedings. 9.  From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention for three months at the pre-trial stage was adopted by the Vilnius Regional Court on 17 April 2014. 10.  The grounds relied on by the domestic courts extending the applicant\u2019s detention were repeated, additionally mentioning new procedural actions that had to be performed or other details. For example, on 18 April 2013 the Vilnius City District Court noted that even though the applicant was married and had a family and a permanent place of residence, these circumstances were not enough to ensure that the applicant would not abscond. On 17 July 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the factual information, including the testimony of witnesses in the case, identification reports, restrictive measures, expert conclusions, items necessary for the investigation, and information received from the authorities of Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Russia, were sufficient to hold that the applicant might have committed the criminal offences of which he was suspected. Also, the case was complex and wide-ranging; there were over forty suspects in the case; the offences had been committed in the territories of Lithuania, European Union member States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia; legal cooperation requests had been sent to Russia, Ukraine, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Also, numerous investigative actions had been taken since the last extension of the applicant\u2019s detention: existing suspects had been further questioned; new suspects had been arrested and questioned; restrictive measures had been either imposed or extended; expert conclusions had been received; large-scale replies had been received from the authorities of Russia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom; these replies had been translated into Lithuanian; and searches had been carried out, as well as other investigative actions. On 13 August 2013 the Court of Appeal observed that the pre-trial investigation was intense; its length depended on the objective circumstances and complexity of the case. On 21 October 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court noted that on 16 May 2013 another pre-trial investigation had been joined to the current one. On 15 November 2013 the Court of Appeal decided to strike the ground that the applicant might abscond out of the list of grounds on which the applicant had been detained. The court added that the applicant had some health issues but that medical assistance was available for him in the Prison Hospital, which he had already received. The court also considered that in the case at hand the criminal offences had been committed over a period of at least four years by a criminal organisation, the most serious form of complicity, and had involved the territories of multiple countries. Many procedural actions had been carried out, including the sending of legal assistance requests to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the suspects and witnesses had been questioned again, eyewitnesses had been identified, new suspects had been arrested and questioned, recognitions had taken place, authorities of Russia and the United Kingdom had been addressed, the Vilnius City District Court had been approached with requests for searches, tasks to examine certain items had been resourced, and expert conclusions received. On 21 January and 17 April 2017 and the Vilnius Regional Court observed that additional information had been received from Spain and several legal assistance requests had been sent to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 11.  On 30 June 2014 the bill of indictment was drawn up.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s detention during his trial 12.  On 2 July 2014 the bill of indictment and the case were referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits, but on 11 July 2014 the Court of Appeal transferred the case for examination on the merits to the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, because judges of the Vilnius Regional Court had participated in the investigative actions. 13.  On 10 July 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended every three months, until 22 July 2016. The courts constantly held that this measure was not too strict in the circumstances of the present case. The courts considered that bail, requested by the applicant, would not remove the threat to the criminal process or to the interests of society, the State, or to other people. They also indicated that the case file kept growing, and that by January 2016 it had reached over 130 volumes. On 16 May 2016 the Court of Appeal noted that the length of the pre-trial detention could not exceed two-thirds of the most serious sentence a person risked incurring. In the present case this requirement had not been breached. 14.  On 22 July 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court decided not to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. The court referred to the Court\u2019s practice and held that the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested had committed an offence was a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer sufficed. Formal arguments that a person might abscond, commit new offences or interfere with the execution of justice were not enough to extend detention. Prolonged detention could only be possible in exceptional cases when other less restrictive measures were not enough. In the present case, the applicant was arrested on 22 January 2013; at this time his detention had lasted for three years and six months. In 2016 for objective reasons only three hearings had taken place in the criminal case, and other hearings had been scheduled for 25 October, 29 November, and 13, 21 and 22 December 2016. A further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention could therefore be assessed as a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. The court took into account the fact that EUR 30,000 had been paid as bail. It ordered his documents to be confiscated and placed him under intense supervision by ordering him to wear an electronic ankle bracelet. The applicant was also prohibited from leaving his home for six months unless related to the court hearings. The applicant was released immediately. 15.  On 5 August 2016 the Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, quashed the lower court\u2019s decision to release the applicant. The court observed that the lower court had not examined whether the grounds to detain the applicant had disappeared. The court held that although the applicant had a family (he married for a second time while detained), a place of residence, and sufficient income, he had been found guilty of an offence in the past, which was a negative character trait. Moreover, the nature and scale of the alleged criminal activities allowed for the conclusion that the applicant had connections abroad. There was therefore a risk that he might abscond. Taking into account the nature of the offences, there was a risk that the applicant might commit further crimes. Although the court acknowledged that the applicant had been detained for a very long time (more than three years and six months), it reiterated that the public interest outweighed the right to individual liberty. The scope of the case (thirteen accused and 139 volumes of material) and the complexity of the investigation justified the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The court noted that examination of the criminal case had not continued after the previous hearing on 29 February 2016 and that the break in proceedings was scheduled to last until 25 October 2016. However, a hearing due on 16 June 2016 had not taken place, because two of the accused had not been present, while the state of health of another two accused had caused another break. The court further observed that twenty-four hearings had taken place in 2015, and concluded that the examination of the case had been intensive. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for three months from the date of his arrest. 16.  On 3 November 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. The court held that the examination of the case was speedy, but that the process had been protracted for reasons unconnected with the work of the court, such as delay in expert reports and illnesses of the accused. The court also indicated that a search for L.P., who was one of the accused, had been announced. From then on the applicant\u2019s detention was extended every three months. The last decision, by which the applicant\u2019s detention was extended for three months, was adopted on 3 November 2017 by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court. The courts observed the growing volume of the case material, the need to order psychiatric examinations for several of the accused, and the international element of the case. On 12 June 2017 the Court of Appeal disagreed with the arguments of the applicant\u2019s lawyer that examination of the criminal case had become protracted because of the ineffective organisation of the trial court\u2019s work. The court held that the hearings had been scheduled in advance and that examination of the case had become protracted for objective reasons (some hearings had not taken place because of the state of health of the accused, requests from the accused and their lawyers, and the additional questioning of witnesses). The court noted that none of the hearings had been cancelled or postponed because of negligence or inaction on the part of the judges. The court was of the view that the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court had examined the criminal case with sufficient due diligence. Finally, the court held that the Court\u2019s judgment in Lisovskij v. Lithuania (no. 36249/14, 2 May 2017) was not final and could be changed by the Grand Chamber.  On 30 August 2017 the Court of Appeal found that although for thirty-three months in total there had been no hearings, the breaks had taken place for reasons unconnected with the work of the courts, and it had not been possible to speed up the proceedings. The court observed that during the hearing of 2 December 2015 it had been announced that the next hearing would take place on 29 February 2016 because there needed to be a psychiatric examination of two of the accused. On 19 January 2016 the results of the psychiatric examination were received but it had been decided that the court\u2019s questions could not be answered, and a new psychiatric examination was ordered by a decision of the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court of 29 February 2016. The results were received on 8 and 15 June 2016. The criminal case had not been examined in the hearings that took place on 16 June and 25 October 2016 because some of the accused and their lawyers had failed to appear. On 29 November 2016 the examination of the evidence had continued. The court considered that the breaks in the proceedings had taken place because of both justified and unjustified failure of the parties to the proceedings to appear, prior commitments of the court, or of the parties to the proceedings, and other circumstances. Nevertheless, the court considered that the hearings had been scheduled at regular intervals and the length of the proceedings was justifiable. The court referred to Lisovskij (cited above) but stated that the factual circumstances of that case and the present one were different. Finally, the court held that the examination of the evidence in the criminal case was now complete, and that the case was at the stage of closing statements, however, new circumstances could be revealed at that stage and there was a necessity to further extend the applicant\u2019s detention. On 11 December 2017 the Court of Appeal indicated that a search for one of the accused, L.P. had been announced in 2016 and that he had been found and transferred from Sweden to Lithuania on 18 January 2017. 17.  On 20 December 2017 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found the applicant guilty of organising or leading a criminal organisation, unlawful production, acquisition, storage, transportation forwarding, selling or otherwise distributing category I precursors of narcotic and psychotropic substances, and smuggling and unlawful possession of narcotic or psychotropic substances for the purpose of distribution, and sentenced him to fourteen years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The court noted that the issue of the length of the applicant\u2019s detention had been examined by the Court. The court further noted that because of the length of the examination of the criminal case the sentence imposed was lower than the average for such offences. The court also stated that according to the practice of the Court, a more lenient sentence could be imposed to compensate for the length of a restrictive measure, and this would deprive a person of his or her victim status. The court did not, however, further elaborate on that issue and did not refer to any cases of the Court. 18.  On 18 January 2018 the criminal case was referred for examination at the Court of Appeal. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (24 August 2018) those proceedings were still pending. 19.  The applicant is currently serving his sentence in Marijampol\u0117 Correctional Facility. 20.  On 23 July 2015 the applicant asked the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison authorities to grant him a visit with his future spouse on the day of their wedding in August 2015, without supervision and with physical contact. On 2 September 2015 Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison replied that visits to remand detainees took place without physical contact. Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison indicated that the applicant could appeal to the director of the Prison Department. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the decision. 21.  On 8 May 2017 the applicant lodged a claim before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, raising, among other issues, the complaint that he could not have long-stay visits while detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison between 1 January 2016 and 26 September 2016. On 13 November 2017 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that remand detainees could receive an unlimited number of visits from their relatives and other people, but that visits had to be approved in writing by the prosecutor of the court carrying out the pre-trial investigation. One visit could not exceed two hours. In the present case there was no information that the applicant had applied for a visit or that he had been refused such visits. The court therefore dismissed this complaint as unfounded. The proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court are still ongoing. 22.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that during the applicant\u2019s detention in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison the applicant was granted twenty-seven short visits in 2014, ninety-nine short visits in 2015, and sixty-four short visits in 2016. During the applicant\u2019s detention in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison, between 9 August 2016 and 1 January 2017 he was granted seventy-six short visits. After the change of domestic law on 1 January 2017 (see \u010ciapas v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 62564/13, \u00a7 11, 4 July 2017), the applicant was granted ten long-stay visits with physical contact. 23.  On 23 January 2013 the Vilnius District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for three months. The court relied on very similar reasons as for the first applicant (see paragraph 8 above). The court added that the fact of the applicant\u2019s being married and having children was not sufficient to establish that his ties to society minimised the risk of absconding. Moreover, the applicant was unemployed, thus there was a risk that he might commit new crimes. 24.  From then on the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention at the pre-trial stage was taken on 17 April 2014. The courts when extending the applicant\u2019s detention relied on various reasons. They noted that although the applicant had a permanent place of residence, children, and a family, these circumstances did not render it unnecessary to keep him in detention. And the applicant had previous convictions: this was a negative character trait and showed that he was not keen on following the laws and general ethical norms. The courts also relied on the complexity of the case and the investigative actions that needed to be performed. On 13 August 2013 the Court of Appeal decided to remove the ground that the applicant might interfere with the proceedings if released. On 21 October 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court noted that the offences had been well planned and had been committed not only in Lithuania but also in other countries. On 19 November 2013 the Court of Appeal observed that on 16 May 2013 another pre-trial investigation was joined to the present one. On 20 January 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court held that there were over fifty suspects in the case, and that legal cooperation requests had been sent to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The circle of suspects and the offences were continuing to increase. Also, numerous investigative actions had been taken since the applicant\u2019s detention had last been extended: suspects had been further questioned, new suspects had been arrested and questioned, witnesses had been questioned, searches of several suspects had been announced and carried out, restrictive measures had been imposed or extended, searches had been performed, items necessary for the investigation had been taken, tasks for experts had been appointed, some expert conclusions had been received, and wide-ranging replies on some of the issues had been received from the authorities of Russia and Spain. 25.  On 30 June 2014 the bill of indictment was drawn up.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s detention during his trial 26.  On 10 July 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months, until 22 July 2016. The courts observed that the case file kept increasing in volume: there was a huge number of witnesses. The applicant\u2019s requests to be released on bail were dismissed. 27.  On 22 July 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court decided not to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. The court relied on identical arguments to those made in the case of the first applicant, and ordered the same restrictive measures (see paragraph 14 above). 28.  On 5 August 2016 the Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, quashed the lower court\u2019s decision to release the applicant. The court relied on very similar arguments to those made in the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 15 above). The court added that although the applicant had a family and a place of residence, he was unemployed before his arrest, thus he had no strong ties with Lithuania and might abscond. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for three months from the date of his arrest. 29.  From then on the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended every three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention was adopted on 3 November 2017 by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court. The courts constantly underlined the complexity of the case and its international element. On 12 June 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court held that Lisovskij (cited above), referred to by the applicant, was not final and could still be changed. The court stated that the criminal case was extremely complex, had 147 volumes, and the offences had been committed in Lithuania, other European Union member States, and also third States. Hearings had been scheduled on 11, 12, and 25 November and 9 December 2014; 19 and 20 January, 24 February, 16, 18, 30, and 31 March, 1 and 13 April, 3, 4, 5, and 19 May, 1 and 2 June, 13 and 14 July, 16 and 19 October, 10 and 11 November, and 1 and 2 December 2015; 29 February, 16 June, 25 October and 29 November 2016; 17 February, 17 March, 3 and 11 April, and 3 and 16 May 2017; and had also been scheduled on 30 June and 3, 11 and 12 July 2017. The court held that some of the hearings had been adjourned for reasons unconnected with its work: on 16 March 2015 the victim, A.P., had failed to appear, and had subsequently been placed under arrest for one month in order to ensure his attendance. On 2 April 2015 the court had ordered that seven witnesses be brought to the hearing, while an adjournment had taken place on 14 and 15 April 2015 because of the state of health of one of the accused. On 3 June 2015 the court had ordered one witness to pay a fine and ordered the authorities to bring him to the hearing. A hearing due on 16 October 2015 had not taken place because the applicant was ill. During a hearing on 19 October 2015 one of the accused had been questioned but it had been found that he had experienced a head injury the month before. Another accused\u2019s health was also questionable, thus an expert opinion had been ordered by the court on 20 October 2015. Another expert report had been ordered on 29 February 2016. The hearing set for 25 October 2016 was postponed because one of the accused, L.P., had breached the requirements of his restrictive measure and had been arrested in Sweden, while two other accused had health issues. The other hearings had taken place in accordance with the schedule. On 30 August 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court dismissed the arguments of the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant\u2019s detention had been extended on identical grounds to those given by the courts. The court stated that the mere fact that the arguments given by the courts had been similar or identical did not mean that the reasons to extend the detention had been arbitrary. The court considered that the first-instance court had complied with the requirement of requisite diligence, and made a reasoned conclusion. Moreover, the case was extremely complex, and had 150 volumes of material at that time. The examination of the accused had been protracted for reasons unconnected with the work of the court: the necessity to carry out certain investigative actions; failure of the parties to the proceedings to appear, for both justified and unjustified reasons; and prior commitments on the part of the parties to the proceedings and the court. The regional court had taken the necessary measures (fines, summons, and other measures) to ensure that the proceedings were not protracted. The court referred to the case-law of the Court, and observed that the exceptional circumstances could justify the length of the pre-trial detention. Such circumstances in the present case were: the danger presented by the applicant, his supposed role in the offences of which he was accused, and the nature of the offences. As mentioned by the other courts, the applicant was accused of setting up a criminal organisation using firearms that had committed offences designated as both very serious and serious within the territories of several States. The applicant\u2019s detention was thus justified. On 22 November 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court observed that the argument of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, that the applicant was never the cause of cancellation or adjournment of the hearings, was not justified, because on 16 October 2015 the hearing did not take place because the applicant refused to attend because of the conditions of detention in custody. Also, the court noted that the next hearing was scheduled for 7 December 2017 and the closing statements would be pronounced at that hearing, which meant that the case would be determined soon. 30.  On 20 December 2017 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found the applicant guilty of involvement in the criminal activities of a criminal organisation, unlawful production, acquisition, storage, transportation forwarding, selling or otherwise distributing category I precursors of narcotic and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and unlawful possession of narcotic or psychotropic substances for the purpose of distribution, and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court gave the same reasoning as regards the length of the examination of the criminal case as in the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 17 above). 31.  On 18 January 2018 the criminal case was referred for examination at the Court of Appeal. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (24 August 2018) those proceedings were still pending. 32.  The applicant is currently serving his sentence in Marijampol\u0117 Correctional Facility. 33.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that between 24 January 2013 and 22 July 2016 the applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, and between 9 August 2016 and 1 December 2017 he was detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison. 34.  On 25 May 2015 the applicant asked the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison to allow him to have long-stay visits without supervision. On 23 June 2015 the prison authorities replied that long-stay visits were not available for remand detainees, and that the applicant could have short visits of up to two hours, without physical contact. 35.  The applicant lodged a claim, complaining about, among other issues, the lack of long-stay visits between 31 October and 5 November 2008 and between 24 January 2013 and 17 August 2015. On 6 February 2017 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Administrative Court dismissed the part of the applicant\u2019s complaint covering the period between 31 October and 5 November 2008 because he had missed a three-year limitation period. The court held that no long-stay visits were allowed for remand detainees under domestic law but that the applicant had received forty-three short visits between 24 January 2013 and 17 August 2015. However, in compensation for inadequate conditions of detention the applicant had received EUR 5,800 for 671 days of insufficient personal space at his disposal and other material conditions of detention. On 14 March 2018 the Supreme Administrative Court referred to the case of Varnas v. Lithuania (no. 42615/06, 9 July 2013) and held that the applicant\u2019s rights had been breached with regard to the authorities\u2019 refusal to allow him long-stay visits. The court increased the compensation to EUR 7,300. 36.  The applicant lodged another claim, complaining about the lack of both long and short visits between 17 August 2015 and 22 July 2016. On 25 July 2017 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had not provided any evidence that he had asked the prison administration for a visit. As a result, this part of the claim was dismissed. The applicant submitted an appeal, which is still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court. 37.  It appears that the applicant received thirteen short visits in 2014, eighteen short visits in 2015 and eleven short visits in 2016. Between 9 August 2016 and 1 January 2017 the applicant had fifteen short visits. After the entry into force of the new regulation on 1 January 2017, the applicant was granted ten long-stay visits with physical contact. It appears that the applicant did not ask for more short visits, nor did he argue that he had been refused them. 38.  On 24 January 2013 the Vilnius District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for three months. The court considered essentially the same arguments as those in the cases of the first and the second applicants (see paragraphs 8 and 23 above). The applicant\u2019s having a family, children, a permanent place of residence and employment was not sufficient to establish that his ties to society minimised the risk of absconding. 39.  From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention at the pre\u2011trial stage was taken on 17 April 2014. The courts relied on the necessity to carry out additional investigative measures, the complexity of the case, and the international element. On 13 August 2013 the Court of Appeal removed the risk of absconding from the list of grounds on which the applicant had been detained. On 23 October 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court added that on 16 May 2013 another pre-trial investigation was joined to the current one. In further decisions extending the applicant\u2019s detention on remand the courts took into account that the offences had been committed over a period of at least four years by the criminal organisation, and had involved the territories of multiple countries. The courts identified the investigative actions that had been carried out and indicated that more investigative actions would have to be carried out. 40.  On 30 June 2014 a bill of indictment was drawn up.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s detention during his trial 41.  On 2 July 2014 the bill of indictment and the case were referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits, but on 11 July 2014 the Court of Appeal transferred the case for examination on the merits to the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, because the judges of the Vilnius Regional Court had taken part in the investigative actions. 42.  On 10 July 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was constantly extended for three months until 22 July 2016. The courts relied on the complexity of the case, the applicant\u2019s character, and the nature of the offences. 43.  On 22 July 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court approved an application by the applicant for a variation in the restrictive measure regime. The court found that for reasons unconnected with the work of the courts only three hearings in the criminal case against the applicant had taken place, further hearings were not scheduled until October-December, and a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention could be assessed as a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. The other arguments were very similar to those pronounced in the cases of the first and second applicants, and the restrictive measures were the same (see paragraphs 14 and 27 above) 44.  On 5 August 2016 the Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, quashed the lower court\u2019s decision to release the applicant. The court relied on the same arguments as in the cases of the first and second applicants (see paragraphs 15 and 28 above). The court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for three months from the date of his arrest. 45.  On 3 November 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention was adopted on 3 November 2017 by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court. The courts relied on the complexity of the case and the international element, and noted that the court examining the criminal case on the merits had put maximum efforts into ensuring that the examination of the case was speedy; despite this the process had been protracted for unconnected reasons. On 12 June 2017 the Court of Appeal held that there was no unjustified delay in the proceedings. It reiterated the reasons given by the Court of Appeal on 12 June 2017 in the second applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 29 above). It added that the Court\u2019s judgment in Lisovskij (cited above), referred to by the applicant, was not final and that the factual circumstances of that case were different. On 30 August 2017 the Court of Appeal held that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention was justified by the applicant\u2019s character, the seriousness of the offences, the extreme complexity of the case (thirteen accused, many witnesses, many episodes of criminal activity, 150 volumes of evidence) as well as by the public interest, which was justified under the Court\u2019s case-law. The court did not agree that the proceedings in the criminal case had been conducted passively: the hearings had been scheduled in advance and the schedule had been intense. The breaks in the proceedings had been announced because of failure of the parties to the proceedings to appear, because of absconding, and because of the necessity to carry out special investigations. 46.  On 20 December 2017 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found the applicant guilty of unlawful deprivation of liberty, robbery, organising or leading a criminal organisation, unlawful production, acquisition, storage, transportation, forwarding, selling or otherwise distributing category I precursors of narcotic and psychotropic substances, seizure of a seal, stamp or document or use of a stolen seal, stamp or document, and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court gave the same reasoning as regards the length of the examination of the criminal case as in the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 17 above). 47.  On 18 January 2018 the criminal case was referred for examination at the Court of Appeal. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (24 August 2018) those proceedings were still pending. 48.  By a decision of 8 February 2018 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant\u2019s request to allow him to start serving the sentence imposed on him by the judgment of the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court of 20 December 2017. 49.  The applicant started serving his sentence in Kybartai Correctional Facility on 22 February 2018. 50.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that between 4 February 2013 and 22 July 2016 the applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison and between 9 August 2016 and 1 December 2017 in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison. 51.  In May 2016 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court concerning, among other, the fact that he could not receive long-stay visits. On 3 August 2016 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court stated that the applicant\u2019s complaint was abstract: it was not clear whether he had asked the prison authorities for a long-stay visit or named a person from who he wanted to receive such a visit. 52.  The applicant lodged an appeal, but on 24 March 2017 informed the Supreme Administrative Court that he did not want his appeal to be examined, and asked for the appellate proceedings to be terminated. On 26 April 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. 53.  On 29 August 2016 the applicant asked the \u0160iauliai Remand Prison authorities to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his wife. On 30 August 2016 the prison authorities replied that the domestic law did not allow remand prisoners long-stay visits. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 54.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that while detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison in 2014 the applicant had sixteen short visits, in 2015 he had twenty short visits and in 2016 he had ten short visits. It appears that in while detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison 2016 the applicant had four short visits and in 2017 he had eight short visits. On 24 June and 9 August 2017 the applicant was allowed to receive visits without physical separation. On 11 January, 25 February, 13 April, 18 May, 18 July and 17 October 2017 the applicant was allowed to receive long-stay visits from his wife. 55.  On 23 January 2013 the Vilnius City District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for two months from 22 January 2013. The court relied on essentially the same arguments as in the cases of the first three applicants (see paragraphs 8, 23 and 38 above). The court further stated that the applicant had a family, a five-month-old child, and a permanent place of residence. He had also been diagnosed with Hepatitis C, but none of these circumstances meant that he could not be detained. 56.  On 19 March 2013 and 15 May 2013 the Vilnius City District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further two months. The court held that it was possible that realising the severity of the penalty the applicant might make use of his connections outside the territory of Lithuania and abscond. The fact that the applicant had a child was not sufficient to hold that the applicant would not abscond; nor were the applicant\u2019s health issues. If medical treatment was necessary, the applicant would have to approach the prison authorities, who were obliged to ensure the proper provision of medical services. Also, the applicant was suspected of committing well\u2011organised crimes that had an international element. He was suspected of being one of the leaders of a criminal organisation. It was also suspected that the applicant had been receiving income from his criminal activities, because although he had several business certificates he had not been engaging in any activity in that respect, and had not received income from them. 57.  From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended for three months. The last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention for three months at the pre-trial stage was adopted by the Vilnius Regional Court on 18 April 2014. The courts relied on the international element, the complexity of the case, and the need to carry out investigative actions. 58.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to release the applicant from detention and to impose a less restrictive measure on him. The prosecutor refused, because the applicant was facing a sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecutor also stated that the grounds for keeping the applicant in detention persisted. Also, in the context of the present case, another suspect was released from detention twice: he committed further offences and had to be detained again. 59.  On 30 June 2014 the bill of indictment was drawn up.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s detention during his trial 60.  On 2 July 2014 the bill of indictment and the case were referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits, but on 11 July 2014 the Court of Appeal transferred the case for examination on the merits to the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, because the judges of the Vilnius Regional Court had taken part in the investigative actions. 61.  On 10 July 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months; from then on the applicant\u2019s detention was extended every three months until 22 July 2016. The courts relied on the complexity of the case, the applicant\u2019s character, the nature of the offences, and the international element of the case. 62.  On 22 July 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court decided to release the applicant on bail and to place him under intense supervision. It relied on the same reasons as in the cases of the first three applicants and applied the same restrictive measures (see paragraphs 14, 27 and 43 above). 63.  On 5 August 2016 the Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, quashed the lower court\u2019s decision to release the applicant on essentially the same grounds as in the case of the first three applicants (see paragraphs 15, 28 and 44 above). The court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for three months from the date of his arrest. 64.  On 3 November 2016 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. From then on, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly extended every three months. The last decision on that matter was adopted by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court on 3 November 2017. On 12 June 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant. The court analysed the requisite diligence criteria established in Lisovskij (cited above), which was referred to by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. The court held that while very long periods of detention did not automatically violate Article 5 \u00a7 3, exceptional circumstances were usually required to justify them. In the case at hand, those special circumstances were the dangerousness of the applicant\u2019s character, the nature and extent of the criminal offences, the fact that the offences had been committed by a criminal organisation that possessed firearms, and the fact that the offences had an international element. The court examining the criminal case had taken all the necessary measures to ensure that there were no unjustified delays in the criminal proceedings. Although no hearings had taken place from 2 December 2015 to 29 November 2016 there had been objective reasons for this: it had been announced during the hearing on 20 October 2015 that no hearing would take place on 19 January 2016 because one of the judges had a hearing in another case; on 2 December 2015 the court had announced that there would be a break until 29 February 2016 because there was to be a psychiatric examination of two of the accused on 19 January 2016; an additional expert report was commissioned for the same two accused on 29 February 2016; and there was a further adjournment (the results of the expert report were received on 8 and 17 June 2016); the hearing on 16 June 2016 did not take place because one of the accused was sick and another had been arrested in Sweden; and there was no hearing on 25 November 2016 because three of the accused had failed to appear (one of them had been arrested in Sweden and his transfer to Lithuania was to take place on 18 January 2017). Further hearings had been scheduled for 30 June 2017, while the questioning of two witnesses and closing speeches had been scheduled for 3, 11 and 12 July 2017. The court concluded that the examination of the criminal case had not been unreasonably protracted. On 30 August 2017 the Court of Appeal held that the absence of close social ties, the number of offences committed, their international element, their severity, their nature, and the fact that the applicant risked a very severe sentence, all increased the risk of absconding. It was also probable that the applicant would commit new crimes if released. Also, the court held that the closing speeches had already commenced in the criminal case, and the court examining the case was obliged to make sure that the case was examined as quickly as possible. 65.  On 20 December 2017 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found the applicant guilty of organising or leading a criminal organisation, unlawful production, acquisition, storage, transportation or forwarding, selling or otherwise distributing category I precursors of narcotic and psychotropic substances, and smuggling, and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court gave the same reasoning as regards the length of the examination of the criminal case as in the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 17 above). 66.  On 18 January 2018 the criminal case was referred for examination at the Court of Appeal. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (24 August 2018) those proceedings were still pending. 67.  By a decision of 30 January 2018 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant\u2019s request to be allowed to start serving the sentence imposed on him by the judgment of the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court of 20 December 2017. 68.  The applicant started serving his sentence in Kybartai Correctional Facility on 22 February 2018. 69.  The applicant received ten short-term visits while detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison between 4 February 2013 and 18 August 2014. The applicant received 122 short visits while detained in Kaunas Remand Prison between 18 August 2014 and 22 July 2016. The applicant received forty-four short visits while detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison between 9 August 2016 and 1 December 2017. It appears that neither the applicant nor his partner applied to the relevant prisons for a long-stay visit. 70.  Between January and August 2017 the applicant received six long\u2011stay visits from his partner; from January 2017 the applicant was allowed seven visits with physical contact. 71.  From the applicants\u2019 arrest on 22 January 2013 until the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 30 June 2014 (see paragraphs 6, 11, 25, 40 and 59 above) the authorities carried out a number of investigative actions, such as: personal searches of all the applicants and other suspects as well as various home searches; questioning all the applicants, other suspects and witnesses; sending legal cooperation requests to Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Belarus; crime scenes were visited several times; items taken during the searches examined; a number of chemical, biological, dactyloscopic and ballistic investigations set up; items necessary for the investigation taken; a number of recognitions from pictures were achieved; a detailed description of the characteristics of the accused were received; numerous decisions on limitations of property taken; a criminal conduct simulation model and secret surveillance were set up and carried out; one search was announced, and several eyewitness identifications conducted. 72.  According to the information in the Court\u2019s possession, between the transfer of the case to the court for examination on the merits on 2 July 2014 (on 11 July 2014 the Court Appeal solved a jurisdictional issue and decided that the case had to be examined by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, so the case was transferred to that court on 21 July 2014) and the first-instance judgment on 20 December 2017, a total of fifty-one hearings were coordinated in advance and scheduled; ten of those hearings were either cancelled or adjourned:\n(a) In 2014 four hearings were scheduled and held: on 11, 12 and 25 November and on 9 December;\n(b) In 2015 twenty-five hearings were scheduled, two of them were adjourned (on 14 April the hearing was adjourned because of the health state of one of the accused, R.V., and on 16 October the hearing was adjourned because the second applicant refused to be taken to the hearing from custody) and one was cancelled (on 15 April because of the health of R.V.). Hearings were held on 19 and 20 January; 24 February; 16, 18, 30 and 31 March; 1 and 13 April; 4, 5 and 19 May; 1, 2 and 3 June; 13 and 14 July; 19 October; 10 and 11 November; and 1 and 2 December;\n(c) In 2016 four hearings were scheduled; three of them were adjourned (on 29 February because of requests for psychiatric examinations of two of the co-accused, R.V. and K.L.; on 16 June because the co-accused R.V. and K.L. failed to appear; and on 25 October because the co-accused R.V., K.L., L.P. and two defence lawyers failed to appear). The only hearing in 2016 was held on 29 November 2016;\n(d) In 2017 eighteen hearings were scheduled; four of them were cancelled (on 3 July because one of the accused was being treated in a psychiatric hospital and failed to appear together with his lawyer; on 3 August because the applicants\u2019 defence lawyers and two other lawyers were not ready to present their closing statements; on 17 October because one lawyer requested that the hearing not be held; and on 13 November because the chairman decided that the hearing would not be held). Hearings were held on 17 February; 17 March; 3 and 11 April; 3 and 16 May; 30 June; 11 and 12 July; 6, 9 and 27 October; 10 November; and 7 December. 73.  During the forty-one hearings which were held, the court examined the evidence, heard testimony from the witnesses and the accused, played audio and video recordings, ordered psychiatric examinations, and heard the closing statements.", "references": ["0", "5", "7", "9", "3", "8", "6", "1", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently living in Armenia. 7.  The applicant left Iran in March 2011 and travelled to Turkey. He entered Cyprus unlawfully through the \u201cTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus\u201d (the \u201cTRNC\u201d) on 21 March 2011. 8.  On 28 March 2011 the applicant was arrested at Larnaca airport as he attempted to take a flight to London on a forged Romanian passport. He was arrested for the offences of (i) circulating a forged document (sections 331, 333, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154) \u2013 see A.H. and J.K. v. Cyprus, nos. 41903/10 and 41911/10, \u00a7 114, 21 July 2015), (ii) impersonation (section 360 of Cap. 154; ibid.) and (iii) unlawful entry into the Republic (section 12(1), (2) and (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105, as amended) \u2013 see Seagal v. Cyprus, no. 50756/13, \u00a7\u00a7 91 and 93, 26 April 2016). He was placed in detention at Nicosia central prisons. 9.  On 29 March 2011 the applicant appeared before the Larnaca District Court, which ordered his detention on remand for three days. 10.  On 31 March 2011 criminal charges were brought against him (case no. 5220/2011). The Larnaca District Court adjourned the case until 5 April 2011 and extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand until that date. 11.  On 31 March 2011, however, the Attorney General decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings and gave instructions for the applicant to be deported. 12.  In a letter dated 4 April 2011 sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Larnaca Police to the Aliens and Immigration Service, the issuance of deportation and detention orders against the applicant was recommended in order to ensure that the applicant would not abscond following the expiration of the detention order issued by the Larnaca District Court. 13.  On 4 April 2011 detention and deportation orders were issued by the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior under section 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105) on the grounds that the applicant was a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of sections 6(1)(k) and (l) of that law (see paragraph 97 below). A letter from the Ministry of the Interior dated 4 April 2011 was addressed to the applicant informing him (i) that he was an illegal immigrant under the above-mentioned provisions on the grounds of illegal entry and (ii) of the decision to detain and deport him. 14.  On that letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that the letter was served on the applicant on 5 April 2011 at 12:05 p.m. but that he refused to sign for it. 15.  The police also ascertained at the time that the applicant did not have a valid passport. 16.  The applicant was transferred to the holding facility for immigration detainees at Famagusta police station. 17.  On 12 April 2011, while in detention, the applicant applied for asylum. 18.  In view of that development, on 14 April 2011, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to suspend the deportation order pending the examination of the applicant\u2019s asylum application. 19.  The application was dismissed by the Asylum Service on 30 April 2011. 20.  On 5 May 2011 the applicant was served with a letter informing him of the above decision, but he refused to sign for it. 21.  On 1 June 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (\u201cthe Reviewing Authority\u201d) against the Asylum Service\u2019s decision. This was dismissed on 10 August 2011; the applicant was served with the relevant decision on 17 August 2011. 22.  On 21 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Paphos police station. 23.  On 10 October 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (\u201cjudicial review proceedings\u201d; recourse no. 1320/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution, challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority. 24.  On 13 October 2011 the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service re-examined the applicant\u2019s case and recommended that the authorities proceed with the applicant\u2019s deportation following the dismissal of his asylum application by the Reviewing Authority (see paragraph 21 above). Bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, the Director decided that the principle of non-refoulement was not an obstacle to his removal. 25.  On 9 November 2011 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application (application no.133/2011) with the Supreme Court (as the first-instance court) challenging the lawfulness of his detention owing to the length of its duration. 26.  On 11 November 2011 the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior instructed the police to proceed with the applicant\u2019s deportation. According to an internal note subsequently sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to the Attorney General, the applicant\u2019s deportation had not been possible as the applicant had not had a valid passport and had not co-operated with the authorities in order to secure one. 27.  On 25 November 2011, while the habeas corpus proceedings were pending, Amending Law no. 153(I)/2011 to the Aliens and Immigration Law (transposing into national law Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Members States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals \u2013 \u201cthe EU Returns Directive\u201d (see paragraph 100 below)) came into force. 28.  On 29 November 2011 the Minister of the Interior decided to extend the applicant\u2019s detention for up to eighteen months on the basis of section 18 \u03a0\u03a3\u03a4(8)(\u03b1) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, as amended by Law no. 153(I)/2011 (see paragraphs 100 and 101 below). 29.  On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered his immediate release. With regard to the preliminary issues raised, the Supreme Court firstly held that it had the authority to examine the application, as it had been called upon to examine the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s protracted detention and its extension, and not the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders. The Aliens and Immigration Law expressly provided that habeas corpus applications challenging the lawfulness of detention with a view to deportation could be lodged with the Supreme Court on length grounds. 30.  The Supreme Court then examined the substance of the application and held that the applicant\u2019s detention after 4 October 2011 \u2013 that is to say following a period of six months \u2013 had been unlawful under the EU Returns Directive, which at the time had had direct effect in domestic law. In this connection it held that the six-month period provided in Article 15 \u00a7 5 of the above-mentioned Directive had started to run on 4 April 2011 and had ended on 4 October 2011. Although Article 15 \u00a7 6 of the Directive provided for the possibility of extending detention for a period not exceeding a further twelve months if there was a lack of cooperation on the part of a third-country national, it provided that this should be applied in accordance with the provisions of the national law; however, there had been no such national law in force when the six-month period had expired in this case. As Law no. 153(I)/2011, transposing the Directive into national law had come into force only after the expiration of the six-month period it could not have applied to the applicant. Furthermore, the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of Law no. 153(I)/2011 had been made after the expiration of the six-month period. It had therefore not fallen within the legal framework applicable at the time, and the Ministry of the Interior had not been entitled to retroactively validate the applicant\u2019s detention. The authorities had not been entitled to cite the applicant\u2019s refusal to cooperate as grounds for extending his detention after 4 October 2011. 31.  The Government did not lodge an appeal against this judgment. 32.  On 22 December 2011, following the judgment in his favour given by the Supreme Court on that date, the applicant (who was present at the court) was immediately released but was then rearrested a few minutes later upon his leaving the courtroom. 33.  The applicant was arrested on the basis of new detention and deportation orders issued against him on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the first detention and deportation orders \u2013 that is to say under sections 6(1)(k) and (l) and 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 13 above). The Government submitted that the decision to rearrest the applicant had been based on the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s decision of 29 November 2011 to extend the applicant\u2019s detention period to eighteen months (see paragraph 28 above). Upon his arrest, the police officers informed the applicant of his rights, pursuant to the 2005 Law on the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained (Law no. 163(I)/of 2005 \u2013 see Seagal, cited above, \u00a7 99). He was also served with a letter dated 22 December 2011 from the First Chief Administrative Officer of the Ministry of the Interior informing him that he was an illegal immigrant under sections 6(1)(k) and (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the grounds (i) of his having illegally entered and stayed in the Republic of Cyprus and (ii) the decision to detain and deport him. 34.  On the letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that it had been served on the applicant on 22 December 2011 at 12:10 p.m. and that the contents had been explained to him but that he had refused to sign it. 35.  The applicant was taken back to Paphos police station. 36.  On the same date the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Police, stating that the new detention and deportation orders were in conflict with the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 22 December 2011 and infringed the provisions of the EU Returns Directive. She pointed out that the orders had been issued on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous ones and that the applicant\u2019s detention had been found to be unlawful by the Supreme Court. She also stressed that the applicant had been detained despite the fact that he was an asylum seeker. She requested the applicant\u2019s release. She also requested, in the event that the authorities continued to detain him, that the applicant be transferred to another facility; she lodged that request because the applicant was being held at Paphos police station, along with criminal suspects, in inhuman and degrading conditions. The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 37.  On 28 December 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (no. 1724/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) challenging the lawfulness of the new detention and deportation orders on the basis of which he had been rearrested and detained. 38.  By a letter dated 15 March 2012 the applicant\u2019s representative complained to the Minister of the Int+erior about the applicant\u2019s detention and requested that the applicant\u2019s detention order be reviewed, in accordance with section 18 \u03a0\u03a3\u03a4(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that this letter had received no reply. 39.  By a letter dated 22 May 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained again to the Minister of Justice and Public Order and to the Chief of Police about the applicant\u2019s continuing detention, as well as the conditions of his detention at Paphos police station and the psychological and psychosomatic effects that those conditions had had on him. 40.  On 25 May 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant\u2019s detention and decided on its continuation for another six months as the applicant did not have travel documents and continued to refuse to visit the Iranian Embassy in order to secure the issuance of a passport to him, thus hampering the deportation process. 41.  On 29 May 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 42.  On 13 June 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant\u2019s detention and decided to extend it for six months on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous decision (see paragraph 40 above). 43.  On 14 June 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the applicant informing him of the above-mentioned decision taken by the Minister under section 18 \u03a0\u03a3\u03a4(8)(\u03b1) of the Aliens and Immigration Law because of his refusal to cooperate with the authorities regarding his return to Iran (see paragraph 101 below). The Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service was also informed of this decision. 44.  On 13 July 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s recourse. It found that the applicant\u2019s main claims \u2013 namely that (i) the Aliens and Immigration Law, where it concerned the issuance of the deportation and detention orders, was unconstitutional, (ii) the deportation and detention orders had not been issued under the correct provision of that law, and (iii) he had the right under the Refugee Law to remain in the country pending the determination of his appeal by the Supreme Court (no. 1320/2011 \u2013 see paragraph 23 above) \u2013 had not been raised or dealt with adequately in the legal points of the recourse. 45.  On 24 July 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant\u2019s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40 and 42 above). 46.  On 30 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (as the appellate revisional jurisdiction \u2013 appeal no. 156/2012) against the first-instance judgment on his recourse (see paragraph 44 above). 47.  On 11 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Aradippou police station. 48.  On 27 August 2012 and again on 25 September 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant\u2019s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40, 42 and 45 above). 49.  In the meantime, on 12 September 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior complaining about the period of the applicant\u2019s detention and about the failure of the Minister of the Interior to review the applicant\u2019s detention order every two months, as provided by section 18 \u03a0\u03a3\u03a4(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 50.  On 15 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 51.  \u039fn 18 October 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to annul the deportation and detention orders of 22 December 2011, as the applicant\u2019s deportation had not been effected within the above-mentioned eighteen-month time-limit. 52.  On 25 October 2012 the applicant was released under conditions to which he agreed. The applicant was informed that he would be issued with a special residence/employment permit under the Aliens and Immigration Law and the relevant regulations for a period of six months from the date of his release. However, prior to the issuance of this permit he was obliged to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated to and approved by the Department of Labour. He was also asked to (i) report to the police once a week, (ii) report his residential address to his local branch of the Aliens and Immigration Police within fifteen days of his release, and (iii) contact the Iranian Embassy in Nicosia in order to make appropriate arrangements for the issuance of a passport. The applicant was informed that the residence permit would not be extended unless he obtained a valid Iranian passport. 53.  The last time the applicant presented himself at a police station, in line with the conditions of his release, was on 10 January 2013. 54.  The applicant was informed by a letter dated 4 January 2013 that the Reviewing Authority had decided to revoke its negative decision of 10 August 2011 and that it would re-examine his appeal and issue a new decision on his asylum application. Consequently, on 7 January 2013 the applicant withdrew recourse no. 1320/2011 (see paragraph 23 above). He provided the Reviewing Authority with a number of documents in support of his claims. 55.  The applicant subsequently left Cyprus without informing his lawyer. 56.  By a letter dated 14 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority requested him to attend an interview on 24 October 2014 and to provide original documents in support of his claims. The letter also stated that if he failed to contact the Authority he would be considered as non-co-operative and his application would be dismissed and his file closed, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Refugee Law (Law 6(I) of 2000, as amended). 57.  When his lawyer tried to contact the applicant she was informed by other Iranians in Cyprus that he had left the country. 58.  By a letter dated 20 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Reviewing Authority that the applicant had left Cyprus and could not attend the interview. 59.  By a letter dated 30 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that, following a second review, it had rejected his appeal under the above-mentioned provisions and that the first-instance decision of the Asylum Service had been upheld. 60.  In a letter dated 7 April 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Registry that the applicant had left Cyprus through the \u201cTRNC\u201d and was living in Armenia but that his status there was undocumented. He informed her that he had left Cyprus because he feared he would be arrested and detained again and had no means of survival. 61.  On 27 February 2018 the Supreme Court gave its judgment on the applicant\u2019s appeal in respect of the second deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 46 above). It upheld the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 44 above). In addition it noted that during the proceedings the applicant\u2019s lawyer had informed the court that the applicant had in the meantime left Cyprus. As this had been of his own free will, without any coercion, pressure or reservations, the applicant no longer had any legitimate interest in challenging the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders; such a legitimate interest had to continue to exist up to the conclusion of the appeal. 62.  The applicant submitted that during his detention in the various police stations he had felt disoriented in terms of space and time. Moreover, he had been suffering from memory loss since his detention. He had been detained immediately upon his arrival in Cyprus and had never lived in Cyprus before and had not known where each detention centre was. He had been completely disoriented when he had been transferred from one police station to another because he had not been given any information or explanations regarding his transferral.\n(a)  Famagusta police station (5 April 2011 - 21 September 2011)\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions 63.  The applicant stated that Famagusta police station, during the period of his detention there, must have contained about twenty detainees. He had shared a cell, which he estimated had measured approximately 20 or 25 sq. m, with another eight detainees. 64.  The sanitary facilities had been poor: the detention facility had only had a few toilets and showers, which had not been properly cleaned or disinfected. The detainees had lacked basic hygiene products, such as toilet paper, soap and shampoo; these had been provided by the officers only after persistent requests lodged by detainees. 65.  The applicant had had to remain in his cell all the time: there had been no exercise yard and therefore no possibility for any outdoor activity. 66.  The food had been very bad, and the quantities thereof had been insufficient and had not met the dietary needs of Muslim detainees during the Ramadan period. 67.  Furthermore, detainees had been handcuffed during visits. 68.  Lastly there had been violent incidents at the police station. He had informed a local non-governmental organisation, KISA, about one of these incidents; KISA had then reported it to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (\u201cthe Ombudsman\u201d), resulting in a visit to the station by her office (see paragraph 120 below).\n(ii)  The Government\u2019s description 69.  The Government submitted that this detention facility had stopped operating and had been subsequently demolished in 2015 following the issuance of a report by the Ombudsman dated 3 October 2011 (see paragraphs 120-122 below). 70.  The applicant\u2019s personal file concerning his detention in the said facility had been destroyed, pursuant to the applicable police rules. As a result, the Government did not have any records concerning the dimensions of the cells in which the applicant had been kept or the number of inmates kept with the applicant in the same cell. The Government therefore accepted the Ombudsman\u2019s findings in her report of 3 October 2011 in this connection (see paragraph 121 below). 71.  According to a report submitted by the Government dated 18 October 2011 prepared by the police officer in charge of the detention facilities at the time, all cells had had access to natural light and ventilation. The cells had had windows measuring 1.5 by 2 metres which had been capable of being opened. The cells had also had sufficient artificial light. They had been equipped with a bed and a table with chairs. 72.  The cells had been open during the day and detainees had been able to move freely in the common areas of the facility. The common area had been equipped with chairs, tables, a satellite television and books in various languages. Detainees had also been able to exercise in the common area. 73.  The facilities had had an air cooling and heating system (referred to by the Government as \u201csplit units\u201d). The detainees had been able to regulate the temperature as they wished. The sanitary facilities had been for common use. Detainees had been provided each day with toilet paper, soap and shampoo upon request. Detainees had been able go outside for three and a half hours per day, accompanied by a police officer, in a yard measuring 5 by 5 metres. 74.  Detainees had been served three meals a day of adequate quantity, in line with their religious needs. They had also been able to order takeaway meals and receive food or other items from friends or relatives. 75.  Detainees had been allowed to have their telephones in their possession and they had been able to receive visitors at any time during the day. They had been able to meet with their visitors in the offices of police officers outside the facility. They had been handcuffed only during their transfer from the facility to the police offices and back. 76.  Detainees had been kept together according to their ethnic origin.\n(b)  Paphos police station (21 September 2011- 29 May 2012)\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions 77.  In this station the applicant had been in a cell on his own. The cell had measured between approximately 8 and 10 sq. m. There had been a toilet and a shower in the cell; these had not, however, been separated from the rest of the cell and had been visible to the staff. The cells had not had proper windows \u2013 just small glass windows that it not been possible to open. Thus, there had been no natural ventilation, and the cell had lacked adequate natural light. Furthermore, the police officers had often switched off the ventilation system as a form of punishment when detainees had protested about various issues in the facility. His lawyer stated that on one of her visits, the ventilation system had been turned off and the atmosphere \u2013 including in the visitors\u2019 area \u2013 had become unbearable. The applicant had been brought to the visitation area handcuffed. 78.  The applicant had been responsible for cleaning his cell himself but no cleaning products had been given to the detainees. Apart from toilet paper, no other hygiene products had been provided. 79.  There had been an indoor exercise area. There had been no specific schedule for exercise and on some days detainees had not exercised at all and had remained in their cells. As a result of this the applicant had felt completely disoriented and had lost all sense of time. 80.  The food had been bad and the quantities inadequate: detainees had been provided with only two small meals per day. 81.  Furthermore, immigration detainees and criminal suspects had been held together. 82.  The applicant submitted that the conditions at this station had been very harsh and had caused him great psychological distress, as well as prompting suicidal tendencies. For this reason his lawyer had sent letters to the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice and Public Order and the Chief of Police requesting his transfer to other facilities.\n(ii)  The Government\u2019s description of the conditions 83.  The applicant had been kept alone in single-occupancy cells \u2013specifically, cells nos. 32 and 29. Cell no. 32 had measured 11.7 sq. m (4.50 by 2.60 metres), and cell no. 29 had measured 15.95 sq. m. (5.50 by 2.90 metres). All cells had had properly insulated windows measuring 120 cm by 76 cm and made of glass bricks that had allowed natural light to enter. Ventilation in the cells had been artificial. There had been two lamps in each cell, providing adequate artificial light. 84.  All cells had been equipped with a plinth, a fixed stool, a table and an in-cell toilet, sink and shower. The toilet, sink and shower had together accounted for about 2.1 sq. m. Detainees using the sanitary facilities in their cells had not been visible from the outside. There had been a central-heating and ventilation system which had operated twenty-four hours per day. During the summer, room temperature had been between 20\u02daC and 23\u02daC, and during the winter between 24\u02daC and 25\u02daC. 85.  Upon being placed in the cells, detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo, as well as with clean sheets and blankets. Each detainee had had the right to have additional hygiene products but this had had to be at their own expense or provided by their visitors. Each detainee had been offered sufficient cleaning materials with which to clean his or her own cell if they wished to do so. Common areas had been cleaned by the police station\u2019s cleaners. The Government provided invoices for December 2011, April and May 2012 in respect of the purchase of, inter alia, cleaning materials and hygiene products (namely toilet paper and liquid hand soap) by the headquarters of the Paphos Divisional Police (which, the Government submitted, also covered the detention facility). 86.  During his detention, the applicant had been served with three meals a day (breakfast, lunch and dinner). The Government provided the contract with the company providing the meals for the relevant period and the weekly three-meals-a-day plan that it had followed. The applicant had not been served with food unacceptable to Muslims. In addition, he had had the right to obtain additional food at his own expense or from friends or relatives. 87.  The station\u2019s detention facility had had an open courtyard where the applicant had been allowed to move around and exercise freely during the day, given his status as a long-term immigration detainee. During the day the applicant\u2019s cell had been open and he had been able to move freely in the facility\u2019s corridors and common areas. 88.  According to the entries in the station\u2019s record ledger in respect of the period of the applicant\u2019s detention at Paphos police station (which the Government submitted), the applicant had had a psychiatric condition for which he had been provided with prescribed medication and had received psychiatric care at Paphos General Hospital. It could also be seen from this ledger that the applicant had attempted to self-harm and to commit suicide and had also threatened to commit suicide if he was not transferred to another detention facility.\n(c)  Aradippou police station (11 August 2012 - 15 October 2012)\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions 89.  The applicant had been detained in a cell which he estimated had measured approximately between 7 and 8 sq. m and which he had shared with another detainee. The sanitary facilities had been outside the cell and common to all detainees. There had been a television which detainees had been sometimes able to watch. There had been no natural light or ventilation and the hygiene conditions had been poor. The food had been bad and insufficient.\n(ii)  The Government\u2019s description of the conditions 90.  The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s personal custody file concerning his detention at this station had been destroyed, in line with the applicable police rules. 91.  Cells in this facility had measured 7.08 sq. m (2.92 by 2.42 metres). As the applicant alleged that he had shared a cell with another detainee this meant that he would have had about 3.5 sq. m of personal space in his cell. All cells had had insulated windows measuring 1 by 0.8 metres, which it had been possible to open. The cells had had sufficient natural and artificial light. The station had had a central air-cooling and heating system. Room temperature during the summer had been between twenty and twenty-three degrees Celsius and during the winter between 24\u02daC and 25\u02daC. 92.  During the applicant\u2019s detention the cells had been open during the day and the applicant had been allowed to move freely in the station\u2019s common areas and interior yard. There had been benches and a television in the yard. Fresh drinking water (cold and hot) had also been available. 93.  Sanitary facilities had been for common use. There had been two toilets and two showers for every eight detainees. 94.  The detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo once a day 95.  Detainees had been offered three meals per day: breakfast and two cooked meals (lunch and dinner), prepared in line with their religious needs. In addition, detainees had been able to order takeaway food and to receive food from friends or relatives.", "references": ["5", "9", "3", "4", "7", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5.  On 14 March 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated into the disappearance of A.S. in Irkutsk. The applicant was suspected of having committed aggravated murder against A.S. The applicant was arrested in Ussuriysk at around 9 a.m. on 8 April 2007 by traffic police officers, taken to the Ussuriysk town police station and held in a temporary detention cell overnight. Next day he was taken to Irkutsk by aeroplane. 6.  There are no indications in statements by four traffic police officers who arrested the applicant (made on 16 April 2007 to an investigator of the Ussuriysk town prosecutor\u2019s office) that the applicant resisted arrest or that any force or handcuffs were used in the course of his arrest. 7.  At around 11 p.m. on 9 April 2007 the applicant was taken to the Sverdlovskiy district police department of Irkutsk. 8.  His account of subsequent events is the following. He was placed in a room on the third floor, where seven police officers were waiting. They shackled him to a chair and subjected him to beatings during the night of 9 April 2007. They placed a gas mask over his head and closed off the air flow. He was kicked in the chest, punched in the ears and given electric shocks. He lost consciousness several times. The applicant agreed to sign papers given to him by the police officers on the condition that they stopped physically assaulting him. 9.  According to a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest for murder signed by the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, it was drawn up at 12.30 a.m. on 10 April 2007 by investigator A.M. from the Sverdlovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Irkutsk. It indicates that the applicant was arrested at 10 p.m. on 9 April 2007 at the Sverdlovskiy district police department. 10.  Next morning, from 10.30 a.m. to 2.20 p.m., investigator P. from the Sverdlovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office questioned the applicant as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer appointed by investigator P. According to the record of the questioning, the applicant gave statements voluntarily, he had injuries from handcuffs because \u201che had put up resistance\u201d, and he was not subjected to any violence. The applicant gave self-incriminating statements in relation to the crimes against A.S. Later, during his trial, the applicant claimed that the State-appointed lawyer had not been present during his questioning and had only signed the record of his questioning at the end. On an unspecified date (before 6 June 2007) another lawyer started representing the applicant. 11.  At 11.20 p.m. on 10 April 2007 the applicant was placed in an Irkutsk temporary detention facility (IVS). 12.  On 11 April 2007 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Irkutsk remanded the applicant in custody. On the same day the applicant was placed in a pre-trial detention facility in Irkutsk (IZ 38/1/2). 13.  According to a certificate signed by the IVS doctor, the applicant was examined on 11 April 2007 and had bruises in the area of the left collarbone, left shoulder and left lumbar region, and abrasions in the area of the elbow joints, both hands and wrists. The certificate referred to a home accident without any further details. 14.  On 11 April 2007 investigator P. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant in connection with the criminal case against him. According to report no. 4046 completed on 11 April 2007 by the Irkutsk Regional Forensic Medical Bureau, he was examined that day. The applicant had the following injuries: (i) ten irregularly shaped bruises measuring between 9 x 7 cm and 3 x 2 cm on his chest, left shoulder, left iliac bone, both forearms, elbows, right of the lower spine and outside of the left ear, which had been caused by hard, blunt objects with a limited surface area; and (ii) eleven abrasions in stripe-like shapes measuring between 3 x 0.2 cm and 1 x 0.2 cm on his right wrist and wrist joints, which had been caused by hard objects with an explicitly limited surface area. All injuries had been caused approximately two days before the examination and were classified as injuries not occasioning actual bodily harm. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted by the applicant\u2019s own hand, the expert stated that the injuries were not of the kind which could be inflicted by one\u2019s own hand. 15.  According to records from IZ 38/1/2, on arrival on 11 April 2007 the applicant was examined and had (i) a contusion to soft tissues in the area of the right elbow joint; (ii) abrasions on both wrist joints; and (iii) abrasions on the right wrist. 16.  According to the applicant, soon after his arrival at the pre-trial detention facility he lodged a complaint with the Irkutsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office requesting that the police officers be prosecuted for their unlawful conduct. 17.  According to a letter of 29 May 2009 from IZ 38/1/2, on 16 April 2007 the material in relation to the applicant\u2019s injuries recorded on his arrival at IZ 38/1/2 was forwarded to the Ussuriysk town police department for an inquiry. According to a letter of 10 June 2009 from the Ussuriysk town police department, the applicant\u2019s complaint was examined and a refusal to institute criminal proceedings was issued pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) for lack of the elements of a crime. 18.  On 12 March 2008 the investigative committee for the Irkutsk region refused to initiate criminal proceedings based on a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s injuries which had been recorded by the forensic medical expert. The investigator noted the applicant\u2019s statements that he had had injuries from handcuffs because \u201che had put up resistance\u201d and that he had not been subjected to any violence. The investigator concluded that the injuries on his wrists had been caused as a result of the justified use of handcuffs because under the domestic law the police had a right to use handcuffs to suppress resistance and escort arrested individuals to a police station safely. The investigator further noted that the applicant\u2019s statements had not contained any explanations in relation to the remainder of the applicant\u2019s injuries or a request to prosecute those responsible. He stated that an assault not occasioning actual bodily harm (Article 116 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code) was a case of private prosecution which could not be opened without a relevant complaint against those responsible. He concluded that no criminal proceedings should be initiated pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (5) of the CCrP since no such complaint had been lodged by the applicant. 19.  On 28 April 2010 the Irkutsk Regional Court received the applicant\u2019s appeal dated 16 April 2010 against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 12 March 2008. In his appeal the applicant stated that his complaint about the police ill-treatment dated 5 May 2007 had been dispatched by the pre-trial detention facility on 7 May 2007. 20.  On 3 December 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk examined the applicant\u2019s complaint that a timely investigation into his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers had not been conducted and that the decision of 12 March 2008 refusing to open a criminal case was unlawful. The court held that the decision of 12 March 2008 was lawful and well\u2011founded and that there had been no inactivity on the part of the investigating authority in dealing with the applicant\u2019s complaint. 21.  It appears that on 12 March, 23 April and 17 August 2009 refusals to open a criminal case were issued in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment by the investigative committee for the Sverdlovsk district of Irkutsk pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, as none of the elements of the crime under Article 116 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code were present. The former two refusals were annulled on unspecified dates. 22.  On 12 April 2011 the acting head of the investigative committee for the Sverdlovsk district of Irkutsk overruled the refusal to open a criminal case of 17 August 2009 as unsubstantiated and unlawful, and ordered an additional inquiry. She pointed out the need to interview the applicant, identify the police officers he had resisted during his arrest, interview those police officers, assess police officers\u2019 alleged misconduct under Articles 286 \u00a7 3 (a) and 302 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers with the use of violence and forced extraction of confession respectively), and carry out other activities in order to ensure a full inquiry. 23.  In a letter of 12 October 2011 the Irkutsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that on 22 April 2011 the investigative committee for the Sverdlovskiy district of Irkutsk had refused to open a criminal case in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment by the police officers from the Sverdlovskiy district police department of Irkutsk pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, as none of the elements of the crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code were present. 24.  On 24 June 2008 the Irkutsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of A.S.\u2019s murder, theft and other offences and sentenced him to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment, to run from 9 April 2007. It relied, in particular, on the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements made during his questioning as a suspect. 25.  At his trial, the applicant pleaded guilty in part. He alleged that unlawful investigation techniques and violence had been used to force him to confess to the crimes. In particular, he stated that when he had been taken to the Sverdlovskiy district police station, a gas mask had been placed over his head and he had been given electric shocks to extract a confession. According to the applicant, he had been questioned all night long, had lost consciousness, and had been ready to sign any papers. His hands had been injured by handcuffs. 26.  The trial court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, noting that he had not indicated who had allegedly used violence against him, and had not explained why violence had been used against him after he had given his self-incriminating statements about the crimes. 27.  On 11 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia partly modified this judgment on appeal and sentenced the applicant to eighteen years\u2019 and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court relied on the refusal to open a criminal case of 12 March 2008, noting the applicant\u2019s statements that the injuries on the wrists had been caused as a result of the use of handcuffs to suppress the applicant\u2019s resistance. It fully endorsed the trial court\u2019s findings concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and its use of the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements at the preliminary investigation as evidence. 28.  On 24 November 2009 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the applicant\u2019s request for supervisory review of his case, stating that the decisions of the courts of both instances to dismiss the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had been coerced by violence to give his self\u2011incriminating statements were well-founded. 29.  On 9 June 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court ordered that the term of the applicant\u2019s imprisonment should run from 8 April 2007, the day when he had actually been arrested.", "references": ["7", "4", "8", "3", "5", "6", "2", "0", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant (Ms Makarova) was born in 1989 and lived in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Astakhova) was born in 1985 and lives in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. The third applicant (Ms Fokht\u2011Babushkina) was born in 1994 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7.  On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8.  According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u044b) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three\u2011day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9.  All of the applicants decided to hold solo demonstrations on 19 December 2012. According to them, at around 9 a.m. they positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, \u00a7\u00a7 206-15, 7 February 2017). 10.  According to the first applicant, she was arrested by the police several minutes later and taken to a police van. There were no orders from police officers to stop the demonstration and leave the area. According to the second and third applicants, after their solo demonstrations they left the area, showing their posters to journalists at their request. At that point, they were arrested by the police and taken to the Tverskoy district police station. 11.  According to the Government, at 10 a.m. on 19 December 2012 all of the applicants took part in a group \u201cpicket\u201d (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442) held without prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant had a poster reading \u201cI am looking for an American who will adopt me\u201d, the second and the third applicants had posters reading \u201cOrphans are guilty for the death of Mr Magnitskiy? Do not disgrace yourself\u201d. The applicants did not react to the lawful demands of the police to stop participating in the event and continued \u201cpicketing\u201d, attracting the attention of passers-by. At 10.30 a.m. they were arrested and taken to the Tverskoy district police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 1.20 p.m. on that day the applicants were released. 12.  At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, \u201cthe CAO\u201d). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers\u2019 reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13.  On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers\u2019 reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (\u201cpicket\u201d) which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14.  On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers\u2019 reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant\u2019s lawyer did participate. In the third applicant\u2019s case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant\u2019s guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15.  On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 \u00a7 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.", "references": ["1", "5", "4", "9", "6", "0", "8", "2", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1983 and is detained in Rzeku\u0144. 7.  The applicant was detained in P\u0142ock Prison from 26 March to 29 August 2009 (five months and four days). 8.  The applicant submitted that during his detention in P\u0142ock Prison he had been held in overcrowded cells. 9.  According to documents from the domestic proceedings which were provided, and the Government\u2019s submissions, the applicant was detained in overcrowded cells nos. 400 and 402 between 26 March and 29 August 2009. The ventilation and the sanitary conditions in these cells were inadequate. The applicant had one shower per week and one hour\u2019s outdoor exercise per day. 10.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant brought an action for infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate conditions in P\u0142ock Prison. He claimed 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation (approximately EUR 2,500). He applied to be exempted from court fees. On 18 February 2011 the court allowed this application. The applicant did not apply for legal aid at this stage of the proceedings. 11.  Between 21 January and 31 March 2011 the applicant submitted several requests for evidence and asked to attend the court\u2019s hearings. On 11 March 2011 the P\u0142ock District Court informed the applicant that he would not be transported to the hearing, and instructed him about the formal requirements in respect of requests for evidence, among other things that such requests should be lodged with the court in two copies. 12.  The applicant was not present at the court hearing on 23 March 2011. On 24 March 2011 the P\u0142ock District Court served the applicant with a copy of P\u0142ock Prison\u2019s response to the applicant\u2019s action (odpowied\u017a na pozew) and ordered the applicant to clarify his pleading (sprecyzowanie pow\u00f3dztwa), in particular as regards the period of his detention. The applicant was instructed to send the clarification of the pleading to the court in two copies. 13.  On 12 April 2011 the P\u0142ock District Court rejected part of the applicant\u2019s action on the basis of res judicata, and asked the applicant to inform the court if he wished to maintain the remainder thereof. The court informed the applicant that the requested information should be sent in two copies. 14.  On 6 January 2011 the applicant examined the files of his case in Warsaw Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre. 15.  On 2 February 2012 he applied for legal aid. On 14 February 2012 the P\u0142ock District Court refused the request, finding that the applicant was able to represent himself. He had access to the court\u2019s files and was heard as a witness in the proceedings (I C 31/11). 16.  On 28 May 2012 the P\u0142ock District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It held that the cells in question had indeed been overcrowded for approximately five months, but that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the actions of the respondent (the relevant prison authorities) had constituted unlawful conduct for which the latter were liable. Lastly, the remainder of the applicant\u2019s allegations about the material conditions in his cells were considered unsubstantiated in the light of the material gathered in the case. 17.  On 29 May 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, which read as follows:\n\u201cYou may request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the day on which the judgment was served on you. You have the right to appeal. Any appeal should be submitted to the court which issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the date of service of the judgment with reasoning. Sending the appeal by post is equivalent to submitting it to the court.\u201d 18.  On 22 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first\u2011instance judgment. On 29 June 2012 the court issued an order and instructed the applicant to submit two additional copies of his appeal. On 9 July 2012 the applicant submitted to the court a handwritten letter entitled \u201cappeal\u201d (in two copies), the content of which was similar but not identical to the original appeal. 19.  On 17 July 2012 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court pointed out that a copy of a pleading meant a handwritten copy of an original or a photocopy containing exactly the same submissions and arguments. It held that as the applicant had extended his arguments by relying on the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence, it followed that he had changed his original submissions, and the copies provided by him could not be regarded as copies of the original appeal. 20.  On 2 August 2012 the applicant appealed against the rejection of his earlier appeal. On 22 August 2012 the court requested from the applicant a copy of his interlocutory appeal. He did not comply. Consequently, on 13 September 2012 his interlocutory appeal was rejected. On 20 September 2012 the applicant submitted an interlocutory appeal against the decision of 13 September 2012, arguing as follows:\n\u201cI should have been informed in advance that the court would require me to provide copies of pleadings. I am a simple man without legal knowledge and my application for a legal-aid lawyer was dismissed by the court. If I had had a legal-aid lawyer I would have known that the court might require copies of appeals or interlocutory appeals. The court asked me to provide the copies only after I had sent the original pleading, and I do not have a computer memory to reproduce exactly the same copy of what I had written one month before. If the court had sent me the original pleading I could have copied it and sent it back. For the above reasons I ask the court to accept my appeal and interlocutory appeals.\u201d 21.  On 15 November 2012 the court instructed the applicant that in order to comply with the formal requirement of his interlocutory appeal he should submit an additional copy of it, which the applicant failed to do. On 24 January 2013 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s interlocutory appeal.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "0", "9", "6", "4", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and, as can be seen from the case materials, is currently serving a sentence in a penal institution (see paragraph 20 below). 6.  On 24 May 1996 the applicant was convicted of aggravated double murder and other offences. He was sentenced to the death penalty, which was subsequently commuted to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment in 1997 (\u201cthe first conviction\u201d). The sentence started to run from the date of the applicant\u2019s arrest on 24 August 1995 and was due to expire on 24 August 2015. 7.  On 29 March 2002 the applicant attempted to escape. 8.  On 12 April 2006 after a series of decisions and the remittal of the case to the investigating authorities, the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of attempted escape and the illicit procurement of an official document. He was sentenced to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment (\u201cthe second conviction\u201d). The first-instance court added the applicant\u2019s outstanding sentence for the first conviction to the subsequent sentence, resulting in a total cumulative sentence of thirteen years and six months. The court indicated that the cumulative sentence would start to run from 29 March 2002, the date of commission of the second offence. It was due to expire on 29 September 2015. 9.  On 29 December 2006 the provision of the Criminal Code regulating the imposition of cumulative sentences was amended. Article 59 of the amended law provided that, as regards accumulated sentences, the final sentence imposed should be calculated from the imposition of the later sentence. The amended legislation did not explicitly address the question of its retroactive effect (see paragraph 21 below). 10.  On 20 April 2007, in a different set of proceedings, instituted by the applicant to have legislative amendments reducing the maximum length of a sentence for aggravated murder applied to his first conviction, the Supreme Court reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence for the first conviction to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. When doing so, the Supreme Court did not refer either to the starting date of the sentence or the applicant\u2019s second conviction. 11.  On 20 February 2008 the Supreme Court rectified its decision of 20 April 2007 based on the applicant\u2019s request to that end, stating that the outstanding sentence for the applicant\u2019s first conviction and the sentence for the second conviction were to be cumulative, and that the cumulative sentence of eight years and six months had to start running from 29 March 2002, namely the date of commission of the second offence rather than the date of the imposition of the later sentence, which was 12 April 2006. Appellate proceedings concerning the second conviction were still pending when the Supreme Court adopted the two decisions. Based on the decision of the Supreme Court of 20 February 2008, the applicant\u2019s sentence would have expired on 29 September 2010. 12.  On 3 December 2008, without taking note of the Supreme Court decisions of 20 April 2007 and 20 February 2008 (see paragraphs 10-11 above), the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s second conviction and ruled that he had to serve a cumulative sentence of thirteen years and six months which had started to run on 29 March 2002 which was again, the date of the commission of the second offence. That sentence would have expired on 29 September 2015. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the appellate court\u2019s judgment of 3 December 2008. He requested a reduction in the sentence imposed for his second conviction and the reduction of the cumulative sentence by five years in view of the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions of 20 April 2007 and 20 February 2008 to that end (see paragraphs 10-11 above). The case file and the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law were sent to the Supreme Court on 21 January 2009. 14.  On 3 April 2009, while the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law was pending before the Supreme Court, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal adopted, by means of a written procedure and without the parties\u2019 involvement, a decision rectifying an error in its judgment of 3 December 2008 (\u201cthe rectified appellate decision\u201d). Relying on Article 615 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 24 below), the decision corrected the starting date of the cumulative sentence to 12 April 2006 \u2013 the date on which the first-instance court\u2019s decision concerning the second conviction had been adopted. The appellate court did not elaborate on its decision except for noting that the judgment of 3 December 2008 had contained \u201can inaccuracy\u201d regarding the starting date of the sentence. Based on that new starting date, the applicant\u2019s sentence was due to expire on 12 October 2019. As shown by the case files, the decision of 3 April 2009 was served on the applicant on 16 April 2009. 15.  On 7 April 2009 the Supreme Court issued a reasoned decision, without holding a hearing, and granted the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It noted that the appellate court had failed to take account of the reduction of the applicant\u2019s first sentence by the Supreme Court on 20 April 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). The Supreme Court further reduced the sentence for the applicant\u2019s second conviction to three years. It took note of the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009 (see paragraph 14 above) and stated that the re-calculated cumulative sentence of seven years\u2019 imprisonment had started to run on 12 April 2006, namely the date of the imposition of the sentence for the second offence. That term was due to expire on 12 April 2013. 16.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant requested the rectification of the decision of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2009 in respect of the starting date of his cumulative sentence. He noted that it was only by means of the Supreme Court\u2019s final decision that he had learned about the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009. He submitted that the rectified appellate decision had been contrary to the final decision of the Supreme Court dated 20 February 2008 which had set a different starting date for his cumulative sentence, and would have resulted in a release date of 29 September 2010. He further submitted that the rectification had lacked any legal basis and had gone beyond the scope of Article 615 of the CCP, as it had substantially affected the duration of his sentence. Maintaining that his appeal had been the sole basis for the appellate court\u2019s judgment of 3 December 2008, the applicant submitted that the rectified appellate decision, made by that very court, had been in violation of Article 540 \u00a7 1 of the CCP which had provided a guarantee for an appellant against a worsening of his or her position in the proceedings in the absence of an appeal from the prosecuting authorities. The applicant further indicated that, in addition to the foregoing arguments, taking into account the reduction of his sentence by the Supreme Court on 7 April 2009, his sentence should have expired on 29 March 2009 and that accordingly he was to be released from prison immediately. 17.  On 24 April 2009 the Head of the Registry of the Chamber of Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court replied to the applicant, stating that the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009 had constituted an integral part of the appellate judgment of 3 December 2008. Therefore, the Supreme Court was not in a position to address the applicant\u2019s complaint. 18.  On 11 May 2009, relying on Article 553 of the CCP (see paragraph 22 below), the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal on points of law against the rectified appellate decision. The applicant reiterated the arguments set out in his rectification request of 22 April 2009 (see paragraph 16 above). 19.  On 15 June 2009 an assistant to the Chairman of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal replied to the applicant\u2019s appeal of 11 May 2009 (see paragraph 18 above), noting that the Tbilisi Court of Appeal had adopted a judgment on 3 December 2008 and subsequently rectified on 3 April 2009 an error regarding the starting date of the sentence. It was further noted that, in its decision of 7 April 2009, the Supreme Court had accepted the rectification of the inaccuracy by the appellate court regarding the starting date of the sentence and that the rectified appellate decision had therefore been left unchanged. Accordingly, the response concluded, the interlocutory appeal on points of law against the decision of 3 April 2009 could not be accepted for consideration. 20.  The applicant was released from prison on 27 January 2013 \u2013 earlier than the anticipated release date of 12 April 2013 \u2013 based on an Amnesty Act. As the applicant\u2019s submissions before the Court show, on 6 February 2017 he was arrested on charges of aggravated fraud and repeated forgery of official documents. On 18 October 2017 the applicant was sentenced, at first instance, to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. This set of proceedings against the applicant is not the subject of the present application.", "references": ["1", "9", "7", "0", "5", "6", "4", "8", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and was at the time of the introduction of the application detained at the Safi detention centre. 6.  On 10 September 2016 the applicant, a refugee from Ivory Coast who claimed to have previously obtained asylum in Armenia, left Russia and arrived in Malta by plane. Upon arrival he presented his documents (including a national passport) to the immigration authorities. 7.  According to the applicant he immediately informed the authorities that he was a refugee from Ivory Coast and that he had fled the war in his country many years before. He claimed that he had reached Malta from Armenia, where he had lived as a refugee prior to his arrival in Malta. He also promptly confirmed his intention to seek asylum in Malta, due to his fear that Armenia would return him to Ivory Coast. 8.  The applicant was found carrying false Italian identification documents and, according to the Government, when questioned, he informed the police that he had obtained the documents from a friend in Italy and that his intention was to travel to Italy by transiting via Malta. The applicant was also found to be in possession of a travel ticket to Italy. 9.  The applicant was denied entry since according to the immigration authorities he was not in possession of the required documentation. On the same day he was taken to police headquarters were he was questioned. During questioning the applicant provided further information concerning his escape from war in Ivory Coast, his life in Armenia and the reasons why he felt he could no longer live there, reasons primarily linked to his skin colour and the lack of physical security. The police confiscated his documents. 10.  On the same day, the police (immigration branch) issued a detention order in terms of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) and Subsidiary Legislation 420.06 \u201cReception of Asylum Seekers Regulations\u201d (hereinafter \u201cthe Reception Regulations\u201d \u2013 see Relevant domestic law below) on the grounds that the elements on which the applicant\u2019s application for international protection had been based could not be determined in the absence of detention, in particular due to the risk of absconding. He was informed that he had the right to appeal this decision before the Immigration Appeals Board (hereinafter \u201cthe Board\u201d) within three days. He was further informed that the Board would automatically review this order within seven days from the date of its issuance, which could be extended by a further seven days; and that if he remained in detention a further review would occur every two months. He was informed that he was entitled to free legal assistance. 11.  The applicant was accompanied to Safi Barracks detention centre, where he was detained. 12.  On 20 September 2016 the applicant applied for international protection and was formally registered as an asylum\u2011seeker. 13.  According to documentation submitted by the Government, on 30 September 2016, the applicant appeared before the Board accompanied by one of his lawyers (of choice), but the case was put off to the next board meeting to be held on 5 October 2016, since one of the applicant\u2019s representatives (of choice) was abroad. The applicant appears to contest the existence of this hearing and notes that the Government have not provided any proof of notification of such hearing or what went on. He however claims that even if it did occur his legal aid lawyer was not present as required by law. 14.  On 5 October 2016 the Board convened in order to review the legality of the applicant\u2019s detention, in accordance with Regulation 6(3) of the Reception Regulations. The applicant was present with his legal representatives and was provided with an interpreter. 15.  According to the applicant, during the hearing before the Board, in the presence of a representative of the Malta Police Force who explained the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s detention, the Board informed the applicant that it had not been able to comply with the deadline provided by the law for the review of his detention since on the date required by the Reception Regulations (namely seven working days from the issuing of the detention order) a Board member was attending a conference overseas and therefore he could not take part in the hearing. Furthermore, the Board stressed that since its members were merely part-time employees meeting once a week and lacking administrative support while being responsible for a vast array of immigration related appeals, it was simply unable to meets its legal obligation and determine the lawfulness of his detention on time. 16.  During the hearing the applicant\u2019s representative repeatedly requested the Malta Police Force\u2019s representative and the chairperson of the Board to specify the grounds on which he was being detained. Both the Malta Police Force\u2019s representative and the Board\u2019s chairperson orally indicated \u201cfear of absconding\u201d as the primary reason for the applicant\u2019s detention. 17.  The applicant\u2019s representative made written and oral submissions to the Board. He noted, in particular, that from the moment of his first contact with the Maltese authorities the applicant had provided consistent factual information about his identity, nationality, countries of transit, intention to seek asylum in Malta, migration/asylum status in third countries and reasons for flight from Ivory Coast. He had not made any attempt to conceal any information and had acted with honesty, openness and transparency towards the authorities. It followed that he had already presented to the authorities all the elements on which his application for international protection had been based, thus the legal basis on which the authorities had relied in order to justify his detention could not be held applicable to his case and the interference with the applicant\u2019s liberty had not been provided by law. The applicant also claimed that his detention had been neither necessary nor proportionate. In his opinion the immigration police had failed to demonstrate that without the applicant\u2019s detention it would have been impossible for them to determine any elements on the basis of his asylum application. 18.  On the same day the Board dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints and confirmed the legality of his detention. The Board specified that: (i) the elements in question referred to the application for refugee status, which had not yet been determined; (ii) if the applicant left Malta he would be unable to provide the information (elements) required by the Commissioner for Refugees (REFCOM); (iii) the fact that the applicant had been found in possession of a ticket to go to Italy showed that his intention was not to remain in Malta; (iv) \u201cwith the fact that he was inadmissible in the first place because he had forged a document, there is no reason to believe that appellant will not abscond\u201d. 19.  The Board requested the Principal Immigration Office (PIO) to enquire as to whether all elements had been clarified and given to REFCOM, and whether the applicant would have been given refugee status, in order to ensure that detention did not subsist for longer than was needed. If the period of detention continued because of the asylum proceedings, including an appeal, the PIO were to consider alternatives to detention particularly those listed in Regulation 6(8) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06, as such detention would then no longer be reasonable. 20.  On 21 October 2016 the applicant applied to the Court of Magistrates relying on Article 409(A) of the Criminal Code to contest the lawfulness of his detention. He argued that there had been no individual assessment of the applicant\u2019s situation, and that it was not clear what elements were still required. He noted that a risk of absconding could not be examined on its own and that Regulation 1(6) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06 could not be interpreted as meaning that detention could be prolonged throughout the entire proceedings. 21.  It appears that the immigration police argued that the one fundamental element they expected the applicant to provide was a document confirming the statement that he was recognised as a refugee in Armenia. 22.  On the same day the Court of Magistrates upheld the legality of the applicant\u2019s detention. The court found that the applicant was raising the same issues he had raised before the Board, and which had already been decided by it. The court agreed that the risk of absconding under Regulation 6(1) (b) could not be seen on its own but in the light of the whole Regulation. The Reception Regulations, L.S. 420.06, allowed the detention of persons like the applicant \u2011 pending a decision on asylum \u2011 in order to establish the elements on which such application was based, when it would be difficult to do so in the absence of detention. During the hearing it transpired that further verifications were necessary and that the applicant was at risk of absconding, making the asylum determination impossible. It followed that the applicant\u2019s detention could not be considered unlawful. 23.  The applicant was released from immigrant detention on 8 November 2016, subject to reporting at the police station daily. 24.  By a judgment of 19 January 2017, in accordance with his guilty plea, the applicant was found guilty of using a false passport. Although he was liable to imprisonment for a period of six months to two years, the court, in application of Section 22 of the Probation Act (Chapter 446 of the Laws of Malta) conditionally discharged the applicant for three years. 25.  On an unspecified date in March 2017 the applicant\u2019s asylum application was rejected. The applicant appealed, which appeal reached the Secretary of the Refugee Appeal\u2019s Board on 21 March 2017.", "references": ["6", "7", "4", "3", "5", "9", "0", "8", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Wroc\u0142aw. 6.  The applicant was detained in Wroc\u0142aw Remand Centre during various periods between 1991 and 2014, including from 24 June 2009 to 2 October 2010. He was released from detention on 8 July 2017. 7.  The applicant submitted that during his detention in Wroc\u0142aw Remand Centre he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m 8.  According to documents from the domestic proceedings and the Government\u2019s submissions, the applicant was held in overcrowded cells between 29 July and 26 August 2009 (a period of approximately one month). 9.  On 5 April 2011 the applicant brought a civil claim before the Wroc\u0142aw Regional Court against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in Wroc\u0142aw Remand Centre. He claimed 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. His case was transferred to the Wroc\u0142aw\u2011\u015ar\u00f3dmie\u015bcie District Court in Wroc\u0142aw (hereinafter \u201cthe court\u201d) and registered under the reference number IX C 295/11. 10.  On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11.  In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated:\n\u201cAt the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies.\u201d 12.  On 5 October 2012 the Wroc\u0142aw\u2011\u015ar\u00f3dmie\u015bcie District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil claim. The court found that the applicant\u2019s cells had indeed been overcrowded for approximately one month, but that he had failed to demonstrate that the actions of the defendant had been unlawful. 13.  On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled \u201capplication: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wroc\u0142aw\u2011\u015ar\u00f3dmie\u015bcie District Court of 5 October 2012\u201d which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wroc\u0142aw\u2011\u015ar\u00f3dmie\u015bcie District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15.  On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms:\n\u201cA party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 \u00a7 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment.\u201d 16.  On 12 November 2012 the applicant received the reasoning of the court\u2019s judgment of 5 October 2012. 17.  On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a request for leave to appeal out of time against the judgment of 5 October 2012, as well as two copies of a letter entitled \u201cappeal\u201d. On 1 February 2013 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal, and explained that he had already lodged his appeal on 10 October 2012, which was within the relevant time-limit. The court underlined that the applicant\u2019s appeal of 10 October 2012 did not comply with the formal requirements. 18.  Therefore, on 6 February 2013 the court issued an order and instructed the applicant to comply with the formal requirements of his appeal by submitting a copy thereof within seven days of the service of the court order. The order was served on 14 February 2013. 19.  On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20.  On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof. 21.  On 30 March 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision. When ordered, he rectified the formal requirements of his interlocutory appeal by submitting a copy of it and stating the amount of his claim. On 21 June 2013 the Wroc\u0142aw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s interlocutory appeal, holding that the applicant, who had started a civil action and knew that he was deprived of his liberty, could justifiably be expected to keep copies of all letters he sent to the court, especially since he had been informed on 28 August 2012 that all letters to the court should be submitted in two copies. Additionally, after the judgment had been issued the applicant was informed about the means and procedure of submitting appeals.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "9", "4", "8", "2", "6", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1952. 7.  On 30 May 2012 the applicant was arrested and detained in connection with a suspicion of making two threats by telephone against certain M.S. and \u0160.O. 8.  In the course of the investigation, the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavni odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) commissioned a psychiatric expert report on the applicant\u2019s mental health at the time of the offence, including, if appropriate, the existence of a need for his psychiatric internment. 9.  On 28 June 2012 the psychiatric expert, E.S., submitted her report, which stated that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. She found that he was incapable of understanding and controlling his actions and that he posed a danger to others, which warranted his psychiatric internment. The expert noted that she had not inspected any medical documents concerning the applicant\u2019s previous psychiatric treatment, but she had interviewed him, examined the criminal case file and a medical report from the prison administration. 10.  On 10 July 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Op\u0107inski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of making serious threats. It asked that the measure of involuntary psychiatric internment be ordered in respect of the applicant, as provided under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. 11.  On 27 July 2012 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found that the indictment was flawed as it had been based on an incomplete expert report, which had not taken into account all the medical documentation concerning the applicant\u2019s previous psychiatric treatment. The indictment was thus returned to the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office with an instruction to commission an additional expert report. 12.  On 24 August 2012 E.S. produced a supplement to her report, which she prepared with a psychologist. She explained that she had obtained the applicant\u2019s medical record from his general practitioner, V.P., but had not obtained anything from his psychiatrist, V.G. (a university professor), who had in the meantime retired and could not be reached. The expert also stated that, in her view, the applicant\u2019s diagnosis had already been clear after the first examination and that she did not need further documents to provide a diagnosis. She thus reiterated her previous opinion on the basis of the new records she had obtained. 13.  On 28 August 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office submitted a new indictment against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. This indictment was confirmed and accepted on 3 October 2012 and the case was sent to trial. 14.  Meanwhile, on 30 August 2012, the applicant was released from pre\u2011trial detention because the maximum period had expired (see paragraph 31 below). 15.  At a hearing before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court on 4 December 2012, the applicant asked that his psychiatrist V.G., his general practitioner V.P. and several other witnesses, including his neighbours, be heard. He said they could all give evidence as to his mental state. He also argued that he had had previous conflicts with the victims and asked that the police be requested to submit relevant information about those incidents. 16.  At the same hearing, several prosecution witnesses and the expert witness E.S. were questioned. E.S. reiterated the findings and opinion she had previously given. She also argued that the evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s mental state at the moment of the commission of the offence could not be given by his general practitioner or his psychiatrist. 17.  In the meantime, on 11 September and 13 December 2012 the applicant submitted medical reports by his psychiatrist V.G. according to which he suffered from chronic stress and maladaptation to the environment. This was a behavioural disorder which needed further psychological treatment. V.G. also stressed that the applicant\u2019s psychiatric internment could create adverse effects for his treatment. He pointed out that the applicant participated in an outpatient psychiatric treatment for years and that there were positive developments in his behaviour, in particular related to the abstinence from alcohol. 18.  At a hearing on 18 December 2012, the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court heard further witnesses for the prosecution. It dismissed all the applicant\u2019s requests for the taking of evidence on the grounds that they were irrelevant. In particular, the trial court held that the general practitioner V.P. did not have sufficient expertise to give evidence on the applicant\u2019s mental capacity and that her documents had been taken into account by E.S. The trial court considered that the same arguments applied to V.G. 19.  At a hearing on 23 January 2013 the parties gave their closing arguments. The applicant argued that E.S.\u2019s expert opinion was flawed and incomplete as it had not taken into account the existing medical documentation related to his treatment but only the medical record held by his general practitioner. At the same time, her opinion was contrary to the findings of his psychiatrist V.G. 20.  On the same day the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found that the applicant had committed the offence of making serious threats while lacking mental capacity. Relying on E.S.\u2019s report, it decided that he should be placed in a psychiatric hospital for a period of six months. The Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found the medical reports produced by V.G. (see paragraph 17 above) unreliable on the grounds that they contradicted the findings of the expert witness E.S. and that they had been produced by a doctor whom the applicant had paid privately. 21.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu), alleging numerous substantive and procedural flaws. He pointed out that his psychiatrist V.G., who had treated him for six years, had not been consulted in the course of the proceedings. He also referred to a report by V.G., which found that there were no grounds for his being placed in a psychiatric institution and that any such decision could have severe consequences for his health. 22.  On 9 July 2013 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that all the relevant facts had been correctly established. It stressed that the expert witness E.S. had taken into account the applicant\u2019s medical record held by his general practitioner V.P., which also included the findings of his psychiatrist V.G. The Zagreb County Court therefore considered that it had not been necessary to question V.P. and V.G., particularly since they were not certified court experts as was the case with E.S. The Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court judgment thereby became final. 23.  On 23 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining that the proceedings had been unfair. 24.  On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. It considered that the applicant was simply repeating his arguments from the proceedings before the lower courts challenging their decisions although those decisions did not disclose any arbitrariness or unfairness. 25.  After the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court\u2019s judgment became final (see paragraph 22 above) it was sent for implementation to a single judge of the Zagreb County Court, as provided for under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act (see paragraph 32 below). 26.  In the meantime, the applicant went to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was examined by two experts in forensic psychiatry, A.K. and A.B.M., and a psychologist, S.P. In a report of 10 August 2013 the experts stated that the applicant had various mental disorders of a histrionic type, but did not have paranoid schizophrenia. They also stated that he was fully conscious of his acts and could adopt a critical attitude towards his own conduct. 27.  On 21 October 2013 a judge of the Zagreb County Court ordered that the applicant be sent to the psychiatric hospital. 28.  The applicant appealed against that decision to a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court, referring, inter alia, to the expert report drafted on 10 August 2013 (see paragraph 26 above). 29.  On 7 November 2013 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that there had been nothing in his arguments to raise any doubts about the necessity for his committal to the hospital as established by the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. 30.  According to the available information, the applicant is still at large as he could not be located by the relevant authorities in order to execute the psychiatric internment order.", "references": ["9", "6", "2", "4", "0", "8", "5", "7", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Sofia Prison. 7.  On 17 December 2016 the applicant took a flight from Kutaisi, Georgia, to Sofia, Bulgaria. When trying to pass through the passport control at Sofia Airport, he was arrested pursuant to a red notice issued by the National Central Bureau of Interpol for Iran on 14 September 2016. 8.  According to the red notice, on 24 June 2016 the applicant and another person had stolen by means of trickery a bag containing 50,000 euros from a foreign-exchange office in Tehran. The applicant\u2019s alleged accomplice had been arrested, but the applicant had fled Iran the same day. 9.  The notice went on to say that the offence in connection with which the applicant was being sought was one under Article 656 of the Iranian Penal Code (see paragraphs 38-40 below), and that the maximum penalty in respect of it was three years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  The next day, 18 December 2016, the National Central Bureau of Interpol for Iran confirmed that the applicant was still being sought and sent to the Bulgarian authorities a copy, in Persian, of the warrant for his arrest. 11.  The same day the Bulgarian prosecuting authorities detained the applicant for seventy-two hours. On 21 December 2016 they asked the Sofia City Court to place him in detention for up to forty days pending receipt of a formal extradition request by the Iranian authorities. 12.  The Sofia City Court heard the prosecuting authorities\u2019 application the same day. In his closing statement, the applicant said:\n\u201c[S]ending me to Iran would be unfair, because they have no laws, they decide as they please, they will ascribe this to me and I will not make it home. You know their laws! I have no one to protect me there. They have no laws and judges, but decide as they please. Can you give the sheep to the wolves?\u201d 13.  Having deliberated immediately after the hearing, the Sofia City Court allowed the prosecuting authorities\u2019 request. It noted, inter alia, that at that stage it was not yet deciding whether to extradite the applicant but simply whether to keep him in custody in the meantime. 14.  The applicant\u2019s court-appointed counsel appealed against that decision. However, when the appeal was heard by the Sofia Court of Appeal on 27 December 2016, the applicant said that he had not instructed the court-appointed counsel to lodge it and wished to be represented by counsel of his own choice. In view of the applicant\u2019s statement, the court discontinued the appeal proceedings. 15.  In January 2017 the Iranian authorities submitted to the Bulgarian authorities an extradition request in respect of the applicant. The request stated that the act allegedly committed by him constituted an offence under Article 656 \u00a7 4 of the Iranian Penal Code (see paragraphs 38-40 below), and specified that according to the text of that provision the punishment envisaged under it was six months\u2019 to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 16.  In the request the Iranian authorities assured their Bulgarian counterparts that the applicant would not face torture or inhuman treatment if extradited to Iran. They also expressed their willingness to honour extradition requests by Bulgaria. On that basis, on 26 January 2017 the Bulgarian Minister of Justice confirmed that de facto reciprocity existed between Bulgaria and Iran with respect to extradition. 17.  Extradition proceedings against the applicant were opened in the Sofia City Court on 29 January 2017. He had counsel of his own choice and was given an interpreter into Russian, a language that he apparently speaks. 18.  The same day the prosecuting authorities presented to the applicant and his counsel the extradition request and the documents enclosed with it (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). 19.  The prosecution also asked the court to keep the applicant in detention until the conclusion of the extradition proceedings. The court allowed that request the same day, 29 January 2017. 20.  The court heard the extradition case on 6 and 28 February, 23 March and 12 April 2017. 21.  The line of argument taken by counsel for the applicant from the outset was that the evidence enclosed with the extradition request left some doubt about the actual date and time of the offence the applicant had allegedly committed, and that he could not have committed it on the date and at the time initially specified because he had by then already left Tehran. The prosecution urged the court to invite the Iranian authorities to clarify the date and time of the commission of the alleged offence. 22.  The court did so, in the exercise of its powers under section 17(3) of the Extradition and European Arrest Warrant Act 2005 (see paragraph 34 below), and in a diplomatic note of 5 April 2017 the Iranian authorities said that the applicant had committed the offence at 1.40 p.m. on 23 June 2016. 23.  In his closing statement on 12 April 2017 counsel for the applicant argued that the extradition request, even as supplemented later, failed in various ways to comply with the formal requirements. He said that doubts about the date and time of the commission of the alleged offence \u2013 23 or 24 June 2016 \u2013 persisted, and that the available evidence gave rise to misgivings about whether the applicant had really committed the offence. He also pointed out that although Bulgaria had extradition agreements with many States, Iran was not among them. 24.  The same day the Sofia City Court allowed the request for the applicant\u2019s extradition to Iran. It found, inter alia, that the extradition request met all formal requirements, and that it was permissible to proceed on the basis of the de facto reciprocity between Bulgaria and Iran. It also noted that the Iranian authorities had given assurances that the applicant would not face torture or inhuman treatment, and that there were no reasons to suspect that he would be exposed to a real risk of such treatment. In particular, Iranian law only envisaged imprisonment in respect of the alleged offence. It was not for the extradition court to delve into the merits of the criminal case. 25.  Counsel for the applicant appealed to the Sofia Court of Appeal. He reiterated that the applicant had already left Tehran at the time when the alleged offence had been committed. 26.  The appeal hearing took place on 9 May 2017. Counsel for the applicant made the same points as those that he had made at first instance (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). 27.  In a final decision of the same date, the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the Sofia City Court\u2019s decision to allow the extradition request, for essentially the same reasons. It likewise noted that according to the information from the Iranian authorities, the punishment possibly awaiting the applicant was a term of imprisonment. 28.  The court also decided to keep the applicant in detention pending his extradition to the Iranian authorities.", "references": ["5", "3", "0", "7", "2", "9", "8", "6", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "7.  The Russian Federal Prison Service (\u201cthe FSIN\u201d) transports prisoners across its network of nearly 300 remand prisons and equivalent facilities, eight prisons for convicted offenders, and more than 800 correctional facilities and penal settlements (\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u044f-\u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435). Together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it operates a large fleet of railway carriages and prison vans manned by officers from the convoy department. 8.  The general conditions of transport, as transpires from the material submitted by the parties, may be described as follows. 9.  Special railway carriages for transporting prisoners have a solid metal body mounted on the chassis of a regular passenger carriage. There are four basic models. All have five large compartments and, in addition, four (models nos. 512 and 519) or three (models nos. 824 and 4500) small compartments. The passenger capacity is set out in the \u201cGuidance for equipping penal facilities with security and surveillance systems\u201d (Order no. 279 issued by the Ministry of Justice on 4 September 2006, later replaced by Order no. 94 of 17 June 2013, Annex, point 6.2) and in the Conveyance Instruction (see paragraph 67 below). The measurements based on the technical specifications were given in the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions (see paragraph 69 below). 10.  A large compartment is the same size as a standard Russian passenger compartment designed for four people. It is two metres deep and one and a half metres wide. The prison version of the compartment is fitted with six and a half sleeping places. Six bunks, 60 centimetres wide by 2 metres long, are placed three on each side. A shorter seventh bunk, 50 centimetres wide and 1.6 metres long, bridges the gap between the two middle bunks. The \u201cbridge\u201d bunk makes it impossible to stand upright in the compartment. According to the Conveyance Instruction, a large compartment is suitable for transporting up to twelve people on long\u2011distance journeys or up to sixteen people for short distances. Counsel for the FSIN explained in the proceedings before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 69 below) the manner in which sixteen people were accommodated in a large compartment: five prisoners seated on each of the two lower bunks, one prisoner lying on each of the two upper bunks, and four people seated on the middle bunks joined together with the bridge bunk. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the occupancy limits established in the Conveyance Instruction for long-distance journeys were incompatible with international law (see paragraph 69 below). 11.  Small compartments are two metres deep and one metre wide. They are fitted with three bunks on one side. It is permissible to use them for accommodating up to five people on a long journey or six people on a short journey. 12.  Compartments have no windows or inside lighting. Any light comes through a sliding barred door leading to the corridor where guards are stationed. 13.  Neither mattresses nor bedding is provided. Apart from bunk beds, compartments have no other fixtures or storage space for prisoners\u2019 baggage. 14.  A flush toilet is located at the end of the carriage. It is prohibited to use it when the train is stationary or moving within the perimeter of the sanitary protection zone surrounding a railway station. 15.  Prison vans are used to transport prisoners to and from train stations and also between remand prisons, courts and police wards. They have a van chassis, on which a solid metal body is mounted. The most common brands are GAZ-3307 and 3309 vans with many variants featuring a different number of single- and multi-prisoner cells. Their measurements are set out in vehicle type approval certificates, which were examined in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 69 below), appended to the Government\u2019s submissions in application no. 63058/10, and also listed in point 6.2 of the appendix to the above-mentioned Order no. 94 of 17 June 2013. 16.  The prisoner area of the van has security hatches in the roof but no windows. Prisoners and guards board the van through a back or side door. A central aisle opens onto a guards\u2019 area with cushioned seats for convoy officers and a heating unit. The prisoner area is 1.55 to 1.70 metres high. 17.  A single-prisoner cubicle, commonly referred to by its Russian vernacular name \u201cstakan\u201d (\u201ca drinking glass\u201d), is a solid metal isolation box that is 65 centimetres deep and 50 centimetres wide with one seat inside. Single-prisoner cubicles are used to transport prisoners who belong to a \u201cspecial category\u201d, such as female offenders or former police officers, and as such must be isolated from others (see point 168 of the Conveyance Instruction in paragraph 66 below). These cubicles have a solid metal body and doors with a peephole and small air holes. 18.  Multi-prisoner cells are 1.15 to 1.20 metres deep. They are fitted with two benches facing each other. As per Order no. 94, the occupancy rate in multi-prisoner cells correlates to the length of the bench at a ratio of 45 centimetres per person. Nine or ten-person cells in Gaz and Zil vans are 2.25 to 2.35 metres long; eighteen-person cells in Ural and Kamaz vans are 3.70 metres long. Those cells may have either solid or barred doors. 19.  Mr Aleksey Gennadyevich Tomov was born in 1966 and lives in the village of Vylgort in the Komi Republic. 20.  From 2004 to 2009 Mr Tomov served a custodial sentence in high\u2011security correctional facility IK-22 in Vorkuta. In August 2009, the Vorkuta Town Court amended his sentence, changing the type of facility to a penal settlement. Accordingly, the authorities decided to transfer him to the KP-52 settlement located in the village of Vetyu in the Knyazhpogostskiy district of the Komi Republic. The nearest city was Yemva, which is located some 900 kilometres away from Vorkuta. 21.  The transfer to Yemva began by prison van on 19 September 2009. Mr Tomov and three other detainees were placed in a multi-prisoner cell of a Gaz-3307 van. On its way to the railway station, the van called at the Vorkuta remand prison, where more prisoners were placed on board, bringing the total number of people to ten. The journey to the station took two and a half hours. 22.  The transfer continued by train, along the railway line connecting Vorkuta with Yemva via Pechora and Usinsk. 23.  On the journey between Vorkuta and Usinsk Mr Tomov shared a large compartment with nine people. That part of the transfer began at 5 p.m. on 19 September and ended at 11.30 a.m. the following day. It lasted nineteen hours with a four-hour stop at Pechora. 24.  After a four-hour stop at Usinsk and until their arrival at the destination in Yemva, Mr Tomov shared a small compartment with three people during the second leg of the journey, which lasted from 4.10 p.m. on 20 September until 12.45 p.m. on 21 September, for a total of twenty-one hours with another six-hour stop at Pechora. 25.  Prisoners were allowed to visit the toilet two or three times a day. Using the toilet during stops was prohibited. 26.  Ms Yuliya Vadimovna Punegova was born in 1985 and lives in Syktyvkar. 27.  On 25 and 27 January and 1 and 18 February 2010, in the framework of a pre-trial investigation, she was taken by prison van to the town court, a forensic facility, a remand centre and a hospital. The trips in January lasted three minutes each way, those in February thirty minutes. 28.  According to Ms Punegova, in March, May, July and September 2010 she was also taken to the town court where hearings concerning the matter of her pre-trial detention were held. 29.  After the opening of the trial before the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic, she was shuttled between the remand prison and the trial court on ten or twelve occasions between 15 December 2010 and 24 February 2011. The distance was sixteen kilometres and the travel time thirty-five minutes. 30.  Each time, Ms Punegova was placed in a single-prisoner cubicle inside Gaz and Kavz vans. In the winter months she suffered greatly from the cold because the heating unit was located in the central aisle, while the solid metal door of her cell prevented warm air from circulating. The outside temperature varied between minus 11 and minus 28 degrees Celsius. 31.  Ms Natalya Borisovna Kostromina was born in 1978 and lives in Syktyvkar. She states that she suffers from obesity caused by diabetes. 32.  In June 2010 investigators in Komi asked the prison service to arrange for her transfer from the correctional facility in Kineshma where she was serving her sentence to a remand prison in Syktyvkar. 33.  The transfer began on 25 June 2010 and ended on 18 July 2010. Ms Kostromina transited through remand prisons in Ivanovo, Yaroslavl and Sosnogorsk. She was taken in a prison van from remand centres to railway stations on seven occasions, with each trip lasting one to two hours. 34.  Each time Ms Kostromina was placed in a single-prisoner cubicle in a Gaz prison van, together with another detainee, N., who was also in transit from Kineshma to Syktyvkar. Ms Kostromina\u2019s suffering was aggravated on account of her obesity and unusually hot summer temperatures. 35.  In his letter of 6 June 2011 to a member of the public monitoring commission, the deputy head of the Yaroslavl prison service explained that Ms Kostromina and Ms N. had been placed together in the single-prisoner cubicle in order to isolate them from male offenders. 36.  Mr Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Rakov was born in 1969 in Vladivostok. 37.  Pursuant to an order issued by the Primorskiy Regional Court, Mr Rakov was to be transferred from the facility where he was serving his sentence to a remand prison in Vladivostok, located 200 kilometres away. 38.  At about 4 p.m. on 21 February 2011 Mr Rakov, together with twelve other prisoners, was taken to the Nakhodka railway station and placed in a large compartment of a railway carriage. Prisoners were not allowed to use the toilet until approximately 8 p.m. The wait was particularly difficult for Mr Rakov, who suffered from chronic prostatitis. Upon arriving at Ussuriysk station, the railway carriage was left overnight on a siding with the prisoners locked inside the compartment without access to water or a toilet. They had to urinate into plastic bags or bottles and stash them under the lower bunk. The train arrived at Vladivostok station at about noon the following day, but the prisoners had to wait until 7.30 p.m. until vans were ready to take them to the remand prison. No water or toilet access was authorised during the wait.  The transfer ended at 9 p.m. on 22 February 2011. 39.  Mr Rakov complained about the conditions of his transfer to various authorities and also to a court of general jurisdiction, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 40.  On 12 April 2011 the Primorskiy regional prosecutor\u2019s office replied that they had questioned the guards who had been on duty on 21 and 22 February and established that the number of prisoners in the compartment had not exceeded the norm. Hot water had been distributed between 8.10 p.m. and 8.20 p.m. on 21 February 2011. On the following day no hot water had been distributed because the prisoners had finished their dry rations the previous night. Toilet visits had been authorised from 9.10 p.m. to 10.40 p.m. on 21 February and from 10.10 a.m. to 11.00 a.m. on 22 February. The prosecutor concluded that the guards had not breached any regulations. 41.  On 22 April 2011 the FSIN replied to Mr Rakov that, following verification and having interviewed twenty-three prisoners, it had been established that he had been placed together with nine prisoners in a large compartment. The nine-hour wait at Ussuriysk had been accounted for by the schedule of passenger trains. The relevant sanitary regulations forbade the use of flush toilets of the type installed in prisoner carriages while the train was stationary or was passing through large stations. The FSIN determined that the guards had acted in compliance with the regulations and that the conditions of Mr Rakov\u2019s transportation had not amounted to torture or inhuman treatment. 42.  In his statement of claim to the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok, Mr Rakov designated Mr Shevchenko as his representative. The court informed him that the personal attendance of incarcerated litigants was not provided for by law and invited him to issue a power of attorney for Mr Shevchenko, which Mr Rakov did. On 30 May 2011 the District Court held a hearing, but Mr Shevchenko did not attend. Having heard oral submissions from representatives of the FSIN and the federal treasury, the court rejected Mr Rakov\u2019s claim for compensation. The judgment restated the findings of the above-mentioned inquiry by the FSIN and endorsed its conclusion to the effect that there had been no breach of Mr Rakov\u2019s rights. 43.  Mr Rakov lodged an appeal. He listed Mr Shevchenko as his representative and also sought leave to appear in person. On 12 July 2011 the Primorskiy Regional Court rejected the appeal in a summary decision, without hearing Mr Rakov or his representative. 44.  Mr Dmitriy Lvovich Vasilyev was born in 1958 and lives in Pechora. From 2007 to 2013 he served a custodial sentence in the IK\u201154 correctional facility in the Sverdlovsk Region. 45.  At about 11 p.m. on 10 November 2012 Mr Vasilyev and seven other detainees were loaded into a multi-prisoner cell of a Gaz van. The detainees were in the van for one hour, first in transit to the railway station and later while they waited for the train to arrive. 46.  At about midnight Mr Vasilyev was transferred to a railway carriage, coupled to a passenger train bound for Yekaterinburg. During the eight-hour journey to Yekaterinburg, a two-hour wait in a siding at Yekaterinburg station and a two-hour wait for a police escort, Mr Vasilyev was kept together with between nine and thirteen other people in a large compartment. 47.  In Yekaterinburg, Mr Vasilyev and thirteen other prisoners were taken to the IZ-66/1 remand prison in a multi-prisoner cell of a Kamaz van. The journey ended at 1 p.m. on 11 November 2012 having lasted a total of fourteen hours. 48.  The return journey began at 5 p.m. on 24 November 2012, when Mr Vasilyev and thirteen other prisoners were taken to the railway station in a Kamaz prison van. They were held in a multi-prisoner cell during the two\u2011hour trip. Until 4 a.m. the following day, Mr Vasilyev was transported in a large compartment of a prisoner carriage, with between nine and eleven other people. 49.  At the destination, Mr Vasilyev and seven other prisoners were again loaded into a multi-prisoner cell of a Gaz van. They alighted one hour later at the penal facility. The total duration of the journey was in excess of twelve hours. 50.  Mr Tomov (for his personal details see paragraph 19 above), Mr Nikolay Konstantinovich Roshka, born in 1965 in Moldova, and Mr Nikita Valeryevich Barinov, born in 1990 in Syktyvkar, were in transit between the IZ-11/1 remand prison in Syktyvkar and the IK\u201123 high\u2011security penal facility in the Murmansk Region. It was a journey of approximately 2,200 kilometres. 51.  From 3.30 p.m. to 5 p.m. on 18 December 2015 the three applicants and five other people were placed in a multi-prisoner cell of a Kamaz prison van and taken to Syktyvkar railway station. The same eight prisoners travelled in a large compartment of a prisoner carriage to Sosnogorsk via Ukhta, arriving at 7.30 p.m. the following day. 52.  After a three-night stay at the Sosnogorsk remand prison, in the morning of 22 December they were taken back to Ukhta railway station by prison van in which fourteen people shared a multi-prisoner cell. From 10 a.m. until 7.30 a.m. the following day, ten prisoners, including the applicants, travelled in a large compartment of a railway carriage from Ukhta to Vologda. That journey was followed by a transfer to the Vologda remand prison by van with nine people sharing a multi-prisoner cell. The transfer took one hour. 53.  The three applicants then spent almost three weeks in the Vologda remand prison. 54.  On 13 January 2016 the transfer resumed. From 3.40 p.m. to 5.40 p.m. fifteen prisoners, including the applicants, were placed in a multi\u2011prisoner cell of a Kamaz van and taken to Vologda station. 55.  From 5.40 p.m. on 13 January until 8.10 a.m. on 16 January a total of twelve people were transferred from Vologda to Olenegorsk in the Murmansk Region. They were held in a large compartment of a prisoner railway carriage. During a fifteen-hour stop in St Petersburg on 14 January, the temperature fell to minus 20 degrees Celsius, but the heating did not function because the prisoner carriage was stationary. The prisoners were allowed two toilet visits per day and given three pots of hot water per day. 56.  Lastly, from 8.10 a.m. until 10.10 a.m. on 16 January, fourteen prisoners, including the applicants, were transferred to the penal facility in a multi-prisoner cell of a Kamaz van. 57.  Mr Rakov challenged point 167 of the Conveyance Instruction (see paragraph 67 below), claiming that the excessively high normative capacity of railway carriages led to overcrowding and deprived prisoners of a proper night\u2019s rest. 58.  On 13 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the challenge, finding that the instruction had been issued by the competent authority and did not contradict any hierarchically superior regulations. The normative capacity conformed to the technical specifications of railway carriages and to health and safety regulations. There was no indication that such conditions could be constitutive of torture or inhuman treatment which, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, must involve deliberate infliction of pain or suffering. 59.  Mr Rakov appealed, complaining in particular that the impugned document had not been published and had been classified \u201cfor service use only\u201d. 60.  On 27 December 2011 the Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court rejected the appeal in a summary fashion. 61.  Relying on the Court\u2019s case-law, Mr Tomov and Mr Vasilyev challenged Order no. 279 (see paragraph 9 above), complaining that the normative occupancy rates laid down in the Order were excessively high and necessarily led to overcrowding. 62.  On 16 November 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, finding as follows:\n\u201cThe plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the measurements of cells in prisoner vans and railway carriages, as established in the guidance, are incompatible with the requirements of international law are unfounded because no other normative act of a higher legal order provides for different cell measurements in those conveyances.\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the technical specifications of the guidance are in breach of the case-law of the European Court in the cases of Khudoyorov v. Russia, Guliyev v. Russia, and Idalov v. Russia in the part concerning the conditions of transfer by road and by rail, is erroneous because it does not correspond to the contents [of those judgments].\u201d 63.  On 25 February 2016 the Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court rejected their appeal in a summary fashion.", "references": ["0", "8", "9", "2", "5", "4", "7", "6", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants live in Astrakhan. 7.  The first applicant has been or is a guardian (a foster parent) of the second to eighth applicants. R. was a minor, who remained in the first applicant\u2019s care from 20 July 2001 until 26 July 2010. 8.  At birth R. was diagnosed with several serious health conditions. He spent the first eight months of his life in hospital. As his condition remained very serious and unstable, his natural parents considered themselves unfit to attend to his needs and agreed for their son to be put into the care of the first applicant, who had qualifications in medicine and was an experienced paediatrician. 9.  On 20 July 2001 the first applicant took R. from hospital and brought him at her place of residence. 10.  On 23 November 2001 the Trusovskiy District Council in Astrakhan appointed the first applicant to act as R.\u2019s guardian. The decision stated that R.\u2019s parents were unable to ensure proper care of their child, who had serious congenital diseases, and that therefore they gave their consent in writing to the first applicant\u2019s guardianship over R., and to his transfer into her care. 11.  Eventually, at various dates in the period from 2003 to 2009 the first applicant also was appointed guardian to the second to eighth applicants. 12.  Between 2001 and 2007, the first applicant and R.\u2019s parents maintained good relations. 13.  In 2007 R.\u2019s state of health became more stable, and his parents expressed their wish to take him back into their care. The first applicant refused to return the boy. 14.  On an unspecified date the first applicant brought a claim against R.\u2019s parents in an attempt to have them deprived of their parental authority over him. She argued that they had left R. in the children\u2019s hospital shortly after his birth; that they had not expressed any interest in his life, health and development; that they had not visited him; and that financial support they had given had been inadequate given the child\u2019s special needs. According to the first applicant, R.\u2019s parents were now interested in the boy only with a view to improving their living conditions, as having a disabled child in their care could entitle them to better social housing. The first applicant thus insisted that R.\u2019s parents had evaded their parental duties and thus should be divested of their parental authority over R. 15.  In the proceedings before the first-instance court, the Ministry of Education and Science of Astrakhan Region (hereinafter \u201cthe childcare authority\u201d) provided an expert report on the issue, in which they considered that R.\u2019s parents \u201c[did] not show any interest in his life or health condition, they [did] not participate in his upbringing, they [did] not provide any financial maintenance and [had] chosen not to fulfil their parental duties\u201d. The report concluded that they should be deprived of their parental authority. 16.  On 11 November 2008 the Trusovskiy District Court of Astrakhan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the first applicant\u2019s claim. In particular, it rejected as unfounded the first applicant\u2019s argument that R.\u2019s parents had abandoned him in the children\u2019s hospital; it observed in this connection that no evidence had been submitted to it \u2013 in the form of a written statement by R.\u2019s parents or certificates from any health institutions \u2013 to show that R.\u2019s parents had ever formally renounced their parental authority over the boy. The court further observed that the decision to transfer their son under the first applicant\u2019s guardianship had been taken by the child\u2019s parents at a very difficult time of their lives, when they had faced a very stressful situation of being unable, on their own, to attend to their son\u2019s needs. 17.  The District Court also rejected the first applicant\u2019s allegation concerning R.\u2019s parents\u2019 unwillingness or failure to visit their son in the absence of any obstacles. In the latter connection, the court observed that the first applicant had had a negative attitude towards R.\u2019s parents\u2019 unexpected visits, and she had never informed them of the child\u2019s absence from his place of residence (for outings and trips abroad). Also, R.\u2019s parents had been unable to obtain information about R.\u2019s heath from the relevant healthcare institutions, as the latter had refused give them any such information at the first applicant\u2019s written request. 18.  The court also referred to statements of a number of witnesses which confirmed that R.\u2019s parents had helped the first applicant with his maintenance, both financially and by providing various services requested by the first applicant; in particular, they had had maintenance and repair work in the first applicant\u2019s housing done; they had ensured private transport for R.\u2019s visits to medical appointments; they had supplied medicine and food for R.\u2019s special diet; they had taken his clothes for cleaning and brought him clean clothes. 19.  The court further considered the deprivation of parental authority to be an extraordinary measure that could only be applied on the grounds established in Article 69 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 68 below). In the circumstances of the case, the court did not discern any grounds justifying such a measure. At the same time, the court urged R.\u2019s parents \u201cto change their attitude towards [R.\u2019s] upbringing\u201d and imposed on the competent childcare authority an obligation to monitor their compliance with their parental obligations\u201d. It also noted that the financial support provided by R.\u2019s biological parents was insufficient and ordered that they pay the first applicant one quarter of their monthly income as child maintenance. 20.  On 12 March 2009 the Astrakhan Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 21.  On 26 February 2009 the District Court dismissed an application by R.\u2019s parents to have their son returned to them. 22.  It established, in particular, that the first applicant had been taking good care of R.; that she had actively involved relevant specialist healthcare professionals to ensure that he had received the necessary medical treatment and constant care; she had created all conditions necessary for his life and development, taking into account his special needs. The court also noted that for the period when R. had remained in the first applicant\u2019s care, there had been improvements in his state of his health and progress in his physical and psychological development. It furthermore referred to the evidence confirming that the first applicant\u2019s foster children lived in good living conditions; that they played as a group; that their leisure activities were well organised, and included group nature outings. 23.  The District Court also established, with reference to the available written evidence and witness statements, that, until that moment, R.\u2019s parents had not maintained contact with R., and had never enquired as to his health. 24.  It further observed, with reference to the opinions of healthcare professionals and representatives of the childcare authority who had monitored R., that an abrupt change of surroundings, separation from the people he knew and immediate transfer to his biological parents could seriously traumatise the boy, endanger and harm his psychological state and thus aggravate his conditions. The boy would need a lengthy adaptation period to get used to his natural parents. 25.  The court thus concluded that it would be in the child\u2019s best interests to continue living with the first applicant for the time being. 26.  The judgment became final on 13 March 2009. 27.  On an unspecified date, R.\u2019s parents brought a claim against the first applicant. They complained that she had been obstructing their contact with R. and requested that the court grant them access to the boy, and determine the manner in which they could exercise their contact rights. 28.  By a judgment of 7 May 2009 the District Court determined R.\u2019s parents\u2019 rights of contact with the boy. It established that they should have access to him each Friday from 4.30 to 5.30 pm at the first applicant\u2019s home, and each Sunday from 2 to 4 pm at their home in the first applicant\u2019s presence. 29.  On 10 June 2009 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 30.  The case file reveals that R.\u2019s parents complied with the established order of their contact with R. 31.  On an unspecified date R.\u2019s parents brought another claim against the first applicant and the childcare authority before the District Court. They asked for their son\u2019s return and termination of the first applicant\u2019s guardianship over him. 32.  In the ensuing proceedings both parties were represented by lawyers. 33.  In the context of those proceedings, two reports were drawn up by psychologists of the childcare authority. They reflected the results of monitoring by psychologists of contact sessions between R. and his parents. 34.  The first report dated 29 December 2009 described two contact sessions that had taken place at various times on 25-27 December 2009. It stated, in particular, that R.\u2019s parents had established good psychological contact with the child, and that they had showed a caring and loving attitude towards the boy. The report furthermore stated that, in view of R.\u2019s special condition and the considerable delay in his physical and psychological development, his interaction with the adults was very limited; however, the parents managed to establish tactile and emotional contact with him. Overall, in so far as his conditions made it possible to ascertain, the child felt psychologically comfortable and calm in the presence of his parents. At the same time, the experts pointed out that the child was very fragile and that, for his psychological comfort, he constantly needed the presence of the first applicant. The experts also stated that R.\u2019s parents had insufficient understanding of their son\u2019s emotional state and interests, the particularities of his psychological condition and his capabilities. The report concluded that it was necessary to continue the process of the child\u2019s adaptation to his parents and to that end the duration of the contact sessions between R. and his parents should be extended. 35.  The second report dated 4 May 2010 described two contact sessions that had taken place on 29 and 30 April 2010. It noted the child\u2019s very serious condition, which greatly limited his interaction with the outside world. It further stated, in particular, that R.\u2019s parents had successfully established psychological contact with their son; that they understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. According to the report, when with his parents, R. felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, R.\u2019s parents had created a warm and beneficial environment propitious for the child\u2019s development. 36.  In the proceedings before the court, the childcare authority expressed a generally favourable opinion regarding R.\u2019s return to his biological parents, but pointed out that, in view of R.\u2019s state of health, his integration into his family should be gradual. In particular, the duration of his contact sessions with the parents, which to then had taken place twice a week in daytime, could be extended and could include night-time contact. 37.  On 4 May 2010 the District Court allowed R.\u2019s parents\u2019 claims. 38.  It examined in detail the circumstances of R.\u2019s transfer to the first applicant\u2019s care and the relations between the first applicant, R.\u2019s parents and R. from that time forward. It pointed out, in particular, that R.\u2019s parents had surrendered their son to the first applicant\u2019s care given his very serious condition and her experience as a paediatrician; at that time they had considered themselves incapable of ensuring the specialist care he needed. 39.  It rejected as untenable on the facts the first applicant\u2019s argument that R.\u2019s parents had abandoned their son in the hospital without valid reasons. It noted in this connection:\n\u201cNeither the statements made by [R.\u2019s] parents nor relevant medical documents [to confirm that argument] were presented to the court. The [defendants] denied this fact. They submitted that they had not abandoned their child. On the contrary, they wanted him to get better and to return to his family.\nIt follows from the material in the case file that [R.] was given into the care of the guardian after his parents\u2019 futile attempts to provide him with due medical care and in the child\u2019s [best] interests ...\n[R.\u2019s parents] did not intend to abandon their child ... Even though he was under the [first applicant\u2019s] guardianship, [his] family took an interest in his life and health, they provided ... financial support.\u201d 40.  The District Court further referred to statements of various witnesses. In particular, eleven witnesses described the first applicant as a kind, caring and empathetic person, who helped other families with children with disabilities. They also stated that she had taken good care of R., that as a paediatrician she had attended to his needs, and that his condition had visibly improved owing to her efforts. The witnesses furthermore stated that the first applicant went with her foster children on trips, within the country and abroad. With respect to those statements the District Court noted that they confirmed only the first applicant\u2019s good and caring attitude towards R. and the fact that she had duly performed her obligations towards him. However, in the court\u2019s view, those statements did not show that R.\u2019s parents were unable to take good care of the boy, nor that in view of R.\u2019s physical and psychological condition he should continue living with the first applicant. 41.  The court also referred to statements of Ms Z., a paediatrician, who submitted that she had known and been treating R. since he had been eight months old when he had been given into the first applicant\u2019s care. The child had suffered from a serious congenital illness and had spent considerable time in hospital. At that time, his condition was stable, yet serious owing to his diagnosis \u2013 a central nervous system disorder and mobility impairments. The child needed constant appropriate care and supervision rather than mere medical treatment. The child had grown in ten years, had changed emotionally. He reacted to the people around him. However, he could not take care of himself. He could not eat, drink or walk on his own. He was in need of constant care. Ms Z. also added that she had accompanied the first applicant when she had taken R. to Austria for medical treatment. The boy had had a different reaction when the first applicant had held him in her arms and when Ms Z. had held him in her arms. 42.  Ms M., one of the psychologists who had drawn up the reports of 29 December 2009 and 4 May 2010 (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above), submitted that it had been established in the course of monitoring that R.\u2019s parents had learnt to identify and adequately understand specific psychological and physical particularities of their son. They showed genuine interest in the child and surrounded him with truly parental attention, love and care. They regularly consulted psychologists concerning the psychological condition of a child with developmental difficulties, asking about the requisite material and toys for, and how they should build communication, with such a child. 43.  The District Court went on as follows:\n\u201cAccordingly, as a result of monitoring of the contact sessions, it has been established that [R.\u2019s] parents communicated with [him] in a calm, sincere and benevolent manner. They successfully established psychological contact with him. They understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. When with his parents, [R.] felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, they created a warm and beneficial environment favourable for the child\u2019s development.\nAccording to the report on the plaintiffs\u2019 living conditions ... in a two-room flat, the conditions were found satisfactory and corresponding to the family\u2019s needs and favourable for children\u2019s upbringing and living. [R.\u2019s] parents provided the conditions necessary for [his] living and upbringing.\n...\nThe adduced materials reveal that [R.\u2019s] parents are a stable ... family. They are well-to-do and make an adequate living. They have permanent employment [and a] stable income. They provided positive personal references from their employers and from their place of residence. They do not have a history of psychiatric diseases or criminal records. Accordingly, they meet all the conditions and can raise the child and provide him with due care.\u201d 44.  The court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s argument that R.\u2019s parents were seeking to cancel her guardianship in order to obtain better social housing. According to the court, this allegation had been refuted in the course of the proceedings by the explanations provided by R.\u2019s parents, and by the evidence proving that their minor children, including R., owned shares in their flat. 45.  It further rejected the argument advanced by the childcare authority that the child should be gradually integrated into his parents\u2019 family (see paragraph 36 above). In the court\u2019s view, such gradual integration would have a negative impact on the child\u2019s psychological state. Furthermore, it would interfere with his right to live and be brought up in his family. The court further stated that R.\u2019s parents were his natural parents; they showed due care and love for him, and had by that time established psychological contact with him on the basis of contact sessions that had taken place over a considerable period of time, in particular in their flat. The child understood that his mother and father were his parents, in so far as his psychological development allowed it. The court also pointed out that the childcare authority had admitted that the reunification of R. with his family ultimately served his interest. 46.  The District Court thus considered that \u201cno convincing evidence [had been] submitted to show that [R.\u2019s] parents [had been] unable to bring up their child with due care and attention\u201d, and concluded as follows:\n\u201cRegard being had to the above, the court holds that the plaintiffs\u2019 claim should be granted and they should be reunited with their child in order for them to continue exercising their parental rights in respect of the child\u2019s education and development.\n... the court holds that the [administrative] decision ... [of] 23 November 2001 ... should be terminated as no longer needed.\u201d 47.  The first applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. 48.  On 23 June 2010 the Regional Court examined the first applicant\u2019s appeal submissions, where she and her lawyer made their case in person. 49.  It then upheld the judgment of 4 May 2010 on appeal. It considered that the District Court had thoroughly examined the case and accurately established the relevant circumstances; that on the basis of various pieces of written evidence, the report of 4 May 2010 regarding the effects of R.\u2019s parents\u2019 contact with him and a report on their living conditions being amongst their number, as well as on the basis of numerous witness statements, the first-instance court had taken a justified and well-reasoned decision that R.\u2019s transfer to his biological family had been in his best interests. 50.  On 26 July 2010 R. was transferred to his parents. 51.  On an unspecified date the first applicant brought an action against R.\u2019s parents on behalf of herself and on behalf of the other applicants in an attempt to gain access to R. She averred, in particular, that for the nine years during which R. had remained in her care, she and her foster children \u2013 the other applicants \u2013 had formed a family with a special bond existing between them; she further complained that, after R.\u2019s transfer to his parents, there had been no contact between R. and the applicants, as R.\u2019s parents had obstructed their attempts to maintain contact. 52.  On 19 April 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim. 53.  It observed, in particular, that Article 64 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 65 below) vested the authority to represent and protect a child\u2019s interests in his or her natural parents, unless the latter\u2019s interests stood in conflict with their child\u2019s. The District Court stated, with reference to the available evidence and witness statements, that after R.\u2019s transfer to his biological parents, they had established all the requisite conditions for the boy\u2019s life and education, and had been fully able to attend to his needs. In particular, R. had undergone all the necessary medical examinations; and his parents had complied with healthcare professionals\u2019 recommendations as regards his care and medical assistance. The court concluded that R.\u2019s parents were acting in his interests. 54.  The District Court further noted that R.\u2019s parents as well as the childcare authority objected to the applicants\u2019 communication with R. It also observed that it was impossible to find out R.\u2019s opinion on the matter in view of his medical conditions. 55.  The District Court went on to observe that the first applicant was not a member of R.\u2019s family or a relative, within the meaning of Article 67 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 66 below), nor did she have any legal ties with him after her guardianship over the boy had been terminated by a court decision, with the result that she did not pertain to the category of individuals entitled to seek access to the child under the Russian Family Code. In the court\u2019s view, statements of a number of witnesses confirming R.\u2019s attachment to the first applicant and her taking good care of him \u201cwere not grounds for including the first applicant in the category of individuals entitled under the relevant legal provision to claim access to the child\u201d. 56.  The first applicant appealed arguing, in particular, that the first\u2011instance court had erred, in the absence of a forensic expert examination of the matter, in its finding that the second applicant had been incapable of having and forming attachments to her and the other applicants; she complained that her request to have such an expert examination ordered had been rejected by the District Court. The applicant also argued that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy, as the relationship between the applicants and R. had been similar to that between biological family members. 57.  On 8 June 2011 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 19 April 2011 on appeal. It noted, in particular:\n\u201cWhen dismissing the [first applicant\u2019s] claims, the [first-instance] court considered that, as set forth in Article 67 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to grandfathers, grandmothers, brothers, sisters and other relatives, while [the first applicant] is, as a matter of law, not regarded as a member of the family or a relative of a minor or any other person whose relationship with him is governed by family law (appointed guardians, custodians, de facto guardians) given that her guardianship has been terminated.\nThe [Regional Court] upholds the above finding of the first-instance court. By virtue of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to a grandmother, a grandfather, brothers and sisters, [and] the child\u2019s close relatives who take part in his upbringing and education. Accordingly, the legislation protects [the relevant rights] of close relatives. The right of access to a child is not guaranteed to other individuals.\u201d 58.  As regards the first applicant\u2019s argument that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy and should have considered her as R.\u2019s family member given the nature of ties between them, the appellate court noted as follows:\n\u201cWhen resolving the dispute, the court did not apply the law by analogy. ... [T]he members of the family, as a matter of law, are understood only as the individuals directly indicated in the Family Code of the Russian Federation. The resolution of a dispute by analogy would otherwise contradict the essence of the family relationship.\u201d 59.  The court also rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the first\u2011instance court had failed to determine the degree of R.\u2019s attachment to the applicants; it stated in this connection that the argument in question \u201clacked a legal basis\u201d. 60.  The Regional Court also endorsed the District Court\u2019s findings that R.\u2019s parents had provided the requisite care to R.; and that they had carried out necessary medical and rehabilitation measures. It \u201c[discerned] no evidence that R.\u2019s rights or interests [had been] infringed\u201d and dismissed the first applicant\u2019s argument to that end as unsubstantiated.", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "5", "3", "2", "0", "7", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are eight Russian nationals whose particulars are listed in the appendix. 6.  The applicants were living together at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr\u2011Kort, Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia. They are related (three adult siblings: two brothers and a sister; and the wife and three minor children of one brother). 7.  The three applicants-siblings have another brother, Mr Ali T., known as \u201cMagas\u201d. Since the 1990s Mr Ali T. has been suspected of participating in, and then leading, illegal armed groups operating in Ingushetia and masterminding a number of crimes and terrorist attacks. In July 2001 he was pronounced dead by the Nazran District Court; however, that information was later refuted and attributed to his use of false identity documents. On 26 November 2004 the Nazran District Court revoked the pronouncement in view of new information. 8.  Mr Ali T. was arrested in Ingushetia in June 2010. The criminal investigation into his activities continued until December 2012. In February 2014 the Russian Supreme Court, in a final judgment, found him guilty of a number of terrorism-related crimes, entailing dozens of victims among civilians and security personnel. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 9.  The applicants submitted that they had had no direct contact with Mr Ali T. since 1998. The Government explained, in additional observations of 18 April 2012, that there were a number of pieces of evidence indicating that between 2004 and June 2010 Mr Ali T. had been in regular contact with his relatives in Nasyr-Kort. That evidence included witness statements collected by the criminal investigation between the end of 2010 and early 2011, including those of Mr Ali T. himself, his wife and other persons. According to the evidence, his wife had resided at the said address since 2004, a fact which the relatives must have been aware of. No copies of the documents in question have been provided by the Government. 10.  The Government provided a copy of a certificate issued by the Nasyr-Kort administration on 6 July 2010 to the effect that Mr Ali T. had at the material time been registered as resident at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr\u2011Kort, together with the applicants and other members of the extended family. The document did not list the third applicant among the residents at that address. The Government explained that in March 2011 the third applicant\u2019s place of residence was recorded as 4, Zapadnaya Street, Nasyr-Kort. 11.  On 18 July 2013 the Court rendered a judgment in case no. 50757/06, Taziyeva and Others v. Russia. It was lodged by nine applicants, including two of the applicants in the present case, Mr Askhab Taziyev (the fourth applicant in the present case) and Ms Zareta Taziyeva (the third applicant). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the fact that a search had been carried out without a warrant at the applicants\u2019 house in Nasyr-Kort. The search had been carried out in December 2005 as part of a counter-terrorist operation aimed at apprehending Mr Ali T., and the authorities had relied on the Suppression of Terrorism Act as the only legal basis. In respect of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court found that the applicants had failed to substantiate their complaint in this respect and dismissed it as manifestly ill-founded. 12.  On 21 February 2011 a senior investigator requested authorisation to search the house at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr\u2011Kort. He substantiated his request by reference to the ongoing investigation in case no. 171822 against the leaders and members of \u201cImarat Kavkaz\u201d (declared a terrorist organisation by the Supreme Court in February 2008), and the possibility that documents and items relevant for the investigation, including weapons, ammunition and explosives, might be stored there. 13.  On 22 February 2011 the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow granted the request, pursuant to Articles 165 and 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d). The reasoning and operative part of the decision read as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the documents submitted [number and dates] that ... [T.] Ali M., who stands accused of committing crimes under Articles 208 \u00a7 1, 279, and 222 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code [leadership of an armed gang, organisation of an armed revolt and unlawful handling of arms and ammunition], is one of the leaders of illegal armed group \u201cImarat Kavkaz\u201d ... At his address of registration there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation ...\nThe investigation of this criminal case is particularly complex. It is an exceptional case because it involves criminal activity of a large number of accused who have not yet been arrested, it continues to be carried out in conditions of strict secrecy on the territory of several regions of the Russian Federation and foreign states, and it relates to involvement in criminal activity organised by Umarov D.H. It involves a large number of people. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds to believe that at the address where A.M.[T.] is registered there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation. ...\nThe court, having examined the submitted documents and heard the opinions of the senior prosecutor and the senior investigator, authorises the search of the registered address of A.M.[T.], being satisfied that for the purposes of the investigation there is enough information to believe that there may be objects and documents relevant to the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation on the territory of the Russian Federation.\n...\nDECIDES:\nTo grant the request of the senior special-case investigator [name] to carry out the search on the premises in relation to case no. 171872 and to allow the search at the place of registration of [T.] Ali M at [the address].\nThe decision may be appealed against to the Moscow City Court within ten days.\u201d 14.  On 3 March 2011 servicemen arrived at Nasyr-Kort and surrounded the area around the applicants\u2019 home. They used an armoured personnel carrier, several minibuses and a car. They entered the courtyard and searched the house and surrounding premises. 15. At 2 p.m. on 3 March 2011 the third applicant signed the search warrant. 16.  The second and third applicants were ordered into a minibus, where they were questioned about their brother, Mr Ali T. Other applicants, their neighbours and vehicles were moved a safe distance from the house. Soon afterwards, there was an explosion. 17.  The applicants\u2019 home consisted of two dwellings: a newly finished house with a basement and garage, which was destroyed by the explosion, along with two cars parked in the courtyard; and a second house, which was damaged and rendered unfit for habitation. There were also two \u201ctechnical\u201d buildings \u2013 a garage and an old house used for storage; the latter remained intact but the applicants alleged that all valuables had gone. 18.  At 3.35 p.m. a senior investigator from the Federal Security Service of Russia (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) drew up a search report. It stated that during the search, in the basement of the dwelling situated to the right of the entrance, an improvised explosive device (\u201cIED\u201d) had been discovered consisting of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonator wrapped in black cellophane tape, connected with wires. For security reasons, all persons present at the site and neighbours had been taken a safe distance from the house. The explosives experts had attempted to deactivate the device using a hydro detonator (water cannon). The deactivation had failed and the IED had exploded, causing destruction of the dwelling. Several identity documents and photographs had been collected among the debris. The report was signed by two attesting witnesses, and each page contained an indication that the third applicant had refused to sign it. 19.  Later on 3 March 2011, the site and the debris were inspected by an investigator from the Nazran Interior Department and a report was drawn up. The report ran to six pages and was complete with a plan of the premises; photographs were also taken. The report stated that both dwellings located in the courtyard had been damaged: the window panes and doors were broken, the roofs and the walls were damaged. The third building, a technical shed, had been completely destroyed. Two cars located in the courtyard had also been destroyed and covered with broken bricks. The investigators had collected swabs from the site. The report was co-signed by the investigator, an explosives expert and two attesting witnesses. 20.  The following day the local police reported the explosion at the applicants\u2019 house to the media. The press release stated that FSB servicemen had located two IEDs in the basement and had called in experts. The experts had been unable to deactivate the devices and had had to destroy them with controlled blasts; as a result, the dwellings had been damaged but there were no casualties. 21.  The applicants submitted that the search of 3 March 2011 had been conducted without any authorising documents or attesting witnesses, and that they had been subjected to threats and intimidation by the servicemen. 22.  After the search, the superior officer had said on the radio that no explosives had been found in the yard. The second and third applicants had been ordered to proceed to one of the minibuses parked about 300 metres from the house and interrogated. They had been intimidated and forced to admit that they had been in contact with their brother and had received money from him. They had also been forced to sign several documents. 23.  During the interrogation of the second and third applicants, the armed men had ordered the inhabitants of the neighbouring houses to move as far away as possible because the servicemen had been planning to blow up the house. The military vehicles had also been moved to a safe distance. Later, the applicants had witnessed an explosion. When they had returned to the house, they had seen only debris and realised that all their belongings had been destroyed (washing machine, gold items, tea sets and so on). In addition, two cars that had been parked in the courtyard had been damaged and their radios had been missing. The applicants submitted a video clip showing the state of their house and the courtyard after the explosion. 24.  According to the Government, prior to the search, the third applicant had been presented with a warrant, as attested by her signature. The search had been conducted in the presence of an investigator, two attesting witnesses and the second and third applicants. The security forces had discovered improvised explosive devices in the basement of the applicants\u2019 house and had therefore moved the applicants, as well as their neighbours, to a safe distance. A bomb-disposal expert had used a water cannon, but had failed to deactivate the device and it had exploded, causing the detonation of other explosives, which had not been found during the search. Those explosions had destroyed the dwellings. The second IED had not been recorded in the search record because the security forces had found only one explosive device; they had presumed that the first explosion had detonated the second device. 25.  On 3 March 2011 the third applicant was questioned by an investigator from Nazran police station, and a report was drawn up. She stated that earlier that day armed people had come to their house in several cars and an armed personnel carrier (\u201cAPC\u201d). She and her relatives had been escorted to a vehicle, where she had been questioned. Later she had been shown a site inspection report and had been asked to sign it. She had noted something about an explosion. She had been stressed and under pressure to sign the papers. After the armed persons had left, the applicant and her family had discovered that their residence had been destroyed, the buildings having been blown up. She categorically denied that any IEDs had been stored in the house and suggested that the explosions had been set up by the servicemen. 26.  The second applicant and three neighbours were also questioned by the Nazran police on 3 March 2011. The second applicant stated that the persons who had carried out the search had asked him to show them around. Together with him, they had first entered the house to the left of the entrance to the courtyard, then the two technical buildings, and finally the dwelling that was located to the right. Once the examination of the dwellings had been completed, the second and third applicants and Mr K., a neighbour who had been at their place, had been escorted to a minibus parked nearby. One of the officers had reported to someone over the radio that \u201ceverything was ok\u201d. Inside the vehicle, the two applicants had been questioned about their brother, Ali T., who at the time had been under arrest. Then the second applicant had heard over the radio that an explosive device had been found in the basement and an explosives expert had been called in. In the afternoon he had seen that everyone had left the premises and an explosion had followed; about ten minutes later another explosion had occurred. Both dwellings had been destroyed. After the military had left, the applicants had returned to their home and found the two dwellings destroyed, while the \u201ctechnical\u201d building had been looted \u2013 many of their belongings had gone. The applicant suggested that the explosions had been set up by the military. 27.  The applicants\u2019 neighbours confirmed that the armed men who had carried out the search at the applicants\u2019 house had asked them to leave their houses sometime after 2 p.m. The men had explained that a bomb had been found and there was a risk of explosion. The neighbours had complied; two explosions had occurred within about ten minutes. Later in the day the servicemen had left and the neighbours had been allowed to return to their houses. 28.  On 4 March 2011 the third applicant lodged several complaints with different authorities, including the State prosecutor\u2019s office and the head of the Nazran Interior Department. She complained of the unlawful search, of intimidation during the interrogation, and the theft and destruction of their property. Throughout the following month, she sent several letters to the authorities. 29.  On 12 March 2012 Mr K., the applicants\u2019 neighbour, issued an affidavit. He explained that on 3 March 2011 he had been at the applicants\u2019 home. At about 11 a.m. a large group of armed people and an APC had arrived at the place and a search had been conducted. The witness had not seen any documents or attesting witnesses. He had been taken to a minibus parked nearby, but when the officers had found out that he was not a member of the family, he had been asked to leave. Several hours later all the neighbours had been evacuated from their houses and then two explosions had followed, within a space of ten minutes. 30.  All the complaints were forwarded to and dealt with by the military investigation division, military unit no. 68799, located in the Republic of Ingushetia. 31.  On 8 April 2011 a military investigator refused to open a criminal investigation. The third applicant was informed of that decision by letters of 8 and 18 April, and 5 May 2011, indicating a possibility to appeal. 32.  The decision of 8 April 2011 was revoked by a military investigator\u2019s decision on 27 October 2011. The third applicant was informed by a letter dated 27 October 2011 that the investigation had resumed. On 14 November 2011 the third applicant was informed that the investigation had been stayed on 2 November, indicating a possibility to appeal.\n(b)  The decision of 22 November 2011 33.  On 22 November 2011 the military investigator refused to open an investigation into crimes committed under Articles 286 (exceeding official powers) and 158 (theft) of the Criminal Code. A five-page summary of the decision, forwarded to the third applicant on the same day, indicated that the following procedural measures had been taken: on 14 November 2011 a military investigator had questioned the bomb-disposal expert and the FSB investigator who had conducted the search of the premises. On 16 and 18 November 2011 he had questioned four other FSB officers who had taken part in the search, and on 17 November 2011 he had questioned two attesting witnesses. The third applicant had also been questioned. 34.  The investigator noted that the third applicant had been presented with the search warrant prior to the search, and had counter-signed it. No pressure had been put on her or any other members of her family. At the beginning of the search, in the cellar of one of the buildings, the officers had discovered an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell. The third applicant had denied having any information about the IED. All those present had been taken to a safe distance and the bomb-disposal expert had tried to dismantle it; he had been unsuccessful and the device had exploded. It had caused the detonation of a second device, of which the officers had been unaware. Only one IED had been found and recorded in the site inspection report. 35.  The bomb-disposal expert stated that he had taken part in the search and found an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonating device, wrapped up in black cellophane and connected to the IED with wire. The persons present had been evacuated, following which the IED had been detonated with the help of a hydro detonator. That had resulted in an explosion, the destruction of the building and a fire. About two minutes later another undiscovered IED had detonated, probably because of the fire. 36.  The FSB officers confirmed their presence at the site on the day in question, the fact they had been informed about the discovery of the IED and the need to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. 37.  Finally, the investigator referred to the search report and the site inspection report drawn up on the day in question. 38.  The decision concluded as follows:\n\u201cDrawing on the above, the [third applicant\u2019s] allegations about the unlawful search, use of violence, explosions, damage, destruction and theft of property have not been confirmed by the results of the inquiry.\nIt has been established that the search at the third applicant\u2019s house was carried out by investigator F. on the basis of the decision of 22 February 2011 issued by the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow ... on lawful grounds, with attesting witnesses, and without any breaches of the law. During the search the investigator and the explosives expert did not issue any threats, use violence, force [people] to give statements, or otherwise cause any harm to the third applicant.\nContrary to the applicant\u2019s assertions, the circumstances did not reveal any fault in the actions of the investigator and the explosives expert. They acted lawfully, with the aim of eliminating danger to the life and health of all those present during the search and the residents of the nearby houses. ... Noting well-established facts pointing at the commission by Mr Ali [T.] (\u201cMagas\u201d) of a number of terrorist acts with the use of explosive devices, the investigator took a well-grounded decision to carry out the search with the participation of an explosives expert, who had been instructed to examine the dwellings in order to find potential explosive devices and deactivate them, in order to ensure the safety of all those present.\nThe search report of 3 March 2011 indicated that the explosives expert had found an IED in the cellar of one of the dwellings. Having carefully examined the situation, and taking into account that the IED could have detonated at any moment, the investigator took a grounded decision to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. Under such circumstances, there was no time or possibility to take personal belongings out of the house. Once the evacuation was completed, the explosives expert attempted to deactivate the IED by special means. The attempt led to the IED\u2019s detonation; the ensuing explosions destroyed the dwellings. No one was hurt, due to the security measures taken. ...\nUnder such circumstances, the consequences of the detonation of the explosive device that had occurred while it was being deactivated, and the destruction of the dwellings and other possible damage to property, do not attest to unlawful actions on the part of the law-enforcement personnel, contrary to the applicant\u2019s assertion. The applicant\u2019s allegations have not been confirmed. ...the applicant\u2019s request to open a criminal investigation for abuse of official functions by the investigator and the explosives experts should be dismissed.\u201d 39.  The decision of 22 November 2011 was communicated to the third applicant on the same day. The applicants never appealed against it. 40.  On 12 March 2012 the third applicant asked military investigation unit no. 68799 to send her copies of the decisions of the military investigator of 8 April, 27 October, 2 November and 11 November 2011. On 21 March 2012 the military investigator again forwarded the copies of the requested decisions to the third applicant. It does not appear that the applicants maintained any further contact with the investigation. 41.  In the meantime, on 20 June 2011 the third applicant lodged a court action under Article 125 of the CCrP with the Magas District Court. She complained of a lack of investigation into her complaints of 4 March 2011 and that no decision had yet been made on that matter. She requested the court to assess the authorities\u2019 failure to investigate the incident. 42.  On 27 June 2011 the Magas District Court held a hearing. A representative of the State prosecutor\u2019s office informed the court and the third applicant that her complaints had been forwarded to the military investigation division and that an investigation was still ongoing. The District Court dismissed the action in view of the ongoing investigation. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 43.  In their additional observations of 18 April 2012 the Government explained, without providing copies of the relevant documents, that the criminal investigation against Mr Ali T. and other leaders of the terrorist organisation (file no. 171822) included the incident concerning storage of IEDs at the applicants\u2019 address. At the time of submission of the observations, the criminal investigation was still ongoing, and the documents and witness statements collected within it could not be disclosed, in the interests of justice.", "references": ["8", "2", "5", "1", "3", "0", "7", "9", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and was convicted of attempting to undermine the constitutional order and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At the time of the events relating to the application, he was serving his sentence in the Edirne F-type prison. 6.  Since his imprisonment the applicant has been represented by his lawyer in respect of several applications, including the present application, before the Court. 7.  On an unspecified date, the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a package by post to the applicant. The prison administration believed the contents of the package to be suspect and therefore lodged a request on 12 August 2005 with the public prosecutor for a decision to be taken by an enforcement court to determine whether the material sent to the applicant concerned defence-related documents or whether they concerned any objectionable content so as to prevent them from being handed over to the applicant. 8.  On 25 August 2005 the Edirne Enforcement Court allowed an application by the prosecutor and examined the contents of the package, which contained a book entitled Globalisation and Imperialism (K\u00fcreselle\u015fme ve Emperyalizm), a magazine with the title Rootless Anational Publication (K\u00f6x\u00fcz Anasyonal Ne\u015friyat), and a newspaper with the title Express International Sha la la (Express Enternasyonal \u015ealala). The court held that the material in question did not relate to the rights of the defence and that therefore they should not be handed over to the applicant pursuant to section 5 of Law no. 5351. 9.  On 16 September 2005 the applicant objected to the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court before the Edirne Assize Court. He submitted that he had asked his lawyer to bring those books and magazines in question simply because he had wanted to read them. He submitted that it had been the prison administration which had told his lawyer that they could not be brought in person and had therefore to be sent by post. He further argued that while it was correct that they had not been related to his rights of defence, they were not illegal publications and there had been no basis for the prison administration to withhold them from him simply because they had been sent by post by his lawyer. 10.  On 30 September 2005, the Edirne Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objections on the basis of the case file, holding that the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court had been in accordance with law and procedure. 11.  In the meantime, that is to say on 16 September 2005, the prison administration lodged another request with the public prosecutor in relation to the package sent by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. In that request, it submitted that the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s conduct had been incompatible with her duties as a lawyer and requested that section 5 of Law no. 5351, which provides for an official to be present during consultations between a prisoner and his or her lawyer, be applied to the applicant. 12.  On 23 September 2005, referring to its earlier decision of 25 August 2005, the Edirne Enforcement Court in an examination carried out on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing and without seeking submissions from the applicant or his lawyer, granted an application on the part of the prison administration and therefore held that an official was to be present during the applicant\u2019s consultations with his lawyer. The decision did not specify how long the restriction was to remain in force. The Edirne Enforcement Court further held that, if requested, a separate decision would be taken as to whether the exchange of documents between the applicant and his lawyer would also be subject to a restriction. 13.  On 24 October 2005 the applicant objected to the decision of 23 September 2005 before the Edirne Assize Court. He submitted that the impugned decision did not explain why it was necessary to restrict the privacy of his consultations with his lawyer. He argued in that connection that a provision which provided for such a restriction could only be applied if it had emerged from documents and other evidence that visits by lawyers to a person convicted of organised crime had been serving as a means of communication within the criminal organisation in question. He argued that no such element had been present in his situation and the court had not conducted any examination in that connection. Lastly, he maintained that there were no legal provisions prohibiting the exchange of legal books and magazines between a prisoner and his lawyer. The applicant did not request that the examination of his case be carried out by holding a hearing. 14.  On 27 October 2005 the Edirne Assize Court dismissed the case on the basis of the case file and without holding a hearing. Without responding to the applicant\u2019s arguments, it held that the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision of 23 September 2005 had been in accordance with the law and procedure. 15.  On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Edirne Enforcement Court for the restriction on the conversations between him and his lawyer to be lifted. 16.  On 4 June 2008 the applicant\u2019s application was dismissed on the basis of the case file. The court held that the decision of 23 September 2005 had become final and that there was no need for a further examination. 17.  The applicant lodged another application on 2 November 2010 and applied for a hearing in accordance with the new amendments to the procedure before the enforcement courts (see paragraph 27 below). On 6 December 2010 the Edirne Enforcement Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for a hearing, holding that the new amendments to the procedure concerned only the examination of objections against disciplinary sanctions, so that in so far as the restriction of 23 September 2005 had not been a disciplinary sanction, no hearing could be held in respect of that complaint. It further dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the restriction to be lifted, holding that the decision of 23 September 2005 had been final. An appeal against that decision by the applicant was dismissed on 24 August 2011. 18.  On 21 February 2013 the applicant lodged an application again with the Edirne Enforcement Court and repeated his request for the restriction to be lifted. The court dismissed that application on 11 April 2013, holding that there had not been any change in the circumstances of the applicant and the decision relating to the restriction on the consultations with the applicant\u2019s lawyer. In that connection, the court held that there was still a risk in view of the previous decisions taken in respect of the applicant by the enforcement courts as well as the lawyer\u2019s conduct. An appeal by the applicant against that decision was rejected on 10 June 2013. 19.  At time of the adoption of this judgment, the restriction on the applicant\u2019s right to conf\u0131dential communications with his lawyer remains in place. 20.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining about the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision of 25 August 2005. 21.  On 8 December 2015 the Court delivered an inadmissibility decision on account of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and held that the applicant had to make use of the new domestic remedy established by Law no. 6384 (see Altay and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 9100/06 and 155 others). 22.  On 1 November 2016 the Compensation Commission held that the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision not to hand over the book and the periodicals sent to the applicant by his lawyer had infringed the applicant\u2019s right to receive information within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. They held in that connection that the impugned decision had constituted an interference which had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons, notably because the domestic court had not explained in its decision in what respect the books and magazines in question had jeopardised the security of the institution.", "references": ["2", "7", "0", "8", "1", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. He is a political activist, opposition leader, anti-corruption campaigner and popular blogger. 6.  In 2011-12 the applicant ran an increasingly public anti-corruption campaign targeting high-ranking public officials (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, \u00a7 15, 23 February 2016). He organised and led a number of rallies (see, in particular, Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, 15 November 2018), including an assembly at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (see, among other sources, in Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). 7.  At the beginning of 2012 the applicant investigated the off-duty activities of the chief of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe Investigation Committee\u201d), Mr Bastrykin. On 25 April 2012 the Investigation Committee, on the direct order of Mr Bastrykin, instituted criminal proceedings for embezzlement against the applicant (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, hereinafter \u201cthe Kirovles case\u201d). On 5 July 2012 Mr Bastrykin made a public statement expressing his determination to have the applicant prosecuted. On 26 July 2012 the applicant published an article about Mr Bastrykin, alleging in particular that his business activities and residence status in the Czech Republic were incompatible with the office he held, under the domestic law (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 30\u201131 and 118). 8.  On 4 December 2012 the Investigation Committee decided to open a criminal file on suspicion that the applicant and his brother had committed fraud against the limited liability companies Multidisciplinary Processing (\u201cMPK) and Yves Rocher Vostok and laundered the proceeds of illegal transactions. On 20 December 2012 charges of fraud and money laundering were brought against the applicant under Articles 159.4 and 174.1 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 17 December 2012 the Investigation Committee ordered the applicant not to leave the city of Moscow pending the completion of the investigation to secure his appearance before the investigator. On the same date the investigator granted a request from the applicant to be allowed to travel to Moscow Region (outside the city of Moscow), subject to an obligation to inform the investigator. The investigator\u2019s ruling read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cThe request by [the applicant\u2019s lawyer] to allow his client A.A. Navalnyy to travel to Moscow Region should be granted; the investigator must be informed about making [such] journeys.\u201d 10.  On 18 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov found the applicant guilty of organising large-scale embezzlement in the Kirovles case and gave him a suspended prison sentence of five years. The Court subsequently found that those proceedings had been conducted in violation of Article 6 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 102-21). 11.  On 13 January 2014 the applicant informed the investigator that he had travelled to Moscow Region before and during the New Year holidays. On the same day the Investigation Committee cancelled his permit to travel to Moscow Region and ordered him to seek prior authorisation from the investigator for such travel. The applicant also received a warning for travelling to Moscow Region without proper authorisation from the investigator. 12.  On 14 January 2014 the Investigation Committee rejected a new request from the applicant for permission to travel to Moscow Region. 13.  On 31 January 2014 the applicant complained to the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about the travel ban. The examination of the complaint was postponed several times because of the absence of parties and the failure of the investigation body to present documents from the criminal case file. 14.  On 24 February 2014 the applicant went to Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow to attend the public pronouncement of a verdict in a criminal case concerning the political rally on Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012, but he was arrested in front of the court building. He was arrested for a second time later the same day during a demonstration in the centre of Moscow against the criminal convictions in the aforementioned criminal case. He was accused of a breach of regulations for holding a demonstration and of an alleged failure to obey the lawful orders of the police and was found liable for those administrative offences under Articles 20.2 and 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 15.  On 26 February 2014 the Investigation Committee asked the Basmannyy District Court to place the applicant under house arrest pending the completion of the criminal investigation. The applicant objected and referred to his complaint of 31 January 2014. He asked that the residence order be maintained or, in the alternative, that he pay bail of 500,000 roubles (RUB). 16.  On 28 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the applicant be placed under house arrest until 28 April 2014 because of a risk that he might abscond, continue his criminal activity, threaten witnesses and other participants in the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. The court also referred to his criminal record after the Kirovles case and his recent conviction for administrative offences (see paragraph 14 above). It imposed a number of conditions on the applicant for the period of his house arrest, in particular:\n\u201c-  [it is forbidden] to leave or change the [registered address] without authorisation by the investigator ...;\n-  to communicate with anyone, except for immediate family, as defined by law, legal counsel representing him in the criminal case and [investigating officials];\n-  to receive or send any correspondence, including letters, telegrams, parcels and emails;\n-  to use any means of communication or the Internet telecommunications network;\n-  to make statements, declarations, addresses or to give comments in connection with this criminal case in the media.\u201d 17.  On 3 March 2014 the applicant was placed under the supervision of the Department for the Execution of Sentences. He was notified of the conditions of his house arrest and was tagged with an electronic tracking bracelet. The applicant stayed in his two-bedroom apartment, where he lived with his wife and two children, throughout the period of his arrest. He was not allowed to go to work, take walks, carry out errands or leave his apartment for any purpose other than to attend procedural acts in his criminal case and occasional medical appointments. 18.  On 24 March 2014 the Moscow City Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against his house arrest and upheld the restraint measure. 19.  On 14 April 2014 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was submitted to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. 20.  On 21 April 2014 the Basmannyy District Court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint about the ban on travel to Moscow Region. It declined jurisdiction in favour of the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the grounds that the criminal case had already been submitted there and terminated the proceedings. The applicant appealed against that decision. 21.  On 24 April 2014 the District Court held a preliminary hearing and extended the applicant\u2019s house arrest until 14 October 2014, dismissing his appeal. The applicant did not appeal against the extension. 22.  On 28 April 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court remitted the applicant\u2019s case for further investigation, a decision which was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 18 June 2014. 23.  On 1 August 2014, after an application by the prosecutor to have the applicant placed in pre-trial detention, the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court reviewed the preventive measure. It held that the circumstances justifying house arrest, including the special restrictions, had remained unchanged and found no reason to order pre-trial detention. It rejected a request from the applicant to be allowed daily walks. 24.  On 4 August 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the Basmannyy District Court\u2019s decision of 21 April 2014 to terminate proceedings on the applicant\u2019s complaint about the travel ban. 25.  On 14 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began hearing the applicant\u2019s criminal case. On the same date it extended the applicant\u2019s house arrest, which the applicant did not appeal against. 26.  On 21 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court changed the conditions of the applicant\u2019s house arrest as follows:\n\u201cThe [applicant\u2019s] application should be granted and the ban on communication imposed when the order for his house arrest was issued [should] be lifted, [and] it should be made clear that [the applicant] is prohibited from communicating in any form with persons [given the status of] witnesses in this criminal case.\u201d 27.  On 10 October 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s house arrest after lifting the prohibition on \u201cmaking statements, declarations, addresses or giving comments in connection with this criminal case in the media\u201d on the basis that it was not in compliance with Article 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At the same time it specified radio and television as being among the banned means of communication. It refused to allow the applicant to go to work, take walks or receive correspondence. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 28.  On 30 December 2014 the applicant and his brother were found guilty of money laundering and of defrauding MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok, and were convicted under Articles 159.4 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 and 174.1 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. The applicant received a suspended sentence of three and a half years and a fine RUB 500,000 and had to pay damages to MPK. The court ordered that the applicant should remain under house arrest. On that day the court delivered only the introductory and operative parts of the judgment. Delivery of the judgment in full was adjourned until 12 January 2015. 29.  The applicant appealed against the extension of his house arrest on 31 December 2014. 30.  On 5 January 2015 the applicant issued a public statement that he refused to comply with the terms of his house arrest, citing in particular the fact that he had not been served with a written extension order, even though five days had elapsed since the court\u2019s decision. The applicant illustrated his statement with a photograph of his tracking bracelet having been cut open. No one stopped him or sanctioned him when he left his flat to go to his office. 31.  On 14 January 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint about the extension of his house arrest on 30 December 2014 on the grounds that the measure had been ordered in the judgment on the merits of the criminal case and had not been a procedural decision concerning pre-trial issues. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 32.  On 17 February 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment, except for the part imposing a fine and awarding damages to MPK, which was quashed. 33.  On 27 April 2015 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 34.  On 26 June 2015 the Moscow City Court refused leave to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "7", "0", "4", "3", "5", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Ljubljana. 7.  He and M. have three children, triplets born on 28 October 1996. 8.  On 20 January 2003 the Kranj District Court dissolved the marriage of the applicant and M., and determined that M. would have sole custody of their three children. 9.  In November 2002 the applicant and M. concluded an agreement on contact arrangements with the assistance of the Kranj Social Work Centre (hereinafter \u201cthe Centre\u201d). According to the agreement, contact between the applicant and his children was to take place twice a week and during the holidays. 10.  The contact meetings initially took place without any apparent problems. However, the Centre\u2019s records show that in 2004 M. reported that the children no longer wanted contact with their father. In June 2006 M. sent a letter via her lawyer to the applicant, notifying him that contact was no longer possible because the children had been distressed in relation to the applicant\u2019s visits. The Centre\u2019s records of June 2006 indicate that the applicant was willing to cooperate with the Centre and attend parental counselling with M., who said that she was going to attend therapy sessions with the children, so that they could deal with the distress they felt in relation to their father. No contact between the applicant and the children took place between July 2006 and November 2008 (see paragraph 22 below). 11.  In the years following the dissolution of marriage (see paragraph 8 above), the relationship between the applicant and M. deteriorated. The Centre\u2019s records indicate that by 2003 they rarely talked to each other and that their troubled relationship prevented the conclusion of any agreement with respect to the contact arrangements. 12.  On 5 July 2006 the applicant initiated court proceedings, seeking an order to formalise his contact with the children three times a week and during the holidays. He argued, inter alia, that the mother had been trying to restrict his contact with the children and that the children had been refusing contact because she had manipulated them. The applicant also believed that the Centre had not been impartial in dealing with the case. 13.  In her submissions to the court, M. objected to the applicant\u2019s allegations, maintaining that she had never restricted contact or been manipulating the children. She argued that the children had been expressing their discontent with the contact sessions since 2004 and that in 2006 they had started rejecting contact with their father because they had been afraid of his anger and criticism. 14.  The Centre in its opinion noted that both parents should join individual therapy. In case they did not manage to come to an agreement with respect to the temporary contact arrangements, it suggested the court to suspend the contact. 15.  On 6 July 2006 the court issued an interim order stating that contact would continue in accordance with the 2002 agreement between the parents (see paragraph 9 above). On 14 July 2006 the applicant applied to amend the interim order, proposing that the mother be required to pay a monetary fine and that police assistance at the time of contact be given in the event that the bailiff did not succeed in taking the children to contact. 16.  On 13 November 2006 a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr T., submitted her opinion to the court. As regards the children, she noted that they expressed fear and reluctance to the way the applicant had acted in the past (yelling, physical punishment, the way they played games and his negative remarks about M.). They found the contact unpleasant and refused it. The expert further noted that while M. had not limited contact, she had stopped encouraging the children. Dr T. suggested that contact take place once every other week, initially in the presence of someone the children trusted, and in circumstances permitting their interests to be taken into account. Dr T. also opined that in order to improve the relationship between the applicant and his children, the parents would benefit from counselling. 17.  On 29 April 2008 the Kranj District Court (in non-contentious proceedings) granted the applicant regular contact with his children once a week with an eventual extension of contact to weekends, until the end of the school year in the presence of the school psychologist or someone else from their school. The court also annulled the interim order and dismissed the request to amend it (see paragraph 15 above), finding that at the time the request had been made the court had not had sufficient grounds for making the decision. 18.  On 2 October 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court when deciding the appeal determined that starting from 12 November 2008 contact between the applicant and his children would take place every other Wednesday from 2 until 3.30 p.m. in the presence of an expert caseworker from the Centre. It also determined that M. was to ensure that the children went to the Centre. Relying on the opinion of Dr T. (see paragraph 16 above), the court held that the children had refused contact with the applicant and that this was not the result of the manipulation of M. but originated in their negative experiences with the contact sessions in the past. Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the father and the children had had no contact since June 2006 and that the contact sessions had never before been carried out with the assistance of experts, the court concluded that the negative attitude of the children was not enough to discontinue contact. When fixing the new contact arrangements, the Higher Court emphasised that the presence of an expert from the Centre at the contact sessions was mainly to provide expert assistance in establishing mutual trust between the applicant and the children. It also opined that it was not necessary for the contact sessions to take place at the Centre, and that they could take place somewhere in the vicinity, in a more relaxed environment for the children and the applicant. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible on 18 February 2010. 20.  The Centre cancelled the first contact session scheduled for 12 November 2008 because it had received the relevant court decision (see paragraph 18 above) only two days before and had found the organisation of the session impossible. 21.  On 20 November 2008 the applicant and M. were invited to a meeting at the Centre to discuss and reach an agreement on how the contact sessions would work and be organised under the Centre\u2019s supervision. No agreement was reached. Nonetheless, on 10 December 2008 the Centre sent its proposed expert guidelines (strokovna izhodi\u0161\u010da) for the organisation of the contact sessions to the parents, outlining its expectations and tasks. The Centre records show that in the course of preparing the children for contact, the caseworkers talked to the children, who firmly rejected the idea of any contact with the applicant and asked the caseworkers for permission not to attend the contact sessions. 22.  On 26 November 2008 the first contact session between the applicant and the children took place under the supervision of two caseworkers of the Centre. The Centre\u2019s records show that during the session the children frequently asked if they could leave and told the applicant that they did not want to see him. The caseworkers interrupted the session after around fifteen to twenty minutes because they decided that the continuation of the contact session was not in the children\u2019s interests. The second contact session took place on 10 December 2008. According to the Centre\u2019s records, at the beginning of the session the children again told the applicant that they did not want to see him. After one of the children left the session, the caseworker told the other two children that they could leave if they so wished, but that it was their opportunity to listen to what their father had to say. According to the Centre\u2019s records, on 24 December 2008 the applicant arrived early to prepare for the third contact session. At the beginning of the session the children repeated that they did not want to see the applicant. The caseworker present at the session started crying and asked the father if he could feel the children\u2019s distress. The Centre\u2019s records show that on the next eight occasions, the last being on 15 April 2009, the applicant arrived early to prepare for the contact sessions, which lasted at most a couple of minutes before the children left the room. 23.  On 28 April 2009, after conducting an interview with the children, the Centre informed the applicant that a contact session scheduled for 29 April 2009 had been cancelled on the basis of section 119 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (see paragraph 45 below) because it would be a serious psychological burden for the children. 24.  The sessions were supervised by a team of four caseworkers (a psychologist, social worker and two pedagogues), with two caseworkers present during each session. After every session the Centre\u2019s caseworkers talked to the children and conducted a review (evalvacija) of contact with the parents. It appears from the Centre\u2019s records of the interviews with the children that they expressed a dislike of their father and refused any contact with him. The records of 18 February and 4 March 2009 indicate that one of the caseworkers told the children that she believed that they did not want contact but that the court had decided differently. 25.  Meanwhile, the applicant via his lawyer repeatedly warned the Centre that they had not started with a meaningful implementation of the above-mentioned court decision (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, he complained that they had not offered any expert help to him or the children, had not been sufficiently active in helping to establish contact and had not cooperated with both parents. He also expressed the opinion that the Centre\u2019s officials had been biased, as they knew the mother personally and had worked with her in business matters, and asked the Centre to appoint an independent expert who would not know either of the parents personally and could work with both of them in establishing mutual trust between the applicant and the children. The applicant also suggested that the school psychologist (whom the children trusted) join the process at the Centre. Lastly, he proposed organising contact sessions outside the Centre in a more informal environment, such as during a short trip with someone they trusted. 26.  The Centre\u2019s expert team, composed of a psychologist, social worker, pedagogue (pedagog) and lawyer, met five times between December 2008 and May 2010 to discuss implementation of the contact order under the Centre\u2019s supervision. On 15 January 2009 the expert team decided to propose to the court that it issue an interim order to suspend contact with immediate effect because the contact sessions were not in the children\u2019s interests. 27.  On 11 October 2011 the Centre prepared a risk assessment for the children and an action plan for the children and parents (see paragraph 43 below). According to the assessment, the applicant did not trust the work of the caseworkers and was unaware of his problematic behaviour, while the mother had refused to attend counselling with the applicant and had been generally too passive. It opined that contact would benefit the children only if the parents, through the parental therapy (star\u0161evska terapija) suggested to them, changed their behaviour. 28.  On 30 January 2009 the Centre lodged an application with the Kranj District Court asking the court to order that contact be organised within the framework of family therapy, initially with the parents attending the therapy alone or, if that was not possible, to suspend contact between the applicant and the children. It held in this connection that a parent refusing to attend the therapy would be responsible for the absence of contact between the applicant and his children. The Centre simultaneously applied for an interim order to immediately suspend the applicant\u2019s contact with his children. The Centre noted that, notwithstanding its professional work, and the applicant\u2019s cooperation and good intentions, the children continued to categorically refuse any contact with the applicant. It also noted that the four Centre officials (caseworkers) who had been present during the contact sessions saw no prospect of the relationship between the applicant and the children improving in the framework of the supervised contact sessions and that the children were not willing participants in them. In such circumstances, in the absence of any relationship between the applicant and his children, and for the time being, they also did not foresee the possibility of organising contact sessions outside the Centre. It submitted that the conditions for the applicant maintaining contact with his children could only be created by the applicant and M. jointly, and that they had been unable to achieve this so far. In their further submissions to the court, the Centre noted that the contact sessions were a serious burden for the children and that the continuation of contact would amount to gradual psychological abuse. It also emphasised that the applicant and his lawyer did not trust the Centre and believed that the officials were biased. 29.  The applicant opposed the application, arguing that the Centre had aligned itself with M. and had neglected the obligations imposed on it by the court to monitor contact and assist the applicant and his children in improving their relationship (see paragraph 18 above). The activities of the Centre had been aimed at suspending contact instead of actively establishing it with the help of an expert. He noted, in particular, that at the first contact session the children had actively communicated with him. The first session after a long time had been crucial from an emotional standpoint, but had lasted only fifteen minutes because of the caseworker\u2019s intervention. The next contact session had started with the caseworker\u2019s appeal to the children that they could leave. He argued that the children had been put under systematic pressure by M. and, indirectly, the Centre. Moreover, the Centre had been biased in its submissions and the only impartial opinion \u2212 on which the court should base its decision \u2212 was that of the expert psychiatrist, Dr T. In the course of the proceedings the applicant also requested that the court issue an interim decision ordering M. to attend family therapy with him with a view to establishing communication between them. 30.  On 9 February 2009 the Kranj District Court dismissed the Centre\u2019s request for an interim order to suspend contact between the applicant and his children (see paragraph 28 above). It held that the 2008 contact order had taken into account the applicant\u2019s characteristics and attitude, as well as the fact that the children had not had any contact with him since 2006. In order to overcome the existing alienation and initial difficulties in re-establishing contact, the order specified a third party who would help and offer advice in this regard. The court noted that the records did not show that the Centre had played an active role in implementing the 2008 contact order. In particular, contact was limited to the children entering the Centre under strict protocol, stating that they did not want contact, and them leaving the premises together with the caseworkers. The court concluded that Dr T.\u2019s recommendations regarding how the contact sessions should be conducted had not been followed properly. The court further held that there was no reason not to try systematic family therapy in parallel to the contact sessions at the Centre, especially by preparing the children for contact directly before the sessions. The children, represented in the proceedings by M., appealed against the decision. On 16 April 2009 the Ljubljana Higher Court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It noted that a critical change in circumstances had occurred since contact was formalised in 2008, and that there was a risk to the children\u2019s psychological development. 31.  On 29 April 2009 the Kranj District Court issued an interim order temporarily suspending contact between the applicant and his children. The court observed that the children continued to refuse contact with the applicant and that during five supervised contact sessions there had been no progress in establishing a relationship between him and them. The court held that the Centre\u2019s experts responsible for counselling were of the opinion that their attempts at establishing contact had been unsuccessful and not in the children\u2019s interests, even though they had done everything possible. It thus concluded that continuing with contact would be a psychological burden, threatening the development of the children and that this could cause them irreparable harm. The applicant lodged an objection, arguing that the first-instance court had not taken into account the fact that the 2008 contact order had never been implemented because the Centre had not carried out any activities in this regard but had instead been working towards the discontinuation of contact. His objection was dismissed as unfounded. He then appealed. On 13 April 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it was preferable for the children not to be forced into contact with the applicant. The court reiterated that in terms of the interim order it was irrelevant what the cause was of the traumatic experience the children had in relation to contact, but noted that this could be relevant in the context of potential family therapy. 32.  During the proceedings the court asked the expert psychiatrist Dr T. to update the opinion provided during the 2008 proceedings (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). Dr T. conducted interviews with each child and the parents. In her expert opinion of 20 October 2010 she noted that the children resented any contact with their father because they were preoccupied with their previous negative experiences with him (see paragraph 16 above). They saw it as a decision forced upon them which did not take into account their emotional needs and wishes. The expert observed that the children had not established an emotional connection with their father at a young age and had expressed an irrational fear of their father linked to them feeling insulted. Their resentment was also the main reason for the difficult implementation of supervised contact. Given their age and the circumstances, she believed that establishing contact would not benefit the children. In the opinion she also noted that M. had not prevented contact and that the children\u2019s resentment did not seem to be based on the alleged manipulation. Furthermore, noting that the applicant was capable, motivated and eager to act in his relationship with the children in a way that would not harm them, the expert suggested that the applicant and M. start parental therapy. She explained that the process of forming a relationship with the father was still open and dynamic and that therapy was aimed at establishing mutual trust between parents. When giving evidence to the court (see paragraph 34 below) Dr T. pointed out that therapy involving counselling and teaching appropriate communication to both parents would stand an 80% chance of success. She also noted that M. should obtain some advice on appropriate communication with the children regarding the importance of their contact with their father and communication with the applicant and submitted that if M. refused to attend counselling, this would call into question her motivation to help the children. Lastly, the expert held that she had not noticed any mistakes in the work of the Centre\u2019s caseworkers during the contact sessions. 33.  At a hearing on 21 June 2011 the judge suggested concluding an agreement outlining everyone\u2019s participation in family therapy. While the Centre\u2019s representative agreed, noting that this would be in the children\u2019s best interests, M. refused to participate in any kind of family therapy. 34.  The Kranj District Court held four hearings at which it examined the expert Dr T., the applicant, two caseworkers from the Centre, the school psychologist and M. It rejected a request by the applicant that psychological tests be carried out. It found in this connection that, taking into account the children\u2019s age, the examination by Dr T. was sufficient as it fully explained the relationship between the applicant and children and that a psychologist would offer no other specific knowledge relevant to the outcome of the case. 35.  On 21 June 2011 the Kranj District Court (in non-contentious proceedings) issued a decision on the basis of section 106(5) of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (see paragraph 45 below) discontinuing contact between the applicant and his children. It dismissed the remainder of the Centre\u2019s application, for the obligatory participation in family therapy (see paragraph 28 above), and the applicant\u2019s request for an interim measure ordering family therapy (see paragraph 29 above). The court observed that the supervised contact sessions had been unsuccessful, which had been acknowledged by the Centre, the expert psychiatrist and the applicant. It found that the children, who were almost fifteen years old at the time of the court\u2019s deliberations and thus able to form their own opinion on contact (section 410 of the Civil Procedure Act, see paragraph 47 below), had categorically refused any contact with the father because of their past negative experiences and that supervised contact had caused them mental distress. It held that in such circumstances the reason for the interruption of contact was no longer important. It noted that the children were going through adolescence and that it was possible that they were displaying loyalty to M. by refusing contact with the applicant. In any case, the contact sessions were no longer in the children\u2019s interests because they were a serious psychological burden for the children and were, due to the disagreements between the parents, traumatic for them. The court stated that, according to the expert\u2019s opinion, any attempt to establish contact under the current conditions would not benefit the children. It also noted that, although the applicant was very motivated and keen to establish contact with the children, he had appeared stressed and under pressure during the supervised contact sessions. Moreover, the court held that he was partly responsible for unsuccessful contact because he had been too impatient, had felt offended and angry and had been unable or had not known how to get close to the children, for which he had unreasonably blamed the Centre\u2019s caseworkers. Lastly, the court also found it inappropriate to order family therapy involving the participation of the children. It noted in this connection that M. had not agreed to it and that the children had clearly refused any cooperation with their father during the contact sessions and were seriously distressed. The latter was crucial for deciding that they should not be forced in any further proceedings for the establishment of contact. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for an interim measure ordering family therapy for the same reasons, interpreting it as therapy for all family members, including the children. 36.  The applicant appealed, maintaining, inter alia, that the solution for re-establishing contact between him and the children, as advised by Dr T., was family therapy, initially with the parents alone and later with the children, which had been refused by M. He disagreed with the court\u2019s opinion that the reasons resulting in the discontinuation of contact were no longer relevant and pointed out that the children\u2019s alienation from him was the result of wrong decisions taken by the administrative authorities and wrong assessment of the evidence by the court. He repeated his request to appoint a psychologist, who could explore the negative attitude of the children towards him. He also argued that the initiation of family therapy and a gradual introduction of visits would have been in the best interests of the children, who needed a father figure in their life, as had also been confirmed by Dr T. 37.  On 11 January 2012 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the Kranj District Court\u2019s decision (see paragraph 35 above). In the court\u2019s view, the main reason for the children\u2019s negative attitude towards contact with the applicant were his personal characteristics, as indicated by the court expert, combined with the inadequate participation of M. It found that the opinion of expert Dr T. based on a paedopsychiatric examination of the children and psychiatric diagnostics had provided sufficient grounds for the decision to discontinue contact and that the court-appointed expert had concluded that further tests were unnecessary given the age of the children. The court also stressed that the decision to discontinue contact had not been based solely on the opinion of the children. Other evidence, namely the expert\u2019s opinion, the Centre\u2019s report and the hearing of M. and the applicant, confirmed that contact was not beneficial to the children, who continued to refuse any contact with the applicant. It confirmed that M. had not prevented contact but that, according to the expert\u2019s opinion, she should have played a more active role. The court also observed that the expert believed that the children\u2019s interests required that family therapy be carried out and that such therapy would have an 80% chance of success in the present case. However, the Higher Court found that there was no case-law on the question of whether a custodial parent could, without any relevant legal basis, be forced to participate in family therapy. It also found that family therapy should not, in any event, be ordered because it would only be successful if the applicant\u2019s behaviour changed and M. displayed changes in her attitude. Lastly, although it had been established convincingly that family therapy could be successful in the present case, it had not been established equally convincingly that the applicant would succeed in overcoming the personal difficulties which had hindered the relationship between him and the children. 38.  On 18 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint reiterating his previous complaints (see paragraph 36 above). 39.  On 15 June 2012 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional issue or entail a violation of human rights which had serious consequences for him. The Constitutional Court rejected his constitutional complaint in part regarding the lower courts\u2019 decision not to order M. to join family therapy with him because the applicant lacked legal interest. 40.  On 8 April 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Inspectorate for Social Matters at the Ministry for Work, Family and Social Matters (hereinafter \u201cthe Inspectorate\u201d). On 20 May 2009 the inspector to whom the case had been allocated (hereinafter \u201cthe Inspector\u201d) asked the Centre to submit a written report and copies of the applicant\u2019s family files. 41.  On 25 August 2011 the Inspectorate issued an audit report, which found a number of flaws in the Centre\u2019s handling of the applicant\u2019s case. As a preliminary matter the report noted that, the decision to conduct an extraordinary inspection of the work of the Centre in the present case had not been taken until 11 August 2010 because the Inspector had found it inappropriate to influence the ongoing court proceedings. However, shortly thereafter the Inspector had been absent from work for almost a year and had been unable to conclude the audit until 31 August 2011. 42.  As to the audit\u2019s findings, the report stated that the Centre had violated several legislative provisions and professional regulations, including section 106 and 119 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act and section 92 of the Social Assistance Act (see paragraphs 45 and 46 below). The report found, in particular, that the Centre:\n(i) had not identified the problem that the parents had not been acting in the children\u2019s best interests as regards contact, particularly M., who had refused to cooperate with the applicant;\n(ii) had, consequently, not tried to resolve the problems between the parents, which was one of the reasons that supervised contact could not be established;\n(iii) had not offered the parents the social service of home or personal help even though the applicant had been willing to accept it;\n(iv) had not assessed the attitude of M.\u2019s parents, who had been living with the children, despite this issue being raised by the applicant;\n(v) had not realised that, by not providing these services, it had been following M.\u2019s wishes but failing to safeguard the children\u2019s best interests;\n(vi) despite having been entrusted by the court with the task of re-establishing contact between the applicant and his children it had concluded, on the basis of an incorrect assessment of the facts regarding the alleged harmful behaviour of the applicant during the contact visits in the past, that the children\u2019s contact with the applicant should be discontinued;\n(vii) had not provided proper reasoning for the request to discontinue contact, even though the discontinuation ordered by the court had been ultimately justified because the contact visits under the Centre\u2019s supervision had not been in the children\u2019s interests;\n(viii) had not treated both parents equally and its officials\u2019 methods of approach and communication, especially with the applicant, had been often inappropriate;\n(ix) had not drawn up a proper assessment of the situation or an action plan;\n(x) together with M., had burdened the then still young children with the need to make a decision concerning the desired contact even when different contact from that determined by the court could have been arranged only by the parents\u2019 agreement; and\n(xi) had not assessed how well the children had been prepared for contact. 43.  The report also noted that the situation in the applicant\u2019s family could not be fixed or changed by any measures within the remit of the Inspectorate but only by the parents themselves. In particular, the report emphasised that the parents were responsible for the situation of distress and were the only ones who could resolve it (with the intervention of the Centre). Consequently, the Centre could not be held responsible for the absence of contact. The Inspector, however, noted that the director of the Centre should appoint a new team to deal with the applicant\u2019s children, make a proper assessment of the situation and draw up an action plan, of which both parents should be informed. The Inspectorate also set out general measures to be undertaken in order to improve the Centre\u2019s work in protecting children\u2019s best interests following dissolution of marriage or family life. In particular, it stated that guidelines for internal monitoring, professional criteria for the improvement of teamwork, and special training programmes were to be set up for all officials responsible for assisting families after a marriage break-up. Finally, official J.P., who was the last remaining member of the team dealing with the applicant\u2019s family in the department of family assistance, was asked to retake certain parts of her professional examination. 44.  On 31 August 2011 the Inspectorate ordered the Centre to carry out the proposed measures within the specified time-limit and to file written reports on their implementation. On 3 April 2012 the Inspectorate issued a final report on the extraordinary inspection, noting that the Centre had implemented all the imposed measures properly.", "references": ["8", "6", "1", "2", "5", "9", "0", "7", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Aleksey Alekseyevich Malyy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1972 and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 6.  In the evening of 12 October 2004 a couple, Mr and Ms S. (aged 62 and 55, respectively), were robbed and murdered in their house in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The victims\u2019 15\u2011year-old son A. informed his neighbours, the family of K. (an acquaintance of the applicant), about that tragic event. According to A., the perpetrator was a masked man equipped with a knife and a hammer. 7.  On the same day the police arrested A. on suspicion of the murder. He was detained for over three months and confessed to having killed his parents. However, eventually he retracted that confession as made under duress. 8.  On 15 January 2005 the police arrested the applicant and his acquaintance, K. (see paragraph 6 above), on suspicion of a number of armed robberies of jewellery stores and banks committed together with several other persons in Dnipropetrovsk on various dates in 2004. 9.  On the same date the applicant signed a waiver of legal assistance and confessed to several counts of robbery. 10.  On the following day he again waived his right to a lawyer and reiterated his confessions, adding some further details. 11.  On 17 January 2005 a confrontation was conducted between the applicant and K., in the course of which they both confessed to the robberies and explained all the details. 12.  Later that day the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by lawyer Z. The investigator allowed that request and lawyer Z. was admitted to the proceedings. 13.  On 18 January 2005, shortly before an identification parade in which the security guard of one of the jewellery stores was to recognise the perpetrators, the applicant changed his mind and submitted that he did not need legal representation. Accordingly, he was not assisted by a lawyer during that investigative measure. 14.  Later the same day the applicant once again changed his mind and requested to be represented by lawyer Z. His request was allowed. 15.  The Government submitted to the Court a copy of the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning as an accused conducted later on 18 January 2005 in the presence of his lawyer, Z. The applicant maintained his confession statements. 16.  The applicant did not comment on the above-mentioned record. According to information which he had provided to the Court in his application form, he had had the first meeting with his lawyer on 25 January 2005 in the investigator\u2019s presence. It appears from the case-file materials that no investigative measures were conducted on that date. 17.  On 18 January 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Kirovskyy District Court remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. On the same day he was transferred to the Dnipropetrovsk Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe Dnipropetrovsk ITT\u201d). 18.  The applicant kept confessing to the robberies of which he was accused, in particular, during a reconstruction of the events conducted on 27 January 2005. Before the beginning of that investigative measure, he had stated that he did not need legal assistance given that he maintained his confession and wanted to show his remorse. 19.  The case file contains a copy of the search report of 28 January 2005, according to which the police conducted a search at the applicant\u2019s home from 7.30 a.m. to 8 a.m. on that day. As stated in the report, some of the applicant\u2019s sweaters and t-shirts of different colours and fabrics (about ten in total) were seized with a view to \u201cbeing adduced to the investigation material\u201d. 20.  Later on 28 January 2005 the applicant wrote \u201ca statement of surrender to the police\u201d confessing to the robbery and murder of Mr and Ms S. (see paragraph 6 above). As stated therein, he had found out from K. that the latter\u2019s neighbours, Mr and Ms S., had sold some real estate and had a significant amount of money. The applicant and K. had agreed that the applicant would rob the couple, but the applicant had overstepped that agreement and had killed them. 21.  According to the applicant, the above-mentioned \u201cstatement of surrender\u201d was a result of his continued ill-treatment on that day by the police on the premises of the criminal investigation department of Dnipropetrovsk Region (see paragraph 38 below). 22.  Later the same day K., too, wrote \u201ca statement of surrender to the police\u201d in respect of the robbery and murder of Mr and Ms S., in which he confirmed to the same investigator the account of the events given in the applicant\u2019s related confession (see paragraph 20 above). K. submitted that on 12 October 2004 he had accompanied the applicant to the house of Mr and Ms S., that the applicant had gone inside for about twenty minutes and that after his return he had given K. 1,000 US dollars. Subsequently, in the course of the trial, K. would submit that the investigator had forced him to incriminate the applicant (see paragraphs 31 and 35 below). 23.  The case file contains a copy of the investigator\u2019s decision on the admission of lawyer G. on 28 January 2005, \u201cat the request of the accused\u201d, to represent the applicant in the proceedings. As can be deduced from the case number indicated, those proceedings concerned the murder investigation. It is not known why the applicant\u2019s procedural status was \u201can accused\u201d at that stage (see also paragraphs 24 and 25 below). Nor is there any information or documents indicating when the lawyer started representing him in practice. 24.  On 1 February 2005 the applicant signed a report confirming that he had been familiarised with his defence rights as a suspect. He wrote that he \u201c[did] not need a lawyer at [that] moment\u201d. In the course of his questioning as a suspect that day, he reiterated his confession to the double murder. He signed a statement that \u201cno measures of physical or psychological coercion\u201d had been applied to him. According to his submissions to the Court, he was forced to waive his right to legal assistance and to further incriminate himself under the psychological pressure of the police. 25.  According to the information provided by the Government, on 4 February 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated murder. 26.  On 10 February 2005 the investigator started to hold a confrontation between the applicant and K., in the presence of their lawyers, in respect of the murder case. The applicant, however, refused to participate in that investigative measure, referring to his hostile relations with K. 27.  On 11 February 2005 the investigator showed K. four different sweaters seized from the applicant\u2019s home on 28 January 2005 (see paragraph 19 above). K. recognised one of them as that worn by the applicant at the time of the murder on 12 October 2004. Immediately thereafter, the sweaters were shown to A., who also recognised the same sweater. 28.  On 9 March 2005 a forensic medical immunological expert examination report was issued in respect of the applicant\u2019s sweater recognised by K. and A. as the one worn during the crime (see paragraphs 19 and 27 above). A brown spot measuring about one square centimetre was discovered on the right sleeve. The experts established that it was human blood and that it could not be excluded that it might originate from a person or persons with the same blood group as the victims. 29.  On 12 May 2005 an identification parade took place in the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer. A. identified the applicant \u201cby his stature and voice\u201d as the person who had murdered his parents. As submitted by the applicant, he had been the only person wearing winter clothes, which were also dirty. Furthermore, instead of masks the three participants of the identification parade had worn black plastic bags on their heads. A copy of the identification report of 12 May 2005 in the case file is illegible. It can only be seen that its text is limited to one brief paragraph. 30.  On 14 July 2005 the case was referred to the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Dnipropetrovsk Court\u201d) for trial. 31.  On 19 January 2006 the Dnipropetrovsk Court, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of double murder committed with particular cruelty (in front of the victims\u2019 child) and for profit, several counts of robbery, illegal arms\u2019 handling, and creating a criminal gang. The most severe penalty, life imprisonment, was for the aggravated murder and absorbed those in respect of the other charges. During both the pre-trial investigation and the trial the applicant consistently confessed to almost all the robberies (except for one count). He had, however, retracted at a certain point during the trial his confession to the aggravated murder as extracted under duress and without legal assistance. K. also retracted his earlier statement on that charge in which he had incriminated the applicant, as having been obtained under duress. 32.  In reaching its conclusion about the applicant\u2019s guilt, the trial court relied on his and K.\u2019s \u201cstatements of surrender\u201d made during the pre-trial investigation (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above). It noted that their ill\u2011treatment complaints had been duly investigated and dismissed by the prosecution authorities (see paragraph 43 below). Accordingly, the court considered that their initial confessions had been made of their own free will and observed that they were concordant with each other in all the details. At the same time, given the fact that the defendants had retracted them during the trial, the court refused to consider them as a mitigating circumstance in setting the sentence. The court further relied on the results of the identification parade of 12 May 2005, during which A. had recognised the applicant as the offender (see paragraph 29 above). Lastly, the trial court mentioned the applicant\u2019s sweater among the evidence in support of his guilt (see paragraphs 19, 27 and 28 above). 33.  Both the applicant and his lawyer (the applicant was still represented by lawyer Z. \u2013 see paragraph 12 above) lodged cassation appeals against the above judgment. The case file before the Court contains only a copy of the lawyer\u2019s cassation appeal, but not that lodged by the applicant (see also paragraphs 56-60 below). 34.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted in his cassation appeal that his client maintained his confessions to the robberies, but denied his involvement in the creation of a criminal gang. He also insisted that the applicant had had nothing to do with the aggravated murder of the Mr and Ms S. The lawyer found it suspicious that on 28 January 2005 the applicant had made his \u201cstatement of surrender to the police\u201d in respect of that murder in the criminal investigation department of Dnipropetrovsk Region, whereas the ongoing criminal investigation at that time had been under the responsibility of the Kirovskyy police. In the lawyer\u2019s opinion, that indicated that the applicant\u2019s confession had not been made of his own free will. He further observed that his client had not been legally represented while making that confession. The lawyer argued that, even when the applicant had been legally represented, most investigative measures had taken place in the absence of his lawyer. That had concerned, in particular, the identification parade of 12 May 2005, of which the lawyer had not been informed in due time. The applicant\u2019s lawyer considered that investigative measure to have been flawed also given the considerable difference in appearance between his client and the other participants, as well as the fact that A., who had himself been under suspicion, had had his own interests to pursue. Lastly, the lawyer observed that the trial court had relied on the statements of K. incriminating the applicant even though K. had stated that he had made them under duress. 35.  K. also lodged an appeal in cassation challenging, in particular, his conviction for abetting the robbery of the S. family. He submitted that he had been coerced into incriminating the applicant. 36.  On 3 October 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, as well as that of the other defendants (six persons in total were convicted of the robberies), having found that the first-instance court had duly examined his arguments and complaints. During the hearings before the Supreme Court the applicant, along with the other defendants, was kept in a metal cage and remained handcuffed. 37.  According to the applicant, during the period from 15 to 18 January 2005, when he was held in the Kirovskyy police station after his arrest (see paragraph 8 above), he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment, such as being kept in extremely tight handcuffs, slaps on his ears, deprivation of sleep and verbal abuse. 38.  The applicant also alleged that on 28 January 2005 he had been taken to the Dnipropetrovsk Region criminal investigation department, where the police had ill-treated him with a view to extracting his confession to the aggravated murder of Mr and Ms S. The applicant provided the following account. Police officers put a black cap on his head covering his eyes and hit him many times in the head with a pile of books. His hands remained handcuffed behind his back. They also hit him several times with a rubber truncheon in the kidneys and on the legs. He further alleged that the police had threatened him with rape. The alleged ill-treatment continued from about 10 a.m. to about 6 p.m., after which he succumbed to the pressure (see paragraph 20 above). 39.  The case file contains contradictory information as to whether the applicant was taken to the Dnipropetrovsk Region criminal investigation department on 28 January 2005. The ITT\u2019s records indicate that he did not leave the ITT premises on that day. However, as noted by the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Region criminal investigation department in his letter of 14 May 2007 sent in reply to an enquiry from the applicant, on 28 January 2005 the applicant had indeed been on the premises of that department, but no investigative measures had been carried out on that date. Following the applicant\u2019s request for additional details, the official\u2019s reply was that there was no information as to the exact time the applicant spent in that building on 28 January 2005 or as to which officer had requested his transfer there. 40.  According to the applicant, in the morning of 29 January 2005 he told the ITT doctor that he had been beaten up and that he was suffering from a headache, but his complaints were disregarded. 41.  On 31 January 2005 the applicant was transferred from the Dnipropetrovsk ITT to the Dnipropetrovsk Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Dnipropetrovsk SIZO\u201d). According to the Government, during his medical examination no injuries were discovered on him and he did not raise any complaints. According to the applicant, that examination was superficial and his complaints of headache did not receive any attention. 42.  On 8 November 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Court instructed the prosecution authorities to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment, along with similar allegations from the other accused (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above). 43.  On 18 November 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office issued a ruling refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the above allegations, having found them unsubstantiated. That decision was based on the statements of the police officers concerned, who denied having ill-treated the applicant and the other accused. As the investigator had explained, all the accused had confessed of their own free will to the offences of which they were suspected and had consistently reiterated those confessions. Furthermore, none of them had raised any complaints of ill\u2011treatment. In sum, their allegations were dismissed as being without basis. 44.  After his conviction, the applicant complained to various authorities of ill-treatment by the police during the pre-trial investigation and of the unfairness of his conviction. 45.  On 19 April 2007, having sent numerous requests, the applicant received a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s ruling of 18 November 2005 (see paragraph 43 above). His subsequent complaint to the courts against it was dismissed without examination as belated: having initially complained to the wrong court, the applicant missed the seven-day time-limit calculated from 19 April 2007. 46.  In February 2008 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that there had been no effective investigation into his ill-treatment allegations. Her complaint was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 47.  On 23 March 2017 the Dnipropetrovsk prosecutor informed the Government\u2019s Agent, in reply to an enquiry from the latter, that all the investigation materials had been destroyed because the five-year time-limit for their storage had expired. 48.  From 31 January 2005 to 26 July 2007 the applicant was detained in the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO: in an ordinary cell before his conviction on 19 January 2006; and in the high-security wing located in a semi-basement thereafter. 49.  According to the applicant, during the entire period the conditions of his detention in the SIZO were unacceptable. There were tight metal screens on the windows preventing access to daylight. The artificial light was poor, too. The toilet was not separated from the living area and was exposed to the video-surveillance camera. The sanitary conditions were very poor, with a malfunctioning sewerage system, recurrent floods and a permanent smell of excrement. For most of the time he was detained in a basement cell measuring 1.9 m by 3.7 m, which he shared with another inmate. The cell lacked basic furniture and items such as a cupboard, a mirror or a rubbish bin. The premises were infested with rats and had never been disinfested. The detainees had very limited access to news and information about the outside world, the only source being a radio turned on only for a limited period of time every day, apart from weekends. The food was meagre and consisted mostly of bread and wheat-based cereal. 50.  According to the information provided by the Government, the applicant was detained in the following cells: nos. 1003, 1021 and 1024 (designated for six inmates), nos. 717, 724, 725, 728, 732, 733, 739, 743 and 786 (designated for four inmates), and, following his conviction by the first-instance court, in high-security cells nos. 01, 1k, 02, 03, 04, 4k, 05, 06 and 6k (designated for two inmates). As stated by the SIZO administration, the applicant had been provided with a bed and with \u201call the necessary items\u201d. 51.  On 12 January 2007 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to the State Department for Execution of Sentences (\u201cthe Prison Department\u201d), which replied that they were in compliance with the applicable legal standards. 52.  According to the applicant, on 11 December 2006 he submitted to the SIZO administration his first letter to be dispatched to the Court, outlining his complaints and requesting that proceedings be opened. In the absence of a reply, on 23 February 2007 the applicant submitted another similar letter to the administration. In his further correspondence with the Court he indicated the reference numbers assigned by the administration to those first two letters. The Court has never received them. The first letter from the applicant to have reached the Court was dated 11 December 2006; it had been sent to the Court by his mother on 14 March 2007 (the date on the postage stamp). 53.  As indicated in a letter sent to the applicant by an official of the Prison Department on 11 October 2007, the administration of the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO had duly registered and sent his letters to the Court. 54.  In November 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother requested the governor of Yanakiyeve prison (in which the applicant was serving his sentence at the time) to provide her with documentary evidence proving that her son\u2019s letter of 11 December 2006 had indeed been sent to the Court. The prison official replied that it could be proved by the fact that a copy of the cover letter from the SIZO administration accompanying the applicant\u2019s letter in question was available in the file. 55.  In March 2017 the Dnipro (renamed \u201cDnipropetrovsk\u201d) prison authorities informed the Government\u2019s Agent, in reply to an enquiry from the latter, that the correspondence records of the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO related to the period in question had been destroyed owing to the expiry of the time-limit for the storage of such documents. 56.  Starting from October 2006 the applicant sent numerous requests to the trial court, seeking access to his case file and copies of certain documents, which he intended to submit in substantiation of his application to the Court. 57.  On 27 July and 23 August 2007 the Court requested the applicant to submit a copy of his cassation appeal against the judgment of the Dnipropetrovsk Court of 19 January 2006. 58.  By a letter dated 19 October 2007, the applicant, relying on the above-mentioned letters from the Court, asked the Dnipropetrovsk Court to send him a copy of his appeal in cassation. 59.  In its reply of 24 October 2007, the court stated that there was no legal basis for providing the applicant with copies of documents from his case file after the entry into force of the verdict in his case. 60.  The applicant and his mother on his behalf sent a total of about ten requests for copies of documents from his case file. All of them were rejected with the same reasoning as mentioned above.", "references": ["2", "6", "9", "4", "8", "7", "5", "0", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Munich. He and Mr W. founded the T.AG, a directory enquiries service. The T.AG received, for a fee, the required subscriber information from DTAG. In 2007 and 2008 DTAG was ordered to refund the T.AG part of the fees paid, as they had been excessive. 7.  In 2005 the applicant brought an action against DTAG, claiming that as a result of the excessive prices paid by the T.AG, he and Mr W. had had to reduce their shares in the company before its stock market launch. For that reason, as well as on account of a lower valuation of the company on the day of the launch, he had sustained damage. On 28 May 2013 the Regional Court dismissed the claim. 8.  The applicant appealed against the Regional Court\u2019s decision. In the reasons for the appeal, he made comments on, inter alia, EU law and the respective interpretation by the CJEU and the Federal Court of Justice. He did not request a referral of a particular question to the CJEU. During an oral hearing before the Court of Appeal the issue of EU law was discussed and the court explained that, in its view, the case-law of the CJEU was clear and that, in contrast to what had been suggested by the applicant, EU law was not applicable to the present case. In the same hearing the applicant called for the proceedings to be suspended and a preliminary ruling from the CJEU to be obtained. In submissions after the hearing he repeated his request and suggested the following wording for a possible preliminary question:\n\u201cDoes Article 86 TEC in the version of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, the liability of a dominant undertaking that damages a competing joint-stock company through its abusive prices in violation of Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU), thus putting it at risk of bankruptcy, also for damage sustained by the founding shareholders of the damaged joint-stock company resulting from the fact that they take on new shareholders in order to avert bankruptcy, thereby reducing their own shares in the company?\u201d 9.  On 2 July 2014 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. In its reasoning the court stated, in particular, that his claim could not be based on EU law, as the applicant was not covered by the protective purpose of any of its provisions. In that regard, the court gave a detailed account of why the applicant\u2019s legal opinion was not supported by the CJEU\u2019s case\u2011law, to which it referred extensively. It also referred to the relevant case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. As regards the question of whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal on points of law, the Court of Appeal stated:\n\u201cThere is no reason to grant leave to appeal on points of law pursuant to Article 543 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). The chamber\u2019s reasoning on the legal question as to who is covered by the protective purpose of Article 86 TEC, Article 82 \u00a7 2 EC and Article 102 TFEU and who is consequently eligible for compensation within the meaning of Article 823 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (B\u00fcrgerliches Gesetzbuch) or section 33(1) of the Prevention of Restrictions on Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschr\u00e4nkungen), have no significance in terms of legal principle (no fundamental significance). There is no need to clarify the legal question raised, since there are no doubts concerning the scope and interpretation of those legal provisions. The plaintiff\u2019s opinion that anyone suffering damage on account of a violation of competition law should be entitled to damages, regardless of the law\u2019s protective purpose, is not shared by anyone in academic writing or case-law.\u201c 10.  The applicant filed a complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law. In his complaint he repeated his request for a referral to the CJEU and suggested the wording for two questions, one of them being a slightly modified version of the previously suggested question:\n\u201cDoes Article 86 TEC in the version of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, the liability of a dominant undertaking that damages a competing joint-stock company in violation of Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU), thus putting it at risk of bankruptcy, also for damage sustained by the shareholders of the competing joint-stock company resulting from the fact that they take on new shareholders in order to avert bankruptcy, thereby reducing their own share of the company?\n...\nDoes Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State as laid out in the first question for referral if the damaged shareholders are founding shareholders (investors) who, at the time of the damaging event, have a significant shareholding and, as members of the company\u2019s executive board, decisively shape the company\u2019s competitive conduct?\u201d 11.  On 14 April 2015 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint:\n\u201c... because the legal matter [had] not [been] of fundamental significance, because the complaints based on violations of procedural rights [had] failed to convince and because neither the further development of the law nor the interests in ensuring uniform adjudication [had required] a decision to be issued by the court hearing the appeal on points of law (Article 543 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure). More detailed reasoning can be dispensed with pursuant to the second clause of the second sentence of Article 544 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\u201d 12.  The applicant filed a complaint concerning a violation of his right to be heard (Anh\u00f6rungsr\u00fcge) and argued that the Federal Court of Justice had not provided adequate reasoning for the refusal of a referral to the CJEU. On 18 May 2015 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint, stating that it had examined his submissions but had not considered them sufficiently convincing and that a decision by a court of last resort had not required more detailed reasoning. 13.  On 25 February 2016 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint (1 BvR 1410/16) lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons. 14.  Article 543 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:\n\u201c(1) An appeal on points of law may only be lodged if: 2.  The court hearing the appeal on points of law has granted leave upon a complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law.\n(2) An appeal on points of law shall be admitted if: 2.  Further development of the law or the interests in ensuring uniform adjudication require a decision to be issued by the court hearing the appeal on points of law.\nThe court hearing the appeal on points of law shall be bound by the admission of the appeal by the appellate court.\u201d 15. The relevant parts of Article 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows:\n\u201c(1) Any refusal by the appellate court to grant leave to appeal on points of law may be subject to a complaint (complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal). ...\n(4) The court hearing the appeal on points of law shall rule on the complaint in a corresponding court order. The reasons on which the order is based shall be summarised briefly; that reasoning may be dispensed with where it would not contribute to clarifying the requirements for granting leave to appeal, or where the court finds for the party filing the complaint. The decision regarding the complaint is to be served upon the parties.\n...\u201d 16.  According to the established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court a legal matter is, amongst other reasons, always of \u201cfundamental significance\u201d if it raises a question that requires a uniform interpretation of EU law, which is relevant for deciding the case, and makes a referral for a preliminary ruling during the appeal proceedings very probable. Therefore, refusal of leave to appeal (on points of law) includes the consideration that a referral to the CJEU is not required in that case (see, for example, Federal Court of Justice, I ZR 130/02, 16 January 2003; Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 557/88, 22 December 1992; 1 BvR 2534/10, 3 March 2014; 1 BvR 1320/14, 8 October 2015). To provide the Federal Constitutional Court with the possibility to review such decisions for arbitrariness, it is necessary that the court establish the reasons for the decision either from the reasoning of the court of last resort or otherwise (see Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 557/88, 22 December 1992; 1 BvR 2534/10, 3 March 2014; 1 BvR 1320/14, 8 October 2015). In case 2 BvR 557/88, the first-instance court had provided detailed reasoning concerning the relevant EU law and why there were no doubts regarding the correct interpretation of those provisions. It had relied on established case-law of the Federal Financial Court. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court found it acceptable that the Federal Financial Court had rejected the subsequent complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal without providing reasons. In case 1 BvR 1320/14, however, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a decision by the legally competent court (Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter) because the Federal Court of Justice had rejected a complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law and had not provided any reasoning. In that case, the court found that an obligation for a referral to the CJEU during the appeal on points of law proceedings was very likely (lag nahe) and that the Federal Court of Justice had not explained why it had rejected leave to appeal on points of law nevertheless. Even though the lower court had provided brief reasoning, there were no indications that the Federal Court of Justice had embraced it, particularly since the applicant in the proceedings had made extensive submissions in its complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law, disputing the reasoning of the lower court. 17.  Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (\u201cTFEU\u201d) provides as follows:\n\u201cThe Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:\n(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;\n(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union ...;\nWhere such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.\nWhere any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.\u201d 18.  Interpreting this provision, the CJEU held in the case of S.r.l. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo S.p.a. v. Ministry of Health (C\u2011283/81, judgment of 6 October 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, \u00a7 21) that:\n\u201c... a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court [of Justice], unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.\u201d 19.  In the case of Kenny Roland Lyckeskog (C-99/00, 4 June 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:329) the CJEU decided, among other things, the question of whether a national court which in practice was the court of last resort in a case, because a declaration of admissibility was needed in order for the case to be reviewed by the country\u2019s supreme court, was a court within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 234 EC (current Article 267 of the TFEU). The court held:\n\u201c16. Decisions of a national appellate court which can be challenged by the parties before a supreme court are not decisions of a \u2018court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law\u2019 within the meaning of Article [267]. The fact that examination of the merits of such appeals is subject to a prior declaration of admissibility by the supreme court does not have the effect of depriving the parties of a judicial remedy. 17. That is so under the Swedish system. The parties always have the right to appeal to the H\u00f6gsta domstol against the judgment of a hovr\u00e4tt, which cannot therefore be classified as a court delivering a decision against which there is no judicial remedy. Under Paragraph 10 of Chapter 54 of the R\u00e4tteg\u00e5ngsbalk, the H\u00f6gsta domstol may issue a declaration of admissibility if it is important for guidance as to the application of the law that the appeal be examined by that court. Thus, uncertainty as to the interpretation of the law applicable, including Community law, may give rise to review, at last instance, by the supreme court. 18. If a question arises as to the interpretation or validity of a rule of Community law, the supreme court will be under an obligation, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article [267], to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling either at the stage of the examination of admissibility or at a later stage.\u201d 20.  This judgment was referred to in a later judgment of the CJEU (Cartesio Oktat\u00f3 \u00e9s Szolg\u00e1ltat\u00f3 bt, C-210/06, 16 December 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723), in which it held:\n\u201c76. The Court has already held that decisions of a national appellate court which can be challenged by the parties before a supreme court are not decisions of \u2018a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law\u2019 within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267. The fact that the examination of the merits of such challenges is conditional upon a preliminary declaration of admissibility by the supreme court does not have the effect of depriving the parties of a judicial remedy (Lyckeskog, paragraph 16). 77. That is true a fortiori in the case of a procedural system such as that under which the case before the referring court must be decided, since that system makes no provision for a preliminary declaration by the supreme court that the appeal is admissible and, instead, merely imposes restrictions with regard, in particular, to the nature of the pleas which may be raised before such a court, which must allege a breach of law.\u201d 21.  As regards the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, the CJEU stated in the case of Gy\u00f6rgy Katz v. Istv\u00e1n Roland S\u00f3s (C-404/07, 9 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:553):\n\u201c37. ... It is for the national court, not the parties to the main proceedings, to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. The right to determine the questions to be put to the Court thus devolves on the national court alone and the parties may not change their tenor ...\u201d 22.  In its judgment of 9 November 2010 in the case of VB P\u00e9nz\u00fcgyi L\u00edzing Zrt. v. Ference Schneider (C-137/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659), the CJEU stated:\n\u201c28. ... the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States instituted direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties ...\u201d 23.  On 25 November 2016 the CJEU published its (updated) Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2016/C 439/01). The relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201c3. The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court. In so far as it is called upon to assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, it is for the national court or tribunal before which a dispute has been brought \u2013 and for that court or tribunal alone \u2013 to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.\u201d", "references": ["4", "9", "7", "0", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "6", "2", "3"], "gold": ["6", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Druskininkai. 5.  The applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison periodically between 7 June 2011 and 25 May 2012. He was held in other facilities between 21 June and 5 July 2011; 30 August and 6 September 2011; 27 September and 11 October 2011; 25 October and 8 November 2011; 15 and 17 November 2011; and 6 and 18 January 2012. Between those breaks, the periods he had to spend in overcrowded cells were fourteen, fifty\u2011five, twenty and a half, thirteen, six and a half, forty\u2011eight and ninety\u2011five and a half days respectively. 6.  On 5 January 2011 there was a fire in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. The applicant suffered acute poisoning caused by smoke inhalation and fell into a coma for a few hours. After that, he was hospitalised between 7 and 18 January 2012. 7.  On 5 January 2012 a prie\u2011trial investigation was opened regarding destruction of property and serious health impairment caused by negligence. 8.  On 9 January 2012 a commission was set up to establish the circumstances surrounding the fire and the actions of the officers of Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison during the fire. 9.  On 14 August 2012 the experts received a task to answer two questions: where did the fire start and what was the reason of the fire. On 13 September 2012 an expert report stated that the fire had been caused by an electrical fault, causing short circuits and the electrothermal heating in the utility premises to break down. It also noted that eight persons had been taken to a hospital and 217 persons had been evacuated. 10.  On 30 January 2013 the applicant was questioned in the context of the pre\u2011trial investigation. He stated that his cellmate had woken him up and that within twenty minutes they had hardly been able to see each other because of the smoke. They had started shouting for help, the applicant had started choking, and he had not been able to breathe. He and other inmates had wet towels and put them on their faces. He remembered only that a firefighter had opened the doors of the cell and taken him by his hand, but then the applicant had fainted and later woken up in the hospital (see paragraph 13 below).\nOn the same day he asked to be granted victim status. His request was upheld later that day. 11.  The pre\u2011trial investigation was suspended on 5 November 2013 because of the failure to determine who had caused the fire. The following investigative actions had been performed: the scene of the accident had been examined; the electrics had been inspected; various reports had been received; several witnesses had been questioned; and medical examinations of the victims had been carried out. The applicant claimed that he had not received a copy of the decision to suspend the pre-trial investigation. 12.  The transcripts of the surveillance cameras show that one of the officers smelled smoke at 7.01 a.m. At 7.25 a.m. the officers poured water down the ventilation chamber. The fire brigade was called at 7.37 a.m., the officers were instructed how to carry out the evacuation at 7.40 a.m. and the fire brigade arrived at around 7.44 a.m. The first ambulance arrived at 8.06 a.m. The evacuation of the inmates was finished at 8.08 a.m. The ambulances started taking the victims to the hospital at 8.30 a.m., the applicant was taken to the hospital at 8.40 a.m. and the last ambulance left the prison at 8.58 a.m. It appears that the medical staff of Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison were present during the fire and that the head of the Health Care Service was instructed to organise the provision of first aid for those in need. 13.  In November 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, requesting compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for overcrowding, lack of proper separation between sanitary facilities and the cell, insufficient ventilation in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison from 7 June 2011 until 25 May 2012 and in respect of the alleged inadequate actions of the prison authorities during the fire in that institution on 5 January 2012. The applicant claimed that he had screamed for help during the fire but owing to the untimely actions of the prison authorities he had fallen into a coma that had lasted for several hours (see paragraphs 6 and 10 above). During the hearing, the applicant submitted that the inmates had been told to open the windows before the evacuation. He also confirmed that he had fainted when he had been taken to the ground floor. 14.  In December 2012 Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison submitted their comments and, as regards the fire, they claimed the prison officers had been instructing the prisoners to put wet towels on their faces. The prison officers had also been given instructions on what actions to take. The medical staff distributed the inmates according to their condition and the ones who had been severely injured had been transferred to the hospital. 15.  On 30 January 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had not had enough personal space for 268 days, ten evenings and three mornings, and that this had constituted a violation of both the domestic norms and Article 3 of the Convention. As regards proper separation between the sanitary facilities and the cell and alleged lack of ventilation, the court found no violation. As for the fire, the court held that the applicant had been hospitalised between 7 and 18 January 2012 for irritation of the respiratory system due to acute poisoning caused by smoke inhalation. The applicant had been referred to a psychiatrist later and had received medication. The court further held that the prison authorities had merely provided a general description of the actions of the relevant representatives of the prison during the fire and had not provided any information about the specific actions they had taken in order to immediately remove the applicant from his cell or about the first aid he had received. Although the authorities had stated that the inmates had been instructed how to act in case of fire, the applicant had indicated that he had received no such instructions. The authorities had not indicated within what period of time the applicant had received medical help and what that help had entailed. The applicant had stated that he had spent approximately ninety minutes in a cell full of smoke. The court held that the fact that the applicant had been taken to hospital in a coma had proven that the authorities had failed to evacuate him on time. The applicant had had bronchial asthma but the authorities had failed to provide evidence that his condition had been taken into account during the fire. The applicant\u2019s liberty had been restricted because of his status, and the responsibility for his health had fallen on Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. However, it had not been proved that the officers had acted in a manner prescribed by the law in order to avoid negative consequences to the applicant\u2019s health. As a result, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court awarded the applicant 10,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 2,896 euros (EUR)) in compensation in total: LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 579) for the conditions of detention and LTL 8,000 (approximately EUR 2,317) for the consequences suffered because of the fire. 16.  The applicant and the authorities appealed. On 5 August 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the authorities\u2019 appeal in part. It agreed with the first-instance decision as regards the overcrowding and the violation of both the domestic norms and Article 3 of the Convention, but held that there was no information that the prison authorities had breached the requirements for fire prevention or for evacuation of people. The court further held that the prison staff had been active in their response and thus no unlawful actions by the authorities had taken place. The court thus amended the first-instance decision and awarded the applicant LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 579) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for overcrowding only.", "references": ["3", "4", "6", "8", "5", "7", "9", "2", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant, Editorial Board of Grivna Newspaper, is a Ukrainian single shareholder company which has its registered offices in Kherson. Grivna is a regional newspaper published in that city (hereinafter \u201cthe newspaper\u201d). 7.  In 2006 the newspaper published two articles containing negative statements about Mr I., who from 1996 to 2012 was President of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal. The articles gave rise to defamation proceedings, which are the subject of the present case. The translation of the relevant parts of the articles is given below. The passages which were the subject of the domestic proceedings are underlined and numbered for reference. The parts of the articles rephrased and summarised by the Court are presented in square brackets. Where initials are used, the actual articles contained I.\u2019s full name: his first name, surname and/or patronymic in various combinations. 8.  In January 2006 the plenary Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (hereinafter \u201cthe Parliament\u201d) was to examine the question of I.\u2019s appointment to the position of judge on a permanent basis, until retirement age. The matter was to be examined because I.\u2019s previous ten-year appointment was expiring (see the relevant constitutional and legislative rules concerning the appointment of judges at paragraph 52 below). 9.  Prior to the Parliament\u2019s session, on 5 January 2006 another regional newspaper, Vgoru, published an article alerting the readers that the matter of I.\u2019s permanent appointment would be examined by Parliament and urging readers to send comments on I.\u2019s candidature to the relevant parliamentary committee. 10.  On 12 January 2006 Parliament examined the question of I.\u2019s permanent appointment. Owing to concerns raised by some Members of Parliament about I.\u2019s candidature (see the summary of the transcript of the debate at paragraph 13 below), Parliament decided to adjourn the examination of the question. 11.  An article, published in the issue of the newspaper dated 19\u201126 January 2006, was dedicated to the above event and entitled \u201cPurgatory for Judges\u201d (\u0427\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0449\u0435 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0439). It spread over two full pages. The first page of the article contained the following text:\n\u201cWe often criticise Members of Parliament, and for good reason. But this gathering of people with different views and business interests under the same roof sometimes produces unpredictable decisions. Perhaps it is too soon to call this \u2018democracy\u2019. However, the fact that the MPs have \u2018rejected the advances\u2019 of the President of the Kherson Court of Appeal, Mr I. (\u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b \u043e\u0442 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0442\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u00ab\u0433\u0430\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0437\u0430\u00bb) [A1] speaks volumes.\nSo let us talk about justice in the Kherson Region and first of all about its President Mr I. Below we publish a transcript of the proceedings of Parliament concerning... appointment of judges for life. On 12 January 2006 many Kherson residents watched live this sitting of Parliament and our Mr I. was the main hero of that \u2018show\u2019 [A2]. We have been writing about him much lately. Other publications have been writing even more. We will provide our readers with a brief reminder about Mr I. based only on our own publications which, by the way, have not been challenged. [We] are also in possession of a number of incontrovertible documents.\nWe give you this in lieu of a prologue: \u2018... In his eight years and counting at the head of the Regional Court I. has found himself dozens of loyal people \u2013 lawyers, judges, and important businessmen \u2013 for whose personal and business interests he has successfully lobbied through favourable judicial decisions [A3] (\u043e\u0431\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0434\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0442\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043b\u044e\u0434\u0435\u0439... \u0447\u0435\u0439 \u0431\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0435\u0441 \u0438 \u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u044b \u0443\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0448\u043d\u043e \u043b\u043e\u0431\u0431\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u044c\u044e \u043d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0432 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0445)...\nHere is the conclusion: I. is considered the person in charge and untouchable [A4] in the Kherson Region where 14 governors succeeded each other in 10 years... If one removes him successfully, even if peacefully, the people will believe in changes for the better in the pervasively corrupt judicial system...\u2019\nThis document arrived in our offices last autumn. It was addressed to a very high\u2011ranking and influential official in the capital in response to his request for information from Kherson. But the first official documents had appeared right after I. took up his position and they corroborate the above-mentioned reasoning. Here is just a short quote from the letter by members of the regional council to the President of the Supreme Court dated 17.02.1998:\n\u2018Using his position I. received 100,000 US Dollars from G. who has been released from serving his sentence and confiscation of his assets. He thus helped G. avoid his liabilities vis-\u00e0-vis his... creditors.\u2019\nThey go on to describe I.\u2019s \u2018tricks\u2019 (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u043a\u0438) on two pages! [A5] And here is the response of the Supreme Court\u2019s President to the above-quoted episode: [there followed a quote from a letter of the President of the Supreme Court stating that in April 1998 I. had been reprimanded for a breach of professional ethics by the Qualifications Commission of Judges].\nSo I. has been \u2018duly punished\u2019 at the very dawn of his career. It appears that the lesson did him good since our offices have no information about the highest judge of the region receiving any subsequent reprimands. A new person became the Supreme Court\u2019s President soon afterwards and I. could feel more confident. Perhaps his relative at the Supreme Court helped to make it so [A6]. A relative so influential that he is now awaiting his appointment to the Constitutional Court...\n...\nAnd now I.\u2019s 10-year term as judge is coming to an end. New laws provide for lifetime appointment by a majority vote in Parliament. And here our President \u2018has made himself famous\u2019 nationwide (\u2018\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f\u2019 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0441\u044e \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0443). [A7] [The article then mentioned Judge O., whose resignation was discussed at the same plenary sitting of Parliament as I.\u2019s appointment] But Mr I. is a \u2018hard nut to crack\u2019 and is dreaming of keeping his post no matter what (\u2018\u043a\u0440\u0435\u043f\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043a\u2019 \u0438, \u043d\u0435\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u044f \u043d\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0447\u0442\u043e, \u043e\u043d \u043c\u0435\u0447\u0442\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043e\u0445\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442). [A8]\u201d 12.  The first page of the article also contained extensive quotes from articles previously published in February, April and May 2005 in the same newspaper, in particular one dated 28 April 2005 which discussed assets allegedly belonging to I. and his relatives. That article contained quotes from a letter of the chairman of the Council of Judges dated 8 April 2005. The letter contained an acknowledgement that Judge D., President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, was the father-in-law of I.\u2019s son. 13.  Almost the entire second page of the article was taken up by the verbatim reproduction of the transcript of Parliament\u2019s plenary sitting of 12 January 2006 at which Parliament examined questions about the appointment and resignation of a number of judges. According to the transcript, several MPs said that they had received complaints about the situation in the Kherson Region\u2019s courts. I. denied any wrongdoing and stated that all complaints had been checked by the appropriate authorities and found baseless. The head of the relevant parliamentary committee stated that the committee had also conducted an inquiry into complaints raised about I. and found them to be groundless. He also implied that I. might have been a victim of a slander campaign orchestrated by aggrieved litigants. However, in view of the concerns raised by several MPs, I.\u2019s candidature was withdrawn for additional checks. A brief discussion followed concerning Judge O., from one of the district courts of the Kherson Region, who had presented her resignation to Parliament. One of the MPs made a speech to the effect that Judge O. had resigned to avoid responsibility for bribery. 14.  The newspaper\u2019s reproduction of the transcript was followed by the following conclusion:\n\u201cAs you can see, dear readers, representatives of the Kherson justice system have \u2018distinguished themselves\u2019 twice. It was not only Mr I. who disgraced himself in front of the entire country [A9] but also his subordinate from one of the district courts.\u201d 15.  Mr I.\u2019s photograph was displayed on the first page of the article, covering approximately one sixth of the page. He was shown in formal attire, with a neutral facial expression, apparently sitting at a desk. Under the photograph the following caption appeared:\n\u201cI will recompense them according to their deeds (Old Testament)[1]\nMr I. is shown in the photo\u201d 16.  In the same issue of the newspaper another photograph of I. was published with the caption \u201cParliament so far has not given a \u2018life sentence\u2019 to the president of the Kherson Court of Appeal\u201d. The copy of the article provided to the Court by the applicant company does not contain that second photograph. 17.  Within the next two weeks other newspapers published at least three articles commenting in critical terms on the Parliamentary session dedicated to I.\u2019s appointment and his activities in general. 18.  I. brought a claim in the Kherson Suvorovsky District Court against the applicant company seeking retraction of statements A1-A9 and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the publication in the newspaper, which had a circulation of 62,500, had negatively influenced his professional reputation and public opinion of the judicial system at large, triggering actions aimed at putting pressure on the courts, namely numerous demonstrations outside the region\u2019s courthouses. 19.  The case was tried by Judge S. (trial judge). 20.  According to the applicant company, in the course of the trial it produced, by way of proof of the factual grounds for the impugned statements, twenty\u2011five articles published in the local newspapers from 1997 to 2006. 21.  On 16 April 2006 the applicant company lodged an application with the Supreme Court urging it to reassign the case, in view of the plaintiff\u2019s position, to a court in a different region (see paragraph 42 below for the relevant domestic legal provision). It argued, in particular, that the trial judge had previously examined a claim lodged by I.\u2019s son, himself a vice president of a district court in Kherson, and had allegedly breached the law in those proceedings. It also argued that, as a long-term president of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal, I. had supervisory functions in respect of all judges in the region. 22.  On 28 April 2006 the applicant company asked the first-instance court to postpone hearings in the case until the Supreme Court had ruled on its reassignment application. I. objected. The court decided not to postpone the hearings. 23.  On 19 May 2006 the applicant company asked the court to suspend proceedings in the case under Article 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 43 below) pending examination by the Supreme Court of its application for case reassignment. The court refused. The applicant company challenged the trial judge on the grounds that he had rejected its request to suspend the proceedings. The judge rejected the challenge. 24.  On 22 May 2006 the first-instance court delivered its judgment allowing the claim.\n(i) The court declared: (a) the photographs and captions to them and statements A1-A5 and A7-A9 baseless, insulting and damaging to I.\u2019s reputation, and (b) statement A6 untrue and damaging to I.\u2019s reputation.\n(ii) The court ordered the applicant company to publish its judgment and awarded I. 100,000 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage and UAH 5,000 in court fees (about 14,860 euros and 740 euros (EUR) respectively at the time).\n(iii) By way of reasoning the court stated that statements A1-A5 and A7\u2011A9 could not be protected as value judgments, since they were deliberately insulting. Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention permitted restrictions on freedom of expression for the protection of the reputation of others. Neither the transcript of Parliament\u2019s plenary sitting nor other documents before the court provided a factual basis for those statements.\n(iv) The defendant had failed to prove the truth of the factual statement A6 or to point to the source of that information.\n(v) As to the photographs, the court considered that the applicant company had failed to prove that I.\u2019s photographs had been taken either with his consent or at a public event. While it was established that the photograph with the biblical quote (see paragraph 15 above) had been taken at an official meeting on 5 May 2005, it presented only I. and not the event in general and so was unrelated to the event. The defendant had thus exercised the choice of which fragments of the photographs to publish, selecting those where only the plaintiff was shown \u201cin a certain light\u201d. Combined with the captions added, this demonstrated that publication of the photographs was intended as an attack on the plaintiff\u2019s honour and dignity.\n(vi) The totality of the circumstances showed, for the court, that the applicant company\u2019s purpose in publishing the impugned statements and photographs was deliberately to damage I.\u2019s reputation. 25.  On 23 May 2006 the Supreme Court, apparently unaware that the examination of the case at first instance had already been completed, reassigned the case to a district court in the Mykolaiv Region on the grounds that \u201ca judge was a party to the proceedings\u201d. 26.  The applicant company appealed against the first-instance court\u2019s judgment arguing in particular that the court had not been impartial because it had refused, without giving particular reasons, to suspend proceedings while the reassignment application had been pending before the Supreme Court. The applicant company also argued that the first-instance court\u2019s judgment was contrary to Article 10 of the Convention. 27.  As to statement A6, the applicant company alleged that I.\u2019s daughter-in-law (the wife of his son) was the daughter of D., who at the time was the President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court. The plaintiff was not contesting that fact. The use of the term \u201cperhaps\u201d in statement A6 showed that it had been meant to communicate that the author was wondering whether a relative\u2019s presence on the Supreme Court was protecting I. rather than being a positive affirmation that this was indeed the case. It was thus a value judgment and was true. 28.  On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Court reassigned the case, at I.\u2019s request, to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal. 29.  On 18 August 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal varied the judgment of the first-instance court and reaffirmed the essential part of its reasoning:\n(i) The Court of Appeal reduced the amounts awarded to UAH 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 1,000 for court fees (about EUR 2,970 and 148 respectively at the time), having regard to the applicant company\u2019s financial situation, and upheld the remainder of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment.\n(ii) By way of reasoning, the Court of Appeal stated that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the fact that the subjects of published information had public status made such persons more open to criticism but did not deprive them of the right to sue to defend their reputation.\n(iii) The Court of Appeal found unconvincing the applicant company\u2019s argument that it had pursued the legitimate aim of informing the public, as opposed to damaging I.\u2019s reputation as President of the Regional Court. Given that the impugned statements and captions to the photographs had been presented as a narrative about certain circumstances (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0434\u044c \u043f\u0440\u043e \u043f\u0435\u0432\u043d\u0456 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0438), the first-instance court\u2019s conclusion that they could not be seen as value judgments, but rather as insults, had been justified. An insult was a statement made not with the purpose of communicating information but with the purpose of insulting a person. 30.  In its appeal on points of law, the applicant company reiterated essentially the same arguments as in its previous appeal (see paragraph 27 above). As to statement A6, the applicant company added that a letter from the chairman of the Council of Judges of Ukraine dated 8 April 2005 and quoted in the impugned article (see paragraph 12 above) was in the file. The letter was addressed to a certain Mr B. and contained a detailed response to his complaints against I. The Council stated, in particular, that the fact that D. was the father of I.\u2019s daughter-in-law did not mean that I. had abused his position. 31.  On 10 March 2008 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the court of cassation, amended the lower courts\u2019 decisions by rejecting I.\u2019s claim for damages, retaining only the award of court fees (see paragraph 29 (i) above). It held that the very fact of the decisions in his favour constituted sufficient redress for I. It upheld the remainder of the lower courts\u2019 decisions. It held, in particular, that the trial judge\u2019s failure to suspend proceedings pending examination of the reassignment application by the Supreme Court did not constitute grounds for quashing its judgment. The court held that the aim of the impugned phrases had been solely to humiliate and disparage a representative of the judiciary and the phrases had made no contribution to the resolution of the problems in the administration of justice. Criticism of a judge was possible in the context of a public debate on problems related to inefficiencies in the judicial system or to a judge\u2019s lack of independence or impartiality. However, the impugned article had not discussed those issues. 32.  As concerns the matter of impartiality of the first-instance court\u2019s judge, the Court of Appel made no comment. The court of cassation stated that the fact that that judge had refused to suspend the proceedings and had rejected the challenge against himself (see paragraph 23 above) did not constitute grounds for quashing the lower courts\u2019 decisions. 33.  The article, published in the issue of the newspaper dated 11-18 May 2006, was authored by Ms K., who was at the time the director of the applicant company, and entitled \u201cEx-court president is \u2018burying\u2019 Lady Justice under his claims (\u042d\u043a\u0441-\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430 \u00ab\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043b\u00bb \u0424\u0435\u043c\u0438\u0434\u0443 \u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438)\u201d. Its relevant parts read:\n\u201cClaims raining down on the independent media of the Kherson Region from Mr I., who until recently used to be President of the Regional Court of Appeal, cannot be called anything other than a trend. Newspapers which take a consistent line in favour of a just and honest judicial system are being targeted.\nIt seems that I. \u2018has had enough\u2019 of a clear and consistent position of Mr S., the head of the Kherson City committee of the Union of Retired Officers of the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement.\nFollowing a defamation claim against the Grivna newspaper, Mr I. also sued the VIK newspaper which had published S.\u2019s open letter to the [regional governor]. S. had asked the governor to state his position concerning the events which became a topic for examination in the Parliament and are constantly in the newspapers. In his letter the author appealed to the government\u2019s representative in the hope that he would not remain an impartial observer but could influence the situation as regards justice in the region. [B1] Claims of retired servicemen seeking increases in their pensions to which they are entitled by law have been pending before the courts of the region for two years. While in other regions pensioners get the money to which they are entitled by law, in our region only several dozen pensioners managed to get their money. Why do the courts work this way in our region? [B2] ...\nRemarkably, this publication in the VIK newspaper was not the end of contacts between S. and I. Literally days after the publication of that issue, the letter writer and the judge had a conversation, at the request of the latter. S. says that a dressing-down is the only term that can describe the tone of the \u2018conversation\u2019. After this meeting the officer\u2019s hope of establishing a dialogue with the judge and of clarifying the situation collapsed. This was the subject of a new open letter he addressed directly to Mr I. And then something totally unexpected for the retired submarine officer happened: he was attacked at night by strangers, received a serious blow to the head, obliging him to be hospitalised. A coincidence? The relevant authorities could answer this question but they initially refused to register S.\u2019s complaint about the attack. He has not been informed about the results of the investigation. [B3]\nThis is the short story of the [contacts between S. and I.] The final touch to the story will be a court judgment on the defamation claim. The claim will be examined by the same Judge St. of the Suvorovsky District Court who surprisingly gets to examine I.\u2019s claims. In contrast to the case against our newspaper, where I. is seeking damages for himself, in the case against VIK his claims are entirely selfless. He is asking that damages be paid to [an orphanage]. Charity is of course a laudable enterprise, but the editorial boards of both Grivna and VIK understand that the point of the operation is not to get some money (\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0435\u044f\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043a\u043e \u043d\u0435 \u0438\u0437-\u0437\u0430 \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0434\u0435\u043d\u044c\u0433\u0438). [B4]\nMost likely, court decisions... in his favour would come in handy for I. when Parliament again examines the question of his lifetime appointment. Claims granted at first instance and on appeal may serve as proof for the argument that journalists\u2019 unjustified attacks (this is how Lady Justice\u2019s servants call our critical publications) are made up and baseless. [B5] Especially because Judge St. does not take into account a seemingly logical idea... that if one of the parties is a court or a judge then the case should be examined by a higher court... [B6]\u201d 34.  I. brought a claim against the applicant company and K., seeking retraction of statements B1-B6 and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. As regards, in particular, statement B3, the plaintiff submitted that it was based entirely on S.\u2019s account of the events and that the author of the article had made no attempt to obtain the version of the Kherson Regional Court\u2019s staff. As far as the attack on S. was concerned, the story was presented in such a way as to generate a \u201ccheap sensation\u201d by creating the impression that I. was somehow implicated in the attack. 35.  According to the applicant company, in the course of the trial it produced as proof of the factual grounds for the impugned statements twenty-four articles published in the local newspapers from 1997 to 2006. 36.  The applicant company also produced the letter from S. to the regional governor, reference to which was made in statements B1 and B2. In the letter, dated 14 February 2006, S. stated that I. possessed property which could not be explained by his lawful income and that the Parliament had refused to appoint I. on a permanent basis. The region \u201cwas one of the last in Ukraine in terms of delivering lawful, just decisions in cases of retired military officers who sought to defend their right to a decent pension\u201d in the courts. S. asked the governor to explain why I. was still allowed to remain in the position of the President of the Regional Court and why the governor did not intervene. 37.  On 19 August 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Shevchenkivsky District Court allowed the claim in part, ordering the author of the article to apologise by retracting statements B1-B5 and the applicant company to publish the retraction in the newspaper. The court awarded UAH 50,000 (about EUR 7,450 at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, from the defendants jointly and severally, to be paid to an orphanage. The following elements of the District Court\u2019s reasoning are worthy of note.\n(i) Referring to Article 10 of the Convention the court stated that the public status of the subjects of publications did not deprive them of the right to protection of their reputation. Even though the impugned statements constituted value judgments, they were insulting.\n(ii) According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the fact that subjects of the published information had public status made such persons more open to criticism but did not deprive them of the right to sue to defend their reputation.\n(iii) The impugned statements were insulting. The defendants had failed to provide evidence of grounds for such statements and the evidence they did provide did not contain incontrovertible facts which would allow assessment of the person of the plaintiff and the work of the court over which he presided (\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0447\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0456\u0432, \u044f\u043a\u0456 \u0431 \u0434\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043e\u0446\u0456\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0443 \u0456 \u0434\u0456\u044f\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0443).\n(iv) Referring to Article 5 of the Information Act setting out objectivity as one of the principles of information relations (see paragraph 49 below), the court said that the implementation of that principle in respect of value judgments meant that they had to have a basis. Freedom of the press and protection offered to elements of provocation in journalistic expression could not justify baseless criticism with insulting elements, as had occurred in the case.\n(v) That position was in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In Lingens v. Austria (8 July 1986, \u00a7 46, Series A no. 103) it had stressed the need to distinguish between facts and value judgments, the truth of which was not susceptible of proof. At the same time the District Court stressed the following quote from the same paragraph of Lingens: \u201cThe Court notes in this connection that the facts on which Mr. Lingens founded his value-judgment were undisputed, as was also his good faith.\u201d\n(vi) The District Court went on to note that the defendants had failed to provide proof that the facts which the journalist evaluated in the impugned article were undisputed/incontrovertible (\u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0456\u0432 \u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456 \u043e\u0446\u0456\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0436\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0443 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0456 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0434\u0430\u0447\u0456 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0443 \u043d\u0435 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0438)[2] and, therefore, the court did not consider that they had acted in good faith in accordance with Article 5 of the Information Act. The court concluded that the defendants\u2019 intention was not to inform the public but rather to spread negative information about the plaintiff.\n(vii) The court refused to declare statement B6 defamatory. 38.  On 14 November 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment but modified it to the effect that damages were to be paid to I. and not the orphanage, since domestic law did not allow for the possibility of directing the funds awarded to a plaintiff to a third party charitable institution. The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court\u2019s assessment of the amount of damages, account being taken of the plaintiff\u2019s moral suffering and disruption of his social ties, including as a public official. The first-instance court had not established that the journalist had acted in good faith and checked the information she disseminated and, accordingly, no exemption from liability under the State Support of Media Act applied (see paragraph 51 below). The Court of Appeal stated that an insult was a statement which was uttered not with the aim of disseminating information but with the aim of humiliating a person. 39.  On 21 December 2007 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the court of cassation, upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. It stated that the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was in accordance with the substantive and procedural law and there were no legal grounds to quash it. 40.  On 2 November 2006 I. was appointed to the position of judge on a permanent basis and continued to hold the position of President of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal until 2012.", "references": ["4", "9", "7", "1", "0", "5", "2", "8", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Fredriksberg, Denmark. The applicant was the CEO of one of Iceland\u2019s largest banks, Glitnir, from September 1997 to the end of April 2007. 5.  On 30 July 2009 the Directorate of Tax Investigation (Skattranns\u00f3knarstj\u00f3ri r\u00edkisins) initiated an audit of the applicant\u2019s tax returns. The Directorate\u2019s reason for initiating the investigation was to examine whether the applicant had declared profits from selling shares he received when he stepped down as the CEO of Glitnir. The applicant was questioned by the Directorate of Tax Investigation on 17 August and 2 October 2009. The investigation was concluded with a report issued on 5 October 2010. 6.  By a letter of 6 October 2010, the Directorate informed the applicant of its findings and that the case had been referred to the Directorate of Internal Revenue (R\u00edkisskattstj\u00f3ri) for possible reassessment of his taxes. It also informed the applicant about the Directorate\u2019s upcoming decision on possible criminal proceedings, listed possible ways of finalising the criminal proceedings in the case and gave the applicant 30 days to comment thereon. 7.  In an email of 11 November 2010, the Directorate of Tax Investigation stated that a decision on possible criminal proceedings would be postponed until the Directorate of Internal Revenue had issued its notification letter (bo\u00f0unarbr\u00e9f) on the re-assessment of the applicant\u2019s taxes. 8.  By a letter of 2 May 2011, the Directorate of Internal Revenue notified the applicant that his taxes for the tax years 2007 to 2009 had been re\u2011assessed. The applicant objected to the re-assessment. 9.  On 16 January 2012, in the light of the applicant\u2019s objections, the Directorate of Internal Revenue sent the applicant an amended notification letter (bo\u00f0unarbr\u00e9f) which stated that his taxes for the tax years of 2007 to 2009 had been re-assessed. The Directorate cancelled the prior re\u2011assessment of taxes relating to the profits for selling shares received when the applicant stepped down as the CEO of Glitnir. 10.  Based on the report issued by the Directorate of Tax Investigation, and taking into account the applicants\u2019 objections, the Directorate of Internal Revenue, ruling on 15 May 2012, found that the applicant had failed to declare significant capital income received from 2006 to 2008. Therefore, it revised upwards the amount declared as capital in his tax returns for 2007 to 2009 and, consequently, re-assessed his taxes and imposed a 25% surcharge. The applicant paid the taxes owed and the imposed surcharge. 11.  The applicant did not appeal against the decision to the State Internal Revenue Board, which thus acquired legal force 3 months later, in August 2012, when the time-limit for an appeal had expired. 12.  On 1 March 2012 the Directorate of Tax Investigation reported the matter to the Special Prosecutor and forwarded its report concerning the applicant. The Directorate reported the full matter for investigation, including the possible tax violation related to profits for selling shares received when the applicant stepped down as the CEO of Glitnir. The applicant was informed by letter the same day. 13.  By email of 2 March 2012, the applicant\u2019s lawyer protested at the case being sent to the Special Prosecutor. The lawyer argued that the deadline to object to the Directorate of Internal Revenue\u2019s reassessment had not expired, that the referral was ill-founded and requested that it be withdrawn. 14.  By email of 5 March 2012, the Directorate of Tax Investigation replied and stated that the deadline for the applicant to express his opinion had expired as the Directorate of Internal Revenue\u2019s notification letter (bo\u00f0unarbr\u00e9f) had already been issued and sent to the applicant on 16 January 2012 (see paragraph 9 above). Furthermore, it was stated that the Special Prosecutor would make an independent assessment of the applicant\u2019s case, repeat an investigation and issue an indictment if there was reason to do so. Any questions about the procedure before the Special Prosecutor had to be taken up with the Special Prosecutor as he was responsible for the criminal proceedings in the case. 15.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant was interviewed by the Special Prosecutor. The applicant was informed that the investigation concerned the case as it was concluded by the Directorate of Internal Revenue. Certain aspects of the case reported to the Special Prosecutor had been dropped. 16.  On 17 December 2012 the Special Prosecutor indicted the applicant for aggravated tax offences. The applicant was indicted for having failed to declare income in his tax returns of 2007 to 2009. This included the failure to declare his capital income in the form of property sale profits, dividend payments, interest payments and foreign exchange rate gains, received from 2006 to 2008. 17.  The applicant requested that the case be dismissed, inter alia, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. By a ruling of 23 April 2013, the District Court rejected his claim. 18.  By a judgment of 28 June 2013, the District Court found that the applicant had acted with gross negligence, which was sufficient for criminal liability under the relevant provisions of the tax law, and thus convicted the applicant of the charges against him. The court sentenced him to six months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years, and the payment of a fine in the amount of 38,850,000 Icelandic Kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately 241,000 euro (EUR) at the material time). In fixing the fine the court had regard to the tax surcharges imposed, without describing any calculation made in this respect. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 20.  By a judgment of 15 May 2014 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to dismiss the case on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. The court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and confirmed the fine imposed by the District Court. However, the court sentenced the applicant to eight months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years.", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "9", "7", "4", "6", "8", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant is a media company with its registered office in Ankara. 6.  On 5 November 1998 Kamoy Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Siyasi Dan\u0131\u015fmanl\u0131k ve Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k A.\u015e. (hereinafter \u201cKamoy Ara\u015ft\u0131rma\u201d), a company affiliated with the applicant company, applied to the Turkish Patent Institute (T\u00fcrk Patent Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc) for registration of the trademark \u201c\u00d6zlenen Gazete Vatan, G\u00fcnl\u00fck Siyasi Gazete\u201d (Homeland: The newspaper we longed for). On 5 November 1998 the trademark was registered in the name of the company for a period of ten years. 7.  In February and March 1999 Kamoy Ara\u015ft\u0131rma published a newspaper entitled \u00d6zlenen Gazete Vatan. In March 1999 it halted the publication of the newspaper owing to financial reasons. 8.  On 4 September 2002, Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k A.\u015e. (hereinafter \u201cBa\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik\u201d), another company operating in the media sector, began publishing a newspaper called Vatan. 9.  On 22 October 2002, Kamoy Ara\u015ft\u0131rma brought a case against Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik before the Istanbul Intellectual Property Court, requesting the suspension of the latter\u2019s use of its registered trademark, which according to it constituted unfair competition. It argued, inter alia, that the other party was using the same name for the same product, namely a newspaper, without having obtained any prior permission, despite the fact that it had the rights to the registered trademark which needed to be protected pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 556 on the Protection of Trademarks. 10.  During the course of the proceedings the trademark was transferred to the applicant company, which subsequently became a party to the proceedings. 11.  On 18 August 2003 an expert report assessing both parties\u2019 rights as regards the name at issue was submitted to the court. It noted that while the applicant company had indeed registered the name \u201cVatan\u201d, which was common to both newspapers, Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik had the \u201cdeclaration of intention to publish a periodical\u201d (mevkute beyannamesi \u2013 hereinafter \u201cdeclaration of a periodical\u201d) dated 1974, which allowed it to publish with that name. The report pointed out that the newspaper Vatan had been published since 1975 and that the name had become recognisable long before the applicant company had applied for registration. In that connection, the report noted that in view of the last paragraph of Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556, which made reference to the recognisability of a trademark, it should be accepted that it was Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik that had actually made the name a recognised brand. It concluded accordingly that the Patent Institute should have refused the applicant company\u2019s request for registration pursuant to Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556. 12.  On 27 January 2004 the Istanbul Intellectual Property Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claim. The court noted that the newspaper Vatan, the rights to which had been transferred to Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik in 2002, had been published since 1975. In line with the findings of the expert report, it held that the name \u201cVatan\u201d had become well-known as a newspaper prior to the applicant company\u2019s application for its registration as a trademark and that the applicant company, whose application should actually have been rejected by the Patent Institute, could not be considered to have brought the case in good faith. The court furthermore stated that in any event the use of the name by the defendant party was protected by section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act (Law no. 5000 on the Establishment and Duties of the Turkish Patent Institute), which had come into force on 6 November 2003 during the course of the proceedings and set forth that those who publish periodicals could not be prevented from doing so on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 556. 13.  The applicant company appealed against the judgment. It argued that the \u201cdeclaration of a periodical\u201d mentioned in the expert report was simply an official recognition of an application to publish a periodical and did not have any priority over a registered trademark. Noting that its rights to the trademark at issue were still valid, it argued that Turkish law provided for the absolute protection of a registered trademark. The applicant company also challenged the application of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act to its case, stating that the said regulation had entered into force after it had lodged its case. It argued that the provision did not have a legitimate aim and paved the way for everyone to publish newspapers with the same name. 14.  On 6 May 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on the basis of the second reasoning relied on by the Intellectual Property Court. The appellate court pointed out that according to the additional paragraph of Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556, the application for the registration of a trademark which had previously been recognisable \u2013 in this case, the application for registration lodged by the defendant party (see paragraphs 18-23 below) \u2013 could not be rejected. It found that despite that provision, since the applicant company had already registered the trademark, it would have priority over an unregistered trademark, albeit a recognisable one. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the first reasoning of the court, which gave priority to the unregistered trademark, could not be accepted. It noted, however, that the case should in any event be dismissed pursuant to section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act. 15.  The applicant company applied for rectification of that judgment, arguing that the retrospective application of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act put the other party in a privileged position. In that connection, it maintained that had the Intellectual Property Court ruled on its case within one year of it having been lodged, it would have been able to prevent the unlawful use of its trademark. 16.  On 28 October 2005 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant\u2019s rectification application. 17.  On 31 January 2008, in examining the matter in relation to a separate case, the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, finding that it did not comply with Article 35 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to property. After having established that a trademark constituted a possession, the Constitutional Court stated that Legislative Decree no. 556 was aimed at protecting registered trademarks from unlawful interferences and that the provision at issue made it impossible to exercise that protection as regards unlawful interferences which had already started by its entry into force. It concluded accordingly that such a restriction of trademark rights, which resulted in the protection of unlawful acts, was not in the public interest. 18.  On 24 September 2002 Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik applied for the registration of the name \u201cVatan\u201d as a trademark. The Patent Institute rejected the application on account of the already existing registration in the applicant company\u2019s name. 19.  On an unspecified date Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik objected to the decision of the Patent Institute. 20.  On 8 December 2003 the Patent Institute imposed a provisional measure on the trademark, restricting its transfer to third parties. 21.  On 7 February 2005 the Patent Institute accepted the objection of Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik and decided to register the name \u201cVatan\u201d in its name for publishing services. 22.  In the meantime, on 2 April 2004 Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik had initiated proceedings against the applicant company for the annulment of the latter\u2019s registered trademark. 23.  On 17 February 2005 the Ankara Intellectual Property Court ruled that the registration in the name of the applicant company be declared void, finding that Vatan had become well-known as a newspaper before the applicant company\u2019s registration. The court also held that the applicant company had not used the trademark for a period of five years, which was a reason for annulment of a trademark under Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 556. That judgment became final by a decision of the Court of Cassation on 12 June 2006. 24.  On 11 August 2006 the trademark for the name \u201cVatan\u201d was registered in the name of Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Gazetecilik. 25.  On 9 November 2006 the applicant company\u2019s trademark registration was removed from the register of the Patent Institute.", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "6", "5", "7", "8", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Voronezhskaya, Krasnodar Region. 5.  In summer 2014 Ms F., the head of the Ust-Labinskiy District and of the non-governmental organisation \u201cHuman Rights Defender\u201d, spoke at a television talk show on the situation in the eastern region of Ukraine and relations between Russia and Ukraine. 6.  On 28 July 2015 the applicant published on YouTube a video with the title \u201cKolkhoz TV on Ukrainian crisis\u201d (\u041a\u043e\u043b\u0445\u043e\u0437\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441\u0435) where he made comments on Ms F.\u2019s speech as follows:\n\u201cMs F.: Nobody in the whole world has ever thought that Russia would become such a strong country and ... that Russia would reach new horizons...\nThe applicant (Mr R.): Nodding ironically, showing the brochure \u201cLife of a galley slave\u201d.\nMs F.: ... would organise worldwide renowned Olympic Games...\nMr R.: Nodding ironically, showing brochure \u201cWinter Olympic Games in subtropics\u201d.\nMs F.: ...and would host the Eurovision competition and, at the same time, would become a leading leader among gases (\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u043c \u043b\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u0433\u0430\u0437\u0430).\nMr R.: Yet today, according to the latest reports of the Mendeleyev international rating agency, Russia has reached the top of the list, drawing ahead of such gases as carbon, hydrogen and oxygen.\nMs F.: ...There is a war against Russia, which has become a first-rate power and everybody is annoyed by this fact...They want us to die of drug and alcohol abuse and poverty etc.\nMr R.: But it is not true that we die of alcohol, drugs and poverty... poverty?\nMs F.: ... Ukraine is, so to say, our Russian belly...\nMr R.: I am afraid of asking what the Far East is.\nMs F.: And that\u2019s why we must, certainly, help these people who have found themselves in a horrible situation because Kyiv, to be honest, does not need these people. It needs gas.\nMr R.: But who is \u2018the leading leader among gases\u2019? That means they need Russia!\nMs F.: So, Slavyansk means gas...\nMr R.: Slavyansk means gas. As we know, gas means Russia. This proves that Slavyansk belongs to us on lawful grounds. In fact, it does not.\nMs F.: ... We must not get involved in a war...\nMr R.: Wait! You have said that a war has been declared on us. How can we not get involved in the war if we have been drawn into the war, as everybody knows, by Bulgarians?\nMs F.: ... we may not interfere [with what is happening in Ukraine]. Yes, we are sorry, yes, people die there. As has previously been said, what if our people go there and die?\nMr R.: I would recommend that this woman go to mothers of Russian soldiers, in particular those who had been dismissed from the service or who were on leave and who returned from Ukraine in coffins, so she could tell them that we did not interfere and that we do not have troops there.\nMs F.: And if now the economic situation in the country worsens and Russian people seek to rebel? We are already under pressure from various religious conventions (\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0439) which have infiltrated the country. Even in Krasnodar Region there are many such protestant, so to say, religious cults, as I call them, which influence people\u2019s minds.\nMr R.: What, [beep] you are talking about?!\nMs F.: I guess they are now trying to convince us ideologically that if we are not happy with regional authorities\u2019 decisions we need to organise rallies, revolutions etc. I believe that we must not take the bait!\nMr R.: ... because this breaks with long traditions and principles: to stay in a horsebox and eat all this sh** coming from the television.\nMs F.: We all, including all human rights defenders, need to work together as a team...\nMr R.: A person who claims to be a human rights defender must know what human rights are... Now you have an idea of what is happening inside the heads of those who watch television! Next patient, please!\u201d 7.  On 11 January 2016 Ms F. brought an action against the applicant, stating that he had offended her and had harmed her reputation. 8.  On 28 January 2016 the Ust-Labinskiy District Court of the Krasnodar Region allowed her claim. The court held as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] disseminated untrue statements about Ms F. which damaged her honour, dignity and reputation, because these statements referred to unethical behaviour on her part...\nThe court has established that the defendant used abusive and obscene language in his video ..., therefore [the applicant] intended to humiliate Ms F. and damage her reputation.\n... Ms F., the head of the Ust-Labinsk District, has sustained damage of a non\u2011pecuniary nature due to emotional distress caused by the defendant\u2019s defamatory and discrediting statements and allusions to her unethical conduct. In accordance with the principle of reasonableness, taking into account the seriousness of the wrongful acts, the nature of the offence and the contents of the publication, the degree of suffering involved, and that the information concerned a public activist and was available for the general public, the court allows the plaintiff\u2019s claim for non\u2011pecuniary damage in part and awards 50,000 roubles (\u2018RUB\u2019)\u201d. 9.  On 24 February 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 28 January 2016. He submitted that he had not offended Ms F., but had rather commented on her statements regarding the situation in Ukraine; nor had he disseminated any untruths relating to Ms F. As to obscene words, the applicant had used only one word meaning \u201cprostitute\u201d. However this word had been an interjection rather than an offence, and had been bleeped out. The applicant emphasised that the first-instance court had established that Ms F. was a public person who should tolerate critics, but had still issued a decision violating freedom of political speech. 10.  On 5 May 2016 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld this decision on appeal, stating that the applicant had failed to provide any proof in respect of statements about Ms F. used in his video, and that he had used vulgar and obscene words humiliating Ms F. 11.  On 1 August and 1 November 2016 the Krasnodar Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeals.", "references": ["9", "7", "3", "2", "8", "0", "5", "1", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Szigetv\u00e1r-Becefa. 5.  At 11 a.m. on 4 February 2013 the applicant was taken to Sellye police station for questioning, at first as a witness, in relation to recent occurrences of timber theft. According to the police record, he waived his right to counsel and immediately admitted to his involvement in the offence in question. As a result, from 12.12 p.m. onwards, he was further questioned, this time as a suspect, and disclosed the identity of his accomplices. At 2.15 p.m. the applicant was taken home (in order to change his shoes because the police wanted to seize the ones he had been wearing) and then to the scene of the theft, where he explained to the officers precisely how the offence had been carried out. At 4 p.m. he was released after having signed a document stating that he had not suffered any injuries while in custody and had no complaints about the questioning. 6.  On leaving the police station, the applicant met his aunt and a man from his village, who were waiting for him and his accomplice (his cousin), who had been questioned at the same time by other officers. 7.  At 4.56 p.m. the applicant was examined by a general practitioner in Sellye and was diagnosed with hyperaemia (redness) measuring 8 cm in diameter on his left cheek and a minor wound in his mouth. His chest was also noted to be tender. On 6 February 2013 X-ray and ultrasound examinations were conducted on the applicant at a hospital in P\u00e9cs. No fracture was found, but a bruise was noted at rib cage level. 8.  On 6 February 2013 the applicant initiated proceedings on account of ill-treatment inflicted by the police in order to extort a confession. He indicated his willingness to undergo a polygraph test in order to prove the veracity of his allegations. 9.  On 28 March 2013 the applicant was examined by the P\u00e9cs investigating prosecutor. He contended that, on the morning of 4 February 2013, he had been questioned by five police officers. When he had denied his involvement in the offence, one of them (wearing gloves) had slapped him on both cheeks several times. Another officer had then ordered him to stand up and when he had done so, the officer had kicked him in the chest so that he had fallen back onto the chair. The third officer had slapped him in the face once or twice, and had punched him in the stomach once. The applicant could name two of the officers whom he knew from previous police visits to his village: one of them \u2013 who had been in charge of his questioning on 4 February 2013 \u2013 had not hit him, while the other one had only \u201cdropped by\u201d but had allegedly taken part in his beating. He gave a description of the two unknown officers who he alleged had beaten him. 10.  On 16 October 2013 the prosecutor questioned the police officer who had been in charge of questioning the applicant on 4 February 2013. The police officer firmly denied any kind of ill-treatment and said that, after his release, the applicant had met someone who he had alleged had participated in the crime. The police officer suggested that the applicant\u2019s injuries might well have resulted from that encounter. He further contended that when he had been taken home on 4 February 2013, the applicant had met his mother but had not complained to her of any kind of ill-treatment. 11.  On 25 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s aunt and her son (the applicant\u2019s accomplice) were examined by the prosecutor. The applicant\u2019s aunt said that when she had met the applicant at 4 p.m. in front of the police station, she had seen his mouth bleeding. The accomplice also alleged that he had seen wounds inside the applicant\u2019s mouth. 12.  A medical expert opinion was obtained. On the basis of the documents previously drawn up by the general practitioner and the doctor at P\u00e9cs Hospital, the expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s visible injuries, namely the hyperaemia on his face and a minor wound in his mouth, might have resulted from a single slap inflicted with medium force \u2013 the wound being caused by the canine tooth colliding with the mucous membrane. The expert indicated that the sensitiveness of the chest, without any perceivable external symptoms, was a subjective complaint and it could not therefore be considered as an injury for the purposes of criminal law. 13.  On 15 November 2013 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation. Having particular regard to the medical expert opinion allegedly contradicting the applicant\u2019s statements (given that it only corroborated one blow, rather than several as described by the applicant), he held that the ill-treatment of the applicant while in police custody could not be proven \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. 14.  The applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision, arguing, among other things, that the authorities had failed to organise a confrontation between him and the police officer in charge in order to resolve the discrepancies in their statements, or an identification parade in order for the applicant to identify the police officers involved. Moreover, the prosecutor\u2019s decision had not given any reasons for disregarding the statements of the two witnesses (the applicant\u2019s aunt and her son) who had seen the applicant with a bleeding mouth immediately after his release (see paragraph 11 above). 15.  On 5 December 2013 the Baranya County Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office rejected the complaint as ill-founded. It stressed that further investigative steps (a confrontation or an identification parade) would have been necessary only if the medical expert had substantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations, which he had not. Since the fact of ill-treatment by the police as such was not sufficiently proven, there was no need for further investigation into the identity of the alleged perpetrators. It also noted that the witnesses had not seen the alleged ill-treatment taking place. 16.  This final decision was allegedly served on the applicant on 17 December 2013. The applicant was informed that he had the possibility of bringing a private prosecution, by acting as substitute private prosecutor, under Articles 229-230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17.  On 13 December 2013 the investigation against the applicant on account of the alleged timber theft was discontinued for want of sufficient evidence. The decision took account of the fact that the applicant had withdrawn his confession and that his brother had provided him with an alibi.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "8", "5", "4", "0", "7", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is registered in Vilnius. 6.  It provides heating, cooling, ventilation and air conditioning equipment in Lithuania. 7.  In 2013 the Vilnius territorial customs office (hereinafter \u201cthe customs office\u201d) carried out an audit of the applicant company\u2019s accounting data, related to goods imported between 1 July 2009 and 31 August 2012. During that period the applicant company bought some goods and declared them as air conditioning equipment, comprising of one unit and its parts. The goods were bought from a company registered in the United States of America (hereinafter \u201cthe seller company\u201d) but the applicant company claimed that it had not concluded purchase agreements with that company and that the goods had been bought on the basis of an order. In April 2013 the customs office found that in twenty\u2011three import declarations the value of the goods had been three to four times lower than the value of similar goods declared by other importers. In addition, invoices provided by the applicant company had not contained any information on payment for the goods. Moreover, the customs office stated that the applicant company and seller company were related because two of the latter\u2019s logistics managers were also employed by the applicant company. As a result, the applicant company was ordered to pay 618,083 euros (EUR) in total as customs tax, value added tax, late payment interest and a fine. 8.  The applicant company complained about the customs office\u2019s report to the Customs Department. In June 2014 the latter annulled part of the report and ordered the customs office to carry out an additional investigation. The Customs Department held that the customs office had not precisely indicated which legal provisions had not been complied with by the evidence or facts the applicant company had provided. Furthermore, it was not clear which of the grounds specified in Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of the Community Customs Code (hereinafter \u201cRegulation No. 2454/93\u201d) (see paragraph 25 below) the customs office had been referring to when stating that the applicant company and seller company were related. Moreover, the mere fact that the buyer and seller companies were related and the declared value of goods was small was not enough to warrant a recalculation of the import taxes. 9.  In December 2013 the customs office carried out an additional investigation. It held that in the absence of any evidence that could prove that employees of the applicant company were not related to the American company, it had to conclude that the buyer and seller were related. The customs office also refused to approve twenty\u2011three import declarations provided by the applicant company and calculated the value of the imported goods in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (hereinafter \u201cthe Community Customs Code\u201d). The customs office ordered the applicant company to pay 173,005 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately EUR 50,106) in customs tax, LTL 1,457,978 (approximately EUR 422,260) in value added tax, LTL 437,675 (approximately EUR 126,759) in late payment interest and a fine of LTL 163,098 (approximately EUR 47,236), the total amount being EUR 646,361. 10.  The applicant company complained about the report drawn up during the additional investigation to the Customs Department with a request for it to be annulled. The applicant company claimed that the refusal of the customs office to approve the value of the goods provided by it in accordance with the transaction value method was unfounded, as was the conclusion that the applicant company and seller company were related. Moreover, the applicant company disagreed with the late payment interest because it had increased due to the protractedness of the investigation of the customs office. 11.  In March 2014 the Customs Department approved the customs office\u2019s report of December 2013 (see paragraph 9 above) and dismissed the applicant company\u2019s complaint. 12.  The applicant company appealed against that decision to the Tax Disputes Commission, providing documents from the seller company proving that none of its employees were also employed by the applicant company. In July 2014 the Tax Disputes Commission held that because the applicant company had provided incomplete data, it had been unable to determine the exact circumstances of the purchase agreement concluded with the seller company. Nevertheless, the Tax Disputes Commission decided to exempt the applicant company from paying LTL 27,118.40 (approximately EUR 7,854) of late payment interest. 13.  The applicant company complained to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It claimed that it was not clear from the customs office\u2019s report of December 2013 on which of the grounds specified in Article 143 of Regulation No. 2454/93 (see paragraph 25 below) the customs office had been relying when stating that the applicant company and seller company were related. The mere fact that the applicant company and seller company had been involved in the purchase agreements was not sufficient to conclude that they were business partners. The applicant company also argued that the customs office had refused to apply the transaction value method without providing any reasons. During the hearing, the applicant company asked the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter \u201cCJEU\u201d). 14.  On 22 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s complaint as unfounded. It held that there was enough information to adopt a decision in the case and that no question as to the interpretation of European Union customs law had arisen (teismas pa\u017eymi, kad byloje yra pakankamai duomen\u0173 sprendimo pri\u0117mimui, teismui joki\u0173 papildom\u0173 klausim\u0173 teis\u0117s ai\u0161kinimo klausimais nekilo, tod\u0117l n\u0117ra pagrindo kreiptis \u012f Europos S\u0105jungos Teisingumo Teism\u0105). 15.  The applicant company appealed against that decision. It stated that the first\u2011instance court had misinterpreted the provisions of the Community Customs Code and Regulation No. 2454/93. Moreover, the decision of the first\u2011instance court had lacked reasoning. The applicant company submitted that an interpretation of certain provisions of European Union law was necessary because the case-law of the CJEU regarding the application of Articles 29\u201131 of the Community Customs Code was inconsistent. According to the applicant company, it was necessary to refer the following questions to the CJEU:\n- (1) Whether the conditions specified in Article 29 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code, which influence the sale and price of the goods and whose effect cannot be assessed, include cases such as the one at hand, where at the time of presentation of the goods to customs and the assessment of those goods a debt of buyer to seller exists? If the debt does not have any effect on the sale or price of the goods, is it included in the transaction value defined in Article 29 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code?\n- (2) Can the difference between the price of imported goods and the list of comparative prices collected by customs be independent grounds not to apply the transaction value method, and is this difference considered a circumstance whose effect on the sale or price of goods cannot be assessed, within the meaning of Article 29 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code?\n- (3) If the seller authorises the buyer\u2019s employees to perform certain actions related to the transportation and the customs procedures of the goods, can this be considered a relationship between buyer and seller, within the meaning of Article 29 \u00a7 1 (d) of the Community Customs Code, and can it be grounds not to apply the transaction value method?\n- (4) Can a national customs office rely on Article 31 \u00a7 1 of the Community Customs Code independently, without applying the methods set out in Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code? If the national customs office has to rely on one of the methods set out in Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code, comparative data relating to which period is considered relevant? Does the use of the only case of export as a comparative correspond to the criterion of \u201cat the same time or almost at the same time\u201d when applying it to establish the value of goods declared within a period of three years? Can cases of export from other States (for example, Malaysia) be assessed and can this data be considered comparative? Does the national customs office have to rely on the data collected by it and involving cases of export to Lithuania only or does it have to send other member States a request of information?\n- (5) Is the provision of domestic law that the customs office use data existing in the Customs Department database when applying the transaction value method of similar and identical goods in accordance with Article 31 \u00a7 1 of the Community Customs Code, which provides that where the customs value of imported goods cannot be determined under Articles 29 or 30, it must be determined on the basis of data available in the Community?\n- (6) Can the transaction value of similar goods be compared by comparing not the transaction value of similar goods but the price of one kilogram, which is determined by dividing the transaction value existing in the national customs database by the amount of kilograms? 16.  On 22 March 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first\u2011instance decision. The court referred to the case\u2011law of the Court that Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention could not be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applied could vary according to the nature of the decision. Moreover, it was necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the submissions that a litigant could bring before the courts and the differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and the presentation and drafting of judgments. This was why the question of whether a court had failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons, deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, could only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Administrative Court relied on the following authorities: Hiro Balani v. Spain, 9 December 1994, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 303\u2011B; Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, \u00a7 29, Series A no. 303\u2011A; and Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, \u00a7 34, 1 July 2003, Series A no. 303\u2011A. It held that the first\u2011instance decision had been adequately reasoned. It was established in domestic case\u2011law that the court could refer the issue to the competent judicial institution of the European Union (see paragraph 18 below). However, the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the request of a party to the proceedings to refer a certain question to the judicial institution of the European Union was not obligatory if the application of European Union law was so obvious that no doubts could arise (bylos \u0161alies pra\u0161ymas teismui n\u0117ra privalomas ir jei Europos S\u0105jungos teis\u0117s taikymas yra toks akivaizdus, kad d\u0117l pateikto klausimo sprendimo negali kilti joki\u0173 pagr\u012fst\u0173 abejoni\u0173, galutin\u0117s instancijos nacionalinis teismas neprivalo kreiptis \u012f Europos S\u0105jungos Teisingumo Teism\u0105 su prejudiciniu klausimu). Also, the mere fact that a party to the proceedings did not agree with the interpretation of the law provided by the first\u2011instance court did not mean that the substance of the European Union law was not clear and that there was a necessity to refer the question to the CJEU (Pasteb\u0117tina, kad vien faktin\u0117 aplinkyb\u0117, jog gin\u010do \u0161alis nesutinka su pirmosios instancijos teismo pateiktu teis\u0117s ai\u0161kinimu, savaime nerei\u0161kia, jog n\u0117ra ai\u0161kus Europos S\u0105jungos teis\u0117s turinys, ir, atitinkamai, kad yra pagrindas kreiptis \u012f ESTT prejudicinio sprendimo). The Supreme Administrative Court also held that the application of European Union law was clear enough in the present case and that there was no need to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (\u0160io gin\u010do apimtyje teismui nekyla neai\u0161kum\u0173 d\u0117l Bendrijos muitin\u0117s kodekso 29-31 straipsni\u0173 taikymo, tod\u0117l parei\u0161k\u0117jo pra\u0161ymas kreiptis \u012f Europos S\u0105jungos Teisingumo Teism\u0105 su prejudiciniu klausimu netenkintinas). It quoted another of its cases regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of a directive regulating markets in financial instruments, where it held that the applicant company in that case had failed to indicate specific uncertainties as to the interpretation of that directive and had not indicated why the referral to the CJEU was necessary (case no. A858-48/2011 of 14 April 2011). 17.  In April 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request lodged by the applicant company to reopen the proceedings.", "references": ["7", "4", "0", "2", "5", "9", "6", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant, a former member of the Turkish Constitutional Court, is a Turkish national who was born in 1968 and lives in Ankara. He is currently detained. 7.  In 1993 the applicant began his career as a public prosecutor. In 2001 he was appointed as a rapporteur at the Constitutional Court. On 27 March 2010 he was appointed by the President of Turkey as a judge of the Constitutional Court for a term of office due to expire when he reached the age of 65. On 26 October 2011 he was elected Vice-President of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi Ba\u015fkanvekili) by the court\u2019s judges for a four-year term, which ended on 26 October 2015. At the time of the events to which the application relates, he was a judge at the court. 8.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the \u201cPeace at Home Council\u201d attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed parliament, government and President of Turkey. 9.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators\u2019 control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, also attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 250 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 10.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah G\u00fclen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of an organisation known as FET\u00d6/PDY (\u201cG\u00fclenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure\u201d). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in respect of suspected members of that organisation. 11.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President. 12.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 13.  During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, passed thirty-seven legislative decrees (nos. 667-703) under Article 121 of the Constitution. One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in the Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in Article 3 that the Constitutional Court was authorised to dismiss any of its members who were considered to belong or be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security. The legislative decrees also placed significant restrictions on the procedural safeguards laid down in domestic law for anyone held in police custody or pre-trial detention (for example, extension of the police custody period, and restrictions on access to case files and on the examination of objections against detention orders). 14.  The Government stated that during and after the coup attempt, prosecutors\u2019 offices had initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals involved in the attempt and those who were not involved but had links to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, including members of the judiciary. They specified in that connection that on 16 July 2016, in the context of a criminal investigation opened by the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office, some 3,000 judges and prosecutors, including two judges of the Constitutional Court (including the applicant) and more than 160 judges of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, had been taken into police custody and subsequently placed in pre-trial detention. In addition, warrants had been issued for the arrest of thirty judges of the highest courts who were deemed to be fugitives. 15.  On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted. 16.  On 16 July 2016, in the course of the criminal investigation opened by the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on the instructions of the same office, which described him as a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY terrorist organisation and urged that he be placed in pre-trial detention. The relevant parts of the instructions were worded as follows:\n\u201cThe offence of overthrowing the Government and the constitutional order through force and violence is currently being committed across the country; there is a risk that members of the [FET\u00d6/PDY] terrorist organisation committing the offence in question might flee the country ...\u201d\nOn the same day, the police conducted a search of the applicant\u2019s home and seized computers and other IT equipment belonging to him. 17.  On 19 July 2016 the applicant was questioned by the Ankara public prosecutor. He was suspected of having sought to overthrow the constitutional order (Article 309 of the Criminal Code) and being a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY terrorist organisation (Article 314 of the Criminal Code). During the questioning, the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer, denied all the allegations against him and argued that they could only have been based on his dissenting opinions as set out in judgments of the Constitutional Court. His lawyer challenged the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody, arguing that the requirements of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto were not satisfied and that his client could not be the subject of a criminal investigation without permission from the Constitutional Court. He requested that his client be released on bail. 18.  Later that day, the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the applicant, together with thirteen other suspects \u2013 six judges of the Supreme Administrative Court, six judges of the Court of Cassation and another judge \u2013 to appear before the 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court (sulh ceza hakimli\u01e7i). He called for the applicant to be placed in pre-trial detention, bearing in mind that certain members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation had fled after the events and that evidence had yet to be gathered. 19.  On 20 July 2016 the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, Mr M. Orak, appeared before the 2nd Magistrate\u2019s Court with the thirteen other suspects. According to the record of the questioning, they were suspected of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and being members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, offences punishable under Articles 309 and 314 of the Criminal Code. The suspects\u2019 statements, including those made by the applicant, were recorded using the SEGB\u0130S sound and image information system (Ses ve G\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc Bili\u015fim Sistemi). The transcripts of the recordings indicate that the applicant, after describing his career as a judge at the Constitutional Court, denied all the accusations against him. They also show that his lawyer challenged all the measures taken against his client, relying on the latter\u2019s special status linked to his position as a Constitutional Court judge. The relevant parts of the transcripts read as follows:\n\u201cThe suspect\u2019s lawyer, Mr M. Orak: \u2018... it appears that Articles 109 and 114 [this in fact refers to Articles 309 and 314 of the Criminal Code] were mentioned in the record of the hearing; is the request for detention under Article 114 [314] also being made on the basis of Article 109 [309]?\u2019\nThe magistrate, M.C.: \u2018Not [on the basis of Article] 109 [309].\u2019\nThe suspect\u2019s lawyer, Mr M. Orak: \u2018OK ... Since my client has been brought before you on the basis of Article 114 [314], this is not a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. So all the steps taken in connection with that offence have been ultra vires and unlawful ... In this case, the criminal investigation and trial should be conducted from the start by the plenary Constitutional Court ... There is no concrete evidence that could justify pre-trial detention, and the accusations were based on abstract allegations ... [Furthermore], in this particular case, the cumulative conditions for pre-trial detention were not met, and in any event, we are asking for alternative measures to be ordered ...\u201d 20.  On the same day, the magistrate ordered the pre-trial detention of the applicant and the thirteen other suspects, holding as follows:\n\u201c... In view of the fact that some suspects and their representatives contended that the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office and our court did not have jurisdiction [to deal with the case], it should be noted that in accordance with section 16(1) of Law no. 6216 ..., the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a \u2018continuing offence\u2019 (temadi olan su\u00e7) and that there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto.\nFollowing an examination of the investigation file, the suspects\u2019 pre-trial detention is ordered, regard being had to the nature of the alleged offence, the state of the evidence, [all the] records included in the file, the decisions of 17 July 2016 by the presidents\u2019 offices at the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, the reports on searches and seizures and the entire contents of the case file, and also the fact that there is concrete evidence giving rise to a strong suspicion that the offence in question has been committed. [It is also noted that] the alleged offence was among the so-called \u2018catalogue\u2019 offences listed in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that pre-trial detention is a proportionate measure in view of the length of the sentence provided for by law, and that alternative measures to detention are insufficient on account of the risks of absconding and of damage to evidence.\u201d 21.  Also on 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President.\nIn addition, on 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15 (see paragraphs 11-13 above). 22.  On the same day, the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In support of the objection, he argued that there was no concrete evidence that could justify detention, and that such a measure did not comply with the relevant domestic law. He also asked for alternative measures to be applied on the grounds that his son was severely disabled and dependent on his personal assistance. 23.  In a decision of 4 August 2016 the Constitutional Court, meeting in plenary session, dismissed the applicant from his post. In reaching that decision it noted, on the basis of Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 667, that \u201cinformation from the social environment\u201d (sosyal \u00e7evre bilgisi) and the \u201ccommon opinion emerging over time\u201d (zaman i\u00e7inde olu\u015fan ortak kanaatleri) among members of the Constitutional Court suggested that the applicant had links to the organisation in question, making him no longer fit to practise his profession. 24.  On 9 August 2016 the 3rd Magistrate\u2019s Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection against the order for his detention. 25.  On 26 September 2016 the applicant applied for release on bail. In support of his application, he repeated his argument that his detention did not comply with the relevant domestic law. He argued firstly that as he had not been accused of having taken part in the attempted coup, this was not a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. He further noted that the cases of in flagrante delicto were listed in Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and that his own situation did not fall into any of those categories. In addition, he argued that the order for his detention did not contain any specific grounds relating to him and was not based on any fact justifying such a measure. Lastly, he again asked for alternative measures to be applied, referring to the health of his son, who was seriously disabled and dependent on his personal assistance. 26.  On various other occasions, the applicant applied for release on bail. In decisions adopted on 7 November and 5 December 2016, in line with an earlier decision of 21 September 2016, the competent magistrates refused his applications. 27.  In a letter dated 8 November 2017 the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Court of Cassation forwarded the case file to the 10th Criminal Division of the same court. On several occasions the Criminal Division reviewed whether it was necessary to keep the applicant in pre-trial detention and ordered the extension of his detention. 28.  On 25 October 2017 the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office submitted a summary report (fezleke) to the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Court of Cassation with a view to instituting criminal proceedings against the applicant. In the report it stated that the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation was the instigator of the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and that a judicial investigation was being conducted in respect of judges deemed to be members of that structure and to have acted under its orders and instructions. The public prosecutor\u2019s office pointed out that the risk of a coup had not been entirely eliminated and that a case of discovery in flagrante delicto was at issue, falling within the jurisdiction of the Assize Court; accordingly, a criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of the applicant on 16 July 2016 on the basis of the provisions of ordinary law. It noted that statements by anonymous witnesses and suspects, the content of communications between other individuals via the ByLock messaging service and information about signals from mobile telephones (see paragraphs 32-40 below) all showed that the applicant had committed the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation. 29.  On 7 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been arbitrarily arrested and placed in pre-trial detention, in breach of the relevant law, namely the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 6216) and that court\u2019s rules of procedure. He also alleged that there was no specific evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence necessitating his pre-trial detention. Furthermore, he maintained that the domestic courts had not given sufficient reasons for the decisions ordering his detention. He argued in addition that he had been arrested and detained for reasons other than those provided for in the Constitution. He also complained that the magistrates who had ordered his pre-trial detention were not independent and impartial, and that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. In addition, he contended that his dismissal and the various measures taken against him had infringed his rights to a fair trial, to respect for his private life and home and to freedom of expression, and had constituted discrimination. 30.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/15586) in which it decided, unanimously, to reject the following complaints as manifestly ill-founded: the complaint concerning the lawfulness of the detention order and the lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it; the complaint concerning the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the magistrates who had ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention; and the complaints concerning the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private life and the home and the prohibition of discrimination.\nWith regard to the complaint concerning the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody, the Constitutional Court held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 \u00a7 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. It found that the same applied to his complaints concerning his dismissal. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information in his application or the appended material as to whether the applicant had lodged an objection under Article 91 \u00a7 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared these complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 31.  In its judgment the Constitutional Court, after describing the characteristics of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation and its covert structure within the judiciary, first summarised the evidence gathered by the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office (1) and then addressed the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the detention order and the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it (2). 32.  According to the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment, the allegation that the applicant had knowingly joined the judicial branch of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation was based on the following facts and evidence:\n(a)  statements by anonymous witnesses;\n(b)  statements by a suspect;\n(c)  messages exchanged via ByLock; and\n(d)  other facts.\nThe evidence can be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Statements by anonymous witnesses 33.  An anonymous witness referred to as \u201cDefne\u201d made several statements to the Kahramanmaras and Ankara public prosecutors\u2019 offices.\nIn her statements of 4 August 2016 the witness said the following:\n\u201c... I was appointed as a rapporteur at the Constitutional Court. While I was working at the Constitutional Court, we kept seeing friends who belonged to this structure [the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation] ... There, I noticed that certain files were monitored ... Some practices came to my notice; for instance, applications relating to the election threshold and the funding of political parties ... were monitored by the rapporteurs and members [of the Constitutional Court] belonging to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation. After such applications were lodged, [these rapporteurs and members of the Constitutional Court] started to keep track of the cases by enquiring about their outcome. The ones monitoring these cases were Alparslan Altan, who was the mentor, and the chief rapporteurs belonging to this structure. I recall that Alparslan Altan would write a dissenting opinion whenever a decision was not adopted [along the lines] that he wanted.\u201d\nIn her statement of 6 October 2016 the same witness said the following:\n\u201cOn the basis of my own observations, the contacts I had while working at the Constitutional Court as a rapporteur, and the comments and behaviour of rapporteurs whom I know to be members of this structure, I can say that the former member and rapporteur of the Constitutional Court Alparslan Altan was a member of this cemaat [the term \u2018cemaat\u2019 literally means \u2018community\u2019; however, at the time of the events, the term was commonly used to denote followers of Fetullah G\u00fclen, the presumed head of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation \u2013 hereinafter \u2018the cemaat\u2019]. As in other judicial institutions there was a \u2018secret cell\u2019-type organisation within the Constitutional Court ...\u201d 34.  In a statement taken on 27 December 2016 another anonymous witness, referred to as \u201cKitap\u00e7\u0131\u201d, said the following:\n\u201c... When I started working at the Constitutional Court as a rapporteur, I was convinced that, given his social contacts, Alparslan Altan was a member of the cemaat. His social contacts were what led me to reach this conclusion ...\u201d\n(b)  Statements by a suspect 35.  In addition, R.\u00dc., a former public prosecutor and a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court who was accused of being a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, made several statements to the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office. The relevant parts of his statement recorded on 9 September 2016 read as follows:\n\u201c... Previously, I did not know that the former member of the Constitutional Court Alparslan Altan was a member of the cemaat ... However, when I noticed that this member was always in the minority in [decisions on] individual applications in which members of the cemaat were involved, I became firmly convinced that he could be a member of the cemaat ... I had already imagined, from conversations between members of the cemaat, that some members of the Constitutional Court might belong to [this structure]. But I did not know who. Over time, on account of his [positions] in these decisions, I became certain that this member [of the Constitutional Court] belonged to the cemaat ...\u201d 36.  In statements taken on 21 October 2016 and 19 July and 5 September 2017 R.\u00dc. confirmed his previous statements and asserted that although he had not met the applicant at meetings held between members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, he was convinced that the applicant belonged to that structure. In particular, in his statements of 19 July and 5 September 2017 he mentioned that the applicant\u2019s codename was \u201cSelahattin\u201d.\n(c)  Messages exchanged via ByLock 37.  According to information in the case file, it was not established or alleged during the investigation that the applicant was a user of the ByLock encrypted messaging service.\nHowever, transcripts of ByLock conversations between other individuals suspected of being members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, namely \u00d6.\u0130., S.E. and B.Y., indicate a number of references to the applicant. According to the investigating authorities, \u00d6.\u0130., a teacher, was the \u201clay imam\u201d responsible for members of the judiciary belonging to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation (according to the public prosecutor\u2019s office, each of the structure\u2019s cells that had infiltrated the administrative and judicial authorities was led by a \u201clay imam\u201d); S.E., a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court, was in charge of the cell at that court; and B.Y., another former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court, was a member of the structure. Various measures had been taken against these three individuals in the course of the criminal investigations carried out in the aftermath of the attempted coup: in the case of \u00d6.\u0130., who had left the country, a warrant had been issued for his arrest; the same applied to S.E., who had been dismissed from his post and had fled; as for B.Y., he had been dismissed from his position as a judge by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and had been placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of being a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation.\nAccording to the investigating authorities, in the messages in question each member of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation was designated by a codename. According to the suspect R.\u00dc., the applicant\u2019s codename was \u201cSelahattin\u201d (see paragraph 36 above).\nIt appears from the transcripts of messages exchanged between \u00d6.\u0130., S.E. and B.Y. via ByLock that the name \u201cSelahattin\u201d was mentioned on several occasions in connection with cases then pending before the Constitutional Court. The transcripts of the conversations also indicate that certain internal matters of the Constitutional Court, such as the election of the vice\u2011president, and various cases pending before the court had been discussed by \u00d6.\u0130. and the former Constitutional Court rapporteurs. More specifically, the conversations show that, in relation to certain cases that had been brought by suspected members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation and rejected, the dissenting opinion by \u201cSelahattin\u201d had been praised. The transcripts also indicate that \u201cSelahattin\u201d had been provided with a telephone line by the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation. 38.  The Government did not provide any information about the date on which these various items of evidence had been added to the case file. The applicant, however, stated that the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office had received the physical digital evidence of the ByLock conversations in December 2016, that the Ankara 3rd and 5th Magistrates\u2019 Courts had asked to have a copy of that evidence forwarded to them on 9 December 2016 and 24 March 2017, and that an expert report had been drawn up four months after the latter date.\n(d)  Other facts 39.  After information had been obtained to suggest that a telephone line had been supplied by the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation to the individual known as \u201cSelahattin\u201d (see paragraph 37 above), investigations were carried out to ascertain whether the telephone line registered in the applicant\u2019s name (\u201ctelephone line no. 1\u201d) had sent signals from the same base station as the one used by the telephone line supplied by the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation (\u201ctelephone line no. 2\u201d). It emerged that between 22 November 2015 and 16 July 2016 the two telephone lines had sent signals from the same base station. It also transpired that telephone line no. 2 was used solely for internet access and that both telephone lines had sent signals from the same location for twenty-nine days over different periods. 40.  It was also established that two other telephone lines had been used to call individuals who had subsequently been arrested on suspicion of being members of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation. 2.  The Constitutional Court\u2019s assessment of the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the order for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it 41.  Addressing the complaint about the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s initial detention, the Constitutional Court held at the outset that this issue should be examined under Article 15 of the Constitution, by which, in an emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms could be partially or fully suspended, or measures derogating from the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution for those rights and freedoms could be taken. 42.  As to the merits of the complaint, it held firstly that it was not disputed that the alleged offence \u2013 membership of an armed terrorist organisation \u2013 was an ordinary offence punishable by a heavy sentence and thus falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. Secondly, it noted:\n\u201c123. The offence of which [the applicant] is accused, punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, undoubtedly falls within the jurisdiction of the Assize Court, and this is not disputed by [him]. Moreover, although [the applicant] claims to have been prosecuted on account of his dissenting opinions as expressed in certain judgments of the Constitutional Court, he does not contend that the alleged offence is not an ordinary offence, that is to say, an offence [that was not] committed in connection with or during the performance of official duties. The classification of an offence (as an ordinary offence or as an offence linked to the performance of official duties) is a matter falling within the competence of the judicial authorities. The compliance of such classification with the law may also be reviewed in the context of an ordinary appeal or an appeal on points of law. Provided that there is no arbitrary interpretation \u2013 manifestly breaching the Constitution \u2013 and [entailing], as a result, [a violation of] rights and freedoms, it is primarily the task of the courts dealing with the case (derece mahkemeleri) to interpret and apply the law, including [the question of] the classification of an offence. It cannot be concluded that the classification of the offence of which [the applicant] is accused as an ordinary offence was unjustified and arbitrary, bearing in mind the findings reached and the reasons given [by the investigating bodies and judicial authorities], and in particular, the documents concerning [his] pre-trial detention. 124. In the present case, when the investigating bodies found that this was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto, they based that finding on the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and the fact that the offence of which [the applicant] was accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, is a continuing offence. 125. According to the Court of Cassation\u2019s consistent practice, the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation is a continuing offence (temadi eden su\u00e7).\n... 127. ... The plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation have also held in a case concerning the conviction of two judges ... that \u2018as the current and consistent position of the Court of Cassation makes clear, regarding the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, which is a continuing offence, except in cases where [its continuing nature ends with] the dissolution of the organisation or termination of membership, the continuing nature [of the offence] may be interrupted by the offender\u2019s arrest. The time and place of the offence must therefore be established to that end. For this reason, there is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of an armed organisation.\u2019 128. Having regard to the Court of Cassation judgments cited above, and to the fact that [the applicant] was arrested on suspicion of membership of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation \u2013 deemed by the judicial authorities to constitute an armed terrorist organisation that premeditated the attempted coup \u2013 on 16 July 2016, at a time when [the authorities were taking steps to] defeat the coup attempt, it cannot be concluded that there was no factual and legal basis for the finding by the investigating bodies that the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which [the applicant] was accused, involved a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto. 129. In the light of the foregoing, the allegation that [the applicant], a Constitutional Court judge, was placed in pre-trial detention in an manner not complying with law and the safeguards enshrined in the Constitution and Law no. 6216 is unfounded. Accordingly, the order for [the applicant\u2019s] detention had a legal basis. 130. Before examining whether the detention order \u2013 which had a basis in law \u2013 pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate, it should be ascertained whether there are \u2018facts giving rise to a strong suspicion that the offence has been committed\u2019, this being a prerequisite for pre-trial detention. 131. The [impugned] detention order states, with reference to \u2018[all] the reports on searches and seizures and the entire contents of the case file\u2019, that there was concrete evidence giving rise to a strong suspicion in respect of the suspects, including [the applicant]. 132. It also appears from the summary report (fezleke) concerning [the applicant] that the accusation that [he] was a member of a terrorist organisation was based on the following evidence: statements by anonymous witnesses and a suspect, the contents of communications between other individuals and information concerning the signals from [the applicant\u2019s] mobile telephones. 133. It should be noted that in the messages exchanged between other individuals (\u00d6.I., S.E. and B.Y.) via ByLock, certain references were made to [the applicant]. The investigating bodies found, on the basis of evidence such as the statements by suspects/witnesses and the messages exchanged via ByLock, that \u00d6.I., who is in fact a teacher, was the \u2018lay imam\u2019 responsible for the judges belonging to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation, that S.E. (a rapporteur) was in charge of the organisation [within] the Constitutional Court and that B.Y. was a member of this structure. Among those individuals, an arrest warrant has been issued in respect of \u00d6.I., who has left the country. [Similarly], S.E., who has been dismissed from his post, has fled and a warrant has been issued for his arrest. As for B.Y., he has been dismissed from the position of judge by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and has been placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of being a member of the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation.\n...\n[In paragraphs 134-37 of its judgment, the Constitutional Court assessed the evidence. It then went on to conclude:] 138. It can therefore be observed that there is evidence in the file forming a basis for the suspicions against [the applicant].\u201d\nThe Constitutional Court also observed that, in view of the very specific circumstances surrounding the attempted coup, the extent to which the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation had infiltrated the administrative and judicial authorities and the fact that the alleged offence was among the so-called \u201ccatalogue\u201d offences, the order for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention could be said to have been based on justifiable grounds and proportionate. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, there was a risk that individuals involved in the coup attempt and those who had not been directly involved but had links to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation \u2013 which was identified as the instigator of the attempted coup \u2013 might abscond, tamper with evidence or take advantage of the disorder that had emerged during or after the coup attempt. The Constitutional Court held that these particular circumstances entailed a higher risk than might arise in what could be described as \u201cnormal\u201d circumstances. It added that it was obvious that the applicant, as a member of that court himself, might be in an easier position than others to interfere with the evidence. 43.  On 15 January 2018 the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Court of Cassation filed a bill of indictment in respect of the applicant, charging him in particular, under Article 314 of the Criminal Code, with being a member of an armed terrorist organisation, namely the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation. After describing the characteristics of that organisation and its covert structure within the judiciary, it set out the following items of evidence against the applicant: the statements by two anonymous witnesses (see paragraphs 33-34 above); the statements by a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court accused of belonging to the FET\u00d6/PDY organisation (see paragraphs 35-36 above); the messages exchanged via ByLock and other facts (relating to information about telephone lines and records of journeys abroad). 44.  In a summary judgment of 6 March 2019 the 9th Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation sentenced the applicant to eleven years and three months\u2019 imprisonment, in accordance with Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), for membership of an armed terrorist organisation. The judgment indicated that the applicant had fifteen days in which to lodge an appeal with the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation. 45.  The applicant also lodged two further individual applications with the Constitutional Court. In his application of 3 July 2017 he alleged a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. In his application of 26 July 2018 he complained in particular that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive. According to the material available to the Court, both cases are still pending before the Constitutional Court.", "references": ["3", "6", "0", "1", "5", "8", "4", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are all Roma who live in V\u00e2lcele. 6.  At around 5 a.m. on the morning of 15 December 2011 several police officers and gendarmes, together with the local forest ranger \u2013 all wearing special intervention clothing \u2013 knocked on the applicants\u2019 door, claiming to be their neighbours. As the applicants hesitated, they broke down the unlocked front door and entered by force. Upon entering the applicants\u2019 home, the forest ranger placed a balaclava on his head. The police officers also wore balaclavas. 7.  In the first room the police found the fourth applicant (Ms Elena Lingurar), her daughter (the second applicant, Ms Ana Maria Lingurar) and her daughter-in-law with a seven-month-old baby in her arms. The police dragged the two applicants out of their beds and started hitting them. The fourth applicant was hit on her collar bone with a police truncheon. When the second applicant asked the police why they were beating her mother, she was hit in the mouth and then forced to wash her face to remove the traces of blood. 8.  When the police entered the next room they found the third applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1985) with his wife. They dragged him onto the ground, kicked him and shouted abuse. The first applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1949) was also taken into that room. He had also been beaten by the police. 9.  Without allowing them to put any clothes on, the police took the first and third applicants out into the yard, pushed them onto the ground and hit them. They then put them in a police car, where the violence continued. The fourth applicant was not allowed to approach them or take them clothes. 10.  The first and third applicants were taken to a police station, where they gave their statements. They were fined and sent back home. 11.  On 12 December 2011 a forest ranger informed the Araci police that on 7 December 2011 the first applicant had taken home timber which had been illegally cut from the forest. When confronted by forest rangers, the first applicant had become aggressive. The forest ranger explained that the first applicant had exhibited a hostile attitude towards the forest rangers ever since his son, the third applicant, had been fined by the police, in spring 2011. He submitted that the first applicant had set a bad example for his community:\n\u201cWe consider that Mr Lingurar Aron, who sees himself as being the leader of the Roma in V\u00e2lcele, by his attitude, instead of helping us solve the problems connected with the Roma community in V\u00e2lcele \u2013 which in fact is more peaceful and hard-working than the community in Araci \u2013 creates more problems with the example he sets for the others.\u201d 12.  In this context, and in order to reduce and prevent the criminal activity, to strengthen citizens\u2019 safety, to identify individuals without identity documents, to summon those suspected of having committed several crimes and to recover stolen goods, the police organised the raid of 15 December 2011. 13.  On 14 December 2011 the Covasna Inspectorate of Police (Inspectoratul de Poli\u021bie Jude\u021bean Covasna; hereinafter \u201cthe IPJ\u201d) drafted an intervention plan with a view to carrying out a raid in the villages in the municipality of V\u00e2lcele. Describing the population of the applicants\u2019 village, the plan stated that out of 4,311 inhabitants, 826 had been released on parole, 432 had a criminal record, and 600 had been found guilty of violent crimes. The general context was described as follows:\n\u201cThe V\u00e2lcele municipality consists of the villages V\u00e2lcele, Araci, Hetea, and Ariu\u015fd. Out of a total population of 4,300 inhabitants, 2,902 are of Roma ethnicity. Most of the members of this ethnicity do not have a steady income and make ends meet from social benefits, the sale of timber stolen from the forest, seasonal and occasional work, and from crime \u2013 mostly thefts. ...\nOf the individuals having committed crimes in 2011, it appears that 80% are of Roma ethnicity, with a variety of offences. ...\nAs a result of the preventive activity carried out by the [IPJ] in Araci village, six criminal groups have been identified, made up of members of Roma families R., B., C., G., L., and N. [nb: the applicants\u2019 family is not mentioned among them]\u201d 14.  Given the range of issues to be tackled and the goals of the raid, the intervention involved: fifty-three police officers (eleven from the department for public order, four from the department for criminal investigations, eighteen from the Sf\u00e2ntu Gheorghe police department, six from V\u00e2lcele police station, ten from the Rapid Intervention Squad (Serviciul de Interven\u021bie Rapid\u0103; \u201cSIR\u201d), and two from the department for criminal forensics) and thirty gendarmes from the Covasna Gendarmerie Inspectorate (Inspectoratul Jude\u021bean de Jandarmi Covasna; hereinafter \u201cthe IJJ\u201d). They had thirteen cars at their disposal. 15.  According to the police report of 15 December 2011, the police officers performed the following acts during the raid: they searched 140 cars and performed 190 identity checks; they issued eight administrative fines (sanc\u0163iuni contraven\u0163ionale); they confiscated fifteen cubic metres of timber; they took sixty-four individuals to the police headquarters for further criminal enquiries; they solved six criminal complaints and enforced two orders to appear (mandat de aducere); they identified ten individuals from police operational information; and they took fingerprints from and photographs of fourteen individuals. 16.  The police officers approached the applicants\u2019 home after 6 a.m. and knocked on the door. When two women (the second and fourth applicants) exited the house, the police asked them to call the third applicant, who was wanted for questioning regarding several criminal acts. The third applicant came out of the house, shouted abuse at the police officers and became physically violent. At that point the police immobilised and handcuffed him, and took him to one of the police cars. The first applicant then came out of the house shouting abuse at the police officers. For safety reasons, they handcuffed him and took him to the same police car where the third applicant was waiting. The second and fourth applicants were presumably injured in the process, as they tried to oppose the police actions. They pulled their own hair, slapped themselves on their faces, hit the gate with their fists and shouted, in order to intimidate the police officers. 17.  On 15 and 16 December 2011 the applicants were examined in the emergency ward of the local hospital. Subsequently, they also underwent a forensic examination. 18.  The forensic report delivered on 15 December 2011 states that the second applicant had dried blood on her lips and left cheek, but no bruises or dental pain. The reason for the bleeding could not be established. She refused to undergo further medical examinations. The conclusion of the report was that she did not present any traumatic lesions but that a trauma caused by an act of aggression could not be excluded. 19.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the first applicant. It stated that he had complained of chest pain and had two bruises on his chest. An X\u2011ray examination performed on the same day had not revealed any further damage. It was concluded that the trauma could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that on account of the injuries, the first applicant needed one to two days of medical care. 20.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the third applicant. The presence of bruises on the right eye, chest and right arm were recorded. The examiner concluded that the injuries could have been caused by a blow with a baseball bat and that the third applicant needed four to five days of medical care. 21.  On 21 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the fourth applicant. She complained of abdominal and chest pains and had a bruise on her lower chest. It was concluded that her injuries could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that she needed one to two days of medical care. 22.  On 20 February 2012 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint against the forest ranger and the police officers on duty on 15 December 2011. They accused the officials of beating them and committing other acts of violence. 23.  The case was investigated by the IPJ under the supervision of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal. Thirteen police officers and three gendarmes were put under investigation. The prosecutor interviewed the applicants and the police officers and gendarmes, as well as three witnesses. The witnesses were the applicants\u2019 neighbours who had been present during the incidents. The applicants had proposed that they be questioned. 24.  The prosecutor established that the operation had been organised in accordance with the intervention plan drawn up by the IPJ and the IJJ. The assignment had been to take to the V\u00e2lcele police station several individuals needed for questioning concerning several criminal complaints linked to various criminal investigations. 25.  Relying on the statements given by the forest ranger and the police, the prosecutor established that the forest ranger had not participated in the events, and that the raid had started at 7 a.m. and not at 5 a.m. as indicated by the applicants and their neighbours. 26.  The gendarmes denied having committed acts of violence or having seen traces of injuries on the applicants. Police officer P.A. explained that the use of force and the handcuffing had been necessary because of the applicants\u2019 violent behaviour. Concretely, the first applicant had opposed the police intervention, claiming that he was a local counsellor for Roma matters, and had shouted abuse and threats at the police. 27.  On 6 July 2012 the investigators examined the applicants\u2019 front door. They noted that some of its window panels had been broken, the wood had been splintered, and the paint was missing from the bottom of the door; they were unable to establish when the door had been damaged. 28.  On 11 March 2013 the prosecutor concluded that there was not enough evidence to institute proceedings against the police officers. 29.  The applicants objected to the prosecutor\u2019s decision. They argued mainly that the prosecutor, without justification, had given preference to the statements made by the police to the detriment of those made by the applicants. They also averred that the investigation had failed to provide an explanation for the violence perpetrated against them. They stressed that it was the established and frequent practice of the police in the area to attack members of the Roma community without any justification. 30.  On 17 April 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal dismissed the objection on the following grounds:\n- the intervention had been lawful;\n- the applicants\u2019 immobilisation and the use of handcuffs had been lawful and made necessary by their aggressive behaviour; they had therefore been taken to the police station, interviewed and fined;\n- the investigation had been completed;\n- the prosecutor had clarified all aspects of the case and examined the evidence gathered;\n- the decision had represented the prosecutor\u2019s own conviction based on the evidence in the file, and the reasons given had been adequate;\n- the other assertions made by the applicants had not been substantiated by evidence. 31.  The applicants challenged the prosecutors\u2019 decisions, reiterating the arguments put forward in their objection (see paragraph 29 above). 32.  The Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal heard the case and in a decision of 23 May 2013 it sent the case back to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigations. It mainly considered that the authorities had to provide justification for the injuries sustained by the applicants. The first and third applicants had been taken to the police station, and had thus been under police control for a few hours. The second and fourth applicants had sustained injuries which the prosecutor had failed to explain. 33.  The court further noted that the prosecutor had not identified the person who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and take them to the police station. Both the gendarmes and the police officers involved had denied having immobilised the applicants. 34.  The court went on to question the lawfulness of the police intervention. It noted that at that time the applicants had not been the subject of any criminal investigation and that no order to appear before the police had been issued in their names. It further noted that the second and fourth applicants had not even been arrested. 35.  The court concluded that the criminal investigation had not been exhaustive. It therefore ordered the prosecutor:\n- to hear evidence from witnesses, in particular from other persons who had been targeted by that police intervention and neighbours who could clarify whether the police officers had entered the applicants\u2019 home;\n- to hear the police officers involved in the operation and those responsible for mounting the operation, in order to find out who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and who had carried out that order;\n- to establish how the immobilisation of the first and third applicants had happened;\n- to establish how the second and fourth applicants, who had not been immobilised by the police, had been injured;\n- to establish who had participated in the operation on behalf of the authorities, whether police officers, gendarmes or other individuals. 36.  A new investigation was carried out under the supervision of the same prosecutor from the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal. 37.  On 24 July 2013 the IPJ drafted a report on the investigation, confirming the previous findings concerning the use of force and the applicants\u2019 conduct. The injuries sustained by the second and fourth applicants were explained in the report as follows:\n\u201c[The two women] had exhibited behaviour specific to Roma in such circumstances: they had started pulling their own hair, slapping themselves on their faces, hitting the gate with their fists and shouting in order to intimidate the police officers.\u201d 38.  On 5 August 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to prosecute. It considered that all the indications given by the court had been observed during the new investigation and that further clarifications concerning the case and the general situation in V\u00e2lcele had been provided. 39.  The prosecutor explained, in particular, that because of the problems with the Roma community in V\u00e2lcele, the police and gendarmes had had to combine forces. He recalled that on 27 June 2013 a police officer had been injured and was currently in a critical state in hospital following a police intervention aimed at settling a conflict between two rival Roma clans. Likewise, on 15 July 2013 another police officer had had to open fire in self-defence against an individual who had broken the windscreen of a police car during a police intervention triggered by a distress call. The prosecutor noted that most of the inhabitants of V\u00e2lcele, and in particular those from three villages (Hetea, V\u00e2lcele and Araci), were known for breaking the law and were aggressive towards the police. The applicants\u2019 family members had been subject to investigations for the theft of wood or for disturbing public order. 40.  The prosecutor held that the injuries sustained by the first and third applicants could be explained by the use of force during the immobilisation, which had been made necessary by the applicants\u2019 violent behaviour. The second and fourth applicants had been injured when they had attacked the police officers in order to prevent them from immobilising their family members. The prosecutor reiterated the explanation given in the police report about the behaviour allegedly exhibited by the second and fourth applicants. The identities of the four gendarmes who had executed the immobilisation were known, but had to be kept secret for their own protection. 41.  The applicants objected to that decision, arguing that the prosecutor had failed to investigate whether the use of force had been proportionate and justified. They also complained of the use of stereotypes in respect of Roma in the prosecutor\u2019s decision. 42.  On 20 September 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the same prosecutor\u2019s office upheld the decision on similar grounds to those given in the decision of 17 April 2013 (see paragraph 30 above) and, in addition, on the ground that the prosecutor had complied with the orders made by the court (see paragraph 35 above). 43.  The applicants complained about the prosecutors\u2019 decisions, reiterating their previous arguments. 44.  On 16 January 2014 the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint as unfounded. The decision was final. 45.  The court considered that the prosecutor had respected the requirements set by the previous court decision (see paragraph 35 above). Additional witnesses who did not belong to the police or gendarmerie had been heard. It also considered that the evidence adduced could not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the police officers had injured the applicants. The applicants\u2019 statements and the medical reports, which remained the only elements supporting that theory, were not sufficient to change the conclusion. According to the Court of Appeal, the explanations offered by the prosecutor as to the cause of injuries were plausible and the police officers had not used excessive force. The court also considered that the applicants had an obligation to identify the alleged perpetrators. Lastly, the court noted that the investigations had not been influenced by the fact that the applicants were Roma.", "references": ["0", "2", "7", "5", "6", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and is serving his life sentence in a prison. 6.  On 10 December 2004 the bodies of two women, D. and S., were found in a village \u2013 in D.\u2019s house \u2013 with numerous stab wounds. The prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings on the same day, and over the following days proceeded to interview those of the victims\u2019 neighbours and relatives who might have known something about the incident. 7.  On 11 December 2004 the police searched the house of Dor., a resident of same village, and found clothes bearing blood traces. According to the case file, on the same day the applicant, who knew both D. and Dor., was summoned in the context of these proceedings by a prosecutor; however, he did not appear. No other details are available in the file in this regard. 8.  On 12 December 2004 police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s home and asked him to go with them to the investigator from the Tatarbunary prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe investigator\u201d). The applicant agreed. On their way they picked up G., an acquaintance of his. 9.  From 10 to 11 a.m. on that date, at Tatarbunary police station, the investigator questioned the applicant as a witness in the context of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. His testimony did not contain any confessions or incriminating remarks and did not provide any specific information relating to the circumstances of the crime. He submitted, inter alia, that he did not know who could have committed the murder and that on a number of occasions he had seen D.\u2019s husband communicating with two suspicious men. According to the applicant, the police officers had then taken him and G. to a forest. D.\u2019s husband had been there and had offered them money in exchange for their confession to the murder of D. and S., which had been ordered by Dor. The applicant alleged that they had refused and had been tortured by the police until he had finally agreed to plead guilty to the murder, which he had not in fact committed. 10.  A few hours later, at 2.20 p.m., while still at Tatarbunary police station, the applicant made a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0437 \u043a\u0430\u044f\u0442\u0442\u044f\u043c). This statement commenced by noting that the applicant had been warned of his criminal responsibility if he refused to testify and that he had been advised of his right under Article 63 of the Constitution not to incriminate himself. In his statement, the applicant submitted that he and G. had murdered D. and S. after being incited to do so by Dor., who had wished to take revenge on the women because she believed that one of them had been having an affair with her partner and that the other one had facilitated the start of the affair. At noon on the day of the murder, Dor. had given them knives, which the applicant described in detail, and they had then gone away. At about 6.30 p.m. on that day they had again come to Dor.\u2019s place and then gone to D.\u2019s house. As they had been approaching D.\u2019s house, they had seen her husband leaving home in his car. They had then entered the house carrying the knives given to them by Dor. in their hands. The applicant had entered first and had seen three women in the kitchen \u2013 D. and two others whom he did not know. He had approached one of the women and had stabbed her once or twice until G. had stopped him, saying that she was \u201cfrom our village\u201d and asking him not to harm her. The applicant had then stabbed D. and the third woman to death while G. had watched. The woman he had injured had sat with her face lowered and with her ears covered by her hands. After both of the stabbed women had fallen to the ground the applicant had gone away; G. had remained, talking to the injured woman.\nAs G. had been leaving the house he had encountered D.\u2019s neighbour. Then G. and the applicant had gone to Dor.\u2019s home, where they had met T., one of her relatives. Dor. had then arrived and had asked them to leave. G. had taken the applicant\u2019s knife from him and had hidden it in one of some old disassembled bikes standing in the backyard of Dor.\u2019s house. For half an hour they had hidden first in a field and then at a farm until, one after the other, they had gone back to Dor.\u2019s house. The applicant had taken off his jacket because it had been covered with blood and had put on a leather one given to him by Dor. Then they had gone to the garden of G\u2019.s home, where, using diesel fuel, the applicant had burned his clothes (a detailed description of which was provided by the applicant), including the jacket given to him by Dor. Thereafter they had gone to the applicant\u2019s home and then to a disco bar. The applicant also submitted that the \u201csweater that I was wearing\u201d was at his home; since 10 December 2004 he had not seen Dor. or T. On 11 December 2004 they had gone to Dor.\u2019s house but she had not been at home; they had not checked whether the knife with which he had committed the murder was still in the place where G. had hidden it.\nThe statement of surrender and confession closed with a handwritten statement by the applicant to the effect that he had given the above evidence of his own free will, with no duress having been applied to him. 11.  From 4.30 p.m. until 6.04 p.m. on the same day, in order to clarify and verify information that the applicant had provided in his confession, the investigator conducted a reconstruction of the crime scene in the presence of attesting witnesses and a specialist on criminal procedure. As can be seen from the video recording of the reconstruction and the relevant verbatim record of this investigative step (which have been provided by the Government to the Court), the investigator invited the applicant \u2013 referring to him as \u201ca suspect\u201d \u2013 to tell him about the circumstances of the crime that he had allegedly committed. He did not inform the applicant of his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer present. The applicant repeated his confession and provided details in reply to the investigator\u2019s questions. He submitted, inter alia, that he had not witnessed the moment at which G. had hidden the knife, but had only been made aware of the hiding place when G. had told him about it. A subsequent inspection of Dor.\u2019s backyard by the participants in the reconstruction did not uncover any knife in the place indicated by the applicant. In G.\u2019s garden, in the presence of G.\u2019s parents, fragments of burned clothes \u2013 which matched the description provided by the applicant \u2013 were found. To the investigator\u2019s question regarding whether the applicant had been forced in any way to give evidence during the reconstruction the applicant replied in the negative. The verbatim record of the reconstruction, as well as the record of the review of the reconstruction video, are both signed by the applicant without any statement or comment. 12.  On the same day, at 7.30 p.m., the investigator drew up an arrest report ordering the applicant\u2019s detention as a suspect in the premeditated murder of D. and S. According to the report, the applicant was arrested on the grounds of his statement of surrender and confession, and his right to a lawyer was explained to him. The applicant signed the report and noted that he regretted what he had done. The applicant also signed a separate document explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before his first questioning. When signing the document, the applicant noted that he wished to be legally represented. On the same day, the investigator appointed a legal-aid lawyer, Dym., for the applicant. 13.  On 13 December 2004 the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of Dym. He repeated his earlier statements, elaborating on them in detail: he did not deny that he had murdered D. and S., but he did deny that he had done so for profit. He also submitted that he not had burned all his clothes, as he had stated before. Specifically, he had not burned his trousers (as they had been brand new) but had given them to G. so that he could wash them; he had hidden the leather jacket given to him by Dor. at his home, behind a sofa. On the same date the police officers inspected his home and, in the presence of the applicant\u2019s mother, seized the jacket. The applicant\u2019s mother confirmed that the jacket did not belong to her son. On an unspecified date, G\u2019s mother testified that on the night of 11 December 2004 her son had asked her to wash his trousers, as they had been dirty. While washing them, she had noticed that the water had become blood-red. Her son explained this by stating that he had been involved in a conflict at a disco bar. 14.  On the same date N., the woman whom the applicant had allegedly injured (but not killed) at D.\u2019s home, was questioned. No record of her questioning has been submitted to the Court. The trial-court judgment (see paragraphs 27 and 28 below) suggests that she provided an account of the events that was similar to that given by the applicant; she submitted, inter alia, that D. had addresed the applicant by name while he had been stabbing her. When shown passport photographs of the applicant and G. she identified the applicant as the person who had inflicted injuries upon her and had killed D. and S.; she identified G. as his accomplice. 15.  From 14 December 2004 onwards the applicant, in Dym.\u2019s presence, repeatedly confirmed his confession during different investigative actions (his questioning as a suspect and as accused, the reconstruction of the crime scene, and a confrontation conducted between him and Dor.) and provided details of the murder. When doing so, however, he persistently denied that he had committed the murder for profit. He also stated that he must have been poisoned or placed under some kind of hypnosis by Dor. as in normal circumstances he would have never killed D., as he had known her well and had been on good terms with her. 16.  On 17 December 2004 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, who concluded that he had no bodily injuries. 17.  On 20 December 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, G. and Dor. in connection with the aggravated murder of D. and S.; on 21 December 2004, in the presence of Dym., he was charged accordingly. After being informed of his rights, the applicant submitted in writing that he wished to be legally represented. 18.  On 21 April 2005 two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant were also instituted in respect of (a) the contract murder of D. and S., committed for profit and with extreme brutality, and (b) the applicant having inflicted bodily injuries on N. Those proceedings were joined with those instituted on 20 December 2004. On the same date the applicant\u2019s charges were amended accordingly. 19.  On 27 April 2005 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant and Dym. were given access to the case file, which they then examined in full. 20.  On 03 June 2005 the applicant, G. and Dor. were committed to stand trial before the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), acting as a first-instance court. 21.  On an unspecified date in June 2005, during the preparatory hearing of the Regional Court, the applicant requested that Dym. be replaced by another lawyer, as the former had failed to provide him with qualified legal assistance. In particular, he had acquainted himself with the case file at a different time than that at which he had shown it to the applicant, while in official documents he had stated that they had been shown the file together. His request was allowed and, on 24 June 2005, Sk., a lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s relatives, was appointed to the applicant. 22.  During the trial the applicant denied any involvement in the murder of D. and S. and submitted that his confession had been obtained by means of ill-treatment inflicted by the investigating officers, on the orders of D.\u2019s husband. He provided the account of events given in paragraph 9 above. G. made similar statements. 23.  On 25 July 2005 the Regional Court, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 24.  The applicant and Sk. appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s voluntary surrender to the police and other self-incriminating statements had been obtained by the police by means of ill-treatment and in breach of his defence rights. The prosecution also appealed, alleging that the gravity of the offence called for the imposition of penalties stricter than those imposed by the first-instance court. 25.  On 21 March 2006 the Supreme Court, sitting as a second-instance court, allowed an appeal lodged by the prosecution (having found that the gravity of the crime imputed to the defendants called for the imposition of more severe penalties) and remitted the case for fresh consideration, having also instructed the Regional Court to verify the allegations made by the defendants. 26.  On 11 December 2006 the criminal case was remitted to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation, and on an unspecified date it was sent back to the Regional Court for a new trial. 27.  On 15 January 2008 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of (i) the premeditated double murder of D. and S., committed in a group, to order and for profit and with particular cruelty, and (ii) causing light bodily injuries to N. It sentenced him to life imprisonment. In doing so, the court referred to various pieces of evidence, which included the identification of the applicant by N. and the fact that she had heard D. addressing the applicant by name when he had been stabbing her; the testimony of the applicant\u2019s and G\u2019s mothers; the results of forensic examinations, which had revealed, inter alia, that blood discovered on the applicant\u2019s sweater had not belonged to him, contrary to his statements, but could have belonged to one of the victims; the statements of witnesses that they had seen the applicant and G. at Dor.\u2019s home during the evening of 10 December 2004; and the confessions made by the applicant \u201cduring the reconstruction of the crime scene carried out in the presence of his lawyer\u201d and during other investigative actions conducted in the lawyer\u2019s presence. 28.  The court noted that it considered the applicant\u2019s denial of his guilt during the trial as constituting an attempt to escape criminal responsibility. It went on to note that the applicant had made self-incriminating statements of his own free will and in the presence of a lawyer and that neither the applicant nor the lawyer had raised any complaint when signing the records of the relevant procedural actions. It furthermore observed that at a different stage of the pre-trial investigation the applicant had given a similar detailed account of events that had tallied with the evidence given by N. The list of items of evidence referred to by the court in this context included the applicant\u2019s voluntary surrender to the police and the \u201crecords of reconstructions of the crime scene\u201d. 29.  The Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment. Having examined the applicant\u2019s medical file and having watched the video recordings of procedural actions undertaken with his participation, it concluded that there was no evidence that the applicant had suffered any physical injuries at the hands of the police. It also observed that in the course of the investigation the applicant had never complained of any ill-treatment but that, in the presence of Dym., he had consistently repeated his confession (including to a forensic psychiatrist), which contained information that had not been known to the police and could only have been known to the perpetrator. The checks conducted by the investigating authorities following his confessions had confirmed the accuracy of his statements. 30.  In a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant stated, inter alia, that his initial confessions made on 12 December 2004 had been at the heart of his conviction and that this evidence had been obtained under duress and in the absence of a lawyer. More specifically, no lawyer had been present either during his initial questioning as a witness on 12 December 2004 or later on that date, during the reconstruction of the crime scene and when he had made his statement of surrender and confession to the police. His right to remain silent and to legal counsel had not been explained to him until the investigator had obtained, by means of ill-treatment, detailed confessions from him. He furthermore submitted that N. had given false evidence and had been in league with D.\u2019s husband. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, in lodging a separate cassation appeal, also submitted that the applicant had repeated his confession in Dym.\u2019s presence as he had \u201chad no trust in the latter\u201d and had continued to be affected by his ill\u2011treatment. 31.  On 12 August 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Regional Court of 15 January 2008 (see paragraph 27 above), with some amendments introduced at the request of the prosecution. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been proved by the statements of N., who had witnessed the crime, and that the accuracy of her statements had been confirmed by other evidence, including by the fact that the applicant had given a similar account of events in his statement of surrender and confession to the police, together with the following statements that he had made. The court furthermore relied on the fact that following the applicant\u2019s initial confessions a sweater bearing traces of the blood of one of the victims had been revealed at his place. 32.  As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the purported breach of his rights of defence, the Supreme Court dismissed them as unfounded. It noted that as soon as the applicant had been detained as a suspect on the basis of his statement of surrender and confession to the police, he was immediately provided with a lawyer, in accordance with the requirements of the domestic law. 33.  The Supreme Court also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been ill-treated by the police, having observed that no bodily injuries had been found on the applicant when he had been searched on 12 December 2004 and following his forensic medical examination five days later (see paragraph 16 above). 34.  The applicant was served with a copy of the above-mentioned judgment on 6 October 2008. 35.  On numerous occasions after the criminal proceedings had been completed the applicant lodged requests with the Regional Court, where the case file was kept, to be provided with copies of his cassation appeals and bills of indictments, as he needed them in connection with his intention to lodge an application with the Court. The Regional Court refused those requests, citing, inter alia, the absence of any legal obligation for it to provide copies of such documents as cassation appeals and noting that the bills of indictments had already been handed over to the applicant. 36.  On 11 February 2009 the applicant lodged his present application with the Court. 37.  By a letter of 4 June 2009 the Court asked the applicant to submit, inter alia, copies of his appeals in cassation against the judgment of 15 January 2008 (see paragraph 30 above). 38.  On 26 August 2009 the applicant asked the Regional Court to provide him with copies of his appeals in cassation. The applicant referred to the Court\u2019s letter and enclosed a copy thereof. No reply was received by the applicant to this request. 39.  In 2010 the applicant again unsuccessfully tried to obtain copies of certain documents in his case file. In his request, he did not mention that he needed them to support his application to the Court. 40.  According to an information note from the State Department for the Execution of Sentences provided to the Court by the Government, after his conviction the applicant maintained contact with his mother and a cousin and, on 12 August 2010, was visited by Sk.", "references": ["0", "8", "2", "6", "9", "4", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1960 and died in 2012. 9.  On 26 July 2003 the body of a man, Mr Z., was discovered in the applicant\u2019s village in the Nemyriv district of the Vinnytsya Region. 10.  On 27 July 2003 the applicant was arrested, ostensibly for the administrative offence of maliciously disobeying a police officer. 11.  According to the applicant, he was arrested on suspicion of Z.\u2019s murder, and on 1 August 2003 the police ill-treated him to make him confess to the murder. In particular, he alleges that he was dunked in a vat of heavily chlorinated water, had electric shocks applied to his genitalia, and was beaten and hung by his elbows from a metal rod for a substantial period of time. 12.  On 1 and 8 August 2003 a witness, Mr I., was questioned by the police and stated that on the night of the murder he had seen the applicant in the victim\u2019s backyard and that he had then, with blood on his hands, come to his house and told him that he had hit the victim. 13.  On 4 August 2003 the applicant, in the absence of a lawyer, confessed to Z.\u2019s murder. 14.  On 6 August 2003 he was formally arrested on suspicion of the murder. 15.  On 7 August 2003 he was questioned in the presence of a lawyer and retracted his confession as having been given under duress. In view of his allegations the next day the investigator requested a forensic medical opinion concerning his injuries. 16.  On 10 August 2003 a forensic medical expert observed a number of injuries on the applicant\u2019s body. The expert noted that the applicant was alleging that he had been tortured. He documented a number of haematomas and abrasions and concluded that they could have been inflicted at the time and in the circumstances alleged by the applicant. 17.  On 15 August 2003 a district court judge rejected the investigator\u2019s request to remand the applicant in custody and released him, holding that there was no evidence in the file to show that there was a reasonable suspicion against him and noting his allegation that his confession had been coerced. 18.  On 16 August 2003 the applicant was released. Prior to his release he wrote a statement in the presence of the officer on duty at the police station affirming that he had not been ill-treated and had no complaints against the police. 19.  From 22 August to 19 September 2003 the applicant underwent a course of rehabilitation treatment in hospital, after being diagnosed with \u201cpost-traumatic paresis of the forearm nerves due to compression of both forearms\u201d. 20.  On 26 September 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for ill-treatment. It was noted that they had denied having ill-treated the applicant, that the applicant had made a statement on 16 August 2003 affirming that he had not been ill\u2011treated and that the police unit in question had not been equipped with an electric shock device. 21.  On 5 February 2004 Ms G., Ms K. and Mr N. made videotaped statements to the investigator to the effect that, in October 2003, the applicant had confessed to them all (on the same occasion) that he had committed the murder. 22.  On an unspecified date in 2004 the investigation into the murder was suspended because the perpetrator could not be identified. 23.  On 1 February 2007 a certain Ms O., who was in prison, informed the prison authorities that in July 2004, when she had lived in the same village as the applicant, he had confessed to her that he had murdered Z. and had described the circumstances of the murder to her. 24.  On 8 February 2007 she repeated her statement to Mr S., an investigator of the Nemyriv district prosecutor\u2019s office. Her statement was video-recorded. 25.  The investigation was resumed. 26.  On 20 February 2007, based in part on O.\u2019s new evidence, the applicant was again arrested on suspicion of the murder. 27.  The applicant stood trial for murder before the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as the trial court. 28.  O. was examined and cross-examined by the defence in court on 10 October 2007. She confirmed her testimony incriminating the applicant. 29.  At a hearing on 12 November 2007 the trial court examined a letter dated 11 October 2007 which O. had sent to the trial court. In it she asked the court to disregard her statements and stated that she had given them under pressure from S., the investigator (see paragraph 24 above). She also asked to be examined again in court. The defence asked for the same. The trial court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate O.\u2019s allegations and held that the defence\u2019s application to have her re-examined would be considered after the investigation was completed. 30.  The investigation was conducted by the Nemyriv district prosecutor. O., who was still in prison at the time, was questioned. She reaffirmed her incriminating statements as having been made of her own free will and stated that she had written to the trial court because one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers had said, in the course of the cross-examination, that she might be criminally liable for any false statements. S., the investigator who had questioned O. in February 2007, and the two police officers present on that occasion were also questioned and denied that any pressure had been used to compel O. to make a statement. On 6 December 2007 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against S. for lack of constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 31.  On 11 January 2008 the trial court received another letter from O., in which she retracted her previous letter. The defence again asked that she be called. The trial court refused to recall her as a witness. 32.  On 25 February 2008 the trial court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. It relied on the evidence of the witnesses O., I., G., K. and N. (see paragraphs 29, 12 and 21 above respectively), who had reiterated in court their statements given in the course of the pre-trial investigation. It also relied on the statements of a number of other witnesses who had testified regarding various aspects of the case other than the applicant\u2019s guilt. In the trial court\u2019s judgment the evidence of I., K., G. and O. was mentioned separately, and in that order, as disproving the applicant\u2019s denials of his guilt. 33.  As to I.\u2019s statements in particular, the trial court stated that they were detailed and directly pointed to the applicant\u2019s guilt. I. had not only made those statements in the course of the pre-trial investigation and in court but had also reiterated them in the course of face-to-face confrontations with the applicant and another witness in the course of the pre-trial investigation. G. and K. had also reiterated their statements in confrontations with the applicant. 34.  As to O.\u2019s evidence, the trial court stated that she had reiterated her pre-trial statement in the course of the trial in the applicant\u2019s presence and that there had been no reason to distrust that testimony. Certain details she had provided coincided with those provided by I. and discovered in the course of a crime scene investigation. As to the retraction of her testimony, the court considered it appropriate to disregard it since the district prosecutor had checked her allegations that her initial statements had been given under pressure, had found those allegations unfounded and had delivered a reasoned decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 35.  On 24 March 2008 the applicant appealed in cassation. He argued primarily that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the evidence. He also argued, among other things, that the court had unjustifiably refused to recall O. as a witness despite the retraction of her testimony and that a search conducted in his home in 2003 \uf02d which had apparently not returned any incriminating items \uf02d had been unlawful for various reasons, including the fact that at the time it had been conducted he had been in detention being tortured. 36.  On 10 July 2008, in a final decision, a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment. It found that the court had correctly assessed the evidence and that there were no grounds to put in doubt its findings. 37.  Following a request by the applicant for the proceedings to be reopened, on 21 May 2009 five judges of the Supreme Court asked the plenary formation of the Supreme Court (consisting of all the judges of the court\u2019s criminal and military divisions) to reopen the proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case in view of the exceptional circumstances (see paragraph 42 below), to quash his sentence and to order a retrial. The judges argued, in particular: (i) that there was medical evidence in the file which indicated that the applicant had been seriously ill-treated in 2003, in particular by being hung by his elbows, (ii) that the investigation into his allegations in this regard had been superficial, and (iii) that the trial court had failed to comment on this. The judges also pointed out what they believed to be a number of contradictions in the evidence cited by the trial court in the judgment for the applicant\u2019s conviction. 38.  On 5 June 2009 the plenary formation of the court held that the arguments cited by the five judges could only serve as a basis for reopening the proceedings if they had been first investigated by the prosecutor\u2019s office and found to be \u201cnewly established circumstances\u201d justifying a reopening (see paragraph 42 below). However, the court observed that the prosecutor\u2019s office had not conducted such an investigation and had not made such a finding. 39.  The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant attempted to initiate, before the prosecutor\u2019s office, an investigation of the type mentioned by the plenary formation of the Supreme Court. 40.  In the application, lodged by his initial representative on his behalf on 9 January 2009, the applicant described, in the \u201cStatement of the facts\u201d section of the form, the ill-treatment he had allegedly suffered in August 2003 (see paragraph 11 above). In the \u201cStatement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments\u201d part of the form he complained under Article 6 \u00a7 2 that his right to be presumed innocent had been breached in that the domestic authorities had relied on evidence obtained unlawfully and under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) that the domestic courts had failed to re-examine O. after she had retracted her initial testimony. 41.  On 1 April 2013 Mr Levytskyy wrote to the Court on behalf of the applicant\u2019s mother concerning the applicant\u2019s death and expressed the mother\u2019s wish to pursue the application in his stead. In his letter Mr Levytskyy provided two arguments concerning the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s right to pursue the application. Firstly, he stated that the applicant had been convicted on the basis of statements made under torture. Secondly, Mr Levytskyy stated that:\n\u201cThe applicant\u2019s former representative... is a journalist by training. However, this is not why she described in the application the acts of torture but limited the application to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention only, leaving the acts of torture outside of the scope of the application... At the time the application was lodged in 2008-2009 the Court was declaring applications under Article 3 inadmissible where applicants failed to appeal to court against the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision not to institute criminal proceedings.\u201d\nMr Levytskyy went on to describe the Court\u2019s approach to the admissibility of such complaints adopted in Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893/03, \u00a7\u00a7 97-99, 15 May 2012) and asked the Court to allow the applicant\u2019s mother to pursue the application. The change in the Court\u2019s approach to the admissibility of complaints concerning alleged ill-treatment by law-enforcement officers, to which Mr Levytskyy referred, is described in paragraphs 59 and 60 below.", "references": ["4", "2", "8", "0", "5", "9", "6", "7", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. He is a journalist and a writer. 5.  K.T., a popular figure of Bulgarian politics, has for many years been the leader of a trade union. He has in addition been a member of the managing bodies of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation. According to information submitted by the Government, the trade union formerly headed by K.T. is the second largest in Bulgaria, with a membership of about 150,000. 6.  In 2003 the applicant published a book called \u201cthe Shadow of Zion\u201d, dealing with Judaism, Zionism, Freemasonry and their impact on world history. 7.  On pp. 69-70 the book contained a paragraph comparing communists and Nazis to Freemasons, stating that, in a Freemason manner, the Nazis had \u201cdreamt to perfect the man\u201d, and also that communists had been \u201cdoing that in practice\u201d, including in Bulgaria. The text then continued:\n\u201cAnd after the \u2018democratic changes\u2019 who became a Freemason? All were communists and people connected with their gloomy secret services.\u201d\nThe names of a number of persons were listed after that, including the \u201cpseudo trade unionist\u201d K.T. The list ended with a reference to a footnote which quoted a 2002 article by another author published in a news magazine. 8.  On 28 September 2005 K.T. brought a tort action against the applicant, stating that the allegations contained in the book, namely that he was a Freemason, a communist connected with the former secret services and a \u201cpseudo trade unionist\u201d, were untrue and defamatory. He stated that he was a fervent Christian, which meant that he could not be a Freemason, as the Church had condemned Freemasonry, that he had never been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party or the youth communist organisation, and that he had not been connected with the communist secret services, but had, on the contrary, all his life fought for human rights and democracy. K.T. argued that the applicant\u2019s allegations had humiliated and defamed him, presenting him as an immoral and unscrupulous person, and that they sought to lower his prestige at the national level and internationally. 9.  The applicant objected to the action. He stated that when calling K.T. a Freemason he had relied on earlier publications by other authors, one of which was expressly cited in a footnote to the disputed paragraph. Moreover, K.T. had himself stated in a newspaper interview that he was a member of the Maltese Order. As to the allegation that K.T. had been connected with the communist secret services, the applicant intended to prove this through witness testimony. He pointed out in addition that K.T. had himself bragged about being related to leading figures of the communist regime. The applicant argued that in any event the expressions complained of had not been offensive or defamatory, and that K.T. had not shown that he had indeed suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result. 10.  The applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings that ensued. 11.  In a judgment of 10 July 2008 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter \u201cthe City Court\u201d) allowed the action and ordered the applicant to pay K.T. 15,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 7,670 euros \u2013 EUR) in moral damage, plus default interest as of 28 September 2005. 12.  The City Court referred to the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, but considered that in the case he had overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism. It analysed the allegations made by him and concluded that they had been untrue. As to the applicant describing K.T. as a Freemason, this had been refuted by the fact that K.T. was a fervent Orthodox Christian, whereas the Church was known to reject Freemasonry. As to K.T.\u2019s affiliation with the communist secret services, this allegation had been disproved by the official attestations of the specialised body dealing with those services\u2019 archives, and the witnesses brought by the applicant to prove this point had been unconvincing. Lastly, the expression \u201cpseudo trade unionist\u201d amounted to a gratuitous offence, aimed solely at discrediting K.T. 13.  The City Court pointed out further that an insult was a \u201csubjective notion\u201d, which meant that if K.T. felt offended by the applicant\u2019s allegations, that sufficed. In particular, being an Orthodox Christian, it was \u201clogical\u201d for him to feel offended by the Freemasonry allegations. 14.  Lastly, justifying the amount of damage to be awarded, the City Court noted that the applicant\u2019s publication had \u201cseriously impinged\u201d upon K.T.\u2019s honour and dignity and had defamed him, both \u201cwithin the whole trade union community in Bulgaria\u201d and internationally. The distress suffered by K.T. had in addition aggravated his health problems, leading to his hospitalisation. 15.  Upon appeal by the applicant, on 23 October 2009, the City Court\u2019s judgment was upheld by the Sofia Court of Appeal. It endorsed the lower court\u2019s reasoning, adding the following: even if K.T. had said that he was a member of the Maltese Order, the applicant had not shown that this was equivalent to Freemasonry; it was irrelevant that the allegations made by the applicant had already been made in earlier publications, as this did not make them \u201cless defamatory or truer\u201d; the fact that K.T. was a public figure justified a higher award of damages such as the one made by the City Court. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a final decision of 17 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal for examination. In particular, it confirmed that whether or not an allegation was to be considered offensive depended on the manner in which it was perceived by the addressee and his social circle, even if this did not conform \u201cto the common understanding of the facts\u201d. 17.  K.T. instituted subsequently enforcement proceedings. In October 2011 a bailiff calculated the total amount due by the applicant, including the principal award of BGN 15,000 (see paragraph 11 above), the default interest accrued by that time and the costs and expenses, at BGN 31,549 (EUR 16,100). The enforcement proceedings were discontinued in 2016 after K.T. abandoned his attempts to obtain payment, with the sum seized from the applicant amounting to merely BGN 4.55 (EUR 2.32). 18.  After the communication of the present application, on 23 May 2018 the Government submitted their observations, which were forwarded to the applicant. 19.  On 30 June 2018 the applicant published a comment on these observations on his personal blog. As to the Government and the position defended by them, he wrote in particular the following paragraphs:\n\u201cTo be able to understand human rights, including freedom and in particular freedom of expression but also of education, every person has to study, to gather knowledge. Stigmatizing, pointing an accusing finger, uttering insults and putting labels are completely different things. These primitive tricks are far from any erudition, which would have made the respective person think, check, and then judge. Alas, the observations prepared by the governmental Agent ... cannot convince the erudite reader that this has been the case.\u201d\n\u201cInstead of [commenting on the case], the Governmental Agent discusses many other things. Often she utters lies and employs defamatory and offensive language.\u201d\n\u201cIt is a pity and I have lost much of my time having to deal with so many and such rough and rude lies and perversions. What is sadder is that they come from the Government of a country which is a member of the European Union.  Let the shame be for their bosses in Brussels.\u201d 20.  The applicant also commented on the Court, calling the former Bulgarian Judge S. Botoucharova \u201ccommunist\u201d and \u201cMuscovite\u201d, the next Judge Z. Kalaydjieva an agent of the former security services, and the current Bulgarian Judge \u2013 a \u201ccommunist infant\u201d. He also wrote:\n\u201cYou will ask me why I have addressed this court of yours. To walk this road to the end and to drain the bitter cup. And to show convincingly one more time that the world is communist. I do not suppose even for a moment that those bolshevized mass idiots with their washed brains in which they still hear the unfired volleys of the Aurora cruiser, and their imbecile heirs, can ever understand this.\u201d", "references": ["9", "1", "7", "3", "0", "8", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Vodnjan. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 9 July 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Pula-Pola Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Puli-Pola) on charges of indecent behaviour. 7.  He was tried in summary proceedings (skra\u0107eni postupak). During the proceedings before the first- and the second-instance courts he was represented by a lawyer, M.K. 8.  On 11 October 2011 the Pula-Pola Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 9.  On 7 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Pula\u2011Pola County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Puli-Pola), challenging the factual and legal grounds for his conviction and sentence. He did not ask that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 10.  On an unspecified date in 2011, the Pula-Pola County Court, acting as the court of appeal, forwarded the applicant\u2019s appeal and the Pula-Pola Municipal Court\u2019s case file to the Pula\u2011Pola County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Puli-Pola) for their examination and opinion. 11.  On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney\u2019s Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows:\n\u201cIn the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 192 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses.\nI consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status.\u201d\nThe submission in question was not forwarded to the defence. 12.  On 20 January 2012 the Pula-Pola County Court held a session which the parties did not attend. On the same day it dismissed the appeal as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgment. 13.  On 13 March 2012 the applicant, represented by lawyer V.D.L., lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial had been violated because the submission of the Pula-Pola County State Attorney\u2019s Office had not been communicated to the defence. 14.  On 14 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It held that the fact that the Pula-Pola County State Attorney\u2019s Office submission of 12 July 2013 had not been forwarded to the applicant had not breached his constitutional rights, having regard to the content of the submission, the fact that he had been tried in summary proceedings and that he had not asked that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 15.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 2 February 2016.", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "7", "5", "6", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1975 and live in T\u00e2rgu-Mure\u015f. 6.  At the time of the facts of the present case, the applicants were working as judicial officers at the Mure\u015f County Court (hereinafter \u201cthe County Court\u201d). They had held those positions since 29 June 2000. 7.  On 18 December 2007, relying on the provisions of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance (Government Ordinance no. 137/2000 on preventing and punishing all forms of discrimination) and of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, the applicants brought an action in the Mure\u015f County Court seeking compensation equivalent to the \u201cloyalty bonus\u201d (spor de fidelitate) to which they felt they had been entitled in respect of their salary since December 2004. They complained that, although they had met the same requirements as all the other categories of judicial and non-judicial court staff (including judges and ancillary personnel) who had received the loyalty bonus in accordance with Article 4 of Ordinance no. 27/2006 as in force at that time, they had been excluded by Article 16 of the Ordinance from benefitting from that bonus. The action was brought against the applicants\u2019 employer and against the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. 8.  In a judgment of 14 February 2008 the County Court allowed the claim. It found that the relevant law created a difference in treatment between the applicants and the rest of the judicial and non-judicial court staff and that there was no justification for that different treatment. The court concluded that Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention were applicable and declared that the applicants had been discriminated against because they had not been awarded the loyalty bonus. The court ordered that the applicants be paid compensation for the discrimination suffered, representing 5% of their monthly salary for the period running from December 2004 until 31 March 2006 and 15% for the period running from 1 April 2006 until the day the discrimination ended. The judgment was immediately enforceable. 9.  On 16 and 25 April 2008 the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance appealed, arguing in the main that the court had overstepped the limits of its judicial authority and had acted as a \u201clawmaker\u201d when it had awarded the applicants a right which had not been provided to them by law. On this point, they argued that the Anti-discrimination Ordinance did not apply to the manner in which social relations were regulated by law; it only concerned the applicability in practice of those laws. 10.  In a final decision of 30 May 2008 the T\u00e2rgu Mure\u015f Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the appeal as unfounded in so far as it concerned the Ministry of Justice and as out of time in so far as it concerned the Ministry of Finance. It considered firstly that the Anti\u2011discrimination Ordinance applied to the applicants\u2019 situation and on this point it dismissed the defendant party\u2019s allegations of a breach of the principles of the separation of powers by the courts. It further considered that, in the light of Article 2 of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance and of the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 14, the applicants had proved their allegations of discrimination, particularly that they had been treated differently from individuals in similar situations, without justification. In the court\u2019s view, the protected right at stake was the principle of equality of treatment in the system of remuneration for work. On the merits of the case, the court relied on the laws regulating \u201cconfidentiality bonus[es]\u201d (spor de confiden\u0163ialitate), noting that the applicants had to respect the confidentiality of the information to which they had access and for this reason concluded that they should be entitled to a \u201cconfidentiality bonus\u201d, like other members of the judiciary and ancillary staff. It therefore awarded the applicants such a \u201cconfidentiality bonus\u201d. 11.  The use of the term \u201cconfidentiality bonus\u201d in the court\u2019s decision was brought to the court\u2019s attention on 20 November 2008 by the defendants by means of an extraordinary appeal (subsection C below) and on 27 November by the applicants by means of an application for correction of material errors (subsection B below). 12.  Meanwhile, on 14 October 2008 the authorities paid each of the applicants 30% of the amount they were entitled to receive as compensation for the period from December 2004 to July 2008. 13.  On 27 November 2008 the applicants lodged an application for correction of material errors in the final decision adopted by the Court of Appeal in their case. They asked in particular that the word \u201cconfidentiality\u201d be replaced with the word \u201cloyalty\u201d throughout the whole decision. 14.  In an interlocutory judgment of 4 December 2008 the same bench \u2013 sitting in camera \u2013 of the Court of Appeal allowed the application, without notifying the parties. The court considered that the use of the phrase \u201cconfidentiality bonus\u201d stemmed from a technical error and did not affect the reasoning of the judgment. 15.  On 20 November 2008 the Ministry of Justice lodged an extraordinary appeal against the final decision of 30 May 2008, claiming that the Court of Appeal had failed to examine the grounds of appeal as stated by the defendants. It pointed out that the subject matter of the dispute was not a confidentiality bonus, as wrongly established by the court, but rather a loyalty bonus. It relied on the provisions of Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) (see paragraph 27 below). 16.  On 7 January 2009 the applicants, who had received a copy of the defendant party\u2019s submissions, added their observations to the file. They argued that the defendant had failed to observe the time-limits set by law for lodging the appeal. They further argued that all the reasons for appeal had been thoroughly examined by the Court of Appeal, which had resolved the legal matter brought before it, that is to say \u2013 the right to compensation for the damage caused by discrimination. They also raised an objection of unconstitutionality of Articles 318 and 319 of the CCP, which in their view, by allowing for an open-ended possibility of lodging the extraordinary appeal, contradicted the right of access to court guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the latter having been incorporated into domestic law by Article 20 of the Constitution. Their objection was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 12 May 2009, on the grounds that the said provisions did set the time-limits for the extraordinary appeal and that in any case, the enforcement proceedings were subject to the general statutes of limitation. 17.  The Court of Appeal sitting in a different formation held a hearing on 14 October 2009. The applicants were not present, but requested that the extraordinary appeal be decided in their absence. The Court of Appeal ruled that the subject matter of the dispute had been wrongly determined as being an entitlement to a confidentiality bonus. In its view, the matter could not be considered as a simple material error:\n\u201cIt cannot be considered that this is a simple material [or] typographical error, which arose because of the striking similarity between the words \u2018confidentiality\u2019 and \u2018loyalty\u2019, as it had been adjudged in the interlocutory judgment of 4 December 2008 whereby this court ordered the correction of this material error by replacing the word \u2018confidentiality\u2019 with the word \u2018loyalty\u2019. The court of appeal referred to a completely different legal matter, which had not been brought before it by the parties, and thus dismissed as unfounded the appeal lodged by the Ministry of Justice without examining the arguments put before it by [the Ministry of Justice] by mistakenly copying the reasoning from a different decision, in which it had examined the issue of awarding a confidentiality bonus.\u201d 18.  Consequently, in the same hearing, the Court of Appeal allowed the extraordinary appeal and quashed the final decision. It observed that on 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court had declared the relevant provisions of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance to be unconstitutional (decisions nos. 818 and 821 of 2008; see paragraph 24 below). It concluded that there were no longer any legal grounds to support the applicants\u2019 action. The Court of Appeal thus allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment rendered by the County Court and rejected the applicants\u2019 initial action. It found as follows:\n\u201cIn their initial action, the [applicants] argued firstly that they had been discriminated against [vis-\u00e0-vis] the remaining judicial staff, because they had been excluded from the benefit of the loyalty bonus. They relied on the provisions of Articles 1-6 and 27 \u00a7 1 of the [Anti-discrimination Ordinance] and of Articles 5 and 154 \u00a7 3 of the Labour Code.\nThe provisions of Articles 27 \u00a7 1 as well as those of Article 1 and 2 of the [Anti\u2011discrimination Ordinance] were declared unconstitutional by Decision no. 821 of 3 July 2008, as well as by Decision no. 818/2008 of the Constitutional Court. According to Article 31 of Law no. 47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court, the decisions rendered in verification of the constitutionality of a law are binding on everyone. This means that the provisions of Article 27 \u00a7 1 of the [Anti-discrimination Ordinance] can no longer be applied.\nIn these conditions, the first-instance [court\u2019s] decision to allow the [applicants\u2019] action can no longer be justified on these legal provisions which have been declared unconstitutional. Therefore, ... the decision lacks legal basis.\nFor this reason the court will not examine the remaining grounds of unlawfulness, will ... allow the appeal, and will ... reject the action lodged by the [applicants].\u201d 19.  The applicants unsuccessfully lodged several extraordinary appeals against that decision, all of which were rejected by final decisions of the Court of Appeal (19 January 2010, 20 January 2010, and 4 February 2010). For instance, on 19 January 2010 the T\u00e2rgu Mure\u015f Court of Appeal rejected the applicants\u2019 argument that the Ministry of Justice had lodged its extraordinary appeal outside the time-limit set by law.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "1", "7", "4", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Uxbridge. 6.  The applicant claims to have entered the United Kingdom illegally on 18 November 2003. She pleaded guilty to offences of cruelty towards her son and was sentenced to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment with a recommendation that she be deported. On 5 August 2008 the Home Secretary served her with notice of intention to make a deportation order. On 8 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s criminal sentence ended and she was thereafter detained under immigration powers from 8 August 2008 to 6 July 2011 (2 years, 10 months, 27 days). The present application is the second one made to this Court by the applicant. 7.  In her first application the applicant complained about her detention from 8 August 2008 to 28 April 2010. This Court found that during this period, there was a lack of due diligence on the part of the authorities from 19 June 2009 to 14 December 2009 (a period of five months and 26 days). Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 in light of the authorities\u2019 delay in considering the applicant\u2019s further representations in the context of her claim for asylum (see V.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 49734/12, \u00a7 99\u2011100, 1 September 2016). The Court did not examine the period of detention after 22 July 2010 in that judgment noting that this was the subject of separate litigation proceedings (see V.M. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 92). 8.  The present case concerns that later period of her detention from 22 July 2010 to 6 July 2011 (11 months, 14 days). A detailed summary of the facts up to 25 July 2010 is set out in V.M. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 16-51. 9.  On 25 November 2010 a deportation order was served on the applicant. The applicant subsequently brought a number of legal challenges arguing that the order should be revoked. Removal directions were set for a flight departing on 7 February 2011, but the High Court enjoined the Home Secretary from effecting removal on 4 February 2011. 10.  On 14 January 2011 an immigration judge refused bail after an oral hearing. 11.  On 10 February 2011 Dr A-D, a clinical psychologist, prepared a psychological report on the instruction of the applicant\u2019s representatives. She concluded that the applicant had given a plausible history of suffering physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her uncle; that she suffered from particularly severe post-traumatic stress disorder; that she was not receiving appropriate treatment for her mental health problems in detention; that release would benefit her mental health; and that her deportation was likely to precipitate further suicide attempts. On 16 February 2011 the representatives submitted this report to the Secretary of State. 12.  On 7 March 2011 and 17 June 2011 a tribunal judge refused to grant bail to the applicant. On 30 June 2011 Dr A-D provided an addendum report which recommended the applicant\u2019s immediate release. Professor K who had previously examined the applicant (see V.M. v. the United Kingdom cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 20-35) also wrote a further report indicating he now agreed with Dr A-D. The tribunal judge granted bail on 1 July 2011 and the applicant was released on 6 July 2011. 13.  Six reviews of the applicant\u2019s detention were written by the applicant\u2019s \u2018caseworker\u2019 between 4 March 2011 and 4 July 2011. Brief reference was made to the report of Dr A-D. Inserted into the recital in each review of the applicant\u2019s protracted immigration history was reference to \"yet another psychiatric report\", which had been \"treated as a further request to revoke\" the deportation order. The reviews identified the applicant\u2019s most recent diagnosis as being that of Dr R on 15 March 2010 (see V.M. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 33). In each case the senior officers endorsed the conclusion that the risk of the applicant\u2019s reoffending and absconding outweighed the presumption in favour of release. 14.  The applicant initiated judicial review proceedings of the period of her detention from 22 July 2010 to 6 July 2011. The High Court refused her permission to bring judicial review proceedings on 3 April 2012. However, permission was granted by the Court of Appeal to appeal that decision. 15.  In its judgment of 17 July 2014, the Court of Appeal found that there had been procedural errors in the reviews of the applicant\u2019s detention but it upheld the decision of the High Court that the challenge should fail. Lady Justice Arden gave the lead opinion:\n\u201cConclusion 68.  Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal. The new diagnosis of Dr [A-D] proposed a new treatment for curing her illness but her condition could still be satisfactorily managed in detention. She could still be held in an acceptable stable mental condition in detention under the existing treatment. In any event, there was a risk of reoffending and absconding. While these would have diminished with the passage of time, there still needed to be safeguards if [the applicant] was released into the community and these were not put in place to the satisfaction of the court until 6 July 2011 when she was in fact released on bail.\u201d 16.  The Court of Appeal refused the applicant permission to appeal its decision but permission was subsequently granted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 27 April 2016 (R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 19), also concluded that some of the applicant\u2019s detention reviews did not refer to available medical evidence where they should have done so. Lord Wilson giving the lead judgment in the Supreme Court summarised the failings in the applicant\u2019s six detention reviews between 4 March 2011 and 4 July 2011:\n\u201c25. ... The reviews\n(a)  failed to refer to Dr [A-D]\u2019s diagnosis of [the applicant] as suffering from [post-traumatic stress disorder] PTSD:\n(b)  indeed wrongly stated that the most recent diagnosis of [the applicant]\u2019s mental condition was that of Dr [R];\n(c)  failed therefore to consider whether [the applicant] could be \u201csatisfactorily managed\u201d at Yarl\u2019s Wood [detention centre] and, even if not, whether there were very exceptional circumstances which nevertheless justified her continued detention. 26.  In the above circumstances the Court of Appeal concluded that the Home Secretary had unlawfully failed to apply the policy set out in para 55.10 of the manual when deciding to continue to detain [the applicant] between March and July 2011. This conclusion the Home Secretary now accepts. She does not suggest that the evidence which she would be entitled to file in the event that the claim was permitted to proceed would be likely to throw a different light on it. The defects in the reviews already filed speak for themselves.\u201d 17.  He went on to comment:\n\u201c34... Realistically [the applicant] accepts that the proper application of the Home Secretary\u2019s policy to her case in the light of the report of Dr [A-D] would not have led to her immediate release in March 2011. She correctly contends that the report should have led the Home Secretary to make inquiries, most of which, judging by the contents of the reviews, seem never to have been made ... At least however, the limited period between March and her release on bail on 6 July 2011 makes one thing clear: even on the dubious assumption that proper application of her policy should in due course have led the Home Secretary to direct [the applicant]\u2019s release, it is unrealistic to consider that the conditions necessary for her release would have been in place prior to 6 July 2011. 35.  For the above reasons, in agreement with the Court of Appeal, I regard it as already clear that, although the Home Secretary unlawfully failed to apply her policy under para 55.10 of the manual to [the applicant]\u2019s continued detention between March and July 2011, a lawful application of her policy would not have secured [the applicant]\u2019s release from detention any earlier than the date of her actual release on bail.\u201d 18.  Lord Wilson concluded:\n\u201c37.... The overall refusal to release [the applicant] ... was procedurally flawed. What however is clear is that, even in the absence of any flaw, no decision to release [the applicant] would in any event have been made prior to 6 July 2011.\n... 50. ... were [the applicant]\u2019s claim for judicial review permitted to proceed, the result in all likelihood would be a declaration that her detention from 4 March 2011 to 6 July 2011 was unlawful and an award to her of damages in the sum of \u00a31. The Court of Appeal decided that, since such was \u2013 \u201cat most\u201d, so it added \u2013 the likely result of the claim, it was appropriate to uphold the refusal of [the High Court] to grant permission for it to proceed. I agree. By the time of its issue [the applicant] had been released and it could bring her no practical benefit. To the extent that her contentions in these proceeding have deserved to be vindicated, she has secured their vindication in this judgment. I would dismiss the appeal.\u201d 19.  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 27 April 2016.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "3", "0", "4", "8", "1", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Yerevan. He was the President of Armenia between 1991 and 1998. 8.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The applicant was running as the main opposition candidate, his main opponent being the then Prime Minister, Mr Sargsyan, who represented the ruling party and was a close ally of the outgoing President, Mr Kocharyan. 9.  Immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results of the election, the applicant called on his supporters to gather at Freedom Square in central Yerevan in order to protest against the irregularities which had allegedly occurred in the election process, announcing that the election had not been free and fair. 10.  From 20 February 2008 onwards, nationwide daily protest rallies were held by the applicant\u2019s supporters, their main meeting place being Freedom Square and the surrounding park. It appears that the rallies at Freedom Square, held during the daytime and late into the night, attracted at times tens of thousands of people, while several hundred demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up a camp. The applicant participated in the rallies in his capacity as opposition leader and presidential candidate, giving speeches two to three times a day on issues of political and public interest and regularly calling on his supporters to continue the mass protests. He himself also stayed at Freedom Square around the clock, leaving only for two to three hours a day. 11.  On 23 February 2008 the outgoing President held individual meetings with the chief of police, chief of the army and chief of national security, announcing that he would not allow anybody to destabilise the situation in the country and giving instructions to that effect. The applicant alleged that, following those meetings, persecution had begun against many of his supporters. Various political and public figures who had expressed their support for his candidacy, members of his election campaign and other supporters were arrested and charged on various grounds. Furthermore, many of his supporters in the regions were subjected to ill-treatment and psychological pressure at police stations, were dismissed from work or deprived of social benefits. His telephone conversations and those of his supporters were tapped and various party premises searched. 12.  On 24 February 2008 the Central Election Commission announced that Mr Sargsyan had won the election with around 52% of all votes cast, while the applicant had received around 21% of votes. 13.  On 29 February 2008 the rallies were still in full swing, while all the international election observers had left the country. The applicant alleged that the authorities had deliberately waited for the departure of the international observers before starting their unlawful dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square. 14.  On the same date the applicant applied to the Constitutional Court, contesting the election results and seeking to annul them. 15.  The applicant alleged that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. the police had arrived at Freedom Square. At that time he had been asleep in his car parked at the square. Most of the demonstrators who were camping there were also asleep, but news spread that the police were in the vicinity and the demonstrators began to waken. The applicant was woken by his bodyguard and walked to one of the statues situated in the centre of the square. By then the police forces had already encircled the several hundred demonstrators based on the square. They started making a loud noise by banging their rubber batons against their shields, which spread panic among the demonstrators. Some of them managed to switch on the microphones and the lights on the square, whereupon the applicant addressed the demonstrators from a platform: \u201cWe see that police forces have arrived on the square. Please, do not have any contact with them and do not touch them. Please, keep your distance from them. Let us wait and see what they want from us. If they have something to tell us, we are ready to listen. Please, be patient and peaceful\u201d. The demonstrators followed his request and kept their distance from the police forces, which by then had surrounded the demonstrators with a triple cordon. Suddenly, without any prior warning or orders to disperse, the police forces, shouting loudly, had attacked the demonstrators, violently beating them with rubber batons and destroying the camp. In a matter of minutes the demonstrators were pushed out of Freedom Square. They tried to save themselves by fleeing from the police officers who chased, beat and kicked them brutally, regardless of their age and gender. 16.  In the meantime, the applicant, who was on the platform, was approached by the Head of the State Protection Department (SPD) of the National Security Service, who was also the chief of the Armenian President\u2019s bodyguard team, and other SPD officers. They surrounded the applicant and his bodyguards and then forcibly took them to one of the central statues on the square, where the applicant was ordered to sit on a bench surrounded only by SPD officers. After the square was cleared of all demonstrators, the Head of the SPD approached the applicant and ordered him to leave the square. The applicant refused to comply, saying that he would not leave the square voluntarily and that they could make him do so only by arresting him. After further attempts to make the applicant leave the square failed, the Head of the SPD forced the applicant into a car and took him to his house in Yerevan. Once there, he was not allowed to leave the territory of his house and garden. The roads to his house were blocked by special police forces, SPD officers, the road traffic police and other police units. Block posts were set up and all vehicles heading to and from his house were checked and searched. No one could reach the applicant or go in or out of his home without the permission of the special forces. The special forces, after carrying out a search of visitors and their vehicles, reported their identity and the purpose of their visit to an unidentified superior and allowed visitors to go in and out only after receiving instructions from that person. 17.  It appears that, after Freedom Square was cleared of demonstrators, some of them relocated to the area near the French Embassy, where they were later joined by thousands of others who apparently poured into the streets of Yerevan in response to the events of the early morning in order to voice their discontent. It further appears that the rallies continued throughout the city until late at night, involving clashes between protesters and law enforcement officers and resulting in ten deaths, including eight civilians, numerous injured and a state of emergency being declared by the outgoing President. The state of emergency, inter alia, prohibited the holding of any further rallies and other mass public events for a period of twenty days. 18.  The Government contested the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned allegations and alleged the following. Firstly, the reason for the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square had been the information obtained the day before by the law enforcement authorities, according to which a large number of weapons were to be distributed to the protesters to incite provocative actions and mass disorder in Yerevan. Members of the relevant police force had arrived on Freedom Square at around 7 a.m. to verify that information, but met with resistance from the demonstrators who had attacked the police officers with wooden bats, metal rods and stones. Secondly, once violence had erupted on Freedom Square, because his security was in danger the applicant had been surrounded on the platform by the Head of the SPD and other SPD officers and taken to the edge of the square, about 20 to 30 metres away, where he sat on a bench surrounded by SPD officers. After the assembly was terminated, the applicant, who was still sitting on the bench, was advised by the Head of the SPD to go home, but he refused. During that time a journalist freely approached the applicant, interviewed him and left. The applicant was then again advised by the Head of the SPD to go home, but did not respond. An SPD car then approached and the applicant got into the car voluntarily and was taken by SPD officers to his home in Yerevan. While being taken home, the applicant did not express any wish to go elsewhere. Later in the afternoon additional SPD and police forces were stationed near the applicant\u2019s house as part of special security measures employed on that day in respect of all persons under State protection, because of the escalating violence in Yerevan. For security reasons SPD officers were instructed to search everyone entering the applicant\u2019s house, but they were never instructed to prohibit anyone from entering the house or to prevent the applicant from leaving. The applicant expressed the wish to leave the house and to join the demonstrators near the French Embassy only once, on 1 March. He was told by the Head of the SPD that he was free to leave and go wherever he wanted, but the SPD would not be able to ensure his security in the area near the French Embassy and they would not accompany him there. The applicant did not wish to leave the house without State protection. 19.  On 1 March 2008 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe issued the following press release:\n\u201cI am very concerned about reports of injuries during the security forces\u2019 operation to disperse protesters in Yerevan this morning. If these reports are confirmed, all allegations of excessive force should be properly investigated. It is also vital to prevent any further violence.\nI am also alarmed by the reports that the runner-up in the recent presidential elections, former President [Levon Ter-Petrosyan], has been put under house arrest. If this is true, he should be immediately released. If he is accused of committing a crime, he should be properly charged and prosecuted in a court of law like anyone else. In a democracy you cannot arbitrarily detain political opponents.\u201d 20.  On the same day the SPD issued a statement that was broadcast on the public television channel, to the effect that SPD officers had decided to remove the applicant from Freedom Square, pursuant to Section 6 \u00a7 3 of the Act on Ensuring the Security of Persons Subject to Special State Protection, in order to ensure his safety \u2013 as a former President of Armenia subject to State protection \u2013 from any danger posed by the situation created during the police operation in the morning of 1 March 2008. The applicant had been removed from the square and taken to his house, which was similarly to be protected by the SPD, pursuant to Section 12 (2) of the same Act. Bearing in mind the necessity of ensuring the applicant\u2019s security, as well as taking into account the fact that the applicant\u2019s leaving his home might lead to unpredictable developments and pose a danger to his security, the SPD \u2013 in the situation which had arisen \u2013 had warned the applicant that he must categorically refrain from attempting to leave his house, indicating that otherwise the SPD could not bear responsibility for his safety, since they could not accompany him to an unlawful demonstration. 21.  On 4 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative filed a request at the hearing before the Constitutional Court, submitting that the applicant was under de facto house arrest and unable to attend, and requesting that the Constitutional Court take measures to ensure his attendance. The President of the Constitutional Court replied that the applicant had three representatives at the hearing. However, if the applicant also wished to attend but was unable for whatever reason, the request would be examined and an appropriate decision would be taken. 22.  On the same date the Constitutional Court took a decision, ordering the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office to clarify the fact of the applicant\u2019s alleged de facto deprivation of liberty, as claimed by his representatives, and to ensure his attendance at the hearing before the Constitutional Court if he so wished. 23.  On the same date the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied that the applicant was not deprived of his liberty, there were no restrictions on his freedom of movement, there was no such concept as \u201chouse arrest\u201d under the law and he was free to attend the hearing before the Constitutional Court if he so wished. It was not the duty of the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office to ensure his attendance. 24.  The applicant alleged that, following the decision of the Constitutional Court, he was allowed to attend the hearing on 5 March 2008 for one hour. Otherwise, his house arrest lasted without interruption until at least 20 March 2008. 25.  The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations and claimed that the applicant had attended the hearing before the Constitutional Court after he had expressed the wish to do so and had been accompanied by SPD officers. After the hearing was over, he himself had asked to return home and thereafter he did not express any wish to leave his house until the state of emergency was lifted on 20 March 2008. The special SPD reinforcements were removed from the applicant\u2019s house on 16 March 2008. Throughout that period the applicant had numerous visitors at his house, including journalists, diplomats and other persons, none of whom was prohibited from entering. 26.  On 8 March 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application of 29 February 2008.", "references": ["5", "1", "6", "9", "0", "3", "4", "No Label", "7", "8", "2"], "gold": ["7", "8", "2"]}
-{"input": "7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them may be summarised as follows. 8.  The applicants and/or their relatives were owners of apartments in Yalova. The permits for the building of those apartments were issued on 23 March 1987. 9.  On 17 August 1999 an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter scale hit the city of Yalova, causing the collapse of the applicants\u2019 apartments (see M. \u00d6zel and Others v. Turkey, no. 14350/05 and 2 others, 17 November 2015, and Hayati \u00c7elebi and Others v. Turkey, no. 582/05, 9 February 2016, for further details about the earthquake). 10.  On different dates in 1999 and 2000 the applicants brought actions for compensation against the contractors responsible for their apartments and their business associates before the Yalova Civil Court (see appended table for some details of the proceedings). 11.  The applicants maintained, in their petition to the court, that the defendants had failed to construct their apartments in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations and therefore they must be held liable for the losses they had caused in accordance with section 41 of the Code of Obligations (Law no. 818) in force at the material time (\u201cthe former Code of Obligations\u201d) (see paragraph 21 below). The applicants claimed pecuniary damages with interest starting from the date of the earthquake and reserved their right to further compensation. 12.  By decisions dated 19 July 2001, the Yalova Civil Court dismissed the claims, without an examination on the merits, and held that they had been introduced out of time. It held that the ten-year limitation period for introducing an action for damages, provided in sections 125 and 126 \u00a7 4 of the former Code of Obligations, had started running from the date on which the building use permit had been issued, that is 23 March 1987, and that the lawsuit had been filed after the expiry of the limitation period. 13.  The relevant parts of the court\u2019s decision read as follows:\n\u201c(...) As a result of the earthquake of 17 August 1999 the apartment that the claimant bought from the defendants was damaged and collapsed. The representatives of the claimant filed the present lawsuit to claim the value of the damaged apartment. It is a known phenomenon that Turkey is located in an earthquake zone. Therefore, earthquake-resistant buildings must be built. The public conscience has been hurt because of the earthquake. Due to the pain, suffering and losses caused by such an incident it is expected that justice be served. And the judge must be conscious of his responsibility towards society in his or her actions. However, when justice is being served, objective and subjective elements in the laws are taken into account. The judge is bound by the legal rules. Doing the opposite would be against the law.\nThus, the judgment of the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation No. E (2001/7015) and 2001/4778, dated 21 March 2001, shows the most correct and clear path by holding: \u201c(...) whereas, for a building, it is necessary to prepare the plan and the project, especially to make healthy static calculations, to build the building in accordance with such plan and project by using appropriate material in terms of both quality and quantity, and to inspect the compliance of all these features with the legislation in force; (...) that for example in a building considered as having a hidden defect, section 125 of the Code of Obligations, by the reference to the fourth paragraph of section 126 of the same law, prescribes a ten-year limitation period which starts from the date of the end of the construction works, that is the date of obtaining the building use permit or the date it is supposed to have been obtained; and that if the building collapses during this period, criminal liability may be invoked; but if the building collapses after the expiry of this period due to a defect because the criminal liability of the (authors) can no longer be invoked in so far as legally they no longer have the faculty to solve the problem, it is considered that there is no longer a causal link; that these considerations are also valid in case of grave fault (...).\u201d Our court also endorses this approach.\nIt is observed that the building use permit for the building of the claimant\u2019s apartment was obtained on 23 March 1987. The ten-year limitation period for filing a lawsuit has elapsed a long time ago. For the purposes of the economy of the procedure and to the extent that there would be no impact on the result, an on-site survey was not ordered. The unfounded objections of the claimant\u2019s representatives [against this decision] were [thus] inadmissible.\nIn conclusion, while the claimant\u2019s representatives claimed compensation for the damaged apartment, their claim must be rejected because of the expiry of the ten-year limitation period (...).\u201d 14.  On 9 December 2003 the applicants lodged an appeal against the Yalova Civil Court\u2019s decision with the Court of Cassation. In their petition of appeal, they firstly argued that even if the dates of the building use permit were to be taken as the starting period of the ten-year limitation period, because the permit issued for their apartments had been renewed in the 1990s, they had introduced their actions within time. They further maintained that, in any event, the date of the earthquake should have been taken as the starting point of the limitation period since the damage caused by the hidden defects in their buildings had become known to them upon the occurrence of the earthquake. 15.  On different dates in 2004 and 2005 (see appended table) the 13th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the Yalova Civil Court\u2019s decisions of 19 July 2001. The 13th Civil Chamber ruled that, having regard to the documents and evidence in the case file, which were relied on by the first-instance court, and in particular to the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by section 125 of the former Code of Obligations, which started running from the date of the transfer of ownership of the properties in question, the applicants\u2019 grounds for appeal had been unfounded. 16.  Meanwhile, on 1 July 2004, the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in a similar case lodged by the applicants\u2019 representative on behalf of other claimants, held that the limitation periods for claiming damages started running from the date of the earthquake, since at the time the unlawful act was committed by the defendants, that is, when the construction of the defective buildings was completed, the claimants had not suffered any actual loss. The 4th Civil Chamber, by applying section 60 of the former Code of Obligations, ruled that the claimants\u2019 action had been introduced less than one year following the occurrence of the earthquake and therefore it had been introduced within the one-year limitation period. On that basis, it quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment which had found, applying section 125 of the former Code of Obligations, that the lawsuit had been introduced following the expiry of a period of ten years from the issuance of the building use permit (see Hayati \u00c7elebi and Others, cited above, \u00a7 37, for the relevant parts of a similar decision by the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 11 December 2001). 17.  On 5 September 2004 the applicants, except Mr S\u00fcleyman \u00d6ner Erdo\u011fan, Mr Can Erdo\u011fan and Ms Nevzer Zorlu, referring to, inter alia, the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 1 July 2004 (see paragraph 16 above), made an application to the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation requesting the harmonisation of the case-law of the 4th and 13th Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation on the application of the limitation period to claims for damages arising from the earthquake of 17 August 1999. 18.  On the same date, all applicants, except Ms Nevzer Zorlu, requested rectification of the 13th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation\u2019s decisions, drawing its attention to the discrepancy between its approach and that of the 4th Civil Chamber in respect of the starting date of the limitation periods. They also asked the 13th Civil Chamber to wait for the outcome of their application to the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation for harmonisation of the case-law. 19.  On 23 June 2005 the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 application, holding that there was no need for harmonisation of the case-law having regard to the content and nature of the judgments in question. 20.  On unspecified dates in 2005 the 13th Civil Chamber dismissed the applicants\u2019 request for rectification.", "references": ["4", "7", "8", "5", "1", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Syktyvkar. 6.  On 19 September 2015 the Federal Security Service (\u2018the FSB\u201d) and the Investigations Committee of the Russian Federation announced that criminal proceedings on suspicion of membership of a criminal gang and fraud had been opened against the Governor of the Komi Republic, Mr Gaizer, one of his deputies, several high-ranking officials in the Komi Republic government, the speaker of the Komi Republic parliament and a representative of the Komi Republic in the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. All of them were arrested on the same day. 7.  On 21 September 2015 the applicant, together with Ms S., notified the Syktyvkar Town Administration of their intention to hold a \u201cpicket\u201d (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) from 5 to 6 p.m. on 25 September 2015 at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets behind the Lenin monument, which fifty people were expected to attend. The aim of the event was to \u201cdiscuss the arrest of the Komi Republic government\u201d. 8.  On the same day the applicant published a copy of his notification of 21 September 2015 on his Internet blog. He said that the aim of the \u201cpicket\u201d was to let the people express their thoughts about the arrests of members of the Komi Republic government. Any opinions \u2013 from approval to criticism of the arrests \u2013 were welcome. He hoped that the \u201cpicket\u201d would be approved. However, if the town administration proposed to hold it on the outskirts of the town, a \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d (\u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0445\u043e\u0434), which did not require prior notification, would be held at the same location (behind the Lenin monument). The applicant then criticised the fact that regional governors were appointed by the President and expressed the wish that governors be elected by the people. He asked why Mr Gaizer had been appointed governor of the Komi Republic in 2010 if, according to the investigators, he had been a member of a criminal gang since 2006. He then said that the accusations against Mr Gaizer and the others seemed to be based on a very slim evidentiary basis, which gave reasons to believe that the criminal proceedings against them were politically motivated. In his opinion, Mr Putin was trying to frighten other governors into submission. In any event, appointed governors always served the interests of those who had appointed them. He therefore wanted to propose a discussion about the future of the Komi Republic and, in particular, about whether the people wanted the next governor to be appointed or elected. 9.  Later on the same day, 21 September 2015, the Syktyvkar Town Administration refused to approve the venue chosen by the applicant, pointing out that regional law no. 91-RZ of 20 November 2012 [sic] prohibited the holding of public events in Stefanovskaya Square (see paragraph 34 below). The town administration proposed that the \u201cpicket\u201d be held at one of the special locations for public events designated by the Komi Republic government. The applicant received that decision the following day, 22 September 2015. 10.  On 22 September 2015 the applicant published a new entry on his Internet blog, informing his readers that the town administration had refused to approve the venue behind the Lenin monument, and enclosing a copy of its decision of 21 September 2015. He said that a \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d would be held instead at the same location and time. He explained that a \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d was an assembly of people who gathered to discuss without there being any organisers. Unlike a \u201cpicket\u201d, it was not possible to use placards during a \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d. The applicant then stated that the official who had signed the refusal to approve the \u201cpicket\u201d was the same official who had been responsible for a 30% increase in the cost of heating in the previous two years. 11.  On 23 September 2015 the applicant also published a post on VKontakte,[1] calling for participation in the public discussion on 25 September 2015. 12.  On 24 September 2015 the applicant\u2019s VKontakte account was blocked by the VKontakte administrator following an order by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media and a deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The deputy Prosecutor General found that the VKontakte post described in paragraph 11 above, which was publicly accessible, contained information about a \u201cpicket\u201d to be held on 25 September 2015 at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. The town administration had, however, refused to allow the \u201cpicket\u201d because it was prohibited to hold public events at that location. The post therefore amounted to campaigning for participation in an unlawful public event in breach of section 10 paragraph 1 of the Public Events Act (for a summary of the domestic law provisions, see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, \u00a7 249, 7 February 2017). The applicant\u2019s VKontakte account therefore had to be blocked pursuant to section 15.3(1) of the Information Act (see paragraph 36 below). 13.  On 25 September 2015 the applicant published a third entry on his blog. He asked what would happen if many people came to the \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d later that day. He did not believe that it would make the Kremlin change its politics, appoint a responsible local person as the governor of the Komi Republic or stop unsubstantiated accusations against Mr Gaiser. He claimed, however, that a high participation rate would show that there were many people who were not afraid to express their opinion. The FSB and the Prosecutor General\u2019s office were afraid of politically active people. He called on everyone to come to the people\u2019s assembly to prevent similar situations in future. 14.  On the same day the administrator of the Internet site that hosted the applicant\u2019s blog informed him by email that access to the three blog entries described in paragraphs 8, 10 and 13 above had been restricted on the order of the Prosecutor General\u2019s office because they had been found to contain calls to participate in public events held in breach of the established procedure. 15.  At about 7 p.m. on 25 September 2015 about fifty people gathered near the Lenin monument. The \u201cpeople\u2019s assembly\u201d went peacefully and without any disturbance. 16.  On 26 October 2015 the applicant challenged before the Syktyvkar Town Court the town administration\u2019s decision of 21 September 2015 refusing to approve the location of the \u201cpicket\u201d. He submitted, in particular, that the \u201cpicket\u201d had been intended to take place fifty metres from Stefanovskaya Square. In any event, it would not have caused any disturbance or inconvenience. The special designated locations proposed by the town administration would have been unsuitable. 17.  On 18 November 2015 the Syktyvkar Town Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint. After citing Article 11 of the Convention, the applicable domestic provisions and the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 2 April 2009 (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 255-59), the court held:\n\u201cThe complainant\u2019s argument that the event would lose its purpose if held at the locations proposed by [the town administration] is unsubstantiated.\nIn substance the law requires organisers to make reasonable and sufficient efforts to reach a compromise on the basis of a balance of interests in order to enjoy the right to freedom of assembly. In a situation where there is no ban on holding a public event but rather an alternative location is proposed, the organisers may not reject without valid reasons the conditions proposed by the authorities for holding the event.\nDecree no. 598 of 25 December 2012 by the Komi Republic Government designated [special locations for holding public events in Syktyvkar], having ensured that they were in keeping with the aims of public events and accessible by public transport, permitted the organisers of, and participants in, public events to use public utility facilities, respected sanitary norms and rules, and guaranteed the safety of the organisers of, and participants in, public events.\nThe [town administration\u2019s] decision of 21 September 2015 mentioned those locations, de facto proposing them as an alternative [to the location chosen by the applicant].\n[The town administration\u2019s] decree no. 9/3483 of 4 September 2013 amended [its] decree no. 10/4160 of 28 October 2008 on locations (plots of land) where public events were prohibited. In accordance with the amended decree, it is prohibited to hold public events at the location chosen by the complainant \u2013 at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets.\nIn such circumstances the municipal authority\u2019s proposal to change the location of Mr Kablis\u2019s public event was well reasoned and lawful ...\nThe court considers that the refusal to approve the location for the reasons advanced in the [town administration\u2019s] decision was lawful and acceptable ...\nThe [town administration\u2019s] decision of 21 September 2015 in Mr Kablis\u2019s case was made within the time-limit established by law and contained reasons justifying the impossibility of holding the public event at the chosen location, a well-reasoned proposal to change the location and an explanation of the procedure for notifying public events. The complainant was not therefore deprived of a possibility to enjoy his constitutional right to hold [public events] in accordance with the procedure established by [the Public Events Act].\nThe complainant\u2019s rights and freedoms under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention were not restricted by the contested decision; there were no obstacles preventing the complainant from enjoying his constitutional rights.\u201d 18.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets was outside the area where public events were prohibited by regional law no. 91-RZ. The town administration\u2019s decree no. 9/3483, which allegedly prohibited public events at that location, had never been published and was therefore not accessible to the public. 19.  On 28 January 2016 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 18 November 2015 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified. It held:\n\u201cThe [district] court rejected the complaint on the merits because the contested refusal to approve the chosen location of the picket had been made by the competent authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The municipal authority had given the complainant an objective possibility to enjoy his constitutional and Convention rights.\nThe [district] court correctly applied [the Public Events Act] providing for the conditions for enjoying the right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution ...\nHaving assessed the evidence in the case file, the [district] court made a correct finding that [the town administration\u2019s] proposal to change the location of the public event chosen by the organisers had been substantiated, well reasoned and justified by the necessity to respect the balance of interests of the parties and to ensure public safety.\nAs correctly established by the [district] court, it is prohibited to hold public events at the location chosen by the complainant \u2013 at the crossroad of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets.\nDecree no. 598 of 25 December 2012 by the Komi Republic Government designated [special locations for holding political public events in Syktyvkar].\nThe choice of a location for an event and its approval by the municipal authorities does not restrict the participants\u2019 right to freedom of opinion and expression. The argument that it was impossible to hold the event was hypothetical and did not refer to any valid reasons explaining why the locations proposed by [the town administration] were incompatible with the public event\u2019s purposes sought by the organisers and its social and political significance.\nThe [district] court correctly held in the judgment that in accordance with Article 17 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the enjoyment of one\u2019s rights and freedoms must not breach the rights and freedoms of others. Therefore, the holding of a public event by some citizens must not create a situation where other citizens are arbitrarily deprived of a possibility to enjoy their rights in accordance with the established order and traditions.\nThere were therefore objective and sufficient reasons \u2013 explaining why it was impossible to approve the location of the public event chosen by the organisers \u2013 for the proposal to change the location with the aim of ensuring a balance between the rights of the organisers and those of third persons.\n[The town administration] did not omit to examine the request for approval of the location of the public event and gave its reply to the complainant within the statutory time-limit. The reply contained reasons explaining why it was impossible to hold the public event at the chosen location and a well-reasoned proposal to change the location. In the court\u2019s opinion, the complainant\u2019s constitutional rights and interests were respected and there was no violation of Article 11 of [the Convention] guaranteeing freedom of assembly, or of [the Public Events Act]. The law does not guarantee the organiser of a public event an unconditional right to hold a public event at the location which he considers the most relevant to its political and social significance.\n[The town administration] fulfilled its statutory obligation to propose an alternative location for the public event that was compatible with its purposes. The locations proposed were an adequate alternative to the chosen location and were in keeping with its purposes.\nThe [district] court therefore correctly rejected the complaint.\nThe arguments set out in the appeal submissions are limited to a statement that the contested decision of [the town administration] refusing to approve the location chosen for the public event in Stefanovskaya Square had breached the complainant\u2019s rights to freedom of assembly, expression, conscience and religion. These arguments are based on an incorrect assessment of the facts of the case and an incorrect interpretation of the applicable legal provisions. They do not therefore warrant the quashing of the [district] court\u2019s judgment ...\nThe contested decision of [the town administration] was in accordance with [the Public Events Act], was made within the municipal authorities\u2019 powers and was in the interests of ensuring public order, with the aim of preventing disorder, protecting health and morality, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of others. It did not therefore breach the complainant\u2019s rights.\u201d 20.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He repeated his previous arguments and added that public events were regularly held at the crossroads of Lenin and Kommunisticheskaya streets. 21.  On 19 July 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the Presidium of that court for examination, having found no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 22.  On 25 December 2015 the applicant challenged before the Syktyvkar Town Court the decisions of the prosecutor\u2019s office to block his VKontakte account and three entries on his Internet blog. He argued that they had not been necessary in a democratic society and had therefore breached his right to freedom of expression. He claimed that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage. 23.  On 5 April 2016 the Syktyvkar Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. After citing Article 10 of the Convention and section 15.3 of the Information Act (see paragraph 36 below), and noting that the town administration had refused to approve \u201cthe picket\u201d at the location chosen by the applicant, the court held:\n\u201cDespite the lack of approval for the public event, [the applicant] described the preparations for holding it on his page on a social networking site, VKontakte, and on his blog ..., calling on an unrestricted audience to participate in an unauthorised public event ...\nIn the present case, access to the information published by the claimant was restricted because he had breached information distribution rules, in particular by distributing information containing calls for participation in a public event to be held in breach of the established procedure.\nIn such circumstances, the restriction had a basis in law and pursued the aim of preventing breaches of law in the sphere of distribution of information. Contrary to the claimant\u2019s allegations, his freedom of expression was not restricted, because access was blocked to information distributed in breach of the law, rather than in connection with the contents of the claimant\u2019s statements about the aims of the notified public event (to discuss the arrest of the Komi Republic government).\nRestriction of access to the entire VKontakte account rather than to the specific post also had a basis in law, which in substance provides for restriction of access to an entire account, taking into consideration the nature of real-time distribution of publicly accessible content on the Internet.\nIn view of the above, and given that it is possible for the claimant to create and distribute new Internet posts, the claimant\u2019s personal non-property rights were not breached. The claim must therefore be dismissed.\u201d 24.  On 7 July 2016 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. 25.  On 14 December 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant with the Presidium of that court for examination. It held, in particular, that calls for participation in public events held in breach of the established procedure were incompatible with public order. The restriction on access to information containing such calls pursued the aim of preventing more serious violations of public order. 26.  On 31 January 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings.", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "8", "4", "5", "2", "9", "No Label", "6", "7"], "gold": ["6", "7"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kazan. 6.  On 2 March 2017 Aleksey Navalnyy published on YouTube a documentary entitled \u201cDon\u2019t Call Him Dimon[1]\u201d denouncing Prime Minister Mr Medvedev for alleged corruption. He called on his supporters to protest on 26 March 2017. 7.  Mr Navalnyy\u2019s followers in many towns notified the local authorities of their intention to hold public assemblies against corruption on 26 March 2017. In the majority of cases the local authorities refused to allow the assemblies. 8.  Despite that, according to media reports, between 32,000 and 93,000 people in ninety-seven towns took part in the country-wide anti\u2011corruption protest on 26 March 2017. Between 1,666 and 1,805 people were arrested and convicted of administrative offences. 9.  In response to the call by Mr Navalnyy to protest against corruption, on 14 March 2017 the applicant notified the Kazan Town Administration of her intention to hold a meeting from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. on 26 March 2017, which 150 people were expected to attend. She proposed three alternative sites for the town administration to choose from, including a specially designated location for holding public events in Krylya Sovetov Park. The aim of the event was to protest against corruption and to demand Mr Medvedev\u2019s resignation. 10.  On 16 March 2017 the Kazan Town Administration refused to approve the meeting, claiming that other (unspecified) public events were scheduled at the locations chosen by the applicant at the same time. 11.  The applicant challenged that refusal before the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan. 12.  On 17 March 2017 the applicant and Mr B. notified the Kazan Town Administration of their intention to hold a \u201cpicket\u201d (\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) against corruption from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. on 26 March 2017. She proposed four alternative sites for the town administration to choose from. 13.  On 21 March 2017 the Kazan Town Administration refused to approve the \u201cpicket\u201d, claiming that other (unspecified) public events were scheduled at the locations chosen by the applicant at the same time. It proposed another venue for the \u201cpicket\u201d. On 22 March 2017 the applicant accepted the venue proposed by the town administration for the \u201cpicket\u201d. 14.  On 23 March 2017 the applicant published a message on VKontakte, criticising the town administration for its decision not to allow the meeting. She stated, in particular, that the decision of 16 March 2017 had been unlawful because the town administration had not proposed alternative locations for the meeting. She further claimed that the town administration could not refuse to allow the meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park because it was a specially designated location for public events. If another event was scheduled at that location, the town administration had to propose another time for the meeting. In any event, Krylya Sovetov Park was very large and there was enough space for several simultaneous events. She also said that the decision of 16 March 2017 had been challenged before a court and that the proceedings were still pending. She stated that people were entitled to assemble peacefully and that it had therefore been decided to hold a meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park at 2 p.m. on 26 March 2017 to protest against corruption. The message ended as follows:\n\u201cInvite your friends to join the group. We demand answers in the streets of Kazan! The meeting point is near the main entrance to Krylya Sovetov Park in Kopylova street, underground station Aviastroitelnaya.\u201d 15.  On 24 March 2017 the Vakhitovskiy District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim against the decision of 16 March 2017 in part. It found that the regional branch of the \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party had earlier notified the town administration of its intention to hold public events from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on 26 March 2017 at all three locations chosen by the applicant and at two other sites. In such circumstances, the town administration was to provide the applicant with well-reasoned proposals for changing the location or time of her intended meeting. No such proposals had been made, however. The town administration\u2019s failure to propose an alternative location or time for the applicant\u2019s event had therefore been unlawful. 16.  On the same day the Kazan department of internal affairs warned the applicant that if she held a public event at one of the locations indicated in her notifications of 14 and 17 March 2017, she would be held liable. 17.  On 26 March 2017 the applicant held a meeting at the specially designated location for public events in Krylya Sovetov Park. According to the applicant, about 1,500 people attended the meeting, which lasted for about one hour and twenty minutes. According to the Government, about 400 people participated in the event. 18.  According to the Government, during the meeting the police used loudspeakers to order the participants to disperse. According to the applicant, no announcements were made through loudspeakers. A police officer had approached her and demanded that she stop the unlawful public event. Referring to the Vakhitovskiy District Court\u2019s decision of 24 March 2017, she had replied that the meeting was lawful. No further action was taken by the police until the end of the meeting. 19.  The applicant was arrested on her way home after the meeting at about 4.20 p.m., and taken to a nearby police station. The police immediately drew up a report stating that she had been escorted to the police station so that a report on an administrative offence could be drawn up. An arrest record, drawn up at the same time, stated that she had been arrested \u201cin connection with an administrative offence [sic.] under Articles 20.2 \u00a7 2 [and] 19.3 \u00a7 1 [of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d)] for examination of the case\u201d. 20.  At 6 p.m. the police drew up a report on an administrative offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. They noted that the applicant had organised an unauthorised public event. In particular, she had published a message on VKontakte calling for participation in the meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park on 26 March 2017. She had then held a meeting from 2 to 3 p.m. in which about 400 people had participated. She had notified the town administration of her intention to hold a meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park but the town administration had refused to allow the meeting. She had been allowed, however, to hold a \u201cpicket\u201d at another location. By holding an unauthorised meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park, the applicant had breached the requirements of section 4 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Public Assemblies Act and had therefore committed an offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. 21.  At the same time, at 6 p.m., the police also drew up a report on an administrative offence under Article 19.3 of the CAO. They repeated verbatim the report on the administrative offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and added that the applicant had been warned by the Kazan department of internal affairs that she would be held liable if she went ahead with a public event at a location which had not been approved by the town administration. The applicant had held the meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park at 2 p.m. on 26 March 2017, despite that warning. The police had ordered her to stop the meeting but she had not taken any actions to comply with that order; the meeting had lasted until about 3 p.m. The applicant had therefore disobeyed a lawful order of the police and had thereby committed an offence under Article 19.3 of the CAO. 22.  The applicant was released at 8.35 p.m. 23.  On 27 March 2017 the Aviastroitelnyy District Court of Kazan, in two separate judgments, found the applicant guilty of offences under Articles 19.3 and 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. It found that she had organised an unauthorised public event, including by publishing a message on VKontakte calling for participation, and had refused to obey a lawful order given by the police to stop that event. The court noted that the applicant had notified the town administration of her intention to hold a meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park but that the town administration had refused to allow the meeting; it had proposed that she hold a \u201cpicket\u201d at another location. The applicant had been warned by the Kazan department of internal affairs that she would be held liable if she went ahead with the public event at locations which had not been approved by the town administration. She had, however, held the meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park. The police had ordered her to stop the meeting but she had not complied with that order. The court did not reply to the applicant\u2019s argument that the town administration\u2019s decision of 16 March 2017 refusing to approve the meeting had been annulled on judicial review and that the meeting had therefore to be considered as authorised and lawful, and the police\u2019s order to stop it unlawful. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) under Article 19.3 of the CAO and to twenty hours of community work under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. 24.  The applicant appealed. She reiterated her argument that the meeting organised by her had been duly notified and therefore lawful, and that the police\u2019s order to stop it had been unlawful. She referred to the decision of 24 March 2017 by the Vakhitovskiy District Court declaring unlawful the town administration\u2019s decision of 16 March 2017 refusing to approve the meeting and submitted that under Article 227 \u00a7 8 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (\u201cthe CAP\u201d), that decision was subject to immediate enforcement (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, \u00a7 293, 7 February 2017). She further referred to a Constitutional Court ruling of 14 February 2013 that a public event was considered to be approved not only after receipt by the organiser of the local authorities\u2019 express approval, but also if the local authorities had not provided the organiser with a well\u2011reasoned proposal for a change of location or time of the event within the statutory time-limit. The applicant also argued that the public event had not created any risk to people\u2019s lives or health or to the property of persons or legal entities. Nor had the participants committed any unlawful acts or breached the procedure for the conduct of public events established by the Public Events Act. There had therefore been no lawful grounds to stop the public event. 25.  On 17 May 2017 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld both judgments of 27 March 2017 on appeal, finding them lawful, well reasoned and justified. In reply to the applicant\u2019s arguments that the meeting had been lawful and that the police\u2019s order to stop it had been unlawful, the court held as follows:\n\u201cCounsel\u2019s and [the applicant\u2019s] arguments that she was innocent and had been unlawfully charged under [Articles 19.3 and 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO] because there had been no corpus delicti [of the above offences] in her actions \u2013 as she had not breached applicable statutory requirements, her guilt had not been proven by the material in the case file and the police officer\u2019s order to stop the public event had been unlawful \u2013 are unsubstantiated. They are based on an incorrect interpretation of the applicable legal provisions and an incorrect assessment of the facts of the present case. The arguments advanced by [the applicant] contradict the facts established during the examination of the case and are disproved by the evidence, which cumulatively shows that [the applicant] disobeyed a lawful order by a police officer who was fulfilling his duty to safeguard public order and ensure public safety.\u201d\nThe court then extensively cited the applicable provisions of the domestic law (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 226-32) and continued:\n\u201cA comprehensive analysis of the applicable legal provisions and the facts of the present case leads [the court] to conclude that in the present case the organiser of the public event did not fully comply with the procedure for organising and holding public events, which rendered the public event unlawful. Furthermore, the judicial decision finding [the town administration\u2019s] failure to act unlawful did not amount to an unconditional approval of the location and time of the public event and did not exempt the organiser from fulfilling the obligations imposed by [the Public Events Act]. The above [judicial decision] did not therefore transform an unauthorised public event into an authorised one ...\nIn the present case the police officer acted within the powers provided by law with the aim of fulfilling his duty to ensure public safety and order. His order to stop the public event, addressed to its organiser, can be considered lawful in accordance with [the Police Act].\nThe argument that the public event was to be considered as approved not only after receipt by the organiser of [the local authorities\u2019] approval, but also if [the local authorities] have not provided the organiser with a well-reasoned proposal for a change of location or time of the event within the statutory time-limit is invalid. The aim of the public event indicated in the notification (against corruption and for Prime Minister Medvedev\u2019s resignation) differed from the real aim of the public event and the aim declared during preliminary campaigning [for that event]. Thus, on 23 March 2017 [the applicant] published on her ... VKontacte personal page campaigning material about the forthcoming public event at 2 p.m. on 26 March 2017 in Krylya Sovetov Park ... which stated: \u201826 March is a nationwide protest day against corruption by Russian high-ranking officials. #whereisDimon#lookforDimon. Friends, we have the right to assemble peacefully, to discuss. It has therefore been decided to hold the meeting in Krylya Sovetov Park ...\u2019.\u201d 26.  Subsequently, on 12 July 2017, the Vakhitovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of an offence under Article 20.2 \u00a7 1 of the CAO. The court noted that the applicant had given oral submissions and had pleaded not guilty. It then found that on 23 March 2017 she had published a message on VKontakte calling for participation in a meeting to be held on 26 March 2017 in Krylya Sovetov Park, despite the fact that the town administration had refused to approve that meeting and had suggested that the applicant should hold a \u201cpicket\u201d at another location. She had therefore campaigned for participation in the public event before it had been approved by the competent regional or municipal authorities. The court ordered the applicant to pay a fine of RUB 10,000. 27.  On 9 August 2017 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the judgment of 12 July 2017 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. It held, in particular, that section 10 \u00a7 1 of the Public Events Act expressly prohibited organisers from campaigning for participation in a public event before it had been approved by the competent local authorities (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7 249). The applicant had breached that prohibition. The court then repeated verbatim the parts of its judgment of 17 May 2017 cited in paragraph 25 above. The applicant attended the hearing and made oral submissions. 28.  On 12 September 2017 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the town administration\u2019s unlawful failure to propose alternative locations for the meeting of 26 March 2017 as established by the judgment of 24 March 2017 (see paragraph 15 above). The court found that the applicant had not proved that she had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the town administration\u2019s failure to act. 29.  On 14 December 2017 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld that judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. It added that on 21 March 2017 the town administration had proposed an alternative location for the public event planned by the applicant. The applicant had not substantiated her argument that that proposal concerned another public event.", "references": ["9", "5", "8", "0", "4", "1", "No Label", "6", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant is registered under Hungarian law as a cooperative based in Aranyosgad\u00e1ny. 7.  The applicant\u2019s aim is to support its members in their agricultural activity, in particular by purchasing expensive machines and lending them to its members free of charge. The members pay a regular \u201ccontribution fee\u201d to the cooperative. 8.  The applicant considered that the lending of machines constituted the very essence of its economic activities. It therefore deducted the value-added tax paid in respect of the machines from the tax which it was liable to pay. 9.  In 2008 the Hungarian Tax Authority fined the applicant, having found that the lending of machines to members free of charge was not an \u201ceconomic activity\u201d within the meaning of Act no. LXXIV of 1992 on Value-Added Tax. As a consequence, the applicant was not entitled to deduct the tax paid on the goods it purchased. 10.  The applicant challenged the decision of the Tax Authority before the administrative courts. Pointing to the special provisions applying to cooperatives and to the fact that its members paid contribution fees, it argued, on the basis of domestic law, that the service in question was to be considered a genuine economic activity. 11.  On 17 February 2009 the Baranya County Court upheld the administrative decision. The Supreme Court, in review proceedings, upheld that judgment on 26 November 2009. In response to the applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that the contribution fee paid by members should be taken into account as a \u201cconsideration\u201d for the lending of machines, rendering the applicant\u2019s activity an \u201ceconomic\u201d one, the Supreme Court referred to the Aardappelenbewaarplaats judgment of the CJEU (C-154/80, EU:C:1981:38), in which that court had held that \u201ca provision of services for which no definite subjective consideration is received does not constitute a provision of services \u2018against payment\u2019 \u201d. 12.  On 9 December 2010 the applicant, represented by a different lawyer from the one who had represented it in the previous set of proceedings, introduced a second set of proceedings, seeking damages against the Supreme Court before the Budapest Regional Court. It alleged that the Supreme Court had violated European Union law on account of its failure to apply, of its own motion, Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (see paragraph 30 below) in its 2009 judgment and on account of the wrongful qualification of the applicant\u2019s activity for the purposes of the value-added tax deduction. The applicant argued that the European Union law provision analysed in the Aardappelenbewaarplaats case was Article 8 of the Second Council Directive 67/228 (defining the basis for assessment of value-added tax), rather than Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (concerning tax deduction). It was the latter that should have been directly applicable in the case before the Supreme Court. In the applicant\u2019s view, the Aardappelenbewaarplaats case was about whether turnover tax should be imposed on storage services provided free of charge for members of a cooperative association, whereas the case before the Supreme Court had concerned a different question, namely the deductibility of input VAT. Alleging the Supreme Court\u2019s liability for judicial malpractice, the applicant relied on the K\u00f6bler judgment of the CJEU (see paragraph 31 below). It requested that the Budapest Regional Court obtain a preliminary ruling from the CJEU as to the conformity of the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment with European Union law and the conditions for establishing whether the Supreme Court might be liable for a wrongful judgment. 13.  On 31 May 2011 the Budapest Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim against the Supreme Court. It held that in the main proceedings, the Supreme Court had been bound by the applicant company\u2019s claim taking issue only with the alleged absence of a \u201cconsideration\u201d and the resulting qualification of its service as not being an \u201ceconomic activity\u201d. The Regional Court was of the view that in that respect the Supreme Court had duly examined the relevant European Union law of its own motion. 14.  Without requesting a preliminary ruling, the Budapest Regional Court held that the K\u00f6bler judgment was not relevant in the case because the applicant had sought to sue the Supreme Court on the basis of the Hungarian Civil Code, rather than seeking to sue the Hungarian State itself under European Union law. 15.  The applicant appealed and requested the second-instance court to obtain a preliminary ruling also on the question of whether the K\u00f6bler principles were applicable if the reparation claim was directed against the Supreme Court and not the State. 16.  On 28 August 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment, without requesting a preliminary ruling. It accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that the reasoning of the first-instance judgment was erroneous with respect to the alleged irrelevance of the K\u00f6bler case, but held that, in any event, the applicant\u2019s claim was ill-founded on other grounds. Notably, it pointed to the fact that during the first set of proceedings (see paragraph 10 above) the applicant had failed to refer to European Union law, and considered that this fact in itself had rendered the applicant\u2019s claim unfounded. 17.  Arguing that European Union law was to be applied proprio motu, even without an explicit reference from the plaintiff, the applicant requested a review of the final judgment by the K\u00faria (the historical appellation by which the Supreme Court was renamed in 2012, see the first sentence of point 36 of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision cited in Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2016). It also reiterated its request that the case be referred for a preliminary ruling and proposed that the K\u00faria also ask whether the liability of a State under the K\u00f6bler principles may be subjected to the precondition that an explicit reference to the relevant provisions of European Union law must be made by the plaintiff in the main \u2013 in the present case first \u2013 proceedings. 18.  The questions thus proposed by the applicant for the purposes of a preliminary ruling read as follows:\n\u201c1.  Does the reparation claim fall within the scope of European law in civil proceedings, such as actions in damages based on section 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, brought by an individual against the Supreme Court of the Member State concerned, in which the plaintiff claims that the Supreme Court has violated a right conferred on him by a directly applicable provision of European law in previous administrative proceedings. If so, to what extent? 2.  In the common system of value-added tax, with regard to the specificities thereof, may Council Directive 77/388/EEC, especially its Article 17(2)(a), be interpreted as meaning that a national measure (e.g. a judgment) is incompatible with it if it denies the right of a cooperative, otherwise subject to value-added tax in the Member State concerned, to deduct input VAT paid on machines purchased, for the sole reason that the cooperative handed over those machines to its members, a \u2018grouping of growers\u2019, without consideration? 3.  Is the liability of a Member State\u2019s Supreme Court excluded, under the rules of European law, by the sole fact that an individual did not allege explicitly the infringement of a specific provision of European law in the judicial proceedings for the review of an administrative decision denying him the right to tax deduction? Or should the domestic court enforce of its own motion the directly applicable provision of European law (in this case, Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive)? 4.  Is the infringement sufficiently serious if the Supreme Court of a Member State denies, in administrative proceedings, an individual\u2019s right to tax deduction without analysing the underlying provision of European law directly or referring the case for a preliminary ruling, in circumstances where the reasoning of the refusal to refer the case [to the CJEU] is based on the Supreme Court\u2019s reliance on a judgment of the [CJEU] adopted on a different subject and where this latter court has not yet adopted a ruling on the issue at hand?\u201d 19.  On 2 October 2013 the K\u00faria dismissed in a procedural order (v\u00e9gz\u00e9s) the applicant\u2019s request for a preliminary ruling. Firstly, it noted that it was not in dispute between the parties that the case fell within the scope of European Union law; the referral of the first question would therefore have been futile. Secondly, concerning the second, third and fourth questions, the K\u00faria held that they could have been considered in the first proceedings, but that they fell outside the scope of the action in damages brought against the Supreme Court on account of alleged judicial malpractice. It further held that in the framework of the action in damages, assessment of the consequences of the applicant\u2019s failure, in the first set of proceedings, to make explicit allegations of an infringement of European Union law (see question 3 quoted in paragraph 18 above) was the task of the national courts, and that it did not raise any question of interpretation that would fall under the jurisdiction of the CJEU. 20.  The applicant complained to the K\u00faria about the above refusal but in vain; on 4 December 2013 it held, in a procedural order (v\u00e9gz\u00e9s), that no appeal lay against such a decision. 21.  On 11 December 2013 the K\u00faria upheld, in a judgment (\u00edt\u00e9let), the final decision of the Budapest Court of Appeal. It reiterated that the applicant could have relied on the Sixth Council Directive and put forward its arguments concerning the allegedly correct interpretation of domestic law in the light of European Union law before the Supreme Court in the 2009 proceedings. Since the applicant had failed to do so, the Supreme Court had indeed been prevented, by force of the applicable procedural rules, from examining such arguments as raised in the subsequent proceedings for damages, concerning the compatibility of the final judgment of 2009 with European Union law. Therefore, the Supreme Court could not bear responsibility for the infringement of European Union law alleged by the applicant. The judgment of the K\u00faria was served on the applicant on 7 February 2014. 22.  On 13 March 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under section 27 of the Constitutional Court Act (see Mendrei v. Hungary (dec.), no. 54927/15, \u00a7 13, 19 June 2018), claiming that the proceedings before the K\u00faria had been unfair on account of the latter\u2019s allegedly arbitrary refusal to refer the case for a preliminary ruling. Contending that the Constitutional Court should be considered as a \u201ccourt or tribunal\u201d for the purposes of Article 267 of the TFEU, the applicant also requested the Constitutional Court to turn to the CJEU in order to enquire whether an \u201carbitrary\u201d refusal of a last-instance jurisdiction to refer a case for a preliminary ruling may violate the party\u2019s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see paragraph 29 below) and, if so, under what conditions such a refusal might be considered arbitrary. The applicant argued, in particular, that the K\u00faria had failed to recognise an issue of fundamental importance, namely that whether a certain legal issue (the consequences of a plaintiff\u2019s failure to put forward explicit allegations as to an infringement of European Union law) fell within the ambit of national law or European Union law was itself a question belonging necessarily to the realm of European law. Ignoring that concept, the K\u00faria had \u201csolved\u201d the problem in an arbitrary fashion, that is, by refusing the reference and barring the applicant\u2019s access to a \u201clawful judge\u201d, the CJEU in the circumstances. 23.  The applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint contained the following passages:\n\u201cThe complainant ... does not want to call into question the merits of the K\u00faria\u2019s impugned judgment in the present procedure [but rather complains that] the K\u00faria acted unfairly in the review proceedings ...\nThe K\u00faria\u2019s procedure was in breach of the claimant\u2019s constitutional right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law, in so far as the K\u00faria acted arbitrarily in omitting to refer the case for a preliminary ruling. ...\nThe K\u00faria failed to explain, in line with the Cilfit requirements ... why and how it had deemed itself exempt from the obligation to refer a question [on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling]. ...\n[I]n the light of the above, the K\u00faria failed to comply with its obligation to refer [a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling] and that in an arbitrary, grossly unprofessional manner ...\u201d 24.  On 19 May 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint as inadmissible, without putting forward a preliminary ruling request (see decision no. 3165/2014. (V.23.), referred to in Somorjai v. Hungary, no. 60934/13, \u00a7 34, 28 August 2018). It held that the question whether a request for reference to the CJEU should be made or not was to be decided by the judges hearing the case in the ordinary courts, and that the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to review such decisions. It further noted that the only claim an applicant might make in constitutional complaint proceedings initiated under section 27 of Act no. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court was that a judgment be quashed. Consequently, no request for a preliminary ruling was possible under that law, and the applicant\u2019s request to that effect had to be rejected. 25.  The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision contained the following passage:\n\u201c[The applicant] was of the view that the rejection by the K\u00faria of his request to have the case referred to the [CJEU] had been arbitrary in that the K\u00faria should have provided professionally appropriate, objective and duly detailed reasons in that respect but, in the applicant\u2019s opinion, it had failed to do so. In that connection, the applicant referred to the requirements contained in the [CJEU]\u2019s Cilfit and K\u00f6bler judgments ...\u201d\nApart from that passage, the decision did not address the issue of adequate reasoning by the K\u00faria. 26.  Certain provisions concerning the Constitutional Court\u2019s power of review in connection with constitutional complaints were set out in Mendrei (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-15).\nSection 43 of the Constitutional Court Act, which was not quoted in Mendrei (cited above), provides as follows:\n\u201c(1)  If the Constitutional Court, in the course of proceedings provided for in section 27 and on the basis of a constitutional complaint, declares that a judicial decision is contrary to the Fundamental Law, it shall quash the decision.\n(2)  Provisions of Acts that contain regulations in respect of court proceedings shall be applied to the procedural consequence of a Constitutional Court decision that quashes a judicial decision.\n(3)  In court proceedings conducted as a consequence of the quashing of a judicial decision by the Constitutional Court, the decision of the Constitutional Court as to the constitutional issue shall be adhered to.\n(4)  The Constitutional Court, when it quashes a judicial decision, may also quash judicial decisions or the decisions of other authorities which were reviewed by the given decision.\u201d 27.  The provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. III of 1952) pertaining to the reference for a preliminary ruling, as in force at the material time, were set out in Somorjai, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28 and 36.\nArticle 361 of the old Code of Civil Procedure provided as follows:\n\u201cIn order to provide redress following a constitutional complaint, the K\u00faria shall decide as follows: ...\n(c)  if the Constitutional Court has quashed a judicial decision, [the K\u00faria] shall ... remit the case to the first or second-instance court for new proceedings and a new decision; or order the adoption of a new decision in respect of an application for review.\u201d 28.  The relevant European Union law and the case-law of the CJEU pertaining to the preliminary ruling procedure was outlined in, among other authorities, Somorjai (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 38-41) and Baydar v. the Netherlands (no. 55385/14, \u00a7\u00a7 21-29, 24 April 2018). 29.  Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides, in so far as relevant:\nRight to an effective remedy and to a fair trial\n\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.\nEveryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. ...\u201d 30.  Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive (Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes), as amended by Article 28f thereof, provides:\n\u201cIn so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the taxable person shall be entitled to deduct from the tax which he is liable to pay:\n(a) [VAT] due or paid within the territory of the country in respect of goods or services supplied or to be supplied to him by another taxable person; ...\u201d 31.  In its K\u00f6bler judgment (C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513, point 1 of the operative part), the CJEU ruled as follows:\n\u201cThe principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance where the rule of Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties. In order to determine whether the infringement is sufficiently serious when the infringement at issue stems from such a decision, the competent national court, taking into account the specific nature of the judicial function, must determine whether that infringement is manifest. It is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to determine disputes relating to that reparation.\u201d 32.  In connection with the role of the national courts in application of European Union law, the CJEU held, among other things, as follows (see, respectively, joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel, EU:C:1995:441, point 2 of the operative part; and C-2/06 Kempter, EU:C:2008:78, paragraph 45):\n\u201cCommunity law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue concerning the breach of provisions of Community law where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions bases his claim.\u201d\n\u201c[W]hile Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion a plea alleging infringement of Community provisions where examination of that plea would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties, they are obliged to raise of their own motion points of law based on binding Community rules where, under national law, they must or may do so in relation to a binding rule of national law ...\u201d", "references": ["8", "0", "4", "5", "2", "1", "9", "No Label", "6", "7", "3"], "gold": ["6", "7", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in San Marino. 7.  The applicant owned the entire share capital (and at the material time was also the director) of S.M.I., a fiduciary company operating in San Marino. Company S.M.I. is currently in compulsory liquidation. 8.  On an unspecified date an individual, B., conferred a mandate to Z. for the latter to open a fiduciary account (conto fiduciario) with company S.M.I. in his own name but on behalf of the former. Thus, on 2 March 1988 Z. signed a fiduciary management mandate (mandato di amministrazione fiduciaria) with company S.M.I. on behalf of B. 9.  As part of the mandate, company S.M.I. opened fiduciary account no. 381\u2011AF07701 in order to carry out some financial operations concerning securities listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. 10.  By a contract of 20 March 1990, signed in the context of the above\u2011mentioned fiduciary mandate (on behalf of B.), company S.M.I. and another company, K., purchased from company P.A. some shares of its subsidiary company, A.N. As part of the price for these shares, companies S.M.I. and K: (i) waived a previous debt owed to them by an owner of company P.A., and (ii) undertook to reimburse a debt of 11,000,000,000 Italian liras (LIT) that company P.A. owed an Italian bank, S. (in particular, company S.M.I. undertook to reimburse LIT 9,900,000,000 and company K. LIT 1,100,000,000). 11.  Eventually B. complained that company S.M.I. had not returned to him part of the proceeds (LIT 9,035,264,332) obtained from the purchase (see paragraph 10 above) and subsequent sale, a few months later, of the shares of company A.N. Nor had company S.M.I. recorded that sum in the statement related to the fiduciary account. B. had become aware of the breach of contract during previous criminal proceedings (ongoing for other reasons, in Milan) in which company S.M.I. had submitted statements concerning the above-mentioned fiduciary account. 12.  On 4 October 2001 B. filed a civil complaint against Z. and company S.M.I., represented by its legal representative and director (the applicant), in order to obtain from them, in solidum, the payment of LIT 9,035,264,332. 13.  By an interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007 the first\u2011instance judge (Commissario della Legge) found that not all the financial operations carried out by company S.M.I. on behalf of B. in execution of the fiduciary mandate had been correctly recorded in the financial statement. The judge applied the rules governing contracts of mandate as established by the domestic case\u2011law and practice, relying, in particular, on the duty of the agent (mandatario \uf02d in this case, company S.M.I.) to give evidence of the operations carried out in execution of a mandate in order to demonstrate that it had fulfilled its reporting obligation (obbligo di rendiconto). According to the judge, the only evidence that company S.M.I. had submitted for that purpose had been the above\u2011mentioned financial statement. However, B. had demonstrated that the statement was incomplete and therefore unreliable. Thus, company S.M.I. had failed to discharge its burden of proof to show that it had returned to B. the sums obtained from the transfer of company A.N.\u2019s shares. 14.  Given the unreliability of the statement, the judge, applying the domestic practice concerning the assessment of documentary evidence, took into consideration only the parts of the statement which constituted evidence against the party which had drafted the document, that is to say, only the credit entries (the sums of money company S.M.I. admitted to having been received by B.) but not the debit entries reported therein (indicating what sums S.M.I. had claimed to have used in execution of the fiduciary mandate). Thus, the judge considered all the credit entries (amounting to LIT 34,962,635,382) and deducted from them the sums which B. acknowledged having received and those which company S.M.I had used on his instructions (amounting to LIT 25,927,371,050) as also admitted by him. This left an outstanding debt of LIT 9,035,264,332 (approximately 4,662,778.93 euros (EUR)) which company S.M.I. owed B. 15.  However, according to the judge, this was the result of presumptions being made, and B. had not entirely discharged the relevant burden of proof. Thus, to compensate for the partial lack of evidence and allow B. to entirely discharge his burden of proof, the judge in the same aforementioned interlocutory judgment summoned B. so that he could take a \u201csupplementary oath\u201d (giuramento suppletorio \u2013 an oath of a party on his or her own behalf as confirmation of otherwise inadmissible or inconclusive evidence \u2013 for more details, see Relevant domestic law, paragraph 68 below). The wording of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d, as set by the judge, was as follows:\n\u201cI swear and declare that I did not authorise any other withdrawals [of money] as reported in financial statement no. 381-AF0770l apart from the ones that I have acknowledged and that [were] indicated in my counsel\u2019s submission of 24 April 2003. Thus, company S.M.I. must return to me LIT 9,028,398,950.\u201d 16.  Consequently, the proceedings continued solely for the purposes of the taking of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d. 17.  In the same interlocutory judgment the judge also found that Z. had been a mere agent of B. and removed him from the case. 18.  On 30 June 2008, B. took the above-mentioned \u201csupplementary oath\u201d as set out by the judge. 19.  No first\u2011instance judgment on the merits was ever issued. 20.  On 12 December 2008 company S.M.I. appealed against the interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007. B. cross-appealed and requested, inter alia, that the interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007 be declared final and that company S.M.I.\u2019s requests be rejected. 21.  By a judgment of 9 June 2011, filed with the registry on 30 June 2011, and served on the applicant on 20 July 2011, the Judge of Administrative Appeals, in his capacity as Judge of Civil Appeals (Giudice Amministrativo d\u2019Appello in veste di Giudice delle Appellazioni Civili), dismissed the appeal. The judge confirmed that company S.M.I. had a remaining debt to B. of LIT 9,028,398,950 (EUR 4,662,778.93), and ordered it to pay him that sum of money together with default interest and currency revaluation. 22.  The judge specified that the judgment (against which S.M.I. had lodged this appeal) had to be considered a \u201cpartial interlocutory judgment\u201d (interlocutoria mista) falling into the category of judgments which examined the merits in part [and thus could be appealed against, as opposed to a \u201cmere interlocutory judgment\u201d (interlocutoria mera) which did not examine the merits and therefore could not be appealed against]. It could not be regarded as a \u201cmere interlocutory judgment\u201d since the first\u2011instance judge, finding that B. had partially proven his statements, had partly examined the case on the merits. Thus, the judgment had become final after B. had taken the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d, and was amenable to appeal. 23.  On 6 July 2011 company S.M.I. attempted to further appeal against the judgment of 30 June 2011, before the Third\u2011Instance Judge (Terza Istanza). By a judgment of 6 April 2012 the complaint was declared inadmissible on the grounds that the only role of a Third\u2011Instance Judge was to decide which one of two non\u2011concordant judgments had to be upheld. That prerequisite did not exist in the case at hand, since both the first and second-instance judgments had been concordant on the merits. 24.  On an unspecified date the applicant (in his own name) filed a criminal complaint against B. under Article 359 of the Criminal Code, accusing him of swearing a false oath. He claimed that, by the statements made under oath on 30 June 2008, B. had committed perjury. A criminal investigation was subsequently initiated. 25.  In turn B. filed a complaint against the applicant, accusing him of slander. The investigating judge (Commissario della Legge Inquirente) joined the two investigations. 26.  By a decision of 11 May 2015 the investigating judge closed the proceedings since in his opinion there was no evidence that B. had committed perjury. The judge considered that since the expert\u2019s report showed that it was not possible to conclude who had made the payment to bank S., there was no evidence to show the non\u2011existence of the debt to B. and consequently the falsity of the statements which he had made under oath. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Judge of Criminal Appeals requesting that the investigation be reopened. 28.  By a decision of 31 July 2015, Judge L.F., a Judge of Civil Appeals in his capacity as Judge of Criminal Appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Civili in veste di Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) dismissed the complaint and upheld the decision to close the case. In the opinion of the judge it was implausible that a reopening of the investigation could lead to the discovery of new documents able to demonstrate the origin of the funds used to pay off the debt to bank S. The expert had already analysed all the documents available, which had been found not only in the headquarters of company S.M.I., but also in the archives of the court in Milan (where other proceedings were ongoing). He had not found any records of such a payment. Moreover, the payment dated back to 1990. Furthermore, the dispute at hand had arisen because company S.M.I. and B. had decided, by mutual consent and on purpose, not to record all the operations carried out in execution of the fiduciary mandate. 29.  Meanwhile, on 30 October 2014 the applicant (in his own name) had lodged an application with the first-instance civil judge to have civil proceedings no. 300/2001 reopened (istanza di riassunzione del giudizio). 30.  Within that application, the applicant submitted a \u201cjactitation suit\u201d (azione di iattanza /di accertamento negativo) (see paragraph 42 and 74 below), requesting the judge to declare that the supplementary oath sworn by B. had been false. The applicant argued that after the taking of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d new evidence had come into his possession. According to him, B. had not provided company S.M.I. with the necessary funds to carry out the purchase of company A.N.\u2019s shares. Thus, the statement that B. had not authorised any other money withdrawals (except for the ones he had expressly acknowledged) had been false since he had at least authorised company S.M.I. to pay off the debt of LIT 9,900,000,000 owed to bank S., in execution of the obligations arising from the contract for the purchase of company A.N.\u2019s shares. That debt had been paid off by company S.M.I. with the proceeds deriving from the sale of the shares of company A.N., since no other funds had been provided by B. for that purpose, and therefore the sum of LIT 9,900,000,000 had to be subtracted from the amount of the alleged debt claimed by B. 31.  By a decision of 12 November 2014 the Chief Justice (Magistrato Dirigente), relying on the domestic law on the competence of the courts (see paragraph 61 below), referred the case to the Court for Trusts and Fiduciary Relationships (Corte per il Trusts ed i Rapporti Fiduciari \u2011 hereinafter \u201cthe Court for Trusts\u201d). The latter had been instituted by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 26 January 2012 and had competence to hear all cases concerning trusts and fiduciary relationships (see paragraph 56 below). 32.  Thus, proceedings no. 2/2014 were instituted before the Court for Trusts. 33.  By a decision of 3 December 2014, pursuant to the relevant law (see paragraph 57 below), the President of the Court for Trusts (hereinafter \u201cthe President\u201d) referred the case to a panel composed of two judges (Judge G. and the President himself). By the same decision, the President calculated the amount of legal fees. To this end, he relied on the \u201cRules on Court Fees and Judicial Remunerations\u201d, which he had issued himself the day before (2 December 2014). He considered that the claim had an \u201cundetermined value\u201d, however, the applicant had requested to establish the non\u2011existence of a debt of EUR 4,662,778.93. Therefore, on the basis of the latter value and the applicable rules, the President calculated the amount of court fees as being EUR 6,000 and the variable part of the judge\u2019s remuneration (la parte variabile del compenso spettante al giudice) as being EUR 23,000 (EUR 20,000 \u2013 in accordance with the relevant table \u2013 increased by 15%, given that the case had been referred to two judges) as well as EUR 500 in reimbursement of judicial expenses. The President ordered the applicant to pay (i) the court fees in toto and (ii) half of the required payments (for a total amount of EUR 17,750) at least seven days before the date of the first hearing, failing which the claim would be barred (see paragraph 57 below). 34.  Although he was regularly notified of the reopening of the proceedings, B. did not respond. 35.  In the course of the proceedings, the court ordered some expert reports to be drawn up. The final liquidation balance sheet of company P.A. was also added to the case file, amongst other things. The applicant submitted a consultant\u2019s report aimed at showing that company S.M.I.\u2019s debt to B. did not exist. That report was also added to the case file. 36.  At a hearing of 26 May 2015 the court questioned the applicant and heard Z. (a witness called by the applicant). 37.  On 10 June 2015 the applicant filed written submissions as requested by the court. 38.  On 30 June 2015 the court, having considered the applicant\u2019s submissions incomplete, heard the applicant again. 39.  On 14 July 2015 the applicant submitted further written submissions. 40.  By a judgment filed with the registry on 18 September 2015 the court partly acceded to the applicant\u2019s complaint. 41.  The court considered that the applicant had an interest in bringing proceedings, given the position which he had held in company S.M.I. (see paragraph 7 above). Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant, in his own name, had not been a party in the \u201coriginal\u201d civil proceedings (brought by B. against company S.M.I.) the outcome of those proceedings (the fact that company S.M.I. had been ordered to pay a substantial sum of money to B.) could have been detrimental to his personal property and reputation both because he would have been liable to pay the sums found to be due, but also because those sums would have been due as a result of his mismanagement. 42.  The court accepted the applicant\u2019s characterisation of the action lodged against B. as a \u201cjactitation suit\u201d aimed at establishing the falsity of the statements that B. had made under oath in the course of the civil proceedings. Addressing the applicant\u2019s claim (that he had brought to the court\u2019s attention new evidence which had come into his possession after the taking of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d, or written evidence which he could not submit before, on the basis of which he had initiated the \u201cjactitation suit\u201d), the court found that the applicant had not submitted any such new evidence. Thus, according to the court, the applicant\u2019s action should have been rejected on procedural grounds, without the merits of the case being dealt with. Nevertheless, in the court\u2019s view, the fact that the parties of the case before it (the applicant and B., the latter in absentia) were different from the original parties in the \u201cordinary\u201d civil proceedings (company S.M.I. and B.), allowed the court to consider the \u201cjactitation suit\u201d procedurally admissible, even in the absence of new evidence (that is to say, in the absence of the prerequisites for the admissibility of a \u201cjactitation suit\u201d as established by the domestic case-law, see paragraph 68 below). The court justified its decision not to follow the above-mentioned precedent on the basis that the final judgment in the \u201cordinary\u201d civil proceedings had to be considered \u201cres inter alios acta\u201d (a thing involving and affecting different parties). 43.  As to the merits, the court declared false only the first part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d (in which B. had declared that he had authorised only the operations he had explicitly acknowledged in the list submitted by his lawyer on 24 April 2003 and not the further money withdrawals which had been recorded in bank statement no. 381\u2011AF0770l \u2013 see paragraph 15 above). However, the court held that what he had said under the second part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d (relating to the final amount due) had been true. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s request to reduce the amount of the debt and confirmed that company S.M.I. had to pay B. the same sum of money. 44.  According to the court, the wording of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d did not imply that the second part had to be seen as a consequence of the first part, despite the use of the word \u201cthus\u201d (per cui). It was therefore preferable to separate the two parts, since operations could have existed which may not have had any effect on the amount of the final balance. 45.  In connection with the first part, the court noted that the authorisation of the mandator (in this case, B.) to use the proceeds obtained from a certain financial operation in order to pay off an obligation arising from the same operation (as had happened in the case at hand) had to be considered implicit in a contract of mandate. This was a \u201cnatural effect\u201d of the contract. It followed that the first part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d (in which B. had stated that the only operations which had been authorised were those listed by B.\u2019s legal representative) had not been exact and the applicant was thus right on that point and the first part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had to be considered false. 46.  In any case, having examined all the evidence, in the court\u2019s view, the declaration of falsity of the first part of the statement made by B. under oath did not necessarily impact upon the quantification of the debt since (i) all the parties to the contract of 20 March 1990 had acted under the instructions of the same mastermind (B.), (ii) company P.A. (the seller of the shares of company A.N., from which company S.M.I. had taken over the debt owed to bank S. \u2013 see paragraph 10 above) belonged to company S.M.I., and (iii) bank S. had not even been notified of the taking over of the debt. Thus, there was no risk that company S.M.I. had to actually pay the debt. In addition, the applicant had not given evidence of any payments made by company S.M.I. enabling a reduction in the amount which it owed B. 47.  By the same judgment the court also calculated the total amount of litigation fees to be EUR 29,500 (which included the estimate provided previously) and approved the fees requested by the lawyers (EUR 37,887). 48.  On 2 October 2015, relying on section 11 (2) of Delegate Decree no. 128 of 30 September 2013 (see paragraph 57 below), the applicant (in his own name) applied to the President of the Court for Trusts for leave to appeal part of the judgment of 18 September 2015. 49.  The applicant claimed, inter alia, that the splitting of the wording of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d into two parts, and the finding of falsity of the first part and not the second, had been illogical and erroneous. According to the applicant, his \u201cjactitation suit\u201d had aimed at ascertaining the existence of actual damage arising from the falsity of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d and such damage had arisen from the second part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d (the one in which B. had claimed the return of a quantified sum) and not the first part. Furthermore, the two parts of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had to be considered strictly connected. Thus, the finding that the first part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had been false should have also automatically led to a declaration of falsity of the second part since between them a logical causal link (nesso logico di causalita) existed. In addition, the decision to split the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d into two parts had not been reasoned and, in the applicant\u2019s view, he needed not bring any proof of the non\u2011existence of the debt, it being an automatic result of the falsity of the statement given on oath. 50.  On 19 October 2015 the President dismissed the application for leave to appeal on the grounds that: (i) most of the applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal concerned the merits of the case (which, under the relevant law, cannot constitute a ground of appeal against judgments of the Court for Trusts, see paragraph 57 below), (ii) in the first-instance proceedings before the Court for Trusts, the applicant had not given evidence of any payments made by company S.M.I. able to reduce the amount which it owed B. In this connection, the judge stated that the applicant did not seem to realise that the Court for Trusts had given fully detailed reasoning as to its decision to consider the second part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d as true, far more than had ever been done in the various phases of the proceedings before the [ordinary] courts. Thus, the court had correctly concluded that the second part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had been true and that the amount of the debt had to remain the same. 51.  The judge added that had he granted leave to appeal, it would have certainly been unsuccessful, which showed the quality of the applicant\u2019s defence in the case at hand. Moreover, according to the judge, leave to appeal also had to be refused because the applicant had not set out any reasons as to why the court had been wrong in its reasoning justifying its decision to split the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d into two parts. 52.  On 3 November 2015 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Judge of Civil Appeals concerning the refusal of leave to appeal, relying on Section 11 (3) of Delegate Decree no. 128 of 30 September 2013 (see paragraph 57 below). He essentially reiterated the same requests which he had already submitted earlier. 53.  By a decision of 11 February 2016, Judge L.F., in his capacity as Judge of Civil Appeals, dismissed the complaint and upheld the decision not to grant leave to appeal. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s legal counsel by email on 16 February 2016. 54.  In the opinion of the judge, the complaint did not contain any issues of law. In particular, whether it had been legitimate for the Court for Trusts to split the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d into two parts was not a point of law (that is to say concerning the interpretation or application of a law or legal principle) and actually concerned the interpretation of the wording of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d by the Court for Trusts, which had to be considered a complaint on the merits. 55.  The judge observed that, on the one hand, the court had considered that the first part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had been false on the basis of the rules governing contracts of mandate and in the light of the evidence of the operations carried out by company S.M.I. On the other hand, the second part of the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d had been held to be true on the basis of the fact that no evidence had demonstrated that company S.M.I. had made any relevant payments in B.\u2019s name (namely the reimbursement of the debt). Thus, the decision to split the \u201csupplementary oath\u201d into two parts had been a consequence of the court\u2019s finding that the two parts were not logically connected.", "references": ["7", "5", "4", "8", "0", "6", "1", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Vienna. He is of Bulgarian origin. 7.  On 23 July 2009 a letter signed by the applicant was sent to the Sofia Municipality. In that letter the applicant complained of construction works undertaken by his nephew, A.K., which had significantly altered the house which had been owned by his parents and where he had been born. The applicant had become aware of that during his stay in Sofia in May 2009. He expressed his indignation about the works undertaken, as well as doubts as to their legality, and requested to be sent copies of all documents concerning them, stating that he intended to bring the matter to court. He stated in addition that A.K. held, for the property in question, an \u201cillegal notarial deed ... acquired on the basis of a forged notarial deed\u201d. These allegations concerned the notarial deeds of 1995 and 1996, described in paragraph 12 below; A.K. had been the beneficiary under both of them. The applicant indicated an intention to challenge these deeds in court. 8.  In December 2009 A.K. initiated a private criminal prosecution of the applicant. In his complaint he stated that he had become aware of the applicant\u2019s letter \u201cby chance\u201d, and claimed that the applicant had defamed him, in particular by stating that he had an \u201cillegal notarial deed ... acquired on the basis of a forged notarial deed\u201d. This implied that A.K. had committed a criminal offence, namely using a forged document. In the same proceedings A.K. also brought a tort action against the applicant, claiming 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN \u2013 the equivalent of 5,114 euros (EUR)) in non\u2011pecuniary damage. 9.  The applicant objected to the complaint against him, contending that what he had stated was true and that he had never claimed that A.K. had actually used the forged documents. 10.  In a decision of the Sofia District Court of 18 October 2012, the criminal prosecution of the applicant was discontinued as time-barred, and the examination of the case continued only as regards A.K.\u2019s tort action. 11.  That action was allowed in a judgment of the Sofia District Court of 30 January 2014. The domestic court stated expressly in that judgment that it did not have to establish the elements of the criminal offence of defamation. It had to establish, in accordance with section 45(1) of the Obligations and Contracts Act (see paragraph 20 below), whether the applicant\u2019s behaviour amounted to a tortious act and whether A.K. had suffered any damage as a result. 12.  As to the facts of the case, the Sofia District Court established that A.K. had become the owner of part of the property at issue after his mother had donated to him a share in 1983 and he had purchased another share from a co-owner in 1995. Both transactions had been attested in notarial deeds. In a further notarial deed of 1996 A.K. had been recognised as the owner of part of the property. In 2006 he had obtained a permit to enlarge the existing house. The construction works had been carried out in 2006 and 2007. A representative of the building control authorities had visited the site on 2 July 2009 and had established breaches of the relevant rules, but no administrative sanction had been ordered against A.K. An additional check had been carried out on 26 November 2009, after one of the co-owners of the property (not the applicant) had complained. That check had showed that part of the construction works undertaken by A.K. did not correspond to the construction permit. It appears however that A.K. had not been ordered to demolish the unlawfully constructed parts. Further complaints by the co\u2011owners concerning the construction undertaken by A.K. had been sent to the municipality on 13 May 2010. 13.  The Sofia District Court heard in addition witnesses who said that, following the applicant\u2019s allegations against him, A.K. had become nervous and had had unspecified problems with the authorities. 14.  The Sofia District Court found that it had never been shown that the notarial deeds in A.K.\u2019s favour had been flawed, meaning that they had to be considered valid. The applicant\u2019s allegations that one of these deeds had been \u201cillegal\u201d and another one \u201cforged\u201d could have affected A.K.\u2019s good name in society, as they suggested that A.K. had profited from using unlawful means. Those allegations had also damaged A.K.\u2019s professional reputation, since he was working in construction. This was so even bearing in mind that the municipal authorities had taken no particular action against A.K., and that checks on the construction site had been incited by other co\u2011owners of the property. The above considerations were valid regardless of whether the applicant had committed the criminal offence of defamation, since this was not the subject of the proceedings. The applicant had had resort to his constitutional right to petition the authorities, but the exercise of that right did not have to involve causing damage to others. 15.  The Sofia District Court ordered the applicant to pay A.K. BGN 5,000 (the equivalent of EUR 2,557) in non-pecuniary damage, plus default interest. It considered such an award to be just, pointing out that A.K. had enjoyed a good name in society, that the applicant\u2019s allegations had also affected A.K.\u2019s professional reputation, and that the allegations had been made before a municipal body and not in private correspondence. 16.  Upon an appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 21 August 2015, the Sofia City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment, endorsing its reasoning. 17.  The applicant has not submitted documents showing that he actually paid the amount awarded to A.K., nor has he claimed to have made any such payment.", "references": ["7", "5", "3", "1", "9", "8", "0", "2", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America). 6.  The case concerns \u201cnon-contentious\u201d proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant\u2019s son to the United States after the child\u2019s mother (a Croatian national and the applicant\u2019s former wife) had in August 2011 \u201cwrongfully retained\u201d him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d). 7.  Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court\u2019s decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court\u2019s decision reads as follows:\n\u201c... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner\u2019s appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ...\nIn the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case.\u201d 8.  In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm \u2013 that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way:\n\u201c... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies \u2013 precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable \u2013 the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision.\u201d 9.  Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Ad\u017ei\u0107 case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Ad\u017ei\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, \u00a7\u00a7 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10.  In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first\u2011instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert\u2019s assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court\u2019s refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11.  By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Ad\u017ei\u0107 case (see paragraph 9 above). 12.  The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court\u2019s judgment in the first Ad\u017ei\u0107 case (see Ad\u017ei\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 6-57).", "references": ["5", "1", "6", "2", "0", "8", "9", "7", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 respectively and are detained in Kharp. 5.  The applicants were co-defendants in domestic criminal proceedings. 6.  In July 2003 the applicant was arrested in the town of Syktyvkar on suspicion of committing a criminal offence. He was ordered not to leave his town of residence. He was subsequently detained on an unspecified date. His detention was later extended. On 29 January 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court extended his detention until 19 February 2004. On 18 February 2004 the prosecuting authorities completed their pre-trial investigation and submitted the case for trial. On 10 March 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention. On 21 April 2004 the trial judge returned the criminal case to the prosecutor and dismissed the defence\u2019s application for release, thereby maintaining detention on remand. 7.  The applicant was also accused of committing a criminal offence in the town of Ivanovo. In April 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court ordered his detention in relation to this criminal offence too. 8.  Subsequently, the related proceedings were pursued before the courts in the town of Ivanovo. 9.  On 3 August 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ivanovo extended the applicant\u2019s detention \u201cpending investigation\u201d (under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCrP\u201d) until 5 October 2004. 10.  On 13 September 2004 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing in the criminal case and also held that the applicant should remain in detention, pending trial (Article 228 of the CCrP). 11.  In December 2004 a local newspaper published an article recounting the relevant events and also indicating that the accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty. 12.  In the meantime, it appears that the district judge returned the case to the prosecutor, which entailed, apparently, modifying the legal basis for the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial (Article 255 of the CCrP) or pending investigation (Article 109 of the CCrP); this in turn necessitated the re\u2011calculation of the respective periods of detention. 13.  In particular, on 20 December 2004 the judge decided to return the criminal case to the prosecutor (Article 237 of the CCrP) and held that the applicant should remain in detention. The applicant appealed. On 14 February 2005 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the judgment. 14.  On 18 February 2005 the prosecutor received the case file. 15.  On 9 March 2005 the prosecutor lodged an application for a fresh detention order to be issued (apparently under Article 109 of the CCrP, since the case was again \u201cpending investigation\u201d). 16.  On 14 March 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 4 June 2005. On 24 March 2005 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. These court decisions were examined on 3 March 2006 by the Presidium of the Regional Court on supervisory review. The Presidium upheld them, also stating that the applicant\u2019s detention between October 2004 and March 2005 had been lawful. 17.  In the meantime, the applicant lodged an application for release. On 1 February 2006 the District Court dismissed it. The applicant appealed. On 23 March 2006 the Regional Court stated that this decision was not appealable. 18.  In the meantime, on 20 February 2006, the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 May 2006. On 23 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld this extension. 19.  It appears that, in the meantime, in February 2006 the court again returned the case to the prosecutor. Apparently, the case was resubmitted to the court in or around August 2006. 20.  On 21 December 2006 the applicant was convicted of an armed robbery undertaken by a group of people. On 14 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 21.  Mr Mityanin brought a civil claim under Article 1070 \u00a7 1 and Article 1100 of the Civil Code for compensation because there had been no valid court decision authorising his detention from 20 February until 10 March 2004 (see above). By a judgment of 4 October 2012 the Town Court ruled that (i) during the relevant period the case against the applicant had been pending before the trial court and that his continued detention had thus been lawful; and (ii) in the absence of any element of illegality there was no legal basis for awarding compensation. It stated as follows:\n\u201cThe detention matter had been determined by a court and in compliance with the rules that had been applicable at the time. The staff of the detention centre had no legal reasons for releasing [the applicant] after 19 February 2004, including in view of the absence of any information from the prosecutor that the case had been submitted for trial to the Town Court. Consequently, [the applicant\u2019s] detention from 19 February to 27 April 2004 was lawful. In addition, this court takes into account the decision of 21 April 2004 in the part concerning the dismissal of the application for release and the decision to maintain detention on remand. Hence, as regards the object of this case, there has been no violation of the rights or freedoms (including those under Article 5 of the Convention) ... Since the detention was lawful, there is no lawful basis for compensation on account of any non-pecuniary damage ...\u201d 22.  On 27 December 2012 the Komi Regional Court upheld the judgment.\n\u201cUnder Article 227 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the CCrP receiving a criminal case a judge must forward it if another court is competent, to list a preliminary hearing or list a hearing. Where a case concerns a defendant who is detained on remand, a judge must decide within fourteen days. Pursuant to Article 228 \u00a7 3 of the CCrP a judge must also determine whether the preventive measure should be amended or cancelled ... It follows from those rules that as soon as a criminal case is submitted for trial the detention matter is decided under Article 227 of the CCrP. The authorised period of detention had not yet expired when the case was submitted for trial. The detention matter was then determined by the judge within the applicable time-limits. Thus, there is no legal basis for awarding compensation.\nPursuant to Article 61 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court is bound in respect of the circumstances that were ascertained by a final and enforceable court decision in another case. Those circumstances cannot be contested during the examination of another case between the same parties ... Thus, it was correctly taken into account that the Regional Court of the Komi Republic had stated in its decision of 25 May 2012 (in reply to an application for release) that the detention from 19 February to 27 April 2004 had been lawful.\u201d 23.  On 12 January 2008 the authorities in Syktyvkar opened criminal proceedings against the applicants and others under Article 210 of the Criminal Code in respect of the creation and functioning of a \u201ccriminal community\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e). 24.  On an unspecified date Mr Mityanin was formally charged with this criminal offence. 25.  On 18 January 2008 a local newspaper published an article entitled \u201cBoxers in detention\u201d, stating that it was the first time that a criminal case under this provision of the Criminal Code had been initiated in the region and that it concerned well-known sportsmen. 26.  The article read as follows:\n\u201cThis is the first time that the law-enforcement authorities of the region have filed charges against a group of former sportsmen, [having accused] them of running a criminal community.\n...\nOfficially, they are all businessmen, sports benefactors or organisers of various sports events. Unofficially, the law-enforcement authorities believe, they are members of the so-called Loginovskaya Gang, which was created in the second half of the 1990s ...\nAccording to information [issued by] the press office of the FSB [the Federal Security Service], the gang members devised an efficient mechanism of securing regular income by way of extortion from businessmen. Those who did not cooperate were subjected to various forms of pressure, such as arson in respect of businesses or vehicles, or violence ...\nThe law-enforcement authorities have been working on the gang for several years. On 12 January 2008 the investigating unit of the regional department of the FSB initiated criminal proceedings against the gang leaders and active members. They are accused of committing an offence under Article 210 of the Criminal Code (\u201cRunning a criminal community\u201d).\nLawyers say that this Article of the Criminal Code is rarely used because it is exceedingly difficult to prove the running of a criminal community. In our region this is the first time it is being used ...\nAccording to information [issued by] the press office of the regional department of the FSB, two more persons \u2013 [the first applicant\u2019s first name and last name] and [the second applicant\u2019s first name and last name] \u2013 are already serving prison terms for other offences. In December 2006 the Ivanovo [District Court] convicted them of robbery. [The first applicant\u2019s last name] was sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment ...\nThe arrest of the suspects received wide coverage in the Ezhvinskiy district of Syktyvkar ...\u201d 27.  The article was accompanied by photographs of the arrested people, including the applicant. 28.  Mr Mityanin brought court proceedings under Articles 152 and 152.1 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 43-45 below) against the newspaper. According to the applicant, it was stated in the article that he had been an active member of the so-called \u201cLoginovskaya Gang\u201d, which had lived off income from the extortion and \u201cprotection\u201d of businesses, with recourse to violence against, and the destruction of the property of, business people who refused to cooperate. The applicant sought, inter alia, a refutation (\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) of the allegation that he was an active member of the criminal community, considering this statement to be defamatory. According to the applicant, the author of the article (who referred to official sources) implied that the applicant had been a member of a notorious \u201cgang\u201d, and that he was therefore guilty of committing an offence under Article 210 of the Criminal Code. 29.  By a judgment of 17 October 2011, the Syktyvkar Town Court of the Komi Republic dismissed Mr Mityanin\u2019s claims. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that the information in the article had been untrue, and that that information had corresponded to the fact that there was an ongoing criminal investigation in respect of, inter alia, the applicant. A successful defamation claim would require that the following conditions be met cumulatively: (i) the information in question had been disseminated to at least one other person; (ii) the content of such information had tarnished the dignity, honour or business reputation of the person concerned; and (iii) the information did \u201cnot correspond to reality\u201d (that is to say it [was] untruthful). The court concluded that the applicant had failed to establish the falsity of the contested information. Lastly, noting that a newspaper was not required to verify information coming from an official source, the court ruled that the case disclosed an exception to the requirement that consent had to be given for the publishing of information relating to one\u2019s private life and one\u2019s photograph. In the court\u2019s view, as required in order for a statutory exception to be made, the case disclosed \u201can interest relating to public and State security\u201d, while the publication had been aimed at informing the public of the \u201cappearance of a person in relation to a criminal investigation\u201d.\nThe judgment also reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving obtained the investigator\u2019s approval, the press officer of the regional department of the Federal Security Service provided the respondent with information about the criminal investigation opened in respect of the claimant and [the] implication [of his involvement] in the criminal community ... The investigating authority was interested in receiving further information, in particular as regards possible eyewitnesses to the crimes. Thus, the respondent was given the above\u2011mentioned information and [the applicant\u2019s] photograph.\u201d 30.  Mr Mityanin lodged an appeal against the Syktyvkar Town Court\u2019s judgment. On 8 December 2011 the Komi Regional Court upheld the judgment, referring to the fact that the newspaper had acquired the contested information from an official source, had referred to this source in the article, and had merely recounted this information. The appeal court pointed out that the information had been true and non-defamatory, since it had \u201ccorresponded to the information [adduced by] the preliminary investigation\u201d; it was important to apprise the public of the appearance of the person in relation to a case receiving media coverage. 31.  In the meantime, in a separate defamation case the applicant challenged another article (apparently with similar content) published by another newspaper in April 2011. By a default judgment (\u0437\u0430\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u2013 that is to say without hearing either of the parties) of 7 September 2011, the Town Court considered that the respondent had failed to prove the veracity of the impugned statements; the court awarded Mr Mityanin 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered the newspaper to publish a refutation. It appears that this judgment was not appealed against, and thus became final. The applicant subsequently referred to the judgment of 7 September 2011 in the course of the criminal trial, alleging a violation of the presumption of innocence. The court refused to allow a copy of the judgment to be placed in the case file, considering, inter alia, that the findings of the civil court were irrelevant for the determination of the criminal charge. 32.  It appears that on 23 June 2014 the applicant was convicted of several counts of multiple offences (including murder and membership of a criminal community) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The applicant submits that in the statement of appeal he and his co-defendants raised certain arguments relating to the above-mentioned publication. On 10 July 2015 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment. 33.  On 4 December 2003 the applicant was arrested in the town of Syktyvkar on suspicion of committing robbery and theft in Syktyvkar. On 5 December 2003 the Syktyvkar Town Court authorised his detention. On 29 January 2004 his detention was extended until 19 February 2004. On an unspecified date, the prosecutor completed the investigation and submitted the case for trial. On 21 April 2004 the judge returned the case to the prosecutor, and held that the preventive measure of detention should remain unchanged. On 27 April 2004 an investigator ordered the applicant\u2019s release in exchange for an undertaking from him not to leave his area of residence. However, the applicant was not released. 34.  In separate proceedings, in March 2004 the applicant was charged in relation to an armed robbery in the town of Ivanovo. On 29 April 2004 the Ukhtinskiy Town Court of the Komi Republic authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation in relation to this robbery. The applicant did not appeal. 35.  The applicant was then transferred to the town of Ivanovo for further proceedings. 36.  On 24 June 2004 his detention was extended until 5 August 2004; on 3 August 2004 his detention was extended until 5 October 2004. On 7 September 2004 the case was submitted to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of the Ivanovo Region. On 13 September 2004 the District Court ordered that the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial be continued. Later on, the judge returned the case to the prosecutor. It was resubmitted to the judge on an unspecified date. On 20 December 2004 the District Court again returned the criminal case to the prosecutor and, inter alia, ordered him to redraft the bill of indictment. The District Court also ordered that the applicant be kept in detention pending the prosecutor\u2019s further actions. On 14 February 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned decisions. The applicant\u2019s detention was extended in 2005. In August 2005 the criminal case was resubmitted for trial before the District Court. It appears that in February 2006 the court again returned the case to the prosecutor. Apparently, the case was resubmitted to the court in or around August 2006. 37.  On 21 December 2006 the applicant was convicted of a number of criminal offences. He was then transferred to a prison in the Komi Republic. 38.  In 2012 the applicant lodged complaints concerning the lawfulness of his detention from 19 February until 29 April 2004. The relevant prosecutor\u2019s office refused to deal with this complaint. He challenged it under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 53 below) and asked to be taken to a court hearing from the detention facility. The Syktyvkar Town Court replied to the motion by indicating that the motion would be dealt with at a hearing on the merits. By a judgment of 24 September 2012 the Town Court heard the respondent and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court indicated in the judgment that it was appropriate to examine the case without the claimant being present because the applicable legislation made no provision for conveying a claimant to a court hearing. As to the merits of the complaint, the court indicated that the applicant\u2019s complaint had been dealt with the appropriate official, in compliance with the applicable procedure and that the official had provided reasons for dismissing the complaint. The applicant appealed; on 3 December 2012 the Komi Regional Court upheld this judgment. 39.  The applicant also brought proceedings (again under Chapter 25 of the CCP) against the head of the relevant remand centre, who had kept him there allegedly unlawfully during the contested period. On 24 September 2012 the same judge of the Town Court heard the respondent and rejected the applicant\u2019s claims in that case too. Having listed the relevant provisions of Article 5 of the Convention, the CCrP and the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the procedural history of the criminal case (see paragraphs 33-34 above), the court concluded that the applicant\u2019s detention during the impugned period had been in compliance with the legislation in force at the time in question; that the head of the remand centre had had no legal basis for releasing the applicant, having information that the criminal case had been pending before a trial court. On 3 December 2012 the Regional Court upheld the judgment, considering as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance established the relevant circumstances and based its judgment on the provisions of the CCrP. It was right to conclude that there had been no legal basis for releasing the applicant after 19 February 2004, given that the head of the remand centre had had information that the criminal case had been submitted for trial. Thus, [the applicant\u2019s] detention from 19 February to 29 April 2004 had been lawful ... The court was correct to dismiss the argument that, receiving no extension decision, the head of the remand centre should have released [the applicant] after 19 February 2004 ... Article 255 \u00a7 2 of the CCrP provides that the detention pending trial should not exceed six months, except for situations listed in paragraph 3 ... Thereafter, the relevant court can extend detention in cases relating to serious and particularly serious offences ... Thus, given that the criminal case was submitted for trial before the Syktyvkar Town Court and taking note of the decision of 21 April 2004 (in the part relating to the dismissal of the application for release), this decision should be de facto considered as a decision to extend [the applicant\u2019s] detention within the time-limits mentioned in Article 255 of the CCrP ...\u201d", "references": ["8", "6", "0", "5", "9", "7", "1", "No Label", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Vratsa. 5.  In 1991, following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act which provided, inter alia, for the restitution of formerly collectivised land, the applicant applied for the restitution of land previously owned by her father. 6.  In a decision of 20 May 1996 the competent body, the Oryahovo land commission, held that the heirs of the applicant\u2019s father (the applicant and her sister) were entitled to the restitution of, inter alia, a plot of land of 11,800 square metres enlisted as \u201cforest\u201d. The decision indicated that the heirs of the applicant\u2019s father had established his property title with a notarial deed. It stated additionally that the plot of land was \u201csituated in an area under section 4\u201d. 7.  That provision (section 4 of the transitional provisions of the Agricultural Land Act, hereinafter \u201csection 4\u201d) concerns plots of land which were offered by the Communist authorities for use of private persons, and stipulates that those persons\u2019 right of use is to be discontinued. Under further conditions, those plots are subject to restitution in favour of the pre\u2011collectivisation owners. Such restitution is to be carried out after the elaboration of a detailed cadastral plan of the respective area and, on its basis, a so-called plan of the newly-created plots. 8.  During the years after 1996 the applicant kept sending letters to different bodies, seeking the completion of the restitution procedure. She was informed that she had to await the elaboration of the above-mentioned plans. 9.  Such plans for the territory of the Oryahovo municipality were prepared and approved by the relevant authorities in 2010. 10.  In 2012, responding to a letter from the applicant, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests informed her that the completion of the restitution procedure as concerns plots under section 4 was within the competence of the municipality. 11.  The applicant contacted the municipality, which informed her in a letter of 23 April 2013 that her plot was not situated within the boundaries of the area concerned by section 4 and not covered by the plan of the newly\u2011created plots. Thus, the municipality was not competent to take any decision to finalise the restitution procedure. It informed the applicant that the plot claimed by her was considered State property and was held and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. 12.  After the applicant contacted once again the Ministry, it informed her, in an undated letter, that she was to address its local branch, the Oryahovo Agriculture Department (former land commission). 13.  The applicant wrote to the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, requesting it to finalise the restitution procedure and transfer to her possession of her father\u2019s plot. In a letter dated 21 August 2013 the Department, while confirming that the municipality had no competence as concerns this plot, explained that the applicant had had to do one of the following: either have the exact borders of her plot identified in a different procedure, which had already been completed, concerning land which is not covered by section 4; or apply for the restitution of the land under the Forests Restitution Act, for which the relevant time-limits had already expired (see paragraph 22 below). 14.  In another letter dated 11 April 2017, replying to a further request by the applicant to finalise the restitution procedure, the Oryahovo Agriculture Department stated that its decision of 20 May 1996, indicating that the applicant\u2019s plot was covered by section 4 and was to be restituted under the procedure concerning such plots, was final, and that the time-limit for seeking its revocation or rectification had expired. 15.  In a further undated letter, replying to a fresh complaint by the applicant, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests instructed her to submit a written request under section 45d of the Regulations on the Application of the Agricultural Land Act (hereinafter \u201csection 45d\u201d, see paragraph 21 below). 16.  On 5 June 2017 the Vratsa Regional Directorate of Agriculture (superior body of the Oryahovo Agriculture Department) instructed the applicant to submit to the Agriculture Department the relevant documents concerning the plot of land. The same was reiterated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests on 30 August 2017, after it was once again contacted by the applicant. 17.  On 8 September 2017 the Oryahovo Agriculture Department sent a letter to the applicant, listing the documents she needed to submit to enable the completion of the restitution procedure. These were: a written request under section 45d; an inheritance certificate; notarial deeds, court decisions and any other documents establishing the title to property; documents sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo municipality concerning the procedure under section 4; a plan prepared by a certified geodesist, indicating the exact borders of the plot of land. 18.  On 19 September 2017 the applicant submitted a written request under section 45d, which was not accompanied by the remaining documents. 19.  The necessity to submit those documents was reiterated in three additional letters sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, dated 23 October and 15 and 23 November 2017. In the meantime, the Department requested ex officio from the municipality any relevant documents concerning the procedure conducted by the latter under section 4. It appears that there were no other relevant developments after that.", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "7", "4", "5", "6", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Golasowice. 5.  On 1 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jastrz\u0119bie Zdr\u00f3j District Court for the purposes of establishing an easement. In particular the applicant sought a decision allowing her to use a strip of land belonging to her neighbours as a roadway allowing her access to her property. The roadway in question, which has been used by her in the past, runs along a causeway (grobla) between fishponds. 6.  By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrz\u0119bie Zdr\u00f3j District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 7.  On 15 November 2000 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case (file no. III Ca 661/00). 8.  At a hearing on 13 March 2001 the court ordered the preparation of an expert opinion. Two experts declined the invitation to prepare an opinion, and the third expert approached by the court eventually prepared it on 17 October 2001. 9.  The defendants contested both the expert opinion itself and the fee for drafting it. In March 2002 they requested preparation of another expert opinion. 10.  It appears that the next hearing was held on 23 April 2002. The court questioned the expert and appointed another one to assess the value of the plot of land. 11.  On 12 November 2002 the court held a viewing of the property. 12.  At a hearing on 13 January 2003 the court decided to appoint yet another expert to establish whether the easement would have any impact on the fishponds. The opinion was submitted to the court on 11 April 2003. The expert was questioned at a hearing on 3 July 2003. On 27 January 2004 another expert submitted a complementary opinion, at the request of the court. 13.  The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14.   On 2 June 2005 the Jastrz\u0119bie Zdr\u00f3j District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant\u2019s claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 15.  On 26 January 2006 (file no. III Ca 1322/05) the Gliwice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for the second time. 16.  At a hearing on 26 June 2006 the court requested preparation of an expert geological opinion. The opinion was submitted one year later, on 22 June 2007. 17.  At a hearing on 18 October 2007 the court decided that further defendants should join the proceedings. 18.  A viewing of the land took place on 6 November 2007. Afterwards anther expert opinion on road construction was ordered by the court. It was submitted to the court in January 2008 and the parties duly commented on it. 19.  At a hearing on 23 July 2008 the court questioned the expert and requested the preparation of another expert opinion on the value of the plot of land. 20.  The opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 2009. 21.  The court held a hearing on 25 November 2009 and decided to hold another viewing of the property. Two subsequent viewings scheduled for December 2009 and February 2010 were cancelled due to the weather conditions. 22.  A hearing was held on 4 March 2010 and on 30 April 2010 the court held a viewing of the land. 23.  Another expert opinion ordered by the court was prepared on 6 August 2010. 24.  The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 25.  The defendants appealed. 26.  On 22 February 2012 the Gliwice Regional Court finally dismissed the appeals. 27.  On 9 December 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gliwice Regional Court under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w post\u0119powaniu s\u0105dowym bez nieuzasadnionej zw\u0142oki \u2013 \u201cthe 2004 Act\u201d). She stated that she had lodged her claim in 1999 and that her case had still not been examined. She also claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 28.  By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant \u201chad not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based.\u201d 29.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged another complaint under the 2004 Act. She sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 30.  By a decision of 5 April 2006 (file no. III S 7/06) the Gliwice Regional Court dismissed the claim. It analysed in detail the course of the proceedings after September 2004 and held that they had generally been conducted in a correct and timely manner. As regards the period prior to September 2004, the court relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence and held that the 2004 Act applied to delays caused by the court\u2019s inactivity occurring before that date but only if that delay still continued; what had not been the case in the case under the consideration.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "6", "8", "2", "9", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in \u0160tip. 6.  On 21 September 2012 a vacancy notice was published in respect of five posts on the State Judicial Council (\u201cthe SJC\u201d) to be filled by sitting judges elected from among their peers. Ethnicity was not among the stated requirements for the posts (see paragraph 20 below). 7.  On 28 September 2012 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice for his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll to be changed from that of Bulgarian to Macedonian. 8.  On 15 October 2012 the electoral roll was made available to the \u0160tip Court of Appeal for inspection. Since the applicant\u2019s ethnic designation had not been changed, on the same date he lodged a fresh request for it to be rectified (from Bulgarian to Macedonian), relying on section 17 of the State Judicial Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) (see paragraph 23 below). 9.  By a decision of 18 October 2012, the Ministry of Justice refused the applicant\u2019s request. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant\u2019s] requests for a change to the details [recorded] in the electoral roll regarding \u2018ethnicity\u2019 were submitted after the announcement had been published of an election of [new] members to [the SJC]. The requested change cannot be made because it [was intended to secure] the attainment of a(n) [electoral] right concerning the election of members of [the SJC]. A change of ethnicity entry [sought exclusively for the attainment of another right] after the announcement for the election of members of the SJC [would put other judges] ... , in a disadvantageous position ...\u201d 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court challenging that decision and arguing that the Ministry\u2019s decision had not been based on any statutory grounds. In particular there had been no provision preventing him from changing his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll while the election of members to the SJC had been ongoing. He furthermore submitted that it had been his personal right to determine his own ethnicity and that the Ministry had had no grounds for disregarding his chosen affiliation in this regard. The conclusion that his request would have put other judges in a disadvantageous position had been unreasonable and unsubstantiated. 11.  On 25 October 2012 the Ministry submitted its observations in reply, to which it appended, inter alia, extracts from the electoral rolls of 2006, 2008 and 2010. 12.  On 26 October 2012 the Administrative Court upheld the Ministry\u2019s decision and the reasons that the Ministry had given. It furthermore added that:\n\u201c... the request (lodged after the publication of the [election] announcement) for a change to the ethnicity entry was aimed exclusively at the attainment of another [electoral] right that would have put other judges (who had attained their right related to the election of [new] members to [the SJC]), in a disadvantageous position. [The applicant\u2019s] request for the rectification post-dated the announcement of the election of [new] members to [the SJC]. The requested change cannot be regarded as a \u2018rectification\u2019 since it does not concern a change to numbers, names or other obvious errors, but rather concerns a detail [concerning his ethnicity] that [the applicant] provided. He enjoyed rights as [an individual] of Bulgarian ethnicity concerning the election of members to [the SJC]. That was established on the basis of extracts from the electoral rolls of October 2006, December 2008 and July 2010 submitted together with the observations in reply to [the applicant\u2019s] claim. In these three electoral rolls [the applicant was] declared [to be] Bulgarian. This means that there has been no violation of his right to declare his own ethnicity.\u201d 13.  The applicant appealed against this decision, contesting as unreasonable the finding that his request had aimed at enabling him to attain rights related to the election of new members to the SJC and that the requested change would have put other judges involved in that election in a disadvantageous position. It was unclear how and by what means those judges would have been put in such a position, or indeed which judges would have been affected. Such findings had no legal basis. Furthermore, he contested as irrelevant the findings that his requests had been lodged after the publication of the announcement. He also reiterated his arguments that declaring his own ethnic identity was his personal right. In that connection it was irrelevant which ethnicity had been ascribed to him in 2006, 2008 and 2010 and what electoral rights he had attempted to attain in the past as a Bulgarian. Lastly, he had not been given the opportunity to comment on the electoral rolls of 2006, 2008 and 2010, which the Ministry of Justice had submitted in evidence and to which the Administrative Court had referred in its decision establishing his ethnic identity as Bulgarian. 14.  On 2 November 2012 the Ministry\u2019s observations in reply were communicated to the applicant. 15.  On 5 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The judgment, in which the court cited the wording of provisions of the Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraphs 19, 23 and 24 below), stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... [the applicant requested] the modification of his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll after the [publication of] the announcement of the election of [new] members to the SJC, in which he ... participates. Such a modification of the national ethnicity after the publication of the announcement related to another right would leave other judges who attain the right related to election of members to the SJC in a disadvantageous position. [The applicant], as a Bulgarian, enjoyed rights related to the election of members to the SJC [given the fact that] he had declared himself in the electoral rolls of [2006, 2008 and 2010] as Bulgarian ...\n... [The Ministry\u2019s] decision is based on the State Judicial Council Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act ...\n... [T]he court examined and rejected as ill-founded [the applicant\u2019s] allegations that the impugned decision had restricted his right to assert his own ethnic identity. In the present case, [the applicant] requested a rectification \u2013 that is to say the modification of his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll. [The Ministry\u2019s] refusal [to do so] cannot be regarded as a restriction on his right to assert his ethnic identity, given that the modification in question was sought after the announcement of the election of [new] members to the SJC had been published.\u201d 16.  On 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted himself for election as a member of the SJC. On an unspecified date, he submitted a written statement affirming that he was of Macedonian ethnicity and that his application for election to the SJC had been made with regard to the general list of judges of the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of the \u0160tip Court of Appeal (see paragraph 21 below). 17.  By a letter of 3 December 2012, the SJC informed the applicant that it had struck his name out of the general list of candidates for election to the SJC to be selected from judges of the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of the \u0160tip Court of Appeal. It had decided to do so in the light of the fact that his declared ethnicity (Macedonian) had not corresponded with the official records, according to which since 1995 he had been registered as being of Bulgarian ethnicity. It also acknowledged the outcome of the \u201crectification proceedings\u201d described above. The SJC furthermore stated that it was not required under the Act to take any decision related to entries in the electoral roll. Section 17 of the Act specified the procedural rules and the relevant body in respect of their rectification.", "references": ["8", "0", "6", "1", "7", "5", "9", "3", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Romny. 5.  In September 2009 criminal proceedings in respect of fraud and bribery were instituted against the applicant. 6.  On 12 January 2010 the Romny Court convicted the applicant of both charges and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. By the same decision the court remanded him in custody pending the execution of its judgment. 7.  On 23 March 2010, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the judgment of 12 January 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. By the same decision it also ordered his continued pre-trial detention, without providing any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it. 8.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant asked the Romny Court to order his release from custody, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. He noted, in particular, that his conviction having been quashed, an undertaking not to abscond would constitute a sufficient measure for ensuring the proper conduct of proceedings. In that regard he submitted that he had no prior criminal record and that the crimes imputed to him were not serious. In addition, he had a permanent residence and had obtained positive character references. He also needed to support a family, including a child, and was suffering from several chronic illnesses which required regular medical supervision and which might deteriorate if he remained in detention. The applicant also submitted that, having been bound by an undertaking not to abscond throughout the first round of the proceedings, he had never attempted to abscond or to obstruct the investigation and had dutifully complied with all his procedural obligations. 9.  On an unknown date in May 2010 the Romny Court refused the applicant\u2019s request for release, having found that the crimes imputed to him were sufficiently serious as to potentially warrant a prison sentence of three years or more. It also ruled, without providing any details, that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings if he were to be released. 10.  On several further occasions (in particular, on 13 July, 29 September and 7 December 2010) the applicant lodged similar requests for release; the court rejected each such application on the date on which it was lodged, referring to the seriousness of the offences imputed to the applicant and to the lack of any valid reasons justifying his release. 11.  On 10 February 2011 the applicant again asked to be released from custody pending the proceedings against him, reiterating his previous arguments and emphasising that it was very difficult while in detention to keep to his special diet and secure the necessary medical supervision for his chronic medical conditions. 12.  On 23 February 2011 the Romny Court allowed that request and released the applicant, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. Referring to Article 5 of the Convention, the court noted that, regard being had to the applicant\u2019s character (in particular, his age, health, family and social status, the absence of a prior criminal record and his positive character references), there was no reason to consider that he would abscond, obstruct the investigation or engage in criminal activity if released pending trial. 13.  Subsequently, the case was remitted to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. The charge of bribery was dropped by the prosecutor\u2019s office, and the applicant was committed to stand trial on the charge of fraud alone. 14.  On 23 November 2012 the Romny Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine. However, it released him from any liability to pay the fine levied for the crime for which he had been tried as the time-limit for implementing that sanction had expired. Accordingly, the court also terminated the proceedings as time-barred. The applicant did not appeal against this ruling and it became final.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "9", "7", "0", "4", "3", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 5 October 2001 the Government adopted Decree no. 950 by which it approved the procedure for the designation of plots of land and real estate situated within Yerevan as alienation zones, and established rules for the payment of compensation, price offers, and their implementation. 6.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N by which it approved as an alienation zone real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan, containing land to be taken for State needs with a total area of 345,000 square metres. 7.  A special body, the \u201cYerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency\u201d (hereinafter \u201cthe Agency\u201d), was set up to manage the implementation of the project. 8.  The applicant owned a building measuring 240.2 square metres and had a lease on the plot of land on which it stood, measuring 437.8 square metres, situated in the centre of Yerevan. This property was included in the alienation zone of real estate to be taken for State needs. The applicant had acquired these pieces of property on 17 December 2003 for 1,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 1,767 euros (EUR) at the material time). 9.  On 7 September 2004 the applicant signed an agreement with the Agency by which she gave up her property for 265,020 US dollars (USD). The contract also provided for a financial incentive of USD 78,006 to be paid to the applicant. Thus, the final amount of the sale, including the additional 15% required by law, was equal to USD 394,479, of which the applicant received USD 355,031, as USD 39,447 was levied as income tax. 10.  On 13 January 2006 the Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings against Agency officials for deliberately overestimating the market value of the applicant\u2019s property and overpaying her. The applicant testified as a witness in the course of the investigation of the criminal case. 11.  According to the applicant, at some point during the proceedings the head of the Agency demanded that she pay back USD 180,000, otherwise she could be held criminally liable for appropriation of State funds. On 3 February 2006 the applicant transferred AMD 75,820,000 (approximately EUR 133,958) to the Agency\u2019s account. 12.  By a prosecutor\u2019s decision of 28 February 2006 the investigation of the case was terminated for absence of evidence that a crime had been committed. The relevant parts of this decision state the following:\n\u201c...it has not been established that [a number of residents of the expropriation zone] had fraudulently misappropriated others\u2019 property ... and therefore their actions lack corpus delicti.\nAs a result of the investigation of the criminal case it has not been established that the officials of [the Agency] have failed to perform properly their official duties or have used their official capacity to the detriment of the interests of their service...\u201d 13.  The applicant subsequently demanded that the Agency return the AMD 75,820,000 paid to its account. On 2 April 2007 she received a reply from the head of the Agency, stating that she had transferred the amount in question to the Agency\u2019s account without any documentary proof. According to the applicant, she contacted the Agency on two occasions thereafter, demanding the return of money transferred to its account, but received no response. 14.  On 30 October 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to recover the money paid back to the Agency, the amount of income tax collected from her, and damages for unlawfully retention of her assets. The applicant claimed that she had paid back part of the sales price received because she was confused as a result of her conversation with the head of the Agency. 15.  In its reply the Agency claimed that, by paying back the amount in question, the applicant had in fact accepted that she had been overpaid and for that reason the criminal proceedings had been terminated. The Yerevan Mayor\u2019s office, which had been involved in the proceedings, submitted a similar argument to that of the Agency. 16.  On 27 May 2008 the applicant withdrew her claim for damages. 17.  On 16 July 2008 the Civil Court of Yerevan partially granted the applicant\u2019s claims. In doing so, it stated that the amount of AMD 75,820,000 was to be returned to the applicant since there was no legal basis for the Agency to keep that amount, on the ground that the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings confirmed that the applicant had not committed any illegal act. 18.  Upon the Agency\u2019s appeal, on 20 October 2008 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the merits. The decision also stated that the Ministry of Finance should have been involved in the proceedings since the applicant\u2019s claims could have implications for the State budget. 19.  On 4 August 2009 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan delivered its judgment by which it rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. The court stated, in particular, that there should be a causal link between the damage allegedly suffered and the fault of the person who allegedly caused the damage, and that the claimant bore the burden of proof in this regard. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the court had applied the provisions of law concerning compensation for damages but that she had withdrawn her claim for damages and had merely demanded the return of her property unlawfully kept by the Agency. She further argued that she had not been charged with any offence in the course of the criminal proceedings; the fact that she had paid the amount in question was confirmed by the payment slip, and moreover the Agency had never denied being in possession of her property. 21.  On 4 May 2010 the Civil Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cArticle 1099 \u00a7 4 provides that monetary assets and other property given in fulfilment of non-existent obligations are not subject to return as unjust enrichment if the acquirer proves that the person demanding return of the property had knowledge of the absence of an obligation ...\nAs a result of the examination of the materials of the civil case it has been revealed that the claimant returned the amount in question on the basis of [the Agency\u2019s] demand which was not based either on the law or ... on a contract. In particular, from the legal point of view the respondent [Agency\u2019s] demand for the return of AMD 75,820,000 had no legal basis and the failure to respect it could not of itself bring about ... negative consequences for the claimant.\n... [the applicant] had no financial obligation towards [the Agency]. The fact that [the applicant] was aware of having no obligations towards the respondent [Agency] is also supported by the fact that, apart from [the agreement of 7 September 2004], the parties have not concluded any other ... agreements or an agreement to return a sum of money or another agreement in relation to it.\nIn view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that paragraph 4 of Article 1099 of the Civil Code is fully applicable in the present ... civil case.\nAs regards [the applicant\u2019s] argument that [the Agency] had informed her that the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office was investigating matters relating to the ... agreement concluded with her, as a result of which she had been confused and therefore had returned the amount to [the Agency]; the Court of Appeal notes in this respect that this argument may serve as an independent legal basis to dispute [the Agency\u2019s] actions in judicial proceedings ...\u201d 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She argued that in the course of the proceedings it had not been substantiated that, when making the payment, she had been aware of the fact that she did not have any obligations towards the Agency, since she had been informed to the contrary, namely that she had been overpaid and that she could be held criminally liable if she did not return the money. 23.  On 21 July 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 24.  According to Article 31, everyone shall have the right to dispose of, use, manage, and bequeath his property in the way he sees fit. No one can be deprived of his property, save by a court in cases prescribed by law. Property can be expropriated for the needs of society and the State only in exceptional cases of paramount public interest, in a procedure prescribed by law, and with prior equivalent compensation. 25.  According to Article 132 \u00a7 1, monetary assets are objects of the civil law. 26.  According to Article 274, the owner has the right to demand the return of his property from the unlawful possession of another person. 27.  According to Article 1092, a person who has acquired possession of the property (acquirer) of another person (victim) without any legal or contractual basis has an obligation to return the unlawfully acquired property (unjust enrichment) with the exception of the cases stated in Article 1099 of the Code. 28.  According to Article 1099 \u00a7 4, monetary assets and other property given in fulfilment of non-existent obligations are not subject to return as unjust enrichment if the acquirer proves that the person demanding return of the property had knowledge of the absence of an obligation or had provided the property for charitable purposes. 29.  Paragraph 4 provides that the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency is responsible for taking the plots of land and real estate, for drawing up price offers to proprietors, and for the supervision and implementation of payment of compensation for expropriation of property. 30.  For the purpose of implementation of construction projects in Yerevan, the Government decided to designate real estate (plots of land, buildings and constructions) situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan as expropriation zones, to be taken for the needs of the State, with a total area of 345,000 square metres.", "references": ["8", "6", "0", "2", "5", "3", "7", "4", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in St Petersburg. 6.  In 1972 the applicant\u2019s grandmother M. was provided with a flat under a social tenancy agreement. Her son, the applicant\u2019s uncle, lived in the flat until his death in November 1998. 7.  In 1995 the applicant\u2019s uncle admitted that he was the father of a newborn baby boy A., whose mother was G., and at his request the boy was registered as living in the flat as the grandson of M. 8.  In November 1998 the applicant\u2019s uncle died. 9.  In December 1998 the applicant moved into the flat with her grandmother and, with the written consent of her grandmother, the authorities registered her as living in the flat as M.\u2019s granddaughter. 10.  In October 2004 the applicant and her grandmother brought court proceedings against G., as she was the legal representative of A., who was a minor. Their statement of claim, as far as relevant, read as follows:\n\u201cMy son, Moshkin Yuriy ..., had close relations with the defendant [G.]. In May 1995 she [G.] gave birth to a baby boy, A. Moshkin Yu. M. acknowledged his paternity in respect of his son A., and registered him as living in our dwelling. A., a minor, never moved into our flat, since his mother, the defendant in the present case, lives in a neighbouring apartment building in a three-room flat, together with her parents. ...\nMoshkin Yuriy, the father of A., a minor, died in November 1998.\nThe charges for the flat increase every year. We, the claimants, have an income which is below the minimum wage. I have been classed as having a second-degree disability, whereas Ansimova Dinara [the applicant] is a student...\nThe defendant does not pay communal charges for her son, who is registered as living in the flat...\nTaking into account that A., a minor born in 1995, was registered as living in our dwelling but never moved in, he has not acquired any right to those living premises, since registration is an administrative act.\nIn accordance with Article 20 of the Civil Code, the place of residence of minors under the age of 14 is the place of residence of their legal representatives \u2013 their parents. A., born in 1995, has acquired a right to the living premises where his mother [G.] lives...\u201d 11.  The applicant and her grandmother asked the court to declare that G.\u2019s son had not acquired any right to use the flat. Later, they submitted additional claims, seeking to recover from G. the amounts they had paid for communal charges. In particular, they submitted that G. had started paying charges in April 2005, after they had brought court proceedings against her. They also submitted that they had already accumulated debts for communal charges. 12.  G. brought a counterclaim against the applicant and her grandmother, seeking the applicant\u2019s eviction from the flat. She submitted in particular that after the death of her son\u2019s father, the applicant, who had been living in the flat, and her grandmother had changed the locks and had not let her and her son into the flat. She submitted that in 2003 she had got married and that she and her son were now living in her husband\u2019s flat. 13.  In October 2005 the applicant\u2019s grandmother died. Following her death, the applicant amended her claims. She asked the court to acknowledge that she was the tenant of the flat and to oblige the district administration to conclude a social tenancy agreement with her. The applicant submitted the following arguments in support of her claims.\n(a)  She had been living in the flat with her grandmother since 1984 and since 1998 had been registered there as M.\u2019s granddaughter. They had lived as a family in a shared household, and she had taken care of her grandmother. On several occasions the authorities had acknowledged that she and her grandmother were a low-income family, and had awarded them a housing allowance.\n(b)  She had renovated the flat at her own expense.\n(c)  G.\u2019s son had been registered as living in the flat, but had never lived there. He had always lived with G. in the three-room flat which she owned.\n(d)  G. had not been paying her son\u2019s share of the charges for the flat. 14.  G. also submitted additional claims, seeking to have her son\u2019s entitlement to the flat acknowledged and asking for the applicant to be deregistered from the flat. This time, G. submitted that the applicant had never moved into the flat and had never lived there. 15.  On 25 April 2007 the Nevskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction from the flat. The District Court further held that G.\u2019s son had a right of occupation and that the district administration had to conclude a social tenancy agreement with him. 16.  On 19 July 2007 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) quashed the judgment of 25 April 2007 as regards the part concerning the applicant\u2019s eviction and the obligation on the district administration to conclude a social tenancy agreement with G.\u2019s son. The matter was remitted to the District Court for fresh examination. The City Court held in particular that, in coming to the conclusion that the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the flat as a family member of her grandmother and in taking a decision to evict the applicant, the District Court had not made any assessment of the fact that the applicant\u2019s grandmother had initially brought the court proceedings together with the applicant and had never challenged the applicant\u2019s right to occupy the flat. The City Court also pointed out that the District Court had not assessed other evidence submitted by the applicant confirming that she had carried out repair and decoration works in the flat, photographs of the applicant with her grandmother which had been taken in the disputed flat, or other evidence submitted by the applicant. 17.  On 5 March 2008 the District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction, following a fresh examination. The District Court found, with reference to Articles 53 and 54 of the Housing Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below) that both the applicant and G.\u2019s son were registered as living in the flat as the grandchildren of M., the previous tenant. The court considered that G. had proved that her son had moved into the flat and had lived there for some time, but had not been able to move back because the applicant had not let him in. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the flat as her grandmother\u2019s family member and had shared the same household and taken care of her. The court concluded that the applicant had to be evicted from the flat without being provided with alternative accommodation. 18.  The applicant appealed against that judgment. She submitted in particular that the District Court had not made any assessment of the fact that she and her grandmother had initially brought court proceedings together as members of the same family, and that her grandmother had never challenged her right to occupy the flat. Nor had the District Court taken into account her submissions that she had been living in the flat in question since childhood, that her grandmother had asked the authorities to register her as living in the flat, and that in 2000 and 2001 the welfare authorities had declared that they were a poor family. A., a minor, had always lived with his mother G. in a three-room flat which G. owned. 19.  On 19 June 2008 the City Court upheld that judgment. The City Court held in particular that in taking its decision in the case, the court of first instance had assessed all the evidence in the case, including the witness testimony, and had reasonably indicated that A. had acquired the right to use the disputed living premises because he had been moved into the flat as a tenant\u2019s family member in accordance with the procedure provided for by law. Therefore, the court of first instance had come to the right conclusion that the claims brought by G., the mother of A., had to be granted. The City Court agreed with the conclusion of the court of first instance that the applicant\u2019s claims had to be dismissed because the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the disputed flat and had shared the same household as the tenant, M., her grandmother. Her registration as living in that flat had been of an administrative nature and had not provided her with any right to live there. In such circumstances, the judgment of the court of first instance had been lawful and duly reasoned. The City Court further held that the grounds of the applicant\u2019s appeal had aimed to reassess the evidence in the case, and that, given the fresh conclusion that the court of first instance had duly assessed the evidence before it, those grounds could not serve as a basis for quashing the judgment. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant was evicted from the flat. 21.  In January 2009 the administration of the Nevskiy District of St Petersburg concluded a social tenancy agreement with A. in respect of the flat in question. 22.  On 17 February 2009 the applicant was registered as living in a communal flat in which her husband owned a room. 23.  On 30 December 2009 the flat from which the applicant had been evicted was transferred to A. by way of privatisation. 24.  On 31 December 2009 the applicant, her husband and her daughter were placed on the municipal housing list as persons in need of housing.", "references": ["2", "9", "5", "8", "0", "6", "3", "1", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Morozivka. 5.  On 20 September 2007 the applicant, who was head of the Brusyliv District State Administration of Zhytomyr Region at the time, was arrested on charges of bribery. 6.  On 21 September 2007 the investigator applied to the court for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The application indicated that the applicant had been accused with a serious crime punished up to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment, and that he could try to abscond from justice, obstruct the investigation, and continue his criminal activities. On the same day the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court reiterated the reasons mentioned in the investigator\u2019s application without providing further details in that regard. 7.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation the applicant\u2019s detention was extended a number of times, including on 15 November 2007, 17 January 2008 and 19 March 2008. The reasons for extending the applicant\u2019s detention were the need to take additional investigative and procedural steps and the fact that there were no grounds to change the preventive measure. No further details were provided in that regard. 8.  On 19 May, 17 June, 26 June, 29 July and 7 August 2008 the courts further extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, basing their decisions, in addition to the previously mentioned grounds (see paragraph 7 above), on the need for him to familiarise himself with the case file. 9.  In the course of reviewing the extension of his detention on 24 September 2007, 8 January, 19 March and 7 August 2008, the applicant raised objections arguing, in particular, that his state of health had been unsatisfactory, that he had a stable family relationship, and that he had not absconded from justice. It appears from the relevant decisions that his arguments were not addressed by the courts. 10.  On 3 October 2008 the Malyn District Court of Zhytomyr Region (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) committed the applicant for trial. The trial court maintained the custodial preventive measure, providing no reasons for that decision and setting no time-limit. 11.  In the course of the trial the applicant applied eleven times to change the preventive measure to a non-custodial one. He stated that his state of health had been unsatisfactory, that his relatives were ready to make the necessary payment of bail, and that a number of individuals, including a member of parliament and State officials, had provided personal guarantees securing his presence during the trial. The trial court rejected those requests, giving similar reasons to those given at the initial stage (see paragraph 6 above). The court further stated that the applicant had been provided with the necessary medical treatment in detention and that his state of health did not warrant his release. 12.  On 16 July 2010 the court found the applicant guilty of bribery and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment, confiscated half of his property and banned him from occupying posts in State bodies and local authorities for three years. On 1 December 2010 and 19 May 2011 respectively the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal and the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters upheld that judgment with minor amendments. 13.  According to the material in the case file, the applicant has suffered from varicose dilatation (\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0437\u0448\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0432\u0435\u043d) since 1980. According to the Government, the applicant was diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs as early as in 1984. 14.  On 18 October 2007 the applicant was placed in the Kyiv pre-trial detention centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant was transferred between different detention facilities. 15.  It was concluded in a forensic examination carried out on 16 January 2008 at the request of the investigator that the applicant had a number of endocrine, heart, venous, neurologic, and digestive conditions. In particular, he was diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs and chronic venous insufficiency of the lower limbs with trophic disorders. The forensic experts concluded that the applicant required elective surgery in respect of the varicose dilatation, and outpatient treatment in respect of the other conditions. 16.  Overall, in the course of his detention the applicant was recommended surgery six times in respect of the varicose dilatation, on 16 January 2008, 5 May 2008, 23 October 2008, 18 March 2009, 22 July 2009 and 18 March 2010. 17.  On 8 April 2009 the applicant was recognised as falling into the \u201cthird category\u201d (the mildest category) of disability (\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u0456\u043d\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456). 18.  On 22 April 2009 the SIZO informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that he had been diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs, third degree chronic venous insufficiency of the lower left limb, second degree chronic venous insufficiency of the lower right limb, hypothalamic dysfunction, impaired glucose tolerance, first degree diffuse non-toxic goiter (an enlarged thyroid) and a chronic trophic ulcer on the left shin. It was specified that the recommended surgical treatment in respect of the varicose dilatation was not available in the SIZO. 19.  On 12 October and 19 November 2009 the SIZO issued another reply to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, stating that it had been recommended that the applicant undergo surgical treatment in respect of his progressing varicose dilatation. This type of treatment could not be carried out within the SIZO, and its medical staff were not in a position to foresee the consequences of the refusal to provide him with surgical treatment. 20.  On 15 February 2013 the applicant consulted a specialist in therapeutics, who recommended that he undergo further examination and treatment at a medical facility within the penal system. On 18 February 2013 the applicant refused that offer, insisting that he needed highly qualified medical assistance in specialist civilian medical institutions. 21.  There is no information in the case file regarding whether the applicant received any medical care after the above-mentioned refusal. 22.  On 18 November 2013 the applicant was dispensed from serving the remainder of his sentence pursuant to a decision of the local court of 8 November 2013 altering his imprisonment to correctional labour. 23.  On 28 November 2013 the applicant underwent surgery on his lower limbs. 24.  On 20 January 2014 he was recognised as falling into the \u201csecond category\u201d (more advanced category) of disability (\u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u0456\u043d\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456). 25.  According to the available information, from November 2007 to February 2013 the applicant consulted a surgeon thirteen times in respect of the varicose dilatation. Outpatient medical treatment was prescribed to him. From 21 March to 5 May and from 23 October to 17 November 2008 he underwent outpatient medical treatment both within the SIZO and at a civilian hospital.", "references": ["5", "7", "6", "4", "0", "8", "1", "9", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1966 and is serving a prison sentence in correctional facility IK-8 in the Khabarovsk region. The second applicant was born in 1967 and is serving a prison sentence in correctional facility IK\u201110 in the Sverdlovsk region. 5.  The applicants were arrested at 6 a.m. (the first applicant) and 7 a.m. (the second applicant) on 19 March 2007 on suspicion of having committed murder and taken to the Department for Combating Organised Crime at the Voronezh regional police department (\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0413\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438, the \u201cUBOP\u201d). Their arrest records were drawn up at 8.40 a.m. and 9 a.m., respectively. 6.  According to the applicants, S., G. and other police officers from the UBOP (according to the second applicant, in the presence of investigator M.) subjected them to violence in different offices at the UBOP premises in order to make them confess to various crimes. The applicants described being administered electric shocks through wires attached to various parts of their bodies, including ears and genitals, while gas masks were put over their heads, their hands were shackled behind their backs and several police officers restrained them on the floor in order not to let them throw the wires off. The police officers pushed on the handcuffs. The first applicant also described being punched and kicked. The applicants did not give any self\u2011incriminating statements. 7.  At around 10 p.m. the applicants were taken to a temporary detention facility at the Voronezh regional police department (the \u201cIVS\u201d). 8.  The IVS duty officer in the presence of police officer S. recorded the following injuries on the first applicant: bruises on the bridge of the nose, under both eyes, on the left shoulder blade, right shoulder and stomach, abrasions on the wrists, and an abrasion and a bruise on the buttocks. An ambulance was called. The ambulance medical assistant recorded an abrasion and bruising to the applicant\u2019s right wrist and directed the applicant to an emergency hospital where he was diagnosed with contusion to the soft tissues of the right wrist. It was noted that he had abrasions and bruising to the right wrist, which was swallowed and hot. 9.  On 22 March 2007 the first applicant was transferred to pre-trial detention facility SIZO-1 in Voronezh, where the following injuries were recorded on him: bruises on both forearms, abrasions on both wrist joints, and small abrasions under thin scabs below the skin level on the left wrist, the right hip and shank. According to SIZO-1, the second applicant had no visible injuries on his arrival there on 23 March 2007. 10.  On 23 March 2007 an investigator of the Voronezh regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the applicants\u2019 forensic medical examination with a view to establishing the presence of injuries, stating that the applicants had been arrested on 19 March 2007 and asking whether injuries, if any, could have been self-inflicted or caused as a result of a fall. 11.  On the same day the second applicant was examined at the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Examination Bureau. Expert Sh. recorded the following injuries on him: a bruise in the area around each wrist joint measuring 13 to 0.4-0.5 centimetres; a bruise on the right shank measuring 3.5 to 2.5 centimetres; a stripe-shaped abrasion on the left forearm measuring 2.2 centimetres with uneven edges and a firm reddish-brown surface at the skin level; and small abrasions on each wrist measuring 0.2 to 0.4 centimetres and on the left shank measuring 0.3 to 0.7 centimetres of an irregular\u2011oval shape with uneven edges and firm reddish surface at or below the skin level. 12.  The expert concluded that \u201cthe injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object, as confirmed by bruises and abrasions\u201d, not earlier than three\u2011five days before the examination (three days as regards the injuries on the wrist joints); that it was unlikely that they could have originated from a fall and that self-harm was not excluded. 13.  According to the expert\u2019s report of 23 March 2007, the second applicant\u2019s examination was conducted in the presence of police officer S. and the applicant stated that police officers had not inflicted any injuries on him. According to the second applicant, his examination was conducted in the presence of S. and other police officers who had subjected him to violence and he feared for his safety; he was not able to fully undress himself for the examination; and the expert did not ask him any questions. 14.  On 27 March 2007 the first applicant was examined at the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Examination Bureau by the same expert who recorded the following injuries on him: a wound on the right wrist joint measuring 1.4 to 0.4 centimetres, of an irregular-oval shape, with uneven edges and rounded ends, under firm brownish scab rising over the skin level; an abrasion on the left wrist joint measuring 1.4 to 0.8 centimetres, of an irregular-oval shape, under firm brownish scab entirely coming off here and there; stripe-shaped abrasions on the wrists under firm brownish scabs entirely coming off here and there, measuring 3.5 to 0.4 centimetres (on the front side of the right wrist joint), 5.5 to 0.4 centimetres (on the back side of the right wrist joint) and 3.7 to 0.4 centimetres (on the back side of the left wrist joint). 15.  The expert concluded that the injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object, as confirmed by their nature, shortly before the examination, possibly at the time as indicated in the investigator\u2019s decision ordering the examination. The expert excluded a fall as the origin of the injuries, while not ruling out self\u2011harm. 16.  According to the expert\u2019s report of 27 March 2007, the first applicant\u2019s examination was conducted in the presence of police officer S. and the applicant stated that on 19 March 2007 after his arrest police officers had punched him in the area of the stomach and the arms, had handcuffed him and tortured him with electric current. 17.  Following the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 March 2007, expert Sh. issued an additional report of 26 April 2007, prepared without the first applicant\u2019s examination, in which she stated that the first applicant\u2019s wrist injuries could have been caused by handcuffs with further squeezing, approximately 7-11 days before the applicant\u2019s examination on 27 March 2007. 18.  On 24 February 2011 a new report by the forensic medical expert was issued, on the basis of the two previous reports and the first applicant\u2019s medical records from the IVS and SIZO-1. The expert concluded that the injuries to the first applicant\u2019s wrists could have been inflicted on 19 March 2007. Their infliction on 16\u201118 March 2007 could not also be excluded. The lack of details in the description of the injuries recorded at the IVS made it impossible to determine the time of their infliction. As regards the injuries recorded at SIZO-1, they could have been inflicted on 19 March 2007 and very unlikely prior to that date. The injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object. The expert did not find it possible to give an opinion as to whether the injures could have been inflicted by electric current. The applicant had received at least one traumatic impact to his face and no less than three traumatic impacts to his torso. The expert found it difficult to determine the number of traumatic impacts to the applicant\u2019s upper and lower limbs in view of the multiplicity of the injuries. The injuries were located within the reach of the first applicant\u2019s own hand (except for the bruise on the left shoulder blade) and could have therefore been self\u2011inflicted. They could not have originated from a fall. 19.  On 25 and 30 March 2007 the first applicant complained about the violence he had allegedly suffered at the hands of the police officers at the UBOP to the Voronezh regional prosecutor\u2019s office. On 9 April 2007 his complaint was received by the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh. Similar complaints were lodged by his wife with the Voronezh regional police department and prosecutor\u2019s office and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. 20.  No criminal case was opened into his alleged ill-treatment. Investigators from the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh, and later from the investigative committee unit for the Leninskiy district of Voronezh, conducted pre\u2011investigation inquiries and issued seven refusals to bring criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of crimes under Articles 286 \u00a7 3 (abuse of powers with use of violence) and 302 (coercion to give statements) of the Criminal Code in the actions of police officers S. and G., pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d). All refusals were annulled by the investigators\u2019 superiors because they were based on incomplete inquiries and additional inquiries were ordered:\n-  refusal of 20 April 2007, annulled on 19 September 2007;\n-  refusal of 29 September 2007, annulled on 2 October 2007;\n-  refusal of 12 October 2007, annulled on 28 November 2007;\n-  refusal of 10 December 2007, annulled on 15 January 2008;\n-  refusal of 25 January 2008, annulled on 11 February 2011;\n-  refusal of 24 February 2011, annulled on 15 April 2011;\n-  refusal of 28 April 2011, annulled on 6 July 2011; and\n-  refusal of 8 July 2011 (on the grounds that the injuries could have been inflicted before the first applicant\u2019s arrest and that the applicant had no injuries which could have been inflicted by electric current), annulled on 28 August 2015 (because the investigator failed, inter alia, to identify all police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant). 21.  The following explanations were received by the investigators in the course of the pre-investigation inquiries. Witness B. stated to have seen that a blow \u201cin the area of the ribs\u201d had been delivered to the first applicant at the UBOP premises and to have heard the first applicant screaming in one of the UBOP offices. According to the first applicant\u2019s wife who witnessed the applicant\u2019s arrest at their home, the first applicant had no injuries before his arrest and he had injuries \u2013 he was limping and had a bruise under the right eye, an abrasion on the bridge of the nose and swallowed hands \u2013 next day when she saw him at the court hearing concerning his detention on remand. Police officers S. and G. stated that after arresting the applicant they had taken him to the UBOP premises where investigator M. had drawn up the record of his arrest. Then they had taken the first applicant to the IVS. At the IVS the first applicant had complained that handcuffs (used when taking him to the IVS) had chafed his hands and they had taken him to an emergency hospital where a doctor had disinfected a scratch on his wrist. They denied, as did investigator M., the first applicant\u2019 ill-treatment. 22.  The first applicant\u2019s appeals under Article 125 of the CCrP against the refusals to bring criminal proceedings of 20 April 2007, 12 October 2007, 10 December 2007, 24 February 2011, 28 April 2011 and 8 July 2011 were not examined by the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh on the grounds that the impugned decisions had been annulled by the investigative authorities (after court appeals had been lodged). The applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings of 25 January 2008 was examined and dismissed on the grounds that the refusal was reasoned and lawful (the District Court\u2019s decision of 18 March 2008, upheld by the Voronezh Regional Court on 15 May 2008). 23.  On 14 August 2007 the second applicant complained about his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the UBOP police officers to the Voronezh regional prosecutor\u2019s office. When describing tortures by electric current he noted, in particular, that in order to keep the wires attached to his body the police officers had put them under the gas mask, under the elastics of the socks, and had tied them to the penis. No criminal case was opened into his alleged ill\u2011treatment.  Investigators from the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh, and later from the investigative committee unit for the Leninskiy district of Voronezh, issued four refusals to bring criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 (abuse of powers) of the Criminal Code in the actions of police officers S. and G. and investigator M., pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of CCrP. All refusals were annulled by the investigators\u2019 superiors because they were based on incomplete inquiries and additional inquiries were ordered:\n-  refusal of 1 October 2007, revoked on 24 October 2007;\n-  refusal of 6 November 2007, revoked on 16 November 2007;\n-  refusal of 26 November 2007, revoked on 27 November 2007; and\n-  refusal of 7 December 2007, revoked on 28 August 2015 (on the grounds, inter alia, that the information about the lack of injuries on the second applicant on his arrival to SIZO-1 on 23 March 2007 had not been supported by medical and other relevant documents). 24.  The refusals to institute criminal proceedings were based on explanations by police officers S. and G. and investigator M. denying the second applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, and explanations allegedly received over phone from expert Sh. that the second applicant\u2019s injuries could not have been inflicted by electric current. The investigating authorities concluded that the second applicant\u2019s allegations were unfounded. 25.  On 14 February 2008 the District Court rejected the second applicant\u2019s appeal under Article 125 of the CCrP against the decision of 7 December 2007. On 1 April 2008 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision. 26.  On 20 March 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh examined in different proceedings an investigator\u2019s request that the applicants be detained on remand on the grounds of the gravity of the crime of which they were suspected (murder) and resultant risks of their absconding, re-offending, threatening witnesses, victims and other participants to the proceedings, destroying evidence and otherwise hindering the criminal proceedings. The applicants and their lawyers objected, referring to the applicants\u2019 permanent places of residence, the hypothetical nature of the investigator\u2019s arguments and, in the first applicant\u2019s case, to his employment and family ties. The court ordered the applicants\u2019 detention, being satisfied that the applicants \u2013 suspected of the particularly grave crime punishable by long terms of deprivation of liberty \u2013 might re-offend, exert pressure on their potential accomplices and abscond, if at large. 27.  On 28 March 2007 the applicants were accused of robbery committed in September 2001 and theft. They were also suspected of having committed a number of other robberies and thefts as part of an organised group. The investigator advanced reasons for the extension of the applicants\u2019 detention on remand similar to those in his initial request. In its decisions of 17 May 2007 (concerning both applicants, upheld on appeal by the Voronezh Regional Court on 5 June 2007), 8 June 2007 (concerning the second applicant, upheld on appeal on 3 July 2007), 9 June 2007 (concerning the first applicant, upheld on appeal on 26 June 2007) and 6 September and 12 December 2007 (concerning the second applicant, the latter decision upheld on appeal on 17 January 2008) the District Court, after hearing the applicants and their lawyers who maintained their objections, granted the investigator\u2019s requests and extended the applicants\u2019 detention, stating that they were accused of the grave crimes and the grounds for the court\u2019s initial decision to remand them in custody had not changed. 28.  Essentially the same reasoning can be found in the court\u2019s decision of 14 September 2007 (concerning the first applicant) which was taken in the presence of the investigator and prosecutor and in the first applicant\u2019s absence due to his \u201chealth condition\u201d. In his appeal against that decision the first applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that on 14 September 2007 the first applicant had been taken to the hearing from his detention facility, he had felt unwell in the courthouse and an ambulance had been called. According to the ambulance records, the applicant had pain in the stomach, was diagnosed with rupture, was provided with medical assistance and required hospitalisation, which was refused. According to the lawyer, hospitalisation had been refused by the investigator who had ordered that the applicant be taken back to the detention facility. Despite the lawyer\u2019s objections to holding the hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence, the court had decided to proceed with the hearing. The lawyer had allegedly left the courtroom in protest. 29.  On 11 October 2007 the Regional Court, after hearing the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the prosecutor, upheld the decision of 14 September 2007, holding that the District Court had taken into account the gravity of the offences incriminated to the applicant, his personality and the lack of grounds for the change of the preventive measure. It noted that according to the District Court\u2019s records of the hearing the applicant\u2019s lawyer had been present. 30.  On 12 December 2007 the District Court, having heard the applicants and their lawyers, extended the applicants\u2019 detention until 16 March 2008. In addition to the gravity of crimes and the alleged corresponding risks of the applicants absconding, re-offending and influencing victims and witnesses, it noted that the investigator had to finalise important investigative measures, such as the additional questioning of victims, psychological expert examinations of the accused and bringing final charges against the applicants and their co\u2011accused. On 17 January 2008 the Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. 31.  In its decisions for extension of the applicants\u2019 detention of 6 March (concerning both applicants), 17 March 2008 (concerning the first applicant, upheld by the Supreme Court of Russia on 20 May 2008) and 18 March 2008 (concerning the second applicant, upheld on appeal on 20 May 2008) the Voronezh Regional Court relied on the gravity of multiple crimes of which the applicants stood accused (including banditry according to final charges), the risk of their re\u2011offending and the need to finalise investigative activities involving 36 victims and eight accused and their lawyers. It also noted complaints by the applicants\u2019 co\u2011accused V.Z. and A.S. that the first applicant had allegedly threatened them with physical retaliation. In his appeal against those decisions the first applicant\u2019s lawyer noted that the complaints by V.Z. and A.S. had not been read out and examined at the hearing, that they appeared to be meaningless in view of the fact that V.Z. and A.S. had themselves been detained pending trial and that the first applicant had lodged a counter-complaint with the police that they had slandered him. According to the first applicant, V.Z. and A.S. had not confirmed their complaints in the course of the relevant inquiry. In upholding the Regional Court\u2019s decisions the Supreme Court did not address the arguments concerning the complaints by V.Z. and A.S. The Regional Court further issued detention extension orders similar to the previous orders on 11 June 2008 (concerning the first applicant, upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 11 September 2008) and 16 June 2008 (concerning the second applicant). 32.  On 16 September 2008 the Regional Court held a preliminary hearing in the case against the applicants and others. In a grouped decision the court ordered that the applicants and other defendants should remain in custody pending trial, stating in general that it had no reasons to consider that the previous grounds for their detention were no longer valid or that a change in preventive measures was warranted. On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 16 September 2008 on appeal. Essentially the same reasons were relied on in extending the applicants\u2019 detention in the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 25 February 2009, upheld on 10 June 2009 by the Supreme Court, which noted, without providing any details, that some victims in the case had expressed fears for their safety and that some defendants had abused their rights delaying the proceedings. 33.  The applicants\u2019 detention was further extended pending trial for essentially the same reasons by the Regional Court\u2019s decisions of 22 May 2009, 25 August 2009, 23 November 2009 (upheld by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2010) and 19 February 2010 (upheld on 27 July 2010). The reasoning in these grouped decisions concerning several defendants comprised (without indicating whom of the defendants it concerned) a reference to victims Kh., S. and Z. who had objected to the defendants\u2019 release fearing for their and their families\u2019 safety (the Government also referred to victims A.G., V.G. and M.; the first applicant noted that those victims, not mentioned in the courts\u2019 decisions, had acknowledged at the trial that they had actually not received any threats from the defendants), the first applicant\u2019s criminal records, the defendants\u2019 abuse of their rights by submitting multiple requests the majority of which had been rejected and the resultant protraction of the proceedings and the risk of the defendants exerting pressure on jurors. It was noted that identification parades at the preliminary investigation had been conducted in a way that the visualisation of some victims by the accused had been excluded, in order to ensure the victims\u2019 safety. According to the first applicant, it was not shown that this had been requested by the victims. The Regional Court also referred to alleged pressure on a co\u2011accused and witnesses by the first applicant by way of written instructions as to what statements to give at the trial. The first applicant disputed those allegations and unsuccessfully requested an expert opinion as to whether the instructions had been written by him. 34.  The applicants\u2019 case was examined in a jury trial. At the preliminary hearing the Voronezh Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 and their co\u2011defendants\u2019 complaints that they had been subjected to violence by the UBOP officers. The trial court heard, among others, witness R.D. who stated to have been subjected to violence, including electric shocks, by police officers S. and G. in the presence of investigator M. Witness B. stated that he had been taken to one of the UBOP offices where the first applicant was lying on the floor face down. Police officers had threatened B. to do the same to his son (the applicants\u2019 co-accused) if B. would not write statements under their instructions. B. had seen that they had pushed on the shackles on the first applicant\u2019s hands. According to written statements by one of the applicants\u2019 co-defendants, V.Z., of 8 April 2008, and by a detainee in SIZO\u20111, V.A.Z., of 7 April 2008 (submitted to the Court by the second applicant), V.Z. and V.A.Z. had allegedly been subjected to violence, including electric shocks, by the UBOP officers in 2007. 35.  Following a jury verdict of 1 December 2010, the Regional Court in a judgment of 29 December 2010 convicted the applicants of banditry (Article 209 of the Criminal Code), several accounts of theft and robbery, murder and illegal use of weapons, and sentenced the first applicant to twenty-four years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine and the second applicant to twenty-two years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 36.  On 23 August 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the judgment in respect of the first applicant and remitted his case to the trial court for a fresh examination from the moment following the jury verdict, extending his detention on remand until 23 November 2011. It upheld the judgment in respect of the second applicant. 37.  On 17 October 2011 the Regional Court convicted the first applicant of banditry (Article 209 of the Criminal Code), several accounts of theft and robbery, murder and illegal use of weapons, and sentenced him to twenty\u2011five years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. On 29 March 2012 the Supreme Court amended the judgment of 17 October 2011 by, inter alia, reducing the first applicant\u2019s sentence to twenty-four years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine and upheld the judgment in the remaining part. 38.  According to a certificate of 27 August 2015 of SIZO-3 in the Voronezh region of the Russian Federal Penal Authority (\u00ab\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439\u00bb, \u201cthe FSIN\u201d) submitted by the Government, the first applicant was held in SIZO-3 alone in cell no. 26 from 20 May 2009 to 29 November 2010, and alone in cell no. 3 from 29 November 2010 to 20 May 2012. The first applicant\u2019s detention in SIZO\u20113 in the Voronezh region from 20 May 2009 to 20 May 2012 is also confirmed by a certificate of 28 August 2015 of medical unit no. 10 of medical-sanitary department no. 36 of the FSIN. 39.  According to a certificate of 8 September 2015 of SIZO-3 and logs of dates of \u201cindividual consultations and psycho\u2011correctional work\u201d submitted by the Government, the first applicant received such consultations on the following dates: 16 June 2009; 28 April, and 2 and 9 December in 2010; 4 February, 11 March, 21 April, 29 September and 23 December in 2011; and 29 March and 5 May in 2012. According to the first applicant, he did not receive such consultations. On some of the dates indicated in the records submitted by the Government he participated in court hearings in his case or had access to the case\u2011file at the courthouse, and some records indicated cell no. 28 as the place of his detention while he was never held there. 40.  According to a certificate of 14 October 2015 from medical unit no. 5 of medical-sanitary department no. 27 of IK-8 (in the Khabarovsk region) addressed to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the first applicant\u2019s examination to determine his fitness for solitary confinement was not carried out. 41.  The first applicant had family visits on the following dates: 21 August, 11 and 25 September, and 6 November in 2009; 15 January, 5 February, 19 March, 16 April, 7 May, 4 June, 9 July, 16 August, 14 September, 17 November, and 3 and 28 December in 2010; 31 January, 21 March, 20 April, 16 May, 11 October, 8 November and 16 December in 2011; and 11 January and 16 May in 2012. 42.  On 15 June 2011 a deputy head of the FSIN Voronezh regional unit issued a report for determining a further place for the first applicant\u2019s detention. He stated that during his detention in SIZO-3 in Voronezh the first applicant had not committed disciplinary offences, had not entered into conflicts with the administration of the detention facility, and had been polite and tactful. However, he had shown himself as an adherent to the thieves\u2019 customs. That report was approved by the head of the operational department of the FSIN for the Voronezh region and by the head of the FSIN for the Voronezh region. 43.  On 30 June 2011 the head of the FSIN ordered that the first applicant further serve his sentence in the Khabarovsk region. 44.  On 19 March 2012 the first applicant requested the Head of the FSIN that he be allowed to serve his sentence in the Voronezh region where his family resided. On 27 April 2012 his request was refused pursuant to Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. 45.  In July 2012 the first applicant arrived at correctional facility IK-8 located in the Khabarovsk region. 46.  On 13 July 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh dismissed the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s appeal against the FSIN\u2019s decision, relying on Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. 47.  On 7 November 2012 the Kominternovskiy District Court of Voronezh dismissed the applicant\u2019s wife\u2019s similar appeal on the same ground. 48.  On 11 January 2013 the first applicant again requested the FSIN that he be transferred to the Voronezh region for serving his sentence. On 25 February 2013 his request was refused. In April 2013 the first applicant challenged the FSIN\u2019s refusal before the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. He complained, in particular, that his transfer to the remote correctional facility had made it impossible for him to have visits from his wife, two children and elderly disabled mother. On 19 July 2013 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint on the grounds that his transfer to the remote correctional facility did not contradict domestic law and that the hindrance of his family members\u2019 visits could not serve as a ground for transferring him to a similar correctional facility in his region. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 22 September 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on the same grounds, noting that the three\u2011month time\u2011limit to appeal against the FSIN\u2019s order had expired.", "references": ["9", "6", "5", "0", "3", "8", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Syria before he came to Russia in 2015. 8.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9.  On 23 March 2016 the applicant was arrested for violation of migration rules. On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk (\u201cthe district court\u201d) imposed an administrative fine on the applicant and ordered his administrative removal and detention until his removal. 10.  On 5 April 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya excluded the removal order from the administrative penalty imposed on him by the district court. 11.  On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 12.  On 3 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya re\u2011opened the applicant\u2019s case at the request of the migration official and sent it for re-examination to the district court. 13.  On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14.  On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff\u2019s request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((\u201cthe CAO\u201d), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant\u2019s lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that,\n\u201cthe grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant\u2019s] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO\u201d (see paragraph 22 below).\nAll these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 15.  On 17 May 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) examined the cassation appeal complaint of the applicant and reviewed the judgments issued in respect of his removal (see paragraph 13 above). The Supreme Court confirmed the judgments but discontinued the enforcement of administrative penalty in the form of the removal imposed on the applicant on 23 March 2016. The Supreme Court found that the applicant might be exposed to a risk of torture or ill-treatment in Syria in the event of his return there. On 2 June 2017 the applicant was released (after the decision entered into force). 16.  On 11 May 2016 the applicant\u2019s request for refugee status was dismissed. According to the applicant, he did not appeal against this decision because the migration authorities had convinced the applicant that \u201chis application for temporary asylum would be granted\u201d. 17.  On 4 July 2016 the applicant\u2019s request for temporary asylum was dismissed. 18.  On 25 November 2016 a second request lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum was denied by the migration authorities and the applicant did not lodge a complaint against this refusal. 19.  According to the information provided by the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "3", "4", "8", "1", "9", "No Label", "0", "2"], "gold": ["0", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and is serving a prison sentence in the Perm Region. 6.  The facts presented below are based on the official version of the events contained in the trial judgment of 25 July 2006. At the time, the applicant was a military deputy prosecutor. 7.  On 24 January 2000 someone broke into the applicant\u2019s flat and stole property belonging to him. The applicant suspected that the theft had been committed by K. He assigned a number of army privates to search for K. 8.  On 29 January 2000 the applicant together with a group of privates and a police officer, M., broke into a flat where K. was hiding. The applicant hit and questioned K. and the latter admitted that he had robbed the applicant\u2019s flat. The applicant and the privates took K. with them. 9.  On the same date, the applicant and M. went to see Kras. at his flat. The applicant asked for the ring that K. had stolen from his flat and sold to Kras. The applicant threatened the latter with a gun and Kras. gave the ring back to the applicant. 10.  In the subsequent days, the privates who were under the applicant\u2019s direct command repeatedly beat K. As a result, K. signed a note acknowledging his debt to the applicant. On several occasions the applicant met with K.\u2019s mother, asking her to repay K.\u2019s debt and threatening her with negative consequences for K. should she fail to comply. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant ordered the privates to beat up Sh., who had been detained as a suspect in a criminal case. The privates complied. 12.  On 26 April 2000 the applicant ordered the privates to beat up Chern., a witness in a criminal case who had refused to cooperate. The privates beat up Chern. The applicant was present and supervised the beatings. 13.  On 29 April 2000 the privates beat up B., another witness in a criminal case, on the applicant\u2019s order. The applicant was present and supervised the beatings. 14.  On 8 April 2000 the applicant had a fight with Sor. during which he stabbed him. Sor. died. The applicant panicked and hid Sor.\u2019s body in a forest nearby. The body was discovered in August 2000. 15.  On 25 July 2006 the Military Court of Garrison 101 found the applicant guilty of murder, extortion and four counts of abuse of power, and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court relied on forensic evidence and witnesses\u2019 statements. The majority of the witnesses were questioned in court. Five of them did not attend and the trial judge, R., read out their statements. 16.  The applicant appealed against his conviction. His main argument was that he had been wrongfully convicted. He claimed that the killing of Sor. had been justifiable as he had acted in self-defence; that he should have been acquitted of extortion; and that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had abused his power as regards the beatings of the suspects and witnesses. The applicant also claimed that, in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure, during the preparation of the verdict the trial judge had repeatedly left the deliberations room and that he had prepared the text of the verdict outside Perm where the trial had been held. The applicant relied on written statements made by his counsel, B., and by M., a retired serviceman. In particular, M. submitted that in July 2006, when Judge R. had been supposed to be drafting the judgment in the applicant\u2019s case, he had seen the judge in another town. The judge had talked openly about the applicant\u2019s trial, telling everyone that he would find the applicant guilty and sentence him to a long term of imprisonment. The applicant also complained that the trial court had failed to question five witnesses. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant retained counsel P. On 27 March and 17 April 2007 P. submitted twelve additional statements of appeal. The appeal court refused to accept them, holding that they had been submitted outside the time-limit, given that counsel P. had not submitted the original statement of appeal. 18.  Following the applicant\u2019s appeal, on 22 June 2007 the Military Court of the Third Circuit upheld his conviction in substance. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that the trial court had failed to question five witnesses, the court noted that three of them had been ill and had been unable to attend the hearing. The court made no comment as regards the remaining two witnesses. It also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning Judge R., holding as follows:\n\u201cThere is no evidence showing that [Judge R.] discussed with anyone any issue relating to the [applicant\u2019s case]. Nor does the case file contain any material confirming the [applicant\u2019s] allegations that [Judge R.] made statements in public about the verdict he was drafting ... The allegations made in the statements of appeal do not constitute such evidence either.\u201d 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a supervisory review of his conviction. He reiterated the arguments raised in his statement of appeal. 20.  On 26 January 2009 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a supervisory review and upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. The court discerned no violation of the rules of criminal procedure and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. 21.  On 23 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation noted that the applicant had not been notified of the date and time of the supervisory review hearing, quashed the judgment of 26 January 2009 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 22.  On 17 September 2009 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a new supervisory review of the applicant\u2019s conviction and upheld it. The court reiterated its earlier findings contained in the judgment of 26 January 2009. 23.  On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 17 September 2009 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration in view of the unlawful composition of the supervisory-review court. 24.  On 11 August 2010 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a new supervisory review of the applicant\u2019s conviction and upheld it. The Presidium ruled, inter alia, that the trial court\u2019s reliance on the witnesses\u2019 statements had been justified, given that those witnesses had been unable to attend the hearing and that their testimonies had not been the decisive or sole evidence in the applicant\u2019s case. The Presidium dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s argument that the trial judge had failed to comply with the applicable rules of criminal procedure when preparing his verdict. Lastly, the Presidium reiterated its earlier findings as regards the dismissal without consideration of the additional statements of appeal lodged by counsel P.", "references": ["2", "9", "4", "1", "6", "8", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently detained in Alytus Correctional Facility. 5.  The applicant was arrested on 3 June 2012 and transferred to Kaunas Remand Prison on 4 June 2012. On 5 June 2012 he was examined by a doctor (see paragraph 15 below). During that examination, the applicant did not indicate that he needed any special devices. 6.  On 26 November 2012 the applicant consulted a doctor and indicated that he had sleep apnoea and he wished to acquire a continuous positive airway pressure (hereinafter \u201cCPAP\u201d) device for its treatment. 7.  On 15 March 2013 a report was issued by a medical expert, indicating that the use of a CPAP device was the most effective way to treat sleep apnoea and that the applicant\u2019s condition was deteriorating because he had not been using a CPAP device. It also indicated that there was a risk of complications if the sleep apnoea was not treated properly. 8.  Between 12 and 17 September 2013 the applicant was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital. A doctor recommended that he continue using a CPAP device following his discharge from the hospital. 9.  On 19 September the applicant asked the prison administration to allow him to use a CPAP device. On 3 October 2013 the administration of Kaunas Remand Prison responded that under domestic law such a device was not among the items that could be given to detainees by their spouses or close relatives (see paragraph 14 below), but indicated that such an item could be purchased from the prison shop. The applicant then asked the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration to allow his relatives to give him the device. On 29 October 2013, this request was also refused, on the grounds that there were no indications in the applicant\u2019s medical history or in the document issued by the Prison Hospital that the applicant needed the device (see paragraph 16 below). 10.  On 20 October 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint before the domestic courts, which he specified on 19 February 2015. He asked the court to award him 86,800 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered in the period between 4 June 2012 and 20 October 2014. The applicant stated that while he had been detained in Kaunas Remand Prison, he had asked the prison administration to allow him to have a CPAP device to treat his sleep apnoea, as recommended to him by a doctor in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that the prison administration had refused to allow him to have such a device, and he had been experiencing serious health issues. 11.  On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint in part and awarded him EUR 1,100 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that the prison administration had failed to provide the applicant with the same level of healthcare available to persons who were not detained. It was clear from the case file that the applicant had twice asked the prison administration to allow him to purchase and use a CPAP device. The refusal of permission by the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration had been unfounded because there had been a recommendation issued by a doctor. The court held that the applicant had a right to compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage suffered from 3 October 2013 (when his request was refused by the prison administration \u2013 see paragraph 9 below) until 20 October 2014 and thus decided to award the applicant EUR 1,100 in this regard. The court also noted that there was no information in the case file to indicate that the applicant had not received appropriate healthcare in Kaunas Remand Prison. It stated that although the recommendation issued by the specialist contained a reference to possible complications, there was no information in the applicant\u2019s case file to show that the inability to use a CPAP device had had any negative consequences for his health. 12.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court. On 4 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety. 13.  On 12 July 2017 the applicant asked the Prison Department for a transfer to Alytus Correctional Facility from Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had been transferred on 20 March 2015. The applicant submitted that he had been serving his sentence in premises for disabled persons but that he could be transferred to the standard dormitory-type premises. On 2 August 2017 the applicant\u2019s request was allowed and he was transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility on 21 August 2017 where he was able to continue using his CPAP device.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "9", "5", "0", "7", "3", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant, Ms O.C.I., was born in 1978 and lives in Tulcea. In 2005 she married P.L.R., an Italian national. The couple lived together in Italy, where O.C.I. gave birth to their children: the second applicant, P.A.R., in 2008, and the third applicant, N.A.R., in 2010. 7.  On 12 June 2015 the family went to Romania for the summer holidays. A few days later P.L.R. returned to Italy, expecting to go back to collect the applicants at the end of summer. On 25 June 2015 the first applicant informed her husband that she and the children would no longer return to Italy. She said that she saw no future for them there. Moreover, she told P.L.R. that he was a bad father who mistreated his children. 8.  On 14 September 2015 P.L.R. lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant in Italy for child abduction in a foreign country. 9.  On 29 September 2015 P.L.R. applied to the Bucharest County Court for the return of the second and third applicants to Italy, the place of their habitual residence. He relied on the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d) and those of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (\u201cthe Brussels II bis Regulation\u201d). He contended that he had not agreed that the second and third applicants would remain permanently in Romania. In his view, the mother had unilaterally changed the children\u2019s residence which, he argued, constituted wrongful retention. 10.  The first applicant opposed the action. She alleged that P.L.R. was a violent father who often got angry with is children when they did not obey him. According to the first applicant, P.L.R. would beat up the children, bruising their faces and giving them nose bleeds. He would pull them by the ears, slap their faces and hit their bottoms. Sometimes he would undress them and beat their bodies with hard objects. He would also call them names and humiliate them. The violence had worsened in recent years and the first applicant had become a target as well. She had tried to intervene but to no avail. She had encouraged her husband to seek medical help for his behaviour, but he had refused. Eventually, the first applicant had decided to find refuge with the children in Romania. She submitted as evidence several recordings of discussions between the applicants and P.L.R. during their common life in Italy, showing episodes similar to those described above. 11.  The first applicant further explained that the children had become integrated in their new environment. They attended school in Romania and had made friends. They participated in after-school activities that they had always wanted to try but had in the past been denied by their father. She also explained that the children refused to speak with their father. They feared going back to Italy and being again subject to abuse. 12.  The County Court heard evidence from the parents (hearing of 27 September 2015) and interviewed the children in the presence of a psychologist (on 16 November 2015). 13.  In a judgment of 18 January 2016 the Bucharest County Court allowed the application for the return of the children to their habitual residence in Italy. It found that there was nothing to oppose the children\u2019s return to Italy. The court concluded that the mother had influenced the children against their father. It also considered that her decision to leave Italy had been made because of marital problems and because of her own dissatisfaction. As for the allegations that the children ran a grave risk of being exposed to physical or psychological harm at their father\u2019s hands, it found as follows:\n\u201cThe evidence in the file proves without doubt that the father used physical force and a raised voice to discipline his children. [P.L.R.] confirmed this in his statement before the court.\nThe child has the right to respect for his dignity, which entails prohibition under any circumstances of any act of physical or psychological violence against the child. It is therefore evident that nothing can justify a departure from this norm.\u201d 14.  The first applicant appealed, and in a final decision of 30 March 2017 the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld the order to return the children. The Court of Appeal considered that the existence of criminal proceedings against the first applicant in Italy did not constitute grounds for refusing the return. In fact, the Court reasoned, in accordance with the European arrest warrant procedure, a criminal sentence would have the same effect regardless of whether the first applicant lived in Romania or Italy.\nThe Court of Appeal reassessed the allegations of grave risk for the children in Italy and concluded as follows:\n\u201c... it cannot be inferred that occasional acts of violence such as those which were proved by the recordings adduced in the file, would reoccur often enough to pose a grave risk ... under Article 13 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Hague Convention ...\n... it is reasonable to expect that the Italian authorities would give the assurance that they would take the measures required by the [Brussels II bis Regulation], so that the aim of the Hague Convention would be observed, namely that a child is not removed or retained in the name of rights linked to his person which are to a larger or lesser extent debatable. It is also reasonable to suppose that if after the decision is rendered the children are exposed to a risk, [the Italian authorities] would take such requisite measures, if the risk was brought to their attention and supported by evidence.\u201d 15.  On 11 July 2017 P.L.R. started enforcement proceedings through the offices of a bailiff in Romania. 16.  On 28 September 2017 the bailiff together with P.L.R. and a psychologist from the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (\u201cthe child-protection authority\u201d) spoke with the children, with their mother\u2019s permission. It was noted that the children refused to go back to Italy with their father. Consequently, the child-protection authority sought a court order for a three-month psychological counselling programme for the children. On 7 December 2017 the Tulcea District Court granted the request. The enforcement proceedings were stayed during that period. 17.  A report of 29 May 2018 on the results of the counselling stated that the children refused contact with their father despite the first applicant\u2019s efforts to encourage that relationship. Therapy for the children was recommended. 18.  On 29 March 2018 P.L.R. sought enforcement in Romania of a Parma District Court order granting him sole parental authority. On 10 July 2018 the first applicant lodged an objection to the enforcement. On 13 July 2018 the court stayed the enforcement proceedings, at the first applicant\u2019s request, on the grounds that the children\u2019s refusal to go back to Italy with their father had already been established. 19.  It appears from the parties\u2019 observations that at least on 26 September 2018 (the date of the most recent relevant information) the applicants were still living in Romania.", "references": ["7", "3", "9", "1", "2", "5", "6", "0", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, who is an Uzbek national, was born in 1989. On an unspecified date in June 2012 he arrived in Russia from Uzbekistan. 6.  On 13 June 2013 the applicant was indicted for religious and politically motivated crimes in Uzbekistan, namely for the participation in an extremist religious organisation Islamic Movement of Turkistan. A search warrant in respect of him was issued and his pre-trial detention was ordered in absentia. 7.  On 24 November 2014 the Moscow Regional Court convicted the applicant of participating in an extremist organisation, forging official documents, and attempting an illegal crossing of the State border. He was transferred to a penal colony to serve his sentence, and his release date was set for 30 June 2016. 8.  On 13 May 2016 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 by the Uzbek authorities in the event of his transfer to Uzbekistan. On 27 May 2016 the migration authorities dismissed his request, referring to the fact that a crime had been committed in Russia. At the same time they informed him of the possibility to apply for temporary asylum. There is no information in the case file on whether the applicant lodged such a request or whether he appealed against the decision of 27 May 2016. 9.  On 2 October 2015, having regard to the applicant\u2019s conviction, the Ministry of Justice declared his presence in Russia undesirable. The applicant was notified of the decision on 13 November 2015. 10.  On 16 May 2016 the migration authorities in the Arkhangelsk Region ordered the applicant\u2019s deportation, referring to the above decision on the undesirability of his stay in Russia. The applicant lodged an objection to a higher administrative authority, without success. 11.  The applicant also challenged the decision of 16 May 2016 in court. In his submissions, he stated that he belonged to a vulnerable group and ran a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 by the Uzbek authorities and he also requested an interim measure that the removal be stayed. 12.  On 21 June 2016 by the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk denied the interim measure, stating that it would \u201cdisturb the balance of public and private interests\u201d. 13.  On 4 July 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk upheld the deportation decision. The court referred to: the applicant\u2019s conviction in Russia, negative character references from the penal colony, the charges against him in Uzbekistan, the international search warrant, the fact that the applicant had arrived in Russia in 2007 seeking employment, and the absence of any history of persecution or ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. The court dismissed references to reports on Uzbekistan as general and lacking a connection to the applicant\u2019s situation. It concluded that the claims concerning the above risks were speculative. 14.  On 13 October 2016 the above judgment was upheld on appeal by the Arkhangelsk Regional Court. 15.  On 28 June 2016 the applicant\u2019s request for an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was granted by the Court, and his removal was stayed for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. The Russian Government were immediately informed about the measure. They were also informed that failure by a Contracting State to comply with a measure indicated under Rule 39 might entail a breach of Article 34 of the Convention. 16.  On 30 June 2016, the day the applicant finished serving his sentence and was released from the penal colony in the Arkhangelsk Region, he was immediately arrested by the authorities without having had the chance to contact his lawyer, who was present outside the penal colony at that time. The applicant\u2019s representatives submit that they immediately verified with the Representative of the Russian Federation that the relevant authorities had been duly informed about the applied interim measure. The representatives also contacted the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the local police and the migration authorities, informing them about the above interim measure and requesting compliance with it. 17.  On the same day the applicant was taken to Arkhangelsk Airport, and he arrived at Moscow Domodedovo Airport on the morning of 1 July 2016. Between 9.49 a.m. and 12.28 p.m. the applicant\u2019s representative sent faxes to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Domodedovo Airport police station, informing them of the events and the fact that the interim measure had been indicated by the Court. 18.  According to the applicant\u2019s representatives, police officers at Domodedovo Airport informed them at 12.45 p.m. that they did not know where the applicant was or which flight he would be deported on. 19.  At 1.54 p.m. on 1 July 2016 the applicant was deported to Uzbekistan. 20.  On 13 July 2016, by letter, the Domodedovo Airport police station informed the applicant\u2019s representative of the deportation. The letter stated that the police officers had been unable to prevent it, since when \u201cthe police officers arrived at the parking position... the airplane was closed and was preparing for the take-off to the destination airport\u201d. 21.  On 14 July 2016 the applicant\u2019s representative asked the Investigative Committee to institute a criminal inquiry against the law\u2011enforcement agents who had enforced the deportation order, as well as the agents who had failed to prevent it. 22.  On 22 July and 7 October 2016 the Investigative Committee informed the applicant\u2019s representative that the request fell outside of its competence, and it was transferred to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 23.  On 26 July and 2 September 2016 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the applicant\u2019s representative that no extradition decision had been issued because the prosecution in respect of the charges in Uzbekistan was time-barred; and that they had been informed about the interim measure indicated by the Court only on 1 July 2016, after the deportation had taken place. 24.  Complaints against the decisions of 22 July and 7 October 2016 of the Investigative Committee were dismissed by the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow several times in 2016-2017, but each time, the lower court\u2019s judgments were annulled by the Moscow City Court and it ordered that the complaints should be reconsidered. On 27 October 2017 the district court dismissed the complaints once again. The applicant\u2019s representative appealed on 7 November 2017. The Court has not been informed about the outcome of those proceedings. 25.  Upon his arrival in Uzbekistan on 1 July 2016 the applicant was immediately arrested. On 7 January 2017 he was convicted and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment by the Qashqardarya Region Criminal Court. He is currently serving his sentence in penal colony 64/6 in Chirchiq. 26.  On 5 September 2017 the Court asked the applicant\u2019s representatives to provide information on whether they were still in contact with him and whether he wished to maintain his application. 27.  On 24 October 2017 the applicant\u2019s representative, Ms Trenina, informed the Court that she was still in contact with the applicant through his relatives and the lawyer representing him in Uzbekistan, and that he wished to maintain his application. In support of that assertion, she provided the following evidence:\n(a) a handwritten note (in Uzbek with a Russian translation) from the applicant\u2019s mother dated 28 September 2017 and addressed to Ms Trenina, which stated that the applicant had expressed his wish to maintain the application during a meeting which he had had with her in the penal colony;\n(b) a handwritten affidavit from the applicant dated 12 October 2017 and addressed to Ms Trenina, which stated that he wished to maintain his application, that he had been subjected to ill-treatment during the investigation in Uzbekistan, that he was being detained in inhuman conditions, that he had almost lost his eyesight, and that he had attempted to commit suicide while in detention;\n(c) a handwritten affidavit from the applicant dated 12 October 2017 and addressed to Ms Trenina, which described his deportation from Russia and specifically mentioned that he had been in contact with his representatives via telephone throughout the deportation procedure on 30 June and 1 July 2016, and that the law-enforcement agents carrying out the deportation had been repeatedly informed of the indication of the interim measure by the Court, but had chosen to ignore this information;\n(d) a report from Ms Rakhmatullayeva, the applicant\u2019s lawyer in Uzbekistan, dated 18 October 2017 and addressed to Ms Trenina, which stated that during a meeting in the penal colony \u2013 in the presence of an Uzbek law-enforcement agent \u2013 the applicant had confirmed both his wish to maintain his application, despite his apparent fear of reprisal from the Uzbek authorities, and the facts stated in the above-mentioned handwritten affidavits of 12 October 2017.", "references": ["9", "8", "7", "4", "6", "5", "0", "2", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Gda\u0144sk. 6.  On 9 June 2011 the Gda\u0144sk Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened an investigation (no. Ap V Ds 27/11) into the kidnapping of J.R. the previous day. The investigation was delegated to the Central Bureau of Investigation of the Police (\u201cthe CBI\u201d), Gda\u0144sk branch. The CBI is the unit of the police responsible for preventing and combatting organised crime. 7.  The kidnappers had demanded a ransom of 1,000,000 euros (EUR) from J.R.\u2019s husband. Part of the ransom was paid on 15 June 2011. It appears that the victim was freed on 16 June 2011. 8.  The CBI and the prosecutor obtained evidence relating to the applicant\u2019s phone calls and his connections to the mobile-phone network. On that basis, the police identified a number of possible suspects, including the applicant, among the friends of J.R.\u2019s family and employees of the family company. On 16 June 2011 the prosecutor ordered that the applicant and other suspects be arrested on suspicion of kidnapping. The applicant was arrested on 16 June and released on 18 June 2011 (see paragraphs 11 and 17 below). 9.  In the ensuing investigation, the police arrested the actual kidnappers. 10.  On 20 April 2012 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation against the applicant and other suspects, finding that they had not committed the alleged offence. The prosecutor noted that the evidence available on 16 June 2011 had justified the decision to arrest the applicant and other suspects. 11.  On 16 June 2011 at 7.40 p.m. the applicant was arrested at his friends\u2019 flat in Tczew on suspicion of kidnapping. The arrest was carried out by the anti-terrorist police squad assisted by the CBI officers. The applicant was taken to the CBI headquarters in Gda\u0144sk. 12.  According to the police record dated 16 June 2011, the applicant had the following injuries on admission to the police detention facility in Gdynia: bruising of the left cheek and abrasions on his arms and back. 13.  The following day the prosecutor charged the applicant with kidnapping and questioned him. The applicant and other suspects denied that they had been involved in the kidnapping. DNA tests had not confirmed the applicant\u2019s and the other suspects\u2019 involvement. 14.  According to the record of arrest (protok\u00f3\u0142 zatrzymania), the applicant did not ask for a medical examination. Nonetheless, the CBI arranged for him to have a medical examination at the hospital. 15.  According to a medical certificate issued by the Regional Specialist Hospital in Gda\u0144sk on 17 June 2011, the applicant complained that he had sustained injuries to his head, face and right arm during his arrest. An X-ray examination did not reveal any fractures. The certificate stated that the applicant\u2019s general condition was good and that he could take part in the investigation. The certificate further stated that the applicant was suffering from tenderness of his left temple (tkliwo\u015b\u0107 okolicy skroniowej lewej), swelling of the left side of his face with bruising (obrz\u0119k lewej cz\u0119\u015bci twarzy z podbiegni\u0119ciami krwawymi), and tenderness of his right arm and wrist. The final diagnosis established bruising on his face and right wrist (st\u0142uczenie twarzy i nadgarstka). 16.  On 17 June 2011 the applicant was also examined in the health centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration in Gda\u0144sk. He complained of pain in the left side of his face and the right wrist. An examination established significant swelling in the area of his left eye socket (silny obrz\u0119k w okolicy oczodo\u0142u lewego) and minor swelling of the right wrist. 17.  The applicant was released on 18 June 2011 at 10 a.m. 18.  On 27 June 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the participating police officers in connection with his arrest. He alleged that he had been ill-treated during his arrest and subsequently in police custody. The applicant attached a copy of the medical examination report of 17 June 2011 and photographs documenting his injuries. 19.  The applicant\u2019s criminal complaint was transferred to the Bydgoszcz Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office. On 27 July 2011 the Bydgoszcz Regional Prosecutor instituted an investigation into the allegation of abuse of power by the police officers under Article 231 of the Criminal Code. 20.  On the same day the applicant was heard by the prosecutor. He gave the following account: on 16 June 2011 he and his girlfriend had visited their friends, \u0141.W. and D.W., in their flat. A sister of D.W.\u2019s was present too. Between 6 and 7 p.m. the applicant had heard explosions. Shortly afterwards, a group of armed and masked police officers had stormed the flat. The applicant and others had followed the police orders to get down on the floor. The applicant had seen one of the police officers hit \u0141.W. in the face with a rifle and seen \u0141.W. bleeding. The other police officer had kicked the applicant in the face. The applicant had also been hit in the head, back and legs. Later, one of the officers had handcuffed him. The applicant alleged that subsequently an electrical discharge weapon, or Taser (paralizator elektryczny \u2013 hereinafter \u201cEDW\u201d) had been used on his back, buttocks, genitals and ears. One of the police officers had pressed the applicant\u2019s face into a pool of \u0141.W.\u2019s blood on the floor. When being taken to a police car he was suffocated. In the police car, an EDW was continually used on the applicant\u2019s back until he started suffocating. The applicant was taken to a police station, where he was made to kneel down in front of a wall for half an hour. The police wanted to know where the money was and who he had worked with to kidnap the woman. The applicant was forced to sign a document which he could not read. He was then taken to a police detention facility in Gdynia. After his release, the applicant went to a hospital in Gda\u0144sk for a medical examination. He also saw a surgeon, a neurologist and a psychologist. 21.  The applicant alleged that as a result of his arrest he had sustained bruising to his head and back and sprained thumbs, as well as burns on his back from the EDW. 22.  The prosecutor noted that owing to a technical error it had not been possible to examine the CCTV footage dated 17 June 2011 from the Gda\u0144sk Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, where the applicant had been questioned. 23.  The prosecutor established that on 9 June 2011 the Gda\u0144sk Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office had opened an investigation into the kidnapping of J.R., and a ransom demand. On 16 June 2011, having regard to the evidence in his possession, the appellate prosecutor ordered the arrest of a number of suspects, including the applicant and his girlfriend. 24.  The prosecutor heard evidence from other individuals arrested with the applicant. The applicant\u2019s girlfriend stated that police officers in balaclavas and bulletproof vests had forced the door of the apartment. One of the officers had handcuffed her. The applicant\u2019s girlfriend had heard the applicant screaming and had seen blood on the floor of the flat. She had been taken to a police station, where she had been threatened with the EDW. After her release, she had seen the applicant with a swollen face and a black eye; his back was covered with little scabs from the EDW. 25.  \u0141.W. testified that, inter alia, the police had forced the door and thrown a stun grenade into the apartment. The police officers had ordered everyone to get down on the floor. \u0141.W. stated that the applicant had been kicked and hit by three police officers, and that the EDW had been used on him. 26.  D.W. stated that one of the police officers had hit her husband, \u0141.W., in the face with a rifle. Z.M. confirmed this. \u0141.W., D.W. and Z.M. were arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs. They were not suspected of involvement in the kidnapping. 27.  The prosecutor ordered a forensic opinion to be prepared. She requested that the forensic expert establish, inter alia, what injuries the applicant had sustained in connection with his arrest. The forensic expert had access to the relevant parts of the prosecutor\u2019s case file and medical documentation. 28.  The forensic opinion was prepared on 26 June 2012. On the basis of the medical documentation, including the police record dated 16 June 2011 and certificates dated 17 June 2011, the forensic opinion established that the applicant had sustained tenderness of his left temple, swelling of the left side of his face with bruising, swelling of the right wrist, and abrasions on his wrists and his back. It further established on the basis of photographs that the applicant had also had bruising on his left arm, the side of his torso and below his navel, and abrasions on his knees. 29.  The forensic expert stated that the bruising could have been caused by the impact of a blunt object or a fall onto such an object. In the applicant\u2019s case, the bruising of the face and torso could have resulted from being kicked; however, being kicked with military\u2011type boots would be more likely to have caused abrasions or crush wounds. The bruising of the applicant\u2019s left arm could have resulted from having arm locks applied to him while he was being moved. The abrasions on his wrists could have resulted from the use of handcuffs. The expert further stated that the angular abrasions on the applicant\u2019s back could have resulted from the use of an EDW. 30.  The forensic opinion concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had resulted in impairment to his health for a period not exceeding seven days. 31.  The prosecutor also heard evidence from the police officers. She established that the arrest had been carried out by a special anti-terrorist police squad composed of eight officers. They had been accompanied outside the flat by seven police officers from the Gda\u0144sk branch of the CBI. The police had considered it necessary to use the special squad because the suspects had been involved in kidnapping, their methods had been brutal, and there was a risk that they possessed dangerous implements. Members of the anti-terrorist squad were equipped with rifles, helmets, and bullet-proof vests, and were wearing balaclavas. The squad had forced the door open and used a stun grenade. 32.  The applicant was arrested by officer R. According to his evidence and those of other officers involved, the applicant had been lying down on the floor with his hands under his body. Officer R. had been sitting on the applicant. The officer had ordered the applicant to lift his arms so he could be handcuffed. However, the applicant had refused to do so and had tried to dislodge the officer. Given the risk that the applicant might have had a firearm and seeing that the applicant had refused to be handcuffed, officer R. had decided to use the EDW on the applicant\u2019s back as the other officer was attempting to handcuff him. Officer R. stated that he did not remember how many times he had discharged the weapon, but he had done so to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance. He had aimed the weapon at the applicant\u2019s back. Officer R. stated that each discharge had released direct current for a few seconds. This may have been applied to different parts of the applicant\u2019s back. The applicant was then arrested. 33.  Officers of the special squad stated that they did not use any other force. 34.  On 26 July 2012 the Regional Prosecutor discontinued the investigation into the alleged abuse of power by the police officers for lack of sufficient evidence that a criminal offence had been committed. 35.  The prosecutor found that officers of the special squad had explained in detail what had happened during the arrest and the manner in which coercive measures were used. The officers had stated that they had only used measures which had been justified by the situation. They had denied that they had hit, kicked or hit with a rifle any of the arrestees. With regard to the EDW, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cThe electroshock weapon was used in accordance with procedure, and only in respect of [the applicant], in the circumstances described by the police officer arresting him and owing to his non-compliance with the orders.\u201d 36.  The prosecutor noted that the arrest of five people (two men and three women) had taken place in a flat, in fact in one room (with four people in it) in a very small space. At least eight people (four arrestees and at least four officers) had been in this room. In connection with the use of a stun grenade in the flat, it could not be ruled out that the arrestees had sustained some unintended injuries. 37.  The prosecutor noted that the applicant had not recorded any objections to the manner of his arrest in the record of arrest, despite the allegedly drastic actions of the police officers. Furthermore, on 11 October 2011 the Gda\u0144sk\u2011Po\u0142udnie District Court had dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 16 June 2011 ordering his arrest. The court had found that, in the light of the evidence available at the material time, the arrest had been justified and carried out lawfully. 38.  In conclusion, the prosecutor accepted that the applicant had sustained the injuries as described in the forensic opinion. Nonetheless, having analysed the totality of the evidence in the case, the prosecutor could not unequivocally establish that the injuries had resulted from the officers\u2019 actions. The prosecutor noted that the arrests had been carried out rapidly, and that the officers\u2019 actions had been aimed at apprehending the suspects swiftly and efficiently. The police officers had presented a consistent version of events. Despite the fact that the version of events presented by the applicant could not be entirely ruled out, the prosecutor, having regard to the principle of in dubio pro reo, decided to discontinue the investigation for lack of sufficient evidence for suspicion that the alleged offence had been committed. 39.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. He alleged that the prosecutor\u2019s assessment of the evidence had been one-sided and aimed at exonerating the police officers. 40.  The applicant submitted that it was undisputed that he had sustained numerous injuries in the course of his arrest. This had been confirmed by the forensic opinion. His injuries could not have resulted from anything but ill-treatment on arrest, specifically from the use of the EDW, blows with a rifle, and kicks. The applicant also underlined that all the arrestees had consistently described brutal behaviour on the part of the police officers. All the arrestees had confirmed that none of them had offered any resistance and that they had all followed police orders. 41.  On 18 March 2013 the Gda\u0144sk-P\u00f3\u0142noc District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. It found that the prosecutor had correctly assessed the evidence in the case and had reached proper conclusions. It noted that there was no need to supplement the evidence. The court held that in the light of the collected evidence it was not possible to unequivocally determine that the alleged offence of abuse of power had been committed. 42.  The court noted that the cases and manner of use of coercive measures by the police was regulated in the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police. Police officers could use these measures in accordance with the rules laid down in section 16(1) and (2) of the Police Act of 6 April 1990. 43.  The court attached importance to the fact that the Gda\u0144sk-Po\u0142udnie District Court had dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against his arrest. That court had found that the arrest had been carried out lawfully. 44.  The court noted that the arrestees\u2019 behaviour and the fact that the arrest had concerned a case of kidnapping had determined the nature of the actions taken by the officers. The officers had acted out of surprise and the situation had developed rapidly. Their objective had been to proceed to a quick and effective arrest. Thus, the manner of the carrying out of the arrest had been undoubtedly conditioned by the necessity to execute it effectively. 45.  The court noted that there were two conflicting versions of events. In this context, it found that those conflicting versions did not permit a clear determination of the relevant facts. In addition, other evidence in the case, particularly medical evidence, did not allow such a determination. 46.  Accordingly, the actions of the police officers could not be considered to amount to a criminal offence. It did not appear unequivocally from the case file that the applicant (and other suspects) could have sustained the injuries as alleged by them in the course of their arrest. The medical evidence did not clarify the relevant uncertainties. The court also noted that the applicant and other suspects had not challenged the police officers\u2019 actions in the record of arrest or during their questioning. 47.  Section 16 of the Police Act of 6 April 1990, in the version applicable at the material time, read, in so far as relevant:\n\u201c1. If a lawful order given by a police authority or police officer has not been complied with, a police officer may apply the following coercive measures:\n1)  physical, technical and chemical means of restraining or escorting persons or of stopping vehicles;\n2)  truncheons;\n3)  water cannons;\n4)  police dogs and horses;\n5)  rubber bullets fired from firearms; 2.  Police officers may apply only such coercive measures as correspond to the exigencies of a given situation and are necessary to have their orders obeyed.\u201d 48.  The Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police (Rozporz\u0105dzenie Rady Ministr\u00f3w w sprawie okre\u015blenia przypadk\u00f3w oraz warunk\u00f3w i sposob\u00f3w u\u017cycia przez policjant\u00f3w \u015brodk\u00f3w przymusu bezpo\u015bredniego) was issued on the basis of section 16(4) of the Police Act. It was applicable at the material time. 49.  Section 1(1) of the Ordinance stipulated that the police may use coercive measures in accordance with the rules laid out in section 16(1) and (2) of the Police Act. Coercive measures could be used after a person had failed to comply with an order and after a warning had been given (section 1(2)). A police officer could act without giving an order or a warning if a delay would cause danger to life, health or property (section 1(3)). The Ordinance prescribes that a police officer should use coercive measures in a manner which causes as little harm as possible, and should discontinue their use if the person complies with orders (section 2(1)(2). 50.  Section 5 of the Ordinance provides that physical force can be used to overpower a person, to counter an attack, or to ensure compliance with an order. When such force is being used, it is forbidden to strike a person, except in self-defence or to counter an attack against life, health or property. 51.  Section 8 of the Ordinance regulates the use of electrical discharge weapons (paralizator elektryczny). Such a weapon may be used against persons who cause danger to life, health or property and if the use of other coercive measures is impossible or has been rendered ineffective. The EDW may be used specifically, inter alia, in the following situations: in order to overpower a person who is refusing to obey an order to immediately drop a dangerous implement; to counter an attack or to overcome active resistance; to arrest a person suspected of having committed an offence or to prevent the escape of a detainee (section 8(3)). Care should be exercised when using an EDW, having regard to the fact that such a weapon may cause danger to life and health. 52.  In a letter to the Commander in Chief of the Police (Komendant G\u0142\u00f3wny Policji) dated 28 June 2017, the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) expressed his concerns about the use of EDWs by the police. He recommended that police officers should be obliged to file a detailed report after every use of that weapon. In his annual report for the year 2017, the Ombudsman also addressed the issue of the use of EDWs by the police. 53.  The 20th General Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), dated 26 October 2010, stated, inter alia:\n\u201c72.  Electrical discharge weapons [\u201cEDWs\u201d] are increasingly being used when effecting arrests, and there have been well-publicised examples of their misuse in this context (e.g. the repeated administration of electric shocks to persons lying on the ground). Clearly, the resort to EDW in such situations must be strictly circumscribed. The guidance found by the CPT in some countries, to the effect that these weapons may be used when law enforcement officials are facing violence \u2013 or a threat of violence \u2013 of such a level that they would need to use force to protect themselves or others, is so broad as to leave the door open to a disproportionate response. If EDW gradually become the weapon of choice whenever faced with a recalcitrant attitude at the time of arrest, this could have a profoundly negative effect on the public\u2019s perception of law enforcement officials.\n... 77.  EDW should be equipped with devices (generally a memory chip) that can be used for recording various items of information and conducting checks on the use of the weapon (such as the exact time of use; the number, duration and intensity of electrical discharges, etc). The information stored on these chips should be systematically read by the competent authorities at appropriate intervals (at least every three months). Further, the weapons should be provided with built-in laser aiming and video recording devices, making safe aiming possible and enabling the circumstances surrounding their use to be recorded.\n... 78.  Electrical discharge weapons issued to law enforcement officials commonly offer different modes of use, in particular a \u2018firing\u2019 and a \u2018contact\u2019 (drive-stun) mode. In the former, the weapon fires projectiles which attach to the person targeted at a short distance from each other, and an electrical discharge is generated. In the great majority of cases, this discharge provokes generalised muscular contraction which induces temporary paralysis and causes the person concerned to fall to the ground. In contrast, when the \u2018contact\u2019 mode is used, electrodes on the end of the weapon produce an electrical arc and when they are brought into contact with the person targeted the electrodes cause very intense, localised pain, with the possibility of burns to the skin. The CPT has strong reservations concerning this latter mode of use. Indeed, properly trained law enforcement officials will have many other control techniques available to them when they are in touching distance of a person who has to be brought under control.\n...\nPost-incident procedure 82.  Following each use of an EDW, there should be a debriefing of the law enforcement official who had recourse to the weapon. Further, the incident should be the subject of a detailed report to a higher authority. This report should indicate the precise circumstances considered to justify resort to the weapon, the mode of use, as well as all other relevant information (presence of witnesses, whether other weapons were available, medical care given to the person targeted, etc). The technical information registered on the memory chip and the video recording of the use of the EDW should be included in the report. 83.  This internal procedure should be accompanied by an external monitoring element. This could consist of systematically informing, at regular intervals, an independent body responsible for supervising law enforcement agencies of all cases of resort to EDW. 84.  Whenever it transpires that the use of an EDW may not have been in accordance with the relevant laws or regulations, an appropriate investigation (disciplinary and/or criminal) should be set in motion.\u201d 54.  The CPT\u2019s report on the visit to Poland carried out from 11 to 22 May 2017 stated, inter alia:\n\u201c22. ... the Committee also recommends that particular attention be paid to reiterating to all police officers instructions regarding the proper conduct as concerns the use of electric discharge weapons (tasers) and to enforcing those rules. In this context, it should be made clear to all police staff that electric discharge weapons may only be used when there is a real and immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury. Recourse to such weapons for the sole purpose of securing compliance with an order is inadmissible.\nThe CPT considers that the use of electric discharge weapons should be subject to the principles of necessity, subsidiarity, proportionality, advance warning (where feasible) and precaution. Furthermore, recourse to such weapons should only be authorised when other less coercive methods (negotiation and persuasion, manual control techniques, etc.) have failed or are impracticable and where it is the only possible alternative to the use of a method presenting a greater risk of injury or death (e.g. firearms).\u201d", "references": ["9", "0", "6", "5", "3", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently serving a life sentence for murder in Mountjoy Prison, Dublin. 6.  In the early hours of 9 November 2008, the applicant killed a man in Limerick. It was a case of mistaken identity. The applicant had set out to kill another man at the behest of a well-known criminal figure in the city in the context of a feud between criminal gangs. The applicant mistook the victim, S.G., who had no connection whatsoever to the criminal milieu, for the intended target. S.G., who was 28 years old, was walking home when the applicant shot and wounded him on the street. He then pursued his victim into the back garden of a nearby house where he shot him several times, inflicting five wounds in all, including a fatal head wound. 7.  On 24 February 2009 investigating police carried out a search of the applicant\u2019s residence. They arrested him there at 7.15 a.m. He was brought to a police station shortly before 8.00 a.m. There he was informed of his rights, including a right of access to a solicitor. He requested legal advice from a particular solicitor, whom the police duly notified. At 9.55 a.m. the solicitor telephoned the police station and spoke to the applicant. This first consultation lasted two minutes. 8.  The first police interview commenced at 10.12 a.m. and lasted fifty minutes. All of the interviews were video recorded, and were conducted without the applicant\u2019s solicitor being physically present in the interview room. At no stage did the applicant or his solicitor request the presence of the latter during questioning. It was confirmed during the subsequent proceedings that, in view of police practice at that time, such a request would have been denied. 9.  Another solicitor, Mr O\u2019D., who was acting on behalf of the first solicitor, arrived at the police station at 11.00 a.m. and represented the applicant from that point onwards. The police concluded the first interview at 11.03 a.m. The applicant then had a consultation with the solicitor lasting nine minutes. The second interview commenced at 11.19 a.m. and lasted twenty-three minutes. The third interview started at 12.07 p.m. and lasted one hour and fifty-four minutes. The fourth interview began at 3.00 p.m. and had a duration of one hour and thirty-nine minutes. The fifth interview, beginning at 5.59 p.m., lasted for two hours and seven minutes. The final interview of the day took place between 10 p.m. and 11.42 p.m., a duration of one hour and forty-two minutes. The applicant, who did not request or have any further contact with his solicitor that day, did not make any admissions to police. 10.  The following day, 25 February 2009, the police continued to question the applicant. Three interviews took place in the morning and afternoon, lasting almost five hours in total. The applicant was brought before the District Court, which extended his detention for a further 72 hours. His solicitor was present at the court hearing. The applicant was brought back to the police station where another interview, the tenth, took place between 10.38 p.m. and 11.25 p.m. During this interview, the police informed him that his former girlfriend, G, who was also the mother of his young daughter, had been arrested in Dublin early the previous morning on suspicion of withholding information. She was being held in detention and interviewed by police about her knowledge of the killing. He was given certain details about her replies to police questions. Once again, the applicant did not request further consultations with his solicitor and did not make any admissions. 11.  The interviewing of the applicant continued on 26 February 2009. The eleventh interview began at 9.03 a.m. and lasted seventy-two minutes. Questioning recommenced at 12.22 p.m. for one hour and twenty-one minutes. The police impressed on him that G was enduring the hardship of detention as well as separation from her young daughter on account of the applicant\u2019s refusal to admit to the crime. They also underlined the fact that the victim had been an entirely innocent man. The thirteenth interview took place between 3.02 p.m. and 4.15 p.m. During it, the applicant asked to consult his solicitor. Questioning stopped while the police made contact with the solicitor. The consultation between the applicant and his solicitor was again by telephone. It lasted approximately two minutes. 12.  The next interview, the fourteenth, commenced at 5.32 p.m. In the first minutes, the police asked the applicant about text messages sent to Ms G. around the time of the murder. At some point the applicant asked to speak to his solicitor again. The interviewers replied that he had just spoken to the solicitor, to which the applicant said that he had not been able to speak to him properly. It is not clear from the documents in the case-file when this occurred. The interview continued. At around 6.15 p.m. the applicant again asked to speak with the solicitor, saying that he would answer questions afterwards. A moment later the interview was briefly suspended while one of the officers left the room to fetch a glass of water. He returned at 6.20 p.m. and for the remaining 15 minutes the officers questioned him about his background and his sporting interests. Before ending, they informed him that Ms G was alright. The interview concluded at 6.35 p.m. 13.  As requested by the applicant, the solicitor arrived at the police station at 6.52 p.m. He and the applicant spoke for about ten minutes. According to a memo written by a police officer some hours afterwards, the solicitor then approached the officers conducting the interviews and told them, on an off\u2011the\u2011record basis, that the applicant was prepared to admit to the murder provided that Ms G. was released. The police replied that they wanted the applicant to tell the truth about the killing. The solicitor conferred again with the applicant for ten minutes and then informed the police that there would be no admissions before Ms G.\u2019s release. The police replied that a confession taken in such circumstances would not be accepted in court, as it would be regarded as inducement. The solicitor then consulted with the applicant for a further 10 minutes, after which he indicated to the police that the applicant would not admit to anything prior to Ms G. being released and then left the police station. 14.  The fifteenth interview commenced at 7.42 p.m. The applicant refused to answer the first two questions posed to him, but then stated that he had been present at the scene around the time of the murder. At that moment another police officer entered the interview room and stated that the applicant\u2019s solicitor had telephoned the station and wished to speak to him. The interview was immediately suspended to allow the applicant confer with his solicitor. This consultation took about four minutes. When the interview resumed at 7.51 p.m., the applicant admitted to shooting the victim. As the interview continued, he provided a number of other details about the crime: how he had been driven to the scene in a particular car; the clothes he had been wearing and which he had burned later; how many shots he had fired, and where; the fact that he had used his right hand to shoot; the fact that the gun had jammed and that he had cleared it by ejecting bullets. He also sketched a map of the crime scene to indicate where each event had taken place. Beyond this, he refused to answer the questions put to him. The interview ended at 9.05 p.m. At the conclusion of the interview, the applicant made a particular gesture. He removed a set of rosary beads that he wore around his neck as a memento of his dead brother, and asked the police give them to the victim\u2019s family. 15.  The sixteenth interview took place between 10.09 p.m. and 11.29 p.m., a duration of 90 minutes. The police repeatedly asked him to explain why he had killed an innocent man, but the applicant refused to answer. 16.  By that time, Ms G. was no longer in custody, having been released at 9 p.m. that same day. 17.  There were five further interviews the next day, 27 February 2009, with a combined duration of seven hours and twenty-seven minutes. The applicant continued to refuse to answer the questions put to him about the identity of the intended victim, about his own association with a well\u2011known criminal figure in the city, and about calls and messages to and from his mobile phone around the date of the murder. In the twentieth interview, held that evening, he indicated on a map how the crime had unfolded, and stated that when he caught up with him in the back garden, the victim had said \u201cplease stop\u201d just before the fatal shots were fired. 18.  Two further interviews were held on 28 February, lasting two hours and three minutes in all. The police showed the applicant various items of evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime, including unfired bullets, bullet casings, bullets removed from the victim\u2019s body, and items of the victim\u2019s clothing. He made no comment on this or any other question put to him. At 3.15 p.m. police charged the applicant with murder and brought him before the District court. 19.  The applicant pleaded not guilty. He was tried in the Central Criminal Court. 20.  The first trial, in 2011, was inconclusive, the jury failing to reach a verdict. 21.  The second trial commenced on 16 January 2012 and lasted 22 days. At the outset, the applicant sought to exclude the admissions he had made to the police. In accordance with domestic law, his challenge was considered by the trial judge in the absence of the jury. This process, a voir dire (a trial within a trial to determine the admissibility of evidence) took ten days. The trial judge viewed more than twenty hours of the video records of the interviews. During that process, the recording of the interview was played on screen and then the interviewing officers gave evidence concerning the videos and were cross-examined by the legal representatives for the prosecution and defence. At the end, counsel for both sides made submissions to the judge in regard to the questions of inducement of threat, oppression and fairness. 22.  On the eleventh day of the trial the judge ruled as follows:\n\u201cThe defence object to the prosecution proposal to call evidence of various admissions made by Barry Doyle in the course of interviews that took place while he was in custody .... The defence contend that these admissions are inadmissible and rely on three grounds.\n1)  That the admissions were made involuntarily as a result of a combination of threats, inducements and oppression.\n2)  That the admissions were made as a result of breaches of the accused\u2019s constitutional right of access to legal advice.\n3)  The admissions were made as a result of breaches of the requirement of fundamental fairness.\n...\nThe onus of proof in respect of admissibility is on the prosecution and if confessions are to be admitted in evidence the Court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is proper to do so.\n...\nWith regard to the question of legal access Barry Doyle had two consultations with his solicitor while he was in [the police station] prior to making admissions and he was also represented by that solicitor in court when an application was made to extend his detention. The Court does not consider the length of time that either consultation lasted to be relevant in the context of this case. The Court also holds that the [police] were entitled to continue interviewing Barry Doyle in interview 14 when he had complained that a short telephone conversation with his solicitor was not a proper consultation and when his solicitor\u2019s arrival at the [police] station was expected within an hour. The Court is satisfied that there was no breach of Barry Doyle\u2019s constitutional right to legal advice.\nIn considering the question of oppression the Court observed Barry Doyle in video recordings over a period of in excess of 20 hours and holds that he appeared to be physically and mentally strong throughout. He engaged with the [police] when he chose to do so and refused to answer questions when he did not wish to do so. ...\nWith regard to the questioning by [the police officers], the Court finds that the interviews were conducted in a careful, patient and structured way in which some of the results of the [police] investigation were gradually revealed to Barry Doyle. The Court also holds that Barry Doyle first began to engage with [the police] in a limited way, essentially as a result of [their] appeal to Barry Doyle\u2019s humanity. This engagement was built on ... and ultimately the accused told the [police] about his involvement in the death of [S.G.].\nThe Court holds that the interviews conducted by [police] were at all times professional and courteous and involved no oppression. The Court also holds that Barry Doyle was in full control of himself throughout the interviews and holds that he made the admissions that he did because he chose to do so.\nWith regard to the question as to whether some of the promptings by the [police] to Barry Doyle to the effect that he should tell the truth and not keep [G] away any longer from their child, the question arises as to whether this, or any other related promptings made prior to interview 15 and relating to the release of [G], could amount to an inducement. The first thing to be said is that these remarks must be viewed in the overall context of all that had taken place, which included the various responses of Barry Doyle regarding the death of his brother, the responses regarding his own family, his children by a previous relationship to his relationship with [G], as well as read or taken in the context of the limited answers he had given about living in Limerick and the fact that he had conceded ... that being in custody on suspicion of the murder of [S.G.] was the lowest point in his life. The context also includes the gradual unfolding of the evidence in the case to him and the context further includes numerous appeals to him to tell the truth.\nNotwithstanding the context in which they occurred, ... even if these promptings could possibly amount to an inducement when objectively viewed they were not immediately acted on and their effect, whatever it may have been, was dissipated by the consultation Barry Doyle had with his solicitor and his solicitor\u2019s interaction with [the police]. This broke any possible causative link and it is highly relevant that the solicitor told the detectives that Barry Doyle would not admit to the offence and that they would have a bit more work to do.\nThe Court holds that when Barry Doyle came to make his admissions in interview 15 he made them voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court holds that the admissions were made not as a result of oppression and were not made as a result of any threat or inducement.\nFinally, the Court has considered the objection made by the defence that the admissions were made as a result of a breach of fundamental fairness. The Court has considered all the objections in the round and bears in mind [the relevant Supreme Court case-law].\nThe Court holds that there is no breach of the requirements of fundamental fairness and accordingly holds that the confessions made by Barry Doyle are admissible in evidence.\u201d 23.  Following the conclusion of the voir dire proceedings, the trial resumed. The jury was shown excerpts from the video recordings and received transcripts of the interviews. There was other evidence before the court. This included ballistic evidence, evidence about the car the applicant had travelled in, and evidence given by G. There was evidence from another witness, C, who said she had been present when the killing had been ordered, and, the day after the murder, had heard the applicant confirm that he had carried it out. 24.  Following the final submissions of the prosecution and defence, the judge summarised the case and gave instructions to the jury in the Judge\u2019s Charge. He instructed the jury to be careful when considering the evidence and underlined their obligation to examine neutrally the question of whether the applicant had been induced to confess to the crime, with a detailed explanation of what that meant in the circumstances. The judge also warned the jury that it may be dangerous to convict a person on confession evidence alone without corroboration. The judge went on to explain in detail why that was the case, and what corroboration evidence meant in the circumstances. 25.  On 15 February 2012 the applicant was unanimously convicted by a jury of the murder of S.G. He received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. 26.  The applicant appealed against his conviction, raising 27 grounds. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 8 June 2015. Insofar as relevant, the Court of Appeal decided as follows. 27.  It first dealt with the submission that the police had resorted to inducement or threat to elicit his confession to the murder. It agreed with the position taken by the trial judge that the fact that the applicant had consulted with his lawyer immediately before admitting the crime in the fifteenth interview represented a significant interruption in the process of police questioning. Of even greater significance was the fact that the police rejected the proposal of the applicant to confess in return for the release of G, which the solicitor conveyed to the applicant. With no room for ambiguity or misunderstanding in this respect, the response of the police was sufficient to refute the argument about inducement or threat. Nor did the Court of Appeal accept that, during the course of the interviews, the police resorted to implied inducement or threat. It considered that, as found by the trial judge, the transcripts showed the police trying to appeal to his better nature and to his essential humanity. This interpretation of the evidence was borne out by the applicant\u2019s gesture of remorse following the fifteenth interview (see paragraph 14 above). It was also supported by the fact that the applicant had retained a degree of precision and control over the admissions he was prepared to make. He provided certain precise details to the police about his own actions but gave nothing away about the other persons implicated in the murder. The fact that he did not ask about G\u2019s release after admitting the murder further suggested that there was no element of inducement. It concluded on this point:\n\u201c48.  The Court holds that the learned trial judge was entitled to find on the evidence that the prosecution had established that the admissions made by the appellant were not brought about by any inducement or threat. The Court is also satisfied that the judge\u2019s interpretation of the interviews was correct. It concludes that the proposal by the appellant\u2019s solicitor not only dissipated any possible belief in an offer by the [police] but also constituted an approach that actually negated belief in an inducement ...\u201d 28.  The Court of Appeal then considered the argument that the applicant had not been granted sufficient access to legal advice and, as a result, had been subjected to oppression during questioning. The applicant further complained of irretrievable prejudice caused by the continuation of the fourteenth interview despite his request to consult his solicitor, which was not cured but actually compounded by the subsequent consultation. The judgment states:\n\u201c69.  The appellant had access to his solicitor for as much time and on as many occasions as he or his lawyer requested, in which circumstances it is hard to see how he can say that there was oppression because of the inadequate legal advice availability. The solicitor ... did not ask to be present for the interviewing by the [police]. No doubt, had he asked for that facility, it would have been refused but that simply did not happen and it was not the understanding at the time that a lawyer was entitled to be present. That, however, does not make the detention of the appellant retrospectively unconstitutional on the basis of a hypothetical refusal of a request that was not made.\n... 72.  It was submitted by the appellant that if a solicitor had been present throughout the interviewing of Barry Doyle, the interviews would have proceeded differently. But it is by no means clear that that would have been of any great assistance to him; the questions would still have been asked and he could well have been in the same situation of deciding that he was going to confess to the extent, limited in degree as it was, that he actually did in interview 15 and followed up in later interviews.\u201d 29.  The Court of Appeal again referred to the fact that all interviews had been recorded, so that the trial judge was able to see precisely what had happened during them. The police had respected the custody regulations, and while they had repeatedly questioned him they had permitted him breaks and access to a solicitor. There was no sign of oppression or unfairness. 30.  The Court of Appeal also reviewed in detail the content of the Judge\u2019s Charge to the jury, following a challenge that it had been inadequate and incorrect, and it rejected that complaint. It considered that most of the challenges to the judge\u2019s charge concerning the applicant\u2019s admissions amounted to a complaint that the judge\u2019s charge had not adopted the applicant\u2019s arguments. The Court of Appeal rejected this recalling that \u201c118.  It would not have been correct for the judge to tell the jury what the appellant wanted him to say\u201d and \u201c121  ... it is not the function of the trial judge to make another speech either for defence or prosecution ...\u201d. The Court of Appeal also noted that the applicant criticised the Judge\u2019s Charge on the question of the dissipation of inducement or threat, and recalled that the judge had consulted with the lawyers of both parties in advance on the presentation of that issue and both had indicated their agreement. Overall, the Court of Appeal concluded:\n\u201c159.  The appellant\u2019s advisors legitimately advanced every ground of objection in defending their client. All of their extensive submissions were fully ventilated and carefully considered by the trial judge. The many issues were re-visited in a hearing in this Court that occupied two full days of oral argument and which were also explored in comprehensive submissions that were of great assistance to the Court. 160.  The Court is satisfied that none of the grounds of appeal can succeed. The trial was satisfactory and the conviction of Mr Doyle was safe.\u201d 31.  On 8 June 2015 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying three issues for examination, one of which is of central relevance to the present application:\n\u201cWhether or not the appellant was, in the circumstances of this case, entitled to consult with a solicitor, and have a solicitor present, prior to and during the 15th interview with the [police], during which admissions were alleged to have been made. This raises the question of whether the right to have a solicitor present during questioning is a matter of right of the detained person, or a matter of concession by the [police].\nWhether the matters set out in the applicant\u2019s application, under the heading \u2018relevant facts considered not to be in dispute\u2019, or any of them, constituted threats or inducements to the applicant, and calculated to extract a confession from him. This is a matter not decided by the court of trial, or the Court of Appeal. Secondly, if they do constitute such threats or inducements, whether their effect had \u2018dissipated\u2019, or \u2018worn off\u2019, by the time of the admissions relied on by the State, as held by the trial judge, and whether or not there was any evidence on which it could have been determined that the effect of these threats, or inducements, (if any), had \u2018dissipated\u2019, or \u2018worn off\u2019, by the time of the alleged admissions.\u201d 32.  On 18 January 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, by a majority of six to one. Six members of the court gave judgment. 33.  In the first judgment, the Chief Justice limited her remarks to the first issue above. She recalled that reasonable access to a solicitor was a constitutional right for persons in detention. As a matter of constitutional law, the concept of basic fairness of process applied from the time of arrest, as the Supreme Court had recently affirmed in a judgment that took into account the relevant Convention jurisprudence \u2013 DPP v. Gormley and DPP v. White, [2014] IESC 17 (\u201cGormley\u201d). Since the question of the presence of a solicitor during questioning did not arise on the facts in Gormley, any statements in the judgment on this matter were obiter. She continued:\n\u201c15.  ... [I]t is clear that the appellant requested access to a solicitor and obtained access to a solicitor. He had access to legal advice. He had access to the solicitor before the important Interview 15, and he had access, at the solicitor\u2019s request, during that interview, when the solicitor phoned in and sought to speak to the appellant as Interview 15 was underway. The interview was interrupted to enable the appellant to speak to his solicitor. There was no request to have the legal adviser present during the interview. 16.  I am satisfied that the constitutional right of access to legal advice was met by the attendance of the appellant with his solicitor prior to Interview 15, and indeed by the telephone call from his solicitor which interrupted Interview 15. 17.  The constitutional right is a right of access to a lawyer. The right is one of access to a lawyer, not of the presence of a lawyer during an interview.\u201d [emphasis in the original] 34.  She considered that the requirements of the Convention had also been met. Regarding the second issue in the appeal she concurred with Charleton J (see below). 35.  The second judgment was given by O\u2019Donnell J, who also confined his analysis to the first issue. He too regarded statements in Gormley about a more general right to the presence of a solicitor during detention as obiter. Referring to relevant Convention case-law he observed:\n\u201c8.  Given the fact that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has to date largely been developed in the context of civil law systems with early supervision of investigation by a magistrate, it cannot be said that it has been definitively determined that the Convention requires a bright-line rule that in a common law system, an accused person must have not just access to, but the assurance of the presence of, a lawyer during any detention. This is particularly so because, until now, the Convention jurisprudence has not adopted any absolute rule that evidence obtained in breach of a Convention right must be inadmissible, but rather has applied a test of considering the overall fairness of the proceedings.\u201d 36.  In his view, the legal argument for adopting an absolute rule of presence of a lawyer as a matter of constitutional principle therefore rested almost entirely on the reasoning of the Miranda decision of the US Supreme Court. However, that authority had not been followed in Irish jurisprudence in the fifty years since it was decided. In the present case, the voluntary nature of the confession was not in doubt, and the admission of the applicant\u2019s statement had not been held to be unfair. Were a bright-line rule to be adopted, it would have the potential to exclude key evidence in the shape of statements given voluntarily without the benefit of legal advice in circumstances otherwise beyond criticism. He stated:\n\u201c14  ... I would for my part stop short at this point of finding that in addition to the videotaping of interviews, the access to and advice from a lawyer (provided if necessary by the State), and the requirement that only statements found to be voluntary beyond reasonable doubt be admitted in evidence, the Constitution nevertheless requires and perhaps has always required, the presence of a lawyer at all times during questioning, as a condition of admissibility of any evidence obtained.\u201d 37.  He concluded:\n\u201c84.  The appellant\u2019s conviction was based upon a confession of his guilt, supported by significant independent evidence. This included a description by the appellant of what happened at the scene of the crime examination of matters unknown to the garda, and ballistic evidence. The conviction was supported by independent testimony from Ms. [G.], to whom he (the appellant) made inculpatory remarks outside the confines of a garda station. It was corroborated by evidence from Ms [A.], who was present both when the order was given to the appellant to commit the murder, and the following day when the appellant was challenged as to whether or not he had shot the right man, and when he asserted, incorrectly, that he had. The voluntary nature of the confession was proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge based upon a detailed review of all the evidence, including 20 hours of interview process. There is no basis, under the law, upon which it can be contended that the evidence was inadmissible, or that the trial herein was an unfair one. ...\u201d 38.  MacMenamin J gave the third judgment. He recalled that at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest and trial, the relevant precedent of the Supreme Court, Lavery v. Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390, did not accept that a suspect was generally entitled to the presence of a solicitor during police questioning. 39.  He rejected the argument that the applicant\u2019s will had been sapped, notably during the fourteenth interview. While the police had continued to question him even after he had requested another consultation with his solicitor, nothing had been elicited in that interview that had carried through to the next interview. There was no basis to consider that the applicant\u2019s position, at that point in time or subsequently, had been irretrievably prejudiced. 40.  As to the argument that, in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Gormley and also Convention and US case-law, there was now a right to have a solicitor present during police questioning, MacMenamin J held that it could not succeed in the instant case. He stated:\n\u201c46.  ... [W]hat I think is imperative to bear in mind, is that here (subject to the point made regarding the immaterial Interview 14), the appellant was granted access to a solicitor at the outset of his custody, during his custody, prior to the relevant interview, and even during that interview. His limited confession was that he accepted that he had killed [S.G.]. Unavoidably, the appellant must face the fact that the logic of what is sought to be applied here is a retrospective recognition and application of a then unrecognised constitutional right to have a lawyer present throughout interviews.\u201d [emphasis in the original] 41.  The judge continued that he would be prepared, in light of recent developments in law and procedures, to recognise in future cases a right under the Constitution to have a solicitor present during police questioning. He then referred to a number of relevant ECtHR judgments, in particular the case of Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008. He considered that the facts of the present case were very different, and that the two must be distinguished. He added that, for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant issue was always whether criminal proceedings as a whole had been fair. 42.  Charleton J, with whom Laffoy J concurred, dealt first with the inducement issue. He reviewed in detail the applicant\u2019s evidence and the circumstances in which it was taken by police. He considered that in the thirteenth interview the references to G\u2019s situation constituted a clear inducement to confess. However, the fact that he was granted access to independent legal advice from his chosen solicitor was important. He then referred to several factors \u2013 including the evidence of remorse, the fact that the applicant limited his admissions to his own role, the fact that he did not retract his statement, and the gesture involving the beads \u2013 which constituted material on which the decision of the trial judge could reasonably be made. The decision could not be disturbed. 43.  On the issue of access to a solicitor, Charleton J noted that the Court of Appeal had followed the existing Supreme Court case-law to the effect that there was no constitutional right to have a solicitor present during questioning. The Gormley case had not established such a right, since this point had not arisen on the facts of that case. While the fundamental requirement of basic fairness applied from the time of arrest, it did not necessarily follow that all of the safeguards of a fair trial, especially legal representation, must also be applied in full from the outset. 44.  O\u2019Malley J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. However, she took a different approach to MacMenamin and Charleton JJ in relation to the implications of the right of access to legal advice. She agreed with the conclusion of MacMenamin J that there was no causative link between the applicant\u2019s admissions and the absence of the solicitor during questioning, and that this was sufficient to dispose of the issue in the present case. However, she considered that the issue might properly arise for consideration in another case. She saw some strength in the argument that this should now be regarded as a right flowing from the constitutional right to a fair trial. The State had in effect anticipated this by modifying police practice in this respect. She noted that the issue might arise in the context of statutory provisions that permit the drawing of inferences from a failure to answer questions. As this was not an appropriate case to reach a definitive view, she reserved her position on the question. She stated:\n\u201c71  ... I consider that the question of the existence of such a right does not truly arise on the admittedly unusual facts of this case. 72.  Largely, this is because of the unusually central role, discussed above, taken by [the solicitor] in the events immediately preceding the admissions. Prior to that, it is true that the appellant did not see his solicitor for any great length of time. However, it is also clear that he was aware of his right to see him; that he saw him when he wanted to, for as long as he wanted; and that he was under no pressure to relinquish or curtail his right of access. It is also clear that while he answered some questions in some interviews he did not incriminate himself prior to Interview No.15. 73.  I do not accept the contention that the statement by the appellant (in Interview No. 14) that he would answer questions when he saw his solicitor demonstrates that he was \u2018irretrievably prejudiced\u2019 by the [police] decision to continue asking questions despite the request for the solicitor. I cannot see that it should be interpreted as a decision to incriminate himself - he committed himself to nothing, and certainly not to admitting guilt. There is no evidence that his will was overborne to any extent, still less to the extent that a consultation could not assist him. 74.  The actual admissions came about in the circumstances discussed above. The role of the solicitor was, in fact, far more central than would be envisaged where a lawyer is present in the interview room - the [police] and the appellant were actually communicating through him, rather than directly with each other. He had complete privacy to advise his client while carrying on the discussion with the [police] and also a greater degree of control than would be normal over what was said on behalf of the client and how it was presented. For the reasons already discussed, therefore I consider that not only was the trial judge entitled to conclude that the admissions were the result of a fully voluntary decision by the appellant, but that there is nothing to indicate that the exercise of the right now contended for would have altered the situation in any material respect.\u201d 45.  McKechnie J dissented. On the issue of the presence of the solicitor during questioning, he first rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the amount of contact he had had with his solicitor during the period of detention did not amount to reasonable access. The real question at issue was if, where reasonable access to legal advice has been afforded, a solicitor\u2019s attendance at the interview process was as of right or by concession. He referred to the recent change of police practice in this respect and observed:\n\u201c136.  [A]lthough this newly-established practice is not definitive in the legal analysis of whether such a right exists, nonetheless the shifts which I have described, being both potent and influential, are significant and should not be underestimated. Reality, as it now stands, must be faced up to.\u201d 46.  Turning to Convention case-law, he analysed the Salduz judgment and considered that it did not directly support the applicant\u2019s argument. He considered, however, that this Court\u2019s interpretation of Article 6 had evolved since then, citing the following cases: Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, 13 October 2009; Navone and Others v. Monaco, nos. 62880/11 and 2 others, 24 October 2013; A.T. v. Luxembourg, no. 30460/13, 9 April 2015; Simons v. Belgium (dec.), no. 71407/10, 28 August 2012; and Brusco v. France, no. 1466/07, 14 October 2010. In drawing out the main points of this case-law he stated:\n\u201c150.  ... [I]t seems clear that the judgments have made express reference to a suspect\u2019s right to have a lawyer present during the interview process. Thus on one reading it could be said that this right has already been clearly established. However, I am not aware of any decision reflecting the particular facts of Mr. Doyle\u2019s situation ... in which the Court has definitively declared the existence of such right.\u201d 47.  He next referred to Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty (OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1\u201312). Under the Directive, the right of suspects or accused persons for their lawyer to be present and to participate effectively in during questioning is provided for. Although the Directive did not apply to Ireland, it \u201cilluminate[d] the directional focus\u201d of other EU Member States, and \u201coffer[ed] further evidence of a prevailing trend amongst fellow members of the Union\u201d. Moreover, the Directive had been referred to by in A.T. v. Luxembourg (cited above). In addition, he took note of the position of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which considered that the right of access to a lawyer should include the right to legal assistance during questioning (CPT/Inf (2011) 28, at \u00a7 24). He then summarised the position in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, noting that in each of them provision was made for solicitors to be present during questioning. In view of all of this material, he saw a \u201csignificant shift in the acknowledgment of this right across other diverse legal regimes\u201d:\n\u201c167.  ... I believe that on balance the existing case law of the ECtHR is already to the effect that the Convention does in fact require the presence of a lawyer during questioning. The judgments [referred to above] and many others, all make express reference to the existence of such a right in clear-cut and deliberate terms. To the reservation that this position has not been definitively spelled out, I believe that if the settled and current trend of dealing with the availability of legal protection should continue, then it is more likely than not that the outcome of any case where the precise point was directly in issue would support the conclusion which I have arrived at. Of course this anticipation may be wrong, but, even if so, the existing state of jurisprudence is of such force in this regard that such of itself is highly influential in calling for such a right. ...\u201d 48.  He then set out a series of considerations in support of according constitutional status to the right to the presence of a solicitor during questioning: the substantial length of detention permitted by law, allowing for multiple interviews throughout the day over a number of days; the daunting and frightening effect that detention may have on many people; even where the accused is a hardened criminal, the importance of preserving their rights too; the increasing complexity of the criminal law; the limits of judicial control, which prohibits rather than prevents abuse. He did not consider that existing safeguards were sufficient to overcome the inequality in the interview room. While the recording of interviews permitted judicial scrutiny of the actions of the police, he was\n\u201cnot convinced that this ex post facto supervision is an adequate surrogate for the presence of a solicitor at the interview itself.\u201d 49.  Article 38.1 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of fairness in the criminal process: \u201cNo person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law\u201d. 50.  The right of access to a solicitor, when requested by or on behalf of a person in detention, was recognised as being a constitutional right by Finlay C.J. in The People (DPP) v. Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73, where he stated:\n\u201cThe undoubted right of reasonable access to a solicitor enjoyed by a person who is in detention must be interpreted as being directed towards the vital function of ensuring that such person is aware of his rights and has the independent advice which would be appropriate in order to permit him to reach a truly free decision as to his attitude to interrogation or to the making of any statement, be it exculpatory or inculpatory. The availability of advice from a lawyer must, in my view, be seen as a contribution, at least, towards some measure of equality in the position of the detained person and his interrogators. Viewed in that light, I am driven to the conclusion that such an important and fundamental standard of fairness in the administration of justice as the right of access to a lawyer must be deemed to be constitutional in it origin, and to classify it as merely legal would be to undermine its importance and the completeness of the protection of it which the courts are obliged to give.\u201d 51.  In the case The People (DPP) v Pringle (1981) 2 Frewen 57, it was held by O\u2019Higgins CJ that, in the absence of an express guarantee against self\u2011incrimination in the Irish Constitution, it was not possible to infer a right to have a solicitor present during questioning. 52.  In the case Lavery v. Member in Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station (cited above, see paragraph 38), O\u2019Flaherty J affirmed that position:\n\u201cCounsel for the State submitted to the High Court Judge that in effect what [the solicitor] was seeking was that the [police] should give him regular updates and running accounts of the progress of their investigations and that this was going too far. I agree. The solicitor is not entitled to be present at the interviews. Neither was it open to the applicant, or his solicitor, to prescribe the manner by which the interviews might be conducted, or where.\u201d 53.  The core issue in DPP v. Gormley and DPP v. White (cited above, see paragraph 33) which was repeatedly referred to by the Supreme Court in the present case was, according to Clarke J:\n\u201c8.1.  ... whether the entitlement to a trial in due course of law, guaranteed by Article 38(1) of [the Irish Constitution], encompasses an entitlement to have access to legal advice prior to the conduct of any interrogation of a suspect arrested .... If that proposition is accepted at the level of general principle then many more questions of detail would, of course, arise. Questions such as ... the extent to which a lawyer is entitled to be present during the questioning as well as being entitled to advise the suspect prior to questioning... . By no means do all of those issues arise on the facts of these cases.\u201d [Emphasis added] 54.  On the main question raised in the Gormley case Clarke J stated:\n\u201c8.7.  The first issue which perhaps arises is as to whether it is appropriate to regard any part of the investigative stage of a criminal process as forming part of a \u2018trial in due course of law\u2019. It is clear that the ECtHR takes such a view. It must, of course, be recalled that, in many civil law countries, there are formal parts of the investigative process which are judicial or involve prosecutors who have a quasi-judicial status. The line between investigation and trial is not necessarily the same in each jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise a potential distinction between a formal investigation directly involving an arrested suspect and what might be termed a pure investigative stage where the police or other relevant prosecuting authorities are simply gathering evidence. 8.8.  I am persuaded that the point at which the coercive power of the State, in the form of an arrest, is exercised against a suspect represents an important juncture in any potential criminal process. Thereafter the suspect is no longer someone who is simply being investigated by the gathering of whatever evidence might be available. Thereafter the suspect has been deprived of his or her liberty and, in many cases, can be subjected to mandatory questioning for various periods and, indeed, in certain circumstances, may be exposed to a requirement, under penal sanction, to provide forensic samples. It seems to me that once the power of the State has been exercised against a suspect in that way, it is proper to regard the process thereafter as being intimately connected with a potential criminal trial rather than being one at a pure investigative stage. It seems to me to follow that the requirement that persons only be tried in due course of law, therefore, requires that the basic fairness of process identified as an essential ingredient of that concept by this Court in State (Healy) v. Donoghue applies from the time of arrest of a suspect. The precise consequences of such a requirement do, of course, require careful and detailed analysis. It does not, necessarily, follow that all of the rights which someone may have at trial (in the sense of the conduct of a full hearing of the criminal charge before a judge with or without a jury) apply at each stage of the process leading up to such a trial. However, it seems to me that the fundamental requirement of basic fairness does apply from the time of arrest such that any breach of that requirement can lead to an absence of a trial in due course of law. In that regard it seems to me that the Irish position is the same as that acknowledged by the ECtHR and by the Supreme Court of the United States.\u201d 55.  Later in his judgment he observed:\n\u201c9.10  ... [T]he question as to whether a suspect is entitled to have a lawyer present during questioning does not arise on the facts of this case for the questioning in respect of which complaint is made occurred before the relevant lawyer even arrived. However, it does need to be noted that the jurisprudence of both the ECtHR and the United States Supreme Court clearly recognises that the entitlements of a suspect extend to having the relevant lawyer present.\u201d 56.  In a concurring judgment, Hardiman J stated:\n\u201cFor many years now judicial and legal authorities have pointed to the likelihood that our system\u2019s option for the very widespread questioning of suspects who are held in custody for that purpose, was very likely to attract a right on the part of such suspects, not merely to be advised by lawyers before interrogation, but to have lawyers present at the interrogation, and enabled to intervene where appropriate. This has now come to pass in countries with similar judicial systems... and also under the European Convention on Human Rights (\u2018ECHR\u2019)...\nIt is notable, however, that Mr. Gormley has not asserted that right to its full extent but has asserted only a right to have a lawyer to advise him, in custody, before the questioning starts. Manifestly, however, it will not be long before some person or other asserts a right to legal advice in custody on a broader basis. I say this in explicit terms in order that this may be considered by those whose duty it is to take account of potential developments.\u201d 57.  Following the Gormley case, and acting on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Irish police force changed its practice so as to permit a solicitor to be present during the questioning of a suspect. In April 2015 it published a code of practice on the subject, setting out in detail the manner in which police officers should give effect to a suspect\u2019s entitlement to the presence of a solicitor. 58.  In December 2015, the Law Society of Ireland published a document entitled \u201cGuidance for Solicitors Providing Legal Services in Garda Stations\u201d. The document sets out advice for solicitors, in light of the relevant law and the police code of practice. 59.  Article 3(1) \u2013 (3) of Directive 2013/48, entitled \u201cThe right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings\u201d reads as follows:\n\u201c1.  Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused persons have the right of access to a lawyer in such time and in such a manner so as to allow the persons concerned to exercise their rights of defence practically and effectively. 2.  Suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer without undue delay. In any event, suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer from whichever of the following points in time is the earliest:\n(a)  before they are questioned by the police or by another law enforcement or judicial authority;\n(b)  upon the carrying out by investigating or other competent authorities of an investigative or other evidence-gathering act in accordance with point (c) of paragraph 3;\n(c)  without undue delay after deprivation of liberty;\n(d)  where they have been summoned to appear before a court having jurisdiction in criminal matters, in due time before they appear before that court. 3.  The right of access to a lawyer shall entail the following:\n(a)  Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons have the right to meet in private and communicate with the lawyer representing them, including prior to questioning by the police or by another law enforcement or judicial authority;\n(b)  Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons have the right for their lawyer to be present and participate effectively when questioned. Such participation shall be in accordance with procedures under national law, provided that such procedures do not prejudice the effective exercise and essence of the right concerned. Where a lawyer participates during questioning, the fact that such participation has taken place shall be noted using the recording procedure in accordance with the law of the Member State concerned;\n(c)  Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons shall have, as a minimum, the right for their lawyer to attend the following investigative or evidence\u2011gathering acts where those acts are provided for under national law and if the suspect or accused person is required or permitted to attend the act concerned:\n(i)  identity parades;\n(ii)  confrontations;\n(iii)  reconstructions of the scene of a crime.\u201d 60.  For a detailed summary of the recitals and other relevant provisions of the directive see Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, \u00a7\u00a7 82-85, 9 November 2018). 61.  Directive 2013/48, which had to be transposed by 12 November 2016, applies to all EU Member States except for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.", "references": ["0", "2", "9", "6", "8", "1", "5", "7", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Marmarashen village. 6.  In June 2006 the applicant\u2019s son, Gegham Sergoyan, was drafted into the Armenian army. 7.  On 8 November 2006 he was assigned to military unit no. 37673 (the \u201cmilitary unit\u201d) situated in the unrecognised Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (the \u201cNKR\u201d). 8.  On 9 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan underwent surgery on a toe on his left foot. 9.  On the same date the military unit doctor temporarily discharged Gegham Sergoyan from his duties until 16 April 2007. Because of the surgery, he was allowed to wear slippers instead of army boots. 10.  On 15 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was put on duty. On that day lieutenant H.G. was the duty officer in charge of the military unit. 11.  By an order of the Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia of 29 December 2003, H.G. had been hired to perform military service for a period of five years and assigned to the military unit with the rank of junior lieutenant.\nAccording to the personal report provided by the military unit command, H.G. had been a weak officer from the first day of service. He had been the subject of several disciplinary penalties, including a \u201cstrict reprimand\u201d and \u201cnot fully fit for service\u201d in September and October 2004 respectively. In July 2006 H.G. was given another reprimand. It was further indicated by his superiors that H.G.\u2019s performance was deficient and his professional training poor. 12.  On 15 April 2007 at 9.40 p.m. H.G., upon seeing Gegham Sergoyan in the duty station room, reproached the latter for having entered without permission and for not wearing uniform, including for being in slippers instead of army boots. Although Gegham Sergoyan admitted his mistake and tried to leave the room, H.G. verbally abused him and violently pushed him against the wall. Then H.G. pointed his gun at Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s head and fired a shot. 13.  On the same date Gegham Sergoyan was taken to Stepanakert Military Hospital in the \u201cNKR\u201d (the SMH) where he underwent surgery. 14.  Upon admission to Stepanakert military hospital, the diagnosis of ballistic trauma of the cervical vertebrae with axis (second cervical vertebra) fracture and mandibular fracture with displacement of the right side was noted in Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s medical records. 15.  On 16 April 2007 at 10 a.m. Gegham Sergoyan was examined by doctors H.E., N.C. and A.G. of the SMH who indicated in the relevant record that Gegham Sergoyan had sustained a ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae with axis fracture, and that he had a fracture of the right side of the lower jaw. 16.  On the same day Gegham Sergoyan was transferred to the Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia (the CMH) in Yerevan pursuant to the transfer certificate issued by Doctor H.E. The same diagnosis, namely ballistic trauma and fracture of the right side of the jaw, was mentioned in the certificate. 17.  On the same day the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 34-104 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code of Armenia (attempted murder). 18.  On 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was admitted to the CMH in Yerevan. It was indicated in the medical record that, according to the transfer diagnosis, Gegham Sergoyan had suffered ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae. Mandibular fracture with displacement on the left side and fracture of the second cervical vertebra was also mentioned, with a question mark. The clinical diagnosis made by the doctors of the CMH stated ballistic trauma to the neck with lesion of the cervical part of the spine (second cervical vertebra) and ballistic fracture of the second and third vertebrae with traumatic spinal cord injury. 19.  During his stay at the CMH, Gegham Sergoyan was examined by forensic medical expert A.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of Armenia (the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine) who stated in his conclusion, inter alia, that the bullet had penetrated from the left side of the lower jaw and, according to descriptions contained in the medical records, it was directed from left to right and upwards from front to back. 20.  On 18 April 2007 H.G. was officially charged with attempted murder and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 34-104 \u00a7 1 and 375 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). 21.  On the same day H.G. was questioned and fully admitted his guilt. He submitted, in particular, that he had been on duty on 15 April 2007 when at 9.40 p.m. he had seen his assistant, J.G., and Gegham Sergoyan watching television together in the duty room. Given that Gegham Sergoyan was in slippers, he had reprimanded him for violation of the uniform code and for having entered the duty room without permission, and had sworn at him, grabbed him by the chest and pushed him against the wall. Gegham Sergoyan and J.G. had been laughing while watching television and he had thought they were laughing at him. Although Gegham Sergoyan had said that he would leave the room, he became even angrier since the latter had been laughing while speaking to him. At that moment he had taken out his gun, loaded it and, pointing the gun at the left side of Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s face, had sworn at him and shot him in the head. He had shot Gegham Sergoyan with the gun attributed to him. 22.  On 2 May 2007 Gegham Sergoyan died in hospital without having regained consciousness. 23.  On the same day the investigator of the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s body to be conducted in Yerevan by forensic medical expert A.L.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine. The expert was requested to determine, inter alia, the cause of death, the existence of any injuries on the body, the time and method of their infliction and their possible link with the death. The expert was also asked to determine whether there were any other external injuries on the body apart from the ballistic trauma, the time of their infliction and their gravity. 24.  On 10 May 2007 the Minister of Defence of Armenia issued an order concerning the incident with the applicant\u2019s son and the imposition of disciplinary penalties on persons responsible. The order stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... The internal investigation has revealed the following:\n- the military unit command had not thoroughly examined [H.G.\u2019s] moral character or his personal and professional preparation, there had been no proper control over the observance of the daily schedule;\n- the instructions from the personnel responsible for the daily timeline in the military unit had been of a formal nature;\n- there had been an unhealthy moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers...\nWith a view to penalising the persons liable for the incident I order 1. The imposition [of the following penalties]\na. a \u201creprimand\u201d in respect of the commander of [the military unit] ... for poor supervision of personnel responsible for the daily timeline;\nb. a \u201cstrict reprimand\u201d in respect of:\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] ... for failure to organise properly [military] service;\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for the armoury ... (in charge of the military unit on the day of the incident) ...\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for working with the personnel ... for the tense moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers. 2. Commanders of military units\n- to discuss the incident ... and to undertake concrete measures to prevent the occurrence of such ...\u201d 25.  On an unspecified date in May 2007 the Ministry of Defence of Armenia paid the applicant 2,250,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) (approximately EUR 4,650 at the relevant time), including compensation for Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s funeral expenses and a lump sum insurance payment for the family. 26.  On 15 May 2007 the investigator made a decision to involve the applicant in the proceedings as Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s legal heir. 27.  On 1 June 2007 the post-mortem examination, including an autopsy, was completed. Forensic medical expert A.L.D. concluded that Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s death had been caused by acute penetrating ballistic trauma to the neck. The expert stated, inter alia, that on 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan had been examined by a maxillofacial surgeon who had not detected any jawbone pathology on the basis of X-ray computed tomography and radiography results. 28.  On 9 June 2007 the investigation into Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s death was taken over by the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia. 29.  On 14 September 2007 the charges against H.G. were modified and he was charged with murder motivated by hooliganism and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 104 \u00a7 2 (10) and 375 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). 30.  On 13 February 2008 the case, together with the finalised bill of indictment, was transmitted to the Southern Criminal Court for examination on the merits. Thereafter the case was transmitted to the Syunik Regional Court for reasons of territorial jurisdiction. 31.  On the same date the Military Prosecutor filed a civil claim against H.G. seeking to recover AMD 2,789,153 (approximately EUR 6,200 at the relevant time) from the latter. This amount included the expenses borne from the State budget, including the medical expenses paid by the State and AMD 2,250,000 paid to Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s family for funeral expenses and insurance benefit. 32.  In the course of the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Armenia, namely the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance of Armenia, seeking compensation in the amount of EUR 300,000 for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the murder of his only son, which had caused him deep sorrow and severe mental suffering: he had lost the normal rhythm of life and his health had deteriorated. The applicant relied, in particular, on Article 18 of the Civil Code of Armenia and Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. 33.  In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Court H.G. pleaded guilty. 34.  A number of witnesses were questioned during the proceedings, including Gegham Sergoyan\u2019s fellow servicemen. In particular J.G., who had personally witnessed the events of 15 April 2007, testified that he had seen H.G. swear at Gegham Sergoyan and shoot him in the face. 35.  Several officers of the military unit stated that to their knowledge Gegham Sergoyan had never had any problems with lieutenant H.G. before. 36.  On 1 September 2009 the Syunik Regional Court found H.G. guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s civil claim by stating that no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage was envisaged under the law. It further stated that, although the accused had committed the crime while in military service, the crime had been committed on a personal level and therefore any damage incurred should be compensated by the person liable for it. 37.  On 1 October 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. He submitted, inter alia, that lieutenant H.G. had committed the crime during his service while assigned to duty in the military unit on 15 April 2007. Gegham Sergoyan was murdered while performing his army service obligations when he was on duty according to the relevant orders of the military unit command. He further submitted that, although no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage existed under Armenian civil law, such a requirement existed under the Convention: according to Article 6 of the Constitution ratified international treaties were a constituent part of the legal system of Armenia and, in the case of inconsistency with the national law, the norms of the treaty should prevail. 38.  On 2 February 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Regional Court. As regards the applicant\u2019s civil claim, the Court of Appeal relied on Article 1087 of the Civil Code to state that, in the event of the victim\u2019s death, only compensation for funeral expenses is envisaged under the civil law. 39.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. The applicant submitted the same arguments as before and restated his position concerning his claim for non-pecuniary damages as expressed in his initial civil claim with the Regional Court and in his appeal before the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 1 April 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. 41.  Article 34 provides that attempted crime is the action (inaction) committed through direct wilfulness deliberately aimed at committing the crime if the crime was not completed for reasons beyond the person\u2019s control. 42.  Article 104 \u00a7 1 provides that murder shall be punishable by imprisonment from six to twelve years. 43.  Article 104 \u00a7 2 (10) provides that murder committed out of hooliganism shall be punishable by imprisonment from eight to fifteen years or life imprisonment. 44.  Article 375 \u00a7 1 provides that abuse of authority or public position, exceeding public authority, as well as omission by a superior or public official, if such acts were committed for selfish ends, personal interest or the interests of a group and which resulted in grave damage, shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to five years. 45.  Article 154 \u00a7 3 provides that the civil claim lodged in criminal proceedings is decided in accordance with the provisions of civil law. 46.  According to Article 17 \u00a7 1 the person whose rights have been violated may claim full compensation for the damage suffered, unless the law or contract envisages a lower amount of compensation. 47.  According to Article 17 \u00a7 2, damages are the expenses borne or to be borne by the person whose rights have been violated, in connection with restoring the violated rights, loss of his property or damage to it (material damage), including lost income. 48.  Article 18 provides that damage caused to natural or legal persons as a result of unlawful actions (inaction) of state and local self-government bodies or their officials is subject to compensation by the Republic of Armenia or the relevant local community. 49.  Article 1077 \u00a7 2 provides that damage caused to the life or the health of a person while performing, inter alia, military service is compensated in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Civil Code, if stricter liability is not provided for by statute or contract. 50.  According to Article 1087, persons responsible for damage linked to the victim\u2019s death shall reimburse the necessary funeral expenses to the person who has incurred such expenses. 51.  Since 1 November 2014 Article 17 \u00a7 2 has included non\u2011pecuniary damage in the list of the types of civil damage for which compensation can be claimed in civil proceedings. The Civil Code was supplemented by new Articles 162.1 and 1087.2 which regulate the procedure for claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Until the introduction of further amendments on 30 December 2015 (in force from 1 January 2016), compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage could be claimed where it had been established by a judicial ruling that a person\u2019s rights guaranteed by Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention had been violated, and also in cases of wrongful conviction. 52.  The Constitutional Court found Article 17 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code incompatible with Articles 3 \u00a7 2, 16 \u00a7 4, 18 \u00a7 1, 19 \u00a7 1 and 43 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution in so far as it does not envisage non-pecuniary damage as a type of civil damages and does not provide for a possibility to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary damage by impeding the effective exercise of the right of access to court and the right to a fair trial and at the same time hindering due compliance with its international obligations by the Republic of Armenia.\nThe Constitutional Court stated that Article 17 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code would lose its legal force at the latest on 1 October 2014.", "references": ["8", "5", "2", "6", "3", "1", "9", "7", "No Label", "0", "4"], "gold": ["0", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Belgrade. 5.  On 9 May 2005 the applicant lodged a claim seeking ownership of 265 shares of the company Tri Grozda a.d. Beograd 6.  On 14 September 2007 the Belgrade Court of First Instance delivered a judgment in favour of the applicant. 7.  On 13 December 2011 the Belgrade Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of 14 September 2007, and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. 8.  On 3 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time and requesting compensation in that regard. 9.  On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time. It held that the finding of a violation had constituted sufficient just satisfaction in the particular circumstances of the present case for the following reasons. First, the nominal value of the impugned shares was only slightly higher than 200 euros. The case was thus of minor importance for the applicant. Secondly, it considered that the applicant had contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by failing to lodge a constitutional appeal earlier.", "references": ["9", "6", "4", "8", "2", "5", "1", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Alphen aan den Rijn. 7.  On 19 August 2009 the applicant, who was then nineteen years of age, was arrested on suspicion of distribution of child pornography (three pictures of a 16-year-old girl) in April of that year. He was informed that he had the right to consult a lawyer. 8.  At the police station the applicant was taken into police custody (inverzekeringstelling) and, before he had consulted his lawyer (who had not been immediately available) but with his consent, police officers commenced the so-called social interview (sociaal verhoor), during which questions were put to him about his personal circumstances and his personality but not about the offence of which he was suspected. He told the officers, inter alia, that he had a brain disorder: he had cavernous hemangiomas (clusters of abnormal blood vessels) in his brain and spinal cord. This did not affect his functioning other than that it might have a bearing on his trust in others; moreover, while he was allowed to play football he could not head the ball. When the applicant\u2019s lawyer became available the police officers suspended the interview to give the applicant the opportunity to consult his lawyer by telephone. After that conversation, the applicant stated that his lawyer would come to see him at the end of the afternoon and that, on the advice of his lawyer, he would not answer any more questions. The interview was terminated. The applicant met with his lawyer later that day. 9.  The following day, 20 August 2009, the applicant was interviewed twice, including concerning distribution of child pornography, of which he was suspected. At the beginning of the interview, the applicant stated that he would prefer to have his lawyer present. He was told that this was not possible and the interview was started. The applicant replied to the questions put to him. 10.  In the course of the interview the police officers questioning the applicant noted that he made a spasm-like movement with his arm. They asked him whether he was having an epileptic fit. The applicant confirmed that he was. The police officers then decided to interrupt the interview and call a doctor. They heard the applicant say that the seizure could have been caused by a combination of stress and other factors. The interview was resumed. 11.  A final interview was held with the applicant on 21 August 2009. Audio recordings were made of all the interviews. 12.  The applicant was released from police custody on 21 August 2009. 13.  On 25 March 2011 the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague found the applicant guilty of distribution of child pornography and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two weeks\u2019 imprisonment and to eighty hours\u2019 community service. The Regional Court was of the opinion that the applicant should have been enabled to consult his lawyer prior to being interviewed by the police for the first time. However, it did not appear from the subsequent interviews that they had been conducted without the applicant having been able to consult his lawyer. Given, moreover, that the contents of the interviews that had been conducted after the applicant had received legal assistance had not substantially differed from the content of the interview that had taken place without legal assistance, the Regional Court considered that the finding that a procedural requirement had not been complied with (vormverzuim) sufficed. The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep). 14.  On 3 July 2013 the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague quashed the decision of the Regional Court, convicted the applicant of the same offence and sentenced him to forty hours\u2019 community service. As regards the claim that the applicant ought to have been assisted by a lawyer during the police interviews, the Court of Appeal held as follows:\n\u201cAt the hearing on appeal counsel submitted that at the time of the police interviews the suspect had the mental age of a 15 or 16-year old, and also that he was suffering from a brain disorder which may have caused him to have epileptic seizures. Counsel did not submit (medical) data to substantiate that claim.\nIn the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the above does not entail an indication for the officers who interviewed the suspect that he had the mental age of a 15 or 16-year old, nor that the brain disorder from which the suspect is apparently suffering was capable of causing an epileptic seizure. After the suspect had, in the eyes of the interviewing officers, made \u2018a kind of spastic\u2019 movement, they had consulted a physician before resuming the interview. The Court of Appeal considers that this was the correct course of action. The Court of Appeal does not agree with counsel that the interviewing officers ought reasonably to have considered the suspect as vulnerable or underage. This means in the light of the Salduz case-law that the suspect, who was an adult at the time, was not entitled to have a lawyer present at his interview.\u201d 15.  The Court of Appeal based its conviction of the applicant on the following evidence:\n-  a complaint lodged with the police by the victim, who claimed that in March 2009 (when she had been 16 years old), she had shown the applicant various parts of her body via webcam, that she had subsequently been told by a third party that the applicant had sent photographs of her to that third party, and that she had been told by two other parties that they had received photographs of her;\n-  a further statement made by the victim to the police, according to which she had taken a photograph of a part of her body and sent it to the applicant by mobile telephone;\n-  a statement made by the applicant to the police on 20 August 2009 to the effect that he had sent several photographs (showing parts of the victim\u2019s body), one of which he had taken by means of a screen shot while the others had been sent to him by the victim, to a third party via mobile telephone and that he had also uploaded them onto an image-hosting website;\n-  a statement made by the aforementioned third party to the police, according to which she had received two photographs from the applicant showing parts of the victim\u2019s body; and\n-  a record drawn up by a police officer whose investigations into the victim\u2019s allegations had shown that the photographs showing part of the victim\u2019s body were accessible on the world wide web via a profile with a name used by the applicant on the above-mentioned image-hosting website. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), complaining, inter alia, of the refusal to allow him to be assisted by his lawyer during police questioning. On 18 November 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with summary reasoning, in accordance with section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). Under that provision, the Supreme Court may limit its reasoning in a decision to a finding that a complaint does not provide grounds to overturn the judgment appealed against or does not require answers to questions of law in the interests of the uniform application or development of the law.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "4", "0", "6", "9", "2", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Marusino, Moscow Region. 6.  On 1 August 2000 the Ministry of the Interior of Belarus ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest on suspicion of her having committed several criminal offences. On an unspecified date her name was put on the international wanted persons list. 7.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant was arrested in Lyubertsy, Moscow Region. 8.  On 20 February 2014 the Lyubertsy Town Court of the Moscow Region authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for forty days pending her extradition to Belarus. 9.  On 28 March 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 18 August 2014. 10.  On 18 August 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 18 February 2015. On 18 September 2014 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 18 August 2014 on appeal. The applicant did not attend the hearing. The applicant\u2019s lawyers were present and made submissions to the court. 11.  On 10 February 2015 the Town Prosecutor ordered the applicant\u2019s release on an undertaking not to leave town. 12.  On 20 August and 21 September 2015 the investigative committee of the Republic of Belarus discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 13.  On 4 February 2016 the Town Prosecutor discontinued the extradition proceedings against the applicant. 14.  From 21 February 2014 to 10 February 2015 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-6 in the Moscow Region. According to the Government, she was held in the following cells:\nCell no.\nPeriod of detention\nCell size (sq. m)\n28\nFrom 21 to 22 February 2014 15.  According to the Government, the personal space afforded to the applicant during her detention in the remand prison was approximately 3.27 sq. m, which was below the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. She was provided with an individual sleeping place, a mattress, a pillow, two bed sheets, a pillowcase, a towel and a blanket. She also received a bowl, a spoon and a mug. The inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. The bed sheets were changed on a weekly basis. The applicant was provided with access to a radio, books and board games. The temperature in the cells was 22oC in summer and at least 18oC in winter. The food provided to the inmates was in compliance with the relevant norms and standards. 16.  According to the applicant, the cells in which she was held were overcrowded and dirty. The walls were covered with mould and fungus. The lighting was insufficient during the day and was not turned off at night. The heating was also insufficient. On numerous occasions it was completely turned off. The mattresses, pillows and bed linen were too old and worn-out. The inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week. The food was of poor quality. No fruit or vegetables were available. The inmates were allowed one hour of exercise a day in a prison yard with no sports facilities. If one of the inmates were sick or refused to take part in the daily exercise, the administration cancelled it for all the inmates held in the same cell. 17.  During her transfers between the remand prison and court, the applicant was placed in a compartment measuring 1 by 0.7 m, often with another inmate. The journey lasted for two and a half to three hours. 18.  Upon her return to the remand prison, the applicant was placed in a holding cell measuring 1 by 1.5 m with three other inmates. Prior to being admitted to their cells, the inmates were required to take off their clothes, do several sit-ups and then remain crouched down. 19.  On 26 February 2014 the Deputy Town Prosecutor carried out an inspection of remand prison SIZO-6. He established, inter alia, that it was overcrowded, noting in particular that the average personal space afforded to inmates varied from 1 to 3 sq. m and that in cells nos. 8, 69 and 97 the inmates were not provided with individual beds. According to the prison administration, the remand prison capacity was 327 inmates. However, at the time of the inspection the prison population exceeded that limit by 62%, holding a total of 530 inmates. 20.  On an unspecified date in 2014 the Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office carried out an inspection of the conditions of detention in remand prison SIZO-6. On 21 March 2014 the Regional Prosecutor issued a notice to the head of the regional penal service (FSIN), advising that the conditions of detention in the prison be brought in line with the statutory requirements. As to the issue of overcrowding, the prosecutor indicated as follows:\n\u201cAs regards the number of beds ... in the cells ... the [statutory] requirement of 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is not being complied with ... The average personal space afforded to detainees is 2.6 sq. m and in cells nos. 10, 14, 16, 25 etc. it varies from 1.6 to 1.55 sq. m per inmate.\u201d 21.  According to the applicant, between February and March 2014 the Town Prosecutor authorised the applicant\u2019s mother to visit her at the remand prison on three occasions. 22.  On 10 October 2014, in response to a request by the applicant to meet with her family, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office responded that, as stipulated in the Pre-trial Detention Act, suspects and defendants could have no more than two family visits per month, subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case, and advised the applicant to apply to the law-enforcement bodies in Belarus for approval of her relatives\u2019 visits. 23.  On 21 January 2015 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 10 October 2014, without considering the merits. 24.  On 11 March 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 21 January 2015 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 25.  On 6 May 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of 10 October 2014. 26.  On 17 August 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal. 27.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant was issued with a Russian passport by the Russian Embassy in Minsk, Belarus. On an unspecified date she moved to Moscow, Russia. 28.  On 20 August 2004 a district police department in Moscow issued an internal passport in the applicant\u2019s name. 29.  On 16 February 2012 the Moscow City Department of the Federal Migration Service decided, on the basis of an earlier inquiry, that the applicant had been wrongly issued with a Russian passport. They based their findings, inter alia, on information received from the Russian Embassy in Minsk indicating that there was no information in the relevant database confirming the issuance of a Russian passport in the applicant\u2019s name in 2001. 30.  On 5 February 2015 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the decision of 16 February 2012. On 26 June 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 5 February 2015. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant, being a Belorussian citizen, applied for a residency permit in Russia. On 17 April 2017 the Federal Migration Service issued a residency permit.", "references": ["5", "7", "0", "6", "3", "8", "9", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  Details concerning the applicants can be found in the Appendix. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  From 2 September 2004 until 2 January 2005 secret surveillance activities were carried out with respect to the third applicant in the context of ongoing criminal proceedings. The proceedings were later terminated without the applicant being prosecuted. On 4 December 2006 the information obtained via the secret surveillance in those proceedings was put in the surveillance file (j\u00e4litusprotokoll) of the criminal proceedings under review in the present case. 9.  The criminal proceedings under review in the instant case were instituted on 18 August 2005 without the applicants being informed of the proceedings. Those proceedings concerned suspicions of high\u2011level corruption as regards the exchange of plots of land in conservation areas for plots in areas where development was permitted. 10.  Between 23 August 2005 and 11 October 2006 the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei) carried out various surveillance activities in respect of the first applicant, the second applicant and the third applicant (with respect to the third applicant, the surveillance activities commenced on 16 December 2005). The third applicant was also acting as a member of the supervisory board of the two applicant companies at the material time. In the course of those activities, communications between the fourth applicant and the persons under surveillance were covertly intercepted and listened to. 11.  The surveillance activities were based on authorisation decisions issued by either a prosecutor (forty-four authorisations altogether in respect of covert observation and requests for communication data) or by a preliminary investigation judge (twenty-one authorisations altogether in respect of covert listening in on conversations and the interception of communications). 12.  The authorisation decisions issued by (different) preliminary investigation judges provided general reasons as to why the judges considered the secret surveillance necessary. As an example, one authorisation read as follows: \u201cThe judge has acquainted himself with the material gathered during the criminal proceedings and is convinced that the prosecutor\u2019s application is justified. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows for evidence to be gathered by means of secret surveillance. Considering the gravity of the offence, the interests of protecting the legal order, and the fact that gathering evidence by other procedural means is either impossible or especially complicated, then, in the interests of elucidating the truth, the application is perfectly justified and lawful.\u201d The other authorisations by preliminary investigation judges included variations of the same wording, occasionally also including references such as \u201cwhen public officials abuse their position, it damages their credibility in the eyes of society and damages the State\u2019s reputation\u201d and \u201c[t]his offence belongs to the category of offences relating to office. ... Considering that ..., this type of offence is difficult to discover and prove, and [such offences] hamper the legal rights of all people\u201d. The relevant prosecutors\u2019 decisions contained no reasoning at all. 13.  In addition to surveillance activities, during the pre-trial proceedings, there were various queries, inspections, and home and office searches; (forensic) expert reports were ordered, requests for documents were made to various persons, and the material received was examined. Between 3 October 2006 and 12 November 2007, 202 persons (witnesses and suspects) were interviewed, some of them repeatedly. Between 17 March 2008 and 24 March 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office invited the applicants to inspect a copy of the criminal file (comprising 191 volumes altogether). The applicants\u2019 representatives submitted different applications concerning the time they needed to inspect the files, ranging between six and ten months. By an order of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 13 May 2008, the applicants were given until 3 November 2008 to inspect the criminal file. Their representatives (except the first applicant\u2019s counsel) submitted requests to the Office of the Prosecutor General, asking it to remove the material which the prosecution did not intend to rely on from the criminal file, and to specify which evidence was intended to prove which facts. The Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed those requests, explaining that the applicants had been presented with all the material gathered during the pre-trial proceedings so that they could assess which material was relevant from the perspective of defence rights. 14.  During the pre-trial proceedings, the second applicant discovered a surveillance device in his office on 25 September 2005. On 3 October 2006 the offices of the third applicant, the second applicant company and the first applicant were searched, and on 20 September 2007 the premises of the first applicant company were searched. On 16 October 2007 the fourth applicant was questioned as a suspect. 15.  As two of the accused \u2013 the fourth applicant and E.T. \u2013 were members of the Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) at the time the pre-trial proceedings were completed, the consent of a majority of the Members of Parliament had to be obtained to lift their immunity and bring charges against them. The Office of the Prosecutor General initiated the relevant procedure on 12 December 2008, and Parliament gave its consent on 24 March 2009. 16.  Altogether, the pre-trial proceedings lasted three and a half years and ended on 31 March 2009 when the statement of charges against the applicants was submitted to the trial court. None of the applicants claimed that there had been periods of inactivity or other significant interruptions as regards the pre-trial proceedings. 17.  From May 2009 onwards the Harju County Court heard the case over a total of ninety-two hearing days. During that time, numerous witnesses were heard: eighty witnesses requested by the prosecution, twenty-eight witnesses requested by the defence, and two people summoned by the court as experts. In May 2009 dates for hearings in November and December 2009 and January, February, April, May and June 2010 were scheduled. Further dates were scheduled in February 2010 (for dates in September and October 2010), in June 2010 (for dates in December 2010 and February and April 2011), in April 2011 (for dates in October, November and December 2011), in November 2011 (for dates in December 2011 and January, February, April and May 2012), in December 2011 (for dates in January and February 2012), and in February 2012 (for dates in March 2012). At the request of some representatives, hearings were not scheduled to take place more than three days a week. The court also took into account the representatives\u2019 wishes that hearings not be scheduled too far in advance, as they were simultaneously involved in other criminal proceedings and therefore not always available. At the end of each hearing day, considering the evidence that was to be examined the following day, the court determined which of the accused and their representatives should appear at court the following day. This allowed persons who were not concerned by such evidence not to attend the particular hearing. Occasionally, hearings had to be rescheduled owing to illness or owing to other personal circumstances of either the accused or their representatives. In November 2009 the court noted that there was a risk that the proceedings might take too long, and decided that the number of witnesses to be heard each day must be increased. 18.  An application was made to separate the first applicant\u2019s case from the case against two other accused (including E.T.), but the representatives of the second and the fourth applicants objected to the first applicant\u2019s case being separated in this way. They submitted that the cases were closely linked, and argued that separating the cases would hinder defence rights and force them to attend other parallel proceedings at the same time. The court dismissed the application to separate the case, referring to the need to guarantee the defence rights of the other accused. 19.  By a judgment of 19 June 2012 the Harju County Court acquitted the applicants of the charges against them. The proceedings before the first-instance court lasted approximately three years and three months. The court found that the surveillance activities had been unlawful and that all the evidence collected by such activities was inadmissible. It did not address the question of whether or not the secret surveillance authorisations in the case had been sufficiently reasoned at the time they had been issued. 20.  The Office of the Prosecutor General appealed to the Court of Appeal on 4 July 2012. Among other things, it challenged the first-instance court\u2019s assessment of the lawfulness of the surveillance activities. 21.  On 13 July 2012 the Tallinn Court of Appeal invited the applicants to notify it of suitable dates in October, November and December 2012, so that hearings could be scheduled. As no dates suitable for everyone could be found out of the dates proposed by the applicants\u2019 representatives, the court invited them to propose new dates for 2013. On 17 August 2012 the dates were set for January and February 2013. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal had also granted an application by the prosecutor for a review of the lawfulness of the surveillance activities. It asked for the surveillance files, including all the prosecutors\u2019 and preliminary investigation judges\u2019 decisions authorising the secret surveillance, to be sent to it. 22.  The Court of Appeal convicted the applicants by a judgment of 19 June 2013. After examining the surveillance files, the court found that the prosecutors\u2019 applications for authorisation of secret surveillance had contained sufficient information to assess the need for such activities. It considered that the surveillance activities had been lawful and the evidence thereby obtained admissible. In convicting the first and the second applicant companies, the court relied on Article 14 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 56 below) and found that the third applicant had acted in the interests of the two companies. 23.  Between 17 and 19 July 2013 all of the applicants lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court. 24.  On 17 December 2013 the Supreme Court granted the applicants leave to appeal. On 22 January 2014 it gave the parties a deadline of 19 March 2014 to submit their observations. In the meantime, the Supreme Court had asked for the surveillance files to be forwarded to it. On 10 April 2014 it was decided that the case would be transferred to the full panel of the Criminal Chamber, and the parties were given an additional deadline of 28 May 2014 to submit their observations. 25.  On 30 June 2014 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the applicants\u2019 criminal case (no. 3\u20111\u20111\u201114\u201114). It considered the evidence gathered by means of secret surveillance to be admissible. In substance, it upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction. 26.  In assessing whether the length of the proceedings had been reasonable, the Supreme Court relied on the criteria established in the Court\u2019s case-law. 27.  As for the period to be taken into account, the Supreme Court considered that the relevant period had not necessarily started running from the date when the first steps in the criminal proceedings had been taken, but rather when the applicants could be considered to be subject to a \u201ccharge\u201d, or when they had been otherwise substantially affected by actions taken by the prosecuting authorities. The Supreme Court did not agree that the relevant period should be calculated from the date when the first secret surveillance activities had been carried out with respect to the applicants. This also applied to the third applicant and the applicant companies, who had suggested that the start date of the surveillance activities \u2013 carried out as of 2 September 2004 with respect to the third applicant in different criminal proceedings which were later terminated \u2013 should be taken as a starting point (see paragraph 8 above). 28.  Against that background, the Supreme Court considered that the beginning of the relevant time period should be determined as follows: 25 September 2005 for the second applicant (when he had discovered a surveillance device in his office); 3 October 2006 for the first applicant (when his office had been searched); 3 October 2006 for the second applicant company and the third applicant, in relation to certain criminal incidents (when the premises of the company, including the office of the third applicant, had been searched); 20 September 2007 for the first applicant company and the third applicant, in relation to other criminal incidents (when the premises of the company had been searched); and 16 October 2007 for the fourth applicant (when he had been questioned as a suspect). 29.  The proceedings ended on 30 June 2014 when the Supreme Court judgment was adopted and became final. This meant that the criminal proceedings had lasted: eight years, nine months and five days with respect to the second applicant; seven years, eight months and twenty-eight days with respect to the first applicant, the second applicant company and the third applicant (in relation to certain criminal incidents); six years, nine months and eleven days with respect to the first applicant company and the third applicant (in relation to other criminal incidents); and six years, eight months and twenty-one days with respect to the fourth applicant. 30.  When assessing whether the proceedings had been excessively long, the Supreme Court firstly observed that the case had been rather complex as regards the issues of law, and very complex from an evidentiary perspective. Nine persons had been accused, two of whom had been Members of Parliament whose immunity had had to be lifted (see paragraph 15 above). Complex schemes had been used to commit the offences in question, and the activities of the accused had involved a high level of conspiracy. This had made the collection of evidence concerning the offences difficult and the analysis of the (circumstancial) evidence time-consuming. Numerous witnesses had been heard during the pre-trial proceedings and in court (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). The proceedings before the court of first instance had entailed hearings over the course of ninety-two days, and this also indicated how many questions had needed to be addressed and how complex the questions had been. 31.  Secondly, the Supreme Court stated that there had been no delays during the pre-trial and trial stage of the proceedings. Rather, the lower courts had attempted to guarantee that the proceedings would not last an excessively long time. Some procedural flexibility had been lost due to the fact that the first-instance court had allowed the accused who had not been directly concerned by particular questions and evidence to be absent from the hearings altogether (see paragraph 17 above). At the same time, this had alleviated the effect of the proceedings on the accused, and had therefore been justified. The Supreme Court admitted that the organisation of the court hearings at first instance (not planning hearings sufficiently far in advance and not deciding on procedural matters quickly enough, thus allowing for long disputes between the parties), the volume and structure of the criminal file, and the presentation of the statement of charges (which had entailed unnecessary repetition and the structure of which had been illogical to some extent) might have added to the duration of the proceedings. However, the court noted that the defence representatives had opposed hearings being planned in advance, and in that regard they too had to be considered responsible. Furthermore, although it might have been reasonable for the prosecution to remove some of the material from the criminal file, the Supreme Court also considered that it had been for the defence representatives and not for the prosecution to decide whether some of the evidence in the criminal file was relevant from the perspective of the defence. The presentation of the statement of charges had not hindered defence rights either. As for separating the criminal case of E.T. from the rest of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 79 below), the Supreme Court considered that this had related to only one of the charges against the third applicant and the first applicant company, and the latter\u2019s counsel had not objected to the separation. Accordingly, the decision not to separate the case of E.T. from the rest of the proceedings could not be considered justified. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that although some time might have been lost owing to the above-mentioned issues, the overall loss of time had been relatively insignificant in the context of the total duration of the proceedings. 32.  Thirdly, the Supreme Court considered that the applicants had not prolonged the proceedings. In that regard, it noted that the defence representatives could not have been expected to preventively clear their timetables for possible appeal hearings in autumn 2012. Therefore, the fact that, at the appeal stage, hearings had only taken place six months after the Court of Appeal had started planning the relevant dates (see paragraph 21 above) could not be held against the applicants. Although the applicants could not be reproached for the fact that hearings had had to be cancelled or adjourned owing to their health and other personal reasons (see paragraph 17 above), such delays could not be attributed to the State either. 33.  The Supreme Court admitted that the impact of the proceedings on the applicants had undoubtedly been serious, especially given the significant public interest in the case. At the same time, the court considered that other than the two months and nineteen days that the second applicant had spent in detention, and the two days when the first applicant had been under arrest, the applicants had not been detained. Moreover, on 17 February 2010 the first-instance court had annulled a restriction imposed on the first, the second and the third applicants not to leave their place of residence. 34.  Assessing all those circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the proceedings, although close to being excessively lengthy, had still been concluded within a reasonable time. 35.  The Supreme Court noted that secret surveillance interfered with people\u2019s right to privacy, and that the principle of ultima ratio served the purpose of ensuring the proportionality of such interference. 36.  The Supreme Court then addressed the preliminary investigation judges\u2019 decisions authorising the surveillance activities. Firstly, it noted that, in accordance with Article 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik, hereinafter \u201cthe CCrP\u201d, see paragraph 49 below) all court decisions, including decisions authorising secret surveillance activities, had to be reasoned. That meant that, in accordance with Article 110 \u00a7 1 of the CCrP (see paragraph 45 below), authorisation decisions had to contain reasoning as to why the issuing court found that there was probable cause to believe that an offence had been committed, and why it was impossible, or especially complicated, to collect evidence by other means (the principle of ultima ratio). That reasoning could not be merely declaratory. The necessary reasoning could, however, rely on general criminological knowledge, for example knowledge concerning the nature of organised crime, the high level of conspiracy involved in the case in question, a presumed lack of witnesses willing to give statements, and so on. In any event, the reasoning had to be linked to the evidence in that particular case. Owing to time pressure and the likely fragmentary nature of information available at the time, the duty to provide reasons was less extensive when authorising secret surveillance than when deciding to convict a person. 37.  The Supreme Court then noted that the preliminary investigation judges\u2019 decisions (see paragraph 12 above) had not complied with the requirement of being reasoned. However, the lack of reasoning did not amount to a lack of authorisation, and did not mean that the surveillance activities had been conducted arbitrarily and beyond judicial control. This was so because the investigating authority was not competent to assess the adequacy of reasoning. It had the right to rely on the operative part of a decision authorising surveillance activities. Therefore, the failure to give proper reasons for a decision authorising surveillance activities did not result in the inadmissibility of evidence thereby collected. The Supreme Court reasoned that it was not only during the authorisation stage that the ultima ratio nature of the secret surveillance measures could be examined. In fact, regardless of the existence of earlier decisions authorising surveillance activities, courts subsequently hearing a criminal case also had an obligation to examine whether the substantive conditions for granting the authorisation decisions had been fulfilled at the time the decisions had been issued. If necessary, the courts could then declare the evidence thereby obtained inadmissible. A lack of requisite reasoning in an initial authorisation decision required the subsequent examination to be conducted with special diligence. 38.  The Supreme Court went on to note that it had directly examined the material in the surveillance file, including the prosecutors\u2019 applications for authorisation of surveillance activities. Based on that material, it had concluded that the substantive conditions for authorising surveillance activities had been fulfilled at the time the authorisation decisions had been issued. The Supreme Court was convinced that at that time there had been probable cause to believe that offences had been committed, and that it had been impossible to collect evidence by other means to verify that suspicion. In support of its findings, the Supreme Court referred to the nature of the crimes and the high level of conspiracy involved, and considered that it was unlikely that written or electronic evidence could have been collected or that witnesses could have been found without the proceedings being jeopardised. 39.  With regard to the reasoning in the prosecutors\u2019 decisions to authorise surveillance activities, the Supreme Court observed that, despite the requirement \u2013 deriving from Article 145 of the CCrP \u2013 that such decisions also had to be reasoned, they contained only an operative part and no reasoning at all. It then reiterated its position outlined above regarding the decisions issued by a preliminary investigation judge authorising surveillance activities. The Supreme Court concluded that the conditions set out in Article 110 of the CCrP had been fulfilled at the time the decisions had been issued. 40.  As the third applicant had raised the question of the compatibility of the regulation of secret surveillance with the Constitution and the Convention, the Supreme Court \u2013 also acting as a constitutional review court \u2013 analysed the regulation of the CCrP (the limitations as regards offences in respect of which secret surveillance could be conducted, the principle of foreseeability, and the permitted duration of surveillance). It found that the relevant regulation was constitutional. The Supreme Court also concluded that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the duration of the surveillance activities with respect to the second and the third applicants had not been excessively lengthy. 41.  Judge Kergandberg addressed the requirement to provide reasons for decisions authorising secret surveillance. He found that the Supreme Court had altered its earlier practice by \u201cif not 180 degrees, then 160 degrees\u201d by accepting that the lack of reasoning in the relevant decisions could not be equated to a lack of authorisation. Up until that judgment, it had been established case-law that, in accordance with Article 111 of the CCrP, violating the ultima ratio principle when issuing secret surveillance authorisations also inevitably meant that the evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible. In the instant case, the Supreme Court had distinguished between \u201cgranting authorisation for secret surveillance activities\u201d and \u201cobtaining evidence via secret surveillance activities\u201d, and had stated that a violation of law during the authorisation stage could not affect the admissibility of evidence.", "references": ["5", "2", "7", "9", "8", "0", "1", "6", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived either in the Chechen Republic or the Republic of Ingushetia, a region neighbouring Chechnya. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-2006 after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen. In each of the applications the events took place in areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants received no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6.  In each of the cases the applicants complained of the respective abduction to law-enforcement bodies and an official investigation was instituted. The proceedings in respect of each case, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without any tangible results having been attained. As can be seen from the documents submitted, no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than their forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Further to such requests, the authorities generally reported in respect of each case that the involvement of servicemen in the abduction in question had not been established and that no special operations had been carried out at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged with various authorities requests for information and assistance in the search for their missing relatives but received only formal responses, if any. The identities of the perpetrators have never been established by the investigating authorities. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities by the applicants, their relatives and/or neighbours, and other witnesses. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but contested the involvement of servicemen in the events in question. 8.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, who was born in 1972. The first applicant is his wife, the second applicant is his sister and the third and fourth applicants are his children. 9.  The facts of the present application have already been examined by the Court in Bekova v. Russia (no. 53679/07) in respect of the abduction of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev (see Sultygov and Others v. Russia, nos. 42575/07 and 11 others, \u00a7\u00a7 40-80, 9 October 2014). 10.  At the material time Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev worked at a construction site located at Moscovskaya Street in Nazran, Ingushetia. At about 9.30 a.m. on 29 September 2005 he was in the workers\u2019 trailer at the construction site when a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms broke into it. Most of the armed men were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. 11.  Having broken into the trailer, the armed men immediately started beating Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev and dragged him outside. Two men \u2011 Mr M\u2011A.B. and Mr Ruslan Yandiyev, who were also present at the site \u2011 tried to intervene but the armed men took them outside and forced them into their vehicles. They then put Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, unconscious and bleeding, into the boot of one of the vehicles and drove away with the three men. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 12.  The whereabouts of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev remain unknown. 13.  For the main witness statements and investigative steps taken by the authorities, see Sultygov and Others (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 50-80). 14.  On 29 September 2005 Mr M.-B.M. lodged a complaint with the Nazran town prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the abduction of his brother (Mr M.-A.B.), Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev and an unknown third man. The investigators immediately examined the crime scene and found a substance resembling blood on a fragment of broken glass. 15.  On 9 October 2005 the Nazran town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 05560115 into the abduction of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, Mr M.-A.B. and Mr Ruslan Yandiyev. 16.  On 15 October 2005 the mother of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev was granted victim status in the criminal case. 17.  On 29 December 2005 and 18 September 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that her husband had been abducted by unknown people on 29 September 2005 from his place of work. 18.  On an unknown date (apparently in 2008) the first applicant was granted victim status. 19.  On 17 April 2007 the investigators informed the first applicant that operational search activities were in progress with the aim of establishing her husband\u2019s whereabouts. 20.  On 27 February 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform her of any progress in the proceedings. 21.  On 5 April 2008 the investigators again questioned the first applicant. On 14 April 2008 they questioned the second applicant. 22.  The investigation into the abduction was suspended and resumed on numerous occasions. It was last suspended on 24 May 2015. The investigation is still pending. 23.  The applicant was the wife of Mr Ibragim Idrisov, who was born in 1951. She died on 24 August 2011. Her daughter, Ms Larisa Ibayeva (also spelled as Larissa Ibaeva), who is also the daughter of the disappeared Mr Ibragim Idrisov, expressed her wish to pursue the application. 24.  On 27 January 2002 Mr Ibragim Idrisov went to Shali, Chechnya, for a work-related purpose. On the same date servicemen from the Shali district temporary department of the interior (\u201cthe VOVD\u201d) arrested him and placed him in a temporary detention ward on the premises of the VOVD police station. His GAZ-2410 vehicle was seized and placed in the station\u2019s inner courtyard. 25.  Following Mr Ibragim Idrisov\u2019s arrest the applicant was informed thereof. From 28 January 2002 until 2 February 2002 she visited him regularly in the VOVD, bringing him food and warm clothing. 26.  On the morning of 3 February 2002, when the applicant came to visit her husband in the VOVD as usual, she was informed that Mr Ibragim Idrisov had been released the day before, on 2 February 2002. Meanwhile, Mr Ibragim Idrisov\u2019s GAZ-2410 vehicle remained parked on the premises of the VOVD. 27.  The whereabouts of Mr Ibragim Idrisov remain unknown. 28.  On 11 February 2002 the applicant lodged an official complaint with the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office requesting assistance in the search for her husband. 29.  On 13 February 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59053 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 30.  On 20 February 2002 Major A.Sh., the head of the VOVD, issued a report stating that Mr Ibragim Idrisov had been detained on 27 January 2002, placed in the VOVD\u2019s temporary detention ward and then released on 2 February 2002. His vehicle remained on the VOVD premises. 31.  On 8 August 2002 the investigators informed the applicant that the proceedings in respect of the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 32.  On 14 January 2003 the investigation was resumed. 33.  On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2004 the applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. She received letters in reply stating, in particular, that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish her husband\u2019s whereabouts. 34.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 35.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Magomed Dadulagov, who was born in 1951. 36.  On 9 December 2003 Mr Magomed Dadulagov was buying sugar at the market in Nazran, Ingushetia when a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a grey UAZ-469 (tabletka) vehicle without registration plates. The servicemen forced Mr Magomed Dadulagov into the vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. His GAZ-2410 vehicle, in which he had driven to the market, also disappeared. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 37.  The whereabouts of Mr Magomed Dadulagov remain unknown. 38.  On 31 December 2003 the Nazran town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 03560091 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 39.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Magomed Dadulagov was available. 40.  On 8 January 2004 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 41.  On 15 January 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S., who worked at the market. He stated that on 9 December 2003 a Chechen man had arrived in a GAZ-2410 vehicle and had asked to buy sugar from him. When Mr S. had come out of his kiosk with sugar and change he had seen this man lying on the ground. He had been surrounded by about seven men, some of them wearing balaclavas. One of the assailants had threatened the market tradespeople with a gun and told them all to stand still. Then the assailants had forced the Chechen man into a UAZ-469 vehicle and had left. One of them had got into the driving seat of the above-mentioned GAZ-2410 vehicle and had followed behind the UAZ-469. Some of the abductors had been of Slavic appearance; others had been of Asiatic appearance. They had carried firearms with silencers. In Mr S.\u2019s opinion, this had been a planned operation by the secret services. The next day the son of the abducted man had come searching for him; Mr S. had returned to him the money left by his father. 42.  On 31 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 43.  On several occasions between 2006 and 2010 the applicant complained to various State authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. Some replies contained statements to the effect that the necessary operational activities were being carried out. 44.  On 23 January 2014 a lawyer retained by the applicant sent a request to the head of the Nazran Investigative Committee asking him to provide him with copies of certain case-file documents. On 6 February 2014 he received a reply that the investigation had been suspended on 31 March 2004. 45.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 46.  According to the Government, on 25 May 2015 the Shali Town Court of the Chechen Republic (\u0428\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438), at the applicant\u2019s request, declared Mr Magomed Dadulagov dead. 47.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Rizvan Bashayev, who was born in 1962. 48.  On 20 December 2000 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 20 February 2001) Mr Rizvan Bashayev left his sister\u2019s house in Grozny and never returned. 49.  The whereabouts of Mr Rizvan Bashayev have remained unknown ever since. 50.  On 26 January 2001 Zavodskoy District police station in Grozny opened a search file (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u043e \u2013 no. 102004) in respect of Mr Rizvan Bashayev. It is unclear whether any measures for establishing his whereabouts were undertaken. 51.  On an unspecified date in 2002 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic \u2013 in response to a request lodged by the applicant \u2013 declared her husband missing. The court found, in particular, that Mr Rizvan Bashayev had disappeared on 20 December 2000 after his arrest at a roadblock in the village of Komsomolskoye. The court also referred to the applicant\u2019s statements that she had lodged a complaint with Zavodskoy District police station, whose officers had been searching for her husband, but to no avail. 52.  On 29 October 2005 a police officer from Zavodskoy District police station interviewed Ms S., the sister of Mr Rizvan Bashayev. She stated that on 21 December 2001 at around 3 p.m. her brother had come to visit her at the market, where she worked. After having a meal with her at a caf\u00e9, he had left the caf\u00e9 to have a smoke but had promised to return. She had not seen her brother since. 53.  On 31 October 2005 the Zavodskoy District prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 41209 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 54.  On 20 and 23 November 2005 the investigators questioned the relatives of Mr Rizvan Bashayev, who gave statements that were similar to that of Ms S. 55.  On 26 November 2005 Ms S. was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. 56.  On 28 November 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene. 57.  On 29 November 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 58.  On various dates the investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Rizvan Bashayev was available. 59.  On 31 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof. 60.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 61.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Khizir Galtakov (also spelled as Goltakov), who was born in 1969. The first applicant is his wife; the second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant was the mother of Mr Khizir Galtakov; she died in March 2017. 62.  At about 11 p.m. on 17 May 2005 Mr Khizir Galtakov and his friend Mr K. were in the village of Znamenskoye, Chechnya, at the intersection of Shosseynaya Street and the road between Ken\u2011Yurt and Bratskoye, when a group of about six armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a grey UAZ vehicle without registration plates. The men forced Mr Khizir Galtakov into the vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. 63.  The whereabouts of Mr Khizir Galtakov remain unknown. 64.  On 18 May 2005 the first applicant informed the authorities of the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. A few hours later a task force examined the crime scene. 65.  On 28 May 2005 the Nadterechniy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 49007 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 66.  On 1 June 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 67.  On 2 June 2005 the investigators questioned Mr K., whose statement concerning the circumstances of Khizir Galtakov\u2019s abduction was similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions to the Court. 68.  Over the next few days the investigators questioned several other witnesses who had found out about the events of 17 May 2005, mostly from Mr K. or through hearsay. 69.  The investigators also sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Khizir Galtakov was available. 70.  On 28 July 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof on 11 January 2007. 71.  On 9 September 2008 the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior issued a certificate confirming the circumstances of Mr Khizir Galtakov\u2019s abduction, as described by the applicants. 72.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 73.  On 31 October 2008 the Nadterechniy District Court in the Chechen Republic declared Mr Khizir Galtakov a missing person. 74.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Sharudi Obrugov, who was born in 1980. The first applicant is his father and the second applicant is his mother. The third applicant was his brother; he died on 28 May 2011. 75.  At about 5 p.m. on 14 August 2002 Mr Sharudi Obrugov was with his friends at the crossroads of Melnichnaya and Lugovaya Streets in Argun when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a white VAZ-2107 car with tinted windows and a Gazel minivan without registration plates. Speaking Russian, the servicemen ordered Mr Sharudi Obrugov and his friends to lie face down on the ground and to put their hands behind their backs. Having searched them and checked their identity documents, the servicemen handcuffed Mr Obrugov, forced him into the minivan and drove off to an unknown destination. 76.  Immediately after the abduction, the first applicant went to the Argun military commander\u2019s office, where one of the officers confirmed that his son had been detained by military servicemen. The first applicant also learned from the officer that Mr Sharudi Obrugov had been transferred to the main military base of the Russian federal forces in Khankala. 77.  The whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov remain unknown. 78.  On 18 September 2002 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Argun Town Police Office regarding the abduction of his son. 79.  On 1 October 2002 the Argun town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 78094 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 80.  On 19 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. 81.  On the same date the investigators questioned Mr I.I. and Mr A.A., two friends of Mr Sharudi Obrugov who had witnessed his abduction. They affirmed the account of events submitted by the applicants. 82.  On 25 October 2002 the investigators sent a letter to the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) asking whether any security operation had been carried out on 14 August 2002 and whether Mr Sharudi Obrugov had participated in any illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The FSB replied in the negative. 83.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Sharudi Obrugov was available. 84.  On 1 December 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 8 May 2003 and suspended again on 8 June 2003. 85.  On 2 June 2005 the investigation was resumed. On 20 June 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene and the house where Mr Sharudi Obrugov had lived before his abduction. On 2 July 2005 the investigation was suspended. 86.  In 2007 operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov were carried out. Police officers interviewed his neighbours and relatives and examined cemeteries, but to no avail. 87.  On 19 February 2010 the second applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be informed of any progress in the proceedings. Her request was refused. 88.  On 21 May 2010 the second applicant requested the investigators to grant her full access to the criminal case file. Full access was granted. 89.  On 9 October 2010 the investigation was resumed. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities and questioned Mr A.A., the second applicant and the cousins of Mr Sharudi Obrugov. The investigators also ordered a forensic DNA examination. 90.  On 29 November 2010 the investigation was suspended. At the same time, the investigators ordered that operational search activities be carried out, with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov. 91.  On 5 October 2011 the investigation was resumed. The first applicant was granted \u201ccivil claimant\u201d status (\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0446) in the criminal case. On 6 October 2011 the investigation was suspended. 92.  On several occasions between 2002 and 2010 the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of their son and requested assistance in the search for him. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their son\u2019s whereabouts. 93.  On 13 January 2012 the NGO Materi Chechni, acting on behalf of the second applicant, asked the head of the Chechen Parliamentary Committee on the search for the Disappeared (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u041f\u0430\u0440\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0443 \u043b\u0438\u0446, \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0434 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) for assistance in the search of Mr Obrugov. On 12 March 2012 the investigators replied that operational search activities were being undertaken in order to establish his whereabouts. 94.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 95.  On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic steps. On 18 October 2010 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 9 October 2010 the investigation had been resumed. On 8 December 2010 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 96.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ayub Bakhayev, who was born in 1979. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother, and the third applicant is his sister. 97.  At about 1 p.m. on 13 October 2001 Mr Ayub Bakhayev left his home at 25a Melnichnaya Street in Argun to go to the pharmacy. He was heading towards the pharmacy when a group of approximately six armed servicemen in military uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two VAZ-2106 vehicles with registration plates allegedly comprising the digits \u201c680 95 RUS\u201d and \u201c689 95 RUS\u201d. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen threatened passers-by with firearms and warned them to stand still. Then they searched Mr Ayub Bakhayev, forced him into one of the vehicles and drove to the premises of the Argun district military commander\u2019s office. 98.  Subsequently, on several occasions, both of the above-mentioned vehicles that had been used by the abductors were seen unrestrictedly entering the premises of the commander\u2019 office. 99.  Following the abduction, the applicants went to the commander\u2019s office, where one of the officers confirmed that Mr Ayub Bakhayev had been arrested. 100.  The whereabouts of Mr Ayub Bakhayev have remained unknown since the date of his abduction. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant. 101.  On 15 October 2001 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. 102.  On 20 January 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 78009 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 103.  On 23 January 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. 104.  On 25 December 2002 the first applicant was questioned. She gave the same account of events as that which she submitted to the Court. 105.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Ayub Bakhayev was available, that no security operation had been carried out on 13 October 2001, and that there was no information concerning the VAZ-2106 vehicles. 106.  On 20 March 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 20 November 2002 and again suspended on 30 December 2002. 107.  On 28 April 2004 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Argun town prosecutor, asking that the investigation be resumed. 108.  On 7 May 2004 the Argun town prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed. The applicant was informed thereof. 109.  On 10 June 2004 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. 110.  In 2007 the Argun Town police station carried out operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Ayub Bakhayev. The police questioned the first applicant and several witnesses and sent requests for information to various authorities. 111.  On 3 March 2010 the first applicant requested that the proceedings be resumed and that she be informed of any progress in the investigation. In reply, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended and that operational search activities were in progress with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of her son. 112.  On 21 May 2010 the applicant requested that she be granted access to the investigation file. No reply was made to this request. 113.  On 7 October 2010 the investigators\u2019 supervisor ordered that the investigation be resumed. 114.  On 17 October 2010 the first applicant was questioned again. She gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the abduction of her son that was similar to that which she submitted to the Court. 115.  On 19 October 2010 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the DNA taken from the first applicant\u2019s blood. 116.  From 8 until 10 November 2010 the investigators questioned several witnesses, including the applicants\u2019 neighbours. 117.  On 15 November 2010 the investigation was suspended and subsequently resumed on 24 June 2011 after the investigators\u2019 superior pointed out several defects in the investigation. The investigators sent several requests for information to State authorities concerning the two above-mentioned VAZ-2106 vehicles and to this end questioned three witnesses about those vehicles; their statements did not provide any pertinent information. 118.  On 24 July 2011 the investigation was suspended again. On 5 October 2011 it was resumed; the first applicant was informed thereof. On the same day she was granted \u201ccivil claimant\u201d status in the criminal case. 119.  On 6 October 2011 the investigation was suspended. 120.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 121.  On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the proceedings and their failure to take basic investigative steps. On 13 October 2010 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 7 October 2010 the investigation had already been resumed. On 17 November 2010 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 122.  The first applicant was the mother of Mr Said-Emin (also spelled as Sayd\u2011Emi and Sayd-Emin) Ocherkhadzhiyev, who was born in 1967. She died on 2 April 2014. The second applicant, Mr Adam Ocherkhadzhiyev, is the brother of Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev. 123.  In January 2000 the Russian federal forces conducted an extensive military operation against members of illegal armed groups in Grozny. The town was subjected to shelling and sweeping-up operations. By the end of January 2000 the central parts of the city, including the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, were under the Russian forces\u2019 control (see Umayeva v. Russia, no. 1200/03, \u00a7 79, 4 December 2008, and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, \u00a7\u00a7 16 and 41, 24 February 2005). 124.  On 19 January 2000 Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev left his home in the settlement (\u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u043b\u043e\u043a) of Katayama in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, accompanied by the second applicant. They went to the settlement of Michurina in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny to visit a relative. A neighbour, Mr S.Kh., joined them. On their way there they came across an armoured personnel carrier (APC) carrying Russian servicemen. The servicemen wore military uniforms, spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. They opened fire and wounded Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev. Meanwhile, the second applicant and Mr S.Kh. managed to hide behind a building and escaped the shooting. The servicemen picked the wounded Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev off the ground, put him into the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. 125.  The whereabouts of Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev remain unknown. 126.  As soon as the shelling in Grozny was over, the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 127.  On 19 June 2001 the Grozny town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 17073 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 128.  On 27 July 2001 the first applicant was granted victim status. 129.  The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 19 August 2001 for failure to identify the perpetrators; the applicants were not duly informed of this decision. The investigation was resumed on 24 November 2005 and suspended on 24 January 2006, resumed again on 18 January 2010 and suspended on 28 February 2010, then resumed on 8 November 2010 and suspended again on 8 December 2010. 130.  On 10 May 2011 the first applicant lodged a request with the investigating authority for the resumption of the investigation into the disappearance of her son. She also asked the investigators to question the second applicant and Mr S.Kh. 131.  On 11 May 2011 the investigation was resumed. 132.  On 12 May 2011 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who gave the same account of events as that which he submitted to the Court. In addition, he stated that he had not given testimony earlier because he was afraid of coming to the investigating authorities as a witness to the above-mentioned events. 133.  On 14 May 2011 the investigators questioned Mr S.Kh., whose statement was very similar to that of the second applicant. 134.  In some of their replies to requests for information lodged by the applicants regarding Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev, the investigators indicated that he had disappeared during a counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic. 135.  On 16 May 2011 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 19 October 2011 and suspended on 20 October 2011, then resumed on 18 April 2012 and suspended on 8 May 2012. 136.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 137.  On 13 January 2010 and 12 August 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Grozny challenging the investigators\u2019 decisions to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic steps. On 7 April 2010 and 22 November 2010 the court rejected that complaint, having found that the decisions to suspend the proceedings had already been annulled and the investigation resumed. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision of 22 November 2010. 138.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev, who was born in 1980. The second and the third applicants are his brother and sister. 139.  On 5 April 2003 Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev, the second applicant and a group of about five or six residents of different neighbouring villages went into the mountains nearby the settlement of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoy district of Chechnya to pick wild garlic (allium ursinum). Having finished picking in the evening on the same date, they headed down from the mountains in the direction of the road, where a vehicle was waiting to take them home. Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev walked ahead of the group. Somewhere on the path to the road a group of about ten-fifteen military servicemen stopped Mr Mazhiyev. Having witnessed this, the second applicant and other fellow villagers tried to approach and help Mr Mazhiyev, but the servicemen threatened them with firearms and ordered them to lie down on the ground and stay still. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance; they were wearing paratroopers\u2019 military uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. All of them were armed and equipped with portable radio sets. After the servicemen had taken Mr Mazhiyev away, the second applicant and the others got up from the ground. They went down the mountain to their vehicle, hoping that Mr Mazhiyev would be waiting for them there, but they could not find him. 140.  The next day, the second applicant, together with other relatives, went to a military unit stationed in the village of Dachu\u2011Barzoy. One of the officers, who introduced himself as Valeriy, informed them that Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev had been detained by military servicemen; those servicemen had brought him to the 45th regiment, which was stationed in the village of Khattuni. 141.  The whereabouts of Mr Alikhan Mezhiyev remain unknown. 142.  According to the applicants, immediately after the above events they abstained from lodging any official complaints, fearing for their lives and the life of their missing relative. On 29 June 2003 they lodged a complaint with the authorities regarding the abduction, requesting that a criminal investigation be opened. 143.  On 29 July 2003 the Vedeno district prosecutors\u2019 office opened criminal case no. 24058 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 144.  On 29 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The first applicant was informed thereof. 145.  On 14 and 28 April 2010 the first applicant requested information about progress in the proceedings. She also asked to be granted access to the investigation file. 146.  On 15 June 2010 the military prosecutor\u2019s office of the United Group Alignment informed the first applicant that the investigation file had been lost and that measures were being taken to retrieve it. 147.  On 1 July 2010 the acting head of the Shali inter-district investigations department ordered that the criminal case file be retrieved. 148.  On 5 July 2010 the applicants were informed that the investigation had been resumed. It was subsequently suspended on 4 August 2010, then resumed on 9 June 2011, suspended on 11 July 2011, then resumed on 13 July 2011 and suspended again on 25 July 2011. 149.  On 20 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 150.  On 21 July 2010 the second applicant was questioned as a witness. He gave the same account of events as that which he submitted to the Court. 151.  On the same date, another brother of Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev was questioned as a witness. He had been told of the events of 5 April 2003 by the second applicant. 152.  On 22 July 2010 the investigators questioned the third applicant. She confirmed that on the day following the abduction of her brother her relatives had gone to the military unit stationed in Dachu\u2011Barzoy village. They had been told by the chief serviceman that Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev had been held in the village of Khattuni. 153.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities and to various hospitals. The responses stated that no information about Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev was available. 154.  On 2 August 2010 the investigators lodged a request with the head of the Vedenskiy District police station for a properly secured on-site examination to be organised of the area between the settlements of Ulus\u2011Kert and Selmintauzin. The military commander informed him in reply that such an examination was impossible because the officers of the FSB were carrying out special operations in that area. 155.  On 14 April 2011 the first applicant obtained the investigators\u2019 permission to study the case file. 156.  On 25 June 2011 the first applicant was questioned again. 157.  On 15 July 2011 the investigators questioned a police officer who had been working in the villages of Tevzana and Khatuni since 2001. He stated that in 2003 various units of the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence (6-\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0413\u0420\u0423) in Grozny had been stationed on the outskirts of the village of Khattuni. 158.  On numerous occasions between 2003 and 2011 the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that their complaints had been examined or forwarded to other authorities for examination and that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their relative\u2019s whereabouts. 159.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 160.  On 16 May 2011 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the proceedings and their failure to take basic steps. On 14 June 2011 the court rejected that complaint, having found that several days earlier, on 9 June 2011, the investigators had resumed the proceedings. On 29 July 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the above decision on appeal. 161.  The first applicant was the mother of Ms Tumisha (also spelled as Tumishat) Sadykova, who was born in 1959. She died on 22 October 2014. The second applicant is the sister of Ms Tumisha Sadykova. 162.  At the material time, Ms Tumisha Sadykova worked at a car wash on Subbotnikov Street in Grozny. A regional department of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency was located across the street. 163.  At about 2 p.m. on 15 March 2006 Ms Tumisha Sadykova and her relative, Mr Kh.Kh., were at the car wash, when a group of about ten armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in VAZ\u201121099 and UAZ-469 vehicles without registration plates. The men forced Ms Tumisha Sadykova and Mr Kh.Kh. into the UAZ vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 164.  Mr Kh.Kh. was released later on the same date somewhere in Grozny (see below). 165.  At some point after the abduction, one of Ms Tumisha Sadykova\u2019s colleagues (named Adam) and a relative of the applicants (named Aslanbek) \u2013 both of whom assisted the applicants in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova \u2013 obtained information concerning the possibility of her being released in exchange for money. The two men asked the applicants to give them money in the amount allegedly demanded of them in exchange for Mr Tumisha Sadykova\u2019s release. According to the applicants, they paid the amount requested, but Ms Tumisha Sadykova was not released. As can be seen from the case file, the investigators were subsequently informed of those developments. 166.  The whereabouts of Ms Tumisha Sadykova have remained unknown ever since the day of her abduction. 167.  On 16 August 2006 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that an investigation be opened. 168.  On 30 September 2006 the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 50176 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 169.  On the same date the first applicant was granted victim status. 170.  On 2 October 2006 the first applicant was questioned by the investigators. 171.  On 9 and 10 October 2006 the investigators questioned two eyewitnesses to the abduction, Mr L-A.Ch. and Mr R.Kh. Their statements about the events of 15 March 2006 were similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions to the Court. In addition, Mr R.Kh. stated that one of the armed men had asked him in Chechen where the entrance to the caf\u00e9 was. 172.  On 14 October 2006 and 6 April 2010 the second applicant was questioned. She affirmed the account of the abduction given above. 173.  On 8 November 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.S. (the father of Ms Tumisha Sadykova), who stated in particular that some time after the abduction, two men (a colleague of his daughter named Adam and a relative of his family) \u2013 both of whom had been engaged in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova \u2013 had asked him to hand over to them the amount of money allegedly demanded by way of a ransom for her release. He had paid the amount requested, but Ms Tumisha Sadykova had not been released. 174.  The investigators lodged several requests for information with the law-enforcement authorities; those authorities\u2019 responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Ms Tumisha Sadykova was available. 175.  On 30 November 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 176.  A number of operational search activities aimed at finding Ms Tumisha Sadykova were carried out by police officers in 2010. In particular, on 26 April 2010 they examined the crime scene at the car wash. Those steps yielded no tangible results. 177.  On 8 April 2009 a relative of the applicants requested the Chechen Parliament for assistance in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 178.  On 31 March 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed. On 16 June 2011 her request was granted and the investigation was resumed. It was suspended on 16 July 2011 and again resumed on 27 January 2012. 179.  On 10 February 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant. She stated, in particular, that after the first Chechen war, from 1997 until 1999, her sister, Ms Tumisha Sadykova, had worked at the Ministry of Sharia National Security (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438) during the period when Aslan Maskhadov had been President of Chechnya. 180.  On 24 February 2012 the investigation was suspended. On 31 May 2012 that decision was annulled by the Leninsky district prosecutor\u2019s office , which pointed out several defects in the investigation. Consequently, on 4 June 2012 the investigation was resumed. 181.  On 7 June 2012 Mr Kh.M. was questioned. He stated that in March 2006 he met Ms Tumisha Sadykova at the car wash. During their conversation, an UAZ-469 vehicle had arrived; four armed man in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas had got out of the vehicle. They had demanded in Russian and in Chechen that Mr Kh.M. show them his identity documents. When he had attempted to present his official identification issued by the law-enforcement agency, where he worked, the men had grabbed him and forced him into his VAZ\u201121140 car. He had not seen what had happened to Ms Tumisha Sadykova. The men had told him that they would take him to the settlement of Khankala. On their way there they had checked his service identity document over the radio. Having verified that he did in fact work at the law-enforcement agency, the men had stopped the car. An UAZ-469 vehicle had arrived; the men had got out of Mr Kh.M.\u2019s car and told him to stay in his car without moving for about fifteen minutes. Then they had got into the UAZ-469 vehicle and had left. Mr Kh.M. had informed the relatives of Ms Tumisha Sadykova of the circumstances of her abduction. 182.  On 8 June 2012 the investigators questioned another witness, Mr B.M., who had seen several armed men forcing Ms Tumisha Sadykova into the UAZ-469 vehicle and Mr Kh.M. into the VAZ-21140 car. The men had spoken Russian and Chechen. 183.  On 4 July 2012 the investigation was suspended. On 8 April 2014 that suspension was overruled by the Leninsky district prosecutor\u2019s office. Consequently, on 14 April 2014 the investigation was resumed. 184.  The investigator sent several requests for information to various medical institutions. The responses contained statements to the effect that Ms Tumisha Sadykova had not sought medical treatment in those institutions. 185.  On 14 May 2014 the investigation was suspended. 186.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 187.  On 20 December 2011 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny challenging the investigators\u2019 decision of 16 July 2011 to suspend the proceedings. On 27 January 2012 her complaint was rejected, as the proceedings had already been resumed. On 29 February 2012 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 188.  For a summary of the relevant domestic law and practice and for international and domestic reports on disappearances in Chechnya and Ingushetia between 1999 and 2006, see Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia (nos. 2944/06 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7 43-59 and \u00a7\u00a7 69-84, 18 December 2012).", "references": ["7", "5", "9", "3", "6", "4", "8", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Dmitrovgrad. 5.  Between 2012 and 2014 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the local police department concerning the allegedly unauthorised use of the plot of land near the block of flats where her family resided. She also alleged that there had been a number of assassination attempts planned against her. 6.  On 15 January 2014 the head of the inter-municipal police department forwarded the following letter to the Psychiatric and Narcological Service:\n\u201cFollowing receipt of numerous complaints, the [police department] asks you to examine (check) [the applicant] ... at her place of residence. Her behaviour is inappropriate. She constantly talks about conspiracies against her. Complaints lodged by residents and entrepreneurs about her aggressive behaviour have grown in number. [The applicant] might cause harm to others.\u201d 7.  On 28 and 29 January 2014 a psychiatrist, Sav., questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbours, asking them if they had observed any strange behaviour on the applicant\u2019s part. 8.  On 30 January 2014 a psychiatrist visited the applicant at her place of residence. 9.  On 31 January 2014 the psychiatrist informed the police that the applicant did not have any psychiatric disorders. 10.  On 12 March 2014, in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint, the Dimitrovgrad Town Court found the psychiatrist\u2019s actions unlawful. The court established that, contrary to the applicable legislation, the psychiatrist had failed to obtain the applicant\u2019s consent to a psychiatric examination and that the applicant had objected to such an examination. 11.  On 17 March 2014 the applicant asked the court to find the police\u2019s decision to have her assessed by the psychiatrist unlawful. She considered that the decision had been arbitrary and that it had amounted to an unjustified interference with her private life. 12.  On 29 April 2014 the Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court found that the actions of the police had had a basis in law. The court interpreted the letter of 15 January 2014 issued by the police department as a request for information from the psychiatrist as to whether the applicant suffered from any mental illness. It further reasoned that the police had not asked the psychiatric service to examine the applicant. In 2012 the police had received numerous complaints from the applicant, who had alleged that she had been persecuted by unknown persons, and complaints from owners and employees of concession stands alleging that the applicant had destroyed their property and had disrupted their activities by making scenes. The police had conducted an inquiry, which did not confirm the applicant\u2019s allegations. Accordingly, the police had decided to obtain information about the applicant\u2019s mental condition. Lastly, the court reasoned that the fact that, in response to the police\u2019s request for information, the psychiatric service had examined the applicant unlawfully had no bearing on the lawfulness of the police\u2019s actions. 13.  On 22 July 2014 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 April 2014 on appeal. 14.  On 17 December 2014 the Regional Court refused to grant the applicant leave to lodge a cassation appeal. 15.  On 26 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision in response to the applicant\u2019s application to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["7", "2", "9", "0", "1", "8", "3", "5", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived in the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia, a region neighbouring Chechnya. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-05 after allegedly having been unlawfully detained by service personnel. In each of the applications the events took place in the areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants had no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6.  In each of the cases the applicants complained in respect of the abduction to law-enforcement bodies and official investigations were instituted. In every case the proceedings, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without attaining any tangible results. It follows from the documents submitted that no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Following such requests, the authorities generally reported that service personnel\u2019s involvement in the abduction had not been established and that no special operations had been ongoing at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged requests for information and assistance in the search of their missing relatives to various authorities but received only formulaic responses, if any. The perpetrators have never been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but contested the involvement of service personnel in these events. 8.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Suliman (also spelled as Suleyman) Isayev, who was born in 1966, Mr Rumid Isayev, who was born in 1969, and Mr Ramzan Isayev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Suliman Isayev and the third applicant is the wife of Mr Ramzan Isayev. 9.  On 7 April 2001 Mr Rumid Isayev went to the village of Lermontovo in Chechnya to visit his relatives. At about 8 p.m. he was detained by Russian service personnel at the checkpoint on the road between the villages of Kulary and Lermontovo. 10.  The whereabouts of Mr Rumid Isayev remain unknown ever since. 11.  Immediately after the disappearance the first applicant informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for Mr Rumid Isayev. 12.  On 10 June 2001 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 19079 under Article 127 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). 13.  On 10 August 2001 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 14.  On 7 April 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case. 15.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 16.  During her questioning as a victim in the proceedings concerning the abduction of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev, the first applicant also described the circumstances of the disappearance of Mr Rumid Isayev (see paragraphs 26, 40 and 42 below). 17.  At the material time, Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev lived with their families in the village of Kulary, Chechnya. The two families occupied neighbouring houses at nos. 66 and 68 Pervomayskaya Street. 18.  On 5 October 2003 the presidential elections were due to take place in the Chechen Republic. Enhanced security measures were taken on account of this event; the village of Kulary was patrolled by armed service personnel. 19.  At about 6 a.m. on 4 October 2003 a group of around twenty armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a UAZ-469 vehicle (\u0442\u0430\u0431\u043b\u0435\u0442\u043a\u0430) and three VAZ vehicles without registration numbers. The service personnel, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the applicants\u2019 houses and searched the premises. At some point they fired a gun. Then they forced Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev into one of the vehicles and drove away with them in the direction of the Baku to Rostov-on-Don highway. The vehicles passed the roadblock unhindered. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants\u2019 neighbours. 20.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained to the head of the Federal Migration Service\u2019s Office in Kulary, Mr I., about the abduction of their relatives. Mr I. informed them that Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev were detained in the building of the Urus-Martan District police station. 21.  The whereabouts of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev remain unknown ever since. 22.  On 4 October 2003 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal investigation be opened into the incident. 23.  On 4 October 2003 the investigators from the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office examined the crime scene and found a bullet casing. 24.  On 3 November 2003 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 42190 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 25.  On the same date the second and the third applicants were granted victim status and questioned. They gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the abduction of their husbands, similar to that before the Court. 26.  On 28 November 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of her three sons as described above. 27.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev was available. 28.  On 1 December 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant\u2019s eldest son, Mr Kh.I. He stated that on 10 October 2003 he had gone together with Mr I. to the police station. Only Mr I. had been allowed to enter it. Mr. I. had informed him that his brothers had been detained there and that they would be transferred to the village of Tolstoy-Yurt the next day. Mr Kh.I. also told the investigators that the ex-wife of his disappeared brother Mr Rumid Isayev, Ms. G., had complained to the law-enforcement authorities of the alleged involvement of his brothers in the abduction of people. According to him, she had sought revenge against his family because they had asked her to leave after the disappearance of Mr Rumid Isayev. 29.  On 3 December 2003 the investigators questioned Mr I. He confirmed that he had learnt about the detention of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev in the police station from a police officer. When he had visited it on 10 October 2003 together with Mr Kh.I., he had been informed that Isayev brothers had not been detained there. Then Mr. I. and Mr. Kh.I. had visited the premises of the 6th division of the Anti-Organised Crime Department (\u0420\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u0431\u043e\u0440\u044c\u0431\u0435 \u0441 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe RUBOP\u201d) in Urus-Martan but the Isayev brothers had not been detained there either. Mr I. denied that he had had any information about where the Isayev brothers had been detained. 30.  On 20 December 2003 the investigators ordered a ballistic expert examination of the bullet casing found at the crime scene. 31.  The ballistic expert examination established that the casing had been part of the cartridge of a bullet for a Kalashnikov machine gun of 5.45 mm calibre. 32.  On 18 January 2004, during a confrontation with Mr Kh.I., Mr. I. repeated his previous statements. 33.  On 3 February 2004 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 34.  On 6 April 2006 the first applicant lodged a request with the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic asking for the search of her sons to be intensified. In reply the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office informed her that the operational search activities aimed at establishing her sons\u2019 whereabouts were in progress. 35.  On numerous occasions between 2004 and 2006 the first applicant complained to high-ranking officials of the Chechen Republic in respect of the disappearance of her sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 36.  On 8 May 2007 the NGO Memorial, acting on the first applicant\u2019s behalf, asked the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office for information about any progress in the investigation. 37.  On 17 May 2007 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office informed the first applicant and the NGO Memorial that the investigation had been suspended and that the operational search activities were in progress in order to establish the whereabouts of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev. 38.  On 26 December 2007 the investigation was resumed. The applicants were informed thereof. 39.  In January 2008 the investigators questioned several witnesses who knew about the circumstances of the abduction of the Isayev brothers from others. 40.  On 27 January 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. She confirmed that she suspected Ms. G. of organising the abduction of her sons. 41.  On 27 January 2008 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 42.  On 20 March 2008 the investigation was resumed. The investigators questioned the first applicant with the participation of the interpreter. She additionally stated that four days after the abduction together with Mr. Kh.I. she had visited the 6th division of the RUBOP in Urus-Martan where they had learnt that her sons had been detained in that division. The first applicant had also reiterated the circumstances of the abduction of her son Mr Rumid Isayev. 43.  On 24 March and 18 April 2008 the investigators questioned Ms G., who denied that she had complained to the law-enforcement authorities about the alleged involvement of the Isayev brothers into the abduction of people. 44.  On 31 March 2008 the Grozy District Court ordered the phone tapping of two mobile numbers belonging to Ms G. 45.  On 8 April 2008 the Zavodskoy District police station in Grozny informed the investigators that no complaints concerning the alleged involvement of the Isayev brothers into the abduction of people lodged by Ms. G. were registered in the station\u2019s logbooks. 46.  On 20 April 2008 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 47.  On 14 March 2013 the second applicant asked the investigators\u2019 permission to make copies of the criminal case file. In reply the investigators informed her that copying of the case-file material was impossible owing to the need to keep the investigation secret. The second applicant was allowed however to familiarise herself with the case file. 48.  On 27 March 2013 the second and the third applicants asked the investigators give them copies of the case-file documents that they were entitled to have. 49.  On 22 April 2013 the second and the third applicants familiarised themselves with the criminal case file. The next day they asked to resume the proceedings and take additional steps to establish their husbands\u2019 whereabouts. 50.  On 6 May 2013 the investigation was resumed; it was suspended on 11 May 2013. 51.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 52.  On 30 January 2008 the first applicant complained of the inaction on the part of the investigators\u2019 to the Grozny District Court. On 22 February 2008 the court rejected her complaint as unsubstantiated having found that all the necessary steps had been taken by the authorities. On 19 March 2008 the applicant appealed against that decision. The outcome of the appeal is unknown. 53.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Sergey Vasilkov, who was born in 1953. 54.  In January 2000 the Russian federal forces conducted an extensive military operation against members of illegal armed groups (\u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f) in Grozny. The town was subjected to shellings and sweep operations. By the end of January 2000 the central parts of the city were under the Russian forces\u2019 control (see Umayeva v. Russia, no. 1200/03, \u00a7 79, 4 December 2008, and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, \u00a7\u00a7 16 and 41, 24 February 2005). 55.  At about 11 a.m. on 17 January 2000 a group of armed service personnel, wearing camouflage uniforms and equipped with portable radio sets, arrived in a Ural lorry at the applicant\u2019s house at number 16 1st Poltavskaya Street in Grozny. They were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. The service personnel detained Mr Sergey Vasilkov for the purposes of an identity check, put him in the lorry and drove off to an unknown destination. Three other people, the applicant\u2019s relative Mr. G., as well as Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. were also detained and taken away together with the applicant\u2019s husband. The abductions took place in the course of the sweep operation in the Karpinskiy Kurgan settlement of Grozny. 56.  The whereabouts of Mr Sergey Vasilkov remain unknown. 57. On 21 March 2001 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction of her husband. On the same day she was interviewed by a police officer. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and stated that five days later she had seen in the street one of the service personnel who had participated in her husband\u2019s abduction. In her opinion, the abductors were from a special division of a military unit. 58.  On 25 March 2001 the same police officer interviewed the applicant\u2019s niece, Ms S. who confirmed the applicant\u2019s statements. 59.  On 15 April 2001 the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 13064 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code into the abduction of Mr Sergey Vasilkov and Mr G. 60.  On 15 June 2001 the investigation was suspended. 61.  On 27 June 2001 the applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District police station about the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. 62.  On 11 July 2001 the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office opened a new criminal case no. 13103 into the abduction of Mr Sergey Vasilkov. 63.  On 17 July 2001 Ms S. was questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. which she had eyewitnessed. Referring to the service personnel, she stated that Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. had been taken for an identity check to the checkpoint at Karpinskiy Kurgan and that they would have been released in one day. 64.  On an unspecified date the applicant was questioned. 65.  On 11 September 2001 the investigation in the case no. 13103 was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the applicant was not informed of this decision. 66.  On 6 November 2003 the investigation was resumed and cases nos. 13064, 13103 and 12284 (opened into the abduction of Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D.) were joined under the joint number 12284. 67.  On 3 December 2003 the applicant was granted victim status. 68.  On 9 December 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. 69.  On 6 January 2004 the investigation was suspended. The applicant was informed thereof. 70.  On 26 January 2005 the investigation was resumed. 71.  On 10 February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr U. who stated that Mr S.Ch. had allegedly been found half a year after his abduction in a prison in Volgograd. However, he had never returned home. 72.  The investigation was subsequently suspended on 27 February 2005, then resumed on 1 December 2009, suspended again on 31 December 2009 and resumed on 8 July 2011, then suspended on 13 July 2011 and resumed on 25 December 2012. 73.  On 25 January 2013 the applicant was questioned again. 74.  On 4 February 2013 the investigators questioned Ms N.S. who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of the four men as described above. 75.  On 5 February 2013 the investigation was suspended. 76.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 77.  On 25 November 2009 the applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation of 27 February 2005 before the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny. On 2 December 2009 the court terminated the proceedings having found that the investigation had been resumed the day before. 78.  On 27 July 2009 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction of her husband by State service personnel because their involvement in this incident had not been proven. 79.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, who was born in 1979. 80.  At 6 a.m. on 2 April 2005 a group of seven or eight armed men in camouflage uniforms and black bulletproof vests broke into the applicant\u2019s house at 26 Gvardeyskaya Street in Gekhi. They were of Slavic and Chechen appearance and spoke Russian and Chechen. The men were equipped with portable radio sets. One of them grabbed the applicant by the throat and threatened to kill her if she moved. The others forced Mr Vakha Dadakhayev outside, saying that they were taking him for interrogation to the Urus-Martan District police station. After the intruders left, the applicant went outside and saw several cars without registration numbers parked near the house: one khaki UAZ minivan and three VAZ-2115 and VAZ-2107 vehicles. The applicant opened the door of one of VAZ-2107 cars and saw her husband on the back seat with three men. When she asked where they were taking him, the men replied that they were going to the police station. Then they drove off towards the checkpoint in Gekhi, which was situated on the road to Urus\u2011Martan. 81.  One of the applicant\u2019s neighbours, Mr A.-Kh. B., followed the convoy and saw that there were two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) parked in Gagarin Street, where the convoy with Mr Vakha Dadakhayev passed through. 82.  On 6 April 2005 the body of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, with numerous bruises and thermal injuries, was found on the outskirts of Gekhi near the Baku \u2013 Rostov-on-Don highway. 83.  On 2 April 2005 the applicant complained to the police about the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. The investigators interviewed her and examined the crime scene. 84.  On 7 April 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 44024 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder), after the discovery of the body of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev. 85.  On 10 April 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic medical examination of the corpse. 86.  The forensic medical examination established that death of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev could have been caused by multiple rib fractures accompanied by injury of internal organs. 87.  On unidentified dates in April-May 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant and her relatives who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 88.  On 1 June 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 89.  On 7 August 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 90.  According to the applicant, between 2005 and 2010 she applied to various law-enforcement authorities in person and requested information on the progress in the investigation. In reply she was told that the investigation was pending. 91.  On 29 March 2010 the applicant applied to the Grozny district investigative committee for access to the criminal case file. 92.  On 23 August 2010 her request was granted by the investigators and the applicant copied the entire case file. 93.  On 3 February 2011 the investigation was resumed. The applicant was informed thereof. 94.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Vakha Dadakhayev was available and that no security operations in his respect had been carried out. 95.  On 10 February 2011 the applicant was allowed to read the forensic medical examination report. On the same date she was questioned again. 96.  On 14 February 2011 the investigators questioned Ms S.D, a relative of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, who lived in the same street as the applicant at the time. She stated that after the abduction she had seen traces left by military footwear in her courtyard. 97.  On 17 February 2011 the investigators questioned Ms A., the applicant\u2019s neighbour, who confirmed having heard the cars leaving the applicant\u2019s house after the abduction. Then she had entered the house and had noticed the traces left by military footwear on the floor. 98.  On 3 March 2011 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 21 June 2011. The applicant was informed thereof. 99.  On 24 June 2011 the investigation was suspended; it was resumed again on 19 December 2011 and then suspended on the next day. 100.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 101.  On 26 January 2011 the applicant complained to the Grozny District Court in Chechnya of the investigators\u2019 inaction and pointed out numerous defects of the investigation. On 4 February 2011 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as the investigators had already resumed the investigation a day before. On 22 February 2011 the applicant appealed against this decision. 102.  On an unspecified date the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the decision of 4 February 2011 and remitted the case for fresh examination to the same court. On 25 April 2011 the Groznenskiy District Court granted the applicant\u2019s complaint and found that the decision of 3 March 2011 suspending the investigation was premature. The court obliged the investigators to resume the proceedings and to take investigative steps aimed at identifying the perpetrators. 103.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev, who was born in 1954. The second and the third applicants are his children. 104.  At the material time Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev and his family lived at Tridtsatiy Uchastok Street in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny. A special anti-terrorist unit of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior was located nearby. 105.  On 15 November 2004 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev\u2019s brother was abducted by service personnel. During the night after his abduction a group of armed service personnel in masks broke into the applicants\u2019 home and searched the premises. Having found that Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev was not at home, they left. 106.  At about 7 p.m. on 15 March 2005 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev left home to visit his neighbour, who lived in a nearby building, when a group of armed men in black camouflage uniforms seized him on the street, forced him into a \u201cZhiguli\u201d car without registration numbers and drove off in the direction of Grozny city centre, passing without restriction through checkpoints on the way. 107.  According to the applicants, Mr Kh.M., who was allegedly an agent of a law-enforcement agency, participated in the abduction. The applicants provided this information to the investigators. 108.  On 23 July 2005 a relative of the applicants, Ms T.N., received a telephone call from an unidentified person who offered information about Mr Bamatgiriyev\u2019s whereabouts in exchange for 5,000 United States dollars (USD). According to the applicants, the caller\u2019s telephone number belonged to the office of the Shali District police station in Chechnya. The applicants also gave that information to the investigators. 109.  In October 2006 two men arrived at the first applicant\u2019s house and told her that Mr Bamatgiriyev had been abducted by law-enforcement agents. The men suggested that she pay them USD 10,000 for information concerning his whereabouts. They visited the first applicant at least three times afterwards and promised to give information in exchange for money. One of the men also told the applicant that Mr Kh.M. had known about the abduction of her husband beforehand. The first applicant subsequently informed the investigators about these developments. 110.  The whereabouts of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev have remained unknown ever since. 111.  After the abduction of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev, Ms Z.I. informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for him. On 30 May 2005 the first applicant complained about the authorities\u2019 inaction to the President of Chechen Republic. 112.  On 9 August 2005 the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 42095 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 113.  On 19 August 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 114.  The investigators also questioned several witnesses who stated that on the day of the abduction a VAZ-21099 vehicle with people in camouflage uniforms inside had been parked all day near Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev\u2019s house. 115.  On 9 November 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 18 December 2005 it was resumed, then suspended again on 18 January 2006 and resumed on 30 April 2007. 116.  On several occasions the prosecutor of the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny ordered the investigators to identify and question the eyewitnesses of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev\u2019s abduction. It appears that the investigators failed to follow this order. 117.  On 7 June 2007 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M. who stated that he had been in the Kostroma Region when Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev had been abducted. He also stated that he had heard about the membership of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev in illegal armed groups. 118.  On 30 June 2007 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed on 23 August 2007, suspended on 23 September 2007, then resumed on 30 October 2007 and suspended on 1 December 2007, resumed again on 11 March 2008 and suspended on 11 April 2008, resumed on 18 June 2008 and then suspended on 18 July 2008. 119.  On 22 September 2008 the deputy prosecutor of the Oktyabrskiy District of Grozny pointed out several defects of the investigation and ordered that the investigators took remedial measures. Subsequently, on 30 September 2008 the investigation was resumed, then suspended again on 6 November 2008 and resumed on 15 December 2010, then suspended on 30 December 2010. 120.  On 5 March 2012 the investigation was resumed following the supervisor\u2019s criticism. Subsequently it was suspended on 10 April 2012, resumed on 1 July 2013 and suspended on 8 July 2013, then resumed on 31 July 2014 and suspended on 24 August 2014, resumed again on 28 September 2014 and suspended on 2 November 2014. 121.  On numerous occasions between 2005 and 2013 the first applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. She consistently insisted on the involvement of Mr Kh.M. in the abduction. In reply she received letters stating that operational search activities were in progress to establish Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev\u2019s whereabouts. 122.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 123.  On 12 June 2008 the first applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny. On 19 June 2008 the court dismissed her complaint having found that the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. On 4 February 2009 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld this decision on appeal. 124.  On 14 September 2010 the first applicant lodged another complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court challenging the investigators\u2019 inaction. On 11 October 2010 the court allowed her complaint and ordered that the investigation be resumed. 125.  The applicants are the relatives of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn (also spelled Said Khuseyn) Tembulatov, who was born in 1972. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his sister. 126.  According to the applicants, on 2 April 2001 the Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweep operation in Argun and cordoned off certain town districts with military vehicles. 127.  At around 7.30 p.m. that day a group of about twenty armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two APCs with identification numbers \u201cA 631\u201d and \u201c813\u201d at the first applicant\u2019s house at 12 Solnechnaya Street in Argun. The men, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the house and searched the premises. Having seized Mr Sayd\u2011Khuseyn Tembulatov\u2019s passport, the servicemen forced him into one of the APCs and drove off to the outskirts of Argun where they joined a larger group of servicemen and then left in the direction of Khankala. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant and the neighbours. 128.  On the same day a resident of the neighbouring house at 8 Solnechnaya Street in Argun, Mr T.A., was abducted under similar circumstances. 129.  After the abduction the applicants complained to the Argun military commander\u2019s office, where they were informed that Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov had been detained by \u201ca special group from Khankala\u201d which had not coordinated its operation with the local commander. 130.  On 31 May 2001 the local radio station Chechnya Svobodnaya broadcast an interview with an officer of the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) named \u201cVadim\u201d. He stated that Mr Sayd Khuseyn Tembulatov and Mr T.A. had been detained among other members of illegal armed groups by the FSB. 131.  The whereabouts of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov have remained unknown since. 132.  On 3 April 2001 the first applicant together with the mother of Mr T.A. complained to the head of Argun Administration about the abduction of their sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 133.  On 4 April 2001 Mr Kh.T., the father of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov, complained to the Argun inter-district prosecutors\u2019 office in respect of the abduction of his son and asked that a criminal case be opened into the incident. 134.  On 11 April 2001 the first applicant was interviewed by a police officer. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 135.  On 13 April 2001 the Argun inter-district prosecutors\u2019 office opened criminal case no. 45038 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 136.  On 23 April 2001 Mr Kh.T. was granted victim status and questioned. 137.  On 1 June 2001 the first applicant informed the investigators about the interview with an officer of the FSB which had been broadcast over the radio the day before (see paragraph 130 above), and asked for the search for her son to be intensified. 138.  The investigators sent several requests for information to various authorities and law-enforcement bodies. On 1 May 2001 the Argun military commander\u2019s office informed them that no special operations had been carried out by his troops on 2 April 2001. 139.  On 13 June 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the culprits. 140.  In 2001-02 the first applicant and her husband Mr Kh.T. complained to various authorities of the abduction of their son and requested assistance in the search for him. 141.  On 2 October 2002 the investigation was resumed. The investigators sent several requests for information to various military units about any special operations in Argun on 2 April 2001 and the two APCs involved in the abduction. The replies contained statements that no special operations had been carried out on these dates, and that an APC with the registration number \u201cA 631\u201d was listed as belonging to military unit no. 3179 deployed in Reutovo-3 in Moscow Region. 142.  On 2 November 2002 the investigation was suspended and resumed again on 7 August 2003. Mr Kh.T. was informed of both decisions. 143.  On 8 September 2003 the investigation was suspended. Mr Kh.T. was informed thereof. 144.  On 25 March 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor gave written instructions to the head of the Argun Town police station in which he indicated further investigative steps to be taken in the investigation into the abduction of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov. 145.  On numerous occasions between 2004 and 2010 the first applicant complained to the main Military prosecutor\u2019s office and various authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. In reply she received letters stating that the authorities were taking measures to establish Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov\u2019s whereabouts. The military prosecutor\u2019s office replied that no State service personnel had been involved in the abduction. 146.  On 4 March 2010 the investigators dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request to allow her to read the case file and make copies of the documents. 147.  On 30 July 2010 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the criminal case because her husband, Mr Kh.T., had died in September 2009. 148.  On 5 August 2010 the investigation was resumed and the first applicant was granted victim status. On the same day she was questioned. 149.  On August 2010 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 150.  On 16 February 2011 the investigation was resumed. The investigators questioned several neighbours of the first applicant whose statements about the abduction of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov were similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions before the Court. 151.  On 14 March 2011 the investigators ordered a forensic DNA examination. 152.  On 16 March 2001 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed on 2 August 2011 and suspended again on 12 August 2011. 153.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 154.  On 18 October 2010 and on an unspecified date in 2011 the first applicant challenged the decision to suspend the investigation of 8 September 2003 and the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. On 29 October 2010 and 17 February 2011 respectively the court rejected her complaints having found that the investigators had earlier quashed the decision to suspend the investigation and resumed the proceedings. 155.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov, who was born in 1966, and Mr Lema (also spelled as Lema) Shavanov, who was born in 1986 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 1981). The first applicant was their mother; she died on 27 July 2018. The second applicant was their father; he died on 22 April 2016. The third applicant is the wife of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are his children. The eighth applicant is the wife of Mr Lema Shavanov. The ninth and tenth applicants are his children. 156.  At about 7 a.m. on 18 February 2001 Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov, Mr Lema Shavanov and their acquaintance Mr Sh.U. drove two UAZ-469 vehicles from Staryye Atagi to Grozny to buy fuel. They were stopped by a large group of armed military service personnel in camouflage uniforms at a roadblock next to the Prigorodnoye village, on the tenth kilometre of the Grozny-Shatoy motorway. The service personnel spoke unaccented Russian; they were in three armoured infantry vehicles (\u0431\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043c\u0430\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0445\u043e\u0442\u044b) with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356. Having checked the identity documents, the service personnel pulled bags over the Shavanov brothers\u2019 heads, forced them into one of the armoured infantry vehicles and drove off in the direction of Grozny. 157.  Mr Sh.U. asked one of the service personnel where the brothers were being taken to. The serviceman replied that they were taken to Khankala. 158.  The whereabouts of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and Mr Lema Shavanov have remained unknown ever since. 159.  On 18 February 2001 some of the applicants went in person to the Grozny District police station and the Grozny district prosecutors\u2019 office and reported the incident, requesting that the authorities open a criminal case into the abduction. 160.  On 20 February 2001 the brother of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and Mr Lema Shavanov, Mr L.Sh. complained to the Grozny prosecutor of their abduction. 161.  On 1 April 2001 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 19044 under Article 127 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). The decision to open the criminal case stated that the Shavanov brothers had been detained by federal military service personnel. 162.  On 2 April 2001 the investigators interviewed Mr Sh.U., who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 163.  On 10 April 2001 Mr S.Sh., the cousin of the Shavanov brothers, was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. He stated that on 26 February 2001 he had met a Chechen man called \u201cKhamzat\u201d. He offered to pick up Mr S.Sh.\u2019s brothers who had been detained by the reconnaissance unit of motorised rifle battalion no. 71 (\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0434\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0431\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043e\u043d 71 \u043c\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043b\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043a\u0430) in exchange for money. They had agreed to meet, but Khamzat had not come to the meeting. 164.  On 19 April 2001 the first and the second applicants were granted victim status and questioned. 165.  On 11 May 2001 the second applicant was questioned again. He stated additionally that he had visited the roadblock at the entrance to Khankala. There an officer had told him that on 18 February 2001 he had seen the armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 entering Khankala; they had been followed by two UAZ-469 vehicles. 166.  On 14 May 2001 Mr Sh.U. was questioned again. He had found out that three armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 had been stationed in Prigorodnoye village in the morning of 18 February 2001. 167.  On 26 May 2001 the investigators questioned Mr S.U. who had seen in the morning on 18 February 2001 at the roadblock in Prigorodnoye village two UAZ vehicles which had belonged to Shavanov brothers. A group of military service personnel with their commander had been standing next to the vehicles. 168.  On 1 June 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of this decision. 169.  On 15 August 2001 the investigation was resumed. On 15 September 2001 the investigation was suspended again. It was subsequently resumed on 29 August 2002, then suspended on 15 September 2002, resumed on 20 November 2002, suspended on 20 December 2002 and resumed again on 16 May 2003. 170.  On 18 June 2003 the military prosecutor\u2019s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the investigators that the armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 were listed as belonging to the military unit no. 23132 deployed in Shali. 171.  On 20 June 2003 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 18 December 2003, then suspended on 22 January 2004, resumed on 14 March 2004 and suspended again on 30 May 2004. 172.  On 21 October 2006 the investigation was resumed. 173.  On 10 November 2006 the investigators questioned the first and the second applicants and Mr S.U. All of them reiterated their earlier statements. The first applicant additionally stated that in May 2002 she had met a woman at the central market in Grozny whose son had been detained in Khankala together with the Shavanov brothers. 174.  On 17 November 2006 the investigators questioned Ms Z.D., whose son had been detained together with the Shavanov brothers, held in a pit, in Khankala. 175.  On 23 and 29 November 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene. 176.  On 21 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. It was resumed on 15 April 2008 and then suspended on 15 May 2008. 177.  On numerous occasions between 2001 and 2006 the first and the second applicants as well as Mr L.Sh. complained to various military and law-enforcement authorities of the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish the whereabouts of the Shavanov brothers. 178.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 179.  On 10 April 2008 the applicants challenged the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps before the Grozny District Court. On 18 April 2008 the court dismissed her complaint having found that several days earlier the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. 180.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Arbi Umarov and Mr Aslanbek (also spelled as Aslambek) Umarov, who were born in 1957 and 1969 respectively. The second applicant is the mother of Mr Andarbek Abubakarov, who was born in 1975. The third applicant is the mother of Mr Mayrbek Murtazaliyev, who was born in 1979; the fourth applicant is his wife and the fifth and sixth applicants are his children. 181.  The circumstances of the abductions of local residents in the course of the special military operation conducted in Novyye Atagi on 24 April 2001 have already been examined by the Court in Ibragimova v. Russia (no. 30592/10) as regards the abduction of Mr Masud Khakimov (see Pitsayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 53036/08 and 19 others, \u00a7\u00a7 248-49, 9 January 2014). 182.  At the material time the applicants and their families lived in a Red Cross refugee camp situated in the building of a former school in Novyye Atagi in the Shali district. 183.  Between 2 and 3 p.m. on 24 April 2001 a large group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at the camp in four APCs, several UAZ vehicles. They broke in and abducted Mr Arbi Umarov, Mr Aslanbek Umarov, Mr Andarbek Abubakarov, Mr Mayrbek Murtazaliyev and Mr Masoud Khakimov (with regards to the abduction of Mr Masoud Khakimov, see Pitsayeva and Others, cited above). 184.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained thereof to the Shali district military commander\u2019s office. The commander, Officer N., confirmed to the applicants that their relatives had been detained by military service personnel and that the detainees would return home the following day. 185.  The applicants have not seen their relatives since their abduction. 186.  The Government did not submit the criminal case file concerning the abduction of the applicants\u2019 relatives on the grounds that it was classified. For the main information and witness statements concerning the military operation in Novyye Atagi on 24 April 2001 see Pitsayeva and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 251-56). 187.  On 12 July 2001 the Shali district prosecutors\u2019 office opened criminal case no. 23131 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code into the abduction of the applicants\u2019 relatives and Mr Masud Khakimov. 188.  On 10 and 15 August 2001 the first and the second applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal case. 189.  On 12 September 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently resumed and again suspended on numerous occasions. Thus, the investigation was resumed on 1 May and 1 July 2002, 13 June 2008, 15 May 2009 and suspended on 1 June and 26 September 2002, 11 June 2007 and 14 June 2009. 190.  Meanwhile, on 7 August 2002 the criminal case was transferred to the military prosecutors\u2019 office of military unit no. 20116 (later \u2013 no. 68798) for further investigation, where it was given the number 34/35/0173-02. 191.  On a number of occasions between 2001 and 2011 the first, second and third applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities and NGOs in respect of the abductions of their sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 192.  On 27 November 2008 the Naurskiy District Court of the Chechen Republic declared Mr Arbi Umarov and Mr Aslanbek Umarov missing persons following a request by the first applicant. 193.  On 27 March 2011 the first applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended. On 12 April 2011 it was resumed; the first, second and third applicants were informed thereof. 194.  The investigation was subsequently resumed and suspended on numerous occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 27 May 2011, then on 12 July 2011 this decision was annulled by the investigators\u2019 superior; on 12 August 2011 the investigation was suspended again and resumed on 12 October 2011, then suspended on 11 November 2011. On 12 November 2013 the investigation was resumed, then suspended on 12 December 2013, resumed again on 9 October 2014 and suspended on 29 December 2014. 195.  It appears that the result of the investigation is still pending. 196.  On an unspecified date in 2008 the first applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decision of 11 June 2007 to suspend the proceedings before the Military Court of the Grozny Garrison. On 6 October 2008 the court rejected the complaint having found that on 13 June 2008 the investigators had resumed the proceedings. 197.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Imran Inalkayev, who was born in 1980. 198.  On an unspecified date in the beginning of February 2000 (in certain documents submitted the date was referred to as 2 February 2000) Mr Imran Inalkayev was going from the settlement (\u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u043b\u043e\u043a) of Sleptsovskaya to the town of Urus-Martan in a regular local bus. At the checkpoint located at the crossroad next to the villages of Valerik, Shalazhi and Gekhi a group of armed military service personnel in camouflage uniforms stopped the bus to check the passengers\u2019 identity. Having checked his documents, the service personnel detained Mr Imran Inalkayev and took him into the checkpoint building. There were an APC and a Ural lorry parked near the building. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 199.  The whereabouts of Mr Imran Inalkayev have remained unknown since. 200.  On an unspecified date in February 2000 and subsequently on several occasions in 2001-03 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. 201.  On 14 April 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case into the incident. 202.  On 28 August 2003 the supervising prosecutor annulled the above decision following the applicant\u2019s complaint and opened criminal case no. 34089 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 203.  On 6 September 2003 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 204.  On various dates the investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements that no information about Mr Imran Inalkayev was available. 205.  On 28 October 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; the applicant was informed thereof. Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 7 October 2004 following the applicant\u2019s complaints to the supervising prosecutors, who criticised the investigation and ordered that steps be taken. Then the proceedings were suspended on 15 November 2004, again resumed on 16 May 2011 and suspended again on 26 May 2011. 206.  On 9 June 2007 the investigators instructed the Urus-Martan police to undertake measures aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Imran Inalkayev. In particular, they ordered to interview relatives and neighbours, to examine cemeteries and to obtain copies of documents about his activities. It appears that some measures were taken but brought no tangible results. 207.  On 20 May 2011 and 24 May 2011 the investigators questioned the eyewitnesses of the events. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 208.  On several occasions between 2006 and 2011 the applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities of the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for her son. The authorities forwarded her requests to the prosecutor\u2019s office. In reply she received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish Mr Imran Inalkayev\u2019s whereabouts. 209.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 210.  On 5 May 2011 the applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the proceedings of 15 November 2004 and their failure to take basic steps before the Urus-Martan District Court. On 16 May 2011 the court terminated the proceedings having found that earlier on the same day the investigation had been resumed. 211.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, who was born in 1965. The second applicant is his mother, the third and the fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant is the mother of Mr Beslan Yusupov, who was born in 1971. The sixth and the seventh applicants are his wife and daughter respectively. The eighth applicant is the father of Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev, who was born in 1975. The ninth applicant is his wife, the tenth applicant is his daughter and the eleventh applicant is his mother. 212.  In the morning on 8 February 2002 Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev were driving from Dzhalka village to Grozny in two UAZ vehicles. At about 7 a.m. on the same day they reached checkpoint no. 111, known as Otvaga, where a group of military service personnel in camouflage uniforms and masks stopped their cars and ordered them to get out. The service personnel allegedly belonged to a military unit called 34 ObrON (34 \u041e\u0431\u0440\u041e\u041d) stationed nearby; they were armed with machineguns and grenade launchers, and they were in three APCs and a Ural lorry. Having searched Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev, they forced them into the Ural lorry and drove off in the direction of Argun. The abduction took place in the presence of several police officers manning the checkpoint who subsequently gave their statements to the investigators (see paragraph 218 below). 213.  Several days after the abduction the applicants received a handwritten note from the abducted men stating that they had been detained at a checkpoint and taken to the base of the 34 ObrON military unit in Argun. 214.  According to the applicants, after the abduction the commander of the first special task battalion of the military unit no. 3671 Officer N.Sh. sought a ransom from them in exchange for information about their relatives. 215.  The whereabouts of the applicants\u2019 relatives have remained unknown ever since. 216.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 217.  On 18 February 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 78021 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 218.  On the same day the investigators questioned seven police officers who had manned the checkpoint on the day of the events and witnessed the abduction. Their statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions before the Court. 219.  On 18 April 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 220.  On an unspecified date in 2002 the office of the Chechen Government informed the investigators that Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev were detained in a military unit in Argun near elevator no. 34. 221.  On 8 May 2003 the sixth applicant requested that proceedings be resumed because she had information about her husband\u2019s whereabouts. On the same day the investigation was resumed. 222.  On 10 May 2003 the sixth applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She told the investigators about the handwritten note received from the abducted men (see paragraph 213 above). 223.  On 13 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev\u2019s brother, Mr S.S. He confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and additionally stated that the Ural lorry, in which his brother had been taken away from the checkpoint on 8 February 2002, had been seen on several occasions entering the base of the 34 ObrON military unit. He also added that Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev\u2019s and Mr Said\u2011Magomed Abzayev\u2019s UAZ vehicles had been taken away by military service personnel on the day of the abduction and had been subsequently parked on the unit\u2019s premises. 224.  On 14 May 2003 the investigators questioned the first and the eighth applicants, who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 225.  On 30 May 2003 the forensic examination established that the note received by the applicants (see paragraph 213 above) could have been partially written by Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev. 226.  On 13 June 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. 227.  On 8 July 2003 the investigation was suspended. Subsequently, it was resumed on 14 November 2003, suspended on 14 December 2003, then resumed on 15 December 2004 and suspended again on 15 January 2005, resumed on 17 January 2005 and then suspended on 18 February 2005. 228.  On 13 November 2003 the sixth applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings. On 1 December 2003 she was questioned; she informed the investigators where Officer N.Sh. had been serving. 229.  On 5 January 2004 the eighth applicant was granted victim status. 230.  On 27 January 2004 Officer N.Sh. was questioned. He denied demanding a ransom from the applicants and stated that Mr S.S. had suggested that he pay him USD 10,000 for any information about his brother. Officer N.Sh. stated that he had no information about the detention of the applicants\u2019 relatives. 231.  On 25 June 2008 the eighth applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps before the Shali Town Court. On 7 July 2008 the court allowed his complaint. 232.  On 21 February 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status and to allow her to make copies of the criminal case file. 233.  On 7 March 2011 the investigation was resumed. On the same day the first applicant\u2019s request was granted. 234.  On 12 March 2011 the investigation was suspended again. 235.  On 1 July 2011 the fifth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case upon her request. 236.  On 29 December 2011 the investigation was resumed. It was suspended on 30 January 2012. 237.  On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2011 the first, sixth and eighth applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of their relatives and requested assistance in the search for them. In reply the applicants received letters stating that operational search activities were undertaken to establish their relatives\u2019 whereabouts. 238.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 239.  The first applicant was the mother of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, who was born in 1968. She died on 26 August 2016. The second applicant is the brother of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev. 240.  The present application concerns the abduction of the applicants\u2019 relative in the course of the same special operation carried out by the Russian federal forces in Avtury in May 2002 as in the case of Mezhidovy v. Russia (see Mezhidovy and Others v. Russia [Committee], nos. 50606/08 and 9 others, \u00a7 8, 23 October 2018). 241.  At about 1 p.m. on 14 May 2002 a large group of armed military service personnel arrived in an APC and an armoured infantry vehicle at the applicants\u2019 house at 25 Kooperativnaya Street in Avtury. The service personnel were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. Having searched the premises, they detained Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, put him into the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant and her daughter, Ms K.Kh. The arrest was filmed by the service personnel; later the applicants managed to obtain a copy of the video recording and to provide it to the investigators. 242.  On 20 April 2010 two sets of human remains were found in a forest near Avtury. One set was identified by the applicants as belonging to Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev (see paragraph 252 below). The other set belonged to Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, who had been abducted on 15 May 2002 in the course of the special operation in Avtury (see Mezhidovy and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 11 and 17). 243.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities and requested that a criminal investigation into the incident be opened. 244.  On 28 September 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59240 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 245.  The investigators sent several requests for information to various law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev was available. 246.  On 28 November 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 247.  In the beginning of 2004 the second applicant complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chechen Republic of the disappearance of his brother and asked for assistance in the search for him. In reply he was informed that operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev were under way. 248.  In July 2006 the first applicant asked the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chechen Republic for assistance in the search for her son. In reply she was informed that on 17 July 2006 the investigation in the case was resumed. 249.  On an unspecified date a police officer from the Shali District police station reported that he had visited several neighbours of the applicants. Although they had eyewitnessed the abduction of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, they had refused to give written statements about it. 250.  On 15 August 2006 the second applicant was questioned. His statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction of his brother were similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions before the Court. 251.  On 17 August 2006 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed of this decision. 252.  On 22 April 2010 the investigators found the skeletal remains of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev and Mr Magomed-Emin Mizhidov, as identified by their relatives, with bullet holes in their heads (see paragraph 242 above). On the same day, the investigators resumed the proceedings and ordered a forensic medical examination of the remains. 253.  The forensic medical examination established that Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev\u2019s death could have been caused by the skull bone fracture. 254.  On 23 April 2010 the investigators ordered a ballistic expert examination of the bullet found at the burial site. 255.  The ballistic expert examination established that the bullet was part of the cartridge for a Makarov handgun of 9 mm calibre, a Stechkin pistol, or another gun of 9 mm calibre. 256.  On 23 April 2010 the investigators ordered a biological expert examination of the clothes of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev found at the site. 257.  The biological expert examination discovered no blood or other biological substances on the clothes. 258.  On 22 May 2010 the investigation was suspended; it was resumed on 27 December 2010. 259.  On 29 December 2010 the investigators examined the site. 260.  In January 2011 the investigators questioned several witnesses who confirmed that a special operation had been carried out in Avtury in May 2002, during which around seventy individuals had been detained by service personnel. Almost all of them had been released except for Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev and Mr Magomed-Emin Mizhidov. Some witnesses confirmed that they had heard from other individuals detained together with Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev that he had been severely beaten and could hardly move because his hands and legs had been shot. 261.  On 23 January 2011 the investigators obtained the video recording of the abduction from the second applicant and included it into the case file. 262.  On 18 September 2012 the first applicant asked the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chechen Republic to inform her about the progress in the criminal proceedings and to resume the investigation if it had been suspended. It is unclear whether any reply was given to that request. 263.  It appears that the investigation is still pending.", "references": ["4", "5", "6", "9", "3", "8", "7", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law. 6.  On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Str\u0103\u015feni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Str\u0103\u015feni \u2013 \u201cthe Inspectorate\u201d) under which it had been fined for non\u2011compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined. 7.  On 26 December 2013 the Str\u0103\u015feni District Court upheld the applicant company\u2019s claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing. 8.  On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Str\u0103\u015feni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty\u2011day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it. 9.  In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case. 10.  On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal\u2019s strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal\u2019s calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal for re-examination. 11.  On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate\u2019s appeal, quashed the judgment of the Str\u0103\u015feni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company\u2019s action was rejected as ill-founded. 12.  On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "0", "5", "8", "1", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tolyatti. 7.  On 8 May 2007 the applicant\u2019s daughter, Z., was found hanged in the apartment where she had been living with her husband, Ch., and their two minor children. 8.  On the same day the law-enforcement bodies of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region were informed of Z.\u2019s death. An on-site inspection and an initial examination of Z.\u2019s body were carried out. Statements were obtained from those who had had contact with Z. shortly before her death and a post-mortem examination of Z.\u2019s body was ordered. 9.  The post-mortem examination (in a report of 1 June 2007) established that Z. had died as a result of mechanical asphyxia caused by deliberate self\u2011harm by means of hanging. Apart from a strangulation mark, multiple bruises and abrasions were discovered on Z.\u2019s face, forearms and shins which could have manifested shortly before Z.\u2019s death as a result of impacts from blunt objects, such as blows inflicted on her face, arms and legs at the hands of another person. Ethyl alcohol was found in Z.\u2019s blood and urine, which confirmed that she had been in a state of alcohol intoxication. 10.  In May to June 2007 the applicant lodged complaints with the Nenetskiy Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, seeking to have criminal proceedings instituted against her son-in-law, Ch., who she alleged had incited Z. to commit suicide by inflicting regular beatings and other violent actions on her. 11.  Between 18 May 2007 and 14 October 2009 nineteen decisions were taken by an investigator refusing to institute a formal criminal investigation into Z.\u2019s death. The pre-investigation inquiry established that Z., in a state of alcohol intoxication and after having had a row with Ch., had committed suicide by hanging herself. The above decisions were subsequently set aside by the supervising prosecutor and by the Naryan-Mar Town Court of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) as unlawful and unsubstantiated. On each occasion it was noted that the instructions, given to the investigator by the prosecutor and the head of the criminal investigations department, to carry out procedural measures aimed at establishing the existence of the circumstances mentioned in the applicant\u2019s complaint and the circumstances surrounding Z.\u2019s death, had not been complied with. 12.  On 13 November 2009 the applicant complained to the Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the failure of the criminal investigations department and the police department to carry out comprehensive and prompt inquiries into the death of her daughter. 13.  On the same day the first deputy prosecutor of the Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office held that there had been a failure to comply with the law and the requirement of promptness in carrying out the inquiry into Z.\u2019s death by the officers of the criminal investigations department and the police department, which had violated the applicant\u2019s rights. 14.  Subsequently, on 15 December 2009 the investigator took another decision refusing to institute a criminal investigation into Z.\u2019s death. 15.  On 16 September 2011 the chief of the Inter-District Investigative Department of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation for the Arkhangelsk Region and the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region set aside the decision of 15 December 2009 as unlawful and unsubstantiated. He noted, in particular, that the investigator had not given due consideration to information received from several persons to the effect that Ch. had regularly subjected Z. to beatings and humiliation. In order to establish the circumstances of the incident and the reasons and the motives for the suicide, the chief investigator considered it necessary to carry out investigative measures involving, in particular, specialists and experts in psychology and psychiatry, which was only possible in the framework of a criminal investigation. 16.  On 19 September 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against Ch. under Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to commit suicide). 17.  On 20 September 2011, however, the deputy prosecutor of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region set aside the above decision. 18.  Following another round of pre-investigation inquiries, on 24 October 2011 the institution of a criminal investigation into the death of Z. was again refused under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in view of a lack of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 110 of the Criminal Code in Ch.\u2019s actions and the absence of any crime under Article 105 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (murder). The investigator arrived at the conclusion that Z.\u2019s decision to commit suicide had not been provoked by any actions of Ch. amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment. Z. had been in a state of severe alcohol intoxication and could not have fully understood her actions when taking the decision to take her own life. The bruises and abrasions on Z.\u2019s face and body could have originated during a heated altercation with Ch. shortly before the former\u2019s death. No direct evidence in support of the theory that Ch. had ill-treated Z. had been discovered. Even assuming that the two disclosed instances of Z. being beaten by Ch. (in 2005 and 2007) had indeed taken place, they would have been one-off unrelated events occurring under unspecified circumstances and could not have been connected to Z.\u2019s decision to take her own life. Furthermore, Z. had not been fully dependent on Ch. or particularly vulnerable. According to Z.\u2019s relatives, she could have left Ch. at any time, divorced him, taken the children and changed her place of residence. She could also have sought medical assistance, and/or complained about Ch.\u2019s actions to the police. However, she had not done so. At the same time she had told her relatives that she loved her husband and did not want to divorce him. The case file further contained information indicating that Ch. had inflicted beatings on Z. in June 2006, of which Z. had complained to the police. However, Z.\u2019s submissions had been inconsistent and she had eventually refused to pursue those proceedings. The applicant\u2019s theory that Ch. had staged the suicide had been checked and found to be unsupported by the material in the case file. 19.  Following a complaint by the applicant, on 10 September 2013 the Town Court found the decision of 24 October 2011 lawful and justified. 20.  In the meantime, on 8 May 2008 it had been established by the investigator that Ch.\u2019s actions in respect of Z. contained the elements of a criminal offence under Article 117 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (causing physical suffering by inflicting regular beatings) for the period between 19 June 2006 and 8 May 2007. The relevant material was submitted for a pre-investigation inquiry to the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region police department. 21.  Between May 2008 and March 2010 at least seventeen decisions were taken by the police department refusing to institute criminal proceedings against Ch. under Article 117 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, all of which were subsequently set aside by the supervising prosecutor as unlawful and unsubstantiated. 22.  On 24 June 2010 criminal proceedings were instituted against Ch. under Article 117 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 23.  On 7 July 2010 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 24.  On 13 April 2011 Ch.\u2019s actions were reclassified as inflicting beatings, thus coming under Article 116 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, but charges under this Article could not be pursued in the absence of an application by the victim. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings were discontinued on the basis of Article 24 \u00a7 1 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25.  In April 2009 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking damages for the non-pecuniary harm caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of her daughter\u2019s death. 26.  On 5 June 2009 the Naryan-Mar Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 27.  On 16 July 2009 the Nenetskiy Autonomous Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["7", "3", "5", "4", "2", "1", "8", "6", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow. From 1995 until his retirement on 21 August 2006 he was a prosecutor of the North-Western District of Moscow. 5.  On 29 May 2007 the Moscow city public prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation into the recent activities of a group of former and acting law-enforcement officers and officials. 6.  On 24 April 2008 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody pending investigation and trial (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541/09, 24 January 2012). 7.  On 23 July 2009 the prosecutor completed the investigation in respect of fifteen suspects, including the applicant, and transferred the case to the Moscow City Court. 8.  On 5 August the City Court held a preliminary hearing and decided not to allow access to the public for hearings of the criminal case. In particular, the court held as follows:\n\u201c[The court] will examine the present case in camera. The case file contains information classified as state secrets and the disclosure of this information might have a serious adverse effect on the interests of society and the State.\u201d 9.  On 24 May 2010 the jury delivered a guilty verdict in the applicant\u2019s case. 10.  On 9 June 2010 the City Court sentenced the applicant to nine years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine in the amount of 500,000 roubles (RUB). The applicant appealed, complaining in particular about the lack of a public hearing. 11.  On 16 November 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation held an appeal hearing. The court heard the prosecutor, the civil party, the defendants, including the applicant, and their counsel. The court upheld, in substance, and reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint about the lack of public hearing, the court stated as follows:\n\u201c... the [trial] court justified its decision to hear the case in camera. The case file contains documents constituting State secrets and the disclosure of such information might entail a serious violation of the [interests] of society and the State.\u201d 12.  On 10 September 2009 the main national television channel broadcast a programme on the circumstances of the criminal case against the applicant. The presenter stated that the applicant, a former district prosecutor, lived on unearned income and that the value of his assets significantly exceeded his revenues. He further claimed that the value of the applicant\u2019s house was 2 million United States dollars (USD). The programme featured footage of the applicant\u2019s two-storey house and its interior and the tax declarations of the applicant and the members of his family. A photograph of the applicant in his prosecutor\u2019s uniform was also shown. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his wife brought a civil action for damages against the television channel, arguing, inter alia, that the respondent company had failed to obtain their consent for disclosure of their personal data, including the tax information and the footage of their house and its interior. 14.  On 18 May 2010 the Ostankinskiy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims in full. In particular, the court ruled:\n\u201cThe mass media have repeatedly reported, and continue to report, on the financial situation and revenues of high-ranking officials. Accordingly, the court considers it possible to refer to the case-law of the [European Court of Human Rights] and notes, in particular, that journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. [The court referred to Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (26 April 1995, Series A no. 313).]\nRegard being had to the above, the court accepts that the exact value of the house owned by the plaintiffs, the exact amount of their incomes and the exact amount of their real property, in the circumstances of the case, are immaterial. The most important issue is that the value of their house does not correspond to their income.\n... According to the investment agreement ... the value of the house was estimated at ... USD 60,000 ..., which did not include the cost of the interior, including the installation of a winding staircase and a jacuzzi ... [One of the plaintiffs\u2019 witnesses] submitted that [the applicant] had been offered a reduced price for the house because of his friendship with the management of the construction company ... [The court] finds it incompatible with the standing of the prosecutor. [The court] further takes into account that the plaintiffs had their title to the house registered on the basis of the purchase agreement ... Accordingly, in addition to the amount paid under the investment agreement ... the plaintiffs paid a significant sum of money which exceeded their income ... and the amount they received when they sold their three\u2011roomed flat ... for the equivalent of USD 50,000 ...\n... Pursuant to [the Russian Federal Law on the Mass Media], a journalist must obtain consent for the disclosure of information concerning a person\u2019s private life from that person or his representative, except when such disclosure is necessary for the protection of public interests. [The court] considers that this rule applied when [the journalist] disclosed information concerning the income of the prosecutor\u2019s family. This is justified by the public interest. The question raised in the programme about the public servant\u2019s income and the value of his property is a matter of public interest.\nThe Court considers that [the applicant\u2019s] claims that the respondent party should retract the information presented in the TV show that [the applicant] was involved in criminal activities and had received unlawfully from an entrepreneur USD 500,000 should also be dismissed.\n...\n... [the journalist] presented in the show evidence contained in the criminal case file, including a certificate showing the plaintiffs\u2019 revenues, video footage featuring the plaintiffs\u2019 house, and excerpts from their telephone conversations. The journalist obtained those materials lawfully, with the investigator\u2019s approval. The journalist assessed that evidence. The veracity of his assessment cannot be subject to verification given that such verification should be carried out [in the course of the criminal investigation].\n... According to Ms Samoylova (the applicant\u2019s wife and a plaintiff), the Moscow City Court is examining a criminal case against [the applicant] ... [The court considers] that the journalist presented to the public his opinion that there is evidence confirming that [the applicant] is implicated in the commission of the offences he is charged with; [the journalist] commented on the criminal investigation, showed evidence collected and assessed it.\n...\n... The court considers that [the journalist] produced evidence confirming his statements about the [applicant\u2019s] involvement in illegal activities and dismisses the plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\u201d 15.  On 20 December 2010 the City Court upheld the judgment of 18 May 2010 on appeal.", "references": ["1", "7", "9", "6", "2", "5", "8", "0", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The details of the applicants are available in the Annex. 6.  The applicants are owners of a property situated at 8, Flat 1, Old Prison Street, Senglea, (hereinafter \u201cthe property\u201d) which they inherited from their ancestors. The property had been conceded to third parties by a title of temporary emphyteusis for a period of seventeen years, at an established ground rent of 40 Maltese liras (MTL - approximately EUR 98) per year, which was to expire in 1990. 7.  On 1 September 1986 the Government issued a requisition order on the property. In October 1988 the Government derequisitioned the property and returned the keys to the applicants. 8.  On 15 April 1989 the Commissioner of Land took over (occupied) the property. 9.  In spring-summer 1989 the applicants became aware that the property had been demolished at some point between March and September 1989 in connection with a slum clearance project, in order to make way for the development of social housing. 10.  By means of a President\u2019s declaration of 27 October 1989, that is after the property was demolished, the Commissioner of Land formally took over the property under title of possession and use (see relevant domestic law). 11.  By means of a President\u2019s declaration of 4 October 1991 the Commissioner of Land issued an order to convert the title from one of possession and use into one of public tenure (see relevant domestic law). 12.  On 22 March 1999, the Commissioner of Land submitted a notice to treat to the Land Arbitration Board (LAB), by means of which the sum of MTL 15.62 (approximately EUR 36.39) per year was offered to the owners (the Zammit family) as a yearly recognition rent. The sum was based on an estimate of the Land Valuation Office in line with their policies, but did not take account other factors, and was significantly lower than the rent at which the property had been leased prior to its demolition. 13.  By means of a judicial letter of 12 April 1999 the owners refused the offer. 14.  On 22 May 2000 the Commissioner of Land instituted proceedings before the LAB requesting them to order the transfer of the property and set the relevant compensation. 15.  On 29 November 2006, the second and seventh applicants intervened in the proceedings as heirs of their deceased parent. 16.  During these proceedings, the technical experts, appointed before the LAB, considered that in 1986 the property had been valued at MTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 2,320). On 10 August 2005 the applicants\u2019 ex\u2011parte architect estimated the fair rent of the property in 2005 at the equivalent of EUR 229.64 per year, and its sale value at MTL 7,500 (approximately EUR 17,470.30) \u2013 the property having been demolished, his estimate was based on the plans of the building from which it transpired that it had a depth of 14.5 metres and a width of 5.5 metres. In 2011 the technical experts of the LAB considered that the rental value for the property was EUR 158.40 per year, and its sale value (according to the terms of possession and use) was EUR 10,575.36. 17.  By a decision of 7 March 2012, acknowledging that the property had been demolished prior to the formal taking by the Government, the LAB considered that it was inconceivable that rent be paid for a property which had been demolished in order to be built anew, and that the right course of action would have been to acquire the property by outright purchase. Nevertheless, given that Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta concerning expropriation by public tenure did not preclude such an action, the LAB fixed the recognition rent at EUR 158.40 per year. 18.  On 27 March 2012 the Commissioner of Land appealed against the amount of rent established. On 16 April 2012 the applicants filed a reply asking the court to declare the appeal null and void as appeals could only be lodged on points of law. It was also noted that constitutional redress proceedings were being lodged by the applicants concerning the illegalities in the procedure and the alleged unconstitutionality of the law. Following the constitutional redress proceedings (described below) the Commissioner of Land\u2019s appeal was withdrawn. 19.  On 16 April 2012 the applicants filed constitutional redress proceedings. They claimed that the demolition of the property was illegal and amounted to a de facto expropriation contrary to the Constitution and the Convention and its Protocols; that Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta and related articles were in breach of the Constitution and the Convention and its Protocols; they requested the court to annul the LAB\u2019s decision and to award them damages as well as any other relevant remedy. 20.  The defendants filed their reply and produced a valuation by an architect appointed by the Commissioner of Land who estimated the sale value of the property at EUR 45,000. The report noted that the property had been demolished and was replaced by new residential apartments. 21.  By a judgment of 12 February 2014 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence delivered a partial judgment where it rejected the defendants\u2019 plea that the applicants had not exhausted ordinary remedies, and found a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights in so far as the recognition rent established for the taking under public tenure, which was not subject to any future increases, was too low and thus disproportionate. It rejected the remainder of the claims, and left the liquidation of damage to be established in the final judgment. 22.  In particular the court was of the view that \u2011 despite the applicants\u2019 claim that the property had been demolished prior to it having been taken under possession and use \u2011 the period in which the property had allegedly been taken and demolished must have been the same as that when it had been taken under title of possession and use, and thus the latter taking could not be considered illegal. According to domestic law the State could also have taken the property under title of public tenure in exchange for a recognition rent, to eventually demolish it. The demolition was thus lawful pursuant to Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta. As to the impugned law, this could not be found to be incompatible with the Constitution since it had been in force before 1962. As to its compatibility with the Convention, the court found that the taking had pursued a public interest namely a slum clearance project. However, the recognition rent established in line with LAB policies, which was not subject to any future increases, was too low and thus disproportionate. There had therefore been a breach of the applicants\u2019 right of property. 23.  During the continuation of the proceedings the applicants submitted an ex\u2011parte architect valuation dated 2014 which established the sale value of the property at EUR 50,000 and its rental value at EUR 250 per year. The report noted that the property had been demolished, and that it had had the measurements identified above, which resulted in an area of 80 square metres for the apartment which was located in a block of two apartments. The defendants declared that they did not object to this valuation. 24.  By a judgment of 27 May 2015 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence awarded EUR 15,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damage, bearing in mind the value of the property, that no compensation had been paid since its demolition, that the applicants would never get their property back and the recognition rent would never increase. The court further held that pecuniary compensation would be decided by the LAB, when deciding on the Commissioner of Land\u2019s appeal. Costs were to be shared equally between the parties. 25.  The defendants appealed and the applicants cross\u2011appealed. By a judgment of 18 February 2016 the Constitutional Court varied the first\u2011instance judgment by limiting the basis of the violation, and reducing the compensation to EUR 1,500. 26.  The Constitutional Court held that in view of the evidence, it could not agree with the first\u2011instance court that the demolition had taken place after a legitimate taking. Indeed there had been relevant witness testimony to the effect that the property had been demolished around three months prior to the first taking, the LAB had accepted that it was so, and the Government had not objected to such fact, nor had they shown when the demolition took place. It followed that the demolition had taken place prior to the taking under possession and use and at a time when the Government had no title over the property. However, even if this were not so, and that it had been demolished when it was under title of possession and use, the demolition would still have been unlawful, since according to law it was not possible to demolish a property under a title of possession and use the rights attached to which were limited. That illegality persisted until the Commissioner of Land acquired the property under title of public tenure; however, despite the passage of three years since the demolition the applicants did not challenge that measure. In any event that was no longer an issue, as the situation was sanctioned when the State took the property under title of public tenure (as provided for in Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta). The measure thus became lawful, and pursued the general interest of slum clearance. 27.  Moreover, the applicants were entitled to recognition rent for the property and, more importantly, for the land at issue. Indeed the fact that the taking consisted of land (as the property above it had been demolished) made it feasible to apply the taking under public tenure procedure. The Constitutional Court further rejected the applicants\u2019 claim that it would have been more appropriate to take the property by means of outright purchase, as they had not requested the LAB to order the Commissioner of Land to take such a course of action under the mentioned Article 19. The law granted the Commissioner of Land discretion as to which form of taking it would undertake and the Constitutional Court\u2019s role was limited to verifying whether the form of taking which was actually used breached the rights of an individual. 28.  As to the proportionality of the measure, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicants had claimed recognition rent of EUR 229.64 yearly and were awarded by the LAB a rent of EUR 158.40 yearly which the applicants had not appealed. Thus, given the award, in the light of their claim, it could not be considered that there arose such a disproportionality leading to a violation of the applicants\u2019 property rights. Nevertheless, a breach did arise as a result of a failure to pay compensation since 1989, given that the applicants\u2019 refusal to accept the offer of MTL 15.62 (approximately EUR 36.39) had been entirely justified. The Constitutional Court noted that as the breach had occurred and continued to persist, there was no reason to await the outcome of the LAB proceedings. 29.  As to redress the Constitutional Court considered that the applicants were to be awarded non\u2011pecuniary damage for the violation suffered. It furthered considered that the taking had pursued two legitimate aims, firstly social housing, and secondly slum clearance. While the applicants claimed compensation of around EUR 50,000 the Constitutional Court noted that the sale value according to the applicant\u2019s ex-parte architect in 2005 was EUR 17,470.30 and that in 2011, according to the technical experts of the board, it was EUR 10,575.36. Thus, given the small size of the property, the area in which it was in, the fact that it had been demolished at the expense of the Government and the fact that the recognition rent was adequate, the Constitutional Court considered that EUR 1,500 was an adequate amount of compensation to be shared by the applicants jointly. It further considered that it needed not examine the Convention compatibility of the relevant law in abstracto, it having already determined that its application in the present case constituted a breach. Costs of the first\u2011instance proceedings were to remain shared by the parties, as were those of the main appeal; and costs of the cross appeal were to be paid by the applicants. 30.  At the date of lodging the application with the Court, the applicants had not received any compensation, nor had they received any recognition rent since the date of the demolition of the property. The property has been rebuilt as apartments for social housing. 31.  Section 5 of the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance (\u201cthe Ordinance\u201d), Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta (now repealed), provided for three methods of acquisition by the Government of private property. It reads as follows:\n\u201cThe competent authority may acquire any land required for any public purpose, either -\n(a) by the absolute purchase thereof; or\n(b) for the possession and use thereof for a stated time, or during such time as the exigencies of the public purpose shall require; or\n(c) on public tenure:\nProvided that after a competent authority has acquired any land for possession and use or on public tenure the conversion into public tenure or into absolute ownership of the terms upon which such land is held shall always be deemed to be an acquisition of land required for a public purpose and to be in the public interest:\nProvided also that, subject to the provisions of articles 14, 15 and 16, a competent authority may acquire land partly by one and partly by another or others of the methods in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c):\nProvided further that where the land is to be acquired on behalf and for the use of a third party for a purpose connected with or ancillary to the public interest or utility, the acquisition shall, in every case, be by the absolute purchase of the land.\u201d 32.  Section 13 regarding compensation read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c(1) The amount of compensation to be paid for any land required by a competent authority may be determined at any time by agreement between the competent authority and the owner, saving the provisions contained in subarticle (2).\n(2) The compensation shall in the case of acquisition of land for temporary possession and use be an acquisition rent and in the case of acquisition of land on public tenure be a recognition rent determined in either case in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in article 27.\u201d 33.  The Ordinance provided that compensation in respect of absolute purchase was to be calculated in accordance with the applicable \u201cfair rent\u201d, as agreed by the parties following the Government\u2019s offer or as established by the LAB. In respect of public tenure, Section 27(13) of the Ordinance provided as follows:\n\u201cThe compensation in respect of the acquisition of any land on public tenure shall be equal to the acquisition rent assessable in respect thereof in accordance with the provisions contained in subarticles (2) to (12), inclusive, of this article, increased (a) by forty per centum (40%) in the case of an old urban tenement and (b) by twenty per centum (20%) in the case of agricultural land.\u201d 34.  In so far as relevant, Section 19(1) and (5) read as follows:\n\u201c(1) When land has been acquired by a competent authority for use and possession during such time as the exigencies of the public purpose shall require, the owner may, after the lapse of ten years from the date when possession was taken by the competent authority, apply to the Board for an order that the land be purchased or acquired on public tenure or vacated within a period of one year from the date of the order, and the land shall either be vacated or acquired on public tenure or purchased upon compensation to be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance or of any Ordinance amending or substituted for this Ordinance.\n(5) Public tenure shall of its nature endure in perpetuity, without prejudice to any consolidation by mutual consent or otherwise according to law of that tenure with the residual ownership of the land; and the recognition rent payable in respect thereof shall in every case be unalterable, without prejudice to the effects of any consolidation, total or partial. The residual ownership of land held on public tenure with the inherent right to receive recognition rent, shall, for all purposes of law, be deemed to be an immovable right by reason of the object to which it refers and shall be transferable according to law at the option of the owner, from time to time, of that right.\u201d 35.  Thus, while a taking under title of \u201cpossession and use\u201d was intended for a determinate period of time, a taking under title of \u201cpublic tenure\u201d was for an indeterminate period of time, possibly forever, and the relevant recognition rent was to remain unaltered for its duration.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "5", "4", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "9.  Mr Mammadov is an Azerbaijani national who has been involved in various political organisations and local and international non-governmental organisations for a number of years. In 2008 he co-founded the Republican Alternative Movement (\u201cREAL\u201d) and in 2012 was elected its chairman. For several years he has also been the Director of the Baku School of Political Studies, which is part of a network of schools of political studies affiliated with the Council of Europe (see the first Mammadov judgment, \u00a7 6). 10.  Mr Mammadov maintained a personal internet blog on which he commented on various political issues. In particular, in November 2012, after the enactment of a new law by the National Assembly introducing heavy sanctions for unauthorised public gatherings, Mr Mammadov posted a comment on his blog which he claimed was meant to insult members of the National Assembly. Without naming any names, he went on to state, inter alia, that the National Assembly was composed of \u201cfraudulent people\u201d and compared the entire legislative body to a zoo. Those statements were quoted in the media and elicited a number of seemingly irate responses from various National Assembly members. The responses, also published in the media, ranged in content from retaliatory ad hominem insults to calls for punishment and threats of suing him in court. According to Mr Mammadov, the parliamentarians\u2019 \u201clawsuit plans were ... temporarily dropped\u201d after the calls for reprisals against him were condemned by one of the Vice\u2011Presidents of the European Commission, who was visiting the country at the time (ibid., \u00a7 7). 11.  At the beginning of January 2013 REAL announced that it would consider nominating its own candidate for the upcoming presidential election of November 2013. Mr Mammadov himself announced that he was considering standing as a candidate in the election. According to him, his prospective presidential candidacy was widely discussed in Azerbaijan at that time (ibid., \u00a7 8). 12.  On 23 January 2013 rioting broke out in the town of Ismayilli, located to the northwest of Baku. According to media reports quoting local residents, the rioting was sparked by an incident involving V.A., the son of the then Minister of Labour and Social Protection and nephew of the then Head of the Ismayilli District Executive Authority (\u201cIDEA\u201d). It was claimed that after being involved in a car accident, V.A. had insulted and physically assaulted passengers of the other car, who were local residents. On hearing of the incident, hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local residents took to the streets and destroyed a number of commercial establishments (including the Chirag Hotel) and other property in Ismayilli thought to be owned by V.A.\u2019s family (ibid., \u00a7 9). 13.  On 24 January 2013 Mr Mammadov travelled to Ismayilli to get a first\u2011hand account of the events. On 25 January 2013 he described his impressions from the trip on his blog. On 28 January 2013 Mr Mammadov posted more information on his blog concerning the events, citing the official websites of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Taxes and publishing screenshots of those sites. In particular, he noted that, according to those sources and to information posted on V.A.\u2019s Facebook account, the Chirag Hotel was actually owned by V.A. This directly contradicted an earlier denial by the Head of IDEA. The information cited by Mr Mammadov was removed from the aforementioned Government websites and V.A.\u2019s Facebook page within one hour of Mr Mammadov publishing his blog entry. However, the blog entry itself was extensively quoted in the media (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 12-13). 14.  On 29 January 2013 Mr Mammadov received a phone call from the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and was orally invited to the department for questioning as a witness. Over the course of the following days he was repeatedly questioned (see ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 16\u201128). 15.  On 4 February 2013 Mr Mammadov was charged with criminal offences under Articles 233 (organising or actively participating in actions causing a breach of public order) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code (ibid., \u00a7 27). 16.  On the same day, 4 February 2013, Mr Mammadov was remanded in custody for a period of two months (until 4 April 2013) by a decision of the Nasimi District Court (ibid., \u00a7 32). 17.  On 30 April 2013 the head of the investigation team decided to charge Mr Mammadov under Articles 220.1 (mass disorder) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code, thereby replacing the original charges (ibid., \u00a7 49). 18.  The original two-month period of Mr Mammadov\u2019s detention was subsequently extended by the decisions of the Nasimi District Court of 14 March 2013 (extended until 4 June 2013), 15 May 2013 (until 4 September 2013) and 14 August 2013 (until 4 November 2013) (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 44, 51 and 53). His appeals against the original detention order of 4 February 2013 (see paragraph 16 above) and the extension orders were rejected (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 34-39, 45-46 and 53). Mr Mammadov also made unsuccessful requests to have his detention replaced by house arrest and to be released on bail (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 40-42 and 47-48). 19.  Mr Mammadov\u2019s trial, involving eighteen defendants in total, commenced in November 2013. On 4 November 2013 the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes held a preliminary hearing of the case (see Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 919/15, \u00a7\u00a7 21 et seq., 16 November 2017) (\u201cthe second Mammadov judgment\u201d). The trial, during which he remained detained, spanned approximately thirty hearings (ibid., \u00a7 26). 20.  On 17 March 2014 the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes delivered its judgment, convicting him as charged and sentencing him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment (ibid., \u00a7 94). 21.  On 24 September 2014, following an appeal by Mr Mammadov, the Shaki Court of Appeal upheld his conviction and sentence (ibid., \u00a7 121). 22.  In November 2014 Mr Mammadov lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. At the first hearing held on 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court decided, in the absence of any objections, to postpone any further hearing of the case for an indefinite period because it needed more time for examination of the case file (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 123-124). 23.  The hearing was resumed on 13 October 2015. By a decision on that date, the Supreme Court quashed the Shaki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 24 September 2014, having found that the lower courts\u2019 rejection of the defence\u2019s requests for the examination of additional witnesses and other evidence had been insufficiently reasoned and were in breach of the domestic procedural rules and the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The case was remitted for a new examination by the appellate court (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 124-125). 24.  On 29 April 2016, having re-examined the case material and having examined additional evidence, the Shaki Court of Appeal delivered a judgment upholding Mr Mammadov\u2019s conviction and sentence (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 127-129). 25.  The Court of Appeal took account of the Court\u2019s finding a violation of Article 5 (1) (c) in the first Mammadov judgment but concluded that it was unfounded. Having heard a number of witnesses it instead concluded that there had been sufficient evidence to charge and convict Mr Mammadov for the crimes with which he had been charged. It made no reference to the violations of other Articles of the Convention in the first Mammadov judgment. It referred to Mr Mammadov\u2019s \u201cdisobedience\u2011provoking\u201d facebook and blog posts and found:\n\u201cCase circumstances undoubtedly prove that Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu travelled to Ismailli town on 24 January 2013 and organised and actively participated in mass riots resulting in an attack on the local government office at about 5 p.m. committed by local residents ...\nThe court collegium notes that Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu arrived from Baku and managed to convert spontaneous rallies into organised mass riots within two hours: though in normal circumstances this could look odd the situation was strained, local residents condemned the head of Executive Power N.Alekperov and were excited and as Ilgar Mammadov noted \u201cthe situation was flammable\u201d. Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu took advantage of these factors and using anti\u2011government slogans attracted the crowd\u2019s attention, made emotions high and committed criminal acts described above.\u201d 26.  It continued:\n\u201cThe court collegium concluded that in compliance with provisions of the Articles 143-146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sufficient evidence was collected and assessed comprehensively and objectively at the court of first instance. Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan were correctly applied to the indictees Yagublu Tofig Rashid and Mammadov Ilgar Eldar.\u201d 27.  Mr Mammadov made a second appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court on 21 June 2016. By a final decision of 18 November 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Shaki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 29 April 2016 (ibid., \u00a7 149). Mr Mammadov remained in detention from that point until 13 August 2018 (see paragraph 32 below). 28.  After the second Mammadov judgment of the Court (see paragraphs 74-80 below) became final on 5 March 2018, Mr Mammadov again appealed to the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan to re-open his case. On 29 June 2018 the Plenum of the Supreme Court accepted his appeal, re\u2011opened his case and remitted it to the Shaki Court of Appeal. 29.  On 13 August 2018, the Shaki Court of Appeal reviewed the judgment of the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes which initially convicted Mr Mammadov on 17 March 2014. Both Mr Mammadov and the Prosecution Service were heard during the appeal. Neither adduced new information. 30.  The Court of Appeal re-examined the evidence and recalled that in accordance with this Court\u2019s well established case-law the domestic courts are in a better position to evaluate the evidence. Reviewing the evidence given by police officers it considered that there was \u201cdefinitely no legal basis to cast doubt on the reliability of the[ir] testimonies\u201d. It then reviewed the other original witness statements and evidence. It affirmed the conclusion in its decision of 29 April 2016 that \u201csufficient evidence was collected and assessed comprehensively and objectively before the court of first instance\u201d. It concluded:\n\u201cThus, as a result of reviewing the appeals, the court finds that the judgment of the Shaki Serious Crimes Court dated 17 March 2014 by which the defendant Ilgar Mammadov was found to be guilty under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment for six years under Article 220.1 of the Criminal Code and for four years under Article 315.2 of the Criminal Code and overall for seven years by partial combination of these terms under Article 66.3 of the Criminal Code, was lawful and grounded.\u201d 31.  As regards sentencing the Court of Appeal stated as follows:\n\u201cThe court also notes that, during the conditional sentence, the convict is not released from criminal responsibility; when a sentence imposed by the judgment is not enforced, it is served in the special form defined by the law.\nThe court, having regard to the personality of the convict Ilgar Mammadov, the existence of one minor child in his care, the absence of a prior criminal record, the fact that he has served the most part of the sentence and that he has not committed any illegal action during the period of imprisonment and the absence of any complaint or claim directly filed against him in connection with the crime committed, considers that his rehabilitation is possible without his serving the remaining part of his sentence and without his isolation from the public. Accordingly, the court considers that the application of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan and conditional enforcement of the remaining part of sentence, along with the determination of a probation period, corresponds to the law and is appropriate from the perspective of attaining the aim of the punishment.\u201d 32.  The Court of Appeal decided that the unserved term of one year five months and 21 days should be deducted from his final sentence. Applying Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan it granted him a two year probation period to expire on 13 August 2020. Mr Mammadov was released from prison the day of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment \u2013 13 August 2018. The Court of Appeal indicated:\n\u201cThe supervision of the convicted person\u2019s behaviour shall be assigned to the Enforcement and Probation Department of his place of residence. In accordance with Article 70.5 of the Criminal Code, during the probation period Ilgar Mammadov shall not change his permanent place of residence without informing the supervising authority, shall present himself when called upon by that body, shall not leave the country and shall prove his correction by his behaviour.\u201d 33.  In the first Mammadov judgment of 22 May 2014, which became final on 13 October 2014, the Court found violations of Articles 5 \u00a7 1(c), 5 \u00a7 4, 6 \u00a7 2, as well as Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5, in relation to criminal charges brought against Mr Mammadov in February 2013 for denouncing on his blog the authorities\u2019 version of the Ismayilli riots of 23 January 2013 and his subsequent pre-trial detention (see paragraphs 9 to 18 above). It awarded Mr Mammadov the sum of EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 34.  The Court found that the arrest and detention of Mr Mammadov took place in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence and therefore constituted a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1(c) (see the first Mammadov judgment \u00a7\u00a7 99-101)[1]:\n\u201c99.  For the above reasons, the Court considers that no specific facts or information giving rise to a suspicion justifying the applicant\u2019s arrest were mentioned or produced during the pre-trial proceedings, and that R.N.\u2019s and I.M.\u2019s statements, which were only subsequently produced before the Court, have not been shown to constitute such facts or information. Furthermore, it has not been shown that, following the applicant\u2019s arrest and throughout the entire period of his continued detention falling within the scope of this case, the authorities obtained any new information or evidence of such nature. 100.  The Court is mindful of the fact that the applicant\u2019s case has been taken to trial (the applicant\u2019s continued detention during the trial proceedings and the trial hearings themselves have not yet been the subject of a complaint before the Court). That, however, does not affect the Court\u2019s findings in connection with the present complaint, in which it is called upon to examine whether the deprivation of the applicant\u2019s liberty during the pre\u2011trial period was justified on the basis of information or facts available at the relevant time. In this respect, having regard to the above analysis, the Court finds that the material put before it does not meet the minimum standard set by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual\u2019s arrest and continued detention. Accordingly, it has not been demonstrated in a satisfactory manner that, during the period under the Court\u2019s consideration in the present case, the applicant was deprived of his liberty on a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d of having committed a criminal offence. 35.  It also found that the domestic courts, both at first instance and on appeal, had limited themselves in all their decisions to an automatic endorsement of the prosecution\u2019s requests without having conducted a genuine review of the lawfulness of the detention, resulting in a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4. 36.  Recalling that the charges brought against Mr Mammadov were not based on reasonable suspicion, the Court further found that the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence or punish Mr Mammadov for having criticised the government and for having attempted to disseminate what he believed to be true information which the government was trying to hide (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 141-143, cited at paragraph 187 below). 37.  Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 (ibid., \u00a7 144). 38.  The Court also found a violation of the Mr Mammadov\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 \u00a7 2 on account of statements made to the press by the Prosecutor General and the Minister of the Interior encouraging the public to believe that Mr Mammadov was guilty (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 127-128). 39.  Once the first Mammadov judgment became final on 13 October 2014 it was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, in order for the Committee to supervise its execution in accordance with Article 46 \u00a7 2 (see paragraph 3 above). 40.  On 26 November 2014 the Government took its first procedural step in the execution process (see paragraph 102), which was to submit an Action Plan to the Committee (see DH-DD(2014)1450). 41.  In the Action Plan, the Government informed the Committee about the state of the domestic criminal proceedings, in particular that following the facts examined in the first Mammadov judgment, Mr Mammadov had been convicted by a judgment of the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes of 17 March 2014, which had been upheld by the Shaki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 24 September 2014. A cassation appeal brought by him against the appellate judgment was pending (see paragraphs 19 to 22). 42.  The Government then included quotations from a decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of 3 November 2009 \u201con the application of the legislation by the courts during the examination of requests for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of an accused\u201d. 43.  Setting out the measures they had \u201cplanned and taken in order to give effect to the Court\u2019s judgment\u201d, the Government noted that the first Mammadov judgment had been submitted to the Supreme Court \u201cto be taken into account during the examination of the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal\u201d. 44.  The Government Agent\u2019s Office also planned to organise, together with the Supreme Court, a series of training sessions for the judges of first\u2011instance and appellate courts as regards the implementation of the Plenum\u2019s decision of 3 November 2009. Lastly, according to the Action Plan it was also envisaged that training would be held for prosecutors as regards the principle of presumption of innocence and the requirement of submission of the prosecution\u2019s case files for review by the courts for the purpose of verifying the existence of a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d. It was noted that the detailed time-table of the above measures would be submitted to the Committee in due course, following necessary arrangements. 2.  Proceedings from the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Human Rights meeting in December 2014 to its Human Rights meeting in December 2016\n(a)  Overview 45.  Following the Government\u2019s submission of the Action Plan (see paragraphs 40 to 44 above) the Committee of Ministers examined the case at the first of its quarterly Human Rights meetings to be held after the judgment had become final (its 1214th Human Rights meeting (2\u20114 December 2014) see also paragraph 100 below). It was advised by its Secretariat as follows:\n\u201cThe violation of Article 18, taken in conjunction with Article 5 casts doubt on the merit of the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant.\n...\nIt would therefore be useful if the authorities informed the Committee of the measures which the authorities and bodies concerned (notably, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Supreme Court) intend to take in order to take into account the findings of the Court and to erase, as far as possible, the consequences of this violation for the applicant in the context of the criminal procedure which appears to be pending before the Supreme Court. In the light of the serious findings of the Court in this case, release of the applicant would constitute the first important measure to be envisaged as a matter of priority and without delay, in accordance with the domestic procedures.\u201d\nAt that meeting the Committee of Ministers classified the case in the \u201cenhanced procedure\u201d on the basis that it required \u201curgent individual measures\u201d and disclosed a \u201ccomplex problem\u201d (see paragraph 101 below). Having considered the judgment, the Action Plan provided and the advice of its Secretariat, the Committee adopted the following decision:\n\u201cThe Deputies 1.  as regards individual measures and considering the circumstances of the case, called upon the authorities, to ensure the applicant\u2019s release without delay; 2.  in view of the preoccupying reports about the applicant\u2019s health condition, called upon the authorities to urgently take any necessary action and provide rapidly information in this respect; 3.  invited the authorities to indicate the further measures taken or planned in order to give effect to the Court\u2019s judgment, and to erase rapidly, as far as possible, the remaining consequences for the applicant of the serious violations established; 4.  noted, in this context, that the criminal proceedings, the initiation of which was criticised by the European Court, are still pending before the Supreme Court; 5.  recalled the general problem of the arbitrary application of criminal legislation to restrict freedom of expression and conveyed their particular concern about the finding of a violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention; 6.  therefore called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to furnish, without delay, concrete and comprehensive information on the measures taken and/or planned to avoid that criminal proceedings are instituted without a legitimate basis and to ensure effective judicial review of such attempts by the Prosecutor\u2019s office; 7.  expressed concern about the repetitive nature of the breach of the principle of presumption of innocence by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and members of the government, despite several judgments of the Court which, since 2010, have indicated the precise requirements of the Convention in this regard, and insisted on the necessity of rapid and decisive action in order to prevent similar violations in the future;\n...\u201d 46.  During this period, the Committee of Ministers was informed in the context of the individual measures that Mr Mammadov had initiated a cassation appeal against the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal of 24 September 2014 (see paragraphs 21-22 above) to the Supreme Court. On 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court postponed the appeal sine die and at its Human Rights meeting of 12 March 2015, the Committee adopted an interim resolution calling for Mr Mammadov\u2019s release \u201cwithout delay\u201d (see CM/ResDH(2015)43). The Supreme Court ultimately gave its judgment on 13 October 2015 quashing the judgment of the Shaki Court of Appeal (see paragraph 23 above). Examining that judgment, the Committee concluded that the Supreme Court had not taken into account the findings of the first Mammadov judgment. At its examination of the case at its 1243rd Human Rights meeting (from 8-9 December 2015), the Committee:\n\u201c3.  insisted anew on the necessity for the authorities to ensure, without further delay, the applicant\u2019s release ...\n... 4.  noted that the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan ordered only a partial cassation, which does not appear to take into account the findings of the European Court in the applicant\u2019s case and, in particular, those [findings] relating to the violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5;\n...\u201d 47.  The Committee of Ministers continued to follow the events concerning Mr Mammadov\u2019s conviction and appeal (see paragraphs 19-27 above). It noted that after the decision of the Supreme Court, the Shaki Court of Appeal on 29 April 2016 re-examined Mr Mammadov\u2019s case and confirmed his conviction (see paragraph 24 above). On 21 June 2016, he again appealed the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 27 above). 48.  Until June 2016, the Committee of Ministers examined the case at each of its quarterly Human Rights meetings (see paragraph 100 below). From June 2016 it decided to examine Mr Mammadov\u2019s situation at its ordinary, monthly, meetings whilst also continuing to examine it at every Human Rights meeting of the Committee.[2]\n(b)  Information submitted to the Committee of Ministers 49.  From December 2014 to December 2016 the Committee of Ministers received nineteen submissions of information from Mr Mammadov about the individual measures in the case, submitted under Rule 9 of its Rules (see paragraphs 89 and 93 below) and at a frequency of around one submission every fortnight. He complained about his continued detention stating that the judgment was not executed as he had not been released; the domestic courts had failed to take into account this Court\u2019s findings in the re-opened proceedings; and the domestic courts were taking too long to consider his case. Mr Mammadov also submitted that he had been assaulted and mistreated in detention and that members of his family had been threatened. 50.  In addition to their initial Action Plan submitted on 26 November 2014 (see paragraph 40 above) the Government made three submissions to the Committee of Ministers during this period under Rule 8 of the Rules (see paragraph 92 below) and responding to Mr Mammadov\u2019s submissions. On 15 December 2014 (see DH-DD(2014)1521) and 5 August 2015 (see DH-DD(2015)780) they provided information indicating that Mr Mammadov\u2019s health was satisfactory. On 7 March 2016 (see DH\u2011DD(2016)261) they indicated that national law obliged his appearance at the hearings in his case and as such he was being transferred to Shaki Court of Appeal. 51.  Under Rule 9 of the Rules (see paragraph 93 below), the NGO Freedom Now made one submission to the Committee of Ministers on 26 November 2014 (see DH-DD(2015)844). It stated that Azerbaijan had failed to execute the Court\u2019s judgment by failing to release Mr Mammadov or stop domestic judicial proceedings against him and by failing to provide any workable plan to curtail political prosecutions. It urged the Committee to initiate proceedings under Article 46 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. 52.  Two NGOs, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Public Association for Assistance to a Free Economy, made a joint submission of information on 6 March 2015 (see DH-DD(2015)264). They criticised the content of the authorities\u2019 Action Plan from 2014 (see paragraph 40 above) and, with reference to other cases against Azerbaijan pending before the Court, underlined a pattern of increased application of criminal legislation to persecute those exercising their freedom of expression.\n(c)  Decisions and Interim Resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers during this period 53.  In its examination of the case at the nine meetings up to and including December 2016, the Committee of Ministers adopted three interim resolutions and six decisions (one at every Human Rights meeting where the case was examined and an interim resolution was not adopted). 54.  All those decisions and resolutions expressed the Committee of Ministers\u2019 insistence that Mr Mammadov should be released immediately and that information should be provided on the general measures envisaged to execute the judgment. The language used by the Committee reflected its growing concerns about the fact that Mr Mammadov remained in detention, notwithstanding its repeated calls for his release. 55.  The Committee of Ministers\u2019 addressed its concerns first to the authorities of Azerbaijan in general, then to the highest authorities in Azerbaijan. From the 1236th Human Rights meeting onwards (24 September 2015) it called on the Council of Europe as a whole and member states acting individually to use all means available to ensure Azerbaijan\u2019s compliance with its obligations under the judgment. 56.  The Committee also indicated that it would use all the means at the disposal of the Organisation, including under Article 46 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see paragraph 58 below). 57.  The last interim resolution adopted in that period was at the Committee of Ministers\u2019 1259th Human Rights meeting (7-9 June 2016 (see CM/Res/DH(2016)144). It stated:\n\u201cThe Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provide that the Committee supervises the execution of final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe Court\u201d) below;\nDeeply deploring that, despite the Court\u2019s findings on the fundamental flaws of the criminal proceedings engaged against him and notwithstanding the Committee\u2019s repeated calls, the applicant still has not been released;\nRecalling that it is intolerable that, in a State subject to the rule of law, a person should continue to be deprived of his liberty on the basis of proceedings engaged, in breach of the Convention, with a view to punishing him for having criticised the government.\nRecalling that the obligation to abide by the judgments of the Court is unconditional;\nINSISTS that the highest competent authorities of the respondent State take all necessary measures to ensure without further delay Ilgar Mammadov\u2019s release;\nDECLARES the Committee\u2019s resolve to ensure, with all means available to the Organisation, Azerbaijan\u2019s compliance with its obligations under this judgment;\nDECIDES in view thereof to examine the applicant\u2019s situation at each regular and Human Rights meeting of the Committee until such time as he is released.\u201d 58.  The final decision adopted during this period at its 1273rd Human Rights meeting (6-8 December 2016) stated:\n\u201cThe Deputies 1.  noting with the utmost concern that, more than two years after the final judgment of the European Court and notwithstanding the repeated calls of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General on the respondent State to release the applicant, he remains detained; 2.  recalling the previous decisions and interim resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers, particularly the repeated calls of the Committee for the immediate release of the applicant; 3.  deeply deplored that the criminal proceedings against the applicant concluded on 18 November 2016 before the Supreme Court without the consequences of the violations found by the European Court having been drawn, in particular, that of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention; 4.  firmly reiterated that it is not acceptable that, in a state subject to the rule of law, an individual remains deprived of his liberty on the basis of proceedings carried out in violation of the Convention in order to punish him for having criticised the government and that, in consequence, the continuing arbitrary detention of Ilgar Mammadov constitutes a flagrant breach of the obligations under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention; 5.  affirmed their determination to ensure the implementation of the judgment by actively considering using all the means at the disposal of the Organisation, including under Article 46, paragraph 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 6.  finally expressed their deep concern about the absence of any information from the authorities concerning the general measures taken or envisaged to prevent violations of the rule of law through abuse of power of the kind established in the European Court\u2019s judgment; in this respect, encouraged Azerbaijan to engage in meaningful dialogue with the Committee of Ministers.\u201d 59.  Exercising his powers under Article 52 of the Convention the Secretary General of the Council of Europe appointed a representative to visit Baku. On 11 January 2017, the representative attended meetings in the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan when issues concerning the execution of the judgment were discussed. 60.  On 10 February 2017 the President of Azerbaijan signed an Executive Order. According to the analysis of the Secretariat at the 1280th Human Rights meeting ((7-10 March 2017) CM/Notes/1280/H46-2) the Order envisaged the adoption of a number of measures. Amongst others, it foresaw measures regarding:\n\u201c... the prevention of arbitrary arrests; a liberalisation of criminal policy; an obligation to \u201cstrictly comply with the principles of criminal law and general grounds of sentencing\u201d; the elimination of \u201cnon-procedural attitudes during criminal prosecution and execution of sentences\u201d; or the implementation of stricter measures to fight notably abuse of power. The Executive Order also foresaw the elaboration within two months of draft laws notably on: the decriminalisation of certain crimes, in particular in the economic field; a greater recourse to alternatives to imprisonment and \u201ca wider application of substitution of remainder of imprisonment by lighter punishment, parole and suspended sentence\u201d. It has also been recommended to the domestic courts to examine the existence of reasonable suspicions of individuals having committed an offence and grounds for arrest, when deciding on measure of restraint, and arguments in favour of alternative measures. In addition, it has also been recommended to the Supreme Court to ensure continued analysis of case law concerning arrest and imposition of imprisonment, and development of fair case law in this field.\u201d 61.  The Committee of Ministers adopted the following decision at that 1280th meeting:\n\u201c1.  recalling their previous decisions and interim resolutions calling for the immediate release of Ilgar Mammadov and in particular their decision of December 2016 affirming their determination to ensure the implementation of the judgment by actively considering using all the means at the disposal of the Organisation; 3.  in this respect took note with interest of the Azerbaijani authorities\u2019 commitment to examine all avenues discussed during the mission of the representative of the Secretary General to execute the Ilgar Mammadov judgment, as well as of the recent Presidential Executive Order which foresees promising measures for the execution of this judgment; 4.  invited the authorities to keep the Committee informed of the concrete measures adopted on the basis of this Executive Order and in particular of those enabling the release of Ilgar Mammadov without further delay; 5.  noted the indication given during the meeting by the Azerbaijani authorities that the just satisfaction has been paid to Ilgar Mammadov in December 2015 ...; invited them to confirm this information in writing;\n...\u201d 62.  At its 1288th Human Rights meeting (6-7 June 2017), the Committee of Ministers\u2019 adopted a decision which recalled the terms of the decision from its previous meeting, called for Mr Mammadov\u2019s \u201cunconditional\u201d release and encouraged urgent progress of the Executive Order. 63.  The Committee of Ministers examined the case at its 1293rd (ordinary) meeting (13 September 2017). At that meeting the Secretary General of the Council of Europe called on the Committee of Ministers, should Mr Mammadov\u2019s situation remain unchanged, to trigger proceedings under Article 46 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. 64.  The Committee of Ministers then examined the case at its 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017). It noted information provided by the Azerbaijan authorities on 6 September 2017 (see DH\u2011DD(2017)951) that the draft legislative amendments to the Criminal Code to implement the Executive Order had been submitted to parliament; that the authorities considered there was no particular urgency to adopt those reforms but that the amendments could be adopted in the autumn session. In response to questions asked by the Deputies about whether those amendments would assist Mr Mammadov, the Government indicated their position that the Court\u2019s findings of a violation in the first Mammadov judgment concerned the pre-trial phase of proceedings and a second application was pending concerning the criminal proceedings. They informed the Committee that the amendments would help to prevent similar violations. 65.  Recalling the statement of the Secretary General, the Committee of Ministers adopted a decision at that meeting which followed the terms of the decisions adopted in March and June 2017 (see paragraphs 60 to 62 above). 66.  At its ordinary meeting on 25 October 2017, in light of the lack of further developments, the Committee of Ministers adopted a fourth interim resolution putting Azerbaijan on formal notice that it had failed to fulfil its obligations (see CM/ResDH(2017)379). 67.  Finally, at its 1302nd Human Rights meeting (5-7 December 2017) it adopted its fifth interim resolution (CM/ResDH(2017)429) which triggered proceedings under Article 46 \u00a7 4:\n\u201cRecalling anew\na.  that in its above-mentioned judgment, the Court found not only a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of  the Convention, as no facts or information had been produced giving rise to a suspicion justifying  the bringing of charges against the applicant or his arrest and pre-trial detention, but also a violation  of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5, as the actual purpose of these measures was to silence or punish him for criticising the government;\nb.  the respondent State\u2019s obligation, under Article 46 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, to abide by all  final judgments in cases to which it has been a party and that this obligation entails, in addition to the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent State, where required, of individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum;\nc.  the Committee\u2019s call, at its first examination on 4 December 2014, of the individual measures required in the light of the above judgment to ensure the applicant\u2019s release without  delay;\nd.  the Committee\u2019s numerous subsequent decisions and interim resolutions stressing the fundamental flaws in the criminal proceedings revealed by the Court\u2019s conclusions under Article 18 combined with Article 5 of the Convention and calling for the applicant\u2019s immediate and  unconditional release;\ne.  that the criminal proceedings against the applicant concluded on 18 November 2016 before the Supreme Court without the consequences of the violations found by the European Court having  been drawn, in particular, that of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention;\nf.  that, over three years since the Court\u2019s judgment became final, the applicant remains in detention on the basis of the flawed criminal proceedings;\nConsiders that, in these circumstances, by not having ensured the applicant\u2019s unconditional release, the Republic of Azerbaijan refuses to abide by the final judgment of the Court;\nDecides to refer to the Court, in accordance with Article 46 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, the question whether the Republic of Azerbaijan has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 46 \u00a7 1; ...\u201d 68.  In accordance with the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Rules (see paragraph 94 below) the views of the Republic of Azerbaijan were included in an Appendix to the resolution (see Annex to the present judgment). There, the Government set out the measures adopted to execute the judgment. In respect of individual measures they confirmed payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court. They also stated that on 29 April 2016 the Shaki Court of Appeal finalised its examination of Mr Mammadov\u2019s appeal and in doing so it carefully addressed the Court\u2019s conclusions in the first Mammadov judgment and remedied the deficiencies found in the proceedings leading to Mr Mammadov\u2019s conviction. 69.  In respect of general measures they referred to the Executive Order presented to the Committee of Ministers during the supervision process in 2017 (see paragraph 60 above). They also confirmed the adoption on 20 October 2017 by the Milli Medjlis of the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code decriminalising certain acts and creating the possibility for those convicted for serious crimes to apply for conditional release after having served two-thirds of a criminal sentence. 71.  On 14 August 2018 the Government of Azerbaijan wrote to the Committee of Ministers informing them of the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal and Mr Mammadov\u2019s release on 13 August 2018 (see paragraphs 28-32 above). The Committee of Ministers replied to the Government of Azerbaijan on 28 August 2018 asking them a number of questions on the factual and procedural developments in Mr Mammadov\u2019s case. The Government provided a memorandum in reply which was also commented on by Mr Mammadov in a separate submission (see documents DH\u2011DD(2018)816 and DH-DD(2018)891). 72.  The Committee of Ministers examined the first and second Mammadov judgments together in light of those written exchanges at its 1324th (Human Rights) meeting of 18-20 September 2018, and then the first Mammadov judgment at its 1325th ordinary meeting on 26 September 2018. It did not adopt any decisions relevant to the cases at those meetings. 73.  According to information provided by the Government of Azerbaijan, on 28 March 2019 the Supreme Court gave its decision in a cassation appeal by Mr Mammadov against the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal in part and amended the Shaki Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 13 August 2018. It reduced the consolidated sentences imposed on Mr Mammadov to five years, six months and nine days imprisonment. In light of the time Mr Mammadov had already spent in prison, the Supreme Court considered his sentence to have been fully served. The Supreme Court also set aside the conditional sentence of two years imposed by the Shaki Court of Appeal, thus removing its associated restrictions on Mr Mammadov (see paragraphs 31-32 above) including the obligation on him to report to the Enforcement and Probation Department, and restrictions on his residence and travel. 74.  On 19 December 2014 Mr Mammadov made a second application to the Court alleging violations of the Convention arising from the conduct of his trial and conviction which followed his pre-trial detention examined by the Court in the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraphs 19-27 above). 75.  In the second Mammadov judgment, cited above, the Court found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 in connection with his trial and conviction; events also examined by the Committee of Ministers in the execution proceedings for the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraphs 45 to 48 above). 76.  In that judgment, delivered on 16 November 2017, after the Committee of Ministers had put Azerbaijan on formal notice in relation to the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraph 66 above), the Court first considered in detail the scope of its examination, stating:\n\u201c202.  The scope of the [first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment was limited, inter alia, to the issues of compatibility with Articles 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c) and 4 and Article 18 of the Convention of the applicant\u2019s detention during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. In the present case, however, the Court is called upon to examine a different set of legal issues \u2013 namely, whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, were fair, as required by Article 6 of the Convention. 203.  While the issues to be examined and the legal standards applicable under Article 6 of the Convention are different, both the previous case and the present case concern the same criminal proceedings against the applicant involving the same charges stemming from the same events. As the Court held in the [first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment, during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the accusations against the applicant suffered from a prima facie lack of plausibility. In particular, the Court highlighted the fact that the applicant was accused of arriving in Ismayilli one day after the spontaneous and disorganised \u201cacts of hooliganism\u201d had already taken place and that within the short period of two hours, his overall stay in the town, he managed to seize a significant degree of control over the situation, turn the ongoing disorganised rioting into \u201corganised acts\u201d of disorder, establish himself as a leader of the protestors whom he had not known before and who had already gathered without his involvement, and directly cause all of their subsequent disorderly actions. As already noted, this lack of plausibility of the accusations, coupled with the attitude of the authorities towards the applicant\u2019s political activities, called for a high level of scrutiny of the facts. The circumstances on which this previous finding of the Court was based remain unchanged in the present case. The Court will therefore proceed with analysing under Article 6 whether this deficiency has been compensated by the evidence presented at the trial and the reasons provided by the domestic courts.\u201d 77.  Then, concluding in respect of Article 6, it found:\n\u201c237.  Having regard to the aforementioned considerations, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s rights to a reasoned judgment and to examine witnesses were infringed. His conviction was based on flawed or misrepresented evidence and his objections in this respect were inadequately addressed. The evidence favourable to the applicant was systematically dismissed in an inadequately reasoned or manifestly unreasonable manner. Even though the case was remitted once for a new examination by the Supreme Court and an attempt was made to address some of the defence\u2019s requests and objections, none of the shortcomings noted above were eventually remedied. The above findings are sufficient to conclude that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, did not comply with guarantees of a fair trial.\u201d 78.  In relation to Mr Mammadov\u2019s complaint of a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 6 the Court stated in the second Mammadov judgment, cited above:\n\u201c260.  The Court recalls that it has already held in [the first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 142-43) that the restriction of the applicant\u2019s liberty prior to the conviction which is the focus of the present application had been applied for purposes other than bringing him before a competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. This led the Court in that case to find a breach of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention (...). 261.  Furthermore, the Court observes that the question of whether Article 6 of the Convention contains any express or implied restrictions which may form the subject of the Court\u2019s examination under Article 18 of the Convention remains open .... 262.  Taking those circumstances into account and having further regard to the submissions of the parties and its findings under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the complaint under Article 18 in the present case (compare Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014, with further references).\u201d 79.  Concerning the remaining issues, it found that Mr Mammadov\u2019s complaint under Articles 6 and 13 concerning the length of proceedings, and his complaint under Article 17 were inadmissible. It concluded that it was not necessary to examine separately the admissibility or merits of his complaints under Articles 13 and 14, or under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 6. 80.  Under Article 41, it awarded him EUR 10 000 for any non-pecuniary damage suffered (ibid., \u00a7 269). 81.  Following extensive work carried out over a number of decades on the legal principles of State responsibility as set out in a series of Draft Articles, in 2001 the International Law Commission adopted those Articles which became known as the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the \u201cARSIWA\u201d). The International Law Commission submitted the text to the United Nations General Assembly in a report which contained commentaries on the Articles.[3] 82.  The United Nations General Assembly has given consideration to those Articles on a number of occasions since 2001. At its seventy-first session the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly adopted resolution 71/133 on 19 December 2016 which acknowledged the growing number of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies referring to them, and continued to acknowledge their importance and usefulness. 83.  The Articles formulate general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions and omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. Concerning the applicability of the Articles, paragraph (4) (b) of the General Commentary states as follows:\n\u201c... Nor do the articles cover such indirect or additional consequences as may flow from the responses of international organisations to wrongful conduct. In carrying out their functions it may be necessary for international organisations to take a position on whether a State has breached an international obligation. But even where this is so, the consequences will be those determined by or within the framework of the constituent instrument of the organisation, and these fall outside the scope of the articles.\u201d 84.  Article 30 which relates to cessation and non-repetition reads:\n\u201cThe State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:\n(a)  to cease that act, if it is continuing;\n(b)  to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.\u201d 85.  Article 31 is titled \u201cReparation\u201d and states:\n\u201c1.  The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 86.  According to the commentaries on that article a number of principles arising from international law should be used to interpret those provisions:\n\u201c(9)  Paragraph 2 addresses a further issue, namely the question of a causal link between the internationally wrongful act and the injury. It is only \u201c[i]njury ... caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State\u201d for which full reparation must be made. This phrase is used to make clear that the subject matter of reparation is, globally, the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally wrongful act.\n(10)  The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is, in principle, a legal and not only a historical or causal process [...]. But other factors may also be relevant: for example, whether State organs deliberately caused the harm in question, or whether the harm caused was within the ambit of the rule which was breached, having regard to the purpose of that rule. In other words, the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation[4]. In international as in national law, the question of remoteness of damage \u201cis not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily solved by search for a single verbal formula\u201d. The notion of a sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied in the general requirement in article 31 that the injury should be in consequence of the wrongful act, but without the addition of any particular qualifying phrase.\n(11)  A further element affecting the scope of reparation is the question of mitigation of damage. Even the wholly innocent victim of wrongful conduct is expected to act reasonably when confronted by the injury. Although often expressed in terms of a \u201cduty to mitigate\u201d, this is not a legal obligation which itself gives rise to responsibility. It is rather that a failure to mitigate by the Injured Party may preclude recovery to that extent ...\u201d 87.  Article 32 is titled \u201cIrrelevance of internal law\u201d:\n\u201cThe responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part.\u201d 88.  Articles 34 to 37 address the constituent elements of reparation, (restitution, compensation and satisfaction):\n\u201cArticle 34. Forms of reparation\nFull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.\nArticle 35. Restitution\nA State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:\n(a)  is not materially impossible;\n(b)  does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation.\nCommentary\n(1)  In accordance with article 34, restitution is the first of the forms of reparation available to a State injured by an internationally wrongful act. Restitution involves the re-establishment as far as possible of the situation which existed prior to the commission of the internationally wrongful act, to the extent that any changes that have occurred in that situation may be traced to that act. In its simplest form, this involves such conduct as the release of persons wrongly detained or the return of property wrongly seized. In other cases, restitution may be a more complex act.\n...\nArticle 36. Compensation 1.  The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2.  The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.\nArticle 37. Satisfaction 1.  The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2.  Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 89.  The Committee of Ministers, which is the executive body of the Council of Europe, supervises the execution of the judgments of the Court under Article 46 of the Convention. For this purpose it has adopted Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements reflecting the principles of state responsibility in international law. It has also adopted a number of \u201cpractical modalities\u201d which govern its daily work. 90.  The Committee of Ministers adopted the Rules governing the supervision of the execution of judgments on 10 May 2006 at the 964th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (later amended on 18 January 2017 at the 1275th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies). 91.  Rule 6 states as follows:\n\u201cRule 6 - Information to the Committee of Ministers on the execution of the judgment 1.  When, in a judgment transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Court has decided that there has been a violation of the Convention or its protocols and/or has awarded just satisfaction to the Injured Party under Article 41 of the Convention, the Committee shall invite the High Contracting Party concerned to inform it of the measures which the High Contracting Party has taken or intends to take in consequence of the judgment, having regard to its obligation to abide by it under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 2.  When supervising the execution of a judgment by the High Contracting Party concerned, pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers shall examine:\na.  whether any just satisfaction awarded by the Court has been paid, including as the case may be, default interest; and\nb.  if required, and taking into account the discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned to choose the means necessary to comply with the judgment, whether:\ni.  individual measures1 have been taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the Injured Party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention;\nii.  general measures2 have been adopted, preventing new violations similar to that or those found or putting an end to continuing violations.\n__________________ 1.  For instance, the striking out of an unjustified criminal conviction from the criminal records, the granting of a residence permit or the reopening of impugned domestic proceedings (see on this latter point Recommendation Rec(2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, adopted on 19 January 2000 at the 694th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies). 2.  For instance, legislative or regulatory amendments, changes of case-law or administrative practice or publication of the Court\u2019s judgment in the language of the respondent state and its dissemination to the authorities concerned.\u201d 92.  Rule 8 provides for the accessibility of information submitted in the supervision process:\n\u201cRule 8 - Access to information 1.  The provisions of this Rule are without prejudice to the confidential nature of the Committee of Ministers\u2019 deliberations in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 2.  The following information shall be accessible to the public unless the Committee decides otherwise in order to protect legitimate public or private interests:\na.  information and documents relating thereto provided by a High Contracting Party to the Committee of Ministers pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention;\nb.  information and documents relating thereto provided to the Committee of Ministers, in accordance with the present Rules, by the Injured Party, by non\u2011governmental organisations or by national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.\n...\u201d 93.  Rule 9 allows information to be submitted to the Committee of Ministers by individual applicants, non-governmental organisations and other bodies on the execution of a judgment. It states:\n\u201cRule 9 - Communications to the Committee of Ministers 1.  The Committee of Ministers shall consider any communication from the Injured Party with regard to payment of the just satisfaction or the taking of individual measures. 2.  The Committee of Ministers shall be entitled to consider any communication from non-governmental organisations, as well as national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, with regard to the execution of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention. 3.  The Committee of Ministers shall also be entitled to consider any communication from an international intergovernmental organisation or its bodies or agencies whose aims and activities include the protection or the promotion of human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with regard to the issues relating to the execution of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention which fall within their competence. 4.  The Committee of Ministers shall likewise be entitled to consider any communication from an institution or body allowed, whether as a matter of right or upon special invitation from the Court, to intervene in the procedure before the Court, with regard to the execution under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention of the judgment either in all cases (in respect of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights) or in all those concerned by the Court\u2019s authorisation (in respect of any other institution or body). 5.  The Secretariat shall bring, in an appropriate way, any communication received under paragraph 1 of this Rule, to the attention of the Committee of Ministers. 6.  The Secretariat shall bring any communication received under paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of this Rule to the attention of the State concerned. When the State responds within five working days, both the communication and the response shall be brought to the attention of the Committee of Ministers and made public. If there has been no response within this time limit, the communication shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers but shall not be made public. It shall be published ten working days after notification, together with any response received within this time limit. A State response received after these ten working days shall be circulated and published separately upon receipt.\u201d 94.  Rule 11 sets out the procedure in infringement proceedings under Article 46 \u00a7 4 of the Convention:\n\u201cRule 11- Infringement proceedings 1.  When in accordance with Article 46, paragraph 4, of the Convention the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation. 2.  Infringement proceedings should be brought only in exceptional circumstances. They shall not be initiated unless formal notice of the Committee\u2019s intention to bring such proceedings has been given to the High Contracting Party concerned. Such formal notice shall be given ultimately six months before the lodging of proceedings, unless the Committee decides otherwise, and shall take the form of an interim resolution. This Resolution shall be adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. 3.  The referral decision of the matter to the Court shall take the form of an interim resolution. It shall be reasoned and concisely reflect the views of the High Contracting Party concerned. 4.  The Committee of Ministers shall be represented before the Court by its Chair unless the Committee decides upon another form of representation. This decision shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.\u201d 95.  Rule 16 addresses the adoption of interim resolutions in the execution process and their intended function:\n\u201cRule 16 \u2013 Interim resolutions\nIn the course of its supervision of the execution of a judgment or of the terms of a friendly settlement, the Committee of Ministers may adopt interim resolutions, notably in order to provide information on the state of progress of the execution or, where appropriate, to express concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the execution.\u201d 96.  Rule 17 states:\n\u201cRule 17 - Final resolution\nAfter having established that the High Contracting Party concerned has taken all the necessary measures to abide by the judgment or that the terms of the friendly settlement have been executed, the Committee of Ministers shall adopt a Resolution concluding that its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2, or Article 39, paragraph 4, of the Convention have been exercised.\u201d 97.  The procedures for the supervision of the execution of judgments were adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2010 (see Information document: CM/Inf/DH(2010)37). 98.  The procedures were based on two principles. The first is that of \u201ccontinuous supervision\u201d, meaning that all final judgments remain under the continuous supervision of the Committee of Ministers until the Committee closes its supervision procedure by adopting a final resolution (see paragraph 96 above). 99.  The second principle is that of prioritisation, as implemented through the Committee of Ministers\u2019 \u201ctwin-track\u201d approach. In line with that approach, all cases pending in the supervision process will be examined under the \u201cstandard supervision\u201d track unless, because of its specific nature, a case warrants consideration under the \u201cenhanced supervision\u201d track. 100.  Applying these two principles means that it is not necessary to include every case pending execution on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers\u2019 quarterly Human Rights meetings. These meetings are dedicated to the supervision of the Court\u2019s judgments and held in March, June, September and December (in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and Section III. 3. of the Committee\u2019s general Rules of Procedure). The cases pending execution remain under the Committee\u2019s continued supervision, as entrusted to the Committee\u2019s secretariat. The Committee\u2019s quarterly meetings are therefore reserved for the examination of a minority of the cases pending which are classified under the enhanced procedure and which may require more active intervention by the Committee such as the adoption of decisions and/or interim resolutions, in the latter case usually following debate and sometimes a vote. 101.  The types of cases that may be placed in the enhanced procedure are judgments requiring urgent individual measures; pilot judgments; judgments raising structural and/or complex problems as identified by the Court or by the Committee of Ministers; and interstate cases. 102.  In order to allow the Committee of Ministers to effectively carry out its supervision role respondent states should submit Action Plans and/or Action reports to the Committee to inform it of the measures planned and/or adopted to execute a judgment of the Court (see also paragraph 91 above about Rule 6 of the Rules). 103.  For cases classified in the enhanced procedure, the Committee of Ministers entrusts its Secretariat with a role of more intensive and pro-active cooperation with States. 104.  There have been relatively few applications to the Court under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 (for a summary of the Court\u2019s case\u2011law see the recent judgment in Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, \u00a7\u00a7 264-282, 28 November 2017). To date there have been nine cases where the Court has found such a violation, including in the first Mammadov judgment. The first was Gusinskiy v. Russia, no. 70276/01, ECHR 2004\u2011IV. After that, Cebotari v. Moldova, no. 35615/06, 13 November 2007; then two cases against Ukraine: Lutsenko v. Ukraine, no. 6492/11, 3 July 2012, and Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, no. 49872/11, 30 April 2013. Those were followed by Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, 17 March 2016, Merabishvili v. Georgia, cited above, Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, no. 47145/14, 19 April 2018, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 48653/13 and 3 others, 7 June 2018. 105.  Of the eight cases listed above, three became final relatively recently and have not yet been examined by the Committee of Ministers \u2013 Merabishvili, Mammadli, and Rashad Hasanov cited above. Four cases have been examined by the Committee and are pending in the supervision procedure \u2013 Gusinskiy, Lutsenko, Tymoshenko and Rasul Jafarov, all cited above. Finally, the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision procedure in one case, Cebotari, cited above. An overview of the execution process is set out below.\n(b)  Cases pending supervision before the Committee of Ministers where the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5\n(i)  Individual measures 106.  In the four cases pending supervision where there has been a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, the Committee of Ministers has examined three elements taken by respondent states as individual measures \u2013 payment of the just satisfaction, erasure of the negative consequences of the impugned decision, and release of the applicants following the judgment. 107.  The Committee noted that payment of the just satisfaction and release of the applicants had occurred in Lutsenko, cited above (examination at the 1172nd Human Rights meeting (4-6 June 2013) and Tymoshenko, cited above (examination at the 1193rd Human Rights meeting (4-6 March 2014)). In Gusinskiy, cited above (examination at the 1243rd Human Rights meeting (8-9 December 2015)), the Committee noted that the applicant was released prior to the Court\u2019s judgment becoming final and the commercial agreement the applicant was intimidated into signing whilst held in detention on remand was not enforced. 108.  In Rasul Jafarov, cited above, the applicant was pardoned and released the day that the judgment of the European Court was delivered, however the just satisfaction was not paid in full. Notwithstanding his pardon, as a result of his conviction the applicant was prevented from standing for any elections in Azerbaijan until 2021, and from admission to the Bar Association also until 2021. In the decision adopted at the Committee\u2019s 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017) the Committee:\n\u201c1.  urged the authorities to pay without delay the remaining amount of just satisfaction, including default interest; 2.  in view of the seriousness of the consequences which the applicant continues to suffer despite his early release, urged the authorities to explore all avenues including a reopening of the impugned proceedings in order to erase the consequences of the violations found;\u201d\n(ii)  General measures 109.  In respect of the general measures taken in the four cases pending supervision to avoid similar violations of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, the Committee\u2019s Secretariat\u2019s analysis in the cases of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko (see the Committee\u2019s examination of the case at its 1193rd Human Rights meeting (4-6 March 2014)) indicated:\n\u201c... reform of the prosecution service and the constitutional reform aimed at strengthening the independence of the judiciary, appear relevant and interesting and a more in-depth examination is under way (both these draft legislative reforms have been examined from a more general point of view by the Venice Commission in 2013 \u2013 see CDL\u2011AD(2013)025E and CDL\u2011AD(2013)034E). It also underlined that the progress achieved in these respects is also followed in the context of other groups of cases, notably the Oleksandr Volkov case, also dealing with important shortcomings in the organisation of the Ukrainian judiciary.\u201d 110.  In the third case, Gusinsky, the Secretariat\u2019s analysis prepared at the 1243rd meeting (8-9 December 2015) advised the Committee in relation to the violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 that:\n\u201c... it appears that this violation was closely linked to the vagueness of the law at the time and the absence of effective judicial review of detention of suspects. The new CCP adopted in 2001 appears to have eliminated the vagueness of Article 90 of the 1960 CCP. Effective judicial review has also been introduced. Accordingly, the kind of abuse of power by the executive and the prosecutor services at issue in the Gusinskiy case would today be subjected to effective judicial review. These developments also appear to address the violation of Article 5 found in this case.\u201d 111.  In its decision at that meeting the Committee:\n\u201c... welcomed the efforts made by the Russian authorities aimed at aligning Russian legislation and practice with the Convention requirements under Article 5 of the Convention\u201d.\nHowever, the Gusinsky case remains pending to ensure supervision of other elements arising from the judgment in the context of the Committee\u2019s supervision of the Klyakin group v. Russia (see the examination of that group of cases at its 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017)). 112.  The general measures in the case of Rasul Jafarov, cited above, were considered by the Committee to be the same as in the first Mammadov judgment and therefore that case also remains pending supervision (examination at the 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017)).\n(c)  Case where the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 and the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision procedure 113.  As mentioned above (see paragraph 105), the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision process in Cebotari, cited above. In that case, the applicant had been released and acquitted by the domestic courts before the judgment of this Court became final (see Cebotari, cited above, \u00a7 36). Concerning the general measures the Committee was advised (see the Order of Business from the 1259th Human Rights meeting (7-8 June 2016)) that:\n\u201cthe reform of the Moldovan prosecution service, and notably the new Law on the Prosecution Service of February 2016, appear to improve and consolidate the independence of the prosecution from executive and legislative powers (in particular as regards the handling of individual cases), exclude political involvement of prosecutors, including the Prosecutor General, and enhance their criminal and disciplinary accountability. Taking also into account the fact that no further violations of Article 18 have been established since, these measures would appear in principle capable of preventing abuse of the kind here at issue. As the question of individual measures is resolved, it is accordingly proposed to close the supervision of the Cebotari case.\u201d 114.  Accordingly, the Committee decided to close its supervision of the case at its 1259th Human Rights meeting (8 June 2016 (see Final Resolution CM/ResDH(2016)147)). 115.  The idea of introducing infringement proceedings as a procedural possibility in the Convention was set out by the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe in its Resolution 1226(2000) and followed up in Assembly Recommendation 1477(2000). The initial proposal was to amend the Convention to introduce a system of \u201castreintes\u201d (daily fines for a delay in the performance of a legal obligation) to be imposed on states that persistently fail to execute a judgment. The Recommendation does not indicate whether the Committee of Ministers or the Court was intended to have the power to impose a fine. 116.  The proposal to impose fines was not ultimately taken up in Protocol 14 but it initiated a debate which led to the insertion of Article 46 \u00a7 4 in the Convention. That debate was about the need to increase the Committee of Ministers\u2019 powers when supervising the execution of judgments. As it states in the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14:\n\u201cMeasures to be taken concerning execution of judgments 16.  Execution of the Court\u2019s judgments is an integral part of the Convention system. The measures that follow are designed to improve and accelerate the execution process. The Court\u2019s authority and the system\u2019s credibility both depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of this process. Rapid and adequate execution has, of course, an effect on the influx of new cases: the more rapidly general measures are taken by States Parties to execute judgments which point to a structural problem, the fewer repetitive applications there will be. In this regard, it would be desirable for states, over and above their obligations under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to give retroactive effect to such measures and remedies. Several measures advocated in the above-mentioned recommendations and resolutions pursue this aim. In addition, it would be useful if the Court and, as regards the supervision of the execution of judgments, the Committee of Ministers, adopted a special procedure so as to give priority treatment to judgments that identify a structural problem capable of generating a significant number of repetitive applications, with a view to securing speedy execution of the judgment. The most important Convention amendment in the context of execution of judgments of the Court involves empowering the Committee of Ministers to bring infringement proceedings in the Court against any state which refuses to comply with a judgment. 17.  The measures referred to in the previous paragraph are also designed to increase the effectiveness of the Convention system as a whole. While the supervision of the execution of judgments generally functions satisfactorily, the process needs to be improved to maintain the system\u2019s effectiveness\n...\nArticle 46 \u2013 Binding force and execution of judgments\n... 98.  Rapid and full execution of the Court\u2019s judgments is vital. It is even more important in cases concerning structural problems, so as to ensure that the Court is not swamped with repetitive applications. For this reason, ever since the Rome ministerial conference of 3 and 4 November 2000 (Resolution I), it has been considered essential to strengthen the means given in this context to the Committee of Ministers. The Parties to the Convention have a collective duty to preserve the Court\u2019s authority \u2013 and thus the Convention system\u2019s credibility and effectiveness \u2013 whenever the Committee of Ministers considers that one of the High Contracting Parties refuses, expressly or through its conduct, to comply with the Court\u2019s final judgment in a case to which it is party. 99.  Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 46 accordingly empower the Committee of Ministers to bring infringement proceedings in the Court (which shall sit as a Grand Chamber \u2013 see new Article 31, paragraph b), having first served the state concerned with notice to comply. The Committee of Ministers\u2019 decision to do so requires a qualified majority of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. This infringement procedure does not aim to reopen the question of violation, already decided in the Court\u2019s first judgment. Nor does it provide for payment of a financial penalty by a High Contracting Party found in violation of Article 46, paragraph 1. It is felt that the political pressure exerted by proceedings for noncompliance in the Grand Chamber and by the latter\u2019s judgment should suffice to secure execution of the Court\u2019s initial judgment by the state concerned. 100.  The Committee of Ministers should bring infringement proceedings only in exceptional circumstances. None the less, it appeared necessary to give the Committee of Ministers, as the competent organ for supervising execution of the Court\u2019s judgments, a wider range of means of pressure to secure execution of judgments. Currently the ultimate measure available to the Committee of Ministers is recourse to Article 8 of the Council of Europe\u2019s Statute (suspension of voting rights in the Committee of Ministers, or even expulsion from the Organisation). This is an extreme measure, which would prove counter-productive in most cases; indeed the High Contracting Party which finds itself in the situation foreseen in paragraph 4 of Article 46 continues to need, far more than others, the discipline of the Council of Europe. The new Article 46 therefore adds further possibilities of bringing pressure to bear to the existing ones. The procedure\u2019s mere existence, and the threat of using it, should act as an effective new incentive to execute the Court\u2019s judgments. It is foreseen that the outcome of infringement proceedings would be expressed in a judgment of the Court.\u201d", "references": ["4", "8", "7", "1", "9", "5", "0", "6", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bor. 6.  The proceedings began on 30 March 1992 when the applicant brought a lawsuit against third persons concerning the execution of a contract. 7.  On 19 June 1997 the first-instance court accepted the applicant\u2019s claim. 8.  On 30 October 1997 the appeal court quashed the decision on legal costs, remitted that issue to the first-instance court for a retrial and upheld the remainder of the first-instance judgment. 9.  The first-instance court subsequently rendered three decisions on the costs of the proceedings on 23 July 1998, 19 February 1999 and 3 March 2000. All of these decisions were quashed on appeal. 10.  On 5 February 2013 the first-instance court rendered a fourth decision on the issue of legal costs awarding the applicant approximately 2,000 euros (EUR). 11.  According to the information on the file, the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court. 12.  On 13 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him EUR 300 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in this regard. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s proceedings to be expedited.", "references": ["7", "8", "9", "4", "5", "1", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1983. She lives in Vilnius and has three children. The first time she gave birth was in 2009 in a public hospital in Vilnius. According to the applicant, the doctors therein were rude and rebuked her for her wish to give birth at home, and she felt humiliated and for a long time afterwards could not discuss her experience of giving birth at the hospital without tears coming to her eyes. For those reasons, in 2011 she gave birth to her second child at home, with the assistance of an unlicensed doula (pribuv\u0117ja), J.I.\u0160. That birth passed without complications and without the need for medical intervention. 6.  After falling pregnant for a third time, and with no possibility of giving birth at home owing to the fact that criminal charges had been brought in respect of the above-mentioned doula, J.I.\u0160. (see paragraphs 31\u201135 below), on 9 May 2012 the first applicant asked two public hospitals \u2013 one in Vilnius and one in Kaunas \u2013 to provide her with medical assistance during the home birth that she was planning. Both hospitals refused on the grounds that providing such assistance was prohibited under Lithuanian law \u2013 namely, under Medical Regulation MN 40:2006 (see paragraph 44 below). 7.  On 13 June 2012 the first applicant asked the Ministry of Health to either guarantee the provision of such medical assistance during the birth of her third child or to amend the secondary legislation so that healthcare professionals could be allowed to provide such assistance. She considered that the participation of a healthcare professional in the birth was indispensable in order to guarantee the child\u2019s and her safety. She indicated that she would give birth on 4-5 July 2012. 8.  By a letter of 5 July 2012 the Ministry of Health replied that it had already received proposals from several non-governmental organisations that births outside hospitals be regulated. The Ministry then consulted numerous medical organisations \u2013 including the Lithuanian Midwives Association (Lietuvos aku\u0161eri\u0173 s\u0105junga), the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists (Lietuvos aku\u0161eri\u0173 ir ginekolog\u0173 draugija), the Lithuanian Doctors Association (Lietuvos gydytoj\u0173 s\u0105junga), the obstetrics and midwifery clinics of both Vilnius University and the Lithuanian University of Health Sciences \u2013 for their views on home birth. However, the specialists were unanimous in the conclusion that it was safest for a woman to give birth on a maternity ward, even when there was little risk of complications. It was impossible to foresee that any birth would pass without complications, and it was always possible that a woman giving birth or a newborn baby might need urgent medical assistance that could be provided only on a maternity ward. 9.  The Ministry also pointed out that Lithuania had made great efforts to ensure that safe healthcare services were provided to women giving birth (gimdyv\u0117), and that the conditions in maternity wards were designed to render them as close as possible to the home environment. For that purpose medical establishments were supplied with modern medical equipment; at the same time, a woman\u2019s family members could be present during birth, and medical institutions were being encouraged to obtain the status of \u201cnewborn-friendly\u201d. Over the previous twenty years Lithuania had achieved good results in significantly reducing the mortality rate of pregnant women, women giving birth and babies. To provide midwifery services at home, where there were not all the facilities necessary to be able to provide help to women giving birth and to the newborn, would constitute a step backwards. Similarly, to shift the legal and financial liability onto the healthcare specialist or healthcare institution in question would likewise not be acceptable. Moreover, the question of home birth concerned not only the woman\u2019s, but also the State\u2019s choice; at the same time, it was necessary to balance the interests of society and the rights of the individual. This view was supported by the Court\u2019s judgment in Ternovszky v. Hungary, (no. 67545/09, \u00a7 24, 14 December 2010). Accordingly, the Ministry had no plans to initiate changes to secondary legislation that would regulate the provision of midwifery services at home. 10.  The first applicant states in her application that on 11 July 2012 she \u201c[gave] birth at home without qualified healthcare assistance and risked her and the baby\u2019s life and health\u201d. 11.  The second applicant was born in 1979. She lives in Vilnius and has three children. She indicated in her application that she had given birth at home in 2006, 2008 and 2011, with the assistance of J.I.\u0160., the above\u2011mentioned doula. All three births had been \u201csuccessful\u201d. 12.  The second applicant submitted that after she had fallen pregnant for a fourth time, and \u201cnot being able to safely give birth at home\u201d owing to criminal charges having been brought in respect of the above-mentioned doula, J.I.\u0160. (see paragraph 6 above and paragraphs 31-35 below), she in April 2012 asked two public hospitals \u2013 one in Trakai and one in Vilnius \u2013 to provide her with medical assistance during the home birth that she was planning. Both hospitals refused, on the same grounds as those given in the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 6 above). Afterwards, the Ministry of Health also refused a request lodged by the second applicant for changes to be made to the relevant legislation, for reasons identical to those cited in respect of the first applicant\u2019s case (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). 13.  In her application to the Court of 19 October 2012 the second applicant noted that she was \u201cfirmly resolved (tvirtai nusiteikusi) to give birth at home, irrespective of whether she would receive qualified assistance during the birth\u201d. Her due date was 17 November 2012. 14.  The third applicant was born in 1982. She lives in Vilnius. She noted in her application that she had given birth at home in 2009 and 2010, with the assistance of the unlicensed doula, J.I.\u0160. Both births had been \u201cwithout complications [and] successful, and the children [were] growing up and developing healthily\u201d. 15.  In her application of 19 October 2012, the third applicant stated that \u2013 wishing to have more children and expecting to become pregnant as soon as possible, but also having learned of the criminal charges brought against the doula J.I.\u0160. \u2013 in spring 2012 she became an active member of the movement known as \u201cgimimas.lt\u201d (see paragraphs 26 and 31-35 below). The applicant stated to the Court that during her third pregnancy, having had positive experiences during the first two home births, she could not imagine herself giving birth outside her home, since this seemed to her \u201cthe safest, most tranquil [environment] ... for the most intimate of occasions\u201d. 16.  In September 2012 she asked three public hospitals in Vilnius to provide her with medical assistance during her home birth. All the hospitals refused, on the grounds that in Lithuania there was no legal basis on which to provide medical assistance during a home birth. The head of the Maternity and Obstetrics Clinics at the Vilnius University Hospital (Vilniaus universiteto Aku\u0161erijos ir ginekologijos klinika) also indicated that she did not have the right to oblige medical personnel to provide medical services outside the hospital. Nevertheless, she invited the third applicant to visit the maternity ward of those clinics in order to \u201cget acquainted with the environment, [which is] a cosy [one] for a woman giving birth\u201d. 17.  On 21 September 2012 the third applicant then asked the Ministry of Health to either guarantee medical assistance at her home during the birth of her third child or to amend the relevant secondary legislation so that the healthcare professionals were permitted to provide such assistance. She also argued that if the two relevant pieces of secondary legislation were annulled by the Minister of Health (see paragraphs 42 and 44 below), there would remain no obstacles to women receiving medical assistance during home births. 18.  This request was refused by the Ministry on 16 October 2012 for the same reasons as those given to the first and second applicants (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). Given that in her request the third applicant insisted on relying on the Court\u2019s judgment in Ternovszky (cited above), the Ministry of Health consulted the Ministry of Justice on the matter. The Ministry of Justice noted that the Court had found a violation in the above\u2011mentioned case because of its very particular and specific circumstances, which had led the Court to conclude that the situation in Hungary, in as much as it related to healthcare professionals providing assistance during home births, was surrounded by legal uncertainty that gave rise to arbitrariness. Nonetheless, the Court had acknowledged that, as concerned the provision of healthcare services, the States had a wide margin of appreciation, and regulation had to ensure a proper balance between societal interests and the right at stake. The Ministry of Justice pointed out that the Court\u2019s judgment did not mean that a State was under a general obligation to establish a regulatory framework that would allow healthcare specialists to provide services to women giving birth at home. Taking into account the above, and given that Lithuanian law did not contain provisions regarding the provision of healthcare services to women giving birth at home, the Ministry concluded that a pregnant woman could not require that, upon her request, a healthcare institution or a healthcare specialist provide her with childbirth-related healthcare services outside a healthcare institution. Similarly, a healthcare institution or a specialist had no obligation to provide such services, even if a pregnant woman so wished. That being so, the Ministry also emphasised that the third applicant was welcome to visit the maternity wards in Lithuania and to choose the one which had the environment that most suited her. 19.  In her application to the Court of 19 October 2012, the third applicant, like the second applicant, stated that she was \u201cfirmly resolved to give birth at home, irrespective of whether she would receive qualified assistance during the birth\u201d. She was due to give birth in March 2013. 20.  After having lodged the instant application with the Court, the third applicant also started administrative court proceedings in respect of the Ministry\u2019s refusal to grant her request for the changes in secondary legislation (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). 21.  On 8 April 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the third applicant\u2019s complaint. The court noted that there were no legal instruments explicitly regulating home births in Lithuania. Therefore, the third applicant\u2019s assertion that the two legal instruments adopted by the Minister of Health (see paragraphs 42 and 44 below) directly prohibited home birth was erroneous and unsubstantiated. Those legal instruments only regulated birth in hospitals, not home births. 22.  On 22 January 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. It rejected the third applicant\u2019s argument that the absence of any legal regulation allowing the provision of healthcare services during home births constituted a breach of the right to respect for one\u2019s private life. The court referred to Article 52 of the Law on the Healthcare System (see paragraph 39 below), which guaranteed a patient\u2019s right to privacy. For the court, such legal regulation thus empowered the third applicant to give birth in a specialised medical institution of her choice, which was equipped in accordance with the requirements for such institutions, so that the health of the mother and the newborn would be protected and they could receive immediate high-quality and effective help, should any danger arise to their health or lives during childbirth. The Supreme Administrative Court held that such legal regulation maintained a balance between two constitutional values: privacy and the protection of health. 23.  The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to the content of the Ministry of Health letter of 16 October 2012 (see paragraph 18 above), wherein that institution had reminded the third applicant that her family members could be present during the birth of her child and had offered her the opportunity to visit hospitals with maternity wards and to choose the most suitable one. Accordingly, the third applicant had the right and possibility, guaranteed by law, to choose the most suitable medical institution and to state her wishes regarding conditions of privacy and their scope (d\u0117l privatumo s\u0105lyg\u0173 ir apimties). There was no information in the file to the effect that the third applicant had ever approached any of the maternity wards or that she had faced obstacles in choosing how to make use of that right to privacy (for example, by requesting certain services, such as a private room) and then instituted court proceedings. One also had to bear in mind the fact that privacy in respect of the third applicant\u2019s personal life (which she had sought by demanding to be provided with medical assistance during her home birth) could not be seen as having a greater value than the health of her and the newborn child, for the purpose of which the State had established a system of personal healthcare and qualified medical assistance. 24.  The fourth applicant was born in 1975. She lives in Vilnius. The fourth applicant stated that she had given birth at home in 2001, 2003 and 2011, with the assistance of doula J.I.\u0160. 25.  In her application to the Court the fourth applicant also stated that even though she was of \u201creproductive age\u201d, she did not dare to become pregnant for the fourth time, owing to the charges pending in respect of J.I.\u0160., \u201cwhile the issue of giving birth at home remained legally unregulated in Lithuania\u201d (kol Lietuvoje n\u0117ra teisi\u0161kai sureguliuotas gimdymo namuose klausimas). 26.  In 2012 a non-governmental organisation for promoting childbirth at home, \u201cgimimas.lt\u201d, was established. In April 2012 it published an Internet press release calling on society and the State authorities, including the Ministry of Health, to discuss the question of home birth. The third and fourth applicants were among those who initiated that NGO and were its active participants. 27.  In April 2012 the Association of Lithuanian Psychologists (Lietuvos psicholog\u0173 s\u0105junga) asked the Ministry of Health to initiate changes in legislation to permit midwives and obstetrician-gynaecologists to provide medical assistance to women choosing to give birth outside hospital. 28.  On 26 April 2012, at the Seimas, the Minister of Health was asked to comment about the possibility of providing medical assistance during home births. He replied that his opinion was categorical and negative; he also asked the non-governmental organisations that promoted that issue to be cautious and responsible. The Minister noted that at that time there were criminal investigations pending concerning \u201cimpostors\u201d (apsi\u0161auk\u0117liai) who had assisted with home births at which babies had died and mothers had suffered serious injuries. He pointed out that it was precisely owing to those criminal investigations that various requests concerning assistance for home births had started reaching the Ministry. 29.  In April and May 2012 a group of non-governmental organisations asked the Lithuanian Midwives Association and the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists for their views on home birth.  In its written reply of 17 May 2012, the Lithuanian Midwives Association stated its disapproval of the prospect of midwives assisting with home births. On 19 June 2012 the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists replied that despite significant worldwide changes in the sphere of maternity care, the question of planned home births remained sensitive and controversial. 30.  According to publicly available information, after the death of a baby born at home in June 2011, the police started a criminal investigation. Eventually, the authorities started examining the legality of the actions of a number of persons assisting with home births. The Government were informed by the police that in respect of those criminal proceedings the applicants only had the status of witnesses. 31.  On an unspecified date the prosecutors started criminal proceedings under Article 202 of the Criminal Code (Unauthorised Engagement in an Economic Activity, see paragraph 48 below) in respect of doula J.I.\u0160., who, despite having no medical training whatsoever, between 1999 and 2011 on thirty-six occasions had assisted at home births. The scope of her actions at those home births had varied between merely examining newborn babies to performing certain childbirth-related actions. 32.  By a judgment of 23 December 2016, the Vilnius City District Court acquitted J.I.\u0160., holding that she had revived the old profession of doula, which although not regulated in Lithuania, was also not forbidden by law. The court considered that since J.I.\u0160. had had no medical training and had not acted as an obstetrician-gynaecologist or as a midwife, or as a medical professional in general, she could not be liable under Article 202 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. 33.  On 19 July 2017 the Vilnius Regional Court overturned the lower court\u2019s judgment and convicted J.I.\u0160. under Article 202 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. The appellate court held that while taking part in home births J.I.\u0160. had been providing healthcare services that fell within the competence of an obstetrician-gynaecologist or a midwife, whereas J.I.\u0160. had neither a medical education nor a licence to provide such services. By acting in such a manner J.I.\u0160. had acted in breach of the existing legal regulations, under which the only specialists who could assist with births were obstetrician\u2011gynaecologists and midwives and birth with such assistance could take place (gimdymai priimami) only in a maternity ward. It followed that J.I.\u0160. had been engaged in prohibited medical activities. She was sentenced to six months of deprivation of liberty, suspended for one year. 34.  J.I.\u0160. lodged an appeal on points of law. 35.  By a ruling of 12 June 2018, an enlarged chamber (seven judges) of the Supreme Court noted that activities relating to home births, as a phenomenon, had been neither criminalised nor forbidden by law in Lithuania. Accordingly, the appellate court had erred in holding that J.I.\u0160. had been engaged in unauthorised professional activity, as understood under Article 202 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. That notwithstanding, J.I.\u0160.\u2019s activity, although it had not been prohibited (jos vykdyta veikla n\u0117ra u\u017edrausta), had been unlawful (neteis\u0117ta). However, the Supreme Court found that the bill of indictment had failed to establish the precise amount of income that J.I.\u0160. had received for her activities. It was therefore impossible to establish the element of entrepreneurship, which was necessary in order to hold a person criminally liable under Article 202 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. She therefore had to be acquitted.", "references": ["3", "1", "7", "2", "6", "9", "0", "5", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "6.  A list of applicants is set out in the Appendix. 7.  The applicants are joint owners of the property at number 204, High Street, Mosta, Malta (hereinafter referred to as \u201cProperty A\u201d) having a ground floor footprint of 505 sq.m. and a first floor of a little more than 100 sq.m., with roof terraces, located in the primary town centre. Property A is located adjacent to another property that is also jointly owned by the applicants, namely Villa Grech\u2011Mifsud, High Street, Mosta (hereinafter referred to as \u201cProperty B\u201d). The applicants became owners either through inheritance or donation from their parents on various dates between 1991 and 2011. 8.  In 1923, the applicants\u2019 ascendants entered into a rent agreement with Nicol\u00f2 Isouard Band Club Association (hereinafter referred to as the \u201cBand Club\u201d), whereby they willingly rented Property A to the Band Club for twenty pounds sterling annually (approximately 23.84 euros (EUR)). In 1947 the rent was increased to twenty\u2011four pounds sterling annually (around EUR 28.62). 9.  In 1970, L.G., one of the applicants\u2019 ascendants, filed an application before the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Board\u201d), on behalf of all the joint owners at the time, whereby he requested that the annual rent be raised. On 15 December 1970 the Board upheld the request and increased the rent to sixty pounds sterling annually (approximately EUR 71.60), to be paid six months in advance. 10.  On 14 August 1978 the applicants\u2019 ascendants entered into a new lease agreement with the Band Club, whereby they willingly rented Property A and part of the garden of Property B (hereinafter, jointly referred to as \u201cthe rented property\u201d) to the Band Club for 120 Maltese liras annually ((MTL) \u2013 approximately EUR 279.52), to be paid six months in advance. 11.  L.G., who died during the constitutional redress proceedings (see hereunder), gave evidence before the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, to the effect that the annual rent due to the applicants was that of MTL 136 (approximately EUR 316), and that the Band Club was actually paying MTL 130 annually (approximately EUR 302). These amounts did not correspond to those agreed upon within the rent agreement of 14 August 1978. In the mentioned proceedings the court concluded that, on an unspecified date, the applicants and the Band Club had entered into a verbal agreement, whereby the annual rent due was increased because the Band Club had requested the use of a further part of the garden of Property B. 12.  On 28 October 1980 and again on 10 January 1983 L.G. complained with the Band Club about its use of the rented property as a discotheque and as a restaurant. 13.  In 2004 and 2005 the Band Club had requested that it be able to rent a further part of the garden of Property B and for it to purchase the part of the property that was being utilized as the seat of the club. The applicants refused. 14.  On 8 August 2009 the applicants appointed an architect who estimated that the rented property ought to at least attract a rental income of EUR 36,700 yearly. 15.  On 12 February 2010 the applicants or their ascendants (as owners, hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe owners\u201d) filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. They claimed, inter alia, that their right to peaceful enjoyment of their property, as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, had been violated. They referred to Article 4 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as \u2018the Ordinance\u2019), which precluded them from increasing the rent to reflect the market value of the rented property. 16.  On 15 July 2015 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, inter alia, found that the owners had suffered a violation of their rights as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and awarded them the sum of EUR 50,000 in compensation. 17.  The court noted the Attorney General\u2019s arguments against the owners whereby he contended that: the owners\u2019 ascendants had not been forced to enter into the rental agreement with the Band Club \u2011 they had willingly entered into the agreement which at the time they deemed just; when the owners\u2019 ascendants had entered into the agreement the special legal dispositions regulating the renting of a property as a club (introduced through the enactment of the Reletting of Urban Property (regulation) Ordinance) were already in place and therefore the owners\u2019 ascendants had entered into the agreement with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to; therefore they had brought the situation upon themselves and could not allege a violation of their rights, nor should the owners be resorting to the courts to alter their situation. 18.  The court noted that, in 1923, when the owners had entered into the first rental agreement with the Band Club, the laws enacting the special dispositions concerning renting a property as a club had not yet come into force. The special dispositions came into play between the first rental agreement (1923) and the second rental agreement (1978). The court considered that the rental agreement of 14 August 1978 was an extension of the first rental agreement - the first agreement having been entered into before the special dispositions had come into force. Therefore, the court rejected the Attorney General\u2019s arguments. 19.  The court accepted that clubs play a social role in Maltese society, even to date. With this social interest the State was permitted a level of interference. The legality of such interference had not been contested. However, when comparing the circumstances in which the rent agreement had originally been entered into, to the present day circumstances, the element of proportionality had not been respected and thus the applicant\u2019s rights had been breached. 20.  As to the owners\u2019 request for the court to establish a raise in the rent payable to them, the court considered that it was not its role to take on functions that the Constitution granted to another organ of the state, just as much as it could not \u201cerase\u201d (t\u0127assar) laws unless it found that they had \u201cno effect\u201d (ma jiswewx). Thus, it was not competent to give the remedy requested by the applicants. This decision was reinforced by the introduction of the new laws in 2014 which updated the rents payable. 21.  The court considered that the estimate provided by the ex parte architect did not suffice due to the criteria used and the approximate manner in which the calculations had been done. However, some form of compensation was due. Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, the evidence presented before it and the applicable laws, the court awarded compensation in the sum of EUR 50,000. 22.  On 26 June 2015 the Constitutional Court, upheld the Attorney General\u2019s appeal and concluded that the owners had not suffered a violation of their rights as protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and therefore no compensation was due. The costs of proceedings at both instances were to be paid by the owners. 23.  The Constitutional Court observed that the complaint concerned two rental agreements that were entered into in 1923 and 1978 respectively, between which special legal dispositions concerning properties rented as clubs were introduced. Unlike the first-instance court, the Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement of 14 August 1978 amounted to novation (see relevant domestic law). It was a new rent agreement concerning a larger property and a higher annual rent payable. The intentions of the parties in the original agreement were set aside, and were now regulated by means of a new agreement. The court considered that on 14 August 1978 Articles 3 and 4 of the Ordinance were already in force. Thus, the parties had willingly entered into the agreement with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to. Therefore the owners could not allege a violation of their rights. The principle volenti non fit injuria applied. The court concluded that the case of the owners did not concern the renunciation of a human right, but rather the exercise on the part of the owners to dispose of their property as they desired. From the evidence presented before it, the Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement of 14 August 1978 established clearly that the owners wanted to enter into a rental agreement for a larger property, with a higher rent to be paid by the Band Club, and had done so. Therefore the owners had not suffered a violation of their property rights. 24.  The relevant domestic law concerning leases of band clubs is set out in Bradshaw and Others v. Malta (no. 37121/15, \u00a7\u00a7 21-24, 23 October 2018). 25.  In so far as relevant Article 1179 of the Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta, reads as follows:\n\u201cNovation takes place -\n(a) when the debtor contracts towards his creditor a new debt, and this is substituted for the old one which is extinguished;\u201d", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "1", "6", "7", "3", "5", "No Label", "0", "9"], "gold": ["0", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived in the neighbouring regions of the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-04 after allegedly being unlawfully detained by service personnel. In each of the applications the events took place in areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants had no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6.  In each of the cases the applicants complained in respect of the abduction to law-enforcement bodies and an official investigation was instituted. In every case the investigations, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without attaining any tangible results. It is apparent from the documents submitted that no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia and the North Caucasus. Further to such requests, the authorities generally reported that service personnel\u2019s involvement in the abduction had not been established and that no special operations had been carried out at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged requests for information and assistance in the search of their missing relatives to various authorities but received only formal responses, if any. The perpetrators have never been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or other witnesses to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. Despite the Court\u2019s request to this end, the Government did not submit the documents from the investigation files in each application. They did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but denied that the abductors had been State service personnel. 8.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev, who was born in 1986. 9.  The applicant\u2019s husband and two sons, who were ten and eleven years old at the material time, died during shelling of Grozny in 1994. When military operations were launched in Chechnya in 1999, the applicant with two other children moved to Nazran, Ingushetia where they lived as refugees. 10.  On 28 May 2000 the applicant\u2019s son, Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev, who was thirteen years old at the time, left Nazran and went to Grozny by bus. He was taken off the bus by service personnel at a checkpoint near the canning factory in Grozny because he did not have identity documents. Then he was forced into an APC and taken away. While being taken to the APC, Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev shouted out his name and the applicant\u2019s name and asked the bus passengers to inform her of his arrest. 11.  The circumstances of the abduction were confirmed by bus passengers\u2019 statements submitted to the Court. 12.  The whereabouts of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev have remained unknown ever since. 13.  According to the applicant, she reported the abduction immediately to the local military command in Grozny, the Office of the Prosecutor of Chechnya and various NGOs. 14.  On 14 July 2000 the applicant complained in respect of the abduction again to the Leninskiy district police station and asked for assistance in the search for her son. 15.  On 21 July 2000 the Leninskiy district police station opened search file (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u043e) no. 30/48 into the abduction. Between May and September 2000 police officers took steps to establish Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev\u2019s whereabouts but to no avail. 16.  On 18 December 2000 the Leninskiy district police station refused to open a criminal case into the abduction of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev. 17.  On 19 August 2001 the applicant complained in respect of the abduction to the Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District and asked him for assistance in the search for her son. 18.  On 29 July 2005 the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 40147 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 19.  On 14 September 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She stated that she had visited all checkpoints in Grozny trying to find her son but to no avail. Near the canning factory she had met women who had been trading at the local market. They had told her that a teenager who had looked like her son had been forced into an APC and taken away. 20.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law\u2011enforcement authorities. According to the responses, it was established that Mr Amirkhadzhiyev had been arrested and taken away by service personnel of the federal forces. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Amirkhadzhiyev was available. 21.  On 29 September 2005 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 19 January 2006 and suspended again on 20 February 2006. 22.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents from the investigation file. On 8 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s request was granted. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 23.  According to the applicant, between 2000 and 2010 she contacted various authorities, including the investigators, seeking their assistance in the search for her son, but to no avail. 24.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev, who was born in 1979. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his sister. 25.  On 11 July 2002 service personnel under the command of General I.B. carried out a \u201csweep\u201d operation in Chechen-Aul. As she was afraid for her son\u2019s safety, the first applicant told Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev to go to her sister, who lived in Belgatoy village. 26.  On their way to Belgatoy Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev and Mr M.Z. were passing by the Argun river, when the service personnel saw them and opened fire. It is unclear whether it was Mr Vatsayev or Mr M.Z. who was injured and fell to the ground on the bank. The other man jumped into the river and was carried away by the strong current. The service personnel picked up the injured man and took him away to an unknown destination. 27.  The eyewitnesses did not see which of the two men had been injured and who had jumped into the water. According to the applicants, the injured man must have been Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev, as his passport was later found on the bank. 28.  The whereabouts of Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev have remained unknown ever since. 29.  On 23 July 2002 the first applicant reported the abduction to the Head of the Government of the Chechen Republic. 30.  On 9 September 2002 the first applicant complained of the abduction to the Grozny district police station. 31.  In October 2002 police officers interviewed several relatives of Mr M.Z. and the first applicant. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 32.  According to the applicants, on several occasions between 2002 and 2005 they complained of the police\u2019s failure to take necessary investigative steps to the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office. 33.  In December 2005 the Grozny district police station carried out additional preliminary enquiries into the applicants\u2019 abduction complaint. 34.  On 21 December 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office examined the results of its preliminary enquiries and pointed out that contrary to the relevant procedural regulations, no operational search activities had been carried out by the Grozny district police station since 2002. 35.  Following the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s criticism, the head of the police station sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Vatsayev was available. 36.  On 24 January 2006 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 54006 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 37.  On 30 January 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status. According to the applicant, on several occasions between 2006 and 2011 she contacted the authorities with requests for assistance in the search for her son. 38.  On 24 March 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 4 June 2011, then suspended on 16 June 2011 and resumed again on 21 July 2011. 39.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 40.  On 1 July 2011 the applicants challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation of 16 June 2011 and their failure to take basic steps before the Grozny District Court. On 22 July 2011 the court terminated the proceedings having found that the day before the investigation had been resumed. On 24 August 2011 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 41.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev, who was born in 1964. The first applicant is his wife and other applicants are his children. 42.  Around 5 a.m. on 17 July 2002 several armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants\u2019 house in Shali. Another group of service personnel also broke into the house of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev\u2019s brother, which was situated nearby. The service personnel, who spoke unaccented Russian, asked for the identity documents of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev. After checking them, the service personnel handcuffed Mr Chapsurkayev. Then they pulled his shirt over his head, forced him into the one of three APCs (armoured personnel carriers) and drove off in the direction of Shali town centre. One of the service personnel filmed the events on a video camera. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and their neighbours. 43.  The whereabouts of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev have remained unknown ever since. 44.  On 24 October 2002 the first applicant lodged an official complaint in respect of her husband\u2019s abduction with the authorities and requested assistance in the search for him. 45.  On 29 November 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 59267 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 46.  On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the events as described above. 47.  On 29 January 2003 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 48.  On 3 July 2003 the first applicant complained of the abduction to the military prosecutor of Shali and requested assistance in the search for him. 49.  On 17 April 2004 the military prosecutor\u2019s office of military unit no. 20166 replied to the applicant\u2019s complaint, stating that on 17 July 2002 their service personnel had neither carried out any special operation nor detained anyone. 50.  In 2005 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the State Council of the Chechen Republic. It is unclear whether her complaint was forwarded to the investigators and whether any reply was given to it. 51.  On 30 November 2006 the first applicant again complained to the Shali district prosecutor in respect of the abduction. It is unclear whether she received any reply. 52.  On 29 February 2010 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the investigation and grant her access to the case file. No reply was given to this request. 53.  However, following the above request, on an unidentified date in June 2010 the investigation was resumed. 54.  On 13 July 2010 the investigators questioned the first applicant. 55.  On 22 and 26 July 2010 the investigators questioned the applicants\u2019 neighbour, Mr A.D., who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 56.  On 6 May 2012 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her of the progress in the investigation. On the same day she challenged the investigators\u2019 decision of 29 January 2003 to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. The outcome of the court proceedings is unknown. 57.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 58.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev (in the documents submitted also referred to as Lorsanukayev, Lorsunukayev, Lorsankayev), who was born in 1961. The second applicant is his wife. 59.  At the relevant time Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev lived as a refugee in Nazran, Ingushetia. On 10 May 2002 he went with his relative, Ms Ya.S., to Grozny to visit his brother Mr A.L. At around 2 p.m. on 12 May 2002 Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev, his brother and two neighbours, Mr V.B. and Mr S.E., were playing cards in Mr A.L.\u2019s flat when a group of eight or nine armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke in. Without any explanation, they pulled Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev\u2019s shirt over his head, took him barefoot outside and forced him into a UAZ minivan (\u0442\u0430\u0431\u043b\u0435\u0442\u043a\u0430) with tinted windows. The vehicle had no registration numbers. The service personnel spoke Russian and Chechen. 60.  Mr. V.B. attempted to inform the service personnel that he was a police officer from the Leninskiy district police station in Grozny. The service personnel disregarded this information, kicked him and then pushed him to the floor together with Mr. S.E. Then the service personnel took Mr A.L. outside and put him in a UAZ vehicle in which Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev was being held. Ms Ya.S. tried to stop the service personnel, but they hit her with their rifle butts and drove away. Five minutes later the service personnel pushed Mr A.L. out of the UAZ vehicle and proceeded to an unknown destination. 61.  The whereabouts of Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev have remained unknown ever since. 62.  About three weeks after the abduction a man visited Mr A.L. and passed him a written message from Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev. The message, written on an empty cigarette box, stated \u201cI am here\u201d. According to the man, that cigarette box had been thrown out of a vehicle parked near the building of the Federal Security Service in Grozny. 63.  On 20 June 2002 Mr A.L. complained to the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office of the abduction of his son and requested assistance in the search for him. 64.  On 24 July 2002 the Grozny prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 48116 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 65.  On 6 August 2002 Ms Ya.S. was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 66.  On the same day the investigators questioned Mr A.L. and his wife. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 67.  On 24 September 2002 the investigation was suspended. According to the applicants, between 2002 and 2008 they contacted the investigators and other authorities asking for information on the progress of the investigation. 68.  On 15 July 2008 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her of the progress of the investigation, resume the investigation and allow her access to the case file. She stated, in particular, that they had passed the message from Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev to the investigators. 69.  On 23 July 2009 the investigation was resumed. 70.  On 20 August 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 71.  On 22 August 2009 the investigation was suspended. 72.  On 29 June 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigators grant her access to the case file. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 73.  On 20 April 2012 the second applicant asked the investigators to provide her with the copies of the investigation-file documents. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 74.  On 30 August 2012 the investigation was resumed. It appears that it is still pending. 75.  On 26 June 2012 the second applicants challenged the investigators\u2019 decision of 22 August 2009 to suspend the investigation before the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny. On 8 August 2012 the complaint was transferred to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny. On 31 August 2012 that court terminated the proceedings, having found that a day earlier the investigation had been resumed. On 24 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld this decision on appeal. 76.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Arbi Isiyev, who was born in 1985. The second applicant is his sister. 77.  Around 1 p.m. on 29 September 2004 Mr Arbi Isiyev left his home in Argun to visit his aunt, who lived in the same town. When Mr Arbi Isiyev was walking down Gudermesskaya Street, several service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas forced him into a white GAZ-3110 car and took him to an unknown destination. Mr Arbi Isiyev managed to throw 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB) on the ground and asked a passer-by, Mr R.D., in Chechen (so that the service personnel could not understand him) to give that money to his relatives. The abduction took place in the presence of Ms S.Sh. and Mr R.D. 78.  Mr Arbi Isiyev has not been seen since. 79.  On 30 September 2004 the applicants\u2019 relative, Mr I.K., complained of the abduction to authorities. 80.  On 23 October 2004 the Argun town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 48042 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 81.  On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 82.  Between October and December 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant and the witnesses Ms S.Sh. and Mr R.D. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 83.  On 23 December 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 18 February 2008 and suspended again on 18 March 2008. 84.  In 2009 the first applicant asked the head of the Chechen Parliamentary Committee on the Search for the Disappeared (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u041f\u0430\u0440\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0443 \u043b\u0438\u0446, \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0432 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0434 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) for assistance in the search for her son. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who on 18 May 2009 replied that that the investigation had been suspended and that operational search activities were being carried out to establish Mr Isiyev\u2019s whereabouts. 85.  On 22 April 2010 and then again on 22 July 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigators grant her access to the investigation file. 86.  On 1 August 2011 the applicants\u2019 request was granted. 87.  On 26 October 2011 the investigation was resumed and then suspended again on 26 November 2011. 88.  On 4 September 2012 the applicants requested that the investigators inform them of the progress in the investigation. 89.  On 11 September 2012 the investigation was resumed. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 90.  On 17 October 2011 the first applicant challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation of 18 March 2008 and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. On 17 November 2011 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 26 October 2011 the investigation had been resumed. On 21 December 2011 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision on appeal. 91.  On 7 September 2012 the applicants challenged the investigators\u2019 decision to suspend the investigation of 26 November 2011 before the Shali Town Court. On 17 September 2012 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 11 September 2012 the investigation had been resumed. On 31 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision on appeal.", "references": ["3", "6", "9", "8", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  Details of the applicants can be found in the appendix. 6.  At the time of the events giving rise to the applications, the applicants were all serving prison sentences in the Edirne F-type Prison. 7.  On 21 June 2005 the disciplinary board of the Edirne F-Type Prison decided to intercept letters sent by an association, D.D. (\u201cthe association\u201d), to the applicants on the ground that their content included propaganda for an illegal organisation and referred to activities in support of the illegal organisation and of people on a \u201cfast to the death\u201d. 8.  On 28 June 2005 the Edirne Enforcement Court dismissed an objection lodged by the second applicant against that decision. 9.  On 18 July 2005 the Edirne Assize Court upheld the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision. 10.  The applicants lodged an initial individual application with the Court (no. 45443/05) raising substantive complaints under the Convention, which was subsequently declared inadmissible on 12 October 2017 under the single-judge procedure. 11.  On 14 September 2005 Mr Tamer, the applicants\u2019 lawyer at the material time, sent a letter to the applicants asking them to fill out and sign the forms of authority that were enclosed with the letter, to authorise him to lodge an application on their behalf with the Court concerning the disciplinary board\u2019s decision to intercept the letters sent by the association (see paragraph 7 above). He explained that he was sending his letter by registered mail because he had not received a reply to his previous letter with the same content. He also mentioned that the forms of authority were not required by the Court immediately on bringing an application and that they could be submitted at a later stage. In addition, he asked the applicants to inform him in the event that they did not want to pursue their application before the Court. 12.  The administration of the Edirne F-Type Prison believed the contents of the letter of 14 September 2005 to be suspect and therefore lodged a request with the public prosecutor on 21 September 2005 for a decision to refer the matter to an enforcement court to determine whether the material sent to the applicants included objectionable content. 13.  On 25 October 2005 the Edirne Enforcement Court allowed an application by the prosecutor and examined the contents of the letter. It decided that, under section 5 of Law no. 5351, the letter and the forms of authority should not be handed over to the applicants because it considered that Mr Tamer\u2019s request for the applicants to complete the forms of authority for the purpose of bringing an application before the Court did not constitute a permitted professional activity (serbest \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma hayat\u0131na ayk\u0131r\u0131l\u0131k) but instead pressurised and incited the applicants to institute proceedings. The decision was served on the applicants on 17 November 2005. 14.  On 29 November 2005 the Edirne Assize Court dismissed an objection lodged by the second, fourth and fifth applicants and upheld the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision of 25 October 2005. 15.  On 1 December 2005 Mr Tamer filed a complaint with the Edirne Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office against the governor of the Edirne F-Type Prison on the ground that he had neglected his official duties by not forwarding Mr Tamer\u2019s letter of 14 September 2005 to the applicants. 16.  On 26 December 2005 the Edirne Chief Prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to prosecute the governor in relation to Mr Tamer\u2019s complaints, since the letter in question had been withheld from the applicants as a result of the implementation of the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision of 25 October 2005. 17.  An objection to the prosecutor\u2019s decision, lodged by Mr Tamer, was dismissed by the K\u0131rklareli Assize Court on 19 April 2006. 18.  In the meantime, on 23 November 2005 Mr Tamer wrote to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe informing it that the Edirne F-Type Prison administration\u2019s refusal to give the applicants the letter in question had impaired his ability to lodge an application with the Court and constituted a violation of the European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights. 19.  On 22 February 2006 the Registry of the Court sent a letter to Mr Tamer acknowledging receipt of his letter dated 23 November 2005, addressed to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as indicating the applicants\u2019 intention to lodge an application with the Court and invited him to submit a duly completed application form. 20.  On 19 October 2006 the applicants\u2019 representative sent an application form to the Court. Their application was registered as application no. 4536/06. 21.  On 30 March 2007 the Registry of the Court sent a standard letter to the applicants\u2019 representative in connection with application no. 4536/06 confirming, inter alia, receipt of their application and requesting the representative to provide forms of authority in connection with that application. 22.  On 18 April 2007 the applicants\u2019 representative sent a copy of the Court\u2019s letter together with forms of authority to the applicants and requested them to fill out the forms of authority in connection with application no. 4536/06. 23.  The Edirne F-Type Prison administration believed the contents of the letter of 18 April 2007 to be suspect and therefore lodged a request with the public prosecutor on 24 April 2007 for a decision to refer the letter to an enforcement court to determine whether the material being sent to the applicants included objectionable content. 24.  On 9 May 2007 the Edirne Enforcement Court allowed an application by the prosecutor and examined the contents of the letter. It decided that, under section 5 of Law no. 5351, the letter enclosing the forms of authority should not be handed over to the applicants, on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision dated 25 October 2005. The decision was served on the applicants on 18 May 2007. 25.  On 1 June 2007 the Edirne Assize Court dismissed an objection lodged by the second and fourth applicants and upheld the Edirne Enforcement Court\u2019s decision. 26.  On 21 November 2007 the applicants\u2019 representative lodged another application with the Court, complaining that the decision of 9 May 2007 had violated the applicants\u2019 right to effectively pursue their application with the Court. Their application was registered as application no. 53287/07. 27.  All the applicants submitted forms of authority in respect of each of the present applications to the Court on 5 April and 21 October 2010 respectively. 28.  The relevant provisions of Law no. 5275 on the enforcement of sentences and preventive measures as in force at the material time provided as follows:\nSection 59 \u2013 Right to consultation with a lawyer or a notary\n\u201c...\n(2)  Consultation with a lawyer or a notary may be carried out in working hours except for weekends and public holidays, in a place reserved for that purpose within the sight but not hearing of officials.\n...\n(4)  [as amended by section 5 of Law no. 5351] A lawyer\u2019s documents and files related to defence and his or her records of the meetings with his or her client shall not be subject to examination. However, if it emerges from documents or other evidence that visits by lawyers to a person convicted of the offences set out in section 220 of the Criminal Code or sub-chapters 4 and 5 of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code are serving as a means of communication with a terrorist organisation or of committing a crime or otherwise jeopardising the security of the prison, the enforcement court may, at the application of the prosecution, impose [the following measures]: presence of an official during the lawyer\u2019s visits; verification of documents exchanged between the prisoner and his or her lawyers during such visits; and/or confiscation of all or some of these documents by the judge.\n...\u201d\nSection 68 \u2013 Right to send and receive letters, faxes and telegrams\n\u201c(1)  With the exception of the restrictions set forth in this section, convicted prisoners shall have the right, at their own expense, to send and receive letters, faxes and telegrams.\n(2)  The letters, faxes and telegrams sent or received by prisoners shall be monitored by the reading committee in those prisons that have such a body, or, in those which do not, by the highest authority in the prison.\n(3)  If letters, faxes and telegrams to prisoners are a threat to order and security in the prison, single out serving officials as targets, permit communication with terrorist or criminal organisations, contain false or misleading information likely to cause panic in individuals or institutions, or contain threats or insults, they shall not be forwarded to the addressee.\nNor shall [letters, faxes and telegrams of the type described above] written by prisoners be dispatched.\n(4)  Letters, faxes and telegrams sent by prisoners to authorities or to lawyers for the purpose of their defence are not subject to monitoring. \u201d 29.  Details of the relevant provisions of the prison regulations in force at the material time can be found in Tan v. Turkey (no. 9460/03, \u00a7\u00a7 13-14, 3 July 2007) and Mehmet Nuri \u00d6zen and Others v. Turkey (nos. 15672/08 and 10 others, \u00a7\u00a7 30-34, 11 January 2011). 30.  Section 55 sets out a prohibition on legal advertising as follows:\n\u201cLawyers are prohibited from advertising or engaging in any conduct which may be regarded as soliciting for the purpose of offering their services ...\u201d 31.  Article 3 of the European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights, ratified by Turkey on 6 October 2004 and in force as of 1 December 2004, reads as follows:\n\u201c1.  The Contracting Parties shall respect the right of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Agreement to correspond freely with the Commission and the Court. 2.  As regards persons under detention, the exercise of this right shall in particular imply that:\n(a)  if their correspondence is examined by the competent authorities, its despatch and delivery shall nevertheless take place without undue delay and without alteration;\n(b)  such persons shall not be subject to disciplinary measures in any form on account of any communication sent through the proper channels to the Commission or the Court;\n(c)  such persons shall have the right to correspond, and consult out of hearing of other persons, with a lawyer qualified to appear before the courts of the country where they are detained in regard to an application to the Commission, or any proceedings resulting therefrom. 3.  In application of the preceding paragraphs, there shall be no interference by a public authority except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, for the detection or prosecution of a criminal offence or for the protection of health.\u201d", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "9", "7", "2", "4", "3", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic or Ingushetia. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5.  The applicants reported the abductions to law\u2011enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies for information and assistance in the search for their relatives. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 6.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or other witnesses to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Aslan Abubakarov, who was born in 1979. 8.  At the material time the applicant and her family lived in the village of Achkhoy-Martan in the vicinity of the Achkhoy-Martan district department of the interior (\u201cthe Achkhoy-Martan ROVD\u201d) and the Achkhoy\u2011Martan district department of the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe Achkhoy-Martan FSB\u201d). 9.  At about 3 a.m. on 14 October 2004 a large group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in two armoured personnel carriers (\u201cAPCs\u201d) and two Ural lorries without registration plates. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. Some of them were equipped with helmets, metal shields and portable radio devices. A group of around six servicemen broke into the house, searched the premises and checked the identity documents of the residents. Then they forced Mr Aslan Abubakarov into one of the Ural lorries and drove him off in the direction of the Achkhoy-Martan FSB. 10.  The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. The applicant submitted written statements by three neighbours, Ms B.A., Mr Sh.S. and Ms S.S., who had seen a group of servicemen arriving at her house in military vehicles, including APCs. 11.  Shortly thereafter the applicant\u2019s husband, together with his son and two neighbours, Mr Sh.S., and Mr T.A., went to the checkpoint on the outskirts of Achkhoy-Martan in search of Mr Aslan Abubakarov. Servicemen manning the checkpoint told them that a convoy of military vehicles had passed through unrestricted earlier that night. 12.  On 14 October 2004 the father of Mr Aslan Abubakarov contacted the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor seeking to have a criminal investigation opened into the abduction of his son. 13.  Two days later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. On the same day the investigators questioned the applicant and her husband. Their submissions were similar to the applicant\u2019s submissions before the Court. 14.  On 1 November 2004 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 38050 under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code (\u201cthe CC\u201d) (abduction). 15.  Between November and December 2004 the investigators questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbours, who had heard about the abduction. They noted that Mr Aslan Abubakarov had not participated in illegal armed groups. 16.  In the meantime the investigators requested various law-enforcement authorities, including the FSB, and detention facilities to provide them with information about the possible arrest and detention of Mr Aslan Abubakarov. The authorities replied that they did not have any information on the matter. 17.  On 29 December 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 18.  On 19 January 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbour Mr Sh.S., an eyewitness to the abduction, who said that Mr Aslan Abubakarov had been abducted by men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas who had arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in APCs. 19.  On 1 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 20.  On 29 April 2005 the above decision was overruled as ill-founded and the investigation was resumed. 21.  Having questioned several hearsay witnesses, the investigators suspended the investigation on 6 June 2005. 22.  On 14 November 2006 Mr Aslan Abubakarov\u2019s father contacted the Russian Prosecutor General, complaining of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into his son\u2019s abduction. On 22 January 2007 the complaint was forwarded to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, who overruled the decision of 6 June 2005 as unlawful and ordered the resumption of the investigation on 14 February 2007. 23.  Subsequently the investigation was suspended on 14 March and 30 November 2007 and 11 July 2008 and then resumed on 31 October 2007, 11 June 2008 and 13 September 2011 respectively, before being suspended again on 14 September 2011. 24.  In the meantime, on 4 September 2008 and 14 April 2009, Mr Aslan Abubakarov\u2019s parents contacted the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons respectively, asking for their assistance in the search for their son. Their requests were forwarded to the investigators. By letters of 5 December 2008 and 6 June 2009 the investigators replied that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities were ongoing. 25.  There is no information about any further developments in the proceedings. 26.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev, who was born in 1979. The first and second applicants are his parents, the third and fourth applicants are his sisters, and the fifth applicant is his son. 27.  On 10 September 2002 Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev was taken to the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD and questioned by a police investigator, M.K., and an FSB officer, V.K., on suspicion of having been involved in a truck crane theft. On the same day he was released under an obligation to appear before the FSB officer for subsequent questioning on 16 September 2002. However, he failed to do so. 28.  At 3 a.m. on 18 September 2002 seven or eight servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas armed with automatic weapons arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in the village of Zakan-Yurt, Chechnya, in several APCs. They broke into the house, searched the premises, bound Mr Said\u2011Emin Magaziyev, put him in one of the APCs and drove off towards the village of Samashki. 29.  The abduction took place in the presence of several neighbours who had been woken up by the noise of military vehicles passing by. The applicants submitted written statements by three of them, Mr I.A., Mr A.M. and Mr B.M. They confirmed that on the night of 18 September 2002 military vehicles, including an APC, had parked near the applicants\u2019 house. Several minutes later they had driven off in the direction of Samashki. As soon as the vehicles had left, the first and second applicants went to see the neighbours, complaining about their son\u2019s abduction. 30.  Immediately thereafter the first applicant and several neighbours followed the abductors. Having reached Samashki, they spoke with villagers, who told them that several APCs had entered the premises of the Samashki military commander\u2019s headquarters. 31.  In the morning the first applicant went to the headquarters. The personnel manning the headquarters told him that Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev had been detained and brought to the headquarters at 4 a.m. on 18 September 2002. A few hours later a UAZ minivan had taken him away to an unknown destination. 32.  On an unspecified date the applicants informed the authorities of Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev\u2019s abduction. 33.  On 28 September 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63072 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34.  The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicants\u2019 submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 35.  On 27 December 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 36.  On an unspecified date in 2002 or 2003 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 37.  On 8 August 2003 they resumed the investigation, and at some point later they suspended it again. 38.  On 3 December 2004 the applicants contacted the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, seeking its assistance in the search for Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev. The outcome of the request is unknown. 39.  In early 2007 the first applicant complained to the Russian Prosecutor General of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into his son\u2019s abduction. 40.  On 9 March 2007 the investigators resumed the investigation. 41.  On 16 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation was forwarded to the investigators. By a letter of 3 April 2007 they replied that the investigation had already been resumed. Four days later, on 7 April 2007, the investigation was suspended. 42.  On an unspecified date in 2008 the investigation was resumed. Subsequently it was suspended on 10 June 2008 and 16 February 2009 and then resumed on 16 January and 23 March 2009 respectively, before being suspended again on 23 April 2009. 43.  In the meantime, on 20 January 2009 the fourth applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 44.  On 14 May 2009 the third applicant requested that the investigators grant her permission to review the criminal case file. The outcome of the request is unknown. 45.  On 21 June 2011 the fourth applicant complained to the investigators of the lack of information about the course of the proceedings. The next day she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended on 23 April 2009, but that extensive operational search activities were ongoing. 46.  There is no information about any further developments in the case. 47.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev, who was born in 1962. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. 48.  The fifth applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Zibikov, who was born in 1964. The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth applicants are his children. 49.  The tenth applicant is the wife of Mr Sayd-Ali (also spelled as Said\u2011Ali) Sharshuyev, who was born in 1954. 50.  At 7 a.m. on 20 July 2003 three armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the first applicant\u2019s house in the village of Avtury, Chechnya, and ordered the first applicant and her family members to show their identity documents. They checked Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev\u2019s passport and left. 51.  About ten minutes later the first applicant heard several gunshots outside. Then two armed servicemen of Chechen and Slavic appearance entered the house. The Chechen serviceman ordered Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev to follow them. They put him in a grey UAZ vehicle without registration plates and drove away. 52.  Immediately after that, the first applicant went to see Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev\u2019s brother, who lived nearby, and followed the UAZ in a car with him. They caught up with the UAZ in the village centre. The first applicant was allowed to pass socks and medication on to her husband. Then three other UAZ vehicles arrived and the convoy drove off in the direction of the village of Shali. The first applicant attempted to follow the convoy, but was not allowed to cross the checkpoint between Shali and Avtury.\n(b)  Abduction of Mr Shamkhan Zibikov 53.  At about 7 a.m. on 20 July 2003 two armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the fifth applicants\u2019 house in Avtury, Chechnya, and checked the identity documents of the family members. At the time Mr Shamkhan Zibikov was in the courtyard and the fifth applicant did not see what was happening to him. When she went outside, she saw about fifteen military UAZ and VAZ vehicles. The servicemen ordered her to go back inside the house. A few minutes later all the vehicles, except for three, left. She did not see in which vehicle her husband was put.\n(c)  Abduction of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev 54.  At about 7.30 a.m. on 20 July 2003 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms, some of whom were in balaclavas, arrived in VAZ\u201121099 and UAZ vehicles at the tenth applicant\u2019s house in Avtury, Chechnya, searched the premises and took Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev away. 55.  On 20 July 2003 the head of the Avtury municipal administration informed the Shali district department of the interior (\u201cthe Shali ROVD\u201d) about the abduction of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev, Mr Shamkhan Zibikov and Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev. On the same day investigators from the Shali ROVD examined the applicants\u2019 houses. No evidence was collected. 56.  On 24 July 2003 the case was transferred to the Shali district prosecutor. 57.  On 30 July 2003 he opened criminal case no. 22111 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 58.  On 31 July 2003 the investigators questioned the tenth applicant, who described the circumstances of her husband\u2019s abduction, and her neighbour, Mr A.A. The latter stated that he had seen the abduction of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev by servicemen in camouflage uniforms, who had arrived in VAZ and UAZ vehicles without registration plates. 59.  In early August 2003 the investigators questioned relatives of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev and Mr Shamkhan Zibikov, eyewitnesses to their abductions. Their description was consistent with the applicants\u2019 account of the events. 60.  On 13 September 2003 the investigators contacted various military and law-enforcement authorities to check whether the abducted persons had been arrested and taken into custody. The respondent authorities replied that they had no information about their arrests or detention. 61.  On 18 and 19 August 2003 the first, fifth and tenth applicants were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 62.  On 18 August 2003 the brother of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev informed the investigators that he had identified one of the persons who had arrested Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev. It was Mr A., from the village of Tsotsin-Yurt, who worked in the Chechen President\u2019s security service. Mr A. had told him that the security service had detained Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev for two days and then had transferred him to the FSB. 63.  On an unspecified date (apparently in August 2003) one of the investigators spoke with the head of the Chechen President\u2019s security service, Mr S. He stated that on 20 July 2003 the security service had conducted a special operation in Avtury. As a result of that operation four persons had been arrested. One of them had been released afterwards, whereas three others had been taken to the town of Gudermes to take part in \u201coperational activities\u201d. Mr S. refused to give a formal statement. 64.  On 30 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 3 July 2004 and suspended on 9 August 2004. 65.  On 22 September 2004 the investigators resumed the investigation. 66.  On 12 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S., who denied the involvement of the security service in the abduction. 67.  On 22 October 2004 the investigation was suspended. It was then resumed on 6 September 2005, 12 April 2006, 12 January 2010 and 9 August 2011, and then suspended on 14 November 2005, 14 May 2006, 12 February 2010 and 19 August 2011 respectively. 68.  In the meantime, on 8 June 2006 and 22 May 2007 the first and tenth applicants respectively contacted the Chechen Parliament seeking assistance in the search for their missing husbands. It appears that their letters were forwarded to the investigators. It is not clear whether any replies followed. 69.  On an unspecified date in 2009 the tenth applicant asked the Chechen Parliament\u2019s relevant committee to help her to find her husband. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 23 April 2009 that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities in the case were ongoing. 70.  On 22 January 2010 the investigators questioned Mr A. According to his statements, on 20 July 2003 he had been working in the Kurchaloiy district department of the interior and had participated in a \u201cmopping-up\u201d operation carried out by FSB officers from the \u201cSSG-1\u201d unit in Avtury. The operation had been headed by an officer with the call sign \u201cTerek\u201d. Four or five people had been arrested during that operation on suspicion of having participated in an illegal armed group. 71.  On 6 February 2010 the investigators requested the FSB in Chechnya to provide them with a list of persons who had participated in the \u201cmopping-up operation\u201d. By a letter of 5 March 2010 the FSB replied that the relevant archive documents had been destroyed, and that in any event the information requested was classified. 72.  There is no information about any further developments in the case. 73.  On an unspecified date in 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, challenging the effectiveness of the investigation and seeking to have the criminal proceedings resumed. 74.  On 10 August 2011 the Shali Town Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the investigation had already been resumed a day before, on 9 August 2011. 75.  The applicant is the sister of Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov, who was born in 1957. 76.  At 8 p.m. on 28 August 2002 a group of fifteen to twenty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the courtyard of the applicant\u2019s house in Grozny. Some of them remained in the courtyard, while the others entered the house. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian. They searched the premises and left. 77.  At 8 p.m. on 7 September 2002 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in an APC. They broke into the house and searched the premises. Thereafter the servicemen took Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov outside. A couple of minutes later the applicant went outside. She did not find her brother, but saw the APC driving away. Her neighbours told her that Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov had been forced into the vehicle by the servicemen. 78.  On 9 and 12 September 2002 the applicant contacted the head of the Staropromyslovskiy district municipal administration in Grozny and the Grozny town prosecutor, complaining about her brother\u2019s abduction. 79.  A month later, on 12 October 2002 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 54087 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 80.  The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicant\u2019s submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 81.  On 12 December 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators, and on 12 October 2004 it was resumed again. 82.  On 2 December 2004 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 83.  Ten days later, on 12 December 2004, the investigation was suspended. 84.  According to the applicant, she and her mother contacted the local authorities, the investigative committee and the Red Cross, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relative, but to no avail. 85.  On 17 June 2009 the applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the criminal proceedings. 86.  On 11 June 2010 she requested the investigators to resume the investigation and to allow her to review the case file. 87.  It appears that no responses were forthcoming in reply to those two requests. 88.  On 26 September 2011 the investigators resumed the investigation. 89.  On the next day they granted the applicant victim status and questioned her. Her statements were similar to the account of the events described above. 90.  Subsequently, the investigation was suspended on 26 October 2011, 27 January and 23 March 2012 and 18 December 2013, and then resumed on 27 December 2011, 13 March 2012, and on an unspecified date in 2013 respectively. 91.  In the meantime, on 3 and 27 February 2012 the applicant requested the investigators to allow her to review the case file. Several months later her lawyer obtained access to the documents in the case file. 92.  There is no information about the further progress of the investigation. 93.  The applicant is Ms Ayzan Golbatsova, who was born in 1953. She is the mother of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov, who was born in 1979. 94.  The applicant died on 17 August 2013. Her daughter, Ms Elina Golbatsova, the sister of Mr Golbatsov, expressed her wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court in her mother\u2019s stead. 95.  At about 9 p.m. on 25 November 2004 Mr Alikhan Golbatsov and his acquaintance Mr S.K. were driving a Zaporozhets car in the village of Avtury in the direction of its centre, when a group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms stopped them. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. They were in two UAZ minivans and three Ural lorries. Having forced Mr Golbatsov and Mr S.K. into one of the minivans, the servicemen drove off to an unknown destination. 96.  The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. The applicant submitted written statements by several of them. Her neighbour, Ms D.A., had seen Mr Alikhan Golbatsov\u2019s car being stopped by armed servicemen in a white UAZ minivan. The servicemen had surrounded the car and argued in unaccented Russian. Other witnesses, Mr L.Z. and Ms E.A., made similar statements. The aforementioned three witnesses were not questioned by the investigators. 97.  Immediately after the abduction the applicant informed the authorities and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 98.  On 23 December 2004 investigators from the Shali district department of the interior examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. On the same day they questioned Mr Alikhan Golbatsov\u2019s relatives. They submitted that on 25 November 2004 he had not returned home. 99.  On 24 December 2004 the case was transferred to the Shali district prosecutor. 100.  On 10 January 2005 he opened criminal case no. 46002 under Article 105 of the CC (murder). 101.  In January 2005, apparently following allegations made by relatives of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov or Mr S.K. that the two men had been abducted by State agents, the investigators contacted various authorities, including the Shali district FSB and remand prisons, to check whether Mr Alikhan Golbatsov had been arrested and taken into custody. The authorities replied that they had no information on the matter. 102.  On 11 January 2005 the head of the Avtury municipal authority informed the investigators that the remains of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov\u2019s car bearing signs of an explosion had been found near a road between the villages of Avtury and Niki-Khita in the Kurchaloiy district, Chehcnya. 103.  On 1 February 2005 the applicant, the mother of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov, was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 104.  On 23 February 2005 the investigators asked the Kurchaloiy district military commander whether a special operation had been conducted on 25 November 2004. The military commander replied in the negative. 105.  On 17 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 17 June 2005, and suspended again on 17 July 2005. 106.  On 22 January 2007, apparently after the investigation had been resumed one more time, the wife of Mr S.K. was granted victim status. 107.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant contacted the Chechen Ombudsman, seeking his assistance in the search for her son. She submitted that on 25 November 2004 Mr Alikhan Golbatsov had been arrested in the centre of Avtury by a group of servicemen in camouflage uniforms. On 8 October 2007 the Ombudsman requested the investigators to inform him about the progress of the case. 108.  On 12 November 2007 the investigators resumed the investigation and asked the applicant to tell them the names of the village residents who had seen the abduction of her son. Owing to the time that had elapsed, she could not recall the names. 109.  On 11 December 2007 the investigation was suspended. 110.  On unspecified dates in early 2008 and 2009 the applicant asked the Chechen President and the Chechen Parliament\u2019s committee for the search for missing persons to assist in the search for her son. Her requests were forwarded to the investigators. By a letter dated 18 June 2009 they informed her that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search measures were ongoing. 111.  On 28 March 2011 the applicant requested that the investigators inform her about the progress of the investigation and allow her to review the criminal case file. Her request was granted. 112.  On 14 June 2012 the investigation was transferred to the Kurchaloiy district prosecutor. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 113.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Ruslan Pareulidze (also spelled as Paraulidze), who was born in 1982. 114.  At the material time Mr Ruslan Pareulidze was visiting his aunt, Ms M.M., in the Nesterovskaya settlement, Ingushetia. 115.  At about 5 p.m. on 7 October 2003 Mr Pareulidze was in the courtyard of his aunt\u2019s house when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in a military UAZ car, a Niva car and a Gazel minivan with the registration plates O 182 MM 06. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. They forced Mr Ruslan Pareulidze into the minivan and drove off to an unknown destination. 116.  About five days later a group of about 200 servicemen arrived at Ms M.M.\u2019s house in APCs, Ural lorries and UAZ minivans. They brought a man, presumably Mr Ruslan Pareulidze, whose upper body and head were covered with a sack. The servicemen searched the house and then drove off again with the man. 117.  On 8 October 2003 Ms M.M. informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 118.  Two days later the investigators questioned Ms M.M., her son, and two neighbours who had witnessed the abduction. Their submissions were similar to the account of the events set out above. 119.  On 20 October 2003 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 23600067 (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as 036600067) under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 120.  On 25 October 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. On the same day the investigators questioned her and several neighbours. They repeated the statements given before, adding that several days after the abduction Ms M.M.\u2019s house had been searched by persons in uniforms, accompanied by a neighbourhood police officer. Some of the witnesses said that according to rumours, Mr Ruslan Pareulidze had been in the custody of the FSB. 121.  On 16 October 2003 the road traffic police, further to a request from the investigators, informed them that the registration number O 182 MM 06 belonged to a Niva car owned by the FSB in Ingushetia. 122.  On 20 February 2004 the investigators questioned the neighbourhood police officer who had participated in the search which followed the abduction. He submitted that on 7 October 2004 he had accompanied a group of the FSB officers who intended to check the registration documents of two families, including that of Ms M.M. When they had arrived at the latter\u2019s address he had remained outside. The FSB officers had entered the house and left it shortly thereafter. Then they had moved to another address and found a large secret store of weapons. According to rumours, the location of that store had been disclosed by Mr Ruslan Pareulidze, who had been in the custody of the FSB. 123.  In the meantime, on various dates in 2003 and 2004 the investigators requested a number of law-enforcement authorities, including the FSB, to provide them with any information about Mr Ruslan Pareulidze\u2019s arrest or detention. The authorities replied that they had no information on the matter. 124.  On 20 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 125.  On 16 December 2004 the applicant contacted the FSB in Ingushetia, seeking its assistance in the search for her son. The FSB forwarded her letter to the investigators, who replied that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities were still ongoing. 126.  On 28 March 2005 the applicant requested the update on the course of the proceedings. Three days later the investigators informed her that there had been no new developments in the case. 127.  On 12 March 2008 the applicant requested the investigators to provide her with copies of some documents from the investigation file. Her request was granted on 15 March 2008. 128.  On 24 November 2010 the investigators resumed the investigation and on 30 December 2010 they suspended it again. 129.  On 27 August 2011 and 26 June 2012 the applicant contacted the investigators, requesting information about new developments in the case. On 9 July 2012 the investigators replied that the proceedings had been suspended, but that recently they had ordered that operational search measures in the case be intensified. 130.  There is no information about the further progress of the investigation. 131.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Lema (also spelled as Lemma) Khamzatov, who was born in 1964. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The application form was also lodged on behalf of Mr Lema Khamzatov\u2019s father, Mr Saydamagomed Khamzatov. However, on 8 July 2016 the applicants informed the Court that he had died in 2011, that is to say before the application was submitted. Therefore he cannot be treated as one of the applicants. 132.  At about 3 a.m. on 4 May 2003 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 5 May 2003) Mr Lema Khamzatov was at home in the Noviye Aldy settlement, Chechnya (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as Grozny) when a group of about thirty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at his house in APCs and UAZ minivans. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian. Having broken into the house, they checked the identity documents of the residents, including the applicants, and then forced Mr Khamzatov outside, handcuffed him, put him into one of the APCs and drove off to an unknown destination. 133.  The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by four neighbours, Ms R.S., Mr R.D., Ms M.A. and Mr L.Kh, who had seen the abduction from their houses. They confirmed the account of the events as described above. 134.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants attempted to search for Mr Khamzatov on their own, but in vain. On 6 May 2003 Mr Lema Khamzatov\u2019s father lodged an official complaint asking the authorities to assist in the search for his son. 135.  On 15 May 2003 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 30069 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 136.  On an unspecified date the investigators examined the crime scene and collected cartridge cases and bullets, allegedly left by the perpetrators near a neighbouring house. 137.  On 29 May 2003 the investigators ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence collected, as well as a fingerprint analysis. The experts concluded that the cartridge cases and bullets belonged to a special sniper rifle (\u0412\u0438\u043d\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0421\u043d\u0430\u0439\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f), a \u201cVal\u201d special automatic rifle (\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0442 \u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u201c\u0412\u0430\u043b\u201d), and an Army Sniper Complex-94 rifle (\u0412\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0421\u043d\u0430\u0439\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441-94). No fingerprints were found. 138.  On 6 June 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. A copy of the records of questioning submitted by the Government is illegible. 139.  On 11 June 2003 the investigators questioned the father of Mr Lema Khamzatov. His description of the events was similar to the applicants\u2019 submissions before the Court. 140.  On 15 July 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 141.  On 25 August and 1 and 11 September 2003 Mr Lema Khamzatov\u2019s father contacted the Russian Prosecutor General, the head of the Russian Parliament and the head of the Chechen Parliament respectively, seeking their assistance in the investigation. The requests were forwarded to the investigators, who did not reply. 142.  On 5 April 2004 the applicant asked the investigators to resume the investigation. On the next day, 6 April 2004 the investigation was resumed. It was then suspended on 9 May 2004. 143.  On 21 August 2004 the aforementioned decision was overruled by the deputy prosecutor of Chechnya. He noted the investigators\u2019 failure to identify all of the eyewitnesses to the abduction, to question the police officers who had manned the road checkpoints at the material time, and to take other basic investigative steps. The investigation was resumed and then suspended on 25 September 2004. It does not appear that the persons mentioned by the deputy prosecutor were questioned, in spite of his direct orders to that end. 144.  Subsequently the investigation was resumed on 25 April 2006 and 1 March 2010, and then suspended on 25 May 2006 and 2 March 2010 respectively. In the meantime, on 4 February 2010 the father of Mr Lema Khamzatov requested the investigators to provide him with information about new developments in the case and to grant him victim status. On 1 March 2010 his request was granted. 145.  The Government did not submit a copy of the investigation file concerning further developments in the case. From the documents presented by the applicants it appears that on 8 July 2010 the NGO SRJI/ASTREYA, on behalf of Mr Lema Khamzatov\u2019s father, requested an update about the progress of the case and access to the documents in the case file. No reply was forthcoming. 146.  On 14 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s relatives father repeated the request, but to no avail. 147.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Islam Reshidov and Mr Usam (also spelled as Usama) Reshidov, who were born in 1986 and 1989 respectively. 148.  At about 2.30 p.m. on 7 December 2004 Mr Usam Reshidov was at the crossroads of Zavodskaya and A. Sheripova Streets in the town of Argun, Chechnya, when a group of armed servicemen in military camouflage uniforms arrived in an APC, a UAZ vehicle and a Niva car. The servicemen apprehended Mr Usam Reshidov and took him away to an unknown destination. 149.  At about 7 p.m. on the same date, presumably the same group of servicemen in military vehicles (among which were APCs, a UAZ car and a Niva car) surrounded a block of flats on Sakhzavodskaya Street in Argun, broke into a flat, where Mr Islam Reshidov was with his friends Mr A.Kh. and Ms I.D., apprehended them and then took them to the Argun military commander\u2019s headquarters. Subsequently Ms I.D. was released from detention. 150.  Immediately after the abductions the applicants complained to the police, asking for assistance in the search for their sons. 151.  On 21 December 2004 the first applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Chechnya prosecutor. She stated that Mr Usam Reshidov had left home on 7 December 2004 and had not come back, and that Mr Islam Reshidov had been abducted on the same date from his friend\u2019s flat in Argun by military servicemen in APCs. 152.  On 30 December 2004 she contacted the Argun district department of the interior (\u201cArgun ROVD\u201d). She submitted that on 7 December 2004 her sons had left home and had not returned. On 6 January 2005 the Argun ROVD refused to open a criminal investigation into the incidents. 153.  On 27 January 2005, at the request of Mr A.Kh.\u2019s father, the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 58003 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154.  On 7 February 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor overruled the refusal to open a criminal case dated 6 January 2005. The investigation into the abduction of the Reshidov brothers was joined to the investigation in criminal case no. 58003. 155.  Two days later, on 9 February 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. She told the investigators that after the abduction she and Ms I.D.\u2019s mother had gone to the Argun military commander\u2019s headquarters in search of their relatives. At the headquarters she had met officer R. From her conversation with him she had understood that both of her sons had been detained on the headquarters\u2019 premises. 156.  Between February and April 2005 the investigators requested a number of law-enforcement agencies to inform them whether they had conducted any special operations on 7 December 2004 in Argun and whether they had arrested or detained the Reshidov brothers. No reply in the affirmative was received. 157.  Between February and August 2005, and again in February 2006, the investigators questioned residents of the block of flats from which Mr Islam Reshidov had been abducted. Some of them had heard gunshots and sounds produced by heavy military vehicles outside their flats on the evening of 7 December 2004; others had directly witnessed the special operation conducted by the law-enforcement agencies. 158.  On 17 February 2005 the investigators questioned officer A.Kh. from the Argun ROVD. According to him, on 8 December 2004 he had heard from Argun ROVD officers and officers from the temporary operative group of the Ministry of the Interior (\u0412\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0412\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0414\u0435\u043b) (\u201cthe VOGOP\u201d) that a special operation aimed at arresting Mr A.Kh. had taken place on 7 December 2004, but that the arrest had failed. 159.  14 March 2005 the investigators questioned Ms I.D. Her statement concerning the circumstances of the abduction was similar to the applicants\u2019 account of the events submitted to the Court. According to her, the abductors had placed her in a police station detention unit, where she had been detained for nine days and then released. 160.  On 27 April 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 15 May 2005. 161.  At some point the investigators established that the VOGOP had been manned by officers from the Chelyabinsk regional department of the police, and asked them to submit information about the special operation carried out on 7 December 2004. 162.  By a letter of 22 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk regional department of the police replied that at the investigator\u2019s request they had questioned several officers who had worked in Argun at the time of the abduction. Those officers had submitted that in 2004 the authorities had obtained information that Mr A.Kh. and Mr Islam Reshidov had planted a bomb in the building of the Argun municipal administration. On 7 December 2004 servicemen from the Argun municipal administration\u2019s security service and the FSB had carried out a special operation to arrest the men. The police had arrived at a block of flats on Sakhzavodskaya Street in Argun and broken into the flat where Mr A.Kh. and Mr Islam Reshidov resided. Mr Usam Reshidov and Ms I.D. had also been in the flat. An exchange of fire had followed and Mr A.Kh. had managed to escape. The Reshidov brothers and Ms I.D. had been apprehended and taken to the headquarters of the Argun municipal administration\u2019s security service. Their fate remains unknown. The allegation that an explosive device had been planted in the municipal administration building had proved to be false. 163.  On 30 June 2005 the investigation was suspended. It was then resumed on several occasions: on 19 January and 16 May 2006, 1 April 2008, 17 May and 3 July 2013 and 23 December 2014 and then suspended on 21 February and 23 June 2006, 7 May 2008, 21 May and 13 July 2013 and 30 December 2014 respectively. 164.  In the meantime, on 7 June 2006 the investigators questioned Mr I.N., the Argun acting prosecutor at the time of the events. He submitted that in December 2004 a special operation had been conducted on account of the alleged involvement of the Reshidov brothers, Ms I.D. and Mr A.Kh. in the preparation of a terrorist attack in Argun. 165.  On 21 June 2006 similar information was obtained from the Argun ROVD officer Mr Sh.D., who stated that the Reshidov brothers, Ms I.D. and Mr A.Kh. had been arrested by military servicemen in the course of a special operation. 166.  On 14 May 2013 the second applicant requested that he be granted victim status in the case. His request was granted on 4 July 2013. 167.  On 29 December 2014 the investigators ordered a DNA sample to be taken from the second applicant to compare it with those stored in the DNA database of unidentified bodies. 168.  There is no information about any further developments in the case. 169.  On 3 April 2006 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, challenging her lack of access to the criminal case file and the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. 170.  On 1 June 2006 the court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint in part and ordered the investigators to allow her to review the case file. 171.  On 26 June 2013 the applicants lodged a similar complaint with the court, challenging their lack of access to the criminal case file and the investigators\u2019 inaction. 172.  On 29 July 2013 the court rejected the complaint, finding that the investigators had already resumed the investigation. 173.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Magomed Mezhiyev, who was born in 1977. The third, fourth and fifth applicants are his wife and children. The sixth, seventh and eighth applicants are his sister and brothers. 174.  On 22 October 2016 the applicants informed the Court of the death of the first applicant on 5 November 2015. 175.  On 27 April 2017 the third applicant informed the Court that she had changed her surname from Mezhiyeva to Muguyeva. 176.  At about 12 noon (in the documents submitted the time was also referred to as 2 p.m.) on 24 July 2005 Mr Magomed Mezhiyev, who was an officer of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior, and his acquaintance, Mr A.M. (in the documents submitted also referred to as Mr A.Kh.), were driving on Pobedy Avenue in Grozny when a group of armed men in camouflage trousers and black T-shirts forced them out of their car. The men apprehended Mr Magomed Mezhiyev and put him into the boot of a car which was parked nearby. Shortly afterwards several VAZ 2107 cars without registration plates arrived at the scene. The men forced Mr A.M. into one of those cars and drove off in the direction of Minutka Square, Grozny. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 177.  According to the applicants, several days after the abduction an unidentified armed man in a black uniform contacted them and offered to sell them for 1,000 United States dollars (USD) a video recording depicting Mr Magomed Mezhiyev and Mr A.M. being detained on the premises of the Grozny district department of the interior (\u201cthe Grozny ROVD\u201d). The applicants paid the sum requested for the recording and then submitted it to the investigators (see paragraph 183 below). 178.  On 24 July 2005 the applicants contacted the Zavodskoiy district department of the interior requesting that a criminal case into the incident be opened. On the same day the first applicant was questioned. His allegations were similar to the applicants\u2019 account of the events. 179.  On 24 July 2005 the investigators questioned Mr A.Sh., who had seen the abduction. The description he provided was consistent with the applicants\u2019 version of the events. 180.  At some point later the case was transferred to the Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny. 181.  On 2 August 2005 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 41082 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 182.  On 8 August 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned again. Referring to hearsay evidence, he submitted that after they had forced his son into their vehicle, the abductors had told the eyewitnesses that they were FSB officers conducting a special operation. One of the witnesses had followed their car and seen it entering the premises of the Grozny ROVD. 183.  On 19 September 2005 the first applicant told the investigators that he had obtained a video recording showing his son and his acquaintance Mr A.M. on the ground in the Grozny ROVD. The first applicant stated that he had recognised the appearance and the voice of his son, the Grozny ROVD building and the car belonging to the head of the Grozny ROVD. According to the first applicant, he had bought the recording from an armed serviceman in camouflage uniform who had arrived at his house and offered it in exchange for USD 1,000. 184.  On the same date the investigators seized the aforementioned recording as evidence. 185.  On 28 October 2005 the investigators questioned the head of the Grozny ROVD. He denied that Mr Magomed Mezhiyev had been arrested. 186.  On 2 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 9 December 2005, 3 March and 28 September 2006, 22 February 2007, 27 March, 2 June 2008 and 11 August 2008, 28 March and 8 September 2011, 28 May 2012, 14 November 2013, 12 March 2014 and 13 July 2016 and then suspended on 9 January, 11 April and 6 November 2006, 14 April 2007, 4 May, 9 July 2008 and 25 September 2008, 28 April and 28 September 2011, 14 June 2012, 14 December 2013, 17 March 2014 and 13 August 2016 respectively. 187.  In the meantime, on 27 October 2006 the investigators attempted to examine the premises of the Grozny ROVD to verify whether it had been depicted on the video, but they were not let in owing to the lack of special authorisation. 188.  At some point the video recording submitted by the first applicant to the investigators was lost and the investigators requested the applicants to provide them with a new copy. The applicants did so on 3 September 2008. 189.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the third applicant requested the investigators to provide her with an update about the progress of the proceedings. On 18 June 2010 she was informed that the investigation had been suspended. 190.  On 21 November 2013 the investigators obtained the first applicant\u2019s DNA sample to compare it with those stored in a database of unidentified bodies. The outcome of the expert examination is unknown. 191.  There is no information about any further developments in the proceedings. 192.  On 15 May 2012 and 26 February 2014 the first applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny, challenging the respective decisions of 28 April 2011 and 14 December 2013 to suspend the investigation and the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps. 193.  On 30 May 2012 and 13 March 2014 respectively the court rejected the complaints, finding that the investigators had already resumed the investigation. On 15 April 2014 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the latter decision on appeal. 194.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Bekmagomed (also spelled as Bek\u2011Magamed) Daniyev, who was born in 1975. 195.  On 17 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative lodged an application form with the Court signed by him on behalf of the applicant. The power of attorney enclosed had not been signed by the applicant. 196.  On 4 April 2016 the Registry of the Court instructed the applicant to submit a signed power of attorney as soon as possible. 197.  On 10 May 2016 the applicant signed the power of attorney and sent it to the Court. 198.  On 6 January 2005 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 28 January 2005) the applicant and Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev were at home in their flat in the town of Argun when at about 6 a.m. a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at their block of flats in three cars, including a UAZ and white Gazel minivan. The men spoke unaccented Chechen and Russian; some of them were in balaclavas. Some of those who were not wearing balaclavas were of Slavic appearance. The men broke into the applicant\u2019s flat, forced Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev outside, put him in one of their vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 199.  The white Gazel minivan was subsequently seen exiting the premises of the Argun military commander\u2019s headquarters. 200.  On 24 January 2005 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and asked for assistance in the search for her husband. 201.  On the same day investigators from the Argun ROVD examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. The investigators also questioned several relatives of Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev, including the applicant. Their statements were similar to the applicant\u2019s submissions before the Court. Among other details the applicant noted that the abductors had presented themselves as police officers from the Argun ROVD. 202.  On 28 January 2005 the case was transferred from the Argun ROVD to the Argun prosecutor. 203.  Between 1 and 15 February 2005 the Argun prosecutor requested that a number of law-enforcement agencies provide information on whether they had conducted any special operation on 6 January 2005 or detained Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev, and whether any information existed on the latter\u2019s suspected involvement in illegal armed groups. The Argun prosecutor\u2019s office also asked those law-enforcement agencies whether they had ever used a white Gazel minivan. No reply in the affirmative was received. 204.  On 7 February 2005 the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 58005 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 205.  On 8 February 2005 the investigators decided to pursue four main theories, namely that Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had been abducted: by servicemen of either federal or local law\u2011enforcement agencies because of his suspected terrorist activities, by members of illegal armed groups, or for the purpose of obtaining a ransom. 206.  On the same day the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 207.  On an unspecified date between March and April 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor examined the investigation file and concluded that the most probable version of the events was that Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had been abducted by officers from the Chechen President\u2019s security service on suspicion of having participated in an illegal armed group. 208.  On 7 May 2005 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 3 August 2007 that decision was quashed by the supervising authorities and the investigation was resumed. 209.  On 21 August 2007 the deputy head of the Argun ROVD informed the investigators that according to \u201coperative information\u201d, Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had aided an illegal armed group. 210.  On 3 September 2007 the investigation was suspended. 211.  On 4 December 2008 the applicant complained to the investigators\u2019 supervisors that the investigation was ineffective and requested that the proceedings be resumed. The outcome of the request is unknown. 212.  On 7 April 2009 the mother of Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev complained to the Chechen Ombudsman about the abduction. On 23 April 2009 the Ombudsman asked the investigators to take measures to establish Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev\u2019s whereabouts. 213.  On 18 August 2011 the applicant again requested the investigators to resume the criminal investigation. Her request was rejected on 9 September 2011. 214.  On 10 May 2012 the applicant requested permission to inspect the investigation file. The next day her request was granted. 215.  There is no information about any further developments in the case. 216.  On 12 October 2012 the applicant lodged a claim with the Presnenskiy District Court in Moscow seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged abduction of her husband by law\u2011enforcement agencies. 217.  On 22 April 2013 the court dismissed her claim as unfounded. On 22 April 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that ruling on appeal.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "8", "3", "6", "9", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zgornja Korena. 6.  On 3 June 2010 the Maribor Local Court found the applicant guilty, pursuant to the (old) Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below), of two counts of violent behaviour, which had been committed in the periods between 1 May and 29 June 2003, and between 1 July 2003 and 22 November 2004, respectively. The applicant was given a suspended prison sentence. The judgment became final on 17 June 2011. 7.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant was granted a licence to work as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings under the Compulsory Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Bankruptcy Act\u201d) then in force. His name was entered in the Register of Liquidators maintained by the Ministry of Justice. At the time of his appointment the Bankruptcy Act regulated the conditions under which such a licence could be granted and revoked (see paragraph 28 below). 8.  On 1 October 2008 a new Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Financial Operations Act\u201d) came into force, replacing the Bankruptcy Act (see paragraph 29 below). 9.  On 21 June 2011 the Maribor Local Court informed the Ministry of Justice that the applicant\u2019s conviction for the criminal offences committed in 2003 and 2004 had become final (see paragraph 6 above). Accordingly, on 27 June 2011 the Ministry of Justice revoked the applicant\u2019s licence, based on section 109 of the Financial Operations Act. It stated that pursuant to that provision, the applicant, having been convicted of an offence prosecuted ex officio (hereinafter \u201cpublicly prosecutable\u201d) committed with intent, had to be divested of his licence. Three days following the decision the applicant\u2019s name was removed from the registry of liquidators. 10.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the decision revoking his licence. He argued that at the time he had committed the criminal offence he could not have foreseen that it would have entailed such a sanction and that section 109 of the Financial Operations Act should not have been applied retrospectively \u2013 an issue which in his view had been entirely disregarded by the Ministry of Justice. The applicant also emphasised that at the time he had acquired the licence the law had not provided for the measure of revocation in a case of conviction for a criminal offence. In this connection, he referred to Article 28 of the Slovenian Constitution, which sets out the principle of legality in criminal law prohibiting, inter alia, any retroactive application of criminal law. Accordingly, he could not have been expected to anticipate that such legal consequences would have arisen from his actions which, furthermore, had no bearing on the performance of his duties as a liquidator. He argued that over the years in this profession, he had gained extensive experience and had built up his reputation. His job as a liquidator had constituted his only source of income and he and his family had thus suffered a grave and unexpected loss of earnings following the revocation of his licence. 11.  On 7 November 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that the revocation of his licence had been entirely lawful. As regards the applicant\u2019s assertion that the measure should not have been applied retroactively, it found that the time when the offence had been committed was not to be considered relevant since the measure in question pertained to the final conviction, thereby respecting the presumption of innocence. 12.  On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating the argument that his licence had been unlawfully revoked. He further alleged that the Administrative Court had failed to address that key argument and to provide a reasoned response to his complaints. Moreover, the applicant was of the view that, assuming that the Administrative Court had correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act, those provisions were inconsistent with the Constitution. 13.  On 13 February 2013 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, holding that the question he had raised did not meet the standard of \u201can important legal question\u201d which should be resolved by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision of section 109 of the Financial Operations Act was unambiguous and did not require any particular interpretation; it was clear from its wording that it applied equally to those liquidators who had acquired their licence prior to the enactment of the Financial Operations Act as well as to those who had acquired it after the new Act had come into force. Moreover, the Act did not specifically provide that the measure in question applied only to convictions for criminal offences committed after it had entered into force. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate that the revocation of his licence had had particularly harmful consequences for him. 14.  On 19 April 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on several constitutional provisions, including those enshrining equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection and to enjoy the freedom of work. He complained that the lower courts\u2019 decisions had been very brief and had not answered his arguments and that no evidence concerning, inter alia, his financial situation had been assessed. He continued to aver that when given the licence, he had complied with all the pertinent criteria and that the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act were unconstitutional. He also argued that the courts had not applied the more lenient law, which had been the old Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, the courts had disregarded the fact that only a suspended prison sentence had been imposed on him and that the legal distinction to include all criminal offences committed with intent was arbitrary and not relevant to the aim of maintaining public confidence in the profession at issue. 15.  On 6 November 2013 the Constitutional Court decided not to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, relying on the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). 16.  In the meantime, as it transpires from a decision granting him unemployment allowance, on 15 April 2012 the applicant was dismissed from the Institute for Insolvency Management. He was subsequently unemployed. From November 2014 to November 2015, he was employed through a programme for older workers. 17.  On 28 February 2013 the applicant\u2019s conviction was expunged from his criminal record. 18.  On 8 April 2013 the applicant applied for a new liquidator\u2019s licence. 19.  On 29 May 2013 the Ministry of Justice rejected his application, citing the Financial Operations Act\u2019s provision, pursuant to which a licence could not be granted once it had been revoked (point 2, paragraph 4 of section 108 of the Financial Operations Act \u2013 see paragraph 30 below) and noting that the applicant\u2019s licence had been revoked on 27 June 2011. 20.  On 27 June 2013 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the above decision. He argued that the sanction of permanent revocation was absolutely disproportionate and that neither judges nor lawyers were subject to such strict conditions as both were able to reapply for office after they had been dismissed. The applicant further submitted that he had lost his job virtually overnight and that the companies which had provided support services to him, such as accounting, had also been seriously affected by the measure. He also explained that he was unemployed and found it difficult to provide for his children who were in his sole custody. 21.  On 5 January 2014 the applicant lodged pleadings referring to a judgment issued in criminal proceedings unconnected with the present case. He argued that a convicted person could successfully apply for a liquidator\u2019s licence after his conviction had been expunged from his criminal record. 22.  On 12 March 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It found that the refusal to grant a licence was based on a valid law, which prohibited granting of a licence to an applicant whose previous licence had been revoked. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that further to the expungement of his conviction from his criminal record he should have been able to reapply. 23.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 24.  On 10 March 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law on the grounds that he had failed to demonstrate that there was an important legal question, he had not pointed to any inconsistencies in the case-law and he had not shown that he had suffered very severe consequences as a result of the impugned measure, which the court pointed out had been a refusal to grant him a licence and not the earlier revocation. 25.  On 27 May 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on several provisions of the Constitution including equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection, freedom of work, as well as Articles 6, 7 and 14 of the Convention. He argued that his case was an important one and that if the current position of the courts remained in effect, he would never be able to work as a liquidator again. The applicant disputed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, which had required him to show that there had been inconsistencies in the case-law. The Supreme Court ignored his argument to the effect that the relevant provisions were unconstitutional and instead took a position that only a departure from case\u2011law would merit the examination of his appeal. The applicant furthermore argued that the interpretation of the relevant legislation had not yet been settled. 26.  On 14 December 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as inadmissible, citing the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). The decision was served on the applicant on 4 January 2016.", "references": ["2", "1", "7", "6", "0", "5", "8", "3", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Paola. 7.  On 29 January 2002 a hold-up in the applicant\u2019s business premises (a showroom), while he was present, was reported to the Police. The Police suspected that this was not a case of a real hold-up but of fabrication of false evidence. 8.  On an unspecified day, shortly after the incident, the applicant gave statements to a court expert. He explained that four individuals had entered the premises, tied him up, and stolen money, amongst other things. 9.  A.F., an employee of the company, told the police that he had tied the applicant to a chair with tape and that he had put a suitcase next to the entrance of the showroom, as requested by the applicant. He also stated that he accepted to help the applicant move a photocopier (which had been found overturned on the floor) and that he had seen the applicant put the server of a computer network system under the sofa of a room on the second floor, and the video recorder and the safe-deposit box in other places. 10.  Subsequently, on 1 February 2002 at 6.00 pm, the police questioned the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. He was cautioned i.e. he was informed of his right to remain silent and that everything he would say would be put down in writing and could be used as evidence against him. During the interrogation the applicant confirmed to the Police the statement he had given to the expert, noting that something had been done behind his back. In reply to questioning, he stated that another person had the keys to his showroom and that he had not seen a server of a computer network system, neither a video recorder connected to CCTV cameras nor a safe\u2011deposit box (which had allegedly been stolen on 29 January 2002) and which were found by the police on 1 February 2002. Confronted with A.F.s version of events, the applicant stated that that was A.F.\u2019s allegation. The applicant stated that he had nothing to do with the items mentioned or with what A.F. said they had done together. Thus, it was irrelevant to consider as a coincidence or otherwise the fact that the police had found the things in the places where A.F. had indicated they would be. The applicant repeatedly stated that he had no difficulty reiterating his version of events, if and when it was needed, should they go to court. When invited to repeat his version of events on the spot the applicant requested that his statement be tape\u2011recorded and his request was acceded to. He confirmed that his statement had been made freely and without threats or promises. The questioning session ended at 6.43 pm. 11.  He was then moved to another room at 7.50 pm to record his detailed statement of events (a 38 page transcript). The applicant gave his particulars, was cautioned and recounted in great detail his version of the events of 29 January 2002. Following that, the applicant was asked questions about his business. In particular he noted that he had no reason to make up such a plan and that it would have been foolish of him to throw out (narmih) his business. The applicant was unable to quantify how much profits he was making, questioning which companies were making profits at the time. He avoided replying to a question concerning any losses and insisted that it was irrelevant whether or not he was making profits, as he had saved up the profits he had made in previous years. The applicant could not recall when he last imported products, but he replied that the last time he had exported was \u2011 if he remembered well \u2011 in December, probably towards Dubai but he could not remember the value of the transaction. On being asked again, he replied that he probably last imported in December, but was unable to give any details. He stated that local business was doing better than exports, but he was unable to quantify his profits. Upon repeated questioning he replied that during the same year he had made a loss. The applicant denied that he was not doing well also on the local market and was hesitant to accept that his business was facing a downfall. The applicant claimed to have had 70,000 United States dollars (USD) in the safe\u2011deposit box which had been stolen. He admitted that neither on the day of the hold\u2011up nor earlier that day (1 February 2002) had it been possible to open the safe\u2011deposit box (found by the police officers). The applicant admitted dealing in thousands of Maltese liras (MTL), but denied that his last import was more than three months before, although he admitted it could have been in November. He admitted that the photocopier which had been found overturned on the floor had not been working for more than two years; adding that it was moved recently to where it was found only because he adjusted its settings and made it work. He admitted that the repairs had been estimated at MTL 280 (approximately 650 euros (EUR)), but it happened that he knew how to operate it. A series of questions ensued concerning the photocopier. The applicant then admitted that the items allegedly stolen (the safe\u2011deposit box, the server and the CCTV recorder) were found earlier at the premises (on the same day \u2011 1 February 2002) and he insisted that if the police were to watch the CCTV video, they would see the four men. A series of questions concerning the functioning of the CCTV and the movements of A.F., his only employee, ensued, as well as a series of questions concerning the details of the actual robbery, the money stolen, i.e. allegedly USD 70,000 which were in the safe\u2011deposit box and MTL 34,000 (approximately EUR 79,000) which were in a suitcase and other cash from his wallet. The applicant stated that he could provide some paper invoices in connection with some of the money. The police questioned why he had said the opposite earlier, i.e. that he could not provide proof in the absence of the server which had been stolen. Again questioned about his profits, the applicant was unable to say how much profit or sales he made on a daily basis, admitting that it had been a long time since he had made MTL 100,000 (EUR 233,000) a day. He was also unable to give details about the local sales and admitted that he had problems with the bank. A series of questions and answers concerning A.F., and in particular how he was paid his monthly salary, ensued. At a point A.F. was also brought to the room for questioning in the presence of the applicant. Throughout the questioning the applicant repeatedly reiterated that he was not insured for theft of cash, but in as far as he recalled only for theft of apparatus. On further questioning he could not remember details of his insurance policy. The applicant stated that he had more money than he owed the bank, but did not know how much exactly he owed in payment of rents for various properties he had on the island. In any event he declared that he could pay such rent as the bank had recently reopened his accounts. The questioning ended with a series of factual questioning concerning the events on the day of the alleged robbery. 12.  On 2 February 2002 at 10.28 a.m. the applicant made another statement to the police, after being cautioned and in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed that the police had, on the previous day, seized a video recorder (of the brand GYYR) and a video tape which was in it, and that upon the applicant\u2019s request, the police, the applicant and the court\u2011appointed expert had viewed the content of the video tape together that same evening. He confirmed that the video recordings showed that it started on 9 October 2000 and ended on 24 October 2000, and that he had requested the viewing of the video for the police to confirm and see the four individuals who had robbed him. However, it had not shown the four persons who robbed him. The applicant explained that he could not confirm that the video recorder was the same one connected to the system, and the second tape inside it was surely not the same type that recorded the events of 29 January 2002. He could not remember how many video recorders of the brand GYYR he possessed noting that the new ones used to be in the stores and others could be in the repair room or in another room. He answered that when the previous day, on site, he had replied to the police that he had no idea where the video recorder would be, he had done so because he had no video recorder except for that attached to the system which had been stolen. When the police pointed out the inconsistency with his previous answer the applicant replied that he had been speaking about the repair room. When he was asked whether the CCTV worked, the applicant had responded that the last time he had needed to check something (at Christmas time), it had been functioning properly. He confirmed that he did not know where the things were located and, in his view, this had been a frame up against him or against his company, by someone close to him or someone who had worked for him, or a competitor. The questioning was concluded at 11.16 am. 13.  On the same day i.e. 2 February 2002 the applicant was brought before the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Inquiry, together with his employee A.F. They were charged with fabrication of false evidence, simulation of offence, fraud relating to insurance and making a false statement under oath under Articles 110 (1) and (2), 295 and 108 of the Maltese Criminal Code, Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta. The applicant was also charged with being a recidivist. 14.  On an unspecified date, upon a request by the prosecution of 7 October 2002, the case of the applicant was separated from that of his employee A.F. in order for them to be judged separately. On 30 June 2003 A.F. was found guilty of simulation of an offence. On 2 April 2004 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the judgment against A.F. 15.  On 19 May 2006 A.F. gave evidence in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. He testified that the applicant, who was his employer, had forced him to tie him (the applicant) to a chair. On the applicant\u2019s insistence he had done so for fear of losing his job. He had tied him to a metal chair brought by the applicant himself. He had left the shop at around 2.30 p.m. and when he returned the applicant had told him what to do and where to call and who to call in a particular sequence. The applicant\u2019s son had arrived at around 3.30 p.m. to help him open the shutter; the applicant pretended to cry and told them to call the police. When A.F. had been asked whether the applicant ever told him why he had wanted to be tied, A.F. replied that the applicant had repeatedly noted that he had to close business, and on the day in question he had said \u201cotherwise I will have to close\u201d. 16.  On 23 January 2007, the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Judicature, on the basis of the evidence in the case\u2011file, found the applicant not guilty of all the charges brought against him and acquitted him. It noted that there were two diametrically opposed versions (the applicant\u2019s and A.F.\u2019s), there was therefore a reasonable doubt which had to be resolved in favour of the applicant. 17.  On 6 February 2007 the Attorney General (hereinafter the AG) appealed against that judgment. 18.  By a judgment of 21 June 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeal varied, in part, the judgment of the Court of Magistrates. 19.  It confirmed that there had not been any evidence concerning the charges of fraud relating to insurance and making a false oath, as well as concerning the charge of recidivism. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had consistently repeated during the interrogation that his insurance did not cover theft or money losses, and no proof had been adduced to discredit his statement to that effect. Nor had the applicant lied on oath as he had never made any statement before a judge or magistrate and neither had the prosecution submitted any judgments capable of showing recidivism in terms of law. Similarly, the charge of fabrication of false evidence had also not been proved, since no matter what the applicant had actually done, there had been no proof that he had done so with the intention to put the blame on an innocent third person. 20.  However, the Court of Criminal Appeal found the applicant guilty of simulation of an offence under Article 110 (2) of the Criminal Code. It considered that there was direct evidence against the applicant, namely that from his accomplice (A.F.), who testified in the proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 15 above). As to the testimony of an expert in relation to certain computer programs, found in the applicant\u2019s possession, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered that they had not shed any light on the alleged hold up per se. However, it also noted the witness testimony of the four police officers who had questioned the applicant and carried out investigative work, including searches on the site of the alleged hold\u2011up. 21.  The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that in his first statement the applicant had denied the facts as submitted by A.F. and gave his version of the events of that day. He had stated that he was ready to repeat his version in court and that he had no difficulty to repeat it and to have it recorded on tape, as the applicant had requested. The applicant was then questioned in an interviewing room where he gave his detailed version of the alleged hold\u2011up, which was transcribed. The applicant was then confronted with A.F., who had said that he acted according to the applicant\u2019s will because he was forced to. A long series of questions ensued, where the police enquired about whether the applicant had been insured for the theft of money, the rent he paid, as well as about where and how certain items had been found, after having previously said that they had been stolen or thrown on the floor. 22.  The Court of Criminal Appeal further noted that in his subsequent statement the applicant said that the video he had watched with the police officers had started on 9 October 2000 and ended on 24 October 2000. He could not confirm whether the video recorder was the same one which had been included in the system but he considered that the second tape inside was surely not the one he was recording on, on 29 January 2002. He did not know how many videos of the brand GYYR he had. According to the applicant the new ones used to be in the stores and others could be in the repair room or in another room. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had not mentioned any of this a day earlier, as according to the applicant he had no GYYR video except for the one included in the system. When he had been asked whether the CCTV worked, the applicant had responded that the last time he had needed to check something (at Christmas time), it had been functioning properly. He confirmed that he did not know where the things where and, in his view, this had been a frame up against him or against his company, by someone close to him or someone who had worked for him, or a competitor. 23.  The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had also testified before the first\u2011instance court about his local and international projects as well as the events of the day at issue. He had explained as follows: 24.  A certain P.M.D. had left the shop at around 1.40 pm and, after that, two people wearing motorcycle helmets came into the shop and demanded money of him. He gave them his wallet which contained more than MTL 1,000 (around EUR 2,300) and they had said that they wanted more. The applicant then gave them a suitcase with money in it, once they opened it they asked for the safe-deposit box while pointing a gun at the applicant\u2019s throat which left him speechless. They went downstairs; the applicant noticed that one of the two men knew his way. The applicant opened the wardrobe in which he kept a small safe-deposit box that he carried with him nearly every day and which weighed around fifteen kilograms. The men asked him to open it but he could not; thus one of the men took it and they then went back upstairs where the two men tied the applicant to a chair they had brought with them. He was tied with tape and could barely breathe. One of the two men went back downstairs and the applicant heard a loud noise. They then went back upstairs by which time there were four of them \u2013 the applicant had already noticed the other two men downstairs \u2013 and they started to close the curtains and the shutter of the main entrance. From the inside he saw two motorcycles and their drivers wearing helmets as well as a white van. He claimed that all four men had been wearing identical outfits, white crash helmets with tinted visors, green gloves and jeans jackets. 25.  In cross-examination, the applicant claimed to have no suspicion about his employee (A.F.) who he did not want to harm. As to the latter\u2019s version, the applicant replied that everyone was entitled to an opinion. A.F. had testified twice although only his last statement had been added to the file. P.M.D. testified that he had been with the applicant and had left early in the afternoon, before the alleged hold-up. 26.  The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that since there had been no proof of an insurance policy covering theft of money, there had been no motive. However, it noted that A.F.\u2019s version had been corroborated by, for example, the finding of certain objects in places indicated by A.F., which had been placed by the applicant himself, or by A.F. on orders from the applicant. Thus, according to the Court of Criminal Appeal, A.F.\u2019s testimony was enough to conclude that the applicant was guilty of simulation of offence. It was true that the applicant had repeatedly and categorically denied any wrongdoing; however, he was not reliable in the light of the evasive and hesitant way in which he replied to police questions concerning his business, profitability, rents, and profits of the previous year. The Court of Criminal Appeal also relied on other circumstances such as the fact that the CCTV did not record the events on the day of the alleged hold\u2011up. Such details raised doubt and made the applicant\u2019s version of events less plausible or acceptable. In the light of all the evidence it considered that the first court had wrongly acquitted the applicant. The Court of Criminal Appeal thus found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended for four years. 27.  On 15 June 2011, the applicant filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, complaining about a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on the basis that, inter alia, the Court of Criminal Appeal\u2019s judgment was based on statements given by the applicant to the police without the assistance of a lawyer. 28.  By a judgment of 29 October 2012, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaints. The court recalled the first-instance judgment in the names of The Police vs Mark Lombardi (Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence, 9 October 2009) where it had been held that the mere fact that a person was not assisted by a lawyer during police interrogation did not violate an applicant\u2019s fundamental rights. It had also held that for there to be a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, one must consider the proceedings as a whole and not the statements in isolation. The court noted, however, that the first\u2011instance judgment in that case had been overturned by the Constitutional Court which, on 12 April 2011, found a violation of the rights of the individual concerned as the lack of legal assistance deprived objectively the applicant of a fair trial. However, the Constitutional Court in that judgment had also made it clear that the ECtHR\u2019s case\u2011law should not have retroactive effect and should not be applicable to judgments that had become res judicata \u2013 it had not been so in the case of Lombardi since proceedings had still been pending. The situation was different in the present case, which had ended. In conclusion, relying on the Constitutional Court\u2019s position on res judicata in the case of Lombardi, cited above, the court, in the instant case, dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 29.  On 16 November 2012 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Civil Court (First Hall) was wrong in finding that courts of constitutional competence did not have the function to assess what had happened in criminal proceedings that had become res judicata. 30.  By a judgment of 5 April 2013, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 31.  The Constitutional Court held that although there may be circumstances where it could provide a remedy if it found that a statement was taken abusively despite the criminal proceedings having come to an end and the judgment having become res judicata, in the present case the applicant had given his statement on 2 February 2002. He had never alleged that the statement was taken abusively. Moreover, he had not even raised this complaint when filing the constitutional application on 15 June 2011. It was only on 23 March 2012, more than eleven years after making the statement, that the applicant requested a correction in the constitutional redress application to add the complaint concerning his statement, possibly because the applicant had become aware of the Court\u2019s judgment in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008), of 27 November 2008, and realised that it could give him another means of defence. The Constitutional Court held that the fact that the applicant had never raised a complaint before the courts of criminal jurisdiction, when he had every opportunity to do so, was proof that he did not feel that this was of prejudice to him or that his statement was taken abusively. Thus, the applicant could not now, without abusing the judicial process, expect to reopen a closed case which had become res judicata, once he had not raised the issue previously. According to the Constitutional Court, it was also relevant that the Court of Criminal Appeal had not relied solely on the applicant\u2019s statement, but also on other means of corroboration. Consequently, in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view the applicant\u2019s statement was not determinative to the finding of guilt and the first\u2011instance court had been right not to disturb a judgment which had become res judicata. 32.  The relevant domestic law and case\u2011law concerning constitutional redress proceedings is set out in Brincat and Others v. Malta (nos. 60908/11 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7 23-26, 24 July 2014) and Dimech v. Malta (no. 34373/13, \u00a7 26, 2 April 2015). 33.  By Act III of 2002 the Maltese Parliament introduced the right to legal assistance at the pre-trial stage. However, the law only came into force in 2010 by means of Legal Notice 35 of 2010. Prior to this Legal Notice Maltese law did not provide for legal assistance during the pre\u2011trial investigation and specifically during questioning, whether by the police or by a magistrate in his investigative role. Before questioning, however, suspects would be cautioned, that is, informed of their right to remain silent and that anything they said could be taken down and produced as evidence. At the time no inferences could be drawn by the trial courts from the silence of the accused at this stage. 34.  Statements taken by the police could be confirmed on oath before the Court of Magistrates, after arraignment, in which case the person was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer.\n(a)   Cases decided in 2011 - during the pendency of criminal proceedings against the complainants 35.  In the wake of the judgment in Salduz, cited above, a number of accused persons raised constitutional complaints during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against them and requested the relevant criminal courts to make a referral to the constitutional jurisdictions. In 2011 three cases were decided by the Constitutional Court (in similar yet never identical formations of three judges), namely The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011, and The Police vs Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011. In the three cases the Constitutional Court held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. The relevant details are as follows:\nThe Police vs Alvin Privitera, Constitutional Court judgment of 11 April 2011, upholding a first-instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 36.  The Constitutional Court confirmed that it should apply the Grand Chamber judgment in Salduz and the subsequent line of case-law. In particular it noted that, in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently \u201cpractical and effective\u201d, Article 6 \u00a7 1 required that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first questioning of a suspect by the police. Even where compelling reasons might exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence would in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer were used for a conviction. Given that the absence of a lawyer at the investigation stage could irretrievably prejudice the accused\u2019s right, the court considered that where there existed sufficient reasons indicating a violation, it should not wait for the end of the criminal proceedings in order to examine the merits of the case. 37.  The Constitutional Court rejected the Government\u2019s plea that the applicant had not raised the issue until the prosecution had finished submitting evidence, noting that in the domestic legal system there was no deadline for raising constitutional claims. It found the Government\u2019s argument that the accused had not been forced to give a statement, and that he had been informed of his right to remain silent, to be irrelevant given the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and in particular the Salduz judgment. 38.  It was not necessary in the case at hand to examine whether there existed any compelling reasons to justify the absence of a lawyer during questioning or whether such restrictions prejudiced the case, in so far as at the relevant time Maltese law had not provided for the right to legal assistance at that stage of the investigation and therefore there had been no need for the accused to request it. There had therefore been a systemic restriction on access to a lawyer under the relevant legal provision in force at the time. It followed that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1. 39.  The Constitutional Court further noted that in its view the right to be assisted by a lawyer must be granted from the very start of the investigation and before the person being investigated gave a statement, but it did not require that an accused be assisted during questioning. 40.  The Constitutional Court did not order the statements to be expunged from the record of the proceedings, but it ordered that the Court of Criminal Judicature be informed of the said judgment so that it could decide accordingly on the validity and admissibility of the statement made.\nThe Police vs Esron Pullicino, judgment of 12 April 2011 upholding a first-instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 41.  The Constitutional Court reiterated the same reasoning applied in the case of Alvin Privitera, cited above, stopping short, however, of reiterating the court\u2019s opinion in relation to assistance during the actual questioning.\nThe Police vs Mark Lombardi, judgment of 12 April 2011 upholding a first\u2011instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 42.  The Constitutional Court reiterated the same reasoning applied in the cases of Alvin Privitera and Esron Pullicino, cited above. It further noted case-law subsequent to Salduz in which the Court had found a violation despite the fact that the applicant had remained silent while in police custody (Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, 13 October 2009) and despite there being no admission of guilt in the statements given by the applicants (Ye\u015filkaya v. Turkey, no. 59780/00, 8 December 2009). In Boz v. Turkey (no. 2039/04, 9 February 2010) the Court had stressed that the systemic restriction of access to a lawyer pursuant to the relevant legal provisions breached Article 6. The Constitutional Court further referred to the finding in Cadder v. Her Majesty\u2019s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, which concerned the same situation in the Scottish legal system and where that court had agreed to follow Salduz to the letter. 43.  The Constitutional Court stopped short of reiterating the court\u2019s opinion in Alvin Privitera in relation to assistance during the actual interrogation. It however added that Salduz should not apply retroactively to cases which had become res judicata this was not so in the present case given that the proceedings were still pending.\n(b)   Subsequent cases 44.  Following the above\u2011mentioned judgments of 2011, the Constitutional Court abandoned the above described reasoning (to the effect that a systemic restriction resulted in an automatic breach of Article 6), and started to consider Salduz as an exceptional case and to interpret it to the effect that a number of factors had to be taken into consideration when assessing whether a breach of Article 6 had occurred. By way of example:\n(i)  Cases brought before the constitutional jurisdictions while the criminal proceedings were pending against the complainant\nCharles Stephen Muscat vs the Attorney General, Constitutional Court judgment of 8 October 2012 45.  By a judgment of 10 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence, dismissed an objection to the effect that the complaint was premature and found that the fact that the law precluded the accused from being legally assisted sufficed to find a violation. It thus ordered that his statements be expunged from the acts of the criminal proceedings. 46.  In reply to the AG\u2019s argument that Mr Muscat had not raised his complaint earlier during the criminal proceedings (which were still pending) the court, relying on the Alvin Privitera case reiterated that the applicant was not subject to any time-limit to bring forward his complaint. 47.  On appeal, by a judgment of 8 October 2012 the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment. 48.  It accepted that prima facie it appeared premature to complain about a breach of the right to a fair trial due to a lack of legal assistance, solely on the basis of a statement made without such assistance at a time when a hearing was not yet held and the criminal proceedings were still pending. However, Maltese law (both the Constitution and the European Convention Act) provided for access to the constitutional jurisdictions in respect of fundamental rights complaints also when a breach is likely to occur. Thus, it could not reject the complaint as premature. 49.  As to the merits it considered that its role was to determine whether the statement given in the absence of legal assistance amounted to a breach of the applicant\u2019s right given the trial as a whole, and whether there was a risk that the applicant be found guilty when he was in reality innocent. In the absence of such risk no breach would occur. Having examined the ECtHR case law from Imbrioscia v. Switzerland (24 November 1993, Series A no. 275) onwards, it noted, with particular reference to Salduz, that in Maltese law, at the relevant time, no inferences from silence could be made. Mr Muscat had been informed of his right to remain silent. He was a mature adult, who was already expiating a criminal sentence in prison. He had made his statement in 2002 while he had been in detention since 1994. He had had experience with questioning and was not vulnerable. Thus the factor (young age) present in the Pullicino and Privitera cases was missing. 50.  The Constitutional Court further noted that Mr Muscat waited until 2010 to bring forward his complaint, and during such time he did not challenge the content of his statement. This signalled that he himself had not felt disadvantaged by the content of his statement. In any event Mr Muscat was still to undergo trial with all the relevant procedural guarantees, and during which the judge could also decide to exclude the statement at issue if it could be shown that it had been given under threat or duress. It followed that the mere taking of the statement could not result in a breach of the right to a fair trial.\nThe Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri Constitutional Court judgment of 12 November 2012 51.  In the particular circumstances of the case, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the accused\u2019s fair trial rights, in particular because he had not even been cautioned by the police. However, following a request for retrial which was upheld by a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 31 January 2014, no violation was found because the accused, who had given a statement in the absence of a lawyer, had not been forced to reply to the questions put to him by the police, nor was he particularly vulnerable to the extent that he would have required the assistance of a lawyer. The accused was fifty-five years old and therefore mature. While he had never been to prison or been questioned, he had already been found guilty of minor charges and therefore was acquainted with the law. Lastly, his statement had not been the only evidence, as some police officers had been eyewitnesses to his handling of the drugs in issue.\nThe Police vs Tyron Fenech, Constitutional Court judgment of 22 February 2013 52.  By a judgment of 23 January 2012, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found, inter alia, a violation of the first applicant\u2019s right to a fair trial, as he had not had access to a lawyer before and during the police interrogation which led to his statement of a specific date. The same applied in respect of his other statement under oath before the magistrate, if made while under arrest. It considered that a person had just as much a right to legal assistance before making a statement to a judicial authority as he or she did before making a statement to the police. 53.  The Constitutional Court reversed in part the first-instance judgment. Accepting that the case was not premature, and in the light of the criminal courts\u2019 referral pending criminal proceedings against Mr Fenech, it found that the Mr Fenech\u2019s right to a fair trial had been breached only in relation to the statement given to the police, but not the statement given before the magistrate, which could thus be admitted as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. 54.  It considered that a breach of the right to legal assistance during interrogation would occur when a statement was obtained by abuse and not solely because there was no lawyer present. The right to legal assistance was intended to protect persons in particular situations of vulnerability, weakness or fear who as a result of which made statements which led to a finding of guilt despite their innocence. Legal assistance in such cases prevented any such abuse and counteracted the vulnerability of the individual concerned. 55.  Mr Fenech was only nineteen years of age at the time and may well have been vulnerable; however, someone other than a lawyer could have provided for such a guarantee, such as a magistrate (independent from the police), before whom the applicant made his second statement in accordance with domestic law. For these reasons the Constitutional Court upheld the Article 6 violation only in respect of the statement the applicant made to the police, which could not therefore be used in the criminal proceedings against him, but not in respect of the statement made before the inquiring magistrate, which could be used in the proceedings. 56.  Similar conclusions were reached in The Police vs Amanda Agius, Constitutional Court judgment also of 22 February 2013.\nThe Republic of Malta vs Carmel Camilleri Constitutional Court judgment of 22 February 2013 57.  Mr Camilleri raised his constitutional complaint \u2011 about lack of assistance when he gave a statement at pre-trail stage - during the criminal proceedings against him, and the matter was referred to the constitutional jurisdictions. 58.  By a judgment of 26 June 2012 the first-instance court found a violation of Article 6 in that respect, on the basis of the Salduz judgment, as well as the Constitutional Court judgment in the Privitera case (cited above). 59.  On appeal the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment. It held that the right to a fair trial was violated when a statement was taken abusively and not merely because it was given without legal assistance. This had always been part of the right to a fair trial and had not been created by means of the Salduz judgment. Thus, any finding of a violation to this effect would not constitute a retroactive application of some new right created by jurisprudence. Relying on the Privitera case, it considered that it should not wait for the end of the criminal proceedings in order to examine the merits of the case. Moreover, in the present case, it was precisely the court hearing the criminal proceedings that had referred the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions, and that court had suspended proceedings awaiting this judgment. 60.  However, Mr Camilleri did not fall under any category of vulnerability. Furthermore, it could not be said that he had had no access whatsoever to a lawyer, indeed in his first statement he had denied all wrong doing and walked away free. Thus, before he was voluntarily called in for questioning the following days he had all the time necessary to seek the assistance of a lawyer before he appeared voluntarily on three subsequent days where he gave three statements. His statement had also been corroborated by other evidence, there was thus no risk that they were unsafe \u2011 in that light it would not be appropriate to expunge such statements.\n(ii)  cases brought before the constitutional jurisdictions after the criminal proceedings had come to an end\nSimon Xuereb vs the Attorney General, Constitutional Court judgment of 28 June 2012 61.  The Constitutional Court considered that the case was different from the three 2011 judgments (mentioned-above) relied upon by the applicant, in so far as those cases had concerned proceedings which were still pending, while the case of Mr Xuereb concerned a judgment which had become final. 62.  The Constitutional Court noted that in 2001 Mr Xuereb had been cautioned, that is, informed of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be taken down and produced as evidence, and yet he chose to make a statement. At the time Maltese law did not provide for the assistance of a lawyer and the Salduz judgment had not yet been delivered. It followed that Mr Xuereb could not complain about that matter. Moreover, the finding of guilt would not have been based solely on his incriminating statement, because there existed various other evidence. Furthermore, he chose to admit to the crimes and settle for a plea bargain. Thus, given his actions during those proceedings he could not now complain of a breach of his rights. It further referred to its established practice based on English case\u2011law to the effect that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision is excluded from cases that have been finally determined.\nJoseph Bu\u0121eja vs the Attorney General, first-instance judgment of an unspecified date in 2012 confirmed on appeal on 14 January 2013 63.  In its judgment the first-instance court of constitutional competence referred to the [then] recent judgments of the Constitutional Court and held that, firstly, the right to legal assistance was not created by recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The right existed already at the time when criminal proceedings against Mr Bu\u0121eja were still ongoing and if the latter had not invoked that right at the opportune moment, he could not invoke it almost two years after the final judgment of the Court of Magistrates. The court also noted that after Mr Bu\u0121eja released his statement he had had every opportunity to contest it. During the criminal proceedings he had only contested that his statement did not reflect the truth and he testified again to give another version which he claimed was the truth. At no point had he alleged that he had been coerced to sign such statement or that the statement had breached his fundamental human rights. Moreover, he had not even appealed the judgment of the Court of Magistrates. 64.  Secondly, the court also considered that the judgment handed down by the Court of Magistrates was not based solely or principally on Mr Bu\u0121eja\u2019s statement but on other circumstances which made his involvement in the crime evident. Further, the court referred the Lombardi case decided by the Constitutional Court which held that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR should not be applied retrospectively and affect those judgments which were today res judicata and it referred to the United Kingdom jurisprudence which held that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision was excluded from cases that have been finally determined. Hence, the court rejected the application. 65.  On 14 January 2013, the outcome of the judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court. The latter held, inter alia, that the fact that the Mr Bu\u0121eja had not raised the issue during criminal proceedings (despite the Salduz judgment having been delivered before) did not mean that the applicant could not raise the issue before the constitutional jurisdictions. However, it showed that in the claimant\u2019s own view the matter had had no serious consequences and was simply a formal failing \u2011 to the extent that in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view this amounted to abuse of process. Similarly, Mr Bu\u0121eja had not appealed the criminal judgment, meaning he had not felt aggrieved. He had only opted to raise the issue after hearing about various judgments of the domestic courts and the ECtHR and thought he could obtain a get-out-of-jail-free card. 66.  The Constitutional Court reiterated that the right to legal assistance was not intended to create a formality, which, if not observed, provided the accused with a means to avoid conviction. Before the introduction of Article 355 AT the right to legal assistance was part and parcel of the right to a fair hearing, intended to protect persons who as a result of a particular vulnerability might have given statements as a result of which they could be found to be guilty when in reality they were innocent. In various domestic and ECtHR cases violations had been found in the cases of minors. In the present case, the applicant was neither a minor nor suffering from any other vulnerability, nor had he complained that the statement had been made under duress. Moreover, referring to the Salduz judgment, it recalled that under domestic law as stood at the relevant time, no inferences could be made from silence, thus the applicant could have chosen to remain silent. Furthermore, the applicant had been found guilty not only on the basis of his statement but also on other statements of eye witnesses.\nGeorge Pace vs Attorney General and Commissioner of Police, Constitutional Court judgment of 31 October 2014 67.  By a judgment of 9 April 2014 the Civil Court (First Hall) rejected his complaint, noting that Mr Pace had been questioned fifteen years after the murder, and thus had had plenty of time to seek legal advice. Moreover, he only complained about the matter in 2011, despite him having been questioned in 2004 and the Salduz judgment having been delivered in 2008. 68.  By a judgment of 31 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected Mr Pace\u2019s appeal. It noted, inter alia, that it was true that it was still open to the applicant to raise his complaint despite the passage of time. Nevertheless, the court could draw other conclusions as a result, such as those related to credibility. Indeed had the statement been taken under duress the applicant would have raised the matter prior to 2011, it was thus likely that Mr Pace was solely trying to take advantage of the evolution of the ECtHR case-law. It considered that to determine the fairness of the proceedings they had to be taken as a whole, on the facts of the case it did not appear to be so in the present case where Mr Pace did not object to the presentation of his statements to the jurors during the criminal proceedings, to the contrary he noted that he was not challenging the validity of the second statement, which showed that the applicant had not felt prejudiced by his statements, which had been reiterated before the Court of Magistrates. Moreover, his statements had not been the only evidence against him.\n(iii)  Other case-law\nGregory Robert Eyre vs the Attorney General, judgment of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence of 27 June 2012 (final) 69.  On 25 August 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeal had found Mr Eyre guilty of committing drug related offences. Subsequently, on 14 October 2011, he filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence claiming that his case was based on the incriminating statements he had given to the Police at a time when he was not yet being legally assisted. 70.  Referring to the Lombardi case, the court reiterated the principle that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision is excluded from cases that had been finally determined. In the light of this principle as well as other principles emanating from the judgments of the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR, the court went on to consider that the finding of guilt was not solely based on Mr Eyre\u2019s statements to the Police at a time when he had no legal assistance. Mr Eyre had also sworn his statement before a Magistrate in the presence of his lawyer and he had admitted his guilt. Moreover on appeal, he asked the Court of Criminal Appeal to confirm his guilty plea, and vary other parts of the judgment. In the light of all those circumstances, the court held that Mr Eyre\u2019s allegations were unfounded and rejected his pleas. 71.  There was no appeal from the judgement.\nMatthew Lanzon vs Commissioner of Police, Constitutional Court judgment of 25 February 2013 72.  Mr Lanzon had been charged with trafficking in cannabis in 2001 \u2011 at the time he was aged sixteen. Thus, pending his criminal proceedings, he complained before the constitutional jurisdictions about the lack of assistance of a lawyer and by a final judgment of 29 November 2004 his complaint was rejected by the Constitutional Court on the basis that his arrest and questioning were lawful, had lasted a few hours and the applicant had had the right to remain silent. 73.  By means of another application lodged in 2011, whilst the criminal proceedings against him were still pending, he once again brought the same complaint before the constitutional jurisdictions. By a judgment of 11 November 2011 the application was rejected as being res judicata, his complaint being identical to that already decided by the Constitutional Court in 2004. It reiterated that jurisprudential change could not have a retroactive application. The judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 25 February 2013, noting that the Constitutional Court judgment of 2004 had already decided the matter which could not be altered due to the Salduz judgment which was decided four years later.", "references": ["9", "2", "7", "6", "4", "8", "1", "5", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant Sigur\u00f0ur Einarsson was born in 1960 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. The applicant Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson was born in 1970 and lives in Luxembourg. The applicant \u00d3lafur \u00d3lafsson was born in 1957 and lives in Pully, Switzerland. The applicant Magn\u00fas Gu\u00f0mundsson was born in 1970 and lives in Luxembourg. 7.  In the autumn of 2008 a crisis hit the Icelandic financial sector resulting, among other things, in the collapse of one of Iceland\u2019s largest banks, Kaup\u00feing banki hf. (hereafter \u201cKaup\u00feing\u201d). On 9 October 2008 the Financial Supervisory Authority (hereafter \u201cthe FME\u201d) exercised its authority to take over the powers invested in a shareholders\u2019 meeting and to take over the management of Kaup\u00feing immediately, dismissing the Board of Directors and appointing a Resolution Committee to direct the bank. In December 2008 the Office of the Special Prosecutor was established to investigate potential criminal conduct in connection with the financial crisis and, where appropriate, to prosecute those concerned. The Special Prosecutor had police authority to investigate criminal cases as well as prosecutorial authority. 8.  At the relevant time, the applicants held the following positions: Sigur\u00f0ur Einarsson was Chairman of the Board of Kaup\u00feing and Chairman of the Board Credit Committee; Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson was Chief Executive Officer of Kaup\u00feing and a member of the Board Credit Committee; \u00d3lafur \u00d3lafsson was majority owner of a company which indirectly owned another company which was at the time the second largest shareholder in Kaup\u00feing, with 9.88% of its shares; Magn\u00fas Gu\u00f0mundsson was Chief Executive Officer of Kaup\u00feing\u2019s subsidiary, Kaup\u00feing Bank Luxembourg S.A. (hereafter \u201cKBL\u201d). 9.  On 22 September 2008 Kaup\u00feing issued a press release stating that Q, a company owned indirectly by Sheik Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Thani (hereafter \u201cAl Thani\u201d), a member of Qatar\u2019s royal family and a wealthy businessman, had bought 5.01% of the share capital of Kaup\u00feing for 25,599,000,000 Iceland kr\u00f3nur (ISK). An investigation revealed that Kaup\u00feing had provided a loan for the entire purchase price of the shares, which the bank itself had owned prior to their sale: two companies in the British Virgin Islands, ST and GA, the former of which was owned by Al Thani and the latter by the applicant \u00d3lafur \u00d3lafsson, had each obtained a loan from Kaup\u00feing amounting to half the purchase price, which they had then lent to a Cypriot company, CS, itself owned by the two said companies. CS had then provided a loan to Q for the purchase price. The loan transactions and the payment for the shares had all been made on 29 September 2008. Shortly before, Kaup\u00feing had also provided BT, another company owned indirectly by Al Thani, with a loan in the amount of 50,000,000 US dollars (USD), which had been disbursed on 19 September into BT\u2019s account with Kaup\u00feing\u2019s subsidiary, KBL. Neither the loan to GA nor the loan to BT had had the necessarily approval of Kaup\u00feing\u2019s Board Credit Committee, and no or insufficient securities had been provided for them. 10.  On 9 December 2008 the FME was informed of possible suspicious transactions in Kaup\u00feing\u2019s operations shortly before the bank collapsed. Having made inquiries, the FME submitted a complaint to the Special Prosecutor on 13 March 2009. The Special Prosecutor then conducted a criminal investigation which lasted almost three years and led to an extensive collection of data (see paragraphs 14-25 below). Moreover, the applicants and ten other individuals had their telephone conversations intercepted. 11.  On 16 February 2012, the Special Prosecutor issued an indictment charging Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson and Sigur\u00f0ur Einarsson with breach of trust under Article 249 of the Criminal Code, and the other two applicants with participation in certain of those offences. These charges related essentially to the provision of unsecured loans without the appropriate authorisations. In addition, all the applicants were charged with market manipulation under section 117 of Act No. 108/2007 on Securities Transactions for giving a misleading picture of the transactions in question. 12.  The case was submitted to the Reykjav\u00edk District Court on 7 March 2012 and the main hearing took place from 4 to 14 November 2013. Forty witnesses gave evidence, including the applicants. On 12 December 2013 the District Court rendered its judgment, convicting the applicants as charged and sentencing them to between three years\u2019 and five years six months\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court which, in a judgment of 12 February 2015, found the applicant \u00d3lafur \u00d3lafsson guilty of market manipulation and the other three applicants guilty of breach of trust and market manipulation. Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson was sentenced to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, Sigur\u00f0ur Einarsson was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment and the other two applicants were sentenced to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  Three of the applicants lodged petitions with the Committee on Reopening of Judicial Proceedings (Enduruppt\u00f6kunefnd), seeking to have the proceedings before the Supreme Court reopened. Their petitions were based inter alia on the ground that there had been significant defects in the procedure, as one of the Supreme Court judges, \u00c1.K., had been disqualified from sitting in the case on account of his wife\u2019s and his son\u2019s connection to the case (see paragraphs 33-35 below). On 26 January 2016 the petitions were rejected. Magn\u00fas Gu\u00f0mundsson did not lodge a petition for reopening. 15.  During the investigation, the Special Prosecutor, on the basis of court warranted searches, seized large amounts of documents and electronic data, including from Kaup\u00feing and KBL. The Government identified three different categories of data: \u201cfull collection of data\u201d (heildarsafn gagna) referred to all the data seized and held by the Special Prosecutor, regardless of whether it had relevance to the case or not; \u201cinvestigation documents\u201d (ranns\u00f3knarg\u00f6gn) referred to the data, documents and other materials extracted from the full collection of data which had been defined by the Special Prosecutor as relevant to the case and which were marked as part of the \u201cinvestigation file\u201d; \u201cevidence in the case\u201d referred to the documents and other materials that were submitted in court by the prosecution or the defence and were part of the \u201ccase file\u201d in the court proceedings. 16.  In order to conduct a search of the electronic data, the Special Prosecutor used an e-Discovery system named \u201cClearwell\u201d. Certain keywords were entered into the programme, which then gave a collection of documents containing those words. Three separate Clearwell searches were carried out to sort out roughly the documents that might have relevance to the case, and after the searches new Clearwell case folders were created containing these \u201ctagged\u201d documents (which the applicants regard as a separate category). These folders were given the following names:\n-  ESS KAU Q Iceland, containing 8,956 documents, derived from Kaup\u00feing\u2019s computer systems, where e-mails and personal drives of 62 employees were searched through, and from other items seized in searches at three companies related to the applicants and at a law firm, as well as from items handed over by the FME;\n-  ESS KAU Q Iceland 2, containing 54,468 documents, from Kaup\u00feing\u2019s computer systems and from KBL; the e-mails of 11 employees of these companies in the period from 1 September to 31 October 2008 were searched;\n-  KAU KBLUC, containing 712,378 documents, derived from KBL\u2019s computer systems after searching through all e-mails of 13 employees from December 2006.\nThe documents in these Clearwell folders were subsequently reviewed by the investigators by making further searches using the Clearwell system and by reviewing them manually. Those documents that were regarded as having a connection with the case were then tagged and exported and made into \u201cinvestigation documents\u201d. 17.  During the course of the investigation, the applicants\u2019 lawyers were regularly provided with copies of the \u201cinvestigation documents\u201d. However, they were denied copies of dvd recordings of statements by witnesses and the accused, on the ground that the requested material did not constitute a \u201cdocument\u201d within the meaning of section 37 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Procedures Act (Law No. 88/2008: see paragraph 36 below); instead, they were invited to access these recordings in the premises of the Special Prosecutor, a procedure which was validated by the Supreme Court in decisions of 21 September 2009 by which it rejected the applicants\u2019 requests to obtain copies. However, transcripts of all recorded depositions were made and handed over to the applicants, albeit with some delay on account of the volume of the material. 18.  When the case was submitted to the District Court, the defence received a copy of all the evidence submitted to the court by the prosecution, except for the aforementioned dvd recordings, of which transcripts were however provided. Moreover, the prosecution also submitted a list of all \u201cinvestigation documents\u201d, as well as those that it had decided not to submit as evidence. Included in the submitted evidence were files on all seized items in the case, along with rough overviews of what the items contained and which evidence, if any, had been collected from each seized item. 19.  The applicants and their lawyers repeatedly complained to the Special Prosecutor that their right of access to documents had been breached. At preliminary court sessions on 29 March and 27 April 2012 the applicants requested that the Special Prosecutor be required to hand over \u201ca copy of the register of events (log-register) about connections between telephone calls or any other data which may have been created during the investigation of the case at the Office of the Special Prosecutor and which contains an overview of telephone calls which were tapped on the basis of rulings on tappings in the case\u201d, as well as copies of all e-mails which had passed through their e-mail addresses and had been seized by the Special Prosecutor during the investigation. On 4 May 2012 the District Court dismissed the request, noting that the prosecution had stated that the data in question was accessible in the premises of the Special Prosecutor, where the defence could review it and, if appropriate, request that documents be submitted to the court as evidence. Following an appeal, the Supreme Court instructed the District Court to take a substantive position on the request. In a ruling of 29 May 2012 the District Court reiterated that the documentation was accessible to the accused. It further observed that while the prosecution should be considered generally to be under an obligation to grant the defence access to data acquired by the police during an investigation but not submitted to the court, the police and prosecution were not obliged to hand over copies of such data to the defence. On 8 June 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision. Subsequently, the Special Prosecutor granted access to the data in question upon request. 20.  On 20 November 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 request for dismissal of the case on account of the alleged breach of their right of access to documents. The indictment was partly dismissed on other grounds but that decision was overturned by the Supreme Court on 10 December 2012. 21.  In January 2013 the Special Prosecutor informed the defence that only documents and data marked by the investigators as relevant were considered to constitute \u201cinvestigation documents\u201d and that access did not extend to the \u201cfull collection of data\u201d or to the collection of documents which had been identified in the Clearwell rough searches. However, the applicants would have access to their own e-mails, as well as to recordings of their own tapped telephone conversations, in so far as these were still stored at the relevant time. The defence was also informed that a complete list of recorded telephone conversations did not exist. 22.  The defence disputed that the above limitations were in compliance with domestic law and the Convention. The Special Prosecutor replied on 22 January 2013, referring to the obligation of the police to consider equally evidence against and in favour of the accused. He noted that an indictment was not accompanied by all investigative documents but only those on which the prosecution based its case, and that all investigation documents were nevertheless listed in the main document file, so that it was clear which documents had not been submitted. Those investigation documents could be reviewed in the premises of the prosecution after the case had been submitted to the court. 23.  At a court session on 24 January 2013 the prosecution submitted a large part of the documents requested by the applicant Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson, as well as transcripts of certain phone calls which had been unknown to the prosecution until after the court proceedings began. On 7 March 2013 the prosecution submitted further evidence requested by the defence, as well as further transcripts of phone calls which it had received after submitting the case to the court. 24.  At a preliminary court session on 21 March 2013 the applicants requested \u201ca summary of all documents and other materials which have been acquired by the police and have not been submitted in the case\u201d or, alternatively, a summary of all documents which had been acquired during the investigation by the police, that had been identified in a Clearwell search programme, and had been given the names \u201cESS KAU Q Iceland\u201d, \u201cESS KAU Q Iceland 2\u201d and \u201cKAU KBLUC\u201d and had not been submitted in the case. As a further alternative, they requested a summary of all documents which had been acquired during the investigation, identified using the Clearwell programme and given the aforementioned names, which could be found using 15 specified search words or connections. The prosecution opposed those requests on the ground that such documents did not exist. The District Court, in a ruling of 26 March 2013, dismissed the applicants\u2019 requests on the ground that section 37 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Procedures Act applied only to data which had come into being and were still available but did not oblige the police or the prosecution to prepare documents at the request of the defence. On 4 April 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on the ground that the ruling in question could not be appealed against. 25.  In the context of the applicants\u2019 appeal against their conviction, they requested dismissal of the case inter alia on the ground that their right to have access to documentation, guaranteed by Article 70 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention, had been violated. In its judgment, the Supreme Court noted that the applicants had been invited to access the \u201caggregate collections of data\u201d. It then observed in relation to the request dismissed by the District Court on 29 May 2012 that it could not be overlooked that the collection of data seized by the police was enormous in scope and that among the data were e-mail communications that by their nature had to concern the financial affairs of a great many customers of Kaup\u00feing and which had to be kept confidential, as well as personal messages concerning the private lives of employees. It further noted that the requests dismissed by the District Court on 26 March 2013 had related to the preparation of specific documents for the applicants rather than access to them. In neither of the District Court\u2019s rulings had the applicants been denied access to specific documents; rather, they had been refused copies of an extensive collection of documents, which they had however been invited to access on the police premises. Thus, the rejection of the requests had not restricted the applicants\u2019 right to access documents. 26.  The Supreme Court finally noted that the applicants had not made any other requests to the District Court for access to documents. It observed that \u201cwhen an assessment is made as to whether the right of an accused man to access to documents has been restricted ..., the basic condition must be satisfied that a demand concerning that matter has been referred to the courts.\u201d Consequently, it held that there were no grounds for dismissal of the case on the basis of a violation of the right of access to documents. 27.   Shortly after the investigation began, the Special Prosecutor contacted Mr S.S., a British lawyer who had represented Al Thani and his relative and adviser, Sheik Sultan (hereafter \u201cSultan\u201d), in their dealings with Kaup\u00feing. Representatives of the Special Prosecutor met with Sultan in London in October 2009 and with Al Thani in October 2011, to obtain information about the case. The defence was not notified of these interviews or given an opportunity to participate. In the view of the Special Prosecutor, the interviews did not constitute formal depositions within the meaning of chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedures Act but rather informal questioning within the meaning of section 60 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Procedures Act. The interviews were recorded and the audio recordings as well as written transcripts were included in the evidence submitted by the prosecution to the trial court. 28.  When the case was submitted to the District Court, the prosecution submitted a list of witnesses which it wished to have summoned to testify, including Al Thani and Sultan. On 10 February 2013 the prosecution contacted S.S. by e-mail and asked him to inform his clients of the prosecution\u2019s decision and the court\u2019s wish to hear both of them in person during a hearing in April. S.S. was also informed that his clients could, if they preferred, give evidence by telephone. On 21 February 2013 S.S.\u2019s law firm informed the prosecution that Al Thani and Sultan were prepared to provide short statements confirming what they had previously said during their interviews but that they did not otherwise wish to participate in the proceedings in Iceland. At a court hearing on 7 March 2013, the prosecution informed the District Court that Al Thani and Sultan had refused to testify in court. No further attempts were made by the prosecution or the court to have them testify. The records of the hearing do not indicate that the defence at that point or before the main hearing commented on the witnesses not testifying or made any claims or requests that further attempts be made to summon them. 29.  In their appeals to the Supreme Court against their convictions, the applicants submitted that insufficient attempts had been made to have Al Thani and Sultan testify in court. The Supreme Court considered, however, that the District Court judgment could only be quashed on that basis \u201cif it were shown that [their] testimony ... might have had a significant impact on the conclusion regarding some issue in the case\u201d. It also emphasised that the prosecution would have to bear the adverse consequences of the lack of that evidence. 30.  In connection with the investigation of the case, and of other cases involving the applicants which were being investigated at the same time, the Vesturland District Court granted the Special Prosecutor several warrants to tap all phone calls made to and from all phone numbers registered to or being used by the applicants. The applicants\u2019 phones were tapped in the period from 9 to 27 March 2010. The Special Prosecutor informed the applicants by letter of 28 December 2011 that the tapping had taken place and informed them that the records from the phone tapping would be deleted in accordance with section 85 \u00a7 1 of the of Criminal Procedures Act. 31.  During the period from February to April 2013, the applicants examined their tapped telephone conversations which were stored by the Special Prosecutor and discovered that among the phone calls were four calls between Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson and his lawyer and one call between Magn\u00fas Gu\u00f0mundsson and his lawyer. Those applicants\u2019 lawyers each wrote to the Special Prosecutor in this connection and also submitted a complaint to the State Prosecutor against the employees at the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor replied to Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson\u2019s lawyer, stating that a mistake had been made as the phone calls in question had not been deleted immediately pursuant to section 85 of the Criminal Procedures Act, but that they had since been deleted. He described the phone tapping process as follows. The calls had been recorded with help from the Computer Forensics Division of the Rejkjav\u00edk Metropolitan Police; they had been scanned by the investigators, who had at the same time made brief notes about what they regarded as relevant to the investigation of the case; the investigators had been instructed to stop listening to phone calls when it became clear that a defendant was speaking to his defence lawyer and not to record what had been revealed in the conversation up until that point. However, an employee responsible for documenting the phone calls had made the mistake of not mentioning the phone calls in question when writing a memorandum, and as a result they had been omitted from a list of phone calls that should be deleted. The Special Prosecutor emphasised that the phone calls had not been listened to and that confidentiality had been respected. 32.  The State Prosecutor, by letters of 24 April 2013 and 14 February 2014, decided to suspend the investigations into the complaints which had been lodged. In the letter to Hrei\u00f0ar M\u00e1r Sigur\u00f0sson, it was considered that the explanations provided by the Special Prosecutor were satisfactory; in the letter to Magn\u00fas Gu\u00f0mundsson, it was noted that the tapping had been carried out in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Act, which was based on the premise that it was unavoidable that conversations between defendants and their lawyers would be recorded along with other conversations. It was added that nothing seemed to indicate that the applicant\u2019s conversations had been listened to or used for the purposes of the investigation or in the submission of evidence. It therefore had to be considered that it had been a mistake or accident, and could not be considered to constitute gross negligence or intent. 33.  In their appeals to the Supreme Court against their convictions, the applicants in question referred to the recording of telephone conversations between them and their lawyers. The Supreme Court emphasised that there were no transcripts of any such recorded conversations in the case file, so that it was clear that they had not been used as evidence before the court. It further noted that it was not apparent how the police could arrange their procedures for tapping a defendant\u2019s telephone in any other way, since it could not be known in advance whether the conversation would be with a defence lawyer. Moreover, as to the applicants\u2019 suggestion that parties other than police employees could have ascertained the nature of the conversations, the Supreme Court observed that the police had no authority to assign this task, which involved intrusion into private life, to others. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that no arguments had been presented to the effect that any such recordings had actually affected the investigation of the case or that there could have been a realistic danger of that. 34.  On 8 December 2014 the Supreme Court informed the parties that \u00c1.K., a former Supreme Court judge, would be sitting as an ad hoc judge in the appeal. The Supreme Court received no comments in that respect, but the defence commented on the possible lack of impartiality of another Supreme Court judge, who subsequently withdrew. By e-mail of 19 December 2014, the Supreme Court informed the parties that \u00c1.K.\u2019s wife, Mrs S., had been a member of the Board of the FME until January 2009 and invited them to submit their observations on the matter. Upon a request from one of the defence lawyers, further information on the exact day Mrs S. had left the FME Board was sent to the parties. By 23 December 2014 the Supreme Court had received answers from all the parties, stating that no objections were made as to the participation of \u00c1.K. in the proceedings. 35.  The Government informed the Court in their observations that they had received a statement from \u00c1.K. dated 19 September 2016 in which he stated that his wife, Mrs S., had been appointed Vice-Chair of the Board of the FME on 1 January 2007 and that she had resigned on 25 January 2009. She had confirmed that between 9 December 2008, when the transactions at issue had been sent to the FME, and the date of her resignation, the transactions had been discussed once in a Board meeting, on 19 January 2009, when the director of the FME had announced that a specialist had been appointed to make further inquiries into them; the specialist had handed his report to the FME on 6 March 2009 and the FME had submitted its complaint to the Special Prosecutor on 13 March 2009. Consequently, the matter had never been discussed while Mrs S. had been on the Board. \u00c1.K. further stated that he had not regarded himself as being disqualified from sitting but that he had not wished to sit unless it was clear that the defence had no reservations, and he had therefore requested that the defence be informed of the connection. 36.  The Government had also received a statement from \u00c1.K.\u2019s son, Mr K., dated 19 September 2016, confirmed by a former member of the Winding-Up Committee of Kaup\u00feing, according to which Mr K. had worked in Kaup\u00feing\u2019s legal department from November 2007 until the bank collapsed in October 2008. Shortly after the appointment of the Resolution Committee, Mr K. had started working for the Committee and he had been head of its legal department from December 2008. After the Resolution Committee had been discontinued at the end of 2011 and a Winding-Up Committee had been appointed, Mr K. had taken up the position as head of the legal department of the latter committee, a post which he had held until August 2013. Mr K. noted in his statement that when he had taken the position of head of the legal department of the Resolution Committee, it had been decided that cases concerning criminal investigations and actions for damages against former employees would not form part of the work of the legal division of the Resolution Committee, because he had been an employee of Kaup\u00feing before its collapse; the same applied after the Winding-Up Committee was appointed. These cases were entrusted to other employees who reported directly to the Resolution and Winding-Up Committees. Mr K. thus stated that he had not been involved in any way in the case against the applicants or civil actions against them. He added that there had never been any contracts between him and the said committees with an incentive tied to the recovery of Kaup\u00feing\u2019s assets. Following his resignation in 2013, he had acted as a consultant to the Winding-Up Board but the consultancy agreement had not related to the present case and had not included performance-related payments. Finally, with regard to the applicants\u2019 assertion that the defence had not been notified that he had been head of Kaup\u00feing\u2019s legal department, Mr K. observed that he was personally acquainted with all of the defence lawyers in the case and had worked with three of them. Moreover, he had been in contact with two of them while head of the legal department. 37.  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedures Act (Law no. 88/2008) are as follows:\nSection 6\n\u201c1. A judge, including an associate judge, is disqualified from conducting a case if:\n...\ng. there are other conditions or circumstances which are likely to cast reasonable doubt on his impartiality.\u201d\nSection 7\n\u201c1. A judge shall be responsible for ensuring his own eligibility to hear a case. Parties may, however, require a judge to recuse himself. In the same manner, the presiding chief judge shall ensure the eligibility of expert associate judges.\u201d\nSection 37\n\u201c1. The defence attorney must, as soon as possible, obtain a copy of all case documents[1] relating to his client, as well as facilities to examine other materials in the case. The police, however, can deny a defence attorney access to individual documents or other data for up to three weeks after they were created or came into their custody if it is believed that such access would damage the investigation of the case. The police may deny the defence attorney copies of individual documents while the case is being investigated for the same reason. Denial of access may be referred to a judge.\n... 3. In addition, the police may deny the defence attorney access to individual documents and other data during the investigation of the case if the interests of the State or the public are at stake, or if the urgent interests of individuals other than his client are at stake, or if communications with authorities in other countries prevent such access. Such denial of access may be referred to a judge.\n... 5. The police must give the defence attorney the opportunity to follow the progress of the investigation in so far as possible. The police are to take into account any suggestions the defence attorney may submit as regards individual investigative actions, unless the police consider such suggestions prohibited or irrelevant.\u201d\nSection 116\n\u201c1. Anybody aged fifteen or older who is subject to Icelandic jurisdiction and is not the defendant or his representative must appear before the court as a witness to respond verbally to questions asked of them about the facts of the case ...\n... 4. If the witness is located far from the court or if attending the court would otherwise cause him significant inconvenience, the judge may decide that testimony is to be given during the court session by telephone ot other telecommunications methods, provided that the testimony is given in such a manner that everyone present during the session is able to hear the testimony. This authorisation cannot be applied if the testimony of the witness may be expected to be of substance in the resolution of the case.\u201d\nSection 120\n\u201c1. The prosecutor shall be responsible for summoning witnesses to the court. The defendant may, however, summon witnesses to the court if he so chooses. ... 2. If necessary, the judge shall summon a witness to the court by means of a written summons issued on his own initiative or at the request of either party. The summons shall state the name and address of the witness, the main reasons for the summons, the name of the court, where and when the testimony is to be given and what the consequences may be if the witness does not attend or comply with his duty in other respects. The prosecutor shall be responsible for the issuance of the summons and such issuance shall be conducted in the same manner as the issuance of the charges, ...\u201d\nSection 121\n\u201c1. If a witness does not attend the court according to a legitimately issued summons and has not provided a legitimate reason for not doing so, the prosecutor may instruct the police to fetch the witness or to bring the witness before the court at a later date. The police are under an obligation to comply with such instructions from the prosecutor.\n...\u201d 38.  According to the Criminal Procedures Act, judicial proceedings can be reopened under certain conditions. Section 228 of the Act states that when a District Court judgment has not been appealed or the time limit to appeal has passed, the Committee on Reopening of Judicial Proceedings can approve a request of a person who considers that he or she has been wrongly convicted or convicted of a more serious offence than he or she committed to reopen the judicial proceedings before the District Court, if certain conditions are fulfilled. The conditions are, inter alia, that there were serious defects in the processing of the case which affected its conclusion (item d). The State Prosecutor can request a reopening to the advantage of the convicted person if he considers that the conditions in paragraph 1 of section 228 of the Act are fulfilled. In accordance with section 229 of the Act, the request for reopening shall be in writing and sent to the Committee on Reopening of Judicial Proceedings. It shall include detailed reasoning on how the conditions for reopening are considered to be fulfilled. According to section 231 of the Act, the Committee on Reopening of Judicial Proceedings decides whether proceedings will be reopened. If a request for reopening is approved the first judgment remains in force until a new judgment is delivered in the case. Section 232 of the Act states that the Committee on Reopening of Judicial Proceedings can accept a request for the reopening of a case which has been finally decided by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court and a new judgment will be delivered if the conditions of section 228 are fulfilled.", "references": ["6", "2", "5", "7", "9", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants are:\n(1) Ms Umidat Mukhtarova, who was born in 1942,\n(2) Ms Manash Mukhtarova, who was born in 1965,\n(3) Ms Mariya Umarova, who was born in 1950,\n(4) Mr Lechi Umarov, who was born in 1942,\n(5) Ms Zara Umarova, who was born in 1977.\nThe second applicant lives in Grozny. The other four applicants live in the village of Kharsenoy, Chechnya. 6.  The first and second applicants are the mother and the sister of Mr Sharpudi (also spelled as Sharpuddi and Sharpudin) Mukhtarov, who was born in 1975. The third and fourth applicants are the parents of Mr Zaurbek (also spelled as Zovrbek) Umarov, who was born in 1975 (in the documents submitted the year was also stated as 1981). The fifth applicant is his sister. 7.  The circumstances of the case can be summarised as follows. 8.  At the relevant time Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov lived with his family in the camp for refugees from Chechnya in the village of Nesterovskaya, Ingushetia. At about 3.30 p.m. on 1 November 2003 he and his friend Mr Zaurbek Umarov were on the outskirts of the village when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in a military UAZ and VAZ\u20112106 vehicles without registration numbers. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian; some of them were wearing balaclavas. They put Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov on the ground threatening them with weapons, then forced them into the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Ordzhonikidzevskaya village. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 9.  On 16 May 2008 an interview with Mr Umarov appeared in a television programme broadcast by the Russian television news channel NTV (\u041d\u0422\u0412). The second applicant provided this information to the investigators (see below). 10.  The whereabouts of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov and Mr Zaurbek Umarov have been unknown since the date of their abduction. 11.  Immediately after the abduction the first applicant informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 12.  On 18 November 2003 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 23600076 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code concerning the abduction of Mr Mukhtarov. The decision stated that it was taken following the first applicant\u2019s complaint. 13.  On 8 December 2003 Mr M.M., the father of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov, was granted victim status and questioned. 14.  On 6 January 2004 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor gave instructions to the investigators. He indicated, in particular, that Mr Zaurbek Umarov, who had been abducted together with Mr Mukhtarov, was wanted by law-enforcement authorities on account of his participation as a member of an illegal armed group in a shootout with the authorities in October 2003 in Troitskaya village. 15.  On 13 January 2004 the investigators requested an extension of the investigation\u2019s time frame, stating, amongst other reasons, that there were grounds to suspect that the abduction of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov was linked to his friendship with Mr Zaurbek Umarov. 16.  On 18 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The investigators\u2019 decision stated that Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov had been abducted together. Mr M.M. was informed about this decision by a letter of 20 March 2004. 17.  On 14 August 2008 the investigation was resumed. 18.  On 15 August 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status upon her request (see paragraph 34 below). 19.  On 19 August 2008 the investigation was suspended again. 20.  On 24 November 2008 the investigation was resumed following the second applicant\u2019s submissions to the investigators about the TV interview with Mr Umarov (see paragraph 35 below). 21.  On 29 November 2008 Ms. E.E., Mr Zaurbek Umarov\u2019s wife, was granted victim status. The investigators\u2019 decision stated that her husband Mr Zaurbek Umarov had been abducted together with Mr Mukhtarov. 22.  On 24 December 2008 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 30 March 2009. 23.  On 1 April 2009 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of Ingushetia granted the investigators\u2019 request and allowed the seizure of the video containing the interview with Mr Umarov from the NTV channel. 24.  On 30 April 2009 the investigators sent a request to the NTV channel. In reply NTV informed them that the video recording of the programme had already been destroyed owing to the expiry of the conservation period. 25.  On the same date the investigation was suspended. The whereabouts of both Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov and Mr Zaurbek Umarov remain unknown. 26.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 27.  On 15 January 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who denied that Mr Mukhtarov had been involved in illegal armed groups. 28.  On 22 January 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Z.I., the Mukhtarov family\u2019s neighbour, who had witnessed the abduction. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and stated that the abductors had been wearing military uniforms and had looked a lot like law-enforcement officers. 29.  On 4 February 2004 the investigators questioned a police officer from the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (police station), Mr M.R. He confirmed that Mr Zaurbek Umarov was among those who had offered armed resistance to law-enforcement officers in October 2003 in Troitskaya village. 30.  Between 5 and 20 February 2004 the investigators questioned Mr A.I., Ms D.M. and Ms Z.Kh., who had also witnessed the abduction. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 31.  On 15 August 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. Her statements were similar to the account of events submitted to the Court. 32.  On 19 November 2008 the investigators questioned Ms E.E. She stated that she had learnt about the circumstances of Mr Umarov\u2019s abduction from her mother-in-law (the third applicant) and that she had not lodged any complaints in that connection. On 16 May 2008 around 8.30 p.m. she had seen an interview with her husband, whom she had identified with certainty in a television programme, lasting about five minutes. She had not informed the investigators of this fact. 33.  On an unknown date the investigators questioned Ms Z.E., who was the mother of Ms E.E. She confirmed that she had also seen the interview with Mr Umarov in the TV programme. She had identified Mr Umarov by facial features and a scar on his face. Ms Z.E. learnt from the programme that he had been sentenced to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. 34.  On 4 August 2008 the first applicant informed the investigators about the death of her husband, Mr M.M., and asked to be granted victim status in the criminal case. 35.  On 12 November 2008 the second applicant informed the investigators of the television programme in which Mr Zaurbek Umarov had appeared (see paragraph 9 above). She stated that she had learnt about it from some acquaintances and asked the investigators to obtain a copy of the programme. 36.  On 3 March 2009 the second applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the investigators to be allowed to read the investigation file and make copies of the documents. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 37.  On 29 April 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide her with copies of documents from the investigation file. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 38.  On several occasions between 2003 and 2009 the first applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. Her complaints were forwarded to the investigators. In reply she received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish her son\u2019s whereabouts. 39.  On 27 August 2011 the second applicant requested information about any progress in the proceedings. She also asked to be granted victim status in the criminal case. The outcome of this request is unknown. 40.  According to the fifth applicant\u2019s submissions to the Court, Mr Umarov\u2019s relatives had learnt about his abduction from Mr Mukhtarov\u2019s relatives on 1 November 2003. They complained about the incident to the local police and Sunzhenskiy district police station. Despite their complaints, the criminal case was opened only on 18 December 2003. The third, fourth and fifth applicants had received no news about the whereabouts of Mr Umarov since then. The fifth applicant also stated that she had seen the interview with her brother on television in May 2008. 41.  On 7 September 2005 the NGO Memorial, acting on behalf of Ms Z.U., Mr Umarov\u2019s sister, asked the public prosecutor of Ingushetia whether any criminal case had been instituted into Mr Umarov\u2019s disappearance. 42.  On 3 October 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office of Ingushetia informed Ms Z.U. and the NGO Memorial that the criminal case into the abduction of Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov had been opened on 18 November 2003, and that the investigation had been suspended.", "references": ["4", "9", "5", "8", "3", "6", "7", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Ki\u010devo. 5.  On 2 February 2010 the applicant submitted a written statement in which he denied that he had collaborated with the State security bodies after 1944. Such a statement was to be submitted to the Fact Verification Commission (\u201cthe Lustration Commission\u201d) by public officials and was required under the Additional Requirement for Public Office Act of 2008 (\u201cthe 2008 Lustration Act\u201d). By a decision of 12 September 2011, the Lustration Commission confirmed that the applicant satisfied the additional condition for the performance of the office of a judge, having confirmed that he had not collaborated with the security bodies of the past regime. 6.  On 16 November 2012 the Lustration Commission, on a request by its chairman, reopened the lustration proceedings in respect of the applicant and, on the basis of \u201cnew facts and evidence\u201d, quashed its decision of 12 September 2011. The Commission\u2019s decision, which referred to submissions made by a third person (namely a certain Z.T., who was identified in connection with the chairman\u2019s request) in its introduction, relied on three files concerning three people (one of whom was Z.T.), from which it established that the applicant \u2013 referred to in those files as an \u201coperational liaison\u201d (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430) \u2013 had provided relevant information to the State security bodies in the 1970s. The relevant parts of those notes read as follows:\n\u201c... I [the handler] met with [the applicant], a law student [at the time], on two occasions on which he expressed a wish to collaborate with the State Security Office (\u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442) ...\n... the relationship (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430) \u2013 [the applicant] informed me that [code name] had exchanged letters with ...\n... the conversation with [the applicant] was on my [the handler\u2019s] initiative ... the source [the applicant] was used occasionally, during his stay in Skopje. He was reassigned for use to ...\u201d 7.  The Lustration Commission found that, under the Law on determining conditions limiting the exercise of public office, access to documents and the publication of information about cooperation with State security bodies (\u201cthe 2012 Lustration Act\u201d, which had replaced the 2008 Lustration Act), the applicant had collaborated with the State security bodies. Its decision stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... [the applicant] had provided the security bodies with information about certain people of interest for the State Security Office ... on the basis of documentary evidence, it was established that the State Security Office had used [the applicant] as an operational liaison ...\n... the Lustration Commission established that [the applicant], as a secret collaborator, informant or operational liaison, [in the process of] creating and storing information about certain people, by which their rights and freedoms had been violated on political or ideological grounds, had collaborated with the State security services in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner, in return for favours in getting promoted, by which the condition specified in sections 4 and 18 of the [2012 Lustration Act] is fulfilled.\u201d 8.  After the Lustration Commission published the above decision (and the notes of the security bodies referred to in the decision) on its website, the applicant requested (making a non-disclosure statement) and obtained a redacted copy of those documents, in the form in which they were published on the Commission\u2019s website. They were redacted to withhold the identities of the handler(s) who had drawn them up and the third persons in respect of whom the applicant had allegedly provided information to the security bodies. The documents were not signed by the applicant or the handler. The applicant also asked to be provided with a complete and unredacted copy (\u0446\u0435\u043b\u043e\u0441\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0458\u0430) of those documents. 9.  In a written statement of 27 November 2012, certified by a notary public, P.K., the handler who had drawn up some of the notes to which the Lustration Commission had referred in its decision, stated, inter alia:\n\u201c... I drafted [the notes] (\u0441\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430) concerning [the applicant] without [his] knowledge, according to my interpretation (\u043f\u043e \u043c\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u0438\u0434\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) and following a spontaneous conversation that he had not requested, let alone intended to be used for a role as a secret collaborator or informant. I avow that [the applicant] was not recorded or registered by the security bodies as such ... Neither I nor my colleagues, as far as I know, had requested that he be registered as a secret collaborator, informant, operational liaison ... neither had [the applicant] made a request to collaborate with the security service ...\nI submit that the contents of the official records are not truthful (\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0458\u043d\u0438) and at times [the applicant] had not provided the information in any organised manner, i.e. ... he had not been an organised liaison with the State Security Office ...\u201d 10.  On 30 November 2012 the applicant challenged the Commission\u2019s decision before the Administrative Court. He complained that, inter alia, the Lustration Commission had not held an oral hearing and it had not provided sufficient reasoning for its findings, in particular to show that his alleged collaboration had satisfied the criteria specified in section 18 of the 2012 Lustration Act. In support of this complaint, he referred to P.K.\u2019s statement, which he appended to his claim. He also argued that according to the documents in his case file, no measures had been taken against the persons in respect of whom he had allegedly provided information to the security bodies. He further challenged the veracity and authenticity of the documents in question, claiming that only copy documents had been admitted into evidence, that they had not been signed by the handler or himself and that no official stamp had been affixed on them. In that connection, he subsequently submitted a letter from the Intelligence Service (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442 \u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) dated 2013, in which it was confirmed that the applicant had not been registered in its records and that the documents used in the impugned proceedings had not been from its archives. Given the complexity of the case, the applicant requested that the court hold a public and oral hearing in order to establish the relevant facts. In that regard he requested that the court hear oral evidence from P.K. and an expert (\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d \u043f\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0447), V.P., a university professor and former intelligence officer, regarding the reliability of the documentary evidence against the applicant and whether he could be regarded as a collaborator within the meaning of the 2012 Lustration Act. In this respect, he submitted a copy of a statement made by V.P. and published on a news portal in which V.P. had underlined the qualitative criteria of such collaboration and the difference between \u201can informant\u201d and \u201ca collaborator\u201d. In that statement V.P. defined \u201can informant\u201d as \u201ca person who had not established a relationship of collaboration (\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0438 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441), but had provided information to the security services without having signed a collaboration agreement\u201d. 11.  At a hearing held in private, and in the absence of the parties, on 20 December 2013, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. Referring to the information in the relevant documents (see paragraph 6 above), which it found truthful (having compared the copy documents in the applicant\u2019s case file with the originals), the court confirmed the Lustration Commission\u2019s findings that the applicant had collaborated with the security services in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner as a secret informant, notably as an operational liaison. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c[the applicant] had followed, provided and transferred information about people ... whereby their rights and freedoms had been violated on political or ideological grounds during the communist era ... irrespective of whether [those people] had been criminally prosecuted.\n... [the applicant] had agreed to cooperate with the State Security Office. His friendly relationship with the handler did not preclude collaboration within the meaning of the law, and indeed such a relationship suggests that the collaborator knew to whom and why he had been providing information. For these reasons, the court does not accept (\u043d\u0435 \u0458\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0444\u0430\u0442\u0438) the certified statement appended to the claim.\nThe court made its decision at a hearing held in private because the Commission had correctly established the relevant facts on the basis of written material and [the applicant] had not submitted any evidence that led to different facts.\u201d 12.  On 24 January 2014 the applicant requested that the Lustration Commission grant him access to the original documents in his case file. In reply, the Commission informed him that the originals had been returned to the State Archives. 13.  The applicant appealed against the above-mentioned decision of the Administrative Court reiterating his complaints and arguing that that court had not held an oral hearing at which it could hear the testimony of the parties, P.K. and V.P., in order to establish as a fact whether there had been any collaboration within the meaning of the 2012 Lustration Act, that is whether the applicant\u2019s actions had been conscious, secret, organised and continuous. The reasoning provided by the lower bodies in that respect had not been sufficient. Furthermore, there was no evidence that in return for providing information he had obtained any favours in getting promoted, which was a requirement for the alleged collaboration to fall within the meaning of section 18(4) of the 2012 Lustration Act. On the other hand, there was evidence that the materials on which the impugned decisions were based had not been reliable (see paragraph 9 above) and that he had not been aware that the information would reach the State Security Office. The authenticity of the files used against him had also been compromised in that they had not been from the archives of the Intelligence Service on the one hand, but that they had seemingly been drawn up by handlers at the State Security Office \u2013 which was the predecessor of the Intelligence Service \u2013 on the other hand. Furthermore, they had been admitted into evidence as copy documents, without having their authenticity confirmed by the security bodies. He asked for an oral hearing to be held. 14.  At a hearing held in private, and in the absence of the parties, on 12 June 2014, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision without hearing the testimony of the witnesses proposed by the applicant. The court confirmed the findings of the lower authorities after it had verified that the contents of the documents in the applicant\u2019s case file, admitted as copy documents, were identical to the originals from the State Archives. It held that, owing to the applicant\u2019s conduct, the human rights and freedoms of others had been violated. The court added:\n\u201cTaking into consideration that the Lustration Commission carries out only a verification of facts to determine if there has either been collaboration or no collaboration with State security bodies, reports drawn up by handlers in [such bodies] are to be regarded as facts\u201d. 15.  On 15 July 2014 the State Judicial Council declared that the applicant\u2019s position as a judge had been terminated (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u043a \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0440\u0448\u0435\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430). 16.  On 13 November 2015 the applicant submitted audio recordings and a transcript of taped telephone conversations which allegedly involved the then chairman of the Lustration Commission and a member of parliament from the ruling political party. The material concerned conversations in which that member of parliament informed the chairman of the Lustration Commission that certain material regarding the applicant had been submitted before the Commission by Z.T. and asked that the proceedings be conducted as quickly as possible. The applicant contended that on 6 April 2015 the audio material was made public by the then political opposition in the respondent State and was also made available online.", "references": ["5", "2", "0", "6", "7", "1", "8", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  On 5 and 20 March 2007 the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) to authorise the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of M.M., on the grounds that he was suspected of drug trafficking. 6.  During the investigation and while secret surveillance measures were being used against M.M., the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of telephone conversations in connection with drug trafficking. The fourth applicant\u2019s telephone number was noted in that respect. 7.  Following an application lodged on 3 May 2007 by the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office, on 4 May 2007 the investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court authorised the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of the fourth applicant and three other persons, on the grounds that they were suspected of drug trafficking proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. Her statement of reasons reads as follows:\n\u201cOn 3 May 2007 the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office lodged an application for an order for [secret surveillance] measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of A.J., [the fourth applicant], G.P. and N.M., due to [there being] probable cause to believe that the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code had been committed.\nThe application of the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office is well founded.\nThe application refers to the police report ... of 3 May 2007 concerning the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of M.M., alleging that there is probable cause to believe that the persons mentioned [in that report] often communicate about purchasing cocaine, [something] which is established on the basis of telephone conversations with M.M., [a person] in respect of whom this court ordered [secret surveillance] measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1 (1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 5 March 2007.\nThe investigating judge considers that the application is well founded, because in this particular case the investigation of these criminal offences could not be carried out by other means, as [the offences] concern the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code.\nBearing in mind the above facts, the investigating judge [issues] an order under Article 180 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... because the stated circumstances point to there being sufficient grounds for suspecting the commission of the criminal offence proscribed under Article 173 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code.\u201d 8.  On 1 June 2007 the Zagreb County Court issued another order, accepting an application by the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta, hereinafter \u201cthe OSCOC\u201d) for the use of secret surveillance measures for a period of three months in respect of the first and fourth applicants and four other persons, on the grounds that they were suspected of drug trafficking proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. The judge\u2019s relevant statement of reasons reads as follows:\n\u201cIn explaining its application for an order implementing measures referred to in Article 180 \u00a7 1 (1) [in respect of the first applicant] and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure [in respect of the first and fourth applicants], the OSCOC refers to the report of the Zagreb Police Department ... of 31 May 2007. Namely, by analysing the implementation of surveillance measures and the recording of telephone conversations, that is remote communication by mobile telephones ... used by A.J. and the number ... used by [the fourth applicant], it was established on several occasions that conversations between the persons concerned and other persons were being held regarding the sale of cocaine, that is that the persons concerned, together with several other persons, continuously, as an organised group, were selling the drug cocaine on the Zagreb narcotics market. In addition to the [information stated] above, it appears that A.J. has three places where he stores drugs ... where there is cocaine, and that G.T., K.K. and [the first applicant] are the persons in charge of [those places], and A.J. is obviously not satisfied with cocaine leaving those places in an uncontrolled manner.\n...\nThe enclosed document delivered with the OSCOC\u2019s application ... of 31 May 2007 and the conversations monitored so far indicate that A.J., with the assistance of [the fourth applicant] has organised a criminal group that sells large amounts of cocaine (several kilograms) in the territory of Zagreb and the Republic of Croatia, [a criminal group] which, in addition to [A.J and the fourth applicant] consists of [the first applicant], G.T., K.K. and T.K.. [The first applicant] was also introduced by A.J. and [the fourth applicant] to a legal business for catering facilities, and it appears that he is the third most important person in that organisation, after [the fourth applicant]. It follows that there are grounds for suspicion that the above-mentioned persons are involved in the commission of the offence proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code.\n...\nGiven the information stated above, and since there are grounds for suspicion that an offence of narcotic abuse under Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code has been committed and that criminal offences of this kind are still being committed, and taking into consideration that inquiries into the criminal offences could not be carried out in any other way or would be carried out with unreasonable difficulties, given how the offences are committed, the application submitted by OSCOC ought to be accepted ...\u201d 9.  On 14 June 2007 the OSCOC requested that an order which included additional telephone numbers be issued against the first applicant and A.J. The following day the investigating judge issued a decision allowing a surveillance measure which included new telephone numbers for a period of three months, and suspended the measure regarding the first applicant\u2019s previous telephone numbers. The investigating judge explained that the police report of 14 June 2007 attached to the OSCOC\u2019s application indicated that the first applicant and A.J. were using new telephone numbers to organise the smuggling and selling of cocaine, and that the measure was necessary in order to identify persons who were committing the criminal offence of drug trafficking \u2013 proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code \u2013 together with the first applicant and A.J. The judge further explained that owing to the specific manner in which the latter criminal offence was being committed, inquiries into that criminal offence could not be carried out in any other way, or would be carried out with unreasonable difficulties. 10.  While secret surveillance measures were being used against the first applicant, on 27, 28 and 29 June and 2 July 2007 the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of his telephone conversations with the second and third applicants \u2013 who lived in the Netherlands at the time \u2013 in connection with drug trafficking. 11.  On 2 July 2007 the OSCOC requested that the order issued against A.J. and the fourth applicant on 4 May 2007 (see paragraph 7 above) be extended for another two months, stating that the measures carried out thus far indicated that A.J. and the fourth applicant continuously communicated regarding perpetrating the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. On the same day the investigating judge allowed the extension, deeming the application \u201cwell founded, because in this particular case, the investigation of these criminal offences could not be carried out by other means\u201d. 12.  On 6 July 2007 the secret surveillance measures were suspended, since the applicants and several other persons had been arrested and a criminal complaint against them had been filed. 13.  On 1 October 2007 the OSCOC indicted the applicants and several other persons in the Zagreb County Court on charges of drug trafficking under Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they were charged with associating in the territory of Croatia and the Netherlands from May to July 2007 for the purpose of continuously smuggling large amounts of cocaine from the Netherlands to Croatia, and selling those drugs in Croatian territory with a view to acquiring pecuniary gain. As to the fourth applicant, he was charged with, inter alia, selling cocaine to B.S. in May 2007 in Zagreb, after acquiring that drug from the first applicant. 14.  In the course of the proceedings before the Zagreb County Court the applicants challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance, alleging that it had not been ordered in accordance with the relevant domestic law and that the evidence so obtained was not relevant or accurate, as nothing suggested that they had been involved in the alleged drug trafficking. 15.  On 25 March 2008 the trial court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the secret surveillance orders as unfounded, and proceeded with the examination of the case. 16.  The latter decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 14 May 2008. The relevant statement of reasons given by the Supreme Court reads as follows:\n\u201c... this second-instance court agrees with the first-instance court\u2019s conclusion that evidence obtained by using an investigative measure ordered against a person in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he is committing, alone or jointly with others, one of the criminal offences proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can be used not only against [that person], but also against every other person caught participating in [that person\u2019s] criminal activity, [when] the criminal activity of the other person amounts to the criminal offence proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but always on the condition that the other person has been caught acting together with the person against whom one of the measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1(1)-(6) has been lawfully issued.\n...\nSection 22 of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (Zakon o Uredu za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta, hereinafter \u2018the OSCOC Act\u2019) provides that in proceedings concerning criminal offences under section 21 of the OSCOC Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure and other general provisions of criminal procedure shall apply, unless the OSCOC Act provides otherwise.\nSection 42(1) of the OSCOC Act is an extension of section 41 of that Act. [Section41] provides that other measures provided for in that section may be ordered for criminal offences set out in that section, in addition to measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the content of the cited provisions of the OSCOC Act, to which the appellants refer in their appeals, does not exclude the application of special measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but such measures are extended in respect of some criminal offences by the measures provided for under section 41 of the OSCOC Act.\nConsequently, in its application for special measures of inquiry into criminal offences proscribed by Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code in the specific case against the defendants, the OSCOC proposed the application of the provisions of Article 180 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which the court had applied when issuing the order ... of 1 June 2007. Therefore, since the OSCOC has jurisdiction over proceedings regarding the criminal offence under Article 173 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code and proposed ordering special measures of inquiry into such an offence under Article 180 \u00a7 1of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court accepted the application, which is why the issued order is not unlawful. Furthermore, applying Article 180 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the order at issue, even though daily reports and documentation regarding technical recordings drafted by the members of the police authorities who were implementing the ordered measures were not delivered to the investigating judge on a daily basis \u2013 the judge did not ask for this under Article 182a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but this was done after the special measures had been implemented \u2013 this does not render the order in question unlawful pursuant to Article 9 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor does it make the material evidence obtained from the measures unlawful, contrary to the allegations in the defendants\u2019 appeals.\n... restricting the freedom and confidentiality of correspondence ... was necessary for conducting the criminal proceedings. It was not contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or contrary to the criteria set by the European Court of Human Rights, because it was based on the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had a legitimate aim, and was necessary, taking into account all the specific circumstances involved in establishing the perpetrators of the criminal offence.\u201d 17.  At a hearing held on 15 December 2008 the trial court heard M.S., a witness called by the fourth applicant. M.S. stated that he had been friends with the fourth applicant, whom he had asked to watch over his son, B.S., who had been a drug addict. In May 2007 B.S. had gone to Zagreb to purchase an air-conditioning device. B.S. had subsequently told him that in Zagreb he had purchased drugs from some people. 18.  At a hearing held on 30 January 2009 the trial court heard B.S., a witness called by the fourth applicant. B.S. stated that in May 2007 he had purchased cocaine from S.H., and not from the fourth applicant, and that this fact could be confirmed by A.P. and M.D., who had been with him on that day. The fourth applicant then asked to call A.P. and M.D., who he said would testify about the circumstances in which B.S. had purchased cocaine in May 2007. The trial court dismissed that proposal. 19.  On 4 February 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced the first applicant to ten years\u2019 imprisonment, the second and the third applicants to six years\u2019 imprisonment, and the fourth applicant to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. In convicting them, the Zagreb County Court relied on the recordings obtained by secret surveillance, finding them lawful and credible. As to the fourth applicant, it explained that it had refused to hear A.P. and M.D. as witnesses since at that point it had already been established beyond doubt, on the basis of the results of the secret surveillance measures and the cocaine found on B.S., that B.S. had purchased the cocaine from the fourth applicant. 20.  The applicants challenged the Zagreb County Court\u2019s judgment by lodging appeals with the Supreme Court. They contended that the secret surveillance orders had lacked the relevant reasoning as to the lawfulness and necessity of such surveillance. Moreover, they contended that the procedure for supervising the execution of the secret surveillance orders, which in the case at hand had been based on the Code of Criminal Procedure, should have been based on special legislation concerning organised crime (the OSCOC Act). The OSCOC Act required the police to submit daily reports to the investigating judge concerning the execution of such orders, something which had not been done in their case. The applicants further challenged the findings which were based on the recordings obtained by secret surveillance. The second and third applicants also contended that the secret surveillance orders had not been issued in respect of them, and that the secret surveillance had been conducted outside Croatian territory in the absence of a request for international legal assistance in criminal matters. In their view, there was no provision for this in the relevant domestic law, and thus the secret surveillance carried out in respect of them had run counter to Article 36 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. The fourth applicant also complained that the trial court had failed to call two defence witnesses he had asked to be called (A.P. and M.D.), who would have confirmed B.S.\u2019 statement that he had not purchased cocaine from the fourth applicant, but from S.H. Lastly, the first applicant, who disputed his conviction and sentence, challenging all factual aspects of the case and alleging procedural errors in the trial, asked that his lawyer be allowed to attend the session of the appeal panel. 21.  On 21 September 2009 the State Attorney\u2019s Office of the Republic of Croatia (Dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo Republike Hrvatske) submitted a reasoned opinion proposing that the applicants\u2019 appeals be dismissed. That opinion was not forwarded to the defence. 22.  On 13 January 2010 the Supreme Court informed the parties that a session of the appeal panel would be held on 9 March 2010. The parties were invited to attend, but it was expressly stated that the presence of the accused, who were in pre-trial detention and had a lawyer, would not be ensured, and that there would be no order for them to be brought to court. 23.  On 9 March 2010 the Supreme Court held a session in the presence of the applicants\u2019 lawyers and the Deputy State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia (Zamjenik Glavnog dr\u017eavnog odvjetnika Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter, \u201cthe Deputy State Attorney\u201d). That court stated that it had decided that it would not be useful to have the accused, who were represented by lawyers, brought from pre-trial detention. The Deputy State Attorney stated that he confirmed the proposal submitted under Article 373 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 21 above and 33 below). The parties stated that they had no objections as to how the session had been conducted or the content of the record of the session. The record of the session was signed by the appeal panel president and the clerk. 24.  On the same day the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld their convictions. It held that all the secret surveillance orders had essentially provided sufficient reasoning. It explained that although the orders \u2013 apart from the first one issued against the fourth applicant \u2013 had been based on the Code of Criminal Procedure and not on the special legislation concerning organised crime (the OSCOC Act), that on its own did not render them unlawful. Section 41 and section 42(1) of the OSCOC Act provided for the possibility of ordering such measures. Also, the fact that the police had not submitted daily reports to the investigating judge concerning the execution of the orders did not render the secret surveillance orders unlawful, because a report had been submitted after the measures had been implemented. The court further held that the sovereignty of the Netherlands had not been violated by the interception of the second and third applicants\u2019 telephone conversations, since the Croatian authorities had never issued a secret surveillance order against them. The secret surveillance orders had been lawfully issued in respect of several people in Croatia whom the second and third applicants \u2013 who had lived in the Netherlands at the time \u2013 had contacted. Since the second and third applicants had participated in the criminal activities of the persons under secret surveillance \u2013 activities which had amounted to the criminal offence proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2013 such evidence (intercepted telephone conversations) could be used in the criminal proceedings against them. The Supreme Court also indicated that the trial court had correctly established the facts which were based on the applicants\u2019 telephone conversations recorded by secret surveillance. 25.  The applicants challenged those findings by lodging constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). They reiterated their complaints concerning the secret surveillance and the use of evidence so obtained in the criminal proceedings against them. The first, second and third applicants contended that the reasoned opinion of the State Attorney\u2019s Office of the Republic of Croatia submitted during the appeal proceedings had not been forwarded to the defence. In addition, the first applicant complained that even though the Supreme Court had examined a number of legal and factual issues, including the question of an appropriate sentence which he had raised in his appeal, he had not been invited to attend the session of the appeal panel. The fourth applicant also complained that the domestic courts had failed to call two defence witnesses he had wished to call. 26.  On 9 January 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints, upholding the findings of the Supreme Court. As to the first, second and third applicants\u2019 complaint concerning the reasoned opinion of the State Attorney\u2019s Office of the Republic of Croatia not being forwarded to the defence, the Constitutional Court noted that at the session of the appeal panel the Deputy State Attorney had reiterated the arguments submitted in the opinion in question. The applicants\u2019 lawyers had attended the session and had therefore had the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on those submissions. As to the fourth applicant\u2019s complaint that the trial court had refused to hear two witnesses whom he had wished to call, the Constitutional Court noted that the trial court had given reasons for doing so. 27.  The decisions of the Constitutional Court were served on the lawyer representing the first, second and third applicants and the lawyer representing the fourth applicant on 21 and 24 February 2014 respectively.", "references": ["9", "1", "5", "7", "6", "8", "0", "2", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Czarnowo. 5.  On 29 January 2010 the Szczecin Social Security Board (\u201cthe ZUS\u201d) dismissed an application by the applicant for a disability pension on account of a total incapacity to work. The ZUS based its decision on a medical opinion which had found the applicant fit to work. The applicant appealed to a court. 6.  On 8 April 2010 the Szczecin Regional Court decided to appoint experts on neurology, orthopaedics and psychiatry and requested that they prepare opinions on the applicant\u2019s state of health. The expert opinions were submitted to the court on 12 July 2010. According to the opinions the applicant was fit to work. 7.  On 16 July 2010 the court dismissed an application by the applicant to appoint a legal aid lawyer to represent her. The applicant appointed her husband to represent her in the proceedings. 8.  The applicant\u2019s representative submitted comments on the expert\u2019s opinions on 3 August 2010 and, afterwards, several applications for the case to be examined by another court. Some of the representative\u2019s letters to the court contained insulting expressions and he was advised that such expressions could amount to contempt of court. On 28 March 2011 the applicant\u2019s representative also challenged the impartiality of all the judges of the Szczecin Regional Court. 9.  On 18 April 2011 the court asked the experts to supplement their opinions but they upheld their earlier conclusions. 10.  On 31 May 2011 the court ordered that the applicant be examined by doctors again. Although at first she refused the examination, it did take place. In July 2011 a further expert opinion was prepared. It did not differ in its conclusions from the earlier ones. 11.  In August 2011 the court sent the case file to an expert on psychiatry who submitted his supplementary opinion in September 2011. The expert suggested that a further opinion on the applicant\u2019s mental health should be obtained. The court ordered the preparation of such an opinion. It appears that the applicant refused to undergo an examination at a psychiatric hospital. 12.  On 19 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s representative was punished for contempt of court in connection with his insulting letter to the court. He was fined 5,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant\u2019s representative appealed and his appeal was initially rejected for formal reasons but was ultimately admitted for examination on its merits. On 28 November 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 19 October 2011, finding that insulting remarks contained in a letter to a court should not be regarded as contempt of court. The applicant in the meantime withdrew power of attorney from her husband and started representing herself. She also repeated her application for a legal aid lawyer to be appointed. 13.  On 24 June 2013 the court sent the case file to another expert. The opinion was prepared within a month. 14.  Subsequently, the court dealt with various applications by the applicant to have a legal aid lawyer appointed, which were ultimately dismissed on 26 March 2015. The applicant lodged several procedural applications with the court, in particular challenging experts. The applicant also challenged the judges again; the presiding judge was changed following a decision of the president of the court on 20 May 2015. 15.  On 22 May 2015 the Szczecin Regional Court gave a judgment in which it dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the ZUS decision of 29 January 2010. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 27 April 2016 the applicant submitted an application challenging all the judges of the Court of Appeal. In July 2016 the court granted her request for a legal aid lawyer and one was appointed to represent the applicant before the Supreme Court. 17.  On 10 January 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed her application challenging all the judges of the Szczecin Court of Appeal. 18.  The case file was returned to the Szczecin Court of Appeal for examination. The court ordered further expert opinions on the subjects of psychiatry and occupational medicine. The applicant refused to undergo a medical examination. The expert opinions were finally prepared on 31 August 2017. 19.  On 27 February 2018 the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 20.  On 25 April 2018 the court granted an application by the applicant for a legal aid lawyer for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal. 21.  A legal aid lawyer was appointed to represent her; however, the applicant requested the appointment of another lawyer. Afterwards she appointed a different lawyer of her choice and revoked power of attorney for her legal aid lawyer. 22.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer was asked to remedy some formal shortcomings in her cassation appeal and to pay a fee. 23.  On 17 August 2018 the cassation appeal was sent to the Supreme Court. 24.  The proceedings are pending. 25.  The applicant lodged several complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about breaches of the right to have a case examined, in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w post\u0119powaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i post\u0119powaniu s\u0105dowym bez nieuzasadnionej zw\u0142oki - \u201cthe 2004 Act\u201d). 26.  On 4 January 2013, 17 February 2014 and 29 June 2015 the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed her complaints. The court, relying on Convention principles, considered that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. In particular, in the second of the above-mentioned decisions, the court agreed that the proceedings in the case had concentrated on the examination of the applicant\u2019s applications for legal aid and her applications challenging the experts and judges. The applicant and her representative had been very active in lodging numerous unfounded applications and appeals, including seeking to appeal after they had been instructed that no further appeal was available under the law. The large number of those applications had made it virtually impossible to deal with the merits of the case. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 17 February 2014, although no such remedy was available under the law. Her appeal and a further request to reopen the proceedings were rejected by the Szczecin Court of Appeal in May 2014. 28.  Some other complaints about the length of the proceedings were rejected as they had been lodged less than twelve months following a previous decision under the 2004 Act. On 26 February 2018 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s most recent complaint about the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal as it had not been lodged by a lawyer. 29.  A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings \u2013 in particular, the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act \u2013 is set out in the Court\u2019s decisions in the cases of Charzy\u0144ski v.Poland ((dec.), no. 15212/03, \u00a7\u00a7 12-23, ECHR 2005-V) and Ratajczyk v. Poland ((dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005-VIII), and in its judgments in the cases of Krasuski v. Poland (no. 61444/00, \u00a7\u00a7 34-46, ECHR 2005-V (extracts)) and Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (nos. 72287/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 75-107, 7 July 2015).", "references": ["5", "1", "7", "8", "4", "6", "0", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "4.  On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract (\u201cthe contract\u201d) with the Ministry of Finance (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (\u0432\u043e \u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0432\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0435\u0432\u0440\u0430). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430 y\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5.  On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company\u2019s protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u041e\u0445\u0440\u0438\u0434) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0411\u0438\u0442\u043e\u043b\u0430), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6.  On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency\u2019s domestic rate (\u0434\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0430) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (\u0420\u0435\u04321. \u0431\u0440. 74/2012). 7.  The applicant company\u2019s claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company\u2019s representative on 31 March 2014. 8.  On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9.  In judgments \u0420\u0435\u0432.1 \u0431\u0440. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, \u0420\u0435\u0432.1 \u0431\u0440.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and \u0420\u0435\u0432. \u0431\u0440. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency\u2019s domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (\u0422\u0421\u0416 \u0431\u0440. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and \u0422\u0421\u0416 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).", "references": ["0", "2", "6", "9", "1", "7", "5", "4", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently detained in the Kyiv pre-trial detention centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 7.  On 1 June 2017 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping. 8.  On 2 June 2017 the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court agreed with the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention which had been advanced by the investigator, but did not mention them in its decision. The decision merely stated that the reasons advanced by the investigator were sufficient for the court to conclude that the applicant might try to abscond from justice, obstruct the investigation, and influence the other suspect or witnesses in the proceedings. No further details were provided by the court. On 3 August 2017 the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 9.  On 6 June 2017 the applicant was placed in the Kyiv SIZO. 10.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation the applicant\u2019s detention was extended a number of times, including on 27 July, 22 and 28 September, and 15 and 29 November 2017. The reasons for extending his detention were the severity of the possible sanction, the need to take additional investigative and procedural steps, and the fact that the existing risks [of the applicant\u2019s absconding or obstructing the criminal proceedings] were still relevant. No further details were provided by the courts. On the last mentioned date the court maintained non-custodial preventive measures in respect of two co-accused. 11.  On 13 December 2017 the Kagarlyk Court of Kyiv Region (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) committed the applicant for trial. The trial court maintained the custodial preventive measure in respect of the applicant, reiterating, without providing details, the same reasons which had been mentioned at the pre\u2011trial stage, namely that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the said crime; if released he might attempt to abscond from justice; the statutory penalty for the crime was up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment along with confiscation of all property; and, being a foreign national, he had no permanent place of residence in Ukraine and was unemployed. 12.  During the trial the applicant\u2019s detention was again extended a number of times, including on 9 February, 28 March, 24 April, 13 June, 11 September, 7 November 2018 and 11 February 2019. The reasons for extending his detention were similar to those mentioned in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 above. No further details were provided by the courts. 13.  In the decisions taken on 22 September and 13 December 2017, 28 March, 13 June and 11 September 2018, and 7 November and 11 February 2019, the courts also referred to the fact that the applicant was a national of the Russian Federation, and might therefore escape justice abroad as he had not handed in his passport, had no permanent place of residence, no social ties in Ukraine and was unemployed. No further details or reasons for the relevant decision were provided by the courts in that regard. 14.  In the course of the proceedings in respect of the extension of his detention, on 28 September and 13 December 2017, 28 March, 24 April, 13 June, 11 September, 7 November 2018, and 11 February 2019 the applicant raised objections. He argued, inter alia, that his state of health was unsatisfactory as he had recently suffered a stroke, that he had a stable family relationship, and that he had not attempted to abscond from justice. 15.  In particular, on 13 December 2017, 7 February, 21 March, and 23 April 2018 the applicant applied to the court to change the preventive measure for house arrest. He stated that he suffered from cardiac and neurological conditions and that his state of health required treatment in a specialised medical facility outside the SIZO; that he had a permanent residence permit issued by the Ukrainian authorities; and that he had had a civil partner and two children born in Ukraine. He further stated that a non\u2011custodial preventive measure had been applied to his two co-accused in the course of the pre-trial investigation, and the fact that they were at liberty had not obstructed the investigation. It appears from the relevant decisions that the courts did not address the above-mentioned arguments. 16.  According to the available information, between September and November 2017 an ambulance was called ten times to provide the applicant with urgent treatment or to take him outside the SIZO. Additionally, on hearing days, notably on 13 December 2017, 16 January, 9 February, 24 April and 8 May 2018, he was taken to the trial court by ambulance in view of his poor health. 17.  According to the available information, the applicant is currently detained in the Kyiv SIZO pending examination of his case by the trial court. 18.  According to the Government, when he was placed in the SIZO (see paragraph 9 above), the applicant did not raise any health complaints. 19.  Since 6 July 2017 the applicant has been treated in the SIZO medical unit in connection with, inter alia, ischemic heart disease and second\u2011stage hypertension. 20.  On 3 September 2017 an ambulance took the applicant to the Kyiv Medical Emergency Hospital (\u201cthe Emergency Hospital\u201d) where he was diagnosed with a haemorrhagic stroke and third\u2011stage hypertension. He was provided with urgent treatment. 21.  On 8 September 2017 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and returned to the SIZO with medical prescriptions and recommendations for further treatment. His medical condition was assessed as being of medium gravity. 22.  On 13 September 2017 the applicant consulted a neurologist and a cardiologist, who prescribed medication in view of his diagnosis (see paragraph 20 above) and recommended further in-patient treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology. It was also recommended that he undergo a magnetic resonance tomography (\u201cMRT\u201d), massages and rehabilitation exercises. In a further recommendation of 2 October 2017 the neurologist stated that a lack of adequate medical treatment could result in another intracerebral hemorrhage and disability. The neurologist also stated that by 13 September 2017 the applicant had needed further examinations and treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology, in order to specify the further treatment to be prescribed. 23.  In the course of the court hearing on 21 September 2017 the applicant felt unwell. An ambulance transported him to the Emergency Hospital where he consulted a neurosurgeon and a therapist, and underwent a spiral computed tomography (CT) scan of the brain. He was recommended further supervision by a neurologist and sent back to the SIZO. 24.  On the same day the District Court ordered the Kyiv SIZO administration to ensure that the applicant underwent an urgent forensic examination. The parties did not inform the Court whether that order had been implemented. 25.  On 29 September and 10 October 2017 the applicant consulted a neurologist, who prescribed him medication and massage of the limbs of the left side of the body. 26.  On 29 December 2017 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer that the SIZO had no cardiologist or rehabilitation physician on its staff. An MRT scanner was not available either. Medical treatment for those suffering from cardiac diseases was provided by a therapist. According to the case-file material, an MRT scan was eventually carried out on 15 January 2018 in an outside facility, allegedly at the expense of the applicant\u2019s wife. 27.  On 3 January 2018 the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer requested the Kyiv Bureau for Forensic Medical Examinations to carry out a forensic examination with a view to establishing, inter alia, what medical conditions the applicant was suffering from and whether he required medical treatment. 28.  In the course the above-mentioned examination the forensic experts studied the applicant\u2019s medical file and examined him in person. In their opinion of 2 February 2018 the forensic experts concluded that the applicant was suffering from cerebrovascular disease, acute stroke (3 September 2017), discirculatory encephalopathy, and third-degree hypertension. From his symptoms at the time of examination it was evident that he had had repeated acute strokes and that further examination and in-patient treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology were imperative. 29.  On 9 February and 6 March 2018 the SIZO administration replied to the defence lawyer\u2019s applications for the applicant\u2019s transfer to a specialised medical facility, informing him that such a transfer would be possible if the relevant documentation confirming the readiness of the medical facility in question to admit the applicant for treatment, were presented. 30.  On 8 May 2018 the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer applied to the trial court, seeking the applicant\u2019s transfer to a medical facility specialising in neurology with a view to his further examination and in-patient treatment. On the same day the trial court allowed that application and ordered the applicant\u2019s transfer to a relevant medical facility of the applicant\u2019s choice and at his or his relatives\u2019 expense. 31.  On 11 May 2018 the SIZO authorities informed the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer that his client\u2019s transfer for treatment would be possible if he presented relevant documentation confirming the readiness of the medical facility in question to admit the applicant for treatment. The lawyer was further informed that the applicant was being provided with symptomatic treatment at the SIZO. 32.  On 4 June 2018 the applicant was transferred to Kyiv City Hospital no. 4 for treatment. A number of tests and examinations were carried out and medication was prescribed. On 22 June 2018 he was discharged and sent back to the SIZO with an insignificant improvement in his health. 33.  On 5 July 2018 the applicant was recognised as a person suffering from a category 2 disability. The second category is the intermediary one, the first constituting the severest level of disability and the third the least severe. The applicant was also recommended rehabilitation treatment. 34.  The parties did not inform the Court about the treatment the applicant had been provided with after July 2018.", "references": ["8", "3", "4", "6", "9", "5", "7", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first, second and third applicants were born in 1981, 1973 and 1984 respectively. Since 2004 they have been serving life sentences in correctional colonies in Ukraine. 7.  On 11 July 2003 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Code on the Execution of Sentences of Ukraine (\u201cthe Code\u201d). Article 150 of the Code (\u201cPlace of serving life imprisonment\u201d) provided that life prisoners were to serve their sentences in maximum-security correctional colonies. Article 151 (\u201cProcedure for, and conditions of, the execution and serving of life sentences\u201d) further provided, inter alia, that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every six months. No reference to prisoners\u2019 gender was made in those Articles. At the same time, Article 18 (\u201cCorrectional colonies\u201d) provided that female life prisoners were to serve their sentences in medium-security colonies. In turn, Article 139 (\u201cMedium-security correctional colonies\u201d) provided that prisoners serving their sentences in such colonies were entitled, inter alia, to have one short visit every month and one long visit every three months. Article 110 specified that a short visit from relatives or other persons could last for up to four hours and a long visit from close relatives could last for up to three days. 8.  By a letter of 27 June 2007 the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences informed the second applicant, in reply to a letter sent by him on an earlier date, that female life prisoners were entitled to have one long visit every three months, as provided by Article 139 of the Code, given that they served their sentences in medium-security colonies, as provided by Article 18 of the Code. Referring, in particular, to Article 151 of the Code, the Department further stated that male life prisoners were entitled to have one short visit every six months and that they were not entitled to have long visits. 9.  On 21 January 2010 the Code was amended (\u201cthe 2010 amendments\u201d). Article 150, as amended, stated that persons sentenced to life imprisonment were to serve their sentences as follows: male prisoners \u2011 either in maximum-security sectors of medium-security correctional colonies or in maximum-security correctional colonies; and female prisoners \u2013 either in medium-security sectors of minimum-security correctional colonies with general conditions of detention or in medium-security correctional colonies. Article 151, as amended, stated that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every three months. A newly introduced Article 151\u00b2 (\u201cSpecifics regarding the serving of sentences by female life prisoners\u201d) provided that female life prisoners were to be placed, as a rule, in medium-security sectors of minimum-security colonies with general conditions of detention. It also provided that female life prisoners were to be subject to the regime laid down for prisoners held in medium\u2011security colonies (that is, the regime provided for in Article 139 of the Code). 10.  By the Law of 8 April 2014 on the introduction of amendments to the Code relating to the adaptation of status of convicted persons to European standards the Code was amended again (\u201cthe 2014 amendments\u201d). Article 151 was amended to entitle all life prisoners to one short visit every month and one long visit every three months regardless of the type of correctional colony in which they were detained or the security regime to which they were subject. 11.  Further amendments to Article 151 of the Code, which were passed by Parliament on 7 September 2016, entitled all life prisoners to one long visit every two months. 12.  The first applicant stated that he and his family had wished to maintain their relationships, but as the result of the absence of the right to long visits until 2014 he had had to divorce his wife. His father, grandfather and grandmother had died in 2008, 2009 and 2014 respectively and he had not been able to see them while serving his sentence. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the first applicant had received twenty-eight short visits on unspecified dates and fifteen long visits (between 17 March 2015 and 6 July 2018) from his new wife, mother and his other grandmother. 13.  The second applicant stated that, because of the lack of the opportunity to have long visits until 2014, he had lost contact with his family. His relatives had died \u2013 in particular he referred to his father having died in 2012 \u2013 and when the 2014 amendments entitled him to long visits, there had no longer been anyone to visit him. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the second applicant had had one short visit in 2005 (from his sister) and had not requested any long visits. 14.  The third applicant stated that, in the absence of the right to long visits until 2014, his right to found a family had been more declaratory than effective as, in particular, he had not been able to have any physical contact in order to conceive children. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the third applicant had had twelve short visits (between 25 July 2012 and 26 December 2017) and fourteen long visits (between 5 August 2014 and 6 February 2018) from his wife, mother, father and friends.", "references": ["3", "2", "9", "6", "5", "7", "1", "0", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Skopje. 5.  On 7 May 2005 a person holding a handgun stopped a car driven by F.N. and fired several shots in his direction, as a consequence of which F.N. died on the spot, and J.T., an Albanian national who had been in the passenger seat, was injured. J.T. was taken to hospital, where he was interviewed by the police. An on-site examination was also carried out. 6.  On 8 May 2005 the police presented J.T. with photographs of potential suspects, from which he identified the applicant as the person who had fired at him and F.N. 7.  The next morning the police conducted a search of the applicant\u2019s house, where he lived with his parents, and recovered a handgun. Subsequent to the search, the applicant was arrested. 8.  On the same day an identification parade was organised by the police, in which J.T. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. 9.  On 11 May 2005 J.T. gave a statement before an investigating judge and a prosecutor. According to the record of the examination, the applicant\u2019s lawyer had agreed to the interview taking place in his absence. J.T. stated that he had been asked to work on F.N.\u2019s house as a handyman. He had arrived in Skopje on the day of the murder and he had been picked up by F.N. On their way to the house, a young man holding a handgun, around 24-25 years old, had intercepted the car. When F.N. had tried to open the car door the man had fired several times, killing F.N. and injuring J.T. The man had been standing in close proximity to the car when he had fired and J.T. had been able to see his face clearly. 10.  On 6 July 2005 the applicant was indicted for murder and attempted murder before the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d). The prosecution proposed to call J.T. as a witness. 11.  On 30 September 2005 the trial court requested that the Ministry of Justice (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) summon J.T. via diplomatic means, as he had returned to Albania. The trial court was not informed as to whether J.T. had received the summons. 12.  At a hearing held on 22 November 2005 the applicant testified. He was disoriented and claimed to have no knowledge of the murder. A psychiatrist who attended the hearing as an expert clarified that that was as a result of his reduced mental capacity. Given the severity of his condition, the expert expressed concerns about how the applicant could have arrived at the place of the crime, which was located some 8-9 kilometres from his house (\u043d\u0435 \u0431\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u0434\u0430 \u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0430\u043c \u043a\u0430\u043a\u043e \u0441\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u043e \u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u0447\u0438). 13.  At the same hearing two of the applicant\u2019s neighbours testified. M.J. stated that he had seen the applicant at home at the time of the murder. A.M. stated that he had seen the applicant in front of his house at about the same time, adding that the applicant could only walk very short distances unaccompanied. 14.  On 23 November 2005 the trial court sent another summons to J.T. through the Ministry. 15.  A hearing scheduled for 16 February 2006 was postponed on account of J.T.\u2019s absence. There was no information as to whether he had received the summons. On the same day the trial court requested information regarding the summons of 23 November 2005. The Ministry responded that it had forwarded the summons to the Albanian authorities and that the trial court should allow more time between hearings to ensure a timely delivery of the summons. 16.  A hearing scheduled for 14 March 2006 was postponed owing to the absence of J.T., who had not been summoned properly. The trial judge sent another summons to J.T. via diplomatic means. The Ministry again informed the trial judge that she should allow more time between hearings. 17.  The trial court held four hearings and sent four summonses to J.T. in the period between June 2006 and December 2007. One summons was not delivered to him until after the hearing had taken place. He was properly summoned for another hearing, but he did not appear. 18.  On a hearing dated 29 January 2008, the trial court admitted into evidence the statement that J.T. had given before the investigating judge, stating that it had made numerous attempts to secure his attendance. It concluded that J.T. had been properly served with several summonses, but had failed to appear. In view of the above, it ruled that there were justified reasons to admit his statement into evidence. In his closing argument, given at the same hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyer protested against that decision. He argued that admitting J.T.\u2019s statement into evidence was a violation of section 351 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, by which the trial court had to provide the defence with an opportunity to cross-examine him. Failing that, a judgment could not be based merely on his statement. 19.  On 7 February 2008 the trial court acquitted the applicant, holding that there had been no nitrate particles found on his body, the handgun that had been seized from the his house had not been the one used in the murder and there was no fingerprint evidence to suggest that he had been the perpetrator. The sole evidence in support of the prosecution had been the evidence provided by J.T., which was insufficient for a conviction. 20.  The Skopje Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435) quashed the judgment, finding that the lower court had not given adequate weight to the evidence provided by J.T. 21.  After two more remittals, on 24 October 2013 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and ordered him to undergo compulsory psychiatric treatment. It reiterated its earlier findings (see paragraph 19 above), but concluded that the applicant had been guilty of the crimes on the basis of the on-site examination, the statement of J.T., the identification parade and the fact that J.T. had identified the applicant from the photographs. 22.  The applicant appealed, asking that J.T. be cross-examined. He further stated that there was no basis in domestic law to admit J.T.\u2019s statement into evidence and that all remaining evidence pointed to his innocence. 23.  On 4 July 2014, after holding a public hearing, the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the judgment finding that the evidence produced by J.T. had been admitted in compliance with section 351 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.", "references": ["0", "5", "4", "6", "8", "7", "1", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  On 7 July 2000 the applicant company and the Ukrvuglegeologiya State Company (\u201cthe UVG\u201d), an administrative entity of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine represented by its own administrative entity, the Sevastopol\u2011based Izumrud Recreation Centre (\u201cthe IRC\u201d), concluded a ten\u2011year rental agreement, under which the applicant company rented bedroom block no. 3 (\u201cblock no. 3\u201d) in the IRC from the UVG. 6.  Subsequently, the applicant company and the IRC concluded an additional agreement under which the former undertook to repair block no. 3, as previously approved by the UVG. The applicant company duly repaired it. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant company applied to the Sevastopol office of the State Property Fund of Ukraine (\u201cthe Fund\u201d) seeking the privatisation of block no. 3. In turn, the latter sought approval from the Ministry, which in a letter of 6 August 2003 stated that it did not object. 8.  By a decision of 8 December 2003 the Fund included block no. 3 in the list of property to be subjected to privatisation. 9.  On 26 December 2003 the Fund\u2019s Sevastopol office adopted a decision to privatise block no. 3 by entering into a contract selling it to the applicant company for 552,756 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH). This sum represented the block\u2019s market value minus the value of the repairs made to it by the applicant company (UAH 375,295), as established in an expert report prepared on 30 November 2003 by the I. company at the office\u2019s request. On the same date it concluded a sale contract with the applicant company, and the latter registered its title to block no. 3 with a notary. 10.  In view of the above-mentioned contract, on 12 February 2004 the applicant company and the IRC terminated the rental agreement of 7 July 2000. 11.  According to the applicant company, despite the above-mentioned contract, the UVG retained block no. 3 on its books. Moreover, in 2005 the block was disconnected from the IRC\u2019s electricity and water supplies. 12.  In August 2005 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court against the UVG, asking the court to oblige the UVG to remove block no. 3 from its books and to reconnect it to the IRC\u2019s networks. In turn, the UVG lodged a counterclaim against the applicant company and the Fund\u2019s Sevastopol office, seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003, alleging that the IRC and block no. 3 had not been eligible for privatisation. 13.  By a judgment of 1 February 2006, the court partly allowed the claim and dismissed the counterclaim. It stated that the applicant company was the owner of block no. 3, having obtained title to it following its privatisation, which had not been declared invalid. As regards the alleged invalidity of the contract of 26 December 2003, it held that: (1) it was the Fund itself, rather than its Sevastopol office, which had made the decision on privatisation, and that decision was not being contested; (2) block no. 3 was privatised not as an \u201cintegral property complex\u201d (\u0446\u0456\u043b\u0456\u0441\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441) but as an \u201cindividually determined immovable property\u201d (\u0456\u043d\u0434\u0438\u0432\u0456\u0434\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e \u2013 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u043a\u0442 \u043d\u0435\u0440\u0443\u0445\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456) which, in accordance with the law, could be privatised; and that (3) the UVG had failed to prove that block no. 3 belonged to the category of objects of cultural, historical or national importance which, under the law, could not be privatised. The court thus ordered the UVG to remove block no. 3 from its books and to reconnect it to the IRC\u2019s utility networks. 14.  On 21 March 2006 the Commercial Court of Appeal of the Donetsk Region quashed the above-mentioned judgment on the grounds that the case had to be examined by the Sevastopol City Commercial Court. On 21 June 2006 the Higher Commercial Court quashed that decision as erroneous and upheld the judgment of 1 February 2006.  On 23 August 2006 the Supreme Court refused to allow an appeal by the UVG against the decision of 21 June 2006. 15.  In the meantime, on 20 December 2005 the Ministry for the Coal Industry (the successor to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy) decided to reorganise the UVG by singling out its structural unit, the IRC, and creating on its base the Izumrud Recreation Centre State Enterprise (\u201cthe IRC State Enterprise\u201d). The IRC State Enterprise was stated to be UVG\u2019s successor in relation to the activities connected with its former structural unit, the IRC. 16.  On 23 October 2006 the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court allowed a request by the applicant company and replaced the UVG with its successor, the IRC State Enterprise, as a party in proceedings instituted for the enforcement of the judgment of 1 February 2006 which remained unenforced. 17.  On 4 June 2007 bailiffs informed the applicant company that they had two mutually exclusive writs of execution: one concerning the judgment of 1 February 2006 and another one concerning a judgment of 13 October 2006 (see paragraph 21 below). They sent a letter to the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court, asking it to clarify how the judgment of 1 February 2006 was to be enforced. It appears that they did not receive any reply and accordingly stayed the enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 24 April 2007 the IRC State Enterprise lodged a request with the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court for a review of the judgment of 1 February 2006 under a procedure relating to newly discovered circumstances. Referring to findings made in the judgment of 13 October 2006, it considered that the judgment of 1 February 2006 had lost its legal effect and asked the court to quash it. 19.  On 4 June 2008 the court returned the request unexamined, as the IRC State Enterprise had subsequently withdrawn its request, having failed both to explain the reasons for it and to send a representative to the court hearings. 20.  In September 2006 the IRC State Enterprise lodged a claim with the Sevastopol City Commercial Court against the Fund\u2019s Sevastopol office and the applicant company, seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003. In response, the applicant company sought the discontinuation of the proceedings, arguing, with reference to Article 80 of the 1991 Code of Commercial Procedure, that the same dispute between the same parties had already been resolved by the judgment of 1 February 2006. 21.  By a judgment of 13 October 2006, the court partly allowed the claim. It stated that the UVG, a geological-service enterprise, was a company of national importance. It thus belonged to the category of State property that had not been eligible for privatisation. At the moment of conclusion of the contract of 26 December 2003, block no. 3 had been part of the UVG\u2019s integral property complex. The IRC was a structural unit of the UVG and its property could not be privatised. Therefore, the Fund\u2019s inclusion of block no. 3 in the list of objects for privatisation had been in breach of the law. The court thus invalidated the contract of 26 December 2003, ordered the applicant company to return block no. 3 to the State and ordered the State to refund UAH 552,756 to the applicant company. As to the applicant company\u2019s request, the court held that by the time the case had been resolved by the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court, the IRC had been reorganised into an independent legal entity and its property rights had been transferred to the IRC State Enterprise. The UVG had not therefore been a proper party to the proceedings and it could not have put forward any counterclaims seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003. The applicant had thus failed to prove that the courts had already decided a claim by the IRC State Enterprise in relation to the same object and grounds. 22.  On 10 November 2006 the Sevastopol Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. As to the applicant company\u2019s objections, it stated that it was the IRC State Enterprise, and not the UVG, which should have been the proper respondent (counterclaimant) in the case when the judgment of 1 February 2006 was adopted, and that the applicant company had failed to prove that the same dispute with the IRC State Enterprise had already been decided by the courts. 23.  On 21 December 2006 the Higher Commercial Court partly amended the judgment of 13 October 2006 and removed from it an order that UAH 552,756 be refunded to the applicant company. It held that under domestic law in the event of the invalidation of a sale of privatised objects, money paid by buyers for such objects was to be refunded, on the basis of a court decision, from the proceeds of their onward sale. 24.  On 20 February 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the above decision.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "7", "1", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The present case concerns criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was Minister of Defence in the period between July 2000 and May 2001, and three other defendants (K.Gj., V.T. and Lj.P.). The applicant and K.Gj., who was undersecretary (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440) in the Ministry of Defence (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) at the time, were convicted of abuse of office (\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0438 \u043e\u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435) in relation to two procurement contracts (for food and construction services) concluded in December 2000 between the Ministry and HS (\u201cthe company\u201d) that had been owned at the time by Z.S. and his wife, M.S. In February 2001, the company was bought by Lj.P. and V.T. \u2013 the applicant\u2019s father-in-law and brother-in-law respectively. The latter contract concerned construction of army housing in a military base (\u043a\u0430\u0441\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430) in Skopje. 6.  In spring 2001 an armed conflict broke out in the respondent State. 7.  On an unspecified date in 2001, an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435 \u2013 \u201cthe trial court\u201d) opened an investigation in respect of the applicant, K.Gj., Lj.P. and V.T., because of a reasonable suspicion of abuse of office. Several witnesses were examined and a forensic accounting report was commissioned. 8.  On 11 June 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from K.K., a Ministry official. He stated that K.Gj. had asked him to meet with Lj.P. to sign the construction contract and told him that the applicant had insisted on having the contract urgently signed. He had met with Lj.P., but an issue had arisen when, erroneously, a certain company called M. had been indicated as the supplier. At that point Lj.P. had called the applicant and told him \u201cthis [had] not [been] our company, ours [had been the company HS]\u201d. 9.  On 18 June 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from the applicant, who denied the charges against him. 10.  On 26 October 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from Z.S. solely in the presence of the public prosecutor. He denied any personal acquaintance with the applicant and stated that Lj.P. had asked him to make a bid to supply food to the Ministry. He further affirmed that V.T. had signed the contracts on behalf of the company, although he had not authorised him to represent the company. After Z.S. had found out about the bank transfers from the Ministry, Lj.P. and V.T. had threatened that he would sell the company to them. 11.  On 23 November 2001 the public prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the trial court against the four defendants. The applicant and K.Gj. were indicted on charges of abuse of office and Lj.P. and V.T. were charged with inciting them to commit the offence. The applicant was also charged with ordering K.Gj. to conclude the two public-procurement contracts on behalf of the Ministry with the company, contrary to the procedure provided by the Public Procurement Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0431\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0438, Official Gazette no.26/98). The prosecutor proposed that certain evidence be admitted at trial, and requested that the court summon witnesses, including Z.S. 12.  On 11 March 2002 a three-judge panel of the trial court confirmed the indictment dismissing the defendants\u2019 objections as unfounded. 13.  All four defendants gave oral statements at the trial. The applicant gave his statement at the trial hearing held on 13 June 2003. Throughout these proceedings he maintained his innocence. The applicant denied any involvement in the procurement process regarding the two contracts and challenged K.Gj.\u2019s allegations as untrue (see paragraph 14 below). He maintained that the procurement process had been conducted through the Ministry\u2019s administration (\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0447\u043d\u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0438) and the undersecretary, that he had not been informed of the details of individual contracts and that the two contracts had been lawfully concluded. He insisted that had been unaware that his relatives had owned the company. 14.  His co-defendant, K.Gj., asserted that he had informed the applicant of the public-procurement decisions and acted on his orders. He affirmed that on the applicant\u2019s orders the construction contract that had been initially signed with the company M. had been invalidated and a new contract had been signed with company HS. Throughout the proceedings, K.Gj. maintained that the two contracts had been concluded in accordance with the law as they had been exempt from the regular process under the Public Procurement Act for the following reasons: the food contract had concerned urgent procurement; and the construction contract had concerned issues of security and defence. 15.  The other two co-defendants, V.T. and Lj.P., maintained that the takeover of the company had been mutually agreed. V.T. asserted that he had signed the two contracts on Z.S.\u2019s instructions and with proper authorisation. Lj.P. claimed that he had intended to fulfil all contractual obligations, but the construction had been stalled owing to the breakout of armed conflict. 16.  At a hearing held on 11 September 2003 the trial court, despite the objections of the defence, read out Z.S.\u2019s pre-trial statement (see paragraph 10 above) since police enquiries had confirmed that he had left the country for the United States. At the same hearing, the court heard evidence from other witnesses, including M.S., who maintained that neither she, nor her husband had authorised V.T. to sign contracts on behalf of the company. She confirmed that her husband had asked her to sign the documents for the takeover of the company and that he had been scared. V.M. (M.\u2019s owner) also testified, confirming that the Ministry had withdrawn from the construction contract that had been initially signed with his company. 17.  On 3 November 2003 the trial court convicted the defendants as charged, except Lj.P., the proceedings against whom had been separated. On 2 March 2004 this judgment had been quashed by the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435 \u2013 \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) which gave detailed instructions to the trial court. It noted that the trial court had not made sufficient efforts to hear evidence from Z.S., whose testimony was considered as key evidence (\u043a\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437). His examination was considered relevant in the context of V.T.\u2019s role in the case and the use of the funds transferred by the Ministry to the company. The trial court also needed to examine those Ministry officials that had participated in the procurement procedure regarding the contracts in order to establish whether the defence arguments regarding the lawfulness of the contracts were valid. Lastly, all relevant facts needed to be established regarding the execution of the two contracts, including the existence of any objective difficulties in this regard. 18.  In the re-trial proceedings, the trial court commissioned an addendum to the forensic accounting report and an additional expert report regarding the construction contract. The first hearing in the re-trial proceedings was held on 13 September 2005. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court held numerous hearings, examined a number of witnesses and admitted other documents and expert evidence (see paragraph 20 below). It joined the case against Lj.P. to the applicant\u2019s case. The court heard evidence from the Ministry officials who had participated in the construction services and food procurement and examined K.K., who maintained his earlier statements (see paragraph 8 above). Several hearings were postponed on account of health reasons in respect of some of the defendants. 19.  At the hearing held on 27 April 2006 the trial court admitted the written record of Z.S.\u2019s pre-trial statement as evidence on basis of section 351(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 29 below) since securing his attendance at the trial would have been extremely difficult and might have prolonged the proceedings, given that repeated police enquiries had confirmed his residence in the United States. Moreover, sufficient evidence had been adduced regarding the facts that needed to be established from his testimony. The defence objected to his statement and argued that his presence was required in order to establish all relevant facts, particularly regarding V.T.\u2019s authorisation to represent the company and Z.S.\u2019s alleged use of company funds. They argued that Z.S.\u2019s address abroad had been known and the trial court could have summoned him through diplomatic channels. 20.  At the same hearing, the court admitted documentary evidence, including: financial and other documents related to the company; official documents from the Ministry related to the procurement process and the two contracts; and several letters from the Ministry sent in reply to enquiries made by the trial court. The defence challenged the veracity of the letters and applied to have the signatories examined at the trial. They proposed that further documentary evidence be taken into evidence, including the full case file from the Ministry regarding the contracts. These proposals were rejected as the trial court found no reason to doubt the veracity of the letters and considered that all relevant documents had already been submitted and any further requests were aimed only at prolonging the trial. 21.  At the hearings held on 10 and 17 November 2006 the defence reiterated their request to examine the signatories of the letters (see paragraph 20 above) and some other witnesses and proposed as evidence written material (including army reports and documents, government transcripts and media articles related to the armed conflict) in order that the court establish the relevant facts in respect of the circumstances related to the procurement process, the execution of the contracts, the influence of the deteriorating security situation and Z.S.\u2019s role in the company\u2019s affairs. The trial court refused to admit the request, finding that sufficient evidence had already been adduced regarding the relevant facts that were to be established from the proposed evidence. 22.  On 29 December 2006 the trial court convicted the defendants as charged and ordered them to compensate jointly the Ministry for the damage caused. The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. Relying on a considerable amount of evidence, including the testimony of Ministry officials who had participated in the two contracts and other witnesses, written material related to the procurement, two expert reports and the statements of the two experts at the trial, the trial court concluded the two contracts had not been awarded in a process compliant with the rules of public procurement. It was established that the food contract could not be considered as urgent procurement. As to the construction contract, the court found that there had been neither a legal framework governing the construction of military housing on the site of the base, nor a clear decision or plan for the particular location, which suggested that the defendants\u2019 choice of location had been aimed at circumventing the public-procurement rules. The company had not been officially registered for construction activity at the time of award of the contracts, only subsequently. The trial court also found that any reasons related to the inability to execute the contracts had been irrelevant. 23.  The trial court dismissed the applicant\u2019s defence, relying on the statements of K.Gj. and K.K., who confirmed his involvement with the impugned contracts (see paragraphs 8 and 14 above). A written order signed by the applicant requiring that all procurement was to be executed according to the plan and that he should be notified of the process was considered as a further confirmation of his involvement. Referring to Z.S.\u2019s statement, the trial court dismissed V.T. and Lj.P.\u2019s defence, holding that his and M.S.\u2019s statements had proven that these two defendants had taken over the company with threats, as part of their plan to obtain unlawful pecuniary gain (see paragraphs 10 and 16 above). 24.  As to the refused evidence, it reiterated the reasons given at the trial hearings (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). Z.S.\u2019s statement had been admitted into evidence because it would be difficult to secure his presence at the trial as he resided at an address in California in the United States of America. 25.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had dismissed all his applications to introduce evidence (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above) which aimed to prove: (i) that the deteriorating security situation had justified the urgent food procurement and impeded the execution of the construction contract; (ii) that any construction in the military base had fallen under the \u201csecurity\u201d exception of the public-procurement rules. The trial court had also failed to secure the presence of Z.S. at the trial, despite the Court of Appeal\u2019s instructions, and had refused evidence to disprove his testimony. 26.  On 18 and 19 September 2007 the Court of Appeal held a public hearing at which it dismissed the defendants\u2019 appeals. It found that all relevant facts had been correctly established and that the trial court had complied with its instructions. It considered that the refused evidence, which had mostly concerned the inability to execute the construction contract, had been irrelevant for the case. The court referred to the statements of Z.S. and M.S. in the context of the use of their company in the impugned procurement process by V.T. and Lj.P., without commenting on Z.S.\u2019s absence from the trial. 27.  The applicant lodged an application for extraordinary review of the final judgment (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430) reiterating his complaints (see paragraph 25 above). 28.  On 20 May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgments and their findings regarding the lawfulness of the contracts. It found, inter alia, that the deteriorating security situation had not affected to the events in question. It further found that the trial court had admitted into the file evidence proposed by both the prosecution and the defence that had been necessary for establishing the relevant facts. The refusal to admit further evidence had not violated the defendants\u2019 right to defence, nor had it affected the lawful and correct adjudication of the case.", "references": ["1", "4", "5", "0", "8", "9", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Yalta, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 7.  On 11 October 1997, following a purchase agreement, the applicant became owner of flat no. 2 at 1 Pushkinska Street in Yalta (\u201cthe Pushkinska flat\u201d) in a multi-dwelling building which had been built before 1917 (\u201cthe Pushkinska building\u201d) and was a municipal property. The flat had one room and measured 37.5 sq. m. According to the applicant, she did not reside in the flat and rented it out in the summer as it was located in the historic part of the city centre and next to the beach. 8.  At the beginning of 2005, all flats in the Pushkinska building \u2013 with the exception of two which belonged to the applicant and K.\u2013 had been bought by a private construction company, JSC Zodiak-tsentr (hereinafter \u201cthe Company\u201d). 9.  On 22 September 2005 the Executive Committee of the Yalta City Council (\u201cthe Executive Committee\u201d) approved a report on the examination of the Pushkinska building issued by an interdepartmental commission set up by the Executive Committee. The report suggested that the building was in poor technical condition with its carrying walls unsafe. On the basis of the report, the Executive Committee classified the building as a dangerous structure and found that it was under a threat of collapse (\u201cDecree 1349\u201d). No copies of the report and Decree 1349 have been made available to the Court. 10.  On 5 October 2005 Yalta City Council (\u201cthe Council\u201d) and the Executive Committee concluded an agreement with the Company which provided, inter alia, that the Company would purchase two flats to move the applicant and the owner of another apartment from the dangerous building in exchange for granting to the Company title over the applicant\u2019s and the other person\u2019s flats and then over the building as a whole (\u201cthe agreement\u201d). The Council and the Executive Committee further undertook to take measures to evict the applicant from the dangerous building, to authorise the Company to demolish the Pushkinska building, and to grant a construction permit. The agreement was approved by the Council during its 19 October 2005 session. According to the applicant she was not aware of the agreement at the time. 11.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the Council adopted the general city development plan which, according to the applicant, envisaged the renovation of the Pushkinska building (\u043f\u0456\u0434\u043b\u044f\u0433\u0430\u0454 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0446\u0456\u0456 (\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044e)), with construction of an additional floor. No copy of the plan has been made available to the Court. 12.  To comply with the agreement, the Company purchased flat no. 1 at 23 Sosnova Street (\u201cthe Sosnova flat\u201d) in Yalta as a replacement for the applicant. The flat measured 57.7 sq. m, had two rooms and was located away from Yalta city centre. The Council and the Executive Committee refused to take the apartment into municipal ownership. In this view, the Company instituted court proceedings against the Council and the Executive Committee for their failure to comply with the terms of the agreement. In judgments of 6 June 2006 and 10 October 2006 the Commercial Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol Commercial Court of Appeal respectively obliged the defendants to comply with their obligations under the agreement. On 22 March 2007 the Sosnova flat was transferred into municipal ownership. 13.  On 31 May 2007 the Executive Committee passed a decision by which it, inter alia, offered the Sosnova flat to the applicant. No copy of the relevant decree has been made available to the Court. 14.  On 16 June 2007, in a letter, the Executive Committee invited the applicant to appear, by 1 July 2007 at the latest, before the relevant body and obtain the title deeds (\u043e\u0440\u0434\u0435\u0440) to the Sosnova flat. The applicant did not respond to the offer as she believed the authorities\u2019 demand had no legal basis. 15.  On 17 July 2007 the Executive Committee applied to the Yalta City Court to have the applicant evicted and her title to the Pushkinska flat terminated, her moved to the Sosnova flat and her property rights over the latter flat established. It relied on Articles 109, 110 and 112 of the Housing Code and Articles 321 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code as the legal grounds for the claim (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). The Executive Committee noted, in particular, that the Pushkinska building was under the threat of collapse and that, as the body responsible for observance of the technical condition of buildings and rehousing of residents from dangerous ones, it did not wish to be answerable for any grave consequences which the dangerousness of the Pushkinska building might cause. 16.  On 4 October 2007 the Yalta City Court allowed the Executive Committee\u2019s application. 17.  On an unspecified date the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) remitted the case for fresh consideration to the first-instance court, noting that the Council, as the owner of the Sosnova flat, had not been involved in the proceedings. 18.  On 4 April 2008 the Council joined the proceedings as a co-plaintiff and supported the Executive Committee\u2019s claims. 19.  On 9 April 2008 the Yalta City Court found against the applicant. It annulled the applicant\u2019s title to the Pushkinska flat, ordered her eviction and rehousing in the Sosnova flat and vested her with the title to the latter flat. The court made the following findings: (a) it was not in dispute between the parties that the Pushkinska building was a municipal property and was maintained by a municipal company, and that it was the Executive Committee\u2019s task under the relevant laws to exercise control over the safety of buildings irrespective of their form of ownership; (b) in carrying out this obligation, the Executive Committee found that the building had been under the threat of collapse and these findings had been valid and had not been appealed against by any interested person. The agreement and the Council\u2019s decision of 19 October 2005 approving it were likewise valid; (c) pursuant to Article 112 of the Housing Code the Executive Committee had been obliged to provide the applicant with a replacement dwelling, which it had done, but the applicant had refused to move on a voluntary basis without providing any reasons; and (d) pursuant to the agreement, which had been approved by the Council, the Pushkinska building was to be demolished, and not renovated, as claimed by the applicant, which made her return to the property impossible; she thus had to be evicted from that flat and moved to another apartment with her title to the Pushkinska flat annulled by the court, which would be in compliance with Article 346 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code. 20.  The Yalta City Court further found that the Sosnova flat constituted adequate compensation for the applicant in respect of the Pushkinska flat. It had more rooms and space than the Pushkinska flat and was in an appropriate condition and in the same city. The court also noted that the market value of the Sosnova flat, according to a sale agreement dated 2005, was higher than the starting price for the whole Pushkinska building. It thus concluded that the applicant\u2019s interests had been protected in full. 21.  The applicant appealed, stating, inter alia, that the deprivation of her property was unlawful. In particular, the Pushkinska flat was her private property and not that of the State and thus the provisions of the Housing Code, cited by the trial court, had been inapplicable to her situation and could not have served a basis for annulment of her title to the property. Article 346 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code was a reference provision which specified that a property right could be terminated in \u201cother cases provided for by the law\u201d but the court had failed to specify any legal provision providing for this \u201cother case\u201d. She further argued that there had been no public need behind deprivation of her flat but only private business interests, given that the title to the Pushkinska flat after her rehousing was to be given to the Company. Even assuming that the building was in poor structural condition, no proper decision existed suggesting that it would be subject to demolition. The applicant referred in that connection to Governmental Decree no. 189 of 26 April 1984, in accordance with which as it was within the Regional Council\u2019s ambit to decide, on the basis of a proposal by a city council, whether a building should be demolished or restored and stated that the Council had thus acted ultra vires when it had allowed the Company to demolish the building in the agreement. She also relied on the general city development plan, which had been adopted a year after the agreement, pursuant to which the Pushkinska building was to be renovated, with an additional floor constructed, but not demolished. She argued that her property thus would remain extant. 22.  The applicant further alleged that she, as the owner of the Pushkinska flat, had not been involved in any way in choosing the form of the compensation for her flat. She had not been a party to the agreement and at the time had not been informed at all of any intentions to void her property rights over the Pushkinska flat and to evict her. Then she was just presented with the fact that she had to move to an apartment chosen for her by the company, without her consent. The offered flat had not been of the same value as the Pushkinska flat and had not compensated her in full for her losses. She referred to the location of the Sosnova flat, the impossibility to profit from renting it out, and its poor general condition. In support, she provided an expert report, which stated that the building at no. 23 Sosnova Street was situated in a zone of active ground subsidence and that urgent and expensive construction work was necessary to prevent further damage. The applicant also disputed the fairness of the calculations used by the first-instance court, referring to the fact that, just before the Pushkinska building had been declared dangerous, the Company had bought several flats from the applicant\u2019s neighbours, which had been in poor condition, for very high prices \u2013 much higher than the building price referred to by the Council. Lastly, she argued that she could not have property rights over the Sosnova flat imposed on her against her will. 23.  On 17 June 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 April 2008. It reiterated that it had been correctly established by the first-instance court that the Pushkinska building had been under the threat of collapse and that in this situation, pursuant to Article 112 of the Housing Code, the applicant must be evicted and provided by the Executive Committee with another dwelling. It noted that the Executive Committee had complied with its obligation and by its Decision of 31 May 2007 had assigned a replacement dwelling to the applicant. 24.  The Court of Appeal then rejected as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s argument that the Executive Committee\u2019s demands had breached her property rights. It pointed out in that connection that Article 41 of the Constitution allowed deprivation of property in exceptional cases of public necessity, on the grounds of and by the procedure established by law, and \u2013 the court emphasised \u2013 on the condition of advance and complete compensation of its value. It noted that the Sosnova flat had complied with the requirements of Article 113 of the Housing Code and was more spacious than the Pushkinska flat. The applicant\u2019s rehousing in that flat was thus not in breach of her rights but in her own interests and her arguments to the contrary were unsubstantiated. 25.  On 18 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected an application for leave to appeal on points of law from the applicant. 26.  The applicant was unsuccessful in her attempts to reopen the proceedings under newly discovered and exceptional circumstances. 27.  On 26 August 2008 the applicant and her son were evicted from the Pushkinska flat and the documents confirming their property right over the Sosnova flat were served. 28.  On 9 July 2009 the Executive Committee granted the title to the Pushkinska flat to the Company. 29.  In 2018, in her comments on the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant informed the Court that the building at 1 Pushkinska Street had not been demolished but renovated, with an additional floor added on top, and had been converted into a privately owned hotel.", "references": ["6", "2", "7", "5", "4", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1976, 1972, 1976, 1970 and 1976 respectively. They are currently detained in Turkey. 6.  The applicants were secondary school teachers in a private chain of schools in Moldova called Orizont, which has been in operation since 1993. 7.  Mr Yasin Ozdil had lived in Moldova since 2015 with his wife and their two minor children. Mr Mujdat Celebi had lived in Moldova since 2014 with his wife and their three minor children. Mr Riza Dogan had lived in Moldova since 1993 with his wife and their two minor children, who are Moldovan citizens. Mr Sedat Hasan Karacaoglu had lived in Moldova since 1998 with his wife. Mr Mehmet Feridun Tufekci had lived in Moldova since 1993 together with his Moldovan wife and their two minor children, who are Moldovan citizens. All the applicants had valid residence permits for Moldova. 8.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the \u201cPeace at Home Council\u201d attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah G\u00fclen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FET\u00d6/PDY (\u201cG\u00fclenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure\u201d). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. In connection with the above events, the Turkish ambassador to Moldova accused the Orizont schools of ties to that movement and accused the teachers in those schools of terrorism. 9.  In May 2017 the Turkish Prime Minister visited Moldova and requested from his Moldovan counterpart the shutdown of the Orizont schools. 10.  On 31 March 2018 the principal of the Chi\u015fin\u0103u-based Orizont secondary school was arrested at Chi\u015fin\u0103u Airport and questioned for seven hours by the Moldovan secret service concerning allegations of supporting terrorist organisations. A criminal investigation was initiated against him and the preventive measure of a bar on leaving the country for ten days was imposed. 11.  In connection with the above events, on 6 April 2018 all the applicants applied to the Moldovan Bureau for Migration and Asylum (\u201cthe BMA\u201d) for asylum. They sought to obtain refugee status in Moldova because they feared reprisals in their country of origin, Turkey, on the grounds of their political views. 12.  On 10 April 2018 the charges against the principal of the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Orizont secondary school were dropped and the investigation was discontinued. On 5 May 2018 the applicants wrote to the competent authorities in Moldova and asked for information on whether there were any pending criminal investigations concerning them. In a letter dated 13 June 2018 the prosecutor\u2019s office specialising in organised crime wrote to the applicants, stating that there were no pending criminal investigations involving them. A similar letter was received by the applicants on 31 July 2018 from the anti-corruption prosecutor\u2019s office. 13.  On 6 September 2018 in the morning, seven teachers from the Orizont schools \u2013 among them the applicants \u2013 were arrested in their homes or on their way to work by individuals wearing plain clothes and taken to an unknown destination. Later in the day the Moldovan secret service issued several statements concerning a large anti-terrorist operation which had taken place that day, during which seven foreign nationals suspected of ties to an Islamist organisation had been arrested and removed from Moldova in cooperation with secret services from other countries. 14.  On the same day the Turkish media reported that the Turkish secret service had conducted a successful operation in Moldova, during which seven members of the Fethullah G\u00fclen movement had been arrested. 15.  On 6 September 2018 some of the members of the applicants\u2019 families, their colleagues from the schools and human rights defenders spent the day at the airport in the hope of stopping the applicants\u2019 deportation to Turkey. They expected the applicants to be taken to Turkey by the scheduled flight leaving later in the day. 16.  The fate of the applicants, and even whether they were still in Moldova, remained unknown to their families for several weeks. The Moldovan authorities refrained from communicating any information about them either to their families or to the press. 17.  It appeared later that on the very morning of their arrest the applicants were taken directly to Chi\u015fin\u0103u Airport, where an aeroplane chartered for that purpose was waiting for them and took them immediately to Turkey. 18.  On 7 September 2018, the head of the BMA, O.P., stated in an interview that the authority had not been involved in the case of the seven Orizont teachers and that the procedure for declaring them undesirable and removing them from Moldova had not been carried out by the BMA. 19.  Several days after the applicants\u2019 arrest, their families received letters from the BMA containing decisions dated 4 September 2018 in which the applicants\u2019 applications for asylum were rejected. The decisions contained a thorough analysis of the manner in which the G\u00fclen movement followers had been treated in Turkey and concluded that the applicants\u2019 fear of reprisals at the hands of the Turkish authorities were justified. In particular, the BMA found that the Turkish authorities had committed acts of harassment, threatening, arbitrary detentions and other serious human rights violations in respect of opposition leaders and members of the G\u00fclen movement. The BMA concluded that the applicants fulfilled the legal requirements to be granted asylum in Moldova. Nevertheless, their applications were rejected on the basis of a classified note received from the Moldovan secret service, according to which the applicants presented a threat to national security. The decisions did not give any details as to the content of the note, not even the date on which it had been issued. The applicants were given fifteen days to leave the country and they were entitled to challenge the decisions within thirty days. The letters accompanying the decisions were posted on 7 and 10 September 2018 and were signed by the head of the BMA, O.P. 20.  Several days after the applicants\u2019 arrest and transfer to Turkey their families also received from the BMA decisions dated 5 September 2018, banning the applicants from entering Moldovan territory for a period of five years and ordering their expulsion under supervision from Moldova by the BMA in accordance with section 58 of the Status of Aliens Act (see paragraph 27 below). The letters accompanying the decisions were also signed by the head of the BMA, O.P. 21.  On different dates in September and October 2018 the applicants\u2019 representative, who had received powers of attorney from their wives, contested the above decisions in court. However, their actions were dismissed on the grounds that the powers of attorney had not been signed by the applicants themselves. The court decisions were challenged before the hierarchically superior court but without any success. 22.  On 15 October 2018 the European Parliament made public a report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Moldova (2017/2281(INI)). In its report, the European Parliament issued a statement in which it expressed itself in the following terms on the manner in which the applicants had been transferred from Turkey:\n\u201c29. Strongly condemns the recent extradition/abduction of Turkish citizens to Turkey due to their alleged links to the G\u00fclen movement, in violation of the rule of law and basic human rights; urges the Moldovan authorities to ensure that any extradition requests coming from third countries are processed in a transparent manner while following judicial procedures fully in line with European principles and standards...\u201d 23.  Amnesty International also made a statement in relation to the deportation of the seven Orizont teachers to Turkey. On 6 September 2018 the organisation\u2019s director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia made the following statement in relation to the applicants\u2019 transfer to Turkey:\n\u201cThe Moldovan authorities didn\u2019t just violate these individuals\u2019 rights once by deporting them - they put them on a fast-track to further human rights violations such as an unfair trial. ... The latest arrests in Moldova follow the pattern of political reprisals against Turkish nationals living abroad by the increasingly repressive government of Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan. ... Forcible return of those seeking protection in Moldova is a flagrant violation of Moldova\u2019s international human rights obligations. The state authorities must immediately hold to account those responsible for the arbitrary detention and expulsion of the Turkish nationals.\u201d", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "6", "7", "8", "5", "9", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Elbasan, Albania. He is the brother of Sh.P., born in 1973. Sh.P. died on 22 February 2011. 6.  On 29 March 2010 the Shkod\u00ebr District Court sentenced Sh.P. to four years\u2019 imprisonment for attempted murder. The trial was held in absentia. On 2 December 2010 the Shkod\u00ebr Court of Appeal upheld the Shkod\u00ebr District Court\u2019s decision. On 3 February 2011 the latter decision was executed and Sh.P. was sent to serve his prison sentence in the Lezh\u00eb detention facility. 7.  It appears from the case file that Sh.P. was diagnosed by the doctor of the Lezh\u00eb detention facility as suffering from psoriasis, parapanesis inferior (partial paralysis of both legs) and elephantiasis. On 9 February 2011 Sh.P. was urgently transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital (Qendra Spitalore e Burgjeve) because according to the doctor of the Lezh\u00eb detention facility, he could not be properly treated in an ordinary prison setting. On 17 February 2011 he was transferred to Tirana University Hospital Centre (Qendra Spitalore Universitare Tiran\u00eb). It appears from the hospital file of 17 February 2011 that the applicant\u2019s brother had been diagnosed with elephantiasis, morbid obesity and multi-organ insufficiency, and was prescribed medication. 8.  It appears that on 22 February 2011 Sh.P. died in the intensive care unit of Tirana University Hospital. 9.  On 22 February 2011 a group composed of a judicial police officer, a criminalist and a forensic medical expert carried out an on-site investigation (kqyrjen e vendit t\u00eb ngjarjes) at Tirana University Hospital Centre and an external examination of the corpse (kqyrjen e kufom\u00ebs) of Sh.P, and took photographs at the scene. On the same day, the judicial police officer seized Sh.P\u2019s medical file (sekuestroi kartel\u00ebn klinike) kept at Tirana University Hospital Centre. 10.  On 22 February 2011 the judicial police officer in charge of the case ordered a forensic examination of Sh.P. and put the following questions to the forensic medical experts:\n\u201c1. What kind of injuries were noticeable on the deceased? 11.  On 22 February 2011 the applicant was questioned as a person with knowledge of the event. He stated that his family members had informed him that his brother was being sent to Lezh\u00eb detention facility. On 17 February 2011 his mother had told him that his brother had fallen ill and was being transferred to the hospital in Tirana. When he had arrived at the hospital he had found his brother unconscious and tied to the bed with the sheets. He had noticed that the mattress and the blankets were wet and that the area around the bed was very dirty. At approximately 6 a.m. on 22 February 2011, his sister had called him to say that their brother\u2019s condition had deteriorated. When he had arrived at the hospital, he had found his brother dead. He added that he wanted to know the cause of his brother\u2019s death. 12.  On 25 February 2011 the judicial police officer in charge looked at the admissions register of Tirana Prison Hospital, where it was recorded that Sh.P. had been transferred to that facility on 9 February 2011. 13.  On 9 March 2011 and again on 25 March 2011 the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office requested Sh.P.\u2019s file from the Lezh\u00eb detention facility. On 21 March 2011 the Lezh\u00eb detention facility replied by letter stating that the applicant had been suffering from dyspnea, his lower limbs had both had oedemas, and that he had therefore been urgently transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital. In addition, they attached Sh.P.\u2019s prison file. 14.  On 10 March 2011, the prosecutor in charge of the case ordered a series of investigative actions to be carried out by a judicial police officer:\n\u201c(1)  to contact forensic experts who would carry out a forensic examination to find out the cause of death of the deceased; (2)  to seize the criminal and medical files of Sh.P. from the prison facilities, as well as from the hospital; (3)  to search the registers of the Tirana Prison Hospital, Tirana University Hospital and Shkod\u00ebr civilian hospital in order to find out when he had been hospitalised, what the diagnosis had been, how long he had stayed, etc.; the pages of the register relevant to the search would have to be attached to the report; (4)  to question Tirana prison employees, medical staff who had taken care of Sh.P., and his family members about his medical history, his treatment, when he had last been hospitalised, etc.; and (5)  to carry out any other action which might be deemed necessary before 29 March 2011.\u201d 15.  On 25 March 2011 I.O., one of the doctors who had been taking care of the applicant\u2019s brother in the hospital, when questioned by the judicial police officer, stated that while under their supervision Sh.P. had been manifesting respiratory and hepatic insufficiency. According to him, Sh.P. had been diagnosed with multi-organ insufficiency and morbid obesity. Sh.P. had been treated like any other patient and the treatment prescribed had been administered in accordance with the rules. 16.  On 25 March 2011 P.D., one of the doctors who had been taking care of the applicant\u2019s brother in the hospital, when questioned by the judicial police officer, stated that Sh.P. had been transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital from Lezh\u00eb prison hospital. He had been treated like any other patient and the treatment prescribed had been administered in accordance with the rules. 17.  On 30 March 2011 a group of forensic experts carried out an examination of Sh.P. The forensic medical report stated, inter alia:\n\u201c...1. Two ecchymoses were noticed on both forearms. Oedemas on the lower extremities. Psoriasis. ... 2. ... Ecchymosis caused by blunt objects (sende t\u00eb mbreh\u00ebta). Rest of the lesions are a consequence of the other illnesses of the deceased ... 4. ... The death of Sh.P. was a result of acute cardio-respiratory insufficiency due to complications of the generalised metabolic illness of the deceased ... 5. With regard to the question whether Sh.P. underwent a negligent medical treatment, this would be the subject of an inquiry by another forensic medical commission once they had the investigative file at their disposal ...\u201d 18.  On 24 February 2011 the police reported Sh.P.\u2019s death to the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office, which registered it in a criminal file. After having carried out some investigative actions, on 13 April 2011 the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings (mosfillimin e procedimit penal) and to give notice of that decision to the interested parties. The decision was based on the medical report of 30 March 2011, which had found that the death of Sh.P. had been the result of acute respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and other diseases. Furthermore, the decision stated that there was no fact, evidence or indication that a criminal offence could have been committed. On 13 May 2011 the applicant was notified of the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s decision. 19.  On 17 May 2011, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tirana District Court against the decision of the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office. On 20 October 2011 the Tirana District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint on the grounds that he did not have legal standing to complain against the impugned decision, because he had only been notified of it as a family member of the deceased. The first-instance court also stated that under Article 291 of the Criminal Procedural Code, only the persons who had reported an offence could complain against a decision not to institute criminal proceedings. 20.  On 20 April 2012 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the Tirana District Court\u2019s decision of 20 October 2011. On 23 January 2014 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant. On 17 November 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaints against the ordinary domestic courts\u2019 decisions, with the argument that the statutory denial of standing to challenge the prosecutor\u2019s decision did not violate the essence of the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court. 21.  On 16 February 2015 the applicant reported the death of his brother to the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office. On 27 March 2015 the Tirana prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings based on the applicant\u2019s report. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tirana District Court about the above-mentioned decision. On 18 November 2015, the Tirana District Court, making reference to the first set of proceedings and evidence used in those proceedings, decided without hearing the applicant to reject his complaint.", "references": ["9", "5", "8", "3", "4", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Piaski. 5.  On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zap\u0142aty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 6.  The applicant lodged an appeal (zarzuty) within the time-limit. She complained that the payment order had been based on a lease contract which had turned out to be null and void but which she had secured by a blank bill of exchange signed by her. She challenged that basis for the payment order and considered it illegal and unfounded. She further applied for exemption from the court fees. 7.  On 13 July 2011 a court officer from the Koszalin Regional Court (referendarz s\u0105dowy) decided to partly exempt her from the fees. The court examined in detail the financial situation of the applicant. In particular it noted that in 2010 her company had generated a gross income of PLN 213,000; however, the expenses exceeded this sum by approximately PLN 50,000. As regards the first four months of 2011 the applicant had declared a gross income of PLN 53,600 and expenses of PLN 48,500; therefore she had generated a net income of over PLN 5,000. Moreover the applicant had declared that she had other financial obligations, amounting to PLN 4,000 per month, which she had been paying on time. The court agreed that her financial situation had been difficult and that she had not initiated the current proceedings. However, the situation of a commercial activity which had been generating a very high income, and even higher costs, did not automatically justify a full exemption from court fees. Moreover, the applicant had declared a net income for the first four months of 2011. In an extensively reasoned decision the domestic court concluded that the applicant should be expected to pay one third of the fees due for lodging an appeal against the payment order. 8.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the court officer. She reiterated that her business had generated losses and that she had been financially dependent on her family. The applicant stressed that she had not instituted the civil proceedings, so could not prepare for their costs or limit the sum claimed. 9.  On 3 August 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court upheld the decision of the court officer. The applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,928 (EUR 500) within seven days. 10.  On 22 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company\u2019s activity as it had been operating at a loss. 11.  On 26 August 2011 the court officer of the Koszalin District Court partly allowed the applicant\u2019s request and exempted her from the court fees above PLN 1,000 (equivalent to EUR 250). The court took into account the applicant\u2019s difficult financial situation but noted that the court fee should not have been regarded as less important than the other financial obligations that the applicant had been able to honour, in the amount of PLN 4,000 monthly. Having examined all the arguments relied on by the applicant, the court considered that the situation did not justify a total exemption from the court fees. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12.  On 16 September 2011 the applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,000 within seven days. 13.  On 29 September 2011 the applicant lodged a third request for exemption from the court fees. She submitted that her financial situation had not improved and that she had no income whatsoever. Moreover her car broke down which generated further costs. 14.  On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15.  On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16.  On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17.  On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.", "references": ["9", "5", "7", "1", "6", "4", "8", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Stalowa Wola. 6.  On the night of 23 June 2013 the applicant was drinking alcohol with a group of friends in a public square in Stalowa Wola. At around 11 p.m. a police patrol arrived, reminded them to keep quiet during night hours, checked their documents and ordered them to disperse. Part of the group, including the applicant, moved on to a different spot. Subsequently, following a message received at around 11.50 p.m., two police officers, K.P. and D.Z., found those members of the group and proceeded to arrest them. The officers used truncheons in order to put the applicant and his six friends into a police car. 7.  According to the applicant, he was also punched in the face by one of the police officers during the arrest. 8.  According to the Government, this allegation was not confirmed during the investigation. A doctor who examined the applicant in Stalowa Wola District Hospital noted that he had no facial injuries. 9.  The arrested persons were taken to the Stalowa Wola district police station, where they underwent breathalyser tests. With respect to the applicant, the test revealed an alcohol level of 0.76 mg/l in his breath. 10.  According to the applicant, at the Stalowa Wola district police station he asked to go to the toilet, but instead was taken to a room without closed-circuit television (CCTV). Once there, he was thrown to the ground. One of the officers kicked him on his left knee. He was subsequently beaten by another officer with a truncheon. When leaving the room, one of the officers slammed the door in the applicant\u2019s face. As a result, the applicant injured his nose, broke his tooth and damaged his dental braces. 11.  According to the Government, the applicant was taken to a separate room without CCTV in order for a body search to be carried out. However, he continued to resist, and was aggressive and vulgar towards the officers. The allegations that he had been kicked on his knee and had had the door slammed in his face were not confirmed in the course of the subsequent investigation. 12.  Subsequently, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who found no reasons why he could not be detained. 13.  On 25 June 2013 the applicant was seen by a dentist, who confirmed that he had a broken tooth and damaged dental braces. 14.  On the night of 26 June 2013 the applicant was admitted to Stalowa Wola District Hospital. He was released on the same day. The doctor noted that the applicant had bruising on his left thigh and had twisted his left knee. 15.  On 24 June 2013 the applicant and two of his friends, K.W. and J.B., were charged with resisting lawful arrest and insulting police officers in the performance of their duty. On 22 November 2013 an act of indictment was lodged with the Stalowa Wola District Court. 16.  On 28 May 2014 the Stalowa Wola District Court gave its judgment. The applicant was convicted of insulting and using violence against the two police officers, K.P and D.Z. 17.  The judgment was upheld by the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court on 28 October 2014. 18.  On 27 June 2013 the Stalowa Wola District Prosecutor severed complaints against the two police officers who had arrested the applicant and J.B. from the proceedings described in paragraphs 15-17 above. 19.  On 30 July 2013 the Mielec District Prosecutor instituted an investigation into the police officers\u2019 alleged abuse of power on the night of 23-24 June 2013. 20.  During the proceedings the prosecutor heard evidence from witnesses (people who had been involved in the incident, police officers and medical staff) and also obtained expert reports. 21.  On 8 October 2013 an expert surgeon prepared a forensic medical report on the basis of medical documents in the applicant\u2019s file. The expert referred to a certificate from the dentist dated 25 June 2013, the applicant\u2019s medical files from Stalowa Wola District Hospital and two medical certificates of 24 June 2013. He confirmed that the applicant had experienced bruising and swelling to his left knee. While, in his opinion, the injury had occurred earlier than the applicant had alleged, there was no medical documentation in this respect. In addition, the applicant had had bruises on his lower legs and thighs, bruising and abrasions on his nose, a broken tooth and damaged dental braces. As to the origins of these injuries, the expert confirmed that the bruising had been typical of the kind caused by truncheons, while the knee injury could have occurred when the applicant had resisted getting into the police car or going to another room. 22.  On 31 October 2013 a visual technology expert prepared a report. In that report, he confirmed in particular that CCTV footage demonstrated that the applicant had begun to limp after he had left the room without CCTV. There was no footage of him limping before entering the room. 23.  On 12 November 2013 the prosecutor questioned Dr M.B., one of the doctors who had treated the applicant in Stalowa Wola District Hospital on 26 June 2013. The doctor stated that he had diagnosed the applicant with chronic instability of the knee. In his view, the instability had not been acute, and could have occurred earlier due to an injury or illness. The joint had not been swollen and there had been no accumulation of fluid. 24.  On 12 December 2013 the prosecutor questioned Dr H.L., another doctor who had treated the applicant in Stalowa Wola District Hospital on 26 June 2013. The doctor stated that the applicant had had several bruises on his thighs and chest. He had not had any visible injuries on his face or hands. In his view, the applicant had been simulating some of the symptoms, as they had not been confirmed by a medical examination. 25.  Meanwhile, on 21 November 2013 a formal face\u2011to\u2011face confrontation had been held between the applicant and the two police officers, K.P and D.Z. 26.  On 23 December 2013 the Mielec District Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. The prosecutor established that, during the police intervention on the night of 23 June 2013, the applicant and his friends had behaved aggressively, insulted the officers and resisted arrest. Since the applicant had refused to get into the police car, the officers had warned him that they would use direct restraint measures (\u015brodki przymusu bezpo\u015bredniego), and eventually they had hit him with truncheons on his lower legs, thighs and forearms. During the intervention the police had arrested seven people, including the applicant. At the police station he had undergone a breathalyser test, which had shown an alcohol level of 0.76 mg/l in his breath. Subsequently, the applicant had been taken to another room in order to undergo a body search. He had resisted the officers while leaving his cell and had continued to behave aggressively towards them. Eventually, four of the people who had been arrested had been released, while the applicant, K.W. and J.B. had been detained on charges of resisting lawful arrest and insulting police officers. 27.  The prosecutor also established that on 26 June 2013 the applicant had been admitted to Stalowa Wola District Hospital, where he had complained of bruising to his thigh and a knee sprain. He had been discharged on the following day. The doctor on duty had diagnosed him with chronic instability of the knee, with no swelling or fluid accumulation in the joint. 28.  The prosecutor further referred to the expert\u2019s report of 8 October 2013 (see paragraph 21 above). 29.  The prosecutor acknowledged that the police officers had used force against the applicant as he had been aggressive during the arrest, but he had not been beaten by the police officers whilst at Stalowa Wola district police station. The prosecutor was of the view that the evidence given by the applicant\u2019s friends was not consistent. On the other hand the officers had clearly and in detail described the course of the events and their statements were coherent and logical. He concluded that the use of force against the applicant had been necessary, in view of his aggressive behaviour. 30.  The applicant appealed, alleging that the prosecution service had failed to correctly establish the course of events. He submitted that the statements of five witnesses, who had all confirmed that he and his friends had not resisted arrest on 23 June 2013, had been ignored. He further relied on the report prepared by the visual technology expert who had analysed the CCTV footage and noted that his injury could have occurred in the room without CCTV (while he had been searched). Lastly, he stated that the discrepancies between the versions presented by the officers and the participants had not been clarified. 31.  On 3 July 2014 the Stalowa Wola District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court held that the statements of the applicant\u2019s friends who had been involved in the incident were not coherent. Although they all agreed that the applicant had been beaten by police officers in the car and at the police station, they had not been able to give a consistent version of events. Furthermore, none of the witnesses had seen the incident at the police station. They had only heard noises and noticed the applicant\u2019s bruises and that he had begun to limp. On the other hand, the court considered that the evidence given by the police officers was logical, coherent and consistent. Consequently, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the applicant\u2019s aggressive and provocative behaviour during his arrest had justified the use of force by the police. Furthermore, there were no indications that the police officers had abused their powers or used disproportionate force against the applicant. In so far as the applicant had referred to the visual technology expert\u2019s report, the court noted that, even if the applicant had begun limping after leaving the room where the body search had taken place, the possibility that his knee injury had occurred earlier on and that he had only begun to feel pain in that leg at a later stage could not be excluded. Also, the medical opinion had not been explicit in this respect, since the applicant suffered from chronic instability of the knee, and the swelling might have resulted from the resistance he had demonstrated while getting into the police car.", "references": ["0", "5", "6", "2", "8", "4", "3", "9", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Vinkovci. 6.  On 19 September 1998 the applicant married D.M., who gave birth to their son on 17 April 2001. The family lived together in Sesvete until 2007, when the applicant moved to Vukovar for work-related reasons. 7.  On 29 January 2008 D.M. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Sesvete Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Sesvetama), seeking divorce, custody of their son and maintenance for the child. She submitted, inter alia, that their marital union had de facto ended in March 2007 when the applicant had moved to Vukovar. 8.  On 27 March 2008 D.M. asked the court to issue an interim custody and contact order and grant her temporary custody of the child until the adoption of the final judgment. The applicant requested that he be granted temporary custody. 9.  In its report to the Municipal Court of 4 June 2008 issued as part of the mandatory mediation procedure, the Sesvete social welfare centre established that the relationship between the parents had been deeply and permanently strained; communication between them was poor and they had difficulties agreeing on parental care. The report also stated that the applicant\u2019s contacts with his son were problematic. 10.  In the course of the divorce proceedings, the court heard a number of experts, including, on 30 June 2008, a psychologist from the Sesvete social welfare centre, who stressed that the child needed contact with his father in order to maintain an emotional bond with him. 11.  On 3 July 2008 the Sesvete Municipal Court issued a first interim custody and contact order, awarding temporary custody to the mother and contact rights to the applicant. Following an appeal lodged by D.M., that decision was quashed by the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) on 28 October 2008. 12.  Meanwhile, on 30 September 2008 by a partial judgment the Sesvete Municipal Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and D.M., but the proceedings continued as regards the remaining issues of custody, contact rights and child maintenance, on which the court decided to obtain an expert opinion from the Zagreb Child Protection Clinic (Poliklinika za za\u0161titu djece grada Zagreba). 13.  In the resumed proceedings, on 20 January 2009 the Zagreb Child Protection Clinic carried out an assessment of the applicant, D.M. and their son. It found that the child was depressed about his parents\u2019 separation and burdened with their strained relationship, which put him in a loyalty conflict. It therefore recommended that the parents undergo counselling and that the child receive supportive psychotherapy. 14.  On 20 March 2009 the Municipal Court issued a second interim custody and contact order, granting the applicant contact rights one day per week, every second weekend, every second public holiday and half of the school holidays. That decision was again quashed on D.M.\u2019s appeal and the case was remitted. 15.  On 15 October 2009 the Municipal Court issued a third interim contact order, awarding the applicant contact rights to be exercised two hours every Wednesday, every second weekend and every second public holiday. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201c... On the basis of the case-file, the first-instance court concludes that meetings between the father and the son have thus far not been taking place in a manner corresponding to the best interest of the child, because the father had been able to see the son very rarely, and those rare occasions on Wednesdays had been limited to fifteen minutes after school ...\n... The lack of co-operation by the parents concerning the exercise of their parental rights, the mother\u2019s firm attitude and her unwillingness to co-operate with [the applicant] must not run counter to the child\u2019s interests ...\nGiven that so far the mother has not been co-operative as regards the time scheduled for father-son meetings once a week, it was in the interest of the child to supplement the previous decision ...\u201d 16.  An appeal lodged by D.M. against that order was dismissed. 17.  In January 2011, at the request of the Sesvete Social Welfare Centre, the court ordered an expert assessment of the parties, taking into account the growing resistance of the child to contacts with his father. D.M. and the child refused to undertake the court-ordered assessment. 18.  On 28 September 2012 the Sesvete Municipal Court held a hearing at which the child said that he wanted to live with his mother. 19.  On 12 October 2012 the Sesvete Municipal Court rendered a judgment awarding custody rights to the mother and contact rights to the applicant. It also ordered the applicant to pay 2,000 kunas (HRK) per month for child maintenance. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cThe child is eleven and a half years old and, notwithstanding the significance of the mother\u2019s influence on his development (concerning the father\u2019s allegations of manipulation), he leaves the impression of a boy standing firmly behind his beliefs and attitudes, who expresses his will openly and clearly ...\nThe child wishes to live with his mother and to spend a maximum of two hours on Saturdays with his father, without supervision, as his weekly schedule is full of school and music assignments. He uses the court to ask his parents to do everything they can in order to bring the court proceedings to an end.\n... [the Vinkovci social welfare centre] suggested father-son meetings every Saturday from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. ... for seven days during the winter holidays, fifteen days during the summer holidays and on alternate public holidays.\n... [the Vinkovci social welfare centre\u2019s supervising officer from 15 July 2010 to 15 July 2011] saw the child once on the doorstep. He refused to talk to the father or to her, and showed resistance towards them. [The Vinkovci social welfare centre\u2019s supervising officer since 15 February 2012] said that a first meeting had been held, and there had been meetings after that, but only partially and not in line with the court\u2019s decision. [The supervising officer also said] that the boy had been resisting the meetings, so another date had been scheduled, but the next meeting again had not taken place. The boy had asked his father to terminate the lawsuits against his mother, and said that the father would then be able to see him ...\nIn an essay which the child wrote in the third grade, one can detect a firm connection with his mother, the heavy burden of the pending court proceedings (enforcement proceedings, criminal proceedings, present case) and the child\u2019s feeling that his father has left his mother and does not respect the love he feels for her. He is also burdened with the feeling that he \u2018must spend time with the father\u2019 when he does not want to and the feeling that his father does not understand him and did not understand him earlier. Finally, he is sad about the fact that his father has a new family ...\nIn the present case the child has had a stronger emotional bond with his mother since birth and shows resistance to his father. He also shows a significant level of resistance towards the set schedule of meetings, and his parents despite everything fail to reach the minimum level of co-operation and dialogue in the interests of their child. With the passage of time, they are drifting apart and argue more and more, which is evident from the enforcement proceedings and the supervision of meetings, which negatively influence their child, deprived of the freedom of choice.\nThe joint parental care necessary for the healthy, proper and successful development and upbringing of every child is lacking in the present case. No court decision can replace a good agreement between the parents on joint care. Such a decision in the present case is being enforced imperatively on the child, but ultimately protects his \u2018right to both parents\u2019.\n... in order that a father-son emotional bond can be established and developed, and taking into account the child\u2019s wishes and his free time, the court decides to start with Saturday meetings for two hours ... so that the child can see that the court has respected his ability to independently express the wish to spend more or less time with the father, and afterwards every Saturday from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. [as suggested by the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre] ...\nHaving regard to the events and the length of these proceedings, the Centre\u2019s proposal of 28 September 2012 that the court order the parents and the child to undergo an assessment at the Zagreb Child Protection Clinic, after which the Centre would give its final opinion, was dismissed, as there are no reasons for the court to delay its decision after more than four years, given that the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre has issued its recommendation and that the decisions in the proceedings are subject to change within the meaning of section 102 of the Family Act.\u201d 20.  Both parties lodged appeals against that judgment, which were dismissed by the second-instance court. The applicant\u2019s subsequent constitutional complaint was also dismissed. 21.  Meanwhile, on 12 February 2010 the applicant sought enforcement of the third interim order of the Sesvete Municipal Court of 15 October 2009 (see paragraph 15 above). He asked the court to order D.M. to enable him to have contacts with his son or to face a HRK 5,000 fine. If she failed to comply with the court order, the applicant suggested that the court enforcement officer, the police and the representatives of the social welfare centre intervene at the scene. 22.  On the same day the Vinkovci Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vinkovcima) issued an enforcement order, setting an eight-day time-limit for D.M. to comply with the third interim order or face a HRK 5,000 fine. Following an appeal lodged by D.M., on 21 May 2010 the Vukovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vukovaru) quashed the enforcement order and remitted the case, finding that the first-instance court had to seek an opinion from the relevant social welfare centre. 23.  On 5 October 2010 the Vinkovci social welfare centre delivered a report in which it recommended that the enforcement proceedings be completed because it was in the best interests of the child to establish regular contacts with his father. 24.  On 11 October 2010 the Vinkovci Municipal Court issued a fresh enforcement order. An appeal lodged by D.M. against that order was dismissed. 25.  On 21 January 2011 the Vinkovci Municipal Court fined D.M. HRK 5,000 for non-compliance with the Sesvete Municipal Court\u2019s interim custody and contact order. She was also ordered to enable the applicant to exercise his contact rights within eight days, failing which she would face a further HRK 7,000 fine. D.M. appealed. 26.  On 30 May, 30 June and 25 July 2011 the applicant informed the Municipal Court that he had not had any contact with his son and again requested that the police and the social welfare centre intervene. 27.  On 3 August 2011 the Vinkovci Municipal Court converted the fine imposed on D.M. into twenty-eight days\u2019 imprisonment, fined her an additional HRK 7,000 and ordered her to allow the applicant to exercise his contact rights within eight days or face a further HRK 10,000 fine. An appeal lodged by D.M. against that decision was dismissed. 28.  On 23 April 2012 the applicant informed the Vinkovci Municipal Court that he still had no contact with his son. 29.  The enforcement proceedings were ultimately discontinued because the applicant had not amended his application for enforcement in accordance with the new decision on contact rights of 12 October 2012 (see paragraph 19 above). 30.  On 27 August 2013 the applicant sought enforcement of the contact arrangements as set out in the Sesvete Municipal Court\u2019s final judgment of 12 October 2012 (see paragraph 19 above). 31.  On 30 October 2013 the Vinkovci Municipal Court held a hearing, at which D.M. claimed that she had not prevented the applicant from seeing his son, but that the child did not want to see his father. 32.  In February 2014 the Vinkovci Municipal Court requested the Vinkovci social welfare centre to appoint a special guardian for the child, which it did. On 14 April 2014 the child\u2019s special guardian stated that he agreed with the enforcement request. Given the suggestive influence and manipulative behaviour of the mother, it was the mother\u2019s wish, and not the wish of the child, not to have contacts with the father. 33.  In an enforcement order of 9 February 2015 the Vinkovci Municipal Court ordered D.M. to allow the applicant contacts with his son as established in the final court judgment of 12 October 2012, failing which she would be fined HRK 5,000. That decision was upheld on appeal. 34.  In February 2016 the applicant informed the court that meetings with his son were still not taking place and on 24 February 2016 the court imposed another fine on D.M., which was subsequently quashed by the second-instance court. 35.  According to the available information, the enforcement proceedings appear to be still ongoing. 36.  Meanwhile, on 9 June 2011 the applicant brought criminal charges against D.M. before the Vukovar Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vukovaru) for obstruction of child-protection measures laid down in Article 215 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 47 below). 37.  During those proceedings, on 11 October 2012 the court heard the applicant\u2019s son, who stated that he did not wish to have contacts with the applicant and that this attitude had not been induced by his mother. A forensic psychologist concluded that the child\u2019s desire to break ties with the father should be seen in the context of extremely suggestive behaviour and manipulation by his mother and that the cessation of contact with his father did not contribute to the child\u2019s welfare. 38.  On 16 May 2013 the Vukovar Municipal Court found D.M. guilty as charged and judicially admonished her (sudska opomena \u2013 see paragraph 47 below). The applicant was instructed to pursue his civil claim for damages in separate civil proceedings. Appeals lodged by both parties were dismissed. 39.  On 13 November 2013 the Vukovar State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Vukovaru) indicted D.M. for non\u2011implementation of decisions for the protection of child welfare, in particular for obstructing the enforcement of the applicant\u2019s contact rights pursuant to the final court judgment of 12 October 2012 (see paragraph 19 above). 40.  On 30 September 2018 the Vukovar Municipal Court sentenced D.M. as charged to one year\u2019s imprisonment suspended for two years (uvjetna osuda). 41.  On 13 October 2008 the Sesvete social welfare centre concluded that the Begovi\u0107 family needed professional assistance and referred them to the Zagreb Child Protection Clinic for assessment and possible treatment. In its letter, the centre stressed that contacts between the applicant and his son were difficult because the mother was always present. 42.  On 10 March 2009, the social welfare centre adopted a child\u2011protection measure provided for in section 109 of the Family Act (see paragraph 46 below). In particular, it issued a warning to the applicant and D.M. about mistakes leading to shortcomings in the care and upbringing of their son, and cautioning them about their inadequate cooperation, which made contacts between the applicant and his son difficult. It referred them to counselling and indicated that it would undertake further child-protection measures if they failed to attend.  Between March and July 2009 the applicant and D.M. attended counselling sessions. 43.  On 1 July 2010, relying on section 110 of the Family Act, the centre imposed on the applicant and D.M. the child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority (nadzor nad izvr\u0161avanjem roditeljske skrbi) for a period of one year. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cAfter their separation the parents did not establish adequate communication regarding [the exercise of their parental authority] which would have enabled both parents to participate adequately in the child\u2019s life. The fact is that meetings between the son and the father are not taking place despite the final judicial decision. Treatment in [various institutions], as well as treatment by the psychologist [I.P.], yielded no results.\n...\nGiven that in the instant case one of the basic rights of the child provided for in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the legislation in force is jeopardised, it was necessary to offer the parents professional assistance in establishing an adequate relationship by [imposing] the [child protection] measure of supervision of contacts between the son and the father so as to enable both parents to participate in [the child\u2019s] upbringing.\n...\n... [T]he child\u2019s parents live separately, the father in Zagreb and the mother in Vinkovci. [Therefore,] because of the distance [between the two towns] and work obligations, and [given] the [resultant] impossibility of implementing the court\u2019s decision in the part concerning contacts between the son and the father during the week owing to changed circumstances, those [contacts] will not be covered by the supervision of contacts between the son and the father.\u201d 44.  On 25 January 2012 the centre again imposed the child-protection measure of supervising the exercise of parental authority for a further year. It found that meetings between the applicant and his son were still not taking place, that the applicant did not participate in his son\u2019s life and that the cooperation between the parents had stopped completely. 45.  In the final report on another child protection measure of supervising the exercise of parental authority, issued for the period between July 2015 and June 2016, the social worker concluded that the measure had produced no results as the contacts between the applicant and his son were still not taking place.", "references": ["2", "8", "1", "3", "5", "9", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in W\u0142oc\u0142awek. 5.  Criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning charges of leading an organised criminal gang, assault and extortion have been pending since 29 September 2005 (case no. IV K 59/09, \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court). 6.  On 1 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. 7.  On 2 March 2010 the applicant was indicted before the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court. The bill of indictment was directed against the applicant and twenty\u2011two co-accused charged with over 900 offences in total. The applicant was charged on thirty-eight counts with respect to various offences related to stealing cars, dealing in drugs, assaults and burglaries, in the context of an organised criminal gang. 8.  At a session on 23 November 2010 the trial court decided to sever the remainder of the case from the proceedings against the applicant, which would be dealt with at a separate trial and joined with other charges brought against him. In consequence, the proceedings against the applicant were to be transferred to another division of the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court. The decision pertaining to the competence of the court was quashed on 14 December 2010. On 28 December 2010 the trial court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. On 4 February 2011 the proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of another trial, but that decision was quashed upon appeal on 16 March 2011. The case was transferred to the relevant division of the court in March 2011, and thereafter the presiding judge scheduled the beginning of the trial for 14 September 2011 and undertook other preparative actions (such as tracing the addresses of some twelve witnesses).\nDuring the proceedings the applicant lodged multiple procedural requests which were examined by the trial court. In particular, he asked for adjournments of hearings, asked for new evidence to be admitted, and challenged a judge and a prosecutor. 9.  The \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court held about twenty-four hearings in total and on 13 May 2013 convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. 11.  A hearing of the appellate court scheduled for 15 April 2014 was cancelled due to the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 12.  On 12 June 2014 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal in part and reduced his sentence to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 13.  On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. 14.  The applicant lodged two complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints of breaches of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor, and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w post\u0119powaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i post\u0119powaniu s\u0105dowym bez nieuzasadnionej zw\u0142oki - \u201cthe 2004 Act\u201d). 15.  On 7 September 2011 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal dismissed the first complaint. The court, relying on the Convention principles, ruled that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. During the period under consideration the trial court had prepared diligently for trial by, for instance, securing the presence of a large number of witnesses who had been summoned from various detention facilities. 16.  On 28 November 2012 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s second complaint. The court examined the course of the proceedings and ruled that there had been no delays on the part of the courts. It noted that the trial court had taken many procedural decisions requested by the parties, including the applicant.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "6", "2", "9", "5", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company, Virprod-Lux S.R.L., is a company incorporated in Moldova. 6.  On 13 April 2000 the Tax Authority seized a building from a State\u2011owned company, company V., on account of taxes which were due. 7.  On 1 October 2000, at the request of the Tax Authority, the building was valued by an estate agency at 352,000 Moldovan lei (MDL). 8.  On 29 January 2001 the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property sold the building in question to company B. for MDL 360,500 (approximately 29,678 Euros (EUR), following a public auction. 9.  On 25 April 2003 the applicant company bought the building from company B. for MDL 628,000 (approximately EUR 22,053). 10.  On 29 March 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office initiated court proceedings in which it sought the annulment of both the sale of the building on 29 January 2001 and the subsequent transaction between company B. and the applicant company. It also sought the return of the building to its initial owner, company V. The reason relied upon by the Prosecutor\u2019s General\u2019s Office was that the valuation of the building conducted by the estate agency had not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. The applicant company opposed the Prosecutor General\u2019s action and argued, among other things, that it was time-barred. 11.  On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General\u2019s action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General\u2019s action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place. 12.  On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld an appeal by the Prosecutor General, reversed the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal, and upheld the action in its entirety. The Supreme Court considered that the Prosecutor General\u2019s action concerned a declaration of the absolute nullity of the contracts in question and that therefore, in accordance with Article 217 of the Civil Code, enacted on 12 June 2003, it could not be limited in time. Following this judgment, the transactions of 29 January 2001 and 25 April 2003 were annulled and each party involved was ordered to return to the other parties whatever they received by virtue of those transactions. 13.  On 7 December 2007 the applicant company lodged a revision request against the above judgment in which it indicated that it had carried out an expert evaluation of the disputed building by an independent expert who determined its value at MDL 8,550,000 (approximately EUR 511,440) after the improvements made by the applicant company to it. 14.  In the meantime, the applicant company did not leave the disputed building because it had its production line there and it needed time and resources to find another suitable building and to move its production line. 15.  Since company V. did not need the disputed building, the applicant company proposed to it and the latter accepted to conclude a friendly settlement agreement in accordance with which company V. agreed that the applicant company would retain ownership of the building in exchange for MDL 325,092 (approximately EUR 19,328). 16.  On 20 March 2008, within the framework of the review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the parties\u2019 request to settle the case. It confirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant company and company V., and on that basis it quashed its previous judgment and rejected the Prosecutor General\u2019s action. 17.  It is unclear from the materials of the case and the parties\u2019 submissions whether after the adoption of the judgment of 11 October 2007 by the Supreme Court of Justice, company B. returned to the applicant company the amount received as a result of the transaction of 25 April 2003.", "references": ["6", "4", "5", "7", "1", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicants, who were born in 1980 and 1977, respectively, live in Slobozia and Parcani, in the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d). In view of the fact that, in the applicants\u2019 submission, it was impossible for them to apply to the Court directly, the application was lodged by their mothers. 7.  On 2 March 2005 the applicants were arrested by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities and placed in detention on remand on suspicion of murder. On 1 June 2009 they were convicted by an \u201cMRT\u201d court and sentenced to terms of fourteen years and a half, and fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court of the \u201cMRT\u201d upheld the above judgment, but reduced the sentence of the first applicant to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  It does not appear from the material in the case file and from the parties\u2019 submissions that the applicants informed the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the proceedings against them and the conviction and detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d. 9.  In December 2014 the applicants challenged their conviction by way of an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova which, on 14 February 2015, upheld their appeal and quashed the judgments of the \u201cMRT\u201d courts on the ground that they had been issued by unconstitutional tribunals. 10.  The applicants were released from detention on 20 July and 20 August 2015, respectively, for reasons which were not related to the Supreme Court of Moldova\u2019s decision of 14 February 2015.", "references": ["7", "9", "4", "2", "1", "5", "8", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "7.  The applicants live in Kharkiv. 8.  According to the applicants, in the period from 20 May to 6 July 2010 they participated in obstructive protest activities against a road-construction project, in particular tree-felling, in Gorky Park (\u041f\u0430\u0440\u043a \u0456\u043c. \u0413\u043e\u0440\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e) in Kharkiv. 9.  The following issues are raised in connection with those events and their aftermath:[1]\n(i)  all applicants: whether alleged verbal and physical harassment on the part of the personnel involved in the project against the applicants breached their right to freedom of peaceful assembly;\n(ii)  the first six applicants: whether their arrest and conviction for refusal to obey the orders to leave the site breached their freedom of peaceful assembly. In this respect there are two sub-groups: the first five applicants who were arrested together and the sixth applicant who was arrested on a different date;\n(iii)  the first and second applicants: whether the above-mentioned proceedings for failure to obey the police order to leave were fair in view of the applicants\u2019 absence from the appeal hearings;\n(iv)  the third, seventh and ninth applicants: whether those applicants were subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by the personnel involved in the project and, if so, whether there was a failure to protect them from such treatment and investigate it effectively. 10.  On 23 June 2004 the Kharkiv City Council (\u201cthe City Council\u201d) adopted a document entitled General Urban Development Plan until 2026, which had been drafted by the State Academic Institute for Urban Planning \u201cDipromisto\u201d (\u201cthe Urban Planning Institute\u201d). A public consultation on the plan had been held in 2003. 11.  On 20 September 2007 the Kharkiv Municipal Construction Department (\u0414\u0435\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0456\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0442\u0430 \u0448\u043b\u044f\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0433\u043e\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438) published in the Kharkivsky Kuryer newspaper information about its plan to build a road from Sumska Street to Novgorodska Street, namely through the park in question, and invited comments. 12.  On 10 September 2008 the City Council allocated land for the road construction to the Municipal Construction Department. 13.  On 14 March 2008 the Urban Planning Institute approved the plan submitted by the Kharkiv Municipal Urban Planning Department (\u0414\u0435\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0431\u0443\u0434\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f, \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0456\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0438 \u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043d) envisaging construction of the road through the park and modification of the Urban Development Plan in that respect. 14.  On 25 January or February 2009 the City Council approved the overall plan for the prospective road construction, including the road through the park. 15.  On 27 April 2010 a commission of municipal officials examined the trees which had to be felled in order to allow the road construction and drew up a detailed list of the trees, including their varieties, ages, diameters and state of health. On 18 May 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Environmental Protection Department approved the list. 16.  On 7 May 2010 the Municipal Construction Department published a notice about the planned construction of the road in Ekologiya Syogodni (Environment Today), a newspaper published by the Kharkiv Regional Environmental Inspectorate. The notice contained an indication of where the road would be sited, and stated that it would be 1,283 metres long and 16 metres wide, with a footpath and a bicycle path. The notice stated that in the process, 503 trees would be destroyed but that 75 trees and 35 bushes would be replanted along the road. Comment was solicited and the Department\u2019s postal address given for the purpose. 17.  On 17 May 2010 the Municipal Construction Department sent letters to the regional environmental protection authorities explaining that the purpose of the road construction was to relieve the problem of increasing traffic in central Kharkiv by creating a road linking two radial roads and thus circumventing the city centre. 18.  On 19 May 2010 the Executive Committee of the Kharkiv City Council (the municipality\u2019s executive authority, \u201cthe Executive Committee\u201d) authorised the felling of 503 trees in Gorky Park. 19.  On 11 or 19 May 2010 the Construction Department entered into a contract with private company P., engaging the latter as the main contractor for the road construction project (\u201cthe Main Contractor\u201d). 20.  On 19 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement with a private company to perform \u201cpreparatory works\u201d for the road construction. On the same date the Main Contractor also subcontracted municipal company K. to do the tree-felling on the construction site. Company K. in turn engaged another municipal company as its own subcontractor (hereinafter \u201cthe subcontractors\u201d). 21.  On 26 May 2010 the Regional Architecture and Construction Inspectorate (\u0406\u043d\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0456\u044f \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0456\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u043e-\u0431\u0443\u0434\u0456\u0432\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044e \u0443 \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) issued to the Municipal Construction Department a permit to carry out preparatory work for the road construction. 22.  On 13 or 19 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement for the provision of security guard services with the local authority-owned company Municipal Guard (Munitsipalna okhorona; \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u0456\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0454\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u00ab\u041c\u0443\u043d\u0456\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0430\u00bb \u2013 hereinafter \u201cMG\u201d). Under the agreement MG undertook to provide services consisting of guarding the above-mentioned construction site. MG held a licence authorising it to provide commercial security guard services, issued on 2 February 2010 by the Ministry of the Interior. 23.  On 19 May 2010 the Executive Committee sent a letter to the chief of the Kharkiv city police. Referring to its decision of the same date authorising the felling of trees (see paragraph 18 above), it asked him to dispatch police officers to the construction site as from 20 May 2010 to ensure public order. 24.  On 19 May 2010 Kharkiv city police approved an action plan for ensuring public safety during the tree-felling work. According to the plan, twenty-seven active officers were assigned for ensuring public order and safety at the site daily from 20 May and a number of officers were to be kept in reserve at the local police station in case of need. It was mentioned in the plan that the tree felling could potentially generate picketing, demonstrations and other, unexpected action by opponents of the construction project. 25.  On 21 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement for the provision of security guard services with private security company P-4 (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u0456\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0454\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u00ab\u041e\u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0435 \u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u00ab\u0420-4\u00bb). (hereinafter \u201cPS\u201d). The subject of the agreement was the provision of security guard services for the purpose of preventing third parties from entering the road construction site, and the services were to be provided as from 28 May 2010. PS held a licence authorising it to provide commercial security guard services, issued on 11 April 2007 by the Ministry of the Interior. 26.  On 25 May 2010 the Main Contractor asked the chief of the city police to send police units to the site at 7 a.m. on 26 May 2010 to prevent third parties from infiltrating the construction site. On 29 May it asked the chief of police of the then Dzerzhinsky (presently Shevchenkivsky) District, where Gorky Park is located (hereinafter \u201cthe district\u201d), to ensure public order on the construction site, referring to an incident the previous day in which, according to the company, unidentified people had interfered with the construction work, shouted profanities at the workers and tried to provoke a fight. 27.  The tree felling commenced on 20 May 2010, attracting a number of individuals (including, according to them, the applicants) who protested against it. According to the applicants, there were \u201chundreds\u201d of protesters. No formal notification had been sent to the municipal authorities. The protesters alleged, inter alia, that the felling was unjustified and not duly authorised, and demanded proof of its legality. Some protesters actively attempted to interfere with the work. In particular, they climbed the trees with the help of climbing equipment, and attached themselves to the trees to be felled or interfered with work to be carried out by machinery by placing themselves in front of it. 28.  Notwithstanding the protests, the work proceeded. According to the Government\u2019s submissions, in response to the protesters\u2019 actions the security guards attempted to drive them away by pushing them back beyond the boundaries of the area. In some instances, clashes took place. On at least fifteen occasions ambulances were called to the site. The police officers deployed at the site allegedly remained largely passive in the face of the clashes. 29.  It appears that the bulk of the protest activity was brought to an end on 2 June 2010 and most of the protesters left the site on that day (see paragraph 76 below regarding the relevant police report). However, some of the protesters apparently continued to picket the construction site until about mid\u2011August 2010 (see also paragraphs 64 and 65 below concerning the sixth applicant\u2019s arrest on 6 July 2010). 30.  Video and photographic evidence of the events of 20 May to 2 June 2010, described in paragraphs 31 to 35, 38, 40, 42 and 45 below, was provided by the applicants. At the time of examination of the case by this Court, similar video evidence was also publicly available online (see paragraph 45 below regarding the evidence concerning the events of 28 May, for example).[2] Certain video material was also examined in the course of the domestic proceedings (see, for example, paragraphs 51 and 82 below) but it was not provided to the Court. The Court will rely on the evidence set out below to the extent that it does not contradict the domestic authorities\u2019 findings (see on this point paragraph 248 below) and, in particular, to the extent that it disproves the applicants\u2019 own allegations (see, for example, paragraphs 145, 154 and 212 below). 31.  Material for 20 May 2010 consists of a news report by the Kharkiv local television channel ATN concerning the events in Gorky Park. The report shows workers felling trees, apparently unobstructed. There is no sign of any protesters. The narrator says that the tree-felling work for the road construction is advancing rapidly. The project dated from 2007 but, at the time, was attracting opposition from academics, environmentalists and city residents. At this point the report shows footage of what appears to be a demonstration in front of a public building with flags and the slogan \u201cDobkin [Kharkiv mayor at the time], do not destroy the park\u201d. This is marked as archive footage. The narrator goes on to say that those protests have not prevented the city authorities from pushing ahead with the project. At what appears to be a public meeting of city authorities, the head of the Municipal Construction Department is shown explaining the need for the new road in the city\u2019s traffic scheme. In footage marked \u201c17 September 2007\u201d the then-mayor of Kharkiv is shown speaking at what appears to be a press conference about the sources of financing for the project.\nMr Sh., a representative of Pechenigy, an NGO, discusses his concern that more trees would be felled than authorised. Mr K., a representative of another NGO, My Kharkivyany, denies that he has been shown the permits for tree felling, in particular the Executive Committee\u2019s decision of 19 May. The acting mayor of Kharkiv is shown at a public meeting of the Executive Committee saying that the project has all the necessary permits and the NGOs have been informed. The narrator says that civil activists have complained to the police of illegal tree felling and intended to appeal to the prosecutor\u2019s office and the courts. 32.  Material for 22 May shows an area that has been cleared of some trees. Protesters are seen standing by two trees and hugging them. 33.  Material for 23 May shows tree-felling work with a number of individuals standing by. An individual is seen being taken away by the police. Three individuals are surrounding a tree and facing the police. One of them says \u201cWelcome to the picnic\u201d. 34.  Material for 24 May shows tree-felling work. Police and individuals who appear to be protesters surround the loggers who are holding chainsaws. One scene shows a logger starting to cut down a tree with a chainsaw, at which moment an individual in civilian clothing comes along and puts his foot on the tree trunk at the level where the logger is attempting to cut. The worker walks away. 35.  Material for 25 May shows a large number of police officers standing in lines blocking protesters\u2019 access to certain areas where tree felling is ongoing or pulling individual protesters away from the trees while protesters attempt to cling to them. It appears that the protesters are pushed, pulled and escorted away from the felling area and released. Another scene shows the police pushing back some protesters who appear to be trying to get closer to the area where a tall tree is being cut down. A worker starts cutting a tree with a chainsaw, he makes a short pause, a protester comes along and hugs the tree, preventing the worker from proceeding. 36.  The applicants alleged a number of \u201cattacks\u201d on them and other protesters by the security guards and loggers in the period from 20 May to 2 June 2010. The following alleged incidents are of particular note. 37.  According to the applicants, on 27 May 2010 the ninth applicant was beaten by unidentified men in orange vests.\nAn ambulance was called and the ninth applicant was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed as having sustained injuries to the soft tissue of the head and face, and was treated as an outpatient. On the same day he lodged a complaint with the district police, alleging that he had been assaulted in the course of the Gorky Park events near the children\u2019s railway. 38.  Video and photographic material for 27 May shows the following scenes: (i) a person introducing himself as the head of the Municipal Construction Department and surrounded, apparently, by some other officials, including a police officer, is arguing with protesters; (ii) a group of protesters confront a bulldozer near railway tracks. They attempt to sit down on its blade. Several individuals in civilian clothing unsuccessfully attempt to pull the protesters off, but they manage to surround the blade and block the bulldozer; (iii) a group of individuals in orange vests and a group in civilian clothing are shown confronting and pushing each other in a chaotic fashion around an excavator. Several individuals in civilian clothing on what appears to be the protesters\u2019 side are seen recording the events with cameras. Photographs reproduce what appear to be some aspects of the same scenes. Red-and-white warning tape is seen on some photographs for the first time. 39.  According to the applicants, on 31 May 2010 the seventh applicant was assaulted by men in black wearing MG badges in response to her protests about the beating of another protester. According to her, the police officers who were standing nearby observed the assault without reacting to her cries for help.\nOn that day she was taken to hospital by ambulance. In the hospital she was diagnosed as suffering from stress-related hypertension and soft tissue contusions in the lumbar area. She stayed in the hospital from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. that day.\nOn 1 June 2010 the seventh applicant complained to the head of the district police that on 31 May she had been hit in the back by the MG staff. 40.  Video and photographic material for 31 May shows another tumultuous scene. The sound of machinery is heard in the background and men in black with badges are seen confronting a large group of individuals in civilian clothing. They appear to be pulling some protesters away from an area they are attempting to protect. They then form an elbow-to-elbow line blocking access. Individuals in civilian clothing on the protesters\u2019 side are seen filming the events. There are shouts of \u201cPolice!\u201d and \u201cCall an ambulance!\u201d A woman (apparently the ninth applicant) is seen lying on the ground surrounded by the crowd. An ambulance team arrives and takes her away. Photographs show other scenes, supposedly from the same day: (i) individuals, apparently protesters, are seen sitting in groups around trees marked with slogans; (ii) men in black clothing with badges confront individuals in civilian clothing, pushing them away; (iii) a man in black is facing what appears to be a group of protesters sitting on the ground and holding onto a tree. 41.  According to the applicants, on 2 June 2010 men in black with MG badges and loggers were attempting to clear the site of protesters. In the course of that action, the third applicant was closely approached by two loggers, subsequently identified as A. and K., employees of one of the subcontractors. They threatened him and a group of other protesters with working chainsaws. One of them nearly injured the third applicant.\nThe Government alleged, on the contrary, that it was the protesters who had attacked the workers, trying to take away the chainsaws so that the workers had had to retreat to avoid injuries. In their statements in the course of the domestic investigation, as summarised in the decision not to institute criminal proceedings of 9 August 2010 (see paragraph 81 below), A. and K. stated that on the day in question, on arriving at the designated felling area in Gorky Park, they had observed men in black and protesters. The latter had started insulting the workers and the men in black. They had had then started to push A. and K., grabbing their arms, trying to seize their chainsaws. In order to prevent those people from approaching, A. and K. had switched on the chainsaws. However, the protesters had started approaching and in order not to injure them, A. and K. had had to step back, holding the chainsaws in front of them. 42.  Video material for 2 June shows a tumultuous scene involving dozens of individuals, with men in black attempting to push the protesters away from the trees and the protesters attempting to hold their ground and push back. Several police officers observe. Some distance away from this altercation, two workers are seen starting their chainsaws. At the same time an individual identified as the third applicant approaches closely and confronts one of the workers, raising and spreading his arms. Several other individuals also closely approach the worker. The worker is shown stepping back while holding the chainsaw close and waving it in horizontal semi-circles in front of him. Shortly thereafter, a group of individuals in camouflage and in black intervene and interpose themselves in a line between the workers and the protesters. 43.  On 28 May 2010 the first to fifth, the eighth and the tenth applicants, among other protesters, were arrested and taken to a police station, where charges of malicious insubordination in the face of lawful demands of a police officer were drawn up. According to those reports, the above applicants had repeatedly refused to abide by police officers\u2019 instructions to leave the construction site and resisted the officers\u2019 efforts to remove them, in particular by dragging their feet and attempting to break free and to remain on the site. It appears that the applicants were released shortly after the reports had been drawn up. 44.  On various dates those reports were examined by the Kharkiv Dzerzhinsky District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). During the hearings, the applicants pleaded not guilty. They submitted, in particular, that on the morning of 28 May 2010 they had been in Gorky Park along with some other protesters to express their dissatisfaction with the tree felling (see, however, the first and second applicants\u2019 statements, which differed from others in this respect, at paragraphs 52 and 53 below). The construction site had no boundary markers and they had believed that they were lawfully in a public open space. About 100 police officers had been standing nearby, and they had never asked the protesters to leave the area. A number of men in black with MG badges had surrounded the protesters and started pressing them into a tight circle. The police officers had then approached and, instead of responding to the protesters\u2019 cries for help, had taken some of the protesters, including the applicants, out of the crowd one by one and escorted them to the police station, without any demands or explanations. The applicants had followed the officers without offering any resistance. 45.  Video and photographic material for 28 May shows an individual in civilian clothing leading a group of several dozen men in black and other clothing with badges. They approach a group of protesters, who are within a zone marked off with warning tape standing by what appears to be a railroad crossing. The individual repeats several times \u201cPlease leave the construction site\u201d. He receives the response: \u201cThis is a park, not a construction site\u201d. Then the people with badges, having lined up elbow\u2011to\u2011elbow, start pushing, apparently attempting to push the protesters away from the crossing towards the periphery of the marked-off area. The protesters resist the pressure and some shout \u201cPolice!\u201d and \u201cThe park is ours!\u201d (\u041f\u0430\u0440\u043a \u043d\u0430\u0448!) A large group of police officers arrives. On seeing them, the protesters start chanting \u201cPolice with the people!\u201d (\u041c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0441 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c!) By the time the police have arrived, the protesters have been moved away from the crossing and are surrounded by the people with badges, in a tight circle, but are still within the marked-off area. The police officer in charge exchanges inaudible words \u2013 he appears to be saying \u201cDo you wish to leave [the territory]?\u201d (\u0425\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0442\u044c?) \u2013 with a person who appears to be one of the surrounded protesters, and says to the other officers \u201cTo the police station!\u201d. The exact exchange is difficult to hear as there is so much noise, in particular from the protesters, who continue to chant \u201cPolice with the people!\u201d The police officers then start prising individuals from the group and lead them away from the marked-off area. Several are seen dragging their feet and arguing. Eventually, the area previously occupied by the protesters is cleared and an excavator moves through it.\n(a)  The first and second applicants 46.  In his statement to the police the first applicant said that at 7.30 a.m. on 28 May 2010 he had been in Gorky Park with his bicycle. He had been grabbed by people with MG badges and then handed over to the police. 47.  In his statement to the police the second applicant said that at 7.20 a.m. on 28 May 2010 he had been in the park near the railway crossing, where he had seen a crowd and had come closer to find out what was going on. He had been unaware that construction work was being conducted there. Individuals with MG badges had pushed him and others away from the railway crossing and encircled them. Afterwards, police officers had come and dragged him out of the circle and to the police station. He had not heard any warnings to leave the site. 48.  On 28 May 2010 the cases against the first and second applicants were sent to court. The applicants requested that the hearings in their cases be postponed as they needed time to appoint a lawyer. They appointed a lawyer on the same day. 49.  The second applicant\u2019s administrative-offence case file contains two versions of the report drawn up by arresting officers and addressed to their superiors concerning the circumstances of his arrest. The first version states that the second applicant was taken to the police station because he had been protesting at the construction site in Gorky Park, thus putting his life at risk and interfering with the construction work. The second version states that the applicant had been present at the construction site in Gorky Park, had refused to leave despite repeated warnings from police officers, and had struggled when police officers had attempted to escort him out of the area. 50.  On 31 May 2010 the first and second applicants\u2019 lawyer asked the court to admit to the file and examine a video recording of the events of 28 May 2010. 51.  On 9 June 2010 the District Court held a hearing at which it heard the police officers, who supported the charges and the account of events set out in the offence reports. It also heard the applicants and some witnesses, and examined the video recording submitted by the applicants\u2019 lawyer. 52.  The first applicant stated that on the morning of 28 May he had been cycling through Gorky Park on his way to work. He had seen many people in the place where trees were being felled and had gone closer. There had been red-and-white tape but he had not realised that that meant that the area in question was a construction site. People with MG badges had tried to push him and others away from the railway crossing and had surrounded them, after which he had been taken away by police officers, who had not addressed any orders to him personally. 53.  The second applicant stated that on the morning of 28 May he had gone to the park to look at the events surrounding the tree felling. There had been a lot of people there. There had been red-and-white tape but he had not understood that that meant it was a construction site and that his presence there could be dangerous. He described the subsequent events in terms close to those used by the first applicant. 54.  At the close of the hearing the court convicted the first and second applicants as charged and sentenced them to fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention. The court stated that, in view of the examined evidence, including that submitted by the defence, it was convinced that the applicants were guilty as charged. It further stated that the video recording submitted by the applicants\u2019 lawyer had not exculpated them since it had pauses and did not show certain witnesses; therefore, it could not be regarded as a complete record of the events in question. Having examined the circumstances of the case and the character of the applicants, it was also convinced that a punishment less severe than detention would not be adequate. The decision was enforced immediately and the applicants were taken into custody. 55.  The District Court\u2019s judgments were served on the first and second applicants and on 10 June 2010 their lawyer appealed to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). He argued that the District Court had failed to set out its analysis of the evidence which had led it to the conclusion that the applicants were guilty, and had thus failed adequately to reason its judgments. He also argued that under the Code of Administrative Offences administrative detention could only be applied in exceptional cases. The court had failed to explain the exceptional nature of the applicants\u2019 cases which would justify the severity of the punishment imposed. 56.  On 14 June 2010 the District Court notified the lawyer and the applicants (through the detention centre) that their cases were being sent to the Court of Appeal. 57.  According to a note in the domestic files, at 5 p.m. on 17 June 2010 a clerk from the Court of Appeal informed the applicants\u2019 lawyer that court hearings in the first and second applicants\u2019 cases would be held at 2 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. the following day respectively. The same day the lawyer studied the files. 58.  On 18 June 2010 the Court of Appeal heard the appeals of the first and second applicants in their absence but in the presence of their lawyer, and upheld their conviction. The Court of Appeal found that the case-file material showed that the police officers had acted lawfully in directing the applicants to leave the construction site. The construction work was being conducted on the basis of valid permits and the appellants had failed to show otherwise. At the same time, the court concluded that the District Court had not had sufficient grounds to impose the maximum punishment on the applicants, having failed to sufficiently take into account the circumstances of the cases and the applicants\u2019 personal characteristics. Accordingly, it reduced their sentence to nine days\u2019 detention. 59.  On the same day that decision became final and the first and second applicants were released.\n(b)  The third and fourth applicants 60.  In the course of the hearing before the District Court the third applicant stated that he had indeed been in Gorky Park, he had not heard any orders to leave the site from the police officers but had heard it from a person in civilian clothing. He and other protesters had been surrounded by a line of individuals in civilian clothing and he had then been dragged from the circle by police officers, who had taken him to the police station.\nOn 14 June 2010 the District Court, having heard the police officers, who supported the charges, the third and fourth applicants and some witnesses, convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to fines of 136 and 170 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) respectively, at the time the equivalent of about 14 and 17 euros (EUR) respectively (see paragraph 97 below). The applicants appealed. In his appeal the third applicant argued, in particular, that he could not be held liable for failure to comply with the order of the police since he had had the right to be present in the park and the order to leave it had been without legal basis. The fourth applicant also argued that police officers had not issued any order to leave the site. 61.  On 27 July and 11 August 2010 respectively the judgments in those applicants\u2019 cases were upheld by the Court of Appeal.\n(c)  The fifth applicant 62.  On 23 June 2010 the District Court, having heard the police officers, the fifth applicant and some witnesses, convicted the fifth applicant as charged and fined him UAH 170, at the time the equivalent of about EUR 17. On 27 July 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction by a final decision and discontinued the proceedings against the fifth applicant under Article 22 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 95 below). It found that the trial court had correctly established the facts concerning the applicant\u2019s guilt, but that its judgment lacked reasoning as to the degree of dangerousness of the applicant\u2019s conduct and his actions and as to his personal characteristics. The Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant\u2019s registered residence was in Kharkiv, that he was employed and that his actions had not caused prejudice to the public interest or to individuals. Therefore, the delinquent element in his conduct had been so insignificant that an oral reprimand would have sufficed, under Article 22 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 95 below). The court proceeded to issue the reprimand.\n(d)  The eighth and tenth applicants 63.  On 8 June and 12 July 2010 the District Court discontinued proceedings against the eight and tenth applicants. In its judgment concerning the eighth applicant the District Court noted, in particular, that his explanations were consistent with a private video recording of the events submitted by him. There were inconsistencies between various police reports in the case file and a lack of evidence that the officers had duly instructed him to leave. Concerning the tenth applicant, the court likewise pointed to inconsistencies between various police reports in the case file and the lack of evidence that the officers had duly instructed him to leave. 64.  On 6 July 2010 the sixth applicant was arrested and charged with malicious insubordination in the face of orders given by police officers to leave the construction site. 65.  On 7 July 2010 the sixth applicant\u2019s case was heard by the District Court. At the hearing the police officers supported the charges. The sixth applicant acknowledged that he had been sitting on the ground in the construction area, protesting against the tree felling, which he considered unlawful. He had refused to comply with the police officers\u2019 requests to leave the site, to the point where they had had to drag him away by the arms with his legs dragging on the ground. He further admitted that he had told the police officers that he would return to the site as soon as he could. Witnesses gave testimony to the same effect, with one adding that the applicant had also tried to break away from the police. 66.  On the same day the District Court convicted the sixth applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten days\u2019 administrative detention. The court set out the evidence describing the applicant\u2019s conduct. In justifying the sanction, the court stated that it had taken into account the nature of the offence and its specific circumstances, the applicant\u2019s personal characteristics, the fact that he had no employment, the absence of aggravating or attenuating circumstances, and the need to re-educate the offender and to prevent new offences. It considered that the use of sanctions less severe than imprisonment would be insufficient and that administrative detention needed to be imposed, but not for the maximum duration provided for in the law. The applicant started to serve his sentence immediately. 67.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal, arguing that the District Court had failed to set out its analysis of the evidence which had led it to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty, and had thus failed adequately to reason its judgment. He also argued that under the Code of Administrative Offences administrative detention could only be applied in exceptional cases (see paragraph 96 below). The District Court had failed to explain the exceptional nature of the applicant\u2019s case which would justify the severity of the punishment imposed. He requested that the District Court\u2019s judgment be quashed and the proceedings in the case discontinued. 68.  On 15 September 2010, after a hearing at which it heard the sixth applicant and his lawyer and having examined, at the request of the defence, an additional witness, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. It recounted the evidence in the file and concluded that the evidence, notably the applicant\u2019s own explanations in court, fully supported the finding of the applicant\u2019s guilt. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s arguments, there was no indication of illegality in the police order to leave the site, in particular because the applicant had not submitted any evidence of any challenge having been lodged concerning the police actions or the Executive Committee\u2019s decision of 19 May 2010 authorising the tree felling. Concerning the sentence, the Court of Appeal was in no positon to reduce it, since neither the applicant nor his lawyer had asked the court to modify the District Court\u2019s judgment in that respect, in the light of any particular circumstances of the case or of the applicant\u2019s personal characteristics, but had rather insisted only on the applicant\u2019s innocence. 69.  On 2 June 2010 the ninth applicant informed the chief of the city police that, in protest against the destruction of trees in Gorky Park, the Kharkiv regional council would be picketed daily from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and until further notice, by the Zelenyi Front association (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0417\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0444\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0442), which the ninth applicant represented. 70.  On 14 June 2010 the Regional Environmental Protection Inspectorate informed the Municipal Construction Department that it had failed to obtain an environmental impact assessment for the road construction project from the Inspectorate. 71.  On 17 June 2010 the Executive Committee ordered that 1,006 trees be planted in city parks to compensate for the trees felled in Gorky Park. 72.  On 2 July 2010 the Regional Environmental Protection Department issued a positive environmental impact assessment (\u0432\u0438\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043a \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0435\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0438) of the road construction project. 73.  On various dates the protesters, including some of the applicants, complained to the law-enforcement authorities that they had been assaulted by unidentified loggers and men in black clothing with MG badges, and that the police officers stationed nearby had done nothing to protect them. Those complaints were investigated by the city prosecutor\u2019s office. 74.  On or around 3 June 2010 two television companies sent to the prosecutor\u2019s office, at its request, their video recordings of the events in the park. 75.  On 3 June 2010 the assistant prosecutor of Kharkiv questioned Mr Kl., director of MG, and the heads of four departments of that company about the presence and acts of the guards in the area. They stated, in particular, that there had been nobody from the company present in the area except them. They also stated that there had been a lot of men in black with MG badges, who, nevertheless, were not in fact the company\u2019s employees. On 28 May 2010, after having being rebuked by Mr Kl., those individuals had taken the badges off. 76.  On 3 June 2010 the chief of the Kharkiv police sent to the city prosecutor a report summarising the law-enforcement measures taken in the course of the protests. The report stated, in particular, that Sh. and K., the heads of the NGOs Pechenigy and My Kharkivyany (see paragraph 31 above), had taken part in the protests. The police chief reported that the police had invited the protesters to submit an official notification of their protest action, as required by Article 39 of the Constitution, but they had responded that they were not organising any assembly or action but were rather present in the park as ordinary citizens. Police officers had been deployed in full force, as envisaged by the law-enforcement plan (see paragraph 24 above), that is twenty-seven officers on site daily from 20 May to 2 June 2010, except for 23, 29 and 30 May 2010 when two officers had been deployed. The construction site had been marked off with tape on 28 May 2010. The \u201cpicketing\u201d of the construction site had been discontinued at 9.45 a.m. on 2 June. 77.  The prosecutor\u2019s office questioned a number of police officers and employees of subcontractor companies, and journalists. It also examined video evidence of the events provided by the protesters and solicited information from the local hospital concerning reports of injuries sustained in the course of the events in the park. 78.  On 17 and 18 June the prosecutor\u2019s office questioned twenty PS employees (see paragraph 25 above). The latter stated that they had not assaulted the protesters, had not deployed any special gear but had indeed pushed the protesters away from the construction site. 79.  On 24 June 2010 the Kharkiv city prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to institute any criminal proceedings. 80.  On 4 August 2010 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decision of 24 June 2010 and ordered a further inquiry. 81.  Following an additional round of pre-investigation enquiries, on 9 August 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings against loggers A. and K., managers of the Main Contractor and subcontractor companies, MG, the City Council or its executive authorities, including the Municipal Construction Department, for lack of constituent elements of a crime in their actions.\nThe decision stated that it was the result of an investigation conducted in response to a large number of complaints in connection with the Gorky Park events, including from several members of parliament, a member of the regional council, the Pechenigy NGO (see paragraph 76 above), a number of journalists and a number of protesters, including the applicants\u2019 then representative, Mr Bushchenko (see paragraph 2 above), and the seventh and ninth applicants. It also referred to the rulings of the District Court of 26 May and 14 July 2010 in a case brought by a certain Ms Y. against the Executive Committee concerning the construction project as being at the origin of the investigation. 82.  The decision stated that in the course of the investigation more than a hundred people, including protesters, police officers, employees of the Main Contractor and subcontractors, and MG staff had been questioned. The prosecutor\u2019s office had also examined photographs and video recordings of the events, including those provided by news outlets, complainants and NGOs. 83.  As to the events of 28 May 2010, the prosecutor\u2019s office described the facts as follows. At around 7 a.m. the Main Contractor\u2019s staff had marked the boundaries of the construction site with tape and MG staff had taken up the duties of guarding it. The MG staff had then asked any individuals who were at the time within the perimeter to leave the area in order to avoid the risk of trauma from the construction equipment. When they refused, the Main Contractor\u2019s management had appealed to the police for help in removing those individuals from the construction site. Some protesters had then been arrested as they had refused to leave. 84.  PS staff had provided guard services on the construction site from 28 May to 2 June 2010. When questioned, the private security guards had stated that they had avoided any conflict with the protesters and had not assaulted them, despite provocative behaviour on the part of the latter. 85.  The prosecutor\u2019s office concluded that no criminal-law provision had been breached in the course of issuance of approvals for the project, tree removal, the construction work or interactions with the protesters. Loggers A. and K. had not committed any offence for the reasons set out in the Government\u2019s version of the events of 2 June 2010 (see paragraph 41 above). 86.  According to the applicants, notwithstanding their persistent efforts and requests submitted on 17 February, 5 July, 9 August and 12 September 2011, they had been unable to obtain a copy of the decision of 9 August 2010.\nThey submitted a copy of the letter from the city prosecutor\u2019s office of 19 August 2011, which stated that in response to Mr Bushchenko\u2019s request of 5 July 2011 a copy of the decision of 9 August 2010 had been sent to him on 26 July 2011. On 4 October 2011 Mr Bushchenko wrote to the prosecutor\u2019s office again, stating that in fact a copy of the decision had not been enclosed with the authorities\u2019 previous letters. On 10 October 2011 the city prosecutor\u2019s office sent Mr Bushchenko another copy. The applicants allege that he finally received that copy, for the first time, on 19 October 2011.\nOn 25 October 2011 the applicants appealed against the decision of 9 August 2010. According to them, on 25 November 2011 the Kharkiv Kyivsky District Court dismissed their appeal. On 2 April 2012 the applicants appealed against that decision. They have not informed the Court of any further developments. 87.  On 13 August 2010 the police refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the seventh applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment. On 20 March 2012 the Kharkiv Dzerzhinsky District Court quashed that decision on the grounds that the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning pre-investigation enquiries (see paragraph 101 below) had not been complied with and the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been verified. The applicants submitted a copy of a letter from their lawyer to the district police dated 3 October 2014, stating that after the court\u2019s decision of 20 March 2012, the seventh applicant had not been informed about any further progress in the proceedings. 88.  According to the Government, the prosecutor\u2019s office investigated possible official involvement in the alleged attacks on the seventh and ninth applicants and, having found no such involvement, forwarded the material to the police to investigate the possibility that bodily injuries may have been inflicted by private parties. On 20 August 2010 the police decided not to institute criminal proceedings in that respect either.\nIn their response of 15 November 2011 to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicants alleged that they had learned about the decision of 20 August 2010 only from those observations and had never been provided with a copy. They submitted copies of letters addressed to the city prosecutor\u2019s office and to the city and district police chiefs in which they had asked to be provided with a copy of the decision of 20 August 2010 and enclosed postal receipts showing that those letters had been delivered on 9 and 10 November 2010.\nIn their comments of 1 March 2012 concerning the applicants\u2019 observations of 15 November 2011, the Government commented on a number of factual matters raised by the applicants (notably the public consultation concerning the project, see paragraph 200 below) but not on the applicants\u2019 alleged inability to obtain a copy of the decision of 20 August 2010. 89.  On 31 July 2014, in response to the Court\u2019s request for further observations (see paragraph 5 above), the Government informed the Court that material concerning enquiries into the seventh and the ninth\u2019s applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment had been destroyed due to the expiry of the time-limit for their preservation. They provided a statement documenting the destruction dated 9 September 2013. 90.  In November 2010 a number of protesters, including all the applicants, lodged an action with the Kharkiv Circuit Administrative Court, complaining that the police had failed to protect them against assaults during their peaceful protest against the tree felling, in particular on 28 and 31 May and 1 and 2 June 2010.\nAccording to the Government, in the course of the trial in this case the seventh applicant was examined by a representative of the police. She stated that she could not say with certitude who had hit her on 31 May 2010 and only supposed that it had been a person in black. 91.  On 24 May 2011 the first-instance court rejected the applicants\u2019 claim. On 9 December 2011 the Kharkiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld that decision. On 26 June 2014 the High Administrative Court allowed an appeal lodged by the applicants and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination on the grounds that the lower courts\u2019 examination of the facts had been incomplete. They had failed, in particular, to establish whether attacks on the protesters had really taken place, the list of the officers present, and whether the protesters had appealed for help. 92.  As of the date of the last communication from the applicants on this point, 8 October 2014, the claim was pending before the first-instance court.", "references": ["0", "2", "5", "9", "6", "8", "4", "No Label", "7", "1", "3"], "gold": ["7", "1", "3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Corjova. 7.  He had his car registered with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and had Moldovan registration plates installed on it. 8.  On 16 December 2006 a customs officer of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d) stopped the applicant at a check\u2011point and seized his car on the ground that upon entry on the territory of Transdniestria he had failed to stop at the border. He was later obliged to pay a fine of 58 United States dollars in order to recover the car. 9.  On 19 December 2006 the applicant\u2019s driving licence was seized on the ground that he had failed to comply with traffic rules. His car was also seized, on the ground of his failure to comply with customs regulations, but the seizure report was destroyed and he was able to recover his car five hours later after the intervention of a group of Russian peacekeepers. His driving licence was not returned and he was issued a temporary driving licence. 10.  According to the applicant, he complained to the authorities of Moldova, but they informed him that there was nothing they could help him with. The Moldovan Government disputed the fact that the applicant had informed them about the circumstances of the present case. 11.  Reports by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the relevant domestic law and practice of the Republic of Moldova, and other pertinent documents were summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, \u00a7\u00a7 61-77, 23 February 2016).", "references": ["7", "1", "4", "6", "0", "3", "8", "5", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Vantaa, Finland. 6.  The applicant has been living and working in Finland since 1999 on the basis of a permanent residence permit. 7.  In 2009 the applicant married a Russian national, Ms I.K., in Helsinki. After the marriage the couple settled in Vantaa, Finland, living in a flat owned by the applicant. I.K. had a temporary residence permit (expired in summer 2015). 8.  On 24 December 2012 I.K. gave birth to a daughter, V. The parents exercised joint custody in respect of the child, in accordance with Finnish law. The applicant also has two children from a previous marriage, both residing in Vantaa. V. had a temporary residence permit in Finland (expired in December 2014). On an unspecified date she acquired Russian nationality. 9.  In January 2013 I.K. suffered two strokes and was partially paralysed. She was admitted to hospital. 10.  The applicant took parental leave to take care of V. I.K.\u2019s parents (most often her father) often visited from Russia to help care for V. while I.K. was undergoing medical treatment. 11.  In April 2013 I.K. was discharged from hospital. She had not, however, fully recovered mobility in one hand and one leg. 12.  Relations between the applicant and I.K. apparently deteriorated, and in June 2013 I.K. travelled to Russia, accompanied by her father, for further medical treatment and physiotherapy. V. remained with the applicant. 13.  Since the applicant had to return to work, in July 2013 he took V. to his parents in Norway, where V. was taken care of by her paternal grandmother and aunt. 14.  Following her return to Finland in August 2013, I.K. instituted proceedings with a view to having the child returned to Finland under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d). 15.  In October 2013 the applicant brought V. back to Finland, and the proceedings for the return of the child were discontinued. 16.  Meanwhile, in August 2013 I.K. initiated divorce proceedings, asking the court to grant her sole custody of V. and to determine V.\u2019s place of residence as being with her. 17.  Between November 2013 and March 2014 five interim decisions were issued by the Vantaa District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) determining that, pending resolution of the proceedings, the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that the latter should reside with the applicant. 18.  On 14 November 2013 the District Court addressed the applicant\u2019s concern that there was a risk of I.K.\u2019s taking V. to Russia without his consent and ordered that V.\u2019s passport be handed in to the police. 19.  On 23 December 2013 the District Court noted that there was no risk of the child\u2019s being taken outside Finland as her passport had been handed in to the police. 20.  On 11 April 2014 the District Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and I.K. 21.  On 23 December 2014 the District Court held that the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that V. was to reside with the applicant. The court also established a detailed schedule setting out I.K.\u2019s contact with V. up until 2019. In taking that decision the District Court took into account I.K.\u2019s state of health, in particular the fact that she had not completely recovered mobility in one hand and one leg after her stroke and was still undergoing rehabilitation procedures, which made it difficult for her to react quickly to the toddler\u2019s active behaviour and to prevent potentially dangerous situations. The judgment was enforceable pending a decision in appeal proceedings. 22.  I.K. appealed against the above judgment. 23.  On 20 November 2015 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed I.K.\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of 23 December 2014. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of their daughter, I.K. had no right to remove V. from Finland without the applicant\u2019s consent. 24.  I.K. lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court of Finland. 25.  On 26 February 2016 the Supreme Court refused I.K. leave to appeal. 26.  In the meantime, while the appeal proceedings were pending, on 5 February 2015 I.K. took V. to Russia without the applicant\u2019s consent. She informed him by email that she did not intend to come back to Finland. 27.  On 20 February 2015 the applicant applied to the Finnish Ministry of Justice to have the child returned to Finland under the Hague Convention. 28.  The Finnish Ministry of Justice sent an enquiry to the Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, which confirmed that the child was residing with I.K. in St Petersburg. 29.  On 6 August 2015, after failed attempts to come to an agreement with I.K. as regards V.\u2019s return to Finland, the applicant lodged an application with the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg seeking the child\u2019s return to Finland on the basis of the Hague Convention. 30.  I.K. objected to V.\u2019s return to Finland. Relying on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, she claimed that V. was already settled in her new environment in Russia, that she did not speak the Finnish language, that V.\u2019s return to Finland would separate them and that it would thus be psychologically traumatic for her. She further indicated that V. had been removed to Russia so that she could be provided with the medical assistance she needed and, finally, that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder. 31.  The childcare authority involved in the proceedings considered that the child\u2019s interests would best be met if she continued to reside with her mother, I.K. 32.  The Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg considered that V.\u2019s removal from Finland to Russia had not been unlawful since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of the child and the child\u2019s removal to Russia did not diminish the applicant\u2019s rights on the territory of the Russian Federation; moreover, V. had a number of medical conditions which could expose her to a risk of physical harm in the event of her return to Finland. 33.  By a judgment of 2 December 2015, the Dzerzhinskiy District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and ordered that the child be returned to Finland immediately. The court found, and it was common ground between the parties, that V.\u2019s place of habitual residence was Finland and that her removal from Finland had taken place without the applicant\u2019s consent. It concluded, therefore, that the child\u2019s removal had been in breach of the applicant\u2019s custody rights. It also found that there were no grounds for granting an exception to the child\u2019s immediate return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention: the argument concerning the risk of V. suffering psychological harm in the event of her return to Finland and the allegation that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder were found unsubstantiated; I.K. had provided no evidence to the effect that the medical assistance necessitated by V.\u2019s state of health could not been provided to the latter in Finland; V.\u2019s return to Finland would not entail her separation from I.K. since the Finnish Court had determined that the parties should have joint custody of the child and had set out a detailed schedule of I.K.\u2019s contact with V. 34.  However, on 3 February 2016 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) quashed the above judgment on appeal and rejected the applicant\u2019s request for V.\u2019s return to Finland. The City Court held that since the judgment of the Vantaa District Court of 23 December 2014 \u2012 which had determined V.\u2019s residence as being with the applicant in Finland \u2012 had not yet entered into force, I.K.\u2019s actions in bringing V. to Russia had not been unlawful. The circumstances of the removal of the child, a national of the Russian Federation, to Russia had not violated the applicant\u2019s parental rights. The City Court noted that at the time of the child\u2019s removal, as well as the time of the examination of the appeal, she had not had a valid Finnish residence permit. The City Court also took into account the following facts: that since February 2015 V. had been permanently resident in St Petersburg \u2012 at the address where I.K. was registered \u2012 where suitable conditions had been created for her life and development; that both parties had registered places of residence in Russia; that at the time of her removal V. had been aged two years and one month, of which she had spent several months (from July to October 2013) in Norway, where she had been taken by the applicant without I.K.\u2019s consent; and finally that V. did not speak Finnish and since February 2015 had been attending various medical facilities and nursery school in Russia. In view of the foregoing, the City Court came to the conclusion that Finland was not the State in which V. was habitually resident. Since February 2015 V. had integrated well into the Russian social and family environment and her retention in Russia was therefore not unlawful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. V.\u2019s attendance at a kindergarten in Finland for a short period of time between November 2014 and January 2015 did not constitute sufficient proof of integration into the social environment in Finland such that Finland could be considered as the child\u2019s habitual place of residence. Lastly, the City Court noted that the report of the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg stated that both parents had parental authority in respect of V., that the applicant\u2019s rights were not diminished on the territory of the Russian Federation, and that the removal of the child from her mother in Russia to her father in Finland for the purposes of permanent residence in Finland could, on account of her numerous medical conditions, cause her physical harm. The court further noted that medical documents contained in the case file confirmed that the child had a number of medical conditions. It concluded that this circumstance \u2012 which under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention constituted an exception to immediate return \u2012 also led to the conclusion that there were no grounds for granting the applicant\u2019s request. 35.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Presidium of the City Court. 36.  On 12 May 2016 a judge of the St Petersburg City Court refused to refer the case for consideration by the Presidium of that Court. 37.  On 4 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia refused to refer the case for consideration by the Civil Chamber of that Court. 38.  On 7 September 2016 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg ruled that V. should reside with her mother, I.K., in St Petersburg and ordered the applicant to pay child maintenance starting from 8 June 2015. 39.  Referring to temporary financial difficulties and insisting on V.\u2019s return in Finland, the applicant has not been complying with the above\u2011mentioned judgment. 40.  On 5 October 2016 enforcement proceedings were instituted against the applicant. Restrictive measures were applied against him by the bailiffs service in the form of a prohibition on exiting the Russian territory. That decision currently prevents the applicant from travelling to Russia. 41.  As of 13 February 2018 the applicant\u2019s child maintenance arrears amounted to 494,644 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 42.  The applicant has not seen his daughter since she left Finland. 43.  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d) entered into force between Russia and Finland on 1 January 2013. It provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:\nArticle 1\n\u201cThe objects of the present Convention are \u2013\na)  to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and\nb)  to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.\n...\u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201cThe removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where \u2013\na)  it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and\nb)  at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.\nThe rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.\u201d\nArticle 4\n\u201cThe Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.\u201d\nArticle 11\n\u201cThe judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.\nIf the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.\u201d\nArticle 12\n\u201cWhere a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.\nThe judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.\n...\u201d\nArticle 13\n\u201cNotwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that \u2013\na) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or\nb) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.\nThe judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.\nIn considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child\u2019s habitual residence.\u201d\nArticle 14\n\u201cIn ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.\u201d\nArticle 19\n\u201cA decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.\u201d 44.  The Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention, prepared by Elisa P\u00e9rez-Vera and published by The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in 1982 ( \u201cthe Explanatory Report\u201d), provides as follows: 1.  The notion of \u2018the best interests of the child\u2019\n\u201c21.  ... the legal standard \u2018the best interests of the child\u2019 is at first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard. 24.  ... [the philosophy of the Hague Convention] can be defined as follows: the struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must always be inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their true interests. ... the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less arguable rights concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what constitutes the interests of the child.\n... the true victim of the \u2018childnapping\u2019 is the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers and relatives. 25.  It is thus legitimate to assert that the two objects of the Convention \u2013 the one preventive, the other designed to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment \u2013 both correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the \u2018best interests of the child\u2019. However ... it has to be admitted that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected. Therefore the Convention recognizes the need for certain exceptions to the general obligations assumed by States to secure the prompt return of children who have been unlawfully removed or retained.\u201d 2.  The notion of the child\u2019s \u2018habitual residence\u2019 and the \u2018wrongfulness of his or her removal or retention\u2019\n\u201c64.  Article 3 [of the Hague Convention] as a whole constitutes one of the key provisions of the Convention, since the setting in motion of the Convention\u2019s machinery for the return of the child depends upon its application. In fact, the duty to return a child arises only if its removal or retention is considered wrongful in terms of the Convention. 66.  ... the notion of habitual residence [is] a well-established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile. 68.  The first source referred to in Article 3 is law, where it is stated that custody \u2018may arise ... by operation of law\u2019. That leads us to stress one of the characteristics of this Convention, namely its application to the protection of custody rights which were exercised prior to any decision thereon. This is important, since one cannot forget that, in terms of statistics, the number of cases in which a child is removed prior to a decision on its custody are quite frequent. Moreover, the possibility of the dispossessed parent being able to recover the child in such circumstances, except within the Convention\u2019s framework, is practically non-existent, unless he in his turn resorts to force, a course of action which is always harmful to the child. 71.  ... from the Convention\u2019s standpoint, the removal of a child by one of the joint holders without the consent of the other, is equally wrongful, and this wrongfulness derives in this particular case, not from some action in breach of a particular law, but from the fact that such action has disregarded the rights of the other parent which are also protected by law, and has interfered with their normal exercise. The Convention\u2019s true nature is revealed most clearly in these situations: it is not concerned with establishing the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future, nor with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a decision awarding joint custody on the basis of facts which have subsequently changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties.\u201d 3.  The exceptions to the principle of the child\u2019s prompt return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention\n\u201c34.  ... [the exceptions] to the rule concerning the return of the child must be applied only as far as they go and no further. This implies above all that they are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter ... The practical application of this principle requires that the signatory States be convinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them \u2013 those of the child\u2019s habitual residence \u2013 are in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access. As a result, a systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the child\u2019s residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration. 113.  ... the exceptions [in Articles 13 and 20] do not apply automatically, in that they do not invariably result in the child\u2019s retention; nevertheless, the very nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion \u2013 and does not impose upon them a duty \u2013 to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances. 114.  With regard to Article 13, the introductory part of the first paragraph highlights the fact that the burden of proving the facts stated in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) is imposed on the person who opposes the return of the child ... 116.  The exceptions contained in [Article 13] (b) deal with situations where international child abduction has indeed occurred, but where the return of the child would be contrary to its interests ... Each of the terms used in this provision, is the result of a fragile compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept unaltered. Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation ...\u201d 4.  The use of expeditious procedures by judicial or administrative authorities\n\u201c104.  The importance throughout the Convention of the time factor appears again in [Article 11 of the Hague Convention]. Whereas Article 2 of the Convention imposes upon Contracting States the duty to use expeditious procedures, the first paragraph of this Article restates the obligation, this time with regard to the authorities of the State to which the child has been taken and which are to decide upon its return. There is a double aspect to this duty: firstly, the use of the most speedy procedures known to their legal system; secondly, that applications are, so far as possible, to be granted priority treatment. 105.  The second paragraph [of Article 11 of the Hague Convention], so as to prompt internal authorities to accord maximum priority to dealing with the problems arising out of the international removal of children, lays down a non-obligatory time\u2011limit of six weeks, after which the applicant or Central Authority of the requested State may request a statement of reasons for the delay. Moreover, after the Central Authority of the requested State receives the reply, it is once more under a duty to inform, a duty owed either to the Central Authority of the requesting State or to the applicant who has applied to it directly. In short, the provision\u2019s importance cannot be measured in terms of the requirements of the obligations imposed by it, but by the very fact that it draws the attention of the competent authorities to the decisive nature of the time factor in such situations and that it determines the maximum period of time within which a decision on this matter should be taken.\u201d 45.  The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was signed in New York on 20 November 1989 and entered into force in respect of Russia on 15 September 1990, read as follows:\nPreamble\n\u201cThe States Parties to the present Convention,\n...\nConvinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,\nRecognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ...\nHave agreed as follows:\n...\u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201c1.  In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.\n...\u201d\nArticle 7\n\u201c1.  The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth ... to know and be cared for by his or her parents.\n...\u201d\nArticle 9\n\u201c1.  States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will.\n...\u201d\nArticle 18\n\u201c1.  States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.\n...\u201d", "references": ["7", "2", "8", "0", "6", "3", "1", "5", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in \u0218tefan-Vod\u0103. 6.  In 2007 the applicant was charged with trafficking in human beings, together with another co-accused, B. In particular, he was charged with the attempt to organise the transfer of S. to a foreign country for the purpose of sexual exploitation. 7.  On 8 June 2007 the \u0218tefan-Vod\u0103 District Court found the applicant guilty on the strength of the statements made by B. (a co-accused), S. (a victim), and C.E. and C.T., who were witnesses. 8.  The applicant never admitted his guilt and stated that his involvement had been limited to driving S. to an apartment in Slobozia as requested by B. to pick up her passport without knowing the purpose of this action. 9.  B. admitted her guilt and declared that she had had an arrangement with the applicant to transfer S. to Turkey for the purpose of sexual exploitation. She said that S.\u2019s passport had been kept by the applicant so that he could prepare the documents necessary for S.\u2019s transfer. She said the applicant had promised her money for this and that she had received an advance payment. 10.  S. declared that she had met only B., who had promised to find her employment in Russia; that B. had arranged accommodation for her in the apartment she had been renting in Slobozia; that B. had taken her passport and that another roommate, C.T., had informed her about B.\u2019s intention to transfer her to Cyprus for the purpose of sexual exploitation. It had been upon learning this that she had gone to the police. 11.  C.E. stated that she had been the landlord who had rented her apartment to B. and that S. and C.T. had also lived in that apartment. She said that B. had told her about her arrangement with the applicant to transfer S. to Turkey, that the applicant had intended to take care of all the formalities and that he had promised a reward for each woman she had found who could be moved to Turkey for the purpose of prostitution. 12.  C.T., a witness, declared that she had shared the apartment with B. and that the latter had not told her about any intention to transfer S. to Turkey, but that she had intended to find employment for S. in Russia or Ukraine. During the court proceedings, she denied having told S. about B.\u2019s criminal intentions. The court noted that C. had changed her depositions given during criminal investigation, in which she had stated that B. had revealed her criminal intentions, and had chosen to rely on those initial depositions. 13.  The District Court convicted both B. and the applicant on all counts, sentencing B. to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, but absolving her from the execution of the sentence because she was infected with HIV, and sentencing the applicant to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. The prosecutor and the applicant appealed against this judgment. 14.  On 6 December 2007 after having heard the prosecutor, the applicant and the victim, the Bender Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution had failed to provide reliable evidence in support of the contention that the applicant had indeed acted together with B. and that the first-instance court had based its findings essentially on B.\u2019s statements. The Court of Appeal noted that B.\u2019s statements alone had been unreliable if unsupported by other witness statements and evidence. According to the court, the evidence gathered by the prosecution had been insufficient to determine the applicant\u2019s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court therefore allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal, acquitted him of all charges and released him. The court upheld B.\u2019s conviction and ordered that she serve her sentence only after her child had turned eight years of age. The prosecutor appealed against this judgment. 15.  On 1 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing at which the applicant and his lawyer were absent. It appears from the material in the domestic case file that a summons was sent to the applicant\u2019s address on an unknown date; however, the post office did not deliver it and returned it with a note to the effect that that the applicant did not live on that address. During the proceedings the applicant was represented by a pro bono lawyer and no witnesses gave evidence. According to the applicant, his chosen representative never received a summons for this hearing. The court quashed the judgment of the Bender Court of Appeal, upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction by the first-instance court and ordered a fresh examination of the case in respect of B. It did not examine directly any evidence and based its findings on the case file as established by the lower courts. On the basis of the case-file material, it found the testimonies of B., S. and E. to be reliable and directly incriminating in respect of the applicant and to be sufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal had reached incorrect conclusions on the basis of the file. 16.  On 20 October 2008 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal held a hearing in the absence of the applicant and of his representative. The court re\u2011examined and dismissed as ill-founded the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of \u0218tefan-Vod\u0103 District Court of 8 June 2007. It allowed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and sentenced B. to seven years\u2019 imprisonment in a closed-type detention facility, without allowing any adjournment for serving the sentence. 17.  On 27 November 2008 the applicant was arrested at his place of work and only then was he informed of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice of 1 April 2008 and of the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal of 20 October 2008. The applicant appealed against the latter, arguing, inter alia, that he had not been legally summonsed and that in his absence the court had adopted a decision relying on assumptions rather than on factual evidence. 18.  On 28 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, his representative, the victim and the prosecutor. The court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and found that the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal had been entitled to examine the case in respect of B. only, because in respect of the applicant a final judgment had been delivered on 1 April 2008 by the Supreme Court of Justice. The court removed any reference to the applicant from the judgment of the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal of 20 October 2008 but did not change in any way the sentence in respect of him. 19.  On 2 June 2009 the applicant submitted an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, arguing, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention as he had not been legally summonsed to the Supreme Court of Justice hearing of 1 April 2008 and to the Court of Appeal hearing of 20 October 2008, and complaining of the lack of evidence and reasons for his conviction. S., a victim, also submitted an extraordinary appeal, arguing that the proceedings had been unfair because she had also not been summoned and that because the applicant had been convicted unfairly because he was not guilty. On 28 October 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the appeals, noting, inter alia, that the applicant had not appeared in court despite the fact that he had been summoned to the hearing of 1 April 2008, and that the applicant had been represented at that hearing by a pro bono lawyer.", "references": ["7", "1", "9", "0", "5", "8", "4", "6", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chi\u015fin\u0103u. 6.  The applicant had a dispute with H. over ownership of a house. He brought a claim against H. seeking acknowledgement of his property rights, as his father\u2019s heir, and H.\u2019s eviction from the house. H. lodged a counterclaim, seeking acknowledgement of her property rights to the house as she had built it. 7.  On 20 December 2007 the Buiucani District Court dismissed H.\u2019s counterclaim and allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in full. H. lodged an appeal. On 20 May 2008 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the earlier judgment and dismissed H.\u2019s appeal. H. did not attend the appellate hearing, even though the summons had been repeatedly sent to the address she had provided in her appeal. A registered letter was returned with a note stating that H. did not live at the address indicated by her. The judgment became final after the expiry of the two-month time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law. 8.  On 11 May 2009 H. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, stating that she had only learned of the judgment of 20 May 2008 on 23 April 2009. In her application, she indicated the same address as in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant asked the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal as being lodged outside the legal time-limit. He submitted that since it had been H. who had lodged the appeal with the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal, it had been her duty to enquire about the progress of the proceedings and not to wait for a year before doing so. 9.  On 16 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed H.\u2019s appeal on points of law, quashed the previous judgments and delivered a new judgment on the merits of the case dividing the disputed house into equal shares between the applicant and H. The court argued that the appeal had not been lodged outside the time-limit because H. had not attended the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was nothing in the file to suggest that that court had informed her of the availability of the full judgment. The court concluded that without any evidence of the date when H. had learned of the judgment, her appeal was considered to have been submitted on time. The judgment was final.", "references": ["4", "5", "0", "2", "1", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1984 and the second applicant in 2009. 7.  A had a relationship with C and in 2009 their daughter, B, was born. The family lived together at the house of C\u2019s parents until January 2014 when A and B moved out. B continued to see C regularly and spend two to three nights a week at the house he shared with his parents. 8.  According to A, on an unspecified date in June 2014 B, then four and a half years old, was playing with her genitals in front of A and told her that she had been playing like that with her father, C, every evening before going to bed. 9.  On 11 June 2014 A called \u201cthe Brave Telephone\u201d, a children\u2019s helpline, which advised her to contact the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in X (hereinafter \u201cthe Polyclinic\u201d). On the same evening, A took B to C\u2019s house and left her there to spend the night with her father. 10.  The following day A called the Polyclinic and scheduled an appointment for B for 20 June 2014. It is unknown which information A gave the Polyclinic at that time. 11.  The next day, A and B travelled to another town to visit A\u2019s family. According to A, on 14 June 2014 when B was with her maternal aunt, she asked her to \u201ctouch [herself] down there\u201d and told the aunt that \u201cdaddy has been playing with [her] so as to touch [her] on the genitals with his hands, which [she] told [her] paternal grandparents and [her] grandfather shouted at [her] father\u201d. B also told her aunt that C had been singing a song to her about a bunny. The aunt considered the lyrics of the song as having erotic content. 12.  On 16 June 2014 A went to the Y Police Station to report that C had been sexually abusing their child, B, at the time aged four and a half. A was interviewed by a police officer. According to the police report, A said that about two and half years previously she had found her daughter naked from the waist to the knees in a bed with her partner, C, who was asleep. C\u2019s face had been close to the child\u2019s genitals. A had woken him up and asked him why B was naked. C had replied that she had probably taken her clothes off while he had been asleep. Since there had been no other suspicious signs in B or C\u2019s behaviour at the time, A had not taken any action. However, in the spring of 2014, when A, B, and A\u2019s sister had been out in public, B had suddenly grabbed a woman she did not know by her genitals. Around then C had been taking care of B most of the time. Also, on 14 June 2014 A had left B with her aunt, A\u2019s sister. When A had returned after about an hour, her sister had told her that B had said that C had been \u201ctouching [her] down there\u201d, and that she had heard B singing some songs about \u201ca bunny entering a hole\u201d. B had said that she had told her paternal grandparents all this, and that her grandfather had \u201cyelled at daddy not to do things like that anymore\u201d. 13.  According to A, she did not receive any assistance from the police and was only told to contact the Polyclinic, which she had already done (see paragraph 10 above). 14.  On the same day the police interviewed D and E, A\u2019s siblings. D confirmed A\u2019s allegations, and said that she had recorded some of B\u2019s behaviour and statements on her mobile telephone. E said that one day mid-June 2014 B had started to behave aggressively towards him, had wanted to kiss him on the mouth and had tried to touch his genitals. He had told D about it. 15.  On the same day, C\u2019s father reported to the Y Welfare Centre that A had been \u201cemotionally and physically abusing B\u201d, in that she was frequently shouting at B, hitting and insulting her. 16.  On 17 June 2014 the police interviewed a paediatrician who had treated B. She said that A had approached her the previous day very upset and had wanted to discuss the possible sexual abuse of B by her father, C. The doctor said that C had been taking care of B most of the time, and that when she had needed medical assistance, he had been the one who had brought B to see her. The doctor described B as a communicative, bright and intelligent child and said that she had not noticed any signs of any kind of abuse. 17.  On the same day the police interviewed two teachers in the kindergarten B had been attending. They both described B as a normal, communicative child. Neither of them had noticed any signs of abuse. 18.  On the same day A reported the alleged sexual abuse of B by C to the Y Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter \u201cthe Centre\u201d). She gave the Centre details on the alleged abuse and informed them that she had already made an appointment at the Polyclinic. A report was drawn up and on the same day forwarded to the Y Police. On 18 June 2014 the Centre contacted the Polyclinic inquiring about the exact date of their appointment with A and B. 19.  On 20 June 2014 B was seen by a multidisciplinary team at the Polyclinic. According to A, when she arrived at the Polyclinic she found that C was also there. She was surprised since she had not been informed that he would be present. According to her, both she and C were constantly present during the interviews with B, except for maybe five minutes. According to the Government, the first applicant and C were \u201cprocessed\u201d at the Polyclinic but were not present during the interviews with B. 20.  According to the Government, on 23 June 2014 the Y Police Department requested the Polyclinic to urgently deliver to them its findings concerning B. 21.  On 2 July 2014, as instructed by the Polyclinic, B was examined by a gynaecologist. Both her parents were there, but neither of them were present during the examination. No signs of sexual penetration or a fresh or older injury were observed. 22.  On 4 July 2014 a multidisciplinary team from the Polyclinic issued a report on B. According to that report, during the assessment B was seen by a social worker, a paediatrician, a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The report does not state the dates she was seen by any of the specialists. The relevant parts of that report read as follows:\n\u201cAssessment and opinion of the social worker\nThe girl came to the [interview with] the social worker accompanied by her parents ... During the interview with the parents, the girl entered the [interview] room several times. She accepts to stay alone, but on several occasions she exits the room and asks that her mother join her. During the conversation... she says that \u201cdad touched her [vagina]\u201d and that mum \u201ctold her to say that\u201d, no other information can be obtained ...\nAssessment and opinion of the paediatrician\n... sexual organ externally female, clean, no irritations or change of colour... Appointment arranged with ... gynaecologist ... for 30 June 2014.\nAssessment and opinion of the psychologist\nThe girl comes accompanied by her parents ... At this point the girls is separated from her parents and remains alone with the interviewer but several times exits the room checking on her parents, which she also does when parents were in the room while she was outside in the hallway with a companion ... As her reason for coming she says that her mother had told her that her father \u201chad done something bad, was touching her [vagina]\u201d, which is why \u201cher mum is protecting her from her father, so that she does not go close to him\u201d. She provides no further details ...\nIn conclusion ... [the girl] is growing up in a family with separating parents, she witnesses their broken down relationship, and is exposed to negative attributes of the other parent by the mother, which creates a pressure on the girl ... During the conversation she says that the reason for her coming was inadequate behaviour by the father, but she has difficulties providing details. No signs confirming such behaviour are observed through psychological assessment ...\nAssessment and opinion of the psychiatrist\n... The girl states that she lives with her mother, that her father used to be very good, but now he is very bad and rude to her, she claims that he \u201ctouched her [vagina]\u201d. The girl talks about the father\u2019s alleged actions spontaneously, without any discomfort ... Later on, we get the information that her mother told her to say so ...\nPsychiatric profile: ... established verbal communication, says she had been sexually abused by the father, but without discomfort or adequate affections ...\nPsychiatric assessment does not show signs clearly showing sexual abuse (affectionate inadequacy), but it is not possible to exclude inducement of the girl, which constitutes a risk of emotional abuse.\nOpinion of the multidisciplinary team\nThe girl has been included into the multidisciplinary assessment as instructed by the relevant Centre and police, for suspicions of abuse by the father...\nDuring the examination, the girl did not show clear signs of being sexually abused. The girl did not describe contextually characteristic situations and her affective response did not correspond to the verbally expressed content. There are elements which indicate pressure by the mother and the possibility of inducement cannot be excluded, which presents a risk of emotional abuse.\nThe assessment of the father\u2019s possible inappropriate behaviour is aggravated by the family climate of fighting, the relationship between the parents, the heteroamnestic information obtained, the different information given by the parents, as well as the mother being overwhelmed by her own experience and mistrust towards the girl\u2019s father.\n...\nIt is recommended that the girl receives supportive supervision over her further development. [It is also recommended] that the parents take part in counselling and that assistance be provided to the family through supervision of parental care to ensure the girl grows up in a safe and stable environment.\u201d 23.  On 15 July 2014 C instituted court proceedings against A seeking custody of B. 24.  On 6 August 2014 the police sent a special report to the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office containing all the interviews are reports gathered by them up to that point. 25.  On 11 August 2014 the Y police interviewed C. He denied any sexual abuse of B and alleged that A had been physically punishing her, about which he had lodged a criminal complaint. 26.  On the same day, the police requested the Y Welfare Centre to urgently send the family anamnesis and all available information on A and C\u2019s family. 27.  On 13 August 2014 the Y Municipal Court issued an interim measure allowing A to \u201cexercise all parental rights\u201d over B, owing to the allegations of sexual abuse against C. 28.  On the same day, the Centre inquired with the Polyclinic whether B had been included in any supportive follow-up treatments further to her multidisciplinary assessment. 29.  On 20 August 2014 the Y police interviewed C\u2019s parents, aunt and brother-in-law. The parents had not witnessed any incidents of C sexually abusing B, but both described incidents of A physically abusing B. The aunt and brother-in-law had heard from A about the alleged sexual abuse of B by C, but had not witnessed any incidents of that kind. 30.  On 22 August 2014 the Y police confiscated a USB stick from C. 31.  On 25 August 2014 A\u2019s mother approached the Y police and expressed her concerns about a meeting between B and C ordered by the Y Social Welfare Centre for 28 August 2014. She said that at the mention of the meeting with C, B had thrown herself to the ground and started crying and being aggressive towards her toys, pets and relatives. She also described B\u2019s overtly sexual behaviour. 32.  On 27 August 2014 the Y Welfare Centre applied a \u201csupervision of parental care\u201d child-protection measure in respect of both A and C. 33.  On 2 September 2014 the Y police provided the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office with another special report on the actions taken following A\u2019s criminal complaint. 34.  On 5 September 2014 the Y Welfare Centre sent its report on A, B and C to the Y Municipal Court. It suggested that for the time being care of B be granted to A. 35.  On 19 September 2014 the Y Municipal Court awarded custody of B to A and ordered that contact between C and B take place between 4 and 6 p.m. every Tuesday. 36.  On 6 October 2014 the Y police interviewed B\u2019s babysitter, who described incidents of sexual behaviour by B. On the same day, the police provided the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office with another special report on the actions taken following A\u2019s criminal complaint. 37.  On 10 October 2014 A requested the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office to hear further witnesses in the case. 38.  On 30 October 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office ordered that B be seen by a defectologist and that, along with the relevant social welfare centre, the results of the child-protection measure be assessed (see paragraph 32 above) with a view to protecting B\u2019s best interest. 39.  On 14 November 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office requested Polyclinic A.B.R., where B was being treated, to submit its assessment on whether B was being abused by either of her parents, with a view to her criminal protection. 40.  On 17 November 2014 A submitted to the State Attorney\u2019s Office a report dated 10 November 2014 issued by a psychiatrist Z.K, employed with Clinic P, where A had taken B for another assessment. The relevant part of that report reads as follows:\n\u201c... In the drawing of her family, the father is described as mean and doing things that he should not. She says that the father took her clothes off and pinched her behind and genitals on three occasions, that she told him not to do it, but he had always replied that he did not care. She also says that daddy used to kiss her on the mouth but has stopped doing it. She says that she has not had similar experiences with anyone else. The mother says that the girl behaves in an overtly sexual manner, tries to kiss other people on the mouth (her nannies, mother and uncle). The mother says that the girl wants to touch other people on the behind, inserts her fingers in her underwear and then into other people\u2019s mouths and that she had inserted her finger into her cat\u2019s rectum. The girl denies remembering any of this.\n...\nDuring examination the girl attempted to make inappropriate contact with the doctor writing the report. She stopped playing with toys and approached him from behind, tried to hold his upper arm and leant her head against it. This behaviour is regarded as inappropriate in the current situation.\nRecommendations\nIt is advised that the girl continue psychotherapeutic counselling currently being performed at ... Polyclinic A.B.R. Given the overall context and ongoing court proceedings, I recommend issuance of regular documents, cooperation with both parents as seen fit by the psychotherapist in charge of the child. In order to determine the forensic issues, in light of the complicated status of the girl and the overall circumstances of the \u2018case\u2019, it would be necessary to obtain an expert opinion, which could sufficiently determine the psychiatric and psychological characteristics of both parents and their causal link with the behaviour of the child or possible manipulation of the child. There is no professional need for ... double psychotherapy by two psychotherapists ...\u201d 41.  On 17 November 2014 A\u2019s lawyer asked the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office to commission a forensic expert report on B. 42.  In reply to the State Attorney\u2019s Office letter of 14 November 2014, on 3 December 2014 the A.B.R. Polyclinic submitted its psychological assessment and opinion dated 1 December 2014 and drawn up by psychologist Z.G. The relevant part of that report, reads as follows:\n\u201c1.  The child expresses a lack of distance and erotic closeness with people she does not know. On the basis of her playing and drawings and the information given by both parents, it could be concluded that the child expresses a premature interest in sexuality which is repeated constantly, so it cannot be seen as behaviour appropriate for [the child\u2019s] age, but as behaviour which indicates [the existence of] trauma. 2.  It is clear that the child is emotionally and socially neglected because of the severe conflict between the parents over a longer period. The neglect is so severe that both parents are responsible for it. It is difficult to tell to what extent and in what way such a parental approach has contributed to the observed behaviour of the child, that is to say her premature and intense interest in sexuality and her sexual behaviour. 3.  I therefore consider that the child, apart from being educationally and emotionally neglected, has also been exposed to inappropriate content and/or conduct by an adult with sexual connotations. 4.  At the time of examination the child was not testable, so the projective techniques which could better explain the parents\u2019 influence on the observed behaviour could not have been applied. 5.  Before deciding which parent is better placed to have custody of the child, an assessment of [their] capability should be carried out. 6.  The child should certainly [receive] intensive treatment so as to diminish or remove the obstacles from the emotional and social sphere.\u201d 43.  On the same day a senior expert consultant of the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a report on the applicants\u2019 case, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n\u201c... on her mother\u2019s initiative, the girl has been examined at various psychological and psychiatric institutions, so one gets the impression that the mother visits various experts and institutions in order to support her accusations and when she does not obtain confirmation of her accusations, she goes to another institution. The girl has hence been treated by the Social Welfare Centre, the Polyclinic, Clinic P and is now treated in Polyclinic A.B.R.\nIt transpires from the examinations and opinions of all institutions that the girl behaves in an inappropriately sexualised manner, but they do not establish that such behaviour would be due to sexual abuse by the father. The Polyclinic established that there had been no signs clearly indicating a sexual trauma because the girl did not describe contextually characteristic situations and her affectionate [behaviour] is not in line with verbally described content. On the other hand, [the Polyclinic] did note elements indicating the mother\u2019s pressure due to which inducement of the girl could not be excluded, which is a form of emotional abuse.\n...\nGenerally it can be concluded that the relationship between former spouses is very disturbed and that the child was left to nannies and has not bonded with either of the parents. Although the child shows erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, her inducement by the mother is so obvious as well as her taking of the child to various institutions and psychiatrists, that no credibility can any longer be given to the child\u2019s statements. Through her behaviour, the mother is pushing the girl even more to regression and emotional trauma, and although she has been warned about this, she ignores the experts. One gets the impression that she contacts institutions until she receives confirmation for her accusations. When experts point out her failures, she becomes verbally aggressive. On the other hand, the father distances himself, he is anxious and depressed and actually participates in the education only passively, sets no boundaries for the girl who has no distance in respect of him and acts appropriately considering her age in a given situation.\nTo sum up, the behaviour of both parents and their severely disturbed relationship and conflicts which break down on the girl and continue through institutions, severely endanger the child\u2019s further emotional, cognitive and social development, and regression is observed already at this stage and is continuing negatively. I consider both parents responsible for such a state of the girl. I consider that both parents should be included in psychotherapy, which has already been suggested to them, but neither of them has thus far joined any expert treatment nor has asked for help; what is important is that the girl is being taken to various experts, from institution to institution so that she already feels at home there and adapts her behaviour, so no credible statement can any longer be obtained from her.\n...\u201d 44.  On 31 December 2014 the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office informed A and her lawyer that the case had been closed. The relevant part of the letter sent to them reads:\n\u201c... after careful assessment of the ... documentation ..., even though it has been concluded with certainty that child B shows erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, no facts or circumstances have been established which would clearly indicate that the cause of this behaviour is sexual abuse of child B by the suspect C.\nSince in this case reasonable suspicion has not been established that C has sexually abused child B, or that his behaviour amounted to any other criminal act liable to State-assisted prosecution, there is therefore no basis for the State Attorney\u2019s Office to process [the case] further.\u201d 45.  On 30 January 2015 the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a formal decision not to prosecute. The decision describes in detail all the evidence gathered. The relevant part of its conclusion reads:\n\u201cOn the basis of the allegations contained in the criminal complaint, the documentation obtained during the enquiry and [that] submitted by the complainant ... it has been established that there were no signs of either old or fresh injuries on child B\u2019s body and genitals ... that child B shows a premature interest in sexuality and erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, and that both parents should receive appropriate [psychotherapy]. The fact that child B shows a premature interest in sexuality and erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age has been established in interviews with complainant A, [the child\u2019s maternal grandmother, A\u2019s siblings] D and E, and by the opinions given by experts of various institutions ... However, even though the A.B.R. Polyclinic\u2019s report ... shows that the child was exposed to inappropriate content and/or conduct by an adult with sexual connotations, the fact is that none of the four institutions which had previously treated the child, including the A.B.R. Polyclinic, has established that the cause of this erotic behaviour ... is sexual abuse by her father C. The report by the Polyclinic\u2019s multidisciplinary team ... indicates that there are no clear signs of sexual abuse. On the other hand, elements showing pressure by the mother were present. This could not exclude the possibility of the girl\u2019s inducement ... which represents emotional abuse. Furthermore, elements of pressure by the mother on the child were observed by other experts ... It has been established that the conduct of the mother, who is well informed about the manner in which sexually abused children are treated and monitored, led the child to give statements which were often contradictory or untrue, which is why it is no longer possible to obtain a truthful statement from the child.\u201d\nThe decision then concludes that, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it was not possible to conclude that C had committed any criminal offence liable to State-assisted prosecution. A was also informed that she could lodge a request for an investigation with a competent county court\u2019s investigating judge within eight days. 46.  A complied with the instruction on 26 February 2015 by submitting a request to an investigating judge of the Z County Court seeking an investigation into the allegations of sexual abuse of B by her father. 47.  A also lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Z State Attorney\u2019s Office of 30 January 2015. It was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 28 April 2015 on the ground that the impugned decision did not amount to an act by which \u201ca competent court has decided on the merits about a right or an obligation of the applicant or a criminal charge against her\u201d. 48.  On 30 October 2015 an investigation judge of the Z County Court dismissed A\u2019s request for an investigation (see paragraph 46 above) on the grounds that the requirement of a reasonable suspicion against C had not been met. A\u2019s appeal against that decision was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the same court on 8 December 2015. 49.  On 27 August 2014 the Centre ordered three measures to protect the rights of B: supervision of parental care of both parents, supervision of personal contact between B and C and providing expert assistance and support with parental care. 50.  The measure of supervision of parental care was implemented in respect of both parents for the period 30 August 2014 to 29 February 2016. A psychologist was assigned to observe the manner in which parental care was carried out and she gave expert advice to the parents on how to minimise the tension between them. Monthly reports were submitted to the Centre. 51.  The measure of supervision of personal contact between B and C was implemented on 2 September 2016. The supervisor assigned submits monthly reports to the Centre. 52.  The measure of expert assistance was implemented in respect of both parents on 30 September 2016. A pedagogical expert was appointed to assist A with her parental care of B. 53.  The documents submitted by the parties show the following. 54.  B continues to be seen by a psychiatrist. 55.  On 28 August 2014 a meeting was held at the Centre with a psychologist to inform the parents about the measure of supervision of parental care. It was agreed that the psychologist would see the mother once every two weeks and that the father would also see B every second week in the presence of the psychologist. Reports of the psychologist show that these meetings have been held regularly. 56.  The psychologist also made contact with and consulted the psychiatrist treating B, the relevant professionals from the kindergarten and school attended by B and the psychologist treating C. 57.  On 13 August 2014 the Z Municipal Court ordered contact between B and C every Tuesday afternoon for two hours, under the supervision of a social worker. It appears that this order has been complied with. 58.  A attended counselling for single parents on her own initiative. 59.  Detailed reports were submitted to the Centre after every meeting with each of the parents, on contact between B and C and members of his family and on meetings with B. The reports show that B and C have a good relationship and that A insists on not communicating with C. 60.  Several sets of proceedings concerning the custody of B and contact rights of C were pending before the national authorities at the material time. 61.  On 7 May 2018 a municipal court awarded C custody of B, finding it in the child\u2019s best interest to live with her father. 62.  Sexual abuse of a child under fifteen years of age (Article 158), satisfaction of lust in front of a child (Article 160) and the introduction of children to pornography (Article 164) are all offences under the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 125/2011 and 144/2012).\nB  Code of Criminal Procedure 63.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette no. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012, 56/2013 and 145/2013) at the material time provided as follows:\nArticle 2\n\u201c(1)  Criminal proceedings shall be instituted and conducted at the request of a qualified prosecutor only. ...\n(2)  In respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution the qualified prosecutor shall be the State Attorney and in respect of criminal offences to be prosecuted privately the qualified prosecutor shall be a private prosecutor.\n(3)  Unless otherwise provided by law, the State Attorney shall undertake a criminal prosecution where there is a reasonable suspicion that an identified person has committed a criminal offence subject to public prosecution and where there are no legal impediments to the prosecution of that person.\n(4)  Where the State Attorney finds that there are no grounds to institute or conduct criminal proceedings, the injured party as a subsidiary prosecutor may take his place under the conditions prescribed by this Act.\u201d\nArticle 44\n\u201c(1)  A child victim of a criminal offence ... has the right to: 4.  exclusion of the public [from proceedings]\n...\u201d\nArticle 205\n\u201c(1)  [A criminal] report shall be filed with the relevant State Attorney in writing, orally or by other means.\n...\n(3)  If the report was filed with the court, the police authority or a State Attorney lacking jurisdiction, they shall receive it and immediately forward it to the State Attorney having jurisdiction ...\u201d\nArticle 207\n\u201c(2)  The police shall notify the State Attorney about all inquiries into criminal offences immediately, and not later than 24 hours from the moment the action was conducted ...\n...\n(4)  On the basis of conducted inquiries, the police shall ... compose a criminal complaint or a report about the conducted inquiries, stating all the evidence which it gathered ...\n(5)  Should the police subsequently learn about new facts [or] evidence ... it shall collect the necessary information and inform the State Attorney about it immediately ...\u201d\nArticle 285\n\u201c(1)  The following persons are not obliged to give evidence as witnesses:\n... 4.  a child who, owing to his or her age and emotional development, is unable to understand the meaning of the right not to give evidence as a witness cannot be heard as a witness, but the information obtained from him or her through experts, relatives or other persons who have been in contact with the child may serve as evidence.\n...\u201d 64.  Section 4 of the Act on Protection from Domestic Violence (Zakon o za\u0161titi od nasilja u obitelji, Official Gazette no. 116/2003), defines domestic violence as follows:\n\u201c... every use of physical force or psychological pressure against the integrity of a person; every other behaviour of a family member which can cause or potentially cause physical or psychological pain; causing feelings of fear or being personally endangered or feeling of offended dignity; physical attack regardless of whether or not it results in physical injury, verbal assaults, insults, cursing, name-calling and other forms of severe disturbance, sexual harassment; spying and all other forms of disturbing; illegal isolation or restriction of the freedom of movement or communication with third persons; damage or destruction of property or attempts to do so.\u201d 65.  The relevant provisions of the Family Act (Obiteljski zakon, Official Gazette no. 103/2015) provide:\nSection 127\n\u201c(1)  Parents have a duty and responsibility to protect the rights and welfare of their child.\n(2)  In the cases prescribed by this Act other family members also have the duty and responsibility referred to in paragraph 1 of this section.\n(3)  Measures to protect the rights and welfare of a child are applied in respect of the parents.\n(4)  Measures which may be taken by a social welfare centre to protect the rights and welfare of a child may also be applied in respect of persons who care for a child on a daily basis.\u201d\nSection 128\n\u201cWhen determining the appropriate measure to protect the rights and welfare of a child, the body conducting the procedure shall ensure that a measure is applied which restricts as little as possible a parent\u2019s right to care for the child where it is possible to protect the rights and welfare of the child by such a measure.\u201d\nSection 131\n\u201cMeasures to protect the rights and welfare of a child shall be ordered on the basis of an expert assessment if it has been established that there has been an infringement of the child\u2019s rights or welfare or that the child\u2019s rights or welfare are at risk.\u201d\nSection 134\n\u201cA social welfare centre may apply [the following measures] to protect the rights and welfare of a child: 66.  The National Strategy for the Rights of Children in the Republic of Croatia for the period 2014 to 2020 (Nacionalna strategija za prava djece u Republici Hrvatskoj) was adopted in September 2014 by the Croatian Government. Four main aims were identified: ensuring that services in various areas were adapted to children (such as justice, health care, social welfare, education, sport and culture), eliminating all forms of violence against children, ensuring that the rights of children in vulnerable situations are respected and ensuring the active participation of children. 67.  The Protocol on Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases (Protokol o postupanju u slu\u010daju nasilja u obitelji \u2013 hereinafter \u201cProtocol 1\u201d) was issued in 2008 by the Ministry of Family, Homeland War Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity. It relies on the definition of domestic violence, as stated in the Act on Protection against Domestic Violence Act (see paragraph 64 above). 68.  As regards the duties of the police, Protocol 1 provides that when the police receive information in any way and from anyone about an instance of domestic violence, an officer must interview the victim in separate premises without the alleged perpetrator being present. If the victim or witness of domestic violence is a child, specially trained officers must carry out all tasks. 69.  As regards the duties of social welfare centres, Protocol 1 provides that such centres are obliged to provide help to the victims of domestic violence in obtaining legal aid, encourage the victim to seek appropriate counselling, and assess whether the best interests of a child victim of domestic violence require that a special guardian be appointed so that his or her rights are completely protected in criminal or minor offences proceedings. 70.  The Protocol on Conduct in Cases of Sexual Violence (Protokol o postupanju u slu\u010daju seksualnog nasilja \u2013 hereinafter \u201cProtocol 2\u201d) was adopted by the Croatian Government on 4 September 2014. It provides that all actions by the police, save for urgent measures, are to be carried out by officers specially trained in sexual violence cases and that the police must inform the victim of the possibility of obtaining expert help for the protection of his or her physical and psychological well-being. The police are obliged to immediately inform a State attorney\u2019s office of the information gathered. 71.  As regards the duties of social welfare centres, Protocol 2 provides that centres are obliged to provide victims with help in obtaining legal aid, as well as counselling and psychosocial support. 72.  The Protocol on Conduct in Cases of Ill-treatment and Neglect of Children (Protokol o postupanju u slu\u010daju zlostavljanja i zanemarivanja djece \u2013 hereinafter \u201cProtocol 3\u201d) was adopted by the Croatian Government in November 2014. 73.  Protocol 3 provides that the best interests of a child have primary importance in all matters covered by it. The procedures followed should be efficient in order to ensure that the child is given prompt and co-ordinated protection from further ill-treatment, including sexual abuse, or neglect, as well as provided appropriate support. All procedures conducted by State bodies are to be carried out by experts in the relevant fields. 74.  A social welfare centre should appoint a special guardian for the child if its experts assess that his or her interests are in conflict with those of the parent. It should also instruct the parent to seek counselling or involve the child in appropriate forms of psychosocial help, rehabilitation programmes and other forms or expert help and support. The social welfare centre is also obliged to provide information to the parent about any pending procedures, activities planned and their possible consequences and the rights of the child. It must also co-operate with other bodies and institutions involved and organise consultation meetings so as to ensure a coordinated approach in order to provide the child with appropriate help, support and treatment with the aim of protecting him or her from further trauma, and to prevent repeated interviews or examinations. 75.  Medical institutions are obliged to ensure cooperation through a multi-disciplinary team approach in order to avoid repetition of the traumatic experience. 76.  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012/29/EU) of 25 October 2012 establishes minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. The relevant part of the Directive, which was to be implemented into the national laws of the European Union Member States by 16 November 2015, provides as follows:\nArticle 1Objectives\n\u201c2.  Member States shall ensure that in the application of this Directive, where the victim is a child, the child\u2019s best interests shall be a primary consideration and shall be assessed on an individual basis. A child-sensitive approach, taking due account of the child\u2019s age, maturity, views, needs and concerns, shall prevail. The child and the holder of parental responsibility or other legal representative, if any, shall be informed of any measures or rights specifically focused on the child.\u201d\nArticle 19\n\u201cA person should be considered to be a victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between them ...\u201d\nArticle 20 \u2013 Right to protection of victims during criminal investigations\n\u201cWithout prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during criminal investigations:\n(a)  interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the competent authority;\n(b)  the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal investigation;\n...\n(d)  medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.\u201d\nArticle 22Individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs\n\u201c4.  For the purposes of this Directive, child victims shall be presumed to have specific protection needs due to their vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation. To determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special measures as provided for under Articles 23 and 24, child victims shall be subject to an individual assessment as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.\u201d\nArticle 24Right to protection of child victims during criminal proceedings\n\u201c1.  In addition to the measures provided for in Article 23, Member States shall ensure that where the victim is a child:\n(a)  in criminal investigations, all interviews with the child victim may be audiovisually recorded and such recorded interviews may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings;\n(b)  in criminal investigations and proceedings, in accordance with the role of victims in the relevant criminal justice system, competent authorities appoint a special representative for child victims where, according to national law, the holders of parental responsibility are precluded from representing the child victim as a result of a conflict of interest between them and the child victim, or where the child victim is unaccompanied or separated from the family;\n(c)  where the child victim has the right to a lawyer, he or she has the right to legal advice and representation, in his or her own name, in proceedings where there is, or there could be, a conflict of interest between the child victim and the holders of parental responsibility.\nThe procedural rules for the audiovisual recordings referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph and the use thereof shall be determined by national law.\u201d 77.  The relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which came into force on 2 September 1990, read as follows:\nArticle 3\n\u201c1.  In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.\n...\nArticle 19 1.  States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child. 2.  Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.\nArticle 34\nStates Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:\n(a)  The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;\n(b)  The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;\n(c)  The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.\u201d 78.  This Convention obliges its parties to take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to criminalise certain intentional conduct. It was adopted in Lanzarote on 25 October 2007 and entered into force on 1 July 2010. As regards Croatia, it was ratified on 21 September 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2012. The relevant parts read:\nArticle 4 \u2013 Principles\n\u201cEach Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to protect children.\u201d\nArticle 14 \u2013 Assistance to victims\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to assist victims, in the short and long term, in their physical and psycho-social recovery. Measures taken pursuant to this paragraph shall take due account of the child\u2019s views, needs and concerns.\n... 4.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the persons who are close to the victim may benefit, where appropriate, from therapeutic assistance, notably emergency psychological care.\u201d\nChapter VI \u2013 Substantive criminal lawArticle 18 \u2013 Sexual abuse\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is criminalised:\na.  engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities;\n...\u201d\nChapter VII \u2013 Investigation, prosecution and procedural lawArticle 30 \u2013 Principles\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and criminal proceedings are carried out in the best interests and respecting the rights of the child. 2.  Each Party shall adopt a protective approach towards victims, ensuring that the investigations and criminal proceedings do not aggravate the trauma experienced by the child and that the criminal justice response is followed by assistance, where appropriate. 3.  Each Party shall ensure that the investigations and criminal proceedings are treated as priority and carried out without any unjustified delay.\n...\u201d\nArticle 31 \u2013 General measures of protection\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and criminal proceedings, in particular by:\na.  informing them of their rights and the services at their disposal and, unless they do not wish to receive such information, the follow-up given to their complaint, the charges, the general progress of the investigation or proceedings, and their role therein as well as the outcome of their cases;\n...\nd.  providing them with appropriate support services so that their rights and interests are duly presented and taken into account;\n...\ng.  ensuring that contact between victims and perpetrators within court and law enforcement agency premises is avoided, unless the competent authorities establish otherwise in the best interests of the child or when the investigations or proceedings require such contact.\n... 4.  Each Party shall provide for the possibility for the judicial authorities to appoint a special representative for the victim when, by internal law, he or she may have the status of a party to the criminal proceedings and where the holders of parental responsibility are precluded from representing the child in such proceedings as a result of a conflict of interest between them and the victim.\n...\u201d\nArticle 34 \u2013 Investigations\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons, units or services in charge of investigations are specialised in the field of combating sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children or that persons are trained for this purpose. Such units or services shall have adequate financial resources.\n...\u201d\nArticle 35 \u2013 Interviews with the child\n\u201c1.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that:\na.  interviews with the child take place without unjustified delay after the facts have been reported to the competent authorities;\nb.  interviews with the child take place, where necessary, in premises designed or adapted for this purpose;\nc.  interviews with the child are carried out by professionals trained for this purpose;\nd.  the same persons, if possible and where appropriate, conduct all interviews with the child;\ne.  the number of interviews is as limited as possible and in so far as strictly necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings;\nf.  the child may be accompanied by his or her legal representative or, where appropriate, an adult of his or her choice, unless a reasoned decision has been made to the contrary in respect of that person. 2.  Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that all interviews with the victim or, where appropriate, those with a child witness, may be videotaped and that these videotaped interviews may be accepted as evidence during the court proceedings, according to the rules provided by its internal law.\n...\u201d 79.  The relevant part of the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse reads as follows:\nArticle 31 \u2013 General measures of protection\n\u201c... 227.  Paragraph 4 makes provision for the situation in cases of sexual abuse within the family, in which the holders of parental responsibility, while responsible for defending the child\u2019s interests, are involved in some way in the proceedings in which the child is a victim (where there is a \u201cconflict of interest\u201d). In such cases, this provision makes it possible for the child to be represented in judicial proceedings by a special representative appointed by the judicial authorities. This may be the case when, for example, the holders of parental responsibility are the perpetrators or joint perpetrators of the offence, or the nature of their relationship with the perpetrator is such that they cannot be expected to defend the interests of the child victim with impartiality.\n...\u201d\nArticle 35 \u2013 Interviews with the child\n\u201c236.  This provision concerns interviews with the child both during investigations and during trial proceedings. ... The main purpose of the provision is the same as that described more generally in connection with Article 30: to safeguard the interests of the child and ensure that he or she is not further traumatised by the interviews. ... 237.  In order to achieve these objectives, Article 35 lays down a set of rules designed to limit the number of successive interviews with children, which force them to relive the events they have suffered, and enable them to be interviewed by the same people, who have been trained for the purpose, in suitable premises and a setting that is reassuring... 238.  Paragraph 2, provides that interviews with a child victim or, where appropriate, those with a child witness, may be videotaped for use as evidence during the criminal proceedings. The main objective of this provision is to protect children against the risk of being further traumatised. The videotaped interview can serve multiple purposes, including medical examination and therapeutic services, thus facilitating the aim of limiting the number of interviews as far as possible. It reflects practices successfully developed over the last few years in numerous countries.\n...\u201d 80.  Committee of the Parties to the Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (Lanzarote Committee) adopted a 1st implementation report on the protection of children on sexual abuse in the circle of trust on 4 December 2015. The relevant parts of that report read as follows:\n\u201cIII.   BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND CHILD FRIENDLY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 77.  Child sexual abuse is typically a very intimate and secretive act... A child\u2019s ability and willingness to report their victimisation plays a crucial role in legal and therapeutic intervention. It represents the most valuable source of information and it is on this that the whole case may rest. 78.  In this respect it is crucial to avoid the negative consequences which result from inappropriate and repetitive interviewing techniques and adverse facilities where these interviews may take place. To guarantee the rights and best interests of child victims of sexual abuse, authorities need to recognize that they have to act collectively, not just as a government or a judicial system, but all together as a society. Acting collectively means implementing measures to protect children, which are not confined to individual actions... but which are truly child-focused and comprehensive with regard to prevention, intervention and rehabilitation. An interdisciplinary and multi-agency approach delivered by all the different entities in society whose responsibility is to carry out these tasks is therefore paramount.\n...\nIII.5 Article 31 \u00a7 4: Appointment by the judicial authorities of a special representative for the victim to avoid a conflict of interest between the holders of parental responsibility and the victim 125.  Considering that the level of family support is one of the most important predictors of the degree to which the child can adjust following his or her disclosure, family support can be heavily disrupted when the alleged perpetrator is part of the child\u2019s family environment. In Belgium and Croatia the non-offending parent will often be appointed as special representative if this is in the child\u2019s best interest. However, although this option can provide valuable emotional support for the child\u2019s future wellbeing, it may also create a conflict of interests with the child, especially if the non-offending parent is involved emotionally.\n...\u201d 81.  The Convention was adopted in Istanbul on 11 May 2011 and entered into force on 1 August 2014. It was signed by Croatia on 22 January 2013, ratified on 12 June 2018 and came into force on 1 October 2018. The relevant part reads:\nChapter IV \u2013 Protection and supportArticle 18 \u2013 General obligations\n\u201c1.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect all victims from any further acts of violence. 2.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in accordance with internal law, to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to provide for effective co\u2010operation between all relevant state agencies, including the judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, local and regional authorities as well as non\u2010governmental organisations and other relevant organisations and entities, in protecting and supporting victims and witnesses of all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention, including by referring to general and specialist support services as detailed in Articles 20 and 22 of this Convention. 3.  Parties shall ensure that measures taken pursuant to this chapter shall:\n\u2013  be based on a gendered understanding of violence against women and domestic violence and shall focus on the human rights and safety of the victim;\n\u2013  be based on an integrated approach which takes into account the relationship between victims, perpetrators, children and their wider social environment;\n\u2013  aim at avoiding secondary victimisation;\n...\n\u2013  allow, where appropriate, for a range of protection and support services to be located on the same premises;\n\u2013  address the specific needs of vulnerable persons, including child victims, and be made available to them. 5.  Parties shall take the appropriate measures to provide consular and other protection and support to their nationals and other victims entitled to such protection in accordance with their obligations under international law.\u201d\nArticle 19 \u2013 Information\n\u201cParties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that victims receive adequate and timely information on available support services and legal measures in a language they understand.\u201d\nChapter VI \u2013 Investigation, prosecution, procedural law and protective measuresArticle 49 \u2013 General obligations\n\u201c1.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings.\n...\u201d\nArticle 50 \u2013 Immediate response, prevention and protection\n\u201c1.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the responsible law enforcement agencies respond to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention promptly and appropriately by offering adequate and immediate protection to victims.\n...\u201d\nArticle 56 \u2013 Measures of protection\n\u201c... 2.  A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.\u201d 82.  The relevant part of the Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on assistance to crime victims, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 June 2006 at the 967th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, reads as follows: 1.  Definitions\n\u201c1.3.  Secondary victimisation means victimisation that occurs not as a direct result of the criminal act but through the response of institutions and individuals to the victim.\u201d 2.  Principles\n\u201c2.1.  States should ensure the effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights of victims with regard to their human rights; they should, in particular, respect the security, dignity, private and family life of victims and recognise the negative effects of crime on victims. 2.3.  The granting of these services and measures should not depend on the identification, arrest, prosecution or conviction of the perpetrator of the criminal act.\u201d 3.4.  States should ensure that victims who are particularly vulnerable, either through their personal characteristics or through the circumstances of the crime, can benefit from special measures best suited to their situation.\u201d 10.  ProtectionProtection of physical and psychological integrity\n\u201c10.1.  States should ensure, at all stages of the procedure, the protection of the victim\u2019s physical and psychological integrity. Particular protection may be necessary for victims who could be required to provide testimony. 10.2.  Specific protection measures should be taken for victims at risk of intimidation, reprisals or repeat victimisation.\u201d 14.  Co-ordination and co-operation\n\u201c14.1.  Each state should develop and maintain co-ordinated strategies to promote and protect the rights and interests of victims. 14.2.  To this end, each state should ensure, both nationally and locally, that:\n\u2013  all agencies involved in criminal justice, social provision and health care, in the statutory, private and voluntary sectors, work together to ensure a co-ordinated response to victims;\n...\u201d 83.  Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child friendly justice were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010. The relevant part reads:\n\u201cB.  Best interests of the child 1.  Member states should guarantee the effective implementation of the right of children to have their best interests be a primary consideration in all matters involving or affecting them. 2.  In assessing the best interests of the involved or affected children:\na.  their views and opinions should be given due weight;\nb.  all other rights of the child, such as the right to dignity, liberty and equal treatment should be respected at all times;\nc.  a comprehensive approach should be adopted by all relevant authorities so as to take due account of all interests at stake, including psychological and physical well-being and legal, social and economic interests of the child. 3.  The best interests of all children involved in the same procedure or case should be separately assessed and balanced with a view to reconciling possible conflicting interests of the children. 4.  While the judicial authorities have the ultimate competence and responsibility for making the final decisions, member states should make, where necessary, concerted efforts to establish multidisciplinary approaches with the objective of assessing the best interests of children in procedures involving them. 1.  Children should be treated with care, sensitivity, fairness and respect throughout any procedure or case, with special attention for their personal situation, well-being and specific needs, and with full respect for their physical and psychological integrity. This treatment should be given to them, in whichever way they have come into contact with judicial or non-judicial proceedings or other interventions, and regardless of their legal status and capacity in any procedure or case. 37.  Children should have the right to their own legal counsel and representation, in their own name, in proceedings where there is, or could be, a conflict of interest between the child and the parents or other involved parties.\n... 42.  In cases where there are conflicting interests between parents and children, the competent authority should appoint either a guardian ad litem or another independent representative to represent the views and interests of the child. 43.  Adequate representation and the right to be represented independently from the parents should be guaranteed, especially in proceedings where the parents, members of the family or caregivers are the alleged offenders. 68.  Direct contact, confrontation or interaction between a child victim or witness with alleged perpetrators should, as far as possible, be avoided unless at the request of the child victim.", "references": ["3", "7", "0", "5", "2", "6", "9", "8", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  By a court decision the applicant was under an obligation to provide financial support in the amount of a quarter of his income for his child, who was living separately. 6.  In November 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State bailiffs service, claiming that they had erroneously determined his debt for child support in the amount of 75,083.05 hryvnias (UAH)[1] and that they had taken wrongful actions to ensure the collection of the debt. The applicant claimed, in particular, that the bailiffs had determined the debt on the basis of the gross earnings the applicant had received as a private entrepreneur, without deducting the expenses he had incurred in the course of those activities. The bailiffs objected to the claim and submitted that they had received the information about the applicant\u2019s income from the tax authorities. 7.  The court ordered an expert accounting report to determine the actual income of the applicant at the relevant time. 8.  In June 2007 the expert provided the report, indicating that the applicant had submitted to the tax authorities the information about his gross earnings obtained in the course of his business activities. The expert further concluded that the applicant\u2019s actual income was much lower than that determined by the bailiffs and that the debt for child support constituted UAH 1,650.90[2]. 9.  On 9 November 2007 the Zhytomyr District Court, relying on the expert report, found that the bailiffs had wrongly determined the amount of child-support debt. 10.  On 13 February 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above decision and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as unfounded. The Court of Appeal considered that the first-instance court had needlessly ordered an expert accounting report which was based on the tax legislation, given that the amount of child support was not a matter of tax law. The Court of Appeal noted that the bailiffs had relied on the official data obtained from the authorities and had correctly determined the amount of debt by referring to the available information on the applicant\u2019s income. The Court of Appeal then added that the applicant had not provided any evidence to disprove the amounts of income determined by the bailiffs. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had endorsed the bailiffs\u2019 calculation without dealing with his objections based on the expert report. 12.  On 9 July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, stating in general terms that the Court of Appeal had taken a lawful and reasoned decision. 13.  Ms Kobilyeva married her husband in 1984. Both the applicant and her husband worked at a rubber-production company. In 2000 the company provided the applicant\u2019s husband with a flat in which all the family resided. In 2002 a flat ownership certificate was issued to the applicant\u2019s husband. 14.  In 2008 the applicant divorced her husband. In 2009 she instituted civil proceedings against her former husband, arguing that the flat was their common marital property and that she was entitled to half of the flat. 15.  On 21 July 2009 the Bila Tserkva Town Court dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated, stating that the flat was the personal property of the former husband and not part of their marital property. The court had regard to the written evidence as well as oral statements of the company director, who had submitted that the company had provided the flat to the applicant\u2019s former husband in order to reward him for his professional achievements. The court referred to Article 57 of the Family Code of 2002, which provided that rewards and awards for personal achievements of one of the spouses were part of his or her individual property and not the marital property of both spouses. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the court had wrongly resolved the dispute on the basis of the Family Code of 2002, which had come into effect on 1 January 2004 and which could not apply retrospectively to the property regime in respect of the flat at issue. Under the Marriage and Family Code of 1969, which had been in force when her former husband had acquired the flat, the latter had been the common marital property of the spouses, and no exceptions were made for rewards or awards for personal achievements of one of the spouses. 17.  On 27 October 2009 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded, holding that she had failed to prove that the flat was the marital property of the former spouses and that she had made any contribution to the acquisition of the flat. The applicant then raised those arguments before the Supreme Court. On 16 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed as unfounded an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 18.  The applicant\u2019s husband worked at company O. from 1981 until his death on 3 July 2006. 19.  On 20 December 1995 company O., the applicant\u2019s husband and K., a construction company, concluded an agreement under which the applicant\u2019s husband was to be provided with a three-room flat, no. 42, in a multi-storey building. Company O. financed the construction work. As a party to that agreement, the applicant\u2019s husband was obliged to carry out internal repairs in the flat. On 26 July 1996 the administration of company O. and its trade union confirmed that the applicant\u2019s husband and his family, which included two children, were entitled to flat no. 42 in the building which was under construction. 20.  On 22 December 1998 company K., company O. and another company which was participating in the financing of the construction of the building, concluded another agreement specifying once again that the applicant\u2019s husband would be provided with a three-room flat, no. 42. On the same date company O. issued a certificate stating that the applicant\u2019s husband was the successor of company O. under the agreements of 20 December 1995 and 22 December 1998, given that company O. had been declared bankrupt and the construction work had not been completed. 21.  In 2002 company K. made further arrangements and agreements aimed at raising funds for the completion of the building. In 2005 company K. transferred the flat at issue to another individual. 22.  After the death of her husband, the applicant instituted civil proceedings against company O. and company K., seeking to oblige them to provide her with a flat analogous to the one specified in the contracts with her husband. On 12 April 2010 the Kirovskyy District Court of Kirovohrad dismissed the claim, finding that the applicant\u2019s husband \u201chad not been a party\u201d to the agreements of 20 December 1995 and 22 December 1998 and that therefore the defendants could not be held liable for failing to comply with any contractual obligations. As to the alleged succession of rights by the applicant\u2019s husband in accordance with the certificate of 22 December 1998, such allegations had not been based on law. 23.  The applicant appealed, arguing that her husband had been expressly designated as a party to the agreement of December 1995. In any event, under the applicable law, contracts could be concluded for the benefit of a third party and such beneficiary was entitled to seek proper performance of the contract. Furthermore, company O. had assigned its rights to the flat to the applicant\u2019s husband. Lastly, the applicant argued that the rights to the flat had been retained by her husband\u2019s family after his death. 24.  On 21 September 2010 the Kirovohrad Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that the claim against company K. was groundless because it had been just a technical contractor and not a party responsible for the provision and distribution of flats; it had been the responsibility of company O. to provide the applicant\u2019s husband with the flat. However, there was no evidence that company O. still existed as a legal entity or had any successors. Furthermore, the applicant herself had never been a party to the agreements with the defendants. 25.  The applicant then raised those arguments before the Supreme Court. On 19 January 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed as unfounded an appeal on points of law. 26.  The applicant\u2019s grandmother worked in an agricultural collective farm and was entitled to a share in the plots of land allocated to that farm. According to the applicant, his grandmother had died without having actually been provided with the share of land. 27.  The applicant instituted civil proceedings against the local authorities and the collective farm, claiming that, as his grandmother\u2019s successor, he had to be provided with the share of land to which his grandmother had been entitled. He enclosed, among other things, official letters from the domestic authorities confirming to him that his grandmother had had the right to a share of land. 28.  Following the applicant\u2019s request, on 4 March 2010 the Obukhiv District Court ordered the local land resources department to submit to the court the land ownership documents given to the farm, including an official list of citizens who had been given the shares in the plots of land allocated to the farm. As the official list had not been provided, on 30 March 2010 the court requested it once again. Subsequently, the court sent a warning that administrative liability could be imposed for failure to submit the requested list of citizens. 29.  On 25 may 2010 the Obukhiv District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim after finding that he had failed to substantiate it and to prove that his grandmother had not received any share of land. The court stated, in particular, that the applicant had failed to submit the official list of citizens who had been given shares in the plots of land allocated to the farm. The court noted that its attempt to obtain that evidence had not been successful. 30.  The applicant appealed, arguing that (i) the fact that his grandmother had not received the share of land had been confirmed, in his opinion, by the official replies from the local authorities which he had submitted to the court; and (ii) he did not have access to the list of citizens mentioned by first-instance court. 31.  On 4 November 2010 the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the first-instance court\u2019s reasoning that by not providing the official list of citizens who had received the shares of land, the applicant had failed to prove that his grandmother had not received any such share. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that he could not have access to the above-mentioned list and it was for the courts to take measures to obtain the list from the defendants. However, even in the absence of the list, there were official replies from the local authorities confirming, in his opinion, that his grandmother had not been allocated the share of land to which she had been entitled. 33.  On 4 January 2011 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed the appeal on points of law, noting that the applicant had failed to present the above-mentioned list of citizens in support of his claim.", "references": ["1", "8", "4", "9", "0", "7", "5", "6", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in \u00dcberherrn. He had worked as a prison officer in the prison of Saarbr\u00fccken. 7.  In April 2007 the prison authorities discovered that a mobile phone had been smuggled into the prison in December 2006. In May 2007 an investigation was opened against the applicant and in October 2007 several investigative measures against the applicant, including telephone surveillance, were ordered. On 14 January 2008 the applicant was summoned for questioning and on 16 January 2008 he was interviewed by the police. On 13 May 2008 the public prosecutor\u2019s office filed a bill of indictment on charges of taking a bribe. He was accused of having accepted a bribe in the amount of 200 euros (EUR), of having smuggled a mobile phone into the prison and of having provided it to an inmate. Charges were also brought against seven other accused. 8.  Subsequently, the District Court appointed defence counsel for all accused, and provided them in turn with access to the case files, including the recordings of the telephone surveillance. The refusal to appoint counsel for one co-accused was appealed against before the Regional Court, which decided on that matter in April 2009. 9.  On 8 January 2010 the main proceedings were instituted before the District Court, and on 12 January 2010 the court scheduled the trial hearings. It subsequently enquired with counsel for the defence as to which dates might be suitable for further hearings for oral argument in the months of June and July 2010 and on which days in April 2010 it would be possible to hold a preparatory meeting. 10. The first hearing of the main proceedings took place on 3 May 2010 and after fourteen hearings the District Court convicted the applicant for having taken a bribe and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of one year and four months, suspended on probation. On 23 September 2010 the written judgment was filed by the court. In October 2010 the applicant was preliminarily suspended from his duties and his salary was reduced by approximately 25 %. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. In addition, the four co-accused and the public prosecutor appealed against the respective judgments. 12.  In September 2011 the applicant changed his defence counsel; new counsel was provided with access to the case file. 13.  The appeal proceedings commenced on 25 October 2011 and ended after seven hearings on 18 November 2011. The Regional Court acquitted the applicant as well as his co-defendants. It provided the judgment in writing on 23 December 2011. 14.  On the day on which the judgment was pronounced, 18 November 2011, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law and submitted the reasoning on 16 January 2012. Responses to the appeal were submitted by the accused, and the Court of Appeal scheduled a hearing for 21 January 2013. 15.  On 21 January 2013 the Court of Appeal set the judgment of the Regional Court aside and remitted the matter to the Regional Court. 16.  New appeal proceedings commenced on 11 February 2015 and ended on 2 April 2015. The Regional Court convicted the applicant for having taken a bribe and sentenced him to eight months\u2019 imprisonment. It suspended the execution of the prison sentence on probation and declared three of the eight months as having been served. 17.  In its reasoning concerning sentencing the court held, inter alia, that it had to be taken into consideration in favour of the applicant that the deed had been committed already in 2006, that more than eight years had elapsed since then and that he had been subjected for many years, since 2007, to a criminal investigation and court proceedings that had been pursued against him. The court had also taken into account that the applicant had been suspended from service as soon as he had been convicted by the court of first instance and as a consequence had been receiving only a reduced salary since then. 18.  Lastly, the court declared three months of the prison sentence as having been served in order to compensate for the excessively long proceedings. These had resulted from the fact that the presiding judge had only been able to schedule hearings on the matter from 11 February 2015 onwards after the matter had been remitted by the Court of Appeal on 29 January 2013. A discontinuation of the proceedings sought by the applicant based on the unreasonable length of the proceedings had, however, not been appropriate. This was only an option in extreme cases, where the weight of the disadvantage to be compensated for was greater than the weight of the punishment to be executed, to which such compensation was to apply. This standard, the court held, had not been met in the applicant\u2019s case. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Regional Court on 2 April 2015 and submitted his writ of appeal on points of law on 8 April 2015. 20.  On 29 April 2016 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as being manifestly ill-founded. His subsequent complaint of a violation of his right to be heard was to no avail either. The appellate judgment of the Regional Court thus became final on 12 May 2016. 21.  On 2 June 2016 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. On 4 July 2016 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to admit it for adjudication (2 BvR 1140/16). 22.  As a consequence of the conviction becoming final, the applicant lost his status as a civil servant pursuant to the Status of Civil Servants Act (Beamtenstatusgesetz). A statement to that effect by the authorities was not required, nor did a formal notification have to be sent to the applicant. 23.  The applicant then applied to the Administrative Court seeking an interim injunction, under which he would retain his status as a civil servant for the time being, and the Land of Saarland would be instructed to continue paying his basic salary. By a decision of 12 July 2016 the Administrative Court dismissed his application, holding, inter alia, that it was contrary to the Status of Civil Servants Act (see paragraph 34 below). The court also stated that the fact that, in the event that the suspension of his prison sentence was revoked, only five months would have to be served, did not change the fact that he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least six months. 24.  On 6 October 2016 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Administrative Court of 12 July 2016.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "2", "8", "9", "6", "1", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in the Poltava region. 7.  According to the applicant, who lived in Donetsk at the material time, on 27 May 2008 a police officer called him and invited him to attend the Donetsk regional police station to discuss his past service in the police. When he arrived there at about 10 a.m. he was told that he would not be able to leave because he was going to be arrested. His mobile telephone was taken away and switched off. Two hours later police officers from the Volnovakha police arrived and took him to the Volnovakha police station, where at about 2 p.m. police officers G., P. and S. started threatening him and told him to confess to the murder of A. He refused and at about 9 p.m. they twisted his arms behind his back, put handcuffs on his wrists, pushed him down to the floor, put a plastic bag on his head blocking his airway, connected and switched on an electric shock device attached to his right wrist, and started hitting him in the head and body. After thirty minutes of ill-treatment he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, G. put the plastic bag on his head again. Afraid of further ill-treatment, he agreed to make written statements, dated 28 May 2008, concerning A.\u2019s murder. One of the police officers forced him to write his signature in an empty entry of the police visitors\u2019 book (\u043a\u043d\u0438\u0433\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0432\u0456\u0434\u0443\u0432\u0430\u0447\u0456\u0432). He was then held at the police station until the next evening when, at 7.52 p.m., he was taken to appear before the investigator, Sh. When the latter started drawing up the arrest report pursuant to Article 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, T., a lawyer from Donetsk hired by the applicant\u2019s father, entered Sh.\u2019s office and informed Sh. that she would provide legal assistance to the applicant. 8.  According to the Government, at 7.10 p.m. on 27 May 2008 the applicant attended the Volnovakha police station to \u201cgive explanations\u201d and left at 9.10 p.m. the same evening. At 9.10 a.m. on 28 May 2008 he attended the police station again to \u201cgive explanations\u201d and left at 11.40 a.m. At 7.52 p.m. he was arrested there in the presence of his lawyer, T. 9.  According to the police visitors\u2019 book, on 27 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the police station at 7.10 p.m. and left at 9.10 p.m. On 28 May 2008 he arrived at the police station at 9.10 a.m. and left at 11.40 a.m., while T. came to the police station at 7.10 p.m. Only the above two entries were made on 28 May 2008. The photocopy of the visitors\u2019 book provided by the Government does not contain a column with visitors\u2019 signatures. 10.  According to the police arrestees\u2019 logbook (\u043a\u043d\u0438\u0433\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0443 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0445), at 7.52 p.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant was brought to the police station on suspicion of aggravated murder. 11.  The arrest report drawn up by Sh. between 7.52 and 8.12 p.m. on 28 May 2008 contained the applicant\u2019s complaint that at about 9 p.m. on 27 May 2008 he had been beaten by police officers. It also contained a request by him to be taken to hospital for a medical examination. It also stated that the applicant\u2019s father had been notified of the applicant\u2019s arrest. 12.  It appears from the case file that on the evening of 28 May 2008 Sh. allowed T. to talk briefly with the applicant. During their conversation G. allegedly approached them, shouting at T. and threatening her. Later T. made a complaint against G. in the police visitors\u2019 book. 13.  The search report, drawn up on 28 May 2008 and attested by witnesses K. and B., stated that nothing had been seized from the applicant during his search. 14.  At about 10 p.m. the same evening the applicant was examined in the local hospital. Doctors noted in a medical certificate that he had informed them that at about 9 p.m. on 27 May 2008 he had been beaten by police officers. They documented numerous bruises, haematomas and abrasions on his face, head, wrists and shoulders. 15.  At 10.45 p.m. the same evening the applicant was placed in the Volnovakha temporary detention facility (\u201cthe ITT\u201d). The ITT officers noted numerous injuries on the applicant\u2019s face, forehead, wrist joints, shoulder joints and right thigh. The ITT duty officer then reported those injuries to the head of the Volnovakha police station. 16.  On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the town prosecutor regarding his alleged ill-treatment at the Volnovakha police station on the evening of 27 May and unlawful detention on 27 and 28 May 2008. In particular, he described in detail the alleged ill-treatment (as stated in paragraph 7 above). He also stated that his detention in that police station had not been recorded and that the duty officer had only made an entry in the police visitors\u2019 book about his alleged visit to that police station at 9.10 a.m. on 28 May 2008 after T.\u2019s arrival. 17.  On the same day T. complained to the prosecutor that on the evening of 28 May 2008 G., who had ill-treated the applicant the day before, had threatened her during her conversation with the applicant in the police station corridor. 18.  On the same day the applicant was questioned. In addition to the statements made in his complaint to the prosecutor, he stated that one of the alleged perpetrators had forced him to write his signature in an empty entry of the police visitors\u2019 book. 19. On the same day, at Sh.\u2019s request, P. conducted a forensic medical examination of the applicant. According to his expert report, completed on 2 July 2008, the applicant had a number of bruises, haematomas and abrasions, which were classified as minor bodily injuries. They had been caused by blunt objects or by impact with them. Some of them (abrasions on the right forearm and left wrist) had been sustained up to one day before the examination, while others had been sustained three to four days (some bruises on his face, right shoulder joint and right shoulder) or five to seven days (haematomas in the right groin area and on the left shoulder joint) before the examination. A number of others (haematomas on the head, neck, face, left hip and forearm, left wrist and knee, abrasions on the right forearm, left leg, and a scratch on the right leg) could have been sustained during the period indicated by the applicant. There were no signs of electric shock treatment. 20.  On 12 November 2008 the applicant acquainted himself with the above-mentioned report. He stated that he disagreed with it, because he still had signs of electric shock treatment, the injuries on his wrist joints had not been examined, and the manner in which they had been inflicted had not been established. He added that all the injuries had been sustained at the police station. 21.  On 3 June 2008 the prosecutor questioned the applicant as a suspect in A.\u2019s murder. According to the interview record, the prosecutor\u2019s first question concerned the vehicles which the applicant had used from 1 January 2008 \u201cuntil the time of [his] arrest on 27 May 2008\u201d. 22.  Following the pre-investigation inquiries, on 7 June, 7 August and 28 November 2008, 21 January and 10 April 2009 the town prosecutor or his assistant refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of 29 May 2008. While mentioning the applicant\u2019s explanation that he had been beaten at the police station on 27 May 2008 and the expert report of 2 July 2008, which had established that he could have sustained a number of injuries during the period indicated by him, the prosecutor found that there was no evidence that those injuries had been inflicted at the police station and not elsewhere, because on 27 and 28 May 2008 the applicant had not been at the police station all the time. The prosecutor relied on statements given by the alleged perpetrators, the investigator Sh. and police officer K., who had been on duty on 28 May 2008. According to them, on 27 May 2008 G. had received a call from the Donetsk regional police informing him that they were holding the applicant, who was suspected of a crime committed on the territory of the Volnovakha district. G. and another police officer had gone by car to Donetsk, where they had arrived at about 5 p.m. They had taken the applicant and at about 7 p.m. had returned to the Volnovakha police station. The applicant had not been questioned that day because he had given confused answers to their questions and had asked for some time to think things over. He had left the police station at about 9 p.m. and written his signature in the police visitors\u2019 book. The following day he had come back at around 9 a.m. and had written a statement concerning A.\u2019s murder. He had then been invited to wait to be questioned by Sh., but he had said that he would wait for him outside and had left the police station premises at about 11 a.m., having put his signature in the visitors\u2019 book. At 7.52 p.m. G. and S. had taken the applicant to the police station and then to appear before Sh. Nobody had seen any injuries on him, and he had not been handcuffed. When Sh. had started drawing up the arrest report, T. had entered Sh.\u2019s office, informing him that she had been appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 23.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decisions. In his appeals he again described his alleged ill-treatment in detail (as stated in paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, he stated that his signatures in the police visitors\u2019 book had been forged and that when he had asked for the book to state his complaints, it had been hidden from him. Only T. had been able to write her complaint against G. in it. 24.  On 21 July and 4 November 2008, 18 January, 30 March and 21 September 2009 the higher prosecutor or the Volnovakha Court set aside the above-mentioned decisions on the grounds that the inquiries were superficial and had not examined all the circumstances stated by the applicant. In decisions of 30 March and 21 September 2009 the latter court also instructed the prosecutor to order a handwriting analysis of the applicant\u2019s signatures in the police visitors\u2019 book. 25.  On 14 January 2010 the town prosecutor ordered a handwriting analysis of two signatures allegedly written by the applicant in the visitors\u2019 book on 27 and 28 May 2008. However, on the same day he again refused to institute criminal proceedings, largely for the same reasons as before. 26.  On 27 April 2010 a specialist, S., concluded that the signatures were authentic. In complaints lodged with the Volnovakha Court the applicant stated that he had only been informed of the results of the above-mentioned analysis in a letter from the prosecutor, but had not been provided with the document containing those results. 27.  On 30 April 2010 the prosecutor ordered an additional forensic medical examination of the applicant as per the court\u2019s instructions of 22 October 2009 (see paragraph 34 below). On 6 May 2010 P. supplemented his expert report of 2 July 2008 by adding that injuries which could have been sustained during the period indicated by the applicant had also included haematomas on his back. 28.  On 1 June 2010 the applicant complained to the Volnovakha Court about the decision of 14 January 2010. He stated, inter alia, that if the prosecutor had established that he had been taken to the police station on 28 May 2008 at about 8 p.m. without any visible injuries, and the medical examination at 10 p.m. had found numerous injuries on him, that meant that he had received them on 28 May 2008 between 8 and 10 p.m. The applicant also complained that those who had attended the police station on 27 and 28 May 2008 and could have been witnesses to the events on those days had not been identified. 29.  On 8 October 2010, following a request from the applicant\u2019s father, who was acting as his representative, two experts, G. and K. from the Kharkiv State Medical Academy, issued an expert medical report. That report, based on the material of the expert medical examination of 29 May 2008, established that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by rubbing, compression and hyperextension of the skin and by blows. He had sustained at least twenty-two blows from blunt solid objects. Formation of haematomas on the neck and back of the head as a result of the tightening up of a plastic bag was \u201cnot excluded\u201d. A haematoma and abrasion on the forearms were \u201ctypical\u201d handcuff injuries; their being sustained as a result of sharp raising by another person of the applicant\u2019s hands twisted behind his back was \u201cnot excluded\u201d. A haematoma on the applicant\u2019s left knee had been sustained upon impact of that area with a blunt object; it could have resulted from him falling over. Haematomas in the right part of the head and on the cheeks could have been caused by punches. 30.  On 27 April 2011 the Volnovakha Court set aside the decision of 14 January 2010 on the grounds that the inquiry was incomplete and one-sided. In particular, the prosecutor had not complied with the court decision requiring a handwriting analysis. He had not assessed the fact that, according to the expert report of 2 July 2008, some of the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained during the period indicated by him. Nor had he questioned the officer who had been on duty on 27 May 2008 and a doctor who had examined the applicant on 28 May 2008. 31.  On 6 July 2011 the prosecutor again refused to open criminal proceedings. The applicant\u2019s father complained to the higher prosecutors, pointing to a contradiction between the prosecutor\u2019s decisions in which it had been established that the police officers had not seen any injuries on the applicant when he had been taken to the police station on 28 May 2008, and the expert report of 2 July 2008, which stated that a number of injuries could have been sustained by the applicant on 27 May 2008. Therefore, those officers would have seen the injuries and had therefore given false statements. 32.  On 18 July 2011 M. and G., who shared a cell with the applicant for some time during his pre-trial detention, sent letters to the prosecutor stating that on 14 July 2011 S., one of the alleged perpetrators, who was later arrested on charges of bribery, had been placed in their cell for thirty minutes. M. and G. asked him whether he had participated in the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. He had answered in the affirmative, adding that he would have been fired if he had not participated in the ill-treatment. 33.  On 25 July 2011 the higher prosecutor set aside the decision of 6 July 2011. The parties did not inform the Court of the subsequent events. 34.  The applicant also raised complaints of ill-treatment within the criminal proceedings against him. On 22 October 2009 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal sent the criminal case against him for further investigation, inter alia, on the grounds that the prosecutor\u2019s inquiry into his complaints was incomplete. In particular, the expert report of 2 July 2008 had not mentioned the injuries on the applicant\u2019s back and the expert had to establish the manner in which the injuries had been sustained and whether they could have been sustained in the circumstances alleged by the applicant. 35.  The parties did not inform the Court of the subsequent events. Publicly available material shows that on 3 April 2014 the Dokuchayivsk Town Court acquitted the applicant for lack of evidence against him. In examining various pieces of evidence, it also referred to the applicant\u2019s statement given during the trial that, inter alia, on 27 May 2008 he had been ill-treated at the Volnovakha police station.", "references": ["0", "5", "9", "4", "8", "7", "3", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan. 7.  In 1990 the applicant started living with Ms T.K. 8.  In 1991 and 1992 they had two daughters, Kr. (born on 1 July 1991) and K. (born on 13 July 1992). The applicant did not register his paternity. 9.  In 2002 the applicant and T.K. separated. Both girls continued living with the applicant. 10.  In 2004 T.K. married Yu.K. 11.  In May 2004 Yu.K. registered his paternity in respect of Kr. and K. However, the girls still remained living with the applicant. 12.  In July 2007 K. stopped attending school, frequently ran away from home and exhibited delinquent behaviour. She allegedly stole her mother\u2019s jewellery. 13.  In December 2007, following an application by T.K., K. was placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 14.  On 18 February 2008 the Kirovskiy District Court of Makhachkala (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), sitting in a single-judge formation composed of Judge I., granted an application lodged by the administration of the Kirovskiy District of Makhachkala to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors for two years and five months. In taking this decision the District Court relied on the following circumstances: K.\u2019s not attending school, running away from home, vagabonding and leading an anti-social and immoral lifestyle, as well as unsuccessful attempts to discipline K. and her being detained in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 15.  On an unspecified date shortly afterwards K. was placed in a closed educational institution for minors in the town of Pokrov, Vladimir Region, some 2,500 km from her home town of Makhachkala. According to the applicant, his daughter\u2019s correspondence with him was subjected to censorship by the facility\u2019s administration. 16.  In the meantime, the applicant brought proceedings seeking the establishment of his paternity vis-\u00e0-vis Kr. and K. 17.  On 9 April 2008 the District Court established the applicant\u2019s paternity in respect of Kr. and K. and annuled the registration of Yu.K. as the girls\u2019 father. 18.  At the applicant\u2019s request, the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan for a supervisory review of the decision of 18 February 2008. 19.  The present application was already pending before the European Court of Human Rights when, on 7 August 2008, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan, by way of a supervisory review, quashed the decision of 18 February 2008 as unlawful and unjustified, and discontinued the proceedings. The court held, in particular, that in violation of the procedure established by the Federal Law on Basic Measures for Preventing Child Neglect and Delinquency of Minors, no. 120-FZ of 24 June 1999 (\u201cthe Minors Act\u201d), the District Court had decided to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors in the absence of a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings or a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the latter, and without her having undergone a prior medical examination. 20.  On 30 September 2008 K. was released from the closed educational institution for minors and returned home.", "references": ["6", "0", "5", "8", "1", "3", "7", "9", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
-{"input": "8.  The applicants were born in 2001 and 1967 respectively and live in Bucharest. 9.  The first applicant is the second applicant\u2019s son. 10.  The first applicant has spastic quadriplegia, a medical condition characterised by impaired function in the limbs but which does not affect his mental capacities. From the age of one, he was registered as having a severe disability (grad de handicap sever) requiring a personal assistant. 11.  Owing to his disability, the first applicant has undergone complex and ongoing medical treatment aimed at maintaining the mobility of his limbs and compensating for abnormalities in muscle tone. He has undergone regular surgery, has been admitted on several occasions to rehabilitation clinics in Romania and Ukraine, has undergone neurological and orthopaedic tests in Israel and is under constant physiotherapy. He relies on assistive devices to walk, including electric wheelchairs, mopeds and tricycles. His health is monitored at M.C. Children\u2019s Hospital in Bucharest. In January 2011 the first applicant underwent significant surgical interventions which left him wheelchair-bound. 12.  The second applicant is a single parent and sole breadwinner. 13.  When the first applicant reached school age, the authorities assessed his situation and recommended that he attend a mainstream school (report of 25 October 2007, see paragraph 35 below). The recommendation was maintained in all subsequent assessments. 14.  On 8 February 2013 the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (Direc\u0163ia General\u0103 de Asisten\u0163\u0103 Social\u0103 \u015fi Protec\u0163ia Copilului, \u201cthe child protection authority\u201d) drafted a plan for the first applicant\u2019s physical rehabilitation. It listed the rights provided for by law, such as the right to special allowances, free public transport, parking in spaces reserved for people with disabilities, physiotherapy, and special arrangements at school such as a specially adapted curriculum and methods of testing, appropriate physical education, appropriate facilities in the school building to ensure accessibility, and assistance from a school nurse. It recommended that a personal assistant be hired by its Human Resources Department and that the accessibility of public infrastructure be improved (accessibility of kerbs, pedestrian crossings and pathways, public transport stations and parks). 15.  The first applicant attended several schools:\n(a)  In 2004 the first applicant was enrolled in nursery school but, according to the second applicant, he was forced to leave after only three days, when the school manager informed the mother that her institution \u201c[did] not do handicap\u201d.\n(b)  From 2007 to April 2013 the first applicant attended classes at school no. 131, a mainstream educational facility for primary and secondary education (children aged six to fourteen). The school building was located sixty metres from the applicants\u2019 home. The applicants argued that the school did not offer adequate conditions despite the authorities\u2019 reassurance and the applicants\u2019 continuous efforts.\n(c)  In the academic year 2013/14 the first applicant attended school no. 148 where, according to the applicants\u2019 submissions, the conditions and the support were acceptable.\n(d)  In October 2015 he started classes in \u201cMihai Eminescu\u201d High School (\u201cM.E. School\u201d) where he remained until 2017. The applicants complained about the conditions in this school.\n(e) On 30 August 2017 the first applicant moved to a private school for the second-last year of high school. In April 2018, the date of the latest communication to the Court from the applicants, he was still attending this school. 16.  The applicants\u2019 description of the situation concerns the academic years 2011/12 and 2012/13. When the first applicant started school, the school building had no facilities for disabled students. A new gate had to be pierced in the fence facing the street where the applicants lived and a concrete strip was laid leading to the students\u2019 entrance in the main building. The toilets were not equipped for disabled children and a cubicle was improvised in the girls\u2019 toilet on the first floor. Later, in 2013, a special toilet on the ground floor was equipped for the needs of children with disabilities, but the first applicant still required support when using it. The sports facilities were not adapted for the use of disabled children and the first applicant could neither take part in class sports activities nor do the exercises recommended by his physicians in order to help with his muscle tone. 17.  The second applicant alleged that, at her own expense, she had arranged for small adjustments to be made to the classroom and toilet, such as rails on the walls, to facilitate her son\u2019s movements. 18.  Because there were no access ramps in the school, the first applicant could not on his own reach the upper floors of the building, where some important facilities were located such as the doctor\u2019s office, the psychologist\u2019s office, the laboratories and the after-school care facilities. The second applicant had to spend significant amounts of time at the school carrying him and the walking devices to the upper floors, and helping him go to the toilet, do the mandatory physical exercise recommended by his physicians and carry his school books, lunchbox and other items. In the first applicant\u2019s first four years at school, in addition to his mother\u2019s support, his classmates or the school staff also helped him with some of these tasks. 19.  The absence of adequate medical personnel at the school and the lack of access to medical facilities during school hours contributed to the worsening of the first applicant\u2019s physical condition. The benefits he gained from surgery were lost and he became less autonomous and more reliant on support from others. 20.  Because of the lack of accessibility of public buildings, the first applicant could not be included in some of the school activities, such as outings. No alternative activities were provided for him. The second applicant\u2019s attempts to have extracurricular activities arranged for her son remained futile; for example, although the child was admitted to piano lessons, the building housing the piano club was inaccessible to wheelchairs. 21.  In time the situation generated tensions between, on the one hand, the applicants and, on the other hand, the school staff, the other children and their parents.\n(b)  M.E. School 22.  According to the applicants, the school building was not adapted for the needs of children with disabilities and its premises remained mostly inaccessible. In the absence of any support in school, the second applicant had to physically carry her son on a daily basis around the school building and to the upper floors where the science laboratory and the gym were situated. The school also failed to provide for his basic needs such as personal and intimate care, feeding and moving around. He was often abandoned unassisted in the school corridors. 23.  The applicants submitted that during the first applicant\u2019s stay in M.E. School, the authorities had failed to devise and implement an individualised educational plan. The teaching, testing and curriculum had not been adapted to his situation and some of the school teachers had openly refused to adapt their routine to his needs or had asked that he be sent to a special school, an attitude which had been tolerated by the school administration. 24.  Based on the information provided by the management of school no. 131 and the local administration, the Government gave a different account of the situation. They explained that from the time of his enrolment in the school, the needs of the first applicant had always been taken into account. 25.  In September 2008 the school administration contacted the Bucharest Schools Inspectorate (Inspectoratul \u015ecolar al Municipiului Bucure\u015fti, \u201cthe ISMB\u201d), in order to seek financial help to adapt the school premises to the first applicant\u2019s needs. 26.  During 2012 and 2013 the school buildings were rendered more accessible to wheelchairs. In particular, an access ramp was installed; one toilet cubicle was equipped with an alarm bell linked directly to the school secretariat; the yard was asphalted; the nurse\u2019s office was moved to the ground floor, next to the first applicant\u2019s classroom; the first applicant was provided with specially adapted desks in the classroom; and an air-conditioning unit was placed in the classroom. 27.  On 7 April 2014 an ISMB internal audit concluded, after verifying the school documents, that the entire cost of the work had been met from the school\u2019s budget. 28.  The first applicant was able to use the toilet facilities but because of the deterioration of his general health he was sometimes unable to reach the toilets on time. The school personnel helped with all aspects of his personal and intimate care and offered fresh clothes when his mother did not want to provide clean changes. 29.  The child did not return to school after 3 April 2013 (see paragraph 69 below). From the official documents it appears that from 7 to 24 May 2013 the first applicant received medical treatment in B\u0103ile Felix Hospital and attended classes in the nearby Oradea School Centre for Inclusive Education. According to the Government, the second applicant did not inform the administration of school no. 131 about this situation and continued to complain that she and her son were being denied access to the school premises.\n(b)  M.E. School 30.  Starting with the 2015/16 school year the first applicant attended classes in M.E. School. At that time, the building was partially accessible: it was equipped with an access ramp, had classrooms on the ground floor, and had access in the yard for a specially adapted car. 31.  On 9 September 2015, as soon as it was informed of the first applicant\u2019s transfer, the M.E. School administration asked the local authorities for help in installing an accessible toilet and a lift, acquiring a computer with specially adapted software, and creating a medical office and a library on the ground floor. 32.  According to the information provided by the authorities, in March 2016 the school building had two access ramps, two reserved parking places for people with disabilities, a classroom on the ground floor, and a specially adapted desk in the first applicant\u2019s classroom. 33.  The school was unable to negotiate the acquisition of a lift during the 2015/16 school year. According to the information presented by the local authorities, the second applicant refused several options proposed to her. Eventually, the school administration managed to purchase a stairlift which was installed on 21 November 2016. On the same day the school personnel were trained in how to operate it. 34.  On several occasions the second applicant brought her son into school without a wheelchair by carrying him on her back (on 3-5 February and on 3 and 18 March 2016) and left him without any means of moving around the school premises. According to the Government, at that time the school was accessible with a wheelchair, the first applicant had a specially adapted desk in his classroom and his transport to and from school was taken care of by the foundation \u201cMotivation\u201d. On other occasions the second applicant refused to let the child stay in school as he did not have a personal assistant. 35.  On 25 October 2007 the child protection authority recommended that the first applicant attend classes in school no. 131 and be given the assistance of a support teacher (professor de sprijin). The recommendation was reiterated on 25 August 2011 in relation to secondary education. 36.  The school adapted the timetable and testing methods to the first applicant\u2019s needs. The child was entitled to a 50% increase in the time allotted for written exams and was partly exempted from attending school. In addition, the school offered the first applicant the possibility to attend classes via Skype during periods when he needed to be away from school for medical reasons. 37.  From 22 September 2015 M.A. was assigned as a support teacher for the first applicant. On 7 December 2015 M.A. drafted a personal intervention plan detailing the subjects that the first applicant would take in school and the specially adapted teaching methods. On the same day M.A. informed her superiors of the difficulties she had with the second applicant, who had asked her not to work with her son and had tried to dictate to her which subjects to exclude from her son\u2019s curriculum. 38.  On 11 December 2015 M.A. was replaced by D.C., who on 4 March 2016 presented a new intervention plan which was accepted by the majority of the first applicant\u2019s teachers. D.C. continued to assist the first applicant in the school year 2016/17, and on 15 September 2016 drafted a new intervention plan which was accepted by most of the teachers. According to the documents in the file, the second applicant refused any communication with D.C. and did not participate in any of the meetings organised by D.C. with the school staff in order to discuss the first applicant\u2019s development and needs. 39.  After the adoption of decision no. 913 of 25 July 2016 (see paragraph 63 below), the authorities put in place a system for providing the first applicant with support and assistance in school. Specifically, in September 2016 the child protection authority designated for this task several professionals working in a centre for abused children who had experience in working with children. According to the Government, they encountered difficulties with the second applicant, who on occasions refused to leave the child at school, refused to explain the reason for his absence or verbally abused the representatives of the child protection authority. 40.  The first applicant did not attend school daily and was absent on several occasions, sometimes for long periods of time. He also attended other schools in the towns where he was hospitalised for treatment or rehabilitation. According to the report drafted by the support teacher, the first applicant\u2019s long absences from school, as well as the second applicant\u2019s attitude, had a negative impact on the first applicant\u2019s education. 41.  The first applicant\u2019s physicians set out recommendations for the school and other authorities regarding the child\u2019s medical needs, emphasising the importance of regular physiotherapy and occupational therapy, including during school hours. They advised against keeping the patient in the same position for long periods of time, as that could cause muscle rigidity and discomfort, thus compromising his rehabilitation and, in time, leading to deformities. They recommended that the child alternate periodically between sitting and standing up. 42.  In November 2012 a physiotherapist was assigned to come to the school to work with the first applicant, and the school reserved a space in the gym room for the physiotherapy sessions. During the second term of the 2012/13 school year, the physiotherapist and the first applicant met for three sessions of one hour each. 43.  At the beginning of the 2011/12 school year the school requested that it be provided with a physiotherapist, a nurse and a medical assistant. 44.  It appears from the information provided by the Government that the second applicant failed to provide the school with the medical information concerning the first applicant\u2019s needs in terms of physical recuperation. The physical education teacher created a special programme for the child despite not being acquainted with the precise medical recommendations. The second applicant refused to bring the child to his sessions. 45.  The school also arranged psychological counselling for the applicants, which was not pursued as the second applicant stopped bringing the child to the meetings. 46.  During the 2015/16 school year the first applicant received weekly sessions of speech therapy and educational therapy during the periods when he attended school. In the next school year the sessions were discontinued because the second applicant refused to give her assent. 47.  The first applicant could not receive physiotherapy in school as his mother refused to allow him to participate in any session which did not take place in the school gymnasium. She also omitted to present the medical certificates that were required in order for the therapist to adapt the sessions to the first applicant\u2019s needs. 48.  In 2011 the second applicant asked the authorities to appoint a personal assistant for her son to provide him with support, in particular during school hours. She explained that she could not act as his personal assistant as she had to work for a living. On 15 September 2011 the school administration also informed the child protection authority that in the absence of a personal assistant the first applicant could not safely continue his studies in a mainstream school. 49.  According to the applicants, the child protection authority initially denied that the first applicant had the right to a personal assistant, then considered the second applicant to be the child\u2019s personal assistant. 50.  In a judgment of 19 July 2011 (case no. 8249/3/2011), the Bucharest County Court (hereinafter \u201cthe County Court\u201d) partly allowed an action brought by the second applicant against various authorities concerning the manner in which they had dealt with her son\u2019s situation. The court observed that the rehabilitation plan had not been drawn up in accordance with the legal requirements, in particular because the second applicant had not been involved in the process and the plan had not included all the services required by the child and had not taken into account his particular needs. It therefore ordered the child protection authority to supplement the plan according to the court\u2019s instructions. Furthermore, the court noted that it was not objectively impossible for the authorities to hire a personal assistant for the first applicant. It therefore ordered the child protection authority to identify a suitable person and to make a proposal to the city council, which in turn was ordered to provide the necessary funds from its budget to cover the salary of the personal assistant. The decision was upheld by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final decision of 9 April 2012. 51.  On 19 October 2011 the second applicant asked school no. 131 to hire a nurse who could assist her son with his needs, as an alternative to the appointment of a personal assistant, but no such appointment was made during the first applicant\u2019s stay in this school (see paragraph 15 above). 52.  According to the information transmitted by the Government, between 2011 and 2014 the child protection authorities organised several interviews in order to find a suitable personal assistant for the first applicant. Eventually, on 23 May 2014 the child protection authority hired a personal assistant. On 17 September 2014 that person resigned, on the ground that the second applicant had asked her to perform tasks which were not consistent with her job description. 53.  On 29 January 2015 the second applicant informed the authorities that she insisted that a personal assistant be hired. Three individuals expressed an interest in the position and were approved by the second applicant. However, one refused to sign the contract as he considered the second applicant\u2019s attitude towards him to be abusive and offensive; he explained that the second applicant had asked him to wash dishes and clean the house, tasks which had not been in his job description, and had then accused him of wanting to harm her son. The other candidates took the job on a part-time basis starting on 1 September 2015. One had to leave on 16 December 2015 as his visa was not extended, and the other resigned for health reasons on 27 January 2016. 54.  In January 2016 the authorities started the process of finding a new personal assistant, working in close contact with various non-governmental organisations involved in the protection of disabled persons. 55.  The second applicant lodged several complaints with the administrative authorities, with the National Council against Discrimination (Consiliul Na\u0163ional pentru Combaterea Discrimin\u0103rii, \u201cthe NCAD\u201d) (at least six cases lodged directly with this authority and continued before the courts), with the courts (at least five applications lodged directly with the courts) and with the prosecutor\u2019s office (at least sixteen complaints have been investigated so far by the prosecutor\u2019s office). These complaints mainly concerned the alleged lack of services for her son, both in school and outside school, and the manner in which the competent authorities handling his case had discharged their obligation to support the first applicant and to adapt the infrastructure to the needs of people with disabilities, and in particular to the first applicant\u2019s needs. 56.  The case concerned an application lodged by the applicants on 24 April 2014               against the authorities with responsibility for assisting the applicants with matters concerning disability and education, namely the Bucharest Centre for Resources and Educational Assistance (Centrul Municipiului Bucure\u015fti de Resurse \u015fi Asisten\u0163\u0103 Educa\u0163ional\u0103, \u201cthe CMBRAE\u201d), the Bucharest local council of the fourth precinct, which was responsible for M.E. School (\u201cthe Bucharest IV local council\u201d), the Bucharest local council of the fifth precinct, which was responsible for school no. 131 (\u201cthe Bucharest V local council\u201d), the child protection authority, the Commission for Child Protection (an authority created at local level under Law no. 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of children\u2019s rights), the ISMB, and the NCAD. The applicants sought to compel these authorities to re-evaluate the first applicant\u2019s educational placement, to provide support in school, to adapt the school premises to the first applicant\u2019s needs, and to grant compensation for the harm suffered by the child in school. 57.  On 30 June 2014 and 13 and 20 August 2015 the applicants extended their action and on the last-mentioned date asked the court to ensure that the same hardship would not continue also in M.E. School. On 25 November 2014 the Administrative Disputes Division of the County Court sent the case to the Civil Division of the same court and on 23 June 2015 the case was sent to a bench of the Civil Division specialising in children\u2019s rights. 58.  In a decision of 10 June 2016 the County Court found partly in favour of the applicants and ordered the local authorities to take several actions, in accordance with their remit:\n(a)  It ordered the CMBRAE to issue a new personalised intervention plan (plan de interven\u0163ie personalizat); it also noted that the first applicant was already allowed extended work time during tests in class and had a specially adapted desk, but considered that those measures, while being necessary, were not sufficient.\n(b)  The court ordered the CMBRAE and the ISMB to adapt the school curriculum and the educational plans to the first applicant\u2019s needs, finding as follows:\n\u201cWhile in the special education [curriculum] the educational plans and school curriculum are tailored to the type and degree of disability, thus allowing time for therapy ..., in mainstream schools this kind of adaptation does not exist.\nHowever, in the present case the child, who was placed in a mainstream school, has a normally developed intellect but has a neuromotor disability which drastically limits his movement ... A daily school programme of 6-7 hours goes against the medical recommendations ... and limits his opportunities to undergo therapy.\u201d\n(c)  It ordered the ISMB and the child protection authority to continue to provide the first applicant with psycho-educational assistance and a safe environment in school, in terms of the physical surroundings and specialist personnel. The court found as follows:\n\u201cThe current legislation provides for measures capable of ensuring the integration of children with disabilities in school and in society, notably special educational services via the support teacher, speech therapy and psycho-educational counselling. ...\nThe personal rehabilitation plan drafted by the child protection authority [for the first applicant] provided for such services: physiotherapy, speech therapy and psychological counselling. ....\nBased on the parties\u2019 statements, the court finds that the authorities involved did not refuse to provide the child with the services that he was entitled to under the law and which were included in his personal rehabilitation plan; [what they refused were] merely the conditions imposed by the mother that [the services] should be provided on the school premises ...\nHowever, in order to meet the child\u2019s complex needs and ensure that he had access to all services, the authorities, in addition to the psycho-educational counselling offered by the school psychologist, organised speech therapy and physiotherapy in his school.\nFor these reasons, the [applicants\u2019] action is allowed and the institutions involved are ordered to take measures to ensure the continuity of services in terms of personnel, but also in terms of the physical environment and the necessary equipment.\u201d\n(d)  The court ordered the ISMB, the child protection authority, the Bucharest V local council and the Bucharest IV local council to take measures to ensure the child\u2019s assistance and safety in school, via teachers, school auxiliary staff, a personal assistant or a qualified caregiver. The court found as follows:\n\u201cThe services provided in school to assist [the first applicant], provided by psychologists, speech therapists, school counsellors, support teachers, physiotherapists, etc., are necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the child\u2019s recuperation and therapy, but do not fully meet the child\u2019s complex needs during school time.\n... the child has severe neuromotor disabilities which make it impossible for him to move, to walk, to help himself, to take notes in class, etc., and which consequently make it necessary for him to be assisted by another person who can move him, as needed, from the wheelchair or assistive devices to his desk and back; help him move around the school (take charge of him at the school door, accompany him back to the door at the end of the school day, and take him to the toilet, the sports room, and the laboratories which are on the upper floor); help him with taking notes during lessons and writing down the homework; assist him with physical exercises; assist him in the event of an emergency evacuation, etc. ...\nConcerning the presence of a nurse [infirmier] the court notes that, although the law requires that children with disabilities be integrated in mainstream schools, the schools\u2019 structure does not include qualified staff who can meet the complex needs of a child with severe neuromotor disabilities that limit or exclude the child\u2019s capacity to move or to help himself.\nThe absence of assistance ... makes it impossible for the child to attend school and affects ... his right to education ...\nThe personal assistant not only acts as an accompanying adult for a child with severe disabilities but must also provide basic care (personal hygiene, dressing and undressing, personal and intimate care, feeding, hydration, transport, mobility and movement, etc.), assist in the child\u2019s family, community, and school activities, and assist in the child\u2019s school and with his or her educational integration.\nThere is nothing to prevent the [child protection authority] and the Bucharest V local council from including these activities in the personal assistant\u2019s contract ...\nTherefore the court considers that, in principle, the assistance, supervision and safety of the child during school hours must be ensured by his personal assistant or in the latter\u2019s absence ... by a person approved and nominated for the purpose by the parent ...\nFor the same reason, the ISMB and the Bucharest IV local council ... must take measures in order to ensure the child\u2019s effective access to education and his supervision and safety. ...\nAs the court thus considers that the child\u2019s action is well-founded on this count, it orders the ISMB, the child protection authority and the Bucharest IV and V local councils to take measures in order to ensure the child\u2019s supervision and safety in school, via the teachers or auxiliary staff, his personal assistant or a qualified caregiver.\u201d\n(e)  The court ordered the ISMB and the Bucharest IV local council to ensure the first applicant\u2019s access to education by rendering the school building accessible by wheelchair, in particular by: providing specially adapted desks in the classroom and laboratories; ensuring access to the upper floors of the school building; removing the obstacles preventing the first applicant from moving around the school, such as thresholds and narrow doors; adapting the sports room to the child\u2019s needs; and providing him with a computer and software adapted to his educational needs. The court noted that on 28 October 2015, at its request, the authorities had met with the applicants in order to listen to their demands and agree on solutions. It took note of the fact that at the date of the meeting, in M.E. School, there had been two reserved parking places and a toilet adapted to the first applicant\u2019s needs. 59.  At the same time, the District Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 request for reimbursement of the costs incurred in respect of transport to and from school with their own vehicles, on the grounds that they received financial assistance from the State in the form of free public transport and an annual lump sum for costs, which was meant to cover transport as well. 60.  Lastly, with regard to the request for non-pecuniary damage on account of the discrimination suffered by the applicants because of the authorities\u2019 attitude towards them, the District Court separated the issue from the main proceedings and created case no. 22624/3/2016. In a final decision of 31 May 2018 in that case, the Bucharest Court of Appeal ordered the ISMB, the CMBRAE and the Bucharest V local council to pay the applicants 7,500 Romanian lei (RON)[1] in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 61.  In a final decision of 7 February 2018 the Bucharest Court of Appeal examined the appeals lodged by the parties against the decision of 10 June 2016. It amended the County Court\u2019s decision so that the authorities\u2019 obligations applied only for as long as the first applicant attended classes in a mainstream school, but dismissed the remaining appeals. 62.  On 5 April 2018 the applicants started enforcement proceedings through the offices of a bailiff. 63.  In decision no. 913 of 25 July 2016 the County Court ordered the authorities to appoint a person to assist the first applicant in school until the decision of 10 June 2016 became final (see paragraph 58 above). 64.  On 28 November 2016 the bailiff ordered the authorities to comply with the court order and to pay the applicants the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 65.  The Bucharest IV local council contested the enforcement proceedings, arguing that the council had already complied with the court order in so far as, when the school year had started on 12 September 2016, a person had been appointed to assist the first applicant in school. The council explained that the person appointed to assist the first applicant had been replaced on several occasions because of disagreements with the second applicant, but argued that the mere fact that the second applicant was dissatisfied with these persons could not be regarded as a failure on the part of the authorities to comply with the court order. 66.  In a judgment of 2 March 2017 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the objection and found as follows:\n\u201cIt appears that the minor, Stoian \u015etefan Moshe, was unable to benefit from the measures ordered by the court not only because of the poor cooperation between his legal representative and the ... authorities, but also because of the bureaucratic mechanism for implementing the measures and the manner in which responsibilities in this sphere are shared between the authorities concerned.\nThe court considers that there is no evidence that the minor\u2019s legal representative refused enforcement of the obligations laid down in the court order.\u201d 67.  On 25 April 2017 the District Court dismissed an objection to enforcement in which the ISMB and the CMBRAE also claimed that they had already complied with the court order. The court found as follows:\n\u201cThe assertions made by the objecting parties \u2013 that at the date on which the enforcement request was lodged they had already complied with the obligations laid down in the court decision \u2013 is contradicted by the facts, as the child\u2019s school situation is still uncertain in so far as he still does not benefit in school from the conditions set by that court decision.\u201d 68.  On 23 January 2018 the District Court noted that the authorities had not fully complied with their obligation under the interim injunction of 25 July 2016 and that all the objections to enforcement had been dismissed. Consequently, it ordered each of those authorities to pay RON 200 for each day of delay in enforcement. 69.  On 3 April 2013 the second applicant had a dispute in school with her son\u2019s teacher, during the lesson. The class teacher asked her to leave the classroom, warning her that her presence was no longer tolerated and that the authorities had been alerted. The second applicant refused to leave and was eventually removed by force by two police officers and taken to the police station. She was given a formal warning for refusing to leave the school premises. She left the police station three hours later and went back to the school to collect her son. According to the Government, during the second applicant\u2019s stay in the police station, the first applicant remained in school, in the presence of the school nurse and a teacher on duty. 70.  On 31 May 2013 the applicants filed a criminal complaint about the incidents. The school headmaster, supported by parents\u2019 statements, also lodged a complaint against the second applicant, alleging that she had repeatedly disturbed the learning process. The second applicant and the school headmaster gave statements to the police. On 4 April 2017 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court closed the investigation. It found, based on the evidence in the file, that the force used by the police officers had been necessary in order to put an end to the second applicant\u2019s disruptive behaviour and had been proportionate to her reactions. It observed that the second applicant had disturbed lessons and had refused to leave the classroom, to show her identity papers to the police and to accompany the police officers to the police station. The prosecutor concluded that the injuries suffered by the second applicant had been the result of the use of force and of her own opposition to the police officers\u2019 actions. On 18 October 2017 the objection lodged by the applicants against the prosecutor\u2019s decision was dismissed as out of time by the chief prosecutor from the same prosecutor\u2019s office. The applicants\u2019 appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Bucharest District Court (final decision of 11 December 2017).", "references": ["9", "3", "7", "1", "0", "2", "5", "6", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in Syria in 1963. He currently lives in Ilid\u017ea, Sarajevo Canton. 6.  In 1983 the applicant went to the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to pursue his studies. He first studied at Belgrade University, in Serbia, and then at Rijeka University, in Croatia. 7.  It would appear that the last time the applicant was in Syria was in January 1993. He stayed for one month and obtained a new Syrian passport. 8.  In 1993, having returned from Syria, the applicant met a refugee from Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cBH\u201d) in Croatia. They were married in a Muslim wedding ceremony in 1993 and then in a civil ceremony in 1995. They have three children together, born in 1994, 1997 and 1999. 9.  During the 1992-95 war the applicant was a member of the El Mujahedin unit which had been organised as a unit within the local forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe ARBH\u201d) in August 1993 (for more information about foreign mujahedin in BH see Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 3727/08, \u00a7\u00a7 8-14, 7 February 2012). On an unknown date the applicant obtained BH citizenship. 10.  Article III of Annex 1A to the Dayton Peace Agreement called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces (including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and personnel) from neighbouring and other States, irrespective of whether they were legally and militarily subordinated to any of the local forces. Accordingly, on 14 December 1995 the ARBH disbanded the El Mujahedin unit and ordered its foreign members to leave the country by 10 January 1996. Whereas most of the unit\u2019s foreign members left BH, some of them (such as the present applicant) applied for BH citizenship and continued to live in BH. After the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001, the official attitude towards foreign mujahedin changed. Many lost their BH citizenship or were deported from BH after being declared a threat to national security. 11.  In the immediate aftermath of the 1992-95 war, the applicant acted as the leader of a group of foreign mujahedin and their local supporters based in Donja Bo\u010dinja, a village in central BH. The group advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam. In his role as the group\u2019s leader, the applicant interrogated two local Serbs for a couple of hours in 1998. This led to his conviction for unlawful deprivation of liberty in May 2000 and a suspended prison sentence. 12.  On 5 April 2007 the applicant\u2019s BH citizenship was revoked, as a result of which he became unlawfully resident in BH. The authorities held that he had acquired BH citizenship by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and the concealment of relevant facts. 13.  On 6 October 2008 the applicant was placed in an immigration centre on security grounds, pursuant to section 99(2)(b) of the 2008 Aliens Act, because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security. 14.  Following the dismissal of an asylum claim lodged by the applicant, the Aliens Service issued a deportation order in respect of him on 1 February 2011. It was decided to expel the applicant and to prohibit his re-entry to BH for five years. On 2 March 2011 and 29 November 2011, following appeals by the applicant, the Ministry of Security and the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe State Court\u201d), respectively, upheld that decision. Thereafter the applicant was detained with a view to his deportation, pursuant to section 99(1)(a) of the 2008 Aliens Act. 15.  On 29 December 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d) against the decisions of the Aliens Service, the Ministry of Security and the State Court of 1 February 2011, 2 March 2011 and 29 November 2011, respectively (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant invoked Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. The Constitutional Court gave a decision on 30 October 2012 (see paragraph 20 below). 16.  On 22 January 2008 the applicant lodged his first application with the Court (see Al Husin, cited above), complaining, in particular, that his deportation to Syria would expose him to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that his detention amounted to a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. On 15 March 2011, after a deportation order against the applicant had been issued and become final (see paragraph 14 above), the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings, to indicate to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Syria until further notice (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). 17.  In a judgment of 7 February 2012 the Court held that there would be a violation of Article 3 in the event of the applicant\u2019s deportation to Syria (see Al Husin, cited above, \u00a7 54). The Court considered that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 should remain in force until the above-mentioned judgment became final or until the Court took a further decision in that connection (ibid., \u00a7 92). The Court furthermore found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 with regard to the period of the applicant\u2019s detention from 6 October 2008 until 31 January 2011 because during that time he had been detained without a deportation order having been issued against him (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 62-66; see also paragraph 14 above). As regards his detention from 1 February 2011 onwards, the Court found that there had been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 67-69). That judgment became final on 9 July 2012. 18.  On 6 March 2012 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court reversed the State Court\u2019s judgment of 29 November 2011, quashed the decisions of 1 February 2011 and 2 March 2011 (see paragraph 14 above) and remitted the case to the Aliens Service for reconsideration. The Appeals Chamber held that the administrative authorities and the State Court had failed to take into account the situation in the country of the applicant\u2019s origin and the potential violations of his rights under Article 3 and 5 of the Convention in the event of his deportation to Syria. 19.  On 15 March 2012 the Aliens Service issued a new deportation order in respect of the applicant, which prohibited his re-entry into BH for five years. The order furthermore stated that once the applicant had become subject to expulsion, in the event that he failed to voluntarily leave the country, an additional \u201cremoval directions\u201d (zaklju\u010dak o dozvoli izvr\u0161enja) order would be issued specifying a destination country and the manner, the time, and the place of the enforcement thereof. On 3 April 2012 and 4 July 2012, following appeals by the applicant, the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, upheld that decision. The State Court rejected, in particular, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the lack of specification of a destination country in the deportation order. It emphasised that under the 2008 Aliens Act a destination country was to be specified only in the relevant removal directions (see paragraph 77 below). 20.  On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal (see paragraph 15 above). It held that the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case had changed following the Court\u2019s judgment of 7 February 2012 (see paragraph 17 above) and that consequently, the further examination of his complaints was no longer necessary. 21.  On 16 February 2012 the Aliens Service extended the applicant\u2019s detention, with a view to his deportation, for a period of thirty days on the same grounds as before (see paragraph 13 above). Thereafter, throughout 2012 and 2013, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly examined and extended every month (and, following changes to the 2008 Aliens Act, every two months; see paragraph 76 below). The Aliens Service held that the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention still pertained \u2013 specifically in view of evidence provided by the National Security Agency that indicated that the applicant still posed a threat to national security. He was an unlawful resident in BH who had refused to leave the country voluntarily. Furthermore, the Aliens Service had regard to the Court\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s deportation to Syria would have led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and to the fact that the conditions for his deportation to a safe third country had not been met. Each time the applicant\u2019s detention was extended, the Aliens Service examined whether it was justified to impose less strict preventive measures. 22.  The applicant repeatedly challenged his detention. His appeals were rejected by the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, which had essentially endorsed the reasons advanced by the Aliens Service. 23.  On 26 February 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant\u2019s detention. That decision was upheld on 3 March 2014 and 10 March 2014 by the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively. 24.  On 14 May 2014 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court quashed the judgment of 10 March 2014 (see paragraph 23 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. The Appeals Chamber, referring to the Court\u2019s case-law, held that the applicant should have been informed of the reasons for his continued detention and of the grounds on which he was deemed to be a security risk. It emphasised that it was not necessary to present all of the relevant information to the applicant. However, the information provided to him by the National Security Agency had not satisfied the minimum requirements under Article 5 of the Convention to justify the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. The Appeals Chamber furthermore emphasised that the courts were entitled to assess the existence of any reasonable doubt \u2013 that is to say the reasons given by the National Security Agency. Without such an assessment the examination by a court of the applicant\u2019s case would constitute a pure formality, which would be contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, the State Court\u2019s examination of the possibility to apply other less strict preventive measure had involved the assessment of general and abstract arguments, without any further consideration. The Appeals Chamber invited the State Court to examine that possibility in the light of the circumstances of the case \u2013 in particular, the length of the applicant\u2019s detention, the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances and the evidence related to national security. 25.  On 5 June 2014 the State Court again upheld the Ministry of Security\u2019s decision of 3 March 2014 (see paragraph 23 above). The court stated that on 21 May 2014 the National Security Agency had submitted classified evidence for the court\u2019s review and \u201copen\u201d evidence for the applicant\u2019s review. On 23 May 2014 the court heard the applicant and disclosed to him the open evidence, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n\u201cImad Al Husin arrived [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] immediately after the outbreak of war ... [At the time he] was a member of the El Mujahedin unit, in which he was one of the main persons in charge of logistical support. The applicant acted as one of the leaders in the formation of a mujahedin community in Donja Bo\u010dinja, in the municipality of Maglaj; [the mujahedin community] was a closed community and the first of that sort in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... the applicant was in charge of reconstruction and building and of maintaining contacts with the authorities.\nSecurity information shows that Imad Al Husin owns various real estate in Bosnia and Herzegovina worth millions, as well as [holding] bank accounts abroad ... the members of the Bo\u010dinja community claimed that they did not \u2018respect the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina\u2019 and did not \u2018recognise the Bosnian Government\u2019... [The applicant], as one of the leaders of the mujahedin community, knew that some members of his community had left to fight with other mujahedin, mostly in Afghanistan ... He had contacts with mujahedin who had fought or were still fighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Most of those persons were declared to be a threat to national security ... Imad Al Husin was involved in the humanitarian agency Islamic Relief, [which was] led at the time by Enam Arnaout, who was later convicted of terrorism in the United States ... In 1995 Imad Al Husin maintained contacts with a certain Ahmed Zuhair ... from Saudi Arabia, who has been involved in several terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Together with several other foreign citizens, Imad Al Husin has established [several companies, including] PP Al Karamein [and] Bedr Bosna, which have employed mostly former foreign fighters who participated in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2002 and 2005 the Federal Financial Police discovered a number of irregularities concerning the Bedr Bosna company, mostly concerning tax evasion ... From mid-2007 he maintained closer contacts with members of criminal circles in Sarajevo ... On 25 June 2008 Imad Al Husin attempted to buy ammunition, most probably for a gun, in an ammunition shop located in Hifzi Bjelavca Street ... in Sarajevo ... but was refused because he did not possess a gun licence ... In 2008 he was visited by a certain Hussam Mousaa El Abed, who at the time lived in Denmark; on that occasion he gave [to the applicant] money collected abroad ... Al Abed was suspected of providing financial support to terrorist organisations ... On 3 April 2007 Imad Al Husin obtained a passport from the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade ... His family in Syria is very influential and its members serve at the highest level of Bashar Al Assad\u2019s government. His brother used to be a colonel in the Syrian Army. Imad Al Hussin is or has been in contact with many persons suspected of international terrorism, including [persons] who lived in the mujahedin community in Bo\u010dinja, as well as [persons] living abroad who visited the community.\u201d 26.  The applicant dismissed all the information as general and unsubstantiated. He in particular denied the assertion that he had advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam. He argued that he should not have been perceived as a terrorist just because he spoke Arabic and moved in the BH Arabic community. The applicant submitted that on one occasion he and some of his friends had helped the National Security Agency to locate and arrest persons connected with the killing of a police officer. He furthermore pointed out that, following a request by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the United States State Department\u2019s 2007 Country Report on Terrorism \u2013 specifically, the entry for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the applicant had been wrongly identified as Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Egyptian national and a convicted terrorist \u2013 had been amended in 2008. The applicant also submitted that he had always responded to summonses issued by the authorities. He furthermore provided a certificate issued by the BH Islamic Community confirming that he had been one of its members and statements given by two imams from Sarajevo attesting that the applicant had never given any lectures in their respective mosques. Moreover, the applicant also denied the veracity of the allegation regarding his bank accounts and real estate. He asked to be presented with evidence in support of those claims. 27.  The State Court held that the applicant had not succeeded in calling into question or refuting the open evidence submitted by the National Security Agency. Rather, he had used abstract and general statements in an effort to downplay the importance of the information provided therein. Furthermore, the applicant had submitted certain documents (written statements, letters and so on) for the first time at the hearing of 23 May 2014, even though it was apparent that he had had them before. Having assessed the reasons given by the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Security, the content of the classified and open evidence, and the applicant\u2019s arguments, the court concluded that there still existed reasonable doubt as to whether or not the applicant posed a threat to national security and that the imposition of a less strict preventive measure was not justified, given the particular circumstances of the case. The State Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The court furthermore held that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s arguments that he feared criminal prosecution in Syria, it was evident from the case file that his family was very influential and close to Bashar Al Assad\u2019s regime. Many members of the applicant\u2019s family occupied high positions in government. His brother was a retired colonel in the Syrian Security Forces. Moreover, on 3 April 2007 the applicant had obtained a passport from the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade. The court concluded that in the prevailing circumstances there were no longer any obstacles to the applicant\u2019s deportation to Syria. Lastly, the court assessed the Ministry of Security\u2019s efforts in finding a safe third country and concluded that it had acted diligently and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, thirty-two countries, including all the Arab states, had refused to accept the applicant, giving as a reason his personality and the circumstances surrounding him. 28.  On 16 July 2014 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court upheld the judgment of 5 June 2014. 29.  In the meantime, on 27 May 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant\u2019s detention. On 2 June 2014, following an appeal by the applicant, the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. 30.  On 11 June 2014 the State Court, following an appeal by the applicant, quashed the decisions of 27 May 2014 and 2 June 2014 (see paragraph 29 above) and remitted the case to the Aliens Service for reconsideration. The court noted in particular that the deportation order had been issued on 1 February 2011 (see paragraph 14 above) and that the applicant had been detained with a view to deportation for more than three years, and on national-security grounds for more than five years. During that time no criminal proceedings had been opened against him. Furthermore, the open evidence presented to the applicant was widely known as it had already been published in the media. The deportation order was unlikely to be enforced: the relevant authorities had contacted more than thirty countries, but none of them had agreed to accept the applicant. Moreover, it was apparent from the case file that the National Security Agency did not have any new evidence that would justify the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The evidence on which his continued detention was based was the same as that which had been cited as justification for his initial detention. The court furthermore added that a concern that the applicant could pose a threat to national security, without any new evidence, was not enough to draw a reasonable conclusion regarding the actual threat that he represented. A detention based solely on security grounds was contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The administrative authorities had not justified their conclusion concerning the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant would pose a risk to national security if released. Furthermore, their examination of the possibility to apply less strict preventive measures had involved general and abstract arguments, without any further explanation being given. The court ordered the Aliens Service to examine such a possibility in the light of the arguments presented in its judgment. 31.  Following the remittal of the case, on 20 June 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant\u2019s detention with a view to his deportation and on national-security grounds. On 13 June 2014 the applicant was heard by the Aliens Service concerning the possibility of less strict preventive measures being applied. On that occasion he submitted that he had accommodation (his registered place of residence) outside the Immigration Centre but that he did not have any financial means. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that a preventive measure that included a prohibition on his leaving his registered place of residence, which was in Ilid\u017ea, would not have been suitable for him because he needed the services of a medical-care service located in Sarajevo. The Aliens Service held that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s detention remained the same. It furthermore emphasised that all necessary steps were being taken with a view to finding a safe third country to which the applicant could be deported. 32.  On 23 June 2014 and 27 June 2014 the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, upheld the Aliens Service\u2019s decision of 20 June 2014. 33.  Thereafter, until the end of 2014 and throughout 2015 the applicant\u2019s detention was continually extended. All of his appeals were dismissed by the Ministry of Security, the State Court and the Appeals Chamber of the State Court, respectively. 34.  During this period several hearings were held before the State Court. 35.  At a hearing of 9 September 2014 the applicant submitted that he had contacted the authorities of the Republic of Turkey concerning the possibility of his moving there, but that his request had been refused on the basis of information provided by the National Security Agency. Moreover, the applicant objected that he had not been given the possibility to comment on the open evidence. Since the National Security Agency did not have any new information concerning the applicant, the State Court decided to join to the applicant\u2019s submissions the minutes of the hearing of 23 May 2014 at which he had had the possibility to comment on open evidence (see paragraph 25 above). 36.  At a hearing of 3 March 2015 the State Court presented to the applicant open evidence submitted by the National Security Agency. The same information had already been submitted to the applicant\u2019s representative on 6 February 2015 by the National Security Agency. The information essentially described the applicant\u2019s role as that of the self-proclaimed leader of the mujahidin community in Donja Bo\u010dinja and referred to his conviction for unlawful deprivation of liberty in 2000 (see paragraph 11 above). It furthermore stated that until being placed in detention, the applicant had consistently advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam and had publicly expressed his support for Osama bin Laden. The rest of the information was identical to that disclosed to the applicant at the hearing of 23 May 2014 (see paragraph 25 above). The applicant rejected that information as too general and submitted that no criminal proceedings had ever been initiated against him. 37.  In its decisions following the hearing the State Court held in particular that the relevant authorities were diligently working on finding a safe third country, in compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and that the applicant still posed a threat to national security. The authorities had contacted more than fifty countries, of which thirty-nine had given a negative response to a request to accept the applicant, while the others had not responded at all. The State Court furthermore endorsed the administrative bodies\u2019 conclusion concerning the possibility of applying a less strict preventive measure. 38.  At a hearing of 3 June 2015 the applicant was informed that there had been no new information or evidence submitted against him by the National Security Agency. Accordingly, the State Court decided to join to the applicant\u2019s submissions the minutes from the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which he had had the possibility to comment on the open evidence (see paragraph 36 above). 39.  At a hearing of 28 August 2015 the State Court ruled that a report submitted by the National Security Agency on 17 August 2015 did not contain any new information concerning the applicant. The State Court thus joined again to the applicant\u2019s submissions the minutes of the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which he had had the possibility to comment on the open evidence (see paragraph 36 above). 40.  At a hearing of 30 November 2015 the State Court held that the National Security Agency\u2019s report, submitted on 16 November 2015, did not contain any new information concerning the applicant. Accordingly, the court again referred to the applicant\u2019s submissions during the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which the open evidence had been presented to him (see paragraph 36 above).\n(b)  The Constitutional Court\u2019s decisions 41.  The applicant lodged several constitutional appeals concerning the extension of his detention, relying on Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4, and on Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. He alleged in particular that he had not been granted access to closed evidence, that he had been placed in preventive detention and that it was unrealistic to expect any other country to accept a person who had been declared a threat to national security. 42.  In a decision of 28 February 2013 (decision no. AP 222/13) the Constitutional Court examined the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention from 12 November 2012 until 10 December 2012 and dismissed his appeal as manifestly ill founded, essentially endorsing the reasoning of the State Court and the relevant administrative bodies. 43.  On 17 June 2015 (decision no. AP 2742/13) the Constitutional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against sixteen judgments delivered by the State Court between 14 March 2013 and 25 March 2015 concerning the lawfulness of his detention in the period between 21 March 2013 and 7 June 2015. The Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention with regard to the period of the applicant\u2019s detention from 21 March 2013 until 14 March 2014 (the lawfulness of which had been addressed by the State Court in judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014). It dismissed the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints as manifestly ill-founded. That decision was delivered to the applicant on 13 August 2015.\nThe relevant part of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision reads as follows:\n\u201c46.  As regards the judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014 the Constitutional Court notes ... that is evident that the appellant\u2019s detention was extended in accordance with the law because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security ... The appellant had the possibility to challenge those decisions. However, the fact that the appellant posed a threat to national security was established on the basis of [information held by] the National Security Agency. The appellant alleged that he had not been informed of the charges against him in this respect, but the State Court considered that those arguments were unsubstantiated, because the relevant provisions prohibited the examination of secret evidence if to do so would be against the public interest. 47.  The Constitutional Court reiterates that in case no. AP 4064/13 ... it found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention in respect of a situation in which ... the appellant had been detained on the basis of [information held by] the National Security Agency whose content had never been disclosed to him, not even in substance, and the State Court had failed to adequately examine that information and assess its reliability. 48.  The Constitutional Court does not see any reason to depart from [that] practice ... in the present case as regards the judgments delivered in the period from 14 March 2013 until 6 January 2014, since the content of the [National Security Agency\u2019s] information, on the basis of which he was declared a threat to national security, was not disclosed to the appellant, and the State Court failed to adequately examine that information and assess its reliability. The Constitutional Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention in relation to those judgments.\n... 55.  [As regards the other impugned judgments] ... the Constitutional Court notes that the appellant was detained because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security; his detention was extended in accordance with the law ..., and he had the possibility of [seeking] judicial review of these decisions ... [On 14 May 2014 the Appeals Chamber of] the State Court quashed the judgment of 10 March 2014 because the State Court and the administrative bodies should have disclosed to the appellant the reasons for his detention and the circumstances and facts which had led ... [the National Security Agency] to conclude that he posed a threat to national security ...\n... 57.  The Constitutional Court notes furthermore that the appellant is a Syrian national and not a stateless person, that his BH citizenship was revoked because it was established that he had acquired it by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and the concealment of relevant facts; and that he was placed in detention ... on national-security grounds and that a deportation order has been issued against him. On the other hand, in its judgment no. 3727/08, cited above, the European Court held ... that there was a real risk that the appellant would be exposed to inhuman treatment if deported to Syria ... It is evident from the impugned judgments that thirty-nine countries have refused a request by BH to accept the appellant. All of the above indicates the existence of special circumstances in the present case. In view of that \u2013 and the fact that the authorities have displayed particular diligence in the case of the applicant, who is neither a refugee nor a stateless person ... and the adequate assessment of the existence of a prima facie reasonable suspicion that if released the appellant would pose a threat to national security \u2013 the Constitutional Court concludes, all the while taking into account the excessive length of the appellant\u2019s detention, that there was no violation of Article II/3.d of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention as regards the rest of the impugned judgments [delivered between 6 January 2014 and 25 March 2015] ...\n... 64.  The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to emphasise that although it has found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention in respect of the judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014, given that it did not find such a violation in respect of the rest of the [impugned] judgments, it considers that exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation is sufficient and that there is no need to remit the case for a rehearing ...\u201d 44.  On 22 December 2015 (decision no. AP 2832/15) the Constitutional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgments delivered by the State Court between May and December 2015. The applicant relied on the same provisions as before. The Constitutional Court held that there had been no substantial changes in the legal and factual circumstances of the case since its decision of 17 June 2015 (see paragraph 43 above) and found that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights. Essentially, the court referred to the reasons given in its decision of 17 June 2015. It considered that the authorities had acted diligently in their efforts to find a safe third country (more than fifty countries had been contacted) and had examined the possibility of applying a less strict preventive measure. The court had furthermore taken into account the fact that the applicant had been heard regarding the circumstances of his detention in judicial-review proceedings and that an adequate assessment had been made of the (prima facie reasonable) suspicion that if released he would pose a threat to national security. 45.  In response to a request from the Aliens Service for new information concerning the applicant, on 25 January 2016 the National Security Agency indicated that it had no new information but that it still considered that the applicant constituted a potential threat to national security. However, taking into account the provisions of the 2015 Aliens Act (see paragraphs 78 and 79 below), the National Security Agency submitted that the purpose of the supervision could be achieved by means of a less strict preventive measure. 46.  On 3 February 2016 the National Security Agency submitted to the Aliens Service national-security-related material concerning the applicant; it also indicated to the Aliens Service which part of that material could be disclosed to him. 47.  On 10 February 2016 the applicant was heard by the Aliens Service; certain open evidence was presented to him, while certain material remained closed. The applicant submitted to the Aliens Service that he had already been informed of the content of the open evidence during the proceedings before the State Court. He furthermore stated that he had accommodation and his registered place of residence and financial support. The applicant\u2019s wife, who was also heard, confirmed that he would be staying at her house and that she would be providing for him during his stay. 48.  On 17 February 2016 the Aliens Service terminated the applicant\u2019s detention, in accordance with the 2015 Aliens Act, because it had exceeded eighteen months (see paragraph 78 below). By the same decision preventive measures were imposed on the applicant, which included the following: a prohibition on his leaving the Sarajevo Canton (which encompasses Ilid\u017ea municipality); the duty to report to the Ilid\u017ea police in person between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. every Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday; and the duty to report to the Aliens Service by telephone (from his landline number) every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s passport, which had expired on 2 April 2009, was seized. In doing so Aliens Service referred to section 119 of the 2015 Aliens Act, which provided that the total period of a person\u2019s detention could not exceed eighteen months (see paragraph 78 below). 49.  The preventive measures were to remain in force until the applicant left the country voluntarily or until he was forcibly removed, for as long as the reasons for which he was placed under supervision remained the same. 50.  On 10 September 2012 the Aliens Service asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact countries which were geopolitically and culturally close to Syria. On 10 October, 9 November and 29 November 2012 the Aliens Service contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking for updates on the proceedings. 51.  By 19 October 2012 Slovenia, Jordan and Cyprus had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they were not willing to accept the applicant. 52.  Between 9 November 2012 and 27 November 2013 nine countries were contacted (Austria, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen). 53.  By January 2013 negative responses had been received from twenty-three countries (Estonia, Spain, France, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lichtenstein, Denmark, Switzerland, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, Austria, Norway, the Netherlands, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Turkey, Germany, Serbia, Italy and Bulgaria). 54.  On 21 August and 28 November 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that Yemen and Oman, respectively, had refused to accept the applicant. 55.  On 27 November 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to provide responses to the requests that they agree to accept the applicant. 56.  On 9 December 2013 Qatar refused to accept the applicant. 57.  On 4 March 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that Kuwait was not willing to accept the applicant. 58.  On 30 April 2014 the United Arab Emirates informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they did not wish to accept the applicant. 59.  On 16 June 2014 and 13 November 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a request with the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade for Syria to accept the applicant. 60.  On 8 and 14 August 2014 the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively, informed the applicant that ten more countries had refused their request (Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Romania, Sweden, Morocco, Croatia, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain). 61.  On 12 and 13 August 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again contacted the United Arab Emirates. 62.  On 14 November 2014 and 17 February 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the applicant that there had been no new developments concerning the search for a safe third country. 63.  On 18 February and 3 March 2015 the Aliens Service contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking for updates concerning the proceedings aimed at finding a safe third country. 64.  At the request of the Aliens Service, on 19 May 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Canada to accept the applicant. On 27 August 2015 Canada refused the request. 65.  On 15 June 2015 the Aliens Service lodged a request with the Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo for the applicant to be accepted by Turkey. 66.  Furthermore, throughout 2015 attempts were made to organise a meeting at Saudi Arabia\u2019s embassy in Sarajevo with a view to discussing the possibility of the applicant\u2019s admission to that country. However, it would appear that the meeting did not take place. 67.  On 12 February 2016 the Aliens Service proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodge a request for the applicant\u2019s admission to Kazakhstan. On 22 February 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that it had asked the BH Embassy in Russia (which also covered Kazakhstan) to lodge such a request. 68.  On several occasions the applicant\u2019s representatives requested access to information concerning the activities undertaken by the authorities with a view to finding a safe third country. Such access was regularly granted and the relevant information provided by the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 69.  The Government submitted the following information concerning conditions in the Immigration Centre. 70.  The applicant had been placed in a cell with a surface area of 20.5 square metres in which a maximum of four detainees were held at any one time. Thus, each of them had five square metres of personal space. Each cell had a glass window (160 centimetres tall and 120 centimetres wide), sanitary facilities, direct access to drinking water, and heating. Each inmate was regularly provided with the necessary toiletries. 71.  Detainees had three meals per day and a schedule of daily activities (sporting activities, medical examinations, leisure time, and so on). The Immigration Centre possessed a library and premises for religious activities and for spending leisure time. 72.  Each detainee had a right to one visit per week. The head of the Immigration Centre could authorise more frequent visits should they be in the interests of the family of the detainee concerned. There were no facilities for conjugal visits. 73.  Throughout his detention the applicant was afforded adequate health care, including several examinations conducted by specialists. 74.  In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant submitted a copy of a decision of 8 November 2007, written in Arabic and issued by the Syrian Ministry of Interior, by which his Syrian nationality had been revoked. The applicant also enclosed a copy of the certified translation, dated 28 July 2015, of that decision into one of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina.", "references": ["5", "4", "0", "9", "8", "6", "3", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "11.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Ploie\u015fti. 12.  At around 8.40 p.m. on 3 December 2004 the applicant, who at the time was a judge serving with the D\u00e2mbovi\u021ba County Court, was involved in a car accident. Throughout the domestic proceedings and in his application to the Court, he alleged, inter alia, that a third party \u2013 a certain D.I. \u2013 had crashed his car into the back of the applicant\u2019s car. As a result of this impact, the applicant\u2019s car had been shunted into the back of a stationary military lorry, of which the driver was a certain J.C.P. 13.  Following the collision with the applicant\u2019s car, D.I.\u2019s car bounced off the applicant\u2019s car and collided with another car which had been driving on the oncoming lane (hereinafter \u201cthe fourth driver\u201d). The fourth driver was never the subject of any investigation.\n(a)   The conduct of the investigation 14.  On the same date, on 3 December 2004, the Ploie\u015fti Police Department (hereinafter \u201cthe Police Department\u201d) initiated, of its own motion, a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the accident. The Police Department\u2019s investigation was supervised by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Ploie\u015fti District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d). 15.  The Police Department carried out an on-site investigation. According to the minutes of the report drawn up on the on-site investigation it took measurements and photographs, produced a detailed description of the site of the accident, identified the drivers involved in the incident and had medical personnel collect blood samples from all three drivers in order to establish the level of alcohol in their blood. Also, it asked the Ploie\u015fti Forensic Service (hereinafter \u201cthe Forensic Service\u201d) to produce toxicology reports in respect of the alcohol levels found in the drivers\u2019 blood. In addition, it took statements from some of the passengers of the vehicles involved in the incident. 16.  Between 4 December 2004 and 6 September 2005 the Police Department took statements from the remaining passengers of the vehicles involved in the accident, as well as from the applicant, D.I., and J.C.P. and asked the Forensic Service to produce a forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident. 17.  The toxicology reports \u2013 produced on 6 December 2004 \u2013 concluded that only the applicant had alcohol in his blood that night. 18.  The forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident \u2013 produced on 27 June 2005 \u2013 noted that the applicant had been committed to hospital three times by 6 May 2005. He was diagnosed, inter alia, with polytrauma, post-traumatic mesentery rupture, and fractured and/or displaced bones and body parts. He had undergone three surgical operations, including one involving the removal of part of his intestines, and had required a lower tracheotomy because of respiratory complications. The report further noted that the applicant\u2019s physical examination by the forensic expert had disclosed a diminished power of compression in his right hand and reduced amplitude in the abduction movement of his right arm. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered injuries that could have been caused on 3 December 2004 by collision with or compression by hard objects or surfaces following a car accident. The injuries required between 200 and 250 days of medical care and their severity had endangered the applicant\u2019s life. The presence of any disability was to be assessed after the end of the recovery treatment. 19.  On 22 June 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 20.  On 2 August 2005 the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office declined jurisdiction in favour of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Ploie\u015fti Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) on account of the applicant\u2019s status as a judge. The latter Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings in rem on 6 September 2005 because the accident had caused the applicant severe injuries, giving rise to the offence of involuntary serious bodily harm. 21.  Between 7 and 24 October 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office took statements from several of the witnesses to the accident, including the fourth driver, and heard evidence from the applicant. Also, it instructed the applicant to submit, by 31 October 2005, his views on the technical expert report which he had requested, and the names of further witnesses he had asked to be heard. 22.  On 28 October 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office to postpone the deadline set for the applicant, inter alia, because he was unable to consult the applicant or submit evidence to the file on account of the latter\u2019s serious medical condition.\n(b)   The prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 23.  On 5 December 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings brought against D.I. and J.C.P. and the criminal investigation concerning the applicant. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Also, the applicant was responsible for causing the accident because he had been driving under the influence of alcohol and had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions. However, the elements of an offence had not been met in his case because the alcohol level found in his blood had been below the legal threshold of 0.8\u2030. 24.  The applicant challenged the decision before the Prosecutor General attached to the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office (hereinafter \u201cthe Prosecutor General\u201d). He argued, inter alia, that the prosecutor\u2019s office had failed to produce a technical expert report and had ignored or misinterpreted the available evidence, whether intentionally or not. 25.  On 3 January 2006 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge. He reiterated the findings of the prosecutor\u2019s office. In addition, he held that the applicant had not applied the brakes of his car before the impact with the lorry. He added that no technical expert report was necessary, considering that the evidence already obtained was conclusive. 26.  The applicant appealed against the decisions of 5 December 2005 and 3 January 2006 before the Ploie\u015fti Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). He reiterated the arguments which he had put forward to the Prosecutor General. In addition, he argued that the investigators had ignored his request for evidence to be included in the file which could have allowed him to prove that his blood samples had been collected unlawfully or under suspicious circumstances. 27.  On 17 April 2006 the Court of Appeal declared itself without jurisdiction and referred the case to the Ploie\u015fti District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) on the grounds that the applicant had retired from his post as judge. After the District Court took over the case it adjourned the proceedings five times between 13 June and 6 October 2006 on procedural grounds, and in order to have time to examine the case. 28.  On 13 October 2006 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decisions. It held that the applicant had been responsible for the accident. He had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions in order to avoid potential danger. 29.  Upon an appeal on points of fact and of law (recurs) by the applicant, the Prahova County Court on 18 December 2006 quashed that judgment and ordered the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office to reopen the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. It also ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to produce a technical expert report that would clarify the circumstances of the accident. The available evidence attested that brake marks caused by the applicant\u2019s car had been found and the witness statements on whether the lorry had been correctly parked were contradictory. Furthermore, a forensic expert report was needed with regard to the alcohol level in the applicant\u2019s blood.\n(a)   The conduct of the investigation 30.  On 3 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a psychiatric forensic expert report concerning the applicant. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder which could have been aggravated by any state of conflict. The applicant\u2019s psychological suffering might also have been exacerbated by the repeated surgical interventions, but could not be medically quantified. Prior to the accident the applicant had not been registered as a patient with psychological problems. There was a clear connection between the chronic post-traumatic stress and all the conflict situations he was experiencing. 31.  On 10 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a forensic expert report concerning the applicant\u2019s blood. It concluded that there had been some irregularities in the collection of his blood samples. Among other things, it appeared that the second blood sample had been collected at a time when the applicant was in fact no longer present in the hospital\u2019s stabilisation room. The report also noted the applicant\u2019s argument that there had been an excessive use of disinfectants at the time when the samples were collected and that this could have altered the reading of the alcohol level found in his blood. The experts stated that, if the methodology used to collect the blood samples had not been observed, the result of the alcohol test might have been affected. 32.  On 16 May 2007 the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office reopened the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. and referred the case back to the Police Department for the investigative measures ordered by the court. Subsequently, from 7 June to 22 November 2007, the applicant asked the Police Department and the prosecutor\u2019s office for additional evidence to be included in the file, including a technical expert report concerning the circumstances of the accident and new forensic expert reports on his blood alcohol level and the dynamics of the accident. In addition, he complained repeatedly about the delays in the investigation. 33.  On 3 October 2007, following the Police Department\u2019s request of 14 August 2007 for a forensic expert report concerning the alcohol in the applicant\u2019s blood, the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute (hereinafter \u201cthe Forensic Institute\u201d) informed the Police Department that the substances used when the biological samples had been collected from the applicant could not explain the presence of alcohol in his blood. 34.  On 20 December 2007 an expert assigned by the Police Department on 9 September 2007 produced a technical expert report on the causes of the accident. After having examined the available evidence, the expert concluded that J.C.P. could have prevented the accident if he had complied with the traffic regulations concerning vehicles stopping on public roads at night. Moreover, the first impact had been that between the applicant\u2019s car and the lorry, after which D.I. had crashed into the applicant\u2019s car. Furthermore, D.I. had complied with the traffic regulations and the speed limits, and had kept a safe distance from the car in front of him. He concluded that the applicant and D.I. could not have avoided the accident. 35.  The private experts chosen by the applicant and by D.I. to participate in the activities of the expert appointed by the Police Department, leading to the report of 20 December 2007 submitted comments on that report. The expert chosen by the applicant concluded that the applicant\u2019s car had crashed into the lorry after having been hit by D.I.\u2019s car, and that D.I. could have avoided the accident if he had kept a proper lookout and a sufficient distance from the car in front of him. 36.  Between 22 and 25 January 2008 the Police Department heard evidence from J.C.P. and two of the witnesses to the accident. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a re-enactment of the circumstances of the accident on the grounds that such a re-enactment could be made only on a theoretical level, by producing a technical expert report which would determine the circumstances in which the traffic accident had taken place. Also, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s requests for a new forensic expert report on his blood alcohol level and for a new technical expert report on the grounds that the Forensic Institute and the expert had dealt with the objectives set. On 4 February 2008 it recommended discontinuing the criminal proceedings. 37.  On 18 August 2008 the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the Police Department\u2019s recommendation. It held that the available evidence was contradictory and insufficient to clarify the circumstances of the case. It therefore ordered the Police Department to instruct the Forensic Institute to produce a forensic expert report on the applicant\u2019s alcohol level. The prosecutor\u2019s office also asked the Police Department to mandate the Bucharest Inter-County Laboratory for Criminological Reports (hereinafter \u201cLaboratory for Criminological Reports\u201d) to produce a technical expert report on the circumstances of the accident. Furthermore, depending on the outcome of the forensic expert report, the Police Department was also instructed to produce a second version of the technical expert report assessing whether the accident could have been avoided given the applicant\u2019s alcohol level at the time of the accident. 38.  On 19 February 2009, in response to the Police Department\u2019s 21 October 2008 request for a forensic expert report, the Forensic Institute informed the Police Department that \u2013 given the contradictory and incomplete evidence \u2013 there were serious doubts as to whether the blood collected and examined belonged to the applicant. 39.  On 30 March 2009 the Police Department dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a new forensic expert report to be produced with regard to his blood alcohol level on the grounds, inter alia, that a new report would not be necessary or conclusive for the case. On the same date the Police Department asked the Laboratory for Criminological Reports to produce the technical expert report ordered by the prosecutor\u2019s office. 40.  Following a challenge by the applicant against the Police Department\u2019s decision of 30 March 2009, the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant on 30 April 2009 that the criminal investigation file had been sent to the Laboratory for Criminological Reports and that in the absence of the file his challenge could not be examined within the legal time-limit. The applicant\u2019s subsequent complaint of 8 May 2009 against the notification of 30 April 2009 was dismissed by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Ploie\u015fti County Court on 16 June 2009 as inadmissible. 41.  On 21 April 2009 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports informed the Police Department that, in the light of their extreme workload and the small number of experts available, the technical criminological report in respect of the applicant\u2019s case could not be produced before 2011. 42.  Nevertheless, on 29 September 2010 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports produced the aforementioned report. It concluded, inter alia, that given the speed needed to avoid an impact with the lorry, the applicant could not have avoided it. It could not be established whether D.I. could have avoided hitting the applicant\u2019s car, or whether J.C.P. could have prevented the accident, nor was it possible to establish the manner and the order in which the applicant\u2019s car and D.I.\u2019s car had collided. It estimated that the applicant\u2019s and D.I\u2019s cars had probably collided after the applicant\u2019s car had hit the lorry. 43.  On 6 January 2011, having noted that the case-file had been returned by the Laboratory for Criminological Reports, the applicant reminded the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office of his challenge against the Police Department\u2019s decision of 30 March 2009. 44.  On 28 January 2011 the Police Department dismissed a request by the applicant for a new technical expert report to be produced by a court\u2011appointed expert on the grounds that the report of 29 September 2010 had clarified as far as possible the circumstances of the accident. The applicant\u2019s challenge against the Police Department\u2019s decision was dismissed by the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 3 March 2011.\n(b)   The prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 45.  On 21 February 2011 the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. and J.C.P. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Neither the applicant nor D.I. had adapted their speed to the road conditions. However, the technical expert report of 29 September 2010 had been unable to establish with any certainty whether D.I. could have avoided the accident. Furthermore, according to the forensic expert report of 27 June 2005, the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused mainly by his car\u2019s head-on impact with the lorry. 46.  On 23 March 2011 the higher-level prosecutor of the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge against the decision of 21 February 2011. It held that according to the available evidence the said decision had been lawful. The only blame for the accident that could be established with certainty was that of the applicant. He had been driving his car too fast at night. 47.  On 30 March 2011 the applicant appealed to the District Court against the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u2019s decision of 21 February 2011. He argued, inter alia, that the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision had relied only on part of the evidence on file. Also, he criticised the expert report of 29 September 2010. 48.  Shortly afterwards, the applicant requested the High Court of Cassation and Justice to transfer the case to another court, on the basis of legitimate suspicion regarding the judges of the District Court. The High Court of Cassation and Justice granted the applicant\u2019s request on 21 June 2011, noting the positions of the parties and the fact that the applicant had lodged criminal complaints against the judges and prosecutors from Ploie\u015fti (see paragraph 62 below). It transferred the case to the Bucharest District Court. 49.  On 30 September 2011 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objections against the expert report of 29 September 2010 and confirmed the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision in so far as it discontinued the criminal proceedings against J.C.P. According to the available evidence, the lorry had been legally parked by J.C.P., the applicant first hit the lorry and then his car was hit by D.I. 50.  Concerning the criminal proceedings against D.I., the court considered that D.I. had not discharged his lawful duty to drive preventively. The decision to discontinue the proceedings against D.I. was contradictory, considering that the same decision acknowledged that D.I. had breached his legal duty. Also, the conclusion of the expert report of 20 December 2007 that D.I. could not have avoided the accident was at odds with the provisions of the relevant domestic legislation concerning preventive driving. 51.  However, in the absence of evidence on file clarifying the existence or non-existence of a causal link between D.I.\u2019s action and the applicant\u2019s injuries, the court could not retain the case for examination. Consequently, it quashed the decision in so far as it had ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings against D.I. and ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to produce a new forensic expert report determining the possible existence of a direct connection between D.I.\u2019s actions and the applicant\u2019s injuries. It took the view that this new forensic expert report should be able to establish whether the applicant\u2019s injuries had been produced by the impact between his car and the lorry or by the impact between D.I.\u2019s car and the applicant\u2019s car or by a combination of the two events. 52.  The District Court noted that the statute of limitations for criminal liability was close to becoming applicable. However, it considered that it could not retain the case for examination and indict D.I. because, in the absence of the requested evidence, the existence of all the elements of an offence could not be established beyond any doubt. 53.  D.I.\u2019s appeal on points of fact and of law against this judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 16 January 2012.\n(a)   The conduct of the investigation 54.  On 5 April 2012 the District Court Prosecutor\u2019s Office reopened the criminal proceedings against D.I. On 6 April 2012, it asked the Forensic Service to produce the forensic expert report requested by the court. The Forensic Service produced the said report on 11 April 2012 and concluded, inter alia, that a very short period of time had elapsed between the two impacts. It could not be established on the basis of the applicant\u2019s injuries which of the two events had been the cause. A combination of the two impacts was possible. 55.  On 25 April 2012 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office to take over the case on the grounds that the case was complex and the proceedings had been lengthy. The Prosecutor General granted his request on 26 April 2012 on the ground that there was a risk that the statutory limitation period would expire. 56.  On 28 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s respective requests of 12 April and 18 May 2012 for a simulation of the accident to be carried out and for a new forensic expert report to be produced by the Forensic Institute. It held that \u2013 in the light of the conclusions of the available reports \u2013 the evidence requested by the applicant was neither relevant nor necessary for the case.\n(b)   The prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 57.  On 30 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. The forensic expert report of 11 April 2012 could not establish how many of the medical-care days needed by the applicant had been the result of the self-inflicted injuries or of the injuries caused by D.I., or whether the latter\u2019s actions had generated any need at all for medical-care days. Consequently, there was doubt regarding the causal link between D.I.\u2019s actions and the applicant\u2019s injuries, and this doubt worked in D.I.\u2019s favour. 58.  On 18 June 2012 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge against this decision. He held that the statute of limitations had taken effect on 3 June 2012 and that the investigation in the case therefore could not be continued. 59.  On 18 July 2012 the applicant asked the District Court to quash the Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 18 June 2012 and to retain the case for examination. He argued, inter alia, that the statute of limitations had not taken effect. Also, the prosecutor\u2019s office had breached his right to defence by dismissing his request for a review of the expert report dated 11 April 2012 by the Forensic Institute. 60.  By final judgment of 21 December 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Prosecutor General. The court held that according to the relevant criminal law provisions, including the provision concerning the more lenient criminal law, the statute of limitations in respect of D.I.\u2019s offence had taken effect on 3 June 2012. 61.  The applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact and of law against the judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Court of Appeal on 7 March 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the District Court was not amenable to appeal. However, the Court of Appeal referred to the Constitutional Court a constitutional challenge by the applicant to the relevant legal provisions concerning appeals against prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decisions. The latter court dismissed the constitutional challenge as unfounded on 24 September 2013. 62.  Between 19 November 2008 and 30 September 2011 the applicant submitted several challenges and several criminal and disciplinary complaints to the relevant hierarchical or supervisory authorities, including the Superior Council of Magistrates, against many of the investigating and judicial authorities involved in the investigation and examination of the cases concerning him. His complaints included allegations of bias, of handling his cases in an abusive and unlawful manner and of favouring D.I. and J.C.P. 63.  With one exception (see paragraph 48 above), the applicant\u2019s complaints either were dismissed by the competent authorities on the grounds that no unlawful acts had been committed or in some cases appear to remain pending. In some decisions relating to the applicant\u2019s complaints, such as a decision delivered by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 10 September 2009 and a decision delivered by the Prosecutor General on 25 October 2011, the competent authorities indicated that the applicant was motivated by a subjective dissatisfaction with the outcome of the investigation, or even by a desire to take revenge on the investigators. 64.  On 28 November 2006 the applicant brought proceedings before the D\u00e2mbovi\u021ba County Court against his car insurance company seeking a judgment ordering the insurance company to comply with its contractual obligation to compensate him for the total loss of the insured vehicle and to pay him non-pecuniary damages for the psychological suffering incurred following the insurance company\u2019s allegedly unjustified refusal to comply with its contractual obligation. The applicant also brought proceedings against the company from which he was leasing his car in order to make the judgment binding on that company. On 16 September 2010 the court ordered that D.I. and J.C.P. be joined as third parties to the proceedings. 65.  Eventually, on 27 November 2013, the D\u00e2mbovi\u021ba County Court dismissed the proceedings initiated by the applicant against the insurance and lease companies on the grounds that the applicant had failed to pay the required judicial stamp duty. 66.  The former Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, which was in force at the material time (until 31 January 2014), provided that the object of a civil action was to hold the defendant civilly liable for damage caused by an act which was the subject matter of the criminal proceedings. A civil action could be joined to the criminal proceedings by the lodging of a civil\u2011party claim (Article 14). The injured party could lodge such a claim either during the criminal proceedings or before the trial court, up until the day the indictment was read out in court (Article 15). If an injured party had not joined criminal proceedings as a civil party, he or she could initiate separate proceedings before the civil courts for damages caused as a result of the offence. Civil proceedings had to be stayed pending the final judgment of the criminal courts. An injured party who had joined criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate separate civil proceedings if the criminal proceedings had been stayed. If the criminal proceedings were re\u2011opened, the civil proceedings opened before the civil courts had to be stayed. An injured party who had initiated civil proceedings could abandon those proceedings and lodge a request (for joining a civil claim to the criminal proceedings) with the investigating authorities or the trial court if the indictment had been made or the trial was resumed after the stay. The civil proceedings could not be abandoned once the civil court had delivered judgment, even if it was not yet a final one (Article 19). An injured party who had joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate civil proceedings, if the criminal court, by a final judgment, had left the civil action unexamined (Article 20). The final judgment of the criminal court was res judicata for the civil court which was called to examine the civil action in so far as it concerned the existence of the act, the person who had committed it and that person\u2019s guilt. By contrast, the final judgment of the civil court was not res judicata for the investigating authorities and the criminal court in so far as it concerned the existence of a criminal act, the person who had committed it and that person\u2019s guilt (Article 21). 67.  The former Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, in force until 14 February 2013, provided that a civil court could suspend the proceedings when criminal proceedings had been instituted for an offence which could have a decisive influence on the judgment that had to be delivered, and that the suspension had to remain in force pending a final judgment in the case which had triggered the suspension (Article 244). The court suspended the civil proceedings by an interlocutory judgment amenable to appeal, which could be lodged as long as the proceedings were suspended (Article 2441). 68.  The former Romanian Civil Code, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that any person who was responsible for causing damage to another would be liable to make reparation for it regardless of whether the damage was caused through his or her own actions, through his or her failure to act or through his or her negligence (Articles 998 and 999). 69.  Legislative Decree no. 167/1958 on the statute of limitations, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that the right to lodge an action having a pecuniary scope was time-barred unless it was exercised within three years (Articles 1 and 3). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act started to run from the moment the person became, or should have become, aware of the damage and knew who had caused it (Article 8). However, the time\u2011limit was interrupted by the lodging of a court action (Article 16). A new term of the statute of limitations started to run after its interruption (Article 17). 70.  The new Romanian Civil Code, in force since 1 October 2011, provides that a person with discernment is liable for all damage caused by his actions or inactions and is bound to make full reparation (Article 1349). With regard to the existence of the damage or of the guilt of the perpetrator of the unlawful act, the civil court is not bound by the provisions of criminal law or by the final judgment of acquittal or of closing the criminal trial (Article 1365). The right to lodge an action, including one with a pecuniary scope, is time-barred if not exercised within three years, unless the law provides otherwise (Articles 2500, 2501 and 2517). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act starts to run from the moment the person becomes, or should become, aware of the damage and knows who caused it (Article 2528). The time-limit can be interrupted by the lodging of a court action or of a civil\u2011party claim during the criminal proceedings instituted, or before the court, up to the moment when the court starts the judicial examination of the case (Article 2537). If the time-bar is interrupted by the lodging of a civil\u2011party claim, the interruption remains valid until the order to close or suspend the criminal proceedings or the decision of the court to suspend the proceedings is notified, or until the criminal court has delivered a final judgment (Article 2541).", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "6", "8", "No Label", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants, two brothers, were born in 1970 and 1975 and are currently serving prison sentences in Sol-Iletsk, Orenburg Region. 6.  On 5 December 2001 the Volgograd Regional Court found the applicants guilty of several murders. 7.  On 23 July 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed that judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 8.  In September 2002 the criminal case was resubmitted to the Volgograd Regional Court for trial by a professional judge assisted by two lay judges. 9.  On 13 September 2002 the Regional Court extended the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention, indicating that the measure of restraint should remain unchanged. 10.  According to the second applicant, on 23 September 2002 he lodged two appeals against the extension order of 13 September 2002. The first one, recorded under reference number 35/13/2-218-z, was sent to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the second one, recorded under reference number 35/13/2-217-z, was sent to the Volgograd Regional Court. 11.  On 5 December 2002 the composition of the court was changed and the case was referred to a trial judge and two new lay judges, Mr D. and Ms Mot. 12.  On 17 January 2003 the Regional Court found the applicants guilty of several counts of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 13.  On an unspecified date the second applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2003. 14.  On 8 July 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction on appeal. According to the second applicant, on that date he also learnt that his appeal of 23 September 2002 had not been included in the case file and that it would not be considered. 15.  On 21 December 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 8 July 2003 by way of a supervisory review and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh consideration. 16.  By a letter of April 2007 the Deputy President of the Volgograd Regional Court informed Judge V. of the Supreme Court that Mr D. had acted as a lay judge in five criminal trials on 6, 13 and 21 February, 18 March and 11 September 2002, and that Ms Mot. had been a lay judge in three criminal trials on 8 October, 21 November and 30 December 2002. 17.  On 22 May 2007 the Supreme Court upheld, in substance, the applicants\u2019 conviction on appeal. The appellate court held, inter alia, that the participation of the lay judges in more than one criminal trial per year could not undermine the \u201clegitimacy\u201d of the tribunal in the applicants\u2019 case. 18.  On 28 August 2007 the second applicant requested that the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 13 September 2002 be restored due to the disappearance of the hard copy of his original complaint. 19.  On 21 September 2007 the trial court refused the second applicant\u2019s request, noting that it was no longer possible to establish whether he had lodged the appeal in question in due time or at all. 20.  On 7 May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the refusal, adding that the second applicant\u2019s complaint of unlawful detention after 13 September 2002 was ill-founded.\n\u0421.  Alleged censorship of the second applicant\u2019s letters by the administration of the correctional colony and interference with his right of individual petition 21.  According to the second applicant, on 26 March 2009 he sent an application to the Court via the administration of the correctional colony. The application was not received by the Court. 22.  On 11 December 2009 the Registry of the Court received the initial letter sent by the second applicant through the administration of the correctional colony on 19 November 2009. 23.  On 14 August 2010 the second applicant received a parcel from his representative. It had been opened by the administration of the correctional colony for the purpose of censoring. The parcel contained documents from the Court, sheets of blank paper and two crossword puzzles. The second applicant received the documents and blank paper. The crossword puzzles were transferred for censorship. One day later the second applicant received the crossword puzzles. 24.  Between July and September 2011 the Court received letters from, and sent letters to, the second applicant\u2019s representative. 25.  On 8 December 2011 the second applicant\u2019s complaints were forwarded to the Government for further observations. By that time, the second applicant had sent sixteen letters to the Registry of the Court through his relatives, his representative and the administration of the correctional colony. 26.  Between 31 July 2007, the date on which the application with the Court was lodged, and 8 December 2011, the date on which the complaints were forwarded to the Government, the Registry of the Court sent nineteen letters to the second applicant either acknowledging receipt of letters or requesting documents. 27.  On 15 May 2006 and 27 December 2007, while undergoing a personal inspection, the applicant had altercations with the guards. 28.  On 15 May 2006 the deputy head of the administration decided to terminate an inquiry into a complaint of ill-treatment lodged by the second applicant. The decision stated as follows:\n\u201cAt 6.40 a.m. on 15 May 2006 [the second applicant], while being inspected by the guards of the correctional colony, resisted, pushed back one of the guards, Mr Mar., and tried to kick him. [The second applicant] was urged to stop his resistance; however he continued. Therefore [a rubber truncheon] was used. Eyewitnesses, prison guards Mr Mar. and Mr S., confirmed the above-mentioned facts. According to forensic medical examinations conducted on the same day, the [second applicant] had bruises measuring 8 by 2.7 cm and 10 by 2.7 cm on his hips. The experts concluded that the applicant did not need any medical treatment.\nIn view of the circumstances of the case and [applicable laws], the measures [of restraint] taken against [the applicant] were lawful\u201d. 29.  On 27 December 2007 a forensic medical examination concluded that the first applicant had sustained bruises measuring between 3 by 10 cm and 3 by 15 cm on his hips. 30.  On 28 December 2007 the deputy head of the administration decided to terminate yet another inquiry into the second applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment of 27 December 2007. He dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations, reiterating verbatim the text of the decision of 15 May 2006. 31.  On 27 January 2008 the regional assistant prosecutor, repeating virtually the same facts and findings as those in the decision of 28 December 2007, acknowledged the lawfulness of the measures taken by the guards of the correctional facility on 27 December 2007. 32.  On 16 November 2010 the second applicant sought to institute criminal proceedings in respect of his alleged ill-treatment on 15 May 2006 and 27 December 2007. 33.  On 17 November 2010, after a pre-investigation inquiry, an investigator of the regional investigative committee, I., refused to institute criminal proceedings due to the absence of corpus delicti. In his decision the investigator relied on the statements made by the second applicant and several guards of the correctional colony. He referred to the facts established by the decisions of 15 May 2006 and 28 December 2007 (see paragraphs 28 and 30 above). The investigator\u2019s decision further reads as follows:\n\u201cThe authorities conducting the preliminary inquiry are sceptical about [the second applicant\u2019s] allegations, since he tries to conceal his discontent with the regime of the correctional colony and complains about the measures taken by the administration of the colony as being unlawful.\nAccording to the statements of Mr. Kan., an employee of correctional colony IK-6, [the second applicant] is a liar and has a tendency to commit crime. Special measures have been taken against him due to his failure to comply with the regime of the correctional colony. All measures taken were lawful.\n... Other employees of the correctional colony stated that no unjustified or unlawful measures had been taken in respect of [the second applicant].\u201d 34.  On 17 December 2010 the head of the investigative committee quashed that decision and remitted all the material for fresh consideration. 35.  On 27 December 2010 the investigator again dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint due to the absence of corpus delicti. 36.  On 14 June 2011 the regional prosecutor quashed the decision of 27 December 2010 and remitted the material for fresh consideration. The parties did not inform the Court about the outcome of the proceedings. 37.  According to the second applicant, on 10 August 2009 and in September 2009 he was blindfolded, suspended by his arms and subjected to electric shocks by the guards of the correctional colony. He was unable to identify them. It appears that the second applicant did not bring any proceedings in respect of those events. 38.  According to the second applicant, on 12 May 2010 he was called to the office of the head of the correctional colony and after being threatened to withdraw his application to the Court, he was beaten up by several guards.", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "0", "4", "5", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first, second and third applicants were born in 1950, 2001 and 2007 respectively, and live in C\u0103l\u0103ra\u0219i. 6.  The first applicant worked as a foster parent at the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi office of the Office for Social Care and Child Protection (Direc\u021bia General\u0103 de Asisten\u021b\u0103 Social\u0103 \u015fi Protec\u021bia Copilului, hereinafter \u201cthe DGASPC\u201d) from 1999 to 4 July 2011, when she retired. The organisation was part of the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Council (\u201cthe County Council\u201d). 7.  In May 2001 and April 2008 respectively the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC placed the second and third applicants with the first applicant, decisions which were confirmed by a court. 8.  In line with the first applicant\u2019s express wishes, the other applicants remained in her care even after she retired. The third applicant is still in her care. Following an express request by the first applicant, the second applicant was removed from her care on 13 September 2016. 9.  On 9 June 2008 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of her salary rights in respect of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the previous three years, a supplement for extra work she had performed, and overtime pay for work she had done during weekends and public holidays. She also claimed the reimbursement of expenses relating to her regular medical examinations and laboratory tests and argued that for the previous three years the second applicant had not been given the housing, placement and food allowances to which he had been entitled. 10.  On an unspecified date the County Council intervened in the proceedings as a third party supporting the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC. It argued that the first applicant had had no right to claim the benefits allegedly not given to the second applicant because only the President of the County Council had a legal right to exercise rights on behalf of the child. 11.  On 7 October 2008 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) allowed the first applicant\u2019s action in part, and ordered the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC to pay her financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the period 2005-2007 and a supplement for extra work she had performed. The court also ordered the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC to give the second applicant the allowances provided for under Article 1 of Law no. 326/2003 on the rights enjoyed by children in foster care (see paragraph \n37 below) \u2013 to which he had been entitled since 8 June 2005 and up to the date of the judgment. It held that, even though the contract between the first applicant and her employer was special in nature because foster parents worked from home and were responsible for raising the children entrusted to their care, the provisions of the Labour Code (\u201cthe Code\u201d) applied. Consequently, she had been entitled to compensation for unspent annual leave, and to a supplement for extra work she had performed or overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays. Given the specific nature of her contract, which made it impossible to calculate the overtime work done by her, she was entitled to a supplement for extra work she had performed, and not to overtime pay, and could not be granted both. Also, a child was entitled to a food allowance, which had to be paid to the person feeding the child. The argument that only the President of the County Council could claim the allowance (see paragraph 10 above) was \u201cchildish\u201d and ill-founded. The claim for housing allowance had to be dismissed, because the applicants had not lived in rented accommodation. 12.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. She argued that a week earlier the first-instance court had allowed a trade union\u2019s claims against her employer for overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays. Also, the court had failed to examine or had unlawfully dismissed her claims for housing allowance, reimbursement of her expenses relating to her medical examinations and laboratory tests, and overtime pay for work done during weekdays. 13.  By a final judgment of 12 May 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal on points of fact and law. It held that she could not claim overtime pay, given the special nature of her work contract, and given that her job required her to provide constant care to the children. Also, she had not claimed the housing allowance and the reimbursement of her expenses relating to her regular medical examinations and laboratory tests from her employer on a monthly basis by providing supporting evidence for her claims, and therefore her claims lodged with the courts for retroactive payment had been ill-founded. Moreover, she had failed to provide supporting documents for her claims concerning the relevant medical expenses. 14.  On 14 July 2009 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC, seeking a court order for: overtime pay for work done during weekdays; overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays, starting from July 2006 until 2009, and continuing thereafter; payment of a holiday bonus for the period 2006-2008; payment of the allowances provided for by Article 3 of the relevant collective agreement contract; payment of the personal needs allowances provided for by law for the second applicant in respect of the period September 2004-June 2008; payment of the second applicant\u2019s remaining food allowance for the period January-March 2008; payment of a supplement for the third applicant\u2019s food allowance for the period May 2008-April 2009; payment of the housing allowance for the period 2004-September 2009; reimbursement of fees for her psychological examination; and non-pecuniary damages. 15.  She argued that on 7 October 2008 the County Court had wrongfully dismissed her claims for overtime pay (see paragraph 11 above), even though the same court and other courts in the country had allowed such claims. That court had also wrongfully dismissed her claim for housing allowance and had ignored her claim for payment of a holiday bonus. Consequently, she had lodged a new claim with the court, given that her employer had granted this bonus to public servants and courts across the country had allowed similar claims lodged by foster parents. The principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment of employees of the same unit had been breached by the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC by refusing to pay her benefits. The compensation for non-pecuniary damage was to cover the humiliation and discriminatory treatment she had suffered at the hands of her employer. 16.  On 24 November 2009 the County Court allowed the first applicant\u2019s claims in part. It held that, in accordance with legislation which had entered into force in April 2008, she had been entitled to payment of a supplement for the third applicant\u2019s food allowance for the period May 2008-April 2009. However, it noted that as of May 2008 the first applicant had received the above-mentioned supplement for the other child in her care. She had also been entitled to the reimbursement of fees for her psychological examination, as the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC had refused to reimburse her. In addition, she was entitled to the special allowances provided for by Article 3 of the collective agreement for the period 2007\u20112009. However, the court dismissed as res judicata her claims concerning overtime pay, the housing allowance and the second applicant\u2019s rights under Article 1 of Law no. 326/2003 for the period 2006-2007. It also dismissed her claim for overtime pay and housing allowance for the period 2008-2009, relying on similar reasons to those relied on by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 12 May 2009 (see paragraph 13 above). Lastly, the court dismissed her claim for a holiday bonus on the grounds that the collective agreement concerning her employer for the relevant period did not provide that employees were entitled to it. 17.  There is no evidence in the file that the first applicant appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment of 24 November 2009. 18.  On 8 December 2010 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of her salary for seven days in November and December 2009, and for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2010. 19.  On 10 February 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant\u2019s claims in part. It held that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer, all the employees of that office, including her, were entitled to a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2010. Moreover, she was entitled to be paid for the work she had done on three days in November 2009. However, she had received compensation for the work she had done on the other four days in question. Lastly, the court dismissed the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC\u2019s arguments that her claims had already been examined in the final judgments of 12 May and 24 November 2009 (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above). 20.  The C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 21.  By a final judgment of 6 December 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC\u2019s appeal in part. The court dismissed as res judicata the first applicant\u2019s claim for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2009 because it had already been examined in the judgment of 24 November 2009 (see paragraph 16 above). It held that even though she had used different terminology, in fact her claim concerned the payment of overtime for work done during weekends and public holidays. She had also relied on legal grounds which were similar to those used to justify her claim in the previous proceedings. The court further dismissed her claim for overtime pay for 2010. It held that in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code (see paragraph 11 above) and of the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer, all the employees of that office for whom overtime could be calculated were entitled to such payments. However, the special nature of foster parents\u2019 work and contracts, which implied the acceptance of the extra work which had to be performed and which could not be quantified, excluded them from the categories of employees who could be granted overtime pay. Given the provisions of the special legislation concerning foster parents, the legal provisions invoked by the first applicant could not be a foundation for her claim. Lastly, the court upheld the remaining part of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 22.  On 18 August 2011 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave, and for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period January-July 2011. 23.  On 3 November 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant\u2019s claims. It held that her employer had failed to prove that it had paid her during her annual leave. Also, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code and of the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer she was entitled to a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays. 24.  The C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 25.  By a final judgment of 14 March 2012 the Court of Appeal allowed the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC\u2019s appeal. In dismissing the first applicant\u2019s claim for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays, the court relied on similar reasons to the ones provided by the same court on 6 December 2011 when it had dismissed a similar claim raised by her for the year 2010 (see paragraph 21 above). Also, according to the available evidence, the applicant had taken her annual leave in May and June and had been paid for it. It could not be argued that she had not taken her annual leave in May 2011 because she had spent it in the company of her foster child. She had the option of asking the DGASPC to take the foster child during her leave. 26.  On 14 December 2010 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the period 2008-2010 and payment of the second applicant\u2019s remaining food allowance for the period January-March 2008. 27.  On 24 March 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant\u2019s claims. It held that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code, all employees were entitled to paid leave. Since the applicant had spent her annual leave for the period 2008-2010 in the company of her foster children and had not been relieved of her duties, she was entitled to the financial compensation she claimed. Moreover, her employer had failed to prove that it had paid the second applicant\u2019s remaining food allowance for the period in question. 28.  The C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 29.  By a final judgment of 15 December 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC\u2019s appeal in part. It held that the second applicant had not been entitled to an increased food allowance for the period January-March 2008. The legal provisions entitling the first applicant to receive the above-mentioned allowance had entered into force only in April 2008. 30.  The first applicant submitted to the Court three judgments delivered by three different courts of appeal. The judgments allowed various claims lodged by foster parents and/or trade unions across the country (representing the interests of their members working as either public servants or foster parents) for payment of financial compensation corresponding to unspent annual leave rights and overtime pay. By a final judgment of 19 June 2007 the Pite\u015fti Court of Appeal held that, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the Code, the claimants were entitled to compensation for unspent annual leave for the period 2003-2005. To hold otherwise would be to discriminate against them in relation to other categories of employees. By final judgments of 28 January and 28 April 2009 the Cluj and the Bucharest Courts of Appeal held that, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant collective agreement and the Code, the claimants were entitled to overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays, and/or to compensation for unspent annual leave for the period 2005-2008. The Bucharest Court of Appeal also held that the claimants were entitled to overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays also for the period after 2008. 31.  On 17 March 2010 and 8 March 2011 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC informed the first applicant that following the entry into force of Government Ordinance no. 71/2009 (see paragraph 39 below), only parts of the judgments of 12 May and 24 November 2009 (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above) had been enforced and that the remaining amounts would be paid in two instalments. The first applicant informed the Court on 27 April 2012 that because of the above-mentioned government ordinance, the judgments of 6 and 15 December 2011 (see paragraphs 21 and 29 above) had also remained unenforced. Subsequently, she acknowledged on 31 July 2013 that the authorities had enforced all the judgments. 32.  On 4 January and 9 February 2017 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC informed the Government that the amount corresponding to the first applicant\u2019s unspent annual leave for the period 2008-2010 had been paid to her in full in five instalments between January 2013 and June 2016. In addition, prior to her retirement, she had never asked the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi DGASPC for financial support for her foster children\u2019s possible extracurricular activities, or to be relieved of her duties during her annual leave. 33.  On an unspecified date in 2015 the Ia\u0219i Court of Appeal asked the bench of judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe Court of Cassation\u201d) in charge of delivering advisory opinions to clarify the divergent practice of the courts of appeal which had existed both before and after 3 October 2013 as regards the question of whether foster parents who continued to work voluntarily during their annual leave were entitled to financial compensation corresponding to their unspent annual leave. 34.  On 17 October 2016 the Court of Cassation dismissed the above\u2011mentioned proceedings as inadmissible. It held that the impugned question was not a novel legal issue. The courts had examined it repeatedly between 2008 and 2016, and the judgments suggested that a divergent practice existed in this regard. However, that divergent practice could be solved by way of an \u201cappeal in the interests of the law\u201d. 35.  On 14 February 2017 the Ia\u0219i Court of Appeal lodged an \u201cappeal in the interests of the law\u201d with the Court of Cassation in respect of the above\u2011mentioned legal matter (see paragraphs 33-34 above). It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (4 October 2017) those proceedings are still ongoing.", "references": ["7", "6", "4", "9", "5", "2", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant company has its registered office in Istanbul. 7.  Its case before the Court concerns its unsuccessful efforts to have its claims against the Black Sea Shipping Company (\u201cBlasco\u201d), a Ukrainian State-owned company which is subject to bankruptcy proceedings, recognised and satisfied. 8.  Blasco is the successor of a Soviet State-owned company which until the late 1980s was one the largest shipping companies in the world and operated hundreds of commercial vessels. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s Blasco encountered serious legal and economic difficulties, which resulted in the loss of a large proportion of its assets. 9.  From October 1996 to April 1997 Blasco, as shipowners, and Columbus \u2212 a Liberian company \u2212 as charterers, signed time charters for four of Blasco\u2019s ships. In August 1997 the applicant company also entered into a bareboat charter agreement with Blasco for one of its ships. 10.  On 13 November 1997 Columbus assigned all of its claims against Blasco, without specifying their origin or amount, to the applicant company. Blasco was informed of the assignment. 11.  On 2 December 1997 and 22 October 1998 the applicant company and Blasco signed agreements under which Blasco acknowledged owing certain debts to the applicant company related to services provided to Blasco\u2019s vessels amounting to 3,466,754.93 United States dollars (USD). Of that amount, USD 33,557.29 related to a ship not covered by the above\u2011mentioned charter agreements and USD 257,531.36 was identified as expenses relating to the settlement of unspecified claims and agency costs. The remainder of the claims had apparently arisen in the context of the legal relationship created under the charterparties. 12.  On 20 June 2001 the parties signed another agreement, reducing the overall debt to USD 2,021,370.13, apparently to take into account the fact that one of the ships to which the debt related had in the meantime been transferred to the applicant company in partial settlement. 13.  On 25 December 1998 bankruptcy proceedings were initiated in respect of Blasco. They were suspended on 2 July 1999. It appears that they were then reinitiated and discontinued at some point in 2001. 14.  On 11 July 2003 a certain Mr P., Blasco\u2019s creditor, initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Blasco in the Odessa Regional Commercial Court (\u201cthe Commercial Court\u201d). The notice announcing the initiation of proceedings was published, as required by law, in September 2003. 15.  On 29 September 2003 the applicant company lodged an application with the Commercial Court seeking recognition of the debt owed to it by Blasco in the amount stipulated in the agreement of 20 June 2001 (see paragraph 12 above). 16.  On 18 November 2004 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s claim without considering it on the merits. It held that it was unsubstantiated and considered that the agreements provided by the applicant company were insufficient proof that it had valid claims. In order to show the latter, the applicant company would need to provide the original documents showing the basis on which the debts had arisen. 17.  On 14 March 2005, in an appeal, the applicant company explained that the debt had arisen on the basis of charterparties between it and Blasco in respect of a number of ships. Although under the terms of the charterparties certain costs had to be borne by Blasco as the ship owner, the latter had asked the applicant company to bear those costs and those sums had accordingly become Blasco\u2019s debt. 18.  On 15 March 2005 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the commercial court\u2019s ruling, holding that \u2212 since the claim had been lodged within thirty days of publication of the bankruptcy proceedings notice \u2212 it could not be rejected without an examination of the merits but rather had to be examined on the merits and either allowed or dismissed. The case was remitted to the commercial court. 19.  On 7 February 2006 the applicant company made written submissions to the Commercial Court explaining the origin of the debt. It explained, in particular, that the claim had its basis in services provided to a number of vessels. 20.  On 24 February 2006 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s claims as insufficiently substantiated. It held, in particular, that the actual charterparties on which the claims were supposedly based had not been submitted to the court. 21.  On the same day the court ordered the initiation of a financial rehabilitation procedure in respect of Blasco under a court-appointed receiver. Such procedures are governed by the Bankruptcy Act and are aimed at restoring a debtor\u2019s solvency. 22.  The applicant company appealed against the rejection of its claim. 23.  On 12 August 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the commercial court\u2019s ruling of 24 February 2006 concerning the applicant company\u2019s claims. 24.  On 10 September 2008 the applicant company appealed to the High Commercial Court (\u201cthe HCC\u201d). Among other arguments the applicant company further submitted that the courts dealing with its case lacked impartiality. In that connection it referred to a number of letters from the president of the Commercial Court to various executive authorities:\n(i)  A letter to the Ministry of the Economy of 19 January 2006 in which the court president asked the Ministry \u2212 which at the time was the body responsible for licensing bankruptcy receivers \u2212 for candidates to act as the receiver in the proceedings concerning Blasco. In that letter the court president referred to the instruction of the President to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prosecutor General and the central bank concerning the audit of the debtor company;\n(ii)  A letter to the Prime Minister of 26 April 2005 in which the court president stated that in the period prior to 2001, when the bankruptcy proceedings were suspended, a major part of the debtor\u2019s assets had been transferred to the Ministry of Transport and certain State-owned and other companies. He complained that in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings the Ministry of Transport and Blasco\u2019s management had failed to provide sufficient information about the debtor\u2019s assets and obligations and that Blasco had been transferring assets to third parties outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. The court president went on to inform the Prime Minister that he had informed the law-enforcement authorities that there were indications that Blasco\u2019s management was engaging in criminal activity, and in particular artificially driving the company into bankruptcy. Blasco\u2019s management and their superiors at the Ministry of Transport were not interested in restoring the debtor\u2019s solvency. The court president accordingly asked the Prime Minister for her intervention in order to compel those officials to comply with the law;\n(iii)  A letter to the President of Ukraine of the same date and with similar content;\n(iv)  A letter to the President of Ukraine of 3 March 2006. In that letter the court president pointed out that the President\u2019s earlier instruction to the Cabinet of Ministers concerning the need to take steps to improve the Blasco situation had not been complied with and that the court had been unable to obtain information from the authorities about the debtor\u2019s assets for more than seven years. In view of those facts the court president invited the President to create a \u201cNational Council for the Restoration of Ukraine\u2019s Status as a Seafaring Nation\u201d, which would be tasked with making proposals as to how to return vessels transferred by Blasco to foreign entities or to receive compensation for them. The President\u2019s personal focus on this issue would permit the Ukrainian nation and State to restore their leading role as a seafaring nation among other countries of the world. 25.  For the applicant company, the statements in the above letters were evidence of the fact that the Commercial Court had failed to play an active role in protecting the creditors\u2019 interests. The court was addressing the executive authorities as if it were their subordinate, merely reporting to them instead of exercising the function of a body with effective power over the process. The applicant company also pointed out that the decision of 24 February 2006 to initiate a rehabilitation procedure in respect of Blasco (see paragraph 21 above) referred to the instruction of the President of Ukraine in a way that suggested that it was a document that constituted guidance to be followed by the court. 26.  On the same day, 23 December 2008, the applicant company also lodged a separate application with the HCC asking it to discontinue the bankruptcy proceedings as they were unfair to the creditors and represented an inadequate tool for protecting their interests and, instead, to recognise the State\u2019s direct responsibility for Blasco\u2019s debts. The applicant company cited examples of transfers of the debtor\u2019s assets prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings and the letters from the commercial court\u2019s president indicating that similar activities could be continuing. The applicant company accordingly submitted that the State must bear full liability for the entire debt owed by Blasco to the creditors. 27.  On 21 January 2009 the HCC allowed the applicant company\u2019s appeal in part, quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 12 August 2008, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the latter had essentially required the applicant company to comply with the requirements of domestic Ukrainian law concerning record-keeping and submit documentary proof to prove its claims, whereas it should have determined the applicable law and evaluated the claims in that light. 28.  The applicant company lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, asking it to quash the HCC\u2019s ruling, terminate the proceedings and hold the State fully liable for Blasco\u2019s debts. 29.  On 2 April 2009 a panel of judges of the Supreme Court refused the applicant company leave to appeal to the full Commercial Chamber of that court. 30.  On 27 October 2009 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant company\u2019s application and recognised its claims against Blasco. However, at the same time it refused to include them in the register of creditors\u2019 claims, holding that the latter had to be done in separate proceedings. The Ministry of Transport appealed, but on 10 November 2010 its appeal was dismissed by the HCC. The ruling of 27 October 2009 then became final. 31.  On 27 November 2009 the applicant company applied to have its claims included in the register of creditors\u2019 claims. Following an initial rejection and appeals against that decision, on 11 January 2012 the Commercial Court included the claims in the register. On 8 August 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the receiver and upheld that ruling. 32.  On 22 February 2013 the applicant company requested the withdrawal of Judge B., who was presiding over the bankruptcy proceedings at the time, and all the judges of the Commercial Court. It referred to the correspondence of the court president with the various executive authorities (see paragraph 24 above). In addition, the applicant company stated that the Commercial Court was operating in a building in Odessa that had previously belonged to Blasco. It referred to a newspaper article published in 2001. The article reported Blasco\u2019s then CEO saying, at a press conference, that the company was transferring that building to the court in order to secure the court\u2019s cooperation in accelerating the examination of the company\u2019s cases (see paragraph 42 below). For the applicant company, those circumstances raised doubts as to the Commercial Court\u2019s impartiality. 33.  On the same day Judge B. dismissed that request on the grounds that she had only taken over the case in July 2011 and so was not affected by the circumstances referred to by the applicant company, which dated back to 2006 and earlier. Moreover, the judge held that under domestic law it was not possible to request the withdrawal of all the judges of a court, only the judge sitting in the case. 34.  On 29 March 2013 the Court of Appeal\u2019s registry received Blasco\u2019s application requesting the court to set aside its ruling of 27 October 2009 to recognise the applicant company\u2019s claims (see paragraph 30 above) in the light of \u201cnewly discovered circumstances\u201d. In particular, according to Blasco, the documents sent to Blasco by the prosecutor\u2019s office on 18 October 2012 showed that the claims presented by the applicant company were unfounded. 35.  On 15 May 2013 the applicant company requested the withdrawal of the panel of the Court of Appeal considering Blasco\u2019s application for reopening. It mainly focussed on the allegation that the debtor had missed the three-year time-limit for lodging the application (see paragraph 49 below) and that, by examining such a belated request, the court was discriminating against it and favouring a State debtor over a foreign company. 36.  On 30 May 2013 the Court of Appeal quashed its own decision of 27 October 2009 in the light of the \u201cnewly discovered circumstances\u201d. The court stated that the application had been lodged by Blasco within the statutory three-year time\u2011limit. On the substance, it found that the applicant company\u2019s claims had been based only on agreements signed by Blasco\u2019s managers between 1997 and 2001 acknowledging certain debts. However, the documents discovered by the prosecutor\u2019s office in 2012 showed that there was no basis in fact for the alleged underlying debt: the applicant company had acquired its claims from Columbus. Columbus\u2019s claims, in turn, had been based on charterparties for Blasco\u2019s vessels (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The Court of Appeal found that charterers had presented unsubstantiated bills to Blasco for vessel operating costs which were the charterers\u2019 responsibility to bear. The court concluded that the applicant company\u2019s claims could not be recognised in the bankruptcy proceedings. 37.  On 17 June 2013 the applicant company appealed. It argued, in particular, that it had acquired only Columbus\u2019s claims against Blasco and not its obligations vis\u2011\u00e0-vis Blasco. Moreover, the charterparties to which the Court of Appeal referred had been governed by English law and subject to London arbitration. However, the Court of Appeal had failed to establish that Blasco did in fact have valid claims against Columbus under those contracts and, if so, whether it had attempted to settle them through arbitration. Moreover, the circumstances on which the Court of Appeal had based its decision were not really \u201cnewly established\u201d as the courts had been aware of them since at least 24 February 2006 (see paragraph 20 above). 38.  On 8 October 2013 the HCC dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of 30 May 2013. The applicant company was served with the earlier decision on 12 November 2013. 39.  On 31 December 2013 the applicant company lodged an application for a review of the HCC ruling by the Supreme Court (see the relevant provisions of domestic law in paragraph 47 below). It argued that: (i) the lower courts\u2019 assessment that there were \u201cnewly established\u201d circumstances in the case justifying reopening had been erroneous, in particular because Blasco had failed to prove that it had been unaware of the circumstances it had cited as \u201cnewly established\u201d; (ii) the courts had erred in their assessment of the evidence in finding that Blasco had not missed the three-year time-limit to request reopening; (iii) the courts\u2019 conclusions concerning the nature and origin of its claims against Blasco had been erroneous as they had not been supported by the evidence in the file; (iv) the HCC had applied the general provisions of the Code of Commercial Procedure concerning evidence and the requirement that judicial decisions be lawful in a divergent manner; (v) the applicant company had been discriminated against in breach of international treaties. 40.  On 11 February 2014 an HCC panel declared the applicant company\u2019s application for Supreme Court\u2019s review inadmissible. It held that the HCC\u2019s ruling concerned the question of whether it was appropriate to reopen proceedings in light of the newly established circumstances, which was a matter of procedural rather than substantive law. There were, therefore, no grounds to examine the petition by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 47 below for the relevant provisions of the domestic law). 41.  According to the applicant company, it only became aware of the ruling of 11 February 2014 on 15 July 2014. 42.  In May 2005 the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal moved into an office building at 29 Shevchenko Boulevard in Odessa. According to the applicant company, that building used to belong to Blasco and remained on Blasco\u2019s balance sheet. According to a clipping from an Odessa newspaper submitted by the application company, at a press conference in 2001 Blasco\u2019s then CEO stated that, while the bankruptcy proceedings were pending against Blasco, the Commercial Court was looking for new premises. Accordingly, Blasco transferred that building to the court in order to secure the court\u2019s cooperation in accelerating the examination of the company\u2019s cases.", "references": ["5", "1", "0", "4", "8", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Tbilisi. 7.  The applicant was a member and one of the leaders of a group which called itself the National Religious Movement, which was founded in Tbilisi on 11 May 2011. On 26 May 2011 a police officer drew up a report, which stated that he possessed information that twenty-four individuals, including the applicant, were plotting a violent overthrow of the Government of Georgia. According to the report, all the alleged plotters were located at the Kintsvisi Monastery, in the Kareli region. 8.  On 30 May 2011 a press release was posted on the website of the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe MoI\u201d), which said that an armed group of twenty-four people had been detained in Kintsvisi on 26 May 2011. 9.  According to the official record of the detention and search of the applicant, which he duly signed, the applicant was placed under arrest at 6.12 a.m. on 27 May 2011 at Tbilisi police headquarters on suspicion of committing an offence under Article 315 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (conspiracy or insurrection intended to change the constitutional order of Georgia by violent means). The report, which stated that he had been arrested after being questioned as a witness, also noted that he had bruises in the tailbone area, buttocks and left thigh, and haemorrhages on his left eye, right cheek and his nose. 10.  At 12.30 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to a pre-trial detention centre, where he underwent a visual examination on admission. The report drawn up thereafter confirmed that he had a swollen blue left eye, haemorrhages on his nose, and bruises in the tailbone area. 11.  By a decision of 28 May 2011 a judge, acting at the request of the prosecution, remanded the applicant in custody for fifty-five days. At the detention hearing, the applicant challenged the official report of his arrest and stated that he had been apprehended on 26 May in Kintsvisi, rather than on 27 May 2011 in Tbilisi. His submission disagreeing with the official record of his arrest was, however, dismissed. Relying in particular on the official record of the arrest, duly signed by the applicant, the Tbilisi City Court judge concluded that his allegations of unlawful detention were unsubstantiated. 12.  The applicant appealed against his pre-trial detention, maintaining his version of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. In particular, he stated that after having been apprehended in the Kintsvisi Monastery at around 11.30 a.m. on 26 May 2011, he had been transferred to Kareli police station where he had been beaten. He had then been transferred to Tbilisi police headquarters, where after having been physically assaulted again, he had been questioned for about six hours. The applicant maintained that the actual time of his arrest was different from the time of the arrest indicated in the official record. In such circumstances, the time-limit of 48 hours referred to in Article 196 of the CCP (see paragraph 36 below) had been exceeded, rendering his detention unlawful. On 6 June 2011 the applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal as inadmissible. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 June 2011. 13.  On 1 June 2011 the defence counsel of the applicant requested, at their own expense, a forensic medical examination of the applicant. On 22 July 2011 the applicant was examined by five medical specialists who concluded that from neurological and traumatological point of view the applicant\u2019s condition was not serious. They noted that the bruises and cuts he had allegedly had on 27 May 2011 according to the report on his visual examination, were not visible. 14.  On 15 July 2011, the applicant was additionally charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms, an offence under Article 236 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. 15.  On 21 July 2011 the applicant\u2019s trial started. The applicant reiterated his allegation that he had been detained on 26 May in Kintsvisi and not on 27 May in Tbilisi. He also complained of the physical and psychological abuse to which he had been subjected in Kintsvisi, then in the Kareli police station and finally at Tbilisi police headquarters. In particular, he alleged that he had been punched in the face by one of the officers of the Special Forces in Kintsvisi and then severely beaten by the same officer and several others in the Kareli police station. In Tbilisi he had been subjected to further abuse and psyshological pressure with the prupose of extracting a confession from him. 16.  On 12 August 2011 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The judge relying on the official record of the detention and search of the applicant dismissed his submission that he had been arrested in Kintsvisi rather than Tbilisi. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations. 17.  The applicant appealed. His conviction was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 22 November 2011. By a decision of 12 March 2012 the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law as inadmissible. 18.  The applicant was released from prison on 13 January 2013 under the Amnesty Act of 28 December 2012. 19.  On 28 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi no. 8 Prison. On admission he underwent a visual examination which confirmed bruises and haemorrhages on his body and face (see paragraphs 9-10 above). On 1 June 2011 the prison administration sent a copy of the above report together with the applicant\u2019s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment to the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Georgia and requested the initiation of proceedings. 20.  On 4 June 2011 an investigation was begun under Article 333 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code into the offence of exceeding official authority. The applicant repeatedly asked to be questioned in that regard, but his requests were ignored by the authorities. On 29 August 2011 he sent a letter to the prosecutor\u2019s office complaining of their inactivity. While maintaining his allegations, he requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against those who had committed unlawful acts against him. In support of his allegations he submitted a photo, allegedly taken during his initial questioning, showing injuries on his face. 21.  On 2 September 2011 the applicant was questioned by an investigator at Tbilisi no. 8 Prison. He reiterated his version of events concerning his arrest and subsequent ill\u2011treatment. He claimed that he had been punched in the face by one of the officers of the Special Forces in Kintsvisi. Then, he had been beaten by several officers in the Kareli police department. One of them, according to the applicant, had been wearing a mask. In Tbilisi two police officers had further subjected him to physical and psychological abuse. 22.  The applicant subsequently filed several complaints criticising the lack of progress in the investigation and particularly the fact that his detailed statement had not given rise to a number of further procedural measures. In response to one of his complaints, by a letter of 11 December 2011, he was told that he was not a party to the criminal proceedings in question and hence had no right to lodge any applications or to request that certain investigative steps be taken. 23.  During 2012 the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, acting at the request of the applicant, sent three requests for information to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia concerning the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. All three letters remained unanswered. 24.  On 18 December 2012 the applicant was questioned again. He confirmed his account of events as given in his statement of 2 September 2011, describing in a more detailed manner his arrest operation and the alleged ill-treatment that followed. He claimed that his beating at the Kareli police department had lasted for about an hour and that among others he had been severely beaten on his coccyx with a rubber truncheon. The applicant also provided a physical description of the officers allegedly implicated in his ill-treatment and claimed that he could identify at least two of them. As to the abuse he allegedly suffered at Tbilisi police headquarters, he claimed that he could identify both of the men involved, as they had body type of a wrestler. They also had, as the applicant could remember, damaged ears, an identifiable feature of wrestlers. 25.  On 7 February 2013 the applicant filed a complaint with the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia, criticising the lack of progress in the investigation. That complaint was followed by others to the Minister of Justice, the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the investigator in charge of the case. 26.  On 25 February 2013 the applicant was questioned once again. This time along with providing details of his alleged ill-treatment, the applicant gave the investigator several photographs and a video footage depicting one of the officers of the Special Forces allegedly involved in his ill-treatment. 27.  In the meantime, between January and April 2013 the investigator in charge questioned various officials from the MoI, among them police officers of the Kareli police station. They all denied having seen either the applicant or any of the other detainees being ill-treated. The investigator also interviewed the staff of the local emergency service. They confirmed that on 26 May 2011 an ambulance had been called for one of the detainees at the Kareli police station. While examining him they had observed multiple haemorrhages on his back. They had also seen twenty to twenty\u2011five other detainees at the police station, although they had not witnessed any fact of violence themselves. Within the same period of time, the investigation also questioned the twenty-three co-defendants of the applicant. They all claimed that they had been ill-treated on the day of the arrest by members of the Special Forces. 28.  According to the case file, on 3 May 2016 the investigation into the offence of exceeding official authority by the police was transferred from the Shida Kartli Prosecutor\u2019s Office to the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Georgia. On 13 June 2016 the investigator in charge obtained a medical record from Tbilisi no. 8 Prison, according to which the following injuries were observed on the applicant on 28 May 2011: small bruises on his nose and left eye, large haemorrhages in the area of his buttocks, left thigh and the tailbone. According to the record, the applicant claimed to have sustained those injuries prior to his arrest. 29.  In June 2017 the investigator questioned two former high officials of the Kareli police. He also obtained video recordings that were apparently available online in connection with the Kintsvisi operation. 30.  On 19 July 2017 the offence under the investigation was reclassified into an offence of exceeding power by using violence, an offence under Article 333 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Criminal Code. The responsible prosecutor concluded that there was sufficient medical evidence to show that the applicant and other detainees had sustained various injuries on 26 May 2011. In support of his conclusion he also referred to the statements of the twenty-three co-defendants of the applicant, who had all confirmed the fact of their enduring physical and psychological abuse on the day of the arrest. Most of them, according to the prosecutor, had not voiced their ill-treatment allegations at the initial stage of the investigation out of fear of further abuse and also in exchange for plea bargain that the prosecution had concluded with them. 31.  In May 2018 twelve co-defendants of the applicant were questioned again. They provided detailed description of their individual experience of the ill-treatment focusing in addition on the physical description of the officers involved. They claimed that the officers of the Special Forces spoke Megrelian (a Kartvelian language spoken in certain regions of western Georgia). 32.  On 25 July 2018 the applicant sent yet another letter to the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office complaining of the lack of progress in the investigation. He criticised the fact that despite having consistently maintained that he could identify the officers who had ill-treated him, no arrangements had been made for an identification procedure to be undertaken for over seven years. He also requested that the two investigators who had drawn up the record on his arrest and personal search and who had participated in questioning him on 26 and 27 May 2011 be interviewed, and that further interviews take place with several other officials who had been involved in his arrest. While requesting that a number of other specific investigative measures be undertaken, the applicant again asked the prosecution authorities to grant him victim status and also to reclassify the offence under the investigation from abuse of power (an offence under Article 333 of the Criminal Code) to torture (an offence under Article 144 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The applicant\u2019s letter has apparently gone unanswered. 33.  In July-September 2018 some additional investigative acts were undertaken, including the questioning of the medical staff of the Ministry of the Interior and Tbilisi no. 8 Prison, and of clerics from the Kintsvisi Monastery. The latter while confirming having seen the applicant and his entourage assaulted when arrested, also provided information about the appearance of those involved in the arrest operation. They also claimed hearing the officers speak Megrelian. 34.  According to the case-file the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["9", "5", "7", "3", "4", "0", "8", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants purchased licences for gambling operations for the periods indicated in the Appendix. They (except the third applicant; see paragraphs 43-47 below) operated gambling businesses. The licences were prepaid for the entire period for which they were issued. The applicants each paid the amount in Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) equivalent to 150,000 euros (EUR) for the licences (see paragraph 63 below). The licences were revoked by operation of law on 25 June 2009 (see paragraph 15 below). 6.  On 23 December 2008 the Cabinet of Ministers introduced a bill in Parliament on regulation of gambling operations. The bill proposed detailed rules for comprehensive regulation of commercial gambling operations, such as a new licensing system and a number of regulatory requirements (see paragraph 78 below). The bill envisaged that the resulting law would come into force thirty days after enactment and that the entities holding gambling licences under the old system would have a year from that day to comply with the new set of requirements; their licences would remain in effect for the periods for which they were issued. On 26 December 2008 Parliament adopted the bill at its first reading. 7.  On 18 March 2009 the relevant parliamentary committee approved its amended text for the second reading. 8.  On 26 March 2009 two members of parliament introduced a bill which proposed a total prohibition on gambling, to come into force on 1 January 2010. In an explanatory note the authors stated that gambling was developing rapidly, leading to a rise in crime, and that an increasing number of children and young people were being drawn into it (see paragraph 147 below). 9.  On 7 May 2009 a fire occurred at a gambling establishment in the city of Dnipro, leaving nine people dead and eleven injured. The incident attracted considerable public attention. 10.  On the same day the Cabinet of Ministers issued an instruction (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u043f\u043e\u0440\u044f\u0434\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f) entitled \u201cMeasures to Increase the Safety of Citizens\u201d, which envisaged a number of measures in response to the disaster, including:\n(i) directing the Ministry of Finance and local executive authorities to take action to revoke the licences of the entities which had operated the establishment where the fire had taken place; and\n(ii) directing the Ministry of Finance to suspend (\u0437\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0438) all gambling licences for one month. 11.  On 8 May 2009 the Ministry of Finance issued an order by which it suspended all gambling licences until 7 June 2009 with immediate effect. 12.  On 15 May 2009 Parliament passed into law the bill introduced on 26 March 2009 (see paragraph 8 above) prohibiting all gambling operations in Ukraine (hereinafter \u201cthe Prohibition Law\u201d), with some limited exceptions \u2013 notably in respect of lotteries. The law did not contain any provisions regarding compensation for licence holders (see paragraphs 66 and 67 below). 13.  The President vetoed the Prohibition Law. He pointed out, in particular, that:\n(i) the Licensing Law did not provide for such grounds for the revocation of licences as the banning of a particular activity;\n(ii) the proposed law was contrary to the constitutional provisions protecting property (see paragraph 58 below);\n(iii) the proposed law was silent regarding the matter of expenses already committed by businesses for the acquisition of licences and for rent; and\n(iv) businesses would sue the State for the funds they had paid for licences and permits and for any other damage they would incur if the bill became law. 14.  On 11 June 2009 Parliament overrode the veto. 15.  On 25 June 2009 the law entered into force and as of that date the applicants\u2019 licences were deemed to have been revoked by operation of law. 16.  The applicants lodged claims for compensation with the domestic courts, but those claims were dismissed. 17.  Prior to the prohibition, the applicant company operated at least fifteen gambling establishments and points in Kharkiv. 18.  On 26 September 2009 the applicant company lodged a claim for damages against the Ministry of Finance and the State Treasury Administration.\nIt claimed 11,461,690 Ukrainian hryvnias ((UAH \u2013 about 905,426 euros (EUR) at the time) in damages, representing: part of the licence fees corresponding to the period from the Prohibition Law\u2019s entry into force to the date on which the applicant company\u2019s licence was supposed to expire (25 April 2011); and various losses it had suffered in respect of the purchase of gambling-related equipment and special tax-control software, the refurbishment of gambling premises and lost profit. Subsequently, it increased those claims to the equivalent of EUR 3,219,900.\nIt relied on various provisions of domestic law. Its first argument was that, by selling a licence for five years priced \u201cper year\u201d, the State had given it a guarantee that it would be able to engage in the licensed activity for the duration of the licence, provided that it complied with the licence terms. The Licensing Law, which was a lex specialis, did not provide for the collective revocation of licences, which was only possible on a case-by-case basis on the grounds provided in that law.\nThe applicant company also relied on the following provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 68-71 below):\n(i)  Article 1166 concerning the general obligation to compensate for tort damage;\n(ii)  Article 1170 concerning the obligation of the State to compensate for damage caused by the enactment of laws terminating property rights (hereinafter also referred to as \u201cthe Legislative Takings Clause\u201d); and\n(iii)  Article 1173 concerning the obligation of public authorities to compensate for damage caused by their unlawful decisions and actions. 19.  On 10 December 2009 the Kyiv City Commercial Court dismissed the claim. The court cited the part of Article 1166 of the Civil Code requiring intent or negligence for tort liability. Article 1173 required a finding that the acts of the authorities were unlawful. Parliament had the constitutional power to enact laws, which it had done in enacting the Prohibition Law. That law had not been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there was no indication of unlawful action on the part of the State. For the same reason, Article 1175 of the Civil Code, providing for liability in the event of damage caused by legislative documents that had been declared unlawful (see paragraph 72 below), was equally inapplicable. Neither the Prohibition Law nor the budget provided for any compensation. There was thus no basis for the claim for damages. 20.  The applicant company appealed. It raised essentially the same arguments. It also argued that the first-instance court had failed to apply the Legislative Takings Clause, which was the applicable provision in the case since the Prohibition Law had terminated the applicant company\u2019s property rights in respect of the licence, cash registers and gambling equipment. That provision of the Civil Code required compensation specifically for lawful action, in this case the enactment of the Prohibition Law. This also followed from the provision of the Constitution requiring full compensation for the taking of private property (see paragraph 58 below).\nIn addition, the applicant company cited Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and stated that the notions of \u201cpossessions\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d used in that provision were autonomous and broad. In that context the applicant company stated that in Tre Trakt\u00f6rer AB v. Sweden (7 July 1989, \u00a7 53, Series A no. 159) the Court had recognised that a licence to sell alcoholic beverages constituted a \u201cpossession\u201d for those purposes. The applicant company referred to the domestic provisions incorporating the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law (see paragraphs 74-76 below) and submitted that the first-instance court had failed to comply with its obligation to apply Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the Court\u2019s case-law.\nIn the concluding part of its appeal the applicant company stated that Article 41 of the Convention provided for payment of just satisfaction. 21.  On 6 April 2010 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. It cited the Civil Code provisions concerning tort liability in general and tort liability for unlawful action by public authorities (see paragraphs 37 below and 68-71 below) and endorsed the first-instance court\u2019s reasoning. It did not comment on the applicant company\u2019s arguments concerning the Legislative Takings Clause, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or the Court\u2019s case-law. 22.  The applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It argued that the lower courts\u2019 finding that there was only an obligation to compensate for unlawful acts was wrong and that the Legislative Takings Clause provided for compensation in the event of the lawful termination of property rights. It repeated the other arguments it had raised in the first appeal. 23.  On 22 September 2010 the High Commercial Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. It stated that the Prohibition Law did not provide for the termination of property rights within the meaning of the Legislative Takings Clause, or for payment of any compensation to licence holders. The law in question had not been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the lower courts had correctly found that the applicant company had failed to show that there had been either any unlawful conduct on the part of the defendants or a causal connection between the defendants\u2019 actions and its losses, both of which were required elements in a claim for damages. 24.  The applicant lodged several claims with the domestic courts. They are set out below in the order in which they were completed domestically and the applicant submitted her corresponding application forms with the Court.\n(a)  First set of proceedings: reimbursement of licence fees 25.  In the first set of proceedings (application form submitted on 25 September 2012) the applicant claimed UAH 360,349.59 (about EUR 30,160 at the time) from the State Treasury Administration and the Ministry of Finance, corresponding to the licence fees for the unused part of her licence, in respect of the period from the Prohibition Law\u2019s entry into force to the date on which her licence was supposed to expire (16 May 2011).\nShe relied on various provisions of domestic law, most notably the Legislative Takings Clause (see paragraph 70 below). In that context she pointed out that, in accordance with the Court\u2019s judgment in Tre Trakt\u00f6rer AB (cited above), licences constituted \u201cpossessions\u201d for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She relied on the provisions of domestic law incorporating the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law and the primacy of the former (see paragraphs 74 and 76 below) and argued that the Prohibition Law, by revoking her licence, had terminated her property rights within the meaning of the Legislative Takings Clause. 26.  On 15 December 2011 the Kyiv Commercial Court rejected her claim on the grounds that the Prohibition Law did not provide for the reimbursement of the licence fees paid for licences revoked by operation of that law. 27.  The applicant appealed, relying in particular on the same provisions of the Civil Code, the Convention, the Court\u2019s case-law and the incorporating provisions of domestic law. She also pointed to the provisions of the Code of Commercial Procedure prohibiting the courts from refusing to give judgment in the absence of legislation governing an issue (see paragraph 76 below). 28.  On 1 February 2012 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. It cited domestic provisions concerning the obligations of the public authorities to compensate for damage caused by their unlawful conduct (see, in particular, paragraph 71 below), and stated that Parliament\u2019s constitutional role was to enact laws, that it had acted within those powers in adopting the Prohibition Law and that that law did not provide for the payment of any compensation to former licence holders. 29.  The applicant, reiterating essentially the same arguments, lodged an appeal on points of law with the High Commercial Court. 30.  On 21 May 2012 the High Commercial Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions, holding that there was no indication of an error of law in them.\n(b)  Second set of proceedings: challenge against the Cabinet of Ministers\u2019 instruction to suspend all gambling licences 31.  In the second set of proceedings (application form submitted on 4 November 2013), the applicant sought to have the acts of the Cabinet of Ministers and of the Ministry of Finance regarding the one-month suspension of her licence declared unlawful and quashed (see paragraph 11 above). She argued that no law conferred power on the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance to suspend a licence. The Licensing Law itself only provided for the revocation of licences in certain cases but not for the \u201csuspension\u201d of licences (see paragraph 64 above). 32.  The Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court returned the applicant\u2019s claim in so far as it was directed against the Ministry, holding that the administrative courts at the place of her registration as a businessperson were competent. This resulted in the third set of proceedings instituted by her (see paragraph 37 below). It proceeded to examine the remainder of the claim against the Cabinet of Ministers. Similar claims lodged by three other companies were joined to the proceedings. 33.  On 27 September 2011 the first-instance court agreed with the applicant\u2019s arguments, allowed the claim and declared unlawful the relevant part of the Cabinet of Ministers\u2019 instruction (see paragraph 10 above). 34.  On 31 May 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal allowed appeals by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance and quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. It referred to the constitutional rules defining the Cabinet of Ministers as the highest executive authority having the power to issue instructions to ministries (see paragraphs 60 and 62 below). The Ministry of Finance was required to follow the Cabinet\u2019s instructions. Accordingly, the Cabinet of Ministers had had the power to issue the instruction in question. 35.  One of the other claimant companies lodged an appeal on points of law, which the applicant joined. The appeal presented essentially the same arguments as in the applicant\u2019s claim (see paragraph 31 above). 36.  On 28 May 2013 the High Administrative Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision, having largely repeated its reasoning.\n(c)  Third set of proceedings: challenge against the Ministry of Finance order suspending all gambling licences 37.  In the third set of proceedings (application form submitted on 19 July 2016) the applicant submitted a separate claim seeking to have the order of the Ministry of Finance which had suspended her licence declared unlawful and quashed. Her main argument was that the Ministry had acted ultra vires (see paragraph 31 above). The applicant also stated that, in addition to breaching domestic law, the order had also breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which she quoted. She referred to the the Court\u2019s judgment in Tre Trakt\u00f6rer to the effect that a licence constituted a \u201cpossession\u201d. The applicant also invoked Article 17 of the Convention. 38.  On 2 July 2013 the Zakarpattya Circuit Administrative Court rejected her claim, holding that, because the Cabinet of Ministers had powers to give instructions to ministries (see paragraph 62 below) and the ministries had the power to issue their own orders, the Ministry, in issuing the impugned order which complied with the Cabinet of Ministers\u2019 instructions, had acted within its powers. 39.  The applicant appealed. She reiterated the same arguments, insisting that the order was contrary to higher-level norms than the Cabinet of Ministers\u2019 instruction, namely the Licensing Law and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 40.  On 2 December 2015 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, essentially repeating its reasoning. 41.  On 20 January 2016 a judge of the High Administrative Court denied the applicant\u2019s company leave to appeal on points of law, stating that there was no appearance of any error of law in the lower courts\u2019 decisions. 42.  The third applicant, a single-shareholder company, was established in September 2008. 43.  On 10 November 2008 the applicant company paid the full price for a five-year licence to the State Treasury and on 14 November 2008 it obtained its licence, valid from 28 October 2008 to 27 October 2013. 44.  According to the applicant company, it invested in preparation for the opening of a gambling business, acquired permits, cash registers and gambling equipment, rented premises and recruited staff, but never launched the business because of the prohibition of gambling. 45.  In July 2009 the applicant company asked the Ministry of Finance for a refund of the licence fees but was told that no refund was forthcoming. 46.  In November 2010 the applicant company asked an authority responsible for licensing for a certificate, which it intended to submit to the State Treasury Department to obtain reimbursement of the funds paid for the licence, under the procedure established for the reimbursement of erroneous and excess payments to the Treasury (see paragraph 77 below). 47.  Having received no response, the applicant company lodged a claim against the licensing authority, the State Treasury Administration and the Ministry of Finance, seeking reimbursement of the amount it had paid for the licence. It relied on the provisions concerning reimbursement of erroneous or excess payments to the Treasury and the provisions of the Code of Administrative Justice that required the courts to give judgment even in the absence of relevant legislation (see paragraphs 76 and 77 below). 48.  On 4 May 2011 the Lviv Circuit Administrative Court allowed the applicant company\u2019s claim in part and ordered the State Treasury to return UAH 963,030.15 (about EUR 80,600 at the time), corresponding to the part of the licence fees for the period from the Prohibition Law\u2019s entry into force to the date on which the applicant company\u2019s licence was supposed to expire (27 October 2013).\nThe court stated, in particular, that the defendants\u2019 main argument was that there was no established mechanism for the reimbursement of funds paid for revoked gambling licences. However, the court rejected that argument, relying on the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice that required the courts to give judgment even in the absence of relevant legislation (see paragraphs 76 below). The key consideration for the court was that, under the Licensing Law, a licence was a document which granted the right to operate a particular business for a certain period of time. The applicant company had paid and obtained the licence for the totality of that period. Given that it was prevented from actually using the licence, a portion of the fees had to be reimbursed. 49.  The defendants appealed. Copies of their appeals have not been provided to the Court. 50.  The applicant company responded. In addition to its other arguments, it relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court\u2019s judgment in Tre Trakt\u00f6rer AB (cited above) and the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice requiring administrative courts to apply the Court\u2019s case-law (see paragraph 76 below). It argued that, because the Prohibition Law had revoked its licence in the absence of any grounds for doing so under the Licensing Law and, indeed, in the absence of any wrongdoing on its part, the domestic law did not meet the requirement of \u201cforeseeability\u201d under the Convention. It also pointed out that the transitional provisions of the Prohibition Law required the Cabinet of Ministers to enact new regulations as required for the implementation of the Prohibition Law (see paragraph 67 below). The applicant company argued that those regulations had to include the mechanism for compensation but that the Cabinet\u2019s failure to enact them could not disadvantage the former licence holders. 51.  On 21 July 2014 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court\u2019s decision, holding that the Prohibition Law did not provide for any mechanism for reimbursement and that the procedures established for erroneous or excess payments to the Treasury were inapplicable. 52.  The applicant company appealed, arguing that the first-instance court\u2019s judgment had been correct. It reiterated its arguments. Developing its argument in respect of the alleged lack of foreseeability of the domestic law, it also quoted certain passages from Sierpi\u0144ski v. Poland (no. 38016/07, \u00a7\u00a7 72, 79 and 80, 3 November 2009) concerning uncertainty in respect of compensation as applicable to its own case. 53.  On 15 March 2016 the High Administrative Court upheld the appeal court\u2019s decision. It stated that the lower courts\u2019 conclusion that the procedures established for erroneous or excess payments were inapplicable had been correct. 54.  Article 8 of the Constitution provides that the provisions of the Constitution have direct effect and guarantees the right to apply to the courts relying directly on the Constitution. 55.  Article 9 provides that international treaties ratified by Parliament are part of domestic law. 56.  Article 13 \u00a7 4 requires the State to ensure the protection of property. 57.  Article 19 establishes the principle of legality and the principle that any action by the public authorities must be based on powers granted by the Constitution or laws passed by Parliament. 58.  Article 41 guarantees the right to property. It provides, in particular:\n\u201c...\nNo one shall be unlawfully deprived of the right of property. The right of private property is inviolable.\nThe expropriation of objects covered by the right of private property may be carried out only in exceptional cases for reasons of social necessity, on the grounds of and by the procedure established by law, and on condition of full compensation for their value in advance. The expropriation of such objects with full compensation for their value at a subsequent stage is permitted only under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency.\nConfiscation of property may take place only pursuant to a court decision, in the cases, to the extent and by the procedure established by law.\n...\u201d 59.  Article 42 provides that everyone has the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity that is not prohibited by law. 60.  Article 133 defines the Cabinet of Ministers as the highest body in the executive branch of government. 61.  Article 150 authorises the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws enacted by Parliament on applications from the President, forty-five members of parliament, the Supreme Court, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. At the relevant time, no right to apply for individual constitutional review was recognised. 62.  Section 1 of the Law provided that the Cabinet of Ministers exercised executive power directly, as well as through ministries and other executive agencies which it had the power to direct, coordinate and control. 63.  Section 15 of the Law, as worded at the material time, provided that payment for a licence had to be made at the time that the licence was issued. The fee for the issuance of a licence for gambling operations was EUR 30,000 per year, and licences were issued for a five-year term. 64.  Section 21 of the Law contained an exhaustive list of situations in which a licence could be revoked (\u0430\u043d\u0443\u043b\u044e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f), such as in the event of a repeated breach of the terms of the licence or misrepresentation in the licence application. The Law did not contain any provisions on the revocation of licences in the event of the prohibition of a previously lawful licensed activity. Neither did it provide for any temporary \u201csuspension\u201d (\u0437\u0443\u043f\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f) of licences. 65.  The Laws regulating fire and workplace safety and public-health supervision provide for the right of the relevant inspectors to conduct checks of various establishments and suspend their operations if they present a risk of fire, workplace accidents or health hazards. 66.  Section 2 of the Law on the Prohibition of Gambling in Ukraine of 15 May 2009 contains a general prohibition on gambling in Ukraine with some limited exceptions \u2013 notably in respect of lotteries. 67.  Section 4 of the Law contains transitional provisions.\nPursuant to section 4(1), the Law came into effect on the date of its official publication, which occurred on 25 June 2009; it was to remain in effect until a law was passed authorising gambling in specially designated areas (no such law has been passed to date).\nSection 4(2) provides that gambling licences issued prior to the date of the Law\u2019s entry into force are deemed to have been revoked and that no new licences will be issued.\nSection 4(4) directed the Cabinet of Ministers to take the following action, within three months:\n(i)  submit to Parliament a bill providing for gambling in specially designated areas;\n(ii)  submit to Parliament draft amendments to other laws flowing from the Prohibition Law;\n(iii)  amend its own regulations in line with the Prohibition Law and ensure that executive agencies did the same at their level; and\n(iv)  adopt new regulations as required for the implementation of the Law. 68.  Article 1166 of the Code, which sets out general grounds for tort liability, provides that a person who causes damage can be released from liability where the damage did not result from intent or negligence on his or her part. It also provides that a person can be held liable for lawful acts where the Code and other laws so provide. 69.  Subsequent Articles of the Code set out alternative grounds for possible claims for damages in tort. 70.  Article 1170 of the Code provides that, in the event of the enactment of a law which terminates property rights in respect of certain assets (\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0456 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0439\u043d\u044f\u0442\u0442\u044f \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0443, \u0449\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0438\u043d\u044f\u0454 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0456 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0432\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e), the State is to compensate the owner for the loss in its entirety. This provision is also referred to as the \u201cLegislative Takings Clause\u201d (see paragraph 18 above). 71.  Article 1173 of the Code requires the public authorities to compensate for damage caused by unlawful decisions, actions or inaction of such authorities. There is no need to show that the authority acted with intent or negligence. 72.  Article 1175 of the Code provides for compensation for the adoption of a legislative document (\u043d\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0430) if that document is subsequently declared unlawful and rescinded. There is no need to show intent or negligence. 73.  As a general rule, the statute of limitations for tort claims is three years (Article 257 of the Code). 74.  Section 17 of the Law on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 2006 provides that the courts, when deciding cases, are to apply the Convention and Protocols and the Court\u2019s case-law of as a source of law. 75.  Section 19 of the International Treaties Law of 2004 provides that international treaties are deemed part of domestic law and prevail over conflicting provisions of domestic legislation. 76.  Article 8 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice, as worded at the relevant time, provided that the courts were guided (\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0443\u0454\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f) by the principle of the rule of law and that they had to apply this principle taking into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Paragraph 3 provided that claimants could invoke the Constitution directly.\nUnder paragraph 4 of the same Article, the courts could not refuse to give judgment if there was no legislation governing matters before them or if the relevant legislation was incomplete, unclear or contradictory. A similar provision could be found in Article 4 of the 1991 Code of Commercial Procedure.\nArticle 9 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Administrative Justice provided that in the event of a contradiction between a legislative act and the Constitution, an international treaty or a legislative instrument which was higher in the hierarchy of norms and one which was lower, the court was to apply the former. Paragraph 6 provided that in the event of a conflict between a binding international treaty and a law enacted by Parliament, the court had to apply the treaty. A similar provision could be found in Article 4 of the Code of Commercial Procedure. 77.  The State Committee for Entrepreneurship, the State agency responsible for certain licensing matters at the time, established (order no. 88 of 7 May 2009) a procedure for reimbursement of funds paid erroneously or excess payments for licences and permits. Under the procedure, on a licensee\u2019s application a regional department of the Committee had to issue a reimbursement certificate, to be submitted to the State Treasury Administration. The State Treasury Administration also approved a procedure for reimbursement of taxes and payments made to the Treasury in error or in excess of what was due (\u043f\u043e\u043c\u0438\u043b\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e \u0430\u0431\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0434\u043c\u0456\u0440\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0445). 78.  The system of gambling regulation proposed by the Cabinet of Ministers in its bill no. 3535 of 23 December 2008 contained the following elements: (i) a licensing system with five-year licences, provisions for revocation and temporary suspension of licences; (ii) a requirement for gambling operators to own rather than rent all gambling equipment and to comply with certain minimum capital levels, from EUR 200,000 to EUR 1,000,000 depending on the type of operations; (iii) restriction of the locations where gambling establishments could operate, barring them from such places as schools and public transport, and minimum requirements for the size of gambling establishments (500 sq. m for casinos and 250 sq. m for others); (iv) special certification for gambling equipment and software.\nThe text proposed for the second reading tightened certain regulatory requirements, such as raising the minimum age for entry to gambling establishments from eighteen to twenty-one years and adding certain additional places, such a cultural heritage sites, to the list of places where gambling would be prohibited.", "references": ["6", "5", "8", "2", "1", "0", "7", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively. 6.  The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law. 7.  On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court (\u201cthe HAC\u201d), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts\u2019 judgments and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 8.  The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so\u2011called \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d) (see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant\u2019s case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law. 9.  On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts\u2019 decisions and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 10.  Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC\u2019s final decisions quashing the lower courts\u2019 decisions in their favour. 11.  As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts\u2019 decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding. 12.  The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, \u00a7 15, 27 June 2017).", "references": ["5", "0", "8", "1", "4", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant company, an editorial and publishing house registered in Moscow, edits and publishes a national newspaper with a circulation of 500,000, the Novaya Gazeta (\u201cthe newspaper\u201d). The second applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Moscow. 6.  At 11.30 a.m. on 12 August 2000 K-141 Kursk, a nuclear cruise missile submarine of the Russian Navy (\u201cthe Kursk\u201d), sank as a result of explosions on board while in the Barents Sea on a naval training exercise. Most of the crew died within minutes of the explosions. However, twenty\u2011three crew members (of the 118 aboard) survived the explosions and gathered in a stern compartment. They wrote a note to report the events. All of these twenty-three men died on board the Kursk before the arrival of a rescue team. It is not known for certain how long the men remained alive after the explosions. However, it was established later that they had died in a fire caused by oily sea water coming into contact with the equipment, which had triggered a chemical reaction. 7.  In case no. 29/00/0016-00 (\u201cthe investigation\u201d), the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office launched an official investigation into the accident under Article 263 \u00a7 3 of the Russian Criminal Code (a provision on \u201ca breach of safety procedures while using a means of transportation which causes the death of two or more persons by negligence\u201d). 8.  On 22 July 2002 the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the investigation for lack of evidence of a crime. The prosecutors found that there had been minor technical defects in the Kursk and certain omissions in the organisation and conduct of the naval exercise and the rescue operation. However, they found that it was impossible to establish a causal link between those defects and omissions and the sinking of the submarine and the death of the crew members. In particular, they established that the twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died as a result of fire and asphyxiation within eight hours of the explosions. In view of the rapidity of their death, any attempt to rescue them would have been futile. 9.  On 30 December 2002 B.K., counsel for the relatives of the deceased members of the Kursk crew, challenged the decision to terminate the investigation before the Chief Military Prosecutor. On 4 January 2003 his complaint was dismissed. B.K. challenged both decisions in court. 10.  On 21 April 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison confirmed the decision of 22 July 2002. On 29 June 2004 the Appeal Tribunal of the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison upheld the judgment on appeal. 11.  Between 2000 and 2005 the applicant company published in the newspaper a number of articles written by the second applicant covering the Kursk catastrophe and the investigation into it. 12.  On 11 August 2003 the newspaper published an editorial written by the second applicant. It was timed to commemorate the third anniversary of the Kursk catastrophe. The article appeared under the headline \u201cThe Kursk case must be reopened\u201d (\u00ab\u0414\u0435\u043b\u043e \u00ab\u041a\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430\u00bb \u043d\u0430\u0434\u043e \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0437\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u00bb), followed by a subtitle \u201cThose wearing military rank insignia are among those responsible for the wreck of the submarine and the death of its crew\u201d (\u00ab\u0412 \u0433\u0438\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u043b\u043e\u0434\u043a\u0438 \u0438 \u044d\u043a\u0438\u043f\u0430\u0436\u0430 \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0433\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0445\u00bb). 13.  The article criticised the authorities for their decision to discontinue the investigation. It began by congratulating the investigators on their hard and meticulous work and their discovery of many omissions by senior officers of the Navy. It further alleged that there were reasons to believe that the investigators had made the conclusion about the absence of a causal link between the naval officers\u2019 omissions and the death of the Kursk crew members under pressure. The article reproduced excerpts from the complaint lodged by B.K. against the decision to discontinue the investigation. The complaint had contested the investigators\u2019 findings and presented an alternative interpretation of the evidence collected. The article went on to suggest that the authorities should pay close attention to B.K.\u2019s arguments and reconsider their decision not to prosecute the senior naval officers. 14.  The article further described the authorities\u2019 fierce reaction to B.K.\u2019s complaint. The reaction of V.K., the chief forensic expert of the Russian Ministry of Defence, had been particularly harsh, as he had publicly accused B.K. of making a reputation for himself out of the Kursk catastrophe. The article continued as follows:\n\u201cV.K. presided over the panel of medical experts (which means that he was responsible for collating all the medical expert opinions in the case file). ...\nThe expert examination performed by V.K. ... [was] not supposed to be key evidence, BUT [IT] BECAME DECISIVE[1], as [the expert] pursued a specific aim: to prove that twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died no later than eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk.\u201d 15.  The article suggested that the expert findings made by V.K. were particularly convenient for the naval officers responsible for the belated commencement of the rescue operation. Those findings indicated that even if the rescue operation had commenced in good time, it would have been in any event impossible to rescue the men in the ninth compartment, in view of the rapidity of their death. Hence, the conclusion that there was no causal link between the omissions during the rescue operation and the death of the crew members. The article then continued:\n\u201cThis is the aim pursued by V.K. in his expert examination: to help the naval officers in charge of the rescue operation avoid criminal responsibility. V.K. uses bizarre wording: \u2018Died no later than four and a half to eight hours after the explosion[2] in the Kursk\u2019. However, in the earlier expert reports it was mentioned that the crew [had] died [several hours] after the ignition of the fire[3] in the ninth compartment, and that it was not possible to establish the time of the ignition. The case file does not contain any proof of a causal link between the explosion and the fire in the ninth compartment. ...\nThe fire in the ninth compartment ... started a considerable time after the explosion and the sinking of the Kursk. What V.K. did is called distortion of the facts (\u00ab\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432\u00bb). However, the investigators preferred not to notice this distortion, and to make official findings on the basis of V.K.\u2019s expert opinion.\u201d 16.  The article further mentioned that independent experts had found it impossible to scientifically establish the crew members\u2019 exact time of death. V.K.\u2019s findings were not scientifically based, and his military rank gave reason to believe that he was biased. 17.  V.K. brought defamation claims against the applicants before the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). He sought a retraction of the following four statements that, in his view, had tarnished his honour, dignity and business reputation:\n[1]  \u201c[The expert] pursued a specific aim: to prove that twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died no later than eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk.\u201d\n[2]  \u201cThis is the aim pursued by V.K. in his expert examination: to help the naval officers in charge of the rescue operation avoid criminal responsibility.\u201d\n[3]  \u201cV.K. uses bizarre wording: \u2018Died no later than four and a half to eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk\u2019.\u201d\n[4]  \u201cWhat V.K. did is called distortion of the facts.\u201d 18.  V.K. also sought compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage and legal costs. 19.  On 6 November 2003 the District Court dismissed the claim in full. It found that the first impugned statement was a true statement of fact. It was undisputed that V.K. had performed a medical expert examination and had found that the submarine crew had died within four and a half to eight hours of the explosion of the submarine. The remaining statements about the aims pursued by V.K. and the alleged distortion of the facts were the second applicant\u2019s opinions based on a sufficient factual basis. They did not contain any allegations of violations of laws or moral principles by V.K. Therefore, they were not damaging to his honour, dignity or business reputation. 20.  On 14 May 2004 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) quashed the judgment on appeal. It found that the District Court had erred in finding that the statements published by the applicants did not amount to an allegation of a violation of laws by V.K. As an expert in a criminal investigation, he had been bound by the rules of conduct established for experts by the Criminal Procedure Code. Allegations regarding an expert having improper aims and distorting the facts amounted to an accusation regarding him or her giving a biased expert opinion in violation of those rules. Moreover, in the City Court\u2019s view, a journalist could not claim exemption from liability for defamation on the grounds that he or she was expressing an opinion if that opinion was damaging to a third party\u2019s honour or dignity. The case was referred to the District Court for re\u2011examination. 21.  On 6 December 2004 the District Court granted V.K.\u2019s claims in part. Referring to Resolution no. 11 of the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraph 30 below), it emphasised that in a defamation case the only thing that a claimant had to prove was the fact that there had been dissemination of an impugned statement by a respondent. It also emphasised that the burden of proof as regards the truthfulness of a disseminated statement lay with the respondent. The District Court found that the impugned statements \u2013 namely the allegations that V.K. had performed an expert examination with a definite aim in mind and had distorted the facts in order to achieve that aim \u2013 amounted to an accusation of perjury, an offence under Article 307 of the Criminal Code, and an accusation that there had been serious breaches of the Criminal Procedure Code. In so far as relevant, the District Court\u2019s judgment read as follows:\n\u201cIn the court\u2019s opinion, the analysis of the impugned statements reveals that they contain allegations that V.K. performed an expert examination with the intention of receiving a predetermined result, that is, he was biased and had a personal interest in the proceedings. The same statements affirm that, in breach of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, V.K. did not withdraw from the case. Accordingly, the contested statements contain allegations of breaches of laws by V.K. ... and tarnish his honour, dignity and business reputation.\nThe respondents\u2019 argument that the impugned statements were a permissible expression of opinion by a journalist cannot be accepted by the court ... for the following reasons. ...\nFreedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation may not be used as an instrument for an attack on the honour and dignity of other citizens.\nTherefore, a journalist could not claim exemption from liability for defamation on the grounds that he or she was expressing an opinion if that opinion was damaging to the interests protected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, namely honour, dignity and business reputation.\nThe respondents\u2019 argument \u2013 that the material from the criminal case file revealed many breaches of law which had taken place during the expert examination with the participation of V.K. \u2013 was not confirmed during the hearing. The documents from the criminal case file submitted by the respondents do not contain any direct reference to unlawful acts committed by V.K. during the expert examination. A civil court does not have competence to review judicial or other decisions taken in the framework of criminal proceedings. ...\nThe evidence submitted by the respondents does not prove the truthfulness of the disseminated statements about the claimant.\u201d 22.  The District Court ordered the applicant company to pay V.K. 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 1,350 euros[4] (EUR)) and the second applicant to pay him RUB 5,000 (approximately EUR 135). As regards court fees, the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 9, and the second applicant was ordered to pay RUB 10. The District Court also ordered the applicant company to publish a retraction. 23.  The applicant company appealed, complaining in particular of a violation of its right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention and Article 29 of the Russian Constitution. It argued that the article contained the journalist\u2019s opinions and value judgments on a matter of public interest, and they had a sufficiently accurate and reliable factual basis and were not susceptible of proof. 24.  On 19 July 2005 the City Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. It did not mention Resolution no. 3 of the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraph 31 below). In so far as relevant, the appeal judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe respondents have not proved that the disseminated statements corresponded to reality. ...\nIn the statement of appeal, the respondent [company] claims that the journalist expressed her opinion, which was based on the criminal case material, and that civil law does not hold a journalist liable for the expression of a subjective opinion. This argument is analogous to the one already assessed by the first-instance court, and the [appeals] panel endorses that assessment.\nMoreover, the impugned statements contain statements of fact, not the journalist\u2019s subjective opinion. ...\u201d 25.  On 15 August 2005 the District Court issued writs of execution against the applicants in V.K.\u2019s favour. 26.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant company transferred to the bailiffs\u2019 bank account RUB 50,009 to be paid to V.K. 27.  It is not clear whether the second applicant paid the amount which the District Court ordered her to pay to V.K.", "references": ["9", "7", "2", "0", "3", "5", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Orhei. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 16 January 1997 the Orhei mayor\u2019s office attested the property right of a number of private individuals over plots of land in the town. Based on that decision, on 3 April 1997 the same office issued the applicant\u2019s brother (C.) title to 0.0569 hectares of land. 7.  On 13 July 1998 C. died. After his death the applicant took possession of the land and used continuously for her own needs. 8.  On 10 September 1999 the territorial cadastre office registered the plot of land as belonging to C. 9.  On 31 January 2000 the Orhei mayor\u2019s office amended the annex to its decision of 16 January 1997. C. continued to be mentioned as the owner of the relevant plot of land. 10.  On 15 July 2005 the Orhei mayor\u2019s office lodged a civil court action aimed at annulling the property right of C. and the applicant to the relevant land. It claimed that the title had been issued in error since C. had moved to an apartment provided by the town and was no longer eligible to obtain such land. Following this relocation, the cadastre office was supposed to remove C.\u2019s title from the list, which it had failed to do. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant initiated a court action aimed at extending the time-limit for accepting her brother\u2019s inheritance. The two court actions were joined by the court on 6 November 2006. 11.  On 15 February 2017 the Orhei district court rejected the court action lodged by the mayor\u2019s office and accepted that of the applicant. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had raised the issue of expiry of the three-year limitation period and added that under Article 78 of the old Civil Code (see paragraph 15 below), the court had to apply the rules concerning the limitation period regardless of the parties\u2019 arguments. It found that the mayor\u2019s office had missed the three-year limitation period. However, in the operative part the court omitted to refer to the expiry of the limitation period and found that the court action had been groundless. The court also accepted the applicant\u2019s action, extending the time-limit for accepting her brother\u2019s inheritance since she had taken possession of the relevant land immediately after his death. 12.  On 4 October 2007 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal overturned that judgment, accepting the appeal lodged by the mayor\u2019s office. It annulled C.\u2019s title to the relevant land, finding that he had obtained it in error and that under the applicable law he could not be the owner of that land. Moreover, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim for extending the time-limit for accepting her brother\u2019s inheritance, finding that she had missed it without a valid reason. 13.  On 12 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal. 14.  The applicant submitted documents showing that she had paid various taxes for the land in question over the years. 15.  The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (1964, in force before 12 June 2003) reads as follows:\n\u201cArticle 74.  General limitation periods.\nThe general limitation period for defending, by a court action, against the breach of a person\u2019s rights (prescrip\u021bia) is of three years ...\u201d\n\u201cArticle 78.  Mandatory application of the limitation period.\nThe competent court ... shall apply the limitation period regardless of the parties\u2019 request.\u201d\n\u201cArticle 581.  Acceptance of inheritance.\nIn order to inherit, the heir must accept the inheritance. ...\nIt shall be considered that the heir has accepted the inheritance if he/she took actual possession or administration of inheritance assets ...\u201d 16.  The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (in force from 12 June 2003) read as follows:\n\u201cArticle 7.  Application of the civil law in time.\n(1)  The civil law has no retroactive effect. It does not modify and does not annul the conditions of creation of a legal situation which previously appeared, nor the conditions of ending of a legal situation which previously ended.\n...\n(6)  The provisions of the new law concerning limitation periods ... shall apply to limitation periods which started before the date of entry into force of the new law, but did not end before that date. ... The start, the suspension and the interruption of the limitation period shall be determined under the old law for the period before the entry into force of the new law.\n...\u201d", "references": ["2", "8", "5", "9", "4", "1", "0", "7", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  Following judicial proceedings which ended with a final judgment of the B\u0103l\u0163i Court of Appeal of 8 December 2009, the applicant company obtained a final ruling obliging the Cadastral Authority to register immovable property privatised by it in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. 6.  On an unspecified date the defendant in the proceedings lodged a request for a review of the judgment of 8 December 2009, seeking its annulment on the grounds that in a technical report dated 25 May 2009 it had been stated that the immovable property in question did not qualify as immovable property (\u201cthe review request\u201d). 7.  On 24 August 2010 the B\u0103l\u0163i Court of Appeal dismissed the review request on the grounds that the information contained in the technical report of 25 May 2009 did not qualify as new and relevant information which could not have been obtained before the delivery of the final judgment in the case. 8.  On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment and ordered a re-examination of the review request. 9.  On 16 November 2011 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant\u2019s control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 10.  On 16 August 2012, after examining the merits of the case, the Edine\u0163 District Court again found in favour of the applicant company and required the Cadastral Authority to register some of the immovable property privatised by the applicant company in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. The Cadastral Authority challenged that judgment by lodging an appeal and the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "2", "1", "6", "7", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
-{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Mr Evghenii Antonov, is a Russian national who was born in 1979 and lives in Tiraspol. The second applicant, Mrs Iryna Antonova, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Tiraspol. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The first applicant was arrested in Tiraspol in August 2009 and accused of having in his possession a hunter\u2019s knife and a packet of marijuana. He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the \u201cMRT\u201d Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cIVS Tiraspol\u201d), and on 30 October 2009 was moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 8.  A few days after his arrest the first applicant called the second applicant and asked her to bring him food and warm clothes. He told her that he was being held in a dark, damp cell without basic hygiene. 9.  The second applicant was not allowed to see the first applicant, and the OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009, where some 90 detainees, including the first applicant, were on a hunger strike to protest against ill-treatment and inhuman conditions of detention. Further complaints to the Moldovan, Russian and \u201cMRT\u201d authorities were unsuccessful. 10.  On 9 December 2009 the second applicant was able to see the first applicant during a court trial; she submitted that he looked tired and weak. 11.  On 9 November 2010 the Tiraspol city court found the first applicant guilty of preparing to commit theft, carrying an illegal weapon and having been in possession of a narcotic substance. At the time of the last submissions to the Court, the case was pending before the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court. 12.  The first applicant, Mr Alexandru B\u0103lu\u0163\u0103, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1984 and lives in Lunga. The second applicant, Mrs Tamara B\u0103lu\u0163\u0103, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1954 and lives in Lunga. 13.  The first applicant was arrested in Tiraspol in December 2004 and accused of murder and arson. He was allegedly severely beaten. He was released in 2007 with an undertaking not to leave the city without permission. However, he left to work abroad and was rearrested on 13 September 2009, when he returned home. 14.  He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the \u201cMRT\u201d Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cIVS Tiraspol\u201d), then moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 15.  The first applicant has allegedly been held in inhuman conditions of detention, namely in a dark, damp cell without basic hygiene and without any facilities for a daily walk. According to the second applicant, food and other items which she attempts to send to the first applicant do not reach him (except for bread) and all her requests to see him have been refused. 16.  On 13 October 2009 the second applicant found out that many of the detainees in IVS Tiraspol were on hunger strike in protest against abuse and inhuman conditions of detention. She alleged that on 16 October 2009 a special riot police force entered the prison and beat up the prisoners. 17.  The OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009. Further complaints to the Moldovan, Russian and \u201cMRT\u201d authorities were unsuccessful. In particular, on 27 October 2009 the second applicant complained to the Russian Embassy in Moldova, which promised to officially contact the \u201cMRT\u201d prosecutor\u2019s office in connection with the case. 18.  In reply to the second applicant\u2019s letter of 12 October 2009, asking for permission to see the first applicant, on 29 October 2009 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the \u201cMRT\u201d replied that \u201cunder [the applicable legislation] the investigator is not under an obligation to authorise the meeting of detainees with their relatives. In your case, such meetings were refused.\u201d No other reasons were given. 19.  On an unknown date the applicant was transferred to another prison in Grigoriopol, also under the control of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. 20.  The first applicant, Mr Oleksandr Bezrodnii, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1986 and lives in Tiraspol. The second applicant, Mrs Liudmila Bezrodnyaya, is a Russian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Tiraspol. 21.  The first applicant is the leader of the non-governmental organisation \u201cThe World of Youth\u201d. He was arrested in Tiraspol on 23 July 2009 and accused of stealing roses from a public park, as well as endangering the life of three \u201cmilitia\u201d officers and private security agents. He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the \u201cMRT\u201d Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cIVS Tiraspol\u201d), then moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 22.  On 29 July 2009 the second applicant was told by a lawyer appointed by the \u201cMRT\u201d court that the first applicant had been brought to that court for a hearing. When the second applicant saw the first applicant, he allegedly had blood on his face and some green substance on his head, which she claims masked the effects of a severe blow to his head. She also saw bruises on the first applicant\u2019s body. The first applicant was allegedly able to tell the second applicant that he was being ill-treated with the aim of extracting self-incriminating statements from him. 23.  Also on 29 July 2009 the \u201cTiraspol town court\u201d ordered the first applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for an undetermined period of time. It reiterated the charges against the first applicant and stated that\n\u201c... the court takes into account the fact that [the first applicant] is charged with a serious offence for which the law provides a punishment of lengthy imprisonment, that he is not well viewed by society, that he is unemployed and has already been convicted of a criminal offence in the past, that he does not acknowledge his guilt, which gives the court reasons to believe that if released he may abscond or reoffend. The case-file contains sufficient evidence to support the investigator\u2019s request.\u201d 24.  On an unknown date in September 2009 the first applicant attended a court hearing and was able to have a brief conversation with the second applicant, in the course of which he told her that he had been ill-treated and intimidated. He described the conditions of detention in the following manner: he was held in a cell in the basement of the detention centre without any access to daylight; he was held with persons with infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis; there were insufficient beds (in the form of hard platforms, without any mattresses or bed linen), forcing the detainees to take it in turns to get some sleep; he was only allowed one shower a month; the toilet was in the cell and was very rarely cleaned; the cell was damp and lacked a working ventilation system; the cell was full of parasitic insects and on the rare occasions when disinfections were carried out the detainees were present in the cell; there were almost no hygiene products; the food was inedible, full of mould and insects; and no medical assistance was given to him despite his injuries. 25.  The second applicant submitted that all the food and other items which she had attempted to send to the first applicant had been rejected by the prison administration or destroyed. On 13 October 2009 the second applicant was told by the prison staff that no food was necessary for the detainees since they were on hunger strike. She was warned that if the strike continued, riot police would be called in. 26.  On 15 October 2009 Mr V. Ursu, a member of the Consulting Committee for Prevention of Torture in Moldova, reported that on 14 October 2009 he had been informed by relatives of several persons detained in the detention centre of the \u201cMRT\u201d Ministry of Internal Affairs that many detainees in that centre were on hunger strike and that they were being subjected to ill-treatment. 27.  On 16 October 2009 the second applicant found out that the riot police had entered the prison. She was unable to find out what had happened to the first applicant. 28.  The applicants have submitted several press reports concerning the hunger strike at the above-mentioned detention centre and the alleged ill-treatment of detainees. They have also submitted copies of press reports by the \u201cMRT\u201d media, according to which on 22 October 2009 the \u201cMRT\u201d Minister of Justice declared that pre-trial detention centres were overcrowded. 29.  The OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009. Further complaints to Moldovan, Russian and \u201cMRT\u201d authorities were unsuccessful. In particular, on 27 October 2009 the second applicant complained to the Russian Embassy in Moldova, which promised to officially contact the \u201cMRT\u201d prosecutor\u2019s office in connection with the case. In letters to the Council of Europe and to the Centre for Human Rights the second applicant noted that she had seen the first applicant covered in blood and with bruises on his head. 30.  In a letter to the Tiraspol city court, dated 3 February 2010, the first applicant complained that he had been severely beaten by the \u201cMRT\u201d militia on 23 July 2009 when he had been arrested. He noted that he had numerous bruises and hematomas on his body and limbs, that he had suffered many blows to his head and that his leg was so swollen and bruised that he had been taken to a medical facility (\u201cmedical town\u201d \u2013 \u043b\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043a), which should have registered the treatment administered to him. 31.  On 28 July 2010 the first applicant was found guilty by the Tiraspol city court and sentenced to 4 years\u2019 imprisonment suspended for three years. That sentence was quashed by the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court on 31 August 2010 and sent for re-examination by the Tiraspol city court. The case was pending before that court at the time of the last submissions made to the Court. 32.  The relevant materials have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 11138/10, \u00a7\u00a7 61-77, ECHR 2016).", "references": ["3", "0", "9", "7", "5", "8", "No Label", "6", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["6", "1", "2", "4"]}
-{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny. 7.  On 6 March 2010 the applicant got into a fight in a car park in front of a nightclub in P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny, apparently under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The incident was reported to P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny police station. 8.  The applicant asserts that around 3 a.m. he and his girlfriend were sitting in his car, not in traffic, pulled over to the side of the road, when patrolling police officers approached them. According to the file produced in the subsequent criminal proceedings, the applicant refused to take a breathalyser test for alcohol. Following an identity check and a search, he was handcuffed and taken to P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny police station to be held for questioning (el\u0151\u00e1ll\u00edt\u00e1s), on suspicion of having committed an offence. According to the police reports, the police officers believed that he was under the influence of either alcohol or drugs. 9.  At the police station the applicant started to insult the police officers and was handcuffed again. According to the applicant, he was also placed in leg restraints, during which time he suffered injuries. He was then transported to the P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny medical emergency service by four police officers for a blood and urine test. 10.  The applicant told a doctor that he was unable to urinate. According to the police reports, the applicant was under the influence of alcohol, \u201cuncooperative, making the insertion of a catheter necessary\u201d; he was also \u201cviolent and resisted the procedure\u201d. Furthermore, \u201cit was necessary to physically restrain him and have recourse to force\u201d to obtain the necessary urine sample. 11.  The doctor on duty proceeded with the applicant\u2019s catheterisation while the latter\u2019s arms were handcuffed. Afterwards, the doctor cut the applicant\u2019s shirt and took a blood sample. He also issued a medical report on the applicant\u2019s injuries. 12.  On 22 April 2010 the applicant was fined 50,000 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately 180 euros (EUR)) for the minor offence of failing to comply with lawful police measures. That decision was subsequently overturned, and the proceedings were discontinued by a decision of the P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny District Court of 22 April 2011. The P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny District Court established that the police measure could not be held to be lawful, since the medical intervention had been carried out without the applicant\u2019s written consent, required under the Health Care Act. 13.  Furthermore, in a judgment of 15 November 2011 the P\u00fcsp\u00f6klad\u00e1ny District Court found the applicant guilty of disorderly conduct, drink-driving and violence against a representative of a public authority. He was sentenced to two years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant challenged the evidence obtained through the urine test, and the court found it established that he had consented to the use of the catheter, as evidenced by five or six witness testimonies, and he had only withdrawn his consent upon realising that the intervention was painful. The judgment stated that, irrespective of the result of urine test, it was clear that the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol at the material time, as observed by the police officers, the witnesses and the doctor on duty. On appeal, the applicant\u2019s sentence was reduced to one year and nine months\u2019 imprisonment suspended for five years by the Debrecen Regional Court. 14.  On 11 March 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers involved in the incident, alleging that they had interrogated him by subjecting him to ill-treatment \u2013 beating him, using handcuffs and leg restraints, and forcibly taking blood samples from him and urine samples by catheterisation. 15.  On 26 November 2010 the investigations division of the Debrecen public prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of any conclusive evidence. As to the urinary catheterisation, relying on the witness testimonies of the doctor on duty, a nurse, a driver who was on duty at the medical service at the time and the police officers, the prosecutor\u2019s office concluded that the applicant had voluntarily agreed to the sample being taken by catheterisation. Referring to an expert opinion produced by the Medical Expert Division of the Forensic Expert and Research Institute, the prosecutor\u2019s office found that urinary catheterisation did not amount to a surgical intervention. In any event, the use of physical restraint had only been necessary as the applicant had become aggressive and tried to resist once the medical intervention had started. 16.  The applicant lodged a complaint against the decision, requesting that the investigation into the unlawful use of leg restraints and the catheterisation continue. By a decision of 10 January 2011 the Hajd\u00fa Bihar county chief public prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, endorsing the findings of the first-instance authority. 17.  In a parallel procedure, on 16 March 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Board (\u201cthe Board\u201d), the body responsible for inquiring into alleged violations of fundamental rights committed by the police, challenging the use of handcuffs and leg restraints, the fact that he had been held for questioning, his ill-treatment at the hands of the police officers, and the forcible taking of urine and blood samples. The Board inquired with the doctor on duty about the incident, who stated in his reply that the applicant had agreed to the insertion of a catheter before a number of witnesses, and that he had interpreted the fact that the applicant had removed his clothes as consent to the procedure. According to the doctor, the applicant had been cooperative and had only turned violent at a later stage. According to the facts established by the Board, since the applicant had been unable to produce the urine sample, the police officers had asked the doctor on duty to carry out the catheterisation. 18.  The Board commissioned an expert opinion from the chief physician of the Budapest Institute of Forensic Medicine, who stated in an opinion of 4 June 2010 that, although some medical institutions required written consent for catheterisation, this was not the policy of the majority of institutions. In his opinion, such a procedure was not general practice, and recourse to an \u201cemergency\u201d intervention was professionally unreasonable. In any event, according to professional guidelines, if a urine test could not be carried out, a blood test was sufficient. 19.  In an opinion of 4 August 2010 the Board found that the use of handcuffs had been legitimate and that the ill-treatment alleged could not be established. However, as regards the catheterisation and the use of leg restraints, the Board concluded that those measures had infringed the applicant\u2019s right to dignity, physical integrity, health and a fair trial. It forwarded its opinion to the Commander of the National Police Service. 20.  Following the adoption of the Board\u2019s opinion, the applicant\u2019s complaint was examined by the Commander of the National Police Service under section 92(1) of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (\u201cthe Police Act\u201d), with a view to establishing whether the police measure had been unlawful. It was dismissed on 26 October 2010. The decision established that the applicant had informed the doctor on duty that he had been unable to produce a urine sample and that he would not drink water in order to be able to do it later. He had behaved aggressively and had been uncooperative, but had nonetheless agreed to the catheterisation before witnesses by loudly screaming \u201cdo the catheterisation\u201d, and had undressed voluntarily. He had only been restrained to prevent him from causing injuries to himself or the doctor, once the procedure had started. Moreover, the forcible taking of a sample was justified in situations where there were grounds to believe that the driver of a vehicle was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 21.  The applicant sought judicial review of the decision, arguing that he had not been heard during the proceedings and the facts had been established solely on the basis of the testimonies of the police officers and the medical staff. He disputed the finding that he had voluntarily undressed for his catheterisation. He emphasised that he had submitted a medical report substantiating his allegations about the use of leg restraints, which had been disregarded by the Commander of the National Police Service. 22.  On 7 February 2012 the Budapest Regional Administrative and Labour Court dismissed his action. The court emphasised that, according to the medical expert opinion commissioned by the Board, there was no clear medical approach to catheterisation and the question of whether it was an invasive or non-invasive intervention, thus hospital practice differed in relation to the necessity of consent. If an examination was considered invasive, oral consent was not sufficient. In any case, the procedure could always be stopped. The medical expert also stated that, in comparison to a blood test, a urine test was not a precise method to establish whether a person was under the influence of drugs. Furthermore, catheterisation was a procedure that could be interrupted at any time. 23.  The court concluded that the procedure had been in compliance with the provisions of the Police Act setting out that a police officer could oblige a driver to provide a sample of breath, blood and urine for the purposes of a test. The court also indicated that the question as to whether consent was required for catheterisation, and whether the procedure should or should not have been carried out against the applicant\u2019s will, was outside the scope of its examination. It had been up to the doctor and not the police officers to decide on the method by which to take a sample. The court also took note of several witness testimonies and concluded that the use of leg restraints could not be established in the applicant\u2019s case. 24.  The applicant lodged a petition for review with the K\u00faria, arguing that the Commander of the National Police Service had failed to establish the facts of the case. In particular, the service had not commissioned a medical report capable of substantiating the use of leg restraints, had not heard him in person, and had drawn erroneous conclusions as regards his consent to the catheterisation. The applicant further submitted that the first-instance court had erred in classifying the medical examination, since it had been neither obligatory under the provisions of the Police Act, nor reasonable or proportionate according to medical standards. 25.  The K\u00faria upheld the first-instance judgment on 25 March 2014, endorsing its reasoning. The judgment was served on the applicant on 11 July 2014.", "references": ["5", "9", "6", "2", "7", "4", "0", "3", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 and are detained in Lipcani. 6.  In July 1999 the German police found the corpse of a Moldovan national in a river near Hamburg. The investigation led to a Moldovan national, A.B., who had shared a house with the victim. During questioning by the German police, A.B., who was a suspect, declared that the murder had been committed by the applicants who had beaten up the victim and strangled him. A.B. stated that he had only helped them to carry the victim\u2019s dead body and that he had not seen the body being thrown into the river. He knew, however, that a concrete pole had been attached to the victim\u2019s body before it immersion. The goal of the murder was allegedly to obtain the victim\u2019s five thousand German marks, which he had deposited with a German family. According to A.B., after the murder, the applicants manipulated the German family into believing that the victim had been arrested by police in another part of Germany and that he needed the money. After obtaining the money, one of the applicants wired it to his family in Moldova. 7.  During the court proceedings in Moldova, the competent court resorted to international legal assistance by summoning at least seven witnesses who lived in Germany, including A.B. All witnesses were summoned once through the intermediary of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice and the German authorities. However, none of them appeared before the Moldovan court and no reasons for failure to appear were given. The attempts to summon the witness were not repeated. 8.  On 29 December 2008 the Botanica District Court acquitted the applicants of murder charges that had been brought against them. The court found that the only piece of evidence presented by the prosecutor in support of the accusation against the applicants was the statements made by A.B. to the German police. Since A.B. himself had been accused by the German police of the victim\u2019s murder at the time of his questioning, he had a personal interest in accusing other persons. Moreover, his statements were not totally coherent and consistent. In particular, he had stated to the German police that he had not been present when the victim\u2019s body had been thrown into the river. However, somehow he knew that a concrete pole had been attached to the corpse. Lastly, the Moldovan authorities had been unable to bring A.B. to Moldova, and the applicants had not been present during the interview with the German police and had therefore been unable to put questions to A.B. For all the above reasons the evidence was excluded from the file. However, the applicants were found guilty of fraud as a result of the fact that they had manipulated the German family with whom the victim\u2019s money had been deposited, and had appropriated the money. 9.  On 25 February 2010 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and reversed the judgment of the lower court in so far as it concerned the murder charges. The court admitted A.B.\u2019s statements given before the German police in evidence and found the applicants guilty of murder. The court found A.B.\u2019s statements to be reliable because they had been made before an investigating judge. The applicants were sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. At the same time, the applicants were cleared of the charge of fraud on account of the Statute of Limitations. 10.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Justice in which they argued, inter alia, that the statements made by A.B. before the German authorities and read out during the hearing before the Court of Appeal could not be admitted in evidence unless they had had the opportunity to confront A.B. in a court hearing and address questions to him. Moreover, the applicants submitted that A.B. had a personal interest in accusing them because he was a suspect himself. 11.  On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicants had not been present during A.B.\u2019s questioning by the German authorities had been as a result of their own actions, because they had left Germany by that time. Two of the sitting judges (S.M. and V.T.) wrote a dissenting opinion in which they expressed the view that the applicants\u2019 rights as guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had been breached by the fact that they had been unable to examine the only prosecution witness, A.B., on whose evidence their convictions had been based.", "references": ["5", "2", "0", "7", "8", "1", "9", "4", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self\u2011proclaimed \u201cTransdniestrian Moldovan Republic\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d, see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2004\u2011VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6.  On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7.  On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant\u2019s ambulance was stopped by the \u201cMRT\u201d road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8.  On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the \u201cMRT\u201d militia station located in Dub\u0103sari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days\u2019 administrative detention. 9.  The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court\u2019s decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10.  During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant\u2019s relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant\u2019s detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11.  On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12.  In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor\u2019s office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking \u201cMRT\u201d officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the \u201cMRT\u201d.", "references": ["9", "0", "8", "7", "4", "5", "No Label", "6", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["6", "1", "2", "3"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Grim\u0103nc\u0103u\u021bi. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant is a farmer who grows and sells potatoes. On 5 February 2008 he and his brother went to the Varni\u021ba village, in the vicinity of the city of Bender/Tighina. The latter is controlled by the authorities of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdiestria\u201d (\u201cthe MRT\u201d), while Varni\u021ba itself is under Moldovan control. 8.  Having sold potatoes for some time in various places in Varni\u021ba, with authorisation from the local administration, on 5 February 2008 at around 2.30 p.m. the applicant was approached by plain clothed officers of the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authority. The latter asked for documents for the merchandise, including evidence of payment of taxes for importing merchandise into the \u201cMRT\u201d. The applicant explained that he had all the relevant documents and had paid taxes to the Moldovan local authorities in Varni\u021ba. Shortly thereafter two more officers from the \u201cMRT\u201d security and customs authorities arrived in a car. When the applicant\u2019s brother announced that he had called the Moldovan police, the applicant was attacked by the \u201cMRT\u201d officers, forced into their car and driven away. The Moldovan police arrived after the impugned event. 9.  Later in the evening, the applicant\u2019s car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere. 10.  On 6 February 2008 the Bender city court (an \u201cMRT\u201d court) found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence of resistance to the customs officers. The applicant explained that he considered having been arrested on Moldovan territory (Varni\u021ba village) and not having seen any signs warning that he was about to cross into the territory under the \u201cMRT\u201d control. The court sentenced him to three days\u2019 detention. According to the applicant, the hearing took place in Russian, a language which he understood only to a limited degree, and in the absence of a translator. He was refused the right to be assisted by a lawyer when preparing for the hearing, and a court-appointed lawyer was only present at the court hearing, not assisting him in any manner. The applicant was given neither a copy of the record of his arrest prior to its examination by the court, nor a copy of the court decision of 6 February 2008. 11.  The decision was enforced immediately and the applicant served all three days until the evening of 8 February 2008, when he was released. He could recover his car and merchandise at 11 p.m. on the same day. 12.  On 15 February 2008 the applicant lodged a summary appeal against the decision of the first-instance court, noting that he would submit a full appeal once he received a copy of the decision of 6 February 2008. At his request, on 17 March 2008 he obtained a copy of that decision. 13.  On 18 March 2008 the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision because of the failure to specify the exact place where the offence had been committed. The case was sent for re-examination by the lower court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. On 25 April 2008 the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court accepted an extraordinary appeal lodged by the president of that court\u2019s chair and decided that the case was to be re-examined by that court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. 14.  On 27 May 2008 the applicant received by fax a letter dated 12 May 2008 summoning him to the hearing of the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court on 27 May 2008 at 10 a.m. Because of this late summoning he could not appear at the hearing. On the same day the court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 6 February 2008, finding that he had been arrested on the territory of the city of Bender after refusing to abide by orders of the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authority. 15.  On 6 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s brother made a criminal complaint in the applicant\u2019s name to various Moldovan authorities, including the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, about the applicant\u2019s unlawful arrest by officers from the \u201cMRT\u201d. He asked for the criminal prosecution of those responsible. 16.  On 7 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s brother sent a complaint about the applicant\u2019s abduction by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities to the embassies of several countries in Moldova, including that of the Russian Federation. On 11 February 2008 the applicant sent letters to various embassies, including that of the Russian Federation, thanking them for their intervention into the case by bringing the matter before the Joint Control Commission.[1] Following this alleged intervention the applicant\u2019s car and merchandise were returned to him. 17.  On 28 February 2008 the Moldovan police station in Bender started a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s abduction by \u201cMRT\u201d officers. Several witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been forcibly taken away in a car from near a bar in Varni\u021ba village and that two of the \u201cMRT\u201d officers were identified. In view of the Moldovan prosecuting authorities\u2019 inability to effectively prosecute persons on the territory controlled of the \u201cMRT\u201d, on 28 August 2008, the investigation was suspended. On 30 May 2013 the investigation was resumed and was pending by the time of the last submissions made to the Court (December 2013). The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in that regard.", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "7", "0", "9", "6", "5", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
-{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Orsk. 5.  Late in the evening on 19 December a resident of Orsk, Mr Sh. was killed in his home. Suspicion fell on the applicant. 6.  The circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning are partly disputed, and therefore each version is given below. 7.  On 23 December 2004 two operatives of the town anti-narcotics brigade, First Lieutenants Kh. and U., were waiting in ambush near the applicant\u2019s hiding place. When the applicant appeared, they approached him. Kh. noticed bruises under the applicant\u2019s eye and on a lip. The officers introduced themselves, and asked the applicant to follow them. In reply, the applicant (who was drunk) cursed and shouted that as an ex\u2011commando he would easily overpower the officers. He hit Kh. in the chest, and then tried to flee. The operatives used sambo (a martial art) to tackle him, and took him in handcuffs to Sovietsky police station (\u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u041e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430). 8.  At the station the applicant was shown into room 31 for an \u201cexplanatory conversation\u201d (\u0440\u0430\u0437\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430) with Captain Shch. in order to clarify the circumstances of the crime. 9.  According to one source, Shch. noticed that the applicant had a black eye and asked about its origin. The applicant explained that he had had a fight with a neighbour. According to another source, Shch. noticed no injuries on the applicant. 10.  During the conversation, which was respectful, the applicant decided to confess because, as he said, he would be unable to live with a heavy heart. The applicant told that on 19 December he had been drinking with Sh., that Sh. had angered him, and that he had twice punched him on the nose. At 5.55 p.m. Shch. recorded the confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). The applicant signed it and was handed over to Investigator Po. at Oktyabrsky police station. 11.  At 5 p.m. Investigator Po. opened a criminal investigation into Sh.\u2019s murder. Once in front of the investigator, the applicant said that he had confessed at Sovietsky police station and wrote another confession. This time he added that after he had punched Sh., Sh. had collapsed to the floor and fallen asleep. The applicant noted that he was confessing without psychological or physical coercion. 12.  At 7.12 p.m. the investigator formally detained the applicant as a suspect. The applicant agreed with the detention order and made no remarks. The investigator told the applicant\u2019s partner about the detention. 13.  The investigator also commissioned a forensic examination to find out, in particular, if the applicant\u2019s hands were injured. 14.  According to one source, in the morning of, or, according to another source, at 2\u20133 p.m. on 23 December 2004 the applicant was arrested by three officers, two young fair-haired ones, and an older one wearing a moustache. They put a gun to the applicant\u2019s head and drove him to Sovietsky police station. 15.  At the station the applicant was shown into a room on the third floor. The officers started to punch and kick him on the sides, buttocks, and ears, urging him to incriminate himself. The beatings left him bleeding with a burst eardrum, a black eye, split lips, and several chipped teeth. On seeing the futility of the beatings, the officers turned to torture. They tied the applicant into a painful position called \u201cthe swallow\u201d (\u201c\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0430\u201d), in which hands and legs are fastened together behind the back, and four times suffocated him with a gas-mask filled with ammonia. After six hours, already after dark, the applicant capitulated and penned a dictated confession. He was handed over to Investigator Po. at Oktyabrsky police station. 16.  Once in front of the investigator, the applicant complained to him of the torture. In response, the investigator commissioned a forensic examination of the applicant, but for some reason omitted to record the applicant\u2019s complaint. 17.  Later the same day, a forensic doctor examined the applicant. The applicant told the doctor that he and Sh. had struck each other in the face and that the police had tortured him. To his description of torture he added slaps on his right hand. The doctor established the following injuries: bruises on the left eye and cheekbone caused by a blunt object three to five days before, and bruises on the upper lip and damage to the two upper front teeth caused by blunt objects no more than one day before. The right hand was not injured. 18.  Another report made on the same day established that the applicant was moderately intoxicated as a result of alcohol. 19.  At 1.30 a.m. on 24 December 2004 the applicant was transferred to the temporary-detention centre (\u0418\u0412\u0421) of Orsk. On admission, the duty officer noticed a bruise under the applicant\u2019s left eye. 20.  At 12\u20131 p.m. on 24 December 2004, the applicant (aided by counsel) re-appeared before Investigator Po. The investigator formally interviewed the applicant first as a suspect, and then as the accused. Both times the applicant declined to testify and made no other remarks. 21.  On 25 December 2004 the applicant appeared before a judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Orsk. The judge ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. The applicant agreed to be detained and made no other remarks. 22.  In February 2005 Po. opened a criminal investigation into the theft of electronic devices from Sh.\u2019s home. He joined the two investigations, and on 21 February 2005 interviewed the applicant as the accused. The applicant (aided by counsel) declined to testify and made no other remarks. 23.  On 10 March 2005 the applicant complained to the Orenburg Region public prosecutor of torture. 24.  On 21 March 2005 the applicant went on hunger strike in protest against the lack of a reply. 25.  On 28 March 2005 the complaint was referred to the prosecutor of the Sovietsky district of Orsk for a pre-investigation inquiry (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430). 26.  The inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegation of torture was entrusted to Investigator Pa. of the Oktyabrsky district prosecutor\u2019s office. 27.  In his turn, Pa. asked the head of the unit in which the applicant\u2019s alleged assailants served to hold an internal inquiry (\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0435\u0431\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430). Officers Kh., U., and Shch. wrote out their versions of the applicant\u2019s arrest and interview at Sovietsky police station. The head of the unit issued three almost identical performance reviews for the officers, saying, among other compliments, that each of them could \u201cinspire others to confessional conversation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043b\u044e\u0434\u0435\u0439 \u043a \u0434\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0435). The internal inquiry concluded that the applicant had not been ill\u2011treated. 28.  In addition, Pa. interviewed the applicant (assisted by counsel) and Investigator Po. 29.  On 15 April 2005 Pa. decided not to institute criminal proceedings. Based on the gathered evidence, he concluded that the applicant had been injured before he had been brought to Sovietsky police station, and thus the officers had no case to answer. At the same time, the investigator decided not to prosecute the applicant for falsely accusing the officers because he had been honestly mistaken that they had wronged him. 30.  On 26 April 2005 the Oktyabriskiy District Court of Orsk found the applicant guilty of murder and theft. The court established that the applicant had beaten Sh. to death while they had been drinking in Sh.\u2019s flat and had stolen some home electronic equipment on his way out. 31.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He said that on the night of the murder he had been drinking elsewhere and that he had been tortured into falsely incriminating himself as proven by the injuries on his body. 32.  The court dismissed this defence, noting that the forensic report suggested that the applicant had been injured before his arrest, and that the pre-investigation inquiry had cleared the officers of any misconduct. 33.  The court sentenced the applicant to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 34.  On 2 June 2005 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld this sentence. 35.  In January 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative, Mr Kiryukhin applied for judicial review of the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the operatives. He alleged that Pa.\u2019s inquiry had been superficial because he had failed to have the officers undergo a lie-detector test. 36.  On 25 January 2008 the Sovietsky District Court ruled that for pre\u2011investigation inquiries a lie-detector test was not mandatory and upheld the investigator\u2019s findings. 37.  The applicant appealed, pleading that he himself would be prepared to undergo a lie-detector test to prove his accusations, that the court had blindly sided with the operatives, that in 2006 or 2007 U. had been convicted for torturing others and of forging official records, and that the court had ignored the case-law of the Strasbourg Court. 38.  On 26 February 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 January 2008 without answering the argument about U.\u2019s conviction.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "3", "0", "7", "9", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
-{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1965, 1977 and 1976 respectively. 6.  The first two applicants are currently serving sentences in penal institutions in the Krasnoyarsk Region, namely UP-288/T (prison) in Minusinsk and OIK-36 (correctional colony). The third applicant lives in Shilka in the Zabaykalskiy Region. 7.  By a first-instance judgment of 21 May 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya convicted the first applicant of several offences including robbery, theft, forgery, destruction of property, banditry, possession and transportation of firearms and murder, sentencing him to life imprisonment. 8.  The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Russia on 19 June 2003. The first applicant did not allege in his appeal arguments that the composition of the first-instance court had been unlawful. 9.  On 22 September 2004 the Eniseyskiy District Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region brought the first applicant\u2019s conviction in line with newly introduced amendments to the Russian Criminal Code, having made minor corrections to the legal characterisation of his acts. His sentence was left essentially unchanged. 10.  That decision was upheld following a supervisory review by the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court on 30 May 2006. 11.  In 2007 the first applicant made some enquiries to check the lawfulness of the composition of the first-instance court in his case. Eventually, he found out that two lay assessors who had sat in his case at the first level of jurisdiction had not had authority to take part in the proceedings. Thereafter, in an attempt to contest the lawfulness of his conviction on the above-mentioned grounds, he requested that the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Republic of Buryatiya institute supervisory review proceedings with a view to setting aside the judgment of 21 May 2002. His requests were unsuccessful. 12.  By a judgment of 5 December 2003 the Leninskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk convicted the second applicant of murder and destruction of property and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment to be served in a correctional colony with a strict regime. 13.  On 5 February 2004 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the second applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 14.  On 6 April 2007 the Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk changed the regime of the second applicant\u2019s imprisonment and ordered that three years of his sentence be served in prison. 15.  The details of the third applicant\u2019s criminal history are unknown. 16.  The first applicant was placed in UP-288/T prison in Minusinsk, where it appears he remains to date. 17.  The case file shows that his cell is under constant surveillance by prison guards by a closed-circuit television camera (hereinafter \u201cCCTV camera\u201d) installed inside. The first applicant submitted a copy of a judgment in the case of another inmate, which stated that the prison guard who monitored the cells in that prison was a woman. 18.  He also submitted screenshots of the CCTV camera installed in each of the two cells in which he had been kept. The screenshots show that in both cells there was a CCTV camera installed above the door, at ceiling level, in such a manner that the entire cell was clearly visible, including the bed. The toilet was located directly below the CCTV camera and was almost entirely hidden from the camera\u2019s view by a shield. 19.  Between 22 May 2007 and 24 May 2010 the second applicant also served a sentence in UP-288/T prison. According to him, during his detention in that facility he was unable to take walks and undertake outdoor exercise in wintertime because he was not provided with winter boots of a suitable size, despite numerous requests to that effect. 20.  On an unspecified date the second applicant was transferred to IK-5 (strict-regime correctional colony) in Krasnoyarsk. According to him, his cell was under constant surveillance by prison guards by a CCTV camera installed inside the cell. The applicant submitted that the prison guard who monitored his cell was a woman, as at times he could hear her giving him orders via loudspeaker. 21.  Whilst serving a prison sentence in IK-2 (special-regime correctional colony) in the Zabaykalskiy Region, on 22 June 2013 the third applicant was transferred to IZ-1 (pre-trial detention centre) in the same region with a view to ensuring his participation in court proceedings unrelated to this case. The third applicant was placed in cell no. 465, where he remained until 22 February 2014. 22.  According to him, the cell was designed for two inmates, but most of the time he was there alone. The cell was under permanent surveillance by a CCTV camera operated by female guards. A screenshot of the CCTV camera submitted by the third applicant shows that it was installed above the entrance door, at ceiling level, in such a manner that the entire cell was clearly visible, including, at least in part, the bed. The screenshot also shows that the toilet was separated by a partition at each side, but had no cover, with the result that the upper part of the cubicle was visible. 23.  On an unspecified date the third applicant lodged a complaint against the actions of the administration of pre-trial detention centre IZ-1 (\u201cthe detention centre authorities\u201d) with the Ingodinskiy District Court of Chita (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). He argued that permanent video surveillance of his cell by female operators was humiliating as, in particular, he had to undress in plain view of them, which breached his rights. He asked the court to oblige the detention centre authorities to bring the violation to an end. 24.  At a hearing a representative of the detention centre authorities conceded that the duty officers who performed video surveillance were women, but argued that they were merely performing their professional duties. The representative also pointed out that all the other cells in the pre\u2011trial detention centre were equipped with CCTV cameras, which had been installed for security purposes. The representative further argued that the applicant\u2019s sleeping place and cell toilet were outside the CCTV camera\u2019s field of view. 25.  In a judgment of 5 July 2013 the District Court dismissed the third applicant\u2019s complaint. 26.  It found it established that the third applicant\u2019s cell and all the other cells in pre-trial detention centre IZ-1 were equipped with CCTV cameras located under the ceiling for the purposes of surveillance of detainees. It further accepted the argument of the detention centre authorities that the toilet and sleeping place were outside the camera\u2019s field of view. 27.  The court further observed that Article 83 of the Russian Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 33 below) and section 34(1) of the Pre-trial Detention Act (see paragraph 34 below) enabled the use of audio and video equipment for surveillance and control with a view to preventing escapes and other crimes or breaches of internal order. Moreover, those legal instruments, as well as the relevant regulations of the Russian Ministry of Justice, including executive order no. 204-dsp of 3 November 2005, as amended on 25 May 2011 (see paragraphs 35-38 below), provided that only body searches and supervision of detainees during hygienic procedures should be performed by officers of the same sex, whereas surveillance of cells by CCTV cameras by officers of the opposite sex was not prohibited by the above-mentioned legal instruments. Officers of pre-trial detention centre IZ-1 were civil servants who performed the professional duties within their competence, as established, in particular, by section 21 of executive order no. 204-dsp of 3 November 2005 (see paragraph 36 below). In that connection, the court noted that no evidence had been submitted to it to show that the officers of pre-trial detention centre IZ-1 had breached or acted outside the scope of their professional duties. 28.  The District Court also pointed out that decision no. 1393-O-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia dated 19 October 2010 (see paragraphs 42-43 below) stated that use by the authorities of various pre-trial detention centres and penal institutions of technical means of surveillance and control was part of the mechanism that ensured detainees\u2019 personal safety and respect for their rights, as well as performance by them of their obligations. In the District Court\u2019s view, such use thus pursued constitutional aims and could not be regarded as a disproportionate restriction of the third applicant\u2019s rights. 29.  The District Court concluded that, under the applicable law, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court of Russia, it was permissible for officers of the opposite sex to perform CCTV camera monitoring of detainees, thus the situation had not debased the third applicant\u2019s dignity, as the female officers had acted within their competence and in the performance of their professional duties. 30.  On 11 September 2013 the Zabaykalskiy Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal, endorsing its reasoning.", "references": ["1", "7", "3", "6", "8", "0", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}